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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c17b057 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #51181 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/51181) diff --git a/old/51181-0.txt b/old/51181-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 25cb898..0000000 --- a/old/51181-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18135 +0,0 @@ -Project Gutenberg's History of Greece, Volume 7 (of 12), by George Grote - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: History of Greece, Volume 7 (of 12) - -Author: George Grote - -Release Date: February 11, 2016 [EBook #51181] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF GREECE, VOLUME 7 OF 12 *** - - - - -Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Ramon Pajares Box and the -Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net -(This file was produced from images generously made -available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) - - - - - - -TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE - - * Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_. - * Small caps are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS. - * Letter spaced Greek text is enclosed in tildes as in ~καὶ τὰ - λοιπά~. - * Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after - comparison with a later edition of this work. Greek text has - also been corrected after checking with this later edition and - with Perseus, when the reference was found. - * Original spelling, hyphenation and punctuation have been kept, - but variant spellings were made consistent when a predominant - usage was found. - * Some inconsistencies in the use of accents over proper nouns - (like “Alkibiades” and “Alkibiadês”) have been retained. - * The following changes were also made, after checking with - Perseus and other editions: - - note 337: “Thucyd. vi, 69” → “Thucyd, i, 69” - note 573: “vii, 73” → “viii, 73” - - - - - HISTORY OF GREECE. - - BY - GEORGE GROTE, ESQ. - - VOL. VII. - - REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION - - NEW YORK: - HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS - 329 AND 331 PEARL STREET. - - - - -CONTENTS. - -VOL. VII. - - -PART II. - -CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE. - - - CHAPTER LV. - - FROM THE PEACE OF NIKIAS TO THE OLYMPIC FESTIVAL OF - OLYMPIAD 90. - - Negotiations for peace during the winter after the battle - of Amphipolis.—Peace called the Peace of Nikias—concluded - in March 421 B.C. Conditions of peace.—Peace accepted at - Sparta by the majority of members of the Peloponnesian - alliance.—The most powerful members of the alliance refuse - to accept the truce—Bœotians, Megarians, Corinthians, and - Eleians.—Position and feelings of the Lacedæmonians—their - great anxiety for peace—their uncertain relations with - Argos.—Steps taken by the Lacedæmonians to execute the - peace—Amphipolis is not restored to Athens—the great - allies of Sparta do not accept the peace.—Separate - alliance for mutual defence concluded between Sparta and - Athens.—Terms of the alliance.—Athens restores the Spartan - captives.—Mismanagement of the political interests of - Athens by Nikias and the peace party.—By the terms of - the alliance Athens renounced all the advantages of her - position in reference to the Lacedæmonians—she gained none - of those concessions upon which she calculated, while - they gained materially.—Discontent and remonstrances - of the Athenians against Sparta in consequence of the - non-performance of the conditions—they repent of having - given up the captives—excuses of Sparta.—New combinations - in Peloponnesus—suspicion entertained of concert between - Sparta and Athens—Argos stands prominently forward—state - of Argos—aristocratical regiment of one thousand formed - in that city.—The Corinthians prevail upon Argos to stand - forward as head of a new Peloponnesian alliance.—Congress - of recusant Peloponnesian allies at Corinth—the Mantineians - join Argos—state of Arcadia—rivalship of Tegea and - Mantineia.—Remonstrances of Lacedæmonian envoys at the - congress at Corinth—redefence of the Corinthians—pretence - of religious scruple.—The Bœotians and Megarians refuse - to break with Sparta, or to ally themselves with Argos—the - Corinthians hesitate in actually joining Argos.—The - Eleians become allies of Argos—their reasons for doing - so—relations with Lepreum—the Corinthians now join Argos - also.—Refusal of Tegea to separate from Sparta.—The - Corinthians are disheartened—their application through - the Bœotians to Athens.—The Lacedæmonians emancipate the - Arcadian subjects of Mantineia—they plant the Brasidean - Helots at Lepreum.—Treatment of the Spartan captives after - their liberation from Athens and return to Sparta—they are - disfranchised for a time and in a qualified manner.—The - Athenians recapture Skiônê—put to death all the adult - males.—Political relations in Peloponnesus—change of ephors - at Sparta—the new ephors are hostile to Athens.—Congress - at Sparta—Athenian, Bœotian, and Corinthian deputies, - present—long debates, but no settlement attained of any - one of the disputed points—intrigues of the anti-Athenian - ephors—Kleobulus and Xenarês.—These ephors try to bring - about underhand an alliance between Sparta and Argos, - through the Bœotians—the project fails.—The Lacedæmonians - conclude a special alliance with the Bœotians, thereby - violating their alliance with Athens—the Bœotians raze - Panaktum to the ground.—Application from the Argeians - to Sparta to renew the expiring treaty. Project of - renewed treaty agreed upon. Curious stipulation about - combat by champions, to keep the question open about - the title to Thyrea.—Lacedæmonian envoys go first to - Bœotia, next to Athens—they find Panaktum demolished—they - ask for the cession of Pylos from Athens.—The envoys - are badly received at Athens—angry feeling against - the Lacedæmonians.—Alkibiadês stands forward as a - party-leader. His education and character.—Great energy - and capacity of Alkibiadês in public affairs—his - reckless expenditure—lawless demeanor—unprincipled - character, inspiring suspicion and alarm—military - service.—Alkibiadês—Sokratês—the Sophists.—Conflicting - sentiments entertained towards Alkibiadês—his great energy - and capacity. Admiration, fear, hatred, and jealousy, which - he inspires.—Alkibiadês tries to renew the ancient but - interrupted connection of his ancestors with Lacedæmon, - as proxeni.—The Spartans reject his advances—he turns - against them—alters his politics, and becomes their enemy - at Athens.—He tries to bring Athens into alliance with - Argos.—He induces the Argeians to send envoys to Athens—the - Argeians eagerly embrace this opening, and drop their - negotiations with Sparta.—Embassy of the Lacedæmonians - to Athens, to press the Athenians not to throw up the - alliance. The envoys are favorably received.—Trick by which - Alkibiadês cheats and disgraces the envoys, and baffles - the Lacedæmonian project. Indignation of the Athenians - against Sparta.—Nikias prevails with the assembly to - send himself and others as envoys to Sparta, in order to - clear up the embarrassment.—Failure of the embassy of - Nikias at Sparta—Athens concludes the alliance with Argos, - Elis, and Mantineia.—Conditions of this convention and - alliance.—Complicated relations among the Grecian states - as to treaty and alliance.—Olympic festival of the 90th - Olympiad, July 420 B.C., its memorable character.—First - appearance of Athens at the Olympic festival since the - beginning of the war. Immense display of Alkibiadês in - the chariot-race.—The Eleians exclude the Spartan sacred - legation from this Olympic festival, in consequence of - alleged violation of the Olympic truce.—Alarm felt at the - festival lest the Spartans should come in arms.—Depressed - estimation of Sparta throughout Greece—Herakleia. 1-61 - - - CHAPTER LVI. - - FROM THE FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD 90, DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF - MANTINEIA. - - New policy of Athens, attempted by Alkibiadês.—Expedition - of Alkibiadês into the interior of Peloponnesus.—Attack - upon Epidaurus by Argos and Athens.—Movements of the - Spartans and Argeians.—The sacred month Karneius—trick - played by the Argeians with their calendar—Congress - at Mantineia for peace—the discussions prove - abortive.—Athenian lordship of the sea—the alliance between - Athens and Sparta continues in name, but is indirectly - violated by both.—Invasion of Argos by Agis and the - Lacedæmonians, Bœotians, and Corinthians.—Approach of the - invaders to Argos by different lines of march.—Superior - forces and advantageous position of the invaders—danger - of Argos—Agis takes upon him to grant an armistice to - the Argeians, and withdraws the army—dissatisfaction of - the allies.—Severe censure against Agis on his return - to Sparta.—Tardy arrival of Alkibiadês, Lachês, etc., - with the Athenian contingent at Argos—expedition of - Athenians, Eleians, Mantineians, and Argeians, against - the Arcadian town of Orchomenus.—Plans against Tegea—the - Eleians return home.—Danger of Tegea—Agis and the - Lacedæmonians march to its relief.—Manœuvres of Agis - to bring on a battle on fair ground.—Forward march - and new position of the Argeians.—The Lacedæmonians - are surprised: their sudden and ready formation into - battle order.—Gradation of command and responsibility - peculiar to the Lacedæmonian army.—Lacedæmonian line: - privileged post of the Skiritæ on the left.—Uncertain - numbers of both armies.—Preliminary harangues to the - soldiers.—Battle of Mantineia.—Movement ordered by Agis, - on the instant before the battle; his order disobeyed. - His left wing is defeated.—Complete ultimate victory - of the Lacedæmonians.—Great effects of the victory in - reëstablishing the reputation of Sparta.—Operations - of Argeians, Eleians, etc., near Epidaurus.—Political - change at Argos, arising out of the battle of - Mantineia.—Oligarchical conspiracy of the Thousand-regiment - at Argos, in concert with the Lacedæmonians.—Treaty of - peace between Sparta and Argos.—Treaty of alliance between - Sparta and Argos—dissolution of the alliance of Argos with - Athens, Mantineia, and Elis.—Submission of Mantineia to - Sparta.—Oligarchical revolution effected at Argos by the - Thousand, in concert with the Lacedæmonians.—Oligarchy in - Sikyôn and the towns in Achaia.—Violences of the Thousand - at Argos: counter-revolution in that town: restoration of - the democracy.—Proceedings of the restored Argeian Demos: - tardiness of Sparta.—Alkibiadês at Argos: measures for the - protection of the democracy.—Nominal peace, but precarious - relations, between Athens and Sparta.—Relations of Athens - with Perdikkas of Macedonia.—Negligence of Athens about - Amphipolis: improvidence of Nikias and the peace-party: - adventurous speculations of Alkibiadês.—Projected - contention of ostracism between Nikias and Alkibiadês. - Proposition supported by Hyperbolus.—Gradual desuetude of - the ostracism, as the democracy became assured.—Siege of - Mêlos by the Athenians.—Dialogue set forth by Thucydidês, - between the Athenian envoys and the Executive Council - of Mêlos.—Language represented by Thucydidês as having - been held by the Athenian envoys—with the replies of - the Melians.—Refusal of the Melians to submit.—Siege and - capture of Mêlos.—Remarks upon the event.—View taken by - Thucydidês of this incident.—Place which it occupies in the - general historical conception of Thucydidês. 61-118 - - - CHAPTER LVII. - - SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXTINCTION OF THE GELONIAN - DYNASTY. - - Expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty from Syracuse, and - of other despots from the other Sicilian towns.—Large - changes of resident inhabitants—effects of this - fact.—Relative power and condition of the Sicilian - cities. Political dissensions at Syracuse. Ostracism - tried and abandoned.—Power and foreign exploits - of Syracuse.—Sikels in the interior of Sicily—the - Sikel prince Duketius—he founds the new Sikel town - of Palikê.—Exploits of Duketius—he is defeated and - becomes the prisoner of the Syracusans, who spare him, - and send him to Corinth.—Duketius breaks his parole - and returns to Sicily.—Conquests of Syracuse in the - interior of Sicily—death of Duketius.—Prosperity - and power of Agrigentum.—Intellectual movement in - Sicily—Empedoklês—Tisias—Korax—Gorgias.—Sicilian - cities—their condition and proceedings at the first - breaking out of the Peloponnesian war, 431 B.C.—Relations - of Sicily to Athens and Sparta—altered by the quarrel - between Corinth and Korkyra and the intervention of - Athens.—Expectations entertained by Sparta of aid from the - Sicilian Dorians, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian - war. Expectations not realized.—The Dorian cities in - Sicily attack the Ionian cities in Sicily.—The Ionic - cities in Sicily solicit aid from Athens—first Athenian - expedition to Sicily under Lachês.—Second expedition - under Pythodôrus.—Indecisive operations near Messênê and - Rhegium.—Defeat of the Messenians by the Naxians and - Sikels, near Naxos.—Eurymedon and Sophoklês, with a larger - Athenian fleet, arrive in Sicily.—Congress of the Sicilian - cities at Gela. Speech of Hermokratês.—General peace made - between the Sicilian cities. Eurymedon accedes to the - peace, and withdraws the Athenian fleet.—Displeasure of the - Athenians against Eurymedon and his colleagues.—Intestine - dissension in Leontini—expulsion of the Leontine Demos, - by the aid of Syracuse.—Application of the Leontine - Demos for help to Athens. The Athenians send Phæax - to make observations.—Leontini depopulated—the Demos - expelled—Leontine exiles at Athens.—War between Selinus and - Egesta—the latter applies to Athens for aid.—Promises of - the Egestæans: motives offered to Athens for intervention - in Sicily.—Alkibiadês warmly espouses their cause, and - advises intervention.—Inspecting commissioners despatched - by the Athenians to Egesta—frauds practised by the - Egestæans to delude them.—Return of the commissioners to - Athens—impression produced by their report. Resolution - taken to send an expedition to Sicily.—Embarrassment of - Nikias as opposer of the expedition.—Speech of Nikias - at the second assembly held by the Athenians.—Reply - of Alkibiadês.—The assembly favorable to the views - of Alkibiadês—adheres to the resolution of sailing - to Sicily.—Second speech of Nikias—exaggerating the - difficulties and dangers of the expedition, and demanding a - force on the largest scale.—Effect of this speech—increased - eagerness of the assembly for the expedition—order and - unanimity in reference to the plan.—Excitement in the city - among all classes—great increase in the scale on which the - expedition was planned.—Large preparations made for the - expedition.—Review of these preliminary proceedings to the - Sicilian expedition.—Advice and influence of Nikias.—Advice - and influence of Alkibiadês.—Athens believed herself - entitled to be mistress of the islands as well as of the - sea. 118-162 - - - CHAPTER LVIII. - - FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE ATHENIANS TO ATTACK SYRACUSE, - DOWN TO THE FIRST WINTER AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL IN SICILY. - - Preparations for the expedition against Sicily—general - enthusiasm and sanguine hopes at Athens.—Abundance in - the Athenian treasury—display of wealth as well as of - force in the armament.—Mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens. - Numbers and sanctity of the Hermæ.—Violent excitement - and religious alarm produced by the act at Athens.—The - authors of the act unknown—but it was certainly done by - design and conspiracy.—Various parties suspected—great - probability beforehand that it would induce the Athenians - to abandon or postpone the expedition.—The political - enemies of Alkibiadês take advantage of the reigning - excitement to try and ruin him.—Anxiety of the Athenians - to detect and punish the conspirators—rewards offered for - information.—Informations given in—commissioners of inquiry - appointed.—First accusation of Alkibiadês, of having - profaned and divulged the Eleusinian mysteries.—Violent - speeches in the assembly against Alkibiadês unfavorably - received.—He denies the charge and demands immediate - trial—his demand is eluded by his enemies.—Departure of - the armament from Peiræus—splendor and exciting character - of the spectacle.—Solemnities of parting, on shipboard - and on the water’s edge.—Full muster of the armament - at Korkyra.—Progress to Rhegium—cold reception by the - Italian cities.—Feeling at Syracuse as to the approaching - armament—disposition to undervalue its magnitude, - and even to question its intended coming.—Strenuous - exhortations of Hermokratês, to be prepared.—Temper and - parties in the Syracusan assembly.—Reply of Athenagoras, - the popular orator.—Interposition of the stratêgi to - moderate the violence of the debate.—Relative position - of Athenagoras and other parties at Syracuse.—Pacific - dispositions of Athenagoras.—His general denunciations - against the oligarchical youth were well founded.—Active - preparations at Syracuse on the approach of the - Athenian armament.—Discouragement of the Athenians at - Rhegium on learning the truth respecting the poverty - of Egesta.—The Athenian generals discuss their plan of - action—opinion of Nikias.—Opinion of Alkibiadês.—Opinion - of Lamachus.—Superior discernment of Lamachus—plan of - Alkibiadês preferred.—Alkibiadês at Messênê—Naxos joins - the Athenians. Empty display of the armament.—Alkibiadês - at Katana—the Athenians masters of Katana—they establish - their station there. Refusal of Kamarina.—Alkibiadês is - summoned home to take his trial.—Feelings and proceedings - at Athens since the departure of the armament.—Number of - citizens imprisoned on suspicion—increased agony of the - public mind.—Peisander and Chariklês the commissioners - of inquiry.—Information of Diokleidês.—More prisoners - arrested—increased terror in the city—Andokidês - among the persons imprisoned.—Andokidês is solicited - by his fellow-prisoners to stand forward and give - information—he complies.—Andokidês designates the - authors of the mutilation of the Hermæ—consequence of - his revelations.—Questionable authority of Andokidês, as - to what he himself really stated in information.—Belief - of the Athenians in his information—its tranquillizing - effects.—Anxiety and alarm revived, respecting - the persons concerned in the profanation of the - Eleusinian mysteries.—Revival of the accusation against - Alkibiadês.—Indictment presented by Thessalus, son - of Kimon, against Alkibiadês.—Resolution to send for - Alkibiadês home from Sicily to be tried.—Alkibiadês quits - the army, as if to come home: makes his escape at Thurii, - and retires to Peloponnesus.—Conduct of the Athenian public - in reference to Alkibiadês—how far blamable. Conduct of - his enemies.—Mischief to Athens from the banishment of - Alkibiadês. Languid operations of the Sicilian armament - under Nikias.—Increase of confidence and preparations at - Syracuse, arising from the delays of Nikias.—Manœuvre of - Nikias from Katana—he lands his forces in the Great Harbor - of Syracuse.—Return of the Syracusan army from Katana to - the Great Harbor—preparations for fighting Nikias.—Feelings - of the ancient soldier.—Harangue of Nikias.—Battle near the - Olympieion—victory of the Athenians.—Unabated confidence - of the Syracusans—they garrison the Olympieion—Nikias - reembarks his army, and returns to Katana.—He determines - to take up his winter quarters at Katana, and sends - to Athens for reinforcements of horse.—His failure at - Messênê, through the betrayal by Alkibiadês.—Salutary - lesson to the Syracusans, arising out of the recent - defeat—mischiefs to the Athenians from the delay of - Nikias.—Confidence of the Athenians at home in Nikias—their - good temper—they send to him the reinforcements - demanded.—Determined feeling at Syracuse—improved measures - of defence—recommendations of Hermokratês.—Enlargement - of the fortifications of Syracuse. Improvement of - their situation. Increase of the difficulties of - Nikias.—Hermokratês and Euphêmus—counter-envoys at - Kamarina.—Speech of Euphêmus.—The Kamarinæans maintain - practical neutrality.—Winter proceedings of Nikias from - his quarters at Katana.—Syracusan envoys sent to solicit - aid from Corinth and Sparta.—Alkibiadês at Sparta—his - intense hostility to Athens.—Speech of Alkibiadês in the - Lacedæmonian assembly.—Great effect of his speech on - the Peloponnesians.—Misrepresentations contained in the - speech.—Resolutions of the Spartans.—The Lacedæmonians send - Gylippus to Syracuse. 163-243 - - - CHAPTER LIX. - - FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE OF SYRACUSE BY NIKIAS, - DOWN TO THE SECOND ATHENIAN EXPEDITION UNDER DEMOSTHENES, - AND THE RESUMPTION OF THE GENERAL WAR. - - Movements of Nikias in the early spring.—Local condition - and fortifications of Syracuse, at the time when Nikias - arrived.—Inner and Outer City.—Localities without the wall - of the outer city—Epipolæ.—Possibilities of the siege when - Nikias first arrived in Sicily—increase of difficulties - through his delay.—Increased importance of the upper - ground of Epipolæ. Intention of the Syracusans to occupy - the summit of Epipolæ.—The summit is surprised by the - Athenians.—The success of this surprise was essential - to the effective future prosecution of the siege.—First - operations of the siege.—Central work of the Athenians - on Epipolæ, called The Circle.—First counter-wall of - the Syracusans.—Its direction, south of the Athenian - circle—its completion.—It is stormed, taken, and destroyed - by the Athenians.—Nikias occupies the southern cliff—and - prosecutes his line of blockade south of the Circle.—Second - counter-work of the Syracusans—reaching across the marsh, - south of Epipolæ, to the river Anapus.—This counter-work - attacked and taken by Lamachus—general battle—death - of Lamachus.—Danger of the Athenian circle and of - Nikias—victory of the Athenians.—Entrance of the Athenian - fleet into the Great Harbor.—The southern portion of the - wall of blockade, across the marsh to the Great Harbor, - is prosecuted and nearly finished.—The Syracusans offer - no farther obstruction—despondency at Syracuse—increasing - closeness of the siege.—Order of the besieging operations - successively undertaken by the Athenians.—Triumphant - prospects of the Athenians. Disposition among the Sikels - and Italian Greeks to favor them.—Conduct of Nikias—his - correspondents in the interior of Syracuse.—Confidence of - Nikias—comparative languor of his operations.—Approach - of Gylippus—he despairs of relieving Syracuse.—Progress - of Gylippus, in spite of discouraging reports.—Approach - of Gylippus is made known to Nikias. Facility of - preventing his farther advance—Nikias despises him, and - leaves him to come unobstructed. He lands at Himera in - Sicily.—Blindness of Nikias—egregious mistake of letting - in Gylippus.—Gylippus levies an army and marches across - Sicily from Himera to Syracuse.—The Corinthian Goggylus - reaches Syracuse before Gylippus—just in time to hinder - the town from capitulating.—Gylippus with his new-levied - force enters Syracuse unopposed.—Unaccountable inaction - of Nikias.—Vigorous and aggressive measures of Gylippus, - immediately on arriving.—Gylippus surprises and captures - the Athenian fort of Labdalum.—He begins the construction - of a third counter-wall, on the north side of the Athenian - circle.—Nikias fortifies Cape Plemmyrium.—Inconveniences - of Plemmyrium as a maritime station—mischief which ensues - to the Athenian naval strength.—Operations of Gylippus in - the field—his defeat.—His decisive victory—the Athenians - are shut up within their lines. The Syracusan counter-wall - is carried on so far as to cut the Athenian line of - blockade.—Farther defences provided by Gylippus, joining - the higher part of Epipolæ with the city wall.—Confidence - of Gylippus and the Syracusans—aggressive plans against - the Athenians, even on the sea.—Discouragement of Nikias - and the Athenians.—Nikias sends home a despatch to - Athens, soliciting reinforcements.—Despatch of Nikias - to the Athenian people.—Resolution of the Athenians to - send Demosthenês with a second armament.—Remarks upon the - despatch of Nikias.—Former despatches of Nikias.—Effect - of his despatch upon the Athenians.—Treatment of - Nikias by the Athenians.—Capital mistake committed by - the Athenians.—Hostilities from Sparta certain and - impending.—Resolution of Sparta to invade Attica forthwith, - and to send farther reinforcements to Sicily. 243-286 - - - CHAPTER LX. - - FROM THE RESUMPTION OF DIRECT HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ATHENS - AND SPARTA, DOWN TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN - ARMAMENT IN SICILY. - - Active warlike preparations throughout Greece during - the winter of 414-413 B.C.—Invasion of Attica by - Agis and the Peloponnesian force—fortification of - Dekeleia.—Second expedition from Athens against Syracuse, - under Demosthenês.—Operations of Gylippus at Syracuse. He - determines to attack the Athenians at sea.—Naval combat in - the harbor of Syracuse—the Athenians victorious.—Gylippus - surprises and takes Plemmyrium.—Important consequences - of the capture.—Increased spirits and confidence of the - Syracusans, even for sea-fight.—Efforts of the Syracusans - to procure farther reinforcements from the Sicilian - towns.—Conflicts between the Athenians and Syracusans - in the Great Harbor.—Defeat of a Sicilian reinforcement - marching to aid Syracuse—Renewed attack by Gylippus - on the Athenians.—Disadvantages of the Athenian fleet - in the harbor. Their naval tactics impossible in the - narrow space.—Improvements in Syracusan ships suited to - the narrow space.—The Syracusans threaten attack upon - the Athenian naval station.—Additional preparations - of Nikias—battle renewed.—Complete defeat of the - Athenians.—Danger of the Athenian armament—arrival of - Demosthenês with the second armament.—Voyage of Demosthenês - from Korkyra.—Imposing effect of his entry into the Great - Harbor.—Revived courage of the Athenians. Judicious - and decisive resolutions of Demosthenês.—Position and - plans of Demosthenês.—Nocturnal march of Demosthenês - to surprise Epipolæ, and turn the Syracusan line of - defence.—Partial success at first—complete and ruinous - defeat finally.—Disorder of the Athenians—great loss - in the flight.—Elate spirits, and renewed aggressive - plans, of the Syracusans.—Deliberation and different - opinions of the Athenian generals.—Demosthenês insists - on departing from Sicily—Nikias opposes him.—Demosthenês - insists at least on removing out of the Great - Harbor.—Nikias refuses to consent to such removal.—The - armament remains in the Great Harbor, neither acting nor - retiring.—Infatuation of Nikias.—Increase of force and - confidence in Syracuse.—Nikias at length consents to - retreat. Orders for retreat privately circulated.—Eclipse - of the moon—Athenian retreat postponed.—Eclipses - considered as signs—differently interpreted—opinion of - Philochorus.—Renewed attacks of the Syracusans—defeat of - the Athenian fleet in the Great Harbor.—Partial success - ashore against Gylippus.—The Syracusans determine to block - up the mouth of the harbor, and destroy or capture the - whole Athenian armament.—Large views of the Syracusans - against the power of Athens—new hazards now opened to - endanger that power.—Vast numbers, and miscellaneous - origin, of the combatants now engaged in fighting for - or against Syracuse.—The Syracusans block up the mouth - of the harbor.—The Athenians resolve to force their way - out—preparations made by the generals.—Exhortations of - Nikias on putting the crews aboard.—Agony of Nikias—his - efforts to encourage the officers.—Bold and animated - language of Gylippus to the Syracusan fleet.—Syracusan - arrangements. Condition of the Great Harbor—sympathizing - population surrounding it.—Attempt of the Athenian fleet - to break out—battle in the Great Harbor.—Long-continued - and desperate struggle—intense emotion—total defeat of the - Athenians.—Military operations of ancient times—strong - emotions which accompanied them.—Causes of the defeat of - the Athenians.—Feelings of the victors and vanquished after - the battle.—Resolution of Demosthenês and Nikias to make - a second attempt—the armament are too much discouraged - to obey.—The Athenians determine to retreat by land—they - postpone their retreat, under false communications from - Syracuse.—The Syracusans block up the roads, to intercept - their retreat.—Retreat of the Athenians—miserable condition - of the army.—Wretchedness arising from abandoning the - sick and wounded.—Attempt of the generals to maintain - some order—energy of Nikias.—Exhortations of Nikias to - the suffering army.—Commencement of the retreat—harassed - and impeded by the Syracusans.—Continued conflict—no - progress made by the retreating army.—Violent storm—effect - produced on both parties—change of feeling in the last - two years.—Night march of the Athenians, in an altered - direction, towards the southern sea.—Separation of - the two divisions under Nikias and Demosthenês. The - first division under Nikias gets across the river - Erineus.—The rear division under Demosthenês is pursued, - overtaken, and forced to surrender.—Gylippus overtakes - and attacks the division of Nikias.—Nikias gets to the - river Asinarus—intolerable thirst and suffering of the - soldiers—he and his division become prisoners.—Total - numbers captured.—Hard treatment and sufferings of - the Athenian prisoners at Syracuse.—Treatment of - Nikias and Demosthenês—difference of opinion among the - conquerors.—Influence of the Corinthians—efforts of - Gylippus—both the generals are slain.—Disgrace of Nikias - after his death, at Athens—continued respect for the memory - of Demosthenês.—Opinion of Thucydidês about Nikias.—How - far that opinion is just.—Opinion of the Athenians about - Nikias—their steady over-confidence and over-esteem - for him, arising from his respectable and religious - character.—Over-confidence in Nikias was the greatest - personal mistake which the Athenian public ever committed. 287-352 - - - CHAPTER LXI. - - FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY, - DOWN TO THE OLIGARCHICAL CONSPIRACY OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AT - ATHENS. - - Consequences of the ruin of the Athenian armament in - Sicily.—Occupation of Dekeleia by the Lacedæmonians—its - ruinous effects upon Athens.—Athens becomes a - military post—heavy duty in arms imposed upon the - citizens.—Financial pressure.—Athens dismisses her - Thracian mercenaries—massacre at Mykalêssus.—The Thracians - driven back with slaughter by the Thebans.—Athenian - station at Naupaktus—decline of the naval superiority of - Athens.—Naval battle near Naupaktus—indecisive result.—Last - news of the Athenians from Syracuse—ruin of the army - there not officially made known to them.—Reluctance of - the Athenians to believe the full truth.—Terror and - affliction at Athens.—Energetic resolutions adopted by - the Athenians—Board of Probûli.—Prodigious effect of the - catastrophe upon all Greeks—enemies and allies of Athens - as well as neutrals—and even on the Persians.—Motions - of king Agis.—The Eubœans apply to Agis for aid in - revolting from Athens—the Lesbians also apply, and - are preferred.—The Chians, with the same view, make - application to Sparta.—Envoys from Tissaphernês and - Pharnabazus come to Sparta at the same time.—Alkibiadês - at Sparta—his recommendations determine the Lacedæmonians - to send aid to Chios.—Synod of the Peloponnesian allies - at Corinth—measures resolved.—Isthmian festival—scruples - of the Corinthians—delay about Chios—suspicions of - Athens.—Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth to Chios—it - is defeated by the Athenians.—Small squadron starts - from Sparta under Chalkideus and Alkibiadês, to go to - Chios.—Energetic advice of Alkibiadês—his great usefulness - to Sparta.—Arrival of Alkibiadês at Chios—revolt of the - island from Athens.—General population of Chios was - disinclined to revolt from Athens.—Dismay occasioned at - Athens by the revolt of Chios—the Athenians set free - and appropriate their reserved fund.—Athenian force - despatched to Chios under Strombichidês.—Activity of - the Chians in promoting revolt among the other Athenian - allies—Alkibiadês determines Milêtus to revolt.—First - alliance between the Peloponnesians and Tissaphernês, - concluded by Chalkideus at Milêtus.—Dishonorable and - disadvantageous conditions of the treaty.—Energetic efforts - of Athens—democratical revolution at Samos.—Peloponnesian - fleet at Kenchreæ—Astyochus is sent as Spartan admiral - to Ionia.—Expedition of the Chians against Lesbos.—Ill - success of the Chians—Lesbos is maintained by the - Athenians.—Harassing operations of the Athenians against - Chios.—Hardships suffered by the Chians—prosperity - of the island up to this time.—Fresh forces from - Athens—victory of the Athenians near Milêtus.—Fresh - Peloponnesian forces arrive—the Athenians retire, pursuant - to the strong recommendation of Phrynichus.—Capture of - Iasus by the Peloponnesians—rich plunder—Amorgês made - prisoner.—Tissaphernês begins to furnish pay to the - Peloponnesian fleet. He reduces the rate of pay for the - future.—Powerful Athenian fleet at Samos—unexpected - renovation of the navy of Athens.—Astyochus at Chios and - on the opposite coast.—Pedaritus, Lacedæmonian governor at - Chios—disagreement between him and Astyochus.—Astyochus - abandons Chios and returns to Milêtus—accident whereby - he escaped the Athenian fleet.—The Athenians establish a - fortified post in Chios, to ravage the island.—Dorieus - arrives on the Asiatic coast with a squadron from Thurii, - to join Astyochus—maritime contests near Knidus.—Second - Peloponnesian treaty with Tissaphernês, concluded by - Astyochus and Theramenês.—Comparison of the second - treaty with the first.—Arrival of a fresh Peloponnesian - squadron under Antisthenês at Kaunus—Lichas comes out as - Spartan commissioner.—Astyochus goes with the fleet from - Milêtus to join the newly-arrived squadron—he defeats - the Athenian squadron under Charmînus.—Peloponnesian - fleet at Knidus—double dealing of Tissaphernês—breach - between him and Lichas.—Peloponnesian fleet masters - Rhodes, and establishes itself in that island.—Long - inaction of the fleet at Rhodes—paralyzing intrigues of - Tissaphernês—corruption of the Lacedæmonian officers. 353-402 - - - - -HISTORY OF GREECE. - - -PART II. - -CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE. - - - - -CHAPTER LV. - -FROM THE PEACE OF NIKIAS TO THE OLYMPIC FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD NINETY. - - -My last chapter and last volume terminated with the peace called the -Peace of Nikias, concluded in March 421 B.C., between Athens and the -Spartan confederacy, for fifty years. - -This peace—negotiated during the autumn and winter succeeding the -defeat of the Athenians at Amphipolis, wherein both Kleon and -Brasidas were slain—resulted partly from the extraordinary anxiety -of the Spartans to recover their captives who had been taken at -Sphakteria, partly from the discouragement of the Athenians, leading -them to listen to the peace-party who acted with Nikias. The general -principle adopted for the peace was, the restitution by both parties -of what had been acquired by war, yet excluding such places as had -been surrendered by capitulation: according to which reserve the -Athenians, while prevented from recovering Platæa, continued to hold -Nisæa, the harbor of Megara. The Lacedæmonians engaged to restore -Amphipolis to Athens, and to relinquish their connection with the -revolted allies of Athens in Thrace; that is, Argilus, Stageirus, -Akanthus, Skôlus, Olynthus, and Spartôlus. These six cities, however, -were not to be enrolled as allies of Athens unless they chose -voluntarily to become so, but only to pay regularly to Athens the -tribute originally assessed by Aristeidês, as a sort of recompense -for the protection of the Ægean sea against private war or piracy. -Any inhabitant of Amphipolis or the other cities, who chose to leave -them, was at liberty to do so, and to carry away his property. -Farther, the Lacedæmonians covenanted to restore Panaktum to Athens, -together with all the Athenian prisoners in their possession. As to -Skiônê, Torônê, and Sermylus, the Athenians were declared free to -take their own measures. On their part, they engaged to release all -captives in their hands, either of Sparta or her allies; to restore -Pylus, Kythêra, Methônê, Pteleon, and Atalantê; and to liberate all -the Peloponnesian or Brasidean soldiers now under blockade in Skiônê. - -Provision was also made, by special articles, that all Greeks should -have free access to the sacred Pan-Hellenic festivals, either by -land or sea; and that the autonomy of the Delphian temple should be -guaranteed. - -The contracting parties swore to abstain in future from all injury -to each other, and to settle by amicable decision any dispute which -might arise.[1] - - [1] Thucyd. v, 17-29. - -Lastly, it was provided that if any matter should afterwards occur -as having been forgotten, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians might by -mutual consent amend the treaty as they thought fit. So prepared, the -oaths were interchanged between seventeen principal Athenians and as -many principal Lacedæmonians. - -Earnestly bent as Sparta herself was upon the peace, and ratified as -it had been by the vote of a majority among her confederates, still, -there was a powerful minority who not only refused their assent -but strenuously protested against its conditions. The Corinthians -were discontented because they did not receive back Sollium and -Anaktorium; the Megarians, because they did not regain Nisæa; the -Bœotians, because Panaktum was to be restored to Athens: the Eleians -also on some other ground which we do not distinctly know. All of -them, moreover, took common offence at the article which provided -that Athens and Sparta might, by mutual consent, and without -consulting the allies, amend the treaty in any way that they thought -proper.[2] Though the peace was sworn, therefore, the most powerful -members of the Spartan confederacy remained all recusant. - - [2] Thucyd. v, 18. - -So strong was the interest of the Spartans themselves, however, -that having obtained the favorable vote of the majority, they -resolved to carry the peace through, even at the risk of breaking -up the confederacy. Besides the earnest desire of recovering their -captives from the Athenians, they were farther alarmed by the fact -that their truce for thirty years concluded with Argos was just now -expiring. They had indeed made application to Argos for renewing it, -through Lichas the Spartan proxenus of that city. But the Argeians -had refused, except upon the inadmissible condition that the border -territory of Kynuria should be ceded to them: there was reason to -fear therefore that this new and powerful force might be thrown into -the scale of Athens, if war were allowed to continue.[3] - - [3] Thucyd. v, 14, 22, 76. - -Accordingly, no sooner had the peace been sworn than the Spartans -proceeded to execute its provisions. Lots being drawn to determine -whether Sparta or Athens should be the first to make the cessions -required, the Athenians drew the favorable lot: an advantage so very -great, under the circumstances, that Theophrastus affirmed Nikias to -have gained the point by bribery. There is no ground for believing -such alleged bribery; the rather, as we shall presently find Nikias -gratuitously throwing away most of the benefit which the lucky lot -conferred.[4] - - [4] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10. - -The Spartans began their compliance by forthwith releasing all -the Athenian prisoners in their hands, and despatching Ischagoras -with two other envoys to Amphipolis and the Thracian towns. These -envoys were directed to proclaim the peace as well as to enforce -its observance upon the Thracian towns, and especially to command -Klearidas, the Spartan commander in Amphipolis, that he should -surrender the town to the Athenians. But on arriving in Thrace, these -envoys met with nothing but unanimous opposition: and so energetic -were the remonstrances of the Chalkidians, both in Amphipolis and out -of it, that even Klearidas refused obedience to his own government, -pretending that he was not strong enough to surrender the place -against the resistance of the Chalkidians. Thus completely baffled, -the envoys returned to Sparta, whither Klearidas thought it prudent -to accompany them, partly to explain his own conduct, partly in hopes -of being able to procure some modification of the terms. But he found -this impossible, and he was sent back to Amphipolis with peremptory -orders to surrender the place to the Athenians, if it could possibly -be done; if that should prove beyond his force, then to come away, -and bring home every Peloponnesian soldier in the garrison. Perhaps -the surrender was really impracticable to a force no greater -than that which Klearidas commanded, since the reluctance of the -population was doubtless obstinate. At any rate, he represented it to -be impracticable: the troops accordingly came home, but the Athenians -still remained excluded from Amphipolis, and all the stipulations of -the peace respecting the Thracian towns remained unperformed. Nor -was this all. The envoys from the recusant minority (Corinthians and -others), after having gone home for instructions, had now come back -to Sparta with increased repugnance and protest against the injustice -of the peace, so that all the efforts of the Spartans to bring them -to compliance were fruitless.[5] - - [5] Thucyd. v, 21, 22. - -The latter were now in serious embarrassment. Not having executed -their portion of the treaty, they could not demand that Athens should -execute hers: and they were threatened with the double misfortune of -forfeiting the confidence of their allies without acquiring any one -of the advantages of the treaty. In this dilemma they determined to -enter into closer relations, and separate relations, with Athens, -at all hazard of offending their allies. Of the enmity of Argos, -if unaided by Athens, they had little apprehension; while the -moment was now favorable for alliance with Athens, from the decided -pacific tendencies reigning on both sides, as well as from the -known philo-Laconian sentiment of the leaders Nikias and Lachês. -The Athenian envoys had remained at Sparta ever since the swearing -of the peace, awaiting the fulfilment of the conditions; Nikias -or Lachês, one or both, being very probably among them. When they -saw that Sparta was unable to fulfil her bond, so that the treaty -seemed likely to be cancelled, they would doubtless encourage, and -perhaps may even have suggested, the idea of a separate alliance -between Sparta and Athens, as the only expedient for covering the -deficiency; promising that under that alliance the Spartan captives -should be restored. Accordingly, a treaty was concluded between the -two, for fifty years; not merely of peace, but of defensive alliance. -Each party pledged itself to assist in repelling any invaders of -the territory of the other, to treat them as enemies, and not to -conclude peace with them without the consent of the other. This was -the single provision of the alliance, with one addition, however, -of no mean importance, for the security of Lacedæmon. The Athenians -engaged to lend their best and most energetic aid in putting down any -rising of the Helots which might occur in Laconia. Such a provision -indicates powerfully the uneasiness felt by the Lacedæmonians -respecting their serf-population: but at the present moment it was of -peculiar value to them, since it bound the Athenians to restrain, if -not to withdraw, the Messenian garrison of Pylos, planted there by -themselves for the express purpose of provoking the Helots to revolt. - -An alliance with stipulations so few and simple took no long time -to discuss. It was concluded very speedily after the return of the -envoys from Amphipolis, probably not more than a month or two after -the former peace. It was sworn to by the same individuals on both -sides; with similar declaration that the oath should be annually -renewed, and also with similar proviso that Sparta and Athens might -by mutual consent either enlarge or contract the terms, without -violating the oath.[6] Moreover, the treaty was directed to be -inscribed on two columns: one to be set up in the temple of Apollo at -Amyklæ, the other in the temple of Athênê, in the acropolis of Athens. - - [6] Thucyd. v, 23. The treaty of alliance seems to have been - drawn up at Sparta, and approved or concerted with the Athenian - envoys; then sent to Athens, and there adopted by the people; - then sworn to on both sides. The interval between this second - treaty and the first (οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον, v, 24), may have been - more than a month; for it comprised the visit of the Lacedæmonian - envoys to Amphipolis and the other towns of Thrace, the - manifestation of resistance in those towns, and the return of - Klearidas to Sparta to give an account of his conduct. - -The most important result of this new alliance was something -not specified in its provisions, but understood, we may be well -assured, between the Spartan ephors and Nikias at the time when it -was concluded. All the Spartan captives at Athens were forthwith -restored.[7] - - [7] Thucyd. v, 24. - -Nothing can demonstrate more powerfully the pacific and acquiescent -feeling now reigning at Athens, as well as the strong philo-Laconian -inclinations of her leading men (at this moment Alkibiadês was -competing with Nikias for the favor of Sparta, as will be stated -presently), than the terms of this alliance, which bound Athens to -assist in keeping down the Helots, and the still more important -after-proceeding, of restoring the Spartan captives. Athens thus -parted irrevocably with her best card, and promised to renounce her -second best, without obtaining the smallest equivalent beyond what -was contained in the oath of Sparta to become her ally. For the last -three years and a half, ever since the capture of Sphakteria, the -possession of these captives had placed her in a position of decided -advantage in regard to her chief enemy; advantage, however, which -had to a certain extent been countervailed by subsequent losses. -This state of things was fairly enough represented by the treaty of -peace deliberately discussed during the winter, and sworn to at the -commencement of spring, whereby a string of concessions, reciprocal -and balancing, had been imposed on both parties. Moreover, Athens had -been lucky enough in drawing lots to find herself enabled to wait for -the actual fulfilment of such concessions by the Spartans, before -she consummated her own. Now the Spartans had not as yet realized -any one of their promised concessions: nay, more; in trying to do -so, they had displayed such a want either of power or of will, as -made it plain, that nothing short of the most stringent necessity -would convert their promises into realities. Yet, under these marked -indications, Nikias persuades his countrymen to conclude a second -treaty which practically annuls the first, and which insures to -the Spartans gratuitously all the main benefits of the first, with -little or none of the correlative sacrifices. The alliance of Sparta -could hardly be said to count as a consideration: for that alliance -was at this moment, under the uncertain relations with Argos, not -less valuable to Sparta herself than to Athens. There can be little -doubt that, if the game of Athens had now been played with prudence, -she might have recovered Amphipolis in exchange for the captives: -for the inability of Klearidas to make over the place, even if we -grant it to have been a real fact and not merely simulated, might -have been removed by decisive coöperation on the part of Sparta -with an Athenian armament sent to occupy the place. In fact, that -which Athens was now induced to grant was precisely the original -proposition transmitted to her by the Lacedæmonians four years -before, when the hoplites were first inclosed in Sphakteria, but -before the actual capture. They then tendered no equivalent, but -merely said, through their envoys, “Give us the men in the island, -and accept in exchange peace, together with our alliance.”[8] At that -moment there were some plausible reasons in favor of granting the -proposition: but even then, the case of Kleon against it was also -plausible and powerful, when he contended that Athens was entitled -to make a better bargain. But _now_, there were no reasons in its -favor, and a strong concurrence of reasons against it. Alliance with -the Spartans was of no great value to Athens: peace was of material -importance to her; but peace had been already sworn to on both sides, -after deliberate discussion, and required now only to be carried into -execution. That equal reciprocity of concession, which presented the -best chance of permanent result, had been agreed on; and fortune had -procured for her the privilege of receiving the purchase-money before -she handed over the goods. Why renounce so advantageous a position, -accepting in exchange a hollow and barren alliance, under the -obligation of handing over her most precious merchandise upon credit, -and upon credit as delusive in promise as it afterwards proved -unproductive in reality? The alliance, in fact, prevented the peace -from being fulfilled: it became, as Thucydidês himself[9] admits, no -peace, but a simple suspension of direct hostilities. - - [8] Thucyd. iv, 19. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ὑμᾶς προκαλοῦνται ἐς - σπονδὰς καὶ διάλυσιν πολέμου, διδόντες μὲν εἰρήνην καὶ ξυμμαχίαν - καὶ ἄλλην φιλίαν πολλὴν καὶ οἰκειότητα ἐς ἀλλήλους ὑπάρχειν, - ἀνταιτοῦντες δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας. - - [9] Thucyd. v, 26. οὐκ εἰκὸς ὂν εἰρήνην αὐτὴν κριθῆναι, etc. - -Thucydidês states on more than one occasion, and it was the -sentiment of Nikias himself, that at the moment of concluding the -peace which bears his name, the position of Sparta was one of -disadvantage and dishonor in reference to Athens;[10] alluding -chiefly to the captives in the hands of the latter; for as to other -matters, the defeats of Delium and Amphipolis, with the serious -losses in Thrace, would more than countervail the acquisitions -of Nisæa, Pylus, Kythêra, and Methônê. Yet so inconsiderate and -short-sighted were the philo-Laconian leanings of Nikias and the -men who now commanded confidence at Athens, that they threw away -this advantage, suffered Athens to be cheated of all those hopes -which they had themselves held out as the inducement for peace, and -nevertheless yielded gratuitously to Sparta all the main points which -she desired. Most certainly there was never any public recommendation -of Kleon, as far as our information goes, so ruinously impolitic as -this alliance with Sparta and surrender of the captives, wherein -both Nikias and Alkibiadês concurred. Probably the Spartan ephors -amused Nikias, and he amused the Athenian assembly, with fallacious -assurances of certain obedience in Thrace, under alleged peremptory -orders given to Klearidas. And now that the vehement leather-dresser, -with his criminative eloquence, had passed away, replaced only by an -inferior successor, the lamp-maker[11] Hyperbolus, and leaving the -Athenian public under the undisputed guidance of citizens eminent for -birth and station, descended from gods and heroes, there remained -no one to expose effectively the futility of such assurances, or to -enforce the lesson of simple and obvious prudence: “Wait, as you are -entitled to wait, until the Spartans have performed the onerous part -of their bargain, before you perform the onerous part of yours. Or, -if you choose to relax in regard to some of the concessions which -they have sworn to make, at any rate stick to the capital point of -all, and lay before them the peremptory alternative—Amphipolis in -exchange for the captives.” - - [10] Thucyd. v, 28. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἥ τε Λακεδαίμων - μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἤκουσε καὶ ὑπερώφθη διὰ τὰς ξυμφορὰς.—(Νικίας) - λέγων ἐν μὲν τῷ σφετέρῳ καλῷ (Athenian) ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐκείνων ἀπρεπεῖ - (Lacedæmonian) τὸν πόλεμον ἀναβάλλεσθαι, etc. (v, 46)—Οἷς πρῶτον - μὲν (to the Lacedæmonians) διὰ ξυμφορῶν ἡ ξύμβασις, etc. - - [11] Aristophan. Pac. 665-887. - -The Athenians were not long in finding out how completely they had -forfeited the advantage of their position, and their chief means of -enforcement, by giving up the captives; which imparted a freedom -of action to Sparta such as she had never enjoyed since the first -blockade of Sphakteria. Yet it seems that under the present ephors -Sparta was not guilty of any deliberate or positive act which -could be called a breach of faith. She gave orders to Klearidas -to surrender Amphipolis if he could; if not, to evacuate it, and -bring the Peloponnesian troops home. Of course, the place was not -surrendered to the Athenians, but evacuated; and she then considered -that she had discharged her duty to Athens, as far as Amphipolis was -concerned, though she had sworn to restore it, and her oath remained -unperformed.[12] The other Thracian towns were equally deaf to her -persuasions, and equally obstinate in their hostility to Athens. So -also were the Bœotians, Corinthians, Megarians, and Eleians: but the -Bœotians, while refusing to become parties to the truce along with -Sparta, concluded for themselves a separate convention or armistice -with Athens, terminable at ten days’ notice on either side.[13] - - [12] Thucyd. v, 21-35. - - [13] Thucyd. v, 32. - -In this state of things, though ostensible relations of peace and -free reciprocity of intercourse between Athens and Peloponnesus were -established, the discontent of the Athenians, and the remonstrances -of their envoys at Sparta, soon became serious. The Lacedæmonians -had sworn for themselves and their allies, yet the most powerful -among these allies, and those whose enmity was most important -to Athens, continued still recusant. Neither Panaktum, nor the -Athenian prisoners in Bœotia, were yet restored to Athens; nor had -the Thracian cities yet submitted to the peace. In reply to the -remonstrances of the Athenian envoys, the Lacedæmonians affirmed -that they had already surrendered all the Athenian prisoners in -their own hands, and had withdrawn their troops from Thrace, which -was, they said, all the intervention in their power, since they were -not masters of Amphipolis, nor capable of constraining the Thracian -cities against their will. As to the Bœotians and Corinthians, the -Lacedæmonians went so far as to profess readiness to take arms -along with Athens,[14] for the purpose of constraining them to -accept the peace, and even spoke about naming a day, after which -these recusant states should be proclaimed as joint enemies, both -by Sparta and Athens. But their propositions were always confined -to vague words, nor would they consent to bind themselves by any -written or peremptory instrument. Nevertheless, so great was their -confidence either in the sufficiency of these assurances, or in the -facility of Nikias, that they ventured to require from Athens the -surrender of Pylus, or at least the withdrawal of the Messenian -garrison with the Helot deserters from that place, leaving in it none -but native Athenian soldiers, until farther progress should be made -in the peace. But the feeling of the Athenians was now seriously -altered, and they received this demand with marked coldness. None -of the stipulations of the treaty in their favor had yet been -performed, none even seemed in course of being performed: so that -they now began to suspect Sparta of dishonesty and deceit, and deeply -regretted their inconsiderate surrender of the captives.[15] Their -remonstrances at Sparta, often repeated during the course of the -summer, produced no positive effect: nevertheless, they suffered -themselves to be persuaded to remove the Messenians and Helots from -Pylus to Kephallenia, replacing them by an Athenian garrison.[16] - - [14] Thucyd. v, 35. λέγοντες ἀεὶ ὡς μετ’ Ἀθηναίων τούτους, - ἢν μὴ θέλωσι, κοινῇ ἀναγκάσουσι· ~χρόνους δὲ προὔθεντο ἄνευ - ξυγγραφῆς~, ἐν οἷς χρῆν τοὺς μὴ ἐσιόντας ἀμφοτέροις πολεμίους - εἶναι. - - [15] Thucyd. v, 35. τούτων οὖν ὁρῶντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδὲν ἔργῳ - γιγνόμενον, ὑπετόπευον τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μηδὲν δίκαιον - διανοεῖσθαι, ὥστε οὔτε Πύλον ἀπαιτούντων αὐτῶν ἀπεδίδοσαν, ἀλλὰ - ~καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας μετεμέλοντο ἀποδεδωκότες~, etc. - - [16] Thucyd. v, 35. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ πολλῶν λόγων γενομένων ἐν τῷ - θέρει τούτῳ, etc. - -The Athenians had doubtless good reason to complain of Sparta. But -the persons of whom they had still better reason to complain, were -Nikias and their own philo-Laconian leaders; who had first accepted -from Sparta promises doubtful as to execution, and next—though -favored by the lot in regard to priority of cession, and thus -acquiring proof that Sparta either would not or could not perform her -promises—renounced all these advantages, and procured for Sparta -almost gratuitously the only boon for which she seriously cared. The -many critics on Grecian history, who think no term too harsh for the -demagogue Kleon, ought in fairness to contrast his political counsel -with that of his rivals, and see which of the two betokens greater -forethought in the management of the foreign relations of Athens. -Amphipolis had been once lost by the improvident watch of Thucydidês -and Euklês: it was now again lost by the improvident concessions of -Nikias. - -So much was the Peloponnesian alliance unhinged by the number of -states which had refused the peace, and so greatly was the ascendency -of Sparta for the time impaired, that new combinations were now -springing up in the peninsula. It has already been mentioned that -the truce between Argos and Sparta was just now expiring: Argos -therefore was free, with her old pretensions to the headship of -Peloponnesus, backed by an undiminished fulness of wealth, power, -and population. Having taken no direct part in the late exhausting -war, she had even earned money by lending occasional aid on both -sides;[17] while her military force was just now farther strengthened -by a step of very considerable importance. She had recently set apart -a body of a thousand select hoplites, composed of young men of wealth -and station, to receive constant military training at the public -expense, and to be enrolled as a separate regiment by themselves, -apart from the other citizens.[18] To a democratical government like -Argos, such an institution was internally dangerous, and pregnant -with mischief, which will be hereafter described. But at the present -moment, the democratical leaders of Argos seem to have thought only -of the foreign relations of their city, now that her truce with -Sparta was expiring, and that the disorganized state of the Spartan -confederacy opened new chances to her ambition of regaining something -like headship in Peloponnesus. - - [17] Thucyd. v, 28. Aristophan. Pac. 467, about the Argeians, - δίχοθεν μισθοφοροῦντες ἄλφιτα. - - He characterizes the Argeians as anxious for this reason to - prolong the war between Athens and Sparta. This passage, as well - as the whole tenor of the play, affords ground for affirming that - the Pax was represented during the winter immediately preceding - the Peace of Nikias, about four or five months after the battle - of Amphipolis and the death of Kleon and Brasidas; not two years - later, as Mr. Clinton would place it, on the authority of a date - in the play itself, upon which he lays too great stress. - - [18] Thucyd. v, 67. Ἀργείων οἱ Χίλιοι λογάδες, οἷς ἡ πόλις ~ἐκ - πολλοῦ~ ἄσκησιν τῶν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον δημοσίᾳ παρεῖχε. - - Diodorus (xii, 75) represents the first formation of this - Thousand-regiment at Argos as having taken place just about this - time, and I think he is here worthy of credit; so that I do not - regard the expression of Thucydidês ἐκ πολλοῦ as indicating a - time more than two years prior to the battle of Mantineia. For - Grecian military training, two years of constant practice would - be a _long_ time. It is not to be imagined that the Argeian - democracy would have incurred the expense and danger of keeping - up this select regiment during all the period of their long - peace, just now coming to an end. - -The discontent of the recusant Peloponnesian allies was now inducing -them to turn their attention towards Argos as a new chief. They had -mistrusted Sparta, even before the peace, well knowing that she had -separate interests from the confederacy, arising from desire to get -back her captives: in the terms of peace, it seemed as if Sparta and -Athens alone were regarded, the interests of the remaining allies, -especially those in Thrace, being put out of sight. Moreover, that -article in the treaty of peace whereby it was provided that Athens -and Sparta might by mutual consent add or strike out any article that -they chose, without consulting the allies, excited general alarm, as -if Sparta were meditating some treason in conjunction with Athens -against the confederacy.[19] And the alarm, once roused, was still -farther aggravated by the separate treaty of alliance between Sparta -and Athens, which followed so closely afterwards, as well as by the -restoration of the Spartan captives. - - [19] Thucyd. v, 29. μὴ μετὰ Ἀθηναίων σφᾶς βούλωνται Λακεδαιμόνιοι - δουλώσασθαι: compare Diodorus, xii, 75. - -Such general displeasure among the Peloponnesian states at the -unexpected combination of Athenians and Lacedæmonians, strengthened -in the case of each particular state by private interests of its own, -first manifested itself openly through the Corinthians. On retiring -from the conferences at Sparta,—where the recent alliance between -the Athenians and Spartans had just been made known, and where the -latter had vainly endeavored to prevail upon their allies to accept -the peace,—the Corinthians went straight to Argos to communicate -what had passed, and to solicit interference. They suggested to the -leading men in that city, that it was now the duty of Argos to step -forward as saviour of Peloponnesus, which the Lacedæmonians were -openly betraying to the common enemy, and to invite for that purpose, -into alliance for reciprocal defence, every autonomous Hellenic state -which would bind itself to give and receive amicable satisfaction in -all points of difference. They affirmed that many cities, from hatred -of Sparta, would gladly comply with such invitation; especially if a -board of commissioners in small number were named, with full powers -to admit all suitable applicants; so that, in case of rejection, -there might at least be no exposure before the public assembly in the -Argeian democracy. This suggestion—privately made by the Corinthians, -who returned home immediately afterwards—was eagerly adopted both -by leaders and people at Argos, as promising to realize their -long-cherished pretensions to headship. Twelve commissioners were -accordingly appointed, with power to admit any new allies whom they -might think eligible, except Athens and Sparta. With either of those -two cities, no treaty was allowed without the formal sanction of the -public assembly.[20] - - [20] Thucyd. v, 28. - -Meanwhile, the Corinthians, though they had been the first to set the -Argeians in motion, nevertheless thought it right, before enrolling -themselves publicly in the new alliance, to invite a congress of -Peloponnesian malcontents to Corinth. It was the Mantineians who made -the first application to Argos under the notice just issued. And -here we are admitted to a partial view of the relations among the -secondary and interior states of Peloponnesus. Mantineia and Tegea, -being conterminous as well as the two most considerable states in -Arcadia, were in perpetual rivalry, which had shown itself only a -year and a half before in a bloody but indecisive battle.[21] Tegea, -situated on the frontiers of Laconia, and oligarchically governed, -was tenaciously attached to Sparta: while for that very reason, as -well as from the democratical character of her government, Mantineia -was less so, though she was still enrolled in and acted as a member -of the Peloponnesian confederacy. She had recently conquered for -herself[22] a little empire in her own neighborhood, composed of -village districts in Arcadia, reckoned as her subject allies, and -comrades in her ranks at the last battle with Tegea. This conquest -had been made even during the continuance of the war with Athens; a -period when the lesser states of Peloponnesus generally, and even -subject-states as against their own imperial states, were under -the guarantee of the confederacy, to which they were required to -render their unpaid service against the common enemy; so that she -was apprehensive of Lacedæmonian interference at the request and -for the emancipation of these subjects, who lay, moreover, near -to the borders of Laconia. Such interference would probably have -been invoked earlier; only that Sparta had been under pressing -embarrassments—and farther, had assembled no general muster of the -confederacy against Athens—ever since the disaster in Sphakteria. But -now she had her hands free, together with a good pretext as well as -motive for interference. - - [21] Thucyd. iv, 134. - - [22] Thucyd. v, 29. τοῖς γὰρ Μαντινεῦσι μέρος τι τῆς Ἀρκαδίας - κατέστραπτο ὑπήκοον, ἔτι τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πολέμου ὄντος, καὶ - ἐνόμιζον οὐ περιόψεσθαι σφᾶς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἄρχειν, ἐπειδὴ - καὶ σχολὴν ἦγον. - - As to the way in which the agreement of the members of the - confederacy modified the relations between subordinate and - imperial states, see farther on, pages 25 and 26, in the case of - Elis and Lepreum. - -To maintain the autonomy of all the little states, and prevent any -of them from being mediatized or grouped into aggregations under the -ascendency of the greater, had been the general policy of Sparta; -especially since her own influence as general leader was increased by -insuring to every lesser state a substantive vote at the meetings of -the confederacy.[23] Moreover, the rivalry of Tegea would probably -operate here as an auxiliary motive against Mantineia. Under such -apprehensions, the Mantineians hastened to court the alliance and -protection of Argos, with whom they enjoyed the additional sympathy -of a common democracy. Such revolt from Sparta[24] (for so it was -considered) excited great sensation throughout Peloponnesus, together -with considerable disposition, amidst the discontent then prevalent, -to follow the example. - - [23] Thucyd. i, 125. - - [24] Thucyd. v, 29. ~Ἀποστάντων δὲ τῶν Μαντινέων~, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη - Πελοπόννησος ἐς θροῦν καθίστατο ὡς καὶ σφίσι ποιητέον τοῦτο, - νομίζοντες πλέον τέ τι εἰδότας μεταστῆναι αὐτοὺς, καὶ τοὺς - Λακεδαιμονίους ἅμα δι’ ὀργῆς ἔχοντες, etc. - -In particular, it contributed much to enhance the importance of -the congress at Corinth; whither the Lacedæmonians thought it -necessary to send special envoys to counteract the intrigues going -on against them. Their envoy addressed to the Corinthians strenuous -remonstrance, and even reproach, for the leading part which they -had taken in stirring up dissension among the old confederates, and -organizing a new confederacy under the presidency of Argos. “They -(the Corinthians) were thus aggravating the original guilt and -perjury which they had committed by setting at nought the formal -vote of a majority of the confederacy, and refusing to accept the -peace,—for it was the sworn and fundamental maxim of the confederacy, -that the decision of the majority should be binding on all, -except in such cases as involved some offence to gods or heroes.” -Encouraged by the presence of many sympathizing deputies, Bœotian, -Megarian, Chalkidian from Thrace,[25] etc., the Corinthians replied -with firmness. But they did not think it good policy to proclaim -their real ground for rejecting the peace, namely, that it had not -procured for themselves the restoration of Sollium and Anaktorium: -since, first, this was a question in which their allies present had -no interest; next, it did not furnish any valid excuse for their -resistance to the vote of the majority. Accordingly, they took their -stand upon a pretence at once generous and religious; upon that -reserve for religious scruples, which the Lacedæmonian envoy had -himself admitted, and which of course was to be construed by each -member with reference to his own pious feeling. “It _was_ a religious -impediment (the Corinthians contended) which prevented us from -acceding to the peace with Athens, notwithstanding the vote of the -majority; for we had previously exchanged oaths, ourselves apart from -the confederacy, with the Chalkidians of Thrace at the time when they -revolted from Athens: and we should have infringed those separate -oaths, had we accepted a treaty of peace in which these Chalkidians -were abandoned. As for alliance with Argos, we consider ourselves -free to adopt any resolution which we may deem suitable, after -consultation with our friends here present.” With this unsatisfactory -answer the Lacedæmonian envoys were compelled to return home. Yet -some Argeian envoys, who were also present in the assembly for the -purpose of urging the Corinthians to realize forthwith the hopes of -alliance which they had held out to Argos, were still unable on their -side to obtain a decided affirmative, being requested to come again -at the next conference.[26] - - [25] Thucyd. v, 30. Κορίνθιοι δὲ παρόντων σφίσι τῶν ξυμμάχων, - ὅσοι οὐδ’ αὐτοὶ ἐδέξαντο τὰς σπονδάς (παρεκάλεσαν δὲ αὐτοὺς αὐτοὶ - πρότερον) ἀντέλεγον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ~ἃ μὲν ἠδικοῦντο, οὐ - δηλοῦντες ἄντικρυς~, etc. - - [26] Thucyd. v, 30. - -Though the Corinthians had themselves originated the idea of the new -Argeian confederacy and compromised Argos in an open proclamation, -yet they now hesitated about the execution of their own scheme. -They were restrained in part doubtless by the bitterness of -Lacedæmonian reproof; for the open consummation of this revolt, -apart from its grave political consequences, shocked a train of very -old feelings; but still more by the discovery that their friends, -who agreed with them in rejecting the peace, decidedly refused -all open revolt from Sparta and all alliance with Argos. In this -category were the Bœotians and Megarians. Both of these states—left -to their own impression and judgment by the Lacedæmonians, who did -not address to them any distinct appeal as they had done to the -Corinthians—spontaneously turned away from Argos, not less from -aversion towards the Argeian democracy than from sympathy with the -oligarchy at Sparta:[27] they were linked together by communion of -interest, not merely as being both neighbors and intense enemies of -Attica, but as each having a body of democratical exiles who might -perhaps find encouragement at Argos. Discouraged by the resistance of -these two important allies, the Corinthians hung back from visiting -Argos, until they were pushed forward by a new accidental impulse, -the application of the Eleians; who, eagerly embracing the new -project, sent envoys first to conclude alliance with the Corinthians, -and next to go on and enroll Elis as an ally of Argos. This incident -so confirmed the Corinthians in their previous scheme, that they -speedily went to Argos, along with the Chalkidians of Thrace, to join -the new confederacy. - - [27] Thucyd. v, 31. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ καὶ Μεγαρῆς τὸ αὐτὸ λέγοντες - ἡσύχαζον, ~περιορώμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων~, καὶ νομίζοντες - σφίσι τὴν Ἀργείων δημοκρατίαν αὐτοῖς ὀλιγαρχουμένοις ἧσσον - ξύμφορον εἶναι τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας. - - These words, περιορώμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, are not clear, - and have occasioned much embarrassment to the commentators, - as well as some propositions for altering the text. It would - undoubtedly be an improvement in the sense, if we were permitted - (with Dobree) to strike out the words ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων as - a gloss, and thus to construe περιορώμενοι as a middle verb, - “waiting to see the event,” or literally, “keeping a look-out - about them.” But taking the text as it now stands, the sense - which I have given to it seems the best which can be elicited. - - Most of the critics translate περιορώμενοι “slighted or despised - by the Lacedæmonians.” But in the first place, this is not true - as a matter of fact: in the next place, if it were true, we - ought to have an adversative conjunction instead of καὶ before - νομίζοντες, since the tendency of the two motives indicated would - then be in opposite directions. “The Bœotians, though despised - by the Lacedæmonians, still thought a junction with the Argeian - democracy dangerous.” And this is the sense which Haack actually - proposes, though it does great violence to the word καὶ. - - Dr. Thirlwall and Dr. Arnold translate περιορώμενοι “feeling - themselves slighted;” and the latter says, “The Bœotians and - Megarians took neither side; not the Lacedæmonian, for they felt - that the Lacedæmonians had slighted them; not the Argive, for - they thought that the Argive democracy would suit them less than - the constitution of Sparta.” But this again puts an inadmissible - meaning on ἡσύχαζον, which means “stood as they were.” The - Bœotians were not called upon to choose between two sides or two - positive schemes of action: they were invited to ally themselves - with Argos, and this they decline doing: they prefer to _remain - as they are_, allies of Lacedæmon, but refusing to become parties - to the peace. Moreover, in the sense proposed by Dr. Arnold, we - should surely find an adversative conjunction in place of καὶ. - - I submit that the word περιορᾶν does not necessarily mean “to - slight or despise,” but sometimes “to leave alone, to take - no notice of, to abstain from interfering.” Thus, Thucyd. i, - 24. Ἐπιδάμνιοι—πέμπουσιν ἐς τὴν Κερκύραν πρέσβεις—δεόμενοι μὴ - σφᾶς ~περιορᾶν~ φθειρομένους, etc. Again, i, 69, καὶ νῦν τοὺς - Ἀθηναίους οὐχ ἑκάς ἀλλ’ ἐγγὺς ὄντας ~περιορᾶτε~, etc. The same - is the sense of περιϊδεῖν and περιόψεσθαι, ii, 20. In all these - passages there is no idea of _contempt_ implied in the word: the - “leaving alone” or “abstaining from interference,” proceeds from - feelings quite different from contempt. - - So in the passage here before us, περιορώμενοι seems the - _passive_ participle in this sense. Thucydidês, having just - described an energetic remonstrance sent by the Spartans to - prevent Corinth from joining Argos, means to intimate (by the - words here in discussion) that _no_ similar _interference_ was - resorted to by them to prevent the Bœotians and Megarians from - joining her: “The Bœotians and Megarians remained as they were, - _left to themselves by the Lacedæmonians_, and thinking the - Argeian democracy less suitable to them than the oligarchy of - Sparta.” - -The conduct of Elis, like that of Mantineia, in thus revolting from -Sparta, had been dictated by private grounds of quarrel, arising -out of relations with their dependent ally Lepreum. The Lepreates -had become dependent on Elis some time before the beginning of the -Peloponnesian war, in consideration of aid lent by the Eleians to -extricate them from a dangerous war against some Arcadian enemies. -To purchase such aid, they had engaged to cede to the Eleians half -their territory; but had been left in residence and occupation of it, -under the stipulation of paying one talent yearly as tribute to the -Olympian Zeus; in other words, to the Eleians as his stewards. When -the Peloponnesian war began,[28] and the Lacedæmonians began to call -for the unpaid service of the Peloponnesian cities generally, small -as well as great, against Athens, the Lepreates were, by the standing -agreement of the confederacy, exempted for the time from continuing -to pay their tribute to Elis. Such exemption ceased with the war; at -the close of which Elis became entitled, under the same agreement, -to resume the suspended tribute. She accordingly required that the -payment should then be recommenced: but the Lepreates refused, and -when she proceeded to apply force, threw themselves on the protection -of Sparta, by whose decision the Eleians themselves at first agreed -to abide, having the general agreement of the confederacy decidedly -in their favor. But it presently appeared that Sparta was more -disposed to carry out her general system of favoring the autonomy -of the lesser states, than to enforce the positive agreement of -the confederacy. Accordingly the Eleians, accusing her of unjust -bias, renounced her authority as arbitrator, and sent a military -force to occupy Lepreum. Nevertheless, the Spartans persisted in -their adjudication, pronounced Lepreum to be autonomous, and sent a -body of their own hoplites to defend it against the Eleians. The -latter loudly protested against this proceeding, and pronounced the -Lacedæmonians as having robbed them of one of their dependencies, -contrary to that agreement which had been adopted by the general -confederacy when the war began,—to the effect that each imperial city -should receive back at the end of the war all the dependencies which -it possessed at the beginning, on condition of waiving its title to -tribute and military service from them so long as the war lasted. -After fruitless remonstrances with Sparta, the Eleians eagerly -embraced the opportunity now offered of revolting from her, and of -joining the new league with Corinth and Argos.[29] - - [28] Thucyd. v, 31. Καὶ μέχρι τοῦ Ἀττικοῦ πολέμου ἀπέφερον· - ἔπειτα παυσαμένων διὰ πρόφασιν τοῦ πολέμου, οἱ Ἠλεῖοι - ἐπηνάγκαζον, οἱ δ’ ἐτράποντο πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. - - For the _agreement_ here alluded to, see a few lines forward. - - [29] Thucyd. v, 31. τὴν ξυνθήκην προφέροντες ἐν ᾗ εἴρητο, ἃ - ἔχοντες ἐς τὸν Ἀττικὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντό τινες, ταῦτα ἔχοντας - καὶ ἐξελθεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἴσον ἔχοντες ἀφίστανται, etc. - - Of the agreement here alluded to among the members of the - Peloponnesian confederacy, we hear only in this one passage. - It was extremely important to such of the confederates as - were imperial cities; that is, which had subordinates or - subject-allies. - - Poppo and Bloomfield wonder that the Corinthians did not appeal - to this agreement in order to procure the restitution of - Sollium and Anaktorium. But they misconceive the scope of the - agreement, which did not relate to captures made during the war - by the common enemy. It would be useless for the confederacy to - enter into a formal agreement that none of the members should - lose anything through capture made by the enemy. This would - be a question of superiority of force, for no agreement could - bind the enemy. But the confederacy might very well make a - covenant among themselves, as to the relations between their own - imperial _immediate_ members, and the _mediate_ or subordinate - dependencies of each. Each imperial state consented to forego - the tribute or services of its dependency, so long as the latter - was called upon to lend its aid in the general effort of the - confederacy against the common enemy. But the confederacy at the - same time gave its guarantee, that the imperial state should - reënter upon these suspended rights, so soon as the war should - be at an end. This guarantee was clearly violated by Sparta in - the case of Elis and Lepreum. On the contrary, in the case of - Mantineia, mentioned a few pages back, p. 19, the Mantineians had - violated the maxim of the confederacy, and Sparta was justified - in interfering at the request of their subjects to maintain the - autonomy of the latter. - -That new league, including Argos, Corinth, Elis, and Mantineia, had -now acquired such strength and confidence, that the Argeians and -Corinthians proceeded on a joint embassy to Tegea to obtain the -junction of that city, seemingly the most powerful in Peloponnesus -next to Sparta and Argos. What grounds they had for expecting success -we are not told. The mere fact of Mantineia having joined Argos, -seemed likely to deter Tegea, as the rival Arcadian power, from doing -the same: and so it proved, for the Tegeans decidedly refused the -proposal, not without strenuous protestations that they would stand -by Sparta in everything. The Corinthians were greatly disheartened -by this repulse, which they had by no means expected, having been -so far misled by general expressions of discontent against Sparta -as to believe that they could transfer nearly the whole body of -confederates to Argos. But they now began to despair of all farther -extension of Argeian headship, and even to regard their own position -as insecure on the side of Athens; with whom they were not at peace, -while by joining Argos they had forfeited their claim upon Sparta -and all her confederacy, including Bœotia and Megara. In this -embarrassment they betook themselves to the Bœotians, whom they again -entreated to join them in the Argeian alliance: a request already -once refused, and not likely to be now granted, but intended to usher -in a different request preferred at the same time. The Bœotians were -entreated to accompany the Corinthians to Athens, and obtain for them -from the Athenians an armistice terminable at ten days’ notice, such -as that which they had contracted for themselves. In case of refusal, -they were farther entreated to throw up their own agreement, and to -conclude no other without the concurrence of the Corinthians. So far -the Bœotians complied, as to go to Athens with the Corinthians, and -back their application for an armistice, which the Athenians declined -to grant, saying that the Corinthians were already included in the -general peace, if they were allies of Sparta. On receiving this -answer the Corinthians entreated the Bœotians, putting it as a matter -of obligation, to renounce their own armistice, and make common cause -as to all future compact. But this request was steadily refused. The -Bœotians maintained their ten days’ armistice; and the Corinthians -were obliged to acquiesce in their existing condition of peace _de -facto_, though not guaranteed by any pledge of Athens.[30] - - [30] Thucyd. v, 32. Κορινθίοις δὲ ἀνακωχὴ ἄσπονδος ἦν πρὸς - Ἀθηναίους. - - Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks: “By ἄσπονδος is meant a mere - agreement in words, not ratified by the solemnities of religion. - And the Greeks, as we have seen, considered the breach of their - word very different from the breach of their oath.” - - Not so much is here meant even as that which Dr. Arnold supposes. - There was no agreement at all, either in words or by oath. There - was a simple absence of hostilities, _de facto_, not arising out - of any recognized pledge. Such is the meaning of ἀνακωχὴ, i, 66; - iii, 25, 26. - - The answer here made by the Athenians to the application of - Corinth is not easy to understand. They might, with much better - reason, have declined to conclude the ten day’s armistice with - the _Bœotians_, because these latter still remained allies of - Sparta, though refusing to accede to the general peace; whereas - the Corinthians, having joined Argos, had less right to be - considered allies of Sparta. Nevertheless, we shall still find - them attending the meetings at Sparta, and acting as allies of - the latter. - -Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians were not unmindful of the affront which -they had sustained by the revolt of Mantineia and Elis. At the -request of a party among the Parrhasii, the Arcadian subjects of -Mantineia, they marched under king Pleistoanax into that territory, -and compelled the Mantineians to evacuate the fort which they had -erected within it; which the latter were unable to defend, though -they received a body of Argeian troops to guard their city, and -were thus enabled to march their whole force to the threatened -spot. Besides liberating the Arcadian subjects of Mantineia, -the Lacedæmonians also planted an additional body of Helots and -Neodamodes at Lepreum, as a defence and means of observation on -the frontiers of Elis.[31] These were the Brasidean soldiers, whom -Klearidas had now brought back from Thrace. The Helots among them had -been manumitted as a reward, and allowed to reside where they chose. -But as they had imbibed lessons of bravery under their distinguished -commander, their presence would undoubtedly be dangerous among the -serfs of Laconia: hence the disposition of the Lacedæmonians to -plant them out. We may recollect that not very long before, they -had caused two thousand of the most soldierly Helots to be secretly -assassinated, without any ground of suspicion against these victims -personally, but simply from fear of the whole body and of course -greater fear of the bravest.[32] - - [31] Thucyd. v, 33, 34. The Neodamodes were Helots previously - enfranchised, or the sons of such. - - [32] Thucyd. iv, 80. - -It was not only against danger from the returning Brasidean Helots -that the Lacedæmonians had to guard, but also against danger—real -or supposed—from their own Spartan captives, liberated by Athens -at the conclusion of the recent alliance. Though the surrender of -Sphakteria had been untarnished by any dishonor, nevertheless these -men could hardly fail to be looked upon as degraded, in the eyes -of Spartan pride; or at least they might fancy that they were so -looked upon, and thus become discontented. Some of them were already -in the exercise of various functions, when the ephors contracted -suspicions of their designs, and condemned them all to temporary -disqualification for any official post, placing the whole of their -property under trust-management, and interdicting them, like minors, -from every act either of purchase or sale.[33] This species of -disfranchisement lasted for a considerable time; but the sufferers -were at length relieved from it, the danger being supposed to be -over. The nature of the interdict confirms, what we know directly -from Thucydidês, that many of these captives were among the first and -wealthiest families in the state, and the ephors may have apprehended -that they would employ their wealth in acquiring partisans and -organizing revolt among the Helots. We have no facts to enable -us to appreciate the situation; but the ungenerous spirit of the -regulation, as applied to brave warriors recently come home from a -long imprisonment—justly pointed out by modern historians—would not -weigh much with the ephors under any symptoms of public danger. - - [33] Thucyd. v, 34. Ἀτίμους ἐποίησαν, ἀτιμίαν δὲ τοιαύτην, ὥστε - μήτε ἄρχειν, μήτε πριαμένους τι, ἢ πωλοῦντας, κυρίους εἶναι. - -Of the proceedings of the Athenians during this summer we hear -nothing, except that the town of Skiônê at length surrendered to -them after a long-continued blockade, and that they put to death -the male population of military age, selling the women and children -into slavery. The odium of having proposed this cruel resolution two -years and a half before, belongs to Kleon; that of executing it, -nearly a year after his death, to the leaders who succeeded him, -and to his countrymen generally. The reader will, however, now be -sufficiently accustomed to the Greek laws of war not to be surprised -at such treatment against subjects revolted and reconquered. Skiônê -and its territory was made over to the Platæan refugees. The native -population of Delos, also, who had been removed from that sacred -spot during the preceding year, under the impression that they were -too impure for the discharge of the sacerdotal functions, were -now restored to their island. The subsequent defeat of Amphipolis -had created a belief at Athens that this removal had offended the -gods; under which impression, confirmed by the Delphian oracle, -the Athenians now showed their repentance by restoring the Delian -exiles.[34] They farther lost the towns of Thyssus on the peninsula -of Athos, and Mekyberna on the Sithonian gulf, which were captured by -the Chalkidians of Thrace.[35] - - [34] Thucyd. v, 32. - - [35] Thucyd. v, 35-39. I agree with Dr. Thirlwall and Dr. Arnold - in preferring the conjecture of Poppo, Χαλκιδῆς, in this place. - -Meanwhile the political relations throughout the powerful Grecian -states remained all provisional and undetermined. The alliance still -subsisted between Sparta and Athens, yet with continual complaints on -the part of the latter that the prior treaty remained unfulfilled. -The members of the Spartan confederacy were discontented; some had -seceded, and others seemed likely to do the same; while Argos, -ambitious to supplant Sparta, was trying to put herself at the head -of a new confederacy, though as yet with very partial success. -Hitherto, however, the authorities of Sparta—king Pleistoanax as well -as the ephors of the year—had been sincerely desirous to maintain -the Athenian alliance, so far as it could be done without sacrifice, -and without the real employment of force against recusants, of which -they had merely talked in order to amuse the Athenians. Moreover, -the prodigious advantage which they had gained by recovering the -prisoners, doubtless making them very popular at home, would attach -them the more firmly to their own measure. But at the close of the -summer—seemingly about the end of September or beginning of October, -B.C. 421—the year of these ephors expired, and new ephors were -nominated for the ensuing year. Under the existing state of things -this was an important revolution: for out of the five new ephors, -two—Kleobûlus and Xenarês—were decidedly hostile to peace with -Athens, and the remaining three apparently indifferent.[36] And we -may here remark, that this fluctuation and instability of public -policy, which is often denounced as if it were the peculiar attribute -of a democracy, occurs quite as much under the constitutional -monarchy of Sparta, the least popular government in Greece, both in -principle and detail. - - [36] Thucyd. v, 36. - -The new ephors convened a special congress at Sparta for the -settlement of the pending differences, at which among the rest -Athenian, Bœotian, and Corinthian envoys were all present. But, -after prolonged debates, no approach was made to agreement; so that -the congress was on the point of breaking up, when Kleobûlus and -Xenarês, together with many of their partisans,[37] originated, in -concert with the Bœotian and Corinthian deputies, a series of private -underhand manœuvres for the dissolution of the Athenian alliance. -This was to be effected by bringing about a separate alliance between -Argos and Sparta, which the Spartans sincerely desired, and would -grasp at in preference, so these ephors affirmed, even if it cost -them the breach of their new tie with Athens. The Bœotians were -urged, first to become allies of Argos themselves, and then to bring -Argos into alliance with Sparta. But it was farther essential that -they should give up Panaktum to Sparta, so that it might be tendered -to the Athenians in exchange for Pylos; for Sparta could not easily -go to war with them while they remained masters of the latter.[38] - - [37] Thucyd. v, 37. ἐπεσταλμένοι ἀπό τε τοῦ Κλεοβούλου καὶ - Ξενάρους καὶ ὅσοι φίλοι ἦσαν αὐτοῖς, etc. - - [38] Thucyd. v, 36. - -Such were the plans which Kleobûlus and Xenarês laid with the -Corinthian and Bœotian deputies, and which the latter went home -prepared to execute. Chance seemed to favor the purpose at once: for -on their road home, they were accosted by two Argeians, senators -in their own city, who expressed an earnest anxiety to bring about -alliance between the Bœotians and Argos. The Bœotian deputies, warmly -encouraging this idea, urged the Argeians to send envoys to Thebes -as solicitors of the alliance; and communicated to the bœotarchs, on -their arrival at home, both the plans laid by the Spartan ephors and -the wishes of these Argeians. The bœotarchs also entered heartily -into the entire scheme; receiving the Argeian envoys with marked -favor, and promising, as soon as they should have obtained the -requisite sanction, to send envoys of their own and ask for alliance -with Argos. - -That sanction was to be obtained from “the Four Senates of the -Bœotians;” bodies, of the constitution of which nothing is known. -But they were usually found so passive and acquiescent that the -bœotarchs, reckoning upon their assent as a matter of course, -even without any full exposition of reasons, laid all their plans -accordingly.[39] They proposed to these four Senates a resolution -in general terms, empowering themselves in the name of the Bœotian -federation to exchange oaths of alliance with any Grecian city which -might be willing to contract on terms mutually beneficial: their -particular object being, as they stated, to form alliance with -the Corinthians, Megarians, and Chalkidians of Thrace, for mutual -defence, and for war as well as peace with others only by common -consent. To this specific object they anticipated no resistance on -the part of the Senates, inasmuch as their connection with Corinth -had always been intimate, while the position of the four parties -named was the same, all being recusants of the recent peace. But -the resolution was advisedly couched in the most comprehensive -terms, in order that it might authorize them to proceed farther -afterwards, and conclude alliance on the part of the Bœotians and -Megarians with Argos; that ulterior purpose being however for the -present kept back, because alliance with Argos was a novelty which -might surprise and alarm the Senates. The manœuvre, skilfully -contrived for entrapping these bodies into an approval of measures -which they never contemplated, illustrates the manner in which an -oligarchical executive could elude the checks devised to control -its proceedings. But the bœotarchs, to their astonishment, found -themselves defeated at the outset: for the Senates would not even -hear of alliance with Corinth, so much did they fear to offend Sparta -by any special connection with a city which had revolted from her. -Nor did the bœotarchs think it safe to divulge their communications -with Kleobûlus and Xenarês, or to acquaint the Senates that the whole -plan originated with a powerful party in Sparta herself. Accordingly, -under this formal refusal on the part of the Senates, no farther -proceedings could be taken. The Corinthian and Chalkidian envoys left -Thebes, while the promise of sending Bœotian envoys to Argos remained -unexecuted.[40] - - [39] Thucyd. v, 38. οἰόμενοι τὴν βουλὴν, κἂν μὴ εἴπωσιν, οὐκ ἄλλα - ψηφιεῖσθαι ἢ ἃ σφίσι προδιαγνόντες παραινοῦσιν ... ταῖς τέσσαρσι - βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν, αἵπερ ἅπαν τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσι. - - [40] Thucyd. v, 38. - -But the anti-Athenian ephors at Sparta, though baffled in their -schemes for arriving at the Argeian alliance through the agency -of the Bœotians, did not the less persist in their views upon -Panaktum. That place—a frontier fortress in the mountainous range -between Attica and Bœotia, apparently on the Bœotian side of Phylê, -and on or near the direct road from Athens to Thebes which led -through Phylê[41]—had been an Athenian possession, until six months -before the peace, when it had been treacherously betrayed to the -Bœotians.[42] A special provision of the treaty between Athens -and Sparta, prescribed that it should be restored to Athens; and -Lacedæmonian envoys were now sent on an express mission to Bœotia, -to request from the Bœotians the delivery of Panaktum as well as -of their Athenian captives, in order that by tendering these to -Athens she might be induced to surrender Pylos. The Bœotians refused -compliance with this request, except on condition that Sparta should -enter into special alliance with them as she had done with the -Athenians. Now the Spartans stood pledged by their covenant with the -latter, either by its terms or by its recognized import, not to enter -into any new alliance without their consent. But they were eagerly -bent upon getting possession of Panaktum; while the prospect of -breach with Athens, far from being a deterring motive, was exactly -that which Kleobûlus and Xenarês desired. Under these feelings, -the Lacedæmonians consented to and swore the special alliance with -Bœotia. But the Bœotians, instead of handing over Panaktum for -surrender, as they had promised, immediately razed the fortress to -the ground; under pretence of some ancient oaths which had been -exchanged between their ancestors and the Athenians, to the effect -that the district round it should always remain without resident -inhabitants, as a neutral strip of borderland, and under common -pasture. - - [41] See Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. ii, ch. - xvii, p. 370. - - [42] Thucyd. v, 3. - -These negotiations, after having been in progress throughout -the winter, ended in the accomplishment of the alliance and the -destruction of Panaktum at the beginning of spring or about the -middle of March. And while the Lacedæmonian ephors thus seemed to -be carrying their point on the side of Bœotia, they were agreeably -surprised by an unexpected encouragement to their views from another -quarter. An embassy arrived at Sparta from Argos, to solicit renewal -of the peace just expiring. The Argeians found that they made no -progress in the enlargement of their newly-formed confederacy, while -their recent disappointment with the Bœotians made them despair of -realizing their ambitious projects of Peloponnesian headship. But -when they learned that the Lacedæmonians had concluded a separate -alliance with the Bœotians, and that Panaktum had been razed, their -disappointment was converted into positive alarm for the future. -Naturally inferring that this new alliance would not have been -concluded except in concert with Athens, they interpreted the whole -proceeding as indicating that Sparta had prevailed upon the Bœotians -to accept the peace with Athens, the destruction of Panaktum being -conceived as a compromise to obviate disputes respecting possession. -Under such a persuasion,—noway unreasonable in itself, when the two -contracting governments, both oligarchical and both secret, furnished -no collateral evidence to explain their real intent,—the Argeians saw -themselves excluded from alliance not merely with Bœotia, Sparta, -and Tegea, but also with Athens; which latter city they had hitherto -regarded as a sure resort in case of hostility with Sparta. Without -a moment’s delay, they despatched Eustrophus and Æson, two Argeians -much esteemed at Sparta, and perhaps proxeni of that city, to press -for a renewal of their expiring truce with the Spartans, and to -obtain the best terms they could. - -To the Lacedæmonian ephors this application was eminently acceptable, -the very event which they had been manœuvring underhand to bring -about: and negotiations were opened, in which the Argeian envoys -at first proposed that the disputed possession of Thyrea should -be referred to arbitration. But they found their demand met by a -peremptory negative, the Lacedæmonians refusing to enter upon such -a discussion, and insisting upon simple renewal of the peace now at -an end. At last the Argeian envoys, eagerly bent upon keeping the -question respecting Thyrea open, in some way or other, prevailed upon -the Lacedæmonians to assent to the following singular agreement. -Peace was concluded between Athens and Sparta for fifty years; but -if at any moment within that interval, excluding either periods -of epidemic or periods of war, it should suit the views of either -party to provoke a combat by chosen champions of equal number for -the purpose of determining the right to Thyrea, there was to be full -liberty of doing so; the combat to take place within the territory of -Thyrea itself, and the victors to be interdicted from pursuing the -vanquished beyond the undisputed border of either territory. It will -be recollected, that about one hundred and twenty years before this -date, there had been a combat of this sort by three hundred champions -on each side, in which, after desperate valor on both sides, the -victory as well as the disputed right still remained undetermined. -The proposition made by the Argeians was a revival of this old -practice of judicial combat: nevertheless, such was the alteration -which the Greek mind had undergone during the interval, that it now -appeared a perfect absurdity, even in the eyes of the Lacedæmonians, -the most old-fashioned people in Greece.[43] Yet since they hazarded -nothing, practically, by so vague a concession, and were supremely -anxious to make their relations smooth with Argos, in contemplation -of a breach with Athens, they at last agreed to the condition, drew -up the treaty, and placed it in the hands of the envoys to carry back -to Argos. Formal acceptance and ratification, by the Argeian public -assembly, was necessary to give it validity: should this be granted, -the envoys were invited to return to Sparta at the festival of the -Hyakinthia, and there go through the solemnity of the oaths. - -Amidst such strange crossing of purposes and interests, the Spartan -ephors seemed now to have carried all their points; friendship with -Argos, breach with Athens, and yet the means—through the possession -of Panaktum—of procuring from Athens the cession of Pylos. But they -were not yet on firm ground. For when their deputies, Andromedês -and two colleagues, arrived in Bœotia for the purpose of going on -to Athens and prosecuting the negotiation about Panaktum, at the -time when Eustrophus and Æson were carrying on their negotiation at -Sparta, they discovered for the first time that the Bœotians, instead -of performing their promise to hand over Panaktum, had razed it to -the ground. This was a serious blow to their chance of success at -Athens: nevertheless, Andromedês proceeded thither, taking with him -all the Athenian captives in Bœotia. These he restored at Athens, -at the same time announcing the demolition of Panaktum as a fact: -Panaktum as well as the prisoners was thus _restored_, he pretended; -for the Athenians would not now find a single enemy in the place: and -he claimed the cession of Pylos in exchange.[44] - - [43] Thucyd. v, 41. Τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐδόκει - μωρία εἶναι ταῦτα· ἔπειτα (ἐπεθύμουν γὰρ τὸ Ἄργος πάντως φίλιον - ἔχειν) ξυνεχώρησαν ἐφ’ οἷς ἠξίουν, καὶ ξυνεγράψαντο. - - By the forms of treaty which remain, we are led to infer that - the treaty was not subscribed by any signatures, but drawn up by - the secretary or authorized officer, and ultimately engraved on - a column. The names of those who take the oath are recorded, but - seemingly no official signature. - - [44] Thucyd. v. 42. - -But he soon found that the final term of Athenian compliance had been -reached. It was probably on this occasion that the separate alliance -concluded between Sparta and the Bœotians first became discovered at -Athens; since not only were the proceedings of these oligarchical -governments habitually secret, but there was a peculiar motive for -keeping this alliance concealed until the discussion about Panaktum -and Pylos had been brought to a close. Both this alliance, and the -demolition of Panaktum, excited among the Athenians the strongest -marks of disgust and anger; aggravated probably rather than softened -by the quibble of Andromedês, that demolition of the fort, being -tantamount to restitution, and precluding any farther tenancy by the -enemy, was a substantial satisfaction of the treaty; and aggravated -still farther by the recollection of all the other unperformed -items in the treaty. A whole year had now elapsed, amidst frequent -notes and protocols, to employ a modern phrase; yet not one of the -conditions favorable to Athens had yet been executed, except the -restitution of her captives, seemingly not many in number; while she -on her side had made to Sparta the capital cession on which almost -everything hinged. A long train of accumulated indignation, brought -to a head by this mission of Andromedês, discharged itself in the -harshest dismissal and rebuke of himself and his colleagues.[45] - - [45] Thucyd. v. 42. - -Even Nikias, Lachês, and the other leading men, to whose improvident -facility and misjudgment the embarrassment of the moment was owing, -were probably not much behind the general public in exclamation -against Spartan perfidy, if it were only to divert attention from -their own mistake. But there was one of them—Alkibiadês son of -Kleinias—who took this opportunity of putting himself at the head of -the vehement anti-Laconian sentiment which now agitated the ekklesia, -and giving to it a substantive aim. - -The present is the first occasion on which we hear of this remarkable -man as taking a prominent part in public life. He was now about -thirty-one or thirty-two years old, which in Greece was considered -an early age for a man to exercise important command. But such was -the splendor, wealth, and antiquity of his family, of Æakid lineage -through the heroes Eurysakês and Ajax, and such the effect of that -lineage upon the democratical public of Athens,[46] that he stepped -speedily and easily into a conspicuous station. Belonging also -through his mother Deinomachê to the gens of the Alkmæonidæ, he -was related to Periklês, who became his guardian when he was left -an orphan at about five years old, along with his younger brother -Kleinias. It was at that time that their father Kleinias was slain at -the battle of Koroneia, having already served with honor in a trireme -of his own at the sea-fight of Artemisium against the Persians. A -Spartan nurse named Amykla was provided for the young Alkibiadês, and -a slave named Zopyrus chosen by his distinguished guardian to watch -over him; but even his boyhood was utterly ungovernable, and Athens -was full of his freaks and enormities, to the unavailing regret of -Periklês and his brother Ariphron.[47] His violent passions, love of -enjoyment, ambition of preëminence, and insolence towards others,[48] -were manifested at an early age, and never deserted him throughout -his life. His finished beauty of person both as boy, youth, and -mature man, caused him to be much run after by women,[49] and even -by women of generally reserved habits. Moreover, even before the -age when such temptations were usually presented, the beauty of his -earlier youth, while going through the ordinary gymnastic training, -procured for him assiduous caresses, compliments, and solicitations -of every sort, from the leading Athenians who frequented the public -palæstræ. These men not only endured his petulance, but were -even flattered when he would condescend to bestow it upon them. -Amidst such universal admiration and indulgence, amidst corrupting -influences exercised from so many quarters and from so early an -age, combined with great wealth and the highest position, it was -not likely that either self-restraint or regard for the welfare of -others would ever acquire development in the mind of Alkibiadês. The -anecdotes which fill his biography reveal the utter absence of both -these constituent elements of morality; and though, in regard to the -particular stories, allowance must doubtless be made for scandal -and exaggeration, yet the general type of character stands plainly -marked and sufficiently established in all. - - [46] Thucyd. v. 43. Ἀλκιβιάδης ... ἀνὴρ ἡλικίᾳ μὲν ὢν ἔτι τότε - νέος, ὡς ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει, ἀξιώματι δὲ προγόνων τιμώμενος. - - The expression cf Plutarch, however, ἔτι μειράκιον, seems an - exaggeration (Alkibiad. c. 10). - - Kritias and Chariklês, in reply to the question of Sokratês, whom - they had forbidden to converse with or teach young men, defined a - _young man_ to be one under thirty years of age, the senatorial - age at Athens (Xenophon, Memor. i. 2. 35). - - [47] Plato, Protagoras, c. 10, p. 320; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. - 2, 3, 4; Isokratês, De Bigis, Orat. xvi, p. 353, sect. 33, 34; - Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 1. - - [48] Πέπονθα δὲ πρὸς τοῦτον (Σωκράτη) μόνον ἀνθρώπων, ~ὃ οὐκ ἄν - τις οἴοιτο ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐνεῖναι, τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι ὁντινοῦν~. - - This is a part of the language which Plato puts into the mouth - of Alkibiadês, in the Symposion, c. 32, p. 216; see also Plato, - Alkibiad. i, c. 1, 2, 3. - - Compare his other contemporary, Xenophon, Memor. i, 2, 16-25. - - Φύσει δὲ πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ μεγάλων πάθων ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ φιλόνεικον - ἰσχυρότατον ἦν καὶ τὸ φιλόπρωτον, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστι τοῖς παιδικοῖς - ὑπομνήμασι (Plutarch, Alkib. c. 2). - - [49] I translate, with some diminution of the force of the words, - the expression of a contemporary author, Xenophon, Memorab. i, - 2. 24. Ἀλκιβιάδης δ’ αὖ διὰ μὲν κάλλος ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν - γυναικῶν ~θηρώμενος~, etc. - -A dissolute life, and an immoderate love of pleasure in all its -forms, is what we might naturally expect from a young man so -circumstanced; and it appears that with him these tastes were -indulged with an offensive publicity which destroyed the comfort -of his wife Hipparetê, daughter of Hipponikus who was slain at the -battle of Delium. She had brought him a large dowry of ten talents: -when she sought a divorce, as the law of Athens permitted, Alkibiadês -violently interposed to prevent her from obtaining the benefit of -the law, and brought her back by force to his house even from the -presence of the magistrate. It is this violence of selfish passion, -and reckless disregard of social obligation towards every one, -which forms the peculiar characteristic of Alkibiadês. He strikes -the schoolmaster whose house he happens to find unprovided with a -copy of Homer; he strikes Taureas,[50] a rival chorêgus, in the -public theatre, while the representation is going on; he strikes -Hipponikus, who afterwards became his father-in-law, out of a wager -of mere wantonness, afterwards appeasing him by an ample apology; -he protects the Thasian poet Hêgêmon, against whom an indictment -had been formally lodged before the archon, by effacing it with -his own hand from the published list in the public edifice, called -Metrôon; defying both magistrate and accuser to press the cause on -for trial.[51] Nor does it appear that any injured person ever dared -to bring Alkibiadês to trial before the dikastery, though we read -with amazement the tissue of lawlessness[52] which marked his private -life; a combination of insolence and ostentation with occasional -mean deceit when it suited his purpose. But amidst the perfect legal, -judicial, and constitutional equality, which reigned among the -citizens of Athens, there still remained great social inequalities -between one man and another, handed down from the times preceding -the democracy: inequalities which the democratical institutions -limited in their practical mischiefs, but never either effaced or -discredited, and which were recognized as modifying elements in the -current, unconscious vein of sentiment and criticism, by those whom -they injured as well as by those whom they favored. In the speech -which Thucydidês[53] ascribes to Alkibiadês before the Athenian -public assembly, we find the insolence of wealth and high social -position not only admitted as a fact, but vindicated as a just -morality; and the history of his life, as well as many other facts -in Athenian society, show that if not approved, it was at least -tolerated in practice to a serious extent, in spite of the restraints -of the democracy. - - [50] Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, c. 49; Thucyd. vi, 16; Antipho - apud Athenæum, xii, p. 525. - - [51] Athenæus, ix, p. 407. - - [52] Thucyd. vi, 15. I translate the expression of Thucydidês, - which is of great force and significance—φοβηθέντες γὰρ αὐτοῦ οἱ - πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα ~παρανομίας~ ἐς τὴν - δίαιταν, etc. The same word is repeated by the historian, vi, 28. - τὴν ἄλλην αὐτοῦ ἐς τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δημοτικὴν ~παρανομίαν~. - - The same phrase is also found in the short extract from the - λοιδορία of Antipho (Athenæus, xii, p. 525). - - The description of Alkibiadês, given in that Discourse called the - Ἐρωτικὸς Λόγος, erroneously ascribed to Demosthenês (c. 12, p. - 1414), is more discriminating than we commonly find in rhetorical - compositions. Τοῦτο δ’, Ἀλκιβιάδην εὑρήσεις φύσει μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν - πολλῷ χεῖρον διακείμενον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπερηφάνως, τὰ δὲ ταπεινῶς, - τὰ δ’ ὑπεράκρως, ζῆν προῃρημένον· ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς Σωκράτους ὁμιλίας - πολλὰ μὲν ἐπανορθωθέντα τοῦ βίου, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν - ἄλλων ἔργων ἐπικρυψάμενον. - - Of the three epithets, whereby the author describes the bad - tendencies of Alkibiadês, full illustrations will be seen in his - proceedings, hereafter to be described. The improving influence - here ascribed to Sokratês is unfortunately far less borne out. - - [53] Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 4; Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 2; - Plato, Protagoras, c. 1. - - I do not know how far the memorable narrative ascribed to - Alkibiadês in the Symposium of Plato (c. 33, 34, pp. 216, 217) - can be regarded as matter of actual fact and history, so far as - Sokratês is concerned; but it is abundant proof in regard to the - general relations of Alkibiadês with others: compare Xenophon, - Memorab. i, 2, 29, 30; iv. 1-2. - - Several of the dialogues of Plato present to us striking pictures - of the palæstra, with the boys, the young men, the gymnastic - teachers, engaged in their exercises or resting from them, and - the philosophers and spectators who came there for amusement - and conversation. See particularly the opening chapters of the - Lysis and the Charmidês; also the Rivales, where the scene is - laid in the house of a γραμματιστὴς, or schoolmaster. In the - Lysis, Sokratês professes to set his own conversation with - these interesting youths as an antidote to the corrupting - flatteries of most of those who sought to gain their good-will. - Οὕτω χρὴ, ὦ Ἱππόθαλες, τοῖς παιδικοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, ταπεινοῦντα - καὶ συστέλλοντα, ἀλλὰ μὴ, ὥσπερ σὺ, χαυνοῦντα καὶ διαθρύπτοντα - (Lysis, c. 7, p. 210). - - See, in illustration of what is here said about Alkibiadês as - a youth, Euripid. Supplic. 906 (about Parthenopæus), and the - beautiful lines in the Atys of Catullus, 60-69. - - There cannot be a doubt that the characters of all the Greek - youth of any pretensions were considerably affected by this - society and conversation of their boyish years; though the - subject is one upon which the full evidence cannot well be - produced and discussed. - -Amidst such unprincipled exorbitances of behavior, Alkibiadês stood -distinguished for personal bravery. He served as a hoplite in the -army under Phormion at the siege of Potidæa in 432 B.C. Though then -hardly twenty years of age, he was among the most forward soldiers -in the battle, received a severe wound, and was in great danger; -owing his life only to the exertions of Sokratês, who served in -the ranks along with him. Eight years afterwards, Alkibiadês also -served with credit in the cavalry at the battle of Delium, and -had the opportunity of requiting his obligation to Sokratês, by -protecting him against the Bœotian pursuers. As a rich young man, -also, choregy and trierarchy became incumbent upon him; expensive -duties, which, as we might expect, he discharged not merely with -sufficiency, but with ostentation. In fact, expenditure of this sort, -though compulsory up to a certain point upon all rich men, was so -fully repaid, to all those who had the least ambition, in the shape -of popularity and influence, that most of them spontaneously went -beyond the requisite minimum for the purpose of showing themselves -off. The first appearance of Alkibiadês in public life is said to -have been as a donor, for some special purpose, in the ekklesia, when -various citizens were handing in their contributions: and the loud -applause which his subscription provoked was at that time so novel -and exciting to him, that he suffered a tame quail which he carried -in his bosom to escape. This incident excited mirth and sympathy -among the citizens present: the bird was caught and restored to him -by Antiochus, who from that time forward acquired his favor, and in -after days became his pilot and confidential lieutenant.[54] - - [54] Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 10. - -To a young man like Alkibiadês, thirsting for power and preëminence, -a certain measure of rhetorical facility and persuasive power was -indispensable. With a view to this acquisition, he frequented the -society of various sophistical and rhetorical teachers,[55] Prodikus, -Protagoras, and others; but most of all that of Sokratês. His -intimacy with Sokratês has become celebrated on many grounds, and -is commemorated both by Plato and Xenophon, though unfortunately -with less instruction than we could desire. We may readily believe -Xenophon, when he tells us that Alkibiadês—like the oligarchical -Kritias, of whom we shall have much to say hereafter—was attracted -to Sokratês by his unrivalled skill of dialectical conversation, his -suggestive influence over the minds of his hearers, in eliciting -new thoughts and combinations, his mastery of apposite and homely -illustrations, his power of seeing far beforehand the end of a long -cross-examination, his ironical affectation of ignorance, whereby -the humiliation of opponents was rendered only the more complete, -when they were convicted of inconsistency and contradiction out -of their own answers. The exhibitions of such ingenuity were in -themselves highly interesting, and stimulating to the mental -activity of listeners, while the faculty itself was one of peculiar -value to those who proposed to take the lead in public debate; -with which view both these ambitious young men tried to catch the -knack from Sokratês,[56] and to copy his formidable string of -interrogations. Both of them doubtless involuntarily respected the -poor, self-sufficing, honest, temperate, and brave citizen, in whom -this eminent talent resided; especially Alkibiadês, who not only owed -his life to the generous valor of Sokratês at Potidæa, but had also -learned in that service to admire the iron physical frame of the -philosopher in his armor, enduring hunger, cold, and hardship.[57] -But we are not to suppose that either of them came to Sokratês with -the purpose of hearing and obeying his precepts on matters of duty, -or receiving from him a new plan of life. They came partly to gratify -an intellectual appetite, partly to acquire a stock of words and -ideas, with facility of argumentative handling, suitable for their -after-purpose as public speakers. Subjects moral, political, and -intellectual, served as the theme sometimes of discourse, sometimes -of discussion, in the society of all these sophists, Prodikus and -Protagoras not less than Sokratês; for in the Athenian sense of -the word, Sokratês was a sophist as well as the others: and to the -rich youths of Athens, like Alkibiadês and Kritias, such society -was highly useful.[58] It imparted a nobler aim to their ambition, -including mental accomplishments as well as political success: -it enlarged the range of their understandings, and opened to them -as ample a vein of literature and criticism as the age afforded: -it accustomed them to canvass human conduct, with the causes and -obstructions of human well-being, both public and private: it even -suggested to them indirectly lessons of duty and prudence, from which -their social position tended to estrange them, and which they would -hardly have submitted to hear except from the lips of one whom they -intellectually admired. In learning to talk, they were forced to -learn more or less to think, and familiarized with the difference -between truth and error: nor would an eloquent lecturer fail to -enlist their feelings in the great topics of morals and politics. -Their thirst for mental stimulus and rhetorical accomplishments had -thus, as far as it went, a moralizing effect, though this was rarely -their purpose in the pursuit.[59] - - [55] See the description in the Protagoras of Plato, c. 8, p. 317. - - [56] See Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 12-24, 39-47. - - Κριτίας μὲν καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης, οὐκ ἀρέσκοντος αὐτοῖς Σωκράτους - ὡμιλησάτην, ὃν χρόνον ὡμιλείτην αὐτῷ, ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς - ὡρμηκότε προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως. Ἔτι γὰρ Σωκράτει ξυνόντες - οὐκ ἄλλοις τισὶ μᾶλλον ἐπεχείρουν διαλέγεσθαι ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα - πράττουσι τὰ πολιτικά.... Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τάχιστα τῶν πολιτευομένων - ὑπέλαβον κρείττονες εἶναι, Σωκράτει μὲν οὐκ ἔτι προσῄεσαν, οὐδὲ - γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἄλλως ἤρεσκεν· εἴτε προσέλθοιεν, ὑπὲρ ὧν, ἡμάρτανον - ἐλεγχόμενοι ἤχθοντο· τὰ δὲ τῆς πóλεως ἔπραττον, ὧνπερ ἕνεκεν καὶ - Σωκράτει προσῆλθον. Compare Plato, Apolog. Sokrat. c. 10, p. 23; - c. 22, p. 33. - - Xenophon represents Alkibiadês and Kritias as frequenting the - society of Sokratês, for the same reason and with the same - objects as Plato affirms that young men generally went to the - Sophists: see Plato, Sophist. c. 20, p. 232 D. - - “Nam et Socrati (observes Quintilian, Inst. Or. ii, 16) objiciunt - comici, docere cum, quomodo pejorem causam meliorem reddat; et - contra Tisiam et Gorgiam similia dicit polliceri Plato.” - - The representation given by Plato of the great influence acquired - by Sokratês over Alkibiadês, and of the deference and submission - of the latter, is plainly not to be taken as historical, even if - we had not the more simple and trustworthy picture of Xenophon. - Isokratês goes so far as to say that Sokratês was never known by - any one as teacher of Alkibiadês: which is an exaggeration in the - other direction. Isokratês, Busiris, Or. xi. sect. 6, p. 222. - - [57] Plato, Symposium, c. 35-36, p. 220, etc. - - [58] See the representation, given in the Protagoras of Plato, - of the temper in which the young and wealthy Hippokratês goes - to seek instruction from Protagoras, and of the objects which - Protagoras proposes to himself in imparting the instruction. - Plato, Protagoras, c. 2, p. 310 D.; c. 8, p. 316 C.; c. 9, p. - 318, etc.: compare also Plato, Meno. p. 91, and Gorgias, c. 4. p. - 449 E., asserting the connection, in the mind of Gorgias, between - teaching to speak and teaching to think—λέγειν καὶ φρονεῖν, etc. - - It would not be reasonable to repeat, as true and just, all the - polemical charges against those who are called Sophists, even as - we find them in Plato, without scrutiny and consideration. But - modern writers on Grecian affairs run down the Sophists even more - than Plato did, and take no notice of the admissions in their - favor which he, though their opponent, is perpetually making. - - This is a very extensive subject, to which I hope to revert. - - [59] I dissent entirely from the judgment of Dr. Thirlwall, who - repeats what is the usual representation of Sokratês and the - Sophists, depicting Alkibiadês as “ensnared by the Sophists,” - while Sokratês is described as a good genius preserving him from - their corruptions (Hist. of Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, pp. - 312, 313, 314). I think him also mistaken when he distinguishes - so pointedly Sokratês from the Sophists; when he describes - the Sophists as “pretenders to wisdom;” as “a new school;” as - “teaching that there was no real difference between truth and - falsehood, right and wrong,” etc. - - All the plausibility that there is in this representation, arises - from a confusion between the original sense and the modern sense - of the word Sophist; the latter seemingly first bestowed upon the - word by Plato and Aristotle. In the common ancient acceptation - of the word at Athens, it meant not a _school_ of persons - professing common doctrines, but a _class_ of men bearing the - same name, because they derived their celebrity from analogous - objects of study and common intellectual occupation. The Sophists - were men of similar calling and pursuits, partly speculative, - partly professional; but they differed widely from each other, - both in method and doctrine. (See for example Isokratês, cont. - Sophistas, Orat. xiii; Plato, Meno. p. 87 B.) Whoever made - himself eminent in speculative pursuits, and communicated his - opinions by public lecture, discussion, or conversation, was - called a Sophist, whatever might be the conclusions which he - sought to expound or defend. The difference between taking money, - and expounding gratuitously, on which Sokratês himself was so - fond of dwelling (Xenoph. Memor. i, 6, 12), has plainly no - essential bearing on the case. When Æschinês the orator reminds - the dikasts, “Recollect that you Athenians put to death _the - Sophist Sokratês_, because he was shown to have been the teacher - of Kritias,” (Æschin. cont. Timarch. c. 34, p. 74,) he uses the - word in its natural and true Athenian sense. He had no point to - make against Sokratês, who had then been dead more than forty - years; but he describes him by his profession or occupation, just - as he would have said, _Hippokratês the physician_, _Pheidias - the sculptor_, etc. Dionysius of Halikarn. calls both Plato and - Isokratês sophists (Ars Rhetor. De Compos. Verborum, p. 208 R.). - The Nubes of Aristophanês, and the defences put forth by Plato - and Xenophon, show that Sokratês was not only called by the name - Sophist, but regarded just in the same light as that in which - Dr. Thirlwall presents to us what he calls “the new School of - the Sophists;” as “a corruptor of youth, indifferent to truth or - falsehood, right or wrong,” etc. See a striking passage in the - Politicus of Plato, c. 38, p. 299 B. Whoever thinks, as I think, - that these accusations were falsely advanced against Sokratês, - will be careful how he advances them against the general - profession to which Sokratês belonged. - - That there were unprincipled and immoral men among the class of - Sophists—as there are and always have been among schoolmasters, - professors, lawyers, etc., and all bodies of men—I do not - doubt; in what proportion, we cannot determine. But the extreme - hardship of passing a sweeping condemnation on the great body - of intellectual teachers at Athens, and canonizing exclusively - Sokratês and his followers, will be felt, when we recollect that - the well-known Apologue, called the _Choice of Hercules_, was the - work of the Sophist Prodikus, and his favorite theme of lecture - (Xenophon, Memor. ii, 1, 21-34). To this day, that Apologue - remains without a superior, for the impressive simplicity with - which it presents one of the most important points of view of - moral obligation: and it has been embodied in a greater number of - books of elementary morality than anything of Sokratês, Plato, - or Xenophon. To treat the author of that Apologue, and the - class to which he belonged, as teaching “that there was no real - difference between right and wrong, truth and falsehood,” etc., - is a criticism not in harmony with the just and liberal tone of - Dr. Thirlwall’s history. - - I will add that Plato himself, in a very important passage of - the Republic (vi, c. 6, 7, pp. 492-493), refutes the imputation - against the Sophists of being specially the corruptors of youth. - He represents them as inculcating upon their youthful pupils that - morality which was received as true and just in their age and - society; nothing better, nothing worse. The grand corruptor, he - says, is society itself; the Sophists merely repeat the voice - and judgment of society. Without inquiring at present how far - Plato or Sokratês were right in condemning the received morality - of their countrymen, I most fully accept his assertion that the - great body of the contemporary professional teachers taught what - was considered good morality among the Athenian public: there - were doubtless some who taught a better morality, others who - taught a worse. And this may be said with equal truth of the - great body of professional teachers in every age and nation. - - Xenophon enumerates various causes to which he ascribes the - corruption of the character of Alkibiadês; wealth, rank, personal - beauty, flatterers, etc.; but he does not name the Sophists among - them (Memorab. i, 2. 24, 25). - -Alkibiadês, full of impulse and ambition of every kind, enjoyed -the conversation of all the eminent talkers and lecturers to be -found in Athens, that of Sokratês most of all and most frequently. -The philosopher became greatly attached to him, and doubtless lost -no opportunity of inculcating on him salutary lessons, as far as -could be done, without disgusting the pride of a haughty and spoiled -youth who was looking forward to the celebrity of public life. -But unhappily his lessons never produced any serious effect, and -ultimately became even distasteful to the pupil. The whole life -of Alkibiadês attests how faintly the sentiment of obligation, -public or private, ever got footing in his mind; how much the ends -which he pursued were dictated by overbearing vanity and love of -aggrandizement. In the later part of life, Sokratês was marked out -to public hatred by his enemies, as having been the teacher of -Alkibiadês and Kritias. And if we could be so unjust as to judge of -the morality of the teacher by that of these two pupils, we should -certainly rank him among the worst of the Athenian sophists. - -At the age of thirty-one or thirty-two, the earliest at which it -was permitted to look forward to an ascendent position in public -life, Alkibiadês came forward with a reputation stained by private -enormities, and with a number of enemies created by his insolent -demeanor. But this did not hinder him from stepping into that -position to which his rank, connections, and club-partisans, afforded -him introduction; nor was he slow in displaying his extraordinary -energy, decision, and capacity of command. From the beginning to -the end of his eventful political life, he showed a combination -of boldness in design, resource in contrivance, and vigor in -execution, not surpassed by any one of his contemporary Greeks: and -what distinguished him from all was his extraordinary flexibility -of character[60] and consummate power of adapting himself to new -habits, new necessities, and new persons, whenever circumstances -required. Like Themistoklês, whom he resembled as well in ability and -vigor as in want of public principle and in recklessness about means, -Alkibiadês was essentially a man of action. Eloquence was in him a -secondary quality, subordinate to action; and though he possessed -enough of it for his purposes, his speeches were distinguished -only for pertinence of matter, often imperfectly expressed, at -least according to the high standard of Athens.[61] But his career -affords a memorable example of splendid qualities, both for action -and command, ruined and turned into instruments of mischief by -the utter want of morality, public and private. A strong tide of -individual hatred was thus roused against him, as well from middling -citizens whom he had insulted, as from rich men whom his ruinous -ostentation outshone. For his exorbitant voluntary expenditure in -the public festivals, transcending the largest measure of private -fortune, satisfied discerning men that he would reimburse himself -by plundering the public, and even, if opportunity offered, by -overthrowing[62] the constitution to make himself master of the -persons and properties of his fellow-citizens. He never inspired -confidence or esteem in any one; and sooner or later, among a public -like that of Athens, so much accumulated odium and suspicion was sure -to bring a public man to ruin, in spite of the strongest admiration -for his capacity. He was always the object of very conflicting -sentiments: “The Athenians desired him, hated him, but still -wished to have him,” was said in the latter years of his life by a -contemporary poet; while we find also another pithy precept delivered -in regard to him: “You ought not to keep a lion’s whelp in your city -at all; but, if you choose to keep him, you must submit yourself to -his behavior.”[63] Athens had to feel the force of his energy, as an -exile and enemy, but the great harm which he did to her was in his -capacity of adviser; awakening in his countrymen the same thirst for -showy, rapacious, uncertain, perilous aggrandizement which dictated -his own personal actions. - - [60] Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 1; Satyrus apud Athenæum, xii, - p. 534; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 23. - - Οὗ γὰρ τοιούτων δεῖ, τοιοῦτος εἰμ’ ἐγώ, says Odysseus, in the - Philoktêtês of Sophoklês. - - [61] I follow the criticism which Plutarch cites from - Theophrastus, seemingly discriminating and measured: much - more trustworthy than the vague eulogy of Nepos, or even of - Demosthenês (of course not from his own knowledge), upon the - eloquence of Alkibiadês (Plutarch, Alkib. c. 10); Plutarch, - Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. c. 8, p. 804. - - Antisthenês, companion and pupil of Sokratês, and originator of - what is called the Cynic philosophy, contemporary and personally - acquainted with Alkibiadês, was full of admiration for his - extreme personal beauty, and pronounced him to be strong, manly, - and audacious, but unschooled, ~ἀπαίδευτον~. His scandals about - the lawless life of Alkibiadês, however, exceed what we can - reasonably admit, even from a contemporary (Antisthenês ap. - Athenæum, v, p. 220, xii, p. 534). Antisthenês had composed a - dialogue called Alkibiadês (Diog. Laërt. vi, 15). - - See the collection of the Fragmenta Antisthenis (by A. G. - Winckelmann, Zurich, 1842, pp. 17-19). - - The comic writers of the day—Eupolis, Aristophanês, Pherekratês, - and others—seem to have been abundant in their jests and libels - against the excesses of Alkibiadês, real or supposed. There was - a tale, untrue, but current in comic tradition, that Alkibiadês, - who was not a man to suffer himself to be insulted with impunity, - had drowned Eupolis in the sea, in revenge, for his comedy of the - Baptæ. See Meineke, Fragm. Com. Græ. Eupolidis Βάπται and Κόλακες - (vol. ii, pp. 447-494), and Aristophanês Τριφαλῆς, p. 1166: - also Meineke’s first volume, Historia Critica Comic. Græc. pp. - 124-136; and the Dissertat. xix, in Buttmann’s _Mythologus_, on - the Baptæ and the Cotyttia. - - [62] Thucyd. vi, 15. Compare Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præc. c. 4, p. - 800. The sketch which Plato draws in the first three chapters of - the ninth Book of the Republic, of the citizen who erects himself - into a despot and enslaves his fellow-citizens, exactly suits the - character of Alkibiadês. See also the same treatise, vi, 6-8, pp. - 491-494, and the preface of Schleiermacher to his translation of - the Platonic dialogue called Alkibiadês the first. - - [63] Aristophan. Ranæ, 1445-1453; Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 16; - Plutarch, Nikias, c. 9. - -Mentioning Alkibiadês now for the first time, I have somewhat -anticipated on future chapters, in order to present a general idea -of his character, hereafter to be illustrated. But at the moment -which we have now reached (March, 420 B.C.) the lion’s whelp was yet -young, and had neither acquired his entire strength nor disclosed his -full-grown claws. - -He began to put himself forward as a party leader, seemingly not long -before the Peace of Nikias. The political traditions hereditary in -his family, as in that of his relation Periklês, were democratical: -his grandfather Alkibiadês had been vehement in his opposition -to the Peisistratids, and had even afterwards publicly renounced -an established connection of hospitality with the Lacedæmonian -government, from strong antipathy to them on political grounds. But -Alkibiadês himself, in commencing political life, departed from this -family tradition, and presented himself as a partisan of oligarchical -and philo-Laconian sentiment, doubtless far more consonant to his -natural temper than the democratical. He thus started in the same -general party with Nikias and Thessalus son of Kimôn, who afterwards -became his bitter opponents; and it was in part probably to put -himself on a par with them, that he took the marked step of trying to -revive the ancient family tie of hospitality with Sparta, which his -grandfather had broken off.[64] - - [64] Thucyd. v, 43, vi, 90; Isokratês, De Bigis, Or. xvi, p. 352, - sect. 27-30. - - Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 14) carelessly represents Alkibiadês as - being actually proxenus of Sparta at Athens. - -To promote this object, he displayed peculiar solicitude for the good -treatment of the Spartan captives, during their detention at Athens. -Many of them being of high family at Sparta, he naturally calculated -upon their gratitude, as well as upon the favorable sympathies of -their countrymen, whenever they should be restored. He advocated -both the peace and the alliance with Sparta, and the restoration -of her captives; and indeed not only advocated these measures, but -tendered his services, and was eager to be employed, as the agent -of Sparta for carrying them through at Athens. From these selfish -hopes in regard to Sparta, and especially from the expectation of -acquiring, through the agency of the restored captives, the title of -Proxenus of Sparta, Alkibiadês thus became a partisan of the blind -and gratuitous philo-Laconian concessions of Nikias. But the captives -on their return were either unable, or unwilling, to carry the point -which he wished; while the authorities at Sparta rejected all his -advances, not without a contemptuous sneer at the idea of confiding -important political interests to the care of a youth chiefly known -for ostentation, profligacy, and insolence. That the Spartans -should thus judge, is noway astonishing, considering their extreme -reverence both for old age and for strict discipline. They naturally -preferred Nikias and Lachês, whose prudence would commend, if it did -not originally suggest, their mistrust of the new claimant. Nor had -Alkibiadês yet shown the mighty movement of which he was capable. -But this contemptuous refusal of the Spartans stung him so to the -quick, that, making an entire revolution in his political course,[65] -he immediately threw himself into anti-Laconian politics with an -energy and ability which he was not before known to possess. - - [65] Thucyd. v, 43. Οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήματι φιλονεικῶν - ἠναντιοῦτο, ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι διὰ Νικίου καὶ Λάχητος ἔπραξαν τὰς - σπονδὰς, αὐτὸν διὰ τὴν νεότητα ὑπεριδόντες καὶ κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν - προξενίαν ποτὲ οὖσαν οὐ τιμήσαντες, ἣν τοῦ πάππου ἀπειπόντος - αὐτὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους θεραπεύων διενοεῖτο - ἀνανεώσασθαι. ~Πανταχόθεν τε νομίζων ἐλασσοῦσθαι~ τό τε πρῶτον - ἀντεῖπεν, etc. - -The moment was favorable, since the recent death of Kleon, for a new -political leader to espouse this side; and was rendered still more -favorable by the conduct of the Lacedæmonians. Month after month -passed, remonstrance after remonstrance was addressed, yet not one -of the restitutions prescribed by the treaty in favor of Athens had -yet been accomplished. Alkibiadês had therefore ample pretext for -altering his tone respecting the Spartans, and for denouncing them -as deceivers who had broken their solemn oaths, abusing the generous -confidence of Athens. Under his present antipathies, his attention -naturally turned to Argos, in which city he possessed some powerful -friends and family guests. The condition of that city, now free by -the expiration of the peace with Sparta, opened a possibility of -connection with Athens, and this policy was strongly recommended -by Alkibiadês, who insisted that Sparta was playing false with the -Athenians, merely in order to keep their hands tied until she had -attacked and put down Argos separately. This particular argument had -less force when it was seen that Argos acquired new and powerful -allies, Mantineia, Elis, and Corinth; but on the other hand, such -acquisitions rendered Argos positively more valuable as an ally to -the Athenians. - -It was not so much, however, the inclination towards Argos, but the -growing wrath against Sparta, which furthered the philo-Argeian plans -of Alkibiadês; and when the Lacedæmonian envoy Andromedês arrived -at Athens from Bœotia, tendering to the Athenians the mere ruins of -Panaktum in exchange for Pylos; when it farther became known that -the Spartans had already concluded a special alliance with the -Bœotians without consulting Athens, the unmeasured expression of -displeasure in the Athenian ekklesia showed Alkibiadês that the time -was now come for bringing on a substantive decision. While he lent -his own voice to strengthen this discontent against Sparta, he at -the same time despatched a private intimation to his correspondents -at Argos, exhorting them, under assurances of success and promise of -his own strenuous aid, to send without delay an embassy to Athens -in conjunction with the Mantineians and Eleians, requesting to be -admitted as Athenian allies. The Argeians received this intimation -at the very moment when their citizens Eustrophus and Æson were -negotiating at Sparta for the renewal of the peace, having been sent -thither under great uneasiness lest Argos should be left without -allies to contend single-handed against the Lacedæmonians. But no -sooner was the unexpected chance held out to them of alliance with -Athens, a former friend, a democracy like their own, an imperial -state at sea, but not interfering with their own primacy in -Peloponnesus,—than they became careless of Eustrophus and Æson, and -despatched forthwith to Athens the embassy advised. It was a joint -embassy, Argeian, Eleian, and Mantineian:[66] the alliance between -these three cities had already been rendered more intimate by a -second treaty concluded since that treaty to which Corinth was a -party; but Corinth had refused all concern in the second.[67] - - [66] Thucyd. v, 43. - - [67] Thucyd. v, 48. - -But the Spartans had been already alarmed by the harsh repulse of -their envoy Andromedês, and probably warned by reports from Nikias -and their other Athenian friends of the crisis impending respecting -alliance between Athens and Argos. Accordingly they sent off without -a moment’s delay three citizens extremely popular at Athens,[68] -Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius; with full powers to settle all -matters of difference. The envoys were instructed to deprecate all -alliance of Athens with Argos, to explain that the alliance of Sparta -with Bœotia had been concluded without any purpose or possibility of -evil to Athens, and at the same time to renew the demand that Pylos -should be restored to them in exchange for the demolished Panaktum. -Such was still the confidence of the Lacedæmonians in the strength -of assent at Athens, that they did not yet despair of obtaining -an affirmative, even to this very unequal proposition: and when -the three envoys, under the introduction and advice of Nikias, had -their first interview with the Athenian senate, preparatory to an -audience before the public assembly, the impression which they made, -on stating that they came with full powers of settlement, was highly -favorable. It was indeed so favorable, that Alkibiadês became alarmed -lest, if they made the same statement in the public assembly, holding -out the prospect of some trifling concessions, the philo-Laconian -party might determine public feeling to accept a compromise, and thus -preclude all idea of alliance with Argos. - - [68] Thucyd. v, 44. Ἀφίκοντο δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις ~κατὰ - τάχος~, etc. - -To obviate such a defeat of his plans, he resorted to a singular -manœuvre. One of the Lacedæmonian envoys, Endius, was his private -guest, by an ancient and particular intimacy subsisting between their -two families.[69] This probably assisted in procuring for him a -secret interview with the envoys, and enabled him to address them -with greater effect, on the day before the meeting of the public -assembly, and without the knowledge of Nikias. He accosted them in -the tone of a friend of Sparta, anxious that their proposition should -succeed; but he intimated that they would find the public assembly -turbulent and angry, very different from the tranquil demeanor of -the senate: so that if they proclaimed themselves to have come with -full powers of settlement, the people would burst out with fury, to -act upon their fears and bully them into extravagant concessions. -He therefore strongly urged them to declare that they had come, -not with any full powers of settlement, but merely to explain, -discuss, and report: the people would then find that they could gain -nothing by intimidation, explanations would be heard, and disputed -points be discussed with temper, and he (Alkibiadês) would speak -emphatically in their favor. He would advise, and felt confident -that he could persuade, the Athenians to restore Pylos, a step which -his opposition had hitherto been the chief means of preventing. -He gave them his solemn pledge—confirmed by an oath, according to -Plutarch—that he would adopt this conduct, if they would act upon his -counsel.[70] The envoys were much struck with the apparent sagacity -of these suggestions,[71] and still more delighted to find that the -man from whom they anticipated the most formidable opposition was -prepared to speak in their favor. His language obtained with them, -probably, the more ready admission and confidence, inasmuch as he -had volunteered his services to become the political agent of Sparta -only a few months before; and he appeared now to be simply resuming -that policy. They were sure of the support of Nikias and his party, -under all circumstances; if, by complying with the recommendation of -Alkibiadês, they could gain _his_ strenuous advocacy and influence -also, they fancied that their cause was sure of success. Accordingly, -they agreed to act upon his suggestion, not only without consulting -but without even warning Nikias, which was exactly what Alkibiadês -desired, and had probably required them to promise. - - [69] Thucyd. viii, 6. Ἐνδίῳ τῷ ἐφορεύοντι πατρικὸς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα - φίλος—ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα Λακωνικὸν ἡ οἰκία αὐτῶν κατὰ τὴν ξενίαν - ἔσχεν· Ἔνδιος γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐκαλεῖτο. - - I incline to suspect, from this passage, that the father of - Endius was not named Alkibiadês, but that Endius himself was - nevertheless named Ἔνδιος Ἀλκιβιάδου, in consequence of the - peculiar intimacy of connection with the Athenian family in - which that name occurred. If the father of Endius was really - named Alkibiadês, Endius himself would naturally, pursuant to - general custom, be styled Ἔνδιος Ἀλκιβιάδου: there would be - nothing in this denomination to call for the particular remark - of Thucydidês. But according to the view of the Scholiast and - most commentators, all that Thucydidês wishes to explain here is, - how the father of Endius came to receive the name of Alkibiadês. - Now if he had meant this, he surely would not have used the - terms which we read: the circumstance to be explained would then - have reference to the father of Endius, not to Endius himself, - nor to the family generally. His words imply that the family, - that is, each successive individual of the family, derived his - Laconian designation (not from the name of his father, but) - from his intimate connection of hospitality with the Athenian - family of Alkibiadês. Each successive individual attached to - his own personal name the genitive case Ἀλκιβιάδου, instead of - the genitive of his real father’s name. Doubtless this was an - anomaly in Grecian practice; but on the present occasion, we are - to expect something anomalous; had it not been such, Thucydidês - would not have stepped aside to particularize it. - - [70] Thucyd. v, 45. Μηχανᾶται δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοῖονδέ τι ὁ - Ἀλκιβιάδης· τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους πείθει, ~πίστιν αὐτοῖς δοὺς~, - ἢν μὴ ὁμολογήσωσιν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ αὐτοκράτορες ἥκειν, Πύλον τε - αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν (~πείσειν γὰρ αὐτὸς Ἀθηναίους~, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν - ἀντιλέγειν) καὶ τἄλλα ξυναλλάξειν. Βουλόμενος δὲ αὐτοὺς Νικίου τε - ἀποστῆσαι ταῦτα ἔπραττε, καὶ ὅπως ~ἐν τῷ δήμῳ διαβαλὼν αὐτοὺς ὡς - οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς ἐν νῷ ἔχουσιν, οὐδὲ λέγουσιν οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ, τοὺς - Ἀργείους ξυμμάχους ποιήσῃ~. - - [71] Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 14). Ταῦτα δ’ εἰπὼν ~ὅρκους ἔδωκεν - αὐτοῖς~, καὶ μετέστησεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Νικίου παντάπασι πιστεύοντας - αὐτῷ, καὶ ~θαυμάζοντας ἅμα τὴν δεινότητα καὶ σύνεσιν~, ὡς οὐ τοῦ - τυχόντος ἀνδρὸς οὖσαν. Again, Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10. - -Next day, the public assembly met, and the envoys were introduced; -upon which Alkibiadês himself, in a tone of peculiar mildness, put -the question to them, upon what footing they came?[72] what powers -they brought with them? They immediately declared that they had -brought no full powers for treating and settlement, but only came -to explain and discuss. Nothing could exceed the astonishment with -which this declaration was heard. The senators present, to whom -these envoys a day or two before had publicly declared the distinct -contrary,—the assembled people, who, made aware of this previous -affirmation, had come prepared to hear the ultimatum of Sparta from -their lips,—lastly, most of all, Nikias himself,—their confidential -agent and probably their host at Athens,—who had doubtless announced -them as plenipotentiaries, and concerted with them the management -of their cases before the assembly,—all were alike astounded, and -none knew what to make of the words just heard. But the indignation -of the people equalled their astonishment: there was a unanimous -burst of wrath against the standing faithlessness and duplicity -of Lacedæmonians; never saying the same thing two days together. -To crown the whole, Alkibiadês himself affected to share all the -surprise of the multitude, and was even the loudest of them all in -invectives against the envoys; denouncing Lacedæmonian perfidy and -evil designs in language far more bitter than he had ever employed -before. Nor was this all:[73] he took advantage of the vehement -acclamation which welcomed these invectives to propose that the -Argeian envoys should be called in and the alliance with Argos -concluded forthwith. And this would certainly have been done, if a -remarkable phenomenon—an earthquake—had not occurred to prevent it; -causing the assembly to be adjourned to the next day, pursuant to a -religious scruple then recognized as paramount. - - [72] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 14. Ἐρωτώμενοι δ’ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου - ~πάνυ φιλανθρώπως~, ἐφ’ οἷς ἀφιγμένοι τυγχάνουσιν, οὐκ ἔφασαν - ἥκειν αὐτοκράτορες. - - [73] Thucyd. v, 45. Οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ἠνείχοντο, ἀλλὰ - τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ~πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον καταβοῶντος τῶν - Λακεδαιμονίων~, ἐσήκουόν τε καὶ ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐθὺς παραγαγεῖν - τοὺς Ἀργείους, etc. - - Compare Plutarch, Alkib. c. 14; and Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10. - -This remarkable anecdote comes in all its main circumstances from -Thucydidês. It illustrates forcibly that unprincipled character which -will be found to attach to Alkibiadês through life, and presents -indeed an unblushing combination of impudence and fraud, which we -cannot better describe than by saying that it is exactly in the vein -of Fielding’s Jonathan Wild. In depicting Kleon and Hyperbolus, -historians vie with each other in strong language to mark the -impudence which is said to have been their peculiar characteristic. -Now we have no particular facts before us to measure the amount -of truth in this, though as a general charge it is sufficiently -credible. But we may affirm, with full assurance, that none of -the much-decried demagogues of Athens—not one of those sellers of -leather, lamps, sheep, ropes, pollard, and other commodities, upon -whom Aristophanês heaps so many excellent jokes—ever surpassed, if -they ever equalled, the impudence of this descendant of Æakus and -Zeus in his manner of overreaching and disgracing the Lacedæmonian -envoys. These latter, it must be added, display a carelessness of -public faith and consistency, a facility in publicly unsaying what -they have just before publicly said, and a treachery towards their -own confidential agent, which is truly surprising, and goes far to -justify the general charge of habitual duplicity so often alleged -against the Lacedæmonian character.[74] - - [74] Euripid. Andromach. 445-455; Herodot. ix, 54. - -The disgraced envoys would doubtless quit Athens immediately: but -this opportune earthquake gave Nikias a few hours to recover from -his unexpected overthrow. In the assembly of the next day, he still -contended that the friendship of Sparta was preferable to that of -Argos, and insisted on the prudence of postponing all consummation -of engagement with the latter until the real intentions of Sparta, -now so contradictory and inexplicable, should be made clear. He -contended that the position of Athens, in regard to the peace and -alliance, was that of superior honor and advantage; the position -of Sparta, one of comparative disgrace: Athens had thus a greater -interest than Sparta in maintaining what had been concluded. But he -at the same time admitted that a distinct and peremptory explanation -must be exacted from Sparta as to her intentions, and he requested -the people to send himself with some other colleagues to demand it. -The Lacedæmonians should be apprised that Argeian envoys were already -present in Athens with propositions, and that the Athenians might -already have concluded this alliance, if they could have permitted -themselves to do wrong to the existing alliance with Sparta. But -the Lacedæmonians, if their intentions were honorable, must show it -forthwith: 1. By restoring Panaktum, not demolished, but standing. 2. -By restoring Amphipolis also. 3. By renouncing their special alliance -with the Bœotians, unless the Bœotians on their side chose to become -parties to the peace with Athens.[75] - - [75] Thucyd. v, 46. - -The Athenian assembly, acquiescing in the recommendation of Nikias, -invested him with the commission which he required: a remarkable -proof, after the overpowering defeat of the preceding day, how strong -was the hold which he still retained upon them, and how sincere their -desire to keep on the best terms with Sparta. This was a last chance -granted to Nikias and his policy; a perfectly fair chance, since all -that was asked of Sparta was just; but it forced him to bring matters -to a decisive issue with her, and shut out all farther evasion. His -mission to Sparta failed altogether: the influence of Kleobûlus and -Xenarês, the anti-Athenian ephors, was found predominant, so that -not one of his demands was complied with. And even when he formally -announced that unless Sparta renounced her special alliance with the -Bœotians or compelled the Bœotians to accept the peace with Athens, -the Athenians would immediately contract alliance with Argos, the -menace produced no effect. He could only obtain, and that too as a -personal favor to himself, that the oaths as they stood should be -formally renewed; an empty concession, which covered but faintly the -humiliation of his retreat to Athens. The Athenian assembly listened -to his report with strong indignation against the Lacedæmonians, and -with marked displeasure even against himself, as the great author and -voucher of this unperformed treaty; while Alkibiadês was permitted -to introduce the envoys—already at hand in the city—from Argos, -Mantineia, and Elis, with whom a pact was at once concluded.[76] - - [76] Thucyd. v, 46; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10. - -The words of this, which Thucydidês gives us doubtless from the -record on the public column, comprise two engagements; one for peace, -another for alliance. - -The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, have concluded a -treaty of peace by sea and by land, without fraud or mischief, each -for themselves and for the allies over whom each exercise empire.[77] -[The express terms in which these states announce themselves as -imperial states and their allies as dependencies, deserve notice. No -such words appear in the treaty between Athens and Lacedæmon. I have -already mentioned that the main ground of discontent on the part of -Mantineia and Elis towards Sparta, was connected with their imperial -power.] - - [77] Thucyd. v, 47. ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ἄρχουσιν - ἑκάτεροι. - -Neither of them shall bear arms against the other for purposes of -damage. - -The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, shall be allies -with each other for one hundred years. If any enemy shall invade -Attica, the three contracting cities shall lend the most vigorous aid -in their power at the invitation of Athens. Should the forces of the -invading city damage Attica and then retire, the three will proclaim -that city their enemy and attack it: neither of the four shall in -that case suspend the war, without consent of the others. - -Reciprocal obligations imposed upon Athens, in case Argos, Mantineia, -or Elis, shall be attacked. - -Neither of the four contracting powers shall grant passage to troops -through their own territory, or the territory of allies over whom -they may at the time be exercising command, either by land or sea, -unless upon joint resolution.[78] - - [78] Thucyd. v, 48. καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ~ὧν ἂν ἄρχουσιν~ ἕκαστοι. - The tense and phrase here deserve notice, as contrasted with the - phrase in the former part of the treaty—τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ~ἄρχουσιν~ - ἑκάτεροι. - - The clause imposing actual obligation to hinder the passage of - troops, required to be left open for application to the actual - time. - -In case auxiliary troops shall be required and sent under this -treaty, the city sending shall furnish their maintenance for the -space of thirty days, from the day of their entrance upon the -territory of the city requiring. Should their services be needed for -a longer period, the city requiring shall furnish their maintenance, -at the rate of three Æginæan oboli for each hoplite, light-armed or -archer, and of one Æginæan drachma or six oboli for each horseman, -per day. The city requiring shall possess the command, so long as the -service required shall be in her territory. But if any expedition -shall be undertaken by joint resolution, then the command shall be -shared equally between all. - -Such were the substantive conditions of the new alliance. Provision -was then made for the oaths,—by whom? where? when? in what words? -how often? they were to be taken. Athens was to swear on behalf of -herself and her allies; but Argos, Elis, and Mantineia, with their -respective allies, were to swear by separate cities. The oaths were -to be renewed every four years; by Athens, within thirty days before -each Olympic festival, at Argos, Elis, and Mantineia; by these three -cities, at Athens, ten days before each festival of the greater -Panathenæa. “The words of the treaty of peace and alliance, and the -oaths sworn, shall be engraven on stone columns, and put up in the -temples of each of the four cities; and also upon a brazen column, to -be put up by joint cost at Olympia, for the festival now approaching.” - -“The four cities may, by joint consent, make any change they please -in the provisions of this treaty, without violating their oaths.”[79] - - [79] Thucyd. v, 47. - -The conclusion of this new treaty introduced a greater degree of -complication into the grouping and association of the Grecian cities -than had ever before been known. The ancient Spartan confederacy, -and the Athenian empire still subsisted. A peace had been concluded -between them, ratified by the formal vote of the majority of the -confederates, yet not accepted by several of the minority. Not -merely peace, but also special alliance had been concluded between -Athens and Sparta; and a special alliance between Sparta and Bœotia. -Corinth, member of the Spartan confederacy, was also member of a -defensive alliance with Argos, Mantineia, and Elis; which three -states had concluded a more intimate alliance, first with each other -(without Corinth), and now recently with Athens. Yet both Athens and -Sparta still retained the alliance[80] concluded between themselves, -without formal rupture on either side, though Athens still complained -that the treaty had not been fulfilled. No relations whatever -subsisted between Argos and Sparta. Between Athens and Bœotia there -was an armistice terminable at ten days’ notice. Lastly, Corinth -could not be prevailed upon, in spite of repeated solicitation from -the Argeians, to join the new alliance of Athens with Argos: so -that no relations subsisted between Corinth and Athens; while the -Corinthians began, though faintly, to resume their former tendencies -towards Sparta.[81] - - [80] Thucyd. v, 48. - - [81] Thucyd. v, 48-50. - -The alliance between Athens and Argos, of which particulars have -just been given, was concluded not long before the Olympic festival -of the 90th Olympiad, or 420 B.C.: the festival being about the -beginning of July, the treaty might be in May.[82] That festival -was memorable, on more than one ground. It was the first which had -been celebrated since the conclusion of the peace, the leading -clause of which had been expressly introduced to guarantee to all -Greeks free access to the great Pan-Hellenic temples, with liberty -of sacrificing, consulting the oracle, and witnessing the matches. -For the last eleven years, including two Olympic festivals, Athens -herself, and apparently all the numerous allies of Athens, had been -excluded from sending their solemn legation, or theôry, and from -attending as spectators, at the Olympic games.[83] Now that such -exclusion was removed, and that the Eleian heralds (who came to -announce the approaching games and proclaim the truce connected with -them) again trod the soil of Attica,—the Athenian visit was felt -both by themselves and by others as a novelty. Some curiosity was -entertained to see what figure the theôry of Athens would make as -to show and splendor. Nor were there wanting spiteful rumors, that -Athens had been so much impoverished by the war, as to be prevented -from appearing with appropriate magnificence at the altar and in the -presence of Olympic Zeus. - - [82] Καταθέντων δὲ καὶ Ὀλυμπίασι στήλην χαλκῆν κοινῇ ~Ὀλυμπίοις - τοῖς νυνί~ (Thucyd. v, 47), words of the treaty. - - [83] Dorieus of Rhodes was victor in the Pankration, both in - Olymp. 88 and 89, (428-424 B.C.). Rhodes was included among the - tributary allies of Athens. But the athletes who came to contend - were privileged and (as it were) sacred persons, who were never - molested or hindered from coming to the festival, if they chose - to come, under any state of war. Their inviolability was never - disturbed even down to the harsh proceeding of Aratus (Plutarch, - Aratus, c. 28). - - But this does not prove that Rhodian visitors generally, or a - Rhodian theôry, could have come to Olympia between 431-421 in - safety. - - From the presence of individuals, even as spectators, little - can be inferred: because, even at this very Olympic festival of - 420 B.C., Lichas the Spartan was present as a spectator, though - all Lacedæmonians were formally excluded by proclamation of the - Eleians (Thucyd. v, 50). - -Alkibiadês took pride in silencing these surmises, as well as in -glorifying his own name and person, by a display more imposing than -had ever been previously beheld. He had already distinguished himself -in the local festivals and liturgies of Athens by an ostentation -surpassing Athenian rivals: but he now felt himself standing -forward as the champion and leader of Athens before Greece. He had -discredited his political rival Nikias, given a new direction to -the politics of Athens by the Argeian alliance, and was about to -commence a series of intra-Peloponnesian operations against the -Lacedæmonians. On all these grounds he determined that his first -appearance on the plain of Olympia should impose upon all beholders. -The Athenian theôry, of which he was a member, was set out with -first-rate splendor, and with the amplest show of golden ewers, -censers, etc., for the public sacrifice and procession.[84] But when -the chariot-races came on, Alkibiadês himself appeared as competitor -at his own cost,—not merely with one well-equipped chariot and four, -which the richest Greeks had hitherto counted as an extraordinary -personal glory, but with the prodigious number of seven distinct -chariots, each with a team of four horses. And so superior was their -quality, that one of his chariots gained a first prize, and another -a second prize, so that Alkibiadês was twice crowned with sprigs of -the sacred olive-tree, and twice proclaimed by the herald. Another of -his seven chariots also came in fourth: but no crown or proclamation, -it seems, was awarded to any after the second in order. We must -recollect that he had competitors from all parts of Greece to contend -against, not merely private men, but even despots and governments. -Nor was this all. The tent which the Athenian theôrs provided for -their countrymen, visitors to the games, was handsomely adorned; -but a separate tent, which Alkibiadês himself provided for a public -banquet to celebrate his triumph, together with the banquet itself, -was set forth on a scale still more stately and expensive. The rich -allies of Athens—Ephesus, Chios, and Lesbos—are said to have lent him -their aid in enhancing this display. It is highly probable that they -would be glad to cultivate his favor, as he had now become one of -the first men in Athens, and was in an ascendent course. But we must -farther recollect that they, as well as Athens, had been excluded -from the Olympic festival, so that their own feelings on first -returning might well prompt them to take a genuine interest in this -imposing reappearance of the Ionic race at the common sanctuary of -Hellas. - - [84] Of the taste and elegance with which these exhibitions were - usually got up in Athens, surpassing generally every other city - in Greece, see a remarkable testimony in Xenophon, Memorabil. - iii, 3, 12. - -Five years afterwards, on an important discussion which will be -hereafter described, Alkibiadês maintained publicly before the -Athenian assembly that his unparalleled Olympic display had produced -an effect upon the Grecian mind highly beneficial to Athens;[85] -dissipating the suspicions entertained that she was ruined by the -war, and establishing beyond dispute her vast wealth and power. He -was doubtless right to a considerable extent; though not sufficient -to repel the charge from himself, which it was his purpose to do, -both of overweening personal vanity, and of that reckless expenditure -which he would be compelled to try and overtake by peculation -or violence at the public cost. All the unfavorable impressions -suggested to prudent Athenians by his previous life, were aggravated -by this stupendous display; much more, of course, the jealousy and -hatred of personal competitors. And this feeling was not the less -real, though as a political man he was now in the full tide of public -favor. - - [85] Thucyd. vi, 16. Οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες καὶ ὑπὲρ δύναμιν μείζω ἡμῶν - τὴν πόλιν ἐνόμισαν τῷ ἐμῷ διαπρεπεῖ τῆς Ὀλυμπίαζε θεωρίας, - ~πρότερον ἐλπίζοντες αὐτὴν καταπεπολεμῆσθαι~· διότι ἅρματα - μὲν ἑπτὰ καθῆκα, ὅσα οὐδείς πω ἰδιώτης πρότερον, ἐνίκησά τε, - καὶ δεύτερος καὶ τέταρτος ἐγενόμην, καὶ τἄλλα ἀξίως τῆς νίκης - παρεσκευασάμην. - - The full force of this grandiose display cannot be felt unless - we bring to our minds the special position both of Athens and - the Athenian allies towards Olympia,—and of Alkibiadês himself - towards Athens, Argos, and the rest of Greece,—in the first half - of the year 420 B.C. - - Alkibiadês obtained from Euripidês the honor of an epinikian - ode, or song of triumph, to celebrate this event; of which a few - lines are preserved by Plutarch (Alkib. c. 11). It is curious - that the poet alleges Alkibiadês to have been first, second, and - _third_, in the course; while Alkibiadês himself, more modest - and doubtless more exact, pretends only to first, second, and - _fourth_. Euripidês informs us that Alkibiadês was crowned twice - and proclaimed twice—δὶς στεφθέντ’ ἐλαίᾳ κάρυκι βοᾷν παραδοῦναι. - Reiske, Coray, and Schäfer, have thought it right to alter this - word δὶς to τρὶς, without any authority, which completely alters - the asserted fact. Sintenis in his edition of Plutarch has - properly restored the word δὶς. - - How long the recollection of this famous Olympic festival - remained in the Athenian public mind, is attested partly by the - Oratio de Bigis of Isokratês, composed in defence of the son - of Alkibiadês at least twenty-five years afterwards, perhaps - more. Isokratês repeats the loose assertion of Euripidês, - πρῶτος, δεύτερος, and τρίτος (Or. xvi, p. 353, sect. 40). The - spurious Oration called that of Andokidês against Alkibiadês - also preserves many of the current tales, some of which I - have admitted into the text, because I think them probable in - themselves, and because that oration itself may reasonably be - believed to be a composition of the middle of the fourth century - B.C. That oration puts all the proceedings of Alkibiadês in a - very invidious temper and with palpable exaggeration. The story - of Alkibiadês having robbed an Athenian named Diomêdês of a fine - chariot, appears to be a sort of variation on the story about - Tisias, which figures in the oration of Isokratês; see Andokid. - cont. Alkib. sect. 26: possibly Alkibiadês may have left one of - the teams not paid for. The aid lent to Alkibiadês by the Chians, - Ephesians, etc., as described in that oration, is likely to be - substantially true, and may easily be explained. Compare Athenæ. - i, p. 3. - - Our information about the arrangements of the chariot-racing at - Olympia is very imperfect. We do not distinctly know how the - seven chariots of Alkibiadês ran,—in how many races,—for all the - seven could not, in my judgment, have run in one and the same - race. There must have been many other chariots to run, belonging - to other competitors: and it seems difficult to believe that ever - a greater number than ten can have run in the same race, since - the course involved going _twelve_ times round the goal (Pindar, - Ol. iii, 33; vi, 75). Ten competing chariots run in the race - described by Sophoklês (Electr. 708), and if we could venture to - construe strictly the expression of the poet,—~δέκατον ἐκπληρῶν~ - ὄχον,—it would seem that ten was the extreme number permitted to - run. Even so great a number as ten was replete with danger to - the persons engaged, as may be seen by reading the description - in Sophoklês (compare Demosth. Ἐρωτ. Λογ. p. 1410), who refers - indeed to a Pythian and not an Olympic solemnity: but the main - circumstances must have been common to both; and we know that the - twelve turns (δωδεκάγναμπτον δωδεκάδρομον) _were_ common to both - (Pindar, Pyth. v, 31). - - Alkibiadês was not the only person who gained a chariot victory - at this 90th Olympiad, 420 B.C. Lichas the Lacedæmonian also - gained one (Thucyd. v, 50), though the chariot was obliged to be - entered in another name, since the Lacedæmonians were interdicted - from attendance. - - Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. of Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 316) - says: “We are not aware that the Olympiad, in which these - chariot-victories of Alkibiadês were gained, can be distinctly - fixed. But it was probably Olymp. 89, B.C. 424.” - - In my judgment, both Olymp. 88 (B.C. 428) and Olymp. 89 (B.C. - 424) are excluded from the possible supposition, by the fact that - the general war was raging at both periods. To suppose that in - the midst of the summer of these two fighting years, there was an - Olympic truce for a month, allowing Athens and her allies to send - thither their solemn legations, their chariots for competition, - and their numerous individual visitors, appears to me contrary - to all probability. The Olympic month of B.C. 424, would occur - just about the time when Brasidas was at the Isthmus levying - troops for his intended expedition to Thrace, and when he rescued - Megara from the Athenian attack. This would not be a very quiet - time for the peaceable Athenian visitors, with the costly display - of gold and silver plate and the ostentatious theôry, to pass - by, on its way to Olympia. During the time when the Spartans - occupied Dekeleia, the solemn processions of communicants at the - Eleusinian mysteries could never march along the Sacred Way from - Athens to Eleusis. Xen. Hell. i, 4, 20. - - Moreover, we see that the very first article both of the Truce - for one year and of the Peace of Nikias, expressly stipulate - for liberty to all to attend the common temples and festivals. - The first of the two relates to Delphi expressly: the second is - general, and embraces Olympia as well as Delphi. If the Athenians - had visited Olympia in 428 or 424 B.C. without impediment, these - stipulations in the treaties would have no purpose nor meaning. - But the fact of their standing in the front of the treaty, proves - that they were looked upon as of much interest and importance. - - I have placed the Olympic festival wherein Alkibiadês contended - with his seven chariots, in 420 B.C., in the peace, but - immediately after the war. No other festival appears to me at all - suitable. - - Dr. Thirlwall farther assumes, as a matter of course, that there - was only _one_ chariot-race at this Olympic festival, that all - the seven chariots of Alkibiadês ran in this one race, and that - in the festival of 420 B.C., Lichas gained _the_ prize: thus - implying that Alkibiadês could not have gained the prize at the - same festival. - - I am not aware that there is any evidence to prove either of - these three propositions. To me they all appear improbable and - unfounded. - - We know from Pausanias (vi, 13, 2) that even in the case of the - stadiodromi, or runners who contended in the stadium, all were - not brought out in one race. They were distributed into sets, or - batches, of what number we know not. Each set ran its own heat, - and the victors in each then competed with each other in a fresh - heat; so that the victor who gained the grand final prize was - sure to have won two heats. - - Now if this practice was adopted with the foot-runners, much - more would it be likely to be adopted with the chariot-racers in - case many chariots were brought to the same festival. The danger - would be lessened, the sport would be increased, and the glory - of the competitors enhanced. The Olympic festival lasted five - days, a long time to provide amusement for so vast a crowd of - spectators. Alkibiadês and Lichas may therefore both have gained - chariot-victories at the same festival: of course only one of - them can have gained the grand final prize, and which of the two - that was it is impossible to say. - -If the festival of the 90th Olympiad was peculiarly distinguished -by the reappearance of Athenians and those connected with them, it -was marked by a farther novelty yet more striking, the exclusion of -the Lacedæmonians. This exclusion was the consequence of the new -political interests of the Eleians, combined with their increased -consciousness of force arising out of the recent alliance with Argos, -Athens, and Mantineia. It has already been mentioned that since the -peace with Athens, the Lacedæmonians, acting as arbitrators in the -case of Lepreum, which the Eleians claimed as their dependency, -had declared it to be autonomous, and had sent a body of troops to -defend it. Probably the Eleians had recently renewed their attacks -upon the district, since the junction with their new allies; for -the Lacedæmonians had detached thither a fresh body of one thousand -hoplites immediately prior to the Olympic festival. Out of the -mission of this fresh detachment the sentence of exclusion arose. The -Eleians were privileged administrators of the festival, regulating -the details of the ceremony itself, and formally proclaiming by -heralds the commencement of the Olympic truce during which all -violation of the Eleian territory by an armed force was a sin against -the majesty of Zeus. On the present occasion they affirmed that the -Lacedæmonians had sent the one thousand hoplites into Lepreum, and -had captured a fort called Phyrkus, both Eleian possessions, after -the proclamation of the truce. They accordingly imposed upon Sparta -the fine prescribed by the “Olympian law,” of two minæ for each man, -two thousand minæ in all; a part to Zeus Olympius, a part to the -Eleians themselves. During the interval between the proclamation of -the truce and the commencement of the festival, the Lacedæmonians -sent to remonstrate against this fine, which they alleged to have -been unjustly imposed, inasmuch as the heralds had not yet proclaimed -the truce at Sparta when the hoplites reached Lepreum. The Eleians -replied that the truce had already at that time been proclaimed among -themselves (for they always proclaimed it first at home, before -their heralds crossed the borders), so that _they_ were interdicted -from all military operations; of which the Lacedæmonian hoplites -had taken advantage to commit their last aggressions. To which the -Lacedæmonians rejoined, that the behavior of the Eleians themselves -contradicted their own allegation, for they had sent the Eleian -heralds to Sparta to proclaim the truce after they knew of the -sending of the hoplites, thus showing that they did not consider the -truce to have been already violated. The Lacedæmonians added, that -after the herald reached Sparta, they had taken no farther military -measures. How the truth stood in this disputed question, we have no -means of deciding. But the Eleians rejected the explanation, though -offering, if the Lacedæmonians would restore to them Lepreum, to -forego such part of the fine as would accrue to themselves, and to -pay out of their own treasury on behalf of the Lacedæmonians the -portion which belonged to the god. This new proposition being alike -refused, was again modified by the Eleians. They intimated that they -would be satisfied if the Lacedæmonians, instead of paying the fine -at once, would publicly on the altar at Olympia, in presence of the -assembled Greeks, take an oath to pay it at a future date. But the -Lacedæmonians would not listen to the proposition either of payment -or of promise. Accordingly the Eleians, as judges under the Olympic -law, interdicted them from the temple of Olympic Zeus, from the -privilege of sacrificing there, and from attendance and competition -at the games; that is, from attendance in the form of the sacred -legation called theôry, occupying a formal and recognized place at -the solemnity.[86] - - [86] Thucyd. v, 49, 50. - -As all the other Grecian states—with the single exception of -Lepreum—were present by their theôries[87] as well as by individual -spectators, so the Spartan theôry “shone by its absence” in a -manner painfully and insultingly conspicuous. So extreme, indeed, -was the affront put upon the Lacedæmonians, connected as they were -with Olympia by a tie ancient, peculiar, and never yet broken; so -pointed the evidence of that comparative degradation into which -they had fallen, through the peace with Athens coming at the back -of the Sphakterian disaster,[88] that they were supposed likely -to set the exclusion at defiance; and to escort their theôrs into -the temple at Olympia for sacrifice, under the protection of an -armed force. The Eleians even thought it necessary to put their -younger hoplites under arms, and to summon to their aid one thousand -hoplites from Mantineia as well as the same number from Argos, for -the purpose of repelling this probable attack: while a detachment -of Athenian cavalry were stationed at Argos during the festival, -to lend assistance in case of need. The alarm prevalent among the -spectators of the festival was most serious, and became considerably -aggravated by an incident which occurred after the chariot racing. -Lichas,[89] a Lacedæmonian of great wealth and consequence, had a -chariot running in the lists, which he was obliged to enter, not in -his own name, but in the name of the Bœotian federation. The sentence -of exclusion hindered him from taking any ostensible part, but it did -not hinder him from being present as a spectator; and when he saw -his chariot proclaimed victorious under the title of Bœotian, his -impatience to make himself known became uncontrollable. He stepped -into the midst of the lists, and placed a chaplet on the head of -the charioteer, thus advertising himself as the master. This was a -flagrant indecorum and known violation of the order of the festival: -accordingly, the official attendants with their staffs interfered at -once in performance of their duty, chastising and driving him back to -his place with blows.[90] Hence arose an increased apprehension of -armed Lacedæmonian interference. None such took place, however: the -Lacedæmonians, for the first and last time in their history, offered -their Olympic sacrifice at home, and the festival passed off without -any interruption.[91] The boldness of the Eleians in putting this -affront upon the most powerful state in Greece is so astonishing, -that we can hardly be mistaken in supposing their proceeding to have -been suggested by Alkibiadês and encouraged by the armed aid from the -allies. He was at this moment not less ostentatious in humiliating -Sparta than in showing off Athens. - - [87] Thucyd. v, 50. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν εἴργοντο τοῦ ἱεροῦ, θυσίας - καὶ ἀγώνων, καὶ οἴκοι ἔθυον· οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες ἐθεώρουν, πλὴν - Λεπρεατῶν. - - [88] Thucyd. v, 28. Κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἥ τε Λακεδαίμων - μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἤκουσε, καὶ ὑπερώφθη διὰ τὰς ξυμφορὰς, οἵ τε - Ἀργεῖοι ἄριστα ἔσχον τοῖς πᾶσι, etc. - - [89] See a previous note, p. 56. - - [90] Thucyd. v, 50. Λίχας ὁ Ἀρκεσιλάου Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι - ὑπὸ τῶν ῥαβδούχων πληγὰς ἔλαβεν, ὅτι νικῶντος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ζεύγους, - καὶ ἀνακηρυχθέντος Βοιωτῶν δημοσίου κατὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐξουσίαν τῆς - ἀγωνίσεως προελθὼν ἐς τὸν ἀγῶνα ἀνέδησε τὸν ἡνίοχον, βουλόμενος - δηλῶσαι ὅτι ἑαυτοῦ ἦν τὸ ἅρμα. - - We see by comparison with this incident how much less rough and - harsh was the manner of dealing at Athens, and in how much more - serious a light blows to the person were considered. At the - Athenian festival of the Dionysia, if a person committed disorder - or obtruded himself into a place not properly belonging to him - in the theatre, the archon or his officials were both empowered - and required to repress the disorder by turning the person out, - and fining him, if necessary. But they were upon no account to - strike him. If they did, they were punishable themselves by the - dikastery afterwards (Demosth. cont. Meidiam, c. 49). - - [91] It will be seen, however, that the Lacedæmonians remembered - and revenged themselves upon the Eleians for this insult twelve - years afterwards during the plenitude of their power (Xenoph. - Hellen. iii, 2, 21; Diodor. xiv, 17). - -Of the depressed influence and estimation of Sparta, a farther -proof was soon afforded by the fate of her colony, the Trachinian -Herakleia, established near Thermopylæ, in the third year of the -war. That colony—though at first comprising a numerous body of -settlers, in consequence of the general trust in Lacedæmonian power, -and though always under the government of a Lacedæmonian harmost—had -never prospered. It had been persecuted from the beginning by -the neighboring tribes, and administered with harshness as well -as peculation by its governors. The establishment of the town had -been regarded from the beginning by the neighbors, especially -the Thessalians, as an invasion of their territory; and their -hostilities, always vexatious, had, in the winter succeeding the -Olympic festival just described, been carried to a greater point of -violence than ever. They had defeated the Herakleots in a ruinous -battle, and slain Xenarês the Lacedæmonian governor. But though the -place was so reduced as to be unable to maintain itself without -foreign aid, Sparta was too much embarrassed by Peloponnesian enemies -and waverers to be able to succor it; and the Bœotians, observing her -inability, became apprehensive that the interference of Athens would -be invoked. Accordingly they thought it prudent to occupy Herakleia -with a body of Bœotian troops, dismissing the Lacedæmonian governor -Hegesippidas for alleged misconduct. Nor could the Lacedæmonians -prevent this proceeding, though it occasioned them to make indignant -remonstrance.[92] - - [92] Thucyd. v, 51, 52. - - - - -CHAPTER LVI. - -FROM THE FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD NINETY DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEIA. - - -Shortly after the remarkable events of the Olympic festival described -in my last chapter, the Argeians and their allies sent a fresh -embassy to invite the Corinthians to join them. They thought it a -promising opportunity, after the affront just put upon Sparta, to -prevail upon the Corinthians to desert her: but Spartan envoys were -present also, and though the discussions were much protracted, no new -resolution was adopted. An earthquake—possibly an earthquake not -real, but simulated for convenience—abruptly terminated the congress. -The Corinthians—though seemingly distrusting Argos, now that she was -united with Athens, and leaning rather towards Sparta—were unwilling -to pronounce themselves in favor of one so as to make an enemy of the -other.[93] - - [93] Thucyd. v, 48-50. - -In spite of this first failure, the new alliance of Athens and -Argos manifested its fruits vigorously in the ensuing spring. Under -the inspirations of Alkibiadês, Athens was about to attempt the -new experiment of seeking to obtain intra-Peloponnesian followers -and influence. At the beginning of the war, she had been maritime, -defensive, and simply conservative, under the guidance of Periklês. -After the events of Sphakteria, she made use of that great advantage -to aim at the recovery of Megara and Bœotia, which she had before -been compelled to abandon by the thirty years’ truce, at the -recommendation of Kleon. In this attempt she employed the eighth year -of the war, but with signal ill-success; while Brasidas during that -period broke open the gates of her maritime empire, and robbed her of -many important dependencies. The grand object of Athens then became, -to recover these lost dependencies, especially Amphipolis: Nikias and -his partisans sought to effect such recovery by making peace, while -Kleon and his supporters insisted that it could never be achieved -except by military efforts. The expedition under Kleon against -Amphipolis had failed, the peace concluded by Nikias had failed also: -Athens had surrendered her capital advantage, without regaining -Amphipolis; and if she wished to regain it, there was no alternative -except to repeat the attempt which had failed under Kleon. And this -perhaps she might have done, as we shall find her projecting to do in -the course of about four years forward, if it had not been, first, -that the Athenian mind was now probably sick and disheartened about -Amphipolis, in consequence of the prodigious disgrace so recently -undergone there; next, that Alkibiadês, the new chief adviser or -prime minister of Athens—if we may be allowed to use an inaccurate -expression, which yet suggests the reality of the case—was prompted -by his personal impulses to turn the stream of Athenian ardor into -a different channel. Full of antipathy to Sparta, he regarded the -interior of Peloponnesus as her most vulnerable point, especially in -the present disjointed relations of its component cities. Moreover, -his personal thirst for glory was better gratified amidst the centre -of Grecian life than by undertaking an expedition into a distant and -barbarous region: lastly, he probably recollected with discomfort -the hardships and extreme cold, insupportable to all except the iron -frame of Sokrates, which he had himself endured at the blockade of -Potidæa twelve years before,[94] and which any armament destined -to conquer Amphipolis would have to go through again. It was under -these impressions that he now began to press his intra-Peloponnesian -operations against Lacedæmon, with the view of organizing a -counter-alliance under Argos sufficient to keep her in check, and -at any rate to nullify her power of carrying invasion beyond the -Isthmus. All this was to be done without ostensibly breaking the -peace and alliance between Athens and Lacedæmon, which stood in -conspicuous letters on pillars erected in both cities. - - [94] Plato, Symposion, c. 35, p. 220. δεινοὶ γὰρ αὐτόθι χειμῶνες, - πάγου οἵου δεινοτάτου, etc. - -Coming to Argos at the head of a few Athenian hoplites and bowmen, -and reinforced by Peloponnesian allies, Alkibiadês exhibited the -spectacle of an Athenian general traversing the interior of the -peninsula, and imposing his own arrangements in various quarters, a -spectacle at that moment new and striking.[95] He first turned his -attention to the Achæan towns in the northwest, where he persuaded -the inhabitants of Patræ to ally themselves with Athens, and even to -undertake the labor of connecting their town with the sea by means of -long walls, so as to place themselves within the protection of Athens -from seaward. He farther projected the erection of a fort and the -formation of a naval station at the extreme point of Cape Rhium, just -at the narrow entrance of the Corinthian gulf; whereby the Athenians, -who already possessed the opposite shore by means of Naupaktus, would -have become masters of the commerce of the gulf. But the Corinthians -and Sikyonians, to whom this would have been a serious mischief, -despatched forces enough to prevent the consummation of the scheme, -and probably also to hinder the erection of the walls at Patræ.[96] -Yet the march of Alkibiadês doubtless strengthened the anti-Laconian -interest throughout the Achæan coast. - - [95] Thucyd. v, 52. Isokratês (De Bigis, sect. 17, p. 349) - speaks of this expedition of Alkibiadês in his usual loose and - exaggerated language: but he has a right to call attention to it - as something very memorable at the time. - - [96] Thucyd. v, 52. - -He then returned to take part with the Argeians in a war against -Epidaurus. To acquire possession of this city would much facilitate -the communication between Athens and Argos, since it was not -only immediately opposite to the island of Ægina now occupied by -the Athenians, but also opened to the latter an access by land, -dispensing with the labor of circumnavigating Cape Skyllæum, the -southeastern point of the Argeian and Epidaurian peninsula, whenever -they sent forces to Argos. Moreover, the territory of Epidaurus -bordered to the north on that of Corinth, so that the possession -of it would be an additional guarantee for the neutrality of the -Corinthians. Accordingly it was resolved to attack Epidaurus, for -which a pretext was easily found. As presiding and administering -state of the temple of Apollo Pythäeus (situated within the walls -of Argos), the Argeians enjoyed a sort of religious supremacy over -Epidaurus and other neighboring cities, seemingly the remnant of -that extensive supremacy, political as well as religious, which in -early times had been theirs.[97] The Epidaurians owed to this temple -certain sacrifices and other ceremonial obligations, one of which, -arising out of some circumstance which we cannot understand, was now -due and unperformed: at least so the Argeians alleged. Such default -imposed upon them the duty of getting together a military force to -attack the Epidaurians and enforce the obligation. - - [97] Thucyd. v, 53, with Dr. Arnold’s note. - -Their invading march, however, was for a time suspended by the news -that king Agis with the full force of Lacedæmon and her allies had -advanced as far as Leuktra, one of the border towns of Laconia on -the northwest, towards Mount Lykæum and the Arcadian Parrhasii. What -this movement meant was known only to Agis himself, who did not even -explain the purpose to his own soldiers or officers, or allies.[98] -But the sacrifice constantly offered before passing the border was -found so unfavorable, that he abandoned his march for the present -and returned home. The month Karneius, a period of truce as well as -religious festival among the Dorian states, being now at hand, he -directed the allies to hold themselves prepared for an out-march as -soon as that month had expired. - - [98] Thucyd. v, 54. ᾔδει δὲ οὐδεὶς ὅποι στρατεύουσιν οὐδὲ αἱ - πόλεις ἐξ ὧν ἐπέμφθησαν. - - This incident shows that Sparta employed the military force - of her allies without any regard to their feelings, quite as - decidedly as Athens; though there were some among them too - powerful to be thus treated. - -On being informed that Agis had dismissed his troops, the Argeians -prepared to execute their invasion of Epidaurus. The day on which -they set out was already the twenty-sixth of the month preceding -the Karneian month, so that there remained only three days before -the commencement of that latter month with its holy truce, binding -upon the religious feelings of the Dorian states generally, to which -Argos, Sparta, and Epidaurus all belonged. But the Argeians made -use of that very peculiarity of the season, which was accounted -likely to keep them at home, to facilitate their scheme, by -playing a trick with the calendar, and proclaiming one of those -arbitrary interferences with the reckoning of time which the Greeks -occasionally employed to correct the ever-recurring confusion of -their lunar system. Having begun their march on the twenty-sixth -of the month before Karneius, the Argeians called each succeeding -day still the twenty-sixth, thus disallowing the lapse of time, -and pretending that the Karneian month had not yet commenced. This -proceeding was farther facilitated by the circumstance, that their -allies of Athens, Elis, and Mantineia, not being Dorians, were -under no obligation to observe the Karneian truce. Accordingly, the -army marched from Argos into the territory of Epidaurus, and spent -seemingly a fortnight or three weeks in laying it waste; all this -time being really, according to the reckoning of the other Dorian -states, part of the Karneian truce, which the Argeians, adopting -their own arbitrary computation of time, professed not to be -violating. The Epidaurians, unable to meet them single-handed in the -field, invoked the aid of their allies: who, however, had already -been summoned by Sparta for the succeeding month, and did not choose, -any more than the Spartans, to move during the Karneian month itself. -Some allies, however, perhaps the Corinthians, came as far as the -Epidaurian border, but did not feel themselves strong enough to lend -aid by entering the territory alone.[99] - - [99] Thucyd. v, 54. Ἀργεῖοι δ’ ἀναχωρησάντων αὐτῶν (the - Lacedæmonians), τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ Καρνείου μηνὸς ἐξελθόντες τετράδι - φθίνοντος, ~καὶ ἄγοντες τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην πάντα τὸν χρόνον~, - ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἐπιδαυρίαν καὶ ~ἐδῄουν~· Ἐπιδαύριοι δὲ τοὺς - ξυμμάχους ἐπεκαλοῦντο· ὧν οἱ μὲν ~τὸν μῆνα προυφασίσαντο~, οἱ δὲ - καὶ ἐς μεθορίαν τῆς Ἐπιδαυρίας ἐλθόντες ἡσύχαζον. - - In explaining this passage, I venture to depart from the views - of all the commentators; with the less scruple, as it seems - to me that even the best of them are here embarrassed and - unsatisfactory. - - The meaning which I give to the words is the most strict and - literal possible: “The Argeians, having set out on the 26th of - the month before Karneius, and _keeping that day during the whole - time_, invaded the Epidaurian territory, and went on ravaging - it.” By “during the whole time” is meant, during the whole time - that this expedition lasted. That is, in my judgment, they - kept the twenty-sixth day of the antecedent month for a whole - fortnight or so; they called each successive day by the same - name; they stopped the computed march of time; the twenty-seventh - was never admitted to have arrived. Dr. Thirlwall translates - it (Hist. Gr. vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 331): “They began their - march on a day which they had _always_ been used to keep holy.” - But surely the words πάντα τὸν χρόνον must denote some definite - interval of time, and can hardly be construed as equivalent - to ἀεί. Moreover the words, as Dr. Thirlwall construes them, - introduce a new fact which has no visible bearing on the main - affirmation of the sentence. - - The meaning which I give may perhaps be called in question on the - ground that such tampering with the calendar is too absurd and - childish to have been really committed. Yet it is not more absurd - than the two votes of the Athenian assembly (in 290 B.C.), who - being in the month of Munychion, first passed a vote that that - month should be the month Anthestêrion; next, that it should be - the month Boêdromion; in order that Demetrius Poliorkêtês might - be initiated both in the lesser and greater mysteries of Dêmêtêr, - both at once and at the same time. Demetrius arrived at Athens in - the month Munychion, and went through both ceremonies with little - or no delay; the religious scruple, and the dignity of the Two - Goddesses being saved by altering the name of the month twice - (Plutarch, Demetrius, c. 26). - - Besides, if we look to the conduct of the Argeians themselves at - a subsequent period (B.C. 389, Xenophon, Hellen. iv, 7, 2, 5; v, - 1, 29), we shall see them playing an analogous trick with the - calendar in order to get the benefit of the sacred truce. When - the Lacedæmonians invaded Argos, the Argeians despatched heralds - with wreaths and the appropriate insignia, to warn them off on - the ground of its being the period of the holy truce,—though it - _really was not so_,—~οὐχ ὅποτε κάθηκοι ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ’ ὅποτε - ἐμβάλλειν μέλλοιεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τότε ὑπέφερον τοὺς μῆνας~—Οἱ - δ’ Ἀργεῖοι ἐπεὶ ἔγνωσαν οὐ δυνησόμενοι κωλύειν, ἔπεμψαν, ὥσπερ - εἰώθεσαν, ἐστεφανωμένους δύο κήρυκας ~ὑποφέροντας σπονδάς~. - On more than one occasion, this stratagem was successful: the - Lacedæmonians did not dare to act in defiance of the summons of - the heralds, who affirmed that it _was_ the time of the truce, - though in reality it was not so. At last, the Spartan king - Agesipolis actually went both to Olympia and Delphi, to put - the express question to those oracles, whether he was bound to - accept the truce at any moment, right or wrong, when it might - suit the convenience of the Argeians to bring it forward as a - sham plea (ὑποφέρειν). The oracles both told him that he was - under no obligation to submit to such a pretence; accordingly, he - sent back the heralds, refusing to attend to their summons, and - invaded the Argeian territory. - - Now here is a case exactly in point, with this difference; that - the Argeians, when they are invaders of Epidaurus, falsify the - calendar in order to blot out the holy truce where it really - ought to have come: whereas when they are the party invaded, they - commit similar falsification in order to introduce the truce - where it does not legitimately belong. I conceive, therefore, - that such an analogous incident completely justifies the - interpretation which I have given of the passage now before us in - Thucydidês. - - But even if I were unable to produce a case so exactly parallel, - I should still defend the interpretation. Looking to the state - of the ancient Grecian calendars, the proceeding imputed to the - Argeians ought not to be looked on as too preposterous and absurd - for adoption, with the same eyes as we should regard it now. - - With the exception of Athens, we do not know completely the - calendar of a single other Grecian city: but we know that the - months of all were lunar months, and that the practice followed - in regard to intercalation, for the prevention of inconvenient - divergence between lunar and solar time, was different in each - different city. Accordingly, the lunar month of one city did not, - except by accident, either begin or end at the same time as the - lunar month of another. M. Boeckh observes (ad Corp. Inscr. t. i, - p. 734): “Variorum populorum menses, qui sibi secundum legitimos - annorum cardines respondent, non quovis conveniunt anno, nisi - cyclus intercalationum utrique populi idem sit: sed ubi differunt - cycli, altero populo prius intercalante mensem dum non intercalat - alter, eorum qui non intercalarunt mensis certus cedit jam in eum - mensem alterorum qui præcedit illum cui vulgo respondet certus - iste mensis: quod tamen negligere solent chronologi.” Compare - also the valuable Dissertation of K. F. Hermann, Ueber die - Griechische Monatskunde, Götting. 1844, pp. 21-27, where all that - is known about the Grecian names and arrangement of months is - well brought together. - - The names of the Argeian months we hardly know at all (see K. F. - Hermann, pp. 84-124): indeed, the only single name resting on - positive proof, is that of a month _Hermæus_. How far the months - of Argos agreed with those of Epidaurus or Sparta we do not - know, nor have we any right to presume that they did agree. Nor - is it by any means clear that every city in Greece had what may - properly be called a _system_ of intercalation, so correct as to - keep the calendar right without frequent arbitrary interferences. - Even at Athens, it is not yet satisfactorily proved that the - Metonic calendar was ever actually received into civil use. - Cicero, in describing the practice of the Sicilian Greeks about - reckoning of time, characterizes their interferences for the - purpose of correcting the calendar as occasional rather than - systematic. Verres took occasion from these interferences to make - a still more violent change, by declaring the Ides of January to - be the calends of March (Cicero, Verr. ii, 52, 129). - - Now where a people are accustomed to get wrong in their calendar, - and to see occasional interferences introduced by authority - to set them right, the step which I here suppose the Argeians - to have taken about the invasion of Epidaurus will not appear - absurd and preposterous. The Argeians would pretend that the - real time for celebrating the festival of Karneia had not yet - arrived. On that point, they were not bound to follow the views - of other Dorian states, since there does not seem to have been - any recognized authority for proclaiming the commencement of the - Karneian truce, as the Eleians proclaimed the Olympic and the - Corinthians the Isthmiac truce. In saying, therefore, that the - twenty-sixth of the month preceding Karneius should be repeated, - and that the twenty-seventh should not be recognized as arriving - for a fortnight or three weeks, the Argeian government would - only be employing an expedient the like of which had been before - resorted to; though, in the case before us, it was employed for a - fraudulent purpose. - - The Spartan month _Hekatombeus_ appears to have corresponded - with the Attic month Hekatombæon; the Spartan month following - it, _Karneius_, with the Attic month Metageitnion (Hermann, p. - 112), our months July and August; such correspondence being by - no means exact or constant. Both Dr. Arnold and Göller speak of - Hekatombeus as if it were the _Argeian_ month preceding Karneius: - but we only know it as a _Spartan_ month. Its name does not - appear among the months of the Dorian cities in Sicily, among - whom nevertheless Karneius seems universal. See Franz, Comm. ad - Corp. Inscript. Græc. No. 5475, 5491, 5640. Part xxxii, p. 640. - - The tricks played with the calendar at Rome, by political - authorities for party purposes, are well known to every one. And - even in some states of Greece, the course of the calendar was so - uncertain as to serve as a proverbial expression for inextricable - confusion. See Hesychius—~Ἐν Κέῳ τις ἡμέρα~; Ἐπὶ τῶν οὐκ - εὐγνώστον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ οἶδεν ἐν Κέῳ τις ἡ ἡμέρα, ὅτι οὐκ ἑστᾶσιν - αἱ ἡμέραι, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἕκαστοι θέλουσιν ἄγουσι. See also Aristoph. - Nubes, 605. - -Meanwhile the Athenians had convoked another congress of deputies -at Mantineia, for the purpose of discussing propositions of peace: -perhaps this may have been a point carried by Nikias at Athens, in -spite of Alkibiadês. What other deputies attended we are not told; -but Euphamidas, coming as envoy from Corinth, animadverted even at -the opening of the debates upon the inconsistency of assembling -a peace congress while war was actually raging in the Epidaurian -territory. So much were the Athenian deputies struck with this -observation, that they departed, persuaded the Argeians to retire -from Epidaurus, and then came back to resume negotiations. Still, -however, the pretensions of both parties were found irreconcilable, -and the congress broke up; upon which the Argeians again returned -to renew their devastation in Epidaurus, while the Lacedæmonians, -immediately on the expiration of the Karneian month, marched out -again, as far as their border town of Karyæ, but were again arrested -and forced to return by unfavorable border-sacrifices. Intimation -of their out-march, however, was transmitted to Athens; upon which -Alkibiadês, at the head of one thousand Athenian hoplites, was sent -to join the Argeians. But before he arrived, the Lacedæmonian army -had been already disbanded; so that his services were no longer -required, and the Argeians carried their ravages over one-third of -the territory of Epidaurus before they at length evacuated it.[100] - - [100] Thucyd. v, 55. καὶ Ἀθηναίων αὐτοῖς χίλιοι ἐβοήθησαν - ὁπλῖται καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης στρατηγὸς: πυθόμενοι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους - ἐξεστρατεῦσθαι· καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ἔτι αὐτῶν ἔδει, ἀπῆλθον. This is the - reading which Portus, Bloomfield, Didot, and Göller, either adopt - or recommend; leaving out the particle δὲ which stands in the - common text after πυθόμενοι. - - If we do not adopt this reading, we must construe ἐξεστρατεῦσθαι, - as Dr. Arnold and Poppo construe it, in the sense of “had already - completed their expedition and returned home.” But no authority - is produced for putting such a meaning upon the verb ἐκστρατεύω: - and the view of Dr. Arnold, who conceives that this meaning - exclusively belongs to the preterite or pluperfect tense, is - powerfully contradicted by the use of the word ἐξεστρατευμένων - (ii, 7), the same verb and the same tense, yet in a meaning - contrary to that which he assigns. - - It appears to me the least objectionable proceeding of the two, - to dispense with the particle δέ. - -The Epidaurians were reinforced about the end of September by a -detachment of three hundred Lacedæmonian hoplites under Agesippidas, -sent by sea without the knowledge of the Athenians. Of this, the -Argeians preferred loud complaints at Athens; and they had good -reason to condemn the negligence of the Athenians as allies, for not -having kept better naval watch at their neighboring station of Ægina, -and for having allowed this enemy to enter the harbor of Epidaurus. -But they took another ground of complaint, somewhat remarkable. In -the alliance between Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantineia, it had been -stipulated that neither of the four should suffer the passage of -troops through its territory, without the joint consent of all. Now -the sea was accounted a part of the territory of Athens: so that the -Athenians had violated this article of the treaty by permitting the -Lacedæmonians to send troops by sea to Epidaurus. And the Argeians -now required Athens, in compensation for this wrong, to carry back -the Messenians and Helots from Kephallenia to Pylos, and allow them -to ravage Laconia. The Athenians, under the persuasion of Alkibiadês, -complied with their requisition; inscribing, at the foot of the -pillar on which their alliance with Sparta stood recorded, that the -Lacedæmonians had not observed their oaths. Nevertheless, they still -abstained from formally throwing up their treaty with Lacedæmon, or -breaking it in any other way.[101] The relations between Athens and -Sparta thus remained in name, peace and alliance, so far as concerns -direct operations against each other’s territory; in reality, hostile -action as well as hostile manœuvring, against each other, as allies -respectively of third parties. - - [101] Thucyd. v, 56. - -The Argeians, after having prolonged their incursions on the -Epidaurian territory throughout all the autumn, made in the winter -an unavailing attempt to take the town itself by storm. Though there -was no considerable action, but merely a succession of desultory -attacks, in some of which the Epidaurians even had the advantage, -yet they still suffered serious hardship, and pressed their case -forcibly on the sympathy of Sparta. Thus importuned, and mortified as -well as alarmed by the increasing defection or coldness which they -now experienced throughout Peloponnesus, the Lacedæmonians determined -during the course of the ensuing summer to put forth their strength -vigorously, and win back their lost ground.[102] - - [102] Thucyd. v, 37. - -Towards the month of June (B.C. 418) they marched with their full -force, freemen as well as Helots, under king Agis, against Argos. -The Tegeans and other Arcadian allies joined them on the march, -while their other allies near the Isthmus,—Bœotians, Megarians, -Corinthians, Sikyonians, Phliasians, etc., were directed to -assemble at Phlius. The number of these latter allies were very -considerable, for we hear of five thousand Bœotian hoplites, and two -thousand Corinthian: the Bœotians had with them also five thousand -light-armed, five hundred horsemen, and five hundred foot-soldiers, -who ran alongside of the horsemen. The numbers of the rest, or of -Spartans themselves, we do not know; nor probably did Thucydidês -himself know: for we find him remarking elsewhere the impenetrable -concealment of the Lacedæmonians on all public affairs, in reference -to the numbers at the subsequent battle of Mantineia. Such muster of -the Lacedæmonian alliance was no secret to the Argeians, who marching -first to Mantineia, and there taking up the force of that city as -well as three thousand Eleian hoplites who came to join them, met the -Lacedæmonians in their march at Methydrium in Arcadia. The two armies -being posted on opposite hills, the Argeians had resolved to attack -Agis the next day, so as to prevent him from joining his allies at -Phlius. But he eluded this separate encounter by decamping in the -night, reached Phlius, and operated his junction in safety. We do not -hear that there was in the Lacedæmonian army any commander of lochus, -who, copying the unreasonable punctilio of Amompharetus before the -battle of Platæa, refused to obey the order of retreat before the -enemy, to the imminent risk of the whole army. And the fact, that -no similar incident occurred now, may be held to prove that the -Lacedæmonians had acquired greater familiarity with the exigencies of -actual warfare. - -As soon as the Lacedæmonian retreat was known in the morning, the -Argeians left their position also, and marched with their allies, -first to Argos itself; next, to Nemea, on the ordinary road from -Corinth and Phlius to Argos, by which they imagined that the -invaders would approach. But Agis acted differently. Distributing -his force into three divisions, he himself with the Lacedæmonians -and Arcadians, taking a short, but very rugged and difficult road, -crossed the ridge of the mountains and descended straight into the -plain near Argos. The Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phliasians, were -directed to follow another mountain road, which entered the same -plain upon a different point; while the Bœotians, Corinthians, and -Sikyonians, followed the longer, more even, and more ordinary route, -by Nemea. This route, though apparently frequented and convenient, -led for a considerable distance along a narrow ravine, called the -Trêtus, bounded on each side by mountains. The united army under Agis -was much superior in number to the Argeians: but if all had marched -in one line by the frequented route through the narrow Trêtus, -their superiority of number would have been of little use, whilst -the Argeians would have had a position highly favorable to their -defence. By dividing his force, and taking the mountain road with his -own division, Agis got into the plain of Argos in the rear of the -Argeian position at Nemea. He anticipated that when the Argeians saw -him devastating their properties near the city, they would forthwith -quit the advantageous ground near Nemea, to come and attack him in -the plain: the Bœotian division would thus find the road by Nemea -and the Trêtus open, and would be able to march without resistance -into the plain of Argos, where their numerous cavalry would act with -effect against the Argeians engaged in attacking Agis. This triple -march was executed. Agis with his division, and the Corinthians with -theirs, got across the mountains into the Argeian plain during the -night; while the Argeians,[103] hearing at daybreak that he was near -their city, ravaging Saminthus and other places, left their position -at Nemea to come down to the plain and attack him. In their march -they had a partial skirmish with the Corinthian division, which had -reached a high ground immediately above the Argeian plain, and which -lay nearly in the road. But this affair was indecisive, and they soon -found themselves in the plain near to Agis and the Lacedæmonians, who -lay between them and their city. - - [103] Thucyd. v, 58. Οἱ δὲ Ἀργεῖοι γνόντες ἐβοήθουν ~ἡμέρας ἤδη~ - ἐκ τῆς Νεμέας, etc. - -On both sides, the armies were marshalled, and order taken for -battle. But the situation of the Argeians was in reality little -less than desperate: for while they had Agis and his division in -their front, the Corinthian detachment was near enough to take -them in flank, and the Bœotians marching along the undefended road -through the Trêtus would attack them in the rear. The Bœotian -cavalry too would act with full effect upon them in the plain, since -neither Argos, Elis, nor Mantineia, seemed to have possessed any -horsemen; a description of force which ought to have been sent from -Athens, though from some cause which does not appear, the Athenian -contingent had not yet arrived. Nevertheless, in spite of this very -critical position, both the Argeians and their allies were elate -with confidence and impatient for battle; thinking only of the -division of Agis immediately in their front, which appeared to be -inclosed between them and their city, and taking no heed to the other -formidable enemies in their flank and rear. But the Argeian generals -were better aware than their soldiers of the real danger; and just -as the two armies were about to charge, Alkiphron, proxenus of the -Lacedæmonians at Argos, accompanied Thrasyllus, one of the five -generals of the Argeians, to a separate parley with Agis, without -the least consultation or privity on the part of their own army. -They exhorted Agis not to force on a battle, assuring him that the -Argeians were ready both to give and receive equitable satisfaction, -in all matters of complaint which the Lacedæmonians might urge -against them, and to conclude a just peace for the future. Agis, -at once acquiescing in the proposal, granted them a truce of four -months to accomplish what they had promised. He on his part also -took this step without consulting either his army or his allies, -simply addressing a few words of confidential talk to one of the -official Spartans near him. Immediately, he gave the order for -retreat, and the army, instead of being led to battle, was conducted -out of the Argeian territory, through the Nemean road whereby the -Bœotians had just been entering. But it required all the habitual -discipline of Lacedæmonian soldiers to make them obey this order -of the Spartan king, alike unexpected and unwelcome.[104] For the -army were fully sensible both of the prodigious advantages of their -position, and of the overwhelming strength of the invading force, -so that all the three divisions were loud in their denunciations of -Agis, and penetrated with shame at the thoughts of so disgraceful -a retreat. And when they all saw themselves in one united body at -Nemea, previous to breaking up and going home,—so as to have before -their eyes their own full numbers and the complete equipment of one -of the finest Hellenic armies which had ever been assembled,—the -Argeian body of allies, before whom they were now retiring, appeared -contemptible in the comparison, and they separated with yet warmer -and more universal indignation against the king who had betrayed -their cause. - - [104] Thucyd. v, 60. Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι εἵποντο - μὲν ὡς ἡγεῖτο διὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐν αἰτίᾳ δὲ εἶχον κατ’ ἀλλήλους - πολλῇ τὸν Ἆγιν, etc. - -On returning home, Agis incurred not less blame from the Spartan -authorities than from his own army, for having thrown away so -admirable an opportunity of subduing Argos. This was assuredly -no more than he deserved: but we read with no small astonishment -that the Argeians and their allies on returning were even more -exasperated against Thrasyllus,[105] whom they accused of having -traitorously thrown away a certain victory. They had indeed good -ground, in the received practice, to censure him for having concluded -a truce without taking the sense of the people. It was their custom -on returning from a march, to hold a public court-martial before -entering the city, at a place called the Charadrus, or winter torrent -near the walls, for the purpose of adjudicating on offences and -faults committed in the army. Such was their wrath on this occasion -against Thrasyllus, that they would scarcely be prevailed upon even -to put him upon his trial, but began to stone him. He was forced to -seek personal safety at the altar; upon which the soldiers tried -him, and he was condemned to have his property confiscated.[106] - - [105] Thucyd. v, 60. Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔτι ἐν πολλῷ πλέονι - αἰτίᾳ εἶχον ~τοὺς σπεισαμένους ἄνευ τοῦ πλήθους~, etc. - - [106] Thucyd. v, 60. - -Very shortly afterwards the expected Athenian contingent arrived, -which probably ought to have come earlier: one thousand hoplites, -with three hundred horsemen, under Lachês and Nikostratus. Alkibiadês -came as ambassador, probably serving as a soldier also among the -horsemen. The Argeians, notwithstanding their displeasure against -Thrasyllus, nevertheless felt themselves pledged to observe the truce -which he had concluded, and their magistrates accordingly desired the -newly-arrived Athenians to depart. Nor was Alkibiadês even permitted -to approach and address the public assembly, until the Mantineian and -Eleian allies insisted that thus much at least should not be refused. -An assembly was therefore convened, in which these allies took part, -along with the Argeians. Alkibiadês contended strenuously that the -recent truce with the Lacedæmonians was null and void; since it had -been contracted without the privity of all the allies, distinctly at -variance with the terms of the alliance. He therefore called upon -them to resume military operations forthwith, in conjunction with -the reinforcement now seasonably arrived. His speech so persuaded -the assembly, that the Mantineians and Eleians consented at once to -join him in an expedition against the Arcadian town of Orchomenus; -the Argeians, also, though at first reluctant, very speedily followed -them thither. Orchomenus was a place important to acquire, not merely -because its territory joined that of Mantineia on the northward, but -because the Lacedæmonians had deposited therein the hostages which -they had taken from Arcadian townships and villages as guarantee -for fidelity. Its walls were however in bad condition, and its -inhabitants, after a short resistance, capitulated. They agreed to -become allies of Mantineia, to furnish hostages for faithful adhesion -to such alliance, and to deliver up the hostages deposited with them -by Sparta.[107] - - [107] Thucyd. v, 62. - -Encouraged by first success, the allies debated what they should -next undertake; the Eleians contending strenuously for a march -against Lepreum, while the Mantineians were anxious to attack their -enemy and neighbor Tegea. The Argeians and Athenians preferred -the latter, incomparably the more important enterprise of the two: -but such was the disgust of the Eleians at the rejection of their -proposition, that they abandoned the army altogether, and went home. -Notwithstanding their desertion, however, the remaining allies -continued together at Mantineia, organizing their attack upon Tegea, -in which city they had a strong favorable party, who had actually -laid their plans, and were on the point of proclaiming the revolt -of the city from Sparta,[108] when the philo-Laconian Tegeans just -saved themselves by despatching the most urgent message to Sparta, -and receiving the most rapid succor. The Lacedæmonians, filled with -indignation at the news of the surrender of Orchomenus, vented anew -all their displeasure against Agis, whom they now threatened with -the severe punishment of demolishing his house and fining him in -the sum of one hundred thousand drachmæ, or about twenty-seven and -two-thirds Attic talents. He urgently entreated that an opportunity -might be afforded to him of redeeming by some brave deed the ill name -which he had incurred: if he failed in doing so, then they might -inflict on him what penalty they chose. The penalty was accordingly -withdrawn: but a restriction, new to the Spartan constitution, was -now placed upon the authority of the king. It had been before a part -of his prerogative to lead out the army single-handed and on his -own authority; but a council of ten was now named, without whose -concurrence he was interdicted from exercising such power.[109] - - [108] Thucyd. v, 64. ὅσον οὐκ ἀφέστηκεν, etc. - - [109] Thucyd. v, 63. - -To the great good fortune of Agis, a pressing message now arrived -announcing the imminent revolt of Tegea, the most important ally of -Sparta, and close upon her border. Such was the alarm occasioned by -this news that the whole military population instantly started off -to relieve the place, Agis at their head, the most rapid movement -ever known to have been made by Lacedæmonian soldiers.[110] When they -arrived at Orestheium in Arcadia, in their way, perhaps hearing that -the danger was somewhat less pressing, they sent back to Sparta -one-sixth part of the forces, for home defence, the oldest as well -as the youngest men. The remainder marched forward to Tegea, where -they were speedily joined by their Arcadian allies. They farther sent -messages to the Corinthians and Bœotians, as well as to the Phocians -and Lokrians, invoking the immediate presence of these contingents -in the territory of Mantineia. The arrival of such reinforcements, -however, even with all possible zeal on the part of the cities -contributing, could not be looked for without some lapse of time; the -rather, as it appears, that they could not get into the territory -of Mantineia except by passing through that of Argos,[111] which -could not be safely attempted until they had all formed a junction. -Accordingly Agis, impatient to redeem his reputation, marched at once -with the Lacedæmonians and the Arcadian allies present, into the -territory of Mantineia, and took up a position near the Herakleion, -or temple of Hêraklês,[112] from whence he began to ravage the -neighboring lands. The Argeians and their allies presently came forth -from Mantineia, planted themselves near him, but on very rugged and -impracticable ground, and thus offered him battle. Nothing daunted -by the difficulties of the position, he marshalled his army and led -it up to attack them. His rashness on the present occasion might -have produced as much mischief as his inconsiderate concession to -Thrasyllus near Argos, had not an ancient Spartan called out to him -that he was now merely proceeding “to heal mischief by mischief.” So -forcibly was Agis impressed either with this timely admonition, or by -the closer view of the position which he had undertaken to assault, -that he suddenly halted the army and gave orders for retreat, though -actually within distance no greater than the cast of a javelin from -the enemy.[113] - - [110] Thucyd. v, 64. ἐνταῦθα δὴ βοήθεια τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων - γίγνεται αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν Εἱλώτων πανδημεὶ ὀξεῖα καὶ οἵα οὔπω - πρότερον. The out-march of the Spartans just before the battle of - Platæa (described in Herodot. vii, 10) seems, however, to have - been quite as rapid and instantaneous. - - [111] Thucyd. v, 64. ξυνέκλῃε γὰρ διὰ μέσου. - - [112] The Lacedæmonian kings appear to have felt a sense of - protection in encamping near a temple of Hêraklês, their heroic - progenitor (see Xenophon, Hellen. vii, 1, 31). - - [113] Thucyd. v, 65. See an exclamation by an old Spartan - mentioned as productive of important consequences, at the moment - when a battle was going to commence, in Xenophon, Hellen. vii, 4, - 25. - -His march was now intended to draw the Argeians away from the -difficult ground which they occupied. On the frontier between -Mantineia and Tegea—both situated on a lofty but inclosed plain, -drained only by katabothra, or natural subterranean channels in the -mountains—was situated a head of water, the regular efflux of which -seems to have been kept up by joint operations of both cities for -their mutual benefit. Thither Agis now conducted his army, for the -purpose of turning the water towards the side of Mantineia, where -it would occasion serious damage; calculating that the Mantineians -and their allies would certainly descend from their position to -hinder it. No stratagem however was necessary to induce the latter -to adopt this resolution. For so soon as they saw the Lacedæmonians, -after advancing to the foot of the hill, first suddenly halt, next -retreat, and lastly disappear, their surprise was very great: and -this surprise was soon converted into contemptuous confidence and -impatience to pursue the flying enemy. The generals not sharing such -confidence, hesitated at first to quit their secure position: upon -which the troops became clamorous, and loudly denounced them for -treason in letting the Lacedæmonians quietly escape a second time, -as they had before done near Argos. These generals would probably -not be the same with those who had incurred, a short time before, -so much undeserved censure for their convention with Agis: but the -murmurs on the present occasion, hardly less unreasonable, drove -them, not without considerable shame and confusion, to give orders -for advance. They abandoned the hill, marched down into the plain -so as to approach the Lacedæmonians, and employed the next day in -arranging themselves in good battle order, so as to be ready to fight -at a moment’s notice. - -Meanwhile it appears that Agis had found himself disappointed in his -operations upon the water. He had either not done so much damage, or -not spread so much terror, as he had expected: and he accordingly -desisted, putting himself again in march to resume his position -at the Herakleion, and supposing that his enemies still retained -their position on the hill. But in the course of this march he -came suddenly upon the Argeian and allied army where he was not in -the least prepared to see them: they were not only in the plain, -but already drawn up in perfect order of battle. The Mantineians -occupied the right wing, the post of honor, because the ground was in -their territory: next to them stood their dependent Arcadian allies: -then the chosen Thousand-regiment of Argos, citizens of wealth and -family, trained in arms at the cost of the state: alongside of them, -the remaining Argeian hoplites, with their dependent allies of Kleônæ -and Orneæ: last of all, on the left wing, stood the Athenians, their -hoplites as well as their horsemen. - -It was with the greatest surprise that Agis and his army beheld this -unexpected apparition. To any other Greeks than Lacedæmonians, the -sudden presentation of a formidable enemy would have occasioned a -feeling of dismay from which they would have found it difficult to -recover; and even the Lacedæmonians, on this occasion, underwent -a momentary shock unparalleled in their previous experience.[114] -But they now felt the full advantage of their rigorous training -and habit of military obedience, as well as of that subordination -of officers which was peculiar to themselves in Greece. In other -Grecian armies orders were proclaimed to the troops in a loud voice -by a herald, who received them personally from the general: each -_taxis_, or company, indeed, had its own taxiarch, but the latter -did not receive his orders separately from the general, and seems -to have had no personal responsibility for the execution of them by -his soldiers. Subordinate and responsible military authority was not -recognized. Among the Lacedæmonians, on the contrary, there was a -regular gradation of military and responsible authority, “commanders -of commanders,” each of whom had his special duty in insuring the -execution of orders.[115] Every order emanated from the Spartan king -when he was present, and was given to the polemarchs (each commanding -a mora, the largest military division), who intimated it to the -lochagi, or colonels, of the respective lochi. These again gave -command to each pentekontêr, or captain of a pentekosty; lastly, -he to the enômotarch, who commanded the lowest subdivision, called -an enômoty. The soldier thus received no immediate orders except -from the enômotarch, who was in the first instance responsible for -his enômoty; but the pentekontêr and the lochage were responsible -also each for his larger division; the pentekosty including four -enômoties, and the lochus four pentekosties, at least so the numbers -stood on this occasion. All the various military manœuvres were -familiar to the Lacedæmonians from their unremitting drill, so -that their armies enjoyed the advantage of readier obedience along -with more systematic command. Accordingly, though thus taken by -surprise, and called on now for the first time in their lives, to -form in the presence of an enemy, they only manifested the greater -promptitude[116] and anxious haste in obeying the orders of Agis, -transmitted through the regular series of officers. The battle array -was attained with regularity as well as with speed. - - [114] Thucyd. v, 66. μάλιστα δὴ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐς ὃ ἐμέμνηντο, - ἐν τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ ἐξεπλάγησαν· διὰ βραχείας γὰρ μελλήσεως ἡ - παρασκευὴ αὐτοῖς ἐγίγνετο, etc. - - [115] Thucyd. v, 66. Σχεδὸν γάρ τι πᾶν, πλὴν ὀλίγου, τὸ - στρατόπεδον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἄρχοντες ἀρχόντων εἰσὶ, καὶ τὸ - ἐπιμελὲς τοῦ δρωμένου πολλοῖς προσήκει. - - Xenophon, De Republ. Laced. xi, 5. Αἱ παραγωγαὶ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ κήρυκος - ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐνωμοτάρχου λόγῳ δηλοῦνται: compare xi, 8, τῷ ἐνωμοτάρχῃ - παρεγγυᾶται εἰς μέτωπον παρ’ ἄσπιδα καθίστασθαι, etc. - - [116] Thucyd. v, 66. εὐθὺς ὑπὸ σπουδῆς καθίσταντο ~ἐς κόσμον τὸν - ἑαυτῶν~, Ἄγιδος τοῦ βασιλέως ἕκαστα ἐξηγουμένου κατὰ τὸν νόμον, - etc. - -The extreme left of the Lacedæmonian line belonged by ancient -privilege to the Skiritæ; mountaineers of the border district of -Laconia, skirting the Arcadian Parrhasii, seemingly east of the -Eurotas, near its earliest and highest course. These men, originally -Arcadians, now constituted a variety of Laconian Periœki, with -peculiar duties as well as peculiar privileges. Numbered among the -bravest and most active men in Peloponnesus, they generally formed -the vanguard in an advancing march; and the Spartans stand accused -of having exposed them to danger as well as toil with unbecoming -recklessness.[117] Next to the Skiritæ, who were six hundred in -number, stood the enfranchised Helots, recently returned from serving -with Brasidas in Thrace, and the Neodamôdes, both probably summoned -home from Lepreum, where we were told before that they had been -planted. After them, in the centre of the entire line, came the -Lacedæmonian lochi, seven in number, with the Arcadian dependent -allies, Heræan and Mænalian, near them. Lastly, in the right wing, -stood the Tegeans, with a small division of Lacedæmonians occupying -the extreme right, as the post of honor. On each flank there were -some Lacedæmonian horsemen.[118] - - [117] Xenophon, Cyrop. iv, 2. 1: see Diodor. xv, c. 32; Xenophon, - Rep. Laced. xiii, 6. - - [118] Thucyd. v, 67. - -Thucydidês, with a frankness which enhances the value of his -testimony wherever he gives it positively, informs us that he cannot -pretend to set down the number of either army. It is evident that -this silence is not for want of having inquired; but none of the -answers which he received appeared to him trustworthy: the extreme -secrecy of Lacedæmonian politics admitted of no certainty about -_their_ numbers, while the empty numerical boasts of other Greeks -were not less misleading. In the absence of assured information about -aggregate number, the historian gives us some general information -accessible to every inquirer, and some facts visible to a spectator. -From his language it is conjectured, with some probability, by Dr. -Thirlwall and others, that he was himself present at the battle, -though in what capacity we cannot determine, as he was an exile -from his country. First, he states that the Lacedæmonian army -_appeared_ more numerous than that of the enemy. Next he tells us, -that independent of the Skiritæ on the left, who were six hundred in -number, the remaining Lacedæmonian front, to the extremity of their -right wing, consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men, each -enômoty having four men in front. In respect to depth, the different -enômoties were not all equal; but for the most part, the files were -eight deep. There were seven lochi in all (apart from the Skiritæ); -each lochus comprised four pentekosties, each pentekosty contained -four enômoties.[119] Multiplying four hundred and forty-four by -eight, and adding the six hundred Skiritæ, this would make a total -of four thousand one hundred and eighty-four hoplites, besides a few -horsemen on each flank. Respecting light-armed, nothing is said. -I have no confidence in such an estimate—but the total is smaller -than we should have expected, considering that the Lacedæmonians -had marched out from Sparta with their entire force on a pressing -emergency, and that they had only sent home one-sixth of their total, -their oldest and youngest soldiers. - - [119] Very little can be made out respecting the structure of the - Lacedæmonian army. We know that the enômoty was the elementary - division, the military unit: that the pentekosty was composed - of a definite (not always the same) number of enômoties: that - the lochus also was composed of a definite (not always the same) - number of pentekosties. The mora appears to have been a still - larger division, consisting of so many lochi (according to - Xenophon, of four lochi): but Thucydidês speaks as if he knew no - division larger than the lochus. - - Beyond this very slender information, there seems no other - fact certainly established about the Lacedæmonian military - distribution. Nor ought we reasonably to expect to find that - these words _enômoty_, _pentekosty_, lochus, etc., indicate - any fixed number of men: our own names _regiment_, _company_, - _troop_, _brigade_, _division_, etc., are all more or less - indefinite as to positive numbers and proportion to each other. - - That which was peculiar to the Lacedæmonian drill, was, the - teaching a small number of men like an enômoty (twenty-five, - thirty-two, thirty-six men, as we sometimes find it), to perform - its evolutions under the command of its enômotarch. When this - was once secured, it is probable that the combination of these - elementary divisions was left to be determined in every case by - circumstances. - - Thucydidês states two distinct facts. 1. Each enômoty had _four - men in front_. 2. Each enômoty _varied in depth_, according as - every lochagus chose. Now Dobree asks, with much reason, how - these two assertions are to be reconciled? Given the number of - men in front, the depth of the enômoty is of course determined, - without any reference to the discretion of any one. These two - assertions appear distinctly contradictory; unless we suppose - (what seems very difficult to believe) that the lochage might - make one or two of the four files of the same enômoty deeper - than the rest. Dobree proposes, as a means of removing this - difficulty, to expunge some words from the text. One cannot have - confidence, however, in the conjecture. - -It does not appear that the generals on the Argeian side made any -attempt to charge while the Lacedæmonian battle-array was yet -incomplete. It was necessary for them, according to Grecian practice, -to wind up the courage of their troops by some words of exhortation -and encouragement: and before these were finished, the Lacedæmonians -may probably have attained their order. The Mantineian officers -reminded their countrymen that the coming battle would decide whether -Mantineia should continue to be a free and imperial city, with -Arcadian dependencies of her own, as she now was, or should again -be degraded into a dependency of Lacedæmon. The Argeian leaders -dwelt upon the opportunity which Argos now had of recovering her -lost ascendency in Peloponnesus, and of revenging herself upon her -worst enemy and neighbor. The Athenian troops were exhorted to show -themselves worthy of the many brave allies with whom they were now -associated, as well as to protect their own territory and empire by -vanquishing their enemy in Peloponnesus. - -It illustrates forcibly the peculiarity of Lacedæmonian character, -that to them no similar words of encouragement were addressed either -by Agis or any of the officers. “They knew (says the historian[120]) -that long practice beforehand in the business of war, was a better -preservative than fine speeches on the spur of the moment.” As among -professional soldiers, bravery was assumed as a thing of course, -without any special exhortation: but mutual suggestions were heard -among them with a view to get their order of battle and position -perfect, which at first it probably was not, from the sudden and -hurried manner in which they had been constrained to form. Moreover, -various war-songs, perhaps those of Tyrtæus, were chanted in the -ranks. At length the word was given to attack: the numerous pipers -in attendance—an hereditary caste at Sparta—began to play, while the -slow, solemn, and equable march of the troops adjusted itself to the -time given by these instruments without any break or wavering in the -line. A striking contrast to this deliberate pace was presented by -the enemy: who having no pipers or other musical instruments, rushed -forward to the charge with a step vehement and even furious,[121] -fresh from the exhortations just addressed to them. - - [120] Thucyd. v, 69. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ καθ’ ἑκάστους τε καὶ - μετὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν νόμων ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὧν ἠπίσταντο τὴν - παρακέλευσιν τῆς μνήμης ἀγαθοῖς οὖσιν ἐποιοῦντο, εἰδότες ἔργων ἐκ - πολλοῦ μελέτην πλείω σώζουσαν ἢ λόγων δι’ ὀλίγου καλῶς ῥηθέντων - παραίνεσιν. - - [121] Thucyd. v, 70. Ἀργεῖοι μὲν καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, ἐντόνως καὶ - ὀργῇ χωροῦντες, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ, βραδέως καὶ ὑπὸ αὐλητῶν πολλῶν - νόμῳ ἐγκαθεστώτων, οὐ τοῦ θείου χάριν, ἀλλ’ ἵνα ὁμαλῶς μετὰ - ῥυθμοῦ βαίνοντες προσέλθοιεν καὶ μὴ διασπασθείη αὐτῶν ἡ τάξις, - ὅπερ φιλεῖ τὰ μεγάλα στρατόπεδα ἐν ταῖς προσόδοις ποιεῖν. - -It was the natural tendency of all Grecian armies, when coming into -conflict, to march not exactly straight forward, but somewhat -aslant towards the right. The soldiers on the extreme right of -both armies set the example of such inclination, in order to avoid -exposing their own unshielded side; while for the same reason every -man along the line took care to keep close to the shield of his -right-hand neighbor. We see from hence that, with equal numbers, -the right was not merely the post of honor, but also of comparative -safety. So it proved on the present occasion, even the Lacedæmonian -discipline being noway exempt from this cause of disturbance. Though -the Lacedæmonian front, from their superior numbers, was more -extended than that of the enemy, still their right files did not -think themselves safe without slanting still farther to the right, -and thus outflanked very greatly the Athenians on the opposite left -wing; while on the opposite side the Mantineians who formed the -right wing, from the same disposition to keep the left shoulder -forward, outflanked, though not in so great a degree, the Skiritæ and -Brasideians on the Lacedæmonian left. King Agis, whose post was with -the lochi in the centre, saw plainly that when the armies closed, -his left would be certainly taken in flank and perhaps even in the -rear. Accordingly, he thought it necessary to alter his dispositions -even at this critical moment, which he relied upon being able to -accomplish through the exact discipline, practised evolutions, and -slow march, of his soldiers. - -The natural mode of meeting the impending danger would have been to -bring round a division from the extreme right, where it could well be -spared, to the extreme left against the advancing Mantineians. But -the ancient privilege of the Skiritæ, who always fought by themselves -on the extreme left, forbade such an order.[122] Accordingly, Agis -gave signal to the Brasideians and Skiritæ to make a flank movement -on the left so as to get on equal front with the Mantineians; while -in order to fill up the vacancy thus created in his line, he sent -orders to the two polemarchs Aristoklês and Hipponoidas, who had -their lochi on the extreme right of the line, to move to the rear -and take post on the right of the Brasideians, so as again to close -up the line. But these two polemarchs, who had the safest and most -victorious place in the line, chose to keep it, disobeying his -express orders: so that Agis, when he saw that they did not move, -was forced to send a second order countermanding the flank movement -of the Skiritæ, and directing them to fall in upon the centre, back -into their former place. But it had now become too late to execute -this second command before the hostile armies closed: and the Skiritæ -and Brasideians were thus assailed while in disorder and cut off from -their own centre. The Mantineians, finding them in this condition, -defeated and drove them back; while the chosen Thousand of Argos, -breaking in by the vacant space between the Brasideians and the -Lacedæmonian centre, took them on the right flank and completed their -discomfiture. They were routed and pursued even to the Lacedæmonian -baggage-wagons in the rear; some of the elder troops who guarded the -wagons being slain, and the whole Lacedæmonian left wing altogether -dispersed. - - [122] Thucyd. v, 67. Τότε δὲ κέρας μὲν εὐώνυμον Σκιρῖται αὐτοῖς - καθίσταντο, ~ἀεὶ ταύτην τὴν τάξιν μόνοι Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπὶ σφῶν - αὐτῶν ἔχοντες~, etc. - - The strong and precise language, which Thucydidês here - uses, shows that this was a privilege pointedly noted and - much esteemed: among the Lacedæmonians, especially, ancient - routine was more valued than elsewhere. And it is essential to - take notice of the circumstance, in order to appreciate the - generalship of Agis, which has been rather hardly criticized. - -But the victorious Mantineians and their comrades, thinking only -of what was immediately before them, wasted thus a precious time -when their aid was urgently needed elsewhere. Matters passed very -differently on the Lacedæmonian centre and right; where Agis, with -his body-guard of three hundred chosen youths called Hippeis, and -with the Spartan lochi, found himself in front conflict with the -centre and left of the enemy;—with the Argeians, their elderly troops -and the so-called Five Lochi, with the Kleonæans and Orneates, -dependent allies of Argos, and with the Athenians. Over all these -troops they were completely victorious, after a short resistance, -indeed, on some points with no resistance at all. So formidable was -the aspect and name of the Lacedæmonians, that the opposing troops -gave way without crossing spears; and even with a panic so headlong, -that they trod down each other in anxiety to escape.[123] While -thus defeated in front, they were taken in flank by the Tegeans -and Lacedæmonians on the right of Agis’s army, and the Athenians -here incurred serious hazard of being all cut to pieces, had they -not been effectively aided by their own cavalry close at hand. -Moreover Agis, having decidedly beaten and driven them back was -less anxious to pursue them than to return to the rescue of his own -defeated left wing; so that even the Athenians, who were exposed -both in flank and front, were enabled to effect their retreat in -safety. The Mantineians and the Argeian Thousand, though victorious -on their part of the line, yet seeing the remainder of their army -in disorderly flight, had little disposition to renew the combat -against Agis and the conquering Lacedæmonians. They sought only to -effect their retreat, which however could not be done without severe -loss, especially on the part of the Mantineians; and which Agis -might have prevented altogether, had not the Lacedæmonian system, -enforced on this occasion by the counsels of an ancient Spartan named -Pharax, enjoyed abstinence from prolonged pursuit against a defeated -enemy.[124] - - [123] Thucyd. v, 72. (Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοὺς Ἀργείους) Ἔτρεψαν - οὐδὲ ἐς χεῖρας τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑπομείναντας, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπῇσαν οἱ - Λακεδαιμόνιοι εὐθὺς ἐνδόντας, καὶ ἐστὶν οὓς καὶ καταπατηθέντας, - τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν. - - The last words of this sentence present a difficulty which has - perplexed all the commentators, and which none of them have yet - satisfactorily cleared up. - - They all admit that the expressions, ~τοῦ, τοῦ μὴ~, preceding the - infinitive mood as here, signify _design_ or _purpose_; ἕνεκα - being understood. But none of them can construe the sentence - satisfactorily with this meaning: accordingly they here ascribe - to the words a different and exceptional meaning. See the notes - of Poppo, Göller, and Dr. Arnold, in which notes the views of - other critics are cited and discussed. - - Some say that τοῦ μὴ in this place means the same as ὥστε μή: - others affirm, that it is identical with διὰ τὸ μὴ or with τῷ - μή. “Formula ~τοῦ, τοῦ μὴ~ (say Bauer and Göller), plerumque - _consilium_ significat: interdum _effectum_ (_i. e._ ὥστε μή); - hic _causam_ indicat (i. e. διὰ τὸ μὴ, or τῷ μή).” But I agree - with Dr. Arnold in thinking that the last of these three alleged - meanings is wholly unauthorized; while the second, which is - adopted by Dr. Arnold himself, is sustained only by feeble and - dubious evidence; for the passage of Thucydidês (ii, 4. τοῦ μὴ - ἐκφεύγειν) may be as well construed, as Poppo’s note thereupon - suggests, without any such supposed exceptional sense of the - words. - - Now it seems to me quite possible to construe the words τοῦ μὴ - φθῆναι here in their regular and legitimate sense of ~ἕνεκα τοῦ~, - or _consilium_. But first an error must be cleared up which - pervades the view of most of the commentators. They suppose that - those Argeians, who are here affirmed to have been “_trodden - under foot_,” were so trodden down by _the Lacedæmonians_ - in their advance. But this is in every way improbable. The - Lacedæmonians were particularly slow in their motions, regular - in their ranks, and backward as to pursuit, qualities which are - dwelt upon by Thucydidês in regard to this very battle. They were - not at all likely to overtake such terrified men as were only - anxious to run away: moreover, if they did overtake them, they - would spear them, not trample them under foot. - - To be trampled under foot, though possible enough from the - numerous Persian cavalry (Herodot. vii, 173; Xenoph. Hellen. - iii, 4, 12), is not the treatment which defeated soldiers meet - with from victorious hostile infantry in the field, especially - Lacedæmonian infantry. But it is precisely the treatment which - they meet with, if they be in one of the hinder ranks, from their - own panic-stricken comrades in the front rank, who find the enemy - closing upon them, and rush back madly to get away from him. Of - course it was the Argeians in the front rank who were seized - with the most violent panic, and who thus fell back upon their - own comrades in the rear ranks, overthrowing and treading them - down to secure their own escape. It seems quite plain that it - was the Argeians in front—not the Lacedæmonians—who trod down - their comrades in the rear (there were probably six or eight - men in every file), in order to escape themselves before the - Lacedæmonians should be upon them: compare Xen. Hellenic. iv, 4, - 11; Œconomic. viii, 5. - - There are therefore in the whole scene which Thucydidês - describes, three distinct subjects: 1. The Lacedæmonians 2. - The Argeians soldiers, who were trodden down. 3. Other Argeian - soldiers, who trod them down in order to get away themselves. Out - of these three he only specifies the first two; but the third - is present to his mind, and is implied in his narrative, just - as much as if he had written καταπατηθέντας ~ὑπ’ ἄλλων~, or ὑπ’ - ἀλλήλων, as in Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 4, 11. - - Now it is to this third subject, implied in the narrative, but - not formally specified (_i. e._ those Argeians who trod down - their comrades in order to get away themselves), or rather to the - second and third conjointly and confusedly, that the _design_ or - _purpose_ (_consilium_) in the words τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι refers. - - Farther, the commentators all construe τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι τὴν - ἐγκατάληψιν, as if the last word were an accusative case coming - _after_ φθῆναι and governed by it. But there is also another - construction, equally good Greek, and much better for the sense. - In my judgment, τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν is here the accusative case - coming _before_ φθῆναι and forming the _subject_ of it. The words - will thus read (ἕνεκα) τοῦ τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν μὴ φθῆναι (ἐπελθοῦσαν - αὐτοῖς): “in order that the actual grasp of the Lacedæmonians - might not be beforehand in coming upon them;” “might not come - upon them too soon,” _i. e._ “sooner than they could get away.” - And since the word ἐγκατάληψις is an abstract active substantive, - so, in order to get at the real meaning here, we may substitute - the concrete words with which it correlates, _i. e._ τοὺς - Λακεδαιμονίους ἐγκαταλαβόντας, subject as well as attribute, for - the active participle is here essentially involved. - - The sentence would then read, supposing the ellipsis filled up - and the meaning expressed in full and concrete words—ἔστιν οὓς - καὶ καταπατηθέντας ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων φευγόντων (or βιαζομένων), ἕνεκα - τοῦ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μὴ φθῆναι ἐγκαταλαβόντας αὐτοὺς (τοὺς - φεύγοντας): “As soon as the Lacedæmonians approached near, the - Argeians gave way at once, without staying for hand-combat: - and some were even trodden down by each other, or by their own - comrades running away in order that the Lacedæmonians might not - be beforehand in catching them sooner than they could escape.” - - Construing in this way the sentence as it now stands, we have τοῦ - μὴ φθῆναι used in its regular and legitimate sense of _purpose_, - or _consilium_. We have moreover a plain and natural state of - facts, in full keeping with the general narrative. Nor is there - any violence put upon the words. Nothing more is done than to - expand a very elliptical sentence, and to fill up that entire - sentence which was present to the writer’s own mind. To do this - properly is the chief duty, as well as the chief difficulty, of - an expositor of Thucydidês. - - [124] Thucyd. v, 73; Diodor. xii, 79. - -There fell in this battle seven hundred men of the Argeians, -Kleonæans, and Orneates; two hundred Athenians, together with both -the generals Lachês and Nikostratus; and two hundred Mantineians. -The loss of the Lacedæmonians, though never certainly known, from -the habitual secrecy of their public proceedings, was estimated at -about three hundred men. They stripped the enemy’s dead, spreading -out to view the arms thus acquired, and selecting some for a trophy; -then picked up their own dead and carried them away for burial at -Tegea, granting the customary burial-truce to the defeated enemy. -Pleistoanax, the other Spartan king, had advanced as far as Tegea -with a reinforcement composed of the elder and younger citizens; but -on hearing of the victory, he returned back home.[125] - - [125] Thucyd. v, 73. - -Such was the important battle of Mantineia, fought in the month -of June 418 B.C. Its effect throughout Greece was prodigious. The -numbers engaged on both sides were very considerable for a Grecian -army of that day, though seemingly not so large as at the battle -of Delium five years before: the number and grandeur of the states -whose troops were engaged was, however, greater than at Delium. But -what gave peculiar value to the battle was, that it wiped off at -once the preëxisting stain upon the honor of Sparta. The disaster -in Sphakteria, disappointing all previous expectation, had drawn -upon her the imputation of something like cowardice; and there were -other proceedings which, with far better reason, caused her to be -stigmatized as stupid and backward. But the victory of Mantineia -silenced all such disparaging criticism, and replaced Sparta in her -old position of military preëminence before the eyes of Greece. It -worked so much the more powerfully because it was entirely the fruit -of Lacedæmonian courage, with little aid from that peculiar skill and -tactics, which was generally seen concomitant, but had in the present -case been found comparatively wanting. The manœuvre of Agis, in -itself not ill-conceived, for the purpose of extending his left wing, -had failed through the disobedience of the two refractory polemarchs: -but in such a case the shame of failure falls more or less upon all -parties concerned; nor could either general or soldiers be considered -to have displayed at Mantineia any of that professional aptitude -which caused the Lacedæmonians to be styled “artists in warlike -affairs.” So much the more conspicuously did Lacedæmonian courage -stand out to view. After the left wing had been broken, and when the -Argeian Thousand had penetrated into the vacant space between the -left and centre, so that they might have taken the centre in flank, -and ought to have done so, had they been well advised, the troops in -the centre, instead of being daunted as most Grecian soldiers would -have been, had marched forward against the enemies in their front, -and gained a complete victory. The consequences of the battle were -thus immense in reëstablishing the reputation of the Lacedæmonians, -and in exalting them again to their ancient dignity of chiefs of -Peloponnesus.[126] - - [126] Thucyd. v, 75. Καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοτε ἐπιφερομένην - αἰτίαν ἔς τε μαλακίαν διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ξυμφορὰν, καὶ ἐς τὴν - ἄλλην ἀβουλίαν τε καὶ βραδύτητα, ἑνὶ ἔργῳ τούτῳ ἀπελύσαντο· τύχῃ - μέν, ὡς ἐδόκουν, κακιζόμενοι, γνώμῃ δὲ, οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀεὶ ὄντες. - -We are not surprised to hear that the two polemarchs, Aristoklês and -Hipponoidas, whose disobedience had wellnigh caused the ruin of the -army, were tried and condemned to banishment as cowards, on their -return to Sparta.[127] - - [127] Thucyd. v, 72. - -Looking at the battle from the point of view of the other side, we -may remark, that the defeat was greatly occasioned by the selfish -caprice of the Eleians in withdrawing their three thousand men -immediately before the battle, because the other allies, instead -of marching against Lepreum, preferred to attempt the far more -important town of Tegea: an additional illustration of the remark -of Periklês at the beginning of the war, that numerous and equal -allies could never be kept in harmonious coöperation.[128] Shortly -after the defeat, the three thousand Eleians came back to the -aid of Mantineia,—probably regretting their previous untoward -departure,—together with a reinforcement of one thousand Athenians. -Moreover, the Karneian month began, a season which the Lacedæmonians -kept rigidly holy; even despatching messengers to countermand their -extra-Peloponnesian allies, whom they had invoked prior to the late -battle,[129] and remaining themselves within their own territory, -so that the field was for the moment left clear for the operations -of a defeated enemy. Accordingly, the Epidaurians, though they -had made an inroad into the territory of Argos during the absence -of the Argeian main force at the time of the late battle, and had -gained a partial success, now found their own territory overrun -by the united Eleians, Mantineians, and Athenians, who were bold -enough even to commence a wall of circumvallation round the town of -Epidaurus itself. The entire work was distributed between them to -be accomplished; but the superior activity and perseverance of the -Athenians was here displayed in a conspicuous manner. For while the -portion of work committed to them—the fortification of the cape on -which the Heræum or temple of Hêrê was situated—was indefatigably -prosecuted and speedily brought to completion, their allies, both -Eleians and Mantineians, abandoned the tasks respectively allotted -to them in impatience and disgust. The idea of circumvallation being -for this reason relinquished, a joint garrison was left in the new -fort at Cape Heræum, after which the allies evacuated the Epidaurian -territory.[130] - - [128] Thucyd. i, 141. - - [129] Thucyd. v, 75. - - [130] Thucyd. v, 75. - -So far, the Lacedæmonians appeared to have derived little positive -benefit from their late victory: but the fruits of it were soon -manifested in the very centre of their enemy’s force, at Argos. A -material change had taken place since the battle in the political -tendencies of that city. There had been within it always an -opposition party, philo-Laconian and anti-democratical: and the -effect of the defeat of Mantineia had been to strengthen this party -as much as it depressed their opponents. The democratical leaders, -who, in conjunction with Athens and Alkibiades, had aspired to -maintain an ascendency in Peloponnesus hostile and equal, if not -superior to Sparta, now found their calculations overthrown and -exchanged for the discouraging necessities of self-defence against a -victorious enemy. And while these leaders thus lost general influence -by so complete a defeat of their foreign policy, the ordinary -democratical soldiers of Argos brought back with them from the field -of Mantineia, nothing but humiliation and terror of the Lacedæmonian -arms. But the chosen Argeian Thousand-regiment returned with very -different feelings. Victorious over the left wing of their enemies, -they had not been seriously obstructed in their retreat even by the -Lacedæmonian centre. They had thus reaped positive glory,[131] and -doubtless felt contempt for their beaten fellow-citizens. Now it has -been already mentioned that these Thousand were men of rich families, -and the best military age, set apart by the Argeian democracy to -receive permanent training at the public expense, just at a time -when the ambitious views of Argos first began to dawn, after the -Peace of Nikias. So long as Argos was likely to become or continue -the imperial state of Peloponnesus, these Thousand wealthy men would -probably find their dignity sufficiently consulted in upholding her -as such, and would thus acquiesce in the democratical government. But -when the defeat of Mantineia reduced Argos to her own limits, and -threw her upon the defensive, there was nothing to counterbalance -their natural oligarchical sentiments, so that they became decided -opponents of the democratical government in its distress. The -oligarchical party in Argos, thus encouraged and reinforced, entered -into a conspiracy with the Lacedæmonians to bring the city into -alliance with Sparta as well as to overthrow the democracy.[132] - - [131] Aristotle (Politic. v, 4, 9) expressly notices the credit - gained by the oligarchical force of Argos in the battle of - Mantineia, as one main cause of the subsequent revolution, - notwithstanding that the Argeians generally were beaten: ~Οἱ - γνώριμοι εὐδοκιμήσαντες~ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ, etc. - - An example of contempt entertained by victorious troops over - defeated fellow-countrymen, is mentioned by Xenophon in the - Athenian army under Alkibiadês and Thrasyllus, in one of the - later years of the Peloponnesian war: see Xenophon, Hellen. i, 2, - 15-17. - - [132] Thucyd. v, 76; Diodor. xii, 80. - -As the first step towards the execution of this scheme, the -Lacedæmonians, about the end of September, marched out their -full forces as far as Tegea, thus threatening invasion, and -inspiring terror at Argos. From Tegea they sent forward as envoy -Lichas, proxenus of the Argeians at Sparta, with two alternative -propositions: one for peace, which he was instructed to tender and -prevail upon the Argeians to accept, if he could; another, in case -they refused, of a menacing character. It was the scheme of the -oligarchical faction first to bring the city into alliance with -Lacedæmon and dissolve the connection with Athens, before they -attempted any innovation in the government. The arrival of Lichas -was the signal for them to manifest themselves by strenuously -pressing the acceptance of his pacific proposition. But they had -to contend against a strong resistance; since Alkibiadês, still in -Argos, employed his utmost energy to defeat their views. Nothing -but the presence of the Lacedæmonian army at Tegea, and the general -despondency of the people, at length enabled them to carry their -point, and to procure acceptance of the proposed treaty; which being -already adopted by the ekklesia at Sparta, was sent ready prepared to -Argos, and there sanctioned without alteration. The conditions were -substantially as follows:— - -“The Argeians shall restore the boys whom they have received as -hostages from Orchomenus, and the men-hostages from the Mænalii. -They shall restore to the Lacedæmonians the men now in Mantineia, -whom the Lacedæmonians had placed as hostages for safe custody in -Orchomenus, and whom the Argeians and Mantineians have carried away -from that place. They shall evacuate Epidaurus, and raze the fort -recently erected near it. The Athenians, unless they also forthwith -evacuate Epidaurus, shall be proclaimed as enemies to Lacedæmon as -well as to Argos, and to the allies of both. The Lacedæmonians shall -restore all the hostages whom they now have in keeping, from whatever -place they may have been taken. Respecting the sacrifice alleged -to be due to Apollo by the Epidaurians, the Argeians will consent -to tender to them an oath, which if they swear, they shall clear -themselves.[133] Every city in Peloponnesus, small or great, shall be -autonomous and at liberty to maintain its own ancient constitution. -If any extra-Peloponnesian city shall come against Peloponnesus with -mischievous projects, Lacedæmon and Argos will take joint counsel -against it, in the manner most equitable for the interest of the -Peloponnesians generally. The extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta -shall be in the same position with reference to this treaty as the -allies of Lacedæmon and Argos in Peloponnesus, and shall hold their -own in the same manner. The Argeians shall show this treaty to their -allies, who shall be admitted to subscribe to it, if they think fit. -But if the allies desire anything different, the Argeians shall send -them home about their business.”[134] - - [133] Thucyd. v, 77. The text of Thucydidês is incurably corrupt, - in regard to several words of this clause; though the general - sense appears sufficiently certain, that the Epidaurians are to - be allowed to clear themselves in respect to this demand by an - oath. In regard to this purifying oath, it seems to have been - essential that the oath should be _tendered_ by one litigant - party and _taken_ by the other: perhaps therefore σέμεν or θέμεν - λῇν (Valckenaer’s conjecture) might be preferable to εἶμεν λῇν. - - To Herodot. vi, 86, and Aristotel. Rhetoric. i, 16, 6, which Dr. - Arnold and other commentators notice in illustration of this - practice, we may add the instructive exposition of the analogous - practice in the procedure of Roman law, as given by Von Savigny, - in his System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, sects. 309-313, - vol. vii, pp. 53-83. It was an oath tendered by one litigant - party to the opposite, in hopes that the latter would refuse to - take it; if taken, it had the effect of a judgment in favor of - the swearer. But the Roman lawyers laid down many limits and - formalities, with respect to this _jusjurandum delatum_, which - Von Savigny sets forth with his usual perspicuity. - - [134] Thucyd. v, 77. Ἐπιδείξαντας δὲ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ξυμβαλέσθαι, - αἴ κα αὐτοῖς δοκῇ· αἰ δέ τι καὶ ἄλλο δοκῇ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις, ~οἴκαδ’ - ἀπιάλλειν~. See Dr. Arnold’s note, and Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. - ch. xxiv. vol. iii, p. 342. - - One cannot be certain about the meaning of these two last words, - but I incline to believe that they express a peremptory and - almost a hostile sentiment, such as I have given in the text. - The allies here alluded to are Athens, Elis, and Mantineia; all - hostile in feeling to Sparta. The Lacedæmonians could not well - decline admitting these cities to share in this treaty as it - stood; but would probably think it suitable to repel them even - with rudeness, if they desired any change. - - I rather imagine, too, that this last clause (ἐπιδείξαντας) - has reference exclusively to the Argeians, and not to the - Lacedæmonians also. The form of the treaty is, that of a - resolution already taken at Sparta, and sent for approval to - Argos. - -Such was the agreement sent ready prepared by the Lacedæmonians to -Argos, and there literally accepted. It presented a reciprocity -little more than nominal, imposing one obligation of no importance -upon Sparta; though it answered the purpose of the latter by -substantially dissolving the alliance of Argos with its three -confederates. - -But this treaty was meant by the oligarchical party in Argos only -as preface to a series of ulterior measures. As soon as it was -concluded, the menacing army of Sparta was withdrawn from Tegea, and -was exchanged for free and peaceful intercommunication between the -Lacedæmonians and Argeians. Probably Alkibiadês at the same time -retired, while the renewed visits and hospitalities of Lacedæmonians -at Argos strengthened the interest of their party more than ever. -They were soon powerful enough to persuade the Argeian assembly -formally to renounce the alliance with Athens, Elis, and Mantineia, -and to conclude a special alliance with Sparta, on the following -terms:— - -“There shall be peace and alliance for fifty years between the -Lacedæmonians and the Argeians—upon equal terms—each giving amicable -satisfaction, according to its established constitution, to all -complaints preferred by the other. On the same condition, also, the -other Peloponnesian cities shall partake in this peace and alliance, -holding their own territory, laws, and separate constitution. All -extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be put upon the same -footing as the Lacedæmonians themselves. The allies of Argos shall -also be put upon the same footing as Argos herself, holding their -own territory undisturbed. Should occasion arise for common military -operations on any point, the Lacedæmonians and Argeians shall take -counsel together, determining in the most equitable manner they can -for the interest of their allies. If any one of the cities hereunto -belonging, either in or out of Peloponnesus, shall have disputes -either about boundaries or other topics, she shall be held bound -to enter upon amicable adjustment.[135] If any allied city shall -quarrel with another allied city, the matter shall be referred to -some third city satisfactory to both. Each city shall render justice -to her own citizens according to her own ancient constitution.” - - [135] Thucyd. v, 79. Αἰ δέ τινι τᾶν πολίων ᾖ ἀμφίλογα, ἢ τᾶν - ἐντὸς ἢ τᾶν ἐκτὸς Πελοποννάσου, αἴτε περὶ ὅρων αἴτε περὶ ἄλλου - τινὸς, διακριθῆμεν. - - The object of this clause I presume to be, to provide that the - joint forces of Lacedæmon and Argos should not be bound to - interfere for every separate dispute of each single ally with a - foreign state, not included in the alliance. Thus, there were - at this time standing disputes between Bœotia and Athens, and - between Megara and Athens: the Argeians probably would not choose - to pledge themselves to interfere for the maintenance of the - alleged rights of Bœotia and Megara in these disputes. They guard - themselves against such necessity in this clause. - - M. H. Meier, in his recent Dissertation (Die Privat. - Schiedsrichter und die öffentlichen Diäteten Athens (Halle, - 1846), sect. 19, p. 41), has given an analysis and explanation of - this treaty which seems to me on many points unsatisfactory. - -It will be observed that in this treaty of alliance, the disputed -question of headship is compromised or evaded. Lacedæmon and -Argos are both put upon an equal footing, in respect to taking -joint counsel for the general body of allies: they two alone are -to decide, without consulting the other allies, though binding -themselves to have regard to the interests of the latter. The policy -of Lacedæmon also pervades the treaty, that of insuring autonomy -to all the lesser states of Peloponnesus, and thus breaking up the -empire of Elis, Mantineia, or any other larger state which might -have dependencies.[136] And accordingly the Mantineians, finding -themselves abandoned by Argos, were constrained to make their -submission to Sparta, enrolling themselves again as her allies, -renouncing all command over their Arcadian subjects, and delivering -up the hostages of these latter, according to the stipulation in -the treaty between Lacedæmon and Argos.[137] The Lacedæmonians do -not seem to have meddled farther with Elis. Being already possessed -of Lepreum,—through the Brasideian settlers planted there,—they -perhaps did not wish again to provoke the Eleians, from fear of being -excluded a second time from the Olympic festival. - - [136] All the smaller states in Peloponnesus are pronounced - by this treaty to be (if we employ the language employed - with reference to the Delphians peculiarly in the Peace of - Nikias) αὐτονόμους, αὐτοτελεῖς, αὐτοδίκους, Thucyd. v, 19. - The last clause of this treaty guarantees αὐτοδικíαν to all, - though in language somewhat different, τοῖς δὲ ἔταις κατὰ - πάτρια δικάζεσθαι. The expression in this treaty αὐτοπόλιες is - substantially equivalent to αὐτοτελεῖς in the former. - - It is remarkable that we never find in Thucydidês the very - convenient Herodotean word δωσίδικοι (Herodot. vi, 42), though - there are occasions in these fourth and fifth books on which it - would be useful to his meaning. - - [137] Thucyd. v. 81; Diodor. xii, 81. - -Meanwhile the conclusion of the alliance with Lacedæmon—about -November or December, 418 B.C.—had still farther depressed the -popular leaders at Argos. The oligarchical faction, and the chosen -regiment of the Thousand, all men of wealth and family, as well as -bound together by their common military training, now saw their way -clearly to the dissolution of the democracy by force, and to the -accomplishment of a revolution. Instigated by such ambitious views, -and flattered by the idea of admitted headship jointly with Sparta, -they espoused the new policy of the city with extreme vehemence, and -began immediately to multiply occasions of collision with Athens. -Joint Lacedæmonian and Argeian envoys were despatched to Thrace and -Macedonia. With the Chalkidians of Thrace, the revolted subjects -of Athens, the old alliance was renewed and even new engagements -concluded; while Perdikkas of Macedonia was urged to renounce -his covenants with Athens, and join the new confederacy. In that -quarter the influence of Argos was considerable; for the Macedonian -princes prized very highly their ancient descent from Argos, which -constituted them brethren of the Hellenic family. Accordingly, -Perdikkas consented to the demand and concluded the new treaty; -insisting, however, with his habitual duplicity, that the step -should for the moment be kept secret from Athens.[138] In farther -pursuance of the new tone of hostility to that city, joint envoys -were also sent thither, to require that the Athenians should quit -Peloponnesus, and especially that they should evacuate the fort -recently erected near Epidaurus. It seems to have been held jointly -by Argeians, Mantineians, Eleians, and Athenians; and as the latter -were only a minority of the whole, the Athenians in the city judged -it prudent to send Dêmosthenês to bring them away. That general not -only effected the retreat, but also contrived a stratagem, which -gave to it the air almost of an advantage. On his first arrival in -the fort, he proclaimed a gymnastic match outside of the gates for -the amusement of the whole garrison, contriving to keep back the -Athenians within until all the rest had marched out: then hastily -shutting the gates, he remained master of the place.[139] Having no -intention, however, of keeping it, he made it over presently to the -Epidaurians themselves, with whom he renewed the truce to which they -had been parties jointly with the Lacedæmonians five years before, -two years before the Peace of Nikias.[140] - - [138] Compare Thucyd. v, 80, and v, 83. - - [139] The instances appear to have been not rare, wherein Grecian - towns changed masters, by the citizens thus going out of the - gates all together, or most part of them, for some religious - festival. See the case of Smyrna (Herodot. i, 150), and the - precautionary suggestions of the military writer Æneas, in his - treatise called Poliorketicus, c. 17. - - [140] Thucyd. v, 80. Καὶ ὕστερον Ἐπιδαυρίοις ~ἀνανεωσάμενοι~ τὰς - σπονδὰς, αὐτοὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέδοσαν τὸ τείχισμα. We are here told - that the Athenians RENEWED their truce with the Epidaurians: but - I know no truce previously between them except the general truce - for a year, which the Epidaurians swore to, in conjunction with - Sparta (iv, 119), in the beginning of B.C. 423. - -The mode of proceeding here resorted to by Athens, in respect to -the surrender of the fort, seems to have been dictated by a desire -to manifest her displeasure against the Argeians. This was exactly -what the Argeian leaders and oligarchical party, on their side, most -desired; the breach with Athens had become irreparable, and their -plans were now matured for violently subverting their own democracy. -They concerted with Sparta a joint military expedition, of one -thousand hoplites from each city,—the first joint expedition under -the new alliance,—against Sikyôn, for the purpose of introducing more -thorough-paced oligarchy into the already oligarchical Sikyônian -government. It is possible that there may have been some democratical -opposition gradually acquiring strength at Sikyôn: but that city -seems to have been, as far as we know, always oligarchical in policy, -and passively faithful to Sparta. Probably, therefore, the joint -enterprise against Sikyôn was nothing more than a pretext to cover -the introduction of one thousand Lacedæmonian hoplites into Argos, -whither the joint detachment immediately returned, after the business -at Sikyôn had been accomplished. Thus reinforced, the oligarchical -leaders and the chosen Thousand at Argos put down by force the -democratical constitution in that city, slew the democratical -leaders, and established themselves in complete possession of the -government.[141] - - [141] Thucyd. v, 81. Καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀργεῖοι, χίλιοι - ἑκάτεροι, ξυστρατεύσαντες τά τ’ ἐν Σικυῶνι ἐς ὀλίγους μᾶλλον - κατέστησαν αὐτοὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐλθόντες, καὶ μετ’ ἐκεῖνα - ξυναμφότεροι ἤδη καὶ τὸν ἐν Ἄργει δῆμον κατέλυσαν, καὶ ὀλιγαρχία - ἐπιτηδεία τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις κατέστη: compare Diodor. xii, 80. - -This revolution, accomplished about February, B.C. 417, the result of -the victory of Mantineia and the consummation of a train of policy -laid by Sparta, raised her ascendency in Peloponnesus to a higher and -more undisputed point than it had ever before attained. The towns in -Achaia were as yet not sufficiently oligarchical for her purpose, -perhaps since the march of Alkibiadês thither, two years before; -accordingly, she now remodelled their governments in conformity with -her own views. The new rulers of Argos were subservient to her, not -merely from oligarchical sympathy, but from need of her aid to keep -down internal rising against themselves: so that there was neither -enemy, nor even neutral, to counter-work her or to favor Athens, -throughout the whole peninsula. - -But the Spartan ascendency at Argos was not destined to last. -Though there were many cities in Greece, in which oligarchies long -maintained themselves unshaken, through adherence to a traditional -routine and by being usually in the hands of men accustomed to -govern, yet an oligarchy erected by force upon the ruins of a -democracy was rarely of long duration. The angry discontent of -the people, put down by temporary intimidation, usually revived, -and threatened the security of the rulers enough to render them -suspicious and probably cruel. Nor was such cruelty their only fault: -they found their emancipation from democratical restraints too -tempting to be able to control either their lust or their rapacity. -With the population of Argos, comparatively coarse and brutal in all -ranks, and more like Korkyra than like Athens, such abuse was pretty -sure to be speedy as well as flagrant. Especially the chosen regiment -of the Thousand—men in the vigor of their age, and proud of their -military prowess as well as of their wealthier station—construed -the new oligarchical government which they had helped to erect as a -period of individual license to themselves. The behavior and fate of -their chief, Bryas, illustrates the general demeanor of the troop. -After many other outrages against persons of poorer condition, he one -day met in the streets a wedding procession, in which the person of -the bride captivated his fancy. He caused her to be violently torn -from her company, carried her to his house, and possessed himself -of her by force. But in the middle of the night, this high-spirited -woman revenged herself for the outrage by putting out the eyes of the -ravisher while he was fast asleep:[142] a terrible revenge, which -the pointed clasp-pins of the feminine attire sometimes enabled -women[143] to take upon those who wronged them. Having contrived to -make her escape, she found concealment among her friends, as well as -protection among the people generally against the indignant efforts -of the chosen Thousand to avenge their leader. - - [142] Pausanias, ii, 20, 1. - - [143] See Herodot. v, 87; Euripid. Hecub. 1152, and the note of - Musgrave on line 1135 of that drama. - -From incidents such as this, and from the multitude of petty insults -which so flagitious an outrage implies as coexistent, we are not -surprised to learn that the Demos of Argos soon recovered their lost -courage, and resolved upon an effort to put down their oligarchical -oppressors. They waited for the moment when the festival called the -Gymnopædiæ was in course of being solemnized at Sparta,—a festival at -which the choric performances of men and boys were so interwoven with -Spartan religion as well as bodily training, that the Lacedæmonians -would make no military movement until they were finished. At this -critical moment, the Argeian Demos rose in insurrection, and after -a sharp contest gained a victory over the oligarchy, some of whom -were slain, while others only saved themselves by flight. Even at the -first instant of danger, pressing messages had been sent to Sparta -for aid. But the Lacedæmonians at first peremptorily refused to move -during the period of their festival: nor was it until messenger after -messenger had arrived to set forth the pressing necessity of their -friends, that they reluctantly put aside their festival to march -towards Argos. They were too late: the precious moment had already -passed by. They were met at Tegea by an intimation that their friends -were overthrown, and Argos in possession of the victorious people. -Nevertheless, various exiles who had escaped still promised them -success, urgently entreating them to proceed, but the Lacedæmonians -refused to comply, returned to Sparta, and resumed their intermitted -festival.[144] - - [144] Thucyd. v, 82; Diodor. xii, 80. - -Thus was the oligarchy of Argos overthrown, after a continuance of -about four months,[145] from February to June, 417 B.C., and the -chosen Thousand-regiment either dissolved or destroyed. The movement -excited great sympathy in several Peloponnesian cities,[146] who -were becoming jealous of the exorbitant preponderance of Sparta. -Nevertheless, the Argeian Demos, though victorious within the city, -felt so much distrust of being able to maintain themselves, that they -sent envoys to Sparta to plead their cause and to entreat favorable -treatment: a proceeding which proves the insurrection to have been -spontaneous, not fomented by Athens. But the envoys of the expelled -oligarchs were there to confront them, and the Lacedæmonians, after -a lengthened discussion, adjudging the Demos to have been guilty of -wrong, proclaimed the resolution of sending forces to put them down. -Still, the habitual tardiness of Lacedæmonian habits prevented any -immediate or separate movement. Their allies were to be summoned, -none being very zealous in the cause, and least of all at this -moment, when the period of harvest was at hand; so that about three -months intervened before any actual force was brought together. - - [145] Diodorus (xii, 80) says that it lasted eight months: - but this, if correct at all, must be taken as beginning from - the alliance between Sparta and Argos, and not from the first - establishment of the oligarchy. The narrative of Thucydidês does - not allow more than four months for the duration of the latter. - - [146] Thucyd. v, 82. ξυνῄδεσαν δὲ τὸν τειχισμὸν καὶ τῶν ἐν - Πελοποννήσῳ τινὲς πόλεων. - -This important interval was turned to account by the Argeian Demos, -who, being plainly warned that they were to look on Sparta only as -an enemy, immediately renewed their alliance with Athens. Regarding -her as their main refuge, they commenced the building of long walls -to connect their city with the sea, in order that the road might -always be open for supplies and reinforcement from Athens, in case -they should be confined to their walls by a superior Spartan force. -The whole Argeian population—men and women, free and slave—set about -the work with the utmost ardor: while Alkibiadês brought assistance -from Athens,[147] especially skilled masons and carpenters, of whom -they stood in much need. The step may probably have been suggested -by himself, as it was the same which, two years before, he had -urged upon the inhabitants of Patræ. But the construction of walls -adequate for defence, along the line of four miles and a half -between Argos and the sea,[148] required a long time. Moreover, -the oligarchical party within the town, as well as the exiles -without,—a party defeated but not annihilated,—strenuously urged -the Lacedæmonians to put an end to the work, and even promised them -a counter-revolutionary movement in the town as soon as they drew -near to assist; the same intrigue which had been entered into by the -oligarchical party at Athens forty years before, when the walls down -to Peiræus were in course of erection.[149] Accordingly about the end -of September, 417 B.C., king Agis conducted an army of Lacedæmonians -and allies against Argos, drove the population within the city, and -destroyed so much of the long walls as had been already raised. -But the oligarchical party within were not able to realize their -engagements of rising in arms, so that he was obliged to retire after -merely ravaging the territory and taking the town of Hysiæ, where -he put to death all the freemen who fell into his hands. After his -departure, the Argeians retaliated these ravages upon the neighboring -territory of Phlius, where the exiles from Argos chiefly resided.[150] - - [147] Thucyd. v, 82. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀργεῖοι πανδημεὶ, καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ - γυναῖκες καὶ οἰκέται, ἐτείχιζον, etc. Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 15. - - [148] Pausanias, ii, 36, 3. - - [149] Thucyd. i, 107. - - [150] Thucyd. v, 83. Diodorus inaccurately states that the - Argeians _had already_ built their long walls down to the - sea—πυθόμενοι τοὺς Ἀργείους ~ᾠκοδομηκέναι τὰ μακρὰ τείχη μέχρι - τῆς θαλάσσης~ (xii, 81). Thucydidês uses the participle of the - present tense—~τὰ οἰκοδομούμενα~ τείχη ἐλόντες καὶ κατασκάψαντες, - etc. - -The close neighborhood of such exiles, together with the declared -countenance of Sparta, and the continued schemes of the oligarchical -party within the walls, kept the Argeian democracy in perpetual -uneasiness and alarm throughout the winter, in spite of their recent -victory and the suppression of the dangerous regiment of a Thousand. -To relieve them in part from embarrassment, Alkibiadês was despatched -thither early in the spring with an Athenian armament and twenty -triremes. His friends and guests appear to have been now in the -ascendency, as leaders of the democratical government; and in concert -with them, he selected three hundred marked oligarchical persons, -whom he carried away and deposited in various Athenian islands, as -hostages for the quiescence of the party, B.C. 416. Another ravaging -march was also undertaken by the Argeians into the territory of -Phlius, wherein, however, they sustained nothing but loss. And -again, about the end of September, the Lacedæmonians gave the word -for a second expedition against Argos. But having marched as far as -the borders, they found the sacrifices—always offered previous to -leaving their own territory—so unfavorable, that they returned back -and disbanded their forces. The Argeian oligarchical party, in spite -of the hostages recently taken from them, had been on the watch for -this Lacedæmonian force, and had projected a rising; or at least -were suspected of doing so, to such a degree that some of them were -seized and imprisoned by the government, while others made their -escape.[151] Later in the same winter, however, the Lacedæmonians -became more fortunate with their border sacrifices, entered the -Argeian territory in conjunction with their allies (except the -Corinthians, who refused to take part), and established the Argeian -oligarchical exiles at Orneæ: from which town these latter were -again speedily expelled, after the retirement of the Lacedæmonian -army, by the Argeian democracy with the aid of an Athenian -reinforcement.[152] - - [151] Thucyd. v, 116. Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ~μελλήσαντες~ ἐς τὴν Ἀργείαν - στρατεύειν ... ἀνεχώρησαν. Καὶ Ἀργεῖοι διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων ~μέλλησιν~ - τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὰς ὑποτοπήσαντες, τοὺς μὲν ξυνέλαβον, οἱ δ’ - αὐτοὺς καὶ διέφυγον. - - I presume μέλλησιν here is not used in its ordinary meaning of - _loitering delay_, but is to be construed by the previous verb - μελλήσαντες, and agreeably to the analogy of iv, 126—“prospect of - action immediately impending:” compare Diodor. xii, 81. - - [152] Thucyd. vi, 7. - -To maintain the renewed democratical government of Argos, against -enemies both internal and external, was an important policy to -Athens, as affording the basis, which might afterwards be extended, -of an anti-Laconian party in Peloponnesus. But at the present time -the Argeian alliance was a drain and an exhaustion rather than a -source of strength to Athens: very different from the splendid hopes -which it had presented prior to the battle of Mantineia, hopes of -supplanting Sparta in her ascendency within the Isthmus. It is -remarkable, that in spite of the complete alienation of feeling -between Athens and Sparta,—and continued reciprocal hostilities, in -an indirect manner, so long as each was acting as ally of some third -party,—nevertheless, neither the one nor the other would formally -renounce the sworn alliance, nor obliterate the record inscribed -on its stone column. Both parties shrank from proclaiming the real -truth, though each half year brought them a step nearer to it in -fact. Thus during the course of the present summer (416 B.C.) the -Athenian and Messenian garrison at Pylos became more active than ever -in their incursions on Laconia, and brought home large booty; upon -which the Lacedæmonians, though still not renouncing the alliance, -publicly proclaimed their willingness to grant what we may call -letters of marque, to any one, for privateering against Athenian -commerce. The Corinthians also, on private grounds of quarrel, -commenced hostilities against the Athenians.[153] Yet still Sparta -and her allies remained in a state of formal peace with Athens: the -Athenians resisted all the repeated solicitations of the Argeians -to induce them to make a landing on any part of Laconia and commit -devastation.[154] Nor was the license of free intercourse for -individuals as yet suspended. We cannot doubt that the Athenians were -invited to the Olympic festival of 416 B.C. (the 91st Olympiad), and -sent thither their solemn legation along with those of Sparta and -other Dorian Greeks. - - [153] Thucyd. v, 115. - - [154] Thucyd. vi, 105. The author of the loose and inaccurate - Oratio de Pace, ascribed to Andokidês, affirms that the war - was resumed by Athens against Sparta on the persuasion of the - Argeians (Orat. de Pac. c. 1, 6, 3, 31, pp. 93-105). This - assertion is indeed partially true: the alliance with Argos was - one of the causes of the resumption of war, but only one among - others, some of them more powerful. Thucydidês tells us that the - _persuasions_ of Argos, to induce Athens to throw up her alliance - with Sparta were repeated and unavailing. - -Now that they had again become allies of Argos, the Athenians -probably found out, more fully than they had before known, the -intrigue carried on by the former Argeian government with the -Macedonian Perdikkas. The effects of these intrigues, however, had -made themselves felt even earlier in the conduct of that prince, who, -having as an ally of Athens engaged to coöperate with an Athenian -expedition projected under Nikias for the spring or summer of 417 -B.C. against the Chalkidians of Thrace and Amphipolis, now withdrew -his concurrence, receded from the alliance of Athens, and frustrated -the whole scheme of expedition. The Athenians accordingly placed the -ports of Macedonia under naval blockade, proclaiming Perdikkas an -enemy.[155] - - [155] Thucyd. v, 83. - -Nearly five years had elapsed since the defeat of Kleon, without -any fresh attempt to recover Amphipolis: the project just alluded -to appears to have been the first. The proceedings of the Athenians -with regard to this important town afford ample proof of that want -of wisdom on the part of their leading men Nikias and Alkibiades, -and of erroneous tendencies on the part of the body of the citizens, -which we shall gradually find conducting their empire to ruin. Among -all their possessions out of Attica, there was none so valuable as -Amphipolis: the centre of a great commercial and mining region, -situated on a large river and lake which the Athenian navy could -readily command, and claimed by them with reasonable justice, since -it was their original colony, planted by their wisest statesman, -Periklês. It had been lost only through unpardonable negligence on -the part of their generals; and when lost, we should have expected -to see the chief energies of Athens directed to the recovery of it; -the more so, as, if once recovered, it admitted of being made sure -and retained as a future possession. Kleon is the only leading man -who at once proclaims to his countrymen the important truth that it -never can be recovered except by force. He strenuously urges his -countrymen to make the requisite military effort, and prevails upon -them in part to do so, but the attempt disgracefully fails; partly -through his own incompetence as commander, whether his undertaking -of that duty was a matter of choice or of constraint, partly through -the strong opposition and antipathy against him from so large a -portion of his fellow-citizens, which rendered the military force -not hearty in the enterprise. Next, Nikias, Lachês, and Alkibiadês, -all concur in making peace and alliance with the Lacedæmonians, with -express promise and purpose to procure the restoration of Amphipolis. -But after a series of diplomatic proceedings, which display as much -silly credulity in Nikias as selfish deceit in Alkibiadês, the result -becomes evident, as Kleon had insisted, that peace will not restore -to them Amphipolis, and that it can only be regained by force. The -fatal defect of Nikias is now conspicuously seen: his inertness -of character and incapacity of decided or energetic effort. When -he discovered that he had been out-manœuvred by the Lacedæmonian -diplomacy, and had fatally misadvised his countrymen into making -important cessions on the faith of equivalents to come, we might -have expected to find him spurred on by indignant repentance for -this mistake, and putting forth his own strongest efforts, as well -as those of his country, in order to recover those portions of her -empire which the peace had promised, but did not restore. Instead of -which he exhibits no effective movement, while Alkibiadês begins to -display the defects of his political character, yet more dangerous -than those of Nikias, the passion for showy, precarious, boundless, -and even perilous novelties. It is only in the year 417 B.C., after -the defeat of Mantineia had put an end to the political speculations -of Alkibiadês in the interior of Peloponnesus, that Nikias projects -an expedition against Amphipolis; and even then it is projected -only contingent upon the aid of Perdikkas, a prince of notorious -perfidy. It was not by any half-exertions of force that the place -could be regained, as the defeat of Kleon had sufficiently proved. -We obtain from these proceedings a fair measure of the foreign -politics of Athens at this time, during what is called the Peace of -Nikias, preparing us for that melancholy catastrophe which will be -developed in the coming chapters, where she is brought near to ruin -by the defects of Nikias and Alkibiadês combined for, by singular -misfortune, she does not reap the benefit of the good qualities of -either. - -It was in one of the three years between 420-416 B.C., though we do -not know in which, that the vote of ostracism took place, arising -out of the contention between Nikias and Alkibiadês.[156] The -political antipathy between the two having reached a point of great -violence, it was proposed that a vote of ostracism should be taken, -and this proposition—probably made by the partisans of Nikias, since -Alkibiadês was the person most likely to be reputed dangerous—was -adopted by the people. Hyperbolus the lamp-maker, son of Cheremês, a -speaker of considerable influence in the public assembly, strenuously -supported it, hating Nikias not less than Alkibiadês. Hyperbolus is -named by Aristophanês as having succeeded Kleon in the mastership -of the rostrum in the Pnyx:[157] if this were true, his supposed -demagogic preëminence would commence about September 422 B.C., the -period of the death of Kleon. Long before that time, however, he -had been among the chief butts of the comic authors, who ascribe -to him the same baseness, dishonesty, impudence, and malignity in -accusation, as that which they fasten upon Kleon, though in language -which seems to imply an inferior idea of his power. And it may be -doubted whether Hyperbolus ever succeeded to the same influence as -had been enjoyed by Kleon, when we observe that Thucydidês does not -name him in any of the important debates which took place at and -after the Peace of Nikias. Thucydidês only mentions him once, in 411 -B.C., while he was in banishment under sentence of ostracism, and -resident at Samos. He terms him, “one Hyperbolus, a low busy-body, -who had been ostracized, not from fear of dangerous excess of dignity -and power, but through his wickedness and his being felt as a -disgrace to the city.”[158] This sentence of Thucydidês is really the -only evidence against Hyperbolus: for it is not less unjust in his -case than in that of Kleon to cite the jests and libels of comedy as -if they were so much authentic fact and trustworthy criticism. It was -at Samos that Hyperbolus was slain by the oligarchical conspirators -who were aiming to overthrow the democracy at Athens. We have no -particular facts respecting him to enable us to test the general -character given by Thucydidês. - - [156] Dr. Thirlwall (History of Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. - 360) places this vote of ostracism in midwinter or early spring - of 415 B.C., immediately before the Sicilian expedition. - - His grounds for this opinion are derived from the Oration called - Andokidês against Alkibiadês, the genuineness of which he seems - to accept (see his Appendix ii, on that subject, vol. iii, p. - 494, _seq._). - - The more frequently I read over this Oration, the more do I - feel persuaded that it is a spurious composition of one or two - generations after the time to which it professes to refer. My - reasons for this opinion have been already stated in previous - notes, nor do I think that Dr. Thirlwall’s Appendix is successful - in removing the objections against the genuineness of the speech. - See my preceding vol. vi, ch. xlvii, p. 6, note. - - [157] Aristophan. Pac. 680. - - [158] Thucyd. viii, 73. ~Ὑπέρβολόν τέ τινα τῶν~ Ἀθηναίων, - μοχθηρὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὠστρακισμένον οὐ διὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀξιώματος - φόβον, ἀλλὰ διὰ πονηρίαν καὶ αἰσχύνην τῆς πόλεως. According to - Androtion (Fragm. 48, ed. Didot.)—ὠστρακισμένον διὰ φαυλότητα. - - Compare about Hyperbolus, Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11; Plutarch, - Alkibiadês, c. 13; Ælian. V. H. xii, 43; Theopompus, Fragm. 102, - 103, ed. Didot. - -At the time when the resolution was adopted at Athens, to take a -vote of ostracism suggested by the political dissension between -Nikias and Alkibiadês, about twenty-four years had elapsed since -a similar vote had been resorted to; the last example having been -that of Periklês and Thucydidês son of Melêsius, the latter of whom -was ostracized about 442 B.C. The democratical constitution had -become sufficiently confirmed to lessen materially the necessity for -ostracism as a safeguard against individual usurpers: moreover, there -was now full confidence in the numerous dikasteries as competent to -deal with the greatest of such criminals, thus abating the necessity -as conceived in men’s minds, not less than the real necessity, for -such precautionary intervention. Under such a state of things, -altered reality as well as altered feeling, we are not surprised -to find that the vote of ostracism now invoked, though we do not -know the circumstances which immediately preceded it, ended in an -abuse, or rather in a sort of parody, of the ancient preventive. At -a moment of extreme heat of party dispute, the friends of Alkibiadês -probably accepted the challenge of Nikias and concurred in supporting -a vote of ostracism; each hoping to get rid of the opponent. The -vote was accordingly decreed, but before it actually took place, -the partisans of both changed their views, and preferred to let -the political dissension proceed without closing it by separating -the combatants. But the ostracizing vote, having been formally -pronounced, could not now be prevented from taking place: it was -always, however, perfectly general in its form, admitting of any -citizen being selected for temporary banishment. Accordingly, the -two opposing parties, each doubtless including various clubs, or -hetæries, and according to some accounts the friends of Phæax also, -united to turn the vote against some one else: and they fixed upon -a man whom all of them jointly disliked, Hyperbolus.[159] By thus -concurring, they obtained a sufficient number of votes against him -to pass the sentence, and he was sent into temporary banishment. But -such a result was in no one’s contemplation when the vote was decreed -to take place, and Plutarch even represents the people as clapping -their hands at it as a good joke. It was presently recognized by -every one, seemingly even by the enemies of Hyperbolus, as a gross -abuse of the ostracism. And the language of Thucydidês himself -distinctly implies this; for if we even grant that Hyperbolus fully -deserved the censure which that historian bestows, no one could -treat his presence as dangerous to the commonwealth; nor was the -ostracism introduced to meet low dishonesty or wickedness. It was, -even before, passing out of the political morality of Athens; and -this sentence consummated its extinction, so that we never hear of -it as employed afterwards. It had been extremely valuable in earlier -days, as a security to the growing democracy against individual -usurpation of power, and against dangerous exaggeration of rivalry -between individual leaders: but the democracy was now strong enough -to dispense with such exceptional protection. Yet if Alkibiadês -had returned as victor from Syracuse, it is highly probable that -the Athenians would have had no other means than the precautionary -antidote of ostracism to save themselves from him as despot. - - [159] Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 13; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11. - Theophrastus says that the violent opposition at first, and the - coalition afterwards, was not between Nikias and Alkibiadês, but - between Phæax and Alkibiadês. - - The coalition of votes and parties may well have included all - three. - -It was in the beginning of summer (416 B.C.) that the Athenians -undertook the siege and conquest of the Dorian island of Mêlos, -one of the Cyclades, and the only one, except Thêra, which was not -already included in their empire. Mêlos and Thêra were both ancient -colonies of Lacedæmon, with whom they had strong sympathies of -lineage. They had never joined the confederacy of Delos, nor been -in any way connected with Athens; but at the same time, neither had -they ever taken part in the recent war against her, nor given her -any ground of complaint,[160] until she landed and attacked them -in the sixth year of the recent war. She now renewed her attempt, -sending against the island a considerable force under Kleomêdês and -Tisias: thirty Athenian triremes, with six Chian and two Lesbian, -twelve hundred Athenian hoplites, and fifteen hundred hoplites from -the allies, with three hundred bowmen and twenty horse-bowmen. These -officers, after disembarking their forces, and taking position, sent -envoys into the city summoning the government to surrender, and to -become a subject-ally of Athens. - - [160] Thucyd. iii, 91. - -It was a practice, frequent, if not universal, in Greece, even in -governments not professedly democratical—to discuss propositions for -peace or war before the assembly of the people. But on the present -occasion the Melian leaders departed from this practice, and admitted -the envoys only to a private conversation with their executive -council. Of this conversation Thucydidês professes to give a detailed -and elaborate account, at surprising length, considering his general -brevity. He sets down thirteen distinct observations, with as many -replies, interchanged between the Athenian envoys and the Melians; no -one of them separately long, and some very short; but the dialogue -carried on is dramatic, and very impressive. There is, indeed, every -reason for concluding that what we here read in Thucydidês is in far -larger proportion his own and in smaller proportion authentic report, -than any of the other speeches which he professes to set down. For -this was not a public harangue, in respect to which he might have -had the opportunity of consulting the recollection of many different -persons: it was a private conversation, wherein three or four -Athenians, and perhaps ten or a dozen Melians, may have taken part. -Now as all the Melian population were slain immediately after the -capture of the town, there remained only the Athenian envoys through -whose report Thucydidês could possibly have heard what really passed. -That he did hear either from or through them the general character of -what passed, I make no doubt: but there is no ground for believing -that he received from them anything like the consecutive stream of -debate, which, together with part of the illustrative reasoning, we -must refer to his dramatic genius and arrangement. - -The Athenian begins by restricting the subject of discussion to the -mutual interests of both parties in the peculiar circumstances in -which they now stand, in spite of the disposition of the Melians -to enlarge the range of topics, by introducing considerations of -justice and appealing to the sentiment of impartial critics. He will -not multiply words to demonstrate the just origin of the Athenian -empire, erected on the expulsion of the Persians, or to set forth -injury suffered, as pretext for the present expedition. Nor will he -listen to any plea on the part of the Melians, that they, though -colonists of Sparta, have never fought alongside of her or done -Athens wrong. He presses upon them to aim at what is attainable -under existing circumstances, since they know as well as he that -justice in the reasoning of mankind is settled according to equal -compulsion on both sides; the strong doing what their power allows, -and the weak submitting to it.[161] To this the Melians reply, -that—omitting all appeal to justice, and speaking only of what was -expedient—they hold it to be even expedient for Athens not to break -down the common moral sanction of mankind, but to permit that equity -and justice shall still remain as a refuge for men in trouble, with -some indulgence even towards those who may be unable to make out a -case of full and strict right. Most of all was this the interest of -Athens herself, inasmuch as her ruin, if it ever occurred, would be -awful both as punishment to herself and as lesson to others.—“We -are not afraid of _that_ (rejoined the Athenian) even if our empire -should be overthrown. It is not imperial cities like Sparta who -deal harshly with the conquered. Moreover, our present contest is -not undertaken against Sparta; it is a contest to determine whether -subjects shall by their own attack prevail over their rulers. This -is a risk for us to judge of: in the mean time, let us remind you -that we come here for the advantage of our own empire, and that we -are now speaking with a view to your safety; wishing to get you under -our empire without trouble to ourselves, and to preserve you for the -mutual benefit of both of us.”—“Cannot you leave us alone, and let -us be your friends instead of enemies, but neither allies of you nor -of Sparta?” said the Melians.—“No (is the reply); your friendship -does us more harm than your enmity: your friendship is a proof of -our weakness, in the eyes of our subject-allies; your enmity will -give a demonstration of our power.”—“But do your subjects really -take such a measure of equity, as to put us, who have no sort of -connection with you, on the same footing with themselves, most of -whom are your own colonists, while many of them have even revolted -from you and been reconquered?”—“They do: for they think that both -one and the other have fair ground for claiming independence, and -that if you are left independent, this arises only from your power -and from our fear to attack you. So that your submission will not -only enlarge our empire, but strengthen our security throughout the -whole; especially as you are islanders, and feeble islanders too, -while we are lords of the sea.”—“But surely that very circumstance is -in other ways a protection to you, as evincing your moderation: for -if you attack us, you will at once alarm all neutrals, and convert -them into enemies.”—“We are in little fear of continental cities, -who are out of our reach and not likely to take part against us, but -only of islanders; either yet unincorporated in our empire, like you, -or already in our empire and discontented with the constraint which -it imposes. It is such islanders who by their ill-judged obstinacy -are likely, with their eyes open, to bring both us and themselves -into peril.”—“We know well (said the Melians, after some other -observations had been interchanged) how terrible it is to contend -against your superior power, and your good fortune; nevertheless, we -trust that in point of fortune we shall receive fair treatment from -the gods, since we stand upon grounds of right against injustice; -and as to our inferior power, we trust that the deficiency will be -made up by our ally Sparta, whose kindred race will compel her from -very shame to aid us.”—“We too (replied the Athenians) think that we -shall not be worse off than others in regard to the divine favor. For -we neither advance any claim, nor do any act, overpassing that which -men believe in regard to the gods, and wish in regard to themselves. -What we believe about the gods is the same as that which we see -to be the practice of men: the impulse of nature inclines them of -necessity to rule over what is inferior in force to themselves. This -is the principle on which we now proceed,—not having been the first -either to lay it down or to follow it, but finding it established -and likely to continue for ever,—and knowing well too that you or -others in our position would do as much. As for your expectations -from the Lacedæmonians, founded on the disgrace of their remaining -deaf to your call, we congratulate you indeed on your innocent -simplicity, but we at the same time deprecate such foolishness. -For the Lacedæmonians are indeed most studious of excellence in -regard to themselves and their own national customs. But looking at -their behavior towards others, we affirm roundly, and can prove by -many examples of their history, that they are of all men the most -conspicuous in construing what is pleasing as if it were honorable, -and what is expedient as if it were just. Now that is not the state -of mind which you require, to square with your desperate calculations -of safety.” - - [161] In reference to this argumentation of the Athenian envoy, - I call attention to the attack and bombardment of Copenhagen by - the English government in 1807, together with the language used - by the English envoy to the Danish Prince Regent on the subject. - We read as follows in M. Thiers’s Histoire du Consulat et de - l’Empire:— - - “L’agent choisi étoit digne de sa mission. C’étoit M. Jackson - qui avait été autrefois chargé d’affaires en France, avant - l’arrivée de Lord Whitworth, à Paris, mais qu’on n’avoit pas pû - y laisser, à cause du mauvais esprit qu’il manifestoit en toute - occasion. Introduit auprès du régent, il allégua de prétendues - stipulations secrètes, en vertu desquelles le Danemark devoit, - (disoit on) de gré ou de force, faire partie d’une coalition - contre l’Angleterre: il donna comme raison d’agir la necessité - où se trouvoit le cabinet Britannique de prendre des précautions - pour que les forces navales du Danemark et le passage du Sund - ne tombassent pas au pouvoir des François: et en conséquence - il demanda au nom de son gouvernement, qu’on livrât à l’armée - Angloise la forteresse de Kronenberg qui commande de Sund, le - port de Copenhague, et enfin la flotte elle-même—promettant de - garder le tout en dépôt, pour le compte du Danemark, qui seroit - remis en possession de ce qu’on alloit lui enlever, dès que - le danger seroit passé. M. Jackson assura que le Danemark ne - perdroit rien, que l’on se conduiroit chez lui en auxiliaires - et en amis—que les troupes Britanniques payeroient tout ce - qu’elles consommeroient.—Et avec quoi, répondit le prince - indigné, payeriez vous notre honneur perdu, si nous adhérions - à cette infame proposition?—Le prince continuant, et opposant - à cette perfide intention la conduite loyale du Danemark, qui - n’avoit pris aucune précaution contre les Anglois, qui les avoit - toutes prises contre les François, ce dont on abusoit pour le - surprendre—_M. Jackson répondit à cette juste indignation par - une insolente familiarité, disant que la guerre étoit la guerre, - qu’il falloit se résigner à ces nécessités, et céder au plus - fort quand on étoit le plus foible_. Le prince congédia l’agent - Anglois avec des paroles fort dures, et lui déclara qu’il alloit - se transporter à Copenhague, pour y remplir ses devoirs de prince - et de citoyen Danois.” (Thiers, Histoire du Consulat et de - l’Empire, tome viii, livre xxviii, p. 190.) - -After various other observations interchanged in a similar tenor, the -Athenian envoys, strenuously urging upon the Melians to reconsider -the matter more cautiously among themselves, withdrew, and after a -certain interval were recalled by the Melian council to hear the -following words: “We hold to the same opinion, as at first, men of -Athens: we shall not surrender the independence of a city which -has already stood for seven hundred years; we shall yet make an -effort to save ourselves, relying on that favorable fortune which -the gods have hitherto vouchsafed to us, as well as upon aid from -men, and especially from the Lacedæmonians. We request that we may -be considered as your friends, but as hostile to neither party, and -that you will leave the island after concluding such a truce as may -be mutually acceptable.”—“Well (said the Athenian envoys), you alone -seem to consider future contingencies as clearer than the facts -before your eyes, and to look at an uncertain distance, through your -own wishes, as if it were present reality. You have staked your all -upon the Lacedæmonians, upon fortune, and upon fond hopes; and, with -your all, you will come to ruin.” - -The siege was forthwith commenced. A wall of circumvallation, -distributed in portions among the different allies of Athens, was -constructed round the town; which was left under full blockade, both -by sea and land, while the rest of the armament retired home. The -town remained blocked up for several months. During the course of -that time, the besieged made two successful sallies, which afforded -them some temporary relief, and forced the Athenians to send an -additional detachment, under Philokratês. At length the provisions -within were exhausted; plots for betrayal commenced among the -Melians themselves, so that they were constrained to surrender at -discretion. The Athenians resolved to put to death all the men of -military age and to sell the women and children as slaves. Who the -proposer of this barbarous resolution was, Thucydidês does not say; -but Plutarch and others inform us that Alkibiadês[162] was strenuous -in supporting it. Five hundred Athenian settlers were subsequently -sent thither, to form a new community: apparently not as kleruchs, or -out-citizens of Athens, but as new Melians.[163] - - [162] Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 16. This is doubtless one of the - statements which the composer of the Oration of Andokidês against - Alkibiadês found current in respect to the conduct of the latter - (sect. 123). Nor is there any reason for questioning the truth of - it. - - [163] Thucyd. v, 106. τὸ δὲ χωρίον αὐτοὶ ᾤκησαν, ἀποίκους ὕστερον - πεντακοσίους πέμψαντες. Lysander restored some Melians to the - island after the battle of Ægospotami (Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 9): - some, therefore, must have escaped or must have been spared. - -Taking the proceedings of the Athenians towards Mêlos from the -beginning to the end, they form one of the grossest and most -inexcusable pieces of cruelty combined with injustice which Grecian -history presents to us. In appreciating the cruelty of such -wholesale executions, we ought to recollect that the laws of war -placed the prisoner altogether at the disposal of his conqueror, -and that an Athenian garrison, if captured by the Corinthians in -Naupaktus, Nisæa, or elsewhere, would assuredly have undergone the -same fate, unless in so far as they might be kept for exchange. -But the treatment of the Melians goes beyond all rigor of the laws -of war; for they had never been at war with Athens, nor had they -done anything to incur her enmity. Moreover, the acquisition of the -island was of no material value to Athens; not sufficient to pay the -expenses of the armament employed in its capture. And while the gain -was thus in every sense slender, the shock to Grecian feeling by the -whole proceeding seems to have occasioned serious mischief to Athens. -Far from tending to strengthen her entire empire, by sweeping in this -small insular population, who had hitherto been neutral and harmless, -it raised nothing but odium against her, and was treasured up in -after times as among the first of her misdeeds. - -To gratify her pride of empire by a new conquest—easy to effect, -though of small value—was doubtless her chief motive; probably also -strengthened by pique against Sparta, between whom and herself a -thoroughly hostile feeling subsisted, and by a desire to humiliate -Sparta through the Melians. This passion for new acquisition, -superseding the more reasonable hopes of recovering the lost portions -of her empire, will be seen in the coming chapters breaking out with -still more fatal predominance. - -Both these two points, it will be observed, are prominently marked -in the dialogue set forth by Thucydidês. I have already stated that -this dialogue can hardly represent what actually passed, except -as to a few general points, which the historian has followed out -into deductions and illustrations,[164] thus dramatizing the given -situation in a powerful and characteristic manner. The language put -into the mouth of the Athenian envoys is that of pirates and robbers, -as Dionysius of Halikarnassus[165] long ago remarked; intimating his -suspicion that Thucydidês had so set out the case for the purpose -of discrediting the country which had sent him into exile. Whatever -may be thought of this suspicion, we may at least affirm that the -arguments which he here ascribes to Athens are not in harmony even -with the defects of the Athenian character. Athenian speakers are -more open to the charge of equivocal wording, multiplication of false -pretences, softening down the bad points of their case, putting an -amiable name upon vicious acts, employing what is properly called -_sophistry_, where their purpose needs it.[166] Now the language of -the envoy at Mêlos, which has been sometimes cited as illustrating -the immorality of the class or profession—falsely called a -school—named Sophists at Athens, is above all things remarkable for -a sort of audacious frankness; a disdain not merely of sophistry, -in the modern sense of the word, but even of such plausible excuse -as might have been offered. It has been strangely argued, as if -“_The good old plan, that they should take who have the power, and -they should keep who can_,” had been first discovered and openly -promulgated by Athenian sophists; whereas the true purpose and value -of sophists, even in the modern and worst sense of the word—putting -aside the perversion of applying that sense to the persons called -sophists at Athens—is, to furnish plausible matter of deceptive -justification, so that the strong man may be enabled to act upon -this “good old plan” as much as he pleases, but without avowing -it, and while professing fair dealing or just retaliation for some -imaginary wrong. The wolf in Æsop’s fable (of the Wolf and the Lamb) -speaks like a sophist; the Athenian envoy at Mêlos speaks in a manner -totally unlike a sophist, either in the Athenian sense or in the -modern sense of the word; we may add, unlike an Athenian at all, as -Dionysius has observed. - - [164] Such is also the opinion of Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. vol. - iii, ch. xxiv, p. 348. - - [165] Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Thucydid. c. 37-42, pp. 906-920, - Reisk: compare the remarks in his Epistol. ad Cn. Pompeium, de - Præcipuis Historicis, p. 774, Reisk. - - [166] Plutarch, Alkibiad. 16. τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀεὶ τὰ πραότατα τῶν - ὀνομάτων τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασι τιθεμένους, παιδιὰς καὶ φιλανθρωπίας. To - the same purpose Plutarch, Solon, c. 15. - -As a matter of fact and practice, it is true that stronger states, in -Greece and in the contemporary world, did habitually tend, as they -have tended throughout the course of history down to the present day, -to enlarge their power at the expense of the weaker. Every territory -in Greece, except Attica and Arcadia, had been seized by conquerors -who dispossessed or enslaved the prior inhabitants. We find Brasidas -reminding his soldiers of the good sword of their forefathers, which -had established dominion over men far more numerous than themselves, -as matter of pride and glory:[167] and when we come to the times of -Philip and Alexander of Macedon, we shall see the lust of conquest -reaching a pitch never witnessed among free Greeks. Of right thus -founded on simple superiority of force, there were abundant examples -to be quoted, as parallels to the Athenian conquest of Mêlos: but -that which is unparalleled is the mode adopted by the Athenian envoy -of justifying it, or rather of setting aside all justification, -looking at the actual state of civilization in Greece. A barbarous -invader casts his sword into the scale in lieu of argument: a -civilized conqueror is bound by received international morality to -furnish some justification,—a good plea, if he can,—a false plea, or -sham plea, if he has no better. But the Athenian envoy neither copies -the contemptuous silence of the barbarian nor the smooth lying of the -civilized invader. Though coming from the most cultivated city in -Greece, where the vices prevalent were those of refinement and not of -barbarism, he disdains the conventional arts of civilized diplomacy -more than would have been done by an envoy even of Argos or Korkyra. -He even disdains to mention, what might have been said with perfect -truth as a matter of fact, whatever may be thought of its sufficiency -as a justification, that the Melians had enjoyed for the last fifty -years the security of the Ægean waters at the cost of Athens and her -allies, without any payment of their own. - - [167] Compare also what Brasidas says in his speech to the - Akanthians, v, 86 ~ἴσχυος δικαιώσει~, ἣν ἡ τύχη ἔδωκεν, etc. - -So at least he is made to do in the Thucydidean dramatic -fragment,—Μήλου Ἅλωσις (The Capture of Melos),—if we may parody the -title of the lost tragedy of Phrynichus “The Capture of Miletus.” -And I think a comprehensive view of the history of Thucydidês will -suggest to us the explanation of this drama, with its powerful and -tragical effect. The capture of Mêlos comes immediately before the -great Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which was resolved upon -three or four months afterwards, and despatched during the course -of the following summer. That expedition was the gigantic effort -of Athens, which ended in the most ruinous catastrophe known to -ancient history. From such a blow it was impossible for Athens to -recover. Though thus crippled, indeed, she struggled against its -effects with surprising energy; but her fortune went on, in the main, -declining,—yet with occasional moments of apparent restoration,—until -her complete prostration and subjugation by Lysander. Now Thucydidês, -just before he gets upon the plane of this descending progress, -makes a halt, to illustrate the sentiment of Athenian power in -its most exaggerated, insolent, and cruel manifestation, by this -dramatic fragment of the envoys at Mêlos. It will be recollected that -Herodotus, when about to describe the forward march of Xerxês into -Greece, destined to terminate in such fatal humiliation, impresses -his readers with an elaborate idea of the monarch’s insolence and -superhuman pride, by various conversations between him and the -courtiers about him, as well as by other anecdotes, combined with the -overwhelming specifications of the muster at Doriskus. Such moral -contrasts and juxtapositions, especially that of ruinous reverse -following upon overweening good fortune, were highly interesting to -the Greek mind. And Thucydidês—having before him an act of great -injustice and cruelty on the part of Athens, committed exactly at -this point of time—has availed himself of the form of dialogue, for -once in his history, to bring out the sentiments of a disdainful and -confident conqueror in dramatic antithesis. They are, however, his -own sentiments, conceived as suitable to the situation; not those of -the Athenian envoy,—still less, those of the Athenian public,—least -of all, those of that much-calumniated class of men, the Athenian -sophists. - - - - -CHAPTER LVII. - -SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXTINCTION OF THE GELONIAN DYNASTY. - - -In the preceding chapters, I have brought down the general history of -the Peloponnesian war to the time immediately preceding the memorable -Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which changed the whole face -of the war. At this period, and for some time to come, the history -of the Peloponnesian Greeks becomes intimately blended with that of -the Sicilian Greeks. But hitherto the connection between the two has -been merely occasional, and of little reciprocal effect: so that I -have thought it for the convenience of the reader to keep the two -streams entirely separate, omitting the proceedings of Athens in -Sicily during the first ten years of the war. I now proceed to fill -up this blank: to recount as much as can be made out of Sicilian -events during the interval between 461-416 B.C., and to assign the -successive steps whereby the Athenians entangled themselves in -ambitious projects against Syracuse, until they at length came to -stake the larger portion of their force upon that fatal hazard. - -The extinction of the Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse,[168] followed by -the expulsion or retirement of all the other despots throughout the -island, left the various Grecian cities to reorganize themselves in -free and self-constituted governments. Unfortunately, our memorials -respecting this revolution are miserably scanty; but there is -enough to indicate that it was something much more than a change -from single-headed to popular government. It included, farther, -transfers on the largest scale both of inhabitants and of property. -The preceding despots had sent many old citizens into exile, -transplanted others from one part of Sicily to another, and provided -settlements for numerous emigrants and mercenaries devoted to their -interest. Of these proceedings much was reversed, when the dynasties -were overthrown, so that the personal and proprietary revolution -was more complicated and perplexing than the political. After a -period of severe commotion, an accommodation was concluded, whereby -the adherents of the expelled dynasty were planted partly in the -territory of Messêne, partly in the reëstablished city of Kamarina in -the eastern portion of the southern coast, bordering on Syracuse.[169] - - [168] See above, vol. v, ch. xliii, pp. 204-239, for the history - of these events. I now take up the thread from that chapter. - - [169] Mr. Mitford, in the spirit which is usual with him, while - enlarging upon the suffering occasioned by this extensive - revolution both of inhabitants and of property throughout Sicily, - takes no notice of the cause in which it originated, namely, - the number of foreign mercenaries whom the Gelonian dynasty had - brought in and enrolled as new citizens (Gelon alone having - brought in ten thousand, Diodor. xi, 72), and the number of - exiles whom they had banished and dispossessed. - - I will here notice only one of his misrepresentations respecting - the events of this period, because it is definite as well as - important (vol. iv, p. 9, chap. xviii, sect. 1). - - “But thus (he says) in every little state, lands were left to - become public property, or to be assigned to new individual - owners. _Everywhere, then, that favorite measure of democracy, - the equal division of the lands of the state, was resolved upon_: - a measure impossible to be perfectly executed; impossible to be - maintained as executed; and of very doubtful advantage, if it - could be perfectly executed and perfectly maintained.” - - Again, sect. iii, p. 23, he speaks of “that incomplete and - iniquitous partition of lands,” etc. - - Now, upon this we may remark:— - - 1. The _equal division of the lands_ of the state, here affirmed - by Mr. Mitford, is a pure fancy of his own. He has no authority - for it whatever. Diodorus says (xi, 76) κατεκληρούχησαν τὴν - χώραν, etc.; and again (xi, 86) he speaks of τὸν ἀναδασμὸν - τῆς χώρας: the _redivision_ of the territory; but respecting - _equality of division_, not one word does he say. Nor can - any principle of division in this case be less probable than - equality; for one of the great motives of the redivision was - to provide for those exiles who had been dispossessed by the - Gelonian dynasty: and these men would receive lots, greater or - less, on the ground of compensation for loss, greater or less as - it might have been. Besides, immediately after the redivision, we - find rich and poor mentioned, just as before (xi, 86). - - 2. Next, Mr. Mitford calls “the equal division of all the lands - of the state” the _favorite measure of democracy_. This is an - assertion not less incorrect. Not a single democracy in Greece, - so far as my knowledge extends, can be produced, in which such - equal partition is ever known to have been carried into effect. - In the Athenian democracy, especially, not only there existed - constantly great inequality of landed property, but the oath - annually taken by the popular heliastic judges had a special - clause, protesting emphatically against _redivision of the land - or extinction of debts_. - -But though peace was thus reëstablished, these large mutations -of inhabitants first begun by the despots,—and the incoherent -mixture of races, religious institutions, dialects, etc., which -was brought about unavoidably during the process,—left throughout -Sicily a feeling of local instability, very different from the long -traditional tenures in Peloponnesus and Attica, and numbered by -foreign enemies among the elements of its weakness.[170] The wonder -indeed rather is, that such real and powerful causes of disorder were -soon so efficaciously controlled by the popular governments, that the -half century now approaching was decidedly the most prosperous and -undisturbed period in the history of the island. - - [170] Thucyd. vi, 17. - -The southern coast of Sicily was occupied, beginning from the -westward by Selinus, Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina. Then came -Syracuse, possessing the southeastern cape, and the southern portion -of the eastern coast: next, on the eastern coast, Leontini, Katana, -and Naxos: Messênê, on the strait adjoining Italy. The centre of the -island, and even much of the northern coast, was occupied by the -non-Hellenic Sikels and Sikans: on this coast, Himera was the only -Grecian city. Between Himera and Cape Lilybæum, the western corner -of the island was occupied by the non-Hellenic cities of Egesta and -Eryx, and by the Carthaginian seaports, of which Panormus (Palermo) -was the principal. - -Of these various Grecian cities, all independent, Syracuse was the -first in power, Agrigentum the second. The causes above noticed, -disturbing the first commencement of popular governments in all of -them, were most powerfully operative at Syracuse. We do not know -the particulars of the democratical constitution which was there -established, but its stability was threatened by more than one -ambitious pretender, eager to seize the sceptre of Gelo and Hiero. -The most prominent among these pretenders was Tyndarion, who employed -a considerable fortune in distributing largesses and procuring -partisans among the poor. His political designs were at length so -openly manifested, that he was brought to trial, condemned, and put -to death; yet not without an abortive insurrection of his partisans -to rescue him. After several leading citizens had tried, and failed -in a similar manner, the people thought it expedient to pass a law -similar to the Athenian ostracism, authorizing the infliction of -temporary preventive banishment.[171] Under this law several powerful -citizens were actually and speedily banished; and such was the abuse -of the new engine, by the political parties in the city, that men -of conspicuous position are said to have become afraid of meddling -with public affairs. Thus put in practice, the institution is said -to have given rise to new political contentions not less violent -than those which it checked, insomuch that the Syracusans found -themselves obliged to repeal the law not long after its introduction. -We should have been glad to learn some particulars concerning this -political experiment, beyond the meagre abstract given by Diodorus, -and especially to know the precautionary securities by which the -application of the ostracizing sentence was restrained at Syracuse. -Perhaps no care was taken to copy the checks and formalities -provided by Kleisthenês at Athens. Yet under all circumstances, the -institution, though tutelary, if reserved for its proper emergencies, -was eminently open to abuse, so that we have no reason to wonder -that abuse occurred, especially at a period of great violence and -discord. The wonder rather is, that it was so little abused at Athens. - - [171] Diodor. xi, 86, 87. The institution at Syracuse was called - the _petalism_; because, in taking the votes, the name of the - citizen intended to be banished was written upon a leaf of olive, - instead of a shell or potsherd. - -Although the ostracism, or petalism, at Syracuse was speedily -discontinued, it may probably have left a salutary impression behind, -as far as we can judge from the fact that new pretenders to despotism -are not hereafter mentioned. The republic increases in wealth, and -manifests an energetic action in foreign affairs. The Syracusan -admiral Phaӱllus was despatched with a powerful fleet to repress the -piracies of the Tyrrhenian maritime towns, and after ravaging the -island of Elba, returned home, under the suspicion of having been -bought off by bribes from the enemy; on which accusation he was tried -and banished, a second fleet of sixty triremes under Apellês being -sent to the same regions. The new admiral not only plundered many -parts of the Tyrrhenian coast, but also carried his ravages into the -island of Corsica, at that time a Tyrrhenian possession, and reduced -the island of Elba completely. His return was signalized by a large -number of captives and a rich booty.[172] - - [172] Diodor. xi. 87, 88. - -Meanwhile the great antecedent revolutions, among the Grecian cities -in Sicily had raised a new spirit among the Sikels of the interior, -and inspired the Sikel prince Duketius, a man of spirit and ability, -with large ideas of aggrandizement. Many exiled Greeks having -probably sought service with him, it was either by their suggestion, -or from having himself caught the spirit of Hellenic improvement, -that he commenced the plan of bringing the petty Sikel communities -into something like city life and collective coöperation. Having -acquired glory by the capture of the Grecian town of Morgantina, he -induced all the Sikel communities, with the exception of Hybla, to -enter into a sort of federative compact. Next, in order to obtain a -central point for the new organization, he transferred his own little -town from the hill-top, called Menæ, down to a convenient spot of the -neighboring plain, near to the sacred precinct of the gods called -Paliki.[173] As the veneration paid to these gods, determined in -part by the striking volcanic manifestations in the neighborhood, -rendered this plain a suitable point of attraction for Sikels -generally, Duketius was enabled to establish a considerable new city -of Palikê, with walls of large circumference, and an ample range of -adjacent land which he distributed among a numerous Sikel population, -probably with some Greeks intermingled. - - [173] Diodor. xi, 78, 88, 90. The proceeding of Duketius is - illustrated by the description of Dardanus in the Iliad, xx, 216:— - - Κτίσσε δὲ Δαρδανίην, ἐπεὶ οὔπω Ἴλιος ἱρὴ - Ἐν πεδίῳ πεπόλιστο, πόλις μερόπων ἀνθρώπων, - Ἀλλ’ ἔθ’ ὑπωρείας ᾤκουν πολυπιδάκου Ἴδης. - - Compare Plato, de Legg. iii, pp. 681, 682. - -The powerful position which Duketius had thus acquired is attested -by the aggressive character of his measures, intended gradually -to recover a portion at least of that ground which the Greeks had -appropriated at the expense of the indigenous population. The Sikel -town of Ennesia had been seized by the Hieronian Greeks expelled from -Ætna, and had received from them the name of Ætna:[174] Duketius -now found means to reconquer it, after ensnaring by stratagem the -leading magistrate. He was next bold enough to invade the territory -of the Agrigentines, and to besiege one of their country garrisons -called Motyum. We are impressed with a high idea of his power, when -we learn that the Agrigentines, while marching to relieve the place, -thought it necessary to invoke aid from the Syracusans, who sent to -them a force under Bolkon. Over this united force Duketius gained a -victory, in consequence of the treason or cowardice of Bolkon, as -the Syracusans believed, insomuch that they condemned him to death. -In the succeeding year, however, the good fortune of the Sikel -prince changed. The united army of these two powerful cities raised -the blockade of Motyum, completely defeated him in the field, and -dispersed all his forces. Finding himself deserted by his comrades -and even on the point of being betrayed, he took the desperate -resolution of casting himself upon the mercy of the Syracusans. He -rode off by night to the gates of Syracuse, entered the city unknown, -and sat down as a suppliant on the altar in the agora, surrendering -himself together with all his territory. A spectacle thus unexpected -brought together a crowd of Syracuse citizens, exciting in them -the strongest emotions: and when the magistrates convened the -assembly for the purpose of deciding his fate, the voice of mercy -was found paramount, in spite of the contrary recommendations of -some of the political leaders. The most respected among the elder -citizens—earnestly recommending mild treatment towards a foe thus -fallen and suppliant, coupled with scrupulous regard not to bring -upon the city the avenging hand of Nemesis—found their appeal to the -generous sentiment of the people welcomed by one unanimous cry of -“Save the suppliant.”[175] Duketius, withdrawn from the altar, was -sent off to Corinth, under his engagement to live there quietly for -the future; the Syracusans providing for his comfortable maintenance. - - [174] Diodor. xi, 76. - - [175] Diodor. xi, 91, 92. Ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὥσπερ τινὶ μιᾷ φωνῇ σώζειν - ἅπαντες ἐβόων τὸν ἱκέτην. - -Amidst the cruelty habitual in ancient warfare, this remarkable -incident excites mingled surprise and admiration. Doubtless the -lenient impulse of the people mainly arose from their seeing Duketius -actually before them in suppliant posture at their altar, instead -of being called upon to determine his fate in his absence,—just as -the Athenian people were in like manner moved by the actual sight of -the captive Dorieus, and induced to spare his life, on an occasion -which will be hereafter recounted.[176] If in some instances the -assembled people, obeying the usual vehemence of multitudinous -sentiment, carried severities to excess,—so, in other cases, as well -as in this, the appeal to their humane impulses will be found to have -triumphed over prudential regard for future security. Such was the -fruit which the Syracusans reaped for sparing Duketius, who, after -residing a year or two at Corinth, violated his parole. Pretending -to have received an order from the oracle, he assembled a number of -colonists, whom he conducted into Sicily to found a city at Kalê Aktê -on the northern coast belonging to the Sikels. We cannot doubt that -when the Syracusans found in what manner their lenity was requited, -the speakers who had recommended severe treatment would take great -credit on the score of superior foresight.[177] - - [176] Xenophon, Hellen. i, 5, 19; Pausanias, vi, 7, 2. - - [177] Mr. Mitford recounts as follows the return of Duketius - to Sicily: “The Syracusan chiefs brought back Duketius from - Corinth, apparently to make him instrumental to their own views - for advancing the power of their commonwealth. They permitted, - or rather encouraged him to establish a colony of mixed people, - Greeks and Sicels, at Calé Acté, on the northern coast of the - island,” (ch. xviii, sect. i, vol. iv, p. 13.) - - The statement that “the Syracusans brought back Duketius, or - encouraged him to come back, or to found the colony of Kalê - Aktê,” is a complete departure from Diodorus on the part of - Mr. Mitford; who transforms a breach of parole on the part of - the Sikel _prince_ into an ambitious manœuvre on the part of - Syracusan _democracy_. The words of Diodorus, the only authority - in the case, are as follows (xii, 8): Οὗτος δὲ (Duketius) - ὀλίγον χρόνον μείνας ἐν τῇ Κορίνθῳ, ~τὰς ὁμολογίας ἔλυσε~, καὶ - προσποιησάμενος χρησμὸν ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἑαυτῷ δεδόσθαι, κτίσαι τὴν - Καλὴν Ἀκτὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ, κατέπλευσεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον μετὰ πολλῶν - οἰκητόρων· συνεπελάβοντο δὲ καὶ τῶν Σικελῶν τινες, ἐν οἷς ἦν - καὶ Ἀρχωνίδης, ὁ τῶν Ἑρβιταίων δυναστεύων. Οὗτος μὲν οὖν περὶ - τὸν οἰκισμὸν τῆς Καλῆς Ἀκτῆς ἐγίνετο· Ἀκραγαντῖνοι δὲ, ἅμα μὲν - φθονοῦντες τοῖς Συρακοσίοις, ἅμα δ’ ἐγκαλοῦντες αὐτοῖς ὅτι - Δουκέτιον ὄντα κοινὸν πολέμιον ~διέσωσαν ἄνευ τῆς Ἀκραγαντίνων - γνώμης~, πόλεμον ἐξήνεγκαν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις. - -But the return of this energetic enemy was not the only mischief -which the Syracusans suffered. Their resolution to spare Duketius -had been adopted without the concurrence of the Agrigentines, who -had helped to conquer him; and the latter, when they saw him again -in the island, and again formidable, were so indignant that they -declared war against Syracuse. A standing jealousy prevailed between -these two great cities, the first and second powers in Sicily. War -actually broke out between them, wherein other Greek cities took -part. After lasting some time, with various acts of hostility, and -especially a serious defeat of the Agrigentines at the river Himera, -these latter solicited and obtained peace.[178] The discord between -the two cities, however, had left leisure to Duketius to found the -city of Kalê Aktê, and to make some progress in reëstablishing his -ascendency over the Sikels, in which operation he was overtaken by -death. He probably left no successor to carry on his plans, so that -the Syracusans, pressing their attacks vigorously, reduced many of -the Sikel townships in the island, regaining his former conquest, -Morgantinê, and subduing even the strong position and town called -Trinakia,[179] after a brave and desperate resistance on the part of -the inhabitants. - - [178] Diodor. xii, 8. - - [179] Diodor. xii, 29. For the reconquest of Morgantinê, see - Thucyd. iv, 65. - - Respecting this town of Trinakia, known only from the passage - of Diodorus here, Paulmier (as cited in Wesseling’s note), as - well as Mannert (Geographie der Griechen und Römer, b. x, ch. - xv, p. 446), intimate some skepticism; which I share so far as - to believe that Diodorus has greatly overrated its magnitude and - importance. - - Nor can it be true, as Diodorus affirms, that Trinakia was _the - only_ Sikel township remaining unsubdued by the Syracusans, and - that, after conquering that place, they had subdued them all. - We know that there were no inconsiderable number of independent - Sikels, at the time of the Athenian invasion of Sicily (Thucyd. - vi, 88; vii, 2). - -By this large accession both of subjects and of tribute, combined -with her recent victory over Agrigentum, Syracuse was elevated to -the height of power, and began to indulge schemes for extending -her ascendency throughout the island: with which view her horsemen -were doubled in number, and one hundred new triremes were -constructed.[180] Whether any, or what, steps were taken to realize -her designs our historian does not tell us. But the position of -Sicily remains the same at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war: -Syracuse, the first city as to power, indulging in ambitious dreams, -if not in ambitious aggressions; Agrigentum, a jealous second, and -almost a rival; the remaining Grecian states maintaining their -independence, yet not without mistrust and apprehension. - - [180] Diodor. xii, 30. - -Though the particular phenomena of this period, however, have not -come to our knowledge, we see enough to prove that it was one of -great prosperity for Sicily. The wealth, commerce, and public -monuments of Agrigentum, especially appear to have even surpassed -those of the Syracusans. Her trade with Carthage and the African -coast was both extensive and profitable; for at this time neither -the vine nor the olive were much cultivated in Libya, and the -Carthaginians derived their wine and oil from the southern territory -of Sicily,[181] particularly that of Agrigentum. The temples of the -city, among which that of Olympic Zeus stood foremost, were on the -grandest scale of magnificence, surpassing everything of the kind -in Sicily. The population of the city, free as well as slave, was -very great: the number of rich men keeping chariots and competing -for the prize at the Olympic games was renowned, not less than the -accumulation of works of art, statues and pictures,[182] with -manifold insignia of ornament and luxury. All this is particularly -brought to our notice because of the frightful catastrophe which -desolated Agrigentum in 406 B.C. from the hands of the Carthaginians. -It was in the interval which we are now describing that this -prosperity was accumulated; doubtless not in Agrigentum alone, but -more or less throughout all the Grecian cities of the island. - - [181] Diodor. xiii, 81. - - [182] Diodor. xiii. 82, 83, 90. - -Nor was it only in material prosperity that they were distinguished. -At this time, the intellectual movement in some of the Italian and -Sicilian towns was very considerable. The inconsiderable town of Elea -in the gulf of Poseidonia nourished two of the greatest speculative -philosophers in Greece, Parmenidês and Zeno. Empedoklês of Agrigentum -was hardly less eminent in the same department, yet combining with -it a political and practical efficiency. The popular character of -the Sicilian governments stimulated the cultivation of rhetorical -studies, wherein not only Empedoklês and Pôlus at Agrigentum, but -Tisias and Korax at Syracuse, and still more, Gorgias at Leontini, -acquired great reputation.[183] The constitution established at -Agrigentum after the dispossession of the Theronian dynasty was at -first not thoroughly democratical, the principal authority residing -in a large Senate of One Thousand members. We are told even that an -ambitious club of citizens were aiming at the reëstablishment of -a despotism, when Empedoklês, availing himself of wealth and high -position, took the lead in a popular opposition; so as not only -to defeat this intrigue, but also to put down the Senate of One -Thousand, and render the government completely democratical. His -influence over the people was enhanced by the vein of mysticism, and -pretence to miraculous or divine endowments, which accompanied his -philosophical speculations, in a manner similar to Pythagoras.[184] -The same combination of rhetoric with physical speculation appears -also in Gorgias of Leontini, whose celebrity as a teacher throughout -Greece was both greater and earlier than that of any one else. It -was a similar demand for popular speaking in the assembly and the -judicatures which gave encouragement to the rhetorical teachers -Tisias and Korax at Syracuse. - - [183] See Aristotle as cited by Cicero, Brut. c. 12; Plato, - Phædr. p. 267, c. 113, 114; Dionys. Halic. Judicium de Isocrate, - p. 534 R. and Epist. ii, ad Ammæum, p. 792; also Quintilian, - iii, 1, 125. According to Cicero (de Inventione, ii, 2), the - treatises of these ancient rhetoricians, “usque a principe illo - et inventore Tisiâ,” had been superseded by Aristotle, who had - collected them carefully, “nominatim,” and had improved upon - their expositions. Dionysius laments that they had been so - superseded (Epist. ad Ammæ. p. 722). - - [184] Diogen. Laërt. viii, 64-71; Seyfert, Akragas und - sein Gebiet, sect. ii, p. 70; Ritter, Geschichte der Alten - Philosophie, vol. i. ch. vi, p. 533, _seqq._ - -In this state of material prosperity, popular politics, and -intellectual activity, the Sicilian towns were found at the breaking -out of the great struggle between Athens and the Peloponnesian -confederacy in 431 B.C. In that struggle the Italian and Sicilian -Greeks had no direct concern, nor anything to fear from the ambition -of Athens; who, though she had founded Thurii in 443 B.C., appears -to have never aimed at any political ascendency even over that town, -much less anywhere else on the coast. But the Sicilian Greeks, though -forming a system apart in their own island, from which it suited the -dominant policy of Syracuse to exclude all foreign interference,[185] -were yet connected, by sympathy, and on one side even by alliances, -with the two main streams of Hellenic politics. Among the allies -of Sparta were numbered all or most of the Dorian cities of -Sicily,—Syracuse, Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, perhaps -Himera and Messênê,—together with Lokri and Tarentum in Italy: among -the allies of Athens, perhaps the Chalkidic or Ionic Rhegium in -Italy.[186] Whether the Ionic cities in Sicily—Naxos, Katana, and -Leontini—were at this time united with Athens by any special treaty, -is very doubtful. But if we examine the state of politics prior to -the breaking out of the war, it will be found that the connection of -the Sicilian cities on both sides with Central Greece was rather one -of sympathy and tendency than of pronounced obligation and action. -The Dorian Sicilians, though doubtless sharing the antipathy of the -Peloponnesian Dorians to Athens, had never been called upon for any -coöperation with Sparta; nor had the Ionic Sicilians yet learned -to look to Athens for protection against their powerful neighbor -Syracuse. - - [185] Thucyd. iv. 61-64. This is the tenor of the speech - delivered by Hermokratês at the congress of Gela in the eighth - year of the Peloponnesian war. His language is remarkable: he - calls all non-Sicilian Greeks ἀλλοφύλους. - - [186] The inscription in Boeckh’s Corpus Inscriptt. (No. 74, - part i, p. 112) relating to the alliance between Athens and - Rhegium, conveys little certain information. Boeckh refers it - to a covenant concluded in the archonship of Apseudês at Athens - (Olymp. 86, 4, B.C. 433-432, the year before the Peloponnesian - war), renewing an alliance which was even then of old date. But - it appears to me that the supposition of a renewal is only his - own conjecture; and even the name of the archon, _Apseudês_, - which he has restored by a plausible conjecture, can hardly be - considered as certain. - - If we could believe the story in Justin iv, 3, Rhegium must have - ceased to be Ionic before the Peloponnesian war. He states, - that in a sedition at Rhegium, one of the parties called in - auxiliaries from Himera. These Himeræan exiles having first - destroyed the enemies against whom they were invoked, next - massacred the friends who had invoked them: “ausi facinus nulli - tyranno comparandum.” They married the Rhegine women, and seized - the city for themselves. - - I do not know what to make of this story, which neither appears - noticed in Thucydidês, nor seems to consist with what he does - tell us. - -It was the memorable quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, and -the intervention of Athens in that quarrel (B.C. 433-432), which -brought the Sicilian parties one step nearer to coöperation in the -Peloponnesian quarrel, in two different ways; first, by exciting -the most violent anti-Athenian war spirit in Corinth, with whom -the Sicilian Dorians held their chief commerce and sympathy,—next, -by providing a basis for the action of Athenian maritime force in -Italy and Sicily, which would have been impracticable without an -established footing in Korkyra. But Plutarch—whom most historians -have followed—is mistaken, and is contradicted by Thucydidês, when -he ascribes to the Athenians at this time ambitious projects in -Sicily of the nature of those which they came to conceive seven -or eight years afterwards. At the outbreak, and for some years -before the outbreak, of the war, the policy of Athens was purely -conservative, and that of her enemies aggressive, as I have shown -in a former chapter. At that moment, Sparta and Corinth anticipated -large assistance from the Sicilian Dorians, in ships of war, in -money, and in provisions; while the value of Korkyra as an ally -of Athens consisted in affording facilities for obstructing such -reinforcements, far more than from any anticipated conquests.[187] - - [187] Thucyd. i, 36. - -In the spring of 431 B.C., the Spartans, then organizing their first -invasion of Attica, and full of hope that Athens would be crushed -in one or two campaigns, contemplated the building of a vast fleet -of five hundred ships of war among the confederacy. A considerable -portion of this charge was imposed upon the Italian and Sicilian -Dorians, and a contribution in money besides; with instructions to -refrain from any immediate declaration against Athens until their -fleet should be ready.[188] Of such expected succor, indeed, little -was ever realized in any way; in ships, nothing at all. But the -expectations and orders of Sparta, show that here as elsewhere -she was then on the offensive, and Athens only on the defensive. -Probably the Corinthians had encouraged the expectation of ample -reinforcements from Syracuse and the neighboring towns, a hope which -must have contributed largely to the confidence with which they -began the struggle. What were the causes which prevented it from -being realized, we are not distinctly told; and we find Hermokratês -the Syracusan reproaching his countrymen fifteen years afterwards, -immediately before the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse, -with their antecedent apathy.[189] But it is easy to see, that as the -Sicilian Greeks had no direct interest in the contest,—neither wrongs -to avenge, nor dangers to apprehend, from Athens,—nor any habit of -obeying requisitions from Sparta, so they might naturally content -themselves with expressions of sympathy and promises of aid in case -of need, without taxing themselves to the enormous extent which it -pleased Sparta to impose, for purposes both aggressive and purely -Peloponnesian. Perhaps the leading men in Syracuse, from attachment -to Corinth, may have sought to act upon the order. But no similar -motive would be found operative either at Agrigentum or at Gela or -Selinus. - - [188] Thucyd. ii, 7. Καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις μὲν, πρὸς ταῖς αὐτοῦ - ὑπαρχούσαις, ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας τοῖς τἀκείνων ἑλομένοις, - ναῦς ἐπετάχθησαν ποιεῖσθαι κατὰ μέγεθος τῶν πόλεων, ὡς ἐς τὸν - πάντα ἀριθμὸν πεντακοσίων νεῶν ἐσόμενον, etc. - - Respecting the construction of this perplexing passage, read the - notes of Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Göller: compare Poppo, ad Thucyd. - vol. i, ch. xv, p. 181. - - I agree with Dr. Arnold and Göller in rejecting the construction - of αὐτοῦ with ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας, in the sense of “those - ships which were in Peloponnesus from Italy and Sicily.” This - would be untrue in point of fact, as they observe: there were no - Sicilian ships of war in Peloponnesus. - - Nevertheless I think, differing from them, that αὐτοῦ is not - a pronoun referring to ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας, but is used - in contrast with those words, and really means, “in or about - Peloponnesus.” It was contemplated that new ships should be built - in Sicily and Italy, of sufficient number to make the total - fleet of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, including the triremes - already in Peloponnesus, equal to five hundred sail. But it - was never contemplated that the triremes in Italy and Sicily - _alone_ should amount to five hundred sail, as Dr. Arnold, in my - judgment, erroneously imagines. Five hundred sail for the entire - confederacy would be a prodigious total: five hundred sail for - Sicily and Italy alone, would be incredible. - - To construe the sentence as it stands now, putting aside the - conjecture of νῆες instead of ναῦς, or ἐπετάχθη instead of - ἐπετάχθησαν, which would make it run smoothly, we must admit the - supposition of a break or double construction, such as sometimes - occurs in Thucydidês. The sentence begins with one form of - construction and concludes with another. We must suppose, with - Göller, that αἱ πόλεις understood as the nominative case to - ἐπετάχθησαν. The dative cases (Λακεδαιμονίοις—ἑλομένοις) are to - be considered, I apprehend, as governed by νῆες ἐπετάχθησαν: that - is, these dative cases belong to the first form of construction, - which Thucydidês has not carried out. The sentence is begun as if - νῆες ἐπετάχθησαν were intended to follow. - - [189] Thucyd. vi, 34: compare iii, 86. - -Though the order was not executed, however, there can be little -doubt that it was publicly announced and threatened, thus becoming -known to the Ionic cities in Sicily as well as to Athens; and that -it weighed materially in determining the latter afterwards to -assist those cities, when they sent to invoke her aid. Instead of -despatching their forces to Peloponnesus, where they had nothing -to gain, the Sicilian Dorians preferred attacking the Ionic cities -in their own island, whose territory they might have reasonable -hopes of conquering and appropriating,—Naxos, Katana, and Leontini. -These cities doubtless sympathized with Athens in her struggle -against Sparta; yet, far from being strong enough to assist her -or to threaten their Dorian neighbors, they were unable to defend -themselves without Athenian aid. They were assisted by the Dorian -city of Kamarina, which was afraid of her powerful border city -Syracuse, and by Rhegium in Italy; while Lokri in Italy, the bitter -enemy of Rhegium, sided with Syracuse against them. In the fifth -summer of the war, finding themselves blockaded by sea and confined -to their walls, they sent to Athens, both to entreat succor, as -allies[190] and Ionians, and to represent that, if Syracuse succeeded -in crushing them, she and the other Dorians in Sicily would forthwith -send over the positive aid which the Peloponnesians had so long been -invoking. The eminent rhetor Gorgias of Leontini, whose peculiar -style of speaking is said to have been new to the Athenian assembly, -and to have produced a powerful effect, was at the head of this -embassy. It is certain that this rhetor procured for himself numerous -pupils and large gains, not merely in Athens but in many other towns -of Central Greece,[191] though it is exaggeration to ascribe to his -pleading the success of the present application. - - [190] Thucyd. vi, 86. - - [191] Thucyd. iii, 86; Diodor. xii, 53; Plato, Hipp. Maj. p. 282, - B. It is remarkable that Thucydidês, though he is said, with much - probability, to have been among the pupils of Gorgias, makes no - mention of that rhetor personally as among the envoys. Diodorus - probably copied from Ephorus, the pupil of Isokratês. Among the - writers of the Isokratean school, the persons of distinguished - rhetors, and their supposed political efficiency, counted for - much more than in the estimation of Thucydidês. Pausanias (vi, - 17, 3) speaks of Tisias also as having been among the envoys in - this celebrated legation. - -Now the Athenians had a real interest as well in protecting these -Ionic Sicilians from being conquered by the Dorians in the island, -as in obstructing the transport of Sicilian corn to Peloponnesus: -and they sent twenty triremes under Lachês and Charœadês, with -instructions, while accomplishing these objects, to ascertain the -possibility of going beyond the defensive, and making conquests. -Taking station at Rhegium, Lachês did something towards rescuing -the Ionic cities in part from their maritime blockade, and even -undertook an abortive expedition against the Lipari isles, which -were in alliance with Syracuse.[192] Throughout the ensuing year, -he pressed the war in the neighborhood of Rhegium and Messênê, his -colleague Charœadês being slain. Attacking Mylæ in the Messenian -territory, he was fortunate enough to gain so decisive an advantage -over the troops of Messênê, that that city itself capitulated to him, -gave hostages, and enrolled itself as ally of Athens and the Ionic -cities.[193] He also contracted an alliance with the non-Hellenic -city of Egesta, in the northwest portion of Sicily, and he invaded -the territory of Lokri, capturing one of the country forts on the -river Halex:[194] after which, in a second debarkation, he defeated -a Lokrian detachment under Proxenus. But he was unsuccessful in an -expedition into the interior of Sicily against Inêssus. This was a -native Sikel township, held in coercion by a Syracusan garrison in -the acropolis; which the Athenians vainly attempted to storm, being -repulsed with loss.[195] Lachês concluded his operations in the -autumn by an ineffective incursion on the territory of Himera and on -the Lipari isles. On returning to Rhegium at the beginning of the -ensuing year (B.C. 425), he found Pythodôrus already arrived from -Athens to supersede him.[196] - - [192] Thucyd. iii, 88; Diodor. xii, 54. - - [193] Thucyd. iii, 90; vi, 6. - - [194] Thucyd. iii, 99. - - [195] Thucyd. iii, 103. - - [196] Thucyd. iii, 115. - -That officer had come as the forerunner of a more considerable -expedition, intended to arrive in the spring, under Eurymedon and -Sophoklês, who were to command in conjunction with himself. The Ionic -cities in Sicily, finding the squadron under Lachês insufficient to -render them a match for their enemies at sea, had been emboldened -to send a second embassy to Athens, with request for farther -reinforcements, at the same time making increased efforts to enlarge -their own naval force. It happened that at this moment the Athenians -had no special employment elsewhere for their fleet, which they -desired to keep in constant practice. They accordingly resolved to -send to Sicily forty additional triremes, in full hopes of bringing -the contest to a speedy close.[197] - - [197] Thucyd. iii, 115. - -Early in the ensuing spring, Eurymedon and Sophoklês started from -Athens for Sicily in command of this squadron, with instructions to -afford relief at Korkyra in their way, and with Demosthenês on board -to act on the coast of Peloponnesus. It was this fleet which, in -conjunction with the land-forces under the command of Kleon, making a -descent almost by accident on the Laconian coast at Pylos, achieved -for Athens the most signal success of the whole war, the capture -of the Lacedæmonian hoplites in Sphakteria.[198] But the fleet was -so long occupied, first in the blockade of that island, next in -operations at Korkyra, that it did not reach Sicily until about the -month of September.[199] - - [198] See the preceding vol. vi, ch. lii. - - [199] Thucyd. iv, 48. - -Such delay, eminently advantageous for Athens generally, was fatal -to her hopes of success in Sicily during the whole summer. For -Pythodôrus, acting only with the fleet previously commanded by Lachês -at Rhegium, was not merely defeated in a descent upon Lokri, but -experienced a more irreparable loss by the revolt of Messênê, which -had surrendered to Lachês a few months before; and which, together -with Rhegium, had given to the Athenians the command of the strait. -Apprized of the coming Athenian fleet, the Syracusans were anxious to -deprive them of this important base of operations against the island; -and a fleet of twenty sail—half Syracusan, half Lokrian—was enabled -by the concurrence of a party in Messênê to seize the town. It would -appear that the Athenian fleet was then at Rhegium, but that town was -at the same time threatened by the entrance of the entire land-force -of Lokri, together with a body of Rhegine exiles: these latter were -even not without hopes of obtaining admission by means of a favorable -party in the town. Though such hopes were disappointed, yet the -diversion prevented all succor from Rhegium to Messênê. The latter -town now served as a harbor for the fleet hostile to Athens,[200] -which was speedily reinforced to more than thirty sail, and began -maritime operations forthwith, in hopes of crushing the Athenians -and capturing Rhegium, before Eurymedon should arrive. But the -Athenians, though they had only sixteen triremes together with eight -others from Rhegium, gained a decided victory, in an action brought -on accidentally for the possession of a merchantman sailing through -the strait. They put the enemy’s ships to flight, and drove them -to seek refuge, some under protection of the Syracusan land-force -at Cape Pelôrus near Messênê, others under the Lokrian force near -Rhegium, each as they best could, with the loss of one trireme.[201] -This defeat so broke up the scheme of Lokrian operations against -the latter place, that their land-force retired from the Rhegine -territory, while the whole defeated squadron was reunited on the -opposite coast under Cape Pelôrus. Here the ships were moored close -on shore under the protection of the land-force, when the Athenians -and Rhegines came up to attack them; but without success, and even -with the loss of one trireme, which the men on shore contrived to -seize and detain by a grappling-iron; her crew escaping by swimming -to the vessels of their comrades. Having repulsed the enemy, the -Syracusans got aboard, and rowed close along-shore, partly aided by -tow-ropes, to the harbor of Messênê, in which transit they were again -attacked, but the Athenians were a second time beaten off with the -loss of another ship. Their superior seamanship was of no avail in -this along-shore fighting.[202] - - [200] Thucyd. iii, 115; iv, 1. - - [201] Thucyd. iv, 24. Καὶ νικηθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων διὰ τάχους - ἀπέπλευσαν, ὡς ἕκαστοι ἔτυχον, ἐς τὰ οἰκεῖα στρατόπεδα, τό τε ἐν - τῇ Μεσσήνῃ καὶ ἐν τῷ Ῥηγίῳ, μίαν ναῦν ἀπολέσαντες, etc. - - I concur in Dr. Arnold’s explanation of this passage, yet - conceiving that the words ὡς ἕκαστοι ἔτυχον designate the flight - as disorderly, insomuch that _all_ the Lokrian ships did not get - back to the Lokrian station, nor _all_ the Syracusan ships to the - Syracusan station: but each separate ship fled to either one or - the other, as it best could. - - [202] Thucyd. iv, 25. ἀποσιμωσάντων ἐκείνων καὶ προεμβαλόντων. - - I do not distinctly understand the nautical movement which - is expressed by ἀποσιμωσάντων, in spite of the notes of the - commentators. And I cannot but doubt the correctness of Dr. - Arnold’s explanation, when he says “The Syracusans, on a sudden, - threw off their towing-ropes, made their way to the open sea by - a lateral movement, and thus became the assailants,” etc. The - open sea was what the Athenians required, in order to obtain the - benefit of their superior seamanship. - -The Athenian fleet was now suddenly withdrawn in order to prevent an -intended movement in Kamarina, where a philo-Syracusan party under -Archias threatened revolt: and the Messenian forces, thus left free, -invaded the territory of their neighbor, the Chalkidic city of Naxos, -sending their fleet round to the mouth of the Akesinês near that -city. They were ravaging the lands, and were preparing to storm the -town, when a considerable body of the indigenous Sikels were seen -descending the neighboring hills to succor the Naxians: upon which -the latter, elate with the sight, and mistaking the new comers for -their Grecian brethren from Leontini, rushed out of the gates and -made a vigorous sally at a moment when their enemies were unprepared. -The Messenians were completely defeated, with the loss of no less -than one thousand men, and with a still greater loss sustained in -their retreat home from the pursuit of the Sikels. Their fleet -went back also to Messênê, from whence such of the ships as were -not Messenian returned home. So much was the city weakened by its -recent defeat, that a Lokrian garrison was sent for its protection -under Demomelês, while the Leontines and Naxians, together with -the Athenian squadron on returning from Kamarina, attacked it by -land and sea in this moment of distress. A well-timed sally of the -Messenians and Lokrians, however, dispersed the Leontine land-force; -but the Athenian force, landing from their ships, attacked the -assailants while in the disorder of pursuit, and drove them back -within the walls. The scheme against Messênê, however, had now -become impracticable, so that the Athenians crossed the strait to -Rhegium.[203] - - [203] Thucyd. iv, 25. - -Thus indecisive was the result of operations in Sicily, during the -first half of the seventh year of the Peloponnesian war: nor does it -appear that the Athenians undertook anything considerable during the -autumnal half, though the full fleet under Eurymedon had then joined -Pythodôrus.[204] Yet while the presence of so large an Athenian fleet -at Rhegium would produce considerable effect upon the Syracusan mind, -the triumphant promise of Athenian affairs, and the astonishing -humiliation of Sparta during the months immediately following the -capture of Sphakteria, probably struck much deeper. In the spring -of the eighth year of the war, Athens was not only in possession -of the Spartan prisoners, but also of Pylos and Kythêra, so that a -rising among the Helots appeared noway improbable. She was in the -full swing of hope, while her discouraged enemies were all thrown on -the defensive. Hence the Sicilian Dorians, intimidated by a state of -affairs so different from that in which they had begun the war three -years before, were now eager to bring about a pacification in their -island.[205] The Dorian city of Kamarina, which had hitherto acted -along with the Ionic or Chalkidic cities, was the first to make a -separate accommodation with its neighboring city of Gela; at which -latter place deputies were invited to attend from all the cities in -the island, with a view to the conclusion of peace.[206] - - [204] Thucyd. iv, 48. - - [205] Compare a similar remark made by the Syracusan Hermokratês, - nine years afterwards, when the great Athenian expedition against - Syracuse was on its way, respecting the increased disposition - to union among the Sicilian cities, produced by common fear of - Athens (Thucyd. vi, 33). - - [206] Thucyd. iv, 58. - -This congress met in the spring of 424 B.C., when Syracuse, the most -powerful city in Sicily, took the lead in urging the common interest -which all had in the conclusion of peace. The Syracusan Hermokratês, -chief adviser of this policy in his native city, now appeared to -vindicate and enforce it in the congress. He was a well-born, brave, -and able man, clear-sighted in regard to the foreign interests of his -country; but at the same time of pronounced oligarchical sentiments, -mistrusted by the people, seemingly with good reason, in regard to -their internal constitution. The speech which Thucydidês places -in his mouth, on the present occasion, sets forth emphatically -the necessity of keeping Sicily at all cost free from foreign -intervention, and of settling at home all differences which might -arise between the various Sicilian cities. Hermokratês impressed upon -his hearers that the aggressive schemes of Athens, now the greatest -power in Greece, were directed against all Sicily, and threatened -all cities alike, Ionians not less than Dorians. If they enfeebled -one another by internal quarrels, and then invited the Athenians -as arbitrators, the result would be ruin and slavery to all. The -Athenians were but too ready to encroach everywhere, even without -invitation: they had now come, with a zeal outrunning all obligation, -under pretence of aiding the Chalkidic cities who had never aided -them, but in the real hope of achieving conquest for themselves. The -Chalkidic cities must not rely upon their Ionic kindred for security -against evil designs on the part of Athens: as Sicilians, they had a -paramount interest in upholding the independence of the island. If -possible, they ought to maintain undisturbed peace; but if that were -impossible, it was essential at least to confine the war to Sicily, -apart from any foreign intruders. Complaints should be exchanged, -and injuries redressed, by all, in a spirit of mutual forbearance; -of which Syracuse—the first city in the island, and best able to -sustain the brunt of war—was prepared to set the example, without -that foolish over-valuation of favorable chances so ruinous even to -first-rate powers, and with full sense of the uncertainty of the -future. Let them all feel that they were neighbors, inhabitants of -the same island, and called by the common name of Sikeliots; and -let them all with one accord repel the intrusion of aliens in their -affairs, whether as open assailants or as treacherous mediators.[207] - - [207] See the speech of Hermokratês, Thucyd. iv, 59-64. One - expression in this speech indicates that it was composed by - Thucydidês many years after its proper date, subsequently to the - great expedition of the Athenians against Syracuse in 415 B.C.; - though I doubt not that Thucydidês collected the memoranda for it - at the time. - - Hermokratês says: “The Athenians are now near us with _a few - ships_, lying in wait for our blunders,”—οἱ δύναμιν ἔχοντες - μεγίστην τῶν Ἑλλήνων τάς τε ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν τηροῦσιν, ~ὀλίγαις - ναυσὶ παρόντες~, etc. (iv, 60). - - Now the fleet under the command of Eurymedon and his colleagues - at Rhegium included all or most of the ships which had acted - at Sphakteria and Korkyra, together with those which had been - previously at the strait of Messina under Pythodôrus. It could - not have been less than fifty sail, and may possibly have been - sixty sail. It is hardly conceivable that any Greek, speaking in - the early spring of 424 B.C., should have alluded to this as a - _small_ fleet: assuredly, Hermokratês would not thus allude to - it, since it was for the interest of his argument to exaggerate - rather than extenuate, the formidable manifestations of Athens. - - But Thucydidês, composing the speech after the great Athenian - expedition of 415 B.C., so much more numerous and commanding - in every respect, might not unnaturally represent the fleet - of Eurymedon as “a few ships,” when he tacitly compared the - two. This is the only way that I know, of explaining such an - expression. - - The Scholiast observes that some of the copies in his time - omitted the words ὀλίγαις ναυσὶ: probably they noticed the - contradiction which I have remarked; and the passage _may_ - certainly be construed without those words. - -This harangue from Hermokratês, and the earnest dispositions of -Syracuse for peace, found general sympathy among the Sicilian cities, -Ionic as well as Doric. All of them doubtless suffered by the war, -and the Ionic cities, who had solicited the intervention of the -Athenians as protectors against Syracuse, conceived from the evident -uneasiness of the latter a fair assurance of her pacific demeanor -for the future. Accordingly, the peace was accepted by all the -belligerent parties, each retaining what they possessed, except that -the Syracusans agreed to cede Morgantinê to Kamarina, on receipt of -a fixed sum of money.[208] The Ionic cities stipulated that Athens -should be included in the pacification; a condition agreed to by all, -except the Epizephyrian Lokrians.[209] They then acquainted Eurymedon -and his colleagues with the terms; inviting them to accede to the -pacification in the name of Athens, and then to withdraw their fleet -from Sicily. Nor had these generals any choice but to close with the -proposition. Athens thus was placed on terms of peace with all the -Sicilian cities, with liberty of access reciprocally to any single -ship of war, but no armed force to cross the sea between Sicily and -Peloponnesus. Eurymedon then sailed with his fleet home.[210] - - [208] Thucyd. iv, 65. We learn from Polybius (Fragm. xii, 22, - 23, one of the Excerpta recently published by Maii, from the - Cod. Vatic.) that Timæus had in his twenty-first book described - the congress of Gela at considerable length, and had composed an - elaborate speech for Hermokratês: which speech Polybius condemns, - as a piece of empty declamation. - - [209] Thucyd. v, 5. - - [210] Thucyd. vi, 13-52. - -On reaching Athens, however, he and his colleagues were received -by the people with much displeasure. He himself was fined, and his -colleagues Sophoklês and Pythodôrus banished, on the charge of having -been bribed to quit Sicily, at a time when the fleet—so the Athenians -believed—was strong enough to have made important conquests. Why the -three colleagues were differently treated we are not informed.[211] -This sentence was harsh and unmerited; for it does not seem that -Eurymedon had it in his power to prevent the Ionic cities from -concluding peace, while it is certain that without them he could have -achieved nothing serious. All that seems unexplained in his conduct, -as recounted by Thucydidês, is, that his arrival at Rhegium with -the entire fleet in September, 425 B.C., does not seem to have been -attended with any increased vigor or success, in the prosecution -of the war. But the Athenians—besides an undue depreciation of -the Sicilian cities, which we shall find fatally misleading them -hereafter—were at this moment at the maximum of extravagant hopes, -counting upon new triumphs everywhere, impatient of disappointment, -and careless of proportion between the means intrusted to, and the -objects expected from, their commanders. Such unmeasured confidence -was painfully corrected in the course of a few months, by the battle -of Delium and the losses in Thrace. But at the present moment, -it was probably not less astonishing than grievous to the three -generals, who had all left Athens prior to the success in Sphakteria. - - [211] Thucyd. iv, 65. - -The Ionic cities in Sicily were soon made to feel that they had been -premature in sending away the Athenians. Dispute between Leontini -and Syracuse, the same cause which had occasioned the invocation -of Athens three years before, broke out afresh soon after the -pacification of Gela. The democratical government of Leontini came -to the resolution of strengthening their city by the enrolment of -many new citizens; and a redivision of the territorial property of -the state was projected in order to provide lots of land for these -new-comers. But the aristocracy of the town upon whom the necessity -would thus be imposed of parting with a portion of their lands, -forestalled the project, seemingly before it was even formally -decided, by entering into a treasonable correspondence with Syracuse, -bringing in a Syracusan army, and expelling the Demos.[212] While -these exiles found shelter as they could in other cities, the rich -Leontines deserted and dismantled their own city, transferred their -residence to Syracuse, and were enrolled as Syracusan citizens. To -them the operation was exceedingly profitable, since they became -masters of the properties of the exiled Demos in addition to their -own. Presently, however, some of them, dissatisfied with their -residence in Syracuse, returned to the abandoned city, and fitted up -a portion of it called Phokeis, together with a neighboring strong -post called Brikinnies. Here, after being joined by a considerable -number of the exiled Demos, they contrived to hold out for some -time against the efforts of the Syracusans to expel them from their -fortifications. - - [212] Thucyd. v, 4. Λεοντῖνοι γὰρ, ἀπελθόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐκ - Σικελίας μετὰ τὴν ξύμβασιν, πολίτας τε ἐπεγράψαντο πολλοὺς, καὶ - ὁ δῆμος τὴν γῆν ἐπενόει ἀναδάσασθαι. Οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ αἰσθόμενοι - Συρακοσίους τε ἐπάγονται καὶ ἐκβάλλουσι τὸν δῆμον. Καὶ οἱ μὲν - ἐπλανήθησαν ὡς ἕκαστοι, etc. - - Upon this Dr. Arnold observes: “The principle on which this - ἀναδασμὸς γῆς was redemanded, was this; that every citizen was - entitled to his portion, κλῆρος, of the land of the state, and - that the admission of new citizens rendered a redivision of - the property of the state a matter at once of necessity and of - justice. It is not probable that in any case the actual κλῆροι - (properties) of the old citizens were required to be shared - with the new members of the state; but only, as at Rome, the - ager publicus, or land still remaining to the state itself, - and not apportioned out to individuals. This land, however, - being beneficially enjoyed by numbers of the old citizens, - either as common pasture, or as being farmed by different - individuals on very advantageous terms, a division of it among - the newly-admitted citizens, although not, strictly speaking, - a spoliation of private property, was yet a serious shock to - a great mass of existing interests, and was therefore always - regarded as a revolutionary measure.” - - I transcribe this note of Dr. Arnold rather from its intrinsic - worth than from any belief that analogy of agrarian relations - existed between Rome and Leontini. The ager publicus at Rome was - the product of successive conquests from foreign enemies of the - city: there may, indeed, have been originally a similar ager - publicus in the peculiar domain of Rome itself, anterior to all - conquests; but this must at any rate have been very small, and - had probably been all absorbed and assigned in private property - before the agrarian disputes began. - - We cannot suppose that the Leontines had any ager publicus - acquired by conquest, nor are we entitled to presume that they - had any at all, capable of being divided. Most probably the lots - for the new citizens were to be provided out of private property. - But unfortunately we are not told how, nor on what principles and - conditions. Of what class of men were the new emigrants? Were - they individuals altogether poor, having nothing but their hands - to work with; or did they bring with them any amount of funds, - to begin their settlement on the fertile and tempting plain of - Leontini? (compare Thucyd. i, 27, and Plato de Legib. v, p. 744, - A.) If the latter, we have no reason to imagine that they would - be allowed to acquire their new lots gratuitously. Existing - proprietors would be forced to sell at a fixed price, but not - to yield their properties without compensation. I have already - noticed, that to a small self-working proprietor, who had no - slaves, it was almost essential that his land should be near the - city; and provided this were insured, it might be a good bargain - for a new resident having some money, but no land elsewhere, to - come in and buy. - - We have no means of answering these questions: but the few words - of Thucydidês do not present this measure as revolutionary, or - as intended against the rich, or for the benefit of the poor. - It was proposed, on public grounds, to strengthen the city by - the acquisition of new citizens. This might be wise policy, - in the close neighborhood of a doubtful and superior city, - like Syracuse; though we cannot judge of the policy of the - measure without knowing more. But most assuredly Mr. Mitford’s - representation can be noway justified from Thucydidês: “Time and - circumstances had greatly altered the state of property in all - the Sicilian commonwealths, since _that incomplete and iniquitous - partition of lands_, which had been made, on the general - establishment of democratical government, after the expulsion of - the family of Gelon. In other cities, the poor rested under their - lot; but in Leontini, they were warm in project _for a fresh and - equal partition_; and to strengthen themselves against the party - of the wealthy, they carried, in the general assembly, a decree - for associating a number of new citizens.” (Mitford, H. G. ch. - xviii, sect. ii, vol. iv, p. 23.) - - I have already remarked, in a previous note, that Mr. Mitford - has misrepresented the redivision of lands which took place - after the expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty. That redivision had - not been upon the principle of equal lots: it is not therefore - correct to assert, as Mr. Mitford does, that the present - movement at Leontini arose from the innovation made by time and - circumstances in that equal division: as little is it correct to - say, that the poor at Leontini now desired “a fresh and equal - partition.” Thucydidês says _not one word about equal partition_. - He puts forward the enrolment of new citizens as the substantive - and primary resolution, actually taken by the Leontines; the - redivision of the lands, as a measure consequent and subsidiary - to this, and as yet existing only in project (ἐπενόει). Mr. - Mitford states the fresh and equal division to have been the real - object of desire, and the enrolment of new citizens to have been - proposed with a view to attain it. His representation is greatly - at variance with that of Thucydidês. - -The new enrolment of citizens, projected by the Leontine democracy, -seems to date during the year succeeding the pacification of Gela, -and was probably intended to place the city in a more defensible -position in case of renewed attacks from Syracuse, thus compensating -for the departure of the Athenian auxiliaries. The Leontine Demos, -in exile and suffering, doubtless bitterly repenting that they had -concurred in dismissing these auxiliaries, sent envoys to Athens with -complaints, and renewed prayers for help.[213] - - [213] Justin (iv, 4) surrounds the Sicilian envoys at Athens with - all the insignia of misery and humiliation, while addressing the - Athenian assembly: “Sordidâ veste, capillo barbâque promissis, et - omni squaloris habitu ad misericordiam commovendam conquisito, - concionem deformes adeunt.” - -But Athens was then too much pressed to attend to their call; her -defeat at Delium and her losses in Thrace had been followed by -the truce for one year; and even during that truce, she had been -called upon for strenuous efforts in Thrace to check the progress -of Brasidas. After the expiration of that truce, she sent Phæax and -two colleagues to Sicily (B.C. 422) with the modest force of two -triremes. He was directed to try and organize an anti-Syracusan -party in the island, for the purpose of reëstablishing the Leontine -Demos. In passing along the coast of Italy, he concluded amicable -relations with some of the Grecian cities, especially with Lokri, -which had hitherto stood aloof from Athens; and his first addresses -in Sicily appeared to promise success. His representations of danger -from Syracusan ambition were well received both at Kamarina and -Agrigentum. For on the one hand, that universal terror of Athens, -which had dictated the pacification of Gela, had now disappeared; -while on the other hand, the proceeding of Syracuse in regard -to Leontini was well calculated to excite alarm. We see by that -proceeding that sympathy between democracies in different towns was -not universal: the Syracusan democracy had joined with the Leontine -aristocracy to expel the Demos, just as the despot Gelon had combined -with the aristocracy of Megara and Eubœa, sixty years before, and -had sold the Demos of those towns into slavery. The birthplace of -the famous rhetor Gorgias was struck out of the list of inhabited -cities; its temples were deserted; and its territory had become -a part of Syracuse. All these were circumstances so powerfully -affecting Grecian imagination, that the Kamarinæans, neighbors of -Syracuse on the other side, might well fear lest the like unjust -conquest, expulsion, and absorption, should soon overtake them. -Agrigentum, though without any similar fear, was disposed from -policy, and jealousy of Syracuse, to second the views of Phæax. But -when the latter proceeded to Gela, in order to procure the adhesion -of that city in addition to the other two, he found himself met by -so resolute an opposition that his whole scheme was frustrated, nor -did he think it advisable even to open his case at Selinus or Himera. -In returning, he crossed the interior of the island through the -territory of the Sikels to Katana, passing in his way by Brikinnies, -where the Leontine Demos were still maintaining a precarious -existence. Having encouraged them to hold out by assurances of aid, -he proceeded on his homeward voyage. In the strait of Messina, he -struck upon some vessels conveying a body of expelled Lokrians from -Messênê to Lokri. The Lokrians had got possession of Messênê after -the pacification of Gela, by means of an internal sedition; but -after holding it some time, they were now driven out by a second -revolution. Phæax, being under agreement with Lokri, passed by these -vessels without any act of hostility.[214] - - [214] Thucyd. v, 4, 5. - -The Leontine exiles at Brikinnies, however, received no benefit from -his assurances, and appear soon afterwards to have been completely -expelled. Nevertheless, Athens was noway disposed, for a considerable -time, to operations in Sicily. A few months after the visit of -Phæax to that island, came the Peace of Nikias: the consequences -of that peace occupied her whole attention in Peloponnesus, while -the ambition of Alkibiadês carried her on for three years in -intra-Peloponnesian projects and coöperation with Argos against -Sparta. It was only in the year 417 B.C., when these projects -had proved abortive, that she had leisure to turn her attention -elsewhere. During that year, Nikias had contemplated an expedition -against Amphipolis in conjunction with Perdikkas, whose desertion -frustrated the scheme. The year 416 B.C. was that in which Mêlos was -besieged and taken. - -Meanwhile the Syracusans had cleared and appropriated all the -territory of Leontini, which city now existed only in the talk -and hopes of its exiles. Of these latter a portion seem to have -continued at Athens, pressing their entreaties for aid, which began -to obtain some attention about the year 417 B.C., when another -incident happened to strengthen their chance of success. A quarrel -broke out between the neighboring cities of Selinus (Hellenic) and -Egesta (non-Hellenic) in the western corner of Sicily; partly about -a piece of land on the river which divided the two territories, -partly about some alleged wrong in cases of internuptial connection. -The Selinuntines, not satisfied with their own strength, obtained -assistance from the Syracusans their allies, and thus reduced -Egesta to considerable straits by land as well as by sea.[215] Now -the Egestæans had allied themselves with Lachês ten years before, -during the first expedition sent by the Athenians to Sicily; upon -the strength of which alliance they sent to Athens, to solicit her -intervention for their defence, after having in vain applied both -to Agrigentum and to Carthage. It may seem singular that Carthage -did not at this time readily embrace the pretext for interference, -considering that, ten years afterwards, she interfered with such -destructive effect against Selinus. At this time, however, the fear -of Athens and her formidable navy appears to have been felt even at -Carthage,[216] thus protecting the Sicilian Greeks against the most -dangerous of their neighbors. - - [215] Thucyd. vi, 6; Diodor. xii, 82. The statement of - Diodorus—that the Egestæans applied not merely to Agrigentum - but also to Syracuse—is highly improbable. The war which he - mentions as having taken place some years before between Egesta - and Lilybæum (xi, 86) in 454 B.C., may probably have been a war - between Egesta and Selinus. - - [216] Thucyd. vi, 34. - -The Egestæan envoys reached Athens in the spring of 416 B.C., -at a time when the Athenians had no immediate project to occupy -their thoughts, except the enterprise against Mêlos, which could -not be either long or doubtful. Though urgent in setting forth -the necessities of their position, they at the same time did not -appear, like the Leontines, as mere helpless suppliants, addressing -themselves to Athenian compassion. They rested their appeal chiefly -on grounds of policy. The Syracusans, having already extinguished -one ally of Athens (Leontini), were now hard pressing upon a second -(Egesta), and would thus successively subdue them all: as soon as -this was completed, there would be nothing left in Sicily except an -omnipotent Dorian combination, allied to Peloponnesus both by race -and descent, and sure to lend effective aid in putting down Athens -herself. It was therefore essential for Athens to forestall this -coming danger by interfering forthwith to uphold her remaining allies -against the encroachments of Syracuse. If she would send a naval -expedition adequate to the rescue of Egesta, the Egestæans themselves -engaged to provide ample funds for the prosecution of the war.[217] - - [217] Thucyd. vi, 6; Diodor. xii, 83. - -Such representations from the envoys, and fears of Syracusan -aggrandizement as a source of strength to Peloponnesus, worked along -with the prayers of the Leontines in rekindling the appetite of -Athens for extending her power in Sicily. The impression made upon -the Athenian public, favorable from the first, was wound up to a -still higher pitch by renewed discussion. The envoys were repeatedly -heard in the public assembly,[218] together with those citizens who -supported their propositions. At the head of these was Alkibiadês, -who aspired to the command of the intended expedition, tempting alike -to his love of glory, of adventure, and of personal gain. But it is -plain from these renewed discussions that at first the disposition of -the people was by no means decided, much less unanimous, and that a -considerable party sustained Nikias in a prudential opposition. Even -at last, the resolution adopted was not one of positive consent, but -a mean term such as perhaps Nikias himself could not resist. Special -envoys were despatched to Egesta, partly to ascertain the means of -the town to fulfil its assurance of defraying the costs of war, -partly to make investigations on the spot and report upon the general -state of affairs. - - [218] Thucyd. vi, 6. ὧν ἀκούοντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις - τῶν τε Ἐγεσταίων ~πολλάκις λεγόντων~ καὶ τῶν ξυναγορευόντων - αὐτοῖς ἐψηφίσαντο, etc. - - Mr. Mitford takes no notice of all these previous debates, when - he imputes to the Athenians hurry and passion in the ultimate - decision (ch. xviii. sect. ii, vol. iv, p. 30.) - -Perhaps the commissioners despatched were men themselves friendly -to the enterprise; nor is it impossible that some of them may -have been individually bribed by the Egestæans; at least such a -supposition is not forbidden by the average state of Athenian public -morality. But the most honest or even suspicious men could hardly -be prepared for the deep-laid stratagems put in practice to delude -them, on their arrival at Egesta. They were conducted to the rich -temple of Aphroditê on Mount Eryx, where the plate and donatives -were exhibited before them; abundant in number, and striking -to the eye, yet composed mostly of silver-gilt vessels, which, -though falsely passed off as solid gold, were in reality of little -pecuniary value. Moreover, the Egestæan citizens were profuse in -their hospitalities and entertainments both to the commissioners and -to the crews of the triremes.[219] They collected together all the -gold and silver vessels, dishes, and goblets, of Egesta, which they -farther enlarged by borrowing additional ornaments of the same kind -from the neighboring cities, Hellenic as well as Carthaginian. At -each successive entertainment, every Egestæan host exhibited all -this large stock of plate as his own property, the same stock being -transferred from house to house for the occasion. A false appearance -was thus created, of the large number of wealthy men in Egesta; and -the Athenian seamen, while their hearts were won by the caresses, -saw with amazement this prodigious display of gold and silver, and -were thoroughly duped by the fraud.[220] To complete the illusion, by -resting it on a basis of reality and prompt payment, sixty talents -of uncoined silver were at once produced as ready for the operations -of war. With this sum in hand, the Athenian commissioners, after -finishing their examination, and the Egestæan envoys also, returned -to Athens, which they reached in the spring of 415 B.C.,[221] about -three months after the capture of Mêlos. - - [219] Thucyd. vi, 46. ἰδίᾳ ξενίσεις ποιούμενοι τῶν τριηριτῶν, τά - τε ἐξ αὐτῆς Ἐγέστης ἐκπώματα καὶ χρυσᾶ καὶ ἀργυρᾶ ξυλλέξαντες, - καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐγγὺς πόλεων καὶ Φοινικικῶν καὶ Ἑλληνίδων - αἰτησάμενοι, ἐσέφερον ἐς τὰς ἑστιάσεις ὡς οἰκεῖα ἕκαστοι. Καὶ - πάντων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρωμένων, καὶ πανταχοῦ πολλῶν - φαινομένων, μεγάλην τὴν ἔκπληξιν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τριήρων Ἀθηναίοις - παρεῖχον, etc. - - Such loans of gold and silver plate betoken a remarkable degree - of intimacy among the different cities. - - [220] Thucyd. vi, 46; Diodor. xii, 83. - - [221] To this winter or spring, perhaps, we may refer the - representation of the lost comedy Τριφάλης of Aristophanês. - Iberians were alluded to in it, to be introduced by Aristarchus; - seemingly, Iberian mercenaries, who were among the auxiliaries - talked of at this time by Alkibiadês and the other prominent - advisers of the expedition, as a means of conquest in Sicily - (Thucyd. vi, 90). The word Τριφάλης was a nickname (not difficult - to understand) applied to Alkibiadês, who was just now at the - height of his importance, and therefore likely enough to be - chosen as the butt of a comedy. See the few fragments remaining - of the Τριφάλης, in Meineke, Fragm. Comic. Gr. vol. ii, pp. - 1162-1167. - -The Athenian assembly being presently convened to hear their report, -the deluded commissioners drew a magnificent picture of the wealth, -public and private, which they had actually seen and touched at -Egesta, and presented the sixty talents—one month’s pay for a fleet -of sixty triremes—as a small instalment out of the vast stock -remaining behind. While they thus officially certified the capacity -of the Egestæans to perform their promise of defraying the cost -of the war, the seamen of their trireme, addressing the assembly -in their character of citizens,—beyond all suspicion of being -bribed,—overflowing with sympathy for the town in which they had -just been so cordially welcomed, and full of wonder at the display -of wealth which they had witnessed, would probably contribute still -more effectually to kindle the sympathies of their countrymen. -Accordingly, when the Egestæan envoys again renewed their petitions -and representations, confidently appealing to the scrutiny which -they had undergone,—when the distress of the suppliant Leontines was -again depicted,—the Athenian assembly no longer delayed coming to a -final decision. They determined to send forthwith sixty triremes to -Sicily, under three generals with full powers,—Nikias, Alkibiadês, -and Lamachus; for the purpose, first, of relieving Egesta; next, -as soon as that primary object should have been accomplished, of -reëstablishing the city of Leontini; lastly, of furthering the -views of Athens in Sicily, by any other means which they might find -practicable.[222] Such resolution being passed, a fresh assembly was -appointed for the fifth day following, to settle the details. - - [222] Thucyd. vi, 8; Diodor. xii, 83. - -We cannot doubt that this assembly, in which the reports from Egesta -were first delivered, was one of unqualified triumph to Alkibiadês -and those who had from the first advocated the expedition, as well as -of embarrassment and humiliation to Nikias, who had opposed it. He -was probably more astonished than any one else at the statements of -the commissioners and seamen, because he did not believe in the point -which they went to establish. Yet he could not venture to contradict -eye-witnesses speaking in evident good faith, and as the assembly -went heartily along with them, he labored under great difficulty -in repeating his objections to a scheme now so much strengthened -in public favor. Accordingly, his speech was probably hesitating -and ineffective; the more so, as his opponents, far from wishing -to make good any personal triumph against himself, were forward -in proposing his name first on the list of generals, in spite of -his own declared repugnance.[223] But when the assembly broke up, -he became fearfully impressed with the perilous resolution which -it had adopted, and at the same time conscious that he had not -done justice to his own case against it. He therefore resolved to -avail himself of the next assembly, four days afterwards, for the -purpose of reopening the debate, and again denouncing the intended -expedition. Properly speaking, the Athenians might have declined to -hear him on this subject; indeed, the question which he raised could -not be put without illegality: the principle of the measure had been -already determined, and it remained only to arrange the details, for -which special purpose the coming assembly had been appointed. But he -was heard, and with perfect patience; and his harangue, a valuable -sample, both of the man and of the time, is set forth at length by -Thucydidês. I give here the chief points of it, not confining myself -to the exact expressions. - - [223] Thucyd. vi, 8. Ὁ δὲ Νικίας, ἀκούσιος μὲν ᾑρημένος ἄρχειν, - etc. The reading ἀκούσιος appears better sustained by MSS., - and intrinsically more suitable, than ἀκούσας, which latter - word probably arose from the correction of some reader who was - surprised that Nikias made in the second assembly a speech - which properly belonged to the first, and who explained this by - supposing that Nikias had not been present at the first assembly. - That he was not present, however, is highly improbable. The - matter, nevertheless, does require some explanation; and I have - endeavored to supply one in the text. - -“Though we are met to-day, Athenians, to settle the particulars -of the expedition already pronounced against Sicily, yet I think -we ought to take farther counsel whether it be well to send that -expedition at all; nor ought we thus hastily to plunge, at the -instance of aliens, into a dangerous war noway belonging to us. To -myself personally, indeed, your resolution has offered an honorable -appointment, and for my own bodily danger I care as little as any -man: yet no considerations of personal dignity have ever before -prevented me, nor shall now prevent me, from giving you my honest -opinion, however it may clash with your habitual judgments. I tell -you, then, that in your desire to go to Sicily, you leave many -enemies here behind you, and that you will bring upon yourselves new -enemies from thence to help them. Perhaps you fancy that your truce -with Sparta is an adequate protection. In name, indeed (though only -in name, thanks to the intrigues of parties both here and there), -that truce may stand, so long as your power remains unimpaired; but -on your first serious reverses, the enemy will eagerly take the -opportunity of assailing you. Some of your most powerful enemies -have never even accepted the truce; and if you divide your force -as you now propose, they will probably set upon you at once along -with the Sicilians, whom they would have been too happy to procure -as coöperating allies at the beginning of the war. Recollect that -your Chalkidian subjects in Thrace are still in revolt, and have -never yet been conquered: other continental subjects, too, are not -much to be trusted; and you are going to redress injuries offered -to Egesta, before you have yet thought of redressing your own. Now -your conquests in Thrace, if you make any, can be maintained; but -Sicily is so distant, and the people so powerful, that you will -never be able to maintain permanent ascendency; and it is absurd -to undertake an expedition wherein conquest cannot be permanent, -while failure will be destructive. The Egestæans alarm you by the -prospect of Syracusan aggrandizement. But to me it seems that the -Sicilian Greeks, even if they become subjects of Syracuse, will be -less dangerous to you than they are at present: for as matters stand -now, they might possibly send aid to Peloponnesus, from desire on the -part of each to gain the favor of Lacedæmon, but imperial Syracuse -would have no motive to endanger her own empire for the purpose of -putting down yours. You are now full of confidence, because you have -come out of the war better than you at first feared. But do not trust -the Spartans: they, the most sensitive of all men to the reputation -of superiority, are lying in wait to play you a trick in order to -repair their own dishonor: their oligarchical machinations against -you demand all your vigilance, and leave you no leisure to think of -these foreigners at Egesta. Having just recovered ourselves somewhat -from the pressure of disease and war, we ought to reserve this -newly-acquired strength for our own purposes, instead of wasting it -upon the treacherous assurances of desperate exiles from Sicily.” - -Nikias then continued, doubtless turning towards Alkibiadês: “If any -man, delighted to be named to the command, though still too young -for it, exhorts you to this expedition in his own selfish interests, -looking to admiration for his ostentation in chariot-racing, and to -profit from his command, as a means of making good his extravagances, -do not let such a man gain celebrity for himself at the hazard of the -entire city. Be persuaded that such persons are alike unprincipled in -regard to the public property and wasteful as to their own, and that -this matter is too serious for the rash counsels of youth. I tremble -when I see before me this band sitting, by previous concert, close -to their leader in the assembly; and I in my turn exhort the elderly -men, who are near them, not to be shamed out of their opposition by -the fear of being called cowards. Let them leave to these men the -ruinous appetite for what is not within reach, in the conviction that -few plans ever succeed from passionate desire; many, from deliberate -foresight. Let them vote against the expedition; maintaining -undisturbed our present relations with the Sicilian cities, and -desiring the Egestæans to close the war against Selinus, as they -have begun it, without the aid of Athens.[224] Nor be thou afraid, -prytanis (Mr. President), to submit this momentous question again to -the decision of the assembly, seeing that breach of the law, in the -presence of so many witnesses, cannot expose thee to impeachment, -while thou wilt afford opportunity for the correction of a perilous -misjudgment.” - - [224] Thucyd. vi, 9-14. Καὶ σὺ, ὦ πρύτανι, ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἡγεῖ - σοι προσήκειν κήδεσθαί τε τῆς πόλεως, καὶ βούλει γενέσθαι - πολίτης ἀγαθός, ἐπιψήφιζε, καὶ γνώμας προτίθει αὖθις Ἀθηναίοις, - νομίσας, εἰ ὀῤῥωδεῖς τὸ ἀναψηφίσαι, τὸ μὲν λύειν τοὺς νόμους - μὴ μετὰ τοσῶνδ’ ἂν μαρτύρων αἰτίαν σχεῖν, τῆς δὲ πόλεως κακῶς - βουλευσαμένης ἰατρὸς ἂν γενέσθαι, etc. - - I cannot concur in the remarks of Dr. Arnold, either on this - passage or upon the parallel case of the renewed debate in - the Athenian assembly, on the subject of the punishment to be - inflicted on the Mitylenæans (see above, vol. vi, ch. 1, p. 338, - and Thucyd. iii, 36). It appears to me that Nikias was here - asking the prytanis to do an illegal act, which might well expose - him to accusation and punishment. Probably he _would_ have been - accused on this ground, if the decision of the second assembly - had been different from what it actually turned out; if they had - reversed the decision of the former assembly, but only by a small - majority. - - The distinction taken by Dr. Arnold between what was _illegal_ - and what was merely _irregular_, was little marked at Athens: - both were called _illegal_, τοὺς νόμους λύειν. The rules which - the Athenian assembly, a sovereign assembly, laid down for its - own debates and decisions, were just as much _laws_ as those - which it passed for the guidance of private citizens. The English - House of Commons is not a sovereign assembly, but only a portion - of the sovereign power: accordingly, the rules which it lays down - for its debates are not _laws_, but orders of the House: a breach - of these orders, therefore, in debating any particular subject, - would not be illegal, but merely irregular or informal. The same - was the case with the French Chamber of Deputies, prior to the - revolution of February, 1848: the rules which it laid down for - its own proceedings were not laws, but simply _le réglement de la - Chambre_. It is remarkable that the present National Assembly now - sitting (March, 1849) has retained this expression, and adopted - a _réglement_ for its own business; though it is in point of - fact a sovereign assembly, and the rules which it sanctions are, - properly speaking, _laws_. - - Both in this case, and in the Mitylenæan debate, I think the - Athenian prytanis committed an illegality. In the first case, - every one is glad of the illegality, because it proved the - salvation of so many Mitylenæan lives. In the second case, - the illegality was productive of practical bad consequences, - inasmuch as it seems to have brought about the immense extension - of the scale upon which the expedition was projected. But there - will occur in a few years a third incident, the condemnation - of the six generals after the battle of Arginusæ, in which the - prodigious importance of a strict observance of forms will appear - painfully and conspicuously manifest. - -Such were the principal points in the speech of Nikias on this -memorable occasion. It was heard with attention, and probably made -some impression, since it completely reopened the entire debate, in -spite of the formal illegality. Immediately after he sat down, while -his words were yet fresh in the ears of the audience, Alkibiadês rose -to reply. The speech just made, bringing the expedition again into -question, endangered his dearest hopes both of fame and of pecuniary -acquisition; for his dreams went farther than those of any man in -Athens; not merely to the conquest of all Sicily, but also to that -of Carthage and the Carthaginian empire. Opposed to Nikias, both in -personal character and in political tendencies, he had pushed his -rivalry to such a degree of bitterness that at one moment a vote -of ostracism had been on the point of deciding between them. That -vote had indeed been turned aside by joint consent, and discharged -upon Hyperbolus; yet the hostile feeling still continued on both -sides, and Nikias had just manifested it by a parliamentary attack -of the most galling character; all the more galling because it was -strictly accurate and well deserved. Provoked as well as alarmed, -Alkibiadês started up forthwith, his impatience breaking loose from -the formalities of an exordium. - -“Athenians, I both have better title than others to the post of -commander,—for the taunts of Nikias force me to begin here,—and I -count myself fully worthy of it. Those very matters with which he -reproaches me are sources not merely of glory to my ancestors and -myself, but of positive advantage to my country. For the Greeks, -on witnessing my splendid theôry at Olympia, were induced to rate -the power of Athens even above the reality, having before regarded -it as broken down by the war; when I sent into the lists seven -chariots, being more than any private individual had ever sent -before, winning the first prize, coming in also second and fourth, -and performing all the accessories in a manner suitable to an Olympic -victory. Custom attaches honor to such exploits, but the power of -the performers is at the same time brought home to the feelings of -spectators. My exhibitions at Athens, too, choregic and others, are -naturally viewed with jealousy by my rivals here; but in the eyes -of strangers they are evidences of power. Such so-called folly is -by no means useless, when a man at his own cost serves the city as -well as himself. Nor is it unjust, when a man has an exalted opinion -of himself, that he should not conduct himself towards others as if -he were their equal; for the man in misfortune finds no one to bear -a share of it. Just as, when we are in distress, we find no one to -speak to us, in like manner let a man lay his account to bear the -insolence of the prosperous, or else let him give equal dealing to -the low, and then claim to receive it from the high. I know well -that such exalted personages, and all who have in any way attained -eminence, have been during their lifetime unpopular, chiefly in -society with their equals, and to a certain extent with others -also; while after their decease, they have left such a reputation -as to make people claim kindred with them falsely, and to induce -their country to boast of them, not as though they were aliens or -wrongdoers, but as her own citizens and as men who did her honor. It -is this glory which I desire, and in pursuit of which I incur such -reproaches for my private conduct. Yet look at my public conduct, -and see whether it will not bear comparison with that of any other -citizen. I brought together the most powerful states in Peloponnesus -without any serious cost or hazard to you, and made the Lacedæmonians -peril their all at Mantineia on the fortune of one day: a peril so -great, that, though victorious, they have not even yet regained their -steady belief in their own strength.” - -“Thus did my youth, and my so-called monstrous folly, find suitable -words to address the Peloponnesian powers, and earnestness to give -them confidence and obtain their coöperation. Be not now, therefore, -afraid of this youth of mine: but so long an I possess it in full -vigor, and so long as Nikias retains his reputation for good fortune, -turn us each to account in our own way.”[225] - - [225] Thucyd. vi, 16, 17. - -Having thus vindicated himself personally, Alkibiadês went on to -deprecate any change of the public resolution already taken. The -Sicilian cities, he said, were not so formidable as was represented. -Their population was numerous, indeed, but fluctuating, turbulent, -often on the move, and without local attachment. No man there -considered himself as a permanent resident, nor cared to defend the -city in which he dwelt; nor were there arms or organization for such -a purpose. The native Sikels, detesting Syracuse, would willingly -lend their aid to her assailants. As to the Peloponnesians, powerful -as they were, they were not more desperate enemies now than they had -been in former days:[226] they might invade Attica by land whether -the Athenians sailed to Sicily or not; but they could do no mischief -by sea, for Athens would still have in reserve a navy sufficient -to restrain them. What valid ground was there, therefore, to evade -performing obligations which Athens had sworn to her Sicilian allies? -To be sure, _they_ could bring no help to Attica in return; but -Athens did not want them on her own side of the water; she wanted -them in Sicily, to prevent her Sicilian enemies from coming over to -attack her. She had originally acquired her empire by a readiness -to interfere wherever she was invited; nor would she have made any -progress, if she had been backward or prudish in scrutinizing such -invitations. She could not now set limits to the extent of her -imperial sway; she was under a necessity not merely to retain her -present subjects, but to lay snares for new subjects, on pain of -falling into dependence herself if she ceased to be imperial. Let -her then persist in the resolution adopted, and strike terror into -the Peloponnesians by undertaking this great expedition. She would -probably conquer all Sicily; at least she would humble Syracuse: in -case even of failure, she could always bring back her troops, from -her unquestionable superiority at sea. The stationary and inactive -policy recommended by Nikias was not less at variance with the -temper, than with the position, of Athens, and would be ruinous to -her if pursued. Her military organization would decline, and her -energies would be wasted in internal rub and conflict, instead of -that steady activity and acquisition which had become engrafted upon -her laws and habits, which could not be now renounced, even if bad in -itself, without speedy destruction.[227] - - [226] Thucyd. vi, 17. Καὶ νῦν οὔτε ἀνέλπιστοί πω μᾶλλον - Πελοποννήσιοι ἐς ἡμᾶς ἐγένοντο, εἴτε καὶ πάνυ ἔῤῥωνται, etc. - - The construction of ἀνέλπιστοι here is not certain: yet I cannot - think that the meaning which Dr. Arnold and others assign to it - is the most suitable. It rather seems to mean the same as in vii, - 4, and vii, 47: “enemies beyond our hopes of being able to deal - with.” - - [227] Thucyd. vi, 16-19. - -Such was substantially the reply of Alkibiadês to Nikias. The debate -was now completely reopened, so that several speakers addressed the -assembly on both sides; more, however, decidedly in favor of the -expedition than against it. The alarmed Egestæans and Leontines -renewed their supplications, appealing to the plighted faith of the -city: probably also those Athenians who had visited Egesta, again -stood forward to protest against what they would call the ungenerous -doubts and insinuations of Nikias. By all these appeals, after -considerable debate, the assembly was so powerfully moved, that -their determination to send the fleet became more intense than ever; -and Nikias, perceiving that farther direct opposition was useless, -altered his tactics. He now attempted a manœuvre, designed indirectly -to disgust his countrymen with the plan, by enlarging upon its -dangers and difficulties, and insisting upon a prodigious force as -indispensable to surmount them. Nor was he without hopes that they -might be sufficiently disheartened by such prospective hardships, -to throw up the scheme altogether. At any rate, if they persisted, -he himself as commander would thus be enabled to execute it with -completeness and confidence. - -Accepting the expedition, therefore, as the pronounced fiat of the -people, he reminded them that the cities which they were about to -attack, especially Syracuse and Selinus, were powerful, populous, -free: well prepared in every way with hoplites, horsemen, light-armed -troops, ships of war, plenty of horses to mount their cavalry, and -abundant corn at home. At best, Athens could hope for no other -allies in Sicily except Naxus and Katana, from their kindred with -the Leontines. It was no mere fleet, therefore, which could cope -with enemies like these on their own soil. The fleet indeed must -be prodigiously great, for the purpose not merely of maritime -combat, but of keeping open communication at sea, and insuring the -importation of subsistence. But there must besides be a large force -of hoplites, bowmen, and slingers, a large stock of provisions in -transports, and, above all an abundant amount of money: for the funds -promised by the Egestæans would be found mere empty delusion. The -army must be not simply a match for the enemy’s regular hoplites and -powerful cavalry, but also independent of foreign aid from the first -day of their landing.[228] If not, in case of the least reverse, they -would find everywhere nothing but active enemies, without a single -friend. “I know (he concluded) that there are many dangers against -which we must take precaution, and many more in which we must trust -to good fortune, serious as it is for mere men to do so. But I choose -to leave as little as possible in the power of fortune, and to have -in hand all means of reasonable security at the time when I leave -Athens. Looking merely to the interests of the commonwealth, this is -the most assured course; while to us who are to form the armament, it -is indispensable for preservation. If any man thinks differently, I -resign to him the command.”[229] - - [228] Thucyd. vi, 22. - - [229] Thucyd. vi, 23. ὅπερ ἐγὼ φοβούμενος, καὶ εἰδὼς πολλὰ - μὲν ἡμᾶς δέον βουλεύσασθαι, ἔτι δὲ πλείω εὐτυχῆσαι (~χαλεπὸν - δὲ ἀνθρώπους ὄντας~), ὅτι ἐλάχιστα τῇ τύχῃ παραδοὺς ἐμαυτὸν - βούλομαι ἐκπλεῖν, παρασκευῇ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰκότων ἀσφαλὴς ἐκπλεῦσαι. - Ταῦτα γὰρ τῇ τε ξυμπάσῃ πόλει βεβαιότατα ἡγοῦμαι, καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς - στρατευσομένοις σωτήρια· εἰ δέ τῳ ἄλλως δοκεῖ, παρίημι αὐτῷ τὴν - ἀρχήν. - -The effect of this second speech of Nikias on the assembly, coming -as it did after a long and contentious debate, was much greater -than that which had been produced by his first. But it was an -effect totally opposite to that which he himself had anticipated -and intended. Far from being discouraged or alienated from the -expedition by those impediments which he had studiously magnified, -the people only attached themselves to it with yet greater obstinacy. -The difficulties which stood in the way of Sicilian conquest served -but to endear it to them the more, calling forth increased ardor -and eagerness for personal exertion in the cause. The people not -only accepted, without hesitation or deduction, the estimate which -Nikias had laid before them of risk and cost, but warmly extolled -his frankness not less than his sagacity, as the only means of making -success certain. They were ready to grant without reserve everything -which he asked, with an enthusiasm and unanimity such as was rarely -seen to reign in an Athenian assembly. In fact, the second speech of -Nikias had brought the two dissentient veins of the assembly into -a confluence and harmony, all the more welcome because unexpected. -While his partisans seconded it as the best way of neutralizing the -popular madness, his opponents—Alkibiadês, the Egestæans, and the -Leontines—caught at it with acclamation, as realizing more than -they had hoped for, and more than they could ever have ventured to -propose. If Alkibiadês had demanded an armament on so vast a scale, -the people would have turned a deaf ear. But such was their respect -for Nikias—on the united grounds of prudence, good fortune, piety, -and favor with the gods—that his opposition to their favorite scheme -had really made them uneasy; and when he made the same demand, they -were delighted to purchase his concurrence by adopting all such -conditions as he imposed.[230] - - [230] Plutarch. Compare Nikias and Crassus, c. 3. - -It was thus that Nikias, quite contrary to his own purpose, not only -imparted to the enterprise a gigantic magnitude which its projectors -had never contemplated, but threw into it the whole soul of Athens, -and roused a burst of ardor beyond all former example. Every man -present, old as well as young, rich and poor, of all classes and -professions, was eager to put down his name for personal service. -Some were tempted by the love of gain, others by the curiosity of -seeing so distant a region, others again by the pride and supposed -safety of enlisting in so irresistible an armament. So overpowering -was the popular voice in calling for the execution of the scheme, -that the small minority who retained their objections were afraid -to hold up their hands, for fear of incurring the suspicion of want -of patriotism. When the excitement had somewhat subsided, an orator -named Demostratus, coming forward as spokesman of this sentiment, -urged Nikias to declare at once, without farther evasion, what force -he required from the people. Disappointed as Nikias was, yet being -left without any alternative, he sadly responded to the appeal; -saying, that he would take farther counsel with his colleagues, -but that speaking on his first impression, he thought the triremes -required must be not less than one hundred, nor the hoplites less -than five thousand, Athenians and allies together. There must farther -be a proportional equipment of other forces and accompaniments, -especially Kretan bowmen and slingers. Enormous as this requisition -was, the vote of the people not only sanctioned it without delay, but -even went beyond it. They conferred upon the generals full power to -fix both the numbers of the armament and every other matter relating -to the expedition, just as they might think best for the interest of -Athens. - -Pursuant to this momentous resolution, the enrolment and preparation -of the forces was immediately begun. Messages were sent to summon -sufficient triremes from the nautical allies, as well as to invite -hoplites from Argos and Mantineia, and to hire bowmen and slingers -elsewhere. For three months, the generals were busily engaged in this -proceeding, while the city was in a state of alertness and bustle, -fatally interrupted, however, by an incident which I shall recount in -the next chapter. - -Considering the prodigious consequences which turned on the -expedition of Athens against Sicily, it is worth while to bestow -a few reflections on the preliminary proceedings of the Athenian -people. Those who are accustomed to impute all the misfortunes of -Athens to the hurry, passion, and ignorance of democracy, will not -find the charge borne out by the facts which we have been just -considering. The supplications of Egestæans and Leontines, forwarded -to Athens about the spring or summer of 416 B.C., undergo careful and -repeated discussion in the public assembly. They at first meet with -considerable opposition, but the repeated debates gradually kindle -both the sympathies and the ambition of the people. Still, however, -no decisive step is taken without more ample and correct information -from the spot, and special commissioners are sent to Egesta for -the purpose. These men bring back a decisive report, triumphantly -certifying all that the Egestæans had promised: nor can we at all -wonder that the people never suspected the deep-laid fraud whereby -their commissioners had been duped. - -Upon the result of that mission to Egesta, the two parties for and -against the projected expedition had evidently joined issue; and -when the commissioners returned, bearing testimony so decisive in -favor of the former, the party thus strengthened thought itself -warranted in calling for a decision immediately, after all the -previous debates. Nevertheless, the measure still had to surmount the -renewed and hearty opposition of Nikias, before it became finally -ratified. It was this long and frequent debate, with opposition often -repeated but always outreasoned, which working gradually deeper and -deeper conviction in the minds of the people, brought them all into -hearty unanimity to support it, and made them cling to it with that -tenacity which the coming chapters will demonstrate. In so far as the -expedition was an error, it certainly was not error arising either -from hurry, or want of discussion, or want of inquiry. Never in -Grecian history was any measure more carefully weighed beforehand, or -more deliberately and unanimously resolved. - -The position of Nikias in reference to the measure is remarkable. As -a dissuasive and warning counsellor, he took a right view of it; but -in that capacity he could not carry the people along with him. Yet -such was their steady esteem for him personally, and their reluctance -to proceed in the enterprise without him, that they eagerly embraced -any conditions which he thought proper to impose. And the conditions -which he named had the effect of exaggerating the enterprise into -such gigantic magnitude as no one in Athens had ever contemplated; -thus casting into it so prodigious a proportion of the blood of -Athens, that its discomfiture would be equivalent to the ruin of the -commonwealth. This was the first mischief occasioned by Nikias, when, -after being forced to relinquish his direct opposition, he resorted -to the indirect manœuvre of demanding more than he thought the people -would be willing to grant. It will be found only the first among a -sad series of other mistakes, fatal to his country as well as to -himself. - -Giving to Nikias, however, for the present, full credit for the -wisdom of his dissuasive counsel and his skepticism about the -reports from Egesta, we cannot but notice the opposite quality in -Alkibiadês. His speech is not merely full of overweening insolence, -as a manifestation of individual character, but of rash and ruinous -instigations in regard to the foreign policy of his country. The -arguments whereby he enforces the expedition against Syracuse are -indeed more mischievous in their tendency than the expedition -itself, for the failure of which Alkibiades is not to be held -responsible. It might have succeeded in its special object, had -it been properly conducted; but even if it had succeeded, the -remark of Nikias is not the less just, that Athens was aiming at -an unmeasured breadth of empire, which it would be altogether -impossible for her to preserve. When we recollect the true political -wisdom with which Periklês had advised his countrymen to maintain -strenuously their existing empire, but by no means to grasp at any -new acquisitions while they had powerful enemies in Peloponnesus, -we shall appreciate by contrast the feverish system of never-ending -aggression inculcated by Alkibiadês, and the destructive principles -which he lays down, that Athens must forever be engaged in new -conquests, on pain of forfeiting her existing empire and tearing -herself to pieces by internal discord. Even granting the necessity -for Athens to employ her military and naval force, as Nikias had -truly observed, Amphipolis and the revolted subjects in Thrace were -still unsubdued; and the first employment of Athenian force ought -to be directed against them, instead of being wasted in distant -hazards and treacherous novelties, creating for Athens a position -in which she could never permanently maintain herself. The parallel -which Alkibiadês draws, between the enterprising spirit whereby -the Athenian empire had been first acquired, and the undefined -speculations which he was himself recommending, is altogether -fallacious. The Athenian empire took its rise from Athenian -enterprise, working in concert with a serious alarm and necessity -on the part of all the Grecian cities in or round the Ægean sea. -Athens rendered an essential service by keeping off the Persians, and -preserving that sea in a better condition than it had ever been in -before: her empire had begun by being a voluntary confederacy, and -had only passed by degrees into constraint; while the local situation -of all her subjects was sufficiently near to be within the reach of -her controlling navy. Her new career of aggression in Sicily, was -in all these respects different. Nor is it less surprising to find -Alkibiadês asserting that the multiplication of subjects in that -distant island, employing a large portion of the Athenian naval force -to watch them, would impart new stability to the preëxisting Athenian -empire; to read the terms in which he makes light of enemies both in -Peloponnesus and in Sicily, the Sicilian war being a new enterprise -hardly less in magnitude and hazard than the Peloponnesian,[231] and -to notice the credit which he claims to himself for his operations -in Peloponnesus and the battle of Mantineia,[232] although it had -ended in complete failure; restoring the ascendency of Sparta to the -maximum at which it had stood before the events of Sphakteria! There -is in fact no speech in Thucydidês so replete with rash misguiding, -and fallacious counsels, as this harangue of Alkibiadês. - - [231] Thucyd. vi, 1. οὐ πολλῷ τινι ὑποδεέστερον πόλεμον, etc.: - compare vii, 28. - - [232] Compare Plutarch, Præcept. Reipubl. Gerend. p. 804. - -As a man of action, Alkibiadês was always brave, vigorous, and -full of resource; as a politician and adviser, he was especially -mischievous to his country, because he addressed himself exactly to -their weak point, and exaggerated their sanguine and enterprising -temper into a temerity which overlooked all permanent calculation. -The Athenians had now contracted the belief that they, as lords of -the sea, were entitled to dominion and receipt of tribute from all -islands; a belief which they had not only acted upon, but openly -professed, in their attack upon Mêlos during the preceding autumn. -As Sicily was an island, it seemed to fall naturally under this -category of subjects; nor ought we to wonder, amidst the inaccurate -geographical data current in that day, that they were ignorant how -much larger Sicily was[233] than the largest island in the Ægean. -Yet they seem to have been aware that it was a prodigious conquest -to struggle for; as we may judge from the fact, that the object was -one kept back rather than openly avowed, and that they acceded to -all the immense preparations demanded by Nikias.[234] Moreover, we -shall see presently, that even the armament which was despatched had -conceived nothing beyond vague and hesitating ideas of something -great to be achieved in Sicily. But if the Athenian public were rash -and ignorant, in contemplating the conquest of Sicily, much more -extravagant were the views of Alkibiadês, who looked even beyond -Sicily to the conquest of Carthage and her empire. Nor was it merely -ambition which he desired to gratify; he was not less eager for the -immense private gains which would be consequent upon success, in -order to supply those deficiencies which his profligate expenditure -had occasioned.[235] - - [233] Thucyd. v, 99; vi, 1-6. - - [234] Thucyd. vi, 6. ἐφιέμενοι μὲν τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ προφάσει, τῆς - πάσης (Σικελίας) ἄρξειν, βοηθεῖν δὲ ἅμα εὐπρεπῶς βουλόμενοι τοῖς - ἑαυτῶν ξυγγένεσι καὶ τοῖς προσγεγενημένοις ξυμμάχοις. - - Even in the speech of Alkibiadês, the conquest of Sicily is only - once alluded to, and that indirectly; rather as a favorable - possibility, than as a result to be counted upon. - - [235] Thucyd. vi, 15. Καὶ μάλιστα στρατηγῆσαί τε ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ - ἐλπίζων Σικελίαν τε δι’ αὐτοῦ καὶ Καρχηδόνα λήψεσθαι, καὶ τὰ ἴδια - ἅμα εὐτυχήσας χρήμασί τε καὶ δόξῃ ὠφελήσειν. Ὢν γὰρ ἐν ἀξιώματι - ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀστῶν, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις μείζοσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν - οὐσίαν ἐχρῆτο ἔς τε τὰς ἱπποτροφίας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δαπάνας, etc. - - Compare vi, 90. Plutarch (Alkib. c. 19; Nikias, c. 12). Plutarch - sometimes speaks as if, not Alkibiadês alone (or at least in - conjunction with a few partisans), but the Athenians generally, - set out with an expectation of conquering Carthage as well as - Sicily. In the speech which Alkibiadês made at Sparta after his - banishment (Thucyd. vi, 90), he does indeed state this as the - general purpose of the expedition. But it seems plain that he - is here describing, to his countrymen generally, plans which - were only fermenting in his own brain, as we may discern from a - careful perusal of the first twenty chapters of the sixth book of - Thucydidês. - - In the inaccurate Oratio de Pace ascribed to Andokidês (sect. - 30), it is alleged that the Syracusans sent an embassy to Athens, - a little before this expedition, entreating to be admitted as - allies of the Athenians, and affirming that Syracuse would be - a more valuable ally to Athens than Egesta or Katana. This - statement is wholly untrue. - -When we recollect how loudly the charges have been preferred against -Kleon, of presumption, of rash policy, and of selfish motive, in -reference to Sphakteria, to the prosecution of the war generally, and -to Amphipolis; and when we compare these proceedings with the conduct -of Alkibiadês as here described, we shall see how much more forcibly -such charges attach to the latter than the former. It will be seen -before this volume is finished, that the vices of Alkibiadês, and the -defects of Nikias, were the cause of far greater ruin to Athens than -either Kleon or Hyperbolus, even if we regard the two latter with the -eyes of their worst enemies. - - - - -CHAPTER LVIII. - -FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE ATHENIANS TO ATTACK SYRACUSE, DOWN TO THE -FIRST WINTER AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL IN SICILY. - - -For the two or three months immediately succeeding the final -resolution taken by the Athenians to invade Sicily, described in the -last chapter, the whole city was elate and bustling with preparation. -I have already mentioned that this resolution, though long opposed by -Nikias with a considerable minority, had at last been adopted—chiefly -through the unforeseen working of that which he intended as a -counter-manœuvre—with a degree of enthusiasm and unanimity, and upon -an enlarged scale, which surpassed all the anticipations of its -promoters. The prophets, circulators of oracles, and other accredited -religious advisers, announced generally the favorable dispositions of -the gods, and promised a triumphant result.[236] All classes in the -city, rich and poor,—cultivators, traders, and seamen, old and young, -all embraced the project with ardor; as requiring a great effort, yet -promising unparalleled results, both of public aggrandizement and -individual gain. Each man was anxious to put down his own name for -personal service; so that the three generals, Nikias, Alkibiadês, and -Lamachus, when they proceeded to make their selection of hoplites, -instead of being forced to employ constraint and incur ill-will, -as happened when an expedition was unpopular, had only to choose -the fittest among a throng of eager volunteers. Every man provided -himself with his best arms and with bodily accoutrements, useful as -well as ostentatious, for a long voyage and for the exigencies of a -varied land-and-sea-service. Among the trierarchs, or rich citizens, -who undertook each in his turn the duty of commanding a ship of war, -the competition was yet stronger. Each of them accounted it an honor -to be named, and vied with his comrades to exhibit his ship in the -most finished state of equipment. The state, indeed, furnished both -the trireme with its essential tackle and oars, and the regular pay -for the crew; but the trierarch, even in ordinary cases, usually -incurred various expenses besides, to make the equipment complete -and to keep the crew together. Such additional outlay, neither -exacted nor defined by law, but only by custom and general opinion, -was different in every individual case, according to temper and -circumstances. But on the present occasion, zeal and forwardness -were universal: each trierarch tried to procure for his own ship the -best crew, by offers of additional reward to all, but especially to -the thranitæ or rowers on the highest of the three tiers:[237] and -it seems that the seamen were not appointed specially to one ship, -but were at liberty to accept these offers, and to serve in any ship -they preferred. Each trierarch spent more than had ever been known -before in pay, outfit, provision, and even external decoration of his -vessel. Besides the best crews which Athens herself could furnish, -picked seamen were also required from subject-allies, and were bid -for in the same way by the trierarchs.[238] - - [236] Thucyd. viii, 1. - - [237] Thucyd. vi, 31. ἐπιφοράς τε πρὸς τῷ ἐκ δημοσίου μισθῷ - διδόντων τοῖς θρανίταις τῶν ναυτῶν καὶ ~ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις~, καὶ - τἄλλα σημείοις καὶ κατασκευαῖς πολυτελέσι χρησαμένων, etc. - - Dobree and Dr. Arnold explain ὑπηρεσίαις to mean _the petty - officers_, such as κυβερνήτης, κελευστὴς, etc. Göller and Poppo - construe it to mean “_the servants of the sailors_.” Neither - of the two seems to me satisfactory. I think the word means - “to the crews generally;” the word ὑπερησία being a perfectly - general word comprising all who received pay in the ship. All the - examples produced in the notes of the commentators testify this - meaning, which also occurs in the text itself two lines before. - To construe ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις as meaning “the crews generally, or - the remaining crews, along with the thranitæ,” is doubtless more - or less awkward. But it departs less from ordinary construction - than either of the two senses which the commentators propose. - - [238] Thucyd. vii, 13. οἱ ξένοι, οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ ἐσβάντες, etc. - -Such efforts were much facilitated by the fact, that five years had -now elapsed since the Peace of Nikias, without any considerable -warlike operations. While the treasury had become replenished with -fresh accumulations,[239] and the triremes increased in number, the -military population, reinforced by additional numbers of youth, had -forgotten both the hardships of the war and the pressure of epidemic -disease. Hence the fleet now got together, while it surpassed in -number all previous armaments of Athens, except a single one in the -second year of the previous war under Periklês, was incomparably -superior even to that, and still more superior to all the rest, -in the other ingredients of force, material as well as moral; in -picked men, universal ardor, ships as well as arms in the best -condition, and accessories of every kind in abundance. Such was -the confidence of success, that many Athenians went prepared for -trade as well as for combat; so that the private stock thus added -to the public outfit, and to the sums placed in the hands of the -generals, constituted an unparalleled aggregate of wealth. Much of -this was visible to the eye, contributing to heighten that general -excitement of Athenian imagination which pervaded the whole city -while the preparations were going forward: a mingled feeling of -private sympathy and patriotism,—a dash of uneasiness from reflection -on the distant and unknown region wherein the fleet was to act,—yet -an elate confidence in Athenian force, such as had never before been -entertained.[240] We hear of Sokratês the philosopher, and Meton the -astronomer, as forming exceptions to this universal tone of sanguine -anticipation: the familiar genius which constantly waited upon the -philosopher is supposed to have forewarned him of the result. Nor is -it impossible that he may have been averse to the expedition, though -the fact is less fully certified than we could wish. Amidst a general -predominance of the various favorable religious signs and prophecies, -there were also some unfavorable. Usually, on all public matters of -risk or gravity, there were prophets who gave assurances in opposite -ways: those which turned out right were treasured up: the rest were -at once forgotten, or never long remembered.[241] - - [239] Thucyd. vi, 26. I do not trust the statement given in - Æschinês, De Fals. Legat. c. 54, p. 302, and in Andokidês, De - Pace, sect. 8, that seven thousand talents were laid by as an - accumulated treasure in the acropolis during the Peace of Nikias, - and that four hundred triremes, or three hundred triremes, were - newly built. The numerous historical inaccuracies in those - orations, concerning the facts prior to 400 B.C., are such as to - deprive them of all authority, except where they are confirmed - by other testimony; even if we admitted the oration ascribed to - Andokidês as genuine, which in all probability it is not. - - But there exists an interesting Inscription which proves that - the sum of three thousand talents at least must have been laid - by, during the interval between the conclusion of the Peace of - Nikias and the Sicilian Expedition, in the acropolis; and that - over and above this accumulated fund, the state was in condition - to discharge, out of the current receipts, various sums which it - had borrowed during the previous war from the treasury of various - temples, and seems to have had besides a surplus for docks and - fortifications. The Inscription above named records the vote - passed for discharging these debts, and for securing the sums so - paid in the opisthodomus, or back-chamber, of the Parthenon, for - account of those gods to whom they respectively belonged. See - Boeckh’s Corp. Inscr. part ii, Inscr. Att. No. 76, p. 117; also - the Staats-haushaltung der Athener of the same author, vol. ii, - p. 198. This Inscription belongs unquestionably to one of the - years between 421-415 B.C., to which year we cannot say. - - [240] Thucyd. vi, 31; Diodor. xiii, 2, 3. - - [241] Plutarch (Nikias, c. 12, 13; Alkibiad. c. 17). Immediately - after the catastrophe at Syracuse, the Athenians were very angry - with those prophets who had promised them success (Thucyd. viii, - 1). - -After between two and three months of active preparations, the -expedition was almost ready to start, when an event happened which -fatally poisoned the prevalent cheerfulness of the city. This was the -mutilation of the Hermæ, one of the most extraordinary events in all -Grecian history. - -These Hermæ, or half-statues of the god Hermês, were blocks of marble -about the height of the human figure. The upper part was cut into a -head, face, neck, and bust; the lower part was left as a quadrangular -pillar, broad at the base, without arms, body, or legs, but with the -significant mark of the male sex in front. They were distributed in -great numbers throughout Athens, and always in the most conspicuous -situations; standing beside the outer doors of private houses as well -as of temples, near the most frequented porticos, at the intersection -of cross ways, in the public agora. They were thus present to the -eye of every Athenian in all his acts of intercommunion, either -for business or pleasure, with his fellow-citizens. The religious -feelings of the Greeks considered the god to be planted or -domiciliated where his statue stood,[242] so that the companionship, -sympathy, and guardianship of Hermês became associated with most of -the manifestations of conjunct life at Athens,—political, social, -commercial, or gymnastic. Moreover, the quadrangular fashion of -these statues, employed occasionally for other gods besides Hermês, -was a most ancient relic handed down from the primitive rudeness -of Pelasgian workmanship and was popular in Arcadia as well as -peculiarly frequent in Athens.[243] - - [242] Cicero, Legg. ii, 11. “Melius Græci atque nostri; qui, - ut augerent pietatem in Deos, easdem illos urbes, quas nos, - _incolere_ voluerunt.” - - How much the Grecian mind was penetrated with the idea of the - god as an actual inhabitant of the town, may be seen illustrated - in the Oration of Lysias, cont. Andokid. sects. 15-46: compare - Herodotus, v, 67; a striking story, as illustrated in this - History, vol. iii, ch. ix, p. 34; also Xenophon, Hellen. vi, 4-7; - Livy, xxxviii, 43. - - In an Inscription in Boeckh’s Corp. Insc. (part ii, No. 190, p. - 320) a list of the names of Prytaneis, appears, at the head of - which list figures the name of Athênê Polias. - - [243] Pausanias, i, 24, 3; iv, 33, 4; viii, 31, 4; viii, 48, - 4; viii, 41, 4; Plutarch, An Seni sit Gerenda Respubl. ad - finem; Aristophan. Plut. 1153, and Schol.: compare O. Müller, - Archäologie der Kunst, sect. 67; K. F. Hermann, Gottesdienstl. - Alterth. der Griechen, sect. 15; Gerhard, De Religione Hermarum. - Berlin, 1845. - -About the end of May, 415 B.C., in the course of one and the same -night, all these Hermæ, one of the most peculiar marks of the city, -were mutilated by unknown hands. Their characteristic features were -knocked off or levelled, so that nothing was left except a mass of -stone with no resemblance to humanity or deity. All were thus dealt -with in the same way, save and except very few: nay, Andokidês -affirms, and I incline to believe him, that there was but _one_ which -escaped unharmed.[244] - - [244] Thucyd. vi, 27. ὅσοι Ἑρμαῖ ἦσαν λίθινοι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇ - Ἀθηναίων ... ~μιᾷ νυκτὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι~ περιεκόπησαν τὰ πρόσωπα. - - Andokidês (De Myst. sect. 63) expressly states that only a single - one was spared—καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὁ Ἑρμῆς ὃν ὁρᾶτε πάντες, ὁ παρὰ τὴν - πατρῷαν οἰκίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν, οὐ περιεκόπη, ~μόνος τῶν Ἑρμῶν τῶν - Ἀθήνῃσι~. - - Cornelius Nepos (Alkibiad. c. 3) and Plutarch (Alkib. c. 13) - copy Andokidês: in his life of Nikias (c. 18) the latter uses - the expression of Thucydidês—οἱ πλεῖστοι. This expression is - noway at variance with Andokidês, though it stops short of his - affirmation. There is great mixture of truth and falsehood in the - Oration of Andokidês; but I think that he is to be trusted as to - this point. - - Diodorus (xiii, 2) says that _all_ the Hermæ were mutilated, not - recognizing a single exception. Cornelius Nepos, by a singular - inaccuracy, talks about the Hermæ as having been all _thrown - down_ (dejicerentur). - -It is of course impossible for any one to sympathize fully with the -feelings of a religion not his own: indeed, the sentiment with -which, in the case of persons of different creeds, each regards -the strong emotions growing out of causes peculiar to the other, -is usually one of surprise that such trifles and absurdities can -occasion any serious distress or excitement.[245] But if we take -that reasonable pains, which is incumbent on those who study the -history of Greece, to realize in our minds the religious and -political associations of the Athenians,[246] noted in ancient -times for their superior piety, as well as for their accuracy and -magnificence about the visible monuments embodying that feeling,—we -shall in part comprehend the intensity of mingled dismay, terror, -and wrath, which beset the public mind on the morning after this -nocturnal sacrilege, alike unforeseen and unparalleled. Amidst all -the ruin and impoverishment which had been inflicted by the Persian -invasion of Attica, there was nothing which was so profoundly felt -or so long remembered as the deliberate burning of the statues and -temples of the gods.[247] If we could imagine the excitement of -a Spanish or Italian town, on finding that all the images of the -Virgin had been defaced during the same night, we should have a -parallel, though a very inadequate parallel, to what was now felt -at Athens, where religious associations and persons were far more -intimately allied with all civil acts and with all the proceedings -of every-day life; where, too, the god and his efficiency were more -forcibly localized, as well as identified with the presence and -keeping of the statue. To the Athenians, when they went forth on the -following morning, each man seeing the divine guardian at his doorway -dishonored and defaced, and each man gradually coming to know that -the devastation was general, it would seem that the town had become -as it were godless; that the streets, the market-place, the porticos, -were robbed of their divine protectors; and what was worse still, -that these protectors, having been grossly insulted, carried away -with them alienated sentiments, wrathful and vindictive instead of -tutelary and sympathizing. It was on the protection of the gods, that -all their political constitution as well as the blessings of civil -life depended; insomuch that the curses of the gods were habitually -invoked as sanction and punishment for grave offences, political as -well as others:[248] an extension and generalization of the feeling -still attached to the judicial oath. This was, in the minds of the -people of Athens, a sincere and literal conviction, not simply a -form of speech to be pronounced in prayers and public harangues, -without being ever construed as a reality in calculating consequences -and determining practical measures. Accordingly, they drew from -the mutilation of the Hermæ the inference, not less natural than -terrifying, that heavy public misfortune was impending over the city, -and that the political constitution to which they were attached was -in imminent danger of being subverted.[249] - - [245] It is truly astonishing to read the account given of this - mutilation of the Hermæ, and its consequences, by Wachsmuth, - Hellen. Alterthümer, vol. ii, sect. 65, pp. 191-196. While he - denounces the Athenian people, for their conduct during the - subsequent inquiry, in the most unmeasured language, you would - suppose that the incident which plunged them into this mental - distraction, at a moment of overflowing hope and confidence, was - a mere trifle: so briefly does he pass it over, without taking - the smallest pains to show in what way it profoundly wounded the - religious feeling of Athens. - - Büttner (Geschichte der politischen Hetærieen zu Athen. p. 65), - though very brief, takes a fairer view than Wachsmuth. - - [246] Pausanias, i, 17, 1; i, 24, 3; Harpokration v, Ἑρμαῖ. See - Sluiter, Lectiones Andocideæ, cap. 2. - - Especially the ἀγυιατίδες θεραπεῖαι (Eurip. Ion. 187) were noted - at Athens: ceremonial attentions towards the divine persons who - protected the public streets, a function performed by Apollo - Aguieus, as well as by Hermes. - - [247] Herodot. viii, 144; Æschylus, Pers. 810; Æschyl. Agam. - 339. The wrath for any indignity offered to the statue of a - god or goddess, and impatience to punish it capitally, is - manifested as far back as the ancient epic poem of Arktinus: - see the argument of the Ἰλίου Πέρσις in Proclus, and Welcker, - Griechische Tragödien, _Sophoklês_, sect. 21, vol. i, p. 162. - Herodotus cannot explain the indignities offered by Kambyses to - the Egyptian statues and holy customs upon any other supposition - than that of stark madness, ἐμάνη μεγάλως; Herod. iii, 37-38. - - Timæus the Sicilian historian (writing about 320-290 B.C.) - represented the subsequent defeat of the Athenians as a divine - punishment for the desecration of the Hermæ, inflicted chiefly by - the Syracusan Hermokratês, son of Hermon and descendant of the - god Hermes (Timæi Fragm. 103-104, ed. Didot; Longinus, de Sublim. - iv, 3). - - The etymological thread of connection, between the Hermæ and - Hermokratês, is strange enough: but what is of importance to - remark, is the deep-seated belief that such an act must bring - after it divine punishment, and that the Athenians as a people - were collectively responsible, unless they could appease the - divine displeasure. If this was the view taken by the historian - Timæus a century and more after the transaction, much more keenly - was it present to the minds of the Athenians of that day. - - [248] Thucyd. viii, 97; Plato, Legg. ix, pp. 871 _b_, 881 _d_. - ἡ τοῦ νόμου ἄρα, etc. Demosthen. Fals. Legat. p. 363, c. 24, p. - 404, c. 60; Plutarch, Solon, c. 24. - - [249] Dr. Thirlwall observes, in reference to the feeling at - Athens after the mutilation of the Hermæ:— - - “We indeed see so little connection between acts of daring - impiety and designs against the state, that we can hardly - understand how they could have been associated together as - they were in the minds of the Athenians. But perhaps the - difficulty may not without reason have appeared much less to the - contemporaries of Alcibiadês, who were rather disposed by their - views of religion to regard them as inseparable.” (Hist. Gr. ch. - xxv, vol. iii, p. 394.) - - This remark, like so many others in Dr. Thirlwall’s history, - indicates a tone of liberality forming a striking contrast - with Wachsmuth; and rare indeed among the learned men who have - undertaken to depict the democracy of Athens. It might, however, - have been stated far more strongly; for an Athenian citizen - would have had quite as much difficulty in comprehending our - _disjunction_ of the two ideas, as we have in comprehending his - _association_ of the two. - -Such was the mysterious incident which broke in upon the eager -and bustling movement of Athens, a few days before the Sicilian -expedition was in condition for starting. In reference to that -expedition it was taken to heart as a most depressing omen.[250] -It would doubtless have been so determined, had it been a mere -undesigned accident happening to any venerated religious object, -just as we are told that similar misgivings were occasioned by the -occurrence, about this same time, of the melancholy festival of the -Adonia, wherein the women loudly bewailed the untimely death of -Adonis.[251] The mutilation of the Hermæ, however, was something -much more ominous than the worst accident. It proclaimed itself as -the deliberate act of organized conspirators, not inconsiderable in -number, whose names and final purpose were indeed unknown, but who -had begun by committing sacrilege of a character flagrant and unheard -of. For intentional mutilation of a public and sacred statue, where -the material afforded no temptation to plunder, is a case to which we -know no parallel: much more mutilation by wholesale, spread by one -band and in one night throughout an entire city. Though neither the -parties concerned, nor their purposes, were ever more than partially -made out, the concert and conspiracy itself is unquestionable. - - [250] Thucyd. vi, 27. Καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα μειζόνως ἐλάμβανον· τοῦ τε - γὰρ ἐκπλοῦ οἰωνὸς ἐδόκει εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ἅμα νεωτέρων - πραγμάτων καὶ δήμου καταλύσεως γεγενῆσθαι. - - Cornelius Nepos, Alcibiad. c. 3. “Hoc quum appareret non sine - magnimultorum consensione esse factam,” etc. - - [251] Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 18; Pherekratês, Fr. Inc. 84, ed. - Meineke; Fragment. Comic. Græc. vol. ii, p. 358, also p. 1164; - Aristoph. Frag. Inc. 120. - -It seems probable, as far as we can form an opinion, that the -conspirators had two objects, perhaps some of them one and some the -other: to ruin Alkibiadês, to frustrate or delay the expedition. How -they pursued the former purpose, will be presently seen: towards the -latter, nothing was ostensibly done, but the position of Teukrus, -and other metics implicated, renders it more likely that they were -influenced by sympathies with Corinth and Megara,[252] prompting -them to intercept an expedition which was supposed to promise great -triumphs to Athens, rather than corrupted by the violent antipathies -of intestine politics. Indeed, the two objects were intimately -connected with each other; for the prosecution of the enterprise, -while full of prospective conquest to Athens, was yet more pregnant -with future power and wealth to Alkibiadês himself. Such chances -would disappear if the expedition could be prevented; nor was it at -all impossible that the Athenians, under the intense impression of -religious terror consequent on the mutilation of the Hermæ, might -throw up the scheme altogether. Especially Nikias, exquisitely -sensitive in his own religious conscience, and never hearty in his -wish for going, a fact perfectly known to the enemy,[253] would -hasten to consult his prophets, and might reasonably be expected -to renew his opposition on the fresh ground offered to him, or -at least to claim delay until the offended gods should have been -appeased. We may judge how much such a proceeding was in the line of -his character, and of the Athenian character, when we find him, two -years afterwards, with the full concurrence of his soldiers, actually -sacrificing the last opportunity of safe retreat for the half-ruined -Athenian army in Sicily, and refusing even to allow the proposition -to be debated, in consequence of an eclipse of the moon; and when we -reflect that Spartans and other Greeks frequently renounced public -designs if an earthquake happened before the execution.[254] - - [252] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 18; Pseudo-Plutarch, Vit. X, Orator. - p. 834, who professes to quote from Kratippus, an author nearly - contemporary. The Pseudo-Plutarch, however, asserts, what cannot - be true, that the Corinthians employed Leontine and Egestæan - agents to destroy the Hermæ. The Leontines and Egestæans were - exactly the parties who had greatest interest in getting the - Sicilian expedition to start: they are the last persons whom the - Corinthians would have chosen as instruments. The fact is, that - no foreigners could well have done the deed: it required great - familiarity with all the buildings, highways, and byways of - Athens. - - The Athenian Philochorus (writing about the date 310-280 B.C.) - ascribed the mutilation of the Hermæ to the Corinthians; if we - may believe the scholiast on Aristophanês; who, however, is not - very careful, since he tells us that _Thucydidês_ ascribed that - act to Alkibiadês and his friends; which is not true (Philochor. - Frag. 110, ed. Didot; Schol. Aristoph. Lysistr. 1094). - - [253] Thucyd. vi, 34. - - [254] See Thucyd. v, 45; v, 50; viii, 5. Xenophon, Hellen. iv, 7, - 4. - -But though the chance of setting aside the expedition altogether -might reasonably enter into the plans of the conspirators, as a -likely consequence of the intense shock inflicted on the religious -mind of Athens, and especially of Nikias, this calculation was not -realized. Probably matters had already proceeded too far even for -Nikias to recede. Notice had been sent round to all the allies; -forces were already on their way to the rendezvous at Korkyra; the -Argeian and Mantineian allies were arriving at Peiræus to embark. So -much the more eagerly did the conspirators proceed in the other part -of their plan, to work that exaggerated religious terror, which they -had themselves artificially brought about, for the ruin of Alkibiadês. - -Few men in Athens either had or deserved to have a greater number of -enemies, political as well as private, than Alkibiades; many of them -being among the highest citizens, whom he offended by his insolence, -and whose liturgies and other customary exhibitions he outshone by -his reckless expenditure. His importance had been already so much -increased, and threatened to be so much more increased, by the -Sicilian enterprise, that they no longer observed any measures in -compassing his ruin. That which the mutilators of the Hermæ seem to -have deliberately planned, his other enemies were ready to turn to -profit. - -Amidst the mournful dismay spread by the discovery of so unparalleled -a sacrilege, it appeared to the Athenian people,—as it would -have appeared to the ephors at Sparta, or to the rulers in every -oligarchical city of Greece,—that it was their paramount and -imperative duty to detect and punish the authors. So long as these -latter were walking about unknown and unpunished, the temples were -defiled by their presence, and the whole city was accounted under -the displeasure of the gods, who would inflict upon it heavy public -misfortunes.[255] Under this displeasure every citizen felt himself -comprehended, so that the sense of public security as well as of -private comfort were alike unappeased, until the offenders should be -discovered and atonement made by punishing or expelling them. Large -rewards were accordingly proclaimed to any person who could give -information, and even impunity to any accomplice whose confession -might lay open the plot. Nor did the matter stop here. Once under -this painful shock of religious and political terror, the Athenians -became eager talkers and listeners on the subject of other recent -acts of impiety. Every one was impatient to tell all that he knew, -and more than he knew, about such incidents; while to exercise -any strict criticism upon the truth of such reports, would argue -weakness of faith and want of religious zeal, rendering the critic -himself a suspected man, “metuunt dubitasse videri.” To rake out -and rigorously visit all such offenders, and thus to display an -earnest zeal for the honor of the gods, was accounted one auxiliary -means of obtaining absolution from them for the recent outrage. -Hence an additional public vote was passed, promising rewards and -inviting information from all witnesses,—citizens, metics, or even -slaves,—respecting any previous acts of impiety which might have -come within their cognizance,[256] but at the same time providing -that informers who gave false depositions should be punished -capitally.[257] - - [255] See the remarkable passage in the contemporary pleading of - Antiphon on a trial for homicide (Orat. ii. Tetralog. 1. 1, 10). - - Ἀσύμφορόν θ’ ὑμῖν ἐστὶ τόνδε μιαρὸν καὶ ἄναγνον ὄντα εἰς τὰ - τεμένη τῶν θεῶν εἰσιόντα μιαίνειν τὴν ἁγνείαν αὐτῶν ἐπί τε - τὰς αὐτὰς τραπέζας ἰόντα ~συγκαταπιμπλάναι τοὺς ἀναιτίους· ἐκ - γὰρ τούτων αἵ τε ἀφορίαι γίγνονται δυστυχεῖς θ’ αἱ πράξεις - καθίστανται~. ~Οἰκείαν~ οὖν χρὴ τὴν ~τιμωρίαν ἡγησαμένους~, αὐτῷ - τούτῳ τὰ τούτου ἀσεβήματα ἀναθέντας, ἰδίαν μὲν τὴν συμφορὰν - καθαρὰν δὲ τὴν πόλιν καταστῆσαι. - - Compare Antiphon, De Cæde Herodis, sect. 83 and Sophoklês, Œdip. - Tyrann. 26, 96, 170, as to the miseries which befell a country, - so long as the person guilty of homicide remained to pollute - the soil and until he was slain or expelled. See also Xenophon, - Hiero. iv, 4, and Plato, Legg. x, p. 885-910, at the beginning - and the end of the tenth book. Plato ranks (ὕβρις) outrage - against sacred objects as the highest and most guilty species - of ὕβρις; deserving the severest punishment. He considers that - the person committing such impiety, unless he be punished or - banished, brings evil and the anger of the gods upon the whole - population. - - [256] Thucyd. vi, 27. - - [257] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sect. 20. - -The Senate of Five Hundred were invested with full powers of action; -while Diognêtus, Peisander, Chariklês, and others, were named -commissioners for receiving and prosecuting inquiries, and public -assemblies were held nearly every day to receive reports.[258] The -first informations received, however, did not relate to the grave -and recent mutilation of the Hermæ, but to analogous incidents of -older date; to certain defacements of other statues, accomplished in -drunken frolic; and above all, to ludicrous ceremonies celebrated -in various houses,[259] by parties of revellers caricaturing and -divulging the Eleusinian mysteries. It was under this latter head -that the first impeachment was preferred against Alkibiadês. - - [258] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 14, 15, 36; Plutarch, - Alkibiad. c. 18. - - [259] Those who are disposed to imagine that the violent feelings - and proceedings at Athens by the mutilation of the Hermæ were - the consequence of her democratical government, may be reminded - of an analogous event of modern times from which we are not yet - separated by a century. - - In the year 1766, at Abbeville in France, two young gentlemen - of good family—the Chevalier d’Etallonde and Chevalier de la - Barre—were tried, convicted, and condemned for having injured - a wooden crucifix which stood on the bridge of that town: in - aggravation of this offence they were charged with having - sung indecent songs. The evidence to prove these points was - exceedingly doubtful; nevertheless, both were condemned to - have their tongues cut out by the roots, to have their right - hands cut off at the church gate, then to be tied to a post - in the market-place with an iron chain, and burnt by a slow - fire. This sentence, after being submitted by way of appeal to - the Parliament of Paris, and by them confirmed, was actually - executed upon the Chevalier de la Barre—d’Etallonde having - escaped—in July, 1766; with this mitigation, that he was allowed - to be decapitated before he was burnt; but at the same time - with this aggravation, that he was put to the torture, ordinary - and extraordinary, to compel him to disclose his accomplices - (Voltaire, Relation de la Mort du Chevalier de la Barre, Œuvres, - vol. xlii, pp. 361-379, ed. Beuchot: also Voltaire, Le Cri du - Sang Innocent, vol. xii, p. 133). - - I extract from this treatise a passage showing how—as in this - mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens—the occurrence of one act of - sacrilege turns men’s imagination, belief, and talk, to others, - real or imaginary:— - - “Tandis que Belleval ourdissoit sécrètement cette trame, il - arriva malheureusement que le crucifix de bois, posé sur le pont - d’Abbeville, étoit endommagé, et l’on soupçonna que des soldats - ivres avoient commis cette insolence impie. - - “Malheureusement l’evêque d’Amiens, étant aussi evêque - d’Abbeville, donna à cette aventure une célébrité et une - importance qu’elle ne méritoit pas. Il fit lancer des monitoires: - il vint faire une procession solennelle auprès du crucifix; _et - on ne parla en Abbeville que de sacrilèges pendant une année - entière_. On disoit qu’il se formoit une nouvelle secte qui - brisoit les crucifix, qui jettoit par terre toutes les hosties, - et les perçoit à coups de couteaux. On assuroit qu’ils avoient - répandu beaucoup de sang. Il y eut des femmes qui crurent en - avoir été témoins. On renouvela tous les contes calomnieux - répandus contre les Juifs dans tant de villes de l’Europe. Vous - connoissez, Monsieur, jusqu’à quel point la populace porte la - credulité et le fanatisme, toujours encouragé par les moines. - - “La procédure une fois commencée, il y eut une foule de - délations. Chacun disoit ce qu’il avoit vu ou cru voir—ce qu’il - avoit entendu ou cru entendre.” - - It will be recollected that the sentence on the Chevalier de - la Barre was passed, not by the people, nor by any popular - judicature, but by a limited court of professional judges sitting - at Abbeville, and afterwards confirmed by the Parlement de Paris, - the first tribunal of professional judges in France. - -So fully were the preparations of the armament now complete, that -the trireme of Lamachus—who was doubtless more diligent about the -military details than either of his two colleagues—was already moored -in the outer harbor, and the last public assembly was held for the -departing officers,[260] who probably laid before their countrymen -an imposing account of the force assembled, when Pythonikus rose to -impeach Alkibiadês. “Athenians,” said he, “you are going to despatch -this great force and incur all this hazard, at a moment when I am -prepared to show you that your general Alkibiadês is one of the -profaners of the holy mysteries, in a private house. Pass a vote of -impunity, and I will produce to you forthwith a slave of one here -present, who, though himself not initiated in the mysteries, shall -repeat to you what they are. Deal with me in any way you choose, -if my statement prove untrue.” While Alkibiadês strenuously denied -the allegation, the prytanes—senators presiding over the assembly, -according to the order determined by lot for that year among the ten -tribes—at once made proclamation for all uninitiated citizens to -depart from the assembly, and went to fetch the slave—Andromachus by -name—whom Pythonikus had indicated. On being introduced, Andromachus -deposed before the assembly that he had been with his master in the -house of Polytion, when Alkibiadês, Nikiadês, and Melêtus, went -through the sham celebration of the mysteries; many other persons -being present, and especially three other slaves besides himself. We -must presume that he verified this affirmation by describing what -the mysteries were which he had seen, the test which Pythonikus had -offered.[261] - - [260] Andokidês (De Myster. s. 11) marks this time minutely—Ἦν - μὲν γὰρ ἐκκλησία τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τοῖς εἰς Σικελίαν, Νικίᾳ καὶ - Λαμάχῳ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, καὶ τριήρης ἡ στρατηγὶς ἤδη ἐξώρμει ἡ - Λαμάχου· ἀναστὰς δὲ Πυθόνικος ἐν τῷ δήμῳ εἶπεν, etc. - - [261] Andokid. de Myster. s. 11-13. - -Such was the first direct attack made upon Alkibiadês by his enemies. -Pythonikus, the demagogue Androklês, and other speakers, having -put in evidence this irreverent proceeding,—probably in substance -true,—enlarged upon it with the strongest invective, imputed to him -many other acts of the like character, and even denounced him as -cognizant of the recent mutilation of the Hermæ. All had been done, -they said, with a view to accomplish his purpose of subverting the -democracy, when bereft of its divine protectors; a purpose manifested -by the constant tenor of his lawless, overbearing, antipopular -demeanor. Infamous as this calumny was, so far as regarded the -mutilation of the Hermæ,—for whatever else Alkibiadês may have done, -of that act he was unquestionably innocent, being the very person -who had most to lose by it, and whom it ultimately ruined,—they -calculated upon the reigning excitement to get it accredited, and -probably to procure his deposition from the command, preparatory -to public trial. But in spite of all the disquietude arising from -the recent sacrilege, their expectations were defeated. The -strenuous denial of Alkibiadês, aided by his very peculiar position -as commander of the armament, as well as by the reflection that -the recent outrage tended rather to spoil his favorite projects in -Sicily, found general credence. The citizens enrolled to serve, -manifested strong disposition to stand by him; the allies from Argos -and Mantineia were known to have embraced the service chiefly at his -instigation; the people generally had become familiar with him as -the intended conqueror in Sicily, and were loth to be balked of this -project. From all these circumstances, his enemies, finding little -disposition to welcome the accusations which they preferred, were -compelled to postpone them until a more suitable time.[262] - - [262] Thucyd. vi, 29. Isokratês (Orat. xvi, De Bigis, sects. 7, - 8) represents these proceedings before the departure for Sicily, - in a very inaccurate manner. - -But Alkibiadês saw full well the danger of having such charges -hanging over his head, and the peculiar advantage which he derived -from his accidental position at the moment. He implored the people -to investigate the charges at once; proclaiming his anxiety to -stand trial and even to suffer death, if found guilty,—accepting -the command only in case he should be acquitted,—and insisting -above all things on the mischief to the city, of sending him on -such an expedition with the charge undecided, as well as on the -hardship to himself, of being aspersed by calumny during his absence, -without power of defence. Such appeals, just and reasonable in -themselves, and urged with all the vehemence of a man who felt that -the question was one of life or death to his future prospects, were -very near prevailing. His enemies could only defeat them by the -trick of putting up fresh speakers, less notorious for hostility -to Alkibiadês. These men affected a tone of candor, deprecated the -delay which would be occasioned in the departure of the expedition, -if he were put upon his trial forthwith, and proposed deferring the -trial until a certain number of days after his return.[263] Such was -the determination ultimately adopted; the supporters of Alkibiadês -probably not fully appreciating its consequences, and conceiving -that the speedy departure of the expedition was advisable even for -his interest, as well as agreeable to their own feelings. And thus -his enemies, though baffled in their first attempt to bring on his -immediate ruin, carried a postponement which insured to them leisure -for thoroughly poisoning the public mind against him, and choosing -their own time for his trial. They took care to keep back all farther -accusation until he and the armament had departed.[264] - - [263] Thucyd. vi, 29. Οἱ δ’ ἐχθροὶ, δεδιότες τό τε στράτευμα, - μὴ εὔνουν ἔχῃ, ἢν ἤδη ἀγωνίζηται, ὅ τε δῆμος μὴ μαλακίζηται, - θεραπεύων ὅτι δι’ ἐκεῖνον οἵ τ’ Ἀργεῖοι ξυνεστράτευον καὶ τῶν - Μαντινέων τινες, ἀπέτρεπον καὶ ἀπέσπευδον, ~ἄλλους ῥήτορας - ἐνιέντες~, οἳ ἔλεγον νῦν μὲν πλεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ κατασχεῖν τὴν - ἀγωγὴν, ἐλθόντα δὲ κρίνεσθαι ἐν ἡμέραις ῥηταῖς, βουλόμενοι - ἐκ μείζονος διαβολῆς, ἣν ἔμελλον ῥᾷον αὐτοῦ ἀπόντος ποριεῖν, - μετάπεμπτον κομισθέντα αὐτὸν ἀγωνίσασθαι. - - Compare Plutarch, Alkib. c. 19. - - [264] The account which Andokidês gives of the first accusation - against Alkibiadês by Pythonikus, in the assembly, prior to - the departure of the fleet, presents the appearance of being - substantially correct, and I have followed it in the text. It - is in harmony with the more brief indications of Thucydidês. - But when Andokidês goes on to say, that “in consequence of this - information, Polystratus was seized and put to death, while the - rest of the parties denounced fled, and were condemned to death - in their absence,” (sect. 13,) this cannot be true. Alkibiadês - most certainly did not flee, and was not condemned at _that - time_. If Alkibiadês was not then tried, neither could the other - persons have been tried, who were denounced as his accomplices in - the same offence. My belief is that this information, having been - first presented by the enemies of Alkibiadês before the sailing - of the fleet, was dropped entirely for that time, both against - him and against his accomplices. It was afterwards resumed, when - the information of Andokidês himself had satisfied the Athenians - on the question of the Hermokopids: and the impeachment presented - by Thessalus son of Kimon against Alkibiadês, was founded, in - part at least, upon the information presented by Andromachus. - - If Polystratus was put to death at all, it could only have been - on this second bringing forward of the charge, at the time when - Alkibiadês was sent for and refused to come home. But we may - well doubt whether he was put to death at that time or on that - ground, when we see how inaccurate the statement of Andokidês - is as to the consequences of the information of Andromachus. He - mentions Panætius as one of those who fled in consequence of that - information, and were condemned in their absence: but Panætius - appears afterwards, in the very same speech, as _not_ having - fled at that time (sects. 13, 52, 67). Harpokration states (v. - Πολύστρατος), on the authority of an oration ascribed to Lysias, - that Polystratus was put to death on the charge of having been - concerned in the mutilation of the Hermæ. This is quite different - from the statement of Andokidês, and would lead us to suppose - that Polystratus was one of those against whom Andokidês himself - informed. - -The spectacle of its departure was indeed so imposing, and the moment -so full of anxious interest, that it banished even the recollection -of the recent sacrilege. The entire armament was not mustered at -Athens; for it had been judged expedient to order most of the allied -contingents to rendezvous at once at Korkyra. But the Athenian force -alone was astounding to behold. There were one hundred triremes, -sixty of which were in full trim for rapid nautical movement, while -the remaining forty were employed as transports for the soldiers. -There were fifteen hundred select citizen hoplites, chosen from -the general muster-roll, and seven hundred Thêtes, or citizens too -poor to be included in the muster-roll, who served as hoplites on -shipboard,—epibatæ, or marines,—each with a panoply furnished by the -state. To these must be added, five hundred Argeian and two hundred -and fifty Mantineian hoplites, paid by Athens and transported on -board Athenian ships.[265] The number of horsemen was so small, that -all were conveyed in a single horse transport. But the condition, -the equipment, the pomp both of wealth and force, visible in the -armament, was still more impressive than the number. At daybreak -on the day appointed, when all the ships were ready in Peiræus, -for departure, the military force was marched down in a body from -the city and embarked. They were accompanied by nearly the whole -population, metics and foreigners as well as citizens, so that the -appearance was that of a collective emigration, like the flight to -Salamis sixty-five years before. While the crowd of foreigners, -brought thither by curiosity, were amazed by the grandeur of the -spectacle, the citizens accompanying were moved by deeper and more -stirring anxieties. Their sons, brothers, relatives, and friends, -were just starting on the longest and largest enterprise which Athens -had ever undertaken; against an island extensive as well as powerful, -known to none of them accurately, and into a sea of undefined -possibilities; glory and profit on the one side, but hazards of -unassignable magnitude on the other. At this final parting, ideas -of doubt and danger became far more painfully present than they had -been in any of the preliminary discussions; and in spite of all -the reassuring effect of the unrivalled armament before them, the -relatives now separating at the water’s edge could not banish the -dark presentiment that they were bidding each other farewell for the -last time. - - [265] Thucyd. vi, 43; vii, 57. - -The moment immediately succeeding this farewell—when all the soldiers -were already on board, and the keleustês was on the point of -beginning his chant to put the rowers in motion—was peculiarly solemn -and touching. Silence having been enjoined and obtained by sound of -trumpet, both the crews in every ship and the spectators on shore -followed the voice of the herald in praying to the gods for success, -and in singing the pæan. On every deck were seen bowls of wine -prepared, out of which the officers and the epibatæ made libations, -with goblets of silver and gold. At length the final signal was -given, and the whole fleet quitted Peiræus in single file, displaying -the exuberance of their yet untried force by a race of speed as -far as Ægina.[266] Never in Grecian history was an invocation more -unanimous, emphatic, and imposing, addressed to the gods; never was -the refusing nod of Zeus more stern or peremptory. All these details, -given by Thucydidês, of the triumphant promise which now issued from -Peiræus, derive a painful interest from their contrast with the sad -issue which will hereafter be unfolded. - - [266] Thucyd. vi, 32; Diodor. xiii, 3. - -The fleet made straight for Korkyra, where the contingents of the -maritime allies, with the ships for burden and provisions, were found -assembled. The armament thus complete was passed in review, and found -to comprise one hundred and thirty-four triremes with two Rhodian -pentekonters; five thousand one hundred hoplites; four hundred and -eighty bowmen, eighty of them Kretan; seven hundred Rhodian slingers; -and one hundred and twenty Megarian exiles serving as light troops. -Of vessels of burden, in attendance with provisions, muniments of -war, bakers, masons, and carpenters, etc., the number was not less -than five hundred; besides which, there was a considerable number -of private trading-ships, following it voluntarily for purposes -of profit.[267] Three fast-sailing triremes were despatched in -advance to ascertain which of the cities in Italy and Sicily would -welcome the arrival of the armament; and especially to give notice -at Egesta, that the succor solicited was now on its way, requiring -at the same time that the money promised by the Egestæans should be -produced. Having then distributed by lot the armament into three -divisions, one under each of the generals, Nikias, Alkibiadês, and -Lamachus, they crossed the Ionic gulf from Korkyra to the Iapygian -promontory. - - [267] Thucyd. vi, 44. - -In their progress southward along the coast of Italy to Rhegium, they -met with a very cold reception from the various Grecian cities. None -would receive them within their walls or even sell them provisions -without. The utmost which they would grant was, the liberty of -taking moorings and of watering; and even thus much was denied to -them both at Tarentum and at the Epizephyrian Lokri. At Rhegium, -immediately on the Sicilian strait, though the town-gate was still -kept shut, they were so far more hospitably treated, that a market -of provisions was furnished to them, and they were allowed to encamp -in the sacred precinct of Artemis, not far from the walls. They -here hauled their ships ashore and took repose until the return of -the three scout-ships from Egesta; while the generals entered into -negotiation with the magistrates and people of Rhegium, endeavoring -to induce them to aid the armament in reëstablishing the dispossessed -Leontines, who were of common Chalkidian origin with themselves. But -the answer returned was discouraging. The Rhegines would promise -nothing more than neutrality, and coöperation in any course of policy -which it might suit the other Italian Greeks to adopt. Probably they, -as well as the other Italian Greeks, were astonished and intimidated -by the magnitude of the newly-arrived force, and desired to leave -themselves open latitude of conduct for the future, not without -mistrust of Athens and her affected forwardness for the restoration -of the Leontines. To the Athenian generals, however, such a negative -from Rhegium was an unwelcome disappointment; for that city had been -the ally of Athens in the last war, and they had calculated on the -operation of Chalkidic sympathies.[268] - - [268] Thucyd. vi, 44-46. - -It was not until after the muster of the Athenians at Korkyra, about -July 415 B.C., that the Syracusans became thoroughly convinced both -of their approach, and of the extent of their designs against -Sicily. Intimation had indeed reached Syracuse, from several -quarters, of the resolution taken by the Athenians in the preceding -March to assist Egesta and Leontini, and of the preparations going -on in consequence. There was, however, a prevailing indisposition -to credit such tidings. Nothing in the state of Sicily held out any -encouragement to Athenian ambition: the Leontines could give no aid, -the Egestæans very little, and that little at the opposite corner of -the island; while the Syracusans considered themselves fully able to -cope with any force which Athens was likely to send. Some derided -the intelligence as mere idle rumor; others anticipated, at most, -nothing more serious than the expedition sent from Athens ten years -before.[269] No one could imagine the new eagerness and obstinacy -with which she had just thrown herself into the scheme of Sicilian -conquest, nor the formidable armament presently about to start. -Nevertheless, the Syracusan generals thought it their duty to make -preparations, and strengthen the military condition of the state.[270] - - [269] Thucyd. vi, 32-35. Mr. Mitford observes: “It is not - specified by historians, but the account of Thucydidês makes - it evident, that there had been a revolution in the government - of Syracuse, or at least a great change in its administration, - since the oligarchical Leontines were admitted to the rights of - Syracusan citizens (ch. xviii, sect. iii, vol. iv, p. 46). The - democratical party now bore the sway,” etc. - - I cannot imagine upon what passage of Thucydidês Mr. Mitford - founds this conjecture, which appears to me pure fancy. He had - spoken of the government as a democracy before, he continues - to speak of it as a democracy now, in the same unaltered - vituperative strain. - - [270] Thucyd. vi, 41. τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπιμεμελήμεθα ἤδη, etc. - -Hermokratês, however, whose information was more complete, judged -these preparations insufficient, and took advantage of a public -assembly—held seemingly about the time that the Athenians were -starting from Peiræus—to impress such conviction on his countrymen, -as well as to correct their incredulity. He pledged his own credit -that the reports which had been circulated were not merely true, but -even less than the full truth; that the Athenians were actually on -their way, with an armament on the largest scale, and vast designs -of conquering all Sicily. While he strenuously urged that the city -should be put in immediate condition for repelling a most formidable -invasion, he deprecated all alarm as to the result, and held out the -firmest assurances of ultimate triumph. The very magnitude of the -approaching force would intimidate the Sicilian cities and drive -them into hearty defensive coöperation with Syracuse. Rarely indeed -did any large or distant expedition ever succeed in its object, as -might be seen from the failure of the Persians against Greece, by -which failure Athens herself had so largely profited. Preparations, -however, both effective and immediate, were indispensable; not merely -at home, but by means of foreign missions, to the Sicilian and -Italian Greeks, to the Sikels, and to the Carthaginians, who had for -some time been suspicious of the unmeasured aggressive designs of -Athens, and whose immense wealth would now be especially serviceable, -and to Lacedæmon and Corinth, for the purpose of soliciting aid in -Sicily, as well as renewed invasion of Attica. So confident did he -(Hermokratês) feel of their powers of defence, if properly organized, -that he would even advise the Syracusans with their Sicilian[271] -allies to put to sea at once, with all their naval force and two -months’ provisions, and to sail forthwith to the friendly harbor of -Tarentum, from whence they would be able to meet the Athenian fleet -and prevent it even from crossing the Ionic gulf from Korkyra. They -would thus show that they were not only determined on defence, but -even forward in coming to blows: the only way of taking down the -presumption of the Athenians, who now speculated upon Syracusan -lukewarmness, because they had rendered no aid to Sparta when she -solicited it at the beginning of the war. The Syracusans would -probably be able to deter or obstruct the advance of the expedition -until winter approached: in which case Nikias, the ablest of the -three generals, who was understood to have undertaken the scheme -against his own consent, would probably avail himself of the pretext -to return.[272] - - [271] Thucyd. vi, 34. Ὃ δὲ μάλιστα ἐγώ τε νομίζω ἐπίκαιρον, - ~ὑμεῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ ξύνηθες ἥσυχον ἥκιστ’ ἂν ὀξέως πείθοισθε~, ὅμως - εἰρήσεται. - - That “habitual quiescence” which Hermokratês here predicates of - his countrymen, forms a remarkable contrast with the restless - activity, and intermeddling carried even to excess, which - Periklês and Nikias deprecate in the Athenians (Thucyd. i, 144; - vi, 7). Both of the governments, however, were democratical. This - serves as a lesson of caution respecting general predications - about _all_ democracies; for it is certain that one democracy - differed in many respects from another. It may be doubted, - however, whether the attribute here ascribed by Hermokratês to - his countrymen was really deserved, to the extent which his - language implies. - - [272] Thucyd. vi, 33-36. - -Though these opinions of Hermokratês were espoused farther by -various other citizens in the assembly, the greater number of -speakers held an opposite language, and placed little faith in his -warnings. We have already noticed Hermokratês nine years before as -envoy of Syracuse and chief adviser at the congress of Gela,—then, -as now, watchful to bar the door against Athenian interference in -Sicily,—then, as now, belonging to the oligarchical party, and -of sentiments hostile to the existing democratical constitution; -but brave as well as intelligent in foreign affairs. A warm and -even angry debate arose upon his present speech.[273] Though there -was nothing, in the words of Hermokratês himself, disparaging -either to the democracy or to the existing magistrates, yet it -would seem that his partisans who spoke after him must have taken -up a more criminative tone, and must have exaggerated that which -he characterized as the “habitual quiescence” of the Syracusans, -into contemptible remissness and disorganization under those -administrators and generals, characterized as worthless, whom the -democracy preferred. Amidst the speakers, who, in replying to -Hermokratês and the others, indignantly repelled such insinuations -and retorted upon their authors, a citizen named Athenagoras was the -most distinguished. He was at this time the leading democratical -politician, and the most popular orator, in Syracuse.[274] - - [273] Thucyd. vi, 32-35. τῶν δὲ Συρακοσίων ὁ δῆμος ἐν πολλῇ πρὸς - ἀλλήλους ἔριδι ἦσαν, etc. - - [274] Thucyd. vi, 35. παρελθὼν δ’ αὐτοῖς Ἀθηναγόρας, ὃς δήμου τε - προστάτης ἦν καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πιθανώτατος τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἔλεγε - τοιάδε, etc. - - The position ascribed here to Athenagoras seems to be the same - as that which is assigned to Kleon at Athens—ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ’ - ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὢν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος, etc. (iv, 21). - - Neither δήμου προστάτης nor δημαγωγὸς, denotes any express - functions, or titular office (see the note of Dr. Arnold), at - least in these places. It is possible that there may have been - some Grecian town constitutions, in which there was an office - bearing that title: but this is a point which cannot be affirmed. - Nor would the words δήμου προστάτης always imply an equal degree - of power: the person so designated might have more power in one - town than in another. Thus in Megara (iv, 67) it seems that the - oligarchical party had recently been banished: the leaders of the - popular party had become the most influential men in the city. - See also iii, 70, Peithias at Korkyra. - -“Every one[275] (said he), except only cowards and bad citizens, must -wish that the Athenians _would_ be fools enough to come here and put -themselves into our power. The tales which you have just heard are -nothing better than fabrications, got up to alarm you; and I wonder -at the folly of these alarmists in fancying that their machinations -are not seen through.[276] You will be too wise to take measure of -the future from their reports: you will rather judge from what able -men, such as the Athenians, are likely to do. Be assured that they -will never leave behind them the Peloponnesians in menacing attitude, -to come hither and court a fresh war not less formidable: indeed, -I think they account themselves lucky that we, with our powerful -cities, have never come across to attack them. And if they _should_ -come, as it is pretended, they will find Sicily a more formidable foe -than Peloponnesus: nay, our own city alone will be a match for twice -the force which they can bring across. The Athenians, knowing all -this well enough, will mind their own business, in spite of all the -fictions which men on this side of the water conjure up, and which -they have already tried often before, sometimes even worse than on -the present occasion, in order to terrify you, and get themselves -nominated to the chief posts.[277] One of these days, I fear they -may even succeed, from our want of precautions beforehand. Such -intrigues leave but short moments of tranquillity to our city; they -condemn it to an intestine discord worse than foreign war, and have -sometimes betrayed it even to despots and usurpers. However, if you -will listen to me, I will try and prevent anything of this sort -at present; by simple persuasion to you, by chastisement to these -conspirators, and by watchful denunciation of the oligarchical party -generally. Let me ask, indeed, what is it that you younger nobles -covet? To get into command at your early age? The law forbids you, -because you are yet incompetent. Or, do you wish not to be under -equal laws with the many? But how can you pretend that citizens of -the same city should not have the same rights? Some one will tell -me[278] that democracy is neither intelligent nor just, and that -the rich are the persons best fitted to command. But I affirm, -first, that the people are the sum total, and the oligarchy merely -a fraction; next, that rich men are the best trustees of the -aggregate wealth existing in the community,—intelligent men, the -best counsellors,—and the multitude, the best qualified for hearing -and deciding after such advice. In a democracy, these functions, one -and all, find their proper place. But oligarchy, though imposing on -the multitude a full participation in all hazards, is not content -even with an exorbitant share in the public advantages, but grasps -and monopolizes the whole for itself.[279] This is just what you -young and powerful men are aiming at, though you will never be able -to keep it permanently in a city such as Syracuse. Be taught by me, -or at least alter your views, and devote yourselves to the public -advantage of our common city. Desist from practising, by reports such -as these, upon the belief of men who know you too well to be duped. -If even there be any truth in what you say, and if the Athenians _do_ -come, our city will repel them in a manner worthy of her reputation. -She will not take you at your word, and choose _you_ commanders, in -order to put the yoke upon her own neck. She will look for herself, -construe your communications for what they really mean, and, instead -of suffering you to talk her out of her free government, will take -effective precautions for maintaining it against you.” - - [275] Thucyd. vi, 36-40. I give the substance of what is ascribed - to Athenagoras by Thucydidês, without binding myself to the words. - - [276] Thucyd. vi, 36. τοὺς δ’ ἀγγέλλοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ - περιφόβους ὑμᾶς ποιοῦντας τῆς μὲν τόλμης οὐ θαυμάζω, τῆς δὲ - ἀξυνεσίας, εἰ μὴ οἴονται ἔνδηλοι εἶναι. - - [277] Thucyd. vi, 38. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι - γιγνώσκοντες, τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν, εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι, σῴζουσι, καὶ ἐνθένδε - ἄνδρες οὔτε ὄντα, οὔτε ἂν γενόμενα, λογοποιοῦσιν. Οὓς ἐγὼ οὐ - νῦν πρῶτον, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἐπίσταμαι, ἤτοι λόγοις γε τοιοῖσδε, καὶ - ἔτι τούτων κακουργοτέροις, ἢ ἔργοις, βουλομένους καταπλήξαντας - τὸ ὑμέτερον πλῆθος αὐτοὺς τῆς πόλεως ἄρχειν. Καὶ δέδοικα μέντοι - μήποτε πολλὰ πειρῶντες καὶ κατορθώσωσιν, etc. - - [278] Thucyd. vi, 39. φήσει τις δημοκρατίαν οὔτε ξυνετὸν οὔτ’ - ἴσον εἶναι, τοὺς δ’ ἔχοντας τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἄρχειν ἄριστα - βελτίστους. Ἐγὼ δέ φημι πρῶτα μὲν, δῆμον ξύμπαν ὠνομάσθαι, - ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ μέρος· ἔπειτα, ~φύλακας μὲν ἀρίστους εἶναι χρημάτων - τοὺς πλουσίους~, βουλεῦσαι δ’ ἂν βέλτιστα τοὺς ξυνετοὺς, κρῖναι - δ’ ἂν ἀκούσαντας ἄριστα τοὺς πολλούς· καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως καὶ κατὰ - μέρη καὶ ξύμπαντα ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ ἰσομοιρεῖν. - - Dr. Arnold translates φύλακας χρημάτων, “having the care of the - public purse,” as if it were φύλακας τῶν δημοσίων χρημάτων. But - it seems to me that the words carry a larger sense, and refer to - the private property of these rich men, not to their functions - as keepers of what was collected from taxation or tribute. - Looking at a rich man from the point of view of the public, he is - guardian of his own property until the necessities of the state - require that he should spend more or less of it for the public - defence or benefit: in the interim, he enjoys it as he pleases, - but he will for his own interest take care that the property - does not perish (compare vi, 9). This is the service which he - renders, _quatenus_, _rich man_, to the state; he may also serve - it in other ways, but that would be by means of his personal - qualities; thus he may, for example, be intelligent as well as - rich (ξυνετὸς as well as πλούσιος), and then he may serve the - state as _counsellor_, the second of the two categories named by - Athenagoras. What that orator is here negativing is, the better - title and superior fitness of the rich to exercise command, which - was the claim put forward in their behalf. And he goes on to - indicate what is their real position and service in a democracy; - that they are to enjoy the revenue, and preserve the capital, - of their wealth, subject to demands for public purposes when - necessary, but not to expect command, unless they are personally - competent. Properly speaking, that which he here affirms is true - of the small lots of property taken in the mass, as well as - of the large, and is one of the grounds of defence of private - property against communism. But the rich man’s property is an - appreciable item to the state, individually taken; moreover, he - is perpetually raising unjust pretensions to political power, - so that it becomes necessary to define how much he is really - entitled to. - - [279] Thucyd. vi, 39. Ὀλιγαρχία δὲ τῶν μὲν κινδύνων τοῖς - πολλοῖς μεταδίδωσι, τῶν δ’ ὠφελίμων οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ μόνον, ἀλλὰ - καὶ ξύμπαν ἀφελομένη ἔχει· ~ἃ ὑμῶν οἵ τε δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ νέοι - προθυμοῦνται~, ἀδύνατα ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει κατασχεῖν. - -Immediately after this vehement speech from Athenagoras, one of the -stratêgi who presided in the assembly interposed; permitting no -one else to speak, and abruptly closing the assembly, with these -few words: “We generals deprecate this interchange of personal -vituperation, and trust that the hearers present will not suffer -themselves to be biased by it. Let us rather take care, in reference -to the reports just communicated, that we be one and all in a -condition to repel the invader. And even should the necessity not -arise, there is no harm in strengthening our public force with -horses, arms, and the other muniments of war. _We_ generals shall -take upon ourselves the care and supervision of these matters, -as well as of the missions to neighboring cities, for procuring -information and for other objects. We have, indeed, already busied -ourselves for the purpose, and we shall keep you informed of what we -learn.” - -The language of Athenagoras, indicating much virulence of party -feeling, lets us somewhat into the real working of politics among -the Syracusan democracy. Athenagoras at Syracuse was like Kleon -at Athens, the popular orator of the city. But he was by no means -the most influential person, nor had he the principal direction of -public affairs. Executive and magisterial functions belonged chiefly -to Hermokratês and his partisans, the opponents of Athenagoras. -Hermokratês has already appeared as taking the lead at the congress -of Gela nine years before, and will be seen throughout the coming -period almost constantly in the same position; while the political -rank of Athenagoras is more analogous to that which we should call a -leader of opposition, a function of course suspended under pressing -danger, so that we hear of him no more. At Athens as at Syracuse, -the men who got to real power and handled the force and treasures of -the state, were chiefly of the rich families, often of oligarchical -sentiments, acquiescing in the democracy as an uncomfortable -necessity, and continually open to be solicited by friends or kinsmen -to conspire against it. Their proceedings were doubtless always -liable to the scrutiny, and their persons to the animadversion, of -the public assembly: hence arose the influence of the demagogue, -such as Athenagoras and Kleon, the bad side of whose character is so -constantly kept before the readers of Grecian history. By whatever -disparaging epithets such character may be surrounded, it is in -reality the distinguishing feature of a free government under all -its forms, whether constitutional monarchy or democracy. By the side -of the real political actors, who hold principal office and wield -personal powers, there are always abundant censors and critics,—some -better, others worse, in respect of honesty, candor, wisdom, or -rhetoric,—the most distinguished of whom acquires considerable -importance, though holding a function essentially inferior to that -of the authorized magistrate or general. - -We observe here, that Athenagoras, far from being inclined to push -the city into war, is averse to it, even beyond reasonable limit; -and denounces it as the interested policy of the oligarchical party. -This may show how little it was any constant interest or policy on -the part of the persons called demagogues, to involve their city -in unnecessary wars: a charge which has been frequently advanced -against them, because it so happens that Kleon, in the first half -of the Peloponnesian war, discountenanced the propositions of peace -between Athens and Sparta. We see by the harangue of Athenagoras -that the oligarchical party were the usual promoters of war: a fact -which we should naturally expect, seeing that the rich and great, in -most communities, have accounted the pursuit of military glory more -conformable to their dignity than any other career. At Syracuse, the -ascendency of Hermokratês was much increased by the invasion of the -Athenians, while Athenagoras does not again appear. The latter was -egregiously mistaken in his anticipations respecting the conduct of -Athens, though right in his judgment respecting her true political -interest. But it is very unsafe to assume that nations will always -pursue their true political interest, where present temptations -of ambition or vanity intervene. Positive information was in this -instance a surer guide than speculations _à priori_ founded upon -the probable policy of Athens. But that the imputations advanced by -Athenagoras against the oligarchical youth, of promoting military -organization with a view to their own separate interest, were not -visionary, may be seen by the analogous case of Argos, two or -three years before. The democracy of Argos, contemplating a more -warlike and aggressive policy, had been persuaded to organize and -train the select regiment of one thousand hoplites, chosen from the -oligarchical youth: within three years, this regiment subverted the -democratical constitution.[280] Now the persons, respecting whose -designs Athenagoras expresses so much apprehension, were exactly the -class at Syracuse corresponding to the select thousand at Argos. - - [280] See above, in this volume, chap. lvi. - -The political views, proclaimed in this remarkable speech, are -deserving of attention, though we cannot fully understand it without -having before us those speeches to which it replies. Not only is -democratical constitution forcibly contrasted with oligarchy, but -the separate places which it assigns to wealth, intelligence, -and multitude, are laid down with a distinctness not unworthy of -Aristotle. - -Even before the debate here adverted to, the Syracusan generals -had evidently acted upon views more nearly approaching to those -of Hermokratês than to those of Athenagoras. Already alive to the -danger, they were apprized by their scouts when the Athenian armament -was passing from Korkyra to Rhegium, and pushed their preparations -with the utmost activity, distributing garrisons and sending envoys -among their Sikel dependencies, while the force within the city was -mustered and placed under all the conditions of war.[281] The halt -of the Athenians at Rhegium afforded increased leisure for such -equipment. That halt was prolonged for more than one reason. In the -first place, Nikias and his colleagues wished to negotiate with the -Rhegines, as well as to haul ashore and clean their ships: next, they -awaited the return of the three scout-ships from Egesta: lastly, they -had as yet formed no plan of action in Sicily. - - [281] Thucyd. vi, 45. - -The ships from Egesta returned with disheartening news. Instead of -the abundant wealth which had been held forth as existing in that -town, and upon which the resolutions of the Athenians as to Sicilian -operations had been mainly grounded, it turned out that no more than -thirty talents in all could be produced. What was yet worse, the -elaborate fraud, whereby the Egestæans had duped the commissioners -on their first visit, was now exposed; and these commissioners, on -returning to Rhegium from their second visit, were condemned to the -mortification of proclaiming their own credulity, visited by severe -taunts and reproaches from the army. Disappointed in the source from -whence they had calculated on obtaining money,—for it appears that -both Alkibiadês and Lamachus had sincerely relied on the pecuniary -resources of Egesta, though Nikias was always mistrustful,—the -generals now discussed their plan of action. - -Nikias—availing himself of the fraudulent conduct on the part of -the Egestæan allies, now become palpable—wished to circumscribe his -range of operations within the rigorous letter of the vote which the -Athenian assembly had passed. He proposed to sail at once against -Selinus; then, formally to require the Egestæans to provide the -means of maintaining the armament, or, at least, of maintaining -those sixty triremes which they themselves had solicited. Since this -requisition would not be realized, he would only tarry long enough to -obtain from the Selinuntines some tolerable terms of accommodation -with Egesta, and then return home; exhibiting, as they sailed along, -to all the maritime cities, this great display of Athenian naval -force. And while he would be ready to profit by any opportunity which -accident might present for serving the Leontines or establishing new -alliances, he strongly deprecated any prolonged stay in the island -for speculative enterprises, all at the cost of Athens.[282] - - [282] Thucyd. vi, 47; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 14. - -Against this scheme Alkibiadês protested, as narrow, timid, and -disgraceful to the prodigious force with which they had been -intrusted. He proposed to begin by opening negotiations with all -the other Sicilian Greeks,—especially Messênê, convenient both as -harbor for their fleet and as base of their military operations,—to -prevail upon them to coöperate against Syracuse and Selinus. With -the same view, he recommended establishing relations with the Sikels -of the interior, in order to detach such of them as were subjects -of Syracuse, as well as to insure supplies of provisions. As soon -as it had been thus ascertained what extent of foreign aid might be -looked for, he would open direct attack forthwith against Syracuse -and Selinus; unless, indeed, the former should consent to reëstablish -Leontini, and the latter to come to terms with Egesta.[283] - - [283] Thucyd. vi, 48. Οὕτως ἤδη Συρακούσαις καὶ Σελινοῦντι - ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢν μὴ οἱ μὲν Ἐγεσταίοις ξυμβαίνωσιν, οἱ δὲ Λεοντίνους - ἐῶσι κατοικίζειν. - -Lamachus, delivering his opinion last, dissented from both his -colleagues. He advised, that they should proceed at once, without -any delay, to attack Syracuse, and fight their battle under its -walls. The Syracusans, he urged, were now in terror and only -half-prepared for defence. Many of their citizens, and much -property, would be found still lingering throughout the neighboring -lands, not yet removed within the walls, and might thus be seized -for the subsistence of their army;[284] while the deserted town and -harbor of Megara, very near to Syracuse both by land and by sea, -might be occupied by the fleet as a naval station. The imposing -and intimidating effect of the armament, not less than its real -efficiency, was now at the maximum, immediately after its arrival. -If advantage were taken of this first impression to strike an -instant blow at their principal enemy, the Syracusans would be found -destitute of the courage, not less than of the means, to resist: but -the longer such attack was delayed, the more this first impression -of dismay would be effaced, giving place to a reactionary sentiment -of indifference and even contempt, when the much-dreaded armament -was seen to accomplish little or nothing. As for the other Sicilian -cities, nothing would contribute so much to determine their immediate -adhesion, as successful operations against Syracuse.[285] - - [284] Compare iv, 104, describing the surprise of Amphipolis by - Brasidas. - - [285] Thucyd. vi, 49. - -But Lamachus found no favor with either of the other two, and being -thus compelled to choose between the plans of Alkibiadês and Nikias, -gave his support to that of the former, which was the mean term -of the three. There can be no doubt—as far as it is becoming to -pronounce respecting that which never reached execution—that the plan -of Lamachus was far the best and most judicious; at first sight, -indeed, the most daring, but intrinsically the safest, easiest, and -speediest, that could be suggested. For undoubtedly the siege and -capture of Syracuse, was the one enterprise indispensable towards the -promotion of Athenian views in Sicily. The sooner that was commenced, -the more easily it would be accomplished: and its difficulties were -in many ways aggravated, in no way abated, by those preliminary -precautions upon which Alkibiadês insisted. Anything like delay -tended fearfully to impair the efficiency, real as well as reputed, -of an ancient aggressive armament, and to animate as well as to -strengthen those who stood on the defensive, a point on which we -shall find painful evidence presently. The advice of Lamachus, alike -soldier-like and far-sighted, would probably have been approved and -executed either by Brasidas or by Demosthenês; while the dilatory -policy still advocated by Alkibiadês, even after the suggestion of -Lamachus had been started, tends to show that if he was superior in -military energy to one of his colleagues, he was not less inferior to -the other. Indeed, when we find him talking of besieging Syracuse, -_unless_ the Syracusans would consent to the reëstablishment of -Leontini, it seems probable that he had not yet made up his mind -peremptorily to besiege the city at all; a fact completely at -variance with those unbounded hopes of conquest which he is reported -as having conceived even at Athens. It is possible that he may have -thought it impolitic to contradict too abruptly the tendencies of -Nikias, who, anxious as he was chiefly to find some pretext for -carrying back his troops unharmed, might account the proposition -of Lamachus too desperate even to be discussed. Unfortunately, the -latter, though the ablest soldier of the three, was a poor man, of -no political position, and little influence among the hoplites. Had -he possessed, along with his own straightforward military energy, -the wealth and family ascendency of either of his colleagues, the -achievements as well as the fate of this splendid armament would have -been entirely altered, and the Athenians would have entered Syracuse -not as prisoners but as conquerors. - -Alkibiadês, as soon as his plan had become adopted by means of the -approval of Lamachus, sailed across the strait in his own trireme -from Rhegium to Messênê. Though admitted personally into the city, -and allowed to address the public assembly, he could not induce -them to conclude any alliance, or to admit the armament to anything -beyond a market of provisions without the walls. He accordingly -returned back to Rhegium, from whence he and one of his colleagues -immediately departed with sixty triremes for Naxos. The Naxians -cordially received the armament, which then steered southward along -the coast of Sicily to Katana. In the latter place the leading men -and the general sentiment were at this time favorable to Syracuse, -so that the Athenians, finding admittance refused, were compelled -to sail farther southward and take their night-station at the mouth -of the river Terias. On the ensuing day they made sail with their -ships in single column immediately in front of Syracuse itself, -while an advanced squadron of ten triremes were even despatched into -the Great Harbor, south of the town, for the purpose of surveying on -this side the city with its docks and fortifications, and for the -farther purpose of proclaiming from shipboard by the voice of the -herald: “The Leontines now in Syracuse are hereby invited to come -forth without apprehension and join their friends and benefactors, -the Athenians.” After this empty display, they returned back to -Katana.[286] - - [286] Thucyd. vi, 50. - -We may remark that this proceeding was completely at variance with -the judicious recommendation of Lamachus. It tended to familiarize -the Syracusans with the sight of the armament piece-meal, without any -instant action, and thus to abate in their minds the terror-striking -impression of its first arrival. - -At Katana, Alkibiadês personally was admitted into the town, and -allowed to open his case before the public assembly, as he had -been at Messênê. Accident alone enabled him to carry his point, -for the general opinion was averse to his propositions. While most -of the citizens were in the assembly listening to his discourse, -some Athenian soldiers without, observing a postern-gate carelessly -guarded, broke it open and showed themselves in the market-place. -The town was thus in the power of the Athenians, so that the leading -men who were friends of Syracuse thought themselves lucky to escape -in safety, while the general assembly came to a resolution accepting -the alliance proposed by Alkibiadês.[287] The whole Athenian armament -was now conducted from Rhegium to Katana, which was established -as head-quarters. Intimation was farther received from a party -at Kamarina, that the city might be induced to join them, if the -armament showed itself: accordingly, the whole armament proceeded -thither, and took moorings off the shore, while a herald was sent -up to the city. But the Kamarinæans declined to admit the army, and -declared that they would abide by the existing treaty; which bound -them to receive at any time one single ship, but no more, unless they -themselves should ask for it. The Athenians were therefore obliged -to return to Katana. Passing by Syracuse both going and returning, -they ascertained the falsehood of a report that the Syracusans were -putting a naval force afloat; moreover, they landed near the city -and ravaged some of the neighboring lands. The Syracusan cavalry and -light troops soon appeared, and a skirmish with trifling loss ensued, -before the invaders retired to their ships,[288] the first blood shed -in this important struggle, and again at variance with the advice of -Lamachus. - - [287] Polyænus (i, 40, 4) treats this acquisition of Katana as - the result, not of accident, but of a preconcerted plot. I follow - the account as given by Thucydidês. - -Serious news awaited them on their return to Katana. They found -the public ceremonial trireme, called the Salaminian, just arrived -from Athens, the bearer of a formal resolution of the assembly, -requiring Alkibiadês to come home and stand his trial for various -alleged matters of irreligion combined with treasonable purposes. A -few other citizens specified by name were commanded to come along -with him under the same charge; but the trierarch of the Salaminian -was especially directed to serve him only with the summons, without -any guard or coercion, so that he might return home in his own -trireme.[289] - - [288] Thucyd. vi, 52. - - [289] Thucyd. vi. 53-61. - -This summons, pregnant with momentous results both to Athens and to -her enemies, arose out of the mutilation of the Hermæ, described a -few pages back, and the inquiries instituted into the authorship -of that deed, since the departure of the armament. The extensive -and anxious sympathies connected with so large a body of departing -citizens, combined with the solemnity of the scene itself, had for -the moment suspended the alarm caused by that sacrilege; but it -speedily revived, and the people could not rest without finding out -by whom the deed had been done. Considerable rewards, one thousand -and even ten thousand drachms, were proclaimed to informers; of whom -others soon appeared, in addition to the slave Andromachus, before -mentioned. A metic named Teukrus had fled from Athens, immediately -after the event, to Megara, from whence he sent intimation to the -senate at Athens that he had himself been a party concerned in the -recent sacrilege concerning the mysteries, as well as cognizant of -the mutilation of the Hermæ, and that, if impunity were guaranteed -to him, he would come back and give full information. A vote of -the senate was immediately passed to invite him. He denounced by -name eleven persons as having been concerned, jointly with himself, -in the mock-celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries, and eighteen -different persons, himself not being one, as the violators of the -Hermæ. A woman named Agaristê, daughter of Alkmæonidês,—these names -bespeak her great rank and family in the city,—deposed farther that -Alkibiadês, Axiochus, and Adeimantus, had gone through a parody of -the mysteries in a similar manner, in the house of Charmidês. And -lastly Lydus, slave of a citizen named Phereklês, stated that the -like scene had been enacted in the house of his master in the deme -Thêmakus, giving the names of the parties present, one of whom—though -asleep, and unconscious of what was passing—he stated to be Leogoras, -the father of Andokidês.[290] Of the parties named in these different -depositions, the greater number seem to have fled from the city at -once; but all who remained were put into prison to stand future -trial.[291] Those informers received the promised rewards, after -some debate as to the parties entitled to receive the reward; for -Pythonikus, the citizen who had produced the slave Andromachus, -pretended to the first claim, while Androkles, one of the senators, -contended that the senate collectively ought to receive[292] the -money; a strange pretension, which we do not know how he justified. -At last, however, at the time of the Panathenaic festival, -Andromachus the slave received the first reward of ten thousand -drachms; Teukrus the metic, the second reward of one thousand drachms. - - [290] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 14, 15, 35. In reference to - the deposition of Agaristê, Andokidês again includes Alkibiadês - among those who fled into banishment in consequence of it. Unless - we are to suppose another Alkibiadês, not the general in Sicily, - this statement cannot be true. There was another Alkibiadês, - of the deme Phegus: but Andokidês in mentioning him afterwards - (sect. 65), specifies his deme. He was cousin of Alkibiadês, and - was in exile at the same time with him (Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 13). - - [291] Andokidês (sects. 13-34) affirms that some of the persons, - accused by Teukrus as mutilators of the Hermæ, were put to death - upon his deposition. But I contest his accuracy on this point. - For Thucydidês recognizes no one as having been put to death - except those against whom Andokidês himself informed (see vi, - 27, 53, 61). He dwells particularly upon the number of persons, - and persons of excellent character, imprisoned on suspicion; - but he mentions none as having been put to death except those - against whom Andokidês gave testimony. He describes it as a - great harshness, and as an extraordinary proof of the reigning - excitement, that the Athenians should have detained so many - persons upon suspicion, on the evidence of informers not entitled - to credence. But he would not have specified this detention as - extraordinary harshness, if the Athenians had gone so far as to - put individuals to death upon the same evidence. Besides, to put - these men to death would have defeated their own object, the - full and entire disclosure of the plot and the conspirators. - The ignorance in which they were of their internal enemies, was - among the most agonizing of all their sentiments; and to put any - prisoner to death until they arrived, or believed themselves to - have arrived, at the knowledge of the whole, would tend so far - to bar their own chance of obtaining evidence: ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὁ τῶν - Ἀθηναίων ἄσμενος λαβὼν, ὡς ᾤετο, τὸ σαφὲς, καὶ δεινὸν ποιούμενοι - πρότερον εἰ τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας σφῶν τῷ πλήθει μὴ εἴσονται, etc. - - Wachsmuth says (p. 194): “The bloodthirsty dispositions of the - people had been excited by the previous murders: the greater the - number of victims to be slaughtered, the better were the people - pleased,” etc. This is an inaccuracy quite in harmony with the - general spirit of his narrative. It is contradicted, implicitly, - by the very words of Thucydidês which he transcribes in his note - 108. - - [292] Andokid. de Mysteriis, sects. 27-28. καὶ Ἀνδροκλῆς ~ὑπὲρ~ - τῆς βουλῆς. - -A large number of citizens, many of them of the first consideration -in the city, were thus either lying in prison or had fled into -exile. But the alarm, the agony, and the suspicion, in the public -mind, went on increasing rather than diminishing. The information -hitherto received had been all partial, and, with the exception of -Agaristê, all the informants had been either slaves or metics, not -citizens; while Teukrus, the only one among them who had stated -anything respecting the mutilation of the Hermæ, did not profess to -be a party concerned, or to know all those who were.[293] The people -had heard only a succession of disclosures, all attesting a frequency -of irreligious acts, calculated to insult and banish the local gods -who protected their country and constitution; all indicating that -there were many powerful citizens bent on prosecuting such designs, -interpreted as treasonable, yet none communicating any full or -satisfactory idea of the Hermokopid plot, of the real conspirators, -or of their farther purposes. The enemy was among themselves, -yet they knew not where to lay hands upon him. Amidst the gloomy -terrors, political blended with religious, which distracted their -minds, all the ancient stories of the last and worst oppressions of -the Peisistratid despots, ninety-five years before, became again -revived, and some new despots, they knew not who, seemed on the -point of occupying the acropolis. To detect the real conspirators, -was the only way of procuring respite from this melancholy paroxysm, -for which purpose the people were willing to welcome questionable -witnesses, and to imprison on suspicion citizens of the best -character, until the truth could be ascertained.[294] - - [293] Andokid. de Myster. sect. 36. It seems that Diognêtus, who - had been commissioner of inquiry at the time when Pythonikus - presented the first information of the slave Andromachus, was - himself among the parties denounced by Teukrus (And. de Mys. - sects. 14, 15). - - [294] Thucyd. vi, 53-60. οὐ δοκιμάζοντες τοὺς μηνυτὰς, ἀλλὰ - πάντας ὑπόπτως ἀποδεχόμενοι, διὰ πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων πίστιν πάνυ - χρηστοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν ξυλλαμβάνοντες κατέδουν, χρησιμώτερον - ἡγούμενοι εἶναι βασανίσαι τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ εὑρεῖν, ἢ διὰ μηνυτοῦ - πονηρίαν τινὰ καὶ χρηστὸν δοκοῦντα εἶναι αἰτιαθέντα ἀνέλεγκτον - διαφυγεῖν.... - - ... δεινὸν ποιούμενοι, εἰ τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας σφῶν τῷ πλήθει μὴ - εἴσονται.... - -The public distraction was aggravated by Peisander and Chariklês, who -acted as commissioners of investigation, furious and unprincipled -politicians,[295] at that time professing exaggerated attachment to -the democratical constitution, though we shall find both of them -hereafter among the most unscrupulous agents in its subversion. These -men loudly proclaimed that the facts disclosed indicated the band of -Hermokopid conspirators to be numerous, with an ulterior design of -speedily putting down the democracy; and they insisted on pressing -their investigations until full discovery should be attained. And -the sentiment of the people, collectively taken, responded to this -stimulus; though individually, every man was so afraid of becoming -himself the next victim arrested, that when the herald convoked the -senate for the purpose of receiving informations, the crowd in the -market-place straightway dispersed. - - [295] Andokid. de Myst. sect. 36. - -It was amidst such eager thirst for discovery, that a new informer -appeared, Diokleidês, who professed to communicate some material -facts connected with the mutilation of the Hermæ, affirming that the -authors of it were three hundred in number. He recounted that, on -the night on which that incident occurred, he started from Athens -to go to the mines of Laureion; wherein he had a slave working on -hire, on whose account he was to receive pay. It was full moon, and -the night was so bright that he began his journey mistaking it for -daybreak.[296] On reaching the propylæum of the temple of Dionysus, -he saw a body of men about three hundred in number descending -from the Odeon towards the public theatre. Being alarmed at this -unexpected sight, he concealed himself behind a pillar, from whence -he had leisure to contemplate this body of men, who stood for some -time conversing together, in groups of fifteen or twenty each, and -then dispersed: the moon was so bright that he could discern the -faces of most of them. As soon as they had dispersed, he pursued -his walk to Laureion, from whence he returned next day, and learned -to his surprise that during the night the Hermæ had been mutilated; -also, that commissioners of inquiry had been named, and the reward -of ten thousand drachms proclaimed for information. Impressed at -once with the belief that the nocturnal crowd whom he had seen were -authors of the deed, he happened soon afterwards to see one of -them, Euphêmus, sitting in the workshop of a brazier, and took him -aside to the neighboring temple of Hephæstus, where he mentioned in -confidence that he had seen the party at work and could denounce -them, but that he preferred being paid for silence, instead of giving -information and incurring private enmities. Euphêmus thanked him for -the warning, desiring him to come next day to the house of Leogoras -and his son Andokidês, where he would see them as well as the other -parties concerned. Andokidês and the rest offered to him, under -solemn covenant, the sum of two talents, or twelve thousand drachms, -thus overbidding the reward of ten thousand drachms proclaimed by the -senate to any truth-telling informer, with admission to a partnership -in the benefits of their conspiracy, supposing that it should -succeed. Upon his reply that he would consider the proposition, they -desired him to meet them at the house of Kallias son of Têleklês, -brother-in-law of Andokidês: which meeting accordingly took place, -and a solemn bargain was concluded in the acropolis. Andokidês and -his friends engaged to pay the two talents to Diokleidês at the -beginning of the ensuing month, as the price of his silence. But -since this engagement was never performed, Diokleidês came with his -information to the senate.[297] - - [296] Plutarch (Alkib. c. 20) and Diodorus (xiii, 2) assert - that this testimony was glaringly false, since on the night in - question it was _new moon_. I presume, at least, that the remark - of Diodorus refers to the deposition of Diokleidês, though he - never mentions the name of the latter, and even describes the - deposition referred to with many material variations as compared - with Andokidês. Plutarch’s observation certainly refers to - Diokleidês, whose deposition, he says, affirming that he had seen - and distinguished the persons in question by the light of the - moon, on a night when it was _new_ moon, shocked all sensible - men, but produced no effect upon the blind fury of the people. - Wachsmuth (Hellenisch. Alterth. vol. ii, ch. viii, p. 194) copies - this remark from Plutarch. - - I disbelieve altogether the assertion that it was _new moon_ on - that night. Andokidês gives in great detail the deposition of - Diokleidês, with a strong wish to show that it was false and - perfidiously got up. But he nowhere mentions the fact that it was - _new moon_ on the night in question; though if we read his report - and his comments upon the deposition of Diokleidês, we shall see - that he never could have omitted such a means of discrediting the - whole tale, if the fact had been so (Andokid. de Myster. sects. - 37-43). Besides, it requires very good positive evidence to make - us believe, that a suborned informer, giving his deposition not - long after one of the most memorable nights that ever passed at - Athens, would be so clumsy as to make particular reference to the - circumstance that it was _full moon_ (εἶναι δὲ πανσέληνον), if it - had really been _new moon_. - - [297] Andokid. de Myster. sects. 37-42. - -Such—according to the report of Andokidês—was the story of this -informer, which he concluded by designating forty-two individuals, -out of the three hundred whom he had seen. The first names whom -he specified were those of Mantitheus and Aphepsion, two senators -actually sitting among his audience. Next came the remaining forty, -among whom were Andokidês and many of his nearest relatives, his -father Leogoras, his first or second cousins and brother-in-law, -Charmidês, Taureas, Nisæus, Kalias son of Alkmæon, Phrynichus, -Eukratês (brother of Nikias the commander in Sicily), and Kritias. -But as there were a still greater number of names—assuming the -total of three hundred to be correct—which Diokleidês was unable -to specify, the commissioner Peisander proposed that Mantitheus -and Aphepsion should be at once seized and tortured, in order to -force them to disclose their accomplices; the psephism passed in -the archonship of Skamandrius, whereby it was unlawful to apply -the torture to any free Athenian, being first abrogated. Illegal, -not less than cruel, as this proposition was, the senate at first -received it with favor. But Mantitheus and Aphepsion, casting -themselves as suppliants upon the altar in the senate-house, pleaded -so strenuously for their rights as citizens, to be allowed to put -in bail and stand trial before the dikastery, that this was at last -granted.[298] No sooner had they provided their sureties, than they -broke their covenant, mounted their horses, and deserted to the -enemy, without any regard to their sureties, who were exposed by law -to the same trial and the same penalties as would have overtaken the -offenders themselves. This sudden flight, together with the news that -a Bœotian force was assembled on the borders of Attica, exasperated -still farther the frantic terror of the public mind. The senate -at once took quiet measures for seizing and imprisoning all the -remaining forty whose names had been denounced; while by concert with -the strategi, all the citizens were put under arms; those who dwelt -in the city, mustering in the market-place; those in and near the -long walls, in the Theseium; those in Peiræus, in the square called -the Market-place of Hippodamus. Even the horsemen of the city were -convoked by sound of trumpet in the sacred precinct of the Anakeion. -The senate itself remained all night in the acropolis, except the -prytanes, or fifty senators of the presiding tribe, who passed the -night in the public building called the Tholus. Every man in Athens -felt the terrible sense of an internal conspiracy on the point of -breaking out, perhaps along with an invasion of the foreigner, -prevented only by the timely disclosure of Diokleidês, who was hailed -as the saviour of the city, and carried in procession to dinner at -the prytaneium.[299] - - [298] Considering the extreme alarm which then pervaded the - Athenian mind, and their conviction that there were traitors - among themselves whom yet they could not identify, it is to be - noted as remarkable that they resisted the proposition of their - commissioners for applying torture. We must recollect that the - Athenians admitted the principle of the torture, as a good mode - of eliciting truth as well as of testing depositions,—for they - applied it often to the testimony of slaves,—sometimes apparently - to that of metics. Their attachment to the established law, which - forbade the application of it to citizens, must have been very - great, to enable them to resist the great special and immediate - temptation to apply it in this case to Mantitheus and Aphepsion, - if only by way of exception. - - The application of torture to witnesses and suspected persons, - handed down from the Roman law, was in like manner recognized, - and pervaded nearly all the criminal jurisprudence of Europe - until the last century. I hope that the reader, after having gone - through the painful narrative of the proceedings of the Athenians - after the mutilation of the Hermæ, will take the trouble to - peruse by way of comparison the _Storia della Colonna Infame_, by - the eminent Alexander Manzoni, author of “I Promessi Sposi.” This - little volume, including a republication of Verri’s “Osservazioni - sulla Tortura,” is full both of interest and instruction. It - lays open the judicial enormities committed at Milan in 1630, - while the terrible pestilence was raging there, by the examining - judges and the senate, in order to get evidence against certain - suspected persons called _Untori_; that is, men who were firmly - believed by the whole population, with very few exceptions, to - be causing and propagating the pestilence by means of certain - ointment which they applied to the doors and walls of houses. - Manzoni recounts with simple, eloquent, and impressive detail, - the incredible barbarity with which the official lawyers at - Milan, under the authority of the senate, extorted, by force of - torture, evidence against several persons, of having committed - this imaginary and impossible crime. The persons thus convicted - were executed under horrible torments: the house of one of them, - a barber named Mora, was pulled down, and a pillar with an - inscription erected upon the site, to commemorate the deed. This - pillar, the _Colonna Infame_, remained standing in Milan until - the close of the 18th century. The reader will understand, from - Manzoni’s narrative, the degree to which public excitement and - alarm can operate to poison and barbarize the course of justice - in a Christian city, without a taint of democracy, and with - professional lawyers and judges to guide the whole procedure - secretly, as compared with a pagan city, ultra-democratical, - where judicial procedure as well as decision was all oral, - public, and multitudinous. - - [299] Andokid. de Myst. sects. 41-46. - -Miserable as the condition of the city was generally, yet more -miserable was that of the prisoners confined; and worse, in every -way, was still to be looked for, since the Athenians would know -neither peace nor patience until they could reach, by some means -or other, the names of the undisclosed conspirators. The female -relatives and children of Andokidês, and his companions, were by -permission along with them in the prison,[300] aggravating by their -tears and wailings the affliction of the scene, when Charmidês, one -of the parties confined, addressed himself to Andokidês, as his -cousin and friend, imploring him to make a voluntary disclosure of -all that he knew, in order to preserve the lives of so many innocent -persons, his immediate kinsmen, as well as to rescue the city out -of a feverish alarm not to be endured. “You know (he said) all that -passed about the mutilation of the Hermæ, and your silence will now -bring destruction not only upon yourself, but also upon your father -and upon all of us; while if you inform, whether you have been an -actor in the scene or not, you will obtain impunity for yourself -and us, and at the same time soothe the terrors of the city.” Such -instances on the part of Charmidês,[301] aided by the supplications -of the other prisoners present, overcame the reluctance of Andokidês -to become informer, and he next day made his disclosures to the -senate. “Euphilêtus (he said) was the chief author of the mutilation -of the Hermæ. He proposed the deed at a convivial party where I was -present, but I denounced it in the strongest manner and refused all -compliance. Presently, I broke my collar-bone, and injured my head, -by a fall from a young horse, so badly as to be confined to my bed; -when Euphilêtus took the opportunity of my absence to assure the rest -of the company falsely that I had consented, and that I had agreed -to cut the Hermes near my paternal house, which the tribe Ægeïs -have dedicated. Accordingly, they executed the project, while I was -incapable of moving, without my knowledge: they presumed that _I_ -would undertake the mutilation of this particular Hermes, and you see -that this is the only one in all Athens which has escaped injury. -When the conspirators ascertained that I had not been a party, -Euphilêtus and Melêtus threatened me with a terrible revenge unless I -observed silence: to which I replied that it was not I, but their own -crime, which had brought them into danger.” - - [300] Andokid. de Myst. sect. 48: compare Lysias, Orat. xiii, - cont. Agorat. sect. 42. - - [301] Plutarch (Alkib. c. 21) states that the person who thus - addressed himself to, and persuaded Andokidês, was named Timæus. - From whom he got the latter name, we do not know. - -Having recounted this tale, in substance, to the senate, Andokidês -tendered his slaves, both male and female, to be tortured, in -order that they might confirm his story that he was in his bed and -unable to leave it, on the night when the Hermæ were mutilated. -It appears that the torture was actually applied (according to -the custom so cruelly frequent at Athens in the case of slaves), -and that the senators thus became satisfied of the truth of what -Andokidês affirmed. He delivered in twenty-two names of citizens as -having been the mutilators of the Hermæ: eighteen of these names, -including Euphilêtus and Melêtus, had already been specified in the -information of Teukrus; the remaining four, were Panætius, Diakritus, -Lysistratus, and Chæredêmus; all of whom fled, the instant their -names were mentioned, without waiting the chance of being seized. -As soon as the senate heard the story of Andokidês, they proceeded -to question Diokleidês over again; who confessed that he had given -a false deposition, and begged for mercy, mentioning Alkibiadês -the Phegusian—a relative of the commander in Sicily—and Amiantus, -as having suborned him to the crime. Both of them fled immediately -on this revelation; but Diokleidês was detained, sent before the -dikastery for trial, and put to death.[302] - - [302] The narrative, which I have here given in substance, is to - be found in Andokid. de Myst. sects. 48-66. - -The foregoing is the story which Andokidês, in the oration De -Mysteriis, delivered between fifteen and twenty years afterwards, -represented himself to have communicated to the senate at this -perilous crisis. But it probably is not the story which he really -did tell, certainly not that which his enemies represented him as -having told: least of all does it communicate the whole truth, or -afford any satisfaction to such anxiety and alarm as are described to -have been prevalent at the time. Nor does it accord with the brief -information of Thucydidês, who tells us that Andokidês impeached -himself, along with others, as participant in the mutilation.[303] -Among the accomplices against whom he informed, his enemies affirmed -that his own nearest relatives were included, though this latter -statement is denied by himself. We may be sure, therefore, that the -tale which Andokidês really told was something very different from -what now stands in his oration. But what it really was we cannot make -out; nor should we gain much even if it could be made out, since -even at the time, neither Thucydidês nor other intelligent critics -could determine how far it was true. The mutilation of the Hermæ -remained to them always an unexplained mystery; though they accounted -Andokidês the principal organizer.[304] - - [303] Thucyd. vi, 60. Καὶ ὁ μὲν ~αὐτός τε καθ’ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατ’ - ἄλλων~ μηνύει τὸ τῶν Ἑρμῶν, etc. - - To the same effect, see the hostile oration of Lysias contra - Andocidem, Or. vi, sects. 36, 37, 51: also Andokidês himself, De - Mysteriis, sect. 71; De Reditu, sect. 7. - - If we may believe the Pseudo-Plutarch (Vit. x, Orator, p. 834), - Andokidês had on a previous occasion been guilty of drunken - irregularity and damaging a statue. - - [304] Thucyd. vi, 60. ἐνταῦθα ἀναπείθεται ~εἷς τῶν δεδεμένων, - ὅσπερ ἐδόκει αἰτιώτατος εἶναι~, ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνδεσμωτῶν τινὸς, εἴτε - ἄρα καὶ τὰ ὄντα μηνῦσαι, εἴτε καὶ οὔ· ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα γὰρ εἰκάζεται· - τὸ δὲ σαφὲς οὐδεὶς οὔτε τότε οὔτε ὕστερον ἔχει εἰπεῖν περὶ τῶν - δρασάντων τὸ ἔργον. - - If the statement of Andokidês in the Oratio de Mysteriis is - correct, the deposition previously given by Teukrus the metic - must have been a true one; though this man is commonly denounced - among the lying witnesses (see the words of the comic writer - Phrynichus ap. Plutarch, Alkib. c. 20). - - Thucydidês refuses even to mention the name of Andokidês, and - expresses himself with more than usual reserve about this dark - transaction, as if he were afraid of giving offence to great - Athenian families. The bitter feuds which it left behind at - Athens, for years afterwards, are shown in the two orations - of Lysias and of Andokidês. If the story of Didymus be true, - that Thucydidês after his return from exile to Athens died by a - violent death (see Biogr. Thucyd. p. xvii. ed. Arnold), it would - seem probable that all his reserve did not protect him against - private enmities arising out of his historical assertions. - -That which is at once most important and most incontestable, is the -effect produced by the revelations of Andokidês, true or false, on -the public mind at Athens. He was a young man of rank and wealth -in the city, belonging to the sacred family of the Kerykes,—said -to trace his pedigree to the hero Odysseus,—and invested on a -previous occasion with an important naval command; whereas the -preceding informers had been metics and slaves. Moreover, he was -making confession of his own guilt. Hence the people received his -communications with implicit confidence. They were delighted to -have got to the bottom of the terrible mystery: and the public mind -subsided from its furious terrors into comparative tranquillity. -The citizens again began to think themselves in safety and to -resume their habitual confidence in each other, while the hoplites -everywhere on guard were allowed to return to their homes.[305] All -the prisoners in custody on suspicion, except those against whom -Andokidês informed were forthwith released: those who had fled out -of apprehension, were allowed to return; while those whom he named -as guilty, were tried, convicted, and put to death. Such of them as -had already fled, were condemned to death in their absence, and a -reward offered for their heads.[306] And though discerning men were -not satisfied with the evidence upon which these sentences were -pronounced, yet the general public fully believed themselves to have -punished the real offenders, and were thus inexpressibly relieved -from the depressing sense of unexpiated insult to the gods, as well -as of danger to their political constitution from the withdrawal -of divine protection.[307] Andokidês himself was pardoned, and was -for the time an object, apparently, even of public gratitude, so -that his father Leogoras who had been among the parties imprisoned, -ventured to indict a senator named Speusippus for illegal proceedings -towards him, and obtained an almost unanimous verdict from the -dikastery.[308] But the character of a statue-breaker and an informer -could never be otherwise than odious at Athens. Andokidês was either -banished by the indirect effect of a general disqualifying decree; or -at least found that he had made so many enemies, and incurred so much -obloquy, by his conduct in this affair, as to make it necessary for -him to quit the city. He remained in banishment for many years, and -seems never to have got clear of the hatred which his conduct in this -nefarious proceeding so well merited.[309] - - [305] Thucyd. vi, 60. Ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἄσμενος λαβὼν, ὡς - ᾤετο, τὸ σαφὲς, etc.: compare Andokid. de Mysteriis, sects. 67, - 68. - - [306] Andokid. de Myster. sect 66; Thucyd. vi, 60; Philochorus, - Fragment. 111, ed. Didot. - - [307] Thucyd. vi, 60. ἡ μέντοι ἄλλη πόλις περιφανῶς ὠφέλητο: - compare Andokid. de Reditu, sect. 8. - - [308] See Andokid. de Mysteriis, sect. 17. There are several - circumstances not easily intelligible respecting this γραφὴ - παρανόμων, which Andokidês alleges that his father Leogoras - brought against the senator Speusippus, before a dikastery of - six thousand persons (a number very difficult to believe), out - of whom he says that Speusippus only obtained two hundred votes; - but if this trial ever took place at all, we cannot believe - that it could have taken place until after the public mind was - tranquillized by the disclosures of Andokidês, especially as - Leogoras was actually in prison along with Andokidês immediately - before those disclosures were given in. - - [309] See for evidence of these general positions respecting the - circumstances of Andokidês, the three Orations: Andokidês de - Mysteriis, Andokidês de Reditu Suo, and Lysias contra Andokidem. - -But the comfort arising out of these disclosures respecting the -Hermæ, though genuine and inestimable at the moment, was soon again -disturbed. There still remained the various alleged profanations of -the Eleusinian mysteries, which had not yet been investigated or -brought to atonement; and these were the more sure to be pressed -home, and worked with a factitious exaggeration of pious zeal, -since the enemies of Alkibiadês were bent upon turning them to his -ruin. Among all the ceremonies of Attic religion, there was none -more profoundly or universally reverenced than the mysteries of -Eleusis, originally enjoined by the goddess Dêmêtêr herself, in -her visit to that place, to Eumolpus and the other Eleusinian -patriarch, and transmitted as a precious hereditary privilege in -their families.[310] Celebrated annually in the month of August -or September, under the special care of the basileus, or second -archon, these mysteries were attended by vast crowds from Athens -as well as from other parts of Greece, presenting to the eye a -solemn and imposing spectacle, and striking the imagination still -more powerfully by the special initiation which they conferred, -under pledge of secrecy, upon pious and predisposed communicants. -Even the divulgation in words to the uninitiated, of that which was -exhibited to the eye and ear of the assembly in the interior of the -Eleusinian temple, was accounted highly criminal: much more the -actual mimicry of these ceremonies for the amusement of a convivial -party. Moreover, the individuals who held the great sacred offices at -Eleusis,—the hierophant, the daduch (torch-bearer), and the keryx, or -herald,—which were transmitted by inheritance in the Eumolpidæ and -other great families of antiquity and importance, were personally -insulted by such proceedings, and vindicated their own dignity at the -same time that they invoked punishment on the offenders in the name -of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê. The most appalling legends were current -among the Athenian public, and repeated on proper occasions even by -the hierophant himself, respecting the divine judgments which always -overtook such impious men.[311] - - [310] Homer, Hymn. Cerer. 475. Compare the Epigram cited in - Lobeck, Eleusinia, p. 47. - - [311] Lysias cont. Andokid. init. et fin.; Andokid. de Myster. - sect. 29. Compare the fragment of a lost Oration by Lysias - against Kinêsias (Fragm. xxxi, p. 490, Bekker; Athenæus, xii, - p. 551), where Kinêsias and his friends are accused of numerous - impieties, one of which consisted in celebrating festivals on - unlucky and forbidden days, “in derision of our gods and our - laws,”—ὡς καταλεγῶντες τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν νόμων τῶν ἡμετέρων. The - lamentable consequences which the displeasure of the gods had - brought upon them are then set forth: the companions of Kinêsias - had all miserably perished, while Kinêsias himself was living - in wretched health and in a condition worse than death: τὸ δ’ - οὕτως ἔχοντα τοσοῦτον χρόνον διατελεῖν, καὶ καθ’ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν - ἀποθνήσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι τελευτῆσαι τὸν βίον, τούτοις μόνοις - προσήκει τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἅπερ οὗτος ἐξερματεκόσι. - - The comic poets Strattis and Plato also marked out Kinêsias - among their favorite subjects of derision and libel, and seem - particularly to have represented his lean person and constant ill - health as a punishment of the gods for his impiety. See Meineke, - Fragm. Comic. Græc. (Strattis), vol. ii, p. 768 (Plato), p. 679. - -When we recollect how highly the Eleusinian mysteries were venerated -by Greeks not born in Athens and even by foreigners, we shall not -wonder at the violent indignation excited in the Athenian mind by -persons who profaned or divulged them; especially at a moment when -their religious sensibilities had been so keenly wounded, and so -tardily and recently healed, in reference to the Hermæ.[312] It was -about this same time[313] that a prosecution was instituted against -the Melian philosopher Diagoras for irreligious doctrines. Having -left Athens before trial, he was found guilty in his absence, and a -reward was offered for his life. - - [312] Lysias cont. Andokid. sects. 50, 51; Cornel. Nepos, Alcib. - c. 4. The expressions of Pindar (Fragm. 96) and of Sophoklês - (Fragm. 58, Brunck.—Œdip. Kolon. 1058) respecting the value of - the Eleusinian mysteries, are very striking: also Cicero, Legg. - ii, 14. - - Horace will not allow himself to be under the same roof, or in - the same boat, with any one who has been guilty of divulging - these mysteries (Od. iii. 2, 26), much more then of deriding them. - - The reader will find the fullest information about these - ceremonies in the _Eleusinia_, forming the first treatise in the - work of Lobeck called Aglaophamus; and in the Dissertation called - _Eleusinia_, in K. O. Müller’s Kleine Schriften. vol ii, p. 242, - _seqq._ - - [313] Diodor. xiii. 6 - - Probably the privileged sacred families, connected with the - mysteries, were foremost in calling for expiation from the - state to the majesty of the two offended goddesses, and - for punishment on the delinquents.[314] And the enemies of - Alkibiadês, personal as well as political, found the opportunity - favorable for reviving that charge against him which they had - artfully suffered to drop before his departure to Sicily. The - matter of fact alleged against him—the mock-celebration of these - holy ceremonies—was not only in itself probable, but proved by - reasonably good testimony against him and some of his intimate - companions. Moreover, the overbearing insolence of demeanor - habitual with Alkibiadês, so glaringly at variance with the equal - restraints of democracy, enabled his enemies to impute to him - not only irreligious acts, but anti-constitutional purposes; an - association of ideas which was at this moment the more easily - accredited, since his divulgation and parody of the mysteries - did not stand alone, but was interpreted in conjunction with - the recent mutilation of the Hermæ—as a manifestation of the - same anti-patriotic and irreligious feeling, if not part and - parcel of the same treasonable scheme. And the alarm on this - subject was now renewed by the appearance of a Lacedæmonian army - at the isthmus, professing to contemplate some enterprise in - conjunction with the Bœotians, a purpose not easy to understand, - and presenting every appearance of being a cloak for hostile - designs against Athens. So fully was this believed among the - Athenians, that they took arms, and remained under arms one whole - night in the sacred precinct of the Theseium. No enemy indeed - appeared, either without or within; but the conspiracy had only - been prevented from breaking out, so they imagined, by the recent - inquiries and detection. Moreover, the party in Argos connected - with Alkibiadês were just at this time suspected of a plot for - the subversion of their own democracy, which still farther - aggravated the presumptions against him, while it induced the - Athenians to give up to the Argeian democratical government the - oligarchical hostages which had been taken from that town a few - months before,[315] in order that it might put these hostages to - death, whenever it thought fit. - - [314] We shall find these sacred families hereafter to be - the most obstinate in opposing the return of Alkibiadês from - banishment (Thucyd. viii, 53). - - [315] Thucyd. vi, 53-61. - -Such incidents materially aided the enemies of Alkibiadês in their -unremitting efforts to procure his recall and condemnation. Among -them were men very different in station and temper: Thessalus son of -Kimon, a man of the highest lineage and of hereditary oligarchical -politics, as well as Androklês, a leading demagogue or popular -orator. It was the former who preferred against him in the senate the -memorable impeachment, which, fortunately for our information, is -recorded verbatim. - -“Thessalus son of Kimon, of the deme Lakiadæ, hath impeached -Alkibiadês son of Kleinias, of the deme Skambônidæ, as guilty of -crime in regard to the two goddesses Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, in -mimicking the mysteries, and exhibiting them to his companions in -his own house, wearing the costume of the hierophant: applying to -himself the name of hierophant; to Polytion, that of daduch; to -Theodôrus that of herald, and addressing his remaining companions as -mysts and epopts; all contrary to the sacred customs and canons, of -old established by the Eumolpidæ, the Kerykes, and the Eleusinian -priests.”[316] - - [316] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22. Θέσσαλος Κίμωνος Λακιάδης, - Ἀλκιβιάδην Κλεινίου Σκαμβωνίδην εἰσήγγειλεν ἀδικεῖν περὶ τὼ - θεὼ, τὴν Δήμητρα καὶ τὴν Κόρην, ἀπομιμούμενον τὰ μυστήρια, καὶ - δεικνύοντα τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἑταίροις ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, ἔχοντα - στολὴν οἵανπερ ἱεροφάντης ἔχων δεικνύει τὰ ἱερὰ, καὶ ὀνομάζοντα - αὐτὸν μὲν ἱεροφάντην, Πολυτίωνα δὲ δᾳδοῦχον, κήρυκα δὲ Θεόδωρον - Φηγεέα· τοὺς δ’ ἄλλους ἑταίρους, μύστας προσαγορεύοντα καὶ - ἐπόπτας, παρὰ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ καθεστηκότα ὑπὸ τ’ Εὐμολπιδῶν καὶ - κηρύκων καὶ τῶν ἱερέων τῶν ἐξ Ἐλευσῖνος. - -Similar impeachments being at the same time presented against other -citizens now serving in Sicily along with Alkibiadês, the accusers -moved that he and the rest might be sent for to come home and take -their trial. We may observe that the indictment against him is quite -distinct and special, making no allusion to any supposed treasonable -or anti-constitutional projects: probably, however, these suspicions -were pressed by his enemies in their preliminary speeches, for the -purpose of inducing the Athenians to remove him from the command of -the army forthwith, and send for him home. For such a step it was -indispensable that a strong case should be made out: but the public -was at length thoroughly brought round, and the Salaminian trireme -was despatched to Sicily to fetch him. Great care however was taken, -in sending this summons, to avoid all appearance of prejudgment, -or harshness, or menace. The trierarch was forbidden to seize his -person, and had instructions to invite him simply to accompany the -Salaminian home in his own trireme: so as to avoid the hazard of -offending the Argeian and Mantineian allies serving in Sicily, or the -army itself.[317] - - [317] Thucyd. vi, 61. - -It was on the return of the Athenian army from their unsuccessful -attempt at Kamarina, to their previous quarters at Katana, that they -found the Salaminian trireme newly arrived from Athens with this -grave requisition against the general. We may be sure that Alkibiadês -received private intimation from his friends at Athens, by the same -trireme, communicating to him the temper of the people, so that his -resolution was speedily taken. Professing to obey, he departed in -his own trireme on the voyage homeward, along with the other persons -accused, the Salaminian trireme being in company; but as soon as they -arrived at Thurii, in coasting along Italy, he and his companions -quitted the vessel and disappeared. After a fruitless search on the -part of the Salaminian trierarch, the two triremes were obliged to -return to Athens without him. Both Alkibiadês and the rest of the -accused—one of whom[318] was his own cousin and namesake—were tried, -condemned to death on non-appearance, and their property confiscated; -while the Eumolpidæ and the other Eleusinian sacred families -pronounced him to be accursed by the gods, for his desecration of the -mysteries,[319] and recorded the condemnation on a plate of lead. - - [318] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 13. - - [319] Thucyd. vi. 61; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22-33; Lysias, Orat. - vi, cont. Andokid. sect. 42. - - Plutarch says that it would have been easy for Alkibiadês to - raise a mutiny in the army at Katana, had he chosen to resist the - order for coming home. But this is highly improbable. Considering - what his conduct became immediately afterwards, we shall see good - reason to believe that he _would_ have taken this step, had it - been practicable. - -Probably his disappearance and exile were acceptable to his enemies -at Athens: at any rate, they thus made sure of getting rid of him; -while had he come back, his condemnation to death, though probable, -could not be considered as certain. In considering the conduct of -the Athenians towards Alkibiadês, we have to remark, that the people -were guilty of no act of injustice. He had committed—at least there -was fair reason for believing that he had committed—an act criminal -in the estimation of every Greek; the divulgation and profanation of -the mysteries. This act—alleged against him in the indictment very -distinctly, divested of all supposed ulterior purpose, treasonable -or otherwise—was legally punishable at Athens, and was universally -accounted guilty in public estimation, as an offence at once against -the religious sentiment of the people and against the public safety, -by offending the two goddesses, Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, and driving -them to withdraw their favor and protection. The same demand for -legal punishment would have been supposed to exist in a Christian -Catholic country, down to a very recent period of history, if instead -of the Eleusinian mysteries we suppose the sacrament of the mass to -have been the ceremony ridiculed; though such a proceeding would -involve no breach of obligation to secrecy. Nor ought we to judge -what would have been the measure of penalty formerly awarded to a -person convicted of such an offence, by consulting the tendency of -penal legislation during the last sixty years. Even down to the -last century it would have been visited with something sharper than -the draught of hemlock, which is the worst that could possibly have -befallen Alkibiadês at Athens, as we may see by the condemnation -and execution of the Chevalier de la Barre at Abbeville, in 1766. -The uniform tendency of Christian legislation,[320] down to a -recent period, leaves no room for reproaching the Athenians with -excessive cruelty in their penal visitation of offences against the -religious sentiment. On the contrary, the Athenians are distinguished -for comparative mildness and tolerance, as we shall find various -opportunities for remarking. - - [320] To appreciate fairly the violent emotion raised at Athens - by the mutilation of the Hermæ and by the profanation of the - mysteries, it is necessary to consider the way in which analogous - acts of sacrilege have been viewed in Christian and Catholic - penal legislation, even down to the time of the first French - Revolution. - - I transcribe the following extract from a work of authority on - French criminal jurisprudence—_Jousse_, Traité de la Justice - Criminelle, Paris, 1771, part iv, tit. 27, vol. iii, p. 672:— - - “Du Crime de Leze-Majesté Divine.—Les Crimes de Leze Majesté - Divine, sont ceux qui attaquent Dieu immédiatement, et qu’on doit - regarder par cette raison comme les plus atroces et les plus - exécrables.—La Majesté de Dieu peut être offensée de plusieurs - manières.—1. En niant l’existence de Dieu. 2. Par le crime de - ceux qui attentent directement contre la Divinité: comme quand on - profane ou qu’on foule aux pieds les saintes Hosties; ou qu’on - _frappe les Images de Dieu_ dans le dessein de l’insulter. C’est - ce qu’on appelle _Crime de Leze-Majesté Divine au prémier Chef_.” - - Again in the same work, part iv, tit. 46, n. 5, 8, 10, 11, vol. - iv, pp. 97-99:— - - “_La profanation des Sacremens et des Mystères de la Réligion - est un sacrilège des plus exécrables._ Tel est le crime de - ceux qui emploient les choses sacrées à des usages communs - et mauvais, _en dérision des Mystères_; ceux qui _profanent - la sainte Eucharistie_, ou qui en abusent en quelque manière - que ce soit; ceux qui en mépris de la Réligion, profanent les - Fonts-Baptismaux; qui jettent par terre les saintes Hosties, - ou qui les emploient à des usages vils et profanes: _ceux qui, - en dérision de nos sacrés Mystères, les contrefont dans leurs - débauches; ceux qui frappent, mutilent, abattent, les Images - consacrées à Dieu, ou à la Sainte Vierge, ou aux Saints_, en - mépris de la Réligion; et enfin, tous ceux qui commettent - de semblables impiétés. Tous ces crimes _sont des crimes de - Leze-Majesté divine au prémier chef_, parce qu’ils s’attaquent - immédiatement à Dieu, et ne se font à aucun dessein que de - l’offenser.” - - “... La peine du Sacrilège, par l’Ancien Testament, étoit celle - du feu, et d’être lapidé.—Par les Loix Romaines, les coupables - étoient condamnés au fer, au feu, et aux bêtes farouches, - suivant les circonstances.—En France, la peine du sacrilège est - arbitraire, et dépend de la qualité et des circonstances du - crime, du lieu, du temps, et de la qualité de l’accusé.—Dans _le - sacrilège au prémier chef, qui attaque la Divinité, la Sainte - Vierge, et les Saints_, v. g. à l’égard de ceux qui foulent aux - pieds les saintes Hosties, ou qui les jettent à terre, ou en - abusent, et qui les emploient à des usages vils et profanes, la - peine est le feu, l’amende honorable, et le poing coupé. Il en - est de même de ceux qui profanent les Fonts-Baptismaux; _ceux - qui, en dérision de nos Mystères, s’en moquent et les contrefont - dans leurs débauches_: ils doivent être punis de peine capitale, - parce que ces crimes attaquent immédiatement la Divinité.” - - M. Jousse proceeds to cite several examples of persons condemned - to death for acts of sacrilege, of the nature above described. - -Now in reviewing the conduct of the Athenians towards Alkibiadês, -we must consider, that this violation of the mysteries, of which -he was indicted in good legal form, was an action for which he -really deserved punishment, if any one deserved it. Even his -enemies did not fabricate this charge, or impute it to him falsely; -though they were guilty of insidious and unprincipled manœuvres to -exasperate the public mind against him. Their machinations begin -with the mutilation of the Hermæ; an act of new and unparalleled -wickedness, to which historians of Greece seldom do justice. It -was not, like the violations of the mysteries, a piece of indecent -pastime committed within four walls, and never intended to become -known. It was an outrage essentially public, planned and executed by -conspirators for the deliberate purpose of lacerating the religious -mind of Athens, and turning the prevalent terror and distraction to -political profit. Thus much is certain; though we cannot be sure -who the conspirators were, nor what was their exact or special -purpose. That the destruction of Alkibiadês was one of the direct -purposes of the conspirators, is highly probable. But his enemies, -even if they were not among the original authors, at least took upon -themselves half the guilt of the proceeding, by making it the basis -of treacherous machinations against his person. How their scheme, -which was originally contrived to destroy him before the expedition -departed, at first failed, was then artfully dropped, and at length -effectually revived, after a long train of calumny against the -absent general, has been already recounted. It is among the darkest -chapters of Athenian political history, indicating, on the part of -the people, strong religious excitability, without any injustice -towards Alkibiadês; but indicating, on the part of his enemies, as -well as of the Hermokopids generally, a depth of wicked contrivance -rarely paralleled in political warfare. It is to these men, not to -the people, that Alkibiadês owes his expulsion, aided indeed by -the effect of his own previous character. In regard to the Hermæ, -the Athenians condemned to death—after and by consequence of the -deposition of Andokidês—a small number of men who may perhaps have -been innocent victims, but whom they sincerely believed to be guilty; -and whose death not only tranquillized comparatively the public mind, -but served as the only means of rescue to a far larger number of -prisoners confined on suspicion. In regard to Alkibiadês, they came -to no collective resolution, except that of recalling him to take his -trial, a resolution implying no wrong in those who voted for it, -whatever may be the guilt of those who proposed and prepared it by -perfidious means.[321] - - [321] The proceedings in England in 1678 and 1679, in consequence - of the pretended Popish Plot, have been alluded to by various - authors, and recently by Dr. Thirlwall, as affording an analogy - to that which occurred at Athens after the mutilation of the - Hermæ. But there are many material differences, and all, so far - as I can perceive, to the advantage of Athens. - - 1. The “hellish and damnable plot of the Popish Recusants,” (to - adopt the words of the Houses of Lords and Commons,—see Dr. - Lingard’s History of England, vol. xiii, ch. v, p. 88,—words, the - like of which were doubtless employed at Athens in reference to - the Hermokopids,) was baseless, mendacious, and incredible, from - the beginning. It started from no real fact: the whole of it was - a tissue of falsehoods and fabrications proceeding from Oates, - Bedloe, and a few other informers of the worst character. - - At Athens, there was unquestionably a plot; the Hermokopids were - real conspirators, not few in number. No one could doubt that - they conspired for other objects besides the mutilation of the - Hermæ. At the same time, no one knew what these objects were, nor - who the conspirators themselves were. - - If before the mutilation of the Hermæ, a man like Oates had - pretended to reveal to the Athenian people a fabricated - plot implicating Alkibiadês and others, he would have found - no credence. It was not until after and by reason of that - terror-striking incident, that the Athenians began to give - credence to informers. And we are to recollect that they did not - put any one to death on the evidence of these informers. They - contented themselves with imprisoning on suspicion, until they - got the confession and deposition of Andokidês. Those implicated - in _that_ deposition were condemned to death. Now Andokidês, as - a witness, deserves but very qualified confidence; yet it is - impossible to degrade him to the same level even as Teukrus or - Diokleidês, much less to that of Oates and Bedloe. We cannot - wonder that the people trusted him, and, under the peculiar - circumstances of the case, it was the least evil that they should - trust him. The witnesses upon whose testimony the prisoners under - the Popish Plot were condemned, were even inferior to Teukrus and - Diokleidês in presumptive credibility. - - The Athenian people have been censured for their folly in - believing the democratical constitution in danger, because the - Hermæ had been mutilated. I have endeavored to show, that, - looking to their religious ideas, the thread of connection - between these two ideas is perfectly explicable. And why are we - to quarrel with the Athenians because they took arms, and put - themselves on their guard, when a Lacedæmonian or a Bœotian armed - force was actually on their frontier? - - As for the condemnation of Alkibiadês and others for profaning - and divulging the Eleusinian mysteries, these are not for a - moment to be put upon a level with the condemnations in the - Popish Plot. These were true charges, at least there is strong - presumptive reason for believing that they were true. Persons - were convicted and punished for having done acts which they - really had done, and which they knew to be legal crimes. Whether - it be right to constitute such acts legal crimes, or not, is - another question. The enormity of the Popish Plot consisted in - punishing persons for acts which they had not done, and upon - depositions of the most lying and worthless witnesses. - - The state of mind into which the Athenians were driven after the - cutting of the Hermæ, was indeed very analogous to that of the - English people during the circulation of the Popish Plot. The - suffering, terror, and distraction, I apprehend to have been even - greater at Athens: but the cause of it was graver and more real, - and the active injustice which it produced was far less than in - England. - - “I shall not detain the reader (says Dr. Lingard, Hist. Engl. - xiii, p. 105) with a narrative of the partial trials and judicial - murders of the unfortunate men, whose names had been inserted - by Oates in his pretended discoveries. So violent was the - excitement, so general the delusion created by the perjuries - of the informer, that the voice of reason and the claims of - justice were equally disregarded. Both judge and jury seemed to - have no other object than to inflict vengeance on the supposed - traitors. To speak in support of their witnesses, or to hint the - improbability of the informations, required a strength of mind, - a recklessness of consequences, which falls to the lot of few - individuals: even the king himself, convinced as he was of the - imposture, and contemptuously as he spoke of it in private, dared - not exercise his prerogative of mercy to save the lives of the - innocent.” - - It is to be noted that the House of Lords, both acting as a - legislative body, and in their judicial character when the - Catholic Lord Stafford was tried before them (ch. vi, pp. - 231-241), displayed a degree of prejudice and injustice quite - equal to that of the judges and juries in the law-courts. - - Both the English judicature on this occasion, and the Milanese - judicature on the occasion adverted to in a previous note, were - more corrupted and driven to greater injustice by the reigning - prejudice, than the purely popular dikastery of Athens in this - affair of the Hermæ, and of the other profanations. - -In order to appreciate the desperate hatred with which the exile -Alkibiadês afterwards revenged himself on his countrymen, it has been -necessary to explain to what extent he had just ground of complaint -against them. On being informed that they had condemned him to death -in his absence, he is said to have exclaimed: “I shall show them that -I am alive.” He fully redeemed his word.[322] - - [322] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22. - -The recall and consequent banishment of Alkibiadês was mischievous to -Athens in several ways. It transferred to the enemy’s camp an angry -exile, to make known her weak points, and to rouse the sluggishness -of Sparta. It offended a portion of the Sicilian armament, most of -all probably the Argeians and Mantineians, and slackened their zeal -in the cause.[323] And what was worst of all, it left the armament -altogether under the paralyzing command of Nikias. For Lamachus, -though still equal in nominal authority, and now invested with the -command of one-half instead of one-third of the army, appears to have -had no real influence except in the field. - - [323] Thucyd. ii, 65. τά τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν, - etc. - -Nikias now proceeded to execute that scheme which he had first -suggested, to sail round from Katana to Selinus and Egesta, with the -view of investigating the quarrel between the two as well as the -financial means of the latter. Passing through the strait and along -the north coast of the island, he first touched at Himera, where -admittance was refused to him; he next captured a Sikanian maritime -town named Hykkara, together with many prisoners; among them the -celebrated courtezan Laïs, then a very young girl.[324] Having handed -over this place to the Egestæans, Nikias went in person to inspect -their city and condition; but could obtain no more money than the -thirty talents which had been before announced on the second visit -of the commissioners. He then restored the prisoners from Hykkara -to their Sikanian countrymen, receiving a ransom of one hundred and -twenty talents,[325] and conducted the Athenian land-force across the -centre of the island, through the territory of the friendly Sikels -to Katana; making an attack in his way upon the hostile Sikel town -of Hybla, in which he was repulsed. At Katana he was rejoined by his -naval force. - - [324] The statements respecting the age and life of Laïs appear - involved in inextricable confusion. See the note of Göller ad - Philisti, Fragment. v. - - [325] Diodor. viii, 6; Thucyd. vi, 62. Καὶ τἀνδράποδα ~ἀπέδοσαν~, - καὶ ἐγένοντο ἐξ αὐτῶν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν τάλαντα. The word - ἀπέδοσαν seems to mean that the prisoners were handed over to - their fellow-countrymen, the natural persons to negotiate for - their release, upon private contract of a definite sum. Had - Thucydidês said ἀπέδοντο, it would have meant that they were put - up to auction for what they would fetch. This distinction is at - least possible, and, in my judgment, more admissible than that - proposed in the note of Dr. Arnold. - - If, however, we refer to Thucyd. vi, 88, with Duker’s note, we - shall see that μεταπέμπειν is sometimes, though rarely, used in - the sense of μεταπέμπεσθαι. The case may perhaps be the same with - ἀπέδοσαν for ἀπέδοντο. - -It was now seemingly about the middle of October, and three -months had elapsed since the arrival of the Athenian armament at -Rhegium; during which period they had achieved nothing except the -acquisition of Naxus and Katana as allies—unless we are to reckon -the insignificant capture of Hykkara. But Naxus and Katana, as -Chalkidic cities, had been counted upon beforehand even by Nikias; -together with Rhegium, which had been found reluctant, to his great -disappointment. What is still worse, in reference to the character of -the general, not only nothing serious had been achieved, but nothing -serious had been attempted. The precious moment pointed out by -Lamachus for action, when the terrific menace of the recent untried -armament was at its maximum, and preparation as well as confidence -was wanting at Syracuse, had been irreparably wasted. Every day the -preparations of the Syracusans improved and their fears diminished; -the invader, whom they had looked upon as so formidable, turned out -both hesitating and timorous,[326] and when he had disappeared out -of their sight to Hykkara and Egesta, still more when he assailed in -vain the insignificant Sikel post of Hybla, their minds underwent a -reaction from dismay to extreme confidence. The mass of Syracusan -citizens, now reinforced by allies from Selinus and other cities, -called upon their generals to lead to the attack of the Athenian -position at Katana, since the Athenians did not dare to approach -Syracuse; while Syracusan horsemen even went so far as to insult -the Athenians in their camp, riding up to ask if they were come to -settle as peaceable citizens in the island, instead of restoring -the Leontines. Such unexpected humiliation, acting probably on -the feelings of the soldiers, at length shamed Nikias out of his -inaction, and compelled him to strike a blow for the maintenance of -his own reputation. He devised a stratagem for approaching Syracuse -in such a manner as to elude the opposition of the Syracusan cavalry, -informing himself as to the ground near the city, through some exiles -serving along with him.[327] - - [326] Thucyd. vi, 63; vii, 42. - - [327] Thucyd. vi, 63; Diodor. xiii, 6. - -He despatched to Syracuse a Katanæan citizen, in his heart attached -to Athens, yet apparently neutral and on good terms with the other -side, as bearer of a pretended message and proposition from the -friends of Syracuse at Katana. Many of the Athenian soldiers, so the -message ran, were in the habit of passing the night within the walls, -apart from their camp and arms. It would be easy for the Syracusans -by a vigorous attack at daybreak, to surprise them thus unprepared -and dispersed; while the philo-Syracusan party at Katana promised -to aid, by closing the gates, assailing the Athenians within, and -setting fire to the ships. A numerous body of Katanæans, they added, -were eager to coöperate in the plan now proposed. - -This communication, reaching the Syracusan generals at a moment -when they were themselves elate and disposed to an aggressive -movement, found such incautious credence, that they sent back the -messenger to Katana with cordial assent and agreement for a precise -day. Accordingly, a day or two before, the entire Syracusan force -was marched out towards Katana, and encamped for the night on the -river Symæthus, in the Leontine territory, within about eight miles -of Katana. But Nikias, with whom the whole proceeding originated, -choosing this same day to put on shipboard his army, together with -his Sikel allies present, sailed by night southward along the coast, -rounding the island of Ortygia, into the Great Harbor of Syracuse. -Arrived thither by break of day, he disembarked his troops unopposed -south of the mouth of the Anâpus, in the interior of the Great -Harbor, near the hamlet which stretched towards the temple of Zeus -Olympius. Having broken down the neighboring bridge, where the -Helôrine road crossed the Anâpus, he took up a position protected by -various embarrassing obstacles,—houses, walls, trees, and standing -water, besides the steep ground of the Olympieion itself on his -left wing; so that he could choose his own time for fighting, and -was out of the attack of the Syracusan horse. For the protection of -his ships on the shore, he provided a palisade work by cutting down -the neighboring trees; and even took precautions for his rear by -throwing up a hasty fence of wood and stones touching the shore at -the inner bay called Daskon. He had full leisure for such defensive -works, since the enemy within the walls made no attempt to disturb -him, while the Syracusan horse only discovered his manœuvre on -arriving before the lines at Katana; and though they lost no time -in returning, the march back was a long one.[328] Such was the -confidence of the Syracusans, however, that even after so long a -march, they offered battle forthwith; but as Nikias did not quit his -position, they retreated, to take up their night-station on the other -side of the Helôrine road, probably a road bordered on each side by -walls. - - [328] Thucyd. vi, 65, 66; Diodor. xiii, 6; Plutarch, Nikias, c. - 13. - -On the next morning, Nikias marched out of his position and formed -his troops in order of battle, in two divisions, each eight deep. -His front division was intended to attack; his rear division—in -hollow square, with the baggage in the middle—was held in reserve -near the camp, to lend aid where aid might be wanted; cavalry there -was none. The Syracusan hoplites, seemingly far more numerous than -his, presented the levy in mass of the city, without any selection; -they were ranged in the deeper order of sixteen, alongside of their -Selinuntine allies. On the right wing were posted their horsemen, -the best part of their force, not less than twelve hundred in -number; together with two hundred horsemen from Gela, twenty from -Kamarina, about fifty bowmen, and a company of darters. The hoplites, -though full of courage, had little training; and their array, -never precisely kept, was on this occasion farther disturbed by -the immediate vicinity of the city. Some had gone in to see their -families; others, hurrying out to join, found the battle already -begun, and took rank wherever they could.[329] - - [329] Thucyd. vi, 67-69. - -Thucydidês, in describing this battle, gives us, according to his -practice, a statement of the motives and feelings which animated the -combatants on both sides, and which furnished a theme for the brief -harangue of Nikias. This appears surprising to one accustomed to -modern warfare, where the soldier is under the influence simply of -professional honor and disgrace, without any thought of the cause -for which he is fighting. In ancient times, such a motive was only -one among many others, which, according to the circumstances of the -case, contributed to elevate or depress the soldier’s mind at the eve -of action. Nikias adverted to the recognized military preëminence -of chosen Argeians, Mantineians, and Athenians, as compared to -the Syracusan levy in mass, who were full of belief in their own -superiority,—this is a striking confession of the deplorable change -which had been wrought by his own delay,—but who would come short in -actual conflict, from want of discipline.[330] Moreover, he reminded -them that they were far away from home, and that defeat would render -them victims, one and all, of the Syracusan cavalry. He little -thought, nor did his prophets forewarn him, that such a calamity, -serious as it would have been, was even desirable for Athens, since -it would have saved her from the far more overwhelming disasters -which will be found to sadden the coming chapters of this history. - - [330] Thucyd. vi, 68, 69. ἄλλως δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας πανδημεί - τε ἀμυνομένους, καὶ οὐκ ἀπολέκτους ὥσπερ ἡμᾶς· καὶ προσέτι - Σικελιώτας, οἳ ~ὑπερφρονοῦσι μὲν ἡμᾶς~, ὑπομένουσι δὲ οὔ· διὰ τὸ - τὴν ἐπιστήμην τῆς τόλμης ἥσσω ἔχειν. - - This passage illustrates very clearly the meaning of the adverb - πανδημεί. Compare πανδαμεὶ, πανομιλεὶ, Æschylus, Sept. Theb. 275. - -While the customary sacrifices were being performed, the slingers and -bowmen on both sides became engaged in skirmishing. But presently the -trumpets sounded, and Nikias ordered his first division of hoplites -to charge at once rapidly, before the Syracusans expected it. Judging -from his previous backwardness, they never imagined that he would be -the first to give orders for charging; nor was it until they saw the -Athenian line actually advancing towards them that they lifted their -own arms from the ground and came forward to give the meeting. The -shock was bravely encountered on both sides, and for some time the -battle continued hand to hand with undecided result. There happened -to supervene a violent storm of rain, with thunder and lightning, -which alarmed the Syracusans, who construed it as an unfavorable -augury, while to the more practised Athenian hoplites, it seemed -a mere phenomenon of the season,[331] so that they still farther -astonished the Syracusans by the unabated confidence with which -they continued the fight. At length the Syracusan army was broken, -dispersed, and fled; first, before the Argeians on the right, next, -before the Athenians in the centre. The victors pursued as far as -was safe and practicable, without disordering their ranks: for the -Syracusan cavalry, which had not yet been engaged, checked all who -pressed forward, and enabled their own infantry to retire in safety -behind the Helôrine road.[332] - - [331] Thucyd. vi, 70. Τοῖς δ’ ἐμπειροτέροις, τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα, - καὶ ὥρᾳ ἔτους περαίνεσθαι δοκεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθεστῶτας, πολὺ μείζω - ἔκπληξιν μὴ νικωμένους παρέχειν. - - The Athenians, unfortunately for themselves, were not equally - unmoved by eclipses of the moon. The force of this remark will be - seen in the next chapter but one. - - [332] Thucyd. vi, 70. - -So little were the Syracusans dispirited with this defeat, that they -did not retire within their city until they had sent an adequate -detachment to guard the neighboring temple and sacred precinct of -the Olympian Zeus, wherein there was much deposited wealth, which -they feared that the Athenians might seize. Nikias, however, without -approaching the sacred ground, contented himself with occupying the -field of battle, burnt his own dead, and stripped the arms from the -dead of the enemy. The Syracusans and their allies lost two hundred -and fifty men, the Athenians fifty.[333] - - [333] Thucyd. vi, 71. Plutarch (Nikias, c. 16) states that Nikias - refused from religious scruples to invade the sacred precinct, - though his soldiers were eager to seize its contents. - - Diodorus (xiii, 6) affirms erroneously that the Athenians became - masters of the Olympieion. Pausanias too says the same thing (x, - 28, 3), adding that Nikias abstained from disturbing either the - treasures or the offerings, and left them still under the care of - the Syracusan priests. - - Plutarch farther states that Nikias stayed some days in his - position before he returned to Katana. But the language of - Thucydidês indicates that the Athenians returned on the day after - the battle. - -On the morrow, having granted to the Syracusans their dead bodies -for burial, and collected the ashes of his own dead, Nikias -reëmbarked his troops, put to sea, and sailed back to his former -station at Katana. He conceived it impossible, without cavalry and -a farther stock of money, to maintain his position near Syracuse or -to prosecute immediate operations of siege or blockade. And as the -winter was now approaching, he determined to take up winter quarters -at Katana; though considering the mild winter at Syracuse, and the -danger of marsh fever near the Great Harbor in summer, the change -of season might well be regarded as a questionable gain. But he -proposed to employ the interval in sending to Athens for cavalry -and money, as well as in procuring the like reinforcements from his -Sicilian allies, whose numbers he calculated now on increasing by the -accession of new cities after his recent victory, and to get together -magazines of every kind for beginning the siege of Syracuse in the -spring. Despatching a trireme to Athens with these requisitions, -he sailed with his forces to Messênê, within which there was a -favorable party who gave hopes of opening the gates to him. Such a -correspondence had already been commenced before the departure of -Alkibiadês: but it was the first act of revenge which the departing -general took on his country, to betray the proceedings to the -philo-Syracusan party in Messênê. Accordingly, these latter, watching -their opportunity, rose in arms before the arrival of Nikias, put to -death their chief antagonists, and held the town by force against the -Athenians; who after a fruitless delay of thirteen days, with scanty -supplies and under stormy weather, were forced to return to Naxos, -where they established a palisaded camp and station, and went into -winter quarters.[334] - - [334] Thucyd. vi, 71-74. - -The recent stratagem of Nikias, followed by the movement into the -harbor of Syracuse, and the battle, had been ably planned and -executed. It served to show the courage and discipline of the army, -as well as to keep up the spirits of the soldiers themselves, and -to obviate those feelings of disappointment which the previous -inefficiency of the armament tended to arouse. But as to other -results, the victory was barren; we may even say, positively -mischievous, since it imparted a momentary stimulus which served -as an excuse to Nikias for the three months of total inaction -which followed, and since it neither weakened nor humiliated the -Syracusans, but gave them a salutary lesson which they turned to -account while Nikias was in his winter quarters. His apathy during -these first eight months after the arrival of the expedition at -Rhegium (from July 415 B.C. to March 414 B.C.), was the most -deplorable of all calamities to his army, his country, and himself. -Abundant proofs of this will be seen in the coming events: at -present, we have only to turn back to his own predictions and -recommendations. All the difficulties and dangers to be surmounted -in Sicily had been foreseen by himself and impressed upon the -Athenians: in the first instance, as grounds against undertaking -the expedition; but the Athenians, though unfortunately not -allowing them to avail in that capacity, fully admitted their -reality, and authorized him to demand whatever force was necessary -to overcome them.[335] He had thus been allowed to bring with him -a force calculated upon his own ideas, together with supplies and -implements for besieging; yet when arrived, he seems only anxious -to avoid exposing that force in any serious enterprise, and to -find an excuse for conducting it back to Athens. That Syracuse was -the grand enemy, and that the capital point of the enterprise was -the siege of that city, was a truth familiar to himself as well -as every man at Athens:[336] upon the formidable cavalry of the -Syracusans, Nikias had himself insisted, in the preliminary debates. -Yet, after four months of mere trifling, and pretence of action -so as to evade dealing with the real difficulty, the existence of -this cavalry is made an excuse for a farther postponement of four -months until reinforcements can be obtained from Athens. To all -the intrinsic dangers of the case, predicted by Nikias himself -with proper discernment, was thus superadded the aggravated danger -of his own factitious delay; frittering away the first impression -of his armament, giving the Syracusans leisure to enlarge their -fortifications, and allowing the Peloponnesians time to interfere -against Attica as well as to succor Sicily. It was the unhappy -weakness of this commander to shrink from decisive resolutions of -every kind, and at any rate to postpone them until the necessity -became imminent: the consequence of which was,—to use an expression -of the Corinthian envoy before the Peloponnesian war in censuring -the dilatory policy of Sparta,—that never acting, yet always seeming -about to act, he found his enemy in double force instead of single, -at the moment of actual conflict.[337] - - [335] Thucyd. vi, 21-26. - - [336] Thucyd. vi, 20. - - [337] Thucyd. i, 69. ἡσυχάζετε γὰρ μόνοι Ἑλλήνων, ὦ - Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ τῇ δυνάμει τινὰ ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι, - καὶ μόνοι ~οὐκ ἀρχομένην τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, ἀλλὰ - διπλασιουμένην, καταλύοντες~. - -Great, indeed, must have been the disappointment of the Athenians, -when, after having sent forth in the month of June, an expedition -of unparalleled efficiency, they receive in the month of November a -despatch to acquaint them that the general has accomplished little -except one indecisive victory; and that he has not even attempted -anything serious, nor can do so unless they send him farther cavalry -and money. Yet the only answer which they made was, to grant and -provide for this demand without any public expression of discontent -or disappointment against him.[338] And this is the more to be noted, -since the removal of Alkibiadês afforded an inviting and even -valuable opportunity for proposing to send out a fresh colleague -in his room. If there were no complaints raised against Nikias at -Athens, so neither are we informed of any such, even among his own -soldiers in Sicily, though _their_ disappointment must have been -yet greater than that of their countrymen at home, considering -the expectations with which they had come out. We may remember -that the delay of a few days at Eion, under perfectly justifiable -circumstances, and while awaiting the arrival of reinforcements -actually sent for, raised the loudest murmurs against Kleon in -his expedition against Amphipolis, from the hoplites in his own -army.[339] The contrast is instructive, and will appear yet more -instructive as we advance forward. - - [338] Αἰσχρὸν δὲ βιασθέντας ἀπελθεῖν, ἢ ~ὕστερον - ἐπιμεταπέμπεσθαι~, τὸ πρῶτον ἀσκέπτως βουλευσαμένους: “It is - disgraceful to be driven out of Sicily by superior force, or to - _send back here afterwards for fresh reinforcements, through our - own fault in making bad calculations at first_.” (Thucyd. vi, 21.) - - This was a part of the last speech by Nikias himself at Athens, - prior to the expedition. The Athenian people in reply had passed - a vote that he and his colleagues should fix their own amount of - force, and should have everything which they asked for. Moreover, - such was the feeling in the city, that every one individually was - anxious to put down his name to serve (vi, 26-31). Thucydidês - can hardly find words sufficient to depict the completeness, the - grandeur, the wealth public and private, of the armament. - - As this goes to establish what I have advanced in the text,—that - the actions of Nikias in Sicily stand most of all condemned by - his own previous speeches at Athens,—so it seems to have been - forgotten by Dr. Arnold, when he wrote his note on the remarkable - passage, ii, 65, of Thucydidês,—ἐξ ὧν ἄλλα τε πολλὰ, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ - πόλει, καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη, καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς· - ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνώμης ἁμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὓς ἐπῄεσαν, ὅσον ~οἱ - ἐκπέμψαντες, οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες~, - ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας, τά τε - ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν πρῶτον - ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐταράχθησαν. Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks:— - - “Thucydidês here expresses the same opinion which he repeats in - two other places (vi, 31; vii, 42). namely, that the Athenian - power was fully adequate to the conquest of Syracuse, _had not - the expedition been mismanaged by the general, and insufficiently - supplied by the government at home_. The words οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα - τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες signify “_not voting afterwards - the needful supplies to their absent armament_:” for Nikias was - prevented from improving his first victory over the Syracusans - by the want of cavalry and money; and the whole winter was lost - before he could get supplied from Athens. And subsequently - the armament was allowed to be reduced to great distress and - weakness, before the second expedition was sent to reinforce it.” - Göller and Poppo concur in this explanation. - - Let us in the first place discuss the explanation here given of - the words τὰ πρόσφορα ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες. It appears to me that - these words do _not_ signify “_voting the needful supplies_.” - - The word ἐπιγιγνώσκειν cannot be used in the same sense with - ἐπιπέμπειν—παρασχεῖν (vii, 2-15), ἐκπορίζειν. As it would not - be admissible to say ἐπιγιγνώσκειν ὅπλα, νῆας, ἵππους, χρήματα, - etc., so neither can it be right to say ἐπιγιγνώσκειν τὰ - πρόσφορα, if this latter word were used only as a comprehensive - word for these particulars, meaning “_supplies_.” The words - really mean: “_taking farther resolutions_ (after the expedition - was gone) _unsuitable or mischievous to the absent armament_.” - Πρόσφορα is used here quite generally, agreeing with βουλεύματα, - or some such word: indeed, we find the phrase τὰ πρόσφορα used - in the most general sense, for “what is suitable;” “what is - advantageous or convenient:” γυμνάσω τὰ πρόσφορα—πράσσεται τὰ - πρόσφορα—τὰ πρόσφορ’ ηὔξατ’—τὰ πρόσφορα δρῳης ἂν—τὸ ταῖσδε - πρόσφορον. Euripid. Hippol. 112; Alkestis, 148; Iphig. Aul. 160, - B; Helen. 1299; Troades, 304. - - Thucydidês appears to have in view the violent party contests - which broke out in reference to the Hermæ and the other - irreligious acts at Athens, after the departure of the armament, - especially to the mischief of recalling Alkibiadês, which grew - out of those contests. He does not allude to the withholding - of supplies from the armament; nor was it the purpose of any - of the parties at Athens to withhold them. The party acrimony - was directed against Alkibiadês exclusively, not against the - expedition. - - Next, as to the main allegation in Dr. Arnold’s note, that _one - of the causes_ of the failure of the Athenian expedition in - Sicily, was, that it was “insufficiently supplied by Athens.” Of - the two passages to which he refers in Thucydidês (vi, 31; vii, - 42), the first distinctly contradicts this allegation, by setting - forth the prodigious amount of force sent; the second says - nothing about it, and indirectly discountenances it, by dwelling - upon the glaring blunders of Nikias. - - After the Athenians had allowed Nikias in the spring to name and - collect the force which he thought requisite, how could they - expect to receive a demand for farther reinforcements in the - autumn, the army having really done nothing? Nevertheless, the - supplies _were sent_, as soon as they could be, and as soon as - Nikias expected them. If the whole winter was lost, that was not - the fault of the Athenians. - - Still harder is it in Dr. Arnold, to say, “that the armament - _was allowed_ to be reduced to great distress and weakness - before the second expedition was sent to reinforce it.” The - second expedition was sent the moment that Nikias made known - his distress and asked for it; his intimation of distress - coming quite suddenly, almost immediately after most successful - appearances. - - It appears to me that nothing can be more incorrect or - inconsistent with the whole tenor of the narrative of - Thucydidês, than to charge the Athenians with having starved - their expedition. What they are really chargeable with, is, the - having devoted to it a disproportionate fraction of their entire - strength, perfectly enormous and ruinous. And so Thucydidês - plainly conceives it, when he is describing both the armament of - Nikias and that of Demosthenês. - - Thucydidês is very reserved in saying anything against Nikias, - whom he treats throughout with the greatest indulgence and - tenderness. But he lets drop quite sufficient to prove that - he conceived the mismanagement of the general as _the cause_ - of the failure of the armament, not as “one of two causes,” - as Dr. Arnold here presents it. Of course, I recognize fully - the consummate skill, and the aggressive vigor so unusual in a - Spartan, of Gylippus, together with the effective influence which - this exercised upon the result. But Gylippus would never have - set foot in Syracuse, had he not been let in, first through the - apathy, next through the contemptuous want of precaution, shown - by Nikias (vii, 42). - - [339] Thucyd. v, 7. See volume vi of this History, chap. liv, p. - 464. - -Meanwhile the Syracusans were profiting by the lesson of their -recent defeat. In the next public assembly which ensued, Hermokratês -addressed them in the mingled tone of encouragement and admonition. -He praised their bravery, while he deprecated their want of tactics -and discipline. Considering the great superiority of the enemy in -this last respect, he regarded the recent battle as giving good -promise for the future; and he appealed with satisfaction to the -precautions taken by Nikias in fortifying his camp, as well as to -his speedy retreat after the battle. He pressed them to diminish -the excessive number of fifteen generals, whom they had hitherto -been accustomed to nominate to the command; to reduce the number to -three, conferring upon them at the same time fuller powers than -had been before enjoyed, and swearing a solemn oath to leave them -unfettered in the exercise of such powers; lastly, to enjoin upon -these generals the most strenuous efforts, during the coming winter, -for training and arming the whole population. Accordingly Hermokratês -himself, with Herakleidês and Sikanus, were named to the command. -Ambassadors were sent both to Sparta and to Corinth, for the purpose -of entreating assistance in Sicily, as well as of prevailing on the -Peloponnesians to recommence a direct attack against Attica;[340] -so as at least to prevent the Athenians from sending farther -reinforcements to Nikias, and perhaps even to bring about the recall -of his army. - - [340] Thucyd. vi, 72, 73. - -But by far the most important measure which marked the nomination of -the new generals, was, the enlargement of the line of fortifications -at Syracuse. They constructed a new wall, inclosing an additional -space and covering both their inner and their outer city to the -westward, reaching from the outer sea to the Great Harbor, across -the whole space fronting the rising slope of the hill of Epipolæ, -and stretching far enough westward to inclose the sacred precinct of -Apollo Temenites. This was intended as a precaution, in order that -if Nikias, resuming operations in the spring, should beat them in -the field and confine them to their walls, he might, nevertheless, -be prevented from carrying a wall of circumvallation from sea to sea -without covering a great additional extent of ground.[341] Besides -this, the Syracusans fitted up and garrisoned the deserted town of -Megara, on the coast to the north of Syracuse; they established a -regular fortification and garrison in the Olympieion or temple of -Zeus Olympius, which they had already garrisoned after the recent -battle with Nikias; and they planted stakes in the sea to obstruct -the convenient landing-places. All these precautions were useful -to them; and we may even say that the new outlying fortification, -inclosing the Temenites, proved their salvation in the coming siege, -by so lengthening the circumvallation necessary for the Athenians to -construct, that Gylippus had time to arrive before it was finished. -But there was one farther precaution which the Syracusans omitted -at this moment, when it was open to them without any hindrance, -to occupy and fortify the Euryâlus, or the summit of the hill of -Epipolæ. Had they done this now, probably the Athenians could never -have made progress with their lines of circumvallation: but they did -not think of it until too late, as we shall presently see. - - [341] Thucyd. vi, 75. Ἐτείχιζον δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι - πρός τε τῇ πόλει, τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐντὸς ποιησάμενοι, ~τεῖχος - παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς~ ὁρῶν, ~ὅπως μὴ δι’ ἐλάσσονος - εὐαποτείχιστοι ὦσιν~, ἢν ἄρα σφάλλωνται, etc. - - I reserve the general explanation of the topography of Syracuse - for the next chapter, when the siege begins. - -Nevertheless it is important to remark, in reference to the general -scheme of Athenian operations in Sicily, that if Nikias had -adopted the plan originally recommended by Lamachus, or if he had -begun his permanent besieging operations against Syracuse in the -summer or autumn of 415 B.C., instead of postponing them, as he -actually did, to the spring of 414 B.C., he would have found none -of these additional defences to contend against, and the line of -circumvallation necessary for his purpose would have been shorter and -easier. Besides these permanent and irreparable disadvantages, his -winter’s inaction at Naxos drew upon him the farther insult, that -the Syracusans marched to his former quarters at Katana and burned -the tents which they found standing, ravaging at the same time the -neighboring fields.[342] - - [342] Thucyd. vi, 75. - -Kamarina maintained an equivocal policy which made both parties hope -to gain it; and in the course of this winter the Athenian envoy -Euphêmus with others was sent thither to propose a renewal of that -alliance, between the city and Athens, which had been concluded -ten years before. Hermokratês the Syracusan went to counteract his -object; and both of them, according to Grecian custom, were admitted -to address the public assembly. - -Hermokratês began by denouncing the views, designs, and past history -of Athens. He did not, he said, fear her power, provided the -Sicilian cities were united and true to each other: even against -Syracuse alone, the hasty retreat of the Athenians after the recent -battle had shown how little they confided in their own strength. -What he did fear, was, the delusive promises and insinuations of -Athens, tending to disunite the island, and to paralyze all joint -resistance. Every one knew that her purpose in this expedition was -to subjugate all Sicily,—that Leontini and Egesta served merely -as convenient pretences to put forward,—and that she could have no -sincere sympathy for Chalkidians in Sicily, when she herself held in -slavery the Chalkidians in Eubœa. It was, in truth, nothing else but -an extension of the same scheme of rapacious ambition, whereby she -had reduced her Ionian allies and kinsmen to their present wretched -slavery, now threatened against Sicily. The Sicilians could not too -speedily show her that they were no Ionians, made to be transferred -from one master to another, but autonomous Dorians from the centre -of autonomy, Peloponnesus. It would be madness to forfeit this -honorable position through jealousy or lukewarmness among themselves. -Let not the Kamarinæans imagine that Athens was striking her blow at -Syracuse alone: they were themselves next neighbors of Syracuse, and -would be the first victims if she were conquered. They might wish, -from apprehension or envy, to see the superior power of Syracuse -humbled, but this could not happen without endangering their own -existence. They ought to do for her what they would have asked her to -do if the Athenians had invaded Kamarina, instead of lending merely -nominal aid, as they had hitherto done. Their former alliance with -Athens was for purposes of mutual defence, not binding them to aid -her in schemes of pure aggression. To hold aloof, give fair words -to both parties, and leave Syracuse to fight the battle of Sicily -single-handed, was as unjust as it was dishonorable. If she came off -victor in the struggle, she would take care that the Kamarinæans -should be no gainers by such a policy. The state of affairs was so -plain, that he (Hermokratês) could not pretend to enlighten them: but -he solemnly appealed to their sentiments of common blood and lineage. -The Dorians of Syracuse were assailed by their eternal enemies the -Ionians, and ought not to be now betrayed by their own brother -Dorians of Kamarina.[343] - - [343] Thucyd. vi, 77-80. - -Euphêmus, in reply, explained the proceedings of Athens in reference -to her empire, and vindicated her against the charges of Hermokratês. -Though addressing a Dorian assembly, he did not fear to take his -start from the position laid down by Hermokratês, that Ionians -were the natural enemies of Dorians. Under this feeling Athens, as -an Ionian city, had looked about to strengthen herself against -the supremacy of her powerful Dorian neighbors in Peloponnesus. -Finding herself after the repulse of the Persian king at the head -of those Ionians and other Greeks who had just revolted from him, -she had made use of her position as well as of her superior navy -to shake off the illegitimate ascendency of Sparta. Her empire was -justified by regard for her own safety against Sparta, as well as -by the immense superiority of her maritime efforts in the rescue of -Greece from the Persians. Even in reference to her allies, she had -good ground for reducing them to subjection, because they had made -themselves the instruments and auxiliaries of the Persian king in -his attempt to conquer her. Prudential views for assured safety to -herself had thus led her to the acquisition of her present empire, -and the same views now brought her to Sicily. He was prepared to show -that the interests of Kamarina were in full accordance with those -of Athens. The main purpose of Athens in Sicily was to prevent her -Sicilian enemies from sending aid to her Peloponnesian enemies, to -accomplish which, powerful Sicilian allies were indispensable to her. -To enfeeble or subjugate her Sicilian allies would be folly: if she -did this, they would not serve her purpose of keeping the Syracusans -employed in their own island. Hence her desire to reëstablish the -expatriated Leontines, powerful and free, though she retained the -Chalkidians in Eubœa as subjects. Near home, she wanted nothing but -subjects, disarmed and tribute-paying, while in Sicily, she required -independent and efficient allies; so that the double conduct, which -Hermokratês reproached as inconsistent, proceeded from one and the -same root of public prudence. Pursuant to that motive, Athens dealt -differently with her different allies, according to the circumstances -of each. Thus, she respected the autonomy of Chios and Methymna, and -maintained equal relations with other islanders near Peloponnesus; -and such were the relations which she now wished to establish in -Sicily. - -No: it was Syracuse, not Athens, whom the Kamarinæans and other -Sicilians had really ground to fear. Syracuse was aiming at the -acquisition of imperial sway over the island; and that which she -had already done towards the Leontines showed what she was prepared -to do when the time came, against Kamarina and others. It was under -this apprehension that the Kamarinæans had formerly invited Athens -into Sicily: it would be alike unjust and impolitic were they now to -repudiate her aid, for she could accomplish nothing without them; if -they did so on the present occasion, they would repent it hereafter -when exposed to the hostility of a constant encroaching neighbor, -and when Athenian auxiliaries could not again be had. He repelled -the imputations which Hermokratês had cast upon Athens, but the -Kamarinæans were not sitting as judges or censors upon her merits. It -was for them to consider whether that meddlesome disposition, with -which Athens was reproached, was not highly beneficial as the terror -of oppressors, and the shield of weaker states, throughout Greece. -He now tendered it to the Kamarinæans as their only security against -Syracuse; calling upon them, instead of living in perpetual fear of -her aggression, to seize the present opportunity of attacking her on -an equal footing, jointly with Athens.[344] - - [344] Thucyd. vi, 83-87. - -In these two remarkable speeches, we find Hermokratês renewing -substantially the same line of counsel as he had taken up ten years -before at the congress of Gela, to settle all Sicilian differences at -home, and above all things to keep out the intervention of Athens; -who if she once got footing in Sicily, would never rest until she -reduced all the cities successively. This was the natural point of -view for a Syracusan politician; but by no means equally natural, -nor equally conclusive, for an inhabitant of one of the secondary -Sicilian cities, especially of the conterminous Kamarina. And the -oration of Euphêmus is an able pleading to demonstrate that the -Kamarinæans had far more to fear from Syracuse than from Athens. -His arguments to this point are at least highly plausible, if not -convincing: but he seems to lay himself open to attack from the -opposite quarter. If Athens cannot hope to gain any subjects in -Sicily, what motive has she for interfering? This Euphêmus meets -by contending that if she does not interfere, the Syracusans and -their allies will come across and render assistance to the enemies -of Athens in Peloponnesus. It is manifest, however, that under the -actual circumstances of the time, Athens could have no real fears of -this nature, and that her real motives for meddling in Sicily were -those of hope and encroachment, not of self-defence. But it shows -how little likely such hopes were to be realized, and therefore how -ill-advised the whole plan of interference in Sicily was,—that the -Athenian envoy could say to the Kamarinæans, in the same strain -as Nikias had spoken at Athens when combating the wisdom of the -expedition: “Such is the distance of Sicily from Athens, and such -the difficulty of guarding cities of great force and ample territory -combined, that if we wished to hold you Sicilians as subjects, -we should be unable to do it: we can only retain you as free and -powerful allies.”[345] What Nikias said at Athens to dissuade his -countrymen from the enterprise, under sincere conviction, Euphêmus -repeated at Kamarina for the purpose of conciliating that city; -probably, without believing it himself, yet the anticipation was not -on that account the less true and reasonable. - - [345] Thucyd. vi, 86. ἡμεῖς μέν γε οὔτε ἐμμεῖναι δυνατοὶ μὴ - μεθ’ ὑμῶν· εἴ τε καὶ γενόμενοι κακοὶ κατεργασαίμεθα, ἀδύνατοι - κατασχεῖν, διὰ μῆκός τε πλοῦ καὶ ἀπορίᾳ φυλακῆς πόλεων μεγάλων - καὶ παρασκευῇ ἠπειρωτίδων, etc. - - This is exactly the language of Nikias in his speech to the - Athenians. vi, 11. - -The Kamarinæans felt the force of both speeches, from Hermokratês -and Euphêmus. Their inclinations carried them towards the Athenians, -yet not without a certain misgiving in case Athens should prove -completely successful. Towards the Syracusans, on the contrary, they -entertained nothing but unqualified apprehension, and jealousy of -very ancient date; and even now their great fear was, of probable -suffering, if the Syracusans succeeded against Athens without their -coöperation. In this dilemma, they thought it safest to give an -evasive answer, of friendly sentiment towards both parties, but -refusal of aid to either; hoping thus to avoid an inexpiable breach, -whichever way the ultimate success might turn.[346] - - [346] Thucyd. vi, 88. - -For a city comparatively weak and situated like Kamarina, such was -perhaps the least hazardous policy. In December, 415 B.C., no human -being could venture to predict how the struggle between Nikias and -the Syracusans in the coming year would turn out; nor were the -Kamarinæans prompted by any hearty feeling to take the extreme -chances with either party. Matters had borne a different aspect, -indeed, in the preceding month of July 415 B.C., when the Athenians -first arrived. Had the vigorous policy urged by Lamachus been then -followed up, the Athenians would always have appeared likely to -succeed, if, indeed, they had not already become conquerors of -Syracuse; so that waverers like the Kamarinæans would have remained -attached to them from policy. The best way to obtain allies, Lamachus -had contended, was, to be prompt and decisive in action, and to -strike at the capital point at once, while the intimidating effect -of their arrival was fresh. Of the value of his advice, an emphatic -illustration is afforded by the conduct of Kamarina.[347] - - [347] Compare the remarks of Alkibiadês, Thucyd. vi, 91. - -Throughout the rest of the winter, Nikias did little or nothing. -He merely despatched envoys for the purpose of conciliating the -Sikels in the interior, where the autonomous Sikels, who dwelt in -the central regions of the island, for the most part declared in -his favor,—especially the powerful Sikel prince Archônidês,—sending -provisions and even money to the camp at Naxos. Against some -refractory tribes, Nikias sent detachments for purposes of -compulsion; while the Syracusans on their part did the like to -counteract him. Such Sikel tribes as had become dependents of -Syracuse, stood aloof from the struggle. As the spring approached, -Nikias transferred his position from Naxos to Katana, reëstablishing -that camp which the Syracusans had destroyed.[348] - - [348] Thucyd. vi, 88. - -He farther sent a trireme to Carthage, to invite coöperation from -that city; and a second to the Tyrrhenian maritime cities on the -southern coast of Italy, some of whom had proffered to him their -services, as ancient enemies of Syracuse, and now realized their -promises. From Carthage nothing was obtained; why, we do not know; -for we shall find the Carthaginians, six years hence, invading -Sicily with prodigious forces; and if they entertained any such -intentions, it would seem that the presence of Nikias in Sicily must -have presented the most convenient moment for executing them. To the -Sikels, Egestæans, and all the other allies of Athens, Nikias sent -orders for bricks, iron bars, clamps, and everything suitable for the -wall of circumvallation, which was to be commenced with the first -burst of spring. - -While such preparations were going on in Sicily, debates of -portentous promise took place at Sparta. Immediately after the -battle near the Olympieion, and the retreat of Nikias into winter -quarters, the Syracusans had despatched envoys to Peloponnesus to -solicit reinforcements. Here, again, we are compelled to notice the -lamentable consequences arising out of the inaction of Nikias. Had -he commenced the siege of Syracuse on his first arrival, it may be -doubted whether any such envoys would have been sent to Peloponnesus -at all; at any rate, they would not have arrived in time to produce -decisive effects.[349] After exerting what influence they could upon -the Italian Greeks in their voyage, the Syracusan envoys reached -Corinth, where they found the warmest reception and obtained promises -of speedy succor. The Corinthians furnished envoys of their own to -accompany them to Sparta, and to back their request for Lacedæmonian -aid. - - [349] Thucyd. vi, 88; vii, 42. - -They found at the congress at Sparta another advocate upon whom they -could not reasonably have counted, Alkibiadês. That exile had crossed -over from Thurii to the Eleian port of Kyllênê in Peloponnesus in -a merchant-vessel,[350] and now appeared at Sparta on special -invitation and safe-conduct from the Lacedæmonians; of whom he was -at first vehemently afraid, in consequence of having raised against -them that Peloponnesian combination which had given them so much -trouble before the battle of Mantineia. He now appeared, too, burning -with hostility against his country, and eager to inflict upon her -all the mischief in his power. Having been the chief evil genius to -plunge her, mainly for selfish ends of his own, into this ill-starred -venture, he was now about to do his best to turn it into her -irreparable ruin. His fiery stimulus, and unmeasured exaggerations, -supplied what was wanting in Corinthian and Syracusan eloquence, and -inflamed the tardy good-will of the Spartan ephors into comparative -decision and activity.[351] His harangue in the Spartan congress is -given to us by Thucydidês, who may possibly have heard it, as he was -then himself in exile. Like the earlier speech which he puts into the -mouth of Alkibiadês at Athens, it is characteristic in a high degree; -and interesting in another point of view as the latest composed -speech of any length which we find in his history. I give here the -substance, without professing to translate the words. - - [350] Plutarch (Alkib. c. 23) says that he went to reside at - Argos; but this seems difficult to reconcile with the assertion - of Thucydidês (vi, 61) that his friends at Argos had incurred - grave suspicions of treason. - - Cornelius Nepos (Alkib. c. 4) says, with greater probability of - truth, that Alkibiadês went from Thurii, first to Elis, next to - Thebes. - - Isokratês (De Bigis, Orat. xvi, s. 10) says that the Athenians - banished him out of all Greece, inscribed his name on a column, - and sent envoys to demand his person from the Argeians; so that - Alkibiadês _was compelled_ to take refuge with the Lacedæmonians. - This whole statement of Isokratês is exceedingly loose and - untrustworthy, carrying back the commencement of the conspiracy - of the Four Hundred to a time anterior to the banishment of - Alkibiadês. But among all the vague sentences, this allegation - that the Athenians banished him out of _all Greece_ stands - prominent. They could only banish him from the territory of - Athens and her allies. Whether he went to Argos, as I have - already said, seems to me very doubtful: perhaps Plutarch copied - the statement from this passage of Isokratês. - - But under all circumstances, we are not to believe that - Alkibiadês turned against his country, or went to Sparta, _upon - compulsion_. The first act of his hostility to Athens, the - disappointing her of the acquisition of Messênê, was committed - before he left Sicily. Moreover, Thucydidês represents him as - unwilling indeed to go to Sparta, but only unwilling because he - was afraid of the Spartans; in fact, waiting for a safe-conduct - and invitation from them. Thucydidês mentions nothing about his - going to Argos (vi, 88). - - [351] Thucyd. vi, 88. - -“First, I must address you, Lacedæmonians, respecting the prejudices -current against me personally, before I can hope to find a fair -hearing on public matters. You know it was I, who renewed my public -connection with Sparta, after my ancestors before me had quarrelled -with you and renounced it. Moreover, I assiduously cultivated your -favor on all points, especially by attentions to your prisoners at -Athens: but while I was showing all this zeal towards you, you took -the opportunity of the peace which you made with Athens to employ -my enemies as your agents, thus strengthening their hands, and -dishonoring me. It was this conduct of yours which drove me to unite -with the Argeians and Mantineians; nor ought you to be angry with -me for mischief which you thus drew upon yourselves. Probably some -of you hate me too, without any good reason, as a forward partisan -of democracy. My family were always opposed to the Peisistratid -despots; and as all opposition to a reigning dynasty takes the name -of The People, so from that time forward we continued to act as -leaders of the people.[352] Moreover, our established constitution -was a democracy, so that I had no choice but to obey, though I did my -best to maintain a moderate line of political conduct in the midst -of the reigning license. It was not my family, but others, who in -former times as well as now, led the people into the worst courses, -those same men who sent me into exile. I always acted as leader, not -of a party, but of the entire city; thinking it right to uphold that -constitution in which Athens had enjoyed her grandeur and freedom, -and which I found already existing.[353] For as to democracy, all we -Athenians of common sense well knew its real character. Personally, -I have better reason than any one else to rail against it, if one -_could_ say anything new about such confessed folly; but I did not -think it safe to change the government, while you were standing by as -enemies. - - [352] Thucyd. vi, 89. Τοῖς γὰρ τυράννοις ἀεί ποτε διάφοροί ἐσμεν, - πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἐναντιούμενον τῷ δυναστεύοντι δῆμος ὠνόμασται· καὶ ἀπ’ - ἐκείνου ξυμπαρέμεινεν ἡ προστασία ἡμῖν τοῦ πλήθους. - - It is to be recollected that the Lacedæmonians had been always - opposed to τύραννοι, or despots, and had been particularly - opposed to the Peisistratid τύραννοι, whom they in fact put - down. In tracing his democratical tendencies, therefore, to this - source, Alkibiadês took the best means of excusing them before a - Lacedæmonian audience. - - [353] Thucyd. vi, 89. ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦ ξύμπαντος προέστημεν, - δικαιοῦντες ἐν ᾧ σχήματι μεγίστη ἡ πόλις ἔτυχε καὶ ἐλευθερωτάτη - οὖσα, καὶ ὅπερ ἐδέξατό τις, τοῦτο ξυνδιασῴζειν· ἐπεὶ δημοκρατίαν - γε καὶ ἐγιγνώσκομεν οἱ φρονοῦντές τι, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐδενὸς ἂν - χεῖρον, ὅσῳ καὶ λοιδορήσαιμι· ἀλλὰ περὶ ὁμολογουμένης ἀνοίας - οὐδὲν ἂν καινὸν λέγοιτο· καὶ τὸ μεθιστάναι αὐτὴν οὐκ ἐδόκει ἡμῖν - ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι, ὑμῶν πολεμίων προσκαθημένων. - -“So much as to myself personally: I shall now talk to you about the -business of the meeting, and tell you something more than you yet -know. Our purpose in sailing from Athens, was, first to conquer the -Sicilian Greeks; next, the Italian Greeks; afterwards, to make an -attempt on the Carthaginian empire and on Carthage herself. If all -or most of this succeeded, we were then to attack Peloponnesus. -We intended to bring to this enterprise the entire power of the -Sicilian and Italian Greeks, besides large numbers of Iberian and -other warlike barbaric mercenaries, together with many new triremes -built from the abundant forests of Italy, and large supplies both of -treasure and provision. We could thus blockade Peloponnesus all round -with our fleet, and at the same time assail it with our land-force; -and we calculated, by taking some towns by storm and occupying others -as permanent fortified positions, that we should easily conquer the -whole peninsula, and then become undisputed masters of Greece. You -thus hear the whole scheme of our expedition from the man who knows -it best; and you may depend on it that the remaining generals will -execute all this, if they can. Nothing but your intervention can -hinder them. If, indeed, the Sicilian Greeks were all united, they -might hold out; but the Syracusans standing alone cannot, beaten as -they already have been in a general action, and blocked up as they -are by sea. If Syracuse falls into the hands of the Athenians, all -Sicily and all Italy will share the same fate; and the danger which I -have described will be soon upon you. - -“It is not therefore simply for the safety of Sicily,—it is for -the safety of Peloponnesus,—that I now urge you to send across, -forthwith, a fleet with an army of hoplites as rowers; and what I -consider still more important than an army, a Spartan general to -take the supreme command. Moreover, you must also carry on declared -and vigorous war against Athens here, that the Syracusans may be -encouraged to hold out, and that Athens may be in no condition to -send additional reinforcements thither. You must farther fortify and -permanently garrison Dekeleia in Attica:[354] that is the contingency -which the Athenians have always been most afraid of, and which -therefore you may know to be your best policy. You will thus get -into your own hands the live and dead stock of Attica, interrupt the -working of the silver mines at Laureion, deprive the Athenians of -their profits from judicial fines as well as of their landed revenue, -and dispose the subject-allies to withhold their tribute. - - [354] The establishment and permanent occupation of a fortified - post in Attica, had been contemplated by the Corinthians even - before the beginning of the war (Thucyd. i, 122). - -“None of you ought to think the worse of me because I make this -vigorous onset upon my country in conjunction with her enemies, -I who once passed for a patriot.[355] Nor ought you to mistrust -my assurances, as coming from the reckless passion of an exile. -The worst enemies of Athens are not those who make open war like -you, but those who drive her best friends into hostility. I loved -my country,[356] while I was secure as a citizen; I love her no -more, now that I am wronged. In fact, I do not conceive myself to -be assailing a country still mine; I am rather trying to win back -a country now lost to me. The real patriot is not he, who, having -unjustly lost his country, acquiesces in patience, but he whose ardor -makes him try every means to regain her. - - [355] Thucyd. vi, 92. Καὶ χείρων οὐδενὶ ἀξιῶ δοκεῖν ὑμῶν εἶναι, - εἰ τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ μετὰ τῶν πολεμιωτάτων, φιλόπολίς ποτε δοκῶν εἶναι, - νῦν ἐγκρατῶς ἐπέρχομαι. - - [356] Thucyd. vi, 92. Τό τε φιλόπολι οὐκ ἐν ᾧ ἀδικοῦμαι ἔχω, ἀλλ’ - ἐν ᾧ ἀσφαλῶς ἐπολιτεύθην. Οὐδ’ ἐπὶ πατρίδα οὖσαν ἔτι ἡγοῦμαι νῦν - ἰέναι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν οὐκ οὖσαν ἀνακτᾶσθαι. Καὶ φιλόπολις - οὗτος ὀρθῶς, οὐχ ὃς ἂν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως ἀπολέσας μὴ ἐπίῃ, ἀλλ’ - ὃς ἂν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν πειραθῇ αὐτὴν ἀναλαβεῖν. - -“Employ me without fear, Lacedæmonians, in any service of danger or -suffering; the more harm I did you formerly as an enemy, the more -good I can now do you as a friend. But above all, do not shrink back -from instant operations both in Sicily and in Attica, upon which so -much depends. You will thus put down the power of Athens, present as -well as future; you will dwell yourselves in safety; and you will -become the leaders of undivided Hellas, by free consent and without -force.”[357] - - [357] Thucyd. vi, 89-92. - -Enormous consequences turned upon this speech, no less masterly -in reference to the purpose and the audience, than infamous as an -indication of the character of the speaker. If its contents became -known at Athens, as they probably did, the enemies of Alkibiadês -would be supplied with a justification of their most violent -political attacks. That imputation which they had taken so much -pains to fasten upon him, citing in proof of it alike his profligate -expenditure, overbearing insolence, and derision of the religious -ceremonies of the state,[358]—that he detested the democracy in his -heart, submitted to it only from necessity, and was watching for the -first safe opportunity of subverting it,—appears here in his own -language as matter of avowal and boast. The sentence of condemnation -against him would now be unanimously approved, even by those who -at the time had deprecated it; and the people would be more firmly -persuaded than before of the reality of the association between -irreligious manifestations and treasonable designs. Doubtless the -inferences so drawn from the speech would be unsound, because it -represented, not the actual past sentiments of Alkibiadês, but those -to which he now found it convenient to lay claim. As far as so very -selfish a politician could be said to have any preference, democracy -was, in some respects, more convenient to him than oligarchy. -Though offensive to his taste, it held out larger prospects to -his love of show, his adventurous ambition, and his rapacity for -foreign plunder; while under an oligarchy, the jealous restraints -and repulses imposed on him by a few equals, would be perhaps more -galling to his temper than those arising from the whole people.[359] -He takes credit in his speech for moderation, as opposed to the -standing license of democracy. But this is a pretence absurd even to -extravagance, and which Athenians of all parties would have listened -to with astonishment. Such license as that of Alkibiadês had never -been seen at Athens; and it was the adventurous instincts of the -democracy towards foreign conquest, combined with their imperfect -apprehension of the limits and conditions under which alone their -empire could be permanently maintained, which he stimulated up to the -highest point, and then made use of for his own power and profit. As -against himself, he had reason for accusing his political enemies -of unworthy manœuvres, and even of gross political wickedness, if -they were authors or accomplices—as seems probable of some—in the -mutilation of the Hermæ. But most certainly, their public advice to -the commonwealth was far less mischievous than his. And if we are to -strike the balance of personal political merit between Alkibiadês -and his enemies, we must take into the comparison his fraud upon the -simplicity of the Lacedæmonian envoys, recounted in the last chapter -but one of this History. - - [358] Thucyd. vi, 28. - - [359] See a remarkable passage of Thucyd. viii, 89, ῥᾷον τὰ - ἀποβαίνοντα, ὡς οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἐλασσούμενός τις φέρει, - and the note in explanation of it, in a later chapter of this - History, chap. lxii. - -If, then, that portion of the speech of Alkibiadês, wherein he -touches upon Athenian politics and his own past conduct, is not -to be taken as historical evidence, just as little can we trust -the following portion in which he professes to describe the real -purposes of Athens in her Sicilian expedition. That any such vast -designs as those which he announces were ever really contemplated -even by himself and his immediate friends, is very improbable; that -they were contemplated by the Athenian public, by the armament, or -by Nikias, is utterly incredible. The tardiness and timid movements -of the armament—during the first eight months after arriving at -Rhegium—recommended by Nikias, partially admitted even by Alkibiadês, -opposed only by the unavailing wisdom of Lamachus, and not strongly -censured when known at Athens, conspire to prove that their minds -were not at first fully made up even to the siege of Syracuse; -that they counted on alliances and money in Sicily which they did -not find; and that those who sailed from Athens with large hopes -of brilliant and easy conquest were soon taught to see the reality -with different eyes. If Alkibiadês had himself conceived at Athens -the designs which he professed to reveal in his speech at Sparta, -there can be no doubt that he would have espoused the scheme of -Lamachus, or rather would have originated it himself. We find him, -indeed, in his speech delivered at Athens before the determination -to sail, holding out hopes that by means of conquests in Sicily, -Athens might become mistress of all Greece. But this is there put as -an alternative and as a favorable possibility, is noticed only in -one place, without expansion or amplification, and shows that the -speaker did not reckon upon finding any such expectations prevalent -among his hearers. Alkibiadês could not have ventured to promise, -in his discourse at Athens, the results which he afterwards talked -of at Sparta as having been actually contemplated,—Sicily, Italy, -Carthage, Iberian mercenaries, etc., all ending in a blockading fleet -large enough to gird round Peloponnesus.[360] Had he put forth such -promises, the charge of juvenile folly which Nikias urged against -him would probably have been believed by every one. His speech at -Sparta, though it has passed with some as a fragment of true Grecian -history, is in truth little better than a gigantic romance dressed up -to alarm his audience.[361] - - [360] Thucyd. vi, 12-17. - - [361] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 17. - -Intended for this purpose, it was eminently suitable and -effective. The Lacedæmonians had already been partly moved by the -representations from Corinth and Syracuse, and were even prepared -to send envoys to the latter place with encouragement to hold out -against Athens. But the Peace of Nikias and the alliance succeeding -it, still subsisted between Athens and Sparta. It had indeed been -partially and indirectly violated in many ways, but both the -contracting parties still considered it as subsisting, nor would -either of them yet consent to break their oaths openly and avowedly. -For this reason—as well as from the distance of Sicily, great even -in the estimation of the more nautical Athenians—the ephors could -not yet make up their minds to despatch thither any positive aid. -It was exactly in this point of hesitation between the will and the -deed that the energetic and vindictive exile from Athens found them. -His flaming picture of the danger impending,—brought home to their -own doors, and appearing to proceed from the best informed of all -witnesses,—overcame their reluctance at once; while he at the same -time pointed out the precise steps whereby their interference would -be rendered of most avail. The transfer of Alkibiadês to Sparta -thus reverses the superiority of force between the two contending -chiefs of Greece: “Momentumque fuit mutatus Curio rerum.”[362] He had -not yet shown his power of doing his country good, as we shall find -him hereafter engaged, during the later years of the war: his first -achievements were but too successful in doing her harm. - - [362] Lucan, Pharsal. iv, 819. - -The Lacedæmonians forthwith resolved to send an auxiliary force -to Syracuse. But as this could not be done before the spring, -they nominated Gylippus commander, directing him to proceed -thither without delay, and to take counsel with the Corinthians -for operations as speedily as the case admitted.[363] We do not -know that Gylippus had as yet given any positive evidence of that -consummate skill and activity which we shall presently be called -upon to describe. He was probably chosen on account of his superior -acquaintance with the circumstances of the Italian and Sicilian -Greeks; since his father Kleandridas, after having been banished -from Sparta fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war for taking -Athenian bribes, had been domiciliated as a citizen at Thurii.[364] -Gylippus desired the Corinthians to send immediately two triremes for -him to Asinê, in the Messenian gulf, and to prepare as many others as -their docks could furnish. - - [363] Thucyd. vi, 93; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 23; Diodor. xiii, 7. - - [364] Thucyd. vi, 104. - - - - -CHAPTER LIX. - -FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE OF SYRACUSE BY NIKIAS, DOWN TO THE -SECOND ATHENIAN EXPEDITION UNDER DEMOSTHENES, AND THE RESUMPTION OF -THE GENERAL WAR. - - -The Athenian troops at Katana, probably tired of inaction, were -put in motion in the early spring, even before the arrival of the -reinforcements from Athens, and sailed to the deserted walls of -Megara, not far from Syracuse, which the Syracusans had recently -garrisoned. Having in vain attacked the Syracusan garrison, and laid -waste the neighboring fields, they reëmbarked, landed again for -similar purposes at the mouth of the river Terias, and then, after an -insignificant skirmish, returned to Katana. An expedition into the -interior of the island procured for them the alliance of the Sikel -town of Kentoripa; and the cavalry being now arrived from Athens, -they prepared for operations against Syracuse. Nikias had received -from Athens two hundred and fifty horsemen fully equipped, for whom -horses were to be procured in Sicily,[365] thirty horse-bowmen, -and three hundred talents in money. He was not long in furnishing -them with horses from Egesta and Katana, from which cities he also -received some farther cavalry, so that he was presently able to -muster six hundred and fifty cavalry in all.[366] - - [365] Horses were so largely bred in Sicily, that they even found - their way into Attica and Central Greece, Sophoklês, Œd. Kolon. - 312:— - - γυναῖχ’ ὁρῶ - Στείχουσαν ἡμῖν, ἆσσον, Αἰτναίας ἐπὶ - Πῶλου βεβῶσαν. - - If the Scholiast is to be trusted, the Sicilian horses were of - unusually great size. - - [366] Thucyd. vi, 95-98. - -Even before this cavalry could be mounted, Nikias made his first -approach to Syracuse. For the Syracusan generals on their side, -apprized of the arrival of the reinforcement from Athens, and aware -that besieging operations were on the point of being commenced, now -thought it necessary to take the precaution of occupying and guarding -the roads of access to the high ground of Epipolæ which overhung -their outer city. - -Syracuse consisted at this time of two parts, an inner and outer -city. The former was comprised in the island of Ortygia, the original -settlement founded by Archias, and within which the modern city is -at this moment included: the latter or outer city, afterwards known -by the name of Achradina, occupied the high ground of the peninsula -north of Ortygia, but does not seem to have joined the inner city, or -to have been comprised in the same fortification. This outer city was -defended, on the north and east, by the sea, with rocks presenting -great difficulties of landing, and by a sea-wall; so that on these -sides it was out of the reach of attack. Its wall on the land-side, -beginning from the sea somewhat eastward of the entrance of the cleft -now called Santa Bonagia, or Panagia, ran in a direction westward of -south as far as the termination of the high ground of Achradina, and -then turned eastward along the stone quarries now known as those of -the Capucins and Novanteris, where the ground is in part so steep, -that probably little fortification was needed. This fortified high -land of Achradina thus constituted the outer city; while the lower -ground, situated between it and the inner city, or Ortygia, seems at -this time not to have been included in the fortifications of either, -but was employed (and probably had been employed even from the first -settlement in the island), partly for religious processions, games, -and other multitudinous ceremonies; partly for the burial of the -dead, which, according to invariable Grecian custom, was performed -without the walls of the city. Extensive catacombs yet remain to mark -the length of time during which this ancient Nekropolis served its -purpose. - -To the northwest of the outer city wall, in the direction of the port -called Trogilus, stood an unfortified suburb which afterwards became -enlarged into the distinct walled town of Tychê. West of the southern -part of the same outer city wall, nearly southwest of the outer city -itself, stood another suburb, afterwards known and fortified as -Neapolis, but deriving its name, in the year 415 B.C., from having -within it the statue and consecrated ground of Apollo Temenitês,[367] -which stood a little way up on the ascent of the hill of Epipolæ, -and stretching from thence down southward in the direction of the -Great Harbor. Between these two suburbs lay a broad open space, the -ground rising in gradual acclivity from Achradina to the westward, -and diminishing in breadth as it rose higher, until at length it -ended in a small conical mound, called in modern times the Belvedere. -This acclivity formed the eastern ascent of the long ridge of high -ground called Epipolæ. It was a triangle upon an inclined plane, of -which Achradina was the base: to the north as well as to the south, -it was suddenly broken off by lines of limestone cliff (forming the -sides of the triangle), about fifteen or twenty feet high, and quite -precipitous, except in some few openings made for convenient ascent. -From the western point or apex of the triangle, the descent was easy -and gradual—excepting two or three special mounds, or cliffs—towards -the city, the interior of which was visible from this outer slope. - - [367] At the neighboring city of Gela, also, a little without the - walls, there stood a large brazen statue of Apollo; of so much - sanctity, beauty, or notoriety, that the Carthaginians in their - invasion of the island, seven years after the siege of Syracuse - by Nikias, carried it away with them and transported it to Tyre - (Diodor. xiii, 108). - -According to the warfare of that time, Nikias could only take -Syracuse by building a wall of circumvallation so as to cut off -its supplies by land, and at the same time blockading it by sea. -Now looking at the inner and outer city as above described, at the -moment when he first reached Sicily, we see that—after defeating -the Syracusans and driving them within their walls, which would be -of course the first part of the process—he might have carried his -blockading wall in a direction nearly southerly from the innermost -point of the cleft of Santa Bonagia, between the city wall and the -Temenitês so as to reach the Great Harbor at a spot not far westward -of the junction of Ortygia with the main land. Or he might have -landed in the Great Harbor, and executed the same wall, beginning -from the opposite end. Or he might have preferred to construct two -blockading walls, one for each city separately: a short wall would -have sufficed in front of the isthmus joining Ortygia, while a -separate wall might have been carried to shut up the outer city, -across the unfortified space constituting the Nekropolis, so as to -end not in the Great Harbor, but in the coast of the Nekropolis -opposite to Ortygia. Such were the possibilities of the case at the -time when Nikias first reached Rhegium. But during the many months -of inaction which he had allowed, the Syracusans had barred out both -these possibilities, and had greatly augmented the difficulties of -his intended enterprise. They had constructed a new wall, covering -both their inner and their outer city,—stretching across the whole -front which faced the slope of Epipolæ, from the Great Harbor to -the opposite sea near Santa Bonagia,—and expanding westward so as -to include within it the statue and consecrated ground of Apollo -Temenitês, with the cliff near adjoining to it known by the name -of the Temenite Cliff. This was done for the express purpose of -lengthening the line indispensable for the besiegers to make their -wall a good blockade.[368] After it was finished, Nikias could not -begin his blockade from the side of the Great Harbor, since he would -have been obstructed by the precipitous southern cliff of Epipolæ. -He was under the necessity of beginning his wall from a portion of -the higher ground of Epipolæ, and of carrying it both along a greater -space and higher up on the slope, until he touched the Great Harbor -at a point farther removed from Ortygia. - - [368] Thucyd. vi, 75. Ἐτείχιζον δὲ καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τῷ - χειμῶνι τούτῳ πρός τε τῇ πόλει, τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐντὸς ποιησάμενοι, - ~τεῖχος παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς ὁρῶν, ὅπως μὴ δι’ ἐλάσσονος - εὐαποτείχιστοι ὦσιν~, ἢν ἄρα σφάλλωνται, etc. - -Syracuse having thus become assailable only from the side of Epipolæ, -the necessity so created for carrying on operations much higher up on -the slope, gave to the summit of that eminence a greater importance -than it had before possessed. Nikias, doubtless furnished with good -local information by the exiles, seems to have made this discovery -earlier than the Syracusan generals, who—having been occupied in -augmenting their defences on another point, where they were yet more -vulnerable—did not make it until immediately before the opening -of the spring campaign. It was at that critical moment that they -proclaimed a full muster, for break of day, in the low mead on the -left bank of the Anapus. After an inspection of arms, and probably -final distribution of forces for the approaching struggle, a chosen -regiment of six hundred hoplites was placed under the orders of an -Andrian exile named Diomilus, in order to act as garrison of Epipolæ, -as well as to be in constant readiness wherever they might be -wanted.[369] These men were intended to occupy the strong ground on -the summit of the hill, and thus obstruct all the various approaches -to it, seemingly not many in number, and all narrow. - - [369] Thucyd. vi, 96. - -But before they had yet left their muster, to march to the summit, -intelligence reached them that the Athenians were already in -possession of it. Nikias and Lamachus, putting their troops on board -at Katana, had sailed during the preceding night to a landing-place -not far from a place called Leon, or the Lion, which was only six or -seven furlongs from Epipolæ, and seems to have lain between Megara -and the peninsula of Thapsus. They here landed their hoplites, and -placed their fleet in safety under cover of a palisade across the -narrow isthmus of Thapsus, before day and before the Syracusans had -any intimation of their arrival. Their hoplites immediately moved -forward with rapid step to ascend Epipolæ, mounting seemingly from -the northeast, by the side towards Megara and farthest removed from -Syracuse; so that they first reached the summit called Euryalus, near -the apex of the triangle above described. From hence they commanded -the slope of Epipolæ beneath them, and the town of Syracuse to the -eastward. They were presently attacked by the Syracusans, who broke -up their muster in the mead as soon as they heard the news. But as -the road by which they had to march, approaching Euryalus from the -southwest, was circuitous, and hardly less than three English miles -in length, they had the mortification of seeing that the Athenians -were already masters of the position; and when they hastened up to -retake it, the rapid pace had so disordered their ranks, that the -Athenians attacked them at great advantage, besides having the higher -ground. The Syracusans were driven back to their city with loss, -Diomilus with half his regiment being slain; while the Athenians -remained masters of the high ground of Euryalus, as well as of the -upper portion of the slope of Epipolæ.[370] - - [370] Thucyd. vi, 97. - -This was a most important advantage; indeed, seemingly essential to -the successful prosecution of the siege. It was gained by a plan -both well laid and well executed, grounded upon the omission of the -Syracusans to occupy a post of which they did not at first perceive -the importance, and which in fact only acquired its preëminent -importance from the new enlargement made by the Syracusans in -their fortifications. To that extent, therefore, it depended upon -a favorable accident which could not have been reasonably expected -to occur. The capture of Syracuse was certain, upon the supposition -that the attack and siege of the city had been commenced on the -first arrival of the Athenians in the island, without giving time -for any improvement in its defensibility. But the moment such delay -was allowed, success ceased to be certain, depending more or less -upon this favorable turn of accident. The Syracusans actually did -a great deal to create additional difficulty to the besiegers, and -might have done more, especially in regard to the occupation of -the high ground above Epipolæ. Had they taken this precaution, the -effective prosecution of the siege would have been rendered extremely -difficult, if not completely frustrated. - -On the next morning, Nikias and Lamachus marched their army down the -slope of Epipolæ near to the Syracusan walls, and offered battle, -which the enemy did not accept. They then withdrew the Athenian -troops; after which their first operation was to construct a fort -on the high ground called Labdalum, near the western end of the -upper northern cliffs bordering Epipolæ, on the brink of the cliff, -and looking northward towards Megara. This was intended as a place -of security wherein both treasures and stores might be deposited, -so as to leave the army unencumbered in its motions. The Athenian -cavalry being now completed by the new arrivals from Egesta, Nikias -descended from Labdalum to a new position called Sykê, lower down -on Epipolæ, seemingly about midway between the northern and southern -cliffs. He here constructed, with as much rapidity as possible, -a walled inclosure, called the Circle, intended as a centre from -whence the projected wall of circumvallation was to start northward -towards the sea at Trogilus, southward towards the Great Harbor. This -Circle appears to have covered a considerable space, and was farther -protected by an outwork in front covering an area of one thousand -square feet.[371] Astounded at the rapidity with which the Athenians -executed this construction,[372] the Syracusans marched their forces -out, and prepared to give battle in order to interrupt it. But -when the Athenians, relinquishing the work, drew up on their side -in battle order, the Syracusan generals were so struck with their -manifest superiority in soldier-like array, as compared with the -disorderly trim of their own ranks, that they withdrew their soldiers -back into the city without venturing to engage; merely leaving a body -of horse to harass the operations of the besiegers, and constrain -them to keep in masses. The newly-acquired Athenian cavalry, however, -were here brought for the first time into effective combat. With the -aid of one tribe of their own hoplites, they charged the Syracusan -horse, drove them off with some loss, and erected their trophy. This -is the only occasion on which we read of the Athenian cavalry being -brought into conflict; though Nikias had made the absence of cavalry -the great reason for his prolonged inaction. - - [371] Thucyd. vi, 98. ἐχώρουν πρὸς τὴν Συκῆν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἵναπερ - καθεζόμενοι ἐτείχισαν τὸν κύκλον διὰ τάχους. - - [372] The Athenians seem to have surpassed all other Greeks in - the diligence and skill with which they executed fortifications: - see some examples, Thucyd. v, 75-82; Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 4, 18. - -Interruption being thus checked, Nikias continued his blockading -operations; first completing the Circle,[373] then beginning his -wall of circumvallation in a northerly direction from the Circle -towards Trogilus: for which purpose a portion of his forces were -employed in bringing stones and wood, and depositing them in proper -places along the intended line. So strongly did Hermokratês feel -the inferiority of the Syracusan hoplites in the field, that he -discouraged any fresh general action, and proposed to construct a -counter-wall, or cross-wall, traversing the space along which the -Athenian circumvallation must necessarily be continued so as to -impede its farther progress. A tenable counter-wall, if they could -get time to carry it sufficiently far to a defensible terminus, would -completely defeat the intent of the besiegers: but even if Nikias -should interrupt the work by his attacks, the Syracusans calculated -on being able to provide a sufficient force to repel them, during the -short time necessary for hastily constructing the palisade, or front -outwork. Such palisade would serve them as a temporary defence, while -they finished the more elaborate cross-wall behind it, and would, -even at the worst, compel Nikias to suspend all his proceedings and -employ his whole force to dislodge them.[374] - - [373] Dr. Arnold, in his note on Thucyd. vi, 98, says that the - Circle is spoken of, in one passage of Thucydidês, as if it had - _never been completed_. I construe this one passage differently - from him (vii, 2, 4)—τῷ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου πρὸς τὸν Τρώγιλον ἐπὶ τὴν - ἑτέραν θάλασσαν: where I think τῷ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου is equivalent - to ἑτέρωθι τοῦ κύκλου, as plainly appears from the accompanying - mention of Trogilus and the northern sea. I am persuaded that - the Circle was finished; and Dr. Arnold himself indicates two - passages in which it is distinctly spoken of as having been - completed. - - [374] Thucyd. vi, 99. ~Ὑποτειχίζειν~ δὲ ἄμεινον ἐδόκει εἶναι - (τοῖς Συρακουσίοις) ᾗ ἐκεῖνοι (the Athenians) ἔμελλον ἄξειν τὸ - τεῖχος· καὶ εἰ φθάσειαν, ἀποκλῄσεις γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἅμα καὶ ἐν - τούτῳ εἰ ἐπιβοηθοῖεν, μέρος ἀντιπέμπειν αὐτοὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς, καὶ - φθάνειν ἂν αὐτοὶ τοῖς σταυροῖς ~προκαταλαμβάνοντες τὰς ἐφόδους~· - ἐκείνους δὲ ἂν παυομένους τοῦ ἔργου πάντας ἂν πρὸς σφᾶς τρέπεσθαι. - - The Scholiast here explains τὰς ἐφόδους to mean τὰ βάσιμα; - adding ὀλίγα δὲ τὰ ἐπιβαθῆναι δυνάμενα, διὰ τὸ τελματῶδες εἶναι - τὸ χωρίον. Though he is here followed by the best commentators, - I cannot think that his explanation is correct. He evidently - supposes that this first counter-wall of the Syracusans was - built—as we shall see presently that the second counter-work - was—across the marsh, or low ground between the southern cliff - of Epipolæ and the Great Harbor. “The ground being generally - marshy (τελματῶδες) there were only a few places where it could - be crossed.” But I conceive this supposition to be erroneous. The - first counter-wall of the Syracusans was carried, as it seems - to me, up the slope of Epipolæ, between the Athenian circle and - the southern cliff: it commenced at the Syracusan newly-erected - advanced wall, inclosing the Temenitês. This was all hard, firm - ground, such as the Athenians could march across at any point: - there might perhaps be some roughness here and there, but they - would be mere exceptions to the general character of the ground. - - It appears to me that τὰς ἐφόδους means simply, “the attacks - of the Athenians,” without intending to denote any special - assailable points; προκαταλαμβάνειν τὰς ἐφόδους, means “to get - beforehand with the attacks,” (see Thucyd. i, 57, v, 30.) This is - in fact the more usual meaning of ἔφοδος (compare vii, 5; vii, - 43; i, 6; v, 35; vi, 63), “attack, approach, visit,” etc. There - are doubtless other passages in which it means, “the way or road - through which the attack was made:” in one of these, however - (vii, 51), all the best editors now read ἐσόδου instead of ἐφόδου. - - It will be seen that arguments have been founded upon the - inadmissible sense which the Scholiast here gives to the word - ἔφοδοι: see Dr. Arnold, Memoir on the Map of Syracuse, Appendix - to his ed. of Thucyd. vol. iii, p. 271. - -Accordingly, they took their start from the postern-gate near the -grove of Apollo Temenitês; a gate in the new wall, erected four or -five months before, to enlarge the fortified space of the city. From -this point, which was lower down on the slope of Epipolæ than the -Athenian circle, they carried their palisade and counter-wall up -the slope, in a direction calculated to intersect the intended line -of hostile circumvallation southward of the Circle. The nautical -population from Ortygia could be employed in this enterprise, since -the city was still completely undisturbed by sea, and mistress of the -great harbor, the Athenian fleet not having yet moved from Thapsus. -Besides this active crowd of workmen, the sacred olive-trees in the -Temenite grove were cut down to serve as materials; and by such -efforts the work was presently finished to a sufficient distance for -traversing and intercepting the blockading wall intended to come -southward from the Circle. It seems to have terminated at the brink -of the precipitous southern cliff of Epipolæ, which prevented the -Athenians from turning it and attacking it in flank; while it was -defended in front by a stockade and topped with wooden towers for -discharge of missiles. One tribe of hoplites was left to defend it, -while the crowd of Syracusans who had either been employed on the -work or on guard, returned back to the city. - -During all this process, Nikias had not thought it prudent to -interrupt them.[375] Employed as he seems to have been on the -Circle, and on the wall branching out from his Circle northward, -he was unwilling to march across the slope of Epipolæ to attack -them with half his forces, leaving his own rear exposed to attack -from the numerous Syracusans in the city, and his own Circle only -partially guarded. Moreover, by such delay, he was enabled to -prosecute his own part of the circumvallation without hindrance, -and to watch for an opportunity of assaulting the new counter-wall -with advantage. Such an opportunity soon occurred, just at the time -when he had accomplished the farther important object of destroying -the aqueducts, which supplied the city, partially at least, with -water for drinking. The Syracusans appear to have been filled with -confidence, both by the completion of their counter-wall, which -seemed an effective bar to the besiegers, and by his inaction. The -tribe left on guard presently began to relax in their vigilance: -instead of occupying the wall, tents were erected behind it to -shelter them from the midday sun; while some even permitted -themselves to take repose during that hour within the city walls. -Such negligence did not escape the Athenian generals, who silently -prepared an assault for midday. Three hundred chosen hoplites, -with some light troops clothed in panoplies for the occasion, -were instructed to sally out suddenly and run across straight to -attack the stockade and counter-wall; while the main Athenian force -marched in two divisions under Nikias and Lamachus; half towards -the city walls, to prevent any succor from coming out of the gates, -half towards the Temenite postern-gate from whence the stockade -and cross-wall commenced. The rapid forward movement of the chosen -three hundred was crowned with full success. They captured both the -stockade and the counter-wall, feebly defended by its guards; who, -taken by surprise, abandoned their post and fled along behind their -wall to enter the city by the Temenite postern-gate. Before all of -them could get in, however, both the pursuing three hundred, and the -Athenian division which marched straight to that point, had partially -come up with them: so that some of these assailants even forced -their way along with them through the gate into the interior of the -Temenite city wall. Here, however, the Syracusan strength within -was too much for them: these foremost Athenians and Argeians were -thrust out again with loss. But the general movement of the Athenians -had been completely triumphant. They pulled down the counter-wall, -plucked up the palisade, and carried the materials away for the use -of their own circumvallation. - - [375] Thucyd. vi, 100. - -As the recent Syracusan counter-work had been carried to the brink -of the southern cliff, which rendered it unassailable in flank, -Nikias was warned of the necessity of becoming master of this cliff, -so as to deprive them of this resource in future. Accordingly, -without staying to finish his blockading wall, regularly and -continuously from the Circle southward, across the slope of Epipolæ, -he left the Circle under a guard, and marched across at once to -take possession of the southern cliff, at the point where the -blockading wall was intended to reach it. This point of the southern -cliff he immediately fortified as a defensive position, whereby -he accomplished two objects. First, he prevented the Syracusans -from again employing the cliff as a flank defence for a second -counter-wall.[376] Next, he acquired the means of providing a safe -and easy road of communication between the high ground of Epipolæ -and the low marshy ground beneath, which divided Epipolæ from the -Great Harbor, and across which the Athenian wall of circumvallation -must necessarily be presently carried. As his troops would have to -carry on simultaneous operations, partly on the high ground above, -partly on the low ground beneath, he could not allow them to be -separated from each other by a precipitous cliff which would prevent -ready mutual assistance. The intermediate space between the Circle -and the fortified point of the cliff, was for the time left with an -unfinished wall, with the intention of coming back to it, as was -in fact afterwards done, and this portion of wall was in the end -completed. The Circle, though isolated, was strong enough for the -time to maintain itself against attack, and was adequately garrisoned. - - [376] Thucyd. vi, 101. Τῇ δ’ ὑστεραίᾳ ~ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου~ ἐτείχιζον - οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν κρημνὸν τὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἕλους, ὃς τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν - ταύτῃ πρὸς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα ὁρᾷ, καὶ ᾗπερ αὐτοῖς βραχύτατον - ἐγίγνετο καταβᾶσι διὰ τοῦ ὁμάλου καὶ τοῦ ἕλους ἐς τὸν λιμένα τὸ - περιτείχισμα. - - I give in the text what I believe to be the meaning of this - sentence, though the words ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου are not clear, and have - been differently construed. Göller, in his first edition, had - construed them as if it stood ~ἀρξάμενοι~ ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου: as if - the fortification now begun on the cliff was continuous and in - actual junction with the Circle. In his second edition, he seems - to relinquish this opinion, and to translate them in a manner - similar to Dr. Arnold, who considers them as equivalent to ἀπὸ - τοῦ κύκλου ὁρμώμενοι, but not at all implying that the fresh work - performed was continuous with the Circle, which he believes not - to have been the fact. If thus construed, the words would imply, - “starting from the Circle as a base of operations.” Agreeing with - Dr. Arnold in his conception of the event signified, I incline, - in construing the words, to proceed upon the analogy of two - or three passages in Thucyd. i, 7; i, 46; i, 99; vi, 64—Αἱ δὲ - παλαιαὶ πόλεις διὰ τὴν λῃστείαν ἐπιπολὺ ἀντισχοῦσαν ~ἀπὸ θαλάσσης - μᾶλλον ᾠκίσθησαν~ ... Ἐστὶ δὲ λιμὴν, καὶ πόλις ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ~κεῖται - ἀπὸ θαλάσσης~ ἐν τῇ Ἐλαιάτιδι τῆς Θεσπρώτιδος, Ἐφύρη. In these - passages ἀπὸ is used in the same sense as we find ἄποθεν, iv, - 125, signifying “apart from, at some distance from;” but not - implying any accompanying idea of motion, or proceeding from, - either literal or metaphorical. - - “The Athenians began to fortify, at some distance from their - Circle, the cliff above the marsh,” etc. - -By this new movement, the Syracusans were debarred from carrying a -second counter-wall on the same side of Epipolæ, since the enemy -were masters of the terminating cliff on the southern side of the -slope. They now turned their operations to the lower ground or marsh -between the southern cliff of the Epipolæ and the Great Harbor; -being as yet free on that side, since the Athenian fleet was still -at Thapsus. Across that marsh—and seemingly as far as the river -Anapus, to serve as a flank barrier—they resolved to carry a palisade -work with a ditch, so as to intersect the line which the Athenians -must next pursue in completing the southernmost portion of their -circumvallation. They so pressed the prosecution of this new cross -palisade, beginning from the lower portion of their own city walls, -and stretching in a southwesterly direction across the low ground -as far as the river Anapus, that, by the time the new Athenian -fortification on the cliff was completed, the new Syracusan obstacle -was completed also, and a stockade with a ditch seemed to shut out -the besiegers from reaching the Great Harbor. - -Lamachus overcame the difficulty before him with ability and bravery. -Descending unexpectedly, one morning before daybreak, from his fort -on the cliff of Epipolæ into the low ground beneath,—and providing -his troops with planks and broad gates to bridge over the marsh -where it was scarcely passable,—he contrived to reach and surprise -the palisade with the first dawn of morning. Orders were at the same -time given for the Athenian fleet to sail round from Thapsus into -the Great Harbor, so as to divert the attention of the enemy, and -get on the rear of the new palisade work. But before the fleet could -arrive, the palisade and ditch had been carried, and its defenders -driven off. A large Syracusan force came out from the city to sustain -them, and retake it, so that a general action now ensued, in the -low ground between the cliff of Epipolæ, the harbor, and the river -Anapus. The superior discipline of the Athenians proved successful: -the Syracusans were defeated and driven back on all sides, so that -their right wing fled into the city, and their left (including the -larger portion of their best force, the horsemen), along the banks -of the river Anapus, to reach the bridge. Flushed with victory, the -Athenians hoped to cut them off from this retreat, and a chosen -body of three hundred hoplites ran fast in hopes of getting to the -bridge first. In this hasty movement they fell into disorder, so -that the Syracusan cavalry turned upon them, put them to flight, -and threw them back upon the Athenian right wing, to which the -fugitives communicated their own panic and disorder. The fate of the -battle appeared to be turning against the Athenians, when Lamachus, -who was on the left wing, hastened to their aid with the Argeian -hoplites and as many bowmen as he could collect. His ardor carried -him incautiously forward, so that he crossed a ditch with very few -followers, before the remaining troops could follow him. He was here -attacked and slain,[377] in single combat with a horseman named -Kallikratês: but the Syracusans were driven back when his soldiers -came up, and had only just time to snatch and carry off his dead -body, with which they crossed the bridge and retreated behind the -Anapus. The rapid movement of this gallant officer was thus crowned -with complete success, restoring the victory to his own right wing: a -victory dearly purchased by the forfeit of his own life.[378] - - [377] Thucyd. vi, 102; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 18. Diodorus - erroneously places the battle, in which Lamachus was slain, - _after_ the arrival of Gylippus (xiii, 8). - - [378] Thucyd. vi, 102. - -Meanwhile the visible disorder and temporary flight of the Athenian -right wing, and the withdrawal of Lamachus from the left to reinforce -it, imparted fresh courage to the Syracusan right, which had fled -into the town. They again came forth to renew the contest; while -their generals attempted a diversion by sending out a detachment from -the northwestern gates of the city to attack the Athenian circle on -the mid-slope of Epipolæ. As this Circle lay completely apart and -at considerable distance from the battle, they hoped to find the -garrison unprepared for attack, and thus to carry it by surprise. -Their manœuvre, bold and well-timed, was on the point of succeeding. -They carried with little difficulty the covering outwork in front, -and the Circle itself, probably stripped of part of its garrison to -reinforce the combatants in the lower ground, was only saved by the -presence of mind and resource of Nikias, who was lying ill within it. -He directed the attendants immediately to set fire to a quantity of -wood which lay, together with the battering engines of the army, in -front of the circle-wall, so that the flames prevented all farther -advance on the part of the assailants, and forced them to retreat. -The same flames also served as a signal to the Athenians engaged in -the battle beneath, who immediately sent reinforcements to the relief -of their general; while at the same time the Athenian fleet, just -arrived from Thapsus, was seen sailing into the Great Harbor. This -last event, threatening the Syracusans on a new side, drew off their -whole attention to the defence of their city, so that both their -combatants from the field and their detachment from the Circle were -brought back within the walls.[379] - - [379] Thucyd. vi, 102. - -Had the recent attempt on the Circle succeeded, carrying with it the -death or capture of Nikias, and combined with the death of Lamachus -in the field on that same day, it would have greatly brightened the -prospects of the Syracusans, and might even have arrested the farther -progress of the siege, from the want of an authorized commander. -But in spite of such imminent hazard, the actual result of the -day left the Athenians completely victorious, and the Syracusans -more discouraged than ever. What materially contributed to their -discouragement, was, the recent entrance of the Athenian fleet -into the Great Harbor, wherein it was henceforward permanently -established, in coöperation with the army in a station near the left -bank of the Anapus. - -Both the army and the fleet now began to occupy themselves seriously -with the construction of the southernmost part of the wall of -circumvallation; beginning immediately below the Athenian fortified -point of descent from the southern cliff of Epipolæ, and stretching -across the lower marshy ground to the Great Harbor. The distance -between these two extreme points was about eight stadia or nearly an -English mile: the wall was double, with gates, and probably towers, -at suitable intervals, inclosing a space of considerable breadth, -doubtless roofed over in part, since it served afterwards, with the -help of the adjoining citadel on the cliff, as shelter and defence -for the whole Athenian army. The Syracusans could not interrupt this -process, nor could they undertake a new counter-wall up the mid-slope -of Epipolæ, without coming out to fight a general battle, which they -did not feel competent to do. Of course the Circle had now been put -into condition to defy a second surprise. - -But not only were they thus compelled to look on without hindering -the blockading wall towards the Harbor. It was now, for the first -time, that they began to taste the real restraints and privations -of a siege.[380] Down to this moment, their communication with the -Anapus and the country beyond, as well as with all sides of the Great -Harbor, had been open and unimpeded; whereas now, the arrival of the -Athenian fleet, and the change of position of the Athenian army, had -cut them off from both,[381] so that little or no fresh supplies -of provision could reach them except at the hazard of capture from -the hostile ships. On the side of Thapsus, where the northern -cliff of Epipolæ affords only two or three practicable passages of -ascent, they had before been blocked up by the Athenian army and -fleet; and a portion of the fleet seems even now to have been left -at Thapsus: so that nothing now remained open, except a portion, -especially the northern portion, of the slope of Epipolæ. Of this -outlet the besieged, especially their numerous cavalry, doubtless -availed themselves, for the purpose of excursions and of bringing -in supplies. But it was both longer and more circuitous for such -purposes than the plain near the Great Harbor and the Helôrine road: -moreover, it had to pass by the high and narrow pass of Euryâlus, -and might thus be rendered unavailable to the besieged, whenever -Nikias thought fit to occupy and fortify that position. Unfortunately -for himself and his army, he omitted this easy but capital -precaution, even at the moment when he must have known Gylippus to be -approaching. - - [380] Thucyd. vi, 103. οἷα δὲ εἰκὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀπορούντων καὶ - μᾶλλον ἢ πρὶν πολιορκουμένων, etc. - - [381] Diodorus, however, is wrong in stating (xiii, 7) that the - Athenians occupied the temple of Zeus Olympius and the polichnê, - or hamlet, surrounding it, on the right bank of the Anapus. These - posts remained always occupied by the Syracusans, throughout the - whole war (Thucyd. vii, 4, 37). - -In regard to the works actually undertaken, the order followed -by Nikias and Lamachus can be satisfactorily explained. Having -established their fortified post on the centre of the slope of -Epipolæ, they were in condition to combat opposition and attack any -counter-wall on whichever side the enemy might erect it. Commencing -in the first place the execution of the northern portion of the -blockading line, they soon desist from this and turn their attention -to the southern portion, because it was here that the Syracusans -carried their two first counter-works. In attacking the second -counter-work of the Syracusans, across the marsh to the Anapus, -they chose a suitable moment for bringing the main fleet round from -Thapsus into the Great Harbor, with a view to its coöperation. After -clearing the lower ground, they probably deemed it advisable, in -order to establish a safe and easy communication with their fleet, -that the double wall across the marsh, from Epipolæ to the Harbor, -should stand next for execution; for which there was this farther -reason, that they thereby blocked up the most convenient exit and -channel of supply for Syracuse. There are thus plausible reasons -assignable why the northern portion of the line of blockade, from -the Athenian camp on Epipolæ to the sea at Trogilus, was left to -the last, and was found open, at least the greater part of it, by -Gylippus. - -While the Syracusans thus began to despair of their situation, the -prospects of the Athenians were better than ever, promising certain -and not very distant triumph. The reports circulating through the -neighboring cities all represented them as in the full tide of -success, so that many Sikel tribes, hitherto wavering, came in to -tender their alliance, while three armed pentekonters also arrived -from the Tyrrhenian coast. Moreover, abundant supplies were furnished -from the Italian Greeks generally. Nikias, now sole commander -since the death of Lamachus, had even the glory of receiving and -discussing proposals from Syracuse for capitulation, a necessity -which was openly and abundantly canvassed within the city itself. -The ill-success of Hermokratês and his colleagues had caused them -to be recently displaced from their functions as generals, to which -Herakleidês, Euklês, and Tellias, were appointed. But this change -did not give them confidence to hazard a fresh battle, while the -temper of the city, during such period of forced inaction, was -melancholy in the extreme. Though several propositions for surrender, -perhaps unofficial, yet seemingly sincere, were made to Nikias, -nothing definitive could be agreed upon as to the terms.[382] Had -the Syracusan government been oligarchical, the present distress -would have exhibited a large body of malcontents upon whom he could -have worked with advantage; but the democratical character of the -government maintained union at home in this trying emergency.[383] - - [382] Thucyd. vi, 103. πολλὰ ἐλέγετο πρός τε ἐκεῖνον καὶ πλείω - ἔτι κατὰ τὴν πόλιν. - - [383] Thucyd. vii, 55. - -We must take particular note of these propositions in order to -understand the conduct of Nikias during the present critical -interval. He had been from the beginning in secret correspondence -with a party in Syracuse;[384] who, though neither numerous nor -powerful in themselves, were now doubtless both more active and more -influential than ever they had been before. From them he received -constant and not unreasonable assurances that the city was on the -point of surrendering, and could not possibly hold out. And as the -tone of opinion without, as well as within, conspired to raise such -an impression in his mind, so he suffered himself to be betrayed -into a fatal languor and security as to the farther prosecution of -the besieging operations. The injurious consequences of the death -of Lamachus now became evident. From the time of the departure from -Katana down to the battle in which that gallant officer perished,—a -period seemingly of about three months, from about March to June -414 B.C.,—the operations of the siege had been conducted with great -vigor as well as unremitting perseverance, and the building-work, -especially, had been so rapidly executed as to fill the Syracusans -with amazement. But so soon as Nikias is left sole commander, this -vigorous march disappears and is exchanged for slackness and apathy. -The wall across the low ground near the harbor might have been -expected to proceed more rapidly, because the Athenian position -generally was much stronger, the chance of opposition from the -Syracusans was much lessened, and the fleet had been brought into the -Great Harbor to coöperate. Yet in fact it seems to have proceeded -more slowly; Nikias builds it at first as a double wall, though it -would have been practicable to complete the whole line of blockade -with a single wall before the arrival of Gylippus, and afterwards, if -necessary, to have doubled it either wholly or partially, instead of -employing so much time in completing this one portion that Gylippus -arrived before it was finished, scarcely less than two months after -the death of Lamachus. Both the besiegers and their commander now -seem to consider success as certain, without any chance of effective -interruption from within, still less from without; so that they may -take their time over the work, without caring whether the ultimate -consummation comes a month sooner or later. - - [384] Thucyd. vii, 49-86. - -Though such was the present temper of the Athenian troops, Nikias -could doubtless have spurred them on and accelerated the operations, -had he himself been convinced of the necessity of doing so. Hitherto, -we have seen him always overrating the gloomy contingencies of the -future, and disposed to calculate as if the worst was to happen which -possibly could happen. But a great part of what passes for caution in -his character, was in fact backwardness and inertia of temperament, -aggravated by the melancholy addition of a painful internal -complaint. If he wasted in indolence the first six months after his -arrival in Sicily, and turned to inadequate account the present two -months of triumphant position before Syracuse, both these mistakes -arose from the same cause; from reluctance to act except under the -pressure and stimulus of some obvious necessity. Accordingly, he was -always behindhand with events; but when necessity became terrible, -so as to subdue the energies of other men, then did he come forward -and display unwonted vigor, as we shall see in the following chapter. -But now, relieved from all urgency of apparent danger, and misled -by the delusive hopes held out through his correspondence in the -town, combined with the atmosphere of success which exhilarated his -own armament, Nikias fancied the surrender of Syracuse inevitable, -and became, for one brief moment preceding his calamitous end, not -merely sanguine, but even careless and presumptuous in the extreme. -Nothing short of this presumption could have let in his destroying -enemy, Gylippus.[385] - - [385] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 18. - -That officer—named by the Lacedæmonians commander in Sicily, at -the winter-meeting which Alkibiadês had addressed at Sparta—had -employed himself in getting together forces for the purpose of the -expedition. But the Lacedæmonians, though so far stimulated by the -representations of the Athenian exile as to promise aid, were not -forward to perform the promise. Even the Corinthians, decidedly the -most hearty of all in behalf of Syracuse, were yet so tardy, that in -the month of June, Gylippus was still at Leukas, with his armament -not quite ready to sail. To embark in a squadron for Sicily, against -the numerous and excellent Athenian fleet now acting there, was a -service not tempting to any one, and demanding both personal daring -and devotion. Moreover, every vessel from Sicily, between March -and June 414 B.C., brought intelligence of progressive success on -the part of Nikias and Lamachus, thus rendering the prospects of -Corinthian auxiliaries still more discouraging. - -At length, in the month of June, arrived the news of that defeat -of the Syracusans wherein Lamachus was slain, and of its important -consequences in forwarding the operations of the besiegers. Great -as those consequences were, they were still farther exaggerated by -report. It was confidently affirmed, by messenger after messenger, -that the wall of circumvallation had been completed, and that -Syracuse was now invested on all sides.[386] Both Gylippus and the -Corinthians were so far misled as to believe this to be the fact, -and despaired, in consequence, of being able to render any effective -aid against the Athenians in Sicily. But as there still remained -hopes of being able to preserve the Greek cities in Italy, Gylippus -thought it important to pass over thither at once with his own little -squadron of four sail, two Lacedæmonians and two Corinthians, and -the Corinthian captain Pythên; leaving the Corinthian main squadron -to follow as soon as it was ready. Intending then to act only in -Italy, Gylippus did not fear falling in with the Athenian fleet. He -first sailed to Tarentum, friendly and warm in his cause. From hence -he undertook a visit to Thurii, where his father Kleandridas, exiled -from Sparta, had formerly resided as citizen. After trying to profit -by this opening for the purpose of gaining the Thurians, and finding -nothing but refusal, he passed on farther southward, until he came -opposite to the Terinæan gulf near the southeastern cape of Italy. -Here a violent gust of wind off the land overtook him, exposed his -vessels to the greatest dangers, and drove him out to sea, until at -length, standing in a northerly direction, he was fortunate enough to -find shelter again at Tarentum.[387] But such was the damage which -his ships had sustained, that he was forced to remain here while they -were hauled ashore and refitted.[388] - - [386] Thucyd. vi, 104. ὡς αὐτοῖς αἱ ἀγγελίαι ἐφοίτων δειναὶ καὶ - πᾶσαι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐψευσμέναι, ὡς ἤδη παντελῶς ἀποτετειχισμέναι αἱ - Συράκουσαί εἰσι, τῆς μὲν Σικελίας οὐκέτι ἐλπίδα οὐδεμίαν εἶχεν - ὁ Γύλιππος, τὴν δὲ Ἰταλίαν βουλόμενος περιποιῆσαι, etc. Compare - Plutarch, Nikias. c. 18. - - It will be seen from Thucydidês, that Gylippus heard this news - while he was yet at Leukas. - - [387] Thucyd. vi, 104. Ἄρας (Γύλιππος) παρέπλει τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ - ἁρπασθεὶς ὑπ’ ἀνέμου κατὰ τὸν Τεριναῖον κόλπον, ὃς ἐκπνεῖ ταύτῃ - μέγας, κατὰ Βορέαν ἑστηκὼς ἀποφέρεται ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, καὶ πάλιν - χειμασθεὶς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα Τάραντι προσμίσγει. - - Though all the commentators here construe the words κατὰ Βορέαν - ἑστηκὼς as if they agreed with ὃς or ἄνεμος, I cannot but - think that these words really agree with Γύλιππος. Gylippus is - overtaken by this violent off-shore wind while he is sailing - southward along the eastern shore of what is now called Calabria - Ultra: “setting his ship towards the north or _standing to the - north_ (to use the English nautical phrase), he is carried out - to sea, from whence, after great difficulties, he again gets - into Tarentum.” If Gylippus was carried out to sea when in this - position, and trying to get to Tarentum, he would naturally lay - his course northward. What is meant by the words κατὰ Βορέαν - ἑστηκὼς, as applied _to the wind_, I confess I do not understand; - nor do the critics throw much light upon it. Whenever a point - of the compass is mentioned in conjunction with any wind, it - always seems to mean the point _from whence_ the wind blows. - Now, that κατὰ Βορέαν ἑστηκὼς means “a wind which blows steadily - from the north,” as the commentators affirm, I cannot believe - without better authority than they produce. Moreover, Gylippus - could never have laid his course for Tarentum, if there had been - a strong wind in this direction; while such a wind would have - forwarded him to Lokri, the very place whither he wanted to go. - The mention of the _Terinæan_ gulf is certainly embarrassing. - If the words are right (which perhaps may be doubted), the - explanation of Dr. Arnold in his note seems the best which can - be offered. Perhaps, indeed,—for though improbable, this is - not wholly impossible,—Thucydidês may himself have committed a - geographical inadvertence, in supposing the Terinæan gulf to be - on the east side of Calabria. - - [388] Thucyd. vi, 104. - -So untoward a delay threatened to intercept altogether his farther -progress. For the Thurians had sent intimation of his visit as well -as of the number of his vessels, to Nikias at Syracuse; treating with -contempt the idea of four triremes coming to attack the powerful -Athenian fleet. In the present sanguine phase of his character, -Nikias sympathized with the flattering tenor of the message, and -overlooked the gravity of the fact announced. He despised Gylippus -as a mere privateer, nor would he even take the precaution of -sending four ships from his numerous fleet to watch and intercept -the new-comer. Accordingly Gylippus, after having refitted his ships -at Tarentum, advanced southward along the coast without opposition -to the Epizephyrian Lokri. Here he first learned, to his great -satisfaction, that Syracuse was not yet so completely blockaded but -that an army might still reach and relieve it from the interior, -entering it by the Euryâlus and the heights of Epipolæ. Having -deliberated whether he should take the chance of running his ships -into the harbor of Syracuse, despite the watch of the Athenian fleet, -or whether he should sail through the strait of Messina to Himera at -the north of Sicily, and from thence levy an army to cross the island -and relieve Syracuse by land, he resolved on the latter course, -and passed forthwith through the strait, which he found altogether -unguarded. After touching both at Rhegium and Messênê, he arrived -safely at Himera. Even at Rhegium, there was no Athenian naval force; -though Nikias had, indeed, sent thither four Athenian triremes, after -he had been apprized that Gylippus had reached Lokri, rather from -excess of precaution, than because he thought it necessary. But this -Athenian squadron reached Rhegium too late: Gylippus had already -passed the strait; and fortune, smiting his enemy with blindness, -landed him unopposed on the fatal soil of Sicily. - -The blindness of Nikias would indeed appear unaccountable, were -it not that we shall have worse yet to recount. To appreciate his -misjudgment fully, and to be sensible that we are not making him -responsible for results which could not have been foreseen, we have -only to turn back to what had been said six months before by the -exile Alkibiadês at Sparta: “Send forthwith an army to Sicily (he -exhorted the Lacedæmonians); _but send at the same time, what will -be yet more valuable than an army, a Spartan to take the supreme -command_.” It was in fulfilment of this recommendation, the wisdom of -which will abundantly appear, that Gylippus had been appointed. And -had he even reached Syracuse alone in a fishing-boat, the effect of -his presence, carrying the great name of Sparta, and full assurance -of Spartan intervention to come, not to mention his great personal -ability, would have sufficed to give new life to the besieged. -Yet Nikias—having, through a lucky accident, timely notice of his -approach, when a squadron of four ships would have prevented his -reaching the island—disdains even this most easy precaution, and -neglects him as a freebooter of no significance. Such neglect too is -the more surprising, since the well-known philo-Laconian tendencies -of Nikias would have led us to expect, that he would overvalue rather -than undervalue the imposing ascendency of the Spartan name. - -Gylippus, on arriving at Himera, as commander named by Sparta, and -announcing himself as forerunner of Peloponnesian reinforcements, met -with a hearty welcome. The Himeræans agreed to aid him with a body -of hoplites, and to furnish panoplies for the seamen in his vessels. -On sending to Selinus, Gela, and some of the Sikel tribes in the -interior, he received equally favorable assurances; so that he was -enabled in no very long time to get together a respectable force. -The interest of Athens among the Sikels had been recently weakened -by the death of one of her most active partisans, the Sikel prince -Archonidês, a circumstance which both enabled Gylippus to obtain -more of their aid, and facilitated his march across the island. He -was enabled to undertake this inland march from Himera to Syracuse -at the head of seven hundred hoplites from his own vessels, seamen -and epibatæ taken together; one thousand hoplites and light troops, -with one hundred horse, from Himera, some horse and light troops -from Selinus and Gela, and one thousand Sikels.[389] With these -forces, some of whom joined him on the march, he reached Euryâlus and -the heights of Epipolæ above Syracuse, assaulting and capturing the -Sikel fort of Ietæ in his way, but without experiencing any other -opposition. - - [389] Thucyd. vii, 1. - -His arrival was all but too late, and might have been actually too -late, had not the Corinthian admiral Goggylus got to Syracuse a -little before him. The Corinthian fleet of twelve triremes, under -Erasinidês—having started from Leukas later than Gylippus, but as -soon as it was ready—was now on its way to Syracuse. But Goggylus -had been detained at Leukas by some accident, so that he did not -depart until after all the rest. Yet he reached Syracuse the soonest; -probably striking a straighter course across the sea, and favored -by weather. He got safely into the harbor of Syracuse, escaping the -Athenian guardships, whose watch doubtless partook of the general -negligence of the besieging operations.[390] - - [390] Thucyd. vii, 2-7. - -The arrival of Goggylus at that moment was an accident of unspeakable -moment, and was in fact nothing less than the salvation of the city. -Among all the causes of despair in the Syracusan mind, there was none -more powerful than the circumstance, that they had not as yet heard -of any relief approaching, or of any active intervention in their -favor, from Peloponnesus. Their discouragement increasing from day to -day, and the interchange of propositions with Nikias becoming more -frequent, matters had at last so ripened that a public assembly was -just about to be held to sanction a definitive capitulation.[391] -It was at this critical juncture that Goggylus arrived, apparently -a little before Gylippus reached Himera. He was the first to -announce that both the Corinthian fleet and a Spartan commander were -now actually on their voyage, and might be expected immediately, -intelligence which filled the Syracusans with enthusiasm and with -renewed courage. They instantly threw aside all idea of capitulation, -and resolved to hold out to the last. - - [391] Thucyd. vi, 103; vii, 2; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 19. - -It was not long before they received intimation that Gylippus had -reached Himera, which Goggylus at his arrival could not know, and -was raising an army to march across for their relief. After the -interval necessary for his preparations and for his march, probably -not less than between a fortnight and three weeks, they learned that -he was approaching Syracuse by the way of Euryâlus and Epipolæ. He -was presently seen coming, having ascended Epipolæ by Euryâlus; the -same way by which the Athenians had come from Katana in the spring, -when they commenced the siege. As he descended the slope of Epipolæ, -the whole Syracusan force went out in a body to hail his arrival and -accompany him into the city.[392] - - [392] Thucyd. vii, 2. - -Few incidents throughout the whole siege of Syracuse appear so -unaccountable as the fact, that the proceedings and march of -Gylippus, from his landing at Himera to the moment of his entering -the town, were accomplished without the smallest resistance on -the part of Nikias. After this instant, the besiegers pass from -incontestable superiority in the field, and apparent certainty of -prospective capture of the city, to a state of inferiority, not -only excluding all hope of capture, but even sinking, step by step, -into absolute ruin. Yet Nikias had remained with his eyes shut and -his hands tied, not making the least effort to obstruct so fatal a -consummation. After having despised Gylippus, in his voyage along -the coast of Italy, as a freebooter with four ships, he now despises -him not less at the head of an army marching from Himera. If he was -taken unawares, as he really appears to have been,[393] the fault was -altogether his own, and the ignorance such as we must almost call -voluntary. For the approach of Gylippus must have been well known to -him beforehand. He must have learned from the four ships which he -sent to Rhegium, that Gylippus had already touched thither in passing -through the strait, on his way to Himera. He must therefore have been -well aware, that the purpose was to attempt the relief of Syracuse -by an army from the interior; and his correspondence among the Sikel -tribes must have placed him in cognizance of the equipment going on -at Himera. Moreover, when we recollect that Gylippus reached that -place without either troops or arms; that he had to obtain forces not -merely from Himera, but also from Selinus and Gela, as well as to -sound the Sikel towns, not all of them friendly; lastly, that he had -to march all across the island, partly through hostile territory, it -is impossible to allow less interval than a fortnight or three weeks -between his landing at Himera and his arrival at Epipolæ. Farther, -Nikias must have learned, through his intelligence in the interior of -Syracuse, the important revolution which had taken place in Syracusan -opinion through the arrival of Goggylus, even before the landing of -Gylippus in Sicily was known. He was apprized, from that moment, that -he had to take measures, not only against renewed obstinate hostility -within the town, but against a fresh invading enemy without. Lastly, -that enemy had first to march all across Sicily, during which march -he might have been embarrassed and perhaps defeated,[394] and could -then approach Syracuse only by one road, over the high ground of -Euryâlus in the Athenian rear, through passes few in number, easy to -defend, by which Nikias had himself first approached, and through -which he had only got by a well-laid plan of surprise. Yet Nikias -leaves these passes unoccupied and undefended; he takes not a single -new precaution; the relieving army enters Syracuse as it were over a -broad and free plain. - - [393] Thucyd. vii, 3. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι, ~αἰφνιδίως~ τοῦ τε Γυλίππου - καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων σφίσιν ἐπιόντων, etc. - - [394] Compare an incident in the ensuing year, Thucyd. vii, 32. - The Athenians, at a moment when they had become much weaker than - they were now, had influence enough among the Sikel tribes to - raise opposition to the march of a corps coming from the interior - to the help of Syracuse. This auxiliary corps was defeated and - nearly destroyed in its march. - -If we are amazed at the insolent carelessness with which Nikias -disdained the commonest precautions for repelling the foreknown -approach, by sea, of an enemy formidable even single-handed, what are -we to say of that unaccountable blindness which led him to neglect -the same enemy when coming at the head of a relieving army, and to -omit the most obvious means of defence in a crisis upon which his -future fate turned? Homer would have designated such neglect as a -temporary delirium inflicted by the fearful inspiration of Atê: the -historian has no such explanatory name to give, and can only note it -as a sad and suitable prelude to the calamities too nearly at hand. - -At the moment when the fortunate Spartan auxiliary was thus -allowed to march quietly into Syracuse, the Athenian double wall of -circumvallation, between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great -Harbor, eight stadia long, was all but completed: a few yards only of -the end close to the harbor were wanting. But Gylippus cared not to -interrupt its completion. He aimed at higher objects, and he knew, -what Nikias, unhappily, never felt and never lived to learn, the -immense advantage of turning to active account that first impression -and full tide of confidence which his arrival had just infused into -the Syracusans. Hardly had he accomplished his junction with them, -when he marshalled the united force in order of battle, and marched -up to the lines of the Athenians. Amazed as they were, and struck -dumb by his unexpected arrival, they too formed in battle order, and -awaited his approach. His first proceeding marked how much the odds -of the game were changed. He sent a herald to tender to them a five -days’ armistice, on condition that they should collect their effects -and withdraw from the island. Nikias disdained to return any reply -to this insulting proposal; but his conduct showed how much _he_ -felt, as well as Gylippus, that the tide was now turned. For when the -Spartan commander, perceiving now for the first time the disorderly -trim of his Syracusan hoplites, thought fit to retreat into more open -ground farther removed from the walls, probably in order that he -might have a better field for his cavalry, Nikias declined to follow -him, and remained in position close to his own fortifications.[395] -This was tantamount to a confession of inferiority in the field. -It was a virtual abandonment of the capture of Syracuse, a tacit -admission that the Athenians could hope for nothing better in the end -than the humiliating offer which the herald had just made to them. -So it seems to have been felt by both parties; for from this time -forward, the Syracusans become and continue aggressors, the Athenians -remaining always on the defensive, except for one brief instant after -the arrival of Demosthenês. - - [395] Thucyd. vii, 3. - -After drawing off his troops and keeping them encamped for that -night on the Temenite cliff, seemingly within the added fortified -inclosure of Syracuse, Gylippus brought them out again the next -morning, and marshalled them in front of the Athenian lines, as if -about to attack. But while the attention of the Athenians was thus -engaged, he sent a detachment to surprise the fort of Labdalum, which -was not within view of their lines. The enterprise was completely -successful. The fort was taken, and the garrison put to the sword; -while the Syracusans gained another unexpected advantage during -the day, by the capture of one of the Athenian triremes which was -watching their harbor. Gylippus pursued his successes actively, by -immediately beginning the construction of a fresh counter-wall, from -the outer city wall in a northwesterly direction aslant up the slope -of Epipolæ; so as to traverse the intended line of the Athenian -circumvallation on the north side of their Circle, and render -blockade impossible. He availed himself, for this purpose, of stones -laid by the Athenians for their own circumvallation, at the same time -alarming them by threatening attack upon their lower wall, between -the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbor, which was now -just finished, so as to leave their troops disposable for action on -the higher ground. Against one part of the wall, which seemed weaker -than the rest, he attempted a nocturnal surprise, but finding the -Athenians in vigilant guard without, he was forced to retire. This -part of the wall was now heightened, and the Athenians took charge of -it themselves, distributing their allies along the remainder.[396] - - [396] Thucyd. vii, 4. - -These attacks, however, appear to have been chiefly intended as -diversions, in order to hinder the enemy from obstructing the -completion of the counter-wall. Now was the time for Nikias to adopt -vigorous aggressive measures both against this wall and against the -Syracusans in the field, unless he chose to relinquish all hope of -ever being able to beleaguer Syracuse. And, indeed, he seems actually -to have relinquished such hope, even thus early after he had seemed -certain master of the city. For he now undertook a measure altogether -new; highly important in itself, but indicating an altered scheme of -policy. He resolved to fortify Cape Plemmyrium,—the rocky promontory -which forms one extremity of the narrow entrance of the Great Harbor, -immediately south of the point of Ortygia,—and to make it a secure -main station for the fleet and stores. The fleet had been hitherto -stationed in close neighborhood of the land-force, in a fortified -position at the extremity of the double blockading wall between the -southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbor. From such a station -in the interior of the harbor, it was difficult for the Athenian -triremes to perform the duties incumbent on them, of watching the two -ports of Syracuse—one on each side of the isthmus which joins Ortygia -to the mainland—so as to prevent any exit of ships from within, or -ingress of ships from without, and of insuring the unobstructed -admission by sea of supplies for their own army. For both these -purposes, the station of Plemmyrium was far more convenient; and -Nikias now saw that henceforward his operations would be for the most -part maritime. Without confessing it openly, he thus practically -acknowledged that the superiority of land-force had passed to the -side of his opponents, and that a successful prosecution of the -blockade had become impossible.[397] - - [397] Thucyd. vii, 4. - -Three forts, one of considerable size and two subsidiary, were -erected on the seaboard of Cape Plemmyrium, which became the station -for triremes as well as for ships of burden. Though the situation -was found convenient for all naval operations, it entailed also -serious disadvantages; being destitute of any spring of water, -such as the memorable fountain of Arethusa on the opposite island -of Ortygia. So that for supplies of water, and of wood also, the -crews of the ships had to range a considerable distance, exposed to -surprise from the numerous Syracusan cavalry placed in garrison at -the temple of Zeus Olympius. Day after day, losses were sustained in -this manner, besides the increased facilities given for desertion, -which soon fatally diminished the efficiency of each ship’s crew. -As the Athenian hopes of success now declined, both the slaves and -the numerous foreigners who served in their navy became disposed to -steal away. And though the ships of war, down to this time, had been -scarcely at all engaged in actual warfare, yet they had been for many -months continually at sea and on the watch, without any opportunity -of hauling ashore to refit. Hence the naval force, now about to be -called into action as the chief hope of the Athenians, was found -lamentably degenerated from that ostentatious perfection in which it -had set sail fifteen months before, from the harbor of Peiræus. - -The erection of the new forts at Plemmyrium, while by withdrawing -the Athenian forces it left Gylippus unopposed in the prosecution of -his counter-wall, at the same time emboldened him by the manifest -decline of hope which it implied. Day after day he brought out his -Syracusans in battle-array, planting them near the Athenian lines; -but the Athenians showed no disposition to attack. At length he -took advantage of what he thought a favorable opportunity to make -the attack himself; but the ground was so hemmed in by various -walls—the Athenian fortified lines on one side, the Syracusan front -or Temenitic fortification on another, and the counter-wall now -in course of construction on a third—that his cavalry and darters -had no space to act. Accordingly, the Syracusan hoplites, having -to fight without these auxiliaries, were beaten and driven back -with loss, the Corinthian Goggylus being among the slain.[398] On -the next day, Gylippus had the prudence to take the blame of this -defeat upon himself. It was all owing to his mistake, he publicly -confessed, in having made choice of a confined space wherein neither -cavalry nor darters could avail. He would presently give them another -opportunity, in a fairer field, and he exhorted them to show their -inbred superiority, as Dorians and Peloponnesians, by chasing these -Ionians with their rabble of islanders out of Sicily. Accordingly, -after no long time, he again brought them up in order of battle; -taking care, however, to keep in the open space, beyond the extremity -of the walls and fortifications. - - [398] Thucyd. vii, 5; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 19. - -On this occasion, Nikias did not decline the combat, but marched -out into the open space to meet him. He probably felt encouraged -by the result of the recent action; but there was a farther and -more pressing motive. The counter-wall of intersection, which the -Syracusans were constructing, was on the point of cutting the -Athenian line of circumvallation, so that it was essential for Nikias -to attack without delay, unless he formally abnegated all farther -hope of successful siege. Nor could the army endure, in spite of -altered fortune, irrevocably to shut themselves out from such hope, -without one struggle more. Both armies were therefore ranged in -battle order on the open space beyond the walls, higher up the slope -of Epipolæ; Gylippus placing his cavalry and darters to the right of -his line, on the highest and most open ground. In the midst of the -action between the hoplites on both sides, these troops on the right -charged the left flank of the Athenians with such vigor, that they -completely broke it. The whole Athenian army underwent a thorough -defeat, and only found shelter within its fortified lines. And in the -course of the very next night, the Syracusan counter-wall was pushed -so far as to traverse and get beyond the projected line of Athenian -blockade, reaching presently as far as the edge of the northern -cliff: so that Syracuse was now safe, unless the enemy should not -only recover their superiority in the field, but also become strong -enough to storm and carry the new-built wall.[399] - - [399] Thucyd. vii, 5, 6. - -Farther defence was also obtained by the safe arrival of the -Corinthian, Ambrakiotic, and Leukadian fleet of twelve triremes, -under Erasinidês, which Nikias had vainly endeavored to intercept. -He had sent twenty sail to the southern coast of Italy; but the -new-comers had had the good luck to avoid them. - -Erasinidês and his division lent their hands to the execution of a -work which completed the scheme of defence for the city. Gylippus -took the precaution of constructing a fort or redoubt on the high -ground of Epipolæ, so as to command the approach to Syracuse from -the high ground of Euryalus; a step which Hermokratês had not -thought of until too late, and which Nikias had never thought of -at all, during his period of triumph and mastery. He erected a -new fort on a suitable point of the high ground, backed by three -fortified positions or encampments at proper distances in the rear -of it, intended for bodies of troops to support the advanced post in -case it was attacked. A continuous wall was then carried from this -advanced post down the slope of Epipolæ, so as to reach and join -the counter-wall recently constructed; whereby this counter-wall, -already traversing and cutting the Athenian line of circumvallation, -became in fact prolonged up the whole slope of Epipolæ, and barred -all direct access from the Athenians in their existing lines up to -the summit of that eminence, as well as up to the northern cliff. The -Syracusans had now one continuous and uninterrupted line of defence; -a long single wall, resting at one extremity on the new-built fort -upon the high ground of Epipolæ, at the other extremity, upon the -city wall. This wall was only single; but it was defended, along -its whole length, by the permanent detachments occupying the three -several fortified positions or encampments just mentioned. One of -these positions was occupied by native Syracusans; a second, by -Sicilian Greeks; a third, by other allies. Such was the improved -and systematic scheme of defence which the genius of Gylippus -first projected, and which he brought to execution at the present -moment:[400] a scheme, the full value of which will be appreciated -when we come to describe the proceedings of the second Athenian -armament under Demosthenês. - - [400] Thucyd. vii, 7. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, αἵ τε τῶν Κορινθίων νῆες καὶ - Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λευκαδίων ἐσέπλευσαν αἱ ὑπόλοιποι δώδεκα (ἦρχε - δὲ αὐτῶν Ἐρασινίδης Κορίνθιος), καὶ ~ξυνετείχισαν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῖς - Συρακοσίοις μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους~. - - These words of Thucydidês are very obscure, and have been - explained by different commentators in different ways. The - explanation which I here give does not, so far as I know, - coincide with any of them; yet I venture to think that it is the - most plausible, and the only one satisfactory. Compare the Memoir - of Dr. Arnold on his Map of Syracuse (Arn. Thucyd. vol. iii, p. - 273), and the notes of Poppo and Göller. Dr. Arnold is indeed so - little satisfied with any explanation which had suggested itself - to him that he thinks some words must have dropped out. - -Not content with having placed the Syracusans out of the reach of -danger, Gylippus took advantage of their renewed confidence to -infuse into them projects of retaliation against the enemy who had -brought them so near to ruin. They began to equip their ships in -the harbor, and to put their seamen under training, in hopes of -qualifying themselves to contend with the Athenians even on their own -element; while Gylippus himself quitted the city to visit the various -cities of the island, and to get together farther reinforcements, -naval as well as military. And as it was foreseen that Nikias on -his part would probably demand aid from Athens, envoys, Syracusan -as well as Corinthian, were despatched to Peloponnesus, to urge -the necessity of forwarding additional troops, even in merchant -vessels, if no triremes could be spared to convey them.[401] Should -no reinforcements reach the Athenian camp, the Syracusans well knew -that its efficiency must diminish by every month’s delay, while their -own strength, in spite of heavy cost and effort, was growing with -their increased prospects of success. - - [401] Thucyd. vii, 7. - -If this double conviction was present to sustain, the ardor of the -Syracusans, it was not less painfully felt amidst the Athenian camp, -now blocked up like a besieged city, and enjoying no free movement -except through their ships and their command of the sea. Nikias saw -that if Gylippus should return with any considerable additional -force, even the attack upon him by land would become too powerful -to resist, besides the increasing disorganization of his fleet. He -became fully convinced that to remain as they were was absolute ruin. -As all possibility of prosecuting the siege of Syracuse successfully -was now at an end, a sound judgment would have dictated that his -position in the harbor had become useless as well as dangerous, and -that the sooner it was evacuated the better. Probably Demosthenês -would have acted thus, under similar circumstances; but such -foresight and resolution were not in the character of Nikias, who was -afraid, moreover, of the blame which it would bring down upon him at -home, if not from his own army. Not venturing to quit his position -without orders from Athens, he determined to send home thither an -undisguised account of his critical position, and to solicit either -reinforcements or instructions to return. - -It was now, indeed, the end of September (B.C. 414), so that he could -not even hope for an answer before midwinter, nor for reinforcements, -if such were to be sent, until the ensuing spring was far advanced. -Nevertheless, he determined to encounter this risk, and to trust to -vigilant precautions for safety during the interval, precautions -which, as the result will show, were within a hair’s breadth of -proving insufficient. But as it was of the last importance to him to -make his countrymen at home fully sensible of the grave danger of his -position, he resolved to transmit a written despatch; not trusting -to the oral statement of a messenger, who might be wanting either in -courage, in presence of mind, or in competent expression, to impress -the full and sad truth upon a reluctant audience.[402] Accordingly he -sent home a despatch, which seems to have reached Athens about the -end of November, and was read formally in the public assembly by the -secretary of the city. Preserved by Thucydidês verbatim, it stands as -one of the most interesting remnants of antiquity, and well deserves -a literal translation. - - [402] Thucyd. vii, 8. - -“Our previous proceedings have been already made known to you, -Athenians, in many other despatches;[403] but the present crisis is -such as to require your deliberation more than ever, when you shall -have heard the situation in which we stand. After we had overcome in -many engagements the Syracusans, against whom we were sent, and had -built the fortified lines which we now occupy, there came upon us -the Lacedæmonian Gylippus, with an army partly Peloponnesian, partly -Sicilian. Him too we defeated, in the first action; but in a second, -we were overwhelmed by a crowd of cavalry and darters, and forced to -retire within our lines. And thus the superior number of our enemies -has compelled us to suspend our circumvallation, and remain inactive; -indeed, we cannot employ in the field even the full force which we -possess, since a portion of our hoplites are necessarily required for -the protection of our walls. Meanwhile the enemy have carried out a -single intersecting counter-wall beyond our line of circumvallation, -so that we can no longer continue the latter to completion, unless we -have force enough to attack and storm their counter-wall. And things -have come to such a pass, that we, who profess to besiege others, -are ourselves rather the party besieged, by land at least, since the -cavalry leave us scarce any liberty of motion. Farther, the enemy -have sent envoys to Peloponnesus to obtain reinforcements, while -Gylippus in person is going round the Sicilian cities, trying to -stir up to action such of them as are now neutral, and to get, from -the rest, additional naval and military supplies. For it is their -determination, as I understand, not merely to assail our lines on -shore with their land-force, but also to attack us by sea with their -ships. - - [403] Thucyd. vii, 9. ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς ἐπιστολαῖς. The word - _despatches_, which I use to translate ἐπιστολαῖς, is not - inapplicable to oral, as well as to written messages, and thus - retains the ambiguity involved in the original; for ἐπιστολαῖς, - though usually implying, does not necessarily imply, _written_ - communications. - - The words of Thucydidês (vii, 8) _may_ certainly be construed - to imply that Nikias had never on any previous occasion sent a - written communication to Athens; and so Dr. Thirlwall understands - them, though not without hesitation (Hist. Gr. ch. xxvi, vol. - iii, p. 418). At the same time, I think them reconcilable with - the supposition that Nikias may previously have sent written - despatches, though much shorter than the present, leaving details - and particulars to be supplied by the officer who carried them. - - Mr. Mitford states the direct reverse of that which Dr. Thirlwall - understands: “Nicias had used the precaution of frequently - sending despatches in writing, with an exact account of every - transaction.” (Ch. xviii, sect v, vol. iv, p. 100.) - - Certainly, the statement of Thucydidês does not imply this. - -“Be not shocked when I tell you, that they intend to become -aggressors even at sea. They know well, that our fleet was at first -in high condition, with dry ships[404] and excellent crews; but -now the ships have rotted, from remaining too long at sea, and the -crews are ruined. Nor have we the means of hauling our ships ashore -to refit, since the enemy’s fleet, equal or superior in numbers, -always appears on the point of attacking us. We see them in constant -practice, and they can choose their own moment for attack. Moreover, -they can keep their ships high and dry more than we can; for they -are not engaged in maintaining watch upon others; while to us, who -are obliged to retain all our fleet on guard, nothing less than -prodigious superiority of number could insure the like facility. And -were we to relax ever so little in our vigilance, we should no longer -be sure of our supplies, which we bring in even now with difficulty -close under their walls. - - [404] It seems, that in Greek ship-building, moist and unseasoned - wood was preferred, from the facility of bending it into the - proper shape (Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. v, 7, 4). - -“Our crews, too, have been and are still wasting away from various -causes. Among the seamen who are our own citizens, many, in going -to a distance for wood, for water, or for pillage, are cut off by -the Syracusan cavalry. Such of them as are slaves, desert, now that -our superiority is gone, and that we have come to equal chances with -our enemy; while the foreigners whom we pressed into our service, -make off straight to some of the neighboring cities; and those who -came, tempted by high pay, under the idea of enriching themselves -by traffic rather than of fighting, now that they find the enemy in -full competence to cope with us by sea as well as by land, either go -over to him as professed deserters, or get away as they can amidst -the wide area of Sicily.[405] Nay, there are even some, who, while -trafficking here on their own account, bribe the trierarchs to -accept Hykkarian slaves as substitutes, and thus destroy the strict -discipline of our marine. And you know as well as I, that no crew -ever continues long in perfect condition, and that the first class of -seamen, who set the ship in motion, and maintain the uniformity of -the oar-stroke, is but a small fraction of the whole number. - - [405] Thucyd. vii, 13. Καὶ οἱ ξένοι οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ ἐσβάντες, - εὐθὺς κατὰ τὰς πόλεις ἀποχωροῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ μεγάλου μισθοῦ τὸ - πρῶτον ἐπαρθέντες, καὶ οἰόμενοι χρηματιεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μαχεῖσθαι, - ἐπειδὴ παρὰ γνώμην ναύτικόν τε δὴ καὶ τἄλλα ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων - ἀνθεστῶτα ὁρῶσιν, οἱ μὲν ~ἐπ’ αὐτομολίας προφάσει ἀπέρχονται~, οἱ - δὲ ὡς ἕκαστοι δύνανται· πολλὴ δ’ ἡ Σικελία. - - All the commentators bestow long notes in explanation of this - phrase ἐπ’ αὐτομολίας προφάσει ἀπέρχονται: but I cannot think - that any of them are successful. There are even some who - despair of success so much, as to wish to change αὐτομολίας by - conjecture; see the citations in Poppo’s long note. - - But surely the literal sense of the words is here both - defensible and instructive: “Some of them depart under pretence - (or profession) of being deserters to the enemy.” All the - commentators reject this meaning, because they say, it is absurd - to talk of a man’s announcing beforehand that he intends to - desert to the enemy, and giving _that_ as an excuse for quitting - the camp. Such is not, in my judgment, the meaning of the word - προφάσει here. It does not denote what a man said _before_ he - quitted the Athenian camp, he would of course say nothing of - his intention to any one, but the color which he would put upon - his conduct _after he got within_ the Syracusan lines. He would - present himself to them as a deserter to their cause; he would - profess anxiety to take part in the defence; he would pretend - to be tired of the oppressive Athenian dominion; for it is to - be recollected, that all or most of these deserters were men - belonging to the subject-allies of Athens. Those who passed over - to the Syracusan lines would naturally recommend themselves - by making profession of such dispositions, even though they - did not really feel any such; for their real reason was, that - the Athenian service had now become irksome, unprofitable, and - dangerous; and the easiest manner of getting away from it was, to - pass over as a deserter to Syracuse. - - Nikias distinguishes these men from others, “who got away, as - they could find opportunity, to some part or other of Sicily.” - These latter also would of course keep their intention of - departing secret, until they got safe away into some Sicilian - town; but when once there, they would make no profession of any - feeling which they did not entertain. If they said anything, they - would tell the plain truth, that they were making their escape - from a position which now gave them more trouble than profit. - - It appears to me that the words ἐπ’ αὐτομολίας προφάσει will bear - this sense perfectly well, and that it is the real meaning of - Nikias. - - Even before the Peloponnesian war was begun, the Corinthian - envoy at Sparta affirms that the Athenians cannot depend upon - their seamen standing true to them, since their navy was manned - with hired foreign seamen rather than with natives—ὠνητὴ γὰρ ἡ - Ἀθηναίων δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεία (Thucyd. i, 121). The statement - of Nikias proves that this remark was to a great extent well - founded. - -“Among all these embarrassments, the worst of all is, that I as -general can neither prevent the mischief, from the difficulty of -your tempers to govern, nor can I provide supplementary recruits -elsewhere, as the enemy can easily do from many places open to him. -We have nothing but the original stock which we brought out with -us, both to make good losses and to do present duty; for Naxus and -Katana, our only present allies, are of insignificant strength. And -if our enemy gain but one farther point,—if the Italian cities, -from whence we now draw our supplies, should turn against us, under -the impression of our present bad condition, with no reinforcement -arriving from you,—we shall be starved out, and he will bring the war -to triumphant close, even without a battle. - -“Pleasanter news than these I could easily have found to send you; -but assuredly nothing so useful, seeing that the full knowledge -of the state of affairs here is essential to your deliberations. -Moreover, I thought it even the safer policy to tell you the truth -without disguise, understanding as I do your real dispositions, that -you never listen willingly to any but the most favorable assurances, -yet are angry in the end if they turn to unfavorable results. Be -thoroughly satisfied, that in regard to the force against which you -originally sent us, both your generals and your soldiers have done -themselves no discredit. But now that all Sicily is united against -us, and that farther reinforcements are expected from Peloponnesus, -you must take your resolution with full knowledge that we here have -not even strength to contend against our present difficulties. You -must either send for us home, or you must send us a second army, -land-force as well as naval, not inferior to that which is now here, -together with a considerable supply of money. You must farther send a -successor to supersede me, as I am incapable of work from a disease -in the kidneys. I think myself entitled to ask this indulgence at -your hands, for while my health lasted I did you much good service -in various military commands. But whatever you intend, do it at the -first opening of spring, without any delay: for the new succors which -the enemy is getting together in Sicily, will soon be here, and those -which are to come from Peloponnesus, though they will be longer -in arriving, yet, if you do not keep watch, will either elude or -forestall you as they have already once done.”[406] - - [406] Thucyd. vii, 11-15. - -Such was the memorable despatch of Nikias, which was read to the -public assembly of Athens about the end of November, or beginning of -December, 414 B.C., brought by officers who strengthened its effect -by their own oral communications, and answered all such inquiries as -were put to them.[407] We have much reason to regret that Thucydidês -does not give us any idea of the debate which so gloomy a revelation -called forth. He tells us merely the result: the Athenians resolved -to comply with the second portion of the alternative put by Nikias; -not to send for the present armament home, but to reinforce it -by a second powerful armament, both of land and naval force, in -prosecution of the same objects. But they declined his other personal -request, and insisted on continuing him in command; passing a vote, -however, to name Menander and Euthydemus, officers already in the -army before Syracuse, joint commanders along with him, in order to -assist him in his laborious duties. They sent Eurymedon speedily, -about the winter solstice, in command of ten triremes to Syracuse, -carrying one hundred and twenty talents of silver, together with -assurances of coming aid to the suffering army. And they resolved to -equip a new and formidable force, under Demosthenês and Eurymedon, -to go thither as reinforcement in the earliest months of the spring. -Demosthenês was directed to employ himself actively in getting this -larger force ready.[408] - - [407] Thucyd. vii, 10. - - [408] Thucyd. vii, 16. There is here a doubt as to the reading, - between one hundred and twenty talents, or twenty talents. - - I agree with Dr. Arnold and other commentators in thinking that - the money taken out by Eurymedon was far more probably the larger - sum of the two, than the smaller. The former reading seems to - deserve the preference. Besides, Diodorus states that Eurymedon - took out with him one hundred and forty talents: his authority, - indeed, does not count for much, but it counts for something, - in coincidence with a certain force of intrinsic probability - (Diodor. xiii, 8). - - On an occasion such as this, to send a very small sum, such as - twenty talents, would produce a discouraging effect upon the - armament. - -This letter of Nikias—so authentic, so full of matter, and so -characteristic of the manners of the time—suggests several serious -reflections, in reference both to himself and to the Athenian people. -As to himself, there is nothing so remarkable as the sentence of -condemnation which it pronounces on his own past proceedings in -Sicily. When we find him lamenting the wear and tear of the armament, -and treating the fact as notorious that even the best naval force -could only maintain itself in good condition for a short time, -what graver condemnation could be passed upon those eight months -which he wasted in trifling measures, after his arrival in Sicily, -before commencing the siege of Syracuse? When he announces that the -arrival of Gylippus with his auxiliary force before Syracuse, made -the difference to the Athenian army between triumph and something -bordering on ruin, the inquiry naturally suggests itself, whether he -had done his best to anticipate, and what precautions he had himself -taken to prevent, the coming of the Spartan general. To which the -answer must be, that, so far from anticipating the arrival of new -enemies as a possible danger, he had almost invited them from abroad -by his delay, and that he had taken no precautions at all against -them, though forewarned and having sufficient means at his disposal. -The desertion and demoralization of his naval force, doubtless but -too real, was, as he himself points out, mainly the consequence of -this turn of fortune, and was also the first commencement of that -unmanageable temper of the Athenian soldiery, numbered among his -difficulties. For it would be injustice to this unfortunate army -not to recognize that they first acquiesced patiently in prolonged -inaction, because their general directed it, and next did their duty -most gallantly in the operations of the siege, down to the death of -Lamachus. - -If even with our imperfect knowledge of the case, the ruin complained -of by Nikias be distinctly traceable to his own remissness and -oversight, much more must this conviction have been felt by -intelligent Athenians, both in the camp and in the city, as we shall -see by the conduct of Demosthenês[409] hereafter to be related. -Let us conceive the series of despatches, to which Nikias himself -alludes, as having been transmitted home, from their commencement. We -must recollect that the expedition was originally sent from Athens -with hopes of the most glowing character, and with a consciousness -of extraordinary efforts about to be rewarded with commensurate -triumphs. For some months, the despatches of the general disclose -nothing but movements either abortive or inglorious; adorned, -indeed, by one barren victory, but accompanied by an intimation -that he must wait till the spring, and that reinforcements must be -sent to him, before he can undertake the really serious enterprise. -Though the disappointment occasioned by this news at Athens must -have been mortifying, nevertheless his requisition was complied -with; and the despatches of Nikias, during the spring and summer of -414 B.C., become cheering. The siege of Syracuse is described as -proceeding successfully, and at length, about July or August, as -being on the point of coming to a triumphant close, in spite of a -Spartan adventurer, named Gylippus, making his way across the Ionian -sea with a force too contemptible to be noticed. Suddenly, without -any intermediate step to smooth the transition, comes a despatch -announcing that this adventurer has marched into Syracuse at the -head of a powerful army, and that the Athenians are thrown upon -the defensive, without power of proceeding with the siege. This is -followed, after a short time, by the gloomy and almost desperate -communication above translated. - - [409] Thucyd. vii, 42. - -When we thus look at the despatch, not merely as it stands singly, -but as falling in series with its antecedents, the natural effect -which we should suppose it likely to produce upon the Athenians, -would be a vehement burst of wrath and displeasure against Nikias. -Upon the most candid and impartial scrutiny, he deserved nothing -less. And when we consider, farther, the character generally ascribed -by historians of Greece to the Athenian people, that they are -represented as fickle, ungrateful, and irritable, by standing habit; -as abandoning upon the most trifling grounds those whom they had -once esteemed, forgetting all prior services, visiting upon innocent -generals the unavoidable misfortunes of war, and impelled by nothing -better than demagogic excitements, we naturally expect that the -blame really deserved by Nikias would be exaggerated beyond all due -measure, and break forth in a storm of violence and fury. Yet what -is the actual resolution taken in consequence of his despatch, after -the full and free debate of the Athenian assembly? Not a word of -blame or displeasure is proclaimed. Doubtless there must have been -individual speakers who criticized him as he deserved. To suppose the -contrary, would be to think meanly indeed of the Athenian assembly. -But the general vote was one not simply imputing no blame, but even -pronouncing continued and unabated confidence. The people positively -refuse to relieve him from the command, though he himself solicits it -in a manner sincere and even touching. So great is the value which -they set upon his services, and the esteem which they entertain -for his character, that they will not avail themselves of the easy -opportunity which he himself provides to get rid of him. - -It is not by way of compliment to the Athenians that I make these -remarks on their present proceeding. Quite the contrary. The -misplaced confidence of the Athenians in Nikias, on more than one -previous occasion, but especially on this, betrays an incapacity of -appreciating facts immediately before their eyes, and a blindness -to decisive and multiplied evidences of incompetency, which is one -of the least creditable manifestations of their political history. -But we do learn from it a clear lesson, that the habitual defects -of the Athenian character were very different from what historians -commonly impute to them. Instead of being fickle, we find them -tenacious in the extreme of confidence once bestowed, and of schemes -once embarked upon: instead of ingratitude for services actually -rendered, we find credit given for services which an officer ought -to have rendered, but has not: instead of angry captiousness, we -discover an indulgence not merely generous, but even culpable, in -the midst of disappointment and humiliation: instead of a public -assembly, wherein, as it is commonly depicted, the criminative -orators were omnipotent, and could bring to condemnation any -unsuccessful general, however meritorious; we see that even grave -and well-founded accusations make no impression upon the people in -opposition to preëstablished personal esteem; and personal esteem -for a man who not only was no demagogue, but in every respect the -opposite of a demagogue: an oligarch by taste, sentiment, and -position; who yielded to the democracy nothing more than sincere -obedience, coupled with gentleness and munificence in his private -bearing. If Kleon had committed but a small part of those capital -blunders which discredit the military career of Nikias, he would have -been irretrievably ruined. So much weaker was _his_ hold upon his -countrymen, by means of demagogic excellences, as compared with those -causes which attracted confidence to Nikias; his great family and -position, his wealth dexterously expended, his known incorruptibility -against bribes, and even comparative absence of personal ambition, -his personal courage combined with reputation for caution, his -decorous private life and ultra-religious habits. All this assemblage -of negative merits, and decencies of daily life, in a citizen -whose station might have enabled him to act with the insolence of -Alkibiadês, placed Nikias on a far firmer basis of public esteem than -the mere power of accusatory speech in the public assembly or the -dikastery could have done. It entitled him to have the most indulgent -construction put upon all his shortcomings, and spread a fatal -varnish over his glaring incompetence for all grave and responsible -command. - -The incident now before us is one of the most instructive in all -history, as an illustration of the usual sentiment, and strongest -causes of error, prevalent among the Athenian democracy, and as -a refutation of that exaggerated mischief which it is common to -impute to the person called a demagogue. Happy would it have been -for Athens had she now had Kleon present, or any other demagogue -of equal power, at that public assembly which took the melancholy -resolution of sending fresh forces to Sicily and continuing Nikias -in the command! The case was one in which the accusatory eloquence -of the demagogue was especially called for, to expose the real past -mismanagement of Nikias, to break down that undeserved confidence in -his ability and caution which had grown into a sentiment of faith or -routine, to prove how much mischief he had already done, and how much -more he would do if continued.[410] Unluckily for Athens, she had -now no demagogue who could convince the assembly beforehand of this -truth, and prevent them from taking the most unwise and destructive -resolution ever passed in the Pnyx. - - [410] Plutarch (Nikias, c. 20) tells us that the Athenians had - been disposed to send a second armament to Sicily, even before - the despatch of Nikias reached them: but that they had been - prevented by certain men who were envious (φθόνῳ) of the glory - and good fortune of Nikias. - - No judgment can be more inconsistent with the facts of the case - than this, facts recounted in general terms even by Plutarch - himself. - -What makes the resolution so peculiarly discreditable, is, that it -was adopted in defiance of clear and present evidence. To persist -in the siege of Syracuse, under present circumstances, was sad -misjudgment; to persist in it with Nikias as commander, was hardly -less than insanity. The first expedition, though even _that_ was -rash and ill-conceived, nevertheless presented tempting hopes -which explain, if they do not excuse, the too light estimate of -impossibility of lasting possession. Moreover, there was at that -time a confusion,—between the narrow objects connected with Leontini -and Egesta, and the larger acquisitions to be realized through the -siege of Syracuse,—which prevented any clear and unanimous estimate -of the undertaking in the Athenian mind. But now, the circumstances -of Sicily were fully known: the mendacious promises of Egesta had -been exposed; the hopes of allies for Athens in the island were -seen to be futile; while Syracuse, armed with a Spartan general and -Peloponnesian aid, had not only become inexpugnable, but had assumed -the aggressive: lastly, the chance of a renewal of Peloponnesian -hostility against Attica had been now raised into certainty. While -perseverance in the siege of Syracuse, therefore, under circumstances -so unpromising and under such necessity for increased exertions -at home, was a melancholy imprudence in itself, perseverance in -employing Nikias converted that imprudence into ruin, which even the -addition of an energetic colleague in the person of Demosthenês was -not sufficient to avert. Those who study the conduct of the Athenian -people on this occasion, will not be disposed to repeat against them -the charge of fickleness which forms one of the standing reproaches -against democracy. Their mistake here arose from the very opposite -quality; from what may be called obtuseness, or inability to get -clear of two sentiments which had become deeply engraven on their -minds; ideas of Sicilian conquest, and confidence in Nikias. - -A little more of this alleged fickleness—or easy escape from past -associations and impressibility to actual circumstances—would have -been at the present juncture a tutelary quality to Athens. She would -then have appreciated more justly the increased hazards thickening -around her both in Sicily and at home. War with Sparta, though not -yet actually proclaimed, had become impending and inevitable. Even -in the preceding winter, the Lacedæmonians had listened favorably -to the recommendation of Alkibiadês[411] that they should establish -a fortified post at Dekeleia in Attica. They had not yet indeed -brought themselves to execution of this resolve; for the peace -between them and Athens, though indirectly broken in many ways, still -subsisted in name, and they hesitated to break it openly, partly -because they knew that the breach of peace had been on their side at -the beginning of the Peloponnesian war; attributing to this fault -their capital misfortune at Sphakteria.[412] Athens on her side -had also scrupulously avoided direct violation of the Lacedæmonian -territory, in spite of much solicitation from her allies at Argos. -But her reserve on this point gave way during the present summer, -probably at the time when her prospect of taking Syracuse appeared -certain. The Lacedæmonians having invaded and plundered the Argeian -territory, thirty Athenian triremes were sent to aid in its defence, -under Pythodôrus with two colleagues. This armament disembarked on -the eastern coast of Laconia near Prasiæ and committed devastations: -which direct act of hostility—coming in addition to the marauding -excursions of the garrison of Pylos, and to the refusal of pacific -redress at Athens—satisfied the Lacedæmonians that the peace had -been now first and undeniably broken by their enemy, so that they -might with a safe conscience recommence the war.[413] - - [411] Thucyd. vi, 93. - - [412] Thucyd. vii, 18. - - [413] Thucyd. vi, 105; vii, 18. - -Such was the state of feeling between the two great powers of -Central Greece in November 414 B.C., when the envoys arrived from -Syracuse; envoys from Nikias on the one part, from Gylippus and -the Syracusans on the other; each urgently calling for farther -support. The Corinthians and Syracusans vehemently pressed their -claims at Sparta; nor was Alkibiadês again wanting, to renew his -instances for the occupation of Dekeleia. It was in the face of -this impending liability to renewed Peloponnesian invasion that -the Athenians took their resolution, above commented on, to send a -second army to Syracuse and prosecute the siege with vigor. If there -were any hesitation yet remaining on the part of the Lacedæmonians, -it disappeared so soon as they were made aware of the imprudent -resolution of Athens; which not only created an imperative necessity -for sustaining Syracuse, but also rendered Athens so much more -vulnerable at home, by removing the better part of her force. -Accordingly, very soon after the vote passed at Athens, an equally -decisive resolution for direct hostilities was adopted at Sparta. -It was determined that a Peloponnesian allied force should be -immediately prepared, to be sent at the first opening of spring to -Syracuse, and that at the same time Attica should be invaded, and the -post of Dekeleia fortified. Orders to this effect were immediately -transmitted to the whole body of Peloponnesian allies; especially -requisitions for implements, materials, and workmen, towards the -construction of the projected fort at Dekeleia.[414] - - [414] Thucyd. vii, 18. - - - - -CHAPTER LX. - -FROM THE RESUMPTION OF DIRECT HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA, -DOWN TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY. - - -The Syracusan war now no longer stands apart, as an event by itself, -but becomes absorbed in the general war rekindling throughout Greece. -Never was any winter so actively and extensively employed in military -preparations, as the winter of 414-413 B.C., the months immediately -preceding that which Thucydidês terms the nineteenth spring of the -Peloponnesian war, but which other historians call the beginning of -the Dekeleian war.[415] While Eurymedon went with his ten triremes -to Syracuse, even in midwinter, Demosthenês exerted himself all the -winter to get together the second armament for early spring. Twenty -other Athenian triremes were farther sent round Peloponnesus to -the station of Naupaktus, to prevent any Corinthian reinforcements -from sailing out of the Corinthian gulf. Against these latter, the -Corinthians on their side prepared twenty-five fresh triremes, to -serve as a convoy to the transports carrying their hoplites.[416] -In Corinth, Sikyôn, and Bœotia, as well as at Lacedæmon, levies of -hoplites were going on for the armament to Syracuse, at the same time -that everything was getting ready for the occupation of Dekeleia. -Lastly, Gylippus was engaged with not less activity in stirring up -all Sicily to take a more decisive part in the coming year’s struggle. - - [415] Diodor. xiii, 8. - - [416] Thucyd. vii, 17. - -From Cape Tænarus in Laconia, at the earliest moment of spring, -embarked a force of six hundred Lacedæmonian hoplites—Helots and -Neodamodes—under the Spartan Ekkritus, and three hundred Bœotian -hoplites under the Thebans Xenon and Nikon, with the Thespian -Hegesandrus. They were directed to cross the sea southward to Kyrênê -in Libya, and from thence to make their way along the African coast -to Sicily. At the same time a body of seven hundred hoplites under -Alexarchus, partly Corinthians, partly hired Arcadians, partly -Sikyonians, under constraint from their powerful neighbors,[417] -departed from the northwest of Peloponnesus and the mouth of the -Corinthian gulf for Sicily, the Corinthian triremes watching them -until they were past the Athenian squadron at Naupaktus. - - [417] Thucyd. vii, 19-58. Σικυώνιοι ἀναγκαστοὶ στρατεύοντες. - -These were proceedings of importance: but the most important of all -was the reinvasion of Attica at the same time by the great force -of the Peloponnesian alliance, under the Spartan king Agis son of -Archidamus. Twelve years had elapsed since Attica last felt the -hand of the destroyer, a little before the siege of Sphakteria. The -plain in the neighborhood of Athens was now first laid waste, after -which the invaders proceeded to their special purpose of erecting -a fortified post for occupation at Dekeleia. The work, apportioned -among the allies present, who had come prepared with the means -of executing it, was completed during the present summer, and a -garrison was established there composed of contingents relieving -each other at intervals, under the command of king Agis himself. -Dekeleia was situated on an outlying eminence belonging to the range -called Parnês, about fourteen miles to the north of Athens, near the -termination of the plain of Athens, and commanding an extensive view -of that plain as well as of the plain of Eleusis. The hill on which -it stood, if not the fort itself, was visible even from the walls -of Athens. It was admirably situated both as a central point for -excursions over Attica, and for communication with Bœotia; while the -road from Athens to Orôpus, the main communication with Eubœa, passed -through the gorge immediately under it.[418] - - [418] Thucyd. vii, 19-28, with Dr. Arnold’s note. - -We read with amazement, and the contemporary world saw with yet -greater amazement, that while this important work was actually going -on, and while the whole Peloponnesian confederacy was renewing its -pressure with redoubled force upon Athens, at that very moment,[419] -the Athenians sent out, not only a fleet of thirty triremes under -Chariklês to annoy the coasts of Peloponnesus, but also the great -armament which they had resolved upon under Demosthenês, to push -offensive operations against Syracuse. The force under the latter -general consisted of sixty Athenian and five Chian triremes; of -twelve hundred Athenian hoplites of the best class, chosen from the -citizen muster-roll; with a considerable number of hoplites besides, -from the subject-allies and elsewhere. There had been also engaged -on hire fifteen hundred peltasts from Thrace, of the tribe called -Dii; but these men did not arrive in time, so that Demosthenês -set sail without them.[420] Chariklês having gone forward to take -aboard a body of allies from Argos, the two fleets joined at Ægina, -inflicted some devastations on the coasts of Laconia, and established -a strong post on the island of Kythêra to encourage desertion -among the Helots. From hence Chariklês returned with the Argeians, -while Demosthenês conducted his armament round Peloponnesus to -Korkyra.[421] On the Eleian coast, he destroyed a transport carrying -hoplites to Syracuse, though the men escaped ashore: from thence he -proceeded to Zakynthus and Kephallenia, from whence he engaged some -additional hoplites, and to Anaktorium, in order to procure darters -and slingers from Akarnania. It was here that he was met by Eurymedon -with his ten triremes, who had gone forward to Syracuse in the -winter with the pecuniary remittance urgently required, and was now -returning to act as colleague of Demosthenês in the command.[422] The -news brought by Eurymedon from Sicily was in every way discouraging. -Yet the two admirals were under the necessity of sparing ten triremes -from their fleet to reinforce Konon at Naupaktus, who was not -strong enough alone to contend against the Corinthian fleet which -watched him from the opposite coast. To make good this diminution, -Eurymedon went forward to Korkyra, with the view of obtaining from -the Korkyræans fifteen fresh triremes and a contingent of hoplites, -while Demosthenês was getting together the Akarnanian darters and -slingers.[423] - - [419] Thucyd. vii, 20. ἅμα τῆς Δεκελείας τῷ τειχισμῷ, etc. - Compare Isokratês, Orat. viii, De Pace, s. 102, p. 236, Bekk. - - [420] Thucyd. vii, 20-27. - - [421] Thucyd. vii, 26. - - [422] Thucyd. vii, 31. Ὄντι δ’ αὐτῷ (Demosthenês) περὶ ταῦτα - (Anaktorium) Εὐρυμέδων ἀπαντᾷ, ὃς τότε τοῦ χειμῶνος ~τὰ χρήματα - ἄγων τῇ στρατιᾷ ἀπεπέμφθη~, καὶ ἀγγέλλει, etc. - - The meaning of this passage appears quite unambiguous, that - Eurymedon had been sent to Sicily in the winter, to carry the sum - of one hundred and twenty talents to Nikias, and was now on his - return (see Thucyd. vii, 11). Nor is it without some astonishment - that I read in Mr. Mitford: “At Anactorium, Demosthenês found - Eurymedon _collecting provisions_ for Sicily,” etc. Mr. Mitford - then says in a note (quoting the Scholiast, Ἤτοι τὰ πρὸς τροφὴν - χρήσιμα, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ συντείνοντα αὐτοῖς, Schol.): “This is not - the only occasion on which Thucydidês uses the term χρήματα for - _necessaries in general_. Smith has translated accordingly: - but the Latin has _pecuniam_, which does not express the sense - intended here,” (ch. xviii, sect. vi, vol. iv, p. 118.) - - There cannot be the least doubt that the Latin is here right. - The definite article makes the point quite certain, even if it - were true (which I doubt) that Thucydidês sometimes uses the word - χρήματα to mean “necessaries in general.” I doubt still more - whether he ever uses ἄγων in the sense of “collecting.” - - [423] Thucyd. vii, 31. - -Eurymedon not only brought back word of the distressed condition -of the Athenians in the harbor of Syracuse, but had also learned, -during his way back, their heavy additional loss by the capture of -the fort at Plemmyrium. Gylippus returned to Syracuse early in the -spring, nearly about the time when Agis invaded Attica and when -Demosthenês quitted Peiræus. He returned with fresh reinforcements -from the interior, and with redoubled ardor for decisive operations -against Nikias before aid could arrive from Athens. It was his first -care, in conjunction with Hermokratês, to inspire the Syracusans -with courage for fighting the Athenians on shipboard. Such was the -acknowledged superiority of the latter at sea, that this was a task -of some difficulty, calling for all the eloquence and ascendency of -the two leaders: “The Athenians (said Hermokratês to his countrymen) -have not been always eminent at sea as they now are: they were once -landsmen like you, and more than you, they were only forced on -shipboard by the Persian invasion. The only way to deal with bold -men like them, is to show a front bolder still. _They_ have often by -their audacity daunted enemies of greater real force than themselves, -and they must now be taught that others can play the same game with -them. Go right at them before they expect it; and you will gain more -by thus surprising and intimidating them, than you will suffer by -their superior science.” Such lessons, addressed to men already in -the tide of success, were presently efficacious, and a naval attack -was resolved.[424] - - [424] Thucyd. vii, 21. Among the topics of encouragement dwelt - upon by Hermokratês, it is remarkable that he makes no mention of - that which the sequel proved to be the most important of all, the - confined space of the harbor, which rendered Athenian ships and - tactics unavailing. - -The town of Syracuse had two ports, one on each side of the island -of Ortygia. The lesser port—as it was called afterwards, the Portus -Lakkius—lay northward of Ortygia, between that island and the low -ground or Nekropolis near the outer city: the other lay on the -opposite side of the isthmus of Ortygia within the Great Harbor. Both -of them, it appears, were protected against attack from without, -by piles and stakes planted in the bottom in front of them. But -the lesser port was the more secure of the two, and the principal -docks of the Syracusans were situated within it; the Syracusan -fleet, eighty triremes strong, being distributed between them. The -entire Athenian fleet was stationed under the fort of Plemmyrium, -immediately opposite to the southern point of Ortygia. - -Gylippus laid his plan with great ability, so as to take the -Athenians completely by surprise. Having trained and prepared the -naval force as thoroughly as he could, he marched out his land-force -secretly by night, over Epipolæ and round by the right bank of the -Anapus, to the neighborhood of the fort of Plemmyrium. With the first -dawn of morning, the Syracusan fleet sailed out, at one and the same -signal, from both the ports; forty-five triremes out of the lesser -port, thirty-five out of the other. Both squadrons tried to round the -southern point of Ortygia, so as to unite and to attack the enemy at -Plemmyrium in concert. The Athenians, though unprepared and confused, -hastened to man sixty ships; with twenty-five of which, they met the -thirty-five Syracusans sailing forth from the Great Harbor, while -with the other thirty-five they encountered the forty-five from the -lesser port, immediately outside of the mouth of the Great Harbor. In -the former of these two actions the Syracusans were at first victors; -in the second also, the Syracusans from the outside forced their -way into the mouth of the Great Harbor, and joined their comrades. -But being little accustomed to naval warfare, they presently fell -into complete confusion, partly in consequence of their unexpected -success: so that the Athenians, recovering from the first shock, -attacked them anew and completely defeated them; sinking or disabling -eleven ships, of three of which the crews were made prisoners, the -rest being mostly slain.[425] Three Athenian triremes were destroyed -also. - - [425] Thucyd. vii, 23; Diod. xiii, 9; Plut. Nikias, c. 20. - -But this victory, itself not easily won, was more than -counterbalanced by the irreparable loss of Plemmyrium. During the -first excitement at the Athenian naval station, when the ships were -in course of being manned to meet the unexpected onset from both -ports at once, the garrison of Plemmyrium went to the water’s edge to -watch and encourage their countrymen, leaving their own walls thinly -guarded, and little suspecting the presence of their enemy on the -land side. This was just what Gylippus had anticipated. He attacked -the forts at daybreak, taking the garrison completely by surprise, -and captured them after a feeble resistance; first the greatest -and most important fort, next the two smaller. The garrison sought -safety as they could, on board the transports and vessels of burden -at the station, and rowed across the Great Harbor to the land-camp -of Nikias on the other side. Those who fled from the greater fort, -which was the first taken, ran some risk from the Syracusan triremes, -which were at that moment victorious at sea. But by the time that -the two lesser forts were taken, the Athenian fleet had regained its -superiority, so that there was no danger of similar pursuit in the -crossing of the Great Harbor. - -This well-concerted surprise was no less productive to the captors -than fatal as a blow to the Athenians. Not only were many men slain, -and many made prisoners, in the assault, but there were vast stores -of every kind, and even a large stock of money found within the fort; -partly belonging to the military chest, partly the property of the -trierarchs and of private merchants, who had deposited it there as -in the place of greatest security. The sails of not less than forty -triremes were also found there, and three triremes which had been -dragged up ashore. Gylippus caused one of the three forts to be -pulled down, and carefully garrisoned the other two.[426] - - [426] Thucyd. vii, 23, 24. - -Great as the positive loss was here to the Athenians at a time when -their situation could ill bear it, the collateral damage and peril -growing out of the capture of Plemmyrium was yet more serious, -besides the alarm and discouragement which it spread among the -army. The Syracusans were now masters of the mouth of the harbor on -both sides, so that not a single storeship could enter without a -convoy and a battle. What was of not less detriment, the Athenian -fleet was now forced to take station under the fortified lines of -its own land-force, and was thus cramped up on a small space in the -innermost portion of the Great Harbor, between the city-wall and the -river Anapus; the Syracusans being masters everywhere else, with full -communication between their posts all round, hemming in the Athenian -position both by sea and by land. - -To the Syracusans, on the contrary, the result of the recent -battle proved every way encouraging; not merely from the valuable -acquisition of Plemmyrium, but even from the sea-fight itself, which -had indeed turned out to be a defeat, but which promised at first -to be a victory, had they not thrown away the chance by their own -disorder. It removed all superstitious fear of Athenian nautical -superiority; while their position was so much improved by having -acquired the command of the mouth of the harbor, that they began even -to assume the aggressive at sea. They detached a squadron of twelve -triremes to the coast of Italy, for the purpose of intercepting some -merchant vessels coming with a supply of money to the Athenians. So -little fear was there of an enemy at sea, that these vessels seem to -have been coming without convoy, and were for the most part destroyed -by the Syracusans, together with a stock of ship-timber which the -Athenians had collected near Kaulonia. In touching at Lokri, on their -return, they took aboard a company of Thespian hoplites who had made -their way thither in a transport. They were also fortunate enough to -escape the squadron of twenty triremes which Nikias detached to lie -in wait for them near Megara, with the loss of one ship, however, -including her crew.[427] - - [427] Thucyd. vii, 25. - -One of this Syracusan squadron had gone forward from Italy with -envoys to Peloponnesus, to communicate the favorable news of the -capture of Plemmyrium, and to accelerate as much as possible, -the operations against Attica, in order that no reinforcements -might be sent from thence. At the same time, other envoys went -from Syracuse—not merely Syracusans, but also Corinthians and -Lacedæmonians—to visit the cities in the interior of Sicily. They -made known everywhere the prodigious improvement in Syracusan affairs -arising from the gain of Plemmyrium, as well as the insignificant -character of the recent naval defeat. They strenuously pleaded for -farther aid to Syracuse without delay, since there were now the best -hopes of being able to crush the Athenians in the harbor completely, -before the reinforcements about to be despatched could reach -them.[428] - - [428] Thucyd. vii, 25. - -While these envoys were absent on their mission, the Great Harbor was -the scene of much desultory conflict, though not of any comprehensive -single battle. Since the loss of Plemmyrium, the Athenian naval -station was in the northwest interior corner of that harbor, -adjoining the fortified lines occupied by their land-army. It was -inclosed and protected by a row of posts or stakes stuck in the -bottom and standing out of the water.[429] The Syracusans on their -side had also planted a stockade in front of the interior port of -Ortygia, to defend their ships, their ship-houses, and their docks -within. As the two stations were not far apart, each party watched -for opportunities of occasional attack or annoyance by missile -weapons to the other; and daily skirmishes of this sort took place, -in which on the whole the Athenians seem to have had the advantage. -They even formed the plan of breaking through the outworks of the -Syracusan dockyard, and burning the ships within. They brought up -a ship of the largest size, with wooden towers and side defences, -against the line of posts fronting the dockyard, and tried to force -the entrance, either by means of divers, who sawed them through at -the bottom, or by boat-crews, who fastened ropes round them and thus -unfixed or plucked them out. All this was done under cover of the -great vessel with its towers manned by light-armed, who exchanged -showers of missiles with the Syracusan bowmen on the top of the -ship-houses, and prevented the latter from coming near enough to -interrupt the operation. The Athenians contrived thus to remove many -of the posts planted, even the most dangerous among them, those which -did not reach to the surface of the water, and which therefore a -ship approaching could not see. But they gained little by it, since -the Syracusans were able to plant others in their room. On the -whole, no serious damage was done, either to the dockyard or to the -ships within. And the state of affairs in the Great Harbor stood -substantially unaltered, during all the time that the envoys were -absent on their Sicilian tour, probably three weeks or a month.[430] - - [429] Thucyd. vii, 38. - - [430] Thucyd. vii, 25. - -These envoys had found themselves almost everywhere well received. -The prospects of Syracuse were now so triumphant, and those of Nikias -with his present force so utterly hopeless, that the waverers thought -it time to declare themselves; and all the Greek cities in Sicily, -except Agrigentum, which still remained neutral (and of course -except Naxos and Katana), resolved on aiding the winning cause. -From Kamarina came five hundred hoplites, four hundred darters, -and three hundred bowmen; from Gela, five triremes, four hundred -darters, and two hundred horsemen. Besides these, an additional force -from the other cities was collected, to march to Syracuse in a body -across the interior of the island, under the conduct of the envoys -themselves. But this part of the scheme was frustrated by Nikias, -who was rendered more vigilant by the present desperate condition -of his affairs, than he had been in reference to the cross march of -Gylippus. At his instance, the Sikel tribes Kentoripes and Halikyæi, -allies of Athens, were prevailed upon to attack the approaching -enemy. They planned a skilful ambuscade, set upon them unawares, and -dispersed them with the loss of eight hundred men. All the envoys -were also slain, except the Corinthian, who conducted the remaining -force, about fifteen hundred in number, to Syracuse.[431] - - [431] Thucyd. vii, 32, 33. - -This reverse—which seems to have happened about the time when -Demosthenês with his armament were at Korkyra, on the way to -Syracuse—so greatly dismayed and mortified the Syracusans, that -Gylippus thought it advisable to postpone awhile the attack which he -intended to have made immediately on the reinforcement arriving.[432] -The delay of these few days proved nothing less than the salvation of -the Athenian army. - - [432] Thucyd. vii, 33. - -It was not until Demosthenês was approaching Rhegium within two or -three days’ sail of Syracuse, that the attack was determined on -without farther delay. Preparation in every way had been made for -it long before, especially for the most effective employment of the -naval force. The captains and ship-masters of Syracuse and Corinth -had now become fully aware of the superiority of Athenian nautical -manœuvre, and of the causes upon which that superiority depended. -The Athenian trireme was of a build comparatively light, fit for -rapid motion through the water, and for easy change of direction: -its prow was narrow, armed with a sharp projecting beak at the end, -but hollow and thin, not calculated to force its way through very -strong resistance. It was never intended to meet, in direct impact -and collision, the prow of an enemy: such a proceeding passed among -the able seamen of Athens for gross awkwardness. In advancing against -an enemy’s vessel, they evaded the direct shock, steered so as to -pass by it, then, by the excellence and exactness of their rowing, -turned swiftly round, altered their direction and came back before -the enemy could alter his: or perhaps rowed rapidly round him, or -backed their ship stern foremost, until the opportunity was found -for driving the beak of their ship against some weak part of his, -against the midships, the quarter, the stern, or the oarblades -without. In such manœuvres the Athenians were unrivalled: but none -such could be performed unless there were ample sea-room, which -rendered their present naval station the most disadvantageous that -could be imagined. They were cooped up in the inmost part of a -harbor of small dimensions, close on the station of their enemies, -and with all the shore, except their own lines, in possession of -those enemies: so that they could not pull round from want of space, -nor could they back water, because they durst not come near shore. -In this contracted area, the only mode of fighting possible was by -straightforward collision, prow against prow; a process which not -only shut out all their superior manœuvring, but was unsuited to the -build of their triremes. On the other hand, the Syracusans, under -the advice of the able Corinthian steersman Aristo, altered the -construction of their triremes to meet the special exigency of the -case, disregarding all idea of what had been generally looked upon -as good nautical manœuvring.[433] Instead of the long, thin, hollow, -and sharp, advancing beak, striking the enemy considerably above -the water-level, and therefore doing less damage, they shortened -the prow, but made it excessively heavy and solid, and lowered the -elevation of the projecting beak: so that it became not so much -calculated to pierce, as to break in and crush by main force all the -opposing part of the enemy’s ship, not far above the water. What -were called the epôtids, “ear-caps,” or nozzles, projecting forwards -to the right and left of the beak, were made peculiarly thick, and -sustained by under-beams let in to the hull of the ship. In the Attic -build, the beak stood forward very prominent, and the epôtids on -each side of it were kept back, serving the same purpose as what are -called catheads, in modern ships, to which the anchors are suspended: -but in the Corinthian build, the beak projected less, and the epôtids -more, so that they served to strike the enemy: instead of having -one single beak, the Corinthian ship might be said to have three -nozzles.[434] The Syracusans relied on the narrowness of the space, -for shutting out the Athenian evolutions, and bringing the contest to -nothing more than a straightforward collision; in which the weaker -vessel would be broken and stove in at the prow, and thus rendered -unmanageable. - - [433] Thucyd. vii, 36. τῇ δὲ πρότερον ἀμαθίᾳ τῶν κυβερνητῶν - δοκούσῃ εἶναι, τὸ ἀντίπρωρον ξυγκροῦσαι, μάλιστ’ ἂν αὐτοὶ - χρήσασθαι· πλεῖστον γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ σχήσειν, etc. - - Diodor. xiii, 10. - - [434] Compare Thucyd. vii, 34-30; Diodor. xiii. 10; Eurip. Iph. - Taur. 1335. See also the notes of Arnold, Poppo, and Didot, on - the passages of Thucydidês. - - It appears as if the ἀντηρίδες or sustaining beams were something - new, now provided for the first time, in order to strengthen the - epôtid and render it fit to drive in collision against the enemy. - The words which Thucydidês employs to describe the position of - these ἀντηρίδες, are to me very obscure, nor do I think that any - of the commentators clear them up satisfactorily. - - It is Diodorus who specifies that the Corinthians lowered the - level of their prows, so as to strike nearer to the water, which - Thucydidês does not mention. - - A captive ship, when towed in as a prize, was disarmed by being - deprived of her beak (Athenæus, xii, p. 535). Lysander reserved - the beaks of the Athenian triremes captured at Ægospotami to - grace his triumphal return (Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 8). - -Having completed these arrangements, their land-force was marched -out under Gylippus to threaten one side of the Athenian lines, while -the cavalry and the garrison of the Olympieion marched up to the -other side. The Athenians were putting themselves in position to -defend their walls from what seemed to be a land attack, when they -saw the Syracusan fleet, eighty triremes strong, sailing out from -its dock prepared for action: upon which they too, though at first -confused by this unexpected appearance, put their crews on shipboard, -and went out of their palisaded station, seventy-five triremes in -number, to meet the enemy. The whole day passed off, however, in -desultory and indecisive skirmish, with trifling advantage to the -Syracusans, who disabled one or two Athenian ships, yet merely tried -to invite the Athenians to attack, without choosing themselves to -force on a close and general action.[435] - - [435] Thucyd. vii, 37, 38. - -It was competent to the Athenians to avoid altogether a naval action, -at least until the necessity arose for escorting fresh supplies into -the harbor, by keeping within their station; and as Demosthenês -was now at hand, prudence counselled this reserve. Nikias himself, -too, is said to have deprecated immediate fighting, but to have -been outvoted by his two newly-appointed colleagues Menander and -Euthydemus, who were anxious to show what they could do without -Demosthenês, and took their stand upon Athenian maritime honor, which -peremptorily forbade them to shrink from the battle when offered.[436] - - [436] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 20. Diodorus (xiii, 10) represents the - battle as having been brought on against the wish and intention - of the Athenians generally, not alluding to any difference of - opinion among the commanders. - -Though on the next day the Syracusans made no movement, yet Nikias -foreseeing that they would speedily recommence, and noway encouraged -by the equal manifestations of the preceding day, caused every -trierarch to repair what damage his ship had sustained, and even -took the precaution of farther securing his naval station by mooring -merchant-vessels just alongside of the openings in the palisade, -about two hundred feet apart. The prows of these vessels were -provided with dolphins, or beams lifted up on high and armed at -the end with massive heads of iron, which could be so let fall as -to crush any ship entering:[437] any Athenian trireme which might -be hard-pressed, would thus be enabled to get through this opening -where no enemy could follow, and choose her own time for sailing out -again. Before night these arrangements were completed, and at the -earliest dawn of next day, the Syracusans reappeared, with the same -demonstrations both of land force and naval force as before. The -Athenian fleet having gone forth to meet them, several hours were -spent in the like indecisive and partial skirmishes, until at length -the Syracusan fleet sailed back to the city again without bringing -on any general or close combat. The Athenians, construing this -retirement of the enemy as evidence of backwardness and unwillingness -to fight,[438] and supposing the day’s duty at an end, retired on -their side within their own station, disembarked, and separated to -get their dinners at leisure, having tasted no food that day. - - [437] Thucyd. vii, 41. αἱ κεραῖαι δελφινοφόροι: compare Pollux, - i, 85, and Fragment vi, of the comedy of the poet Pherekratês, - entitled Ἄγριοι; Meineke, Fragm. Comic. Græc. vol. ii, p. 258, - and the Scholiast. ad Aristoph. Equit. 759. - - [438] Thucyd. vii, 40. Οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναῖοι, νομίσαντες αὐτοὺς ὡς - ἡσσημένους σφῶν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἀνακρούσασθαι, etc. - -But ere they had been long ashore, they were astonished to see the -Syracusan fleet sailing back to renew the attack, in full battle -order. This was a manœuvre suggested by the Corinthian Aristo, the -ablest steersman in the fleet; at whose instance, the Syracusan -admirals had sent back an urgent request to the city authorities, -that an abundant stock of provisions might for that day be brought -down to the sea-shore, and sale be rendered compulsory; so that no -time should be lost, when the fleet returned thither, in taking a -hasty meal without dispersion of the crews. Accordingly the fleet, -after a short but sufficient interval allowed for refreshment thus -close at hand, was brought back unexpectedly to the enemy’s station. -Confounded at the sight, the Athenian crews forced themselves again -on board, most of them yet without refreshment, and in the midst -of murmurs and disorder.[439] On sailing out of their station, the -indecisive skirmishing again commenced, and continued for some -time, until at length the Athenian captains became so impatient -of prolonged and exhausting fatigue, that they resolved to begin -of themselves, and make the action close as well as general. -Accordingly, the word of command was given, and they rowed forward -to make the attack, which was cheerfully received by the Syracusans. -By receiving the attack instead of making it, the latter were better -enabled to insure a straightforward collision of prow against prow, -excluding all circuit, backing, or evolutions, on the part of the -enemy: at any rate, their steersmen contrived to realize this plan, -and to crush, stave in, or damage, the forepart of many of the -Athenian triremes, simply by superior weight of material and solidity -on their own side. The Syracusan darters on the deck, moreover, as -soon as the combat became close, were both numerous and destructive; -while their little boats rowed immediately under the sides of the -Athenian triremes, broke the blades of their oars, and shot darts -in through the oar-holes, against the rowers within. At length -the Athenians, after sustaining the combat bravely for some time, -found themselves at such disadvantage, that they were compelled to -give way and to seek shelter within their own station. The armed -merchant-vessels which Nikias had planted before the openings in -the palisade were now found of great use in checking the pursuing -Syracusans; two of whose triremes, in the excitement of victory, -pushed forward too near to them and were disabled by the heavy -implements on board, one of them being captured with all her crew. -The general victory of the Syracusans, however, was complete: seven -Athenian triremes were sunk or disabled, many others were seriously -damaged, and numbers of seamen either slain or made prisoners.[440] - - [439] Thucyd. vii, 40. - - [440] Thucyd. vii, 41. - -Overjoyed with the result of this battle, which seems to have been -no less skilfully planned than bravely executed, the Syracusans now -felt confident of their superiority by sea as well as on land, and -contemplated nothing less than the complete destruction of their -enemies in the harbor. The generals were already concerting measures -for renewed attack both by land and by sea, and a week or two more -would probably have seen the ruin of this once triumphant besieging -armament, now full of nothing but discouragement. The mere stoppage -of supplies, in fact, as the Syracusans were masters of the mouth -of the harbor, would be sure to starve it out in no long time, if -they maintained their superiority at sea. All their calculations -were suspended, however, and the hopes of the Athenians for the time -revived, by the entry of Demosthenês and Eurymedon with the second -armament into the Great Harbor; which seems to have taken place on -the very day, or on the second day, after the recent battle.[441] So -important were the consequences which turned upon that postponement -of the Syracusan attack, occasioned by the recent defeat of their -reinforcing army from the interior. So little did either party think, -at that moment, that it would have been a mitigation of calamity to -Athens, if Demosthenês had _not_ arrived in time; if the ruin of the -first armament had been actually consummated before the coming of the -second! - - [441] Thucyd. vii, 42. - -Demosthenês, after obtaining the required reinforcements at Korkyra, -had crossed the Ionian sea to the islands called Chœrades on the -coast of Iapygia; where he took aboard a band of one hundred and -fifty Messapian darters, through the friendly aid of the native -prince Artas, with whom an ancient alliance was renewed. Passing on -farther to Metapontum, already in alliance with Athens, he was there -reinforced with two triremes and three hundred darters, with which -addition he sailed on to Thurii. Here he found himself cordially -welcomed; for the philo-Athenian party was in full ascendency, -having recently got the better in a vehement dissension, and passed -a sentence of banishment against their opponents.[442] They not only -took a formal resolution to acknowledge the same friends and the same -enemies as the Athenians, but equipped a regiment of seven hundred -hoplites and three hundred darters to accompany Demosthenês, who -remained there long enough to pass his troops in review and verify -the completeness of each division. After having held this review on -the banks of the river Sybaris, he marched his troops by land through -the Thurian territory to the banks of the river Hylias which divided -it from Kroton. He was here met by Krotoniate envoys, who forbade the -access to their territory: upon which he marched down the river to -the sea-shore, got on shipboard, and pursued his voyage southward -along the coast of Italy, touching at the various towns, all except -the hostile Lokri.[443] - - [442] Thucyd. vii, 33-57. - - [443] Thucyd. vii, 35. - -His entry into the harbor of Syracuse,[444] accomplished in the most -ostentatious trim, with decorations and musical accompaniments, -was no less imposing from the magnitude of his force than critical -in respect to opportunity. Taking Athenians, allies, and mercenary -forces, together, he conducted seventy-three triremes, five -thousand hoplites, and a large number of light troops of every -description,—archers, slingers, darters, etc., with other requisites -for effective operation. At the sight of such an armament, not -inferior to the first which had arrived under Nikias, the Syracusans -lost for a moment the confidence of their recent triumph, and were -struck with dismay as well as wonder.[445] That Athens could be rash -enough to spare such an armament, at a moment when the full burst of -Peloponnesian hostility was reopening upon her, and when Dekeleia -was in course of being fortified, was a fact out of all reasonable -probability, and not to be credited unless actually seen. And -probably the Syracusans, though they knew that Demosthenês was on his -way, had no idea beforehand of the magnitude of his armament. - - [444] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 21. - - [445] Thucyd. vii, 42. - -On the other hand, the hearts of the discomfited and beleaguered -Athenians again revived as they welcomed their new comrades. They -saw themselves again masters by land as well as by sea; and they -displayed their renewed superiority by marching out of their lines -forthwith and ravaging the lands near the Anapus; the Syracusans not -venturing to engage in a general action, and merely watching the -movement with some cavalry from the Olympieion. - -But Demosthenês was not imposed upon by this delusive show of power, -so soon as he had made himself master of the full state of affairs, -and had compared his own means with those of the enemy. He found the -army of Nikias not merely worn down with long-continued toil, and -disheartened by previous defeat, but also weakened in a terrible -degree by the marsh fever general towards the close of summer, in the -low ground where they were encamped.[446] - - [446] Thucyd. vii, 47-50. - -He saw that the Syracusans were strong in multiplied allies, extended -fortifications, a leader of great ability, and general belief that -theirs was the winning cause. Moreover, he felt deeply the position -of Athens at home, and her need of all her citizens against enemies -within sight of her own walls. But above all, he came penetrated with -the deplorable effects which had resulted from the mistake of Nikias, -in wasting irreparably so much precious time, and frittering away the -first terror-striking impression of his splendid armament. All these -considerations determined Demosthenês to act, without a moment’s -delay and while the impression produced by his arrival was yet -unimpaired, and to aim one great and decisive blow, such as might, -if successful, make the conquest of Syracuse again probable. If this -should fail, he resolved to abandon the whole enterprise, and return -home with his armament forthwith.[447] - - [447] Thucyd. vii, 42. - -By means of the Athenian lines, he had possession of the southernmost -portion of the slope of Epipolæ. But all along that slope from east -to west, immediately in front or to the north of his position, -stretched the counter-wall built by the Syracusans; beginning at -the city wall on the lowest ground, and reaching up first in a -northwesterly, next in a westerly direction, until it joined the fort -on the upper ground near the cliff, where the road from Euryalus -down to Syracuse passed. The Syracusans, as defenders, were on the -north side of this counter-wall; he and the Athenians on the south -side. It was a complete bar to his progress, nor could he stir a step -without making himself master of it: towards which end there were -only two possible means,—either to storm it in front, or to turn it -from its western extremity by marching round up to the Euryalus. -He began by trying the first method; but the wall was abundantly -manned and vigorously defended; his battering machines were all burnt -or disqualified, and every attempt which he made was completely -repulsed.[448] There then remained only the second method, to turn -the wall, ascending by circuitous roads to the heights of Euryalus -behind it, and then attacking the fort in which it terminated. - - [448] Thucyd. vii, 43. - -But the march necessary for this purpose, first, up the valley of -the Anapus, visible from the Syracusan posts above; next, ascending -to the Euryalus by a narrow and winding path, was so difficult, -that even Demosthenês, naturally sanguine, despaired of being able -to force his way up in the daylight, against an enemy seeing the -attack. He was therefore constrained to attempt a night-surprise, for -which, Nikias and his other colleagues consenting, he accordingly -made preparations on the largest and most effective scale. He took -the command himself, along with Menander and Eurymedon (Nikias being -left to command within the lines),[449] conducting hoplites and light -troops, together with masons and carpenters, and all other matters -necessary for establishing a fortified post; lastly, giving orders -that every man should carry with him provisions for five days. - - [449] Thucyd. vii, 43. Diodorus tells us that Demosthenês took - with him ten thousand hoplites, and ten thousand light troops, - numbers which are not at all to be trusted (xiii, 11). - - Plutarch (Nikias, c. 21) says that Nikias was extremely averse to - the attack on Epipolæ: Thucydidês notices nothing of the kind, - and the assertion seems improbable. - -Fortune so far favored him, that not only all these preliminary -arrangements, but even his march itself, was accomplished without -any suspicion of the enemy. At the beginning of a moonlight night, -he quitted the lines, moved along the low ground on the left -bank of the Anapus and parallel to that river for a considerable -distance, then following various roads to the right, arrived at -the Euryalus, or highest pitch of Epipolæ, where he found himself -in the same track by which the Athenians in coming from Katana a -year and a half before—and Gylippus in coming from the interior -of the island about ten months before—had passed, in order to get -to the slope of Epipolæ above Syracuse. He reached, without being -discovered, the extreme Syracusan fort on the high ground, assailed -it completely by surprise, and captured it after a feeble resistance. -Some of the garrison within it were slain; but the greater part -escaped, and ran to give the alarm to the three fortified camps of -Syracusans and allies, which were placed one below another behind -the long continuous wall,[450] on the declivity of Epipolæ, as well -as to a chosen regiment of six hundred Syracusan hoplites under -Hermokratês,[451] who formed a night-watch, or bivouac. This regiment -hastened up to the rescue, but Demosthenês and the Athenian vanguard -charging impetuously forward, drove them back in disorder upon the -fortified positions in their rear. Even Gylippus and the Syracusan -troops advancing upwards out of these positions, were at first -carried back by the same retreating movement. - - [450] Thucyd. vii, 42, 43. Καὶ (Demosthenês) ὁρῶν τὸ παρατείχισμα - τῶν Συρακοσίων, ᾧ ἐκώλυσαν περιτειχίσαι σφᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, - ἁπλοῦν τε ὂν, καί εἰ ἐπικρατήσειέ τις τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν τῆς ἀναβάσεως, - καὶ αὖθις τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς στρατοπέδου, ῥᾳδίως ἂν αὐτὸ ληφθέν (οὐδὲ - γὰρ ὑπομεῖναι ἂν σφᾶς οὐδένα) ἠπείγετο ἐπιθέσθαι τῇ πείρᾳ. - - vii, 43. καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν ἀδύνατα ἐδόκει εἶναι λαθεῖν προσελθόντας - καὶ ἀναβάντας, etc. - - Dr. Arnold and Göller both interpret this description of - Thucydidês (see their notes on this chapter, and Dr. Arnold’s - Appendix, p. 275) as if Nikias, immediately that the Syracusan - counter-wall had crossed his blockading line, had evacuated his - circle and works on the slope of Epipolæ, and had retired down - exclusively into the lower ground below. Dr. Thirlwall too is of - the same opinion (Hist. Gr. vol. iii, ch. xxvi, pp. 432-434). - - This appears to me unauthorized and incorrect. What conceivable - motive can be assigned to induce Nikias to yield up to the enemy - so important an advantage? If he had once relinquished the slope - of Epipolæ, to occupy exclusively the marsh beneath the southern - cliff, Gylippus and the Syracusans would have taken good care - that he should never again have mounted that cliff; nor could - he ever have got near to the παρατείχισμα. The moment when the - Athenians did at last abandon their fortifications on the slope - of Epipolæ (τὰ ἀνω τείχη) is specially marked by Thucydidês - afterwards, vii, 60: it was at the last moment of desperation, - when the service of all was needed for the final maritime battle - in the Great Harbor. Dr. Arnold (p. 275) misinterprets this - passage, in my judgment, evading the direct sense of it. - - The words of Thucydidês, vii, 42—εἰ ἐπικρατήσειέ τις τῶν τε - Ἐπιπολῶν τῆς ἀναβάσεως, καὶ αὖθις τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς στρατοπέδου—are - more correctly conceived by M. Firmin Didot, in the note to - his translation, than by Arnold and Göller. The στρατόπεδον - here indicated does _not_ mean the Athenian circle, and their - partially completed line of circumvallation on the slope of - Epipolæ. It means the ground higher up than this, which they - had partially occupied at first while building the fort of - Labdalum, and of which they had been substantially masters until - the arrival of Gylippus who had now converted it into a camp or - στρατόπεδον of the Syracusans. - - [451] Diodor. xiii, 11. - -So far the enterprise of Demosthenês had been successful beyond -all reasonable hope. He was master not only of the outer fort -of the Syracusan position, but also of the extremity of their -counter-wall which rested upon that fort; the counter-wall was no -longer defensible, now that he had got on the north or Syracusan -side of it, so that the men on the parapet, where it joined the -fort, made no resistance, and fled. Some of the Athenians even -began to tear down the parapets, and demolish this part of the -counter-wall, an operation of extreme importance, since it would -have opened to Demosthenês a communication with the southern side -of the counter-wall, leading directly towards the Athenian lines -on Epipolæ. At any rate, his plan of turning the counter-wall was -already carried, if he could only have maintained himself in his -actual position, even without advancing farther, and if he could -have demolished two or three hundred yards of the upper extremity -of the wall now in his power. Whether it would have been possible -for him to maintain himself without farther advance, until day -broke, and thus avoid the unknown perils of a night-battle, we -cannot say. But both he and his men, too much flushed with success -to think of halting, hastened forward to complete their victory, -and to prevent the disordered Syracusans from again recovering a -firm array. Unfortunately, however, their ardor of pursuit—as it -constantly happened with Grecian hoplites—disturbed the regularity -of their own ranks, so that they were not in condition to stand the -shock of the Bœotian hoplites, just emerged from their position, and -marching up in steady and excellent order to the scene of action. -The Bœotians charged them, and after a short resistance, broke them -completely, forcing them to take flight. The fugitives of the van -were thus driven back upon their own comrades advancing from behind, -still under the impression of success, ignorant of what had passed -in front, and themselves urged on by the fresh troops closing up in -their rear. - -In this manner the whole army presently became one scene of clamor -and confusion wherein there was neither command nor obedience, -nor could any one discern what was passing. The light of the moon -rendered objects and figures generally visible, without being -sufficient to discriminate friend from foe. The beaten Athenians, -thrown back upon their comrades, were in many cases mistaken for -enemies, and slain. The Syracusans and Bœotians, shouting aloud and -pursuing their advantage, became intermingled with the foremost -Athenians, and both armies thus grouped into knots which only -distinguished each other by mutual demand of the watchword. This -test also soon failed, since each party got acquainted with the -watchword of the other, especially that of the Athenians, among whom -the confusion was the greatest, became well known to the Syracusans, -who kept together in larger parties. Above all, the effect of the -pæan or war-shout on both sides was remarkable. The Dorians in the -Athenian army—from Argos, Korkyra, and other places—raised a pæan not -distinguishable from that of the Syracusans; accordingly, their shout -struck terror into the Athenians themselves, who fancied that they -had enemies in their own rear and centre. Such disorder and panic -presently ended in a general flight. The Athenians hurried back by -the same roads which they had ascended; but these roads were found -too narrow for terrified fugitives, and many of them threw away their -arms in order to scramble or jump down the cliffs, in which most of -them perished. Even of those who safely effected their descent into -the plain below, many—especially the new-comers belonging to the -armament of Demosthenês—lost their way through ignorance, and were -cut off the next day by the Syracusan horse. With terrible loss of -numbers, and broken spirit, the Athenians at length found shelter -within their own lines. Their loss of arms was even greater than -that of men, from the throwing away of shields by those soldiers who -leaped the cliff.[452] - - [452] Thucyd. vii, 44, 45. - -The overjoyed Syracusans erected two trophies, one upon the road -to Epipolæ, the other upon the exact and critical spot where the -Bœotians had first withstood and first repelled the enemy. By this -unexpected and overwhelming victory, their feelings were restored -to the same pitch of confidence which had animated them before the -arrival of Demosthenês. Again now masters of the field, they again -indulged the hope of storming the Athenian lines and destroying -the armament; to which end, however, it was thought necessary to -obtain additional reinforcements, and Gylippus went in person with -this commission to the various cities of Sicily, while Sikanus with -fifteen triremes was despatched to Agrigentum, then understood to be -wavering, and in a political crisis.[453] - - [453] Thucyd. vii, 46. Plutarch (Nikias, c. 21) states that - the number of slain was two thousand. Diodorus gives it at two - thousand five hundred (xiii, 11). Thucydidês does not state it at - all. - - These two authors probably both copied from some common - authority, not Thucydidês; perhaps Philistus. - -During this absence of Gylippus, the Athenian generals were left to -mourn the recent reverse, and to discuss the exigencies of their -untoward position. The whole armament was now full of discouragement -and weariness; impatient to escape from a scene where fever daily -thinned their numbers, and where they seemed destined to nothing but -dishonor. Such painful evidences of increasing disorganization only -made Demosthenês more strenuous in enforcing the resolution which -he had taken before the attack on Epipolæ. He had done his best to -strike one decisive blow; the chances of war had turned out against -him, and inflicted a humiliating defeat; he now therefore insisted -on relinquishing the whole enterprise and returning home forthwith. -The season was yet favorable for the voyage (it seems to have been -the beginning of August), while the triremes recently brought, as -yet unused, rendered them masters at sea for the present. It was -idle, he added, to waste more time and money in staying to carry -on war against Syracuse, which they could not now hope to subdue, -especially when Athens had so much need of them all at home, against -the garrison of Dekeleia.[454] - - [454] Thucyd. vi, 47. - -This proposition, though espoused and seconded by Eurymedon, was -peremptorily opposed by Nikias; who contended, first, that their -present distress and the unpromising chances for the future, though -he admitted the full reality of both, ought not nevertheless to -be publicly proclaimed. A formal resolution to retire, passed in -the presence of so many persons, would inevitably become known to -the enemy, and therefore could never be executed with silence and -secrecy,[455] as such a resolution ought to be. But farthermore, he -(Nikias) took a decided objection to the resolution itself. He would -never consent to carry back the armament, without specific authority -from home to do so. Sure he was, that the Athenian people would never -tolerate such a proceeding. When submitted to the public assembly at -home, the conduct of the generals would be judged, not by persons -who had been at Syracuse and cognizant of the actual facts, but by -hearers who would learn all that they knew from the artful speeches -of criminative orators. Even the citizens actually serving, though -now loud in cries of suffering, and impatient to get home, would -alter their tone when they were safe in the public assembly; and -would turn round to denounce their generals as having been bribed to -bring away the army. Speaking his own personal feelings, he knew too -well the tempers of his countrymen to expose himself to the danger -of thus perishing under a charge alike unmerited and disgraceful. -Sooner would he incur any extremity of risk from the enemy.[456] It -must be recollected too, he added, that if _their_ affairs were now -bad, those of Syracuse were as bad, and even worse. For more than a -year, the war had been imposing upon the Syracusans a ruinous cost, -in subsistence for foreign allies as well as in keeping up outlying -posts; so that they had already spent two thousand talents, besides -heavy debts contracted and not paid. They could not continue in -this course longer; yet the suspension of their payments would at -once alienate their allies, and leave them helpless. The cost of -the war—to which Demosthenês had alluded as a reason for returning -home—could be much better borne by Athens; while a little farther -pressure would utterly break down the Syracusans. He (Nikias) -therefore advised to remain where they were and continue the -siege;[457] the more so, as their fleet had now become unquestionably -the superior. - - [455] Thucyd. vii, 48. Ὁ δὲ Νικίας ἐνόμιζε μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς πονηρὰ - σφῶν τὰ πράγματα εἶναι, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ οὐκ ἐβούλετο αὐτὰ ἀσθενῆ - ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐδ’ ~ἐμφανῶς~ σφᾶς ψηφιζομένους ~μετὰ πολλῶν~ τὴν - ἀναχώρησιν τοῖς πολεμίοις καταγγέλτους γίγνεσθαι· λαθεῖν γὰρ ἂν, - ὁπότε βούλοιντο, τοῦτο ποιοῦντες πολλῷ ἧττον. - - It seems probable that some of the taxiarchs and trierarchs - were present at this deliberation, as we find in another case - afterwards, c. 60. Possibly, Demosthenês might even desire that - they _should_ be present, as witnesses respecting the feeling of - the army; and also as supporters, if the matter came afterwards - to be debated in the public assembly at Athens. It is to this - fact that the words ἐμφανῶς μετὰ πολλῶν seem to allude. - - [456] Thucyd. vii, 48. Οὐκοῦν βούλεσθαι αὐτός γε, ἐπιστάμενος - τὰς Ἀθηναίων φύσεις, ἐπὶ αἰσχρᾷ γε αἰτίᾳ καὶ ἀδίκως ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων - ἀπολέσθαι, μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, εἰ δεῖ, κινδυνεύσας τοῦτο - παθεῖν, ~ἰδίᾳ~. - - The situation of the last word ἰδίᾳ in this sentence is - perplexing, because it can hardly be construed except either with - ἀπολέσθαι or with αὐτός γε: for Nikias could not run any risk of - perishing _separately_ by the hands of the enemy, unless we are - to ascribe to him an absurd rhodomontade quite foreign to his - character. Compare Plutarch Nikias, c. 22. - - [457] Thucyd. vii, 48. τρίβειν οὖν ἔφη χρῆναι προσκαθημένους, etc. - -Both Demosthenês and Eurymedon protested in the strongest language -against the proposition of Nikias. Especially they treated the plan -of remaining in the Great Harbor as fraught with ruin, and insisted, -at the very least, on quitting this position without a moment’s -delay. Even admitting, for argument, the scruples of Nikias against -abandoning the Syracusan war without formal authority from home, -they still urged an immediate transfer of their camp from the Great -Harbor to Thapsus or Katana. At either of these stations they could -prosecute operations against Syracuse, with all the advantage of a -wider range of country for supplies, a healthier spot, and above -all, of an open sea, which was absolutely indispensable to the naval -tactics of Athenians; escaping from that narrow basin which condemned -them to inferiority even on their own proper element. At all events -to remove, and remove forthwith, out of the Great Harbor, such was -the pressing requisition of Demosthenês and Eurymedon.[458] - - [458] Thucyd. vii, 49. Ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης περὶ μὲν τοῦ ~προσκαθῆσθαι - οὐδ’ ὁπωσοῦν ἐνεδέχετο~—τὸ δὲ ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν, ~οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ οἱ ἔφη - ἀρέσκειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔτι μένειν~, ἀλλ’ ~ὅτι τάχιστα ἤδη καὶ μὴ - μέλλειν ἐξανίστασθαι~. Καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδων αὐτῷ ταῦτα ξυνηγόρευεν. - -But even to the modified motion of transferring the actual position -to Thapsus or Katana, Nikias refused to consent. He insisted -on remaining as they were; and it appears that Menander and -Euthydemus[459]—colleagues named by the assembly at home, before -the departure of the second armament—must have voted under the -influence of his authority; whereby the majority became on his side. -Nothing less than being in a minority, probably, would have induced -Demosthenês and Eurymedon to submit, on a point of such transcendent -importance. - - [459] Thucyd. vii, 69; Diodor. xiii, 12. - -It was thus that the Athenian armament remained without quitting the -harbor, yet apparently quite inactive, during a period which cannot -have been less than between three weeks and a month, until Gylippus -returned to Syracuse with fresh reinforcements. Throughout the army, -hope of success appears to have vanished, while anxiety for return -had become general. The opinions of Demosthenês and Eurymedon were -doubtless well known, and orders for retreat were expected, but never -came. Nikias obstinately refused to give them, during the whole of -this fatal interval; which plunged the army into the abyss of ruin, -instead of mere failure in their aggressive enterprise. - -So unaccountable did such obstinacy appear, that many persons -gave Nikias credit for knowing more than he chose to reveal. Even -Thucydidês thinks that he was misled by that party in Syracuse with -whom he had always kept up a secret correspondence, seemingly apart -from his colleagues, and who still urged him, by special messages, -not to go away; assuring him that Syracuse could not possibly go on -longer. Without fully trusting these intimations, he could not bring -himself to act against them; and he therefore hung back from day to -day, and refused to pronounce the decisive word.[460] - - [460] Thucyd. vii, 48. ~Ἃ ἐπιστάμενος, τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ ἔτι ἐπ’ - ἀμφότερα ἔχων καὶ διασκοπῶν ἀνεῖχε, τῷ δ’ ἐμφανεῖ τότε λόγῳ οὐκ - ἔφη ἀπάξειν τὴν στρατιάν.~ - - The insignificance of the party in Syracuse which corresponded - with Nikias may be reasonably inferred from Thucyd. vii, 55. It - consisted in part of those Leontines who had been incorporated - into the Syracusan citizenship (Diodor. xiii, 18). - - Polyænus (i, 43, 1) has a tale respecting a revolt of the slaves - or villeins (οἰκέται) at Syracuse during the Athenian siege, - under a leader named Sosikratês, a revolt suppressed by the - stratagem of Hermokratês. That various attempts of this sort - took place at Syracuse during these two trying years, is by no - means improbable. In fact, it is difficult to understand how - the numerous predial slaves were kept in order during the great - pressure and danger, prior to the coming of Gylippus. - -Nothing throughout the whole career of Nikias is so inexplicable as -his guilty fatuity—for we can call it by no lighter name, seeing that -it involved all the brave men around him in one common ruin with -himself—at the present critical juncture. How can we suppose him -to have really believed that the Syracusans, now in the flood-tide -of success, and when Gylippus was gone forth to procure additional -forces, would break down and be unable to carry on the war? Childish -as such credulity seems, we are nevertheless compelled to admit it -as real, to such an extent as to counterbalance all the pressing -motives for departure, motives enforced by discerning colleagues as -well as by the complaints of the army, and brought home to his own -observation by the experience of the late naval defeat. At any rate, -it served as an excuse for that fatal weakness of his character which -made him incapable of taking resolutions founded on prospective -calculations, and chained him to his actual position until he was -driven to act by imminent necessity. - -But we discern on the present occasion another motive, which counts -for much in dictating his hesitation. The other generals think with -satisfaction of going back to their country and rescuing the force -which yet remained, even under circumstances of disappointment -and failure. Not so Nikias: he knows too well the reception which -he had deserved, and which might possibly be in store for him. -Avowedly, indeed, he anticipates reproach from the Athenians against -the generals, but only unmerited reproach, on the special ground -of bringing away the army without orders from home; adding some -harsh criticisms upon the injustice of the popular judgment and -the perfidy of his own soldiers. But in the first place, we may -remark, that Demosthenês and Eurymedon, though as much responsible -as he was for this decision, had no such fear of popular injustice; -or, if they had, saw clearly that the obligation of braving it was -here imperative. And in the next place, no man ever had so little -reason to complain of the popular judgment as Nikias. The mistakes -of the people in regard to him had always been those of indulgence, -over-esteem, and over-constancy. But Nikias foresaw too well that -he would have more to answer for at Athens than the simple fact -of sanctioning retreat under existing circumstances. He could -not but remember the pride and sanguine hopes under which he had -originally conducted the expedition out of Peiræus, contrasted with -the miserable sequel and ignominious close, even if the account had -been now closed, without worse. He could not but be conscious, more -or less, how much of all this was owing to his own misjudgment; and -under such impressions, the idea of meeting the free criticisms and -scrutiny of his fellow-citizens—even putting aside the chance of -judicial trial—must have been insupportably humiliating. To Nikias,—a -perfectly brave man, and suffering withal under an incurable -disease,—life at Athens had neither charm nor honor left. Hence, as -much as from any other reason, he was induced to withhold the order -for departure; clinging to the hope that some unforeseen boon of -fortune might yet turn up, and yielding to the idlest delusions from -correspondents in the interior of Syracuse.[461] - - [461] Thucyd. vii, 49. Ἀντιλέγοντος δὲ τοῦ Νικίου, ὄκνος τις - καὶ μέλλησις ἐνεγένετο, καὶ ἅμα ὑπόνοια μή τι καὶ πλέον εἰδὼς ὁ - Νικίας ἰσχυρίζηται. - - The language of Justin respecting this proceeding is just and - discriminating: “Nicias, seu pudore male actæ rei, seu metu - destitutæ spei civium, seu impellente fato, manere contendit.” - (Justin, iv, 5.) - -Nearly a month after the night-battle on Epipolæ,[462] Gylippus and -Sikanus both returned to Syracuse. The latter had been unsuccessful -at Agrigentum, where the philo-Syracusan party had been sent -into banishment before his arrival; but Gylippus brought with -him a considerable force of Sicilian Greeks, together with those -Peloponnesian hoplites who had started from Cape Tænarus in the early -spring, and who had made their way from Kyrênê first along the coast -of Africa, and then across to Selinus. Such increase of strength -immediately determined the Syracusans to resume the aggressive both -by land and by sea. In the Athenians, as they saw the new allies -marching in over Epipolæ, it produced a deeper despondency, combined -with bitter regret that they had not adopted the proposition of -departing immediately after the battle of Epipolæ, when Demosthenês -first proposed it. The late interval of lingering hopeless inaction -with continued sickness, had farther weakened their strength, -and Demosthenês now again pressed the resolution for immediate -departure. Whatever fancies Nikias may have indulged about Syracusan -embarrassments, were dissipated by the arrival of Gylippus; nor did -he venture to persist in his former peremptory opposition, though -even now he seems to have assented against his own conviction.[463] -He however insisted, with good reason, that no formal or public -vote should be taken on the occasion, but that the order should be -circulated through the camp, as privately as possible, to be ready -for departure at a given signal. Intimation was sent to Katana that -the armament was on the point of coming away, with orders to forward -no farther supplies.[464] - - [462] This interval may be inferred (see Dodwell, Ann. Thucyd. - vii, 50) from the state of the moon at the time of the battle of - Epipolæ, compared with the subsequent eclipse. - - [463] Thucyd. vii, 50. ὡς αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ ὁ Νικίας ~ἔτι ὁμοίως - ἠναντιοῦτο~, etc. Diodor. xiii, 12. Ὁ Νικίας ἠναγκάσθη - συγχωρῆσαι, etc. - - [464] Thucyd. vii, 60. - -This plan was proceeding successfully: the ships were made ready, -much of the property of the army had already been conveyed aboard -without awakening the suspicion of the enemy, the signal would have -been hoisted on the ensuing morning, and within a few hours this -fated armament would have found itself clear of the harbor, with -comparatively small loss,[465] when the gods themselves—I speak -in the language and feelings of the Athenian camp—interfered to -forbid its departure. On the very night before, the 27th August, 413 -B.C., which was full moon, the moon was eclipsed. Such a portent, -impressive to the Athenians at all times, was doubly so under their -present despondency, and many of them construed it as a divine -prohibition against departure until a certain time should have -elapsed, with expiatory ceremonies to take off the effect. They made -known their wish for postponement to Nikias and his colleagues; -but their interference was superfluous, for Nikias himself was -more deeply affected than any one else. He consulted the prophets, -who declared that the army ought not to decamp until thrice nine -days, a full circle of the moon, should have passed over.[466] And -Nikias took upon himself to announce, that until after the interval -indicated by them, he would not permit even any discussion or -proposition on the subject. - - [465] Diodor. xiii, 12. Οἱ στρατιῶται τὰ σκεύη ἐνετίθεντο, etc. - Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23. - - [466] The moon was totally eclipsed on this night, August 27, 413 - B.C., from twenty-seven minutes past nine to thirty-four minutes - past ten P.M. (Wurm, De Ponderib. Græcor. sect. xciv, p. 184), - speaking with reference to an observer in Sicily. - - Thucydidês states that Nikias adopted the injunction of the - prophets, to tarry _thrice nine_ days (vii, 50). Diodorus says - _three_ days. Plutarch intimates that Nikias went beyond the - injunction of the prophets, who only insisted on _three_ days, - while he resolved on remaining for an entire lunar period - (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23). - - I follow the statement of Thucydidês: there is no reason to - believe that Nikias would lengthen the time beyond what the - prophets prescribed. - - The erroneous statement respecting this memorable event, in so - respectable an author as Polybius, is not a little surprising - (Polyb. ix, 19). - -The decision of the prophets, which Nikias thus made his own, was a -sentence of death to the Athenian army, yet it went along with the -general feeling, and was obeyed without hesitation. Even Demosthenês, -though if he had commanded alone, he might have tried to overrule -it, found himself compelled to yield. Yet according to Philochorus, -himself a professional diviner, skilful in construing the religious -meaning of events, it was a decision decidedly wrong; that is, wrong -according to the canonical principles of divination. To men planning -escape, or any other operation requiring silence and secrecy, an -eclipse of the moon, as hiding light and producing darkness, was, he -affirmed, an encouraging sign, and ought to have made the Athenians -even more willing and forward in quitting the harbor. We are told, -too, that Nikias had recently lost by death Stilbidês, the ablest -prophet in his service, and that he was thus forced to have recourse -to prophets of inferior ability.[467] His piety left no means -untried of appeasing the gods, by prayer, sacrifice, and expiatory -ceremonies, continued until the necessity of actual conflict -arrived.[468] - - [467] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 22; Diodor. xiii, 12; Thucyd. vii, - 50. Stilbidês was eminent in his profession of a prophet: see - Aristophan. Pac. 1029, with the citations from Eupolis and - Philochorus in the Scholia. - - Compare the description of the effect produced by the eclipse of - the sun at Thebes, immediately prior to the last expedition of - Pelopidas into Thessaly (Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 31). - - [468] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24. - -The impediment thus finally and irreparably intercepting the -Athenian departure, was the direct, though unintended, consequence -of the delay previously caused by Nikias. We cannot doubt, however, -that, when the eclipse first happened, he regarded it as a sign -confirmatory of the opinion which he had himself before delivered, -and that he congratulated himself upon having so long resisted the -proposition for going away. Let us add, that all those Athenians -who were predisposed to look upon eclipses as signs from heaven of -calamity about to come, would find themselves strengthened in that -belief by the unparalleled woes even now impending over this unhappy -army. - -What interpretation the Syracusans, confident and victorious, -put on the eclipse, we are not told. But they knew well how to -interpret the fact, which speedily came to their knowledge, that the -Athenians had fully resolved to make a furtive escape, and had only -been prevented by the eclipse. Such a resolution, amounting to an -unequivocal confession of helplessness, emboldened the Syracusans -yet farther, to crush them as they were in the harbor, and never to -permit them to occupy even any other post in Sicily. Accordingly, -Gylippus caused his triremes to be manned and practised for several -days: he then drew out his land-force, and made a demonstration of -no great significance against the Athenian lines. On the morrow, he -brought out all his forces, both land and naval; with the former -of which he beset the Athenian lines, while the fleet, seventy-six -triremes in number, was directed to sail up to the Athenian naval -station. The Athenian fleet, eighty-six triremes strong, sailed out -to meet it, and a close, general, and desperate action took place. -The fortune of Athens had fled. The Syracusans first beat the centre -division of the Athenians; next, the right division under Eurymedon, -who in attempting an evolution to outflank the enemy’s left, forgot -those narrow limits of the harbor which were at every turn the ruin -of the Athenian mariner, neared the land too much, and was pinned -up against it, in the recess of Daskon, by the vigorous attack of -the Syracusans. He was here slain, and his division destroyed: -successively, the entire Athenian fleet was beaten and driven ashore. - -Few of the defeated ships could get into their own station. Most of -them were forced ashore or grounded on points without those limits; -upon which Gylippus marched down his land-force to the water’s edge, -in order to prevent the retreat of the crews as well as to assist -the Syracusan seamen in hauling off the ships as prizes. His march, -however, was so hurried and disorderly, that the Tyrrhenian troops, -on guard at the flank of the Athenian station, sallied out against -them as they approached, beat the foremost of them, and drove them -away from the shore into the marsh called Lysimeleia. More Syracusan -troops came to their aid; but the Athenians also, anxious above all -things for the protection of their ships, came forth in greater -numbers; and a general battle ensued in which the latter were -victorious. Though they did not inflict much loss upon the enemy, -yet they saved most of their own triremes which had been driven -ashore, together with the crews, and carried them into the naval -station. Except for this success on land, the entire Athenian fleet -would have been destroyed: as it was, the defeat was still complete, -and eighteen triremes were lost, all their crews being slain. This -was probably the division of Eurymedon, which having been driven -ashore in the recess of Daskon, was too far off from the Athenian -station to receive any land assistance. As the Athenians were hauling -in their disabled triremes, the Syracusans made a last effort to -destroy them by means of a fireship, for which the wind happened to -be favorable. But the Athenians found means to prevent her approach, -and to extinguish the flames.[469] - - [469] Thucyd. vii, 52, 53; Diodor. xiii, 13. - -Here was a complete victory gained over Athens on her own element, -gained with inferior numbers, gained even over the fresh and yet -formidable fleet recently brought by Demosthenês. It told but -too plainly on which side the superiority now lay, how well the -Syracusans had organized their naval strength for the specialties -of their own harbor, how ruinous had been the folly of Nikias in -retaining his excellent seamen imprisoned within that petty and -unwholesome lake, where land and water alike did the work of their -enemies. It not only disheartened the Athenians, but belied all -their past experience, and utterly confounded them. Sickness of -the whole enterprise, and repentance for having undertaken it, now -became uppermost in their minds: yet it is remarkable that we hear -of no complaints against Nikias separately.[470] But repentance came -too late. The Syracusans, fully alive to the importance of their -victory, sailed round the harbor in triumph as again their own,[471] -and already looked on the enemy within it as their prisoners. They -determined to close up and guard the mouth of it, from Plemmyrium to -Ortygia, so as to leave no farther liberty of exit. - - [470] Thucyd. vii, 55. Οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν παντὶ δὴ ἀθυμίας ἦσαν, - καὶ ὁ παράλογος αὐτοῖς μέγας ἦν, πολὺ δὲ μείζων ἔτι τῆς στρατείας - ὁ μετάμελος. - - [471] Thucyd. vii, 56. Οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι τόν τε λιμένα εὐθὺς - παρέπλεον ἀδεῶς, etc. This elate and visible manifestation of - feeling ought not to pass unnoticed, as an evidence of Grecian - character. - -Nor were they insensible how vastly the scope of the contest was -now widened, and the value of the stake before them enhanced. It was -not merely to rescue their own city from siege, nor even to repel -and destroy the besieging army, that they were now contending. It -was to extinguish the entire power of Athens, and liberate the half -of Greece from dependence; for Athens could never be expected to -survive so terrific a loss as that of the entire double armament -before Syracuse.[472] The Syracusans exulted in the thought that this -great achievement would be theirs, that their city was the field, -and their navy the chief instrument of victory: a lasting source of -glory to them, not merely in the eyes of contemporaries, but even in -those of posterity. Their pride swelled when they reflected on the -Pan-Hellenic importance which the siege of Syracuse had now acquired, -and when they counted up the number and variety of Greek warriors -who were now fighting, on one side or the other, between Euryalus -and Plemmyrium. With the exception of the great struggle between -Athens and the Peloponnesian confederacy, never before had combatants -so many and so miscellaneous been engaged under the same banners. -Greeks, continental and insular, Ionic, Doric, and Æolic, autonomous -and dependent, volunteers and mercenaries, from Miletus and Chios in -the east to Selinus in the west, were all here to be found; and not -merely Greeks, but also the barbaric Sikels, Egestæans, Tyrrhenians, -and Iapygians. If the Lacædemonians, Corinthians, and Bœotians were -fighting on the side of Syracuse, the Argeians and Mantineians, not -to mention the great insular cities, stood in arms against her. The -jumble of kinship among the combatants on both sides, as well as -the cross action of different local antipathies, is put in lively -antithesis by Thucydidês.[473] But amidst so vast an assembled -number, of which they were the chiefs, the paymasters, and the centre -of combination, the Syracusans might well feel a sense of personal -aggrandizement, and a consciousness of the great blow which they were -about to strike, sufficient to exalt them for the time above the -level even of their great Dorian chiefs in Peloponnesus. - - [472] Thucyd. vii, 56. - - [473] Thucyd. vii, 57, 58. - -It was their first operation, occupying three days, to close up -the mouth of the Great Harbor, which was nearly one mile broad, -with vessels of every description, triremes, traders, boats, etc., -anchored in an oblique direction, and chained together.[474] They at -the same time prepared their naval force with redoubled zeal for the -desperate struggle which they knew to be coming. They then awaited -the efforts of the Athenians, who watched their proceedings with -sadness and anxiety. - - [474] Thucyd. vii, 59; Diodor. xiii, 14. - -Nikias and his colleagues called together the principal officers to -deliberate what was to be done. As they had few provisions remaining, -and had counter-ordered their farther supplies, some instant and -desperate effort was indispensable; and the only point in debate was, -whether they should burn their fleet and retire by land, or make a -fresh maritime exertion to break out of the harbor. Such had been -the impression left by the recent sea-fight, that many in the camp -leaned to the former scheme.[475] But the generals resolved upon -first trying the latter, and exhausted all their combinations to give -to it the greatest possible effect. They now evacuated the upper -portion of their lines, both on the higher ground of Epipolæ, and -even on the lower ground, such portion as was nearest to the southern -cliff; confining themselves to a limited fortified space close to the -shore, just adequate for their sick, their wounded, and their stores; -in order to spare the necessity for a large garrison to defend them, -and thus leave nearly their whole force disposable for sea-service. -They then made ready every trireme in the station, which could be -rendered ever so imperfectly seaworthy, constraining every fit man -to serve aboard them, without distinction of age, rank, or country. -The triremes were manned with double crews of soldiers, hoplites as -well as bowmen and darters, the latter mostly Akarnanians; while the -hoplites, stationed at the prow with orders to board the enemy as -quickly as possible, were furnished with grappling-irons to detain -the enemy’s ship immediately after the moment of collision, in order -that it might not be withdrawn and the collision repeated, with all -its injurious effects arising from the strength and massiveness -of the Syracusan epôtids. The best consultation was held with the -steersmen as to arrangement and manœuvres of every trireme, nor was -any precaution omitted which the scanty means at hand allowed. In -the well-known impossibility of obtaining new provisions, every -man was anxious to hurry on the struggle.[476] But Nikias, as he -mustered them on the shore immediately before going aboard, saw but -too plainly that it was the mere stress of desperation which impelled -them; that the elasticity, the disciplined confidence, the maritime -pride, habitual to the Athenians on shipboard, was extinct, or dimly -and faintly burning. - - [475] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24. - - [476] Thucyd. vii, 60. - -He did his best to revive them, by exhortations unusually emphatic -and impressive. “Recollect (he said) that you too, not less than -the Syracusans, are now fighting for your own safety and for your -country; for it is only by victory in the coming struggle that any -of you can ever hope to see his country again. Yield not to despair -like raw recruits after a first defeat; you, Athenians and allies, -familiar with the unexpected revolutions of war, will hope now for -the fair turn of fortune, and fight with a spirit worthy of the -great force which you see here around you. We generals have now made -effective provision against our two great disadvantages, the narrow -circuit of the harbor, and the thickness of the enemy’s prows.[477] -Sad as the necessity is, we have thrown aside all our Athenian skill -and tactics, and have prepared to fight under the conditions forced -upon us by the enemy, a land-battle on shipboard.[478] It will be -for you to conquer in this last desperate struggle, where there is -no friendly shore to receive you if you give way. You, hoplites on -the deck, as soon as you have the enemy’s trireme in contact, keep -him fast, and relax not until you have swept away his hoplites and -mastered his deck. You, seamen and rowers, must yet keep up your -courage, in spite of this sad failure in our means, and subversion -of our tactics. You are better defended on deck above, and you have -more triremes to help you, than in the recent defeat. Such of you, -as are not Athenian citizens, I entreat to recollect the valuable -privileges which you have hitherto enjoyed from serving in the navy -of Athens. Though not really citizens, you have been reputed and -treated as such; you have acquired our dialect, you have copied our -habits, and have thus enjoyed the admiration, the imposing station, -and the security, arising from our great empire.[479] Partaking as -you do freely in the benefits of that empire, do not now betray it -to these Sicilians and Corinthians whom you have so often beaten. -For such of you as _are_ Athenians, I again remind you that Athens -has neither fresh triremes, nor fresh hoplites, to replace those -now here. Unless you are now victorious, her enemies near home will -find her defenceless; and our countrymen there will become slaves to -Sparta, as you will to Syracuse. Recollect, every man of you, that -you now going aboard here are the _all_ of Athens,—her hoplites, her -ships, her entire remaining city, and her splendid name.[480] Bear up -then and conquer, every man with his best mettle, in this one last -struggle, for Athens as well as yourselves, and on an occasion which -will never return.” - - [477] Thucyd. vii, 62. Ἃ δὲ ἀρωγὰ ἐνείδομεν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ λιμένος - στενότητι πρὸς τὸν μέλλοντα ὄχλον τῶν νεῶν ἔσεσθαι, etc. - - [478] Thucyd. vii, 62. Ἐς τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἠναγκάσμεθα, ὥστε - πεζομαχεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν, καὶ τὸ μήτε αὐτοὺς ἀνακρούεσθαι, μήτε - ἐκείνους ἐᾷν, ὠφέλιμον φαίνεται. - - [479] Thucyd. vii, 63. Τοῖς δὲ ναύταις παραινῶ, καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ - τῷδε καὶ δέομαι, μὴ ἐκπεπλῆχθαί τι ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς ἄγαν ... - ἐκείνην τε τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, ὡς ἀξία ἐστὶ διασώσασθαι, ~οἱ - τέως Ἀθηναῖοι νομιζόμενοι καὶ μὴ ὄντες ὑμῶν~, τῆς τε φωνῆς τῇ - ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τῶν τρόπων τῇ μιμήσει, ἐθαυμάζεσθε κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, - καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας οὐκ ἔλασσον κατὰ τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι, ἔς - τε τὸ φοβερὸν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι πολὺ πλεῖον, - μετείχετε, ὥστε κοινωνοὶ μόνοι ἐλευθέρως ἡμῖν τῆς ἀρχῆς ὄντες, - δικαίως αὐτὴν νῦν μὴ καταπροδίδοτε, etc. - - Dr. Arnold (together with Göller and Poppo), following the - Scholiast, explain these words as having particular reference - to the metics in the Athenian naval service. But I cannot think - this correct. All persons in that service—who were freemen, but - yet not citizens of Athens—are here designated; partly metics, - doubtless, but partly also citizens of the islands and dependent - allies,—the ξένοι ναυβάται alluded to by the Corinthians and by - Periklês at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. i, - 121-143) as the ὠνητὴ δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεία of Athens. Without - doubt there were numerous foreign seamen in the warlike navy - of Athens, who derived great consideration as well as profit - from the service, and often passed themselves off for Athenian - citizens when they really were not so. - - [480] Thucyd. vii, 64. Ὅτι οἱ ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ὑμῶν νῦν ἐσόμενοι, - καὶ πέζοι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις εἰσὶ καὶ νῆες, καὶ ἡ ὑπόλοιπος πόλις, - καὶ τὸ μέγα ὄνομα τῶν Ἀθηνῶν.... - -If, in translating the despatch written home ten months before by -Nikias to the people of Athens, we were compelled to remark, that -the greater part of it was the bitterest condemnation of his own -previous policy as commander, so we are here carried back, when we -find him striving to palliate the ruinous effects of that confined -space of water which paralyzed the Athenian seamen, to his own -obstinate improvidence in forbidding the egress of the fleet when -insisted on by Demosthenês. His hearers probably were too much -absorbed with the terrible present, to revert to irremediable -mistakes of the past. Immediately on the conclusion of his touching -address, the order was given to go aboard, and the seamen took -their places. But when the triremes were fully manned, and the -trierarchs, after superintending the embarkation, were themselves -about to enter and push off, the agony of Nikias was too great to be -repressed. Feeling more keenly than any man the intensity of this -last death-struggle, and the serious, but inevitable, shortcomings -of the armament in its present condition, he still thought that he -had not said enough for the occasion. He now renewed his appeal -personally to the trierarchs, all of them citizens of rank and wealth -at Athens. They were all familiarly known to him, and he addressed -himself to every man separately by his own name, his father’s name, -and his tribe, adjuring him by the deepest and most solemn motives -which could touch the human feelings. Some he reminded of their -own previous glories, others of the achievements of illustrious -ancestors, imploring them not to dishonor or betray these precious -titles: to all alike he recalled the charm of their beloved country, -with its full political freedom and its unconstrained license of -individual agency to every man: to all alike he appealed in the names -of their wives, their children, and their paternal gods. He cared not -for being suspected of trenching upon the common places of rhetoric: -he caught at every topic which could touch the inmost affections, -awaken the inbred patriotism, and rekindle the abated courage of -the officers, whom he was sending forth to this desperate venture. -He at length constrained himself to leave off, still fancying in -his anxiety that he ought to say more, and proceeded to marshal the -land-force for the defence of the lines, as well as along the shore, -where they might render as much service and as much encouragement as -possible to the combatants on shipboard.[481] - - [481] See the striking chapter of Thucyd. vii, 69. Even the tame - style of Diodorus (xiii, 15) becomes animated in describing this - scene. - -Very different was the spirit prevalent, and very opposite the -burning words uttered, on the seaboard of the Syracusan station, as -the leaders were mustering their men immediately before embarkation. -They had been apprized of the grappling-irons now about to be -employed by the Athenians, and had guarded against them in part by -stretching hides along their bows, so that the “iron hand” might slip -off without acquiring any hold. The preparatory movements even within -the Athenian station being perfectly visible, Gylippus sent the -fleet out with the usual prefatory harangue. He complimented them on -the great achievements which they had already performed in breaking -down the naval power of Athens, so long held irresistible.[482] He -reminded them that the sally of their enemies was only a last effort -of despair, seeking nothing but escape, undertaken without confidence -in themselves, and under the necessity of throwing aside all their -own tactics in order to copy feebly those of the Syracusans.[483] -He called upon them to recollect the destructive purposes which the -invaders had brought with them against Syracuse, to inflict with -resentful hand the finishing stroke upon this half-ruined armament, -and to taste the delight of satiating a legitimate revenge.[484] - - [482] Thucyd. vii, 65. - - [483] Thucyd. vii, 66, 67. - - [484] Thucyd. vii, 68. πρὸς οὖν ἀταξίαν τε τοιαύτην ... ὀργῇ - προσμίξωμεν, καὶ νομίσωμεν ἅμα μὲν νομιμώτατον εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς - ἐναντίους, οἳ ἂν ὡς ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ τοῦ προσπεσόντος δικαιώσωσιν - ἀποπλῆσαι τῆς γνώμης τὸ θυμούμενον, ἅμα δὲ ἐχθροὺς ἀμύνασθαι - ἐγγενησόμενον ἡμῖν, καὶ (τὸ λεγόμενόν που) ἥδιστον εἶναι. - - This plain and undisguised invocation of the angry and revengeful - passions should be noticed, as a mark of character and manners. - -The Syracusan fleet—seventy-six triremes strong, as in the last -battle—was the first to put off from shore; Pythen with the -Corinthians in the centre, Sikanus and Agatharchus on the wings. A -certain proportion of them were placed near the mouth of the harbor, -in order to guard the barrier; while the rest were distributed -around the harbor in order to attack the Athenians from different -sides as soon as they should approach. Moreover, the surface of the -harbor swarmed with the light craft of the Syracusans, in many of -which embarked youthful volunteers, sons of the best families in -the city;[485] boats of no mean service during the battle, saving -or destroying the seamen cast overboard from disabled ships, as -well as annoying the fighting Athenian triremes. The day was one -sacred to Hêraklês at Syracuse; and the prophets announced that the -god would insure victory to the Syracusans, provided they stood on -the defensive, and did not begin the attack.[486] Moreover, the -entire shore round the harbor, except the Athenian station and its -immediate neighborhood, was crowded with Syracusan soldiers and -spectators; while the walls of Ortygia, immediately overhanging the -water, were lined with the feebler population of the city, the old -men, women, and children. From the Athenian station presently came -forth one hundred and ten triremes, under Demosthenês, Menander, and -Euthydêmus, with the customary pæan, its tone probably partaking -of the general sadness of the camp. They steered across direct to -the mouth of the harbor, beholding on all sides the armed enemies -ranged along the shore, as well as the unarmed multitudes who were -imprecating the vengeance of the gods upon their heads; while for -them there was no sympathy, except among the fellow-sufferers within -their own lines. Inside of this narrow basin, rather more than -five English miles in circuit, one hundred and ninety-four ships -of war, each manned with more than two hundred men, were about to -join battle, in the presence of countless masses around, all with -palpitating hearts, and near enough both to see and hear; the most -picturesque battle—if we could abstract our minds from its terrible -interest —probably in history, without smoke or other impediments -to vision, and in the clear atmosphere of Sicily, a serious and -magnified realization of those naumachiæ which the Roman emperors -used to exhibit with gladiators on the Italian lakes, for the -recreation of the people. - -The Athenian fleet made directly for that portion of the barrier -where a narrow opening—perhaps closed by a movable chain—had been -left for merchant-vessels. Their first impetuous attack broke through -the Syracusan squadron defending it, and they were already attempting -to sever its connecting bonds, when the enemy from all sides crowded -in upon them and forced them to desist. Presently the battle became -general, and the combatants were distributed in various parts of the -harbor. On both sides a fierce and desperate courage was displayed, -even greater than had been shown on any of the former occasions. -At the first onset, the skill and tactics of the steersmen shone -conspicuous, well seconded by zeal on the part of the rowers and by -their ready obedience to the voice of the keleustês. As the vessels -neared, the bowmen, slingers, and throwers on the deck, hurled clouds -of missiles against the enemy; next, was heard the loud crash of the -two impinging metallic fronts, resounding all along the shore.[487] -When the vessels were thus once in contact, they were rarely allowed -to separate: a strenuous hand-fight then commenced by the hoplites -in each, trying respectively to board and master their enemy’s deck. -It was not always, however, that each trireme had its own single -and special enemy: sometimes one ship had two or three enemies to -contend with at once, sometimes she fell aboard of one unsought, and -became entangled. After a certain time, the fight still obstinately -continuing, all sort of battle order became lost; the skill of the -steersman was of little avail, and the voice of the keleustês was -drowned amidst the universal din and mingled cries from victors as -well as vanquished. On both sides emulous exhortations were poured -forth, together with reproach and sarcasm addressed to any ship which -appeared flinching from the contest; though factitious stimulus of -this sort was indeed but little needed. - - [485] Diodorus, xiii, 14. Plutarch has a similar statement, - in reference to the previous battle: but I think he must have - confused one battle with the other, for his account can hardly be - made to harmonize with Thucydidês (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24). - - It is to be recollected that both Plutarch and Diodorus had - probably read the description of the battles in the Great Harbor - of Syracuse, contained in Philistus; a better witness, if we - had his account before us, even than Thucydidês; since he was - probably at this time in Syracuse and was perhaps actually - engaged. - - [486] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24, 25. Timæus reckoned the aid of - Hêraklês as having been one of the great causes of Syracusan - victory over the Athenians. He gave several reasons why the god - was provoked against the Athenians: see Timæus, Fragm. 104, ed. - Didot. - - [487] The destructive impact of these metallic masses at the - head of the ships of war, as well as the periplus practised by - a lighter ship to avoid direct collision against a heavier, - is strikingly illustrated by a passage in Plutarch’s Life of - Lucullus, where a naval engagement between the Roman general, and - Neoptolemus the admiral of Mithridates, is described. “Lucullus - was on board a Rhodian quinquerime, commanded by Damagoras, a - skilful Rhodian pilot; while Neoptolemus was approaching with a - ship much heavier, and driving forward to a direct collision: - upon which Damagoras evaded the blow, rowed rapidly round, and - struck the enemy in the stern.” ... δείσας ὁ Δαμαγόρας τὸ βάρος - τῆς βασιλικῆς, καὶ ~τὴν τραχύτητα τοῦ χαλκώματος~, οὐκ ἐτόλμησε - συμπεσεῖν ἀντίπρωρος, ἀλλ’ ὀξέως ἐκ περιαγωγῆς ἀποστρέψας - ἐκέλευσεν ἐπὶ πρύμναν ὤσασθαι· καὶ πιεσθείσης ἐνταῦθα τῆς νεώς - ἐδέξατο τὴν πληγὴν ἀβλαβῆ γενομένην, ἅτε δὴ τοῖς θαλαττεύουσι τῆς - νέως μέρεσι προσπεσοῦσαν.—Plutarch, Lucull. c. 3. - -Such was the heroic courage on both sides, that for a long time -victory was altogether doubtful, and the whole harbor was a scene -of partial encounters, wherein sometimes Syracusans, sometimes -Athenians, prevailed. According as success thus fluctuated, so -followed the cheers or wailings of the spectators ashore. At one and -the same time, every variety of human emotion might be witnessed; -according as attention was turned towards a victorious or a defeated -ship. It was among the spectators in the Athenian station above all, -whose entire life and liberty were staked in the combat, that this -emotion might be seen exaggerated into agony, and overpassing the -excitement even of the combatants themselves.[488] Those among them -who looked towards a portion of the harbor where their friends seemed -winning, were full of joy and thanksgiving to the gods: such of their -neighbors who contemplated an Athenian ship in difficulty, gave vent -to their feelings in shrieks and lamentation; while a third group, -with their eyes fixed on some portion of the combat still disputed, -were plunged in all the agitations of doubt, manifested even in -the tremulous swing of their bodies, as hope or fear alternately -predominated. During all the time that the combat remained undecided, -the Athenians ashore were distracted by all these manifold varieties -of intense sympathy. But at length the moment came, after a -long-protracted struggle, when victory began to declare in favor of -the Syracusans, who, perceiving that their enemies were slackening, -redoubled their shouts as well as their efforts, and pushed them all -back towards the land. All the Athenian triremes, abandoning farther -resistance, were thrust ashore like shipwrecked vessels in or near -their own station; a few being even captured before they could arrive -there. The diverse manifestations of sympathy among the Athenians in -the station itself were now exchanged for one unanimous shriek of -agony and despair. The boldest of them rushed to rescue the ships -and their crews from pursuit, others to man their walls in case of -attack from land: many were even paralyzed at the sight, and absorbed -with the thoughts of their own irretrievable ruin. Their souls were -doubtless still farther subdued by the wild and enthusiastic joy -which burst forth in maddening shouts from the hostile crowds around -the harbor, in response to their own victorious comrades on shipboard. - - [488] Thucyd. vii, 71. - -Such was the close of this awful, heart-stirring, and decisive -combat. The modern historian strives in vain to convey the impression -of it which appears in the condensed and burning phrases of -Thucydidês. We find in his description of battles generally, and -of this battle beyond all others, a depth and abundance of human -emotion which has now passed out of military proceedings. The Greeks -who fight, like the Greeks who look on, are not soldiers withdrawn -from the community, and specialized as well as hardened by long -professional training, but citizens with all the passions, instincts, -sympathies, joys, and sorrows of domestic as well as political -life. Moreover, the non-military population in ancient times had an -interest of the most intense kind in the result of the struggle; -which made the difference to them, if not of life and death, at -least of the extremity of happiness and misery. Hence the strong -light and shade, the Homeric exhibition of undisguised impulse, the -tragic detail of personal motive and suffering, which pervades this -and other military descriptions of Thucydidês. When we read the few -but most vehement words which he employs to depict the Athenian camp -under this fearful trial, we must recollect that these were not only -men whose all was at stake, but that they were moreover citizens full -of impressibility, sensitive and demonstrative Greeks; and, indeed, -the most sensitive and demonstrative of all Greeks. To repress all -manifestations of strong emotion was not considered in ancient times -essential to the dignity of the human character. - -Amidst all the deep pathos, however, which the great historian has -imparted to the final battle at Syracuse, he has not explained the -causes upon which its ultimate issue turned. Considering that the -Athenians were superior to their enemies in number, as one hundred -and ten to seventy-six triremes, that they fought with courage not -less heroic, and that the action was on their own element, we might -have anticipated for them, if not a victory, at least a drawn battle, -with equal loss on both sides. But we may observe, 1. The number of -one hundred and ten triremes was formed by including some hardly -seaworthy.[489] 2. The crews were composed partly of men not used to -sea-service; and the Akarnanian darters, especially, were for this -reason unhandy with their missiles.[490] 3. Though the water had -been hitherto the element favorable to Athens, yet her superiority -in this respect was declining, and her enemies approaching nearer to -her, even in the open sea. But the narrow dimensions of the harbor -would have nullified her superiority at all times, and placed her -even at great disadvantage,—without the means of twisting and turning -her triremes so as to strike only at a vulnerable point of the -enemy,—compared with the thick, heavy, straightforward butting of -the Syracusans; like a nimble pugilist of light weight contending, -in a very confined ring, against superior weight and muscle.[491] -For the mere land-fight on shipboard, Athenians had not only no -advantage, but had on the contrary the odds against them. 4. The -Syracusans enjoyed great advantage from having nearly the whole -harbor lined round with their soldiers and friends; not simply from -the force of encouraging sympathy, no mean auxiliary, but because -any of their triremes, if compelled to fall back before an Athenian, -found protection on the shore, and could return to the fight at -leisure; while an Athenian in the same predicament had no escape. -5. The numerous light craft of the Syracusans doubtless rendered -great service in this battle, as they had done in the preceding, -though Thucydidês does not again mention them. 6. Lastly, both in the -Athenian and Syracusan characters, the pressure of necessity was less -potent as a stimulus to action, than hopeful confidence and elation, -with the idea of a flood-tide yet mounting. In the character of some -other races, the Jews for instance, the comparative force of these -motives appears to be the other way. - - [489] Thucyd. vii, 60. τὰς ναῦς ἁπάσας ὅσαι ἦσαν καὶ δυναταὶ ~καὶ - ἀπλοώτεραι~. - - [490] Thucyd. vii, 60. πάντα τινὰ ἐσβιβάζοντες - πληρῶσαι—ἀναγκάσαντες ἐσβαίνειν ὅστις καὶ ~ὁπωσοῦν ἐδόκει ἡλικίας - μετέχων ἐπιτήδειος~ εἶναι. Compare also the speech of Gylippus, - c. 67. - - [491] The language of Theokritus, in describing the pugilistic - contest between Pollux and the Bebrykian Amykus, is not - inapplicable to the position of the Athenian ships and seamen - when cramped up in this harbor (Idyll. xxii, 91):— - - .................... ἐκ δ’ ἑτέρωθεν - Ἥρωες κρατερὸν Πολυδεύκεα θαρσύνεσκον, - Δειδιότες μή πώς μιν ~ἐπιβρίσας δαμάσειεν, - Χώρῳ ἐνὶ στεινῷ~, Τιτύῳ ἐναλίγκιος ἀνήρ. - - Compare Virgil’s picture of Entellus and Darês, Æneid, v, 430. - -About sixty Athenian triremes, little more than half of the fleet -which came forth, were saved as the wreck from this terrible -conflict. The Syracusans on their part had suffered severely; only -fifty triremes remaining out of seventy-six. The triumph with -which, nevertheless, on returning to the city, they erected their -trophy, and the exultation which reigned among the vast crowds -encircling the harbor, was beyond all measure or precedent. Its -clamorous manifestations were doubtless but too well heard in the -neighboring camp of the Athenians, and increased, if anything could -increase, the soul-subduing extremity of distress which paralyzed the -vanquished. So utterly did the pressure of suffering, anticipated as -well as actual, benumb their minds and extinguish their most sacred -associations, that no man among them, not even the ultra-religious -Nikias, thought of picking up the floating bodies or asking for a -truce to bury the dead. This obligation, usually so serious and -imperative upon the survivors after a battle, now passed unheeded -amidst the sorrow, terror, and despair, of the living man for himself. - -Such despair, however, was not shared by the generals, to their -honor be it spoken. On the afternoon of this terrible defeat, -Demosthenês proposed to Nikias that at daybreak the ensuing morning -they should man all the remaining ships—even now more in number than -the Syracusan—and make a fresh attempt to break out of the harbor. -To this Nikias agreed, and both proceeded to try their influence in -getting the resolution executed. But so irreparably was the spirit of -the seamen broken, that nothing could prevail upon them to go again -on shipboard: they would hear of nothing but attempting to escape -by land.[492] Preparations were therefore made for commencing their -march in the darkness of that very night. The roads were still open, -and, had they so marched, a portion of them, at least, might even -yet have been saved.[493] But there occurred one more mistake, one -farther postponement, which cut off the last hopes of this gallant -and fated remnant. - - [492] Thucyd. vii, 72. - - [493] Diodor. xiii, 18. - -The Syracusan Hermokratês, fully anticipating that the Athenians -would decamp that very night, was eager to prevent their retreat, -because of the mischief which they might do if established in -any other part of Sicily. He pressed Gylippus and the military -authorities to send out forthwith, and block up the principal -roads, passes, and fords, by which the fugitives would get off. -Though sensible of the wisdom of his advice, the generals thought -it wholly unexecutable. Such was the universal and unbounded joy -which now pervaded the city, in consequence of the recent victory, -still farther magnified by the circumstance that the day was sacred -to Hêraklês,—so wild the jollity, the feasting, the intoxication, -the congratulations, amidst men rewarding themselves after their -recent effort and triumph, and amidst the necessary care for the -wounded,—that an order to arm and march out would have been as little -listened to as the order to go on shipboard was by the desponding -Athenians. Perceiving that he could get nothing done until the next -morning, Hermokratês resorted to a stratagem in order to delay -the departure of the Athenians for that night. At the moment when -darkness was beginning, he sent down some confidential friends on -horseback to the Athenian wall. These men, riding up near enough to -make themselves heard, and calling for the sentries, addressed them -as messengers from the private correspondents of Nikias in Syracuse, -who had sent to warn him, they affirmed, not to decamp during the -night, inasmuch as the Syracusans had already beset and occupied the -roads; but to begin his march quietly the next morning after adequate -preparation.[494] - - [494] Thucyd. vii, 73; Diodor. xiii, 18. - -This fraud—the same as the Athenians had themselves practised two -years before,[495] in order to tempt the Syracusans to march out -against Katana—was perfectly successful: the sincerity of the -information was believed, and the advice adopted. Had Demosthenês -been in command alone, we may doubt whether he would have been so -easily duped; for granting the accuracy of the fact asserted, it -was not the less obvious that the difficulties, instead of being -diminished, would be increased tenfold on the following day. We -have seen, however, on more than one previous occasion, how fatally -Nikias was misled by his treacherous advices from the philo-Athenians -at Syracuse. An excuse for inaction was always congenial to his -character; and the present recommendation, moreover, fell in but too -happily with the temper of the army, now benumbed with depression and -terror, like those unfortunate soldiers, in the Retreat of the Ten -Thousand Greeks, who were yielding to the lethargy of extreme cold on -the snows of Armenia, and whom Xenophon vainly tried to arouse.[496] -Having remained over that night, the generals determined also to stay -the next day,—in order that the army might carry away with them as -much of their baggage as possible,—sending forward a messenger to the -Sikels in the interior to request that they would meet the army, and -bring with them a supply of provisions.[497] Gylippus and Hermokratês -had thus ample time, on the following day, to send out forces and -occupy all the positions convenient for obstructing the Athenian -march. They at the same time towed into Syracuse as prizes all the -Athenian triremes which had been driven ashore in the recent battle, -and which now lay like worthless hulks, unguarded and unheeded,[498] -seemingly even those within the station itself. - - [495] Thucyd. vi, 64. - - [496] Xenophon, Anab. iv, 5, 15, 19; v, 8, 15. - - [497] Thucyd. vii, 77. - - [498] Thucyd. vii, 74. - -It was on the next day but one after the maritime defeat that Nikias -and Demosthenês put their army in motion to attempt retreat. The -camp had long been a scene of sickness and death from the prevalence -of marsh fever; but since the recent battle the number of wounded -men, and the unburied bodies of the slain, had rendered it yet more -pitiable. Forty thousand miserable men—so prodigious was the total, -including all ranks and functions—now set forth to quit it, on a -march of which few could hope to see the end; like the pouring forth -of the population of a large city starved out by blockade. Many -had little or no provisions to carry, so low had the stock become -reduced; but of those who had, every man carried his own, even the -horsemen and hoplites, now for the first time either already left -without slaves, by desertion, or knowing that no slave could now be -trusted. But neither such melancholy equality of suffering, nor the -number of sufferers, counted for much in the way of alleviation. A -downcast stupor and sense of abasement possessed every man; the more -intolerable, when they recollected the exit of the armament from -Peiræus two years before, with prayers, and solemn pæans, and all -the splendid dreams of conquest, set against the humiliation of the -closing scene now before them, without a single trireme left out of -two prodigious fleets. - -But it was not until the army had actually begun its march that the -full measure of wretchedness was felt and manifested. It was then -that the necessity first became proclaimed, which no one probably -spoke out beforehand, of leaving behind not merely the unburied -bodies, but also the sick and the wounded. The scenes of woe which -marked this hour passed endurance or description. The departing -soldier sorrowed and shuddered with the sentiment of an unperformed -duty, as he turned from the unburied bodies of the slain; but far -more terrible was the trial, when he had to tear himself from the -living sufferers, who implored their comrades, with wailings of agony -and distraction, not to abandon them. Appealing to all the claims -of pious friendship, they clung round their knees, and even crawled -along the line of march until their strength failed. The silent -dejection of the previous day was now exchanged for universal tears -and groans, and clamorous outbursts of sorrow, amidst which the army -could not without the utmost difficulty be disengaged and put in -motion. - -After such heart-rending scenes, it might seem that their cup of -bitterness was exhausted; but worse was yet in store, and the terrors -of the future dictated a struggle against all the miseries of past -and present. The generals did their best to keep up some sense of -order as well as courage; and Nikias, particularly, in this closing -hour of his career, displayed a degree of energy and heroism which he -had never before seemed to possess. Though himself among the greatest -personal sufferers of all, from his incurable complaint, he was seen -everywhere in the ranks marshalling the troops, heartening up their -dejection, and addressing them with a voice louder, more strenuous, -and more commanding than was his wont. - -“Keep up your hope still, Athenians (he said), even as we are now: -others have been saved out of circumstances worse than ours. Be not -too much humiliated, either with your defeats or with your present -unmerited hardships. I too, having no advantage over any of you in -strength,—nay, you see the condition to which I have been brought by -my disease,—and accustomed even to superior splendor and good fortune -in private as well as public life, I too am plunged in the same peril -with the humblest soldier among you. Nevertheless, my conduct has -been constantly pious towards the gods as well as just and blameless -towards men; in recompense for which, my hope for the future is -yet sanguine, at the same time that our actual misfortunes do not -appall me in proportion to their intrinsic magnitude.[499] Perhaps, -indeed, they may from this time forward abate; for our enemies have -had their full swing of good fortune, and if, at the moment of our -starting, we were under the jealous wrath of any of the gods, we -have already undergone chastisement amply sufficient. Other people -before us have invaded foreign lands, and after having done what was -competent to human power, have suffered what was within the limit -of human endurance. We too may reasonably hope henceforward to have -the offended god dealing with us more mildly, for we are now objects -fitter for his compassion than for his jealousy.[500] Look, moreover, -at your own ranks, hoplites so numerous and so excellent: let that -guard you against excessive despair, and recollect that, wherever -you may sit down, you are yourselves at once a city; nor is there -any other city in Sicily that can either repulse your attack or -expel you if you choose to stay. Be careful yourselves to keep your -march firm and orderly, every man of you with this conviction, that -whatever spot he may be forced to fight in, that spot is his country -and his fortress, and must be kept by victorious effort. As our -provisions are very scanty, we shall hasten on night and day alike; -and so soon as you reach any friendly village of the Sikels, who -still remain constant to us from hatred to Syracuse, then consider -yourselves in security. We have sent forward to apprize them, and -intreat them to meet us with supplies. Once more, soldiers, recollect -that to act like brave men is now a matter of necessity to you, and -that if you falter, there is no refuge for you anywhere. Whereas if -you now get clear of your enemies, such of you as are not Athenians -will again enjoy the sight of home, while such of you as _are_ -Athenians will live to renovate the great power of our city, fallen -though it now be. _It is men that make a city; not walls, nor ships -without men._”[501] - - [499] Thucyd. vii, 77. Καίτοι πολλὰ μὲν ἐς θεοὺς νόμιμα - δεδιῄτημαι, πολλὰ δὲ ἐς ἀνθρώπους δίκαια καὶ ἀνεπίφθονα. ~Ἀνθ’ - ὧν ἡ μὲν ἐλπὶς ὅμως θρασεῖα τοῦ μέλλοντος, αἱ δὲ ξυμφοραὶ οὐ - κατ’ ἀξίαν δὴ φοβοῦσι~. Τάχα δ’ ἂν καὶ λωφήσειαν· ἱκανὰ γὰρ τοῖς - τε πολεμίοις εὐτύχηται, καὶ εἴ τῳ θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι ἐστρατεύσαμεν, - ἀρκούντως ἤδη τετιμωρήμεθα. - - I have translated the words οὐ κατ’ ἀξίαν, and the sentence of - which they form a part, differently from what has been hitherto - sanctioned by the commentators, who construe κατ’ ἀξίαν as - meaning “according to our desert,” understand the words αἱ - ξυμφοραὶ οὐ κατ’ ἀξίαν as bearing the same sense with the words - ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις some lines before; and likewise - construe οὐ, not with φοβοῦσι, but with κατ’ ἀξίαν, assigning to - φοβοῦσι an affirmative sense. They translate: “Quare, _quamvis - nostra fortuna, prorsus afflicta videatur_ (these words have - no parallel in the original) rerum tamen futurarum spes est - audax: sed clades, quas nullo nostro merito accepimus, _nos_ - jam terrent. At fortasse cessabunt,” etc. M. Didot translates: - “Aussi j’ai un ferme espoir dans l’avenir, _malgré l’effroi_ que - des _malheurs non mérités_ nous causent.” Dr. Arnold passes the - sentence over without notice. - - This manner of translating appears to me not less unsuitable - in reference to the spirit and thread of the harangue, than - awkward as regards the individual words. Looking to the spirit - of the harangue, the object of encouraging the dejected soldiers - would hardly be much answered by repeating—what in fact had been - glanced at in a manner sufficient and becoming, before—that “the - unmerited reverses terrified either Nikias or the soldiers.” - Then as to the words; the expressions ἀνθ’ ὧν, ὅμως, μὲν, and - δὲ, seem to me to denote, not only that the two halves of the - sentence apply both of them to Nikias, but that the first half of - the sentence is in harmony, not in opposition, with the second. - Matthiæ (in my judgment, erroneously) refers (Gr. Gr. § 623) ὅμως - to some words which have preceded; I think that ὅμως contributes - to hold together the first and the second affirmation of the - sentence. Now the Latin translation refers the first half of the - sentence to Nikias, and the last half to the soldiers whom he - addresses; while the translation of M. Didot, by means of the - word _malgré_, for which there is nothing corresponding in the - Greek, puts the second half in antithesis to the first. - - I cannot but think that οὐ ought to be construed with φοβοῦσι, - and that the words κατ’ ἀξίαν do not bear the meaning assigned to - them by the translators. Ἀξίαν not only means, “_desert_, merit, - the title to that which a man has earned by his conduct,” as in - the previous phrase παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, but it also means, “price, - value, title to be cared for, capacity of exciting more or less - desire or aversion,” in which last sense it is predicated as - an attribute, not only of moral beings, but of other objects - besides. Thus Aristotle says (Ethic. Nikom. iii, 11): ὁ γὰρ οὕτως - ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ~ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας~· ὁ δὲ σώφρων - οὐ τοιοῦτος, etc. Again, ibid. iii, 5. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὖ - ἕνεκα, ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ - καὶ θαῤῥῶν, ἀνδρεῖος· ~κατ’ ἀξίαν~ γὰρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει - καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. Again, ibid. iv, 2. Διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ - μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ γένει, μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν· τὸ γὰρ - τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐυπέρβλητον, καὶ ἔχον ~κατ’ ἀξίαν~ τοῦ δαπανήματος. - Again, ibid. viii, 14. Ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ὄντα οὔ φασι δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν· - λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι, καὶ οὐ φιλίαν, εἰ μὴ ~κατ’ ἀξίαν~ - τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας. Compare also ib. viii, 13. - - Xenophon, Cyrop. viii, 4, 32. τὸ γὰρ πολλὰ δοκοῦντα ἔχειν - μὴ ~κατ’ ἀξίαν~ τῆς οὐσίας φαίνεσθαι ὠφελοῦντα τοὺς φίλους, - ἀνελευθερίαν ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ περιάπτειν. Compare Xenophon, Memorab. - ii, 5, 2. ὥσπερ τῶν οἰκετῶν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν φίλων, εἰσὶν ~ἀξίαι~; - also ibid. i, 6, 11, and Isokratês, cont. Lochit. Or. xx, s. 8. - - The words κατ’ ἀξίαν in Thucydidês appear to me to bear the - same meaning as in these passages of Xenophon and Aristotle, - “in proportion to their value,” or to their real magnitude. If - we so construe them, the words ἀνθ’ ὧν, ὅμως, μὲν, and δὲ, all - fall into their proper order: the whole sentence after ἀνθ’ ὧν - applies to Nikias personally, is a corollary from what he had - asserted before, and forms a suitable point in an harangue for - encouraging his dispirited soldiers: “Look how _I_ bear up, who - have as much cause for mourning as any of you. I have behaved - well both towards gods and towards men: in return for which, I - am comparatively comfortable both as to the future and as to the - present: as to the future, I have strong hopes; at the same time - that, as to the present, I am not overwhelmed by the present - misfortunes in proportion to their prodigious intensity.” - - This is the precise thing for a man of resolution to say upon so - terrible an occasion. - - The particle δὴ has its appropriate meaning, αἱ δὲ ξυμφοραὶ οὐ - κατ’ ἀξίαν ~δὴ~ φοβοῦσι; “and the present distresses, though - they do appall me, do not appall me _assuredly_ in proportion - to their actual magnitude.” Lastly, the particle καὶ (in the - succeeding phrase, τάχα δ’ ἂν ~καὶ~ λωφήσειαν) does not fit on to - the preceding passage as usually construed: accordingly the Latin - translator, as well as M. Didot, leave it out, and translate: “At - fortasse cessabunt.” “Mais peut-être vont-ils cesser.” It ought - to be translated: “And perhaps they may _even_ abate,” which - implies that what had been asserted in the preceding sentence is - here intended not to be contradicted, but to be carried forward - and strengthened: see Kühner, Griech. Gramm. sects. 725-728. Such - would not be the case as the sentence is usually construed. - - [500] Thucyd. vii, 77. Ἱκανὰ γὰρ τοῖς τε πολεμίοις εὐτύχηται, καὶ - εἴ τῳ θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι ἐστρατεύσαμεν, ἀποχρώντως ἤδη τετιμωρήμεθα· - ἦλθον γάρ που καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἤδη ἐφ’ ἑτέρους, καὶ ἀνθρώπεια - δράσαντες ἀνεκτὰ ἔπαθον. Καὶ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς νῦν τά τε ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ - ἐλπίζειν ἠπιώτερα ἕξειν· οἴκτου γὰρ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἀξιώτεροι ἤδη ἐσμὲν - ἢ φθόνου. - - This is a remarkable illustration of the doctrine, so frequently - set forth in Herodotus, that the gods were jealous of any man - or any nation who was preëminently powerful, fortunate, or - prosperous. Nikias, recollecting the immense manifestation and - promise with which his armament had started from Peiræus, now - believed that this had provoked the jealousy of some of the gods, - and brought about the misfortunes in Sicily. He comforts his - soldiers by saying that the enemy is now at the same dangerous - pinnacle of exaltation, whilst _they_ have exhausted the sad - effects of the divine jealousy. - - Compare the story of Amasis and Polykratês in Herodotus (iii, - 39), and the striking remarks put into the mouth of Paulus - Æmilius by Plutarch (Vit. Paul. Æmil. c. 36). - - [501] Thucyd. vii, 77. Ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις, καὶ οὐ τείχη, οὐδὲ νῆες - ἀνδρῶν κεναί. - -The efforts of both commanders were in full harmony with these -strenuous words. The army was distributed into two divisions; the -hoplites marching in a hollow oblong, with the baggage and unarmed in -the interior. The front division was commanded by Nikias, the rear by -Demosthenês. Directing their course towards the Sikel territory, in -the interior of the island, they first marched along the left bank -of the Anapus until they came to the ford of that river, which they -found guarded by a Syracusan detachment. They forced the passage, -however, without much resistance, and accomplished on that day a -march of about five miles, under the delay arising from the harassing -of the enemy’s cavalry and light troops. Encamping for that night on -an eminence, they recommenced their march with the earliest dawn, and -halted, after about two miles and a half, in a deserted village on a -plain. They were in hopes of finding some provisions in the houses, -and were even under the necessity of carrying along with them some -water from this spot; there being none to be found farther on. As -their intended line of march had now become evident, the Syracusans -profited by this halt to get on before them, and to occupy in force -a position on the road, called the Akræan cliff. Here the road, -ascending a high hill, formed a sort of ravine bordered on each side -by steep cliffs. The Syracusans erected a wall or barricade across -the whole breadth of the road, and occupied the high ground on each -side. But even to reach this pass was beyond the competence of the -Athenians; so impracticable was it to get over the ground in the face -of overwhelming attacks from the enemy’s cavalry and light troops. -They were compelled, after a short march, to retreat to their camp of -the night before.[502] - - [502] Thucyd. vii, 78. - -Every hour added to the distress of their position; for their food -was all but exhausted, nor could any man straggle from the main -body without encountering certain destruction from the cavalry. -Accordingly, on the next morning, they tried one more desperate -effort to get over the hilly ground into the interior. Starting -very early, they arrived at the foot of the hill called the Akræan -cliff, where they found the barricades placed across the road, with -deep files of Syracusan hoplites behind them, and crowds of light -troops lining the cliffs on each border. They made the most strenuous -and obstinate efforts to force this inexpugnable position, but all -their struggles were vain, while they suffered miserably from the -missiles of the troops above. Amidst all the discouragement of this -repulse, they were yet farther disheartened by storms of thunder and -lightning, which occurred during the time, and which they construed -as portents significant of their impending ruin.[503] - - [503] Thucyd. vii, 79. ἀφ’ ὧν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μᾶλλον ἔτι ἠθύμουν, καὶ - ἐνόμιζον ~ἐπὶ τῷ σφετέρῳ ὀλέθρῳ καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γίγνεσθαι~. - -This fact strikingly illustrates both the change which the last -two years had wrought in the contending parties, and the degree to -which such religious interpretations of phenomena depended for their -efficacy on predisposing temper, gloomy or cheerful. In the first -battle between Nikias and the Syracusans, near the Great Harbor, -some months before the siege was begun, a similar thunder-storm had -taken place: on that occasion the Athenian soldiers had continued -the battle unmoved, treating it as a natural event belonging -to the season, and such indifference on their part had still -farther imposed upon the alarmed Syracusans.[504] Now, both the -self-confidence and the religious impression had changed sides. - - [504] Thucyd. vi, 70. - -Exhausted by their fruitless efforts, the Athenians fell back a short -space to repose, when Gylippus tried to surround them by sending a -detachment to block up the narrow road in their rear. This, however, -they prevented, effecting their retreat into the open plain, where -they passed the night, and on the ensuing day attempted once more -the hopeless march over the Akræan cliff. But they were not allowed -even to advance so far as the pass and the barricade. They were -so assailed and harassed by the cavalry and darters, in flank and -rear, that, in spite of heroic effort and endurance, they could not -accomplish a progress of so much as one single mile. Extenuated by -fatigue, half-starved, and with numbers of wounded men, they were -compelled to spend a third miserable night in the same fatal plain. - -As soon as the Syracusans had retired for the night to their camp, -Nikias and Demosthenês took counsel. They saw plainly that the route -which they had originally projected, over the Akræan cliff into the -Sikel regions of the interior and from thence to Katana, had become -impracticable, and that their unhappy troops would be still less in -condition to force it on the morrow than they had been on the day -preceding. Accordingly, they resolved to make off during the night, -leaving numerous fires burning to mislead the enemy; but completely -to alter the direction, and to turn down towards the southern coast -on which lay Kamarina and Gela. Their guides informed them that if -they could cross the river Kakyparis, which fell into the sea south -of Syracuse, on the southeastern coast of Sicily, or a river still -farther on, called the Erineus,—they might march up the right bank -of either into the regions of the interior. Accordingly, they broke -up in the night, amidst confusion and alarm; in spite of which, the -front division of the army under Nikias got into full march, and -made considerable advance. By daybreak this division reached the -southeastern coast of the island not far south of Syracuse, and fell -into the track of the Helôrine road, which they pursued until they -arrived at the Kakyparis. Even here, however, they found a Syracusan -detachment beforehand with them, raising a redoubt, and blocking up -the ford; nor could Nikias pass it without forcing his way through -them. He marched straightforward to the Erineus, which he crossed -on the same day, and encamped his troops on some high ground on the -other side.[505] - - [505] Thucyd. vii, 80-82. - -Except at the ford of the Kakyparis, his march had been all day -unobstructed by the enemy; and he thought it wiser to push hid -troops as fast as possible, in order to arrive at some place both -of safety and subsistence, without concerning himself about the -rear division under Demosthenês. That division, the larger half of -the army, started both later and in great disorder. Unaccountable -panics and darkness made them part company or miss their way, so -that Demosthenês, with all his efforts to keep them together, made -little progress, and fell much behind Nikias. He was overtaken by -the Syracusans during the forenoon, seemingly before he reached the -Kakyparis,[506] and at a moment when the foremost division was -nearly six miles ahead, between the Kakyparis and the Erineus. - - [506] Dr. Arnold (Thucyd. vol. iii, p. 280, copied by Göller, - ad vii, 81) thinks that the division of Demosthenês reached - and passed the river Kakyparis; and was captured between the - Kakyparis and the Erineus. But the words of Thucyd. vii, 80, 81, - do not sustain this. The division of Nikias was in advance of - Demosthenês from the beginning, and gained upon it principally - during the early part of the march, before daybreak; because it - was then that the disorder of the division of Demosthenês was the - most inconvenient: see c. 81—ὡς τῆς νυκτὸς τότε ξυνεταράχθησαν, - etc. When Thucydidês, therefore, says, that “at daybreak _they_ - arrived at the sea,” (ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἕῳ ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὴν θάλατταν, - c. 80,) this cannot be true _both_ of Nikias and of Demosthenês. - If the former arrived there at daybreak, the latter cannot have - come to the same point till some time after daybreak. Nikias must - have been beforehand with Demosthenês when he reached the sea, - and considerably _more_ beforehand when he reached the Kakyparis: - moreover, we are expressly told that Nikias did not wait for his - colleague, that he thought it for the best to get on as fast as - possible with his own division. - - It appears to me that the words ἀφικνοῦνται, etc. (c. 80), are - not to be understood both of Nikias and Demosthenês, but that - they refer back to the word αὐτοῖς, two or three lines behind: - “the _Athenians (taken generally)_ reached the sea,” no attention - being at that moment paid to the difference between the front - and the rear divisions. The _Athenians_ might be said, not - improperly, to reach the sea, at the time when the division of - Nikias reached it. - -When the Syracusans discovered at dawn that their enemy had made off -in the night, their first impulse was to accuse Gylippus of treachery -in having permitted the escape. Such ungrateful surmises, however, -were soon dissipated, and the cavalry set forth in rapid pursuit, -until they overtook the rear division, which they immediately began -to attack and impede. The advance of Demosthenês had been tardy -before, and his division disorganized: but he was now compelled to -turn and defend himself against an indefatigable enemy, who presently -got before him and thus stopped him altogether. Their numerous -light troops and cavalry assailed him on all sides and without -intermission; employing nothing but missiles, however, and taking -care to avoid any close encounter. While this unfortunate division -were exerting their best efforts both to defend themselves, and if -possible to get forward, they found themselves inclosed in a walled -olive-ground, through the middle of which the road passed; a farm -bearing the name, and probably once the property, of Polyzêlus, -brother of the despot Gelon.[507] Entangled and huddled up in this -inclosure, from whence exit at the farther end in the face of an -enemy was found impossible, they were now overwhelmed with hostile -missiles from the walls on all sides.[508] Though unable to get at -the enemy, and deprived even of the resources of an active despair, -they endured incessant harassing for the greater part of the day, -without refreshment or repose, and with the number of their wounded -continually increasing; until at length the remaining spirit of the -unhappy sufferers was thoroughly broken. Perceiving their condition, -Gylippus sent to them a herald with a proclamation; inviting all -the islanders among them to come forth from the rest, and promising -them freedom if they did so. The inhabitants of some cities, yet -not many,—a fact much to their honor,—availed themselves of this -offer and surrendered. Presently, however, a larger negotiation -was opened, which ended by the entire division capitulating upon -terms, and giving up their arms. Gylippus and the Syracusans engaged -that the lives of all should be spared; that is, that none should -be put to death either by violence, or by intolerable bonds, or by -starvation. Having all been disarmed, they were forthwith conveyed -away as prisoners to Syracuse, six thousand in number. It is a -remarkable proof of the easy and opulent circumstances of many among -these gallant sufferers, when we are told that the money which they -had about them, even at this last moment of pressure, was sufficient -to fill the concavities of four shields.[509] Disdaining either -to surrender or to make any stipulation for himself personally, -Demosthenês was on the point of killing himself with his own sword -the moment that the capitulation was concluded; but his intention -was prevented, and he was carried off a disarmed prisoner by the -Syracusans.[510] - - [507] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27. - - [508] Thucyd. vii, 81. Καὶ τότε γνοὺς (sc. Demosthenês) τοὺς - Συρακοσίους διώκοντας οὐ προὐχώρει μᾶλλον ἢ ἐς μάχην ξυνετάσσετο, - ἕως ἐνδιατρίβων κυκλοῦταί τε ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐν πολλῷ θορύβῳ - αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ μετ’ αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦσαν· ἀνειληθέντες γὰρ ἔς τι - χωρίον, ᾧ κύκλῳ μὲν τειχίον περιῆν, ~ὁδὸς δὲ ἔνθεν τε καὶ ἔνθεν~, - ἐλάας δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγας εἶχεν, ἐβάλλοντο περισταδόν. - - I translate ὁδὸς δὲ ἔνθεν τε καὶ ἔνθεν differently from Dr. - Arnold, from Mitford, and from others. These words are commonly - understood to mean that this walled plantation was bordered - by two roads, one on each side. Certainly the words _might_ - have that signification; but I think they also may have the - signification (compare ii, 76) which I have given in the text, - and which seems more plausible. It certainly is very improbable - that the Athenians should have gone out of the road, in order - to shelter themselves in the plantation; since they were fully - aware that there was no safety for them except in getting away. - If we suppose that the plantation lay exactly in the road, the - word ἀνειληθέντες becomes perfectly explicable, on which I do not - think that Dr. Arnold’s comment is satisfactory. The pressure of - the troops from the rear into the hither opening, while those - in the front could not get out by the farther opening, would - naturally cause this crowd and _huddling_ inside. A road which - passed right through the walled ground, entering at one side and - coming out at the other, might well be called ὁδὸς δὲ ἔνθεν τε - καὶ ἔνθεν. Compare Dr. Arnold’s Remarks on the Map of Syracuse, - vol. iii, p. 281; as well as his note on vii, 81. - - I imagine the olive-trees to be here named, not for either of the - two reasons mentioned by Dr. Arnold, but because they hindered - the Athenians from seeing beforehand distinctly the nature of the - inclosure into which they were hastening, and therefore prevented - any precautions from being taken, such as that of forbidding too - many troops from entering at once, etc. - - [509] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27; Thucyd. vii, 82. - - [510] This statement depends upon the very good authority of - the contemporary Syracusan, Philistus: see Pausanias, i, 29, 9; - Philisti Fragm. 46, ed. Didot. - -On the next day, Gylippus and the victorious Syracusans overtook -Nikias on the right bank of the Erineus, apprized him of the -capitulation of Demosthenês, and summoned him to capitulate also. He -demanded leave to send a horseman for the purpose of verifying the -statement; and on the return of the horseman, he made a proposition -to Gylippus, that his army should be permitted to return home, on -condition of Athens reimbursing to Syracuse the whole expense of -the war, and furnishing hostages until payment should be made; -one citizen against each talent of silver. These conditions were -rejected; but Nikias could not yet bring himself to submit to -the same terms for his division as Demosthenês. Accordingly, the -Syracusans recommenced their attacks, which the Athenians, in spite -of hunger and fatigue, sustained as they best could until night. It -was the intention of Nikias again to take advantage of the night for -the purpose of getting away. But on this occasion the Syracusans -were on the watch, and as soon as they heard movement in the camp, -they raised the pæan, or war-shout; thus showing that they were on -the lookout, and inducing the Athenians again to lay down the arms -which they had taken up for departure. A detachment of three hundred -Athenians, nevertheless, still persisting in marching off, apart from -the rest, forced their way through the posts of the Syracusans. These -men got safely away, and nothing but the want of guides prevented -them from escaping altogether.[511] - - [511] Thucyd. vii, 83. - -During all this painful retreat, the personal resolution displayed -by Nikias was exemplary; his sick and feeble frame was made to bear -up, and even to hearten up stronger men, against the extremity of -hardship, exhausting the last fragment of hope or even possibility. -It was now the sixth day of the retreat,—six days[512] of constant -privation, suffering, and endurance of attack,—yet Nikias early in -the morning attempted a fresh march, in order to get to the river -Asinarus, which falls into the same sea, south of the Erineus, but -is a more considerable stream, flowing deeply imbedded between lofty -banks. This was a last effort of despair, with little hope of final -escape, even if they did reach it. Yet the march was accomplished, -in spite of renewed and incessant attacks all the way, from the -Syracusan cavalry; who even got to the river before the Athenians, -occupying the ford, and lining the high banks near it. Here the -resolution of the unhappy fugitives at length gave way; when they -reached the river, their strength, their patience, their spirit, and -their hopes for the future, were all extinct. Tormented with raging -thirst, and compelled by the attacks of the cavalry to march in one -compact mass, they rushed into the ford all at once, treading down -and tumbling over each other in the universal avidity for drink. Many -thus perished from being pushed down upon the points of the spears, -or lost their footing among the scattered articles of baggage, and -were thus borne down under water.[513] Meanwhile, the Syracusans -from above poured upon the huddled mass showers of missiles, while -the Peloponnesian hoplites even descended into the river, came to -close quarters with them, and slew considerable numbers. So violent, -nevertheless, was the thirst of the Athenians, that all other -suffering was endured in order to taste relief by drinking. And even -when dead and wounded were heaped in the river,—when the water was -tainted and turbid with blood, as well as thick with the mud trodden -up,—still, the new-comers pushed their way in and swallowed it with -voracity.[514] - - [512] Plutarch (Nikias. c. 27) says _eight_ days, inaccurately. - - [513] Thucyd. vii, 85. See Dr. Arnold’s note. - - [514] Thucyd. vii, 84. ... ἔβαλλον ἄνωθεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, - ~πίνοντάς τε τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀσμένους~, καὶ ἐν κοίλῳ ὄντι τῷ ποτάμῳ - ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ταρασσομένους. - -Wretched, helpless, and demoralized as the army now was, Nikias -could think no farther of resistance. He accordingly surrendered -himself to Gylippus, to be dealt with at the discretion of that -general and of the Lacedæmonians,[515] earnestly imploring that the -slaughter of the defenceless soldiers might be arrested. Accordingly, -Gylippus gave orders that no more should be killed, but that the -rest should be secured as captives. Many were slain before this -order was understood; but of those who remained, almost all were -made captive, very few escaping. Nay, even the detachment of three -hundred, who had broken out in the night, having seemingly not known -whither to go, were captured, and brought in by troops sent forth -for the purpose.[516] The triumph of the Syracusans was in every -way complete, they hung the trees on the banks of the Asinarus with -Athenian panoplies as trophy, and carried back their prisoners in -joyous procession to the city. - - [515] Thucyd. vii, 85, 86; Philistus, Fragm. 46, ed. Didot; - Pausanias, i. 29, 9. - - [516] Thucyd. vii, 85; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27. - -The number of prisoners thus made, is not positively specified by -Thucydidês, as in the case of the division of Demosthenês, which -had capitulated and laid down their arms in a mass within the walls -of the olive-ground. Of the captives from the division of Nikias, -the larger proportion were seized by private individuals, and -fraudulently secreted for their own profit; the number obtained for -the state being comparatively small, seemingly not more than one -thousand.[517] The various Sicilian towns became soon full of these -prisoners, sold as slaves for private account. - - [517] Thucydidês states, roughly, and without pretending to - exact means of knowledge, that the total number of captives - brought to Syracuse under public supervision, was not less than - seven thousand—ἐλήφθησαν δὲ οἱ ξύμπαντες, ἀκριβείᾳ μὲν χαλεπὸν - ἐξειπεῖν, ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἐλάσσους ἑπτακισχιλίων (vii, 87). As the - number taken with Demosthenês was six thousand (vii, 82), this - leaves one thousand as having been obtained from the division of - Nikias. - -Not less than forty thousand persons in the aggregate had started -from the Athenian camp to commence the retreat, six days before. Of -these probably many, either wounded or otherwise incompetent even -when the march began, soon found themselves unable to keep up, and -were left behind to perish. Each of the six days was a day of hard -fighting and annoyance from an indefatigable crowd of light troops, -with little, and at last seemingly nothing, to eat. The number was -thus successively thinned, by wounds, privations, and straggling, -so that the six thousand taken with Demosthenês, and perhaps three -thousand or four thousand captured with Nikias, formed the melancholy -remnant. Of the stragglers during the march, however, we are glad to -learn that many contrived to escape the Syracusan cavalry and get to -Katana, where also those who afterwards ran away from their slavery -under private masters, found a refuge.[518] These fugitive Athenians -served as auxiliaries to repel the attacks of the Syracusans upon -Katana.[519] - - [518] Thucyd. vii, 85. ~πολλοὶ~ δὲ ὅμως καὶ διέφυγον, οἱ μὲν καὶ - παραυτίκα, οἱ δὲ καὶ δουλεύσαντες καὶ διαδιδράσκοντες ὕστερον. - The word παραυτίκα means, during the retreat. - - [519] Lysias pro Polystrato. Orat. xx, sects. 26-28, c. 6, p. 686 - R. - -It was in this manner, chiefly, that Athens came to receive again -within her bosom a few of those ill-fated sons whom she had drafted -forth in two such splendid divisions to Sicily. For of those who were -carried as prisoners to Syracuse, fewer yet could ever have got home. -They were placed for safe custody, along with the other prisoners, in -the stone-quarries of Syracuse,—of which there were several, partly -on the southern descent of the outer city towards the Nekropolis, -or from the higher level to the lower level of Achradina,—partly in -the suburb afterwards called Neapolis, under the southern cliff of -Epipolæ. Into these quarries—deep hollows of confined space, with -precipitous sides, and open at the top to the sky—the miserable -prisoners were plunged, lying huddled one upon another, without the -smallest protection or convenience. For subsistence, they received -each day a ration of one pint of wheaten bread,—half the daily ration -of a slave,—with no more than half a pint of water, so that they -were not preserved from the pangs either of hunger or of thirst. -Moreover, the heat of the midday sun, alternating with the chill of -the autumn nights, was alike afflicting and destructive; while the -wants of life having all to be performed where they were, without -relief, the filth and stench presently became insupportable. Sick -and wounded even at the moment of arrival, many of them speedily -died; and happiest was he who died the first, leaving an unconscious -corpse, which the Syracusans would not take the trouble to remove, to -distress and infect the survivors. Under this condition and treatment -they remained for seventy days; probably serving as a spectacle for -the triumphant Syracusan population, with their wives and children, -to come and look down upon, and to congratulate themselves on their -own narrow escape from sufferings similar in kind at least, if not -in degree. After that time the novelty of the spectacle had worn -off, while the place must have become a den of abomination and a -nuisance intolerable even to the citizens themselves. Accordingly, -they now removed all the surviving prisoners, except the native -Athenians and the few Italian or Sicilian Greeks among them. All -those so removed were sold for slaves;[520] while the dead bodies -were probably at the same time taken away, and the prison rendered -somewhat less loathsome. What became of the remaining prisoners, -we are not told; it may be presumed that those who could survive -so great an extremity of suffering might after a certain time be -allowed to get back to Athens on ransom. Perhaps some of them may -have obtained their release; as was the case, we are told, with -several of those who had been sold to private masters, by the -elegance of their accomplishments and the dignity of their demeanor. -The dramas of Euripidês were so peculiarly popular throughout all -Sicily, that those Athenian prisoners who knew by heart considerable -portions of them, won the affections of their masters. Some even -of the stragglers from the army are affirmed to have procured for -themselves, by the same attraction, shelter and hospitality during -their flight. Euripidês, we are informed, lived to receive the thanks -of several among these unhappy sufferers, after their return to -Athens.[521] I cannot refrain from mentioning this story, though I -fear its trustworthiness as matter of fact is much inferior to its -pathos and interest. - - [520] Thucyd. vii, 87. Diodorus (xiii, 20-32) gives two long - orations purporting to have been held in the Syracusan assembly, - in discussing how the prisoners were to be dealt with. An old - citizen, named Nikolaus, who has lost his two sons in the war, is - made to advocate the side of humane treatment; while Gylippus is - introduced as the orator recommending harshness and revenge. - - From whom Diodorus borrowed this, I do not know; but his whole - account of the matter appears to me untrustworthy. - - One may judge of his accuracy when one finds him stating that the - prisoners received each two _chœnikes_ of barley-meal, instead of - two _kotylæ_; the chœnix being four times as much as the kotylê - (Diodor. xiii, 19). - - [521] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 29; Diodor. xiii, 33. The reader will - see how the Carthaginians treated the Grecian prisoners whom they - took in Sicily, in Diodor. xiii, 111. - -Upon the treatment of Nikias and Demosthenês, not merely the -Syracusans, but also the allies present, were consulted, and much -difference of opinion was found. To keep them in confinement simply, -without putting them to death, was apparently the opinion advocated -by Hermokratês.[522] But Gylippus, then in full ascendency and an -object of deep gratitude for his invaluable services, solicited as a -reward to himself to be allowed to conduct them back as prisoners to -Sparta. To achieve this would have earned for him signal honor in the -eyes of his countrymen; for while Demosthenês, from his success at -Pylos, was their hated enemy, Nikias had always shown himself their -friend as far as an Athenian could do so. It was to him that they -owed the release of their prisoners taken at Sphakteria; and he had -calculated upon this obligation when he surrendered himself prisoner -to Gylippus, and not to the Syracusans. - - [522] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28; Diodor. xiii, 19. - -In spite of all his influence, however, Gylippus could not carry -this point. First, the Corinthians both strenuously opposed him -themselves, and prevailed on the other allies to do the same. They -were afraid that the wealth of Nikias would always procure for him -the means of escaping from imprisonment, so as to do them farther -injury, and they insisted on his being put to death. Next, those -Syracusans, who had been in secret correspondence with Nikias -during the siege, were yet more anxious to get him put out of -the way, being apprehensive that, if tortured by their political -opponents, he might disclose their names and intrigues. Such various -influences prevailed, and Nikias as well as Demosthenês was ordered -to be put to death by a decree of the public assembly, much to the -discontent of Gylippus. Hermokratês vainly opposed the resolution, -but perceiving that it was certain to be carried, he sent to them a -private intimation before the discussion closed; and procured for -them, through one of the sentinels, the means of dying by their own -hands. Their bodies were publicly exposed before the city gates to -the view of the Syracusan citizens;[523] while the day on which the -final capture of Nikias and his army was accomplished, came to be -celebrated as an annual festival, under the title of the Asinaria, on -the twenty-sixth day of the Dorian month Karneius.[524] - - [523] Thucyd. vii, 86; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28. The statement - which Plutarch here cites from Timæus respecting the intervention - of Hermokratês, is not in any substantial contradiction with - Philistus and Thucydidês. The word κελευσθέντας seems decidedly - preferable to καταλευσθέντας, in the text of Plutarch. - - [524] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28. Though Plutarch says that the - month Karneius is “that which the Athenians call Metageitnion,” - yet it is not safe to affirm that the day of the slaughter of the - Asinarus was the 16th of the Attic month Metageitnion. We know - that the civil months of different cities seldom or never exactly - coincided. See the remarks of Franz on this point, in his comment - on the valuable Inscriptions of Tauromenium, Corp. Inscr. Gr. No. - 5640, part xxxii, sect 3, p. 640. - - The surrender of Nikias must have taken place, I think, not less - than twenty-four or twenty-five days after the eclipse, which - occurred on the 27th of August, that is, about Sept. 21. Mr. - Fynes Clinton (F. H. ad ann. 413 B.C.) seems to me to compress - too much the interval between the eclipse and the retreat; - considering that that interval included two great battles, with a - certain delay before, between, and after. - - The μετόπωρον noticed by Thucyd. vii, 79. suits with Sept. 21: - compare Plutarch, Nikias, c. 22. - -Such was the close of the expedition, or rather of the two -expeditions, undertaken by Athens against Syracuse. Never in Grecian -history had a force so large, so costly, so efficient, and so full of -promise and confidence, been turned out; never in Grecian history had -ruin so complete and sweeping, or victory so glorious and unexpected, -been witnessed.[525] Its consequences were felt from one end of the -Grecian world to the other, as will appear in the coming chapters. - - [525] Thucyd. vii, 87. - -The esteem and admiration felt at Athens towards Nikias had been -throughout lofty and unshaken; after his death it was exchanged -for disgrace. His name was omitted, while that of his colleague -Demosthenês was engraved, on the funereal pillar erected to -commemorate the fallen warriors. This difference Pausanias explains -by saying that Nikias was conceived to have disgraced himself as -a military man by his voluntary surrender, which Demosthenês had -disdained.[526] - - [526] Pausan. i, 29, 9; Philist. Fragm. 46, ed. Didot. - - Justin erroneously says that Demosthenês actually did kill - himself, rather than submit to surrender, before the surrender of - Nikias; who, he says, did not choose to follow the example:— - - “Demosthenês, amisso exercitu a captivitate gladio et voluntariâ - morte se vindicat: Nicias autem, ne Demosthenis quidem exemplo, - ut sibi consuleret, admonitus, cladem suorum auxit dedecore - captivitatis.” (Justin, iv, 5.) - - Philistus, whom Pausanias announces himself as following, is an - excellent witness for the actual facts in Sicily; though not so - good a witness for the impression at Athens respecting those - facts. - - It seems certain, even from Thucydidês, that Nikias, in - surrendering himself to Gylippus, thought that he had - considerable chance of saving his life, Plutarch too so - interprets the proceeding, and condemns it as disgraceful, see - his comparison of Nikias and Crassus, near the end. Demosthenês - could not have thought the same for himself: the fact of his - attempted suicide appears to me certain, on the authority of - Philistus, though Thucydidês does not notice it. - -The opinion of Thucydidês deserves special notice, in the face of -this judgment of his countrymen. While he says not a word about -Demosthenês, beyond the fact of his execution, he adds in reference -to Nikias a few words of marked sympathy and commendation. “Such, or -nearly such, (he says,) were the reasons why Nikias was put to death; -though _he_ assuredly, among all Greeks of my time, least deserved -to come to so extreme a pitch of ill-fortune, considering his exact -performance of established duties to the divinity.”[527] - - [527] Thucyd. vii, 86. Καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιαύτῃ ἢ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτων - αἰτίᾳ ἐτεθνήκει, ἥκιστα δὴ ἄξιος ὢν τῶν γε ἐπ’ ἐμοῦ Ἑλλήνων ἐς - τοῦτο δυστυχίας ἀφικέσθαι, ~διὰ τὴν νενομισμένην ἐς τὸ θεῖον - ἐπιτήδευσιν~. - - So stood the text of Thucydidês, until various recent editors - changed the last words, on the authority of some MSS., to ~διὰ - τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν~. - - Though Dr. Arnold and some of the best critics prefer and adopt - the latter reading, I confess it seems to me that the former - is more suitable to the Greek vein of thought, as well as more - conformable to truth about Nikias. - - A man’s good or bad fortune, depending on the favorable or - unfavorable disposition of the gods towards him, was understood - to be determined more directly by his piety and religious - observances, rather than by his virtue, see passages in Isokratês - de Permutation. Orat. xv, sect. 301; Lysias, cont. Nikomach. c. - 5, p. 854, though undoubtedly the two ideas went to a certain - extent together. Men might differ about the virtue of Nikias; - but his piety was an incontestable fact; and his “good fortune” - also, in times prior to the Sicilian expedition, was recognized - by men like Alkibiadês, who most probably had no very lofty - opinion of his virtue (Thucyd. vi, 17). The contrast between the - remarkable piety of Nikias, and that extremity of ill-fortune - which marked the close of his life, was very likely to shock - Grecian ideas generally, and was a natural circumstance for the - historian to note. Whereas if we read, in the passage, πᾶσαν ἐς - ἀρετὴν, the panegyric upon Nikias becomes both less special and - more disproportionate, beyond what even Thucydidês (as far as we - can infer from other expressions, see v, 16) would be inclined to - bestow upon him—more, in fact, than he says in commendation even - of Periklês. - -If we were judging Nikias merely as a private man, and setting his -personal conduct in one scale against his personal suffering on the -other, the remark of Thucydidês would be natural and intelligible. -But the general of a great expedition, upon whose conduct the lives -of thousands of brave men as well as the most momentous interests -of his country, depend, cannot be tried by any such standard. His -private merit becomes a secondary point in the case, as compared with -the discharge of his responsible public duties, by which he must -stand or fall. - -Tried by this more appropriate standard, what are we to say of -Nikias? We are compelled to say, that if his personal suffering -could possibly be regarded in the light of an atonement, or set in -an equation against the mischief brought by himself both on his army -and his country, it would not be greater than his deserts. I shall -not here repeat the separate points in his conduct which justify this -view, and which have been set forth as they have occurred, in the -preceding pages. Admitting fully both the good intentions of Nikias, -and his personal bravery, rising even into heroism during the last -few days in Sicily, it is not the less incontestable, that, first, -the failure of the enterprise, next, the destruction of the armament, -is to be traced distinctly to his lamentable misjudgment. Sometimes -petty trifling, sometimes apathy and inaction, sometimes presumptuous -neglect, sometimes obstinate blindness even to urgent and obvious -necessities, one or other of these his sad mental defects, will be -found operative at every step, whereby this fated armament sinks down -from exuberant efficiency into the last depth of aggregate ruin and -individual misery. His improvidence and incapacity stand proclaimed, -not merely in the narrative of the historian, but even in his own -letter to the Athenians, and in his own speeches both before the -expedition and during its closing misfortunes, when contrasted with -the reality of his proceedings. The man whose flagrant incompetency -brought such wholesale ruin upon two fine armaments intrusted to -his command, upon the Athenian maritime empire, and ultimately upon -Athens herself, must appear on the tablets of history under the -severest condemnation, even though his personal virtues had been -loftier than those of Nikias. - -And yet our great historian, after devoting two immortal books to -this expedition, after setting forth emphatically both the glory of -its dawn and the wretchedness of its close, with a dramatic genius -parallel to the Œdipus Tyrannus of Sophoklês, when he comes to -recount the melancholy end of the two commanders, has no words to -spare for Demosthenês,—far the abler officer of the two, who perished -by no fault of his own,—but reserves his flowers to strew on the -grave of Nikias, the author of the whole calamity—“What a pity! Such -a respectable and religious man!” - -Thucydidês is here the more instructive, because he exactly -represents the sentiment of the general Athenian public towards -Nikias during his lifetime. They could not bear to condemn, to -mistrust, to dismiss, or to do without, so respectable and religious -a citizen. The private qualities of Nikias were not only held to -entitle him to the most indulgent construction of all his public -shortcomings, but also insured to him credit for political and -military competence altogether disproportionate to his deserts. -When we find Thucydidês, after narrating so much improvidence and -mismanagement on the grand scale, still keeping attention fixed on -the private morality and decorum of Nikias, as if it constituted the -main feature of his character, we can understand how the Athenian -people originally came both to over-estimate this unfortunate leader, -and continued over-estimating him with tenacious fidelity even after -glaring proof of his incapacity. Never in the political history -of Athens did the people make so fatal a mistake in placing their -confidence. - -In reviewing the causes of popular misjudgment, historians are -apt to enlarge prominently, if not exclusively, on demagogues and -demagogic influences. Mankind being usually considered in the light -of governable material, or as instruments for exalting, arming, -and decorating their rulers, whatever renders them more difficult -to handle in this capacity, ranks first in the category of vices. -Nor can it be denied that this was a real and serious cause: clever -criminative speakers often passed themselves off for something -above their real worth; though useful and indispensable as a -protection against worse, they sometimes deluded the people into -measures impolitic or unjust. But, even if we grant, to the cause -of misjudgment here indicated, a greater practical efficiency than -history will fairly sanction, still, it is only one among others more -mischievous. Never did any man at Athens, by mere force of demagogic -qualities, acquire a measure of esteem at once so exaggerated and so -durable, combined with so much power of injuring his fellow-citizens, -as the anti-demagogic Nikias. The man who, over and above his shabby -manœuvre about the expedition against Sphakteria, and his improvident -sacrifice of Athenian interests in the alliance with Sparta, ended -by inflicting on his country that cruel wound which destroyed so -many of her citizens as well as her maritime empire, was not a -leather-seller of impudent and criminative eloquence, but a man of -ancient family and hereditary wealth, munificent and affable, having -credit not merely for the largesses which he bestowed, but also for -all the insolences, which as a rich man he might have committed, but -did not commit,—free from all pecuniary corruption,—a brave man, and -above all, an ultra-religious man, believed therefore to stand high -in the favor of the gods, and to be fortunate. Such was the esteem -which the Athenians felt for this union of good qualities purely -personal and negative with eminent station, that they presumed the -higher aptitudes of command,[528] and presumed them, unhappily, -after proof that they did not exist,—after proof that what they -had supposed to be caution was only apathy and mental weakness. No -demagogic arts or eloquence would ever have created in the people so -deep-seated an illusion as the imposing respectability of Nikias. -Now it was against the overweening ascendency of such decorous and -pious incompetence, when aided by wealth and family advantages, that -the demagogic accusatory eloquence ought to have served as a natural -bar and corrective. Performing the functions of a constitutional -opposition, it afforded the only chance of that tutelary exposure -whereby blunders and shortcomings might be arrested in time. How -insufficient was the check which it provided,—even at Athens, where -every one denounces it as having prevailed in devouring excess,—the -history of Nikias is an ever-living testimony. - - [528] A good many of the features depicted by Tacitus (Hist. i, - 49) in Galba, suit the character of Nikias, much more than those - of the rapacious and unprincipled Crassus, with whom Plutarch - compares the latter:— - - “Vetus in familiâ nobilitas, magnæ opes: ipsi medium ingenium, - magis extra vitia, quam cum virtutibus. Sed claritas natalium, - et metus temporum, obtentui fuit, ut _quod segnitia fuit, - sapientia_ vocaretur. Dum vigebat ætas, militari laude apud - Germanias floruit: proconsul, Africam moderate; jam senior, - citeriorem Hispaniam, pari justitiâ continuit. _Major privato - visus dum privatus fuit, et omnium consensu capax imperii, nisi - imperasset._” - - - - -CHAPTER LXI. - -FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY, DOWN TO THE -OLIGARCHICAL CONSPIRACY OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS. - - -In the preceding chapter we followed to its melancholy close the -united armament of Nikias and Demosthenês, first in the harbor and -lastly in the neighborhood of Syracuse, towards the end of September, -413 B.C. - -The first impression which we derive from the perusal of that -narrative is, sympathy for the parties directly concerned, chiefly -for the number of gallant Athenians who thus miserably perished, -partly also for the Syracusan victors, themselves a few months before -on the verge of apparent ruin. But the distant and collateral effects -of the catastrophe throughout Greece, were yet more momentous than -those within the island in which it occurred. - -I have already mentioned that even at the moment when Demosthenês -with his powerful armament left Peiræus to go to Sicily, the -hostilities of the Peloponnesian confederacy against Athens herself -had been already recommenced. Not only was the Spartan king Agis -ravaging Attica, but the far more important step of fortifying -Dekeleia, for the abode of a permanent garrison, was in course of -completion. That fortress, having been begun about the middle of -March, was probably by the month of June in a situation to shelter -its garrison, which consisted of contingents periodically furnished, -and relieving each other alternately, from all the different states -of the confederacy, under the permanent command of king Agis himself. - -And now began that incessant marauding of domiciliated -enemies—destined to last for nine years until the final capture -of Athens—partially contemplated even at the beginning of the -Peloponnesian war, and recently enforced, with full comprehension -of its disastrous effects, by the virulent antipathy of the exile -Alkibiadês.[529] The earlier invasions of Attica had been all -temporary, continuing for five or six weeks at the farthest, and -leaving the country in repose for the remainder of the year. But the -Athenians now underwent from henceforward the fatal experience of a -hostile garrison within fifteen miles of their city; an experience -peculiarly painful this summer, as well from its novelty as from -the extraordinary vigor which Agis displayed in his operations. His -excursions were so widely extended, that no part of Attica was secure -or could be rendered productive. Not only were all the sheep and -cattle destroyed, but the slaves too, especially the most valuable -slaves, or artisans, began to desert to Dekeleia in great numbers; -more than twenty thousand of them soon disappeared in this way. -So terrible a loss of income, both to proprietors of land and to -employers in the city, was farther aggravated by the increased cost -and difficulty of import from Eubœa. Provisions and cattle from that -island had previously come over land from Oropus, but as that road -was completely stopped by the garrison of Dekeleia, they were now of -necessity sent round Cape Sunium by sea; a transit more circuitous -and expensive, besides being open to attack from the enemy’s -privateers.[530] In the midst of such heavy privations, the demands -on citizens and metics for military duty were multiplied beyond -measure. The presence of the enemy at Dekeleia forced them to keep -watch day and night throughout their long extent of wall, comprising -both Athens and Peiræus: in the daytime the hoplites of the city -relieved each other on guard, but at night, nearly all of them were -either on the battlements or at the various military stations in -the city. Instead of a city, in fact, Athens was reduced to the -condition of something like a military post.[531] Moreover, the rich -citizens of the state, who served as horsemen, shared in the general -hardship; being called on for daily duty in order to restrain at -least, since they could not entirely prevent, the excursions of the -garrison of Dekeleia, their efficiency was, however, soon impaired by -the laming of their horses on the hard and stony soil.[532] - - [529] Thucyd. i, 122-142; vi, 90. - - [530] Thucyd. viii. 4. About the extensive ruin caused by the - Lacedæmonians to the olive-grounds in Attica, see Lysias, Or. - vii, De Oleâ Sacrâ, sects. 6, 7. - - An inscription preserved in M. Boeckh’s Corp. Inscr. (part ii, - No. 93, p. 132), gives some hint how landlords and tenants met - this inevitable damage from the hands of the invaders. The deme - Æxôneis lets a farm to a certain tenant for forty years, at a - fixed rent of one hundred and forty drachmæ; but if an invading - enemy shall drive him out or injure his farm, the deme is to - receive one half of the year’s produce, in place of the year’s - rent. - - [531] Thucyd. vii, 28, 29. - - [532] Thucyd. vii, 27. - -Besides the personal efforts of the citizens, such exigencies -pressed heavily on the financial resources of the state. Already the -immense expense incurred in fitting out the two large armaments for -Sicily, had exhausted all the accumulations laid by in the treasury -during the interval since the Peace of Nikias; so that the attacks -from Dekeleia, not only imposing heavy additional cost, but at the -same time cutting up the means of paying, brought the finances of -Athens into positive embarrassment. With the view of increasing her -revenues, she altered the principle on which her subject-allies had -hitherto been assessed: instead of a fixed sum of annual tribute, she -now required from them payment of a duty of five per cent. on all -imports and exports by sea.[533] How this new principle of assessment -worked, we have unfortunately no information. To collect the duty and -take precautions against evasion, an Athenian custom-house officer -must have been required in each allied city. Yet it is difficult to -understand how Athens could have enforced a system at once novel, -extensive, vexatious, and more burdensome to the payers, when we -come to see how much her hold over those payers, as well as her -naval force, became enfeebled, before the close even of the actual -year.[534] - - [533] Thucyd. vii, 28. - - [534] Upon this new assessment on the allies, determined by the - Athenians, Mr. Mitford remarks as follows:— - - “Thus light, in comparison of what we have laid upon ourselves, - was the heaviest tax, as far as we learn from history, at that - time known in the world. Yet it caused much discontent among the - dependent commonwealths; the arbitrary power by which it was - imposed being indeed reasonably execrated, though the burden - itself was comparatively a nothing.” - - This admission is not easily reconciled with the frequent - invectives in which Mr. Mitford indulges against the empire - of Athens, as practising a system of extortion and oppression - ruinous to the subject-allies. - - I do not know, however, on what authority he affirms that this - was “the heaviest tax then known in the world;” and that “it - caused much discontent among the subject commonwealths.” The - latter assertion would indeed be sufficiently probable, if it - be true that the tax ever came into operation; but we are not - entitled to affirm it. - - Considering how very soon the terrible misfortunes of Athens came - on, I cannot but think it a matter of uncertainty whether the new - assessment ever became a reality throughout the Athenian empire. - And the fact that Thucydidês does not notice it as an additional - cause of discontent among the allies, is one reason for such - doubts. - -Her impoverished finances also compelled her to dismiss a body of -Thracian mercenaries, whose aid would have been very useful against -the enemy at Dekeleia. These Thracian peltasts, thirteen hundred in -number, had been hired at a drachma per day each man, to go with -Demosthenês to Syracuse, but had not reached Athens in time. As soon -as they came thither, the Athenians placed them under the command -of Diitrephês, to conduct them back to their native country, with -instructions to do damage to the Bœotians, as opportunity might -occur, in his way through the Euripus. Accordingly, Diitrephês, -putting them on shipboard, sailed round Sunium and northward along -the eastern coast of Attica. After a short disembarkation near -Tanagra, he passed on to Chalkis in Eubœa in the narrowest part -of the strait, from whence he crossed in the night to the Bœotian -coast opposite, and marched up some distance from the sea to the -neighborhood of the Bœotian town Mykalêssus. He arrived here unseen, -lay in wait near a temple of Hermês about two miles distant, and fell -upon the town unexpectedly at break of day. To the Mykalessians, -dwelling in the centre of Bœotia, not far from Thebes, and at a -considerable distance from the sea, such an assault was not less -unexpected than formidable. Their fortifications were feeble, in -some parts low, in other parts even tumbling down; nor had they even -taken the precaution to close their gates at night: so that the -barbarians under Diitrephês, entering the town without the smallest -difficulty, began at once the work of pillage and destruction. The -scene which followed was something alike novel and revolting to -Grecian eyes. Not only were all the houses and even the temples -plundered, but the Thracians farther manifested that raging thirst -for blood which seemed inherent in their race. They slew every living -thing that came in their way; men, women, children, horses, cattle, -etc. They burst into a school, wherein many boys had just been -assembled, and massacred them all. This scene of bloodshed, committed -by barbarians who had not been seen in Greece since the days of -Xerxes, was recounted with horror and sympathy throughout all Grecian -communities, though Mykalêssus was in itself a town of second-rate or -third-rate magnitude.[535] - - [535] Thucyd. vii, 29, 30, 31. I conceive that οὔσῃ ~οὐ~ μεγάλῃ - is the right reading, and not οὔσῃ μεγάλῃ, in reference to - Mykalêssus. The words ὡς ἐπὶ μεγέθει, in c. 31, refer to the size - of the city. - - The reading is, however, disputed among critics. It is evident - from the language of Thucydidês that the catastrophe at - Mykalêssus made a profound impression throughout Greece. - -The succor brought from Thebes, by Mykalessian fugitives, arrived -unhappily only in time to avenge, but not to save, the inhabitants. -The Thracians were already retiring with the booty which they could -carry away, when the bœotarch Skirphondas overtook them, both -with cavalry and hoplites, after having put to death some greedy -plunderers who tarried too long in the town. He compelled them to -relinquish most of their booty, and pursued them to the sea-shore; -not without a brave resistance from these peltasts, who had a -peculiar way of fighting which disconcerted the Thebans. But when -they arrived at the sea-shore, the Athenian ships did not think it -safe to approach very close, so that not less than two hundred and -fifty Thracians were slain before they could get aboard;[536] and the -Athenian commander, Diitrephês was so severely wounded that he died -shortly afterwards. The rest pursued their voyage homeward. - - [536] Thucyd. vii, 30; Pausanias. i, 23, 3. Compare Meineke, ad - Aristophanis Fragment. Ἥρωες, vol. ii, p. 1069. - -Meanwhile, the important station of Naupaktus and the mouth of -the Corinthian gulf again became the theatre of naval encounter. -It will be recollected that this was the scene of the memorable -victories gained by the Athenian admiral Phormion in the second year -of the Peloponnesian war,[537] wherein the nautical superiority -of Athens over her enemies, as to ships, crews, and admiral, had -been so transcendently manifested. In that respect matters had now -considerably changed. While the navy of Athens had fallen off since -the days of Phormion, that of her enemy had improved: Ariston, -and other skilful Corinthian steersmen, not attempting to copy -Athenian tactics, had studied the best mode of coping with them, and -had modified the build of their own triremes accordingly,[538] at -Corinth as well as at Syracuse. Seventeen years before, Phormion with -eighteen Athenian triremes would have thought himself a full match -for twenty-five Corinthian; but the Athenian admiral of this year, -Konon, also a perfectly brave man, now judged so differently, that -he constrained Demosthenês and Eurymedon to reinforce his eighteen -triremes with ten others,—out of the best of their fleet, at a -time when they had certainly none to spare,—on the ground that the -Corinthian fleet opposite, of twenty-five sail, was about to assume -the offensive against him.[539] - - [537] See above, vol. vi, ch. xlix, p. 196 of this History. - - [538] See the preceding chapter. - - [539] Thucyd. vii, 31. Compare the language of Phormion, ii. 88, - 89. - -Soon afterwards Diphilus came to supersede Konon, with some -fresh ships from Athens, which made the total number of triremes -thirty-three. The Corinthian fleet, reinforced so as to be nearly of -the same number, took up a station on the coast of Achaia opposite -Naupaktus, at a spot called Erineus, in the territory of Rhypes. -They ranged themselves across the mouth of a little indentation of -the coast, or bay, in the shape of a crescent, with two projecting -promontories as horns: each of these promontories was occupied by a -friendly land-force, thus supporting the line of triremes at both -flanks. This was a position which did not permit the Athenians to -sail through the line, or manœuvre round it and in the rear of it. -Accordingly, when the fleet of Diphilus came across from Naupaktus, -it remained for some time close in front of the Corinthians, neither -party venturing to attack; for the straightforward collision was -destructive to the Athenian ships with their sharp, but light and -feeble beaks, while it was favorable to the solid bows and thick -epôtids, or ear-projections, of the Corinthian trireme. After -considerable delay, the Corinthians at length began the attack on -their side, yet not advancing far enough out to sea to admit of the -manœuvring and evolutions of the Athenians. The battle lasted some -time, terminating with no decisive advantage to either party. Three -Corinthian triremes were completely disabled, though the crews of -all escaped by swimming to their friends ashore: on the Athenian -side, not one trireme became absolutely water-logged, but seven -were so much damaged, by straightforward collision with the stronger -bows of the enemy, that they became almost useless after they got -back to Naupaktus. The Athenians had so far the advantage, that they -maintained their station, while the Corinthians did not venture to -renew the fight: moreover, both the wind and the current set towards -the northern shore, so that the floating fragments and dead bodies -came into possession of the Athenians. Each party thought itself -entitled to erect a trophy, but the real feeling of victory lay on -the side of Corinth, and that of defeat on the side of Athens. The -reputed maritime superiority of the latter was felt by both parties -to have sustained a diminution; and such assuredly would have been -the impression of Phormion, had he been alive to witness it.[540] - - [540] Thucyd. vii, 34. - -This battle appears to have taken place, so far as we can make out, -a short time before the arrival of Demosthenês at Syracuse, about -the close of the month of May. We cannot doubt that the Athenians -most anxiously expected news from that officer, with some account -of victories obtained in Sicily, to console them for having sent -him away at a moment when his services were so cruelly wanted at -home. Perhaps they may even have indulged hopes of the near capture -of Syracuse, as a means of restoring their crippled finances. Their -disappointment would be all the more bitter when they came to -receive, towards the end of June or beginning of July, despatches -announcing the capital defeat of Demosthenês in his attempt upon -Epipolæ, and the consequent extinction of all hope that Syracuse -could ever be taken. After these despatches, we may perhaps doubt -whether any others subsequently reached Athens. The generals would -not write home during the month of indecision immediately succeeding, -when Demosthenês was pressing for retreat, and Nikias resisting it. -They might possibly, however, write immediately on taking their -resolution to retreat, at the time when they sent to Katana to forbid -farther supplies of provisions, but this was the last practicable -opportunity; for closely afterwards followed their naval defeat, and -the blocking up of the mouth of the Great Harbor. The mere absence -of intelligence would satisfy the Athenians that their affairs in -Sicily were proceeding badly; but the closing series of calamities, -down to the final catastrophe, would only come to their knowledge -indirectly; partly through the triumphant despatches transmitted from -Syracuse to Sparta, Corinth, and Thebes, partly through individual -soldiers of their own armament who escaped. - -According to the tale of Plutarch, the news was first made known at -Athens through a stranger, who, arriving at Peiræus, went into a -barber’s shop and began to converse about it, as upon a theme which -must of course be uppermost in every one’s mind. - -The astonished barber, hearing for the first time such fearful -tidings, ran up to Athens to communicate it to the archons as well -as to the public in the market-place. The public assembly being -forthwith convoked, he was brought before it, and called upon to -produce his authority, which he was unable to do, as the stranger -had disappeared. He was consequently treated as a fabricator of -uncertified rumors for the disturbance of the public tranquillity, -and even put to the torture.[541] How much of this improbable tale -may be true, we cannot determine; but we may easily believe that -neutrals, passing from Corinth or Megara to Peiræus, were the -earliest communicants of the misfortunes of Nikias and Demosthenês -in Sicily during the months of July and August. Presently came -individual soldiers of the armament, who had got away from the -defeat and found a passage home; so that the bad news was but too -fully confirmed. But the Athenians were long before they could bring -themselves to believe, even upon the testimony of these fugitives, -how entire had been the destruction of their two splendid armaments, -without even a feeble remnant left to console them.[542] - - [541] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 30. He gives the story without much - confidence, Ἀθηναίους δέ ~φασι~, etc. - - [542] Thucyd. viii, 1. - -As soon as the full extent of their loss was at length forced -upon their convictions, the city presented a scene of the deepest -affliction, dismay, and terror. Over and above the extent of private -mourning, from the loss of friends and relatives, which overspread -nearly the whole city, there prevailed utter despair as to the public -safety. Not merely was the empire of Athens apparently lost, but -Athens herself seemed utterly defenceless. Her treasury was empty, -her docks nearly destitute of triremes, the flower of her hoplites -as well as of her seamen had perished in Sicily without leaving their -like behind, and her maritime reputation was irretrievably damaged; -while her enemies, on the contrary, animated by feelings of exuberant -confidence and triumph, were farther strengthened by the accession -of their new Sicilian allies. In these melancholy months—October, -November, 413 B.C.—the Athenians expected nothing less than a -vigorous attack, both by land and sea, from the Peloponnesian and -Sicilian forces united, with the aid of their own revolted allies, an -attack which they knew themselves to be in no condition to repel.[543] - - [543] Thucyd. viii, 1. Πάντα δὲ πανταχόθεν αὐτοὺς ἐλύπει, etc. - -Amidst so gloomy a prospect, without one ray of hope to cheer them -on any side, it was but poor satisfaction to vent their displeasure -on the chief speakers who had recommended their recent disastrous -expedition, or on those prophets and reporters of oracles who had -promised them the divine blessing upon it.[544] After this first -burst both of grief and anger, however, they began gradually to look -their actual situation in the face; and the more energetic speakers -would doubtless administer the salutary lesson of reminding them -how much had been achieved by their forefathers, sixty-seven years -before, when the approach of Xerxes threatened them with dangers -not less overwhelming. Under the peril of the moment, the energy of -despair revived in their bosoms; they resolved to get together, as -speedily as they could, both ships and money,—to keep watch over -their allies, especially Eubœa,—and to defend themselves to the last. -A Board of ten elderly men, under the title of Probûli, was named -to review the expenditure, to suggest all practicable economies, -and propose for the future such measures as occasion might seem to -require. The propositions of these probûli were for the most part -adopted, with a degree of unanimity and promptitude rarely seen in -an Athenian assembly, springing out of that pressure and alarm of -the moment which silenced all criticism.[545] Among other economies, -the Athenians abridged the costly splendor of their choric and -liturgic ceremonies at home, and brought back the recent garrison -which they had established on the Laconian coast; they at the same -time collected timber, commenced the construction of new ships, and -fortified Cape Sunium, in order to protect their numerous transport -ships in the passage from Eubœa to Peiræus.[546] - - [544] Thucyd. viii, 1. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔγνωσαν, χαλεποὶ μὲν ἦσαν - τοῖς ξυμπροθυμηθεῖσι τῶν ῥητόρων τὸν ἔκπλουν, ~ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ - ψηφισάμενοι~, etc. - - From these latter words, it would seem that Thucydidês considered - the Athenians, after having adopted the expedition by their - votes, to have debarred themselves from the right of complaining - of those speakers who had stood forward prominently to advise the - step. I do not at all concur in his opinion. The adviser of any - important measure always makes himself morally responsible for - its justice, usefulness, and practicability; and he very properly - incurs disgrace, more or less according to the case, if it turns - out to present results totally contrary to those which he had - predicted. We know that the Athenian law often imposed upon the - mover of a proposition not merely _moral_, but even _legal_, - responsibility; a regulation of doubtful propriety under other - circumstances, but which I believe to have been useful at Athens. - - It must be admitted, however, to have been hard upon the advisers - of this expedition, that—from the total destruction of the - armament, neither generals nor soldiers returning—they were not - enabled to show how much of the ruin had arisen from faults in - the execution, not in the plan conceived. The speaker in the - Oration of Lysias—περὶ δημεύσεως τοῦ Νικίου ἀδελφοῦ (Or. xviii, - sect. 2)—attempts to transfer the blame from Nikias upon the - advisers of the expedition, a manifest injustice. - - Demosthenês (in the Oration De Coronâ, c. 73) gives an emphatic - and noble statement of the responsibility which he cheerfully - accepts for himself as a political speaker and adviser; - responsibility for seeing the beginnings and understanding the - premonitory signs of coming events, and giving his countrymen - warning beforehand: ἰδεῖν τὰ πράγματα ἀρχόμενα καὶ προαισθέσθαι - καὶ προειπεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις. This is the just view of the subject; - and, applying the measure proposed by Demosthenês, the Athenians - had ample ground to be displeased with their orators. - - [545] Thucyd. viii, 1. πάντα δὲ πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα περιδεὲς, ὅπερ - φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν, ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐτακτεῖν; compare Xenoph. Mem. - iii, 5, 5. - - [546] Thucyd. viii, 1-4. About the functions of this Board of - Probûli, much has been said for which there is no warrant in - Thucydidês: τῶν τε κατὰ τὴν πόλιν τι ἐς εὐτέλειαν σωφρονίσαι, καὶ - ἀρχήν τινα πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν ἑλέσθαι, οἵτινες περὶ τῶν παρόντων - ὡς ἂν καιρὸς ᾖ προβουλεύσουσι. Πάντα δὲ πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα - περιδεὲς, ὅπερ φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν, ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐτακτεῖν. - - Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks: “That is, no measure was to be - submitted to the people, till it had first been approved by - this council of elders.” And such is the general view of the - commentators. - - No such meaning as this, however, is necessarily contained in - the word Πρόβουλοι. It is, indeed, conceivable that persons - so denominated might be invested with such a control; but we - cannot infer it, or affirm it, simply from the name. Nor will - the passages in Aristotle’s Politics, wherein the word Πρόβουλοι - occurs, authorize any inference with respect to this Board in the - special case of Athens (Aristotel. Politic. iv, 11, 9; iv, 12, 8; - vi, 5, 10-13). - - The Board only seems to have lasted for a short time at Athens, - being named for a temporary purpose, at a moment of peculiar - pressure and discouragement. During such a state of feeling, - there was little necessity for throwing additional obstacles - in the way of new propositions to be made to the people. It - was rather of importance to _encourage_ the suggestion of new - measures, from men of sense and experience. A Board destined - merely for control and hindrance, would have been mischievous - instead of useful under the reigning melancholy at Athens. - - The Board was doubtless merged in the Oligarchy of Four Hundred, - like all the other magistracies of the state, and was not - reconstituted after their deposition. - - I cannot think it admissible to draw inferences as to the - functions of this Board of Probûli now constituted, from the - proceedings of the Probûlus in Aristophanis Lysistrata, as is - done by Wachsmuth (Hellenische Alterthumskunde, i, 2, p. 198), - and by Wattenbach (De Quadringentorum Athenis Factione, pp. - 17-21, Berlin 1842). - - Schömann (Ant. Jur. Pub. Græcor. v, xii, p. 181) says of these - Πρόβουλοι: “Videtur autem eorum potestas fere annua fuisse.” I do - not distinctly understand what he means by these words; whether - he means that the Board continued permanent, but that the members - were annually changed. If this be his meaning, I dissent from - it. I think that the Board lasted until the time of the Four - Hundred, which would be about a year and a half after its first - institution. - -While Athens was thus struggling to make head against her -misfortunes, all the rest of Greece was full of excitement and -aggressive scheming against her. So vast an event as the destruction -of this great armament had never happened since the expedition of -Xerxes against Greece. It not only roused the most distant cities -of the Grecian world, but also the Persian satraps and the court of -Susa. It stimulated the enemies of Athens to redoubled activity; -it emboldened her subject-allies to revolt; it pushed the neutral -states, who all feared what she would have done if successful against -Syracuse, now to declare war against her, and put the finishing -stroke to her power as well as to her ambition. All of them, enemies, -subjects, and neutrals, alike believed that the doom of Athens was -sealed, and that the coming spring would see her captured. Earlier -than the ensuing spring, the Lacedæmonians did not feel disposed -to act; but they sent round their instructions to the allies for -operations both by land and sea to be then commenced; all these -allies being prepared to do their best, in hopes that this effort -would be the last required from them, and the most richly rewarded. -A fleet of one hundred triremes was directed to be prepared against -the spring; fifty of these being imposed in equal proportion on -the Lacedæmonians themselves and the Bœotians; fifteen on Corinth; -fifteen on the Phocians and Lokrians; ten on the Arcadians, with -Pellênê and Sikyon; ten on Megara, Trœzen, Epidaurus, and Hermionê. -It seems to have been considered that these ships might be built -and launched during the interval between September and March.[547] -The same large hopes, which had worked upon men’s minds at the -beginning of the war, were now again rife in the bosoms of the -Peloponnesians;[548] the rather as that powerful force from Sicily, -which they had then been disappointed in obtaining, might now be -anticipated with tolerable assurance as really forthcoming.[549] - - [547] Thucyd. viii, 2, 3. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὴν πρόσταξιν ταῖς - πόλεσιν ἑκατὸν νεῶν ~τῆς ναυπηγίας~ ἐποιοῦντο, etc.; compare also - c. 4—παρεσκευάζοντο τὴν ~ναυπηγίαν~, etc. - - [548] Thucyd. viii, 5. ὄντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὥσπερ ἀρχομένων ἐν - κατασκευῇ τοῦ πολέμου: compare ii, 7. - - [549] Thucyd. viii, 2: compare ii, 7; iii, 86. - -From the smaller allies, contributions in money were exacted for the -intended fleet by Agis, who moved about during this autumn with a -portion of the garrison of Dekeleia. In the course of his circuit, he -visited the town of Herakleia, near the Maliac gulf, and levied large -contributions on the neighboring Œtæans, in reprisal for the plunder -which they had taken from that town, as well as from the Phthiot -Achæans and other subjects of the Thessalians, though the latter -vainly entered their protest against his proceedings.[550] - - [550] Thucyd. viii, 3. - -It was during the march of Agis through Bœotia that the inhabitants -of Eubœa—probably of Chalkis and Eretria—applied to him, entreating -his aid to enable them to revolt from Athens; which he readily -promised, sending for Alkamenês at the head of three hundred -Neodamode hoplites from Sparta, to be despatched across to the -island as harmost. Having a force permanently at his disposal, with -full liberty of military action, the Spartan king at Dekeleia was -more influential even than the authorities at home, so that the -disaffected allies of Athens addressed themselves in preference to -him. It was not long before envoys from Lesbos visited him for this -purpose. So powerfully was their claim enforced by the Bœotians -(their kinsmen of the Æolic race), who engaged to furnish ten -triremes for their aid, provided Agis would send ten others, that he -was induced to postpone his promise to the Eubœans, and to direct -Alkamenês as harmost to Lesbos instead of Eubœa,[551] without at all -consulting the authorities at Sparta. - - [551] Thucyd. viii, 5. - -The threatened revolt of Lesbos and Eubœa, especially the latter, -was a vital blow to the empire of Athens. But this was not the -worst. At the same time that these two islands were negotiating with -Agis, envoys from Chios, the first and most powerful of all Athenian -allies, had gone to Sparta for the same purpose. The government of -Chios,—an oligarchy, but distinguished for its prudent management and -caution in avoiding risks,—considering Athens to be now on the verge -of ruin, even in the estimation of the Athenians themselves, thought -itself safe, together with the opposite city of Erythræ, in taking -measures for achieving independence.[552] - - [552] Thucyd. viii, 7-24. - -Besides these three great allies, whose example in revolting was -sure to be followed by others, Athens was now on the point of being -assailed by other enemies yet more unexpected, the two Persian -satraps of the Asiatic seaboard, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. No -sooner was the Athenian catastrophe in Sicily known at the court -of Susa, than the Great King claimed from these two satraps the -tribute due from the Asiatic Greeks on the coast; for which they -had always stood enrolled in the tribute records, though it had -never been actually levied since the complete establishment of the -Athenian empire. The only way to realize this tribute, for which the -satraps were thus made debtors, was to detach the towns from Athens, -and break up her empire;[553] for which purpose Tissaphernes sent -an envoy to Sparta, in conjunction with those of the Chians and -Erythræans. He invited the Lacedæmonians to conclude an alliance with -the Great King, for joint operations against the Athenian empire in -Asia; promising to furnish pay and maintenance for any forces which -they might send, at the rate of one drachma per day for each man -of the ship’s crews.[554] He farther hoped by means of this aid to -reduce Amorgês the revolted son of the late satrap Pissuthnês, who -was established in the strong maritime town of Iasus, with a Grecian -mercenary force and a considerable treasure, and was in alliance -with Athens. The Great King had sent down a peremptory mandate, that -Amorgês should be either brought prisoner to Susa or slain. - - [553] Thucyd. viii, 5. Ὑπὸ βασιλέως γὰρ ~νεωστὶ~ ἐτύγχανε - πεπραγμένος (Tissaphernes) τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς φόρους, οὓς - δι’ Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐ δυνάμενος πράσσεσθαι - ἐπωφείλησε. Τούς τε οὖν φόρους μᾶλλον ἐνόμιζε κομιεῖσθαι κακώσας - τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, etc. - - I have already discussed this important passage at some length, - in its bearing upon the treaty concluded thirty-seven years - before this time between Athens and Persia. See the note to - volume v, chap. xlv, pp. 337-339, of this History. - - [554] Thucyd. viii, 29. Καὶ μηνὸς μὲν τροφήν, ~ὥσπερ ὑπέστη ἐν - τῇ Λακεδαίμονι~, ἐς δραχμὴν Ἀττικὴν ἑκάστῳ πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ - διέδωκε, τοῦ δὲ λοιποῦ χρόνου ἐβούλετο τριώβολον διδόναι, etc. - -At the same moment, though without any concert, there arrived at -Sparta Kalligeitus and Timagoras, two Grecian exiles in the service -of Pharnabazus, bringing propositions of a similar character from -that satrap, whose government[555] comprehended the coast lands north -of Æolis, from the Euxine and Propontis, to the northeast corner of -the Elæatic gulf. Eager to have the assistance of a Lacedæmonian -fleet in order to detach the Hellespontine Greeks from Athens, and -realize the tribute required by the court of Susa, Pharnabazus was at -the same time desirous of forestalling Tissaphernes as the medium of -alliance between Sparta and the Great King. The two missions having -thus arrived simultaneously at Sparta, a strong competition arose -between them, one striving to attract the projected expedition to -Chios, the other to the Hellespont:[556] for which latter purpose, -Kalligeitus had brought twenty-five talents, which he tendered as a -first payment in part. - - [555] The satrapy of Tissaphernes extended as far north as - Antandrus and Adramyttium (Thucyd. viii, 108). - - [556] Thucyd. viii, 6. - -From all quarters, new enemies were thus springing up against Athens -in the hour of her distress, and the Lacedæmonians had only to -choose which they would prefer; a choice in which they were much -guided by the exile Alkibiadês. It so happened that his family -friend Endius was at this moment one of the board of ephors; while -his personal enemy king Agis, with whose wife Timæa he carried on -an intrigue,[557] was absent in command at Dekeleia. Knowing well -the great power and importance of Chios, Alkibiadês strenuously -exhorted the Spartan authorities to devote their first attention to -that island. A periœkus named Phrynis, being sent thither to examine -whether the resources alleged by the envoys were really forthcoming, -brought back a satisfactory report, that the Chian fleet was not less -than sixty triremes strong: upon which the Lacedæmonians concluded -an alliance with Chios and Erythræ, engaging to send a fleet of -forty sail to their aid. Ten of these triremes, now ready in the -Lacedæmonian ports—probably at Gythium—were directed immediately -to sail to Chios, under the admiral Melanchridas. It seems to have -been now midwinter; but Alkibiadês, and still more the Chian envoys, -insisted on the necessity of prompt action, for fear that the -Athenians should detect the intrigue. However, an earthquake just -then intervening, was construed by the Spartans as an index of divine -displeasure, so that they would not persist in sending either the -same commander or the same ships. Chalkideus was named to supersede -Melanchridas, while five new ships were directed to be equipped, so -as to be ready to sail in the early spring along with the larger -fleet from Corinth.[558] - - [557] Thucyd. viii, 6-12; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 23, 24; - Cornelius Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 3. - - [558] Thucyd. viii, 6. - -As soon as spring arrived, three Spartan commissioners were sent -to Corinth—in compliance with the pressing instances of the Chian -envoys—to transport across the isthmus from the Corinthian to the -Saronic gulf, the thirty-nine triremes now in the Corinthian port of -Lechæum. It was at first proposed to send off all, at one and the -same time, to Chios, even those which Agis had been equipping for the -assistance of Lesbos; although Kalligeitus declined any concern with -Chios, and refused to contribute for this purpose any of the money -which he had brought. A general synod of deputies from the allies -was held at Corinth, wherein it was determined, with the concurrence -of Agis, to despatch the fleet first to Chios, under Chalkideus; -next, to Lesbos, under Alkamenês; lastly, to the Hellespont, under -Klearchus. But it was judged expedient to divide the fleet, and bring -across twenty-one triremes out of the thirty-nine, so as to distract -the attention of Athens, and divide her means of resistance. So low -was the estimate formed of these means, that the Lacedæmonians did -not scruple to despatch their expedition openly from the Saronic -gulf, where the Athenians would have full knowledge both of its -numbers and of its movements.[559] - - [559] Thucyd. viii, 8. - -Hardly had the twenty-one triremes, however, been brought across -to Kenchreæ, when a fresh delay arose to obstruct their departure. -The Isthmian festival, celebrated every alternate year, and kept -especially holy by the Corinthians, was just approaching; nor would -they consent to begin any military operations until it was concluded, -though Agis tried to elude their scruples by offering to adopt the -intended expedition as his own. It was during the delay which thus -ensued that the Athenians were first led to conceive suspicions about -Chios, whither they despatched Aristokratês, one of the generals of -the year. The Chian authorities strenuously denied all projects of -revolt, and being required by Aristokratês to furnish some evidence -of their good faith, sent back along with him seven triremes to the -aid of Athens. It was much against their own will that they were -compelled thus to act; but they knew that the Chian people were in -general averse to the idea of revolting from Athens, nor did they -feel confidence enough to proclaim their secret designs without some -manifestation of support from Peloponnesus, which had been so much -delayed that they knew not when it would arrive. The Athenians, in -their present state of weakness, perhaps thought it prudent to accept -insufficient assurances, for fear of driving this powerful island to -open revolt. But during the Isthmian festival, to which they were -invited along with other Greeks, they discovered farther evidences -of the plot which was going on, and resolved to keep strict watch -on the motions of the fleet now assembled at Kenchreæ, suspecting -that this squadron was intended to second the revolting party in -Chios.[560] - - [560] Thucyd. viii, 10. Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τὰ Ἴσθμια ἐγένετο· καὶ οἱ - Ἀθηναῖοι (ἐπηγγέλθησαν γὰρ) ἐθεώρουν ἐς αὐτά· καὶ κατάδηλα μᾶλλον - αὐτοῖς τὰ τῶν Χίων ἐφάνη. - - The language of Thucydidês in this passage deserves notice. The - Athenians were now at enmity with Corinth: it was therefore - remarkable, and contrary to what would be expected among Greeks, - that they should be present with their theôry, or solemn - sacrifice, at the Isthmian festival. Accordingly Thucydidês, when - he mentions that they went thither, thinks it right to add the - explanation—~ἐπηγγέλθησαν γὰρ~—“for they had been invited;” “for - the festival truce had been formally signified to them.” That - the heralds who proclaimed the truce should come and proclaim it - to a state in hostility with Corinth, was something unusual, and - merited special notice: otherwise, Thucydidês would never have - thought it worth while to mention the proclamation, it being the - uniform practice. - - We must recollect that this was the first Isthmian festival - which had taken place since the resumption of the war between - Athens and the Peloponnesian alliance. The habit of leaving out - Athens from the Corinthian herald’s proclamation had not yet been - renewed. In regard to the Isthmian festival, there was probably - greater reluctance to leave her out, because that festival was - in its origin half Athenian; said to have been established, or - revived after interruption, by Theseus; and the Athenian theôry - enjoyed a προεδρία, or privileged place, at the games (Plutarch, - Theseus, c. 25; Argument. ad Pindar. Isthm. Schol.). - -Shortly after the Isthmian festival, the squadron actually started -from Kenchreæ to Chios, under Alkamenês; but an equal number of -Athenian ships watched them as they sailed along the shore, and -tried to tempt them farther out to sea, with a view to fight them. -Alkamenês, however, desirous of avoiding a battle, thought it best -to return back; upon which the Athenians also returned to Peiræus, -mistrusting the fidelity of the seven Chian triremes which formed -part of their fleet. Reappearing presently with a larger squadron of -thirty-seven triremes, they pursued Alkamenês, who had again begun -his voyage along the shore southward, and attacked him near the -uninhabited harbor called Peiræum, on the frontiers of Corinth and -Epidaurus. They here gained a victory, captured one of his ships, -and damaged or disabled most of the remainder. Alkamenês himself -was slain, and the ships were run ashore, where on the morrow the -Peloponnesian land-force arrived in sufficient numbers to defend -them. So inconvenient, however, was their station on this desert -spot, that they at first determined to burn the vessels and depart. -Nor was it without difficulty that they were induced, partly by the -instances of king Agis, to guard the ships until an opportunity could -be found for eluding the blockading Athenian fleet; a part of which -still kept watch off the shore, while the rest were stationed at a -neighboring islet.[561] - - [561] Thucyd. viii, 11. - -The Spartan ephors had directed Alkamenês, at the moment of his -departure from Kenchræa, to despatch a messenger to Sparta, in order -that the five triremes under Chalkideus and Alkibiadês might leave -Laconia at the same moment. And these latter appear to have been -actually under way, when a second messenger brought the news of the -defeat and death of Alkamenês at Peiræum. Besides the discouragement -arising from such a check at the outset of their plans against Ionia, -the ephors thought it impossible to begin operations with so small a -squadron as five triremes, so that the departure of Chalkideus was -for the present countermanded. This resolution, perfectly natural to -adopt, was only reversed at the strenuous instance of the Athenian -exile Alkibiadês, who urged them to permit Chalkideus and himself to -start forthwith. Small as the squadron was, yet as it would reach -Chios before the defeat at Peiræum became public, it might be passed -off as the precursor of the main fleet; while he (Alkibiadês) pledged -himself to procure the revolt of Chios and the other Ionic cities, -through his personal connection with the leading men, who would -repose confidence in his assurances of the helplessness of Athens, as -well as of the thorough determination of Sparta to stand by them. To -these arguments, Alkibiadês added an appeal to the personal vanity -of Endius; whom he instigated to assume for himself the glory of -liberating Ionia as well as of first commencing the Persian alliance, -instead of leaving this enterprise to king Agis.[562] - - [562] Thucyd. viii, 12. - -By these arguments—assisted doubtless by his personal influence, -since his advice respecting Gylippus and respecting Dekeleia had -turned out so successful—Alkibiadês obtained the consent of the -Spartan ephors, and sailed along with Chalkideus in the five -triremes to Chios. Nothing less than his energy and ascendency could -have extorted from men both dull and backward, a determination -apparently so rash, yet, in spite of such appearance, admirably -conceived, and of the highest importance. Had the Chians waited for -the fleet now blocked up at Peiræum, their revolt would at least have -been long delayed, and perhaps might not have occurred at all: the -accomplishment of that revolt by the little squadron of Alkibiadês -was the proximate cause of all the Spartan successes in Ionia, and -was ultimately the means even of disengaging the fleet at Peiræum, by -distracting the attention of Athens. So well did this unprincipled -exile, while playing the game of Sparta, know where to inflict the -dangerous wounds upon his country! - -There was, indeed, little danger in crossing the Ægean to Ionia, -with ever so small a squadron; for Athens in her present destitute -condition had no fleet there, and although Strombichidês was detached -with eight triremes from the blockading fleet off Peiræum, to pursue -Chalkideus and Alkibiadês as soon as their departure was known, he -was far behind them, and soon returned without success. To keep their -voyage secret, they detained the boats and vessels which they met, -and did not liberate them, until they reached Korykus in Asia Minor, -the mountainous land southward of Erythræ. They were here visited by -their leading partisans from Chios, who urged them to sail thither -at once before their arrival could be proclaimed. Accordingly, -they reached the town of Chios—on the eastern coast of the island, -immediately opposite to Erythræ on the continent—to the astonishment -and dismay of every one, except the oligarchical plotters who had -invited them. By the contrivance of these latter, the council was -found just assembling, so that Alkibiadês was admitted without -delay, and invited to state his case. Suppressing all mention of -the defeat at Peiræum, he represented his squadron as the foremost -of a large Lacedæmonian fleet actually at sea and approaching, -and affirmed Athens to be now helpless by sea as well as by land, -incapable of maintaining any farther hold upon her allies. Under -these impressions, and while the population were yet under their -first impulse of surprise and alarm, the oligarchical council took -the resolution of revolting. The example was followed by Erythræ, -and soon afterwards by Klazomenæ, determined by three triremes from -Chios. The Klazomenians had hitherto dwelt upon an islet close to the -continent; on which latter, however, a portion of their town, called -Polichnê, was situated, which they now resolved, in anticipation of -attack from Athens, to fortify as their main residence. Both the -Chians and Erythræans also actively employed themselves in fortifying -their towns and preparing for war.[563] - - [563] Thucyd. viii, 14. - -In reviewing this account of the revolt of Chios, we find occasion -to repeat remarks already suggested by previous revolts of other -allies of Athens,—Lesbos, Akanthus, Torônê, Mendê, Amphipolis, -etc. Contrary to what is commonly intimated by historians, we may -observe first, that Athens did not systematically interfere to -impose her own democratical government upon her allies; next, that -the empire of Athens, though upheld mainly by an established belief -in her superior force, was nevertheless by no means odious, nor -the proposition of revolting from her acceptable to the general -population of her allies. She had at this moment no force in Ionia; -and the oligarchical government of Chios, wishing to revolt, was only -prevented from openly declaring its intention by the reluctance of -its own population, a reluctance which it overcame partly by surprise -arising from the sudden arrival of Alkibiadês and Chalkideus, partly -by the fallacious assurance of a still greater Peloponnesian force -approaching.[564] Nor would the Chian oligarchy themselves have -determined to revolt, had they not been persuaded that such was now -the safer course, inasmuch as Athens was now ruined, and her power -to protect, not less than her power to oppress, at an end.[565] The -envoys of Tissaphernês had accompanied those of Chios to Sparta, so -that the Chian government saw plainly that the misfortunes of Athens -had only the effect of reviving the aggressions and pretensions of -their former foreign master, against whom Athens had protected them -for the last fifty years. We may well doubt, therefore, whether -this prudent government looked upon the change as on the whole -advantageous. But they had no motive to stand by Athens in her -misfortunes, and good policy seemed now to advise a timely union with -Sparta as the preponderant force. The sentiment entertained towards -Athens by her allies, as I have before observed, was more negative -than positive. It was favorable rather than otherwise, in the minds -of the general population, to whom she caused little actual hardship -or oppression; but averse, to a certain extent, in the minds of their -leading men, since she wounded their dignity, and offended that love -of town autonomy which was instinctive in the Grecian political mind. - - [564] Thucyd. viii, 9. Αἴτιον δ’ ἐγένετο τῆς ἀποστολῆς τῶν νεῶν, - ~οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν Χίων οὐκ εἰδότες τὰ πρασσόμενα~, οἱ δὲ ὀλίγοι - ξυνειδότες, ~τό τε πλῆθος οὐ βουλόμενοί πω πολέμιον ἔχειν~, - πρίν τι καὶ ἰσχυρὸν λάβωσι, καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους οὐκέτι - προσδεχόμενοι ἥξειν, ὅτι διέτριβον. - - Also viii, 14. Ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης καὶ ὁ Χαλκιδεὺς ... - προξυγγενόμενοι τῶν ξυμπρασσόντων Χίων τισὶ, καὶ κελευόντων - καταπλεῖν μὴ προειπόντας ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ἀφικνοῦνται αἰφνίδιοι τοῖς - Χίοις. ~Καὶ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἐν θαύματι ἦσαν καὶ ἐκπλήξει· τοῖς δ’ - ὀλίγοις παρεσκεύαστο~ ὥστε βουλήν τε τυχεῖν ξυλλεγομένην, καὶ - γενομένων λόγων ἀπό τε τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὡς ἄλλαι τε νῆες πολλαὶ - προσπλέουσι, καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς πολιορκίας τῶν ἐν Πειραίῳ νεῶν οὐ - δηλωσάντων, ἀφίστανται Χῖοι, καὶ αὖθις Ἐρυθραῖοι, Ἀθηναίων. - - [565] See the remarkable passage of Thucyd. viii, 24, about the - calculations of the Chian government. - -The revolt of Chios, speedily proclaimed, filled every man at Athens -with dismay. It was the most fearful symptom, as well as the heaviest -aggravation, of their fallen condition; especially as there was every -reason to apprehend that the example of this first and greatest -among the allies would be soon followed by the rest. The Athenians -had no fleet or force even to attempt its reconquest: but they now -felt the full importance of that reserve of one thousand talents, -which Perikles had set aside in the first year of the war against -the special emergency of a hostile fleet approaching Peiræus. The -penalty of death had been decreed against any one who should propose -to devote this fund to any other purpose; and, in spite of severe -financial pressure, it had remained untouched for twenty years. -Now, however, though the special contingency foreseen had not yet -arisen, matters were come to such an extremity, that the only chance -of saving the remaining empire was by the appropriation of this -money. An unanimous vote was accordingly passed to abrogate the penal -enactment, or standing order, against proposing any other mode of -appropriation; after which the resolution was taken to devote this -money to present necessities.[566] - - [566] Thucyd. viii, 15. - -By means of this new fund, they were enabled to find pay and -equipment for all the triremes ready or nearly ready in their harbor, -and thus to spare a portion from their blockading fleet off Peiræum; -out of which Strombichidês with his squadron of eight triremes was -despatched immediately to Ionia; followed, after a short interval, -by Thrasyklês, with twelve others. At the same time, the seven -Chian triremes which also formed part of this fleet, were cleared -of their crews; among whom such as were slaves were liberated, -while the freemen were put in custody. Besides fitting out an equal -number of fresh ships to keep up the numbers of the blockading -fleet, the Athenians worked with the utmost ardor to get ready -thirty additional triremes. The extreme exigency of the situation, -since Chios had revolted, was felt by every one: yet with all their -efforts, the force which they were enabled to send was at first -lamentably inadequate. Strombichidês, arriving at Samos, and finding -Chios, Erythræ, and Klazomenæ already in revolt, reinforced his -little squadron with one Samian trireme, and sailed to Teos,—on the -continent, at the southern coast of that isthmus, of which Klazomenæ -is on the northern,—in hopes of preserving that place. But he had not -been long there when Chalkideus arrived from Chios with twenty-three -triremes, all or mostly Chian; while the forces of Erythræ and -Klazomenæ approached by land. Strombichidês was obliged to make a -hasty flight back to Samos, vainly pursued by the Chian fleet. Upon -this evidence of Athenian weakness, and the superiority of the enemy, -the Teians admitted into their town the land-force without; by the -help of which, they now demolished the wall formerly built by Athens -to protect the city against attack from the interior. Some of the -troops of Tissaphernês lending their aid in the demolition, the town -was laid altogether open to the satrap; who, moreover, came himself -shortly afterwards to complete the work.[567] - - [567] Thucyd. viii, 16. - -Having themselves revolted from Athens, the Chian government were -prompted by considerations of their own safety to instigate revolt in -all other Athenian dependencies; and Alkibiadês now took advantage -of their forwardness in the cause to make an attempt on Milêtus. -He was eager to acquire this important city, the first among all -the continental allies of Athens, by his own resources and those -of Chios, before the fleet could arrive from Peiræum; in order -that the glory of the exploit might be insured to Endius, and not -to Agis. Accordingly, he and Chalkideus left Chios with a fleet of -twenty-five triremes, twenty of them Chian, together with the five -which they themselves had brought from Laconia: these last five had -been remanned with Chian crews, the Peloponnesian crews having been -armed as hoplites and left as garrison in the island. Conducting -his voyage as secretly as possible, he was fortunate enough to pass -unobserved by the Athenian station at Samos, where Strombichidês had -just been reinforced by Thrasyklês with the twelve fresh triremes -from the blockading fleet at Peiræum. Arriving at Milêtus, where he -possessed established connections among the leading men, and had -already laid his train, as at Chios, for revolt, Alkibiadês prevailed -on them to break with Athens forthwith: so that when Strombichidês -and Thrasyklês, who came in pursuit the moment they learned his -movements, approached, they found the port shut against them, and -were forced to take up a station on the neighboring island of Ladê. -So anxious were the Chians for the success of Alkibiadês in this -enterprise, that they advanced with ten fresh triremes along the -Asiatic coast as far as Anæa, opposite to Samos, in order to hear -the result and to render aid if required. A message from Chalkideus -apprized them that he was master of Milêtus, and that Amorgês, the -Persian ally of Athens at Iasus, was on his way at the head of an -army; upon which they returned to Chios, but were unexpectedly seen -in the way—off the temple of Zeus, between Lebedos and Kolophon—and -pursued, by sixteen fresh ships just arrived from Athens, under the -command of Diomedon. Of the ten Chian triremes, one found refuge at -Ephesus, and five at Teos: the remaining four were obliged to run -ashore and became prizes, though the crews all escaped. In spite -of this check, however, the Chians came out again with fresh ships -and some land-forces, as soon as the Athenian fleet had gone back -to Samos, and procured the revolt both of Lebedos and Eræ from -Athens.[568] - - [568] Thucyd. viii, 17-19. - -It was at Milêtus, immediately after the revolt, that the first -treaty was concluded between Tissaphernês, on behalf of himself and -the Great King, and Chalkideus, for Sparta and her allies. Probably -the aid of Tissaphernês was considered necessary to maintain the -town, when the Athenian fleet was watching it so closely on the -neighboring island: at least it is difficult to explain otherwise an -agreement so eminently dishonorable as well as disadvantageous to the -Greeks:— - -“The Lacedæmonians and their allies have concluded alliance with the -Great King and Tissaphernês, on the following conditions: The king -shall possess whatever territories and cities he himself had, or his -predecessors had before him. The king, and the Lacedæmonians with -their allies, shall jointly hinder the Athenians from deriving either -money or other advantages from all those cities which have hitherto -furnished to them any such. They shall jointly carry on war against -the Athenians, and shall not renounce the war against them, except by -joint consent. Whoever shall revolt from the king, shall be treated -as an enemy by the Lacedæmonians and their allies; whoever shall -revolt from the Lacedæmonians, shall in like manner be treated as an -enemy by the king.”[569] - - [569] Thucyd. viii, 18. - -As a first step to the execution of this treaty, Milêtus was handed -over to Tissaphernês, who immediately caused a citadel to be erected -and placed a garrison within it.[570] If fully carried out, indeed, -the terms of the treaty would have made the Great King master not -only of all the Asiatic Greeks and all the islanders in the Ægean, -but also of all Thessaly and Bœotia, and the full ground which had -once been covered by Xerxes.[571] Besides this monstrous stipulation, -the treaty farther bound the Lacedæmonians to aid the king in keeping -enslaved any Greeks who might be under his dominion. Nor did it, -on the other hand, secure to them any pecuniary aid from him for -the payment of their armament, which was their great motive for -courting his alliance. We shall find the Lacedæmonian authorities -themselves hereafter refusing to ratify the treaty, on the ground of -its exorbitant concessions. But it stands as a melancholy evidence of -the new source of mischief now opening upon the Asiatic and insular -Greeks, the moment that the empire of Athens was broken up, the -revived pretensions of their ancient lord and master; whom nothing -had hitherto kept in check, for the last fifty years, except Athens, -first as representative and executive agent, next as successor and -mistress, of the confederacy of Delos. We thus see against what evils -Athens had hitherto protected them: we shall presently see, what is -partially disclosed in this very treaty, the manner in which Sparta -realized her promise of conferring autonomy on each separate Grecian -state. - - [570] Thucyd. viii, 84-109. - - [571] Thucyd. viii, 44. - -The great stress of the war had now been transferred to Ionia -and the Asiatic side of the Ægean sea. The enemies of Athens had -anticipated that her entire empire in that quarter would fall an -easy prey: yet in spite of two such serious defections as Chios and -Milêtus, she showed an unexpected energy in keeping hold of the -remainder. Her great and capital station, from the present time to -the end of the war, was Samos; and a revolution which now happened, -insuring the fidelity of that island to her alliance, was a condition -indispensable to her power of maintaining the struggle in Ionia. - -We have heard nothing about Samos throughout the whole war, since -its reconquest by the Athenians after the revolt of 440 B.C.: but we -now find it under the government of an oligarchy called the Geômori, -the proprietors of land, as at Syracuse before the rule of Gelon. -It cannot be doubted that these geômori were disposed to follow the -example of the Chian oligarchy, and revolt from Athens, while the -people at Samos, as at Chios, were averse to such a change. Under -this state of circumstances, the Chian oligarchy had themselves -conspired with Sparta, to trick and constrain their Demos by surprise -into revolt, through the aid of five Peloponnesian ships. The like -would have happened at Samos, had the people remained quiet. But they -profited by the recent warning, forestalled the designs of their -oligarchy, and rose in insurrection, with the help of three Athenian -triremes which then chanced to be in the port. The oligarchy were -completely defeated, but not without a violent and bloody struggle; -two hundred of them being slain, and four hundred banished. This -revolution secured—and probably nothing less than a democratical -revolution could have secured, under the existing state of Hellenic -affairs—the adherence of Samos to the Athenians; who immediately -recognized the new democracy, and granted to it the privilege of -an equal and autonomous ally. The Samian people confiscated and -divided among themselves the property of such of the geômori as -were slain or banished:[572] the remainder were deprived of all -political privileges, and were even forbidden to intermarry with -any of the families of the remaining citizens.[573] We may fairly -suspect that this latter prohibition is only the retaliation of a -similar exclusion which the oligarchy, when in power, had enforced to -maintain the purity of their own blood. What they had enacted as a -privilege was now thrown back upon them as an insult. - - [572] Thucyd. viii, 21. Ἐγένετο δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον καὶ - ἡ ἐν Σάμῳ ~ἐπανάστασις ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς~, μετὰ - Ἀθηναίων, οἳ ἔτυχον ἐν τρισὶ ναυσὶ παρόντες. Καὶ ὁ δῆμος ὁ Σαμίων - ἐς διακοσίους μέν τινας τοὺς πάντας τῶν δυνατῶν ἀπέκτεινε, - τετρακοσίους δὲ φυγῇ ζημιώσαντες καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν καὶ - οἰκίας νειμάμενοι, Ἀθηναίων τε σφίσιν αὐτονομίαν μετὰ ταῦτα ~ὡς - βεβαίοις ἤδη~ ψηφισαμένων, τὰ λοιπὰ διῴκουν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τοῖς - γεωμόροις μετεδίδοσαν οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς, οὔτε ἐκδοῦναι οὐδ’ - ἀγαγέσθαι παρ’ ἐκείνων οὐδ’ ἐς ἐκείνους οὐδενὶ ἔτι τοῦ δήμου ἐξῆν. - - [573] Thucyd. viii, 21. The dispositions and plans of the “higher - people” at Samos, to call in the Peloponnesians and revolt from - Athens, are fully admitted even by Mr. Mitford, and implied by - Dr. Thirlwall, who argues that the government of Samos cannot - have been oligarchical, because, if it had been so, the island - would already have revolted from Athens to the Peloponnesians. - - Mr. Mitford says (ch. xix, sect. iii, vol. iv, p. 191): - “Meanwhile the body of the higher people at Samos, more depressed - than all others since their reduction on their former revolt, - were _proposing to seize the opportunity that seemed to offer - through the prevalence of the Peloponnesian arms, of mending - their condition_. The lower people, _having intelligence of their - design_, rose upon them, and, with the assistance of the crews of - three Athenian ships then at Samos, overpowered them,” etc. etc. - etc. - - “The _massacre and robbery_ were rewarded by a decree of the - Athenian people, granting to the perpetrators the independent - administration of the affairs of their island; which, since the - last rebellion, had been kept _under the immediate control of the - Athenian government_.” - - To call this a _massacre_ is perversion of language. It was an - insurrection and intestine conflict, in which the “higher people” - were vanquished, but of which they also were the beginners, by - their conspiracy—which Mr. Mitford himself admits as a fact—to - introduce a foreign enemy into the island. Does he imagine that - the “lower people” were bound to sit still and see this done? And - what means had they of preventing it, except by insurrection; - which inevitably became bloody, because the “higher people” were - a strong party, in possession of the powers of government, with - great means of resistance. The loss on the part of the assailants - is not made known to us, nor indeed the loss in so far as it fell - on the followers of the geômori. Thucydidês specifies only the - number of the geômori themselves, who were persons of individual - importance. - - I do not clearly understand what idea Mr. Mitford forms to - himself of the government of Samos at this time. He seems to - conceive it as democratical, yet under great immediate control - from Athens, and that it kept the “higher people” in a state of - severe depression, from which they sought to relieve themselves - by the aid of the Peloponnesian arms. - - But if he means by the expression, “_under the immediate - control of the Athenian government_,” that there was any - Athenian governor or garrison at Samos, the account here - given by Thucydidês distinctly refutes him. The conflict was - between two intestine parties, “the higher people and the lower - people.” The only Athenians who took part in it were the crews - of three triremes, and even they were there by accident (οἳ - ἔτυχον παρόντες), not as a regular garrison. Samos was under an - indigenous government; but it was a subject and tributary ally - of Athens, like all the other allies, with the exception of - Chios and Methymna (Thucyd. vi, 85). After this resolution, the - Athenians raised it to the rank of an autonomous ally, which Mr. - Mitford is pleased to call “rewarding massacre and robbery,” in - the language of a party orator rather than of an historian. - - But was the government of Samos, immediately before this - intestine contest, oligarchical or democratical? The language - of Thucydidês carries to my mind a full conviction that it was - oligarchical, under an exclusive aristocracy, called The Geômori. - Dr. Thirlwall, however (whose candid and equitable narrative of - this event forms a striking contrast to that of Mr. Mitford), is - of a different opinion. He thinks it certain that a democratical - government had been established at Samos by the Athenians, when - it was reconquered by them (B.C. 440) after its revolt. That the - government continued democratical during the first years of the - Peloponnesian war, he conceives to be proved by the hostility of - the Samian exiles at Anæa, whom he looks upon as oligarchical - refugees. And though not agreeing in Mr. Mitford’s view of the - peculiarly depressed condition of the “higher people” at Samos - at this later time, he nevertheless thinks that they were not - actually in possession of the government. “Still (he says), as - the island gradually recovered its prosperity, the privileged - class seems also to have looked upward, perhaps contrived to - regain a part of the substance of power under different forms, - and probably betrayed a strong inclination to revive its ancient - pretensions on the first opportunity. _That it had not yet - advanced beyond this point, may be regarded as certain; because - otherwise Samos would have been among the foremost to revolt - from Athens_: and on the other hand, it is no less clear, that - the state of parties there was such as to excite a high degree - of mutual jealousy, and great alarm in the Athenians, to whom - the loss of the island at this juncture would have been almost - irreparable.” (Hist. of Gr. ch. xxvii, vol. iii, p. 477 2d edit.) - Manso (Sparta, book iv, vol. ii, p. 266) is of the same opinion. - - Surely, the conclusion which Dr. Thirlwall here announces as - certain, cannot be held to rest on adequate premises. Admitting - that there was an oligarchy in power at Samos, it is perfectly - possible to explain why this oligarchy had not yet carried into - act its disposition to revolt from Athens. We see that none - of the allies of Athens—not even Chios, the most powerful of - all—revolted without the extraneous pressure and encouragement - of a foreign fleet. Alkibiadês, after securing Chios, considered - Milêtus to be next in order of importance, and had, moreover, - peculiar connections with the leading men there (viii, 17); so - that he went next to detach that place from Athens. Milêtus, - being on the continent, placed him in immediate communication - with Tissaphernês, for which reason he might naturally deem it - of importance superior even to Samos in his plans. Moreover, - not only no foreign fleet had yet reached Samos, but several - Athenian ships had arrived there: for Strombichidês, having come - across the Ægean too late to save Chios, made Samos a sort of - central station (viii, 16). These circumstances combined with - the known reluctance of the Samian demos, or commonalty, are - surely sufficient to explain why the Samian oligarchy had not - yet consummated its designs to revolt. And hence the fact, that - no revolt had yet taken place, cannot be held to warrant Dr. - Thirlwall’s inference, that the government was _not_ oligarchical. - - We have no information how or when the oligarchical government - at Samos got up. That the Samian refugees at Anæa, so actively - hostile to Samos and Athens during the first ten years of the - Peloponnesian war, were oligarchical exiles acting against a - democratical government at Samos (iv, 75), is not in itself - improbable; yet it is not positively stated. The government of - Samos might have been, even at that time, oligarchical; yet, if - it acted in the Athenian interest, there would doubtless be a - body of exiles watching for opportunities of injuring it, by aid - of the enemies of Athens. - - Moreover, it seems to me, that if we read and put together the - passages of Thucydidês, viii, 21, 63, 73, it is impossible - without the greatest violence to put any other sense upon - them, except as meaning that the government of Samos was now - in the hands of the oligarchy, or geômori, and that the Demos - rose in insurrection against them, with ultimate triumph. The - natural sense of the words ἐπανάστασις, ἐπανίσταμαι, is that - of _insurrection against an established government: it does - not mean, “a violent attack by one party upon another;” still - less does it mean, “an attack made by a party in possession of - the government:_” which nevertheless it ought to mean, if Dr. - Thirlwall be correct in supposing that the Samian government was - now democratical. Thus we have, in the description of the Samian - revolt from Athens—Thucyd. i, 115 (after Thucydidês has stated - that the Athenians established a democratical government, he next - says that the Samian exiles presently came over with a mercenary - force)—καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῷ ~δήμῳ ἐπανέστησαν~, καὶ ἐκράτησαν τῶν - πλείστων, etc. Again, v, 23—about the apprehended insurrection of - the Helots against the Spartans—ἢν δὲ ἡ δούλεια ~ἐπανίστηται~: - compare Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 19; Plato, Republ. iv, 18, p. 444; - Herodot. iii, 39-120. So also δυνατοὶ is among the words which - Thucydidês uses for an oligarchical party, either in government - or in what may be called _opposition_ (i, 24; v, 4). But it is - not conceivable to me that Thucydidês would have employed the - words ἡ ἐπανάστασις ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς—if the Demos had - at that time been actually in the government. - - Again, viii, 63, he says, that the Athenian oligarchical party - under Peisander αὐτῶν τῶν Σαμίων προὐτρέψαντο τοὺς δυνατοὺς ὥστε - πειρᾶσθαι μετὰ σφῶν ὀλιγαρχηθῆναι, καίπερ ~ἐπαναστάντας αὐτοὺς - ἀλλήλοις ἵνα μὴ ὀλιγαρχῶνται~. Here the motive of the previous - ἐπανάστασις is clearly noted; it was in order that they might - _not be under an oligarchical government_: for I agree with - Krüger (in opposition to Dr. Thirlwall), that this is the clear - meaning of the words, and that the use of the present tense - prevents our construing it, “in order that their democratical - government might not be subverted, and an oligarchy put upon - them,” which ought to be the sense, if Dr. Thirlwall’s view were - just. - - Lastly, viii, 73, we have οἱ γὰρ ~τότε τῶν Σαμίων ἐπαναστάντες - τοῖς δυνατοῖς καὶ ὄντες δῆμος, μεταβαλλόμενοι αὖθις~—ἐγένοντό - τε ἐς τριακοσίους ξυνωμόται, καὶ ἔμελλον τοῖς ἄλλοις ~ὡς δήμῳ - ὄντι~ ἐπιθήσεσθαι. Surely these words—οἱ ἐπαναστάντες τοῖς - δυνατοῖς καὶ ὄντες δῆμος—“those who having risen in arms against - the wealthy and powerful, were now a demos, or a democracy,” - must imply, _that the persons against whom the rising had taken - place had been a governing oligarchy_. Surely, also, the words - μεταβαλλόμενοι αὖθις, can mean nothing else except to point out - the strange antithesis between the conduct of these same men at - two different epochs not far distant from each other. On the - first occasion, they rose up against an established oligarchical - government, and constituted a democratical government. On the - second occasion, they rose up in conspiracy against this very - democratical government, in order to subvert it, and constitute - themselves an oligarchy in its place. If we suppose that on - the first occasion, the established government was already - democratical, and that the persons here mentioned were not - conspirators against an established oligarchy, but merely - persons making use of the powers of a democratical government - to do violence to rich citizens, all this antithesis completely - vanishes. - - On the whole, I feel satisfied that the government of Samos, at - the time when Chios revolted from Athens, was oligarchical, like - that of Chios itself. Nor do I see any difficulty in believing - this to be the fact, though I cannot state when and how the - oligarchy became established there. So long as the island - performed its duty as a subject ally, Athens did not interfere - with the form of its government. And she was least of all likely - to interfere during the seven years of peace intervening between - the years 421-414 B.C. There was nothing then to excite her - apprehensions. The degree to which Athens intermeddled generally - with the internal affairs of her subject-allies, seems to me to - have been much exaggerated. - - The Samian oligarchy, or geômori, dispossessed of the government - on this occasion, were restored by Lysander after his victorious - close of the Peloponnesian war,—Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 3, 6—where - they are called οἱ ἀρχαῖοι πολῖται. - -On the other hand, the Athenian blockading fleet was surprised and -defeated, with the loss of four triremes, by the Peloponnesian fleet -at Peiræum, which was thus enabled to get to Kenchreæ, and to refit -in order that it might be sent to Ionia. The sixteen Peloponnesian -ships which had fought at Syracuse had already come back to Lechæum, -in spite of the obstructions thrown in their way by the Athenian -squadron under Hippoklês at Naupaktus.[574] The Lacedæmonian admiral -Astyochus was sent to Kenchreæ to take the command and proceed to -Ionia as admiral-in-chief: but it was some time before he could -depart for Chios, whither he arrived with only four triremes, -followed by six more afterwards.[575] - - [574] Thucyd. viii, 13. - - [575] Thucyd. viii, 20-23. - -Before he reached that island, however, the Chians, zealous in the -new part which they had taken up, and interested for their own safety -in multiplying defections from Athens, had themselves undertaken the -prosecution of the plans concerted by Agis and the Lacedæmonians at -Corinth. They originated an expedition of their own, with thirteen -triremes under a Lacedæmonian periœkus named Deiniadas, to procure -the revolt of Lesbos; with the view, if successful, of proceeding -afterwards to do the same among the Hellespontine dependencies of -Athens. A land force under the Spartan Eualas, partly Peloponnesian, -partly Asiatic, marched along the coast of the mainland northward -towards Kymê, to coöperate in both these objects. Lesbos was at -this time divided into at least five separate city governments; -Methymna at the north of the island, Mitylênê towards the south-east, -Antissa, Eresus, and Pyrrha on the west. Whether these governments -were oligarchical or democratical we do not know, but the Athenian -kleruchs who had been sent to Mitylênê after its revolt sixteen -years before, must have long ago disappeared.[576] The Chian fleet -first went to Methymna and procured the revolt of that place, where -four triremes were left in guard, while the remaining nine sailed -forward to Mitylênê, and succeeded in obtaining that important town -also.[577] - - [576] See the earlier part of this History, vol. vi, ch. l, pp. - 257, 258. - - [577] Thucyd. viii, 22. - -Their proceedings, however, were not unwatched by the Athenian fleet -at Samos. Unable to recover possession of Teos, Diomedon had been -obliged to content himself with procuring neutrality from that town, -and admission for the vessels of Athens as well as of her enemies: he -had, moreover, failed in an attack upon Eræ.[578] But he had since -been strengthened partly by the democratical revolution at Samos, -partly by the arrival of Leon with ten additional triremes from -Athens: so that these two commanders were now enabled to sail, with -twenty-five triremes, to the relief of Lesbos. Reaching Mitylênê—the -largest town in that island—very shortly after its revolt, they -sailed straight into the harbor when no one expected them, seized -the nine Chian ships with little resistance, and after a successful -battle on shore, regained possession of the city. The Lacedæmonian -admiral Astyochus—who had only been three days arrived at Chios from -Kenchreæ with his four triremes—saw the Athenian fleet pass through -the channel between Chios and the mainland, on its way to Lesbos; and -immediately on the same evening followed it to that island, to lend -what aid he could, with one Chian trireme added to his own four, and -some hoplites aboard. He sailed first to Pyrrha, and on the next day -to Eresus, on the west side of the island, where he first learned the -recapture of Mitylênê by the Athenians. He was here also joined by -three out of the four Chian triremes which had been left to defend -that place, and which had been driven away, with the loss of one of -their number, by a portion of the Athenian fleet pushing on thither -from Mitylênê. Astyochus prevailed on Eresus to revolt from Athens, -and having armed the population, sent them by land together with his -own hoplites under Eteonikus to Methymna, in hopes of preserving that -place, whither he also proceeded with his fleet along the coast. -But in spite of all his endeavors, Methymna as well as Eresus and -all Lesbos was recovered by the Athenians, while he himself was -obliged to return with his forces to Chios. The land troops which -had marched along the mainland, with a view to farther operations at -the Hellespont, were carried back to Chios and to their respective -homes.[579] - - [578] Thucyd. viii, 20. - - [579] Thucyd. viii, 23. ἀπεκομίσθη δὲ πάλιν κατὰ πόλεις καὶ ὁ - ~ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζός~, ὃς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἐμέλλησεν ἰέναι. - - Dr. Arnold and Göller suppose that these soldiers had been - carried over to Lesbos to coöperate in detaching the island - from the Athenians. But this is not implied in the narrative. - The land-force _marched along_ by land to Klazomenæ and Kymê (ὁ - πεζὸς ἅμα Πελοποννησίων τε τῶν παρόντων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων - ~παρῄει~ ἐπὶ Κλαζομένων τε καὶ Κύμης). Thucydidês does not say - that they ever crossed to Lesbos: they remained near Kymê, - prepared to march forward, after that island should have been - conquered, to the Hellespont. - - Haacke is right, I think, in referring the words ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν - νεῶν πεζός to what had been stated in c. 17; that Alkibiadês - and Chalkideus, on first arriving with the Peloponnesian five - triremes at Chios, disembarked on that island their Peloponnesian - seamen and armed them as hoplites for land-forces; taking aboard - fresh crews of seamen from the island. The motive to make this - exchange was, the great superiority of bravery, in heavy armor - and stand-up fighting, of Peloponnesians as compared with - Chians or Asiatic Greeks (see Xenoph. Hell. iii, 2, 17). These - foot-soldiers taken from the Peloponnesian ships are the same as - those spoken of in c. 22: ὁ πεζὸς ἅμα Πελοποννησίων τε τῶν - παρόντων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων ... ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζός. - - Farther, these troops are again mentioned in c. 24, as οἱ μετὰ - Χαλκιδέως ἐλθόντες Πελοποννήσιοι, where Dr. Arnold again speaks - of them in his note incorrectly. He says: “The Peloponnesians - who came with Chalkideus must have been too few to offer any - effectual resistance to one thousand heavy-armed Athenians, - being only _the epibatæ_ of five ships.” The fact is that they - were not merely the epibatæ, but the _entire crews_, of five - ships; comprising probably from eight hundred to one thousand - men (ἐκ μὲν τῶν ~ἐκ Πελοποννήσου νεῶν τοὺς ναύτας ὁπλίσαντες~ ἐν - Χίῳ καταλιμπάνουσι, c. 17), since there were a remnant of five - hundred left of them, after some months’ operations and a serious - defeat (viii, 32). - -The recovery of Lesbos, which the Athenians now placed in a better -posture of defence, was of great importance in itself, and arrested -for the moment all operations against them at the Hellespont. Their -fleet from Lesbos was first employed in the recovery of Klazomenæ, -which they again carried back to its original islet near the shore; -the new town on the mainland, called Polichna, though in course of -being built, being not yet sufficiently fortified to defend itself. -The leading anti-Athenians in the town made their escape, and went -farther up the country to Daphnûs. Animated by such additional -success—as well as by a victory which the Athenians, who were -blockading Milêtus, gained over Chalkideus, wherein that officer -was slain—Leon and Diomedon thought themselves in a condition to -begin aggressive measures against Chios, now their most active enemy -in Ionia. Their fleet of twenty-five sail was well equipped with -epibatæ; who, though under ordinary circumstances they were thêtes -armed at the public cost, yet in the present stress of affairs were -impressed from the superior hoplites in the city muster-roll.[580] -They occupied the little islets called Œnussæ, near Chios on the -northeast, as well as the forts of Sidussa and Pteleus in the -territory of Erythræ; from which positions they began a series of -harassing operations against Chios itself. Disembarking on the island -at Kardamylê and Bolissus, they not only ravaged the neighborhood, -but inflicted upon the Chian forces a bloody defeat. After two -farther defeats, at Phanæ and at Leukonium, the Chians no longer -dared to quit their fortifications; so that the invaders were left -to ravage at pleasure the whole territory, being at the same time -masters of the sea around, and blocking up the port. - - [580] Thucyd. viii, 24, with Dr. Arnold’s note. - -The Athenians now retaliated upon Chios the hardships under which -Attica itself was suffering; hardships the more painfully felt, -inasmuch as this was the first time that an enemy had ever been -seen in the island since the repulse of Xerxês from Greece and the -organization of the confederacy of Delos, more than sixty years -before. The territory of Chios was highly cultivated,[581] its -commerce extensive, and its wealth among the greatest in all Greece. -In fact, under the Athenian empire, its prosperity had been so marked -and so uninterrupted, that Thucydidês expresses his astonishment -at the undeviating prudence and circumspection of the government, -in spite of circumstances well calculated to tempt them into -extravagance. “Except Sparta (he says),[582] Chios is the only state -that I know, which maintained its sober judgment throughout a career -of prosperity, and became even more watchful in regard to security, -in proportion as it advanced in power.” He adds, that the step of -revolting from Athens, though the Chian government now discovered it -to have been an error, was at any rate a pardonable error; for it -was undertaken under the impression, universal throughout Greece, -and prevalent even in Athens herself after the disaster at Syracuse, -that Athenian power, if not Athenian independence, was at an end, and -undertaken in conjunction with allies seemingly more than sufficient -to sustain it. This remarkable observation of Thucydidês doubtless -includes an indirect censure upon his own city, as abusing her -prosperity for purposes of unmeasured aggrandizement: a censure not -undeserved in reference to the enterprise against Sicily. But it -counts at the same time as a valuable testimony to the condition of -the allies of Athens under the Athenian empire, and goes far in reply -to the charge of practical oppression against the imperial city. - - [581] Aristotel. Politic. iv, 4, 1; Athenæus, vi, p. 265. - - [582] Thucyd. viii, 24. Καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Χῖοι ἤδη οὐκέτι - ἐπεξῄσαν, οἱ δὲ (Ἀθηναῖοι) τὴν χώραν, καλῶς κατεσκευασμένην καὶ - ἀπαθῆ οὖσαν ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν μέχρι τότε, διεπόρθησαν. Χῖοι γὰρ - μόνοι μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίους, ὧν ἐγὼ ᾐσθόμην, εὐδαιμονήσαντας ἅμα - καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἐπεδίδου ἡ πόλις αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον, - τόσῳ δὲ καὶ ἐκοσμοῦντο ἐχυρώτερον, etc. - - viii. 45. Οἱ Χῖοι ... πλουσιώτατοι ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, etc. - -The operations now carrying on in Chios indicated such an unexpected -renovation in Athenian affairs, that a party in the island began to -declare in favor of reunion with Athens. The Chian government were -forced to summon Astyochus, with his four Peloponnesian ships from -Erythræ, to strengthen their hands, and keep down opposition, by -seizing hostages from the suspected parties, as well as by other -precautions. While the Chians were thus endangered at home, the -Athenian interest in Ionia was still farther fortified by the arrival -of a fresh armament from Athens at Samos. Phrynichus, Onomaklês, and -Skironidês conducted a fleet of forty-eight triremes, some of them -employed for the transportation of hoplites; of which latter there -were aboard one thousand Athenians, and fifteen hundred Argeians. -Five hundred of these Argeians, having come to Athens without arms, -were clothed with Athenian panoplies for service. The newly-arrived -armament immediately sailed from Samos to Milêtus, where it effected -a disembarkation, in conjunction with those Athenians who had been -before watching the place from the island of Ladê. The Milêsians -marched forth to give them battle; mustering eight hundred of -their own hoplites, together with the Peloponnesian seamen of the -five triremes brought across by Chalkideus, and a body of troops, -chiefly cavalry, yet with a few mercenary hoplites, under the satrap -Tissaphernês. Alkibiadês, also, was present and engaged. The Argeians -were so full of contempt for the Ionians of Milêtus who stood -opposite to them, that they rushed forward to the charge with great -neglect of rank or order; a presumption which they expiated by an -entire defeat, with the loss of three hundred men. But the Athenians -on their wing were so completely victorious over the Peloponnesians -and others opposed to them, that all the army of the latter, and -even the Milesians themselves on returning from their pursuit of the -Argeians, were forced to shelter themselves within the walls of the -town. The issue of this combat excited much astonishment, inasmuch -as, on each side, Ionian hoplites were victorious over Dorian.[583] - - [583] Thucyd. viii, 25, 26. - -For a moment, the Athenian army, masters of the field under the walls -of Milêtus, indulged the hope of putting that city under blockade, -by a wall across the isthmus which connected it with the continent. -But these hopes soon vanished when they were apprized, on the very -evening of the battle, that the main Peloponnesian and Sicilian -fleet, fifty-five triremes in number, was actually in sight. Of -these fifty-five, twenty-two were Sicilian,—twenty from Syracuse and -two from Selinus,—sent at the pressing instance of Hermokratês, and -under his command, for the purpose of striking the final blow at -Athens; so at least it was anticipated, in the beginning of 412 B.C. -The remaining thirty-three triremes being Peloponnesian, the whole -fleet was placed under the temporary command of Theramenês, until he -could join the admiral Astyochus. Theramenês, halting first at the -island of Lerus,—off the coast, towards the southward of Milêtus,—was -there first informed of the recent victory of the Athenians, so -that he thought it prudent to take station for the night in the -neighboring gulf of Iasus. Here he was found by Alkibiadês, who came -on horseback, in all haste, from Milêtus to the Milesian town of -Teichiussa on that gulf. Alkibiadês strenuously urged him to lend -immediate aid to the Milêsians, so as to prevent the construction -of the intended wall of blockade; representing that if that city -were captured, all the hopes of the Peloponnesians in Ionia would -be extinguished. Accordingly, he prepared to sail thither the next -morning: but, during the night, the Athenians thought it wise to -abandon their position near Milêtus and return to Samos with their -wounded and their baggage. Having heard of the arrival of Theramenês -with his fleet, they preferred leaving their victory unimproved, to -the hazard of a general battle. Two out of the three commanders, -indeed, were at first inclined to take the latter course, insisting -that the maritime honor of Athens would be tarnished by retiring -before the enemy. But the third, Phrynichus, opposed with so much -emphasis the proposition of fighting, that he at length induced his -colleagues to retire. The fleet, he said, had not come prepared for -fighting a naval battle, but full of hoplites for land-operations -against Milêtus: the numbers of the newly-arrived Peloponnesians -were not accurately known; and a defeat at sea, under existing -circumstances, would be utter ruin to Athens. Thucydidês bestows -much praise on Phrynichus for the wisdom of this advice, which was -forthwith acted upon. The Athenian fleet sailed back to Samos; from -which place the Argeian hoplites, sulky with their recent defeat, -demanded to be conveyed home.[584] - - [584] Thucyd. viii, 26, 27. - -On the ensuing morning, the Peloponnesian fleet sailed from the gulf -of Iasus to Milêtus, expecting to find and fight the Athenians, and -leaving their masts, sails, and rigging—as was usual when going into -action—at Teichiussa. Finding Milêtus already relieved of the enemy, -they stayed there only one day, in order to reinforce themselves with -the twenty-five triremes which Chalkideus had originally brought -thither, and which had been since blocked up by the Athenian fleet at -Ladê, and then sailed back to Teichiussa to pick up the tackle there -deposited. Being now not far from Iasus, the residence of Amorgês, -Tissaphernês persuaded them to attack it by sea, in coöperation with -his forces by land. No one at Iasus was aware of the arrival of the -Peloponnesian fleet: the triremes approaching were supposed to be -Athenians and friends, so that the place was entered and taken by -surprise;[585] though strong in situation and fortifications, and -defended by a powerful band of Grecian mercenaries. The capture of -Iasus, in which the Syracusans distinguished themselves, was of -signal advantage, from the abundant plunder which it distributed -among the army; the place being rich from ancient date, and probably -containing the accumulations of the satrap Pissuthnês, father of -Amorgês. It was handed over to Tissaphernês, along with all the -prisoners, for each head of whom he paid down a Daric stater, or -twenty Attic drachmæ, and along with Amorgês himself, who had been -taken alive, and whom the satrap was thus enabled to send up to Susa. -The Grecian mercenaries captured in the place were enrolled in the -service of the captors, and sent by land under Pedaritus to Erythræ, -in order that they might cross over from thence to Chios.[586] - - [585] Phrynichus the Athenian commander was afterwards displaced - by the Athenians,—by the recommendation of Peisander, at the time - when this displacement suited the purpose of the oligarchical - conspirators,—on the charge of having abandoned and betrayed - Amorgês on this occasion, and caused the capture of Iasus - (Thucyd. viii, 54). - - Phrynichus and his colleagues were certainly guilty of grave - omission in not sending notice to Amorgês of the sudden - retirement of the Athenian fleet from Milêtus, the ignorance - of which circumstance was one reason why Amorgês mistook the - Peloponnesian ships for Athenian. - - [586] Thucyd. viii, 28. - -The arrival of the recent reinforcements to both the opposing fleets, -and the capture of Iasus, took place about the autumnal equinox or -the end of September; at which period, the Peloponnesian fleet being -assembled at Milêtus, Tissaphernês paid to them the wages of the -crews, at the rate of one Attic drachma per head per diem, as he -had promised by his envoy at Sparta. But he at the same time gave -notice for the future,—partly at the instigation of Alkibiadês, of -which more hereafter,—that he could not continue so high a rate -of pay, unless he should receive express instructions from Susa; -and that, until such instructions came, he should give only half a -drachma per day. Theramenês, being only commander for the interim, -until the junction with Astyochus, was indifferent to the rate at -which the men were paid,—a miserable jealousy, which marks the low -character of many of these Spartan officers,—but the Syracusan -Hermokratês remonstrated so loudly against the reduction, that he -obtained from Tissaphernês the promise of a slight increase above -the half drachma, though he could not succeed in getting the entire -drachma continued.[587] For the present, however, the seamen were in -good spirits; not merely from having received the high rate of pay, -but from the plentiful booty recently acquired at Iasus;[588] while -Astyochus and the Chians were also greatly encouraged by the arrival -of so large a fleet. Nevertheless, the Athenians on their side were -also reinforced by thirty-five fresh triremes, which reached Samos -under Strombichidês, Charminus, and Euktêmon. The Athenian fleet -from Chios was now recalled to Samos, where the commanders mustered -their whole naval force, with a view of redividing it for ulterior -operations. - - [587] Thucyd. viii, 29. What this new rate of pay was, or by - what exact fraction it exceeded the half drachma, is a matter - which the words of Thucydidês do not enable us to make out. None - of the commentators can explain the text without admitting some - alteration or omission of words: nor do any of the explanations - given appear to me convincing. On the whole, I incline to - consider the conjecture and explanation given by Paulmier and - Dobree as more plausible than that of Dr. Arnold and Göller, or - of Poppo and Hermann. - - [588] Thucyd. viii, 36. - -Considering that in the autumn of the preceding year, immediately -after the Syracusan disaster, the navy of Athens had been no less -scanty in number of ships than defective in equipment, we read with -amazement, that she had now at Samos no less than one hundred and -four triremes in full condition and disposable for service, besides -some others specially destined for the transport of troops. Indeed, -the total number which she had sent out, putting together the -separate squadrons, had been one hundred and twenty-eight.[589] So -energetic an effort, and so unexpected a renovation of affairs from -the hopeless prostration of last year, was such as no Grecian state -except Athens could have accomplished; nor even Athens herself, had -she not been aided by that reserve fund, consecrated twenty years -before through the long-sighted calculation of Periklês. - - [589] Thucyd. viii, 30; compare Dr. Arnold’s note. - -The Athenians resolved to employ thirty triremes in making a landing, -and establishing a fortified post, in Chios; and lots being drawn -among the generals, Strombichidês with two others were assigned to -the command. The other seventy-four triremes, remaining masters of -the sea, made descents near Milêtus, and in vain tried to provoke -the Peloponnesian fleet out of that harbor. It was some time before -Astyochus actually went thither to assume his new command, being -engaged in operations near to Chios, which island had been left -comparatively free by the recall of the Athenian fleet to the general -muster at Samos. Going forth with twenty triremes,—ten Peloponnesian -and ten Chian,—he made a fruitless attack upon Pteleus, the Athenian -fortified post in the Erythræan territory; after which he sailed -to Klazomenæ, recently retransferred from the continent to the -neighboring islet. He here—in conjunction with Tamôs, the Persian -general of the district—enjoined the Klazomenians again to break -with Athens, to leave their islet, and to take up their residence -inland at Daphnûs, where the philo-Peloponnesian party among them -still remained established since the former revolt. This demand being -rejected, he attacked Klazomenæ, but was repulsed, although the town -was unfortified, and was presently driven off by a severe storm, -from which he found shelter at Kymê and Phokæa. Some of his ships -sheltered themselves during the same storm on certain islets near -to and belonging to Klazomenæ; on which they remained eight days, -destroying and plundering the property of the inhabitants, and then -rejoined Astyochus. That admiral was now anxious to make an attempt -on Lesbos, from which he received envoys promising revolt from -Athens. But the Corinthians and others in his fleet were so averse to -the enterprise, that he was forced to relinquish it and sail back to -Chios; his fleet, before it arrived there, being again dispersed by -the storms, frequent in the month of November.[590] - - [590] Thucyd. viii, 31, 32. - -Meanwhile Pedaritus, despatched by land from Milêtus,—at the head -of the mercenary force made prisoners at Iasus, as well as of five -hundred of the Peloponnesian seamen who had originally crossed the -sea with Chalkideus, and since served as hoplites,—had reached -Erythræ and from thence crossed the channel to Chios. To him and to -the Chians, Astyochus now proposed to undertake the expedition to -Lesbos; but he experienced from them the same reluctance as from the -Corinthians, a strong proof that the tone of feeling in Lesbos had -been found to be decidedly philo-Athenian on the former expedition. -Pedaritus even peremptorily refused to let him have the Chian -triremes for any such purpose, an act of direct insubordination in a -Lacedæmonian officer towards the admiral-in-chief, which Astyochus -resented so strongly, that he immediately left Chios for Milêtus, -carrying away with him all the Peloponnesian triremes, and telling -the Chians, in terms of strong displeasure, that they might look -in vain to him for aid, if they should come to need it. He halted -with his fleet for the night under the headland of Korykus (in -the Erythræan territory), on the north side; but while there, he -received an intimation of a supposed plot to betray Erythræ by means -of prisoners sent back from the Athenian station at Samos. Instead -of pursuing his voyage to Milêtus, he therefore returned on the -next day to Erythræ to investigate this plot, which turned out to -be a stratagem of the prisoners themselves in order to obtain their -liberation.[591] - - [591] Thucyd. viii, 32, 33. - -The fact of his thus going back to Erythræ, instead of pursuing -his voyage, proved, by accident, the salvation of his fleet. For -it so happened that on that same night the Athenian fleet, under -Strombichidês—thirty triremes, accompanied by some triremes carrying -hoplites—had its station on the southern side of the same headland. -Neither knew of the position of the other, and Astyochus, had he gone -forward the next day towards Milêtus, would have fallen in with the -superior numbers of his enemy. He farther escaped a terrible storm, -which the Athenians encountered when they doubled the headland going -northward. Descrying three Chian triremes, they gave chase, but the -storm became so violent that even these Chians had great difficulty -in making their own harbor, while the three foremost Athenian ships -were wrecked on the neighboring shore, all the crews either perishing -or becoming prisoners.[592] The rest of the Athenian fleet found -shelter in the harbor of Phœnikus on the opposite mainland, under the -lofty mountain called Mimas, north of Erythræ. - - [592] Thucyd. viii, 33, 34. - -As soon as weather permitted, they pursued their voyage to Lesbos, -from which island they commenced their operations of invading Chios -and establishing in it a permanent fortified post. Having transported -their land-force across from Lesbos, they occupied a strong maritime -site called Delphinium, seemingly a projecting cape having a -sheltered harbor on each side, not far from the city of Chios.[593] -They bestowed great labor and time in fortifying this post, both on -the land and the sea-side, during which process they were scarcely -interrupted at all either by the Chians, or by Pedaritus and his -garrison; whose inaction arose not merely from the discouragement of -the previous defeats, but from the political dissension which now -reigned in the city. A strong philo-Athenian party had pronounced -itself; and though Tydeus its leader was seized by Pedaritus and -put to death, still, his remaining partisans were so numerous, that -the government was brought to an oligarchy narrower than ever, and -to the extreme of jealous precaution, not knowing whom to trust. -In spite of numerous messages sent to Milêtus, intreating succor, -and representing the urgent peril to which this greatest among all -the Ionian allies of Sparta was exposed, Astyochus adhered to his -parting menaces, and refused compliance. The indignant Pedaritus sent -to prefer complaint against him at Sparta as a traitor. Meanwhile -the fortress at Delphinium advanced so near towards completion, -that Chios began to suffer from it as much as Athens suffered from -Dekeleia, with the farther misfortune of being blocked up by sea. -The slaves in this wealthy island—chiefly foreigners acquired by -purchase, but more numerous than in any other Grecian state except -Laconia—were emboldened by the manifest superiority and assured -position of the invaders to desert in crowds; and the loss arising, -not merely from their flight, but from the valuable information and -aid which they gave to the enemy was immense.[594] The distress of -the island increased every day, nor could anything relieve it except -succor from without, which Astyochus still withheld. - - [593] Thucyd. viii, 34-38. Δελφίνιον—~λιμένας~ ἔχον, etc. - - That the Athenians should select Lesbos on this occasion as the - base of their operations, and as the immediate scene of last - preparations, against Chios,—was only repeating what they had - once done before (c. 24), and what they again did afterwards (c. - 100). I do not feel the difficulty which strikes Dobree and Dr. - Thirlwall. Doubtless Delphinium was to the north of the city of - Chios. - - [594] Thucyd. viii, 38-40. About the slaves in Chios, see the - extracts from Theopompus and Nymphodôrus in Athenæus, vi, p. 265. - - That from Nymphodôrus appears to be nothing but a romantic local - legend, connected with the Chapel of the _Kind-hearted Hero_ - (Ἥρωος εὐμένους) at Chios. - - Even in antiquity, though the institution of slavery was - universal and noway disapproved, yet the slave-trade, or the - buying and selling of slaves, was accounted more or less odious. - -That officer, on reaching Milêtus, found the Peloponnesian force on -the Asiatic side of the Ægean just reinforced by a squadron of twelve -triremes under Dorieus; chiefly from Thurii, which had undergone a -political revolution since the Athenian disaster at Syracuse, and was -now decidedly in the hands of the active philo-Laconian party; the -chief persons friendly to Athens having been exiled.[595] Dorieus -and his squadron, crossing the Ægean in its southern latitude, -had arrived safely at Knidus, which had already been conquered by -Tissaphernês from Athens, and had received a Persian garrison.[596] -Orders were sent from Milêtus that half of this newly-arrived -squadron should remain on guard at Knidus, while the other half -should cruise near the Triopian cape to intercept the trading vessels -from Egypt. But the Athenians, who had also learned the arrival -of Dorieus, sent a powerful squadron from Samos, which captured -all these six triremes off Cape Triopium, though the crews escaped -ashore. They farther made an attempt to recover Knidus, which was -very nearly successful, as the town was unfortified on the sea-side. -On the morrow the attack was renewed,—but additional defences -had been provided during the night, while the crews of the ships -captured near Triopium had come in to help,—so that the Athenians -were forced to return to Samos without any farther advantage than -that of ravaging the Knidian territory. Astyochus took no step to -intercept them, nor did he think himself strong enough to keep the -sea against the seventy-four Athenian triremes at Samos, though his -fleet at Milêtus was at this moment in high condition. The rich booty -acquired at Iasus was unconsumed; the Milêsians were zealous in -the confederate cause; while the pay from Tissaphernês continued to -be supplied with tolerable regularity, though at the reduced rate -mentioned a little above.[597] - - [595] See the life of Lysias the Rhetor, in Dionysius of - Halikarnassus, c. i, p. 453, Reisk., and in Plutarch, Vit. x, - Orat. p. 835. - - [596] Thucyd. viii, 35-109. - - [597] Thucyd. viii, 35, 36. καὶ γὰρ μισθὸς ἐδίδοτο ~ἀρκούντως~, - etc. - -Though the Peloponnesians had yet no ground of complaint—such as they -soon came to have—against the satrap for irregularity of payment, -still, the powerful fleet now at Milêtus inspired the commanders -with a new tone of confidence, so that they became ashamed of the -stipulations of that treaty to which Chalkideus and Alkibiadês, when -first landing at Milêtus with their scanty armament, had submitted. -Accordingly Astyochus, shortly after his arrival at Milêtus, and -even before the departure of Theramenês,—whose functions had expired -when he had handed over the fleet,—insisted on a fresh treaty with -Tissaphernês, which was agreed on, to the following effect:— - -“Convention and alliance is concluded, on the following conditions, -between the Lacedæmonians, with their allies, and king Darius, his -sons, and Tissaphernês. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall not -attack or injure any territory or any city which belongs to Darius, -or has belonged to his father or ancestors; nor shall they raise any -tribute from any of the said cities. Neither Darius nor any of his -subjects shall attack or injure the Lacedæmonians or their allies. -Should the Lacedæmonians or their allies have any occasion for the -king, or should the king have any occasion for the Lacedæmonians or -their allies, let each meet, as much as may be, the wishes expressed -by the other. Both will carry on jointly the war against Athens and -her allies: neither party shall bring the war to a close, without -mutual consent. The king shall pay and keep any army which he may -have sent for, and which may be employed in his territory. If any -of the cities parties to this convention shall attack the king’s -territory, the rest engage to hinder them, and to defend the king -with their best power. And if any one within the king’s territory, -or within the territory subject to him,[598] shall attack the -Lacedæmonians or their allies, the king shall hinder them, and lend -his best defensive aid.” - - [598] Thucyd. viii, 37. Καὶ ἤν τις τῶν ~ἐν τῇ βασιλέως χώρᾳ, ἢ - ὅσης βασιλεὺς ἄρχει~, ἐπὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἴῃ ἢ τῶν ξυμμάχων, - βασιλεὺς κωλυέτω καὶ ἀμυνέτω κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. - - The distinction here drawn between _the king’s territory_, and - the territory _over which the king holds empire_, deserves - notice. By the former phrase, is understood, I presume, the - continent of Asia, which the court of Susa looked upon, together - with all its inhabitants, as a freehold exceedingly sacred and - peculiar (Herodot. i, 4): by the latter, as much as the satrap - should find it convenient to lay hands upon, of that which had - once belonged to Darius son of Hystaspes or to Xerxes, in the - plenitude of their power. - -Looked at with the eyes of Pan-Hellenic patriotism, this second -treaty of Astyochus and Theramenês was less disgraceful than the -first treaty of Chalkideus. It did not formally proclaim that all -those Grecian cities which had ever belonged to the king or to his -ancestors, should still be considered as his subjects, nor did -it pledge the Lacedæmonians to aid the king in hindering any of -them from achieving their liberty. It still admitted, however, by -implication, the same undiminished extent of the king’s dominion, as -it had stood when at its maximum under his predecessors; the same -undefined rights of the king to meddle with Grecian affairs; the -same unqualified abandonment of all the Greeks on the continent of -Asia. The conclusion of this treaty was the last act performed by -Theramenês, who was lost at sea shortly afterwards, on his voyage -home, in a small boat, no one knew how.[599] - - [599] Thucyd. viii, 38. ἀποπλέων ἐν κέλητι ἀφανίζεται. - -Astyochus, now alone in command, was still importuned by the urgent -solicitations of the distressed Chians for relief, and, in spite of -his reluctance, was compelled by the murmurs of his own army to lend -an ear to them, when a new incident happened which gave him at least -a good pretext for directing his attention southward. A Peloponnesian -squadron of twenty-seven triremes under the command of Antisthenês, -having started from Cape Malea about the winter tropic or close of -412 B.C., had first crossed the sea to Melos, where it dispersed -ten Athenian triremes and captured three of them; then afterwards, -from apprehension that these fugitive Athenians would make known -its approach at Samos, had made a long circuit round by Krete, and -thus ultimately reached Kaunus at the southeastern extremity of -Asia Minor. This was the squadron which Kalligeitus and Timagoras -had caused to be equipped, having come over for that purpose a -year before as envoys from the satrap Pharnabazus. Antisthenês was -instructed first to get to Milêtus and put himself in concert with -the main Lacedæmonian fleet; next, to forward these triremes, or -another squadron of equal force under Klearchus, to the Hellespont, -for the purpose of coöperating with Pharnabazus against the Athenian -dependencies in that region. Eleven Spartans, the chief of whom was -Lichas, accompanied Antisthenês, to be attached to Astyochus as -advisers, according to a practice not unusual with the Lacedæmonians. -These men were not only directed to review the state of affairs at -Milêtus, and exercise control coördinate with Astyochus, but even -empowered, if they saw reason, to dismiss that admiral himself, upon -whom the complaints of Pedaritus from Chios had cast suspicion; and -to appoint Antisthenês in his place.[600] - - [600] Thucyd. viii, 39. Καὶ εἴρητο αὐτοῖς, ἐς Μίλητον ἀφικομένους - ~τῶν τε ἄλλων ξυνεπιμελεῖσθαι~, ᾗ μέλλει ἄριστα ἕξειν, etc. - -No sooner had Astyochus learned at Milêtus the arrival of Antisthenês -at Kaunus, than he postponed all idea of lending aid to Chios, and -sailed immediately to secure his junction with the twenty-seven new -triremes as well as with the new Spartan counsellors. In his voyage -southward he captured the city of Kôs, unfortified and half-ruined -by a recent earthquake, and then passed on to Knidus; where the -inhabitants strenuously urged him to go forward at once, even -without disembarking his men, in order that he might surprise an -Athenian squadron of twenty triremes under Charmînus; which had been -despatched from Samos, after the news received from Melos, in order -to attack and repel the squadron under Antisthenês. Charmînus, having -his station at Symê, was cruising near Rhodes and the Lykian coast, -to watch, though he had not been able to keep back, the Peloponnesian -fleet just arrived at Kaunus. In this position he was found by the -far more numerous fleet of Astyochus, the approach of which he did -not at all expect. But the rainy and hazy weather had so dispersed -it, that Charmînus, seeing at first only a few ships apart from the -rest, mistook them for the smaller squadron of new-comers. Attacking -the triremes thus seen, he at first gained considerable advantage, -disabling three and damaging several others. But presently the -dispersed vessels of the main fleet came in sight and closed round -him, so that he was forced to make the best speed in escaping, -first to the island called Teutlussa, next to Halikarnassus. He -did not effect his escape without the loss of six ships; while the -victorious Peloponnesians, after erecting their trophy on the island -of Symê, returned to Knidus, where the entire fleet, including -the twenty-seven triremes newly arrived, was now united.[601] The -Athenians in Samos—whose affairs were now in confusion, from causes -which will be explained in the ensuing chapter—had kept no watch on -the movements of the main Peloponnesian fleet at Milêtus, and seem -to have been ignorant of its departure until they were apprized of -the defeat of Charmînus. They then sailed down to Symê, took up the -sails and rigging belonging to that squadron, which had been there -deposited, and then, after an attack upon Loryma, carried back their -whole fleet, probably including the remnant of the squadron of -Charmînus, to Samos.[602] - - [601] Thucyd. viii, 42. - - [602] Thucyd. viii, 43. This defeat of Charmînus is made the - subject of a jest by Aristophanês, Thesmophor. 810, with the note - of Paulmier. - -Though the Peloponnesian fleet now assembled at Knidus consisted of -ninety-four triremes, much superior in number to the Athenian, it -did not try to provoke any general action. The time of Lichas and -his brother commissioners was at first spent in negotiations with -Tissaphernês, who had joined them at Knidus, and against whom they -found a strong feeling of discontent prevalent in the fleet. That -satrap—now acting greatly under the advice of Alkibiadês, of which -also more in the coming chapter—had of late become slack in the -Peloponnesian cause, and irregular in furnishing pay to their seamen, -during the last weeks of their stay at Milêtus. He was at the same -time full of promises, paralyzing all their operations by assurances -that he was bringing up the vast fleet of Phenicia to their aid: but -in reality his object was, under fair appearances, merely to prolong -the contest and waste the strength of both parties. Arriving in the -midst of this state of feeling, and discussing with Tissaphernês the -future conduct of the war, Lichas not only expressed displeasure -at his past conduct, but even protested against the two conventions -concluded by Chalkideus and by Theramenês, as being, both the one -and the other, a disgrace to the Hellenic name. By the express terms -of the former, and by the implications of the latter, not merely -all the islands of the Ægean, but even Thessaly and Bœotia, were -acknowledged as subject to Persia; so that Sparta, if she sanctioned -such conditions, would be merely imposing upon the Greeks a Persian -sceptre, instead of general freedom, for which she professed to be -struggling. Lichas, declaring that he would rather renounce all -prospect of Persian pay, than submit to such conditions, proposed -to negotiate for a fresh treaty upon other and better terms, a -proposition which Tissaphernês rejected with so much indignation as -to depart without settling anything.[603] - - [603] Thucyd. viii, 43. - -His desertion did not discourage the Peloponnesian counsellors. -Possessing a fleet larger than they had ever before had united in -Asia, together with a numerous body of allies, they calculated on -being able to get money to pay their men without Persian aid; and -an invitation, which they just now received from various powerful -men at Rhodes, tended to strengthen such confidence. The island of -Rhodes, inhabited by a Dorian population considerable in number as -well as distinguished for nautical skill, was at this time divided -between three separate city governments, as it had been at the epoch -of the Homeric Catalogue,—Lindus, Ialysus, and Kameirus; for the -city called Rhodes, formed by a coalescence of all these three, -dates only from two or three years after the period which we have -now reached. Invited by several of the wealthy men of the island, -the Peloponnesian fleet first attacked Kameirus, the population of -which, intimidated by a force of ninety-four triremes, and altogether -uninformed of their approach, abandoned their city, which had no -defences, and fled to the mountains.[604] All the three Rhodian -towns, destitute of fortifications, were partly persuaded, partly -frightened, into the step of revolting from Athens and allying -themselves with the Peloponnesians. The Athenian fleet, whose -commanders were just now too busy with political intrigue to keep -due military watch, arrived from Samos too late to save Rhodes, and -presently returned to the former island, leaving detachments at -Chalkê and Kôs to harass the Peloponnesians with desultory attacks. - - [604] Thucyd. viii, 44. Οἱ δ’ ἐς τὴν Ῥόδον, ἐπικηρυκευομένων ἀπὸ - τῶν δυνατωτάτων ἀνδρῶν, τὴν γνώμην εἶχον πλεῖν, etc. - - ... Καὶ προσβαλόντες Καμείρῳ τῆς Ῥοδίας πρώτῃ, ναυσὶ τέσσαρσι - καὶ ἐνενήκοντα, ~ἐξεφόβησαν μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς, οὐκ εἰδότας τὰ - πρασσόμενα~, καὶ ἔφυγον, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτειχίστου οὔσης τῆς - πόλεως, etc. - - We have to remark here, as on former occasions of revolts among - the dependent allies of Athens, that the general population - of the allied city manifests no previous discontent, nor any - spontaneous disposition to revolt. The powerful men of the - island—those who, if the government was democratical, formed the - oligarchical minority, but who formed the government itself, - if oligarchical—conspire and bring in the Peloponnesian force, - unknown to the body of the citizens, and thus leave to the latter - no free choice. The real feeling towards Athens on the part of - the body of the citizens is one of simple acquiescence, with - little attachment on the one hand, yet no hatred, or sense of - practical suffering, on the other. - -The Peloponnesians now levied from the Rhodians a contribution of -thirty-two talents, and adopted the island as the main station for -their fleet, instead of Milêtus. We can explain this change of place -by their recent unfriendly discussion with Tissaphernês, and their -desire to be more out of his reach.[605] But what we cannot so easily -explain, is, that they remained on the island without any movement -or military action, and actually hauled their triremes ashore, for -the space of no less than eighty days; that is, from about the middle -of January to the end of March 411 B.C. While their powerful fleet -of ninety-four triremes, superior to that of Athens at Samos, was -thus lying idle, their allies in Chios were known to be suffering -severe and increasing distress, and repeatedly pressing for aid:[606] -moreover, the promise of sending to coöperate with Pharnabazus -against the Athenian dependencies on the Hellespont, remained -unperformed.[607] We may impute such extreme military slackness -mainly to the insidious policy of Tissaphernês, now playing a double -game between Sparta and Athens. He still kept up intelligence with -the Peloponnesians at Rhodes, paralyzed their energies by assurances -that the Phenician fleet was actually on its way to aid them, -and insured the success of these intrigues by bribes distributed -personally among the generals and the trierarchs. Even Astyochus, -the general-in-chief, took his share in this corrupt bargain, against -which not one stood out except the Syracusan Hermokratês.[608] Such -prolonged inaction of the armament, at the moment of its greatest -force, was thus not simply the fruit of honest mistake, like the -tardiness of Nikias in Sicily, but proceeded from the dishonesty and -personal avidity of the Peloponnesian officers. - - [605] Thucyd. viii, 44: compare c. 57. - - [606] Thucyd. viii, 40-55. - - [607] Thucyd. viii, 39. - - [608] Thucyd. viii, 45. Suggestions of Alkibiadês to - Tissaphernês—Καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν πόλεων - ἐδίδασκεν ~ὥστε δόντα χρήματα αὐτὸν πεῖσαι~, ὥστε ~ξυγχωρῆσαι - ταῦτα ἑαυτῷ~, πλὴν τῶν Συρακοσίων· τούτων δὲ, Ἑρμοκράτης - ἠναντιοῦτο ~μόνος~ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ξύμπαντος ξυμμαχικοῦ. - - About the bribes to Astyochus himself, see also c. 50. - -I have noticed, on more than one previous occasion, the many -evidences which exist of the prevalence of personal corruption—even -in its coarsest form, that of direct bribery—among the leading Greeks -of all the cities, when acting individually. Of such evidences the -incident here recorded is not the least remarkable. Nor ought this -general fact ever to be forgotten by those who discuss the question -between oligarchy and democracy, as it stood in the Grecian world. -The confident pretensions put forth by the wealthy and oligarchical -Greeks to superior virtue, public as well as private,—and the quiet -repetition, by various writers modern and ancient, of the laudatory -epithets implying such assumed virtue,—are so far from being borne -out by history, that these individuals were perpetually ready as -statesmen to betray their countrymen, or as generals even to betray -the interests of their soldiers, for the purpose of acquiring money -themselves. Of course, it is not meant that this was true of all of -them; but it was true sufficiently often, to be reckoned upon as a -contingency more than probable. If, speaking on the average, the -leading men of a Grecian community were not above the commission -of political misdeeds thus palpable, and of a nature not to be -disguised even from themselves, far less would they be above the -vices, always more or less mingled with self-delusion, of pride, -power-seeking, party-antipathy or sympathy, love of ease, etc. And -if the community were to have any chance of guarantee against such -abuses, it could only be by full license of accusation against -delinquents, and certainty of trial before judges identified in -interest with the people themselves. Such were the securities -which the Grecian democracies, especially that of Athens, tried to -provide; in a manner not always wise, still less always effectual, -but assuredly justified, in the amplest manner, by the urgency and -prevalence of the evil. Yet in the common representations given of -Athenian affairs, this evil is overlooked or evaded; the precautions -taken against it are denounced as so many evidences of democratical -ill-temper and injustice; and the class of men, through whose -initiatory action alone such precautions were enforced, are held up -to scorn as demagogues and _sycophants_. Had these Peloponnesian -generals and trierarchs, who under the influence of bribes wasted two -important months in inaction, been Athenians, there might have been -some chance of their being tried and punished; though even at Athens -the chance of impunity to offenders, through powerful political -clubs and other sinister artifices, was much greater than it ought -to have been. So little is it consistent with the truth, however -often affirmed, that judicial accusation was too easy, and judicial -condemnation too frequent. When the judicial precautions provided -at Athens are looked at, as they ought to be, side by side with the -evil, they will be found imperfect, indeed, both in the scheme and in -the working, but certainly neither uncalled for nor over-severe. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of History of Greece, Volume 7 (of 12), by -George Grote - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF GREECE, VOLUME 7 OF 12 *** - -***** This file should be named 51181-0.txt or 51181-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/1/1/8/51181/ - -Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Ramon Pajares Box and the -Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net -(This file was produced from images generously made -available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: History of Greece, Volume 7 (of 12) - -Author: George Grote - -Release Date: February 11, 2016 [EBook #51181] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF GREECE, VOLUME 7 OF 12 *** - - - - -Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Ramon Pajares Box and the -Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net -(This file was produced from images generously made -available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) - - - - - - -</pre> - - -<div class="front"> - <p><a href="#tnote">Transcriber's note</a></p> - <p><a href="#ToC">Table of Contents</a></p> -</div> - -<div class="screenonly"> - <div class="figcenter"> - <img src="images/cover.jpg" - alt="Book cover" /> - </div> -</div> - -<div class="tit"> - <hr class="chap" /> - - <h1>HISTORY OF GREECE.</h1> - - <p class="xl p2"><small>BY</small><br /> - GEORGE GROTE, <span class="smcap">Esq.</span></p> - - <p class="large p2">VOL. VII.</p> - - <p class="xs p4">REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION</p> - - <p class="medium p2">NEW YORK:<br /> - HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS<br /> - <span class="small">329 <small>AND</small> 331 <small>PEARL STREET.</small></span></p> - - <hr class="chap" /> -</div> - - -<div class="chapter" id="ToC"> - <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_iii">[p. iii]</span></p> - <h2>CONTENTS.<br /> - <span class="large">VOL. VII.</span></h2> - <hr class="sep2" /> - <p class="xl center">PART II.</p> - <p class="large center">CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.</p> - <hr class="sep2" /> -</div> - -<div class="contents"> - -<p class="chap">CHAPTER LV.</p> -<p class="small center">FROM THE PEACE OF NIKIAS TO THE OLYMPIC -FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD 90.</p> - -<p class="p1">Negotiations for peace during the winter after the -battle of Amphipolis. — Peace called the Peace of Nikias — concluded -in March 421 <small>B.C.</small> Conditions of peace. — Peace -accepted at Sparta by the majority of members of the Peloponnesian -alliance. — The most powerful members of the alliance refuse to -accept the truce — Bœotians, Megarians, Corinthians, and Eleians. -— Position and feelings of the Lacedæmonians — their great anxiety -for peace — their uncertain relations with Argos. — Steps taken -by the Lacedæmonians to execute the peace — Amphipolis is not -restored to Athens — the great allies of Sparta do not accept the -peace. — Separate alliance for mutual defence concluded between -Sparta and Athens. — Terms of the alliance. — Athens restores the -Spartan captives. — Mismanagement of the political interests of -Athens by Nikias and the peace party. — By the terms of the alliance -Athens renounced all the advantages of her position in reference -to the Lacedæmonians — she gained none of those concessions upon -which she calculated, while they gained materially. — Discontent -and remonstrances of the Athenians against Sparta in consequence -of the non-performance of the conditions — they repent of having -given up the captives — excuses of Sparta. — New combinations in -Peloponnesus — suspicion entertained of concert between Sparta -and Athens — Argos stands prominently forward — state of Argos — -aristocratical regiment of one thousand formed in that city. — -The Corinthians prevail upon Argos to stand forward as head of a -new Peloponnesian alliance. — Congress of recusant Peloponnesian -allies at Corinth — the Mantineians join Argos — state of Arcadia — -rivalship of Tegea and Mantineia. — Remonstrances of Lacedæmonian -envoys at the congress at Corinth — redefence of the Corinthians -— pretence of religious<span class="pagenum" id="Page_iv">[p. -iv]</span> scruple. — The Bœotians and Megarians refuse to break -with Sparta, or to ally themselves with Argos — the Corinthians -hesitate in actually joining Argos. — The Eleians become allies of -Argos — their reasons for doing so — relations with Lepreum — the -Corinthians now join Argos also. — Refusal of Tegea to separate -from Sparta. — The Corinthians are disheartened — their application -through the Bœotians to Athens. — The Lacedæmonians emancipate the -Arcadian subjects of Mantineia — they plant the Brasidean Helots at -Lepreum. — Treatment of the Spartan captives after their liberation -from Athens and return to Sparta — they are disfranchised for a time -and in a qualified manner. — The Athenians recapture Skiônê — put to -death all the adult males. — Political relations in Peloponnesus — -change of ephors at Sparta — the new ephors are hostile to Athens. -— Congress at Sparta — Athenian, Bœotian, and Corinthian deputies, -present — long debates, but no settlement attained of any one of the -disputed points — intrigues of the anti-Athenian ephors — Kleobulus -and Xenarês. — These ephors try to bring about underhand an alliance -between Sparta and Argos, through the Bœotians — the project fails. -— The Lacedæmonians conclude a special alliance with the Bœotians, -thereby violating their alliance with Athens — the Bœotians raze -Panaktum to the ground. — Application from the Argeians to Sparta to -renew the expiring treaty. Project of renewed treaty agreed upon. -Curious stipulation about combat by champions, to keep the question -open about the title to Thyrea. — Lacedæmonian envoys go first to -Bœotia, next to Athens — they find Panaktum demolished — they ask for -the cession of Pylos from Athens. — The envoys are badly received -at Athens — angry feeling against the Lacedæmonians. — Alkibiadês -stands forward as a party-leader. His education and character. — -Great energy and capacity of Alkibiadês in public affairs — his -reckless expenditure — lawless demeanor — unprincipled character, -inspiring suspicion and alarm — military service. — Alkibiadês — -Sokratês — the Sophists. — Conflicting sentiments entertained towards -Alkibiadês — his great energy and capacity. Admiration, fear, hatred, -and jealousy, which he inspires. — Alkibiadês tries to renew the -ancient but interrupted connection of his ancestors with Lacedæmon, -as proxeni. — The Spartans reject his advances — he turns against -them — alters his politics, and becomes their enemy at Athens. — He -tries to bring Athens into alliance with Argos. — He induces the -Argeians to send envoys to Athens — the Argeians eagerly embrace -this opening, and drop their negotiations with Sparta. — Embassy of -the Lacedæmonians to Athens, to press the Athenians not to throw -up the alliance. The envoys are favorably received. — Trick by -which Alkibiadês cheats and disgraces the envoys, and baffles the -Lacedæmonian project. Indignation of the Athenians against Sparta. -— Nikias prevails with the assembly to send himself and others as -envoys to Sparta, in order to clear up the embarrassment. — Failure -of the embassy of Nikias at Sparta — Athens concludes the alliance -with Argos, Elis, and Mantineia. — Conditions of this convention -and alliance. — Complicated relations among the Grecian states as -to treaty and alliance. — Olympic festival of the 90th Olympiad, -July 420 <small>B.C.</small>, its memorable character. — First -appearance of Athens at the Olympic festival since the beginning -of the war. Immense display of Alkibiadês in the chariot-race. — -The Eleians exclude the Spartan sacred legation from this Olympic -festival, in consequence of alleged violation of the Olympic truce. — -Alarm felt at the festival lest the Spartans should come in arms. — -Depressed estimation of Sparta throughout Greece — Herakleia.</p> -<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_55">1-61</a></p> - - - -<p class="chap"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_v">[p. -v]</span>CHAPTER LVI.</p> -<p class="small center">FROM THE FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD 90, DOWN TO THE -BATTLE OF MANTINEIA.</p> - -<p class="p1">New policy of Athens, attempted by Alkibiadês. — -Expedition of Alkibiadês into the interior of Peloponnesus. — Attack -upon Epidaurus by Argos and Athens. — Movements of the Spartans -and Argeians. — The sacred month Karneius — trick played by the -Argeians with their calendar — Congress at Mantineia for peace — -the discussions prove abortive. — Athenian lordship of the sea -— the alliance between Athens and Sparta continues in name, but -is indirectly violated by both. — Invasion of Argos by Agis and -the Lacedæmonians, Bœotians, and Corinthians. — Approach of the -invaders to Argos by different lines of march. — Superior forces and -advantageous position of the invaders — danger of Argos — Agis takes -upon him to grant an armistice to the Argeians, and withdraws the -army — dissatisfaction of the allies. — Severe censure against Agis -on his return to Sparta. — Tardy arrival of Alkibiadês, Lachês, etc., -with the Athenian contingent at Argos — expedition of Athenians, -Eleians, Mantineians, and Argeians, against the Arcadian town of -Orchomenus. — Plans against Tegea — the Eleians return home. — -Danger of Tegea — Agis and the Lacedæmonians march to its relief. -— Manœuvres of Agis to bring on a battle on fair ground. — Forward -march and new position of the Argeians. — The Lacedæmonians are -surprised: their sudden and ready formation into battle order. — -Gradation of command and responsibility peculiar to the Lacedæmonian -army. — Lacedæmonian line: privileged post of the Skiritæ on the -left. — Uncertain numbers of both armies. — Preliminary harangues -to the soldiers. — Battle of Mantineia. — Movement ordered by Agis, -on the instant before the battle; his order disobeyed. His left -wing is defeated. — Complete ultimate victory of the Lacedæmonians. -— Great effects of the victory in reëstablishing the reputation of -Sparta. — Operations of Argeians, Eleians, etc., near Epidaurus. — -Political change at Argos, arising out of the battle of Mantineia. — -Oligarchical conspiracy of the Thousand-regiment at Argos, in concert -with the Lacedæmonians. — Treaty of peace between Sparta and Argos. -— Treaty of alliance between Sparta and Argos — dissolution of the -alliance of Argos with Athens, Mantineia, and Elis. — Submission of -Mantineia to Sparta. — Oligarchical revolution effected at Argos -by the Thousand, in concert with the Lacedæmonians. — Oligarchy in -Sikyôn and the towns in Achaia. — Violences of the Thousand at Argos: -counter-revolution in that town: restoration of the democracy. — -Proceedings of the restored Argeian Demos: tardiness of Sparta. — -Alkibiadês at Argos: measures for the protection of the democracy. — -Nominal peace, but precarious relations, between Athens and Sparta. -— Relations of Athens with Perdikkas of Macedonia. — Negligence of -Athens about Amphipolis: improvidence of Nikias and the peace-party: -adventurous speculations of Alkibiadês. — Projected contention of -ostracism between Nikias and Alkibiadês. Proposition supported by -Hyperbolus. — Gradual desuetude of the ostracism, as the democracy -became assured. — Siege of Mêlos by the Athenians. — Dialogue set -forth by Thucydidês, between the Athenian envoys and the Executive -Council of Mêlos. — Language represented by Thucydidês as having been -held by the Athenian envoys<span class="pagenum" id="Page_vi">[p. -vi]</span> — with the replies of the Melians. — Refusal of the -Melians to submit. — Siege and capture of Mêlos. — Remarks upon the -event. — View taken by Thucydidês of this incident. — Place which it -occupies in the general historical conception of Thucydidês.</p> -<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_56">61-118</a></p> - - -<p class="chap">CHAPTER LVII.</p> -<p class="small center">SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXTINCTION OF THE -GELONIAN DYNASTY.</p> - -<p class="p1">Expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty from Syracuse, and -of other despots from the other Sicilian towns. — Large changes of -resident inhabitants — effects of this fact. — Relative power and -condition of the Sicilian cities. Political dissensions at Syracuse. -Ostracism tried and abandoned. — Power and foreign exploits of -Syracuse. — Sikels in the interior of Sicily — the Sikel prince -Duketius — he founds the new Sikel town of Palikê. — Exploits of -Duketius — he is defeated and becomes the prisoner of the Syracusans, -who spare him, and send him to Corinth. — Duketius breaks his parole -and returns to Sicily. — Conquests of Syracuse in the interior of -Sicily — death of Duketius. — Prosperity and power of Agrigentum. -— Intellectual movement in Sicily — Empedoklês — Tisias — Korax — -Gorgias. — Sicilian cities — their condition and proceedings at the -first breaking out of the Peloponnesian war, 431 <small>B.C.</small> -— Relations of Sicily to Athens and Sparta — altered by the quarrel -between Corinth and Korkyra and the intervention of Athens. — -Expectations entertained by Sparta of aid from the Sicilian Dorians, -at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Expectations not realized. -— The Dorian cities in Sicily attack the Ionian cities in Sicily. -— The Ionic cities in Sicily solicit aid from Athens — first -Athenian expedition to Sicily under Lachês. — Second expedition -under Pythodôrus. — Indecisive operations near Messênê and Rhegium. -— Defeat of the Messenians by the Naxians and Sikels, near Naxos. -— Eurymedon and Sophoklês, with a larger Athenian fleet, arrive -in Sicily. — Congress of the Sicilian cities at Gela. Speech of -Hermokratês. — General peace made between the Sicilian cities. -Eurymedon accedes to the peace, and withdraws the Athenian fleet. — -Displeasure of the Athenians against Eurymedon and his colleagues. -— Intestine dissension in Leontini — expulsion of the Leontine -Demos, by the aid of Syracuse. — Application of the Leontine Demos -for help to Athens. The Athenians send Phæax to make observations. -— Leontini depopulated — the Demos expelled — Leontine exiles at -Athens. — War between Selinus and Egesta — the latter applies to -Athens for aid. — Promises of the Egestæans: motives offered to -Athens for intervention in Sicily. — Alkibiadês warmly espouses -their cause, and advises intervention. — Inspecting commissioners -despatched by the Athenians to Egesta — frauds practised by the -Egestæans to delude them. — Return of the commissioners to Athens -— impression produced by their report. Resolution taken to send an -expedition to Sicily. — Embarrassment of Nikias as opposer of the -expedition. — Speech of Nikias at the second assembly held by the -Athenians. — Reply of Alkibiadês. — The assembly favorable to the -views of Alkibiadês — adheres to the resolution of sailing to Sicily. -— Second speech of Nikias — exaggerating the difficulties and dangers -of the expedition, and demanding a force on the largest scale. — -Effect of this speech — increased eagerness of the assembly for -the expe<span class="pagenum" id="Page_vii">[p. vii]</span>dition -— order and unanimity in reference to the plan. — Excitement in -the city among all classes — great increase in the scale on which -the expedition was planned. — Large preparations made for the -expedition. — Review of these preliminary proceedings to the Sicilian -expedition. — Advice and influence of Nikias. — Advice and influence -of Alkibiadês. — Athens believed herself entitled to be mistress -of the islands as well as of the sea.</p> -<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_57">118-162</a></p> - - -<p class="chap">CHAPTER LVIII.</p> -<p class="small center">FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE ATHENIANS TO -ATTACK SYRACUSE, DOWN TO THE FIRST WINTER AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL IN -SICILY.</p> - -<p class="p1">Preparations for the expedition against Sicily — -general enthusiasm and sanguine hopes at Athens. — Abundance in the -Athenian treasury — display of wealth as well as of force in the -armament. — Mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens. Numbers and sanctity -of the Hermæ. — Violent excitement and religious alarm produced by -the act at Athens. — The authors of the act unknown — but it was -certainly done by design and conspiracy. — Various parties suspected -— great probability beforehand that it would induce the Athenians -to abandon or postpone the expedition. — The political enemies of -Alkibiadês take advantage of the reigning excitement to try and ruin -him. — Anxiety of the Athenians to detect and punish the conspirators -— rewards offered for information. — Informations given in — -commissioners of inquiry appointed. — First accusation of Alkibiadês, -of having profaned and divulged the Eleusinian mysteries. — Violent -speeches in the assembly against Alkibiadês unfavorably received. -— He denies the charge and demands immediate trial — his demand is -eluded by his enemies. — Departure of the armament from Peiræus — -splendor and exciting character of the spectacle. — Solemnities of -parting, on shipboard and on the water’s edge. — Full muster of the -armament at Korkyra. — Progress to Rhegium — cold reception by the -Italian cities. — Feeling at Syracuse as to the approaching armament -— disposition to undervalue its magnitude, and even to question its -intended coming. — Strenuous exhortations of Hermokratês, to be -prepared. — Temper and parties in the Syracusan assembly. — Reply -of Athenagoras, the popular orator. — Interposition of the stratêgi -to moderate the violence of the debate. — Relative position of -Athenagoras and other parties at Syracuse. — Pacific dispositions of -Athenagoras. — His general denunciations against the oligarchical -youth were well founded. — Active preparations at Syracuse on -the approach of the Athenian armament. — Discouragement of the -Athenians at Rhegium on learning the truth respecting the poverty -of Egesta. — The Athenian generals discuss their plan of action — -opinion of Nikias. — Opinion of Alkibiadês. — Opinion of Lamachus. -— Superior discernment of Lamachus — plan of Alkibiadês preferred. -— Alkibiadês at Messênê — Naxos joins the Athenians. Empty display -of the armament. — Alkibiadês at Katana — the Athenians masters of -Katana — they establish their station there. Refusal of Kamarina. -— Alkibiadês is summoned home to take his trial. — Feelings and -proceedings at Athens since the departure of the armament. — Number -of citizens imprisoned on suspicion — increased agony of the public -mind. — Peisander and Chariklês the commissioners of inquiry. — -Information of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_viii">[p. viii]</span> -Diokleidês. — More prisoners arrested — increased terror in the city -— Andokidês among the persons imprisoned. — Andokidês is solicited -by his fellow-prisoners to stand forward and give information — he -complies. — Andokidês designates the authors of the mutilation of -the Hermæ — consequence of his revelations. — Questionable authority -of Andokidês, as to what he himself really stated in information. -— Belief of the Athenians in his information — its tranquillizing -effects. — Anxiety and alarm revived, respecting the persons -concerned in the profanation of the Eleusinian mysteries. — Revival -of the accusation against Alkibiadês. — Indictment presented by -Thessalus, son of Kimon, against Alkibiadês. — Resolution to send -for Alkibiadês home from Sicily to be tried. — Alkibiadês quits the -army, as if to come home: makes his escape at Thurii, and retires -to Peloponnesus. — Conduct of the Athenian public in reference to -Alkibiadês — how far blamable. Conduct of his enemies. — Mischief -to Athens from the banishment of Alkibiadês. Languid operations -of the Sicilian armament under Nikias. — Increase of confidence -and preparations at Syracuse, arising from the delays of Nikias. — -Manœuvre of Nikias from Katana — he lands his forces in the Great -Harbor of Syracuse. — Return of the Syracusan army from Katana to the -Great Harbor — preparations for fighting Nikias. — Feelings of the -ancient soldier. — Harangue of Nikias. — Battle near the Olympieion — -victory of the Athenians. — Unabated confidence of the Syracusans — -they garrison the Olympieion — Nikias reembarks his army, and returns -to Katana. — He determines to take up his winter quarters at Katana, -and sends to Athens for reinforcements of horse. — His failure at -Messênê, through the betrayal by Alkibiadês. — Salutary lesson to -the Syracusans, arising out of the recent defeat — mischiefs to the -Athenians from the delay of Nikias. — Confidence of the Athenians -at home in Nikias — their good temper — they send to him the -reinforcements demanded. — Determined feeling at Syracuse — improved -measures of defence — recommendations of Hermokratês. — Enlargement -of the fortifications of Syracuse. Improvement of their situation. -Increase of the difficulties of Nikias. — Hermokratês and Euphêmus — -counter-envoys at Kamarina. — Speech of Euphêmus. — The Kamarinæans -maintain practical neutrality. — Winter proceedings of Nikias from -his quarters at Katana. — Syracusan envoys sent to solicit aid from -Corinth and Sparta. — Alkibiadês at Sparta — his intense hostility to -Athens. — Speech of Alkibiadês in the Lacedæmonian assembly. — Great -effect of his speech on the Peloponnesians. — Misrepresentations -contained in the speech. — Resolutions of the Spartans. — The -Lacedæmonians send Gylippus to Syracuse.</p> -<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_58">163-243</a></p> - - -<p class="chap">CHAPTER LIX.</p> -<p class="small center">FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE OF -SYRACUSE BY NIKIAS, DOWN TO THE SECOND ATHENIAN EXPEDITION UNDER -DEMOSTHENES, AND THE RESUMPTION OF THE GENERAL WAR.</p> - -<p class="p1">Movements of Nikias in the early spring. — Local -condition and fortifications of Syracuse, at the time when Nikias -arrived. — Inner and Outer City. — Localities without the wall of -the outer city — Epipolæ. — Possibilities of the siege when Nikias -first arrived in Sicily — increase of difficulties through his delay. -— Increased importance of the upper ground<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_ix">[p. ix]</span> of Epipolæ. Intention of the Syracusans -to occupy the summit of Epipolæ. — The summit is surprised by the -Athenians. — The success of this surprise was essential to the -effective future prosecution of the siege. — First operations of the -siege. — Central work of the Athenians on Epipolæ, called The Circle. -— First counter-wall of the Syracusans. — Its direction, south of -the Athenian circle — its completion. — It is stormed, taken, and -destroyed by the Athenians. — Nikias occupies the southern cliff — -and prosecutes his line of blockade south of the Circle. — Second -counter-work of the Syracusans — reaching across the marsh, south -of Epipolæ, to the river Anapus. — This counter-work attacked and -taken by Lamachus — general battle — death of Lamachus. — Danger -of the Athenian circle and of Nikias — victory of the Athenians. — -Entrance of the Athenian fleet into the Great Harbor. — The southern -portion of the wall of blockade, across the marsh to the Great -Harbor, is prosecuted and nearly finished. — The Syracusans offer no -farther obstruction — despondency at Syracuse — increasing closeness -of the siege. — Order of the besieging operations successively -undertaken by the Athenians. — Triumphant prospects of the Athenians. -Disposition among the Sikels and Italian Greeks to favor them. — -Conduct of Nikias — his correspondents in the interior of Syracuse. -— Confidence of Nikias — comparative languor of his operations. — -Approach of Gylippus — he despairs of relieving Syracuse. — Progress -of Gylippus, in spite of discouraging reports. — Approach of Gylippus -is made known to Nikias. Facility of preventing his farther advance -— Nikias despises him, and leaves him to come unobstructed. He lands -at Himera in Sicily. — Blindness of Nikias — egregious mistake -of letting in Gylippus. — Gylippus levies an army and marches -across Sicily from Himera to Syracuse. — The Corinthian Goggylus -reaches Syracuse before Gylippus — just in time to hinder the town -from capitulating. — Gylippus with his new-levied force enters -Syracuse unopposed. — Unaccountable inaction of Nikias. — Vigorous -and aggressive measures of Gylippus, immediately on arriving. — -Gylippus surprises and captures the Athenian fort of Labdalum. — -He begins the construction of a third counter-wall, on the north -side of the Athenian circle. — Nikias fortifies Cape Plemmyrium. — -Inconveniences of Plemmyrium as a maritime station — mischief which -ensues to the Athenian naval strength. — Operations of Gylippus in -the field — his defeat. — His decisive victory — the Athenians are -shut up within their lines. The Syracusan counter-wall is carried on -so far as to cut the Athenian line of blockade. — Farther defences -provided by Gylippus, joining the higher part of Epipolæ with the -city wall. — Confidence of Gylippus and the Syracusans — aggressive -plans against the Athenians, even on the sea. — Discouragement -of Nikias and the Athenians. — Nikias sends home a despatch to -Athens, soliciting reinforcements. — Despatch of Nikias to the -Athenian people. — Resolution of the Athenians to send Demosthenês -with a second armament. — Remarks upon the despatch of Nikias. — -Former despatches of Nikias. — Effect of his despatch upon the -Athenians. — Treatment of Nikias by the Athenians. — Capital mistake -committed by the Athenians. — Hostilities from Sparta certain and -impending. — Resolution of Sparta to invade Attica forthwith, and -to send farther reinforcements to Sicily.</p> -<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_59">243-286</a></p> - - -<p class="chap"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_x">[p. -x]</span>CHAPTER LX.</p> -<p class="small center">FROM THE RESUMPTION OF DIRECT HOSTILITIES -BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA, DOWN TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN -ARMAMENT IN SICILY.</p> - -<p class="p1">Active warlike preparations throughout Greece during -the winter of 414-413 <small>B.C.</small> — Invasion of Attica by -Agis and the Peloponnesian force — fortification of Dekeleia. — -Second expedition from Athens against Syracuse, under Demosthenês. -— Operations of Gylippus at Syracuse. He determines to attack the -Athenians at sea. — Naval combat in the harbor of Syracuse — the -Athenians victorious. — Gylippus surprises and takes Plemmyrium. -— Important consequences of the capture. — Increased spirits and -confidence of the Syracusans, even for sea-fight. — Efforts of the -Syracusans to procure farther reinforcements from the Sicilian -towns. — Conflicts between the Athenians and Syracusans in the Great -Harbor. — Defeat of a Sicilian reinforcement marching to aid Syracuse -— Renewed attack by Gylippus on the Athenians. — Disadvantages of -the Athenian fleet in the harbor. Their naval tactics impossible in -the narrow space. — Improvements in Syracusan ships suited to the -narrow space. — The Syracusans threaten attack upon the Athenian -naval station. — Additional preparations of Nikias — battle renewed. -— Complete defeat of the Athenians. — Danger of the Athenian -armament — arrival of Demosthenês with the second armament. — Voyage -of Demosthenês from Korkyra. — Imposing effect of his entry into -the Great Harbor. — Revived courage of the Athenians. Judicious -and decisive resolutions of Demosthenês. — Position and plans of -Demosthenês. — Nocturnal march of Demosthenês to surprise Epipolæ, -and turn the Syracusan line of defence. — Partial success at first -— complete and ruinous defeat finally. — Disorder of the Athenians -— great loss in the flight. — Elate spirits, and renewed aggressive -plans, of the Syracusans. — Deliberation and different opinions -of the Athenian generals. — Demosthenês insists on departing from -Sicily — Nikias opposes him. — Demosthenês insists at least on -removing out of the Great Harbor. — Nikias refuses to consent to -such removal. — The armament remains in the Great Harbor, neither -acting nor retiring. — Infatuation of Nikias. — Increase of force -and confidence in Syracuse. — Nikias at length consents to retreat. -Orders for retreat privately circulated. — Eclipse of the moon -— Athenian retreat postponed. — Eclipses considered as signs — -differently interpreted — opinion of Philochorus. — Renewed attacks -of the Syracusans — defeat of the Athenian fleet in the Great Harbor. -— Partial success ashore against Gylippus. — The Syracusans determine -to block up the mouth of the harbor, and destroy or capture the whole -Athenian armament. — Large views of the Syracusans against the power -of Athens — new hazards now opened to endanger that power. — Vast -numbers, and miscellaneous origin, of the combatants now engaged -in fighting for or against Syracuse. — The Syracusans block up the -mouth of the harbor. — The Athenians resolve to force their way -out — preparations made by the generals. — Exhortations of Nikias -on putting the crews aboard. — Agony of Nikias — his efforts to -encourage the officers. — Bold and animated language of Gylippus to -the Syracusan fleet. — Syracusan arrangements.<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_xi">[p. xi]</span> Condition of the Great Harbor — -sympathizing population surrounding it. — Attempt of the Athenian -fleet to break out — battle in the Great Harbor. — Long-continued -and desperate struggle — intense emotion — total defeat of the -Athenians. — Military operations of ancient times — strong emotions -which accompanied them. — Causes of the defeat of the Athenians. — -Feelings of the victors and vanquished after the battle. — Resolution -of Demosthenês and Nikias to make a second attempt — the armament are -too much discouraged to obey. — The Athenians determine to retreat by -land — they postpone their retreat, under false communications from -Syracuse. — The Syracusans block up the roads, to intercept their -retreat. — Retreat of the Athenians — miserable condition of the -army. — Wretchedness arising from abandoning the sick and wounded. — -Attempt of the generals to maintain some order — energy of Nikias. -— Exhortations of Nikias to the suffering army. — Commencement of -the retreat — harassed and impeded by the Syracusans. — Continued -conflict — no progress made by the retreating army. — Violent storm -— effect produced on both parties — change of feeling in the last -two years. — Night march of the Athenians, in an altered direction, -towards the southern sea. — Separation of the two divisions under -Nikias and Demosthenês. The first division under Nikias gets -across the river Erineus. — The rear division under Demosthenês is -pursued, overtaken, and forced to surrender. — Gylippus overtakes -and attacks the division of Nikias. — Nikias gets to the river -Asinarus — intolerable thirst and suffering of the soldiers — he -and his division become prisoners. — Total numbers captured. — Hard -treatment and sufferings of the Athenian prisoners at Syracuse. — -Treatment of Nikias and Demosthenês — difference of opinion among -the conquerors. — Influence of the Corinthians — efforts of Gylippus -— both the generals are slain. — Disgrace of Nikias after his -death, at Athens — continued respect for the memory of Demosthenês. -— Opinion of Thucydidês about Nikias. — How far that opinion is -just. — Opinion of the Athenians about Nikias — their steady -over-confidence and over-esteem for him, arising from his respectable -and religious character. — Over-confidence in Nikias was the greatest -personal mistake which the Athenian public ever committed.</p> -<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_60">287-352</a></p> - - -<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXI.</p> -<p class="small center">FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT -IN SICILY, DOWN TO THE OLIGARCHICAL CONSPIRACY OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AT -ATHENS.</p> - -<p class="p1">Consequences of the ruin of the Athenian armament in -Sicily. — Occupation of Dekeleia by the Lacedæmonians — its ruinous -effects upon Athens. — Athens becomes a military post — heavy duty -in arms imposed upon the citizens. — Financial pressure. — Athens -dismisses her Thracian mercenaries — massacre at Mykalêssus. — The -Thracians driven back with slaughter by the Thebans. — Athenian -station at Naupaktus — decline of the naval superiority of Athens. -— Naval battle near Naupaktus — indecisive result. — Last news of -the Athenians from Syracuse — ruin of the army there not officially -made known to them. — Reluctance of the Athenians to believe the full -truth. — Terror and affliction at Athens. — Energetic resolutions -adopted by the Athenians — Board of Probûli. — Prodigious<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_xii">[p. xii]</span> effect of the -catastrophe upon all Greeks — enemies and allies of Athens as well -as neutrals — and even on the Persians. — Motions of king Agis. — -The Eubœans apply to Agis for aid in revolting from Athens — the -Lesbians also apply, and are preferred. — The Chians, with the same -view, make application to Sparta. — Envoys from Tissaphernês and -Pharnabazus come to Sparta at the same time. — Alkibiadês at Sparta — -his recommendations determine the Lacedæmonians to send aid to Chios. -— Synod of the Peloponnesian allies at Corinth — measures resolved. — -Isthmian festival — scruples of the Corinthians — delay about Chios -— suspicions of Athens. — Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth to Chios -— it is defeated by the Athenians. — Small squadron starts from -Sparta under Chalkideus and Alkibiadês, to go to Chios. — Energetic -advice of Alkibiadês — his great usefulness to Sparta. — Arrival of -Alkibiadês at Chios — revolt of the island from Athens. — General -population of Chios was disinclined to revolt from Athens. — Dismay -occasioned at Athens by the revolt of Chios — the Athenians set free -and appropriate their reserved fund. — Athenian force despatched to -Chios under Strombichidês. — Activity of the Chians in promoting -revolt among the other Athenian allies — Alkibiadês determines -Milêtus to revolt. — First alliance between the Peloponnesians and -Tissaphernês, concluded by Chalkideus at Milêtus. — Dishonorable -and disadvantageous conditions of the treaty. — Energetic efforts -of Athens — democratical revolution at Samos. — Peloponnesian fleet -at Kenchreæ — Astyochus is sent as Spartan admiral to Ionia. — -Expedition of the Chians against Lesbos. — Ill success of the Chians -— Lesbos is maintained by the Athenians. — Harassing operations of -the Athenians against Chios. — Hardships suffered by the Chians — -prosperity of the island up to this time. — Fresh forces from Athens -— victory of the Athenians near Milêtus. — Fresh Peloponnesian forces -arrive — the Athenians retire, pursuant to the strong recommendation -of Phrynichus. — Capture of Iasus by the Peloponnesians — rich -plunder — Amorgês made prisoner. — Tissaphernês begins to furnish -pay to the Peloponnesian fleet. He reduces the rate of pay for the -future. — Powerful Athenian fleet at Samos — unexpected renovation of -the navy of Athens. — Astyochus at Chios and on the opposite coast. -— Pedaritus, Lacedæmonian governor at Chios — disagreement between -him and Astyochus. — Astyochus abandons Chios and returns to Milêtus -— accident whereby he escaped the Athenian fleet. — The Athenians -establish a fortified post in Chios, to ravage the island. — Dorieus -arrives on the Asiatic coast with a squadron from Thurii, to join -Astyochus — maritime contests near Knidus. — Second Peloponnesian -treaty with Tissaphernês, concluded by Astyochus and Theramenês. -— Comparison of the second treaty with the first. — Arrival of a -fresh Peloponnesian squadron under Antisthenês at Kaunus — Lichas -comes out as Spartan commissioner. — Astyochus goes with the fleet -from Milêtus to join the newly-arrived squadron — he defeats the -Athenian squadron under Charmînus. — Peloponnesian fleet at Knidus -— double dealing of Tissaphernês — breach between him and Lichas. — -Peloponnesian fleet masters Rhodes, and establishes itself in that -island. — Long inaction of the fleet at Rhodes — paralyzing intrigues -of Tissaphernês — corruption of the Lacedæmonian officers.</p> -<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_61">353-402</a></p> - -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="Chap_55"> - <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_1">[p. 1]</a></span></p> - <p class="falseh1">HISTORY OF GREECE.</p> - <hr class="sep2" /> - <p class="xl center">PART II.<br /> - <small>CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.</small></p> - <hr class="sep2" /> - <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LV.<br /> - FROM THE PEACE OF NIKIAS TO THE OLYMPIC FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD NINETY.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">My</span> -last chapter and last volume terminated with the peace called the -Peace of Nikias, concluded in March 421 <small>B.C.</small>, between -Athens and the Spartan confederacy, for fifty years.</p> - -<p>This peace—negotiated during the autumn and winter succeeding -the defeat of the Athenians at Amphipolis, wherein both Kleon and -Brasidas were slain—resulted partly from the extraordinary anxiety -of the Spartans to recover their captives who had been taken at -Sphakteria, partly from the discouragement of the Athenians, leading -them to listen to the peace-party who acted with Nikias. The general -principle adopted for the peace was, the restitution by both parties -of what had been acquired by war, yet excluding such places as had -been surrendered by capitulation: according to which reserve the -Athenians, while prevented from recovering Platæa, continued to hold -Nisæa, the harbor of Megara. The Lacedæmonians engaged to restore -Amphipolis to Athens, and to relinquish their connection with the -revolted allies of Athens in Thrace; that is, Argilus, Stageirus, -Akanthus, Skôlus, Olynthus, and Spartôlus. These six cities, however, -were not to be enrolled as allies of Athens unless they chose -voluntarily to become so, but only to pay reg<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_2">[p. 2]</span>ularly to Athens the tribute originally -assessed by Aristeidês, as a sort of recompense for the protection -of the Ægean sea against private war or piracy. Any inhabitant of -Amphipolis or the other cities, who chose to leave them, was at -liberty to do so, and to carry away his property. Farther, the -Lacedæmonians covenanted to restore Panaktum to Athens, together -with all the Athenian prisoners in their possession. As to Skiônê, -Torônê, and Sermylus, the Athenians were declared free to take their -own measures. On their part, they engaged to release all captives -in their hands, either of Sparta or her allies; to restore Pylus, -Kythêra, Methônê, Pteleon, and Atalantê; and to liberate all the -Peloponnesian or Brasidean soldiers now under blockade in Skiônê.</p> - -<p>Provision was also made, by special articles, that all Greeks should -have free access to the sacred Pan-Hellenic festivals, either by -land or sea; and that the autonomy of the Delphian temple should be -guaranteed.</p> - -<p>The contracting parties swore to abstain in future from all -injury to each other, and to settle by amicable decision any -dispute which might arise.<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" -class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<p>Lastly, it was provided that if any matter should afterwards occur -as having been forgotten, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians might by -mutual consent amend the treaty as they thought fit. So prepared, the -oaths were interchanged between seventeen principal Athenians and as -many principal Lacedæmonians.</p> - -<p>Earnestly bent as Sparta herself was upon the peace, and ratified -as it had been by the vote of a majority among her confederates, -still, there was a powerful minority who not only refused their -assent but strenuously protested against its conditions. The -Corinthians were discontented because they did not receive back -Sollium and Anaktorium; the Megarians, because they did not regain -Nisæa; the Bœotians, because Panaktum was to be restored to Athens: -the Eleians also on some other ground which we do not distinctly -know. All of them, moreover, took common offence at the article -which provided that Athens and Sparta might, by mutual consent, -and without consulting the allies, amend the treaty in any way -that they thought proper.<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" -class="fnanchor">[2]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_3">[p. -3]</span> Though the peace was sworn, therefore, the most powerful -members of the Spartan confederacy remained all recusant.</p> - -<p>So strong was the interest of the Spartans themselves, however, -that having obtained the favorable vote of the majority, they -resolved to carry the peace through, even at the risk of breaking -up the confederacy. Besides the earnest desire of recovering their -captives from the Athenians, they were farther alarmed by the fact -that their truce for thirty years concluded with Argos was just now -expiring. They had indeed made application to Argos for renewing -it, through Lichas the Spartan proxenus of that city. But the -Argeians had refused, except upon the inadmissible condition that -the border territory of Kynuria should be ceded to them: there was -reason to fear therefore that this new and powerful force might be -thrown into the scale of Athens, if war were allowed to continue.<a -id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> - -<p>Accordingly, no sooner had the peace been sworn than the Spartans -proceeded to execute its provisions. Lots being drawn to determine -whether Sparta or Athens should be the first to make the cessions -required, the Athenians drew the favorable lot: an advantage so -very great, under the circumstances, that Theophrastus affirmed -Nikias to have gained the point by bribery. There is no ground for -believing such alleged bribery; the rather, as we shall presently -find Nikias gratuitously throwing away most of the benefit which -the lucky lot conferred.<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" -class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> - -<p>The Spartans began their compliance by forthwith releasing all -the Athenian prisoners in their hands, and despatching Ischagoras -with two other envoys to Amphipolis and the Thracian towns. These -envoys were directed to proclaim the peace as well as to enforce -its observance upon the Thracian towns, and especially to command -Klearidas, the Spartan commander in Amphipolis, that he should -surrender the town to the Athenians. But on arriving in Thrace, these -envoys met with nothing but unanimous opposition: and so energetic -were the remonstrances of the Chalkidians, both in Amphipolis -and out of it, that even Klearidas refused obedience to his own -government, pretending that he was not strong enough to surrender the -place against the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_4">[p. 4]</span> -resistance of the Chalkidians. Thus completely baffled, the envoys -returned to Sparta, whither Klearidas thought it prudent to accompany -them, partly to explain his own conduct, partly in hopes of being -able to procure some modification of the terms. But he found this -impossible, and he was sent back to Amphipolis with peremptory orders -to surrender the place to the Athenians, if it could possibly be -done; if that should prove beyond his force, then to come away, and -bring home every Peloponnesian soldier in the garrison. Perhaps the -surrender was really impracticable to a force no greater than that -which Klearidas commanded, since the reluctance of the population -was doubtless obstinate. At any rate, he represented it to be -impracticable: the troops accordingly came home, but the Athenians -still remained excluded from Amphipolis, and all the stipulations of -the peace respecting the Thracian towns remained unperformed. Nor -was this all. The envoys from the recusant minority (Corinthians and -others), after having gone home for instructions, had now come back -to Sparta with increased repugnance and protest against the injustice -of the peace, so that all the efforts of the Spartans to bring them -to compliance were fruitless.<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" -class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p> - -<p>The latter were now in serious embarrassment. Not having executed -their portion of the treaty, they could not demand that Athens should -execute hers: and they were threatened with the double misfortune of -forfeiting the confidence of their allies without acquiring any one -of the advantages of the treaty. In this dilemma they determined to -enter into closer relations, and separate relations, with Athens, -at all hazard of offending their allies. Of the enmity of Argos, -if unaided by Athens, they had little apprehension; while the -moment was now favorable for alliance with Athens, from the decided -pacific tendencies reigning on both sides, as well as from the -known philo-Laconian sentiment of the leaders Nikias and Lachês. -The Athenian envoys had remained at Sparta ever since the swearing -of the peace, awaiting the fulfilment of the conditions; Nikias -or Lachês, one or both, being very probably among them. When they -saw that Sparta was unable to fulfil her bond, so that the treaty -seemed likely to be cancelled, they would doubtless encourage, and -per<span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">[p. 5]</span>haps may even -have suggested, the idea of a separate alliance between Sparta and -Athens, as the only expedient for covering the deficiency; promising -that under that alliance the Spartan captives should be restored. -Accordingly, a treaty was concluded between the two, for fifty -years; not merely of peace, but of defensive alliance. Each party -pledged itself to assist in repelling any invaders of the territory -of the other, to treat them as enemies, and not to conclude peace -with them without the consent of the other. This was the single -provision of the alliance, with one addition, however, of no mean -importance, for the security of Lacedæmon. The Athenians engaged -to lend their best and most energetic aid in putting down any -rising of the Helots which might occur in Laconia. Such a provision -indicates powerfully the uneasiness felt by the Lacedæmonians -respecting their serf-population: but at the present moment it was -of peculiar value to them, since it bound the Athenians to restrain, -if not to withdraw, the Messenian garrison of Pylos, planted there -by themselves for the express purpose of provoking the Helots to -revolt.</p> - -<p>An alliance with stipulations so few and simple took no long -time to discuss. It was concluded very speedily after the return -of the envoys from Amphipolis, probably not more than a month or -two after the former peace. It was sworn to by the same individuals -on both sides; with similar declaration that the oath should be -annually renewed, and also with similar proviso that Sparta and -Athens might by mutual consent either enlarge or contract the terms, -without violating the oath.<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" -class="fnanchor">[6]</a> Moreover, the treaty was directed to be -inscribed on two columns: one to be set up in the temple of Apollo -at Amyklæ, the other in the temple of Athênê, in the acropolis of -Athens.</p> - -<p>The most important result of this new alliance was something<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_6">[p. 6]</span> not specified in its -provisions, but understood, we may be well assured, between the -Spartan ephors and Nikias at the time when it was concluded. All the -Spartan captives at Athens were forthwith restored.<a id="FNanchor_7" -href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p> - -<p>Nothing can demonstrate more powerfully the pacific and -acquiescent feeling now reigning at Athens, as well as the strong -philo-Laconian inclinations of her leading men (at this moment -Alkibiadês was competing with Nikias for the favor of Sparta, as -will be stated presently), than the terms of this alliance, which -bound Athens to assist in keeping down the Helots, and the still more -important after-proceeding, of restoring the Spartan captives. Athens -thus parted irrevocably with her best card, and promised to renounce -her second best, without obtaining the smallest equivalent beyond -what was contained in the oath of Sparta to become her ally. For the -last three years and a half, ever since the capture of Sphakteria, -the possession of these captives had placed her in a position of -decided advantage in regard to her chief enemy; advantage, however, -which had to a certain extent been countervailed by subsequent -losses. This state of things was fairly enough represented by the -treaty of peace deliberately discussed during the winter, and sworn -to at the commencement of spring, whereby a string of concessions, -reciprocal and balancing, had been imposed on both parties. Moreover, -Athens had been lucky enough in drawing lots to find herself enabled -to wait for the actual fulfilment of such concessions by the -Spartans, before she consummated her own. Now the Spartans had not -as yet realized any one of their promised concessions: nay, more; in -trying to do so, they had displayed such a want either of power or -of will, as made it plain, that nothing short of the most stringent -necessity would convert their promises into realities. Yet, under -these marked indications, Nikias persuades his countrymen to conclude -a second treaty which practically annuls the first, and which insures -to the Spartans gratuitously all the main benefits of the first, with -little or none of the correlative sacrifices. The alliance of Sparta -could hardly be said to count as a consideration: for that alliance -was at this moment, under the uncertain relations with Argos,<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_7">[p. 7]</span> not less valuable to -Sparta herself than to Athens. There can be little doubt that, if -the game of Athens had now been played with prudence, she might have -recovered Amphipolis in exchange for the captives: for the inability -of Klearidas to make over the place, even if we grant it to have -been a real fact and not merely simulated, might have been removed -by decisive coöperation on the part of Sparta with an Athenian -armament sent to occupy the place. In fact, that which Athens was now -induced to grant was precisely the original proposition transmitted -to her by the Lacedæmonians four years before, when the hoplites -were first inclosed in Sphakteria, but before the actual capture. -They then tendered no equivalent, but merely said, through their -envoys, “Give us the men in the island, and accept in exchange peace, -together with our alliance.”<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" -class="fnanchor">[8]</a> At that moment there were some plausible -reasons in favor of granting the proposition: but even then, the -case of Kleon against it was also plausible and powerful, when he -contended that Athens was entitled to make a better bargain. But -<i>now</i>, there were no reasons in its favor, and a strong concurrence -of reasons against it. Alliance with the Spartans was of no great -value to Athens: peace was of material importance to her; but -peace had been already sworn to on both sides, after deliberate -discussion, and required now only to be carried into execution. That -equal reciprocity of concession, which presented the best chance of -permanent result, had been agreed on; and fortune had procured for -her the privilege of receiving the purchase-money before she handed -over the goods. Why renounce so advantageous a position, accepting -in exchange a hollow and barren alliance, under the obligation of -handing over her most precious merchandise upon credit, and upon -credit as delusive in promise as it afterwards proved unproductive -in reality? The alliance, in fact, prevented the peace from being -fulfilled: it became, as Thucydidês himself<a id="FNanchor_9" -href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> admits, no peace, but a -simple suspension of direct hostilities.</p> - -<p>Thucydidês states on more than one occasion, and it was the<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_8">[p. 8]</span> sentiment of Nikias -himself, that at the moment of concluding the peace which bears his -name, the position of Sparta was one of disadvantage and dishonor -in reference to Athens;<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" -class="fnanchor">[10]</a> alluding chiefly to the captives in the -hands of the latter; for as to other matters, the defeats of Delium -and Amphipolis, with the serious losses in Thrace, would more than -countervail the acquisitions of Nisæa, Pylus, Kythêra, and Methônê. -Yet so inconsiderate and short-sighted were the philo-Laconian -leanings of Nikias and the men who now commanded confidence at -Athens, that they threw away this advantage, suffered Athens to be -cheated of all those hopes which they had themselves held out as the -inducement for peace, and nevertheless yielded gratuitously to Sparta -all the main points which she desired. Most certainly there was never -any public recommendation of Kleon, as far as our information goes, -so ruinously impolitic as this alliance with Sparta and surrender -of the captives, wherein both Nikias and Alkibiadês concurred. -Probably the Spartan ephors amused Nikias, and he amused the Athenian -assembly, with fallacious assurances of certain obedience in Thrace, -under alleged peremptory orders given to Klearidas. And now that -the vehement leather-dresser, with his criminative eloquence, had -passed away, replaced only by an inferior successor, the lamp-maker<a -id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> -Hyperbolus, and leaving the Athenian public under the undisputed -guidance of citizens eminent for birth and station, descended from -gods and heroes, there remained no one to expose effectively the -futility of such assurances, or to enforce the lesson of simple and -obvious prudence: “Wait, as you are entitled to wait, until the -Spartans have performed the onerous part of their bargain, before -you perform the onerous part of yours. Or, if you choose to relax in -regard to some of the concessions which they have sworn to make, at -any rate stick to the capital point of all, and lay before them the -peremptory alternative—Amphipolis in exchange for the captives.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_9">[p. 9]</span></p> - -<p>The Athenians were not long in finding out how completely they -had forfeited the advantage of their position, and their chief -means of enforcement, by giving up the captives; which imparted a -freedom of action to Sparta such as she had never enjoyed since -the first blockade of Sphakteria. Yet it seems that under the -present ephors Sparta was not guilty of any deliberate or positive -act which could be called a breach of faith. She gave orders to -Klearidas to surrender Amphipolis if he could; if not, to evacuate -it, and bring the Peloponnesian troops home. Of course, the place -was not surrendered to the Athenians, but evacuated; and she then -considered that she had discharged her duty to Athens, as far as -Amphipolis was concerned, though she had sworn to restore it, and her -oath remained unperformed.<a id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" -class="fnanchor">[12]</a> The other Thracian towns were equally -deaf to her persuasions, and equally obstinate in their hostility -to Athens. So also were the Bœotians, Corinthians, Megarians, and -Eleians: but the Bœotians, while refusing to become parties to -the truce along with Sparta, concluded for themselves a separate -convention or armistice with Athens, terminable at ten days’ -notice on either side.<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" -class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p> - -<p>In this state of things, though ostensible relations of peace and -free reciprocity of intercourse between Athens and Peloponnesus were -established, the discontent of the Athenians, and the remonstrances -of their envoys at Sparta, soon became serious. The Lacedæmonians -had sworn for themselves and their allies, yet the most powerful -among these allies, and those whose enmity was most important -to Athens, continued still recusant. Neither Panaktum, nor the -Athenian prisoners in Bœotia, were yet restored to Athens; nor had -the Thracian cities yet submitted to the peace. In reply to the -remonstrances of the Athenian envoys, the Lacedæmonians affirmed -that they had already surrendered all the Athenian prisoners in -their own hands, and had withdrawn their troops from Thrace, -which was, they said, all the intervention in their power, since -they were not masters of Amphipolis, nor capable of constraining -the Thracian cities against their will. As to the Bœotians and -Corinthians, the Lacedæmonians went so<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_10">[p. 10]</span> far as to profess readiness to take -arms along with Athens,<a id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" -class="fnanchor">[14]</a> for the purpose of constraining them to -accept the peace, and even spoke about naming a day, after which -these recusant states should be proclaimed as joint enemies, both -by Sparta and Athens. But their propositions were always confined -to vague words, nor would they consent to bind themselves by any -written or peremptory instrument. Nevertheless, so great was their -confidence either in the sufficiency of these assurances, or in the -facility of Nikias, that they ventured to require from Athens the -surrender of Pylus, or at least the withdrawal of the Messenian -garrison with the Helot deserters from that place, leaving in it none -but native Athenian soldiers, until farther progress should be made -in the peace. But the feeling of the Athenians was now seriously -altered, and they received this demand with marked coldness. None -of the stipulations of the treaty in their favor had yet been -performed, none even seemed in course of being performed: so that -they now began to suspect Sparta of dishonesty and deceit, and -deeply regretted their inconsiderate surrender of the captives.<a -id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> Their -remonstrances at Sparta, often repeated during the course of the -summer, produced no positive effect: nevertheless, they suffered -themselves to be persuaded to remove the Messenians and Helots from -Pylus to Kephallenia, replacing them by an Athenian garrison.<a -id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a></p> - -<p>The Athenians had doubtless good reason to complain of Sparta. But -the persons of whom they had still better reason to complain, were -Nikias and their own philo-Laconian leaders; who had first accepted -from Sparta promises doubtful as to execution, and next—though -favored by the lot in regard to priority of cession, and thus -acquiring proof that Sparta either would not or could not perform her -promises—renounced all these advantages, and<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_11">[p. 11]</span> procured for Sparta almost gratuitously -the only boon for which she seriously cared. The many critics on -Grecian history, who think no term too harsh for the demagogue Kleon, -ought in fairness to contrast his political counsel with that of his -rivals, and see which of the two betokens greater forethought in the -management of the foreign relations of Athens. Amphipolis had been -once lost by the improvident watch of Thucydidês and Euklês: it was -now again lost by the improvident concessions of Nikias.</p> - -<p>So much was the Peloponnesian alliance unhinged by the number of -states which had refused the peace, and so greatly was the ascendency -of Sparta for the time impaired, that new combinations were now -springing up in the peninsula. It has already been mentioned that -the truce between Argos and Sparta was just now expiring: Argos -therefore was free, with her old pretensions to the headship of -Peloponnesus, backed by an undiminished fulness of wealth, power, and -population. Having taken no direct part in the late exhausting war, -she had even earned money by lending occasional aid on both sides;<a -id="FNanchor_17" href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> -while her military force was just now farther strengthened by a -step of very considerable importance. She had recently set apart a -body of a thousand select hoplites, composed of young men of wealth -and station, to receive constant military training at the public -expense, and to be enrolled as a separate regiment by themselves, -apart from the other citizens.<a id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" -class="fnanchor">[18]</a> To a democratical government like Argos, -such<span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">[p. 12]</span> an institution -was internally dangerous, and pregnant with mischief, which will be -hereafter described. But at the present moment, the democratical -leaders of Argos seem to have thought only of the foreign relations -of their city, now that her truce with Sparta was expiring, and -that the disorganized state of the Spartan confederacy opened new -chances to her ambition of regaining something like headship in -Peloponnesus.</p> - -<p>The discontent of the recusant Peloponnesian allies was now -inducing them to turn their attention towards Argos as a new chief. -They had mistrusted Sparta, even before the peace, well knowing -that she had separate interests from the confederacy, arising from -desire to get back her captives: in the terms of peace, it seemed -as if Sparta and Athens alone were regarded, the interests of the -remaining allies, especially those in Thrace, being put out of -sight. Moreover, that article in the treaty of peace whereby it was -provided that Athens and Sparta might by mutual consent add or strike -out any article that they chose, without consulting the allies, -excited general alarm, as if Sparta were meditating some treason in -conjunction with Athens against the confederacy.<a id="FNanchor_19" -href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> And the alarm, once -roused, was still farther aggravated by the separate treaty of -alliance between Sparta and Athens, which followed so closely -afterwards, as well as by the restoration of the Spartan captives.</p> - -<p>Such general displeasure among the Peloponnesian states at the -unexpected combination of Athenians and Lacedæmonians, strengthened -in the case of each particular state by private interests of its own, -first manifested itself openly through the Corinthians. On retiring -from the conferences at Sparta,—where the recent alliance between -the Athenians and Spartans had just been made known, and where the -latter had vainly endeavored to prevail upon their allies to accept -the peace,—the Corinthians went straight to Argos to communicate -what had passed, and to solicit interference. They suggested to the -leading men in that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">[p. 13]</span> -city, that it was now the duty of Argos to step forward as saviour -of Peloponnesus, which the Lacedæmonians were openly betraying to -the common enemy, and to invite for that purpose, into alliance for -reciprocal defence, every autonomous Hellenic state which would -bind itself to give and receive amicable satisfaction in all points -of difference. They affirmed that many cities, from hatred of -Sparta, would gladly comply with such invitation; especially if a -board of commissioners in small number were named, with full powers -to admit all suitable applicants; so that, in case of rejection, -there might at least be no exposure before the public assembly -in the Argeian democracy. This suggestion—privately made by the -Corinthians, who returned home immediately afterwards—was eagerly -adopted both by leaders and people at Argos, as promising to realize -their long-cherished pretensions to headship. Twelve commissioners -were accordingly appointed, with power to admit any new allies whom -they might think eligible, except Athens and Sparta. With either of -those two cities, no treaty was allowed without the formal sanction -of the public assembly.<a id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" -class="fnanchor">[20]</a></p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the Corinthians, though they had been the first -to set the Argeians in motion, nevertheless thought it right, -before enrolling themselves publicly in the new alliance, to -invite a congress of Peloponnesian malcontents to Corinth. It was -the Mantineians who made the first application to Argos under -the notice just issued. And here we are admitted to a partial -view of the relations among the secondary and interior states of -Peloponnesus. Mantineia and Tegea, being conterminous as well as -the two most considerable states in Arcadia, were in perpetual -rivalry, which had shown itself only a year and a half before in a -bloody but indecisive battle.<a id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21" -class="fnanchor">[21]</a> Tegea, situated on the frontiers of -Laconia, and oligarchically governed, was tenaciously attached -to Sparta: while for that very reason, as well as from the -democratical character of her government, Mantineia was less so, -though she was still enrolled in and acted as a member of the -Peloponnesian confederacy. She had recently conquered for herself<a -id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> -a little empire in her own neighborhood, composed of<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_14">[p. 14]</span> village districts in -Arcadia, reckoned as her subject allies, and comrades in her ranks -at the last battle with Tegea. This conquest had been made even -during the continuance of the war with Athens; a period when the -lesser states of Peloponnesus generally, and even subject-states -as against their own imperial states, were under the guarantee of -the confederacy, to which they were required to render their unpaid -service against the common enemy; so that she was apprehensive of -Lacedæmonian interference at the request and for the emancipation of -these subjects, who lay, moreover, near to the borders of Laconia. -Such interference would probably have been invoked earlier; only -that Sparta had been under pressing embarrassments—and farther, had -assembled no general muster of the confederacy against Athens—ever -since the disaster in Sphakteria. But now she had her hands free, -together with a good pretext as well as motive for interference.</p> - -<p>To maintain the autonomy of all the little states, and prevent -any of them from being mediatized or grouped into aggregations -under the ascendency of the greater, had been the general policy of -Sparta; especially since her own influence as general leader was -increased by insuring to every lesser state a substantive vote at the -meetings of the confederacy.<a id="FNanchor_23" href="#Footnote_23" -class="fnanchor">[23]</a> Moreover, the rivalry of Tegea would -probably operate here as an auxiliary motive against Mantineia. -Under such apprehensions, the Mantineians hastened to court the -alliance and protection of Argos, with whom they enjoyed the -additional sympathy of a common democracy. Such revolt from Sparta<a -id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> -(for so it was considered) excited great sensation throughout -Peloponnesus, together with considerable disposition, amidst the -discontent then prevalent, to follow the example.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">[p. 15]</span></p> - -<p>In particular, it contributed much to enhance the importance -of the congress at Corinth; whither the Lacedæmonians thought it -necessary to send special envoys to counteract the intrigues going -on against them. Their envoy addressed to the Corinthians strenuous -remonstrance, and even reproach, for the leading part which they -had taken in stirring up dissension among the old confederates, -and organizing a new confederacy under the presidency of Argos. -“They (the Corinthians) were thus aggravating the original guilt -and perjury which they had committed by setting at nought the -formal vote of a majority of the confederacy, and refusing to -accept the peace,—for it was the sworn and fundamental maxim of the -confederacy, that the decision of the majority should be binding -on all, except in such cases as involved some offence to gods or -heroes.” Encouraged by the presence of many sympathizing deputies, -Bœotian, Megarian, Chalkidian from Thrace,<a id="FNanchor_25" -href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> etc., the Corinthians -replied with firmness. But they did not think it good policy to -proclaim their real ground for rejecting the peace, namely, that -it had not procured for themselves the restoration of Sollium and -Anaktorium: since, first, this was a question in which their allies -present had no interest; next, it did not furnish any valid excuse -for their resistance to the vote of the majority. Accordingly, they -took their stand upon a pretence at once generous and religious; -upon that reserve for religious scruples, which the Lacedæmonian -envoy had himself admitted, and which of course was to be construed -by each member with reference to his own pious feeling. “It <i>was</i> a -religious impediment (the Corinthians contended) which prevented us -from acceding to the peace with Athens, notwithstanding the vote of -the majority; for we had previously exchanged oaths, ourselves apart -from the confederacy, with the Chalkidians of Thrace at the time -when they revolted from Athens: and we should have infringed those -separate oaths, had we accepted a treaty of peace in which these -Chalkidians were abandoned. As for alliance with Argos, we consider -ourselves free to adopt any<span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">[p. -16]</span> resolution which we may deem suitable, after consultation -with our friends here present.” With this unsatisfactory answer the -Lacedæmonian envoys were compelled to return home. Yet some Argeian -envoys, who were also present in the assembly for the purpose of -urging the Corinthians to realize forthwith the hopes of alliance -which they had held out to Argos, were still unable on their side -to obtain a decided affirmative, being requested to come again -at the next conference.<a id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26" -class="fnanchor">[26]</a></p> - -<p>Though the Corinthians had themselves originated the idea of -the new Argeian confederacy and compromised Argos in an open -proclamation, yet they now hesitated about the execution of their -own scheme. They were restrained in part doubtless by the bitterness -of Lacedæmonian reproof; for the open consummation of this revolt, -apart from its grave political consequences, shocked a train of very -old feelings; but still more by the discovery that their friends, -who agreed with them in rejecting the peace, decidedly refused -all open revolt from Sparta and all alliance with Argos. In this -category were the Bœotians and Megarians. Both of these states—left -to their own impression and judgment by the Lacedæmonians, who did -not address to them any distinct appeal as they had done to the -Corinthians—spontaneously turned away from Argos, not less from -aversion towards the Argeian democracy than from sympathy with -the oligarchy at Sparta:<a id="FNanchor_27" href="#Footnote_27" -class="fnanchor">[27]</a> they were linked together by<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_17">[p. 17]</span> communion of interest, -not merely as being both neighbors and intense enemies of Attica, -but as each having a body of democratical exiles who might perhaps -find encouragement at Argos. Discouraged by the resistance of these -two important allies, the Corinthians hung back from visiting Argos, -until they were pushed forward by a new accidental impulse, the -application of the Eleians; who, eagerly embracing the new project, -sent envoys first to conclude alliance with the Corinthians, and next -to go on and enroll Elis as an ally of Argos. This incident so<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_18">[p. 18]</span> confirmed the Corinthians -in their previous scheme, that they speedily went to Argos, along -with the Chalkidians of Thrace, to join the new confederacy.</p> - -<p>The conduct of Elis, like that of Mantineia, in thus revolting -from Sparta, had been dictated by private grounds of quarrel, arising -out of relations with their dependent ally Lepreum. The Lepreates -had become dependent on Elis some time before the beginning of the -Peloponnesian war, in consideration of aid lent by the Eleians to -extricate them from a dangerous war against some Arcadian enemies. -To purchase such aid, they had engaged to cede to the Eleians half -their territory; but had been left in residence and occupation of it, -under the stipulation of paying one talent yearly as tribute to the -Olympian Zeus; in other words, to the Eleians as his stewards. When -the Peloponnesian war began,<a id="FNanchor_28" href="#Footnote_28" -class="fnanchor">[28]</a> and the Lacedæmonians began to call for -the unpaid service of the Peloponnesian cities generally, small as -well as great, against Athens, the Lepreates were, by the standing -agreement of the confederacy, exempted for the time from continuing -to pay their tribute to Elis. Such exemption ceased with the war; at -the close of which Elis became entitled, under the same agreement, -to resume the suspended tribute. She accordingly required that the -payment should then be recommenced: but the Lepreates refused, and -when she proceeded to apply force, threw themselves on the protection -of Sparta, by whose decision the Eleians themselves at first agreed -to abide, having the general agreement of the confederacy decidedly -in their favor. But it presently appeared that Sparta was more -disposed to carry out her general system of favoring the autonomy -of the lesser states, than to enforce the positive agreement of the -confederacy. Accordingly the Eleians, accusing her of unjust bias, -renounced her authority as arbitrator, and sent a military force -to occupy Lepreum. Nevertheless, the Spartans persisted in their -adjudication, pronounced Lepreum to be autonomous, and sent a body -of their own hoplites to defend it against<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_19">[p. 19]</span> the Eleians. The latter loudly protested -against this proceeding, and pronounced the Lacedæmonians as -having robbed them of one of their dependencies, contrary to that -agreement which had been adopted by the general confederacy when -the war began,—to the effect that each imperial city should receive -back at the end of the war all the dependencies which it possessed -at the beginning, on condition of waiving its title to tribute -and military service from them so long as the war lasted. After -fruitless remonstrances with Sparta, the Eleians eagerly embraced the -opportunity now offered of revolting from her, and of joining the new -league with Corinth and Argos.<a id="FNanchor_29" href="#Footnote_29" -class="fnanchor">[29]</a></p> - -<p>That new league, including Argos, Corinth, Elis, and Mantineia, -had now acquired such strength and confidence, that the Argeians -and Corinthians proceeded on a joint embassy to Tegea to obtain the -junction of that city, seemingly the most<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_20">[p. 20]</span> powerful in Peloponnesus next to Sparta -and Argos. What grounds they had for expecting success we are -not told. The mere fact of Mantineia having joined Argos, seemed -likely to deter Tegea, as the rival Arcadian power, from doing -the same: and so it proved, for the Tegeans decidedly refused the -proposal, not without strenuous protestations that they would stand -by Sparta in everything. The Corinthians were greatly disheartened -by this repulse, which they had by no means expected, having been -so far misled by general expressions of discontent against Sparta -as to believe that they could transfer nearly the whole body of -confederates to Argos. But they now began to despair of all farther -extension of Argeian headship, and even to regard their own position -as insecure on the side of Athens; with whom they were not at peace, -while by joining Argos they had forfeited their claim upon Sparta -and all her confederacy, including Bœotia and Megara. In this -embarrassment they betook themselves to the Bœotians, whom they again -entreated to join them in the Argeian alliance: a request already -once refused, and not likely to be now granted, but intended to usher -in a different request preferred at the same time. The Bœotians were -entreated to accompany the Corinthians to Athens, and obtain for them -from the Athenians an armistice terminable at ten days’ notice, such -as that which they had contracted for themselves. In case of refusal, -they were farther entreated to throw up their own agreement, and to -conclude no other without the concurrence of the Corinthians. So -far the Bœotians complied, as to go to Athens with the Corinthians, -and back their application for an armistice, which the Athenians -declined to grant, saying that the Corinthians were already included -in the general peace, if they were allies of Sparta. On receiving -this answer the Corinthians entreated the Bœotians, putting it as -a matter of obligation, to renounce their own armistice, and make -common cause as to all future compact. But this request was steadily -refused. The Bœotians maintained their ten days’ armistice; and the -Corinthians were obliged to acquiesce in their existing condition of -peace <i>de facto</i>, though not guaranteed by any pledge of Athens.<a -id="FNanchor_30" href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">[p. 21]</span></p> -<p>Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians were not unmindful of the affront -which they had sustained by the revolt of Mantineia and Elis. At the -request of a party among the Parrhasii, the Arcadian subjects of -Mantineia, they marched under king Pleistoanax into that territory, -and compelled the Mantineians to evacuate the fort which they had -erected within it; which the latter were unable to defend, though -they received a body of Argeian troops to guard their city, and -were thus enabled to march their whole force to the threatened -spot. Besides liberating the Arcadian subjects of Mantineia, -the Lacedæmonians also planted an additional body of Helots and -Neodamodes at <span id="See_1">Lepreum</span>, as a defence and means of observation on -the frontiers of Elis.<a id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31" -class="fnanchor">[31]</a> These were the Brasidean soldiers, whom -Klearidas had now brought back from Thrace. The Helots among them had -been manumitted as a reward, and allowed to reside where they chose. -But as they had imbibed lessons of bravery under their distinguished -commander, their presence would undoubtedly be dangerous among the -serfs of Laconia: hence the disposition of the Lacedæmonians to -plant them out. We may recollect that not very long before, they -had caused two thousand of the most soldierly Helots to be secretly -assassinated, without any ground of suspicion against these victims -personally, but simply from fear of the whole body and of course -greater fear of the bravest.<a id="FNanchor_32" href="#Footnote_32" -class="fnanchor">[32]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_22">[p. 22]</span></p> - -<p>It was not only against danger from the returning Brasidean Helots -that the Lacedæmonians had to guard, but also against danger—real -or supposed—from their own Spartan captives, liberated by Athens -at the conclusion of the recent alliance. Though the surrender of -Sphakteria had been untarnished by any dishonor, nevertheless these -men could hardly fail to be looked upon as degraded, in the eyes -of Spartan pride; or at least they might fancy that they were so -looked upon, and thus become discontented. Some of them were already -in the exercise of various functions, when the ephors contracted -suspicions of their designs, and condemned them all to temporary -disqualification for any official post, placing the whole of their -property under trust-management, and interdicting them, like minors, -from every act either of purchase or sale.<a id="FNanchor_33" -href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> This species of -disfranchisement lasted for a considerable time; but the sufferers -were at length relieved from it, the danger being supposed to be -over. The nature of the interdict confirms, what we know directly -from Thucydidês, that many of these captives were among the first and -wealthiest families in the state, and the ephors may have apprehended -that they would employ their wealth in acquiring partisans and -organizing revolt among the Helots. We have no facts to enable -us to appreciate the situation; but the ungenerous spirit of the -regulation, as applied to brave warriors recently come home from a -long imprisonment—justly pointed out by modern historians—would not -weigh much with the ephors under any symptoms of public danger.</p> - -<p>Of the proceedings of the Athenians during this summer we hear -nothing, except that the town of Skiônê at length surrendered to -them after a long-continued blockade, and that they put to death the -male population of military age, selling the women and children into -slavery. The odium of having proposed this cruel resolution two years -and a half before, belongs to Kleon; that of executing it, nearly a -year after his death, to the leaders who succeeded him, and to his -countrymen generally. The reader will, however, now be sufficiently -accustomed to the Greek laws of war not to be surprised at such -treatment against<span class="pagenum" id="Page_23">[p. 23]</span> -subjects revolted and reconquered. Skiônê and its territory was made -over to the Platæan refugees. The native population of Delos, also, -who had been removed from that sacred spot during the preceding year, -under the impression that they were too impure for the discharge of -the sacerdotal functions, were now restored to their island. The -subsequent defeat of Amphipolis had created a belief at Athens that -this removal had offended the gods; under which impression, confirmed -by the Delphian oracle, the Athenians now showed their repentance by -restoring the Delian exiles.<a id="FNanchor_34" href="#Footnote_34" -class="fnanchor">[34]</a> They farther lost the towns of Thyssus on -the peninsula of Athos, and Mekyberna on the Sithonian gulf, which -were captured by the Chalkidians of Thrace.<a id="FNanchor_35" -href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a></p> - -<p>Meanwhile the political relations throughout the powerful Grecian -states remained all provisional and undetermined. The alliance still -subsisted between Sparta and Athens, yet with continual complaints on -the part of the latter that the prior treaty remained unfulfilled. -The members of the Spartan confederacy were discontented; some had -seceded, and others seemed likely to do the same; while Argos, -ambitious to supplant Sparta, was trying to put herself at the head -of a new confederacy, though as yet with very partial success. -Hitherto, however, the authorities of Sparta—king Pleistoanax as well -as the ephors of the year—had been sincerely desirous to maintain -the Athenian alliance, so far as it could be done without sacrifice, -and without the real employment of force against recusants, of which -they had merely talked in order to amuse the Athenians. Moreover, -the prodigious advantage which they had gained by recovering the -prisoners, doubtless making them very popular at home, would attach -them the more firmly to their own measure. But at the close of the -summer—seemingly about the end of September or beginning of October, -<small>B.C.</small> 421—the year of these ephors expired, -and new ephors were nominated for the ensuing year. Under the -existing state of things this was an important revolution: for out of -the five new ephors, two—Kleobûlus and Xenarês—were decidedly hostile -to peace with Athens, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">[p. -24]</span> the remaining three apparently indifferent.<a -id="FNanchor_36" href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> And -we may here remark, that this fluctuation and instability of public -policy, which is often denounced as if it were the peculiar attribute -of a democracy, occurs quite as much under the constitutional -monarchy of Sparta, the least popular government in Greece, both in -principle and detail.</p> - -<p>The new ephors convened a special congress at Sparta for the -settlement of the pending differences, at which among the rest -Athenian, Bœotian, and Corinthian envoys were all present. But, -after prolonged debates, no approach was made to agreement; so that -the congress was on the point of breaking up, when Kleobûlus and -Xenarês, together with many of their partisans,<a id="FNanchor_37" -href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> originated, in concert -with the Bœotian and Corinthian deputies, a series of private -underhand manœuvres for the dissolution of the Athenian alliance. -This was to be effected by bringing about a separate alliance between -Argos and Sparta, which the Spartans sincerely desired, and would -grasp at in preference, so these ephors affirmed, even if it cost -them the breach of their new tie with Athens. The Bœotians were -urged, first to become allies of Argos themselves, and then to bring -Argos into alliance with Sparta. But it was farther essential that -they should give up Panaktum to Sparta, so that it might be tendered -to the Athenians in exchange for Pylos; for Sparta could not easily -go to war with them while they remained masters of the latter.<a -id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a></p> - -<p>Such were the plans which Kleobûlus and Xenarês laid with the -Corinthian and Bœotian deputies, and which the latter went home -prepared to execute. Chance seemed to favor the purpose at once: for -on their road home, they were accosted by two Argeians, senators -in their own city, who expressed an earnest anxiety to bring about -alliance between the Bœotians and Argos. The Bœotian deputies, warmly -encouraging this idea, urged the Argeians to send envoys to Thebes -as solicitors of the alliance; and communicated to the bœotarchs, on -their arrival at home, both the plans laid by the Spartan ephors and -the wishes of these<span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">[p. 25]</span> -Argeians. The bœotarchs also entered heartily into the entire scheme; -receiving the Argeian envoys with marked favor, and promising, as -soon as they should have obtained the requisite sanction, to send -envoys of their own and ask for alliance with Argos.</p> - -<p>That sanction was to be obtained from “the Four Senates of -the Bœotians;” bodies, of the constitution of which nothing is -known. But they were usually found so passive and acquiescent -that the bœotarchs, reckoning upon their assent as a matter of -course, even without any full exposition of reasons, laid all -their plans accordingly.<a id="FNanchor_39" href="#Footnote_39" -class="fnanchor">[39]</a> They proposed to these four Senates a -resolution in general terms, empowering themselves in the name -of the Bœotian federation to exchange oaths of alliance with any -Grecian city which might be willing to contract on terms mutually -beneficial: their particular object being, as they stated, to form -alliance with the Corinthians, Megarians, and Chalkidians of Thrace, -for mutual defence, and for war as well as peace with others only -by common consent. To this specific object they anticipated no -resistance on the part of the Senates, inasmuch as their connection -with Corinth had always been intimate, while the position of -the four parties named was the same, all being recusants of the -recent peace. But the resolution was advisedly couched in the most -comprehensive terms, in order that it might authorize them to -proceed farther afterwards, and conclude alliance on the part of -the Bœotians and Megarians with Argos; that ulterior purpose being -however for the present kept back, because alliance with Argos was -a novelty which might surprise and alarm the Senates. The manœuvre, -skilfully contrived for entrapping these bodies into an approval of -measures which they never contemplated, illustrates the manner in -which an oligarchical executive could elude the checks devised to -control its proceedings. But the bœotarchs, to their astonishment, -found themselves defeated at the outset: for the Senates would -not even hear of alliance with Corinth, so much did they fear to -offend Sparta by any special connection with a city which had<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_26">[p. 26]</span> revolted from her. Nor -did the bœotarchs think it safe to divulge their communications -with Kleobûlus and Xenarês, or to acquaint the Senates that the -whole plan originated with a powerful party in Sparta herself. -Accordingly, under this formal refusal on the part of the Senates, -no farther proceedings could be taken. The Corinthian and Chalkidian -envoys left Thebes, while the promise of sending Bœotian envoys to -Argos remained unexecuted.<a id="FNanchor_40" href="#Footnote_40" -class="fnanchor">[40]</a></p> - -<p>But the anti-Athenian ephors at Sparta, though baffled in their -schemes for arriving at the Argeian alliance through the agency of -the Bœotians, did not the less persist in their views upon Panaktum. -That place—a frontier fortress in the mountainous range between -Attica and Bœotia, apparently on the Bœotian side of Phylê, and on or -near the direct road from Athens to Thebes which led through Phylê<a -id="FNanchor_41" href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a>—had -been an Athenian possession, until six months before the peace, -when it had been treacherously betrayed to the Bœotians.<a -id="FNanchor_42" href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> A -special provision of the treaty between Athens and Sparta, prescribed -that it should be restored to Athens; and Lacedæmonian envoys were -now sent on an express mission to Bœotia, to request from the -Bœotians the delivery of Panaktum as well as of their Athenian -captives, in order that by tendering these to Athens she might be -induced to surrender Pylos. The Bœotians refused compliance with -this request, except on condition that Sparta should enter into -special alliance with them as she had done with the Athenians. -Now the Spartans stood pledged by their covenant with the latter, -either by its terms or by its recognized import, not to enter into -any new alliance without their consent. But they were eagerly bent -upon getting possession of Panaktum; while the prospect of breach -with Athens, far from being a deterring motive, was exactly that -which Kleobûlus and Xenarês desired. Under these feelings, the -Lacedæmonians consented to and swore the special alliance with -Bœotia. But the Bœotians, instead of handing over Panaktum for -surrender, as they had promised, immediately razed the fortress to -the ground; under pretence of some ancient<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_27">[p. 27]</span> oaths which had been exchanged between -their ancestors and the Athenians, to the effect that the district -round it should always remain without resident inhabitants, as a -neutral strip of borderland, and under common pasture.</p> - -<p>These negotiations, after having been in progress throughout -the winter, ended in the accomplishment of the alliance and the -destruction of Panaktum at the beginning of spring or about the -middle of March. And while the Lacedæmonian ephors thus seemed to -be carrying their point on the side of Bœotia, they were agreeably -surprised by an unexpected encouragement to their views from another -quarter. An embassy arrived at Sparta from Argos, to solicit renewal -of the peace just expiring. The Argeians found that they made no -progress in the enlargement of their newly-formed confederacy, while -their recent disappointment with the Bœotians made them despair of -realizing their ambitious projects of Peloponnesian headship. But -when they learned that the Lacedæmonians had concluded a separate -alliance with the Bœotians, and that Panaktum had been razed, their -disappointment was converted into positive alarm for the future. -Naturally inferring that this new alliance would not have been -concluded except in concert with Athens, they interpreted the whole -proceeding as indicating that Sparta had prevailed upon the Bœotians -to accept the peace with Athens, the destruction of Panaktum being -conceived as a compromise to obviate disputes respecting possession. -Under such a persuasion,—noway unreasonable in itself, when the two -contracting governments, both oligarchical and both secret, furnished -no collateral evidence to explain their real intent,—the Argeians saw -themselves excluded from alliance not merely with Bœotia, Sparta, -and Tegea, but also with Athens; which latter city they had hitherto -regarded as a sure resort in case of hostility with Sparta. Without -a moment’s delay, they despatched Eustrophus and Æson, two Argeians -much esteemed at Sparta, and perhaps proxeni of that city, to press -for a renewal of their expiring truce with the Spartans, and to -obtain the best terms they could.</p> - -<p>To the Lacedæmonian ephors this application was eminently -acceptable, the very event which they had been manœuvring underhand -to bring about: and negotiations were opened, in which the Argeian -envoys at first proposed that the disputed<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_28">[p. 28]</span> possession of Thyrea should be referred -to arbitration. But they found their demand met by a peremptory -negative, the Lacedæmonians refusing to enter upon such a discussion, -and insisting upon simple renewal of the peace now at an end. At -last the Argeian envoys, eagerly bent upon keeping the question -respecting Thyrea open, in some way or other, prevailed upon the -Lacedæmonians to assent to the following singular agreement. Peace -was concluded between Athens and Sparta for fifty years; but if -at any moment within that interval, excluding either periods of -epidemic or periods of war, it should suit the views of either party -to provoke a combat by chosen champions of equal number for the -purpose of determining the right to Thyrea, there was to be full -liberty of doing so; the combat to take place within the territory of -Thyrea itself, and the victors to be interdicted from pursuing the -vanquished beyond the undisputed border of either territory. It will -be recollected, that about one hundred and twenty years before this -date, there had been a combat of this sort by three hundred champions -on each side, in which, after desperate valor on both sides, the -victory as well as the disputed right still remained undetermined. -The proposition made by the Argeians was a revival of this old -practice of judicial combat: nevertheless, such was the alteration -which the Greek mind had undergone during the interval, that it now -appeared a perfect absurdity, even in the eyes of the Lacedæmonians, -the most old-fashioned people in Greece.<a id="FNanchor_43" -href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> Yet since they hazarded -nothing, practically, by so vague a concession, and were supremely -anxious to make their relations smooth with Argos, in contemplation -of a breach with Athens, they at last agreed to the condition, drew -up the treaty, and placed it in the hands of the envoys to carry back -to Argos. Formal acceptance and ratification, by the Argeian public -assembly, was necessary to give it validity: should this be granted, -the envoys were invited to return to Sparta at<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_29">[p. 29]</span> the festival of the Hyakinthia, and there -go through the solemnity of the oaths.</p> - -<p>Amidst such strange crossing of purposes and interests, the -Spartan ephors seemed now to have carried all their points; -friendship with Argos, breach with Athens, and yet the means—through -the possession of Panaktum—of procuring from Athens the cession of -Pylos. But they were not yet on firm ground. For when their deputies, -Andromedês and two colleagues, arrived in Bœotia for the purpose of -going on to Athens and prosecuting the negotiation about Panaktum, at -the time when Eustrophus and Æson were carrying on their negotiation -at Sparta, they discovered for the first time that the Bœotians, -instead of performing their promise to hand over Panaktum, had razed -it to the ground. This was a serious blow to their chance of success -at Athens: nevertheless, Andromedês proceeded thither, taking with -him all the Athenian captives in Bœotia. These he restored at Athens, -at the same time announcing the demolition of Panaktum as a fact: -Panaktum as well as the prisoners was thus <i>restored</i>, he pretended; -for the Athenians would not now find a single enemy in the place: -and he claimed the cession of Pylos in exchange.<a id="FNanchor_44" -href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a></p> - -<p>But he soon found that the final term of Athenian compliance had -been reached. It was probably on this occasion that the separate -alliance concluded between Sparta and the Bœotians first became -discovered at Athens; since not only were the proceedings of these -oligarchical governments habitually secret, but there was a peculiar -motive for keeping this alliance concealed until the discussion about -Panaktum and Pylos had been brought to a close. Both this alliance, -and the demolition of Panaktum, excited among the Athenians the -strongest marks of disgust and anger; aggravated probably rather -than softened by the quibble of Andromedês, that demolition of the -fort, being tantamount to restitution, and precluding any farther -tenancy by the enemy, was a substantial satisfaction of the treaty; -and aggravated still farther by the recollection of all the other -unperformed items in the treaty. A whole year had now elapsed, amidst -frequent notes and protocols, to employ a modern phrase; yet not one -of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">[p. 30]</span> the conditions -favorable to Athens had yet been executed, except the restitution of -her captives, seemingly not many in number; while she on her side had -made to Sparta the capital cession on which almost everything hinged. -A long train of accumulated indignation, brought to a head by this -mission of Andromedês, discharged itself in the harshest dismissal -and rebuke of himself and his colleagues.<a id="FNanchor_45" -href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a></p> - -<p>Even Nikias, Lachês, and the other leading men, to whose improvident -facility and misjudgment the embarrassment of the moment was owing, -were probably not much behind the general public in exclamation -against Spartan perfidy, if it were only to divert attention from -their own mistake. But there was one of them—Alkibiadês son of -Kleinias—who took this opportunity of putting himself at the head of -the vehement anti-Laconian sentiment which now agitated the ekklesia, -and giving to it a substantive aim.</p> - -<p>The present is the first occasion on which we hear of this -remarkable man as taking a prominent part in public life. He was -now about thirty-one or thirty-two years old, which in Greece was -considered an early age for a man to exercise important command. -But such was the splendor, wealth, and antiquity of his family, of -Æakid lineage through the heroes Eurysakês and Ajax, and such the -effect of that lineage upon the democratical public of Athens,<a -id="FNanchor_46" href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> that -he stepped speedily and easily into a conspicuous station. Belonging -also through his mother Deinomachê to the gens of the Alkmæonidæ, he -was related to Periklês, who became his guardian when he was left -an orphan at about five years old, along with his younger brother -Kleinias. It was at that time that their father Kleinias was slain -at the battle of Koroneia, having already served with honor in a -trireme of his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">[p. 31]</span> -own at the sea-fight of Artemisium against the Persians. A Spartan -nurse named Amykla was provided for the young Alkibiadês, and a slave -named Zopyrus chosen by his distinguished guardian to watch over him; -but even his boyhood was utterly ungovernable, and Athens was full -of his freaks and enormities, to the unavailing regret of Periklês -and his brother Ariphron.<a id="FNanchor_47" href="#Footnote_47" -class="fnanchor">[47]</a> His violent passions, love of enjoyment, -ambition of preëminence, and insolence towards others,<a -id="FNanchor_48" href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> were -manifested at an early age, and never deserted him throughout his -life. His finished beauty of person both as boy, youth, and mature -man, caused him to be much run after by women,<a id="FNanchor_49" -href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> and even by women of -generally reserved habits. Moreover, even before the age when such -temptations were usually presented, the beauty of his earlier youth, -while going through the ordinary gymnastic training, procured for him -assiduous caresses, compliments, and solicitations of every sort, -from the leading Athenians who frequented the public palæstræ. These -men not only endured his petulance, but were even flattered when -he would condescend to bestow it upon them. Amidst such universal -admiration and indulgence, amidst corrupting influences exercised -from so many quarters and from so early an age, combined with great -wealth and the highest position, it was not likely that either -self-restraint or regard for the welfare of others would ever acquire -development in the mind of Alkibiadês. The anecdotes which fill his -biography reveal the utter absence of both these constituent elements -of morality; and though, in regard to the particular stories, -allowance must doubtless be made for scandal and exaggeration, yet -the general type<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">[p. 32]</span> -of character stands plainly marked and sufficiently established in -all.</p> - -<p>A dissolute life, and an immoderate love of pleasure in all -its forms, is what we might naturally expect from a young man so -circumstanced; and it appears that with him these tastes were -indulged with an offensive publicity which destroyed the comfort -of his wife Hipparetê, daughter of Hipponikus who was slain at -the battle of Delium. She had brought him a large dowry of ten -talents: when she sought a divorce, as the law of Athens permitted, -Alkibiadês violently interposed to prevent her from obtaining the -benefit of the law, and brought her back by force to his house even -from the presence of the magistrate. It is this violence of selfish -passion, and reckless disregard of social obligation towards every -one, which forms the peculiar characteristic of Alkibiadês. He -strikes the schoolmaster whose house he happens to find unprovided -with a copy of Homer; he strikes Taureas,<a id="FNanchor_50" -href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> a rival chorêgus, -in the public theatre, while the representation is going on; he -strikes Hipponikus, who afterwards became his father-in-law, out of -a wager of mere wantonness, afterwards appeasing him by an ample -apology; he protects the Thasian poet Hêgêmon, against whom an -indictment had been formally lodged before the archon, by effacing -it with his own hand from the published list in the public edifice, -called Metrôon; defying both magistrate and accuser to press -the cause on for trial.<a id="FNanchor_51" href="#Footnote_51" -class="fnanchor">[51]</a> Nor does it appear that any injured person -ever dared to bring Alkibiadês to trial before the dikastery, though -we read with amazement the tissue of lawlessness<a id="FNanchor_52" -href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> which marked his -private life;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">[p. 33]</span> -a combination of insolence and ostentation with occasional mean -deceit when it suited his purpose. But amidst the perfect legal, -judicial, and constitutional equality, which reigned among the -citizens of Athens, there still remained great social inequalities -between one man and another, handed down from the times preceding -the democracy: inequalities which the democratical institutions -limited in their practical mischiefs, but never either effaced or -discredited, and which were recognized as modifying elements in -the current, unconscious vein of sentiment and criticism, by those -whom they injured as well as by those whom they favored. In the -speech which Thucydidês<a id="FNanchor_53" href="#Footnote_53" -class="fnanchor">[53]</a> ascribes to Alkibiadês before the<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_34">[p. 34]</span> Athenian public assembly, -we find the insolence of wealth and high social position not only -admitted as a fact, but vindicated as a just morality; and the -history of his life, as well as many other facts in Athenian society, -show that if not approved, it was at least tolerated in practice to a -serious extent, in spite of the restraints of the democracy.</p> - -<p>Amidst such unprincipled exorbitances of behavior, Alkibiadês -stood distinguished for personal bravery. He served as a hoplite -in the army under Phormion at the siege of Potidæa in 432 -<small>B.C.</small> Though then hardly twenty years of age, he was -among the most forward soldiers in the battle, received a severe -wound, and was in great danger; owing his life only to the exertions -of Sokratês, who served in the ranks along with him. Eight years -afterwards, Alkibiadês also served with credit in the cavalry at -the battle of Delium, and had the opportunity of requiting his -obligation to Sokratês, by protecting him against the Bœotian -pursuers. As a rich young man, also, choregy and trierarchy became -incumbent upon him; expensive duties, which, as we might expect, he -discharged not merely with sufficiency, but with ostentation. In -fact, expenditure of this sort, though compulsory up to a certain -point upon all rich men, was so fully repaid, to all those who had -the least ambition, in the shape of popularity and influence, that -most of them spontaneously went beyond the requisite minimum for the -purpose of showing themselves off. The first appearance of Alkibiadês -in public life is said to have been as a donor, for some special -purpose, in the ekklesia, when various citizens were handing in -their contributions: and the loud applause which his subscription -provoked was at that time so novel and exciting to him, that he -suffered a tame quail which he carried in his bosom to escape. This -incident excited mirth and sympathy among the citizens present: the -bird was caught and restored to him by Antiochus, who from that -time forward acquired his favor, and in after days became his pilot -and confidential lieutenant.<a id="FNanchor_54" href="#Footnote_54" -class="fnanchor">[54]</a></p> - -<p>To a young man like Alkibiadês, thirsting for power and -pre<span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">[p. 35]</span>ëminence, a -certain measure of rhetorical facility and persuasive power was -indispensable. With a view to this acquisition, he frequented -the society of various sophistical and rhetorical teachers,<a -id="FNanchor_55" href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> -Prodikus, Protagoras, and others; but most of all that of Sokratês. -His intimacy with Sokratês has become celebrated on many grounds, -and is commemorated both by Plato and Xenophon, though unfortunately -with less instruction than we could desire. We may readily believe -Xenophon, when he tells us that Alkibiadês—like the oligarchical -Kritias, of whom we shall have much to say hereafter—was attracted -to Sokratês by his unrivalled skill of dialectical conversation, his -suggestive influence over the minds of his hearers, in eliciting -new thoughts and combinations, his mastery of apposite and homely -illustrations, his power of seeing far beforehand the end of a long -cross-examination, his ironical affectation of ignorance, whereby -the humiliation of opponents was rendered only the more complete, -when they were convicted of inconsistency and contradiction out -of their own answers. The exhibitions of such ingenuity were in -themselves highly interesting, and stimulating to the mental -activity of listeners, while the faculty itself was one of peculiar -value to those who proposed to take the lead in public debate; -with which view both these ambitious young men tried to catch -the knack from Sokratês,<a id="FNanchor_56" href="#Footnote_56" -class="fnanchor">[56]</a> and to copy his formidable string of<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_36">[p. 36]</span> interrogations. Both of -them doubtless involuntarily respected the poor, self-sufficing, -honest, temperate, and brave citizen, in whom this eminent talent -resided; especially Alkibiadês, who not only owed his life to the -generous valor of Sokratês at Potidæa, but had also learned in that -service to admire the iron physical frame of the philosopher in -his armor, enduring hunger, cold, and hardship.<a id="FNanchor_57" -href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a> But we are not to -suppose that either of them came to Sokratês with the purpose of -hearing and obeying his precepts on matters of duty, or receiving -from him a new plan of life. They came partly to gratify an -intellectual appetite, partly to acquire a stock of words and -ideas, with facility of argumentative handling, suitable for their -after-purpose as public speakers. Subjects moral, political, and -intellectual, served as the theme sometimes of discourse, sometimes -of discussion, in the society of all these sophists, Prodikus -and Protagoras not less than Sokratês; for in the Athenian sense -of the word, Sokratês was a sophist as well as the others: and -to the rich youths of Athens, like Alkibiadês and Kritias, such -society was highly useful.<a id="FNanchor_58" href="#Footnote_58" -class="fnanchor">[58]</a> It imparted a nobler aim to their ambition, -including<span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">[p. 37]</span> mental -accomplishments as well as political success: it enlarged the -range of their understandings, and opened to them as ample a vein -of literature and criticism as the age afforded: it accustomed -them to canvass human conduct, with the causes and obstructions -of human well-being, both public and private: it even suggested -to them indirectly lessons of duty and prudence, from which their -social position tended to estrange them, and which they would -hardly have submitted to hear except from the lips of one whom they -intellectually admired. In learning to talk, they were forced to -learn more or less to think, and familiarized with the difference -between truth and error: nor would an eloquent lecturer fail to -enlist their feelings in the great topics of morals and politics. -Their thirst for mental stimulus and rhetorical accomplishments had -thus, as far as it went, a moralizing effect, though this was rarely -their purpose in the pursuit.<a id="FNanchor_59" href="#Footnote_59" -class="fnanchor">[59]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">[p. 38]</span></p> - -<p>Alkibiadês, full of impulse and ambition of every kind, enjoyed -the conversation of all the eminent talkers and lecturers to<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_39">[p. 39]</span> be found in Athens, -that of Sokratês most of all and most frequently. The philosopher -became greatly attached to him, and doubtless lost no opportunity -of inculcating on him salutary lessons, as far as could be done, -without disgusting the pride of a haughty and spoiled youth who was -looking forward to the celebrity of public life. But unhappily his -lessons never produced any serious effect, and ultimately became -even distasteful to the pupil. The whole life of Alkibiadês attests -how faintly the sentiment of obligation, public or private, ever got -footing in his mind; how much the ends which he pursued were dictated -by overbearing vanity and love of aggrandizement. In the later part -of life, Sokratês was marked out to public hatred by his enemies, as -having been the teacher of Alkibiadês and Kritias. And if we could -be so unjust as to judge of the morality of the teacher by that of -these two pupils, we should certainly rank him among the worst of the -Athenian sophists.</p> - -<p>At the age of thirty-one or thirty-two, the earliest at which -it was permitted to look forward to an ascendent position in -public life, Alkibiadês came forward with a reputation stained by -private enormities, and with a number of enemies created by his -insolent demeanor. But this did not hinder him from stepping into -that position to which his rank, connections, and club-partisans, -afforded him introduction; nor was he slow in displaying his -extraordinary energy, decision, and capacity of command. From the -beginning to the end of his eventful political life, he showed a -combination of boldness in design, resource in contrivance, and -vigor in execution, not surpassed by any one of his contemporary -Greeks: and what distinguished him from all was his extraordinary -flexibility of character<a id="FNanchor_60" href="#Footnote_60" -class="fnanchor">[60]</a> and consummate<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_40">[p. 40]</span> power of adapting himself to new habits, -new necessities, and new persons, whenever circumstances required. -Like Themistoklês, whom he resembled as well in ability and vigor -as in want of public principle and in recklessness about means, -Alkibiadês was essentially a man of action. Eloquence was in him a -secondary quality, subordinate to action; and though he possessed -enough of it for his purposes, his speeches were distinguished -only for pertinence of matter, often imperfectly expressed, at -least according to the high standard of Athens.<a id="FNanchor_61" -href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> But his career affords -a memorable example of splendid qualities, both for action and -command, ruined and turned into instruments of mischief by the utter -want of morality, public and private. A strong tide of individual -hatred was thus roused against him, as well from middling citizens -whom he had insulted, as from rich men whom his ruinous ostentation -outshone. For his exorbitant voluntary expenditure in the public -festivals, transcending the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">[p. -41]</span> largest measure of private fortune, satisfied discerning -men that he would reimburse himself by plundering the public, and -even, if opportunity offered, by overthrowing<a id="FNanchor_62" -href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> the constitution -to make himself master of the persons and properties of his -fellow-citizens. He never inspired confidence or esteem in any one; -and sooner or later, among a public like that of Athens, so much -accumulated odium and suspicion was sure to bring a public man to -ruin, in spite of the strongest admiration for his capacity. He was -always the object of very conflicting sentiments: “The Athenians -desired him, hated him, but still wished to have him,” was said -in the latter years of his life by a contemporary poet; while we -find also another pithy precept delivered in regard to him: “You -ought not to keep a lion’s whelp in your city at all; but, if you -choose to keep him, you must submit yourself to his behavior.”<a -id="FNanchor_63" href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> Athens -had to feel the force of his energy, as an exile and enemy, but -the great harm which he did to her was in his capacity of adviser; -awakening in his countrymen the same thirst for showy, rapacious, -uncertain, perilous aggrandizement which dictated his own personal -actions.</p> - -<p>Mentioning Alkibiadês now for the first time, I have somewhat -anticipated on future chapters, in order to present a general idea of -his character, hereafter to be illustrated. But at the moment which -we have now reached (March, 420 <small>B.C.</small>) -the lion’s whelp was yet young, and had neither acquired his entire -strength nor disclosed his full-grown claws.</p> - -<p>He began to put himself forward as a party leader, seemingly -not long before the Peace of Nikias. The political traditions -hereditary in his family, as in that of his relation Periklês, were -democratical: his grandfather Alkibiadês had been vehement in his -opposition to the Peisistratids, and had even afterwards publicly -renounced an established connection of hospitality with the<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_42">[p. 42]</span> Lacedæmonian government, -from strong antipathy to them on political grounds. But Alkibiadês -himself, in commencing political life, departed from this family -tradition, and presented himself as a partisan of oligarchical and -philo-Laconian sentiment, doubtless far more consonant to his natural -temper than the democratical. He thus started in the same general -party with Nikias and Thessalus son of Kimôn, who afterwards became -his bitter opponents; and it was in part probably to put himself -on a par with them, that he took the marked step of trying to -revive the ancient family tie of hospitality with Sparta, which his -grandfather had broken off.<a id="FNanchor_64" href="#Footnote_64" -class="fnanchor">[64]</a></p> - -<p>To promote this object, he displayed peculiar solicitude for the -good treatment of the Spartan captives, during their detention at -Athens. Many of them being of high family at Sparta, he naturally -calculated upon their gratitude, as well as upon the favorable -sympathies of their countrymen, whenever they should be restored. -He advocated both the peace and the alliance with Sparta, and the -restoration of her captives; and indeed not only advocated these -measures, but tendered his services, and was eager to be employed, -as the agent of Sparta for carrying them through at Athens. From -these selfish hopes in regard to Sparta, and especially from the -expectation of acquiring, through the agency of the restored -captives, the title of Proxenus of Sparta, Alkibiadês thus became -a partisan of the blind and gratuitous philo-Laconian concessions -of Nikias. But the captives on their return were either unable, or -unwilling, to carry the point which he wished; while the authorities -at Sparta rejected all his advances, not without a contemptuous -sneer at the idea of confiding important political interests to -the care of a youth chiefly known for ostentation, profligacy, and -insolence. That the Spartans should thus judge, is noway astonishing, -considering their extreme reverence both for old age and for strict -discipline. They naturally preferred Nikias and Lachês, whose -prudence would commend, if it did not originally suggest, their -mistrust of the new claimant. Nor had Alkibiadês yet shown the -mighty move<span class="pagenum" id="Page_43">[p. 43]</span>ment -of which he was capable. But this contemptuous refusal of the -Spartans stung him so to the quick, that, making an entire revolution -in his political course,<a id="FNanchor_65" href="#Footnote_65" -class="fnanchor">[65]</a> he immediately threw himself into -anti-Laconian politics with an energy and ability which he was not -before known to possess.</p> - -<p>The moment was favorable, since the recent death of Kleon, for a -new political leader to espouse this side; and was rendered still -more favorable by the conduct of the Lacedæmonians. Month after month -passed, remonstrance after remonstrance was addressed, yet not one -of the restitutions prescribed by the treaty in favor of Athens had -yet been accomplished. Alkibiadês had therefore ample pretext for -altering his tone respecting the Spartans, and for denouncing them -as deceivers who had broken their solemn oaths, abusing the generous -confidence of Athens. Under his present antipathies, his attention -naturally turned to Argos, in which city he possessed some powerful -friends and family guests. The condition of that city, now free by -the expiration of the peace with Sparta, opened a possibility of -connection with Athens, and this policy was strongly recommended -by Alkibiadês, who insisted that Sparta was playing false with the -Athenians, merely in order to keep their hands tied until she had -attacked and put down Argos separately. This particular argument had -less force when it was seen that Argos acquired new and powerful -allies, Mantineia, Elis, and Corinth; but on the other hand, such -acquisitions rendered Argos positively more valuable as an ally to -the Athenians.</p> - -<p>It was not so much, however, the inclination towards Argos, but -the growing wrath against Sparta, which furthered the philo-Argeian -plans of Alkibiadês; and when the Lacedæmonian envoy Andromedês -arrived at Athens from Bœotia, tendering to the Athenians the mere -ruins of Panaktum in exchange for Pylos; when it farther became -known that the Spartans had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">[p. -44]</span> already concluded a special alliance with the Bœotians -without consulting Athens, the unmeasured expression of displeasure -in the Athenian ekklesia showed Alkibiadês that the time was now -come for bringing on a substantive decision. While he lent his -own voice to strengthen this discontent against Sparta, he at the -same time despatched a private intimation to his correspondents at -Argos, exhorting them, under assurances of success and promise of -his own strenuous aid, to send without delay an embassy to Athens -in conjunction with the Mantineians and Eleians, requesting to be -admitted as Athenian allies. The Argeians received this intimation -at the very moment when their citizens Eustrophus and Æson were -negotiating at Sparta for the renewal of the peace, having been sent -thither under great uneasiness lest Argos should be left without -allies to contend single-handed against the Lacedæmonians. But -no sooner was the unexpected chance held out to them of alliance -with Athens, a former friend, a democracy like their own, an -imperial state at sea, but not interfering with their own primacy -in Peloponnesus,—than they became careless of Eustrophus and Æson, -and despatched forthwith to Athens the embassy advised. It was a -joint embassy, Argeian, Eleian, and Mantineian:<a id="FNanchor_66" -href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a> the alliance between -these three cities had already been rendered more intimate by a -second treaty concluded since that treaty to which Corinth was -a party; but Corinth had refused all concern in the second.<a -id="FNanchor_67" href="#Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a></p> - -<p>But the Spartans had been already alarmed by the harsh repulse of -their envoy Andromedês, and probably warned by reports from Nikias -and their other Athenian friends of the crisis impending respecting -alliance between Athens and Argos. Accordingly they sent off without -a moment’s delay three citizens extremely popular at Athens,<a -id="FNanchor_68" href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a> -Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius; with full powers to settle all -matters of difference. The envoys were instructed to deprecate all -alliance of Athens with Argos, to explain that the alliance of Sparta -with Bœotia had been concluded without any purpose or possibility of -evil to Athens, and at the same time to renew the demand that Pylos -should be re<span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">[p. 45]</span>stored -to them in exchange for the demolished Panaktum. Such was still the -confidence of the Lacedæmonians in the strength of assent at Athens, -that they did not yet despair of obtaining an affirmative, even to -this very unequal proposition: and when the three envoys, under the -introduction and advice of Nikias, had their first interview with -the Athenian senate, preparatory to an audience before the public -assembly, the impression which they made, on stating that they came -with full powers of settlement, was highly favorable. It was indeed -so favorable, that Alkibiadês became alarmed lest, if they made the -same statement in the public assembly, holding out the prospect of -some trifling concessions, the philo-Laconian party might determine -public feeling to accept a compromise, and thus preclude all idea of -alliance with Argos.</p> - -<p>To obviate such a defeat of his plans, he resorted to a -singular manœuvre. One of the Lacedæmonian envoys, Endius, was his -private guest, by an ancient and particular intimacy subsisting -between their two families.<a id="FNanchor_69" href="#Footnote_69" -class="fnanchor">[69]</a> This probably assisted in procuring<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_46">[p. 46]</span> for him a secret -interview with the envoys, and enabled him to address them with -greater effect, on the day before the meeting of the public assembly, -and without the knowledge of Nikias. He accosted them in the tone of -a friend of Sparta, anxious that their proposition should succeed; -but he intimated that they would find the public assembly turbulent -and angry, very different from the tranquil demeanor of the senate: -so that if they proclaimed themselves to have come with full powers -of settlement, the people would burst out with fury, to act upon -their fears and bully them into extravagant concessions. He therefore -strongly urged them to declare that they had come, not with any -full powers of settlement, but merely to explain, discuss, and -report: the people would then find that they could gain nothing by -intimidation, explanations would be heard, and disputed points be -discussed with temper, and he (Alkibiadês) would speak emphatically -in their favor. He would advise, and felt confident that he could -persuade, the Athenians to restore Pylos, a step which his opposition -had hitherto been the chief means of preventing. He gave them his -solemn pledge—confirmed by an oath, according to Plutarch—that he -would adopt this conduct, if they would act upon his counsel.<a -id="FNanchor_70" href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a> -The envoys were much struck with the apparent sagacity of -these suggestions,<a id="FNanchor_71" href="#Footnote_71" -class="fnanchor">[71]</a> and still more delighted to find that -the man from whom they anticipated the most formidable opposition -was prepared to speak in their favor. His language obtained with -them, probably, the more ready admission and confidence, inasmuch -as he had volunteered his services to become the political agent -of Sparta only a few months before; and he appeared now to be -simply resuming that policy. They were sure of the support of<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_47">[p. 47]</span> Nikias and his party, -under all circumstances; if, by complying with the recommendation of -Alkibiadês, they could gain <i>his</i> strenuous advocacy and influence -also, they fancied that their cause was sure of success. Accordingly, -they agreed to act upon his suggestion, not only without consulting -but without even warning Nikias, which was exactly what Alkibiadês -desired, and had probably required them to promise.</p> - -<p>Next day, the public assembly met, and the envoys were introduced; -upon which Alkibiadês himself, in a tone of peculiar mildness, put -the question to them, upon what footing they came?<a id="FNanchor_72" -href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a> what powers they -brought with them? They immediately declared that they had brought -no full powers for treating and settlement, but only came to -explain and discuss. Nothing could exceed the astonishment with -which this declaration was heard. The senators present, to whom -these envoys a day or two before had publicly declared the distinct -contrary,—the assembled people, who, made aware of this previous -affirmation, had come prepared to hear the ultimatum of Sparta from -their lips,—lastly, most of all, Nikias himself,—their confidential -agent and probably their host at Athens,—who had doubtless announced -them as plenipotentiaries, and concerted with them the management -of their cases before the assembly,—all were alike astounded, and -none knew what to make of the words just heard. But the indignation -of the people equalled their astonishment: there was a unanimous -burst of wrath against the standing faithlessness and duplicity -of Lacedæmonians; never saying the same thing two days together. -To crown the whole, Alkibiadês himself affected to share all the -surprise of the multitude, and was even the loudest of them all in -invectives against the envoys; denouncing Lacedæmonian perfidy and -evil designs in language far more bitter than he had ever employed -before. Nor was this all:<a id="FNanchor_73" href="#Footnote_73" -class="fnanchor">[73]</a> he took advantage of<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_48">[p. 48]</span> the vehement acclamation which welcomed -these invectives to propose that the Argeian envoys should be -called in and the alliance with Argos concluded forthwith. And -this would certainly have been done, if a remarkable phenomenon—an -earthquake—had not occurred to prevent it; causing the assembly to -be adjourned to the next day, pursuant to a religious scruple then -recognized as paramount.</p> - -<p>This remarkable anecdote comes in all its main circumstances from -Thucydidês. It illustrates forcibly that unprincipled character which -will be found to attach to Alkibiadês through life, and presents -indeed an unblushing combination of impudence and fraud, which we -cannot better describe than by saying that it is exactly in the vein -of Fielding’s Jonathan Wild. In depicting Kleon and Hyperbolus, -historians vie with each other in strong language to mark the -impudence which is said to have been their peculiar characteristic. -Now we have no particular facts before us to measure the amount -of truth in this, though as a general charge it is sufficiently -credible. But we may affirm, with full assurance, that none of -the much-decried demagogues of Athens—not one of those sellers of -leather, lamps, sheep, ropes, pollard, and other commodities, upon -whom Aristophanês heaps so many excellent jokes—ever surpassed, if -they ever equalled, the impudence of this descendant of Æakus and -Zeus in his manner of overreaching and disgracing the Lacedæmonian -envoys. These latter, it must be added, display a carelessness -of public faith and consistency, a facility in publicly unsaying -what they have just before publicly said, and a treachery towards -their own confidential agent, which is truly surprising, and goes -far to justify the general charge of habitual duplicity so often -alleged against the Lacedæmonian character.<a id="FNanchor_74" -href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a></p> - -<p>The disgraced envoys would doubtless quit Athens immediately: -but this opportune earthquake gave Nikias a few hours to recover -from his unexpected overthrow. In the assembly of the next day, -he still contended that the friendship of Sparta was preferable -to that of Argos, and insisted on the prudence of postponing all -consummation of engagement with the latter until the real intentions -of Sparta, now so contradictory and inexplic<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_49">[p. 49]</span>able, should be made clear. He contended -that the position of Athens, in regard to the peace and alliance, was -that of superior honor and advantage; the position of Sparta, one of -comparative disgrace: Athens had thus a greater interest than Sparta -in maintaining what had been concluded. But he at the same time -admitted that a distinct and peremptory explanation must be exacted -from Sparta as to her intentions, and he requested the people to send -himself with some other colleagues to demand it. The Lacedæmonians -should be apprised that Argeian envoys were already present in -Athens with propositions, and that the Athenians might already have -concluded this alliance, if they could have permitted themselves to -do wrong to the existing alliance with Sparta. But the Lacedæmonians, -if their intentions were honorable, must show it forthwith: 1. By -restoring Panaktum, not demolished, but standing. 2. By restoring -Amphipolis also. 3. By renouncing their special alliance with the -Bœotians, unless the Bœotians on their side chose to become parties -to the peace with Athens.<a id="FNanchor_75" href="#Footnote_75" -class="fnanchor">[75]</a></p> - -<p>The Athenian assembly, acquiescing in the recommendation of -Nikias, invested him with the commission which he required: a -remarkable proof, after the overpowering defeat of the preceding -day, how strong was the hold which he still retained upon them, and -how sincere their desire to keep on the best terms with Sparta. This -was a last chance granted to Nikias and his policy; a perfectly fair -chance, since all that was asked of Sparta was just; but it forced -him to bring matters to a decisive issue with her, and shut out -all farther evasion. His mission to Sparta failed altogether: the -influence of Kleobûlus and Xenarês, the anti-Athenian ephors, was -found predominant, so that not one of his demands was complied with. -And even when he formally announced that unless Sparta renounced -her special alliance with the Bœotians or compelled the Bœotians -to accept the peace with Athens, the Athenians would immediately -contract alliance with Argos, the menace produced no effect. He -could only obtain, and that too as a personal favor to himself, -that the oaths as they stood should be formally renewed; an empty -concession, which covered but faintly the humiliation of his retreat -to Athens.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">[p. 50]</span> The -Athenian assembly listened to his report with strong indignation -against the Lacedæmonians, and with marked displeasure even against -himself, as the great author and voucher of this unperformed treaty; -while Alkibiadês was permitted to introduce the envoys—already -at hand in the city—from Argos, Mantineia, and Elis, with whom a -pact was at once concluded.<a id="FNanchor_76" href="#Footnote_76" -class="fnanchor">[76]</a></p> - -<p>The words of this, which Thucydidês gives us doubtless from the -record on the public column, comprise two engagements; one for peace, -another for alliance.</p> - -<p>The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, have concluded -a treaty of peace by sea and by land, without fraud or mischief, each -for themselves and for the allies over whom each exercise empire.<a -id="FNanchor_77" href="#Footnote_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a> [The -express terms in which these states announce themselves as imperial -states and their allies as dependencies, deserve notice. No such -words appear in the treaty between Athens and Lacedæmon. I have -already mentioned that the main ground of discontent on the part of -Mantineia and Elis towards Sparta, was connected with their imperial -power.]</p> - -<p>Neither of them shall bear arms against the other for purposes of -damage.</p> - -<p>The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, shall be allies -with each other for one hundred years. If any enemy shall invade -Attica, the three contracting cities shall lend the most vigorous aid -in their power at the invitation of Athens. Should the forces of the -invading city damage Attica and then retire, the three will proclaim -that city their enemy and attack it: neither of the four shall in -that case suspend the war, without consent of the others.</p> - -<p>Reciprocal obligations imposed upon Athens, in case Argos, Mantineia, -or Elis, shall be attacked.</p> - -<p>Neither of the four contracting powers shall grant passage to -troops through their own territory, or the territory of allies -over whom they may at the time be exercising command, either by -land or sea, unless upon joint resolution.<a id="FNanchor_78" -href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_51">[p. 51]</span></p> <p>In case -auxiliary troops shall be required and sent under this treaty, the -city sending shall furnish their maintenance for the space of thirty -days, from the day of their entrance upon the territory of the city -requiring. Should their services be needed for a longer period, the -city requiring shall furnish their maintenance, at the rate of three -Æginæan oboli for each hoplite, light-armed or archer, and of one -Æginæan drachma or six oboli for each horseman, per day. The city -requiring shall possess the command, so long as the service required -shall be in her territory. But if any expedition shall be undertaken -by joint resolution, then the command shall be shared equally between -all.</p> - -<p>Such were the substantive conditions of the new alliance. -Provision was then made for the oaths,—by whom? where? when? in what -words? how often? they were to be taken. Athens was to swear on -behalf of herself and her allies; but Argos, Elis, and Mantineia, -with their respective allies, were to swear by separate cities. The -oaths were to be renewed every four years; by Athens, within thirty -days before each Olympic festival, at Argos, Elis, and Mantineia; by -these three cities, at Athens, ten days before each festival of the -greater Panathenæa. “The words of the treaty of peace and alliance, -and the oaths sworn, shall be engraven on stone columns, and put up -in the temples of each of the four cities; and also upon a brazen -column, to be put up by joint cost at Olympia, for the festival now -approaching.”</p> - -<p>“The four cities may, by joint consent, make any change -they please in the provisions of this treaty, without -violating their oaths.”<a id="FNanchor_79" href="#Footnote_79" -class="fnanchor">[79]</a></p> - -<p>The conclusion of this new treaty introduced a greater degree of -complication into the grouping and association of the Grecian cities -than had ever before been known. The ancient Spartan confederacy, and -the Athenian empire still subsisted. A peace<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_52">[p. 52]</span> had been concluded between them, -ratified by the formal vote of the majority of the confederates, -yet not accepted by several of the minority. Not merely peace, -but also special alliance had been concluded between Athens and -Sparta; and a special alliance between Sparta and Bœotia. Corinth, -member of the Spartan confederacy, was also member of a defensive -alliance with Argos, Mantineia, and Elis; which three states had -concluded a more intimate alliance, first with each other (without -Corinth), and now recently with Athens. Yet both Athens and Sparta -still retained the alliance<a id="FNanchor_80" href="#Footnote_80" -class="fnanchor">[80]</a> concluded between themselves, without -formal rupture on either side, though Athens still complained that -the treaty had not been fulfilled. No relations whatever subsisted -between Argos and Sparta. Between Athens and Bœotia there was an -armistice terminable at ten days’ notice. Lastly, Corinth could -not be prevailed upon, in spite of repeated solicitation from -the Argeians, to join the new alliance of Athens with Argos: so -that no relations subsisted between Corinth and Athens; while -the Corinthians began, though faintly, to resume their former -tendencies towards Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_81" href="#Footnote_81" -class="fnanchor">[81]</a></p> - -<p>The alliance between Athens and Argos, of which particulars have -just been given, was concluded not long before the Olympic festival -of the 90th Olympiad, or 420 <small>B.C.</small>: the -festival being about the beginning of July, the treaty might be in -May.<a id="FNanchor_82" href="#Footnote_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a> -That festival was memorable, on more than one ground. It was -the first which had been celebrated since the conclusion of the -peace, the leading clause of which had been expressly introduced -to guarantee to all Greeks free access to the great Pan-Hellenic -temples, with liberty of sacrificing, consulting the oracle, and -witnessing the matches. For the last eleven years, including -two Olympic festivals, Athens herself, and apparently all the -numerous allies of Athens, had been excluded from sending their -solemn legation, or theôry, and from attending as spectators, -at the Olympic games.<a id="FNanchor_83" href="#Footnote_83" -class="fnanchor">[83]</a> Now that such exclusion was removed,<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_53">[p. 53]</span> and that the Eleian -heralds (who came to announce the approaching games and proclaim -the truce connected with them) again trod the soil of Attica,—the -Athenian visit was felt both by themselves and by others as a -novelty. Some curiosity was entertained to see what figure the theôry -of Athens would make as to show and splendor. Nor were there wanting -spiteful rumors, that Athens had been so much impoverished by the -war, as to be prevented from appearing with appropriate magnificence -at the altar and in the presence of Olympic Zeus.</p> - -<p>Alkibiadês took pride in silencing these surmises, as well as -in glorifying his own name and person, by a display more imposing -than had ever been previously beheld. He had already distinguished -himself in the local festivals and liturgies of Athens by an -ostentation surpassing Athenian rivals: but he now felt himself -standing forward as the champion and leader of Athens before -Greece. He had discredited his political rival Nikias, given a new -direction to the politics of Athens by the Argeian alliance, and -was about to commence a series of intra-Peloponnesian operations -against the Lacedæmonians. On all these grounds he determined that -his first appearance on the plain of Olympia should impose upon all -beholders. The Athenian theôry, of which he was a member, was set -out with first-rate splendor, and with the amplest show of golden -ewers, censers, etc., for the public sacrifice and procession.<a -id="FNanchor_84" href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a> -But when the chariot-races came on, Alkibiadês himself appeared -as competitor at his own cost,—not merely with one well-equipped -chariot and four, which the richest Greeks had hitherto counted as -an extra<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">[p. 54]</span>ordinary -personal glory, but with the prodigious number of seven distinct -chariots, each with a team of four horses. And so superior was their -quality, that one of his chariots gained a first prize, and another -a second prize, so that Alkibiadês was twice crowned with sprigs of -the sacred olive-tree, and twice proclaimed by the herald. Another of -his seven chariots also came in fourth: but no crown or proclamation, -it seems, was awarded to any after the second in order. We must -recollect that he had competitors from all parts of Greece to contend -against, not merely private men, but even despots and governments. -Nor was this all. The tent which the Athenian theôrs provided for -their countrymen, visitors to the games, was handsomely adorned; -but a separate tent, which Alkibiadês himself provided for a public -banquet to celebrate his triumph, together with the banquet itself, -was set forth on a scale still more stately and expensive. The rich -allies of Athens—Ephesus, Chios, and Lesbos—are said to have lent him -their aid in enhancing this display. It is highly probable that they -would be glad to cultivate his favor, as he had now become one of -the first men in Athens, and was in an ascendent course. But we must -farther recollect that they, as well as Athens, had been excluded -from the Olympic festival, so that their own feelings on first -returning might well prompt them to take a genuine interest in this -imposing reappearance of the Ionic race at the common sanctuary of -Hellas.</p> - -<p>Five years afterwards, on an important discussion which will -be hereafter described, Alkibiadês maintained publicly before the -Athenian assembly that his unparalleled Olympic display had produced -an effect upon the Grecian mind highly beneficial to Athens;<a -id="FNanchor_85" href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a><span -class="pagenum" id="Page_55">[p. 55]</span> dissipating the -suspicions entertained that she was ruined by the war, and -establishing beyond dispute her vast wealth and power.<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_56">[p. 56]</span> He was doubtless right -to a considerable extent; though not sufficient to repel the -charge from himself, which it was his pur<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_57">[p. 57]</span>pose to do, both of overweening personal -vanity, and of that reckless expenditure which he would be compelled -to try and overtake by peculation or violence at the public cost. All -the unfavorable impressions suggested to prudent Athenians by his -previous life, were aggravated by this stupendous display; much more, -of course, the jealousy and hatred of personal competitors. And this -feeling was not the less real, though as a political man he was now -in the full tide of public favor.</p> - -<p>If the festival of the 90th Olympiad was peculiarly distinguished -by the reappearance of Athenians and those connected with them, it -was marked by a farther novelty yet more striking, the exclusion of -the Lacedæmonians. This exclusion was the consequence of the new -political interests of the Eleians, combined with their increased -consciousness of force arising out of the recent alliance with Argos, -Athens, and Mantineia. It has already been mentioned that since the -peace with Athens, the Lacedæmonians, acting as arbitrators in the -case of Lepreum, which the Eleians claimed as their dependency, -had declared it to be autonomous, and had sent a body of troops to -defend it. Probably the Eleians had recently renewed their attacks -upon the district, since the junction with their new allies; -for the Lacedæmonians had detached thither a fresh body of one -thousand hoplites immediately prior to the Olympic festival. Out -of the mission of this fresh detachment the sentence of exclusion -arose. The Eleians were privileged administrators of the festival, -regulating the details of the ceremony itself, and formally<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_58">[p. 58]</span> proclaiming by heralds -the commencement of the Olympic truce during which all violation -of the Eleian territory by an armed force was a sin against the -majesty of Zeus. On the present occasion they affirmed that the -Lacedæmonians had sent the one thousand hoplites into Lepreum, and -had captured a fort called Phyrkus, both Eleian possessions, after -the proclamation of the truce. They accordingly imposed upon Sparta -the fine prescribed by the “Olympian law,” of two minæ for each man, -two thousand minæ in all; a part to Zeus Olympius, a part to the -Eleians themselves. During the interval between the proclamation of -the truce and the commencement of the festival, the Lacedæmonians -sent to remonstrate against this fine, which they alleged to have -been unjustly imposed, inasmuch as the heralds had not yet proclaimed -the truce at Sparta when the hoplites reached Lepreum. The Eleians -replied that the truce had already at that time been proclaimed among -themselves (for they always proclaimed it first at home, before -their heralds crossed the borders), so that <i>they</i> were interdicted -from all military operations; of which the Lacedæmonian hoplites -had taken advantage to commit their last aggressions. To which the -Lacedæmonians rejoined, that the behavior of the Eleians themselves -contradicted their own allegation, for they had sent the Eleian -heralds to Sparta to proclaim the truce after they knew of the -sending of the hoplites, thus showing that they did not consider the -truce to have been already violated. The Lacedæmonians added, that -after the herald reached Sparta, they had taken no farther military -measures. How the truth stood in this disputed question, we have no -means of deciding. But the Eleians rejected the explanation, though -offering, if the Lacedæmonians would restore to them Lepreum, to -forego such part of the fine as would accrue to themselves, and to -pay out of their own treasury on behalf of the Lacedæmonians the -portion which belonged to the god. This new proposition being alike -refused, was again modified by the Eleians. They intimated that they -would be satisfied if the Lacedæmonians, instead of paying the fine -at once, would publicly on the altar at Olympia, in presence of the -assembled Greeks, take an oath to pay it at a future date. But the -Lacedæmonians would not listen to the proposition either of payment -or of promise. Accordingly the Eleians, as judges under the<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_59">[p. 59]</span> Olympic law, interdicted -them from the temple of Olympic Zeus, from the privilege of -sacrificing there, and from attendance and competition at the games; -that is, from attendance in the form of the sacred legation called -theôry, occupying a formal and recognized place at the solemnity.<a -id="FNanchor_86" href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a></p> - -<p>As all the other Grecian states—with the single exception -of Lepreum—were present by their theôries<a id="FNanchor_87" -href="#Footnote_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a> as well as by -individual spectators, so the Spartan theôry “shone by its absence” -in a manner painfully and insultingly conspicuous. So extreme, -indeed, was the affront put upon the Lacedæmonians, connected as they -were with Olympia by a tie ancient, peculiar, and never yet broken; -so pointed the evidence of that comparative degradation into which -they had fallen, through the peace with Athens coming at the back -of the Sphakterian disaster,<a id="FNanchor_88" href="#Footnote_88" -class="fnanchor">[88]</a> that they were supposed likely to set the -exclusion at defiance; and to escort their theôrs into the temple at -Olympia for sacrifice, under the protection of an armed force. The -Eleians even thought it necessary to put their younger hoplites under -arms, and to summon to their aid one thousand hoplites from Mantineia -as well as the same number from Argos, for the purpose of repelling -this probable attack: while a detachment of Athenian cavalry were -stationed at Argos during the festival, to lend assistance in case -of need. The alarm prevalent among the spectators of the festival -was most serious, and became considerably aggravated by an incident -which occurred after the chariot racing. Lichas,<a id="FNanchor_89" -href="#Footnote_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a> a Lacedæmonian of -great wealth and consequence, had a chariot running in the lists, -which he was obliged to enter, not in his own name, but in the name -of the Bœotian federation. The sentence of exclusion hindered him -from taking any ostensible part, but it did not hinder him from -being present as a spectator; and when he saw his chariot proclaimed -victorious under the title of Bœotian, his impatience to make himself -known became uncontrol<span class="pagenum" id="Page_60">[p. -60]</span>lable. He stepped into the midst of the lists, and placed -a chaplet on the head of the charioteer, thus advertising himself -as the master. This was a flagrant indecorum and known violation -of the order of the festival: accordingly, the official attendants -with their staffs interfered at once in performance of their -duty, chastising and driving him back to his place with blows.<a -id="FNanchor_90" href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a> Hence -arose an increased apprehension of armed Lacedæmonian interference. -None such took place, however: the Lacedæmonians, for the first -and last time in their history, offered their Olympic sacrifice -at home, and the festival passed off without any interruption.<a -id="FNanchor_91" href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a> -The boldness of the Eleians in putting this affront upon the most -powerful state in Greece is so astonishing, that we can hardly be -mistaken in supposing their proceeding to have been suggested by -Alkibiadês and encouraged by the armed aid from the allies. He was -at this moment not less ostentatious in humiliating Sparta than in -showing off Athens.</p> - -<p>Of the depressed influence and estimation of Sparta, a farther -proof was soon afforded by the fate of her colony, the Trachinian -Herakleia, established near Thermopylæ, in the third year of the war. -That colony—though at first comprising a numerous body of settlers, -in consequence of the general trust in Lacedæmonian power, and though -always under the government of a Lacedæmonian harmost—had never -prospered. It had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_61">[p. 61]</span> -been persecuted from the beginning by the neighboring tribes, and -administered with harshness as well as peculation by its governors. -The establishment of the town had been regarded from the beginning by -the neighbors, especially the Thessalians, as an invasion of their -territory; and their hostilities, always vexatious, had, in the -winter succeeding the Olympic festival just described, been carried -to a greater point of violence than ever. They had defeated the -Herakleots in a ruinous battle, and slain Xenarês the Lacedæmonian -governor. But though the place was so reduced as to be unable to -maintain itself without foreign aid, Sparta was too much embarrassed -by Peloponnesian enemies and waverers to be able to succor it; and -the Bœotians, observing her inability, became apprehensive that the -interference of Athens would be invoked. Accordingly they thought it -prudent to occupy Herakleia with a body of Bœotian troops, dismissing -the Lacedæmonian governor Hegesippidas for alleged misconduct. -Nor could the Lacedæmonians prevent this proceeding, though it -occasioned them to make indignant remonstrance.<a id="FNanchor_92" -href="#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="Chap_56"> - <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LVI.<br /> - FROM THE FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD NINETY DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF - MANTINEIA.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">Shortly</span> -after the remarkable events of the Olympic festival described in my -last chapter, the Argeians and their allies sent a fresh embassy to -invite the Corinthians to join them. They thought it a promising -opportunity, after the affront just put upon Sparta, to prevail upon -the Corinthians to desert her: but Spartan envoys were present also, -and though the discussions were much protracted, no new resolution -was adopted. An<span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">[p. 62]</span> -earthquake—possibly an earthquake not real, but simulated for -convenience—abruptly terminated the congress. The Corinthians—though -seemingly distrusting Argos, now that she was united with Athens, -and leaning rather towards Sparta—were unwilling to pronounce -themselves in favor of one so as to make an enemy of the other.<a -id="FNanchor_93" href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a></p> - -<p>In spite of this first failure, the new alliance of Athens and -Argos manifested its fruits vigorously in the ensuing spring. Under -the inspirations of Alkibiadês, Athens was about to attempt the -new experiment of seeking to obtain intra-Peloponnesian followers -and influence. At the beginning of the war, she had been maritime, -defensive, and simply conservative, under the guidance of Periklês. -After the events of Sphakteria, she made use of that great advantage -to aim at the recovery of Megara and Bœotia, which she had before -been compelled to abandon by the thirty years’ truce, at the -recommendation of Kleon. In this attempt she employed the eighth -year of the war, but with signal ill-success; while Brasidas during -that period broke open the gates of her maritime empire, and robbed -her of many important dependencies. The grand object of Athens then -became, to recover these lost dependencies, especially Amphipolis: -Nikias and his partisans sought to effect such recovery by making -peace, while Kleon and his supporters insisted that it could never -be achieved except by military efforts. The expedition under Kleon -against Amphipolis had failed, the peace concluded by Nikias had -failed also: Athens had surrendered her capital advantage, without -regaining Amphipolis; and if she wished to regain it, there was no -alternative except to repeat the attempt which had failed under -Kleon. And this perhaps she might have done, as we shall find her -projecting to do in the course of about four years forward, if it -had not been, first, that the Athenian mind was now probably sick -and disheartened about Amphipolis, in consequence of the prodigious -disgrace so recently undergone there; next, that Alkibiadês, the -new chief adviser or prime minister of Athens—if we may be allowed -to use an inaccurate expression, which yet suggests the reality of -the case—was prompted by his personal impulses to turn the stream of -Athe<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">[p. 63]</span>nian ardor into -a different channel. Full of antipathy to Sparta, he regarded the -interior of Peloponnesus as her most vulnerable point, especially in -the present disjointed relations of its component cities. Moreover, -his personal thirst for glory was better gratified amidst the centre -of Grecian life than by undertaking an expedition into a distant and -barbarous region: lastly, he probably recollected with discomfort -the hardships and extreme cold, insupportable to all except the iron -frame of Sokrates, which he had himself endured at the blockade of -Potidæa twelve years before,<a id="FNanchor_94" href="#Footnote_94" -class="fnanchor">[94]</a> and which any armament destined to conquer -Amphipolis would have to go through again. It was under these -impressions that he now began to press his intra-Peloponnesian -operations against Lacedæmon, with the view of organizing a -counter-alliance under Argos sufficient to keep her in check, and -at any rate to nullify her power of carrying invasion beyond the -Isthmus. All this was to be done without ostensibly breaking the -peace and alliance between Athens and Lacedæmon, which stood in -conspicuous letters on pillars erected in both cities.</p> - -<p>Coming to Argos at the head of a few Athenian hoplites and bowmen, -and reinforced by Peloponnesian allies, Alkibiadês exhibited the -spectacle of an Athenian general traversing the interior of the -peninsula, and imposing his own arrangements in various quarters, -a spectacle at that moment new and striking.<a id="FNanchor_95" -href="#Footnote_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a> He first turned his -attention to the Achæan towns in the northwest, where he persuaded -the inhabitants of Patræ to ally themselves with Athens, and even to -undertake the labor of connecting their town with the sea by means of -long walls, so as to place themselves within the protection of Athens -from seaward. He farther projected the erection of a fort and the -formation of a naval station at the extreme point of Cape Rhium, just -at the narrow entrance of the Corinthian gulf; whereby the Athenians, -who already possessed the opposite shore by means of Naupaktus, -would have become masters of the commerce of the gulf.<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_64">[p. 64]</span> But the Corinthians -and Sikyonians, to whom this would have been a serious mischief, -despatched forces enough to prevent the consummation of the scheme, -and probably also to hinder the erection of the walls at Patræ.<a -id="FNanchor_96" href="#Footnote_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a> Yet -the march of Alkibiadês doubtless strengthened the anti-Laconian -interest throughout the Achæan coast.</p> - -<p>He then returned to take part with the Argeians in a war against -Epidaurus. To acquire possession of this city would much facilitate -the communication between Athens and Argos, since it was not -only immediately opposite to the island of Ægina now occupied by -the Athenians, but also opened to the latter an access by land, -dispensing with the labor of circumnavigating Cape Skyllæum, the -southeastern point of the Argeian and Epidaurian peninsula, whenever -they sent forces to Argos. Moreover, the territory of Epidaurus -bordered to the north on that of Corinth, so that the possession -of it would be an additional guarantee for the neutrality of the -Corinthians. Accordingly it was resolved to attack Epidaurus, for -which a pretext was easily found. As presiding and administering -state of the temple of Apollo Pythäeus (situated within the walls -of Argos), the Argeians enjoyed a sort of religious supremacy over -Epidaurus and other neighboring cities, seemingly the remnant of -that extensive supremacy, political as well as religious, which in -early times had been theirs.<a id="FNanchor_97" href="#Footnote_97" -class="fnanchor">[97]</a> The Epidaurians owed to this temple certain -sacrifices and other ceremonial obligations, one of which, arising -out of some circumstance which we cannot understand, was now due and -unperformed: at least so the Argeians alleged. Such default imposed -upon them the duty of getting together a military force to attack the -Epidaurians and enforce the obligation.</p> - -<p>Their invading march, however, was for a time suspended by the -news that king Agis with the full force of Lacedæmon and her allies -had advanced as far as Leuktra, one of the border towns of Laconia -on the northwest, towards Mount Lykæum and the Arcadian Parrhasii. -What this movement meant was known only to Agis himself, who did not -even explain the purpose to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">[p. -65]</span> his own soldiers or officers, or allies.<a -id="FNanchor_98" href="#Footnote_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a> But -the sacrifice constantly offered before passing the border was -found so unfavorable, that he abandoned his march for the present -and returned home. The month Karneius, a period of truce as well as -religious festival among the Dorian states, being now at hand, he -directed the allies to hold themselves prepared for an out-march as -soon as that month had expired.</p> - -<p>On being informed that Agis had dismissed his troops, the -Argeians prepared to execute their invasion of Epidaurus. The day -on which they set out was already the twenty-sixth of the month -preceding the Karneian month, so that there remained only three -days before the commencement of that latter month with its holy -truce, binding upon the religious feelings of the Dorian states -generally, to which Argos, Sparta, and Epidaurus all belonged. But -the Argeians made use of that very peculiarity of the season, which -was accounted likely to keep them at home, to facilitate their -scheme, by playing a trick with the calendar, and proclaiming one -of those arbitrary interferences with the reckoning of time which -the Greeks occasionally employed to correct the ever-recurring -confusion of their lunar system. Having begun their march on the -twenty-sixth of the month before Karneius, the Argeians called each -succeeding day still the twenty-sixth, thus disallowing the lapse of -time, and pretending that the Karneian month had not yet commenced. -This proceeding was farther facilitated by the circumstance, that -their allies of Athens, Elis, and Mantineia, not being Dorians, were -under no obligation to observe the Karneian truce. Accordingly, -the army marched from Argos into the territory of Epidaurus, and -spent seemingly a fortnight or three weeks in laying it waste; all -this time being really, according to the reckoning of the other -Dorian states, part of the Karneian truce, which the Argeians, -adopting their own arbitrary computation of time, professed not to -be violating. The Epidaurians, unable to meet them single-handed in -the field,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_66">[p. 66]</span> invoked -the aid of their allies: who, however, had already been summoned by -Sparta for the succeeding month, and did not choose, any more than -the Spartans, to move during the Karneian month itself. Some allies, -however, perhaps the Corinthians, came as far as the Epidaurian -border, but did not feel themselves strong enough to lend aid by -entering the territory alone.<a id="FNanchor_99" href="#Footnote_99" -class="fnanchor">[99]</a></p> <p><span class="pagenum" -id="Page_67">[p. 67]</span></p> <p>Meanwhile the Athenians had -convoked another congress of deputies at Mantineia, for the purpose -of discussing propositions<span class="pagenum" id="Page_68">[p. -68]</span> of peace: perhaps this may have been a point carried -by Nikias at Athens, in spite of Alkibiadês. What other deputies -attended<span class="pagenum" id="Page_69">[p. 69]</span> we are not -told; but Euphamidas, coming as envoy from Corinth, animadverted even -at the opening of the debates upon the inconsistency of assembling -a peace congress while war was actually raging in the Epidaurian -territory. So much were the Athenian deputies struck with this -observation, that they departed, persuaded the Argeians to retire -from Epidaurus, and then came back to resume negotiations. Still, -however, the pretensions of both parties were found irreconcilable, -and the congress broke up; upon which the Argeians again returned -to renew their devastation in Epidaurus, while the Lacedæmonians, -immediately on the expiration of the Karneian month, marched out -again, as far as their border town of Karyæ, but were again arrested -and forced to return by unfavorable border-sacrifices. Intimation -of their out-march, however, was transmitted to Athens; upon which -Alkibiadês, at the head of one thousand Athenian hoplites, was sent -to join the Argeians. But before he arrived, the Lacedæmonian army -had been already disbanded; so that his services were no longer -required, and the Argeians carried their ravages over one-third of -the territory of Epidaurus before they at length evacuated it.<a -id="FNanchor_100" href="#Footnote_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_70">[p. 70]</span></p> <p>The -Epidaurians were reinforced about the end of September by a -detachment of three hundred Lacedæmonian hoplites under Agesippidas, -sent by sea without the knowledge of the Athenians. Of this, the -Argeians preferred loud complaints at Athens; and they had good -reason to condemn the negligence of the Athenians as allies, for not -having kept better naval watch at their neighboring station of Ægina, -and for having allowed this enemy to enter the harbor of Epidaurus. -But they took another ground of complaint, somewhat remarkable. In -the alliance between Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantineia, it had been -stipulated that neither of the four should suffer the passage of -troops through its territory, without the joint consent of all. Now -the sea was accounted a part of the territory of Athens: so that the -Athenians had violated this article of the treaty by permitting the -Lacedæmonians to send troops by sea to Epidaurus. And the Argeians -now required Athens, in compensation for this wrong, to carry back -the Messenians and Helots from Kephallenia to Pylos, and allow -them to ravage Laconia. The Athenians, under the persuasion of -Alkibiadês, complied with their requisition; inscribing, at the foot -of the pillar on which their alliance with Sparta stood recorded, -that the Lacedæmonians had not observed their oaths. Nevertheless, -they still abstained from formally throwing up their treaty with -Lacedæmon, or breaking it in any other way.<a id="FNanchor_101" -href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a> The relations between -Athens and Sparta thus remained in name, peace and alliance, so far -as concerns direct operations against each other’s territory; in -reality, hostile action as well as hostile manœuvring, against each -other, as allies respectively of third parties.</p> - -<p>The Argeians, after having prolonged their incursions on the -Epidaurian territory throughout all the autumn, made in the winter -an unavailing attempt to take the town itself by storm. Though there -was no considerable action, but merely a succession of desultory -attacks, in some of which the Epidaurians even<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_71">[p. 71]</span> had the advantage, yet they still -suffered serious hardship, and pressed their case forcibly on the -sympathy of Sparta. Thus importuned, and mortified as well as -alarmed by the increasing defection or coldness which they now -experienced throughout Peloponnesus, the Lacedæmonians determined -during the course of the ensuing summer to put forth their strength -vigorously, and win back their lost ground.<a id="FNanchor_102" -href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a></p> - -<p>Towards the month of June (<small>B.C.</small> 418) -they marched with their full force, freemen as well as Helots, -under king Agis, against Argos. The Tegeans and other Arcadian -allies joined them on the march, while their other allies near the -Isthmus,—Bœotians, Megarians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Phliasians, -etc., were directed to assemble at Phlius. The number of these latter -allies were very considerable, for we hear of five thousand Bœotian -hoplites, and two thousand Corinthian: the Bœotians had with them -also five thousand light-armed, five hundred horsemen, and five -hundred foot-soldiers, who ran alongside of the horsemen. The numbers -of the rest, or of Spartans themselves, we do not know; nor probably -did Thucydidês himself know: for we find him remarking elsewhere the -impenetrable concealment of the Lacedæmonians on all public affairs, -in reference to the numbers at the subsequent battle of Mantineia. -Such muster of the Lacedæmonian alliance was no secret to the -Argeians, who marching first to Mantineia, and there taking up the -force of that city as well as three thousand Eleian hoplites who came -to join them, met the Lacedæmonians in their march at Methydrium in -Arcadia. The two armies being posted on opposite hills, the Argeians -had resolved to attack Agis the next day, so as to prevent him from -joining his allies at Phlius. But he eluded this separate encounter -by decamping in the night, reached Phlius, and operated his junction -in safety. We do not hear that there was in the Lacedæmonian army -any commander of lochus, who, copying the unreasonable punctilio of -Amompharetus before the battle of Platæa, refused to obey the order -of retreat before the enemy, to the imminent risk of the whole army. -And the fact, that no similar incident occurred now, may be held to -prove that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">[p. 72]</span> the -Lacedæmonians had acquired greater familiarity with the exigencies of -actual warfare.</p> - -<p>As soon as the Lacedæmonian retreat was known in the morning, -the Argeians left their position also, and marched with their -allies, first to Argos itself; next, to Nemea, on the ordinary road -from Corinth and Phlius to Argos, by which they imagined that the -invaders would approach. But Agis acted differently. Distributing -his force into three divisions, he himself with the Lacedæmonians -and Arcadians, taking a short, but very rugged and difficult road, -crossed the ridge of the mountains and descended straight into the -plain near Argos. The Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phliasians, were -directed to follow another mountain road, which entered the same -plain upon a different point; while the Bœotians, Corinthians, and -Sikyonians, followed the longer, more even, and more ordinary route, -by Nemea. This route, though apparently frequented and convenient, -led for a considerable distance along a narrow ravine, called the -Trêtus, bounded on each side by mountains. The united army under Agis -was much superior in number to the Argeians: but if all had marched -in one line by the frequented route through the narrow Trêtus, -their superiority of number would have been of little use, whilst -the Argeians would have had a position highly favorable to their -defence. By dividing his force, and taking the mountain road with his -own division, Agis got into the plain of Argos in the rear of the -Argeian position at Nemea. He anticipated that when the Argeians saw -him devastating their properties near the city, they would forthwith -quit the advantageous ground near Nemea, to come and attack him in -the plain: the Bœotian division would thus find the road by Nemea -and the Trêtus open, and would be able to march without resistance -into the plain of Argos, where their numerous cavalry would act with -effect against the Argeians engaged in attacking Agis. This triple -march was executed. Agis with his division, and the Corinthians with -theirs, got across the mountains into the Argeian plain during the -night; while the Argeians,<a id="FNanchor_103" href="#Footnote_103" -class="fnanchor">[103]</a> hearing at daybreak that he was near -their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">[p. 73]</span> city, -ravaging Saminthus and other places, left their position at Nemea -to come down to the plain and attack him. In their march they had a -partial skirmish with the Corinthian division, which had reached a -high ground immediately above the Argeian plain, and which lay nearly -in the road. But this affair was indecisive, and they soon found -themselves in the plain near to Agis and the Lacedæmonians, who lay -between them and their city.</p> - -<p>On both sides, the armies were marshalled, and order taken for -battle. But the situation of the Argeians was in reality little -less than desperate: for while they had Agis and his division in -their front, the Corinthian detachment was near enough to take -them in flank, and the Bœotians marching along the undefended road -through the Trêtus would attack them in the rear. The Bœotian -cavalry too would act with full effect upon them in the plain, since -neither Argos, Elis, nor Mantineia, seemed to have possessed any -horsemen; a description of force which ought to have been sent from -Athens, though from some cause which does not appear, the Athenian -contingent had not yet arrived. Nevertheless, in spite of this very -critical position, both the Argeians and their allies were elate -with confidence and impatient for battle; thinking only of the -division of Agis immediately in their front, which appeared to be -inclosed between them and their city, and taking no heed to the other -formidable enemies in their flank and rear. But the Argeian generals -were better aware than their soldiers of the real danger; and just -as the two armies were about to charge, Alkiphron, proxenus of the -Lacedæmonians at Argos, accompanied Thrasyllus, one of the five -generals of the Argeians, to a separate parley with Agis, without -the least consultation or privity on the part of their own army. -They exhorted Agis not to force on a battle, assuring him that the -Argeians were ready both to give and receive equitable satisfaction, -in all matters of complaint which the Lacedæmonians might urge -against them, and to conclude a just peace for the future. Agis, -at once acquiescing in the proposal, granted them a truce of four -months to accomplish what they had promised. He on his part also took -this step without consulting either his army or his allies, simply -addressing a few words of confidential talk to<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_74">[p. 74]</span> one of the official Spartans near him. -Immediately, he gave the order for retreat, and the army, instead -of being led to battle, was conducted out of the Argeian territory, -through the Nemean road whereby the Bœotians had just been entering. -But it required all the habitual discipline of Lacedæmonian -soldiers to make them obey this order of the Spartan king, alike -unexpected and unwelcome.<a id="FNanchor_104" href="#Footnote_104" -class="fnanchor">[104]</a> For the army were fully sensible both of -the prodigious advantages of their position, and of the overwhelming -strength of the invading force, so that all the three divisions -were loud in their denunciations of Agis, and penetrated with shame -at the thoughts of so disgraceful a retreat. And when they all saw -themselves in one united body at Nemea, previous to breaking up and -going home,—so as to have before their eyes their own full numbers -and the complete equipment of one of the finest Hellenic armies which -had ever been assembled,—the Argeian body of allies, before whom they -were now retiring, appeared contemptible in the comparison, and they -separated with yet warmer and more universal indignation against the -king who had betrayed their cause.</p> - -<p>On returning home, Agis incurred not less blame from the Spartan -authorities than from his own army, for having thrown away so -admirable an opportunity of subduing Argos. This was assuredly no -more than he deserved: but we read with no small astonishment that -the Argeians and their allies on returning were even more exasperated -against Thrasyllus,<a id="FNanchor_105" href="#Footnote_105" -class="fnanchor">[105]</a> whom they accused of having traitorously -thrown away a certain victory. They had indeed good ground, in the -received practice, to censure him for having concluded a truce -without taking the sense of the people. It was their custom on -returning from a march, to hold a public court-martial before -entering the city, at a place called the Charadrus, or winter torrent -near the walls, for the purpose of adjudicating on offences and -faults committed in the army. Such was their wrath on this occasion -against Thrasyllus, that they would scarcely be prevailed upon even -to put him upon his trial, but began to stone him. He was forced -to seek personal<span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">[p. 75]</span> -safety at the altar; upon which the soldiers tried him, and he was -condemned to have his property confiscated.<a id="FNanchor_106" -href="#Footnote_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a></p> - -<p>Very shortly afterwards the expected Athenian contingent arrived, -which probably ought to have come earlier: one thousand hoplites, -with three hundred horsemen, under Lachês and Nikostratus. Alkibiadês -came as ambassador, probably serving as a soldier also among the -horsemen. The Argeians, notwithstanding their displeasure against -Thrasyllus, nevertheless felt themselves pledged to observe the truce -which he had concluded, and their magistrates accordingly desired the -newly-arrived Athenians to depart. Nor was Alkibiadês even permitted -to approach and address the public assembly, until the Mantineian and -Eleian allies insisted that thus much at least should not be refused. -An assembly was therefore convened, in which these allies took part, -along with the Argeians. Alkibiadês contended strenuously that the -recent truce with the Lacedæmonians was null and void; since it had -been contracted without the privity of all the allies, distinctly at -variance with the terms of the alliance. He therefore called upon -them to resume military operations forthwith, in conjunction with -the reinforcement now seasonably arrived. His speech so persuaded -the assembly, that the Mantineians and Eleians consented at once to -join him in an expedition against the Arcadian town of Orchomenus; -the Argeians, also, though at first reluctant, very speedily followed -them thither. Orchomenus was a place important to acquire, not merely -because its territory joined that of Mantineia on the northward, but -because the Lacedæmonians had deposited therein the hostages which -they had taken from Arcadian townships and villages as guarantee -for fidelity. Its walls were however in bad condition, and its -inhabitants, after a short resistance, capitulated. They agreed -to become allies of Mantineia, to furnish hostages for faithful -adhesion to such alliance, and to deliver up the hostages deposited -with them by Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_107" href="#Footnote_107" -class="fnanchor">[107]</a></p> - -<p>Encouraged by first success, the allies debated what they should -next undertake; the Eleians contending strenuously for a march -against Lepreum, while the Mantineians were anxious to attack -their enemy and neighbor Tegea. The Argeians and Athenians<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_76">[p. 76]</span> preferred the latter, -incomparably the more important enterprise of the two: but -such was the disgust of the Eleians at the rejection of their -proposition, that they abandoned the army altogether, and went home. -Notwithstanding their desertion, however, the remaining allies -continued together at Mantineia, organizing their attack upon Tegea, -in which city they had a strong favorable party, who had actually -laid their plans, and were on the point of proclaiming the revolt -of the city from Sparta,<a id="FNanchor_108" href="#Footnote_108" -class="fnanchor">[108]</a> when the philo-Laconian Tegeans just -saved themselves by despatching the most urgent message to Sparta, -and receiving the most rapid succor. The Lacedæmonians, filled with -indignation at the news of the surrender of Orchomenus, vented anew -all their displeasure against Agis, whom they now threatened with -the severe punishment of demolishing his house and fining him in -the sum of one hundred thousand drachmæ, or about twenty-seven and -two-thirds Attic talents. He urgently entreated that an opportunity -might be afforded to him of redeeming by some brave deed the ill name -which he had incurred: if he failed in doing so, then they might -inflict on him what penalty they chose. The penalty was accordingly -withdrawn: but a restriction, new to the Spartan constitution, -was now placed upon the authority of the king. It had been before -a part of his prerogative to lead out the army single-handed and -on his own authority; but a council of ten was now named, without -whose concurrence he was interdicted from exercising such power.<a -id="FNanchor_109" href="#Footnote_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a></p> - -<p>To the great good fortune of Agis, a pressing message now arrived -announcing the imminent revolt of Tegea, the most important ally of -Sparta, and close upon her border. Such was the alarm occasioned by -this news that the whole military population instantly started off to -relieve the place, Agis at their head, the most rapid movement ever -known to have been made by Lacedæmonian soldiers.<a id="FNanchor_110" -href="#Footnote_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a> When they arrived at -Orestheium in Arcadia, in their way, perhaps hearing that the danger -was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">[p. 77]</span> somewhat less -pressing, they sent back to Sparta one-sixth part of the forces, for -home defence, the oldest as well as the youngest men. The remainder -marched forward to Tegea, where they were speedily joined by their -Arcadian allies. They farther sent messages to the Corinthians -and Bœotians, as well as to the Phocians and Lokrians, invoking -the immediate presence of these contingents in the territory of -Mantineia. The arrival of such reinforcements, however, even with -all possible zeal on the part of the cities contributing, could -not be looked for without some lapse of time; the rather, as it -appears, that they could not get into the territory of Mantineia -except by passing through that of Argos,<a id="FNanchor_111" -href="#Footnote_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a> which could not be -safely attempted until they had all formed a junction. Accordingly -Agis, impatient to redeem his reputation, marched at once with the -Lacedæmonians and the Arcadian allies present, into the territory -of Mantineia, and took up a position near the Herakleion, or -temple of Hêraklês,<a id="FNanchor_112" href="#Footnote_112" -class="fnanchor">[112]</a> from whence he began to ravage the -neighboring lands. The Argeians and their allies presently came forth -from Mantineia, planted themselves near him, but on very rugged and -impracticable ground, and thus offered him battle. Nothing daunted -by the difficulties of the position, he marshalled his army and led -it up to attack them. His rashness on the present occasion might -have produced as much mischief as his inconsiderate concession to -Thrasyllus near Argos, had not an ancient Spartan called out to him -that he was now merely proceeding “to heal mischief by mischief.” -So forcibly was Agis impressed either with this timely admonition, -or by the closer view of the position which he had undertaken to -assault, that he suddenly halted the army and gave orders for -retreat, though actually within distance no greater than the cast of -a javelin from the enemy.<a id="FNanchor_113" href="#Footnote_113" -class="fnanchor">[113]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">[p. 78]</span></p> - -<p>His march was now intended to draw the Argeians away from the -difficult ground which they occupied. On the frontier between -Mantineia and Tegea—both situated on a lofty but inclosed plain, -drained only by katabothra, or natural subterranean channels in the -mountains—was situated a head of water, the regular efflux of which -seems to have been kept up by joint operations of both cities for -their mutual benefit. Thither Agis now conducted his army, for the -purpose of turning the water towards the side of Mantineia, where -it would occasion serious damage; calculating that the Mantineians -and their allies would certainly descend from their position to -hinder it. No stratagem however was necessary to induce the latter -to adopt this resolution. For so soon as they saw the Lacedæmonians, -after advancing to the foot of the hill, first suddenly halt, next -retreat, and lastly disappear, their surprise was very great: and -this surprise was soon converted into contemptuous confidence and -impatience to pursue the flying enemy. The generals not sharing such -confidence, hesitated at first to quit their secure position: upon -which the troops became clamorous, and loudly denounced them for -treason in letting the Lacedæmonians quietly escape a second time, -as they had before done near Argos. These generals would probably -not be the same with those who had incurred, a short time before, -so much undeserved censure for their convention with Agis: but the -murmurs on the present occasion, hardly less unreasonable, drove -them, not without considerable shame and confusion, to give orders -for advance. They abandoned the hill, marched down into the plain -so as to approach the Lacedæmonians, and employed the next day in -arranging themselves in good battle order, so as to be ready to fight -at a moment’s notice.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile it appears that Agis had found himself disappointed in -his operations upon the water. He had either not done so much damage, -or not spread so much terror, as he had expected: and he accordingly -desisted, putting himself again in march to resume his position -at the Herakleion, and supposing that his enemies still retained -their position on the hill. But in the course of this march he came -suddenly upon the Argeian and allied army where he was not in the -least prepared to see them: they were not only in the plain, but -already drawn up in perfect<span class="pagenum" id="Page_79">[p. -79]</span> order of battle. The Mantineians occupied the right -wing, the post of honor, because the ground was in their territory: -next to them stood their dependent Arcadian allies: then the chosen -Thousand-regiment of Argos, citizens of wealth and family, trained -in arms at the cost of the state: alongside of them, the remaining -Argeian hoplites, with their dependent allies of Kleônæ and Orneæ: -last of all, on the left wing, stood the Athenians, their hoplites as -well as their horsemen.</p> - -<p>It was with the greatest surprise that Agis and his army beheld -this unexpected apparition. To any other Greeks than Lacedæmonians, -the sudden presentation of a formidable enemy would have occasioned -a feeling of dismay from which they would have found it difficult -to recover; and even the Lacedæmonians, on this occasion, underwent -a momentary shock unparalleled in their previous experience.<a -id="FNanchor_114" href="#Footnote_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a> But -they now felt the full advantage of their rigorous training and habit -of military obedience, as well as of that subordination of officers -which was peculiar to themselves in Greece. In other Grecian armies -orders were proclaimed to the troops in a loud voice by a herald, who -received them personally from the general: each <i>taxis</i>, or company, -indeed, had its own taxiarch, but the latter did not receive his -orders separately from the general, and seems to have had no personal -responsibility for the execution of them by his soldiers. Subordinate -and responsible military authority was not recognized. Among the -Lacedæmonians, on the contrary, there was a regular gradation of -military and responsible authority, “commanders of commanders,” each -of whom had his special duty in insuring the execution of orders.<a -id="FNanchor_115" href="#Footnote_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a> -Every order emanated from the Spartan king when he was present, and -was given to the polemarchs (each commanding a mora, the largest -military divis<span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">[p. 80]</span>ion), -who intimated it to the lochagi, or colonels, of the respective -lochi. These again gave command to each pentekontêr, or captain -of a pentekosty; lastly, he to the enômotarch, who commanded the -lowest subdivision, called an enômoty. The soldier thus received -no immediate orders except from the enômotarch, who was in the -first instance responsible for his enômoty; but the pentekontêr and -the lochage were responsible also each for his larger division; -the pentekosty including four enômoties, and the lochus four -pentekosties, at least so the numbers stood on this occasion. All -the various military manœuvres were familiar to the Lacedæmonians -from their unremitting drill, so that their armies enjoyed the -advantage of readier obedience along with more systematic command. -Accordingly, though thus taken by surprise, and called on now for -the first time in their lives, to form in the presence of an enemy, -they only manifested the greater promptitude<a id="FNanchor_116" -href="#Footnote_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a> and anxious haste in -obeying the orders of Agis, transmitted through the regular series of -officers. The battle array was attained with regularity as well as -with speed.</p> - -<p>The extreme left of the Lacedæmonian line belonged by ancient -privilege to the Skiritæ; mountaineers of the border district of -Laconia, skirting the Arcadian Parrhasii, seemingly east of the -Eurotas, near its earliest and highest course. These men, originally -Arcadians, now constituted a variety of Laconian Periœki, with -peculiar duties as well as peculiar privileges. Numbered among -the bravest and most active men in Peloponnesus, they generally -formed the vanguard in an advancing march; and the Spartans stand -accused of having exposed them to danger as well as toil with -unbecoming recklessness.<a id="FNanchor_117" href="#Footnote_117" -class="fnanchor">[117]</a> Next to the Skiritæ, who were six hundred -in number, stood the enfranchised Helots, recently returned from -serving with Brasidas in Thrace, and the Neodamôdes, both probably -summoned home from Lepreum, where we were told before that they -had been planted. After them, in the centre of the entire line, -came the Lacedæmonian lochi, seven in number, with the Arcadian -de<span class="pagenum" id="Page_81">[p. 81]</span>pendent allies, -Heræan and Mænalian, near them. Lastly, in the right wing, stood -the Tegeans, with a small division of Lacedæmonians occupying the -extreme right, as the post of honor. On each flank there were some -Lacedæmonian horsemen.<a id="FNanchor_118" href="#Footnote_118" -class="fnanchor">[118]</a></p> - -<p>Thucydidês, with a frankness which enhances the value of his -testimony wherever he gives it positively, informs us that he cannot -pretend to set down the number of either army. It is evident that -this silence is not for want of having inquired; but none of the -answers which he received appeared to him trustworthy: the extreme -secrecy of Lacedæmonian politics admitted of no certainty about -<i>their</i> numbers, while the empty numerical boasts of other Greeks -were not less misleading. In the absence of assured information about -aggregate number, the historian gives us some general information -accessible to every inquirer, and some facts visible to a spectator. -From his language it is conjectured, with some probability, by Dr. -Thirlwall and others, that he was himself present at the battle, -though in what capacity we cannot determine, as he was an exile -from his country. First, he states that the Lacedæmonian army -<i>appeared</i> more numerous than that of the enemy. Next he tells us, -that independent of the Skiritæ on the left, who were six hundred -in number, the remaining Lacedæmonian front, to the extremity of -their right wing, consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men, -each enômoty having four men in front. In respect to depth, the -different enômoties were not all equal; but for the most part, the -files were eight deep. There were seven lochi in all (apart from the -Skiritæ); each lochus comprised four pentekosties, each pentekosty -contained four enômoties.<a id="FNanchor_119" href="#Footnote_119" -class="fnanchor">[119]</a> Multiplying four hundred and<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_82">[p. 82]</span> forty-four by eight, -and adding the six hundred Skiritæ, this would make a total of four -thousand one hundred and eighty-four hoplites, besides a few horsemen -on each flank. Respecting light-armed, nothing is said. I have no -confidence in such an estimate—but the total is smaller than we -should have expected, considering that the Lacedæmonians had marched -out from Sparta with their entire force on a pressing emergency, and -that they had only sent home one-sixth of their total, their oldest -and youngest soldiers.</p> - -<p>It does not appear that the generals on the Argeian side made -any attempt to charge while the Lacedæmonian battle-array was yet -incomplete. It was necessary for them, according to Grecian practice, -to wind up the courage of their troops by some words of exhortation -and encouragement: and before these were finished, the Lacedæmonians -may probably have attained their order. The Mantineian officers -reminded their countrymen that the coming battle would decide whether -Mantineia should continue to be a free and imperial city, with -Arcadian dependencies of her own, as she now was, or should again -be degraded into a dependency of Lacedæmon. The Argeian leaders -dwelt upon<span class="pagenum" id="Page_83">[p. 83]</span> the -opportunity which Argos now had of recovering her lost ascendency -in Peloponnesus, and of revenging herself upon her worst enemy and -neighbor. The Athenian troops were exhorted to show themselves worthy -of the many brave allies with whom they were now associated, as well -as to protect their own territory and empire by vanquishing their -enemy in Peloponnesus.</p> - -<p>It illustrates forcibly the peculiarity of Lacedæmonian character, -that to them no similar words of encouragement were addressed either -by Agis or any of the officers. “They knew (says the historian<a -id="FNanchor_120" href="#Footnote_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a>) -that long practice beforehand in the business of war, was a better -preservative than fine speeches on the spur of the moment.” As among -professional soldiers, bravery was assumed as a thing of course, -without any special exhortation: but mutual suggestions were heard -among them with a view to get their order of battle and position -perfect, which at first it probably was not, from the sudden and -hurried manner in which they had been constrained to form. Moreover, -various war-songs, perhaps those of Tyrtæus, were chanted in the -ranks. At length the word was given to attack: the numerous pipers -in attendance—an hereditary caste at Sparta—began to play, while the -slow, solemn, and equable march of the troops adjusted itself to the -time given by these instruments without any break or wavering in -the line. A striking contrast to this deliberate pace was presented -by the enemy: who having no pipers or other musical instruments, -rushed forward to the charge with a step vehement and even furious,<a -id="FNanchor_121" href="#Footnote_121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a> -fresh from the exhortations just addressed to them.</p> - -<p>It was the natural tendency of all Grecian armies, when -coming into conflict, to march not exactly straight forward, but -somewhat<span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">[p. 84]</span> aslant -towards the right. The soldiers on the extreme right of both armies -set the example of such inclination, in order to avoid exposing -their own unshielded side; while for the same reason every man along -the line took care to keep close to the shield of his right-hand -neighbor. We see from hence that, with equal numbers, the right was -not merely the post of honor, but also of comparative safety. So it -proved on the present occasion, even the Lacedæmonian discipline -being noway exempt from this cause of disturbance. Though the -Lacedæmonian front, from their superior numbers, was more extended -than that of the enemy, still their right files did not think -themselves safe without slanting still farther to the right, and -thus outflanked very greatly the Athenians on the opposite left -wing; while on the opposite side the Mantineians who formed the -right wing, from the same disposition to keep the left shoulder -forward, outflanked, though not in so great a degree, the Skiritæ and -Brasideians on the Lacedæmonian left. King Agis, whose post was with -the lochi in the centre, saw plainly that when the armies closed, -his left would be certainly taken in flank and perhaps even in the -rear. Accordingly, he thought it necessary to alter his dispositions -even at this critical moment, which he relied upon being able to -accomplish through the exact discipline, practised evolutions, and -slow march, of his soldiers.</p> - -<p>The natural mode of meeting the impending danger would have been -to bring round a division from the extreme right, where it could well -be spared, to the extreme left against the advancing Mantineians. But -the ancient privilege of the Skiritæ, who always fought by themselves -on the extreme left, forbade such an order.<a id="FNanchor_122" -href="#Footnote_122" class="fnanchor">[122]</a> Accordingly, Agis -gave signal to the Brasideians and Skiritæ to make a flank movement -on the left so as to get on equal front with the Mantineians; while -in order to fill<span class="pagenum" id="Page_85">[p. 85]</span> -up the vacancy thus created in his line, he sent orders to the two -polemarchs Aristoklês and Hipponoidas, who had their lochi on the -extreme right of the line, to move to the rear and take post on the -right of the Brasideians, so as again to close up the line. But these -two polemarchs, who had the safest and most victorious place in the -line, chose to keep it, disobeying his express orders: so that Agis, -when he saw that they did not move, was forced to send a second order -countermanding the flank movement of the Skiritæ, and directing them -to fall in upon the centre, back into their former place. But it -had now become too late to execute this second command before the -hostile armies closed: and the Skiritæ and Brasideians were thus -assailed while in disorder and cut off from their own centre. The -Mantineians, finding them in this condition, defeated and drove them -back; while the chosen Thousand of Argos, breaking in by the vacant -space between the Brasideians and the Lacedæmonian centre, took them -on the right flank and completed their discomfiture. They were routed -and pursued even to the Lacedæmonian baggage-wagons in the rear; some -of the elder troops who guarded the wagons being slain, and the whole -Lacedæmonian left wing altogether dispersed.</p> - -<p>But the victorious Mantineians and their comrades, thinking -only of what was immediately before them, wasted thus a precious -time when their aid was urgently needed elsewhere. Matters passed -very differently on the Lacedæmonian centre and right; where Agis, -with his body-guard of three hundred chosen youths called Hippeis, -and with the Spartan lochi, found himself in front conflict with -the centre and left of the enemy;—with the Argeians, their elderly -troops and the so-called Five Lochi, with the Kleonæans and Orneates, -dependent allies of Argos, and with the Athenians. Over all these -troops they were completely victorious, after a short resistance, -indeed, on some points with no resistance at all. So formidable -was the aspect and name of the Lacedæmonians, that the opposing -troops gave way without crossing spears; and even with a panic so -headlong, that they trod down each other in anxiety to escape.<a -id="FNanchor_123" href="#Footnote_123" class="fnanchor">[123]</a> -While thus<span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">[p. 86]</span> defeated -in front, they were taken in flank by the Tegeans and Lacedæmonians -on the right of Agis’s army, and the Athenians<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_87">[p. 87]</span> here incurred serious hazard of being -all cut to pieces, had they not been effectively aided by their -own cavalry close at hand.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">[p. -88]</span> Moreover Agis, having decidedly beaten and driven them -back was less anxious to pursue them than to return to the rescue -of his own defeated left wing; so that even the Athenians, who -were exposed both in flank and front, were enabled to effect their -retreat in safety. The Mantineians and the Argeian Thousand, though -victorious on their part of the line, yet seeing the remainder of -their army in disorderly flight, had little disposition to renew -the combat against Agis and the conquering Lacedæmonians. They -sought only to effect their retreat, which however could not be done -without severe loss, especially on the part of the Mantineians; and -which Agis might have prevented altogether, had not the Lacedæmonian -system, enforced on this occasion by the counsels of an ancient -Spartan named Pharax, enjoyed abstinence from prolonged pursuit -against a defeated enemy.<a id="FNanchor_124" href="#Footnote_124" -class="fnanchor">[124]</a></p> - -<p>There fell in this battle seven hundred men of the Argeians, -Kleonæans, and Orneates; two hundred Athenians, together with both -the generals Lachês and Nikostratus; and two hundred Mantineians. -The loss of the Lacedæmonians, though never certainly known, from -the habitual secrecy of their public proceedings, was estimated at -about three hundred men. They stripped the enemy’s dead, spreading -out to view the arms thus acquired, and selecting some for a trophy; -then picked up their own dead and carried them away for burial at -Tegea, granting the customary burial-truce to the defeated enemy. -Pleistoanax, the other Spartan king, had advanced as far as Tegea -with a reinforcement composed of the elder and younger citizens; but -on hearing of the victory, he returned back home.<a id="FNanchor_125" -href="#Footnote_125" class="fnanchor">[125]</a></p> - -<p>Such was the important battle of Mantineia, fought in the month -of June 418 <small>B.C.</small> Its effect throughout -Greece was prodigious. The numbers engaged on both sides were very -considerable for a Grecian army of that day, though seemingly not -so large as at the battle of Delium five years before: the number -and grandeur of the states whose troops were engaged was, however, -greater than at Delium. But what gave peculiar value to the battle -was, that it wiped off at once the preëxisting stain upon<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_89">[p. 89]</span> the honor of Sparta. The -disaster in Sphakteria, disappointing all previous expectation, had -drawn upon her the imputation of something like cowardice; and there -were other proceedings which, with far better reason, caused her to -be stigmatized as stupid and backward. But the victory of Mantineia -silenced all such disparaging criticism, and replaced Sparta in her -old position of military preëminence before the eyes of Greece. -It worked so much the more powerfully because it was entirely the -fruit of Lacedæmonian courage, with little aid from that peculiar -skill and tactics, which was generally seen concomitant, but had in -the present case been found comparatively wanting. The manœuvre of -Agis, in itself not ill-conceived, for the purpose of extending his -left wing, had failed through the disobedience of the two refractory -polemarchs: but in such a case the shame of failure falls more or -less upon all parties concerned; nor could either general or soldiers -be considered to have displayed at Mantineia any of that professional -aptitude which caused the Lacedæmonians to be styled “artists in -warlike affairs.” So much the more conspicuously did Lacedæmonian -courage stand out to view. After the left wing had been broken, -and when the Argeian Thousand had penetrated into the vacant space -between the left and centre, so that they might have taken the centre -in flank, and ought to have done so, had they been well advised, -the troops in the centre, instead of being daunted as most Grecian -soldiers would have been, had marched forward against the enemies -in their front, and gained a complete victory. The consequences of -the battle were thus immense in reëstablishing the reputation of the -Lacedæmonians, and in exalting them again to their ancient dignity -of chiefs of Peloponnesus.<a id="FNanchor_126" href="#Footnote_126" -class="fnanchor">[126]</a></p> - -<p>We are not surprised to hear that the two polemarchs, Aristoklês -and Hipponoidas, whose disobedience had wellnigh caused the ruin -of the army, were tried and condemned to banishment as cowards, on -their return to Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_127" href="#Footnote_127" -class="fnanchor">[127]</a></p> - -<p>Looking at the battle from the point of view of the other -side,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_90">[p. 90]</span> we may -remark, that the defeat was greatly occasioned by the selfish -caprice of the Eleians in withdrawing their three thousand men -immediately before the battle, because the other allies, instead -of marching against Lepreum, preferred to attempt the far more -important town of Tegea: an additional illustration of the remark -of Periklês at the beginning of the war, that numerous and -equal allies could never be kept in harmonious coöperation.<a -id="FNanchor_128" href="#Footnote_128" class="fnanchor">[128]</a> -Shortly after the defeat, the three thousand Eleians came back -to the aid of Mantineia,—probably regretting their previous -untoward departure,—together with a reinforcement of one thousand -Athenians. Moreover, the Karneian month began, a season which the -Lacedæmonians kept rigidly holy; even despatching messengers to -countermand their extra-Peloponnesian allies, whom they had invoked -prior to the late battle,<a id="FNanchor_129" href="#Footnote_129" -class="fnanchor">[129]</a> and remaining themselves within their -own territory, so that the field was for the moment left clear for -the operations of a defeated enemy. Accordingly, the Epidaurians, -though they had made an inroad into the territory of Argos during the -absence of the Argeian main force at the time of the late battle, and -had gained a partial success, now found their own territory overrun -by the united Eleians, Mantineians, and Athenians, who were bold -enough even to commence a wall of circumvallation round the town of -Epidaurus itself. The entire work was distributed between them to -be accomplished; but the superior activity and perseverance of the -Athenians was here displayed in a conspicuous manner. For while the -portion of work committed to them—the fortification of the cape on -which the Heræum or temple of Hêrê was situated—was indefatigably -prosecuted and speedily brought to completion, their allies, both -Eleians and Mantineians, abandoned the tasks respectively allotted -to them in impatience and disgust. The idea of circumvallation -being for this reason relinquished, a joint garrison was left in -the new fort at Cape Heræum, after which the allies evacuated the -Epidaurian territory.<a id="FNanchor_130" href="#Footnote_130" -class="fnanchor">[130]</a></p> - -<p>So far, the Lacedæmonians appeared to have derived little -positive benefit from their late victory: but the fruits of it -were soon manifested in the very centre of their enemy’s force, at -Argos. A material change had taken place since the battle in<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_91">[p. 91]</span> the political tendencies -of that city. There had been within it always an opposition party, -philo-Laconian and anti-democratical: and the effect of the defeat of -Mantineia had been to strengthen this party as much as it depressed -their opponents. The democratical leaders, who, in conjunction with -Athens and Alkibiades, had aspired to maintain an ascendency in -Peloponnesus hostile and equal, if not superior to Sparta, now found -their calculations overthrown and exchanged for the discouraging -necessities of self-defence against a victorious enemy. And while -these leaders thus lost general influence by so complete a defeat -of their foreign policy, the ordinary democratical soldiers of -Argos brought back with them from the field of Mantineia, nothing -but humiliation and terror of the Lacedæmonian arms. But the chosen -Argeian Thousand-regiment returned with very different feelings. -Victorious over the left wing of their enemies, they had not been -seriously obstructed in their retreat even by the Lacedæmonian -centre. They had thus reaped positive glory,<a id="FNanchor_131" -href="#Footnote_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a> and doubtless felt -contempt for their beaten fellow-citizens. Now it has been already -mentioned that these Thousand were men of rich families, and the best -military age, set apart by the Argeian democracy to receive permanent -training at the public expense, just at a time when the ambitious -views of Argos first began to dawn, after the Peace of Nikias. So -long as Argos was likely to become or continue the imperial state of -Peloponnesus, these Thousand wealthy men would probably find their -dignity sufficiently consulted in upholding her as such, and would -thus acquiesce in the democratical government. But when the defeat -of Mantineia reduced Argos to her own limits, and threw her upon -the defensive, there was nothing to counterbalance their natural -oligarchical sentiments, so that they became decided opponents of -the democratical government in its distress. The oligarchical<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_92">[p. 92]</span> party in Argos, thus -encouraged and reinforced, entered into a conspiracy with the -Lacedæmonians to bring the city into alliance with Sparta as well as -to overthrow the democracy.<a id="FNanchor_132" href="#Footnote_132" -class="fnanchor">[132]</a></p> - -<p>As the first step towards the execution of this scheme, the -Lacedæmonians, about the end of September, marched out their -full forces as far as Tegea, thus threatening invasion, and -inspiring terror at Argos. From Tegea they sent forward as envoy -Lichas, proxenus of the Argeians at Sparta, with two alternative -propositions: one for peace, which he was instructed to tender and -prevail upon the Argeians to accept, if he could; another, in case -they refused, of a menacing character. It was the scheme of the -oligarchical faction first to bring the city into alliance with -Lacedæmon and dissolve the connection with Athens, before they -attempted any innovation in the government. The arrival of Lichas -was the signal for them to manifest themselves by strenuously -pressing the acceptance of his pacific proposition. But they had -to contend against a strong resistance; since Alkibiadês, still in -Argos, employed his utmost energy to defeat their views. Nothing -but the presence of the Lacedæmonian army at Tegea, and the general -despondency of the people, at length enabled them to carry their -point, and to procure acceptance of the proposed treaty; which being -already adopted by the ekklesia at Sparta, was sent ready prepared to -Argos, and there sanctioned without alteration. The conditions were -substantially as follows:—</p> - -<p>“The Argeians shall restore the boys whom they have received as -hostages from Orchomenus, and the men-hostages from the Mænalii. -They shall restore to the Lacedæmonians the men now in Mantineia, -whom the Lacedæmonians had placed as hostages for safe custody in -Orchomenus, and whom the Argeians and Mantineians have carried away -from that place. They shall evacuate Epidaurus, and raze the fort -recently erected near it. The Athenians, unless they also forthwith -evacuate Epidaurus, shall be proclaimed as enemies to Lacedæmon as -well as to Argos, and to the allies of both. The Lacedæmonians shall -restore all the hostages whom they now have in keeping, from whatever -place they may have been taken. Respecting the<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_93">[p. 93]</span> sacrifice alleged to be due to Apollo by -the Epidaurians, the Argeians will consent to tender to them an oath, -which if they swear, they shall clear themselves.<a id="FNanchor_133" -href="#Footnote_133" class="fnanchor">[133]</a> Every city in -Peloponnesus, small or great, shall be autonomous and at liberty to -maintain its own ancient constitution. If any extra-Peloponnesian -city shall come against Peloponnesus with mischievous projects, -Lacedæmon and Argos will take joint counsel against it, in the manner -most equitable for the interest of the Peloponnesians generally. -The extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be in the same -position with reference to this treaty as the allies of Lacedæmon -and Argos in Peloponnesus, and shall hold their own in the same -manner. The Argeians shall show this treaty to their allies, who -shall be admitted to subscribe to it, if they think fit. But if the -allies desire anything different, the Argeians shall send them home -about their business.”<a id="FNanchor_134" href="#Footnote_134" -class="fnanchor">[134]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">[p. 94]</span></p> - -<p>Such was the agreement sent ready prepared by the Lacedæmonians -to Argos, and there literally accepted. It presented a reciprocity -little more than nominal, imposing one obligation of no importance -upon Sparta; though it answered the purpose of the latter by -substantially dissolving the alliance of Argos with its three -confederates.</p> - -<p>But this treaty was meant by the oligarchical party in Argos -only as preface to a series of ulterior measures. As soon as it was -concluded, the menacing army of Sparta was withdrawn from Tegea, and -was exchanged for free and peaceful intercommunication between the -Lacedæmonians and Argeians. Probably Alkibiadês at the same time -retired, while the renewed visits and hospitalities of Lacedæmonians -at Argos strengthened the interest of their party more than ever. -They were soon powerful enough to persuade the Argeian assembly -formally to renounce the alliance with Athens, Elis, and Mantineia, -and to conclude a special alliance with Sparta, on the following -terms:—</p> - -<p>“There shall be peace and alliance for fifty years between the -Lacedæmonians and the Argeians—upon equal terms—each giving amicable -satisfaction, according to its established constitution, to all -complaints preferred by the other. On the same condition, also, the -other Peloponnesian cities shall partake in this peace and alliance, -holding their own territory, laws, and separate constitution. All -extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be put upon the same -footing as the Lacedæmonians themselves. The allies of Argos shall -also be put upon the same footing as Argos herself, holding their -own territory undisturbed. Should occasion arise for common military -operations on any point, the Lacedæmonians and Argeians shall take -counsel together, determining in the most equitable manner they can -for the interest of their allies. If any one of the cities hereunto -belonging, either in or out of Peloponnesus, shall have disputes -either about boundaries or other topics, she shall be held bound -to enter upon<span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">[p. 95]</span> -amicable adjustment.<a id="FNanchor_135" href="#Footnote_135" -class="fnanchor">[135]</a> If any allied city shall quarrel with -another allied city, the matter shall be referred to some third city -satisfactory to both. Each city shall render justice to her own -citizens according to her own ancient constitution.”</p> - -<p>It will be observed that in this treaty of alliance, the disputed -question of headship is compromised or evaded. Lacedæmon and Argos -are both put upon an equal footing, in respect to taking joint -counsel for the general body of allies: they two alone are to decide, -without consulting the other allies, though binding themselves to -have regard to the interests of the latter. The policy of Lacedæmon -also pervades the treaty, that of insuring autonomy to all the lesser -states of Peloponnesus, and thus breaking up the empire of Elis, -Mantineia, or any other larger state which might have dependencies.<a -id="FNanchor_136" href="#Footnote_136" class="fnanchor">[136]</a> -And accordingly the Mantineians, finding themselves abandoned -by Argos, were constrained to make their submission to Sparta, -enrolling themselves again as her allies, renouncing all command over -their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_96">[p. 96]</span> Arcadian -subjects, and delivering up the hostages of these latter, according -to the stipulation in the treaty between Lacedæmon and Argos.<a -id="FNanchor_137" href="#Footnote_137" class="fnanchor">[137]</a> The -Lacedæmonians do not seem to have meddled farther with Elis. Being -already possessed of Lepreum,—through the Brasideian settlers planted -there,—they perhaps did not wish again to provoke the Eleians, from -fear of being excluded a second time from the Olympic festival.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the conclusion of the alliance with Lacedæmon—about -November or December, 418 <small>B.C.</small>—had still -farther depressed the popular leaders at Argos. The oligarchical -faction, and the chosen regiment of the Thousand, all men of wealth -and family, as well as bound together by their common military -training, now saw their way clearly to the dissolution of the -democracy by force, and to the accomplishment of a revolution. -Instigated by such ambitious views, and flattered by the idea -of admitted headship jointly with Sparta, they espoused the new -policy of the city with extreme vehemence, and began immediately -to multiply occasions of collision with Athens. Joint Lacedæmonian -and Argeian envoys were despatched to Thrace and Macedonia. With -the Chalkidians of Thrace, the revolted subjects of Athens, the -old alliance was renewed and even new engagements concluded; while -Perdikkas of Macedonia was urged to renounce his covenants with -Athens, and join the new confederacy. In that quarter the influence -of Argos was considerable; for the Macedonian princes prized very -highly their ancient descent from Argos, which constituted them -brethren of the Hellenic family. Accordingly, Perdikkas consented -to the demand and concluded the new treaty; insisting, however, -with his habitual duplicity, that the step should for the moment be -kept secret from Athens.<a id="FNanchor_138" href="#Footnote_138" -class="fnanchor">[138]</a> In farther pursuance of the new tone -of hostility to that city, joint envoys were also sent thither, -to require that the Athenians should quit Peloponnesus, and -especially that they should evacuate the fort recently erected -near Epidaurus. It seems to have been held jointly by Argeians, -Mantineians, Eleians, and Athenians; and as the latter were only -a minority of the whole, the Athenians in the city judged<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_97">[p. 97]</span> it prudent to send -Dêmosthenês to bring them away. That general not only effected -the retreat, but also contrived a stratagem, which gave to it the -air almost of an advantage. On his first arrival in the fort, he -proclaimed a gymnastic match outside of the gates for the amusement -of the whole garrison, contriving to keep back the Athenians -within until all the rest had marched out: then hastily shutting -the gates, he remained master of the place.<a id="FNanchor_139" -href="#Footnote_139" class="fnanchor">[139]</a> Having no intention, -however, of keeping it, he made it over presently to the Epidaurians -themselves, with whom he renewed the truce to which they had been -parties jointly with the Lacedæmonians five years before, two years -before the Peace of Nikias.<a id="FNanchor_140" href="#Footnote_140" -class="fnanchor">[140]</a></p> - -<p>The mode of proceeding here resorted to by Athens, in respect to -the surrender of the fort, seems to have been dictated by a desire -to manifest her displeasure against the Argeians. This was exactly -what the Argeian leaders and oligarchical party, on their side, most -desired; the breach with Athens had become irreparable, and their -plans were now matured for violently subverting their own democracy. -They concerted with Sparta a joint military expedition, of one -thousand hoplites from each city,—the first joint expedition under -the new alliance,—against Sikyôn, for the purpose of introducing more -thorough-paced oligarchy into the already oligarchical Sikyônian -government. It is possible that there may have been some democratical -opposition gradually acquiring strength at Sikyôn: but that city -seems to have been, as far as we know, always oligarchical in policy, -and passively faithful to Sparta. Probably, therefore, the joint -enterprise against Sikyôn was nothing more than a pretext to<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_98">[p. 98]</span> cover the introduction -of one thousand Lacedæmonian hoplites into Argos, whither the joint -detachment immediately returned, after the business at Sikyôn had -been accomplished. Thus reinforced, the oligarchical leaders and -the chosen Thousand at Argos put down by force the democratical -constitution in that city, slew the democratical leaders, and -established themselves in complete possession of the government.<a -id="FNanchor_141" href="#Footnote_141" class="fnanchor">[141]</a></p> - -<p>This revolution, accomplished about February, <small>B.C.</small> -417, the result of the victory of Mantineia and the consummation -of a train of policy laid by Sparta, raised her ascendency in -Peloponnesus to a higher and more undisputed point than it had ever -before attained. The towns in Achaia were as yet not sufficiently -oligarchical for her purpose, perhaps since the march of Alkibiadês -thither, two years before; accordingly, she now remodelled their -governments in conformity with her own views. The new rulers of Argos -were subservient to her, not merely from oligarchical sympathy, but -from need of her aid to keep down internal rising against themselves: -so that there was neither enemy, nor even neutral, to counter-work -her or to favor Athens, throughout the whole peninsula.</p> - -<p>But the Spartan ascendency at Argos was not destined to last. -Though there were many cities in Greece, in which oligarchies long -maintained themselves unshaken, through adherence to a traditional -routine and by being usually in the hands of men accustomed to -govern, yet an oligarchy erected by force upon the ruins of a -democracy was rarely of long duration. The angry discontent of -the people, put down by temporary intimidation, usually revived, -and threatened the security of the rulers enough to render them -suspicious and probably cruel. Nor was such cruelty their only fault: -they found their emancipation from democratical restraints too -tempting to be able to control either their lust or their rapacity. -With the population of Argos, comparatively coarse and brutal in -all ranks, and more like Korkyra than like<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_99">[p. 99]</span> Athens, such abuse was pretty sure to -be speedy as well as flagrant. Especially the chosen regiment of -the Thousand—men in the vigor of their age, and proud of their -military prowess as well as of their wealthier station—construed -the new oligarchical government which they had helped to erect as -a period of individual license to themselves. The behavior and -fate of their chief, Bryas, illustrates the general demeanor of -the troop. After many other outrages against persons of poorer -condition, he one day met in the streets a wedding procession, in -which the person of the bride captivated his fancy. He caused her -to be violently torn from her company, carried her to his house, -and possessed himself of her by force. But in the middle of the -night, this high-spirited woman revenged herself for the outrage by -putting out the eyes of the ravisher while he was fast asleep:<a -id="FNanchor_142" href="#Footnote_142" class="fnanchor">[142]</a> a -terrible revenge, which the pointed clasp-pins of the feminine attire -sometimes enabled women<a id="FNanchor_143" href="#Footnote_143" -class="fnanchor">[143]</a> to take upon those who wronged them. -Having contrived to make her escape, she found concealment among her -friends, as well as protection among the people generally against the -indignant efforts of the chosen Thousand to avenge their leader.</p> - -<p>From incidents such as this, and from the multitude of petty -insults which so flagitious an outrage implies as coexistent, we -are not surprised to learn that the Demos of Argos soon recovered -their lost courage, and resolved upon an effort to put down their -oligarchical oppressors. They waited for the moment when the -festival called the Gymnopædiæ was in course of being solemnized -at Sparta,—a festival at which the choric performances of men and -boys were so interwoven with Spartan religion as well as bodily -training, that the Lacedæmonians would make no military movement -until they were finished. At this critical moment, the Argeian Demos -rose in insurrection, and after a sharp contest gained a victory -over the oligarchy, some of whom were slain, while others only saved -themselves by flight. Even at the first instant of danger, pressing -messages had been sent to Sparta for aid. But the Lacedæmonians -at first peremptorily<span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">[p. -100]</span> refused to move during the period of their festival: -nor was it until messenger after messenger had arrived to set forth -the pressing necessity of their friends, that they reluctantly put -aside their festival to march towards Argos. They were too late: -the precious moment had already passed by. They were met at Tegea -by an intimation that their friends were overthrown, and Argos in -possession of the victorious people. Nevertheless, various exiles who -had escaped still promised them success, urgently entreating them -to proceed, but the Lacedæmonians refused to comply, returned to -Sparta, and resumed their intermitted festival.<a id="FNanchor_144" -href="#Footnote_144" class="fnanchor">[144]</a></p> - -<p>Thus was the oligarchy of Argos overthrown, after a -continuance of about four months,<a id="FNanchor_145" -href="#Footnote_145" class="fnanchor">[145]</a> from February to -June, 417 <small>B.C.</small>, and the chosen Thousand-regiment -either dissolved or destroyed. The movement excited great -sympathy in several Peloponnesian cities,<a id="FNanchor_146" -href="#Footnote_146" class="fnanchor">[146]</a> who were becoming -jealous of the exorbitant preponderance of Sparta. Nevertheless, -the Argeian Demos, though victorious within the city, felt so much -distrust of being able to maintain themselves, that they sent envoys -to Sparta to plead their cause and to entreat favorable treatment: a -proceeding which proves the insurrection to have been spontaneous, -not fomented by Athens. But the envoys of the expelled oligarchs were -there to confront them, and the Lacedæmonians, after a lengthened -discussion, adjudging the Demos to have been guilty of wrong, -proclaimed the resolution of sending forces to put them down. Still, -the habitual tardiness of Lacedæmonian habits prevented any immediate -or separate movement. Their allies were to be summoned, none being -very zealous in the cause, and least of all at this moment, when the -period of harvest was at hand; so that about three months intervened -before any actual force was brought together.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_101">[p. 101]</span></p> - -<p>This important interval was turned to account by the Argeian -Demos, who, being plainly warned that they were to look on Sparta -only as an enemy, immediately renewed their alliance with Athens. -Regarding her as their main refuge, they commenced the building -of long walls to connect their city with the sea, in order that -the road might always be open for supplies and reinforcement -from Athens, in case they should be confined to their walls by a -superior Spartan force. The whole Argeian population—men and women, -free and slave—set about the work with the utmost ardor: while -Alkibiadês brought assistance from Athens,<a id="FNanchor_147" -href="#Footnote_147" class="fnanchor">[147]</a> especially skilled -masons and carpenters, of whom they stood in much need. The step may -probably have been suggested by himself, as it was the same which, -two years before, he had urged upon the inhabitants of Patræ. But -the construction of walls adequate for defence, along the line of -four miles and a half between Argos and the sea,<a id="FNanchor_148" -href="#Footnote_148" class="fnanchor">[148]</a> required a long time. -Moreover, the oligarchical party within the town, as well as the -exiles without,—a party defeated but not annihilated,—strenuously -urged the Lacedæmonians to put an end to the work, and even promised -them a counter-revolutionary movement in the town as soon as they -drew near to assist; the same intrigue which had been entered into -by the oligarchical party at Athens forty years before, when the -walls down to Peiræus were in course of erection.<a id="FNanchor_149" -href="#Footnote_149" class="fnanchor">[149]</a> Accordingly about -the end of September, 417 <small>B.C.</small>, king -Agis conducted an army of Lacedæmonians and allies against Argos, -drove the population within the city, and destroyed so much of the -long walls as had been already raised. But the oligarchical party -within were not able to realize their engagements of rising in -arms, so that he was obliged to retire after merely ravaging the -territory and taking the town of Hysiæ, where he put to death all the -freemen who fell into his hands. After his departure, the Argeians -retaliated these ravages upon the neighboring territory of Phlius, -where the exiles from Argos chiefly resided.<a id="FNanchor_150" -href="#Footnote_150" class="fnanchor">[150]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">[p. 102]</span></p> - -<p>The close neighborhood of such exiles, together with the declared -countenance of Sparta, and the continued schemes of the oligarchical -party within the walls, kept the Argeian democracy in perpetual -uneasiness and alarm throughout the winter, in spite of their -recent victory and the suppression of the dangerous regiment of a -Thousand. To relieve them in part from embarrassment, Alkibiadês -was despatched thither early in the spring with an Athenian -armament and twenty triremes. His friends and guests appear to -have been now in the ascendency, as leaders of the democratical -government; and in concert with them, he selected three hundred -marked oligarchical persons, whom he carried away and deposited in -various Athenian islands, as hostages for the quiescence of the -party, <small>B.C.</small> 416. Another ravaging march -was also undertaken by the Argeians into the territory of Phlius, -wherein, however, they sustained nothing but loss. And again, about -the end of September, the Lacedæmonians gave the word for a second -expedition against Argos. But having marched as far as the borders, -they found the sacrifices—always offered previous to leaving their -own territory—so unfavorable, that they returned back and disbanded -their forces. The Argeian oligarchical party, in spite of the -hostages recently taken from them, had been on the watch for this -Lacedæmonian force, and had projected a rising; or at least were -suspected of doing so, to such a degree that some of them were seized -and imprisoned by the government, while others made their escape.<a -id="FNanchor_151" href="#Footnote_151" class="fnanchor">[151]</a> -Later in the same winter, however, the Lacedæmonians became more -fortunate with their border sacrifices, entered the Argeian territory -in conjunction with their allies (except the Corinthians, who -refused to take part), and established the Argeian oligarchi<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_103">[p. 103]</span>cal exiles at Orneæ: -from which town these latter were again speedily expelled, after -the retirement of the Lacedæmonian army, by the Argeian democracy -with the aid of an Athenian reinforcement.<a id="FNanchor_152" -href="#Footnote_152" class="fnanchor">[152]</a></p> - -<p>To maintain the renewed democratical government of Argos, against -enemies both internal and external, was an important policy to -Athens, as affording the basis, which might afterwards be extended, -of an anti-Laconian party in Peloponnesus. But at the present time -the Argeian alliance was a drain and an exhaustion rather than a -source of strength to Athens: very different from the splendid hopes -which it had presented prior to the battle of Mantineia, hopes of -supplanting Sparta in her ascendency within the Isthmus. It is -remarkable, that in spite of the complete alienation of feeling -between Athens and Sparta,—and continued reciprocal hostilities, -in an indirect manner, so long as each was acting as ally of some -third party,—nevertheless, neither the one nor the other would -formally renounce the sworn alliance, nor obliterate the record -inscribed on its stone column. Both parties shrank from proclaiming -the real truth, though each half year brought them a step nearer -to it in fact. Thus during the course of the present summer (416 -<small>B.C.</small>) the Athenian and Messenian garrison at Pylos -became more active than ever in their incursions on Laconia, and -brought home large booty; upon which the Lacedæmonians, though -still not renouncing the alliance, publicly proclaimed their -willingness to grant what we may call letters of marque, to any -one, for privateering against Athenian commerce. The Corinthians -also, on private grounds of quarrel, commenced hostilities -against the Athenians.<a id="FNanchor_153" href="#Footnote_153" -class="fnanchor">[153]</a> Yet still Sparta and her allies remained -in a state of formal peace with Athens: the Athenians resisted -all the repeated solicitations of the Argeians to induce them to -make a landing on any part of Laconia and commit devastation.<a -id="FNanchor_154" href="#Footnote_154" class="fnanchor">[154]</a> -Nor was the license of free<span class="pagenum" id="Page_104">[p. -104]</span> intercourse for individuals as yet suspended. We cannot -doubt that the Athenians were invited to the Olympic festival of -416 <small>B.C.</small> (the 91st Olympiad), and sent thither -their solemn legation along with those of Sparta and other Dorian -Greeks.</p> - -<p>Now that they had again become allies of Argos, the Athenians -probably found out, more fully than they had before known, the -intrigue carried on by the former Argeian government with the -Macedonian Perdikkas. The effects of these intrigues, however, had -made themselves felt even earlier in the conduct of that prince, who, -having as an ally of Athens engaged to coöperate with an Athenian -expedition projected under Nikias for the spring or summer of 417 -<small>B.C.</small> against the Chalkidians of Thrace -and Amphipolis, now withdrew his concurrence, receded from the -alliance of Athens, and frustrated the whole scheme of expedition. -The Athenians accordingly placed the ports of Macedonia under naval -blockade, proclaiming Perdikkas an enemy.<a id="FNanchor_155" -href="#Footnote_155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a></p> - -<p>Nearly five years had elapsed since the defeat of Kleon, without -any fresh attempt to recover Amphipolis: the project just alluded -to appears to have been the first. The proceedings of the Athenians -with regard to this important town afford ample proof of that want -of wisdom on the part of their leading men Nikias and Alkibiades, -and of erroneous tendencies on the part of the body of the citizens, -which we shall gradually find conducting their empire to ruin. Among -all their possessions out of Attica, there was none so valuable as -Amphipolis: the centre of a great commercial and mining region, -situated on a large river and lake which the Athenian navy could -readily command, and claimed by them with reasonable justice, since -it was their original colony, planted by their wisest statesman, -Periklês. It had been lost only through unpardonable negligence on -the part of their generals; and when lost, we should have expected -to see the chief energies of Athens directed to the recovery of it; -the more so, as, if once recovered, it admitted of being made sure -and retained as a future possession. Kleon is the only leading man -who at once proclaims to his countrymen the important truth that -it never can be recovered except by force. He strenuously<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_105">[p. 105]</span> urges his countrymen -to make the requisite military effort, and prevails upon them in -part to do so, but the attempt disgracefully fails; partly through -his own incompetence as commander, whether his undertaking of that -duty was a matter of choice or of constraint, partly through the -strong opposition and antipathy against him from so large a portion -of his fellow-citizens, which rendered the military force not hearty -in the enterprise. Next, Nikias, Lachês, and Alkibiadês, all concur -in making peace and alliance with the Lacedæmonians, with express -promise and purpose to procure the restoration of Amphipolis. But -after a series of diplomatic proceedings, which display as much -silly credulity in Nikias as selfish deceit in Alkibiadês, the -result becomes evident, as Kleon had insisted, that peace will -not restore to them Amphipolis, and that it can only be regained -by force. The fatal defect of Nikias is now conspicuously seen: -his inertness of character and incapacity of decided or energetic -effort. When he discovered that he had been out-manœuvred by the -Lacedæmonian diplomacy, and had fatally misadvised his countrymen -into making important cessions on the faith of equivalents to -come, we might have expected to find him spurred on by indignant -repentance for this mistake, and putting forth his own strongest -efforts, as well as those of his country, in order to recover -those portions of her empire which the peace had promised, but did -not restore. Instead of which he exhibits no effective movement, -while Alkibiadês begins to display the defects of his political -character, yet more dangerous than those of Nikias, the passion -for showy, precarious, boundless, and even perilous novelties. It -is only in the year 417 <small>B.C.</small>, after the -defeat of Mantineia had put an end to the political speculations of -Alkibiadês in the interior of Peloponnesus, that Nikias projects an -expedition against Amphipolis; and even then it is projected only -contingent upon the aid of Perdikkas, a prince of notorious perfidy. -It was not by any half-exertions of force that the place could be -regained, as the defeat of Kleon had sufficiently proved. We obtain -from these proceedings a fair measure of the foreign politics of -Athens at this time, during what is called the Peace of Nikias, -preparing us for that melancholy catastrophe which will be developed -in the coming chapters, where she is brought<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_106">[p. 106]</span> near to ruin by the defects of Nikias -and Alkibiadês combined for, by singular misfortune, she does not -reap the benefit of the good qualities of either.</p> - -<p>It was in one of the three years between 420-416 -<small>B.C.</small>, though we do not know in which, that the vote -of ostracism took place, arising out of the contention between -Nikias and Alkibiadês.<a id="FNanchor_156" href="#Footnote_156" -class="fnanchor">[156]</a> The political antipathy between the two -having reached a point of great violence, it was proposed that a vote -of ostracism should be taken, and this proposition—probably made by -the partisans of Nikias, since Alkibiadês was the person most likely -to be reputed dangerous—was adopted by the people. Hyperbolus the -lamp-maker, son of Cheremês, a speaker of considerable influence in -the public assembly, strenuously supported it, hating Nikias not -less than Alkibiadês. Hyperbolus is named by Aristophanês as having -succeeded Kleon in the mastership of the rostrum in the Pnyx:<a -id="FNanchor_157" href="#Footnote_157" class="fnanchor">[157]</a> if -this were true, his supposed demagogic preëminence would commence -about September 422 <small>B.C.</small>, the period of the death of -Kleon. Long before that time, however, he had been among the chief -butts of the comic authors, who ascribe to him the same baseness, -dishonesty, impudence, and malignity in accusation, as that which -they fasten upon Kleon, though in language which seems to imply an -inferior idea of his power. And it may be doubted whether Hyperbolus -ever succeeded to the same influence as had been enjoyed by Kleon, -when we observe that Thucydidês does not name him in any of the -important debates which took place at and after the Peace of Nikias. -Thucydidês only mentions him once, in 411 <small>B.C.</small>, -while<span class="pagenum" id="Page_107">[p. 107]</span> he was in -banishment under sentence of ostracism, and resident at Samos. He -terms him, “one Hyperbolus, a low busy-body, who had been ostracized, -not from fear of dangerous excess of dignity and power, but through -his wickedness and his being felt as a disgrace to the city.”<a -id="FNanchor_158" href="#Footnote_158" class="fnanchor">[158]</a> -This sentence of Thucydidês is really the only evidence against -Hyperbolus: for it is not less unjust in his case than in that of -Kleon to cite the jests and libels of comedy as if they were so -much authentic fact and trustworthy criticism. It was at Samos that -Hyperbolus was slain by the oligarchical conspirators who were aiming -to overthrow the democracy at Athens. We have no particular facts -respecting him to enable us to test the general character given by -Thucydidês.</p> - -<p>At the time when the resolution was adopted at Athens, to take -a vote of ostracism suggested by the political dissension between -Nikias and Alkibiadês, about twenty-four years had elapsed since a -similar vote had been resorted to; the last example having been that -of Periklês and Thucydidês son of Melêsius, the latter of whom was -ostracized about 442 <small>B.C.</small> The democratical -constitution had become sufficiently confirmed to lessen materially -the necessity for ostracism as a safeguard against individual -usurpers: moreover, there was now full confidence in the numerous -dikasteries as competent to deal with the greatest of such criminals, -thus abating the necessity as conceived in men’s minds, not less -than the real necessity, for such precautionary intervention. Under -such a state of things, altered reality as well as altered feeling, -we are not surprised to find that the vote of ostracism now invoked, -though we do not know the circumstances which immediately preceded -it, ended in an abuse, or rather in a sort of parody, of the ancient -preventive. At a moment of extreme heat of party dispute, the -friends of Alkibiadês probably accepted the challenge of Nikias and -concurred in supporting a vote of ostracism; each hoping to get -rid of the opponent. The vote was accordingly decreed, but before -it actually took place,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_108">[p. -108]</span> the partisans of both changed their views, and preferred -to let the political dissension proceed without closing it by -separating the combatants. But the ostracizing vote, having been -formally pronounced, could not now be prevented from taking place: -it was always, however, perfectly general in its form, admitting of -any citizen being selected for temporary banishment. Accordingly, -the two opposing parties, each doubtless including various clubs, -or hetæries, and according to some accounts the friends of Phæax -also, united to turn the vote against some one else: and they -fixed upon a man whom all of them jointly disliked, Hyperbolus.<a -id="FNanchor_159" href="#Footnote_159" class="fnanchor">[159]</a> -By thus concurring, they obtained a sufficient number of votes -against him to pass the sentence, and he was sent into temporary -banishment. But such a result was in no one’s contemplation when the -vote was decreed to take place, and Plutarch even represents the -people as clapping their hands at it as a good joke. It was presently -recognized by every one, seemingly even by the enemies of Hyperbolus, -as a gross abuse of the ostracism. And the language of Thucydidês -himself distinctly implies this; for if we even grant that Hyperbolus -fully deserved the censure which that historian bestows, no one could -treat his presence as dangerous to the commonwealth; nor was the -ostracism introduced to meet low dishonesty or wickedness. It was, -even before, passing out of the political morality of Athens; and -this sentence consummated its extinction, so that we never hear of -it as employed afterwards. It had been extremely valuable in earlier -days, as a security to the growing democracy against individual -usurpation of power, and against dangerous exaggeration of rivalry -between individual leaders: but the democracy was now strong enough -to dispense with such exceptional protection. Yet if Alkibiadês -had returned as victor from Syracuse, it is highly probable that -the Athenians would have had no other means than the precautionary -antidote of ostracism to save themselves from him as despot.</p> - -<p>It was in the beginning of summer (416 <small>B.C.</small>) that -the Athenians undertook the siege and conquest of the Dorian island -of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">[p. 109]</span> Mêlos, one -of the Cyclades, and the only one, except Thêra, which was not -already included in their empire. Mêlos and Thêra were both ancient -colonies of Lacedæmon, with whom they had strong sympathies of -lineage. They had never joined the confederacy of Delos, nor been -in any way connected with Athens; but at the same time, neither had -they ever taken part in the recent war against her, nor given her -any ground of complaint,<a id="FNanchor_160" href="#Footnote_160" -class="fnanchor">[160]</a> until she landed and attacked them in the -sixth year of the recent war. She now renewed her attempt, sending -against the island a considerable force under Kleomêdês and Tisias: -thirty Athenian triremes, with six Chian and two Lesbian, twelve -hundred Athenian hoplites, and fifteen hundred hoplites from the -allies, with three hundred bowmen and twenty horse-bowmen. These -officers, after disembarking their forces, and taking position, sent -envoys into the city summoning the government to surrender, and to -become a subject-ally of Athens.</p> - -<p>It was a practice, frequent, if not universal, in Greece, even in -governments not professedly democratical—to discuss propositions for -peace or war before the assembly of the people. But on the present -occasion the Melian leaders departed from this practice, and admitted -the envoys only to a private conversation with their executive -council. Of this conversation Thucydidês professes to give a detailed -and elaborate account, at surprising length, considering his general -brevity. He sets down thirteen distinct observations, with as many -replies, interchanged between the Athenian envoys and the Melians; no -one of them separately long, and some very short; but the dialogue -carried on is dramatic, and very impressive. There is, indeed, every -reason for concluding that what we here read in Thucydidês is in -far larger proportion his own and in smaller proportion authentic -report, than any of the other speeches which he professes to set -down. For this was not a public harangue, in respect to which he -might have had the opportunity of consulting the recollection of -many different persons: it was a private conversation, wherein three -or four Athenians, and perhaps ten or a dozen Melians, may have -taken part. Now as all the Melian population were slain imme<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_110">[p. 110]</span>diately after the -capture of the town, there remained only the Athenian envoys through -whose report Thucydidês could possibly have heard what really passed. -That he did hear either from or through them the general character of -what passed, I make no doubt: but there is no ground for believing -that he received from them anything like the consecutive stream of -debate, which, together with part of the illustrative reasoning, we -must refer to his dramatic genius and arrangement.</p> - -<p>The Athenian begins by restricting the subject of discussion to -the mutual interests of both parties in the peculiar circumstances -in which they now stand, in spite of the disposition of the Melians -to enlarge the range of topics, by introducing considerations of -justice and appealing to the sentiment of impartial critics. He will -not multiply words to demonstrate the just origin of the Athenian -empire, erected on the expulsion of the Persians, or to set forth -injury suffered, as pretext for the present expedition. Nor will he -listen to any plea on the part of the Melians, that they, though -colonists of Sparta, have never fought alongside of her or done -Athens wrong. He presses upon them to aim at what is attainable under -existing circumstances, since they know as well as he that justice -in the reasoning of mankind is settled according to equal compulsion -on both sides; the strong doing what their power allows, and the -weak submitting to it.<a id="FNanchor_161" href="#Footnote_161" -class="fnanchor">[161]</a> To<span class="pagenum" id="Page_111">[p. -111]</span> this the Melians reply, that—omitting all appeal to -justice, and speaking only of what was expedient—they hold it to -be even expedient for Athens not to break down the common moral -sanction of mankind, but to permit that equity and justice shall -still remain as a refuge for men in trouble, with some indulgence -even towards those who may be unable to make out a case of full and -strict right. Most of all was this the interest of Athens herself, -inasmuch as her ruin, if it ever occurred, would be awful both as -punishment to herself and as lesson to others.—“We are not afraid -of <i>that</i> (rejoined the Athenian) even if our empire should be -overthrown. It is not imperial cities like Sparta who deal harshly -with the conquered. Moreover, our present contest is not undertaken -against Sparta; it is a contest to determine whether subjects shall -by their own attack prevail over their rulers. This is a risk for us -to judge of: in the mean time, let us remind you that we come here -for the advantage of our own empire, and that we are now speaking -with a view to your safety; wishing to get you under our empire -without trouble to ourselves, and to preserve you for the mutual -benefit of both of us.”—“Cannot you leave us alone, and let us be -your friends instead of enemies, but neither allies of you nor of -Sparta?” said the Melians.—“No (is the reply); your friendship does -us more harm than your enmity: your friendship is a proof of our -weakness, in the eyes of our subject-allies; your enmity will give -a demonstration of our power.”—“But do your subjects really take -such<span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">[p. 112]</span> a measure -of equity, as to put us, who have no sort of connection with you, -on the same footing with themselves, most of whom are your own -colonists, while many of them have even revolted from you and been -reconquered?”—“They do: for they think that both one and the other -have fair ground for claiming independence, and that if you are left -independent, this arises only from your power and from our fear -to attack you. So that your submission will not only enlarge our -empire, but strengthen our security throughout the whole; especially -as you are islanders, and feeble islanders too, while we are lords -of the sea.”—“But surely that very circumstance is in other ways a -protection to you, as evincing your moderation: for if you attack -us, you will at once alarm all neutrals, and convert them into -enemies.”—“We are in little fear of continental cities, who are out -of our reach and not likely to take part against us, but only of -islanders; either yet unincorporated in our empire, like you, or -already in our empire and discontented with the constraint which -it imposes. It is such islanders who by their ill-judged obstinacy -are likely, with their eyes open, to bring both us and themselves -into peril.”—“We know well (said the Melians, after some other -observations had been interchanged) how terrible it is to contend -against your superior power, and your good fortune; nevertheless, we -trust that in point of fortune we shall receive fair treatment from -the gods, since we stand upon grounds of right against injustice; -and as to our inferior power, we trust that the deficiency will be -made up by our ally Sparta, whose kindred race will compel her from -very shame to aid us.”—“We too (replied the Athenians) think that we -shall not be worse off than others in regard to the divine favor. For -we neither advance any claim, nor do any act, overpassing that which -men believe in regard to the gods, and wish in regard to themselves. -What we believe about the gods is the same as that which we see -to be the practice of men: the impulse of nature inclines them of -necessity to rule over what is inferior in force to themselves. This -is the principle on which we now proceed,—not having been the first -either to lay it down or to follow it, but finding it established and -likely to continue for ever,—and knowing well too that you or others -in our position would do as much. As for your expectations from the -Lacedæmonians, founded on the disgrace of their<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_113">[p. 113]</span> remaining deaf to your call, we -congratulate you indeed on your innocent simplicity, but we at the -same time deprecate such foolishness. For the Lacedæmonians are -indeed most studious of excellence in regard to themselves and their -own national customs. But looking at their behavior towards others, -we affirm roundly, and can prove by many examples of their history, -that they are of all men the most conspicuous in construing what is -pleasing as if it were honorable, and what is expedient as if it were -just. Now that is not the state of mind which you require, to square -with your desperate calculations of safety.”</p> - -<p>After various other observations interchanged in a similar tenor, the -Athenian envoys, strenuously urging upon the Melians to reconsider -the matter more cautiously among themselves, withdrew, and after a -certain interval were recalled by the Melian council to hear the -following words: “We hold to the same opinion, as at first, men of -Athens: we shall not surrender the independence of a city which -has already stood for seven hundred years; we shall yet make an -effort to save ourselves, relying on that favorable fortune which -the gods have hitherto vouchsafed to us, as well as upon aid from -men, and especially from the Lacedæmonians. We request that we may -be considered as your friends, but as hostile to neither party, and -that you will leave the island after concluding such a truce as may -be mutually acceptable.”—“Well (said the Athenian envoys), you alone -seem to consider future contingencies as clearer than the facts -before your eyes, and to look at an uncertain distance, through your -own wishes, as if it were present reality. You have staked your all -upon the Lacedæmonians, upon fortune, and upon fond hopes; and, with -your all, you will come to ruin.”</p> - -<p>The siege was forthwith commenced. A wall of circumvallation, -distributed in portions among the different allies of Athens, was -constructed round the town; which was left under full blockade, both -by sea and land, while the rest of the armament retired home. The -town remained blocked up for several months. During the course of -that time, the besieged made two successful sallies, which afforded -them some temporary relief, and forced the Athenians to send an -additional detachment, under Philokratês. At length the provisions -within were exhausted;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_114">[p. -114]</span> plots for betrayal commenced among the Melians -themselves, so that they were constrained to surrender at discretion. -The Athenians resolved to put to death all the men of military age -and to sell the women and children as slaves. Who the proposer -of this barbarous resolution was, Thucydidês does not say; but -Plutarch and others inform us that Alkibiadês<a id="FNanchor_162" -href="#Footnote_162" class="fnanchor">[162]</a> was strenuous in -supporting it. Five hundred Athenian settlers were subsequently -sent thither, to form a new community: apparently not as kleruchs, -or out-citizens of Athens, but as new Melians.<a id="FNanchor_163" -href="#Footnote_163" class="fnanchor">[163]</a></p> - -<p>Taking the proceedings of the Athenians towards Mêlos from -the beginning to the end, they form one of the grossest and most -inexcusable pieces of cruelty combined with injustice which Grecian -history presents to us. In appreciating the cruelty of such -wholesale executions, we ought to recollect that the laws of war -placed the prisoner altogether at the disposal of his conqueror, -and that an Athenian garrison, if captured by the Corinthians in -Naupaktus, Nisæa, or elsewhere, would assuredly have undergone the -same fate, unless in so far as they might be kept for exchange. -But the treatment of the Melians goes beyond all rigor of the laws -of war; for they had never been at war with Athens, nor had they -done anything to incur her enmity. Moreover, the acquisition of the -island was of no material value to Athens; not sufficient to pay the -expenses of the armament employed in its capture. And while the gain -was thus in every sense slender, the shock to Grecian feeling by the -whole proceeding seems to have occasioned serious mischief to Athens. -Far from tending to strengthen her entire empire, by sweeping in this -small insular population, who had hitherto been neutral and harmless, -it raised nothing but odium against her, and was treasured up in -after times as among the first of her misdeeds.</p> - -<p>To gratify her pride of empire by a new conquest—easy to<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_115">[p. 115]</span> effect, though of small -value—was doubtless her chief motive; probably also strengthened by -pique against Sparta, between whom and herself a thoroughly hostile -feeling subsisted, and by a desire to humiliate Sparta through the -Melians. This passion for new acquisition, superseding the more -reasonable hopes of recovering the lost portions of her empire, will -be seen in the coming chapters breaking out with still more fatal -predominance.</p> - -<p>Both these two points, it will be observed, are prominently -marked in the dialogue set forth by Thucydidês. I have already -stated that this dialogue can hardly represent what actually -passed, except as to a few general points, which the historian has -followed out into deductions and illustrations,<a id="FNanchor_164" -href="#Footnote_164" class="fnanchor">[164]</a> thus dramatizing -the given situation in a powerful and characteristic manner. The -language put into the mouth of the Athenian envoys is that of pirates -and robbers, as Dionysius of Halikarnassus<a id="FNanchor_165" -href="#Footnote_165" class="fnanchor">[165]</a> long ago remarked; -intimating his suspicion that Thucydidês had so set out the case -for the purpose of discrediting the country which had sent him -into exile. Whatever may be thought of this suspicion, we may at -least affirm that the arguments which he here ascribes to Athens -are not in harmony even with the defects of the Athenian character. -Athenian speakers are more open to the charge of equivocal wording, -multiplication of false pretences, softening down the bad points of -their case, putting an amiable name upon vicious acts, employing -what is properly called <i>sophistry</i>, where their purpose needs it.<a -id="FNanchor_166" href="#Footnote_166" class="fnanchor">[166]</a> Now -the language of the envoy at Mêlos, which has been sometimes cited as -illustrating the immorality of the class or profession—falsely called -a school—named Sophists at Athens, is above all things remarkable for -a sort of audacious frankness; a disdain not merely of sophistry, -in the modern sense of the word, but even<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_116">[p. 116]</span> of such plausible excuse as might -have been offered. It has been strangely argued, as if “<i>The good -old plan, that they should take who have the power, and they should -keep who can</i>,” had been first discovered and openly promulgated by -Athenian sophists; whereas the true purpose and value of sophists, -even in the modern and worst sense of the word—putting aside the -perversion of applying that sense to the persons called sophists at -Athens—is, to furnish plausible matter of deceptive justification, so -that the strong man may be enabled to act upon this “good old plan” -as much as he pleases, but without avowing it, and while professing -fair dealing or just retaliation for some imaginary wrong. The wolf -in Æsop’s fable (of the Wolf and the Lamb) speaks like a sophist; the -Athenian envoy at Mêlos speaks in a manner totally unlike a sophist, -either in the Athenian sense or in the modern sense of the word; we -may add, unlike an Athenian at all, as Dionysius has observed.</p> - -<p>As a matter of fact and practice, it is true that stronger states, -in Greece and in the contemporary world, did habitually tend, as they -have tended throughout the course of history down to the present day, -to enlarge their power at the expense of the weaker. Every territory -in Greece, except Attica and Arcadia, had been seized by conquerors -who dispossessed or enslaved the prior inhabitants. We find Brasidas -reminding his soldiers of the good sword of their forefathers, -which had established dominion over men far more numerous than -themselves, as matter of pride and glory:<a id="FNanchor_167" -href="#Footnote_167" class="fnanchor">[167]</a> and when we come -to the times of Philip and Alexander of Macedon, we shall see the -lust of conquest reaching a pitch never witnessed among free Greeks. -Of right thus founded on simple superiority of force, there were -abundant examples to be quoted, as parallels to the Athenian conquest -of Mêlos: but that which is unparalleled is the mode adopted by -the Athenian envoy of justifying it, or rather of setting aside -all justification, looking at the actual state of civilization in -Greece. A barbarous invader casts his sword into the scale in lieu of -argument: a civilized conqueror is bound by received international -morality to furnish some justification,—a good plea, if he can,—a -false<span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">[p. 117]</span> plea, or -sham plea, if he has no better. But the Athenian envoy neither copies -the contemptuous silence of the barbarian nor the smooth lying of the -civilized invader. Though coming from the most cultivated city in -Greece, where the vices prevalent were those of refinement and not of -barbarism, he disdains the conventional arts of civilized diplomacy -more than would have been done by an envoy even of Argos or Korkyra. -He even disdains to mention, what might have been said with perfect -truth as a matter of fact, whatever may be thought of its sufficiency -as a justification, that the Melians had enjoyed for the last fifty -years the security of the Ægean waters at the cost of Athens and her -allies, without any payment of their own.</p> - -<p>So at least he is made to do in the Thucydidean dramatic -fragment,—Μήλου Ἅλωσις (The Capture of Melos),—if we may parody the -title of the lost tragedy of Phrynichus “The Capture of Miletus.” -And I think a comprehensive view of the history of Thucydidês will -suggest to us the explanation of this drama, with its powerful and -tragical effect. The capture of Mêlos comes immediately before the -great Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which was resolved upon -three or four months afterwards, and despatched during the course -of the following summer. That expedition was the gigantic effort -of Athens, which ended in the most ruinous catastrophe known to -ancient history. From such a blow it was impossible for Athens to -recover. Though thus crippled, indeed, she struggled against its -effects with surprising energy; but her fortune went on, in the main, -declining,—yet with occasional moments of apparent restoration,—until -her complete prostration and subjugation by Lysander. Now Thucydidês, -just before he gets upon the plane of this descending progress, -makes a halt, to illustrate the sentiment of Athenian power in -its most exaggerated, insolent, and cruel manifestation, by this -dramatic fragment of the envoys at Mêlos. It will be recollected that -Herodotus, when about to describe the forward march of Xerxês into -Greece, destined to terminate in such fatal humiliation, impresses -his readers with an elaborate idea of the monarch’s insolence and -superhuman pride, by various conversations between him and the -courtiers about him, as well as by other anecdotes, combined with -the overwhelming specifications of the muster at Doriskus. Such -moral<span class="pagenum" id="Page_118">[p. 118]</span> contrasts -and juxtapositions, especially that of ruinous reverse following -upon overweening good fortune, were highly interesting to the Greek -mind. And Thucydidês—having before him an act of great injustice -and cruelty on the part of Athens, committed exactly at this point -of time—has availed himself of the form of dialogue, for once -in his history, to bring out the sentiments of a disdainful and -confident conqueror in dramatic antithesis. They are, however, his -own sentiments, conceived as suitable to the situation; not those of -the Athenian envoy,—still less, those of the Athenian public,—least -of all, those of that much-calumniated class of men, the Athenian -sophists.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="Chap_57"> - <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LVII.<br /> - SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXTINCTION OF THE GELONIAN DYNASTY.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">In</span> -the preceding chapters, I have brought down the general history of -the Peloponnesian war to the time immediately preceding the memorable -Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which changed the whole face of -the war. At this period, and for some time to come, the history of -the Peloponnesian Greeks becomes intimately blended with that of the -Sicilian Greeks. But hitherto the connection between the two has been -merely occasional, and of little reciprocal effect: so that I have -thought it for the convenience of the reader to keep the two streams -entirely separate, omitting the proceedings of Athens in Sicily -during the first ten years of the war. I now proceed to fill up this -blank: to recount as much as can be made out of Sicilian events -during the interval between 461-416 <small>B.C.</small>, -and to assign the successive steps whereby the Athenians entangled -themselves in ambitious projects against Syracuse, until they at -length came to stake the larger portion of their force upon that -fatal hazard.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">[p. 119]</span></p> - -<p>The extinction of the Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse,<a -id="FNanchor_168" href="#Footnote_168" class="fnanchor">[168]</a> -followed by the expulsion or retirement of all the other despots -throughout the island, left the various Grecian cities to reorganize -themselves in free and self-constituted governments. Unfortunately, -our memorials respecting this revolution are miserably scanty; but -there is enough to indicate that it was something much more than -a change from single-headed to popular government. It included, -farther, transfers on the largest scale both of inhabitants and of -property. The preceding despots had sent many old citizens into -exile, transplanted others from one part of Sicily to another, -and provided settlements for numerous emigrants and mercenaries -devoted to their interest. Of these proceedings much was reversed, -when the dynasties were overthrown, so that the personal and -proprietary revolution was more complicated and perplexing than the -political. After a period of severe commotion, an accommodation was -concluded, whereby the adherents of the expelled dynasty were planted -partly in the territory of Messêne, partly in the reëstablished -city of Kamarina in the eastern portion of the southern coast, -bordering on Syracuse.<a id="FNanchor_169" href="#Footnote_169" -class="fnanchor">[169]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_120">[p. 120]</span></p> - -<p>But though peace was thus reëstablished, these large mutations -of inhabitants first begun by the despots,—and the incoherent -mixture of races, religious institutions, dialects, etc., which -was brought about unavoidably during the process,—left throughout -Sicily a feeling of local instability, very different from -the long traditional tenures in Peloponnesus and Attica, and -numbered by foreign enemies among the elements of its weakness.<a -id="FNanchor_170" href="#Footnote_170" class="fnanchor">[170]</a> -The wonder indeed rather is, that such real and powerful causes -of disorder were soon so efficaciously controlled by the popular -governments, that the half century now approaching was decidedly -the most prosperous and undisturbed period in the history of the -island.</p> - -<p>The southern coast of Sicily was occupied, beginning from the -westward by Selinus, Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina. Then came -Syracuse, possessing the southeastern cape, and the southern portion -of the eastern coast: next, on the eastern coast, Leontini, Katana, -and Naxos: Messênê, on the strait adjoining Italy. The centre of the -island, and even much of the northern coast, was occupied by the -non-Hellenic Sikels and Sikans: on this coast, Himera was the only -Grecian city. Between Himera and Cape Lilybæum, the western corner -of the island was occupied<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">[p. -121]</span> by the non-Hellenic cities of Egesta and Eryx, and by -the Carthaginian seaports, of which Panormus (Palermo) was the -principal.</p> - -<p>Of these various Grecian cities, all independent, Syracuse -was the first in power, Agrigentum the second. The causes above -noticed, disturbing the first commencement of popular governments -in all of them, were most powerfully operative at Syracuse. We do -not know the particulars of the democratical constitution which was -there established, but its stability was threatened by more than -one ambitious pretender, eager to seize the sceptre of Gelo and -Hiero. The most prominent among these pretenders was Tyndarion, -who employed a considerable fortune in distributing largesses and -procuring partisans among the poor. His political designs were at -length so openly manifested, that he was brought to trial, condemned, -and put to death; yet not without an abortive insurrection of his -partisans to rescue him. After several leading citizens had tried, -and failed in a similar manner, the people thought it expedient -to pass a law similar to the Athenian ostracism, authorizing the -infliction of temporary preventive banishment.<a id="FNanchor_171" -href="#Footnote_171" class="fnanchor">[171]</a> Under this law -several powerful citizens were actually and speedily banished; and -such was the abuse of the new engine, by the political parties in -the city, that men of conspicuous position are said to have become -afraid of meddling with public affairs. Thus put in practice, the -institution is said to have given rise to new political contentions -not less violent than those which it checked, insomuch that the -Syracusans found themselves obliged to repeal the law not long -after its introduction. We should have been glad to learn some -particulars concerning this political experiment, beyond the meagre -abstract given by Diodorus, and especially to know the precautionary -securities by which the application of the ostracizing sentence -was restrained at Syracuse. Perhaps no care was taken to copy the -checks and formalities provided by Kleisthenês at Athens. Yet under -all circumstances, the institution, though tutelary, if reserved -for its proper emergencies, was eminently<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_122">[p. 122]</span> open to abuse, so that we have no -reason to wonder that abuse occurred, especially at a period of great -violence and discord. The wonder rather is, that it was so little -abused at Athens.</p> - -<p>Although the ostracism, or petalism, at Syracuse was speedily -discontinued, it may probably have left a salutary impression behind, -as far as we can judge from the fact that new pretenders to despotism -are not hereafter mentioned. The republic increases in wealth, and -manifests an energetic action in foreign affairs. The Syracusan -admiral Phaӱllus was despatched with a powerful fleet to repress -the piracies of the Tyrrhenian maritime towns, and after ravaging -the island of Elba, returned home, under the suspicion of having -been bought off by bribes from the enemy; on which accusation he was -tried and banished, a second fleet of sixty triremes under Apellês -being sent to the same regions. The new admiral not only plundered -many parts of the Tyrrhenian coast, but also carried his ravages -into the island of Corsica, at that time a Tyrrhenian possession, -and reduced the island of Elba completely. His return was signalized -by a large number of captives and a rich booty.<a id="FNanchor_172" -href="#Footnote_172" class="fnanchor">[172]</a></p> - -<p>Meanwhile the great antecedent revolutions, among the Grecian -cities in Sicily had raised a new spirit among the Sikels of the -interior, and inspired the Sikel prince Duketius, a man of spirit -and ability, with large ideas of aggrandizement. Many exiled Greeks -having probably sought service with him, it was either by their -suggestion, or from having himself caught the spirit of Hellenic -improvement, that he commenced the plan of bringing the petty Sikel -communities into something like city life and collective coöperation. -Having acquired glory by the capture of the Grecian town of -Morgantina, he induced all the Sikel communities, with the exception -of Hybla, to enter into a sort of federative compact. Next, in order -to obtain a central point for the new organization, he transferred -his own little town from the hill-top, called Menæ, down to a -convenient spot of the neighboring plain, near to the sacred precinct -of the gods called Paliki.<a id="FNanchor_173" href="#Footnote_173" -class="fnanchor">[173]</a> As the veneration paid to these gods, -determined in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">[p. 123]</span> -part by the striking volcanic manifestations in the neighborhood, -rendered this plain a suitable point of attraction for Sikels -generally, Duketius was enabled to establish a considerable new city -of Palikê, with walls of large circumference, and an ample range of -adjacent land which he distributed among a numerous Sikel population, -probably with some Greeks intermingled.</p> - -<p>The powerful position which Duketius had thus acquired is -attested by the aggressive character of his measures, intended -gradually to recover a portion at least of that ground which the -Greeks had appropriated at the expense of the indigenous population. -The Sikel town of Ennesia had been seized by the Hieronian Greeks -expelled from Ætna, and had received from them the name of Ætna:<a -id="FNanchor_174" href="#Footnote_174" class="fnanchor">[174]</a> -Duketius now found means to reconquer it, after ensnaring by -stratagem the leading magistrate. He was next bold enough to invade -the territory of the Agrigentines, and to besiege one of their -country garrisons called Motyum. We are impressed with a high idea -of his power, when we learn that the Agrigentines, while marching -to relieve the place, thought it necessary to invoke aid from the -Syracusans, who sent to them a force under Bolkon. Over this united -force Duketius gained a victory, in consequence of the treason or -cowardice of Bolkon, as the Syracusans believed, insomuch that -they condemned him to death. In the succeeding year, however, the -good fortune of the Sikel prince changed. The united army of these -two powerful cities raised the blockade of Motyum, completely -defeated him in the field, and dispersed all his forces. Finding -himself deserted by his comrades and even on the point of being -betrayed, he took the desperate resolution of casting himself upon -the mercy of the Syracusans. He rode off by night to the gates of -Syracuse, entered the city unknown, and sat down as a suppliant on -the altar in the agora, surrendering himself together with all his -territory. A spectacle thus unexpected brought together a crowd of -Syracuse citizens, exciting<span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">[p. -124]</span> in them the strongest emotions: and when the magistrates -convened the assembly for the purpose of deciding his fate, the -voice of mercy was found paramount, in spite of the contrary -recommendations of some of the political leaders. The most respected -among the elder citizens—earnestly recommending mild treatment -towards a foe thus fallen and suppliant, coupled with scrupulous -regard not to bring upon the city the avenging hand of Nemesis—found -their appeal to the generous sentiment of the people welcomed by -one unanimous cry of “Save the suppliant.”<a id="FNanchor_175" -href="#Footnote_175" class="fnanchor">[175]</a> Duketius, withdrawn -from the altar, was sent off to Corinth, under his engagement to -live there quietly for the future; the Syracusans providing for his -comfortable maintenance.</p> - -<p>Amidst the cruelty habitual in ancient warfare, this remarkable -incident excites mingled surprise and admiration. Doubtless the -lenient impulse of the people mainly arose from their seeing Duketius -actually before them in suppliant posture at their altar, instead -of being called upon to determine his fate in his absence,—just -as the Athenian people were in like manner moved by the actual -sight of the captive Dorieus, and induced to spare his life, on an -occasion which will be hereafter recounted.<a id="FNanchor_176" -href="#Footnote_176" class="fnanchor">[176]</a> If in some instances -the assembled people, obeying the usual vehemence of multitudinous -sentiment, carried severities to excess,—so, in other cases, as well -as in this, the appeal to their humane impulses will be found to have -triumphed over prudential regard for future security. Such was the -fruit which the Syracusans reaped for sparing Duketius, who, after -residing a year or two at Corinth, violated his parole. Pretending -to have received an order from the oracle, he assembled a number of -colonists, whom he conducted into Sicily to found a city at Kalê Aktê -on the northern coast belonging to the Sikels. We cannot doubt that -when the Syracusans found in what manner their lenity was requited, -the speakers who had recommended severe treatment would take great -credit on the score of superior foresight.<a id="FNanchor_177" -href="#Footnote_177" class="fnanchor">[177]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_125">[p. 125]</span></p> - -<p>But the return of this energetic enemy was not the only mischief -which the Syracusans suffered. Their resolution to spare Duketius -had been adopted without the concurrence of the Agrigentines, who -had helped to conquer him; and the latter, when they saw him again -in the island, and again formidable, were so indignant that they -declared war against Syracuse. A standing jealousy prevailed between -these two great cities, the first and second powers in Sicily. War -actually broke out between them, wherein other Greek cities took -part. After lasting some time, with various acts of hostility, and -especially a serious defeat of the Agrigentines at the river Himera, -these latter solicited and obtained peace.<a id="FNanchor_178" -href="#Footnote_178" class="fnanchor">[178]</a> The discord between -the two cities, however, had left leisure to Duketius to found the -city of Kalê Aktê, and to make some progress in reëstablishing his -ascendency over the Sikels, in which operation he was overtaken -by death. He probably left no successor to carry on his plans, so -that the Syracusans, pressing their attacks vigorously, reduced -many of the Sikel townships in the island, regaining his former -conquest, Morgantinê, and subduing even the strong position and -town called Trinakia,<a id="FNanchor_179" href="#Footnote_179" -class="fnanchor">[179]</a> after a brave and desperate resistance on -the part of the inhabitants.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_126">[p. 126]</span></p> - -<p>By this large accession both of subjects and of tribute, combined -with her recent victory over Agrigentum, Syracuse was elevated to -the height of power, and began to indulge schemes for extending her -ascendency throughout the island: with which view her horsemen were -doubled in number, and one hundred new triremes were constructed.<a -id="FNanchor_180" href="#Footnote_180" class="fnanchor">[180]</a> -Whether any, or what, steps were taken to realize her designs our -historian does not tell us. But the position of Sicily remains the -same at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war: Syracuse, the first -city as to power, indulging in ambitious dreams, if not in ambitious -aggressions; Agrigentum, a jealous second, and almost a rival; the -remaining Grecian states maintaining their independence, yet not -without mistrust and apprehension.</p> - -<p>Though the particular phenomena of this period, however, have -not come to our knowledge, we see enough to prove that it was -one of great prosperity for Sicily. The wealth, commerce, and -public monuments of Agrigentum, especially appear to have even -surpassed those of the Syracusans. Her trade with Carthage and the -African coast was both extensive and profitable; for at this time -neither the vine nor the olive were much cultivated in Libya, and -the Carthaginians derived their wine and oil from the southern -territory of Sicily,<a id="FNanchor_181" href="#Footnote_181" -class="fnanchor">[181]</a> particularly that of Agrigentum. The -temples of the city, among which that of Olympic Zeus stood foremost, -were on the grandest scale of magnificence, surpassing everything -of the kind in Sicily. The population of the city, free as well as -slave, was very great: the number of rich men keeping chariots and -competing for the prize at the Olympic games was renowned, not less -than the accumulation of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">[p. -127]</span> works of art, statues and pictures,<a id="FNanchor_182" -href="#Footnote_182" class="fnanchor">[182]</a> with manifold -insignia of ornament and luxury. All this is particularly brought -to our notice because of the frightful catastrophe which desolated -Agrigentum in 406 <small>B.C.</small> from the hands of -the Carthaginians. It was in the interval which we are now describing -that this prosperity was accumulated; doubtless not in Agrigentum -alone, but more or less throughout all the Grecian cities of the -island.</p> - -<p>Nor was it only in material prosperity that they were -distinguished. At this time, the intellectual movement in some of the -Italian and Sicilian towns was very considerable. The inconsiderable -town of Elea in the gulf of Poseidonia nourished two of the greatest -speculative philosophers in Greece, Parmenidês and Zeno. Empedoklês -of Agrigentum was hardly less eminent in the same department, yet -combining with it a political and practical efficiency. The popular -character of the Sicilian governments stimulated the cultivation -of rhetorical studies, wherein not only Empedoklês and Pôlus at -Agrigentum, but Tisias and Korax at Syracuse, and still more, -Gorgias at Leontini, acquired great reputation.<a id="FNanchor_183" -href="#Footnote_183" class="fnanchor">[183]</a> The constitution -established at Agrigentum after the dispossession of the Theronian -dynasty was at first not thoroughly democratical, the principal -authority residing in a large Senate of One Thousand members. We -are told even that an ambitious club of citizens were aiming at the -reëstablishment of a despotism, when Empedoklês, availing himself of -wealth and high position, took the lead in a popular opposition; so -as not only to defeat this intrigue, but also to put down the Senate -of One Thousand, and render the government completely democratical. -His influence over the people was enhanced by the vein of mysticism, -and pretence to miraculous or divine endowments, which accompanied -his philosophical speculations, in a manner<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_128">[p. 128]</span> similar to Pythagoras.<a -id="FNanchor_184" href="#Footnote_184" class="fnanchor">[184]</a> -The same combination of rhetoric with physical speculation appears -also in Gorgias of Leontini, whose celebrity as a teacher throughout -Greece was both greater and earlier than that of any one else. It -was a similar demand for popular speaking in the assembly and the -judicatures which gave encouragement to the rhetorical teachers -Tisias and Korax at Syracuse.</p> - -<p>In this state of material prosperity, popular politics, and -intellectual activity, the Sicilian towns were found at the breaking -out of the great struggle between Athens and the Peloponnesian -confederacy in 431 <small>B.C.</small> In that -struggle the Italian and Sicilian Greeks had no direct concern, -nor anything to fear from the ambition of Athens; who, though -she had founded Thurii in 443 <small>B.C.</small>, -appears to have never aimed at any political ascendency even over -that town, much less anywhere else on the coast. But the Sicilian -Greeks, though forming a system apart in their own island, from -which it suited the dominant policy of Syracuse to exclude all -foreign interference,<a id="FNanchor_185" href="#Footnote_185" -class="fnanchor">[185]</a> were yet connected, by sympathy, and on -one side even by alliances, with the two main streams of Hellenic -politics. Among the allies of Sparta were numbered all or most of -the Dorian cities of Sicily,—Syracuse, Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, -Selinus, perhaps Himera and Messênê,—together with Lokri and Tarentum -in Italy: among the allies of Athens, perhaps the Chalkidic or -Ionic Rhegium in Italy.<a id="FNanchor_186" href="#Footnote_186" -class="fnanchor">[186]</a> Whether the Ionic cities in Sicily—Naxos, -Katana, and Leontini—were at this time united with Athens by any -special treaty, is very doubtful. But if we examine the state of -politics prior<span class="pagenum" id="Page_129">[p. 129]</span> to -the breaking out of the war, it will be found that the connection of -the Sicilian cities on both sides with Central Greece was rather one -of sympathy and tendency than of pronounced obligation and action. -The Dorian Sicilians, though doubtless sharing the antipathy of the -Peloponnesian Dorians to Athens, had never been called upon for any -coöperation with Sparta; nor had the Ionic Sicilians yet learned -to look to Athens for protection against their powerful neighbor -Syracuse.</p> - -<p>It was the memorable quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, and the -intervention of Athens in that quarrel (<small>B.C.</small> 433-432), -which brought the Sicilian parties one step nearer to coöperation in -the Peloponnesian quarrel, in two different ways; first, by exciting -the most violent anti-Athenian war spirit in Corinth, with whom -the Sicilian Dorians held their chief commerce and sympathy,—next, -by providing a basis for the action of Athenian maritime force in -Italy and Sicily, which would have been impracticable without an -established footing in Korkyra. But Plutarch—whom most historians -have followed—is mistaken, and is contradicted by Thucydidês, when -he ascribes to the Athenians at this time ambitious projects in -Sicily of the nature of those which they came to conceive seven -or eight years afterwards. At the outbreak, and for some years -before the outbreak, of the war, the policy of Athens was purely -conservative, and that of her enemies aggressive, as I have shown -in a former chapter. At that moment, Sparta and Corinth anticipated -large assistance from the Sicilian Dorians, in ships of war, in -money, and in provisions; while the value of Korkyra as an ally -of Athens consisted in affording facilities for obstructing such -reinforcements, far more than from any anticipated conquests.<a -id="FNanchor_187" href="#Footnote_187" class="fnanchor">[187]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_130">[p. 130]</span></p> <p>In -the spring of 431 <small>B.C.</small>, the Spartans, then organizing -their first invasion of Attica, and full of hope that Athens would -be crushed in one or two campaigns, contemplated the building of a -vast fleet of five hundred ships of war among the confederacy. A -considerable portion of this charge was imposed upon the Italian -and Sicilian Dorians, and a contribution in money besides; with -instructions to refrain from any immediate declaration against -Athens until their fleet should be ready.<a id="FNanchor_188" -href="#Footnote_188" class="fnanchor">[188]</a> Of such expected -succor, indeed, little was ever realized in any way; in ships, -nothing at all. But the expectations and orders of Sparta, show<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_131">[p. 131]</span> that here as elsewhere -she was then on the offensive, and Athens only on the defensive. -Probably the Corinthians had encouraged the expectation of ample -reinforcements from Syracuse and the neighboring towns, a hope -which must have contributed largely to the confidence with which -they began the struggle. What were the causes which prevented -it from being realized, we are not distinctly told; and we find -Hermokratês the Syracusan reproaching his countrymen fifteen years -afterwards, immediately before the great Athenian expedition -against Syracuse, with their antecedent apathy.<a id="FNanchor_189" -href="#Footnote_189" class="fnanchor">[189]</a> But it is easy to -see, that as the Sicilian Greeks had no direct interest in the -contest,—neither wrongs to avenge, nor dangers to apprehend, from -Athens,—nor any habit of obeying requisitions from Sparta, so they -might naturally content themselves with expressions of sympathy and -promises of aid in case of need, without taxing themselves to the -enormous extent which it pleased Sparta to impose, for purposes both -aggressive and purely Peloponnesian. Perhaps the leading men in -Syracuse, from attachment to Corinth, may have sought to act upon -the order. But no similar motive would be found operative either at -Agrigentum or at Gela or Selinus.</p> - -<p>Though the order was not executed, however, there can be little -doubt that it was publicly announced and threatened, thus becoming -known to the Ionic cities in Sicily as well as to Athens; and that -it weighed materially in determining the latter afterwards to -assist those cities, when they sent to invoke her aid. Instead of -despatching their forces to Peloponnesus, where they had nothing -to gain, the Sicilian Dorians preferred attacking the Ionic cities -in their own island, whose territory they might have reasonable -hopes of conquering and appropriating,—Naxos, Katana, and Leontini. -These cities doubtless sympathized with Athens in her struggle -against Sparta; yet, far from being strong enough to assist her -or to threaten their Dorian neighbors, they were unable to defend -themselves without Athenian aid. They were assisted by the Dorian -city of Kamarina, which was afraid of her powerful border city -Syracuse, and by Rhegium in Italy; while Lokri in Italy, the bitter -enemy of Rhegium, sided with Syracuse against them. In the fifth -summer of the war, finding<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">[p. -132]</span> themselves blockaded by sea and confined to their -walls, they sent to Athens, both to entreat succor, as allies<a -id="FNanchor_190" href="#Footnote_190" class="fnanchor">[190]</a> and -Ionians, and to represent that, if Syracuse succeeded in crushing -them, she and the other Dorians in Sicily would forthwith send over -the positive aid which the Peloponnesians had so long been invoking. -The eminent rhetor Gorgias of Leontini, whose peculiar style of -speaking is said to have been new to the Athenian assembly, and to -have produced a powerful effect, was at the head of this embassy. -It is certain that this rhetor procured for himself numerous -pupils and large gains, not merely in Athens but in many other -towns of Central Greece,<a id="FNanchor_191" href="#Footnote_191" -class="fnanchor">[191]</a> though it is exaggeration to ascribe to -his pleading the success of the present application.</p> - -<p>Now the Athenians had a real interest as well in protecting these -Ionic Sicilians from being conquered by the Dorians in the island, -as in obstructing the transport of Sicilian corn to Peloponnesus: -and they sent twenty triremes under Lachês and Charœadês, with -instructions, while accomplishing these objects, to ascertain the -possibility of going beyond the defensive, and making conquests. -Taking station at Rhegium, Lachês did something towards rescuing -the Ionic cities in part from their maritime blockade, and even -undertook an abortive expedition against the Lipari isles, which were -in alliance with Syracuse.<a id="FNanchor_192" href="#Footnote_192" -class="fnanchor">[192]</a> Throughout the ensuing year, he pressed -the war in the neighborhood of Rhegium and Messênê, his colleague -Charœadês being slain. Attacking Mylæ in the Messenian territory, he -was fortunate enough to gain so decisive an advantage over the troops -of Messênê, that that city itself capitulated to him, gave hostages, -and enrolled itself as ally of Athens and the Ionic cities.<a -id="FNanchor_193" href="#Footnote_193" class="fnanchor">[193]</a> He -also<span class="pagenum" id="Page_133">[p. 133]</span> contracted -an alliance with the non-Hellenic city of Egesta, in the northwest -portion of Sicily, and he invaded the territory of Lokri, capturing -one of the country forts on the river Halex:<a id="FNanchor_194" -href="#Footnote_194" class="fnanchor">[194]</a> after which, in a -second debarkation, he defeated a Lokrian detachment under Proxenus. -But he was unsuccessful in an expedition into the interior of Sicily -against Inêssus. This was a native Sikel township, held in coercion -by a Syracusan garrison in the acropolis; which the Athenians vainly -attempted to storm, being repulsed with loss.<a id="FNanchor_195" -href="#Footnote_195" class="fnanchor">[195]</a> Lachês concluded his -operations in the autumn by an ineffective incursion on the territory -of Himera and on the Lipari isles. On returning to Rhegium at the -beginning of the ensuing year (<small>B.C.</small> 425), -he found Pythodôrus already arrived from Athens to supersede him.<a -id="FNanchor_196" href="#Footnote_196" class="fnanchor">[196]</a></p> - -<p>That officer had come as the forerunner of a more considerable -expedition, intended to arrive in the spring, under Eurymedon -and Sophoklês, who were to command in conjunction with himself. -The Ionic cities in Sicily, finding the squadron under Lachês -insufficient to render them a match for their enemies at sea, had -been emboldened to send a second embassy to Athens, with request for -farther reinforcements, at the same time making increased efforts -to enlarge their own naval force. It happened that at this moment -the Athenians had no special employment elsewhere for their fleet, -which they desired to keep in constant practice. They accordingly -resolved to send to Sicily forty additional triremes, in full hopes -of bringing the contest to a speedy close.<a id="FNanchor_197" -href="#Footnote_197" class="fnanchor">[197]</a></p> - -<p>Early in the ensuing spring, Eurymedon and Sophoklês started from -Athens for Sicily in command of this squadron, with instructions -to afford relief at Korkyra in their way, and with Demosthenês -on board to act on the coast of Peloponnesus. It was this fleet -which, in conjunction with the land-forces under the command of -Kleon, making a descent almost by accident on the Laconian coast -at Pylos, achieved for Athens the most signal success of the whole -war, the capture of the Lacedæmonian hoplites in Sphakteria.<a -id="FNanchor_198" href="#Footnote_198" class="fnanchor">[198]</a> -But the fleet was so long occupied, first in<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_134">[p. 134]</span> the blockade of that island, next in -operations at Korkyra, that it did not reach Sicily until about -the month of September.<a id="FNanchor_199" href="#Footnote_199" -class="fnanchor">[199]</a></p> - -<p>Such delay, eminently advantageous for Athens generally, was -fatal to her hopes of success in Sicily during the whole summer. For -Pythodôrus, acting only with the fleet previously commanded by Lachês -at Rhegium, was not merely defeated in a descent upon Lokri, but -experienced a more irreparable loss by the revolt of Messênê, which -had surrendered to Lachês a few months before; and which, together -with Rhegium, had given to the Athenians the command of the strait. -Apprized of the coming Athenian fleet, the Syracusans were anxious -to deprive them of this important base of operations against the -island; and a fleet of twenty sail—half Syracusan, half Lokrian—was -enabled by the concurrence of a party in Messênê to seize the town. -It would appear that the Athenian fleet was then at Rhegium, but that -town was at the same time threatened by the entrance of the entire -land-force of Lokri, together with a body of Rhegine exiles: these -latter were even not without hopes of obtaining admission by means of -a favorable party in the town. Though such hopes were disappointed, -yet the diversion prevented all succor from Rhegium to Messênê. The -latter town now served as a harbor for the fleet hostile to Athens,<a -id="FNanchor_200" href="#Footnote_200" class="fnanchor">[200]</a> -which was speedily reinforced to more than thirty sail, and began -maritime operations forthwith, in hopes of crushing the Athenians -and capturing Rhegium, before Eurymedon should arrive. But the -Athenians, though they had only sixteen triremes together with eight -others from Rhegium, gained a decided victory, in an action brought -on accidentally for the possession of a merchantman sailing through -the strait. They put the enemy’s ships to flight, and drove them -to seek refuge, some under protection of the Syracusan land-force -at Cape Pelôrus near Messênê, others under the Lokrian force near -Rhegium, each as they best could, with the loss of one trireme.<a -id="FNanchor_201" href="#Footnote_201" class="fnanchor">[201]</a> -This de<span class="pagenum" id="Page_135">[p. 135]</span>feat so -broke up the scheme of Lokrian operations against the latter place, -that their land-force retired from the Rhegine territory, while the -whole defeated squadron was reunited on the opposite coast under -Cape Pelôrus. Here the ships were moored close on shore under the -protection of the land-force, when the Athenians and Rhegines came up -to attack them; but without success, and even with the loss of one -trireme, which the men on shore contrived to seize and detain by a -grappling-iron; her crew escaping by swimming to the vessels of their -comrades. Having repulsed the enemy, the Syracusans got aboard, and -rowed close along-shore, partly aided by tow-ropes, to the harbor of -Messênê, in which transit they were again attacked, but the Athenians -were a second time beaten off with the loss of another ship. Their -superior seamanship was of no avail in this along-shore fighting.<a -id="FNanchor_202" href="#Footnote_202" class="fnanchor">[202]</a></p> - -<p>The Athenian fleet was now suddenly withdrawn in order to prevent -an intended movement in Kamarina, where a philo-Syracusan party under -Archias threatened revolt: and the Messenian forces, thus left free, -invaded the territory of their neighbor, the Chalkidic city of Naxos, -sending their fleet round to the mouth of the Akesinês near that -city. They were ravaging the lands, and were preparing to storm the -town, when a considerable body of the indigenous Sikels were seen -descending the neighboring hills to succor the Naxians: upon which -the latter, elate with the sight, and mistaking the new comers for -their Grecian brethren from Leontini, rushed out of the gates and -made a vigorous sally at a moment when their enemies were unprepared. -The Messenians were completely defeated, with the loss of no less -than one thousand men, and with a still greater loss sustained -in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">[p. 136]</span> their retreat -home from the pursuit of the Sikels. Their fleet went back also to -Messênê, from whence such of the ships as were not Messenian returned -home. So much was the city weakened by its recent defeat, that a -Lokrian garrison was sent for its protection under Demomelês, while -the Leontines and Naxians, together with the Athenian squadron on -returning from Kamarina, attacked it by land and sea in this moment -of distress. A well-timed sally of the Messenians and Lokrians, -however, dispersed the Leontine land-force; but the Athenian force, -landing from their ships, attacked the assailants while in the -disorder of pursuit, and drove them back within the walls. The scheme -against Messênê, however, had now become impracticable, so that -the Athenians crossed the strait to Rhegium.<a id="FNanchor_203" -href="#Footnote_203" class="fnanchor">[203]</a></p> - -<p>Thus indecisive was the result of operations in Sicily, during -the first half of the seventh year of the Peloponnesian war: nor -does it appear that the Athenians undertook anything considerable -during the autumnal half, though the full fleet under Eurymedon had -then joined Pythodôrus.<a id="FNanchor_204" href="#Footnote_204" -class="fnanchor">[204]</a> Yet while the presence of so large an -Athenian fleet at Rhegium would produce considerable effect upon -the Syracusan mind, the triumphant promise of Athenian affairs, and -the astonishing humiliation of Sparta during the months immediately -following the capture of Sphakteria, probably struck much deeper. -In the spring of the eighth year of the war, Athens was not only in -possession of the Spartan prisoners, but also of Pylos and Kythêra, -so that a rising among the Helots appeared noway improbable. She was -in the full swing of hope, while her discouraged enemies were all -thrown on the defensive. Hence the Sicilian Dorians, intimidated by a -state of affairs so different from that in which they had begun the -war three years before, were now eager to bring about a pacification -in their island.<a id="FNanchor_205" href="#Footnote_205" -class="fnanchor">[205]</a> The Dorian city of Kamarina, which had -hitherto acted along with the Ionic or Chalkidic cities, was the -first to make a separate accommodation with its neighboring city -of Gela; at which latter place deputies were invited to attend -from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_137">[p. 137]</span> all the -cities in the island, with a view to the conclusion of peace.<a -id="FNanchor_206" href="#Footnote_206" class="fnanchor">[206]</a></p> - -<p>This congress met in the spring of 424 <small>B.C.</small>, when -Syracuse, the most powerful city in Sicily, took the lead in urging -the common interest which all had in the conclusion of peace. The -Syracusan Hermokratês, chief adviser of this policy in his native -city, now appeared to vindicate and enforce it in the congress. He -was a well-born, brave, and able man, clear-sighted in regard to the -foreign interests of his country; but at the same time of pronounced -oligarchical sentiments, mistrusted by the people, seemingly with -good reason, in regard to their internal constitution. The speech -which Thucydidês places in his mouth, on the present occasion, -sets forth emphatically the necessity of keeping Sicily at all -cost free from foreign intervention, and of settling at home all -differences which might arise between the various Sicilian cities. -Hermokratês impressed upon his hearers that the aggressive schemes -of Athens, now the greatest power in Greece, were directed against -all Sicily, and threatened all cities alike, Ionians not less than -Dorians. If they enfeebled one another by internal quarrels, and -then invited the Athenians as arbitrators, the result would be ruin -and slavery to all. The Athenians were but too ready to encroach -everywhere, even without invitation: they had now come, with a zeal -outrunning all obligation, under pretence of aiding the Chalkidic -cities who had never aided them, but in the real hope of achieving -conquest for themselves. The Chalkidic cities must not rely upon -their Ionic kindred for security against evil designs on the part -of Athens: as Sicilians, they had a paramount interest in upholding -the independence of the island. If possible, they ought to maintain -undisturbed peace; but if that were impossible, it was essential at -least to confine the war to Sicily, apart from any foreign intruders. -Complaints should be exchanged, and injuries redressed, by all, -in a spirit of mutual forbearance; of which Syracuse—the first -city in the island, and best able to sustain the brunt of war—was -prepared to set the example, without that foolish over-valuation -of favorable chances so ruinous even to first-rate powers, and -with full sense of the uncertainty of the<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_138">[p. 138]</span> future. Let them all feel that they -were neighbors, inhabitants of the same island, and called by the -common name of Sikeliots; and let them all with one accord repel the -intrusion of aliens in their affairs, whether as open assailants or -as treacherous mediators.<a id="FNanchor_207" href="#Footnote_207" -class="fnanchor">[207]</a></p> - -<p>This harangue from Hermokratês, and the earnest dispositions -of Syracuse for peace, found general sympathy among the Sicilian -cities, Ionic as well as Doric. All of them doubtless suffered by -the war, and the Ionic cities, who had solicited the intervention -of the Athenians as protectors against Syracuse, conceived from the -evident uneasiness of the latter a fair assurance of her pacific -demeanor for the future. Accordingly, the peace was accepted by all -the belligerent parties, each retaining what they possessed, except -that the Syracusans agreed to cede Morgantinê to Kamarina, on receipt -of a fixed sum of money.<a id="FNanchor_208" href="#Footnote_208" -class="fnanchor">[208]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">[p. -139]</span> The Ionic cities stipulated that Athens should be -included in the pacification; a condition agreed to by all, except -the Epizephyrian Lokrians.<a id="FNanchor_209" href="#Footnote_209" -class="fnanchor">[209]</a> They then acquainted Eurymedon and -his colleagues with the terms; inviting them to accede to the -pacification in the name of Athens, and then to withdraw their fleet -from Sicily. Nor had these generals any choice but to close with the -proposition. Athens thus was placed on terms of peace with all the -Sicilian cities, with liberty of access reciprocally to any single -ship of war, but no armed force to cross the sea between Sicily -and Peloponnesus. Eurymedon then sailed with his fleet home.<a -id="FNanchor_210" href="#Footnote_210" class="fnanchor">[210]</a></p> - -<p>On reaching Athens, however, he and his colleagues were received -by the people with much displeasure. He himself was fined, and his -colleagues Sophoklês and Pythodôrus banished, on the charge of having -been bribed to quit Sicily, at a time when the fleet—so the Athenians -believed—was strong enough to have made important conquests. Why the -three colleagues were differently treated we are not informed.<a -id="FNanchor_211" href="#Footnote_211" class="fnanchor">[211]</a> -This sentence was harsh and unmerited; for it does not seem that -Eurymedon had it in his power to prevent the Ionic cities from -concluding peace, while it is certain that without them he could have -achieved nothing serious. All that seems unexplained in his conduct, -as recounted by Thucydidês, is, that his arrival at Rhegium with the -entire fleet in September, 425 <small>B.C.</small>, does -not seem to have been attended with any increased vigor or success, -in the prosecution of the war. But the Athenians—besides an undue -depreciation of the Sicilian cities, which we shall find fatally -misleading them hereafter—were at this moment at the maximum of -extravagant hopes, counting upon new triumphs everywhere, impatient -of disappointment, and careless of proportion between the means -intrusted to, and the objects expected from, their commanders. -Such unmeasured confidence was painfully corrected in the course -of a few months, by the battle of Delium<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_140">[p. 140]</span> and the losses in Thrace. But at the -present moment, it was probably not less astonishing than grievous to -the three generals, who had all left Athens prior to the success in -Sphakteria.</p> - -<p>The Ionic cities in Sicily were soon made to feel that they -had been premature in sending away the Athenians. Dispute between -Leontini and Syracuse, the same cause which had occasioned the -invocation of Athens three years before, broke out afresh soon -after the pacification of Gela. The democratical government of -Leontini came to the resolution of strengthening their city by the -enrolment of many new citizens; and a redivision of the territorial -property of the state was projected in order to provide lots of land -for these new-comers. But the aristocracy of the town upon whom -the necessity would thus be imposed of parting with a portion of -their lands, forestalled the project, seemingly before it was even -formally decided, by entering into a treasonable correspondence with -Syracuse, bringing in a Syracusan army, and expelling the Demos.<a -id="FNanchor_212" href="#Footnote_212" class="fnanchor">[212]</a> -While these exiles found shelter as<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_141">[p. 141]</span> they could in other cities, the rich -Leontines deserted and dismantled their own city, transferred their -residence to Syracuse,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">[p. -142]</span> and were enrolled as Syracusan citizens. To them the -operation was exceedingly profitable, since they became masters -of the properties of the exiled Demos in addition to their own. -Presently, however, some of them, dissatisfied with their residence -in Syracuse, returned to the abandoned city, and fitted up a portion -of it called Phokeis, together with a neighboring strong post called -Brikinnies. Here, after being joined by a considerable number of the -exiled Demos, they contrived to hold out for some time against the -efforts of the Syracusans to expel them from their fortifications.</p> - -<p>The new enrolment of citizens, projected by the Leontine -democracy, seems to date during the year succeeding the pacification -of Gela, and was probably intended to place the city in a more -defensible position in case of renewed attacks from Syracuse, thus -compensating for the departure of the Athenian auxiliaries. The -Leontine Demos, in exile and suffering, doubtless bitterly repenting -that they had concurred in dismissing these auxiliaries, sent -envoys to Athens with complaints, and renewed prayers for help.<a -id="FNanchor_213" href="#Footnote_213" class="fnanchor">[213]</a></p> - -<p>But Athens was then too much pressed to attend to their call; -her defeat at Delium and her losses in Thrace had been followed -by the truce for one year; and even during that truce, she had -been called upon for strenuous efforts in Thrace to check the -progress of Brasidas. After the expiration of that truce, she -sent Phæax and two colleagues to Sicily (<small>B.C.</small> 422) -with the modest force of two triremes. He was directed to try and -organize an anti-Syracusan party in the island, for the purpose of -reëstablishing the Leontine Demos. In passing along the coast of -Italy, he concluded amicable relations with some of the Grecian -cities,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_143">[p. 143]</span> -especially with Lokri, which had hitherto stood aloof from Athens; -and his first addresses in Sicily appeared to promise success. -His representations of danger from Syracusan ambition were well -received both at Kamarina and Agrigentum. For on the one hand, that -universal terror of Athens, which had dictated the pacification of -Gela, had now disappeared; while on the other hand, the proceeding -of Syracuse in regard to Leontini was well calculated to excite -alarm. We see by that proceeding that sympathy between democracies -in different towns was not universal: the Syracusan democracy had -joined with the Leontine aristocracy to expel the Demos, just as -the despot Gelon had combined with the aristocracy of Megara and -Eubœa, sixty years before, and had sold the Demos of those towns -into slavery. The birthplace of the famous rhetor Gorgias was struck -out of the list of inhabited cities; its temples were deserted; -and its territory had become a part of Syracuse. All these were -circumstances so powerfully affecting Grecian imagination, that -the Kamarinæans, neighbors of Syracuse on the other side, might -well fear lest the like unjust conquest, expulsion, and absorption, -should soon overtake them. Agrigentum, though without any similar -fear, was disposed from policy, and jealousy of Syracuse, to second -the views of Phæax. But when the latter proceeded to Gela, in order -to procure the adhesion of that city in addition to the other two, -he found himself met by so resolute an opposition that his whole -scheme was frustrated, nor did he think it advisable even to open -his case at Selinus or Himera. In returning, he crossed the interior -of the island through the territory of the Sikels to Katana, passing -in his way by Brikinnies, where the Leontine Demos were still -maintaining a precarious existence. Having encouraged them to hold -out by assurances of aid, he proceeded on his homeward voyage. In -the strait of Messina, he struck upon some vessels conveying a body -of expelled Lokrians from Messênê to Lokri. The Lokrians had got -possession of Messênê after the pacification of Gela, by means of -an internal sedition; but after holding it some time, they were now -driven out by a second revolution. Phæax, being under agreement -with Lokri, passed by these vessels without any act of hostility.<a -id="FNanchor_214" href="#Footnote_214" class="fnanchor">[214]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">[p. 144]</span></p> <p>The -Leontine exiles at Brikinnies, however, received no benefit from -his assurances, and appear soon afterwards to have been completely -expelled. Nevertheless, Athens was noway disposed, for a considerable -time, to operations in Sicily. A few months after the visit of -Phæax to that island, came the Peace of Nikias: the consequences -of that peace occupied her whole attention in Peloponnesus, while -the ambition of Alkibiadês carried her on for three years in -intra-Peloponnesian projects and coöperation with Argos against -Sparta. It was only in the year 417 <small>B.C.</small>, when these -projects had proved abortive, that she had leisure to turn her -attention elsewhere. During that year, Nikias had contemplated an -expedition against Amphipolis in conjunction with Perdikkas, whose -desertion frustrated the scheme. The year 416 <small>B.C.</small> was -that in which Mêlos was besieged and taken.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the Syracusans had cleared and appropriated all the -territory of Leontini, which city now existed only in the talk and -hopes of its exiles. Of these latter a portion seem to have continued -at Athens, pressing their entreaties for aid, which began to obtain -some attention about the year 417 <small>B.C.</small>, -when another incident happened to strengthen their chance of success. -A quarrel broke out between the neighboring cities of Selinus -(Hellenic) and Egesta (non-Hellenic) in the western corner of Sicily; -partly about a piece of land on the river which divided the two -territories, partly about some alleged wrong in cases of internuptial -connection. The Selinuntines, not satisfied with their own strength, -obtained assistance from the Syracusans their allies, and thus -reduced Egesta to considerable straits by land as well as by sea.<a -id="FNanchor_215" href="#Footnote_215" class="fnanchor">[215]</a> Now -the Egestæans had allied themselves with Lachês ten years before, -during the first expedition sent by the Athenians to Sicily; upon -the strength of which alliance they sent to Athens, to solicit her -intervention for their defence, after having in vain applied both -to Agrigentum and to Carthage. It may seem singular that Carthage -did not at this time readily<span class="pagenum" id="Page_145">[p. -145]</span> embrace the pretext for interference, considering that, -ten years afterwards, she interfered with such destructive effect -against Selinus. At this time, however, the fear of Athens and -her formidable navy appears to have been felt even at Carthage,<a -id="FNanchor_216" href="#Footnote_216" class="fnanchor">[216]</a> -thus protecting the Sicilian Greeks against the most dangerous of -their neighbors.</p> - -<p>The Egestæan envoys reached Athens in the spring of 416 -<small>B.C.</small>, at a time when the Athenians had no immediate -project to occupy their thoughts, except the enterprise against -Mêlos, which could not be either long or doubtful. Though urgent -in setting forth the necessities of their position, they at the -same time did not appear, like the Leontines, as mere helpless -suppliants, addressing themselves to Athenian compassion. They rested -their appeal chiefly on grounds of policy. The Syracusans, having -already extinguished one ally of Athens (Leontini), were now hard -pressing upon a second (Egesta), and would thus successively subdue -them all: as soon as this was completed, there would be nothing -left in Sicily except an omnipotent Dorian combination, allied to -Peloponnesus both by race and descent, and sure to lend effective -aid in putting down Athens herself. It was therefore essential for -Athens to forestall this coming danger by interfering forthwith to -uphold her remaining allies against the encroachments of Syracuse. -If she would send a naval expedition adequate to the rescue of -Egesta, the Egestæans themselves engaged to provide ample funds for -the prosecution of the war.<a id="FNanchor_217" href="#Footnote_217" -class="fnanchor">[217]</a></p> - -<p>Such representations from the envoys, and fears of Syracusan -aggrandizement as a source of strength to Peloponnesus, worked -along with the prayers of the Leontines in rekindling the appetite -of Athens for extending her power in Sicily. The impression made -upon the Athenian public, favorable from the first, was wound up -to a still higher pitch by renewed discussion. The envoys were -repeatedly heard in the public assembly,<a id="FNanchor_218" -href="#Footnote_218" class="fnanchor">[218]</a> together<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_146">[p. 146]</span> with those citizens who -supported their propositions. At the head of these was Alkibiadês, -who aspired to the command of the intended expedition, tempting alike -to his love of glory, of adventure, and of personal gain. But it is -plain from these renewed discussions that at first the disposition of -the people was by no means decided, much less unanimous, and that a -considerable party sustained Nikias in a prudential opposition. Even -at last, the resolution adopted was not one of positive consent, but -a mean term such as perhaps Nikias himself could not resist. Special -envoys were despatched to Egesta, partly to ascertain the means of -the town to fulfil its assurance of defraying the costs of war, -partly to make investigations on the spot and report upon the general -state of affairs.</p> - -<p>Perhaps the commissioners despatched were men themselves -friendly to the enterprise; nor is it impossible that some of them -may have been individually bribed by the Egestæans; at least such -a supposition is not forbidden by the average state of Athenian -public morality. But the most honest or even suspicious men could -hardly be prepared for the deep-laid stratagems put in practice -to delude them, on their arrival at Egesta. They were conducted -to the rich temple of Aphroditê on Mount Eryx, where the plate -and donatives were exhibited before them; abundant in number, and -striking to the eye, yet composed mostly of silver-gilt vessels, -which, though falsely passed off as solid gold, were in reality -of little pecuniary value. Moreover, the Egestæan citizens were -profuse in their hospitalities and entertainments both to the -commissioners and to the crews of the triremes.<a id="FNanchor_219" -href="#Footnote_219" class="fnanchor">[219]</a> They collected -together all the gold and silver vessels, dishes, and goblets, -of Egesta, which they farther enlarged by borrowing additional -ornaments of the same kind from the neighboring cities, Hellenic -as well as Carthaginian. At each successive<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_147">[p. 147]</span> entertainment, every Egestæan host -exhibited all this large stock of plate as his own property, the -same stock being transferred from house to house for the occasion. -A false appearance was thus created, of the large number of wealthy -men in Egesta; and the Athenian seamen, while their hearts were -won by the caresses, saw with amazement this prodigious display -of gold and silver, and were thoroughly duped by the fraud.<a -id="FNanchor_220" href="#Footnote_220" class="fnanchor">[220]</a> To -complete the illusion, by resting it on a basis of reality and prompt -payment, sixty talents of uncoined silver were at once produced -as ready for the operations of war. With this sum in hand, the -Athenian commissioners, after finishing their examination, and the -Egestæan envoys also, returned to Athens, which they reached in the -spring of 415 <small>B.C.</small>,<a id="FNanchor_221" -href="#Footnote_221" class="fnanchor">[221]</a> about three months -after the capture of Mêlos.</p> - -<p>The Athenian assembly being presently convened to hear their -report, the deluded commissioners drew a magnificent picture of -the wealth, public and private, which they had actually seen and -touched at Egesta, and presented the sixty talents—one month’s -pay for a fleet of sixty triremes—as a small instalment out of -the vast stock remaining behind. While they thus officially -certified the capacity of the Egestæans to perform their promise -of defraying the cost of the war, the seamen of their trireme, -addressing the assembly in their character of citizens,—beyond -all suspicion of being bribed,—overflowing with sympathy for the -town in which they had just been so cordially welcomed, and full -of wonder at the display of wealth which they had witnessed, -would probably contribute still more effectually to kindle the -sympathies of their countrymen. Accordingly, when the Eges<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_148">[p. 148]</span>tæan envoys again -renewed their petitions and representations, confidently appealing -to the scrutiny which they had undergone,—when the distress of the -suppliant Leontines was again depicted,—the Athenian assembly no -longer delayed coming to a final decision. They determined to send -forthwith sixty triremes to Sicily, under three generals with full -powers,—Nikias, Alkibiadês, and Lamachus; for the purpose, first, of -relieving Egesta; next, as soon as that primary object should have -been accomplished, of reëstablishing the city of Leontini; lastly, of -furthering the views of Athens in Sicily, by any other means which -they might find practicable.<a id="FNanchor_222" href="#Footnote_222" -class="fnanchor">[222]</a> Such resolution being passed, a fresh -assembly was appointed for the fifth day following, to settle the -details.</p> - -<p>We cannot doubt that this assembly, in which the reports from -Egesta were first delivered, was one of unqualified triumph to -Alkibiadês and those who had from the first advocated the expedition, -as well as of embarrassment and humiliation to Nikias, who had -opposed it. He was probably more astonished than any one else at -the statements of the commissioners and seamen, because he did not -believe in the point which they went to establish. Yet he could -not venture to contradict eye-witnesses speaking in evident good -faith, and as the assembly went heartily along with them, he labored -under great difficulty in repeating his objections to a scheme now -so much strengthened in public favor. Accordingly, his speech was -probably hesitating and ineffective; the more so, as his opponents, -far from wishing to make good any personal triumph against himself, -were forward in proposing his name first on the list of generals, -in spite of his own declared repugnance.<a id="FNanchor_223" -href="#Footnote_223" class="fnanchor">[223]</a> But when the -assembly broke up, he be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_149">[p. -149]</span>came fearfully impressed with the perilous resolution -which it had adopted, and at the same time conscious that he had not -done justice to his own case against it. He therefore resolved to -avail himself of the next assembly, four days afterwards, for the -purpose of reopening the debate, and again denouncing the intended -expedition. Properly speaking, the Athenians might have declined to -hear him on this subject; indeed, the question which he raised could -not be put without illegality: the principle of the measure had been -already determined, and it remained only to arrange the details, for -which special purpose the coming assembly had been appointed. But he -was heard, and with perfect patience; and his harangue, a valuable -sample, both of the man and of the time, is set forth at length by -Thucydidês. I give here the chief points of it, not confining myself -to the exact expressions.</p> - -<p>“Though we are met to-day, Athenians, to settle the particulars -of the expedition already pronounced against Sicily, yet I think -we ought to take farther counsel whether it be well to send that -expedition at all; nor ought we thus hastily to plunge, at the -instance of aliens, into a dangerous war noway belonging to us. To -myself personally, indeed, your resolution has offered an honorable -appointment, and for my own bodily danger I care as little as any -man: yet no considerations of personal dignity have ever before -prevented me, nor shall now prevent me, from giving you my honest -opinion, however it may clash with your habitual judgments. I tell -you, then, that in your desire to go to Sicily, you leave many -enemies here behind you, and that you will bring upon yourselves -new enemies from thence to help them. Perhaps you fancy that your -truce with Sparta is an adequate protection. In name, indeed -(though only in name, thanks to the intrigues of parties both here -and there), that truce may stand, so long as your power remains -unimpaired; but on your first serious reverses, the enemy will -eagerly take the opportunity of assailing you. Some of your most -powerful enemies have never even accepted the truce; and if you -divide your force as you now propose, they will probably set upon -you at once along with the Sicilians, whom they would have been -too happy to procure as coöperating allies at the beginning of the -war. Recollect that your Chalkidian subjects in Thrace are still in -revolt,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_150">[p. 150]</span> and have -never yet been conquered: other continental subjects, too, are not -much to be trusted; and you are going to redress injuries offered -to Egesta, before you have yet thought of redressing your own. Now -your conquests in Thrace, if you make any, can be maintained; but -Sicily is so distant, and the people so powerful, that you will -never be able to maintain permanent ascendency; and it is absurd -to undertake an expedition wherein conquest cannot be permanent, -while failure will be destructive. The Egestæans alarm you by the -prospect of Syracusan aggrandizement. But to me it seems that the -Sicilian Greeks, even if they become subjects of Syracuse, will be -less dangerous to you than they are at present: for as matters stand -now, they might possibly send aid to Peloponnesus, from desire on the -part of each to gain the favor of Lacedæmon, but imperial Syracuse -would have no motive to endanger her own empire for the purpose of -putting down yours. You are now full of confidence, because you have -come out of the war better than you at first feared. But do not trust -the Spartans: they, the most sensitive of all men to the reputation -of superiority, are lying in wait to play you a trick in order to -repair their own dishonor: their oligarchical machinations against -you demand all your vigilance, and leave you no leisure to think of -these foreigners at Egesta. Having just recovered ourselves somewhat -from the pressure of disease and war, we ought to reserve this -newly-acquired strength for our own purposes, instead of wasting it -upon the treacherous assurances of desperate exiles from Sicily.”</p> - -<p>Nikias then continued, doubtless turning towards Alkibiadês: -“If any man, delighted to be named to the command, though still -too young for it, exhorts you to this expedition in his own -selfish interests, looking to admiration for his ostentation in -chariot-racing, and to profit from his command, as a means of making -good his extravagances, do not let such a man gain celebrity for -himself at the hazard of the entire city. Be persuaded that such -persons are alike unprincipled in regard to the public property and -wasteful as to their own, and that this matter is too serious for -the rash counsels of youth. I tremble when I see before me this -band sitting, by previous concert, close to their leader in the -assembly; and I in my turn exhort the elderly men, who are near them, -not to be shamed out of their opposition by<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_151">[p. 151]</span> the fear of being called cowards. Let -them leave to these men the ruinous appetite for what is not within -reach, in the conviction that few plans ever succeed from passionate -desire; many, from deliberate foresight. Let them vote against the -expedition; maintaining undisturbed our present relations with -the Sicilian cities, and desiring the Egestæans to close the war -against Selinus, as they have begun it, without the aid of Athens.<a -id="FNanchor_224" href="#Footnote_224" class="fnanchor">[224]</a> Nor -be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">[p. 152]</span> thou afraid, -prytanis (Mr. President), to submit this momentous question again to -the decision of the assembly, seeing that breach of the law, in the -presence of so many witnesses, cannot expose thee to impeachment, -while thou wilt afford opportunity for the correction of a perilous -misjudgment.”</p> - -<p>Such were the principal points in the speech of Nikias on this -memorable occasion. It was heard with attention, and probably made -some impression, since it completely reopened the entire debate, in -spite of the formal illegality. Immediately after he sat down, while -his words were yet fresh in the ears of the audience, Alkibiadês rose -to reply. The speech just made, bringing the expedition again into -question, endangered his dearest hopes both of fame and of pecuniary -acquisition; for his dreams went farther than those of any man in -Athens; not merely to the conquest of all Sicily, but also to that -of Carthage and the Carthaginian empire. Opposed to Nikias, both in -personal character and in political tendencies, he had pushed his -rivalry to such a degree of bitterness that at one moment a vote -of ostracism had been on the point of deciding between them. That -vote had indeed been turned aside by joint consent, and discharged -upon Hyperbolus; yet the hostile feeling still continued on both -sides, and Nikias had just manifested it by a parliamentary attack -of the most galling character; all the more galling because it was -strictly accurate and well deserved. Provoked as well as alarmed, -Alkibiadês started up forthwith, his impatience breaking loose from -the formalities of an exordium.</p> - -<p>“Athenians, I both have better title than others to the post of -commander,—for the taunts of Nikias force me to begin here,—and I -count myself fully worthy of it. Those very matters with which he -reproaches me are sources not merely of glory to my ancestors and -myself, but of positive advantage to my country. For the Greeks, on -witnessing my splendid theôry at Olympia, were induced to rate the -power of Athens even above the reality, having before regarded it as -broken down by the war; when I sent into the lists seven chariots, -being more than any private individual had ever sent before, winning -the first prize, coming<span class="pagenum" id="Page_153">[p. -153]</span> in also second and fourth, and performing all the -accessories in a manner suitable to an Olympic victory. Custom -attaches honor to such exploits, but the power of the performers -is at the same time brought home to the feelings of spectators. My -exhibitions at Athens, too, choregic and others, are naturally viewed -with jealousy by my rivals here; but in the eyes of strangers they -are evidences of power. Such so-called folly is by no means useless, -when a man at his own cost serves the city as well as himself. Nor -is it unjust, when a man has an exalted opinion of himself, that -he should not conduct himself towards others as if he were their -equal; for the man in misfortune finds no one to bear a share of -it. Just as, when we are in distress, we find no one to speak to -us, in like manner let a man lay his account to bear the insolence -of the prosperous, or else let him give equal dealing to the low, -and then claim to receive it from the high. I know well that such -exalted personages, and all who have in any way attained eminence, -have been during their lifetime unpopular, chiefly in society with -their equals, and to a certain extent with others also; while after -their decease, they have left such a reputation as to make people -claim kindred with them falsely, and to induce their country to boast -of them, not as though they were aliens or wrongdoers, but as her -own citizens and as men who did her honor. It is this glory which -I desire, and in pursuit of which I incur such reproaches for my -private conduct. Yet look at my public conduct, and see whether it -will not bear comparison with that of any other citizen. I brought -together the most powerful states in Peloponnesus without any serious -cost or hazard to you, and made the Lacedæmonians peril their all at -Mantineia on the fortune of one day: a peril so great, that, though -victorious, they have not even yet regained their steady belief in -their own strength.”</p> - -<p>“Thus did my youth, and my so-called monstrous folly, find -suitable words to address the Peloponnesian powers, and earnestness -to give them confidence and obtain their coöperation. Be not now, -therefore, afraid of this youth of mine: but so long an I possess it -in full vigor, and so long as Nikias retains his reputation for good -fortune, turn us each to account in our own way.”<a id="FNanchor_225" -href="#Footnote_225" class="fnanchor">[225]</a></p> <p><span -class="pagenum" id="Page_154">[p. 154]</span></p> <p>Having thus -vindicated himself personally, Alkibiadês went on to deprecate -any change of the public resolution already taken. The Sicilian -cities, he said, were not so formidable as was represented. Their -population was numerous, indeed, but fluctuating, turbulent, often -on the move, and without local attachment. No man there considered -himself as a permanent resident, nor cared to defend the city in -which he dwelt; nor were there arms or organization for such a -purpose. The native Sikels, detesting Syracuse, would willingly lend -their aid to her assailants. As to the Peloponnesians, powerful -as they were, they were not more desperate enemies now than they -had been in former days:<a id="FNanchor_226" href="#Footnote_226" -class="fnanchor">[226]</a> they might invade Attica by land whether -the Athenians sailed to Sicily or not; but they could do no mischief -by sea, for Athens would still have in reserve a navy sufficient -to restrain them. What valid ground was there, therefore, to evade -performing obligations which Athens had sworn to her Sicilian allies? -To be sure, <i>they</i> could bring no help to Attica in return; but -Athens did not want them on her own side of the water; she wanted -them in Sicily, to prevent her Sicilian enemies from coming over to -attack her. She had originally acquired her empire by a readiness -to interfere wherever she was invited; nor would she have made any -progress, if she had been backward or prudish in scrutinizing such -invitations. She could not now set limits to the extent of her -imperial sway; she was under a necessity not merely to retain her -present subjects, but to lay snares for new subjects, on pain of -falling into dependence herself if she ceased to be imperial. Let -her then persist in the resolution adopted, and strike terror into -the Peloponnesians by undertaking this great expedition. She would -probably conquer all Sicily; at least she would humble Syracuse: in -case even of failure, she could always bring back her troops, from -her unquestionable superiority at sea. The stationary and inactive -policy recommended by Nikias<span class="pagenum" id="Page_155">[p. -155]</span> was not less at variance with the temper, than with -the position, of Athens, and would be ruinous to her if pursued. -Her military organization would decline, and her energies would -be wasted in internal rub and conflict, instead of that steady -activity and acquisition which had become engrafted upon her laws -and habits, which could not be now renounced, even if bad in itself, -without speedy destruction.<a id="FNanchor_227" href="#Footnote_227" -class="fnanchor">[227]</a></p> - -<p>Such was substantially the reply of Alkibiadês to Nikias. The -debate was now completely reopened, so that several speakers -addressed the assembly on both sides; more, however, decidedly in -favor of the expedition than against it. The alarmed Egestæans and -Leontines renewed their supplications, appealing to the plighted -faith of the city: probably also those Athenians who had visited -Egesta, again stood forward to protest against what they would call -the ungenerous doubts and insinuations of Nikias. By all these -appeals, after considerable debate, the assembly was so powerfully -moved, that their determination to send the fleet became more intense -than ever; and Nikias, perceiving that farther direct opposition was -useless, altered his tactics. He now attempted a manœuvre, designed -indirectly to disgust his countrymen with the plan, by enlarging upon -its dangers and difficulties, and insisting upon a prodigious force -as indispensable to surmount them. Nor was he without hopes that they -might be sufficiently disheartened by such prospective hardships, -to throw up the scheme altogether. At any rate, if they persisted, -he himself as commander would thus be enabled to execute it with -completeness and confidence.</p> - -<p>Accepting the expedition, therefore, as the pronounced fiat -of the people, he reminded them that the cities which they were -about to attack, especially Syracuse and Selinus, were powerful, -populous, free: well prepared in every way with hoplites, horsemen, -light-armed troops, ships of war, plenty of horses to mount their -cavalry, and abundant corn at home. At best, Athens could hope for no -other allies in Sicily except Naxus and Katana, from their kindred -with the Leontines. It was no mere fleet, therefore, which could -cope with enemies like these on their own soil. The fleet indeed -must be prodigiously great, for the purpose<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_156">[p. 156]</span> not merely of maritime combat, but of -keeping open communication at sea, and insuring the importation of -subsistence. But there must besides be a large force of hoplites, -bowmen, and slingers, a large stock of provisions in transports, -and, above all an abundant amount of money: for the funds promised -by the Egestæans would be found mere empty delusion. The army -must be not simply a match for the enemy’s regular hoplites and -powerful cavalry, but also independent of foreign aid from the first -day of their landing.<a id="FNanchor_228" href="#Footnote_228" -class="fnanchor">[228]</a> If not, in case of the least reverse, they -would find everywhere nothing but active enemies, without a single -friend. “I know (he concluded) that there are many dangers against -which we must take precaution, and many more in which we must trust -to good fortune, serious as it is for mere men to do so. But I choose -to leave as little as possible in the power of fortune, and to have -in hand all means of reasonable security at the time when I leave -Athens. Looking merely to the interests of the commonwealth, this is -the most assured course; while to us who are to form the armament, it -is indispensable for preservation. If any man thinks differently, I -resign to him the command.”<a id="FNanchor_229" href="#Footnote_229" -class="fnanchor">[229]</a></p> - -<p>The effect of this second speech of Nikias on the assembly, -coming as it did after a long and contentious debate, was much -greater than that which had been produced by his first. But it was -an effect totally opposite to that which he himself had anticipated -and intended. Far from being discouraged or alienated from the -expedition by those impediments which he had studiously magnified, -the people only attached themselves to it with yet greater obstinacy. -The difficulties which stood in the way of Sicilian conquest served -but to endear it to them the more, calling forth increased ardor and -eagerness for personal exertion in the cause. The people not only -accepted, without hesitation or deduction, the estimate which Nikias -had laid before them of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">[p. -157]</span> risk and cost, but warmly extolled his frankness -not less than his sagacity, as the only means of making success -certain. They were ready to grant without reserve everything which -he asked, with an enthusiasm and unanimity such as was rarely seen -to reign in an Athenian assembly. In fact, the second speech of -Nikias had brought the two dissentient veins of the assembly into -a confluence and harmony, all the more welcome because unexpected. -While his partisans seconded it as the best way of neutralizing the -popular madness, his opponents—Alkibiadês, the Egestæans, and the -Leontines—caught at it with acclamation, as realizing more than -they had hoped for, and more than they could ever have ventured to -propose. If Alkibiadês had demanded an armament on so vast a scale, -the people would have turned a deaf ear. But such was their respect -for Nikias—on the united grounds of prudence, good fortune, piety, -and favor with the gods—that his opposition to their favorite scheme -had really made them uneasy; and when he made the same demand, they -were delighted to purchase his concurrence by adopting all such -conditions as he imposed.<a id="FNanchor_230" href="#Footnote_230" -class="fnanchor">[230]</a></p> - -<p>It was thus that Nikias, quite contrary to his own purpose, not -only imparted to the enterprise a gigantic magnitude which its -projectors had never contemplated, but threw into it the whole -soul of Athens, and roused a burst of ardor beyond all former -example. Every man present, old as well as young, rich and poor, -of all classes and professions, was eager to put down his name for -personal service. Some were tempted by the love of gain, others -by the curiosity of seeing so distant a region, others again by -the pride and supposed safety of enlisting in so irresistible an -armament. So overpowering was the popular voice in calling for -the execution of the scheme, that the small minority who retained -their objections were afraid to hold up their hands, for fear of -incurring the suspicion of want of patriotism. When the excitement -had somewhat subsided, an orator named Demostratus, coming forward -as spokesman of this sentiment, urged Nikias to declare at once, -without farther evasion, what force he required from the people. -Disappointed as Nikias was, yet being left without any alternative, -he sadly responded to the appeal; saying, that he would take farther -counsel with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">[p. 158]</span> his -colleagues, but that speaking on his first impression, he thought -the triremes required must be not less than one hundred, nor the -hoplites less than five thousand, Athenians and allies together. -There must farther be a proportional equipment of other forces and -accompaniments, especially Kretan bowmen and slingers. Enormous as -this requisition was, the vote of the people not only sanctioned -it without delay, but even went beyond it. They conferred upon the -generals full power to fix both the numbers of the armament and every -other matter relating to the expedition, just as they might think -best for the interest of Athens.</p> - -<p>Pursuant to this momentous resolution, the enrolment and -preparation of the forces was immediately begun. Messages were -sent to summon sufficient triremes from the nautical allies, as -well as to invite hoplites from Argos and Mantineia, and to hire -bowmen and slingers elsewhere. For three months, the generals were -busily engaged in this proceeding, while the city was in a state of -alertness and bustle, fatally interrupted, however, by an incident -which I shall recount in the next chapter.</p> - -<p>Considering the prodigious consequences which turned on the -expedition of Athens against Sicily, it is worth while to bestow -a few reflections on the preliminary proceedings of the Athenian -people. Those who are accustomed to impute all the misfortunes of -Athens to the hurry, passion, and ignorance of democracy, will not -find the charge borne out by the facts which we have been just -considering. The supplications of Egestæans and Leontines, forwarded -to Athens about the spring or summer of 416 <small>B.C.</small>, -undergo careful and repeated discussion in the public assembly. They -at first meet with considerable opposition, but the repeated debates -gradually kindle both the sympathies and the ambition of the people. -Still, however, no decisive step is taken without more ample and -correct information from the spot, and special commissioners are sent -to Egesta for the purpose. These men bring back a decisive report, -triumphantly certifying all that the Egestæans had promised: nor can -we at all wonder that the people never suspected the deep-laid fraud -whereby their commissioners had been duped.</p> - -<p>Upon the result of that mission to Egesta, the two parties for -and against the projected expedition had evidently joined issue; -and when the commissioners returned, bearing testimony so de<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_159">[p. 159]</span>cisive in favor of the -former, the party thus strengthened thought itself warranted in -calling for a decision immediately, after all the previous debates. -Nevertheless, the measure still had to surmount the renewed and -hearty opposition of Nikias, before it became finally ratified. It -was this long and frequent debate, with opposition often repeated -but always outreasoned, which working gradually deeper and deeper -conviction in the minds of the people, brought them all into hearty -unanimity to support it, and made them cling to it with that tenacity -which the coming chapters will demonstrate. In so far as the -expedition was an error, it certainly was not error arising either -from hurry, or want of discussion, or want of inquiry. Never in -Grecian history was any measure more carefully weighed beforehand, or -more deliberately and unanimously resolved.</p> - -<p>The position of Nikias in reference to the measure is remarkable. -As a dissuasive and warning counsellor, he took a right view of -it; but in that capacity he could not carry the people along with -him. Yet such was their steady esteem for him personally, and their -reluctance to proceed in the enterprise without him, that they -eagerly embraced any conditions which he thought proper to impose. -And the conditions which he named had the effect of exaggerating the -enterprise into such gigantic magnitude as no one in Athens had ever -contemplated; thus casting into it so prodigious a proportion of the -blood of Athens, that its discomfiture would be equivalent to the -ruin of the commonwealth. This was the first mischief occasioned by -Nikias, when, after being forced to relinquish his direct opposition, -he resorted to the indirect manœuvre of demanding more than he -thought the people would be willing to grant. It will be found only -the first among a sad series of other mistakes, fatal to his country -as well as to himself.</p> - -<p>Giving to Nikias, however, for the present, full credit for -the wisdom of his dissuasive counsel and his skepticism about the -reports from Egesta, we cannot but notice the opposite quality in -Alkibiadês. His speech is not merely full of overweening insolence, -as a manifestation of individual character, but of rash and ruinous -instigations in regard to the foreign policy of his country. The -arguments whereby he enforces the expedition against Syracuse -are indeed more mischievous in their tendency than the ex<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_160">[p. 160]</span>pedition itself, for -the failure of which Alkibiades is not to be held responsible. It -might have succeeded in its special object, had it been properly -conducted; but even if it had succeeded, the remark of Nikias is not -the less just, that Athens was aiming at an unmeasured breadth of -empire, which it would be altogether impossible for her to preserve. -When we recollect the true political wisdom with which Periklês had -advised his countrymen to maintain strenuously their existing empire, -but by no means to grasp at any new acquisitions while they had -powerful enemies in Peloponnesus, we shall appreciate by contrast the -feverish system of never-ending aggression inculcated by Alkibiadês, -and the destructive principles which he lays down, that Athens -must forever be engaged in new conquests, on pain of forfeiting -her existing empire and tearing herself to pieces by internal -discord. Even granting the necessity for Athens to employ her -military and naval force, as Nikias had truly observed, Amphipolis -and the revolted subjects in Thrace were still unsubdued; and the -first employment of Athenian force ought to be directed against -them, instead of being wasted in distant hazards and treacherous -novelties, creating for Athens a position in which she could never -permanently maintain herself. The parallel which Alkibiadês draws, -between the enterprising spirit whereby the Athenian empire had -been first acquired, and the undefined speculations which he was -himself recommending, is altogether fallacious. The Athenian empire -took its rise from Athenian enterprise, working in concert with a -serious alarm and necessity on the part of all the Grecian cities -in or round the Ægean sea. Athens rendered an essential service -by keeping off the Persians, and preserving that sea in a better -condition than it had ever been in before: her empire had begun -by being a voluntary confederacy, and had only passed by degrees -into constraint; while the local situation of all her subjects was -sufficiently near to be within the reach of her controlling navy. -Her new career of aggression in Sicily, was in all these respects -different. Nor is it less surprising to find Alkibiadês asserting -that the multiplication of subjects in that distant island, employing -a large portion of the Athenian naval force to watch them, would -impart new stability to the preëxisting Athenian empire; to read -the terms in which he makes light of enemies both in Peloponnesus -and in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">[p. 161]</span> -Sicily, the Sicilian war being a new enterprise hardly less in -magnitude and hazard than the Peloponnesian,<a id="FNanchor_231" -href="#Footnote_231" class="fnanchor">[231]</a> and to notice the -credit which he claims to himself for his operations in Peloponnesus -and the battle of Mantineia,<a id="FNanchor_232" href="#Footnote_232" -class="fnanchor">[232]</a> although it had ended in complete failure; -restoring the ascendency of Sparta to the maximum at which it had -stood before the events of Sphakteria! There is in fact no speech in -Thucydidês so replete with rash misguiding, and fallacious counsels, -as this harangue of Alkibiadês.</p> - -<p>As a man of action, Alkibiadês was always brave, vigorous, and -full of resource; as a politician and adviser, he was especially -mischievous to his country, because he addressed himself exactly to -their weak point, and exaggerated their sanguine and enterprising -temper into a temerity which overlooked all permanent calculation. -The Athenians had now contracted the belief that they, as lords of -the sea, were entitled to dominion and receipt of tribute from all -islands; a belief which they had not only acted upon, but openly -professed, in their attack upon Mêlos during the preceding autumn. -As Sicily was an island, it seemed to fall naturally under this -category of subjects; nor ought we to wonder, amidst the inaccurate -geographical data current in that day, that they were ignorant how -much larger Sicily was<a id="FNanchor_233" href="#Footnote_233" -class="fnanchor">[233]</a> than the largest island in the Ægean. -Yet they seem to have been aware that it was a prodigious conquest -to struggle for; as we may judge from the fact, that the object was -one kept back rather than openly avowed, and that they acceded to -all the immense preparations demanded by Nikias.<a id="FNanchor_234" -href="#Footnote_234" class="fnanchor">[234]</a> Moreover, we shall -see presently, that even the armament which was despatched had -conceived nothing beyond vague and hesitating ideas of something -great to be achieved in Sicily. But if the Athenian public<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_162">[p. 162]</span> were rash and ignorant, -in contemplating the conquest of Sicily, much more extravagant -were the views of Alkibiadês, who looked even beyond Sicily to the -conquest of Carthage and her empire. Nor was it merely ambition which -he desired to gratify; he was not less eager for the immense private -gains which would be consequent upon success, in order to supply -those deficiencies which his profligate expenditure had occasioned.<a -id="FNanchor_235" href="#Footnote_235" class="fnanchor">[235]</a></p> - -<p>When we recollect how loudly the charges have been preferred -against Kleon, of presumption, of rash policy, and of selfish motive, -in reference to Sphakteria, to the prosecution of the war generally, -and to Amphipolis; and when we compare these proceedings with the -conduct of Alkibiadês as here described, we shall see how much more -forcibly such charges attach to the latter than the former. It will -be seen before this volume is finished, that the vices of Alkibiadês, -and the defects of Nikias, were the cause of far greater ruin to -Athens than either Kleon or Hyperbolus, even if we regard the two -latter with the eyes of their worst enemies.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="Chap_58"> - <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_163">[p. 163]</span></p> - <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LVIII.<br /> - FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE ATHENIANS TO ATTACK SYRACUSE, DOWN TO - THE FIRST WINTER AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL IN SICILY.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">For</span> -the two or three months immediately succeeding the final resolution -taken by the Athenians to invade Sicily, described in the last -chapter, the whole city was elate and bustling with preparation. I -have already mentioned that this resolution, though long opposed by -Nikias with a considerable minority, had at last been adopted—chiefly -through the unforeseen working of that which he intended as a -counter-manœuvre—with a degree of enthusiasm and unanimity, and upon -an enlarged scale, which surpassed all the anticipations of its -promoters. The prophets, circulators of oracles, and other accredited -religious advisers, announced generally the favorable dispositions -of the gods, and promised a triumphant result.<a id="FNanchor_236" -href="#Footnote_236" class="fnanchor">[236]</a> All classes in the -city, rich and poor,—cultivators, traders, and seamen, old and young, -all embraced the project with ardor; as requiring a great effort, yet -promising unparalleled results, both of public aggrandizement and -individual gain. Each man was anxious to put down his own name for -personal service; so that the three generals, Nikias, Alkibiadês, and -Lamachus, when they proceeded to make their selection of hoplites, -instead of being forced to employ constraint and incur ill-will, -as happened when an expedition was unpopular, had only to choose -the fittest among a throng of eager volunteers. Every man provided -himself with his best arms and with bodily accoutrements, useful as -well as ostentatious, for a long voyage and for the exigencies of a -varied land-and-sea-service. Among the trierarchs, or rich citizens, -who undertook each in his turn the duty of commanding a ship of -war, the competition was yet stronger. Each of them accounted it an -honor to be named, and vied with his comrades to exhibit his ship -in the most finished state of equipment. The state, indeed,<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_164">[p. 164]</span> furnished both the -trireme with its essential tackle and oars, and the regular pay for -the crew; but the trierarch, even in ordinary cases, usually incurred -various expenses besides, to make the equipment complete and to -keep the crew together. Such additional outlay, neither exacted nor -defined by law, but only by custom and general opinion, was different -in every individual case, according to temper and circumstances. -But on the present occasion, zeal and forwardness were universal: -each trierarch tried to procure for his own ship the best crew, by -offers of additional reward to all, but especially to the thranitæ -or rowers on the highest of the three tiers:<a id="FNanchor_237" -href="#Footnote_237" class="fnanchor">[237]</a> and it seems that the -seamen were not appointed specially to one ship, but were at liberty -to accept these offers, and to serve in any ship they preferred. Each -trierarch spent more than had ever been known before in pay, outfit, -provision, and even external decoration of his vessel. Besides the -best crews which Athens herself could furnish, picked seamen were -also required from subject-allies, and were bid for in the same -way by the trierarchs.<a id="FNanchor_238" href="#Footnote_238" -class="fnanchor">[238]</a></p> - -<p>Such efforts were much facilitated by the fact, that five years -had now elapsed since the Peace of Nikias, without any considerable -warlike operations. While the treasury had become replenished with -fresh accumulations,<a id="FNanchor_239" href="#Footnote_239" -class="fnanchor">[239]</a> and the triremes increased<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_165">[p. 165]</span> in number, the military -population, reinforced by additional numbers of youth, had forgotten -both the hardships of the war and the pressure of epidemic disease. -Hence the fleet now got together, while it surpassed in number all -previous armaments of Athens, except a single one in the second -year of the previous war under Periklês, was incomparably superior -even to that, and still more superior to all the rest, in the other -ingredients of force, material as well as moral; in picked men, -universal ardor, ships as well as arms in the best condition, and -accessories of every kind in abundance. Such was the confidence of -success, that many Athenians went prepared for trade as well as for -combat; so that the private stock thus added to the public outfit, -and to the sums placed in the hands of the generals, constituted an -unparalleled aggregate of wealth. Much of this was visible to the -eye, contributing to heighten that general excitement of Athenian -imagination which pervaded the whole city while the preparations -were going forward: a mingled feeling of private sympathy and -patriotism,—a dash of uneasiness from reflection on the distant and -unknown region wherein the fleet was to act,—yet an elate confidence -in Athenian force, such as had never before been entertained.<a -id="FNanchor_240" href="#Footnote_240" class="fnanchor">[240]</a> -We hear of Sokratês the philosopher,<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_166">[p. 166]</span> and Meton the astronomer, as forming -exceptions to this universal tone of sanguine anticipation: the -familiar genius which constantly waited upon the philosopher is -supposed to have forewarned him of the result. Nor is it impossible -that he may have been averse to the expedition, though the fact -is less fully certified than we could wish. Amidst a general -predominance of the various favorable religious signs and prophecies, -there were also some unfavorable. Usually, on all public matters of -risk or gravity, there were prophets who gave assurances in opposite -ways: those which turned out right were treasured up: the rest were -at once forgotten, or never long remembered.<a id="FNanchor_241" -href="#Footnote_241" class="fnanchor">[241]</a></p> - -<p>After between two and three months of active preparations, the -expedition was almost ready to start, when an event happened which -fatally poisoned the prevalent cheerfulness of the city. This was the -mutilation of the Hermæ, one of the most extraordinary events in all -Grecian history.</p> - -<p>These Hermæ, or half-statues of the god Hermês, were blocks of -marble about the height of the human figure. The upper part was -cut into a head, face, neck, and bust; the lower part was left as -a quadrangular pillar, broad at the base, without arms, body, or -legs, but with the significant mark of the male sex in front. They -were distributed in great numbers throughout Athens, and always in -the most conspicuous situations; standing beside the outer doors -of private houses as well as of temples, near the most frequented -porticos, at the intersection of cross ways, in the public agora. -They were thus present to the eye of every Athenian in all his -acts of intercommunion, either for business or pleasure, with his -fellow-citizens. The religious feelings of the Greeks considered -the god to be planted or domiciliated where his statue stood,<a -id="FNanchor_242" href="#Footnote_242" class="fnanchor">[242]</a> -so that the companionship,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_167">[p. -167]</span> sympathy, and guardianship of Hermês became -associated with most of the manifestations of conjunct life at -Athens,—political, social, commercial, or gymnastic. Moreover, the -quadrangular fashion of these statues, employed occasionally for -other gods besides Hermês, was a most ancient relic handed down from -the primitive rudeness of Pelasgian workmanship and was popular in -Arcadia as well as peculiarly frequent in Athens.<a id="FNanchor_243" -href="#Footnote_243" class="fnanchor">[243]</a></p> - -<p>About the end of May, 415 <small>B.C.</small>, in the -course of one and the same night, all these Hermæ, one of the most -peculiar marks of the city, were mutilated by unknown hands. Their -characteristic features were knocked off or levelled, so that nothing -was left except a mass of stone with no resemblance to humanity or -deity. All were thus dealt with in the same way, save and except -very few: nay, Andokidês affirms, and I incline to believe him, that -there was but <i>one</i> which escaped unharmed.<a id="FNanchor_244" -href="#Footnote_244" class="fnanchor">[244]</a></p> - -<p>It is of course impossible for any one to sympathize fully with -the feelings of a religion not his own: indeed, the sentiment -with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_168">[p. 168]</span> which, -in the case of persons of different creeds, each regards the -strong emotions growing out of causes peculiar to the other, is -usually one of surprise that such trifles and absurdities can -occasion any serious distress or excitement.<a id="FNanchor_245" -href="#Footnote_245" class="fnanchor">[245]</a> But if we take -that reasonable pains, which is incumbent on those who study the -history of Greece, to realize in our minds the religious and -political associations of the Athenians,<a id="FNanchor_246" -href="#Footnote_246" class="fnanchor">[246]</a> noted in ancient -times for their superior piety, as well as for their accuracy and -magnificence about the visible monuments embodying that feeling,—we -shall in part comprehend the intensity of mingled dismay, terror, -and wrath, which beset the public mind on the morning after this -nocturnal sacrilege, alike unforeseen and unparalleled. Amidst all -the ruin and impoverishment which had been inflicted by the Persian -invasion of Attica, there was nothing which was so profoundly felt -or so long remembered as the deliberate burning of the statues -and temples of the gods.<a id="FNanchor_247" href="#Footnote_247" -class="fnanchor">[247]</a> If we could imagine<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_169">[p. 169]</span> the excitement of a Spanish or Italian -town, on finding that all the images of the Virgin had been defaced -during the same night, we should have a parallel, though a very -inadequate parallel, to what was now felt at Athens, where religious -associations and persons were far more intimately allied with all -civil acts and with all the proceedings of every-day life; where, -too, the god and his efficiency were more forcibly localized, as well -as identified with the presence and keeping of the statue. To the -Athenians, when they went forth on the following morning, each man -seeing the divine guardian at his doorway dishonored and defaced, and -each man gradually coming to know that the devastation was general, -it would seem that the town had become as it were godless; that the -streets, the market-place, the porticos, were robbed of their divine -protectors; and what was worse still, that these protectors, having -been grossly insulted, carried away with them alienated sentiments, -wrathful and vindictive instead of tutelary and sympathizing. It was -on the protection of the gods, that all their political constitution -as well as the blessings of civil life depended; insomuch that the -curses of the gods were habitually invoked as sanction and punishment -for grave offences, political as well as others:<a id="FNanchor_248" -href="#Footnote_248" class="fnanchor">[248]</a> an extension and -generalization of the feeling still attached to the judicial oath. -This was, in the minds of the people of Athens, a sincere and literal -conviction, not simply a form of speech to be pronounced in prayers -and public harangues, without being ever construed as a reality in -calculating consequences and determining practical measures.<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_170">[p. 170]</span> Accordingly, they drew -from the mutilation of the Hermæ the inference, not less natural -than terrifying, that heavy public misfortune was impending over the -city, and that the political constitution to which they were attached -was in imminent danger of being subverted.<a id="FNanchor_249" -href="#Footnote_249" class="fnanchor">[249]</a></p> - -<p>Such was the mysterious incident which broke in upon the eager -and bustling movement of Athens, a few days before the Sicilian -expedition was in condition for starting. In reference to that -expedition it was taken to heart as a most depressing omen.<a -id="FNanchor_250" href="#Footnote_250" class="fnanchor">[250]</a> -It would doubtless have been so determined, had it been a mere -undesigned accident happening to any venerated religious object, -just as we are told that similar misgivings were occasioned by -the occurrence, about this same time, of the melancholy festival -of the Adonia, wherein the women loudly bewailed the untimely -death of Adonis.<a id="FNanchor_251" href="#Footnote_251" -class="fnanchor">[251]</a> The mutilation of the Hermæ, however, was -something much more ominous than the worst accident. It proclaimed -itself as the deliberate act of organized conspirators, not -inconsiderable in number, whose names and final purpose were<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_171">[p. 171]</span> indeed unknown, but who -had begun by committing sacrilege of a character flagrant and unheard -of. For intentional mutilation of a public and sacred statue, where -the material afforded no temptation to plunder, is a case to which we -know no parallel: much more mutilation by wholesale, spread by one -band and in one night throughout an entire city. Though neither the -parties concerned, nor their purposes, were ever more than partially -made out, the concert and conspiracy itself is unquestionable.</p> - -<p>It seems probable, as far as we can form an opinion, that the -conspirators had two objects, perhaps some of them one and some the -other: to ruin Alkibiadês, to frustrate or delay the expedition. How -they pursued the former purpose, will be presently seen: towards the -latter, nothing was ostensibly done, but the position of Teukrus, -and other metics implicated, renders it more likely that they were -influenced by sympathies with Corinth and Megara,<a id="FNanchor_252" -href="#Footnote_252" class="fnanchor">[252]</a> prompting them -to intercept an expedition which was supposed to promise great -triumphs to Athens, rather than corrupted by the violent antipathies -of intestine politics. Indeed, the two objects were intimately -connected with each other; for the prosecution of the enterprise, -while full of prospective conquest to Athens, was yet more pregnant -with future power and wealth to Alkibiadês himself. Such chances -would disappear if the expedition could be prevented; nor was it at -all impossible that the Athenians, under the intense impression of -religious terror consequent on the mutilation of the Hermæ, might -throw up the scheme altogether. Especially Nikias, exquisitely -sensitive in his own<span class="pagenum" id="Page_172">[p. -172]</span> religious conscience, and never hearty in his wish for -going, a fact perfectly known to the enemy,<a id="FNanchor_253" -href="#Footnote_253" class="fnanchor">[253]</a> would hasten to -consult his prophets, and might reasonably be expected to renew his -opposition on the fresh ground offered to him, or at least to claim -delay until the offended gods should have been appeased. We may judge -how much such a proceeding was in the line of his character, and -of the Athenian character, when we find him, two years afterwards, -with the full concurrence of his soldiers, actually sacrificing the -last opportunity of safe retreat for the half-ruined Athenian army -in Sicily, and refusing even to allow the proposition to be debated, -in consequence of an eclipse of the moon; and when we reflect that -Spartans and other Greeks frequently renounced public designs if -an earthquake happened before the execution.<a id="FNanchor_254" -href="#Footnote_254" class="fnanchor">[254]</a></p> - -<p>But though the chance of setting aside the expedition altogether -might reasonably enter into the plans of the conspirators, as a -likely consequence of the intense shock inflicted on the religious -mind of Athens, and especially of Nikias, this calculation was not -realized. Probably matters had already proceeded too far even for -Nikias to recede. Notice had been sent round to all the allies; -forces were already on their way to the rendezvous at Korkyra; the -Argeian and Mantineian allies were arriving at Peiræus to embark. -So much the more eagerly did the conspirators proceed in the other -part of their plan, to work that exaggerated religious terror, which -they had themselves artificially brought about, for the ruin of -Alkibiadês.</p> - -<p>Few men in Athens either had or deserved to have a greater number -of enemies, political as well as private, than Alkibiades; many -of them being among the highest citizens, whom he offended by his -insolence, and whose liturgies and other customary exhibitions he -outshone by his reckless expenditure. His importance had been already -so much increased, and threatened to be so much more increased, by -the Sicilian enterprise, that they no longer observed any measures in -compassing his ruin. That which the mutilators of the Hermæ seem to -have deliberately planned, his other enemies were ready to turn to -profit.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_173">[p. 173]</span></p> - -<p>Amidst the mournful dismay spread by the discovery of so -unparalleled a sacrilege, it appeared to the Athenian people,—as -it would have appeared to the ephors at Sparta, or to the rulers -in every oligarchical city of Greece,—that it was their paramount -and imperative duty to detect and punish the authors. So long as -these latter were walking about unknown and unpunished, the temples -were defiled by their presence, and the whole city was accounted -under the displeasure of the gods, who would inflict upon it heavy -public misfortunes.<a id="FNanchor_255" href="#Footnote_255" -class="fnanchor">[255]</a> Under this displeasure every citizen felt -himself comprehended, so that the sense of public security as well -as of private comfort were alike unappeased, until the offenders -should be discovered and atonement made by punishing or expelling -them. Large rewards were accordingly proclaimed to any person who -could give information, and even impunity to any accomplice whose -confession might lay open the plot. Nor did the matter stop here. -Once under this painful shock of religious and political terror, -the Athenians became eager talkers and listeners on the subject of -other recent acts of impiety. Every one was impatient to tell all -that he knew, and more than he knew, about such incidents; while -to exercise any strict criticism upon the truth of such reports, -would argue weakness of faith and want of religious zeal, rendering -the critic himself a suspected man, “metuunt dubitasse videri.” -To<span class="pagenum" id="Page_174">[p. 174]</span> rake out -and rigorously visit all such offenders, and thus to display an -earnest zeal for the honor of the gods, was accounted one auxiliary -means of obtaining absolution from them for the recent outrage. -Hence an additional public vote was passed, promising rewards and -inviting information from all witnesses,—citizens, metics, or even -slaves,—respecting any previous acts of impiety which might have come -within their cognizance,<a id="FNanchor_256" href="#Footnote_256" -class="fnanchor">[256]</a> but at the same time providing that -informers who gave false depositions should be punished capitally.<a -id="FNanchor_257" href="#Footnote_257" class="fnanchor">[257]</a></p> - -<p>The Senate of Five Hundred were invested with full powers of -action; while Diognêtus, Peisander, Chariklês, and others, were -named commissioners for receiving and prosecuting inquiries, and -public assemblies were held nearly every day to receive reports.<a -id="FNanchor_258" href="#Footnote_258" class="fnanchor">[258]</a> The -first informations received, however, did not relate to the grave -and recent mutilation of the Hermæ, but to analogous incidents of -older date; to certain defacements of other statues, accomplished in -drunken frolic; and above all, to ludicrous ceremonies celebrated -in various houses,<a id="FNanchor_259" href="#Footnote_259" -class="fnanchor">[259]</a> by parties of revellers<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_175">[p. 175]</span> caricaturing and -divulging the Eleusinian mysteries. It was under this latter head -that the first impeachment was preferred against Alkibiadês.</p> - -<p>So fully were the preparations of the armament now complete, -that the trireme of Lamachus—who was doubtless more diligent about -the military details than either of his two colleagues—was already -moored in the outer harbor, and the last public assembly was held -for the departing officers,<a id="FNanchor_260" href="#Footnote_260" -class="fnanchor">[260]</a> who probably laid before their countrymen -an imposing account of the force assembled, when Pythonikus rose to -impeach Alkibiadês. “Athenians,” said he, “you are going to despatch -this great force and incur all this hazard, at a moment when I am -pre<span class="pagenum" id="Page_176">[p. 176]</span>pared to show -you that your general Alkibiadês is one of the profaners of the -holy mysteries, in a private house. Pass a vote of impunity, and -I will produce to you forthwith a slave of one here present, who, -though himself not initiated in the mysteries, shall repeat to you -what they are. Deal with me in any way you choose, if my statement -prove untrue.” While Alkibiadês strenuously denied the allegation, -the prytanes—senators presiding over the assembly, according to -the order determined by lot for that year among the ten tribes—at -once made proclamation for all uninitiated citizens to depart from -the assembly, and went to fetch the slave—Andromachus by name—whom -Pythonikus had indicated. On being introduced, Andromachus deposed -before the assembly that he had been with his master in the house of -Polytion, when Alkibiadês, Nikiadês, and Melêtus, went through the -sham celebration of the mysteries; many other persons being present, -and especially three other slaves besides himself. We must presume -that he verified this affirmation by describing what the mysteries -were which he had seen, the test which Pythonikus had offered.<a -id="FNanchor_261" href="#Footnote_261" class="fnanchor">[261]</a></p> - -<p>Such was the first direct attack made upon Alkibiadês by his -enemies. Pythonikus, the demagogue Androklês, and other speakers, -having put in evidence this irreverent proceeding,—probably in -substance true,—enlarged upon it with the strongest invective, -imputed to him many other acts of the like character, and even -denounced him as cognizant of the recent mutilation of the Hermæ. -All had been done, they said, with a view to accomplish his -purpose of subverting the democracy, when bereft of its divine -protectors; a purpose manifested by the constant tenor of his -lawless, overbearing, antipopular demeanor. Infamous as this calumny -was, so far as regarded the mutilation of the Hermæ,—for whatever -else Alkibiadês may have done, of that act he was unquestionably -innocent, being the very person who had most to lose by it, and whom -it ultimately ruined,—they calculated upon the reigning excitement -to get it accredited, and probably to procure his deposition from -the command, preparatory to public trial. But in spite of all the -disquietude arising from the recent sacrilege, their expectations -were de<span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">[p. 177]</span>feated. -The strenuous denial of Alkibiadês, aided by his very peculiar -position as commander of the armament, as well as by the reflection -that the recent outrage tended rather to spoil his favorite projects -in Sicily, found general credence. The citizens enrolled to serve, -manifested strong disposition to stand by him; the allies from Argos -and Mantineia were known to have embraced the service chiefly at -his instigation; the people generally had become familiar with him -as the intended conqueror in Sicily, and were loth to be balked of -this project. From all these circumstances, his enemies, finding -little disposition to welcome the accusations which they preferred, -were compelled to postpone them until a more suitable time.<a -id="FNanchor_262" href="#Footnote_262" class="fnanchor">[262]</a></p> - -<p>But Alkibiadês saw full well the danger of having such charges -hanging over his head, and the peculiar advantage which he derived -from his accidental position at the moment. He implored the people -to investigate the charges at once; proclaiming his anxiety to -stand trial and even to suffer death, if found guilty,—accepting -the command only in case he should be acquitted,—and insisting -above all things on the mischief to the city, of sending him on -such an expedition with the charge undecided, as well as on the -hardship to himself, of being aspersed by calumny during his absence, -without power of defence. Such appeals, just and reasonable in -themselves, and urged with all the vehemence of a man who felt that -the question was one of life or death to his future prospects, were -very near prevailing. His enemies could only defeat them by the -trick of putting up fresh speakers, less notorious for hostility to -Alkibiadês. These men affected a tone of candor, deprecated the delay -which would be occasioned in the departure of the expedition, if he -were put upon his trial forthwith, and proposed deferring the trial -until a certain number of days after his return.<a id="FNanchor_263" -href="#Footnote_263" class="fnanchor">[263]</a> Such was the -determi<span class="pagenum" id="Page_178">[p. 178]</span>nation -ultimately adopted; the supporters of Alkibiadês probably not fully -appreciating its consequences, and conceiving that the speedy -departure of the expedition was advisable even for his interest, -as well as agreeable to their own feelings. And thus his enemies, -though baffled in their first attempt to bring on his immediate ruin, -carried a postponement which insured to them leisure for thoroughly -poisoning the public mind against him, and choosing their own time -for his trial. They took care to keep back all farther accusation -until he and the armament had departed.<a id="FNanchor_264" -href="#Footnote_264" class="fnanchor">[264]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_179">[p. 179]</span></p> - -<p>The spectacle of its departure was indeed so imposing, and the -moment so full of anxious interest, that it banished even the -recollection of the recent sacrilege. The entire armament was not -mustered at Athens; for it had been judged expedient to order most -of the allied contingents to rendezvous at once at Korkyra. But -the Athenian force alone was astounding to behold. There were one -hundred triremes, sixty of which were in full trim for rapid nautical -movement, while the remaining forty were employed as transports for -the soldiers. There were fifteen hundred select citizen hoplites, -chosen from the general muster-roll, and seven hundred Thêtes, or -citizens too poor to be included in the muster-roll, who served as -hoplites on shipboard,—epibatæ, or marines,—each with a panoply -furnished by the state. To these must be added, five hundred -Argeian and two hundred and fifty Mantineian hoplites, paid by -Athens and transported on board Athenian ships.<a id="FNanchor_265" -href="#Footnote_265" class="fnanchor">[265]</a> The number of -horsemen was so small, that all were conveyed in a single horse -transport. But the condition, the equipment, the pomp both of wealth -and force, visible in the armament, was still more impressive than -the number. At daybreak on the day appointed, when all the ships were -ready in Peiræus, for departure, the military force was marched down -in a body from the city and embarked. They were accompanied by nearly -the whole population, metics and foreigners as well as citizens, -so that the appearance was that of a collective emigration, like -the flight to Salamis sixty-five years before. While the crowd of -foreigners, brought thither by curiosity, were amazed by the grandeur -of the spectacle, the citizens accompanying were moved by deeper -and more stirring anxieties. Their sons, brothers, relatives, and -friends, were just starting on the longest and largest enterprise -which Athens had ever undertaken; against an island extensive as -well as powerful, known to none of them accurately, and into a -sea of undefined possibilities; glory and profit on the one side, -but hazards of unassignable magnitude on the other. At this final -parting, ideas of doubt and danger became far more painfully present -than they had been in any of the preliminary<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_180">[p. 180]</span> discussions; and in spite of all -the reassuring effect of the unrivalled armament before them, the -relatives now separating at the water’s edge could not banish the -dark presentiment that they were bidding each other farewell for the -last time.</p> - -<p>The moment immediately succeeding this farewell—when all the -soldiers were already on board, and the keleustês was on the point -of beginning his chant to put the rowers in motion—was peculiarly -solemn and touching. Silence having been enjoined and obtained by -sound of trumpet, both the crews in every ship and the spectators -on shore followed the voice of the herald in praying to the gods -for success, and in singing the pæan. On every deck were seen bowls -of wine prepared, out of which the officers and the epibatæ made -libations, with goblets of silver and gold. At length the final -signal was given, and the whole fleet quitted Peiræus in single -file, displaying the exuberance of their yet untried force by a race -of speed as far as Ægina.<a id="FNanchor_266" href="#Footnote_266" -class="fnanchor">[266]</a> Never in Grecian history was an invocation -more unanimous, emphatic, and imposing, addressed to the gods; never -was the refusing nod of Zeus more stern or peremptory. All these -details, given by Thucydidês, of the triumphant promise which now -issued from Peiræus, derive a painful interest from their contrast -with the sad issue which will hereafter be unfolded.</p> - -<p>The fleet made straight for Korkyra, where the contingents of the -maritime allies, with the ships for burden and provisions, were found -assembled. The armament thus complete was passed in review, and found -to comprise one hundred and thirty-four triremes with two Rhodian -pentekonters; five thousand one hundred hoplites; four hundred and -eighty bowmen, eighty of them Kretan; seven hundred Rhodian slingers; -and one hundred and twenty Megarian exiles serving as light troops. -Of vessels of burden, in attendance with provisions, muniments -of war, bakers, masons, and carpenters, etc., the number was not -less than five hundred; besides which, there was a considerable -number of private trading-ships, following it voluntarily for -purposes of profit.<a id="FNanchor_267" href="#Footnote_267" -class="fnanchor">[267]</a> Three fast-sailing triremes were -despatched in advance to ascertain which of the cities in Italy and -Sicily would welcome the arrival of the armament; and especially -to give notice at Egesta,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_181">[p. -181]</span> that the succor solicited was now on its way, requiring -at the same time that the money promised by the Egestæans should be -produced. Having then distributed by lot the armament into three -divisions, one under each of the generals, Nikias, Alkibiadês, and -Lamachus, they crossed the Ionic gulf from Korkyra to the Iapygian -promontory.</p> - -<p>In their progress southward along the coast of Italy to Rhegium, -they met with a very cold reception from the various Grecian -cities. None would receive them within their walls or even sell -them provisions without. The utmost which they would grant was, the -liberty of taking moorings and of watering; and even thus much was -denied to them both at Tarentum and at the Epizephyrian Lokri. At -Rhegium, immediately on the Sicilian strait, though the town-gate -was still kept shut, they were so far more hospitably treated, that -a market of provisions was furnished to them, and they were allowed -to encamp in the sacred precinct of Artemis, not far from the walls. -They here hauled their ships ashore and took repose until the return -of the three scout-ships from Egesta; while the generals entered into -negotiation with the magistrates and people of Rhegium, endeavoring -to induce them to aid the armament in reëstablishing the dispossessed -Leontines, who were of common Chalkidian origin with themselves. But -the answer returned was discouraging. The Rhegines would promise -nothing more than neutrality, and coöperation in any course of policy -which it might suit the other Italian Greeks to adopt. Probably they, -as well as the other Italian Greeks, were astonished and intimidated -by the magnitude of the newly-arrived force, and desired to leave -themselves open latitude of conduct for the future, not without -mistrust of Athens and her affected forwardness for the restoration -of the Leontines. To the Athenian generals, however, such a negative -from Rhegium was an unwelcome disappointment; for that city had -been the ally of Athens in the last war, and they had calculated -on the operation of Chalkidic sympathies.<a id="FNanchor_268" -href="#Footnote_268" class="fnanchor">[268]</a></p> - -<p>It was not until after the muster of the Athenians at Korkyra, -about July 415 <small>B.C.</small>, that the Syracusans -became thoroughly convinced both of their approach, and of the extent -of their designs<span class="pagenum" id="Page_182">[p. 182]</span> -against Sicily. Intimation had indeed reached Syracuse, from several -quarters, of the resolution taken by the Athenians in the preceding -March to assist Egesta and Leontini, and of the preparations going -on in consequence. There was, however, a prevailing indisposition -to credit such tidings. Nothing in the state of Sicily held out any -encouragement to Athenian ambition: the Leontines could give no aid, -the Egestæans very little, and that little at the opposite corner of -the island; while the Syracusans considered themselves fully able to -cope with any force which Athens was likely to send. Some derided the -intelligence as mere idle rumor; others anticipated, at most, nothing -more serious than the expedition sent from Athens ten years before.<a -id="FNanchor_269" href="#Footnote_269" class="fnanchor">[269]</a> -No one could imagine the new eagerness and obstinacy with which she -had just thrown herself into the scheme of Sicilian conquest, nor -the formidable armament presently about to start. Nevertheless, the -Syracusan generals thought it their duty to make preparations, and -strengthen the military condition of the state.<a id="FNanchor_270" -href="#Footnote_270" class="fnanchor">[270]</a></p> - -<p>Hermokratês, however, whose information was more complete, judged -these preparations insufficient, and took advantage of a public -assembly—held seemingly about the time that the Athenians were -starting from Peiræus—to impress such conviction on his countrymen, -as well as to correct their incredulity. He pledged his own credit -that the reports which had been circulated were not merely true, but -even less than the full truth; that the Athenians were actually on -their way, with an armament on the largest scale, and vast designs -of conquering all Sicily. While he strenuously urged that the city -should be put in immediate<span class="pagenum" id="Page_183">[p. -183]</span> condition for repelling a most formidable invasion, he -deprecated all alarm as to the result, and held out the firmest -assurances of ultimate triumph. The very magnitude of the approaching -force would intimidate the Sicilian cities and drive them into hearty -defensive coöperation with Syracuse. Rarely indeed did any large -or distant expedition ever succeed in its object, as might be seen -from the failure of the Persians against Greece, by which failure -Athens herself had so largely profited. Preparations, however, both -effective and immediate, were indispensable; not merely at home, but -by means of foreign missions, to the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, -to the Sikels, and to the Carthaginians, who had for some time been -suspicious of the unmeasured aggressive designs of Athens, and whose -immense wealth would now be especially serviceable, and to Lacedæmon -and Corinth, for the purpose of soliciting aid in Sicily, as well as -renewed invasion of Attica. So confident did he (Hermokratês) feel -of their powers of defence, if properly organized, that he would -even advise the Syracusans with their Sicilian<a id="FNanchor_271" -href="#Footnote_271" class="fnanchor">[271]</a> allies to put to sea -at once, with all their naval force and two months’ provisions, and -to sail forthwith to the friendly harbor of Tarentum, from whence -they would be able to meet the Athenian fleet and prevent it even -from crossing the Ionic gulf from Korkyra. They would thus show -that they were not only determined on defence, but even forward in -coming to blows: the only way of taking down the presumption of the -Athenians, who now speculated upon Syracusan lukewarmness, because -they had rendered no aid to Sparta when she solicited it at the -beginning of the war. The Syracusans would probably be able to<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_184">[p. 184]</span> deter or obstruct -the advance of the expedition until winter approached: in which -case Nikias, the ablest of the three generals, who was understood -to have undertaken the scheme against his own consent, would -probably avail himself of the pretext to return.<a id="FNanchor_272" -href="#Footnote_272" class="fnanchor">[272]</a></p> - -<p>Though these opinions of Hermokratês were espoused farther by -various other citizens in the assembly, the greater number of -speakers held an opposite language, and placed little faith in his -warnings. We have already noticed Hermokratês nine years before as -envoy of Syracuse and chief adviser at the congress of Gela,—then, -as now, watchful to bar the door against Athenian interference in -Sicily,—then, as now, belonging to the oligarchical party, and of -sentiments hostile to the existing democratical constitution; but -brave as well as intelligent in foreign affairs. A warm and even -angry debate arose upon his present speech.<a id="FNanchor_273" -href="#Footnote_273" class="fnanchor">[273]</a> Though there was -nothing, in the words of Hermokratês himself, disparaging either -to the democracy or to the existing magistrates, yet it would -seem that his partisans who spoke after him must have taken up a -more criminative tone, and must have exaggerated that which he -characterized as the “habitual quiescence” of the Syracusans, -into contemptible remissness and disorganization under those -administrators and generals, characterized as worthless, whom the -democracy preferred. Amidst the speakers, who, in replying to -Hermokratês and the others, indignantly repelled such insinuations -and retorted upon their authors, a citizen named Athenagoras -was the most distinguished. He was at this time the leading -democratical politician, and the most popular orator, in Syracuse.<a -id="FNanchor_274" href="#Footnote_274" class="fnanchor">[274]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_185">[p. 185]</span></p> - -<p>“Every one<a id="FNanchor_275" href="#Footnote_275" -class="fnanchor">[275]</a> (said he), except only cowards and bad -citizens, must wish that the Athenians <i>would</i> be fools enough to -come here and put themselves into our power. The tales which you -have just heard are nothing better than fabrications, got up to -alarm you; and I wonder at the folly of these alarmists in fancying -that their machinations are not seen through.<a id="FNanchor_276" -href="#Footnote_276" class="fnanchor">[276]</a> You will be too -wise to take measure of the future from their reports: you will -rather judge from what able men, such as the Athenians, are likely -to do. Be assured that they will never leave behind them the -Peloponnesians in menacing attitude, to come hither and court a fresh -war not less formidable: indeed, I think they account themselves -lucky that we, with our powerful cities, have never come across to -attack them. And if they <i>should</i> come, as it is pretended, they -will find Sicily a more formidable foe than Peloponnesus: nay, our -own city alone will be a match for twice the force which they can -bring across. The Athenians, knowing all this well enough, will -mind their own business, in spite of all the fictions which men -on this side of the water conjure up, and which they have already -tried often before, sometimes even worse than on the present -occasion, in order to terrify you, and get themselves nominated -to the chief posts.<a id="FNanchor_277" href="#Footnote_277" -class="fnanchor">[277]</a> One of these days, I fear they may even -succeed, from our want of precautions before<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_186">[p. 186]</span>hand. Such intrigues leave but short -moments of tranquillity to our city; they condemn it to an intestine -discord worse than foreign war, and have sometimes betrayed it -even to despots and usurpers. However, if you will listen to me, I -will try and prevent anything of this sort at present; by simple -persuasion to you, by chastisement to these conspirators, and by -watchful denunciation of the oligarchical party generally. Let -me ask, indeed, what is it that you younger nobles covet? To get -into command at your early age? The law forbids you, because you -are yet incompetent. Or, do you wish not to be under equal laws -with the many? But how can you pretend that citizens of the same -city should not have the same rights? Some one will tell me<a -id="FNanchor_278" href="#Footnote_278" class="fnanchor">[278]</a> -that democracy is neither intelligent nor just, and that the<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_187">[p. 187]</span> rich are the persons -best fitted to command. But I affirm, first, that the people are -the sum total, and the oligarchy merely a fraction; next, that rich -men are the best trustees of the aggregate wealth existing in the -community,—intelligent men, the best counsellors,—and the multitude, -the best qualified for hearing and deciding after such advice. In a -democracy, these functions, one and all, find their proper place. -But oligarchy, though imposing on the multitude a full participation -in all hazards, is not content even with an exorbitant share in the -public advantages, but grasps and monopolizes the whole for itself.<a -id="FNanchor_279" href="#Footnote_279" class="fnanchor">[279]</a> -This is just what you young and powerful men are aiming at, though -you will never be able to keep it permanently in a city such as -Syracuse. Be taught by me, or at least alter your views, and devote -yourselves to the public advantage of our common city. Desist from -practising, by reports such as these, upon the belief of men who know -you too well to be duped. If even there be any truth in what you say, -and if the Athenians <i>do</i> come, our city will repel them in a manner -worthy of her reputation. She will not take you at your word, and -choose <i>you</i> commanders, in order to put the yoke upon her own neck. -She will look for herself, construe your communications for what they -really mean, and, instead of suffering you to talk her out of her -free government, will take effective precautions for maintaining it -against you.”</p> - -<p>Immediately after this vehement speech from Athenagoras, one of -the stratêgi who presided in the assembly interposed; permitting -no one else to speak, and abruptly closing the assembly, with -these few words: “We generals deprecate this interchange of -personal vituperation, and trust that the hearers present will not -suffer themselves to be biased by it. Let us rather take care, in -reference to the reports just communicated,<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_188">[p. 188]</span> that we be one and all in a condition -to repel the invader. And even should the necessity not arise, there -is no harm in strengthening our public force with horses, arms, and -the other muniments of war. <i>We</i> generals shall take upon ourselves -the care and supervision of these matters, as well as of the missions -to neighboring cities, for procuring information and for other -objects. We have, indeed, already busied ourselves for the purpose, -and we shall keep you informed of what we learn.”</p> - -<p>The language of Athenagoras, indicating much virulence of party -feeling, lets us somewhat into the real working of politics among -the Syracusan democracy. Athenagoras at Syracuse was like Kleon -at Athens, the popular orator of the city. But he was by no means -the most influential person, nor had he the principal direction of -public affairs. Executive and magisterial functions belonged chiefly -to Hermokratês and his partisans, the opponents of Athenagoras. -Hermokratês has already appeared as taking the lead at the congress -of Gela nine years before, and will be seen throughout the coming -period almost constantly in the same position; while the political -rank of Athenagoras is more analogous to that which we should call a -leader of opposition, a function of course suspended under pressing -danger, so that we hear of him no more. At Athens as at Syracuse, -the men who got to real power and handled the force and treasures of -the state, were chiefly of the rich families, often of oligarchical -sentiments, acquiescing in the democracy as an uncomfortable -necessity, and continually open to be solicited by friends or kinsmen -to conspire against it. Their proceedings were doubtless always -liable to the scrutiny, and their persons to the animadversion, of -the public assembly: hence arose the influence of the demagogue, -such as Athenagoras and Kleon, the bad side of whose character is so -constantly kept before the readers of Grecian history. By whatever -disparaging epithets such character may be surrounded, it is in -reality the distinguishing feature of a free government under all -its forms, whether constitutional monarchy or democracy. By the side -of the real political actors, who hold principal office and wield -personal powers, there are always abundant censors and critics,—some -better, others worse, in respect of honesty, candor, wisdom, or -rhetoric,—the most distinguished of whom acquires considerable -importance, though<span class="pagenum" id="Page_189">[p. -189]</span> holding a function essentially inferior to that of the -authorized magistrate or general.</p> - -<p>We observe here, that Athenagoras, far from being inclined to push -the city into war, is averse to it, even beyond reasonable limit; -and denounces it as the interested policy of the oligarchical party. -This may show how little it was any constant interest or policy on -the part of the persons called demagogues, to involve their city -in unnecessary wars: a charge which has been frequently advanced -against them, because it so happens that Kleon, in the first half -of the Peloponnesian war, discountenanced the propositions of peace -between Athens and Sparta. We see by the harangue of Athenagoras -that the oligarchical party were the usual promoters of war: a fact -which we should naturally expect, seeing that the rich and great, in -most communities, have accounted the pursuit of military glory more -conformable to their dignity than any other career. At Syracuse, the -ascendency of Hermokratês was much increased by the invasion of the -Athenians, while Athenagoras does not again appear. The latter was -egregiously mistaken in his anticipations respecting the conduct of -Athens, though right in his judgment respecting her true political -interest. But it is very unsafe to assume that nations will always -pursue their true political interest, where present temptations -of ambition or vanity intervene. Positive information was in this -instance a surer guide than speculations <i>à priori</i> founded upon -the probable policy of Athens. But that the imputations advanced by -Athenagoras against the oligarchical youth, of promoting military -organization with a view to their own separate interest, were not -visionary, may be seen by the analogous case of Argos, two or -three years before. The democracy of Argos, contemplating a more -warlike and aggressive policy, had been persuaded to organize and -train the select regiment of one thousand hoplites, chosen from the -oligarchical youth: within three years, this regiment subverted the -democratical constitution.<a id="FNanchor_280" href="#Footnote_280" -class="fnanchor">[280]</a> Now the persons, respecting whose designs -Athenagoras expresses so much apprehension, were exactly the class at -Syracuse corresponding to the select thousand at Argos.</p> <p><span -class="pagenum" id="Page_190">[p. 190]</span></p> <p>The political -views, proclaimed in this remarkable speech, are deserving of -attention, though we cannot fully understand it without having before -us those speeches to which it replies. Not only is democratical -constitution forcibly contrasted with oligarchy, but the separate -places which it assigns to wealth, intelligence, and multitude, are -laid down with a distinctness not unworthy of Aristotle.</p> - -<p>Even before the debate here adverted to, the Syracusan generals -had evidently acted upon views more nearly approaching to those -of Hermokratês than to those of Athenagoras. Already alive to the -danger, they were apprized by their scouts when the Athenian armament -was passing from Korkyra to Rhegium, and pushed their preparations -with the utmost activity, distributing garrisons and sending -envoys among their Sikel dependencies, while the force within the -city was mustered and placed under all the conditions of war.<a -id="FNanchor_281" href="#Footnote_281" class="fnanchor">[281]</a> The -halt of the Athenians at Rhegium afforded increased leisure for such -equipment. That halt was prolonged for more than one reason. In the -first place, Nikias and his colleagues wished to negotiate with the -Rhegines, as well as to haul ashore and clean their ships: next, they -awaited the return of the three scout-ships from Egesta: lastly, they -had as yet formed no plan of action in Sicily.</p> - -<p>The ships from Egesta returned with disheartening news. Instead -of the abundant wealth which had been held forth as existing in that -town, and upon which the resolutions of the Athenians as to Sicilian -operations had been mainly grounded, it turned out that no more than -thirty talents in all could be produced. What was yet worse, the -elaborate fraud, whereby the Egestæans had duped the commissioners -on their first visit, was now exposed; and these commissioners, on -returning to Rhegium from their second visit, were condemned to the -mortification of proclaiming their own credulity, visited by severe -taunts and reproaches from the army. Disappointed in the source from -whence they had calculated on obtaining money,—for it appears that -both Alkibiadês and Lamachus had sincerely relied on the pecuniary -resources of Egesta, though Nikias was always mistrustful,—the -generals now discussed their plan of action.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_191">[p. 191]</span></p> - -<p>Nikias—availing himself of the fraudulent conduct on the part -of the Egestæan allies, now become palpable—wished to circumscribe -his range of operations within the rigorous letter of the vote -which the Athenian assembly had passed. He proposed to sail at once -against Selinus; then, formally to require the Egestæans to provide -the means of maintaining the armament, or, at least, of maintaining -those sixty triremes which they themselves had solicited. Since this -requisition would not be realized, he would only tarry long enough to -obtain from the Selinuntines some tolerable terms of accommodation -with Egesta, and then return home; exhibiting, as they sailed along, -to all the maritime cities, this great display of Athenian naval -force. And while he would be ready to profit by any opportunity which -accident might present for serving the Leontines or establishing -new alliances, he strongly deprecated any prolonged stay in the -island for speculative enterprises, all at the cost of Athens.<a -id="FNanchor_282" href="#Footnote_282" class="fnanchor">[282]</a></p> - -<p>Against this scheme Alkibiadês protested, as narrow, timid, -and disgraceful to the prodigious force with which they had been -intrusted. He proposed to begin by opening negotiations with all -the other Sicilian Greeks,—especially Messênê, convenient both as -harbor for their fleet and as base of their military operations,—to -prevail upon them to coöperate against Syracuse and Selinus. With -the same view, he recommended establishing relations with the -Sikels of the interior, in order to detach such of them as were -subjects of Syracuse, as well as to insure supplies of provisions. -As soon as it had been thus ascertained what extent of foreign aid -might be looked for, he would open direct attack forthwith against -Syracuse and Selinus; unless, indeed, the former should consent to -reëstablish Leontini, and the latter to come to terms with Egesta.<a -id="FNanchor_283" href="#Footnote_283" class="fnanchor">[283]</a></p> - -<p>Lamachus, delivering his opinion last, dissented from both his -colleagues. He advised, that they should proceed at once, without -any delay, to attack Syracuse, and fight their battle under its -walls. The Syracusans, he urged, were now in terror and only -half-prepared for defence. Many of their citizens, and much<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_192">[p. 192]</span> property, would -be found still lingering throughout the neighboring lands, not -yet removed within the walls, and might thus be seized for the -subsistence of their army;<a id="FNanchor_284" href="#Footnote_284" -class="fnanchor">[284]</a> while the deserted town and harbor -of Megara, very near to Syracuse both by land and by sea, might -be occupied by the fleet as a naval station. The imposing and -intimidating effect of the armament, not less than its real -efficiency, was now at the maximum, immediately after its arrival. -If advantage were taken of this first impression to strike an -instant blow at their principal enemy, the Syracusans would be -found destitute of the courage, not less than of the means, to -resist: but the longer such attack was delayed, the more this first -impression of dismay would be effaced, giving place to a reactionary -sentiment of indifference and even contempt, when the much-dreaded -armament was seen to accomplish little or nothing. As for the other -Sicilian cities, nothing would contribute so much to determine their -immediate adhesion, as successful operations against Syracuse.<a -id="FNanchor_285" href="#Footnote_285" class="fnanchor">[285]</a></p> - -<p>But Lamachus found no favor with either of the other two, and -being thus compelled to choose between the plans of Alkibiadês and -Nikias, gave his support to that of the former, which was the mean -term of the three. There can be no doubt—as far as it is becoming -to pronounce respecting that which never reached execution—that -the plan of Lamachus was far the best and most judicious; at first -sight, indeed, the most daring, but intrinsically the safest, -easiest, and speediest, that could be suggested. For undoubtedly the -siege and capture of Syracuse, was the one enterprise indispensable -towards the promotion of Athenian views in Sicily. The sooner that -was commenced, the more easily it would be accomplished: and its -difficulties were in many ways aggravated, in no way abated, by those -preliminary precautions upon which Alkibiadês insisted. Anything -like delay tended fearfully to impair the efficiency, real as well -as reputed, of an ancient aggressive armament, and to animate as -well as to strengthen those who stood on the defensive, a point -on which we shall find painful evidence presently. The advice of -Lamachus, alike soldier-like and far-sighted, would probably<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_193">[p. 193]</span> have been approved and -executed either by Brasidas or by Demosthenês; while the dilatory -policy still advocated by Alkibiadês, even after the suggestion of -Lamachus had been started, tends to show that if he was superior in -military energy to one of his colleagues, he was not less inferior to -the other. Indeed, when we find him talking of besieging Syracuse, -<i>unless</i> the Syracusans would consent to the reëstablishment of -Leontini, it seems probable that he had not yet made up his mind -peremptorily to besiege the city at all; a fact completely at -variance with those unbounded hopes of conquest which he is reported -as having conceived even at Athens. It is possible that he may have -thought it impolitic to contradict too abruptly the tendencies of -Nikias, who, anxious as he was chiefly to find some pretext for -carrying back his troops unharmed, might account the proposition -of Lamachus too desperate even to be discussed. Unfortunately, the -latter, though the ablest soldier of the three, was a poor man, of -no political position, and little influence among the hoplites. Had -he possessed, along with his own straightforward military energy, -the wealth and family ascendency of either of his colleagues, the -achievements as well as the fate of this splendid armament would have -been entirely altered, and the Athenians would have entered Syracuse -not as prisoners but as conquerors.</p> - -<p>Alkibiadês, as soon as his plan had become adopted by means of the -approval of Lamachus, sailed across the strait in his own trireme -from Rhegium to Messênê. Though admitted personally into the city, -and allowed to address the public assembly, he could not induce -them to conclude any alliance, or to admit the armament to anything -beyond a market of provisions without the walls. He accordingly -returned back to Rhegium, from whence he and one of his colleagues -immediately departed with sixty triremes for Naxos. The Naxians -cordially received the armament, which then steered southward along -the coast of Sicily to Katana. In the latter place the leading men -and the general sentiment were at this time favorable to Syracuse, -so that the Athenians, finding admittance refused, were compelled -to sail farther southward and take their night-station at the mouth -of the river Terias. On the ensuing day they made sail with their -ships in single column immediately in front of Syracuse itself,<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_194">[p. 194]</span> while an advanced -squadron of ten triremes were even despatched into the Great Harbor, -south of the town, for the purpose of surveying on this side the city -with its docks and fortifications, and for the farther purpose of -proclaiming from shipboard by the voice of the herald: “The Leontines -now in Syracuse are hereby invited to come forth without apprehension -and join their friends and benefactors, the Athenians.” After this -empty display, they returned back to Katana.<a id="FNanchor_286" -href="#Footnote_286" class="fnanchor">[286]</a></p> - -<p>We may remark that this proceeding was completely at variance with -the judicious recommendation of Lamachus. It tended to familiarize -the Syracusans with the sight of the armament piece-meal, without any -instant action, and thus to abate in their minds the terror-striking -impression of its first arrival.</p> - -<p>At Katana, Alkibiadês personally was admitted into the town, -and allowed to open his case before the public assembly, as he had -been at Messênê. Accident alone enabled him to carry his point, -for the general opinion was averse to his propositions. While most -of the citizens were in the assembly listening to his discourse, -some Athenian soldiers without, observing a postern-gate carelessly -guarded, broke it open and showed themselves in the market-place. -The town was thus in the power of the Athenians, so that the leading -men who were friends of Syracuse thought themselves lucky to -escape in safety, while the general assembly came to a resolution -accepting the alliance proposed by Alkibiadês.<a id="FNanchor_287" -href="#Footnote_287" class="fnanchor">[287]</a> The whole Athenian -armament was now conducted from Rhegium to Katana, which was -established as head-quarters. Intimation was farther received from -a party at Kamarina, that the city might be induced to join them, -if the armament showed itself: accordingly, the whole armament -proceeded thither, and took moorings off the shore, while a herald -was sent up to the city. But the Kamarinæans declined to admit the -army, and declared that they would abide by the existing treaty; -which bound them to receive at any time one single ship, but no more, -unless they themselves should ask for it. The Athenians were<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_195">[p. 195]</span> therefore obliged to -return to Katana. Passing by Syracuse both going and returning, -they ascertained the falsehood of a report that the Syracusans were -putting a naval force afloat; moreover, they landed near the city -and ravaged some of the neighboring lands. The Syracusan cavalry and -light troops soon appeared, and a skirmish with trifling loss ensued, -before the invaders retired to their ships,<a id="FNanchor_288" -href="#Footnote_288" class="fnanchor">[288]</a> the first blood shed -in this important struggle, and again at variance with the advice of -Lamachus.</p> - -<p>Serious news awaited them on their return to Katana. They found -the public ceremonial trireme, called the Salaminian, just arrived -from Athens, the bearer of a formal resolution of the assembly, -requiring Alkibiadês to come home and stand his trial for various -alleged matters of irreligion combined with treasonable purposes. -A few other citizens specified by name were commanded to come -along with him under the same charge; but the trierarch of the -Salaminian was especially directed to serve him only with the -summons, without any guard or coercion, so that he might return -home in his own trireme.<a id="FNanchor_289" href="#Footnote_289" -class="fnanchor">[289]</a></p> - -<p>This summons, pregnant with momentous results both to Athens -and to her enemies, arose out of the mutilation of the Hermæ, -described a few pages back, and the inquiries instituted into the -authorship of that deed, since the departure of the armament. The -extensive and anxious sympathies connected with so large a body of -departing citizens, combined with the solemnity of the scene itself, -had for the moment suspended the alarm caused by that sacrilege; -but it speedily revived, and the people could not rest without -finding out by whom the deed had been done. Considerable rewards, -one thousand and even ten thousand drachms, were proclaimed to -informers; of whom others soon appeared, in addition to the slave -Andromachus, before mentioned. A metic named Teukrus had fled from -Athens, immediately after the event, to Megara, from whence he sent -intimation to the senate at Athens that he had himself been a party -concerned in the recent sacrilege concerning the mysteries, as well -as cognizant of the mutilation of the Hermæ, and that, if impunity -were guaranteed to him, he would come back and give full<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_196">[p. 196]</span> information. A vote -of the senate was immediately passed to invite him. He denounced by -name eleven persons as having been concerned, jointly with himself, -in the mock-celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries, and eighteen -different persons, himself not being one, as the violators of the -Hermæ. A woman named Agaristê, daughter of Alkmæonidês,—these names -bespeak her great rank and family in the city,—deposed farther that -Alkibiadês, Axiochus, and Adeimantus, had gone through a parody -of the mysteries in a similar manner, in the house of Charmidês. -And lastly Lydus, slave of a citizen named Phereklês, stated that -the like scene had been enacted in the house of his master in the -deme Thêmakus, giving the names of the parties present, one of -whom—though asleep, and unconscious of what was passing—he stated -to be Leogoras, the father of Andokidês.<a id="FNanchor_290" -href="#Footnote_290" class="fnanchor">[290]</a> Of the parties named -in these different depositions, the greater number seem to have fled -from the city at once; but all who remained were put into prison -to stand future trial.<a id="FNanchor_291" href="#Footnote_291" -class="fnanchor">[291]</a> Those inform<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_197">[p. 197]</span>ers received the promised rewards, -after some debate as to the parties entitled to receive the reward; -for Pythonikus, the citizen who had produced the slave Andromachus, -pretended to the first claim, while Androkles, one of the senators, -contended that the senate collectively ought to receive<a -id="FNanchor_292" href="#Footnote_292" class="fnanchor">[292]</a> -the money; a strange pretension, which we do not know how he -justified. At last, however, at the time of the Panathenaic festival, -Andromachus the slave received the first reward of ten thousand -drachms; Teukrus the metic, the second reward of one thousand -drachms.</p> - -<p>A large number of citizens, many of them of the first -consideration in the city, were thus either lying in prison or had -fled into exile. But the alarm, the agony, and the suspicion, in -the public mind, went on increasing rather than diminishing. The -information hitherto received had been all partial, and, with the -exception of Agaristê, all the informants had been either slaves or -metics, not citizens; while Teukrus, the only one among them who -had stated anything respecting the mutilation of the Hermæ, did not -profess to be a party concerned, or to know all those who were.<a -id="FNanchor_293" href="#Footnote_293" class="fnanchor">[293]</a> -The people had heard only a succession of disclosures, all attesting -a frequency of irreligious acts, calculated to insult and banish -the local gods who protected their country and constitution; all -indicating that there were many powerful citizens bent on prosecuting -such designs, interpreted as treasonable, yet none communicating -any full or satisfactory idea of the Hermo<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_198">[p. 198]</span>kopid plot, of the real conspirators, -or of their farther purposes. The enemy was among themselves, -yet they knew not where to lay hands upon him. Amidst the gloomy -terrors, political blended with religious, which distracted their -minds, all the ancient stories of the last and worst oppressions of -the Peisistratid despots, ninety-five years before, became again -revived, and some new despots, they knew not who, seemed on the -point of occupying the acropolis. To detect the real conspirators, -was the only way of procuring respite from this melancholy paroxysm, -for which purpose the people were willing to welcome questionable -witnesses, and to imprison on suspicion citizens of the best -character, until the truth could be ascertained.<a id="FNanchor_294" -href="#Footnote_294" class="fnanchor">[294]</a></p> - -<p>The public distraction was aggravated by Peisander and -Chariklês, who acted as commissioners of investigation, furious and -unprincipled politicians,<a id="FNanchor_295" href="#Footnote_295" -class="fnanchor">[295]</a> at that time professing exaggerated -attachment to the democratical constitution, though we shall find -both of them hereafter among the most unscrupulous agents in its -subversion. These men loudly proclaimed that the facts disclosed -indicated the band of Hermokopid conspirators to be numerous, with -an ulterior design of speedily putting down the democracy; and they -insisted on pressing their investigations until full discovery should -be attained. And the sentiment of the people, collectively taken, -responded to this stimulus; though individually, every man was so -afraid of becoming himself the next victim arrested, that when the -herald convoked the senate for the purpose of receiving informations, -the crowd in the market-place straightway dispersed.</p> - -<p>It was amidst such eager thirst for discovery, that a new informer -appeared, Diokleidês, who professed to communicate some material -facts connected with the mutilation of the Hermæ, affirming that the -authors of it were three hundred in number. He recounted that, on -the night on which that incident occurred, he<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_199">[p. 199]</span> started from Athens to go to the -mines of Laureion; wherein he had a slave working on hire, on whose -account he was to receive pay. It was full moon, and the night was -so bright that he began his journey mistaking it for daybreak.<a -id="FNanchor_296" href="#Footnote_296" class="fnanchor">[296]</a> -On reaching the propylæum of the temple of Dionysus, he saw a -body of men about three hundred in number descending from the -Odeon towards the public theatre. Being alarmed at this unexpected -sight, he concealed himself behind a pillar, from whence he had -leisure to contemplate this body of men, who stood for some time -conversing together, in groups of fifteen or twenty each, and then -dispersed: the moon was so bright that he could discern the faces -of most of them. As soon as they had dispersed, he pursued his -walk to Laureion, from whence he returned next day, and learned to -his surprise that during the night the Hermæ had been mutilated; -also, that commissioners of inquiry had been named, and the reward -of ten thousand drachms proclaimed for information. Impressed at -once with the belief that the nocturnal crowd whom he had seen were -authors of the deed, he happened soon after<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_200">[p. 200]</span>wards to see one of them, Euphêmus, -sitting in the workshop of a brazier, and took him aside to the -neighboring temple of Hephæstus, where he mentioned in confidence -that he had seen the party at work and could denounce them, but that -he preferred being paid for silence, instead of giving information -and incurring private enmities. Euphêmus thanked him for the warning, -desiring him to come next day to the house of Leogoras and his son -Andokidês, where he would see them as well as the other parties -concerned. Andokidês and the rest offered to him, under solemn -covenant, the sum of two talents, or twelve thousand drachms, thus -overbidding the reward of ten thousand drachms proclaimed by the -senate to any truth-telling informer, with admission to a partnership -in the benefits of their conspiracy, supposing that it should -succeed. Upon his reply that he would consider the proposition, they -desired him to meet them at the house of Kallias son of Têleklês, -brother-in-law of Andokidês: which meeting accordingly took place, -and a solemn bargain was concluded in the acropolis. Andokidês and -his friends engaged to pay the two talents to Diokleidês at the -beginning of the ensuing month, as the price of his silence. But -since this engagement was never performed, Diokleidês came with his -information to the senate.<a id="FNanchor_297" href="#Footnote_297" -class="fnanchor">[297]</a></p> - -<p>Such—according to the report of Andokidês—was the story of this -informer, which he concluded by designating forty-two individuals, -out of the three hundred whom he had seen. The first names whom -he specified were those of Mantitheus and Aphepsion, two senators -actually sitting among his audience. Next came the remaining forty, -among whom were Andokidês and many of his nearest relatives, his -father Leogoras, his first or second cousins and brother-in-law, -Charmidês, Taureas, Nisæus, Kalias son of Alkmæon, Phrynichus, -Eukratês (brother of Nikias the commander in Sicily), and Kritias. -But as there were a still greater number of names—assuming the -total of three hundred to be correct—which Diokleidês was unable to -specify, the commissioner Peisander proposed that Mantitheus and -Aphepsion should be at once seized and tortured, in order to force -them to disclose their accomplices; the psephism passed in the -archonship of Skamandrius, whereby it was unlawful to apply<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_201">[p. 201]</span> the torture to any free -Athenian, being first abrogated. Illegal, not less than cruel, as -this proposition was, the senate at first received it with favor. But -Mantitheus and Aphepsion, casting themselves as suppliants upon the -altar in the senate-house, pleaded so strenuously for their rights -as citizens, to be allowed to put in bail and stand trial before -the dikastery, that this was at last granted.<a id="FNanchor_298" -href="#Footnote_298" class="fnanchor">[298]</a> No sooner had they -provided their sureties, than<span class="pagenum" id="Page_202">[p. -202]</span> they broke their covenant, mounted their horses, and -deserted to the enemy, without any regard to their sureties, who were -exposed by law to the same trial and the same penalties as would have -overtaken the offenders themselves. This sudden flight, together with -the news that a Bœotian force was assembled on the borders of Attica, -exasperated still farther the frantic terror of the public mind. -The senate at once took quiet measures for seizing and imprisoning -all the remaining forty whose names had been denounced; while by -concert with the strategi, all the citizens were put under arms; -those who dwelt in the city, mustering in the market-place; those in -and near the long walls, in the Theseium; those in Peiræus, in the -square called the Market-place of Hippodamus. Even the horsemen of -the city were convoked by sound of trumpet in the sacred precinct of -the Anakeion. The senate itself remained all night in the acropolis, -except the prytanes, or fifty senators of the presiding tribe, who -passed the night in the public building called the Tholus. Every -man in Athens felt the terrible sense of an internal conspiracy on -the point of breaking out, perhaps along with an invasion of the -foreigner, prevented only by the timely disclosure of Diokleidês, who -was hailed as the saviour of the city, and carried in procession to -dinner at the prytaneium.<a id="FNanchor_299" href="#Footnote_299" -class="fnanchor">[299]</a></p> - -<p>Miserable as the condition of the city was generally, yet more -miserable was that of the prisoners confined; and worse, in every -way, was still to be looked for, since the Athenians would know -neither peace nor patience until they could reach, by some means -or other, the names of the undisclosed conspirators. The female -relatives and children of Andokidês, and his companions, were by -permission along with them in the prison,<a id="FNanchor_300" -href="#Footnote_300" class="fnanchor">[300]</a> aggravating by their -tears and wailings the affliction of the scene, when Charmidês, -one of the parties confined, addressed himself to Andokidês, as -his cousin and friend, imploring him to make a voluntary dis<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_203">[p. 203]</span>closure of all that he -knew, in order to preserve the lives of so many innocent persons, -his immediate kinsmen, as well as to rescue the city out of a -feverish alarm not to be endured. “You know (he said) all that passed -about the mutilation of the Hermæ, and your silence will now bring -destruction not only upon yourself, but also upon your father and -upon all of us; while if you inform, whether you have been an actor -in the scene or not, you will obtain impunity for yourself and us, -and at the same time soothe the terrors of the city.” Such instances -on the part of Charmidês,<a id="FNanchor_301" href="#Footnote_301" -class="fnanchor">[301]</a> aided by the supplications of the other -prisoners present, overcame the reluctance of Andokidês to become -informer, and he next day made his disclosures to the senate. -“Euphilêtus (he said) was the chief author of the mutilation of -the Hermæ. He proposed the deed at a convivial party where I was -present, but I denounced it in the strongest manner and refused all -compliance. Presently, I broke my collar-bone, and injured my head, -by a fall from a young horse, so badly as to be confined to my bed; -when Euphilêtus took the opportunity of my absence to assure the rest -of the company falsely that I had consented, and that I had agreed -to cut the Hermes near my paternal house, which the tribe Ægeïs -have dedicated. Accordingly, they executed the project, while I was -incapable of moving, without my knowledge: they presumed that <i>I</i> -would undertake the mutilation of this particular Hermes, and you see -that this is the only one in all Athens which has escaped injury. -When the conspirators ascertained that I had not been a party, -Euphilêtus and Melêtus threatened me with a terrible revenge unless I -observed silence: to which I replied that it was not I, but their own -crime, which had brought them into danger.”</p> - -<p>Having recounted this tale, in substance, to the senate, -Andokidês tendered his slaves, both male and female, to be -tortured, in order that they might confirm his story that he was -in his bed and unable to leave it, on the night when the Hermæ -were mutilated. It appears that the torture was actually applied -(according to the custom so cruelly frequent at Athens in the case -of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_204">[p. 204]</span> slaves), -and that the senators thus became satisfied of the truth of what -Andokidês affirmed. He delivered in twenty-two names of citizens as -having been the mutilators of the Hermæ: eighteen of these names, -including Euphilêtus and Melêtus, had already been specified in -the information of Teukrus; the remaining four, were Panætius, -Diakritus, Lysistratus, and Chæredêmus; all of whom fled, the instant -their names were mentioned, without waiting the chance of being -seized. As soon as the senate heard the story of Andokidês, they -proceeded to question Diokleidês over again; who confessed that -he had given a false deposition, and begged for mercy, mentioning -Alkibiadês the Phegusian—a relative of the commander in Sicily—and -Amiantus, as having suborned him to the crime. Both of them fled -immediately on this revelation; but Diokleidês was detained, sent -before the dikastery for trial, and put to death.<a id="FNanchor_302" -href="#Footnote_302" class="fnanchor">[302]</a></p> - -<p>The foregoing is the story which Andokidês, in the oration De -Mysteriis, delivered between fifteen and twenty years afterwards, -represented himself to have communicated to the senate at this -perilous crisis. But it probably is not the story which he really did -tell, certainly not that which his enemies represented him as having -told: least of all does it communicate the whole truth, or afford any -satisfaction to such anxiety and alarm as are described to have been -prevalent at the time. Nor does it accord with the brief information -of Thucydidês, who tells us that Andokidês impeached himself, along -with others, as participant in the mutilation.<a id="FNanchor_303" -href="#Footnote_303" class="fnanchor">[303]</a> Among the accomplices -against whom he informed, his enemies affirmed that his own nearest -relatives were included, though this latter statement is denied by -himself. We may be sure, therefore, that the tale which Andokidês -really told was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_205">[p. 205]</span> -something very different from what now stands in his oration. But -what it really was we cannot make out; nor should we gain much even -if it could be made out, since even at the time, neither Thucydidês -nor other intelligent critics could determine how far it was true. -The mutilation of the Hermæ remained to them always an unexplained -mystery; though they accounted Andokidês the principal organizer.<a -id="FNanchor_304" href="#Footnote_304" class="fnanchor">[304]</a></p> - -<p>That which is at once most important and most incontestable, is -the effect produced by the revelations of Andokidês, true or false, -on the public mind at Athens. He was a young man of rank and wealth -in the city, belonging to the sacred family of the Kerykes,—said -to trace his pedigree to the hero Odysseus,—and invested on a -previous occasion with an important naval command; whereas the -preceding informers had been metics and slaves. Moreover, he was -making confession of his own guilt. Hence the people received his -communications with implicit confidence. They were delighted to -have got to the bottom of the terrible mystery: and the public mind -subsided from its furious terrors into comparative tranquillity. -The citizens again began to think themselves in safety and to -resume their habitual confidence in each other, while the hoplites -everywhere on guard were allowed to return to their homes.<a -id="FNanchor_305" href="#Footnote_305" class="fnanchor">[305]</a> -All the prisoners in cus<span class="pagenum" id="Page_206">[p. -206]</span>tody on suspicion, except those against whom Andokidês -informed were forthwith released: those who had fled out of -apprehension, were allowed to return; while those whom he named as -guilty, were tried, convicted, and put to death. Such of them as had -already fled, were condemned to death in their absence, and a reward -offered for their heads.<a id="FNanchor_306" href="#Footnote_306" -class="fnanchor">[306]</a> And though discerning men were not -satisfied with the evidence upon which these sentences were -pronounced, yet the general public fully believed themselves to have -punished the real offenders, and were thus inexpressibly relieved -from the depressing sense of unexpiated insult to the gods, as well -as of danger to their political constitution from the withdrawal -of divine protection.<a id="FNanchor_307" href="#Footnote_307" -class="fnanchor">[307]</a> Andokidês himself was pardoned, and -was for the time an object, apparently, even of public gratitude, -so that his father Leogoras who had been among the parties -imprisoned, ventured to indict a senator named Speusippus for -illegal proceedings towards him, and obtained an almost unanimous -verdict from the dikastery.<a id="FNanchor_308" href="#Footnote_308" -class="fnanchor">[308]</a> But the character of a statue-breaker and -an informer could never be otherwise than odious at Athens. Andokidês -was either banished by the indirect effect of a general disqualifying -decree; or at least found that he had made so many enemies, and -incurred so much obloquy, by his conduct in this affair, as to make -it necessary for him to quit the city. He remained in banishment -for many years, and seems never to have got clear of the hatred -which his conduct in this nefarious proceeding so well merited.<a -id="FNanchor_309" href="#Footnote_309" class="fnanchor">[309]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_207">[p. 207]</span></p> - -<p>But the comfort arising out of these disclosures respecting the -Hermæ, though genuine and inestimable at the moment, was soon again -disturbed. There still remained the various alleged profanations of -the Eleusinian mysteries, which had not yet been investigated or -brought to atonement; and these were the more sure to be pressed -home, and worked with a factitious exaggeration of pious zeal, since -the enemies of Alkibiadês were bent upon turning them to his ruin. -Among all the ceremonies of Attic religion, there was none more -profoundly or universally reverenced than the mysteries of Eleusis, -originally enjoined by the goddess Dêmêtêr herself, in her visit to -that place, to Eumolpus and the other Eleusinian patriarch, and -transmitted as a precious hereditary privilege in their families.<a -id="FNanchor_310" href="#Footnote_310" class="fnanchor">[310]</a> -Celebrated annually in the month of August or September, under the -special care of the basileus, or second archon, these mysteries were -attended by vast crowds from Athens as well as from other parts -of Greece, presenting to the eye a solemn and imposing spectacle, -and striking the imagination still more powerfully by the special -initiation which they conferred, under pledge of secrecy, upon pious -and predisposed communicants. Even the divulgation in words to the -uninitiated, of that which was exhibited to the eye and ear of the -assembly in the interior of the Eleusinian temple, was accounted -highly criminal: much more the actual mimicry of these ceremonies for -the amusement of a convivial party. Moreover, the individuals who -held the great sacred offices at Eleusis,—the hierophant, the daduch -(torch-bearer), and the keryx, or herald,—which were transmitted by -inheritance in the Eumolpidæ and other great families of antiquity -and importance, were personally insulted by such proceedings, and -vindicated their own dignity at the same time that they invoked -punishment on the offenders in the name of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê. -The most appalling legends were current among the Athenian public, -and repeated on proper occasions even by the hierophant<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_208">[p. 208]</span> himself, respecting -the divine judgments which always overtook such impious men.<a -id="FNanchor_311" href="#Footnote_311" class="fnanchor">[311]</a></p> - -<p>When we recollect how highly the Eleusinian mysteries were -venerated by Greeks not born in Athens and even by foreigners, we -shall not wonder at the violent indignation excited in the Athenian -mind by persons who profaned or divulged them; especially at a moment -when their religious sensibilities had been so keenly wounded, -and so tardily and recently healed, in reference to the Hermæ.<a -id="FNanchor_312" href="#Footnote_312" class="fnanchor">[312]</a> It -was about this same time<a id="FNanchor_313" href="#Footnote_313" -class="fnanchor">[313]</a> that a prosecution was instituted against -the Melian philosopher Diagoras for irreligious doctrines. Having -left Athens before trial, he was found guilty in his absence, and a -reward was offered for his life.</p> - -<p>Probably the privileged sacred families, connected with the -mysteries, were foremost in calling for expiation from the -state<span class="pagenum" id="Page_209">[p. 209]</span> to -the majesty of the two offended goddesses, and for punishment -on the delinquents.<a id="FNanchor_314" href="#Footnote_314" -class="fnanchor">[314]</a> And the enemies of Alkibiadês, personal -as well as political, found the opportunity favorable for reviving -that charge against him which they had artfully suffered to drop -before his departure to Sicily. The matter of fact alleged against -him—the mock-celebration of these holy ceremonies—was not only in -itself probable, but proved by reasonably good testimony against -him and some of his intimate companions. Moreover, the overbearing -insolence of demeanor habitual with Alkibiadês, so glaringly at -variance with the equal restraints of democracy, enabled his enemies -to impute to him not only irreligious acts, but anti-constitutional -purposes; an association of ideas which was at this moment the -more easily accredited, since his divulgation and parody of the -mysteries did not stand alone, but was interpreted in conjunction -with the recent mutilation of the Hermæ—as a manifestation of the -same anti-patriotic and irreligious feeling, if not part and parcel -of the same treasonable scheme. And the alarm on this subject was -now renewed by the appearance of a Lacedæmonian army at the isthmus, -professing to contemplate some enterprise in conjunction with the -Bœotians, a purpose not easy to understand, and presenting every -appearance of being a cloak for hostile designs against Athens. So -fully was this believed among the Athenians, that they took arms, -and remained under arms one whole night in the sacred precinct of -the Theseium. No enemy indeed appeared, either without or within; -but the conspiracy had only been prevented from breaking out, so -they imagined, by the recent inquiries and detection. Moreover, the -party in Argos connected with Alkibiadês were just at this time -suspected of a plot for the subversion of their own democracy, -which still farther aggravated the presumptions against him, while -it induced the Athenians to give up to the Argeian democratical -government the oligarchical hostages which had been taken from that -town a few months before,<a id="FNanchor_315" href="#Footnote_315" -class="fnanchor">[315]</a> in order that it might put these hostages -to death, whenever it thought fit.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_210">[p. 210]</span></p> - -<p>Such incidents materially aided the enemies of Alkibiadês in their -unremitting efforts to procure his recall and condemnation. Among -them were men very different in station and temper: Thessalus son of -Kimon, a man of the highest lineage and of hereditary oligarchical -politics, as well as Androklês, a leading demagogue or popular -orator. It was the former who preferred against him in the senate the -memorable impeachment, which, fortunately for our information, is -recorded verbatim.</p> - -<p>“Thessalus son of Kimon, of the deme Lakiadæ, hath impeached -Alkibiadês son of Kleinias, of the deme Skambônidæ, as guilty of -crime in regard to the two goddesses Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, in -mimicking the mysteries, and exhibiting them to his companions in -his own house, wearing the costume of the hierophant: applying to -himself the name of hierophant; to Polytion, that of daduch; to -Theodôrus that of herald, and addressing his remaining companions -as mysts and epopts; all contrary to the sacred customs and -canons, of old established by the Eumolpidæ, the Kerykes, and the -Eleusinian priests.”<a id="FNanchor_316" href="#Footnote_316" -class="fnanchor">[316]</a></p> - -<p>Similar impeachments being at the same time presented against -other citizens now serving in Sicily along with Alkibiadês, the -accusers moved that he and the rest might be sent for to come home -and take their trial. We may observe that the indictment against him -is quite distinct and special, making no allusion to any supposed -treasonable or anti-constitutional projects: probably, however, -these suspicions were pressed by his enemies in their preliminary -speeches, for the purpose of inducing the Athenians to remove him -from the command of the army forthwith, and send for him home. -For such a step it was indispensable that a strong case should be -made out: but the public was at length thoroughly brought round, -and the Salaminian trireme<span class="pagenum" id="Page_211">[p. -211]</span> was despatched to Sicily to fetch him. Great care however -was taken, in sending this summons, to avoid all appearance of -prejudgment, or harshness, or menace. The trierarch was forbidden -to seize his person, and had instructions to invite him simply to -accompany the Salaminian home in his own trireme: so as to avoid the -hazard of offending the Argeian and Mantineian allies serving in -Sicily, or the army itself.<a id="FNanchor_317" href="#Footnote_317" -class="fnanchor">[317]</a></p> - -<p>It was on the return of the Athenian army from their unsuccessful -attempt at Kamarina, to their previous quarters at Katana, that -they found the Salaminian trireme newly arrived from Athens with -this grave requisition against the general. We may be sure that -Alkibiadês received private intimation from his friends at Athens, -by the same trireme, communicating to him the temper of the people, -so that his resolution was speedily taken. Professing to obey, he -departed in his own trireme on the voyage homeward, along with the -other persons accused, the Salaminian trireme being in company; but -as soon as they arrived at Thurii, in coasting along Italy, he and -his companions quitted the vessel and disappeared. After a fruitless -search on the part of the Salaminian trierarch, the two triremes -were obliged to return to Athens without him. Both Alkibiadês -and the rest of the accused—one of whom<a id="FNanchor_318" -href="#Footnote_318" class="fnanchor">[318]</a> was his own cousin -and namesake—were tried, condemned to death on non-appearance, -and their property confiscated; while the Eumolpidæ and the other -Eleusinian sacred families pronounced him to be accursed by the -gods, for his desecration of the mysteries,<a id="FNanchor_319" -href="#Footnote_319" class="fnanchor">[319]</a> and recorded the -condemnation on a plate of lead.</p> - -<p>Probably his disappearance and exile were acceptable to his -enemies at Athens: at any rate, they thus made sure of getting rid -of him; while had he come back, his condemnation to death,<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_212">[p. 212]</span> though probable, could -not be considered as certain. In considering the conduct of the -Athenians towards Alkibiadês, we have to remark, that the people were -guilty of no act of injustice. He had committed—at least there was -fair reason for believing that he had committed—an act criminal in -the estimation of every Greek; the divulgation and profanation of -the mysteries. This act—alleged against him in the indictment very -distinctly, divested of all supposed ulterior purpose, treasonable -or otherwise—was legally punishable at Athens, and was universally -accounted guilty in public estimation, as an offence at once against -the religious sentiment of the people and against the public safety, -by offending the two goddesses, Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, and driving -them to withdraw their favor and protection. The same demand for -legal punishment would have been supposed to exist in a Christian -Catholic country, down to a very recent period of history, if instead -of the Eleusinian mysteries we suppose the sacrament of the mass to -have been the ceremony ridiculed; though such a proceeding would -involve no breach of obligation to secrecy. Nor ought we to judge -what would have been the measure of penalty formerly awarded to a -person convicted of such an offence, by consulting the tendency of -penal legislation during the last sixty years. Even down to the -last century it would have been visited with something sharper than -the draught of hemlock, which is the worst that could possibly have -befallen Alkibiadês at Athens, as we may see by the condemnation -and execution of the Chevalier de la Barre at Abbeville, in 1766. -The uniform tendency of Christian legislation,<a id="FNanchor_320" -href="#Footnote_320" class="fnanchor">[320]</a> down to a recent -period, leaves no room for reproaching<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_213">[p. 213]</span> the Athenians with excessive cruelty in -their penal visitation of offences against the religious sentiment. -On the contrary, the Athenians are distinguished for comparative -mildness and tolerance, as we shall find various opportunities for -remarking.</p> - -<p>Now in reviewing the conduct of the Athenians towards Alkibiadês, -we must consider, that this violation of the mysteries, of which -he was indicted in good legal form, was an action for which he -really deserved punishment, if any one deserved it. Even<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_214">[p. 214]</span> his enemies did not -fabricate this charge, or impute it to him falsely; though they -were guilty of insidious and unprincipled manœuvres to exasperate -the public mind against him. Their machinations begin with the -mutilation of the Hermæ; an act of new and unparalleled wickedness, -to which historians of Greece seldom do justice. It was not, like -the violations of the mysteries, a piece of indecent pastime -committed within four walls, and never intended to become known. -It was an outrage essentially public, planned and executed by -conspirators for the deliberate purpose of lacerating the religious -mind of Athens, and turning the prevalent terror and distraction to -political profit. Thus much is certain; though we cannot be sure -who the conspirators were, nor what was their exact or special -purpose. That the destruction of Alkibiadês was one of the direct -purposes of the conspirators, is highly probable. But his enemies, -even if they were not among the original authors, at least took -upon themselves half the guilt of the proceeding, by making it the -basis of treacherous machinations against his person. How their -scheme, which was originally contrived to destroy him before the -expedition departed, at first failed, was then artfully dropped, -and at length effectually revived, after a long train of calumny -against the absent general, has been already recounted. It is among -the darkest chapters of Athenian political history, indicating, on -the part of the people, strong religious excitability, without any -injustice towards Alkibiadês; but indicating, on the part of his -enemies, as well as of the Hermokopids generally, a depth of wicked -contrivance rarely paralleled in political warfare. It is to these -men, not to the people, that Alkibiadês owes his expulsion, aided -indeed by the effect of his own previous character. In regard to the -Hermæ, the Athenians condemned to death—after and by consequence of -the deposition of Andokidês—a small number of men who may perhaps -have been innocent victims, but whom they sincerely believed to be -guilty; and whose death not only tranquillized comparatively the -public mind, but served as the only means of rescue to a far larger -number of prisoners confined on suspicion. In regard to Alkibiadês, -they came to no collective resolution, except that of recalling -him to take his trial, a resolution implying no wrong in those -who voted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_215">[p. 215]</span> for -it, whatever may be the guilt of those who proposed and prepared -it by perfidious means.<a id="FNanchor_321" href="#Footnote_321" -class="fnanchor">[321]</a></p> <p><span class="pagenum" -id="Page_216">[p. 216]</span></p> <p>In order to appreciate the -desperate hatred with which the exile Alkibiadês afterwards revenged -himself on his countrymen, it has been necessary to explain to -what extent he had just ground of complaint against them. On being -informed that they had condemned him to death in his absence, he -is said to have exclaimed: “I shall show them that I am alive.” He -fully redeemed his word.<a id="FNanchor_322" href="#Footnote_322" -class="fnanchor">[322]</a></p> - -<p>The recall and consequent banishment of Alkibiadês was -mischievous to Athens in several ways. It transferred to the<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_217">[p. 217]</span> enemy’s camp an angry -exile, to make known her weak points, and to rouse the sluggishness -of Sparta. It offended a portion of the Sicilian armament, most -of all probably the Argeians and Mantineians, and slackened their -zeal in the cause.<a id="FNanchor_323" href="#Footnote_323" -class="fnanchor">[323]</a> And what was worst of all, it left the -armament altogether under the paralyzing command of Nikias. For -Lamachus, though still equal in nominal authority, and now invested -with the command of one-half instead of one-third of the army, -appears to have had no real influence except in the field.</p> - -<p>Nikias now proceeded to execute that scheme which he had first -suggested, to sail round from Katana to Selinus and Egesta, with -the view of investigating the quarrel between the two as well as -the financial means of the latter. Passing through the strait and -along the north coast of the island, he first touched at Himera, -where admittance was refused to him; he next captured a Sikanian -maritime town named Hykkara, together with many prisoners; among -them the celebrated courtezan Laïs, then a very young girl.<a -id="FNanchor_324" href="#Footnote_324" class="fnanchor">[324]</a> -Having handed over this place to the Egestæans, Nikias went in -person to inspect their city and condition; but could obtain no more -money than the thirty talents which had been before announced on the -second visit of the commissioners. He then restored the prisoners -from Hykkara to their Sikanian countrymen, receiving a ransom of one -hundred and twenty talents,<a id="FNanchor_325" href="#Footnote_325" -class="fnanchor">[325]</a> and conducted the Athenian land-force -across the centre of the island, through the territory of the -friendly Sikels to Katana; making an attack in his way upon the -hostile Sikel<span class="pagenum" id="Page_218">[p. 218]</span> -town of Hybla, in which he was repulsed. At Katana he was rejoined by -his naval force.</p> - -<p>It was now seemingly about the middle of October, and three -months had elapsed since the arrival of the Athenian armament at -Rhegium; during which period they had achieved nothing except the -acquisition of Naxus and Katana as allies—unless we are to reckon -the insignificant capture of Hykkara. But Naxus and Katana, as -Chalkidic cities, had been counted upon beforehand even by Nikias; -together with Rhegium, which had been found reluctant, to his great -disappointment. What is still worse, in reference to the character -of the general, not only nothing serious had been achieved, but -nothing serious had been attempted. The precious moment pointed -out by Lamachus for action, when the terrific menace of the recent -untried armament was at its maximum, and preparation as well as -confidence was wanting at Syracuse, had been irreparably wasted. -Every day the preparations of the Syracusans improved and their fears -diminished; the invader, whom they had looked upon as so formidable, -turned out both hesitating and timorous,<a id="FNanchor_326" -href="#Footnote_326" class="fnanchor">[326]</a> and when he had -disappeared out of their sight to Hykkara and Egesta, still more when -he assailed in vain the insignificant Sikel post of Hybla, their -minds underwent a reaction from dismay to extreme confidence. The -mass of Syracusan citizens, now reinforced by allies from Selinus -and other cities, called upon their generals to lead to the attack -of the Athenian position at Katana, since the Athenians did not dare -to approach Syracuse; while Syracusan horsemen even went so far as -to insult the Athenians in their camp, riding up to ask if they -were come to settle as peaceable citizens in the island, instead of -restoring the Leontines. Such unexpected humiliation, acting probably -on the feelings of the soldiers, at length shamed Nikias out of his -inaction, and compelled him to strike a blow for the maintenance of -his own reputation. He devised a stratagem for approaching Syracuse -in such a manner as to elude the opposition of the Syracusan cavalry, -informing himself as to the ground near the city, through some exiles -serving along with him.<a id="FNanchor_327" href="#Footnote_327" -class="fnanchor">[327]</a></p> - -<p>He despatched to Syracuse a Katanæan citizen, in his heart<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_219">[p. 219]</span> attached to Athens, yet -apparently neutral and on good terms with the other side, as bearer -of a pretended message and proposition from the friends of Syracuse -at Katana. Many of the Athenian soldiers, so the message ran, were -in the habit of passing the night within the walls, apart from their -camp and arms. It would be easy for the Syracusans by a vigorous -attack at daybreak, to surprise them thus unprepared and dispersed; -while the philo-Syracusan party at Katana promised to aid, by closing -the gates, assailing the Athenians within, and setting fire to the -ships. A numerous body of Katanæans, they added, were eager to -coöperate in the plan now proposed.</p> - -<p>This communication, reaching the Syracusan generals at a moment -when they were themselves elate and disposed to an aggressive -movement, found such incautious credence, that they sent back the -messenger to Katana with cordial assent and agreement for a precise -day. Accordingly, a day or two before, the entire Syracusan force -was marched out towards Katana, and encamped for the night on the -river Symæthus, in the Leontine territory, within about eight miles -of Katana. But Nikias, with whom the whole proceeding originated, -choosing this same day to put on shipboard his army, together with -his Sikel allies present, sailed by night southward along the coast, -rounding the island of Ortygia, into the Great Harbor of Syracuse. -Arrived thither by break of day, he disembarked his troops unopposed -south of the mouth of the Anâpus, in the interior of the Great -Harbor, near the hamlet which stretched towards the temple of Zeus -Olympius. Having broken down the neighboring bridge, where the -Helôrine road crossed the Anâpus, he took up a position protected by -various embarrassing obstacles,—houses, walls, trees, and standing -water, besides the steep ground of the Olympieion itself on his -left wing; so that he could choose his own time for fighting, and -was out of the attack of the Syracusan horse. For the protection of -his ships on the shore, he provided a palisade work by cutting down -the neighboring trees; and even took precautions for his rear by -throwing up a hasty fence of wood and stones touching the shore at -the inner bay called Daskon. He had full leisure for such defensive -works, since the enemy within the walls made no attempt to disturb -him, while the Syracusan horse only discovered his manœuvre on -arriving<span class="pagenum" id="Page_220">[p. 220]</span> before -the lines at Katana; and though they lost no time in returning, the -march back was a long one.<a id="FNanchor_328" href="#Footnote_328" -class="fnanchor">[328]</a> Such was the confidence of the Syracusans, -however, that even after so long a march, they offered battle -forthwith; but as Nikias did not quit his position, they retreated, -to take up their night-station on the other side of the Helôrine -road, probably a road bordered on each side by walls.</p> - -<p>On the next morning, Nikias marched out of his position and -formed his troops in order of battle, in two divisions, each -eight deep. His front division was intended to attack; his rear -division—in hollow square, with the baggage in the middle—was held -in reserve near the camp, to lend aid where aid might be wanted; -cavalry there was none. The Syracusan hoplites, seemingly far more -numerous than his, presented the levy in mass of the city, without -any selection; they were ranged in the deeper order of sixteen, -alongside of their Selinuntine allies. On the right wing were -posted their horsemen, the best part of their force, not less than -twelve hundred in number; together with two hundred horsemen from -Gela, twenty from Kamarina, about fifty bowmen, and a company of -darters. The hoplites, though full of courage, had little training; -and their array, never precisely kept, was on this occasion farther -disturbed by the immediate vicinity of the city. Some had gone in to -see their families; others, hurrying out to join, found the battle -already begun, and took rank wherever they could.<a id="FNanchor_329" -href="#Footnote_329" class="fnanchor">[329]</a></p> - -<p>Thucydidês, in describing this battle, gives us, according to his -practice, a statement of the motives and feelings which animated the -combatants on both sides, and which furnished a theme for the brief -harangue of Nikias. This appears surprising to one accustomed to -modern warfare, where the soldier is under the influence simply of -professional honor and disgrace, without any thought of the cause -for which he is fighting. In ancient times, such a motive was only -one among many others, which, according to the circumstances of the -case, contributed to elevate or depress the soldier’s mind at the eve -of action. Nikias adverted to the recognized military preëminence -of chosen Argeians, Mantine<span class="pagenum" id="Page_221">[p. -221]</span>ians, and Athenians, as compared to the Syracusan levy in -mass, who were full of belief in their own superiority,—this is a -striking confession of the deplorable change which had been wrought -by his own delay,—but who would come short in actual conflict, -from want of discipline.<a id="FNanchor_330" href="#Footnote_330" -class="fnanchor">[330]</a> Moreover, he reminded them that they were -far away from home, and that defeat would render them victims, one -and all, of the Syracusan cavalry. He little thought, nor did his -prophets forewarn him, that such a calamity, serious as it would -have been, was even desirable for Athens, since it would have saved -her from the far more overwhelming disasters which will be found to -sadden the coming chapters of this history.</p> - -<p>While the customary sacrifices were being performed, the slingers -and bowmen on both sides became engaged in skirmishing. But presently -the trumpets sounded, and Nikias ordered his first division of -hoplites to charge at once rapidly, before the Syracusans expected -it. Judging from his previous backwardness, they never imagined that -he would be the first to give orders for charging; nor was it until -they saw the Athenian line actually advancing towards them that they -lifted their own arms from the ground and came forward to give the -meeting. The shock was bravely encountered on both sides, and for -some time the battle continued hand to hand with undecided result. -There happened to supervene a violent storm of rain, with thunder -and lightning, which alarmed the Syracusans, who construed it as an -unfavorable augury, while to the more practised Athenian hoplites, -it seemed a mere phenomenon of the season,<a id="FNanchor_331" -href="#Footnote_331" class="fnanchor">[331]</a> so that they still -farther astonished the Syracusans by the unabated confidence<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_222">[p. 222]</span> with which they -continued the fight. At length the Syracusan army was broken, -dispersed, and fled; first, before the Argeians on the right, next, -before the Athenians in the centre. The victors pursued as far as -was safe and practicable, without disordering their ranks: for the -Syracusan cavalry, which had not yet been engaged, checked all who -pressed forward, and enabled their own infantry to retire in safety -behind the Helôrine road.<a id="FNanchor_332" href="#Footnote_332" -class="fnanchor">[332]</a></p> - -<p>So little were the Syracusans dispirited with this defeat, that -they did not retire within their city until they had sent an adequate -detachment to guard the neighboring temple and sacred precinct of -the Olympian Zeus, wherein there was much deposited wealth, which -they feared that the Athenians might seize. Nikias, however, without -approaching the sacred ground, contented himself with occupying the -field of battle, burnt his own dead, and stripped the arms from -the dead of the enemy. The Syracusans and their allies lost two -hundred and fifty men, the Athenians fifty.<a id="FNanchor_333" -href="#Footnote_333" class="fnanchor">[333]</a></p> - -<p>On the morrow, having granted to the Syracusans their dead -bodies for burial, and collected the ashes of his own dead, Nikias -reëmbarked his troops, put to sea, and sailed back to his former -station at Katana. He conceived it impossible, without cavalry and -a farther stock of money, to maintain his position near Syracuse or -to prosecute immediate operations of siege or blockade. And as the -winter was now approaching, he determined to take up winter quarters -at Katana; though considering the mild winter at Syracuse, and the -danger of marsh fever near the Great Harbor in summer, the change of -season might well be regarded as a questionable gain. But he proposed -to employ the interval<span class="pagenum" id="Page_223">[p. -223]</span> in sending to Athens for cavalry and money, as well -as in procuring the like reinforcements from his Sicilian allies, -whose numbers he calculated now on increasing by the accession of -new cities after his recent victory, and to get together magazines -of every kind for beginning the siege of Syracuse in the spring. -Despatching a trireme to Athens with these requisitions, he sailed -with his forces to Messênê, within which there was a favorable party -who gave hopes of opening the gates to him. Such a correspondence -had already been commenced before the departure of Alkibiadês: but -it was the first act of revenge which the departing general took -on his country, to betray the proceedings to the philo-Syracusan -party in Messênê. Accordingly, these latter, watching their -opportunity, rose in arms before the arrival of Nikias, put to -death their chief antagonists, and held the town by force against -the Athenians; who after a fruitless delay of thirteen days, with -scanty supplies and under stormy weather, were forced to return to -Naxos, where they established a palisaded camp and station, and -went into winter quarters.<a id="FNanchor_334" href="#Footnote_334" -class="fnanchor">[334]</a></p> - -<p>The recent stratagem of Nikias, followed by the movement into -the harbor of Syracuse, and the battle, had been ably planned and -executed. It served to show the courage and discipline of the army, -as well as to keep up the spirits of the soldiers themselves, and -to obviate those feelings of disappointment which the previous -inefficiency of the armament tended to arouse. But as to other -results, the victory was barren; we may even say, positively -mischievous, since it imparted a momentary stimulus which served -as an excuse to Nikias for the three months of total inaction -which followed, and since it neither weakened nor humiliated the -Syracusans, but gave them a salutary lesson which they turned to -account while Nikias was in his winter quarters. His apathy during -these first eight months after the arrival of the expedition at -Rhegium (from July 415 <small>B.C.</small> to March -414 <small>B.C.</small>), was the most deplorable of -all calamities to his army, his country, and himself. Abundant -proofs of this will be seen in the coming events: at present, we -have only to turn back to his own predictions and recommendations. -All the difficulties and dangers to<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_224">[p. 224]</span> be surmounted in Sicily had been -foreseen by himself and impressed upon the Athenians: in the first -instance, as grounds against undertaking the expedition; but the -Athenians, though unfortunately not allowing them to avail in that -capacity, fully admitted their reality, and authorized him to demand -whatever force was necessary to overcome them.<a id="FNanchor_335" -href="#Footnote_335" class="fnanchor">[335]</a> He had thus been -allowed to bring with him a force calculated upon his own ideas, -together with supplies and implements for besieging; yet when -arrived, he seems only anxious to avoid exposing that force in -any serious enterprise, and to find an excuse for conducting it -back to Athens. That Syracuse was the grand enemy, and that the -capital point of the enterprise was the siege of that city, was -a truth familiar to himself as well as every man at Athens:<a -id="FNanchor_336" href="#Footnote_336" class="fnanchor">[336]</a> -upon the formidable cavalry of the Syracusans, Nikias had himself -insisted, in the preliminary debates. Yet, after four months of mere -trifling, and pretence of action so as to evade dealing with the -real difficulty, the existence of this cavalry is made an excuse -for a farther postponement of four months until reinforcements -can be obtained from Athens. To all the intrinsic dangers of the -case, predicted by Nikias himself with proper discernment, was -thus superadded the aggravated danger of his own factitious delay; -frittering away the first impression of his armament, giving the -Syracusans leisure to enlarge their fortifications, and allowing -the Peloponnesians time to interfere against Attica as well as to -succor Sicily. It was the unhappy weakness of this commander to -shrink from decisive resolutions of every kind, and at any rate to -postpone them until the necessity became imminent: the consequence of -which was,—to use an expression of the Corinthian envoy before the -Peloponnesian war in censuring the dilatory policy of Sparta,—that -never acting, yet always seeming about to act, he found his enemy in -double force instead of single, at the moment of actual conflict.<a -id="FNanchor_337" href="#Footnote_337" class="fnanchor">[337]</a></p> - -<p>Great, indeed, must have been the disappointment of the Athe<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_225">[p. 225]</span>nians, when, after -having sent forth in the month of June, an expedition of unparalleled -efficiency, they receive in the month of November a despatch to -acquaint them that the general has accomplished little except one -indecisive victory; and that he has not even attempted anything -serious, nor can do so unless they send him farther cavalry and -money. Yet the only answer which they made was, to grant and provide -for this demand without any public expression of discontent or -disappointment against him.<a id="FNanchor_338" href="#Footnote_338" -class="fnanchor">[338]</a> And this is the more to be noted, since -the re<span class="pagenum" id="Page_226">[p. 226]</span>moval -of Alkibiadês afforded an inviting and even valuable opportunity -for proposing to send out a fresh colleague in his room.<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_227">[p. 227]</span> If there were no -complaints raised against Nikias at Athens, so neither are we -informed of any such, even among his own soldiers in Sicily, though -<i>their</i> disappointment must have been yet greater than that of their -countrymen at home, considering the expectations with which they -had come out. We may remember that the delay of a few days at Eion, -under perfectly justifiable circumstances, and while awaiting the -arrival of reinforcements actually sent for, raised the loudest -murmurs against Kleon in his expedition against Amphipolis, from the -hoplites in his own army.<a id="FNanchor_339" href="#Footnote_339" -class="fnanchor">[339]</a> The contrast is instructive, and will -appear yet more instructive as we advance forward.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the Syracusans were profiting by the lesson of their -recent defeat. In the next public assembly which ensued, Hermokratês -addressed them in the mingled tone of encouragement and admonition. -He praised their bravery, while he deprecated their want of tactics -and discipline. Considering the great superiority of the enemy in -this last respect, he regarded the recent battle as giving good -promise for the future; and he appealed with satisfaction to the -precautions taken by Nikias in fortifying his camp, as well as to -his speedy retreat after the battle. He pressed them to diminish -the excessive number of fifteen generals, whom they had hitherto -been accustomed to nominate to the command; to reduce the number -to three, conferring upon them at the same<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_228">[p. 228]</span> time fuller powers than had been before -enjoyed, and swearing a solemn oath to leave them unfettered in the -exercise of such powers; lastly, to enjoin upon these generals the -most strenuous efforts, during the coming winter, for training and -arming the whole population. Accordingly Hermokratês himself, with -Herakleidês and Sikanus, were named to the command. Ambassadors were -sent both to Sparta and to Corinth, for the purpose of entreating -assistance in Sicily, as well as of prevailing on the Peloponnesians -to recommence a direct attack against Attica;<a id="FNanchor_340" -href="#Footnote_340" class="fnanchor">[340]</a> so as at least to -prevent the Athenians from sending farther reinforcements to Nikias, -and perhaps even to bring about the recall of his army.</p> - -<p>But by far the most important measure which marked the -nomination of the new generals, was, the enlargement of the line of -fortifications at Syracuse. They constructed a new wall, inclosing -an additional space and covering both their inner and their outer -city to the westward, reaching from the outer sea to the Great -Harbor, across the whole space fronting the rising slope of the -hill of Epipolæ, and stretching far enough westward to inclose -the sacred precinct of Apollo Temenites. This was intended as a -precaution, in order that if Nikias, resuming operations in the -spring, should beat them in the field and confine them to their -walls, he might, nevertheless, be prevented from carrying a wall -of circumvallation from sea to sea without covering a great -additional extent of ground.<a id="FNanchor_341" href="#Footnote_341" -class="fnanchor">[341]</a> Besides this, the Syracusans fitted up -and garrisoned the deserted town of Megara, on the coast to the -north of Syracuse; they established a regular fortification and -garrison in the Olympieion or temple of Zeus Olympius, which they -had already garrisoned after the recent battle with Nikias; and they -planted stakes in the sea to obstruct the convenient landing-places. -All these precautions were useful to them; and we may even say -that the new outlying fortification, inclosing the Temenites, -proved their salvation in the coming siege, by so lengthening the -circumvallation necessary for the Athenians to<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_229">[p. 229]</span> construct, that Gylippus had time to -arrive before it was finished. But there was one farther precaution -which the Syracusans omitted at this moment, when it was open to -them without any hindrance, to occupy and fortify the Euryâlus, or -the summit of the hill of Epipolæ. Had they done this now, probably -the Athenians could never have made progress with their lines of -circumvallation: but they did not think of it until too late, as we -shall presently see.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless it is important to remark, in reference to the -general scheme of Athenian operations in Sicily, that if Nikias -had adopted the plan originally recommended by Lamachus, or if -he had begun his permanent besieging operations against Syracuse -in the summer or autumn of 415 <small>B.C.</small>, -instead of postponing them, as he actually did, to the spring of -414 <small>B.C.</small>, he would have found none of -these additional defences to contend against, and the line of -circumvallation necessary for his purpose would have been shorter -and easier. Besides these permanent and irreparable disadvantages, -his winter’s inaction at Naxos drew upon him the farther insult, -that the Syracusans marched to his former quarters at Katana and -burned the tents which they found standing, ravaging at the same time -the neighboring fields.<a id="FNanchor_342" href="#Footnote_342" -class="fnanchor">[342]</a></p> - -<p>Kamarina maintained an equivocal policy which made both parties -hope to gain it; and in the course of this winter the Athenian envoy -Euphêmus with others was sent thither to propose a renewal of that -alliance, between the city and Athens, which had been concluded -ten years before. Hermokratês the Syracusan went to counteract his -object; and both of them, according to Grecian custom, were admitted -to address the public assembly.</p> - -<p>Hermokratês began by denouncing the views, designs, and past -history of Athens. He did not, he said, fear her power, provided the -Sicilian cities were united and true to each other: even against -Syracuse alone, the hasty retreat of the Athenians after the recent -battle had shown how little they confided in their own strength. What -he did fear, was, the delusive promises and insinuations of Athens, -tending to disunite the island, and to paralyze all joint resistance. -Every one knew that her purpose in this expedition was to subjugate -all Sicily,—that Leontini and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_230">[p. -230]</span> Egesta served merely as convenient pretences to put -forward,—and that she could have no sincere sympathy for Chalkidians -in Sicily, when she herself held in slavery the Chalkidians in Eubœa. -It was, in truth, nothing else but an extension of the same scheme -of rapacious ambition, whereby she had reduced her Ionian allies and -kinsmen to their present wretched slavery, now threatened against -Sicily. The Sicilians could not too speedily show her that they -were no Ionians, made to be transferred from one master to another, -but autonomous Dorians from the centre of autonomy, Peloponnesus. -It would be madness to forfeit this honorable position through -jealousy or lukewarmness among themselves. Let not the Kamarinæans -imagine that Athens was striking her blow at Syracuse alone: they -were themselves next neighbors of Syracuse, and would be the first -victims if she were conquered. They might wish, from apprehension or -envy, to see the superior power of Syracuse humbled, but this could -not happen without endangering their own existence. They ought to do -for her what they would have asked her to do if the Athenians had -invaded Kamarina, instead of lending merely nominal aid, as they had -hitherto done. Their former alliance with Athens was for purposes -of mutual defence, not binding them to aid her in schemes of pure -aggression. To hold aloof, give fair words to both parties, and leave -Syracuse to fight the battle of Sicily single-handed, was as unjust -as it was dishonorable. If she came off victor in the struggle, she -would take care that the Kamarinæans should be no gainers by such -a policy. The state of affairs was so plain, that he (Hermokratês) -could not pretend to enlighten them: but he solemnly appealed to -their sentiments of common blood and lineage. The Dorians of Syracuse -were assailed by their eternal enemies the Ionians, and ought not -to be now betrayed by their own brother Dorians of Kamarina.<a -id="FNanchor_343" href="#Footnote_343" class="fnanchor">[343]</a></p> - -<p>Euphêmus, in reply, explained the proceedings of Athens in -reference to her empire, and vindicated her against the charges of -Hermokratês. Though addressing a Dorian assembly, he did not fear -to take his start from the position laid down by Hermokratês, that -Ionians were the natural enemies of Dorians. Under this feeling -Athens, as an Ionian city, had looked about to<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_231">[p. 231]</span> strengthen herself against the -supremacy of her powerful Dorian neighbors in Peloponnesus. Finding -herself after the repulse of the Persian king at the head of those -Ionians and other Greeks who had just revolted from him, she had made -use of her position as well as of her superior navy to shake off -the illegitimate ascendency of Sparta. Her empire was justified by -regard for her own safety against Sparta, as well as by the immense -superiority of her maritime efforts in the rescue of Greece from -the Persians. Even in reference to her allies, she had good ground -for reducing them to subjection, because they had made themselves -the instruments and auxiliaries of the Persian king in his attempt -to conquer her. Prudential views for assured safety to herself had -thus led her to the acquisition of her present empire, and the same -views now brought her to Sicily. He was prepared to show that the -interests of Kamarina were in full accordance with those of Athens. -The main purpose of Athens in Sicily was to prevent her Sicilian -enemies from sending aid to her Peloponnesian enemies, to accomplish -which, powerful Sicilian allies were indispensable to her. To -enfeeble or subjugate her Sicilian allies would be folly: if she did -this, they would not serve her purpose of keeping the Syracusans -employed in their own island. Hence her desire to reëstablish the -expatriated Leontines, powerful and free, though she retained the -Chalkidians in Eubœa as subjects. Near home, she wanted nothing but -subjects, disarmed and tribute-paying, while in Sicily, she required -independent and efficient allies; so that the double conduct, which -Hermokratês reproached as inconsistent, proceeded from one and the -same root of public prudence. Pursuant to that motive, Athens dealt -differently with her different allies, according to the circumstances -of each. Thus, she respected the autonomy of Chios and Methymna, and -maintained equal relations with other islanders near Peloponnesus; -and such were the relations which she now wished to establish in -Sicily.</p> - -<p>No: it was Syracuse, not Athens, whom the Kamarinæans and other -Sicilians had really ground to fear. Syracuse was aiming at the -acquisition of imperial sway over the island; and that which she had -already done towards the Leontines showed what she was prepared to do -when the time came, against Kamarina and others. It was under this -apprehension that the Kamari<span class="pagenum" id="Page_232">[p. -232]</span>næans had formerly invited Athens into Sicily: it would -be alike unjust and impolitic were they now to repudiate her aid, -for she could accomplish nothing without them; if they did so on the -present occasion, they would repent it hereafter when exposed to -the hostility of a constant encroaching neighbor, and when Athenian -auxiliaries could not again be had. He repelled the imputations -which Hermokratês had cast upon Athens, but the Kamarinæans were -not sitting as judges or censors upon her merits. It was for -them to consider whether that meddlesome disposition, with which -Athens was reproached, was not highly beneficial as the terror of -oppressors, and the shield of weaker states, throughout Greece. He -now tendered it to the Kamarinæans as their only security against -Syracuse; calling upon them, instead of living in perpetual fear -of her aggression, to seize the present opportunity of attacking -her on an equal footing, jointly with Athens.<a id="FNanchor_344" -href="#Footnote_344" class="fnanchor">[344]</a></p> - -<p>In these two remarkable speeches, we find Hermokratês renewing -substantially the same line of counsel as he had taken up ten years -before at the congress of Gela, to settle all Sicilian differences at -home, and above all things to keep out the intervention of Athens; -who if she once got footing in Sicily, would never rest until she -reduced all the cities successively. This was the natural point of -view for a Syracusan politician; but by no means equally natural, -nor equally conclusive, for an inhabitant of one of the secondary -Sicilian cities, especially of the conterminous Kamarina. And the -oration of Euphêmus is an able pleading to demonstrate that the -Kamarinæans had far more to fear from Syracuse than from Athens. -His arguments to this point are at least highly plausible, if not -convincing: but he seems to lay himself open to attack from the -opposite quarter. If Athens cannot hope to gain any subjects in -Sicily, what motive has she for interfering? This Euphêmus meets -by contending that if she does not interfere, the Syracusans and -their allies will come across and render assistance to the enemies -of Athens in Peloponnesus. It is manifest, however, that under the -actual circumstances of the time, Athens could have no real fears -of this nature, and that her real motives for meddling in Sicily -were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_233">[p. 233]</span> those of -hope and encroachment, not of self-defence. But it shows how little -likely such hopes were to be realized, and therefore how ill-advised -the whole plan of interference in Sicily was,—that the Athenian envoy -could say to the Kamarinæans, in the same strain as Nikias had spoken -at Athens when combating the wisdom of the expedition: “Such is the -distance of Sicily from Athens, and such the difficulty of guarding -cities of great force and ample territory combined, that if we wished -to hold you Sicilians as subjects, we should be unable to do it: we -can only retain you as free and powerful allies.”<a id="FNanchor_345" -href="#Footnote_345" class="fnanchor">[345]</a> What Nikias said -at Athens to dissuade his countrymen from the enterprise, under -sincere conviction, Euphêmus repeated at Kamarina for the purpose -of conciliating that city; probably, without believing it himself, -yet the anticipation was not on that account the less true and -reasonable.</p> - -<p>The Kamarinæans felt the force of both speeches, from Hermokratês -and Euphêmus. Their inclinations carried them towards the Athenians, -yet not without a certain misgiving in case Athens should prove -completely successful. Towards the Syracusans, on the contrary, they -entertained nothing but unqualified apprehension, and jealousy of -very ancient date; and even now their great fear was, of probable -suffering, if the Syracusans succeeded against Athens without their -coöperation. In this dilemma, they thought it safest to give an -evasive answer, of friendly sentiment towards both parties, but -refusal of aid to either; hoping thus to avoid an inexpiable breach, -whichever way the ultimate success might turn.<a id="FNanchor_346" -href="#Footnote_346" class="fnanchor">[346]</a></p> - -<p>For a city comparatively weak and situated like Kamarina, -such was perhaps the least hazardous policy. In December, 415 -<small>B.C.</small>, no human being could venture to predict how -the struggle between Nikias and the Syracusans in the coming year -would turn out; nor were the Kamarinæans prompted by any hearty -feeling to take the extreme chances with either party. Matters -had borne<span class="pagenum" id="Page_234">[p. 234]</span> a -different aspect, indeed, in the preceding month of July 415 <small>B.C.</small>, when the Athenians first arrived. Had -the vigorous policy urged by Lamachus been then followed up, the -Athenians would always have appeared likely to succeed, if, indeed, -they had not already become conquerors of Syracuse; so that waverers -like the Kamarinæans would have remained attached to them from -policy. The best way to obtain allies, Lamachus had contended, was, -to be prompt and decisive in action, and to strike at the capital -point at once, while the intimidating effect of their arrival -was fresh. Of the value of his advice, an emphatic illustration -is afforded by the conduct of Kamarina.<a id="FNanchor_347" -href="#Footnote_347" class="fnanchor">[347]</a></p> - -<p>Throughout the rest of the winter, Nikias did little or nothing. -He merely despatched envoys for the purpose of conciliating the -Sikels in the interior, where the autonomous Sikels, who dwelt in -the central regions of the island, for the most part declared in -his favor,—especially the powerful Sikel prince Archônidês,—sending -provisions and even money to the camp at Naxos. Against some -refractory tribes, Nikias sent detachments for purposes of -compulsion; while the Syracusans on their part did the like to -counteract him. Such Sikel tribes as had become dependents of -Syracuse, stood aloof from the struggle. As the spring approached, -Nikias transferred his position from Naxos to Katana, reëstablishing -that camp which the Syracusans had destroyed.<a id="FNanchor_348" -href="#Footnote_348" class="fnanchor">[348]</a></p> - -<p>He farther sent a trireme to Carthage, to invite coöperation from -that city; and a second to the Tyrrhenian maritime cities on the -southern coast of Italy, some of whom had proffered to him their -services, as ancient enemies of Syracuse, and now realized their -promises. From Carthage nothing was obtained; why, we do not know; -for we shall find the Carthaginians, six years hence, invading -Sicily with prodigious forces; and if they entertained any such -intentions, it would seem that the presence of Nikias in Sicily must -have presented the most convenient moment for executing them. To the -Sikels, Egestæans, and all the other allies of Athens, Nikias sent -orders for bricks, iron bars, clamps, and everything suitable for the -wall of circumvallation, which was to be commenced with the first -burst of spring.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_235">[p. 235]</span></p> - -<p>While such preparations were going on in Sicily, debates of -portentous promise took place at Sparta. Immediately after the -battle near the Olympieion, and the retreat of Nikias into winter -quarters, the Syracusans had despatched envoys to Peloponnesus to -solicit reinforcements. Here, again, we are compelled to notice -the lamentable consequences arising out of the inaction of Nikias. -Had he commenced the siege of Syracuse on his first arrival, it -may be doubted whether any such envoys would have been sent to -Peloponnesus at all; at any rate, they would not have arrived in time -to produce decisive effects.<a id="FNanchor_349" href="#Footnote_349" -class="fnanchor">[349]</a> After exerting what influence they could -upon the Italian Greeks in their voyage, the Syracusan envoys reached -Corinth, where they found the warmest reception and obtained promises -of speedy succor. The Corinthians furnished envoys of their own to -accompany them to Sparta, and to back their request for Lacedæmonian -aid.</p> - -<p>They found at the congress at Sparta another advocate upon -whom they could not reasonably have counted, Alkibiadês. That -exile had crossed over from Thurii to the Eleian port of Kyllênê -in Peloponnesus in a merchant-vessel,<a id="FNanchor_350" -href="#Footnote_350" class="fnanchor">[350]</a> and now appeared -at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_236">[p. 236]</span> Sparta on -special invitation and safe-conduct from the Lacedæmonians; of whom -he was at first vehemently afraid, in consequence of having raised -against them that Peloponnesian combination which had given them so -much trouble before the battle of Mantineia. He now appeared, too, -burning with hostility against his country, and eager to inflict -upon her all the mischief in his power. Having been the chief evil -genius to plunge her, mainly for selfish ends of his own, into -this ill-starred venture, he was now about to do his best to turn -it into her irreparable ruin. His fiery stimulus, and unmeasured -exaggerations, supplied what was wanting in Corinthian and Syracusan -eloquence, and inflamed the tardy good-will of the Spartan ephors -into comparative decision and activity.<a id="FNanchor_351" -href="#Footnote_351" class="fnanchor">[351]</a> His harangue in the -Spartan congress is given to us by Thucydidês, who may possibly -have heard it, as he was then himself in exile. Like the earlier -speech which he puts into the mouth of Alkibiadês at Athens, it is -characteristic in a high degree; and interesting in another point of -view as the latest composed speech of any length which we find in his -history. I give here the substance, without professing to translate -the words.</p> - -<p>“First, I must address you, Lacedæmonians, respecting the -prejudices current against me personally, before I can hope to find -a fair hearing on public matters. You know it was I, who renewed -my public connection with Sparta, after my ancestors before me -had quarrelled with you and renounced it. Moreover, I assiduously -cultivated your favor on all points, especially by attentions to -your prisoners at Athens: but while I was showing all this zeal -towards you, you took the opportunity of the peace which you made -with Athens to employ my enemies as your agents, thus strengthening -their hands, and dishonoring me. It was this conduct of yours which -drove me to unite with the Argeians and Mantineians; nor ought you to -be angry with me for mischief which you thus drew upon yourselves. -Probably some of you hate me too, without any good reason, as a -forward partisan of democracy. My family were always opposed to the -Pei<span class="pagenum" id="Page_237">[p. 237]</span>sistratid -despots; and as all opposition to a reigning dynasty takes the -name of The People, so from that time forward we continued to act -as leaders of the people.<a id="FNanchor_352" href="#Footnote_352" -class="fnanchor">[352]</a> Moreover, our established constitution -was a democracy, so that I had no choice but to obey, though I did -my best to maintain a moderate line of political conduct in the -midst of the reigning license. It was not my family, but others, -who in former times as well as now, led the people into the worst -courses, those same men who sent me into exile. I always acted as -leader, not of a party, but of the entire city; thinking it right to -uphold that constitution in which Athens had enjoyed her grandeur -and freedom, and which I found already existing.<a id="FNanchor_353" -href="#Footnote_353" class="fnanchor">[353]</a> For as to democracy, -all we Athenians of common sense well knew its real character. -Personally, I have better reason than any one else to rail against -it, if one <i>could</i> say anything new about such confessed folly; but -I did not think it safe to change the government, while you were -standing by as enemies.</p> - -<p>“So much as to myself personally: I shall now talk to you about -the business of the meeting, and tell you something more than you -yet know. Our purpose in sailing from Athens, was, first to conquer -the Sicilian Greeks; next, the Italian Greeks; afterwards, to make -an attempt on the Carthaginian empire and on Carthage herself. If -all or most of this succeeded, we were then to attack Peloponnesus. -We intended to bring to this enterprise the entire power of the -Sicilian and Italian Greeks, besides large numbers of Iberian and -other warlike barbaric mer<span class="pagenum" id="Page_238">[p. -238]</span>cenaries, together with many new triremes built from the -abundant forests of Italy, and large supplies both of treasure and -provision. We could thus blockade Peloponnesus all round with our -fleet, and at the same time assail it with our land-force; and we -calculated, by taking some towns by storm and occupying others as -permanent fortified positions, that we should easily conquer the -whole peninsula, and then become undisputed masters of Greece. You -thus hear the whole scheme of our expedition from the man who knows -it best; and you may depend on it that the remaining generals will -execute all this, if they can. Nothing but your intervention can -hinder them. If, indeed, the Sicilian Greeks were all united, they -might hold out; but the Syracusans standing alone cannot, beaten as -they already have been in a general action, and blocked up as they -are by sea. If Syracuse falls into the hands of the Athenians, all -Sicily and all Italy will share the same fate; and the danger which I -have described will be soon upon you.</p> - -<p>“It is not therefore simply for the safety of Sicily,—it is for -the safety of Peloponnesus,—that I now urge you to send across, -forthwith, a fleet with an army of hoplites as rowers; and what I -consider still more important than an army, a Spartan general to -take the supreme command. Moreover, you must also carry on declared -and vigorous war against Athens here, that the Syracusans may be -encouraged to hold out, and that Athens may be in no condition to -send additional reinforcements thither. You must farther fortify -and permanently garrison Dekeleia in Attica:<a id="FNanchor_354" -href="#Footnote_354" class="fnanchor">[354]</a> that is the -contingency which the Athenians have always been most afraid of, and -which therefore you may know to be your best policy. You will thus -get into your own hands the live and dead stock of Attica, interrupt -the working of the silver mines at Laureion, deprive the Athenians of -their profits from judicial fines as well as of their landed revenue, -and dispose the subject-allies to withhold their tribute.</p> - -<p>“None of you ought to think the worse of me because I make -this vigorous onset upon my country in conjunction with her<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_239">[p. 239]</span> enemies, I who once -passed for a patriot.<a id="FNanchor_355" href="#Footnote_355" -class="fnanchor">[355]</a> Nor ought you to mistrust my assurances, -as coming from the reckless passion of an exile. The worst enemies -of Athens are not those who make open war like you, but those -who drive her best friends into hostility. I loved my country,<a -id="FNanchor_356" href="#Footnote_356" class="fnanchor">[356]</a> -while I was secure as a citizen; I love her no more, now that I am -wronged. In fact, I do not conceive myself to be assailing a country -still mine; I am rather trying to win back a country now lost to me. -The real patriot is not he, who, having unjustly lost his country, -acquiesces in patience, but he whose ardor makes him try every means -to regain her.</p> - -<p>“Employ me without fear, Lacedæmonians, in any service of danger -or suffering; the more harm I did you formerly as an enemy, the -more good I can now do you as a friend. But above all, do not -shrink back from instant operations both in Sicily and in Attica, -upon which so much depends. You will thus put down the power of -Athens, present as well as future; you will dwell yourselves in -safety; and you will become the leaders of undivided Hellas, by free -consent and without force.”<a id="FNanchor_357" href="#Footnote_357" -class="fnanchor">[357]</a></p> - -<p>Enormous consequences turned upon this speech, no less masterly -in reference to the purpose and the audience, than infamous as an -indication of the character of the speaker. If its contents became -known at Athens, as they probably did, the enemies of Alkibiadês -would be supplied with a justification of their most violent -political attacks. That imputation which they had taken so much -pains to fasten upon him, citing in proof of it alike his profligate -expenditure, overbearing insolence, and derision of the religious -ceremonies of the state,<a id="FNanchor_358" href="#Footnote_358" -class="fnanchor">[358]</a>—that he detested the democracy in his -heart, submitted to it only from necessity, and was watching for -the first safe opportunity of subverting it,—appears here in -his own language as matter of avowal and<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_240">[p. 240]</span> boast. The sentence of condemnation -against him would now be unanimously approved, even by those who -at the time had deprecated it; and the people would be more firmly -persuaded than before of the reality of the association between -irreligious manifestations and treasonable designs. Doubtless the -inferences so drawn from the speech would be unsound, because it -represented, not the actual past sentiments of Alkibiadês, but those -to which he now found it convenient to lay claim. As far as so very -selfish a politician could be said to have any preference, democracy -was, in some respects, more convenient to him than oligarchy. -Though offensive to his taste, it held out larger prospects to -his love of show, his adventurous ambition, and his rapacity for -foreign plunder; while under an oligarchy, the jealous restraints -and repulses imposed on him by a few equals, would be perhaps more -galling to his temper than those arising from the whole people.<a -id="FNanchor_359" href="#Footnote_359" class="fnanchor">[359]</a> -He takes credit in his speech for moderation, as opposed to the -standing license of democracy. But this is a pretence absurd even to -extravagance, and which Athenians of all parties would have listened -to with astonishment. Such license as that of Alkibiadês had never -been seen at Athens; and it was the adventurous instincts of the -democracy towards foreign conquest, combined with their imperfect -apprehension of the limits and conditions under which alone their -empire could be permanently maintained, which he stimulated up to the -highest point, and then made use of for his own power and profit. As -against himself, he had reason for accusing his political enemies -of unworthy manœuvres, and even of gross political wickedness, if -they were authors or accomplices—as seems probable of some—in the -mutilation of the Hermæ. But most certainly, their public advice to -the commonwealth was far less mischievous than his. And if we are to -strike the balance of personal political merit between Alkibiadês -and his enemies, we must take into the comparison his fraud upon the -simplicity of the Lacedæmonian envoys, recounted in the last chapter -but one of this History.</p> - -<p>If, then, that portion of the speech of Alkibiadês, wherein -he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_241">[p. 241]</span> touches upon -Athenian politics and his own past conduct, is not to be taken as -historical evidence, just as little can we trust the following -portion in which he professes to describe the real purposes of Athens -in her Sicilian expedition. That any such vast designs as those which -he announces were ever really contemplated even by himself and his -immediate friends, is very improbable; that they were contemplated -by the Athenian public, by the armament, or by Nikias, is utterly -incredible. The tardiness and timid movements of the armament—during -the first eight months after arriving at Rhegium—recommended by -Nikias, partially admitted even by Alkibiadês, opposed only by the -unavailing wisdom of Lamachus, and not strongly censured when known -at Athens, conspire to prove that their minds were not at first -fully made up even to the siege of Syracuse; that they counted on -alliances and money in Sicily which they did not find; and that -those who sailed from Athens with large hopes of brilliant and easy -conquest were soon taught to see the reality with different eyes. -If Alkibiadês had himself conceived at Athens the designs which he -professed to reveal in his speech at Sparta, there can be no doubt -that he would have espoused the scheme of Lamachus, or rather would -have originated it himself. We find him, indeed, in his speech -delivered at Athens before the determination to sail, holding out -hopes that by means of conquests in Sicily, Athens might become -mistress of all Greece. But this is there put as an alternative and -as a favorable possibility, is noticed only in one place, without -expansion or amplification, and shows that the speaker did not reckon -upon finding any such expectations prevalent among his hearers. -Alkibiadês could not have ventured to promise, in his discourse -at Athens, the results which he afterwards talked of at Sparta as -having been actually contemplated,—Sicily, Italy, Carthage, Iberian -mercenaries, etc., all ending in a blockading fleet large enough to -gird round Peloponnesus.<a id="FNanchor_360" href="#Footnote_360" -class="fnanchor">[360]</a> Had he put forth such promises, the charge -of juvenile folly which Nikias urged against him would probably have -been believed by every one. His speech at Sparta, though it has -passed with some as a fragment of true Grecian<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_242">[p. 242]</span> history, is in truth little better -than a gigantic romance dressed up to alarm his audience.<a -id="FNanchor_361" href="#Footnote_361" class="fnanchor">[361]</a></p> - -<p>Intended for this purpose, it was eminently suitable and -effective. The Lacedæmonians had already been partly moved by the -representations from Corinth and Syracuse, and were even prepared -to send envoys to the latter place with encouragement to hold out -against Athens. But the Peace of Nikias and the alliance succeeding -it, still subsisted between Athens and Sparta. It had indeed been -partially and indirectly violated in many ways, but both the -contracting parties still considered it as subsisting, nor would -either of them yet consent to break their oaths openly and avowedly. -For this reason—as well as from the distance of Sicily, great even -in the estimation of the more nautical Athenians—the ephors could -not yet make up their minds to despatch thither any positive aid. -It was exactly in this point of hesitation between the will and the -deed that the energetic and vindictive exile from Athens found them. -His flaming picture of the danger impending,—brought home to their -own doors, and appearing to proceed from the best informed of all -witnesses,—overcame their reluctance at once; while he at the same -time pointed out the precise steps whereby their interference would -be rendered of most avail. The transfer of Alkibiadês to Sparta -thus reverses the superiority of force between the two contending -chiefs of Greece: “Momentumque fuit mutatus Curio rerum.”<a -id="FNanchor_362" href="#Footnote_362" class="fnanchor">[362]</a> He -had not yet shown his power of doing his country good, as we shall -find him hereafter engaged, during the later years of the war: his -first achievements were but too successful in doing her harm.</p> - -<p>The Lacedæmonians forthwith resolved to send an auxiliary force -to Syracuse. But as this could not be done before the spring, they -nominated Gylippus commander, directing him to proceed thither -without delay, and to take counsel with the Corinthians for -operations as speedily as the case admitted.<a id="FNanchor_363" -href="#Footnote_363" class="fnanchor">[363]</a> We do not know that -Gylippus had as yet given any positive evidence of that consummate -skill and activity which we shall presently be called upon to -describe. He was probably chosen on account<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_243">[p. 243]</span> of his superior acquaintance with -the circumstances of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks; since his -father Kleandridas, after having been banished from Sparta fourteen -years before the Peloponnesian war for taking Athenian bribes, -had been domiciliated as a citizen at Thurii.<a id="FNanchor_364" -href="#Footnote_364" class="fnanchor">[364]</a> Gylippus desired the -Corinthians to send immediately two triremes for him to Asinê, in the -Messenian gulf, and to prepare as many others as their docks could -furnish.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="Chap_59"> - <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LIX.<br /> - FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE OF SYRACUSE BY NIKIAS, DOWN TO - THE SECOND ATHENIAN EXPEDITION UNDER DEMOSTHENES, AND THE RESUMPTION - OF THE GENERAL WAR.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span> -Athenian troops at Katana, probably tired of inaction, were put -in motion in the early spring, even before the arrival of the -reinforcements from Athens, and sailed to the deserted walls of -Megara, not far from Syracuse, which the Syracusans had recently -garrisoned. Having in vain attacked the Syracusan garrison, and -laid waste the neighboring fields, they reëmbarked, landed again -for similar purposes at the mouth of the river Terias, and then, -after an insignificant skirmish, returned to Katana. An expedition -into the interior of the island procured for them the alliance of -the Sikel town of Kentoripa; and the cavalry being now arrived from -Athens, they prepared for operations against Syracuse. Nikias had -received from Athens two hundred and fifty horsemen fully equipped, -for whom horses were to be procured in Sicily,<a id="FNanchor_365" -href="#Footnote_365" class="fnanchor">[365]</a> thirty horse-bowmen, -and three<span class="pagenum" id="Page_244">[p. 244]</span> hundred -talents in money. He was not long in furnishing them with horses -from Egesta and Katana, from which cities he also received some -farther cavalry, so that he was presently able to muster six hundred -and fifty cavalry in all.<a id="FNanchor_366" href="#Footnote_366" -class="fnanchor">[366]</a></p> - -<p>Even before this cavalry could be mounted, Nikias made his first -approach to Syracuse. For the Syracusan generals on their side, -apprized of the arrival of the reinforcement from Athens, and aware -that besieging operations were on the point of being commenced, now -thought it necessary to take the precaution of occupying and guarding -the roads of access to the high ground of Epipolæ which overhung -their outer city.</p> - -<p>Syracuse consisted at this time of two parts, an inner and outer -city. The former was comprised in the island of Ortygia, the original -settlement founded by Archias, and within which the modern city is -at this moment included: the latter or outer city, afterwards known -by the name of Achradina, occupied the high ground of the peninsula -north of Ortygia, but does not seem to have joined the inner city, or -to have been comprised in the same fortification. This outer city was -defended, on the north and east, by the sea, with rocks presenting -great difficulties of landing, and by a sea-wall; so that on these -sides it was out of the reach of attack. Its wall on the land-side, -beginning from the sea somewhat eastward of the entrance of the cleft -now called Santa Bonagia, or Panagia, ran in a direction westward of -south as far as the termination of the high ground of Achradina, and -then turned eastward along the stone quarries now known as those of -the Capucins and Novanteris, where the ground is in part so steep, -that probably little fortification was needed. This fortified high -land of Achradina thus constituted the outer city; while the lower -ground, situated between it and the inner city, or Ortygia, seems at -this time not to have been included in the fortifications of either, -but was employed (and probably had been employed even from the first -settlement in the island), partly for religious processions, games, -and other multitudinous ceremonies; partly for the burial of the -dead, which, according to invariable Grecian custom, was performed -without the walls of the city. Extensive catacombs yet remain to mark -the length of time during which this ancient Nekropolis served its -purpose.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_245">[p. 245]</span></p> - -<p>To the northwest of the outer city wall, in the direction of the -port called Trogilus, stood an unfortified suburb which afterwards -became enlarged into the distinct walled town of Tychê. West of -the southern part of the same outer city wall, nearly southwest -of the outer city itself, stood another suburb, afterwards known -and fortified as Neapolis, but deriving its name, in the year 415 -<small>B.C.</small>, from having within it the statue -and consecrated ground of Apollo Temenitês,<a id="FNanchor_367" -href="#Footnote_367" class="fnanchor">[367]</a> which stood a little -way up on the ascent of the hill of Epipolæ, and stretching from -thence down southward in the direction of the Great Harbor. Between -these two suburbs lay a broad open space, the ground rising in -gradual acclivity from Achradina to the westward, and diminishing -in breadth as it rose higher, until at length it ended in a small -conical mound, called in modern times the Belvedere. This acclivity -formed the eastern ascent of the long ridge of high ground called -Epipolæ. It was a triangle upon an inclined plane, of which Achradina -was the base: to the north as well as to the south, it was suddenly -broken off by lines of limestone cliff (forming the sides of the -triangle), about fifteen or twenty feet high, and quite precipitous, -except in some few openings made for convenient ascent. From the -western point or apex of the triangle, the descent was easy and -gradual—excepting two or three special mounds, or cliffs—towards the -city, the interior of which was visible from this outer slope.</p> - -<p>According to the warfare of that time, Nikias could only take -Syracuse by building a wall of circumvallation so as to cut off -its supplies by land, and at the same time blockading it by sea. -Now looking at the inner and outer city as above described, at the -moment when he first reached Sicily, we see that—after defeating -the Syracusans and driving them within their walls, which would be -of course the first part of the process—he might have carried his -blockading wall in a direction nearly southerly from the innermost -point of the cleft of Santa Bonagia, between the city wall and the -Temenitês so as to reach the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_246">[p. -246]</span> Great Harbor at a spot not far westward of the junction -of Ortygia with the main land. Or he might have landed in the Great -Harbor, and executed the same wall, beginning from the opposite -end. Or he might have preferred to construct two blockading walls, -one for each city separately: a short wall would have sufficed in -front of the isthmus joining Ortygia, while a separate wall might -have been carried to shut up the outer city, across the unfortified -space constituting the Nekropolis, so as to end not in the Great -Harbor, but in the coast of the Nekropolis opposite to Ortygia. Such -were the possibilities of the case at the time when Nikias first -reached Rhegium. But during the many months of inaction which he had -allowed, the Syracusans had barred out both these possibilities, and -had greatly augmented the difficulties of his intended enterprise. -They had constructed a new wall, covering both their inner and -their outer city,—stretching across the whole front which faced -the slope of Epipolæ, from the Great Harbor to the opposite sea -near Santa Bonagia,—and expanding westward so as to include within -it the statue and consecrated ground of Apollo Temenitês, with -the cliff near adjoining to it known by the name of the Temenite -Cliff. This was done for the express purpose of lengthening the line -indispensable for the besiegers to make their wall a good blockade.<a -id="FNanchor_368" href="#Footnote_368" class="fnanchor">[368]</a> -After it was finished, Nikias could not begin his blockade from the -side of the Great Harbor, since he would have been obstructed by the -precipitous southern cliff of Epipolæ. He was under the necessity of -beginning his wall from a portion of the higher ground of Epipolæ, -and of carrying it both along a greater space and higher up on the -slope, until he touched the Great Harbor at a point farther removed -from Ortygia.</p> - -<p>Syracuse having thus become assailable only from the side of -Epipolæ, the necessity so created for carrying on operations much -higher up on the slope, gave to the summit of that eminence a -greater importance than it had before possessed. Nikias, doubtless -furnished with good local information by the exiles, seems to<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_247">[p. 247]</span> have made this -discovery earlier than the Syracusan generals, who—having been -occupied in augmenting their defences on another point, where they -were yet more vulnerable—did not make it until immediately before -the opening of the spring campaign. It was at that critical moment -that they proclaimed a full muster, for break of day, in the low -mead on the left bank of the Anapus. After an inspection of arms, -and probably final distribution of forces for the approaching -struggle, a chosen regiment of six hundred hoplites was placed under -the orders of an Andrian exile named Diomilus, in order to act as -garrison of Epipolæ, as well as to be in constant readiness wherever -they might be wanted.<a id="FNanchor_369" href="#Footnote_369" -class="fnanchor">[369]</a> These men were intended to occupy the -strong ground on the summit of the hill, and thus obstruct all the -various approaches to it, seemingly not many in number, and all -narrow.</p> - -<p>But before they had yet left their muster, to march to the -summit, intelligence reached them that the Athenians were already -in possession of it. Nikias and Lamachus, putting their troops -on board at Katana, had sailed during the preceding night to a -landing-place not far from a place called Leon, or the Lion, which -was only six or seven furlongs from Epipolæ, and seems to have -lain between Megara and the peninsula of Thapsus. They here landed -their hoplites, and placed their fleet in safety under cover of a -palisade across the narrow isthmus of Thapsus, before day and before -the Syracusans had any intimation of their arrival. Their hoplites -immediately moved forward with rapid step to ascend Epipolæ, mounting -seemingly from the northeast, by the side towards Megara and farthest -removed from Syracuse; so that they first reached the summit called -Euryalus, near the apex of the triangle above described. From -hence they commanded the slope of Epipolæ beneath them, and the -town of Syracuse to the eastward. They were presently attacked by -the Syracusans, who broke up their muster in the mead as soon as -they heard the news. But as the road by which they had to march, -approaching Euryalus from the southwest, was circuitous, and hardly -less than three English miles in length, they had the mortification -of seeing that the Athenians were already masters of the position; -and when they hastened up to retake it, the rapid pace had so<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_248">[p. 248]</span> disordered their ranks, -that the Athenians attacked them at great advantage, besides having -the higher ground. The Syracusans were driven back to their city -with loss, Diomilus with half his regiment being slain; while the -Athenians remained masters of the high ground of Euryalus, as well -as of the upper portion of the slope of Epipolæ.<a id="FNanchor_370" -href="#Footnote_370" class="fnanchor">[370]</a></p> - -<p>This was a most important advantage; indeed, seemingly essential -to the successful prosecution of the siege. It was gained by a plan -both well laid and well executed, grounded upon the omission of the -Syracusans to occupy a post of which they did not at first perceive -the importance, and which in fact only acquired its preëminent -importance from the new enlargement made by the Syracusans in -their fortifications. To that extent, therefore, it depended upon -a favorable accident which could not have been reasonably expected -to occur. The capture of Syracuse was certain, upon the supposition -that the attack and siege of the city had been commenced on the -first arrival of the Athenians in the island, without giving time -for any improvement in its defensibility. But the moment such delay -was allowed, success ceased to be certain, depending more or less -upon this favorable turn of accident. The Syracusans actually did -a great deal to create additional difficulty to the besiegers, and -might have done more, especially in regard to the occupation of -the high ground above Epipolæ. Had they taken this precaution, the -effective prosecution of the siege would have been rendered extremely -difficult, if not completely frustrated.</p> - -<p>On the next morning, Nikias and Lamachus marched their army down -the slope of Epipolæ near to the Syracusan walls, and offered battle, -which the enemy did not accept. They then withdrew the Athenian -troops; after which their first operation was to construct a fort on -the high ground called Labdalum, near the western end of the upper -northern cliffs bordering Epipolæ, on the brink of the cliff, and -looking northward towards Megara. This was intended as a place of -security wherein both treasures and stores might be deposited, so as -to leave the army unencumbered in its motions. The Athenian cavalry -being now completed by the new arrivals from Egesta, Nikias descended -from Labda<span class="pagenum" id="Page_249">[p. 249]</span>lum -to a new position called Sykê, lower down on Epipolæ, seemingly -about midway between the northern and southern cliffs. He here -constructed, with as much rapidity as possible, a walled inclosure, -called the Circle, intended as a centre from whence the projected -wall of circumvallation was to start northward towards the sea at -Trogilus, southward towards the Great Harbor. This Circle appears -to have covered a considerable space, and was farther protected by -an outwork in front covering an area of one thousand square feet.<a -id="FNanchor_371" href="#Footnote_371" class="fnanchor">[371]</a> -Astounded at the rapidity with which the Athenians executed -this construction,<a id="FNanchor_372" href="#Footnote_372" -class="fnanchor">[372]</a> the Syracusans marched their forces out, -and prepared to give battle in order to interrupt it. But when the -Athenians, relinquishing the work, drew up on their side in battle -order, the Syracusan generals were so struck with their manifest -superiority in soldier-like array, as compared with the disorderly -trim of their own ranks, that they withdrew their soldiers back into -the city without venturing to engage; merely leaving a body of horse -to harass the operations of the besiegers, and constrain them to keep -in masses. The newly-acquired Athenian cavalry, however, were here -brought for the first time into effective combat. With the aid of one -tribe of their own hoplites, they charged the Syracusan horse, drove -them off with some loss, and erected their trophy. This is the only -occasion on which we read of the Athenian cavalry being brought into -conflict; though Nikias had made the absence of cavalry the great -reason for his prolonged inaction.</p> - -<p>Interruption being thus checked, Nikias continued his blockading -operations; first completing the Circle,<a id="FNanchor_373" -href="#Footnote_373" class="fnanchor">[373]</a> then beginning<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_250">[p. 250]</span> his wall of -circumvallation in a northerly direction from the Circle towards -Trogilus: for which purpose a portion of his forces were employed in -bringing stones and wood, and depositing them in proper places along -the intended line. So strongly did Hermokratês feel the inferiority -of the Syracusan hoplites in the field, that he discouraged any -fresh general action, and proposed to construct a counter-wall, -or cross-wall, traversing the space along which the Athenian -circumvallation must necessarily be continued so as to impede its -farther progress. A tenable counter-wall, if they could get time to -carry it sufficiently far to a defensible terminus, would completely -defeat the intent of the besiegers: but even if Nikias should -interrupt the work by his attacks, the Syracusans calculated on -being able to provide a sufficient force to repel them, during the -short time necessary for hastily constructing the palisade, or front -outwork. Such palisade would serve them as a temporary defence, while -they finished the more elaborate cross-wall behind it, and would, -even at the worst, compel Nikias to suspend all his proceedings -and employ his whole force to dislodge them.<a id="FNanchor_374" -href="#Footnote_374" class="fnanchor">[374]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_251">[p. 251]</span></p> - -<p>Accordingly, they took their start from the postern-gate near -the grove of Apollo Temenitês; a gate in the new wall, erected four -or five months before, to enlarge the fortified space of the city. -From this point, which was lower down on the slope of Epipolæ than -the Athenian circle, they carried their palisade and counter-wall up -the slope, in a direction calculated to intersect the intended line -of hostile circumvallation southward of the Circle. The nautical -population from Ortygia could be employed in this enterprise, since -the city was still completely undisturbed by sea, and mistress of the -great harbor, the Athenian fleet not having yet moved from Thapsus. -Besides this active crowd of workmen, the sacred olive-trees in the -Temenite grove were cut down to serve as materials; and by such -efforts the work was presently finished to a sufficient distance for -traversing and intercepting the blockading wall intended to come -southward from the Circle. It seems to have terminated at the brink -of the precipitous southern cliff of Epipolæ, which prevented the -Athenians from turning it and attacking it in flank; while it was -defended in front by a stockade and topped with wooden towers for -discharge of missiles. One tribe of hoplites was left to defend it, -while the crowd of Syracusans who had either been employed on the -work or on guard, returned back to the city.</p> - -<p>During all this process, Nikias had not thought it prudent -to interrupt them.<a id="FNanchor_375" href="#Footnote_375" -class="fnanchor">[375]</a> Employed as he seems to have been on the -Circle, and on the wall branching out from his Circle northward, -he was unwilling to march across the slope of Epipolæ to attack -them with half his forces, leaving his own rear exposed to attack -from the numerous Syracusans in the city, and his own Circle<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_252">[p. 252]</span> only partially -guarded. Moreover, by such delay, he was enabled to prosecute -his own part of the circumvallation without hindrance, and to -watch for an opportunity of assaulting the new counter-wall with -advantage. Such an opportunity soon occurred, just at the time when -he had accomplished the farther important object of destroying -the aqueducts, which supplied the city, partially at least, with -water for drinking. The Syracusans appear to have been filled with -confidence, both by the completion of their counter-wall, which -seemed an effective bar to the besiegers, and by his inaction. The -tribe left on guard presently began to relax in their vigilance: -instead of occupying the wall, tents were erected behind it to -shelter them from the midday sun; while some even permitted -themselves to take repose during that hour within the city walls. -Such negligence did not escape the Athenian generals, who silently -prepared an assault for midday. Three hundred chosen hoplites, -with some light troops clothed in panoplies for the occasion, -were instructed to sally out suddenly and run across straight to -attack the stockade and counter-wall; while the main Athenian force -marched in two divisions under Nikias and Lamachus; half towards -the city walls, to prevent any succor from coming out of the gates, -half towards the Temenite postern-gate from whence the stockade -and cross-wall commenced. The rapid forward movement of the chosen -three hundred was crowned with full success. They captured both the -stockade and the counter-wall, feebly defended by its guards; who, -taken by surprise, abandoned their post and fled along behind their -wall to enter the city by the Temenite postern-gate. Before all of -them could get in, however, both the pursuing three hundred, and the -Athenian division which marched straight to that point, had partially -come up with them: so that some of these assailants even forced -their way along with them through the gate into the interior of the -Temenite city wall. Here, however, the Syracusan strength within -was too much for them: these foremost Athenians and Argeians were -thrust out again with loss. But the general movement of the Athenians -had been completely triumphant. They pulled down the counter-wall, -plucked up the palisade, and carried the materials away for the use -of their own circumvallation.</p> - -<p>As the recent Syracusan counter-work had been carried to the<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_253">[p. 253]</span> brink of the southern -cliff, which rendered it unassailable in flank, Nikias was warned of -the necessity of becoming master of this cliff, so as to deprive them -of this resource in future. Accordingly, without staying to finish -his blockading wall, regularly and continuously from the Circle -southward, across the slope of Epipolæ, he left the Circle under a -guard, and marched across at once to take possession of the southern -cliff, at the point where the blockading wall was intended to reach -it. This point of the southern cliff he immediately fortified as -a defensive position, whereby he accomplished two objects. First, -he prevented the Syracusans from again employing the cliff as -a flank defence for a second counter-wall.<a id="FNanchor_376" -href="#Footnote_376" class="fnanchor">[376]</a> Next, he acquired -the means of providing a safe and easy road of communication between -the high ground of Epipolæ and the low marshy ground beneath, -which divided Epipolæ from the Great Harbor, and across which the -Athenian wall of circumvallation must necessarily be presently<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_254">[p. 254]</span> carried. As his troops -would have to carry on simultaneous operations, partly on the high -ground above, partly on the low ground beneath, he could not allow -them to be separated from each other by a precipitous cliff which -would prevent ready mutual assistance. The intermediate space between -the Circle and the fortified point of the cliff, was for the time -left with an unfinished wall, with the intention of coming back to -it, as was in fact afterwards done, and this portion of wall was in -the end completed. The Circle, though isolated, was strong enough -for the time to maintain itself against attack, and was adequately -garrisoned.</p> - -<p>By this new movement, the Syracusans were debarred from carrying -a second counter-wall on the same side of Epipolæ, since the enemy -were masters of the terminating cliff on the southern side of the -slope. They now turned their operations to the lower ground or marsh -between the southern cliff of the Epipolæ and the Great Harbor; -being as yet free on that side, since the Athenian fleet was still -at Thapsus. Across that marsh—and seemingly as far as the river -Anapus, to serve as a flank barrier—they resolved to carry a palisade -work with a ditch, so as to intersect the line which the Athenians -must next pursue in completing the southernmost portion of their -circumvallation. They so pressed the prosecution of this new cross -palisade, beginning from the lower portion of their own city walls, -and stretching in a southwesterly direction across the low ground -as far as the river Anapus, that, by the time the new Athenian -fortification on the cliff was completed, the new Syracusan obstacle -was completed also, and a stockade with a ditch seemed to shut out -the besiegers from reaching the Great Harbor.</p> - -<p>Lamachus overcame the difficulty before him with ability and -bravery. Descending unexpectedly, one morning before daybreak, from -his fort on the cliff of Epipolæ into the low ground beneath,—and -providing his troops with planks and broad gates to bridge over the -marsh where it was scarcely passable,—he contrived to reach and -surprise the palisade with the first dawn of morning. Orders were -at the same time given for the Athenian fleet to sail round from -Thapsus into the Great Harbor, so as to divert the attention of the -enemy, and get on the rear of the new palisade work. But before the -fleet could arrive, the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_255">[p. -255]</span> palisade and ditch had been carried, and its defenders -driven off. A large Syracusan force came out from the city to sustain -them, and retake it, so that a general action now ensued, in the -low ground between the cliff of Epipolæ, the harbor, and the river -Anapus. The superior discipline of the Athenians proved successful: -the Syracusans were defeated and driven back on all sides, so that -their right wing fled into the city, and their left (including the -larger portion of their best force, the horsemen), along the banks -of the river Anapus, to reach the bridge. Flushed with victory, the -Athenians hoped to cut them off from this retreat, and a chosen -body of three hundred hoplites ran fast in hopes of getting to the -bridge first. In this hasty movement they fell into disorder, so -that the Syracusan cavalry turned upon them, put them to flight, -and threw them back upon the Athenian right wing, to which the -fugitives communicated their own panic and disorder. The fate of the -battle appeared to be turning against the Athenians, when Lamachus, -who was on the left wing, hastened to their aid with the Argeian -hoplites and as many bowmen as he could collect. His ardor carried -him incautiously forward, so that he crossed a ditch with very few -followers, before the remaining troops could follow him. He was -here attacked and slain,<a id="FNanchor_377" href="#Footnote_377" -class="fnanchor">[377]</a> in single combat with a horseman named -Kallikratês: but the Syracusans were driven back when his soldiers -came up, and had only just time to snatch and carry off his dead -body, with which they crossed the bridge and retreated behind the -Anapus. The rapid movement of this gallant officer was thus crowned -with complete success, restoring the victory to his own right -wing: a victory dearly purchased by the forfeit of his own life.<a -id="FNanchor_378" href="#Footnote_378" class="fnanchor">[378]</a></p> - -<p>Meanwhile the visible disorder and temporary flight of the -Athenian right wing, and the withdrawal of Lamachus from the left -to reinforce it, imparted fresh courage to the Syracusan right, -which had fled into the town. They again came forth to renew the -contest; while their generals attempted a diversion by sending out -a detachment from the northwestern gates of the city to attack -the Athenian circle on the mid-slope of Epipolæ. As this<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_256">[p. 256]</span> Circle lay completely -apart and at considerable distance from the battle, they hoped to -find the garrison unprepared for attack, and thus to carry it by -surprise. Their manœuvre, bold and well-timed, was on the point of -succeeding. They carried with little difficulty the covering outwork -in front, and the Circle itself, probably stripped of part of its -garrison to reinforce the combatants in the lower ground, was only -saved by the presence of mind and resource of Nikias, who was lying -ill within it. He directed the attendants immediately to set fire to -a quantity of wood which lay, together with the battering engines of -the army, in front of the circle-wall, so that the flames prevented -all farther advance on the part of the assailants, and forced them -to retreat. The same flames also served as a signal to the Athenians -engaged in the battle beneath, who immediately sent reinforcements -to the relief of their general; while at the same time the Athenian -fleet, just arrived from Thapsus, was seen sailing into the Great -Harbor. This last event, threatening the Syracusans on a new side, -drew off their whole attention to the defence of their city, so -that both their combatants from the field and their detachment from -the Circle were brought back within the walls.<a id="FNanchor_379" -href="#Footnote_379" class="fnanchor">[379]</a></p> - -<p>Had the recent attempt on the Circle succeeded, carrying with -it the death or capture of Nikias, and combined with the death -of Lamachus in the field on that same day, it would have greatly -brightened the prospects of the Syracusans, and might even have -arrested the farther progress of the siege, from the want of an -authorized commander. But in spite of such imminent hazard, the -actual result of the day left the Athenians completely victorious, -and the Syracusans more discouraged than ever. What materially -contributed to their discouragement, was, the recent entrance of the -Athenian fleet into the Great Harbor, wherein it was henceforward -permanently established, in coöperation with the army in a station -near the left bank of the Anapus.</p> - -<p>Both the army and the fleet now began to occupy themselves -seriously with the construction of the southernmost part of the -wall of circumvallation; beginning immediately below the Athenian -fortified point of descent from the southern cliff of Epipolæ,<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_257">[p. 257]</span> and stretching across -the lower marshy ground to the Great Harbor. The distance between -these two extreme points was about eight stadia or nearly an English -mile: the wall was double, with gates, and probably towers, at -suitable intervals, inclosing a space of considerable breadth, -doubtless roofed over in part, since it served afterwards, with the -help of the adjoining citadel on the cliff, as shelter and defence -for the whole Athenian army. The Syracusans could not interrupt this -process, nor could they undertake a new counter-wall up the mid-slope -of Epipolæ, without coming out to fight a general battle, which they -did not feel competent to do. Of course the Circle had now been put -into condition to defy a second surprise.</p> - -<p>But not only were they thus compelled to look on without -hindering the blockading wall towards the Harbor. It was now, for -the first time, that they began to taste the real restraints and -privations of a siege.<a id="FNanchor_380" href="#Footnote_380" -class="fnanchor">[380]</a> Down to this moment, their communication -with the Anapus and the country beyond, as well as with all sides -of the Great Harbor, had been open and unimpeded; whereas now, the -arrival of the Athenian fleet, and the change of position of the -Athenian army, had cut them off from both,<a id="FNanchor_381" -href="#Footnote_381" class="fnanchor">[381]</a> so that little or no -fresh supplies of provision could reach them except at the hazard -of capture from the hostile ships. On the side of Thapsus, where -the northern cliff of Epipolæ affords only two or three practicable -passages of ascent, they had before been blocked up by the Athenian -army and fleet; and a portion of the fleet seems even now to have -been left at Thapsus: so that nothing now remained open, except a -portion, especially the northern portion, of the slope of Epipolæ. -Of this outlet the besieged, especially their numerous cavalry, -doubtless availed themselves, for the purpose of excursions and of -bringing in supplies. But it was both longer and more circuitous for -such purposes than the plain near the Great Harbor and the Helôrine -road: moreover, it had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_258">[p. -258]</span> to pass by the high and narrow pass of Euryâlus, and -might thus be rendered unavailable to the besieged, whenever Nikias -thought fit to occupy and fortify that position. Unfortunately for -himself and his army, he omitted this easy but capital precaution, -even at the moment when he must have known Gylippus to be -approaching.</p> - -<p>In regard to the works actually undertaken, the order followed -by Nikias and Lamachus can be satisfactorily explained. Having -established their fortified post on the centre of the slope of -Epipolæ, they were in condition to combat opposition and attack any -counter-wall on whichever side the enemy might erect it. Commencing -in the first place the execution of the northern portion of the -blockading line, they soon desist from this and turn their attention -to the southern portion, because it was here that the Syracusans -carried their two first counter-works. In attacking the second -counter-work of the Syracusans, across the marsh to the Anapus, -they chose a suitable moment for bringing the main fleet round from -Thapsus into the Great Harbor, with a view to its coöperation. After -clearing the lower ground, they probably deemed it advisable, in -order to establish a safe and easy communication with their fleet, -that the double wall across the marsh, from Epipolæ to the Harbor, -should stand next for execution; for which there was this farther -reason, that they thereby blocked up the most convenient exit and -channel of supply for Syracuse. There are thus plausible reasons -assignable why the northern portion of the line of blockade, from -the Athenian camp on Epipolæ to the sea at Trogilus, was left to -the last, and was found open, at least the greater part of it, by -Gylippus.</p> - -<p>While the Syracusans thus began to despair of their situation, -the prospects of the Athenians were better than ever, promising -certain and not very distant triumph. The reports circulating -through the neighboring cities all represented them as in the full -tide of success, so that many Sikel tribes, hitherto wavering, came -in to tender their alliance, while three armed pentekonters also -arrived from the Tyrrhenian coast. Moreover, abundant supplies -were furnished from the Italian Greeks generally. Nikias, now -sole commander since the death of Lamachus, had even the glory of -receiving and discussing proposals from Syracuse for capitulation, -a necessity which was openly and abundantly canvassed<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_259">[p. 259]</span> within the city -itself. The ill-success of Hermokratês and his colleagues had caused -them to be recently displaced from their functions as generals, to -which Herakleidês, Euklês, and Tellias, were appointed. But this -change did not give them confidence to hazard a fresh battle, while -the temper of the city, during such period of forced inaction, -was melancholy in the extreme. Though several propositions for -surrender, perhaps unofficial, yet seemingly sincere, were made to -Nikias, nothing definitive could be agreed upon as to the terms.<a -id="FNanchor_382" href="#Footnote_382" class="fnanchor">[382]</a> -Had the Syracusan government been oligarchical, the present distress -would have exhibited a large body of malcontents upon whom he could -have worked with advantage; but the democratical character of the -government maintained union at home in this trying emergency.<a -id="FNanchor_383" href="#Footnote_383" class="fnanchor">[383]</a></p> - -<p>We must take particular note of these propositions in order -to understand the conduct of Nikias during the present critical -interval. He had been from the beginning in secret correspondence -with a party in Syracuse;<a id="FNanchor_384" href="#Footnote_384" -class="fnanchor">[384]</a> who, though neither numerous nor powerful -in themselves, were now doubtless both more active and more -influential than ever they had been before. From them he received -constant and not unreasonable assurances that the city was on the -point of surrendering, and could not possibly hold out. And as the -tone of opinion without, as well as within, conspired to raise such -an impression in his mind, so he suffered himself to be betrayed -into a fatal languor and security as to the farther prosecution of -the besieging operations. The injurious consequences of the death -of Lamachus now became evident. From the time of the departure from -Katana down to the battle in which that gallant officer perished,—a -period seemingly of about three months, from about March to June 414 -<small>B.C.</small>,—the operations of the siege had been -conducted with great vigor as well as unremitting perseverance, and -the building-work, especially, had been so rapidly executed as to -fill the Syracusans with amazement. But so soon as Nikias is left -sole commander, this vigorous march disappears and is exchanged -for slackness and apathy. The wall across the low ground near the -harbor<span class="pagenum" id="Page_260">[p. 260]</span> might -have been expected to proceed more rapidly, because the Athenian -position generally was much stronger, the chance of opposition from -the Syracusans was much lessened, and the fleet had been brought into -the Great Harbor to coöperate. Yet in fact it seems to have proceeded -more slowly; Nikias builds it at first as a double wall, though it -would have been practicable to complete the whole line of blockade -with a single wall before the arrival of Gylippus, and afterwards, if -necessary, to have doubled it either wholly or partially, instead of -employing so much time in completing this one portion that Gylippus -arrived before it was finished, scarcely less than two months after -the death of Lamachus. Both the besiegers and their commander now -seem to consider success as certain, without any chance of effective -interruption from within, still less from without; so that they may -take their time over the work, without caring whether the ultimate -consummation comes a month sooner or later.</p> - -<p>Though such was the present temper of the Athenian troops, Nikias -could doubtless have spurred them on and accelerated the operations, -had he himself been convinced of the necessity of doing so. Hitherto, -we have seen him always overrating the gloomy contingencies of the -future, and disposed to calculate as if the worst was to happen which -possibly could happen. But a great part of what passes for caution in -his character, was in fact backwardness and inertia of temperament, -aggravated by the melancholy addition of a painful internal -complaint. If he wasted in indolence the first six months after his -arrival in Sicily, and turned to inadequate account the present two -months of triumphant position before Syracuse, both these mistakes -arose from the same cause; from reluctance to act except under the -pressure and stimulus of some obvious necessity. Accordingly, he was -always behindhand with events; but when necessity became terrible, -so as to subdue the energies of other men, then did he come forward -and display unwonted vigor, as we shall see in the following chapter. -But now, relieved from all urgency of apparent danger, and misled -by the delusive hopes held out through his correspondence in the -town, combined with the atmosphere of success which exhilarated his -own armament, Nikias fancied the surrender of Syracuse inevitable, -and became, for one brief moment preceding his calamitous end, not -merely<span class="pagenum" id="Page_261">[p. 261]</span> sanguine, -but even careless and presumptuous in the extreme. Nothing short of -this presumption could have let in his destroying enemy, Gylippus.<a -id="FNanchor_385" href="#Footnote_385" class="fnanchor">[385]</a></p> - -<p>That officer—named by the Lacedæmonians commander in Sicily, at -the winter-meeting which Alkibiadês had addressed at Sparta—had -employed himself in getting together forces for the purpose of the -expedition. But the Lacedæmonians, though so far stimulated by the -representations of the Athenian exile as to promise aid, were not -forward to perform the promise. Even the Corinthians, decidedly the -most hearty of all in behalf of Syracuse, were yet so tardy, that in -the month of June, Gylippus was still at Leukas, with his armament -not quite ready to sail. To embark in a squadron for Sicily, against -the numerous and excellent Athenian fleet now acting there, was a -service not tempting to any one, and demanding both personal daring -and devotion. Moreover, every vessel from Sicily, between March -and June 414 <small>B.C.</small>, brought intelligence -of progressive success on the part of Nikias and Lamachus, thus -rendering the prospects of Corinthian auxiliaries still more -discouraging.</p> - -<p>At length, in the month of June, arrived the news of that defeat -of the Syracusans wherein Lamachus was slain, and of its important -consequences in forwarding the operations of the besiegers. Great -as those consequences were, they were still farther exaggerated by -report. It was confidently affirmed, by messenger after messenger, -that the wall of circumvallation had been completed, and that -Syracuse was now invested on all sides.<a id="FNanchor_386" -href="#Footnote_386" class="fnanchor">[386]</a> Both Gylippus and -the Corinthians were so far misled as to believe this to be the -fact, and despaired, in consequence, of being able to render any -effective aid against the Athenians in Sicily. But as there still -remained hopes of being able to preserve the Greek cities in Italy, -Gylippus thought it important to pass over thither at once with his -own little squadron of four sail, two Lacedæ<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_262">[p. 262]</span>monians and two Corinthians, and the -Corinthian captain Pythên; leaving the Corinthian main squadron -to follow as soon as it was ready. Intending then to act only in -Italy, Gylippus did not fear falling in with the Athenian fleet. -He first sailed to Tarentum, friendly and warm in his cause. From -hence he undertook a visit to Thurii, where his father Kleandridas, -exiled from Sparta, had formerly resided as citizen. After trying -to profit by this opening for the purpose of gaining the Thurians, -and finding nothing but refusal, he passed on farther southward, -until he came opposite to the Terinæan gulf near the southeastern -cape of Italy. Here a violent gust of wind off the land overtook -him, exposed his vessels to the greatest dangers, and drove him -out to sea, until at length, standing in a northerly direction, -he was fortunate enough to find shelter again at Tarentum.<a -id="FNanchor_387" href="#Footnote_387" class="fnanchor">[387]</a> -But<span class="pagenum" id="Page_263">[p. 263]</span> such was the -damage which his ships had sustained, that he was forced to remain -here while they were hauled ashore and refitted.<a id="FNanchor_388" -href="#Footnote_388" class="fnanchor">[388]</a></p> - -<p>So untoward a delay threatened to intercept altogether his farther -progress. For the Thurians had sent intimation of his visit as well -as of the number of his vessels, to Nikias at Syracuse; treating with -contempt the idea of four triremes coming to attack the powerful -Athenian fleet. In the present sanguine phase of his character, -Nikias sympathized with the flattering tenor of the message, and -overlooked the gravity of the fact announced. He despised Gylippus -as a mere privateer, nor would he even take the precaution of -sending four ships from his numerous fleet to watch and intercept -the new-comer. Accordingly Gylippus, after having refitted his ships -at Tarentum, advanced southward along the coast without opposition -to the Epizephyrian Lokri. Here he first learned, to his great -satisfaction, that Syracuse was not yet so completely blockaded but -that an army might still reach and relieve it from the interior, -entering it by the Euryâlus and the heights of Epipolæ. Having -deliberated whether he should take the chance of running his ships -into the harbor of Syracuse, despite the watch of the Athenian fleet, -or whether he should sail through the strait of Messina to Himera at -the north of Sicily, and from thence levy an army to cross the island -and relieve Syracuse by land, he resolved on the latter course, -and passed forthwith through the strait, which he found altogether -unguarded. After touching both at Rhegium and Messênê, he arrived -safely at Himera. Even at Rhegium, there was no Athenian naval force; -though Nikias had, indeed, sent thither four Athenian triremes, after -he had been apprized that Gylippus had reached Lokri, rather from -excess of precaution, than because he thought it necessary. But this -Athenian squadron reached Rhegium too late: Gylippus had already -passed the strait; and fortune, smiting his enemy with blindness, -landed him unopposed on the fatal soil of Sicily.</p> - -<p>The blindness of Nikias would indeed appear unaccountable, were -it not that we shall have worse yet to recount. To appreciate -his misjudgment fully, and to be sensible that we are not<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_264">[p. 264]</span> making him responsible -for results which could not have been foreseen, we have only to -turn back to what had been said six months before by the exile -Alkibiadês at Sparta: “Send forthwith an army to Sicily (he exhorted -the Lacedæmonians); <i>but send at the same time, what will be yet -more valuable than an army, a Spartan to take the supreme command</i>.” -It was in fulfilment of this recommendation, the wisdom of which -will abundantly appear, that Gylippus had been appointed. And had -he even reached Syracuse alone in a fishing-boat, the effect of his -presence, carrying the great name of Sparta, and full assurance of -Spartan intervention to come, not to mention his great personal -ability, would have sufficed to give new life to the besieged. -Yet Nikias—having, through a lucky accident, timely notice of his -approach, when a squadron of four ships would have prevented his -reaching the island—disdains even this most easy precaution, and -neglects him as a freebooter of no significance. Such neglect too is -the more surprising, since the well-known philo-Laconian tendencies -of Nikias would have led us to expect, that he would overvalue rather -than undervalue the imposing ascendency of the Spartan name.</p> - -<p>Gylippus, on arriving at Himera, as commander named by Sparta, and -announcing himself as forerunner of Peloponnesian reinforcements, met -with a hearty welcome. The Himeræans agreed to aid him with a body -of hoplites, and to furnish panoplies for the seamen in his vessels. -On sending to Selinus, Gela, and some of the Sikel tribes in the -interior, he received equally favorable assurances; so that he was -enabled in no very long time to get together a respectable force. -The interest of Athens among the Sikels had been recently weakened -by the death of one of her most active partisans, the Sikel prince -Archonidês, a circumstance which both enabled Gylippus to obtain -more of their aid, and facilitated his march across the island. He -was enabled to undertake this inland march from Himera to Syracuse -at the head of seven hundred hoplites from his own vessels, seamen -and epibatæ taken together; one thousand hoplites and light troops, -with one hundred horse, from Himera, some horse and light troops -from Selinus and Gela, and one thousand Sikels.<a id="FNanchor_389" -href="#Footnote_389" class="fnanchor">[389]</a> With<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_265">[p. 265]</span> these forces, some of -whom joined him on the march, he reached Euryâlus and the heights of -Epipolæ above Syracuse, assaulting and capturing the Sikel fort of -Ietæ in his way, but without experiencing any other opposition.</p> - -<p>His arrival was all but too late, and might have been actually -too late, had not the Corinthian admiral Goggylus got to Syracuse a -little before him. The Corinthian fleet of twelve triremes, under -Erasinidês—having started from Leukas later than Gylippus, but as -soon as it was ready—was now on its way to Syracuse. But Goggylus -had been detained at Leukas by some accident, so that he did not -depart until after all the rest. Yet he reached Syracuse the soonest; -probably striking a straighter course across the sea, and favored -by weather. He got safely into the harbor of Syracuse, escaping -the Athenian guardships, whose watch doubtless partook of the -general negligence of the besieging operations.<a id="FNanchor_390" -href="#Footnote_390" class="fnanchor">[390]</a></p> - -<p>The arrival of Goggylus at that moment was an accident of -unspeakable moment, and was in fact nothing less than the salvation -of the city. Among all the causes of despair in the Syracusan mind, -there was none more powerful than the circumstance, that they -had not as yet heard of any relief approaching, or of any active -intervention in their favor, from Peloponnesus. Their discouragement -increasing from day to day, and the interchange of propositions -with Nikias becoming more frequent, matters had at last so ripened -that a public assembly was just about to be held to sanction a -definitive capitulation.<a id="FNanchor_391" href="#Footnote_391" -class="fnanchor">[391]</a> It was at this critical juncture that -Goggylus arrived, apparently a little before Gylippus reached Himera. -He was the first to announce that both the Corinthian fleet and a -Spartan commander were now actually on their voyage, and might be -expected immediately, intelligence which filled the Syracusans with -enthusiasm and with renewed courage. They instantly threw aside all -idea of capitulation, and resolved to hold out to the last.</p> - -<p>It was not long before they received intimation that Gylippus -had reached Himera, which Goggylus at his arrival could not know, -and was raising an army to march across for their relief.<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_266">[p. 266]</span> After the interval -necessary for his preparations and for his march, probably not less -than between a fortnight and three weeks, they learned that he was -approaching Syracuse by the way of Euryâlus and Epipolæ. He was -presently seen coming, having ascended Epipolæ by Euryâlus; the same -way by which the Athenians had come from Katana in the spring, when -they commenced the siege. As he descended the slope of Epipolæ, the -whole Syracusan force went out in a body to hail his arrival and -accompany him into the city.<a id="FNanchor_392" href="#Footnote_392" -class="fnanchor">[392]</a></p> - -<p>Few incidents throughout the whole siege of Syracuse appear -so unaccountable as the fact, that the proceedings and march of -Gylippus, from his landing at Himera to the moment of his entering -the town, were accomplished without the smallest resistance on -the part of Nikias. After this instant, the besiegers pass from -incontestable superiority in the field, and apparent certainty of -prospective capture of the city, to a state of inferiority, not -only excluding all hope of capture, but even sinking, step by step, -into absolute ruin. Yet Nikias had remained with his eyes shut and -his hands tied, not making the least effort to obstruct so fatal a -consummation. After having despised Gylippus, in his voyage along the -coast of Italy, as a freebooter with four ships, he now despises him -not less at the head of an army marching from Himera. If he was taken -unawares, as he really appears to have been,<a id="FNanchor_393" -href="#Footnote_393" class="fnanchor">[393]</a> the fault was -altogether his own, and the ignorance such as we must almost call -voluntary. For the approach of Gylippus must have been well known -to him beforehand. He must have learned from the four ships which -he sent to Rhegium, that Gylippus had already touched thither in -passing through the strait, on his way to Himera. He must therefore -have been well aware, that the purpose was to attempt the relief of -Syracuse by an army from the interior; and his correspondence among -the Sikel tribes must have placed him in cognizance of the equipment -going on at Himera. Moreover, when we recollect that Gylippus reached -that place without either troops or arms; that he had to obtain -forces not merely from Himera, but also from<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_267">[p. 267]</span> Selinus and Gela, as well as to sound -the Sikel towns, not all of them friendly; lastly, that he had to -march all across the island, partly through hostile territory, it is -impossible to allow less interval than a fortnight or three weeks -between his landing at Himera and his arrival at Epipolæ. Farther, -Nikias must have learned, through his intelligence in the interior of -Syracuse, the important revolution which had taken place in Syracusan -opinion through the arrival of Goggylus, even before the landing of -Gylippus in Sicily was known. He was apprized, from that moment, that -he had to take measures, not only against renewed obstinate hostility -within the town, but against a fresh invading enemy without. -Lastly, that enemy had first to march all across Sicily, during -which march he might have been embarrassed and perhaps defeated,<a -id="FNanchor_394" href="#Footnote_394" class="fnanchor">[394]</a> and -could then approach Syracuse only by one road, over the high ground -of Euryâlus in the Athenian rear, through passes few in number, easy -to defend, by which Nikias had himself first approached, and through -which he had only got by a well-laid plan of surprise. Yet Nikias -leaves these passes unoccupied and undefended; he takes not a single -new precaution; the relieving army enters Syracuse as it were over a -broad and free plain.</p> - -<p>If we are amazed at the insolent carelessness with which Nikias -disdained the commonest precautions for repelling the foreknown -approach, by sea, of an enemy formidable even single-handed, what are -we to say of that unaccountable blindness which led him to neglect -the same enemy when coming at the head of a relieving army, and to -omit the most obvious means of defence in a crisis upon which his -future fate turned? Homer would have designated such neglect as a -temporary delirium inflicted by the fearful inspiration of Atê: the -historian has no such explanatory name to give, and can only note -it as a sad and suitable prelude to the calamities too nearly at -hand.</p> - -<p>At the moment when the fortunate Spartan auxiliary was thus<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_268">[p. 268]</span> allowed to march -quietly into Syracuse, the Athenian double wall of circumvallation, -between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbor, eight -stadia long, was all but completed: a few yards only of the end close -to the harbor were wanting. But Gylippus cared not to interrupt -its completion. He aimed at higher objects, and he knew, what -Nikias, unhappily, never felt and never lived to learn, the immense -advantage of turning to active account that first impression and -full tide of confidence which his arrival had just infused into the -Syracusans. Hardly had he accomplished his junction with them, when -he marshalled the united force in order of battle, and marched up to -the lines of the Athenians. Amazed as they were, and struck dumb by -his unexpected arrival, they too formed in battle order, and awaited -his approach. His first proceeding marked how much the odds of the -game were changed. He sent a herald to tender to them a five days’ -armistice, on condition that they should collect their effects and -withdraw from the island. Nikias disdained to return any reply to -this insulting proposal; but his conduct showed how much <i>he</i> felt, -as well as Gylippus, that the tide was now turned. For when the -Spartan commander, perceiving now for the first time the disorderly -trim of his Syracusan hoplites, thought fit to retreat into more open -ground farther removed from the walls, probably in order that he -might have a better field for his cavalry, Nikias declined to follow -him, and remained in position close to his own fortifications.<a -id="FNanchor_395" href="#Footnote_395" class="fnanchor">[395]</a> -This was tantamount to a confession of inferiority in the field. -It was a virtual abandonment of the capture of Syracuse, a tacit -admission that the Athenians could hope for nothing better in the end -than the humiliating offer which the herald had just made to them. -So it seems to have been felt by both parties; for from this time -forward, the Syracusans become and continue aggressors, the Athenians -remaining always on the defensive, except for one brief instant after -the arrival of Demosthenês.</p> - -<p>After drawing off his troops and keeping them encamped for that -night on the Temenite cliff, seemingly within the added fortified -inclosure of Syracuse, Gylippus brought them out again the next -morning, and marshalled them in front of the Athenian<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_269">[p. 269]</span> lines, as if about to -attack. But while the attention of the Athenians was thus engaged, -he sent a detachment to surprise the fort of Labdalum, which was -not within view of their lines. The enterprise was completely -successful. The fort was taken, and the garrison put to the sword; -while the Syracusans gained another unexpected advantage during -the day, by the capture of one of the Athenian triremes which was -watching their harbor. Gylippus pursued his successes actively, by -immediately beginning the construction of a fresh counter-wall, from -the outer city wall in a northwesterly direction aslant up the slope -of Epipolæ; so as to traverse the intended line of the Athenian -circumvallation on the north side of their Circle, and render -blockade impossible. He availed himself, for this purpose, of stones -laid by the Athenians for their own circumvallation, at the same time -alarming them by threatening attack upon their lower wall, between -the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbor, which was now -just finished, so as to leave their troops disposable for action on -the higher ground. Against one part of the wall, which seemed weaker -than the rest, he attempted a nocturnal surprise, but finding the -Athenians in vigilant guard without, he was forced to retire. This -part of the wall was now heightened, and the Athenians took charge -of it themselves, distributing their allies along the remainder.<a -id="FNanchor_396" href="#Footnote_396" class="fnanchor">[396]</a></p> - -<p>These attacks, however, appear to have been chiefly intended -as diversions, in order to hinder the enemy from obstructing the -completion of the counter-wall. Now was the time for Nikias to adopt -vigorous aggressive measures both against this wall and against the -Syracusans in the field, unless he chose to relinquish all hope -of ever being able to beleaguer Syracuse. And, indeed, he seems -actually to have relinquished such hope, even thus early after he had -seemed certain master of the city. For he now undertook a measure -altogether new; highly important in itself, but indicating an altered -scheme of policy. He resolved to fortify Cape Plemmyrium,—the rocky -promontory which forms one extremity of the narrow entrance of the -Great Harbor, immediately south of the point of Ortygia,—and to make -it a secure main station for the fleet and stores. The fleet had -been hitherto<span class="pagenum" id="Page_270">[p. 270]</span> -stationed in close neighborhood of the land-force, in a fortified -position at the extremity of the double blockading wall between the -southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbor. From such a station -in the interior of the harbor, it was difficult for the Athenian -triremes to perform the duties incumbent on them, of watching the two -ports of Syracuse—one on each side of the isthmus which joins Ortygia -to the mainland—so as to prevent any exit of ships from within, or -ingress of ships from without, and of insuring the unobstructed -admission by sea of supplies for their own army. For both these -purposes, the station of Plemmyrium was far more convenient; and -Nikias now saw that henceforward his operations would be for the most -part maritime. Without confessing it openly, he thus practically -acknowledged that the superiority of land-force had passed to -the side of his opponents, and that a successful prosecution -of the blockade had become impossible.<a id="FNanchor_397" -href="#Footnote_397" class="fnanchor">[397]</a></p> - -<p>Three forts, one of considerable size and two subsidiary, were -erected on the seaboard of Cape Plemmyrium, which became the station -for triremes as well as for ships of burden. Though the situation -was found convenient for all naval operations, it entailed also -serious disadvantages; being destitute of any spring of water, -such as the memorable fountain of Arethusa on the opposite island -of Ortygia. So that for supplies of water, and of wood also, the -crews of the ships had to range a considerable distance, exposed to -surprise from the numerous Syracusan cavalry placed in garrison at -the temple of Zeus Olympius. Day after day, losses were sustained in -this manner, besides the increased facilities given for desertion, -which soon fatally diminished the efficiency of each ship’s crew. -As the Athenian hopes of success now declined, both the slaves and -the numerous foreigners who served in their navy became disposed to -steal away. And though the ships of war, down to this time, had been -scarcely at all engaged in actual warfare, yet they had been for many -months continually at sea and on the watch, without any opportunity -of hauling ashore to refit. Hence the naval force, now about to be -called into action as the chief hope of the Athenians, was found -lamentably degenerated from that ostentatious perfection<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_271">[p. 271]</span> in which it had set -sail fifteen months before, from the harbor of Peiræus.</p> - -<p>The erection of the new forts at Plemmyrium, while by withdrawing -the Athenian forces it left Gylippus unopposed in the prosecution of -his counter-wall, at the same time emboldened him by the manifest -decline of hope which it implied. Day after day he brought out his -Syracusans in battle-array, planting them near the Athenian lines; -but the Athenians showed no disposition to attack. At length he -took advantage of what he thought a favorable opportunity to make -the attack himself; but the ground was so hemmed in by various -walls—the Athenian fortified lines on one side, the Syracusan front -or Temenitic fortification on another, and the counter-wall now in -course of construction on a third—that his cavalry and darters had no -space to act. Accordingly, the Syracusan hoplites, having to fight -without these auxiliaries, were beaten and driven back with loss, -the Corinthian Goggylus being among the slain.<a id="FNanchor_398" -href="#Footnote_398" class="fnanchor">[398]</a> On the next day, -Gylippus had the prudence to take the blame of this defeat upon -himself. It was all owing to his mistake, he publicly confessed, -in having made choice of a confined space wherein neither cavalry -nor darters could avail. He would presently give them another -opportunity, in a fairer field, and he exhorted them to show their -inbred superiority, as Dorians and Peloponnesians, by chasing these -Ionians with their rabble of islanders out of Sicily. Accordingly, -after no long time, he again brought them up in order of battle; -taking care, however, to keep in the open space, beyond the extremity -of the walls and fortifications.</p> - -<p>On this occasion, Nikias did not decline the combat, but marched -out into the open space to meet him. He probably felt encouraged -by the result of the recent action; but there was a farther and -more pressing motive. The counter-wall of intersection, which the -Syracusans were constructing, was on the point of cutting the -Athenian line of circumvallation, so that it was essential for Nikias -to attack without delay, unless he formally abnegated all farther -hope of successful siege. Nor could the army endure, in spite of -altered fortune, irrevocably to shut themselves out from such hope, -without one struggle more. Both armies were<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_272">[p. 272]</span> therefore ranged in battle order on -the open space beyond the walls, higher up the slope of Epipolæ; -Gylippus placing his cavalry and darters to the right of his line, on -the highest and most open ground. In the midst of the action between -the hoplites on both sides, these troops on the right charged the -left flank of the Athenians with such vigor, that they completely -broke it. The whole Athenian army underwent a thorough defeat, and -only found shelter within its fortified lines. And in the course of -the very next night, the Syracusan counter-wall was pushed so far as -to traverse and get beyond the projected line of Athenian blockade, -reaching presently as far as the edge of the northern cliff: so that -Syracuse was now safe, unless the enemy should not only recover their -superiority in the field, but also become strong enough to storm and -carry the new-built wall.<a id="FNanchor_399" href="#Footnote_399" -class="fnanchor">[399]</a></p> - -<p>Farther defence was also obtained by the safe arrival of the -Corinthian, Ambrakiotic, and Leukadian fleet of twelve triremes, -under Erasinidês, which Nikias had vainly endeavored to intercept. -He had sent twenty sail to the southern coast of Italy; but the -new-comers had had the good luck to avoid them.</p> - -<p>Erasinidês and his division lent their hands to the execution of -a work which completed the scheme of defence for the city. Gylippus -took the precaution of constructing a fort or redoubt on the high -ground of Epipolæ, so as to command the approach to Syracuse from -the high ground of Euryalus; a step which Hermokratês had not -thought of until too late, and which Nikias had never thought of -at all, during his period of triumph and mastery. He erected a -new fort on a suitable point of the high ground, backed by three -fortified positions or encampments at proper distances in the rear -of it, intended for bodies of troops to support the advanced post in -case it was attacked. A continuous wall was then carried from this -advanced post down the slope of Epipolæ, so as to reach and join -the counter-wall recently constructed; whereby this counter-wall, -already traversing and cutting the Athenian line of circumvallation, -became in fact prolonged up the whole slope of Epipolæ, and barred -all direct access from the Athenians in their existing lines up to -the summit of that eminence, as well as up to the northern cliff. The -Syracusans had now one continuous and uninterrupted line of defence; -a long<span class="pagenum" id="Page_273">[p. 273]</span> single -wall, resting at one extremity on the new-built fort upon the high -ground of Epipolæ, at the other extremity, upon the city wall. This -wall was only single; but it was defended, along its whole length, -by the permanent detachments occupying the three several fortified -positions or encampments just mentioned. One of these positions -was occupied by native Syracusans; a second, by Sicilian Greeks; a -third, by other allies. Such was the improved and systematic scheme -of defence which the genius of Gylippus first projected, and which -he brought to execution at the present moment:<a id="FNanchor_400" -href="#Footnote_400" class="fnanchor">[400]</a> a scheme, the full -value of which will be appreciated when we come to describe the -proceedings of the second Athenian armament under Demosthenês.</p> - -<p>Not content with having placed the Syracusans out of the reach -of danger, Gylippus took advantage of their renewed confidence to -infuse into them projects of retaliation against the enemy who had -brought them so near to ruin. They began to equip their ships in -the harbor, and to put their seamen under training, in hopes of -qualifying themselves to contend with the Athenians even on their own -element; while Gylippus himself quitted the city to visit the various -cities of the island, and to get together farther reinforcements, -naval as well as military. And as it was foreseen that Nikias on -his part would probably demand aid from Athens, envoys, Syracusan -as well as Corinthian, were despatched to Peloponnesus, to urge -the necessity of forwarding additional troops, even in merchant -vessels, if no triremes could be spared to convey them.<a -id="FNanchor_401" href="#Footnote_401" class="fnanchor">[401]</a> -Should no reinforcements reach the Athenian<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_274">[p. 274]</span> camp, the Syracusans well knew that -its efficiency must diminish by every month’s delay, while their own -strength, in spite of heavy cost and effort, was growing with their -increased prospects of success.</p> - -<p>If this double conviction was present to sustain, the ardor of the -Syracusans, it was not less painfully felt amidst the Athenian camp, -now blocked up like a besieged city, and enjoying no free movement -except through their ships and their command of the sea. Nikias saw -that if Gylippus should return with any considerable additional -force, even the attack upon him by land would become too powerful -to resist, besides the increasing disorganization of his fleet. He -became fully convinced that to remain as they were was absolute ruin. -As all possibility of prosecuting the siege of Syracuse successfully -was now at an end, a sound judgment would have dictated that his -position in the harbor had become useless as well as dangerous, and -that the sooner it was evacuated the better. Probably Demosthenês -would have acted thus, under similar circumstances; but such -foresight and resolution were not in the character of Nikias, who was -afraid, moreover, of the blame which it would bring down upon him at -home, if not from his own army. Not venturing to quit his position -without orders from Athens, he determined to send home thither an -undisguised account of his critical position, and to solicit either -reinforcements or instructions to return.</p> - -<p>It was now, indeed, the end of September (<small>B.C.</small> -414), so that he could not even hope for an answer before midwinter, -nor for reinforcements, if such were to be sent, until the ensuing -spring was far advanced. Nevertheless, he determined to encounter -this risk, and to trust to vigilant precautions for safety during -the interval, precautions which, as the result will show, were -within a hair’s breadth of proving insufficient. But as it was of -the last importance to him to make his countrymen at home fully -sensible of the grave danger of his position, he resolved to -transmit a written despatch; not trusting to the oral statement of -a messenger, who might be wanting either in courage, in presence of -mind, or in competent expression, to impress the full and sad truth -upon a reluctant audience.<a id="FNanchor_402" href="#Footnote_402" -class="fnanchor">[402]</a> Accordingly he sent home a despatch, -which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_275">[p. 275]</span> seems to -have reached Athens about the end of November, and was read formally -in the public assembly by the secretary of the city. Preserved -by Thucydidês verbatim, it stands as one of the most interesting -remnants of antiquity, and well deserves a literal translation.</p> - -<p>“Our previous proceedings have been already made known to -you, Athenians, in many other despatches;<a id="FNanchor_403" -href="#Footnote_403" class="fnanchor">[403]</a> but the present -crisis is such as to require your deliberation more than ever, when -you shall have heard the situation in which we stand. After we -had overcome in many engagements the Syracusans, against whom we -were sent, and had built the fortified lines which we now occupy, -there came upon us the Lacedæmonian Gylippus, with an army partly -Peloponnesian, partly Sicilian. Him too we defeated, in the first -action; but in a second, we were overwhelmed by a crowd of cavalry -and darters, and forced to retire within our lines. And thus the -superior number of our enemies has compelled us to suspend our -circumvallation, and remain inactive; indeed, we cannot employ in -the field even the full force which we possess, since a portion of -our hoplites are necessarily required for the protection of our -walls. Meanwhile the enemy have carried out a single intersecting -counter-wall beyond our line of circumvallation, so that we can -no longer continue the latter to completion, unless we have force -enough to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_276">[p. 276]</span> attack -and storm their counter-wall. And things have come to such a pass, -that we, who profess to besiege others, are ourselves rather the -party besieged, by land at least, since the cavalry leave us scarce -any liberty of motion. Farther, the enemy have sent envoys to -Peloponnesus to obtain reinforcements, while Gylippus in person is -going round the Sicilian cities, trying to stir up to action such -of them as are now neutral, and to get, from the rest, additional -naval and military supplies. For it is their determination, as I -understand, not merely to assail our lines on shore with their -land-force, but also to attack us by sea with their ships.</p> - -<p>“Be not shocked when I tell you, that they intend to become -aggressors even at sea. They know well, that our fleet was at -first in high condition, with dry ships<a id="FNanchor_404" -href="#Footnote_404" class="fnanchor">[404]</a> and excellent crews; -but now the ships have rotted, from remaining too long at sea, and -the crews are ruined. Nor have we the means of hauling our ships -ashore to refit, since the enemy’s fleet, equal or superior in -numbers, always appears on the point of attacking us. We see them in -constant practice, and they can choose their own moment for attack. -Moreover, they can keep their ships high and dry more than we can; -for they are not engaged in maintaining watch upon others; while to -us, who are obliged to retain all our fleet on guard, nothing less -than prodigious superiority of number could insure the like facility. -And were we to relax ever so little in our vigilance, we should no -longer be sure of our supplies, which we bring in even now with -difficulty close under their walls.</p> - -<p>“Our crews, too, have been and are still wasting away from various -causes. Among the seamen who are our own citizens, many, in going -to a distance for wood, for water, or for pillage, are cut off by -the Syracusan cavalry. Such of them as are slaves, desert, now that -our superiority is gone, and that we have come to equal chances with -our enemy; while the foreigners whom we pressed into our service, -make off straight to some of the neighboring cities; and those -who came, tempted by high<span class="pagenum" id="Page_277">[p. -277]</span> pay, under the idea of enriching themselves by traffic -rather than of fighting, now that they find the enemy in full -competence to cope with us by sea as well as by land, either go -over to him as professed deserters, or get away as they can amidst -the wide area of Sicily.<a id="FNanchor_405" href="#Footnote_405" -class="fnanchor">[405]</a> Nay, there are even some, who, while -trafficking<span class="pagenum" id="Page_278">[p. 278]</span> -here on their own account, bribe the trierarchs to accept Hykkarian -slaves as substitutes, and thus destroy the strict discipline of our -marine. And you know as well as I, that no crew ever continues long -in perfect condition, and that the first class of seamen, who set the -ship in motion, and maintain the uniformity of the oar-stroke, is but -a small fraction of the whole number.</p> - -<p>“Among all these embarrassments, the worst of all is, that I as -general can neither prevent the mischief, from the difficulty of -your tempers to govern, nor can I provide supplementary recruits -elsewhere, as the enemy can easily do from many places open to him. -We have nothing but the original stock which we brought out with -us, both to make good losses and to do present duty; for Naxus and -Katana, our only present allies, are of insignificant strength. And -if our enemy gain but one farther point,—if the Italian cities, -from whence we now draw our supplies, should turn against us, under -the impression of our present bad condition, with no reinforcement -arriving from you,—we shall be starved out, and he will bring the war -to triumphant close, even without a battle.</p> - -<p>“Pleasanter news than these I could easily have found to send -you; but assuredly nothing so useful, seeing that the full knowledge -of the state of affairs here is essential to your deliberations. -Moreover, I thought it even the safer policy to tell you the truth -without disguise, understanding as I do your real dispositions, that -you never listen willingly to any but the most favorable assurances, -yet are angry in the end if they turn to unfavorable results. Be -thoroughly satisfied, that in regard to the force against which you -originally sent us, both your generals and your soldiers have done -themselves no discredit. But now that all Sicily is united against -us, and that farther reinforcements are expected from Peloponnesus, -you must take your resolution with full knowledge that we here have -not even strength to contend<span class="pagenum" id="Page_279">[p. -279]</span> against our present difficulties. You must either send -for us home, or you must send us a second army, land-force as well -as naval, not inferior to that which is now here, together with a -considerable supply of money. You must farther send a successor -to supersede me, as I am incapable of work from a disease in the -kidneys. I think myself entitled to ask this indulgence at your -hands, for while my health lasted I did you much good service in -various military commands. But whatever you intend, do it at the -first opening of spring, without any delay: for the new succors -which the enemy is getting together in Sicily, will soon be here, -and those which are to come from Peloponnesus, though they will be -longer in arriving, yet, if you do not keep watch, will either elude -or forestall you as they have already once done.”<a id="FNanchor_406" -href="#Footnote_406" class="fnanchor">[406]</a></p> - -<p>Such was the memorable despatch of Nikias, which was read to the -public assembly of Athens about the end of November, or beginning of -December, 414 <small>B.C.</small>, brought by officers -who strengthened its effect by their own oral communications, and -answered all such inquiries as were put to them.<a id="FNanchor_407" -href="#Footnote_407" class="fnanchor">[407]</a> We have much reason -to regret that Thucydidês does not give us any idea of the debate -which so gloomy a revelation called forth. He tells us merely the -result: the Athenians resolved to comply with the second portion of -the alternative put by Nikias; not to send for the present armament -home, but to reinforce it by a second powerful armament, both of -land and naval force, in prosecution of the same objects. But they -declined his other personal request, and insisted on continuing him -in command; passing a vote, however, to name Menander and Euthydemus, -officers already in the army before Syracuse, joint commanders along -with him, in order to assist him in his laborious duties. They sent -Eurymedon speedily, about the winter solstice, in command of ten -triremes to Syracuse, carrying one hundred and twenty talents of -silver, together with assurances of coming aid to the suffering -army. And they resolved to equip a new and formidable force, under -Demosthenês and Eurymedon, to go thither as reinforcement in the -earliest months of the spring. Demosthenês<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_280">[p. 280]</span> was directed to employ himself -actively in getting this larger force ready.<a id="FNanchor_408" -href="#Footnote_408" class="fnanchor">[408]</a></p> - -<p>This letter of Nikias—so authentic, so full of matter, and so -characteristic of the manners of the time—suggests several serious -reflections, in reference both to himself and to the Athenian people. -As to himself, there is nothing so remarkable as the sentence of -condemnation which it pronounces on his own past proceedings in -Sicily. When we find him lamenting the wear and tear of the armament, -and treating the fact as notorious that even the best naval force -could only maintain itself in good condition for a short time, -what graver condemnation could be passed upon those eight months -which he wasted in trifling measures, after his arrival in Sicily, -before commencing the siege of Syracuse? When he announces that the -arrival of Gylippus with his auxiliary force before Syracuse, made -the difference to the Athenian army between triumph and something -bordering on ruin, the inquiry naturally suggests itself, whether he -had done his best to anticipate, and what precautions he had himself -taken to prevent, the coming of the Spartan general. To which the -answer must be, that, so far from anticipating the arrival of new -enemies as a possible danger, he had almost invited them from abroad -by his delay, and that he had taken no precautions at all against -them, though forewarned and having sufficient means at his disposal. -The desertion and demoralization of his naval force, doubtless but -too real, was, as he himself points out, mainly the consequence -of this turn of fortune, and was also the first commencement -of that unmanageable temper of the Athenian soldiery, numbered -among his difficulties. For it would be in<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_281">[p. 281]</span>justice to this unfortunate army not -to recognize that they first acquiesced patiently in prolonged -inaction, because their general directed it, and next did their duty -most gallantly in the operations of the siege, down to the death of -Lamachus.</p> - -<p>If even with our imperfect knowledge of the case, the ruin -complained of by Nikias be distinctly traceable to his own -remissness and oversight, much more must this conviction have been -felt by intelligent Athenians, both in the camp and in the city, -as we shall see by the conduct of Demosthenês<a id="FNanchor_409" -href="#Footnote_409" class="fnanchor">[409]</a> hereafter to be -related. Let us conceive the series of despatches, to which Nikias -himself alludes, as having been transmitted home, from their -commencement. We must recollect that the expedition was originally -sent from Athens with hopes of the most glowing character, and -with a consciousness of extraordinary efforts about to be rewarded -with commensurate triumphs. For some months, the despatches of the -general disclose nothing but movements either abortive or inglorious; -adorned, indeed, by one barren victory, but accompanied by an -intimation that he must wait till the spring, and that reinforcements -must be sent to him, before he can undertake the really serious -enterprise. Though the disappointment occasioned by this news at -Athens must have been mortifying, nevertheless his requisition was -complied with; and the despatches of Nikias, during the spring and -summer of 414 <small>B.C.</small>, become cheering. The -siege of Syracuse is described as proceeding successfully, and at -length, about July or August, as being on the point of coming to a -triumphant close, in spite of a Spartan adventurer, named Gylippus, -making his way across the Ionian sea with a force too contemptible -to be noticed. Suddenly, without any intermediate step to smooth the -transition, comes a despatch announcing that this adventurer has -marched into Syracuse at the head of a powerful army, and that the -Athenians are thrown upon the defensive, without power of proceeding -with the siege. This is followed, after a short time, by the gloomy -and almost desperate communication above translated.</p> - -<p>When we thus look at the despatch, not merely as it stands singly, -but as falling in series with its antecedents, the natural<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_282">[p. 282]</span> effect which we should -suppose it likely to produce upon the Athenians, would be a vehement -burst of wrath and displeasure against Nikias. Upon the most candid -and impartial scrutiny, he deserved nothing less. And when we -consider, farther, the character generally ascribed by historians of -Greece to the Athenian people, that they are represented as fickle, -ungrateful, and irritable, by standing habit; as abandoning upon the -most trifling grounds those whom they had once esteemed, forgetting -all prior services, visiting upon innocent generals the unavoidable -misfortunes of war, and impelled by nothing better than demagogic -excitements, we naturally expect that the blame really deserved by -Nikias would be exaggerated beyond all due measure, and break forth -in a storm of violence and fury. Yet what is the actual resolution -taken in consequence of his despatch, after the full and free debate -of the Athenian assembly? Not a word of blame or displeasure is -proclaimed. Doubtless there must have been individual speakers who -criticized him as he deserved. To suppose the contrary, would be to -think meanly indeed of the Athenian assembly. But the general vote -was one not simply imputing no blame, but even pronouncing continued -and unabated confidence. The people positively refuse to relieve him -from the command, though he himself solicits it in a manner sincere -and even touching. So great is the value which they set upon his -services, and the esteem which they entertain for his character, -that they will not avail themselves of the easy opportunity which he -himself provides to get rid of him.</p> - -<p>It is not by way of compliment to the Athenians that I make -these remarks on their present proceeding. Quite the contrary. The -misplaced confidence of the Athenians in Nikias, on more than one -previous occasion, but especially on this, betrays an incapacity of -appreciating facts immediately before their eyes, and a blindness to -decisive and multiplied evidences of incompetency, which is one of -the least creditable manifestations of their political history. But -we do learn from it a clear lesson, that the habitual defects of the -Athenian character were very different from what historians commonly -impute to them. Instead of being fickle, we find them tenacious in -the extreme of confidence once bestowed, and of schemes once embarked -upon: instead of ingratitude for services actually rendered, we -find credit given for ser<span class="pagenum" id="Page_283">[p. -283]</span>vices which an officer ought to have rendered, but has -not: instead of angry captiousness, we discover an indulgence not -merely generous, but even culpable, in the midst of disappointment -and humiliation: instead of a public assembly, wherein, as it is -commonly depicted, the criminative orators were omnipotent, and could -bring to condemnation any unsuccessful general, however meritorious; -we see that even grave and well-founded accusations make no -impression upon the people in opposition to preëstablished personal -esteem; and personal esteem for a man who not only was no demagogue, -but in every respect the opposite of a demagogue: an oligarch by -taste, sentiment, and position; who yielded to the democracy nothing -more than sincere obedience, coupled with gentleness and munificence -in his private bearing. If Kleon had committed but a small part -of those capital blunders which discredit the military career of -Nikias, he would have been irretrievably ruined. So much weaker was -<i>his</i> hold upon his countrymen, by means of demagogic excellences, -as compared with those causes which attracted confidence to Nikias; -his great family and position, his wealth dexterously expended, his -known incorruptibility against bribes, and even comparative absence -of personal ambition, his personal courage combined with reputation -for caution, his decorous private life and ultra-religious habits. -All this assemblage of negative merits, and decencies of daily life, -in a citizen whose station might have enabled him to act with the -insolence of Alkibiadês, placed Nikias on a far firmer basis of -public esteem than the mere power of accusatory speech in the public -assembly or the dikastery could have done. It entitled him to have -the most indulgent construction put upon all his shortcomings, and -spread a fatal varnish over his glaring incompetence for all grave -and responsible command.</p> - -<p>The incident now before us is one of the most instructive in all -history, as an illustration of the usual sentiment, and strongest -causes of error, prevalent among the Athenian democracy, and as a -refutation of that exaggerated mischief which it is common to impute -to the person called a demagogue. Happy would it have been for Athens -had she now had Kleon present, or any other demagogue of equal -power, at that public assembly which took the melancholy resolution -of sending fresh forces to Sicily and continuing Nikias in the -command! The case was one in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_284">[p. -284]</span> which the accusatory eloquence of the demagogue was -especially called for, to expose the real past mismanagement of -Nikias, to break down that undeserved confidence in his ability -and caution which had grown into a sentiment of faith or routine, -to prove how much mischief he had already done, and how much more -he would do if continued.<a id="FNanchor_410" href="#Footnote_410" -class="fnanchor">[410]</a> Unluckily for Athens, she had now no -demagogue who could convince the assembly beforehand of this truth, -and prevent them from taking the most unwise and destructive -resolution ever passed in the Pnyx.</p> - -<p>What makes the resolution so peculiarly discreditable, is, -that it was adopted in defiance of clear and present evidence. To -persist in the siege of Syracuse, under present circumstances, was -sad misjudgment; to persist in it with Nikias as commander, was -hardly less than insanity. The first expedition, though even <i>that</i> -was rash and ill-conceived, nevertheless presented tempting hopes -which explain, if they do not excuse, the too light estimate of -impossibility of lasting possession. Moreover, there was at that -time a confusion,—between the narrow objects connected with Leontini -and Egesta, and the larger acquisitions to be realized through the -siege of Syracuse,—which prevented any clear and unanimous estimate -of the undertaking in the Athenian mind. But now, the circumstances -of Sicily were fully known: the mendacious promises of Egesta had -been exposed; the hopes of allies for Athens in the island were -seen to be futile; while Syracuse, armed with a Spartan general and -Peloponnesian aid, had not only become inexpugnable, but had assumed -the aggressive: lastly, the chance of a renewal of Peloponnesian -hostility against Attica had been now raised into certainty. While -perseverance in the siege of Syracuse, therefore, under circumstances -so unpromising and under such necessity for increased exertions -at home, was a melancholy imprudence in itself, perseverance in -employing Nikias converted that imprudence into ruin, which even -the addition of an energetic colleague in the person of<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_285">[p. 285]</span> Demosthenês was not -sufficient to avert. Those who study the conduct of the Athenian -people on this occasion, will not be disposed to repeat against them -the charge of fickleness which forms one of the standing reproaches -against democracy. Their mistake here arose from the very opposite -quality; from what may be called obtuseness, or inability to get -clear of two sentiments which had become deeply engraven on their -minds; ideas of Sicilian conquest, and confidence in Nikias.</p> - -<p>A little more of this alleged fickleness—or easy escape from past -associations and impressibility to actual circumstances—would have -been at the present juncture a tutelary quality to Athens. She would -then have appreciated more justly the increased hazards thickening -around her both in Sicily and at home. War with Sparta, though -not yet actually proclaimed, had become impending and inevitable. -Even in the preceding winter, the Lacedæmonians had listened -favorably to the recommendation of Alkibiadês<a id="FNanchor_411" -href="#Footnote_411" class="fnanchor">[411]</a> that they should -establish a fortified post at Dekeleia in Attica. They had not yet -indeed brought themselves to execution of this resolve; for the peace -between them and Athens, though indirectly broken in many ways, -still subsisted in name, and they hesitated to break it openly, -partly because they knew that the breach of peace had been on their -side at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war; attributing to this -fault their capital misfortune at Sphakteria.<a id="FNanchor_412" -href="#Footnote_412" class="fnanchor">[412]</a> Athens on her side -had also scrupulously avoided direct violation of the Lacedæmonian -territory, in spite of much solicitation from her allies at Argos. -But her reserve on this point gave way during the present summer, -probably at the time when her prospect of taking Syracuse appeared -certain. The Lacedæmonians having invaded and plundered the Argeian -territory, thirty Athenian triremes were sent to aid in its defence, -under Pythodôrus with two colleagues. This armament disembarked on -the eastern coast of Laconia near Prasiæ and committed devastations: -which direct act of hostility—coming in addition to the marauding -excursions of the garrison of Pylos, and to the refusal of pacific -redress at Athens—satisfied the Lacedæmonians that the peace -had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_286">[p. 286]</span> been now -first and undeniably broken by their enemy, so that they might -with a safe conscience recommence the war.<a id="FNanchor_413" -href="#Footnote_413" class="fnanchor">[413]</a></p> - -<p>Such was the state of feeling between the two great powers of -Central Greece in November 414 <small>B.C.</small>, -when the envoys arrived from Syracuse; envoys from Nikias on the -one part, from Gylippus and the Syracusans on the other; each -urgently calling for farther support. The Corinthians and Syracusans -vehemently pressed their claims at Sparta; nor was Alkibiadês again -wanting, to renew his instances for the occupation of Dekeleia. It -was in the face of this impending liability to renewed Peloponnesian -invasion that the Athenians took their resolution, above commented -on, to send a second army to Syracuse and prosecute the siege with -vigor. If there were any hesitation yet remaining on the part of the -Lacedæmonians, it disappeared so soon as they were made aware of the -imprudent resolution of Athens; which not only created an imperative -necessity for sustaining Syracuse, but also rendered Athens so much -more vulnerable at home, by removing the better part of her force. -Accordingly, very soon after the vote passed at Athens, an equally -decisive resolution for direct hostilities was adopted at Sparta. -It was determined that a Peloponnesian allied force should be -immediately prepared, to be sent at the first opening of spring to -Syracuse, and that at the same time Attica should be invaded, and the -post of Dekeleia fortified. Orders to this effect were immediately -transmitted to the whole body of Peloponnesian allies; especially -requisitions for implements, materials, and workmen, towards the -construction of the projected fort at Dekeleia.<a id="FNanchor_414" -href="#Footnote_414" class="fnanchor">[414]</a></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="Chap_60"> - <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_287">[p. 287]</span></p> - <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LX.<br /> - FROM THE RESUMPTION OF DIRECT HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA, - DOWN TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span> Syracusan war now -no longer stands apart, as an event by itself, but becomes absorbed -in the general war rekindling throughout Greece. Never was any winter -so actively and extensively employed in military preparations, as -the winter of 414-413 <small>B.C.</small>, the months immediately -preceding that which Thucydidês terms the nineteenth spring of the -Peloponnesian war, but which other historians call the beginning -of the Dekeleian war.<a id="FNanchor_415" href="#Footnote_415" -class="fnanchor">[415]</a> While Eurymedon went with his ten triremes -to Syracuse, even in midwinter, Demosthenês exerted himself all the -winter to get together the second armament for early spring. Twenty -other Athenian triremes were farther sent round Peloponnesus to -the station of Naupaktus, to prevent any Corinthian reinforcements -from sailing out of the Corinthian gulf. Against these latter, the -Corinthians on their side prepared twenty-five fresh triremes, to -serve as a convoy to the transports carrying their hoplites.<a -id="FNanchor_416" href="#Footnote_416" class="fnanchor">[416]</a> -In Corinth, Sikyôn, and Bœotia, as well as at Lacedæmon, levies of -hoplites were going on for the armament to Syracuse, at the same time -that everything was getting ready for the occupation of Dekeleia. -Lastly, Gylippus was engaged with not less activity in stirring -up all Sicily to take a more decisive part in the coming year’s -struggle.</p> - -<p>From Cape Tænarus in Laconia, at the earliest moment of spring, -embarked a force of six hundred Lacedæmonian hoplites—Helots and -Neodamodes—under the Spartan Ekkritus, and three hundred Bœotian -hoplites under the Thebans Xenon and Nikon, with the Thespian -Hegesandrus. They were directed to cross the sea southward to Kyrênê -in Libya, and from thence to make their way along the African -coast to Sicily. At the same time a body of seven hundred hoplites -under Alexarchus, partly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_288">[p. -288]</span> Corinthians, partly hired Arcadians, partly Sikyonians, -under constraint from their powerful neighbors,<a id="FNanchor_417" -href="#Footnote_417" class="fnanchor">[417]</a> departed from the -northwest of Peloponnesus and the mouth of the Corinthian gulf for -Sicily, the Corinthian triremes watching them until they were past -the Athenian squadron at Naupaktus.</p> - -<p>These were proceedings of importance: but the most important of -all was the reinvasion of Attica at the same time by the great force -of the Peloponnesian alliance, under the Spartan king Agis son of -Archidamus. Twelve years had elapsed since Attica last felt the -hand of the destroyer, a little before the siege of Sphakteria. The -plain in the neighborhood of Athens was now first laid waste, after -which the invaders proceeded to their special purpose of erecting -a fortified post for occupation at Dekeleia. The work, apportioned -among the allies present, who had come prepared with the means -of executing it, was completed during the present summer, and a -garrison was established there composed of contingents relieving -each other at intervals, under the command of king Agis himself. -Dekeleia was situated on an outlying eminence belonging to the range -called Parnês, about fourteen miles to the north of Athens, near -the termination of the plain of Athens, and commanding an extensive -view of that plain as well as of the plain of Eleusis. The hill on -which it stood, if not the fort itself, was visible even from the -walls of Athens. It was admirably situated both as a central point -for excursions over Attica, and for communication with Bœotia; while -the road from Athens to Orôpus, the main communication with Eubœa, -passed through the gorge immediately under it.<a id="FNanchor_418" -href="#Footnote_418" class="fnanchor">[418]</a></p> - -<p>We read with amazement, and the contemporary world saw with yet -greater amazement, that while this important work was actually going -on, and while the whole Peloponnesian confederacy was renewing its -pressure with redoubled force upon Athens, at that very moment,<a -id="FNanchor_419" href="#Footnote_419" class="fnanchor">[419]</a> -the Athenians sent out, not only a fleet of thirty triremes -under Chariklês to annoy the coasts of Peloponnesus, but also -the great armament which they had resolved<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_289">[p. 289]</span> upon under Demosthenês, to push -offensive operations against Syracuse. The force under the latter -general consisted of sixty Athenian and five Chian triremes; of -twelve hundred Athenian hoplites of the best class, chosen from the -citizen muster-roll; with a considerable number of hoplites besides, -from the subject-allies and elsewhere. There had been also engaged -on hire fifteen hundred peltasts from Thrace, of the tribe called -Dii; but these men did not arrive in time, so that Demosthenês -set sail without them.<a id="FNanchor_420" href="#Footnote_420" -class="fnanchor">[420]</a> Chariklês having gone forward to take -aboard a body of allies from Argos, the two fleets joined at Ægina, -inflicted some devastations on the coasts of Laconia, and established -a strong post on the island of Kythêra to encourage desertion among -the Helots. From hence Chariklês returned with the Argeians, while -Demosthenês conducted his armament round Peloponnesus to Korkyra.<a -id="FNanchor_421" href="#Footnote_421" class="fnanchor">[421]</a> -On the Eleian coast, he destroyed a transport carrying hoplites to -Syracuse, though the men escaped ashore: from thence he proceeded to -Zakynthus and Kephallenia, from whence he engaged some additional -hoplites, and to Anaktorium, in order to procure darters and slingers -from Akarnania. It was here that he was met by Eurymedon with his -ten triremes, who had gone forward to Syracuse in the winter with -the pecuniary remittance urgently required, and was now returning to -act as colleague of Demosthenês in the command.<a id="FNanchor_422" -href="#Footnote_422" class="fnanchor">[422]</a> The news<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_290">[p. 290]</span> brought by Eurymedon -from Sicily was in every way discouraging. Yet the two admirals -were under the necessity of sparing ten triremes from their fleet -to reinforce Konon at Naupaktus, who was not strong enough alone -to contend against the Corinthian fleet which watched him from the -opposite coast. To make good this diminution, Eurymedon went forward -to Korkyra, with the view of obtaining from the Korkyræans fifteen -fresh triremes and a contingent of hoplites, while Demosthenês -was getting together the Akarnanian darters and slingers.<a -id="FNanchor_423" href="#Footnote_423" class="fnanchor">[423]</a></p> - -<p>Eurymedon not only brought back word of the distressed condition -of the Athenians in the harbor of Syracuse, but had also learned, -during his way back, their heavy additional loss by the capture of -the fort at Plemmyrium. Gylippus returned to Syracuse early in the -spring, nearly about the time when Agis invaded Attica and when -Demosthenês quitted Peiræus. He returned with fresh reinforcements -from the interior, and with redoubled ardor for decisive operations -against Nikias before aid could arrive from Athens. It was his first -care, in conjunction with Hermokratês, to inspire the Syracusans -with courage for fighting the Athenians on shipboard. Such was the -acknowledged superiority of the latter at sea, that this was a task -of some difficulty, calling for all the eloquence and ascendency of -the two leaders: “The Athenians (said Hermokratês to his countrymen) -have not been always eminent at sea as they now are: they were -once landsmen like you, and more than you, they were only forced -on shipboard by the Persian invasion. The only way to deal with -bold men like them, is to show a front bolder still. <i>They</i> have -often by their audacity daunted enemies of greater real force than -themselves, and they must now be taught that others can play the same -game with them. Go right at them before they expect it; and you will -gain more by thus surprising and intimidating them, than you will -suffer by their superior science.” Such lessons, addressed to men -already in the tide of success, were presently efficacious, and a -naval attack was resolved.<a id="FNanchor_424" href="#Footnote_424" -class="fnanchor">[424]</a></p> <p><span class="pagenum" -id="Page_291">[p. 291]</span></p> <p>The town of Syracuse had two -ports, one on each side of the island of Ortygia. The lesser port—as -it was called afterwards, the Portus Lakkius—lay northward of -Ortygia, between that island and the low ground or Nekropolis near -the outer city: the other lay on the opposite side of the isthmus -of Ortygia within the Great Harbor. Both of them, it appears, were -protected against attack from without, by piles and stakes planted in -the bottom in front of them. But the lesser port was the more secure -of the two, and the principal docks of the Syracusans were situated -within it; the Syracusan fleet, eighty triremes strong, being -distributed between them. The entire Athenian fleet was stationed -under the fort of Plemmyrium, immediately opposite to the southern -point of Ortygia.</p> - -<p>Gylippus laid his plan with great ability, so as to take the -Athenians completely by surprise. Having trained and prepared the -naval force as thoroughly as he could, he marched out his land-force -secretly by night, over Epipolæ and round by the right bank of the -Anapus, to the neighborhood of the fort of Plemmyrium. With the first -dawn of morning, the Syracusan fleet sailed out, at one and the same -signal, from both the ports; forty-five triremes out of the lesser -port, thirty-five out of the other. Both squadrons tried to round the -southern point of Ortygia, so as to unite and to attack the enemy at -Plemmyrium in concert. The Athenians, though unprepared and confused, -hastened to man sixty ships; with twenty-five of which, they met the -thirty-five Syracusans sailing forth from the Great Harbor, while -with the other thirty-five they encountered the forty-five from the -lesser port, immediately outside of the mouth of the Great Harbor. In -the former of these two actions the Syracusans were at first victors; -in the second also, the Syracusans from the outside forced their -way into the mouth of the Great Harbor, and joined their comrades. -But being little accustomed to naval warfare, they presently fell -into complete confusion, partly in consequence of their unexpected -success: so that the Athenians, recovering from the first shock, -attacked them anew and completely defeated them; sinking or -disabling eleven ships, of three of which the<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_292">[p. 292]</span> crews were made prisoners, the rest -being mostly slain.<a id="FNanchor_425" href="#Footnote_425" -class="fnanchor">[425]</a> Three Athenian triremes were destroyed -also.</p> - -<p>But this victory, itself not easily won, was more than -counterbalanced by the irreparable loss of Plemmyrium. During the -first excitement at the Athenian naval station, when the ships were -in course of being manned to meet the unexpected onset from both -ports at once, the garrison of Plemmyrium went to the water’s edge to -watch and encourage their countrymen, leaving their own walls thinly -guarded, and little suspecting the presence of their enemy on the -land side. This was just what Gylippus had anticipated. He attacked -the forts at daybreak, taking the garrison completely by surprise, -and captured them after a feeble resistance; first the greatest -and most important fort, next the two smaller. The garrison sought -safety as they could, on board the transports and vessels of burden -at the station, and rowed across the Great Harbor to the land-camp -of Nikias on the other side. Those who fled from the greater fort, -which was the first taken, ran some risk from the Syracusan triremes, -which were at that moment victorious at sea. But by the time that -the two lesser forts were taken, the Athenian fleet had regained its -superiority, so that there was no danger of similar pursuit in the -crossing of the Great Harbor.</p> - -<p>This well-concerted surprise was no less productive to the captors -than fatal as a blow to the Athenians. Not only were many men slain, -and many made prisoners, in the assault, but there were vast stores -of every kind, and even a large stock of money found within the -fort; partly belonging to the military chest, partly the property -of the trierarchs and of private merchants, who had deposited it -there as in the place of greatest security. The sails of not less -than forty triremes were also found there, and three triremes -which had been dragged up ashore. Gylippus caused one of the three -forts to be pulled down, and carefully garrisoned the other two.<a -id="FNanchor_426" href="#Footnote_426" class="fnanchor">[426]</a></p> - -<p>Great as the positive loss was here to the Athenians at a time -when their situation could ill bear it, the collateral damage -and peril growing out of the capture of Plemmyrium was yet more -serious, besides the alarm and discouragement which it spread<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_293">[p. 293]</span> among the army. The -Syracusans were now masters of the mouth of the harbor on both -sides, so that not a single storeship could enter without a convoy -and a battle. What was of not less detriment, the Athenian fleet -was now forced to take station under the fortified lines of its own -land-force, and was thus cramped up on a small space in the innermost -portion of the Great Harbor, between the city-wall and the river -Anapus; the Syracusans being masters everywhere else, with full -communication between their posts all round, hemming in the Athenian -position both by sea and by land.</p> - -<p>To the Syracusans, on the contrary, the result of the recent -battle proved every way encouraging; not merely from the valuable -acquisition of Plemmyrium, but even from the sea-fight itself, which -had indeed turned out to be a defeat, but which promised at first -to be a victory, had they not thrown away the chance by their own -disorder. It removed all superstitious fear of Athenian nautical -superiority; while their position was so much improved by having -acquired the command of the mouth of the harbor, that they began even -to assume the aggressive at sea. They detached a squadron of twelve -triremes to the coast of Italy, for the purpose of intercepting some -merchant vessels coming with a supply of money to the Athenians. So -little fear was there of an enemy at sea, that these vessels seem to -have been coming without convoy, and were for the most part destroyed -by the Syracusans, together with a stock of ship-timber which the -Athenians had collected near Kaulonia. In touching at Lokri, on their -return, they took aboard a company of Thespian hoplites who had made -their way thither in a transport. They were also fortunate enough -to escape the squadron of twenty triremes which Nikias detached -to lie in wait for them near Megara, with the loss of one ship, -however, including her crew.<a id="FNanchor_427" href="#Footnote_427" -class="fnanchor">[427]</a></p> - -<p>One of this Syracusan squadron had gone forward from Italy with -envoys to Peloponnesus, to communicate the favorable news of the -capture of Plemmyrium, and to accelerate as much as possible, the -operations against Attica, in order that no reinforcements might -be sent from thence. At the same time, other envoys went from -Syracuse—not merely Syracusans, but also<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_294">[p. 294]</span> Corinthians and Lacedæmonians—to visit -the cities in the interior of Sicily. They made known everywhere -the prodigious improvement in Syracusan affairs arising from the -gain of Plemmyrium, as well as the insignificant character of the -recent naval defeat. They strenuously pleaded for farther aid to -Syracuse without delay, since there were now the best hopes of -being able to crush the Athenians in the harbor completely, before -the reinforcements about to be despatched could reach them.<a -id="FNanchor_428" href="#Footnote_428" class="fnanchor">[428]</a></p> - -<p>While these envoys were absent on their mission, the Great -Harbor was the scene of much desultory conflict, though not of any -comprehensive single battle. Since the loss of Plemmyrium, the -Athenian naval station was in the northwest interior corner of that -harbor, adjoining the fortified lines occupied by their land-army. -It was inclosed and protected by a row of posts or stakes stuck -in the bottom and standing out of the water.<a id="FNanchor_429" -href="#Footnote_429" class="fnanchor">[429]</a> The Syracusans on -their side had also planted a stockade in front of the interior port -of Ortygia, to defend their ships, their ship-houses, and their docks -within. As the two stations were not far apart, each party watched -for opportunities of occasional attack or annoyance by missile -weapons to the other; and daily skirmishes of this sort took place, -in which on the whole the Athenians seem to have had the advantage. -They even formed the plan of breaking through the outworks of the -Syracusan dockyard, and burning the ships within. They brought up -a ship of the largest size, with wooden towers and side defences, -against the line of posts fronting the dockyard, and tried to force -the entrance, either by means of divers, who sawed them through at -the bottom, or by boat-crews, who fastened ropes round them and thus -unfixed or plucked them out. All this was done under cover of the -great vessel with its towers manned by light-armed, who exchanged -showers of missiles with the Syracusan bowmen on the top of the -ship-houses, and prevented the latter from coming near enough to -interrupt the operation. The Athenians contrived thus to remove many -of the posts planted, even the most dangerous among them, those which -did not reach to the surface of the water, and which therefore a -ship approaching could not see. But they gained little by it, since -the Syracusans<span class="pagenum" id="Page_295">[p. 295]</span> -were able to plant others in their room. On the whole, no serious -damage was done, either to the dockyard or to the ships within. -And the state of affairs in the Great Harbor stood substantially -unaltered, during all the time that the envoys were absent on their -Sicilian tour, probably three weeks or a month.<a id="FNanchor_430" -href="#Footnote_430" class="fnanchor">[430]</a></p> - -<p>These envoys had found themselves almost everywhere well received. -The prospects of Syracuse were now so triumphant, and those of Nikias -with his present force so utterly hopeless, that the waverers thought -it time to declare themselves; and all the Greek cities in Sicily, -except Agrigentum, which still remained neutral (and of course -except Naxos and Katana), resolved on aiding the winning cause. -From Kamarina came five hundred hoplites, four hundred darters, -and three hundred bowmen; from Gela, five triremes, four hundred -darters, and two hundred horsemen. Besides these, an additional -force from the other cities was collected, to march to Syracuse -in a body across the interior of the island, under the conduct of -the envoys themselves. But this part of the scheme was frustrated -by Nikias, who was rendered more vigilant by the present desperate -condition of his affairs, than he had been in reference to the cross -march of Gylippus. At his instance, the Sikel tribes Kentoripes -and Halikyæi, allies of Athens, were prevailed upon to attack the -approaching enemy. They planned a skilful ambuscade, set upon them -unawares, and dispersed them with the loss of eight hundred men. All -the envoys were also slain, except the Corinthian, who conducted the -remaining force, about fifteen hundred in number, to Syracuse.<a -id="FNanchor_431" href="#Footnote_431" class="fnanchor">[431]</a></p> - -<p>This reverse—which seems to have happened about the time when -Demosthenês with his armament were at Korkyra, on the way to -Syracuse—so greatly dismayed and mortified the Syracusans, that -Gylippus thought it advisable to postpone awhile the attack which he -intended to have made immediately on the reinforcement arriving.<a -id="FNanchor_432" href="#Footnote_432" class="fnanchor">[432]</a> The -delay of these few days proved nothing less than the salvation of the -Athenian army.</p> - -<p>It was not until Demosthenês was approaching Rhegium within two -or three days’ sail of Syracuse, that the attack was determined -on without farther delay. Preparation in every way had been<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_296">[p. 296]</span> made for it long -before, especially for the most effective employment of the naval -force. The captains and ship-masters of Syracuse and Corinth had now -become fully aware of the superiority of Athenian nautical manœuvre, -and of the causes upon which that superiority depended. The Athenian -trireme was of a build comparatively light, fit for rapid motion -through the water, and for easy change of direction: its prow was -narrow, armed with a sharp projecting beak at the end, but hollow and -thin, not calculated to force its way through very strong resistance. -It was never intended to meet, in direct impact and collision, the -prow of an enemy: such a proceeding passed among the able seamen of -Athens for gross awkwardness. In advancing against an enemy’s vessel, -they evaded the direct shock, steered so as to pass by it, then, by -the excellence and exactness of their rowing, turned swiftly round, -altered their direction and came back before the enemy could alter -his: or perhaps rowed rapidly round him, or backed their ship stern -foremost, until the opportunity was found for driving the beak of -their ship against some weak part of his, against the midships, the -quarter, the stern, or the oarblades without. In such manœuvres the -Athenians were unrivalled: but none such could be performed unless -there were ample sea-room, which rendered their present naval station -the most disadvantageous that could be imagined. They were cooped -up in the inmost part of a harbor of small dimensions, close on -the station of their enemies, and with all the shore, except their -own lines, in possession of those enemies: so that they could not -pull round from want of space, nor could they back water, because -they durst not come near shore. In this contracted area, the only -mode of fighting possible was by straightforward collision, prow -against prow; a process which not only shut out all their superior -manœuvring, but was unsuited to the build of their triremes. On the -other hand, the Syracusans, under the advice of the able Corinthian -steersman Aristo, altered the construction of their triremes to -meet the special exigency of the case, disregarding all idea of -what had been generally looked upon as good nautical manœuvring.<a -id="FNanchor_433" href="#Footnote_433" class="fnanchor">[433]</a> -Instead of the long, thin, hollow, and<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_297">[p. 297]</span> sharp, advancing beak, striking the -enemy considerably above the water-level, and therefore doing less -damage, they shortened the prow, but made it excessively heavy and -solid, and lowered the elevation of the projecting beak: so that -it became not so much calculated to pierce, as to break in and -crush by main force all the opposing part of the enemy’s ship, not -far above the water. What were called the epôtids, “ear-caps,” or -nozzles, projecting forwards to the right and left of the beak, were -made peculiarly thick, and sustained by under-beams let in to the -hull of the ship. In the Attic build, the beak stood forward very -prominent, and the epôtids on each side of it were kept back, serving -the same purpose as what are called catheads, in modern ships, to -which the anchors are suspended: but in the Corinthian build, the -beak projected less, and the epôtids more, so that they served to -strike the enemy: instead of having one single beak, the Corinthian -ship might be said to have three nozzles.<a id="FNanchor_434" -href="#Footnote_434" class="fnanchor">[434]</a> The Syracusans -relied on the narrowness of the space, for shutting out the Athenian -evolutions, and bringing the contest to nothing more than a -straightforward collision; in which the weaker vessel would be broken -and stove in at the prow, and thus rendered unmanageable.</p> - -<p>Having completed these arrangements, their land-force was<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_298">[p. 298]</span> marched out under -Gylippus to threaten one side of the Athenian lines, while the -cavalry and the garrison of the Olympieion marched up to the other -side. The Athenians were putting themselves in position to defend -their walls from what seemed to be a land attack, when they saw the -Syracusan fleet, eighty triremes strong, sailing out from its dock -prepared for action: upon which they too, though at first confused by -this unexpected appearance, put their crews on shipboard, and went -out of their palisaded station, seventy-five triremes in number, -to meet the enemy. The whole day passed off, however, in desultory -and indecisive skirmish, with trifling advantage to the Syracusans, -who disabled one or two Athenian ships, yet merely tried to invite -the Athenians to attack, without choosing themselves to force on a -close and general action.<a id="FNanchor_435" href="#Footnote_435" -class="fnanchor">[435]</a></p> - -<p>It was competent to the Athenians to avoid altogether a naval -action, at least until the necessity arose for escorting fresh -supplies into the harbor, by keeping within their station; and as -Demosthenês was now at hand, prudence counselled this reserve. Nikias -himself, too, is said to have deprecated immediate fighting, but to -have been outvoted by his two newly-appointed colleagues Menander -and Euthydemus, who were anxious to show what they could do without -Demosthenês, and took their stand upon Athenian maritime honor, which -peremptorily forbade them to shrink from the battle when offered.<a -id="FNanchor_436" href="#Footnote_436" class="fnanchor">[436]</a></p> - -<p>Though on the next day the Syracusans made no movement, yet -Nikias foreseeing that they would speedily recommence, and noway -encouraged by the equal manifestations of the preceding day, caused -every trierarch to repair what damage his ship had sustained, and -even took the precaution of farther securing his naval station -by mooring merchant-vessels just alongside of the openings in -the palisade, about two hundred feet apart. The prows of these -vessels were provided with dolphins, or beams lifted up on high -and armed at the end with massive heads of<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_299">[p. 299]</span> iron, which could be so let fall as to -crush any ship entering:<a id="FNanchor_437" href="#Footnote_437" -class="fnanchor">[437]</a> any Athenian trireme which might be -hard-pressed, would thus be enabled to get through this opening -where no enemy could follow, and choose her own time for sailing -out again. Before night these arrangements were completed, and at -the earliest dawn of next day, the Syracusans reappeared, with the -same demonstrations both of land force and naval force as before. -The Athenian fleet having gone forth to meet them, several hours -were spent in the like indecisive and partial skirmishes, until at -length the Syracusan fleet sailed back to the city again without -bringing on any general or close combat. The Athenians, construing -this retirement of the enemy as evidence of backwardness and -unwillingness to fight,<a id="FNanchor_438" href="#Footnote_438" -class="fnanchor">[438]</a> and supposing the day’s duty at an end, -retired on their side within their own station, disembarked, and -separated to get their dinners at leisure, having tasted no food that -day.</p> - -<p>But ere they had been long ashore, they were astonished to see -the Syracusan fleet sailing back to renew the attack, in full -battle order. This was a manœuvre suggested by the Corinthian -Aristo, the ablest steersman in the fleet; at whose instance, -the Syracusan admirals had sent back an urgent request to the -city authorities, that an abundant stock of provisions might for -that day be brought down to the sea-shore, and sale be rendered -compulsory; so that no time should be lost, when the fleet returned -thither, in taking a hasty meal without dispersion of the crews. -Accordingly the fleet, after a short but sufficient interval -allowed for refreshment thus close at hand, was brought back -unexpectedly to the enemy’s station. Confounded at the sight, the -Athenian crews forced themselves again on board, most of them yet -without refreshment, and in the midst of murmurs and disorder.<a -id="FNanchor_439" href="#Footnote_439" class="fnanchor">[439]</a> -On sailing out of their station, the indecisive skirmishing again -com<span class="pagenum" id="Page_300">[p. 300]</span>menced, and -continued for some time, until at length the Athenian captains -became so impatient of prolonged and exhausting fatigue, that they -resolved to begin of themselves, and make the action close as well -as general. Accordingly, the word of command was given, and they -rowed forward to make the attack, which was cheerfully received by -the Syracusans. By receiving the attack instead of making it, the -latter were better enabled to insure a straightforward collision of -prow against prow, excluding all circuit, backing, or evolutions, -on the part of the enemy: at any rate, their steersmen contrived to -realize this plan, and to crush, stave in, or damage, the forepart of -many of the Athenian triremes, simply by superior weight of material -and solidity on their own side. The Syracusan darters on the deck, -moreover, as soon as the combat became close, were both numerous and -destructive; while their little boats rowed immediately under the -sides of the Athenian triremes, broke the blades of their oars, and -shot darts in through the oar-holes, against the rowers within. At -length the Athenians, after sustaining the combat bravely for some -time, found themselves at such disadvantage, that they were compelled -to give way and to seek shelter within their own station. The armed -merchant-vessels which Nikias had planted before the openings in -the palisade were now found of great use in checking the pursuing -Syracusans; two of whose triremes, in the excitement of victory, -pushed forward too near to them and were disabled by the heavy -implements on board, one of them being captured with all her crew. -The general victory of the Syracusans, however, was complete: seven -Athenian triremes were sunk or disabled, many others were seriously -damaged, and numbers of seamen either slain or made prisoners.<a -id="FNanchor_440" href="#Footnote_440" class="fnanchor">[440]</a></p> - -<p>Overjoyed with the result of this battle, which seems to have -been no less skilfully planned than bravely executed, the Syracusans -now felt confident of their superiority by sea as well as on land, -and contemplated nothing less than the complete destruction of -their enemies in the harbor. The generals were already concerting -measures for renewed attack both by land and by sea, and a week or -two more would probably have seen the ruin of this once triumphant -besieging armament, now full of nothing but<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_301">[p. 301]</span> discouragement. The mere stoppage of -supplies, in fact, as the Syracusans were masters of the mouth of -the harbor, would be sure to starve it out in no long time, if they -maintained their superiority at sea. All their calculations were -suspended, however, and the hopes of the Athenians for the time -revived, by the entry of Demosthenês and Eurymedon with the second -armament into the Great Harbor; which seems to have taken place -on the very day, or on the second day, after the recent battle.<a -id="FNanchor_441" href="#Footnote_441" class="fnanchor">[441]</a> So -important were the consequences which turned upon that postponement -of the Syracusan attack, occasioned by the recent defeat of their -reinforcing army from the interior. So little did either party think, -at that moment, that it would have been a mitigation of calamity to -Athens, if Demosthenês had <i>not</i> arrived in time; if the ruin of the -first armament had been actually consummated before the coming of the -second!</p> - -<p>Demosthenês, after obtaining the required reinforcements at -Korkyra, had crossed the Ionian sea to the islands called Chœrades -on the coast of Iapygia; where he took aboard a band of one hundred -and fifty Messapian darters, through the friendly aid of the native -prince Artas, with whom an ancient alliance was renewed. Passing on -farther to Metapontum, already in alliance with Athens, he was there -reinforced with two triremes and three hundred darters, with which -addition he sailed on to Thurii. Here he found himself cordially -welcomed; for the philo-Athenian party was in full ascendency, having -recently got the better in a vehement dissension, and passed a -sentence of banishment against their opponents.<a id="FNanchor_442" -href="#Footnote_442" class="fnanchor">[442]</a> They not only took -a formal resolution to acknowledge the same friends and the same -enemies as the Athenians, but equipped a regiment of seven hundred -hoplites and three hundred darters to accompany Demosthenês, who -remained there long enough to pass his troops in review and verify -the completeness of each division. After having held this review -on the banks of the river Sybaris, he marched his troops by land -through the Thurian territory to the banks of the river Hylias which -divided it from Kroton. He was here met by Krotoniate envoys, who -forbade the access to their territory: upon which he marched down the -river to the sea-shore, got on shipboard, and<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_302">[p. 302]</span> pursued his voyage southward along -the coast of Italy, touching at the various towns, all except -the hostile Lokri.<a id="FNanchor_443" href="#Footnote_443" -class="fnanchor">[443]</a></p> - -<p>His entry into the harbor of Syracuse,<a id="FNanchor_444" -href="#Footnote_444" class="fnanchor">[444]</a> accomplished in the -most ostentatious trim, with decorations and musical accompaniments, -was no less imposing from the magnitude of his force than critical -in respect to opportunity. Taking Athenians, allies, and mercenary -forces, together, he conducted seventy-three triremes, five -thousand hoplites, and a large number of light troops of every -description,—archers, slingers, darters, etc., with other requisites -for effective operation. At the sight of such an armament, not -inferior to the first which had arrived under Nikias, the Syracusans -lost for a moment the confidence of their recent triumph, and -were struck with dismay as well as wonder.<a id="FNanchor_445" -href="#Footnote_445" class="fnanchor">[445]</a> That Athens could -be rash enough to spare such an armament, at a moment when the full -burst of Peloponnesian hostility was reopening upon her, and when -Dekeleia was in course of being fortified, was a fact out of all -reasonable probability, and not to be credited unless actually seen. -And probably the Syracusans, though they knew that Demosthenês was on -his way, had no idea beforehand of the magnitude of his armament.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the hearts of the discomfited and beleaguered -Athenians again revived as they welcomed their new comrades. They -saw themselves again masters by land as well as by sea; and they -displayed their renewed superiority by marching out of their lines -forthwith and ravaging the lands near the Anapus; the Syracusans not -venturing to engage in a general action, and merely watching the -movement with some cavalry from the Olympieion.</p> - -<p>But Demosthenês was not imposed upon by this delusive show of -power, so soon as he had made himself master of the full state -of affairs, and had compared his own means with those of the -enemy. He found the army of Nikias not merely worn down with -long-continued toil, and disheartened by previous defeat, but also -weakened in a terrible degree by the marsh fever general towards -the close of summer, in the low ground where they were encamped.<a -id="FNanchor_446" href="#Footnote_446" class="fnanchor">[446]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_303">[p. 303]</span></p> - -<p>He saw that the Syracusans were strong in multiplied allies, -extended fortifications, a leader of great ability, and general -belief that theirs was the winning cause. Moreover, he felt deeply -the position of Athens at home, and her need of all her citizens -against enemies within sight of her own walls. But above all, he -came penetrated with the deplorable effects which had resulted from -the mistake of Nikias, in wasting irreparably so much precious time, -and frittering away the first terror-striking impression of his -splendid armament. All these considerations determined Demosthenês -to act, without a moment’s delay and while the impression produced -by his arrival was yet unimpaired, and to aim one great and decisive -blow, such as might, if successful, make the conquest of Syracuse -again probable. If this should fail, he resolved to abandon the -whole enterprise, and return home with his armament forthwith.<a -id="FNanchor_447" href="#Footnote_447" class="fnanchor">[447]</a></p> - -<p>By means of the Athenian lines, he had possession of the -southernmost portion of the slope of Epipolæ. But all along that -slope from east to west, immediately in front or to the north of -his position, stretched the counter-wall built by the Syracusans; -beginning at the city wall on the lowest ground, and reaching up -first in a northwesterly, next in a westerly direction, until it -joined the fort on the upper ground near the cliff, where the road -from Euryalus down to Syracuse passed. The Syracusans, as defenders, -were on the north side of this counter-wall; he and the Athenians -on the south side. It was a complete bar to his progress, nor could -he stir a step without making himself master of it: towards which -end there were only two possible means,—either to storm it in front, -or to turn it from its western extremity by marching round up to -the Euryalus. He began by trying the first method; but the wall was -abundantly manned and vigorously defended; his battering machines -were all burnt or disqualified, and every attempt which he made -was completely repulsed.<a id="FNanchor_448" href="#Footnote_448" -class="fnanchor">[448]</a> There then remained only the second -method, to turn the wall, ascending by circuitous roads to the -heights of Euryalus behind it, and then attacking the fort in which -it terminated.</p> - -<p>But the march necessary for this purpose, first, up the valley -of the Anapus, visible from the Syracusan posts above; next,<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_304">[p. 304]</span> ascending to the -Euryalus by a narrow and winding path, was so difficult, that even -Demosthenês, naturally sanguine, despaired of being able to force his -way up in the daylight, against an enemy seeing the attack. He was -therefore constrained to attempt a night-surprise, for which, Nikias -and his other colleagues consenting, he accordingly made preparations -on the largest and most effective scale. He took the command -himself, along with Menander and Eurymedon (Nikias being left to -command within the lines),<a id="FNanchor_449" href="#Footnote_449" -class="fnanchor">[449]</a> conducting hoplites and light troops, -together with masons and carpenters, and all other matters necessary -for establishing a fortified post; lastly, giving orders that every -man should carry with him provisions for five days.</p> - -<p>Fortune so far favored him, that not only all these preliminary -arrangements, but even his march itself, was accomplished without -any suspicion of the enemy. At the beginning of a moonlight night, -he quitted the lines, moved along the low ground on the left -bank of the Anapus and parallel to that river for a considerable -distance, then following various roads to the right, arrived at -the Euryalus, or highest pitch of Epipolæ, where he found himself -in the same track by which the Athenians in coming from Katana a -year and a half before—and Gylippus in coming from the interior -of the island about ten months before—had passed, in order to get -to the slope of Epipolæ above Syracuse. He reached, without being -discovered, the extreme Syracusan fort on the high ground, assailed -it completely by surprise, and captured it after a feeble resistance. -Some of the garrison within it were slain; but the greater part -escaped, and ran to give the alarm to the three fortified camps of -Syracusans and allies, which were placed one below another behind -the long continuous wall,<a id="FNanchor_450" href="#Footnote_450" -class="fnanchor">[450]</a> on the declivity of Epipolæ, as well as -to a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_305">[p. 305]</span> chosen -regiment of six hundred Syracusan hoplites under Hermokratês,<a -id="FNanchor_451" href="#Footnote_451" class="fnanchor">[451]</a> -who formed a night-watch, or bivouac. This regiment hastened up -to the rescue, but Demosthenês and the Athenian vanguard charging -impetuously forward, drove them back in disorder upon the fortified -positions in their rear. Even Gylippus and the Syracusan troops -advancing upwards out of these positions, were at first carried back -by the same retreating movement.</p> - -<p>So far the enterprise of Demosthenês had been successful beyond -all reasonable hope. He was master not only of the outer fort -of the Syracusan position, but also of the extremity of<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_306">[p. 306]</span> their counter-wall -which rested upon that fort; the counter-wall was no longer -defensible, now that he had got on the north or Syracusan side of -it, so that the men on the parapet, where it joined the fort, made -no resistance, and fled. Some of the Athenians even began to tear -down the parapets, and demolish this part of the counter-wall, -an operation of extreme importance, since it would have opened -to Demosthenês a communication with the southern side of the -counter-wall, leading directly towards the Athenian lines on -Epipolæ. At any rate, his plan of turning the counter-wall was -already carried, if he could only have maintained himself in his -actual position, even without advancing farther, and if he could -have demolished two or three hundred yards of the upper extremity -of the wall now in his power. Whether it would have been possible -for him to maintain himself without farther advance, until day -broke, and thus avoid the unknown perils of a night-battle, we -cannot say. But both he and his men, too much flushed with success -to think of halting, hastened forward to complete their victory, -and to prevent the disordered Syracusans from again recovering a -firm array. Unfortunately, however, their ardor of pursuit—as it -constantly happened with Grecian hoplites—disturbed the regularity -of their own ranks, so that they were not in condition to stand the -shock of the Bœotian hoplites, just emerged from their position, and -marching up in steady and excellent order to the scene of action. -The Bœotians charged them, and after a short resistance, broke them -completely, forcing them to take flight. The fugitives of the van -were thus driven back upon their own comrades advancing from behind, -still under the impression of success, ignorant of what had passed -in front, and themselves urged on by the fresh troops closing up in -their rear.</p> - -<p>In this manner the whole army presently became one scene of clamor -and confusion wherein there was neither command nor obedience, -nor could any one discern what was passing. The light of the moon -rendered objects and figures generally visible, without being -sufficient to discriminate friend from foe. The beaten Athenians, -thrown back upon their comrades, were in many cases mistaken for -enemies, and slain. The Syracusans and Bœotians, shouting aloud and -pursuing their advantage, became intermingled with the foremost -Athenians, and both<span class="pagenum" id="Page_307">[p. -307]</span> armies thus grouped into knots which only distinguished -each other by mutual demand of the watchword. This test also soon -failed, since each party got acquainted with the watchword of the -other, especially that of the Athenians, among whom the confusion was -the greatest, became well known to the Syracusans, who kept together -in larger parties. Above all, the effect of the pæan or war-shout -on both sides was remarkable. The Dorians in the Athenian army—from -Argos, Korkyra, and other places—raised a pæan not distinguishable -from that of the Syracusans; accordingly, their shout struck terror -into the Athenians themselves, who fancied that they had enemies in -their own rear and centre. Such disorder and panic presently ended -in a general flight. The Athenians hurried back by the same roads -which they had ascended; but these roads were found too narrow for -terrified fugitives, and many of them threw away their arms in order -to scramble or jump down the cliffs, in which most of them perished. -Even of those who safely effected their descent into the plain -below, many—especially the new-comers belonging to the armament of -Demosthenês—lost their way through ignorance, and were cut off the -next day by the Syracusan horse. With terrible loss of numbers, and -broken spirit, the Athenians at length found shelter within their own -lines. Their loss of arms was even greater than that of men, from the -throwing away of shields by those soldiers who leaped the cliff.<a -id="FNanchor_452" href="#Footnote_452" class="fnanchor">[452]</a></p> - -<p>The overjoyed Syracusans erected two trophies, one upon the road -to Epipolæ, the other upon the exact and critical spot where the -Bœotians had first withstood and first repelled the enemy. By this -unexpected and overwhelming victory, their feelings were restored -to the same pitch of confidence which had animated them before the -arrival of Demosthenês. Again now masters of the field, they again -indulged the hope of storming the Athenian lines and destroying -the armament; to which end, however, it was thought necessary to -obtain additional reinforcements, and Gylippus went in person with -this commission to the various cities of Sicily, while Sikanus with -fifteen triremes was despatched to Agrigentum, then understood -to be wavering, and in a political crisis.<a id="FNanchor_453" -href="#Footnote_453" class="fnanchor">[453]</a></p> <p><span -class="pagenum" id="Page_308">[p. 308]</span></p> <p>During this -absence of Gylippus, the Athenian generals were left to mourn the -recent reverse, and to discuss the exigencies of their untoward -position. The whole armament was now full of discouragement and -weariness; impatient to escape from a scene where fever daily -thinned their numbers, and where they seemed destined to nothing but -dishonor. Such painful evidences of increasing disorganization only -made Demosthenês more strenuous in enforcing the resolution which -he had taken before the attack on Epipolæ. He had done his best to -strike one decisive blow; the chances of war had turned out against -him, and inflicted a humiliating defeat; he now therefore insisted -on relinquishing the whole enterprise and returning home forthwith. -The season was yet favorable for the voyage (it seems to have been -the beginning of August), while the triremes recently brought, as -yet unused, rendered them masters at sea for the present. It was -idle, he added, to waste more time and money in staying to carry -on war against Syracuse, which they could not now hope to subdue, -especially when Athens had so much need of them all at home, against -the garrison of Dekeleia.<a id="FNanchor_454" href="#Footnote_454" -class="fnanchor">[454]</a></p> - -<p>This proposition, though espoused and seconded by Eurymedon, -was peremptorily opposed by Nikias; who contended, first, that -their present distress and the unpromising chances for the future, -though he admitted the full reality of both, ought not nevertheless -to be publicly proclaimed. A formal resolution to retire, passed -in the presence of so many persons, would inevitably become -known to the enemy, and therefore could never be executed with -silence and secrecy,<a id="FNanchor_455" href="#Footnote_455" -class="fnanchor">[455]</a> as such a resolution ought to<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_309">[p. 309]</span> be. But farthermore, he -(Nikias) took a decided objection to the resolution itself. He would -never consent to carry back the armament, without specific authority -from home to do so. Sure he was, that the Athenian people would never -tolerate such a proceeding. When submitted to the public assembly at -home, the conduct of the generals would be judged, not by persons -who had been at Syracuse and cognizant of the actual facts, but by -hearers who would learn all that they knew from the artful speeches -of criminative orators. Even the citizens actually serving, though -now loud in cries of suffering, and impatient to get home, would -alter their tone when they were safe in the public assembly; and -would turn round to denounce their generals as having been bribed to -bring away the army. Speaking his own personal feelings, he knew too -well the tempers of his countrymen to expose himself to the danger -of thus perishing under a charge alike unmerited and disgraceful. -Sooner would he incur any extremity of risk from the enemy.<a -id="FNanchor_456" href="#Footnote_456" class="fnanchor">[456]</a> It -must be recollected too, he added, that if <i>their</i> affairs were now -bad, those of Syracuse were as bad, and even worse. For more than a -year, the war had been imposing upon the Syracusans a ruinous cost, -in subsistence for foreign allies as well as in keeping up outlying -posts; so that they had already spent two thousand talents, besides -heavy debts contracted and not paid. They could not continue in -this course longer; yet the suspension of their payments would at -once alienate their allies, and leave them helpless. The cost of -the war—to which Demosthenês had alluded as a reason for returning -home—could be much better borne by Athens; while a little farther -pressure would utterly break down the Syr<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_310">[p. 310]</span>acusans. He (Nikias) therefore advised -to remain where they were and continue the siege;<a id="FNanchor_457" -href="#Footnote_457" class="fnanchor">[457]</a> the more so, as their -fleet had now become unquestionably the superior.</p> - -<p>Both Demosthenês and Eurymedon protested in the strongest language -against the proposition of Nikias. Especially they treated the plan -of remaining in the Great Harbor as fraught with ruin, and insisted, -at the very least, on quitting this position without a moment’s -delay. Even admitting, for argument, the scruples of Nikias against -abandoning the Syracusan war without formal authority from home, -they still urged an immediate transfer of their camp from the Great -Harbor to Thapsus or Katana. At either of these stations they could -prosecute operations against Syracuse, with all the advantage of a -wider range of country for supplies, a healthier spot, and above -all, of an open sea, which was absolutely indispensable to the -naval tactics of Athenians; escaping from that narrow basin which -condemned them to inferiority even on their own proper element. At -all events to remove, and remove forthwith, out of the Great Harbor, -such was the pressing requisition of Demosthenês and Eurymedon.<a -id="FNanchor_458" href="#Footnote_458" class="fnanchor">[458]</a></p> - -<p>But even to the modified motion of transferring the actual -position to Thapsus or Katana, Nikias refused to consent. -He insisted on remaining as they were; and it appears that -Menander and Euthydemus<a id="FNanchor_459" href="#Footnote_459" -class="fnanchor">[459]</a>—colleagues named by the assembly at home, -before the departure of the second armament—must have voted under the -influence of his authority; whereby the majority became on his side. -Nothing less than being in a minority, probably, would have induced -Demosthenês and Eurymedon to submit, on a point of such transcendent -importance.</p> - -<p>It was thus that the Athenian armament remained without quitting -the harbor, yet apparently quite inactive, during a period which -cannot have been less than between three weeks and a month, -until Gylippus returned to Syracuse with fresh reinforcements. -Throughout the army, hope of success appears<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_311">[p. 311]</span> to have vanished, while anxiety for -return had become general. The opinions of Demosthenês and Eurymedon -were doubtless well known, and orders for retreat were expected, but -never came. Nikias obstinately refused to give them, during the whole -of this fatal interval; which plunged the army into the abyss of -ruin, instead of mere failure in their aggressive enterprise.</p> - -<p>So unaccountable did such obstinacy appear, that many persons -gave Nikias credit for knowing more than he chose to reveal. Even -Thucydidês thinks that he was misled by that party in Syracuse with -whom he had always kept up a secret correspondence, seemingly apart -from his colleagues, and who still urged him, by special messages, -not to go away; assuring him that Syracuse could not possibly go on -longer. Without fully trusting these intimations, he could not bring -himself to act against them; and he therefore hung back from day to -day, and refused to pronounce the decisive word.<a id="FNanchor_460" -href="#Footnote_460" class="fnanchor">[460]</a></p> - -<p>Nothing throughout the whole career of Nikias is so inexplicable -as his guilty fatuity—for we can call it by no lighter name, seeing -that it involved all the brave men around him in one common ruin with -himself—at the present critical juncture. How can we suppose him -to have really believed that the Syracusans, now in the flood-tide -of success, and when Gylippus was gone forth to procure additional -forces, would break down and be unable to carry on the war? Childish -as such credulity seems, we are nevertheless compelled to admit -it as real, to such an<span class="pagenum" id="Page_312">[p. -312]</span> extent as to counterbalance all the pressing motives for -departure, motives enforced by discerning colleagues as well as by -the complaints of the army, and brought home to his own observation -by the experience of the late naval defeat. At any rate, it served -as an excuse for that fatal weakness of his character which made him -incapable of taking resolutions founded on prospective calculations, -and chained him to his actual position until he was driven to act by -imminent necessity.</p> - -<p>But we discern on the present occasion another motive, which -counts for much in dictating his hesitation. The other generals think -with satisfaction of going back to their country and rescuing the -force which yet remained, even under circumstances of disappointment -and failure. Not so Nikias: he knows too well the reception which -he had deserved, and which might possibly be in store for him. -Avowedly, indeed, he anticipates reproach from the Athenians against -the generals, but only unmerited reproach, on the special ground -of bringing away the army without orders from home; adding some -harsh criticisms upon the injustice of the popular judgment and -the perfidy of his own soldiers. But in the first place, we may -remark, that Demosthenês and Eurymedon, though as much responsible -as he was for this decision, had no such fear of popular injustice; -or, if they had, saw clearly that the obligation of braving it was -here imperative. And in the next place, no man ever had so little -reason to complain of the popular judgment as Nikias. The mistakes -of the people in regard to him had always been those of indulgence, -over-esteem, and over-constancy. But Nikias foresaw too well that -he would have more to answer for at Athens than the simple fact -of sanctioning retreat under existing circumstances. He could -not but remember the pride and sanguine hopes under which he had -originally conducted the expedition out of Peiræus, contrasted with -the miserable sequel and ignominious close, even if the account had -been now closed, without worse. He could not but be conscious, more -or less, how much of all this was owing to his own misjudgment; and -under such impressions, the idea of meeting the free criticisms -and scrutiny of his fellow-citizens—even putting aside the chance -of judicial trial—must have been insupportably humiliating. To -Nikias,—a perfectly brave man, and suffering withal under an<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_313">[p. 313]</span> incurable disease,—life -at Athens had neither charm nor honor left. Hence, as much as from -any other reason, he was induced to withhold the order for departure; -clinging to the hope that some unforeseen boon of fortune might yet -turn up, and yielding to the idlest delusions from correspondents in -the interior of Syracuse.<a id="FNanchor_461" href="#Footnote_461" -class="fnanchor">[461]</a></p> - -<p>Nearly a month after the night-battle on Epipolæ,<a -id="FNanchor_462" href="#Footnote_462" class="fnanchor">[462]</a> -Gylippus and Sikanus both returned to Syracuse. The latter had been -unsuccessful at Agrigentum, where the philo-Syracusan party had been -sent into banishment before his arrival; but Gylippus brought with -him a considerable force of Sicilian Greeks, together with those -Peloponnesian hoplites who had started from Cape Tænarus in the early -spring, and who had made their way from Kyrênê first along the coast -of Africa, and then across to Selinus. Such increase of strength -immediately determined the Syracusans to resume the aggressive both -by land and by sea. In the Athenians, as they saw the new allies -marching in over Epipolæ, it produced a deeper despondency, combined -with bitter regret that they had not adopted the proposition of -departing immediately after the battle of Epipolæ, when Demosthenês -first proposed it. The late interval of lingering hopeless inaction -with continued sickness, had farther weakened their strength, -and Demosthenês now again pressed the resolution for immediate -departure. Whatever fancies Nikias may have indulged about Syracusan -embarrassments, were dissipated by the arrival of Gylippus; nor did -he venture to persist in his former peremptory opposition, though -even now he seems to have assented against his own conviction.<a -id="FNanchor_463" href="#Footnote_463" class="fnanchor">[463]</a> -He however insisted, with good reason, that no formal or public -vote should be taken on the occasion, but that the order<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_314">[p. 314]</span> should be circulated -through the camp, as privately as possible, to be ready for -departure at a given signal. Intimation was sent to Katana that the -armament was on the point of coming away, with orders to forward -no farther supplies.<a id="FNanchor_464" href="#Footnote_464" -class="fnanchor">[464]</a></p> - -<p>This plan was proceeding successfully: the ships were made ready, -much of the property of the army had already been conveyed aboard -without awakening the suspicion of the enemy, the signal would have -been hoisted on the ensuing morning, and within a few hours this -fated armament would have found itself clear of the harbor, with -comparatively small loss,<a id="FNanchor_465" href="#Footnote_465" -class="fnanchor">[465]</a> when the gods themselves—I speak in the -language and feelings of the Athenian camp—interfered to forbid -its departure. On the very night before, the 27th August, 413 -<small>B.C.</small>, which was full moon, the moon -was eclipsed. Such a portent, impressive to the Athenians at all -times, was doubly so under their present despondency, and many of -them construed it as a divine prohibition against departure until -a certain time should have elapsed, with expiatory ceremonies to -take off the effect. They made known their wish for postponement to -Nikias and his colleagues; but their interference was superfluous, -for Nikias himself was more deeply affected than any one else. -He consulted the prophets, who declared that the army ought not -to decamp until thrice nine days, a full circle of the moon, -should have passed over.<a id="FNanchor_466" href="#Footnote_466" -class="fnanchor">[466]</a> And Nikias took upon himself to announce, -that until after the inter<span class="pagenum" id="Page_315">[p. -315]</span>val indicated by them, he would not permit even any -discussion or proposition on the subject.</p> - -<p>The decision of the prophets, which Nikias thus made his own, -was a sentence of death to the Athenian army, yet it went along -with the general feeling, and was obeyed without hesitation. Even -Demosthenês, though if he had commanded alone, he might have tried -to overrule it, found himself compelled to yield. Yet according to -Philochorus, himself a professional diviner, skilful in construing -the religious meaning of events, it was a decision decidedly wrong; -that is, wrong according to the canonical principles of divination. -To men planning escape, or any other operation requiring silence -and secrecy, an eclipse of the moon, as hiding light and producing -darkness, was, he affirmed, an encouraging sign, and ought to have -made the Athenians even more willing and forward in quitting the -harbor. We are told, too, that Nikias had recently lost by death -Stilbidês, the ablest prophet in his service, and that he was -thus forced to have recourse to prophets of inferior ability.<a -id="FNanchor_467" href="#Footnote_467" class="fnanchor">[467]</a> -His piety left no means untried of appeasing the gods, by prayer, -sacrifice, and expiatory ceremonies, continued until the necessity -of actual conflict arrived.<a id="FNanchor_468" href="#Footnote_468" -class="fnanchor">[468]</a></p> - -<p>The impediment thus finally and irreparably intercepting the -Athenian departure, was the direct, though unintended, consequence -of the delay previously caused by Nikias. We cannot doubt, however, -that, when the eclipse first happened, he regarded it as a sign -confirmatory of the opinion which he had himself before delivered, -and that he congratulated himself upon having so long resisted the -proposition for going away. Let us add, that all those Athenians -who were predisposed to look upon eclipses as signs from heaven of -calamity about to come, would find themselves strengthened in that -belief by the unparalleled woes even now impending over this unhappy -army.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_316">[p. 316]</span></p> - -<p>What interpretation the Syracusans, confident and victorious, -put on the eclipse, we are not told. But they knew well how to -interpret the fact, which speedily came to their knowledge, that the -Athenians had fully resolved to make a furtive escape, and had only -been prevented by the eclipse. Such a resolution, amounting to an -unequivocal confession of helplessness, emboldened the Syracusans -yet farther, to crush them as they were in the harbor, and never to -permit them to occupy even any other post in Sicily. Accordingly, -Gylippus caused his triremes to be manned and practised for several -days: he then drew out his land-force, and made a demonstration of -no great significance against the Athenian lines. On the morrow, he -brought out all his forces, both land and naval; with the former -of which he beset the Athenian lines, while the fleet, seventy-six -triremes in number, was directed to sail up to the Athenian naval -station. The Athenian fleet, eighty-six triremes strong, sailed out -to meet it, and a close, general, and desperate action took place. -The fortune of Athens had fled. The Syracusans first beat the centre -division of the Athenians; next, the right division under Eurymedon, -who in attempting an evolution to outflank the enemy’s left, forgot -those narrow limits of the harbor which were at every turn the ruin -of the Athenian mariner, neared the land too much, and was pinned -up against it, in the recess of Daskon, by the vigorous attack of -the Syracusans. He was here slain, and his division destroyed: -successively, the entire Athenian fleet was beaten and driven -ashore.</p> - -<p>Few of the defeated ships could get into their own station. -Most of them were forced ashore or grounded on points without -those limits; upon which Gylippus marched down his land-force to -the water’s edge, in order to prevent the retreat of the crews as -well as to assist the Syracusan seamen in hauling off the ships -as prizes. His march, however, was so hurried and disorderly, -that the Tyrrhenian troops, on guard at the flank of the Athenian -station, sallied out against them as they approached, beat the -foremost of them, and drove them away from the shore into the marsh -called Lysimeleia. More Syracusan troops came to their aid; but the -Athenians also, anxious above all things for the protection of their -ships, came forth in greater numbers; and a general battle ensued in -which the latter were victorious. Though they<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_317">[p. 317]</span> did not inflict much loss upon the -enemy, yet they saved most of their own triremes which had been -driven ashore, together with the crews, and carried them into the -naval station. Except for this success on land, the entire Athenian -fleet would have been destroyed: as it was, the defeat was still -complete, and eighteen triremes were lost, all their crews being -slain. This was probably the division of Eurymedon, which having -been driven ashore in the recess of Daskon, was too far off from the -Athenian station to receive any land assistance. As the Athenians -were hauling in their disabled triremes, the Syracusans made a last -effort to destroy them by means of a fireship, for which the wind -happened to be favorable. But the Athenians found means to prevent -her approach, and to extinguish the flames.<a id="FNanchor_469" -href="#Footnote_469" class="fnanchor">[469]</a></p> - -<p>Here was a complete victory gained over Athens on her own -element, gained with inferior numbers, gained even over the fresh -and yet formidable fleet recently brought by Demosthenês. It told -but too plainly on which side the superiority now lay, how well the -Syracusans had organized their naval strength for the specialties -of their own harbor, how ruinous had been the folly of Nikias in -retaining his excellent seamen imprisoned within that petty and -unwholesome lake, where land and water alike did the work of their -enemies. It not only disheartened the Athenians, but belied all -their past experience, and utterly confounded them. Sickness of -the whole enterprise, and repentance for having undertaken it, now -became uppermost in their minds: yet it is remarkable that we hear -of no complaints against Nikias separately.<a id="FNanchor_470" -href="#Footnote_470" class="fnanchor">[470]</a> But repentance came -too late. The Syracusans, fully alive to the importance of their -victory, sailed round the harbor in triumph as again their own,<a -id="FNanchor_471" href="#Footnote_471" class="fnanchor">[471]</a> -and already looked on the enemy within it as their prisoners. They -determined to close up and guard the mouth of it, from Plemmyrium to -Ortygia, so as to leave no farther liberty of exit.</p> - -<p>Nor were they insensible how vastly the scope of the contest<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_318">[p. 318]</span> was now widened, and -the value of the stake before them enhanced. It was not merely to -rescue their own city from siege, nor even to repel and destroy the -besieging army, that they were now contending. It was to extinguish -the entire power of Athens, and liberate the half of Greece from -dependence; for Athens could never be expected to survive so terrific -a loss as that of the entire double armament before Syracuse.<a -id="FNanchor_472" href="#Footnote_472" class="fnanchor">[472]</a> -The Syracusans exulted in the thought that this great achievement -would be theirs, that their city was the field, and their navy the -chief instrument of victory: a lasting source of glory to them, not -merely in the eyes of contemporaries, but even in those of posterity. -Their pride swelled when they reflected on the Pan-Hellenic -importance which the siege of Syracuse had now acquired, and when -they counted up the number and variety of Greek warriors who were now -fighting, on one side or the other, between Euryalus and Plemmyrium. -With the exception of the great struggle between Athens and the -Peloponnesian confederacy, never before had combatants so many -and so miscellaneous been engaged under the same banners. Greeks, -continental and insular, Ionic, Doric, and Æolic, autonomous and -dependent, volunteers and mercenaries, from Miletus and Chios in -the east to Selinus in the west, were all here to be found; and not -merely Greeks, but also the barbaric Sikels, Egestæans, Tyrrhenians, -and Iapygians. If the Lacædemonians, Corinthians, and Bœotians were -fighting on the side of Syracuse, the Argeians and Mantineians, not -to mention the great insular cities, stood in arms against her. The -jumble of kinship among the combatants on both sides, as well as -the cross action of different local antipathies, is put in lively -antithesis by Thucydidês.<a id="FNanchor_473" href="#Footnote_473" -class="fnanchor">[473]</a> But amidst so vast an assembled number, -of which they were the chiefs, the paymasters, and the centre of -combination, the Syracusans might well feel a sense of personal -aggrandizement, and a consciousness of the great blow which they were -about to strike, sufficient to exalt them for the time above the -level even of their great Dorian chiefs in Peloponnesus.</p> - -<p>It was their first operation, occupying three days, to close -up the mouth of the Great Harbor, which was nearly one mile<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_319">[p. 319]</span> broad, with vessels -of every description, triremes, traders, boats, etc., anchored in -an oblique direction, and chained together.<a id="FNanchor_474" -href="#Footnote_474" class="fnanchor">[474]</a> They at the same time -prepared their naval force with redoubled zeal for the desperate -struggle which they knew to be coming. They then awaited the efforts -of the Athenians, who watched their proceedings with sadness and -anxiety.</p> - -<p>Nikias and his colleagues called together the principal officers -to deliberate what was to be done. As they had few provisions -remaining, and had counter-ordered their farther supplies, some -instant and desperate effort was indispensable; and the only point -in debate was, whether they should burn their fleet and retire by -land, or make a fresh maritime exertion to break out of the harbor. -Such had been the impression left by the recent sea-fight, that -many in the camp leaned to the former scheme.<a id="FNanchor_475" -href="#Footnote_475" class="fnanchor">[475]</a> But the generals -resolved upon first trying the latter, and exhausted all their -combinations to give to it the greatest possible effect. They now -evacuated the upper portion of their lines, both on the higher -ground of Epipolæ, and even on the lower ground, such portion as was -nearest to the southern cliff; confining themselves to a limited -fortified space close to the shore, just adequate for their sick, -their wounded, and their stores; in order to spare the necessity -for a large garrison to defend them, and thus leave nearly their -whole force disposable for sea-service. They then made ready every -trireme in the station, which could be rendered ever so imperfectly -seaworthy, constraining every fit man to serve aboard them, without -distinction of age, rank, or country. The triremes were manned with -double crews of soldiers, hoplites as well as bowmen and darters, the -latter mostly Akarnanians; while the hoplites, stationed at the prow -with orders to board the enemy as quickly as possible, were furnished -with grappling-irons to detain the enemy’s ship immediately after -the moment of collision, in order that it might not be withdrawn -and the collision repeated, with all its injurious effects arising -from the strength and massiveness of the Syracusan epôtids. The -best consultation was held with the steersmen as to arrangement and -manœuvres of every trireme, nor was any precaution omitted which the -scanty means at hand allowed. In the well-known<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_320">[p. 320]</span> impossibility of obtaining new -provisions, every man was anxious to hurry on the struggle.<a -id="FNanchor_476" href="#Footnote_476" class="fnanchor">[476]</a> -But Nikias, as he mustered them on the shore immediately before -going aboard, saw but too plainly that it was the mere stress of -desperation which impelled them; that the elasticity, the disciplined -confidence, the maritime pride, habitual to the Athenians on -shipboard, was extinct, or dimly and faintly burning.</p> - -<p>He did his best to revive them, by exhortations unusually emphatic -and impressive. “Recollect (he said) that you too, not less than -the Syracusans, are now fighting for your own safety and for your -country; for it is only by victory in the coming struggle that any -of you can ever hope to see his country again. Yield not to despair -like raw recruits after a first defeat; you, Athenians and allies, -familiar with the unexpected revolutions of war, will hope now for -the fair turn of fortune, and fight with a spirit worthy of the -great force which you see here around you. We generals have now made -effective provision against our two great disadvantages, the narrow -circuit of the harbor, and the thickness of the enemy’s prows.<a -id="FNanchor_477" href="#Footnote_477" class="fnanchor">[477]</a> -Sad as the necessity is, we have thrown aside all our Athenian skill -and tactics, and have prepared to fight under the conditions forced -upon us by the enemy, a land-battle on shipboard.<a id="FNanchor_478" -href="#Footnote_478" class="fnanchor">[478]</a> It will be for -you to conquer in this last desperate struggle, where there is no -friendly shore to receive you if you give way. You, hoplites on -the deck, as soon as you have the enemy’s trireme in contact, keep -him fast, and relax not until you have swept away his hoplites and -mastered his deck. You, seamen and rowers, must yet keep up your -courage, in spite of this sad failure in our means, and subversion -of our tactics. You are better defended on deck above, and you -have more triremes to help you, than in the recent defeat. Such -of you, as are not Athenian citizens, I entreat to recollect the -valuable privileges which you have hitherto enjoyed from serving in -the navy of Athens. Though<span class="pagenum" id="Page_321">[p. -321]</span> not really citizens, you have been reputed and treated -as such; you have acquired our dialect, you have copied our habits, -and have thus enjoyed the admiration, the imposing station, and -the security, arising from our great empire.<a id="FNanchor_479" -href="#Footnote_479" class="fnanchor">[479]</a> Partaking as you do -freely in the benefits of that empire, do not now betray it to these -Sicilians and Corinthians whom you have so often beaten. For such of -you as <i>are</i> Athenians, I again remind you that Athens has neither -fresh triremes, nor fresh hoplites, to replace those now here. -Unless you are now victorious, her enemies near home will find her -defenceless; and our countrymen there will become slaves to Sparta, -as you will to Syracuse. Recollect, every man of you, that you now -going aboard here are the <i>all</i> of Athens,—her hoplites, her ships, -her entire remaining city, and her splendid name.<a id="FNanchor_480" -href="#Footnote_480" class="fnanchor">[480]</a> Bear up then and -conquer, every man with his best mettle, in this one last struggle, -for Athens as well as yourselves, and on an occasion which will never -return.”</p> - -<p>If, in translating the despatch written home ten months before by -Nikias to the people of Athens, we were compelled to remark, that -the greater part of it was the bitterest condemnation of his<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_322">[p. 322]</span> own previous policy as -commander, so we are here carried back, when we find him striving to -palliate the ruinous effects of that confined space of water which -paralyzed the Athenian seamen, to his own obstinate improvidence in -forbidding the egress of the fleet when insisted on by Demosthenês. -His hearers probably were too much absorbed with the terrible -present, to revert to irremediable mistakes of the past. Immediately -on the conclusion of his touching address, the order was given to -go aboard, and the seamen took their places. But when the triremes -were fully manned, and the trierarchs, after superintending the -embarkation, were themselves about to enter and push off, the agony -of Nikias was too great to be repressed. Feeling more keenly than any -man the intensity of this last death-struggle, and the serious, but -inevitable, shortcomings of the armament in its present condition, -he still thought that he had not said enough for the occasion. He -now renewed his appeal personally to the trierarchs, all of them -citizens of rank and wealth at Athens. They were all familiarly -known to him, and he addressed himself to every man separately by -his own name, his father’s name, and his tribe, adjuring him by the -deepest and most solemn motives which could touch the human feelings. -Some he reminded of their own previous glories, others of the -achievements of illustrious ancestors, imploring them not to dishonor -or betray these precious titles: to all alike he recalled the charm -of their beloved country, with its full political freedom and its -unconstrained license of individual agency to every man: to all alike -he appealed in the names of their wives, their children, and their -paternal gods. He cared not for being suspected of trenching upon the -common places of rhetoric: he caught at every topic which could touch -the inmost affections, awaken the inbred patriotism, and rekindle -the abated courage of the officers, whom he was sending forth to -this desperate venture. He at length constrained himself to leave -off, still fancying in his anxiety that he ought to say more, and -proceeded to marshal the land-force for the defence of the lines, as -well as along the shore, where they might render as much service and -as much encouragement as possible to the combatants on shipboard.<a -id="FNanchor_481" href="#Footnote_481" class="fnanchor">[481]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_323">[p. 323]</span></p> <p>Very -different was the spirit prevalent, and very opposite the burning -words uttered, on the seaboard of the Syracusan station, as the -leaders were mustering their men immediately before embarkation. They -had been apprized of the grappling-irons now about to be employed by -the Athenians, and had guarded against them in part by stretching -hides along their bows, so that the “iron hand” might slip off -without acquiring any hold. The preparatory movements even within the -Athenian station being perfectly visible, Gylippus sent the fleet out -with the usual prefatory harangue. He complimented them on the great -achievements which they had already performed in breaking down the -naval power of Athens, so long held irresistible.<a id="FNanchor_482" -href="#Footnote_482" class="fnanchor">[482]</a> He reminded them that -the sally of their enemies was only a last effort of despair, seeking -nothing but escape, undertaken without confidence in themselves, -and under the necessity of throwing aside all their own tactics in -order to copy feebly those of the Syracusans.<a id="FNanchor_483" -href="#Footnote_483" class="fnanchor">[483]</a> He called upon -them to recollect the destructive purposes which the invaders had -brought with them against Syracuse, to inflict with resentful hand -the finishing stroke upon this half-ruined armament, and to taste -the delight of satiating a legitimate revenge.<a id="FNanchor_484" -href="#Footnote_484" class="fnanchor">[484]</a></p> - -<p>The Syracusan fleet—seventy-six triremes strong, as in the -last battle—was the first to put off from shore; Pythen with the -Corinthians in the centre, Sikanus and Agatharchus on the wings. A -certain proportion of them were placed near the mouth of the harbor, -in order to guard the barrier; while the rest were distributed around -the harbor in order to attack the Athenians from different sides as -soon as they should approach. Moreover, the surface of the harbor -swarmed with the light craft of the Syracusans, in many of which -embarked youthful volun<span class="pagenum" id="Page_324">[p. -324]</span>teers, sons of the best families in the city;<a -id="FNanchor_485" href="#Footnote_485" class="fnanchor">[485]</a> -boats of no mean service during the battle, saving or destroying -the seamen cast overboard from disabled ships, as well as annoying -the fighting Athenian triremes. The day was one sacred to Hêraklês -at Syracuse; and the prophets announced that the god would insure -victory to the Syracusans, provided they stood on the defensive, and -did not begin the attack.<a id="FNanchor_486" href="#Footnote_486" -class="fnanchor">[486]</a> Moreover, the entire shore round the -harbor, except the Athenian station and its immediate neighborhood, -was crowded with Syracusan soldiers and spectators; while the walls -of Ortygia, immediately overhanging the water, were lined with the -feebler population of the city, the old men, women, and children. -From the Athenian station presently came forth one hundred and ten -triremes, under Demosthenês, Menander, and Euthydêmus, with the -customary pæan, its tone probably partaking of the general sadness -of the camp. They steered across direct to the mouth of the harbor, -beholding on all sides the armed enemies ranged along the shore, as -well as the unarmed multitudes who were imprecating the vengeance -of the gods upon their heads; while for them there was no sympathy, -except among the fellow-sufferers within their own lines. Inside of -this narrow basin, rather more than five English miles in circuit, -one hundred and ninety-four ships of war, each manned with more -than two hundred men, were about to join battle, in the presence -of countless masses around, all with palpitating hearts, and near -enough both to see and hear; the most picturesque battle—if we could -abstract our minds from its terrible interest<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_325">[p. 325]</span> —probably in history, without smoke or -other impediments to vision, and in the clear atmosphere of Sicily, a -serious and magnified realization of those naumachiæ which the Roman -emperors used to exhibit with gladiators on the Italian lakes, for -the recreation of the people.</p> - -<p>The Athenian fleet made directly for that portion of the barrier -where a narrow opening—perhaps closed by a movable chain—had been -left for merchant-vessels. Their first impetuous attack broke through -the Syracusan squadron defending it, and they were already attempting -to sever its connecting bonds, when the enemy from all sides crowded -in upon them and forced them to desist. Presently the battle became -general, and the combatants were distributed in various parts of the -harbor. On both sides a fierce and desperate courage was displayed, -even greater than had been shown on any of the former occasions. -At the first onset, the skill and tactics of the steersmen shone -conspicuous, well seconded by zeal on the part of the rowers and by -their ready obedience to the voice of the keleustês. As the vessels -neared, the bowmen, slingers, and throwers on the deck, hurled clouds -of missiles against the enemy; next, was heard the loud crash of the -two impinging metallic fronts, resounding all along the shore.<a -id="FNanchor_487" href="#Footnote_487" class="fnanchor">[487]</a> -When the vessels were thus once in contact, they were rarely allowed -to separate: a strenuous hand-fight then commenced by the hoplites -in each, trying respectively to board and master their enemy’s deck. -It was not always, however, that each trireme had its own single -and special enemy: sometimes one ship had<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_326">[p. 326]</span> two or three enemies to contend with -at once, sometimes she fell aboard of one unsought, and became -entangled. After a certain time, the fight still obstinately -continuing, all sort of battle order became lost; the skill of the -steersman was of little avail, and the voice of the keleustês was -drowned amidst the universal din and mingled cries from victors as -well as vanquished. On both sides emulous exhortations were poured -forth, together with reproach and sarcasm addressed to any ship which -appeared flinching from the contest; though factitious stimulus of -this sort was indeed but little needed.</p> - -<p>Such was the heroic courage on both sides, that for a long time -victory was altogether doubtful, and the whole harbor was a scene -of partial encounters, wherein sometimes Syracusans, sometimes -Athenians, prevailed. According as success thus fluctuated, so -followed the cheers or wailings of the spectators ashore. At one and -the same time, every variety of human emotion might be witnessed; -according as attention was turned towards a victorious or a defeated -ship. It was among the spectators in the Athenian station above all, -whose entire life and liberty were staked in the combat, that this -emotion might be seen exaggerated into agony, and overpassing the -excitement even of the combatants themselves.<a id="FNanchor_488" -href="#Footnote_488" class="fnanchor">[488]</a> Those among them who -looked towards a portion of the harbor where their friends seemed -winning, were full of joy and thanksgiving to the gods: such of their -neighbors who contemplated an Athenian ship in difficulty, gave vent -to their feelings in shrieks and lamentation; while a third group, -with their eyes fixed on some portion of the combat still disputed, -were plunged in all the agitations of doubt, manifested even in -the tremulous swing of their bodies, as hope or fear alternately -predominated. During all the time that the combat remained undecided, -the Athenians ashore were distracted by all these manifold varieties -of intense sympathy. But at length the moment came, after a -long-protracted struggle, when victory began to declare in favor of -the Syracusans, who, perceiving that their enemies were slackening, -redoubled their shouts as well as their efforts, and pushed them all -back towards the land. All the Athenian triremes, abandoning farther -resistance, were thrust ashore like shipwrecked<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_327">[p. 327]</span> vessels in or near their own station; a -few being even captured before they could arrive there. The diverse -manifestations of sympathy among the Athenians in the station itself -were now exchanged for one unanimous shriek of agony and despair. -The boldest of them rushed to rescue the ships and their crews from -pursuit, others to man their walls in case of attack from land: many -were even paralyzed at the sight, and absorbed with the thoughts -of their own irretrievable ruin. Their souls were doubtless still -farther subdued by the wild and enthusiastic joy which burst forth -in maddening shouts from the hostile crowds around the harbor, in -response to their own victorious comrades on shipboard.</p> - -<p>Such was the close of this awful, heart-stirring, and decisive -combat. The modern historian strives in vain to convey the impression -of it which appears in the condensed and burning phrases of -Thucydidês. We find in his description of battles generally, and -of this battle beyond all others, a depth and abundance of human -emotion which has now passed out of military proceedings. The Greeks -who fight, like the Greeks who look on, are not soldiers withdrawn -from the community, and specialized as well as hardened by long -professional training, but citizens with all the passions, instincts, -sympathies, joys, and sorrows of domestic as well as political -life. Moreover, the non-military population in ancient times had an -interest of the most intense kind in the result of the struggle; -which made the difference to them, if not of life and death, at -least of the extremity of happiness and misery. Hence the strong -light and shade, the Homeric exhibition of undisguised impulse, the -tragic detail of personal motive and suffering, which pervades this -and other military descriptions of Thucydidês. When we read the few -but most vehement words which he employs to depict the Athenian camp -under this fearful trial, we must recollect that these were not only -men whose all was at stake, but that they were moreover citizens full -of impressibility, sensitive and demonstrative Greeks; and, indeed, -the most sensitive and demonstrative of all Greeks. To repress all -manifestations of strong emotion was not considered in ancient times -essential to the dignity of the human character.</p> - -<p>Amidst all the deep pathos, however, which the great -historian<span class="pagenum" id="Page_328">[p. 328]</span> has -imparted to the final battle at Syracuse, he has not explained the -causes upon which its ultimate issue turned. Considering that the -Athenians were superior to their enemies in number, as one hundred -and ten to seventy-six triremes, that they fought with courage -not less heroic, and that the action was on their own element, we -might have anticipated for them, if not a victory, at least a drawn -battle, with equal loss on both sides. But we may observe, 1. The -number of one hundred and ten triremes was formed by including -some hardly seaworthy.<a id="FNanchor_489" href="#Footnote_489" -class="fnanchor">[489]</a> 2. The crews were composed partly of men -not used to sea-service; and the Akarnanian darters, especially, were -for this reason unhandy with their missiles.<a id="FNanchor_490" -href="#Footnote_490" class="fnanchor">[490]</a> 3. Though the -water had been hitherto the element favorable to Athens, yet -her superiority in this respect was declining, and her enemies -approaching nearer to her, even in the open sea. But the narrow -dimensions of the harbor would have nullified her superiority at -all times, and placed her even at great disadvantage,—without the -means of twisting and turning her triremes so as to strike only at -a vulnerable point of the enemy,—compared with the thick, heavy, -straightforward butting of the Syracusans; like a nimble pugilist -of light weight contending, in a very confined ring, against -superior weight and muscle.<a id="FNanchor_491" href="#Footnote_491" -class="fnanchor">[491]</a> For the mere land-fight on shipboard, -Athenians had not only no advantage, but had on the contrary the -odds against them. 4. The Syracusans enjoyed great advantage from -having nearly the whole harbor lined round with their soldiers and -friends; not simply from the force of encouraging sympathy, no<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_329">[p. 329]</span> mean auxiliary, but -because any of their triremes, if compelled to fall back before an -Athenian, found protection on the shore, and could return to the -fight at leisure; while an Athenian in the same predicament had no -escape. 5. The numerous light craft of the Syracusans doubtless -rendered great service in this battle, as they had done in the -preceding, though Thucydidês does not again mention them. 6. Lastly, -both in the Athenian and Syracusan characters, the pressure of -necessity was less potent as a stimulus to action, than hopeful -confidence and elation, with the idea of a flood-tide yet mounting. -In the character of some other races, the Jews for instance, the -comparative force of these motives appears to be the other way.</p> - -<p>About sixty Athenian triremes, little more than half of the -fleet which came forth, were saved as the wreck from this terrible -conflict. The Syracusans on their part had suffered severely; only -fifty triremes remaining out of seventy-six. The triumph with -which, nevertheless, on returning to the city, they erected their -trophy, and the exultation which reigned among the vast crowds -encircling the harbor, was beyond all measure or precedent. Its -clamorous manifestations were doubtless but too well heard in the -neighboring camp of the Athenians, and increased, if anything could -increase, the soul-subduing extremity of distress which paralyzed the -vanquished. So utterly did the pressure of suffering, anticipated as -well as actual, benumb their minds and extinguish their most sacred -associations, that no man among them, not even the ultra-religious -Nikias, thought of picking up the floating bodies or asking for a -truce to bury the dead. This obligation, usually so serious and -imperative upon the survivors after a battle, now passed unheeded -amidst the sorrow, terror, and despair, of the living man for -himself.</p> - -<p>Such despair, however, was not shared by the generals, to their -honor be it spoken. On the afternoon of this terrible defeat, -Demosthenês proposed to Nikias that at daybreak the ensuing morning -they should man all the remaining ships—even now more in number than -the Syracusan—and make a fresh attempt to break out of the harbor. -To this Nikias agreed, and both proceeded to try their influence in -getting the resolution executed. But so irreparably was the spirit -of the seamen broken, that nothing could prevail upon them to go -again on shipboard: they<span class="pagenum" id="Page_330">[p. -330]</span> would hear of nothing but attempting to escape by land.<a -id="FNanchor_492" href="#Footnote_492" class="fnanchor">[492]</a> -Preparations were therefore made for commencing their march in -the darkness of that very night. The roads were still open, and, -had they so marched, a portion of them, at least, might even -yet have been saved.<a id="FNanchor_493" href="#Footnote_493" -class="fnanchor">[493]</a> But there occurred one more mistake, one -farther postponement, which cut off the last hopes of this gallant -and fated remnant.</p> - -<p>The Syracusan Hermokratês, fully anticipating that the Athenians -would decamp that very night, was eager to prevent their retreat, -because of the mischief which they might do if established in -any other part of Sicily. He pressed Gylippus and the military -authorities to send out forthwith, and block up the principal -roads, passes, and fords, by which the fugitives would get off. -Though sensible of the wisdom of his advice, the generals thought -it wholly unexecutable. Such was the universal and unbounded joy -which now pervaded the city, in consequence of the recent victory, -still farther magnified by the circumstance that the day was sacred -to Hêraklês,—so wild the jollity, the feasting, the intoxication, -the congratulations, amidst men rewarding themselves after their -recent effort and triumph, and amidst the necessary care for the -wounded,—that an order to arm and march out would have been as little -listened to as the order to go on shipboard was by the desponding -Athenians. Perceiving that he could get nothing done until the next -morning, Hermokratês resorted to a stratagem in order to delay -the departure of the Athenians for that night. At the moment when -darkness was beginning, he sent down some confidential friends on -horseback to the Athenian wall. These men, riding up near enough -to make themselves heard, and calling for the sentries, addressed -them as messengers from the private correspondents of Nikias in -Syracuse, who had sent to warn him, they affirmed, not to decamp -during the night, inasmuch as the Syracusans had already beset and -occupied the roads; but to begin his march quietly the next morning -after adequate preparation.<a id="FNanchor_494" href="#Footnote_494" -class="fnanchor">[494]</a></p> - -<p>This fraud—the same as the Athenians had themselves practised -two years before,<a id="FNanchor_495" href="#Footnote_495" -class="fnanchor">[495]</a> in order to tempt the Syracusans to<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_331">[p. 331]</span> march out against -Katana—was perfectly successful: the sincerity of the information was -believed, and the advice adopted. Had Demosthenês been in command -alone, we may doubt whether he would have been so easily duped; for -granting the accuracy of the fact asserted, it was not the less -obvious that the difficulties, instead of being diminished, would -be increased tenfold on the following day. We have seen, however, -on more than one previous occasion, how fatally Nikias was misled -by his treacherous advices from the philo-Athenians at Syracuse. -An excuse for inaction was always congenial to his character; and -the present recommendation, moreover, fell in but too happily with -the temper of the army, now benumbed with depression and terror, -like those unfortunate soldiers, in the Retreat of the Ten Thousand -Greeks, who were yielding to the lethargy of extreme cold on the -snows of Armenia, and whom Xenophon vainly tried to arouse.<a -id="FNanchor_496" href="#Footnote_496" class="fnanchor">[496]</a> -Having remained over that night, the generals determined also -to stay the next day,—in order that the army might carry away -with them as much of their baggage as possible,—sending forward -a messenger to the Sikels in the interior to request that they -would meet the army, and bring with them a supply of provisions.<a -id="FNanchor_497" href="#Footnote_497" class="fnanchor">[497]</a> -Gylippus and Hermokratês had thus ample time, on the following day, -to send out forces and occupy all the positions convenient for -obstructing the Athenian march. They at the same time towed into -Syracuse as prizes all the Athenian triremes which had been driven -ashore in the recent battle, and which now lay like worthless hulks, -unguarded and unheeded,<a id="FNanchor_498" href="#Footnote_498" -class="fnanchor">[498]</a> seemingly even those within the station -itself.</p> - -<p>It was on the next day but one after the maritime defeat that -Nikias and Demosthenês put their army in motion to attempt retreat. -The camp had long been a scene of sickness and death from the -prevalence of marsh fever; but since the recent battle the number -of wounded men, and the unburied bodies of the slain, had rendered -it yet more pitiable. Forty thousand miserable men—so prodigious -was the total, including all ranks and functions—now set forth to -quit it, on a march of which few could hope to see the end; like -the pouring forth of the population of a<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_332">[p. 332]</span> large city starved out by blockade. -Many had little or no provisions to carry, so low had the stock -become reduced; but of those who had, every man carried his own, even -the horsemen and hoplites, now for the first time either already left -without slaves, by desertion, or knowing that no slave could now be -trusted. But neither such melancholy equality of suffering, nor the -number of sufferers, counted for much in the way of alleviation. A -downcast stupor and sense of abasement possessed every man; the more -intolerable, when they recollected the exit of the armament from -Peiræus two years before, with prayers, and solemn pæans, and all -the splendid dreams of conquest, set against the humiliation of the -closing scene now before them, without a single trireme left out of -two prodigious fleets.</p> - -<p>But it was not until the army had actually begun its march that -the full measure of wretchedness was felt and manifested. It was then -that the necessity first became proclaimed, which no one probably -spoke out beforehand, of leaving behind not merely the unburied -bodies, but also the sick and the wounded. The scenes of woe which -marked this hour passed endurance or description. The departing -soldier sorrowed and shuddered with the sentiment of an unperformed -duty, as he turned from the unburied bodies of the slain; but far -more terrible was the trial, when he had to tear himself from the -living sufferers, who implored their comrades, with wailings of agony -and distraction, not to abandon them. Appealing to all the claims -of pious friendship, they clung round their knees, and even crawled -along the line of march until their strength failed. The silent -dejection of the previous day was now exchanged for universal tears -and groans, and clamorous outbursts of sorrow, amidst which the army -could not without the utmost difficulty be disengaged and put in -motion.</p> - -<p>After such heart-rending scenes, it might seem that their cup of -bitterness was exhausted; but worse was yet in store, and the terrors -of the future dictated a struggle against all the miseries of past -and present. The generals did their best to keep up some sense of -order as well as courage; and Nikias, particularly, in this closing -hour of his career, displayed a degree of energy and heroism which he -had never before seemed to possess. Though himself among the greatest -personal sufferers of all,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_333">[p. -333]</span> from his incurable complaint, he was seen everywhere in -the ranks marshalling the troops, heartening up their dejection, -and addressing them with a voice louder, more strenuous, and more -commanding than was his wont.</p> - -<p>“Keep up your hope still, Athenians (he said), even as we are -now: others have been saved out of circumstances worse than ours. -Be not too much humiliated, either with your defeats or with your -present unmerited hardships. I too, having no advantage over any of -you in strength,—nay, you see the condition to which I have been -brought by my disease,—and accustomed even to superior splendor and -good fortune in private as well as public life, I too am plunged in -the same peril with the humblest soldier among you. Nevertheless, my -conduct has been constantly pious towards the gods as well as just -and blameless towards men; in recompense for which, my hope for the -future is yet sanguine, at the same time that our actual misfortunes -do not appall me in proportion to their intrinsic magnitude.<a -id="FNanchor_499" href="#Footnote_499" class="fnanchor">[499]</a> -Perhaps,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_334">[p. 334]</span> indeed, -they may from this time forward abate; for our enemies have had -their full swing of good fortune, and if, at the moment of our -starting, we were under the jealous wrath of any of the<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_335">[p. 335]</span> gods, we have already -undergone chastisement amply sufficient. Other people before us have -invaded foreign lands, and after having done what was competent -to human power, have suffered what was within the limit of human -endurance. We too may reasonably hope henceforward to have the -offended god dealing with us more mildly, for we are now objects -fitter for his compassion than for his jealousy.<a id="FNanchor_500" -href="#Footnote_500" class="fnanchor">[500]</a> Look, moreover, at -your own ranks, hoplites so numerous and so excellent: let that guard -you against excessive despair, and recollect that, wherever you may -sit down, you are yourselves at once a city; nor is there any other -city in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_336">[p. 336]</span> Sicily -that can either repulse your attack or expel you if you choose to -stay. Be careful yourselves to keep your march firm and orderly, -every man of you with this conviction, that whatever spot he may be -forced to fight in, that spot is his country and his fortress, and -must be kept by victorious effort. As our provisions are very scanty, -we shall hasten on night and day alike; and so soon as you reach -any friendly village of the Sikels, who still remain constant to us -from hatred to Syracuse, then consider yourselves in security. We -have sent forward to apprize them, and intreat them to meet us with -supplies. Once more, soldiers, recollect that to act like brave men -is now a matter of necessity to you, and that if you falter, there -is no refuge for you anywhere. Whereas if you now get clear of your -enemies, such of you as are not Athenians will again enjoy the sight -of home, while such of you as <i>are</i> Athenians will live to renovate -the great power of our city, fallen though it now be. <i>It is men that -make a city; not walls, nor ships without men.</i>”<a id="FNanchor_501" -href="#Footnote_501" class="fnanchor">[501]</a></p> - -<p>The efforts of both commanders were in full harmony with these -strenuous words. The army was distributed into two divisions; the -hoplites marching in a hollow oblong, with the baggage and unarmed in -the interior. The front division was commanded by Nikias, the rear by -Demosthenês. Directing their course towards the Sikel territory, in -the interior of the island, they first marched along the left bank -of the Anapus until they came to the ford of that river, which they -found guarded by a Syracusan detachment. They forced the passage, -however, without much resistance, and accomplished on that day a -march of about five miles, under the delay arising from the harassing -of the enemy’s cavalry and light troops. Encamping for that night -on an eminence, they recommenced their march with the earliest -dawn, and halted, after about two miles and a half, in a deserted -village on a plain. They were in hopes of finding some provisions -in the houses, and were even under the necessity of carrying along -with them some water from this spot; there being none to be found -farther on. As their intended line of march had now become evident, -the Syracusans profited by this halt to get<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_337">[p. 337]</span> on before them, and to occupy in force -a position on the road, called the Akræan cliff. Here the road, -ascending a high hill, formed a sort of ravine bordered on each -side by steep cliffs. The Syracusans erected a wall or barricade -across the whole breadth of the road, and occupied the high ground -on each side. But even to reach this pass was beyond the competence -of the Athenians; so impracticable was it to get over the ground in -the face of overwhelming attacks from the enemy’s cavalry and light -troops. They were compelled, after a short march, to retreat to their -camp of the night before.<a id="FNanchor_502" href="#Footnote_502" -class="fnanchor">[502]</a></p> - -<p>Every hour added to the distress of their position; for their -food was all but exhausted, nor could any man straggle from the main -body without encountering certain destruction from the cavalry. -Accordingly, on the next morning, they tried one more desperate -effort to get over the hilly ground into the interior. Starting -very early, they arrived at the foot of the hill called the Akræan -cliff, where they found the barricades placed across the road, with -deep files of Syracusan hoplites behind them, and crowds of light -troops lining the cliffs on each border. They made the most strenuous -and obstinate efforts to force this inexpugnable position, but all -their struggles were vain, while they suffered miserably from the -missiles of the troops above. Amidst all the discouragement of this -repulse, they were yet farther disheartened by storms of thunder and -lightning, which occurred during the time, and which they construed -as portents significant of their impending ruin.<a id="FNanchor_503" -href="#Footnote_503" class="fnanchor">[503]</a></p> - -<p>This fact strikingly illustrates both the change which the last -two years had wrought in the contending parties, and the degree to -which such religious interpretations of phenomena depended for their -efficacy on predisposing temper, gloomy or cheerful. In the first -battle between Nikias and the Syracusans, near the Great Harbor, -some months before the siege was begun, a similar thunder-storm had -taken place: on that occasion the Athenian soldiers had continued -the battle unmoved, treating it as a natural event belonging to the -season, and such indifference on their part<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_338">[p. 338]</span> had still farther imposed upon the -alarmed Syracusans.<a id="FNanchor_504" href="#Footnote_504" -class="fnanchor">[504]</a> Now, both the self-confidence and the -religious impression had changed sides.</p> - -<p>Exhausted by their fruitless efforts, the Athenians fell back -a short space to repose, when Gylippus tried to surround them by -sending a detachment to block up the narrow road in their rear. This, -however, they prevented, effecting their retreat into the open plain, -where they passed the night, and on the ensuing day attempted once -more the hopeless march over the Akræan cliff. But they were not -allowed even to advance so far as the pass and the barricade. They -were so assailed and harassed by the cavalry and darters, in flank -and rear, that, in spite of heroic effort and endurance, they could -not accomplish a progress of so much as one single mile. Extenuated -by fatigue, half-starved, and with numbers of wounded men, they -were compelled to spend a third miserable night in the same fatal -plain.</p> - -<p>As soon as the Syracusans had retired for the night to their -camp, Nikias and Demosthenês took counsel. They saw plainly that the -route which they had originally projected, over the Akræan cliff -into the Sikel regions of the interior and from thence to Katana, -had become impracticable, and that their unhappy troops would be -still less in condition to force it on the morrow than they had been -on the day preceding. Accordingly, they resolved to make off during -the night, leaving numerous fires burning to mislead the enemy; -but completely to alter the direction, and to turn down towards -the southern coast on which lay Kamarina and Gela. Their guides -informed them that if they could cross the river Kakyparis, which -fell into the sea south of Syracuse, on the southeastern coast of -Sicily, or a river still farther on, called the Erineus,—they might -march up the right bank of either into the regions of the interior. -Accordingly, they broke up in the night, amidst confusion and alarm; -in spite of which, the front division of the army under Nikias got -into full march, and made considerable advance. By daybreak this -division reached the southeastern coast of the island not far south -of Syracuse, and fell into the track of the Helôrine road, which -they pursued until they arrived at the Kakyparis. Even here,<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_339">[p. 339]</span> however, they found a -Syracusan detachment beforehand with them, raising a redoubt, and -blocking up the ford; nor could Nikias pass it without forcing his -way through them. He marched straightforward to the Erineus, which -he crossed on the same day, and encamped his troops on some high -ground on the other side.<a id="FNanchor_505" href="#Footnote_505" -class="fnanchor">[505]</a></p> - -<p>Except at the ford of the Kakyparis, his march had been all -day unobstructed by the enemy; and he thought it wiser to push -hid troops as fast as possible, in order to arrive at some place -both of safety and subsistence, without concerning himself about -the rear division under Demosthenês. That division, the larger -half of the army, started both later and in great disorder. -Unaccountable panics and darkness made them part company or miss -their way, so that Demosthenês, with all his efforts to keep them -together, made little progress, and fell much behind Nikias. He was -overtaken by the Syracusans during the forenoon, seemingly before -he reached the Kakyparis,<a id="FNanchor_506" href="#Footnote_506" -class="fnanchor">[506]</a> and at a moment when<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_340">[p. 340]</span> the foremost division was nearly six -miles ahead, between the Kakyparis and the Erineus.</p> - -<p>When the Syracusans discovered at dawn that their enemy had -made off in the night, their first impulse was to accuse Gylippus -of treachery in having permitted the escape. Such ungrateful -surmises, however, were soon dissipated, and the cavalry set forth -in rapid pursuit, until they overtook the rear division, which they -immediately began to attack and impede. The advance of Demosthenês -had been tardy before, and his division disorganized: but he was -now compelled to turn and defend himself against an indefatigable -enemy, who presently got before him and thus stopped him altogether. -Their numerous light troops and cavalry assailed him on all sides -and without intermission; employing nothing but missiles, however, -and taking care to avoid any close encounter. While this unfortunate -division were exerting their best efforts both to defend themselves, -and if possible to get forward, they found themselves inclosed -in a walled olive-ground, through the middle of which the road -passed; a farm bearing the name, and probably once the property, -of Polyzêlus, brother of the despot Gelon.<a id="FNanchor_507" -href="#Footnote_507" class="fnanchor">[507]</a> Entangled and huddled -up in this inclosure, from whence exit at the farther end in the face -of an enemy was found impossible, they were now overwhelmed with -hostile missiles from the walls on all sides.<a id="FNanchor_508" -href="#Footnote_508" class="fnanchor">[508]</a> Though unable to get -at the en<span class="pagenum" id="Page_341">[p. 341]</span>emy, -and deprived even of the resources of an active despair, they -endured incessant harassing for the greater part of the day, -without refreshment or repose, and with the number of their wounded -continually increasing; until at length the remaining spirit of the -unhappy sufferers was thoroughly broken. Perceiving their condition, -Gylippus sent to them a herald with a proclamation; inviting all -the islanders among them to come forth from the rest, and promising -them freedom if they did so. The inhabitants of some cities, yet -not many,—a fact much to their honor,—availed themselves of this -offer and surrendered. Presently, however, a larger negotiation -was opened, which ended by the entire division capitulating upon -terms, and giving up their arms. Gylippus and the Syracusans -engaged that the lives of all should be spared; that is, that none -should be put to death either by violence, or by intolerable bonds, -or by starvation. Having all been disarmed, they were forthwith -conveyed away as prisoners to Syracuse, six thousand in number. -It is a remarkable proof of the easy and opulent circumstances -of many among these gallant sufferers, when we are told that the -money which they had about them, even at this last moment of -pressure, was sufficient to fill the concavities of four shields.<a -id="FNanchor_509" href="#Footnote_509" class="fnanchor">[509]</a> -Disdaining either to surrender or to make any stipulation for -himself personally, Demosthenês was on the point of killing himself -with his own sword the moment that the capitulation was concluded; -but his intention was prevented, and he was carried off a disarmed -prisoner by the Syracusans.<a id="FNanchor_510" href="#Footnote_510" -class="fnanchor">[510]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_342">[p. 342]</span></p> - -<p>On the next day, Gylippus and the victorious Syracusans overtook -Nikias on the right bank of the Erineus, apprized him of the -capitulation of Demosthenês, and summoned him to capitulate also. He -demanded leave to send a horseman for the purpose of verifying the -statement; and on the return of the horseman, he made a proposition -to Gylippus, that his army should be permitted to return home, on -condition of Athens reimbursing to Syracuse the whole expense of -the war, and furnishing hostages until payment should be made; -one citizen against each talent of silver. These conditions were -rejected; but Nikias could not yet bring himself to submit to -the same terms for his division as Demosthenês. Accordingly, the -Syracusans recommenced their attacks, which the Athenians, in spite -of hunger and fatigue, sustained as they best could until night. It -was the intention of Nikias again to take advantage of the night for -the purpose of getting away. But on this occasion the Syracusans -were on the watch, and as soon as they heard movement in the camp, -they raised the pæan, or war-shout; thus showing that they were -on the lookout, and inducing the Athenians again to lay down the -arms which they had taken up for departure. A detachment of three -hundred Athenians, nevertheless, still persisting in marching off, -apart from the rest, forced their way through the posts of the -Syracusans. These men got safely away, and nothing but the want of -guides prevented them from escaping altogether.<a id="FNanchor_511" -href="#Footnote_511" class="fnanchor">[511]</a></p> - -<p>During all this painful retreat, the personal resolution displayed -by Nikias was exemplary; his sick and feeble frame was made to bear -up, and even to hearten up stronger men, against the extremity of -hardship, exhausting the last fragment of hope or even possibility. -It was now the sixth day of the retreat,—six days<a id="FNanchor_512" -href="#Footnote_512" class="fnanchor">[512]</a> of constant -privation, suffering, and endurance of attack,—yet Nikias early in -the morning attempted a fresh march, in order to get to the river -Asinarus, which falls into the same sea, south of the Erineus, but -is a more considerable stream, flowing deeply imbedded between lofty -banks. This was a last effort of despair, with little hope of final -escape, even if they did reach it. Yet the march was accomplished, in -spite of renewed and inces<span class="pagenum" id="Page_343">[p. -343]</span>sant attacks all the way, from the Syracusan cavalry; who -even got to the river before the Athenians, occupying the ford, and -lining the high banks near it. Here the resolution of the unhappy -fugitives at length gave way; when they reached the river, their -strength, their patience, their spirit, and their hopes for the -future, were all extinct. Tormented with raging thirst, and compelled -by the attacks of the cavalry to march in one compact mass, they -rushed into the ford all at once, treading down and tumbling over -each other in the universal avidity for drink. Many thus perished -from being pushed down upon the points of the spears, or lost their -footing among the scattered articles of baggage, and were thus -borne down under water.<a id="FNanchor_513" href="#Footnote_513" -class="fnanchor">[513]</a> Meanwhile, the Syracusans from above -poured upon the huddled mass showers of missiles, while the -Peloponnesian hoplites even descended into the river, came to close -quarters with them, and slew considerable numbers. So violent, -nevertheless, was the thirst of the Athenians, that all other -suffering was endured in order to taste relief by drinking. And -even when dead and wounded were heaped in the river,—when the -water was tainted and turbid with blood, as well as thick with -the mud trodden up,—still, the new-comers pushed their way in and -swallowed it with voracity.<a id="FNanchor_514" href="#Footnote_514" -class="fnanchor">[514]</a></p> - -<p>Wretched, helpless, and demoralized as the army now was, -Nikias could think no farther of resistance. He accordingly -surrendered himself to Gylippus, to be dealt with at the discretion -of that general and of the Lacedæmonians,<a id="FNanchor_515" -href="#Footnote_515" class="fnanchor">[515]</a> earnestly imploring -that the slaughter of the defenceless soldiers might be arrested. -Accordingly, Gylippus gave orders that no more should be killed, but -that the rest should be secured as captives. Many were slain before -this order was understood; but of those who remained, almost all were -made captive, very few escaping. Nay, even the detachment of three -hundred, who had broken out in the night, having seemingly not known -whither to go, were captured,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_344">[p. -344]</span> and brought in by troops sent forth for the purpose.<a -id="FNanchor_516" href="#Footnote_516" class="fnanchor">[516]</a> The -triumph of the Syracusans was in every way complete, they hung the -trees on the banks of the Asinarus with Athenian panoplies as trophy, -and carried back their prisoners in joyous procession to the city.</p> - -<p>The number of prisoners thus made, is not positively specified -by Thucydidês, as in the case of the division of Demosthenês, which -had capitulated and laid down their arms in a mass within the -walls of the olive-ground. Of the captives from the division of -Nikias, the larger proportion were seized by private individuals, -and fraudulently secreted for their own profit; the number -obtained for the state being comparatively small, seemingly not -more than one thousand.<a id="FNanchor_517" href="#Footnote_517" -class="fnanchor">[517]</a> The various Sicilian towns became soon -full of these prisoners, sold as slaves for private account.</p> - -<p>Not less than forty thousand persons in the aggregate had started -from the Athenian camp to commence the retreat, six days before. Of -these probably many, either wounded or otherwise incompetent even -when the march began, soon found themselves unable to keep up, and -were left behind to perish. Each of the six days was a day of hard -fighting and annoyance from an indefatigable crowd of light troops, -with little, and at last seemingly nothing, to eat. The number was -thus successively thinned, by wounds, privations, and straggling, -so that the six thousand taken with Demosthenês, and perhaps three -thousand or four thousand captured with Nikias, formed the melancholy -remnant. Of the stragglers during the march, however, we are glad -to learn that many contrived to escape the Syracusan cavalry and -get to Katana, where also those who afterwards ran away from their -slavery under private masters, found a refuge.<a id="FNanchor_518" -href="#Footnote_518" class="fnanchor">[518]</a> These fugitive<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_345">[p. 345]</span> Athenians served as -auxiliaries to repel the attacks of the Syracusans upon Katana.<a -id="FNanchor_519" href="#Footnote_519" class="fnanchor">[519]</a></p> - -<p>It was in this manner, chiefly, that Athens came to receive again -within her bosom a few of those ill-fated sons whom she had drafted -forth in two such splendid divisions to Sicily. For of those who -were carried as prisoners to Syracuse, fewer yet could ever have -got home. They were placed for safe custody, along with the other -prisoners, in the stone-quarries of Syracuse,—of which there were -several, partly on the southern descent of the outer city towards -the Nekropolis, or from the higher level to the lower level of -Achradina,—partly in the suburb afterwards called Neapolis, under -the southern cliff of Epipolæ. Into these quarries—deep hollows -of confined space, with precipitous sides, and open at the top to -the sky—the miserable prisoners were plunged, lying huddled one -upon another, without the smallest protection or convenience. For -subsistence, they received each day a ration of one pint of wheaten -bread,—half the daily ration of a slave,—with no more than half -a pint of water, so that they were not preserved from the pangs -either of hunger or of thirst. Moreover, the heat of the midday sun, -alternating with the chill of the autumn nights, was alike afflicting -and destructive; while the wants of life having all to be performed -where they were, without relief, the filth and stench presently -became insupportable. Sick and wounded even at the moment of arrival, -many of them speedily died; and happiest was he who died the first, -leaving an unconscious corpse, which the Syracusans would not take -the trouble to remove, to distress and infect the survivors. Under -this condition and treatment they remained for seventy days; probably -serving as a spectacle for the triumphant Syracusan population, -with their wives and children, to come and look down upon, and to -congratulate themselves on their own narrow escape from sufferings -similar in kind at least, if not in degree. After that time the -novelty of the spectacle had worn off, while the place must have -become a den of abomination and a nuisance intolerable even to the -citizens themselves. Accordingly, they now removed all the surviving -prisoners, except the native Athenians<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_346">[p. 346]</span> and the few Italian or Sicilian -Greeks among them. All those so removed were sold for slaves;<a -id="FNanchor_520" href="#Footnote_520" class="fnanchor">[520]</a> -while the dead bodies were probably at the same time taken away, -and the prison rendered somewhat less loathsome. What became of the -remaining prisoners, we are not told; it may be presumed that those -who could survive so great an extremity of suffering might after a -certain time be allowed to get back to Athens on ransom. Perhaps -some of them may have obtained their release; as was the case, -we are told, with several of those who had been sold to private -masters, by the elegance of their accomplishments and the dignity of -their demeanor. The dramas of Euripidês were so peculiarly popular -throughout all Sicily, that those Athenian prisoners who knew by -heart considerable portions of them, won the affections of their -masters. Some even of the stragglers from the army are affirmed to -have procured for themselves, by the same attraction, shelter and -hospitality during their flight. Euripidês, we are informed, lived to -receive the thanks of several among these unhappy sufferers, after -their return to Athens.<a id="FNanchor_521" href="#Footnote_521" -class="fnanchor">[521]</a> I cannot refrain from mentioning this -story, though I fear its trustworthiness as matter of fact is much -inferior to its pathos and interest.</p> - -<p>Upon the treatment of Nikias and Demosthenês, not merely the -Syracusans, but also the allies present, were consulted, and much -difference of opinion was found. To keep them in confinement -simply, without putting them to death, was apparently the opinion -advocated by Hermokratês.<a id="FNanchor_522" href="#Footnote_522" -class="fnanchor">[522]</a> But Gylippus, then in<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_347">[p. 347]</span> full ascendency and an -object of deep gratitude for his invaluable services, solicited as a -reward to himself to be allowed to conduct them back as prisoners to -Sparta. To achieve this would have earned for him signal honor in the -eyes of his countrymen; for while Demosthenês, from his success at -Pylos, was their hated enemy, Nikias had always shown himself their -friend as far as an Athenian could do so. It was to him that they -owed the release of their prisoners taken at Sphakteria; and he had -calculated upon this obligation when he surrendered himself prisoner -to Gylippus, and not to the Syracusans.</p> - -<p>In spite of all his influence, however, Gylippus could not carry -this point. First, the Corinthians both strenuously opposed him -themselves, and prevailed on the other allies to do the same. They -were afraid that the wealth of Nikias would always procure for him -the means of escaping from imprisonment, so as to do them farther -injury, and they insisted on his being put to death. Next, those -Syracusans, who had been in secret correspondence with Nikias during -the siege, were yet more anxious to get him put out of the way, -being apprehensive that, if tortured by their political opponents, -he might disclose their names and intrigues. Such various influences -prevailed, and Nikias as well as Demosthenês was ordered to be put to -death by a decree of the public assembly, much to the discontent of -Gylippus. Hermokratês vainly opposed the resolution, but perceiving -that it was certain to be carried, he sent to them a private -intimation before the discussion closed; and procured for them, -through one of the sentinels, the means of dying by their own hands. -Their bodies were publicly exposed before the city gates to the view -of the Syracusan citizens;<a id="FNanchor_523" href="#Footnote_523" -class="fnanchor">[523]</a> while the day on which the final capture -of Nikias and his army was accomplished, came to be celebrated -as an annual festival, under the title of the Asinaria, on the -twenty-sixth day of the Dorian month Karneius.<a id="FNanchor_524" -href="#Footnote_524" class="fnanchor">[524]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_348">[p. 348]</span></p> - -<p>Such was the close of the expedition, or rather of the two -expeditions, undertaken by Athens against Syracuse. Never in Grecian -history had a force so large, so costly, so efficient, and so full -of promise and confidence, been turned out; never in Grecian history -had ruin so complete and sweeping, or victory so glorious and -unexpected, been witnessed.<a id="FNanchor_525" href="#Footnote_525" -class="fnanchor">[525]</a> Its consequences were felt from one end -of the Grecian world to the other, as will appear in the coming -chapters.</p> - -<p>The esteem and admiration felt at Athens towards Nikias had -been throughout lofty and unshaken; after his death it was -exchanged for disgrace. His name was omitted, while that of his -colleague Demosthenês was engraved, on the funereal pillar erected -to commemorate the fallen warriors. This difference Pausanias -explains by saying that Nikias was conceived to have disgraced -himself as a military man by his voluntary surrender, which -Demosthenês had disdained.<a id="FNanchor_526" href="#Footnote_526" -class="fnanchor">[526]</a></p> <p><span class="pagenum" -id="Page_349">[p. 349]</span></p> <p>The opinion of Thucydidês -deserves special notice, in the face of this judgment of his -countrymen. While he says not a word about Demosthenês, beyond the -fact of his execution, he adds in reference to Nikias a few words -of marked sympathy and commendation. “Such, or nearly such, (he -says,) were the reasons why Nikias was put to death; though <i>he</i> -assuredly, among all Greeks of my time, least deserved to come to so -extreme a pitch of ill-fortune, considering his exact performance -of established duties to the divinity.”<a id="FNanchor_527" -href="#Footnote_527" class="fnanchor">[527]</a></p> - -<p>If we were judging Nikias merely as a private man, and setting -his personal conduct in one scale against his personal suffer<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_350">[p. 350]</span>ing on the other, the -remark of Thucydidês would be natural and intelligible. But the -general of a great expedition, upon whose conduct the lives of -thousands of brave men as well as the most momentous interests of his -country, depend, cannot be tried by any such standard. His private -merit becomes a secondary point in the case, as compared with the -discharge of his responsible public duties, by which he must stand or -fall.</p> - -<p>Tried by this more appropriate standard, what are we to say of -Nikias? We are compelled to say, that if his personal suffering -could possibly be regarded in the light of an atonement, or set in -an equation against the mischief brought by himself both on his army -and his country, it would not be greater than his deserts. I shall -not here repeat the separate points in his conduct which justify this -view, and which have been set forth as they have occurred, in the -preceding pages. Admitting fully both the good intentions of Nikias, -and his personal bravery, rising even into heroism during the last -few days in Sicily, it is not the less incontestable, that, first, -the failure of the enterprise, next, the destruction of the armament, -is to be traced distinctly to his lamentable misjudgment. Sometimes -petty trifling, sometimes apathy and inaction, sometimes presumptuous -neglect, sometimes obstinate blindness even to urgent and obvious -necessities, one or other of these his sad mental defects, will be -found operative at every step, whereby this fated armament sinks down -from exuberant efficiency into the last depth of aggregate ruin and -individual misery. His improvidence and incapacity stand proclaimed, -not merely in the narrative of the historian, but even in his own -letter to the Athenians, and in his own speeches both before the -expedition and during its closing misfortunes, when contrasted with -the reality of his proceedings. The man whose flagrant incompetency -brought such wholesale ruin upon two fine armaments intrusted to -his command, upon the Athenian maritime empire, and ultimately upon -Athens herself, must appear on the tablets of history under the -severest condemnation, even though his personal virtues had been -loftier than those of Nikias.</p> - -<p>And yet our great historian, after devoting two immortal books -to this expedition, after setting forth emphatically both the glory -of its dawn and the wretchedness of its close, with a dramatic -genius parallel to the Œdipus Tyrannus of Sophoklês, when he<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_351">[p. 351]</span> comes to recount the -melancholy end of the two commanders, has no words to spare for -Demosthenês,—far the abler officer of the two, who perished by no -fault of his own,—but reserves his flowers to strew on the grave -of Nikias, the author of the whole calamity—“What a pity! Such a -respectable and religious man!”</p> - -<p>Thucydidês is here the more instructive, because he exactly -represents the sentiment of the general Athenian public towards -Nikias during his lifetime. They could not bear to condemn, to -mistrust, to dismiss, or to do without, so respectable and religious -a citizen. The private qualities of Nikias were not only held to -entitle him to the most indulgent construction of all his public -shortcomings, but also insured to him credit for political and -military competence altogether disproportionate to his deserts. -When we find Thucydidês, after narrating so much improvidence and -mismanagement on the grand scale, still keeping attention fixed on -the private morality and decorum of Nikias, as if it constituted the -main feature of his character, we can understand how the Athenian -people originally came both to over-estimate this unfortunate leader, -and continued over-estimating him with tenacious fidelity even after -glaring proof of his incapacity. Never in the political history -of Athens did the people make so fatal a mistake in placing their -confidence.</p> - -<p>In reviewing the causes of popular misjudgment, historians are -apt to enlarge prominently, if not exclusively, on demagogues and -demagogic influences. Mankind being usually considered in the -light of governable material, or as instruments for exalting, -arming, and decorating their rulers, whatever renders them more -difficult to handle in this capacity, ranks first in the category -of vices. Nor can it be denied that this was a real and serious -cause: clever criminative speakers often passed themselves off for -something above their real worth; though useful and indispensable -as a protection against worse, they sometimes deluded the people -into measures impolitic or unjust. But, even if we grant, to the -cause of misjudgment here indicated, a greater practical efficiency -than history will fairly sanction, still, it is only one among -others more mischievous. Never did any man at Athens, by mere force -of demagogic qualities, acquire a measure of esteem at once so -exaggerated and so durable, combined with so much power of injuring -his fellow-citizens, as the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_352">[p. -352]</span> anti-demagogic Nikias. The man who, over and above his -shabby manœuvre about the expedition against Sphakteria, and his -improvident sacrifice of Athenian interests in the alliance with -Sparta, ended by inflicting on his country that cruel wound which -destroyed so many of her citizens as well as her maritime empire, was -not a leather-seller of impudent and criminative eloquence, but a -man of ancient family and hereditary wealth, munificent and affable, -having credit not merely for the largesses which he bestowed, but -also for all the insolences, which as a rich man he might have -committed, but did not commit,—free from all pecuniary corruption,—a -brave man, and above all, an ultra-religious man, believed therefore -to stand high in the favor of the gods, and to be fortunate. Such -was the esteem which the Athenians felt for this union of good -qualities purely personal and negative with eminent station, that -they presumed the higher aptitudes of command,<a id="FNanchor_528" -href="#Footnote_528" class="fnanchor">[528]</a> and presumed them, -unhappily, after proof that they did not exist,—after proof that what -they had supposed to be caution was only apathy and mental weakness. -No demagogic arts or eloquence would ever have created in the people -so deep-seated an illusion as the imposing respectability of Nikias. -Now it was against the overweening ascendency of such decorous and -pious incompetence, when aided by wealth and family advantages, that -the demagogic accusatory eloquence ought to have served as a natural -bar and corrective. Performing the functions of a constitutional -opposition, it afforded the only chance of that tutelary exposure -whereby blunders and shortcomings might be arrested in time. How -insufficient was the check which it provided,—even at Athens, where -every one denounces it as having prevailed in devouring excess,—the -history of Nikias is an ever-living testimony.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="Chap_61"> - <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_353">[p. 353]</span></p> - <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXI.<br /> - FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY, DOWN TO - THE OLIGARCHICAL CONSPIRACY OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS.</h2> -</div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">In</span> -the preceding chapter we followed to its melancholy close the united -armament of Nikias and Demosthenês, first in the harbor and lastly -in the neighborhood of Syracuse, towards the end of September, 413 -<small>B.C.</small></p> - -<p>The first impression which we derive from the perusal of that -narrative is, sympathy for the parties directly concerned, chiefly -for the number of gallant Athenians who thus miserably perished, -partly also for the Syracusan victors, themselves a few months before -on the verge of apparent ruin. But the distant and collateral effects -of the catastrophe throughout Greece, were yet more momentous than -those within the island in which it occurred.</p> - -<p>I have already mentioned that even at the moment when Demosthenês -with his powerful armament left Peiræus to go to Sicily, the -hostilities of the Peloponnesian confederacy against Athens herself -had been already recommenced. Not only was the Spartan king Agis -ravaging Attica, but the far more important step of fortifying -Dekeleia, for the abode of a permanent garrison, was in course of -completion. That fortress, having been begun about the middle of -March, was probably by the month of June in a situation to shelter -its garrison, which consisted of contingents periodically furnished, -and relieving each other alternately, from all the different states -of the confederacy, under the permanent command of king Agis himself.</p> - -<p>And now began that incessant marauding of domiciliated -enemies—destined to last for nine years until the final capture -of Athens—partially contemplated even at the beginning of the -Peloponnesian war, and recently enforced, with full comprehension -of its disastrous effects, by the virulent antipathy of the -exile Alkibiadês.<a id="FNanchor_529" href="#Footnote_529" -class="fnanchor">[529]</a> The earlier invasions of Attica had -been all<span class="pagenum" id="Page_354">[p. 354]</span> -temporary, continuing for five or six weeks at the farthest, and -leaving the country in repose for the remainder of the year. But the -Athenians now underwent from henceforward the fatal experience of a -hostile garrison within fifteen miles of their city; an experience -peculiarly painful this summer, as well from its novelty as from -the extraordinary vigor which Agis displayed in his operations. -His excursions were so widely extended, that no part of Attica -was secure or could be rendered productive. Not only were all the -sheep and cattle destroyed, but the slaves too, especially the most -valuable slaves, or artisans, began to desert to Dekeleia in great -numbers; more than twenty thousand of them soon disappeared in this -way. So terrible a loss of income, both to proprietors of land and -to employers in the city, was farther aggravated by the increased -cost and difficulty of import from Eubœa. Provisions and cattle -from that island had previously come over land from Oropus, but -as that road was completely stopped by the garrison of Dekeleia, -they were now of necessity sent round Cape Sunium by sea; a transit -more circuitous and expensive, besides being open to attack from -the enemy’s privateers.<a id="FNanchor_530" href="#Footnote_530" -class="fnanchor">[530]</a> In the midst of such heavy privations, -the demands on citizens and metics for military duty were multiplied -beyond measure. The presence of the enemy at Dekeleia forced them -to keep watch day and night throughout their long extent of wall, -comprising both Athens and Peiræus: in the daytime the hoplites -of the city relieved each other on guard, but at night, nearly -all of them were either on the battlements or at the various -military stations in the city. Instead of a city, in fact, Athens -was reduced to the condition of something like a military post.<a -id="FNanchor_531" href="#Footnote_531" class="fnanchor">[531]</a> -Moreover, the rich citizens of the state, who<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_355">[p. 355]</span> served as horsemen, shared in the -general hardship; being called on for daily duty in order to restrain -at least, since they could not entirely prevent, the excursions -of the garrison of Dekeleia, their efficiency was, however, soon -impaired by the laming of their horses on the hard and stony soil.<a -id="FNanchor_532" href="#Footnote_532" class="fnanchor">[532]</a></p> - -<p>Besides the personal efforts of the citizens, such exigencies -pressed heavily on the financial resources of the state. Already the -immense expense incurred in fitting out the two large armaments for -Sicily, had exhausted all the accumulations laid by in the treasury -during the interval since the Peace of Nikias; so that the attacks -from Dekeleia, not only imposing heavy additional cost, but at the -same time cutting up the means of paying, brought the finances of -Athens into positive embarrassment. With the view of increasing her -revenues, she altered the principle on which her subject-allies had -hitherto been assessed: instead of a fixed sum of annual tribute, she -now required from them payment of a duty of five per cent. on all -imports and exports by sea.<a id="FNanchor_533" href="#Footnote_533" -class="fnanchor">[533]</a> How this new principle of assessment -worked, we have unfortunately no information. To collect the duty and -take precautions against evasion, an Athenian custom-house officer -must have been required in each allied city. Yet it is difficult to -understand how Athens could have enforced a system at once novel, -extensive, vexatious, and more burdensome to the payers, when we come -to see how much her hold over those payers, as well as her naval -force, became enfeebled, before the close even of the actual year.<a -id="FNanchor_534" href="#Footnote_534" class="fnanchor">[534]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_356">[p. 356]</span></p> - -<p>Her impoverished finances also compelled her to dismiss a body of -Thracian mercenaries, whose aid would have been very useful against -the enemy at Dekeleia. These Thracian peltasts, thirteen hundred in -number, had been hired at a drachma per day each man, to go with -Demosthenês to Syracuse, but had not reached Athens in time. As soon -as they came thither, the Athenians placed them under the command -of Diitrephês, to conduct them back to their native country, with -instructions to do damage to the Bœotians, as opportunity might -occur, in his way through the Euripus. Accordingly, Diitrephês, -putting them on shipboard, sailed round Sunium and northward along -the eastern coast of Attica. After a short disembarkation near -Tanagra, he passed on to Chalkis in Eubœa in the narrowest part -of the strait, from whence he crossed in the night to the Bœotian -coast opposite, and marched up some distance from the sea to the -neighborhood of the Bœotian town Mykalêssus. He arrived here unseen, -lay in wait near a temple of Hermês about two miles distant, and fell -upon the town unexpectedly at break of day. To the Mykalessians, -dwelling in the centre of Bœotia, not far from Thebes, and at a -considerable distance from the sea, such an assault was not less -unexpected than formidable. Their fortifications were feeble, in -some parts low, in other parts even tumbling down; nor had they even -taken the precaution to close their gates at night: so that the -barbarians under Diitrephês, entering the town without the smallest -difficulty, began at once the work of pillage and destruction. The -scene which followed was something alike novel and revolting to -Grecian eyes. Not only were all the houses and even the temples -plundered, but the Thracians farther manifested that raging thirst -for blood which seemed inherent in their race. They slew every -living thing that came in their way; men, women, children, horses, -cattle, etc. They burst into a school, wherein many boys had just -been assembled, and <span class="pagenum" id="Page_357">[p. -357]</span>massacred them all. This scene of bloodshed, committed by -barbarians who had not been seen in Greece since the days of Xerxes, -was recounted with horror and sympathy throughout all Grecian -communities, though Mykalêssus was in itself a town of second-rate -or third-rate magnitude.<a id="FNanchor_535" href="#Footnote_535" -class="fnanchor">[535]</a></p> - -<p>The succor brought from Thebes, by Mykalessian fugitives, arrived -unhappily only in time to avenge, but not to save, the inhabitants. -The Thracians were already retiring with the booty which they could -carry away, when the bœotarch Skirphondas overtook them, both -with cavalry and hoplites, after having put to death some greedy -plunderers who tarried too long in the town. He compelled them to -relinquish most of their booty, and pursued them to the sea-shore; -not without a brave resistance from these peltasts, who had a -peculiar way of fighting which disconcerted the Thebans. But when -they arrived at the sea-shore, the Athenian ships did not think -it safe to approach very close, so that not less than two hundred -and fifty Thracians were slain before they could get aboard;<a -id="FNanchor_536" href="#Footnote_536" class="fnanchor">[536]</a> and -the Athenian commander, Diitrephês was so severely wounded that he -died shortly afterwards. The rest pursued their voyage homeward.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the important station of Naupaktus and the mouth of -the Corinthian gulf again became the theatre of naval encounter. -It will be recollected that this was the scene of the memorable -victories gained by the Athenian admiral Phormion in the second year -of the Peloponnesian war,<a id="FNanchor_537" href="#Footnote_537" -class="fnanchor">[537]</a> wherein the nautical superiority of -Athens over her enemies, as to ships, crews, and admiral, had been -so transcendently manifested. In that respect matters had now -considerably changed. While the navy of Athens had fallen off since -the days of Phormion, that of her enemy had improved: Ariston, -and other skilful Corinthian steersmen,<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_358">[p. 358]</span> not attempting to copy Athenian -tactics, had studied the best mode of coping with them, and -had modified the build of their own triremes accordingly,<a -id="FNanchor_538" href="#Footnote_538" class="fnanchor">[538]</a> at -Corinth as well as at Syracuse. Seventeen years before, Phormion with -eighteen Athenian triremes would have thought himself a full match -for twenty-five Corinthian; but the Athenian admiral of this year, -Konon, also a perfectly brave man, now judged so differently, that -he constrained Demosthenês and Eurymedon to reinforce his eighteen -triremes with ten others,—out of the best of their fleet, at a -time when they had certainly none to spare,—on the ground that the -Corinthian fleet opposite, of twenty-five sail, was about to assume -the offensive against him.<a id="FNanchor_539" href="#Footnote_539" -class="fnanchor">[539]</a></p> - -<p>Soon afterwards Diphilus came to supersede Konon, with some -fresh ships from Athens, which made the total number of triremes -thirty-three. The Corinthian fleet, reinforced so as to be nearly of -the same number, took up a station on the coast of Achaia opposite -Naupaktus, at a spot called Erineus, in the territory of Rhypes. -They ranged themselves across the mouth of a little indentation of -the coast, or bay, in the shape of a crescent, with two projecting -promontories as horns: each of these promontories was occupied by a -friendly land-force, thus supporting the line of triremes at both -flanks. This was a position which did not permit the Athenians to -sail through the line, or manœuvre round it and in the rear of it. -Accordingly, when the fleet of Diphilus came across from Naupaktus, -it remained for some time close in front of the Corinthians, neither -party venturing to attack; for the straightforward collision was -destructive to the Athenian ships with their sharp, but light and -feeble beaks, while it was favorable to the solid bows and thick -epôtids, or ear-projections, of the Corinthian trireme. After -considerable delay, the Corinthians at length began the attack on -their side, yet not advancing far enough out to sea to admit of the -manœuvring and evolutions of the Athenians. The battle lasted some -time, terminating with no decisive advantage to either party. Three -Corinthian triremes were completely disabled, though the crews of -all escaped by swimming to their friends ashore: on the Athenian -side, not<span class="pagenum" id="Page_359">[p. 359]</span> one -trireme became absolutely water-logged, but seven were so much -damaged, by straightforward collision with the stronger bows of -the enemy, that they became almost useless after they got back -to Naupaktus. The Athenians had so far the advantage, that they -maintained their station, while the Corinthians did not venture to -renew the fight: moreover, both the wind and the current set towards -the northern shore, so that the floating fragments and dead bodies -came into possession of the Athenians. Each party thought itself -entitled to erect a trophy, but the real feeling of victory lay on -the side of Corinth, and that of defeat on the side of Athens. The -reputed maritime superiority of the latter was felt by both parties -to have sustained a diminution; and such assuredly would have been -the impression of Phormion, had he been alive to witness it.<a -id="FNanchor_540" href="#Footnote_540" class="fnanchor">[540]</a></p> - -<p>This battle appears to have taken place, so far as we can make -out, a short time before the arrival of Demosthenês at Syracuse, -about the close of the month of May. We cannot doubt that the -Athenians most anxiously expected news from that officer, with some -account of victories obtained in Sicily, to console them for having -sent him away at a moment when his services were so cruelly wanted -at home. Perhaps they may even have indulged hopes of the near -capture of Syracuse, as a means of restoring their crippled finances. -Their disappointment would be all the more bitter when they came to -receive, towards the end of June or beginning of July, despatches -announcing the capital defeat of Demosthenês in his attempt upon -Epipolæ, and the consequent extinction of all hope that Syracuse -could ever be taken. After these despatches, we may perhaps doubt -whether any others subsequently reached Athens. The generals would -not write home during the month of indecision immediately succeeding, -when Demosthenês was pressing for retreat, and Nikias resisting it. -They might possibly, however, write immediately on taking their -resolution to retreat, at the time when they sent to Katana to forbid -farther supplies of provisions, but this was the last practicable -opportunity; for closely afterwards followed their naval defeat, -and the blocking up of the mouth of the Great Harbor. The mere -absence of intelligence would satisfy the Athenians that their<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_360">[p. 360]</span> affairs in Sicily were -proceeding badly; but the closing series of calamities, down to the -final catastrophe, would only come to their knowledge indirectly; -partly through the triumphant despatches transmitted from Syracuse to -Sparta, Corinth, and Thebes, partly through individual soldiers of -their own armament who escaped.</p> - -<p>According to the tale of Plutarch, the news was first made known -at Athens through a stranger, who, arriving at Peiræus, went into a -barber’s shop and began to converse about it, as upon a theme which -must of course be uppermost in every one’s mind.</p> - -<p>The astonished barber, hearing for the first time such fearful -tidings, ran up to Athens to communicate it to the archons as well -as to the public in the market-place. The public assembly being -forthwith convoked, he was brought before it, and called upon to -produce his authority, which he was unable to do, as the stranger -had disappeared. He was consequently treated as a fabricator of -uncertified rumors for the disturbance of the public tranquillity, -and even put to the torture.<a id="FNanchor_541" href="#Footnote_541" -class="fnanchor">[541]</a> How much of this improbable tale may be -true, we cannot determine; but we may easily believe that neutrals, -passing from Corinth or Megara to Peiræus, were the earliest -communicants of the misfortunes of Nikias and Demosthenês in Sicily -during the months of July and August. Presently came individual -soldiers of the armament, who had got away from the defeat and found -a passage home; so that the bad news was but too fully confirmed. -But the Athenians were long before they could bring themselves to -believe, even upon the testimony of these fugitives, how entire -had been the destruction of their two splendid armaments, without -even a feeble remnant left to console them.<a id="FNanchor_542" -href="#Footnote_542" class="fnanchor">[542]</a></p> - -<p>As soon as the full extent of their loss was at length forced -upon their convictions, the city presented a scene of the deepest -affliction, dismay, and terror. Over and above the extent of private -mourning, from the loss of friends and relatives, which overspread -nearly the whole city, there prevailed utter despair as to the -public safety. Not merely was the empire of Athens apparently lost, -but Athens herself seemed utterly defenceless. Her treasury was -empty, her docks nearly destitute of triremes, the flower of<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_361">[p. 361]</span> her hoplites as well -as of her seamen had perished in Sicily without leaving their like -behind, and her maritime reputation was irretrievably damaged; while -her enemies, on the contrary, animated by feelings of exuberant -confidence and triumph, were farther strengthened by the accession -of their new Sicilian allies. In these melancholy months—October, -November, 413 <small>B.C.</small>—the Athenians expected -nothing less than a vigorous attack, both by land and sea, from the -Peloponnesian and Sicilian forces united, with the aid of their -own revolted allies, an attack which they knew themselves to be in -no condition to repel.<a id="FNanchor_543" href="#Footnote_543" -class="fnanchor">[543]</a></p> - -<p>Amidst so gloomy a prospect, without one ray of hope to cheer them -on any side, it was but poor satisfaction to vent their displeasure -on the chief speakers who had recommended their recent disastrous -expedition, or on those prophets and reporters of oracles who had -promised them the divine blessing upon it.<a id="FNanchor_544" -href="#Footnote_544" class="fnanchor">[544]</a><span class="pagenum" -id="Page_362">[p. 362]</span> After this first burst both of grief -and anger, however, they began gradually to look their actual -situation in the face; and the more energetic speakers would -doubtless administer the salutary lesson of reminding them how much -had been achieved by their forefathers, sixty-seven years before, -when the approach of Xerxes threatened them with dangers not less -overwhelming. Under the peril of the moment, the energy of despair -revived in their bosoms; they resolved to get together, as speedily -as they could, both ships and money,—to keep watch over their -allies, especially Eubœa,—and to defend themselves to the last. A -Board of ten elderly men, under the title of Probûli, was named -to review the expenditure, to suggest all practicable economies, -and propose for the future such measures as occasion might seem to -require. The propositions of these probûli were for the most part -adopted, with a degree of unanimity and promptitude rarely seen -in an Athenian assembly, springing out of that pressure and alarm -of the moment which silenced all criticism.<a id="FNanchor_545" -href="#Footnote_545" class="fnanchor">[545]</a> Among other -economies, the Athenians abridged the costly splendor of their choric -and liturgic ceremonies at home, and brought back the recent garrison -which they had established on the Laconian coast; they at the same -time collected timber, commenced the construction of new ships, and -fortified Cape Sunium, in order to protect their numerous transport -ships in the passage from Eubœa to Peiræus.<a id="FNanchor_546" -href="#Footnote_546" class="fnanchor">[546]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_363">[p. 363]</span></p> - -<p>While Athens was thus struggling to make head against her -misfortunes, all the rest of Greece was full of excitement and -aggressive scheming against her. So vast an event as the destruction -of this great armament had never happened since the expedition of -Xerxes against Greece. It not only roused the most distant cities -of the Grecian world, but also the Persian satraps and the court of -Susa. It stimulated the enemies of Athens to redoubled activity; -it emboldened her subject-allies to revolt; it pushed the neutral -states, who all feared what she would have done if successful against -Syracuse, now to declare war against her, and put the finishing -stroke to her power as well as to her ambition. All of them, enemies, -subjects, and neutrals, alike believed that the doom of Athens was -sealed, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_364">[p. 364]</span> that -the coming spring would see her captured. Earlier than the ensuing -spring, the Lacedæmonians did not feel disposed to act; but they sent -round their instructions to the allies for operations both by land -and sea to be then commenced; all these allies being prepared to do -their best, in hopes that this effort would be the last required from -them, and the most richly rewarded. A fleet of one hundred triremes -was directed to be prepared against the spring; fifty of these being -imposed in equal proportion on the Lacedæmonians themselves and the -Bœotians; fifteen on Corinth; fifteen on the Phocians and Lokrians; -ten on the Arcadians, with Pellênê and Sikyon; ten on Megara, -Trœzen, Epidaurus, and Hermionê. It seems to have been considered -that these ships might be built and launched during the interval -between September and March.<a id="FNanchor_547" href="#Footnote_547" -class="fnanchor">[547]</a> The same large hopes, which had worked -upon men’s minds at the beginning of the war, were now again -rife in the bosoms of the Peloponnesians;<a id="FNanchor_548" -href="#Footnote_548" class="fnanchor">[548]</a> the rather as that -powerful force from Sicily, which they had then been disappointed -in obtaining, might now be anticipated with tolerable assurance -as really forthcoming.<a id="FNanchor_549" href="#Footnote_549" -class="fnanchor">[549]</a></p> - -<p>From the smaller allies, contributions in money were exacted -for the intended fleet by Agis, who moved about during this autumn -with a portion of the garrison of Dekeleia. In the course of his -circuit, he visited the town of Herakleia, near the Maliac gulf, and -levied large contributions on the neighboring Œtæans, in reprisal -for the plunder which they had taken from that town, as well as from -the Phthiot Achæans and other subjects of the Thessalians, though -the latter vainly entered their protest against his proceedings.<a -id="FNanchor_550" href="#Footnote_550" class="fnanchor">[550]</a></p> - -<p>It was during the march of Agis through Bœotia that the -inhabitants of Eubœa—probably of Chalkis and Eretria—applied to -him, entreating his aid to enable them to revolt from Athens; which -he readily promised, sending for Alkamenês at the head of three -hundred Neodamode hoplites from Sparta, to<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_365">[p. 365]</span> be despatched across to the island -as harmost. Having a force permanently at his disposal, with full -liberty of military action, the Spartan king at Dekeleia was -more influential even than the authorities at home, so that the -disaffected allies of Athens addressed themselves in preference to -him. It was not long before envoys from Lesbos visited him for this -purpose. So powerfully was their claim enforced by the Bœotians -(their kinsmen of the Æolic race), who engaged to furnish ten -triremes for their aid, provided Agis would send ten others, that he -was induced to postpone his promise to the Eubœans, and to direct -Alkamenês as harmost to Lesbos instead of Eubœa,<a id="FNanchor_551" -href="#Footnote_551" class="fnanchor">[551]</a> without at all -consulting the authorities at Sparta.</p> - -<p>The threatened revolt of Lesbos and Eubœa, especially the latter, -was a vital blow to the empire of Athens. But this was not the -worst. At the same time that these two islands were negotiating with -Agis, envoys from Chios, the first and most powerful of all Athenian -allies, had gone to Sparta for the same purpose. The government of -Chios,—an oligarchy, but distinguished for its prudent management -and caution in avoiding risks,—considering Athens to be now on the -verge of ruin, even in the estimation of the Athenians themselves, -thought itself safe, together with the opposite city of Erythræ, -in taking measures for achieving independence.<a id="FNanchor_552" -href="#Footnote_552" class="fnanchor">[552]</a></p> - -<p>Besides these three great allies, whose example in revolting -was sure to be followed by others, Athens was now on the point of -being assailed by other enemies yet more unexpected, the two Persian -satraps of the Asiatic seaboard, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. No -sooner was the Athenian catastrophe in Sicily known at the court -of Susa, than the Great King claimed from these two satraps the -tribute due from the Asiatic Greeks on the coast; for which they -had always stood enrolled in the tribute records, though it had -never been actually levied since the complete establishment of the -Athenian empire. The only way to realize this tribute, for which the -satraps were thus made debtors, was to detach the towns from Athens, -and break up her empire;<a id="FNanchor_553" href="#Footnote_553" -class="fnanchor">[553]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_366">[p. -366]</span> for which purpose Tissaphernes sent an envoy to Sparta, -in conjunction with those of the Chians and Erythræans. He invited -the Lacedæmonians to conclude an alliance with the Great King, for -joint operations against the Athenian empire in Asia; promising to -furnish pay and maintenance for any forces which they might send, at -the rate of one drachma per day for each man of the ship’s crews.<a -id="FNanchor_554" href="#Footnote_554" class="fnanchor">[554]</a> He -farther hoped by means of this aid to reduce Amorgês the revolted -son of the late satrap Pissuthnês, who was established in the -strong maritime town of Iasus, with a Grecian mercenary force and a -considerable treasure, and was in alliance with Athens. The Great -King had sent down a peremptory mandate, that Amorgês should be -either brought prisoner to Susa or slain.</p> - -<p>At the same moment, though without any concert, there arrived -at Sparta Kalligeitus and Timagoras, two Grecian exiles in the -service of Pharnabazus, bringing propositions of a similar -character from that satrap, whose government<a id="FNanchor_555" -href="#Footnote_555" class="fnanchor">[555]</a> comprehended the -coast lands north of Æolis, from the Euxine and Propontis, to the -northeast corner of the Elæatic gulf. Eager to have the assistance -of a Lacedæmonian fleet in order to detach the Hellespontine Greeks -from Athens, and realize the tribute required by the court of -Susa, Pharnabazus was at the same time desirous of forestalling -Tissaphernes as the medium of alliance between Sparta and the Great -King. The two missions having thus arrived simultaneously at Sparta, -a strong competition arose between them, one striving to attract -the projected expedition to Chios, the other to the Hellespont:<a -id="FNanchor_556" href="#Footnote_556" class="fnanchor">[556]</a> -for which latter purpose, Kalligeitus<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_367">[p. 367]</span> had brought twenty-five talents, which -he tendered as a first payment in part.</p> - -<p>From all quarters, new enemies were thus springing up against -Athens in the hour of her distress, and the Lacedæmonians had -only to choose which they would prefer; a choice in which they -were much guided by the exile Alkibiadês. It so happened that -his family friend Endius was at this moment one of the board of -ephors; while his personal enemy king Agis, with whose wife Timæa -he carried on an intrigue,<a id="FNanchor_557" href="#Footnote_557" -class="fnanchor">[557]</a> was absent in command at Dekeleia. Knowing -well the great power and importance of Chios, Alkibiadês strenuously -exhorted the Spartan authorities to devote their first attention to -that island. A periœkus named Phrynis, being sent thither to examine -whether the resources alleged by the envoys were really forthcoming, -brought back a satisfactory report, that the Chian fleet was not less -than sixty triremes strong: upon which the Lacedæmonians concluded -an alliance with Chios and Erythræ, engaging to send a fleet of -forty sail to their aid. Ten of these triremes, now ready in the -Lacedæmonian ports—probably at Gythium—were directed immediately -to sail to Chios, under the admiral Melanchridas. It seems to have -been now midwinter; but Alkibiadês, and still more the Chian envoys, -insisted on the necessity of prompt action, for fear that the -Athenians should detect the intrigue. However, an earthquake just -then intervening, was construed by the Spartans as an index of divine -displeasure, so that they would not persist in sending either the -same commander or the same ships. Chalkideus was named to supersede -Melanchridas, while five new ships were directed to be equipped, so -as to be ready to sail in the early spring along with the larger -fleet from Corinth.<a id="FNanchor_558" href="#Footnote_558" -class="fnanchor">[558]</a></p> - -<p>As soon as spring arrived, three Spartan commissioners were sent -to Corinth—in compliance with the pressing instances of the Chian -envoys—to transport across the isthmus from the Corinthian to the -Saronic gulf, the thirty-nine triremes now in the Corinthian port -of Lechæum. It was at first proposed to send off all, at one and -the same time, to Chios, even those which Agis had been equipping -for the assistance of Lesbos; although Kalli<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_368">[p. 368]</span>geitus declined any concern with Chios, -and refused to contribute for this purpose any of the money which he -had brought. A general synod of deputies from the allies was held at -Corinth, wherein it was determined, with the concurrence of Agis, -to despatch the fleet first to Chios, under Chalkideus; next, to -Lesbos, under Alkamenês; lastly, to the Hellespont, under Klearchus. -But it was judged expedient to divide the fleet, and bring across -twenty-one triremes out of the thirty-nine, so as to distract the -attention of Athens, and divide her means of resistance. So low was -the estimate formed of these means, that the Lacedæmonians did not -scruple to despatch their expedition openly from the Saronic gulf, -where the Athenians would have full knowledge both of its numbers -and of its movements.<a id="FNanchor_559" href="#Footnote_559" -class="fnanchor">[559]</a></p> - -<p>Hardly had the twenty-one triremes, however, been brought across -to Kenchreæ, when a fresh delay arose to obstruct their departure. -The Isthmian festival, celebrated every alternate year, and kept -especially holy by the Corinthians, was just approaching; nor would -they consent to begin any military operations until it was concluded, -though Agis tried to elude their scruples by offering to adopt the -intended expedition as his own. It was during the delay which thus -ensued that the Athenians were first led to conceive suspicions about -Chios, whither they despatched Aristokratês, one of the generals of -the year. The Chian authorities strenuously denied all projects of -revolt, and being required by Aristokratês to furnish some evidence -of their good faith, sent back along with him seven triremes to the -aid of Athens. It was much against their own will that they were -compelled thus to act; but they knew that the Chian people were in -general averse to the idea of revolting from Athens, nor did they -feel confidence enough to proclaim their secret designs without some -manifestation of support from Peloponnesus, which had been so much -delayed that they knew not when it would arrive. The Athenians, in -their present state of weakness, perhaps thought it prudent to accept -insufficient assurances, for fear of driving this powerful island to -open revolt. But during the Isthmian festival, to which they were -invited along with other Greeks, they discovered farther evidences -of the plot which was going<span class="pagenum" id="Page_369">[p. -369]</span> on, and resolved to keep strict watch on the motions -of the fleet now assembled at Kenchreæ, suspecting that this -squadron was intended to second the revolting party in Chios.<a -id="FNanchor_560" href="#Footnote_560" class="fnanchor">[560]</a></p> - -<p>Shortly after the Isthmian festival, the squadron actually started -from Kenchreæ to Chios, under Alkamenês; but an equal number of -Athenian ships watched them as they sailed along the shore, and -tried to tempt them farther out to sea, with a view to fight them. -Alkamenês, however, desirous of avoiding a battle, thought it best -to return back; upon which the Athenians also returned to Peiræus, -mistrusting the fidelity of the seven Chian triremes which formed -part of their fleet. Reappearing presently with a larger squadron of -thirty-seven triremes, they pursued Alkamenês, who had again begun -his voyage along the shore southward, and attacked him near the -uninhabited harbor called Peiræum, on the frontiers of Corinth and -Epidaurus. They here gained a victory, captured one of his ships, -and damaged or disabled most of the remainder. Alkamenês himself -was slain, and the ships were run ashore, where on the morrow the -Pelo<span class="pagenum" id="Page_370">[p. 370]</span>ponnesian -land-force arrived in sufficient numbers to defend them. So -inconvenient, however, was their station on this desert spot, that -they at first determined to burn the vessels and depart. Nor was it -without difficulty that they were induced, partly by the instances -of king Agis, to guard the ships until an opportunity could be -found for eluding the blockading Athenian fleet; a part of which -still kept watch off the shore, while the rest were stationed at -a neighboring islet.<a id="FNanchor_561" href="#Footnote_561" -class="fnanchor">[561]</a></p> - -<p>The Spartan ephors had directed Alkamenês, at the moment of his -departure from Kenchræa, to despatch a messenger to Sparta, in order -that the five triremes under Chalkideus and Alkibiadês might leave -Laconia at the same moment. And these latter appear to have been -actually under way, when a second messenger brought the news of the -defeat and death of Alkamenês at Peiræum. Besides the discouragement -arising from such a check at the outset of their plans against Ionia, -the ephors thought it impossible to begin operations with so small a -squadron as five triremes, so that the departure of Chalkideus was -for the present countermanded. This resolution, perfectly natural to -adopt, was only reversed at the strenuous instance of the Athenian -exile Alkibiadês, who urged them to permit Chalkideus and himself to -start forthwith. Small as the squadron was, yet as it would reach -Chios before the defeat at Peiræum became public, it might be passed -off as the precursor of the main fleet; while he (Alkibiadês) pledged -himself to procure the revolt of Chios and the other Ionic cities, -through his personal connection with the leading men, who would -repose confidence in his assurances of the helplessness of Athens, as -well as of the thorough determination of Sparta to stand by them. To -these arguments, Alkibiadês added an appeal to the personal vanity -of Endius; whom he instigated to assume for himself the glory of -liberating Ionia as well as of first commencing the Persian alliance, -instead of leaving this enterprise to king Agis.<a id="FNanchor_562" -href="#Footnote_562" class="fnanchor">[562]</a></p> - -<p>By these arguments—assisted doubtless by his personal influence, -since his advice respecting Gylippus and respecting Dekeleia -had turned out so successful—Alkibiadês obtained the consent of -the Spartan ephors, and sailed along with Chalkideus in<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_371">[p. 371]</span> the five triremes -to Chios. Nothing less than his energy and ascendency could have -extorted from men both dull and backward, a determination apparently -so rash, yet, in spite of such appearance, admirably conceived, -and of the highest importance. Had the Chians waited for the fleet -now blocked up at Peiræum, their revolt would at least have been -long delayed, and perhaps might not have occurred at all: the -accomplishment of that revolt by the little squadron of Alkibiadês -was the proximate cause of all the Spartan successes in Ionia, and -was ultimately the means even of disengaging the fleet at Peiræum, by -distracting the attention of Athens. So well did this unprincipled -exile, while playing the game of Sparta, know where to inflict the -dangerous wounds upon his country!</p> - -<p>There was, indeed, little danger in crossing the Ægean to Ionia, -with ever so small a squadron; for Athens in her present destitute -condition had no fleet there, and although Strombichidês was detached -with eight triremes from the blockading fleet off Peiræum, to pursue -Chalkideus and Alkibiadês as soon as their departure was known, he -was far behind them, and soon returned without success. To keep their -voyage secret, they detained the boats and vessels which they met, -and did not liberate them, until they reached Korykus in Asia Minor, -the mountainous land southward of Erythræ. They were here visited by -their leading partisans from Chios, who urged them to sail thither -at once before their arrival could be proclaimed. Accordingly, -they reached the town of Chios—on the eastern coast of the island, -immediately opposite to Erythræ on the continent—to the astonishment -and dismay of every one, except the oligarchical plotters who had -invited them. By the contrivance of these latter, the council was -found just assembling, so that Alkibiadês was admitted without -delay, and invited to state his case. Suppressing all mention of -the defeat at Peiræum, he represented his squadron as the foremost -of a large Lacedæmonian fleet actually at sea and approaching, -and affirmed Athens to be now helpless by sea as well as by land, -incapable of maintaining any farther hold upon her allies. Under -these impressions, and while the population were yet under their -first impulse of surprise and alarm, the oligarchical council took -the resolution of revolting. The example was followed by Erythræ, and -soon after<span class="pagenum" id="Page_372">[p. 372]</span>wards -by Klazomenæ, determined by three triremes from Chios. The -Klazomenians had hitherto dwelt upon an islet close to the continent; -on which latter, however, a portion of their town, called Polichnê, -was situated, which they now resolved, in anticipation of attack -from Athens, to fortify as their main residence. Both the Chians and -Erythræans also actively employed themselves in fortifying their -towns and preparing for war.<a id="FNanchor_563" href="#Footnote_563" -class="fnanchor">[563]</a></p> - -<p>In reviewing this account of the revolt of Chios, we find occasion -to repeat remarks already suggested by previous revolts of other -allies of Athens,—Lesbos, Akanthus, Torônê, Mendê, Amphipolis, -etc. Contrary to what is commonly intimated by historians, we may -observe first, that Athens did not systematically interfere to -impose her own democratical government upon her allies; next, that -the empire of Athens, though upheld mainly by an established belief -in her superior force, was nevertheless by no means odious, nor -the proposition of revolting from her acceptable to the general -population of her allies. She had at this moment no force in Ionia; -and the oligarchical government of Chios, wishing to revolt, was only -prevented from openly declaring its intention by the reluctance of -its own population, a reluctance which it overcame partly by surprise -arising from the sudden arrival of Alkibiadês and Chalkideus, -partly by the fallacious assurance of a still greater Peloponnesian -force approaching.<a id="FNanchor_564" href="#Footnote_564" -class="fnanchor">[564]</a> Nor would the Chian oligarchy themselves -have determined to revolt, had they not been persuaded that such was -now the safer course, inasmuch as Athens was now ruined, and<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_373">[p. 373]</span> her power to protect, -not less than her power to oppress, at an end.<a id="FNanchor_565" -href="#Footnote_565" class="fnanchor">[565]</a> The envoys of -Tissaphernês had accompanied those of Chios to Sparta, so that the -Chian government saw plainly that the misfortunes of Athens had only -the effect of reviving the aggressions and pretensions of their -former foreign master, against whom Athens had protected them for the -last fifty years. We may well doubt, therefore, whether this prudent -government looked upon the change as on the whole advantageous. -But they had no motive to stand by Athens in her misfortunes, and -good policy seemed now to advise a timely union with Sparta as the -preponderant force. The sentiment entertained towards Athens by her -allies, as I have before observed, was more negative than positive. -It was favorable rather than otherwise, in the minds of the general -population, to whom she caused little actual hardship or oppression; -but averse, to a certain extent, in the minds of their leading men, -since she wounded their dignity, and offended that love of town -autonomy which was instinctive in the Grecian political mind.</p> - -<p>The revolt of Chios, speedily proclaimed, filled every man at -Athens with dismay. It was the most fearful symptom, as well as the -heaviest aggravation, of their fallen condition; especially as there -was every reason to apprehend that the example of this first and -greatest among the allies would be soon followed by the rest. The -Athenians had no fleet or force even to attempt its reconquest: but -they now felt the full importance of that reserve of one thousand -talents, which Perikles had set aside in the first year of the -war against the special emergency of a hostile fleet approaching -Peiræus. The penalty of death had been decreed against any one -who should propose to devote this fund to any other purpose; and, -in spite of severe financial pressure, it had remained untouched -for twenty years. Now, however, though the special contingency -foreseen had not yet arisen, matters were come to such an extremity, -that the only chance of saving the remaining empire was by the -appropriation of this money. An unanimous vote was accordingly -passed to abrogate the penal enactment, or standing order, against -proposing any other mode<span class="pagenum" id="Page_374">[p. -374]</span> of appropriation; after which the resolution was taken -to devote this money to present necessities.<a id="FNanchor_566" -href="#Footnote_566" class="fnanchor">[566]</a></p> - -<p>By means of this new fund, they were enabled to find pay and -equipment for all the triremes ready or nearly ready in their harbor, -and thus to spare a portion from their blockading fleet off Peiræum; -out of which Strombichidês with his squadron of eight triremes was -despatched immediately to Ionia; followed, after a short interval, -by Thrasyklês, with twelve others. At the same time, the seven -Chian triremes which also formed part of this fleet, were cleared -of their crews; among whom such as were slaves were liberated, -while the freemen were put in custody. Besides fitting out an equal -number of fresh ships to keep up the numbers of the blockading -fleet, the Athenians worked with the utmost ardor to get ready -thirty additional triremes. The extreme exigency of the situation, -since Chios had revolted, was felt by every one: yet with all their -efforts, the force which they were enabled to send was at first -lamentably inadequate. Strombichidês, arriving at Samos, and finding -Chios, Erythræ, and Klazomenæ already in revolt, reinforced his -little squadron with one Samian trireme, and sailed to Teos,—on the -continent, at the southern coast of that isthmus, of which Klazomenæ -is on the northern,—in hopes of preserving that place. But he had not -been long there when Chalkideus arrived from Chios with twenty-three -triremes, all or mostly Chian; while the forces of Erythræ and -Klazomenæ approached by land. Strombichidês was obliged to make -a hasty flight back to Samos, vainly pursued by the Chian fleet. -Upon this evidence of Athenian weakness, and the superiority of the -enemy, the Teians admitted into their town the land-force without; -by the help of which, they now demolished the wall formerly built by -Athens to protect the city against attack from the interior. Some -of the troops of Tissaphernês lending their aid in the demolition, -the town was laid altogether open to the satrap; who, moreover, came -himself shortly afterwards to complete the work.<a id="FNanchor_567" -href="#Footnote_567" class="fnanchor">[567]</a></p> - -<p>Having themselves revolted from Athens, the Chian government -were prompted by considerations of their own safety to instigate -revolt in all other Athenian dependencies; and Alkibiadês<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_375">[p. 375]</span> now took advantage -of their forwardness in the cause to make an attempt on Milêtus. -He was eager to acquire this important city, the first among all -the continental allies of Athens, by his own resources and those -of Chios, before the fleet could arrive from Peiræum; in order -that the glory of the exploit might be insured to Endius, and not -to Agis. Accordingly, he and Chalkideus left Chios with a fleet of -twenty-five triremes, twenty of them Chian, together with the five -which they themselves had brought from Laconia: these last five had -been remanned with Chian crews, the Peloponnesian crews having been -armed as hoplites and left as garrison in the island. Conducting -his voyage as secretly as possible, he was fortunate enough to pass -unobserved by the Athenian station at Samos, where Strombichidês had -just been reinforced by Thrasyklês with the twelve fresh triremes -from the blockading fleet at Peiræum. Arriving at Milêtus, where he -possessed established connections among the leading men, and had -already laid his train, as at Chios, for revolt, Alkibiadês prevailed -on them to break with Athens forthwith: so that when Strombichidês -and Thrasyklês, who came in pursuit the moment they learned his -movements, approached, they found the port shut against them, and -were forced to take up a station on the neighboring island of Ladê. -So anxious were the Chians for the success of Alkibiadês in this -enterprise, that they advanced with ten fresh triremes along the -Asiatic coast as far as Anæa, opposite to Samos, in order to hear -the result and to render aid if required. A message from Chalkideus -apprized them that he was master of Milêtus, and that Amorgês, the -Persian ally of Athens at Iasus, was on his way at the head of an -army; upon which they returned to Chios, but were unexpectedly seen -in the way—off the temple of Zeus, between Lebedos and Kolophon—and -pursued, by sixteen fresh ships just arrived from Athens, under the -command of Diomedon. Of the ten Chian triremes, one found refuge at -Ephesus, and five at Teos: the remaining four were obliged to run -ashore and became prizes, though the crews all escaped. In spite of -this check, however, the Chians came out again with fresh ships and -some land-forces, as soon as the Athenian fleet had gone back to -Samos, and procured the revolt both of Lebedos and Eræ from Athens.<a -id="FNanchor_568" href="#Footnote_568" class="fnanchor">[568]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_376">[p. 376]</span></p> <p>It was -at Milêtus, immediately after the revolt, that the first treaty was -concluded between Tissaphernês, on behalf of himself and the Great -King, and Chalkideus, for Sparta and her allies. Probably the aid -of Tissaphernês was considered necessary to maintain the town, when -the Athenian fleet was watching it so closely on the neighboring -island: at least it is difficult to explain otherwise an agreement so -eminently dishonorable as well as disadvantageous to the Greeks:—</p> - -<p>“The Lacedæmonians and their allies have concluded alliance with -the Great King and Tissaphernês, on the following conditions: The -king shall possess whatever territories and cities he himself had, -or his predecessors had before him. The king, and the Lacedæmonians -with their allies, shall jointly hinder the Athenians from deriving -either money or other advantages from all those cities which have -hitherto furnished to them any such. They shall jointly carry on war -against the Athenians, and shall not renounce the war against them, -except by joint consent. Whoever shall revolt from the king, shall be -treated as an enemy by the Lacedæmonians and their allies; whoever -shall revolt from the Lacedæmonians, shall in like manner be treated -as an enemy by the king.”<a id="FNanchor_569" href="#Footnote_569" -class="fnanchor">[569]</a></p> - -<p>As a first step to the execution of this treaty, Milêtus was -handed over to Tissaphernês, who immediately caused a citadel to -be erected and placed a garrison within it.<a id="FNanchor_570" -href="#Footnote_570" class="fnanchor">[570]</a> If fully carried -out, indeed, the terms of the treaty would have made the Great King -master not only of all the Asiatic Greeks and all the islanders -in the Ægean, but also of all Thessaly and Bœotia, and the full -ground which had once been covered by Xerxes.<a id="FNanchor_571" -href="#Footnote_571" class="fnanchor">[571]</a> Besides this -monstrous stipulation, the treaty farther bound the Lacedæmonians -to aid the king in keeping enslaved any Greeks who might be under -his dominion. Nor did it, on the other hand, secure to them any -pecuniary aid from him for the payment of their armament, which was -their great motive for courting his alliance. We shall find the -Lacedæmonian authorities themselves hereafter refusing to ratify -the treaty, on the ground of its exorbitant concessions. But it -stands as a melancholy evidence of the new<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_377">[p. 377]</span> source of mischief now opening upon -the Asiatic and insular Greeks, the moment that the empire of Athens -was broken up, the revived pretensions of their ancient lord and -master; whom nothing had hitherto kept in check, for the last fifty -years, except Athens, first as representative and executive agent, -next as successor and mistress, of the confederacy of Delos. We thus -see against what evils Athens had hitherto protected them: we shall -presently see, what is partially disclosed in this very treaty, the -manner in which Sparta realized her promise of conferring autonomy on -each separate Grecian state.</p> - -<p>The great stress of the war had now been transferred to Ionia -and the Asiatic side of the Ægean sea. The enemies of Athens had -anticipated that her entire empire in that quarter would fall an -easy prey: yet in spite of two such serious defections as Chios and -Milêtus, she showed an unexpected energy in keeping hold of the -remainder. Her great and capital station, from the present time to -the end of the war, was Samos; and a revolution which now happened, -insuring the fidelity of that island to her alliance, was a condition -indispensable to her power of maintaining the struggle in Ionia.</p> - -<p>We have heard nothing about Samos throughout the whole war, -since its reconquest by the Athenians after the revolt of 440 -<small>B.C.</small>: but we now find it under the government of -an oligarchy called the Geômori, the proprietors of land, as at -Syracuse before the rule of Gelon. It cannot be doubted that these -geômori were disposed to follow the example of the Chian oligarchy, -and revolt from Athens, while the people at Samos, as at Chios, -were averse to such a change. Under this state of circumstances, -the Chian oligarchy had themselves conspired with Sparta, to trick -and constrain their Demos by surprise into revolt, through the aid -of five Peloponnesian ships. The like would have happened at Samos, -had the people remained quiet. But they profited by the recent -warning, forestalled the designs of their oligarchy, and rose in -insurrection, with the help of three Athenian triremes which then -chanced to be in the port. The oligarchy were completely defeated, -but not without a violent and bloody struggle; two hundred of them -being slain, and four hundred banished. This revolution secured—and -probably nothing less than a democratical revolution could have -secured, under the existing<span class="pagenum" id="Page_378">[p. -378]</span> state of Hellenic affairs—the adherence of Samos to the -Athenians; who immediately recognized the new democracy, and granted -to it the privilege of an equal and autonomous ally. The Samian -people confiscated and divided among themselves the property of -such of the geômori as were slain or banished:<a id="FNanchor_572" -href="#Footnote_572" class="fnanchor">[572]</a> the remainder were -deprived of all political privileges, and were even forbidden to -intermarry with any of the families of the remaining citizens.<a -id="FNanchor_573" href="#Footnote_573" class="fnanchor">[573]</a> -We may fairly suspect that this latter prohibition is<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_379">[p. 379]</span> only the retaliation -of a similar exclusion which the oligarchy, when in power, had -enforced to maintain the purity of their own<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_380">[p. 380]</span> blood. What they had enacted as a -privilege was now thrown back upon them as an insult.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_381">[p. 381]</span></p> - -<p>On the other hand, the Athenian blockading fleet was surprised and -defeated, with the loss of four triremes, by the Peloponnesian<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_382">[p. 382]</span> fleet at Peiræum, which -was thus enabled to get to Kenchreæ, and to refit in order that it -might be sent to Ionia. The sixteen Peloponnesian ships which had -fought at Syracuse had already come back to Lechæum, in spite of -the obstructions thrown in their way by the Athenian squadron under -Hippoklês at Naupaktus.<a id="FNanchor_574" href="#Footnote_574" -class="fnanchor">[574]</a> The Lacedæmonian admiral Astyochus -was sent to Kenchreæ to take the command and proceed to Ionia as -admiral-in-chief: but it was some time before he could depart -for Chios, whither he arrived with only four triremes, followed -by six more afterwards.<a id="FNanchor_575" href="#Footnote_575" -class="fnanchor">[575]</a></p> - -<p>Before he reached that island, however, the Chians, zealous in the -new part which they had taken up, and interested for their own safety -in multiplying defections from Athens, had themselves undertaken the -prosecution of the plans concerted by Agis and the Lacedæmonians at -Corinth. They originated an expedition of their own, with thirteen -triremes under a Lacedæmonian periœkus named Deiniadas, to procure -the revolt of Lesbos; with the view, if successful, of proceeding -afterwards to do the same among the Hellespontine dependencies of -Athens. A land force under the Spartan Eualas, partly Peloponnesian, -partly Asiatic, marched along the coast of the mainland northward -towards Kymê, to coöperate in both these objects. Lesbos was at -this time divided into at least five separate city governments; -Methymna at the north of the island, Mitylênê towards the south-east, -Antissa, Eresus, and Pyrrha on the west. Whether these governments -were oligarchical or democratical we do not know, but the Athenian -kleruchs who had been sent to Mitylênê after<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_383">[p. 383]</span> its revolt sixteen years before, must -have long ago disappeared.<a id="FNanchor_576" href="#Footnote_576" -class="fnanchor">[576]</a> The Chian fleet first went to Methymna -and procured the revolt of that place, where four triremes were left -in guard, while the remaining nine sailed forward to Mitylênê, and -succeeded in obtaining that important town also.<a id="FNanchor_577" -href="#Footnote_577" class="fnanchor">[577]</a></p> - -<p>Their proceedings, however, were not unwatched by the Athenian -fleet at Samos. Unable to recover possession of Teos, Diomedon had -been obliged to content himself with procuring neutrality from -that town, and admission for the vessels of Athens as well as of -her enemies: he had, moreover, failed in an attack upon Eræ.<a -id="FNanchor_578" href="#Footnote_578" class="fnanchor">[578]</a> But -he had since been strengthened partly by the democratical revolution -at Samos, partly by the arrival of Leon with ten additional triremes -from Athens: so that these two commanders were now enabled to -sail, with twenty-five triremes, to the relief of Lesbos. Reaching -Mitylênê—the largest town in that island—very shortly after its -revolt, they sailed straight into the harbor when no one expected -them, seized the nine Chian ships with little resistance, and after -a successful battle on shore, regained possession of the city. The -Lacedæmonian admiral Astyochus—who had only been three days arrived -at Chios from Kenchreæ with his four triremes—saw the Athenian fleet -pass through the channel between Chios and the mainland, on its way -to Lesbos; and immediately on the same evening followed it to that -island, to lend what aid he could, with one Chian trireme added to -his own four, and some hoplites aboard. He sailed first to Pyrrha, -and on the next day to Eresus, on the west side of the island, where -he first learned the recapture of Mitylênê by the Athenians. He was -here also joined by three out of the four Chian triremes which had -been left to defend that place, and which had been driven away, with -the loss of one of their number, by a portion of the Athenian fleet -pushing on thither from Mitylênê. Astyochus prevailed on Eresus to -revolt from Athens, and having armed the population, sent them by -land together with his own hoplites under Eteonikus to Methymna, -in hopes of preserving that place, whither he also proceeded with -his fleet along the coast. But in spite of all his endeavors,<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_384">[p. 384]</span> Methymna as well as -Eresus and all Lesbos was recovered by the Athenians, while he -himself was obliged to return with his forces to Chios. The land -troops which had marched along the mainland, with a view to farther -operations at the Hellespont, were carried back to Chios and to -their respective homes.<a id="FNanchor_579" href="#Footnote_579" -class="fnanchor">[579]</a></p> - -<p>The recovery of Lesbos, which the Athenians now placed in a better -posture of defence, was of great importance in itself, and arrested -for the moment all operations against them at the Hellespont. Their -fleet from Lesbos was first employed in the recovery of Klazomenæ, -which they again carried back to its original islet near the shore; -the new town on the mainland, called Polichna, though in course -of being built, being not yet sufficiently<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_385">[p. 385]</span> fortified to defend itself. The leading -anti-Athenians in the town made their escape, and went farther up -the country to Daphnûs. Animated by such additional success—as well -as by a victory which the Athenians, who were blockading Milêtus, -gained over Chalkideus, wherein that officer was slain—Leon and -Diomedon thought themselves in a condition to begin aggressive -measures against Chios, now their most active enemy in Ionia. Their -fleet of twenty-five sail was well equipped with epibatæ; who, though -under ordinary circumstances they were thêtes armed at the public -cost, yet in the present stress of affairs were impressed from the -superior hoplites in the city muster-roll.<a id="FNanchor_580" -href="#Footnote_580" class="fnanchor">[580]</a> They occupied the -little islets called Œnussæ, near Chios on the northeast, as well as -the forts of Sidussa and Pteleus in the territory of Erythræ; from -which positions they began a series of harassing operations against -Chios itself. Disembarking on the island at Kardamylê and Bolissus, -they not only ravaged the neighborhood, but inflicted upon the Chian -forces a bloody defeat. After two farther defeats, at Phanæ and at -Leukonium, the Chians no longer dared to quit their fortifications; -so that the invaders were left to ravage at pleasure the whole -territory, being at the same time masters of the sea around, and -blocking up the port.</p> - -<p>The Athenians now retaliated upon Chios the hardships under -which Attica itself was suffering; hardships the more painfully -felt, inasmuch as this was the first time that an enemy had ever -been seen in the island since the repulse of Xerxês from Greece -and the organization of the confederacy of Delos, more than sixty -years before. The territory of Chios was highly cultivated,<a -id="FNanchor_581" href="#Footnote_581" class="fnanchor">[581]</a> -its commerce extensive, and its wealth among the greatest in all -Greece. In fact, under the Athenian empire, its prosperity had -been so marked and so uninterrupted, that Thucydidês expresses his -astonishment at the undeviating prudence and circumspection of the -government, in spite of circumstances well calculated to tempt them -into extravagance. “Except Sparta (he says),<a id="FNanchor_582" -href="#Footnote_582" class="fnanchor">[582]</a> Chios is the -only state that I know,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_386">[p. -386]</span> which maintained its sober judgment throughout a career -of prosperity, and became even more watchful in regard to security, -in proportion as it advanced in power.” He adds, that the step of -revolting from Athens, though the Chian government now discovered it -to have been an error, was at any rate a pardonable error; for it -was undertaken under the impression, universal throughout Greece, -and prevalent even in Athens herself after the disaster at Syracuse, -that Athenian power, if not Athenian independence, was at an end, and -undertaken in conjunction with allies seemingly more than sufficient -to sustain it. This remarkable observation of Thucydidês doubtless -includes an indirect censure upon his own city, as abusing her -prosperity for purposes of unmeasured aggrandizement: a censure not -undeserved in reference to the enterprise against Sicily. But it -counts at the same time as a valuable testimony to the condition of -the allies of Athens under the Athenian empire, and goes far in reply -to the charge of practical oppression against the imperial city.</p> - -<p>The operations now carrying on in Chios indicated such an -unexpected renovation in Athenian affairs, that a party in the -island began to declare in favor of reunion with Athens. The -Chian government were forced to summon Astyochus, with his four -Peloponnesian ships from Erythræ, to strengthen their hands, and keep -down opposition, by seizing hostages from the suspected parties, as -well as by other precautions. While the Chians were thus endangered -at home, the Athenian interest in Ionia was still farther fortified -by the arrival of a fresh armament from Athens at Samos. Phrynichus, -Onomaklês, and Skironidês conducted a fleet of forty-eight triremes, -some of them employed for the transportation of hoplites; of which -latter there were aboard one thousand Athenians, and fifteen hundred -Argeians. Five hundred of these Argeians, having come to Athens -without arms, were clothed with Athenian panoplies for service. The -newly-arrived armament immediately sailed from Samos to Milêtus, -where it effected a disembarkation, in conjunction with those<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_387">[p. 387]</span> Athenians who had been -before watching the place from the island of Ladê. The Milêsians -marched forth to give them battle; mustering eight hundred of -their own hoplites, together with the Peloponnesian seamen of the -five triremes brought across by Chalkideus, and a body of troops, -chiefly cavalry, yet with a few mercenary hoplites, under the satrap -Tissaphernês. Alkibiadês, also, was present and engaged. The Argeians -were so full of contempt for the Ionians of Milêtus who stood -opposite to them, that they rushed forward to the charge with great -neglect of rank or order; a presumption which they expiated by an -entire defeat, with the loss of three hundred men. But the Athenians -on their wing were so completely victorious over the Peloponnesians -and others opposed to them, that all the army of the latter, and -even the Milesians themselves on returning from their pursuit of the -Argeians, were forced to shelter themselves within the walls of the -town. The issue of this combat excited much astonishment, inasmuch -as, on each side, Ionian hoplites were victorious over Dorian.<a -id="FNanchor_583" href="#Footnote_583" class="fnanchor">[583]</a></p> - -<p>For a moment, the Athenian army, masters of the field under the -walls of Milêtus, indulged the hope of putting that city under -blockade, by a wall across the isthmus which connected it with the -continent. But these hopes soon vanished when they were apprized, -on the very evening of the battle, that the main Peloponnesian and -Sicilian fleet, fifty-five triremes in number, was actually in sight. -Of these fifty-five, twenty-two were Sicilian,—twenty from Syracuse -and two from Selinus,—sent at the pressing instance of Hermokratês, -and under his command, for the purpose of striking the final blow -at Athens; so at least it was anticipated, in the beginning of 412 -<small>B.C.</small> The remaining thirty-three triremes -being Peloponnesian, the whole fleet was placed under the temporary -command of Theramenês, until he could join the admiral Astyochus. -Theramenês, halting first at the island of Lerus,—off the coast, -towards the southward of Milêtus,—was there first informed of the -recent victory of the Athenians, so that he thought it prudent to -take station for the night in the neighboring gulf of Iasus. Here -he was found by Alkibiadês, who came on horseback, in all haste, -from Milêtus to the Milesian<span class="pagenum" id="Page_388">[p. -388]</span> town of Teichiussa on that gulf. Alkibiadês strenuously -urged him to lend immediate aid to the Milêsians, so as to prevent -the construction of the intended wall of blockade; representing that -if that city were captured, all the hopes of the Peloponnesians -in Ionia would be extinguished. Accordingly, he prepared to sail -thither the next morning: but, during the night, the Athenians -thought it wise to abandon their position near Milêtus and return -to Samos with their wounded and their baggage. Having heard of the -arrival of Theramenês with his fleet, they preferred leaving their -victory unimproved, to the hazard of a general battle. Two out of -the three commanders, indeed, were at first inclined to take the -latter course, insisting that the maritime honor of Athens would be -tarnished by retiring before the enemy. But the third, Phrynichus, -opposed with so much emphasis the proposition of fighting, that he -at length induced his colleagues to retire. The fleet, he said, had -not come prepared for fighting a naval battle, but full of hoplites -for land-operations against Milêtus: the numbers of the newly-arrived -Peloponnesians were not accurately known; and a defeat at sea, under -existing circumstances, would be utter ruin to Athens. Thucydidês -bestows much praise on Phrynichus for the wisdom of this advice, -which was forthwith acted upon. The Athenian fleet sailed back to -Samos; from which place the Argeian hoplites, sulky with their -recent defeat, demanded to be conveyed home.<a id="FNanchor_584" -href="#Footnote_584" class="fnanchor">[584]</a></p> - -<p>On the ensuing morning, the Peloponnesian fleet sailed from the -gulf of Iasus to Milêtus, expecting to find and fight the Athenians, -and leaving their masts, sails, and rigging—as was usual when going -into action—at Teichiussa. Finding Milêtus already relieved of -the enemy, they stayed there only one day, in order to reinforce -themselves with the twenty-five triremes which Chalkideus had -originally brought thither, and which had been since blocked up -by the Athenian fleet at Ladê, and then sailed back to Teichiussa -to pick up the tackle there deposited. Being now not far from -Iasus, the residence of Amorgês, Tissaphernês persuaded them to -attack it by sea, in coöperation with his forces by land. No one -at Iasus was aware of the arrival of the Peloponnesian fleet: the -triremes approaching were supposed to be<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_389">[p. 389]</span> Athenians and friends, so that the -place was entered and taken by surprise;<a id="FNanchor_585" -href="#Footnote_585" class="fnanchor">[585]</a> though strong in -situation and fortifications, and defended by a powerful band of -Grecian mercenaries. The capture of Iasus, in which the Syracusans -distinguished themselves, was of signal advantage, from the abundant -plunder which it distributed among the army; the place being rich -from ancient date, and probably containing the accumulations of -the satrap Pissuthnês, father of Amorgês. It was handed over to -Tissaphernês, along with all the prisoners, for each head of whom he -paid down a Daric stater, or twenty Attic drachmæ, and along with -Amorgês himself, who had been taken alive, and whom the satrap was -thus enabled to send up to Susa. The Grecian mercenaries captured -in the place were enrolled in the service of the captors, and sent -by land under Pedaritus to Erythræ, in order that they might cross -over from thence to Chios.<a id="FNanchor_586" href="#Footnote_586" -class="fnanchor">[586]</a></p> - -<p>The arrival of the recent reinforcements to both the opposing -fleets, and the capture of Iasus, took place about the autumnal -equinox or the end of September; at which period, the Peloponnesian -fleet being assembled at Milêtus, Tissaphernês paid to them the -wages of the crews, at the rate of one Attic drachma per head per -diem, as he had promised by his envoy at Sparta. But he at the -same time gave notice for the future,—partly at the instigation of -Alkibiadês, of which more hereafter,—that he could not continue so -high a rate of pay, unless he should receive express instructions -from Susa; and that, until such instructions came, he should give -only half a drachma per day. Theramenês, being only commander for -the interim, until the junction with Astyochus, was indifferent -to the rate at which the men were paid,—a miserable jealousy, -which marks the low character of many of<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_390">[p. 390]</span> these Spartan officers,—but the -Syracusan Hermokratês remonstrated so loudly against the reduction, -that he obtained from Tissaphernês the promise of a slight increase -above the half drachma, though he could not succeed in getting the -entire drachma continued.<a id="FNanchor_587" href="#Footnote_587" -class="fnanchor">[587]</a> For the present, however, the seamen -were in good spirits; not merely from having received the high rate -of pay, but from the plentiful booty recently acquired at Iasus;<a -id="FNanchor_588" href="#Footnote_588" class="fnanchor">[588]</a> -while Astyochus and the Chians were also greatly encouraged by -the arrival of so large a fleet. Nevertheless, the Athenians on -their side were also reinforced by thirty-five fresh triremes, -which reached Samos under Strombichidês, Charminus, and Euktêmon. -The Athenian fleet from Chios was now recalled to Samos, where -the commanders mustered their whole naval force, with a view of -redividing it for ulterior operations.</p> - -<p>Considering that in the autumn of the preceding year, immediately -after the Syracusan disaster, the navy of Athens had been no less -scanty in number of ships than defective in equipment, we read -with amazement, that she had now at Samos no less than one hundred -and four triremes in full condition and disposable for service, -besides some others specially destined for the transport of troops. -Indeed, the total number which she had sent out, putting together -the separate squadrons, had been one hundred and twenty-eight.<a -id="FNanchor_589" href="#Footnote_589" class="fnanchor">[589]</a> So -energetic an effort, and so unexpected a renovation of affairs from -the hopeless prostration of last year, was such as no Grecian state -except Athens could have accomplished; nor even Athens herself, had -she not been aided by that reserve fund, consecrated twenty years -before through the long-sighted calculation of Periklês.</p> - -<p>The Athenians resolved to employ thirty triremes in making a -landing, and establishing a fortified post, in Chios; and lots -being<span class="pagenum" id="Page_391">[p. 391]</span> drawn -among the generals, Strombichidês with two others were assigned to -the command. The other seventy-four triremes, remaining masters of -the sea, made descents near Milêtus, and in vain tried to provoke -the Peloponnesian fleet out of that harbor. It was some time before -Astyochus actually went thither to assume his new command, being -engaged in operations near to Chios, which island had been left -comparatively free by the recall of the Athenian fleet to the general -muster at Samos. Going forth with twenty triremes,—ten Peloponnesian -and ten Chian,—he made a fruitless attack upon Pteleus, the Athenian -fortified post in the Erythræan territory; after which he sailed -to Klazomenæ, recently retransferred from the continent to the -neighboring islet. He here—in conjunction with Tamôs, the Persian -general of the district—enjoined the Klazomenians again to break -with Athens, to leave their islet, and to take up their residence -inland at Daphnûs, where the philo-Peloponnesian party among them -still remained established since the former revolt. This demand being -rejected, he attacked Klazomenæ, but was repulsed, although the town -was unfortified, and was presently driven off by a severe storm, -from which he found shelter at Kymê and Phokæa. Some of his ships -sheltered themselves during the same storm on certain islets near -to and belonging to Klazomenæ; on which they remained eight days, -destroying and plundering the property of the inhabitants, and then -rejoined Astyochus. That admiral was now anxious to make an attempt -on Lesbos, from which he received envoys promising revolt from -Athens. But the Corinthians and others in his fleet were so averse to -the enterprise, that he was forced to relinquish it and sail back to -Chios; his fleet, before it arrived there, being again dispersed by -the storms, frequent in the month of November.<a id="FNanchor_590" -href="#Footnote_590" class="fnanchor">[590]</a></p> - -<p>Meanwhile Pedaritus, despatched by land from Milêtus,—at the -head of the mercenary force made prisoners at Iasus, as well as of -five hundred of the Peloponnesian seamen who had originally crossed -the sea with Chalkideus, and since served as hoplites,—had reached -Erythræ and from thence crossed the channel to Chios. To him and -to the Chians, Astyochus now proposed to undertake the expedition -to Lesbos; but he experi<span class="pagenum" id="Page_392">[p. -392]</span>enced from them the same reluctance as from the -Corinthians, a strong proof that the tone of feeling in Lesbos had -been found to be decidedly philo-Athenian on the former expedition. -Pedaritus even peremptorily refused to let him have the Chian -triremes for any such purpose, an act of direct insubordination in a -Lacedæmonian officer towards the admiral-in-chief, which Astyochus -resented so strongly, that he immediately left Chios for Milêtus, -carrying away with him all the Peloponnesian triremes, and telling -the Chians, in terms of strong displeasure, that they might look -in vain to him for aid, if they should come to need it. He halted -with his fleet for the night under the headland of Korykus (in -the Erythræan territory), on the north side; but while there, he -received an intimation of a supposed plot to betray Erythræ by -means of prisoners sent back from the Athenian station at Samos. -Instead of pursuing his voyage to Milêtus, he therefore returned -on the next day to Erythræ to investigate this plot, which turned -out to be a stratagem of the prisoners themselves in order to -obtain their liberation.<a id="FNanchor_591" href="#Footnote_591" -class="fnanchor">[591]</a></p> - -<p>The fact of his thus going back to Erythræ, instead of pursuing -his voyage, proved, by accident, the salvation of his fleet. For -it so happened that on that same night the Athenian fleet, under -Strombichidês—thirty triremes, accompanied by some triremes carrying -hoplites—had its station on the southern side of the same headland. -Neither knew of the position of the other, and Astyochus, had he gone -forward the next day towards Milêtus, would have fallen in with the -superior numbers of his enemy. He farther escaped a terrible storm, -which the Athenians encountered when they doubled the headland going -northward. Descrying three Chian triremes, they gave chase, but the -storm became so violent that even these Chians had great difficulty -in making their own harbor, while the three foremost Athenian ships -were wrecked on the neighboring shore, all the crews either perishing -or becoming prisoners.<a id="FNanchor_592" href="#Footnote_592" -class="fnanchor">[592]</a> The rest of the Athenian fleet found -shelter in the harbor of Phœnikus on the opposite mainland, under the -lofty mountain called Mimas, north of Erythræ.</p> - -<p>As soon as weather permitted, they pursued their voyage to -Lesbos, from which island they commenced their operations of<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_393">[p. 393]</span> invading Chios and -establishing in it a permanent fortified post. Having transported -their land-force across from Lesbos, they occupied a strong maritime -site called Delphinium, seemingly a projecting cape having a -sheltered harbor on each side, not far from the city of Chios.<a -id="FNanchor_593" href="#Footnote_593" class="fnanchor">[593]</a> -They bestowed great labor and time in fortifying this post, both on -the land and the sea-side, during which process they were scarcely -interrupted at all either by the Chians, or by Pedaritus and his -garrison; whose inaction arose not merely from the discouragement of -the previous defeats, but from the political dissension which now -reigned in the city. A strong philo-Athenian party had pronounced -itself; and though Tydeus its leader was seized by Pedaritus and -put to death, still, his remaining partisans were so numerous, that -the government was brought to an oligarchy narrower than ever, and -to the extreme of jealous precaution, not knowing whom to trust. -In spite of numerous messages sent to Milêtus, intreating succor, -and representing the urgent peril to which this greatest among all -the Ionian allies of Sparta was exposed, Astyochus adhered to his -parting menaces, and refused compliance. The indignant Pedaritus sent -to prefer complaint against him at Sparta as a traitor. Meanwhile -the fortress at Delphinium advanced so near towards completion, -that Chios began to suffer from it as much as Athens suffered from -Dekeleia, with the farther misfortune of being blocked up by sea. -The slaves in this wealthy island—chiefly foreigners acquired by -purchase, but more numerous than in any other Grecian state except -Laconia—were emboldened by the manifest superiority and assured -position of the invaders to desert in crowds; and the loss arising, -not merely from their flight, but from the valuable information and -aid which they gave to the enemy was immense.<a id="FNanchor_594" -href="#Footnote_594" class="fnanchor">[594]</a> The dis<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_394">[p. 394]</span>tress of the island -increased every day, nor could anything relieve it except succor from -without, which Astyochus still withheld.</p> - -<p>That officer, on reaching Milêtus, found the Peloponnesian -force on the Asiatic side of the Ægean just reinforced by a -squadron of twelve triremes under Dorieus; chiefly from Thurii, -which had undergone a political revolution since the Athenian -disaster at Syracuse, and was now decidedly in the hands of the -active philo-Laconian party; the chief persons friendly to Athens -having been exiled.<a id="FNanchor_595" href="#Footnote_595" -class="fnanchor">[595]</a> Dorieus and his squadron, crossing the -Ægean in its southern latitude, had arrived safely at Knidus, which -had already been conquered by Tissaphernês from Athens, and had -received a Persian garrison.<a id="FNanchor_596" href="#Footnote_596" -class="fnanchor">[596]</a> Orders were sent from Milêtus that half of -this newly-arrived squadron should remain on guard at Knidus, while -the other half should cruise near the Triopian cape to intercept the -trading vessels from Egypt. But the Athenians, who had also learned -the arrival of Dorieus, sent a powerful squadron from Samos, which -captured all these six triremes off Cape Triopium, though the crews -escaped ashore. They farther made an attempt to recover Knidus, -which was very nearly successful, as the town was unfortified on -the sea-side. On the morrow the attack was renewed,—but additional -defences had been provided during the night, while the crews of -the ships captured near Triopium had come in to help,—so that -the Athenians were forced to return to Samos without any farther -advantage than that of ravaging the Knidian territory. Astyochus took -no step to intercept them, nor did he think himself strong enough to -keep the sea against the seventy-four Athenian triremes at Samos, -though his fleet at Milêtus was at this moment in high condition. -The rich booty acquired at Iasus was uncon<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_395">[p. 395]</span>sumed; the Milêsians were zealous in -the confederate cause; while the pay from Tissaphernês continued to -be supplied with tolerable regularity, though at the reduced rate -mentioned a little above.<a id="FNanchor_597" href="#Footnote_597" -class="fnanchor">[597]</a></p> - -<p>Though the Peloponnesians had yet no ground of complaint—such -as they soon came to have—against the satrap for irregularity of -payment, still, the powerful fleet now at Milêtus inspired the -commanders with a new tone of confidence, so that they became -ashamed of the stipulations of that treaty to which Chalkideus and -Alkibiadês, when first landing at Milêtus with their scanty armament, -had submitted. Accordingly Astyochus, shortly after his arrival at -Milêtus, and even before the departure of Theramenês,—whose functions -had expired when he had handed over the fleet,—insisted on a fresh -treaty with Tissaphernês, which was agreed on, to the following -effect:—</p> - -<p>“Convention and alliance is concluded, on the following -conditions, between the Lacedæmonians, with their allies, and king -Darius, his sons, and Tissaphernês. The Lacedæmonians and their -allies shall not attack or injure any territory or any city which -belongs to Darius, or has belonged to his father or ancestors; -nor shall they raise any tribute from any of the said cities. -Neither Darius nor any of his subjects shall attack or injure the -Lacedæmonians or their allies. Should the Lacedæmonians or their -allies have any occasion for the king, or should the king have any -occasion for the Lacedæmonians or their allies, let each meet, -as much as may be, the wishes expressed by the other. Both will -carry on jointly the war against Athens and her allies: neither -party shall bring the war to a close, without mutual consent. -The king shall pay and keep any army which he may have sent for, -and which may be employed in his territory. If any of the cities -parties to this convention shall attack the king’s territory, the -rest engage to hinder them, and to defend the king with their best -power. And if any one within the king’s territory, or within the -territory subject to him,<a id="FNanchor_598" href="#Footnote_598" -class="fnanchor">[598]</a> shall attack the<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_396">[p. 396]</span> Lacedæmonians or their allies, the king -shall hinder them, and lend his best defensive aid.”</p> - -<p>Looked at with the eyes of Pan-Hellenic patriotism, this second -treaty of Astyochus and Theramenês was less disgraceful than the -first treaty of Chalkideus. It did not formally proclaim that all -those Grecian cities which had ever belonged to the king or to his -ancestors, should still be considered as his subjects, nor did -it pledge the Lacedæmonians to aid the king in hindering any of -them from achieving their liberty. It still admitted, however, by -implication, the same undiminished extent of the king’s dominion, -as it had stood when at its maximum under his predecessors; the -same undefined rights of the king to meddle with Grecian affairs; -the same unqualified abandonment of all the Greeks on the continent -of Asia. The conclusion of this treaty was the last act performed -by Theramenês, who was lost at sea shortly afterwards, on his -voyage home, in a small boat, no one knew how.<a id="FNanchor_599" -href="#Footnote_599" class="fnanchor">[599]</a></p> - -<p>Astyochus, now alone in command, was still importuned by the -urgent solicitations of the distressed Chians for relief, and, in -spite of his reluctance, was compelled by the murmurs of his own -army to lend an ear to them, when a new incident happened which gave -him at least a good pretext for directing his attention southward. A -Peloponnesian squadron of twenty-seven triremes under the command of -Antisthenês, having started from Cape Malea about the winter tropic -or close of 412 <small>B.C.</small>, had first crossed -the sea to Melos, where it dispersed ten Athenian triremes and -captured three of them; then afterwards, from apprehension that these -fugitive Athenians would make known its approach at Samos, had made -a long circuit round by Krete, and thus ultimately reached Kaunus -at the southeastern extremity of Asia Minor. This was the squadron -which Kalligeitus and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_397">[p. -397]</span> Timagoras had caused to be equipped, having come over for -that purpose a year before as envoys from the satrap Pharnabazus. -Antisthenês was instructed first to get to Milêtus and put himself -in concert with the main Lacedæmonian fleet; next, to forward these -triremes, or another squadron of equal force under Klearchus, to the -Hellespont, for the purpose of coöperating with Pharnabazus against -the Athenian dependencies in that region. Eleven Spartans, the -chief of whom was Lichas, accompanied Antisthenês, to be attached -to Astyochus as advisers, according to a practice not unusual with -the Lacedæmonians. These men were not only directed to review the -state of affairs at Milêtus, and exercise control coördinate with -Astyochus, but even empowered, if they saw reason, to dismiss that -admiral himself, upon whom the complaints of Pedaritus from Chios -had cast suspicion; and to appoint Antisthenês in his place.<a -id="FNanchor_600" href="#Footnote_600" class="fnanchor">[600]</a></p> - -<p>No sooner had Astyochus learned at Milêtus the arrival of -Antisthenês at Kaunus, than he postponed all idea of lending aid -to Chios, and sailed immediately to secure his junction with -the twenty-seven new triremes as well as with the new Spartan -counsellors. In his voyage southward he captured the city of Kôs, -unfortified and half-ruined by a recent earthquake, and then passed -on to Knidus; where the inhabitants strenuously urged him to go -forward at once, even without disembarking his men, in order that -he might surprise an Athenian squadron of twenty triremes under -Charmînus; which had been despatched from Samos, after the news -received from Melos, in order to attack and repel the squadron under -Antisthenês. Charmînus, having his station at Symê, was cruising -near Rhodes and the Lykian coast, to watch, though he had not been -able to keep back, the Peloponnesian fleet just arrived at Kaunus. -In this position he was found by the far more numerous fleet of -Astyochus, the approach of which he did not at all expect. But the -rainy and hazy weather had so dispersed it, that Charmînus, seeing -at first only a few ships apart from the rest, mistook them for the -smaller squadron of new-comers. Attacking the triremes thus seen, he -at first gained considerable advantage, dis<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_398">[p. 398]</span>abling three and damaging several -others. But presently the dispersed vessels of the main fleet -came in sight and closed round him, so that he was forced to make -the best speed in escaping, first to the island called Teutlussa, -next to Halikarnassus. He did not effect his escape without the -loss of six ships; while the victorious Peloponnesians, after -erecting their trophy on the island of Symê, returned to Knidus, -where the entire fleet, including the twenty-seven triremes newly -arrived, was now united.<a id="FNanchor_601" href="#Footnote_601" -class="fnanchor">[601]</a> The Athenians in Samos—whose affairs were -now in confusion, from causes which will be explained in the ensuing -chapter—had kept no watch on the movements of the main Peloponnesian -fleet at Milêtus, and seem to have been ignorant of its departure -until they were apprized of the defeat of Charmînus. They then -sailed down to Symê, took up the sails and rigging belonging to that -squadron, which had been there deposited, and then, after an attack -upon Loryma, carried back their whole fleet, probably including the -remnant of the squadron of Charmînus, to Samos.<a id="FNanchor_602" -href="#Footnote_602" class="fnanchor">[602]</a></p> - -<p>Though the Peloponnesian fleet now assembled at Knidus consisted -of ninety-four triremes, much superior in number to the Athenian, it -did not try to provoke any general action. The time of Lichas and -his brother commissioners was at first spent in negotiations with -Tissaphernês, who had joined them at Knidus, and against whom they -found a strong feeling of discontent prevalent in the fleet. That -satrap—now acting greatly under the advice of Alkibiadês, of which -also more in the coming chapter—had of late become slack in the -Peloponnesian cause, and irregular in furnishing pay to their seamen, -during the last weeks of their stay at Milêtus. He was at the same -time full of promises, paralyzing all their operations by assurances -that he was bringing up the vast fleet of Phenicia to their aid: but -in reality his object was, under fair appearances, merely to prolong -the contest and waste the strength of both parties. Arriving in the -midst of this state of feeling, and discussing with Tissaphernês -the future conduct of the war, Lichas not only expressed dis<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_399">[p. 399]</span>pleasure at his past -conduct, but even protested against the two conventions concluded by -Chalkideus and by Theramenês, as being, both the one and the other, -a disgrace to the Hellenic name. By the express terms of the former, -and by the implications of the latter, not merely all the islands -of the Ægean, but even Thessaly and Bœotia, were acknowledged as -subject to Persia; so that Sparta, if she sanctioned such conditions, -would be merely imposing upon the Greeks a Persian sceptre, instead -of general freedom, for which she professed to be struggling. -Lichas, declaring that he would rather renounce all prospect of -Persian pay, than submit to such conditions, proposed to negotiate -for a fresh treaty upon other and better terms, a proposition -which Tissaphernês rejected with so much indignation as to depart -without settling anything.<a id="FNanchor_603" href="#Footnote_603" -class="fnanchor">[603]</a></p> - -<p>His desertion did not discourage the Peloponnesian counsellors. -Possessing a fleet larger than they had ever before had united in -Asia, together with a numerous body of allies, they calculated on -being able to get money to pay their men without Persian aid; and -an invitation, which they just now received from various powerful -men at Rhodes, tended to strengthen such confidence. The island of -Rhodes, inhabited by a Dorian population considerable in number as -well as distinguished for nautical skill, was at this time divided -between three separate city governments, as it had been at the epoch -of the Homeric Catalogue,—Lindus, Ialysus, and Kameirus; for the -city called Rhodes, formed by a coalescence of all these three, -dates only from two or three years after the period which we have -now reached. Invited by several of the wealthy men of the island, -the Peloponnesian fleet first attacked Kameirus, the population -of which, intimidated by a force of ninety-four triremes, and -altogether uninformed of their approach, abandoned their city, which -had no defences, and fled to the mountains.<a id="FNanchor_604" -href="#Footnote_604" class="fnanchor">[604]</a> All the three -Rhodian towns, destitute of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_400">[p. -400]</span> fortifications, were partly persuaded, partly frightened, -into the step of revolting from Athens and allying themselves with -the Peloponnesians. The Athenian fleet, whose commanders were just -now too busy with political intrigue to keep due military watch, -arrived from Samos too late to save Rhodes, and presently returned to -the former island, leaving detachments at Chalkê and Kôs to harass -the Peloponnesians with desultory attacks.</p> - -<p>The Peloponnesians now levied from the Rhodians a contribution -of thirty-two talents, and adopted the island as the main station -for their fleet, instead of Milêtus. We can explain this change -of place by their recent unfriendly discussion with Tissaphernês, -and their desire to be more out of his reach.<a id="FNanchor_605" -href="#Footnote_605" class="fnanchor">[605]</a> But what we -cannot so easily explain, is, that they remained on the island -without any movement or military action, and actually hauled -their triremes ashore, for the space of no less than eighty -days; that is, from about the middle of January to the end of -March 411 <small>B.C.</small> While their powerful -fleet of ninety-four triremes, superior to that of Athens at -Samos, was thus lying idle, their allies in Chios were known -to be suffering severe and increasing distress, and repeatedly -pressing for aid:<a id="FNanchor_606" href="#Footnote_606" -class="fnanchor">[606]</a> moreover, the promise of sending to -coöperate with Pharnabazus against the Athenian dependencies -on the Hellespont, remained unperformed.<a id="FNanchor_607" -href="#Footnote_607" class="fnanchor">[607]</a> We may impute -such extreme military slackness mainly to the insidious policy of -Tissaphernês, now playing a double game between Sparta and Athens. -He still kept up intelligence with the Peloponnesians at Rhodes, -paralyzed their energies by assurances that the Phenician fleet -was actually on its way to aid them, and insured the success of -these intrigues by bribes distributed per<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_401">[p. 401]</span>sonally among the generals and the -trierarchs. Even Astyochus, the general-in-chief, took his share in -this corrupt bargain, against which not one stood out except the -Syracusan Hermokratês.<a id="FNanchor_608" href="#Footnote_608" -class="fnanchor">[608]</a> Such prolonged inaction of the armament, -at the moment of its greatest force, was thus not simply the fruit of -honest mistake, like the tardiness of Nikias in Sicily, but proceeded -from the dishonesty and personal avidity of the Peloponnesian -officers.</p> - -<p>I have noticed, on more than one previous occasion, the many -evidences which exist of the prevalence of personal corruption—even -in its coarsest form, that of direct bribery—among the leading Greeks -of all the cities, when acting individually. Of such evidences the -incident here recorded is not the least remarkable. Nor ought this -general fact ever to be forgotten by those who discuss the question -between oligarchy and democracy, as it stood in the Grecian world. -The confident pretensions put forth by the wealthy and oligarchical -Greeks to superior virtue, public as well as private,—and the quiet -repetition, by various writers modern and ancient, of the laudatory -epithets implying such assumed virtue,—are so far from being borne -out by history, that these individuals were perpetually ready as -statesmen to betray their countrymen, or as generals even to betray -the interests of their soldiers, for the purpose of acquiring money -themselves. Of course, it is not meant that this was true of all of -them; but it was true sufficiently often, to be reckoned upon as a -contingency more than probable. If, speaking on the average, the -leading men of a Grecian community were not above the commission of -political misdeeds thus palpable, and of a nature not to be disguised -even from themselves, far less would they be above the vices, always -more or less mingled with self-delusion, of pride, power-seeking, -party-antipathy or sympathy, love of ease, etc. And if the community -were to have any chance of guarantee against such abuses, it could -only be by full license of accusation against delinquents,<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_402">[p. 402]</span> and certainty of trial -before judges identified in interest with the people themselves. -Such were the securities which the Grecian democracies, especially -that of Athens, tried to provide; in a manner not always wise, still -less always effectual, but assuredly justified, in the amplest -manner, by the urgency and prevalence of the evil. Yet in the common -representations given of Athenian affairs, this evil is overlooked -or evaded; the precautions taken against it are denounced as so many -evidences of democratical ill-temper and injustice; and the class -of men, through whose initiatory action alone such precautions were -enforced, are held up to scorn as demagogues and <i>sycophants</i>. Had -these Peloponnesian generals and trierarchs, who under the influence -of bribes wasted two important months in inaction, been Athenians, -there might have been some chance of their being tried and punished; -though even at Athens the chance of impunity to offenders, through -powerful political clubs and other sinister artifices, was much -greater than it ought to have been. So little is it consistent with -the truth, however often affirmed, that judicial accusation was too -easy, and judicial condemnation too frequent. When the judicial -precautions provided at Athens are looked at, as they ought to be, -side by side with the evil, they will be found imperfect, indeed, -both in the scheme and in the working, but certainly neither uncalled -for nor over-severe.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="footnotes"> - -<h2>FOOTNOTES</h2> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_1"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_1">[1]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 17-29.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_2"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_2">[2]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 18.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_3"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_3">[3]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 14, 22, 76.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_4"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_4">[4]</a></span> Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_5"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_5">[5]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 21, 22.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_6"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_6">[6]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 23. The treaty of -alliance seems to have been drawn up at Sparta, and approved or -concerted with the Athenian envoys; then sent to Athens, and there -adopted by the people; then sworn to on both sides. The interval -between this second treaty and the first (οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον, v, 24), -may have been more than a month; for it comprised the visit of the -Lacedæmonian envoys to Amphipolis and the other towns of Thrace, -the manifestation of resistance in those towns, and the return of -Klearidas to Sparta to give an account of his conduct.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_7"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_7">[7]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 24.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_8"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_8">[8]</a></span> Thucyd. iv, 19. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ -ὑμᾶς προκαλοῦνται ἐς σπονδὰς καὶ διάλυσιν πολέμου, διδόντες μὲν -εἰρήνην καὶ ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ἄλλην φιλίαν πολλὴν καὶ οἰκειότητα ἐς -ἀλλήλους ὑπάρχειν, ἀνταιτοῦντες δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_9"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_9">[9]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 26. οὐκ εἰκὸς ὂν εἰρήνην -αὐτὴν κριθῆναι, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_10"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_10">[10]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 28. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν -χρόνον τοῦτον ἥ τε Λακεδαίμων μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἤκουσε καὶ ὑπερώφθη -διὰ τὰς ξυμφορὰς.—(Νικίας) λέγων ἐν μὲν τῷ σφετέρῳ καλῷ (Athenian) -ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐκείνων ἀπρεπεῖ (Lacedæmonian) τὸν πόλεμον ἀναβάλλεσθαι, -etc. (v, 46)—Οἷς πρῶτον μὲν (to the Lacedæmonians) διὰ ξυμφορῶν ἡ -ξύμβασις, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_11"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_11">[11]</a></span> Aristophan. Pac. 665-887.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_12"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_12">[12]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 21-35.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_13"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_13">[13]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 32.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_14"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_14">[14]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 35. λέγοντες ἀεὶ ὡς μετ’ Ἀθηναίων τούτους, -ἢν μὴ θέλωσι, κοινῇ ἀναγκάσουσι· <em class="gesperrt">χρόνους δὲ προὔθεντο ἄνευ -ξυγγραφῆς</em>, ἐν οἷς χρῆν τοὺς μὴ ἐσιόντας ἀμφοτέροις πολεμίους -εἶναι.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_15"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_15">[15]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 35. τούτων οὖν ὁρῶντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδὲν -ἔργῳ γιγνόμενον, ὑπετόπευον τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μηδὲν δίκαιον -διανοεῖσθαι, ὥστε οὔτε Πύλον ἀπαιτούντων αὐτῶν ἀπεδίδοσαν, ἀλλὰ -<em class="gesperrt">καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας μετεμέλοντο ἀποδεδωκότες</em>, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_16"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_16">[16]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 35. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ πολλῶν λόγων γενομένων -ἐν τῷ θέρει τούτῳ, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_17"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_17">[17]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 28. Aristophan. Pac. 467, about the -Argeians, δίχοθεν μισθοφοροῦντες ἄλφιτα. -</p> -<p> -He characterizes the Argeians as anxious for this reason to prolong -the war between Athens and Sparta. This passage, as well as the -whole tenor of the play, affords ground for affirming that the Pax -was represented during the winter immediately preceding the Peace of -Nikias, about four or five months after the battle of Amphipolis and -the death of Kleon and Brasidas; not two years later, as Mr. Clinton -would place it, on the authority of a date in the play itself, upon -which he lays too great stress.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_18"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_18">[18]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 67. Ἀργείων οἱ Χίλιοι λογάδες, οἷς ἡ πόλις -<em class="gesperrt">ἐκ πολλοῦ</em> ἄσκησιν τῶν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον δημοσίᾳ παρεῖχε. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus (xii, 75) represents the first formation of this -Thousand-regiment at Argos as having taken place just about this -time, and I think he is here worthy of credit; so that I do not -regard the expression of Thucydidês ἐκ πολλοῦ as indicating a time -more than two years prior to the battle of Mantineia. For Grecian -military training, two years of constant practice would be a <i>long</i> -time. It is not to be imagined that the Argeian democracy would have -incurred the expense and danger of keeping up this select regiment -during all the period of their long peace, just now coming to an end.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_19"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_19">[19]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 29. μὴ μετὰ Ἀθηναίων σφᾶς βούλωνται -Λακεδαιμόνιοι δουλώσασθαι: compare Diodorus, xii, 75.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_20"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_20">[20]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 28.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_21"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_21">[21]</a></span> Thucyd. iv, 134.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_22"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_22">[22]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 29. τοῖς γὰρ -Μαντινεῦσι μέρος τι τῆς Ἀρκαδίας κατέστραπτο ὑπήκοον, ἔτι τοῦ πρὸς -Ἀθηναίους πολέμου ὄντος, καὶ ἐνόμιζον οὐ περιόψεσθαι σφᾶς τοὺς -Λακεδαιμονίους ἄρχειν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σχολὴν ἦγον.</p> - -<p>As to the way in which the agreement of the members of the -confederacy modified the relations between subordinate and imperial -states, see farther on, pages <a href="#See_1">25 and 26</a>, in the case of Elis and -Lepreum.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_23"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_23">[23]</a></span> Thucyd. i, 125.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_24"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_24">[24]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 29. <em class="gesperrt">Ἀποστάντων δὲ τῶν Μαντινέων</em>, -καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Πελοπόννησος ἐς θροῦν καθίστατο ὡς καὶ σφίσι ποιητέον -τοῦτο, νομίζοντες πλέον τέ τι εἰδότας μεταστῆναι αὐτοὺς, καὶ τοὺς -Λακεδαιμονίους ἅμα δι’ ὀργῆς ἔχοντες, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_25"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_25">[25]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 30. Κορίνθιοι δὲ παρόντων σφίσι τῶν -ξυμμάχων, ὅσοι οὐδ’ αὐτοὶ ἐδέξαντο τὰς σπονδάς (παρεκάλεσαν δὲ αὐτοὺς -αὐτοὶ πρότερον) ἀντέλεγον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, <em class="gesperrt">ἃ μὲν ἠδικοῦντο, οὐ -δηλοῦντες ἄντικρυς</em>, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_26"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_26">[26]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 30.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_27"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_27">[27]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 31. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ καὶ Μεγαρῆς τὸ αὐτὸ λέγοντες -ἡσύχαζον, <em class="gesperrt">περιορώμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων</em>, καὶ νομίζοντες -σφίσι τὴν Ἀργείων δημοκρατίαν αὐτοῖς ὀλιγαρχουμένοις ἧσσον ξύμφορον -εἶναι τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας. -</p> -<p> -These words, περιορώμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, are not clear, and -have occasioned much embarrassment to the commentators, as well as -some propositions for altering the text. It would undoubtedly be -an improvement in the sense, if we were permitted (with Dobree) to -strike out the words ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων as a gloss, and thus to -construe περιορώμενοι as a middle verb, “waiting to see the event,” -or literally, “keeping a look-out about them.” But taking the text -as it now stands, the sense which I have given to it seems the best -which can be elicited. -</p> -<p> -Most of the critics translate περιορώμενοι “slighted or despised by -the Lacedæmonians.” But in the first place, this is not true as a -matter of fact: in the next place, if it were true, we ought to have -an adversative conjunction instead of καὶ before νομίζοντες, since -the tendency of the two motives indicated would then be in opposite -directions. “The Bœotians, though despised by the Lacedæmonians, -still thought a junction with the Argeian democracy dangerous.” And -this is the sense which Haack actually proposes, though it does great -violence to the word καὶ. -</p> -<p> -Dr. Thirlwall and Dr. Arnold translate περιορώμενοι “feeling -themselves slighted;” and the latter says, “The Bœotians and -Megarians took neither side; not the Lacedæmonian, for they felt that -the Lacedæmonians had slighted them; not the Argive, for they thought -that the Argive democracy would suit them less than the constitution -of Sparta.” But this again puts an inadmissible meaning on ἡσύχαζον, -which means “stood as they were.” The Bœotians were not called upon -to choose between two sides or two positive schemes of action: they -were invited to ally themselves with Argos, and this they decline -doing: they prefer to <i>remain as they are</i>, allies of Lacedæmon, -but refusing to become parties to the peace. Moreover, in the -sense proposed by Dr. Arnold, we should surely find an adversative -conjunction in place of καὶ. -</p> -<p> -I submit that the word περιορᾶν does not necessarily mean “to slight -or despise,” but sometimes “to leave alone, to take no notice of, to -abstain from interfering.” Thus, Thucyd. i, 24. Ἐπιδάμνιοι—πέμπουσιν -ἐς τὴν Κερκύραν πρέσβεις—δεόμενοι μὴ σφᾶς <em class="gesperrt">περιορᾶν</em> -φθειρομένους, etc. Again, i, 69, καὶ νῦν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οὐχ ἑκάς ἀλλ’ -ἐγγὺς ὄντας <em class="gesperrt">περιορᾶτε</em>, etc. The same is the sense of περιϊδεῖν -and περιόψεσθαι, ii, 20. In all these passages there is no idea of -<i>contempt</i> implied in the word: the “leaving alone” or “abstaining -from interference,” proceeds from feelings quite different from -contempt. -</p> -<p> -So in the passage here before us, περιορώμενοι seems the <i>passive</i> -participle in this sense. Thucydidês, having just described an -energetic remonstrance sent by the Spartans to prevent Corinth from -joining Argos, means to intimate (by the words here in discussion) -that <i>no</i> similar <i>interference</i> was resorted to by them to -prevent the Bœotians and Megarians from joining her: “The Bœotians -and Megarians remained as they were, <i>left to themselves by the -Lacedæmonians</i>, and thinking the Argeian democracy less suitable to -them than the oligarchy of Sparta.”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_28"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_28">[28]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 31. Καὶ μέχρι τοῦ -Ἀττικοῦ πολέμου ἀπέφερον· ἔπειτα παυσαμένων διὰ πρόφασιν τοῦ πολέμου, -οἱ Ἠλεῖοι ἐπηνάγκαζον, οἱ δ’ ἐτράποντο πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους.</p> - -<p>For the <i>agreement</i> here alluded to, see a few lines forward.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_29"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_29">[29]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 31. τὴν ξυνθήκην προφέροντες ἐν ᾗ εἴρητο, ἃ -ἔχοντες ἐς τὸν Ἀττικὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντό τινες, ταῦτα ἔχοντας καὶ -ἐξελθεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἴσον ἔχοντες ἀφίστανται, etc. -</p> -<p> -Of the agreement here alluded to among the members of the -Peloponnesian confederacy, we hear only in this one passage. It was -extremely important to such of the confederates as were imperial -cities; that is, which had subordinates or subject-allies. -</p> -<p> -Poppo and Bloomfield wonder that the Corinthians did not appeal to -this agreement in order to procure the restitution of Sollium and -Anaktorium. But they misconceive the scope of the agreement, which -did not relate to captures made during the war by the common enemy. -It would be useless for the confederacy to enter into a formal -agreement that none of the members should lose anything through -capture made by the enemy. This would be a question of superiority -of force, for no agreement could bind the enemy. But the confederacy -might very well make a covenant among themselves, as to the relations -between their own imperial <i>immediate</i> members, and the <i>mediate</i> -or subordinate dependencies of each. Each imperial state consented -to forego the tribute or services of its dependency, so long as the -latter was called upon to lend its aid in the general effort of the -confederacy against the common enemy. But the confederacy at the -same time gave its guarantee, that the imperial state should reënter -upon these suspended rights, so soon as the war should be at an end. -This guarantee was clearly violated by Sparta in the case of Elis -and Lepreum. On the contrary, in the case of Mantineia, mentioned a -few pages back, p. 19, the Mantineians had violated the maxim of the -confederacy, and Sparta was justified in interfering at the request -of their subjects to maintain the autonomy of the latter.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_30"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_30">[30]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 32. Κορινθίοις δὲ ἀνακωχὴ ἄσπονδος ἦν πρὸς -Ἀθηναίους. -</p> -<p> -Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks: “By ἄσπονδος is meant a mere agreement -in words, not ratified by the solemnities of religion. And the -Greeks, as we have seen, considered the breach of their word very -different from the breach of their oath.” -</p> -<p> -Not so much is here meant even as that which Dr. Arnold supposes. -There was no agreement at all, either in words or by oath. There was -a simple absence of hostilities, <i>de facto</i>, not arising out of any -recognized pledge. Such is the meaning of ἀνακωχὴ, i, 66; iii, 25, 26. -</p> -<p> -The answer here made by the Athenians to the application of Corinth -is not easy to understand. They might, with much better reason, have -declined to conclude the ten day’s armistice with the <i>Bœotians</i>, -because these latter still remained allies of Sparta, though refusing -to accede to the general peace; whereas the Corinthians, having -joined Argos, had less right to be considered allies of Sparta. -Nevertheless, we shall still find them attending the meetings at -Sparta, and acting as allies of the latter.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_31"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_31">[31]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 33, 34. The Neodamodes were Helots -previously enfranchised, or the sons of such.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_32"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_32">[32]</a></span> Thucyd. iv, 80.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_33"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_33">[33]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 34. Ἀτίμους ἐποίησαν, ἀτιμίαν δὲ τοιαύτην, -ὥστε μήτε ἄρχειν, μήτε πριαμένους τι, ἢ πωλοῦντας, κυρίους εἶναι.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_34"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_34">[34]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 32.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_35"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_35">[35]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 35-39. I agree with Dr. Thirlwall and Dr. -Arnold in preferring the conjecture of Poppo, Χαλκιδῆς, in this -place.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_36"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_36">[36]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 36.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_37"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_37">[37]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 37. ἐπεσταλμένοι ἀπό τε τοῦ Κλεοβούλου καὶ -Ξενάρους καὶ ὅσοι φίλοι ἦσαν αὐτοῖς, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_38"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_38">[38]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 36.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_39"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_39">[39]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 38. οἰόμενοι τὴν βουλὴν, κἂν μὴ εἴπωσιν, οὐκ -ἄλλα ψηφιεῖσθαι ἢ ἃ σφίσι προδιαγνόντες παραινοῦσιν ... ταῖς τέσσαρσι -βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν, αἵπερ ἅπαν τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσι.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_40"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_40">[40]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 38.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_41"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_41">[41]</a></span> See Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. ii, -ch. xvii, p. 370.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_42"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_42">[42]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_43"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_43">[43]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 41. Τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον -ἐδόκει μωρία εἶναι ταῦτα· ἔπειτα (ἐπεθύμουν γὰρ τὸ Ἄργος πάντως -φίλιον ἔχειν) ξυνεχώρησαν ἐφ’ οἷς ἠξίουν, καὶ ξυνεγράψαντο. -</p> -<p> -By the forms of treaty which remain, we are led to infer that the -treaty was not subscribed by any signatures, but drawn up by the -secretary or authorized officer, and ultimately engraved on a column. -The names of those who take the oath are recorded, but seemingly no -official signature.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_44"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_44">[44]</a></span> Thucyd. v. 42.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_45"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_45">[45]</a></span> Thucyd. v. 42.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_46"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_46">[46]</a></span> Thucyd. v. 43. Ἀλκιβιάδης ... ἀνὴρ ἡλικίᾳ μὲν ὢν ἔτι -τότε νέος, ὡς ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει, ἀξιώματι δὲ προγόνων τιμώμενος. -</p> -<p> -The expression cf Plutarch, however, ἔτι μειράκιον, seems an -exaggeration (Alkibiad. c. 10). -</p> -<p> -Kritias and Chariklês, in reply to the question of Sokratês, whom -they had forbidden to converse with or teach young men, defined a -<i>young man</i> to be one under thirty years of age, the senatorial age -at Athens (Xenophon, Memor. i. 2. 35).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_47"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_47">[47]</a></span> Plato, Protagoras, c. 10, p. 320; Plutarch, Alkibiad. -c. 2, 3, 4; Isokratês, De Bigis, Orat. xvi, p. 353, sect. 33, 34; -Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_48"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_48">[48]</a></span> Πέπονθα δὲ πρὸς τοῦτον (Σωκράτη) μόνον ἀνθρώπων, <em class="gesperrt">ὃ -οὐκ ἄν τις οἴοιτο ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐνεῖναι, τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι ὁντινοῦν</em>. -</p> -<p> -This is a part of the language which Plato puts into the mouth -of Alkibiadês, in the Symposion, c. 32, p. 216; see also Plato, -Alkibiad. i, c. 1, 2, 3. -</p> -<p> -Compare his other contemporary, Xenophon, Memor. i, 2, 16-25. -</p> -<p> -Φύσει δὲ πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ μεγάλων πάθων ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ φιλόνεικον -ἰσχυρότατον ἦν καὶ τὸ φιλόπρωτον, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστι τοῖς παιδικοῖς -ὑπομνήμασι (Plutarch, Alkib. c. 2).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_49"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_49">[49]</a></span> I translate, with some diminution of the force of the -words, the expression of a contemporary author, Xenophon, Memorab. i, -2. 24. Ἀλκιβιάδης δ’ αὖ διὰ μὲν κάλλος ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν γυναικῶν -<em class="gesperrt">θηρώμενος</em>, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_50"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_50">[50]</a></span> Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, c. 49; Thucyd. vi, 16; -Antipho apud Athenæum, xii, p. 525.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_51"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_51">[51]</a></span> Athenæus, ix, p. 407.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_52"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_52">[52]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 15. I translate the expression of -Thucydidês, which is of great force and significance—φοβηθέντες -γὰρ αὐτοῦ οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα -<em class="gesperrt">παρανομίας</em> ἐς τὴν δίαιταν, etc. The same word is repeated -by the historian, vi, 28. τὴν ἄλλην αὐτοῦ ἐς τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ -δημοτικὴν <em class="gesperrt">παρανομίαν</em>. -</p> -<p> -The same phrase is also found in the short extract from the λοιδορία -of Antipho (Athenæus, xii, p. 525). -</p> -<p> -The description of Alkibiadês, given in that Discourse called the -Ἐρωτικὸς Λόγος, erroneously ascribed to Demosthenês (c. 12, p. -1414), is more discriminating than we commonly find in rhetorical -compositions. Τοῦτο δ’, Ἀλκιβιάδην εὑρήσεις φύσει μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν -πολλῷ χεῖρον διακείμενον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπερηφάνως, τὰ δὲ ταπεινῶς, τὰ -δ’ ὑπεράκρως, ζῆν προῃρημένον· ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς Σωκράτους ὁμιλίας πολλὰ -μὲν ἐπανορθωθέντα τοῦ βίου, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων -ἐπικρυψάμενον. -</p> -<p> -Of the three epithets, whereby the author describes the bad -tendencies of Alkibiadês, full illustrations will be seen in his -proceedings, hereafter to be described. The improving influence here -ascribed to Sokratês is unfortunately far less borne out.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_53"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_53">[53]</a></span> Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 4; Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. -2; Plato, Protagoras, c. 1. -</p> -<p> -I do not know how far the memorable narrative ascribed to Alkibiadês -in the Symposium of Plato (c. 33, 34, pp. 216, 217) can be -regarded as matter of actual fact and history, so far as Sokratês -is concerned; but it is abundant proof in regard to the general -relations of Alkibiadês with others: compare Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, -29, 30; iv. 1-2. -</p> -<p> -Several of the dialogues of Plato present to us striking pictures of -the palæstra, with the boys, the young men, the gymnastic teachers, -engaged in their exercises or resting from them, and the philosophers -and spectators who came there for amusement and conversation. See -particularly the opening chapters of the Lysis and the Charmidês; -also the Rivales, where the scene is laid in the house of a -γραμματιστὴς, or schoolmaster. In the Lysis, Sokratês professes to -set his own conversation with these interesting youths as an antidote -to the corrupting flatteries of most of those who sought to gain -their good-will. Οὕτω χρὴ, ὦ Ἱππόθαλες, τοῖς παιδικοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, -ταπεινοῦντα καὶ συστέλλοντα, ἀλλὰ μὴ, ὥσπερ σὺ, χαυνοῦντα καὶ -διαθρύπτοντα (Lysis, c. 7, p. 210). -</p> -<p> -See, in illustration of what is here said about Alkibiadês as a -youth, Euripid. Supplic. 906 (about Parthenopæus), and the beautiful -lines in the Atys of Catullus, 60-69. -</p> -<p> -There cannot be a doubt that the characters of all the Greek youth -of any pretensions were considerably affected by this society and -conversation of their boyish years; though the subject is one upon -which the full evidence cannot well be produced and discussed.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_54"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_54">[54]</a></span> Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 10.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_55"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_55">[55]</a></span> See the description in the Protagoras of Plato, c. 8, -p. 317.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_56"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_56">[56]</a></span> See Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 12-24, 39-47. -</p> -<p> -Κριτίας μὲν καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης, οὐκ ἀρέσκοντος αὐτοῖς Σωκράτους -ὡμιλησάτην, ὃν χρόνον ὡμιλείτην αὐτῷ, ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὡρμηκότε -προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως. Ἔτι γὰρ Σωκράτει ξυνόντες οὐκ ἄλλοις -τισὶ μᾶλλον ἐπεχείρουν διαλέγεσθαι ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα πράττουσι τὰ -πολιτικά.... Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τάχιστα τῶν πολιτευομένων ὑπέλαβον -κρείττονες εἶναι, Σωκράτει μὲν οὐκ ἔτι προσῄεσαν, οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς -ἄλλως ἤρεσκεν· εἴτε προσέλθοιεν, ὑπὲρ ὧν, ἡμάρτανον ἐλεγχόμενοι -ἤχθοντο· τὰ δὲ τῆς πóλεως ἔπραττον, ὧνπερ ἕνεκεν καὶ Σωκράτει -προσῆλθον. Compare Plato, Apolog. Sokrat. c. 10, p. 23; c. 22, p. 33. -</p> -<p> -Xenophon represents Alkibiadês and Kritias as frequenting the society -of Sokratês, for the same reason and with the same objects as Plato -affirms that young men generally went to the Sophists: see Plato, -Sophist. c. 20, p. 232 D. -</p> -<p> -“Nam et Socrati (observes Quintilian, Inst. Or. ii, 16) objiciunt -comici, docere cum, quomodo pejorem causam meliorem reddat; et contra -Tisiam et Gorgiam similia dicit polliceri Plato.” -</p> -<p> -The representation given by Plato of the great influence acquired by -Sokratês over Alkibiadês, and of the deference and submission of the -latter, is plainly not to be taken as historical, even if we had not -the more simple and trustworthy picture of Xenophon. Isokratês goes -so far as to say that Sokratês was never known by any one as teacher -of Alkibiadês: which is an exaggeration in the other direction. -Isokratês, Busiris, Or. xi. sect. 6, p. 222.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_57"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_57">[57]</a></span> Plato, Symposium, c. 35-36, p. 220, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_58"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_58">[58]</a></span> See the representation, given in the Protagoras of -Plato, of the temper in which the young and wealthy Hippokratês -goes to seek instruction from Protagoras, and of the objects which -Protagoras proposes to himself in imparting the instruction. Plato, -Protagoras, c. 2, p. 310 D.; c. 8, p. 316 C.; c. 9, p. 318, etc.: -compare also Plato, Meno. p. 91, and Gorgias, c. 4. p. 449 E., -asserting the connection, in the mind of Gorgias, between teaching to -speak and teaching to think—λέγειν καὶ φρονεῖν, etc. -</p> -<p> -It would not be reasonable to repeat, as true and just, all the -polemical charges against those who are called Sophists, even as we -find them in Plato, without scrutiny and consideration. But modern -writers on Grecian affairs run down the Sophists even more than Plato -did, and take no notice of the admissions in their favor which he, -though their opponent, is perpetually making. -</p> -<p> -This is a very extensive subject, to which I hope to revert.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_59"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_59">[59]</a></span> I dissent entirely from the judgment of Dr. Thirlwall, -who repeats what is the usual representation of Sokratês and the -Sophists, depicting Alkibiadês as “ensnared by the Sophists,” while -Sokratês is described as a good genius preserving him from their -corruptions (Hist. of Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, pp. 312, 313, 314). -I think him also mistaken when he distinguishes so pointedly Sokratês -from the Sophists; when he describes the Sophists as “pretenders -to wisdom;” as “a new school;” as “teaching that there was no real -difference between truth and falsehood, right and wrong,” etc. -</p> -<p> -All the plausibility that there is in this representation, arises -from a confusion between the original sense and the modern sense of -the word Sophist; the latter seemingly first bestowed upon the word -by Plato and Aristotle. In the common ancient acceptation of the -word at Athens, it meant not a <i>school</i> of persons professing common -doctrines, but a <i>class</i> of men bearing the same name, because they -derived their celebrity from analogous objects of study and common -intellectual occupation. The Sophists were men of similar calling -and pursuits, partly speculative, partly professional; but they -differed widely from each other, both in method and doctrine. (See -for example Isokratês, cont. Sophistas, Orat. xiii; Plato, Meno. -p. 87 B.) Whoever made himself eminent in speculative pursuits, -and communicated his opinions by public lecture, discussion, or -conversation, was called a Sophist, whatever might be the conclusions -which he sought to expound or defend. The difference between taking -money, and expounding gratuitously, on which Sokratês himself was so -fond of dwelling (Xenoph. Memor. i, 6, 12), has plainly no essential -bearing on the case. When Æschinês the orator reminds the dikasts, -“Recollect that you Athenians put to death <i>the Sophist Sokratês</i>, -because he was shown to have been the teacher of Kritias,” (Æschin. -cont. Timarch. c. 34, p. 74,) he uses the word in its natural and -true Athenian sense. He had no point to make against Sokratês, who -had then been dead more than forty years; but he describes him by his -profession or occupation, just as he would have said, <i>Hippokratês -the physician</i>, <i>Pheidias the sculptor</i>, etc. Dionysius of Halikarn. -calls both Plato and Isokratês sophists (Ars Rhetor. De Compos. -Verborum, p. 208 R.). The Nubes of Aristophanês, and the defences put -forth by Plato and Xenophon, show that Sokratês was not only called -by the name Sophist, but regarded just in the same light as that in -which Dr. Thirlwall presents to us what he calls “the new School -of the Sophists;” as “a corruptor of youth, indifferent to truth -or falsehood, right or wrong,” etc. See a striking passage in the -Politicus of Plato, c. 38, p. 299 B. Whoever thinks, as I think, that -these accusations were falsely advanced against Sokratês, will be -careful how he advances them against the general profession to which -Sokratês belonged. -</p> -<p> -That there were unprincipled and immoral men among the class of -Sophists—as there are and always have been among schoolmasters, -professors, lawyers, etc., and all bodies of men—I do not doubt; in -what proportion, we cannot determine. But the extreme hardship of -passing a sweeping condemnation on the great body of intellectual -teachers at Athens, and canonizing exclusively Sokratês and his -followers, will be felt, when we recollect that the well-known -Apologue, called the <i>Choice of Hercules</i>, was the work of the -Sophist Prodikus, and his favorite theme of lecture (Xenophon, Memor. -ii, 1, 21-34). To this day, that Apologue remains without a superior, -for the impressive simplicity with which it presents one of the -most important points of view of moral obligation: and it has been -embodied in a greater number of books of elementary morality than -anything of Sokratês, Plato, or Xenophon. To treat the author of that -Apologue, and the class to which he belonged, as teaching “that there -was no real difference between right and wrong, truth and falsehood,” -etc., is a criticism not in harmony with the just and liberal tone of -Dr. Thirlwall’s history. -</p> -<p> -I will add that Plato himself, in a very important passage of -the Republic (vi, c. 6, 7, pp. 492-493), refutes the imputation -against the Sophists of being specially the corruptors of youth. -He represents them as inculcating upon their youthful pupils that -morality which was received as true and just in their age and -society; nothing better, nothing worse. The grand corruptor, he -says, is society itself; the Sophists merely repeat the voice and -judgment of society. Without inquiring at present how far Plato or -Sokratês were right in condemning the received morality of their -countrymen, I most fully accept his assertion that the great body of -the contemporary professional teachers taught what was considered -good morality among the Athenian public: there were doubtless some -who taught a better morality, others who taught a worse. And this may -be said with equal truth of the great body of professional teachers -in every age and nation. -</p> -<p> -Xenophon enumerates various causes to which he ascribes the -corruption of the character of Alkibiadês; wealth, rank, personal -beauty, flatterers, etc.; but he does not name the Sophists among -them (Memorab. i, 2. 24, 25).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_60"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_60">[60]</a></span> Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 1; -Satyrus apud Athenæum, xii, p. 534; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 23. -</p> -<p> -Οὗ γὰρ τοιούτων δεῖ, τοιοῦτος εἰμ’ ἐγώ, says Odysseus, in the -Philoktêtês of Sophoklês.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_61"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_61">[61]</a></span> I follow the criticism which Plutarch cites from -Theophrastus, seemingly discriminating and measured: much more -trustworthy than the vague eulogy of Nepos, or even of Demosthenês -(of course not from his own knowledge), upon the eloquence of -Alkibiadês (Plutarch, Alkib. c. 10); Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. -Præcept. c. 8, p. 804. -</p> -<p> -Antisthenês, companion and pupil of Sokratês, and originator of -what is called the Cynic philosophy, contemporary and personally -acquainted with Alkibiadês, was full of admiration for his extreme -personal beauty, and pronounced him to be strong, manly, and -audacious, but unschooled, <em class="gesperrt">ἀπαίδευτον</em>. His scandals about the -lawless life of Alkibiadês, however, exceed what we can reasonably -admit, even from a contemporary (Antisthenês ap. Athenæum, v, p. 220, -xii, p. 534). Antisthenês had composed a dialogue called Alkibiadês -(Diog. Laërt. vi, 15). -</p> -<p> -See the collection of the Fragmenta Antisthenis (by A. G. -Winckelmann, Zurich, 1842, pp. 17-19). -</p> -<p> -The comic writers of the day—Eupolis, Aristophanês, Pherekratês, and -others—seem to have been abundant in their jests and libels against -the excesses of Alkibiadês, real or supposed. There was a tale, -untrue, but current in comic tradition, that Alkibiadês, who was not -a man to suffer himself to be insulted with impunity, had drowned -Eupolis in the sea, in revenge, for his comedy of the Baptæ. See -Meineke, Fragm. Com. Græ. Eupolidis Βάπται and Κόλακες (vol. ii, pp. -447-494), and Aristophanês Τριφαλῆς, p. 1166: also Meineke’s first -volume, Historia Critica Comic. Græc. pp. 124-136; and the Dissertat. -xix, in Buttmann’s <i>Mythologus</i>, on the Baptæ and the Cotyttia.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_62"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_62">[62]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 15. Compare Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præc. c. -4, p. 800. The sketch which Plato draws in the first three chapters -of the ninth Book of the Republic, of the citizen who erects himself -into a despot and enslaves his fellow-citizens, exactly suits the -character of Alkibiadês. See also the same treatise, vi, 6-8, pp. -491-494, and the preface of Schleiermacher to his translation of the -Platonic dialogue called Alkibiadês the first.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_63"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_63">[63]</a></span> Aristophan. Ranæ, 1445-1453; Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. -16; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 9.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_64"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_64">[64]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 43, vi, 90; Isokratês, De Bigis, Or. xvi, p. -352, sect. 27-30. -</p> -<p> -Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 14) carelessly represents Alkibiadês as being -actually proxenus of Sparta at Athens.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_65"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_65">[65]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 43. Οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήματι φιλονεικῶν -ἠναντιοῦτο, ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι διὰ Νικίου καὶ Λάχητος ἔπραξαν τὰς -σπονδὰς, αὐτὸν διὰ τὴν νεότητα ὑπεριδόντες καὶ κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν -προξενίαν ποτὲ οὖσαν οὐ τιμήσαντες, ἣν τοῦ πάππου ἀπειπόντος αὐτὸς -τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους θεραπεύων διενοεῖτο ἀνανεώσασθαι. -<em class="gesperrt">Πανταχόθεν τε νομίζων ἐλασσοῦσθαι</em> τό τε πρῶτον ἀντεῖπεν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_66"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_66">[66]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 43.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_67"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_67">[67]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 48.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_68"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_68">[68]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 44. Ἀφίκοντο δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις -<em class="gesperrt">κατὰ τάχος</em>, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_69"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_69">[69]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 6. Ἐνδίῳ τῷ ἐφορεύοντι πατρικὸς ἐς τὰ -μάλιστα φίλος—ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα Λακωνικὸν ἡ οἰκία αὐτῶν κατὰ τὴν -ξενίαν ἔσχεν· Ἔνδιος γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐκαλεῖτο. -</p> -<p> -I incline to suspect, from this passage, that the father of Endius -was not named Alkibiadês, but that Endius himself was nevertheless -named Ἔνδιος Ἀλκιβιάδου, in consequence of the peculiar intimacy of -connection with the Athenian family in which that name occurred. If -the father of Endius was really named Alkibiadês, Endius himself -would naturally, pursuant to general custom, be styled Ἔνδιος -Ἀλκιβιάδου: there would be nothing in this denomination to call for -the particular remark of Thucydidês. But according to the view of -the Scholiast and most commentators, all that Thucydidês wishes to -explain here is, how the father of Endius came to receive the name of -Alkibiadês. Now if he had meant this, he surely would not have used -the terms which we read: the circumstance to be explained would then -have reference to the father of Endius, not to Endius himself, nor to -the family generally. His words imply that the family, that is, each -successive individual of the family, derived his Laconian designation -(not from the name of his father, but) from his intimate connection -of hospitality with the Athenian family of Alkibiadês. Each -successive individual attached to his own personal name the genitive -case Ἀλκιβιάδου, instead of the genitive of his real father’s name. -Doubtless this was an anomaly in Grecian practice; but on the present -occasion, we are to expect something anomalous; had it not been such, -Thucydidês would not have stepped aside to particularize it.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_70"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_70">[70]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 45. Μηχανᾶται δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοῖονδέ τι ὁ -Ἀλκιβιάδης· τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους πείθει, <em class="gesperrt">πίστιν αὐτοῖς δοὺς</em>, -ἢν μὴ ὁμολογήσωσιν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ αὐτοκράτορες ἥκειν, Πύλον τε αὐτοῖς -ἀποδώσειν (<em class="gesperrt">πείσειν γὰρ αὐτὸς Ἀθηναίους</em>, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν -ἀντιλέγειν) καὶ τἄλλα ξυναλλάξειν. Βουλόμενος δὲ αὐτοὺς Νικίου τε -ἀποστῆσαι ταῦτα ἔπραττε, καὶ ὅπως <em class="gesperrt">ἐν τῷ δήμῳ διαβαλὼν αὐτοὺς -ὡς οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς ἐν νῷ ἔχουσιν, οὐδὲ λέγουσιν οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ, τοὺς -Ἀργείους ξυμμάχους ποιήσῃ</em>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_71"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_71">[71]</a></span> Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 14). Ταῦτα δ’ εἰπὼν <em class="gesperrt">ὅρκους -ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς</em>, καὶ μετέστησεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Νικίου παντάπασι -πιστεύοντας αὐτῷ, καὶ <em class="gesperrt">θαυμάζοντας ἅμα τὴν δεινότητα καὶ -σύνεσιν</em>, ὡς οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀνδρὸς οὖσαν. Again, Plutarch, -Nikias, c. 10.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_72"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_72">[72]</a></span> Plutarch, Alkib. c. 14. Ἐρωτώμενοι δ’ ὑπὸ τοῦ -Ἀλκιβιάδου <em class="gesperrt">πάνυ φιλανθρώπως</em>, ἐφ’ οἷς ἀφιγμένοι τυγχάνουσιν, -οὐκ ἔφασαν ἥκειν αὐτοκράτορες.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_73"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_73">[73]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 45. Οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ἠνείχοντο, -ἀλλὰ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου <em class="gesperrt">πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον καταβοῶντος τῶν -Λακεδαιμονίων</em>, ἐσήκουόν τε καὶ ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐθὺς παραγαγεῖν τοὺς -Ἀργείους, etc. -</p> -<p> -Compare Plutarch, Alkib. c. 14; and Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_74"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_74">[74]</a></span> Euripid. Andromach. 445-455; Herodot. ix, 54.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_75"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_75">[75]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 46.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_76"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_76">[76]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 46; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_77"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_77">[77]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 47. ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν -ἄρχουσιν ἑκάτεροι.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_78"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_78">[78]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 48. καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων <em class="gesperrt">ὧν ἂν ἄρχουσιν</em> -ἕκαστοι. The tense and phrase here deserve notice, as contrasted -with the phrase in the former part of the treaty—τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν -<em class="gesperrt">ἄρχουσιν</em> ἑκάτεροι. -</p> -<p> -The clause imposing actual obligation to hinder the passage of -troops, required to be left open for application to the actual time.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_79"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_79">[79]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 47.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_80"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_80">[80]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 48.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_81"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_81">[81]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 48-50.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_82"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_82">[82]</a></span> Καταθέντων δὲ καὶ Ὀλυμπίασι στήλην χαλκῆν κοινῇ -<em class="gesperrt">Ὀλυμπίοις τοῖς νυνί</em> (Thucyd. v, 47), words of the treaty.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_83"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_83">[83]</a></span> Dorieus of Rhodes was victor in the Pankration, both in -Olymp. 88 and 89, (428-424 <small>B.C.</small>). Rhodes was included among -the tributary allies of Athens. But the athletes who came to contend -were privileged and (as it were) sacred persons, who were never -molested or hindered from coming to the festival, if they chose to -come, under any state of war. Their inviolability was never disturbed -even down to the harsh proceeding of Aratus (Plutarch, Aratus, c. 28). -</p> -<p> -But this does not prove that Rhodian visitors generally, or a Rhodian -theôry, could have come to Olympia between 431-421 in safety. -</p> -<p> -From the presence of individuals, even as spectators, little can -be inferred: because, even at this very Olympic festival of 420 -<small>B.C.</small>, Lichas the Spartan was present as a spectator, though -all Lacedæmonians were formally excluded by proclamation of the -Eleians (Thucyd. v, 50).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_84"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_84">[84]</a></span> Of the taste and elegance with which these exhibitions -were usually got up in Athens, surpassing generally every other city -in Greece, see a remarkable testimony in Xenophon, Memorabil. iii, 3, -12.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_85"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_85">[85]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 16. Οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες καὶ ὑπὲρ δύναμιν μείζω -ἡμῶν τὴν πόλιν ἐνόμισαν τῷ ἐμῷ διαπρεπεῖ τῆς Ὀλυμπίαζε θεωρίας, -<em class="gesperrt">πρότερον ἐλπίζοντες αὐτὴν καταπεπολεμῆσθαι</em>· διότι ἅρματα μὲν -ἑπτὰ καθῆκα, ὅσα οὐδείς πω ἰδιώτης πρότερον, ἐνίκησά τε, καὶ δεύτερος -καὶ τέταρτος ἐγενόμην, καὶ τἄλλα ἀξίως τῆς νίκης παρεσκευασάμην. -</p> -<p> -The full force of this grandiose display cannot be felt unless we -bring to our minds the special position both of Athens and the -Athenian allies towards Olympia,—and of Alkibiadês himself towards -Athens, Argos, and the rest of Greece,—in the first half of the year -420 <small>B.C.</small> -</p> -<p> -Alkibiadês obtained from Euripidês the honor of an epinikian ode, -or song of triumph, to celebrate this event; of which a few lines -are preserved by Plutarch (Alkib. c. 11). It is curious that the -poet alleges Alkibiadês to have been first, second, and <i>third</i>, -in the course; while Alkibiadês himself, more modest and doubtless -more exact, pretends only to first, second, and <i>fourth</i>. Euripidês -informs us that Alkibiadês was crowned twice and proclaimed twice—δὶς -στεφθέντ’ ἐλαίᾳ κάρυκι βοᾷν παραδοῦναι. Reiske, Coray, and Schäfer, -have thought it right to alter this word δὶς to τρὶς, without any -authority, which completely alters the asserted fact. Sintenis in his -edition of Plutarch has properly restored the word δὶς. -</p> -<p> -How long the recollection of this famous Olympic festival remained -in the Athenian public mind, is attested partly by the Oratio de -Bigis of Isokratês, composed in defence of the son of Alkibiadês at -least twenty-five years afterwards, perhaps more. Isokratês repeats -the loose assertion of Euripidês, πρῶτος, δεύτερος, and τρίτος (Or. -xvi, p. 353, sect. 40). The spurious Oration called that of Andokidês -against Alkibiadês also preserves many of the current tales, some of -which I have admitted into the text, because I think them probable -in themselves, and because that oration itself may reasonably be -believed to be a composition of the middle of the fourth century -B.C. That oration puts all the proceedings of Alkibiadês in a -very invidious temper and with palpable exaggeration. The story -of Alkibiadês having robbed an Athenian named Diomêdês of a fine -chariot, appears to be a sort of variation on the story about Tisias, -which figures in the oration of Isokratês; see Andokid. cont. Alkib. -sect. 26: possibly Alkibiadês may have left one of the teams not paid -for. The aid lent to Alkibiadês by the Chians, Ephesians, etc., as -described in that oration, is likely to be substantially true, and -may easily be explained. Compare Athenæ. i, p. 3. -</p> -<p> -Our information about the arrangements of the chariot-racing at -Olympia is very imperfect. We do not distinctly know how the seven -chariots of Alkibiadês ran,—in how many races,—for all the seven -could not, in my judgment, have run in one and the same race. There -must have been many other chariots to run, belonging to other -competitors: and it seems difficult to believe that ever a greater -number than ten can have run in the same race, since the course -involved going <i>twelve</i> times round the goal (Pindar, Ol. iii, -33; vi, 75). Ten competing chariots run in the race described by -Sophoklês (Electr. 708), and if we could venture to construe strictly -the expression of the poet,—<em class="gesperrt">δέκατον ἐκπληρῶν</em> ὄχον,—it would -seem that ten was the extreme number permitted to run. Even so great -a number as ten was replete with danger to the persons engaged, -as may be seen by reading the description in Sophoklês (compare -Demosth. Ἐρωτ. Λογ. p. 1410), who refers indeed to a Pythian and -not an Olympic solemnity: but the main circumstances must have been -common to both; and we know that the twelve turns (δωδεκάγναμπτον -δωδεκάδρομον) <i>were</i> common to both (Pindar, Pyth. v, 31). -</p> -<p> -Alkibiadês was not the only person who gained a chariot victory at -this 90th Olympiad, 420 <small>B.C.</small> Lichas the Lacedæmonian also -gained one (Thucyd. v, 50), though the chariot was obliged to be -entered in another name, since the Lacedæmonians were interdicted -from attendance. -</p> -<p> -Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. of Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 316) says: “We -are not aware that the Olympiad, in which these chariot-victories of -Alkibiadês were gained, can be distinctly fixed. But it was probably -Olymp. 89, <small>B.C.</small> 424.” -</p> -<p> -In my judgment, both Olymp. 88 (<small>B.C.</small> 428) and Olymp. 89 -(<small>B.C.</small> 424) are excluded from the possible supposition, by -the fact that the general war was raging at both periods. To suppose -that in the midst of the summer of these two fighting years, there -was an Olympic truce for a month, allowing Athens and her allies to -send thither their solemn legations, their chariots for competition, -and their numerous individual visitors, appears to me contrary to -all probability. The Olympic month of <small>B.C.</small> 424, would occur -just about the time when Brasidas was at the Isthmus levying troops -for his intended expedition to Thrace, and when he rescued Megara -from the Athenian attack. This would not be a very quiet time for -the peaceable Athenian visitors, with the costly display of gold and -silver plate and the ostentatious theôry, to pass by, on its way to -Olympia. During the time when the Spartans occupied Dekeleia, the -solemn processions of communicants at the Eleusinian mysteries could -never march along the Sacred Way from Athens to Eleusis. Xen. Hell. -i, 4, 20. -</p> -<p> -Moreover, we see that the very first article both of the Truce for -one year and of the Peace of Nikias, expressly stipulate for liberty -to all to attend the common temples and festivals. The first of the -two relates to Delphi expressly: the second is general, and embraces -Olympia as well as Delphi. If the Athenians had visited Olympia in -428 or 424 <small>B.C.</small> without impediment, these stipulations in -the treaties would have no purpose nor meaning. But the fact of their -standing in the front of the treaty, proves that they were looked -upon as of much interest and importance. -</p> -<p> -I have placed the Olympic festival wherein Alkibiadês contended -with his seven chariots, in 420 <small>B.C.</small>, in the peace, but -immediately after the war. No other festival appears to me at all -suitable. -</p> -<p> -Dr. Thirlwall farther assumes, as a matter of course, that there was -only <i>one</i> chariot-race at this Olympic festival, that all the seven -chariots of Alkibiadês ran in this one race, and that in the festival -of 420 <small>B.C.</small>, Lichas gained <i>the</i> prize: thus implying that -Alkibiadês could not have gained the prize at the same festival. -</p> -<p> -I am not aware that there is any evidence to prove either of these -three propositions. To me they all appear improbable and unfounded. -</p> -<p> -We know from Pausanias (vi, 13, 2) that even in the case of the -stadiodromi, or runners who contended in the stadium, all were not -brought out in one race. They were distributed into sets, or batches, -of what number we know not. Each set ran its own heat, and the -victors in each then competed with each other in a fresh heat; so -that the victor who gained the grand final prize was sure to have won -two heats. -</p> -<p> -Now if this practice was adopted with the foot-runners, much -more would it be likely to be adopted with the chariot-racers in -case many chariots were brought to the same festival. The danger -would be lessened, the sport would be increased, and the glory -of the competitors enhanced. The Olympic festival lasted five -days, a long time to provide amusement for so vast a crowd of -spectators. Alkibiadês and Lichas may therefore both have gained -chariot-victories at the same festival: of course only one of them -can have gained the grand final prize, and which of the two that was -it is impossible to say.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_86"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_86">[86]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 49, 50.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_87"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_87">[87]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 50. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν εἴργοντο τοῦ ἱεροῦ, -θυσίας καὶ ἀγώνων, καὶ οἴκοι ἔθυον· οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες ἐθεώρουν, -πλὴν Λεπρεατῶν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_88"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_88">[88]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 28. Κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἥ τε -Λακεδαίμων μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἤκουσε, καὶ ὑπερώφθη διὰ τὰς ξυμφορὰς, οἵ -τε Ἀργεῖοι ἄριστα ἔσχον τοῖς πᾶσι, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_89"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_89">[89]</a></span> See a <a href="#Footnote_85">previous note</a>, p. 56.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_90"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_90">[90]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 50. Λίχας ὁ Ἀρκεσιλάου Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐν -τῷ ἀγῶνι ὑπὸ τῶν ῥαβδούχων πληγὰς ἔλαβεν, ὅτι νικῶντος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ -ζεύγους, καὶ ἀνακηρυχθέντος Βοιωτῶν δημοσίου κατὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐξουσίαν -τῆς ἀγωνίσεως προελθὼν ἐς τὸν ἀγῶνα ἀνέδησε τὸν ἡνίοχον, βουλόμενος -δηλῶσαι ὅτι ἑαυτοῦ ἦν τὸ ἅρμα. -</p> -<p> -We see by comparison with this incident how much less rough and harsh -was the manner of dealing at Athens, and in how much more serious a -light blows to the person were considered. At the Athenian festival -of the Dionysia, if a person committed disorder or obtruded himself -into a place not properly belonging to him in the theatre, the archon -or his officials were both empowered and required to repress the -disorder by turning the person out, and fining him, if necessary. -But they were upon no account to strike him. If they did, they were -punishable themselves by the dikastery afterwards (Demosth. cont. -Meidiam, c. 49).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_91"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_91">[91]</a></span> It will be seen, however, that the Lacedæmonians -remembered and revenged themselves upon the Eleians for this insult -twelve years afterwards during the plenitude of their power (Xenoph. -Hellen. iii, 2, 21; Diodor. xiv, 17).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_92"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_92">[92]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 51, 52.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_93"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_93">[93]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 48-50.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_94"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_94">[94]</a></span> Plato, Symposion, c. 35, p. 220. δεινοὶ γὰρ αὐτόθι -χειμῶνες, πάγου οἵου δεινοτάτου, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_95"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_95">[95]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 52. Isokratês (De Bigis, sect. 17, p. 349) -speaks of this expedition of Alkibiadês in his usual loose and -exaggerated language: but he has a right to call attention to it as -something very memorable at the time.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_96"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_96">[96]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 52.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_97"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_97">[97]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 53, with Dr. Arnold’s note.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_98"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_98">[98]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 54. ᾔδει δὲ οὐδεὶς ὅποι στρατεύουσιν οὐδὲ αἱ -πόλεις ἐξ ὧν ἐπέμφθησαν. -</p> -<p> -This incident shows that Sparta employed the military force of her -allies without any regard to their feelings, quite as decidedly as -Athens; though there were some among them too powerful to be thus -treated.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_99"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_99">[99]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 54. Ἀργεῖοι δ’ ἀναχωρησάντων αὐτῶν (the -Lacedæmonians), τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ Καρνείου μηνὸς ἐξελθόντες τετράδι -φθίνοντος, <em class="gesperrt">καὶ ἄγοντες τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην πάντα τὸν χρόνον</em>, -ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἐπιδαυρίαν καὶ <em class="gesperrt">ἐδῄουν</em>· Ἐπιδαύριοι δὲ τοὺς -ξυμμάχους ἐπεκαλοῦντο· ὧν οἱ μὲν <em class="gesperrt">τὸν μῆνα προυφασίσαντο</em>, οἱ δὲ -καὶ ἐς μεθορίαν τῆς Ἐπιδαυρίας ἐλθόντες ἡσύχαζον. -</p> -<p> -In explaining this passage, I venture to depart from the views of all -the commentators; with the less scruple, as it seems to me that even -the best of them are here embarrassed and unsatisfactory. -</p> -<p> -The meaning which I give to the words is the most strict and -literal possible: “The Argeians, having set out on the 26th of -the month before Karneius, and <i>keeping that day during the whole -time</i>, invaded the Epidaurian territory, and went on ravaging it.” -By “during the whole time” is meant, during the whole time that -this expedition lasted. That is, in my judgment, they kept the -twenty-sixth day of the antecedent month for a whole fortnight or so; -they called each successive day by the same name; they stopped the -computed march of time; the twenty-seventh was never admitted to have -arrived. Dr. Thirlwall translates it (Hist. Gr. vol. iii, ch. xxiv, -p. 331): “They began their march on a day which they had <i>always</i> -been used to keep holy.” But surely the words πάντα τὸν χρόνον must -denote some definite interval of time, and can hardly be construed -as equivalent to ἀεί. Moreover the words, as Dr. Thirlwall construes -them, introduce a new fact which has no visible bearing on the main -affirmation of the sentence. -</p> -<p> -The meaning which I give may perhaps be called in question on -the ground that such tampering with the calendar is too absurd -and childish to have been really committed. Yet it is not more -absurd than the two votes of the Athenian assembly (in 290 -<small>B.C.</small>), who being in the month of Munychion, first -passed a vote that that month should be the month Anthestêrion; next, -that it should be the month Boêdromion; in order that Demetrius -Poliorkêtês might be initiated both in the lesser and greater -mysteries of Dêmêtêr, both at once and at the same time. Demetrius -arrived at Athens in the month Munychion, and went through both -ceremonies with little or no delay; the religious scruple, and the -dignity of the Two Goddesses being saved by altering the name of the -month twice (Plutarch, Demetrius, c. 26). -</p> -<p> -Besides, if we look to the conduct of the Argeians themselves at -a subsequent period (<small>B.C.</small> 389, Xenophon, Hellen. iv, 7, -2, 5; v, 1, 29), we shall see them playing an analogous trick with -the calendar in order to get the benefit of the sacred truce. When -the Lacedæmonians invaded Argos, the Argeians despatched heralds -with wreaths and the appropriate insignia, to warn them off on the -ground of its being the period of the holy truce,—though it <i>really -was not so</i>,—<em class="gesperrt">οὐχ ὅποτε κάθηκοι ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ’ ὅποτε ἐμβάλλειν -μέλλοιεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τότε ὑπέφερον τοὺς μῆνας</em>—Οἱ δ’ Ἀργεῖοι -ἐπεὶ ἔγνωσαν οὐ δυνησόμενοι κωλύειν, ἔπεμψαν, ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν, -ἐστεφανωμένους δύο κήρυκας <em class="gesperrt">ὑποφέροντας σπονδάς</em>. On more than -one occasion, this stratagem was successful: the Lacedæmonians did -not dare to act in defiance of the summons of the heralds, who -affirmed that it <i>was</i> the time of the truce, though in reality it -was not so. At last, the Spartan king Agesipolis actually went both -to Olympia and Delphi, to put the express question to those oracles, -whether he was bound to accept the truce at any moment, right or -wrong, when it might suit the convenience of the Argeians to bring it -forward as a sham plea (ὑποφέρειν). The oracles both told him that he -was under no obligation to submit to such a pretence; accordingly, -he sent back the heralds, refusing to attend to their summons, and -invaded the Argeian territory. -</p> -<p> -Now here is a case exactly in point, with this difference; that the -Argeians, when they are invaders of Epidaurus, falsify the calendar -in order to blot out the holy truce where it really ought to have -come: whereas when they are the party invaded, they commit similar -falsification in order to introduce the truce where it does not -legitimately belong. I conceive, therefore, that such an analogous -incident completely justifies the interpretation which I have given -of the passage now before us in Thucydidês. -</p> -<p> -But even if I were unable to produce a case so exactly parallel, I -should still defend the interpretation. Looking to the state of the -ancient Grecian calendars, the proceeding imputed to the Argeians -ought not to be looked on as too preposterous and absurd for -adoption, with the same eyes as we should regard it now. -</p> -<p> -With the exception of Athens, we do not know completely the calendar -of a single other Grecian city: but we know that the months of -all were lunar months, and that the practice followed in regard -to intercalation, for the prevention of inconvenient divergence -between lunar and solar time, was different in each different -city. Accordingly, the lunar month of one city did not, except by -accident, either begin or end at the same time as the lunar month of -another. M. Boeckh observes (ad Corp. Inscr. t. i, p. 734): “Variorum -populorum menses, qui sibi secundum legitimos annorum cardines -respondent, non quovis conveniunt anno, nisi cyclus intercalationum -utrique populi idem sit: sed ubi differunt cycli, altero populo -prius intercalante mensem dum non intercalat alter, eorum qui non -intercalarunt mensis certus cedit jam in eum mensem alterorum qui -præcedit illum cui vulgo respondet certus iste mensis: quod tamen -negligere solent chronologi.” Compare also the valuable Dissertation -of K. F. Hermann, Ueber die Griechische Monatskunde, Götting. 1844, -pp. 21-27, where all that is known about the Grecian names and -arrangement of months is well brought together. -</p> -<p> -The names of the Argeian months we hardly know at all (see K. F. -Hermann, pp. 84-124): indeed, the only single name resting on -positive proof, is that of a month <i>Hermæus</i>. How far the months of -Argos agreed with those of Epidaurus or Sparta we do not know, nor -have we any right to presume that they did agree. Nor is it by any -means clear that every city in Greece had what may properly be called -a <i>system</i> of intercalation, so correct as to keep the calendar -right without frequent arbitrary interferences. Even at Athens, it -is not yet satisfactorily proved that the Metonic calendar was ever -actually received into civil use. Cicero, in describing the practice -of the Sicilian Greeks about reckoning of time, characterizes -their interferences for the purpose of correcting the calendar as -occasional rather than systematic. Verres took occasion from these -interferences to make a still more violent change, by declaring the -Ides of January to be the calends of March (Cicero, Verr. ii, 52, -129). -</p> -<p> -Now where a people are accustomed to get wrong in their calendar, and -to see occasional interferences introduced by authority to set them -right, the step which I here suppose the Argeians to have taken about -the invasion of Epidaurus will not appear absurd and preposterous. -The Argeians would pretend that the real time for celebrating the -festival of Karneia had not yet arrived. On that point, they were not -bound to follow the views of other Dorian states, since there does -not seem to have been any recognized authority for proclaiming the -commencement of the Karneian truce, as the Eleians proclaimed the -Olympic and the Corinthians the Isthmiac truce. In saying, therefore, -that the twenty-sixth of the month preceding Karneius should be -repeated, and that the twenty-seventh should not be recognized as -arriving for a fortnight or three weeks, the Argeian government would -only be employing an expedient the like of which had been before -resorted to; though, in the case before us, it was employed for a -fraudulent purpose. -</p> -<p> -The Spartan month <i>Hekatombeus</i> appears to have corresponded with the -Attic month Hekatombæon; the Spartan month following it, <i>Karneius</i>, -with the Attic month Metageitnion (Hermann, p. 112), our months -July and August; such correspondence being by no means exact or -constant. Both Dr. Arnold and Göller speak of Hekatombeus as if it -were the <i>Argeian</i> month preceding Karneius: but we only know it -as a <i>Spartan</i> month. Its name does not appear among the months of -the Dorian cities in Sicily, among whom nevertheless Karneius seems -universal. See Franz, Comm. ad Corp. Inscript. Græc. No. 5475, 5491, -5640. Part xxxii, p. 640. -</p> -<p> -The tricks played with the calendar at Rome, by political authorities -for party purposes, are well known to every one. And even in some -states of Greece, the course of the calendar was so uncertain as to -serve as a proverbial expression for inextricable confusion. See -Hesychius—<em class="gesperrt">Ἐν Κέῳ τις ἡμέρα</em>; Ἐπὶ τῶν οὐκ -εὐγνώστον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ οἶδεν ἐν Κέῳ τις ἡ ἡμέρα, ὅτι οὐκ ἑστᾶσιν αἱ -ἡμέραι, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἕκαστοι θέλουσιν ἄγουσι. See also Aristoph. Nubes, -605. -</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_100"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_100">[100]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 55. καὶ Ἀθηναίων αὐτοῖς χίλιοι ἐβοήθησαν -ὁπλῖται καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης στρατηγὸς: πυθόμενοι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους -ἐξεστρατεῦσθαι· καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ἔτι αὐτῶν ἔδει, ἀπῆλθον. This is the -reading which Portus, Bloomfield, Didot, and Göller, either adopt or -recommend; leaving out the particle δὲ which stands in the common -text after πυθόμενοι. -</p> -<p> -If we do not adopt this reading, we must construe ἐξεστρατεῦσθαι, -as Dr. Arnold and Poppo construe it, in the sense of “had already -completed their expedition and returned home.” But no authority is -produced for putting such a meaning upon the verb ἐκστρατεύω: and -the view of Dr. Arnold, who conceives that this meaning exclusively -belongs to the preterite or pluperfect tense, is powerfully -contradicted by the use of the word ἐξεστρατευμένων (ii, 7), the same -verb and the same tense, yet in a meaning contrary to that which he -assigns. -</p> -<p> -It appears to me the least objectionable proceeding of the two, to -dispense with the particle δέ.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_101"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_101">[101]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 56.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_102"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_102">[102]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 37.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_103"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_103">[103]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 58. Οἱ δὲ Ἀργεῖοι γνόντες ἐβοήθουν -<em class="gesperrt">ἡμέρας ἤδη</em> ἐκ τῆς Νεμέας, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_104"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_104">[104]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 60. Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι -εἵποντο μὲν ὡς ἡγεῖτο διὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐν αἰτίᾳ δὲ εἶχον κατ’ ἀλλήλους -πολλῇ τὸν Ἆγιν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_105"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_105">[105]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 60. Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔτι ἐν πολλῷ -πλέονι αἰτίᾳ εἶχον <em class="gesperrt">τοὺς σπεισαμένους ἄνευ τοῦ πλήθους</em>, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_106"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_106">[106]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 60.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_107"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_107">[107]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 62.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_108"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_108">[108]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 64. ὅσον οὐκ ἀφέστηκεν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_109"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_109">[109]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 63.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_110"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_110">[110]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 64. ἐνταῦθα δὴ βοήθεια τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων -γίγνεται αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν Εἱλώτων πανδημεὶ ὀξεῖα καὶ οἵα οὔπω -πρότερον. The out-march of the Spartans just before the battle of -Platæa (described in Herodot. vii, 10) seems, however, to have been -quite as rapid and instantaneous.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_111"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_111">[111]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 64. ξυνέκλῃε γὰρ διὰ μέσου.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_112"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_112">[112]</a></span> The Lacedæmonian kings appear to have felt a sense -of protection in encamping near a temple of Hêraklês, their heroic -progenitor (see Xenophon, Hellen. vii, 1, 31).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_113"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_113">[113]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 65. See an exclamation by an old Spartan -mentioned as productive of important consequences, at the moment when -a battle was going to commence, in Xenophon, Hellen. vii, 4, 25.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_114"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_114">[114]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 66. μάλιστα δὴ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐς ὃ -ἐμέμνηντο, ἐν τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ ἐξεπλάγησαν· διὰ βραχείας γὰρ μελλήσεως -ἡ παρασκευὴ αὐτοῖς ἐγίγνετο, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_115"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_115">[115]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 66. Σχεδὸν γάρ τι πᾶν, πλὴν ὀλίγου, τὸ -στρατόπεδον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἄρχοντες ἀρχόντων εἰσὶ, καὶ τὸ ἐπιμελὲς -τοῦ δρωμένου πολλοῖς προσήκει. -</p> -<p> -Xenophon, De Republ. Laced. xi, 5. Αἱ παραγωγαὶ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ κήρυκος -ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐνωμοτάρχου λόγῳ δηλοῦνται: compare xi, 8, τῷ ἐνωμοτάρχῃ -παρεγγυᾶται εἰς μέτωπον παρ’ ἄσπιδα καθίστασθαι, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_116"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_116">[116]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 66. εὐθὺς ὑπὸ σπουδῆς καθίσταντο <em class="gesperrt">ἐς -κόσμον τὸν ἑαυτῶν</em>, Ἄγιδος τοῦ βασιλέως ἕκαστα ἐξηγουμένου κατὰ -τὸν νόμον, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_117"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_117">[117]</a></span> Xenophon, Cyrop. iv, 2. 1: see Diodor. xv, c. 32; -Xenophon, Rep. Laced. xiii, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_118"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_118">[118]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 67.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_119"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_119">[119]</a></span> Very little can be made out respecting the structure -of the Lacedæmonian army. We know that the enômoty was the elementary -division, the military unit: that the pentekosty was composed of a -definite (not always the same) number of enômoties: that the lochus -also was composed of a definite (not always the same) number of -pentekosties. The mora appears to have been a still larger division, -consisting of so many lochi (according to Xenophon, of four lochi): -but Thucydidês speaks as if he knew no division larger than the -lochus. -</p> -<p> -Beyond this very slender information, there seems no other fact -certainly established about the Lacedæmonian military distribution. -Nor ought we reasonably to expect to find that these words <i>enômoty</i>, -<i>pentekosty</i>, lochus, etc., indicate any fixed number of men: our own -names <i>regiment</i>, <i>company</i>, <i>troop</i>, <i>brigade</i>, <i>division</i>, etc., -are all more or less indefinite as to positive numbers and proportion -to each other. -</p> -<p> -That which was peculiar to the Lacedæmonian drill, was, the teaching -a small number of men like an enômoty (twenty-five, thirty-two, -thirty-six men, as we sometimes find it), to perform its evolutions -under the command of its enômotarch. When this was once secured, it -is probable that the combination of these elementary divisions was -left to be determined in every case by circumstances. -</p> -<p> -Thucydidês states two distinct facts. 1. Each enômoty had <i>four -men in front</i>. 2. Each enômoty <i>varied in depth</i>, according as -every lochagus chose. Now Dobree asks, with much reason, how these -two assertions are to be reconciled? Given the number of men in -front, the depth of the enômoty is of course determined, without -any reference to the discretion of any one. These two assertions -appear distinctly contradictory; unless we suppose (what seems very -difficult to believe) that the lochage might make one or two of the -four files of the same enômoty deeper than the rest. Dobree proposes, -as a means of removing this difficulty, to expunge some words from -the text. One cannot have confidence, however, in the conjecture.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_120"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_120">[120]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 69. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ καθ’ ἑκάστους τε -καὶ μετὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν νόμων ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὧν ἠπίσταντο τὴν -παρακέλευσιν τῆς μνήμης ἀγαθοῖς οὖσιν ἐποιοῦντο, εἰδότες ἔργων ἐκ -πολλοῦ μελέτην πλείω σώζουσαν ἢ λόγων δι’ ὀλίγου καλῶς ῥηθέντων -παραίνεσιν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_121"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_121">[121]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 70. Ἀργεῖοι μὲν καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, ἐντόνως -καὶ ὀργῇ χωροῦντες, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ, βραδέως καὶ ὑπὸ αὐλητῶν πολλῶν -νόμῳ ἐγκαθεστώτων, οὐ τοῦ θείου χάριν, ἀλλ’ ἵνα ὁμαλῶς μετὰ ῥυθμοῦ -βαίνοντες προσέλθοιεν καὶ μὴ διασπασθείη αὐτῶν ἡ τάξις, ὅπερ φιλεῖ τὰ -μεγάλα στρατόπεδα ἐν ταῖς προσόδοις ποιεῖν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_122"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_122">[122]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 67. Τότε δὲ κέρας μὲν εὐώνυμον Σκιρῖται -αὐτοῖς καθίσταντο, <em class="gesperrt">ἀεὶ ταύτην τὴν τάξιν μόνοι Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπὶ -σφῶν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες</em>, etc. -</p> -<p> -The strong and precise language, which Thucydidês here uses, shows -that this was a privilege pointedly noted and much esteemed: among -the Lacedæmonians, especially, ancient routine was more valued than -elsewhere. And it is essential to take notice of the circumstance, in -order to appreciate the generalship of Agis, which has been rather -hardly criticized.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_123"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_123">[123]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 72. (Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοὺς Ἀργείους) -Ἔτρεψαν οὐδὲ ἐς χεῖρας τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑπομείναντας, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπῇσαν οἱ -Λακεδαιμόνιοι εὐθὺς ἐνδόντας, καὶ ἐστὶν οὓς καὶ καταπατηθέντας, τοῦ -μὴ φθῆναι τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν. -</p> -<p> -The last words of this sentence present a difficulty which has -perplexed all the commentators, and which none of them have yet -satisfactorily cleared up. -</p> -<p> -They all admit that the expressions, <em class="gesperrt">τοῦ, τοῦ μὴ</em>, preceding -the infinitive mood as here, signify <i>design</i> or <i>purpose</i>; ἕνεκα -being understood. But none of them can construe the sentence -satisfactorily with this meaning: accordingly they here ascribe to -the words a different and exceptional meaning. See the notes of -Poppo, Göller, and Dr. Arnold, in which notes the views of other -critics are cited and discussed. -</p> -<p> -Some say that τοῦ μὴ in this place means the same as ὥστε μή: others -affirm, that it is identical with διὰ τὸ μὴ or with τῷ μή. “Formula -<em class="gesperrt">τοῦ, τοῦ μὴ</em> (say Bauer and Göller), plerumque <i>consilium</i> -significat: interdum <i>effectum</i> (<i>i. e.</i> ὥστε μή); hic <i>causam</i> -indicat (i. e. διὰ τὸ μὴ, or τῷ μή).” But I agree with Dr. Arnold -in thinking that the last of these three alleged meanings is wholly -unauthorized; while the second, which is adopted by Dr. Arnold -himself, is sustained only by feeble and dubious evidence; for the -passage of Thucydidês (ii, 4. τοῦ μὴ ἐκφεύγειν) may be as well -construed, as Poppo’s note thereupon suggests, without any such -supposed exceptional sense of the words. -</p> -<p> -Now it seems to me quite possible to construe the words τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι -here in their regular and legitimate sense of <em class="gesperrt">ἕνεκα τοῦ</em>, or -<i>consilium</i>. But first an error must be cleared up which pervades the -view of most of the commentators. They suppose that those Argeians, -who are here affirmed to have been “<i>trodden under foot</i>,” were so -trodden down by <i>the Lacedæmonians</i> in their advance. But this is in -every way improbable. The Lacedæmonians were particularly slow in -their motions, regular in their ranks, and backward as to pursuit, -qualities which are dwelt upon by Thucydidês in regard to this very -battle. They were not at all likely to overtake such terrified men as -were only anxious to run away: moreover, if they did overtake them, -they would spear them, not trample them under foot. -</p> -<p> -To be trampled under foot, though possible enough from the numerous -Persian cavalry (Herodot. vii, 173; Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 4, 12), is -not the treatment which defeated soldiers meet with from victorious -hostile infantry in the field, especially Lacedæmonian infantry. But -it is precisely the treatment which they meet with, if they be in one -of the hinder ranks, from their own panic-stricken comrades in the -front rank, who find the enemy closing upon them, and rush back madly -to get away from him. Of course it was the Argeians in the front rank -who were seized with the most violent panic, and who thus fell back -upon their own comrades in the rear ranks, overthrowing and treading -them down to secure their own escape. It seems quite plain that it -was the Argeians in front—not the Lacedæmonians—who trod down their -comrades in the rear (there were probably six or eight men in every -file), in order to escape themselves before the Lacedæmonians should -be upon them: compare Xen. Hellenic. iv, 4, 11; Œconomic. viii, 5. -</p> -<p> -There are therefore in the whole scene which Thucydidês describes, -three distinct subjects: 1. The Lacedæmonians 2. The Argeians -soldiers, who were trodden down. 3. Other Argeian soldiers, who trod -them down in order to get away themselves. Out of these three he -only specifies the first two; but the third is present to his mind, -and is implied in his narrative, just as much as if he had written -καταπατηθέντας <em class="gesperrt">ὑπ’ ἄλλων</em>, or ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων, as in Xenoph. -Hellen. iv. 4, 11. -</p> -<p> -Now it is to this third subject, implied in the narrative, but not -formally specified (<i>i. e.</i> those Argeians who trod down their -comrades in order to get away themselves), or rather to the second -and third conjointly and confusedly, that the <i>design</i> or <i>purpose</i> -(<i>consilium</i>) in the words τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι refers. -</p> -<p> -Farther, the commentators all construe τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν, -as if the last word were an accusative case coming <i>after</i> φθῆναι -and governed by it. But there is also another construction, equally -good Greek, and much better for the sense. In my judgment, τὴν -ἐγκατάληψιν is here the accusative case coming <i>before</i> φθῆναι and -forming the <i>subject</i> of it. The words will thus read (ἕνεκα) τοῦ τὴν -ἐγκατάληψιν μὴ φθῆναι (ἐπελθοῦσαν αὐτοῖς): “in order that the actual -grasp of the Lacedæmonians might not be beforehand in coming upon -them;” “might not come upon them too soon,” <i>i. e.</i> “sooner than they -could get away.” And since the word ἐγκατάληψις is an abstract active -substantive, so, in order to get at the real meaning here, we may -substitute the concrete words with which it correlates, <i>i. e.</i> τοὺς -Λακεδαιμονίους ἐγκαταλαβόντας, subject as well as attribute, for the -active participle is here essentially involved. -</p> -<p> -The sentence would then read, supposing the ellipsis filled up and -the meaning expressed in full and concrete words—ἔστιν οὓς καὶ -καταπατηθέντας ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων φευγόντων (or βιαζομένων), ἕνεκα τοῦ τοὺς -Λακεδαιμονίους μὴ φθῆναι ἐγκαταλαβόντας αὐτοὺς (τοὺς φεύγοντας): “As -soon as the Lacedæmonians approached near, the Argeians gave way at -once, without staying for hand-combat: and some were even trodden -down by each other, or by their own comrades running away in order -that the Lacedæmonians might not be beforehand in catching them -sooner than they could escape.” -</p> -<p> -Construing in this way the sentence as it now stands, we have τοῦ -μὴ φθῆναι used in its regular and legitimate sense of <i>purpose</i>, or -<i>consilium</i>. We have moreover a plain and natural state of facts, in -full keeping with the general narrative. Nor is there any violence -put upon the words. Nothing more is done than to expand a very -elliptical sentence, and to fill up that entire sentence which was -present to the writer’s own mind. To do this properly is the chief -duty, as well as the chief difficulty, of an expositor of Thucydidês.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_124"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_124">[124]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 73; Diodor. xii, 79.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_125"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_125">[125]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 73.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_126"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_126">[126]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 75. Καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοτε -ἐπιφερομένην αἰτίαν ἔς τε μαλακίαν διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ξυμφορὰν, καὶ -ἐς τὴν ἄλλην ἀβουλίαν τε καὶ βραδύτητα, ἑνὶ ἔργῳ τούτῳ ἀπελύσαντο· -τύχῃ μέν, ὡς ἐδόκουν, κακιζόμενοι, γνώμῃ δὲ, οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀεὶ ὄντες.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_127"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_127">[127]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 72.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_128"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_128">[128]</a></span> Thucyd. i, 141.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_129"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_129">[129]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 75.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_130"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_130">[130]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 75.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_131"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_131">[131]</a></span> Aristotle (Politic. v, 4, 9) expressly notices the -credit gained by the oligarchical force of Argos in the battle -of Mantineia, as one main cause of the subsequent revolution, -notwithstanding that the Argeians generally were beaten: <em class="gesperrt">Οἱ -γνώριμοι εὐδοκιμήσαντες</em> ἐν Μαντινείᾳ, etc. -</p> -<p> -An example of contempt entertained by victorious troops over defeated -fellow-countrymen, is mentioned by Xenophon in the Athenian army -under Alkibiadês and Thrasyllus, in one of the later years of the -Peloponnesian war: see Xenophon, Hellen. i, 2, 15-17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_132"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_132">[132]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 76; Diodor. xii, 80.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_133"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_133">[133]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 77. The text of Thucydidês is incurably -corrupt, in regard to several words of this clause; though the -general sense appears sufficiently certain, that the Epidaurians -are to be allowed to clear themselves in respect to this demand by -an oath. In regard to this purifying oath, it seems to have been -essential that the oath should be <i>tendered</i> by one litigant party -and <i>taken</i> by the other: perhaps therefore σέμεν or θέμεν λῇν -(Valckenaer’s conjecture) might be preferable to εἶμεν λῇν. -</p> -<p> -To Herodot. vi, 86, and Aristotel. Rhetoric. i, 16, 6, which Dr. -Arnold and other commentators notice in illustration of this -practice, we may add the instructive exposition of the analogous -practice in the procedure of Roman law, as given by Von Savigny, -in his System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, sects. 309-313, vol. -vii, pp. 53-83. It was an oath tendered by one litigant party to -the opposite, in hopes that the latter would refuse to take it; if -taken, it had the effect of a judgment in favor of the swearer. But -the Roman lawyers laid down many limits and formalities, with respect -to this <i>jusjurandum delatum</i>, which Von Savigny sets forth with his -usual perspicuity.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_134"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_134">[134]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 77. Ἐπιδείξαντας δὲ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις -ξυμβαλέσθαι, αἴ κα αὐτοῖς δοκῇ· αἰ δέ τι καὶ ἄλλο δοκῇ τοῖς -ξυμμάχοις, <em class="gesperrt">οἴκαδ’ ἀπιάλλειν</em>. See Dr. Arnold’s note, and Dr. -Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. ch. xxiv. vol. iii, p. 342. -</p> -<p> -One cannot be certain about the meaning of these two last words, but -I incline to believe that they express a peremptory and almost a -hostile sentiment, such as I have given in the text. The allies here -alluded to are Athens, Elis, and Mantineia; all hostile in feeling -to Sparta. The Lacedæmonians could not well decline admitting these -cities to share in this treaty as it stood; but would probably think -it suitable to repel them even with rudeness, if they desired any -change. -</p> -<p> -I rather imagine, too, that this last clause (ἐπιδείξαντας) has -reference exclusively to the Argeians, and not to the Lacedæmonians -also. The form of the treaty is, that of a resolution already taken -at Sparta, and sent for approval to Argos.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_135"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_135">[135]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 79. Αἰ δέ τινι τᾶν πολίων ᾖ ἀμφίλογα, ἢ τᾶν -ἐντὸς ἢ τᾶν ἐκτὸς Πελοποννάσου, αἴτε περὶ ὅρων αἴτε περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς, -διακριθῆμεν. -</p> -<p> -The object of this clause I presume to be, to provide that the joint -forces of Lacedæmon and Argos should not be bound to interfere -for every separate dispute of each single ally with a foreign -state, not included in the alliance. Thus, there were at this time -standing disputes between Bœotia and Athens, and between Megara and -Athens: the Argeians probably would not choose to pledge themselves -to interfere for the maintenance of the alleged rights of Bœotia -and Megara in these disputes. They guard themselves against such -necessity in this clause. -</p> -<p> -M. H. Meier, in his recent Dissertation (Die Privat. Schiedsrichter -und die öffentlichen Diäteten Athens (Halle, 1846), sect. 19, p. 41), -has given an analysis and explanation of this treaty which seems to -me on many points unsatisfactory.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_136"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_136">[136]</a></span> All the smaller states in Peloponnesus are pronounced -by this treaty to be (if we employ the language employed with -reference to the Delphians peculiarly in the Peace of Nikias) -αὐτονόμους, αὐτοτελεῖς, αὐτοδίκους, Thucyd. v, 19. The last clause of -this treaty guarantees αὐτοδικíαν to all, though in language somewhat -different, τοῖς δὲ ἔταις κατὰ πάτρια δικάζεσθαι. The expression in -this treaty αὐτοπόλιες is substantially equivalent to αὐτοτελεῖς in -the former. -</p> -<p> -It is remarkable that we never find in Thucydidês the very convenient -Herodotean word δωσίδικοι (Herodot. vi, 42), though there are -occasions in these fourth and fifth books on which it would be useful -to his meaning.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_137"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_137">[137]</a></span> Thucyd. v. 81; Diodor. xii, 81.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_138"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_138">[138]</a></span> Compare Thucyd. v, 80, and v, 83.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_139"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_139">[139]</a></span> The instances appear to have been not rare, wherein -Grecian towns changed masters, by the citizens thus going out of -the gates all together, or most part of them, for some religious -festival. See the case of Smyrna (Herodot. i, 150), and the -precautionary suggestions of the military writer Æneas, in his -treatise called Poliorketicus, c. 17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_140"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_140">[140]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 80. Καὶ ὕστερον -Ἐπιδαυρίοις <em class="gesperrt">ἀνανεωσάμενοι</em> τὰς σπονδὰς, -αὐτοὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέδοσαν τὸ τείχισμα. We are here told that the -Athenians <small>RENEWED</small> their truce with the Epidaurians: -but I know no truce previously between them except the general truce -for a year, which the Epidaurians swore to, in conjunction with -Sparta (iv, 119), in the beginning of <small>B.C.</small> 423.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_141"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_141">[141]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 81. Καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀργεῖοι, -χίλιοι ἑκάτεροι, ξυστρατεύσαντες τά τ’ ἐν Σικυῶνι ἐς ὀλίγους -μᾶλλον κατέστησαν αὐτοὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐλθόντες, καὶ μετ’ ἐκεῖνα -ξυναμφότεροι ἤδη καὶ τὸν ἐν Ἄργει δῆμον κατέλυσαν, καὶ ὀλιγαρχία -ἐπιτηδεία τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις κατέστη: compare Diodor. xii, 80.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_142"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_142">[142]</a></span> Pausanias, ii, 20, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_143"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_143">[143]</a></span> See Herodot. v, 87; Euripid. Hecub. 1152, and the note -of Musgrave on line 1135 of that drama.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_144"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_144">[144]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 82; Diodor. xii, 80.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_145"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_145">[145]</a></span> Diodorus (xii, 80) says that it lasted eight -months: but this, if correct at all, must be taken as beginning -from the alliance between Sparta and Argos, and not from the first -establishment of the oligarchy. The narrative of Thucydidês does not -allow more than four months for the duration of the latter.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_146"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_146">[146]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 82. ξυνῄδεσαν δὲ τὸν τειχισμὸν καὶ τῶν ἐν -Πελοποννήσῳ τινὲς πόλεων.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_147"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_147">[147]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 82. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀργεῖοι πανδημεὶ, καὶ αὐτοὶ -καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ οἰκέται, ἐτείχιζον, etc. Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 15.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_148"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_148">[148]</a></span> Pausanias, ii, 36, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_149"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_149">[149]</a></span> Thucyd. i, 107.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_150"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_150">[150]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 83. Diodorus inaccurately states that -the Argeians <i>had already</i> built their long walls down to the -sea—πυθόμενοι τοὺς Ἀργείους <em class="gesperrt">ᾠκοδομηκέναι τὰ μακρὰ τείχη μέχρι τῆς -θαλάσσης</em> (xii, 81). Thucydidês uses the participle of the present -tense—<em class="gesperrt">τὰ οἰκοδομούμενα</em> τείχη ἐλόντες καὶ κατασκάψαντες, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_151"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_151">[151]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 116. Λακεδαιμόνιοι, <em class="gesperrt">μελλήσαντες</em> ἐς -τὴν Ἀργείαν στρατεύειν ... ἀνεχώρησαν. Καὶ Ἀργεῖοι διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων -<em class="gesperrt">μέλλησιν</em> τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὰς ὑποτοπήσαντες, τοὺς μὲν -ξυνέλαβον, οἱ δ’ αὐτοὺς καὶ διέφυγον. -</p> -<p> -I presume μέλλησιν here is not used in its ordinary meaning of -<i>loitering delay</i>, but is to be construed by the previous verb -μελλήσαντες, and agreeably to the analogy of iv, 126—“prospect of -action immediately impending:” compare Diodor. xii, 81.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_152"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_152">[152]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 7.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_153"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_153">[153]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 115.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_154"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_154">[154]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 105. The author of the loose and -inaccurate Oratio de Pace, ascribed to Andokidês, affirms that the -war was resumed by Athens against Sparta on the persuasion of the -Argeians (Orat. de Pac. c. 1, 6, 3, 31, pp. 93-105). This assertion -is indeed partially true: the alliance with Argos was one of the -causes of the resumption of war, but only one among others, some of -them more powerful. Thucydidês tells us that the <i>persuasions</i> of -Argos, to induce Athens to throw up her alliance with Sparta were -repeated and unavailing.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_155"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_155">[155]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 83.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_156"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_156">[156]</a></span> Dr. Thirlwall (History of Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, -p. 360) places this vote of ostracism in midwinter or early spring of -415 <small>B.C.</small>, immediately before the Sicilian expedition. -</p> -<p> -His grounds for this opinion are derived from the Oration called -Andokidês against Alkibiadês, the genuineness of which he seems to -accept (see his Appendix ii, on that subject, vol. iii, p. 494, -<i>seq.</i>). -</p> -<p> -The more frequently I read over this Oration, the more do I feel -persuaded that it is a spurious composition of one or two generations -after the time to which it professes to refer. My reasons for -this opinion have been already stated in previous notes, nor do I -think that Dr. Thirlwall’s Appendix is successful in removing the -objections against the genuineness of the speech. See my preceding -vol. vi, ch. xlvii, p. 6, note.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_157"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_157">[157]</a></span> Aristophan. Pac. 680.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_158"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_158">[158]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 73. <em class="gesperrt">Ὑπέρβολόν τέ τινα τῶν</em> -Ἀθηναίων, μοχθηρὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὠστρακισμένον οὐ διὰ δυνάμεως καὶ -ἀξιώματος φόβον, ἀλλὰ διὰ πονηρίαν καὶ αἰσχύνην τῆς πόλεως. According -to Androtion (Fragm. 48, ed. Didot.)—ὠστρακισμένον διὰ φαυλότητα. -</p> -<p> -Compare about Hyperbolus, Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11; Plutarch, -Alkibiadês, c. 13; Ælian. V. H. xii, 43; Theopompus, Fragm. 102, 103, -ed. Didot.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_159"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_159">[159]</a></span> Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 13; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11. -Theophrastus says that the violent opposition at first, and the -coalition afterwards, was not between Nikias and Alkibiadês, but -between Phæax and Alkibiadês. -</p> -<p> -The coalition of votes and parties may well have included all three.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_160"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_160">[160]</a></span> Thucyd. iii, 91.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_161"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_161">[161]</a></span> In reference to this argumentation of the Athenian -envoy, I call attention to the attack and bombardment of Copenhagen -by the English government in 1807, together with the language used by -the English envoy to the Danish Prince Regent on the subject. We read -as follows in M. Thiers’s Histoire du Consulat et de l’Empire:— -</p> -<p> -“L’agent choisi étoit digne de sa mission. C’étoit M. Jackson qui -avait été autrefois chargé d’affaires en France, avant l’arrivée de -Lord Whitworth, à Paris, mais qu’on n’avoit pas pû y laisser, à cause -du mauvais esprit qu’il manifestoit en toute occasion. Introduit -auprès du régent, il allégua de prétendues stipulations secrètes, en -vertu desquelles le Danemark devoit, (disoit on) de gré ou de force, -faire partie d’une coalition contre l’Angleterre: il donna comme -raison d’agir la necessité où se trouvoit le cabinet Britannique de -prendre des précautions pour que les forces navales du Danemark et -le passage du Sund ne tombassent pas au pouvoir des François: et en -conséquence il demanda au nom de son gouvernement, qu’on livrât à -l’armée Angloise la forteresse de Kronenberg qui commande de Sund, le -port de Copenhague, et enfin la flotte elle-même—promettant de garder -le tout en dépôt, pour le compte du Danemark, qui seroit remis en -possession de ce qu’on alloit lui enlever, dès que le danger seroit -passé. M. Jackson assura que le Danemark ne perdroit rien, que l’on -se conduiroit chez lui en auxiliaires et en amis—que les troupes -Britanniques payeroient tout ce qu’elles consommeroient.—Et avec -quoi, répondit le prince indigné, payeriez vous notre honneur perdu, -si nous adhérions à cette infame proposition?—Le prince continuant, -et opposant à cette perfide intention la conduite loyale du Danemark, -qui n’avoit pris aucune précaution contre les Anglois, qui les -avoit toutes prises contre les François, ce dont on abusoit pour le -surprendre—<i>M. Jackson répondit à cette juste indignation par une -insolente familiarité, disant que la guerre étoit la guerre, qu’il -falloit se résigner à ces nécessités, et céder au plus fort quand -on étoit le plus foible</i>. Le prince congédia l’agent Anglois avec -des paroles fort dures, et lui déclara qu’il alloit se transporter -à Copenhague, pour y remplir ses devoirs de prince et de citoyen -Danois.” (Thiers, Histoire du Consulat et de l’Empire, tome viii, -livre xxviii, p. 190.)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_162"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_162">[162]</a></span> Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 16. This is doubtless one of -the statements which the composer of the Oration of Andokidês against -Alkibiadês found current in respect to the conduct of the latter -(sect. 123). Nor is there any reason for questioning the truth of it.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_163"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_163">[163]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 106. τὸ δὲ χωρίον αὐτοὶ ᾤκησαν, ἀποίκους -ὕστερον πεντακοσίους πέμψαντες. Lysander restored some Melians to the -island after the battle of Ægospotami (Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 9): -some, therefore, must have escaped or must have been spared.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_164"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_164">[164]</a></span> Such is also the opinion of Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. -vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 348.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_165"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_165">[165]</a></span> Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Thucydid. c. 37-42, pp. -906-920, Reisk: compare the remarks in his Epistol. ad Cn. Pompeium, -de Præcipuis Historicis, p. 774, Reisk.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_166"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_166">[166]</a></span> Plutarch, Alkibiad. 16. τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀεὶ τὰ πραότατα -τῶν ὀνομάτων τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασι τιθεμένους, παιδιὰς καὶ φιλανθρωπίας. To -the same purpose Plutarch, Solon, c. 15.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_167"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_167">[167]</a></span> Compare also what Brasidas says in his speech to the -Akanthians, v, 86 <em class="gesperrt">ἴσχυος δικαιώσει</em>, ἣν ἡ τύχη ἔδωκεν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_168"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_168">[168]</a></span> See above, vol. v, ch. xliii, pp. 204-239, for the -history of these events. I now take up the thread from that chapter.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_169"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_169">[169]</a></span> Mr. Mitford, in the spirit which is usual with him, -while enlarging upon the suffering occasioned by this extensive -revolution both of inhabitants and of property throughout Sicily, -takes no notice of the cause in which it originated, namely, the -number of foreign mercenaries whom the Gelonian dynasty had brought -in and enrolled as new citizens (Gelon alone having brought in ten -thousand, Diodor. xi, 72), and the number of exiles whom they had -banished and dispossessed. -</p> -<p> -I will here notice only one of his misrepresentations respecting the -events of this period, because it is definite as well as important -(vol. iv, p. 9, chap. xviii, sect. 1). -</p> -<p> -“But thus (he says) in every little state, lands were left to -become public property, or to be assigned to new individual owners. -<i>Everywhere, then, that favorite measure of democracy, the equal -division of the lands of the state, was resolved upon</i>: a measure -impossible to be perfectly executed; impossible to be maintained as -executed; and of very doubtful advantage, if it could be perfectly -executed and perfectly maintained.” -</p> -<p> -Again, sect. iii, p. 23, he speaks of “that incomplete and iniquitous -partition of lands,” etc. -</p> -<p> -Now, upon this we may remark:— -</p> -<p> -1. The <i>equal division of the lands</i> of the state, here affirmed by -Mr. Mitford, is a pure fancy of his own. He has no authority for it -whatever. Diodorus says (xi, 76) κατεκληρούχησαν τὴν χώραν, etc.; and -again (xi, 86) he speaks of τὸν ἀναδασμὸν τῆς χώρας: the <i>redivision</i> -of the territory; but respecting <i>equality of division</i>, not one -word does he say. Nor can any principle of division in this case be -less probable than equality; for one of the great motives of the -redivision was to provide for those exiles who had been dispossessed -by the Gelonian dynasty: and these men would receive lots, greater or -less, on the ground of compensation for loss, greater or less as it -might have been. Besides, immediately after the redivision, we find -rich and poor mentioned, just as before (xi, 86). -</p> -<p> -2. Next, Mr. Mitford calls “the equal division of all the lands -of the state” the <i>favorite measure of democracy</i>. This is an -assertion not less incorrect. Not a single democracy in Greece, so -far as my knowledge extends, can be produced, in which such equal -partition is ever known to have been carried into effect. In the -Athenian democracy, especially, not only there existed constantly -great inequality of landed property, but the oath annually taken -by the popular heliastic judges had a special clause, protesting -emphatically against <i>redivision of the land or extinction of -debts</i>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_170"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_170">[170]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_171"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_171">[171]</a></span> Diodor. xi, 86, 87. The institution at Syracuse was -called the <i>petalism</i>; because, in taking the votes, the name of the -citizen intended to be banished was written upon a leaf of olive, -instead of a shell or potsherd.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_172"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_172">[172]</a></span> Diodor. xi. 87, 88.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_173"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_173">[173]</a></span> Diodor. xi, 78, 88, 90. The proceeding of Duketius is -illustrated by the description of Dardanus in the Iliad, xx, 216:—</p> - -<div class="poetry-container"> - <div class="poetry"> - <p>Κτίσσε δὲ Δαρδανίην, ἐπεὶ οὔπω Ἴλιος ἱρὴ</p> - <p>Ἐν πεδίῳ πεπόλιστο, πόλις μερόπων ἀνθρώπων,</p> - <p>Ἀλλ’ ἔθ’ ὑπωρείας ᾤκουν πολυπιδάκου Ἴδης.</p> - </div> -</div> - -<p class="ni">Compare Plato, de Legg. iii, pp. 681, 682.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_174"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_174">[174]</a></span> Diodor. xi, 76.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_175"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_175">[175]</a></span> Diodor. xi, 91, 92. Ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὥσπερ τινὶ μιᾷ φωνῇ -σώζειν ἅπαντες ἐβόων τὸν ἱκέτην.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_176"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_176">[176]</a></span> Xenophon, Hellen. i, 5, 19; Pausanias, vi, 7, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_177"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_177">[177]</a></span> Mr. Mitford recounts as follows -the return of Duketius to Sicily: “The Syracusan chiefs brought -back Duketius from Corinth, apparently to make him instrumental to -their own views for advancing the power of their commonwealth. They -permitted, or rather encouraged him to establish a colony of mixed -people, Greeks and Sicels, at Calé Acté, on the northern coast of the -island,” (ch. xviii, sect. i, vol. iv, p. 13.)</p> - -<p>The statement that “the Syracusans brought back Duketius, or -encouraged him to come back, or to found the colony of Kalê Aktê,” -is a complete departure from Diodorus on the part of Mr. Mitford; -who transforms a breach of parole on the part of the Sikel <i>prince</i> -into an ambitious manœuvre on the part of Syracusan <i>democracy</i>. -The words of Diodorus, the only authority in the case, are as -follows (xii, 8): Οὗτος δὲ (Duketius) ὀλίγον χρόνον μείνας ἐν -τῇ Κορίνθῳ, <em class="gesperrt">τὰς ὁμολογίας ἔλυσε</em>, καὶ -προσποιησάμενος χρησμὸν ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἑαυτῷ δεδόσθαι, κτίσαι τὴν Καλὴν -Ἀκτὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ, κατέπλευσεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον μετὰ πολλῶν οἰκητόρων· -συνεπελάβοντο δὲ καὶ τῶν Σικελῶν τινες, ἐν οἷς ἦν καὶ Ἀρχωνίδης, ὁ -τῶν Ἑρβιταίων δυναστεύων. Οὗτος μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν οἰκισμὸν τῆς Καλῆς -Ἀκτῆς ἐγίνετο· Ἀκραγαντῖνοι δὲ, ἅμα μὲν φθονοῦντες τοῖς Συρακοσίοις, -ἅμα δ’ ἐγκαλοῦντες αὐτοῖς ὅτι Δουκέτιον ὄντα κοινὸν πολέμιον <em -class="gesperrt">διέσωσαν ἄνευ τῆς Ἀκραγαντίνων γνώμης</em>, πόλεμον -ἐξήνεγκαν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_178"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_178">[178]</a></span> Diodor. xii, 8.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_179"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_179">[179]</a></span> Diodor. xii, 29. For the reconquest of Morgantinê, see -Thucyd. iv, 65. -</p> -<p> -Respecting this town of Trinakia, known only from the passage of -Diodorus here, Paulmier (as cited in Wesseling’s note), as well as -Mannert (Geographie der Griechen und Römer, b. x, ch. xv, p. 446), -intimate some skepticism; which I share so far as to believe that -Diodorus has greatly overrated its magnitude and importance. -</p> -<p> -Nor can it be true, as Diodorus affirms, that Trinakia was <i>the only</i> -Sikel township remaining unsubdued by the Syracusans, and that, after -conquering that place, they had subdued them all. We know that there -were no inconsiderable number of independent Sikels, at the time of -the Athenian invasion of Sicily (Thucyd. vi, 88; vii, 2).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_180"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_180">[180]</a></span> Diodor. xii, 30.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_181"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_181">[181]</a></span> Diodor. xiii, 81.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_182"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_182">[182]</a></span> Diodor. xiii. 82, 83, 90.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_183"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_183">[183]</a></span> See Aristotle as cited by Cicero, Brut. c. 12; Plato, -Phædr. p. 267, c. 113, 114; Dionys. Halic. Judicium de Isocrate, -p. 534 R. and Epist. ii, ad Ammæum, p. 792; also Quintilian, iii, -1, 125. According to Cicero (de Inventione, ii, 2), the treatises -of these ancient rhetoricians, “usque a principe illo et inventore -Tisiâ,” had been superseded by Aristotle, who had collected them -carefully, “nominatim,” and had improved upon their expositions. -Dionysius laments that they had been so superseded (Epist. ad Ammæ. -p. 722).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_184"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_184">[184]</a></span> Diogen. Laërt. viii, 64-71; Seyfert, Akragas und sein -Gebiet, sect. ii, p. 70; Ritter, Geschichte der Alten Philosophie, -vol. i. ch. vi, p. 533, <i>seqq.</i></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_185"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_185">[185]</a></span> Thucyd. iv. 61-64. This is the tenor of the speech -delivered by Hermokratês at the congress of Gela in the eighth year -of the Peloponnesian war. His language is remarkable: he calls all -non-Sicilian Greeks ἀλλοφύλους.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_186"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_186">[186]</a></span> The inscription in Boeckh’s Corpus Inscriptt. (No. -74, part i, p. 112) relating to the alliance between Athens and -Rhegium, conveys little certain information. Boeckh refers it to a -covenant concluded in the archonship of Apseudês at Athens (Olymp. -86, 4, <small>B.C.</small> 433-432, the year before the Peloponnesian war), -renewing an alliance which was even then of old date. But it appears -to me that the supposition of a renewal is only his own conjecture; -and even the name of the archon, <i>Apseudês</i>, which he has restored by -a plausible conjecture, can hardly be considered as certain. -</p> -<p> -If we could believe the story in Justin iv, 3, Rhegium must have -ceased to be Ionic before the Peloponnesian war. He states, that in -a sedition at Rhegium, one of the parties called in auxiliaries from -Himera. These Himeræan exiles having first destroyed the enemies -against whom they were invoked, next massacred the friends who had -invoked them: “ausi facinus nulli tyranno comparandum.” They married -the Rhegine women, and seized the city for themselves. -</p> -<p> -I do not know what to make of this story, which neither appears -noticed in Thucydidês, nor seems to consist with what he does tell -us.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_187"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_187">[187]</a></span> Thucyd. i, 36.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_188"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_188">[188]</a></span> Thucyd. ii, 7. Καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις μὲν, πρὸς ταῖς -αὐτοῦ ὑπαρχούσαις, ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας τοῖς τἀκείνων ἑλομένοις, -ναῦς ἐπετάχθησαν ποιεῖσθαι κατὰ μέγεθος τῶν πόλεων, ὡς ἐς τὸν πάντα -ἀριθμὸν πεντακοσίων νεῶν ἐσόμενον, etc. -</p> -<p> -Respecting the construction of this perplexing passage, read the -notes of Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Göller: compare Poppo, ad Thucyd. -vol. i, ch. xv, p. 181. -</p> -<p> -I agree with Dr. Arnold and Göller in rejecting the construction of -αὐτοῦ with ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας, in the sense of “those ships -which were in Peloponnesus from Italy and Sicily.” This would be -untrue in point of fact, as they observe: there were no Sicilian -ships of war in Peloponnesus. -</p> -<p> -Nevertheless I think, differing from them, that αὐτοῦ is not a -pronoun referring to ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας, but is used in contrast -with those words, and really means, “in or about Peloponnesus.” It -was contemplated that new ships should be built in Sicily and Italy, -of sufficient number to make the total fleet of the Lacedæmonian -confederacy, including the triremes already in Peloponnesus, equal to -five hundred sail. But it was never contemplated that the triremes in -Italy and Sicily <i>alone</i> should amount to five hundred sail, as Dr. -Arnold, in my judgment, erroneously imagines. Five hundred sail for -the entire confederacy would be a prodigious total: five hundred sail -for Sicily and Italy alone, would be incredible. -</p> -<p> -To construe the sentence as it stands now, putting aside the -conjecture of νῆες instead of ναῦς, or ἐπετάχθη instead of -ἐπετάχθησαν, which would make it run smoothly, we must admit the -supposition of a break or double construction, such as sometimes -occurs in Thucydidês. The sentence begins with one form of -construction and concludes with another. We must suppose, with -Göller, that αἱ πόλεις understood as the nominative case to -ἐπετάχθησαν. The dative cases (Λακεδαιμονίοις—ἑλομένοις) are to be -considered, I apprehend, as governed by νῆες ἐπετάχθησαν: that is, -these dative cases belong to the first form of construction, which -Thucydidês has not carried out. The sentence is begun as if νῆες -ἐπετάχθησαν were intended to follow.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_189"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_189">[189]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 34: compare iii, 86.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_190"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_190">[190]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 86.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_191"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_191">[191]</a></span> Thucyd. iii, 86; Diodor. xii, 53; Plato, Hipp. Maj. -p. 282, B. It is remarkable that Thucydidês, though he is said, -with much probability, to have been among the pupils of Gorgias, -makes no mention of that rhetor personally as among the envoys. -Diodorus probably copied from Ephorus, the pupil of Isokratês. Among -the writers of the Isokratean school, the persons of distinguished -rhetors, and their supposed political efficiency, counted for much -more than in the estimation of Thucydidês. Pausanias (vi, 17, 3) -speaks of Tisias also as having been among the envoys in this -celebrated legation.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_192"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_192">[192]</a></span> Thucyd. iii, 88; Diodor. xii, 54.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_193"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_193">[193]</a></span> Thucyd. iii, 90; vi, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_194"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_194">[194]</a></span> Thucyd. iii, 99.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_195"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_195">[195]</a></span> Thucyd. iii, 103.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_196"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_196">[196]</a></span> Thucyd. iii, 115.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_197"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_197">[197]</a></span> Thucyd. iii, 115.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_198"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_198">[198]</a></span> See the preceding vol. vi, ch. lii.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_199"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_199">[199]</a></span> Thucyd. iv, 48.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_200"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_200">[200]</a></span> Thucyd. iii, 115; iv, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_201"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_201">[201]</a></span> Thucyd. iv, 24. Καὶ νικηθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων διὰ -τάχους ἀπέπλευσαν, ὡς ἕκαστοι ἔτυχον, ἐς τὰ οἰκεῖα στρατόπεδα, τό τε -ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ καὶ ἐν τῷ Ῥηγίῳ, μίαν ναῦν ἀπολέσαντες, etc. -</p> -<p> -I concur in Dr. Arnold’s explanation of this passage, yet conceiving -that the words ὡς ἕκαστοι ἔτυχον designate the flight as disorderly, -insomuch that <i>all</i> the Lokrian ships did not get back to the Lokrian -station, nor <i>all</i> the Syracusan ships to the Syracusan station: but -each separate ship fled to either one or the other, as it best could.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_202"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_202">[202]</a></span> Thucyd. iv, 25. ἀποσιμωσάντων ἐκείνων καὶ -προεμβαλόντων. -</p> -<p> -I do not distinctly understand the nautical movement which -is expressed by ἀποσιμωσάντων, in spite of the notes of the -commentators. And I cannot but doubt the correctness of Dr. Arnold’s -explanation, when he says “The Syracusans, on a sudden, threw off -their towing-ropes, made their way to the open sea by a lateral -movement, and thus became the assailants,” etc. The open sea was -what the Athenians required, in order to obtain the benefit of their -superior seamanship.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_203"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_203">[203]</a></span> Thucyd. iv, 25.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_204"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_204">[204]</a></span> Thucyd. iv, 48.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_205"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_205">[205]</a></span> Compare a similar remark made by the Syracusan -Hermokratês, nine years afterwards, when the great Athenian -expedition against Syracuse was on its way, respecting the increased -disposition to union among the Sicilian cities, produced by common -fear of Athens (Thucyd. vi, 33).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_206"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_206">[206]</a></span> Thucyd. iv, 58.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_207"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_207">[207]</a></span> See the speech of Hermokratês, Thucyd. iv, 59-64. -One expression in this speech indicates that it was composed by -Thucydidês many years after its proper date, subsequently to -the great expedition of the Athenians against Syracuse in 415 -<small>B.C.</small>; though I doubt not that Thucydidês collected the -memoranda for it at the time. -</p> -<p> -Hermokratês says: “The Athenians are now near us with <i>a few ships</i>, -lying in wait for our blunders,”—οἱ δύναμιν ἔχοντες μεγίστην τῶν -Ἑλλήνων τάς τε ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν τηροῦσιν, <em class="gesperrt">ὀλίγαις ναυσὶ παρόντες</em>, -etc. (iv, 60). -</p> -<p> -Now the fleet under the command of Eurymedon and his colleagues -at Rhegium included all or most of the ships which had acted at -Sphakteria and Korkyra, together with those which had been previously -at the strait of Messina under Pythodôrus. It could not have been -less than fifty sail, and may possibly have been sixty sail. It is -hardly conceivable that any Greek, speaking in the early spring of -424 <small>B.C.</small>, should have alluded to this as a <i>small</i> fleet: -assuredly, Hermokratês would not thus allude to it, since it was for -the interest of his argument to exaggerate rather than extenuate, the -formidable manifestations of Athens. -</p> -<p> -But Thucydidês, composing the speech after the great Athenian -expedition of 415 <small>B.C.</small>, so much more numerous and commanding -in every respect, might not unnaturally represent the fleet of -Eurymedon as “a few ships,” when he tacitly compared the two. This is -the only way that I know, of explaining such an expression. -</p> -<p> -The Scholiast observes that some of the copies in his time omitted -the words ὀλίγαις ναυσὶ: probably they noticed the contradiction -which I have remarked; and the passage <i>may</i> certainly be construed -without those words.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_208"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_208">[208]</a></span> Thucyd. iv, 65. We learn from Polybius (Fragm. xii, -22, 23, one of the Excerpta recently published by Maii, from the -Cod. Vatic.) that Timæus had in his twenty-first book described -the congress of Gela at considerable length, and had composed an -elaborate speech for Hermokratês: which speech Polybius condemns, as -a piece of empty declamation.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_209"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_209">[209]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_210"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_210">[210]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 13-52.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_211"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_211">[211]</a></span> Thucyd. iv, 65.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_212"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_212">[212]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 4. Λεοντῖνοι γὰρ, ἀπελθόντων Ἀθηναίων -ἐκ Σικελίας μετὰ τὴν ξύμβασιν, πολίτας τε ἐπεγράψαντο πολλοὺς, -καὶ ὁ δῆμος τὴν γῆν ἐπενόει ἀναδάσασθαι. Οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ αἰσθόμενοι -Συρακοσίους τε ἐπάγονται καὶ ἐκβάλλουσι τὸν δῆμον. Καὶ οἱ μὲν -ἐπλανήθησαν ὡς ἕκαστοι, etc. -</p> -<p> -Upon this Dr. Arnold observes: “The principle on which this ἀναδασμὸς -γῆς was redemanded, was this; that every citizen was entitled to his -portion, κλῆρος, of the land of the state, and that the admission of -new citizens rendered a redivision of the property of the state a -matter at once of necessity and of justice. It is not probable that -in any case the actual κλῆροι (properties) of the old citizens were -required to be shared with the new members of the state; but only, -as at Rome, the ager publicus, or land still remaining to the state -itself, and not apportioned out to individuals. This land, however, -being beneficially enjoyed by numbers of the old citizens, either -as common pasture, or as being farmed by different individuals on -very advantageous terms, a division of it among the newly-admitted -citizens, although not, strictly speaking, a spoliation of private -property, was yet a serious shock to a great mass of existing -interests, and was therefore always regarded as a revolutionary -measure.” -</p> -<p> -I transcribe this note of Dr. Arnold rather from its intrinsic worth -than from any belief that analogy of agrarian relations existed -between Rome and Leontini. The ager publicus at Rome was the product -of successive conquests from foreign enemies of the city: there may, -indeed, have been originally a similar ager publicus in the peculiar -domain of Rome itself, anterior to all conquests; but this must at -any rate have been very small, and had probably been all absorbed and -assigned in private property before the agrarian disputes began. -</p> -<p> -We cannot suppose that the Leontines had any ager publicus acquired -by conquest, nor are we entitled to presume that they had any at all, -capable of being divided. Most probably the lots for the new citizens -were to be provided out of private property. But unfortunately we are -not told how, nor on what principles and conditions. Of what class of -men were the new emigrants? Were they individuals altogether poor, -having nothing but their hands to work with; or did they bring with -them any amount of funds, to begin their settlement on the fertile -and tempting plain of Leontini? (compare Thucyd. i, 27, and Plato de -Legib. v, p. 744, A.) If the latter, we have no reason to imagine -that they would be allowed to acquire their new lots gratuitously. -Existing proprietors would be forced to sell at a fixed price, but -not to yield their properties without compensation. I have already -noticed, that to a small self-working proprietor, who had no slaves, -it was almost essential that his land should be near the city; and -provided this were insured, it might be a good bargain for a new -resident having some money, but no land elsewhere, to come in and buy. -</p> -<p> -We have no means of answering these questions: but the few words -of Thucydidês do not present this measure as revolutionary, or -as intended against the rich, or for the benefit of the poor. It -was proposed, on public grounds, to strengthen the city by the -acquisition of new citizens. This might be wise policy, in the -close neighborhood of a doubtful and superior city, like Syracuse; -though we cannot judge of the policy of the measure without knowing -more. But most assuredly Mr. Mitford’s representation can be noway -justified from Thucydidês: “Time and circumstances had greatly -altered the state of property in all the Sicilian commonwealths, -since <i>that incomplete and iniquitous partition of lands</i>, which had -been made, on the general establishment of democratical government, -after the expulsion of the family of Gelon. In other cities, the poor -rested under their lot; but in Leontini, they were warm in project -<i>for a fresh and equal partition</i>; and to strengthen themselves -against the party of the wealthy, they carried, in the general -assembly, a decree for associating a number of new citizens.” -(Mitford, H. G. ch. xviii, sect. ii, vol. iv, p. 23.) -</p> -<p> -I have already remarked, in a previous note, that Mr. Mitford has -misrepresented the redivision of lands which took place after the -expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty. That redivision had not been upon -the principle of equal lots: it is not therefore correct to assert, -as Mr. Mitford does, that the present movement at Leontini arose from -the innovation made by time and circumstances in that equal division: -as little is it correct to say, that the poor at Leontini now desired -“a fresh and equal partition.” Thucydidês says <i>not one word about -equal partition</i>. He puts forward the enrolment of new citizens -as the substantive and primary resolution, actually taken by the -Leontines; the redivision of the lands, as a measure consequent and -subsidiary to this, and as yet existing only in project (ἐπενόει). -Mr. Mitford states the fresh and equal division to have been the real -object of desire, and the enrolment of new citizens to have been -proposed with a view to attain it. His representation is greatly at -variance with that of Thucydidês.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_213"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_213">[213]</a></span> Justin (iv, 4) surrounds the Sicilian envoys at Athens -with all the insignia of misery and humiliation, while addressing -the Athenian assembly: “Sordidâ veste, capillo barbâque promissis, -et omni squaloris habitu ad misericordiam commovendam conquisito, -concionem deformes adeunt.”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_214"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_214">[214]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 4, 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_215"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_215">[215]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 6; Diodor. xii, 82. The statement of -Diodorus—that the Egestæans applied not merely to Agrigentum but also -to Syracuse—is highly improbable. The war which he mentions as having -taken place some years before between Egesta and Lilybæum (xi, 86) in -454 <small>B.C.</small>, may probably have been a war between Egesta and -Selinus.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_216"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_216">[216]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 34.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_217"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_217">[217]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 6; Diodor. xii, 83.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_218"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_218">[218]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 6. ὧν ἀκούοντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν ταῖς -ἐκκλησίαις τῶν τε Ἐγεσταίων <em class="gesperrt">πολλάκις λεγόντων</em> καὶ τῶν -ξυναγορευόντων αὐτοῖς ἐψηφίσαντο, etc. -</p> -<p> -Mr. Mitford takes no notice of all these previous debates, when he -imputes to the Athenians hurry and passion in the ultimate decision -(ch. xviii. sect. ii, vol. iv, p. 30.)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_219"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_219">[219]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 46. ἰδίᾳ ξενίσεις ποιούμενοι τῶν -τριηριτῶν, τά τε ἐξ αὐτῆς Ἐγέστης ἐκπώματα καὶ χρυσᾶ καὶ ἀργυρᾶ -ξυλλέξαντες, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐγγὺς πόλεων καὶ Φοινικικῶν καὶ Ἑλληνίδων -αἰτησάμενοι, ἐσέφερον ἐς τὰς ἑστιάσεις ὡς οἰκεῖα ἕκαστοι. Καὶ πάντων -ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρωμένων, καὶ πανταχοῦ πολλῶν φαινομένων, -μεγάλην τὴν ἔκπληξιν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τριήρων Ἀθηναίοις παρεῖχον, etc. -</p> -<p> -Such loans of gold and silver plate betoken a remarkable degree of -intimacy among the different cities.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_220"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_220">[220]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 46; Diodor. xii, 83.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_221"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_221">[221]</a></span> To this winter or spring, perhaps, we may refer the -representation of the lost comedy Τριφάλης of Aristophanês. Iberians -were alluded to in it, to be introduced by Aristarchus; seemingly, -Iberian mercenaries, who were among the auxiliaries talked of at -this time by Alkibiadês and the other prominent advisers of the -expedition, as a means of conquest in Sicily (Thucyd. vi, 90). The -word Τριφάλης was a nickname (not difficult to understand) applied -to Alkibiadês, who was just now at the height of his importance, and -therefore likely enough to be chosen as the butt of a comedy. See the -few fragments remaining of the Τριφάλης, in Meineke, Fragm. Comic. -Gr. vol. ii, pp. 1162-1167.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_222"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_222">[222]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 8; Diodor. xii, 83.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_223"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_223">[223]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 8. Ὁ δὲ Νικίας, ἀκούσιος μὲν ᾑρημένος -ἄρχειν, etc. The reading ἀκούσιος appears better sustained by MSS., -and intrinsically more suitable, than ἀκούσας, which latter word -probably arose from the correction of some reader who was surprised -that Nikias made in the second assembly a speech which properly -belonged to the first, and who explained this by supposing that -Nikias had not been present at the first assembly. That he was not -present, however, is highly improbable. The matter, nevertheless, -does require some explanation; and I have endeavored to supply one in -the text.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_224"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_224">[224]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 9-14. Καὶ σὺ, ὦ -πρύτανι, ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἡγεῖ σοι προσήκειν κήδεσθαί τε τῆς πόλεως, καὶ -βούλει γενέσθαι πολίτης ἀγαθός, ἐπιψήφιζε, καὶ γνώμας προτίθει αὖθις -Ἀθηναίοις, νομίσας, εἰ ὀῤῥωδεῖς τὸ ἀναψηφίσαι, τὸ μὲν λύειν τοὺς -νόμους μὴ μετὰ τοσῶνδ’ ἂν μαρτύρων αἰτίαν σχεῖν, τῆς δὲ πόλεως κακῶς -βουλευσαμένης ἰατρὸς ἂν γενέσθαι, etc.</p> - -<p> -I cannot concur in the remarks of Dr. Arnold, either on this passage -or upon the parallel case of the renewed debate in the Athenian -assembly, on the subject of the punishment to be inflicted on the -Mitylenæans (see above, vol. vi, ch. 1, p. 338, and Thucyd. iii, -36). It appears to me that Nikias was here asking the prytanis to -do an illegal act, which might well expose him to accusation and -punishment. Probably he <i>would</i> have been accused on this ground, if -the decision of the second assembly had been different from what it -actually turned out; if they had reversed the decision of the former -assembly, but only by a small majority. -</p> -<p> -The distinction taken by Dr. Arnold between what was <i>illegal</i> and -what was merely <i>irregular</i>, was little marked at Athens: both were -called <i>illegal</i>, τοὺς νόμους λύειν. The rules which the Athenian -assembly, a sovereign assembly, laid down for its own debates and -decisions, were just as much <i>laws</i> as those which it passed for the -guidance of private citizens. The English House of Commons is not -a sovereign assembly, but only a portion of the sovereign power: -accordingly, the rules which it lays down for its debates are not -<i>laws</i>, but orders of the House: a breach of these orders, therefore, -in debating any particular subject, would not be illegal, but -merely irregular or informal. The same was the case with the French -Chamber of Deputies, prior to the revolution of February, 1848: the -rules which it laid down for its own proceedings were not laws, -but simply <i>le réglement de la Chambre</i>. It is remarkable that the -present National Assembly now sitting (March, 1849) has retained this -expression, and adopted a <i>réglement</i> for its own business; though -it is in point of fact a sovereign assembly, and the rules which it -sanctions are, properly speaking, <i>laws</i>. -</p> -<p> -Both in this case, and in the Mitylenæan debate, I think the Athenian -prytanis committed an illegality. In the first case, every one is -glad of the illegality, because it proved the salvation of so many -Mitylenæan lives. In the second case, the illegality was productive -of practical bad consequences, inasmuch as it seems to have brought -about the immense extension of the scale upon which the expedition -was projected. But there will occur in a few years a third incident, -the condemnation of the six generals after the battle of Arginusæ, in -which the prodigious importance of a strict observance of forms will -appear painfully and conspicuously manifest.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_225"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_225">[225]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 16, 17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_226"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_226">[226]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 17. Καὶ νῦν οὔτε ἀνέλπιστοί πω μᾶλλον -Πελοποννήσιοι ἐς ἡμᾶς ἐγένοντο, εἴτε καὶ πάνυ ἔῤῥωνται, etc. -</p> -<p> -The construction of ἀνέλπιστοι here is not certain: yet I cannot -think that the meaning which Dr. Arnold and others assign to it is -the most suitable. It rather seems to mean the same as in vii, 4, and -vii, 47: “enemies beyond our hopes of being able to deal with.”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_227"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_227">[227]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 16-19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_228"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_228">[228]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 22.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_229"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_229">[229]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 23. ὅπερ ἐγὼ φοβούμενος, καὶ εἰδὼς πολλὰ -μὲν ἡμᾶς δέον βουλεύσασθαι, ἔτι δὲ πλείω εὐτυχῆσαι (<em class="gesperrt">χαλεπὸν δὲ -ἀνθρώπους ὄντας</em>), ὅτι ἐλάχιστα τῇ τύχῃ παραδοὺς ἐμαυτὸν βούλομαι -ἐκπλεῖν, παρασκευῇ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰκότων ἀσφαλὴς ἐκπλεῦσαι. Ταῦτα γὰρ τῇ -τε ξυμπάσῃ πόλει βεβαιότατα ἡγοῦμαι, καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς στρατευσομένοις -σωτήρια· εἰ δέ τῳ ἄλλως δοκεῖ, παρίημι αὐτῷ τὴν ἀρχήν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_230"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_230">[230]</a></span> Plutarch. Compare Nikias and Crassus, c. 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_231"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_231">[231]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 1. οὐ πολλῷ τινι ὑποδεέστερον πόλεμον, -etc.: compare vii, 28.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_232"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_232">[232]</a></span> Compare Plutarch, Præcept. Reipubl. Gerend. p. 804.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_233"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_233">[233]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 99; vi, 1-6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_234"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_234">[234]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 6. ἐφιέμενοι μὲν τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ προφάσει, -τῆς πάσης (Σικελίας) ἄρξειν, βοηθεῖν δὲ ἅμα εὐπρεπῶς βουλόμενοι τοῖς -ἑαυτῶν ξυγγένεσι καὶ τοῖς προσγεγενημένοις ξυμμάχοις. -</p> -<p> -Even in the speech of Alkibiadês, the conquest of Sicily is only once -alluded to, and that indirectly; rather as a favorable possibility, -than as a result to be counted upon.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_235"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_235">[235]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 15. Καὶ μάλιστα στρατηγῆσαί τε ἐπιθυμῶν -καὶ ἐλπίζων Σικελίαν τε δι’ αὐτοῦ καὶ Καρχηδόνα λήψεσθαι, καὶ τὰ -ἴδια ἅμα εὐτυχήσας χρήμασί τε καὶ δόξῃ ὠφελήσειν. Ὢν γὰρ ἐν ἀξιώματι -ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀστῶν, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις μείζοσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν οὐσίαν -ἐχρῆτο ἔς τε τὰς ἱπποτροφίας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δαπάνας, etc. -</p> -<p> -Compare vi, 90. Plutarch (Alkib. c. 19; Nikias, c. 12). Plutarch -sometimes speaks as if, not Alkibiadês alone (or at least in -conjunction with a few partisans), but the Athenians generally, set -out with an expectation of conquering Carthage as well as Sicily. -In the speech which Alkibiadês made at Sparta after his banishment -(Thucyd. vi, 90), he does indeed state this as the general purpose -of the expedition. But it seems plain that he is here describing, to -his countrymen generally, plans which were only fermenting in his own -brain, as we may discern from a careful perusal of the first twenty -chapters of the sixth book of Thucydidês. -</p> -<p> -In the inaccurate Oratio de Pace ascribed to Andokidês (sect. 30), it -is alleged that the Syracusans sent an embassy to Athens, a little -before this expedition, entreating to be admitted as allies of the -Athenians, and affirming that Syracuse would be a more valuable ally -to Athens than Egesta or Katana. This statement is wholly untrue.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_236"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_236">[236]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_237"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_237">[237]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 31. ἐπιφοράς τε πρὸς τῷ ἐκ δημοσίου μισθῷ -διδόντων τοῖς θρανίταις τῶν ναυτῶν καὶ <em class="gesperrt">ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις</em>, καὶ -τἄλλα σημείοις καὶ κατασκευαῖς πολυτελέσι χρησαμένων, etc. -</p> -<p> -Dobree and Dr. Arnold explain ὑπηρεσίαις to mean <i>the petty -officers</i>, such as κυβερνήτης, κελευστὴς, etc. Göller and Poppo -construe it to mean “<i>the servants of the sailors</i>.” Neither of -the two seems to me satisfactory. I think the word means “to the -crews generally;” the word ὑπερησία being a perfectly general word -comprising all who received pay in the ship. All the examples -produced in the notes of the commentators testify this meaning, which -also occurs in the text itself two lines before. To construe ταῖς -ὑπηρεσίαις as meaning “the crews generally, or the remaining crews, -along with the thranitæ,” is doubtless more or less awkward. But it -departs less from ordinary construction than either of the two senses -which the commentators propose.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_238"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_238">[238]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 13. οἱ ξένοι, οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ ἐσβάντες, -etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_239"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_239">[239]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 26. I do not trust the statement given in -Æschinês, De Fals. Legat. c. 54, p. 302, and in Andokidês, De Pace, -sect. 8, that seven thousand talents were laid by as an accumulated -treasure in the acropolis during the Peace of Nikias, and that four -hundred triremes, or three hundred triremes, were newly built. The -numerous historical inaccuracies in those orations, concerning the -facts prior to 400 <small>B.C.</small>, are such as to deprive them of all -authority, except where they are confirmed by other testimony; even -if we admitted the oration ascribed to Andokidês as genuine, which in -all probability it is not. -</p> -<p> -But there exists an interesting Inscription which proves that the sum -of three thousand talents at least must have been laid by, during -the interval between the conclusion of the Peace of Nikias and the -Sicilian Expedition, in the acropolis; and that over and above this -accumulated fund, the state was in condition to discharge, out of -the current receipts, various sums which it had borrowed during the -previous war from the treasury of various temples, and seems to have -had besides a surplus for docks and fortifications. The Inscription -above named records the vote passed for discharging these debts, and -for securing the sums so paid in the opisthodomus, or back-chamber, -of the Parthenon, for account of those gods to whom they respectively -belonged. See Boeckh’s Corp. Inscr. part ii, Inscr. Att. No. 76, p. -117; also the Staats-haushaltung der Athener of the same author, vol. -ii, p. 198. This Inscription belongs unquestionably to one of the -years between 421-415 <small>B.C.</small>, to which year we cannot say.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_240"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_240">[240]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 31; Diodor. xiii, 2, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_241"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_241">[241]</a></span> Plutarch (Nikias, c. 12, 13; Alkibiad. c. 17). -Immediately after the catastrophe at Syracuse, the Athenians were -very angry with those prophets who had promised them success (Thucyd. -viii, 1).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_242"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_242">[242]</a></span> Cicero, Legg. ii, 11. “Melius Græci atque nostri; -qui, ut augerent pietatem in Deos, easdem illos urbes, quas nos, -<i>incolere</i> voluerunt.” -</p> -<p> -How much the Grecian mind was penetrated with the idea of the god -as an actual inhabitant of the town, may be seen illustrated in the -Oration of Lysias, cont. Andokid. sects. 15-46: compare Herodotus, v, -67; a striking story, as illustrated in this History, vol. iii, ch. -ix, p. 34; also Xenophon, Hellen. vi, 4-7; Livy, xxxviii, 43. -</p> -<p> -In an Inscription in Boeckh’s Corp. Insc. (part ii, No. 190, p. 320) -a list of the names of Prytaneis, appears, at the head of which list -figures the name of Athênê Polias.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_243"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_243">[243]</a></span> Pausanias, i, 24, 3; iv, 33, 4; viii, 31, 4; viii, -48, 4; viii, 41, 4; Plutarch, An Seni sit Gerenda Respubl. ad finem; -Aristophan. Plut. 1153, and Schol.: compare O. Müller, Archäologie -der Kunst, sect. 67; K. F. Hermann, Gottesdienstl. Alterth. der -Griechen, sect. 15; Gerhard, De Religione Hermarum. Berlin, 1845.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_244"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_244">[244]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 27. ὅσοι Ἑρμαῖ ἦσαν λίθινοι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇ -Ἀθηναίων ... <em class="gesperrt">μιᾷ νυκτὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι</em> περιεκόπησαν τὰ πρόσωπα. -</p> -<p> -Andokidês (De Myst. sect. 63) expressly states that only a single one -was spared—καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὁ Ἑρμῆς ὃν ὁρᾶτε πάντες, ὁ παρὰ τὴν πατρῷαν -οἰκίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν, οὐ περιεκόπη, <em class="gesperrt">μόνος τῶν Ἑρμῶν τῶν Ἀθήνῃσι</em>. -</p> -<p> -Cornelius Nepos (Alkibiad. c. 3) and Plutarch (Alkib. c. 13) copy -Andokidês: in his life of Nikias (c. 18) the latter uses the -expression of Thucydidês—οἱ πλεῖστοι. This expression is noway at -variance with Andokidês, though it stops short of his affirmation. -There is great mixture of truth and falsehood in the Oration of -Andokidês; but I think that he is to be trusted as to this point. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus (xiii, 2) says that <i>all</i> the Hermæ were mutilated, not -recognizing a single exception. Cornelius Nepos, by a singular -inaccuracy, talks about the Hermæ as having been all <i>thrown down</i> -(dejicerentur).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_245"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_245">[245]</a></span> It is truly astonishing to read the account -given of this mutilation of the Hermæ, and its consequences, by -Wachsmuth, Hellen. Alterthümer, vol. ii, sect. 65, pp. 191-196. -While he denounces the Athenian people, for their conduct during -the subsequent inquiry, in the most unmeasured language, you would -suppose that the incident which plunged them into this mental -distraction, at a moment of overflowing hope and confidence, was -a mere trifle: so briefly does he pass it over, without taking -the smallest pains to show in what way it profoundly wounded the -religious feeling of Athens. -</p> -<p> -Büttner (Geschichte der politischen Hetærieen zu Athen. p. 65), -though very brief, takes a fairer view than Wachsmuth.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_246"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_246">[246]</a></span> Pausanias, i, 17, 1; i, 24, 3; Harpokration v, Ἑρμαῖ. -See Sluiter, Lectiones Andocideæ, cap. 2. -</p> -<p> -Especially the ἀγυιατίδες θεραπεῖαι (Eurip. Ion. 187) were noted -at Athens: ceremonial attentions towards the divine persons who -protected the public streets, a function performed by Apollo Aguieus, -as well as by Hermes.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_247"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_247">[247]</a></span> Herodot. viii, 144; Æschylus, Pers. 810; Æschyl. -Agam. 339. The wrath for any indignity offered to the statue of a -god or goddess, and impatience to punish it capitally, is manifested -as far back as the ancient epic poem of Arktinus: see the argument -of the Ἰλίου Πέρσις in Proclus, and Welcker, Griechische Tragödien, -<i>Sophoklês</i>, sect. 21, vol. i, p. 162. Herodotus cannot explain the -indignities offered by Kambyses to the Egyptian statues and holy -customs upon any other supposition than that of stark madness, ἐμάνη -μεγάλως; Herod. iii, 37-38. -</p> -<p> -Timæus the Sicilian historian (writing about 320-290 <small>B.C.</small>) -represented the subsequent defeat of the Athenians as a divine -punishment for the desecration of the Hermæ, inflicted chiefly by the -Syracusan Hermokratês, son of Hermon and descendant of the god Hermes -(Timæi Fragm. 103-104, ed. Didot; Longinus, de Sublim. iv, 3). -</p> -<p> -The etymological thread of connection, between the Hermæ and -Hermokratês, is strange enough: but what is of importance to remark, -is the deep-seated belief that such an act must bring after it divine -punishment, and that the Athenians as a people were collectively -responsible, unless they could appease the divine displeasure. If -this was the view taken by the historian Timæus a century and more -after the transaction, much more keenly was it present to the minds -of the Athenians of that day.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_248"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_248">[248]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 97; Plato, Legg. ix, pp. 871 <i>b</i>, 881 -<i>d</i>. ἡ τοῦ νόμου ἄρα, etc. Demosthen. Fals. Legat. p. 363, c. 24, p. -404, c. 60; Plutarch, Solon, c. 24.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_249"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_249">[249]</a></span> Dr. Thirlwall observes, in reference to the feeling at -Athens after the mutilation of the Hermæ:— -</p> -<p> -“We indeed see so little connection between acts of daring impiety -and designs against the state, that we can hardly understand how -they could have been associated together as they were in the minds -of the Athenians. But perhaps the difficulty may not without reason -have appeared much less to the contemporaries of Alcibiadês, who -were rather disposed by their views of religion to regard them as -inseparable.” (Hist. Gr. ch. xxv, vol. iii, p. 394.) -</p> -<p> -This remark, like so many others in Dr. Thirlwall’s history, -indicates a tone of liberality forming a striking contrast with -Wachsmuth; and rare indeed among the learned men who have undertaken -to depict the democracy of Athens. It might, however, have been -stated far more strongly; for an Athenian citizen would have had -quite as much difficulty in comprehending our <i>disjunction</i> of the -two ideas, as we have in comprehending his <i>association</i> of the two.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_250"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_250">[250]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 27. Καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα μειζόνως ἐλάμβανον· τοῦ -τε γὰρ ἐκπλοῦ οἰωνὸς ἐδόκει εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ἅμα νεωτέρων -πραγμάτων καὶ δήμου καταλύσεως γεγενῆσθαι. -</p> -<p> -Cornelius Nepos, Alcibiad. c. 3. “Hoc quum appareret non sine -magnimultorum consensione esse factam,” etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_251"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_251">[251]</a></span> Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 18; Pherekratês, Fr. Inc. 84, -ed. Meineke; Fragment. Comic. Græc. vol. ii, p. 358, also p. 1164; -Aristoph. Frag. Inc. 120.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_252"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_252">[252]</a></span> Plutarch, Alkib. c. 18; Pseudo-Plutarch, Vit. X, -Orator. p. 834, who professes to quote from Kratippus, an author -nearly contemporary. The Pseudo-Plutarch, however, asserts, what -cannot be true, that the Corinthians employed Leontine and Egestæan -agents to destroy the Hermæ. The Leontines and Egestæans were exactly -the parties who had greatest interest in getting the Sicilian -expedition to start: they are the last persons whom the Corinthians -would have chosen as instruments. The fact is, that no foreigners -could well have done the deed: it required great familiarity with all -the buildings, highways, and byways of Athens. -</p> -<p> -The Athenian Philochorus (writing about the date 310-280 -<small>B.C.</small>) ascribed the mutilation of the Hermæ to the -Corinthians; if we may believe the scholiast on Aristophanês; who, -however, is not very careful, since he tells us that <i>Thucydidês</i> -ascribed that act to Alkibiadês and his friends; which is not true -(Philochor. Frag. 110, ed. Didot; Schol. Aristoph. Lysistr. 1094).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_253"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_253">[253]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 34.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_254"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_254">[254]</a></span> See Thucyd. v, 45; v, 50; viii, 5. Xenophon, Hellen. -iv, 7, 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_255"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_255">[255]</a></span> See the remarkable passage in the contemporary -pleading of Antiphon on a trial for homicide (Orat. ii. Tetralog. 1. -1, 10). -</p> -<p> -Ἀσύμφορόν θ’ ὑμῖν ἐστὶ τόνδε μιαρὸν καὶ ἄναγνον ὄντα εἰς τὰ τεμένη -τῶν θεῶν εἰσιόντα μιαίνειν τὴν ἁγνείαν αὐτῶν ἐπί τε τὰς αὐτὰς -τραπέζας ἰόντα <em class="gesperrt">συγκαταπιμπλάναι τοὺς ἀναιτίους· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων -αἵ τε ἀφορίαι γίγνονται δυστυχεῖς θ’ αἱ πράξεις καθίστανται</em>. -<em class="gesperrt">Οἰκείαν</em> οὖν χρὴ τὴν <em class="gesperrt">τιμωρίαν ἡγησαμένους</em>, αὐτῷ τούτῳ -τὰ τούτου ἀσεβήματα ἀναθέντας, ἰδίαν μὲν τὴν συμφορὰν καθαρὰν δὲ τὴν -πόλιν καταστῆσαι. -</p> -<p> -Compare Antiphon, De Cæde Herodis, sect. 83 and Sophoklês, Œdip. -Tyrann. 26, 96, 170, as to the miseries which befell a country, so -long as the person guilty of homicide remained to pollute the soil -and until he was slain or expelled. See also Xenophon, Hiero. iv, 4, -and Plato, Legg. x, p. 885-910, at the beginning and the end of the -tenth book. Plato ranks (ὕβρις) outrage against sacred objects as -the highest and most guilty species of ὕβρις; deserving the severest -punishment. He considers that the person committing such impiety, -unless he be punished or banished, brings evil and the anger of the -gods upon the whole population.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_256"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_256">[256]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_257"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_257">[257]</a></span> Andokidês de Mysteriis, sect. 20.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_258"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_258">[258]</a></span> Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 14, 15, 36; Plutarch, -Alkibiad. c. 18.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_259"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_259">[259]</a></span> Those who are disposed to imagine that the violent -feelings and proceedings at Athens by the mutilation of the Hermæ -were the consequence of her democratical government, may be reminded -of an analogous event of modern times from which we are not yet -separated by a century. -</p> -<p> -In the year 1766, at Abbeville in France, two young gentlemen of -good family—the Chevalier d’Etallonde and Chevalier de la Barre—were -tried, convicted, and condemned for having injured a wooden -crucifix which stood on the bridge of that town: in aggravation of -this offence they were charged with having sung indecent songs. -The evidence to prove these points was exceedingly doubtful; -nevertheless, both were condemned to have their tongues cut out by -the roots, to have their right hands cut off at the church gate, -then to be tied to a post in the market-place with an iron chain, -and burnt by a slow fire. This sentence, after being submitted by -way of appeal to the Parliament of Paris, and by them confirmed, -was actually executed upon the Chevalier de la Barre—d’Etallonde -having escaped—in July, 1766; with this mitigation, that he was -allowed to be decapitated before he was burnt; but at the same time -with this aggravation, that he was put to the torture, ordinary and -extraordinary, to compel him to disclose his accomplices (Voltaire, -Relation de la Mort du Chevalier de la Barre, Œuvres, vol. xlii, pp. -361-379, ed. Beuchot: also Voltaire, Le Cri du Sang Innocent, vol. -xii, p. 133). -</p> -<p> -I extract from this treatise a passage showing how—as in this -mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens—the occurrence of one act of -sacrilege turns men’s imagination, belief, and talk, to others, real -or imaginary:— -</p> -<p> -“Tandis que Belleval ourdissoit sécrètement cette trame, il -arriva malheureusement que le crucifix de bois, posé sur le pont -d’Abbeville, étoit endommagé, et l’on soupçonna que des soldats ivres -avoient commis cette insolence impie. -</p> -<p> -“Malheureusement l’evêque d’Amiens, étant aussi evêque d’Abbeville, -donna à cette aventure une célébrité et une importance qu’elle -ne méritoit pas. Il fit lancer des monitoires: il vint faire une -procession solennelle auprès du crucifix; <i>et on ne parla en -Abbeville que de sacrilèges pendant une année entière</i>. On disoit -qu’il se formoit une nouvelle secte qui brisoit les crucifix, qui -jettoit par terre toutes les hosties, et les perçoit à coups de -couteaux. On assuroit qu’ils avoient répandu beaucoup de sang. Il -y eut des femmes qui crurent en avoir été témoins. On renouvela -tous les contes calomnieux répandus contre les Juifs dans tant de -villes de l’Europe. Vous connoissez, Monsieur, jusqu’à quel point la -populace porte la credulité et le fanatisme, toujours encouragé par -les moines. -</p> -<p> -“La procédure une fois commencée, il y eut une foule de délations. -Chacun disoit ce qu’il avoit vu ou cru voir—ce qu’il avoit entendu ou -cru entendre.” -</p> -<p> -It will be recollected that the sentence on the Chevalier de la Barre -was passed, not by the people, nor by any popular judicature, but -by a limited court of professional judges sitting at Abbeville, and -afterwards confirmed by the Parlement de Paris, the first tribunal of -professional judges in France.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_260"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_260">[260]</a></span> Andokidês (De Myster. s. 11) marks this time -minutely—Ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἐκκλησία τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τοῖς εἰς Σικελίαν, Νικίᾳ -καὶ Λαμάχῳ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, καὶ τριήρης ἡ στρατηγὶς ἤδη ἐξώρμει ἡ -Λαμάχου· ἀναστὰς δὲ Πυθόνικος ἐν τῷ δήμῳ εἶπεν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_261"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_261">[261]</a></span> Andokid. de Myster. s. 11-13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_262"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_262">[262]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 29. Isokratês (Orat. xvi, De Bigis, sects. -7, 8) represents these proceedings before the departure for Sicily, -in a very inaccurate manner.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_263"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_263">[263]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 29. Οἱ δ’ ἐχθροὶ, δεδιότες τό τε -στράτευμα, μὴ εὔνουν ἔχῃ, ἢν ἤδη ἀγωνίζηται, ὅ τε δῆμος μὴ -μαλακίζηται, θεραπεύων ὅτι δι’ ἐκεῖνον οἵ τ’ Ἀργεῖοι ξυνεστράτευον -καὶ τῶν Μαντινέων τινες, ἀπέτρεπον καὶ ἀπέσπευδον, <em class="gesperrt">ἄλλους ῥήτορας -ἐνιέντες</em>, οἳ ἔλεγον νῦν μὲν πλεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ κατασχεῖν τὴν -ἀγωγὴν, ἐλθόντα δὲ κρίνεσθαι ἐν ἡμέραις ῥηταῖς, βουλόμενοι ἐκ -μείζονος διαβολῆς, ἣν ἔμελλον ῥᾷον αὐτοῦ ἀπόντος ποριεῖν, μετάπεμπτον -κομισθέντα αὐτὸν ἀγωνίσασθαι. -</p> -<p> -Compare Plutarch, Alkib. c. 19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_264"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_264">[264]</a></span> The account which Andokidês gives of the first -accusation against Alkibiadês by Pythonikus, in the assembly, -prior to the departure of the fleet, presents the appearance of -being substantially correct, and I have followed it in the text. -It is in harmony with the more brief indications of Thucydidês. -But when Andokidês goes on to say, that “in consequence of this -information, Polystratus was seized and put to death, while the rest -of the parties denounced fled, and were condemned to death in their -absence,” (sect. 13,) this cannot be true. Alkibiadês most certainly -did not flee, and was not condemned at <i>that time</i>. If Alkibiadês -was not then tried, neither could the other persons have been tried, -who were denounced as his accomplices in the same offence. My belief -is that this information, having been first presented by the enemies -of Alkibiadês before the sailing of the fleet, was dropped entirely -for that time, both against him and against his accomplices. It was -afterwards resumed, when the information of Andokidês himself had -satisfied the Athenians on the question of the Hermokopids: and the -impeachment presented by Thessalus son of Kimon against Alkibiadês, -was founded, in part at least, upon the information presented by -Andromachus. -</p> -<p> -If Polystratus was put to death at all, it could only have been -on this second bringing forward of the charge, at the time when -Alkibiadês was sent for and refused to come home. But we may well -doubt whether he was put to death at that time or on that ground, -when we see how inaccurate the statement of Andokidês is as to the -consequences of the information of Andromachus. He mentions Panætius -as one of those who fled in consequence of that information, and were -condemned in their absence: but Panætius appears afterwards, in the -very same speech, as <i>not</i> having fled at that time (sects. 13, 52, -67). Harpokration states (v. Πολύστρατος), on the authority of an -oration ascribed to Lysias, that Polystratus was put to death on the -charge of having been concerned in the mutilation of the Hermæ. This -is quite different from the statement of Andokidês, and would lead us -to suppose that Polystratus was one of those against whom Andokidês -himself informed.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_265"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_265">[265]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 43; vii, 57.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_266"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_266">[266]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 32; Diodor. xiii, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_267"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_267">[267]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 44.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_268"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_268">[268]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 44-46.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_269"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_269">[269]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 32-35. Mr. Mitford observes: “It is -not specified by historians, but the account of Thucydidês makes -it evident, that there had been a revolution in the government of -Syracuse, or at least a great change in its administration, since -the oligarchical Leontines were admitted to the rights of Syracusan -citizens (ch. xviii, sect. iii, vol. iv, p. 46). The democratical -party now bore the sway,” etc. -</p> -<p> -I cannot imagine upon what passage of Thucydidês Mr. Mitford founds -this conjecture, which appears to me pure fancy. He had spoken of the -government as a democracy before, he continues to speak of it as a -democracy now, in the same unaltered vituperative strain.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_270"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_270">[270]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 41. τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπιμεμελήμεθα ἤδη, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_271"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_271">[271]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 34. Ὃ δὲ μάλιστα ἐγώ τε νομίζω ἐπίκαιρον, -<em class="gesperrt">ὑμεῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ ξύνηθες ἥσυχον ἥκιστ’ ἂν ὀξέως πείθοισθε</em>, ὅμως -εἰρήσεται. -</p> -<p> -That “habitual quiescence” which Hermokratês here predicates of his -countrymen, forms a remarkable contrast with the restless activity, -and intermeddling carried even to excess, which Periklês and Nikias -deprecate in the Athenians (Thucyd. i, 144; vi, 7). Both of the -governments, however, were democratical. This serves as a lesson of -caution respecting general predications about <i>all</i> democracies; -for it is certain that one democracy differed in many respects from -another. It may be doubted, however, whether the attribute here -ascribed by Hermokratês to his countrymen was really deserved, to the -extent which his language implies.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_272"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_272">[272]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 33-36.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_273"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_273">[273]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 32-35. τῶν δὲ Συρακοσίων ὁ δῆμος ἐν πολλῇ -πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔριδι ἦσαν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_274"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_274">[274]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 35. παρελθὼν δ’ αὐτοῖς Ἀθηναγόρας, ὃς -δήμου τε προστάτης ἦν καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πιθανώτατος τοῖς πολλοῖς, -ἔλεγε τοιάδε, etc. -</p> -<p> -The position ascribed here to Athenagoras seems to be the same as -that which is assigned to Kleon at Athens—ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ’ ἐκεῖνον -τὸν χρόνον ὢν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος, etc. (iv, 21). -</p> -<p> -Neither δήμου προστάτης nor δημαγωγὸς, denotes any express functions, -or titular office (see the note of Dr. Arnold), at least in these -places. It is possible that there may have been some Grecian town -constitutions, in which there was an office bearing that title: -but this is a point which cannot be affirmed. Nor would the words -δήμου προστάτης always imply an equal degree of power: the person so -designated might have more power in one town than in another. Thus -in Megara (iv, 67) it seems that the oligarchical party had recently -been banished: the leaders of the popular party had become the most -influential men in the city. See also iii, 70, Peithias at Korkyra.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_275"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_275">[275]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 36-40. I give the substance of what is -ascribed to Athenagoras by Thucydidês, without binding myself to the -words.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_276"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_276">[276]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 36. τοὺς δ’ ἀγγέλλοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα -καὶ περιφόβους ὑμᾶς ποιοῦντας τῆς μὲν τόλμης οὐ θαυμάζω, τῆς δὲ -ἀξυνεσίας, εἰ μὴ οἴονται ἔνδηλοι εἶναι.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_277"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_277">[277]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 38. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, οἵ τε -Ἀθηναῖοι γιγνώσκοντες, τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν, εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι, σῴζουσι, καὶ -ἐνθένδε ἄνδρες οὔτε ὄντα, οὔτε ἂν γενόμενα, λογοποιοῦσιν. Οὓς ἐγὼ -οὐ νῦν πρῶτον, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἐπίσταμαι, ἤτοι λόγοις γε τοιοῖσδε, καὶ -ἔτι τούτων κακουργοτέροις, ἢ ἔργοις, βουλομένους καταπλήξαντας τὸ -ὑμέτερον πλῆθος αὐτοὺς τῆς πόλεως ἄρχειν. Καὶ δέδοικα μέντοι μήποτε -πολλὰ πειρῶντες καὶ κατορθώσωσιν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_278"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_278">[278]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 39. φήσει τις δημοκρατίαν οὔτε ξυνετὸν -οὔτ’ ἴσον εἶναι, τοὺς δ’ ἔχοντας τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἄρχειν ἄριστα -βελτίστους. Ἐγὼ δέ φημι πρῶτα μὲν, δῆμον ξύμπαν ὠνομάσθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν -δὲ μέρος· ἔπειτα, <em class="gesperrt">φύλακας μὲν ἀρίστους εἶναι χρημάτων τοὺς -πλουσίους</em>, βουλεῦσαι δ’ ἂν βέλτιστα τοὺς ξυνετοὺς, κρῖναι δ’ ἂν -ἀκούσαντας ἄριστα τοὺς πολλούς· καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως καὶ κατὰ μέρη καὶ -ξύμπαντα ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ ἰσομοιρεῖν. -</p> -<p> -Dr. Arnold translates φύλακας χρημάτων, “having the care of the -public purse,” as if it were φύλακας τῶν δημοσίων χρημάτων. But it -seems to me that the words carry a larger sense, and refer to the -private property of these rich men, not to their functions as keepers -of what was collected from taxation or tribute. Looking at a rich -man from the point of view of the public, he is guardian of his own -property until the necessities of the state require that he should -spend more or less of it for the public defence or benefit: in the -interim, he enjoys it as he pleases, but he will for his own interest -take care that the property does not perish (compare vi, 9). This is -the service which he renders, <i>quatenus</i>, <i>rich man</i>, to the state; -he may also serve it in other ways, but that would be by means of -his personal qualities; thus he may, for example, be intelligent as -well as rich (ξυνετὸς as well as πλούσιος), and then he may serve -the state as <i>counsellor</i>, the second of the two categories named by -Athenagoras. What that orator is here negativing is, the better title -and superior fitness of the rich to exercise command, which was the -claim put forward in their behalf. And he goes on to indicate what -is their real position and service in a democracy; that they are to -enjoy the revenue, and preserve the capital, of their wealth, subject -to demands for public purposes when necessary, but not to expect -command, unless they are personally competent. Properly speaking, -that which he here affirms is true of the small lots of property -taken in the mass, as well as of the large, and is one of the grounds -of defence of private property against communism. But the rich man’s -property is an appreciable item to the state, individually taken; -moreover, he is perpetually raising unjust pretensions to political -power, so that it becomes necessary to define how much he is really -entitled to.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_279"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_279">[279]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 39. Ὀλιγαρχία δὲ τῶν μὲν κινδύνων τοῖς -πολλοῖς μεταδίδωσι, τῶν δ’ ὠφελίμων οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ μόνον, ἀλλὰ -καὶ ξύμπαν ἀφελομένη ἔχει· <em class="gesperrt">ἃ ὑμῶν οἵ τε δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ νέοι -προθυμοῦνται</em>, ἀδύνατα ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει κατασχεῖν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_280"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_280">[280]</a></span> See above, in this volume, <a href="#Chap_56">chap. lvi</a>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_281"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_281">[281]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 45.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_282"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_282">[282]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 47; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 14.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_283"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_283">[283]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 48. Οὕτως ἤδη Συρακούσαις καὶ Σελινοῦντι -ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢν μὴ οἱ μὲν Ἐγεσταίοις ξυμβαίνωσιν, οἱ δὲ Λεοντίνους -ἐῶσι κατοικίζειν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_284"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_284">[284]</a></span> Compare iv, 104, describing the surprise of Amphipolis -by Brasidas.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_285"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_285">[285]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 49.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_286"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_286">[286]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 50.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_287"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_287">[287]</a></span> Polyænus (i, 40, 4) treats this acquisition of Katana -as the result, not of accident, but of a preconcerted plot. I follow -the account as given by Thucydidês.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_288"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_288">[288]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 52.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_289"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_289">[289]</a></span> Thucyd. vi. 53-61.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_290"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_290">[290]</a></span> Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 14, 15, 35. In -reference to the deposition of Agaristê, Andokidês again includes -Alkibiadês among those who fled into banishment in consequence of -it. Unless we are to suppose another Alkibiadês, not the general in -Sicily, this statement cannot be true. There was another Alkibiadês, -of the deme Phegus: but Andokidês in mentioning him afterwards (sect. -65), specifies his deme. He was cousin of Alkibiadês, and was in -exile at the same time with him (Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 13).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_291"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_291">[291]</a></span> Andokidês (sects. 13-34) affirms that some of the -persons, accused by Teukrus as mutilators of the Hermæ, were put -to death upon his deposition. But I contest his accuracy on this -point. For Thucydidês recognizes no one as having been put to death -except those against whom Andokidês himself informed (see vi, 27, -53, 61). He dwells particularly upon the number of persons, and -persons of excellent character, imprisoned on suspicion; but he -mentions none as having been put to death except those against whom -Andokidês gave testimony. He describes it as a great harshness, -and as an extraordinary proof of the reigning excitement, that the -Athenians should have detained so many persons upon suspicion, on -the evidence of informers not entitled to credence. But he would not -have specified this detention as extraordinary harshness, if the -Athenians had gone so far as to put individuals to death upon the -same evidence. Besides, to put these men to death would have defeated -their own object, the full and entire disclosure of the plot and the -conspirators. The ignorance in which they were of their internal -enemies, was among the most agonizing of all their sentiments; and to -put any prisoner to death until they arrived, or believed themselves -to have arrived, at the knowledge of the whole, would tend so far to -bar their own chance of obtaining evidence: ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων -ἄσμενος λαβὼν, ὡς ᾤετο, τὸ σαφὲς, καὶ δεινὸν ποιούμενοι πρότερον εἰ -τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας σφῶν τῷ πλήθει μὴ εἴσονται, etc. -</p> -<p> -Wachsmuth says (p. 194): “The bloodthirsty dispositions of the people -had been excited by the previous murders: the greater the number of -victims to be slaughtered, the better were the people pleased,” etc. -This is an inaccuracy quite in harmony with the general spirit of -his narrative. It is contradicted, implicitly, by the very words of -Thucydidês which he transcribes in his note 108.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_292"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_292">[292]</a></span> Andokid. de Mysteriis, sects. 27-28. καὶ Ἀνδροκλῆς -<em class="gesperrt">ὑπὲρ</em> τῆς βουλῆς.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_293"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_293">[293]</a></span> Andokid. de Myster. sect. 36. It seems that Diognêtus, -who had been commissioner of inquiry at the time when Pythonikus -presented the first information of the slave Andromachus, was himself -among the parties denounced by Teukrus (And. de Mys. sects. 14, 15).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_294"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_294">[294]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 53-60. οὐ δοκιμάζοντες τοὺς μηνυτὰς, -ἀλλὰ πάντας ὑπόπτως ἀποδεχόμενοι, διὰ πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων πίστιν πάνυ -χρηστοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν ξυλλαμβάνοντες κατέδουν, χρησιμώτερον ἡγούμενοι -εἶναι βασανίσαι τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ εὑρεῖν, ἢ διὰ μηνυτοῦ πονηρίαν τινὰ καὶ -χρηστὸν δοκοῦντα εἶναι αἰτιαθέντα ἀνέλεγκτον διαφυγεῖν.... -</p> -<p> -... δεινὸν ποιούμενοι, εἰ τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας σφῶν τῷ πλήθει μὴ -εἴσονται....</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_295"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_295">[295]</a></span> Andokid. de Myst. sect. 36.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_296"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_296">[296]</a></span> Plutarch (Alkib. c. 20) and Diodorus (xiii, 2) assert -that this testimony was glaringly false, since on the night in -question it was <i>new moon</i>. I presume, at least, that the remark of -Diodorus refers to the deposition of Diokleidês, though he never -mentions the name of the latter, and even describes the deposition -referred to with many material variations as compared with Andokidês. -Plutarch’s observation certainly refers to Diokleidês, whose -deposition, he says, affirming that he had seen and distinguished the -persons in question by the light of the moon, on a night when it was -<i>new</i> moon, shocked all sensible men, but produced no effect upon the -blind fury of the people. Wachsmuth (Hellenisch. Alterth. vol. ii, -ch. viii, p. 194) copies this remark from Plutarch. -</p> -<p> -I disbelieve altogether the assertion that it was <i>new moon</i> on that -night. Andokidês gives in great detail the deposition of Diokleidês, -with a strong wish to show that it was false and perfidiously got -up. But he nowhere mentions the fact that it was <i>new moon</i> on the -night in question; though if we read his report and his comments upon -the deposition of Diokleidês, we shall see that he never could have -omitted such a means of discrediting the whole tale, if the fact had -been so (Andokid. de Myster. sects. 37-43). Besides, it requires very -good positive evidence to make us believe, that a suborned informer, -giving his deposition not long after one of the most memorable nights -that ever passed at Athens, would be so clumsy as to make particular -reference to the circumstance that it was <i>full moon</i> (εἶναι δὲ -πανσέληνον), if it had really been <i>new moon</i>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_297"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_297">[297]</a></span> Andokid. de Myster. sects. 37-42.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_298"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_298">[298]</a></span> Considering the extreme alarm which then pervaded the -Athenian mind, and their conviction that there were traitors among -themselves whom yet they could not identify, it is to be noted as -remarkable that they resisted the proposition of their commissioners -for applying torture. We must recollect that the Athenians admitted -the principle of the torture, as a good mode of eliciting truth as -well as of testing depositions,—for they applied it often to the -testimony of slaves,—sometimes apparently to that of metics. Their -attachment to the established law, which forbade the application of -it to citizens, must have been very great, to enable them to resist -the great special and immediate temptation to apply it in this case -to Mantitheus and Aphepsion, if only by way of exception. -</p> -<p> -The application of torture to witnesses and suspected persons, -handed down from the Roman law, was in like manner recognized, and -pervaded nearly all the criminal jurisprudence of Europe until the -last century. I hope that the reader, after having gone through the -painful narrative of the proceedings of the Athenians after the -mutilation of the Hermæ, will take the trouble to peruse by way -of comparison the <i>Storia della Colonna Infame</i>, by the eminent -Alexander Manzoni, author of “I Promessi Sposi.” This little volume, -including a republication of Verri’s “Osservazioni sulla Tortura,” -is full both of interest and instruction. It lays open the judicial -enormities committed at Milan in 1630, while the terrible pestilence -was raging there, by the examining judges and the senate, in order -to get evidence against certain suspected persons called <i>Untori</i>; -that is, men who were firmly believed by the whole population, with -very few exceptions, to be causing and propagating the pestilence by -means of certain ointment which they applied to the doors and walls -of houses. Manzoni recounts with simple, eloquent, and impressive -detail, the incredible barbarity with which the official lawyers -at Milan, under the authority of the senate, extorted, by force of -torture, evidence against several persons, of having committed this -imaginary and impossible crime. The persons thus convicted were -executed under horrible torments: the house of one of them, a barber -named Mora, was pulled down, and a pillar with an inscription erected -upon the site, to commemorate the deed. This pillar, the <i>Colonna -Infame</i>, remained standing in Milan until the close of the 18th -century. The reader will understand, from Manzoni’s narrative, the -degree to which public excitement and alarm can operate to poison -and barbarize the course of justice in a Christian city, without -a taint of democracy, and with professional lawyers and judges to -guide the whole procedure secretly, as compared with a pagan city, -ultra-democratical, where judicial procedure as well as decision was -all oral, public, and multitudinous.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_299"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_299">[299]</a></span> Andokid. de Myst. sects. 41-46.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_300"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_300">[300]</a></span> Andokid. de Myst. sect. 48: compare Lysias, Orat. -xiii, cont. Agorat. sect. 42.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_301"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_301">[301]</a></span> Plutarch (Alkib. c. 21) states that the person who -thus addressed himself to, and persuaded Andokidês, was named Timæus. -From whom he got the latter name, we do not know.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_302"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_302">[302]</a></span> The narrative, which I have here given in substance, -is to be found in Andokid. de Myst. sects. 48-66.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_303"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_303">[303]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 60. Καὶ ὁ μὲν <em class="gesperrt">αὐτός τε καθ’ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ -κατ’ ἄλλων</em> μηνύει τὸ τῶν Ἑρμῶν, etc. -</p> -<p> -To the same effect, see the hostile oration of Lysias contra -Andocidem, Or. vi, sects. 36, 37, 51: also Andokidês himself, De -Mysteriis, sect. 71; De Reditu, sect. 7. -</p> -<p> -If we may believe the Pseudo-Plutarch (Vit. x, Orator, p. 834), -Andokidês had on a previous occasion been guilty of drunken -irregularity and damaging a statue.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_304"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_304">[304]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 60. ἐνταῦθα ἀναπείθεται <em class="gesperrt">εἷς τῶν -δεδεμένων, ὅσπερ ἐδόκει αἰτιώτατος εἶναι</em>, ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνδεσμωτῶν -τινὸς, εἴτε ἄρα καὶ τὰ ὄντα μηνῦσαι, εἴτε καὶ οὔ· ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα γὰρ -εἰκάζεται· τὸ δὲ σαφὲς οὐδεὶς οὔτε τότε οὔτε ὕστερον ἔχει εἰπεῖν περὶ -τῶν δρασάντων τὸ ἔργον. -</p> -<p> -If the statement of Andokidês in the Oratio de Mysteriis is correct, -the deposition previously given by Teukrus the metic must have been -a true one; though this man is commonly denounced among the lying -witnesses (see the words of the comic writer Phrynichus ap. Plutarch, -Alkib. c. 20). -</p> -<p> -Thucydidês refuses even to mention the name of Andokidês, and -expresses himself with more than usual reserve about this dark -transaction, as if he were afraid of giving offence to great Athenian -families. The bitter feuds which it left behind at Athens, for years -afterwards, are shown in the two orations of Lysias and of Andokidês. -If the story of Didymus be true, that Thucydidês after his return -from exile to Athens died by a violent death (see Biogr. Thucyd. -p. xvii. ed. Arnold), it would seem probable that all his reserve -did not protect him against private enmities arising out of his -historical assertions.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_305"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_305">[305]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 60. Ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἄσμενος -λαβὼν, ὡς ᾤετο, τὸ σαφὲς, etc.: compare Andokid. de Mysteriis, sects. -67, 68.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_306"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_306">[306]</a></span> Andokid. de Myster. sect 66; Thucyd. vi, 60; -Philochorus, Fragment. 111, ed. Didot.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_307"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_307">[307]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 60. ἡ μέντοι ἄλλη -πόλις περιφανῶς ὠφέλητο: compare Andokid. de Reditu, sect. 8.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_308"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_308">[308]</a></span> See Andokid. de Mysteriis, sect. 17. There are -several circumstances not easily intelligible respecting this -γραφὴ παρανόμων, which Andokidês alleges that his father Leogoras -brought against the senator Speusippus, before a dikastery of six -thousand persons (a number very difficult to believe), out of whom -he says that Speusippus only obtained two hundred votes; but if this -trial ever took place at all, we cannot believe that it could have -taken place until after the public mind was tranquillized by the -disclosures of Andokidês, especially as Leogoras was actually in -prison along with Andokidês immediately before those disclosures were -given in.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_309"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_309">[309]</a></span> See for evidence of these general positions respecting -the circumstances of Andokidês, the three Orations: Andokidês de -Mysteriis, Andokidês de Reditu Suo, and Lysias contra Andokidem.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_310"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_310">[310]</a></span> Homer, Hymn. Cerer. 475. Compare the Epigram cited in -Lobeck, Eleusinia, p. 47.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_311"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_311">[311]</a></span> Lysias cont. Andokid. init. et fin.; Andokid. de -Myster. sect. 29. Compare the fragment of a lost Oration by Lysias -against Kinêsias (Fragm. xxxi, p. 490, Bekker; Athenæus, xii, -p. 551), where Kinêsias and his friends are accused of numerous -impieties, one of which consisted in celebrating festivals on unlucky -and forbidden days, “in derision of our gods and our laws,”—ὡς -καταλεγῶντες τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν νόμων τῶν ἡμετέρων. The lamentable -consequences which the displeasure of the gods had brought upon them -are then set forth: the companions of Kinêsias had all miserably -perished, while Kinêsias himself was living in wretched health -and in a condition worse than death: τὸ δ’ οὕτως ἔχοντα τοσοῦτον -χρόνον διατελεῖν, καὶ καθ’ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἀποθνήσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι -τελευτῆσαι τὸν βίον, τούτοις μόνοις προσήκει τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἅπερ -οὗτος ἐξερματεκόσι. -</p> -<p> -The comic poets Strattis and Plato also marked out Kinêsias among -their favorite subjects of derision and libel, and seem particularly -to have represented his lean person and constant ill health as a -punishment of the gods for his impiety. See Meineke, Fragm. Comic. -Græc. (Strattis), vol. ii, p. 768 (Plato), p. 679.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_312"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_312">[312]</a></span> Lysias cont. Andokid. sects. 50, 51; Cornel. Nepos, -Alcib. c. 4. The expressions of Pindar (Fragm. 96) and of Sophoklês -(Fragm. 58, Brunck.—Œdip. Kolon. 1058) respecting the value of the -Eleusinian mysteries, are very striking: also Cicero, Legg. ii, 14. -</p> -<p> -Horace will not allow himself to be under the same roof, or in the -same boat, with any one who has been guilty of divulging these -mysteries (Od. iii. 2, 26), much more then of deriding them. -</p> -<p> -The reader will find the fullest information about these ceremonies -in the <i>Eleusinia</i>, forming the first treatise in the work of Lobeck -called Aglaophamus; and in the Dissertation called <i>Eleusinia</i>, in K. -O. Müller’s Kleine Schriften. vol ii, p. 242, <i>seqq.</i></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_313"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_313">[313]</a></span> Diodor. xiii. 6</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_314"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_314">[314]</a></span> We shall find these sacred families hereafter to -be the most obstinate in opposing the return of Alkibiadês from -banishment (Thucyd. viii, 53).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_315"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_315">[315]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 53-61.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_316"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_316">[316]</a></span> Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22. Θέσσαλος Κίμωνος Λακιάδης, -Ἀλκιβιάδην Κλεινίου Σκαμβωνίδην εἰσήγγειλεν ἀδικεῖν περὶ τὼ -θεὼ, τὴν Δήμητρα καὶ τὴν Κόρην, ἀπομιμούμενον τὰ μυστήρια, καὶ -δεικνύοντα τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἑταίροις ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, ἔχοντα στολὴν -οἵανπερ ἱεροφάντης ἔχων δεικνύει τὰ ἱερὰ, καὶ ὀνομάζοντα αὐτὸν μὲν -ἱεροφάντην, Πολυτίωνα δὲ δᾳδοῦχον, κήρυκα δὲ Θεόδωρον Φηγεέα· τοὺς δ’ -ἄλλους ἑταίρους, μύστας προσαγορεύοντα καὶ ἐπόπτας, παρὰ τὰ νόμιμα -καὶ τὰ καθεστηκότα ὑπὸ τ’ Εὐμολπιδῶν καὶ κηρύκων καὶ τῶν ἱερέων τῶν -ἐξ Ἐλευσῖνος.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_317"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_317">[317]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 61.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_318"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_318">[318]</a></span> Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_319"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_319">[319]</a></span> Thucyd. vi. 61; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22-33; Lysias, -Orat. vi, cont. Andokid. sect. 42. -</p> -<p> -Plutarch says that it would have been easy for Alkibiadês to -raise a mutiny in the army at Katana, had he chosen to resist the -order for coming home. But this is highly improbable. Considering -what his conduct became immediately afterwards, we shall see good -reason to believe that he <i>would</i> have taken this step, had it been -practicable.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_320"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_320">[320]</a></span> To appreciate fairly the violent emotion raised at -Athens by the mutilation of the Hermæ and by the profanation of the -mysteries, it is necessary to consider the way in which analogous -acts of sacrilege have been viewed in Christian and Catholic penal -legislation, even down to the time of the first French Revolution. -</p> -<p> -I transcribe the following extract from a work of authority on French -criminal jurisprudence—<i>Jousse</i>, Traité de la Justice Criminelle, -Paris, 1771, part iv, tit. 27, vol. iii, p. 672:— -</p> -<p> -“Du Crime de Leze-Majesté Divine.—Les Crimes de Leze Majesté Divine, -sont ceux qui attaquent Dieu immédiatement, et qu’on doit regarder -par cette raison comme les plus atroces et les plus exécrables.—La -Majesté de Dieu peut être offensée de plusieurs manières.—1. En -niant l’existence de Dieu. 2. Par le crime de ceux qui attentent -directement contre la Divinité: comme quand on profane ou qu’on foule -aux pieds les saintes Hosties; ou qu’on <i>frappe les Images de Dieu</i> -dans le dessein de l’insulter. C’est ce qu’on appelle <i>Crime de -Leze-Majesté Divine au prémier Chef</i>.” -</p> -<p> -Again in the same work, part iv, tit. 46, n. 5, 8, 10, 11, vol. iv, -pp. 97-99:— -</p> -<p> -“<i>La profanation des Sacremens et des Mystères de la Réligion est -un sacrilège des plus exécrables.</i> Tel est le crime de ceux qui -emploient les choses sacrées à des usages communs et mauvais, <i>en -dérision des Mystères</i>; ceux qui <i>profanent la sainte Eucharistie</i>, -ou qui en abusent en quelque manière que ce soit; ceux qui en -mépris de la Réligion, profanent les Fonts-Baptismaux; qui jettent -par terre les saintes Hosties, ou qui les emploient à des usages -vils et profanes: <i>ceux qui, en dérision de nos sacrés Mystères, -les contrefont dans leurs débauches; ceux qui frappent, mutilent, -abattent, les Images consacrées à Dieu, ou à la Sainte Vierge, ou -aux Saints</i>, en mépris de la Réligion; et enfin, tous ceux qui -commettent de semblables impiétés. Tous ces crimes <i>sont des crimes -de Leze-Majesté divine au prémier chef</i>, parce qu’ils s’attaquent -immédiatement à Dieu, et ne se font à aucun dessein que de -l’offenser.” -</p> -<p> -“... La peine du Sacrilège, par l’Ancien Testament, étoit celle -du feu, et d’être lapidé.—Par les Loix Romaines, les coupables -étoient condamnés au fer, au feu, et aux bêtes farouches, suivant -les circonstances.—En France, la peine du sacrilège est arbitraire, -et dépend de la qualité et des circonstances du crime, du lieu, du -temps, et de la qualité de l’accusé.—Dans <i>le sacrilège au prémier -chef, qui attaque la Divinité, la Sainte Vierge, et les Saints</i>, v. -g. à l’égard de ceux qui foulent aux pieds les saintes Hosties, ou -qui les jettent à terre, ou en abusent, et qui les emploient à des -usages vils et profanes, la peine est le feu, l’amende honorable, -et le poing coupé. Il en est de même de ceux qui profanent les -Fonts-Baptismaux; <i>ceux qui, en dérision de nos Mystères, s’en -moquent et les contrefont dans leurs débauches</i>: ils doivent être -punis de peine capitale, parce que ces crimes attaquent immédiatement -la Divinité.” -</p> -<p> -M. Jousse proceeds to cite several examples of persons condemned to -death for acts of sacrilege, of the nature above described.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_321"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_321">[321]</a></span> The proceedings in England in 1678 and 1679, in -consequence of the pretended Popish Plot, have been alluded to by -various authors, and recently by Dr. Thirlwall, as affording an -analogy to that which occurred at Athens after the mutilation of the -Hermæ. But there are many material differences, and all, so far as I -can perceive, to the advantage of Athens. -</p> -<p> -1. The “hellish and damnable plot of the Popish Recusants,” (to adopt -the words of the Houses of Lords and Commons,—see Dr. Lingard’s -History of England, vol. xiii, ch. v, p. 88,—words, the like of which -were doubtless employed at Athens in reference to the Hermokopids,) -was baseless, mendacious, and incredible, from the beginning. It -started from no real fact: the whole of it was a tissue of falsehoods -and fabrications proceeding from Oates, Bedloe, and a few other -informers of the worst character. -</p> -<p> -At Athens, there was unquestionably a plot; the Hermokopids were -real conspirators, not few in number. No one could doubt that they -conspired for other objects besides the mutilation of the Hermæ. -At the same time, no one knew what these objects were, nor who the -conspirators themselves were. -</p> -<p> -If before the mutilation of the Hermæ, a man like Oates had pretended -to reveal to the Athenian people a fabricated plot implicating -Alkibiadês and others, he would have found no credence. It was not -until after and by reason of that terror-striking incident, that -the Athenians began to give credence to informers. And we are to -recollect that they did not put any one to death on the evidence -of these informers. They contented themselves with imprisoning on -suspicion, until they got the confession and deposition of Andokidês. -Those implicated in <i>that</i> deposition were condemned to death. Now -Andokidês, as a witness, deserves but very qualified confidence; yet -it is impossible to degrade him to the same level even as Teukrus or -Diokleidês, much less to that of Oates and Bedloe. We cannot wonder -that the people trusted him, and, under the peculiar circumstances -of the case, it was the least evil that they should trust him. The -witnesses upon whose testimony the prisoners under the Popish Plot -were condemned, were even inferior to Teukrus and Diokleidês in -presumptive credibility. -</p> -<p> -The Athenian people have been censured for their folly in believing -the democratical constitution in danger, because the Hermæ had -been mutilated. I have endeavored to show, that, looking to their -religious ideas, the thread of connection between these two ideas is -perfectly explicable. And why are we to quarrel with the Athenians -because they took arms, and put themselves on their guard, when a -Lacedæmonian or a Bœotian armed force was actually on their frontier? -</p> -<p> -As for the condemnation of Alkibiadês and others for profaning and -divulging the Eleusinian mysteries, these are not for a moment to be -put upon a level with the condemnations in the Popish Plot. These -were true charges, at least there is strong presumptive reason for -believing that they were true. Persons were convicted and punished -for having done acts which they really had done, and which they knew -to be legal crimes. Whether it be right to constitute such acts legal -crimes, or not, is another question. The enormity of the Popish Plot -consisted in punishing persons for acts which they had not done, and -upon depositions of the most lying and worthless witnesses. -</p> -<p> -The state of mind into which the Athenians were driven after the -cutting of the Hermæ, was indeed very analogous to that of the -English people during the circulation of the Popish Plot. The -suffering, terror, and distraction, I apprehend to have been even -greater at Athens: but the cause of it was graver and more real, and -the active injustice which it produced was far less than in England. -</p> -<p> -“I shall not detain the reader (says Dr. Lingard, Hist. Engl. xiii, -p. 105) with a narrative of the partial trials and judicial murders -of the unfortunate men, whose names had been inserted by Oates in his -pretended discoveries. So violent was the excitement, so general the -delusion created by the perjuries of the informer, that the voice of -reason and the claims of justice were equally disregarded. Both judge -and jury seemed to have no other object than to inflict vengeance on -the supposed traitors. To speak in support of their witnesses, or -to hint the improbability of the informations, required a strength -of mind, a recklessness of consequences, which falls to the lot of -few individuals: even the king himself, convinced as he was of the -imposture, and contemptuously as he spoke of it in private, dared not -exercise his prerogative of mercy to save the lives of the innocent.” -</p> -<p> -It is to be noted that the House of Lords, both acting as a -legislative body, and in their judicial character when the Catholic -Lord Stafford was tried before them (ch. vi, pp. 231-241), displayed -a degree of prejudice and injustice quite equal to that of the judges -and juries in the law-courts. -</p> -<p> -Both the English judicature on this occasion, and the Milanese -judicature on the occasion adverted to in a previous note, were more -corrupted and driven to greater injustice by the reigning prejudice, -than the purely popular dikastery of Athens in this affair of the -Hermæ, and of the other profanations.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_322"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_322">[322]</a></span> Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_323"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_323">[323]</a></span> Thucyd. ii, 65. τά τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα -ἐποίουν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_324"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_324">[324]</a></span> The statements respecting the age and life of Laïs -appear involved in inextricable confusion. See the note of Göller ad -Philisti, Fragment. v.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_325"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_325">[325]</a></span> Diodor. viii, 6; Thucyd. vi, 62. Καὶ τἀνδράποδα -<em class="gesperrt">ἀπέδοσαν</em>, καὶ ἐγένοντο ἐξ αὐτῶν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν τάλαντα. The -word ἀπέδοσαν seems to mean that the prisoners were handed over to -their fellow-countrymen, the natural persons to negotiate for their -release, upon private contract of a definite sum. Had Thucydidês said -ἀπέδοντο, it would have meant that they were put up to auction for -what they would fetch. This distinction is at least possible, and, in -my judgment, more admissible than that proposed in the note of Dr. -Arnold. -</p> -<p> -If, however, we refer to Thucyd. vi, 88, with Duker’s note, we shall -see that μεταπέμπειν is sometimes, though rarely, used in the sense -of μεταπέμπεσθαι. The case may perhaps be the same with ἀπέδοσαν for -ἀπέδοντο.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_326"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_326">[326]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 63; vii, 42.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_327"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_327">[327]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 63; Diodor. xiii, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_328"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_328">[328]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 65, 66; Diodor. xiii, 6; Plutarch, Nikias, -c. 13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_329"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_329">[329]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 67-69.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_330"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_330">[330]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 68, 69. ἄλλως δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας -πανδημεί τε ἀμυνομένους, καὶ οὐκ ἀπολέκτους ὥσπερ ἡμᾶς· καὶ προσέτι -Σικελιώτας, οἳ <em class="gesperrt">ὑπερφρονοῦσι μὲν ἡμᾶς</em>, ὑπομένουσι δὲ οὔ· διὰ τὸ -τὴν ἐπιστήμην τῆς τόλμης ἥσσω ἔχειν. -</p> -<p> -This passage illustrates very clearly the meaning of the adverb -πανδημεί. Compare πανδαμεὶ, πανομιλεὶ, Æschylus, Sept. Theb. 275.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_331"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_331">[331]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 70. Τοῖς δ’ ἐμπειροτέροις, τὰ μὲν -γιγνόμενα, καὶ ὥρᾳ ἔτους περαίνεσθαι δοκεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθεστῶτας, πολὺ -μείζω ἔκπληξιν μὴ νικωμένους παρέχειν. -</p> -<p> -The Athenians, unfortunately for themselves, were not equally unmoved -by eclipses of the moon. The force of this remark will be seen in the -next chapter but one.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_332"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_332">[332]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 70.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_333"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_333">[333]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 71. Plutarch (Nikias, c. 16) states that -Nikias refused from religious scruples to invade the sacred precinct, -though his soldiers were eager to seize its contents. -</p> -<p> -Diodorus (xiii, 6) affirms erroneously that the Athenians became -masters of the Olympieion. Pausanias too says the same thing (x, 28, -3), adding that Nikias abstained from disturbing either the treasures -or the offerings, and left them still under the care of the Syracusan -priests. -</p> -<p> -Plutarch farther states that Nikias stayed some days in his position -before he returned to Katana. But the language of Thucydidês -indicates that the Athenians returned on the day after the battle.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_334"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_334">[334]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 71-74.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_335"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_335">[335]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 21-26.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_336"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_336">[336]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 20.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_337"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_337">[337]</a></span> -<span class="replace" id="tn_1" title="In the printed book: Thucyd. vi, 69">Thucyd. i, 69.</span> -ἡσυχάζετε γὰρ μόνοι Ἑλλήνων, ὦ -Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ τῇ δυνάμει τινὰ ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι, καὶ -μόνοι <em class="gesperrt">οὐκ ἀρχομένην τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, ἀλλὰ διπλασιουμένην, -καταλύοντες</em>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_338"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_338">[338]</a></span> Αἰσχρὸν δὲ βιασθέντας ἀπελθεῖν, ἢ <em class="gesperrt">ὕστερον -ἐπιμεταπέμπεσθαι</em>, τὸ πρῶτον ἀσκέπτως βουλευσαμένους: “It is -disgraceful to be driven out of Sicily by superior force, or to <i>send -back here afterwards for fresh reinforcements, through our own fault -in making bad calculations at first</i>.” (Thucyd. vi, 21.) -</p> -<p> -This was a part of the last speech by Nikias himself at Athens, prior -to the expedition. The Athenian people in reply had passed a vote -that he and his colleagues should fix their own amount of force, -and should have everything which they asked for. Moreover, such was -the feeling in the city, that every one individually was anxious to -put down his name to serve (vi, 26-31). Thucydidês can hardly find -words sufficient to depict the completeness, the grandeur, the wealth -public and private, of the armament. -</p> -<p> -As this goes to establish what I have advanced in the text,—that the -actions of Nikias in Sicily stand most of all condemned by his own -previous speeches at Athens,—so it seems to have been forgotten by -Dr. Arnold, when he wrote his note on the remarkable passage, ii, 65, -of Thucydidês,—ἐξ ὧν ἄλλα τε πολλὰ, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει, καὶ ἀρχὴν -ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη, καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς· ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνώμης -ἁμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὓς ἐπῄεσαν, ὅσον <em class="gesperrt">οἱ ἐκπέμψαντες, οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα -τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες</em>, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαβολὰς -περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας, τά τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα -ἐποίουν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν πρῶτον ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐταράχθησαν. Upon -which Dr. Arnold remarks:— -</p> -<p> -“Thucydidês here expresses the same opinion which he repeats in two -other places (vi, 31; vii, 42). namely, that the Athenian power was -fully adequate to the conquest of Syracuse, <i>had not the expedition -been mismanaged by the general, and insufficiently supplied by -the government at home</i>. The words οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις -ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες signify “<i>not voting afterwards the needful supplies -to their absent armament</i>:” for Nikias was prevented from improving -his first victory over the Syracusans by the want of cavalry and -money; and the whole winter was lost before he could get supplied -from Athens. And subsequently the armament was allowed to be reduced -to great distress and weakness, before the second expedition was sent -to reinforce it.” Göller and Poppo concur in this explanation. -</p> -<p> -Let us in the first place discuss the explanation here given of the -words τὰ πρόσφορα ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες. It appears to me that these words -do <i>not</i> signify “<i>voting the needful supplies</i>.” -</p> -<p> -The word ἐπιγιγνώσκειν cannot be used in the same sense with -ἐπιπέμπειν—παρασχεῖν (vii, 2-15), ἐκπορίζειν. As it would not be -admissible to say ἐπιγιγνώσκειν ὅπλα, νῆας, ἵππους, χρήματα, etc., -so neither can it be right to say ἐπιγιγνώσκειν τὰ πρόσφορα, if -this latter word were used only as a comprehensive word for these -particulars, meaning “<i>supplies</i>.” The words really mean: “<i>taking -farther resolutions</i> (after the expedition was gone) <i>unsuitable or -mischievous to the absent armament</i>.” Πρόσφορα is used here quite -generally, agreeing with βουλεύματα, or some such word: indeed, we -find the phrase τὰ πρόσφορα used in the most general sense, for -“what is suitable;” “what is advantageous or convenient:” γυμνάσω τὰ -πρόσφορα—πράσσεται τὰ πρόσφορα—τὰ πρόσφορ’ ηὔξατ’—τὰ πρόσφορα δρῳης -ἂν—τὸ ταῖσδε πρόσφορον. Euripid. Hippol. 112; Alkestis, 148; Iphig. -Aul. 160, B; Helen. 1299; Troades, 304. -</p> -<p> -Thucydidês appears to have in view the violent party contests which -broke out in reference to the Hermæ and the other irreligious acts -at Athens, after the departure of the armament, especially to the -mischief of recalling Alkibiadês, which grew out of those contests. -He does not allude to the withholding of supplies from the armament; -nor was it the purpose of any of the parties at Athens to withhold -them. The party acrimony was directed against Alkibiadês exclusively, -not against the expedition. -</p> -<p> -Next, as to the main allegation in Dr. Arnold’s note, that <i>one of -the causes</i> of the failure of the Athenian expedition in Sicily, -was, that it was “insufficiently supplied by Athens.” Of the two -passages to which he refers in Thucydidês (vi, 31; vii, 42), the -first distinctly contradicts this allegation, by setting forth the -prodigious amount of force sent; the second says nothing about it, -and indirectly discountenances it, by dwelling upon the glaring -blunders of Nikias. -</p> -<p> -After the Athenians had allowed Nikias in the spring to name and -collect the force which he thought requisite, how could they expect -to receive a demand for farther reinforcements in the autumn, the -army having really done nothing? Nevertheless, the supplies <i>were -sent</i>, as soon as they could be, and as soon as Nikias expected them. -If the whole winter was lost, that was not the fault of the Athenians. -</p> -<p> -Still harder is it in Dr. Arnold, to say, “that the armament <i>was -allowed</i> to be reduced to great distress and weakness before the -second expedition was sent to reinforce it.” The second expedition -was sent the moment that Nikias made known his distress and asked -for it; his intimation of distress coming quite suddenly, almost -immediately after most successful appearances. -</p> -<p> -It appears to me that nothing can be more incorrect or inconsistent -with the whole tenor of the narrative of Thucydidês, than to -charge the Athenians with having starved their expedition. What -they are really chargeable with, is, the having devoted to it a -disproportionate fraction of their entire strength, perfectly -enormous and ruinous. And so Thucydidês plainly conceives it, when he -is describing both the armament of Nikias and that of Demosthenês. -</p> -<p> -Thucydidês is very reserved in saying anything against Nikias, whom -he treats throughout with the greatest indulgence and tenderness. -But he lets drop quite sufficient to prove that he conceived the -mismanagement of the general as <i>the cause</i> of the failure of the -armament, not as “one of two causes,” as Dr. Arnold here presents -it. Of course, I recognize fully the consummate skill, and the -aggressive vigor so unusual in a Spartan, of Gylippus, together with -the effective influence which this exercised upon the result. But -Gylippus would never have set foot in Syracuse, had he not been let -in, first through the apathy, next through the contemptuous want of -precaution, shown by Nikias (vii, 42).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_339"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_339">[339]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 7. See volume vi of this History, chap. -liv, p. 464.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_340"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_340">[340]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 72, 73.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_341"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_341">[341]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 75. Ἐτείχιζον δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τῷ -χειμῶνι πρός τε τῇ πόλει, τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐντὸς ποιησάμενοι, <em class="gesperrt">τεῖχος -παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς</em> ὁρῶν, <em class="gesperrt">ὅπως μὴ δι’ ἐλάσσονος -εὐαποτείχιστοι ὦσιν</em>, ἢν ἄρα σφάλλωνται, etc. -</p> -<p> -I reserve the general explanation of the topography of Syracuse for -the next chapter, when the siege begins.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_342"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_342">[342]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 75.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_343"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_343">[343]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 77-80.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_344"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_344">[344]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 83-87.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_345"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_345">[345]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 86. ἡμεῖς μέν γε οὔτε ἐμμεῖναι δυνατοὶ -μὴ μεθ’ ὑμῶν· εἴ τε καὶ γενόμενοι κακοὶ κατεργασαίμεθα, ἀδύνατοι -κατασχεῖν, διὰ μῆκός τε πλοῦ καὶ ἀπορίᾳ φυλακῆς πόλεων μεγάλων καὶ -παρασκευῇ ἠπειρωτίδων, etc. -</p> -<p> -This is exactly the language of Nikias in his speech to the -Athenians. vi, 11.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_346"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_346">[346]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 88.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_347"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_347">[347]</a></span> Compare the remarks of Alkibiadês, Thucyd. vi, 91.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_348"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_348">[348]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 88.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_349"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_349">[349]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 88; vii, 42.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_350"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_350">[350]</a></span> Plutarch (Alkib. c. 23) says that he went to reside -at Argos; but this seems difficult to reconcile with the assertion -of Thucydidês (vi, 61) that his friends at Argos had incurred grave -suspicions of treason. -</p> -<p> -Cornelius Nepos (Alkib. c. 4) says, with greater probability of -truth, that Alkibiadês went from Thurii, first to Elis, next to -Thebes. -</p> -<p> -Isokratês (De Bigis, Orat. xvi, s. 10) says that the Athenians -banished him out of all Greece, inscribed his name on a column, -and sent envoys to demand his person from the Argeians; so that -Alkibiadês <i>was compelled</i> to take refuge with the Lacedæmonians. -This whole statement of Isokratês is exceedingly loose and -untrustworthy, carrying back the commencement of the conspiracy of -the Four Hundred to a time anterior to the banishment of Alkibiadês. -But among all the vague sentences, this allegation that the Athenians -banished him out of <i>all Greece</i> stands prominent. They could only -banish him from the territory of Athens and her allies. Whether he -went to Argos, as I have already said, seems to me very doubtful: -perhaps Plutarch copied the statement from this passage of Isokratês. -</p> -<p> -But under all circumstances, we are not to believe that Alkibiadês -turned against his country, or went to Sparta, <i>upon compulsion</i>. -The first act of his hostility to Athens, the disappointing her of -the acquisition of Messênê, was committed before he left Sicily. -Moreover, Thucydidês represents him as unwilling indeed to go to -Sparta, but only unwilling because he was afraid of the Spartans; in -fact, waiting for a safe-conduct and invitation from them. Thucydidês -mentions nothing about his going to Argos (vi, 88).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_351"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_351">[351]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 88.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_352"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_352">[352]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 89. Τοῖς γὰρ τυράννοις ἀεί ποτε διάφοροί -ἐσμεν, πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἐναντιούμενον τῷ δυναστεύοντι δῆμος ὠνόμασται· καὶ -ἀπ’ ἐκείνου ξυμπαρέμεινεν ἡ προστασία ἡμῖν τοῦ πλήθους. -</p> -<p> -It is to be recollected that the Lacedæmonians had been always -opposed to τύραννοι, or despots, and had been particularly opposed to -the Peisistratid τύραννοι, whom they in fact put down. In tracing his -democratical tendencies, therefore, to this source, Alkibiadês took -the best means of excusing them before a Lacedæmonian audience.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_353"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_353">[353]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 89. ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦ ξύμπαντος προέστημεν, -δικαιοῦντες ἐν ᾧ σχήματι μεγίστη ἡ πόλις ἔτυχε καὶ ἐλευθερωτάτη οὖσα, -καὶ ὅπερ ἐδέξατό τις, τοῦτο ξυνδιασῴζειν· ἐπεὶ δημοκρατίαν γε καὶ -ἐγιγνώσκομεν οἱ φρονοῦντές τι, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐδενὸς ἂν χεῖρον, ὅσῳ καὶ -λοιδορήσαιμι· ἀλλὰ περὶ ὁμολογουμένης ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἂν καινὸν λέγοιτο· -καὶ τὸ μεθιστάναι αὐτὴν οὐκ ἐδόκει ἡμῖν ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι, ὑμῶν πολεμίων -προσκαθημένων.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_354"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_354">[354]</a></span> The establishment and permanent occupation of a -fortified post in Attica, had been contemplated by the Corinthians -even before the beginning of the war (Thucyd. i, 122).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_355"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_355">[355]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 92. Καὶ χείρων οὐδενὶ ἀξιῶ δοκεῖν ὑμῶν -εἶναι, εἰ τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ μετὰ τῶν πολεμιωτάτων, φιλόπολίς ποτε δοκῶν -εἶναι, νῦν ἐγκρατῶς ἐπέρχομαι.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_356"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_356">[356]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 92. Τό τε φιλόπολι οὐκ ἐν ᾧ ἀδικοῦμαι ἔχω, -ἀλλ’ ἐν ᾧ ἀσφαλῶς ἐπολιτεύθην. Οὐδ’ ἐπὶ πατρίδα οὖσαν ἔτι ἡγοῦμαι νῦν -ἰέναι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν οὐκ οὖσαν ἀνακτᾶσθαι. Καὶ φιλόπολις οὗτος -ὀρθῶς, οὐχ ὃς ἂν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως ἀπολέσας μὴ ἐπίῃ, ἀλλ’ ὃς ἂν ἐκ -παντὸς τρόπου διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν πειραθῇ αὐτὴν ἀναλαβεῖν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_357"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_357">[357]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 89-92.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_358"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_358">[358]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 28.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_359"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_359">[359]</a></span> See a remarkable passage of Thucyd. viii, 89, ῥᾷον τὰ -ἀποβαίνοντα, ὡς οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἐλασσούμενός τις φέρει, and the -note in explanation of it, in a later chapter of this History, chap. -lxii.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_360"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_360">[360]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 12-17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_361"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_361">[361]</a></span> Plutarch, Alkib. c. 17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_362"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_362">[362]</a></span> Lucan, Pharsal. iv, 819.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_363"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_363">[363]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 93; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 23; Diodor. xiii, -7.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_364"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_364">[364]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 104.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_365"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_365">[365]</a></span> Horses were so largely bred in Sicily, that they even -found their way into Attica and Central Greece, Sophoklês, Œd. Kolon. -312:—</p> - -<div class="poetry-container"> - <div class="poetry"> - <p class="i9">γυναῖχ’ ὁρῶ</p> - <p>Στείχουσαν ἡμῖν, ἆσσον, Αἰτναίας ἐπὶ</p> - <p>Πῶλου βεβῶσαν.</p> - </div> -</div> - -<p>If the Scholiast is to be trusted, the Sicilian horses were of -unusually great size.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_366"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_366">[366]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 95-98.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_367"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_367">[367]</a></span> At the neighboring city of Gela, also, a little -without the walls, there stood a large brazen statue of Apollo; of so -much sanctity, beauty, or notoriety, that the Carthaginians in their -invasion of the island, seven years after the siege of Syracuse by -Nikias, carried it away with them and transported it to Tyre (Diodor. -xiii, 108).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_368"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_368">[368]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 75. Ἐτείχιζον δὲ καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τῷ -χειμῶνι τούτῳ πρός τε τῇ πόλει, τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐντὸς ποιησάμενοι, -<em class="gesperrt">τεῖχος παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς ὁρῶν, ὅπως μὴ δι’ ἐλάσσονος -εὐαποτείχιστοι ὦσιν</em>, ἢν ἄρα σφάλλωνται, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_369"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_369">[369]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 96.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_370"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_370">[370]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 97.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_371"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_371">[371]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 98. ἐχώρουν πρὸς -τὴν Συκῆν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἵναπερ καθεζόμενοι ἐτείχισαν τὸν κύκλον διὰ -τάχους.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_372"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_372">[372]</a></span> The Athenians seem to have surpassed all other Greeks -in the diligence and skill with which they executed fortifications: -see some examples, Thucyd. v, 75-82; Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 4, 18.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_373"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_373">[373]</a></span> Dr. Arnold, in his note on -Thucyd. vi, 98, says that the Circle is spoken of, in one passage of -Thucydidês, as if it had <i>never been completed</i>. I construe this one -passage differently from him (vii, 2, 4)—τῷ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου πρὸς τὸν -Τρώγιλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν θάλασσαν: where I think τῷ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου -is equivalent to ἑτέρωθι τοῦ κύκλου, as plainly appears from the -accompanying mention of Trogilus and the northern sea. I am persuaded -that the Circle was finished; and Dr. Arnold himself indicates -two passages in which it is distinctly spoken of as having been -completed.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_374"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_374">[374]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 99. <em class="gesperrt">Ὑποτειχίζειν</em> δὲ ἄμεινον ἐδόκει -εἶναι (τοῖς Συρακουσίοις) ᾗ ἐκεῖνοι (the Athenians) ἔμελλον ἄξειν τὸ -τεῖχος· καὶ εἰ φθάσειαν, ἀποκλῄσεις γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἅμα καὶ ἐν τούτῳ -εἰ ἐπιβοηθοῖεν, μέρος ἀντιπέμπειν αὐτοὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς, καὶ φθάνειν ἂν -αὐτοὶ τοῖς σταυροῖς <em class="gesperrt">προκαταλαμβάνοντες τὰς ἐφόδους</em>· ἐκείνους -δὲ ἂν παυομένους τοῦ ἔργου πάντας ἂν πρὸς σφᾶς τρέπεσθαι. -</p> -<p> -The Scholiast here explains τὰς ἐφόδους to mean τὰ βάσιμα; adding -ὀλίγα δὲ τὰ ἐπιβαθῆναι δυνάμενα, διὰ τὸ τελματῶδες εἶναι τὸ χωρίον. -Though he is here followed by the best commentators, I cannot -think that his explanation is correct. He evidently supposes that -this first counter-wall of the Syracusans was built—as we shall -see presently that the second counter-work was—across the marsh, -or low ground between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great -Harbor. “The ground being generally marshy (τελματῶδες) there were -only a few places where it could be crossed.” But I conceive this -supposition to be erroneous. The first counter-wall of the Syracusans -was carried, as it seems to me, up the slope of Epipolæ, between the -Athenian circle and the southern cliff: it commenced at the Syracusan -newly-erected advanced wall, inclosing the Temenitês. This was all -hard, firm ground, such as the Athenians could march across at any -point: there might perhaps be some roughness here and there, but they -would be mere exceptions to the general character of the ground. -</p> -<p> -It appears to me that τὰς ἐφόδους means simply, “the attacks of -the Athenians,” without intending to denote any special assailable -points; προκαταλαμβάνειν τὰς ἐφόδους, means “to get beforehand with -the attacks,” (see Thucyd. i, 57, v, 30.) This is in fact the more -usual meaning of ἔφοδος (compare vii, 5; vii, 43; i, 6; v, 35; vi, -63), “attack, approach, visit,” etc. There are doubtless other -passages in which it means, “the way or road through which the attack -was made:” in one of these, however (vii, 51), all the best editors -now read ἐσόδου instead of ἐφόδου. -</p> -<p> -It will be seen that arguments have been founded upon the -inadmissible sense which the Scholiast here gives to the word ἔφοδοι: -see Dr. Arnold, Memoir on the Map of Syracuse, Appendix to his ed. of -Thucyd. vol. iii, p. 271.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_375"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_375">[375]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 100.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_376"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_376">[376]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 101. Τῇ δ’ ὑστεραίᾳ <em class="gesperrt">ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου</em> -ἐτείχιζον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν κρημνὸν τὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἕλους, ὃς τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν -ταύτῃ πρὸς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα ὁρᾷ, καὶ ᾗπερ αὐτοῖς βραχύτατον ἐγίγνετο -καταβᾶσι διὰ τοῦ ὁμάλου καὶ τοῦ ἕλους ἐς τὸν λιμένα τὸ περιτείχισμα. -</p> -<p> -I give in the text what I believe to be the meaning of this -sentence, though the words ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου are not clear, and have -been differently construed. Göller, in his first edition, had -construed them as if it stood <em class="gesperrt">ἀρξάμενοι</em> ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου: as -if the fortification now begun on the cliff was continuous and in -actual junction with the Circle. In his second edition, he seems to -relinquish this opinion, and to translate them in a manner similar -to Dr. Arnold, who considers them as equivalent to ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου -ὁρμώμενοι, but not at all implying that the fresh work performed -was continuous with the Circle, which he believes not to have been -the fact. If thus construed, the words would imply, “starting from -the Circle as a base of operations.” Agreeing with Dr. Arnold in -his conception of the event signified, I incline, in construing -the words, to proceed upon the analogy of two or three passages in -Thucyd. i, 7; i, 46; i, 99; vi, 64—Αἱ δὲ παλαιαὶ πόλεις διὰ τὴν -λῃστείαν ἐπιπολὺ ἀντισχοῦσαν <em class="gesperrt">ἀπὸ θαλάσσης μᾶλλον ᾠκίσθησαν</em> ... -Ἐστὶ δὲ λιμὴν, καὶ πόλις ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ <em class="gesperrt">κεῖται ἀπὸ θαλάσσης</em> ἐν τῇ -Ἐλαιάτιδι τῆς Θεσπρώτιδος, Ἐφύρη. In these passages ἀπὸ is used in -the same sense as we find ἄποθεν, iv, 125, signifying “apart from, -at some distance from;” but not implying any accompanying idea of -motion, or proceeding from, either literal or metaphorical. -</p> -<p> -“The Athenians began to fortify, at some distance from their Circle, -the cliff above the marsh,” etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_377"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_377">[377]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 102; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 18. Diodorus -erroneously places the battle, in which Lamachus was slain, <i>after</i> -the arrival of Gylippus (xiii, 8).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_378"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_378">[378]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 102.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_379"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_379">[379]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 102.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_380"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_380">[380]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 103. οἷα δὲ εἰκὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀπορούντων καὶ -μᾶλλον ἢ πρὶν πολιορκουμένων, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_381"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_381">[381]</a></span> Diodorus, however, is wrong in stating (xiii, 7) that -the Athenians occupied the temple of Zeus Olympius and the polichnê, -or hamlet, surrounding it, on the right bank of the Anapus. These -posts remained always occupied by the Syracusans, throughout the -whole war (Thucyd. vii, 4, 37).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_382"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_382">[382]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 103. πολλὰ ἐλέγετο πρός τε ἐκεῖνον καὶ -πλείω ἔτι κατὰ τὴν πόλιν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_383"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_383">[383]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 55.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_384"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_384">[384]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 49-86.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_385"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_385">[385]</a></span> Plutarch, Nikias, c. 18.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_386"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_386">[386]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 104. ὡς αὐτοῖς αἱ ἀγγελίαι ἐφοίτων δειναὶ -καὶ πᾶσαι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐψευσμέναι, ὡς ἤδη παντελῶς ἀποτετειχισμέναι -αἱ Συράκουσαί εἰσι, τῆς μὲν Σικελίας οὐκέτι ἐλπίδα οὐδεμίαν εἶχεν -ὁ Γύλιππος, τὴν δὲ Ἰταλίαν βουλόμενος περιποιῆσαι, etc. Compare -Plutarch, Nikias. c. 18. -</p> -<p> -It will be seen from Thucydidês, that Gylippus heard this news while -he was yet at Leukas.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_387"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_387">[387]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 104. Ἄρας (Γύλιππος) παρέπλει τὴν Ἰταλίαν -καὶ ἁρπασθεὶς ὑπ’ ἀνέμου κατὰ τὸν Τεριναῖον κόλπον, ὃς ἐκπνεῖ ταύτῃ -μέγας, κατὰ Βορέαν ἑστηκὼς ἀποφέρεται ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, καὶ πάλιν -χειμασθεὶς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα Τάραντι προσμίσγει. -</p> -<p> -Though all the commentators here construe the words κατὰ Βορέαν -ἑστηκὼς as if they agreed with ὃς or ἄνεμος, I cannot but think that -these words really agree with Γύλιππος. Gylippus is overtaken by -this violent off-shore wind while he is sailing southward along the -eastern shore of what is now called Calabria Ultra: “setting his ship -towards the north or <i>standing to the north</i> (to use the English -nautical phrase), he is carried out to sea, from whence, after great -difficulties, he again gets into Tarentum.” If Gylippus was carried -out to sea when in this position, and trying to get to Tarentum, he -would naturally lay his course northward. What is meant by the words -κατὰ Βορέαν ἑστηκὼς, as applied <i>to the wind</i>, I confess I do not -understand; nor do the critics throw much light upon it. Whenever a -point of the compass is mentioned in conjunction with any wind, it -always seems to mean the point <i>from whence</i> the wind blows. Now, -that κατὰ Βορέαν ἑστηκὼς means “a wind which blows steadily from the -north,” as the commentators affirm, I cannot believe without better -authority than they produce. Moreover, Gylippus could never have laid -his course for Tarentum, if there had been a strong wind in this -direction; while such a wind would have forwarded him to Lokri, the -very place whither he wanted to go. The mention of the <i>Terinæan</i> -gulf is certainly embarrassing. If the words are right (which perhaps -may be doubted), the explanation of Dr. Arnold in his note seems the -best which can be offered. Perhaps, indeed,—for though improbable, -this is not wholly impossible,—Thucydidês may himself have committed -a geographical inadvertence, in supposing the Terinæan gulf to be on -the east side of Calabria.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_388"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_388">[388]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 104.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_389"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_389">[389]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_390"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_390">[390]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 2-7.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_391"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_391">[391]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 103; vii, 2; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_392"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_392">[392]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 2.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_393"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_393">[393]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 3. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι, <em class="gesperrt">αἰφνιδίως</em> τοῦ -τε Γυλίππου καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων σφίσιν ἐπιόντων, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_394"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_394">[394]</a></span> Compare an incident in the ensuing year, Thucyd. vii, -32. The Athenians, at a moment when they had become much weaker -than they were now, had influence enough among the Sikel tribes to -raise opposition to the march of a corps coming from the interior to -the help of Syracuse. This auxiliary corps was defeated and nearly -destroyed in its march.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_395"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_395">[395]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_396"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_396">[396]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_397"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_397">[397]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_398"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_398">[398]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 5; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_399"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_399">[399]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 5, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_400"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_400">[400]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 7. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, αἵ τε τῶν Κορινθίων -νῆες καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λευκαδίων ἐσέπλευσαν αἱ ὑπόλοιποι δώδεκα -(ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Ἐρασινίδης Κορίνθιος), καὶ <em class="gesperrt">ξυνετείχισαν τὸ λοιπὸν -τοῖς Συρακοσίοις μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους</em>. -</p> -<p> -These words of Thucydidês are very obscure, and have been explained -by different commentators in different ways. The explanation which -I here give does not, so far as I know, coincide with any of them; -yet I venture to think that it is the most plausible, and the only -one satisfactory. Compare the Memoir of Dr. Arnold on his Map of -Syracuse (Arn. Thucyd. vol. iii, p. 273), and the notes of Poppo and -Göller. Dr. Arnold is indeed so little satisfied with any explanation -which had suggested itself to him that he thinks some words must have -dropped out.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_401"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_401">[401]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 7.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_402"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_402">[402]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 8.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_403"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_403">[403]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 9. ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς ἐπιστολαῖς. The -word <i>despatches</i>, which I use to translate ἐπιστολαῖς, is not -inapplicable to oral, as well as to written messages, and thus -retains the ambiguity involved in the original; for ἐπιστολαῖς, -though usually implying, does not necessarily imply, <i>written</i> -communications. -</p> -<p> -The words of Thucydidês (vii, 8) <i>may</i> certainly be construed to -imply that Nikias had never on any previous occasion sent a written -communication to Athens; and so Dr. Thirlwall understands them, -though not without hesitation (Hist. Gr. ch. xxvi, vol. iii, p. 418). -At the same time, I think them reconcilable with the supposition -that Nikias may previously have sent written despatches, though much -shorter than the present, leaving details and particulars to be -supplied by the officer who carried them. -</p> -<p> -Mr. Mitford states the direct reverse of that which Dr. Thirlwall -understands: “Nicias had used the precaution of frequently sending -despatches in writing, with an exact account of every transaction.” -(Ch. xviii, sect v, vol. iv, p. 100.) -</p> -<p> -Certainly, the statement of Thucydidês does not imply this.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_404"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_404">[404]</a></span> It seems, that in Greek ship-building, moist and -unseasoned wood was preferred, from the facility of bending it into -the proper shape (Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. v, 7, 4).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_405"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_405">[405]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 13. Καὶ οἱ ξένοι οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ -ἐσβάντες, εὐθὺς κατὰ τὰς πόλεις ἀποχωροῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ μεγάλου μισθοῦ -τὸ πρῶτον ἐπαρθέντες, καὶ οἰόμενοι χρηματιεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μαχεῖσθαι, -ἐπειδὴ παρὰ γνώμην ναύτικόν τε δὴ καὶ τἄλλα ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων -ἀνθεστῶτα ὁρῶσιν, οἱ μὲν <em class="gesperrt">ἐπ’ αὐτομολίας προφάσει ἀπέρχονται</em>, -οἱ δὲ ὡς ἕκαστοι δύνανται· πολλὴ δ’ ἡ Σικελία. -</p> -<p> -All the commentators bestow long notes in explanation of this phrase -ἐπ’ αὐτομολίας προφάσει ἀπέρχονται: but I cannot think that any of -them are successful. There are even some who despair of success -so much, as to wish to change αὐτομολίας by conjecture; see the -citations in Poppo’s long note. -</p> -<p> -But surely the literal sense of the words is here both defensible -and instructive: “Some of them depart under pretence (or profession) -of being deserters to the enemy.” All the commentators reject this -meaning, because they say, it is absurd to talk of a man’s announcing -beforehand that he intends to desert to the enemy, and giving <i>that</i> -as an excuse for quitting the camp. Such is not, in my judgment, the -meaning of the word προφάσει here. It does not denote what a man -said <i>before</i> he quitted the Athenian camp, he would of course say -nothing of his intention to any one, but the color which he would -put upon his conduct <i>after he got within</i> the Syracusan lines. -He would present himself to them as a deserter to their cause; -he would profess anxiety to take part in the defence; he would -pretend to be tired of the oppressive Athenian dominion; for it is -to be recollected, that all or most of these deserters were men -belonging to the subject-allies of Athens. Those who passed over to -the Syracusan lines would naturally recommend themselves by making -profession of such dispositions, even though they did not really -feel any such; for their real reason was, that the Athenian service -had now become irksome, unprofitable, and dangerous; and the easiest -manner of getting away from it was, to pass over as a deserter to -Syracuse. -</p> -<p> -Nikias distinguishes these men from others, “who got away, as they -could find opportunity, to some part or other of Sicily.” These -latter also would of course keep their intention of departing secret, -until they got safe away into some Sicilian town; but when once -there, they would make no profession of any feeling which they did -not entertain. If they said anything, they would tell the plain -truth, that they were making their escape from a position which now -gave them more trouble than profit. -</p> -<p> -It appears to me that the words ἐπ’ αὐτομολίας προφάσει will bear -this sense perfectly well, and that it is the real meaning of Nikias. -</p> -<p> -Even before the Peloponnesian war was begun, the Corinthian envoy at -Sparta affirms that the Athenians cannot depend upon their seamen -standing true to them, since their navy was manned with hired foreign -seamen rather than with natives—ὠνητὴ γὰρ ἡ Ἀθηναίων δύναμις μᾶλλον -ἢ οἰκεία (Thucyd. i, 121). The statement of Nikias proves that this -remark was to a great extent well founded.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_406"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_406">[406]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 11-15.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_407"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_407">[407]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 10.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_408"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_408">[408]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 16. There is here a doubt as to the -reading, between one hundred and twenty talents, or twenty talents. -</p> -<p> -I agree with Dr. Arnold and other commentators in thinking that the -money taken out by Eurymedon was far more probably the larger sum of -the two, than the smaller. The former reading seems to deserve the -preference. Besides, Diodorus states that Eurymedon took out with him -one hundred and forty talents: his authority, indeed, does not count -for much, but it counts for something, in coincidence with a certain -force of intrinsic probability (Diodor. xiii, 8). -</p> -<p> -On an occasion such as this, to send a very small sum, such as twenty -talents, would produce a discouraging effect upon the armament.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_409"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_409">[409]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 42.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_410"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_410">[410]</a></span> Plutarch (Nikias, c. 20) tells us that the Athenians -had been disposed to send a second armament to Sicily, even before -the despatch of Nikias reached them: but that they had been prevented -by certain men who were envious (φθόνῳ) of the glory and good fortune -of Nikias. -</p> -<p> -No judgment can be more inconsistent with the facts of the case than -this, facts recounted in general terms even by Plutarch himself.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_411"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_411">[411]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 93.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_412"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_412">[412]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 18.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_413"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_413">[413]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 105; vii, 18.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_414"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_414">[414]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 18.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_415"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_415">[415]</a></span> Diodor. xiii, 8.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_416"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_416">[416]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 17.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_417"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_417">[417]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 19-58. Σικυώνιοι ἀναγκαστοὶ στρατεύοντες.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_418"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_418">[418]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 19-28, with Dr. Arnold’s note.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_419"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_419">[419]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 20. ἅμα τῆς Δεκελείας τῷ τειχισμῷ, etc. -Compare Isokratês, Orat. viii, De Pace, s. 102, p. 236, Bekk.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_420"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_420">[420]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 20-27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_421"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_421">[421]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 26.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_422"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_422">[422]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 31. Ὄντι δ’ -αὐτῷ (Demosthenês) περὶ ταῦτα (Anaktorium) Εὐρυμέδων ἀπαντᾷ, ὃς -τότε τοῦ χειμῶνος <em class="gesperrt">τὰ χρήματα ἄγων τῇ στρατιᾷ -ἀπεπέμφθη</em>, καὶ ἀγγέλλει, etc. - -</p> -<p> -The meaning of this passage appears quite unambiguous, that Eurymedon -had been sent to Sicily in the winter, to carry the sum of one -hundred and twenty talents to Nikias, and was now on his return (see -Thucyd. vii, 11). Nor is it without some astonishment that I read in -Mr. Mitford: “At Anactorium, Demosthenês found Eurymedon <i>collecting -provisions</i> for Sicily,” etc. Mr. Mitford then says in a note -(quoting the Scholiast, Ἤτοι τὰ πρὸς τροφὴν χρήσιμα, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ -συντείνοντα αὐτοῖς, Schol.): “This is not the only occasion on which -Thucydidês uses the term χρήματα for <i>necessaries in general</i>. Smith -has translated accordingly: but the Latin has <i>pecuniam</i>, which does -not express the sense intended here,” (ch. xviii, sect. vi, vol. iv, -p. 118.) -</p> -<p> -There cannot be the least doubt that the Latin is here right. The -definite article makes the point quite certain, even if it were true -(which I doubt) that Thucydidês sometimes uses the word χρήματα to -mean “necessaries in general.” I doubt still more whether he ever -uses ἄγων in the sense of “collecting.”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_423"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_423">[423]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 31.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_424"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_424">[424]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 21. Among the topics of encouragement -dwelt upon by Hermokratês, it is remarkable that he makes no mention -of that which the sequel proved to be the most important of all, -the confined space of the harbor, which rendered Athenian ships and -tactics unavailing.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_425"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_425">[425]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 23; Diod. xiii, 9; Plut. Nikias, c. 20.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_426"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_426">[426]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 23, 24.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_427"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_427">[427]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 25.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_428"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_428">[428]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 25.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_429"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_429">[429]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 38.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_430"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_430">[430]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 25.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_431"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_431">[431]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 32, 33.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_432"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_432">[432]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 33.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_433"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_433">[433]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 36. τῇ δὲ πρότερον ἀμαθίᾳ τῶν κυβερνητῶν -δοκούσῃ εἶναι, τὸ ἀντίπρωρον ξυγκροῦσαι, μάλιστ’ ἂν αὐτοὶ χρήσασθαι· -πλεῖστον γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ σχήσειν, etc. -</p> -<p> -Diodor. xiii, 10.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_434"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_434">[434]</a></span> Compare Thucyd. vii, 34-30; Diodor. xiii. 10; Eurip. -Iph. Taur. 1335. See also the notes of Arnold, Poppo, and Didot, on -the passages of Thucydidês. -</p> -<p> -It appears as if the ἀντηρίδες or sustaining beams were something -new, now provided for the first time, in order to strengthen the -epôtid and render it fit to drive in collision against the enemy. -The words which Thucydidês employs to describe the position of these -ἀντηρίδες, are to me very obscure, nor do I think that any of the -commentators clear them up satisfactorily. -</p> -<p> -It is Diodorus who specifies that the Corinthians lowered the level -of their prows, so as to strike nearer to the water, which Thucydidês -does not mention. -</p> -<p> -A captive ship, when towed in as a prize, was disarmed by being -deprived of her beak (Athenæus, xii, p. 535). Lysander reserved the -beaks of the Athenian triremes captured at Ægospotami to grace his -triumphal return (Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 8).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_435"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_435">[435]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 37, 38.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_436"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_436">[436]</a></span> Plutarch, Nikias, c. 20. Diodorus (xiii, 10) -represents the battle as having been brought on against the wish and -intention of the Athenians generally, not alluding to any difference -of opinion among the commanders.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_437"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_437">[437]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 41. αἱ κεραῖαι δελφινοφόροι: compare -Pollux, i, 85, and Fragment vi, of the comedy of the poet -Pherekratês, entitled Ἄγριοι; Meineke, Fragm. Comic. Græc. vol. ii, -p. 258, and the Scholiast. ad Aristoph. Equit. 759.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_438"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_438">[438]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 40. Οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναῖοι, νομίσαντες αὐτοὺς ὡς -ἡσσημένους σφῶν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἀνακρούσασθαι, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_439"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_439">[439]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 40.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_440"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_440">[440]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 41.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_441"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_441">[441]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 42.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_442"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_442">[442]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 33-57.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_443"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_443">[443]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 35.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_444"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_444">[444]</a></span> Plutarch, Nikias, c. 21.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_445"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_445">[445]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 42.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_446"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_446">[446]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 47-50.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_447"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_447">[447]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 42.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_448"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_448">[448]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 43.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_449"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_449">[449]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 43. Diodorus tells us that Demosthenês -took with him ten thousand hoplites, and ten thousand light troops, -numbers which are not at all to be trusted (xiii, 11). -</p> -<p> -Plutarch (Nikias, c. 21) says that Nikias was extremely averse to the -attack on Epipolæ: Thucydidês notices nothing of the kind, and the -assertion seems improbable.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_450"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_450">[450]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 42, 43. Καὶ -(Demosthenês) ὁρῶν τὸ παρατείχισμα τῶν Συρακοσίων, ᾧ ἐκώλυσαν -περιτειχίσαι σφᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἁπλοῦν τε ὂν, καί εἰ ἐπικρατήσειέ -τις τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν τῆς ἀναβάσεως, καὶ αὖθις τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς -στρατοπέδου, ῥᾳδίως ἂν αὐτὸ ληφθέν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπομεῖναι ἂν σφᾶς -οὐδένα) ἠπείγετο ἐπιθέσθαι τῇ πείρᾳ. </p> - -<p> -vii, 43. καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν ἀδύνατα ἐδόκει εἶναι λαθεῖν προσελθόντας καὶ -ἀναβάντας, etc. -</p> -<p> -Dr. Arnold and Göller both interpret this description of Thucydidês -(see their notes on this chapter, and Dr. Arnold’s Appendix, p. 275) -as if Nikias, immediately that the Syracusan counter-wall had crossed -his blockading line, had evacuated his circle and works on the slope -of Epipolæ, and had retired down exclusively into the lower ground -below. Dr. Thirlwall too is of the same opinion (Hist. Gr. vol. iii, -ch. xxvi, pp. 432-434). -</p> -<p> -This appears to me unauthorized and incorrect. What conceivable -motive can be assigned to induce Nikias to yield up to the enemy so -important an advantage? If he had once relinquished the slope of -Epipolæ, to occupy exclusively the marsh beneath the southern cliff, -Gylippus and the Syracusans would have taken good care that he should -never again have mounted that cliff; nor could he ever have got -near to the παρατείχισμα. The moment when the Athenians did at last -abandon their fortifications on the slope of Epipolæ (τὰ ἀνω τείχη) -is specially marked by Thucydidês afterwards, vii, 60: it was at the -last moment of desperation, when the service of all was needed for -the final maritime battle in the Great Harbor. Dr. Arnold (p. 275) -misinterprets this passage, in my judgment, evading the direct sense -of it. -</p> -<p> -The words of Thucydidês, vii, 42—εἰ ἐπικρατήσειέ τις τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν -τῆς ἀναβάσεως, καὶ αὖθις τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς στρατοπέδου—are more correctly -conceived by M. Firmin Didot, in the note to his translation, -than by Arnold and Göller. The στρατόπεδον here indicated does -<i>not</i> mean the Athenian circle, and their partially completed line -of circumvallation on the slope of Epipolæ. It means the ground -higher up than this, which they had partially occupied at first -while building the fort of Labdalum, and of which they had been -substantially masters until the arrival of Gylippus who had now -converted it into a camp or στρατόπεδον of the Syracusans.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_451"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_451">[451]</a></span> Diodor. xiii, 11.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_452"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_452">[452]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 44, 45.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_453"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_453">[453]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 46. Plutarch (Nikias, c. 21) states -that the number of slain was two thousand. Diodorus gives it at two -thousand five hundred (xiii, 11). Thucydidês does not state it at all. -</p> -<p> -These two authors probably both copied from some common authority, -not Thucydidês; perhaps Philistus.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_454"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_454">[454]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 47.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_455"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_455">[455]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 48. Ὁ δὲ Νικίας ἐνόμιζε μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς -πονηρὰ σφῶν τὰ πράγματα εἶναι, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ οὐκ ἐβούλετο αὐτὰ ἀσθενῆ -ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐδ’ <em class="gesperrt">ἐμφανῶς</em> σφᾶς ψηφιζομένους <em class="gesperrt">μετὰ -πολλῶν</em> τὴν ἀναχώρησιν τοῖς πολεμίοις καταγγέλτους γίγνεσθαι· -λαθεῖν γὰρ ἂν, ὁπότε βούλοιντο, τοῦτο ποιοῦντες πολλῷ ἧττον. -</p> -<p> -It seems probable that some of the taxiarchs and trierarchs were -present at this deliberation, as we find in another case afterwards, -c. 60. Possibly, Demosthenês might even desire that they <i>should</i> be -present, as witnesses respecting the feeling of the army; and also as -supporters, if the matter came afterwards to be debated in the public -assembly at Athens. It is to this fact that the words ἐμφανῶς μετὰ -πολλῶν seem to allude.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_456"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_456">[456]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 48. Οὐκοῦν -βούλεσθαι αὐτός γε, ἐπιστάμενος τὰς Ἀθηναίων φύσεις, ἐπὶ αἰσχρᾷ γε -αἰτίᾳ καὶ ἀδίκως ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων ἀπολέσθαι, μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, -εἰ δεῖ, κινδυνεύσας τοῦτο παθεῖν, <em class="gesperrt">ἰδίᾳ</em>. - -</p> -<p> -The situation of the last word ἰδίᾳ in this sentence is perplexing, -because it can hardly be construed except either with ἀπολέσθαι -or with αὐτός γε: for Nikias could not run any risk of perishing -<i>separately</i> by the hands of the enemy, unless we are to ascribe to -him an absurd rhodomontade quite foreign to his character. Compare -Plutarch Nikias, c. 22.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_457"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_457">[457]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 48. τρίβειν οὖν ἔφη χρῆναι -προσκαθημένους, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_458"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_458">[458]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 49. Ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης περὶ μὲν τοῦ -<em class="gesperrt">προσκαθῆσθαι οὐδ’ ὁπωσοῦν ἐνεδέχετο</em>—τὸ δὲ ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν, -<em class="gesperrt">οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ οἱ ἔφη ἀρέσκειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔτι μένειν</em>, ἀλλ’ -<em class="gesperrt">ὅτι τάχιστα ἤδη καὶ μὴ μέλλειν ἐξανίστασθαι</em>. Καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδων -αὐτῷ ταῦτα ξυνηγόρευεν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_459"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_459">[459]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 69; Diodor. xiii, 12.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_460"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_460">[460]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 48. <em class="gesperrt">Ἃ ἐπιστάμενος, τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ ἔτι ἐπ’ -ἀμφότερα ἔχων καὶ διασκοπῶν ἀνεῖχε, τῷ δ’ ἐμφανεῖ τότε λόγῳ οὐκ ἔφη -ἀπάξειν τὴν στρατιάν.</em> -</p> -<p> -The insignificance of the party in Syracuse which corresponded with -Nikias may be reasonably inferred from Thucyd. vii, 55. It consisted -in part of those Leontines who had been incorporated into the -Syracusan citizenship (Diodor. xiii, 18). -</p> -<p> -Polyænus (i, 43, 1) has a tale respecting a revolt of the slaves -or villeins (οἰκέται) at Syracuse during the Athenian siege, under -a leader named Sosikratês, a revolt suppressed by the stratagem -of Hermokratês. That various attempts of this sort took place at -Syracuse during these two trying years, is by no means improbable. In -fact, it is difficult to understand how the numerous predial slaves -were kept in order during the great pressure and danger, prior to the -coming of Gylippus.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_461"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_461">[461]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 49. Ἀντιλέγοντος δὲ τοῦ Νικίου, ὄκνος -τις καὶ μέλλησις ἐνεγένετο, καὶ ἅμα ὑπόνοια μή τι καὶ πλέον εἰδὼς ὁ -Νικίας ἰσχυρίζηται. -</p> -<p> -The language of Justin respecting this proceeding is just and -discriminating: “Nicias, seu pudore male actæ rei, seu metu destitutæ -spei civium, seu impellente fato, manere contendit.” (Justin, iv, 5.)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_462"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_462">[462]</a></span> This interval may be inferred (see Dodwell, Ann. -Thucyd. vii, 50) from the state of the moon at the time of the battle -of Epipolæ, compared with the subsequent eclipse.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_463"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_463">[463]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 50. ὡς αὐτοῖς -οὐδὲ ὁ Νικίας <em class="gesperrt">ἔτι ὁμοίως ἠναντιοῦτο</em>, etc. -Diodor. xiii, 12. Ὁ Νικίας ἠναγκάσθη συγχωρῆσαι, - -etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_464"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_464">[464]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 60.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_465"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_465">[465]</a></span> Diodor. xiii, 12. Οἱ στρατιῶται τὰ σκεύη ἐνετίθεντο, -etc. Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_466"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_466">[466]</a></span> The moon was totally eclipsed on this night, August -27, 413 <small>B.C.</small>, from twenty-seven minutes past nine to -thirty-four minutes past ten <small>P.M.</small> (Wurm, De Ponderib. -Græcor. sect. xciv, p. 184), speaking with reference to an observer -in Sicily. -</p> -<p> -Thucydidês states that Nikias adopted the injunction of the prophets, -to tarry <i>thrice nine</i> days (vii, 50). Diodorus says <i>three</i> days. -Plutarch intimates that Nikias went beyond the injunction of the -prophets, who only insisted on <i>three</i> days, while he resolved on -remaining for an entire lunar period (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23). -</p> -<p> -I follow the statement of Thucydidês: there is no reason to believe -that Nikias would lengthen the time beyond what the prophets -prescribed. -</p> -<p> -The erroneous statement respecting this memorable event, in so -respectable an author as Polybius, is not a little surprising (Polyb. -ix, 19).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_467"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_467">[467]</a></span> Plutarch, Nikias, c. 22; Diodor. xiii, 12; Thucyd. -vii, 50. Stilbidês was eminent in his profession of a prophet: -see Aristophan. Pac. 1029, with the citations from Eupolis and -Philochorus in the Scholia. -</p> -<p> -Compare the description of the effect produced by the eclipse of the -sun at Thebes, immediately prior to the last expedition of Pelopidas -into Thessaly (Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 31).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_468"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_468">[468]</a></span> Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_469"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_469">[469]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 52, 53; Diodor. xiii, 13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_470"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_470">[470]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 55. Οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν παντὶ δὴ ἀθυμίας -ἦσαν, καὶ ὁ παράλογος αὐτοῖς μέγας ἦν, πολὺ δὲ μείζων ἔτι τῆς -στρατείας ὁ μετάμελος.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_471"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_471">[471]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 56. Οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι τόν τε λιμένα εὐθὺς -παρέπλεον ἀδεῶς, etc. This elate and visible manifestation of feeling -ought not to pass unnoticed, as an evidence of Grecian character.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_472"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_472">[472]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 56.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_473"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_473">[473]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 57, 58.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_474"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_474">[474]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 59; Diodor. xiii, 14.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_475"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_475">[475]</a></span> Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_476"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_476">[476]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 60.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_477"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_477">[477]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 62. Ἃ δὲ ἀρωγὰ ἐνείδομεν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ -λιμένος στενότητι πρὸς τὸν μέλλοντα ὄχλον τῶν νεῶν ἔσεσθαι, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_478"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_478">[478]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 62. Ἐς τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἠναγκάσμεθα, ὥστε -πεζομαχεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν, καὶ τὸ μήτε αὐτοὺς ἀνακρούεσθαι, μήτε -ἐκείνους ἐᾷν, ὠφέλιμον φαίνεται.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_479"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_479">[479]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 63. Τοῖς δὲ ναύταις παραινῶ, καὶ ἐν τῷ -αὐτῷ τῷδε καὶ δέομαι, μὴ ἐκπεπλῆχθαί τι ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς ἄγαν ... -ἐκείνην τε τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, ὡς ἀξία ἐστὶ διασώσασθαι, <em class="gesperrt">οἱ -τέως Ἀθηναῖοι νομιζόμενοι καὶ μὴ ὄντες ὑμῶν</em>, τῆς τε φωνῆς τῇ -ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τῶν τρόπων τῇ μιμήσει, ἐθαυμάζεσθε κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, -καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας οὐκ ἔλασσον κατὰ τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι, ἔς τε τὸ -φοβερὸν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι πολὺ πλεῖον, μετείχετε, -ὥστε κοινωνοὶ μόνοι ἐλευθέρως ἡμῖν τῆς ἀρχῆς ὄντες, δικαίως αὐτὴν νῦν -μὴ καταπροδίδοτε, etc. -</p> -<p> -Dr. Arnold (together with Göller and Poppo), following the Scholiast, -explain these words as having particular reference to the metics in -the Athenian naval service. But I cannot think this correct. All -persons in that service—who were freemen, but yet not citizens of -Athens—are here designated; partly metics, doubtless, but partly also -citizens of the islands and dependent allies,—the ξένοι ναυβάται -alluded to by the Corinthians and by Periklês at the beginning of the -Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. i, 121-143) as the ὠνητὴ δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ -οἰκεία of Athens. Without doubt there were numerous foreign seamen -in the warlike navy of Athens, who derived great consideration as -well as profit from the service, and often passed themselves off for -Athenian citizens when they really were not so.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_480"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_480">[480]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 64. Ὅτι οἱ ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ὑμῶν νῦν -ἐσόμενοι, καὶ πέζοι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις εἰσὶ καὶ νῆες, καὶ ἡ ὑπόλοιπος -πόλις, καὶ τὸ μέγα ὄνομα τῶν Ἀθηνῶν....</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_481"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_481">[481]</a></span> See the striking chapter of -Thucyd. vii, 69. Even the tame style of Diodorus (xiii, 15) becomes -animated in describing this scene.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_482"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_482">[482]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 65.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_483"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_483">[483]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 66, 67.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_484"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_484">[484]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 68. πρὸς οὖν ἀταξίαν τε τοιαύτην ... -ὀργῇ προσμίξωμεν, καὶ νομίσωμεν ἅμα μὲν νομιμώτατον εἶναι πρὸς -τοὺς ἐναντίους, οἳ ἂν ὡς ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ τοῦ προσπεσόντος δικαιώσωσιν -ἀποπλῆσαι τῆς γνώμης τὸ θυμούμενον, ἅμα δὲ ἐχθροὺς ἀμύνασθαι -ἐγγενησόμενον ἡμῖν, καὶ (τὸ λεγόμενόν που) ἥδιστον εἶναι. -</p> -<p> -This plain and undisguised invocation of the angry and revengeful -passions should be noticed, as a mark of character and manners.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_485"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_485">[485]</a></span> Diodorus, xiii, 14. Plutarch has a similar statement, -in reference to the previous battle: but I think he must have -confused one battle with the other, for his account can hardly be -made to harmonize with Thucydidês (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24). -</p> -<p> -It is to be recollected that both Plutarch and Diodorus had probably -read the description of the battles in the Great Harbor of Syracuse, -contained in Philistus; a better witness, if we had his account -before us, even than Thucydidês; since he was probably at this time -in Syracuse and was perhaps actually engaged.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_486"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_486">[486]</a></span> Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24, 25. Timæus reckoned the aid -of Hêraklês as having been one of the great causes of Syracusan -victory over the Athenians. He gave several reasons why the god was -provoked against the Athenians: see Timæus, Fragm. 104, ed. Didot.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_487"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_487">[487]</a></span> The destructive impact of these metallic masses at -the head of the ships of war, as well as the periplus practised -by a lighter ship to avoid direct collision against a heavier, is -strikingly illustrated by a passage in Plutarch’s Life of Lucullus, -where a naval engagement between the Roman general, and Neoptolemus -the admiral of Mithridates, is described. “Lucullus was on board a -Rhodian quinquerime, commanded by Damagoras, a skilful Rhodian pilot; -while Neoptolemus was approaching with a ship much heavier, and -driving forward to a direct collision: upon which Damagoras evaded -the blow, rowed rapidly round, and struck the enemy in the stern.” -... δείσας ὁ Δαμαγόρας τὸ βάρος τῆς βασιλικῆς, καὶ <em class="gesperrt">τὴν τραχύτητα -τοῦ χαλκώματος</em>, οὐκ ἐτόλμησε συμπεσεῖν ἀντίπρωρος, ἀλλ’ ὀξέως ἐκ -περιαγωγῆς ἀποστρέψας ἐκέλευσεν ἐπὶ πρύμναν ὤσασθαι· καὶ πιεσθείσης -ἐνταῦθα τῆς νεώς ἐδέξατο τὴν πληγὴν ἀβλαβῆ γενομένην, ἅτε δὴ τοῖς -θαλαττεύουσι τῆς νέως μέρεσι προσπεσοῦσαν.—Plutarch, Lucull. c. 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_488"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_488">[488]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 71.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_489"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_489">[489]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 60. τὰς ναῦς ἁπάσας ὅσαι ἦσαν καὶ δυναταὶ -<em class="gesperrt">καὶ ἀπλοώτεραι</em>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_490"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_490">[490]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 60. πάντα τινὰ ἐσβιβάζοντες -πληρῶσαι—ἀναγκάσαντες ἐσβαίνειν ὅστις καὶ <em class="gesperrt">ὁπωσοῦν ἐδόκει ἡλικίας -μετέχων ἐπιτήδειος</em> εἶναι. Compare also the speech of Gylippus, c. -67.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_491"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_491">[491]</a></span> The language of Theokritus, in -describing the pugilistic contest between Pollux and the Bebrykian -Amykus, is not inapplicable to the position of the Athenian ships and -seamen when cramped up in this harbor (Idyll. xxii, 91):—</p> - -<div class="poetry-container2"> - <div class="poetry2"> - <p>. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ἐκ δ’ ἑτέρωθεν</p> - <p>Ἥρωες κρατερὸν Πολυδεύκεα θαρσύνεσκον,</p> - <p>Δειδιότες μή πώς μιν <em class="gesperrt">ἐπιβρίσας δαμάσειεν,</em></p> - <p><em class="gesperrt">Χώρῳ ἐνὶ στεινῷ</em>, Τιτύῳ ἐναλίγκιος ἀνήρ.</p> - </div> -</div> - -<p class="ni">Compare Virgil’s picture of Entellus and Darês, Æneid, v, 430.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_492"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_492">[492]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 72.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_493"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_493">[493]</a></span> Diodor. xiii, 18.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_494"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_494">[494]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 73; Diodor. xiii, 18.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_495"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_495">[495]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 64.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_496"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_496">[496]</a></span> Xenophon, Anab. iv, 5, 15, 19; v, 8, 15.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_497"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_497">[497]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 77.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_498"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_498">[498]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 74.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_499"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_499">[499]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 77. Καίτοι πολλὰ -μὲν ἐς θεοὺς νόμιμα δεδιῄτημαι, πολλὰ δὲ ἐς ἀνθρώπους δίκαια καὶ -ἀνεπίφθονα. <em class="gesperrt">Ἀνθ’ ὧν ἡ μὲν ἐλπὶς ὅμως θρασεῖα τοῦ -μέλλοντος, αἱ δὲ ξυμφοραὶ οὐ κατ’ ἀξίαν δὴ φοβοῦσι</em>. Τάχα δ’ ἂν -καὶ λωφήσειαν· ἱκανὰ γὰρ τοῖς τε πολεμίοις εὐτύχηται, καὶ εἴ τῳ θεῶν -ἐπίφθονοι ἐστρατεύσαμεν, ἀρκούντως ἤδη τετιμωρήμεθα.</p> - -<p>I have translated the words οὐ κατ’ ἀξίαν, and the sentence of -which they form a part, differently from what has been hitherto -sanctioned by the commentators, who construe κατ’ ἀξίαν as meaning -“according to our desert,” understand the words αἱ ξυμφοραὶ οὐ κατ’ -ἀξίαν as bearing the same sense with the words ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν -κακοπραγίαις some lines before; and likewise construe οὐ, not with -φοβοῦσι, but with κατ’ ἀξίαν, assigning to φοβοῦσι an affirmative -sense. They translate: “Quare, <i>quamvis nostra fortuna, prorsus -afflicta videatur</i> (these words have no parallel in the original) -rerum tamen futurarum spes est audax: sed clades, quas nullo nostro -merito accepimus, <i>nos</i> jam terrent. At fortasse cessabunt,” etc. M. -Didot translates: “Aussi j’ai un ferme espoir dans l’avenir, <i>malgré -l’effroi</i> que des <i>malheurs non mérités</i> nous causent.” Dr. Arnold -passes the sentence over without notice.</p> - -<p>This manner of translating appears to me not less unsuitable in -reference to the spirit and thread of the harangue, than awkward as -regards the individual words. Looking to the spirit of the harangue, -the object of encouraging the dejected soldiers would hardly be -much answered by repeating—what in fact had been glanced at in a -manner sufficient and becoming, before—that “the unmerited reverses -terrified either Nikias or the soldiers.” Then as to the words; -the expressions ἀνθ’ ὧν, ὅμως, μὲν, and δὲ, seem to me to denote, -not only that the two halves of the sentence apply both of them to -Nikias, but that the first half of the sentence is in harmony, not in -opposition, with the second. Matthiæ (in my judgment, erroneously) -refers (Gr. Gr. § 623) ὅμως to some words which have preceded; I -think that ὅμως contributes to hold together the first and the -second affirmation of the sentence. Now the Latin translation refers -the first half of the sentence to Nikias, and the last half to the -soldiers whom he addresses; while the translation of M. Didot, by -means of the word <i>malgré</i>, for which there is nothing corresponding -in the Greek, puts the second half in antithesis to the first.</p> - -<p>I cannot but think that οὐ ought to be construed with φοβοῦσι, -and that the words κατ’ ἀξίαν do not bear the meaning assigned to -them by the translators. Ἀξίαν not only means, “<i>desert</i>, merit, -the title to that which a man has earned by his conduct,” as in the -previous phrase παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, but it also means, “price, value, -title to be cared for, capacity of exciting more or less desire or -aversion,” in which last sense it is predicated as an attribute, not -only of moral beings, but of other objects besides. Thus Aristotle -says (Ethic. Nikom. iii, 11): ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς -τοιαύτας <em class="gesperrt">ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας</em>· ὁ δὲ σώφρων οὐ -τοιοῦτος, etc. Again, ibid. iii, 5. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὖ ἕνεκα, -ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαῤῥῶν, -ἀνδρεῖος· <em class="gesperrt">κατ’ ἀξίαν</em> γὰρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ -λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. Again, ibid. iv, 2. Διὰ τοῦτό -ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ γένει, μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν· τὸ -γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐυπέρβλητον, καὶ ἔχον <em class="gesperrt">κατ’ -ἀξίαν</em> τοῦ δαπανήματος. Again, ibid. viii, 14. Ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ὄντα -οὔ φασι δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν· λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι, καὶ οὐ φιλίαν, -εἰ μὴ <em class="gesperrt">κατ’ ἀξίαν</em> τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς -φιλίας. Compare also ib. viii, 13.</p> - -<p>Xenophon, Cyrop. viii, 4, 32. τὸ γὰρ πολλὰ δοκοῦντα ἔχειν μὴ <em -class="gesperrt">κατ’ ἀξίαν</em> τῆς οὐσίας φαίνεσθαι ὠφελοῦντα τοὺς -φίλους, ἀνελευθερίαν ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ περιάπτειν. Compare Xenophon, -Memorab. ii, 5, 2. ὥσπερ τῶν οἰκετῶν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν φίλων, εἰσὶν <em -class="gesperrt">ἀξίαι</em>; also ibid. i, 6, 11, and Isokratês, -cont. Lochit. Or. xx, s. 8.</p> - -<p>The words κατ’ ἀξίαν in Thucydidês appear to me to bear the -same meaning as in these passages of Xenophon and Aristotle, “in -proportion to their value,” or to their real magnitude. If we so -construe them, the words ἀνθ’ ὧν, ὅμως, μὲν, and δὲ, all fall into -their proper order: the whole sentence after ἀνθ’ ὧν applies to -Nikias personally, is a corollary from what he had asserted before, -and forms a suitable point in an harangue for encouraging his -dispirited soldiers: “Look how <i>I</i> bear up, who have as much cause -for mourning as any of you. I have behaved well both towards gods -and towards men: in return for which, I am comparatively comfortable -both as to the future and as to the present: as to the future, I -have strong hopes; at the same time that, as to the present, I am -not overwhelmed by the present misfortunes in proportion to their -prodigious intensity.”</p> - -<p>This is the precise thing for a man of resolution to say upon so -terrible an occasion.</p> - -<p>The particle δὴ has its appropriate meaning, αἱ δὲ ξυμφοραὶ οὐ -κατ’ ἀξίαν <em class="gesperrt">δὴ</em> φοβοῦσι; “and the present -distresses, though they do appall me, do not appall me <i>assuredly</i> -in proportion to their actual magnitude.” Lastly, the particle καὶ -(in the succeeding phrase, τάχα δ’ ἂν <em class="gesperrt">καὶ</em> -λωφήσειαν) does not fit on to the preceding passage as usually -construed: accordingly the Latin translator, as well as M. Didot, -leave it out, and translate: “At fortasse cessabunt.” “Mais peut-être -vont-ils cesser.” It ought to be translated: “And perhaps they may -<i>even</i> abate,” which implies that what had been asserted in the -preceding sentence is here intended not to be contradicted, but to -be carried forward and strengthened: see Kühner, Griech. Gramm. -sects. 725-728. Such would not be the case as the sentence is usually -construed.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_500"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_500">[500]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 77. Ἱκανὰ γὰρ τοῖς τε πολεμίοις -εὐτύχηται, καὶ εἴ τῳ θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι ἐστρατεύσαμεν, ἀποχρώντως ἤδη -τετιμωρήμεθα· ἦλθον γάρ που καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἤδη ἐφ’ ἑτέρους, καὶ -ἀνθρώπεια δράσαντες ἀνεκτὰ ἔπαθον. Καὶ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς νῦν τά τε ἀπὸ τοῦ -θεοῦ ἐλπίζειν ἠπιώτερα ἕξειν· οἴκτου γὰρ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἀξιώτεροι ἤδη -ἐσμὲν ἢ φθόνου. -</p> -<p> -This is a remarkable illustration of the doctrine, so frequently -set forth in Herodotus, that the gods were jealous of any man or -any nation who was preëminently powerful, fortunate, or prosperous. -Nikias, recollecting the immense manifestation and promise with which -his armament had started from Peiræus, now believed that this had -provoked the jealousy of some of the gods, and brought about the -misfortunes in Sicily. He comforts his soldiers by saying that the -enemy is now at the same dangerous pinnacle of exaltation, whilst -<i>they</i> have exhausted the sad effects of the divine jealousy. -</p> -<p> -Compare the story of Amasis and Polykratês in Herodotus (iii, 39), -and the striking remarks put into the mouth of Paulus Æmilius by -Plutarch (Vit. Paul. Æmil. c. 36).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_501"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_501">[501]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 77. Ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις, καὶ οὐ τείχη, οὐδὲ -νῆες ἀνδρῶν κεναί.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_502"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_502">[502]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 78.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_503"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_503">[503]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 79. ἀφ’ ὧν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μᾶλλον ἔτι -ἠθύμουν, καὶ ἐνόμιζον <em class="gesperrt">ἐπὶ τῷ σφετέρῳ ὀλέθρῳ καὶ ταῦτα πάντα -γίγνεσθαι</em>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_504"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_504">[504]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 70.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_505"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_505">[505]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 80-82.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_506"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_506">[506]</a></span> Dr. Arnold (Thucyd. vol. iii, p. 280, copied by -Göller, ad vii, 81) thinks that the division of Demosthenês -reached and passed the river Kakyparis; and was captured between -the Kakyparis and the Erineus. But the words of Thucyd. vii, 80, -81, do not sustain this. The division of Nikias was in advance of -Demosthenês from the beginning, and gained upon it principally -during the early part of the march, before daybreak; because it was -then that the disorder of the division of Demosthenês was the most -inconvenient: see c. 81—ὡς τῆς νυκτὸς τότε ξυνεταράχθησαν, etc. When -Thucydidês, therefore, says, that “at daybreak <i>they</i> arrived at -the sea,” (ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἕῳ ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὴν θάλατταν, c. 80,) this -cannot be true <i>both</i> of Nikias and of Demosthenês. If the former -arrived there at daybreak, the latter cannot have come to the same -point till some time after daybreak. Nikias must have been beforehand -with Demosthenês when he reached the sea, and considerably <i>more</i> -beforehand when he reached the Kakyparis: moreover, we are expressly -told that Nikias did not wait for his colleague, that he thought it -for the best to get on as fast as possible with his own division. -</p> -<p> -It appears to me that the words ἀφικνοῦνται, etc. (c. 80), are not -to be understood both of Nikias and Demosthenês, but that they -refer back to the word αὐτοῖς, two or three lines behind: “the -<i>Athenians (taken generally)</i> reached the sea,” no attention being -at that moment paid to the difference between the front and the rear -divisions. The <i>Athenians</i> might be said, not improperly, to reach -the sea, at the time when the division of Nikias reached it.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_507"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_507">[507]</a></span> Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_508"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_508">[508]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 81. Καὶ τότε γνοὺς (sc. Demosthenês) τοὺς -Συρακοσίους διώκοντας οὐ προὐχώρει μᾶλλον ἢ ἐς μάχην ξυνετάσσετο, ἕως -ἐνδιατρίβων κυκλοῦταί τε ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐν πολλῷ θορύβῳ αὐτός τε καὶ -οἱ μετ’ αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦσαν· ἀνειληθέντες γὰρ ἔς τι χωρίον, ᾧ κύκλῳ -μὲν τειχίον περιῆν, <em class="gesperrt">ὁδὸς δὲ ἔνθεν τε καὶ ἔνθεν</em>, ἐλάας δὲ οὐκ -ὀλίγας εἶχεν, ἐβάλλοντο περισταδόν. -</p> -<p> -I translate ὁδὸς δὲ ἔνθεν τε καὶ ἔνθεν differently from Dr. Arnold, -from Mitford, and from others. These words are commonly understood to -mean that this walled plantation was bordered by two roads, one on -each side. Certainly the words <i>might</i> have that signification; but I -think they also may have the signification (compare ii, 76) which I -have given in the text, and which seems more plausible. It certainly -is very improbable that the Athenians should have gone out of the -road, in order to shelter themselves in the plantation; since they -were fully aware that there was no safety for them except in getting -away. If we suppose that the plantation lay exactly in the road, the -word ἀνειληθέντες becomes perfectly explicable, on which I do not -think that Dr. Arnold’s comment is satisfactory. The pressure of the -troops from the rear into the hither opening, while those in the -front could not get out by the farther opening, would naturally cause -this crowd and <i>huddling</i> inside. A road which passed right through -the walled ground, entering at one side and coming out at the other, -might well be called ὁδὸς δὲ ἔνθεν τε καὶ ἔνθεν. Compare Dr. Arnold’s -Remarks on the Map of Syracuse, vol. iii, p. 281; as well as his note -on vii, 81. -</p> -<p> -I imagine the olive-trees to be here named, not for either of the -two reasons mentioned by Dr. Arnold, but because they hindered -the Athenians from seeing beforehand distinctly the nature of the -inclosure into which they were hastening, and therefore prevented any -precautions from being taken, such as that of forbidding too many -troops from entering at once, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_509"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_509">[509]</a></span> Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27; Thucyd. vii, 82.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_510"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_510">[510]</a></span> This statement depends upon the very good authority -of the contemporary Syracusan, Philistus: see Pausanias, i, 29, 9; -Philisti Fragm. 46, ed. Didot.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_511"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_511">[511]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 83.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_512"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_512">[512]</a></span> Plutarch (Nikias. c. 27) says <i>eight</i> days, -inaccurately.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_513"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_513">[513]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 85. See Dr. -Arnold’s note.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_514"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_514">[514]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 84. ... ἔβαλλον ἄνωθεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, -<em class="gesperrt">πίνοντάς τε τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀσμένους</em>, καὶ ἐν κοίλῳ ὄντι τῷ ποτάμῳ -ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ταρασσομένους.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_515"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_515">[515]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 85, 86; Philistus, Fragm. 46, ed. Didot; -Pausanias, i. 29, 9.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_516"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_516">[516]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 85; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_517"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_517">[517]</a></span> Thucydidês states, roughly, and without pretending -to exact means of knowledge, that the total number of captives -brought to Syracuse under public supervision, was not less than seven -thousand—ἐλήφθησαν δὲ οἱ ξύμπαντες, ἀκριβείᾳ μὲν χαλεπὸν ἐξειπεῖν, -ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἐλάσσους ἑπτακισχιλίων (vii, 87). As the number taken -with Demosthenês was six thousand (vii, 82), this leaves one thousand -as having been obtained from the division of Nikias.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_518"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_518">[518]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 85. <em class="gesperrt">πολλοὶ</em> δὲ ὅμως καὶ διέφυγον, -οἱ μὲν καὶ παραυτίκα, οἱ δὲ καὶ δουλεύσαντες καὶ διαδιδράσκοντες -ὕστερον. The word παραυτίκα means, during the retreat.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_519"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_519">[519]</a></span> Lysias pro Polystrato. Orat. xx, sects. 26-28, c. 6, -p. 686 R.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_520"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_520">[520]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 87. Diodorus (xiii, 20-32) gives two long -orations purporting to have been held in the Syracusan assembly, in -discussing how the prisoners were to be dealt with. An old citizen, -named Nikolaus, who has lost his two sons in the war, is made to -advocate the side of humane treatment; while Gylippus is introduced -as the orator recommending harshness and revenge. -</p> -<p> -From whom Diodorus borrowed this, I do not know; but his whole -account of the matter appears to me untrustworthy. -</p> -<p> -One may judge of his accuracy when one finds him stating that the -prisoners received each two <i>chœnikes</i> of barley-meal, instead of two -<i>kotylæ</i>; the chœnix being four times as much as the kotylê (Diodor. -xiii, 19).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_521"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_521">[521]</a></span> Plutarch, Nikias, c. 29; Diodor. xiii, 33. The reader -will see how the Carthaginians treated the Grecian prisoners whom -they took in Sicily, in Diodor. xiii, 111.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_522"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_522">[522]</a></span> Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28; Diodor. xiii, 19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_523"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_523">[523]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 86; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28. The -statement which Plutarch here cites from Timæus respecting the -intervention of Hermokratês, is not in any substantial contradiction -with Philistus and Thucydidês. The word κελευσθέντας seems decidedly -preferable to καταλευσθέντας, in the text of Plutarch.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_524"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_524">[524]</a></span> Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28. Though Plutarch says that -the month Karneius is “that which the Athenians call Metageitnion,” -yet it is not safe to affirm that the day of the slaughter of the -Asinarus was the 16th of the Attic month Metageitnion. We know -that the civil months of different cities seldom or never exactly -coincided. See the remarks of Franz on this point, in his comment on -the valuable Inscriptions of Tauromenium, Corp. Inscr. Gr. No. 5640, -part xxxii, sect 3, p. 640. -</p> -<p> -The surrender of Nikias must have taken place, I think, not less than -twenty-four or twenty-five days after the eclipse, which occurred on -the 27th of August, that is, about Sept. 21. Mr. Fynes Clinton (F. -H. ad ann. 413 <small>B.C.</small>) seems to me to compress too much the -interval between the eclipse and the retreat; considering that that -interval included two great battles, with a certain delay before, -between, and after. -</p> -<p> -The μετόπωρον noticed by Thucyd. vii, 79. suits with Sept. 21: -compare Plutarch, Nikias, c. 22.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_525"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_525">[525]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 87.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_526"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_526">[526]</a></span> Pausan. i, 29, 9; Philist. Fragm. 46, ed. Didot. -</p> -<p> -Justin erroneously says that Demosthenês actually did kill himself, -rather than submit to surrender, before the surrender of Nikias; who, -he says, did not choose to follow the example:— -</p> -<p> -“Demosthenês, amisso exercitu a captivitate gladio et voluntariâ -morte se vindicat: Nicias autem, ne Demosthenis quidem exemplo, -ut sibi consuleret, admonitus, cladem suorum auxit dedecore -captivitatis.” (Justin, iv, 5.) -</p> -<p> -Philistus, whom Pausanias announces himself as following, is an -excellent witness for the actual facts in Sicily; though not so good -a witness for the impression at Athens respecting those facts. -</p> -<p> -It seems certain, even from Thucydidês, that Nikias, in surrendering -himself to Gylippus, thought that he had considerable chance of -saving his life, Plutarch too so interprets the proceeding, and -condemns it as disgraceful, see his comparison of Nikias and Crassus, -near the end. Demosthenês could not have thought the same for -himself: the fact of his attempted suicide appears to me certain, on -the authority of Philistus, though Thucydidês does not notice it.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_527"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_527">[527]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 86. Καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιαύτῃ ἢ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα -τούτων αἰτίᾳ ἐτεθνήκει, ἥκιστα δὴ ἄξιος ὢν τῶν γε ἐπ’ ἐμοῦ Ἑλλήνων -ἐς τοῦτο δυστυχίας ἀφικέσθαι, <em class="gesperrt">διὰ τὴν νενομισμένην ἐς τὸ θεῖον -ἐπιτήδευσιν</em>. -</p> -<p> -So stood the text of Thucydidês, until various recent editors changed -the last words, on the authority of some MSS., to <em class="gesperrt">διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς -ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν</em>. -</p> -<p> -Though Dr. Arnold and some of the best critics prefer and adopt the -latter reading, I confess it seems to me that the former is more -suitable to the Greek vein of thought, as well as more conformable to -truth about Nikias. -</p> -<p> -A man’s good or bad fortune, depending on the favorable or -unfavorable disposition of the gods towards him, was understood to -be determined more directly by his piety and religious observances, -rather than by his virtue, see passages in Isokratês de Permutation. -Orat. xv, sect. 301; Lysias, cont. Nikomach. c. 5, p. 854, though -undoubtedly the two ideas went to a certain extent together. Men -might differ about the virtue of Nikias; but his piety was an -incontestable fact; and his “good fortune” also, in times prior to -the Sicilian expedition, was recognized by men like Alkibiadês, -who most probably had no very lofty opinion of his virtue (Thucyd. -vi, 17). The contrast between the remarkable piety of Nikias, and -that extremity of ill-fortune which marked the close of his life, -was very likely to shock Grecian ideas generally, and was a natural -circumstance for the historian to note. Whereas if we read, in the -passage, πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν, the panegyric upon Nikias becomes both -less special and more disproportionate, beyond what even Thucydidês -(as far as we can infer from other expressions, see v, 16) would -be inclined to bestow upon him—more, in fact, than he says in -commendation even of Periklês.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_528"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_528">[528]</a></span> A good many of the features depicted by Tacitus -(Hist. i, 49) in Galba, suit the character of Nikias, much more than -those of the rapacious and unprincipled Crassus, with whom Plutarch -compares the latter:— -</p> -<p> -“Vetus in familiâ nobilitas, magnæ opes: ipsi medium ingenium, -magis extra vitia, quam cum virtutibus. Sed claritas natalium, et -metus temporum, obtentui fuit, ut <i>quod segnitia fuit, sapientia</i> -vocaretur. Dum vigebat ætas, militari laude apud Germanias floruit: -proconsul, Africam moderate; jam senior, citeriorem Hispaniam, pari -justitiâ continuit. <i>Major privato visus dum privatus fuit, et omnium -consensu capax imperii, nisi imperasset.</i>”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_529"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_529">[529]</a></span> Thucyd. i, 122-142; vi, 90.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_530"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_530">[530]</a></span> Thucyd. viii. 4. About the extensive ruin caused by -the Lacedæmonians to the olive-grounds in Attica, see Lysias, Or. -vii, De Oleâ Sacrâ, sects. 6, 7. -</p> -<p> -An inscription preserved in M. Boeckh’s Corp. Inscr. (part ii, No. -93, p. 132), gives some hint how landlords and tenants met this -inevitable damage from the hands of the invaders. The deme Æxôneis -lets a farm to a certain tenant for forty years, at a fixed rent of -one hundred and forty drachmæ; but if an invading enemy shall drive -him out or injure his farm, the deme is to receive one half of the -year’s produce, in place of the year’s rent.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_531"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_531">[531]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 28, 29.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_532"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_532">[532]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_533"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_533">[533]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 28.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_534"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_534">[534]</a></span> Upon this new assessment on the allies, determined by -the Athenians, Mr. Mitford remarks as follows:— -</p> -<p> -“Thus light, in comparison of what we have laid upon ourselves, -was the heaviest tax, as far as we learn from history, at that -time known in the world. Yet it caused much discontent among the -dependent commonwealths; the arbitrary power by which it was imposed -being indeed reasonably execrated, though the burden itself was -comparatively a nothing.” -</p> -<p> -This admission is not easily reconciled with the frequent invectives -in which Mr. Mitford indulges against the empire of Athens, as -practising a system of extortion and oppression ruinous to the -subject-allies. -</p> -<p> -I do not know, however, on what authority he affirms that this was -“the heaviest tax then known in the world;” and that “it caused much -discontent among the subject commonwealths.” The latter assertion -would indeed be sufficiently probable, if it be true that the tax -ever came into operation; but we are not entitled to affirm it. -</p> -<p> -Considering how very soon the terrible misfortunes of Athens came -on, I cannot but think it a matter of uncertainty whether the new -assessment ever became a reality throughout the Athenian empire. And -the fact that Thucydidês does not notice it as an additional cause of -discontent among the allies, is one reason for such doubts.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_535"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_535">[535]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 29, 30, 31. I conceive that οὔσῃ -<em class="gesperrt">οὐ</em> μεγάλῃ is the right reading, and not οὔσῃ μεγάλῃ, in -reference to Mykalêssus. The words ὡς ἐπὶ μεγέθει, in c. 31, refer to -the size of the city. -</p> -<p> -The reading is, however, disputed among critics. It is evident from -the language of Thucydidês that the catastrophe at Mykalêssus made a -profound impression throughout Greece.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_536"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_536">[536]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 30; Pausanias. i, 23, 3. Compare Meineke, -ad Aristophanis Fragment. Ἥρωες, vol. ii, p. 1069.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_537"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_537">[537]</a></span> See above, vol. vi, ch. xlix, p. 196 of this History.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_538"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_538">[538]</a></span> See the <a href="#Chap_60">preceding chapter</a>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_539"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_539">[539]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 31. Compare the language of Phormion, ii. -88, 89.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_540"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_540">[540]</a></span> Thucyd. vii, 34.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_541"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_541">[541]</a></span> Plutarch, Nikias, c. 30. He gives the story without -much confidence, Ἀθηναίους δέ <em class="gesperrt">φασι</em>, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_542"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_542">[542]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 1.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_543"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_543">[543]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 1. Πάντα δὲ πανταχόθεν αὐτοὺς ἐλύπει, -etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_544"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_544">[544]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 1. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔγνωσαν, χαλεποὶ μὲν ἦσαν -τοῖς ξυμπροθυμηθεῖσι τῶν ῥητόρων τὸν ἔκπλουν, <em class="gesperrt">ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ -ψηφισάμενοι</em>, etc. -</p> -<p> -From these latter words, it would seem that Thucydidês considered -the Athenians, after having adopted the expedition by their votes, -to have debarred themselves from the right of complaining of those -speakers who had stood forward prominently to advise the step. I -do not at all concur in his opinion. The adviser of any important -measure always makes himself morally responsible for its justice, -usefulness, and practicability; and he very properly incurs disgrace, -more or less according to the case, if it turns out to present -results totally contrary to those which he had predicted. We know -that the Athenian law often imposed upon the mover of a proposition -not merely <i>moral</i>, but even <i>legal</i>, responsibility; a regulation of -doubtful propriety under other circumstances, but which I believe to -have been useful at Athens. -</p> -<p> -It must be admitted, however, to have been hard upon the advisers of -this expedition, that—from the total destruction of the armament, -neither generals nor soldiers returning—they were not enabled to -show how much of the ruin had arisen from faults in the execution, -not in the plan conceived. The speaker in the Oration of Lysias—περὶ -δημεύσεως τοῦ Νικίου ἀδελφοῦ (Or. xviii, sect. 2)—attempts to -transfer the blame from Nikias upon the advisers of the expedition, a -manifest injustice. -</p> -<p> -Demosthenês (in the Oration De Coronâ, c. 73) gives an emphatic and -noble statement of the responsibility which he cheerfully accepts -for himself as a political speaker and adviser; responsibility for -seeing the beginnings and understanding the premonitory signs of -coming events, and giving his countrymen warning beforehand: ἰδεῖν τὰ -πράγματα ἀρχόμενα καὶ προαισθέσθαι καὶ προειπεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις. This -is the just view of the subject; and, applying the measure proposed -by Demosthenês, the Athenians had ample ground to be displeased with -their orators.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_545"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_545">[545]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 1. πάντα δὲ πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα περιδεὲς, -ὅπερ φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν, ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐτακτεῖν; compare Xenoph. Mem. -iii, 5, 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_546"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_546">[546]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 1-4. About the functions of this Board -of Probûli, much has been said for which there is no warrant in -Thucydidês: τῶν τε κατὰ τὴν πόλιν τι ἐς εὐτέλειαν σωφρονίσαι, καὶ -ἀρχήν τινα πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν ἑλέσθαι, οἵτινες περὶ τῶν παρόντων ὡς -ἂν καιρὸς ᾖ προβουλεύσουσι. Πάντα δὲ πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα περιδεὲς, ὅπερ -φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν, ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐτακτεῖν. -</p> -<p> -Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks: “That is, no measure was to be -submitted to the people, till it had first been approved by this -council of elders.” And such is the general view of the commentators. -</p> -<p> -No such meaning as this, however, is necessarily contained in -the word Πρόβουλοι. It is, indeed, conceivable that persons so -denominated might be invested with such a control; but we cannot -infer it, or affirm it, simply from the name. Nor will the passages -in Aristotle’s Politics, wherein the word Πρόβουλοι occurs, authorize -any inference with respect to this Board in the special case of -Athens (Aristotel. Politic. iv, 11, 9; iv, 12, 8; vi, 5, 10-13). -</p> -<p> -The Board only seems to have lasted for a short time at Athens, being -named for a temporary purpose, at a moment of peculiar pressure and -discouragement. During such a state of feeling, there was little -necessity for throwing additional obstacles in the way of new -propositions to be made to the people. It was rather of importance -to <i>encourage</i> the suggestion of new measures, from men of sense and -experience. A Board destined merely for control and hindrance, would -have been mischievous instead of useful under the reigning melancholy -at Athens. -</p> -<p> -The Board was doubtless merged in the Oligarchy of Four Hundred, like -all the other magistracies of the state, and was not reconstituted -after their deposition. -</p> -<p> -I cannot think it admissible to draw inferences as to the functions -of this Board of Probûli now constituted, from the proceedings of -the Probûlus in Aristophanis Lysistrata, as is done by Wachsmuth -(Hellenische Alterthumskunde, i, 2, p. 198), and by Wattenbach (De -Quadringentorum Athenis Factione, pp. 17-21, Berlin 1842). -</p> -<p> -Schömann (Ant. Jur. Pub. Græcor. v, xii, p. 181) says of these -Πρόβουλοι: “Videtur autem eorum potestas fere annua fuisse.” I do -not distinctly understand what he means by these words; whether he -means that the Board continued permanent, but that the members were -annually changed. If this be his meaning, I dissent from it. I think -that the Board lasted until the time of the Four Hundred, which would -be about a year and a half after its first institution.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_547"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_547">[547]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 2, 3. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὴν πρόσταξιν -ταῖς πόλεσιν ἑκατὸν νεῶν <em class="gesperrt">τῆς ναυπηγίας</em> ἐποιοῦντο, etc.; -compare also c. 4—παρεσκευάζοντο τὴν <em class="gesperrt">ναυπηγίαν</em>, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_548"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_548">[548]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 5. ὄντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὥσπερ ἀρχομένων ἐν -κατασκευῇ τοῦ πολέμου: compare ii, 7.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_549"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_549">[549]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 2: compare ii, 7; -iii, 86.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_550"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_550">[550]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_551"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_551">[551]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 5.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_552"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_552">[552]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 7-24.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_553"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_553">[553]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 5. Ὑπὸ -βασιλέως γὰρ <em class="gesperrt">νεωστὶ</em> ἐτύγχανε πεπραγμένος -(Tissaphernes) τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς φόρους, οὓς δι’ Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ -τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐ δυνάμενος πράσσεσθαι ἐπωφείλησε. Τούς τε οὖν -φόρους μᾶλλον ἐνόμιζε κομιεῖσθαι κακώσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, etc. -</p> -<p> -I have already discussed this important passage at some length, in -its bearing upon the treaty concluded thirty-seven years before this -time between Athens and Persia. See the note to volume v, chap. xlv, -pp. 337-339, of this History.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_554"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_554">[554]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 29. Καὶ μηνὸς μὲν -τροφήν, <em class="gesperrt">ὥσπερ ὑπέστη ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι</em>, -ἐς δραχμὴν Ἀττικὴν ἑκάστῳ πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ διέδωκε, τοῦ δὲ λοιποῦ -χρόνου ἐβούλετο τριώβολον διδόναι, etc.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_555"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_555">[555]</a></span> The satrapy of Tissaphernes extended as far north as -Antandrus and Adramyttium (Thucyd. viii, 108).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_556"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_556">[556]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_557"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_557">[557]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 6-12; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 23, 24; -Cornelius Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 3.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_558"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_558">[558]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 6.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_559"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_559">[559]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 8.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_560"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_560">[560]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 10. Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τὰ Ἴσθμια ἐγένετο· καὶ -οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι (ἐπηγγέλθησαν γὰρ) ἐθεώρουν ἐς αὐτά· καὶ κατάδηλα μᾶλλον -αὐτοῖς τὰ τῶν Χίων ἐφάνη. -</p> -<p> -The language of Thucydidês in this passage deserves notice. The -Athenians were now at enmity with Corinth: it was therefore -remarkable, and contrary to what would be expected among Greeks, that -they should be present with their theôry, or solemn sacrifice, at the -Isthmian festival. Accordingly Thucydidês, when he mentions that they -went thither, thinks it right to add the explanation—<em class="gesperrt">ἐπηγγέλθησαν -γὰρ</em>—“for they had been invited;” “for the festival truce had -been formally signified to them.” That the heralds who proclaimed -the truce should come and proclaim it to a state in hostility -with Corinth, was something unusual, and merited special notice: -otherwise, Thucydidês would never have thought it worth while to -mention the proclamation, it being the uniform practice. -</p> -<p> -We must recollect that this was the first Isthmian festival which -had taken place since the resumption of the war between Athens and -the Peloponnesian alliance. The habit of leaving out Athens from the -Corinthian herald’s proclamation had not yet been renewed. In regard -to the Isthmian festival, there was probably greater reluctance to -leave her out, because that festival was in its origin half Athenian; -said to have been established, or revived after interruption, by -Theseus; and the Athenian theôry enjoyed a προεδρία, or privileged -place, at the games (Plutarch, Theseus, c. 25; Argument. ad Pindar. -Isthm. Schol.).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_561"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_561">[561]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 11.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_562"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_562">[562]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 12.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_563"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_563">[563]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 14.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_564"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_564">[564]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 9. Αἴτιον δ’ ἐγένετο τῆς ἀποστολῆς -τῶν νεῶν, <em class="gesperrt">οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν Χίων οὐκ εἰδότες τὰ πρασσόμενα</em>, -οἱ δὲ ὀλίγοι ξυνειδότες, <em class="gesperrt">τό τε πλῆθος οὐ βουλόμενοί πω πολέμιον -ἔχειν</em>, πρίν τι καὶ ἰσχυρὸν λάβωσι, καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους οὐκέτι -προσδεχόμενοι ἥξειν, ὅτι διέτριβον. -</p> -<p> -Also viii, 14. Ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης καὶ ὁ Χαλκιδεὺς ... προξυγγενόμενοι -τῶν ξυμπρασσόντων Χίων τισὶ, καὶ κελευόντων καταπλεῖν μὴ -προειπόντας ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ἀφικνοῦνται αἰφνίδιοι τοῖς Χίοις. <em -class="gesperrt">Καὶ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἐν θαύματι ἦσαν καὶ ἐκπλήξει· τοῖς -δ’ ὀλίγοις παρεσκεύαστο</em> ὥστε βουλήν τε τυχεῖν ξυλλεγομένην, -καὶ γενομένων λόγων ἀπό τε τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὡς ἄλλαι τε νῆες πολλαὶ -προσπλέουσι, καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς πολιορκίας τῶν ἐν Πειραίῳ νεῶν οὐ -δηλωσάντων, ἀφίστανται Χῖοι, καὶ αὖθις Ἐρυθραῖοι, Ἀθηναίων. -</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_565"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_565">[565]</a></span> See the remarkable passage of -Thucyd. viii, 24, about the calculations of the Chian government.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_566"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_566">[566]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 15.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_567"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_567">[567]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 16.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_568"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_568">[568]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 17-19.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_569"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_569">[569]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 18.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_570"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_570">[570]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 84-109.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_571"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_571">[571]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 44.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_572"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_572">[572]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 21. Ἐγένετο δὲ -κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐν Σάμῳ <em class="gesperrt">ἐπανάστασις -ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς</em>, μετὰ Ἀθηναίων, οἳ ἔτυχον ἐν τρισὶ -ναυσὶ παρόντες. Καὶ ὁ δῆμος ὁ Σαμίων ἐς διακοσίους μέν τινας τοὺς -πάντας τῶν δυνατῶν ἀπέκτεινε, τετρακοσίους δὲ φυγῇ ζημιώσαντες -καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν καὶ οἰκίας νειμάμενοι, Ἀθηναίων τε σφίσιν -αὐτονομίαν μετὰ ταῦτα <em class="gesperrt">ὡς βεβαίοις ἤδη</em> -ψηφισαμένων, τὰ λοιπὰ διῴκουν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τοῖς γεωμόροις -μετεδίδοσαν οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς, οὔτε ἐκδοῦναι οὐδ’ ἀγαγέσθαι παρ’ -ἐκείνων οὐδ’ ἐς ἐκείνους οὐδενὶ ἔτι τοῦ δήμου ἐξῆν.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_573"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_573">[573]</a></span> -Thucyd. viii, 21. The dispositions and plans of the -“higher people” at Samos, to call in the Peloponnesians and revolt -from Athens, are fully admitted even by Mr. Mitford, and implied by -Dr. Thirlwall, who argues that the government of Samos cannot have -been oligarchical, because, if it had been so, the island would -already have revolted from Athens to the Peloponnesians. -</p> -<p> -Mr. Mitford says (ch. xix, sect. iii, vol. iv, p. 191): “Meanwhile -the body of the higher people at Samos, more depressed than all -others since their reduction on their former revolt, were <i>proposing -to seize the opportunity that seemed to offer through the prevalence -of the Peloponnesian arms, of mending their condition</i>. The lower -people, <i>having intelligence of their design</i>, rose upon them, and, -with the assistance of the crews of three Athenian ships then at -Samos, overpowered them,” etc. etc. etc. -</p> -<p> -“The <i>massacre and robbery</i> were rewarded by a decree of the Athenian -people, granting to the perpetrators the independent administration -of the affairs of their island; which, since the last rebellion, had -been kept <i>under the immediate control of the Athenian government</i>.” -</p> -<p> -To call this a <i>massacre</i> is perversion of language. It was an -insurrection and intestine conflict, in which the “higher people” -were vanquished, but of which they also were the beginners, by their -conspiracy—which Mr. Mitford himself admits as a fact—to introduce -a foreign enemy into the island. Does he imagine that the “lower -people” were bound to sit still and see this done? And what means -had they of preventing it, except by insurrection; which inevitably -became bloody, because the “higher people” were a strong party, -in possession of the powers of government, with great means of -resistance. The loss on the part of the assailants is not made known -to us, nor indeed the loss in so far as it fell on the followers of -the geômori. Thucydidês specifies only the number of the geômori -themselves, who were persons of individual importance. -</p> -<p> -I do not clearly understand what idea Mr. Mitford forms to himself -of the government of Samos at this time. He seems to conceive it as -democratical, yet under great immediate control from Athens, and -that it kept the “higher people” in a state of severe depression, -from which they sought to relieve themselves by the aid of the -Peloponnesian arms. -</p> -<p> -But if he means by the expression, “<i>under the immediate control of -the Athenian government</i>,” that there was any Athenian governor or -garrison at Samos, the account here given by Thucydidês distinctly -refutes him. The conflict was between two intestine parties, “the -higher people and the lower people.” The only Athenians who took part -in it were the crews of three triremes, and even they were there by -accident (οἳ ἔτυχον παρόντες), not as a regular garrison. Samos was -under an indigenous government; but it was a subject and tributary -ally of Athens, like all the other allies, with the exception of -Chios and Methymna (Thucyd. vi, 85). After this resolution, the -Athenians raised it to the rank of an autonomous ally, which Mr. -Mitford is pleased to call “rewarding massacre and robbery,” in the -language of a party orator rather than of an historian. -</p> -<p> -But was the government of Samos, immediately before this intestine -contest, oligarchical or democratical? The language of Thucydidês -carries to my mind a full conviction that it was oligarchical, under -an exclusive aristocracy, called The Geômori. Dr. Thirlwall, however -(whose candid and equitable narrative of this event forms a striking -contrast to that of Mr. Mitford), is of a different opinion. He -thinks it certain that a democratical government had been established -at Samos by the Athenians, when it was reconquered by them -(<small>B.C.</small> 440) after its revolt. That the government continued -democratical during the first years of the Peloponnesian war, he -conceives to be proved by the hostility of the Samian exiles at Anæa, -whom he looks upon as oligarchical refugees. And though not agreeing -in Mr. Mitford’s view of the peculiarly depressed condition of the -“higher people” at Samos at this later time, he nevertheless thinks -that they were not actually in possession of the government. “Still -(he says), as the island gradually recovered its prosperity, the -privileged class seems also to have looked upward, perhaps contrived -to regain a part of the substance of power under different forms, -and probably betrayed a strong inclination to revive its ancient -pretensions on the first opportunity. <i>That it had not yet advanced -beyond this point, may be regarded as certain; because otherwise -Samos would have been among the foremost to revolt from Athens</i>: and -on the other hand, it is no less clear, that the state of parties -there was such as to excite a high degree of mutual jealousy, and -great alarm in the Athenians, to whom the loss of the island at this -juncture would have been almost irreparable.” (Hist. of Gr. ch. -xxvii, vol. iii, p. 477 2d edit.) Manso (Sparta, book iv, vol. ii, p. -266) is of the same opinion. -</p> -<p> -Surely, the conclusion which Dr. Thirlwall here announces as certain, -cannot be held to rest on adequate premises. Admitting that there was -an oligarchy in power at Samos, it is perfectly possible to explain -why this oligarchy had not yet carried into act its disposition to -revolt from Athens. We see that none of the allies of Athens—not -even Chios, the most powerful of all—revolted without the extraneous -pressure and encouragement of a foreign fleet. Alkibiadês, after -securing Chios, considered Milêtus to be next in order of importance, -and had, moreover, peculiar connections with the leading men -there (viii, 17); so that he went next to detach that place from -Athens. Milêtus, being on the continent, placed him in immediate -communication with Tissaphernês, for which reason he might naturally -deem it of importance superior even to Samos in his plans. Moreover, -not only no foreign fleet had yet reached Samos, but several Athenian -ships had arrived there: for Strombichidês, having come across the -Ægean too late to save Chios, made Samos a sort of central station -(viii, 16). These circumstances combined with the known reluctance of -the Samian demos, or commonalty, are surely sufficient to explain why -the Samian oligarchy had not yet consummated its designs to revolt. -And hence the fact, that no revolt had yet taken place, cannot be -held to warrant Dr. Thirlwall’s inference, that the government was -<i>not</i> oligarchical. -</p> -<p> -We have no information how or when the oligarchical government at -Samos got up. That the Samian refugees at Anæa, so actively hostile -to Samos and Athens during the first ten years of the Peloponnesian -war, were oligarchical exiles acting against a democratical -government at Samos (iv, 75), is not in itself improbable; yet it -is not positively stated. The government of Samos might have been, -even at that time, oligarchical; yet, if it acted in the Athenian -interest, there would doubtless be a body of exiles watching for -opportunities of injuring it, by aid of the enemies of Athens. -</p> -<p> -Moreover, it seems to me, that if we read and put together the -passages of Thucydidês, viii, 21, 63, 73, it is impossible without -the greatest violence to put any other sense upon them, except as -meaning that the government of Samos was now in the hands of the -oligarchy, or geômori, and that the Demos rose in insurrection -against them, with ultimate triumph. The natural sense of the words -ἐπανάστασις, ἐπανίσταμαι, is that of <i>insurrection against an -established government: it does not mean, “a violent attack by one -party upon another;” still less does it mean, “an attack made by a -party in possession of the government:</i>” which nevertheless it ought -to mean, if Dr. Thirlwall be correct in supposing that the Samian -government was now democratical. Thus we have, in the description of -the Samian revolt from Athens—Thucyd. i, 115 (after Thucydidês has -stated that the Athenians established a democratical government, he -next says that the Samian exiles presently came over with a mercenary -force)—καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῷ <em class="gesperrt">δήμῳ ἐπανέστησαν</em>, καὶ ἐκράτησαν τῶν -πλείστων, etc. Again, v, 23—about the apprehended insurrection of -the Helots against the Spartans—ἢν δὲ ἡ δούλεια <em class="gesperrt">ἐπανίστηται</em>: -compare Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 19; Plato, Republ. iv, 18, p. 444; -Herodot. iii, 39-120. So also δυνατοὶ is among the words which -Thucydidês uses for an oligarchical party, either in government or -in what may be called <i>opposition</i> (i, 24; v, 4). But it is not -conceivable to me that Thucydidês would have employed the words ἡ -ἐπανάστασις ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς—if the Demos had at that time -been actually in the government. -</p> -<p> -Again, viii, 63, he says, that the Athenian oligarchical party under -Peisander αὐτῶν τῶν Σαμίων προὐτρέψαντο τοὺς δυνατοὺς ὥστε πειρᾶσθαι -μετὰ σφῶν ὀλιγαρχηθῆναι, καίπερ <em class="gesperrt">ἐπαναστάντας αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλοις ἵνα -μὴ ὀλιγαρχῶνται</em>. Here the motive of the previous ἐπανάστασις -is clearly noted; it was in order that they might <i>not be under an -oligarchical government</i>: for I agree with Krüger (in opposition to -Dr. Thirlwall), that this is the clear meaning of the words, and -that the use of the present tense prevents our construing it, “in -order that their democratical government might not be subverted, and -an oligarchy put upon them,” which ought to be the sense, if Dr. -Thirlwall’s view were just. -</p> -<p> -Lastly, -<span class="replace" id="tn_2" title="In the printed book: vii, 73">viii, 73</span>, -we have οἱ γὰρ <em class="gesperrt">τότε τῶν Σαμίων ἐπαναστάντες τοῖς -δυνατοῖς καὶ ὄντες δῆμος, μεταβαλλόμενοι αὖθις</em>—ἐγένοντό τε ἐς -τριακοσίους ξυνωμόται, καὶ ἔμελλον τοῖς ἄλλοις <em class="gesperrt">ὡς δήμῳ ὄντι</em> -ἐπιθήσεσθαι. Surely these words—οἱ ἐπαναστάντες τοῖς δυνατοῖς καὶ -ὄντες δῆμος—“those who having risen in arms against the wealthy -and powerful, were now a demos, or a democracy,” must imply, <i>that -the persons against whom the rising had taken place had been a -governing oligarchy</i>. Surely, also, the words μεταβαλλόμενοι αὖθις, -can mean nothing else except to point out the strange antithesis -between the conduct of these same men at two different epochs not -far distant from each other. On the first occasion, they rose up -against an established oligarchical government, and constituted a -democratical government. On the second occasion, they rose up in -conspiracy against this very democratical government, in order to -subvert it, and constitute themselves an oligarchy in its place. If -we suppose that on the first occasion, the established government was -already democratical, and that the persons here mentioned were not -conspirators against an established oligarchy, but merely persons -making use of the powers of a democratical government to do violence -to rich citizens, all this antithesis completely vanishes. -</p> -<p> -On the whole, I feel satisfied that the government of Samos, at -the time when Chios revolted from Athens, was oligarchical, like -that of Chios itself. Nor do I see any difficulty in believing this -to be the fact, though I cannot state when and how the oligarchy -became established there. So long as the island performed its duty -as a subject ally, Athens did not interfere with the form of its -government. And she was least of all likely to interfere during -the seven years of peace intervening between the years 421-414 -<small>B.C.</small> There was nothing then to excite her apprehensions. -The degree to which Athens intermeddled generally with the internal -affairs of her subject-allies, seems to me to have been much -exaggerated. -</p> -<p> -The Samian oligarchy, or geômori, dispossessed of the government on -this occasion, were restored by Lysander after his victorious close -of the Peloponnesian war,—Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 3, 6—where they are -called οἱ ἀρχαῖοι πολῖται.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_574"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_574">[574]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 13.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_575"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_575">[575]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 20-23.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_576"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_576">[576]</a></span> See the earlier part of this -History, vol. vi, ch. l, pp. 257, 258.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_577"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_577">[577]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 22.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_578"><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_578">[578]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 20.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_579"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_579">[579]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 23. ἀπεκομίσθη δὲ -πάλιν κατὰ πόλεις καὶ ὁ <em class="gesperrt">ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζός</em>, -ὃς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἐμέλλησεν ἰέναι.</p> - -<p>Dr. Arnold and Göller suppose that these soldiers had been -carried over to Lesbos to coöperate in detaching the island from -the Athenians. But this is not implied in the narrative. The -land-force <i>marched along</i> by land to Klazomenæ and Kymê (ὁ πεζὸς -ἅμα Πελοποννησίων τε τῶν παρόντων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων <em -class="gesperrt">παρῄει</em> ἐπὶ Κλαζομένων τε καὶ Κύμης). Thucydidês -does not say that they ever crossed to Lesbos: they remained near -Kymê, prepared to march forward, after that island should have been -conquered, to the Hellespont.</p> - -<p>Haacke is right, I think, in referring the words ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν -νεῶν πεζός to what had been stated in c. 17; that Alkibiadês and -Chalkideus, on first arriving with the Peloponnesian five triremes -at Chios, disembarked on that island their Peloponnesian seamen -and armed them as hoplites for land-forces; taking aboard fresh -crews of seamen from the island. The motive to make this exchange -was, the great superiority of bravery, in heavy armor and stand-up -fighting, of Peloponnesians as compared with Chians or Asiatic Greeks -(see Xenoph. Hell. iii, 2, 17). These foot-soldiers taken from the -Peloponnesian ships are the same as those spoken of in c. 22: ὁ πεζὸς -ἅμα Πελοποννησίων τε τῶν παρόντων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων ... ὁ ἀπὸ -τῶν νεῶν πεζός.</p> - -<p>Farther, these troops are again mentioned in c. 24, as οἱ μετὰ -Χαλκιδέως ἐλθόντες Πελοποννήσιοι, where Dr. Arnold again speaks -of them in his note incorrectly. He says: “The Peloponnesians who -came with Chalkideus must have been too few to offer any effectual -resistance to one thousand heavy-armed Athenians, being only <i>the -epibatæ</i> of five ships.” The fact is that they were not merely -the epibatæ, but the <i>entire crews</i>, of five ships; comprising -probably from eight hundred to one thousand men (ἐκ μὲν τῶν <em -class="gesperrt">ἐκ Πελοποννήσου νεῶν τοὺς ναύτας ὁπλίσαντες</em> -ἐν Χίῳ καταλιμπάνουσι, c. 17), since there were a remnant of five -hundred left of them, after some months’ operations and a serious -defeat (viii, 32).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_580"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_580">[580]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 24, with Dr. -Arnold’s note.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_581"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_581">[581]</a></span> Aristotel. Politic. iv, 4, 1; -Athenæus, vi, p. 265.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_582"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_582">[582]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 24. Καὶ μετὰ -τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Χῖοι ἤδη οὐκέτι ἐπεξῄσαν, οἱ δὲ (Ἀθηναῖοι) τὴν χώραν, -καλῶς κατεσκευασμένην καὶ ἀπαθῆ οὖσαν ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν μέχρι τότε, -διεπόρθησαν. Χῖοι γὰρ μόνοι μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίους, ὧν ἐγὼ ᾐσθόμην, -εὐδαιμονήσαντες ἅμα καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἐπεδίδου ἡ πόλις αὐτοῖς -ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον, τόσῳ δὲ καὶ ἐκοσμοῦντο ἐχυρώτερον, etc.</p> - -<p>viii. 45. Οἱ Χῖοι ... πλουσιώτατοι ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_583"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_583">[583]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 25, 26.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_584"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_584">[584]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 26, 27.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_585"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_585">[585]</a></span> Phrynichus the Athenian -commander was afterwards displaced by the Athenians,—by the -recommendation of Peisander, at the time when this displacement -suited the purpose of the oligarchical conspirators,—on the charge of -having abandoned and betrayed Amorgês on this occasion, and caused -the capture of Iasus (Thucyd. viii, 54).</p> - -<p>Phrynichus and his colleagues were certainly guilty of grave -omission in not sending notice to Amorgês of the sudden retirement of -the Athenian fleet from Milêtus, the ignorance of which circumstance -was one reason why Amorgês mistook the Peloponnesian ships for -Athenian.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_586"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_586">[586]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 28.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_587"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_587">[587]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 29. What this -new rate of pay was, or by what exact fraction it exceeded the half -drachma, is a matter which the words of Thucydidês do not enable us -to make out. None of the commentators can explain the text without -admitting some alteration or omission of words: nor do any of the -explanations given appear to me convincing. On the whole, I incline -to consider the conjecture and explanation given by Paulmier and -Dobree as more plausible than that of Dr. Arnold and Göller, or of -Poppo and Hermann.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_588"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_588">[588]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 36.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_589"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_589">[589]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 30; compare Dr. -Arnold’s note.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_590"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_590">[590]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 31, 32.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_591"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_591">[591]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 32, 33.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_592"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_592">[592]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 33, 34.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_593"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_593">[593]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 34-38. -Δελφίνιον—<em class="gesperrt">λιμένας</em> ἔχον, etc.</p> - -<p>That the Athenians should select Lesbos on this occasion as -the base of their operations, and as the immediate scene of last -preparations, against Chios,—was only repeating what they had once -done before (c. 24), and what they again did afterwards (c. 100). I -do not feel the difficulty which strikes Dobree and Dr. Thirlwall. -Doubtless Delphinium was to the north of the city of Chios.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_594"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_594">[594]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 38-40. About the -slaves in Chios, see the extracts from Theopompus and Nymphodôrus in -Athenæus, vi, p. 265. </p> - -<p>That from Nymphodôrus appears to be nothing but a romantic local -legend, connected with the Chapel of the <i>Kind-hearted Hero</i> (Ἥρωος -εὐμένους) at Chios.</p> - -<p>Even in antiquity, though the institution of slavery was universal -and noway disapproved, yet the slave-trade, or the buying and selling -of slaves, was accounted more or less odious.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_595"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_595">[595]</a></span> See the life of Lysias the -Rhetor, in Dionysius of Halikarnassus, c. i, p. 453, Reisk., and in -Plutarch, Vit. x, Orat. p. 835.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_596"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_596">[596]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 35-109.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_597"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_597">[597]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 35, 36. καὶ γὰρ -μισθὸς ἐδίδοτο <em class="gesperrt">ἀρκούντως</em>, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_598"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_598">[598]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 37. Καὶ ἤν -τις τῶν <em class="gesperrt">ἐν τῇ βασιλέως χώρᾳ, ἢ ὅσης βασιλεὺς -ἄρχει</em>, ἐπὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἴῃ ἢ τῶν ξυμμάχων, βασιλεὺς κωλυέτω -καὶ ἀμυνέτω κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.</p> - -<p>The distinction here drawn between <i>the king’s territory</i>, and the -territory <i>over which the king holds empire</i>, deserves notice. By the -former phrase, is understood, I presume, the continent of Asia, which -the court of Susa looked upon, together with all its inhabitants, as -a freehold exceedingly sacred and peculiar (Herodot. i, 4): by the -latter, as much as the satrap should find it convenient to lay hands -upon, of that which had once belonged to Darius son of Hystaspes or -to Xerxes, in the plenitude of their power.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_599"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_599">[599]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 38. ἀποπλέων ἐν -κέλητι ἀφανίζεται.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_600"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_600">[600]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 39. Καὶ εἴρητο -αὐτοῖς, ἐς Μίλητον ἀφικομένους <em class="gesperrt">τῶν τε ἄλλων -ξυνεπιμελεῖσθαι</em>, ᾗ μέλλει ἄριστα ἕξειν, etc.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_601"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_601">[601]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 42.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_602"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_602">[602]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 43. This -defeat of Charmînus is made the subject of a jest by Aristophanês, -Thesmophor. 810, with the note of Paulmier.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_603"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_603">[603]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 43.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_604"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_604">[604]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 44. Οἱ δ’ ἐς τὴν -Ῥόδον, ἐπικηρυκευομένων ἀπὸ τῶν δυνατωτάτων ἀνδρῶν, τὴν γνώμην εἶχον -πλεῖν, etc.</p> - -<p>... Καὶ προσβαλόντες Καμείρῳ τῆς Ῥοδίας πρώτῃ, ναυσὶ τέσσαρσι καὶ -ἐνενήκοντα, <em class="gesperrt">ἐξεφόβησαν μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς, οὐκ -εἰδότας τὰ πρασσόμενα</em>, καὶ ἔφυγον, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτειχίστου οὔσης -τῆς πόλεως, etc.</p> - -<p>We have to remark here, as on former occasions of revolts among -the dependent allies of Athens, that the general population of the -allied city manifests no previous discontent, nor any spontaneous -disposition to revolt. The powerful men of the island—those who, if -the government was democratical, formed the oligarchical minority, -but who formed the government itself, if oligarchical—conspire -and bring in the Peloponnesian force, unknown to the body of the -citizens, and thus leave to the latter no free choice. The real -feeling towards Athens on the part of the body of the citizens is one -of simple acquiescence, with little attachment on the one hand, yet -no hatred, or sense of practical suffering, on the other.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_605"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_605">[605]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 44: compare c. -57.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_606"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_606">[606]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 40-55.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_607"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_607">[607]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 39.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_608"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_608">[608]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 45. Suggestions -of Alkibiadês to Tissaphernês—Καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους καὶ τοὺς -στρατηγοὺς τῶν πόλεων ἐδίδασκεν <em class="gesperrt">ὥστε δόντα -χρήματα αὐτὸν πεῖσαι</em>, ὥστε <em class="gesperrt">ξυγχωρῆσαι ταῦτα -ἑαυτῷ</em>, πλὴν τῶν Συρακοσίων· τούτων δὲ, Ἑρμοκράτης ἠναντιοῦτο <em -class="gesperrt">μόνος</em> ὑπὲρ τοῦ ξύμπαντος ξυμμαχικοῦ.</p> - -<p>About the bribes to Astyochus himself, see also c. 50.</p> -</div> - -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="transnote" id="tnote"> - <p class="tnotetit">Transcriber's note</p> - <ul> - <li>Original spelling, hyphenation and punctuation have been kept, but variant spellings were made - consistent when a predominant usage was found.</li> - <li>Footnotes have been renumbered and moved to the end of the book.</li> - <li>Blank pages have been skipped.</li> - <li>Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after comparison with a later edition of - this work. Greek text has also been corrected after checking with this later edition and - with Perseus, when the reference was found.</li> - <li>Some inconsistencies in the use of accents over proper nouns - (like “Alkibiades” and “Alkibiadês”) have been retained.</li> - <li>The following changes were also made, after checking with - Perseus and other editions: - <table summary="changes made"> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">note <a href="#Footnote_337">337</a>:</td> - <td class="tdr">“Thucyd. vi, 69”</td> - <td>→</td> - <td>“<a href="#tn_1">Thucyd, i, 69</a>”</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">note <a href="#Footnote_573">573</a>:</td> - <td class="tdr">“vii, 73”</td> - <td>→</td> - <td>“<a href="#tn_2">viii, 73</a>”</td> - </tr> - </table> - </li> - <li>The book cover image was created by the transcriber and is placed in the public domain.</li> - </ul> -</div> - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of History of Greece, Volume 7 (of 12), by -George Grote - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF GREECE, VOLUME 7 OF 12 *** - -***** This file should be named 51181-h.htm or 51181-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/1/1/8/51181/ - -Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Ramon Pajares Box and the -Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net -(This file was produced from images generously made -available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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