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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Meaning of Truth + +Author: William James + + +Release Date: February, 2004 [EBook #5117] +This file was first posted on May 1, 2002 +Last Updated: July 4, 2013 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE MEANING OF TRUTH *** + + + + +Text file produced by Steve Harris, Charles Franks and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team + +HTML file produced by David Widger + + + + +</pre> + + <div style="height: 8em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h1> + THE MEANING OF TRUTH + </h1> + <h3> + A SEQUEL TO 'PRAGMATISM' + </h3> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <h2> + By William James + </h2> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_PREF" id="link2H_PREF"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + PREFACE + </h2> + <p> + THE pivotal part of my book named Pragmatism is its account of the + relation called 'truth' which may obtain between an idea (opinion, belief, + statement, or what not) and its object. 'Truth,' I there say, 'is a + property of certain of our ideas. It means their agreement, as falsity + means their disagreement, with reality. Pragmatists and intellectualists + both accept this definition as a matter of course. + </p> + <p> + 'Where our ideas [do] not copy definitely their object, what does + agreement with that object mean? ... Pragmatism asks its usual question. + "Grant an idea or belief to be true," it says, "what concrete difference + will its being true make in any one's actual life? What experiences [may] + be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? How + will the truth be realized? What, in short, is the truth's cash-value in + experiential terms?" The moment pragmatism asks this question, it sees the + answer: TRUE IDEAS ARE THOSE THAT WE CAN ASSIMILATE, VALIDATE, + CORROBORATE, AND VERIFY. FALSE IDEAS ARE THOSE THAT WE CANNOT. That is the + practical difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that therefore is + the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known as. + </p> + <p> + 'The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth + HAPPENS to an idea. It BECOMES true, is MADE true by events. Its verity IS + in fact an event, a process, the process namely of its verifying itself, + its veriFICATION. Its validity is the process of its validATION. + [Footnote: But 'VERIFIABILITY,' I add, 'is as good as verification. For + one truth-process completed, there are a million in our lives that + function in [the] state of nascency. They lead us towards direct + verification; lead us into the surroundings of the object they envisage; + and then, if everything, runs on harmoniously, we are so sure that + verification is possible that we omit it, and are usually justified by all + that happens.'] + </p> + <p> + 'To agree in the widest sense with a reality can only mean to be guided + either straight up to it or into its surroundings, or to be put into such + working touch with it as to handle either it or something connected with + it better than if we disagreed. Better either intellectually or + practically .... Any idea that helps us to deal, whether practically or + intellectually, with either the reality or its belongings, that doesn't + entangle our progress in frustrations, that FITS, in fact, and adapts our + life to the reality's whole setting, will agree sufficiently to meet the + requirement. It will be true of that reality. + </p> + <p> + 'THE TRUE, to put it very briefly, IS ONLY THE EXPEDIENT IN THE WAY OF OUR + THINKING, JUST AS THE RIGHT IS ONLY THE EXPEDIENT IN THE WAY OF OUR + BEHAVING. Expedient in almost any fashion, and expedient in the long run + and on the whole, of course; for what meets expediently all the experience + in sight won't necessarily meet all farther experiences equally + satisfactorily. Experience, as we know, has ways of BOILING OVER, and + making us correct our present formulas.' + </p> + <p> + This account of truth, following upon the similar ones given by Messrs. + Dewey and Schiller, has occasioned the liveliest discussion. Few critics + have defended it, most of them have scouted it. It seems evident that the + subject is a hard one to understand, under its apparent simplicity; and + evident also, I think, that the definitive settlement of it will mark a + turning-point in the history of epistemology, and consequently in that of + general philosophy. In order to make my own thought more accessible to + those who hereafter may have to study the question, I have collected in + the volume that follows all the work of my pen that bears directly on the + truth-question. My first statement was in 1884, in the article that begins + the present volume. The other papers follow in the order of their + publication. Two or three appear now for the first time. + </p> + <p> + One of the accusations which I oftenest have had to meet is that of making + the truth of our religious beliefs consist in their 'feeling good' to us, + and in nothing else. I regret to have given some excuse for this charge, + by the unguarded language in which, in the book Pragmatism, I spoke of the + truth of the belief of certain philosophers in the absolute. Explaining + why I do not believe in the absolute myself (p. 78), yet finding that it + may secure 'moral holidays' to those who need them, and is true in so far + forth (if to gain moral holidays be a good), [Footnote: Op. cit., p. 75.] + I offered this as a conciliatory olive-branch to my enemies. But they, as + is only too common with such offerings, trampled the gift under foot and + turned and rent the giver. I had counted too much on their good will—oh + for the rarity of Christian charity under the sun! Oh for the rarity of + ordinary secular intelligence also! I had supposed it to be matter of + common observation that, of two competing views of the universe which in + all other respects are equal, but of which the first denies some vital + human need while the second satisfies it, the second will be favored by + sane men for the simple reason that it makes the world seem more rational. + To choose the first view under such circumstances would be an ascetic act, + an act of philosophic self-denial of which no normal human being would be + guilty. Using the pragmatic test of the meaning of concepts, I had shown + the concept of the absolute to MEAN nothing but the holiday giver, the + banisher of cosmic fear. One's objective deliverance, when one says 'the + absolute exists,' amounted, on my showing, just to this, that 'some + justification of a feeling of security in presence of the universe,' + exists, and that systematically to refuse to cultivate a feeling of + security would be to do violence to a tendency in one's emotional life + which might well be respected as prophetic. + </p> + <p> + Apparently my absolutist critics fail to see the workings of their own + minds in any such picture, so all that I can do is to apologize, and take + my offering back. The absolute is true in NO way then, and least of all, + by the verdict of the critics, in the way which I assigned! + </p> + <p> + My treatment of 'God,' 'freedom,' and 'design' was similar. Reducing, by + the pragmatic test, the meaning of each of these concepts to its positive + experienceable operation, I showed them all to mean the same thing, viz., + the presence of 'promise' in the world. 'God or no God?' means 'promise or + no promise?' It seems to me that the alternative is objective enough, + being a question as to whether the cosmos has one character or another, + even though our own provisional answer be made on subjective grounds. + Nevertheless christian and non-christian critics alike accuse me of + summoning people to say 'God exists,' EVEN WHEN HE DOESN'T EXIST, because + forsooth in my philosophy the 'truth' of the saying doesn't really mean + that he exists in any shape whatever, but only that to say so feels good. + </p> + <p> + Most of the pragmatist and anti-pragmatist warfare is over what the word + 'truth' shall be held to signify, and not over any of the facts embodied + in truth-situations; for both pragmatists and anti-pragmatists believe in + existent objects, just as they believe in our ideas of them. The + difference is that when the pragmatists speak of truth, they mean + exclusively some thing about the ideas, namely their workableness; whereas + when anti-pragmatists speak of truth they seem most often to mean + something about the objects. Since the pragmatist, if he agrees that an + idea is 'really' true, also agrees to whatever it says about its object; + and since most anti-pragmatists have already come round to agreeing that, + if the object exists, the idea that it does so is workable; there would + seem so little left to fight about that I might well be asked why instead + of reprinting my share in so much verbal wrangling, I do not show my sense + of 'values' by burning it all up. + </p> + <p> + I understand the question and I will give my answer. I am interested in + another doctrine in philosophy to which I give the name of radical + empiricism, and it seems to me that the establishment of the pragmatist + theory of truth is a step of first-rate importance in making radical + empiricism prevail. Radical empiricism consists first of a postulate, next + of a statement of fact, and finally of a generalized conclusion. + </p> + <p> + The postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable among + philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience. + [Things of an unexperienceable nature may exist ad libitum, but they form + no part of the material for philosophic debate.] + </p> + <p> + The statement of fact is that the relations between things, conjunctive as + well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular + experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves. + </p> + <p> + The generalized conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold + together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of + experience. The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no + extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own + right a concatenated or continuous structure. + </p> + <p> + The great obstacle to radical empiricism in the contemporary mind is the + rooted rationalist belief that experience as immediately given is all + disjunction and no conjunction, and that to make one world out of this + separateness, a higher unifying agency must be there. In the prevalent + idealism this agency is represented as the absolute all-witness which + 'relates' things together by throwing 'categories' over them like a net. + The most peculiar and unique, perhaps, of all these categories is supposed + to be the truth-relation, which connects parts of reality in pairs, making + of one of them a knower, and of the other a thing known, yet which is + itself contentless experientially, neither describable, explicable, nor + reduceable to lower terms, and denotable only by uttering the name + 'truth.' + </p> + <p> + The pragmatist view, on the contrary, of the truth-relation is that it has + a definite content, and that everything in it is experienceable. Its whole + nature can be told in positive terms. The 'workableness' which ideas must + have, in order to be true, means particular workings, physical or + intellectual, actual or possible, which they may set up from next to next + inside of concrete experience. Were this pragmatic contention admitted, + one great point in the victory of radical empiricism would also be scored, + for the relation between an object and the idea that truly knows it, is + held by rationalists to be nothing of this describable sort, but to stand + outside of all possible temporal experience; and on the relation, so + interpreted, rationalism is wonted to make its last most obdurate rally. + </p> + <p> + Now the anti-pragmatist contentions which I try to meet in this volume can + be so easily used by rationalists as weapons of resistance, not only to + pragmatism but to radical empiricism also (for if the truth-relation were + transcendent, others might be so too), that I feel strongly the + strategical importance of having them definitely met and got out of the + way. What our critics most persistently keep saying is that though + workings go with truth, yet they do not constitute it. It is numerically + additional to them, prior to them, explanatory OF them, and in no wise to + be explained BY them, we are incessantly told. The first point for our + enemies to establish, therefore, is that SOMETHING numerically additional + and prior to the workings is involved in the truth of an idea. Since the + OBJECT is additional, and usually prior, most rationalists plead IT, and + boldly accuse us of denying it. This leaves on the bystanders the + impression—since we cannot reasonably deny the existence of the + object—that our account of truth breaks down, and that our critics + have driven us from the field. Altho in various places in this volume I + try to refute the slanderous charge that we deny real existence, I will + say here again, for the sake of emphasis, that the existence of the + object, whenever the idea asserts it 'truly,' is the only reason, in + innumerable cases, why the idea does work successfully, if it work at all; + and that it seems an abuse of language, to say the least, to transfer the + word 'truth' from the idea to the object's existence, when the falsehood + of ideas that won't work is explained by that existence as well as the + truth of those that will. + </p> + <p> + I find this abuse prevailing among my most accomplished adversaries. But + once establish the proper verbal custom, let the word 'truth' represent a + property of the idea, cease to make it something mysteriously connected + with the object known, and the path opens fair and wide, as I believe, to + the discussion of radical empiricism on its merits. The truth of an idea + will then mean only its workings, or that in it which by ordinary + psychological laws sets up those workings; it will mean neither the idea's + object, nor anything 'saltatory' inside the idea, that terms drawn from + experience cannot describe. + </p> + <p> + One word more, ere I end this preface. A distinction is sometimes made + between Dewey, Schiller and myself, as if I, in supposing the object's + existence, made a concession to popular prejudice which they, as more + radical pragmatists, refuse to make. As I myself understand these authors, + we all three absolutely agree in admitting the transcendency of the object + (provided it be an experienceable object) to the subject, in the + truth-relation. Dewey in particular has insisted almost ad nauseam that + the whole meaning of our cognitive states and processes lies in the way + they intervene in the control and revaluation of independent existences or + facts. His account of knowledge is not only absurd, but meaningless, + unless independent existences be there of which our ideas take account, + and for the transformation of which they work. But because he and Schiller + refuse to discuss objects and relations 'transcendent' in the sense of + being ALTOGETHER TRANS-EXPERIENTIAL, their critics pounce on sentences in + their writings to that effect to show that they deny the existence WITHIN + THE REALM OF EXPERIENCE of objects external to the ideas that declare + their presence there. [Footnote: It gives me pleasure to welcome Professor + Carveth Read into the pragmatistic church, so far as his epistemology + goes. See his vigorous book, The Metaphysics of Nature, 2d Edition, + Appendix A. (London, Black, 1908.) The work What is Reality? by Francis + Howe Johnson (Boston, 1891), of which I make the acquaintance only while + correcting these proofs, contains some striking anticipations of the later + pragmatist view. The Psychology of Thinking, by Irving E. Miller (New + York, Macmillan Co., 1909), which has just appeared, is one of the most + convincing pragmatist document yet published, tho it does not use the word + 'pragmatism' at all. While I am making references, I cannot refrain from + inserting one to the extraordinarily acute article by H. V. Knox in the + Quarterly Review for April, 1909.] + </p> + <p> + It seems incredible that educated and apparently sincere critics should so + fail to catch their adversary's point of view. + </p> + <p> + What misleads so many of them is possibly also the fact that the universes + of discourse of Schiller, Dewey, and myself are panoramas of different + extent, and that what the one postulates explicitly the other + provisionally leaves only in a state of implication, while the reader + thereupon considers it to be denied. Schiller's universe is the smallest, + being essentially a psychological one. He starts with but one sort of + thing, truth-claims, but is led ultimately to the independent objective + facts which they assert, inasmuch as the most successfully validated of + all claims is that such facts are there. My universe is more essentially + epistemological. I start with two things, the objective facts and the + claims, and indicate which claims, the facts being there, will work + successfully as the latter's substitutes and which will not. I call the + former claims true. Dewey's panorama, if I understand this colleague, is + the widest of the three, but I refrain from giving my own account of its + complexity. Suffice it that he holds as firmly as I do to objects + independent of our judgments. If I am wrong in saying this, he must + correct me. I decline in this matter to be corrected at second hand. + </p> + <p> + I have not pretended in the following pages to consider all the critics of + my account of truth, such as Messrs. Taylor, Lovejoy, Gardiner, Bakewell, + Creighton, Hibben, Parodi, Salter, Carus, Lalande, Mentre, McTaggart, G. + E. Moore, Ladd and others, especially not Professor Schinz, who has + published under the title of Anti-pragmatisme an amusing sociological + romance. Some of these critics seem to me to labor under an inability + almost pathetic, to understand the thesis which they seek to refute. I + imagine that most of their difficulties have been answered by anticipation + elsewhere in this volume, and I am sure that my readers will thank me for + not adding more repetition to the fearful amount that is already there. + </p> + <p> + 95 IRVING ST., CAMBRIDGE (MASS.), August, 1909. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <p> + <b>CONTENTS</b> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_PREF"> PREFACE </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_TOC"> DETAILED CONTENTS </a> + </p> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0002"> <b>THE MEANING OF TRUTH</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0003"> I </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0004"> II </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0005"> III </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0006"> IV </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0007"> V </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0008"> VI </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0009"> VII </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0010"> VIII </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0011"> IX </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0012"> X </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0013"> XI </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0014"> XII </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0015"> XIII </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0016"> XIV </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0017"> XV </a> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_TOC" id="link2H_TOC"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <div class="middle"> + <p> + <b>CONTENTS</b> + </p> + I THE FUNCTION OF COGNITION <br /> II THE TIGERS IN INDIA <br /> III + HUMANISM AND TRUTH <br /> IV THE RELATION BETWEEN KNOWER AND KNOWN <br /> V + THE ESSENCE OF HUMANISM <br /> VI A WORD MORE ABOUT TRUTH <br /> VII + PROFESSOR PRATT ON TRUTH <br /> VIII THE PRAGMATIST ACCOUNT OF TRUTH AND + ITS MIS-UNDERSTANDERS <br /> IX THE MEANING OF THE WORD TRUTH <br /> X THE + EXISTENCE OF JULIUS CAESAR <br /> XI THE ABSOLUTE AND THE STRENUOUS LIFE + <br /> XII PROFESSOR HEBERT ON PRAGMATISM <br /> XIII ABSTRACTIONISM AND + 'RELATIVISMUS' <br /> XIV TWO ENGLISH CRITICS <br /> XV A DIALOGUE <br /> + </div> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0002" id="link2H_4_0002"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h1> + THE MEANING OF TRUTH + </h1> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0003" id="link2H_4_0003"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + I + </h2> + <p> + THE FUNCTION OF COGNITION [Footnote: Read before the Aristotelian Society, + December 1, 1884, and first published in Mind, vol. x (1885).—This, + and the following articles have received a very slight verbal revision, + consisting mostly in the omission of redundancy.] + </p> + <p> + The following inquiry is (to use a distinction familiar to readers of Mr. + Shadworth Hodgson) not an inquiry into the 'how it comes,' but into the + 'what it is' of cognition. What we call acts of cognition are evidently + realized through what we call brains and their events, whether there be + 'souls' dynamically connected with the brains or not. But with neither + brains nor souls has this essay any business to transact. In it we shall + simply assume that cognition IS produced, somehow, and limit ourselves to + asking what elements it contains, what factors it implies. + </p> + <p> + Cognition is a function of consciousness. The first factor it implies is + therefore a state of consciousness wherein the cognition shall take place. + Having elsewhere used the word 'feeling' to designate generically all + states of consciousness considered subjectively, or without respect to + their possible function, I shall then say that, whatever elements an act + of cognition may imply besides, it at least implies the existence of a + FEELING. [If the reader share the current antipathy to the word 'feeling,' + he may substitute for it, wherever I use it, the word 'idea,' taken in the + old broad Lockian sense, or he may use the clumsy phrase 'state of + consciousness,' or finally he may say 'thought' instead.] + </p> + <p> + Now it is to be observed that the common consent of mankind has agreed + that some feelings are cognitive and some are simple facts having a + subjective, or, what one might almost call a physical, existence, but no + such self-transcendent function as would be implied in their being pieces + of knowledge. Our task is again limited here. We are not to ask, 'How is + self-transcendence possible?' We are only to ask, 'How comes it that + common sense has assigned a number of cases in which it is assumed not + only to be possible but actual? And what are the marks used by common + sense to distinguish those cases from the rest?' In short, our inquiry is + a chapter in descriptive psychology,—hardly anything more. + </p> + <p> + Condillac embarked on a quest similar to this by his famous hypothesis of + a statue to which various feelings were successively imparted. Its first + feeling was supposed to be one of fragrance. But to avoid all possible + complication with the question of genesis, let us not attribute even to a + statue the possession of our imaginary feeling. Let us rather suppose it + attached to no matter, nor localized at any point in space, but left + swinging IN VACUO, as it were, by the direct creative FIAT of a god. And + let us also, to escape entanglement with difficulties about the physical + or psychical nature of its 'object' not call it a feeling of fragrance or + of any other determinate sort, but limit ourselves to assuming that it is + a feeling of Q. What is true of it under this abstract name will be no + less true of it in any more particular shape (such as fragrance, pain, + hardness) which the reader may suppose. + </p> + <p> + Now, if this feeling of Q be the only creation of the god, it will of + course form the entire universe. And if, to escape the cavils of that + large class of persons who believe that SEMPER IDEM SENTIRE AC NON SENTIRE + are the same, [Footnote:1 'The Relativity of Knowledge,' held in this + sense, is, it may be observed in passing, one of the oddest of philosophic + superstitions. Whatever facts may be cited in its favor are due to the + properties of nerve-tissue, which may be exhausted by too prolonged an + excitement. Patients with neuralgias that last unremittingly for days can, + however, assure us that the limits of this nerve-law are pretty widely + drawn. But if we physically could get a feeling that should last eternally + unchanged, what atom of logical or psychological argument is there to + prove that it would not be felt as long as it lasted, and felt for just + what it is, all that time? The reason for the opposite prejudice seems to + be our reluctance to think that so stupid a thing as such a feeling would + necessarily be, should be allowed to fill eternity with its presence. An + interminable acquaintance, leading to no knowledge-about,—such would + be its condition.] we allow the feeling to be of as short a duration as + they like, that universe will only need to last an infinitesimal part of a + second. The feeling in question will thus be reduced to its fighting + weight, and all that befalls it in the way of a cognitive function must be + held to befall in the brief instant of its quickly snuffed-out life,—a + life, it will also be noticed, that has no other moment of consciousness + either preceding or following it. + </p> + <p> + Well now, can our little feeling, thus left alone in the universe,—for + the god and we psychological critics may be supposed left out of the + account,—can the feeling, I say, be said to have any sort of a + cognitive function? For it to KNOW, there must be something to be known. + What is there, on the present supposition? One may reply, 'the feeling's + content q.' But does it not seem more proper to call this the feeling's + QUALITY than its content? Does not the word 'content' suggest that the + feeling has already dirempted itself as an act from its content as an + object? And would it be quite safe to assume so promptly that the quality + q of a feeling is one and the same thing with a feeling of the quality q? + The quality q, so far, is an entirely subjective fact which the feeling + carries so to speak endogenously, or in its pocket. If any one pleases to + dignify so simple a fact as this by the name of knowledge, of course + nothing can prevent him. But let us keep closer to the path of common + usage, and reserve the name knowledge for the cognition of 'realities,' + meaning by realities things that exist independently of the feeling + through which their cognition occurs. If the content of the feeling occur + nowhere in the universe outside of the feeling itself, and perish with the + feeling, common usage refuses to call it a reality, and brands it as a + subjective feature of the feeling's constitution, or at the most as the + feeling's DREAM. + </p> + <p> + For the feeling to be cognitive in the specific sense, then, it must be + self-transcendent; and we must prevail upon the god to CREATE A REALITY + OUTSIDE OF IT to correspond to its intrinsic quality Q. Thus only can it + be redeemed from the condition of being a solipsism. If now the new + created reality RESEMBLE the feeling's quality Q I say that the feeling + may be held by us TO BE COGNIZANT OF THAT REALITY. + </p> + <p> + This first instalment of my thesis is sure to be attacked. But one word + before defending it 'Reality' has become our warrant for calling a feeling + cognitive; but what becomes our warrant for calling anything reality? The + only reply is—the faith of the present critic or inquirer. At every + moment of his life he finds himself subject to a belief in SOME realities, + even though his realities of this year should prove to be his illusions of + the next. Whenever he finds that the feeling he is studying contemplates + what he himself regards as a reality, he must of course admit the feeling + itself to be truly cognitive. We are ourselves the critics here; and we + shall find our burden much lightened by being allowed to take reality in + this relative and provisional way. Every science must make some + assumptions. Erkenntnisstheoretiker are but fallible mortals. When they + study the function of cognition, they do it by means of the same function + in themselves. And knowing that the fountain cannot go higher than its + source, we should promptly confess that our results in this field are + affected by our own liability to err. THE MOST WE CAN CLAIM IS, THAT WHAT + WE SAY ABOUT COGNITION MAY BE COUNTED AS TRUE AS WHAT WE SAY ABOUT + ANYTHING ELSE. If our hearers agree with us about what are to be held + 'realities,' they will perhaps also agree to the reality of our doctrine + of the way in which they are known. We cannot ask for more. + </p> + <p> + Our terminology shall follow the spirit of these remarks. We will deny the + function of knowledge to any feeling whose quality or content we do not + ourselves believe to exist outside of that feeling as well as in it. We + may call such a feeling a dream if we like; we shall have to see later + whether we can call it a fiction or an error. + </p> + <p> + To revert now to our thesis. Some persons will immediately cry out, 'How + CAN a reality resemble a feeling?' Here we find how wise we were to name + the quality of the feeling by an algebraic letter Q. We flank the whole + difficulty of resemblance between an inner state and an outward reality, + by leaving it free to any one to postulate as the reality whatever sort of + thing he thinks CAN resemble a feeling,—if not an outward thing, + then another feeling like the first one,—the mere feeling Q in the + critic's mind for example. Evading thus this objection, we turn to another + which is sure to be urged. + </p> + <p> + It will come from those philosophers to whom 'thought,' in the sense of a + knowledge of relations, is the all in all of mental life; and who hold a + merely feeling consciousness to be no better—one would sometimes say + from their utterances, a good deal worse—than no consciousness at + all. Such phrases as these, for example, are common to-day in the mouths + of those who claim to walk in the footprints of Kant and Hegel rather than + in the ancestral English paths: 'A perception detached from all others, + "left out of the heap we call a mind," being out of all relation, has no + qualities—is simply nothing. We can no more consider it than we can + see vacancy.' 'It is simply in itself fleeting, momentary, unnameable + (because while we name it it has become another), and for the very same + reason unknowable, the very negation of knowability.' 'Exclude from what + we have considered real all qualities constituted by relation, we find + that none are left.' + </p> + <p> + Altho such citations as these from the writings of Professor Green might + be multiplied almost indefinitely, they would hardly repay the pains of + collection, so egregiously false is the doctrine they teach. Our little + supposed feeling, whatever it may be, from the cognitive point of view, + whether a bit of knowledge or a dream, is certainly no psychical zero. It + is a most positively and definitely qualified inner fact, with a + complexion all its own. Of course there are many mental facts which it is + NOT. It knows Q, if Q be a reality, with a very minimum of knowledge. It + neither dates nor locates it. It neither classes nor names it. And it + neither knows itself as a feeling, nor contrasts itself with other + feelings, nor estimates its own duration or intensity. It is, in short, if + there is no more of it than this, a most dumb and helpless and useless + kind of thing. + </p> + <p> + But if we must describe it by so many negations, and if it can say nothing + ABOUT itself or ABOUT anything else, by what right do we deny that it is a + psychical zero? And may not the 'relationists' be right after all? + </p> + <p> + In the innocent looking word 'about' lies the solution of this riddle; and + a simple enough solution it is when frankly looked at. A quotation from a + too seldom quoted book, the Exploratio Philosophica of John Grote (London, + 1865), p. 60, will form the best introduction to it. + </p> + <p> + 'Our knowledge,' writes Grote, 'may be contemplated in either of two ways, + or, to use other words, we may speak in a double manner of the "object" of + knowledge. That is, we may either use language thus: we KNOW a thing, a + man, etc.; or we may use it thus: we know such and such things ABOUT the + thing, the man, etc. Language in general, following its true logical + instinct, distinguishes between these two applications of the notion of + knowledge, the one being yvwvai, noscere, kennen, connaitre, the other + being eidevai, scire, wissen, savoir. In the origin, the former may be + considered more what I have called phenomenal—it is the notion of + knowledge as ACQUAINTANCE or familiarity with what is known; which notion + is perhaps more akin to the phenomenal bodily communication, and is less + purely intellectual than the other; it is the kind of knowledge which we + have of a thing by the presentation to the senses or the representation of + it in picture or type, a Vorstellung. The other, which is what we express + in judgments or propositions, what is embodied in Begriffe or concepts + without any necessary imaginative representation, is in its origin the + more intellectual notion of knowledge. There is no reason, however, why we + should not express our knowledge, whatever its kind, in either manner, + provided only we do not confusedly express it, in the same proposition or + piece of reasoning, in both.' + </p> + <p> + Now obviously if our supposed feeling of Q is (if knowledge at all) only + knowledge of the mere acquaintance-type, it is milking a he-goat, as the + ancients would have said, to try to extract from it any deliverance ABOUT + anything under the sun, even about itself. And it is as unjust, after our + failure, to turn upon it and call it a psychical nothing, as it would be, + after our fruitless attack upon the billy-goat, to proclaim the + non-lactiferous character of the whole goat-tribe. But the entire industry + of the Hegelian school in trying to shove simple sensation out of the pale + of philosophic recognition is founded on this false issue. It is always + the 'speechlessness' of sensation, its inability to make any + 'statement,'[Footnote: See, for example, Green's Introduction to Hume's + Treatise of Human Nature, p. 36.] that is held to make the very notion of + it meaningless, and to justify the student of knowledge in scouting it out + of existence. 'Significance,' in the sense of standing as the sign of + other mental states, is taken to be the sole function of what mental + states we have; and from the perception that our little primitive + sensation has as yet no significance in this literal sense, it is an easy + step to call it first meaningless, next senseless, then vacuous, and + finally to brand it as absurd and inadmissible. But in this universal + liquidation, this everlasting slip, slip, slip, of direct acquaintance + into knowledge-ABOUT, until at last nothing is left about which the + knowledge can be supposed to obtain, does not all 'significance' depart + from the situation? And when our knowledge about things has reached its + never so complicated perfection, must there not needs abide alongside of + it and inextricably mixed in with it some acquaintance with WHAT things + all this knowledge is about? + </p> + <p> + Now, our supposed little feeling gives a WHAT; and if other feelings + should succeed which remember the first, its WHAT may stand as subject or + predicate of some piece of knowledge-about, of some judgment, perceiving + relations between it and other WHATS which the other feelings may know. + The hitherto dumb Q will then receive a name and be no longer speechless. + But every name, as students of logic know, has its 'denotation'; and the + denotation always means some reality or content, relationless as extra or + with its internal relations unanalyzed, like the Q which our primitive + sensation is supposed to know. No relation-expressing proposition is + possible except on the basis of a preliminary acquaintance with such + 'facts,' with such contents, as this. Let the Q be fragrance, let it be + toothache, or let it be a more complex kind of feeling, like that of the + full-moon swimming in her blue abyss, it must first come in that simple + shape, and be held fast in that first intention, before any knowledge + ABOUT it can be attained. The knowledge ABOUT it is IT with a context + added. Undo IT, and what is added cannot be CONtext. [Footnote: If A + enters and B exclaims, 'Didn't you see my brother on the stairs?' we all + hold that A may answer, 'I saw him, but didn't know he was your brother'; + ignorance of brotherhood not abolishing power to see. But those who, on + account of the unrelatedness of the first facts with which we become + acquainted, deny them to be 'known' to us, ought in consistency to + maintain that if A did not perceive the relationship of the man on the + stairs to B, it was impossible he should have noticed him at all.] + </p> + <p> + Let us say no more then about this objection, but enlarge our thesis, + thus: If there be in the universe a Q other than the Q in the feeling, the + latter may have acquaintance with an entity ejective to itself; an + acquaintance moreover, which, as mere acquaintance, it would be hard to + imagine susceptible either of improvement or increase, being in its way + complete; and which would oblige us (so long as we refuse not to call + acquaintance knowledge) to say not only that the feeling is cognitive, but + that all qualities of feeling, SO LONG AS THERE IS ANYTHING OUTSIDE OF + THEM WHICH THEY RESEMBLE, are feelings OF qualities of existence, and + perceptions of outward fact. + </p> + <p> + The point of this vindication of the cognitive function of the first + feeling lies, it will be noticed, in the discovery that q does exist + elsewhere than in it. In case this discovery were not made, we could not + be sure the feeling was cognitive; and in case there were nothing outside + to be discovered, we should have to call the feeling a dream. But the + feeling itself cannot make the discovery. Its own q is the only q it + grasps; and its own nature is not a particle altered by having the + self-transcendent function of cognition either added to it or taken away. + The function is accidental; synthetic, not analytic; and falls outside and + not inside its being. [Footnote: It seems odd to call so important a + function accidental, but I do not see how we can mend the matter. Just as, + if we start with the reality and ask how it may come to be known, we can + only reply by invoking a feeling which shall RECONSTRUCT it in its own + more private fashion; so, if we start with the feeling and ask how it may + come to know, we can only reply by invoking a reality which shall + RECONSTRUCT it in its own more public fashion. In either case, however, + the datum we start with remains just what it was. One may easily get lost + in verbal mysteries about the difference between quality of feeling and + feeling of quality, between receiving and reconstructing the knowledge of + a reality. But at the end we must confess that the notion of real + cognition involves an unmediated dualism of the knower and the known. See + Bowne's Metaphysics, New York, 1882, pp. 403-412, and various passages in + Lotze, e.g., Logic, Sec. 308. ['Unmediated' is a bad word to have used.—1909.]] + </p> + <p> + A feeling feels as a gun shoots. If there be nothing to be felt or hit, + they discharge themselves ins blaue hinein. If, however, something starts + up opposite them, they no longer simply shoot or feel, they hit and know. + </p> + <p> + But with this arises a worse objection than any yet made. We the critics + look on and see a real q and a feeling of q; and because the two resemble + each other, we say the one knows the other. But what right have we to say + this until we know that the feeling of q means to stand for or represent + just that SAME other q? Suppose, instead of one q, a number of real q's in + the field. If the gun shoots and hits, we can easily see which one of them + it hits. But how can we distinguish which one the feeling knows? It knows + the one it stands for. But which one DOES it stand for? It declares no + intention in this respect. It merely resembles; it resembles all + indifferently; and resembling, per se, is not necessarily representing or + standing-for at all. Eggs resemble each other, but do not on that account + represent, stand for, or know each other. And if you say this is because + neither of them is a FEELING, then imagine the world to consist of nothing + but toothaches, which ARE feelings, feelings resembling each other + exactly,—would they know each other the better for all that? + </p> + <p> + The case of q being a bare quality like that of toothache-pain is quite + different from that of its being a concrete individual thing. There is + practically no test for deciding whether the feeling of a bare quality + means to represent it or not. It can DO nothing to the quality beyond + resembling it, simply because an abstract quality is a thing to which + nothing can be done. Being without context or environment or principium + individuationis, a quiddity with no haecceity, a platonic idea, even + duplicate editions of such a quality (were they possible), would be + indiscernible, and no sign could be given, no result altered, whether the + feeling I meant to stand for this edition or for that, or whether it + simply resembled the quality without meaning to stand for it at all. + </p> + <p> + If now we grant a genuine pluralism of editions to the quality q, by + assigning to each a CONTEXT which shall distinguish it from its mates, we + may proceed to explain which edition of it the feeling knows, by extending + our principle of resemblance to the context too, and saying the feeling + knows the particular q whose context it most exactly duplicates. But here + again the theoretic doubt recurs: duplication and coincidence, are they + knowledge? The gun shows which q it points to and hits, by BREAKING it. + Until the feeling can show us which q it points to and knows, by some + equally flagrant token, why are we not free to deny that it either points + to or knows any one of the REAL q's at all, and to affirm that the word + 'resemblance' exhaustively describes its relation to the reality? + </p> + <p> + Well, as a matter of fact, every actual feeling DOES show us, quite as + flagrantly as the gun, which q it points to; and practically in concrete + cases the matter is decided by an element we have hitherto left out. Let + us pass from abstractions to possible instances, and ask our obliging deus + ex machina to frame for us a richer world. Let him send me, for example, a + dream of the death of a certain man, and let him simultaneously cause the + man to die. How would our practical instinct spontaneously decide whether + this were a case of cognition of the reality, or only a sort of marvellous + coincidence of a resembling reality with my dream? Just such puzzling + cases as this are what the 'society for psychical research' is busily + collecting and trying to interpret in the most reasonable way. + </p> + <p> + If my dream were the only one of the kind I ever had in my life, if the + context of the death in the dream differed in many particulars from the + real death's context, and if my dream led me to no action about the death, + unquestionably we should all call it a strange coincidence, and naught + besides. But if the death in the dream had a long context, agreeing point + for point with every feature that attended the real death; if I were + constantly having such dreams, all equally perfect, and if on awaking I + had a habit of ACTING immediately as if they were true and so getting 'the + start' of my more tardily instructed neighbors,—we should in all + probability have to admit that I had some mysterious kind of clairvoyant + power, that my dreams in an inscrutable way meant just those realities + they figured, and that the word 'coincidence' failed to touch the root of + the matter. And whatever doubts any one preserved would completely vanish, + if it should appear that from the midst of my dream I had the power of + INTERFERING with the course of the reality, and making the events in it + turn this way or that, according as I dreamed they should. Then at least + it would be certain that my waking critics and my dreaming self were + dealing with the SAME. + </p> + <p> + And thus do men invariably decide such a question. THE FALLING OF THE + DREAM'S PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES into the real world, and the EXTENT of the + resemblance between the two worlds are the criteria they instinctively + use. [Footnote: The thoroughgoing objector might, it is true, still return + to the charge, and, granting a dream which should completely mirror the + real universe, and all the actions dreamed in which should be instantly + matched by duplicate actions in this universe, still insist that this is + nothing more than harmony, and that it is as far as ever from being made + clear whether the dream-world refers to that other world, all of whose + details it so closely copies. This objection leads deep into metaphysics. + I do not impugn its importance, and justice obliges me to say that but for + the teachings of my colleague, Dr. Josiah Royce, I should neither have + grasped its full force nor made my own practical and psychological point + of view as clear to myself as it is. On this occasion I prefer to stick + steadfastly to that point of view; but I hope that Dr. Royce's more + fundamental criticism of the function of cognition may ere long see the + light. [I referred in this note to Royce's religious aspect of philosophy, + then about to be published. This powerful book maintained that the notion + of REFERRING involved that of an inclusive mind that shall own both the + real q and the mental q, and use the latter expressly as a representative + symbol of the former. At the time I could not refute this + transcendentalist opinion. Later, largely through the influence of + Professor D. S. Miller (see his essay 'The meaning of truth and error,' in + the Philosophical Review for 1893, vol. 2 p. 403) I came to see that any + definitely experienceable workings would serve as intermediaries quite as + well as the absolute mind's intentions would.]] All feeling is for the + sake of action, all feeling results in action,—to-day no argument is + needed to prove these truths. But by a most singular disposition of nature + which we may conceive to have been different, MY FEELINGS ACT UPON THE + REALITIES WITHIN MY CRITIC'S WORLD. Unless, then, my critic can prove that + my feeling does not 'point to' those realities which it acts upon, how can + he continue to doubt that he and I are alike cognizant of one and the same + real world? If the action is performed in one world, that must be the + world the feeling intends; if in another world, THAT is the world the + feeling has in mind. If your feeling bear no fruits in my world, I call it + utterly detached from my world; I call it a solipsism, and call its world + a dream-world. If your toothache do not prompt you to ACT as if I had a + toothache, nor even as if I had a separate existence; if you neither say + to me, 'I know now how you must suffer!' nor tell me of a remedy, I deny + that your feeling, however it may resemble mine, is really cognizant of + mine. It gives no SIGN of being cognizant, and such a sign is absolutely + necessary to my admission that it is. + </p> + <p> + Before I can think you to mean my world, you must affect my world; before + I can think you to mean much of it, you must affect much of it; and before + I can be sure you mean it AS I DO, you must affect it JUST AS I SHOULD if + I were in your place. Then I, your critic, will gladly believe that we are + thinking, not only of the same reality, but that we are thinking it ALIKE, + and thinking of much of its extent. + </p> + <p> + Without the practical effects of our neighbor's feelings on our own world, + we should never suspect the existence of our neighbor's feelings at all, + and of course should never find ourselves playing the critic as we do in + this article. The constitution of nature is very peculiar. In the world of + each of us are certain objects called human bodies, which move about and + act on all the other objects there, and the occasions of their action are + in the main what the occasions of our action would be, were they our + bodies. They use words and gestures, which, if we used them, would have + thoughts behind them,—no mere thoughts uberhaupt, however, but + strictly determinate thoughts. I think you have the notion of fire in + general, because I see you act towards this fire in my room just as I act + towards it,—poke it and present your person towards it, and so + forth. But that binds me to believe that if you feel 'fire' at all, THIS + is the fire you feel. As a matter of fact, whenever we constitute + ourselves into psychological critics, it is not by dint of discovering + which reality a feeling 'resembles' that we find out which reality it + means. We become first aware of which one it means, and then we suppose + that to be the one it resembles. We see each other looking at the same + objects, pointing to them and turning them over in various ways, and + thereupon we hope and trust that all of our several feelings resemble the + reality and each other. But this is a thing of which we are never + theoretically sure. Still, it would practically be a case of grubelsucht, + if a ruffian were assaulting and drubbing my body, to spend much time in + subtle speculation either as to whether his vision of my body resembled + mine, or as to whether the body he really MEANT to insult were not some + body in his mind's eye, altogether other from my own. The practical point + of view brushes such metaphysical cobwebs away. If what he have in mind be + not MY body, why call we it a body at all? His mind is inferred by me as a + term, to whose existence we trace the things that happen. The inference is + quite void if the term, once inferred, be separated from its connection + with the body that made me infer it, and connected with another that is + not mine at all. No matter for the metaphysical puzzle of how our two + minds, the ruffian's and mine, can mean the same body. Men who see each + other's bodies sharing the same space, treading the same earth, splashing + the same water, making the same air resonant, and pursuing the same game + and eating out of the same dish, will never practically believe in a + pluralism of solipsistic worlds. + </p> + <p> + Where, however, the actions of one mind seem to take no effect in the + world of the other, the case is different. This is what happens in poetry + and fiction. Every one knows Ivanhoe, for example; but so long as we stick + to the story pure and simple without regard to the facts of its + production, few would hesitate to admit that there are as many different + Ivanhoes as there are different minds cognizant of the story. [Footnote: + That is, there is no REAL 'Ivanhoe,' not even the one in Sir Walter + Scott's mind as he was writing the story. That one is only the FIRST one + of the Ivanhoe-solipsisms. It is quite true we can make it the real + Ivanhoe if we like, and then say that the other Ivanhoes know it or do not + know it, according as they refer to and resemble it or no. This is done by + bringing in Sir Walter Scott himself as the author of the real Ivanhoe, + and so making a complex object of both. This object, however, is not a + story pure and simple. It has dynamic relations with the world common to + the experience of all the readers. Sir Walter Scott's Ivanhoe got itself + printed in volumes which we all can handle, and to any one of which we can + refer to see which of our versions be the true one, i.e., the original one + of Scott himself. We can see the manuscript; in short we can get back to + the Ivanhoe in Scott's mind by many an avenue and channel of this real + world of our experience,—a thing we can by no means do with either + the Ivanhoe or the Rebecca, either the Templar or the Isaac of York, of + the story taken simply as such, and detached from the conditions of its + production. Everywhere, then, we have the same test: can we pass + continuously from two objects in two minds to a third object which seems + to be in BOTH minds, because each mind feels every modification imprinted + on it by the other? If so, the first two objects named are derivatives, to + say the least, from the same third object, and may be held, if they + resemble each other, to refer to one and the same reality.] The fact that + all these Ivanhoes RESEMBLE each other does not prove the contrary. But if + an alteration invented by one man in his version were to reverberate + immediately through all the other versions, and produce changes therein, + we should then easily agree that all these thinkers were thinking the SAME + Ivanhoe, and that, fiction or no fiction, it formed a little world common + to them all. + </p> + <p> + Having reached this point, we may take up our thesis and improve it again. + Still calling the reality by the name of q and letting the critic's + feeling vouch for it, we can say that any other feeling will be held + cognizant of q, provided it both resemble q, and refer to q, as shown by + its either modifying q directly, or modifying some other reality, p or r, + which the critic knows to be continuous with q. Or more shortly, thus: THE + FEELING OF q KNOWS WHATEVER REALITY IT RESEMBLES, AND EITHER DIRECTLY OR + INDIRECTLY OPERATES ON. If it resemble without operating, it is a dream; + if it operate without resembling, it is an error. [Footnote: Among such + errors are those cases in which our feeling operates on a reality which it + does partially resemble, and yet does not intend: as for instance, when I + take up your umbrella, meaning to take my own. I cannot be said here + either to know your umbrella, or my own, which latter my feeling more + completely resembles. I am mistaking them both, misrepresenting their + context, etc. + </p> + <p> + We have spoken in the text as if the critic were necessarily one mind, and + the feeling criticised another. But the criticised feeling and its critic + may be earlier and later feelings of the same mind, and here it might seem + that we could dispense with the notion of operating, to prove that critic + and criticised are referring to and meaning to represent the SAME. We + think we see our past feelings directly, and know what they refer to + without appeal. At the worst, we can always fix the intention of our + present feeling and MAKE it refer to the same reality to which any one of + our past feelings may have referred. So we need no 'operating' here, to + make sure that the feeling and its critic mean the same real q. Well, all + the better if this is so! We have covered the more complex and difficult + case in our text, and we may let this easier one go. The main thing at + present is to stick to practical psychology, and ignore metaphysical + difficulties. + </p> + <p> + One more remark. Our formula contains, it will be observed, nothing to + correspond to the great principle of cognition laid down by Professor + Ferrier in his Institutes of Metaphysic and apparently adopted by all the + followers of Fichte, the principle, namely, that for knowledge to be + constituted there must be knowledge of the knowing mind along with + whatever else is known: not q, as we have supposed, but q PLUS MYSELF, + must be the least I can know. It is certain that the common sense of + mankind never dreams of using any such principle when it tries to + discriminate between conscious states that are knowledge and conscious + states that are not. So that Ferrier's principle, if it have any relevancy + at all, must have relevancy to the metaphysical possibility of + consciousness at large, and not to the practically recognized constitution + of cognitive consciousness. We may therefore pass it by without further + notice here.] It is to be feared that the reader may consider this formula + rather insignificant and obvious, and hardly worth the labor of so many + pages, especially when he considers that the only cases to which it + applies are percepts, and that the whole field of symbolic or conceptual + thinking seems to elude its grasp. Where the reality is either a material + thing or act, or a state of the critic's consciousness, I may both mirror + it in my mind and operate upon it—in the latter case indirectly, of + course—as soon as I perceive it. But there are many cognitions, + universally allowed to be such, which neither mirror nor operate on their + realities. + </p> + <p> + In the whole field of symbolic thought we are universally held both to + intend, to speak of, and to reach conclusions about—to know in short—particular + realities, without having in our subjective consciousness any mind-stuff + that resembles them even in a remote degree. We are instructed about them + by language which awakens no consciousness beyond its sound; and we know + WHICH realities they are by the faintest and most fragmentary glimpse of + some remote context they may have and by no direct imagination of + themselves. As minds may differ here, let me speak in the first person. I + am sure that my own current thinking has WORDS for its almost exclusive + subjective material, words which are made intelligible by being referred + to some reality that lies beyond the horizon of direct consciousness, and + of which I am only aware as of a terminal MORE existing in a certain + direction, to which the words might lead but do not lead yet. The SUBJECT, + or TOPIC, of the words is usually something towards which I mentally seem + to pitch them in a backward way, almost as I might jerk my thumb over my + shoulder to point at something, without looking round, if I were only + entirely sure that it was there. The UPSHOT, or CONCLUSION, of the words + is something towards which I seem to incline my head forwards, as if + giving assent to its existence, tho all my mind's eye catches sight of may + be some tatter of an image connected with it, which tatter, however, if + only endued with the feeling of familiarity and reality, makes me feel + that the whole to which it belongs is rational and real, and fit to be let + pass. + </p> + <p> + Here then is cognitive consciousness on a large scale, and yet what it + knows, it hardly resembles in the least degree. The formula last laid down + for our thesis must therefore be made more complete. We may now express it + thus: A PERCEPT KNOWS WHATEVER REALITY IT DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY OPERATES + ON AND RESEMBLES; ACONCEPTUAL FEELING, OR THOUGHT KNOWS A REALITY, + WHENEVER IT ACTUALLY OR POTENTIALLY TERMINATES IN A PERCEPT THAT OPERATES + ON, OR RESEMBLES THAT REALITY, OR IS OTHERWISE CONNECTED WITH IT OR WITH + ITS CONTEXT. The latter percept may be either sensation or sensorial idea; + and when I say the thought must TERMINATE in such a percept, I mean that + it must ultimately be capable of leading up thereto,—by the way of + practical [missing section] is an incomplete 'thought about' that reality, + that reality is its 'topic,' etc. experience, if the terminal feeling be a + sensation; by the way of logical or habitual suggestion, if it be only an + image in the mind. + </p> + <p> + Let an illustration make this plainer. I open the first book I take up, + and read the first sentence that meets my eye: 'Newton saw the handiwork + of God in the heavens as plainly as Paley in the animal kingdom.' I + immediately look back and try to analyze the subjective state in which I + rapidly apprehended this sentence as I read it. In the first place there + was an obvious feeling that the sentence was intelligible and rational and + related to the world of realities. There was also a sense of agreement or + harmony between 'Newton,' 'Paley,' and 'God.' There was no apparent image + connected with the words 'heavens,' or 'handiwork,' or 'God'; they were + words merely. With 'animal kingdom' I think there was the faintest + consciousness (it may possibly have been an image of the steps) of the + Museum of Zoology in the town of Cambridge where I write. With 'Paley' + there was an equally faint consciousness of a small dark leather book; and + with 'Newton' a pretty distinct vision of the right-hand lower corner of + curling periwig. This is all the mind-stuff I can discover in my first + consciousness of the meaning of this sentence, and I am afraid that even + not all of this would have been present had I come upon the sentence in a + genuine reading of the book, and not picked it out for an experiment. And + yet my consciousness was truly cognitive. The sentence is 'about + realities' which my psychological critic—for we must not forget him—acknowledges + to be such, even as he acknowledges my distinct feeling that they ARE + realities, and my acquiescence in the general rightness of what I read of + them, to be true knowledge on my part. + </p> + <p> + Now what justifies my critic in being as lenient as this? This singularly + inadequate consciousness of mine, made up of symbols that neither resemble + nor affect the realities they stand for,—how can he be sure it is + cognizant of the very realities he has himself in mind? + </p> + <p> + He is sure because in countless like cases he has seen such inadequate and + symbolic thoughts, by developing themselves, terminate in percepts that + practically modified and presumably resembled his own. By 'developing' + themselves is meant obeying their tendencies, following up the suggestions + nascently present in them, working in the direction in which they seem to + point, clearing up the penumbra, making distinct the halo, unravelling the + fringe, which is part of their composition, and in the midst of which + their more substantive kernel of subjective content seems consciously to + lie. Thus I may develop my thought in the Paley direction by procuring the + brown leather volume and bringing the passages about the animal kingdom + before the critic's eyes. I may satisfy him that the words mean for me + just what they mean for him, by showing him IN CONCRETO the very animals + and their arrangements, of which the pages treat. I may get Newton's works + and portraits; or if I follow the line of suggestion of the wig, I may + smother my critic in seventeenth-century matters pertaining to Newton's + environment, to show that the word 'Newton' has the same LOCUS and + relations in both our minds. Finally I may, by act and word, persuade him + that what I mean by God and the heavens and the analogy of the handiworks, + is just what he means also. + </p> + <p> + My demonstration in the last resort is to his SENSES. My thought makes me + act on his senses much as he might himself act on them, were he pursuing + the consequences of a perception of his own. Practically then MY thought + terminates in HIS realities. He willingly supposes it, therefore, to be OF + them, and inwardly to RESEMBLE what his own thought would be, were it of + the same symbolic sort as mine. And the pivot and fulcrum and support of + his mental persuasion, is the sensible operation which my thought leads + me, or may lead, to effect—the bringing of Paley's book, of Newton's + portrait, etc., before his very eyes. + </p> + <p> + In the last analysis, then, we believe that we all know and think about + and talk about the same world, because WE BELIEVE OUR PERCEPTS ARE + POSSESSED BY US IN COMMON. And we believe this because the percepts of + each one of us seem to be changed in consequence of changes in the + percepts of someone else. What I am for you is in the first instance a + percept of your own. Unexpectedly, however, I open and show you a book, + uttering certain sounds the while. These acts are also your percepts, but + they so resemble acts of yours with feelings prompting them, that you + cannot doubt I have the feelings too, or that the book is one book felt in + both our worlds. That it is felt in the same way, that my feelings of it + resemble yours, is something of which we never can be sure, but which we + assume as the simplest hypothesis that meets the case. As a matter of + fact, we never ARE sure of it, and, as ERKENNTNISSTHEORETIKER, we can only + say that of feelings that should NOT resemble each other, both could not + know the same thing at the same time in the same way. [Footnote: Though + both might terminate in the same thing and be incomplete thoughts 'about' + it.] If each holds to its own percept as the reality, it is bound to say + of the other percept, that, though it may INTEND that reality, and prove + this by working change upon it, yet, if it do not resemble it, it is all + false and wrong. [Footnote: The difference between Idealism and Realism is + immaterial here. What is said in the text is consistent with either + theory. A law by which my percept shall change yours directly is no more + mysterious than a law by which it shall first change a physical reality, + and then the reality change yours. In either case you and I seem knit into + a continuous world, and not to form a pair of solipsisms.] + </p> + <p> + If this be so of percepts, how much more so of higher modes of thought! + Even in the sphere of sensation individuals are probably different enough. + Comparative study of the simplest conceptual elements seems to show a + wider divergence still. And when it comes to general theories and + emotional attitudes towards life, it is indeed time to say with Thackeray, + 'My friend, two different universes walk about under your hat and under + mine.' + </p> + <p> + What can save us at all and prevent us from flying asunder into a chaos of + mutually repellent solipsisms? Through what can our several minds commune? + Through nothing but the mutual resemblance of those of our perceptual + feelings which have this power of modifying one another, WHICH ARE MERE + DUMB KNOWLEDGES-OF-ACQUAINTANCE, and which must also resemble their + realities or not know them aright at all. In such pieces of + knowledge-of-acquaintance all our knowledge-about must end, and carry a + sense of this possible termination as part of its content. These percepts, + these termini, these sensible things, these mere matters-of-acquaintance, + are the only realities we ever directly know, and the whole history of our + thought is the history of our substitution of one of them for another, and + the reduction of the substitute to the status of a conceptual sign. + Contemned though they be by some thinkers, these sensations are the + mother-earth, the anchorage, the stable rock, the first and last limits, + the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem of the mind. To find such + sensational termini should be our aim with all our higher thought. They + end discussion; they destroy the false conceit of knowledge; and without + them we are all at sea with each other's meaning. If two men act alike on + a percept, they believe themselves to feel alike about it; if not, they + may suspect they know it in differing ways. We can never be sure we + understand each other till we are able to bring the matter to this test. + [Footnote: 'There is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in + anything but a possible difference of practice.... It appears, then, that + the rule for attaining the [highest] grade of clearness of apprehension is + as follows: Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical + bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our + conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.' + Charles S. Peirce: 'How to make our Ideas clear,' in Popular Science + Monthly, New York, January, 1878, p. 293.] This is why metaphysical + discussions are so much like fighting with the air; they have no practical + issue of a sensational kind. 'Scientific' theories, on the other hand, + always terminate in definite percepts. You can deduce a possible sensation + from your theory and, taking me into your laboratory, prove that your + theory is true of my world by giving me the sensation then and there. + Beautiful is the flight of conceptual reason through the upper air of + truth. No wonder philosophers are dazzled by it still, and no wonder they + look with some disdain at the low earth of feeling from which the goddess + launched herself aloft. But woe to her if she return not home to its + acquaintance; Nirgends haften dann die unsicheren Sohlen—every crazy + wind will take her, and, like a fire-balloon at night, she will go out + among the stars. + </p> + <p> + NOTE.—The reader will easily see how much of the account of the + truth-function developed later in Pragmatism was already explicit in this + earlier article, and how much came to be defined later. In this earlier + article we find distinctly asserted:— + </p> + <p> + 1. The reality, external to the true idea; + </p> + <p> + 2. The critic, reader, or epistemologist, with his own belief, as warrant + for this reality's existence; + </p> + <p> + 3. The experienceable environment, as the vehicle or medium connecting + knower with known, and yielding the cognitive RELATION; + </p> + <p> + 4. The notion of POINTING, through this medium, to the reality, as one + condition of our being said to know it; + </p> + <p> + 5. That of RESEMBLING it, and eventually AFFECTING it, as determining the + pointing to IT and not to something else. + </p> + <p> + 6. The elimination of the 'epistemological gulf,' so that the whole + truth-relation falls inside of the continuities of concrete experience, + and is constituted of particular processes, varying with every object and + subject, and susceptible of being described in detail. + </p> + <p> + The defects in this earlier account are:— + </p> + <p> + 1. The possibly undue prominence given to resembling, which altho a + fundamental function in knowing truly, is so often dispensed with; + </p> + <p> + 2. The undue emphasis laid upon operating on the object itself, which in + many cases is indeed decisive of that being what we refer to, but which is + often lacking, or replaced by operations on other things related to the + object. + </p> + <p> + 3. The imperfect development of the generalized notion of the WORKABILITY + of the feeling or idea as equivalent to that SATISFACTORY ADAPTATION to + the particular reality, which constitutes the truth of the idea. It is + this more generalized notion, as covering all such specifications as + pointing, fitting, operating or resembling, that distinguishes the + developed view of Dewey, Schiller, and myself. + </p> + <p> + 4. The treatment, [earlier], of percepts as the only realm of reality. I + now treat concepts as a co-ordinate realm. + </p> + <p> + The next paper represents a somewhat broader grasp of the topic on the + writer's part. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0004" id="link2H_4_0004"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + II + </h2> + <p> + THE TIGERS IN INDIA [Footnote: Extracts from a presidential address before + the American Psychological Association, published in the Psychological + Review, vol. ii, p. 105 (1895).] + </p> + <p> + THERE are two ways of knowing things, knowing them immediately or + intuitively, and knowing them conceptually or representatively. Altho such + things as the white paper before our eyes can be known intuitively, most + of the things we know, the tigers now in India, for example, or the + scholastic system of philosophy, are known only representatively or + symbolically. + </p> + <p> + Suppose, to fix our ideas, that we take first a case of conceptual + knowledge; and let it be our knowledge of the tigers in India, as we sit + here. Exactly what do we MEAN by saying that we here know the tigers? What + is the precise fact that the cognition so confidently claimed is KNOWN-AS, + to use Shadworth Hodgson's inelegant but valuable form of words? + </p> + <p> + Most men would answer that what we mean by knowing the tigers is having + them, however absent in body, become in some way present to our thought; + or that our knowledge of them is known as presence of our thought to them. + A great mystery is usually made of this peculiar presence in absence; and + the scholastic philosophy, which is only common sense grown pedantic, + would explain it as a peculiar kind of existence, called INTENTIONAL + EXISTENCE of the tigers in our mind. At the very least, people would say + that what we mean by knowing the tigers is mentally POINTING towards them + as we sit here. + </p> + <p> + But now what do we mean by POINTING, in such a case as this? What is the + pointing known-as, here? + </p> + <p> + To this question I shall have to give a very prosaic answer—one that + traverses the pre-possessions not only of common sense and scholasticism, + but also those of nearly all the epistemological writers whom I have ever + read. The answer, made brief, is this: The pointing of our thought to the + tigers is known simply and solely as a procession of mental associates and + motor consequences that follow on the thought, and that would lead + harmoniously, if followed out, into some ideal or real context, or even + into the immediate presence, of the tigers. It is known as our rejection + of a jaguar, if that beast were shown us as a tiger; as our assent to a + genuine tiger if so shown. It is known as our ability to utter all sorts + of propositions which don't contradict other propositions that are true of + the real tigers. It is even known, if we take the tigers very seriously, + as actions of ours which may terminate in directly intuited tigers, as + they would if we took a voyage to India for the purpose of tiger-hunting + and brought back a lot of skins of the striped rascals which we had laid + low. In all this there is no self-transcendency in our mental images TAKEN + BY THEMSELVES. They are one phenomenal fact; the tigers are another; and + their pointing to the tigers is a perfectly commonplace intra-experiential + relation, IF YOU ONCE GRANT A CONNECTING WORLD TO BE THERE. In short, the + ideas and the tigers are in themselves as loose and separate, to use + Hume's language, as any two things can be; and pointing means here an + operation as external and adventitious as any that nature + yields.[Footnote: A stone in one field may 'fit,' we say, a hole in + another field. But the relation of 'fitting,' so long as no one carries + the stone to the hole and drops it in, is only one name for the fact that + such an act MAY happen. Similarly with the knowing of the tigers here and + now. It is only an anticipatory name for a further associative and + terminative process that MAY occur.] + </p> + <p> + I hope you may agree with me now that in representative knowledge there is + no special inner mystery, but only an outer chain of physical or mental + intermediaries connecting thought and thing. TO KNOW AN OBJECT IS HERE TO + LEAD TO IT THROUGH A CONTEXT WHICH THE WORLD SUPPLIES. All this was most + instructively set forth by our colleague D. S. Miller at our meeting in + New York last Christmas, and for re-confirming my sometime wavering + opinion, I owe him this acknowledgment. [Footnote: See Dr. Miller's + articles on Truth and Error, and on Content and Function, in the + Philosophical Review, July, 1893, and Nov., 1895.] + </p> + <p> + Let us next pass on to the case of immediate or intuitive acquaintance + with an object, and let the object be the white paper before our eyes. The + thought-stuff and the thing-stuff are here indistinguishably the same in + nature, as we saw a moment since, and there is no context of + intermediaries or associates to stand between and separate the thought and + thing. There is no 'presence in absence' here, and no 'pointing,' but + rather an allround embracing of the paper by the thought; and it is clear + that the knowing cannot now be explained exactly as it was when the tigers + were its object. Dotted all through our experience are states of immediate + acquaintance just like this. Somewhere our belief always does rest on + ultimate data like the whiteness, smoothness, or squareness of this paper. + Whether such qualities be truly ultimate aspects of being, or only + provisional suppositions of ours, held-to till we get better informed, is + quite immaterial for our present inquiry. So long as it is believed in, we + see our object face to face. What now do we mean by 'knowing' such a sort + of object as this? For this is also the way in which we should know the + tiger if our conceptual idea of him were to terminate by having led us to + his lair? + </p> + <p> + This address must not become too long, so I must give my answer in the + fewest words. And let me first say this: So far as the white paper or + other ultimate datum of our experience is considered to enter also into + some one else's experience, and we, in knowing it, are held to know it + there as well as here; so far, again, as it is considered to be a mere + mask for hidden molecules that other now impossible experiences of our own + might some day lay bare to view; so far it is a case of tigers in India + again—the things known being absent experiences, the knowing can + only consist in passing smoothly towards them through the intermediary + context that the world supplies. But if our own private vision of the + paper be considered in abstraction from every other event, as if it + constituted by itself the universe (and it might perfectly well do so, for + aught we can understand to the contrary), then the paper seen and the + seeing of it are only two names for one indivisible fact which, properly + named, is THE DATUM, THE PHENOMENON, OR THE EXPERIENCE. The paper is in + the mind and the mind is around the paper, because paper and mind are only + two names that are given later to the one experience, when, taken in a + larger world of which it forms a part, its connections are traced in + different directions. [Footnote: What is meant by this is that 'the + experience' can be referred to either of two great associative systems, + that of the experiencer's mental history, or that of the experienced facts + of the world. Of both of these systems it forms part, and may be regarded, + indeed, as one of their points of intersection. One might let a vertical + line stand for the mental history; but the same object, O, appears also in + the mental history of different persons, represented by the other vertical + lines. It thus ceases to be the private property of one experience, and + becomes, so to speak, a shared or public thing. We can track its outer + history in this way, and represent it by the horizontal line. (It is also + known representatively at other points of the vertical lines, or + intuitively there again, so that the line of its outer history would have + to be looped and wandering, but I make it straight for simplicity's + sake.)] In any case, however, it is the same stuff figures in all the sets + of lines. + </p> + <p> + TO KNOW IMMEDIATELY, THEN, OR INTUITIVELY, IS FOR MENTAL CONTENT AND + OBJECT TO BE IDENTICAL. This is a very different definition from that + which we gave of representative knowledge; but neither definition involves + those mysterious notions of self-transcendency and presence in absence + which are such essential parts of the ideas of knowledge, both of + philosophers and of common men. [Footnote: The reader will observe that + the text is written from the point of view of NAIF realism or common + sense, and avoids raising the idealistic controversy.] + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0005" id="link2H_4_0005"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + III + </h2> + <p> + HUMANISM AND TRUTH [Footnote: Reprinted, with slight verbal revision, from + Mind, vol. xiii, N. S., p. 457 (October, 1904). A couple of interpolations + from another article in Mind, 'Humanism and truth once more,' in vol. xiv, + have been made.] + </p> + <p> + RECEIVING from the Editor of Mind an advance proof of Mr. Bradley's + article on 'Truth and Practice,' I understand this as a hint to me to join + in the controversy over 'Pragmatism' which seems to have seriously begun. + As my name has been coupled with the movement, I deem it wise to take the + hint, the more so as in some quarters greater credit has been given me + than I deserve, and probably undeserved discredit in other quarters falls + also to my lot. + </p> + <p> + First, as to the word 'pragmatism.' I myself have only used the term to + indicate a method of carrying on abstract discussion. The serious meaning + of a concept, says Mr. Peirce, lies in the concrete difference to some one + which its being true will make. Strive to bring all debated conceptions to + that' pragmatic' test, and you will escape vain wrangling: if it can make + no practical difference which of two statements be true, then they are + really one statement in two verbal forms; if it can make no practical + difference whether a given statement be true or false, then the statement + has no real meaning. In neither case is there anything fit to quarrel + about: we may save our breath, and pass to more important things. + </p> + <p> + All that the pragmatic method implies, then, is that truths should HAVE + practical [Footnote: 'Practical' in the sense of PARTICULAR, of course, + not in the sense that the consequences may not be MENTAL as well as + physical.] consequences. In England the word has been used more broadly + still, to cover the notion that the truth of any statement CONSISTS in the + consequences, and particularly in their being good consequences. Here we + get beyond affairs of method altogether; and since my pragmatism and this + wider pragmatism are so different, and both are important enough to have + different names, I think that Mr. Schiller's proposal to call the wider + pragmatism by the name of 'humanism' is excellent and ought to be adopted. + The narrower pragmatism may still be spoken of as the 'pragmatic method.' + </p> + <p> + I have read in the past six months many hostile reviews of Schiller's and + Dewey's publications; but with the exception of Mr. Bradley's elaborate + indictment, they are out of reach where I write, and I have largely + forgotten them. I think that a free discussion of the subject on my part + would in any case be more useful than a polemic attempt at rebutting these + criticisms in detail. Mr. Bradley in particular can be taken care of by + Mr. Schiller. He repeatedly confesses himself unable to comprehend + Schiller's views, he evidently has not sought to do so sympathetically, + and I deeply regret to say that his laborious article throws, for my mind, + absolutely no useful light upon the subject. It seems to me on the whole + an IGNORATIO ELENCHI, and I feel free to disregard it altogether. + </p> + <p> + The subject is unquestionably difficult. Messrs. Dewey's and Schiller's + thought is eminently an induction, a generalization working itself free + from all sorts of entangling particulars. If true, it involves much + restatement of traditional notions. This is a kind of intellectual product + that never attains a classic form of expression when first promulgated. + The critic ought therefore not to be too sharp and logic-chopping in his + dealings with it, but should weigh it as a whole, and especially weigh it + against its possible alternatives. One should also try to apply it first + to one instance, and then to another to see how it will work. It seems to + me that it is emphatically not a case for instant execution, by conviction + of intrinsic absurdity or of self-contradiction, or by caricature of what + it would look like if reduced to skeleton shape. Humanism is in fact much + more like one of those secular changes that come upon public opinion + overnight, as it were, borne upon tides 'too deep for sound or foam,' that + survive all the crudities and extravagances of their advocates, that you + can pin to no one absolutely essential statement, nor kill by any one + decisive stab. + </p> + <p> + Such have been the changes from aristocracy to democracy, from classic to + romantic taste, from theistic to pantheistic feeling, from static to + evolutionary ways of understanding life—changes of which we all have + been spectators. Scholasticism still opposes to such changes the method of + confutation by single decisive reasons, showing that the new view involves + self-contradiction, or traverses some fundamental principle. This is like + stopping a river by planting a stick in the middle of its bed. Round your + obstacle flows the water and 'gets there all the same.' In reading some of + our opponents, I am not a little reminded of those catholic writers who + refute darwinism by telling us that higher species cannot come from lower + because minus nequit gignere plus, or that the notion of transformation is + absurd, for it implies that species tend to their own destruction, and + that would violate the principle that every reality tends to persevere in + its own shape. The point of view is too myopic, too tight and close to + take in the inductive argument. Wide generalizations in science always + meet with these summary refutations in their early days; but they outlive + them, and the refutations then sound oddly antiquated and scholastic. I + cannot help suspecting that the humanistic theory is going through this + kind of would-be refutation at present. + </p> + <p> + The one condition of understanding humanism is to become inductive-minded + oneself, to drop rigorous definitions, and follow lines of least, + resistance 'on the whole.' 'In other words,' an opponent might say, + 'resolve your intellect into a kind of slush.' 'Even so,' I make reply,—'if + you will consent to use no politer word.' For humanism, conceiving the + more 'true' as the more 'satisfactory' (Dewey's term), has sincerely to + renounce rectilinear arguments and ancient ideals of rigor and finality. + It is in just this temper of renunciation, so different from that of + pyrrhonistic scepticism, that the spirit of humanism essentially consists. + Satisfactoriness has to be measured by a multitude of standards, of which + some, for aught we know, may fail in any given case; and what is more + satisfactory than any alternative in sight, may to the end be a sum of + PLUSES and MINUSES, concerning which we can only trust that by ulterior + corrections and improvements a maximum of the one and a minimum of the + other may some day be approached. It means a real change of heart, a break + with absolutistic hopes, when one takes up this inductive view of the + conditions of belief. + </p> + <p> + As I understand the pragmatist way of seeing things, it owes its being to + the break-down which the last fifty years have brought about in the older + notions of scientific truth. 'God geometrizes,' it used to be said; and it + was believed that Euclid's elements literally reproduced his geometrizing. + There is an eternal and unchangeable 'reason'; and its voice was supposed + to reverberate in Barbara and Celarent. So also of the 'laws of nature,' + physical and chemical, so of natural history classifications—all + were supposed to be exact and exclusive duplicates of pre-human archetypes + buried in the structure of things, to which the spark of divinity hidden + in our intellect enables us to penetrate. The anatomy of the world is + logical, and its logic is that of a university professor, it was thought. + Up to about 1850 almost every one believed that sciences expressed truths + that were exact copies of a definite code of non-human realities. But the + enormously rapid multiplication of theories in these latter days has + well-nigh upset the notion of any one of them being a more literally + objective kind of thing than another. There are so many geometries, so + many logics, so many physical and chemical hypotheses, so many + classifications, each one of them good for so much and yet not good for + everything, that the notion that even the truest formula may be a human + device and not a literal transcript has dawned upon us. We hear scientific + laws now treated as so much 'conceptual shorthand,' true so far as they + are useful but no farther. Our mind has become tolerant of symbol instead + of reproduction, of approximation instead of exactness, of plasticity + instead of rigor. 'Energetics,' measuring the bare face of sensible + phenomena so as to describe in a single formula all their changes of + 'level,' is the last word of this scientific humanism, which indeed leaves + queries enough outstanding as to the reason for so curious a congruence + between the world and the mind, but which at any rate makes our whole + notion of scientific truth more flexible and genial than it used to be. + </p> + <p> + It is to be doubted whether any theorizer to-day, either in mathematics, + logic, physics or biology, conceives himself to be literally re-editing + processes of nature or thoughts of God. The main forms of our thinking, + the separation of subjects from predicates, the negative, hypothetic and + disjunctive judgments, are purely human habits. The ether, as Lord + Salisbury said, is only a noun for the verb to undulate; and many of our + theological ideas are admitted, even by those who call them 'true,' to be + humanistic in like degree. + </p> + <p> + I fancy that these changes in the current notions of truth are what + originally gave the impulse to Messrs. Dewey's and Schiller's views. The + suspicion is in the air nowadays that the superiority of one of our + formulas to another may not consist so much in its literal 'objectivity,' + as in subjective qualities like its usefulness, its 'elegance' or its + congruity with our residual beliefs. Yielding to these suspicions, and + generalizing, we fall into something like the humanistic state of mind. + Truth we conceive to mean everywhere, not duplication, but addition; not + the constructing of inner copies of already complete realities, but rather + the collaborating with realities so as to bring about a clearer result. + Obviously this state of mind is at first full of vagueness and ambiguity. + 'Collaborating' is a vague term; it must at any rate cover conceptions and + logical arrangements. 'Clearer' is vaguer still. Truth must bring clear + thoughts, as well as clear the way to action. 'Reality' is the vaguest + term of all. The only way to test such a programme at all is to apply it + to the various types of truth, in the hope of reaching an account that + shall be more precise. Any hypothesis that forces such a review upon one + has one great merit, even if in the end it prove invalid: it gets us + better acquainted with the total subject. To give the theory plenty of + 'rope' and see if it hangs itself eventually is better tactics than to + choke it off at the outset by abstract accusations of self-contradiction. + I think therefore that a decided effort at sympathetic mental play with + humanism is the provisional attitude to be recommended to the reader. + </p> + <p> + When I find myself playing sympathetically with humanism, something like + what follows is what I end by conceiving it to mean. + </p> + <p> + Experience is a process that continually gives us new material to digest. + We handle this intellectually by the mass of beliefs of which we find + ourselves already possessed, assimilating, rejecting, or rearranging in + different degrees. Some of the apperceiving ideas are recent acquisitions + of our own, but most of them are common-sense traditions of the race. + There is probably not a common-sense tradition, of all those which we now + live by, that was not in the first instance a genuine discovery, an + inductive generalization like those more recent ones of the atom, of + inertia, of energy, of reflex action, or of fitness to survive The notions + of one Time and of one Space as single continuous receptacles; the + distinction between thoughts and things, matter and mind between permanent + subjects and changing attributes; the conception of classes with sub + classes within them; the separation of fortuitous from regularly caused + connections; surely all these were once definite conquests made at + historic dates by our ancestors in their attempt to get the chaos of their + crude individual experiences into a more shareable and manageable shape. + They proved of such sovereign use as denkmittel that they are now a part + of the very structure of our mind. We cannot play fast and loose with + them. No experience can upset them. On the contrary, they apperceive every + experience and assign it to its place. + </p> + <p> + To what effect? That we may the better foresee the course of our + experiences, communicate with one another, and steer our lives by rule. + Also that we may have a cleaner, clearer, more inclusive mental view. + </p> + <p> + The greatest common-sense achievement, after the discovery of one Time and + one Space, is probably the concept of permanently existing things. When a + rattle first drops out of the hand of a baby, he does not look to see + where it has gone. Non-perception he accepts as annihilation until he + finds a better belief. That our perceptions mean BEINGS, rattles that are + there whether we hold them in our hands or not, becomes an interpretation + so luminous of what happens to us that, once employed, it never gets + forgotten. It applies with equal felicity to things and persons, to the + objective and to the ejective realm. However a Berkeley, a Mill, or a + Cornelius may CRITICISE it, it WORKS; and in practical life we never think + of 'going back' upon it, or reading our incoming experiences in any other + terms. We may, indeed, speculatively imagine a state of 'pure' experience + before the hypothesis of permanent objects behind its flux had been + framed; and we can play with the idea that some primeval genius might have + struck into a different hypothesis. But we cannot positively imagine today + what the different hypothesis could have been, for the category of + trans-perceptual reality is now one of the foundations of our life. Our + thoughts must still employ it if they are to possess reasonableness and + truth. + </p> + <p> + This notion of a FIRST in the shape of a most chaotic pure experience + which sets us questions, of a SECOND in the way of fundamental categories, + long ago wrought into the structure of our consciousness and practically + irreversible, which define the general frame within which answers must + fall, and of a THIRD which gives the detail of the answers in the shapes + most congruous with all our present needs, is, as I take it, the essence + of the humanistic conception. It represents experience in its pristine + purity to be now so enveloped in predicates historically worked out that + we can think of it as little more than an OTHER, of a THAT, which the + mind, in Mr. Bradley's phrase, 'encounters,' and to whose stimulating + presence we respond by ways of thinking which we call 'true' in proportion + as they facilitate our mental or physical activities and bring us outer + power and inner peace. But whether the Other, the universal THAT, has + itself any definite inner structure, or whether, if it have any, the + structure resembles any of our predicated WHATS, this is a question which + humanism leaves untouched. For us, at any rate, it insists, reality is an + accumulation of our own intellectual inventions, and the struggle for + 'truth' in our progressive dealings with it is always a struggle to work + in new nouns and adjectives while altering as little as possible the old. + </p> + <p> + It is hard to see why either Mr. Bradley's own logic or his metaphysics + should oblige him to quarrel with this conception. He might consistently + adopt it verbatim et literatim, if he would, and simply throw his peculiar + absolute round it, following in this the good example of Professor Royce. + Bergson in France, and his disciples, Wilbois the physicist and Leroy, are + thoroughgoing humanists in the sense defined. Professor Milhaud also + appears to be one; and the great Poincare misses it by only the breadth of + a hair. In Germany the name of Simmel offers itself as that of a humanist + of the most radical sort. Mach and his school, and Hertz and Ostwald must + be classed as humanists. The view is in the atmosphere and must be + patiently discussed. + </p> + <p> + The best way to discuss it would be to see what the alternative might be. + What is it indeed? Its critics make no explicit statement, Professor Royce + being the only one so far who has formulated anything definite. The first + service of humanism to philosophy accordingly seems to be that it will + probably oblige those who dislike it to search their own hearts and heads. + It will force analysis to the front and make it the order of the day. At + present the lazy tradition that truth is adaequatio intellectus et rei + seems all there is to contradict it with. Mr. Bradley's only suggestion is + that true thought 'must correspond to a determinate being which it cannot + be said to make,' and obviously that sheds no new light. What is the + meaning of the word to 'correspond'? Where is the 'being'? What sort of + things are 'determinations,' and what is meant in this particular case by + 'not to make'? + </p> + <p> + Humanism proceeds immediately to refine upon the looseness of these + epithets. We correspond in SOME way with anything with which we enter into + any relations at all. If it be a thing, we may produce an exact copy of + it, or we may simply feel it as an existent in a certain place. If it be a + demand, we may obey it without knowing anything more about it than its + push. If it be a proposition, we may agree by not contradicting it, by + letting it pass. If it be a relation between things, we may act on the + first thing so as to bring ourselves out where the second will be. If it + be something inaccessible, we may substitute a hypothetical object for it, + which, having the same consequences, will cipher out for us real results. + In a general way we may simply ADD OUR THOUGHT TO IT; and if it SUFFERS + THE ADDITION, and the whole situation harmoniously prolongs and enriches + itself, the thought will pass for true. + </p> + <p> + As for the whereabouts of the beings thus corresponded to, although they + may be outside of the present thought as well as in it, humanism sees no + ground for saying they are outside of finite experience itself. + Pragmatically, their reality means that we submit to them, take account of + them, whether we like to or not, but this we must perpetually do with + experiences other than our own. The whole system of what the present + experience must correspond to 'adequately' may be continuous with the + present experience itself. Reality, so taken as experience other than the + present, might be either the legacy of past experience or the content of + experience to come. Its determinations for US are in any case the + adjectives which our acts of judging fit to it, and those are essentially + humanistic things. + </p> + <p> + To say that our thought does not 'make' this reality means pragmatically + that if our own particular thought were annihilated the reality would + still be there in some shape, though possibly it might be a shape that + would lack something that our thought supplies. That reality is + 'independent' means that there is something in every experience that + escapes our arbitrary control. If it be a sensible experience it coerces + our attention; if a sequence, we cannot invert it; if we compare two terms + we can come to only one result. There is a push, an urgency, within our + very experience, against which we are on the whole powerless, and which + drives us in a direction that is the destiny of our belief. That this + drift of experience itself is in the last resort due to something + independent of all possible experience may or may not be true. There may + or may not be an extra-experiential 'ding an sich' that keeps the ball + rolling, or an 'absolute' that lies eternally behind all the successive + determinations which human thought has made. But within our experience + ITSELF, at any rate, humanism says, some determinations show themselves as + being independent of others; some questions, if we ever ask them, can only + be answered in one way; some beings, if we ever suppose them, must be + supposed to have existed previously to the supposing; some relations, if + they exist ever, must exist as long as their terms exist. + </p> + <p> + Truth thus means, according to humanism, the relation of less fixed parts + of experience (predicates) to other relatively more fixed parts + (subjects); and we are not required to seek it in a relation of experience + as such to anything beyond itself. We can stay at home, for our behavior + as exponents is hemmed in on every side. The forces both of advance and of + resistance are exerted by our own objects, and the notion of truth as + something opposed to waywardness or license inevitably grows up + SOLIPSISTICALLY inside of every human life. + </p> + <p> + So obvious is all this that a common charge against the humanistic authors + 'makes me tired.' 'How can a deweyite discriminate sincerity from bluff?' + was a question asked at a philosophic meeting where I reported on Dewey's + Studies. 'How can the mere [Footnote: I know of no 'mere' pragmatist, if + MERENESS here means, as it seems to, the denial of all concreteness to the + pragmatist's THOUGHT.] pragmatist feel any duty to think truly?' is the + objection urged by Professor Royce. Mr. Bradley in turn says that if a + humanist understands his own doctrine, 'he must hold any idea, however + mad, to be the truth, if any one will have it so.' And Professor Taylor + describes pragmatism as believing anything one pleases and calling it + truth. + </p> + <p> + Such a shallow sense of the conditions under which men's thinking actually + goes on seems to me most surprising. These critics appear to suppose that, + if left to itself, the rudderless raft of our experience must be ready to + drift anywhere or nowhere. Even THO there were compasses on board, they + seem to say, there would be no pole for them to point to. There must be + absolute sailing-directions, they insist, decreed from outside, and an + independent chart of the voyage added to the 'mere' voyage itself, if we + are ever to make a port. But is it not obvious that even THO there be such + absolute sailing-directions in the shape of pre-human standards of truth + that we OUGHT to follow, the only guarantee that we shall in fact follow + them must lie in our human equipment. The 'ought' would be a brutum fulmen + unless there were a felt grain inside of our experience that conspired. As + a matter of fact the DEVOUTEST believers in absolute standards must admit + that men fail to obey them. Waywardness is here, in spite of the eternal + prohibitions, and the existence of any amount of reality ante rem is no + warrant against unlimited error in rebus being incurred. The only REAL + guarantee we have against licentious thinking is the CIRCUMPRESSURE of + experience itself, which gets us sick of concrete errors, whether there be + a trans-empirical reality or not. How does the partisan of absolute + reality know what this orders him to think? He cannot get direct sight of + the absolute; and he has no means of guessing what it wants of him except + by following the humanistic clues. The only truth that he himself will + ever practically ACCEPT will be that to which his finite experiences lead + him of themselves. The state of mind which shudders at the idea of a lot + of experiences left to themselves, and that augurs protection from the + sheer name of an absolute, as if, however inoperative, that might still + stand for a sort of ghostly security, is like the mood of those good + people who, whenever they hear of a social tendency that is damnable, + begin to redden and to puff, and say 'Parliament or Congress ought to make + a law against it,' as if an impotent decree would give relief. + </p> + <p> + All the SANCTIONS of a law of truth lie in the very texture of experience. + Absolute or no absolute, the concrete truth FOR US will always be that way + of thinking in which our various experiences most profitably combine. + </p> + <p> + And yet, the opponent obstinately urges, your humanist will always have a + greater liberty to play fast and loose with truth than will your believer + in an independent realm of reality that makes the standard rigid. If by + this latter believer he means a man who pretends to know the standard and + who fulminates it, the humanist will doubtless prove more flexible; but no + more flexible than the absolutist himself if the latter follows (as + fortunately our present-day absolutists do follow) empirical methods of + inquiry in concrete affairs. To consider hypotheses is surely always + better than to DOGMATISE ins blaue hinein. + </p> + <p> + Nevertheless this probable flexibility of temper in him has been used to + convict the humanist of sin. Believing as he does, that truth lies in + rebus, and is at every moment our own line of most propitious reaction, he + stands forever debarred, as I have heard a learned colleague say, from + trying to convert opponents, for does not their view, being THEIR most + propitious momentary reaction, already fill the bill? Only the believer in + the ante-rem brand of truth can on this theory seek to make converts + without self-stultification. But can there be self-stultification in + urging any account whatever of truth? Can the definition ever contradict + the deed? 'Truth is what I feel like saying'—suppose that to be the + definition. 'Well, I feel like saying that, and I want you to feel like + saying it, and shall continue to say it until I get you to agree.' Where + is there any contradiction? Whatever truth may be said to be, that is the + kind of truth which the saying can be held to carry. The TEMPER which a + saying may comport is an extra-logical matter. It may indeed be hotter in + some individual absolutist than in a humanist, but it need not be so in + another. And the humanist, for his part, is perfectly consistent in + compassing sea and land to make one proselyte, if his nature be + enthusiastic enough. + </p> + <p> + 'But how can you be enthusiastic over any view of things which you know to + have been partly made by yourself, and which is liable to alter during the + next minute? How is any heroic devotion to the ideal of truth possible + under such paltry conditions?' + </p> + <p> + This is just another of those objections by which the anti-humanists show + their own comparatively slack hold on the realities of the situation. If + they would only follow the pragmatic method and ask: 'What is truth + KNOWN-AS? What does its existence stand for in the way of concrete goods?'—they + would see that the name of it is the inbegriff of almost everything that + is valuable in our lives. The true is the opposite of whatever is + instable, of whatever is practically disappointing, of whatever is + useless, of whatever is lying and unreliable, of whatever is unverifiable + and unsupported, of whatever is inconsistent and contradictory, of + whatever is artificial and eccentric, of whatever is unreal in the sense + of being of no practical account. Here are pragmatic reasons with a + vengeance why we should turn to truth—truth saves us from a world of + that complexion. What wonder that its very name awakens loyal feeling! In + particular what wonder that all little provisional fool's paradises of + belief should appear contemptible in comparison with its bare pursuit! + When absolutists reject humanism because they feel it to be untrue, that + means that the whole habit of their mental needs is wedded already to a + different view of reality, in comparison with which the humanistic world + seems but the whim of a few irresponsible youths. Their own subjective + apperceiving mass is what speaks here in the name of the eternal natures + and bids them reject our humanism—as they apprehend it. Just so with + us humanists, when we condemn all noble, clean-cut, fixed, eternal, + rational, temple-like systems of philosophy. These contradict the DRAMATIC + TEMPERAMENT of nature, as our dealings with nature and our habits of + thinking have so far brought us to conceive it. They seem oddly personal + and artificial, even when not bureaucratic and professional in an absurd + degree. We turn from them to the great unpent and unstayed wilderness of + truth as we feel it to be constituted, with as good a conscience as + rationalists are moved by when they turn from our wilderness into their + neater and cleaner intellectual abodes. [Footnote: I cannot forbear + quoting as an illustration of the contrast between humanist and + rationalist tempers of mind, in a sphere remote from philosophy, these + remarks on the Dreyfus 'affaire,' written by one who assuredly had never + heard of humanism or pragmatism. 'Autant que la Revolution, "l'Affaire" + est desormais une de nos "origines." Si elle n'a pas fait ouvrir le + gouffre, c'est elle du moins qui a rendu patent et visible le long travail + souterrain qui, silencieusement, avait prepare la separation entre nos + deux camps d'aujourd'hui, pour ecarter enfin, d'un coup soudain, la France + des traditionalistes (poseurs de principes, chercheurs d'unite, + constructeurs de systemes a priori) el la France eprise du fait positif et + de libre examen;—la France revolutionnaire et romantique si l'on + veut, celle qui met tres haut l'individu, qui ne veut pas qu'un juste + perisse, fut-ce pour sauver la nation, et qui cherche la verite dans + toutes ses parties aussi bien que dans une vue d'ensemble ... Duclaux ne + pouvait pas concevoir qu'on preferat quelque chose a la verite. Mais il + voyait autour de lui de fort honnetes gens qui, mettant en balance la vie + d'un homme et la raison d'Etat, lui avouaient de quel poids leger ils + jugeaient une simple existence individuelle, pour innocente qu'elle fut. + C'etaient des classiques, des gens a qui l'ensemble seul importe.' La Vie + de Emile Duclaux, par Mme. Em. D., Laval, 1906, pp. 243, 247-248.] + </p> + <p> + This is surely enough to show that the humanist does not ignore the + character of objectivity and independence in truth. Let me turn next to + what his opponents mean when they say that to be true, our thoughts must + 'correspond.' + </p> + <p> + The vulgar notion of correspondence here is that the thoughts must COPY + the reality—cognitio fit per assimiliationem cogniti et + cognoscentis; and philosophy, without having ever fairly sat down to the + question, seems to have instinctively accepted this idea: propositions are + held true if they copy the eternal thought; terms are held true if they + copy extra-mental realities. Implicitly, I think that the copy-theory has + animated most of the criticisms that have been made on humanism. + </p> + <p> + A priori, however, it is not self-evident that the sole business of our + mind with realities should be to copy them. Let my reader suppose himself + to constitute for a time all the reality there is in the universe, and + then to receive the announcement that another being is to be created who + shall know him truly. How will he represent the knowing in advance? What + will he hope it to be? I doubt extremely whether it could ever occur to + him to fancy it as a mere copying. Of what use to him would an imperfect + second edition of himself in the new comer's interior be? It would seem + pure waste of a propitious opportunity. The demand would more probably be + for something absolutely new. The reader would conceive the knowing + humanistically, 'the new comer,' he would say, 'must TAKE ACCOUNT OF MY + PRESENCE BY REACTING ON IT IN SUCH A WAY THAT GOOD WOULD ACCRUE TO US + BOTH. If copying be requisite to that end, let there be copying; otherwise + not.' The essence in any case would not be the copying, but the enrichment + of the previous world. + </p> + <p> + I read the other day, in a book of Professor Eucken's, a phrase, 'Die + erhohung des vorgefundenen daseins,' which seems to be pertinent here. Why + may not thought's mission be to increase and elevate, rather than simply + to imitate and reduplicate, existence? No one who has read Lotze can fail + to remember his striking comment on the ordinary view of the secondary + qualities of matter, which brands them as 'illusory' because they copy + nothing in the thing. The notion of a world complete in itself, to which + thought comes as a passive mirror, adding nothing to fact, Lotze says is + irrational. Rather is thought itself a most momentous part of fact, and + the whole mission of the pre-existing and insufficient world of matter may + simply be to provoke thought to produce its far more precious supplement. + </p> + <p> + 'Knowing,' in short, may, for aught we can see beforehand to the contrary, + be ONLY ONE WAY OF GETTING INTO FRUITFUL RELATIONS WITH REALITY whether + copying be one of the relations or not. + </p> + <p> + It is easy to see from what special type of knowing the copy-theory arose. + In our dealings with natural phenomena the great point is to be able to + foretell. Foretelling, according to such a writer as Spencer, is the whole + meaning of intelligence. When Spencer's 'law of intelligence' says that + inner and outer relations must 'correspond,' it means that the + distribution of terms in our inner time-scheme and space-scheme must be an + exact copy of the distribution in real time and space of the real terms. + In strict theory the mental terms themselves need not answer to the real + terms in the sense of severally copying them, symbolic mental terms being + enough, if only the real dates and places be copied. But in our ordinary + life the mental terms are images and the real ones are sensations, and the + images so often copy the sensations, that we easily take copying of terms + as well as of relations to be the natural significance of knowing. + Meanwhile much, even of this common descriptive truth, is couched in + verbal symbols. If our symbols FIT the world, in the sense of determining + our expectations rightly, they may even be the better for not copying its + terms. + </p> + <p> + It seems obvious that the pragmatic account of all this routine of + phenomenal knowledge is accurate. Truth here is a relation, not of our + ideas to non-human realities, but of conceptual parts of our experience to + sensational parts. Those thoughts are true which guide us to BENEFICIAL + INTERACTION with sensible particulars as they occur, whether they copy + these in advance or not. + </p> + <p> + From the frequency of copying in the knowledge of phenomenal fact, copying + has been supposed to be the essence of truth in matters rational also. + Geometry and logic, it has been supposed, must copy archetypal thoughts in + the Creator. But in these abstract spheres there is no need of assuming + archetypes. The mind is free to carve so many figures out of space, to + make so many numerical collections, to frame so many classes and series, + and it can analyze and compare so endlessly, that the very superabundance + of the resulting ideas makes us doubt the 'objective' pre-existence of + their models. It would be plainly wrong to suppose a God whose thought + consecrated rectangular but not polar co-ordinates, or Jevons's notation + but not Boole's. Yet if, on the other hand, we assume God to have thought + in advance of every POSSIBLE flight of human fancy in these directions, + his mind becomes too much like a Hindoo idol with three heads, eight arms + and six breasts, too much made up of superfoetation and redundancy for us + to wish to copy it, and the whole notion of copying tends to evaporate + from these sciences. Their objects can be better interpreted as being + created step by step by men, as fast as they successively conceive them. + </p> + <p> + If now it be asked how, if triangles, squares, square roots, genera, and + the like, are but improvised human 'artefacts,' their properties and + relations can be so promptly known to be 'eternal,' the humanistic answer + is easy. If triangles and genera are of our own production we can keep + them invariant. We can make them 'timeless' by expressly decreeing that on + THE THINGS WE MEAN time shall exert no altering effect, that they are + intentionally and it may be fictitiously abstracted from every corrupting + real associate and condition. But relations between invariant objects will + themselves be invariant. Such relations cannot be happenings, for by + hypothesis nothing shall happen to the objects. I have tried to show in + the last chapter of my Principles of Psychology [Footnote: Vol. ii, pp. + 641 ff.] that they can only be relations of comparison. No one so far + seems to have noticed my suggestion, and I am too ignorant of the + development of mathematics to feel very confident of my own view. But if + it were correct it would solve the difficulty perfectly. Relations of + comparison are matters of direct inspection. As soon as mental objects are + mentally compared, they are perceived to be either like or unlike. But + once the same, always the same, once different, always different, under + these timeless conditions. Which is as much as to say that truths + concerning these man-made objects are necessary and eternal. We can change + our conclusions only by changing our data first. + </p> + <p> + The whole fabric of the a priori sciences can thus be treated as a + man-made product. As Locke long ago pointed out, these sciences have no + immediate connection with fact. Only IF a fact can be humanized by being + identified with any of these ideal objects, is what was true of the + objects now true also of the facts. The truth itself meanwhile was + originally a copy of nothing; it was only a relation directly perceived to + obtain between two artificial mental things. [Footnote: Mental things + which are realities of course within the mental world.] + </p> + <p> + We may now glance at some special types of knowing, so as to see better + whether the humanistic account fits. On the mathematical and logical types + we need not enlarge further, nor need we return at much length to the case + of our descriptive knowledge of the course of nature. So far as this + involves anticipation, tho that MAY mean copying, it need, as we saw, mean + little more than 'getting ready' in advance. But with many distant and + future objects, our practical relations are to the last degree potential + and remote. In no sense can we now get ready for the arrest of the earth's + revolution by the tidal brake, for instance; and with the past, tho we + suppose ourselves to know it truly, we have no practical relations at all. + It is obvious that, altho interests strictly practical have been the + original starting-point of our search for true phenomenal descriptions, + yet an intrinsic interest in the bare describing function has grown up. We + wish accounts that shall be true, whether they bring collateral profit or + not. The primitive function has developed its demand for mere exercise. + This theoretic curiosity seems to be the characteristically human + differentia, and humanism recognizes its enormous scope. A true idea now + means not only one that prepares us for an actual perception. It means + also one that might prepare us for a merely possible perception, or one + that, if spoken, would suggest possible perceptions to others, or suggest + actual perceptions which the speaker cannot share. The ensemble of + perceptions thus thought of as either actual or possible form a system + which it is obviously advantageous to us to get into a stable and + consistent shape; and here it is that the common-sense notion of permanent + beings finds triumphant use. Beings acting outside of the thinker explain, + not only his actual perceptions, past and future, but his possible + perceptions and those of every one else. Accordingly they gratify our + theoretic need in a supremely beautiful way. We pass from our immediate + actual through them into the foreign and the potential, and back again + into the future actual, accounting for innumerable particulars by a single + cause. As in those circular panoramas, where a real foreground of dirt, + grass, bushes, rocks and a broken-down cannon is enveloped by a canvas + picture of sky and earth and of a raging battle, continuing the foreground + so cunningly that the spectator can detect no joint; so these conceptual + objects, added to our present perceptual reality, fuse with it into the + whole universe of our belief. In spite of all berkeleyan criticism, we do + not doubt that they are really there. Tho our discovery of any one of them + may only date from now, we unhesitatingly say that it not only IS, but WAS + there, if, by so saying, the past appears connected more consistently with + what we feel the present to be. This is historic truth. Moses wrote the + Pentateuch, we think, because if he didn't, all our religious habits will + have to be undone. Julius Caesar was real, or we can never listen to + history again. Trilobites were once alive, or all our thought about the + strata is at sea. Radium, discovered only yesterday, must always have + existed, or its analogy with other natural elements, which are permanent, + fails. In all this, it is but one portion of our beliefs reacting on + another so as to yield the most satisfactory total state of mind. That + state of mind, we say, sees truth, and the content of its deliverances we + believe. + </p> + <p> + Of course, if you take the satisfactoriness concretely, as something felt + by you now, and if, by truth, you mean truth taken abstractly and verified + in the long run, you cannot make them equate, for it is notorious that the + temporarily satisfactory is often false. Yet at each and every concrete + moment, truth for each man is what that man 'troweth' at that moment with + the maximum of satisfaction to himself; and similarly, abstract truth, + truth verified by the long run, and abstract satisfactoriness, long-run + satisfactoriness, coincide. If, in short, we compare concrete with + concrete and abstract with abstract, the true and the satisfactory do mean + the same thing. I suspect that a certain muddling of matters hereabouts is + what makes the general philosophic public so impervious to humanism's + claims. + </p> + <p> + The fundamental fact about our experience is that it is a process of + change. For the 'trower' at any moment, truth, like the visible area round + a man walking in a fog, or like what George Eliot calls 'the wall of dark + seen by small fishes' eyes that pierce a span in the wide Ocean,' is an + objective field which the next moment enlarges and of which it is the + critic, and which then either suffers alteration or is continued + unchanged. The critic sees both the first trower's truth and his own + truth, compares them with each other, and verifies or confutes. HIS field + of view is the reality independent of that earlier trower's thinking with + which that thinking ought to correspond. But the critic is himself only a + trower; and if the whole process of experience should terminate at that + instant, there would be no otherwise known independent reality with which + HIS thought might be compared. + </p> + <p> + The immediate in experience is always provisionally in this situation. The + humanism, for instance, which I see and try so hard to defend, is the + completest truth attained from my point of view up to date. But, owing to + the fact that all experience is a process, no point of view can ever be + THE last one. Every one is insufficient and off its balance, and + responsible to later points of view than itself. You, occupying some of + these later points in your own person, and believing in the reality of + others, will not agree that my point of view sees truth positive, truth + timeless, truth that counts, unless they verify and confirm what it sees. + </p> + <p> + You generalize this by saying that any opinion, however satisfactory, can + count positively and absolutely as true only so far as it agrees with a + standard beyond itself; and if you then forget that this standard + perpetually grows up endogenously inside the web of the experiences, you + may carelessly go on to say that what distributively holds of each + experience, holds also collectively of all experience, and that experience + as such and in its totality owes whatever truth it may be possessed-of to + its correspondence with absolute realities outside of its own being. This + evidently is the popular and traditional position. From the fact that + finite experiences must draw support from one another, philosophers pass + to the notion that experience uberhaupt must need an absolute support. The + denial of such a notion by humanism lies probably at the root of most of + the dislike which it incurs. + </p> + <p> + But is this not the globe, the elephant and the tortoise over again? Must + not something end by supporting itself? Humanism is willing to let finite + experience be self-supporting. Somewhere being must immediately breast + nonentity. Why may not the advancing front of experience, carrying its + immanent satisfactions and dissatisfactions, cut against the black inane + as the luminous orb of the moon cuts the caerulean abyss? Why should + anywhere the world be absolutely fixed and finished? And if reality + genuinely grows, why may it not grow in these very determinations which + here and now are made? + </p> + <p> + In point of fact it actually seems to grow by our mental determinations, + be these never so 'true.' Take the 'great bear' or 'dipper' constellation + in the heavens. We call it by that name, we count the stars and call them + seven, we say they were seven before they were counted, and we say that + whether any one had ever noted the fact or not, the dim resemblance to a + long-tailed (or long-necked?) animal was always truly there. But what do + we mean by this projection into past eternity of recent human ways of + thinking? Did an 'absolute' thinker actually do the counting, tell off the + stars upon his standing number-tally, and make the bear-comparison, silly + as the latter is? Were they explicitly seven, explicitly bear-like, before + the human witness came? Surely nothing in the truth of the attributions + drives us to think this. They were only implicitly or virtually what we + call them, and we human witnesses first explicated them and made them + 'real.' A fact virtually pre-exists when every condition of its + realization save one is already there. In this case the condition lacking + is the act of the counting and comparing mind. But the stars (once the + mind considers them) themselves dictate the result. The counting in no + wise modifies their previous nature, and, they being what and where they + are, the count cannot fall out differently. It could then ALWAYS be made. + NEVER could the number seven be questioned, IF THE QUESTION ONCE WERE + RAISED. + </p> + <p> + We have here a quasi-paradox. Undeniably something comes by the counting + that was not there before. And yet that something was ALWAYS TRUE. In one + sense you create it, and in another sense you FIND it. You have to treat + your count as being true beforehand, the moment you come to treat the + matter at all. + </p> + <p> + Our stellar attributes must always be called true, then; yet none the less + are they genuine additions made by our intellect to the world of fact. Not + additions of consciousness only, but additions of 'content.' They copy + nothing that pre-existed, yet they agree with what pre-existed, fit it, + amplify it, relate and connect it with a 'wain,' a number-tally, or what + not, and build it out. It seems to me that humanism is the only theory + that builds this case out in the good direction, and this case stands for + innumerable other kinds of case. In all such eases, odd as it may sound, + our judgment may actually be said to retroact and to enrich the past. + </p> + <p> + Our judgments at any rate change the character of FUTURE reality by the + acts to which they lead. Where these acts are acts expressive of trust,—trust, + e.g., that a man is honest, that our health is good enough, or that we can + make a successful effort,—which acts may be a needed antecedent of + the trusted things becoming true. Professor Taylor says [Footnote: In an + article criticising Pragmatism (as he conceives it) in the McGill + University Quarterly published at Montreal, for May, 1904.] that our trust + is at any rate UNTRUE WHEN IT IS MADE, i. e; before the action; and I seem + to remember that he disposes of anything like a faith in the general + excellence of the universe (making the faithful person's part in it at any + rate more excellent) as a 'lie in the soul.' But the pathos of this + expression should not blind us to the complication of the facts. I doubt + whether Professor Taylor would himself be in favor of practically handling + trusters of these kinds as liars. Future and present really mix in such + emergencies, and one can always escape lies in them by using hypothetic + forms. But Mr. Taylor's attitude suggests such absurd possibilities of + practice that it seems to me to illustrate beautifully how + self-stultifying the conception of a truth that shall merely register a + standing fixture may become. Theoretic truth, truth of passive copying, + sought in the sole interests of copying as such, not because copying is + GOOD FOR SOMETHING, but because copying ought schlechthin to be, seems, if + you look at it coldly, to be an almost preposterous ideal. Why should the + universe, existing in itself, also exist in copies? How CAN it be copied + in the solidity of its objective fulness? And even if it could, what would + the motive be? 'Even the hairs of your head are numbered.' Doubtless they + are, virtually; but why, as an absolute proposition, OUGHT the number to + become copied and known? Surely knowing is only one way of interacting + with reality and adding to its effect. + </p> + <p> + The opponent here will ask: 'Has not the knowing of truth any substantive + value on its own account, apart from the collateral advantages it may + bring? And if you allow theoretic satisfactions to exist at all, do they + not crowd the collateral satisfactions out of house and home, and must not + pragmatism go into bankruptcy, if she admits them at all?' The destructive + force of such talk disappears as soon as we use words concretely instead + of abstractly, and ask, in our quality of good pragmatists, just what the + famous theoretic needs are known as and in what the intellectual + satisfactions consist. + </p> + <p> + Are they not all mere matters of CONSISTENCY—and emphatically NOT of + consistency between an absolute reality and the mind's copies of it, but + of actually felt consistency among judgments, objects, and habits of + reacting, in the mind's own experienceable world? And are not both our + need of such consistency and our pleasure in it conceivable as outcomes of + the natural fact that we are beings that do develop mental HABITS—habit + itself proving adaptively beneficial in an environment where the same + objects, or the same kinds of objects, recur and follow 'law'? If this + were so, what would have come first would have been the collateral profits + of habit as such, and the theoretic life would have grown up in aid of + these. In point of fact, this seems to have been the probable case. At + life's origin, any present perception may have been 'true'—if such a + word could then be applicable. Later, when reactions became organized, the + reactions became 'true' whenever expectation was fulfilled by them. + Otherwise they were 'false' or 'mistaken' reactions. But the same class of + objects needs the same kind of reaction, so the impulse to react + consistently must gradually have been established, and a disappointment + felt whenever the results frustrated expectation. Here is a perfectly + plausible germ for all our higher consistencies. Nowadays, if an object + claims from us a reaction of the kind habitually accorded only to the + opposite class of objects, our mental machinery refuses to run smoothly. + The situation is intellectually unsatisfactory. + </p> + <p> + Theoretic truth thus falls WITHIN the mind, being the accord of some of + its processes and objects with other processes and objects—'accord' + consisting here in well-definable relations. So long as the satisfaction + of feeling such an accord is denied us, whatever collateral profits may + seem to inure from what we believe in are but as dust in the balance—provided + always that we are highly organized intellectually, which the majority of + us are not. The amount of accord which satisfies most men and women is + merely the absence of violent clash between their usual thoughts and + statements and the limited sphere of sense-perceptions in which their + lives are cast. The theoretic truth that most of us think we 'ought' to + attain to is thus the possession of a set of predicates that do not + explicitly contradict their subjects. We preserve it as often as not by + leaving other predicates and subjects out. + </p> + <p> + In some men theory is a passion, just as music is in others. The form of + inner consistency is pursued far beyond the line at which collateral + profits stop. Such men systematize and classify and schematize and make + synoptical tables and invent ideal objects for the pure love of unifying. + Too often the results, glowing with 'truth' for the inventors, seem + pathetically personal and artificial to bystanders. Which is as much as to + say that the purely theoretic criterion of truth can leave us in the lurch + as easily as any other criterion, and that the absolutists, for all their + pretensions, are 'in the same boat' concretely with those whom they + attack. + </p> + <p> + I am well aware that this paper has been rambling in the extreme. But the + whole subject is inductive, and sharp logic is hardly yet in order. My + great trammel has been the non-existence of any definitely stated + alternative on my opponents' part. It may conduce to clearness if I + recapitulate, in closing, what I conceive the main points of humanism to + be. They are these:— + </p> + <p> + 1. An experience, perceptual or conceptual, must conform to reality in + order to be true. + </p> + <p> + 2. By 'reality' humanism means nothing more than the other conceptual or + perceptual experiences with which a given present experience may find + itself in point of fact mixed up. [Footnote: This is meant merely to + exclude reality of an 'unknowable' sort, of which no account in either + perceptual or conceptual terms can be given. It includes of course any + amount if empirical reality independent of the knower. Pragmatism, is thus + 'epistemologically' realistic in its account.] + </p> + <p> + 3. By 'conforming,' humanism means taking account-of in such a way as to + gain any intellectually and practically satisfactory result. + </p> + <p> + 4. To 'take account-of' and to be 'satisfactory' are terms that admit of + no definition, so many are the ways in which these requirements can + practically be worked out. + </p> + <p> + 5. Vaguely and in general, we take account of a reality by preserving it + in as unmodified a form as possible. But, to be then satisfactory, it must + not contradict other realities outside of it which claim also to be + preserved. That we must preserve all the experience we can and minimize + contradiction in what we preserve, is about all that can be said in + advance. + </p> + <p> + 6. The truth which the conforming experience embodies may be a positive + addition to the previous reality, and later judgments may have to conform + to it. Yet, virtually at least, it may have been true previously. + Pragmatically, virtual and actual truth mean the same thing: the + possibility of only one answer, when once the question is raised. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0006" id="link2H_4_0006"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + IV + </h2> + <h3> + THE RELATION BETWEEN KNOWER AND KNOWN + </h3> + <p> + [Footnote: Extract from an article entitled 'A World of Pure Experience,' + in the Journal of Philosophy, etc., September 29,1904.] + </p> + <p> + Throughout the history of philosophy the subject and its object have been + treated as absolutely discontinuous entities; and thereupon the presence + of the latter to the former, or the 'apprehension' by the former of the + latter, has assumed a paradoxical character which all sorts of theories + had to be invented to overcome. Representative theories put a mental + 'representation,' 'image,' or 'content' into the gap, as a sort of + intermediary. Commonsense theories left the gap untouched, declaring our + mind able to clear it by a self-transcending leap. Transcendentalist + theories left it impossible to traverse by finite knowers, and brought an + absolute in to perform the saltatory act. All the while, in the very bosom + of the finite experience, every conjunction required to make the relation + intelligible is given in full. Either the knower and the known are: + </p> + <p> + (1) the self-same piece of experience taken twice over in different + contexts; or they are + </p> + <p> + (2) two pieces of ACTUAL experience belonging to the same subject, with + definite tracts of conjunctive transitional experience between them; or + </p> + <p> + (3) the known is a POSSIBLE experience either of that subject or another, + to which the said conjunctive transitions WOULD lead, if sufficiently + prolonged. + </p> + <p> + To discuss all the ways in which one experience may function as the knower + of another, would be incompatible with the limits of this essay. I have + treated of type 1, the kind of knowledge called perception, in an article + in the Journal of Philosophy, for September 1, 1904, called 'Does + consciousness exist?' This is the type of case in which the mind enjoys + direct 'acquaintance' with a present object. In the other types the mind + has 'knowledge-about' an object not immediately there. Type 3 can always + formally and hypothetically be reduced to type 2, so that a brief + description of that type will now put the present reader sufficiently at + my point of view, and make him see what the actual meanings of the + mysterious cognitive relation may be. + </p> + <p> + Suppose me to be sitting here in my library at Cambridge, at ten minutes' + walk from 'Memorial Hall,' and to be thinking truly of the latter object. + My mind may have before it only the name, or it may have a clear image, or + it may have a very dim image of the hall, but such an intrinsic difference + in the image makes no difference in its cognitive function. Certain + extrinsic phenomena, special experiences of conjunction, are what impart + to the image, be it what it may, its knowing office. + </p> + <p> + For instance, if you ask me what hall I mean by my image, and I can tell + you nothing; or if I fail to point or lead you towards the Harvard Delta; + or if, being led by you, I am uncertain whether the Hall I see be what I + had in mind or not; you would rightly deny that I had 'meant' that + particular hall at all, even tho my mental image might to some degree have + resembled it. The resemblance would count in that case as coincidental + merely, for all sorts of things of a kind resemble one another in this + world without being held for that reason to take cognizance of one + another. + </p> + <p> + On the other hand, if I can lead you to the hall, and tell you of its + history and present uses; if in its presence I feel my idea, however + imperfect it may have been, to have led hither and to be now TERMINATED; + if the associates of the image and of the felt hall run parallel, so that + each term of the one context corresponds serially, as I walk, with an + answering term of the other; why then my soul was prophetic, and my idea + must be, and by common consent would be, called cognizant of reality. That + percept was what I MEANT, for into it my idea has passed by conjunctive + experiences of sameness and fulfilled intention. Nowhere is there jar, but + every later moment continues and corroborates an earlier one. + </p> + <p> + In this continuing and corroborating, taken in no transcendental sense, + but denoting definitely felt transitions, LIES ALL THAT THE KNOWING OF A + PERCEPT BY AN IDEA CAN POSSIBLY CONTAIN OR SIGNIFY. Wherever such + transitions are felt, the first experience KNOWS the last one. Where they + do not, or where even as possibles they can not, intervene, there can be + no pretence of knowing. In this latter case the extremes will be + connected, if connected at all, by inferior relations—bare likeness + or succession, or by 'withness' alone. Knowledge of sensible realities + thus comes to life inside the tissue of experience. It is MADE; and made + by relations that unroll themselves in time. Whenever certain + intermediaries are given, such that, as they develop towards their + terminus, there is experience from point to point of one direction + followed, and finally of one process fulfilled, the result is that THEIR + STARTING-POINT THEREBY BECOMES A KNOWER AND THEIR TERMINUS AN OBJECT MEANT + OR KNOWN. That is all that knowing (in the simple case considered) can be + known-as, that is the whole of its nature, put into experiential terms. + Whenever such is the sequence of our experiences we may freely say that we + had the terminal object 'in mind' from the outset, even altho AT the + outset nothing was there in us but a flat piece of substantive experience + like any other, with no self-transcendency about it, and no mystery save + the mystery of coming into existence and of being gradually followed by + other pieces of substantive experience, with conjunctively transitional + experiences between. That is what we MEAN here by the object's being 'in + mind.' Of any deeper more real way of its being in mind we have no + positive conception, and we have no right to discredit our actual + experience by talking of such a way at all. + </p> + <p> + I know that many a reader will rebel at this. 'Mere intermediaries,' he + will say, 'even tho they be feelings of continuously growing fulfilment, + only SEPARATE the knower from the known, whereas what we have in knowledge + is a kind of immediate touch of the one by the other, an "apprehension" in + the etymological sense of the word, a leaping of the chasm as by + lightning, an act by which two terms are smitten into one over the head of + their distinctness. All these dead intermediaries of yours are out of each + other, and outside of their termini still.' + </p> + <p> + But do not such dialectic difficulties remind us of the dog dropping his + bone and snapping at its image in the water? If we knew any more real kind + of union aliunde, we might be entitled to brand all our empirical unions + as a sham. But unions by continuous transition are the only ones we know + of, whether in this matter of a knowledge-about that terminates in an + acquaintance, whether in personal identity, in logical prediction through + the copula 'is,' or elsewhere. If anywhere there were more absolute + unions, they could only reveal themselves to us by just such conjunctive + results. These are what the unions are worth, these are all that we can + ever practically mean by union, by continuity. Is it not time to repeat + what Lotze said of substances, that to act like one is to be one? Should + we not say here that to be experienced as continuous is to be really + continuous, in a world where experience and reality come to the same + thing? In a picture gallery a painted hook will serve to hang a painted + chain by, a painted cable will hold a painted ship. In a world where both + the terms and their distinctions are affairs of experience, conjunctions + that are experienced must be at least as real as anything else. They will + be 'absolutely' real conjunctions, if we have no transphenomenal absolute + ready, to derealize the whole experienced world by, at a stroke. + </p> + <p> + So much for the essentials of the cognitive relation where the knowledge + is conceptual in type, or forms knowledge 'about' an object. It consists + in intermediary experiences (possible, if not actual) of continuously + developing progress, and, finally, of fulfilment, when the sensible + percept which is the object is reached. The percept here not only VERIFIES + the concept, proves its function of knowing that percept to be true, but + the percept's existence as the terminus of the chain of intermediaries + CREATES the function. Whatever terminates that chain was, because it now + proves itself to be, what the concept 'had in mind.' + </p> + <p> + The towering importance for human life of this kind of knowing lies in the + tact that an experience that knows another can figure as its + REPRESENTATIVE, not in any quasi-miraculous 'epistemological' sense, but + in the definite, practical sense of being its substitute in various + operations, sometimes physical and sometimes mental, which lead us to its + associates and results. By experimenting on our ideas of reality, we may + save ourselves the trouble of experimenting on the real experiences which + they severally mean. The ideas form related systems, corresponding point + for point to the systems which the realities form; and by letting an ideal + term call up its associates systematically, we may be led to a terminus + which the corresponding real term would have led to in case we had + operated on the real world. And this brings us to the general question of + substitution. + </p> + <p> + What, exactly, in a system of experiences, does the 'substitution' of one + of them for another mean? + </p> + <p> + According to my view, experience as a whole is a process in time, whereby + innumerable particular terms lapse and are superseded by others that + follow upon them by transitions which, whether disjunctive or conjunctive + in content, are themselves experiences, and must in general be accounted + at least as real as the terms which they relate. What the nature of the + event called 'superseding' signifies, depends altogether on the kind of + transition that obtains. Some experiences simply abolish their + predecessors without continuing them in any way. Others are felt to + increase or to enlarge their meaning, to carry out their purpose, or to + bring us nearer to their goal. They 'represent' them, and may fulfil their + function better than they fulfilled it themselves. But to 'fulfil a + function' in a world of pure experience can be conceived and defined in + only one possible way. In such a world transitions and arrivals (or + terminations) are the only events that happen, tho they happen by so many + sorts of path. The only function that one experience can perform is to + lead into another experience; and the only fulfilment we can speak of is + the reaching of a certain experienced end. When one experience leads to + (or can lead to) the same end as another, they agree in function. But the + whole system of experiences as they are immediately given presents itself + as a quasi-chaos through which one can pass out of an initial term in many + directions and yet end in the same terminus, moving from next to next by a + great many possible paths. + </p> + <p> + Either one of these paths might be a functional substitute for another, + and to follow one rather than another might on occasion be an advantageous + thing to do. As a matter of fact, and in a general way, the paths that run + through conceptual experiences, that is, through 'thoughts' or 'ideas' + that 'know' the things in which they terminate, are highly advantageous + paths to follow. Not only do they yield inconceivably rapid transitions; + but, owing to the 'universal' character [Footnote: Of which all that need + be said in this essay is that it also an be conceived as functional, and + defined in terms of transitions, or of the possibility of such.] which + they frequently possess, and to their capacity for association with one + another in great systems, they outstrip the tardy consecutions of the + things themselves, and sweep us on towards our ultimate termini in a far + more labor-saving way than the following of trains of sensible perception + ever could. Wonderful are the new cuts and the short-circuits the + thought-paths make. Most thought-paths, it is true, are substitutes for + nothing actual; they end outside the real world altogether, in wayward + fancies, utopias, fictions or mistakes. But where they do re-enter reality + and terminate therein, we substitute them always; and with these + substitutes we pass the greater number of our hours. [Footnote: This is + why I called our experiences, taken all together, a quasi-chaos. There is + vastly more discontinuity in the sum total of experiences than we commonly + suppose. The objective nucleus of every man's experience, his own body, + is, it is true, a continuous percept; and equally continuous as a percept + (though we may be inattentive to it) is the material environment of that + body, changing by gradual transition when the body moves. But the distant + parts of the physical world are at all times absent from us, and form + conceptual objects merely, into the perceptual reality of which our life + inserts itself at points discrete and relatively rare. Round their several + objective nuclei, partly shared and common partly discrete of the real + physical world, innumerable thinkers, pursuing their several lines of + physically true cogitation, trace paths that intersect one another only at + discontinuous perceptual points, and the rest of the time are quite + incongruent; and around all the nuclei of shared 'reality' floats the vast + cloud of experiences that are wholly subjective, that are + non-substitutional, that find not even an eventual ending for themselves + in the perceptual world—the mere day-dreams and joys and sufferings + and wishes of the individual minds. These exist WITH one another, indeed, + and with the objective nuclei, but out of them it is probable that to all + eternity no inter-related system of any kind will ever be made.] + </p> + <p> + Whosoever feels his experience to be something substitutional even while + he has it, may be said to have an experience that reaches beyond itself. + From inside of its own entity it says 'more,' and postulates reality + existing elsewhere. For the transcendentalist, who holds knowing to + consist in a salto motale across an 'epistemological chasm,' such an idea + presents no difficulty; but it seems at first sight as if it might be + inconsistent with an empiricism like our own. Have we not explained that + conceptual knowledge is made such wholly by the existence of things that + fall outside of the knowing experience itself—by intermediary + experiences and by a terminus that fulfils? + </p> + <p> + Can the knowledge be there before these elements that constitute its being + have come? And, if knowledge be not there, how can objective reference + occur? + </p> + <p> + The key to this difficulty lies in the distinction between knowing as + verified and completed, and the same knowing as in transit and on its way. + To recur to the Memorial Hall example lately used, it is only when our + idea of the Hall has actually terminated in the percept that we know 'for + certain' that from the beginning it was truly cognitive of THAT. Until + established by the end of the process, its quality of knowing that, or + indeed of knowing anything, could still be doubted; and yet the knowing + really was there, as the result now shows. We were VIRTUAL knowers of the + Hall long before we were certified to have been its actual knowers, by the + percept's retroactive validating power. Just so we are 'mortal' all the + time, by reason of the virtuality of the inevitable event which will make + us so when it shall have come. + </p> + <p> + Now the immensely greater part of all our knowing never gets beyond this + virtual stage. It never is completed or nailed down. I speak not merely of + our ideas of imperceptibles like ether-waves or dissociated 'ions,' or of + 'ejects' like the contents of our neighbors' minds; I speak also of ideas + which we might verify if we would take the trouble, but which we hold for + true altho unterminated perceptually, because nothing says 'no' to us, and + there is no contradicting truth in sight. TO CONTINUE THINKING + UNCHALLENGED IS, NINETY-NINE TIMES OUT OF A HUNDRED, OUR PRACTICAL + SUBSTITUTE FOR KNOWING IN THE COMPLETED SENSE. As each experience runs by + cognitive transition into the next one, and we nowhere feel a collision + with what we elsewhere count as truth or fact, we commit ourselves to the + current as if the port were sure. We live, as it, were, upon the front + edge of an advancing wave-crest, and our sense of a determinate direction + in falling forward is all we cover of the future of our path. It is as if + a differential quotient should be conscious and treat itself as an + adequate substitute for a traced-out curve. Our experience, inter alia, is + of variations of rate and of direction, and lives in these transitions + more than in the journey's end. The experiences of tendency are sufficient + to act upon—what more could we have DONE at those moments even if + the later verification comes complete? + </p> + <p> + This is what, as a radical empiricist, I say to the charge that the + objective reference which is so flagrant a character of our experiences + involves a chasm and a mortal leap. A positively conjunctive transition + involves neither chasm nor leap. Being the very original of what we mean + by continuity, it makes a continuum wherever it appears. Objective + reference is an incident of the fact that so much of our experience comes + as an insufficient and consists of process and transition. Our fields of + experience have no more definite boundaries than have our fields of view. + Both are fringed forever by a MORE that continuously develops, and that + continuously supersedes them as life proceeds. The relations, generally + speaking, are as real here as the terms are, and the only complaint of the + transcendentalist's with which I could at all sympathize would be his + charge that, by first making knowledge to consist in external relations as + I have done, and by then confessing that nine-tenths of the time these are + not actually but only virtually there, I have knocked the solid bottom out + of the whole business, and palmed off a substitute of knowledge for the + genuine thing. Only the admission, such a critic might say, that our ideas + are self-transcendent and 'true' already; in advance of the experiences + that are to terminate them, can bring solidity back to knowledge in a + world like this, in which transitions and terminations are only by + exception fulfilled. + </p> + <p> + This seems to me an excellent place for applying the pragmatic method. + What would the self-transcendency affirmed to exist in advance of all + experiential mediation or termination, be KNOWN-AS? What would it + practically result in for US, were it true? + </p> + <p> + It could only result in our orientation, in the turning of our + expectations and practical tendencies into the right path; and the right + path here, so long as we and the object are not yet face to face (or can + never get face to face, as in the case of ejects), would be the path that + led us into the object's nearest neighborhood. Where direct acquaintance + is lacking, 'knowledge about' is the next best thing, and an acquaintance + with what actually lies about the 'object, and is most closely related to + it, puts such knowledge within our grasp. Ether-waves and your anger, for + example, are things in which my thoughts will never PERCTEPTUALLY + terminate, but my concepts of them lead me to their very brink, to the + chromatic fringes and to the hurtful words and deeds which are their + really next effects. + </p> + <p> + Even if our ideas did in themselves possess the postulated + self-transcendency, it would still remain true that their putting us into + possession of such effects WOULD BE THE SOLE CASH-VALUE OF THE + SELF-TRANSCENDENCY FOR US. And this cash-value, it is needless to say, is + verbatim et liberatim what our empiricist account pays in. On pragmatist + principles therefore, a dispute over self-transcendency is a pure + logomachy. Call our concepts of ejective things self-transcendent or the + reverse, it makes no difference, so long as we don't differ about the + nature of that exalted virtue's fruits—fruits for us, of course, + humanistic fruits. + </p> + <p> + The transcendentalist believes his ideas to be self-transcendent only + because he finds that in fact they do bear fruits. Why need he quarrel + with an account of knowledge that insists on naming this effect? Why not + treat the working of the idea from next to next as the essence of its + self-transcendency? Why insist that knowing is a static relation out of + time when it practically seems so much a function of our active life? For + a thing to be valid, says Lotze, is the same as to make itself valid. When + the whole universe seems only to be making itself valid and to be still + incomplete (else why its ceaseless changing?) why, of all things, should + knowing be exempt? Why should it not be making itself valid like + everything else? That some parts of it may be already valid or verified + beyond dispute; the empirical philosopher, of course, like any one else, + may always hope. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0007" id="link2H_4_0007"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + V + </h2> + <h3> + THE ESSENCE OF HUMANISM + </h3> + <p> + [Footnote: Reprinted from the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and + Scientific Methods, vol. ii. No. 5, March 2, 1905.] + </p> + <p> + Humanism is a ferment that has 'come to stay.' It is not a single + hypothesis or theorem, and it dwells on no new facts. It is rather a slow + shifting in the philosophic perspective, making things appear as from a + new centre of interest or point of sight. Some writers are strongly + conscious of the shifting, others half unconscious, even though their own + vision may have undergone much change. The result is no small confusion in + debate, the half-conscious humanists often taking part against the radical + ones, as if they wished to count upon the other side. [Footnote: Professor + Baldwin, for example. His address 'Selective Thinking' (Psychological + Review, January, 1898, reprinted in his volume, 'Development and + Evolution') seems to me an unusually well written pragmatic manifesto. + Nevertheless in 'The Limits of Pragmatism' (ibid; January, 1904), he (much + less clearly) joins in the attack.] + </p> + <p> + If humanism really be the name for such a shifting of perspective, it is + obvious that the whole scene of the philosophic stage will change in some + degree if humanism prevails. The emphasis of things, their foreground and + background distribution, their sizes and values, will not keep just the + same. [Footnote: The ethical changes, it seems to me, are beautifully made + evident in Professor Dewey's series of articles, which will never get the + attention they deserve till they are printed in a book. I mean: 'The + Significance of Emotions,' Psychological Review, vol. ii, 13; 'The Reflex + Arc Concept in Psychology,' ibid; iii, 357; 'Psychology and Social + Practice,' ibid., vii, 105; 'Interpretation of Savage Mind,' ibid; ix, + 2l7; 'Green's Theory of the Moral Motive,' Philosophical Review, vol. i, + 593; 'Self-realization as the Moral Ideal,' ibid; ii, 652; 'The Psychology + of Effort,' ibid; vi, 43; 'The Evolutionary Method as Applied to + Morality,' ibid; xi, 107,353; 'Evolution and Ethics,' Monist, vol. viii, + 321; to mention only a few.] If such pervasive consequences be involved in + humanism, it is clear that no pains which philosophers may take, first in + defining it, and then in furthering, checking, or steering its progress, + will be thrown away. + </p> + <p> + It suffers badly at present from incomplete definition. Its most + systematic advocates, Schiller and Dewey, have published fragmentary + programmes only; and its bearing on many vital philosophic problems has + not been traced except by adversaries who, scenting heresies in advance, + have showered blows on doctrines—subjectivism and scepticism, for + example—that no good humanist finds it necessary to entertain. By + their still greater reticences, the anti-humanists have, in turn, + perplexed the humanists. Much of the controversy has involved the word + 'truth.' It is always good in debate to know your adversary's point of + view authentically. But the critics of humanism never define exactly what + the word 'truth' signifies when they use it themselves. The humanists have + to guess at their view; and the result has doubtless been much beating of + the air. Add to all this, great individual differences in both camps, and + it becomes clear that nothing is so urgently needed, at the stage which + things have reached at present, as a sharper definition by each side of + its central point of view. + </p> + <p> + Whoever will contribute any touch of sharpness will help us to make sure + of what's what and who is who. Any one can contribute such a definition, + and, without it, no one knows exactly where he stands. If I offer my own + provisional definition of humanism now and here, others may improve it, + some adversary may be led to define his own creed more sharply by the + contrast, and a certain quickening of the crystallization of general + opinion may result. + </p> + <p> + The essential service of humanism, as I conceive the situation, is to have + seen that THO ONE PART OF OUR EXPERIENCE MAY LEAN UPON ANOTHER PART TO + MAKE IT WHAT IT IS IN ANY ONE OF SEVERAL ASPECTS IN WHICH IT MAY BE + CONSIDERED, EXPERIENCE AS A WHOLE IS SELF-CONTAINING AND LEANS ON NOTHING. + Since this formula also expresses the main contention of transcendental + idealism, it needs abundant explication to make it unambiguous. It seems, + at first sight, to confine itself to denying theism and pantheism. But, in + fact, it need not deny either; everything would depend on the exegesis; + and if the formula ever became canonical, it would certainly develop both + right-wing and left-wing interpreters. I myself read humanism theistically + and pluralistically. If there be a God, he is no absolute all-experiencer, + but simply the experiencer of widest actual conscious span. Read thus, + humanism is for me a religion susceptible of reasoned defence, tho I am + well aware how many minds there are to whom it can appeal religiously only + when it has been monistically translated. Ethically the pluralistic form + of it takes for me a stronger hold on reality than any other philosophy I + know of—it being essentially a SOCIAL philosophy, a philosophy of + 'CO,' in which conjunctions do the work. But my primary reason for + advocating it is its matchless intellectual economy. It gets rid, not only + of the standing 'problems' that monism engenders ('problem of evil,' + 'problem of freedom,' and the like), but of other metaphysical mysteries + and paradoxes as well. + </p> + <p> + It gets rid, for example, of the whole agnostic controversy, by refusing + to entertain the hypothesis of trans-empirical reality at all. It gets rid + of any need for an absolute of the bradleyan type (avowedly sterile for + intellectual purposes) by insisting that the conjunctive relations found + within experience are faultlessly real. It gets rid of the need of an + absolute of the roycean type (similarly sterile) by its pragmatic + treatment of the problem of knowledge. As the views of knowledge, reality + and truth imputed to humanism have been those so far most fiercely + attacked, it is in regard to these ideas that a sharpening of focus seems + most urgently required. I proceed therefore to bring the views which I + impute to humanism in these respects into focus as briefly as I can. + </p> + <h3> + II + </h3> + <p> + If the central humanistic thesis, printed above in italics, be accepted, + it will follow that, if there be any such thing at all as knowing, the + knower and the object known must both be portions of experience. One part + of experience must, therefore, either + </p> + <p> + (1) Know another part of experience—in other words, parts must, as + Professor Woodbridge says, [Footnote: In Science, November 4, 1904, p. + 599.] represent ONE ANOTHER instead of representing realities outside of + 'consciousness'—this case is that of conceptual knowledge; or else + </p> + <p> + (2) They must simply exist as so many ultimate THATS or facts of being, in + the first instance; and then, as a secondary complication, and without + doubling up its entitative singleness, any one and the same THAT in + experience must figure alternately as a thing known and as a knowledge of + the thing, by reason of two divergent kinds of context into which, in the + general course of experience, it gets woven. [Footnote: This statement is + probably excessively obscure to any one who has not read my two articles + 'Does Consciousness Exist?' and 'A World of Pure Experience' in the + Journal of Philosophy, vol. i, 1904.] + </p> + <p> + This second case is that of sense-perception. There is a stage of thought + that goes beyond common sense, and of it I shall say more presently; but + the common-sense stage is a perfectly definite halting-place of thought, + primarily for purposes of action; and, so long as we remain on the + common-sense stage of thought, object and subject FUSE in the fact of + 'presentation' or sense-perception-the pen and hand which I now SEE + writing, for example, ARE the physical realities which those words + designate. In this case there is no self-transcendency implied in the + knowing. Humanism, here, is only a more comminuted IDENTITATSPHILOSOPHIE. + </p> + <p> + In case (1), on the contrary, the representative experience DOES TRANSCEND + ITSELF in knowing the other experience that is its object. No one can talk + of the knowledge of the one by the other without seeing them as + numerically distinct entities, of which the one lies beyond the other and + away from it, along some direction and with some interval, that can be + definitely named. But, if the talker be a humanist, he must also see this + distance-interval concretely and pragmatically, and confess it to consist + of other intervening experiences—of possible ones, at all events, if + not of actual. To call my present idea of my dog, for example, cognitive + of the real dog means that, as the actual tissue of experience is + constituted, the idea is capable of leading into a chain of other + experiences on my part that go from next to next and terminate at last in + vivid sense-perceptions of a jumping, barking, hairy body. Those ARE the + real dog, the dog's full presence, for my common sense. If the supposed + talker is a profound philosopher, altho they may not BE the real dog for + him, they MEAN the real dog, are practical substitutes for the real dog, + as the representation was a practical substitute for them, that real dog + being a lot of atoms, say, or of mind-stuff, that lie WHERE the + sense-perceptions lie in his experience as well as in my own. + </p> + <h3> + III + </h3> + <p> + The philosopher here stands for the stage of thought that goes beyond the + stage of common sense; and the difference is simply that he 'interpolates' + and 'extrapolates,' where common sense does not. For common sense, two men + see the same identical real dog. Philosophy, noting actual differences in + their perceptions points out the duality of these latter, and interpolates + something between them as a more real terminus—first, organs, + viscera, etc.; next, cells; then, ultimate atoms; lastly, mind-stuff + perhaps. The original sense-termini of the two men, instead of coalescing + with each other and with the real dog-object, as at first supposed, are + thus held by philosophers to be separated by invisible realities with + which, at most, they are conterminous. + </p> + <p> + Abolish, now, one of the percipients, and the interpolation changes into + 'extrapolation.' The sense-terminus of the remaining percipient is + regarded by the philosopher as not quite reaching reality. He has only + carried the procession of experiences, the philosopher thinks, to a + definite, because practical, halting-place somewhere on the way towards an + absolute truth that lies beyond. + </p> + <p> + The humanist sees all the time, however, that there is no absolute + transcendency even about the more absolute realities thus conjectured or + believed in. The viscera and cells are only possible percepts following + upon that of the outer body. The atoms again, tho we may never attain to + human means of perceiving them, are still defined perceptually. The + mind-stuff itself is conceived as a kind of experience; and it is possible + to frame the hypothesis (such hypotheses can by no logic be excluded from + philosophy) of two knowers of a piece of mind-stuff and the mind-stuff + itself becoming 'confluent' at the moment at which our imperfect knowing + might pass into knowing of a completed type. Even so do you and I + habitually conceive our two perceptions and the real dog as confluent, tho + only provisionally, and for the common-sense stage of thought. If my pen + be inwardly made of mind-stuff, there is no confluence NOW between that + mind-stuff and my visual perception of the pen. But conceivably there + might come to be such confluence; for, in the case of my HAND, the visual + sensations and the inward feelings of the hand, its mind-stuff, so to + speak, are even now as confluent as any two things can be. + </p> + <p> + There is, thus, no breach in humanistic epistemology. Whether knowledge be + taken as ideally perfected, or only as true enough to pass muster for + practice, it is hung on one continuous scheme. Reality, howsoever remote, + is always defined as a terminus within the general possibilities of + experience; and what knows it is defined as an experience THAT + 'REPRESENTS' IT, IN THE SENSE OF BEING SUBSTITUTABLE FOR IT IN OUR + THINKING because it leads to the same associates, OR IN THE SENSE OF + 'POINTING TO IT THROUGH A CHAIN OF OTHER EXPERIENCES THAT EITHER INTERVENE + OR MAY INTERVENE. + </p> + <p> + Absolute reality here bears the same relation to sensation as sensation + bears to conception or imagination. Both are provisional or final termini, + sensation being only the terminus at which the practical man habitually + stops, while the philosopher projects a 'beyond,' in the shape of more + absolute reality. These termini, for the practical and the philosophical + stages of thought respectively, are self-supporting. They are not 'true' + of anything else, they simply ARE, are REAL. They 'lean on nothing,' as my + italicized formula said. Rather does the whole fabric of experience lean + on them, just as the whole fabric of the solar system, including many + relative positions, leans, for its absolute position in space, on any one + of its constituent stars. Here, again, one gets a new + IDENTITATSPHILOSOPHIE in pluralistic form. + </p> + <h3> + IV + </h3> + <p> + If I have succeeded in making this at all clear (tho I fear that brevity + and abstractness between them may have made me fail), the reader will see + that the 'truth' of our mental operations must always be an + intra-experiential affair. A conception is reckoned true by common sense + when it can be made to lead to a sensation. The sensation, which for + common sense is not so much 'true' as 'real,' is held to be PROVISIONALLY + true by the philosopher just in so far as it COVERS (abuts at, or occupies + the place of) a still more absolutely real experience, in the possibility + of which, to some remoter experient, the philosopher finds reason to + believe. + </p> + <p> + Meanwhile what actually DOES count for true to any individual trower, + whether he be philosopher or common man, is always a result of his + APPERCEPTIONS. If a novel experience, conceptual or sensible, contradict + too emphatically our pre-existent system of beliefs, in ninety-nine cases + out of a hundred it is treated as false. Only when the older and the newer + experiences are congruous enough to mutually apperceive and modify each + other, does what we treat as an advance in truth result. In no case, + however, need truth consist in a relation between our experiences and + something archetypal or trans-experiential. Should we ever reach + absolutely terminal experiences, experiences in which we all agreed, which + were superseded by no revised continuations, these would not be TRUE, they + would be REAL, they would simply BE, and be indeed the angles, corners, + and linchpins of all reality, on which the truth of everything else would + be stayed. Only such OTHER things as led to these by satisfactory + conjunctions would be 'true.' Satisfactory connection of some sort with + such termini is all that the word 'truth' means. On the common-stage of + thought sense-presentations serve as such termini. Our ideas and concepts + and scientific theories pass for true only so far as they harmoniously + lead back to the world of sense. + </p> + <p> + I hope that many humanists will endorse this attempt of mine to trace the + more essential features of that way of viewing things. I feel almost + certain that Messrs. Dewey and Schiller will do so. If the attackers will + also take some slight account of it, it may be that discussion will be a + little less wide of the mark than it has hitherto been. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0008" id="link2H_4_0008"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + VI + </h2> + <h3> + A WORD MORE ABOUT TRUTH + </h3> + <p> + [Footnote: Reprint from the Journal of Philosophy, July 18,1907.] + </p> + <p> + My failure in making converts to my conception of truth seems, if I may + judge by what I hear in conversation, almost complete. An ordinary + philosopher would feel disheartened, and a common choleric sinner would + curse God and die, after such a reception. But instead of taking counsel + of despair, I make bold to vary my statements, in the faint hope that + repeated droppings may wear upon the stone, and that my formulas may seem + less obscure if surrounded by something more of a 'mass' whereby to + apperceive them. + </p> + <p> + For fear of compromising other pragmatists, whoe'er they be, I will speak + of the conception which I am trying to make intelligible, as my own + conception. I first published it in the year 1885, in the first article + reprinted in the present book. Essential theses of this article were + independently supported in 1893 and 1895 by Professor D. S. Miller + [Footnote: Philosophical Review, vol. ii, p. 408, and Psychological + Review, vol. ii, p. 533.] and were repeated by me in a presidential + address on 'The knowing of things together' [Footnote: The relevant parts + of which are printed above, p. 43.] in 1895. Professor Strong, in an + article in the Journal of Philosophy, etc., [Footnote: Vol. i, p. 253.] + entitled 'A naturalistic theory of the reference of thought to reality,' + called our account 'the James-Miller theory of cognition,' and, as I + understood him, gave it his adhesion. Yet, such is the difficulty of + writing clearly in these penetralia of philosophy, that each of these + revered colleagues informs me privately that the account of truth I now + give—which to me is but that earlier statement more completely set + forth—is to him inadequate, and seems to leave the gist of real + cognition out. If such near friends disagree, what can I hope from remoter + ones, and what from unfriendly critics? + </p> + <p> + Yet I feel so sure that the fault must lie in my lame forms of statement + and not in my doctrine, that I am fain to try once more to express myself. + </p> + <p> + Are there not some general distinctions which it may help us to agree + about in advance? Professor Strong distinguishes between what he calls + 'saltatory' and what he calls 'ambulatory' relations. 'Difference,' for + example, is saltatory, jumping as it were immediately from one term to + another, but 'distance' in time or space is made out of intervening parts + of experience through which we ambulate in succession. Years ago, when T. + H. Green's ideas were most influential, I was much troubled by his + criticisms of english sensationalism. One of his disciples in particular + would always say to me, 'Yes! TERMS may indeed be possibly sensational in + origin; but RELATIONS, what are they but pure acts of the intellect coming + upon the sensations from above, and of a higher nature?' I well remember + the sudden relief it gave me to perceive one day that SPACE-relations at + any rate were homogeneous with the terms between which they mediated. The + terms were spaces, and the relations were other intervening spaces. + [Footnote: See my Principles of Psychology, vol. ii, pp. 148-153.] For the + Greenites space-relations had been saltatory, for me they became + thenceforward ambulatory. + </p> + <p> + Now the most general way of contrasting my view of knowledge with the + popular view (which is also the view of most epistemologists) is to call + my view ambulatory, and the other view saltatory; and the most general way + of characterizing the two views is by saying that my view describes + knowing as it exists concretely, while the other view only describes its + results abstractly taken. + </p> + <p> + I fear that most of my recalcitrant readers fail to recognize that what is + ambulatory in the concrete may be taken so abstractly as to appear + saltatory. Distance, for example, is made abstract by emptying out + whatever is particular in the concrete intervals—it is reduced thus + to a sole 'difference,' a difference of 'place,' which is a logical or + saltatory distinction, a so-called 'pure relation.' + </p> + <p> + The same is true of the relation called 'knowing,' which may connect an + idea with a reality. My own account of this relation is ambulatory through + and through. I say that we know an object by means of an idea, whenever we + ambulate towards the object under the impulse which the idea communicates. + If we believe in so-called 'sensible' realities, the idea may not only + send us towards its object, but may put the latter into our very hand, + make it our immediate sensation. But, if, as most reflective people opine, + sensible realities are not 'real' realities, but only their appearances, + our idea brings us at least so far, puts us in touch with reality's most + authentic appearances and substitutes. In any case our idea brings us into + the object's neighborhood, practical or ideal, gets us into commerce with + it, helps us towards its closer acquaintance, enables us to foresee it, + class it, compare it, deduce it,—in short, to deal with it as we + could not were the idea not in our possession. + </p> + <p> + The idea is thus, when functionally considered, an instrument for enabling + us the better to HAVE TO DO with the object and to act about it. But it + and the object are both of them bits of the general sheet and tissue of + reality at large; and when we say that the idea leads us towards the + object, that only means that it carries us forward through intervening + tracts of that reality into the object's closer neighborhood, into the + midst of its associates at least, be these its physical neighbors, or be + they its logical congeners only. Thus carried into closer quarters, we are + in an improved situation as regards acquaintance and conduct; and we say + that through the idea we now KNOW the object better or more truly. + </p> + <p> + My thesis is that the knowing here is MADE by the ambulation through the + intervening experiences. If the idea led us nowhere, or FROM that object + instead of towards it, could we talk at all of its having any cognitive + quality? Surely not, for it is only when taken in conjunction with the + intermediate experiences that it gets related to THAT PARTICULAR OBJECT + rather than to any other part of nature. Those intermediaries determine + what particular knowing function it exerts. The terminus they guide us to + tells us what object it 'means,' the results they enrich us with 'verify' + or 'refute' it. Intervening experiences are thus as indispensable + foundations for a concrete relation of cognition as intervening space is + for a relation of distance. Cognition, whenever we take it concretely, + means determinate 'ambulation,' through intermediaries, from a terminus a + quo to, or towards, a terminus ad quem. As the intermediaries are other + than the termini, and connected with them by the usual associative bonds + (be these 'external' or be they logical, i.e., classificatory, in + character), there would appear to be nothing especially unique about the + processes of knowing. They fall wholly within experience; and we need use, + in describing them, no other categories than those which we employ in + describing other natural processes. + </p> + <p> + But there exist no processes which we cannot also consider abstractly, + eviscerating them down to their essential skeletons or outlines; and when + we have treated the processes of knowing thus, we are easily led to regard + them as something altogether unparalleled in nature. For we first empty + idea, object and intermediaries of all their particularities, in order to + retain only a general scheme, and then we consider the latter only in its + function of giving a result, and not in its character of being a process. + In this treatment the intermediaries shrivel into the form of a mere space + of separation, while the idea and object retain only the logical + distinctness of being the end-terms that are separated. In other words, + the intermediaries which in their concrete particularity form a bridge, + evaporate ideally into an empty interval to cross, and then, the relation + of the end-terms having become saltatory, the whole hocus-pocus of + Erkenntnistheorie begins, and goes on unrestrained by further concrete + considerations. The idea, in 'meaning' an object separated by an + 'epistemological chasm' from itself, now executes what Professor Ladd + calls a 'salto mortale'; in knowing the object's nature, it now + 'transcends' its own. The object in turn becomes 'present' where it is + really absent, etc.; until a scheme remains upon our hands, the sublime + paradoxes of which some of us think that nothing short of an 'absolute' + can explain. + </p> + <p> + The relation between idea and object, thus made abstract and saltatory, is + thenceforward opposed, as being more essential and previous, to its own + ambulatory self, and the more concrete description is branded as either + false or insufficient. The bridge of intermediaries, actual or possible, + which in every real case is what carries and defines the knowing, gets + treated as an episodic complication which need not even potentially be + there. I believe that this vulgar fallacy of opposing abstractions to the + concretes from which they are abstracted, is the main reason why my + account of knowing is deemed so unsatisfactory, and I will therefore say a + word more on that general point. + </p> + <p> + Any vehicle of conjunction, if all its particularities are abstracted from + it, will leave us with nothing on our hands but the original disjunction + which it bridged over. But to escape treating the resultant + self-contradiction as an achievement of dialectical profundity, all we + need is to restore some part, no matter how small, of what we have taken + away. In the case of the epistemological chasm the first reasonable step + is to remember that the chasm was filled with SOME empirical material, + whether ideational or sensational, which performed SOME bridging function + and saved us from the mortal leap. Restoring thus the indispensable + modicum of reality to the matter of our discussion, we find our abstract + treatment genuinely useful. We escape entanglement with special cases + without at the same time falling into gratuitous paradoxes. We can now + describe the general features of cognition, tell what on the whole it DOES + FOR US, in a universal way. + </p> + <p> + We must remember that this whole inquiry into knowing grows up on a + reflective level. In any real moment of knowing, what we are thinking of + is our object, not the way in which we ourselves are momentarily knowing + it. We at this moment, as it happens, have knowing itself for our object; + but I think that the reader will agree that his present knowing of that + object is included only abstractly, and by anticipation, in the results he + may reach. What he concretely has before his mind, as he reasons, is some + supposed objective instance of knowing, as he conceives it to go on in + some other person, or recalls it from his own past. As such, he, the + critic, sees it to contain both an idea and an object, and processes by + which the knower is guided from the one towards the other. He sees that + the idea is remote from the object, and that, whether through + intermediaries or not, it genuinely HAS TO DO with it. He sees that it + thus works beyond its immediate being, and lays hold of a remote reality; + it jumps across, transcends itself. It does all this by extraneous aid, to + be sure, but when the aid has come, it HAS done it and the result is + secure. Why not talk of results by themselves, then, without considering + means? Why not treat the idea as simply grasping or intuiting the reality, + of its having the faculty anyhow, of shooting over nature behind the + scenes and knowing things immediately and directly? Why need we always lug + in the bridging?—it only retards our discourse to do so. + </p> + <p> + Such abstract talk about cognition's results is surely convenient; and it + is surely as legitimate as it is convenient, SO LONG AS WE DO NOT FORGET + OR POSITIVELY DENY, WHAT IT IGNORES. We may on occasion say that our idea + meant ALWAYS that particular object, that it led us there because it was + OF it intrinsically and essentially. We may insist that its verification + follows upon that original cognitive virtue in it—and all the rest—and + we shall do no harm so long as we know that these are only short cuts in + our thinking. They are positively true accounts of fact AS FAR AS THEY GO, + only they leave vast tracts of fact out of the account, tracts of tact + that have to be reinstated to make the accounts literally true of any real + case. But if, not merely passively ignoring the intermediaries, you + actively deny them [Footnote: This is the fallacy which I have called + 'vicious intellectualism' in my book A Pluralistic Universe, Longmans, + Green & Co., 1909.] to be even potential requisites for the results + you are so struck by, your epistemology goes to irremediable smash. You + are as far off the track as an historian would be, if, lost in admiration + of Napoleon's personal power, he were to ignore his marshals and his + armies, and were to accuse you of error in describing his conquests as + effected by their means. Of such abstractness and one-sidedness I accuse + most of the critics of my own account. + </p> + <p> + In the second lecture of the book Pragmatism, I used the illustration of a + squirrel scrambling round a tree-trunk to keep out of sight of a pursuing + man: both go round the tree, but does the man go round the squirrel? It + all depends, I said, on what you mean by going round.' In one sense of the + word the man 'goes round,' in another sense he does not. I settled the + dispute by pragmatically distinguishing the senses. But I told how some + disputants had called my distinction a shuffling evasion and taken their + stand on what they called 'plain honest English going-round.' + </p> + <p> + In such a simple case few people would object to letting the term in + dispute be translated into its concreter equivalents. But in the case of a + complex function like our knowing they act differently. I give full + concrete particular value for the ideas of knowing in every case I can + think of, yet my critics insist that 'plain honest English knowing' is + left out of my account. They write as if the minus were on my side and the + plus on theirs. + </p> + <p> + The essence of the matter for me is that altho knowing can be both + abstractly and concretely described, and altho the abstract descriptions + are often useful enough, yet they are all sucked up and absorbed without + residuum into the concreter ones, and contain nothing of any essentially + other or higher nature, which the concrete descriptions can be justly + accused of leaving behind. Knowing is just a natural process like any + other. There is no ambulatory process whatsoever, the results of which we + may not describe, if we prefer to, in saltatory terms, or represent in + static formulation. Suppose, e.g., that we say a man is 'prudent.' + Concretely, that means that he takes out insurance, hedges in betting, + looks before he leaps. Do such acts CONSTITUTE the prudence? ARE they the + man qua prudent? + </p> + <p> + Or is the prudence something by itself and independent of them? As a + constant habit in him, a permanent tone of character, it is convenient to + call him prudent in abstraction from any one of his acts, prudent in + general and without specification, and to say the acts follow from the + pre-existing prudence. There are peculiarities in his psycho-physical + system that make him act prudently; and there are tendencies to + association in our thoughts that prompt some of them to make for truth and + others for error. But would the man be prudent in the absence of each and + all of the acts? Or would the thoughts be true if they had no associative + or impulsive tendencies? Surely we have no right to oppose static essences + in this way to the moving processes in which they live embedded. + </p> + <p> + My bedroom is above my library. Does the 'aboveness' here mean aught that + is different from the concrete spaces which have to be moved-through in + getting from the one to the other? It means, you may say, a pure + topographic relation, a sort of architect's plan among the eternal + essences. But that is not the full aboveness, it is only an abbreviated + substitute that on occasion may lead my mind towards truer, i.e., fuller, + dealings with the real aboveness. It is not an aboveness ante rem, it is a + post rem extract from the aboveness in rebus. We may indeed talk, for + certain conveniences, as if the abstract scheme preceded, we may say 'I + must go up stairs because of the essential aboveness,' just as we may say + that the man 'does prudent acts because of his ingrained prudence,' or + that our ideas 'lead us truly because of their intrinsic truth.' But this + should not debar us on other occasions from using completer forms of + description. A concrete matter of fact always remains identical under any + form of description, as when we say of a line, now that it runs from left + to right, and now that it runs from right to left. These are but names of + one and the same fact, one more expedient to use at one time, one at + another. The full facts of cognition, whatever be the way in which we talk + about them, even when we talk most abstractly, stand inalterably given in + the actualities and possibilities of the experience-continuum. [Footnote + 1: The ultimate object or terminus of a cognitive process may in certain + instances lie beyond the direct experience of the particular cognizer, but + it, of course, must exist as part of the total universe of experience + whose constitution, with cognition in it, the critic is discussing.] But + my critics treat my own more concrete talk as if IT were the kind that + sinned by its inadequacy, and as if the full continuum left something out. + </p> + <p> + A favorite way of opposing the more abstract to the more concrete account + is to accuse those who favor the latter of 'confounding psychology with + logic.' Our critics say that when we are asked what truth MEANS, we reply + by telling only how it is ARRIVED-AT. But since a meaning is a logical + relation, static, independent of time, how can it possibly be identified, + they say, with any concrete man's experience, perishing as this does at + the instant of its production? This, indeed, sounds profound, but I + challenge the profundity. I defy any one to show any difference between + logic and psychology here. The logical relation stands to the + psychological relation between idea and object only as saltatory + abstractness stands to ambulatory concreteness. Both relations need a + psychological vehicle; and the 'logical' one is simply the 'psychological' + one disemboweled of its fulness, and reduced to a bare abstractional + scheme. + </p> + <p> + A while ago a prisoner, on being released, tried to assassinate the judge + who had sentenced him. He had apparently succeeded in conceiving the judge + timelessly, had reduced him to a bare logical meaning, that of being his + 'enemy and persecutor,' by stripping off all the concrete conditions (as + jury's verdict, official obligation, absence of personal spite, possibly + sympathy) that gave its full psychological character to the sentence as a + particular man's act in time. Truly the sentence WAS inimical to the + culprit; but which idea of it is the truer one, that bare logical + definition of it, or its full psychological specification? The + anti-pragmatists ought in consistency to stand up for the criminal's view + of the case, treat the judge as the latter's logical enemy, and bar out + the other conditions as so much inessential psychological stuff. + </p> + <h3> + II + </h3> + <p> + A still further obstacle, I suspect, stands in the way of my account's + acceptance. Like Dewey and like Schiller, I have had to say that the truth + of an idea is determined by its satisfactoriness. But satisfactoriness is + a subjective term, just as idea is; and truth is generally regarded as + 'objective.' Readers who admit that satisfactoriness is our only MARK of + truth, the only sign that we possess the precious article, will still say + that the objective relation between idea and object which the word 'truth' + points to is left out of my account altogether. I fear also that the + association of my poor name with the 'will to believe' (which 'will,' it + seems to me, ought to play no part in this discussion) works against my + credit in some quarters. I fornicate with that unclean thing, my + adversaries may think, whereas your genuine truth-lover must discourse in + huxleyan heroics, and feel as if truth, to be real truth, ought to bring + eventual messages of death to all our satisfactions. Such divergences + certainly prove the complexity of the area of our discussion; but to my + mind they also are based on misunderstandings, which (tho with but little + hope of success) I will try to diminish by a further word of explanation. + </p> + <p> + First, then, I will ask my objectors to define exactly what SORT of thing + it is they have in mind when they speak of a truth that shall be absolute, + complete and objective; and then I will defy them to show me any + conceivable standing-room for such a kind of truth outside the terms of my + own description. It will fall, as I contend, entirely within the field of + my analysis. + </p> + <p> + To begin with, it must obtain between an idea and a reality that is the + idea's object; and, as a predicate, it must apply to the idea and not to + the object, for objective realities are not TRUE, at least not in the + universe of discourse to which we are now confining ourselves, for there + they are taken as simply BEING, while the ideas are true OF them. But we + can suppose a series of ideas to be successively more and more true of the + same object, and can ask what is the extreme approach to being absolutely + true that the last idea might attain to. + </p> + <p> + The maximal conceivable truth in an idea would seem to be that it should + lead to an actual merging of ourselves with the object, to an utter mutual + confluence and identification. On the common-sense level of belief this is + what is supposed really to take place in sense-perception. My idea of this + pen verifies itself through my percept; and my percept is held to BE the + pen for the time being—percepts and physical realities being treated + by common sense as identical. But the physiology of the senses has + criticised common sense out of court, and the pen 'in itself' is now + believed to lie beyond my momentary percept. Yet the notion once + suggested, of what a completely consummated acquaintance with a reality + might be like, remains over for our speculative purposes. TOTAL CONFLUX OF + THE MIND WITH THE REALITY would be the absolute limit of truth, there + could be no better or more satisfying knowledge than that. + </p> + <p> + Such total conflux, it is needless to say, is ALREADY EXPLICITLY PROVIDED + FOR, AS A POSSIBILITY, IN MY ACCOUNT OF THE MATTER. If an idea should ever + lead us not only TOWARDS, or UP TO, or AGAINST, a reality, but so close + that we and the reality should MELT TOGETHER, it would be made absolutely + true, according to me, by that performance. + </p> + <p> + In point of fact philosophers doubt that this ever occurs. What happens, + they think, is only that we get nearer and nearer to realities, we + approximate more and more to the all-satisfying limit; and the definition + of actually, as distinguished from imaginably, complete and objective + truth, can then only be that it belongs to the idea that will lead us as + CLOSE UP AGAINST THE OBJECT as in the nature of our experience is + possible, literally NEXT to it, for instance. + </p> + <p> + Suppose, now, there were an idea that did this for a certain objective + reality. Suppose that no further approach were possible, that nothing lay + between, that the next step would carry us right INTO the reality; then + that result, being the next thing to conflux, would make the idea true in + the maximal degree that might be supposed practically attainable in the + world which we inhabit. + </p> + <p> + Well, I need hardly explain that THAT DEGREE OF TRUTH IS ALSO PROVIDED FOR + IN MY ACCOUNT OF THE MATTER. And if satisfactions are the marks of truth's + presence, we may add that any less true substitute for such a true idea + would prove less satisfactory. Following its lead, we should probably find + out that we did not quite touch the terminus. We should desiderate a + closer approach, and not rest till we had found it. + </p> + <p> + I am, of course, postulating here a standing reality independent of the + idea that knows it. I am also postulating that satisfactions grow pari + passu with our approximation to such reality. [Footnote 1: Say, if you + prefer to, that DISsatisfactions decrease pari passu with such + approximation. The approximation may be of any kind assignable—approximation + in time or in space, or approximation in kind, which in common speech + means 'copying.'] If my critics challenge this latter assumption, I retort + upon them with the former. Our whole notion of a standing reality grows up + in the form of an ideal limit to the series of successive termini to which + our thoughts have led us and still are leading us. Each terminus proves + provisional by leaving us unsatisfied. The truer idea is the one that + pushes farther; so we are ever beckoned on by the ideal notion of an + ultimate completely satisfactory terminus. I, for one, obey and accept + that notion. I can conceive no other objective CONTENT to the notion of + ideally perfect truth than that of penetration into such a terminus, nor + can I conceive that the notion would ever have grown up, or that true + ideas would ever have been sorted out from false or idle ones, save for + the greater sum of satisfactions, intellectual or practical, which the + truer ones brought with them. Can we imagine a man absolutely satisfied + with an idea and with all its relations to his other ideas and to his + sensible experiences, who should yet not take its content as a true + account of reality? The matter of the true is thus absolutely identical + with the matter of the satisfactory. You may put either word first in your + ways of talking; but leave out that whole notion of SATISFACTORY WORKING + or LEADING (which is the essence of my pragmatistic account) and call + truth a static logical relation, independent even of POSSIBLE leadings or + satisfactions, and it seems to me you cut all ground from under you. + </p> + <p> + I fear that I am still very obscure. But I respectfully implore those who + reject my doctrine because they can make nothing of my stumbling language, + to tell us in their own name—und zwar very concretely and + articulately!—just how the real, genuine and absolutely 'objective' + truth which they believe in so profoundly, is constituted and established. + They mustn't point to the 'reality' itself, for truth is only our + subjective relation to realities. What is the nominal essence of this + relation, its logical definition, whether or not it be 'objectively' + attainable by mortals? + </p> + <p> + Whatever they may say it is, I have the firmest faith that my account will + prove to have allowed for it and included it by anticipation, as one + possible case in the total mixture of cases. There is, in short, no ROOM + for any grade or sort of truth outside of the framework of the pragmatic + system, outside of that jungle of empirical workings and leadings, and + their nearer or ulterior terminations, of which I seem to have written so + unskilfully. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0009" id="link2H_4_0009"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + VII + </h2> + <h3> + PROFESSOR PRATT ON TRUTH + </h3> + <h3> + I + </h3> + <p> + [Footnote: Reprinted from the Journal of Philosophy, etc., August 15, 1907 + (vol. iv, p. 464).] + </p> + <p> + Professor J. B. Pratt's paper in the Journal of Philosophy for June 6, + 1907, is so brilliantly written that its misconception of the pragmatist + position seems doubly to call for a reply. + </p> + <p> + He asserts that, for a pragmatist, truth cannot be a relation between an + idea and a reality outside and transcendent of the idea, but must lie + 'altogether within experience,' where it will need 'no reference to + anything else to justify it'—no reference to the object, apparently. + The pragmatist must 'reduce everything to psychology,' aye, and to the + psychology of the immediate moment. He is consequently debarred from + saying that an idea that eventually gets psychologically verified WAS + already true before the process of verifying was complete; and he is + equally debarred from treating an idea as true provisionally so long as he + only believes that he CAN verify it whenever he will. + </p> + <p> + Whether such a pragmatist as this exists, I know not, never having myself + met with the beast. We can define terms as we like; and if that be my + friend Pratt's definition of a pragmatist, I can only concur with his + anti-pragmatism. But, in setting up the weird type, he quotes words from + me; so, in order to escape being classed by some reader along with so + asinine a being, I will reassert my own view of truth once more. + </p> + <p> + Truth is essentially a relation between two things, an idea, on the one + hand, and a reality outside of the idea, on the other. This relation, like + all relations, has its fundamentum, namely, the matrix of experiential + circumstance, psychological as well as physical, in which the correlated + terms are found embedded. In the case of the relation between 'heir' and + 'legacy' the fundamentum is a world in which there was a testator, and in + which there is now a will and an executor; in the case of that between + idea and object, it is a world with circumstances of a sort to make a + satisfactory verification process, lying around and between the two terms. + But just as a man may be called an heir and treated as one before the + executor has divided the estate, so an idea may practically be credited + with truth before the verification process has been exhaustively carried + out—the existence of the mass of verifying circumstance is enough. + Where potentiality counts for actuality in so many other cases, one does + not see why it may not so count here. We call a man benevolent not only + for his kind acts paid in, but for his readiness to perform others; we + treat an idea as 'luminous' not only for the light it has shed, but for + that we expect it will shed on dark problems. Why should we not equally + trust the truth of our ideas? We live on credits everywhere; and we use + our ideas far oftener for calling up things connected with their immediate + objects, than for calling up those objects themselves. Ninety-nine times + out of a hundred the only use we should make of the object itself, if we + were led up to it by our idea, would be to pass on to those connected + things by its means. So we continually curtail verification-processes, + letting our belief that they are possible suffice. + </p> + <p> + What CONSTITUTES THE RELATION known as truth, I now say, is just the + EXISTENCE IN THE EMPIRICAL WORLD OF THIS FUNDAMENTUM OF CIRCUMSTANCE + SURROUNDING OBJECT AND IDEA and ready to be either short-circuited or + traversed at full length. So long as it exists, and a satisfactory passage + through it between the object and the idea is possible, that idea will + both BE true, and will HAVE BEEN true of that object, whether fully + developed verification has taken place or not. The nature and place and + affinities of the object of course play as vital a part in making the + particular passage possible as do the nature and associative tendencies of + the idea; so that the notion that truth could fall altogether inside of + the thinker's private experience and be something purely psychological, is + absurd. It is BETWEEN the idea and the object that the truth-relation is + to be sought and it involves both terms. + </p> + <p> + But the 'intellectualistic' position, if I understand Mr. Pratt rightly, + is that, altho we can use this fundamentum, this mass of go-between + experience, for TESTING truth, yet the truth-relation in itself remains as + something apart. It means, in Mr. Pratt's words, merely 'THIS SIMPLE THING + THAT THE OBJECT OF WHICH ONE IS THINKING IS AS ONE THINKS IT.' + </p> + <p> + It seems to me that the word 'as,' which qualifies the relation here, and + bears the whole 'epistemological' burden, is anything but simple. What it + most immediately suggests is that the idea should be LIKE the object; but + most of our ideas, being abstract concepts, bear almost no resemblance to + their objects. The 'as' must therefore, I should say, be usually + interpreted functionally, as meaning that the idea shall lead us into the + same quarters of experience AS the object would. Experience leads ever on + and on, and objects and our ideas of objects may both lead to the same + goals. The ideas being in that case shorter cuts, we SUBSTITUTE them more + and more for their objects; and we habitually waive direct verification of + each one of them, as their train passes through our mind, because if an + idea leads AS the object would lead, we can say, in Mr. Pratt's words, + that in so far forth the object is AS we think it, and that the idea, + verified thus in so far forth, is true enough. + </p> + <p> + Mr. Pratt will undoubtedly accept most of these facts, but he will deny + that they spell pragmatism. Of course, definitions are free to every one; + but I have myself never meant by the pragmatic view of truth anything + different from what I now describe; and inasmuch as my use of the term + came earlier than my friend's, I think it ought to have the right of way. + But I suspect that Professor Pratt's contention is not solely as to what + one must think in order to be called a pragmatist. I am cure that he + believes that the truth-relation has something MORE in it than the + fundamentum which I assign can account for. Useful to test truth by, the + matrix of circumstance, he thinks, cannot found the truth-relation in se, + for that is trans-empirical and 'saltatory.' + </p> + <p> + Well, take an object and an idea, and assume that the latter is true of + the former—as eternally and absolutely true as you like. Let the + object be as much 'as' the idea thinks it, as it is possible for one thing + to be 'as' another. I now formally ask of Professor Pratt to tell what + this 'as'-ness in itself CONSISTS in—for it seems to me that it + ought to consist in something assignable and describable, and not remain a + pure mystery, and I promise that if he can assign any determination of it + whatever which I cannot successfully refer to some specification of what + in this article I have called the empirical fundamentum, I will confess my + stupidity cheerfully, and will agree never to publish a line upon this + subject of truth again. + </p> + <h3> + II + </h3> + <p> + Professor Pratt has returned to the charge in a whole book, [Footnote 1: + J. B. Pratt: What is Pragmatism. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1909.—The + comments I have printed were written in March, 1909, after some of the + articles printed later in the present volume.] which for its clearness and + good temper deserves to supersede all the rest of the anti-pragmatistic + literature. I wish it might do so; for its author admits all MY essential + contentions, simply distinguishing my account of truth as 'modified' + pragmatism from Schiller's and Dewey's, which he calls pragmatism of the + 'radical' sort. As I myself understand Dewey and Schiller, our views + absolutely agree, in spite of our different modes of statement; but I have + enough trouble of my own in life without having to defend my friends, so I + abandon them provisionally to the tender mercy of Professor Pratt's + interpretations, utterly erroneous tho I deem these to be. My reply as + regards myself can be very short, for I prefer to consider only + essentials, and Dr. Pratt's whole book hardly takes the matter farther + than the article to which I retort in Part I of the present paper. + </p> + <p> + He repeats the 'as'-formula, as if it were something that I, along with + other pragmatists, had denied, [Footnote: Op. cit., pp. 77-80.] whereas I + have only asked those who insist so on its importance to do something more + than merely utter it—to explicate it, for example, and tell us what + its so great importance consists in. I myself agree most cordially that + for an idea to be true the object must be 'as' the idea declares it, but I + explicate the 'as'-ness as meaning the idea's verifiability. + </p> + <p> + Now since Dr. Pratt denies none of these verifying 'workings' for which I + have pleaded, but only insists on their inability to serve as the + fundamentum of the truth-relation, it seems that there is really nothing + in the line of FACT about which we differ, and that the issue between us + is solely as to how far the notion of workableness or verifiability is an + essential part of the notion of 'trueness'—'trueness' being Dr. + Pratt's present name for the character of as-ness in the true idea. I + maintain that there is no meaning left in this notion of as-ness or + trueness if no reference to the possibility of concrete working on the + part of the idea is made. + </p> + <p> + Take an example where there can be no possible working. Suppose I have an + idea to which I give utterance by the vocable 'skrkl,' claiming at the + same time that it is true. Who now can say that it is FALSE, for why may + there not be somewhere in the unplumbed depths of the cosmos some object + with which 'skrkl' can agree and have trueness in Dr. Pratt's sense? On + the other hand who can say that it is TRUE, for who can lay his hand on + that object and show that it and nothing else is what I MEAN by my word? + But yet again, who can gainsay any one who shall call my word utterly + IRRELATIVE to other reality, and treat it as a bare fact in my mind, + devoid of any cognitive function whatever. One of these three alternatives + must surely be predicated of it. For it not to be irrelevant (or + not-cognitive in nature), an object of some kind must be provided which it + may refer to. Supposing that object provided, whether 'skrkl' is true or + false of it, depends, according to Professor Pratt, on no intermediating + condition whatever. The trueness or the falsity is even now immediately, + absolutely, and positively there. + </p> + <p> + I, on the other hand, demand a cosmic environment of some kind to + establish which of them is there rather than utter irrelevancy. [Footnote: + Dr. Pratt, singularly enough, disposes of this primal postulate of all + pragmatic epistemology, by saying that the pragmatist 'unconsciously + surrenders his whole case by smuggling in the idea of a conditioning + environment which determines whether or not the experience can work, and + which cannot itself be identified with the experience or any part of it' + (pp. 167-168). The 'experience' means here of course the idea, or belief; + and the expression 'smuggling in' is to the last degree diverting. If any + epistemologist could dispense with a conditioning environment, it would + seem to be the antipragmatist, with his immediate saltatory trueness, + independent of work done. The mediating pathway which the environment + supplies is the very essence of the pragmatist's explanation.] I then say, + first, that unless some sort of a natural path exists between the 'skrkl' + and THAT object, distinguishable among the innumerable pathways that run + among all the realities of the universe, linking them promiscuously with + one another, there is nothing there to constitute even the POSSIBILITY OF + ITS REFERRING to that object rather than to any other. + </p> + <p> + I say furthermore that unless it have some TENDENCY TO FOLLOW UP THAT + PATH, there is nothing to constitute its INTENTION to refer to the object + in question. + </p> + <p> + Finally, I say that unless the path be strown with possibilities of + frustration or encouragement, and offer some sort of terminal satisfaction + or contradiction, there is nothing to constitute its agreement or + disagreement with that object, or to constitute the as-ness (or + 'not-as-ness') in which the trueness (or falseness) is said to consist. + </p> + <p> + I think that Dr. Pratt ought to do something more than repeat the name + 'trueness,' in answer to my pathetic question whether that there be not + some CONSTITUTION to a relation as important as this. The pathway, the + tendency, the corroborating or contradicting progress, need not in every + case be experienced in full, but I don't see, if the universe doesn't + contain them among its possibilities of furniture, what LOGICAL MATERIAL + FOR DEFINING the trueness of my idea is left. But if it do contain them, + they and they only are the logical material required. + </p> + <p> + I am perplexed by the superior importance which Dr. Pratt attributes to + abstract trueness over concrete verifiability in an idea, and I wish that + he might be moved to explain. It is prior to verification, to be sure, but + so is the verifiability for which I contend prior, just as a man's + 'mortality' (which is nothing but the possibility of his death) is prior + to his death, but it can hardly be that this abstract priority of all + possibility to its correlative fact is what so obstinate a quarrel is + about. I think it probable that Dr. Pratt is vaguely thinking of something + concreter than this. The trueness of an idea must mean SOMETHING DEFINITE + IN IT THAT DETERMINES ITS TENDENCY TO WORK, and indeed towards this object + rather than towards that. Undoubtedly there is something of this sort in + the idea, just as there is something in man that accounts for his tendency + towards death, and in bread that accounts for its tendency to nourish. + What that something is in the case of truth psychology tells us: the idea + has associates peculiar to itself, motor as well as ideational; it tends + by its place and nature to call these into being, one after another; and + the appearance of them in succession is what we mean by the 'workings' of + the idea. According to what they are, does the trueness or falseness which + the idea harbored come to light. These tendencies have still earlier + conditions which, in a general way, biology, psychology and biography can + trace. This whole chain of natural causal conditions produces a resultant + state of things in which new relations, not simply causal, can now be + found, or into which they can now be introduced,—the relations + namely which we epistemologists study, relations of adaptation, of + substitutability, of instrumentality, of reference and of truth. + </p> + <p> + The prior causal conditions, altho there could be no knowing of any kind, + true or false, without them, are but preliminary to the question of what + makes the ideas true or false when once their tendencies have been obeyed. + The tendencies must exist in some shape anyhow, but their fruits are + truth, falsity, or irrelevancy, according to what they concretely turn out + to be. They are not 'saltatory' at any rate, for they evoke their + consequences contiguously, from next to next only; and not until the final + result of the whole associative sequence, actual or potential, is in our + mental sight, can we feel sure what its epistemological significance, if + it have any, may be. True knowing is, in fine, not substantially, in + itself, or 'as such,' inside of the idea from the first, any more than + mortality AS SUCH is inside of the man, or nourishment AS SUCH inside of + the bread. Something else is there first, that practically MAKES FOR + knowing, dying or nourishing, as the case may be. That something is the + 'nature' namely of the first term, be it idea, man, or bread, that + operates to start the causal chain of processes which, when completed, is + the complex fact to which we give whatever functional name best fits the + case. Another nature, another chain of cognitive workings; and then either + another object known or the same object known differently, will ensue. + </p> + <p> + Dr. Pratt perplexes me again by seeming to charge Dewey and Schiller + [Footnote: Page 200] (I am not sure that he charges me) with an account of + truth which would allow the object believed in not to exist, even if the + belief in it were true. 'Since the truth of an idea,' he writes, 'means + merely the fact that the idea works, that fact is all that you mean when + you say the idea is true' (p. 206). 'WHEN YOU SAY THE IDEA IS TRUE'—does + that mean true for YOU, the critic, or true for the believer whom you are + describing? The critic's trouble over this seems to come from his taking + the word 'true' irrelatively, whereas the pragmatist always means 'true + for him who experiences the workings.' 'But is the object REALLY true or + not?'—the critic then seems to ask,—as if the pragmatist were + bound to throw in a whole ontology on top of his epistemology and tell us + what realities indubitably exist. 'One world at a time,' would seem to be + the right reply here. + </p> + <p> + One other trouble of Dr. Pratt's must be noticed. It concerns the + 'transcendence' of the object. When our ideas have worked so as to bring + us flat up against the object, NEXT to it, 'is our relation to it then + ambulatory or saltatory?' Dr. Pratt asks. If YOUR headache be my object, + 'MY experiences break off where yours begin,' Dr. Pratt writes, and 'this + fact is of great importance, for it bars out the sense of transition and + fulfilment which forms so important an element in the pragmatist + description of knowledge—the sense of fulfilment due to a continuous + passage from the original idea to the known object. If this comes at all + when I know your headache, it comes not with the object, but quite on my + side of the "epistemological gulf." The gulf is still there to be + transcended.' (p. 158). + </p> + <p> + Some day of course, or even now somewhere in the larger life of the + universe, different men's headaches may become confluent or be + 'co-conscious.' Here and now, however, headaches do transcend each other + and, when not felt, can be known only conceptually. My idea is that you + really have a headache; it works well with what I see of your expression, + and with what I hear you say; but it doesn't put me in possession of the + headache itself. I am still at one remove, and the headache 'transcends' + me, even tho it be in nowise transcendent of human experience generally. + Bit the 'gulf' here is that which the pragmatist epistemology itself fixes + in the very first words it uses, by saying there must be an object and an + idea. The idea however doesn't immediately leap the gulf, it only works + from next to next so as to bridge it, fully or approximately. If it + bridges it, in the pragmatist's vision of his hypothetical universe, it + can be called a 'true' idea. If it only MIGHT bridge it, but doesn't, or + if it throws a bridge distinctly AT it, it still has, in the onlooking + pragmatist's eyes, what Professor Pratt calls 'trueness.' But to ask the + pragmatist thereupon whether, when it thus fails to coalesce bodily with + the object, it is REALLY true or has REAL trueness,—in other words + whether the headache he supposes, and supposes the thinker he supposes, to + believe in, be a real headache or not,—is to step from his + hypothetical universe of discourse into the altogether different world of + natural fact. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0010" id="link2H_4_0010"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + VIII + </h2> + <p> + THE PRAGMATIST ACCOUNT OF TRUTH AND ITS MISUNDERSTANDERS [Footnote: + Reprint from the Philosophical Review, January, 1908 (vol. xvii, p. 1).] + </p> + <p> + The account of truth given in my volume entitled Pragmatism, continues to + meet with such persistent misunderstanding that I am tempted to make a + final brief reply. My ideas may well deserve refutation, but they can get + none till they are conceived of in their proper shape. The fantastic + character of the current misconceptions shows how unfamiliar is the + concrete point of view which pragmatism assumes. Persons who are familiar + with a conception move about so easily in it that they understand each + other at a hint, and can converse without anxiously attending to their P's + and Q's. I have to admit, in view of the results, that we have assumed too + ready an intelligence, and consequently in many places used a language too + slipshod. We should never have spoken elliptically. The critics have + boggled at every word they could boggle at, and refused to take the spirit + rather than the letter of our discourse. This seems to show a genuine + unfamiliarity in the whole point of view. It also shows, I think, that the + second stage of opposition, which has already begun to express itself in + the stock phrase that 'what is new is not true, and what is true not new,' + in pragmatism, is insincere. If we said nothing in any degree new, why was + our meaning so desperately hard to catch? The blame cannot be laid wholly + upon our obscurity of speech, for in other subjects we have attained to + making ourselves understood. But recriminations are tasteless; and, as far + as I personally am concerned, I am sure that some of the misconception I + complain of is due to my doctrine of truth being surrounded in that volume + of popular lectures by a lot of other opinions not necessarily implicated + with it, so that a reader may very naturally have grown confused. For this + I am to blame,—likewise for omitting certain explicit cautions, + which the pages that follow will now in part supply. + </p> + <h3> + FIRST MISUNDERSTANDING: PRAGMATISM IS ONLY A RE-EDITING OF POSITIVISM. + </h3> + <p> + This seems the commonest mistake. Scepticism, positivism, and agnosticism + agree with ordinary dogmatic rationalism in presupposing that everybody + knows what the word 'truth' means, without further explanation. But the + former doctrines then either suggest or declare that real truth, absolute + truth, is inaccessible to us, and that we must fain put up with relative + or phenomenal truth as its next best substitute. By scepticism this is + treated as an unsatisfactory state of affairs, while positivism and + agnosticism are cheerful about it, call real truth sour grapes, and + consider phenomenal truth quite sufficient for all our 'practical' + purposes. + </p> + <p> + In point of fact, nothing could be farther from all this than what + pragmatism has to say of truth. Its thesis is an altogether previous one. + It leaves off where these other theories begin, having contented itself + with the word truth's DEFINITION. 'No matter whether any mind extant in + the universe possess truth or not,' it asks, 'what does the notion of + truth signify IDEALLY?' 'What kind of things would true judgments be IN + CASE they existed?' The answer which pragmatism offers is intended to + cover the most complete truth that can be conceived of, 'absolute' truth + if you like, as well as truth of the most relative and imperfect + description. This question of what truth would be like if it did exist, + belongs obviously to a purely speculative field of inquiry. It is not a + theory about any sort of reality, or about what kind of knowledge is + actually possible; it abstracts from particular terms altogether, and + defines the nature of a possible relation between two of them. + </p> + <p> + As Kant's question about synthetic judgments had escaped previous + philosophers, so the pragmatist question is not only so subtile as to have + escaped attention hitherto, but even so subtile, it would seem, that when + openly broached now, dogmatists and sceptics alike fail to apprehend it, + and deem the pragmatist to be treating of something wholly different. He + insists, they say (I quote an actual critic), 'that the greater problems + are insoluble by human intelligence, that our need of knowing truly is + artificial and illusory, and that our reason, incapable of reaching the + foundations of reality, must turn itself exclusively towards ACTION.' + There could not be a worse misapprehension. + </p> + <h3> + SECOND MISUNDERSTANDING: PRAGMATISM IS PRIMARILY AN APPEAL TO ACTION. + </h3> + <p> + The name 'pragmatism,' with its suggestions of action, has been an + unfortunate choice, I have to admit, and has played into the hands of this + mistake. But no word could protect the doctrine from critics so blind to + the nature of the inquiry that, when Dr. Schiller speaks of ideas + 'working' well, the only thing they think of is their immediate workings + in the physical environment, their enabling us to make money, or gain some + similar 'practical' advantage. Ideas do work thus, of course, immediately + or remotely; but they work indefinitely inside of the mental world also. + Not crediting us with this rudimentary insight, our critics treat our view + as offering itself exclusively to engineers, doctors, financiers, and men + of action generally, who need some sort of a rough and ready + weltanschauung, but have no time or wit to study genuine philosophy. It is + usually described as a characteristically American movement, a sort of + bobtailed scheme of thought, excellently fitted for the man on the street, + who naturally hates theory and wants cash returns immediately. + </p> + <p> + It is quite true that, when the refined theoretic question that pragmatism + begins with is once answered, secondary corollaries of a practical sort + follow. Investigation shows that, in the function called truth, previous + realities are not the only independent variables. To a certain extent our + ideas, being realities, are also independent variables, and, just as they + follow other reality and fit it, so, in a measure, does other reality + follow and fit them. When they add themselves to being, they partly + redetermine the existent, so that reality as a whole appears incompletely + definable unless ideas also are kept account of. This pragmatist doctrine, + exhibiting our ideas as complemental factors of reality, throws open + (since our ideas are instigators of our action) a wide window upon human + action, as well as a wide license to originality in thought. But few + things could be sillier than to ignore the prior epistemological edifice + in which the window is built, or to talk as if pragmatism began and ended + at the window. This, nevertheless, is what our critics do almost without + exception. They ignore our primary step and its motive, and make the + relation to action, which is our secondary achievement, primary. + </p> + <p> + THIRD MISUNDERSTANDING: PRAGMATISTS CUT THEMSELVES OFF FROM THE RIGHT TO + BELIEVE IN EJECTIVE REALITIES. + </p> + <p> + They do so, according to the critics, by making the truth of our beliefs + consist in their verifiability, and their verifiability in the way in + which they do work for us. Professor Stout, in his otherwise admirable and + hopeful review of Schiller in Mind for October, 1897, considers that this + ought to lead Schiller (could he sincerely realize the effects of his own + doctrine) to the absurd consequence of being unable to believe genuinely + in another man's headache, even were the headache there. He can only + 'postulate' it for the sake of the working value of the postulate to + himself. The postulate guides certain of his acts and leads to + advantageous consequences; but the moment he understands fully that the + postulate is true ONLY (!) in this sense, it ceases (or should cease) to + be true for him that the other man really HAS a headache. All that makes + the postulate most precious then evaporates: his interest in his + fellow-man 'becomes a veiled form of self-interest, and his world grows + cold, dull, and heartless.' + </p> + <p> + Such an objection makes a curious muddle of the pragmatist's universe of + discourse. Within that universe the pragmatist finds some one with a + headache or other feeling, and some one else who postulates that feeling. + Asking on what condition the postulate is 'true' the pragmatist replies + that, for the postulator at any rate, it is true just in proportion as to + believe in it works in him the fuller sum of satisfactions. What is it + that is satisfactory here? Surely to BELIEVE in the postulated object, + namely, in the really existing feeling of the other man. But how + (especially if the postulator were himself a thoroughgoing pragmatist) + could it ever be satisfactory to him NOT to believe in that feeling, so + long as, in Professor Stout's words, disbelief 'made the world seem to him + cold, dull, and heartless'? Disbelief would seem, on pragmatist + principles, quite out of the question under such conditions, unless the + heartlessness of the world were made probable already on other grounds. + And since the belief in the headache, true for the subject assumed in the + pragmatist's universe of discourse, is also true for the pragmatist who + for his epitemologizing purposes has assumed that entire universe, why is + it not true in that universe absolutely? The headache believed in is a + reality there, and no extant mind disbelieves it, neither the critic's + mind nor his subject's! Have our opponents any better brand of truth in + this real universe of ours that they can show us? [Footnote: I see here a + chance to forestall a criticism which some one may make on Lecture III of + my Pragmatism, where, on pp. 96-100, I said that 'God' and 'Matter' might + be regarded as synonymous terms, so long as no differing future + consequences were deducible from the two conceptions. The passage was + transcribed from my address at the California Philosophical Union, + reprinted in the Journal of Philosophy, vol. i, p. 673. I had no sooner + given the address than I perceived a flaw in that part of it; but I have + left the passage unaltered ever since, because the flaw did not spoil its + illustrative value. The flaw was evident when, as a case analogous to that + of a godless universe, I thought of what I called an 'automatic + sweetheart,' meaning a soulless body which should be absolutely + indistinguishable from a spiritually animated maiden, laughing, talking, + blushing, nursing us, and performing all feminine offices as tactfully and + sweetly as if a soul were in her. Would any one regard her as a full + equivalent? Certainly not, and why? Because, framed as we are, our egoism + craves above all things inward sympathy and recognition, love and + admiration. The outward treatment is valued mainly as an expression, as a + manifestation of the accompanying consciousness believed in. + Pragmatically, then, belief in the automatic sweetheart would not work, + and is point of fact no one treats it as a serious hypothesis. The godless + universe would be exactly similar. Even if matter could do every outward + thing that God does, the idea of it would not work as satisfactorily, + because the chief call for a God on modern men's part is for a being who + will inwardly recognize them and judge them sympathetically. Matter + disappoints this craving of our ego, so God remains for most men the truer + hypothesis, and indeed remains so for definite pragmatic reasons.] + </p> + <p> + So much for the third misunderstanding, which is but one specification of + the following still wider one. + </p> + <p> + FOURTH MISUNDERSTANDING: NO PRAGMATIST CAN BE A REALIST IN HIS + EPISTEMOLOGY. + </p> + <p> + This is supposed to follow from his statement that the truth of our + beliefs consists in general in their giving satisfaction. Of course + satisfaction per se is a subjective condition; so the conclusion is drawn + that truth falls wholly inside of the subject, who then may manufacture it + at his pleasure. True beliefs become thus wayward affections, severed from + all responsibility to other parts of experience. + </p> + <p> + It is difficult to excuse such a parody of the pragmatist's opinion, + ignoring as it does every element but one of his universe of discourse. + The terms of which that universe consists positively forbid any + non-realistic interpretation of the function of knowledge defined there. + The pragmatizing epistemologist posits there a reality and a mind with + ideas. What, now, he asks, can make those ideas true of that reality? + Ordinary epistemology contents itself with the vague statement that the + ideas must 'correspond' or 'agree'; the pragmatist insists on being more + concrete, and asks what such 'agreement' may mean in detail. He finds + first that the ideas must point to or lead towards THAT reality and no + other, and then that the pointings and leadings must yield satisfaction as + their result. So far the pragmatist is hardly less abstract than the + ordinary slouchy epistemologist; but as he defines himself farther, he + grows more concrete. The entire quarrel of the intellectualist with him is + over his concreteness, intellectualism contending that the vaguer and more + abstract account is here the more profound. The concrete pointing and + leading are conceived by the pragmatist to be the work of other portions + of the same universe to which the reality and the mind belong, + intermediary verifying bits of experience with which the mind at one end, + and the reality at the other, are joined. The 'satisfaction,' in turn, is + no abstract satisfaction ueberhaupt, felt by an unspecified being, but is + assumed to consist of such satisfactions (in the plural) as concretely + existing men actually do find in their beliefs. As we humans are + constituted in point of fact, we find that to believe in other men's + minds, in independent physical realities, in past events, in eternal + logical relations, is satisfactory. We find hope satisfactory. We often + find it satisfactory to cease to doubt. Above all we find CONSISTENCY + satisfactory, consistency between the present idea and the entire rest of + our mental equipment, including the whole order of our sensations, and + that of our intuitions of likeness and difference, and our whole stock of + previously acquired truths. + </p> + <p> + The pragmatist, being himself a man, and imagining in general no contrary + lines of truer belief than ours about the 'reality' which he has laid at + the base of his epistemological discussion, is willing to treat our + satisfactions as possibly really true guides to it, not as guides true + solely for US. It would seem here to be the duty of his critics to show + with some explicitness why, being our subjective feelings, these + satisfactions can not yield 'objective' truth. The beliefs which they + accompany 'posit' the assumed reality, 'correspond' and 'agree' with it, + and 'fit' it in perfectly definite and assignable ways, through the + sequent trains of thought and action which form their verification, so + merely to insist on using these words abstractly instead of concretely is + no way of driving the pragmatist from the field,—his more concrete + account virtually includes his critic's. If our critics have any definite + idea of a truth more objectively grounded than the kind we propose, why do + they not show it more articulately? As they stand, they remind one of + Hegel's man who wanted 'fruit,' but rejected cherries, pears, and grapes, + because they were not fruit in the abstract. We offer them the full + quart-pot, and they cry for the empty quart-capacity. + </p> + <p> + But here I think I hear some critic retort as follows: 'If satisfactions + are all that is needed to make truth, how about the notorious fact that + errors are so often satisfactory? And how about the equally notorious fact + that certain true beliefs may cause the bitterest dissatisfaction? Isn't + it clear that not the satisfaction which it gives, but the relation of the + belief TO THE REALITY is all that makes it true? Suppose there were no + such reality, and that the satisfactions yet remained: would they not then + effectively work falsehood? Can they consequently be treated distinctively + as the truth-builders? It is the INHERENT RELATION TO REALITY of a belief + that gives us that specific TRUTH-satisfaction, compared with which all + other satisfactions are the hollowest humbug. The satisfaction of KNOWING + TRULY is thus the only one which the pragmatist ought to have considered. + As a PSYCHOLOGICAL SENTIMENT, the anti-pragmatist gladly concedes it to + him, but then only as a concomitant of truth, not as a constituent. What + CONSTITUTES truth is not the sentiment, but the purely logical or + objective function of rightly cognizing the reality, and the pragmatist's + failure to reduce this function to lower values is patent.' + </p> + <p> + Such anti-pragmatism as this seems to me a tissue of confusion. To begin + with, when the pragmatist says 'indispensable,' it confounds this with + 'sufficient.' The pragmatist calls satisfactions indispensable for + truth-building, but I have everywhere called them insufficient unless + reality be also incidentally led to. If the reality assumed were cancelled + from the pragmatist's universe of discourse, he would straightway give the + name of falsehoods to the beliefs remaining, in spite of all their + satisfactoriness. For him, as for his critic, there can be no truth if + there is nothing to be true about. Ideas are so much flat psychological + surface unless some mirrored matter gives them cognitive lustre. This is + why as a pragmatist I have so carefully posited 'reality' AB INITIO, and + why, throughout my whole discussion, I remain an epistemological realist. + [Footnote: I need hardly remind the reader that both sense-percepts and + percepts of ideal relation (comparisons, etc.) should be classed among the + realities. The bulk of our mental 'stock' consists of truths concerning + these terms.] + </p> + <p> + The anti-pragmatist is guilty of the further confusion of imagining that, + in undertaking to give him an account of what truth formally means, we are + assuming at the same time to provide a warrant for it, trying to define + the occasions when he can be sure of materially possessing it. Our making + it hinge on a reality so 'independent' that when it comes, truth comes, + and when it goes, truth goes with it, disappoints this naive expectation, + so he deems our description unsatisfactory. I suspect that under this + confusion lies the still deeper one of not discriminating sufficiently + between the two notions, truth and reality. Realities are not TRUE, they + ARE; and beliefs are true OF them. But I suspect that in the + anti-pragmatist mind the two notions sometimes swap their attributes. The + reality itself, I fear, is treated as if 'true' and conversely. Whoso + tells us of the one, it is then supposed, must also be telling us of the + other; and a true idea must in a manner BE, or at least YIELD without + extraneous aid, the reality it cognitively is possessed of. + </p> + <p> + To this absolute-idealistic demand pragmatism simply opposes its non + possumus. If there is to be truth, it says, both realities and beliefs + about them must conspire to make it; but whether there ever is such a + thing, or how anyone can be sure that his own beliefs possess it, it never + pretends to determine. That truth-satisfaction par excellence which may + tinge a belief unsatisfactory in other ways, it easily explains as the + feeling of consistency with the stock of previous truths, or supposed + truths, of which one's whole past experience may have left one in + possession. + </p> + <p> + But are not all pragmatists sure that their own belief is right? their + enemies will ask at this point; and this leads me to the + </p> + <p> + FIFTH MISUNDERSTANDING: WHAT PRAGMATISTS SAY IS INCONSISTENT WITH THEIR + SAYING SO. + </p> + <p> + A correspondent puts this objection as follows: 'When you say to your + audience, "pragmatism is the truth concerning truth," the first truth is + different from the second. About the first you and they are not to be at + odds; you are not giving them liberty to take or leave it according as it + works satisfactorily or not for their private uses. Yet the second truth, + which ought to describe and include the first, affirms this liberty. Thus + the INTENT of your utterance seems to contradict the CONTENT of it.' + </p> + <p> + General scepticism has always received this same classic refutation. 'You + have to dogmatize,' the rationalists say to the sceptics,' whenever you + express the sceptical position; so your lives keep contradicting your + thesis.' One would suppose that the impotence of so hoary an argument to + abate in the slightest degree the amount of general scepticism in the + world might have led some rationalists themselves to doubt whether these + instantaneous logical refutations are such fatal ways, after all, of + killing off live mental attitudes. General scepticism is the live mental + attitude of refusing to conclude. It is a permanent torpor of the will, + renewing itself in detail towards each successive thesis that offers, and + you can no more kill it off by logic than you can kill off obstinacy or + practical joking. This is why it is so irritating. Your consistent sceptic + never puts his scepticism into a formal proposition,—he simply + chooses it as a habit. He provokingly hangs back when he might so easily + join us in saying yes, but he is not illogical or stupid,—on the + contrary, he often impresses us by his intellectual superiority. This is + the REAL scepticism that rationalists have to meet, and their logic does + not even touch it. + </p> + <p> + No more can logic kill the pragmatist's behavior: his act of utterance, so + far from contradicting, accurately exemplifies the matter which he utters. + What is the matter which he utters? In part, it is this, that truth, + concretely considered, is an attribute of our beliefs, and that these are + attitudes that follow satisfactions. The ideas around which the + satisfactions cluster are primarily only hypotheses that challenge or + summon a belief to come and take its stand upon them. The pragmatist's + idea of truth is just such a challenge. He finds it ultra-satisfactory to + accept it, and takes his own stand accordingly. But, being gregarious as + they are, men seek to spread their beliefs, to awaken imitation, to infect + others. Why should not YOU also find the same belief satisfactory? thinks + the pragmatist, and forthwith endeavors to convert you. You and he will + then believe similarly; you will hold up your subject-end of a truth, + which will be a truth objective and irreversible if the reality holds up + the object-end by being itself present simultaneously. What there is of + self-contradiction in all this I confess I cannot discover. The + pragmatist's conduct in his own case seems to me on the contrary admirably + to illustrate his universal formula; and of all epistemologists, he is + perhaps the only one who is irreproachably self-consistent. + </p> + <p> + SIXTH MISUNDERSTANDING: PRAGMATISM EXPLAINS NOT WHAT TRUTH IS, BUT ONLY + HOW IT IS ARRIVED AT. + </p> + <p> + In point of fact it tells us both, tells us what it is incidentally to + telling us how it is arrived at,—for what IS arrived at except just + what the truth is? If I tell you how to get to the railroad station, don't + I implicitly introduce you to the WHAT, to the being and nature of that + edifice? It is quite true that the abstract WORD 'how' hasn't the same + meaning as the abstract WORD 'what,' but in this universe of concrete + facts you cannot keep hows and whats asunder. The reasons why I find it + satisfactory to believe that any idea is true, the HOW of my arriving at + that belief, may be among the very reasons why the idea IS true in + reality. If not, I summon the anti-pragmatist to explain the impossibility + articulately. + </p> + <p> + His trouble seems to me mainly to arise from his fixed inability to + understand how a concrete statement can possibly mean as much, or be as + valuable, as an abstract one. I said above that the main quarrel between + us and our critics was that of concreteness VERSUS abstractness. This is + the place to develop that point farther. + </p> + <p> + In the present question, the links of experience sequent upon an idea, + which mediate between it and a reality, form and for the pragmatist indeed + ARE, the CONCRETE relation of truth that may obtain between the idea and + that reality. They, he says, are all that we mean when we speak of the + idea 'pointing' to the reality, 'fitting' it, 'corresponding' with it, or + 'agreeing' with it,—they or other similar mediating trains of + verification. Such mediating events make the idea 'true.' The idea itself, + if it exists at all, is also a concrete event: so pragmatism insists that + truth in the singular is only a collective name for truths in the plural, + these consisting always of series of definite events; and that what + intellectualism calls the truth, the inherent truth, of any one such + series is only the abstract name for its truthfulness in act, for the fact + that the ideas there do lead to the supposed reality in a way that we + consider satisfactory. + </p> + <p> + The pragmatist himself has no objection to abstractions. Elliptically, and + 'for short,' he relies on them as much as any one, ending upon innumerable + occasions that their comparative emptiness makes of them useful + substitutes for the overfulness of the facts he meets, with. But he never + ascribes to them a higher grade of reality. The full reality of a truth + for him is always some process of verification, in which the abstract + property of connecting ideas with objects truly is workingly embodied. + Meanwhile it is endlessly serviceable to be able to talk of properties + abstractly and apart from their working, to find them the same in + innumerable cases, to take them 'out of time,' and to treat of their + relations to other similar abstractions. We thus form whole universes of + platonic ideas ante rem, universes in posse, tho none of them exists + effectively except in rebus. Countless relations obtain there which nobody + experiences as obtaining,—as, in the eternal universe of musical + relations, for example, the notes of Aennchen von Tharau were a lovely + melody long ere mortal ears ever heard them. Even so the music of the + future sleeps now, to be awakened hereafter. Or, if we take the world of + geometrical relations, the thousandth decimal of 'pi' sleeps there, tho no + one may ever try to compute it. Or, if we take the universe of 'fitting,' + countless coats 'fit' backs, and countless boots 'fit' feet, on which they + are not practically FITTED; countless stones 'fit' gaps in walls into + which no one seeks to fit them actually. In the same way countless + opinions 'fit' realities, and countless truths are valid, tho no thinker + ever thinks them. + </p> + <p> + For the anti-pragmatist these prior timeless relations are the + presupposition of the concrete ones, and possess the profounder dignity + and value. The actual workings of our ideas in verification-processes are + as naught in comparison with the 'obtainings' of this discarnate truth + within them. + </p> + <p> + For the pragmatist, on the contrary,—all discarnate truth is static, + impotent, and relatively spectral, full truth being the truth that + energizes and does battle. Can any one suppose that the sleeping quality + of truth would ever have been abstracted or have received a name, if + truths had remained forever in that storage-vault of essential timeless + 'agreements' and had never been embodied in any panting struggle of men's + live ideas for verification? Surely no more than the abstract property of + 'fitting' would have received a name, if in our world there had been no + backs or feet or gaps in walls to be actually fitted. EXISTENTIAL truth is + incidental to the actual competition of opinions. ESSENTIAL truth, the + truth of the intellectualists, the truth with no one thinking it, is like + the coat that fits tho no one has ever tried it on, like the music that no + ear has listened to. It is less real, not more real, than the verified + article; and to attribute a superior degree of glory to it seems little + more than a piece of perverse abstraction-worship. As well might a pencil + insist that the outline is the essential thing in all pictorial + representation, and chide the paint-brush and the camera for omitting it, + forgetting that THEIR pictures not only contain the whole outline, but a + hundred other things in addition. Pragmatist truth contains the whole of + intellectualist truth and a hundred other things in addition. + Intellectualist truth is then only pragmatist truth in posse. That on + innumerable occasions men do substitute truth in posse or verifiability, + for verification or truth in act, is a fact to which no one attributes + more importance than the pragmatist: he emphasizes the practical utility + of such a habit. But he does not on that account consider truth in posse,—truth + not alive enough ever to have been asserted or questioned or contradicted, + to be the metaphysically prior thing, to which truths in act are tributary + and subsidiary. When intellectualists do this, pragmatism charges them + with inverting the real relation. Truth in posse MEANS only truths in act; + and he insists that these latter take precedence in the order of logic as + well as in that of being. + </p> + <h3> + SEVENTH MINUNDERSTANDING: PRAGMATISM IGNORES THE THEORETICAL INTEREST. + </h3> + <p> + This would seem to be an absolutely wanton slander, were not a certain + excuse to be found in the linguistic affinities of the word 'pragmatism,' + and in certain offhand habits of speech of ours which assumed too great a + generosity on our reader's part. When we spoke of the meaning of ideas + consisting "in their 'practical' consequences", or of the 'practical' + differences which our beliefs make to us; when we said that the truth of a + belief consists in its 'working' value, etc.; our language evidently was + too careless, for by 'practical' we were almost unanimously held to mean + OPPOSED to theoretical or genuinely cognitive, and the consequence was + punctually drawn that a truth in our eyes could have no relation to any + independent reality, or to any other truth, or to anything whatever but + the acts which we might ground on it or the satisfactions they might + bring. The mere existence of the idea, all by itself, if only its results + were satisfactory, would give full truth to it, it was charged, in our + absurd pragmatist epistemology. The solemn attribution of this rubbish to + us was also encouraged by two other circumstances. First, ideas ARE + practically useful in the narrow sense, false ideas sometimes, but most + often ideas which we can verify by the sum total of all their leadings, + and the reality of whose objects may thus be considered established beyond + doubt. That these ideas should be true in advance of and apart from their + utility, that, in other words, their objects should be really there, is + the very condition of their having that kind of utility,—the objects + they connect us with are so important that the ideas which serve as the + objects' substitutes grow important also. This manner of their practical + working was the first thing that made truths good in the eyes of primitive + men; and buried among all the other good workings by which true beliefs + are characterized, this kind of subsequential utility remains. + </p> + <p> + The second misleading circumstance was the emphasis laid by Schiller and + Dewey on the fact that, unless a truth be relevant to the mind's momentary + predicament, unless it be germane to the 'practical' situation,—meaning + by this the quite particular perplexity,—it is no good to urge it. + It doesn't meet our interests any better than a falsehood would under the + same circumstances. But why our predicaments and perplexities might not be + theoretical here as well as narrowly practical, I wish that our critics + would explain. They simply assume that no pragmatist CAN admit a genuinely + theoretic interest. Having used the phrase 'cash-value' of an idea, I am + implored by one correspondent to alter it, 'for every one thinks you mean + only pecuniary profit and loss.' Having said that the true is 'the + expedient in our thinking,' I am rebuked in this wise by another learned + correspondent: + </p> + <p> + 'The word expedient has no other meaning than that of self-interest. The + pursuit of this has ended by landing a number of officers of national + banks in penitentiaries. A philosophy that leads to such results must be + unsound.' + </p> + <p> + But the word 'practical' is so habitually loosely used that more + indulgence might have been expected. When one says that a sick man has now + practically recovered, or that an enterprise has practically failed, one + usually means I just the opposite of practically in the literal sense. One + means that, altho untrue in strict practice, what one says is true in + theory, true virtually, certain to be true. Again, by the practical one + often means the distinctively concrete, the individual, particular, and + effective, as opposed to the abstract, general, and inert. To speak for + myself, whenever I have emphasized the practical nature of truth, this is + mainly what has been in my mind. 'Pragmata' are things in their plurality; + and in that early California address, when I described pragmatism as + holding that the meaning of any proposition can always be brought down to + some particular consequence in our future practical experience, whether + passive or active, expressly added these qualifying words: the point lying + rather in the fact that the experience must be particular than in the fact + that it must be active,—by 'active' meaning here 'practical' in the + narrow literal sense. [Footnote: The ambiguity of the word 'practical' + comes out well in these words of a recent would-be reporter of our views: + 'Pragmatism is an Anglo-Saxon reaction against the intellectualism and + rationalism of the Latin mind.... Man, each individual man is the measure + of things. He is able to conceive one but relative truths, that is to say, + illusions. What these illusions are worth is revealed to him, not by + general theory, but by individual practice. Pragmatism, which consists in + experiencing these illusions of the mind and obeying them by acting them + out, is a PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT WORDS, a philosophy of GESTURES AND OF ACTS, + which abandons what is general and olds only to what is particular.' + (Bourdeau, in Journal des. debats, October 89, 1907.)] But particular + consequences can perfectly well be of a theoretic nature. Every remote + fact which we infer from an idea is a particular theoretic consequence + which our mind practically works towards. The loss of every old opinion of + ours which we see that we shall have to give up if a new opinion be true, + is a particular theoretic as well as a particular practical consequence. + After man's interest in breathing freely, the greatest of all his + interests (because it never fluctuates or remits, as most of his physical + interests do), is his interest in consistency, in feeling that what he now + thinks goes with what he thinks on other occasions. We tirelessly compare + truth with truth for this sole purpose. Is the present candidate for + belief perhaps contradicted by principle number one? Is it compatible with + fact number two? and so forth. The particular operations here are the + purely logical ones of analysis, deduction, comparison, etc.; and altho + general terms may be used ad libitum, the satisfactory practical working + of the candidate—idea consists in the consciousness yielded by each + successive theoretic consequence in particular. It is therefore simply + idiotic to repeat that pragmatism takes no account of purely theoretic + interests. All it insists on is that verity in act means VERIFICATIONS, + and that these are always particulars. Even in exclusively theoretic + matters, it insists that vagueness and generality serve to verify nothing. + </p> + <h3> + EIGHTH MISUNDERSTANDING: PRAGMATISM IS SHUT UP TO SOLIPSISM. + </h3> + <p> + I have already said something about this misconception under the third and + fourth heads, above, but a little more may be helpful. The objection is + apt to clothe itself in words like these: 'You make truth to consist in + every value except the cognitive value proper; you always leave your + knower at many removes (or, at the uttermost, at one remove) from his real + object; the best you do is to let his ideas carry him towards it; it + remains forever outside of him,' etc. + </p> + <p> + I think that the leaven working here is the rooted intellectualist + persuasion that, to know a reality, an idea must in some inscrutable + fashion possess or be it. [Footnote: Sensations may, indeed, possess their + objects or coalesce with them, as common sense supposes that they do; and + intuited differences between concepts may coalesce with the 'eternal' + objective differences; but to simplify our discussion. here we can afford + to abstract from these very special cases of knowing.] For pragmatism this + kind of coalescence is inessential. As a rule our cognitions are only + processes of mind off their balance and in motion towards real termini; + and the reality of the termini, believed in by the states of mind in + question, can be guaranteed only by some wider knower [Footnote: The + transcendental idealist thinks that, in some inexplicable way, the finite + states of mind are identical with the transfinite all-knower which he + finds himself obliged to postulate in order to supply a fundamentum far + the relation of knowing, as he apprehends it. Pragmatists can leave the + question of identity open; but they cannot do without the wider knower any + more than they can do without the reality, if they want to prove a case of + knowing. They themselves play the part of the absolute knower for the + universe of discourse which serves them as material for epistemologizing. + They warrant the reality there, and the subject's true knowledge, there, + of it. But whether what they themselves say about that whole universe is + objectively true, i.e., whether the pragmatic theory of truth is true + really, they cannot warrant,—they can only believe it To their + hearers they can only propose it, as I propose it to my readers, as + something to be verified ambulando, or by the way is which its + consequences may confirm it]. But if there is no reason extant in the + universe why they should be doubted, the beliefs are true in the only + sense in which anything can be true anyhow: they are practically and + concretely true, namely. True in the mystical mongrel sense of an + Identitatsphilosophie they need not be; nor is there any intelligible + reason why they ever need be true otherwise than verifiably and + practically. It is reality's part to possess its own existence; it is + thought's part to get into 'touch' with it by innumerable paths of + verification. + </p> + <p> + I fear that the 'humanistic' developments of pragmatism may cause a + certain difficulty here. We get at one truth only through the rest of + truth; and the reality, everlastingly postulated as that which all our + truth must keep in touch with, may never be given to us save in the form + of truth other than that which we are now testing. But since Dr. Schiller + has shown that all our truths, even the most elemental, are affected by + race-inheritance with a human coefficient, reality per se thus may appear + only as a sort of limit; it may be held to shrivel to the mere PLACE for + an object, and what is known may be held to be only matter of our psyche + that we fill the place with. It must be confessed that pragmatism, worked + in this humanistic way, is COMPATIBLE with solipsism. It joins friendly + hands with the agnostic part of kantism, with contemporary agnosticism, + and with idealism generally. But worked thus, it is a metaphysical theory + about the matter of reality, and flies far beyond pragmatism's own modest + analysis of the nature of the knowing function, which analysis may just as + harmoniously be combined with less humanistic accounts of reality. One of + pragmatism's merits is that it is so purely epistemological. It must + assume realities; but it prejudges nothing as to their constitution, and + the most diverse metaphysics can use it as their foundation. It certainly + has no special affinity with solipsism. + </p> + <p> + As I look back over what I have written, much of it gives me a queer + impression, as if the obvious were set forth so condescendingly that + readers might well laugh at my pomposity. It may be, however, that + concreteness as radical as ours is not so obvious. The whole originality + of pragmatism, the whole point in it, is its use of the concrete way of + seeing. It begins with concreteness, and returns and ends with it. Dr. + Schiller, with his two 'practical' aspects of truth, (1) relevancy to + situation, and (2) subsequential utility, is only filling the cup of + concreteness to the brim for us. Once seize that cup, and you cannot + misunderstand pragmatism. It seems as if the power of imagining the world + concretely MIGHT have been common enough to let our readers apprehend us + better, as if they might have read between our lines, and, in spite of all + our infelicities of expression, guessed a little more correctly what our + thought was. But alas! this was not on fate's programme, so we can only + think, with the German ditty:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + "Es waer' zu schoen gewesen, Es hat nicht sollen sein." +</pre> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0011" id="link2H_4_0011"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + IX + </h2> + <p> + THE MEANING OF THE WORD TRUTH [Footnote: Remarks at the meeting of the + American Philosophical Association, Cornell University, December, 1907.] + </p> + <p> + My account of truth is realistic, and follows the epistemological dualism + of common sense. Suppose I say to you 'The thing exists'—is that + true or not? How can you tell? Not till my statement has developed its + meaning farther is it determined as being true, false, or irrelevant to + reality altogether. But if now you ask 'what thing?' and I reply 'a desk'; + if you ask 'where?' and I point to a place; if you ask 'does it exist + materially, or only in imagination?' and I say 'materially'; if moreover I + say 'I mean that desk' and then grasp and shake a desk which you see just + as I have described it, you are willing to call my statement true. But you + and I are commutable here; we can exchange places; and, as you go bail for + my desk, so I can go bail for yours. + </p> + <p> + This notion of a reality independent of either of us, taken from ordinary + social experience, lies at the base of the pragmatist definition of truth. + With some such reality any statement, in order to be counted true, must + agree. Pragmatism defines 'agreeing' to mean certain ways of 'working,' be + they actual or potential. Thus, for my statement 'the desk exists' to be + true of a desk recognized as real by you, it must be able to lead me to + shake your desk, to explain myself by words that suggest that desk to your + mind, to make a drawing that is like the desk you see, etc. Only in such + ways as this is there sense in saying it agrees with THAT reality, only + thus does it gain for me the satisfaction of hearing you corroborate me. + Reference then to something determinate, and some sort of adaptation to it + worthy of the name of agreement, are thus constituent elements in the + definition of any statement of mine as 'true'. + </p> + <p> + You cannot get at either the reference or the adaptation without using the + notion of the workings. THAT the thing is, WHAT it is, and WHICH it is (of + all the possible things with that what) are points determinable only by + the pragmatic method. The 'which' means a possibility of pointing, or of + otherwise singling out the special object; the 'what' means choice on our + part of an essential aspect to conceive it by (and this is always relative + to what Dewey calls our own 'situation'); and the 'that' means our + assumption of the attitude of belief, the reality-recognizing attitude. + Surely for understanding what the word 'true' means as applied to a + statement, the mention of such workings is indispensable. Surely if we + leave them out the subject and the object of the cognitive relation + float-in the same universe, 'tis true—but vaguely and ignorantly and + without mutual contact or mediation. + </p> + <p> + Our critics nevertheless call the workings inessential. No functional + possibilities 'make' our beliefs true, they say; they are true inherently, + true positively, born 'true' as the Count of Chambord was born + 'Henri-Cinq.' Pragmatism insists, on the contrary, that statements and + beliefs are thus inertly and statically true only by courtesy: they + practically pass for true; but you CANNOT DEFINE WHAT YOU MEAN by calling + them true without referring to their functional possibilities. These give + its whole LOGICAL CONTENT to that relation to reality on a belief's part + to which the name 'truth' is applied, a relation which otherwise remains + one of mere coexistence or bare withness. + </p> + <p> + The foregoing statements reproduce the essential content of the lecture on + Truth in my book PRAGMATISM. Schiller's doctrine of 'humanism,' Dewey's + 'Studies in logical theory,' and my own 'radical empiricism,' all involve + this general notion of truth as 'working,' either actual or conceivable. + But they envelop it as only one detail in the midst of much wider theories + that aim eventually at determining the notion of what 'reality' at large + is in its ultimate nature and constitution. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0012" id="link2H_4_0012"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + X + </h2> + <p> + THE EXISTENCE OF JULIUS CAESAR [Footnote: Originally printed under the + title of 'Truth versus Truthfulness,' in the Journal of Philosophy.] + </p> + <p> + My account of truth is purely logical and relates to its definition only. + I contend that you cannot tell what the WORD 'true' MEANS, as applied to a + statement, without invoking the CONCEPT OF THE STATEMENTS WORKINGS. + </p> + <p> + Assume, to fix our ideas, a universe composed of two things only: imperial + Caesar dead and turned to clay, and me, saying 'Caesar really existed.' + Most persons would naively deem truth to be thereby uttered, and say that + by a sort of actio in distans my statement had taken direct hold of the + other fact. + </p> + <p> + But have my words so certainly denoted THAT Caesar?—or so certainly + connoted HIS individual attributes? To fill out the complete measure of + what the epithet 'true' may ideally mean, my thought ought to bear a fully + determinate and unambiguous 'one-to-one-relation' to its own particular + object. In the ultrasimple universe imagined the reference is uncertified. + Were there two Caesars we shouldn't know which was meant. The conditions + of truth thus seem incomplete in this universe of discourse so that it + must be enlarged. + </p> + <p> + Transcendentalists enlarge it by invoking an absolute mind which, as it + owns all the facts, can sovereignly correlate them. If it intends that my + statement SHALL refer to that identical Caesar, and that the attributes I + have in mind SHALL mean his attributes, that intention suffices to make + the statement true. + </p> + <p> + I, in turn, enlarge the universe by admitting finite intermediaries + between the two original facts. Caesar HAD, and my statement HAS, effects; + and if these effects in any way run together, a concrete medium and bottom + is provided for the determinate cognitive relation, which, as a pure ACTIO + IN DISTANS, seemed to float too vaguely and unintelligibly. + </p> + <p> + The real Caesar, for example, wrote a manuscript of which I see a real + reprint, and say 'the Caesar I mean is the author of THAT.' The workings + of my thought thus determine both its denotative and its connotative + significance more fully. It now defines itself as neither irrelevant to + the real Caesar, nor false in what it suggests of him. The absolute mind, + seeing me thus working towards Caesar through the cosmic intermediaries, + might well say: 'Such workings only specify in detail what I meant myself + by the statement being true. I decree the cognitive relation between the + two original facts to mean that just that kind of concrete chain of + intermediaries exists or can exist.' + </p> + <p> + But the chain involves facts prior to the statement the logical conditions + of whose truth we are defining, and facts subsequent to it; and this + circumstance, coupled with the vulgar employment of the terms truth and + fact as synonyms, has laid my account open to misapprehension. 'How,' it + is confusedly asked, 'can Caesar's existence, a truth already 2000 years + old, depend for its truth on anything about to happen now? How can my + acknowledgment of it be made true by the acknowledgment's own effects? The + effects may indeed confirm my belief, but the belief was made true already + by the fact that Caesar really did exist.' + </p> + <p> + Well, be it so, for if there were no Caesar, there could, of course, be no + positive truth about him—but then distinguish between 'true' as + being positively and completely so established, and 'true' as being so + only 'practically,' elliptically, and by courtesy, in the sense of not + being positively irrelevant or UNtrue. Remember also that Caesar's having + existed in fact may make a present statement false or irrelevant as well + as it may make it true, and that in neither case does it itself have to + alter. It being given, whether truth, untruth, or irrelevancy shall be + also given depends on something coming from the statement itself. What + pragmatism contends for is that you cannot adequately DEFINE the something + if you leave the notion of the statement's functional workings out of your + account. Truth meaning agreement with reality, the mode of the agreeing is + a practical problem which the subjective term of the relation alone can + solve. + </p> + <p> + NOTE. This paper was originally followed by a couple of paragraphs meant + to conciliate the intellectualist opposition. Since you love the word + 'true' so, and since you despise so the concrete working of our ideas, I + said, keep the word 'truth' for the saltatory and incomprehensible + relation you care so much for, and I will say of thoughts that know their + objects in an intelligible sense that they are 'truthful.' + </p> + <p> + Like most offerings, this one has been spurned, so I revoke it, repenting + of my generosity. Professor Pratt, in his recent book, calls any objective + state of FACTS 'a truth,' and uses the word 'trueness' in the sense of + 'truth' as proposed by me. Mr. Hawtrey (see below, page 281) uses + 'correctness' in the same sense. Apart from the general evil of ambiguous + vocabularies, we may really forsake all hope, if the term 'truth' is + officially to lose its status as a property of our beliefs and opinions, + and become recognized as a technical synonym for 'fact.' + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0013" id="link2H_4_0013"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XI + </h2> + <p> + THE ABSOLUTE AND THE STRENUOUS LIFE [Footnote: Reprinted from the Journal + of Philosophy, etc., 1906.] + </p> + <p> + Professor W. A. Brown, in the Journal for August 15, approves my + pragmatism for allowing that a belief in the absolute may give holidays to + the spirit, but takes me to task for the narrowness of this concession, + and shows by striking examples how great a power the same belief may have + in letting loose the strenuous life. + </p> + <p> + I have no criticism whatever to make upon his excellent article, but let + me explain why 'moral holidays' were the only gift of the absolute which I + picked out for emphasis. I was primarily concerned in my lectures with + contrasting the belief that the world is still in process of making with + the belief that there is an 'eternal' edition of it ready-made and + complete. The former, or 'pluralistic' belief, was the one that my + pragmatism favored. Both beliefs confirm our strenuous moods. Pluralism + actually demands them, since it makes the world's salvation depend upon + the energizing of its several parts, among which we are. Monism permits + them, for however furious they may be, we can always justify ourselves in + advance for indulging them by the thought that they WILL HAVE BEEN + expressions of the absolute's perfect life. By escaping from your finite + perceptions to the conception of the eternal whole, you can hallow any + tendency whatever. Tho the absolute DICTATES nothing, it will SANCTION + anything and everything after the fact, for whatever is once there will + have to be regarded as an integral member of the universe's perfection. + Quietism and frenzy thus alike receive the absolute's permit to exist. + Those of us who are naturally inert may abide in our resigned passivity; + those whose energy is excessive may grow more reckless still. History + shows how easily both quietists and fanatics have drawn inspiration from + the absolutistic scheme. It suits sick souls and strenuous ones equally + well. + </p> + <p> + One cannot say thus of pluralism. Its world is always vulnerable, for some + part may go astray; and having no 'eternal' edition of it to draw comfort + from, its partisans must always feel to some degree insecure. If, as + pluralists, we grant ourselves moral holidays, they can only be + provisional breathing-spells, intended to refresh us for the morrow's + fight. This forms one permanent inferiority of pluralism from the + pragmatic point of view. It has no saving message for incurably sick + souls. Absolutism, among its other messages, has that message, and is the + only scheme that has it necessarily. That constitutes its chief + superiority and is the source of its religious power. That is why, + desiring to do it full justice, I valued its aptitude for moral-holiday + giving so highly. Its claims in that way are unique, whereas its + affinities with strenuousness are less emphatic than those of the + pluralistic scheme. + </p> + <p> + In the last lecture of my book I candidly admitted this inferiority of + pluralism. It lacks the wide indifference that absolutism shows. It is + bound to disappoint many sick souls whom absolutism can console. It seems + therefore poor tactics for absolutists to make little of this advantage. + The needs of sick souls are surely the most urgent; and believers in the + absolute should rather hold it to be great merit in their philosophy that + it can meet them so well. + </p> + <p> + The pragmatism or pluralism which I defend has to fall back on a certain + ultimate hardihood, a certain willingness to live without assurances or + guarantees. To minds thus willing to live on possibilities that are not + certainties, quietistic religion, sure of salvation ANY HOW, has a slight + flavor of fatty degeneration about it which has caused it to be looked + askance on, even in the church. Which side is right here, who can say? + Within religion, emotion is apt to be tyrannical; but philosophy must + favor the emotion that allies itself best with the whole body and drift of + all the truths in sight. I conceive this to be the more strenuous type of + emotion; but I have to admit that its inability to let loose quietistic + raptures is a serious deficiency in the pluralistic philosophy which I + profess. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0014" id="link2H_4_0014"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XII + </h2> + <p> + PROFESSOR HEBERT ON PRAGMATISM [Footnote: Reprint from the Journal of + Philosophy for December 3, 1908 (vol. v, p. 689), of a review of Le + Pragmatisme et ses Diverses Formes Anglo-Americaines, by Marcel Hebert. + (Paris: Librairie critique Emile Nourry. 1908. Pp. 105.)] + </p> + <p> + Professor Marcel Hebert is a singularly erudite and liberal thinker (a + seceder, I believe, from the Catholic priesthood) and an uncommonly direct + and clear writer. His book Le Divin is one of the ablest reviews of the + general subject of religious philosophy which recent years have produced; + and in the small volume the title of which is copied above he has, + perhaps, taken more pains not to do injustice to pragmatism than any of + its numerous critics. Yet the usual fatal misapprehension of its purposes + vitiates his exposition and his critique. His pamphlet seems to me to form + a worthy hook, as it were, on which to hang one more attempt to tell the + reader what the pragmatist account of truth really means. + </p> + <p> + M. Hebert takes it to mean what most people take it to mean, the doctrine, + namely, that whatever proves subjectively expedient in the way of our + thinking is 'true' in the absolute and unrestricted sense of the word, + whether it corresponds to any objective state of things outside of our + thought or not. Assuming this to be the pragmatist thesis, M. Hebert + opposes it at length. Thought that proves itself to be thus expedient may, + indeed, have every OTHER kind of value for the thinker, he says, but + cognitive value, representative value, VALEUR DE CONNAISSANCE PROPREMENT + DITE, it has not; and when it does have a high degree of general utility + value, this is in every case derived from its previous value in the way of + correctly representing independent objects that have an important + influence on our lives. Only by thus representing things truly do we reap + the useful fruits. But the fruits follow on the truth, they do not + constitute it; so M. Hebert accuses pragmatism of telling us everything + about truth except what it essentially is. He admits, indeed, that the + world is so framed that when men have true ideas of realities, + consequential utilities ensue in abundance; and no one of our critics, I + think, has shown as concrete a sense of the variety of these utilities as + he has; but he reiterates that, whereas such utilities are secondary, we + insist on treating them as primary, and that the connaissance objective + from which they draw all their being is something which we neglect, + exclude, and destroy. The utilitarian value and the strictly cognitive + value of our ideas may perfectly well harmonize, he says—and in the + main he allows that they do harmonize—but they are not logically + identical for that. He admits that subjective interests, desires, impulses + may even have the active 'primacy' in our intellectual life. Cognition + awakens only at their spur, and follows their cues and aims; yet, when it + IS awakened, it is objective cognition proper and not merely another name + for the impulsive tendencies themselves in the state of satisfaction. The + owner of a picture ascribed to Corot gets uneasy when its authenticity is + doubted. He looks up its origin and is reassured. But his uneasiness does + not make the proposition false, any more than his relief makes the + proposition true, that the actual Corot was the painter. Pragmatism, + which, according to M. Hebert, claims that our sentiments MAKE truth and + falsehood, would oblige us to conclude that our minds exert no genuinely + cognitive function whatever. + </p> + <p> + This subjectivist interpretation of our position seems to follow from my + having happened to write (without supposing it necessary to explain that I + was treating of cognition solely on its subjective side) that in the long + run the true is the expedient in the way of our thinking, much as the good + is the expedient in the way of our behavior! Having previously written + that truth means 'agreement with reality,' and insisted that the chief + part of the expediency of any one opinion is its agreement with the rest + of acknowledged truth, I apprehended no exclusively subjectivistic reading + of my meaning. My mind was so filled with the notion of objective + reference that I never dreamed that my hearers would let go of it; and the + very last accusation I expected was that in speaking of ideas and their + satisfactions, I was denying realities outside. My only wonder now is that + critics should have found so silly a personage as I must have seemed in + their eyes, worthy of explicit refutation. + </p> + <p> + The object, for me, is just as much one part of reality as the idea is + another part. The truth of the idea is one relation of it to the reality, + just as its date and its place are other relations. All three relations + CONSIST of intervening parts of the universe which can in every particular + case be assigned and catalogued, and which differ in every instance of + truth, just as they differ with every date and place. + </p> + <p> + The pragmatist thesis, as Dr. Schiller and I hold it,—I prefer to + let Professor Dewey speak for himself,—is that the relation called + 'truth' is thus concretely DEFINABLE. Ours is the only articulate attempt + in the field to say positively what truth actually CONSISTS OF. Our + denouncers have literally nothing to oppose to it as an alternative. For + them, when an idea is true, it IS true, and there the matter terminates; + the word 'true' being indefinable. The relation of the true idea to its + object, being, as they think, unique, it can be expressed in terms of + nothing else, and needs only to be named for any one to recognize and + understand it. Moreover it is invariable and universal, the same in every + single instance of truth, however diverse the ideas, the realities, and + the other relations between them may be. + </p> + <p> + Our pragmatist view, on the contrary, is that the truth-relation is a + definitely experienceable relation, and therefore describable as well as + namable; that it is not unique in kind, and neither invariable nor + universal. The relation to its object that makes an idea true in any given + instance, is, we say, embodied in intermediate details of reality which + lead towards the object, which vary in every instance, and which in every + instance can be concretely traced. The chain of workings which an opinion + sets up IS the opinion's truth, falsehood, or irrelevancy, as the case may + be. Every idea that a man has works some consequences in him, in the shape + either of bodily actions or of other ideas. Through these consequences the + man's relations to surrounding realities are modified. He is carried + nearer to some of them and farther from others, and gets now the feeling + that the idea has worked satisfactorily, now that it has not. The idea has + put him into touch with something that fulfils its intent, or it has not. + </p> + <p> + This something is the MAN'S OBJECT, primarily. Since the only realities we + can talk about are such OBJECTS-BELIEVED-IN, the pragmatist, whenever he + says 'reality,' means in the first instance what may count for the man + himself as a reality, what he believes at the moment to be such. Sometimes + the reality is a concrete sensible presence. The idea, for example, may be + that a certain door opens into a room where a glass of beer may be bought. + If opening the door leads to the actual sight and taste of the beer, the + man calls the idea true. Or his idea may be that of an abstract relation, + say of that between the sides and the hypothenuse of a triangle, such a + relation being, of course, a reality quite as much as a glass of beer is. + If the thought of such a relation leads him to draw auxiliary lines and to + compare the figures they make, he may at last, perceiving one equality + after another, SEE the relation thought of, by a vision quite as + particular and direct as was the taste of the beer. If he does so, he + calls THAT idea, also, true. His idea has, in each case, brought him into + closer touch with a reality felt at the moment to verify just that idea. + Each reality verifies and validates its own idea exclusively; and in each + case the verification consists in the satisfactorily-ending consequences, + mental or physical, which the idea was able to set up. These 'workings' + differ in every single instance, they never transcend experience, they + consist of particulars, mental or sensible, and they admit of concrete + description in every individual case. Pragmatists are unable to see what + you can possibly MEAN by calling an idea true, unless you mean that + between it as a terminus a quo in some one's mind and some particular + reality as a terminus ad quem, such concrete workings do or may intervene. + Their direction constitutes the idea's reference to that reality, their + satisfactoriness constitutes its adaptation thereto, and the two things + together constitute the 'truth' of the idea for its possessor. Without + such intermediating portions of concretely real experience the pragmatist + sees no materials out of which the adaptive relation called truth can be + built up. + </p> + <p> + The anti-pragmatist view is that the workings are but evidences of the + truth's previous inherent presence in the idea, and that you can wipe the + very possibility of them out of existence and still leave the truth of the + idea as solid as ever. But surely this is not a counter-theory of truth to + ours. It is the renunciation of all articulate theory. It is but a claim + to the right to call certain ideas true anyhow; and this is what I meant + above by saying that the anti-pragmatists offer us no real alternative, + and that our account is literally the only positive theory extant. What + meaning, indeed, can an idea's truth have save its power of adapting us + either mentally or physically to a reality? + </p> + <p> + How comes it, then, that our critics so uniformly accuse us of + subjectivism, of denying the reality's existence? It comes, I think, from + the necessary predominance of subjective language in our analysis. However + independent and elective realities may be, we can talk about them, in + framing our accounts of truth, only as so many objects believed-in. But + the process of experience leads men so continually to supersede their + older objects by newer ones which they find it more satisfactory to + believe in, that the notion of an ABSOLUTE reality inevitably arises as a + grenzbegriff, equivalent to that of an object that shall never be + superseded, and belief in which shall be endgueltig. Cognitively we thus + live under a sort of rule of three: as our private concepts represent the + sense-objects to which they lead us, these being public realities + independent of the individual, so these sense-realities may, in turn, + represent realities of a hypersensible order, electrons, mind-stuff. God, + or what not, existing independently of all human thinkers. The notion of + such final realities, knowledge of which would be absolute truth, is an + outgrowth of our cognitive experience from which neither pragmatists nor + anti-pragmatists escape. They form an inevitable regulative postulate in + every one's thinking. Our notion of them is the most abundantly suggested + and satisfied of all our beliefs, the last to suffer doubt. The difference + is that our critics use this belief as their sole paradigm, and treat any + one who talks of human realities as if he thought the notion of reality + 'in itself' illegitimate. Meanwhile, reality-in-itself, so far as by them + TALKED OF, is only a human object; they postulate it just as we postulate + it; and if we are subjectivists they are so no less. Realities in + themselves can be there FOR any one, whether pragmatist or + anti-pragmatist, only by being believed; they are believed only by their + notions appearing true; and their notions appear true only because they + work satisfactorily. Satisfactorily, moreover, for the particular + thinker's purpose. There is no idea which is THE true idea, of anything. + Whose is THE true idea of the absolute? Or to take M. Hebert's example, + what is THE true idea of a picture which you possess? It is the idea that + most satisfactorily meets your present interest. The interest may be in + the picture's place, its age, its 'tone,' its subject, its dimensions, its + authorship, its price, its merit, or what not. If its authorship by Corot + have been doubted, what will satisfy the interest aroused in you at that + moment will be to have your claim to own a Corot confirmed; but, if you + have a normal human mind, merely calling it a Corot will not satisfy other + demands of your mind at the same time. For THEM to be satisfied, what you + learn of the picture must make smooth connection with what you know of the + rest of the system of reality in which the actual Corot played his part. + M. Hebert accuses us of holding that the proprietary satisfactions of + themselves suffice to make the belief true, and that, so far as we are + concerned, no actual Corot need ever have existed. Why we should be thus + cut off from the more general and intellectual satisfactions, I know not; + but whatever the satisfactions may be, intellectual or proprietary, they + belong to the subjective side of the truth-relation. They found our + beliefs; our beliefs are in realities; if no realities are there, the + beliefs are false but if realities are there, how they can even be KNOWN + without first being BELIEVED; or how BELIEVED except by our first having + ideas of them that work satisfactorily, pragmatists find it impossible to + imagine. They also find it impossible to imagine what makes the + anti-pragmatists' dogmatic 'ipse dixit' assurance of reality more credible + than the pragmatists conviction based on concrete verifications. M. Hebert + will probably agree to this, when put in this way, so I do not see our + inferiority to him in the matter of connaissance proprement dite. + </p> + <p> + Some readers will say that, altho I may possibly believe in realities + beyond our ideas Dr. Schiller, at any rate, does not. This is a great + misunderstanding, for Schiller's doctrine and mine are identical, only our + exposition follow different directions. He starts from the subjective pole + of the chain, the individual with his beliefs, as the more concrete and + immediately given phenomenon. 'An individual claims his belief to be + true,' Schiller says, 'but what does he mean by true? and how does he + establish the claim?' With these questions we embark on a psychological + inquiry. To be true, it appears, means, FOR THAT INDIVIDUAL, to work + satisfactorily for him; and the working and the satisfaction, since they + vary from case to case, admit of no universal description. What works is + true and represents a reality, for the individual for whom it works. If he + is infallible, the reality is 'really' there; if mistaken it is not there, + or not there as he thinks it. We all believe, when our ideas work + satisfactorily; but we don't yet know who of us is infallible; so that the + problem of truth and that of error are EBENBURTIG and arise out of the + same situations. Schiller, remaining with the fallible individual, and + treating only of reality-for-him, seems to many of his readers to ignore + reality-in-itself altogether. But that is because he seeks only to tell us + how truths are attained, not what the content of those truths, when + attained, shall be. It may be that the truest of all beliefs shall be that + in transsubjective realities. It certainly SEEMS the truest for no rival + belief is as voluminously satisfactory, and it is probably Dr. Schiller's + own belief; but he is not required, for his immediate purpose, to profess + it. Still less is he obliged to assume it in advance as the basis of his + discussion. + </p> + <p> + I, however, warned by the ways of critics, adopt different tactics. I + start from the object-pole of the idea-reality chain and follow it in the + opposite direction from Schiller's. Anticipating the results of the + general truth-processes of mankind, I begin with the abstract notion of an + objective reality. I postulate it, and ask on my own account, I VOUCHING + FOR THIS REALITY, what would make any one else's idea of it true for me as + well as for him. But I find no different answer from that which Schiller + gives. If the other man's idea leads him, not only to believe that the + reality is there, but to use it as the reality's temporary substitute, by + letting it evoke adaptive thoughts and acts similar to those which the + reality itself would provoke, then it is true in the only intelligible + sense, true through its particular consequences, and true for me as well + as for the man. + </p> + <p> + My account is more of a logical definition; Schiller's is more of a + psychological description. Both treat an absolutely identical matter of + experience, only they traverse it in opposite ways. + </p> + <p> + Possibly these explanations may satisfy M. Hebert, whose little book, + apart from the false accusation of subjectivism, gives a fairly + instructive account of the pragmatist epistemology. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0015" id="link2H_4_0015"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XIII + </h2> + <h3> + ABSTRACTIONISM AND 'RELATIVISMUS' + </h3> + <p> + Abstract concepts, such as elasticity, voluminousness, disconnectedness, + are salient aspects of our concrete experiences which we find it useful to + single out. Useful, because we are then reminded of other things that + offer those same aspects; and, if the aspects carry consequences in those + other things, we can return to our first things, expecting those same + consequences to accrue. + </p> + <p> + To be helped to anticipate consequences is always a gain, and such being + the help that abstract concepts give us, it is obvious that their use is + fulfilled only when we get back again into concrete particulars by their + means, bearing the consequences in our minds, and enriching our notion of + the original objects therewithal. + </p> + <p> + Without abstract concepts to handle our perceptual particulars by, we are + like men hopping on one foot. Using concepts along with the particulars, + we become bipedal. We throw our concept forward, get a foothold on the + consequence, hitch our line to this, and draw our percept up, travelling + thus with a hop, skip and jump over the surface of life at a vastly + rapider rate than if we merely waded through the thickness of the + particulars as accident rained them down upon our heads. Animals have to + do this, but men raise their heads higher and breathe freely in the upper + conceptual air. + </p> + <p> + The enormous esteem professed by all philosophers for the conceptual form + of consciousness is easy to understand. From Plato's time downwards it has + been held to be our sole avenue to essential truth. Concepts are + universal, changeless, pure; their relations are eternal; they are + spiritual, while the concrete particulars which they enable us to handle + are corrupted by the flesh. They are precious in themselves, then, apart + from their original use, and confer new dignity upon our life. + </p> + <p> + One can find no fault with this way of feeling about concepts so long as + their original function does not get swallowed up in the admiration and + lost. That function is of course to enlarge mentally our momentary + experiences by ADDING to them the consequences conceived; but + unfortunately, that function is not only too often forgotten by + philosophers in their reasonings, but is often converted into its exact + opposite, and made a means of diminishing the original experience by + DENYING (implicitly or explicitly) all its features save the one specially + abstracted to conceive it by. + </p> + <p> + This itself is a highly abstract way of stating my complaint, and it needs + to be redeemed from obscurity by showing instances of what is meant. Some + beliefs very dear to my own heart have been conceived in this viciously + abstract way by critics. One is the 'will to believe,' so called; another + is the indeterminism of certain futures; a third is the notion that truth + may vary with the standpoint of the man who holds it. I believe that the + perverse abuse of the abstracting function has led critics to employ false + arguments against these doctrines, and often has led their readers to + false conclusions. I should like to try to save the situation, if + possible, by a few counter-critical remarks. + </p> + <p> + Let me give the name of 'vicious abstractionism' to a way of using + concepts which may be thus described: We conceive a concrete situation by + singling out some salient or important feature in it, and classing it + under that; then, instead of adding to its previous characters all the + positive consequences which the new way of conceiving it may bring, we + proceed to use our concept privatively; reducing the originally rich + phenomenon to the naked suggestions of that name abstractly taken, + treating it as a case of 'nothing but' that concept, and acting as if all + the other characters from out of which the concept is abstracted were + expunged. [Footnote: Let not the reader confound the fallacy here + described with legitimately negative inferences such as those drawn in the + mood 'celarent' of the logic-books.] Abstraction, functioning in this way, + becomes a means of arrest far more than a means of advance in thought. It + mutilates things; it creates difficulties and finds impossibilities; and + more than half the trouble that metaphysicians and logicians give + themselves over the paradoxes and dialectic puzzles of the universe may, I + am convinced, be traced to this relatively simple source. THE VICIOUSLY + PRIVATIVE EMPLOYMENT OF ABSTRACT CHARACTERS AND CLASS NAMES is, I am + persuaded, one of the great original sins of the rationalistic mind. + </p> + <p> + To proceed immediately to concrete examples, cast a glance at the belief + in 'free will,' demolished with such specious persuasiveness recently by + the skilful hand of Professor Fullerton. [Footnote: Popular Science + Monthly, N. Y., vols. lviii and lix.] When a common man says that his will + is free, what does he mean? He means that there are situations of + bifurcation inside of his life in which two futures seem to him equally + possible, for both have their roots equally planted in his present and his + past. Either, if realized, will grow out of his previous motives, + character and circumstances, and will continue uninterruptedly the + pulsations of his personal life. But sometimes both at once are + incompatible with physical nature, and then it seems to the naive observer + as if he made a choice between them NOW, and that the question of which + future is to be, instead of having been decided at the foundation of the + world, were decided afresh at every passing moment in I which fact seems + livingly to grow, and possibility seems, in turning itself towards one + act, to exclude all others. + </p> + <p> + He who takes things at their face-value here may indeed be deceived. He + may far too often mistake his private ignorance of what is predetermined + for a real indetermination of what is to be. Yet, however imaginary it may + be, his picture of the situation offers no appearance of breach between + the past and future. A train is the same train, its passengers are the + same passengers, its momentum is the same momentum, no matter which way + the switch which fixes its direction is placed. For the indeterminist + there is at all times enough past for all the different futures in sight, + and more besides, to find their reasons in it, and whichever future comes + will slide out of that past as easily as the train slides by the switch. + The world, in short, is just as CONTINUOUS WITH ITSELF for the believers + in free will as for the rigorous determinists, only the latter are unable + to believe in points of bifurcation as spots of really indifferent + equilibrium or as containing shunts which there—and there only, NOT + BEFORE—direct existing motions without altering their amount. + </p> + <p> + Were there such spots of indifference, the rigorous determinists think, + the future and the past would be separated absolutely, for, ABSTRACTLY + TAKEN, THE WORD 'INDIFFERENT' SUGGESTS DISCONNECTION SOLELY. Whatever is + indifferent is in so far forth unrelated and detached. Take the term thus + strictly, and you see, they tell us, that if any spot of indifference is + found upon the broad highway between the past and the future, then no + connection of any sort whatever, no continuous momentum, no identical + passenger, no common aim or agent, can be found on both sides of the shunt + or switch which there is moved. The place is an impassable chasm. + </p> + <p> + Mr. Fullerton writes—the italics are mine—as follows:— + </p> + <p> + 'In so far as my action is free, what I have been, what I am, what I have + always done or striven to do, what I most earnestly wish or resolve to do + at the present moment—these things can have NO MORE TO DO WITH ITS + FUTURE REALIZATION THAN IF THEY HAD NO EXISTENCE.... The possibility is a + hideous one; and surely even the most ardent free-willist will, when he + contemplates it frankly, excuse me for hoping that if I am free I am at + least not very free, and that I may reasonably expect to find SOME degree + of consistency in my life and actions. ... Suppose that I have given a + dollar to a blind beggar. Can I, if it is really an act of free-will, be + properly said to have given the money? Was it given because I was a man of + tender heart, etc., etc.? ... What has all this to do with acts of + free-will? If they are free, they must not be conditioned by antecedent + circumstances of any sort, by the misery of the beggar, by the pity in the + heart of the passer-by. They must be causeless, not determined. They must + drop from a clear sky out of the void, for just in so far as they can be + accounted for, they are not free.' [Footnote: Loc. cit., vol. lviii, pp. + 189, 188.] + </p> + <p> + Heaven forbid that I should get entangled here in a controversy about the + rights and wrongs of the free-will question at large, for I am only trying + to illustrate vicious abstractionism by the conduct of some of the + doctrine's assailants. The moments of bifurcation, as the indeterminist + seems to himself to experience them, are moments both of re-direction and + of continuation. But because in the 'either—or' of the re-direction + we hesitate, the determinist abstracts this little element of + discontinuity from the superabundant continuities of the experience, and + cancels in its behalf all the connective characters with which the latter + is filled. Choice, for him, means henceforward DISconnection pure and + simple, something undetermined in advance IN ANY RESPECT WHATEVER, and a + life of choices must be a raving chaos, at no two moments of which could + we be treated as one and the same man. If Nero were 'free' at. the moment + of ordering his mother's murder, Mr. McTaggart [Footnote: Some Dogmas of + Religion, p. 179.] assures us that no one would have the right at any + other moment to call him a bad man, for he would then be an absolutely + other Nero. + </p> + <p> + A polemic author ought not merely to destroy his victim. He ought to try a + bit to make him feel his error—perhaps not enough to convert him, + but enough to give him a bad conscience and to weaken the energy of his + defence. These violent caricatures of men's beliefs arouse only contempt + for the incapacity of their authors to see the situations out of which the + problems grow. To treat the negative character of one abstracted element + as annulling all the positive features with which it coexists, is no way + to change any actual indeterminist's way of looking on the matter, tho it + may make the gallery applaud. + </p> + <p> + Turn now to some criticisms of the 'will to believe,' as another example + of the vicious way in which abstraction is currently employed. The right + to believe in things for the truth of which complete objective proof is + yet lacking is defended by those who apprehend certain human situations in + their concreteness. In those situations the mind has alternatives before + it so vast that the full evidence for either branch is missing, and yet so + significant that simply to wait for proof, and to doubt while waiting, + might often in practical respects be the same thing as weighing down the + negative side. Is life worth while at all? Is there any general meaning in + all this cosmic weather? Is anything being permanently bought by all this + suffering? Is there perhaps a transmundane experience in Being, something + corresponding to a 'fourth dimension,' which, if we had access to it, + might patch up some of this world's zerrissenheit and make things look + more rational than they at first appear? Is there a superhuman + consciousness of which our minds are parts, and from which inspiration and + help may come? Such are the questions in which the right to take sides + practically for yes or no is affirmed by some of us, while others hold + that this is methodologically inadmissible, and summon us to die + professing ignorance and proclaiming the duty of every one to refuse to + believe. + </p> + <p> + I say nothing of the personal inconsistency of some of these critics, + whose printed works furnish exquisite illustrations of the will to + believe, in spite of their denunciations of it as a phrase and as a + recommended thing. Mr. McTaggart, whom I will once more take as an + example, is sure that 'reality is rational and righteous' and 'destined + sub specie temporis to become perfectly good'; and his calling this belief + a result of necessary logic has surely never deceived any reader as to its + real genesis in the gifted author's mind. Mankind is made on too uniform a + pattern for any of us to escape successfully from acts of faith. We have a + lively vision of what a certain view of the universe would mean for us. We + kindle or we shudder at the thought, and our feeling runs through our + whole logical nature and animates its workings. It CAN'T be that, we feel; + it MUST be this. It must be what it OUGHT to be, and OUGHT to be this; and + then we seek for every reason, good or bad, to make this which so deeply + ought to be, seem objectively the probable thing. We show the arguments + against it to be insufficient, so that it MAY be true; we represent its + appeal to be to our whole nature's loyalty and not to any emaciated + faculty of syllogistic proof. We reinforce it by remembering the + enlargement of our world by music, by thinking of the promises of sunsets + and the impulses from vernal woods. And the essence of the whole + experience, when the individual swept through it says finally 'I believe,' + is the intense concreteness of his vision, the individuality of the + hypothesis before him, and the complexity of the various concrete motives + and perceptions that issue in his final state. + </p> + <p> + But see now how the abstractionist treats this rich and intricate vision + that a certain state of things must be true. He accuses the believer of + reasoning by the following syllogism:— + </p> + <p> + All good desires must be fulfilled; The desire to believe this proposition + is a good desire; + </p> + <p> + Ergo, this proposition must be believed. + </p> + <p> + He substitutes this abstraction for the concrete state of mind of the + believer, pins the naked absurdity of it upon him, and easily proves that + any one who defends him must be the greatest fool on earth. As if any real + believer ever thought in this preposterous way, or as if any defender of + the legitimacy of men's concrete ways of concluding ever used the abstract + and general premise, 'All desires must be fulfilled'! Nevertheless, Mr. + McTaggart solemnly and laboriously refutes the syllogism in sections 47 to + 57 of the above-cited book. He shows that there is no fixed link in the + dictionary between the abstract concepts 'desire,' 'goodness' and + 'reality'; and he ignores all the links which in the single concrete case + the believer feels and perceives to be there! He adds:— + </p> + <p> + 'When the reality of a thing is uncertain, the argument encourages us to + suppose that our approval of a thing can determine its reality. And when + this unhallowed link has once been established, retribution overtakes us. + For when the reality of the thing is independently certain, we [then] have + to admit that the reality of the thing should determine our approval of + that thing. I find it difficult to imagine a more degraded position.' + </p> + <p> + One here feels tempted to quote ironically Hegel's famous equation of the + real with the rational to his english disciple, who ends his chapter with + the heroic words:— + </p> + <p> + 'For those who do not pray, there remains the resolve that, so far as + their strength may permit, neither the pains of death nor the pains of + life shall drive them to any comfort in that which they hold to be false, + or drive them from any comfort [discomfort?] in that which they hold to be + true.' + </p> + <p> + How can so ingenious-minded a writer fail to see how far over the heads of + the enemy all his arrows pass? When Mr. McTaggart himself believes that + the universe is run by the dialectic energy of the absolute idea, his + insistent desire to have a world of that sort is felt by him to be no + chance example of desire in general, but an altogether peculiar + insight-giving passion to which, in this if in no other instance, he would + be stupid not to yield. He obeys its concrete singularity, not the bare + abstract feature in it of being a 'desire.' His situation is as particular + as that of an actress who resolves that it is best for her to marry and + leave the stage, of a priest who becomes secular, of a politician who + abandons public life. What sensible man would seek to refute the concrete + decisions of such persons by tracing them to abstract premises, such as + that 'all actresses must marry,' 'all clergymen must be laymen,' 'all + politicians should resign their posts'? Yet this type of refutation, + absolutely unavailing though it be for purposes of conversion, is spread + by Mr. McTaggart through many pages of his book. For the aboundingness of + our real reasons he substitutes one narrow point. For men's real + probabilities he gives a skeletonized abstraction which no man was ever + tempted to believe. + </p> + <p> + The abstraction in my next example is less simple, but is quite as flimsy + as a weapon of attack. Empiricists think that truth in general is + distilled from single men's beliefs; and the so-called pragmatists 'go + them one better' by trying to define what it consists in when it comes. It + consists, I have elsewhere said, in such a working on the part of the + beliefs as may bring the man into satisfactory relations with objects to + which these latter point. The working is of course a concrete working in + the actual experience of human beings, among their ideas, feelings, + perceptions, beliefs and acts, as well as among the physical things of + their environment, and the relations must be understood as being possible + as well as actual. In the chapter on truth of my book Pragmatism I have + taken pains to defend energetically this view. Strange indeed have been + the misconceptions of it by its enemies, and many have these latter been. + Among the most formidable-sounding onslaughts on the attempt to introduce + some concreteness into our notion of what the truth of an idea may mean, + is one that has been raised in many quarters to the effect that to make + truth grow in any way out of human opinion is but to reproduce that + protagorean doctrine that the individual man is 'the measure of all + things,' which Plato in his immortal dialogue, the Thaeatetus, is + unanimously said to have laid away so comfortably in its grave two + thousand years ago. The two cleverest brandishers of this objection to + make truth concrete, Professors Rickert and Munsterberg, write in German, + [Footnote: Munsterberg's book has just appeared in an English version: The + Eternal Values, Boston, 1909.] and 'relativismus' is the name they give to + the heresy which they endeavor to uproot. + </p> + <p> + The first step in their campaign against 'relativismus' is entirely in the + air. They accuse relativists—and we pragmatists are typical + relativists—of being debarred by their self-adopted principles, not + only from the privilege which rationalist philosophers enjoy, of believing + that these principles of their own are truth impersonal and absolute, but + even of framing the abstract notion of such a truth, in the pragmatic + sense, of an ideal opinion in which all men might agree, and which no man + should ever wish to change. Both charges fall wide of their mark. I + myself, as a pragmatist, believe in my own account of truth as firmly as + any rationalist can possibly believe in his. And I believe in it for the + very reason that I have the idea of truth which my learned adversaries + contend that no pragmatist can frame. I expect, namely, that the more + fully men discuss and test my account, the more they will agree that it + fits, and the less will they desire a change. I may of course be premature + in this confidence, and the glory of being truth final and absolute may + fall upon some later revision and correction of my scheme, which later + will then be judged untrue in just the measure in which it departs from + that finally satisfactory formulation. To admit, as we pragmatists do, + that we are liable to correction (even tho we may not expect it) involves + the use on our part of an ideal standard. Rationalists themselves are, as + individuals, sometimes sceptical enough to admit the abstract possibility + of their own present opinions being corrigible and revisable to some + degree, so the fact that the mere NOTION of an absolute standard should + seem to them so important a thing to claim for themselves and to deny to + us is not easy to explain. If, along with the notion of the standard, they + could also claim its exclusive warrant for their own fulminations now, it + would be important to them indeed. But absolutists like Rickert freely + admit the sterility of the notion, even in their own hands. Truth is what + we OUGHT to believe, they say, even tho no man ever did or shall believe + it, and even tho we have no way of getting at it save by the usual + empirical processes of testing our opinions by one another and by facts. + Pragmatically, then, this part of the dispute is idle. No relativist who + ever actually walked the earth [Footnote: Of course the bugaboo creature + called 'the sceptic' in the logic-books, who dogmatically makes the + statement that no statement, not even the one he now makes, is true, is a + mere mechanical toy—target for the rationalist shooting-gallery—hit + him and he turns a summersault—yet he is the only sort of relativist + whom my colleagues appear able to imagine to exist.] has denied the + regulative character in his own thinking of the notion of absolute truth. + What is challenged by relativists is the pretence on any one's part to + have found for certain at any given moment what the shape of that truth + is. Since the better absolutists agree in this, admitting that the + proposition 'There is absolute truth' is the only absolute truth of which + we can be sure, [Footnote: Compare Bickert's Gegenstand der Erkentniss, + pp. 187, 138. Munsterberg's version of this first truth is that 'Es gibt + eine Welt,'—see his Philosophie der Werte, pp. 38 and 74 And, after + all, both these philosophers confess in the end that the primal truth of + which they consider our supposed denial so irrational is not properly an + insight at all, but a dogma adopted by the will which any one who turns + his back on duty may disregard! But if it all reverts to 'the will to + believe,' pragmatists have that privilege as well as their critics.] + further debate is practically unimportant, so we may pass to their next + charge. + </p> + <p> + It is in this charge that the vicious abstractionism becomes most + apparent. The antipragmatist, in postulating absolute truth, refuses to + give any account of what the words may mean. For him they form a + self-explanatory term. The pragmatist, on the contrary, articulately + defines their meaning. Truth absolute, he says, means an ideal set of + formulations towards which all opinions may in the long run of experience + be expected to converge. In this definition of absolute truth he not only + postulates that there is a tendency to such convergence of opinions, to + such ultimate consensus, but he postulates the other factors of his + definition equally, borrowing them by anticipation from the true + conclusions expected to be reached. He postulates the existence of + opinions, he postulates the experience that will sift them, and the + consistency which that experience will show. He justifies himself in these + assumptions by saying that they are not postulates in the strict sense but + simple inductions from the past extended to the future by analogy; and he + insists that human opinion has already reached a pretty stable equilibrium + regarding them, and that if its future development fails to alter them, + the definition itself, with all its terms included, will be part of the + very absolute truth which it defines. The hypothesis will, in short, have + worked successfully all round the circle and proved self-corroborative, + and the circle will be closed. + </p> + <p> + The anti-pragmatist, however, immediately falls foul of the word 'opinion' + here, abstracts it from the universe of life, and uses it as a bare + dictionary-substantive, to deny the rest of the assumptions which it + coexists withal. The dictionary says that an opinion is 'what some one + thinks or believes.' This definition leaves every one's opinion free to be + autogenous, or unrelated either to what any one else may think or to what + the truth may be. + </p> + <p> + Therefore, continue our abstractionists, we must conceive it as + essentially thus unrelated, so that even were a billion men to sport the + same opinion, and only one man to differ, we could admit no collateral + circumstances which might presumptively make it more probable that he, not + they, should be wrong. Truth, they say, follows not the counting of noses, + nor is it only another name for a majority vote. It is a relation that + antedates experience, between our opinions and an independent something + which the pragmatist account ignores, a relation which, tho the opinions + of individuals should to all eternity deny it, would still remain to + qualify them as false. To talk of opinions without referring to this + independent something, the anti-pragmatist assures us, is to play Hamlet + with Hamlet's part left out. + </p> + <p> + But when the pragmatist speaks of opinions, does he mean any such + insulated and unmotived abstractions as are here supposed? Of course not, + he means men's opinions in the flesh, as they have really formed + themselves, opinions surrounded by their causes and the influences they + obey and exert, and along with the whole environment of social + communication of which they are a part and out of which they take their + rise. Moreover the 'experience' which the pragmatic definition postulates + is the independent something which the anti-pragmatist accuses him of + ignoring. Already have men grown unanimous in the opinion that such + experience is of an independent reality, the existence of which all + opinions must acknowledge, in order to be true. Already do they agree that + in the long run it is useless to resist experience's pressure; that the + more of it a man has, the better position he stands in, in respect of + truth; that some men, having had more experience, are therefore better + authorities than others; that some are also wiser by nature and better + able to interpret the experience they have had; that it is one part of + such wisdom to compare notes, discuss, and follow the opinion of our + betters; and that the more systematically and thoroughly such comparison + and weighing of opinions is pursued, the truer the opinions that survive + are likely to be. When the pragmatist talks of opinions, it is opinions as + they thus concretely and livingly and interactingly and correlatively + exist that he has in mind; and when the anti-pragmatist tries to floor him + because the word 'opinion' can also be taken abstractly and as if it had + no environment, he simply ignores the soil out of which the whole + discussion grows. His weapons cut the air and strike no blow. No one gets + wounded in the war against caricatures of belief and skeletons of opinion + of which the German onslaughts upon 'relativismus' consists. Refuse to use + the word 'opinion' abstractly, keep it in its real environment, and the + withers of pragmatism remain unwrung. That men do exist who are + 'opinionated,' in the sense that their opinions are self-willed, is + unfortunately a fact that must be admitted, no matter what one's notion of + truth in general may be. But that this fact should make it impossible for + truth to form itself authentically out of the life of opinion is what no + critic has yet proved. Truth may well consist of certain opinions, and + does indeed consist of nothing but opinions, tho not every opinion need be + true. No pragmatist needs to dogmatize about the consensus of opinion in + the future being right—he need only postulate that it will probably + contain more of truth than any one's opinion now. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0016" id="link2H_4_0016"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XIV + </h2> + <h3> + TWO ENGLISH CRITICS + </h3> + <p> + Mr. Bertrand Russell's article entitled 'Transatlantic Truth,' [Footnote: + In the Albany Review for January, 1908.] has all the clearness, dialectic + subtlety, and wit which one expects from his pen, but it entirely fails to + hit the right point of view for apprehending our position. When, for + instance, we say that a true proposition is one the consequences of + believing which are good, he assumes us to mean that any one who believes + a proposition to be true must first have made out clearly that its + consequences be good, and that his belief must primarily be in that fact,—an + obvious absurdity, for that fact is the deliverance of a new proposition, + quite different from the first one and is, moreover, a fact usually very + hard to verify, it being 'far easier,' as Mr. Russell justly says, 'to + settle the plain question of fact: "Have popes always been infallible?"' + than to settle the question whether the effects of thinking them + infallible are on the whole good.' + </p> + <p> + We affirm nothing as silly as Mr. Russell supposes. Good consequences are + not proposed by us merely as a sure sign, mark, or criterion, by which + truth's presence is habitually ascertained, tho they may indeed serve on + occasion as such a sign; they are proposed rather as the lurking motive + inside of every truth-claim, whether the 'trower' be conscious of such + motive, or whether he obey it blindly. They are proposed as the causa + existendi of our beliefs, not as their logical cue or premise, and still + less as their objective deliverance or content. They assign the only + intelligible practical meaning to that difference in our beliefs which our + habit of calling them true or false comports. + </p> + <p> + No truth-claimer except the pragmatist himself need ever be aware of the + part played in his own mind by consequences, and he himself is aware of it + only abstractly and in general, and may at any moment be quite oblivious + of it with respect to his own beliefs. + </p> + <p> + Mr. Russell next joins the army of those who inform their readers that + according to the pragmatist definition of the word 'truth' the belief that + A exists may be 'true' even when A does not exist. This is the usual + slander repeated to satiety by our critics. They forget that in any + concrete account of what is denoted by 'truth' in human life, the word can + only be used relatively to some particular trower. Thus, I may hold it + true that Shakespeare wrote the plays that bear his name, and may express + my opinion to a critic. If the critic be both a pragmatist and a baconian, + he will in his capacity of pragmatist see plain that the workings of my + opinion, I being who I am, make it perfectly true for me, while in his + capacity of baconian he still believes that Shakespeare never wrote the + plays in question. But most anti-pragmatist critics take the wont 'truth' + as something absolute, and easily play on their reader's readiness to + treat his OWE truths as the absolute ones. If the reader whom they address + believes that A does not exist, while we pragmatists show that those for + whom tho belief that it exists works satisfactorily will always call it + true, he easily sneers at the naivete of our contention, for is not then + the belief in question 'true,' tho what it declares as fact has, as the + reader so well knows, no existence? Mr. Russell speaks of our statement as + an 'attempt to get rid of fact' and naturally enough considers it 'a + failure' (p. 410). 'The old notion of truth reappears,' he adds—that + notion being, of course, that when a belief is true, its object does + exist. + </p> + <p> + It is, of course, BOUND to exist, on sound pragmatic principles. Concepts + signify consequences. How is the world made different for me by my + conceiving an opinion of mine under the concept 'true'? First, an object + must be findable there (or sure signs of such an object must be found) + which shall agree with the opinion. Second, such an opinion must not be + contradicted by anything else I am aware of. But in spite of the obvious + pragmatist requirement that when I have said truly that something exists, + it SHALL exist, the slander which Mr. Russell repeats has gained the + widest currency. + </p> + <p> + Mr. Russell himself is far too witty and athletic a ratiocinator simply to + repeat the slander dogmatically. Being nothing if not mathematical and + logical, he must prove the accusation secundum artem, and convict us not + so much of error as of absurdity. I have sincerely tried to follow the + windings of his mind in this procedure, but for the life of me I can only + see in it another example of what I have called (above, p. 249) vicious + abstractionism. The abstract world of mathematics and pure logic is so + native to Mr. Russell that he thinks that we describers of the functions + of concrete fact must also mean fixed mathematical terms and functions. A + mathematical term, as a, b, c, x, y, sin., log., is self-sufficient, and + terms of this sort, once equated, can be substituted for one another in + endless series without error. Mr. Russell, and also Mr. Hawtrey, of whom I + shall speak presently, seem to think that in our mouth also such terms as + 'meaning,' 'truth,' 'belief,' 'object,' 'definition,' are self-sufficients + with no context of varying relation that might be further asked about. + What a word means is expressed by its definition, isn't it? The definition + claims to be exact and adequate, doesn't it? Then it can be substituted + for the word—since the two are identical—can't it? Then two + words with the same definition can be substituted for one another, n'est—ce + pas? Likewise two definitions of the same word, nicht wahr, etc., etc., + till it will be indeed strange if you can't convict some one of + self-contradiction and absurdity. + </p> + <p> + The particular application of this rigoristic treatment to my own little + account of truth as working seems to be something like what follows. I say + 'working' is what the 'truth' of our ideas means, and call it a + definition. But since meanings and things meant, definitions and things + defined, are equivalent and interchangeable, and nothing extraneous to its + definition can be meant when a term is used, it follows that who so calls + an idea true, and means by that word that it works, cannot mean anything + else, can believe nothing but that it does work, and in particular can + neither imply nor allow anything about its object or deliverance. + 'According to the pragmatists,' Mr. Russell writes, 'to say "it is true + that other people exist" means "it is useful to believe that other people + exist." But if so, then these two phrases are merely different words for + the same proposition; therefore when I believe the one, I believe the + other' (p. 400). [Logic, I may say in passing, would seem to require Mr. + Russell to believe them both at once, but he ignores this consequence, and + considers that other people exist' and 'it is useful to believe that they + do EVEN IF THEY DON'T,' must be identical and therefore substitutable + propositions in the pragmatist mouth.] + </p> + <p> + But may not real terms, I now ask, have accidents not expressed in their + definitions? and when a real value is finally substituted for the result + of an algebraic series of substituted definitions, do not all these + accidents creep back? Beliefs have their objective 'content' or + 'deliverance' as well as their truth, and truth has its implications as + well as its workings. If any one believe that other men exist, it is both + a content of his belief and an implication of its truth, that they should + exist in fact. Mr. Russell's logic would seem to exclude, 'by definition,' + all such accidents as contents, implications, and associates, and would + represent us as translating all belief into a sort of belief in pragmatism + itself—of all things! If I say that a speech is eloquent, and + explain 'eloquent' as meaning the power to work in certain ways upon the + audience; or if I say a book is original, and define 'original' to mean + differing from other books, Russell's logic, if I follow it at all, would + seem to doom me to agreeing that the speech is about eloquence, and the + book about other books. When I call a belief true, and define its truth to + mean its workings, I certainly do not mean that the belief is a belief + ABOUT the workings. It is a belief about the object, and I who talk about + the workings am a different subject, with a different universe of + discourse, from that of the believer of whose concrete thinking I profess + to give an account. + </p> + <p> + The social proposition 'other men exist' and the pragmatist proposition + 'it is expedient to believe that other men exist' come from different + universes of discourse. One can believe the second without being logically + compelled to believe the first; one can believe the first without having + ever heard of the second; or one can believe them both. The first + expresses the object of a belief, the second tells of one condition of the + belief's power to maintain itself. There is no identity of any kind, save + the term 'other men' which they contain in common, in the two + propositions; and to treat them as mutually substitutable, or to insist + that we shall do so, is to give up dealing with realities altogether. + </p> + <p> + Mr. Ralph Hawtrey, who seems also to serve under the banner of + abstractionist logic, convicts us pragmatists of absurdity by arguments + similar to Mr. Russell's. [Footnote: See The New Quarterly, for March, + 1908.] + </p> + <p> + As a favor to us and for the sake of the argument, he abandons the word + 'true' to our fury, allowing it to mean nothing but the fact that certain + beliefs are expedient; and he uses the word 'correctness' (as Mr. Pratt + uses the word 'trueness') to designate a fact, not about the belief, but + about the belief's object, namely that it is as the belief declares it. + 'When therefore,' he writes, 'I say it is correct to say that Caesar is + dead, I mean "Caesar is dead." This must be regarded as the definition of + correctness.' And Mr. Hawtrey then goes on to demolish me by the conflict + of the definitions. What is 'true' for the pragmatist cannot be what is + 'correct,' he says, 'for the definitions are not logically + interchangeable; or if we interchange them, we reach the tautology: + </p> + <p> + "Caesar is dead" means "it is expedient to believe that Caesar is dead." + But what is it expedient to believe? Why, "that Caesar is dead." A + precious definition indeed of 'Caesar is dead.' + </p> + <p> + Mr. Hawtrey's conclusion would seem to be that the pragmatic definition of + the truth of a belief in no way implies—what?—that the + believer shall believe in his own belief's deliverance?—or that the + pragmatist who is talking about him shall believe in that deliverance? The + two cases are quite different. For the believer, Caesar must of course + really exist; for the pragmatist critic he need not, for the pragmatic + deliverance belongs, as I have just said, to another universe of discourse + altogether. When one argues by substituting definition for definition, one + needs to stay in the same universe. + </p> + <p> + The great shifting of universes in this discussion occurs when we carry + the word 'truth' from the subjective into the objective realm, applying it + sometimes to a property of opinions, sometimes to the facts which the + opinions assert. A number of writers, as Mr. Russell himself, Mr. G. E. + Moore, and others, favor the unlucky word 'proposition,' which seems + expressly invented to foster this confusion, for they speak of truth as a + property of 'propositions.' But in naming propositions it is almost + impossible not to use the word 'that.' + </p> + <p> + THAT Caesar is dead, THAT virtue is its own reward, are propositions. + </p> + <p> + I do not say that for certain logical purposes it may not be useful to + treat propositions as absolute entities, with truth or falsehood inside of + them respectively, or to make of a complex like 'that—Caesar—is—dead' + a single term and call it a 'truth.' But the 'that' here has the extremely + convenient ambiguity for those who wish to make trouble for us + pragmatists, that sometimes it means the FACT that, and sometimes the + BELIEF that, Caesar is no longer living. When I then call the belief true, + I am told that the truth means the fact; when I claim the fact also, I am + told that my definition has excluded the fact, being a definition only of + a certain peculiarity in the belief—so that in the end I have no + truth to talk about left in my possession. + </p> + <p> + The only remedy for this intolerable ambiguity is, it seems to me, to + stick to terms consistently. 'Reality,' 'idea' or 'belief,' and the 'truth + of the idea or belief,' which are the terms I have consistently held to, + seem to be free from all objection. + </p> + <p> + Whoever takes terms abstracted from all their natural settings, identifies + them with definitions, and treats the latter more algebraico, not only + risks mixing universes, but risks fallacies which the man in the street + easily detects. To prove 'by definition' that the statement 'Caesar + exists' is identical with a statement about 'expediency' because the one + statement is 'true' and the other is about 'true statements,' is like + proving that an omnibus is a boat because both are vehicles. A horse may + be defined as a beast that walks on the nails of his middle digits. + Whenever we see a horse we see such a beast, just as whenever we believe a + 'truth' we believe something expedient. Messrs. Russell and Hawtrey, if + they followed their antipragmatist logic, would have to say here that we + see THAT IT IS such a beast, a fact which notoriously no one sees who is + not a comparative anatomist. + </p> + <p> + It almost reconciles one to being no logician that one thereby escapes so + much abstractionism. Abstractionism of the worst sort dogs Mr. Russell in + his own trials to tell positively what the word 'truth' means. In the + third of his articles on Meinong, in Mind, vol. xiii, p. 509 (1904), he + attempts this feat by limiting the discussion to three terms only, a + proposition, its content, and an object, abstracting from the whole + context of associated realities in which such terms are found in every + case of actual knowing. He puts the terms, thus taken in a vacuum, and + made into bare logical entities, through every possible permutation and + combination, tortures them on the rack until nothing is left of them, and + after all this logical gymnastic, comes out with the following portentous + conclusion as what he believes to be the correct view: that there is no + problem at all in truth and falsehood, that some propositions are true and + some false, just as some roses are red and some white, that belief is a + certain attitude towards propositions, which is called knowledge when they + are true, error when they are false'—and he seems to think that when + once this insight is reached the question may be considered closed + forever! + </p> + <p> + In spite of my admiration of Mr. Russell's analytic powers, I wish, after + reading such an article, that pragmatism, even had it no other function, + might result in making him and other similarly gifted men ashamed of + having used such powers in such abstraction from reality. Pragmatism saves + us at any rate from such diseased abstractionism as those pages show. + </p> + <p> + P. S. Since the foregoing rejoinder was written an article on Pragmatism + which I believe to be by Mr. Russell has appeared in the Edinburgh Review + for April, 1909. As far as his discussion of the truth-problem goes, altho + he has evidently taken great pains to be fair, it seems to me that he has + in no essential respect improved upon his former arguments. I will + therefore add nothing further, but simply refer readers who may be curious + to pp. 272-280 of the said article. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0017" id="link2H_4_0017"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + XV + </h2> + <h3> + A DIALOGUE + </h3> + <p> + After correcting the proofs of all that precedes I imagine a residual + state of mind on the part of my reader which may still keep him + unconvinced, and which it may be my duty to try at least to dispel. I can + perhaps be briefer if I put what I have to say in dialogue form. Let then + the anti-pragmatist begin:— + </p> + <p> + Anti-Pragmatist:—You say that the truth of an idea is constituted by + its workings. Now suppose a certain state of facts, facts for example of + antediluvian planetary history, concerning which the question may be + asked: + </p> + <p> + 'Shall the truth about them ever be known?' And suppose (leaving the + hypothesis of an omniscient absolute out of the account) that we assume + that the truth is never to be known. I ask you now, brother pragmatist, + whether according to you there can be said to be any truth at all about + such a state of facts. Is there a truth, or is there not a truth, in cases + where at any rate it never comes to be known? + </p> + <p> + Pragmatist:—Why do you ask me such a question? + </p> + <p> + Anti-Prag.:—Because I think it puts you in a bad dilemma. + </p> + <p> + Prag.:—How so? + </p> + <p> + Anti-Prag.:—Why, because if on the one hand you elect to say that + there is a truth, you thereby surrender your whole pragmatist theory. + According to that theory, truth requires ideas and workings to constitute + it; but in the present instance there is supposed to be no knower, and + consequently neither ideas nor workings can exist. What then remains for + you to make your truth of? + </p> + <p> + Prag.:—Do you wish, like so many of my enemies, to force me to make + the truth out of the reality itself? I cannot: the truth is something + known, thought or said about the reality, and consequently numerically + additional to it. But probably your intent is something different; so + before I say which horn of your dilemma I choose, I ask you to let me hear + what the other horn may be. + </p> + <p> + Anti-Prag.:—The other horn is this, that if you elect to say that + there is no truth under the conditions assumed, because there are no ideas + or workings, then you fly in the face of common sense. Doesn't common + sense believe that every state of facts must in the nature of things be + truly statable in some kind of a proposition, even tho in point of fact + the proposition should never be propounded by a living soul? + </p> + <p> + Prag.:—Unquestionably common sense believes this, and so do I. There + have been innumerable events in the history of our planet of which nobody + ever has been or ever will be able to give an account, yet of which it can + already be said abstractly that only one sort of possible account can ever + be true. The truth about any such event is thus already generically + predetermined by the event's nature; and one may accordingly say with a + perfectly good conscience that it virtually pre-exists. Common sense is + thus right in its instinctive contention. + </p> + <p> + Anti-Prag.:—Is this then the horn of the dilemma which you stand + for? Do you say that there is a truth even in cases where it shall never + be known? + </p> + <p> + Prag.:—Indeed I do, provided you let me hold consistently to my own + conception of truth, and do not ask me to abandon it for something which I + find impossible to comprehend.—You also believe, do you not, that + there is a truth, even in cases where it never shall be known? + </p> + <p> + Anti-Prag.:—I do indeed believe so. + </p> + <p> + Prag.:—Pray then inform me in what, according to you, this truth + regarding the unknown consists. + </p> + <p> + Anti-Prag.:—Consists?—pray what do you mean by 'consists'? It + consists in nothing but itself, or more properly speaking it has neither + consistence nor existence, it obtains, it holds. + </p> + <p> + Prag.:—Well, what relation does it bear to the reality of which it + holds? + </p> + <p> + Anti-Prag.:-How do you mean, 'what relation'? It holds of it, of course; + it knows it, it represents it. + </p> + <p> + Prag.:—Who knows it? What represents it? + </p> + <p> + Anti-Prag.:—The truth does; the truth knows it; or rather not + exactly that, but any one knows it who possesses the truth. Any true idea + of the reality represents the truth concerning it. + </p> + <p> + Prag.:—But I thought that we had agreed that no knower of it, nor + any idea representing it was to be supposed. + </p> + <p> + Anti-Prag.:—Sure enough! + </p> + <p> + Prag.:—Then I beg you again to tell me in what this truth consists, + all by itself, this tertium quid intermediate between the facts per se, on + the one hand, and all knowledge of them, actual or potential, on the + other. What is the shape of it in this third estate? Of what stuff, + mental, physical, or 'epistemological,' is it built? What metaphysical + region of reality does it inhabit? + </p> + <p> + Anti-Prag.:—What absurd questions! Isn't it enough to say that it is + true that the facts are so-and-so, and false that they are otherwise? + </p> + <p> + Prag.:—'It' is true that the facts are so-and-so—I won't yield + to the temptation of asking you what is true; but I do ask you whether + your phrase that 'it is true that' the facts are so-and-so really means + anything really additional to the bare being so-and-so of the facts + themselves. + </p> + <p> + Anti-Prag.:—It seems to mean more than the bare being of the facts. + It is a sort of mental equivalent for them, their epistemological + function, their value in noetic terms. Prag.:—A sort of spiritual + double or ghost of them, apparently! If so, may I ask you where this truth + is found. + </p> + <p> + Anti-Prag.:—Where? where? There is no 'where'—it simply + obtains, absolutely obtains. + </p> + <p> + Prag.:—Not in any one's mind? + </p> + <p> + Anti-Prag.:—No, for we agreed that no actual knower of the truth + should be assumed. + </p> + <p> + Prag.:—No actual knower, I agree. But are you sure that no notion of + a potential or ideal knower has anything to do with forming this strangely + elusive idea of the truth of the facts in your mind? + </p> + <p> + Anti-Prag.:—Of course if there be a truth concerning the facts, that + truth is what the ideal knower would know. To that extent you can't keep + the notion of it and the notion of him separate. But it is not him first + and then it; it is it first and then him, in my opinion. + </p> + <p> + Prag.:—But you still leave me terribly puzzled as to the status of + this so-called truth, hanging as it does between earth and heaven, between + reality and knowledge, grounded in the reality, yet numerically additional + to it, and at the same time antecedent to any knower's opinion and + entirely independent thereof. Is it as independent of the knower as you + suppose? It looks to me terribly dubious, as if it might be only another + name for a potential as distinguished from an actual knowledge of the + reality. Isn't your truth, after all, simply what any successful knower + would have to know in case he existed? And in a universe where no knowers + were even conceivable would any truth about the facts there as something + numerically distinguishable from the facts themselves, find a place to + exist in? To me such truth would not only be non-existent, it would be + unimaginable, inconceivable. + </p> + <p> + Anti-Prag.:—But I thought you said a while ago that there is a truth + of past events, even tho no one shall ever know it. + </p> + <p> + Prag.:—Yes, but you must remember that I also stipulated for + permission to define the word in my own fashion. The truth of an event, + past, present, or future, is for me only another name for the fact that if + the event ever does get known, the nature of the knowledge is already to + some degree predetermined. The truth which precedes actual knowledge of a + fact means only what any possible knower of the fact will eventually find + himself necessitated to believe about it. He must believe something that + will bring him into satisfactory relations with it, that will prove a + decent mental substitute for it. What this something may be is of course + partly fixed already by the nature of the fact and by the sphere of its + associations. This seems to me all that you can clearly mean when you say + that truth pre-exists to knowledge. It is knowledge anticipated, knowledge + in the form of possibility merely. + </p> + <p> + Anti-Prag.:—But what does the knowledge know when it comes? Doesn't + it know the truth? And, if so, mustn't the truth be distinct from either + the fact or the knowledge? + </p> + <p> + Prag.:—It seems to me that what the knowledge knows is the fact + itself, the event, or whatever the reality may be. Where you see three + distinct entities in the field, the reality, the knowing, and the truth, I + see only two. Moreover, I can see what each of my two entities is + known-as, but when I ask myself what your third entity, the truth, is + known-as, I can find nothing distinct from the reality on the one hand, + and the ways in which it may be known on the other. Are you not probably + misled by common language, which has found it convenient to introduce a + hybrid name, meaning sometimes a kind of knowing and sometimes a reality + known, to apply to either of these things interchangeably? And has + philosophy anything to gain by perpetuating and consecrating the + ambiguity? If you call the object of knowledge 'reality,' and call the + manner of its being cognized 'truth,' cognized moreover on particular + occasions, and variously, by particular human beings who have their + various businesses with it, and if you hold consistently to this + nomenclature, it seems to me that you escape all sorts of trouble. + </p> + <p> + Anti-Prag.:—Do you mean that you think you escape from my dilemma? + </p> + <p> + Prag.:—Assuredly I escape; for if truth and knowledge are terms + correlative and interdependent, as I maintain they are, then wherever + knowledge is conceivable truth is conceivable, wherever knowledge is + possible truth is possible, wherever knowledge is actual truth is actual. + Therefore when you point your first horn at me, I think of truth actual, + and say it doesn't exist. It doesn't; for by hypothesis there is no + knower, no ideas, no workings. I agree, however, that truth possible or + virtual might exist, for a knower might possibly be brought to birth; and + truth conceivable certainly exists, for, abstractly taken, there is + nothing in the nature of antediluvian events that should make the + application of knowledge to them inconceivable. Therefore when you try to + impale me on your second horn, I think of the truth in question as a mere + abstract possibility, so I say it does exist, and side with common sense. + </p> + <p> + Do not these distinctions rightly relieve me from embarrassment? And don't + you think it might help you to make them yourself? + </p> + <p> + Anti-Prag.:—Never!—so avaunt with your abominable + hair-splitting and sophistry! Truth is truth; and never will I degrade it + by identifying it with low pragmatic particulars in the way you propose. + </p> + <p> + Prag.:—Well, my dear antagonist, I hardly hoped to convert an + eminent intellectualist and logician like you; so enjoy, as long as you + live, your own ineffable conception. Perhaps the rising generation will + grow up more accustomed than you are to that concrete and empirical + interpretation of terms in which the pragmatic method consists. Perhaps + they may then wonder how so harmless and natural an account of truth as + mine could have found such difficulty in entering the minds of men far + more intelligent than I can ever hope to become, but wedded by education + and tradition to the abstractionist manner of thought. + </p> + <div style="height: 6em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Meaning of Truth, by William James + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE MEANING OF TRUTH *** + +***** This file should be named 5117-h.htm or 5117-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/5/1/1/5117/ + + +Text file produced by Steve Harris, Charles Franks and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team + +HTML file produced by David Widger + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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