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<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 51163 ***</div>
<h1 class="pg">The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Australian Victories in France in 1918,
by Sir John Monash</h1>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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      Note:
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      Images of the original pages are available through
      Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries. See
      <a href="https://archive.org/details/australianvictor00mona">
      https://archive.org/details/australianvictor00mona</a>
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<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_i" id="Page_i">[i]</a></span></p>

<p id="half-title"> <i>The Australian Victories
in France in 1918</i></p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ii" id="Page_ii">[ii]</a></span></p>

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<a name="frontispiece" id="frontispiece"><img src="images/i_a_frontispiece.jpg" width="763" height="1200" alt="" /></a>
<div class="caption"><p>Lieut.-General Sir John Monash, <span class="smcap">G.C.M.G.</span>,
<span class="smcap">K.C.B.</span>, <span class="smcap">V.D.</span>, <span class="smcap">D.C.L.</span>, <span class="smcap">LL.D.</span></p></div>
</div>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iii" id="Page_iii">[iii]</a></span></p>
<h1><i>The Australian Victories in France in 1918</i></h1>

<p class="center spaced space-above">
<i>By</i><br />
<i>Lieutenant-General Sir John Monash</i>,<br />
<i>G.C.M.G.</i>, <i>K.C.B.</i>, <i>V.D.</i>, <i>D.C.L.</i>, <i>LL.D.</i><br />
</p>

<p class="center spaced space-above">
<i>WITH 9 FOLDING MAPS IN COLOUR<br />
AND 31 ILLUSTRATIONS</i><br />
</p>

<p class="center spaced space-above">
<i>LONDON: HUTCHINSON &amp; CO.<br />
PATERNOSTER ROW</i><br />
</p>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iv" id="Page_iv">[iv]</a></span></p>

<div class="center">
DEDICATED<br />
to the<br />
AUSTRALIAN SOLDIER<br />
who by his military virtues, and by his deeds<br />
in battle, has earned for himself a<br />
place in history which none<br />
can challenge<br />
</div>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[v]</a></span></p>

<h2>PREFACE</h2>


<p>The following pages, of which I began the compilation when still
engaged in the arduous work of Repatriation of the Australian troops
in all theatres of war, were intended to be something in the nature
of a consecutive and comprehensive story of the Australian Imperial
Force in France during the closing phases of the Great War. I soon
found that the time at my disposal was far too limited to allow me
to make full use of the very voluminous documentary material which
I had collected during the campaign. The realization of such a
project must await a time of greater leisure. So much as I have had
the opportunity of setting down has, therefore, inevitably taken the
form rather of an individual memoir of this stirring period. While I
feel obliged to ask the indulgence of the reader for the personal
character of the present narrative, this may not be altogether a disadvantage.
Having regard to the responsibilities which it fell to
my lot to bear, it may, indeed, be desirable that I should in all candour
set down what was passing in my mind, and should attempt to describe
the ever-changing external circumstances which operated to guide and
form the judgments and decisions which it became my duty to make
from day to day. It may be that hereafter my exercise of command
in the field and the manner in which I made use of the opportunities
which presented themselves will be the subject of criticism. I welcome
this, provided that the facts and the events of the time are
known to and duly weighed by the critic.</p>

<p>My purpose has been to describe in broad outline the part played
by the Australian Army Corps in the closing months of the war, and
I have based upon that record somewhat large claims on behalf of
the Corps. It would have overloaded the story to include in it any
larger number of extracts from original documents than has been done.
I may, however, assert with confidence that the statements, statistics
and deductions made can be verified by reference to authoritative
sources.</p>

<p>The photographs have been selected from a very large number
taken, during the fighting and often under fire, by Captain G. H.
Wilkins, M.C. The maps have been prepared under my personal
supervision, and are compiled from the official battle maps in actual
use by me during the operations.</p>

<div class="right"><span class="smcap">John Monash.</span></div>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">[vi]</a></span></p>

<h2>CONTENTS</h2>

<div class="center">
<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="">
<tr><td align="right">CHAP.</td><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="right">PAGE</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Preface</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_v">v</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Introduction&mdash;The Australian Army Corps</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">I.&mdash;</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Back to the Somme</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_18">18</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">II.&mdash;</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">The Defence of Amiens</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_36">36</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">III.&mdash;</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Hamel</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_51">51</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">IV.&mdash;</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Turning the Tide</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_69">69</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">V.&mdash;</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">The Battle Plan</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_81">81</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">VI.&mdash;</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">The Battle Plan</span> (<i>continued</i>)&nbsp;&nbsp;</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_97">97</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">VII.&mdash;</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">The Chase begins</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_115">115</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">VIII.&mdash;</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Exploitation</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_133">133</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">IX.&mdash;</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Chuignes</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_148">148</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">X.&mdash;</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Pursuit</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_164">164</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">XI.&mdash;</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Mont St. Quentin and Péronne</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_182">182</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">XII.&mdash;</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">A Lull</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_198">198</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">XIII.&mdash;</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Hargicourt</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_214">214</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">XIV.&mdash;</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">America joins in</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_235">235</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">XV.&mdash;</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Bellicourt and Bony</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_254">254</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">XVI.&mdash;</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Montbrehain and after</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_271">271</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">XVII.&mdash;</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Results</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_284">284</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Appendix A</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_299">299</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Appendix B</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_300">300</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Appendix C</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_317">317</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Index</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_345">345</a></td></tr>
</table>
</div>

<hr class="chap" />

<h2>LIST OF MAPS</h2>


<div class="center">
<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="">
<tr><td align="right">A&mdash;</td><td align="left">The Advances of the Third Division&mdash;March to May, 1918</td><td align="center"><i>Facing page</i></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_32">32</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">B&mdash;</td><td align="left">Battle of Hamel, July 4th, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_64">64</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">C&mdash;</td><td align="left">Battle of August 8th, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_144">144</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">D&mdash;</td><td align="left">Battle of Chuignes and Bray, August 23rd, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_160">160</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">E&mdash;</td><td align="left">Péronne and Mont St. Quentin</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_192">192</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">F&mdash;</td><td align="left">Advances of Australian Corps, September 2nd to 17th, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_208">208</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">G&mdash;</td><td align="left">Battle of September 18th, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_224">224</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">H&mdash;</td><td align="left">Breaching of Hindenburg Defences</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_272">272</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">J&mdash;</td><td align="left">Australian Corps Campaign</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_288">288</a></td></tr>
</table></div>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[vii]</a></span></p>

<h2>LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS</h2>


<div class="center">
<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="">
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">Lieut.-General Sir John Monash, G.C.M.G.,</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">K.C.B., V.D., D.C.L., LL.D.</td><td align="center">&nbsp;</td><td align="right"><a href="#frontispiece"><i>Frontispiece</i></a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">1.&mdash;</td><td align="left">The Australian Corps Commander&mdash;with the</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">Generals of his Staff</td><td align="center"><i>Facing page</i></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_14">14</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">2.&mdash;</td><td align="left">The Valley of the Somme&mdash;looking east towards</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">Bray, which was then still in enemy hands</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_15">15</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">3.&mdash;</td><td align="left">German Prisoners&mdash;taken by the Corps at</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">Hamel, being marched to the rear</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_40">40</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">4.&mdash;</td><td align="left">Visit of M. Clemenceau&mdash;group taken at Bussy,</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">July 7th, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_41">41</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">5.&mdash;</td><td align="left">Railway Gun, 11.2-inch Bore&mdash;captured near</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">Rosières on August 8th, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_66">66</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">6.&mdash;</td><td align="left">German Depot of Stores&mdash;captured on August</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">8th, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_67">67</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">7.&mdash;</td><td align="left">Tanks marching into Battle</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_96">96</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">8.&mdash;</td><td align="left">Morcourt Valley&mdash;the Australian attack swept</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">across this on August 8th, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_97">97</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">9.&mdash;</td><td align="left">Dug-outs at Froissy-Beacon&mdash;being "mopped</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">up" during battle</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_112">112</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">10.&mdash;</td><td align="left">Péronne&mdash;barricade in main street</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_113">113</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">11.&mdash;</td><td align="left">Burning Villages&mdash;east of Péronne</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_128">128</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">12.&mdash;</td><td align="left">Dummy Tank Manufacture</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_129">129</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">13.&mdash;</td><td align="left">The Canal and Tunnel at Bellicourt&mdash;looking north</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_152">152</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">14.&mdash;</td><td align="left">The Hindenburg Line&mdash;a characteristic belt of</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">sunken wire</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_153">153</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">15.&mdash;</td><td align="left">Final Instructions to the Platoon&mdash;an incident</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">of the battle of August 8th, 1918. The</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">platoon is waiting to advance to Phase B of the battle</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_176">176</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">16.&mdash;</td><td align="left">An Armoured Car&mdash;disabled near Bony, during</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">the battle of September 29th, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_177">177</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">17.&mdash;</td><td align="left">The Hindenburg Line Wire&mdash;near Bony</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_198">198</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">18.&mdash;</td><td align="left">The 15-inch Naval Gun&mdash;captured at Chuignes</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">August 23rd, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_199">199</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">19.&mdash;</td><td align="left">Australian Artillery&mdash;going into action at</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">Cressaire Wood</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_218">218</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">20.&mdash;</td><td align="left">Battle of August 8th, 1918&mdash;German prisoners<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[viii]</a></span></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">being brought out of the battle under the fire</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">of their own Artillery</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_219">219</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">21.&mdash;</td><td align="left">Mont St. Quentin&mdash;collecting Australian</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">wounded under protection of the Red Cross</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">flag, September 1st, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_240">240</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">22.&mdash;</td><td align="left">An Ammunition Dump&mdash;established in Warfusee</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">village on August 8th, 1918, after its</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">capture the same morning</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_241">241</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">23.&mdash;</td><td align="left">Australian Light Horse&mdash;the 13th A.L.H.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">Regiment riding into action on August 17th, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_256">256</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">24.&mdash;</td><td align="left">The Sniper sniped&mdash;an enemy sniper disposed</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">of by an Australian Sharp-shooter, August 22nd, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_257">257</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">25.&mdash;</td><td align="left">German Prisoners&mdash;captured at the battle of</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">Chuignes, August 23rd, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_274">274</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">26.&mdash;</td><td align="left">Captured German Guns&mdash;Park of Ordnance,</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">captured by the Australians during August, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_275">275</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">27.&mdash;</td><td align="left">The Toll of Battle&mdash;an Australian gun-team</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">destroyed by an enemy shell, September 1st, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_294">294</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">28.&mdash;</td><td align="left">Inter-Divisional Relief&mdash;the 30th American</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">and the 3rd Australian Divisions passing each</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">other in the "Roo de Kanga," Péronne,</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">during the "relief" after the capture of the</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">Hindenburg Line, October 4th, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_295">295</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">29.&mdash;</td><td align="left">Australian Artillery&mdash;moving up to the front,</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">through the Hindenburg wire, October 2nd, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_316">316</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">30.&mdash;</td><td align="left">Advance during Battle&mdash;Third Division Infantry</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">and Tanks advancing to the capture of Bony,</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">October 1st, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_317">317</a></td></tr>
</table></div>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[1]</a></span></p>

<div class="center"><big>The Australian Victories in France in 1918</big></div>

<h2>INTRODUCTION<br />
THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY CORPS</h2>


<p>The renown of the Australians as individual fighters, in
all theatres of the Great War, has loomed large in the
minds and imagination of the people of the Empire.</p>

<p>Many stories of the work they did have been published in
the daily Press and in book form. But it is seldom that any
appreciation can be discovered of the fact that the Australians
in France gradually became, as the war progressed, moulded
into a single, complete and fully organized Army Corps.</p>

<p>Seldom has any stress been laid upon the fact that because
it thus became a formation fixed and stable in composition, fighting
under a single command, and provided with all accessory
arms and services, the Corps was able successfully to undertake
fighting operations on the grandest scale.</p>

<p>There can be little question, however, that it was this development
which constituted the paramount and precedent condition
for the brilliant successes achieved by these splendid troops
during the summer and autumn of 1918&mdash;successes which far
overshadowed those of any earlier period of the war.</p>

<p>For a complete understanding of all the factors which contributed
to those successes, and for an intelligent grasp of the
course of events following so dramatically upon the outbreak of
the great German offensive of March 21st of that year, I propose
to trace, very briefly, the genesis and ultimate development of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[2]</a></span>
the Corps, as it became constituted when, on August 8th, it was
launched upon its great enterprise of opening, in close collaboration
with the Army Corps of its sister Dominion of Canada, that
remarkable counter-offensive, which it maintained, without pause,
without check, and without reverse, for sixty consecutive days&mdash;a
period full of glorious achievement&mdash;which contributed, as
I shall show in these pages, in the most direct and decisive manner,
to the final collapse and surrender of the enemy.</p>

<p>In the days before the war, there was in the British Service no
recognized or authorized organization known as an Army Corps.
When the Expeditionary Force was launched into the conflict
in 1914, the Army Corps organization was hastily improvised,
and consisted at first merely of an Army Corps Staff, with a small
allotment of special Corps Troops and services, and of a fluctuating
number of Divisions.</p>

<p>It was the <i>Division</i><a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> and not the <i>Corps</i>, which was then the
strategical unit of the Army. Even when the necessity for the
formation of Army Corps was recognized, it was still a fundamental
conception that it was the Division, and not the Army
Corps, which constituted the fighting unit.</p>

<p>To each Army Corps were allotted at first only two, but later
as many as four Divisions, according to the needs and circumstances
of the moment. But the component Divisions never,
for long, remained the same. The actual composition of every
Army Corps was subject to constant changes and interchanges,
and it was rare for any given Division to remain for more than
a few weeks in any one Army Corps.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[3]</a></span></p>
<p>The disadvantages of such an arrangement are sufficiently
obvious to require no great elaboration; at the same time,
it has to be recognized that, during the first three years of the
war, at any rate, the Army was undergoing a process of rapid
expansion, and that, on grounds of expediency, it was neither
possible nor desirable to adopt a policy of a fixed and immutable
composition for so large a formation as an Army Corps.</p>

<p>Moreover, the special conditions of trench warfare made it
imperative to create, under the respective Armies, and in the
respective zones of those Armies, a subordinate administrative
and tactical authority with a more or less fixed geographical
jurisdiction. Thus, the frontage held by each of the five British
Armies became subdivided into a series of Corps frontages, and
each Corps Commander had allotted to him a definite frontage,
a definite depth and a definite area, for his administrative and
executive direction.</p>

<p>It was within this Corps area that he exercised entire control
of all functions of a purely local and geographical character:
such as the maintenance of all roads, railways, canals, telegraphs
and telephones; the control of all traffic; the apportionment of
all billeting and quartering facilities; the allocation and employment
of all means of transport; the collection and distribution
of all supplies, comprising food, forage, munitions and engineering
materials; the conservation and distribution of all water
supply; the sanitation of the area; the whole medical administration
within, and the evacuation of sick and wounded from
the area; the establishment and working of shops of all descriptions,
both for general engineering and for Ordnance purposes;
also of laundries, bathing establishments and rest camps; the
creation of facilities for the entertainment and recreation of
resting troops, and of schools for their military training and for
the education of their leaders.</p>

<p>The Corps Commander was, in addition, directly responsible
to the Army Commander for the tactical defence of his whole
area, for the creation and maintenance of the entire system of field
defences covering his frontage, comprising trench systems in
numerous successive zones and field fortifications of all descriptions;
for preparations for the demolition of railways and bridges<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[4]</a></span>
to meet the eventuality of an enforced withdrawal; and for
detailed plans for an advance into the enemy's territory whenever
the opportune moment should arrive.</p>

<p>The extensive responsibilities thus imposed upon the Corps
Commander, and upon the whole of his Staff, obviously demanded
an intimate study and knowledge of the whole of the Corps area,
such as could be acquired only by continuous occupation of one
and the same area for a period extending over many months.
It would therefore have been in the highest degree inconvenient
to move such a complex organization as an Army Corps Staff
from one area to another at short intervals of time. On the
other hand, the several Divisions allotted to any given Corps for
the actual occupation and maintenance of the defences could
not be called upon to carry out without relief or rest, trench
duty for continuous periods longer than a few weeks at a time.</p>

<p>During the first three years the number of Divisions at the
disposal of the British High Command was never adequate to
provide each Army Corps in the front line with sufficient Divisions
to permit of a regular alternation out of its own resources of
periods of trench duty and periods of rest. For a Corps holding
a two-Division frontage, for example, it would have been necessary
to provide a permanent strength of at least four Divisions
in order to permit of such a rotation.</p>

<p>The expedient generally adopted, therefore, was to withdraw
altogether from the Army Corps, each Division in turn, as it
became due for a rest behind the line or was required for duty
elsewhere, and to substitute some other available Division from
G.H.Q. or Army Reserve. The broad result was that such an
deal as that of a fixed composition for an Army Corps proved
quite unattainable, and there was a constant interchange of
nearly the whole of the Divisions of the Army, who served in
succession, for short periods, in many different Corps, and under
many different Commanders.</p>

<p>To this general rule there was, from the outset of its formation,
one striking exception, in the case of the Canadian Army
Corps, consisting of the four Canadian Divisions, which, with
rare exceptions, and these only for short periods and for quite<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[5]</a></span>
special purposes, invariably fought as a complete Corps of fixed
constitution.</p>

<p>It is impossible to overvalue the advantages which accrued
to the Canadian troops from this close and constant association
of all the four Divisions with each other, with the Corps Commander
and his Staff, and with all the accessory Corps services.
It meant mutual knowledge of each other among all Commanders,
all Staffs, all arms and services, and the mutual trust and confidence
born of that knowledge. It was the prime factor in
achieving the brilliant conquest of the Vimy Ridge by that Corps
in the early spring of 1917.</p>

<p>The consummation, so long and so ardently hoped for, of a
similar welding together of all Australian units in the field in
France into a single Corps was not achieved in its entirety until
a full year later, and it will be interesting to trace briefly the
steps by which such a result, strongly pressed as it was by the
Australian Government, was finally brought about.</p>

<p>Australia put into the field and maintained until the end,
altogether five Divisions of Infantry, complete with all requisite
Artillery, Engineers, Pioneers and all Supply, Medical and
Veterinary Services, in full conformity with the Imperial War
Establishments laid down for such Divisions. But the method
and time of their formation and organization, the manner and
circumstances of their war preparation, and their employment as
part of a Corps varied considerably.</p>

<p>The First Australian Division, together with the Fourth
Infantry Brigade, which was then under my command and
subsequently became the nucleus of the Fourth Australian Division,
were raised in Australia in 1914, immediately after the
outbreak of war, were transported to Egypt, where they underwent
their war training in the winter of 1915, and ultimately
formed, with the New Zealand Contingent, the body known as
the "Anzac" Corps, which carried out, on April 25th, the
memorable landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula.</p>

<p>The Second Australian Division speedily followed, being raised
in Australia during 1915, and the greater part of this Second
Contingent joined the Anzac Corps in the later stages of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[6]</a></span>
Dardanelles Expedition. Another independent Brigade (the
Eighth) was also sent to Egypt in that year.</p>

<p>The raising of the Third Australian Division, early in 1916,
was the magnificent answer which Australia made when public
men and the Press declared that the Australian people would
resent the Evacuation from Gallipoli, and the seemingly fruitless
sacrifices which it entailed. This Division was shipped direct
to England, and assembled on Salisbury Plain during the summer
of 1916, where I assumed the command of it. There it underwent
its war training under conditions far more advantageous
than those which confronted the First and Second Divisions in
the Egyptian desert. The Third Division entered the theatre
of war in France in November, 1916.</p>

<p>In the meantime, the Evacuation of the Peninsula, in December,
1915, led to the assembly in Egypt of the First and Second
Australian Divisions, the Fourth and Eighth independent
Infantry Brigades and some thirty thousand reinforcements and
convalescents.</p>

<p>Out of this supply of fighting material it was then decided to
constitute two additional complete Divisions, the Fourth Brigade
forming the nucleus of the Fourth Australian Division, while
the 8th Brigade formed that of the Fifth Australian Division;
the remaining Brigades and the Divisional troops were drawn
from reinforcements, stiffened by a considerable contribution
of veterans taken from the four Infantry Brigades who had
carried out the landing on Gallipoli.</p>

<p>The Fourth and Fifth Divisions were thus formed in Egypt
in February and March, 1916, and the conditions of their war
training were even less satisfactory than those which had confronted
the earlier Divisions. The hot season speedily arrived;
equipment, munitions and animals materialized slowly; training
equipment and suitable training grounds were of the most
meagre character; and upon all these difficulties supervened
the urgent obligation to undertake the strenuous toil of organizing
and executing, on the Sinai desert, the field fortifications required
for the defence of the Suez Canal zone.</p>

<p>The method in which the Divisions then available in Egypt<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[7]</a></span>
were to be grouped for the purposes of Corps Command was
ripe for decision. It was then that the determination was reached
to constitute two separate Army Corps, to be called respectively
"First Anzac" and "Second Anzac." The former embodied
the First, Second and Fifth Australian Divisions, under General
Sir William Birdwood; the latter comprised the Fourth Australian
and the New Zealand Divisions under Lieut.-General
Sir Alexander Godley.</p>

<p>This was the organization of the Australian troops when the
time arrived, in May, 1916, for their transfer by sea from Egypt
to the scene of the titanic conflict which had been for nearly two
years raging on the soil of France and Belgium.</p>

<p>This grouping did not, however, persist for more than a few
weeks. The opening of the great Somme offensive in July 1916
found the First, Second and Fourth Divisions operating under
First Anzac in the valley of the Somme, while the Fifth Australian
and the New Zealand Division constituted the Second
Anzac Corps in the Armentières-Fleurbaix sector. There followed
other interchanges as the campaign developed, and by
November of 1916, the grouping stood with First Anzac employing
the First, Second, Fourth and Fifth Divisions, while Second
Anzac comprised the Third Australian, the New Zealand and
the Thirty-Fourth British Divisions.</p>

<p>The series of offensive operations opening with the great
and successful battle of Messines on June 7th, 1917, found the
Fourth Australian Division once again under the command of
General Godley, only to be again withdrawn before the concluding
phases of the Third Battle of Ypres, in September and
October, 1917. The autumn offensive of 1917, aiming at the
capture of the Passchendaele ridge, was the first occasion on
which the whole of the five Divisions were simultaneously
engaged in the same locality in a common enterprise; but
even on that occasion they still remained distributed under
two different Corps Commands, and had not yet achieved the
long-desired unity of command and of policy.</p>

<p>This constant interchange of these Divisions, unavoidable
as it probably was, undoubtedly militated against the attainment<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[8]</a></span>
of the highest standard of efficiency. Uniform in scope
and purpose as military administration and tactical policy aims
to be when considered on broad lines, yet in a thousand and one
matters of detail, many of them of dominating importance, the
personality and the individual idiosyncrasies of the Corps Commander
and of his principal executive Staff Officers, are calculated
to exercise a powerful influence upon the functioning of
the whole Corps.</p>

<p>Under each Corps Commander there grew up in course of time
a particular code of rules, and policies, of technical methods
and even of technical jargon&mdash;most of it in an unwritten form.
This nevertheless tended towards efficiency so long as the whole
of the component personnel of the Corps remained stable, but
imposed many difficulties upon Divisions and other units which
joined and remained under the Corps for a short period only.</p>

<p>The result was that a Divisional Commander and his Staff,
accustomed to work in one environment, often found great difficulty,
and occupied some appreciable period of time, in accommodating
themselves to a new environment, in which doctrines
of attack or defence, counter-attack or trench routine, supply or
maintenance were, some or all of them, widely different from
those to which they had formerly become accustomed.</p>

<p>But, in the case of Dominion troops, there was a motive far
overshadowing the desire for a removal of difficulties of merely
a technical nature. It was one founded upon a sense of Nationhood,
which prompted the wish, vaguely formed early in the war,
and steadily crystallizing in the minds both of the Australian
people and of the troops themselves, that all the Australian
Divisions should be brought together under a single leadership.</p>

<p>This ideal was associated with the hope that the Commanders
and Staffs should to as large an extent as possible, consist solely
of Australian Officers, as soon as ever men sufficiently qualified
became available. It is difficult to emphasize such a desire
without appearing to display ingratitude to a number of brilliant
General and other officers of the Imperial Regular Service. These
men, at a time when Australia was still able to produce only
few officers with the necessary training and experience to justify<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[9]</a></span>
their appointment to the command of Divisions and Brigades,
or to the senior Administrative and General Staffs, bore these
burdens in a manner which reflected upon them the greatest
credit, and earned for them the gratitude of the Australian
people.</p>

<p>I refer, among many others, particularly to General Sir W.
Birdwood, Major-Generals Sir H. B. Walker, Sir N. M. Smyth,
V.C. and Sir H. V. Cox and Brigadier-Generals W. B. Lesslie and
P. G. M. Skene. But as the war went on, this aspect of the
national aspiration became steadily realized; one by one, the
senior commands and staff appointments were taken over by
Australian Officers who had proved their aptitude and suitability
for such responsibilities.</p>

<p>The other ideal of unity of command and close association with
each other of all Australian units, proved slower of realization. All
concerned thought and hoped that it had been, at last, achieved
in December, 1917, when it was decided to abolish the two
"Anzac" Corps, and to constitute a single Australian Army
Corps. This was effected by the transfer of the Third Australian
Division from Second to First Anzac Corps, by altering the title
of "Second Anzac" to "XXII. Corps," and by substituting
for the name "First Anzac" the name "Australian Army
Corps," which name it bore until the termination of the war.</p>

<p>The only regrettable feature of this development was the
dissolution of the close comradeship which had existed between
the troops from the sister Dominions of Australia and New
Zealand.</p>

<p>Even then all hopes were doomed to disappointment. For
the next four months the Corps contained five Divisions in name
only. Almost at once, the Fourth Australian Division was
withdrawn to serve under the VII. Corps in connection with the
operations before Cambrai. Not many weeks later, when the
German avalanche was loosed, the whole five Divisions became
widely scattered, and, for a time, the Third and Fourth Divisions
served under the VII. British Corps, the Fifth Division under
the III. Corps, and the First Division under the XV. Corps.
It was not until April, 1918, that four out of the five Divisions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[10]</a></span>
again came together under the control of the Australian Corps
Commander, at that time General Sir William Birdwood.</p>

<p>About the middle of May, 1918, this popular Commander was
appointed to the leadership of the Fifth British Army. In deference
to his long association with the Australian Imperial Force,
he was asked to retain his status as G.O.C., A.I.F. His responsibilities
as the Commander of an Army, and its removal to quite
a different area in the theatre of war, made it, however, impossible
for him to take any active part in the direction of the further
operations of the Australian Corps.</p>

<p>Owing to the vacancy thus created, the Commander-in-Chief,
with the concurrence of the Commonwealth Government, did me
the great honour to appoint me to the command of the Australian
Army Corps, a command which I took over during the closing
days of May and retained until after the Armistice.</p>

<p>At that juncture the First Australian Division was still
involved in heavy fighting, under the XV. Corps, in the Hazebrouck
sector, and no amount of pressure which I could bring to
bear succeeded in prevailing upon G.H.Q. to release this Division.
It was not until early in August, 1918, on the very eve of the
opening of the great offensive, that, at long last, all the five
Australian Divisions became united into one Corps, never to be
again separated. From that date onwards all five Divisions
embarked (for the first time in their history) upon a series of
combined offensive operations, the story of which I have set
myself the task of unfolding in these pages.</p>

<p>The Australian Army Corps had by that time evolved from
a mere geographical organization into one which, over and
above its component Infantry Divisions, had acquired a large
number of accessory arms and services, called Corps Troops,
which formed no part of a Division. It is desirable for the
complete understanding of the battle plans of the offensive period,
to consider the extent and nature of the whole of the fighting
and maintenance resources of the Corps.</p>

<p>These fell theoretically into two categories, comprising on
the one hand those units properly designated as "Corps Troops,"
which possessed a fixed and unalterable constitution, and, on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[11]</a></span>
the other hand, those additional units, known as "Army Troops,"
whose number and character fluctuated in accordance with the
varying needs of the situation, and with the requirements of
the various operations.</p>

<p>These Army Troops, whenever detailed to act under the
orders of the Corps Commander, became an integral part of the
Corps, and were to all intents and purposes Corps Troops, until
such time as they had completed the tasks allotted to them.
The Corps Troops were multifarious in character, and amounted
in the aggregate to large numbers, occasionally exceeding 50,000,
a number as great as that of three additional Divisions, whose
normal strength in the closing phases of the war never exceeded
17,000.</p>

<p>The Headquarters of the Army Corps comprised upwards of
300 Staff and assistant Staff Officers, clerks, orderlies, draughtsmen,
motor drivers, grooms, batmen, cooks and general helpers.
The Corps Cavalry consisted, in the case of the Australian Army
Corps, of the 13th Regiment of Australian Light Horse, and was
employed, in conjunction with the Australian Cyclist Battalion,
for reconnaissance, escort and dispatch rider duty.</p>

<p>The Corps Signal Troops were an extensive organization, and
controlled the whole of the Signal communications throughout
the Corps area (except within the Divisions themselves), being
responsible for the establishment, upkeep and working of every
method of communication, whether by telegraph, telephone,
wireless, pigeons, messenger dogs, aeroplane, or dispatch rider.
Apart from telegraphists, mechanics and electrical experts in
considerable numbers, adequate for the very heavy signal
traffic during battle, and even during periods of comparative
quiet, Corps Signals also operated two Motor Air Line and two
Cable Sections, for the laying out and maintenance of wires.
Those within the Corps Area, at any one place and time,
amounted to several hundreds of miles.</p>

<p>The whole of the Mechanical Transport, consisting of hundreds
of motor lorries, for the collection and distribution of ammunition,
food, forage and ordnance stores of all descriptions, was
also under the direct control of Corps Headquarters. So also<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[12]</a></span>
were some half-dozen mobile Ordnance Workshops, for the
repair of weapons and vehicles of all kinds. All these were permanent
Corps Troops, but represented only a fraction of those
serving under the orders of the Corps Commander.</p>

<p>Among the Administrative Services there was a large contingent
of the Labour Corps comprising some 20 Companies, for
the construction and maintenance of all roads, and water supply
installations, and for the handling, daily, of a formidable bulk
and weight of Artillery ammunition; also two or more Motor
Ambulance Convoys, for the evacuation of the sick and wounded
out of the Corps area, and a number of Army Troops Companies
of Engineers, as well as two Companies of Australian Tunnellers,
who were usually employed upon the construction and maintenance
of bridges, locks, water transport mechanism, deep
dug-outs and battle stations.</p>

<p>But the fighting units of the Corps Troops formed by far the
largest proportion, and comprised Artillery, Heavy Trench
Mortars, Air Squadrons and Tanks. The Artillery alone merits
more detailed consideration. It comprised a vast array of
many different classes of guns for many different purposes, and
classified into various categories by reference either to their
calibres, their mobility or their tactical purposes.</p>

<p>Grouped according to calibre, all guns and howitzers of
4&frac12;-inch bore or less were strictly considered as Field Artillery
which, although administered by the Divisions, was almost
invariably fought under the direct orders of the Corps Commander.
All guns and howitzers of greater bore, up to the giant 15-inch,
were known as Heavy and Siege Artillery.</p>

<p>Regarded from the point of view of mobility, all field guns and
that wonderfully useful weapon, the 60-pounder, were horse-drawn,
the larger ordnance were tractor-drawn, and the very
largest were mounted on railway trains and hauled by steam
locomotive.</p>

<p>Finally, as regards tactical utilization, some natures of ordnance
were invariably employed for barrage or harassing fire,
others for bombardment, others for counter-battery fighting, and
yet others for anti-aircraft purposes.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[13]</a></span></p>

<p>The total ordnance under the orders of the Australian Army
Corps naturally fluctuated according to the daily battle requirements,
but amounted at times, during the period of the war
under consideration, to as many as 1,200 guns of all natures and
calibres, grouped in Brigades each of four to six Batteries, each
of four to six guns.</p>

<p>This very formidable Artillery equipment far transcended
in quantity and dynamic power anything that had been envisaged
in the previous years of the war, or in any previous war, as
possible of administrative or tactical control under a single Commander.
It undoubtedly became a paramount factor in the
victories which the Corps achieved. The Artillery of the Corps
is entitled to the proud boast that it earned the confidence and
gratitude of the Infantry.</p>

<p>It must be left to the imagination to conceive the complexity
of the task of keeping this enormous mass of Artillery regularly
supplied with its ammunition, of multifarious types and in
adequate quantities of each, of allocating to each Brigade and
even to each Battery its appropriate task in the general plan,
and of advancing the whole organization over half-ruined roads
and broken bridges, in order to keep up with the Infantry as
the battle moved forward from day to day. It would defy a
detailed description intelligible to any but gunnery experts.</p>

<p>The Air Force had, by the summer of 1918, also achieved
a great development. The numerous Air Squadrons had embarked
upon a policy of specialization in tactical employment,
in accordance with the build and capacities of the aeroplanes
with which they were equipped. Thus gradually the whole
range of utilization became covered, from the small fast single-seater
fighting scout, intended to engage and drive off enemy
'planes, to the slower two-seater reconnaissance machines,
employed chiefly for photography and for the direction of Artillery
fire, and the giant long-distance bombing machines.</p>

<p>The Australian Corps had at its exclusive disposal at all
times the No. 3 Squadron of the Australian Flying Corps, and
employed the machines for reconnaissance prior to and after
battle, and for contact and counter-attack work and Artillery<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[14]</a></span>
observation during battle. But, whenever the scope of the
operations rendered it necessary, the resources of the Corps in
aircraft were enormously increased, and as many as a dozen
squadrons were on occasions employed, during battle, in low
flying pursuit of enemy infantry and transport, in production of
smoke screens, in bombing, in ammunition carrying, and in
dispatch bearing&mdash;over and above usual reconnaissance work
designed to keep Corps and Divisional Headquarters rapidly and
minutely informed, from moment to moment, of the situation of
the Infantry in actual contact with the enemy.</p>

<p>Another branch of the Air Force activities under the direct
control of the Corps was the Captive Balloon Service. Some five
large captive or kite balloons, carrying trained Artillery Observers,
regularly ascended along the Corps front whenever the
weather and the conditions of visibility permitted, to a height
of from 2,000 to 3,000 feet, and with the aid of powerful telescopes
and of telephone wires woven into the anchoring cables,
kept the Artillery regularly notified of all visible enemy movement,
and of the occurrence of all suitable targets of opportunity,
such as the flashes from enemy guns in action.</p>

<p>During battle one such balloon was invariably sent up well
forward to observe as closely as possible the progress of the
fighting, but the results were almost uniformly disappointing,
because the smoke and dust of the barrage and the general murk
of battle usually proved impenetrable to the air observer, tied
as he was to a fixed position. The reports of these observers
were usually confined to the laconic observation: "Can't see
much, but all apparently going well."</p>

<p>The last of the major fighting units of Corps Troops remaining
to be mentioned are the Tanks. These extraordinary products
of the war underwent a remarkable evolution during the
two years which followed their first introduction on the battlefield
in the Somme campaign of 1916. The standard of efficiency
which had been reached by the early summer of 1918,
in the most developed types of these curious monsters, as far outclassed
that of the earlier types in both mechanical and fighting
properties as the modern service rifle compared with the old
Brown Bess of the Peninsular War. The Tank crews had
improved in like proportion, both in skill, enterprise and
adaptability.</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_014fp.jpg" width="1200" height="780" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>The Australian Corps Commander&mdash;with the Generals of his Staff.</p></div>
</div>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_015fp.jpg" width="1200" height="768" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>The Valley of the Somme&mdash;looking East towards Bray, which was then still in enemy hands.</p></div>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[15]</a></span></p>

<p>Nothing can be more unstinted than the acknowledgment
which the Australian Corps makes of its obligation to the Tank
Corps for its powerful assistance throughout the whole of the great
offensive. Commencing with the battle of Hamel, a large contingent
of Tanks participated in every important "set-piece"
engagement which the Corps undertook. The Tanks were
organized into Brigades, each of three Battalions, each of three
Companies, each of twelve Tanks. During the opening phases,
early in August, the Tank contingent comprised a whole Brigade
of Mark V. Tanks, a Battalion of Mark V. (Star) Tanks, and a
Battalion of fast Armoured Cars; in the later phases, during the
assault on the Hindenburg Line, a second Brigade of Mark V.
Tanks and a Battalion of Whippets also co-operated.</p>

<p>Such was the formidable array of fighting resources under
the direct orders of the Australian Corps Commander, and,
together with the five Australian Divisions, formed a fighting
organization of great strength and solidarity. It became an
instrument for offensive warfare, as has been said by a high
authority, which for size and power excelled all Corps organizations
which either this or any previous war had produced. It
was an instrument which it was a great responsibility, as also
a great honour, to wield in the task of shattering the still formidable
military power of the enemy. For in the early summer
of 1918, that power appeared to be still unimpaired, and still
capable of inflicting serious reverses upon the Allied cause.</p>

<p>Early in 1918, owing to the depletion of human material,
the Imperial Divisions were reconstituted by a reduction of their
Infantry Brigades from a four-battalion to a three-battalion
basis, thus reducing the available infantry by twenty-five per
cent. But in this reduction, the Australian Divisions during the
fighting period shared only to a very small extent. In March
the strength of the 15 Brigades of Australian Infantry in the
field was still 60 Battalions. The heavy fighting of March and
April compelled the extinction of 3 Battalions, one each<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[16]</a></span>
respectively in the 9th, 12th and 13th Infantry Brigades; but
the remaining 57 Battalions of Infantry remained intact until
after the close of the actual fighting operations early in October.
The Corps was therefore enabled to maintain an additional
twelve battalions over and above the then prevailing corresponding
Imperial organization.</p>

<p>It was thus the largest of all Army Corps ever organized, in
this or any other war, by any of the combatants&mdash;the largest
both in point of numbers and of military resources of all descriptions,
approaching, and in one case exceeding, a full Army
command.</p>

<p>But even these great resources and responsibilities were
added to, during the course of the operations, by the allocation,
at successive times, to the Australian Corps of the 17th Imperial
Division, the 32nd Imperial Division and the 27th and 30th
American Divisions. Thus, during the closing days of September,
1918, the Corps numbered a total of nearly 200,000 men, exceeding
more than fourfold the whole of the British troops under the
command of the Duke of Wellington at the Battle of Waterloo.</p>

<p>Of this total about one-half comprised Australian troops,
the Heavy Artillery and other Army units attached to the Corps
consisting of Imperial troops. The Commanders and Staffs
from June, 1918, until the end consisted almost entirely of
Australian officers, among whom the following were the
senior:</p>


<div class="center">
<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="">
<tr><td align="left">Corps Commander</td><td align="left">Lieut.-General Sir J. Monash,</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">G.C.M.G., K.C.B., V.D.</span></td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Corps Chief-of-Staff</span></td><td align="left">Brigadier-General T. A. Blamey,</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">C.M.G., D.S.O.</span></td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Corps Artillery Commander</span></td><td align="left">Brigadier-General W. A. Coxen,</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.</span></td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chief Engineer</span></td><td align="left">Brigadier-General C. H. Foott,</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">C.B., C.M.G.</span></td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">1st Div. Commander</td><td align="left">Major-General Sir T. W. Glasgow,</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">K.C.B., D.S.O.</span>
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[17]</a></span></td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">General Staff Officer</span></td><td align="left">Lieut.-Colonel A. M. Ross, C.M.G., D.S.O.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chief Admin. Officer</span></td><td align="left">Lieut.-Colonel H. G. Viney,</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">C.M.G., D.S.O.</span></td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">2nd Div. Commander</td><td align="left">Major-General Sir C. Rosenthal,</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.</span></td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">General Staff Officer</span></td><td align="left">Lieut.-Colonel C. G. N. Miles,</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">C.M.G., D.S.O.</span></td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chief Admin. Officer</span></td><td align="left">Lieut.-Colonel J. M. A. Durrant,</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">C.M.G., D.S.O.</span></td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">3rd Div. Commander</td><td align="left">Major-General Sir J. Gellibrand,</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">K.C.B., D.S.O.</span></td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">General Staff Officer</span></td><td align="left">Lieut.-Colonel C. H. Jess, C.M.G., D.S.O.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chief Admin. Officer</span></td><td align="left">Lieut.-Colonel R. E. Jackson, D.S.O.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">4th Div. Commander</td><td align="left">Major-General E. G. Sinclair-Maclagan,</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">C.B., D.S.O.</span></td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">General Staff Officer</span></td><td align="left">Lieut.-Colonel J. D. Lavarack,</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">C.M.G., D.S.O.</span></td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chief Admin. Officer</span></td><td align="left">Lieutenant-Colonel R. Dowse, D.S.O.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">5th Div. Commander</td><td align="left">Major-General Sir J. J. T. Hobbs,</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">K.C.B., K.C.M.G., V.D.</span></td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">General Staff Officer</span></td><td align="left">Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Peck, C.M.G., D.S.O.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 2em;">and later</span></td><td align="left">Lieut.-Colonel J. T. McColl, O.B.E., M.C.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chief Admin. Officer</span></td><td align="left">Colonel J. H. Bruche, C.B., C.M.G.</td></tr>
</table></div>

<p>All the above were Australian Officers, and most of them were
of Australian birth. There were also two senior staff officers
of the Regular Army, Brigadier-General R. A. Carruthers, C.B.,
C.M.G., who was Chief of the Administrative Services, and
Brigadier-General L. D. Fraser, C.B., C.M.G., who was in immediate
command of the Heavy Artillery of the Corps.<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p>

<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> A <i>Division</i> consists of three Infantry Brigades, Divisional Artillery, three
Field Companies of Engineers, three Field Ambulances, a Pioneer Battalion, a
Machine Gun Battalion, together with Supply, Sanitary and Veterinary
Services. Its nominal strength is 20,000.
</p>
<p>
An <i>Infantry Brigade</i> consists of four Infantry Battalions, each of 1,000 men,
and a Light Trench Mortar Battery.
</p>
<p>
Divisional Artillery comprises two Brigades each of four batteries, each of six
guns or howitzers, also one Heavy and three medium Trench Mortar Batteries,
and the Divisional Ammunition Column.
</p>
<p>
This composition of a Division was modified in detail during the course of
the war.</p></div>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> For grouping of Australian Brigades into Divisions, see Appendix "A."</p></div></div>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[18]</a></span></p>



<h2>CHAPTER I<br />

BACK TO THE SOMME</h2>


<p>The early days of the year 1918 found the Australian Corps
consisting of the First, Second, Third and Fifth Australian
Divisions, while the Fourth had been transferred far south
to co-operate in the later developments of the Cambrai fighting.
The Corps was then holding, defensively, a sector of the line
in Flanders, which had in the previous years of the war become,
at various times, familiar to all our Divisions, and which extended
from the river Lys at Armentières, northwards, as far as to include
the southern half of the Messines Ridge.</p>

<p>It was, indeed, that very stretch of country, which in June,
1917, had been captured by our Third Division, in co-operation
with the New Zealanders. Opposite its centre lay the town of
Warneton, still in the hands of the enemy. Excepting for a
small area of undulating ground in the extreme north of the
Corps sector, the country was a forbidding expanse of devastation,
flat and woebegone, with long stretches of the front line
submerged waist deep after every freshet in the river Lys, and
with the greater part of our trench system like nothing but a
series of canals of liquid mud.</p>

<p>This unsavoury region formed, however, the most obvious
line of approach for an enemy who, debouching from the direction
of Warneton, aimed at the high land between us and the Channel
Ports; so that, tactically useless as were these mud flats, it was
imperative that they should be strongly defended, in order to
protect from capture the important heights of Messines, Kemmel,
Hill 63, Mont des Cats and Cassel.</p>

<p>During the fighting of the preceding summer and early autumn,
which gave the Australian troops possession of this territory,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[19]</a></span>
the locality was dry, practicable for movement, and reasonably
comfortable for the front line troops. Now it was water-logged,
often ice-bound, bleak and inhospitable. The precious months
of dry weather, between August and October, 1917, had been
allowed to pass without any comprehensive attempt on the part
of those Divisions which had relieved the Second Anzac Corps
after its capture of this ground to perfect the defences of the
newly-conquered territory. At any rate, there was little to
show for any work that may have been attempted.</p>

<p>Now, in the very depth of the worst season of the year, the
demand came to prepare the region for defence and resistance
to the last; for the threat of a great German offensive in the
opening of the 1918 campaigning season was already beginning
to take shape. It was the Australian Corps which was called
upon to answer that demand. There followed week after week
of heart-breaking labour, much of it necessarily by night, in
draining the flat land, in erecting acre upon acre of wire entanglements,
in constructing hundreds of strong points, and
concrete machine gun emplacements. Trenches had to be dug,
although the sides collapsed unless immediately revetted with
fascines or sheet iron; roads had to be repaired, and vain attempts
were made to provide the trench garrisons with dry and
bearable underground living quarters.</p>

<p>The monotony of all this labour, which long after&mdash;when the
Australians had disappeared from the scene and were again
fighting on the Somme&mdash;proved to have been undertaken all in
vain, was relieved only by an occasional raid, undertaken by one
or other of our front line Divisions, for the purpose of molesting
the enemy and gathering information. The Corps front was
held by two Divisions in line, one in support, and one resting
in a back area; the rotation of trench duty gave each Division
about six weeks in the line.</p>

<p>My own command at that juncture still comprised the Third
Australian Division, which I had organized and trained in
England, eighteen months before. Although this Division had
never been on the Somme, it had seen a great deal of fighting
in Flanders during 1917. During this period, therefore, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[20]</a></span>
until the outbreak of the storm in the last days of March, 1918,
my interest centred chiefly in the doings of the Third Division,
although for a very short period I had the honour of commanding
the Corps during the temporary absence of Sir William
Birdwood.</p>

<p>The information at our disposal led to the inevitable conclusion
that, during January and February, the enemy was busy
in transferring a great mass of military resources from the
Russian to the Western Front. No one capable of reading the
signs entertained the smallest doubt that he contemplated
taking the offensive, in the spring, on a large scale. The only
questions were, at what point would he strike? and what tactics
would he employ?</p>

<p>Every responsible Australian Commander, accordingly, during
those months, applied himself diligently to these problems,
formulated his doctrines of obstinate defence, and of the defensive
offensive; and saw to it that his troops received such precognition
in these matters as was possible at such a time and in
such an environment. The principles of defence in successive
zones, of the rapid development of Infantry and Artillery fire
power, of the correct distribution of machine guns, of rearguard
tactics, and questions of the best equipment for long marches
and rapid movement were debated and resolved upon, in both
official and unofficial conferences of officers.</p>

<p>All this discussion bore good fruit. Among the possible rôles
which the Australian Divisions might be called upon to fill,
when the great issue was joined, were those which involved these
very matters. And so the event proved; and the Australians
then approached their new and unfamiliar tasks, not wholly
unprepared by training and study for the difficulties involved.</p>

<p>It was on March 8th that the Third Division bade a last but
by no means a regretful farewell to the mud of Flanders and
Belgium&mdash;regions which it had inhabited almost continuously for
the preceding sixteen months. The Division moved back for
a well-earned rest, to a pleasant countryside at Nielles-lez-Blequin,
not far from Boulogne. It was lying there, enjoying<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[21]</a></span>
the first signs of dawning spring when, on March 21st, the
curtain was rung up for a great drama, in which the Australian
troops were destined to play no subordinate part.</p>

<p>There followed many weeks of crowded and strenuous days,
and the story of this time must, of necessity, assume the form
of a personal narrative. Events followed one upon the other
so rapidly, and the centre of interest changed so quickly from
place to place and from hour to hour, that no recital except that
of the future historian writing with a wealth of collected material
at his disposal, could take upon itself any other guise than that
of a record of individual experience.</p>

<p>The Germans attacked the front of the Fifth British Army on
March 21st. The information which was at the disposal of our
High Command was not of such a nature that the promulgation
of it would have been calculated to elevate the spirits of the
Army; consequently Divisions situated as we were, in Reserve,
and, for the time being, entirely out of the picture, had to depend
for our news partly upon rumour, which was always unreliable,
and partly upon severely censored communiqués, framed so as
to allay public anxiety. Nothing definite emerged from such
sources, except that things were going ill and that fighting was
taking place on ground far behind what had been our front line
near St. Quentin. This hint was enough to justify the expectation
that my Division would not be left for long unemployed;
and on the same day, March 21st, instructions were issued for all
units to prepare for a move, to dump unessential baggage, to fill
up all mobile supplies, and to stand by in readiness to march at
a few hours' notice.</p>

<p>Orders came to move on March 22nd. The Division was to
move <i>east</i>, that is, back into Flanders, and not south to the Somme
Valley, as all had hoped. The prescribed move duly started, but
by March 24th had been arrested, for orders had come to cancel
the move and await fresh orders. Advanced parties, for billeting
duty, were to proceed next morning by motor lorry to Doullens,
and there await orders. Later came detailed instructions that
the Division was to be transferred from the Australian Corps to
the Tenth Corps, which latter was to be G.H.Q. Reserve, and that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[22]</a></span>
the whole Division was to be moved the next night to the Doullens<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>
area, the dismounted troops by rail, and the Artillery and other
mounted units by route-march.</p>

<p>It was evident that the plans of the High Command were the
subject of rapid changes, in sympathy, probably, with fluctuations
in the situation, which were not ascertainable by me. There
followed a night and day of strenuous activity, during which
arrangements were completed to entrain the three Infantry
Brigades and the Pioneers at three different railway stations, to
start off the whole of the mounted units on their long march by
road, and to ensure that all fighting troops were properly equipped
with munitions, food and water, all ready for immediate employment.
It was well that my Staff responded capably to the heavy
demands made upon them, and that all this preparatory work was
efficiently done.</p>

<p>The entrainments commenced at midnight on the 25th and
continued all night. At break of day on the 26th, after assuring
myself that everyone was correctly on the move, I proceeded
south by motor-car, in the endeavour to find the Tenth Corps Headquarters,
and to report to them for orders. My fruitless search
of that forenoon revealed to me the first glimpse of the true reason
for that far-reaching disorganization and confusion which
confronted me during the next twenty-four hours.</p>

<p>Over three years of trench warfare had accustomed the whole
Army to fixed locations for all Headquarters, and to settled
routes and lines of inter-communication. The powerful German
onslaught and the recoil of a broad section of our fighting front
had suddenly disturbed the whole of this complex organization.
The Headquarters of Brigades, Divisions, and even Corps, ceased
to have fixed locations where they could be found, or assured lines
of telegraph or telephone communications, by which they could
be reached. Everything was in a state of flux, and the process
of getting into personal contact with each other suddenly took
responsible leaders hours where it had previously taken minutes.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[23]</a></span></p>
<p>In its broad result, this disorganization affected most seriously
the retiring troops, by depriving them of the advantages of
rapidly disseminated orders for properly co-ordinated action by a
large number of Corps and Divisions withdrawing side by side. The
consequence was, I am convinced, that the recoil&mdash;which may have
been inevitable at first by reason of the intensity of the German
attack, and because the defensive organization of the Fifth Army
had been unduly attenuated&mdash;was allowed to extend over a much
greater distance, and to continue for longer, in point of time, than
ought to have been the case.</p>

<p>Between Albert and St. Quentin there were in existence several
lines of defence, which by reason of their topographical features,
or the existence of trenches and entanglements, were eminently
suitable for making a stand. Yet no stand was made, at any rate
on a broad front, because there was no co-ordination in the
spasmodic attempts to do so. I subsequently learned of more
than one instance where Brigades of Infantry or of Artillery found
themselves perfectly well able to hold on, but were compelled to
a continued retirement by the melting away of the units on their
flanks.</p>

<p>I sought the Tenth Corps at Hautcloque, where they were to
be. They were not there. I proceeded to Frevent, where they
were said to have been the night before. They had already left.
In despair, I proceeded to Doullens, resolved at least to ensure
the orderly detrainment of my Division and their quartering for
the following night, and there to await further orders. A despatch
rider was sent off to G.H.Q. to report my whereabouts, and the
fact that I was without orders.</p>

<p>Arriving at Doullens, I tumbled into a scene of indescribable
confusion. The population were preparing to evacuate the
town <i>en masse</i>, and an exhausted and hungry soldiery was pouring
into the town from the east and south-east, with excited tales that
the German cavalry was on their heels. Influenced by the
persistency of these reports, I determined to make, immediately,
dispositions to cover the detrainment of my troops, so that some
show of resistance could be made.</p>

<p>In the midst of all this stress and anxiety, I was favoured by a
run of good luck. Within half an hour of my reaching Doullens,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[24]</a></span>
the first of my railway trains arrived, bringing Brigadier-General
Rosenthal and a battalion of the 9th Brigade, sufficient troops,
at any rate, to furnish a strong outpost line for covering the eastern
approaches of Doullens, while the remainder of the Brigade should
arrive. These arrangements made, I motored to Mondicourt,
where almost immediately afterwards a train arrived, bringing
Brigadier-General McNicoll and the first battalion of the 10th
Brigade.</p>

<p>There also arrived, almost simultaneously, that rumour with
the ridiculous <i>dénouement</i>, that German armoured motor-cars
were approaching along the road from Albert and were within
three miles of that point. Those Armoured Cars proved ultimately
to be a train of French agricultural implements which a
wheezy and rumbling traction engine was doing its best to salve.
McNicoll likewise received orders to put out a line of outposts
to cover Mondicourt railway station.</p>

<p>At this point, too, endless streams of dust-begrimed soldiers
were straggling westwards. McNicoll collected many hundreds
of them, and did not omit, by very direct methods, to prevail
upon all of them who had not yet lost their rifles and essential
equipment, to call a halt and join his own troops in the defensive
dispositions which he was making.</p>

<p>My next business was to select a suitable central point at which
to establish my Headquarters, preferably where I could find a
still intact telephone service. Again by good luck I found a
most suitable location in a small château at Couturelle, whose
owner hospitably provided a much needed meal.</p>

<p>It was there, soon after my arrival, that I learned of the
presence in the neighbourhood of Major-General Maclagan;
this news, implying as it did the presence also of some at least of
the Fourth Australian Division, was a gleam of sunshine in an
otherwise gloomy prospect. Report said that he was at Basseux,
and thither I proceeded, in order to arrange, by personal conference
with him, some plan for co-ordinated action.</p>

<p>Basseux rests on the main road from Doullens to Arras, which
lies roughly parallel to the line along which, as subsequently
transpired, the vanguard of the enemy was endeavouring to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[25]</a></span>
advance at that part of the front. That main road I found packed,
for the whole of the length which I had to traverse, with a steadily
retreating collection of heterogeneous units, service vehicles and
guns of all imaginable types and sizes, intermingled with hundreds
of civilian refugees, and farm waggons, carts, trollies and barrows
packed high with pathetic loads of household effects. The retrograde
movement was orderly and methodical enough, and there
was nothing in the nature of a rout, but it was nevertheless a
determined movement to the rear which evidenced nothing but a
desire to keep moving.</p>

<p>I found Maclagan at about four o'clock. His Division had
already been on the move, by bus and route march, for three days
without rest. The position to the east and south-east of him
was obscure, and he also had posted a line of outposts in the
supposed direction of the enemy, and was arranging to despatch
his 4th Brigade to Hebuterne (which the enemy was reported to
have entered), with orders to recapture that town. That the
enemy was not very far away became evident from the fact that
the vicinity of the hut in which we were conferring presently
came under desultory long-range shell-fire.</p>

<p>There was nothing to be done except to arrange jointly to keep
up an effective and as far as possible continuous line of outposts
towards the south-east, and to await developments. Having
made these arrangements I returned along the same crowded
road, which was now also being leisurely shelled by the enemy, to
Couturelle. There I found that the principal officers of my Staff
had arrived.</p>

<p>Thereupon orders were issued for the concentration, after
detrainment, of my three Brigades in the following areas, each
with due outpost precautions, viz.: 9th Brigade at Pas, 10th
Brigade at Authie, and 11th Brigade at Couin. My Artillery was
still distant a full day's march by road.</p>

<p>About nine o'clock that evening I received, by telephone, my
first order from the Tenth Corps. It ran as follows: "A Staff
Officer has left some time ago on his way to you, carrying instructions
for you to report personally at once to Corbie for orders.
We have since heard that you are to go to Montigny instead."</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[26]</a></span></p>

<p>It was nearly an hour before the Staff Officer arrived, having
been delayed on the road by congestion of traffic. The instructions
he carried transferred my Division from the Tenth to the
Seventh Corps, to whom I was to report personally, without delay,
at Corbie. It was evident from the later telephone message that
the Seventh Corps had been compelled to withdraw from Corbie,
and was proceeding to Montigny.</p>

<p>This was the second stroke of good luck that day; for if the
telephone message above recited had not overtaken the Staff
Officer, it is quite probable that I should have already started
for a wrong destination, and have had to waste valuable time at a
most critical juncture. Had I failed to find General Congreve,
the Seventh Corps Commander, <i>that same night</i>, it is almost
certain that my Division would have arrived on the Somme too
late to prevent the capture of Amiens.</p>

<p>Setting out from Couturelle shortly after ten o'clock that night,
accompanied by four of my Staff and two despatch-riders, with
two motor-cars and two motor cycles, in black darkness, on unfamiliar
roads congested with refugee traffic, I did not reach Montigny
until after midnight. I found General Congreve in the
corner of a bare salon of stately proportions, in a deserted
château by the roadside, seated with his Chief of Staff at a small
table, and examining a map by the flickering light of a candle.
The rest of the château was in darkness, but heaps of hastily
dumped Staff baggage impeded all the corridors.</p>

<p>General Congreve was brief and to the point. What he said
amounted to this: "At four o'clock to-day my Corps was holding
a line from Albert to Bray, when the line gave way. The enemy
is now pushing westwards and if not stopped to-morrow will
certainly secure all the heights overlooking Amiens. What you
must try and do is to get your Division deployed across his path.
The valleys of the Ancre and the Somme offer good points for
your flanks to rest upon. You must, of course, get as far east as
you can, but I know of a good line of old trenches, which I believe
are still in good condition, running from Méricourt-l'Abbé towards
Sailly-le-Sec. Occupy them, if you can't get further east."</p>

<p>At that juncture General Maclagan arrived and received<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[27]</a></span>
similar crisp orders to bring his Division into a position of support
on the high land in the bend of the Ancre to the west of Albert.
I gleaned further that the Seventh Corps was now the south flank
Corps of the Third Army, and that as the Fifth Army, south of
the Somme, had practically melted away, while the French were
retiring south-westerly and leaving an hourly increasing gap
between their north flank and the Somme, General Byng had
resolved to make every effort not only to maintain the flank of
his Third Army on the Somme, but also to prevent it being turned
from the south, while the Commander-in-Chief was taking other
measures to attempt next day to fill the gap above alluded to.</p>

<p>It was already 1 a.m. of March 27th, and I had left my Division
twenty miles away. Everything depended now on quick decision
and faultless executive action. It was fortunate that a telephone
line to G.H.Q. had been found in good working order, and that
the services of three large motor bus convoys could be arranged
for to proceed at once to the Doullens area, in order to transport
my Infantry during the night to the place appointed. I worked
with my Staff till nearly break of day, considering and settling
all detailed arrangements, and we then separated in various
directions to our appointed tasks.</p>

<p>I proceeded myself a little after dawn, with one Staff Officer,
to Franvillers, which had been decided upon as the point for
leaving the buses. There was yet no sign of any Australian
troops, and the village was being hastily evacuated by the terror-stricken
inhabitants. But there were ample and visible signs,
far away on the high plateau beyond the Ancre Valley, that the
German line of skirmishers was already on the move, slowly
driving back the few troops of British Cavalry who were, most
valiantly, trying to delay their advance.</p>

<p>The next hour was one of intense suspense and expectancy;
but my anxiety was relieved when there rolled into the village
from the north, a motor bus convoy of thirty vehicles, crowded
with good staunch Australian Infantry of the 11th Brigade, and
bringing also Brigadier-General Cannan and some of his Brigade
Staff. It was not the first time in the war that the London motor-bus&mdash;after
abandoning the population of the great metropolis<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[28]</a></span>
to enforced pedestrianism&mdash;had helped to save a most critical
situation.</p>

<p>Almost immediately after, there arrived McNicoll, with a
battalion of his 10th Brigade. Hour after hour a steady stream
of omnibus convoys came in. No time was lost in assembling
the troops, and in directing the Infantry&mdash;company after company&mdash;down
the steep, winding road to the little village of Heilly, and
thence across the Ancre, to deploy on the selected line of defence
indicated in the orders above recited.</p>

<p>The spectacle of that Infantry will be ever memorable to me,
as one of the most inspiring sights of the whole war. Here was
the Third Division&mdash;the "new chum" Division, which, in spite
of its great successes in Belgium and Flanders, had never been
able to boast, like its sister Divisions, that it had been "down on
the Somme"&mdash;come into its own at last, and called upon to prove
its mettle. And then there was the thought that they were going
to measure themselves, man to man, against an enemy who,
skulking behind his field works, had for so long pounded them to
pieces in their trenches, poisoned them with gas, and bombed
them as they slept in their billets.</p>

<p>That, at any rate, was the point of view of the private soldier,
and no one who saw those battalions, in spite of the fatigue of
two sleepless nights, marching on that crisp, clear spring morning,
with head erect and the swing and precision of a Royal review
parade, could doubt that not a man of them would flinch from
any assault that was likely to fall upon them. Nor was there a
man who did not fully grasp that upon him and his comrades
was about to fall the whole responsibility of frustrating the
German attempt to capture Amiens and separate the Allied
Armies.</p>

<p>By midday, the situation was already well in hand, and by
four o'clock I was able to report to the Seventh Corps that no less
than six Battalions were already deployed, astride of the
triangle formed by the Ancre and the Somme, on the line Méricourt&mdash;Sailly-le-Sec,
distributed in a series of "localities"
defended by rifles and Lewis guns. As yet no Artillery was available.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[29]</a></span></p>

<p>The 11th Brigade occupied this line to the south of the main
road from Corbie to Bray, the 10th Brigade continued it to the
north of the road, while the 9th Brigade was leaving the buses
and assembling in the neighbourhood of Heilly.</p>

<p>So far, the pressure of the enemy upon my front had not been
serious. It was obvious that he had, as yet, very little Artillery
at his disposal. We had not, however, found our front totally
devoid of defenders. During the forenoon, a few troops of our
cavalry, and a force under Brigadier-General Cummings, comprising
about 1,500 mixed infantry, the remnants of a large
number of different units of the Third Army, were slowly withdrawing
under pressure from the advancing German patrols.
These valiant "die-hards," deserving of the greatest praise in
comparison with the many thousands of their comrades who
had withdrawn from any further attempt to stem the onflowing
tide, were now ordered to retire through my outpost line, thus
leaving the Australian Infantry at last face to face with the
enemy.</p>

<p>These dispositions were completed only in the nick of time. All
that afternoon the enemy appeared over the sky-line in front of
us, both in lines of skirmishers and in numerous small patrols,
endeavouring to work forward in the folds of the ground, and to
sneak towards us in the gullies. But all of them were received
with well directed rifle fire and the enemy suffered many losses.
Towards nightfall the attempts to continue his advance died away.</p>

<p>That was, literally, the end of the great German advance in
this part of the field, and although, as will be told later, the enemy
renewed the attempt on several subsequent occasions to reach
Amiens, he gained not a single inch of ground, but, on the contrary,
was compelled in front of us to undertake a slow but steady
retrograde movement.</p>

<p>Our reconnoitring patrols discovered, however, that the enemy
already had possession of the village of Sailly-Laurette, and of
Marett and Treux Woods, but that he was not yet in great
strength on the crest of the plateau. Orders were issued to perfect
the organization of our defensive line, put out wire entanglements,
dig-in machine guns, and rest the troops in relays during<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[30]</a></span>
the coming night, but not to attempt any forward movement
until the next night.</p>

<p>My Artillery and other mounted units were still half a day's
march away; but Brigadier-General Grimwade, their Commander,
had been instructed to push on in advance, with the
whole of the Commanders of his Brigades and Batteries. They
arrived on the scene in sufficient time to enable the whole situation
to be examined in the daylight, and for detailed action to
be decided upon. The Artillery kept coming in during the whole
of the following night, and although men and horses were almost
exhausted after two days of forced marching, their spirits were
never higher. Next morning found the guns already in action,
and engaging all bodies of the enemy who dared to expose themselves
to view.</p>

<p>I must now turn to the Fourth Australian Division. They
had been less fortunate in several respects. Maclagan was
directed to leave behind his 4th Brigade, which had on the
26th speedily become committed to important operations under
the 62nd Division in front of Hebuterne, from which village this
Brigade had driven the enemy. This left him with only two
Brigades, the 12th and 13th. He was faced with the obligation
of bringing his already over-tired infantry, by route march, down
from the Basseux area, to the high ground west and south-west of
Albert. That town had fallen and the situation there had, by the
26th, also become very critical.</p>

<p>This march was, however, accomplished in strict accordance
with orders, and was a remarkable feat of endurance by the
troops of the 12th and 13th Brigades. There can be no doubt,
however, that the effort was more than justified, for the mere
presence, in a position of readiness, of these two Australian
Brigades, did much to steady the situation opposite Albert, by
heartening the line troops and stimulating their Commanders
to hang on for a little longer. It was this last effort which
brought to a standstill the German advance north of the Ancre,
as the entry of the Third Division had stopped that to the south
of that river.</p>

<p>After his two Brigades had had only four hours' rest, Maclagan<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[31]</a></span>
took over, with them, the control of the fighting front, opposite
Dernancourt and Albert, which the Seventh Corps had allotted
to him.</p>

<p>Thus, by the night of the 27th, as the result of the rapid movements
which I have described and the ready response of the
troops, there was already in position the nucleus of a stout defence
by five Australian Brigades, stretching almost continuously from
Hebuterne to the Somme, while another Australian Brigade, the
9th, remained still uncommitted.</p>

<p>But the situation south of the Somme gave cause for the
gravest anxiety. The north flank of the French was hourly
retiring in a south-westerly direction, and the ever widening gap
was filled only by a scratch force of odd units supported and
assisted by a few elements of the First Cavalry Division. The
right flank of our Third Army, therefore, lay exposed to the danger
of being turned, if the enemy should succeed in pressing his
advantage as far west as Corbie, and in crossing the river at or
west of that town.</p>

<p>It was for this reason that, after a conference with General
Congreve, late in the day, I decided to deploy my 9th Brigade
along the Somme from Sailly-le-Sec westward as far as Aubigny,<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>&mdash;far
too extended a front for one Brigade, but at least an effort
to dispute the passage by the enemy of the existing bridges and
lock-gates over the Somme.</p>

<p>The two following days were full of toil and hard travelling
in establishing touch with Divisional Headquarters to the north
and south of me, in arranging for co-ordinated action with them,
and in gleaning all possible information as to the situation, and
as to the number and condition of other troops available in an
emergency.</p>

<p>It was an especial pleasure for the Australian troops to find
themselves fighting in these days in close association with famous
British Cavalry Regiments, and that these feelings were reciprocated
may be gathered from the following letter from Major-General
Mullens, who commanded the First Cavalry Division,
which was devoting its energies to covering the gap between the
Somme and the French flank:</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[32]</a></span></p>
<blockquote>

<p>"<span class="smcap">My dear Monash</span>,</p>

<p>"I was hoping to have come to see you, when the
battle allowed, to thank you, your Artillery Commander,
and your Brigadiers who were alongside of my Division,
for your most valuable and encouraging support and assistance,
especially on the 30th March, when we had a hard
fight to keep the Bosche out of our position. I was very
much struck by the courtesy of yourself and your officers
in coming to see me personally, and for your own and their
keen desire to do everything in their power to help. As
you know, we had a curious collection of units to deal with,
and it was a very real relief to know that I had your stout-hearted
fellows on my left flank and that all worry was
therefore eliminated as to the safety of my flanks. Your
order for the placing of your heavy guns and batteries so as
to cover my front was of very real assistance, and incidentally
they killed a lot of Huns, and what they did was much
appreciated by us all. Will you convey to all concerned my
own appreciation, and that of all ranks of the 1st Cavalry
Division. It was a pleasure and an honour to be fighting
alongside troops who displayed such magnificent <i>moral</i>.
I only hope we may have the chance of co-operating with you
again, and under more favourable circumstances.</p>

<div class="right">
"Yours sincerely,<br />
(Sgnd.) "<span class="smcap">R. L. Mullens</span>."<br />
</div>
</blockquote>

<p>On the night of March 29th I advanced my line, pivotting on my
right, until my left rested on the Ancre east of Buire, an extreme
advance of over 2,000 yards, meeting some opposition and taking
a few prisoners. This deprived the enemy of over a mile of
valuable vantage ground on the crest of the plateau along which
ran the main road from Corbie to Bray.</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/map-a.jpg" width="1200" height="906" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">Map A.</span></p></div>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[33]</a></span></p>

<p>By that time it was apparent that the enemy's Artillery
resources were hourly accumulating, and on the next afternoon
he delivered a determined attack along my whole front, employing
two Divisions. The attack was completely repelled, with an
estimated loss to the enemy of at least 3,000 killed. My Artillery
were firing over open sights and had never in their previous
experience had such tempting targets.</p>

<p>On the previous day, however, the situation between the Somme
and Villers-Bretonneux, and still further to the south, had become
desperate; and much to my discomfiture I was ordered to hand
over my 9th Brigade (Rosenthal) for duty with the 61st Division,
in order to reinforce that dissolving sector. My importunity
as to the necessity for maintaining the defence of my river flank,
however, led the Seventh Corps Commander to let me have, in
exchange, the 15th Brigade (Elliott), which was the first Brigade
of the Fifth Australian Division to arrive from Flanders on the
present scene of operations. This interchange of Brigades was
completed by the 30th.</p>

<p>That day was further marked by a concentrated bombardment
of the village of Franvillers, in which I had established my
Headquarters. Although no serious loss was suffered, the responsible
work of my Staff was disturbed. On reporting the
occurrence to General Congreve, he insisted upon my moving
my Headquarters back to St. Gratien, which move was completed
the next day.</p>

<p>On April 4th the enemy attacked, in force, south of the Somme,
and the village of Hamel was lost to us by the rout of the remnants
of a very exhausted British Division which had been sent
in the night before to defend it. This success gave the enemy
a footing upon a portion of Hill 104, and brought him to the eastern
outskirts of Villers-Bretonneux. Three months later it cost the
Australian Corps a concentrated effort to compel him to surrender
these advantages.</p>

<p>One last and final attempt to break through the Australian
phalanx north of the Somme was made by the enemy on April 5th.
The full weight of this blow fell chiefly upon the gallant Fourth
Australian Division. The battle of Dernancourt will live long
in the annals of military history as an example of dogged and
successful defence. The whole day long the enemy expended<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[34]</a></span>
Division after Division in the vain endeavour to compel two weak
Australian Brigades to loosen their hold on the important high
ground lying west of Albert. He well knew that the capture by
him of these heights involved the inevitable withdrawal of the
Third Australian Division also, and that thereby the path to
Amiens would again lie open.</p>

<p>The great German blow against the important railway centre
of Amiens had been parried, and from this time onwards interest
in this sphere of operations rapidly waned. It blazed up again
for a few hours only when, three weeks later, the enemy made
his final attempt to reach his goal, on this occasion by way of
Villers-Bretonneux. North of the Somme, his activity quickly
died down, and the attitude of both combatants gradually assumed
the old familiar aspect of trench warfare, with its endless digging
of trenches, line behind line, its weary trench routine, and its
elaborate installation of permanent lines of communication and
of administrative establishments of all descriptions.</p>

<p>South of the Somme, the Fifth Australian Division came into
the line on April 5th, relieving a Cavalry Division on a frontage
of about 5,000 yards, and thereby obviating any further
necessity for the maintenance of my flank river defence. This
duty had been performed for me in succession by the 15th
Australian, the 104th Imperial and the 13th Australian Brigades
(the latter then under Glasgow). My 9th Brigade still remained
detached from me, operating under both the 18th and 61st British
Divisions, and performed prodigies of valorous fighting in a
series of desperate local attacks and counter-attacks, which took
place between Villers-Bretonneux and Hangard, where the
French northern flank then lay. In this service the 9th Brigade
received gallant co-operation from the 5th Australian Brigade
(of the 2nd Australian Division), which was now also arriving
in this area, after having been relieved from trench garrison duty
in the Messines&mdash;Warneton sector in Flanders.</p>

<p>The Fifth Division and these two detached Brigades were,
during this period, serving under the Third Corps (Butler),
which had been reconstituted to fill the gap between the Somme
and the flank of the French Army. The First Australian Division<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[35]</a></span>
was already well on the way to follow the Second Division, when,
on April 11th, it was hurriedly re-transferred to Flanders to assist
in stemming the new German flood which was inundating the
whole of that region, and which was not arrested until it had
almost reached Hazebrouck. This task the First Australian
Division performed most valiantly, thereby upholding the reputation
already earned by its younger sister Divisions for a capacity
for rapid, ordered movement and decisive intervention at a
critical juncture.</p>

<p>For some days there had been rumours that the Australian
Corps Headquarters would shortly be transferred to the Amiens
area, and would once again gather under its control the numerous
elements of the four Australian Divisions which were by now
widely scattered, and had been fighting under the orders of three
different Army Corps. There was the still more interesting and
pregnant rumour that General Lord Rawlinson&mdash;relinquishing
his post of British representative on the Supreme War Council
at Versailles&mdash;was soon to arrive and to form and command a
reconstituted Fourth British Army,<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> which was to be composed
of the Australian and the Third (British) Army Corps.</p>

<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> The majority of the place-names mentioned in the remainder of this chapter
will be found on Maps A or J.</p></div>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Two miles west of Corbie.</p></div>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> The Fourth Army had disappeared when, in 1917, General Rawlinson went
to Versailles. The Fifth Army was not revived until June, 1918.</p></div></div>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[36]</a></span></p>


<h2>CHAPTER II<br />

THE DEFENCE OF AMIENS</h2>


<p>The Australian Corps Headquarters, under General Birdwood,
commenced its activities at Villers-Bocage on
April 7th, but soon after removed to the handsome seventeenth-century
Château at Bertangles, with its pleasant grounds and
spacious parks. One by one the detached Australian Brigades
rejoined their Divisions, and the Divisions themselves came back
under the orders of their own Corps.</p>

<p>The comparative calm which had supervened upon all the
excitement of the closing days of March and the first weeks of
April was rudely broken when, before daybreak on April 24th,
the enemy began a furious bombardment of the whole region
extending from opposite Albert to a point as far south as Hangard.
It was certain that this demonstration was the prelude
of an infantry attack in force, but it was not until well after midday
that the situation clarified, and it became known that the
attack had been confined to the country south of the Somme, that
it had struck the southern flank of the Fifth Australian Division,
which had stood firm and had thereby saved the loss of the
remainder of the tactically important Hill 104. But the town of
Villers-Bretonneux, lying beyond the Australian sector, had
fallen and the Germans were in possession of it.</p>

<p>It was imperative to retrieve this situation, or at least
to make an attempt to do so. The nearest available reserve
Brigades of Infantry were Australian, the 13th under Glasgow,
and the 15th under Elliott. They were placed under the orders
of the Third Corps, and by them directed to recapture the town.</p>

<p>Both Brigades had to make long marches to reach the battleground.
It was already dark before they had deployed on the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[37]</a></span>
appointed lines of departure. The details of this enthralling and
wonderful night attack form too lengthy a story to find a place
in this brief narrative; suffice it to say that when the sun rose on
the third Anniversary of Anzac Day, it looked down upon the
Australians in full possession of the whole town, and standing
upon our original lines of twenty-four hours before, with nearly
1,000 German prisoners to their credit.</p>

<p>In this summary fashion, the last German attempt to split
in two the Allied Armies failed ignominiously, and the attempt
was never again renewed.</p>

<p>A comprehensive rearrangement of the whole Front in this
much-contested region then took place. The appointment of
Marshal Foch as Supreme Commander on the Western Front
bore, as one of its first fruits, a clear decision as to the final point
of junction between the French and the British Armies. This
was fixed just south of Villers-Bretonneux, and not at the Somme
Valley, as was thought desirable by some of the British Commanders.</p>

<p>The new Fourth Army became the flank British Army in
contact with the French. The Australian Corps became the
south flank of that Army. Its sector extended, from the point
named, northwards as far as the Ancre. The Third Corps was
transferred to the north of the Ancre, opposite Albert, and those
two Corps comprised, for some time to come, the whole of the
Fourth Army resources.</p>

<p>The Australian Corps now organized its front with three Divisions
in line and one in reserve. My occupation, with the Third
Australian Division, of the original sector between the Ancre
and the Somme remained undisturbed, and my front line remained
for a time stationary on the alignment gained on March 29th.</p>

<p>But the Third Division had had enough of stationary warfare,
and the troops were athirst for adventure. They were tired of
raids, which meant a mere incursion into enemy territory, and a
subsequent withdrawal, after doing as much damage as possible.</p>

<p>Accordingly, I resolved to embark upon a series of minor battles,
designed not merely to capture prisoners and machine guns, but
also to hold on to the ground gained. This would invite counter-attacks<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[38]</a></span>
which I knew could only enhance the balance in our favour,
and would seriously disorganize the enemy's whole defensive
system, while wearing out his nerves and lowering the <i>moral</i>
of his troops.</p>

<p>Four such miniature battles<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> were fought in rapid succession,
on April 30th and May 3rd, 6th and 7th, by the 9th and 10th
Brigades, who were then in line. These yielded most satisfactory
results. Not only did we capture several hundred prisoners and
numerous machine guns, but also advanced our whole line an
average total distance of a mile. This deprived the enemy of
valuable observation, and forced back his whole Artillery organization.</p>

<p>But these combats, and the numerous offensive patrol operations,
which were also nightly undertaken along my whole
front, did a great deal more. They yielded a constant stream
of prisoners, who at this stage of the war had become sufficiently
demoralized by their disappointments to talk freely, and impart
a mass of valuable information as to movements and conditions
behind the German lines.</p>

<p>The following list of 41 separate identifications, covering
a total of over 300 prisoners, represents the fruits of these efforts
during the period from March 27th to May 11th. From these it
will be seen that during these six weeks I had been confronted by
no less than six different German Divisions:</p>

<div class="center">
<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="">
<tr><td align="right"><i>No.</i></td><td align="center"><i>Date.</i></td><td align="center" colspan="4"><i>Identification.</i></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">1</td><td align="center">28.3.18</td><td align="right">3</td><td align="left">Gren. R.</td><td align="right">1st</td><td align="center">Div.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">2</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">13</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">13</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">3</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">3</td><td align="left">Gren. R.</td><td align="right">1st</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">4</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">1</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">1st</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">&nbsp;</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">13</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">13</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">5</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">86</td><td align="left">Fus. R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">6</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">1</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">1st</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">7</td><td align="center">30.3.18</td><td align="right">13</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">13</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">8</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">31</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">9</td><td align="center">31.3.18</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="left">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">10</td><td align="center">1.4.18</td><td align="right">20</td><td align="left">Foot Arty.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">11</td><td align="center">2.4.18</td><td align="right">3</td><td align="left">"</td><td align="right">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">12</td><td align="center">2/3.4.18</td><td align="right">1</td><td align="left" colspan="3">R.R.Bav. Ft. Arty.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">13</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">13</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">13</td><td align="center">Div.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[39]</a></span></td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">14</td><td align="center">4/5.4.18</td><td align="right">1</td><td align="left">M.W.Coy.</td><td align="right">1st</td><td align="center">Div.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">15</td><td align="center">6/7.4.18</td><td align="right">3</td><td align="left">Jäger Bn.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">16</td><td align="center">9/10.4.18</td><td align="right">31</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">17</td><td align="center">11/12.4.18</td><td align="right">31</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">13/14.4.18</td><td align="right">86</td><td align="left">Fus. R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">19</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">31</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">20</td><td align="center">14/15.4.18</td><td align="right">85</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">21</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">31</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">22</td><td align="center">17/18.4.18</td><td align="right">229</td><td align="left">R.I.R.</td><td align="right">30</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">23</td><td align="center">18/19.4.18</td><td align="right">231</td><td align="left">R.I.R.</td><td align="right">50</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">24</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">85</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">25</td><td align="center">19/20.4.18</td><td align="right">85</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">26</td><td align="center">25/26.4.18</td><td align="right">246</td><td align="left">R.I.R.</td><td align="right">54</td><td align="center">Res. Div.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">27</td><td align="center">27/28.4.18</td><td align="right">229</td><td align="left">R.I.R.</td><td align="right">50</td><td align="center">"&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">28</td><td align="center">28/29.4.18</td><td align="right">247</td><td align="left">R.I.R.</td><td align="right">54</td><td align="center">"&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">29</td><td align="center">30/1.5.18</td><td align="right">247</td><td align="left">R.I.R.</td><td align="right">54</td><td align="center">"&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">30</td><td align="center">3/4.5.18</td><td align="right">357</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">199</td><td align="center">Div.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">31</td><td align="center">4/5.5.18</td><td align="right">114</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">199</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">32</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">31</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">33</td><td align="center">5/6.5.18</td><td align="right">237</td><td align="left">R.I.R.</td><td align="right">199</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">34</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">114</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">199</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">35</td><td align="center">6/7.5.18</td><td align="right">237</td><td align="left">R.I.R.</td><td align="right">199</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">36</td><td align="center">7/8.5.18</td><td align="right">114</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">199</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">37</td><td align="center">8/9.5.18</td><td align="right">114</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">199</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">38</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">237</td><td align="left">R.I.R.</td><td align="right">199</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">39</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">31</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">40</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">357</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">199</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right">41</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;357</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;199</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left" colspan="6">I.R.=Infantry Regiment; R.I.R.=Reserve ditto.</td></tr>
</table></div>

<p>While I was thus exerting a steady pressure on the enemy
and gaining ground easterly, the Australian Corps line south of
the Somme remained stationary, and each successive advance
north of the river served only to accentuate the deep re-entrant
which had been formed on the day when the loss of Hamel forced
the British front line back along the Somme as far as Vaire-sous-Corbie.</p>

<p>While this was not very serious from the point of view of
observation, because I was in possession of much the higher
ground, and was able to look down, almost as upon a map, on to
the enemy in the Hamel basin, yet I was beginning to feel very
seriously the inconvenience of having, square on to my flank, such
excellent concealed Artillery positions as Vaire and Hamel Woods,
which the enemy did not long delay in occupying.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[40]</a></span></p>
<p>Moreover, the whole of the slopes of the valley on my side of
the river remained useless to me, because they were exposed to
the full view of the enemy, so long as he was permitted to occupy
the Hamel salient, which he had on April 5th driven into the very
middle of what was now the Corps front. I therefore made more
than one attempt to persuade the then Corps Commander to
undertake an operation for the elimination in whole or in part of
this inconvenient bend, but, for reasons doubtless satisfactory
at that time, he declined to accept the suggestion. It fell to my
lot myself to carry out this operation nearly two months later.</p>

<p>The Third Division was, however, relieved in the line by our
Second Division on May 11th, and was withdrawn for a short
but well-earned rest after six weeks of trench duty, following
its first fateful rush into the thick of the battle.</p>

<p>It was on May 12th that I received the first intimation from
General Sir William Birdwood that he was to be appointed to
the command of a new Fifth Army, which the British War Council
had decided to form, and that, upon his taking up these new
duties, the task of leading the Australian Army Corps would
devolve upon me.</p>

<p>In consequence of this and other changes, it was shortly
afterwards decided, in consultation, that Glasgow should take
over the command of the First Division, then still fighting at
Hazebrouck, that Rosenthal should command the Second
Division, and that Gellibrand should succeed me at the head of
the Third Division.</p>

<p>Far, therefore, from being permitted a little respite from the
strenuous labours of the preceding six weeks, I found myself
confronted with responsibilities which, in point of numbers
alone, exceeded sixfold those which I had previously had to bear,
but which, in point of difficulty, involved an even higher ratio.</p>

<p>There were numerous Arms and Services, under the Corps,
with whose detailed functions and methods of operation I had not
been previously concerned. The other Divisional Commanders
had hitherto been my colleagues, and I was now called upon to
consider their personalities and temperaments as my subordinates.
There was a vastly increased territory for whose administration
and defence I would become responsible. I had to be
prepared to enter an atmosphere of policy higher and larger than
that which surrounded me as the Commander of a Division. And
finally there was the selection of my new Staff.</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_040fp.jpg" width="1200" height="798" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>German Prisoners&mdash;taken by the Corps at Hamel, being marched to the rear.</p></div>
</div>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_041fp.jpg" width="1200" height="770" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>Visit of Monsieur Clemenceau&mdash;group taken at Bussy on July 7th, 1918.</p></div>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[41]</a></span></p>

<p>My last executive work with the Third Division was the process
of putting this Division back into the line, this time in the Villers-Bretonneux
sector of our front. After handing over the Division
and all its outstanding current affairs to Major-General Gellibrand,
I assumed command of the Australian Army Corps on
May 30th, with Brigadier-General Blamey as my Chief-of-Staff.<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p>

<p>I very soon became aware that, as Corps Commander, I was
privileged to have access to a very large body of interesting
secret information, which was methodically distributed daily by
G.H.Q. Intelligence. This comprised detailed information of
the true facts of all happenings on the fronts of all the Allies,
the gist of the reports of our Secret Service, and very full particulars
from which the nature and distribution of the enemy's military
resources could be deduced with fair accuracy.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[42]</a></span></p>
<p>The numberings and locations of all his Corps and Divisions
actually in the front line, on all the Allied fronts, was, of course,
quite definitely known from day to day. The numberings of all
Formations lying in Reserve were known with equal certainty,
although their actual positions on any date were largely a matter
of deduction by expert investigators. Of particular importance
were the further deductions which could be drawn as to the
condition of readiness or exhaustion of such reserve Divisions,
from known facts as to their successive appearance and experiences
on any active battle front.</p>

<p>Our experts were thus able to classify the enemy Divisions,
and to determine from day to day the probable number, and
even the probable numberings, of fit Divisions actually available
(after one, or after two, or after three days) to reinforce any portion
of the front which was to be the object of an attack by us.
They could also compute the number of fit Divisions which the
enemy had at his disposal at any time for launching an offensive
against us.</p>

<p>All such data had a very direct bearing, not only on the probable
course of the campaign in the immediate future, but also
upon the responsibility which always weighed upon a Corps
Commander of keeping his own sector in preparedness to meet an
attack or to prevent such an attack from coming upon him as a
surprise. He must therefore be alert to watch the signs and
astute to read them aright.</p>

<p>One striking feature of the information at our disposal during
the early part of June was the steady melting away of the enemy
reserves as the consequence of his resultless, even if locally successful,
assaults during the preceding two and a half months,
against Amiens, in Flanders, and on the Chemin des Dames.
But it was apparent that he still held formidable Reserves of
Infantry, and a practically intact Artillery, which he was bound
to employ for at least one great and final effort to gain a decision.</p>

<p>The junction of the French and British Armies still offered a
tempting point of weakness. As mine was now the flank British
Corps, in immediate contact with General Toulorge's 31st French
Corps, I could not afford to relax any of the precautions of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[43]</a></span>
vigilance or preparation which had been initiated by my
predecessor for meeting such an attack. Consequently, during
June, 1918, I ordered on the part of all my line Divisions a
maintenance of their energetic efforts to perfect the defensive
organizations. I also undertook out of other Corps labour
resources the development of further substantial rear systems of
defence, so that Amiens need not, in the event of a renewed
attack, be abandoned to its fate without a prolonged struggle.</p>

<p>The First Australian Division was not yet a part of my new Command,
its continued presence in the Hazebrouck and Merris area,
under the Fifteenth Corps, being still considered indispensable.
My Corps front now extended over a total length of ten miles,
and I had but four Divisions at my disposal to defend it. Three
Divisions held the line, one to the north and two to the south of
the Somme. Only one Division at a time could therefore be
permitted a short rest, and this Division formed my only tactical
reserve.</p>

<p>All this added to the anxieties of the situation, and focussed
the energies of the whole command on a constant scrutiny of all
signs and symptoms that the enemy might be preparing to
deliver his next blow against us. Active patrolling was maintained
and continued to yield a steady stream of prisoners. A
well conceived and planned minor enterprise by the Second
Division, which was carried out on June 10th, and was Rosenthal's
first Divisional operation, gave us possession of a further
slice of the important ridge between Sailly-Laurette and Morlancourt.
It gained us 330 prisoners and 33 machine guns. But
no sign of any preparations on the part of the enemy for an attack
upon us, in this zone, emerged from the careful investigations
which followed this operation.</p>

<p>The days passed and evidences increased that the enemy
was now beginning to devote his further attentions to the French
front far to the south of us. At any rate, he continued to leave
us unmolested, and the interrogations of our numerous prisoners
all confirmed the absence of any preparations for an attack.</p>

<p>The defensive attitude which the situation thus forced upon
us did not for long suit the present temper of the Australian<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[44]</a></span>
troops, and I sought for a promising enterprise on which again to
test their offensive power, on a scale larger than we had yet
attempted in the year's campaign. There had been no Allied
offensive, of any appreciable size, on any of our fronts, in any of
the many theatres of war, since the close of the Passchendaele
fighting in the autumn of 1917.</p>

<p>It was high time that the anxiety and nervousness of the
public, at the sinister encroachments of the enemy upon regions
which he had never previously trodden, should be allayed by a
demonstration that there was still some kick left in the British
Army. It was high time, too, that some Commanders on our
side of No Man's Land should begin to "think offensively," and
cease to look over their shoulders in order to estimate how far
it still was to the coast.</p>

<p>I was ambitious that any such kick should be administered,
first, at any rate, by the Australians. A visit which I was
privileged to pay to General Elles, Commander of the Tank Corps,
when he gave me a demonstration of the capacities of the newer
types of Tanks, only confirmed me in this ambition. Finally,
the Hamel re-entrant had for two months been, as I have already
explained, a source of annoyance and anxiety to me. It was for
these reasons that I resolved to propose an operation for the recapture
of Hamel, conditional upon being supplied with the
assistance of Tanks, a small increase of my Artillery and an addition
to my air resources.</p>

<p>I thereupon set about preparing a general plan for such a battle,
which was to be my first Corps operation. Having mentioned the
matter first verbally to Lord Rawlinson, he requested me to
submit a concrete proposal in writing. The communication is
here reproduced, and will serve to convey an idea of the complexities
involved in even so relatively small an undertaking:</p>

<blockquote>
<div class="right">
Australian Corps.<br />
21st June, 1918.<br />
</div>

<p><i>Fourth Army.</i></p>

<div class="center">HAMEL OFFENSIVE</div>

<p>1. With reference to my proposal for an offensive operation
on the front of the "A" and "B" Divisions of this
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[45]</a></span>Corps, with a view to the capture of <span class="smcap">Hamel</span> Village and
<span class="smcap">Vaire</span> and <span class="smcap">Hamel Wood</span>, etc., the accompanying map
shows, in blue, the proposed ultimate objective line. This
line has been chosen as representing the minimum operation
that would appear to be worth undertaking, while offering
a prospect of substantial advantages.</p>

<p>2.  These advantages may be briefly summarized thus:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>(a) Straightening of our line.</p>

<p>(b)  Shortening of our line.</p>

<p>(c)  Deepening our forward defensive zone, particularly
east of Hill 104.</p>

<p>(d)  Improvement of jumping-off position for future
operations.</p>

<p>(e)  Advancement of our artillery, south of the <span class="smcap">Somme</span>.</p>

<p>(f)  Denial to enemy of observation of ground near
<span class="smcap">Vaux-sur-Somme</span>, valuable for battery positions.</p>

<p>(g)  Facilitating subsequent further minor advances
north of the <span class="smcap">Somme</span>.</p>

<p>(h)  Disorganization of enemy defences.</p>

<p>(i)  Disorganization of possible enemy offensive preparations.</p>

<p>(j) Inflicting losses on enemy personnel and material.</p>

<p>(k) Improvement of our observation.</p>

<p>(l) Maintenance of our initiative on this Corps front.</p></blockquote>

<p>3.  The disadvantages are those arising from the necessity
of bringing into rapid existence a new defensive system on
a frontage of 7,000 yards and also the particular incidence,
at the present juncture, of the inevitable losses, small or
large, of such an operation in this Corps.</p>

<p>4.  In view of the unsatisfactory position of Australian
reinforcements, any substantial losses would precipitate the
time when the question of the reduction in the number of
Australian Divisions would have to be seriously considered.
It is for higher authority to decide whether a portion of the
present resources in Australian man-power in this Corps
would be more profitably ventured upon such an operation
as this, which is in itself a very attractive proposition,
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[46]</a></span>rather than to conserve such resources for employment
elsewhere.</p>

<p>5. Detailed plans can only be prepared after I have
had conferences with representatives of all Arms and Services
involved, but the following proposals are submitted
as the basis of further elaboration:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>(a) The operation will be primarily a Tank operation&mdash;at
least one and preferably two Battalions of
Tanks to be employed.</p>

<p>(b) The whole battle front will be placed temporarily
under command of one Divisional Commander&mdash;by
a temporary readjustment of inter-Divisional
boundaries.</p>

<p>(c) The infantry employed will comprise one Division
plus a Brigade, <i>i.e.</i>, 4 Infantry Brigades, totalling,
say, 7,500 bayonets; about one-half of this force
to be employed in the advance and the other half
to hold our present front defensively, taking over
the captured territory within 48 hours after
Zero.<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p>

<p>(d) The action will be designed on lines to permit of
the Tanks effecting the capture of the ground;
the rôles of the Infantry following the Tanks
will be:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>(i) to assist in reducing strong points and localities.</p>

<p>(ii) to "mop up."</p>

<p>(iii) to consolidate the ground captured.</p></blockquote>

<p>(e) Apart from neutralizing all enemy artillery likely
to engage our troops, our artillery will be employed
to keep under fire enemy centres of resistance and
selected targets&mdash;in front of the advance of the
Tanks. Artillery detailed for close targets will
work on a prearranged and detailed time-table
which will be adjusted to the time-table of the
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[47]</a></span>Tank and Infantry advance. Sufficient "silent"
field artillery supplied before the battle should
be emplaced in advanced positions, to ensure an
effective protective barrage to cover consolidation
on the blue line,<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> and to engage all localities
from which enemy counter-attacks can be
launched. It is estimated that, in addition to
the resources of the Corps, four Field Artillery
Brigades will be required for, say, four days in all.</p>

<p>(f) Engineer stores in sufficient quantities to provide
for the complete organization of the new defences
will require to be dumped beforehand as far forward
as practicable.</p>

<p>(g) No additional machine guns, outside of Corps
resources, will be required,</p>

<p>(h) Contact and counter-attack planes and low-flying
bombing planes prior to and during advance
must be arranged for.</p>

<p>(i) Artillery and mortar smoke to screen the operations
from view of all ground north of the Somme
in the <span class="smcap">Sailly-Laurette</span> locality are required.</p></blockquote>

<p>6. As to the date of the operations, the necessary preparations
will occupy at least seven days after authority
to proceed has been given. As an inter-Divisional relief
is planned to occur on June 28th-29th and 29th-30th, it would
seem that this operation cannot take place earlier than the
first week in July. The postponement of this relief would
not be desirable for several reasons.</p>

<p>7. Valuable training in the joint action of Tanks and
Infantry can be arranged, probably in the territory west of
the <span class="smcap">Hallue</span> Valley&mdash;provided that one or two Tank Companies
can be detached for such a purpose. Thorough
liaison prior to and during the operation between all Tank
and all Infantry Commanders would have to be a special
feature. For this reason only Infantry units not in the line
can be considered as available to undergo the necessary
preparation.</p>

<div class="right">
(Sgd.) <span class="smcap">John Monash</span>,<br />
Lieut.-General.<br />
Cmdg. Australian Corps.<br />
</div>
</blockquote>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[48]</a></span></p>

<p>Approval to these proposals was given without delay; the
additional resources were promised, and preparations for the
battle were immediately put in hand. As I hope, in a later
context, to attempt to describe the evolution of a battle plan,
and the comprehensive measures which are associated with such
an enterprise, it will not be necessary to do so here.</p>

<p>It was the straightening of the Corps front, as an essential
preliminary to any offensive operations on a still larger scale,
to be undertaken when the opportune moment should arrive,
that made the Hamel proposal tactically attractive; it was the
availability of an improved type of Tank that gave it promise of
success, without pledging important resources, or risking serious
losses.</p>

<p>The new Mark V. Tank had not previously been employed in
battle. It marked a great advance upon the earlier types. The
epicyclic gearing with which it was now furnished, the greater
power of its engines, the improved balance of its whole design
gave it increased mobility, facility in turning and immunity from
foundering in ground even of the most broken and uneven character.
It could be driven and steered by one man, where it previously
took four; and it rarely suffered suspended animation
from engine trouble.</p>

<p>But, above all, the men of the Tank Corps had, by the training
which they had undergone, and by the spirited leadership of
Generals Elles, Courage, Hankey and other Tank Commanders,
achieved a higher standard of skill, enterprise and moral; they
were now, more than ever, on their mettle to uphold the prestige
of the Tank Corps.</p>

<p>All the same, the Tanks had become anathema to the Australian
troops. For, at Bullecourt more than a year before,
they had failed badly, and had "let down" the gallant Infantry,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[49]</a></span>
who suffered heavily in consequence; a failure due partly to the
mechanical defects of the Tanks of those days, partly to the
inexperience of the crews, and partly to indifferent staff arrangements,
in the co-ordination of the combined action of the Infantry
and the Tanks.</p>

<p>It was not an easy problem to restore to the Australian soldier
his lost confidence, or to teach him the sympathetic dependence
upon the due performance by the Tanks of the rôles to be allotted
to them, which was essential to a complete utilization of the possibilities
which were now opening up. That the Tanks, appropriately
utilized, were destined to exert a paramount influence
upon the course of the war, was apparent to those who could
envisage the future.</p>

<p>This problem was intensified because the battalions of the
Fourth Division who were to carry out the Infantry tasks at
Hamel were the very units who had undergone that unfortunate
experience at Bullecourt. But, on the principle of restoring the
nerves of the unseated rider by remounting him to continue the
hunt, it was especially important to wean the Fourth Division
from their prejudices.</p>

<p>Battalion after battalion of the 4th, 6th and 11th Brigades of
Infantry was brought by bus to Vaux, a little village tucked away
in a quiet valley, north-west of Amiens, there to spend the day at
play with the Tanks. The Tanks kept open house, and, in the
intervals of more formal rehearsals of tactical schemes of attack,
the Infantry were taken over the field for "joy rides," were
allowed to clamber all over the monsters, inside and out, and even
to help to drive them and put them through their paces.
Platoon and Company leaders met dozens of Tank officers face
to face, and they argued each other to a standstill upon every
aspect that arose.</p>

<p>Set-piece man&oelig;uvre exercises on the scale of a battalion were
designed and rehearsed over and over again; red flags marked
enemy machine-gun posts; real wire entanglements were laid
out to show how easily the Tanks could mow them down; real
trenches were dug for the Tanks to leap and straddle and search
with fire; real rifle grenades were fired by the Infantry to indicate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[50]</a></span>
to the Tanks the enemy strong points which were molesting
and impeding their advance. The Tanks would throw themselves
upon these places, and, pirouetting round and round, would blot
them out, much as a man's heel would crush a scorpion.</p>

<p>It was invaluable as mere training for battle, but the effect
upon the spirits of the men was remarkable. The fame of the
Tanks, and all the wonderful things they could do, spread rapidly
throughout the Corps. The "digger" took the Tank to his
heart, and ever after, each Tank was given a pet name by the
Company of Infantry which it served in battle, a name which was
kept chalked on its iron sides, together with a panegyric commentary
upon its prowess.</p>

<p>There remained, however, much to be arranged, and many
difficult questions to be settled, as regards the tactical employment
of the Tanks. I can never be sufficiently grateful to
Brigadier-General Courage, of the 5th Tank Brigade, for his
diligent assistance, and for his loyal acceptance of the onerous
conditions which the tactical methods that I finally decided
upon imposed upon the Tanks.</p>

<p>These methods involved two entirely new principles. Firstly,
each Tank was, for tactical purposes, to be treated as an Infantry
weapon; from the moment that it entered the battle
until the objective had been gained it was to be under the
exclusive orders of the Infantry Commander to whom it had been
assigned.</p>

<p>Secondly, the deployed line of Tanks was to advance, <i>level
with the Infantry</i>, and pressing close up to the barrage. This,
of course, subjected the Tanks, which towered high above the
heads of the neighbouring infantry, to the danger of being
struck by any of our own shells which happened to fall a little
short. Tank experts, consulted beforehand, considered therefore
that it was not practicable for Tanks to follow close behind
an artillery barrage. The battle of Hamel proved that it was.</p>


<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> See Map A.</p></div>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> A farewell order to the Third Division was issued in the following terms:
</p>
<p>
"As I am about to take up other duties the time has come when I must relinquish
the command of the Division.
</p>
<p>
"Closely associated with you as I have been, since the days of your first
assembly and War Training in <span class="smcap">England</span>, and, later, throughout all your magnificent
work during the past nineteen months in the war zone, it is naturally
a severe wrench for me to part from you.
</p>
<p>
"I find it quite impossible to give adequate expression to my feelings of
gratitude towards all ranks for the splendid and loyal support which you have,
at all times, accorded to me. I am deeply indebted to my Staff, to all Commanders
and to the officers and troops of all Arms and Services for a whole-hearted
co-operation upon which, more than upon any other factor, the success
of the Division has depended.
</p>
<p>
"It is my earnest hope, and also my sincere conviction, that the fine spirit
and the high efficiency of the Division will be maintained under the leadership
of my successor, Brigadier-General Gellibrand; and if the men of the Division
feel, as I trust they do, an obligation to perpetuate for my sake the traditions
built up by them during the period of my command, they can do so in no better
way than by rendering to him a service as thorough and a support as loyal
as I have been privileged to enjoy at their hands.
</p>
<p>
"In formally wishing the Division good-bye and good luck, I wish simply,
but none the less sincerely, to thank each and all of you, for all that you have
done.
</p>
<div class="right">
"(Signed) <span class="smcap">John Monash</span>,<br />
Major-General."<br />
</div>
</div>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> "Zero" refers to the day and hour, not yet determined, on which the battle
is to begin.</p></div>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> "Blue Line," arbitrarily so called, because this line was drawn on the
accompanying map in blue. It was to be the final objective for the day.</p></div></div>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[51]</a></span></p>

<h2>CHAPTER III<br />

HAMEL</h2>


<p>The larger questions relating to the employment of the
Tanks at the battle of Hamel having been disposed of,
the remaining arrangements for the battle presented few novel
aspects. Their manner of execution, however, brought into
prominence some features which became fundamental doctrines
in the Australian Corps then and thereafter.</p>

<p>Although complete written orders were invariably prepared and
issued by a General Staff whose skill and industry left nothing
to be desired, very great importance was attached to the holding
of conferences, at which were assembled every one of the Senior
Commanders and heads of Departments concerned in the impending
operation. At these I personally explained every detail of
the plan, and assured myself that all present applied an identical
interpretation to all orders that had been issued.</p>

<p>Questions were invited; difficulties were cleared up; and the
conflicting views of the different services on matters of technical
detail were ventilated. The points brought to an issue were
invariably decided on the spot. The battle plan having been
thus crystallized, no subsequent alterations were permissible,
under any circumstances, no matter how tempting. This fixity
of plan engendered a confidence throughout the whole command
which facilitated the work of every Commander and Staff Officer.
It obviated the vicious habit of postponing action until the last
possible moment, lest counter orders should necessitate some
alternative action. It was a powerful factor in the gaining of
time, usually all too short for the extensive preparations
necessary.</p>

<p>The final Corps Conference for the battle of Hamel was held at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[52]</a></span>
Bertangles on June 30th, and the date of the battle itself was
fixed for July 4th. This selection was prompted partly by the
desire to allow ample time for the completion of all arrangements;
but there were also sentimental grounds, because this
was the anniversary of the American national holiday, and a
considerable contingent of the United States Army was to co-operate
in the fight.</p>

<p>For some weeks previously the 33rd American Division,
under Major-General John Bell, had been training in the Fourth
Army area, and its several regiments had been distributed, for
training and trench experience, to the Australian and the III.
Corps. I had applied to the Fourth Army and had received
approval to employ in the battle a contingent equivalent in
strength to two British battalions, or a total of about 2,000
men, organized in eight companies. The very proper condition
was attached, however, that these Americans should not be split
up and scattered individually among the Australians, but should
fight at least as complete platoons, under their own platoon
leaders.</p>

<p>All went well until three days before the appointed date, when
General Rawlinson conveyed to me the instruction that, the
matter having been reconsidered, only 1,000 Americans were to
be used. Strongly averse, as I was, from embarrassing the
Infantry plans of General Maclagan, to whom I had entrusted the
conduct of the actual assault, it was not then too late to rearrange
the distribution.</p>

<p>The four companies of United States troops who, under this
decision, had to be withdrawn were loud in their lamentations,
but the remaining four companies were distributed by platoons
among the troops of the three Australian Brigades who were
to carry out the attack&mdash;each American platoon being assigned a
definite place in the line of battle. The dispositions of the main
body of Australian infantry were based upon this arrangement.</p>

<p>In the meantime, somewhere in the upper realms of high control,
a discussion must have been going on as to the propriety of
after all allowing any American troops at all to participate in the
forthcoming operations. Whether the objections were founded<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[53]</a></span>
upon policy, or upon an under-estimate of the fitness of these
troops for offensive fighting, I have never been able to ascertain;
but, to my consternation, I received about four o'clock on the
afternoon of July 3rd, a telephone message from Lord Rawlinson
to the effect that it had now been decided that <i>no</i> American troops
were to be used the next day.</p>

<p>I was, at the moment, while on my daily round of visits to
Divisions and Brigades, at the Headquarters of the Third
Division, at Glisy, and far from my own station. I could only
request that the Army Commander might be so good as to come
at once to the forward area and meet me at Bussy-les-Daours,
the Headquarters of Maclagan&mdash;he being the Commander immediately
affected by this proposed change of plan. In due course
we all met at five o'clock, Rawlinson being accompanied by
Montgomery, his Chief-of-Staff.</p>

<p>It was a meeting full of tense situations&mdash;and of grave import.
At that moment of time, the whole of the Infantry destined for
the assault at dawn next morning, including those very Americans,
was already well on its way to its battle stations; the Artillery
was in the act of dissolving its defensive organization with a view
to moving forward into its battle emplacements as soon as dusk
should fall; I well knew that even if orders could still with
certainty reach the battalions concerned, the withdrawal of those
Americans would result in untold confusion and in dangerous
gaps in our line of battle.</p>

<p>Even had I been ready to risk the success of the battle by going
ahead without them, I could not afford to take the further risk
of the occurrence of something in the nature of an "international
incident" between the troops concerned, whose respective points
of view about the resulting situation could be readily surmised.
So I resolved to take a firm stand and press my views as strongly
as I dared; for even a Corps Commander must use circumspection
when presuming to argue with an Army Commander.</p>

<p>However, disguised in the best diplomatic language that I
was able to command, my representations amounted to this:
firstly, that it was already too late to carry out the order;
secondly, that the battle would have to go on either with the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[54]</a></span>
Americans participating, or not at all; thirdly, that unless I
were expressly ordered to abandon the battle, I intended to go on
as originally planned; and lastly, that unless I received such a
cancellation order before 6.30 p.m. it would in any case be too
late to stop the battle, the preliminary phases of which were just
on the point of beginning.</p>

<p>As always, Lord Rawlinson's charming and sympathetic
personality made it easy to lay my whole case before him. He
was good enough to say that while he entirely agreed with me,
he felt himself bound by the terms of a clear order from the
Commander-in-Chief. My last resource, then, was to urge the
argument that I felt perfectly sure that the Commander-in-Chief
when giving such an order could not have had present to
his mind the probability that compliance with it meant the
abandonment of the battle, and that, under the circumstances,
it was competent for the senior Commander on the spot to act
in the light of the situation as known to him, even to the extent
of disobeying an order.</p>

<p>Rawlinson agreed that this view was correct provided the
Commander-in-Chief was not accessible for reference. Repeated
attempts to raise General Headquarters from Bussy eventually
elicited the information that the Field Marshal was then actually
on his way from Versailles, and expected to arrive in half an
hour. Thereupon Rawlinson promised a decision by 6.30, and
we separated to rejoin our respective Headquarters.</p>

<p>In due course, the Army Commander telephoned that he had
succeeded in speaking to the Field Marshal, who explained that
he had directed the withdrawal of the Americans in deference
to the wish of General Pershing, but that, as matters stood, he
now wished everything to go on as originally planned. And so&mdash;the
crisis passed as suddenly as it had appeared. For, to me
it had taken the form of a very serious crisis, feeling confident
as I did of the success of the forthcoming battle, and of the far-reaching
consequences which would be certain to follow. It
appeared to me at the time that great issues had hung for an
hour or so upon the chance of my being able to carry my point.</p>

<p>An interesting episode, intimately bound up with the story<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[55]</a></span>
of this battle, was the visit to the Corps area on July 2nd of the
Prime Minister of the Commonwealth, Mr. W. M. Hughes, and
Sir Joseph Cook, the Minister of the Navy. They arrived all
unconscious of the impending enterprise, but only by taking
them fully into my confidence could I justify my evident preoccupation
with other business of first-class importance. Most
readily, however, did they accommodate themselves to the
exigencies of the situation.</p>

<p>Both Ministers accompanied me that afternoon on a tour of
inspection of the eight battalions who were then already parading
in full battle array, and on the point of moving off to the assembly
positions from which next day they would march into battle.
The stirring addresses delivered to the men by both Ministers
did much to hearten and stimulate them. As they were on
their way to an Inter-Allied War Council at Versailles, the personal
contact of the Ministers with the actual battle preparations
had the subsequent result of focussing upon the outcome of
the battle a good deal of interest on the part of the whole War
Council.</p>

<p>The fixing of the exact moment for the opening of a battle
has always been the subject of much controversy. As in many
other matters, it becomes in the end the responsibility of one
man to make the fatal decision. The Australians always
favoured the break of day, as this gave them the protection of
the hours of darkness for the assembly of the assaulting troops
in battle order in our front trenches. But there must be at
least sufficient light to see one's way for two hundred yards or
so, otherwise direction is lost and confusion ensues.</p>

<p>The season of the year, the presence and altitude of the moon,
the prospect of fog or ground mist, the state of the weather,
and the nature and condition of the ground are all factors which
affect the proper choice of the correct moment. To aid a decision,
careful observations were usually made on three or four mornings
preceding the chosen day. A new factor on this occasion was
the strong appeal by the Tanks for an extra five minutes of
dawning light, to ensure a true line of approach upon the allotted
objective, whether a ruined village, or a thicket, or a field work.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[56]</a></span></p>

<p>The decision actually given by me was that "Zero" would
be ten minutes past three, and every watch had been carefully
synchronized to the second, to ensure simultaneous action.
A perfected modern battle plan is like nothing so much as a
score for an orchestral composition, where the various arms and
units are the instruments, and the tasks they perform are their
respective musical phrases. Every individual unit must make
its entry precisely at the proper moment, and play its phrase
in the general harmony. The whole programme is controlled
by an exact time-table, to which every infantryman, every
heavy or light gun, every mortar and machine gun, every tank
and aeroplane must respond with punctuality; otherwise there
will be discords which will impair the success of the operation,
and increase the cost of it.</p>

<p>The morning of July 4th was ushered in with a heavy ground
mist. This impeded observation and made guidance difficult,
but it greatly enhanced the surprise. The unexpected occurrence
of this fog lessened the importance of the elaborate care which
had been taken to introduce into the Artillery barrage a due
percentage of smoke shell, and to form smoke screens by the use
of mortars on the flanks of the attack. But the fog largely
accounted for the cheap price at which the victory was bought.</p>

<p>No battle within my previous experience, not even Messines,
passed off so smoothly, so exactly to time-table, or was so free
from any kind of hitch. It was all over in ninety-three minutes.
It was the perfection of team work. It attained all its objectives;
and it yielded great results. The actual assault was
delivered, from right to left, by two battalions of the 6th Brigade,
three battalions of the 4th Brigade, and three battalions of the
11th Brigade. It was also part of the plan that advantage was
taken by a battalion of the 15th Brigade to snatch from the
enemy another slice of territory far away in the Ancre Valley,
opposite Dernancourt, and so, by extending the battle front,
further to distract him.</p>

<p>The attack was a complete surprise, and swept without check
across the whole of the doomed territory. Vaire and Hamel
Woods fell to the 4th Brigade, while the 11th Brigade, with its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[57]</a></span>
allotted Tanks, speedily mastered Hamel Village itself. The
selected objective line was reached in the times prescribed for
its various parts, and was speedily consolidated. It gave us
possession of the whole of the Hamel Valley, and landed us on
the forward or eastern slope of the last ridge, from which the
enemy had been able to overlook any of the country held by us.</p>

<p>Still more important results were that we gathered in no less
than 1,500 prisoners, and killed and disabled at least as many
more, besides taking a great deal of booty, including two field
guns, 26 mortars and 171 machine guns&mdash;at a cost to us of less
than 800 casualties of all kinds, the great majority of whom were
walking wounded. The Tanks fulfilled every expectation, and
the suitability of the tactics employed was fully demonstrated.
Of the 60 Tanks utilized, only 3 were disabled, and even these
3 were taken back to their rallying points under their own power
the very next night. Their moral effect was also proved, and,
with the exception of a few enemy machine-gun teams, who
bravely stood their ground to the very last, most of the enemy
encountered by the Tanks readily surrendered.</p>

<p>Shortly after the battle, G.H.Q. paid the Australian Corps
the compliment of publishing to the whole British Army a General
Staff brochure,<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> containing the complete text of the orders, and
a full and detailed description of the whole of the battle plans
and preparations, with an official commentary upon them. The
last paragraph of this document, which follows, expresses tersely
the conclusions reached by our High Command:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"81. The success of the attack was due:</p>

<p>(a) To the care and skill as regards every detail with
which the plan was drawn up by the Corps,
Division, Brigade and Battalion Staffs.</p>

<p>(b) The excellent co-operation between the infantry,
machine gunners, artillery, tanks and R.A.F.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[58]</a></span></p>
<p>(c) The complete surprise of the enemy, resulting
from the manner in which the operation had
been kept secret up till zero hour.</p>

<p>(d) The precautions which were taken and successfully
carried out by which no warning was given to
the enemy by any previous activity which was
not normal.</p>

<p>(e) The effective counter-battery work and accurate
barrage.</p>

<p>(f) The skill and dash with which the tanks were
handled, and the care taken over details in bringing
them up to the starting line.</p>

<p>(g) Last, but most important of all, the skill, determination
and fine fighting spirit of the infantry
carrying out the attack."</p></blockquote>

<p>Of the extent to which the tactical principles, and the methods
of preparation which had been employed at Hamel, came to be
utilized by other Corps in the later fighting of 1918 no reliable
record is yet available to me. But within the Corps itself this
comparatively small operation became the model for all enterprises
of a similar character, which it afterwards fell to the lot
of the Corps to carry out.</p>

<p>The operation was a small one, however, only by contrast with
the events which followed, although not in comparison with
some of the major operations which had preceded it&mdash;by reference
to the number of troops engaged, although not to the extent of
territory or booty captured. Although only eight Battalions
(or the equivalent of less than one Division) were committed
in the actual assault, the territory recovered was more than four
times that which was, in the pitched battles of 1917, customarily
allotted as an objective to a single Division. The number of
prisoners in relation to our own casualties was also far higher
than had been the experience of previous years. Both of these
new standards which had thus been set up may be regarded as
flowing directly from the employment of the Tanks.</p>

<p>Among other aspects of this battle which are worthy of
mention is the fact that it was the first occasion in the war that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[59]</a></span>
the American troops fought in an offensive battle. The contingent
of them who joined us acquitted themselves most gallantly
and were ever after received by the Australians as blood brothers&mdash;a
fraternity which operated to great mutual advantage nearly
three months later.</p>

<p>This was the first occasion, also, on which the experiment was
made of using aeroplanes for the purpose of carrying and delivering
small-arms ammunition. The "consolidation" of a newly-captured
territory implies, in its broadest sense, its organization
for defence against recapture. For such a purpose the most
rapidly realizable expedient had been found to be the placing of
a predetermined number of machine guns in previously chosen
positions, arranged chequer-wise over the captured ground.
According to such a plan, suitable localities were selected by
an examination of the map and a specified number of Vickers
machine-gun crews were specially told off for the duty of making,
during the battle, by the most direct route, to the selected
localities, there promptly digging in, and preparing to deal with
any attempt on the part of the enemy to press a counter-attack.</p>

<p>The main difficulty affecting the use of machine guns is the
maintenance for them of a regular and adequate supply of ammunition.
Heretofore this function had to be performed by infantry
ammunition carrying parties. It required two men to carry
one ammunition box, holding a thousand rounds, which a machine
gun in action could easily expend in less than five minutes.
Those carrying parties had to travel probably not less than
two to three miles in the double journey across the open, exposed
both to view and fire. Casualties among ammunition carriers
were always substantial.</p>

<p>It was therefore decided to attempt the distribution of this
class of ammunition by aeroplane. Most of the machines of
the Corps Squadron were fitted with bomb racks and releasing
levers. It required no great ingenuity to adapt this gear for
the carrying by each plane of two boxes of ammunition simultaneously,
and to arrange for its release, by hand lever, at the
appropriate time. It remained to determine, by experiment,
the correct size and mode of attachment for a parachute for each<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[60]</a></span>
box of ammunition, so that the box would descend from the air
slowly, and reach the ground without severe impact.</p>

<p>It was Captain Wackett, of the Australian Flying Corps, who
perfected these ideas, and who trained the pilots to put them
into practice. Each machine-gun crew, upon reaching its
appointed locality, spread upon the ground a large V-shaped
canvas (V representing the word "Vickers") as an intimation
to the air of their whereabouts, and that they needed ammunition.
After a very little training, the air-pilots were able to
drop this ammunition from a height of at least 1,000 feet to well
within 100 yards of the appointed spot. In this way, at least
100,000 rounds of ammunition were successfully distributed
during this battle, with obvious economy in lives and wounds.
The method thus initiated became general during later months.</p>

<p>The Corps also put into practice, on this occasion, a stratagem
which had frequently on a smaller scale been employed in connection
with trench raids. Our Artillery was supplied with
many different types of projectile, but among them were both
gas shell and smoke shell. The latter were designed to create
a very palpable smoke cloud, to be employed for the purpose of
screening an assault, but were otherwise harmless. The former
burst, on the other hand, with very little evolution of smoke,
but with a pronounced and easily recognized smell, and their
gas was very deadly.</p>

<p>My practice was, therefore, during the ordinary harassing fire
in periods between offensive activities, always to fire both classes
of shell <i>together</i>, so that the enemy became accustomed to the
belief at the least that our smoke shells were invariably accompanied
by gas shell, even if he did not believe that it was the
smoke shell which alone gave out the warning smell. The effect
upon him of either belief was, however, the same; for it compelled
him in any case to put on his gas mask in order to protect
himself from gas poisoning.</p>

<p>On the actual battle day, however, we fired smoke shell <i>only</i>,
as we dared not vitiate the air through which our own men would
shortly pass. But the enemy had no rapid means of becoming
aware that we were firing only harmless smoke shell. He would,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[61]</a></span>
therefore, promptly don his gas mask, which would obscure his
vision, hamper his freedom of action, and reduce his powers of
resistance. On July 4th both the 4th and 11th Brigades accordingly
took prisoner large numbers of men who were found actually
wearing their gas masks. The stratagem had worked out exactly
as planned.</p>

<p>The battle was over, and when the results were made known
there followed the inevitable flow of congratulatory messages
from superiors, and colleagues and friends, from all parts of the
Front and from England. The following telegrams received
from the Commonwealth Prime Minister were particularly
gratifying:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>1. "On behalf of Prime Minister of Britain, and also of
Prime Ministers of Canada, New Zealand and Newfoundland,
attending <span class="smcap">Versailles</span> Council, I am commissioned
to offer you our warmest congratulations upon brilliant
success of Australian Forces under your command, and to
say that the victory achieved by your Troops is worthy to
rank with greatest achievements of Australian Armies."</p>

<p>2. "My personal congratulations and those of the Government
of Commonwealth on brilliant success of battle.
Please convey to Officers and Men participating in attack
warmest admiration of their valour and dash and manner
in which they have maintained highest traditions of Australian
Army. I am sure that achievement will have most
considerable military and political effect upon Allies and
neutrals, and will heighten <i>moral</i> of all Imperial Forces."</p>

<p>3. "In company with Mr. Lloyd George and General
Rawlinson to-day saw several hundred of prisoners taken
by Australian Troops in battle before Hamel. Rawlinson
expressed to me the opinion that the operation was a brilliant
piece of work. Please convey this to troops."</p></blockquote>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[62]</a></span></p>

<p>The following message transmitted to me by the Commander
of the Fourth Army was also received from the Field Marshal
Commanding-in-Chief:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"Will you please convey to Lieutenant-General Sir John
Monash and all Ranks under his command, including the
Tanks and the detachment of 33rd American Division, my
warm congratulations on the success which attended the
operation carried out this morning, and on the skill and
gallantry with which it was conducted.</p>

<div class="right">"<span class="smcap">D. Haig.</span>"</div>
</blockquote>

<p>A steady stream of visitors also set in, including numbers of
General Staff Officers, who had been sent down from other
Corps and Armies to gather information as to the methods
employed. Everyone, of course, recognized that there was
only one War, and that it was to the mutual benefit of all that
all expedients calculated to accelerate the end of it should become
the common property of all. My Staff were accordingly kept
busy for many days with maps and diagrams explaining the
lines on which the enterprise had been carried out.</p>

<p>The most distinguished and most welcome of all our visitors,
however, was Monsieur Clemenceau, the veteran statesman of
France, who, in spite of the physical effort, immediately after
the sitting of the Versailles War Council had closed, made haste
to travel to the Amiens area, and to visit the Corps for the special
purpose of thanking the troops. He arrived on July 7th, and a
large assemblage of Australian soldiers who had participated in
the battle, and who were resting from their labours near General
Maclagan's Headquarters at Bussy, were privileged to hear him
address them in English in the following terms:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"I am glad to be able to speak at least this small amount
of English, because it enables me to tell you what all French
people think of you. They expected a great deal of you,
because they have heard what you have accomplished in
the development of your own country. I should not like
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[63]</a></span>to say that they are surprised that you have fulfilled their
expectations. By that high standard they judge you, and
admire you that you have reached it. We have all been
fighting the same battle of freedom in these old battlegrounds.
You have all heard the names of them in history.
But it is a great wonder, too, in history that you should
be here fighting on the old battlefields, which you never
thought, perhaps, to see. The work of our fathers, which
we wanted to hand down unharmed to our children, the
Germans tried to take from us. They tried to rob us of all
that is dearest in modern human society. But men were
the same in Australia, England, France, Italy, and all
countries proud of being the home of free people. That is
what made you come; that is what made us greet you
when you came. We knew you would fight a real fight, but
we did not know that from the very beginning you would
astonish the whole Continent with your valour. I have
come here for the simple purpose of seeing the Australians
and telling them this. I shall go back to-morrow and say
to my countrymen: 'I have seen the Australians; I have
looked into their eyes. I know that they, men who have
fought great battles in the cause of freedom, will fight on
alongside us, till the freedom for which we are all fighting
is guaranteed for us and our children.'"</p></blockquote>

<p>The French inhabitants of the Amiens district were also
highly elated at the victory. The city itself had been, for some
weeks, completely evacuated, by official order. Not only had
it become the object of nightly visitations by flights of Gothas;
but also, somewhere in the east and far beyond the reach of my
longest range guns, the enemy had succeeded in emplacing a
cannon of exceptionally large calibre, range and power, which
took its daily toll of the buildings of this beautiful city.</p>

<p>The anniversary of the French national fête was approaching,
and the Prefect of the Department of the Somme, Monsieur
Morain&mdash;appreciating the significance of the Hamel victory as
a definite step towards the ultimate disengagement of the city<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[64]</a></span>
from the German terror&mdash;determined to make the celebration
of this fête not only a compliment to the Australian Corps, but
also a proof of the unquenchable fortitude of the people of his
Department.</p>

<p>Accordingly, in the Hôtel de Ville, in the very heart of the
deserted city, amidst the crumbling ruins of its upper stories,
and of the devastation of the surrounding city blocks, he presided
at a humble but memorable repast, which had been spread
in an undamaged apartment, inviting to his board a bare twenty
representatives of the French and British Armies, and of the
city of Amiens. While we toasted the King and the Republic,
and voiced the firm resolve of both Allies to see the struggle
through to the bitter end, the enemy shells were still thundering
overhead.</p>

<p>But other matters than rejoicings in a task thus happily
accomplished compelled my chief attention during the remaining
days of this July. I had to study and gauge accurately the
tactical and strategical results of the victory of Hamel, and to
lose no time in using the advantage gained. The moral results
both on the enemy and on ourselves were far more important,
and deserve far more emphasis than do the material gains.</p>

<p>It was, as I have said, the first offensive operation, on any
substantial scale, that had been fought by any of the Allies
since the previous autumn. Its effect was electric, and it stimulated
many men to the realization that the enemy was, after all,
not invulnerable, in spite of the formidable increase in his
resources which he had brought from Russia. It marked the
termination, once and for all, of the purely defensive attitude of
the British front. It incited in many quarters an examination
of the possibilities of offensive action on similar lines by similar
means&mdash;a changed attitude of mind, which bore a rich harvest
only a very few weeks later.</p>

<p>But its effect on the enemy was even more startling. His
whole front from the Ancre to Villers-Bretonneux had become
unstable, and was reeling from the blow. It was only the consideration
that I had still to defend a ten-mile front, and had
still only one Division in reserve in case of emergency, that
deterred me from embarking at once upon another blow on an
even larger scale. But I seized every occasion to importune the
Army Commander either to narrow my front, or to let the First
Division from Hazebrouck join my command, or both; but so
far without result.</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 789px;">
<img src="images/map-b.jpg" width="789" height="1200" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">Map B.</span></p></div>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[65]</a></span></p>

<p>The only course that remained open to me was to initiate
immediate measures for taking the fullest advantage of the
enemy's demoralization by exploiting the success obtained to
the utmost possible extent. No later than on the afternoon
of the battle of Hamel itself, orders were issued to all three
line Divisions to commence most vigorous offensive patrolling
all along the Corps front, with a view not merely to prevent the
enemy from re-establishing an organized defensive system, but
also ourselves to penetrate the enemy's ground by the establishment
therein of isolated posts, as a nucleus for subsequent
more effective occupation.</p>

<p>Enterprise of such a nature appeals strongly to the sporting
instinct of the Australian soldier. Divisions, Brigades and
Battalions vied with each other in predatory expeditions, even in
broad daylight, into the enemy's ground, and a steady stream of
prisoners and machine guns flowed in. On the nights of July
5th and 6th, the Fifth Division, now in the sector between the
Ancre and the Somme, possessed themselves with very little
effort of a strip of some three hundred acres of hostile positions,
bringing our front line so near to Morlancourt as to make that
village no longer tenable by the enemy.</p>

<p>On the same nights, and again on July 8th and 9th, the Second
and Fourth Divisions advanced their lines by an average of
two hundred to three hundred yards along their respective fronts,
and this advance was, in the case of the Second Division, particularly
valuable in carrying our front line over the crest of the
plateau of Hill 104, and giving us clear and unbroken observation
far into the enemy's country, in the directions of Warfusee
and Marcelcave.</p>

<p>It was a period replete with instances of individual enterprise
and daring adventure. One incident, characteristic of the varied
efforts of these days, was the capture, single-handed, and in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[66]</a></span>
broad daylight, by Corporal W. Brown, V.C., of the 20th Battalion,
Second Division, of an officer and eleven men of the German
Army, whom he stalked as they lay skulking in a trench dug-out
not far from his observation post, and terrorized into submission
by the threat of throwing a bomb at them.</p>

<p>But perhaps the best testimony of the successful activities
of my troops during this period, and of the serious impression
which they made upon the enemy, can be gathered by extracts
from his own documents, a number of which were captured
during this and subsequent fighting. Of these, the following,
issued by the Second German Army Headquarters (Von der
Marwitz), are among the more interesting:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"The enemy has in his minor enterprises again taken
prisoner a complete front line battalion and part of a support
battalion. The reason is our faulty leadership."</p>

<p>"The enemy penetrated the forward zone of the 108th
Division by means of large patrols at midnight, on July 8th,
1918, without any artillery preparation, and again on the
same night at 11 p.m., with artillery preparation, astride of
the Marcelcave&mdash;Villers-Bretonneux railway. He occupied
the trenches where our most advanced outposts lay, and
took the occupants, comprising fifteen men, prisoner. The
larger part of the forward zone has been lost."</p>

<p>"In the case of the present trench Division, it has often
happened that <i>complete</i> picquets have disappeared from the
forward zone without a trace."</p></blockquote>

<p>All the above refers to the period between July 4th and 12th.
We read again under date July 13th:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"During the last few days the Australians have succeeded
in penetrating, or taking prisoner, single posts or picquets.
They have gradually&mdash;sometimes even in daylight&mdash;succeeded
in getting possession of the majority of the forward
zone of a whole Division."</p></blockquote>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[67]</a></span></p>

<blockquote>

<p>"Troops must fight. They must not give way at every
opportunity and seek to avoid fighting, otherwise they will
get the feeling that the enemy are superior to them."</p>
</blockquote>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_066fp.jpg" width="1200" height="781" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>Railway Gun, 11.2-inch Bore&mdash;captured near Rosières on August 8th, 1918.</p></div>
</div>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_067fp.jpg" width="1200" height="787" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>German Depot of Stores&mdash;captured on August 8th, 1918.</p></div>
</div>

<p>One last extract from these interesting papers:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"The best way to make the enemy more careful in his
attempt to drive us bit by bit out of the outpost line and
forward zone is to do active reconnaissance and carry out
patrol encounters oneself. In this respect absolutely nothing
seems to have been done. If the enemy can succeed in
scoring a success without any special support by artillery
or assistance from special troops, we must be in a position
to do the same."</p></blockquote>

<p>Our line in front of Villers-Bretonneux had for months run
very close to the eastern outskirts of that town, a circumstance
which cramped and embarrassed our defence of it. The enemy
could peer into its streets and sweep them with machine guns. He
had held in strength a locality known as Monument Wood, the
ruins of a once prosperous orchard, and his possession of it
had been a source of annoyance both to us and to the French,
for it lay just opposite the international boundary posts.</p>

<p>The time seemed opportune for a set-piece operation designed
to advance our line opposite the town by 1,000 yards, on a broad
front, to dislodge the enemy from Monument Wood, gain valuable
elbow room, and obtain mastery of the remainder of the plateau
on which the town was built. I had actually completed the draft
of a plan for such an operation, and had held a preliminary conference
with my Staff to discuss it, when it became apparent that
the nightly encroachments which the Second Division were
effecting in this region would, in the course of a few days, achieve
the capture of the whole of this territory without any special
organized effort at all.</p>

<p>And so it proved; for before the middle of July, Rosenthal
had succeeded in possessing himself, by such a process of "peaceful
penetration," of the whole of the coveted area. It was a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[68]</a></span>
further evidence of the serious demoralization which our aggressive
attitude of the preceding months had wrought among the
German forces opposed to us.</p>

<p>The era of minor aggression by the Australian Corps was, however,
about to draw to a close, and the situation was rapidly
beginning to shape itself for greater events.</p>

<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Staff-Sheet No. 218: "Operations of the Australian Corps against Hamel,
etc.," published July, 1918.</p></div></div>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[69]</a></span></p>

<h2>CHAPTER IV<br />

TURNING THE TIDE</h2>


<p>The course of events during June and July pointed to the
conclusions, firstly, that the enemy contemplated no
further offensive operations in the Somme Valley, and, secondly,
that the condition of the whole German Second Army, astride
of the Somme, offered every temptation to us to seize the initiative
against it.</p>

<p>So far as the Australian Corps was concerned, however, my
total frontage, which had been increased (as the result of our
exploitation) to over eleven miles, precluded the possibility, with
only four Divisions at my disposal, of maintaining, even if I could
succeed in initiating, an ambitious offensive. The time was
nevertheless ripe for action on a scale far more decisive than
had become orthodox in the British Army in the past. Efforts
on that method had been confined to a thrust, limited in point
both of distance and of time, and followed by a period of
inaction; they had often given the enemy ample leisure to
recover, and to reorganize his order of battle.</p>

<p>To maintain an offensive, day after day, indefinitely, would
require sufficient resources, particularly in infantry, to allow
Divisions to be used alternatingly. Only in such a way, by having
rested Divisions always available to alternate with tired Divisions,
could a continuous pressure be maintained.</p>

<p>I took every opportunity of pressing these views upon the
Army Commander, and expressed the readiness of the Australian
Corps to undertake and maintain a long sustained offensive,
provided that arrangements could be made to shorten my frontage
from a three to a two-Division battle front, and to increase my
resources, from the present four, to five or even six Divisions. It<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[70]</a></span>
was further essential that in any advances attempted by us, other
Corps must co-operate on both flanks.</p>

<p>It would be bad tactics to drive into the enemy's front a salient
with a narrow base, for such a salient would make our situation
worse instead of better, affording to the enemy the opportunity
of artillery attack upon it from both its flanks as well as from
its front. The salient must therefore be broad based in relation
to its depth, and the base must ever widen as the head of the
salient advances.</p>

<p>This principle implied that a large-scale operation of such a
nature must be begun on a whole Army front, and that, even
at its inception, at least three Corps must co-operate, to be aided
by the entry of additional Corps on the outer flanks as the central
depth developed. In other words, it was a project implying a
large commitment of resources, and the urgent question was
whether the time was yet ripe for taking the risks involved.</p>

<p>The matter, however, now became a subject at least worthy
of practical discussion, and, during the days which followed Hamel,
the Staffs of both the Corps and Army were kept busy with
the investigation of data, maps, and information, while the
availability of additional resources in guns, tanks and aeroplanes
became the subject of anxious inquiry.</p>

<p>A circumstance which troubled me sorely was the fact that
my Corps stood on the flank of the British Army, and that the
troops on my right belonged to the French Army. The relations
between the Australian troops and the Tirailleurs and Zouaves of
the 31st French Corps (General Toulorge) had always been the
very friendliest, and the joint "international" posts had been
the scenes of hearty fraternization and of the evolution of a strange
common vernacular.</p>

<p>This comradeship of "poilu" with "digger" did not, however,
lessen the difficulties incidental to the joint conduct of a major
Operation of War by two Corps of different nationalities, speaking
different languages, with diverse tactical conceptions, and, above
all, of substantially divergent temperaments. The French are
irresistible in attack as they are dogged in defence, but whether
they will attack or defend depends greatly on their temperament<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[71]</a></span>
of the moment. In this they are totally unlike the British or
Australian soldier who will at any time philosophically accept
either rôle that may be prescribed for him.</p>

<p>In short, it was not possible to hope for an effective co-ordination
of effort, controlled particularly by the minute observance
of a time-table, on the part of the Australian and its adjacent
French Corps, and I felt quite unprepared to count upon it. It
was for this reason that I expressed to the Army Commander
the hope that a British Corps might be obtainable to operate on
my right flank in any undertaking that should be decided upon.
Understanding that the greater part of the Canadian Corps was
then unemployed, resting in a back area, I ventured to hope that
this Corps might be made available, in the event of a decision
that the proposal should be proceeded with.</p>

<p>My hesitation to accept the French as colleagues in such a
battle was based not altogether on theoretical or sentimental
grounds. The steady progress in mopping up enemy territory
to the east of Villers-Bretonneux, which had been made by my
south flank Division (the Second) as the aftermath of Hamel,
soon produced a contortion of the Allied front line at this point
which bade fair to prove just as troublesome to me as had been
the great re-entrant opposite Hamel, which that battle had been
specially undertaken to eliminate.</p>

<p>No persuasions on my part, or on that of my flank Division,
could induce the adjacent French Division to extend any co-operation
in these advances or to adopt any measures to flatten
out the re-entrant which, growing deeper every day, threatened
to expose my right flank. I am convinced that such hesitation
was based upon no timidity, but was the result wholly of an
entirely different outlook and policy from those which the Australian
Corps was doing its best to interpret. But the experience
of it made the prospect of punctual co-operation on their part
in much more serious undertakings distinctly less encouraging.</p>

<p>The proposed offensive involved, therefore, far-reaching redispositions,
comprising a substantial displacement southwards
of the inter-Allied boundary, a lengthening by several miles
of the whole British Western front, and an entire rearrangement<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[72]</a></span>
of the respective fronts of the Third and Fourth British Armies.
It is not surprising that a decision was deferred, while the
project was being critically investigated from every point of
view.</p>

<p>Then, suddenly, a new situation arose. On July 15th, the enemy
opened a fresh attack against the French in the south. The scale
on which he undertook it immediately made it patent to all
students of the situation that he was probably employing his
whole remaining reserves of fit, rested Divisions; that he meant
this to be his decisive blow; and that whether he gained a decision
or not, it would be his last effort on the grand scale.</p>

<p>It did not succeed; for just as he had once again reached the
line of the Marne and had on July 17th achieved his "furthest
south" at Château-Thierry, a beautifully timed counter-stroke
by the French and Americans upon the western face of the salient,
extending from Soissons to the Marne, resulted on July 18th in
the capture by the Allies on that day alone, of 15,000 prisoners
and 200 guns.</p>

<p>It was the end of German offensive in the war. Their mobile
reserves were exhausted, and they were compelled slowly to
recede from the Château-Thierry salient. The appropriate
moment, for which Foch and Haig had doubtless been waiting
for months, had at last arrived to begin an Allied counter offensive,
and it was only a question of deciding at what point along the
Franco-British front the effort should be made, and on what
date it should open.</p>

<p>Doubtless influenced by the reasons already discussed, the
choice fell upon that portion of the front of the Fourth Army
which lay south of the Somme; in other words upon the southern
portion of the Australian Corps front. The date remained undecided,
but the requisite redisposition of Armies and Corps was
so extensive that no time was to be lost in making a beginning.</p>

<p>It was on July 21st that General Rawlinson first called together
the Corps Commanders who were to be entrusted with this portentous
task. The strictest secrecy was enjoined, and never
was a secret better kept; with the exception of the Field Marshal
and his Army Commanders, none outside of the Fourth Army<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[73]</a></span>
had any inkling of what was afoot until the actual moment
for action had arrived.</p>

<p>Yet an observant enemy agent, if any such there had been
in the vicinity, might well have drawn a shrewd conclusion that
some mischief was brewing, had he happened along the main
street of the prettily-situated village of Flexicourt, on the Somme,
on that bright summer afternoon, and had observed in front of a
pretentious white mansion, over which floated the black and red
flag of an Army Commander, a quite unusual procession of motor-cars,
ostentatiously flying the Canadian and Australian flags and
the red-and-white pennants of two other Corps Commanders.</p>

<p>There were present at that conference, General Currie, the
Canadian, General Butler, of the Third Corps, General Kavanagh,
of the Cavalry Corps, and myself, while senior representatives of
the Tanks and Air Force also attended. Rawlinson unfolded
the outline of the whole Army plan, and details were discussed
at great length in the light of the views held by each Corps Commander
as to the tasks which he was prepared to undertake
with the resources in his hands or promised to him.</p>

<p>The conditions which I had sought in my previous negotiations
with the Army Commander were, I found, conceded to me almost
to the full extent. My battle front was to be reduced from eleven
miles to a little over 7,000 yards. It would, in fact, extend from
the Somme, as the northern, to the main Péronne railway, as the
southern flank. And&mdash;what was equally important, and profoundly
welcome&mdash;the First Australian Division was shortly
to be relieved in Flanders, and would at last join my Corps, thus
for the first time in the war bringing all Australian field units in
France under one command.</p>

<p>The Canadians were to operate on my right, and further south
again the First French Army (Debenay) was to supply a Corps
to form a defensive flank for the Canadians. The Third British
Corps was to carry out for me a similar function on my northern
flank. Thus, four Corps in line were to operate, the two central
Corps carrying out the main advance, while the two outer flank
Corps would be employed further to broaden the base of the
great salient which the operation would create.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[74]</a></span></p>

<p>The Cavalry Corps would appear in the battle area also, with
all preparations made for a rapid exploitation of any success
achieved. The utility of the Cavalry in modern war, at any rate
in a European theatre, has been the subject of endless controversy.
It is one into which I do not propose to enter. There is
no doubt that, given suitable ground and an absence of wire
entanglements, Cavalry can move rapidly, and undertake important
turning or enveloping movements. Yet it has been argued
that the rarity of such suitable conditions negatives any justification
for superimposing so unwieldy a burden as a large body of
Cavalry&mdash;on the bare chance that it <i>might</i> be useful&mdash;upon
already overpopulated areas, billets, watering places and roads.</p>

<p>I may, however, anticipate the event by saying that the
First Cavalry Brigade was duly allotted to me, and did its best to
prove its utility; but I am bound to say that the results achieved,
in what proved to be very unsuitable country beyond the range
of the Infantry advance, did not justify the effort expended either
by this gallant Brigade or by the other arms and services upon
whom the very presence of the Cavalry proved an added burden.</p>

<p>For the full understanding of subsequent developments both
during and after the battle it becomes of special importance
to consider the proposed rôle of the Third Corps in relation to my
left flank. It is to be remembered that the Fourth Army decided
that the River Somme was to be the tactical boundary between
the two Northern Corps. It was not competent for me to criticize
this decision at the time, but I am free now to say that I believed
such a boundary to have been unsuitable, and the event speedily
proved that it was.</p>

<p>It is always, in my opinion, undesirable to select any bold
natural or artificial feature&mdash;such as a river, ravine, ridge, road
or railway&mdash;as a boundary. It creates, at once, a divided responsibility,
and necessitates between two independent commanders,
and at a critical point, a degree of effective co-operation which
can rarely be hoped for. It is much better boldly to place a unit,
however large or small, <i>astride</i> of such a feature, so that both
sides of it may come under the control of one and the same
Commander.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[75]</a></span></p>

<p>This was especially the case in this part of the Somme Valley
which is broad, and has an ill-defined central line, tortuous, and
with the slopes on either side tactically interdependent; but most
of all because, as I have already described, the high plateau on
the north completely overlooks the relatively lower flats on the
south of the river. The point I am trying to make should be
borne in mind, for I believe it has been fully borne out by subsequent
events.</p>

<p>The decision standing, however, as it did, it fell to the task of
the Third Corps to make an assault (concurrently with that of
the Australian Corps south of the river) for the capture of the
whole of that reach of the river known as the Chipilly Bend, and
of all the high ground on the spur which that bend enfolds. The
object was to deprive the enemy of all ground from which he could
look down upon my advancing left flank, or from which he could
bring rifle or artillery fire to bear upon it.</p>

<p>The Third Corps was to operate on the front of one Division,
the 58th, which, pivoting its left upon the Corbie&mdash;Bray road,
was to advance its right&mdash;in sympathy with the advance of the
left of the Australian Corps&mdash;until it rested upon the river about
one mile downstream from Etinehem. It was a movement
the success of which was rendered promising by the nature of the
ground and the disorganized condition of the enemy between the
Ancre and the Somme.</p>

<p>As regards my right flank, this was to rest as stated upon the
main railway. The Canadian Corps, of four Divisions, would
take over from the French a frontage of about 6,000 yards and
deliver a thrust parallel to and south of the railway, in the direction
of Caix and Beaucourt, and would aim at the seizure of the
important Hill 102, immediately to the west of the latter locality.
At no time did any question of the security of my right flank
furnish me with any cause for anxiety; the prowess of the Canadian
Corps was well known to all Australians, and I knew that,
to use his own expressive vernacular, it was General Currie's
invariable habit to "deliver the goods."</p>

<p>The comprehensive project thus outlined at the conference
of July 21st involved, as a preliminary step, a far-reaching redisposition<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[76]</a></span>
of very large bodies of troops over a very wide front.
With the readjustment of the boundaries between the Third and
Fourth British Armies we are not particularly concerned, because
this affected a region, north of the Ancre, which lay well outside
of the battle area. Nor did the internal readjustment of the
northern part of the Fourth Army front present any difficulty,
as it meant nothing more than a routine "relief" by the 58th
Division of the Fifth Australian Division which was at this juncture
holding that part of my Corps sector which lay between the
Somme and the Ancre.</p>

<p>But the southern half was a very different matter. The First
French Army was to give up to the British a section of about four
miles, extending from Villers-Bretonneux to Thennes. This
was ultimately to be taken over by the Canadian Corps as a
battle front, but that Corps still had two of its Divisions in the
line in the neighbourhood of Arras.</p>

<p>Moreover, it was of the utmost importance to conceal from
the enemy until the last possible moment any change in our dispositions.
This meant concealing them from our own troops
also, because the loss by us of a single talkative prisoner would
have been sufficient to disclose to the enemy at least the suspicion,
if not the certainty, that an attack was in preparation.</p>

<p>After examining the problem and discussing several alternative
solutions, it was ultimately decided at this conference that, five
or six days before the date fixed for the attack, the French
would be relieved in this sector by a Division, not of Canadians,
but of Australians; that under cover of and behind this Australian
Division, the Canadian Corps would come in from the north,
and would proceed to carry out its battle preparations; and
finally that the actual appearance of Canadian troops in the
front line would not ensue until three days before the battle.</p>

<p>During the preceding two days, the Australian troops would
be gradually withdrawn from the sector, leaving only one Brigade
in occupation of the line, to be backed up by the incoming Canadians
in the unexpected contingency of an attack by the enemy.
This last Brigade would quietly melt away, leaving the Canadians
in full possession of the field.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[77]</a></span></p>

<p>It was hoped that, during the days of the temporary Australian
occupation of the sector, nothing would happen which might
disclose to the enemy that the French had left it; and even if
we were to have the misfortune to lose from this sector any
Australian prisoners to the enemy, it was further hoped that,
if kept in total ignorance of the inflow of Canadians, such prisoners
would be unable to make any embarrassing disclosures. The
<i>dénouement</i>, which will be told later, showed that this judgment
of possibilities was a shrewd one, and that such precautions were
not taken in vain.</p>

<p>At this period of the war, large numbers of Americans had
already arrived in France, but only few of them were yet ready
to take their places in the line of battle. The time had not yet
arrived, therefore, when, by taking over large sections of the
Western front they could help to shorten the French and British
frontages. The British front was, therefore, still so extended
that the mobile reserve Divisions at the disposal of the Field
Marshal were few.</p>

<p>This consideration made the contemplated reliefs and interchanges
of Corps and Divisions, and their transference from
one part of our front to another a matter of great complexity,
and one which required time to execute. Each stage of the process
was contingent upon the due completion of a previous stage.
It is, moreover, a process which cannot be unduly hastened,
without serious discomfort and fatigue to the troops and animals
concerned.</p>

<p>Troops destined for battle must be kept in the highest physical
condition. This means good feeding, comfortable housing, and
adequate rest. A couple of weary days and sleepless nights spent
in crowded railway trains, with cold food and little exercise, are
sufficient to play havoc with the fighting trim of even a crack
battalion. So, the daily stages of the journey must be short,
and comfortable billets must be in readiness for each night's halt.
The day's supplies must arrive punctually and at the right railhead,
to ensure hot, well-cooked meals.</p>

<p>With the very limited number of serviceable railway lines
which remained available behind the British front&mdash;and with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[78]</a></span>
the congestion of traffic resulting from the daily transportation
of many thousands of tons of artillery ammunition and other war
stores&mdash;it was not surprising that as the result of the deliberations
of the conference it was resolved to advise the Commander-in-Chief
that it would take not less than five days to rearrange our
order of battle on the lines decided upon, and another five days,
after Corps and Divisions had taken over their battle fronts, to
enable them to complete their preparations.</p>

<p>Thus, the Fourth Army could be ready at ten days' notice,
and the conference broke up, pledged to secrecy and complete
inaction, until formal approval had been given to the proposals
and a date fixed for their realization.</p>

<p>The remainder of July passed with no very startling occurrences.
In the south the German withdrawal from the Soissons salient
and the Marne continued steadily, with the French and Americans
on their heels; but it was a methodical retreat, which would
bring about a substantial shortening of the German line, and so
release Divisions to rest and refit, which might conceivably become
available for a fresh assault elsewhere.</p>

<p>But there was still no sign of any such design upon that always
tender spot, the Allied junction at Villers-Bretonneux. On
the contrary, my second Division still continued to make free
with the enemy's advanced patrols, and in a very brilliant little
infantry operation by the 7th Brigade captured the "Mound,"
a long spoilbank beside the railway at a point about a mile east
of the town, which dominated the landscape in every direction.
The ardour of his troops was only enhanced when they heard that
General Rosenthal himself, while reconnoitring from the Mound,
had been sniped at and had received a nasty wound in the arm.</p>

<p>The enemy attempted nothing in the way of infantry retaliation.
But whenever he had been thoroughly angered, he treated
my front to a liberal drenching of mustard gas, fired by his
artillery. His supplies of mustard gas shell seemed inexhaustible,
and he would frequently expend as many as 10,000 of them
in a single night upon the half-ruined town of Villers-Bretonneux
or on the Bois l'Abbé and other woods which he suspected were
sheltering my reserve infantry.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[79]</a></span></p>

<p>These gas attacks were annoying and troublesome, in the
extreme. During the actual bombardments, troops wore their
gas masks as a matter of course, but doffed them when the
characteristic smell of the gas had disappeared. But it was
warm weather, and as the sun rose, the poisonous liquid, which
had spattered the ground over immense areas, would volatilize,
and rise in sufficient volume still to attack all whose business
took them to and fro across this ground. In this way hundreds of
our men became incapacitated; although there were a few serious
cases, most of the men would be fit to rejoin in two or three weeks.
But this form of attack, and the constant dread of it, made life
in the forward areas anything but endurable.</p>

<p>I was beset by quite another trepidation also. Prisoners
captured during the German withdrawal from the Marne, which
was then in progress, told tales of contemplated withdrawals
on other fronts, and some even asserted that a withdrawal opposite
my own front was being talked of. Judged by subsequent
events, it is more than probable that these stories were stimulated
by the many articles which were at that time appearing in the
German newspapers from the pens of press strategists, who, in
order to allay public anxiety, were representing these withdrawals
as deliberate, and as a masterpiece of strategy, compelling the
Allies to a costly pursuit over difficult and worthless ground.</p>

<p>Opposite Albert, signs that such a withdrawal was actually
in progress also began to appear, although it subsequently transpired
that, in its early stages, this procedure was merely prompted
by a purely local consideration, namely, the desire of the enemy
to improve his tactical position by abandoning the outposts,
which he had been maintaining in the valley of the Ancre, and
transferring them to the higher and better ground on the east
of that river.</p>

<p>It was only natural that those of us who knew of the impending
attack, and of the immense effort which its preparation would
involve, felt nervous lest the enemy might forestall us by withdrawing
his whole line to some methodically prepared position
of defence in the rear, just as he had done once before in 1917
on so large a scale in the Bapaume region. It would probably<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[80]</a></span>
have been a sound measure of military policy, but it would
assuredly, at that juncture, have had as disastrous an effect
upon the <i>moral</i> of the German people as his enforced withdrawal,
which was soon to begin, actually produced not long after.</p>

<p>The order to prepare the attack, and fixing the date of it
for August 8th, came in the closing days of July, and at once
all was bustle and excitement in the Australian Corps. Commanders,
Staff Officers, and Intelligence Service, the Artillery,
the Corps Flying Squadron, the map and photography sections
spent busy days in reconnaissance, and toilsome nights in office
work. The vast extent of the detailed work involved, particularly
upon the administrative services, can only be appreciated
by a study of the plan for the battle, which it fell to my lot, as
Corps Commander, first to formulate, and then to expound to a
series of conferences which were held at Bertangles on July 30th,
and on August 2nd and 4th.</p>

<p>It is, therefore, perhaps appropriate that I should now attempt
to repeat, in non-technical language, an exposition of the outlines
of that plan.</p>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[81]</a></span></p>




<h2>CHAPTER V<br />

THE BATTLE PLAN</h2>


<p>My plan for the impending battle involved the employment
of four Divisions in the actual assault, with one Division
in reserve. The Reserve Division was to be available for use
in one of two ways; either as a reserve of fresh troops to exploit
any successes gained upon the first day, or else to take over and
hold defensively the ground won, if the assaulting Divisions
should have become too exhausted to be relied upon for successful
resistance to a counter-attack in force.</p>

<p>The frontage allotted to the Corps was 7,000 yards, and this
extent of front accommodated itself naturally to the employment
of two first-line Divisions, each on a 3,500 yard front,
each Division having two Brigades in the front line, with one
Brigade in reserve.</p>

<p>As four Divisions were available to me for immediate use in
the battle, I decided to undertake, for the first time in the war,
on so comprehensive a scale, the tactical expedient of a "leapfrog"
by Divisions over each other.</p>

<p>This term had, long before, passed into the homely phraseology
of the war, in order to describe a procedure by which one
body of troops, having reached its objective, was there halted,
as at a completed task, while a second body of troops, of similar
order of importance, but under an entirely separate Commander,
advanced over the ground won, reached the foremost battle line,
took over the tactical responsibility for the fighting front, and
after a prescribed interval of time continued the advance to a
further and more distant objective.</p>

<p>This conception of an advance by a process of "leapfrog"
had been evolved early in 1917 in connection with a method of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[82]</a></span>
assault on successive lines of trenches. It was intended at the
outset to be applied only to very small bodies of infantry, such
as platoons. A normal battle plan for a company of infantry
of four platoons was for the first two platoons to capture and hold
the front line trench, while the next two following platoons would
leap over this trench and over the troops who had gained it, and
then pass beyond to the capture of the second, or support trench.
The method was used, for the first time, on such a modest scale,
at the battle of Messines, in June, 1917, and later on in the
same year was adopted for bodies as large even as Battalions,
in the fighting for the Broodseinde and Passchendaele
heights.</p>

<p>But on no previous occasion had such a principle been applied
to whole Divisions. It is true that at the battle of Messines,
the Fourth Australian Division passed through the New Zealand
Division after the latter had completed the capture of the main
Messines ridge, but this was really exploitation, undertaken in
order to take advantage of the temporary confusion of the enemy,
and for the purpose of gaining ground upon the eastern slopes
of the captured ridge. It was not a movement which was really
part of the main assault, and it was confined to a single Division.</p>

<p>On the present occasion my purpose was to carry out a clear
and definite process of "leapfrogging," not only simultaneously
by two Divisions side by side, but also as an essential part of the
time-table programme for the main battle, and before the exploitation
stage of the fighting was timed to be reached. It was, undeniably,
a daring proposal, involving very definite risks, enormously
increasing the labour of preparation and the mass of
detailed precautions which had to be undertaken in order to
obviate the possibility of great confusion.</p>

<p>The preparations necessary for a single Division proposing
to advance alone, to a prescribed distance, over country much
of which was usually visible to us from our front line, are sufficiently
complex, relating as they do, not only to the establishment
of numerous protected headquarters for Brigades and Battalions,
of miles upon miles of buried and ground cables, of dumps of
all kinds of supplies, and of dressing stations and medical aid<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[83]</a></span>
posts; but also to the disposition, in concealed positions, of
all the assaulting units, down to the smallest of them, of Infantry
Engineers and Pioneers. All these preparations assume a
tenfold complexity when a second Division has to make arrangements
exactly similar in character, variety and extent, using
exactly the same territory for the purpose and at the same
time, and planning to advance over more distant country, entirely
beyond visual range and preliminary reconnaissance.</p>

<p>The project also involved a much greater crowding of troops
into the areas immediately behind our line of departure, and,
therefore, enormously increased the risk of premature detection
by the enemy, both from ground and from air observation, of
unusual movement and of other symptoms which presaged the
possibility of an attack by us. The plan also necessitated the
closest possible co-ordination of effort, and mutual sympathy
and understanding, between the Commanders and Staffs of the
twin Divisions having a common jurisdiction over one and the
same area of preparation, and one and the same battle front.
This was a degree of co-operation which could not have been
looked for unless the personnel concerned had already established,
from long and close association with each other, the most
cordial personal relations. And dominating all other difficulties
were those involved in the proposal to execute this difficult
and untried operation of a Divisional leapfrog, not singly
but in a duplex manner, necessitating the assurance of exactly
similar simultaneous action, similarly timed in every stage, both
before and during battle, by each of two separate pairs of
Divisions.</p>

<p>These threatening difficulties were surely formidable enough,
but I knew that I could rely upon the goodwill of the Divisions
towards each other, and upon the loyal support of them all.
This seemed to me to justify the attempt, and to minimize the
risks; having regard above all else to the results which I stood
to gain if the operation could be executed as planned.</p>

<p>On no previous occasion in the war had an attempt ever been
made to effect a penetration into the enemy's defences at the
first blow, and on the first day, greater than a mile or two. Rarely<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[84]</a></span>
had any previous set-piece attack succeeded in reaching the
enemy's line of field-guns. The result had been that the bulk
of his Artillery had been withdrawn at his leisure, and his losses
had been confined to a few hundred acres of shattered territory.
But the task I had set myself was not only to reach, at the first
onslaught, the whole of the enemy's Artillery positions, but greatly
to overrun them with a view to obliterating, by destruction
or capture, the whole of his defensive organizations and the
whole of the fighting resources which they contained, along the
full extent of my Corps front.</p>

<p>To achieve this object I prepared my plans upon the basis
of a total advance, on the first day, of not less than 9,000 yards.
This was to be divided into three separate stages, as follows:</p>


<div class="center">
<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="">
<tr><td align="left">Phase A&mdash;Set-piece attack with barrage,</td><td align="right">3,000</td><td align="center">yards.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Phase B&mdash;Open-warfare advance,</td><td align="right">4,500</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Phase C&mdash;Exploitation,</td><td align="right">1,500</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="right">&mdash;&mdash;</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Total distance to final objective,</td><td align="right">9,000</td><td align="center">yards.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="right">&mdash;&mdash;</td></tr>
</table>
</div>

<p>The opening phase involved no novel or unusual features so
far as the infantry were concerned, and was conceived on lines
with which the fighting of 1917 had familiarized me, modified
further by the accumulated experience gained from earlier mistakes
in the technical details of such an enterprise. The recent
battle of Hamel became the model for this phase, the conditions
of that battle being now reproduced on a much enlarged
scale.</p>

<p>But there was one very important feature which distinguished
the present undertaking from the battles of Messines and Broodseinde,
and that was in regard to the frontage allotted for attack
to a single Division. At Messines, the Divisional battle front
was 2,000 yards; in the third battle of Ypres it differed but little
from the same standard. For the present battle, I adopted a
battle front of two miles for each assaulting Division, or a mile
for each of the four assaulting Brigades.</p>

<p>This innovation seemed to me to be justified by four principal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[85]</a></span>
factors. The first of these was that the weather, which was
dry, and the state of the ground, which was hard, made the
"going" easy and the stress upon the infantry comparatively
light. Next, the condition of the enemy's defensive works was
undeveloped and stagnant, as clearly disclosed by the air photographs
which the Corps Air Squadron produced in great numbers
on every fine day. No doubt this was due to the encroachments
we had made on his forward works during the fighting at Hamel
and in the remaining weeks of July. Thirdly, the powerful assistance
anticipated from a contingent of four Battalions of Tanks
which General Rawlinson had arranged to place under my orders
led me to estimate that I might greatly reduce the number of
men per yard of front. Lastly, the plan was justified by the
known distribution of the enemy's infantry and guns along the
frontage under attack. For all these reasons, I felt prepared to
impose on the infantry a task which, computed solely upon the
factor of frontage, was more than twice that demanded by me
on any previous occasion.</p>

<p>At the same time, so extended a frontage involved the employment
of a much higher ratio of barrage artillery to the number
of battalions of Infantry actually engaged. Success depended
more upon the efficiency of the fire power of the barrage than
upon any other factor, and I could not afford to incur any risk
by weakening the density of the barrage. For this reason, I
adhered to the standard which previous experience of several
major battles and many minor raids had shown to be adequate
for covering the assaulting infantry, and for keeping down the
enemy's fire. This standard never fluctuated widely from one
field-gun per twenty yards of front, and involved the employment,
on this occasion, of some 432 field-guns in the barrage
alone. This result could not have been achieved if the Fourth
Army authorities had not seen their way to place at my disposal
five additional Brigades of Field Artillery over and above the
thirteen Australian Brigades which formed a permanent part
of the whole Artillery of the Corps.</p>

<p>Phase A, as already stated, involved a penetration of 3,000
yards, and the objective line for this phase, which came to be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[86]</a></span>
known as the "green" line (from the colour employed to delineate
it upon all the fighting maps propounded by the Corps),
was chosen, after an exhaustive study of all aeroplane photographs,
and of the results of numerous observations, by many
diverse means, of the locations of the enemy's Artillery, so as
to make certain that during this phase the whole mass of the
enemy's forward Artillery would be overrun, and captured or
put out of action.</p>

<p>The green line was, in fact, located along the crest of the spur
running north-easterly from Lamotte-en-Santerre in the direction
of Cerisy-Gailly, with the object of carrying the battle well
to the east of the Cerisy valley, in which large numbers of the
enemy's guns had been definitely located. This would give us,
by the capture of this valley, suitable concealed positions in which
the Infantry destined for Phase B could rest for a short
"breather;" and would land the Infantry of the original assault
in a position from which they could detect and forestall any
attempt on the part of the enemy to launch a counter-attack
before the time for the opening of Phase B had
arrived.</p>

<p>The task of executing Phase A of the battle fell to the Second
and Third Australian Divisions, in that order from south to
north, the southern flank of the Second Division resting upon the
main railway line from Amiens to Péronne, and being there in
contact with the Canadian Corps, under General Currie. The
northern flank of the Third Division rested on the River Somme,
and was there in contact with the Third British Corps under
General Butler, while the inter-divisional boundary was at the
southern edge of the Bois-d'Accroche.</p>

<p>These two Divisions were the line Divisions during the period
immediately preceding the battle, and had been holding the line
each with two Brigades in line and one Brigade in support.
Three days prior to the battle, however, it was arranged that
each Division should hold its front with only one Brigade, thereby
making available two Brigades each for the actual carrying
out of Phase A of the attack. These assaulting Brigades were
the 7th, 5th, 9th and 11th, in that order from south to north,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[87]</a></span>
each Brigade having its due allotment of Tanks and machine
guns, etc.</p>

<p>The total estimated time for the completion of Phase A was to
be 143 minutes after the opening of the barrage at "zero" hour;
and there was then to be a pause of 100 minutes to allow time
for the advance and deployment into battle order of the succeeding
two Divisions, who were to carry out the process of "leapfrogging"
and to execute Phases B and C of the battle.</p>

<p>The planning of Phase B, or the advance from the "green"
to the "red" line, involved a totally different tactical conception
and the adoption of a type of warfare which had almost
entirely disappeared from the Western theatre of war since
those far-off days in the late autumn of 1914, when the German
Army first dug itself in, in France and Belgium, and committed
both combatants to the prolonged agony of over three years
of stationary warfare. I allude to the moving battle, or as it
is called in text-book language, "open warfare;" a type of
fighting in which few of the British Forces formed since the original
Expeditionary Force had any experience except on the man&oelig;uvre
ground under peace conditions&mdash;a disability which applied
equally to the Australian troops. Confident, however, in their
adaptability and in their power of initiative under novel conditions,
I did not hesitate to prescribe, for this second phase of
the battle, the adoption of the principles and methods of open
warfare.</p>

<p>In two very important respects in particular, this type of
fighting involved conditions to which the troops had not been
accustomed, and under which they had no previous experience
in battle. In trench warfare, and in a deliberate attack on entrenched
defences, the positions of all headquarters, medical
aid posts, supply dumps and signal stations remained fixed and
immovable. The whole of the internal communications by
telegraph and telephone could, therefore, be completely installed
beforehand, down to the last detail, and the transmission
of all messages, reports, orders and instructions, during the course
of the battle, was rapid and assured. But in a moving battle
no such comprehensive or stable signalling arrangements are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[88]</a></span>
possible, and reliance must be placed upon the much slower
and much more uncertain methods of transmission by flag
and lamp signalling, by dispatch riders, pigeons and runners.</p>

<p>Divisional Headquarters would, therefore, almost as soon as
the battle commenced, fall out of touch with Brigades, and they
in turn with their Battalions; information as to the actual
situation at the fighting front would travel slowly, and would
reach those responsible for making consequential decisions
often long after an entire alteration in the situation had removed
the need for action. Thus, a greatly enhanced responsibility
would come to be imposed upon subordinate leaders to decide
for themselves, without waiting for guidance or orders from higher
authority, and to grasp the initiative by taking all possible
action on the spot in the light of the circumstances and situation
of the moment.</p>

<p>Again, the nature of the Artillery action is, in the moving
battle, fundamentally different from that which prevails during
trench warfare. To begin with, only that portion of the Artillery
which is in the strictest sense mobile can participate to any extent
in open warfare. The employment of Artillery is, therefore,
confined to a few and to the smaller natures of Ordnance, namely,
the 18-pounder field-gun, the 4&frac12;-inch field howitzer and the
60-pounder, which are all horse drawn and which are capable
of being moved off the roads and across all but the most broken
country. Heavier guns, from 6-inch upwards, are in practice confined
to roads, and are too slow and cumbersome to keep pace
with the Infantry. The Artillery fire action is also intrinsically
different, because the guns can be sighted directly upon their
targets, while in trench warfare they are always laid by indirect
methods, with the use of the map and compass, and without
observation, at any rate by the crew of the gun, of the objects
fired at.</p>

<p>The decision which I had to take of carrying out the second
phase of this great battle on the principles of open warfare was,
therefore, one which also involved a certain element of risk.
But it was a risk which I felt justified in taking, in spite of the
fact that the German High Command had more than once expressed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[89]</a></span>
itself in contemptuous terms of the capacity of any
British troops successfully to undertake any operation of open
warfare. My justification lay primarily in my confidence in
the ability of the subordinate commanders and troops to work
satisfactorily under these novel conditions&mdash;a confidence which
the event abundantly justified. But I was placed in the position
of having either to accept this risk, or else abandon altogether
the project of a quite unprecedented penetration of enemy
country to be completed on the first day. It would have been
clearly impossible to continue the advance beyond the green line
without an interval of at least forty-eight hours, which would
have been necessary to enable the Artillery to be redisposed for
barrage fire in forward positions and provided with the necessary
supplies of ammunition for such a purpose.</p>

<p>The Divisions which were told off to carry out the "leapfrog"
enterprise and to execute Phase B of the battle were the Fifth
Australian Division on the south and the Fourth Australian
Division on the north, the outer flanks of the attack remaining
as before, <i>i.e.</i>, the Péronne Railway on the south and the River
Somme on the north. Each of these Divisions was directed to
deploy, on its own frontage, two Infantry Brigades. Its third
Brigade was to be kept intact and to advance during Phase B
at some distance behind, as a support to the fighting line, and to
be employed in the subsequent phase, if it were found that Phase
B could be completed without calling upon this spare Brigade.
The actual dispositions of the Brigades finally proposed by the
respective Divisional Commanders and approved by me brought
about the arrangement that the four first-line mobile Infantry
Brigades were successively, from south to north, the 15th,
8th, 12th and 4th, while the 14th and 1st Brigades followed as
supports in a second line.</p>

<p>To each of these Infantry Brigades I allotted a Brigade of
Field Artillery, to be employed under the direct orders of the
Infantry Brigade Commander, and, in addition, three Artillery
Brigades as well as one Battery of 60-pounders, to each Divisional
Commander. As my resources in Artillery were not unlimited,
the twelve Artillery Brigades, so disposed of, were necessarily<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[90]</a></span>
drawn from the original eighteen Brigades which were to fire
the covering Artillery barrage for Phase A of the battle. The
orders to that portion of the Field Artillery which was to become
mobile in pursuance of this plan, accordingly, were that immediately
upon the completion of their original tasks, by the capture
of the green line, they were to "pull out of the barrage."</p>

<p>This meant, in effect, that all the teams, limbers, battery
wagons, and ammunition wagons of these twelve Brigades,
waiting in their wagon lines far in rear, fully harnessed up and
hooked in at the opening of the battle, had to advance during
the progress of the first phase, so as to reach their guns just at
the right time, but no earlier, to enable these guns to be limbered
up, and the batteries to become completely mobile in order to
join and advance with the Infantry of the second phase.</p>

<p>This was an operation which required the greatest nicety in
timing, and the greatest accuracy in execution. No Australian
Artillery had ever previously undertaken such an operation,
except perhaps on the man&oelig;uvre ground, and then only on the
very limited scale of a Brigade or two at a time. That this rapid
transition from the completely stationary to the completely
mobile battle was carried out, during the very crisis of a great
engagement, without the slightest hitch, and with only the
trifling loss of two or three gun horse teams from shell fire, reflects
the very highest credit upon every officer and man of the Australian
Field Artillery.</p>

<p>The open warfare Infantry Brigades were also to be provided,
out of their own divisional resources, each with a Company of
Engineers, a Company of Machine Guns, a Field Ambulance, and
a detachment of Pioneers, so that, in the most complete sense,
they became a Brigade Group of all arms, capable of dealing,
out of their own resources and on their own ground, with any
situation that might arise during their advance of nearly three
miles from the green to the red line. A detachment of nine
tanks completed the fighting equipment of each of the four front
line Brigades destined to capture the red line.</p>

<p>I must now briefly describe the nature of Phase C, the third
and last stage in this ambitious and complex battle programme.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[91]</a></span>
This phase was to consist of "exploitation," which implies that
it was a provisional preparation, which was to be carried out
only if complete success attended the two preceding phases.
The objective of Phase C was the "blue" line, which I had
located about one mile to the east of the red line, along a system
of old French trenches extending from the river at a point near
Méricourt, and running southerly to the railway at a point a
little to the south-east of Harbonnières. This line gave promise
of furnishing a good defensive position in which to deal with any
possible counter-attack. It also gave a good line of departure
for subsequent operations, and provided ideal artillery positions
in a series of valleys, running parallel and a little to the west of
the line itself.</p>

<p>The troops earmarked for this Exploitation Phase were the
two second line Brigades of the two Divisions which were to
capture the red line, namely, the 14th and 1st Brigades, and the
orders to the Divisional Commanders were that if the red line
was reached without mishap, without undue loss of time, and
without involving the Reserve Brigades, but not otherwise, these
Reserve Brigades were to push on with the utmost determination
to secure and hold the blue line until such time as they could
be reinforced.</p>

<p>Each of these exploitation Brigades was equipped similarly
to the red line Brigades in all respects except that they were
provided with a special contingent of 18 Mark V. (Star) Tanks
of the very latest design. These differed from the Mark V. Tank
employed at Hamel and in the other stages of the present operation,
in that they were longer and had sufficient internal space
to carry, as passengers, over and above their own crews, two
complete infantry Lewis gun detachments each. It was expected
that this infantry fire power, added to the fire power from the
machine guns carried by these 36 Tanks themselves and operated
by the Tank crews, would go far to compensate for the somewhat
attenuated line of probably tired Infantry spread in
two Brigades over an ultimate frontage of over 10,000
yards.</p>

<p>No definite time-table was laid down for the closing phases<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[92]</a></span>
of the battle, except for the regulation of the times when our
Heavy Artillery should "lift off" designated targets&mdash;such as
villages, farms, and known gun positions&mdash;and lengthen its range
so as not to obstruct the further advance of our own Infantry.
But it was estimated that, from the opening of the battle, the
green line would be reached in two and a half hours, the red line
in six hours, and the blue line in eight hours. As the battle was
to open at the first streak of dawn, it would, if all went well,
be completed according to plan by about midday.</p>

<p>In every battle plan, whether great or small, it is necessary
first of all to map out the whole of the intended action of the
Infantry, at any rate on the general lines indicated above. When
that has been done the next step is to work backwards, and to
test the feasibility of each body of infantry being able to reach
its allotted point of departure, punctually, without undue
stress on the troops, and without crossing or impeding the line
of movement of any other body of infantry. It is often necessary
to test minutely, by reference to calculations of time and space,
more than one alternative plan for marshalling the Infantry
prior to battle, and for the successive movements, day by day,
and from point to point, of every battalion engaged.</p>

<p>The present case was no exception, and, indeed, presented
quite special difficulties. The whole of the area for a depth
of many thousands of yards behind our then front line was open
rolling country, devoid of any cover, and (except in the actual
valley of the Somme) with every village, hamlet, farmhouse,
factory and wood obliterated. The plan involved the assembly,
in this confined area, fully exposed by day to the view of any
inquisitive enemy aircraft, of no less than 45 Infantry Battalions,
with all their paraphernalia of war; not to speak of our 600
guns of all calibres, their wagon lines, horse lines and motor
parks, together with Engineers, Pioneers, Tanks, Medical and
Supply Units amounting to tens of thousands of men and animals.</p>

<p>A new factor which, however, ultimately controlled the final
decision which I had to make as to the nature of the dispositions
prior to battle, lay in the consideration of the maximum distances
which would have to be covered by the foot soldiers in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[93]</a></span>
such a far-flung battle. I had little difficulty in coming to the
conclusion that the obvious and normal arrangement was on
this occasion a totally wrong arrangement. If the assaulting
Brigades had been arranged, from front to rear, in their assembly
areas prior to battle, in the same order as that in which they would
have to come into action, this would have involved that the
individual man, who was to be required to march and fight his
way furthest into enemy country, and, therefore, was to be the
last to enter the fight, would also be called upon to march furthest
from his rearmost position of assembly before even reaching
the battle zone. The maximum distance to be traversed on the
day of battle by infantry would have amounted, according to
such a plan, to over ten miles. While this is an easy day's march
on a good road, under tranquil conditions, it would have been an
altogether unreasonable demand upon any infantryman during
the stress and nervous excitement of battle. It would have
been courting a breakdown from over-fatigue, among the very
troops upon whom I had to rely most to defend the captured
territory against any serious enemy reaction.</p>

<p>I therefore adopted the not very obvious course of completely
reversing the normal procedure, and of disposing the Brigades
in depth, from front to rear, in exactly the <i>reverse</i> of the order in
which, in point of time, they would enter the battle.</p>

<p>The following represents, diagrammatically, the disposition of
all twelve Brigades after having been fully <i>deployed</i> in the actual
course of the battle:</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 944px;">
<img src="images/diagram1.png" width="944" height="357" alt="" />
</div>

<pre>
^               (4th Division)      |         (5th Division)
| Direction     4    --     12      |         8    --     15
| of        North     1         Inter-             14         South
| enemy.        (3rd Division)  Divisional    (2nd Division)
|              11    --      9  Boundary.     5    --      7
|                                  |                 Our front line
|----------------------------------+-------------------------------
|                                  |                 before battle
|          10 (in our trenches)    |      6 (in our trenches)
</pre>

<p>The next diagram shows how the twelve Brigades were disposed while<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[94]</a></span>
Phase A of the battle was in progress, and before the second Phase had
begun:</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 918px;">
<img src="images/diagram2.png" width="918" height="372" alt="" />
</div>

<pre>
       (3rd Division)      |           (2nd Division)
      11    --      9      |           5    --      7
                       Inter-                 Our front line
-----------------------Divisional---------------------------
                       Boundary.              before battle
  10 (in our trenches)    |        6 (in our trenches)
       (4th Division)     |            (5th Division)
       4    --     12     |            8    --     15
             1            |                 14
</pre>

<p>But the following diagram represents, in a similar manner, the order
of disposition of the same Brigades, in the territory under our own
occupation, immediately <i>prior</i> to the battle:</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 940px;">
<img src="images/diagram3.png" width="940" height="416" alt="" />
</div>

<pre>
^               (3rd Division)      |       (2nd Division)
|                                   |               Our front line
|-----------------------------------+-----------------------------
| Direction                     Inter-              before battle
| of       10 (in our trenches) Divisional  6 (in our trenches)
| enemy.        (4th Division)  Boundary.   (5th Division)
|               4    --     12      |       8    --     15
|           North     1             |            14         South
|                (3rd Division)     |       (2nd Division)
|              11    --      9      |       5    --      7
</pre>

<p>A little consideration will show that this apparently paradoxical
procedure brought about the desired result of more nearly
equalizing the stress upon the whole of the Infantry engaged,
in point, at least, of the maximum distance to be traversed in
the day's operations. But it produced something else, also,
of much greater concern, which was that the scheme involved
a leapfrogging of Divisions during the approach march into the
battle, in addition to a second leapfrogging, to which I was already
committed, to occur at a later stage during the battle itself.</p>

<p>Thus I was confronted with the dilemma that the only scheme<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[95]</a></span>
of disposition which promised success for the subsequent battle
was also that scheme which made the greatest possible demands
upon the intelligence of the troops and the sympathetic, loyal
and efficient co-operation of my own Corps Staff, and those of
the Commanders acting under me. Influenced once again by
the confidence which I felt in my whole command, I did not
hesitate to increase the complexity of the plans for the Infantry
action by calling upon the four Divisions to execute a man&oelig;uvre
which is unique in the history of war, namely, a "double leapfrog,"
simultaneously carried out by two separate pairs of Divisions,
operating side by side. The first leap was to take place
during the approach to the battle, the second during the progress
of the battle itself.</p>

<p>This expedient, which I finally decided to adopt, in spite of the
dangers involved in its complexity and in the absence of any
precedent, was, however, as logical analysis and the event itself
proved, the very keynote of the success of the entire project.
The whole plan, thanks to an intelligent interpretation by all
Commanders and Staffs concerned, worked like a well-oiled machine,
with smoothness, precision and punctuality, and achieved
to the fullest extent the advantages aimed at.</p>

<p>On the one hand, the stress upon the troops was reduced to
a minimum. By the reduction of physical fatigue, it conserved
the energies of whole Divisions in a manner which permitted of
their speedy re-employment in subsequent decisive operations.
And on the other hand, by the great depth of penetration which
it rendered possible, it ensured a victory which amounted to so
crushing a blow to the enemy that its momentum hurled him
into a retrograde movement, not only along the whole front
under attack, but also for many miles on either flank. This
recoil he was never able to arrest, as we followed up our victory
by blow after blow delivered while he was still reeling from the
effects of the first onslaught of August 8th.</p>

<p>But, so far, I have written of the Infantry plan only; and
much remains to be told of the simultaneous action designed
to be taken by all the other arms, which rendered possible and
emphasized the success of the Infantry. No one can rival me<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[96]</a></span>
in my admiration for the transcendant military virtues of the
Australian Infantryman, for his bravery, his battle discipline,
his absolute reliability, his individual resource, his initiative and
endurance. But I had formed the theory that the true rôle
of the Infantry was not to expend itself upon heroic physical
effort, nor to wither away under merciless machine-gun fire,
nor to impale itself on hostile bayonets, nor to tear itself to pieces
in hostile entanglements&mdash;(I am thinking of Pozières and Stormy
Trench and Bullecourt, and other bloody fields)&mdash;but, on the contrary,
to advance under the maximum possible protection of the
maximum possible array of mechanical resources, in the form of
guns, machine guns, tanks, mortars and aeroplanes; to advance
with as little impediment as possible; to be relieved as far as
possible of the obligation to <i>fight</i> their way forward; to march,
resolutely, regardless of the din and tumult of battle, to the appointed
goal; and there to hold and defend the territory gained;
and to gather in the form of prisoners, guns and stores, the fruits
of victory.</p>

<p>It is my purpose, therefore, to emphasize particularly the
extent to which this theory was realized in the battle under review,
by the achievement of a great and decisive victory at a trifling
cost. That result was due primarily to the very ample resources
in mechanical aids which the foresight and confidence of the
Fourth Army Commander, General Rawlinson, entrusted to me;
but it was due partly, also, to the manner in which those resources
were employed. And that is why I shall attempt to describe
the remainder of the Corps plan.</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_096fp.jpg" width="1200" height="763" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>Tanks marching into Battle.</p></div>
</div>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_097fp.jpg" width="1200" height="763" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>Morcourt Valley&mdash;the Australian attack swept across this on August 8th, 1918.</p></div>
</div>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[97]</a></span></p>




<h2>CHAPTER VI<br />

The battle plan (<i>continued</i>)</h2>


<p>Surprise has been, from time immemorial, one of the
most potent weapons in the armoury of the tactician.
It can be achieved not merely by doing that which the enemy
least anticipates, but also by acting at a time when he least
expects any action. It was a weapon which had been employed
only rarely in the previous greater battles of this war. The
offensive before Cambrai, planned by General Sir Julian Byng,
and the battle of Hamel, were rare exceptions to our general
procedure of heralding the approach of an offensive by feverish
and obvious activity on our part, and by a long sustained preliminary
bombardment of the enemy's defences, designed to
destroy his works and impair his <i>moral</i>.</p>

<p>The situation on the Fourth Army front, early in August,
1918, offered a rare opportunity for the employment of surprise
tactics on the boldest scale. The incessant "nibbling" activities
of the Australian troops during the preceding three months
had been of such a consistent nature as to suggest that our
resources were not equal to any greater effort upon such an
extended front as we were then holding, from the Ancre down to
and beyond Villers-Bretonneux. On the other hand, the passivity
of the first French Army, to the south of the latter town, conveyed
no suggestion of any offensive enterprise on the part of our Ally
in this region.</p>

<p>The problem, therefore, was to convert an extensive front
from a state of passive defence to a state of complete preparedness
for an attack on the largest scale, and to keep the enemy&mdash;who,
as always, was alert and observant both from the ground<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[98]</a></span>
and from the air&mdash;in complete ignorance of every portion of these
extensive preparations, until the very moment when the battle
was to burst upon him. It was, of course, a question not merely
of deceiving the enemy troops in their trenches immediately
opposed to us, but also of arousing in the minds of the German
High Command no suspicions which might have prompted them
to hold in a state of readiness, or to put into motion towards
the threatened zone, any of the reserve Divisions forming part of
their still considerable resources.</p>

<p>The following memorandum, which was issued to the whole of
the senior commanders in the Australian Corps on August 1st,
gives in outline some of the measures adopted to this end:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"<span class="smcap">Secrecy.</span></p>

<p>"1. The first essential to success is the maintenance of
secrecy. The means to be adopted are as follows:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>(i) No person is to be told or informed in any part
or way until such time as the development of the plan
demands action from him. This is the main principle
and will be pursued throughout, down to the lowest
formation.</p>

<p>(ii) Divisional Commanders will work out their reliefs
in such a way as will ensure that the troops in the line
know nothing of the proposed operation until the last
possible moment. This will apply in particular to any
troops who may be employed in the area south of the
<span class="smcap">Amiens</span>&mdash;<span class="smcap">Villers-Bretonneux</span> railway.</p></blockquote>

<p>"2. In order to conceal the intention to carry out a
large operation on this front the following plan has been
adopted:</p>

<p>"The Australian Corps has been relieved of one divisional
sector by the Third Corps, and takes over a divisional sector
from the French Corps. The object of this is to lead the
enemy, and our own people, too, to believe that the action
of the French in the <span class="smcap">Soissons</span> salient has been so costly as
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[99]</a></span>to demand that further French troops had to be made available,
and that this is the apparent cause of the extension of
the Australian Corps front to the south.</p>

<p>"3. (a) The idea is being circulated that the Canadian
Corps is being brought to the south to take over the
rôle of Reserve Corps at the junction of the British and
French Armies in replacement of the 22nd Corps, which
occupied that rôle until it was ordered to the <span class="smcap">Champagne</span>
front. In order that the enemy may be deceived as to the
destination of the Canadian Corps in the event of his discovering
that it has been withdrawn from the <span class="smcap">Arras</span> front,
Canadian wireless personnel has been sent to the Second
Army area,<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> where they have taken over certain wireless
zones.</p>

<p>"(b) To prevent the enemy from discovering the arrival
of the Canadian Corps in this region, they will not take over
from the 4th Australian Division until 'Y' night. This
will necessitate a proportion of the troops of the Fourth
Australian Division remaining in the line in this sector
until 'Y' night. As the Fourth Australian Division will
be required to participate in the attack it is proposed to
distribute one brigade to hold the whole of the line from
'W' night onwards. This will enable the remaining two
Brigades to be withdrawn, given a day or two's rest, and
allow of their part in the operation being fully explained
to them. The place of these two Brigades in rear of the line
Brigade will be taken over by Canadian Divisions.</p>

<p>"(c) In order to deceive our own troops as to the cause
of the coming down here of the Canadians, a rumour is going
abroad that the Canadian Corps is being brought down
with the object of relieving the Australian Corps in the
line. To most of the Australian Corps this would appear
to be an obvious reason for their coming, as the idea has
been mooted on former occasions. While it is not intended
that this rumour should be promulgated, it is not desired
that anyone should disclose the actual facts. This idea,
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[100]</a></span>together with the idea put forth in paragraph 3 (a), should
do much to prevent the real facts from becoming known."<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p></blockquote>

<p>The references to "W," "X," "Y" and "Z" days and nights
in the above memo, are to the successive days preceding Zero
day&mdash;known briefly as "Z" day, on which the battle was to
open. The actual <i>date</i> of "Z" day was kept a close secret by
the Army Commander and the three Corps Commanders concerned,
until a few days before the actual date; while the actual
moment of assault, or "Zero" hour, was not determined or made
known until noon on the day preceding the battle, after a close
study of the conditions of visibility before and after break of
day, on the three preceding mornings.</p>

<p>But these arrangements were directed only towards the prevention
of a premature disclosure of our intention to attack to
the enemy, to our own troops, and through them to the civilian
public, and to enemy agents, whose presence among us had
always to be reckoned with. It still remained to carry out our
battle preparations in a manner which would preclude the
possibility of detection by enemy aircraft, either through direct
observation, or by the help of photography.</p>

<p>Accordingly I issued orders that all movements of troops and
of transport of all descriptions, should take place only during the
hours of darkness, whether in the forward or in the rear areas;
and in order to keep an effective control over the faithful execution
of these difficult orders, I arranged for relays of "police"
aeroplanes, furnished by our No. 3 Squadron, to fly continuously,
by day, over the whole of the Corps area, in order to detect and
report upon any observed unusual movement.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[101]</a></span></p>

<p>At the same time, the normal work on the construction of new
lines of defence, covering Amiens, in my rear areas, which had
been continuously in progress for many weeks and was still
far from complete, was to continue, with a full display of activity;
so that the enemy should be unable to infer, from a stoppage of
such works, any change in our attitude.</p>

<p>Orders were also given to discourage the usual stream of officers
who ordinarily visited our front trenches prior to an operation,
and who often, thoughtlessly, made a great display of unusual
activity, under the very noses of the enemy front line observers,
by the flourishing of maps and field-glasses, and by bobbing up
above our parapets to catch fleeting glimpses of the country to
be fought over. Such reconnaissance, however desirable, was to
be confined to a few senior Commanders and Staff Officers.
All subordinates were to rely upon the very large number of
admirable photographs, taken regularly from the air, both
vertically and obliquely, by the indefatigable Corps Air Squadron.
These served excellently as a substitute for visual observation
from the ground.</p>

<p>The prohibition against the movement of any transport in
the daylight naturally very seriously hampered the freedom of
action of the troops of all arms and services, but was felt in quite
a special degree by the whole of the Artillery. Over 600 guns of
all natures had to be dragged to and emplaced in their battle positions,
and there camouflaged, each gun involving the concurrent
movement of a number of associated vehicles. A full supply
of ammunition had to be collected from railhead, distributed by
mechanical transport to great main dumps, and thence taken by
horsed vehicles for distribution to the numerous actual gun-pits.</p>

<p>As the amount of ammunition to be held in readiness for the
opening of the battle averaged 500 rounds per gun, it became
necessary to handle a total of about 300,000 rounds of shells
and a similar number of cartridges of all calibres, from 3&frac12; to
12 inches, not to mention fuses and primers, or the immense
bulk and weight of infantry and machine-gun ammunition,
bombs, flares, rockets, and the like, for the supply of all of which
the artillery was equally responsible.<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> The great amount of
movement involved in the handling and dumping of all these
munitions, and the deterrent difficulties of carrying out all such
work only during the short hours of darkness, must be left to the
imagination.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[102]</a></span></p>
<p>The artillery was, however, confronted, for the first time, with
a difficulty of quite a different nature. In the previous years of
the war every gun, <i>after</i> being placed in its fighting pit or position,
had to be carefully "registered," by firing a series of rounds at
previously identified reference points, and noting the errors in
line or range due to the instrumental error of the gun, which
error varied with the gradual wearing-out of the gun barrel.
By these means, battery commanders were enabled to compute
the necessary corrections to be applied to any given gun, at any
one time or place, so as to ensure that the gun would fire true to
the task set.</p>

<p>Such registration naturally involved, for a large number of guns,
a very considerable volume of Artillery fire, the extent of which
would speedily disclose to the enemy the presence of a largely
increased mass of Artillery, and would inevitably lead him to the
conclusion that some mischief was afoot. Fortunately, however,
the rapid evolution during the war of scientific methods had by
this juncture placed at my disposal a means of ascertaining the
instrumental error of the guns on a testing ground located many
miles behind the battle zone. This method was known as "calibration,"
and consisted of the firing of the gun through a series
of wired screens, placed successively at known distances from the
muzzle of the gun. The whole elements of the flight of the projectile
could then be accurately determined by recording the intervals
of time between its passage through the respective screens.
From these data could be deduced the muzzle velocity, the jump,
the droop and the lateral error of each gun.</p>

<p>Simple and obvious as was the principle of such an experiment,
the merit of the new process of calibration lay in the remarkable
rapidity and accuracy with which the electric and photographic
mechanism employed made the necessary delicate time
observations, correct to small fractions of a second, and automatically
deduced the mathematical results required. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[103]</a></span>
calibration hut, in which this mechanism was housed, became one
of the show spots to which visitors to the Corps area were taken to
be overawed by the scientific methods of our gunners.</p>

<p>In the early days of August the calibration range of the Australian
Corps was a scene of feverish activity. All day long,
battery after battery of guns could be seen route-marching to the
testing ground, going through the performance of firing six rounds
per gun, and then route-marching back again the same night to
its allotted battle position. So rapid was the procedure that long
before he had reached his destination the Battery Commander
had received the full error sheet of every one of his guns, and by
means of it was enabled to go into action whenever required without
any previous registration whatever. This great advance
in the art of gunnery contributed in the most direct manner
to the result that when these 600 guns opened their tornado of
fire upon the enemy at daybreak on August 8th, the very presence
in this area of most of them remained totally unsuspected.</p>

<p>The manner of the employment of the ponderous mass of Heavy
Artillery at my disposal will be referred to later. The action of
that portion of the Field Artillery which was to become mobile
in the concluding phases of the battle has already been dealt with.
It remains only to describe, in outline, the arrangements made
for the normal barrage fire of the Field Artillery during the
first phase.</p>

<p>It has been my invariable practice to reduce the barrage plan
to the simplest possible elements, avoiding in every direction the
over-elaboration so frequently encountered. By following these
principles not only is the actual preparatory work of the Artillery
greatly reduced in bulk and simplified in quality, but also the
liability to mistake and to erratic shooting of individual batteries
or guns, and consequent risks of damage to our own Infantry,
are greatly diminished. These advantages are bought at the
small price of calling upon the Infantry to undertake, before the
battle, such rectifications and adjustments of our front line as
would accommodate themselves to a straight and simple barrage
line. This is in sharp contrast to the much more usual procedure
which prevailed (and persisted in other Corps to the end of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[104]</a></span>
war) of complicating the barrage enormously in an attempt to
make it conform to the tortuous configuration of our Infantry
front line.</p>

<p>For the present battle it was accordingly arranged that the
barrage should open on a line which was <i>dead straight</i> for the
whole 7,000 yards of our front, and the Infantry tape lines,<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a>
which were to mark the alignment of the Infantry at the moment
of launching the assault, were to be laid exactly 200 yards in
rear of this Artillery "start line." The barrage was to advance,
in exactly parallel lines, 100 yards at a time, at equal rates along
the whole frontage. These rates were 100 yards every 3 minutes,
for the first 24 minutes, and thereafter 100 yards every 4 minutes,
until the conclusion of the time-table at 143 minutes after Zero.
By such a simple plan every one of the 432 field guns engaged was
given a task of uniform character.</p>

<p>Great as was the care necessary to conceal all Artillery preparations,
it required still greater thought and consideration to keep
entirely secret the presence behind the battle front of some 160
Tanks, and particularly to conceal their approach march into the
battle. To both combatants, the arrival of a Tank, or anything
that could be mistaken on an air photograph for a Tank, had for
long been regarded as a sure indication of coming trouble. And,
therefore, imputing to the enemy the same keenness to detect,
in good time, the presence of Tanks, and the same nervousness
which we had been accustomed to feel when prisoners' tales of
the coming into the war of enormous hordes of German monsters
had been crystallized by the reports of some excited observer into
a definite suspicion that the fateful hour had arrived, I considered
it wise to repeat on a much elaborated scale all the precautions of
secrecy first employed for this purpose at Hamel.</p>

<p>It is quite easy to detect from an air photograph the broad,
corrugated track made by a Tank, if the ground be soft and muddy
enough to record such an impression. Consequently, Tanks were
forbidden to move across ploughed fields or marshy land, and were
confined to hard surface. They moved only in small bodies,
and only at night, and were carefully stabled, during the daylight,
in the midst of village ruins, or under the deep shade of woods and
thickets. Thus, by daily stages, and by cautious bounds, each Tank
or group of Tanks ultimately reached its appointed assembly
ground, from which it was to make its last leap into the thick of
the battle, where it would arrive precisely at Zero hour.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[105]</a></span></p>
<p>But that last leap was just the whole difficulty. For the Tank
is a noisy brute, and it was just as imperative to make him
inaudible as to make him invisible. By a fortunate chance,
the noise and buzz made by the powerful petrol engines of a Tank
are so similar to those of the engines of a large-sized bombing
plane, as for example of the Handley-Page type, especially if the
latter be flying at a comparatively low altitude, that from a
little distance off it is quite impossible to distinguish the one sound
from the other.</p>

<p>It was therefore possible to adopt the conjurer's trick of directing
the special attention of the observer to those things which do
not particularly matter, in order to distract his attention from
other things which really do matter very much. In other words,
a flight of high-power bombing planes was kept flying backwards
and forwards over the battle front during the whole of that very
hour, just before dawn, during which our 160 Tanks were loudly
and fussily buzzing their way forward, along carefully reconnoitred
routes, marked by special black and white tapes, across that last
mile of country which brought them up level with the infantry
at the precise moment when the great battle was ushered in by the
belching forth of a volcano of Artillery fire.</p>

<p>The subterfuge succeeded to perfection, as was obvious to
observers and confirmed by the subsequent narratives of prisoners.
The German trench garrisons and trench observers were fully
occupied in listening to the hum of the bombing planes, in
watching their threatened visitation for their customary "egg"
dropping performances, in engaging them with rifle fire, and in
holding themselves in readiness to duck for cover should they
come too near. They never suspected for a moment that this was
merely a new stratagem of "noise camouflage," and that the real
danger was stalking steadily and relentlessly towards them over the
whole front, upon the surface of the ground, instead of in the air.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[106]</a></span></p>

<p>But the trick would not have succeeded so well, or would perhaps
have failed altogether, if the employment of those planes had
been confined to the morning of the battle. Such an unusual
demonstration might have aroused vague suspicions sufficient to
justify a "stand to arms" and a preparedness for some further
activity on our part. And what we had most to fear was the
danger of "giving the show away" in the last ten minutes. For
it would have taken much less than that time for nervous German
trench sentries, by the firing of signal rockets, to bring down
upon our front line trenches, crowded as they were with
expectant fighters, a murderous fire from the German
Artillery.</p>

<p>Consequently the puzzled enemy was treated to the spectacle
of an early morning promenade by these same bombing planes on
every morning, for an hour before dawn, during several mornings
preceding the actual battle day. Doubtless the first morning's
exhibition of such apparently aimless air activity in the darkness
really startled him. After two or three repetitions, it merely
earned his contempt. By the time the actual date arrived he
treated it as negligible. All prisoners interrogated subsequently
agreed that neither the presence nor the noisy approach of so
mighty a phalanx of Tanks had been in the least suspected up to
the very moment when they plunged into view out of the darkness,
just as day was breaking.</p>

<p>The force of Tanks placed at my disposal for the purposes of
this battle comprised the 2nd, 8th and 13th Tank Battalions,
commanded respectively by Lieut.-Colonels Bryce, Bingham
and Lyon, all under the 5th Tank Brigade, commanded by
Brigadier-General Courage. All these Tanks were of the Mark V.
type, as used at Hamel; but there were also attached to the same
Brigade a Battalion of Mark V. (Star) Tanks, of still later design,
under Lieut.-Colonel Ramsay-Fairfax, and also a full Company of
24 Carrying Tanks, under Major Partington. These Carrying
Tanks were not employed in fighting, but were of wonderful
utility in the rapid transport of stores of all descriptions across
the battle zone; and in carrying the wounded out of the battle
on their return journey. I am confident that each of these Tanks<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[107]</a></span>
was capable of doing the work of at least 200 men, with an almost
complete immunity from casualty.</p>

<p>There were thus available to me 168 Tanks in all, and their
dispositions have been already indicated in sufficient detail in
Chapter V. It was a definite feature of the whole plan of battle
that the combined Tank and Infantry tactics which had proved
so successful in the Hamel operation, and which have been
described in Chapter II., were to be employed and exploited to their
utmost. Each Tank became thereby definitely associated with a
specified body of Infantry, and acted during the actual battle
under the immediate orders of the Commander of that body:
the working rule was "one Tank, one Company."</p>

<p>To this was added the second working principle of "one Tank,
one task," which rules meant, in their practical application,
that no individual Tank was to be relied upon to serve more than
one body of Infantry, nor to carry out more than one phase of the
battle. Elementary as this may sound, it involved this striking
advantage that, in the event of any one Tank becoming disabled,
its loss would impair no portion of the battle plan other than
that fraction of it to which that Tank had been allotted.</p>

<p>Thus, the whole of the Infantry operating in Phases B and C
of the battle had each their own adequate equipment of Tanks,
which would be certain to be available to them, even if the whole
of the Tanks employed during Phase A had been knocked out.
At the same time clear orders were issued, and due arrangements
were made, that all Tanks which survived Phase A, and whose
crews were not by then too exhausted, were to rally (during the
100 minutes' pause on the green line) in order to co-operate in the
succeeding phases of the fight.</p>

<p>There was still another Unit, coming under the jurisdiction of
the Tank Corps, which proved of wonderful utility to me, and
which deserved quite special mention. This was the 17th
Armoured Car Battalion, organized into two companies of eight
cars each. Each car carried one forward and one rear Hotchkiss
gun. It was heavily armoured, and the crew operating the guns,
as also the car driver, were protected from all except direct hits
by Artillery. The cars had a speed of 20 miles per hour,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[108]</a></span>
either forwards or backwards. The Battalion was under the
command of Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Carter, an officer of the British
Cavalry. I allotted 12 cars to the use of the 5th Australian
Division, under Major-General Hobbs, who would be likely to
find specially useful employment for them, in scouring the network
of roads beyond his final objective; and retained four cars in
Corps reserve for a special reconnaissance enterprise.</p>

<p>Full of promise of usefulness as were the speed and armament
of these cars, they suffered from one serious disability. Their
top hamper was so heavy compared to their light chassis that
they could not be relied upon to travel without premature breakdown
across country, or indeed on anything but moderately
good roads. Now, such roads were certainly available, as was
evident from aeroplane photographs, in the enemy's back country,
after a zone for a mile or two immediately behind his front line
was passed; but all the subsidiary roads in that zone had been
practically obliterated by shell-craters, and even the great main
road from Villers-Bretonneux to Saint Quentin, which is a Roman
Road and substantially constructed throughout, was known to
have been cut up and traversed by numerous trenches both on our
side and on the enemy's side of "No Man's Land." There was
also every expectation that the few remaining trees which flanked
this great road would be felled by our bombardment, and some of
them would surely fall across and obstruct the roadway.</p>

<p>That road was, however, the only possible outlet into enemy
country for the armoured cars, and I resolved upon a special programme,
and the allotment of a special body of troops for its execution.
The object was to ensure that the cars could be taken
across the impracticable and obstructed stretch of roadway already
described, and launched at the enemy at its eastern extremity,
at the earliest possible moment of time. Then, before the
numerous enemy Corps and Divisional Headquarters and all their
rear organization had time to get clear intelligence of what was
happening at the front, or to recover from the first shock of
surprise, these Armoured Cars would fall upon them, and, travelling
hither and thither at great speed, would spread death, destruction
and confusion in all directions.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[109]</a></span></p>

<p>A whole Battalion of Pioneers, and detachments of other technical
troops, with an adequate amount of road-repairing material,
were got ready, under the direct orders of my Chief Engineer, to
carry out this special task. All trenches in that portion of the
road lying within our own zone of occupation were bridged or
filled in and all obstructions cleared away before the day of the
battle. But as to the more distant stretch of the road, still in
the hands of the enemy, elaborate preparations were made, by a
careful and detailed distribution of tasks to small gangs of men,
and by a fully worked-out time-table. The plan was that from the
moment of the opening of the battle, this road repair work was to
commence, and its advance was to synchronize with the advance
of the Artillery barrage and Infantry skirmishing line.</p>

<p>A pilot armoured car was to follow the working gangs in order
to test the sufficiency of the repair work, and arrangements
were made for sending back signals to the remainder of the cars,
lying waiting in readiness in the shelter of Villers-Bretonneux.
It was planned that the first two miles of road would, by these
means, be cleared and repaired to a sufficient width, within four
hours after the opening of the battle.</p>

<p>I am tempted to anticipate the narrative of the battle by saying
that the whole plan worked out with complete success to the last
detail. The cars got through punctually to time, and the story
of their subsequent adventures, as told later, reads like a romance.
As indicating the importance which I attached to this little
enterprise, which in magnitude was quite a small "side-show,"
but which in its results had the most far-reaching consequence,
I reproduce below the full text (omitting merely formal portions)
of one of the several orders issued by me on this subject:</p>

<blockquote>
<div class="right">
Australian Corps,<br />
7th August, 1918.<br />
</div>

<p>1.  The detachment of the 17th Armoured Car Battalion
held in Corps Reserve (2 sections each of 2 cars), will be
employed on the special duty of long distance reconnaissance
on "Z" day.</p>

<p>2.  These sections will be sent forward under the orders
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[110]</a></span>of the C.O., 17th Armoured Car Battalion, passing the
green line as soon as practicable after Zero plus four hours,
and proceeding eastward, following the lifts of our Heavy
Artillery bombardment, so as to pass the blue line at or
after Zero plus five hours.</p>

<p>3. The area to be reconnoitred lies in the bend of the
Somme, north of the Villers-Bretonneux&mdash;Chaulnes Railway;
but the old Somme battlefield lying N.E. of Chaulnes
need not be entered.</p>

<p>4. Information is required as to presence, distribution
and movement of enemy supporting and reserve troops,
and his defensive organizations within this area.</p>

<p>5. While the primary function of this detachment is to
reconnoitre and not to fight, except defensively, advantage
should be taken of every opportunity to damage the
enemy's telephonic and telegraphic communications.</p>

<p>6. The following information as to enemy organizations
is thought to be reliable:</p>

<div class="center">
<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="">
<tr><td align="left">Vauvillers</td><td align="left">Billets and Detraining point.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Proyart</td><td align="left">Divisional H.Q. and billets.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Chuignolles</td><td align="left">Divisional H.Q. and billets.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Framerville</td><td align="left">Corps H.Q.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Rainecourt</td><td align="left">Billets.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Cappy</td><td align="left">Aerodrome and dumps.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Foucaucourt</td><td align="left">Corps H.Q., dump, billets.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Chaulnes</td><td align="left">Important railway junction.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Ommiécourt</td><td align="left">Dumps.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Fontaine</td><td align="left">Aerodrome, Div. H.Q. and dump.</td></tr>
</table>
</div>
</blockquote>

<p>The Heavy Artillery of the Corps was divided, for this battle
as normally, into two distinct groups, of which the one, or Bombardment
Group, was to devote its energies to destructive
attack, throughout the course of the battle, upon known enemy
centres of resistance, suspected Headquarters, and telephone or
telegraph exchanges, villages believed to be housing support
and reserve troops, railway junctions and the like. The selection<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[111]</a></span>
of all such targets depended upon a judicious choice of many
tempting objectives disclosed by the very comprehensive records
of the highly efficient Intelligence Officers belonging to my
Heavy Artillery Headquarters. After that selection was made,
all that remained was to draw up a time-table for the action of
all bombardment guns which would ensure that they would
lift off any given target just before our own Infantry would be
likely to reach it, and then to apply their fire to a more distant
locality.</p>

<p>The second group of Heavy Guns was known as the Counter-battery
Group, and was at all times under the direction of a
special staff, especially skilled in all the scientific means at our
disposal for determining the position and distribution of the
enemy's Artillery, and in the methods and artifices for silencing
or totally destroying it. Just as it was the special rôle of the
Tanks to deal with the enemy machine guns, so it was the special
rôle of our Counter-battery Artillery to deal with the enemy's
field and heavy guns and howitzers. These&mdash;the guns and
the machine guns&mdash;were the only things that troubled us;
because, for the German soldier individually, our Australian
infantryman is and always has been more than a match.</p>

<p>Very special care was, therefore, devoted to the whole of
the arrangements, first for carefully ascertaining beforehand the
actual or probable position of every enemy gun that could be
brought to bear on our Infantry, and then for allocating as many
heavy guns as could be spared, each with a task appropriate to
its range and hitting-power, to the destruction or suppression
of the selected target. For it served the immediate purpose of
eliminating the causes of molestation to our advancing Infantry
equally well, whether the enemy gun was merely silenced by a
sustained fire of shrapnel or high explosives which drove off the
gun detachment, or by a flood of gas which compelled them to
put on their gas masks, or whether it was actually destroyed by
a direct hit and rendered permanently useless.</p>

<p>The days before the battle were of supreme interest in this
particular aspect. Each day I visited the Counter-battery
Staff Officer, in his modest shanty, hidden away in the interior<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[112]</a></span>
of a leafy wood, where in constant touch, by telephone, with all
balloons, observers and sound-ranging stations, and surrounded
by an imposing array of maps, studded with pins of many shapes
and colours, he made his daily report to me of the enemy gun
positions definitely identified or located, or found to have been
vacated. And here again there was an opportunity for the
display of a modest little stratagem. Having suspected or
verified the fact that the enemy had altered the location of any
given battery, leaving the empty gun pits as a tempting bait to
us, fruitlessly to expend our energies and ammunition upon them&mdash;it
would have been the worst of folly to prove to him that he
had failed to fool us, by engaging his battery in its new position.</p>

<p>On the contrary, we deliberately allowed ourselves to be
fooled; and for several days before the great battle we intentionally
committed the stupid error of methodically engaging
all his empty gun positions. No doubt the German gunners
laughed consumedly as they watched, from a safe distance, our
wasted efforts; but they did not, doubtless, laugh quite so
heartily when at dawn on the great day, the whole weight of
our attack from over a hundred of my heaviest Counter-battery
guns fells upon them in the new positions, which they believed
that we had failed to detect.</p>

<p>The Intelligence Service of the Corps was an extensive and
highly organized department, whose jurisdiction extended
throughout all the Divisions, Brigades and Battalions. Its
routine work comprised the collection and collation of the daily
flow of information from a large staff of observers in the forward
zone, from the interrogation of prisoners, from the examination
of documents and maps, and from neighbouring Corps and
Armies. Before and during battle, however, a greatly added
burden fell upon the shoulders of the Intelligence Staff.</p>

<p>Closely associated with this branch of the Staff work were
two activities of quite special interest. The Australian Corps
organized a Topographical Section, manned by expert draftsmen
and lithographers, who compiled and printed all the maps
required throughout the whole Corps, and it was their business
to keep all battle maps, barrage maps and topographical data
recorded and corrected up to date. This alone proved a heavy
task when pace had to be kept with a rapid advance. At such
times the maps prepared on one day became obsolete two or
three days later.</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_112fp.jpg" width="1200" height="776" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>Dug-outs at Froissy Beacon&mdash;being "mopped up" during battle.</p></div>
</div>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_113fp.jpg" width="1200" height="778" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>Péronne&mdash;barricade in main street.</p></div>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[113]</a></span></p>

<p>The issue of such maps was not confined to Commanders and
Staffs. For all important operations, large numbers of handy
sectional maps were struck off, so that they could be placed in
the hands even of the subordinate officers and non-commissioned
officers. These maps not only enabled the most junior leaders
to study their objectives and tasks in detail before every battle,
but also became a convenient vehicle for sending back reports
as to the positions reached or occupied by front-line troops or
detached parties. On occasions as many as five thousand of
such maps would be struck off for the use of the troops, in a
single operation.</p>

<p>There was also a branch of the Intelligence Staff attached
to the No. 3 Australian Air Squadron. Its special business was
to print and distribute large numbers of photographs, both
vertical and oblique, taken from the air over the territory to be
captured&mdash;showing trenches, wire, roads, hedges and many
other features of paramount interest to the troops. Thousands
of such photographs were distributed before every battle.</p>

<p>The important considerations, in regard both to maps and
photographs, were that on the one hand, they were of priceless
value to all who understood how to read and use them, and on
the other hand, the event proved that their issue was in no sense
labour in vain, for the keen interest taken, even by the private
soldiers, in these facilities contributed powerfully to the success
and precision with which all battle orders were carried out, and
this more than repaid us for the additional trouble involved.
It was inspiriting to me to see, on the eve of every great battle,
as I made my round of the troops, numerous small groups of
men gathered around their sergeant or corporal, eagerly discussing
these maps and the photographs and the things they
disclosed, the lie of the land, the wire, the trenches, the probable
machine-gun posts, the dug-outs and the suspected enemy
strong points.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[114]</a></span></p>

<p>My account of the details prepared for the battle of August
8th is not nearly complete; but the demands of space forbid
any more informative reference to numerous other essential
ingredients of the plan than a mere recital of some of them.
Thus, for example, it was necessary to decide the action of all
Machine Guns, both those used collectively under Corps control,
and those left to be handled by the Divisions; the employment
of Smoke Tactics, by the use of smoke screens created both by
mortars from the ground and by phosphorus bombs dropped
from the air; the use to be made of all the technical troops
(Engineers and Pioneers) in bridging, road and railway repairs
and field fortifications; the arrangements for the medical
evacuation of the wounded, and for the collection and safe-keeping
of the anticipated haul of prisoners, the synchronization
of watches throughout the whole command, so that action should
occur punctually at a common clock time; and last, but not
least, the establishment of the machinery of liaison internally
between all the numerous formations of the Australian Corps,
and also externally with my flank Corps, the Canadians, under
Currie, on my right, and the British Third Corps, under Butler,
on my left.</p>

<p>Such, in outline, were my battle plans and my preparations
for what I hoped would prove an operation of decisive influence
upon the future of the campaign. The immediate results,
which could be estimated on the spot and at the time, and the
admissions of Ludendorff, which came to light only many months
afterwards, combine to show that I was not mistaken.</p>

<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> This was in Flanders and Belgium.</p></div>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> The secret was, indeed, so well kept, and the "camouflage" stories circulated
proved so effective, that the King of the Belgians forwarded a strong
protest to Marshal Foch because the Canadians were about to deliver an attack
in his country, without his having been consulted or made aware of the plans;
and the Canadian Headquarters in London complained to the War Office that
the Canadian Forces were being divided, and were being sent by detachments
to different parts of the front, instead of being always kept together as the
Canadian Government desired. It is said that even Mr. Lloyd George knew
nothing of the intention to attack until late on the day before the battle.</p></div>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> The weight of supplies of all kinds exceeded 10,000 tons.</p></div>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> See Chapter XIII.</p></div></div>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[115]</a></span></p>


<h2>CHAPTER VII<br />

THE CHASE BEGINS</h2>


<p>The preliminary movements of Divisions were duly carried
out without special difficulty. The Fifth Australian
Division was relieved on August 1st by a Division of the Third
Corps, in that part of the Corps front which lay north of the
Somme, and passed into Corps Reserve, in a rear area, there to
undergo training with Tanks, and to prepare itself for the work
which it had to do.</p>

<p>The Fourth Australian Division, from Corps Reserve, took
over the French front, as far south as the Amiens&mdash;Roye road
on August 2nd, and on the next night took over from the Second
Australian Division all that part of its front which lay south
of the railway, thus disposing itself upon what was ultimately
to become the battle front of the Canadian Corps.</p>

<p>On the same night, the Second and Third Divisions, who had
thus been left in sole occupation of the sector which was to be
the Australian Corps battle front, carried out a readjustment
of their own mutual boundary, which would place each of these
two Divisions upon its own proper battle front.</p>

<p>On the night of August 4th, the Second and Third Divisions
rearranged their defensive dispositions so that each of them
deployed only a single Brigade for the passive defence of its
front, and withdrew to its rear area its remaining two Brigades,
who were thus afforded three clear days to complete their internal
preparations.</p>

<p>The Canadian Corps commenced to arrive, and on August 4th
two Canadian Brigades relieved two Brigades of the Fourth
Division, thereby releasing them so that they also might commence
to prepare for the battle. It was originally intended<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[116]</a></span>
that the last Brigade of the Fourth Division should also be
relieved by Canadians on August 6th, when an untoward incident
happened, which caused considerable alarm and speculation;
and it led to a modification of this part of the plan.</p>

<p>The 13th Australian Brigade (of the Fourth Division) was on
August 4th spread out upon a front of over six thousand yards.
It had no option but to leave the greater part of the front-line
trenches unoccupied, and to defend its area with a series of
small, but isolated, posts. On that night, one of these posts,
in the vicinity of the road to Roye,<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> was raided by the enemy,
and the whole of its occupants, comprising a sergeant and four
or five men, were surrounded and taken prisoner.</p>

<p>It was an unusual display of enterprise on the part of the
enemy, at this point of time and in this locality. Whether it
had been inspired by sneering criticisms from behind his line
of the nature which have been quoted, or whether signs of
unusual movement or a changed attitude on the part of our
trench garrison had instigated a suspicion that something was
happening which required investigation, could only be surmised.
But the fact remained that five Australians had been
taken, at a place several miles south of the southernmost point
hitherto occupied by "the English."</p>

<p>The side-stepping of the Australian Corps southwards had
thereby become known to the enemy, and it was necessary
to estimate the deductions which he would be likely to draw
from that discovery. Much depended upon the behaviour of
these prisoners. Would they talk? and, if so, what did they
know? That Australian captives would not volunteer information
likely to imperil the lives of their comrades, might be taken
for granted, but German Intelligence Officers had means at their
disposal to draw from prisoners, unwittingly, anything they
might know.</p>

<p>We could only hope, under the circumstances, that these men
really did know nothing of our intention to attack; and that,
if they had become aware of the presence of Canadian troops
in the rear areas, they would believe the story which we had
sedulously spread, that the Canadians were merely coming to
relieve the Australian Corps, so that it might have a long rest
after its heroic labours.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[117]</a></span></p>
<p>Not many weeks afterwards it was my good fortune to capture
a German Headquarters, in which were found Intelligence Reports
containing a narrative of this very incident. The importance
of the capture of these men had been recognized, and they had
been taken far behind the lines for an exhaustive examination.
But, despite all efforts of the German Intelligence Staff, they
had refused to disclose anything whatever but their names and
units&mdash;which they were bound to do under the rules of war.
The report went on to praise their soldierly bearing and loyal
reticence, and held up these brave Australians as a model to
be followed by their own men, adding that such a demeanour
could only earn the respect of an enemy.</p>

<p>The alarm which this untoward happening created on our
side of the line led to a determination to redouble our precautions.
The Army Commander proposed, and I agreed, that the
relief of the 13th Brigade by Canadians, <i>prior</i> to the eve of the
battle, was out of the question, as being too risky. It was
decided that the 13th Brigade must remain in the line until the
very last.</p>

<p>This decision deprived General Maclagan of one of his three
Brigades, and as it would be asking too much of the Fourth
Division to carry out the rôle which had been allotted to it
in the battle, with only two Brigades, I decided that the only
thing to be done was to transfer to the Fourth Division, temporarily,
one of the Brigades of the First Division, which was to
arrive from the north in the course of the next three days.</p>

<p>Urgent telegrams were therefore despatched to accelerate the
arrival of one of the Brigades of the First Division. In due
course the First Australian Brigade (Mackay) arrived by four
special trains on the night of August 6th, in sufficient time to
enable it to take its place in General Maclagan's order of battle,
in substitution for the 13th Brigade. The 13th Brigade was
destined to have some further stirring adventures before it
again joined its own Division.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[118]</a></span></p>

<p>The day preceding the great battle arrived all too soon. The
prospect of an advance had sent a thrill through all ranks and
expectation became tense. The use of the telephone had been
ordered to be restricted, especially in the forward areas; for it
was known that the enemy was in possession of listening apparatus,
similar to our own, by which conversations on the telephone
could be tapped, and unguarded references to the impending
operations could be overheard.</p>

<p>Final inspections had, therefore, to be made, and final injunctions
administered, by Commanders and Staffs traversing
long distances over the extensive Corps area by motor car and
horse, and even on foot. A strange and ominous quiet pervaded
the scene; it was only when the explosion of a stray enemy
shell would cause hundreds of heads to peer out from trenches,
gun-pits and underground shelters, that one became aware that
the whole country was really packed thick with a teeming
population carefully hidden away.</p>

<p>Later in the afternoon of that last day came another note of
alarm. To the Fourth and Fifth Australian Divisions had been
allotted eighteen Store and Carrying Tanks. These had been
brought the night before, into a small plantation lying about
half a mile to the north of Villers-Bretonneux, loaded to their
utmost capacity with battle stores of all descriptions: reserves
of food and water, rifle ammunition, and a large reserve of Stokes
Mortar bombs; also considerable supplies of petrol, to satisfy
the ravenous appetites of the Tanks themselves.</p>

<p>This locality suddenly became the object of the closest attention
by the enemy's Artillery. He began to deluge it with such
a volume of fire that in less than half an hour a great conflagration
had been started, which did not subside until fifteen of the
Tanks and all their valuable cargo had been reduced to irretrievable
ruin.</p>

<p>Had some unusually keen enemy observer perceived the
presence of Tanks in our area, and would that knowledge have
disclosed to him our jealously guarded secret? Fortunately,
my Artillery Commander, Brigadier-General Coxen, making his
last rounds of the Battery positions, was an eye-witness of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[119]</a></span>
whole occurrence, and was able to reassure me. A chance shell&mdash;the
last of a dozen fired entirely at random into our area&mdash;fell
into the very centre of this group of Tanks, and set fire to
some of the petrol. The resulting cloud of smoke became a
signal to the enemy that something was burning which our
men would probably attempt to salve; and in consonance with
an entirely correct Artillery procedure, he at once concentrated
a heavy fire upon the spot.</p>

<p>That incident is typical of the perturbations through which
all responsible Commanders have to pass on such occasions.
The occurrence was explained as accidental, and implied no
premature discovery by the enemy. Nothing remained but to
repair the damage, and make special arrangements to replenish
the Stores which these Divisions had lost.</p>

<p>On the forenoon of the day before the battle, the following
message was promulgated to all the troops:</p>

<blockquote>
<div class="right">
Corps Headquarters,<br />
August 7th, 1918.<br />
</div>

<p><span class="smcap">To the Soldiers of the Australian Army Corps.</span></p>

<p>For the first time in the history of this Corps, all five
Australian Divisions will to-morrow engage in the largest
and most important battle operation ever undertaken by
the Corps.</p>

<p>They will be supported by an exceptionally powerful
Artillery, and by Tanks and Aeroplanes on a scale never
previously attempted. The full resources of our sister
Dominion, the Canadian Corps, will also operate on our
right, while two British Divisions will guard our left flank.</p>

<p>The many successful offensives which the Brigades and
Battalions of this Corps have so brilliantly executed during
the past four months have been but the prelude to, and the
preparation for, this greatest and culminating effort.</p>

<p>Because of the completeness of our plans and dispositions,
of the magnitude of the operations, of the number of troops
employed, and of the depth to which we intend to overrun
the enemy's positions, this battle will be one of the
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[120]</a></span>most memorable of the whole war; and there can be no
doubt that, by capturing our objectives, we shall inflict
blows upon the enemy which will make him stagger, and
will bring the end appreciably nearer.</p>

<p>I entertain no sort of doubt that every Australian soldier
will worthily rise to so great an occasion, and that every
man, imbued with the spirit of victory, will, in spite of
every difficulty that may confront him, be animated by no
other resolve than grim determination to see through to
a clean finish, whatever his task may be.</p>

<p>The work to be done to-morrow will perhaps make heavy
demands upon the endurance and staying powers of many of
you; but I am confident that, in spite of excitement, fatigue,
and physical strain, every man will carry on to the utmost
of his powers until his goal is won; for the sake of <span class="smcap">Australia</span>,
the Empire and our cause.</p>

<p>I earnestly wish every soldier of the Corps the best of
good fortune, and a glorious and decisive victory, the story
of which will re-echo throughout the world, and will live
for ever in the history of our home land.</p>

<div class="right">
<span class="smcap">John Monash</span>,<br />
Lieut.-General.<br />
Cmdg. Australian Corps.<br />
</div>
</blockquote>

<p>Not many days afterwards a copy of this order fell into the
hands of the enemy, and the use he tried to make of it, to his
own grave discomfiture, as the event proved, is an interesting
story which will be told in due course.</p>

<p>Zero hour was fixed for twenty minutes past four, on the
morning of August 8th. It needs a pen more facile than I can
command to describe, and an imagination more vivid to realize
the stupendous import of the last ten minutes. In black darkness,
a hundred thousand infantry, deployed over twelve miles
of front, are standing grimly, silently, expectantly, in readiness to
advance, or are already crawling stealthily forward to get within
eighty yards of the line on which the barrage will fall; all feel
to make sure that their bayonets are firmly locked, or to set<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[121]</a></span>
their steel helmets firmly on their heads; Company and Platoon
Commanders, their whistles ready to hand, are nervously glancing
at their luminous watches, waiting for minute after minute to go
by&mdash;and giving a last look over their commands&mdash;ensuring that
their runners are by their sides, their observers alert, and that
the officers detailed to control direction have their compasses
set and ready. Carrying parties shoulder their burdens, and
adjust the straps; pioneers grasp their picks and shovels;
engineers take up their stores of explosives and primers and
fuses; machine and Lewis gunners whisper for the last time
to the carriers of their magazines and belt boxes to be sure and
follow up. The Stokes Mortar carrier slings his heavy load, and
his loading numbers fumble to see that their haversacks of
cartridges are handy. Overhead drone the aeroplanes, and from
the rear, in swelling chorus, the buzzing and clamour of the
Tanks grows every moment louder and louder. Scores of telegraph
operators sit by their instruments with their message
forms and registers ready to hand, bracing themselves for the
rush of signal traffic which will set in a few moments later;
dozens of Staff Officers spread their maps in readiness, to record
with coloured pencils the stream of expected information. In
hundreds of pits, the guns are already run up, loaded and laid
on their opening lines of fire; the sergeant is checking the range
for the last time; the layer stands silently with the lanyard
in his hand. The section officer, watch on wrist, counts the last
seconds: "A minute to go"&mdash;"Thirty seconds"&mdash;"Ten seconds"&mdash;"Fire."</p>

<p>And, suddenly, with a mighty roar, more than a thousand
guns begin the symphony. A great illumination lights up the
Eastern horizon; and instantly the whole complex organization,
extending far back to areas almost beyond earshot of the guns,
begins to move forward; every man, every unit, every vehicle
and every Tank on their appointed tasks and to their designated
goals; sweeping onward relentlessly and irresistibly. Viewed
from a high vantage point and in the glimmer of the breaking
day, a great Artillery barrage surely surpasses in dynamic
splendour any other manifestation of collective human effort.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[122]</a></span></p>

<p>The Artillery barrage dominates the battle, and the landscape.
The field is speedily covered with a cloak of dust, and smoke and
spume, making impossible any detailed observation, at the time,
of the course of the battle as a whole. The story can only be
indifferently pieced together, long after, by an attempted compilation
of the reports of a hundred different participants, whose
narratives are usually much impaired by personal bias, by the
nervous excitement of the moment, and by an all too limited
range of vision. That is why no comprehensive account yet
exists of some of the major battles of the war, and why those
partial narratives hitherto produced are so often in conflict.</p>

<p>In so great a battle as this, only the broad facts and tangible
results can be placed on record without danger of controversy.
The whole immense operation proceeded according to plan in
every detail, with a single exception, to which I must specially
refer later on. The first phase, controlled as it was by the
barrage time-table, necessarily ended punctually, and with the
whole of the green line objective in our hands. This success
gave us possession of nearly all the enemy's guns, so that his
artillery retaliation speedily died down.</p>

<p>The captures in this phase were considerable, and few of the
garrisons of the enemy's forward offensive zone escaped destruction
or capture. The Second and Third Divisions had a comparative
"walk over," and they had come to a halt, with their
tasks completed, before 7 a.m.</p>

<p>The "open warfare" phase commenced at twenty minutes
past eight, and both the red and the blue lines were captured in
succession half-an-hour ahead of scheduled time. This capture
covered the whole length of my front except the extreme left,
where a half expected difficulty arose, but one which exercised
no influence upon the day's success.</p>

<p>The Canadians, on my right, had a similar story to tell;
they had driven far into the enemy's defences, exactly as planned.
In spite of the difficulties of observation, the recurrence of a
ground mist of the same nature as we had experienced at Hamel,
and the long distances over which messages and reports had to
travel&mdash;the stream of information which reached me, by telegraph,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[123]</a></span>
telephone, pigeon and aeroplane was so full and ample
that I was not left for a moment out of touch with the situation.</p>

<p>The "inwards" messages are, naturally, far too voluminous for
reproduction; but a brief selection from the many "outwards"
messages telegraphed during that day to the Fourth Army
Headquarters, and which, on a point of responsibility, I made it
an invariable rule to draft myself, will give some indication of
the course of events as they became known:</p>

<blockquote>

<p><i>Sent at 7 a.m.</i>: "Everything going well at 6.45 a.m.
Heavy ground mist facilitating our advance, but delaying
information. Infantry and Tanks got away punctually.
Our attack was a complete surprise. Gailly Village and
Accroche Wood captured. Enemy artillery has ceased
along my whole front. Flanks Corps apparently doing
well."</p>

<p><i>Sent at 8.30 a.m.</i>: "Although not definitely confirmed, no
doubt that our first objective green line captured along
whole Corps front including Gailly, Warfusee, Lamotte and
whole Cerisy Valley. Many guns and prisoners taken.
Infantry and Artillery for second phase moving up to
green line."</p>

<p><i>Sent at 10.55 a.m.</i>: "Fifteenth Battalion has captured
Cerisy with 300 prisoners. Advance to red line going
well."</p>

<p><i>Sent at 11.10 a.m.</i>: "Have taken Morcourt and Bayonvillers
and many additional prisoners and guns. We are
nearing our second objective and have reached it in places.
My Cavalry Brigade has passed across our red line. We are
now advancing to our final objective blue line."</p>

<p><i>Sent at 12.15 p.m.</i>: "Hobbs has captured Harbonnières
and reached blue line final objective on his whole
front."</p>

<p><i>Sent at 1.15 p.m.</i>: "Australian flag hoisted over Harbonnières
at midday to-day. Should be glad if Chief would
cable this to our Governor-General on behalf of Australian
Corps."</p>

<p><i>Sent at 2.5 p.m.</i>: "Total Australian casualties through
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[124]</a></span>dressing stations up to 12 noon under 600. Prisoners actually
counted exceed 4,000. Many more coming in."</p>

<p><i>Sent at 4.40 p.m.</i>: "Captured enemy Corps H.Q. near
Framerville shortly after noon to-day." (This was the 51st
German Corps).</p>

<p><i>Sent at 8 p.m.</i>: "Corps captures will greatly exceed
6,000 prisoners, 100 guns, including heavy and railway
guns, thousands of machine guns, a railway train, and
hundreds of vehicles and teams of regimental transport.
Total casualties for whole Corps will not exceed 1,200."</p></blockquote>

<p>The vital information, which it is imperative for the Corps
Commander to have accurately and rapidly delivered throughout
the course of a battle, is that relating to the actual position,
at any given moment of time, of our front line troops; showing
the locations which they have reached, and whether they are
stationary, advancing or retiring. For it has to be remembered
that the whole Artillery resources of the Corps were pooled and
kept under his own hand; and it was imperative that any changes
in the Artillery action or employment must be quickly made, so
as to extend the utmost help to any Infantry which might get
into difficulties.</p>

<p>Thus, for example, the failure of any body of Infantry to
enter and pass beyond a wood or a village, would be a sure
indication that such locality was still held in strength by the
enemy, and it would be appropriate to "switch" Artillery fire
upon it, in order to drive him out. But such a proceeding would
be anything but prudent if the information on which such action
was to be based were already an hour old.</p>

<p>Transmission of messages from the front line troops to the
nearest telephone terminal is usually slow and uncertain, and the
retransmission of such messages, in succession, by Battalions,
Brigades and Divisions only prolongs the delay. The normal
process is in consequence far too dilatory for the exigencies of
actual battle control.</p>

<p>A vastly superior method had therefore to be devised, and
recourse was had to the use of aeroplanes. The No. 3 Australian<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[125]</a></span>
Squadron soon acquired great proficiency in this work. They
were equipped with two-seater planes, carrying both pilot and
observer, and the work was called "Contact Patrol."</p>

<p>The "plane" flying quite low, usually at not more than 500 feet,
the observer would mark down by conventional signs on a map
the actual positions of our Infantry, of enemy Infantry or other
facts of prime importance, and he often had time to scribble a few
informative notes also. The "plane" then flew back at top
speed to Corps H.Q., and the map, with or without an added report,
was dropped in the middle of an adjacent field, wrapped in
a weighted streamer of many colours. It was then brought by
cyclists into the Staff Office.</p>

<p>Relays of Contact planes were on such service all day on
every battle day, and although it was a hazardous duty few
planes were lost. The total time which elapsed between the
making of the observation at the front line and the arrival of
the information in the hands of the Corps Staff was seldom
more than ten minutes.</p>

<p>There can be no doubt that the whole operation was a complete
surprise both to the troops opposed to us and to the German
High Command. It became abundantly clear, in the following
days, that no proper arrangements existed for rapidly
reinforcing this part of the front in the event of an attack by us,
but that these had to be extemporized after the event. This
discovery points to the conclusion that the enemy had once
again come to regard the British Army as a negligible quantity,
a mistake for which he paid an even heavier price than when he
made it in the early days of the war.</p>

<p>As an indication that even the Divisions in the line whose
duty it primarily was to know, had no suspicions of an impending
attack, comes the story of a German medical officer who was
captured in his pyjamas in Warfusee village, and who confessed
that being awakened by our bombardment and thinking it was
merely a raid, he left his dug-out to see what was afoot, and
thought he must be still dreaming when he saw our Pioneers
a few hundred feet away, busily at work repairing the main road.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[126]</a></span></p>

<p>There was only one blemish in the whole day's operations.
Not serious in relation to the whole, it nevertheless gravely
hampered the work of the left Brigade of the Fourth Division.
In short, the Third Corps Infantry failed to reach their ultimate
objective line, and the enemy remained in possession of the
Chipilly spur and of all the advantages which that possession
conferred upon him.</p>

<p>The advance of my left flank, from the green to the red line,
along the margin of the plateau bordering the Somme, was left
exposed to his full view, while the river valley itself remained
under the domination of his rifle fire, at quite moderate ranges.
But worse than all, a battery of his Field Artillery emplaced just
above the village of Chipilly remained in action, and one after
another, six of the nine Tanks which had been allotted to the
4th Brigade were put out of action by direct hits from these guns.</p>

<p>The possibility was one which had been considered and measures
to meet it were promptly taken. Maclagan, whose right Brigade
in due course reached the blue line according to programme,
making in its progress a splendid haul of prisoners and guns,
took immediate steps to "refuse" his left flank, <i>i.e.</i>, to bend
it back towards Morcourt, and to establish, with a reserve
battalion, a flank defence along the river, facing north from Cerisy
to Morcourt.</p>

<p>Both these villages were, however, successfully captured,
and "mopped up," which meant that all the enemy and machine
guns lurking in them were accounted for. But the river valley
was not captured, and became, until the situation was ultimately
cleared up, a kind of No Man's Land between the enemy still
holding the Chipilly spur on the north, and the Fourth Division
on the south of the river.</p>

<p>The ultimate conquest of the Chipilly Bend forms no part
of that day's story. What were the reasons for the failure of
the Third Corps to complete its allotted task may have been
the subject of internal inquiry, but the result of any such was
not made known. The official report for the day was to the effect
that the enemy on this front had resisted strongly, that fighting
had been fierce, and that no progress could be made. But one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[127]</a></span>
is compelled to recognize that such language was often an euphemistic
method of describing faulty Staff co-ordination, or faulty
local leadership. There would be no justification, however, for
questioning the bravery of the troops themselves.</p>

<p>It has already been foreshadowed that the experiences on
that day of the contingent of sixteen Armoured Motor-cars under
Lieutenant-Colonel Carter would form sensational reading, and
the story of August 8th would not be complete without at least
a brief reference to their exploits.</p>

<p>It was nearly midnight when Carter, with a Staff Officer, got
back to Corps H.Q. to render their report. They were scarcely
recognizable, covered as they were from head to feet, with grime
and grease. They had had a busy time. The substance of what
they had to tell was taken down at the time almost verbatim,
and reads as follows:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"Got Armoured Cars through to Warfusee-Abancourt.
When we reached the other side of No Man's Land we
found that the road was good but a number of trees (large
and small) had been shot down and lay right across it
in places. Obstacles removed by chopping up the smaller
trees and hauling off the big ones by means of a Tank.
Pioneers helped us to clear the road all the way down.
We did not come up to our advancing troops until they
were almost near the Red Line. When we got past our
leading Infantry we came upon quite a number of Huns
and dealt with them. Had then to wait a little on account
of our barrage, but went through a light barrage. When
we got to Blue Line we detached three sections to run down
to Framerville. When they got there they found all the
Boche horse transport and many lorries drawn up in the
main road ready to move off. Head of column tried to
bolt in one direction and other vehicles in another. Complete
confusion. Our men killed the lot (using 3,000 rounds)
and left them there; four Staff Officers on horseback shot
also. The cars then ran down to the east side of Harbonnières,
on the south-east road to Vauvillers, and met<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[128]</a></span>
there a number of steam wagons; fired into their boilers
causing an impassable block. Had a lot of good shooting
around Vauvillers. Then came back to main road. Two
sections of cars went on to Foucaucourt and came in contact
with a Boche gun in a wood north-east of Foucaucourt.
This gun blew the wheels off one car and also hit three
others. However, three of the cars were got away. Two
other cars went to Proyart and found a lot of troops billeted
there having lunch in the houses. Our cars shot through
the windows into the houses, killing quite a lot of the enemy.
Another section went towards Chuignolles and found it full
of German soldiers. Our cars shot them. Found rest
billets and old trenches also with troops in them. Engaged
them. Had quite a battle there. Extent of damage not
known, but considerable. Cars then came back to main
road. We were then well in advance of Blue Line. Everything
was now perfectly quiet&mdash;no shell-fire of any kind.</p>

<p>"I went a quarter of a mile beyond La Flaque. There
was a big dump there, and Huns kept continually coming
out and surrendering, and we brought quite a lot of them
back as prisoners. It was then about 10.30 a.m. A party
of Hun prisoners was detailed to tow back my disabled car.
I saw no sign of any wired system anywhere. Old overgrown
trenches but no organized trench system. I proceeded
to some rising ground near Framerville. Did not
go into Framerville, but could see that the roofs of the
houses were intact. Saw no trace of any organized system
of defence of any kind and no troops. My people saw no
formed bodies of troops of any kind during the day coming
towards us, but very large numbers of fugitives hastening
in the opposite direction. Engaged as many of them as
could be reached from the roads. I saw, from the hill, open
country with a certain amount of vegetation on it."</p></blockquote>

<p>The consternation and disorganization caused by the sudden
onslaught of these cars, at places fully ten miles behind the
enemy's front line of that morning, may be left to the imagination.
It was a feat of daring and resolute performance, which
deserves to be remembered.</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_128fp.jpg" width="1200" height="777" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>The Burning Villages&mdash;east of Péronne.</p></div>
</div>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_129fp.jpg" width="1200" height="774" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>Dummy Tank Manufacture.</p></div>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[129]</a></span></p>

<p>Throughout the whole day, surrenders by the enemy, particularly
of troops in rear or reserve positions, were on a wholesale
scale. The total number of live prisoners actually counted
up to nightfall in the Divisional and Corps Prisoner-of-War
Cages exceeded 8,000 and the Canadians had gathered in at
least as many more.</p>

<p>The Australian Corps also captured 173 guns capable of being
hauled away, not counting those which had been blown to pieces.
These captures included two "railway" guns, one of 9-inch and
the other of 11.2-inch bore. The latter was an imposing affair.
The gun itself rested on two great bogie carriages, each on eight
axles; it was provided with a whole train of railway trucks
fitted some to carry its giant ammunition, others as workshops,
and others as living quarters for the gun detachment. The outfit
was completed by a locomotive to haul the gun forward to its
daily task of shelling Amiens, and hauling it back to its garage
when its ugly work was done.</p>

<p>The captures of machine guns and of trench mortars of all
types and sizes were on so extensive a scale that no attempt
was ever made to make even an approximate count of them.
They were ultimately collected into numerous dumps, and
German prisoners were employed for many weeks in cleaning
and oiling them for transport to Australia as trophies of war.</p>

<p>But the booty comprised a large and varied assortment of
many other kinds of warlike stores. The huge dumps of engineering
material at Rosières and La Flaque served all the
needs of the Corps for the remainder of the war. There were
horses, wagons, lorries and tractors by the hundred, including
field searchlights, mobile pharmacies, motor ambulances, travelling
kitchens, mess carts, limbers, and ammunition wagons,
and there were literally hundreds of thousands of rounds of
artillery ammunition scattered all over the captured territory in
dumps both large and small.</p>

<p>For the next two days all roads leading from the battle area
back towards the Army Cage at Poulainville, where railway<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[130]</a></span>
trains were waiting to receive them, were congested with column
after column of German prisoners, roughly organized into companies&mdash;tangible
evidences to the civilians of the district, as to
our own troops, that a great victory had been won.</p>

<p>The tactical value of the victory was immense, and has never
yet been fully appreciated by the public of the Empire, perhaps
because our censorship at the time strove to conceal the intention
to follow it up immediately with further attacks. But no
better testimony is needed than that of Ludendorff himself, who
calls it Germany's "black day," after which he himself gave
up all hope of a German victory.</p>

<p>Ludendorff in his "Memoirs," republished in the <i>Times</i> of
August 22nd, 1919, writes:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"August 8th was the black day of the German Army
in the history of the war. This was the worst experience
I had to go through.... Early on August 8th, in a dense
fog that had been rendered still thicker by artificial means,
the British, mainly with Australian and Canadian Divisions,
and French, attacked between Albert and Moreuil with
strong squadrons of Tanks, but for the rest with no great
superiority. They broke between the Somme and the
Luce deep into our front. The Divisions in line allowed
themselves to be completely overwhelmed. Divisional
Staffs were surprised in their Headquarters by enemy Tanks"
[<i>sic</i>, our armoured cars were meant].... "The exhausted
[<i>sic</i>] Divisions that had been relieved a few days earlier
and that were lying in the region south-west of Péronne
were immediately alarmed and set in motion by the Commander-in-Chief
of the Second Army. At the same time
he brought forward towards the breach all available troops.
The Rupprecht Army Group dispatched reserves thither
by train. The 18th Army threw its own reserves directly
into the battle from the south-east.... On an order from
me, the 9th Army too, although itself in danger, had to
contribute. Days of course elapsed before the troops
from a further distance could reach the spot.... It was a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[131]</a></span>
very gloomy situation.... Six or seven Divisions that were
quite fairly to be described as effective had been completely
battered.... The situation was uncommonly
serious. If they continued to attack with even comparative
vigour, we should no longer be able to maintain ourselves
west of the Somme.... The wastage of the Second Army
had been very great. Heavy toll had also been taken of
the reserves which had been thrown in.... Owing to the
deficit created our losses had reached such proportions
that the Supreme Command was faced with the necessity
of having to disband a series of Divisions, in order to furnish
drafts.... The enemy had also captured documentary
material of inestimable value to him.... The General
Staff Officer whom I had dispatched to the battlefield on
August 8th, gave me such an account that I was deeply confounded....
August 8th made things clear for both Army
Commands, both for the German and for that of the enemy."</p></blockquote>

<p>A hole had been driven on a width of nearly twelve miles,
right through the German defence, and had blotted out, at one
blow, the whole of the military resources which it had contained.
The obligation which was thereby cast upon the enemy to
throw into the gap troops and guns hastily collected from every
part of his front, imposed upon him also an increased vulnerability
at every other point which had to be so denuded.</p>

<p>It was no part of our programme to rest content upon our
oars, and allow the enemy time to collect himself at leisure.
The resources of the Australian Corps had suffered scarcely any
impairment as the result of that glorious day. Such small
losses as had been incurred were more than counter-balanced by
the elation of these volunteer troops at this further demonstration
of their moral and physical superiority over the professional
soldiers of a militarist enemy nation.</p>

<p>On that very day all necessary measures were taken to maintain
the battle without pause. But, in order not to interrupt the
continuity of the story of subsequent developments, it will be
convenient to mention, in this place, two events which cannot<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[132]</a></span>
be dissociated from the great battle, and which will be memorable
to those who participated in them.</p>

<p>The first was an accidental meeting together of a number
of the most distinguished figures in the war. On August 11th,
the Commander-in-Chief was to come to congratulate the Corps
and to thank the troops through their Commanders. I called
the Divisional Generals together at the Red Château at Villers-Bretonneux
to meet him that afternoon. In the meantime
General Rawlinson invited his Corps Commanders to meet him
in the same village for a battle conference, and chose the same
hour and a spot in the open, under a spreading beech, where
his Generals sat informally around the maps spread upon the
grass. At this meeting were Rawlinson, Currie, Kavanagh,
Godley, myself, Montgomery and Budworth. The Field Marshal,
with Laurence, the Chief of his General Staff, on their way to
the Red Château, soon arrived. Shortly after Sir Henry Wilson,
happening to pass in his car, also joined the party; and not many
moments afterwards there arrived, again entirely without previous
arrangement, Clemenceau and his Finance Minister Klotz.</p>

<p>Villers-Bretonneux, only three days before reeking with gas
and unapproachable, and now delivered from its bondage, was
the lodestone which had attracted the individual members of
this remarkable assemblage; and the more serious business in
hand was perforce postponed while Rawlinson, Currie and I had
to listen to the generous felicitations of all these great war leaders.</p>

<p>The second event was the visit of His Majesty the King, on
August 12th, to Bertangles, when he conferred on me the honour
of Knighthood, in the presence of selected detachments of five
hundred of the men who had fought in the battle, a hundred
from each of my Five Divisions. A representative collection
of guns and other war trophies had been hauled in from the
battlefield to line the avenues by which the King approached.
His Majesty was particularly interested in the German transport
horses, expressing the hope that they would soon learn the
Australian language; a pleasantry which he well remembered
when I had the honour of an audience with him, on the anniversary
of that very day.</p>

<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> See Map J.</p></div></div>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[133]</a></span></p>


<h2>CHAPTER VIII<br />

EXPLOITATION</h2>


<p>The Fourth British Army had opened the great Allied counter-offensive
with a brilliant stroke. It remained to see in
what fashion the Allied High Command would proceed to
exploit the victory. Would the Fourth Army be called upon,
with added resources, at once to thrust due east, with the object
of drawing upon itself the German reserves, and dealing with
them as they arrived; or would blows now be delivered on
other fronts with a view to keeping those reserves dispersed?</p>

<p>The immediate decision, communicated to me by the Army
Commander on the afternoon of August 8th, was that, while the
whole situation was being considered, and troop movements were
in progress to enable the necessary concentrations to be made
elsewhere, the Fourth Army would continue its advance forthwith;
but that, instead of driving due east, the thrust was to
be made in a south-easterly direction.</p>

<p>The object was to aim at Roye, and either by the capture
of that important railway centre, or at least by the threat of its
capture, to precipitate a withdrawal by the enemy from the
great salient which he had in his April and May advances pressed
into the French front opposite Moreuil and Montdidier, a salient
which could be kept supplied by that railway alone.</p>

<p>The Australian Corps front on the evening of August 8th
lay roughly on a north and south line, just east of Méricourt
and just west of Vauvillers. But the Canadian Corps front
bent back sharply from the latter point in a south-westerly direction.
The Canadians were, therefore, to advance between the
railway and the Amiens&mdash;Roye road to the general line Lihons-Le Quesnoy.
The rôle of the Australian Corps was to make a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[134]</a></span>
defensive flank to this advance, by pivotting its left on the Somme
in the vicinity of Méricourt, but advancing its right along the
railway, in the direction of Lihons.</p>

<p>It was a decision which was unpalatable to me, for it condemned
me to leaving the whole of the great bend of the Somme,
on which lay Bray, Péronne and Brie, in the undisturbed possession
of the enemy; and in view of the reports sent in from the
front and confirmed later by the Armoured Cars, it appeared
to me that the resumption of a vigorous advance due east next
day would give us, without fighting, possession, or at least
command, of the whole of this bend; while if we allowed the
enemy to take breath and recover from his shock, he would
probably have time to rally the fugitives, and turn again to face
us.</p>

<p>This same great bend of the river had been the scene of two
years of sedentary warfare, in 1915 and 1916, when the French
and German artillery had converted it into a barren wilderness.
It was, in its eastern part, scored with trenches, and bristled
with wire entanglements in every direction; it was devoid of
villages, woods, or any kind of shelter&mdash;a forbidding expanse
of devastation.</p>

<p>But between our front lines of that day and the western edge
of this wilderness, there still lay a belt of some six or seven
miles of practically unharmed country over which the retreat
of our Fifth Army in March had carried them without much
fighting. I should have welcomed an order to push on the next
morning, in open warfare formation, to gain possession of the
whole of this belt, and force the enemy to make any attempt to
reorganize his line on the inhospitable ground which lay
beyond.</p>

<p>The order stood, however; and instructions were issued for
the First Australian Division to be drawn into the fight, and
to take upon themselves the task of conforming to the advance
of the Canadians along the railway. The first phase of this
advance was to have been carried out at 11 a.m. on August 9th
by the First Division passing through the right Brigade of the
Fifth Division.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[135]</a></span></p>

<p>The 1st Brigade of the First Australian Division had, as already
related, arrived from the North in time to participate in the fighting
of the day before; but the remaining two Brigades arrived so
late, and had to perform so long a march from their detraining
station near Amiens to our now greatly advanced battle front,
that it soon became evident that they could not arrive at
the line of departure in time to synchronize with the Canadian
advance.</p>

<p>In consequence, the Fifth Division was instructed to detail
its right line Brigade to begin this duty; and in due course
the 15th Brigade carried out the first part of the task and advanced
our line to include the capture of Vauvillers, an operation
which was successfully completed by midday.</p>

<p>It will be remembered that the Second and Third Divisions
had been given a task for the previous day which was limited
in time, though not in difficulty, and that this task had been
completed, as it proved with very little stress, by 7 a.m. These
Divisions had thus had a whole day in which to rest and reorganize.
The Second Division was therefore placed under
orders to participate in the advance of August 9th.</p>

<p>In due course, the First Division arrived at our fighting front,
and that afternoon both the First and Second Divisions advanced
in battle order, the former passing through the right Brigade
of the Fifth Division, and the latter through its left Brigade.
This operation carried our front line in this part of the field to
the foot of the Lihons hill, and gave us complete possession of
the village of Framerville. It also incidentally released the
Fifth Division from further line duty.</p>

<p>The opposition met with during this day's operations varied
considerably along the battle front, which extended in this
part of the field over about 6,000 yards. The Lihons ridge was
found to be strongly held, and much fire both from field guns
and machine guns was encountered. It was evident that, over-night,
the enemy had succeeded in organizing sufficient troops
for the local defence of this important point.</p>

<p>Upon the front of the Second Division, however, there was
little opposition and the enemy gave up Framerville almost<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[136]</a></span>
without a struggle. Three Battalions of Tanks co-operated in
the day's fighting, but several of them were disabled by direct
fire from Lihons. The task assigned to the Corps for that day
was, none the less, carried out in its entirety, and by nightfall
contact had been made with the Second Canadian Division on
the railway about a mile east of Rosières.</p>

<p>The situation on the left flank of the Australian Corps was,
however, anything but satisfactory. The Chipilly spur was still
in the hands of the enemy, all the efforts over-night on the part
of the 58th Division (Third Corps) to dislodge them having failed.
General Butler, the Corps Commander, in pursuance of arrangements
come to some days before, was to proceed on sick leave,
as he had for some time been far from well; and General Godley
(my former chief of the 22nd Corps) was temporarily to take
his place. I therefore persuaded the Army Commander to
avail himself of this change to allow me to take in hand the
situation at Chipilly, and to give me, for this purpose, a limited
jurisdiction over the north bank of the Somme. This was merely
getting in the thin edge of the wedge; and not many hours later,
I found myself where I had so strongly desired to be from the
first, namely, astride of the Somme valley.</p>

<p>Accordingly, the 13th Australian Brigade, after a day's rest
from the anxious duty of acting as a screen for the Canadians
on the eve of the main battle, were told off to deal with the
Chipilly spur. Before, however, they could reach the locality,
and in the late afternoon of August 9th, the 131st American
Regiment (of Bell's Division), which was still under the orders
of the Third Corps, very gallantly advanced in broad daylight and
took possession practically of the whole spur.</p>

<p>In the meantime the 13th Brigade arrived, sending a Battalion
across the Somme at Cerisy, and, joining the Americans, helped
to clear up the whole situation. This made my left flank more
secure, and enabled Maclagan to withdraw the defensive flank
which he had deployed along the river from Cerisy to Morcourt.
That night I took over the 131st American Regiment from
the Third Corps, attached it, as a temporary measure, to the Fourth
Division, and placed Maclagan in charge of the newly captured<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[137]</a></span>
front, which extended north of the river as far as the Corbie&mdash;Bray
road.</p>

<p>The day ended with Divisions in the line from south to north
in the following order, viz.:&mdash;First, Second and Fourth, the
last named having been augmented by an American Regiment,
having had its own 13th Brigade restored to it, and having in
exchange yielded up to the First Division the 1st Brigade of the
latter.</p>

<p>The Fourth Division had had comparatively much the worst
of it, up to this stage, of any of my Divisions, and I felt that
they were due for a short rest. Accordingly, I issued orders
that same night for the Third Division, which, like the Second,
had been resting since the previous forenoon, to relieve the Fourth
Division on that part of the front which lay between the Somme
and the main St. Quentin road on the following day, but for the
time being leaving the newly captured ground north of the
Somme still in Maclagan's hands.</p>

<p>After an examination of the ground and a study of the situation,
the opportunity for a further immediate local operation, certain
to gain valuable tactical ground, and likely also to yield a good
number of prisoners, presented itself to me. A further attraction
was that it would permit of a useful advance of my left flank on
the south of the Somme. This project, being of some tactical
interest, demands a short explanatory reference to the terrain.</p>

<p>The river Somme, from Cerisy as far east as Péronne, flows
in a tortuous valley which describes a succession of bends, almost
uniform in size and regular in disposition. These bends face
with their bases alternately north and south, and average a
depth of two miles, by a width across the base of about a mile and
a half. Each came to be known to us by the name of one of the
villages which reposed in its folds, such as Chipilly, Etinehem,
Bray, Cappy, Feuillères, and Ommiécourt; all these have become
names to be remembered in the subsequent conquest of this part
of the Somme valley.</p>

<p>The valley itself is in this region a mile broad; its sides are
steep and often precipitous, and the adjoining plateaus rise some
200 feet above its bed. Through this valley winds, in ordered<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[138]</a></span>
curves, the canal for barge traffic; it is flanked by vast stretches
of backwaters and heavily grassed morasses, in which the river
loses itself. The valley can be traversed only by the few bridges
and the lock gates of the canal, and the causeways leading to
them from either bank.</p>

<p>It would be difficult country for a fight on a general scale,
but ideal for guerilla warfare. The whole succession of villages
clinging to the sides of the valley were in the hands of the enemy,
and in use by him for the housing and shelter of his troops.
To attack and overcome them one by one, by fighting up the
winding valley, would have been a costly business. But it
suggested itself that they might all be won by a species of investment.</p>

<p>Taking any one of these U-shaped bends singly, by drawing
a cordon across its base, the whole of any enemy forces who might
be occupying the bend would be denied escape from it, except
by <i>crossing</i> the river into the adjacent bend. But if a semi-cordon
had been simultaneously drawn across the base of that
next bend also, even that loophole would be closed, and moreover
such troops as inhabited the second bend would find themselves
surrounded also.</p>

<p>Immediately before my left flank lay the Méricourt bend
on the south of the river and the Etinehem bend to the north of
it. Both were held by the enemy, doubtless fugitives from the
great battle, who had sought food, water and underground
shelter in the numerous dug-outs which honeycombed the sides of
the valley. The design was to capture the whole of these with
little effort. It was a good plan, and only an unforeseen accident
prevented its full realization.</p>

<p>Early on the morning of the 10th, I summoned a conference
at Maclagan's Headquarters in Corbie, which was attended by the
Commanders and certain Brigadiers of the Third and Fourth
Divisions. It was arranged that on the north of the river, the
13th Brigade would that night get astride of the Etinehem spur
on the north, while simultaneously the 10th Brigade, by making a
side sweep skirting Proyart, would advance our line till its left
rested on the river a mile east of Méricourt.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[139]</a></span></p>

<p>Columns were to move along defined routes, leaving the objectives
well to the flanks, and then to encircle the enemy positions.
Each column was to be accompanied by Tanks and was to
move in an easterly direction and then wheel in towards the
Somme. Although Tanks had never previously been used at
night, as their utility was uncertain, it was thought that the
effect of the noise they made would lead to the speedy collapse
of the defence.</p>

<p>The plan succeeded to perfection on the north of the river,
and the Etinehem spur and village with all its defenders fell
to us almost without a blow. Four Tanks amused themselves
by racing up and down the main Corbie&mdash;Bray road at top speed,
and the clamour they made cleared the path for the marching
infantry.</p>

<p>On the south, however, just after nightfall, a sudden onslaught
by a flight of enemy bombing planes, threw the head of the
10th Brigade column into confusion, and its Commander was
killed. Two of the Tanks were also disabled by direct hits
from Artillery. This delayed the progress of the operation, and
the next day broke with the task uncompleted. The 9th and
11th Brigades were, however, at once sent up to reinforce, and
during the following day all three Brigades completed the operation
by possessing themselves of the villages of Méricourt and
Proyart and the woods adjoining the river.</p>

<p>This series of local operations yielded some 300 prisoners, and
entirely cleared up the confused and unsatisfactory situation
which had existed on my left flank, as the aftermath of the
Chipilly spur failure of the first day. It also brought my
line up more square to the Somme, and so somewhat shortened
my already expanding front. But my left flank was at last quite
secure.</p>

<p>I must now turn to the extreme right flank, which was, on this
same day, also the scene of very severe fighting. I have related
the progress of the First Division to the foot of the Lihons ridge
the night before. On August 10th and 11th the advance was
continued by the First and Second Divisions in sympathy with
the advance of the Canadian Corps on the south of the railway.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[140]</a></span>
There were only a few Tanks left available to assist in this advance;
and the resistance of the enemy in the neighbourhood of
Lihons had stiffened considerably.</p>

<p>The devastated area had already been reached by us
in this part of the field, and the terrain was a labyrinth
of old trenches, and a sea of shell-holes; the remains of old
wire entanglements spread in every direction, and the whole
area had been covered by a rank growth of thistles and
brambles. It furnished numerous harbours for machine-guns,
and it was country over which it was difficult to preserve
the semblance of an organized battle formation during an
advance.</p>

<p>The enemy fought hard and determinedly to retain Lihons,
and in some parts of the line the battle swayed to and fro. But
before the morning was well advanced, we had taken possession
of the whole of the Lihons Knoll, of Auger Wood, and of the
villages of Lihons and Rainecourt, while the Canadians had passed
through Chilly just south of the railway. All that afternoon the
enemy made repeated counter-attacks, particularly directed
against Lihons and Rainecourt; but they were all successfully
driven off by rifle and machine-gun fire without the loss of any
ground.</p>

<p>It was a great feat to the credit of the First Australian Division,
and ranks among its best performances during the war. Some
20 field-guns and hundreds of machine-guns were captured.
Such a battle, with such results, would, in 1917, have been
placarded as a victory of the first magnitude. Now, with the
new standards set up by the great battle of August 8th, it was
reckoned merely as a local skirmish.</p>

<p>General Currie, operating on my right, had had a similar experience
of slow, although definite, progress, against hourly
stiffening opposition, and the fighting by the methods of open
warfare was growing daily more costly. The enemy had recovered
from his first surprise, our resources in Tanks had been
greatly diminished, and much of our heavy Artillery had not yet
had time to get into its forward positions. In other words, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[141]</a></span>
possibility of further cheap exploitation of the success of August
8th had come to an end.</p>

<p>It was decided, therefore, to recommend to the Army Commander
that a temporary halt should be called on the line thus
reached, and that rested troops should be brought up to relieve
the line Divisions. He concurred and decided that we should
prepare for the delivery on August 15th of another combined
"set-piece" blow, which would have the probable effect of
again putting the enemy on the run, so that the moving battle
could be resumed.</p>

<p>This plan was never actually carried into effect, for reasons
which did not at once appear. But it transpired later that
General Currie had made very strong private representations
to the Fourth Army against the plan. He questioned the wisdom
of expending the resources of the Canadian Corps upon an attempt
to repeat, over such broken country, covered as it was with
entanglements and other obstacles, the great success of August
8th. He urged that the Canadian Corps should be transferred
back to the Arras district&mdash;which they knew so well. It was
country lending itself admirably to operations requiring careful
organization, which none understood better than Currie and his
admirable Staff.</p>

<p>It was an issue in which I was not greatly concerned, for
my share in the proposed operation of August 15th was to be quite
subsidiary. It was to consist merely in once again advancing
my right flank, in sympathy with the Canadian advance, as far as
to include Chaulnes Hill and the very important railway junction
at that town. In ignorance of the fact that the matter was
under discussion, I prepared complete plans for the co-operation
of the Australian Corps, and detailed the Fourth and Fifth
Australian Divisions to carry them out. Fortunately, before any
actual executive action had been initiated, orders came that the
project was to be abandoned.</p>

<p>It soon became known that still larger questions were being
discussed. The British front, which in July reached south as
far only as Villers-Bretonneux, had now been extended to the
latitude of Roye. The Field Marshal was urging reduction, so<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[142]</a></span>
as to liberate Divisions for offensive operations elsewhere, and
Marshal Foch agreed that, as by the elimination of the Soissons
salient the French front had been shortened, this could be done.
In due course confidential announcements were made that, as
soon as it could be arranged, the Canadians would be withdrawn
from the line, and their places taken by French troops. This
would once again make my Corps the south flank Corps of the
British Army, and I would junction with the French on the
Lihons Hill.</p>

<p>The halt thus called gave me breathing time to consider a
thorough reorganization of my whole Corps front. This had,
by August 12th, again grown to a total length of over 16,000
yards. This increase had been the result, firstly, of my having,
as narrated, taken over ground to the north of the Somme,
secondly, by reason of the fact that during the advances of the
last four days my right had hugged the railway, while my left
had continued to rest on the Somme, two lines which were
rapidly diverging from each other, and thirdly, because my front
line now lay sharply oblique to my general line of advance.</p>

<p>Even with a fifth Division, which I now had at my disposal,
a front of 16,000 yards was far too attenuated for Corps operations
on the grand scale, and even for more localized operations,
by one or two Divisions at a time, there was little opportunity
to provide the troops with adequate intervals of rest. I therefore
strongly urged upon General Rawlinson either a shortening of
my front, or a further increase in my resources.</p>

<p>He chose the latter alternative, and on August 12th placed
under my orders, provisionally, the 17th British Division
(Major-General P. R. Robertson), coupled with the condition
that while it might be employed as a line Division, it was not to
be used for offensive operations. The reason, confidentially
given, was that it was shortly to be employed in a large scale
offensive in course of preparation by the Third British
Army.</p>

<p>It was, for me, a most opportune measure of relief from a
difficult situation; for the Third Australian Division was now
also badly in need of a rest. Prior to the great advance, it had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[143]</a></span>
been longest of any of the Divisions in the line, and had subsequently
had a hard time in fighting its way forward from
Méricourt to Proyart. It was therefore relieved in the line on
August 13th by the 17th Division and went into Corps Reserve.</p>

<p>On the same day I put into effect a project of organization
which the necessities of the case forced upon me. North of the
river stood the 13th Australian Brigade, and the 131st American
Regiment, both still under the command of General Maclagan,
the remainder of whose Division was resting, and this Division
might be required at short notice for operations at a totally
different part of the front. (I had, in fact, earmarked it for the
proposed attack on August 15th to which I have referred.)</p>

<p>To overcome this anomalous position, I decided to constitute,
for a brief period, an independent force, composed of the two
units north of the river which I have named, to appoint to the
command of it Brigadier-General Wisdom (of the 7th Brigade),
and to supply him with a nucleus Staff, some Artillery, and
supply and signal services. It became, in fact, to all intents
and purposes, an additional Division with a Headquarters
directly responsible to me.</p>

<p>This force received the name of "Liaison Force" and continued
in existence for about eight days. Its functions were to
keep tactical touch and liaison with the Third Corps, to protect
my left flank by guarding the Etinehem spur from recapture, and
to act as a kind of loose link between the two Corps, advancing
its northern or its southern flanks, or both, in sympathy with any
forward movement to be made by either Corps. While, during
its existence as a separate force, no operations of first magnitude
took place, yet the Liaison Force served me well in the very useful
function of a custodian of my tactical ownership of the Somme
valley, an ownership which I succeeded in retaining to the immense
advantage of the operations of the Corps less than three
weeks later.</p>

<p>By August 13th, therefore, my responsibilities included the
control of seven separate Divisions as well as all the Corps
Troops, and Army Troops attached. The next week was occupied
in local operations by the front line Divisions to straighten<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[144]</a></span>
our front, and to dispose of a number of strong points, small
woods, and village ruins which, so long as they were in enemy
hands, were a source of annoyance to us. The attitude of the
enemy was alert but not aggressive, and an important point
was that he showed every desire to stand his ground, and to contest
our further advance. There was as yet no indication of any
comprehensive withdrawal out of the great river bend. Each
day brought its useful toll of prisoners, all of whom, however,
corroborated the view that the enemy meant to hold on, and
that the troops opposing us were more than a mere rearguard
intended to delay our advance.</p>

<p>The period from August 13th to 20th was also occupied in
carrying out a number of inter-divisional reliefs&mdash;events of
merely technical interest to the student of military history, but
imposing an immense amount of detailed work upon the Staff
of the Corps and upon the Commanders and Staffs of the Divisions
concerned. It was my own special responsibility, and one
which I could not delegate, to decide the date of the relief of
each Division and by which other Division it should be relieved.
Such decisions involved a close inquiry into, and a just and
humane appreciation of the condition of the troops, almost from
hour to hour every day, a duty in the discharge of which I was
able to rely upon the loyal help of the Divisional Commanders
and Brigadiers.</p>

<p>The time that had elapsed since last they had rested, the
marching they had since done, the fighting they had undertaken
and its nature, the mental and physical stress which they had
undergone, and the probable nature and date of their future
employment were all factors which had to be weighed carefully,
and set against the advantages or disadvantages of cutting short
the period of rest of the troops who were available to relieve
them. It was a function which had to be exercised, at all times,
with the greatest circumspection, and the strictest justice; for
troops are very ready to acquire the impression that they are
being called upon to do more than their fair share.</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/map-c.jpg" width="1200" height="629" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>MAP C.</p></div>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[145]</a></span></p>

<p>An actual inter-divisional relief usually occupied two nights
and the intervening day. Incoming units, both fighting and
technical, had to be shown all over the sector, to be taught the
dispositions and the exact situation in front of us; maps, orders
and photographs had to be explained and handed over; stores
and dumps had to be inventoried and receipts passed; while
on the other hand the outgoing troops expected to find their
billets, offices, stables, wagon lines, bathing-places and entertainment
rooms in the rear area all allocated and ready for their
occupation.</p>

<p>Each such mutual relief meant the movement of upwards of
20,000 men, and separate roads had to be allotted for their use.
Frequently in so large a Corps as this, two such inter-divisional
reliefs would synchronize or overlap, and the danger of congestion
and the Staff work necessary to avoid it would be thereby more
than doubled. And all this work would have to go on smoothly
even if the Corps front were in the throes of an actual battle
at the time.</p>

<p>Although much of the routine of such reliefs, which had become
almost a ritual during the preceding years of trench warfare,
was now scrapped, it is a matter of pride to the Australian Corps
and its Divisions, that all such relief operations, even amid all
the stress of these busy fighting months of August and September,
were, until the end, carried out with precision, freedom from
irritating hitches, and a minimum of stress on the troops.</p>

<p>The decisions which had to be given regarding the times and
alternations of these Divisional reliefs became from now on
really of basic importance, and affected the main framework of
the whole of my future plans. It was no longer merely a question
of earmarking certain Divisions for a specified single operation;
but of planning, many days ahead, the rotation in which the
Divisions were to be employed in a continuous series of operations.
I regarded it as a fundamental principle to employ whenever
possible absolutely fresh and rested troops for an operation of
any magnitude or importance. To carry such a principle into
effect involved the necessity of making the best surmise that was
possible as to the course of events a week or even two weeks
ahead.</p>

<p>As I shall endeavour to make clear in the course of the following<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[146]</a></span>
pages, the really outstanding and exceptional features of the
work of the Corps in its last sixty days were the sustained vigour
of its fighting, and the unbroken continuity of its collective
effort. Those results would clearly depend more on the manner
in which the resources in troops were manipulated than upon
any other factor. Each Division had to be kept employed until
the last ounce of effort, consistent with speedy recovery, had
been yielded, and each Division had to rest a sufficient time to
enable it fully to recover its spirit and tone, and yet had to be
ready by the time it was wanted.</p>

<p>The fulfilment of such conditions involved, as a little reflection
will show, a great deal more than a mere mechanical rotation
of employment; for the problem was, always to have available
an adequate supply of sufficiently rested troops for a prospective
demand which, although varying always in accordance with the
changing situation, had nevertheless to be predicted or conjectured.</p>

<p>August 21st found our front line much about the same as that
of August 13th, although generally more advanced and straightened
out. The Corps frontage was still over 16,000 yards, and
upon the completion of the series of reliefs to which I have
alluded the dispositions of the Corps were as follows: The
Fourth Australian Division from Lihons to just south of Herleville,
the 32nd British Division opposite Herleville, the Fifth Australian
Division in front of Proyart, and the Third Australian Division
on the north of the river. The First and Second Divisions
were in Corps Reserve, the former having by then had a good
rest from its Lihons fighting. The Liaison Force had been
broken up; and the 32nd British Division (Major-General T. S.
Lambert) had joined my command in substitution for the
17th Division, which had been withdrawn to join the Third
Army.</p>

<p>Such was the situation of the Australian Corps, when on
August 21st the short period of comparative inactivity came to a
close, and it was destined soon to go forward to further decisive
events. On the previous day the French opened a great attack
in the south, which yielded 10,000 prisoners on the first day, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[147]</a></span>
on the day in question the Third British Army delivered north
of Albert the attack which had been expected for some days.
Thus the enemy would have his hands full in endeavouring to
parry those fresh blows; and the time seemed appropriate for
another stroke on the front of the Fourth Army.</p>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[148]</a></span></p>




<h2>CHAPTER IX<br />

CHUIGNES</h2>


<p>Allusion has been made to the great bend which occurs
in the course of the River Somme. It is indeed a geographical
circumstance which must be borne in mind, if the
phraseology current at this epoch in the war is to be clearly
comprehended.</p>

<p>The river flows in an almost due northerly direction from the
neighbourhood of Roye as far as Péronne, and then bends quite
sharply, at that locality, in a western direction, past Bray,
Corbie and Amiens, towards the sea, beyond Abbeville. In
the story of the fighting of the period from March to August we
have been concerned only with that portion of the river valley
which ran parallel to our line of advance; but interest will
henceforth focus itself largely upon that other reach of the Somme
which runs on a north and south line, upstream, from the town
of Péronne.</p>

<p>This latter stretch of the river lies squarely athwart the
direction in which the Corps had been advancing, and the obstacle
to that advance which the river would presently constitute was
continued in a northerly direction from Péronne by an unfinished
work of a great canalization scheme to be called the "Canal du
Nord." This canal was already wide and deep, and formed a
tactical obstacle of some significance, for the excavations incidental
to this project had been almost completed before the
war.</p>

<p>The "line of the Somme," as it was understood in the tactical
discussions of the period now to be dealt with, meant, in short,
the line formed by that part of the river which lay upstream (<i>i.e.</i>,
to the south of Péronne), and the continuation northwards of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[149]</a></span>
that line by the Canal du Nord. Both features being military
obstacles, they and the highlands to the east of them together
afforded an eminently suitable continuous line on which the
enemy might, if he were permitted to do so, establish himself in
a defensive attitude in order to bar our eastward progress.</p>

<p>The autumn was upon us; not more than another eight or
nine weeks of campaigning weather could be relied upon. A
quite definite possibility existed that the enemy might be able
to put forth so powerful an effort to contest our further advance,
inch by inch, that he would gain sufficient time to prepare the
line of the Somme for a stout defence, and hold us up until the
arrival of winter compelled a suspension of large operations.</p>

<p>There were at that time, indeed, some who contended that as
we had apparently succeeded in putting an end to the German
offensive we should rest content with the year's work; that our
soundest strategy would be to permit the enemy to take up such
a line of defence; and then quietly to wait over the winter until
1919 for the full development of the American effort, now only
in its inception.</p>

<p>So far, the enemy had given no indication of any readiness
to undertake a precipitate withdrawal from the great bend west
of the Somme. On the contrary, his resistance had stiffened
to such an extent that little further progress was to be hoped for
from the methods of open warfare which I had employed since
August 8th.</p>

<p>If, however, another powerful blow could be delivered, to be
followed by energetic exploitation, it was quite possible that the
enemy might be hustled across the Somme, that this might be
achieved at such a rate that I could gain a firm footing on the
east bank, and that thereby the value to him of the line of the
Somme, as a winter defence, might be destroyed.</p>

<p>This was the very project on which I now embarked. The
First Division was in Corps Reserve, had rested and was fresh.
The 32nd Division had only just come into the line. By handing
over a substantial sector to the French, my frontage south of the
Somme was about to be shortened to 7,000 yards, a very suitable
front for a deliberate attack by two Divisions.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[150]</a></span></p>

<p>I held a conference at Fouilloy, near Corbie, in the afternoon
of August 21st to announce the plan, and to settle all details with
the Commanders and services concerned. The Infantry assault
was to be entrusted to Glasgow and Lambert, attacking side by
side; but the former had allotted to him much the larger share
of the battle front, at the northern end, the corollary rôle of the
32nd Division being to seize Herleville and carry our line just
to the east of it.</p>

<p>The date of the attack was fixed for August 23rd, and the
Second and Fifth Divisions were warned to be in readiness to
come into the line a day or two after the battle, in order to commence
immediately the process of keeping the enemy on the run,
and hustling him clean out of the river bend and across the line
of the Somme.</p>

<p>The conference of that day was of special interest, in that I
had to deal with two Divisions which had not participated in
any of those Corps Conferences, previously held, which had
initiated a fully organized Corps operation. The Commanders
and Staffs were strangers to each other and, some of them, to
me and my Staff. Nearly all of them were yet unfamiliar with
the special methods of the Corps. The conference was therefore
a lengthy one, for many problems of tactical mechanism, which
had been settled in connection with the preceding battles of
Hamel and August 8th, had to be reopened and elucidated.</p>

<p>These regular battle conferences were in the Australian Corps
an innovation from the time the command of it devolved upon
me. They proved a powerful instrument for the moulding of
a uniformity of tactical thought and method throughout the
command. They brought together men who met face to face
but seldom, and they permitted of an exhaustive and educative
interchange of views. They led to a development of "team-work"
of a very high order of efficiency.</p>

<p>The work of preparing for, and the actual conduct of, these
conferences was always a very arduous business; but they more
than repaid me for the effort they entailed. They served two
paramount purposes. They enabled me to apply the requisite
driving force to all subordinates collectively, instead of individually,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[151]</a></span>
and thereby created a responsive spirit which was
competitive. In addition, each Commander or Service had the
advantage not only of receiving instructions regarding his own
action, but also of hearing in full detail the instructions conveyed
to his colleagues. He knew, not merely what his colleagues had
to do, but also knew that they had been told what to do; and
he had an opportunity of considering the effect of their action
on his own.</p>

<p>The senior representative of the Heavy Artillery, Tank and
Air Services invariably attended, and listened to all the points
discussed with the Divisions, and the Divisional Commanders
heard all matters arranged with these services. In this way,
each arm acquired in the most direct manner a steadily expanding
knowledge of the technology of all the other arms.</p>

<p>My reason for emphasizing these matters in the present context
is that, on this particular occasion, an attempt was to be made to
carry out a major Corps operation at little more than thirty-six
hours' notice; and the Division which was to have assigned to it
the principal rôle was still in Corps Reserve and a day's march
from the battle front.</p>

<p>That, in spite of these handicaps, the battle proved brilliantly
successful is a testimony to the valuable part which these Corps
conferences played in securing rapid and efficiently co-ordinated
action; a result which would, I am confident, have been unattainable
under the stated conditions by the mere issue of formal
written orders.</p>

<p>Although only two out of the seven Divisions of the Corps were
to participate in this operation, it was my intention to employ,
for the full assistance of the Infantry, the whole resources of the
Corps in Artillery, Tanks and Aircraft. That was a principle
which I always regarded as fundamental, and one from which
I never permitted any exception to be made, although the
pressure upon me to rest a substantial portion of these ancillary
services was always very great.</p>

<p>The general plan for the battle ran briefly as follows. The
32nd Division would attack with one Infantry Brigade, under a
barrage, on a frontage of 1,000 yards; the capture of the village<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[152]</a></span>
of Herleville, which was still strongly held, being its principal
objective.</p>

<p>The 1st Australian Division would attack on a frontage of
4,500 yards, with two Brigades in line, and one Brigade
in reserve. The attack would be carried out in three
phases.</p>

<p>The first phase was a normal assault, under an Artillery barrage,
and with the assistance of Tanks, to a predetermined line, which
would carry us beyond the Chuignes Valley; the second phase
was in the nature of exploitation by the two line Brigades, but
was expressly limited to a maximum distance of 1,000 yards
beyond the main first objective.</p>

<p>The third phase was to be contingent upon the complete
success of the preceding phases, and would consist of an advance
by the Reserve Brigade for a further exploitation of success, by
the seizure of the whole of the Cappy bend of the river, including
the towering hill close to the Somme Canal known as Froissy
Beacon.</p>

<p>All arrangements for the forthcoming battle having thus been
completed, the First Division duly relieved the Fifth Division
on the night of August 21st, and hastened forward its preparations
for the attack, which had been fixed for 4.45 a.m. on
August 23rd.</p>

<p>In the meantime, the first attack which any British Army
other than the Fourth had made since August 8th was at last
launched on August 21st along the whole front of the Third
British Army, northwards from Albert.</p>

<p>It has come to be an article of faith that the whole of the
successive stages of the great closing offensive of the war had been
the subject of most careful timing, and of minute organization
on the part of the Allied High Command, and of our own G.H.Q.
Much eulogistic writing has been devoted to an attempted
analysis of the comprehensive and far-reaching plans which
resulted in the delivery of blow upon blow, in a prescribed order
of time and for the achievement of definite strategical or tactical
ends.</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_152fp.jpg" width="1200" height="779" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>The Canal and Tunnel at Bellicourt&mdash;looking north.</p></div>
</div>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_153fp.jpg" width="1200" height="784" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>The Hindenburg Line&mdash;a characteristic belt of sunken wire.</p></div>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[153]</a></span></p>

<p>All who played any part in these great events well know that
it was nothing of the kind; that nothing in the nature of a detailed
time-table to control so vast a field of effort was possible.
All Commanders, and the most exalted of them in a higher degree
even than those wielding lesser forces, became opportunists, and
bent their energies, not to the realization of a great general plan
for a succession of timed attacks, but upon the problem of hitting
whenever and wherever an opportunity offered, and the means
were ready to hand.</p>

<p>In these matters it was the force of circumstances which
controlled the sequence of events, and nothing else. An elaborate
time-table controlled by definite dates and sequences for the
successive engagement of a series of Armies would have been quite
impossible of realization. Even a Corps Commander had
difficulty in forecasting within a day or two when he would be
ready to launch an attack on any given part of the front. For
an Army Commander it was a matter of a week or even
two.</p>

<p>All attempted time-tables were controlled by our Artillery
requirements; both the assembling of the necessary guns&mdash;often
drawn from distant fronts&mdash;and the accumulating of the
requisite "head" of ammunition to see a battle through,
were processes whose duration could only be very roughly forecasted.</p>

<p>The dumping, in the gun pits and in ammunition stores, of
the necessary 500 or 600 rounds per gun meant days of labour
in collection and distribution on the part of the railways and
motor lorries. The breakdown of a few motor lorries at a critical
time, or the dropping of a single bomb upon an important railway
junction, were disturbing factors quite sufficient to have arrested
the flow of ammunition, and to have postponed, indefinitely, any
programme based upon its prompt delivery.</p>

<p>It will be obvious, therefore, that no reliance could be placed,
days or weeks beforehand, upon a given attack taking place on
a given day; therefore no plans could be made which depended
upon such attacks taking place in a predetermined sequence.</p>

<p>Shortly put, therefore, the decisions of the High Command
were confined to questions such as where an attack should be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[154]</a></span>
made, in what direction, and by what forces. The date was
always a matter of uncertainty, and the only control that could
be exercised was by postponement, and never by acceleration.</p>

<p>For the greater part of the offensive period it was therefore
necessarily left to the Commanders of the Armies to conform
to a general policy of attack, the time and method being left to
their own decision or recommendation. And they, in turn,
relied upon their Corps Commanders to seize the initiative in
the pursuit of such a policy. Naturally, the Army at all times
made every effort to secure co-ordinated action by its several
Corps; but it rarely happened that more than one Corps at a
time carried through the main effort&mdash;the other Corps performing
subsidiary rôles. The great battle of September 29th to October
1st, which completed the final rupture of the Hindenburg line,
was, however, a signal exception to this rule.</p>

<p>The attack by the Third British Army on August 21st is a case
which illustrates the delays inseparable from battle preparations.
The project of such an attack had already been mooted on
August 11th, when General Byng (Third Army) paid me a visit
to discuss my battle plan of August 8th, and I gathered on that
occasion that he hoped to begin within four or five days. The event
showed that the operation actually took ten days to materialize.
No criticism is suggested. The conditions of transport of troops
and munitions doubtless made its earlier realization quite impossible.</p>

<p>The attack coming when it did, however, considerably eased
the situation of the Fourth Army, upon whose front Ludendorff
had flung all his available reserves, drawn from all parts of the
German front, in his endeavours to bring the Australians and
Canadians to a halt.</p>

<p>He was now suddenly confronted with the prospect of
another "break through" in a different part of his line, and
the German people had been taught by their press correspondents
to believe that a "break through" was the one thing most to be
resisted by the German Supreme Command, and the one thing
impossible of achievement by us.</p>

<p>There can be no doubt, therefore, that the success of the Third<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[155]</a></span>
Army on August 21st, although not comparable in its results
with the battle of August 8th, did materially assist the prospects
of my own success in the operations upon which I was then
embarking.</p>

<p>The immediate effect of it was already felt the very next
day. For the Third Corps, which was still the left flank Corps of
the Fourth Army, and which had made very little progress since
August 8th, was enabled to advance its line a little past Albert
and Meaulte.</p>

<p>The Third Australian Division, which, it will be remembered,
had taken over the front and the rôle of the now disbanded
Liaison Force, participated, by arrangement, in this attack and,
swinging up its left, brought my front line, north of the river,
square to the Somme Valley, and just to the forward slopes of
the high plateau overlooking Bray and La Neuville. The Third
Pioneer Battalion at once got to work on restoring the broken
crossings over the Somme, to the south of Bray, and put out
a series of advanced posts upon the left bank of the river, which
gave us practical control of the great island on which stands
La Neuville.</p>

<p>Meanwhile, on the left flank of the 9th Brigade, which had
carried out the Third Divisional attack, there was serious trouble.
The enemy counter-attacked in the late afternoon. The 9th
Brigade stood firm; but the 47th Division (of the Third Corps)
yielded ground, leaving the flank of the 9th Brigade in the air.
A chalk pit, which we had seized, formed a welcome redoubt
which enabled the 33rd Battalion to hang on for sufficiently
long to permit of the 34th Battalion coming up to form a defensive
flank, facing north.</p>

<p>In this way the gallant 9th Brigade (Goddard) was able to
retain the whole of its gains of that day; but the risk of an
immediate further advance was too great while the situation to
the north remained obscure and unsatisfactory. The capture
of the village of Bray, which was still strongly held by the enemy,
had, therefore, to be postponed, although it had been part of
my plan to capture it that same day as a measure of precaution,
seeing that I calculated upon being able the next day to advance<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[156]</a></span>
my line south of the Somme to a point well to the east of
Bray.</p>

<p>The great attack by the First Division supported by the 32nd
Division, which has come to be known as the battle of Chuignes,
was launched at dawn on August 23rd, and was an unqualified
success.</p>

<p>The main valley of the Somme in this region is flanked by a
number of tributary valleys, which run generally in a north and
south direction, extending back from the river four or five miles.
They are broad, with heavily-wooded sides, and harbour a
number of villages, such as Proyart, Chuignolles, Herleville
and Chuignes, which cluster on their slopes.</p>

<p>One such valley, larger and longer than any of those which,
in our previous advances, we had yet crossed, lay before our
front line of that morning, and square across our path. It ran
from Herleville, northwards, past Chuignes, to join the Somme in
the Bray bend. It was the most easterly of all the tributary
valleys to which I have referred, and it was also the last piece of
habitable country before the devastated area of 1916 was reached,
just a mile to the east of it.</p>

<p>The valley afforded excellent cover for the enemy's guns, and
the expectation was that some of them would be overrun by
our attack. It was also ideal country for machine-gun defence,
for the numerous woods, hedges and copses afforded excellent
cover, and had in all probability been amply fortified with
barbed wire. It was a formidable proposition to attack such a
position on such a frontage with only two Brigades.</p>

<p>The 2nd Brigade (Heane) attacked on the right, the 1st Brigade
(Mackay) on the left, and the first phase was completed to time-table,
with the green objective line, located on the east side of
the long valley, in our possession. The only temporary hitch
in the advance along the whole front was at Robert Wood, where
the enemy held out, and had to be completely enveloped from
both flanks before surrendering.</p>

<p>Then came the second phase, and no difficulty was experienced
in advancing our line 1,000 yards east of the green line, nor in
establishing there a firm line of outposts for the night.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[157]</a></span></p>

<p>The third phase presented a great deal more difficulty than I
had anticipated. It was to have been undertaken by the 3rd
Brigade (Bennett) pushing without delay through the 1st Brigade,
and advancing in open warfare formation north-easterly towards
Cappy, for the seizure of Hill 90, overlooking that village and on
the south-west of it, and terminating at its northern extremity
in the high bluff of Froissy Beacon.</p>

<p>There was, however, some unexplained delay in the initiation
of this advance, and it was not until about 2 o'clock that the
3rd Brigade moved forward to the assault of the long slope of
the Chuignes Valley, which still lay before them in this part of
the field. The enemy, under the impression that our attack
had spent itself, had occupied the plateau in great strength, and
at first little progress could be made.</p>

<p>Mobile Artillery was, however, promptly pushed up, and this
proved of great assistance to the infantry. Garenne Wood, on
the top of the plateau, into which large numbers of the enemy
had withdrawn, proved a difficult obstacle, and incapable of capture
by frontal attack. It, too, was conquered by enveloping
tactics, and with its fall the resistance of the enemy rapidly
subsided, and the 3rd Brigade had the satisfaction of hunting
the fugitives clean off the plateau into the Cappy Valley.</p>

<p>The whole of this phase of the battle was an especially fine
piece of work on the part of the Regimental Officers. It was
open warfare of the most complete character, and the victory
was won by excellent battle control on the part of the Battalion
Commanders, by splendid co-operation between the four
Battalions of the Brigade, and by intelligent and gallant leadership
on the part of the Company and Platoon Commanders.</p>

<p>Beset as I had been by many anxieties during the early afternoon
as to how the Third Brigade would fare in the difficult
task which had been given it, rendered more difficult by the delay
of which I have spoken, I had the satisfaction that night of
contemplating a victory far greater than I had calculated
upon.</p>

<p>For the 32nd Division had successfully captured Herleville,
and the First Division had seized the whole country for a depth<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[158]</a></span>
of 1&frac12; miles up to a line extending from Herleville to the western
edge of Cappy. The whole Chuignes Valley was ours. By its
capture the enemy had been despoiled of all habitable areas, and
had been relegated to a waste of broken and ruined country
between us and the line of the Somme.</p>

<p>We took that day 21 guns and over 3,100 prisoners from ten
different regiments. The slaughter of the enemy in the tangled
valleys was considerable, for our Infantry are always vigorous
bayonet fighters. They received much assistance from the Tanks
in disposing of the numerous machine gun detachments which
held their ground to the last.</p>

<p>It was a smashing blow, and far exceeded in its results any
previous record in my experience, having regard to the number
of troops engaged. Its immediate result, the same night, was the
capture of Bray by the Third Division, north of the river, thus
completing the work of that Division which the failure of the
47th Division on their left the day before had compelled them to
leave unfinished. The 40th Battalion took 200 prisoners, with
trifling loss to themselves.</p>

<p>A more remote result, which made itself apparent in the next
few days, was that it compelled the enemy to abandon all hope
of retaining a hold of any country west of the line of the Somme;
it impelled him at last to an evacuation of the great bend of the
river, a process which he began in a very few days.</p>

<p>Such was the battle of Chuignes. Much of the success of this
brilliant engagement was due to the personality of the Divisional
Commander, Major-General Glasgow. He had commenced his
career in the war as a Major of Light Horse, and had participated
in the earliest stages of the fighting on the Gallipoli
Peninsula.</p>

<p>Speedily gaining promotion during that campaign, his outstanding
merits as a leader gained him an appointment to the
command of the 13th Brigade, when the latter was formed in
Egypt in the spring of 1916. For two years he led that Brigade
through all its arduous experiences on the Somme, at Messines
and in the third battle of Ypres.</p>

<p>This fine record was but the prelude to the history-making<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[159]</a></span>
performances of the 13th Brigade in 1918 at Dernancourt and
Villers-Bretonneux, and Glasgow seemed easily the most promising,
among all the Brigadiers of that time, as a prospective
Divisional Commander: a judgment which fully justified itself.</p>

<p>Of strong though not heavy build and of energetic demeanour,
Glasgow succeeded not so much by exceptional mental gifts, or
by tactical skill of any very high order, as by his personal driving
force and determination, which impressed themselves upon all his
subordinates. He always got where he wanted to get&mdash;was
consistently loyal to the Australian ideal, and intensely proud
of the Australian soldier.</p>

<p>The number of prisoners captured on this day, and the total
numbers of the enemy encountered in the course of an advance
which was relatively small, pointed to a disposition of troops
which was unusual on the part of the enemy.</p>

<p>According to the principles so strongly emphasized by Ludendorff,
in instructions which he had issued, and copies of which
duly fell into my hands, there was to be, in his scheme of defensive
tactics, a "fore-field" relatively lightly held by outposts and
machine guns. The main line of resistance was to be well in
rear, and there the main concentration of troops was to be effected.</p>

<p>Why had this dictum been so widely disregarded on this
occasion? It was a question worthy of close inquiry, and two
German Battalion Commanders who were captured by us on that
day supplied the answer.</p>

<p>Reference has already been made to the message which I
issued to the Corps on the eve of the great opening battle; and
to the fact that a copy of this message had fallen into the hands
of the enemy, probably by the capture of an officer in the close
fighting which took place at Lihons on August 9th and 10th.</p>

<p>In due course the substance of this message was published
in the German wireless news, and in the German press of the time,
but cleverly mistranslated to convey a colouring desirable for
the German public.</p>

<p>It so happened that not long before the opening of our offensive
I had, at the request of the authorities, sent to Australia a recruiting
cable, which appealed to the Australian public for a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[160]</a></span>
maintenance of supplies of fighting men.<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> That the full text
of this cable also became speedily known to the enemy is a
testimony to the far-flung alertness of their Intelligence Service.
It, also, was published in their press.</p>

<p>Basing their editorial comments on this material, the <i>Berliner
Tageblatt</i> of August 17th, 1918, a copy of which I captured, and
another journal whose name was not ascertainable, because in
the copy captured the title had been torn off, both indulged
in arguments, which were long, and intended to be convincing,
to prove to the German people that I had promised my troops
a "break-through;" that I had failed, and that, admittedly,
the "proud" Australian Corps had been shattered, had come to
the end of its resources and was no longer to be taken into calculation
as an instrument of attack by the "English."</p>

<p>It was perfectly legitimate, if clumsy, propaganda. But it
was a curious example of a propaganda which recoiled upon the
heads of its propounders. The Battalion Commanders, who,
like all German officers whom we captured, were always voluble
in excuses for their defeat, pleaded that they had been deceived
by the utterances of their own journals into believing that the
Australian offensive effort had come to an end, once and for all,
and that no further attack by this Corps was possible.</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 808px;">
<img src="images/map-d.jpg" width="808" height="1200" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">Map D</span></p></div>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[161]</a></span></p>

<p>It was this belief which, they said, had prompted their respective
Divisions (for each of them represented a separate one)
to disregard Ludendorff's prescription; their Divisional Generals
had felt justified in availing themselves of the very excellent
living quarters which existed in the Chuignes Valley, near the
German front line of August 22nd, to quarter all their support
and reserve Battalions.</p>

<p>It was there that we found them&mdash;increasing the population
of the front zone far beyond that which we had been accustomed
to find. Was there ever a more diverting example of a propaganda
which recoiled upon those who uttered it? Intended to
deceive the German public, it ended in deceiving the German
front line troops, to their own lamentable undoing.</p>

<p>Among the captures of the battle of Chuignes, which, as usual,
comprised a large and varied assortment of warlike stores, including
another great dump of engineering materials near Froissy
Beacon, and two complete railway trains, was the monster
naval gun of 15-inch bore, which had been so systematically
bombarding the city of Amiens, and had wrought such havoc
among its buildings and monuments.</p>

<p>It was first reached by the 3rd Australian Battalion (1st
Brigade) during a bayonet charge which cleared Arcy Wood,
in the shelter of which the giant gun had been erected. An
imposing amount of labour had been expended upon its installation,
and the most cursory examination of the effort involved
was sufficient to make it evident that the enemy entertained no
expectation of ever being hurled back from the region which
it dominated.</p>

<p>The gun with its carriage, platform and concrete foundations
weighed over 500 tons. It was a naval gun, obviously of the type
in use on the German Dreadnoughts, and never intended by its
original designers for use on land. It had a range of over twenty-four
miles, fired a projectile weighing nearly a ton, and the barrel
was seventy feet long.</p>

<p>It had been installed with the elaborate completeness of German
methods. A double railway track, several miles long, had
been built to the site, for the transport of the gun and its parts.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[162]</a></span>
It was electrically trained and elevated. Its ammunition was
handled and loaded by mechanical means. The adjacent hill-side
had been tunnelled to receive the operating machinery, and
the supplies of shells, cartridges and fuses.</p>

<p>The gun and its mounting, when captured, were found to have
been completely disabled. A heavy charge of explosive had
burst the chamber of the gun, and had torn off the projecting
muzzle end, which lay with its nose helplessly buried in the mud.
The giant carriage had been burst asunder, and over acres all
around was strewn the debris of the explosion.</p>

<p>For some time, some of my gunner experts favoured the
theory that the gun had burst accidentally, but the view which
ultimately prevailed was that the demolition had been intentional.
Many months afterwards, the full story of the gun and
its performances was elicited from a prisoner who had belonged
to the No. 4 (German) Heavy Artillery Regiment, and it was
circumstantial enough to be credible.</p>

<p>The story is worthy of repetition, not only because no authentic
account of this wonderful trophy has yet been published, but
also because the history of this gun curiously illuminates the
enemy's plans, intentions and expectations between the dates
of his onslaught in March and his recoil in August.</p>

<p>The substance of the story is as follows: The gun came from
Krupp's. Work on the position was started early in April,
1918&mdash;only a few days after the site had fallen into the enemy's
hands. It was completed and ready for action on the morning
of June 2nd. Its maximum firing capacity was twenty-eight
rounds per day. It fired continuously until June 28th. By this
time the original gun was worn out, having fired over 350 rounds
at Amiens. A new piece was ordered from Krupp's. It arrived
on August 7th, and was ready to fire by 7 p.m. It fired its first
round on August 8th at 2 a.m. and kept on firing till August
9th, firing thirty-five rounds in all. At 7 a.m. on August 9th, all
hands were ordered to remove everything that was portable
and of value. Demolition charges were laid and fired about
9 a.m. on August 9th. The crew returned to Krupp's.</p>

<p>It is to be inferred from this narrative that the enemy's defeat<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[163]</a></span>
at Hamel on July 4th did not deter him from his enterprise of
replacing the original worn gun, but that after August 8th, he
quite definitely accepted the certainty that he would be allowed
no time to remove the gun intact, and so he destroyed it in order
that we might not be able to use it against him.</p>

<p>This is the largest single trophy of war won by any Commander
during the war, and it was a matter of great regret to me that
the cost of its transportation to Australia was prohibitive. The
gun, as it stands, was, therefore, fenced in, and it has been
formally presented to the City of Amiens as a souvenir of the
Australian Army Corps.</p>

<p>So long as any Australian soldiers remained in France, this
spot was a Mecca to which thousands of pilgrims wandered;
and soon there was, over the whole of the immense structure,
not one square inch upon which the "diggers" had not inscribed
their names and sentiments. There, in the shade of Arcy Wood,
the great ruin rests, a memorial alike of the sufferings of Amiens
and of the great Australian victory of Chuignes.</p>

<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a>
The cablegram in question was dated July 13th, and was in the following terms:
</p>
<p>
"Since the opening of the German offensive in March every Division of the
Australian Army in France has been engaged and always with decisive success.
The men of Australia, wherever and whenever they have entered this mighty
conflict, have invariably brought the enemy to a standstill, and have made him
pay dearly for each futile attempt to pass them on the roads to Amiens and to
the Channel Ports. Their reputation as skilful, disciplined and gallant soldiers
has never stood higher throughout the Empire than it does to-day. Those who
are privileged to lead in battle such splendid men are animated with a pride
and admiration which is tempered only by concern at their waning numbers.
Already some battalions which have made historic traditions have ceased to
exist as fighting units, and others must follow unless the Australian nation
stands by us and sees to it that our ranks are kept filled. We refuse to believe
that the men and women of Australia will suffer their famous Divisions to decay,
or that the young manhood still remaining in our homeland will not wish to
share in the renown of their brothers in France. Nothing matters now but
to see this job through to the end, and we appeal to every man to come, and
come quickly, to help in our work, and to share in our glorious endeavour.
</p>
<div class="right">
"<span class="smcap">Monash</span>, Lieutenant-General."<br />
</div>
</div>
</div>


<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[164]</a></span></p>

<h2>CHAPTER X<br />

PURSUIT</h2>


<p>The design which I had formed after the battle of August
8th of driving the enemy completely out of the bend
of the Somme&mdash;but which I was obliged to abandon for the time
being because of the decision of the Fourth Army to thrust in
a south-easterly direction&mdash;was now about to be realized. The
effect of the battle of Chuignes, following so closely upon the
advance of the Third Army two days before, made it probable
that the enemy would decide upon a definite withdrawal to the
line of the Somme.</p>

<p>It now became my object to ensure, if he should attempt to
do so, firstly, that his withdrawal should be more precipitate
than would be agreeable to him, and, secondly, that when he
reached that line he should be accorded no breathing time to
establish upon it a firm defence from which he could hold us at
bay for the remainder of the fine weather.</p>

<p>The French Army took over from me on the night of the
23rd August the whole of that portion of my front which still
extended south of Lihons. General Nollet, Commander of the
36th French Corps (34th and 35th French Divisions), became my
southern neighbour, displacing my Fourth Division, and also a
Canadian Division, for whose sector I had become responsible
since the departure of General Currie, a few days before.</p>

<p>During these redispositions, probably induced to do so by
evidences patent to him that large troop movements were in
progress, the enemy carried out a very heavy gas bombardment
and maintained it for some hours over the whole of the front
which was being taken over by the French.</p>

<p>The wind blowing from the south, the gas, which was unusually<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[165]</a></span>
dense, drifted over the whole areas both of the Fourth Australian
and the 32nd British Divisions, and caused a large number of
gas casualties, which weakened the available garrisons of these
sectors.</p>

<p>The Second and Fifth Divisions were brought up on the night
of August 26th to relieve the First Division, which had worthily
earned a rest, and by these redispositions my whole frontage,
which, in spite of the reduction effected, still exceeded nine miles,
was organized to be held by four Divisions, counting from south
to north as follows: 32nd Division, Fifth Division, Second
Division and Third Division, the latter lying north of the River
Somme.</p>

<p>The First and Fourth Divisions were each sent back, the
former to a pleasant reach of the Somme near Chipilly, and the
latter to the neighbourhood of Amiens, there to have a long
rest and to recuperate after their strenuous labours. These two
Divisions were, I had resolved, to be kept in reserve for any <i>tour
de force</i>, the need for which might arise later. This disposition
was based on intuition rather than on reasoning; but the event
proved that it was a fortunate decision; for, at a juncture,
three weeks later, when a great opportunity presented itself,
these two Divisions, then fully rested, proved of priceless value.</p>

<p>The Third Division held my front north of the Somme, and
their presence there ensured my unchallenged tactical control
of that important river valley. Numerous crossings had been
systematically destroyed by the enemy, as he was being driven
back from bend to bend, and as systematically repaired by my
indefatigable engineer and pioneer services, as fast as the ground
passed under our control.</p>

<p>Reconstruction of bridges and culverts is as tedious a business
as their demolition is expeditious. A charge of gun-cotton,
placed in the right spot, a primer, a short length of fuse, or an
electric lead to a press button are all that are needed, and a single
sapper standing by with a match, to be lighted at the last moment,
can do all that is necessary to provide three days' work for a
whole Company of Engineers.</p>

<p>Nevertheless, the control of the river valley was of inestimable<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[166]</a></span>
advantage, for it enabled me to carry out a policy of continuous
and rapid repair. Consequently, during the whole of our subsequent
advance, every means of traversing the valley from south
to north, which had been tampered with, was soon restored, as
fast as my infantry had made good their advance beyond the
ruined crossing.</p>

<p>This facility was to have an important bearing upon my
freedom of action, not many days later, when the Corps came
head on to the north and south stretch of the Somme, and
found every bridge gone. That circumstance alone would have
proved an irretrievable misfortune, if I had not had already
available numerous restored crossings upon the east and west
reach of the river. For by that means, my ability to pass
troops and guns rapidly from one bank of the Somme to the
other remained unimpaired.</p>

<p>Before leaving the line, the First Division had captured Cappy
and advanced its line on the right to the western outskirts of
Foucaucourt, while the Third Division had possessed itself of
Suzanne. This was the situation when, on the night of August
26th, the Second and Fifth Divisions came into the line. Conferences
with the four line Divisions were held both on the 25th
and 26th August, in order to ensure co-ordinate action for the
process of hustling the enemy across the Somme.</p>

<p>I was, at this stage, sorely perplexed by the uncertain attitude
of the Fourth Army. I was all for pushing on energetically,
and received General Rawlinson's approval to do so on
August 24th; but on the very next day he enunciated a diametrically
opposite policy, which greatly embarrassed me.</p>

<p>The gist of the Army attitude on the 25th may be thus expressed.
The presence of a new German Division, the 41st, of
whom we had taken many prisoners in Cappy, pointed to an
intention on the part of the enemy to reinforce. This negatived
any intention to undertake a withdrawal. This conclusion
justified a revision of the Fourth Army policy. The Army had
done its fair share; it had drawn in upon its front all the loose
German reserves. Its resources in Tanks had been depleted,
and it would take a month to replace them. Other Armies would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[167]</a></span>
now take up the burden, and the Fourth Army would now mark
time, and await events elsewhere. There was no object in hastening
the enemy's evacuation of the bad ground in the bend of the
Somme, or in our taking possession of it. There was a possibility
of the French taking over more frontage from us, and the Australian
Corps front might in consequence be reduced to a three-Division
front, with three Divisions in Corps Reserve.</p>

<p>The course of events, in the next seven days, convinced me
that the results which were then achieved were totally unexpected
by the Fourth Army, and very vitally influenced the whole
subsequent course of the campaign. In point of fact, Lord
Rawlinson quite frankly conceded to me as much in express
terms a week later. The appreciation made at the time was
doubtless an intentionally conservative one, but it did not take
into account the reserve of striking power which remained in
the Australian Corps, even after the past eighteen days of continuous
fighting, and even without the assistance of the Tanks.</p>

<p>There was only one saving clause in the Army attitude, and
this fortunately gave all the loophole necessary for the continued
activity which I desired to pursue. It was this: "Touch
must be kept with the enemy." This was of course a mere
formality of tactics, and was intended as no more than such.
But it was sufficient to justify an aggressive policy on my part.</p>

<p>As the result of my redispositions, completed by the night of
August 27th, and of my conferences with the line Divisions,
each Division stood on that morning on a single Brigade front,
with its two remaining Brigades arranged in depth behind it.
My orders were that in the event of the enemy giving way, the
line Brigade was to push on energetically, and was to be kept
in the line until it had reached the limits of its endurance. The
other two Brigades were to follow up more leisurely, but to be
prepared, each in turn, to relieve the line Brigade.</p>

<p>I had calculated that, by this method, each Brigade should
be able to function for at least two days on the frontage allotted;
and that, therefore, the present line Divisions could continue
for at least six days; and if the stress upon the troops had not
been severe, they could carry out a second rotation of Brigades for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[168]</a></span>
a second tour of six days. The calculation was, in general terms,
fully realized; and all of the four line Divisions of that day did
actually carry on for twelve days, and two of them for an additional
six days.</p>

<p>The Artillery resources of the Corps were throughout the whole
of this period fully maintained at the standard of the early days
of August. I still had at my disposal eighteen Brigades of Field
Artillery; and so was able to allot four Brigades of Artillery to
each line Division, while keeping two in Corps Reserve.</p>

<p>Early on the morning of August 27th, a policy of vigorous
patrolling all along our front was initiated. At several points,
enemy posts which were known to have been strongly held the
night before were found to be now unoccupied. Although reports
varied along my front, they so fully confirmed my anticipations,
that without waiting to make any reference to the Army, I
ordered an immediate general advance along my whole front.</p>

<p>There followed a merry and exciting three days of pursuit;
for the enemy was really on the run, and by nightfall on August
29th, not a German who was not a prisoner remained west of
the Somme between Péronne and Brie.</p>

<p>In previous years, during the enemy's retreat from Bapaume
to the Hindenburg Line, we had had experience of his methods
of withdrawal. Then they were deliberate, and his rearguards
so methodically and resolutely held up the British advance, that
the enemy had been able not only to remove from the evacuated
area every particle of his warlike stores, which were of any value,
but also to carry out a systematic devastation of the whole area,
even to the felling of all the fruit trees, and the tearing up of all
the railways for miles.</p>

<p>The present withdrawal was of a very different character.
To begin with, it had been forced upon him by the battle of
Chuignes, and he had to undertake it precipitately and without
adequate preparation. Secondly, he had an impassable river
behind him, which could be crossed only at three points, Brie,
Eterpigny, and Péronne. Thirdly, he had in front of him a
Corps flushed with its recent victories, while he had been suffering
a succession of defeats and heavy losses.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[169]</a></span></p>

<p>Nevertheless, he put up a good fight, and employed well-considered
tactics. The German Machine Gun Corps was much
the best of all his services. The manner in which the machine
gunners stood their ground, serving their guns to the very last,
and defying even the Juggernaut menace of the Tanks, won the
unstinted admiration of our men. During these three days of
retreat the enemy used his machine guns to the best advantage,
and they constituted the only obstacle to our rapid
advance.</p>

<p>These tactics were not unexpected by me, and I had an answer
ready. Defying the whole traditions of Artillery tactics in open
warfare, I insisted upon two somewhat startling innovations.
The first was to break up battery control, by detaching even
sections (two guns), to come under the direct orders of Infantry
Commanders for the purpose of engaging with direct fire any
machine-gun nest which was holding them up.</p>

<p>The second was to insist that all batteries should carry 20 per
cent. of smoke shell. This elicited a storm of protest from the
gunners. Every shell carried which was not a high explosive or
shrapnel shell meant a shell less of destructive power, and,
therefore, a shell wasted. That had been the Gunnery School
doctrine. But I imagine that the test made at this epoch of the
liberal use of smoke shell against machine guns will lead to a
revision of that doctrine.</p>

<p>Smoke shell proved of inestimable value in blinding the German
machine gunners. A few rounds judiciously placed screened the
approach of our Infantry, and many a machine-gun post was
thereby rushed by us from the flanks or even from the rear.
General Hobbs (Fifth Division) and General Rosenthal (Second
Division), both of whom had formerly been gunners, proved the
strongest advocates for these smoke tactics.</p>

<p>By such means an energetic and successful pursuit was launched
and maintained. By the night of August 27th, our line already
lay to the east of the villages of Vermandovillers, Foucaucourt
(on the main road) and Fontaine. We also mastered the whole
of the Cappy bend, including the crossings of the Somme at
Eclusier. The Fifth Division had a particularly hard fight<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[170]</a></span>
at Foucaucourt, which did not fall to us until we had subjected
it to a considerable bombardment. Tivoli Wood was the chief
obstacle encountered that day by the Second Division. The
advance of the 32nd Division also progressed smoothly.</p>

<p>During August 28th our advance was continued methodically,
and by that night the Corps front had reached the line Génermont&mdash;Berry-en-Santerre&mdash;Estrées&mdash;Frise.</p>

<p>On August 29th the line of the Somme was reached, and all
three Divisions south of the Somme stood upon the high ground
sloping down to the Somme, with the river in sight from opposite
Cléry, past Péronne and as far south as St. Christ.</p>

<p>In the meantime the Third Division north of the Somme
had marched forward, in sympathetic step with the southern
advance, successively seizing Suzanne, Vaux, Curlu, Hem and
Cléry. The Third Corps on my left had followed up the general
advance, though always lagging a little in rear, thus keeping
my left flank secure; and beyond the Third Corps, the Third
Army was approaching the line of the Canal du Nord, which
lay, as explained, in prolongation of the south-north course of
the Somme.</p>

<p>The war correspondents of this time were given to representing
the progress of the Australian Corps during these three days
as a leisurely advance, regulated in its pace by the speed of the
retiring enemy. But it was nothing of the kind.</p>

<p>On the contrary, it was his withdrawal which was regulated
by the speed of our advance. There was not a foot of ground
which was not contested by all the effort which the enemy was
able to put forth. It is quite true that his withdrawal was
intentional; but it is not true that it was conducted at the
deliberate rate which was necessary to enable him to withdraw
in good order.</p>

<p>He was compelled to fight all the time and to withdraw in
disorder. He was forced to abandon guns and huge quantities
of stores. The amount of derelict artillery ammunition found
scattered over the whole of this considerable area alone reached
hundreds of thousands of rounds, distributed in hundreds of
dumps and depots, as well as scores of tons of empty artillery<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[171]</a></span>
cartridge-cases, the brass of which had become of priceless value
to the enemy.</p>

<p>Regimental and even Divisional Headquarters were abandoned
as they stood, with all their furniture and mess equipment left
intact. Signal wire and telephone equipment remained installed
in all directions, hospitals and dressing-stations were left to their
fate. The advance yielded to us over 600 prisoners, some half-dozen
field-guns, and large numbers of smaller weapons.</p>

<p>The last two days of the advance led us across a maze of
trenches and the debris of the 1916 campaign. The weather
was unfavourable, there was much rain and an entire absence
of any kind of shelter. As a result the line Brigades had to put
forth all their powers of endurance and reached the Somme in
a very tired condition.</p>

<p>In the meantime my air squadron had an exceptionally
busy time. Contact patrols were maintained throughout every
hour of daylight. Difficult as it was to identify the positions
reached by our leading troops during an organized battle, where
their approximate positions and ultimate objective lines were
known beforehand, it was doubly so when no guide whatever
existed as to the probable extent of each day's advance, or as to
the amount of resistance likely to be encountered at different
parts of the front.</p>

<p>Yet it was just under these circumstances that rapid and
reliable information as to the progress of the various elements
of our front line troops was more important than ever, and no
means for obtaining such information was so expeditious as the
Contact Aeroplane.</p>

<p>To assist the air observer in identifying our troops, the latter
were provided with flares, of colours which were varied from
time to time in order to minimize the risk of imitation by the
enemy. The method of their employment, whether singly or
in pairs, or three at a time, was also frequently varied.</p>

<p>These flares on being lit gave out a dense cloud of coloured
smoke, easily distinguishable from a moderate height. The
contact plane, which would carry coloured streamers so that
the infantry could identify it as flying on that particular duty,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[172]</a></span>
would, when ready to observe, blow its horn and thereupon
the foremost infantry would light their flares.</p>

<p>It was a method of inter-communication between air and
ground, which, after a little practice, came to be well understood
and intelligently carried out. By its means a Divisional or
Brigade Commander was kept accurately informed, with great
promptitude, of the progress of each of his front line units, in
relation to the various woods, ruined mills, and other obstacles
which lay spread across their path.</p>

<p>But the Air Force had another interesting duty, which was
to watch the roads leading back from the enemy's front line
to his rear areas. During tranquil times little movement could
ever be seen on the enemy's roads in the hours of daylight, for
the very good reason that he took care to carry out all his transportation
to and from his front zone under cover of darkness.</p>

<p>Now, however, his needs pressed sorely upon him; and our
air reports, from this time onwards, became almost monotonous
in their iteration of the fact that large columns of transport
were to be seen moving back in an easterly direction. These
were his retiring batteries or his convoys of wagons carrying
such stores as he was able to salve.</p>

<p>Occasionally, too, came reports of convoys, which looked
like motor lorries or buses, moving hurriedly westward towards
the German front. These were generally diagnosed by us as
reinforcements which were being continually hurried forward to
replace his human wastage, which was considerable both by
direct losses from death, wounds and capture and by reason of
the fatigue of such a strenuous and nerve-racking retreat.</p>

<p>All this movement in the enemy's rearward areas was a legitimate
object of interest to my Artillery. But, unfortunately, most
of it lay well beyond the range of my lighter Ordnance. The
mobile Field Artillery was effective at no greater range than
about four miles. The longer range 60-pounders found it a
formidable task to traverse such broken country, while the still
heavier tractor-drawn 6-inch guns found it quite impossible.</p>

<p>The latter, and all the Heavy and Super-Heavy guns and
howitzers were tied down to the roads, and it proved a tremendous<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[173]</a></span>
business to advance them in sufficient time and numbers to
make their influence felt upon the present situation. I have
nothing but praise for the admirable manner in which Brigadier-General
Fraser and his Heavy Artillery Headquarters carried
out the forward moves of the whole of his extensive Artillery
equipment and organization from August 8th onwards to August
23rd. But the rapid advance of the battle line during the last
week of August left the great bulk of Heavy Artillery far behind.</p>

<p>This was not entirely or even appreciably a question of the
rate of movement of the great lumbering steam or motor-drawn
heavy guns. They could quite easily march their eight or ten
miles a day if they could have a clear road upon which to do it.
But it was this question of roads that dominated the whole
situation during this period, and subsequently until the end of the
campaign of the Corps.</p>

<p>The construction and upkeep of roads throughout the Corps
area had been, even in the days of stationary warfare, a difficult
problem. At a time like the present, when the battle was
moving forward from day to day, it became one of the first
magnitude.</p>

<p>The rate of our advance was controlled almost as much by
the speed with which main and secondary roads could be made
practicable for traffic as by the degree of resistance offered by
the enemy. Obstacles had to be removed, the debris of war
cleared to one side, shell holes solidly filled in, craters of mine
explosions bridged or circumvented, culverts repaired and drains
freed of obstructions.</p>

<p>The road surfaces, speedily deteriorating under the strain
and wear of heavy motor lorry traffic, had to be kept constantly
under repair. The transportation of the necessary road stone
for this purpose alone, imposed a heavy burden upon the roads
and impeded other urgent traffic. The amount of road construction
and reconstruction actually in hand within the Corps
area, at any one time, far exceeded that normally required in
peace time for any great city district.</p>

<p>The traffic on the roads was always of the most dense and
varied character. For the proper maintenance and supply of a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[174]</a></span>
large Army Corps at least three good main roads, leading back
to our sources of supply, would have been no more than adequate;
but I seldom had at my disposal more than one such main road,
which had often to be shared with an adjoining Corps.</p>

<p>There was ever an endless stream of traffic, labouring slowly
along in both directions. On such a road as that leading east
from Amiens towards the battle front, the congestion was always
extreme. Ammunition lorries, regimental horsed transport,
motor dispatch riders, marching infantry, long strings of horses
and mules going to and from water, traction engines, convoy after
convoy of motor buses, supply wagons, mess carts, signal motor
tenders, complete batteries of Artillery, motor tractors, tanks,
Staff motor cars and gangs of coolie labourers surged steadily
forward, in an amazing jumble, with never a moment's pause.</p>

<p>Such were some of the difficulties with which I was beset in
the rear of my battle line. They were negligible compared
with those which now loomed in front of it.</p>

<p>The reach of the Somme which runs northerly from Ham
past Brie to Péronne and there turns westerly, differs entirely
in its topographical features from that picturesque Somme
Valley along both of whose banks the Corps had been fighting
its way forward. The steep banks have disappeared, and for
a mile or so on either side the ground slopes gently towards the
river bed.</p>

<p>The river itself is not less than 1,000 yards wide, being, in fact,
a broad marsh, studded with islets which are overgrown with
rushes, while the stream of the river threads its way in numerous
channels between them. The marsh itself is no more than waist-deep,
but the flowing water is too deep to be waded.</p>

<p>Along the western side of this marsh runs the canalized river,
or, as it is here known, the Somme Canal, flowing between
masonry-lined banks. The construction of a crossing of such
a marsh was, even in peace time, a troublesome business. It
meant, to begin with, a causeway solidly founded upon a firm
masonry bed sunk deep into the mud of the valley bed. The
canal itself and each rivulet required its separate bridge, in spans
varying from thirty to sixty feet.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[175]</a></span></p>

<p>What, therefore, came to be known as the Brie Bridge, situated
on the line of the main road from Amiens to St. Quentin, really
consisted of no less than eight separate bridges disposed at
irregular intervals along the line of the causeway, between the
western and eastern banks of the valley. The demolition of
even the smallest of these eight bridges would render the whole
causeway unusable, and would prohibit all traffic.</p>

<p>There exists an almost exactly similar arrangement of bridges
at St. Christ, about two miles to the south of Brie, but no other
traffic crossing to the north of Brie until Péronne is reached.
There, both the main road and the railway, which cross side by
side, are provided with large span lattice girder bridges, over the
main canal, while the marsh has been reclaimed where the town
has encroached upon it. The river overflow is led through the
town in several smaller canals or drains, all of them liberally
bridged where crossed by roads and streets.</p>

<p>The Péronne bridges are, therefore, no less indispensable, and
no less easily rendered useless than those at Brie. Should
such crossings be denied to me, it would be just possible to pass
infantry across the valley, by night, by wading and swimming,
or by the use of rafts, always provided that no opposition were
to be met with. But to pass tanks or heavy guns, or even vehicles
of the lightest description across the marsh, would have been quite
impossible.</p>

<p>The Somme threatened, therefore, to be a most formidable
obstacle to my further advance. It was incumbent upon me to
assume that at the very least one of each series of bridges would
be demolished by the enemy in his retreat. It would have been
criminal folly on his part were it to have been otherwise; and I
had had previous evidence of the efficiency of his engineer services.</p>

<p>Reconnaissances pushed out on the night of August 29th
speedily verified the assumption that some at least of the bridges
had been wrecked. It was ultimately ascertained that every
single bridge in every one of the crossings named had been
methodically and systematically blown to pieces.</p>

<p>There was only one tactical method by which such an obstacle
could be forced by a frontal operation. By bringing up sufficient<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[176]</a></span>
Artillery to dominate the enemy's defences on the east bank of
the river valley, it might have been possible to pass across
sufficient infantry to establish a wide bridge-head, behind which
the ruined crossings could be restored, probably under enemy
Artillery fire.</p>

<p>But it would have been a costly enterprise, and fraught with
every prospect of failure, should the enemy be prepared to put
up any sort of a fight to prevent it.</p>

<p>The value to me of the possession of the whole of the Somme
Valley from Cléry westwards, and the rapid repair of the bridges
therein which I had been able to effect, will now become apparent.
For it permitted the crystallizing into action of a project for
dealing with the present situation, which had been vaguely
forming in my mind ever since the day when I took over the
Chipilly spur.</p>

<p>This was the plan of turning the line of the Somme from the
north, instead of forcing it by direct assault from the west.</p>

<p>It may be argued that such a plan would have been equally
practicable, even if the left flank of the Australian Corps had
hitherto remained and now still lay south of the Somme, instead
of well to the north of it. In that case other Corps on the north
would have carried out that identical plan, which ultimately did
achieve this important and decisive result.</p>

<p>I very much doubt it.</p>

<p>I had also had some experience of the futility of relying too
much upon the sympathetic action of flank Corps, who usually
had their hands full enough with their own problems, and had
little time to devote to the needs of their neighbours. It would,
moreover, have been disagreeable and inexpedient in the extreme
to seek a right of way through the territory over which another
Corps held jurisdiction. Corps Commanders were inclined to be
jealous of any encroachment upon their frontiers, or upon the
tactical problems in front of them.</p>

<p>Moreover, I wanted, more than anything else, that this should
be an exclusively Australian achievement.</p>

<p>The situation being as it was, I possessed freedom of action,
elbow room, and control not only of all the territory which I
should require to use, but also of all the Somme crossings west
of Cléry.</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_176fp.jpg" width="1200" height="768" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>Final Instructions to the Platoon&mdash;an incident of the battle of August 8th, 1918. The platoon is waiting to
advance to Phase B of the battle.</p></div>
</div>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_177fp.jpg" width="1200" height="776" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>An Armoured Car&mdash;disabled near Bony, during the battle of September 29th, 1918.</p></div>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[177]</a></span></p>

<p>The strategic object in view was to make the line of the Somme
useless to the enemy as a defensive line, and thereby render
probable his immediate further enforced retreat to the Hindenburg
line.</p>

<p>The tactical process by which this was to be achieved was
to be an attack upon and the seizure of the key position of the
whole line, the dominating hill of Mont St. Quentin.</p>

<p>But the paramount consideration was that the attack must
be delivered <i>without delay</i> and that the enemy should not be
allowed a single hour longer than necessary to establish himself
upon that hill.</p>

<p>Often since those days, wondering at the success which came
to the Australian Corps at Mont St. Quentin, I have tried justly
to estimate the causes which won us that success. And I have
always come back to the same conclusion, that it was due firstly
and chiefly to the wonderful gallantry of the men who participated,
secondly to the rapidity with which our plans were put
into action, and thirdly to the sheer daring of the attempt.</p>

<p>Mont St. Quentin lies a mile north of Péronne. It stands
as a sentinel guarding the northern and western approaches to
the town, a bastion of solid defence against any advance from
the west designed to encircle it. The paintings and drawings of
many artists who have visited the historic spot will familiarize
the world with its gentle contours.</p>

<p>Viewed from the west, from the vantage point of the high
ground near Biaches in the very angle of the bend of the river,
Mont St. Quentin constitutes no striking feature in the landscape.
But standing upon the hill itself one speedily realizes how fully
its possession dominates the whole of the approaches to it. So
placed that both stretches of the river can from it be commanded
by fire, and giving full and uninterrupted observation over all
the country to the west and north and south of it, the hill is
ringed around with line upon line of wire entanglements, and its
forward slopes are glacis-like and bare of almost any cover.</p>

<p>Estimated by the eye of an expert in tactics, it would surely<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[178]</a></span>
be reckoned as completely impregnable to the assault, unaided
by Tanks, of any infantry that should attempt it.</p>

<p>It was the seizure, by a sudden attack, of this tactical key
that was the kernel of the plan which now had to be evolved.
The capture of the town of Péronne was consequential upon it,
though little less formidable a task. The effect of both captures
would be completely to turn the whole line of the Somme to the
south, and the line of the Canal du Nord; to open a wide gate
through which the remainder of the Fourth and Third Armies
could pour, so as to roll up the enemy's line in both directions.</p>

<p>In view of the historical importance of the occasion, and the
controversies which have already risen regarding the genesis
of the conception of these plans, I make no apology for reproducing,
<i>in extenso</i>, a literal copy of the notes used at the conference
which I held in the late afternoon of August 29th at the
Headquarters of the Fifth Division, then situated in a group of
bare sheds&mdash;but recently vacated by the enemy&mdash;on the main
east and west road, just south of Proyart. The conference was
attended by Lambert (32nd Division), Hobbs (Fifth Division),
Rosenthal (Second Division), and Gellibrand (Third Division).
Neither "Tanks" nor "Heavy Artillery" attended as they
could not, in any event, co-operate in the execution of the plan.</p>

<blockquote>
<div class="right">29. 8. 18.<br /></div>

<div class="center">PLAN FOR CROSSING THE SOMME</div>

<p>A. <span class="smcap">Alteration of Frontages.</span></p>

<blockquote>
<p><i>Defensive Front</i>: 32nd Division to take over on 30th
from Fifth Division front as far north as Ferme Lamire,
total 7,500 yards, to hold same defensively, place outposts
on river line, demonstrate actively as if aiming
to cross Somme; if no resistance, endeavour establish
posts on far bank; otherwise demonstrate only. Use
only one Brigade; remainder of Division to rest and
refit.</p>

<p><i>Offensive Frontages</i>: Fifth Division to extend along
canal bank from Ferme Lamire to Biaches, frontage
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[179]</a></span>4,000 yards. Second Division to extend from Biaches
for 4,700 yards to bridge at Ommiécourt. Third Division:
present front north of river.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>B. <span class="smcap">Objectives.</span></p>

<blockquote>
<p>All Divisions to continue eastward advance. Each
Division to have an immediate and an ultimate objective,
thus:</p>

<p>Third Division:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Immediate:  High ground north-east of Cléry.</p>
<p>Ultimate:  Bouchavesnes Spur.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Second Division:</p>

<blockquote>
<p>Immediate:  Bridge Head at Halle. If crossing there impossible then cross behind front of Third Division.</p>
<p>Ultimate:   Mont St. Quentin.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Fifth Division:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Immediate:  Force crossing at Péronne Bridges; if bridges gone, follow Second Division
and aim at high ground south of Péronne.</p>
<p>Ultimate:   Wooded spur east of Péronne.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Whichever Division first succeeds in crossing Somme
Valley, the other Divisions to have right of way over
the same crossings.</p>

<p>Each Division to employ only one Brigade until a satisfactory
footing is established on immediate objective.</p>

<p>Second Division to lead the north-east movement.</p>

<p>Artillery to stand as at present allotted, but liable to
re-allotment by me as operation develops.</p>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>

<p>The above brief notes require but little elucidation. It is to
be remembered that at the time they were prepared, no definite
information had yet been received as to the condition of any of
the Somme crossings, because at that hour the river bank had
not yet been reached, and fighting on the west bank of the Somme
was still going on.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[180]</a></span></p>

<p>It has also to be remembered that these notes were only for
my own guidance in verbally expounding the plan, and were
not actually issued as written orders. Naturally many details,
left unexpressed by the notes, were filled in during the conference.
Moreover I anticipated that the whole operation would be one of
a nature in which I would have to intervene as the battle proceeded,
in accordance with the varying situation from time to time,
and this actually proved to be necessary.</p>

<p>It will be noted that on August 29th I had already reached
the definite decision not to attempt to force the passage of the
Somme south of Péronne; the 32nd Division was, however, instructed
to make every demonstration of a desire to attempt it,
the object being to divert the attention of the enemy from the
real point of attack.</p>

<p>This was to be launched from the direction of Cléry. In
preparation for it, the Second Division sent its reserve Brigade,
the 5th (Martin), to cross the river at Feuillères, on August 30th,
to pass through the area and front of the Third Division, and
secure a bridge head on the Cléry side of the river, opposite to the
Ommiécourt bend. The object was to exploit the possibility of
using the Ommiécourt crossing, and if it were found to be intact
to use it for the purpose of crossing with the remaining two
Brigades that same night.</p>

<p>This move was successfully accomplished, although the 5th
Brigade found portion of the village of Cléry still occupied, and
that the trench systems to the east of it were still held in strength.
After much skilful fighting, the Brigade reached its allotted destination,
with slight casualties, capturing seven machine guns and
120 prisoners.</p>

<p>The bridge at Ommiécourt was found to be damaged, but repairable
so as to be usable by infantry on foot, and this work
was at once put in hand. The same night the rearrangement
of the fronts of all four Divisions in the line was carried out, and
all was in readiness for the daring attempt to break the line of the
Somme.</p>

<p>During the afternoon of August 30th, General Rawlinson
came to see me, and I unfolded to him the details of the operations<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[181]</a></span>
contemplated and the arrangements made for the next day. I
have already referred to the pleasant and attractive personality
of this distinguished soldier. His qualities of broad outlook,
searching insight, great sagacity, and strong determination,
tempered by a wise restraint, never failed to impress me deeply.
He always listened sympathetically, and responded convincingly.
On this occasion he was pleased to be pleasantly satirical. "And
so you think you're going to take Mont St. Quentin with three
battalions! What presumption! However, I don't think I
ought to stop you! So, go ahead, and try!&mdash;and I wish you
luck!"</p>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[182]</a></span></p>




<h2>CHAPTER XI<br />

MONT ST. QUENTIN AND PÉRONNE</h2>


<p>From early dawn on Saturday, August 31st, until the evening
of September 3rd, three Divisions of the Australian
Corps engaged in a heroic combat which will ever be memorable
in Australian history.</p>

<p>At its conclusion we emerged complete masters of the situation.
Mont St. Quentin, the Bouchavesnes spur, the large town of
Péronne, and the high ground overlooking it from the east and
north-east, were in our possession. A wide breach had been
driven into the line of defence which the enemy had endeavoured
to establish on the series of heights lying to the east of the Somme
and of the Canal du Nord.</p>

<p>From the edges of this breach, the flanks of that portion of his
line which were still intact were being threatened with envelopment.
For him there was nothing for it, but finally to abandon
the line of the Somme, and to resume his retreat helter-skelter
to the hoped-for secure protection of the great Hindenburg Line.</p>

<p>The extraordinary character of this Australian feat of arms
can best be appreciated by a realization of the supreme efforts
which the enemy put forward to prevent it.</p>

<p>The shower of blows which he had received on the front of his
Second Army from August 8th onwards, had wrought upon it a
grievous disorganization. The battered remnants of his line
Divisions had been reinforced from day to day by fresh units,
scraped up from other parts of his front, and thrown into the
fight as fast as they could be made available.</p>

<p>Sometimes they were complete Divisions from Reserve, often
single reserve Regiments of Divisions already deeply involved,
and sometimes even single Battalions torn from other Regiments&mdash;Pioneer<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[183]</a></span>
Battalions, units of the Labour Corps, Army Troops,
Minenwerfer Companies had all been thrown in, indiscriminately.</p>

<p>This brought about a heterogeneous jumble of units, and of
German nationalities, for Prussians, Bavarians, Saxons and
Würtembergers were captured side by side. The tactical control
of such mixed forces, during a hasty and enforced retreat, and
their daily maintenance, must have presented sore perplexities
to the Headquarters of the German Second Army in those fateful
days.</p>

<p>To meet the crisis with which Ludendorff was now confronted,
he determined to throw in one of the finest of the reserve Divisions
still left at his disposal. The Second Prussian Guards Division
was sent forward to occupy the key position of Mont St. Quentin,
and to hold it at all costs.</p>

<p>This famous Division comprised among its units, the Kaiserin
Augusta and the Kaiser Alexander Regiments, almost as famous
in history and rich in tradition as are our own Grenadiers and
Coldstreams. There is no doubt that this celebrated Division
fought desperately to obey its instructions.</p>

<p>For the defence of Péronne, the enemy command went even
further, and called for volunteers, forming with them a strong
garrison of picked men drawn from many different line Regiments,
to man the ramparts which surround the town. Dozens of machine
guns were posted in vantage points from which the approaches
could be swept.</p>

<p>All over the river flats lying in the angle of the Somme between
Cléry, Mont St. Quentin and Péronne ran line upon line of barbed
wire entanglements, a legacy from the 1916 fighting, and much of
this was still intact, although breaches had been made in many
places both by the French in 1917 and by the Germans themselves,
to facilitate movement over the ground, during their respective
re-occupations of this territory.</p>

<p>The terrain, which was in greater part open, and exposed in
every direction to full view from the heights, sloped gently
upwards towards the commanding knoll. Cover was scarce, and
the few ruins of brickfields and sugar refineries which dotted
the landscape had also been garrisoned by the enemy as centres<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[184]</a></span>
of resistance, designed to break up and dislocate any general
attack.</p>

<p>Our infantry was deprived of the assistance of any Tanks,
for the heavy casualties which had been suffered by this Arm
made it imperative to allow the Tank Corps time for repairs,
renewals and the training of fresh crews. Nor was any appreciable
quantity of Heavy Artillery yet available, since the congested
and dilapidated condition of the roads prevented the
advance of all but a few of the lighter varieties of heavy guns.</p>

<p>The fighting of these four days was, therefore, essentially a pure
infantry combat, assisted only by such mobile Artillery of lesser
calibres as was available.</p>

<p>Such was the formidable nature of the task, and of the disabilities
under which the Second, Third and Fifth Divisions
approached it. That they overcame all obstacles, gained all
their objectives, and captured nearly 2,000 prisoners, mainly
from crack Prussian regiments, constitutes an achievement
memorable in military annals and standing to the everlasting
glory of the troops who took part in it.<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a></p>

<p>It is difficult to write a connected and consecutive account
of the details of the fighting which took place. The most that
is possible in the brief space available is to indicate on general
lines the successive stages of the battle. Indeed, a minute
account of the action of each of the 35 Battalions engaged would
only prove wearisome and confusing. The best method of presenting
a general picture of the course of the engagement is to
follow the fortunes of each Brigade in turn.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[185]</a></span></p>
<p>First in order of time, and of most importance in relation to
its immediate results, was the action of the Second Division.
It was the 5th Brigade (Martin) which Major-General Rosenthal
had detailed to open the attack. The remaining two Brigades
of the Divisions (6th and 7th) received orders to rest the troops
as much as possible, but to be in readiness to move at the shortest
notice.</p>

<p>A Machine Gun Company (16 guns) was placed at the disposal
of Brigadier-General Martin, while the Artillery at the disposal
of the Division, comprising five Brigades of Field Artillery and
one Brigade of Heavy Artillery, remained under the personal
control of the Divisional Commander.</p>

<p>The attack opened with three Battalions of the 5th Brigade in
the first line, and one Battalion in support. The total strength
of the assaulting Infantry of this whole Brigade was on this day
not more than 70 Officers and 1,250 other ranks. The centre
Battalion was directed straight at the highest knoll of Mont
St. Quentin, while the right Battalion prolonged the line to the
right. The left Battalion had assigned to it as an immediate
objective the ruins of the village of Feuillaucourt, from
which it was hoped that a flank attack upon the Mount could be
developed.</p>

<p>The advance began at 5 a.m. It was a dull morning and still
quite dark. The two right Battalions advanced with as much
noise as possible, a ruse which secured the surrender of numbers
of the enemy lying out in advanced outpost positions. A nest
of seven Machine Guns was rushed and captured without any loss
to us.</p>

<p>At the appointed hour, our Artillery opened on selected
targets, the ranges being lengthened from moment to moment
in sympathy with the advance of the Infantry. Although during
the advance a great deal of machine gun fire was encountered,
all went well. The centre and left Battalions gained a footing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[186]</a></span>
respectively in Feuillaucourt and on the main hill, but the progress
of the right Battalion was arrested by heavy machine gun fire
from St. Denis. This was the site of a ruined sugar refinery, and
lay on the main road between Péronne and Mont St. Quentin.
It was a strong point that presented a great deal of difficulty
and held out to the last.</p>

<p>The centre Battalion had by 7 a.m. passed through the ruins
of Mont St. Quentin village and had crossed the main road from
Péronne to Bouchavesnes. It now had to receive the full brunt of
a determined counter attack, at a moment when it was still disorganized
and breathless from its difficult assault. The Battalion
was therefore withdrawn across the road and firmly established
itself in an old trench system to the west of it.</p>

<p>In this position it beat off five successive counter attacks,
inflicting most severe losses upon the enemy. The Brigade
maintained its position until nightfall. Its losses for the day were
380.</p>

<p>In the meantime the 6th Brigade (Robertson) of the Second
Division had been ordered to cross the Somme and move up behind
the 5th Brigade, in readiness to carry on the attack, and obtain
possession of the remainder of the main spur of Mont St. Quentin.
As this Brigade only entered into the fight at a later hour, I must
revert to the events of the forenoon of August 31st.</p>

<p>It was about 8 a.m. that I was able to report to General
Rawlinson, by telephone, that we had obtained a footing on Mont
St. Quentin itself. He was at first totally incredulous, but soon
generously congratulatory, proclaiming that the event was
calculated to have a most important influence upon the immediate
future course of the war. He expressed the hope that we should
be able to hold on to all that we had gained.</p>

<p>To this task I now had to bend myself, and I found it necessary
to put a severe strain upon the endurance and capacity of the
troops. Great as had always been my concern in the pitched
battles of the days recently passed to reduce to very definite
limits the demands made upon the physical powers of the Infantry
soldier, a juncture had arrived and a situation had been
created, which demanded the utmost rapidity in decision and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[187]</a></span>
action, and a relentless insistence upon prompt response by the
troops.</p>

<p>The 5th Brigade had been thrust out nearly two miles beyond
our general line. Its flanks were in the air. It was undoubtedly
fatigued. Everything must be done and done promptly to
render it adequate support, to take advantage of its success, and
to ensure that its effort had not been in vain.</p>

<p>It will be remembered that the Fifth and Second Divisions had
both been instructed to endeavour to secure a crossing over the
river. Whichever Division first succeeded was to accord right
of way to its neighbour. No success had yet attended the efforts
of the Fifth Division, the main Péronne bridges being still
inaccessible from the south. The bridge sites were under the
enemy's fire, which precluded the possibility of repair; and the
approaches to them were also swept by Machine Gun fire.</p>

<p>The Second Division, on the other hand, had during the past
48 hours succeeded in making the Feuillères bridge traffickable
for guns and vehicles, and those at Buscourt and Ommiécourt
for foot traffic. It transpired later that the enemy, rightly
suspecting that I would attempt to use this latter crossing, kept
it under heavy Artillery fire all day.</p>

<p>As soon as I had formed a judgment on the situation, about
8.30 a.m. (August 31st), I issued instructions to General Hobbs immediately
to put in motion his reserve Brigade, the 14th (Stewart).
He was to direct it towards the Ommiécourt crossing, and later
in the day to pass it across the river and through the ground
won that morning by the 5th Brigade, with a view to developing
at the earliest possible moment an attack in a south-easterly
direction upon the town of Péronne itself. The ultimate objective
was still to be the high ground south and east of Péronne.
His 8th Brigade was also to be held ready to move at the shortest
notice.</p>

<p>It was a serious performance to demand, and it was fraught
with many risks. There was no time to assemble responsible
Commanders concerned, separated as they were by long distances
over bad and congested roads. In the absence of properly co-ordinated
action, there was every chance of confusion, and cross-purposes,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[188]</a></span>
and even of collision of authority arising from the
troops of one Division passing over ground under the tactical
control of another Division.</p>

<p>But the only alternative was to do nothing and attempt
nothing. That would have been the worst of bad generalship,
and it was an occasion when risks must be taken.</p>

<p>The course of subsequent events fully demonstrated that the
only true solution was the one chosen, for the whole of the defences
of Péronne were thereby taken with a rush, while they were still
being organized by the enemy. The delay of only a day or two
would have meant that the capture of Péronne would have been
many times more costly than it actually proved to be.</p>

<p>The 14th Brigade had before it a march of some seven miles to
bring it into a position in which it could deploy for an attack
on Péronne. Working according to text book such a march
could have been accomplished in something under three hours.
It took the Brigade over ten hours. For the line of march lay
across the very worst of the shell-torn, tangled country enclosed
in the great bend of the Somme, and progress was most difficult
and exhausting. Frequent halts were necessary to rest the men,
and restore order to the struggling columns.</p>

<p>Discovering the impossibility of crossing the river at Ommiécourt,
the Brigade made a wide detour to cross by the newly
established bridge at Buscourt. It arrived there just at the same
time as the 7th Brigade (Wisdom), which Rosenthal had also
directed to the same point for the same purpose. This occurrence
illustrates the nature of the risks of a hastily developed tactical
plan. However, the good sense of the Commanders on the spot
obviated any serious confusion and the 7th Brigade gave the 14th
Brigade the right of way.</p>

<p>The 14th Brigade completed its march during the hours of
falling darkness and, passing through Cléry, came up on the right
of the 6th Brigade, in readiness for the combined attack by the
two Divisions at dawn on September 1st.</p>

<p>The night that followed was a stressful one for all Commanders.
Divisional Generals had to co-ordinate all action between their
Brigadiers, and their Artillery. The Brigadiers in turn had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[189]</a></span>
afterwards to assemble their Battalion Commanders, and decide
on detailed plans of action for each separate unit. Distances
were long, the country was strange, roads were few and unfamiliar;
so that it is not surprising that the last conferences did
not break up until well into the small hours of September 1st.
There was no sleep that night for any senior officer in the battle
area.</p>

<p>September 1st was a day full of great happenings and bloody
hand to hand fighting. The assault by the 6th Brigade passing
over the line won the day before by the 5th Brigade carried it
well over the crest of Mont St. Quentin, and confirmed for good
and all our hold on that imperious fortress. Few prisoners were
taken, for it was bayonet work over every inch of the advance,
and the field was strewn all over with enemy dead. The impetus
of the 6th Brigade assault carried our line 600 yards to the east
of the summit of the knoll.</p>

<p>It is difficult to allocate, in due proportion, the credit for the
capture of this important stronghold between the two gallant
Brigades concerned. It is true that the 6th Brigade did on
September 1st achieve the summit of the Mount; but it is equally
true that it only completed what the 5th Brigade had so wonderfully
begun the day before. No one will grudge to either
of the two Brigades their share of the honour that is due to both.</p>

<p>The action of the Second Division on that day was completed
by the bringing up of the 7th Brigade into a position of support
behind the 6th Brigade, thereby relieving the 5th Brigade from
further line duty.</p>

<p>Although the action of the individual Brigades of all the three
battle Divisions must necessarily be narrated separately and
with some attempt at a proper chronological sequence, yet it
would be a mistake to suppose that their actions were independent
of each other. On the contrary, they all operated as
part of a comprehensive battle plan, which necessarily took full
account of the interdependence of the course of events in
different parts of the field.</p>

<p>Thus the advance on this day of the 6th Brigade materially
assisted the attack on Péronne by the 14th Brigade, while the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[190]</a></span>
progress of the latter removed much trouble from the southern
flank of the 6th Brigade.</p>

<p>The men of the 14th Brigade that day had their mettle up
to a degree which was astonishing. On the occasion of the great
attack of August 8th, and ever since, it had been the cruel fate
of this Brigade to be the reserve unit of its Division on every
occasion when there was any serious fighting in hand. The
Brigade felt its position very keenly. As one Company Commander,
who distinguished himself in that day's fighting, afterwards
picturesquely put it: "You see! We'd been trying
to buy a fight off the other fellows for a matter of three weeks.
On that day we got what we'd been looking for, and we made the
most of it."<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p>

<p>The 14th Brigade advanced to the assault at 6 a.m. concurrently
with the eastern thrust of the 6th Brigade. One Battalion,
with two others in support, was directed against St. Denis, while
the fourth made a direct attack on Péronne. Many belts of wire
had to be struggled through. There was much machine gun fire,
from front and flanks, and it looked as if further progress would
be impossible. Nevertheless, this gallant Brigade, by persistent
effort, made itself master of the western half of Péronne.</p>

<p>The attack on St. Denis at first made very slow progress, the
enemy holding out resolutely in the ruins of that hamlet, and in
the adjacent brickfields. During the day, the 15th Brigade made
spirited attempts to effect the crossing of the river, and to co-operate
from the south.</p>

<p>The records of the events of these three days are confused
and discontinuous. Many of the men who could have filled in
the gaps of the story were unfortunately killed or evacuated as
casualties. But from the mass of reports, the salient facts
emerge clearly.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[191]</a></span></p>

<p>The 15th Brigade succeeded, on September 2nd, in putting a
Battalion across the river, and this assisted the 14th Brigade
to "mop up" the remainder of the town of Péronne. Later the
rest of the 15th Brigade and two Battalions of the 8th Brigade
(Tivey) were also drawn into the fighting. St. Denis and the
brickfields fell to us during this period.</p>

<p>Although the situation, from the point of view of the advance
eastwards, remained almost stationary, it was a time of fierce
local fighting. Many deeds of valour and sacrifice adorn the story.</p>

<p>It was late on September 3rd that the effects of this long-sustained
struggle became apparent. The whole of Péronne and
most of the high ground in its vicinity were, by then, definitely
in our hands, and although the little suburb of Flamicourt held
out determinedly for another day, the further resistance of the
enemy began to fade away.</p>

<p>Doubtless the loss of Mont St. Quentin was a controlling
factor in the decision which was forced upon him to undertake
a retreat, for with that eminence in our possession, he could not
have maintained himself for many days in the town, nor would
its retention have been of any tactical value to him.</p>

<p>As an immediate result, the high ground of the Flamicourt
spur just south of Péronne fell into our hands on September 3rd,
and the enemy outposts spread along the banks of the marsh
in front of the 32nd Division sought safety from complete envelopment
by a hasty withdrawal; a number of their isolated
posts were, however, left unwarned of this retreat, so that these
were, later on, captured by us from the rear.</p>

<p>I must now briefly turn to the doings of the Third Australian
Division during these four epic days. Its three Brigades (9th,
10th and 11th) daily performed prodigies of valour. The Division
carried our line, inexorably, up the Bouchavesnes spur in a
north-easterly direction. The seizure of this very important
ground not only powerfully aided but also strongly confirmed
our seizure of Mont St. Quentin.</p>

<p>The Division, having been given its general rôle, was necessarily
left to a large extent to decide for itself its detailed
action from day to day, seeing that it still had to perform the
function, inevitable for a flank Division, of a link with my
neighbouring Corps. Fortunately the arrival of a new, fresh<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[192]</a></span>
Division (the 74th) from the Eastern theatre of war, which came
into the Third Corps and was promptly thrown in, enabled
that Corps to keep up fairly well with the general advance.</p>

<p>The British Third Army, too, was now beginning to make its
pressure felt, and was approaching the line of the Canal du Nord
over a wide front. The Third Division was therefore free to
conform its forward movement to that of the rest of the Australian
Corps; its energetic action gave me elbow room for the
man&oelig;uvring of so many Brigades in the region of Cléry, and its
capture of so much valuable ground east of the Canal du Nord
served greatly to widen the breach.</p>

<p>By the night of September 3rd, the main tactical purposes
on which the Corps had been launched on August 29th had been
achieved in their entirety. Their execution furnishes the finest
example in the war of spirited and successful Infantry action
conducted by three whole Divisions operating simultaneously
side by side.</p>

<p>Lord Rawlinson has more than once referred to the operation
as the finest single feat of the war. Inevitably the dramatic
and unlooked for success of the Second Division in the rapid
storming of the Mount enthrals the imagination and overshadows
all the other noteworthy incidents of these pregnant days. But
none will begrudge the rain of congratulations which fell upon
the head of Major-General Rosenthal. A massive man, whose
build belies his extraordinary physical energy, he always was an
egregious optimist, incapable of recognizing the possibility of
failure. That is why he invariably succeeded in all that he
undertook, and often embarked upon the apparently impossible.
An architect before the war, he served for the first two years as
an Artillery officer, both as a Brigade Commander and as a
General of Divisional Artillery. He gained his Infantry experience
as Commander of the 9th Brigade, and so was well qualified
by versatile service to assume the command of the Second
Division. His leadership of the latter contributed in no small
measure to the fame which it has won.</p>

<p>The text of the congratulatory message issued on this occasion
by the Fourth Army read as follows:</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 791px;">
<img src="images/map-e.jpg" width="791" height="1200" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">Map E</span></p></div>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[193]</a></span></p>

<blockquote>

<p>"The capture of Mont St. Quentin by the Second
Division is a feat of arms worthy of the highest praise.
The natural strength of the position is immense, and the
tactical value of it, in reference to Péronne and the whole
system of the Somme defences, cannot be over-estimated.
I am filled with admiration at the gallantry and surpassing
daring of the Second Division in winning this important
fortress, and I congratulate them with all my heart.</p>

<div class="right">"<span class="smcap">Rawlinson.</span>"</div>
</blockquote>

<p>I am concerned nevertheless that the fine performance of the
Fifth Division should not be underrated. The circumstances
under which General Hobbs was called upon to intervene in the
battle, at very short notice, imposed upon him, personally,
difficulties of no mean order. I am prepared to admit quite
frankly that the demands which I had to make upon him, his
Staff and his Division were severe.</p>

<p>Following upon four days of arduous pursuit, his troops were
called upon to undertake a long and difficult march over a most
broken country, to be followed by three days of intensive fighting
of the most severe character.</p>

<p>General Hobbs was, first and foremost, a lover of the Australian
soldiers, and their devoted servitor. He belonged to that
type of citizen-soldier who, before the war, had spent long
years in preparing himself for a day when his country would
surely require his military services. Like several of the most
successful of Australia's generals, he had specialized in Artillery,
and was, in fact, selected as the senior Artillery Commander of
Australia's first contingent. That fact alone was the stamp of
his ability. While he would be the last to lay claim to special
brilliance, or outstanding military genius, he nevertheless succeeded
fully as the Commander of a Division, by his sound
common sense, and his sane attitude towards every problem that
confronted him. He possessed also the virtue of a large-hearted
sympathy for all subordinate to him; and that gave him a loyal
following, which carried him successfully through several great
crises in the affairs of the Fifth Division.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[194]</a></span></p>

<p>This period was one of those crises. When, late on the afternoon
of August 31st, he urged upon me with much earnestness
the stress upon his troops, and repeated the anxious representations
of his Brigadiers&mdash;I was compelled to harden my heart and
to insist that it was imperative to recognize a great opportunity
and to seize it unflinchingly. His response was loyal and
whole-hearted. His Division followed the lead which he thus
gave them, and he led them to imperishable fame.</p>

<p>Considerable redispositions followed upon the transfer of my
battle front to the country east of the Somme. These, and the
reasons which governed their nature, chief among which was
the resumption of the enemy's rearward movement, I shall deal
with in due course.</p>

<p>Battle problems on the grand scale were, for the moment,
relegated to the background, and there now arose a multitude
of other problems, almost equally burdensome, relating to the
supply and maintenance of the Corps.</p>

<p>Every Corps must be based upon a thoroughly reliable and
efficient line of supply, and for this a railway in first-class operating
condition is a prime essential. Every kind of requisite must be
carried by rail to some advanced distribution point called a
"railhead." Thence supplies are distributed by motor lorry to
the areas still further forward.</p>

<p>The appropriate distance of the railhead behind the battle
front is conditioned by the available supply of motor lorries,
and their range of action. If the distance be too great the
stress upon the mechanical transport becomes so severe that it
rapidly deteriorates, and an undue proportion of lorries daily
falls out of service. As the facilities for repair in the mobile
workshops are strictly limited, an excessive rate of wastage
among these vehicles soon dislocates the whole supply arrangements.</p>

<p>The experience hitherto gained had demonstrated that a railhead
could not conveniently be allowed to fall behind our advance
more than ten or twelve miles. This limit had already been
reached when the Corps front arrived on the west bank of the
Somme, and the strain upon the lorry service was already great.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[195]</a></span></p>

<p>For a further deep advance of the whole Corps in pursuit of
the enemy towards the Hindenburg Line, still distant another
fifteen miles, it became imperative, therefore, that the railway
service to Péronne and beyond should be speedily reopened, or
some equally efficient alternative provided. The great lattice
girder railway bridge at Péronne had been irretrievably demolished.
Engineers estimated that it would take two months
to restore it, and at least a month to provide even a temporary
deviation and crossing. Nevertheless, the work was put in hand
without delay.</p>

<p>An alternative possibility was to construct a new line of railway
to connect the existing military line at Bray to the Péronne
railway station, a length of new construction amounting
to some six miles. It was estimated that such a link could
be built in a fortnight, and this work also was commenced
forthwith.</p>

<p>There was a third possibility. This was speedily to repair
that portion of the railway which lay west of the Somme, and
to establish a railhead near Péronne, but on the opposite bank
of the river. This proposal involved only a few days' work, for
extensive sidings already existed on the west bank, and had
been left more or less undamaged by the enemy. But it also
involved the complete restoration of all road traffic bridges,
both at Péronne and at Brie, for the service of the intense traffic
which would ensue across the Somme from such a point of
departure.</p>

<p>The rebuilding of the crossings was, in any case, a matter
of urgent necessity. By this time all my heaviest guns had
already been brought up to the vicinity of the west bank of the
Somme, and had there perforce to wait; for a long detour, on
the densely-crowded roads, to cross the Somme, say as far
back as Corbie, where bridges were strong and grades were easy,
was out of the question.</p>

<p>The problem, therefore, involved a stable and comprehensive
reconstruction; half measures would not meet the case. But
half measures were an inevitable necessity of the situation, to
begin with, because troops had to be fed, and their supplies could<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[196]</a></span>
be carried in no lighter way, in adequate quantities, than in the
normal horse-transport wagons.</p>

<p>The order of procedure had, therefore, to be, firstly, hastily to
reconstruct some sort of bridging, based generally upon the
wreckage of the original bridge, and strong enough to carry loads
up to those of horsed wagons; next to stay, strut and strengthen
these temporary bridges to fit them for the passage of the
lighter guns, and finally to reconstruct them in their entirety
for the heaviest loads.</p>

<p>At a point such as the southern entrance to Péronne, where
the approaches could not be conveniently deviated, the difficulties
of such successive reconstructions, while the flow of traffic had
to be maintained, can hardly be fully realized.</p>

<p>For many days, in the early part of September, Brie, Eterpigny
and Péronne were scenes of feverish activity. Every available
technical unit that could be spared from other urgent duty
was concentrated upon this vital work. Most of the Engineer
Field Companies, three of the five Pioneer Battalions, both
Tunnelling Companies, and all the Army Troops Companies,
laboured in relays, night and day.</p>

<p>Hundreds of tons of steel girders, of all lengths and sections,
were hurried up, by special lorry service. Pile-driving gear was
hastily improvised. The wreckage of the original bridges was
overhauled for sound, useful timbers. The torn and twisted
steelwork was dragged out of the way by horse or steam power,
and tumbled in a confused mass into the river bed. Hammer,
saw and axe were wielded with a zest and vigour rarely seen in
peace-time construction. The whole work was supervised by
my Chief Engineer, Brigadier-General Foott, and was later,
when the advance of the Corps was resumed, completed by the
Army authorities. The speed and punctuality with which the
first temporary viaducts were completed and ready for use
were exemplary, and reflect every credit upon Foott and his
helpers. Within forty-eight hours bridges usable for ordinary
supplies and for field guns became available, and thereafter
were rapidly strengthened by successive stages.</p>

<p>The whole work of restoration, in which the Australian technical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[197]</a></span>
services played so prominent a part, won the highest praise
from the Field Marshal, who expressed his appreciation in a
special message of thanks to these services.</p>

<p>The congestion of traffic at the Péronne bottleneck was,
however, serious. Blocks occurred, reminiscent of those which
are familiar in the heart of London when the dense traffic is
temporarily held up by a passing procession. Marching troops
always had the right of way; and a Division on the move up
to or back from the line meant a severe super-load upon the
already overtaxed road capacity.</p>

<p>Sometimes a block of traffic would occur for an hour at a
time, and a motley collection of vehicles, stretching back for
miles, would pile up on the roads. The capabilities of a very
able road and traffic control service, numbering hundreds of
officers and men, acting under the direction of my Provost
Marshal, were often severely tested. More than once my own
motor car was unavoidably held up at this bottleneck for half
an hour at a time, on occasions, too, when the situation required
my urgent presence at some important meeting.</p>

<p>All these minor embarrassments arising from the passage by
the Australian Corps of a great military obstacle such as the
Somme were, however, soon dissipated. The Somme had loomed
large, for many days, in the minds of all of us&mdash;first as a problem
of tactics, and next as a problem of engineering. Before the end
of the first week of September the Somme had ceased to hold
our further interest. It had become a thing that was behind
us, both in thought and in actuality.</p>

<p>The enemy was once more on the move, and it became our
business to press relentlessly on his heels.</p>

<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> The following telegram, selected at random from the files of September 1st,
indicates the extraordinary mixture of units which the enemy had collected
to defend this vital point:
</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"To Australian Corps Intelligence from 2nd Division&mdash;sent September 1st
at 7 p.m. Identifications from prisoners examined since noon: 28th R.I.R.;
65th I.R.; 161st I.R.; 94th I.R.; 95th I.R.; 96th I.R.; Alexander Regt.;
Augusta Regt.; 4th Bav. I.R.; 8th Bav. I.R.; 25th Bav. I.R.; 447th I.R.;
2nd G. Guard F.A.R.; 221st F.A.R.; 2nd Co. M.G. Corps; 67th Pioneer Co.;
3rd Army Troops; 102nd Pioneer Bn. of 2nd Guards Div.; 402nd M.W.Co.;
185th R.I.R. A pioneer of the 23rd Co. has been retained for 5th Aust. Div. to
remove charges from bridges not yet blown. Prisoner 96th I.R. says Regt.
came up for counter-attack night 31-1 to retake Mt. St. Quentin, but counter-attack
did not come off, owing to attack expected from us. All prisoners
interrogated agree that line was to be held at all costs. Regiments are now
considerably intermingled and disorganized."</p>
</blockquote>

<p>
(<span class="smcap">Note.</span>&mdash;I.R.&mdash;Infanterie Regiment; R.I.R.&mdash;Reserve Infanterie Regiment;
M.W.Co.&mdash;Minenwerfer Compagnie; Bav.&mdash;Bavarian.)</p></div>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a name="Footnote_18_18" id="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> Mr. Hughes, the Commonwealth Prime Minister, visited the battlefield of
Mont St. Quentin, with a distinguished company, on September 14th. The
officer in question, standing near the summit of the hill, was about to relate his
experiences, and this was his preamble.</p></div></div>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[198]</a></span></p>

<h2>CHAPTER XII<br />

A LULL</h2>


<p>During the closing days of August events had commenced
to move rapidly; for the offensive activities initiated
by the Fourth Army, three weeks earlier, began to spread in
both directions along the Allied front.</p>

<p>The Third British Army had entered the fray on August 21st;
the First British Army was ready with its offensive on August
26th, on which date the Canadian Corps, restored to its old
familiar battleground, delivered a great attack opposite Arras.</p>

<p>The French, who, on my right flank, had along their front
followed up the enemy retirement begun after the battle of
Chuignes, reached Roye on August 27th, and Noyon on August
28th. Their line, however, still bore back south-westerly from
the vicinity of the river near Brie and St. Christ.</p>

<p>By August 29th the line of the First Army had reached and
passed Bapaume, and that of the Third Army cut through
Combles. The Third Corps, on my immediate left, had made
good its advance as far as Maurepas.</p>

<p>Thus, the thrust of the Australian Corps beyond the Canal
du Nord, on August 31st to September 3rd, formed the spearhead
which pierced the Somme line, and the Corps was still
leading the advance both of the French and the British.</p>

<p>From the morning of September 4th the evidences of the
enemy's resolution to withdraw to the Hindenburg Line became
hourly more unmistakable. His Artillery fire died down considerably,
particularly that from his long range and high velocity
guns. These were probably already on the move to the rear,
in order to clear the roads for his lighter traffic.</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_198fp.jpg" width="1200" height="793" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>The Hindenburg Line Wire&mdash;near Bony.</p></div>
</div>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_199fp.jpg" width="1200" height="786" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>The 15-inch Naval Gun&mdash;captured at Chuignes, August 23rd, 1918.</p></div>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[199]</a></span></p>

<p>The high ground near Biaches (west of Péronne) provided a
vantage point from which an extensive view of the whole country
could be obtained. There lay before us, beyond the Somme,
a belt about eight miles deep, which had scarcely suffered at all
from the ravages of the previous years of war.</p>

<p>It was gently undulating country, liberally watered, and
heavily wooded, especially in the minor valleys, in which snuggled
numerous villages still almost intact and habitable, although, of
course, entirely deserted by the civilian population.</p>

<p>Beyond this agreeable region there began again an area of
devastation, which grew in awful thoroughness as the great
Hindenburg Line was approached some six miles further on.
For, through the autumn and winter of 1917, and up to the
moment of the German offensive in March, 1918, it was there
that the British Fifth Army had faced the enemy in intensive
trench fighting.</p>

<p>In all directions over this still habitable belt there were now
signs of unusual life and activity. Columns of smoke began to
rise in the direction of all the villages. Sounds of great explosions
rent the air. These were sure indications that the
enemy was burning the stores which he could not hope to salve,
and was destroying his ammunition dumps lest they should
fall into our hands.</p>

<p>A vigorous pursuit was now the policy most to be desired.
But my troops in the line were very tired from the exertions of
a great struggle, and many of the units, by reason of their battle
losses, required time to reorganize and refit. It was also essential
that no rapid advance should be attempted until the arrangements
for supply, depending upon the completion of the Somme
crossings, had been assured.</p>

<p>The general line of advance of the Corps had, during August,
been in a due easterly direction. The operations about Péronne
had necessitated a drive north-easterly, and the advance of my
Third Division up the Bouchavesnes spur had carried them
square across the line of advance of the Third Corps.</p>

<p>The first step was to restore our original Corps boundaries,
and to resume the original line of advance. By arrangement
with General Godley, his 74th Division took over the ground<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[200]</a></span>
captured by my Third Division, which was thereby released
and enabled to concentrate, for a couple of days' rest, in the
Cléry region. The Second Division employed its 7th Brigade
on September 2nd and 3rd to advance our line beyond Haut
Allaines, another two miles east of Mont St. Quentin, routing
from the trenches of that spur the strong rearguards which the
enemy had posted for the purpose of delaying us.</p>

<p>On the night of September 4th the 74th Division took over
the Haut Allaines spur also, thereby releasing my Second
Division, and the latter was withdrawn to the Cappy area for a
thorough and well-deserved rest.</p>

<p>Meanwhile, the 32nd Imperial Division, availing itself of the
temporary crossings which had hastily been effected over the
Somme, brought its front up, on the eastern bank of the river,
level with the line which had by September 4th been reached
by the Fifth Australian Division.</p>

<p>On September 5th, therefore, I had, east of the Somme, two
Divisions in the line, the 32nd on the right or south, the Fifth
Australian on the left or north, each operating on a frontage of
two Brigades, with one Brigade in reserve. This was, however,
quite a temporary arrangement, devised merely to allow time
for the Third Division to reorganize and resume its place in the
front line of the general advance.</p>

<p>The general withdrawal of the enemy, over a very wide front,
now began to effect a very substantial reduction of the length of
frontage which he had to defend. The enemy communiqués
and wireless propaganda of that time busied themselves with the
explanation that the withdrawals in progress were being deliberately
carried out for the very purpose of releasing forces
from the line to form a great strategic reserve.</p>

<p>These protestations did not deceive us, nor did we on our
part fail also to take full advantage of the steady shortenings of
the Allied front. Marshal Foch decided once again to readjust
the international boundary, and my own front was thereby
considerably shortened. The French took over from the 32nd
Division all ground south of the main Amiens&mdash;St. Quentin road;
and that road henceforth became my southern boundary.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[201]</a></span></p>

<p>This, coupled with the readjustment of the northern boundary
with the Third Corps, as already narrated, reduced the total
frontage for which I remained responsible to about ten thousand
yards, an extent which was never again exceeded. It was still,
however, in my judgment, too long a frontage for an effective
pursuit by only two Divisions, and arrangements were initiated
on the same day to bring back the Third Division into line.</p>

<p>During September 5th I advanced my front to the line Athies&mdash;Le
Mesnil&mdash;Doingt&mdash;Bussu. Severe fighting took place near
Doingt. Opposition came mainly from machine guns; but
isolated field-guns also gave us trouble. We captured that day
about a hundred and fifty prisoners.</p>

<p>Next day my Third Division came into the line on the north.
I divided my frontage equally between the three Divisions,
placing each on a single Brigade front. This was, in fact, a
repetition of the order of battle which had carried us so successfully
and rapidly up to the Somme.</p>

<p>Each front line Brigade took up the rôle of Advanced Guard
to its Division. The 11th Brigade led the Third Division; the
8th Brigade led the Fifth Division, while the 97th Brigade covered
the 32nd Imperial Division.</p>

<p>For the first time in the war I found an opportunity of employing
my Corps Cavalry (13th Australian Light Horse) on
other than their habitual duty of carrying despatches, or providing
mounted escorts to convoys of prisoners of war. Here
at last was a chance for bold mounted tactics, as the county
was mainly open and free of wire and trenches.</p>

<p>To each Division I therefore allotted a squadron of Light
Horse for vanguard duty, together with detachments of the
Australian Cyclist Battalion. These troops more than justified
their employment by bold, forward reconnaissance, and energetic
pressure upon the enemy rearguards.</p>

<p>So promising, indeed, was the prospect of the useful employment
of cavalry, that I prevailed upon the Army Commander
to endeavour to secure for my use a whole Cavalry Brigade.
Brigadier-General Neil Haig (cousin of the Field Marshal) was
actually sent for and placed under my orders. I duly arranged<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[202]</a></span>
a plan of action with him, but before the 1st Cavalry Brigade,
stationed many miles away, had completed its long march into
my area, the situation had already changed, and the employment
of Cavalry on the Fourth Army front had to be postponed
until a much later date.</p>

<p>A juncture had arrived when it became imperative for me
to consider the possibility of affording some relief to the three
line Divisions; all of them had been fighting without respite
since August 27th. The troops were so tired from want of sleep
and physical strain that many of them could be seen by the
roadside, fast asleep. These three Divisions had almost reached
the limits of their endurance.</p>

<p>It was essential, however, that they should be called upon
to yield up the last particle of effort of which they were capable.
Every mile by which they could approach nearer to the Hindenburg
defences meant a saving of effort on the part of the fresh
waiting Divisions, whom I had earmarked for the first stage of
our contemplated assault upon that formidable system; a
system which I knew to be too deep to be overwhelmed in a
single operation.</p>

<p>It was for this reason that I was compelled to disregard the
evident signs of overstrain which were brought to my notice
by the Divisional Generals and their Brigadiers, and which
were patent to my own observation of the condition of the troops.
I arranged, however, two measures of immediate relief, the first
being to set a definite limit of time for the further demands to
be made upon the line Divisions. This was fixed for September
10th. The second was to issue orders that the rate of our further
advance was to be controlled by consideration for the well-being
of our own troops, and not by the rate of the enemy's retreat.
If, in consequence, any gap should eventuate, touch with the
enemy was to be kept by the mounted troops and cyclists.</p>

<p>The preliminary steps for effecting the reliefs thus promised
for September 10th were begun on September 5th. The
Corps was, as stated, on a three Division front. I had only
two fit Divisions in Corps Reserve (<i>i.e.</i>, the First and Fourth),
the Second Division being not yet rested. My representations<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[203]</a></span>
to the Army Commander on this matter bore immediate fruit;
for he placed under my orders the Sixth (Imperial) Division
(one of the first seven Divisions of the original Expeditionary
Force). Before, however, I could take advantage of this windfall,
the constitution of the Fourth Army underwent a vital
alteration, of which more will be told later.</p>

<p>The First and Fourth Divisions had been resting since August
26th. They had had time to reorganize their units, to reclothe
and refit their troops, to receive and absorb reinforcements, and
to fill vacancies among leaders. Staffs had been able to deal
with a mass of arrears. The men had enjoyed a pleasant holiday
in the now peaceful Somme Valley, far in rear, a holiday devoted
to games and aquatic sports. Horse and man, alike, were
refreshed, and had been inspired by the continued successes of
the remainder of the Corps.</p>

<p>They were however, by now, far in rear; and it was out of
the question to tax their restored energies by calling upon them
to march back to the battle zone. The Fourth Army, as always,
extended its sympathetic help; two motor bus convoys, each
capable of dealing with a Brigade group a day, were speedily
materialized from the resources of G.H.Q.</p>

<p>The completion of the moves of these two Divisions from the
back area to within easy marching distance of the battle front
therefore occupied three days. The use of mechanical transport
for the execution of troop movements has now entirely passed
the experimental stage, and in future wars, calculations of time
and space will be vitally affected, whenever an ample supply of
lorries or buses and suitable roads are available for the rapid
concentration or dispersal of large bodies of troops.</p>

<p>The Australian soldier is individually philosophic and stoical,
but in the mass he is sensitive to a degree; and he is intelligent
enough to realize how he is used or misused. It was the subject
of complaint among the troops during the earlier years of the war,
that while they were indulgently carried by lorries into the battle
at a time when they were fresh and fit, they were invariably left
to march long distances, out of the battle, when they were on
the verge of exhaustion. I therefore tried, whenever possible,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[204]</a></span>
to provide tired troops with the means of transport to their
rest areas, a facility which was always highly appreciated by
them.</p>

<p>By the time the First and Fourth Divisions had thus been
assembled in the forward areas, ready to relieve the Third and
Fifth Divisions, these latter, together with the 32nd Division,
had advanced our front approximately to the line Vermand&mdash;Vendelles&mdash;Hesbecourt,
carrying it to within three miles of the
front line of the Hindenburg defence system.</p>

<p>There can be no doubt, however, that the rate of our advance,
retarded as it had been for the reasons already explained, had
proceeded much more rapidly than suited the enemy.</p>

<p>A steady stream of prisoners kept pouring in, captured in
twos and threes, all along my front, by my energetic patrols.
Numerous machine guns were taken; and in the vicinity of
Roisel, fully three hundred transport vehicles and much engineering
material were captured, which the enemy had been compelled
to abandon in haste.</p>

<p>At this juncture the British High Command arrived at the
important decision to enlarge the Fourth Army, by adding
another Corps; doubtless contemplating the possibility of operations
on a large scale against the Hindenburg defences in the
near future.</p>

<p>A new Corps Headquarters, the Ninth, was to be reconstituted
under Lieut.-General Braithwaite, and he was to become my
neighbour on my southern flank, interposed between me and
the French. Braithwaite had been Chief of Staff to Sir Ian
Hamilton during the Dardanelles Expedition, and I had seen
much of him there. I was to have the advantage, therefore, of
having old Gallipoli comrades on either flank, Braithwaite on
the south, and Godley on the north.</p>

<p>The immediate result of this decision, which came into effect
early on September 12th, was that the 32nd Division, which
had been under my orders for nearly four weeks, passed over
to the Ninth Corps. Lambert, his Staff and his Division had
served me well and efficiently, and I was sorry to lose them
out of my Corps.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[205]</a></span></p>

<p>With the impending further shortening of my front, I had
no justification for pressing to be permitted to retain this Division.
On the contrary, my representations to General Rawlinson had
always been in favour of shortening my frontage to the effective
battle standard of August 8th, so that the Corps might at any
time be in a position to embark on a major operation, with its
whole resources in Artillery and Infantry concentrated, as on
that occasion, upon a relatively narrow objective. My greatly
extended front, and the direct control of the affairs of six separate
Divisions, had been a heavy burden, involving great and manifold
responsibilities.</p>

<p>According to my promises to the remaining two line Divisions,
the Fifth and Third, these were duly relieved on September
10th by the First and Fourth Divisions, the former on the north,
the latter on the south. Each Division had a frontage of about
four thousand yards, but this was to diminish rapidly, if the
advance of the Corps continued, by reason of the fact that
my southern boundary now became the Omignon River, whose
course ran obliquely from the north-east.</p>

<p>While all these changes in dispositions were being effected,
there was breathing time to give attention to a heavy mass of
arrears of work; for there could be no question of undertaking
an attack on the Hindenburg defences without most careful
and exhaustive preparation.</p>

<p>For this the time was not yet ripe. It would still take some
days to bring forward the remainder of my heaviest Artillery,
to advance the railheads, to replenish the ammunition depots
and supply dumps, and to re-establish telegraph and telephone
communications.</p>

<p>Another good reason for a more leisurely policy on the front
of the Fourth Army lay in the events on other portions of the
Allied fronts. By September 4th the German withdrawal
had become general on all fronts.</p>

<p>It had become clear that the enemy's retirement to his former
position of March, 1918, was not to be confined to those fronts
on which he had been receiving such punishment. All evidence
pointed to the fact that his present strategy was to take up<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[206]</a></span>
as speedily as possible a strong defensive attitude, behind the
great system of field works, which had already served him so
well during 1917, at a time when a considerable proportion of
his military resources was still involved on the Russian and
Roumanian fronts.</p>

<p>His retirement before the First and Third British Armies was
proceeding methodically, and on September 5th the French
were crossing the Vesle, between Rheims and Soissons. All
was going well; and those in the confidence of our High Command
knew that, on any day now, news might be expected of
the first great attack to be made by the American Army, to be
directed against the St. Mihiel Salient on the Alsace front.</p>

<p>This latter attack actually opened on September 11th, and it
was clearly sound military policy to wait for a few days, in order
correctly to diagnose the effect of these operations upon the
enemy's distribution of forces.</p>

<p>Information as to the locations and movements of all the enemy
Divisions was in these days voluminous, accurate and speedy.
Prisoners and documents were daily falling into the hands of the
Allies over the whole length of the Western Front. His Divisions
in the front line were identified daily by actual contact. As to
those resting or refitting or in reserve, accurate deductions could
be made from the mass of information at our disposal.</p>

<p>It was at this time that it began to be made clear to us that
the enemy's mobile reserves had been almost completely absorbed
into the front line. One Division after another, particularly
among those which had been engaged against the Australian
Corps in August, was being disbanded. Among these were the
109th, 225th, 233rd, 54th Reserve, and 14th Bavarian Divisions.</p>

<p>The strength of the enemy's remaining Divisions was also
rapidly diminishing. From prisoners we learned that many
Battalions now had only three Companies instead of four, many
Regiments only two Battalions instead of three, and even the
Company strengths were at a low ebb.</p>

<p>We could well afford to approach the immediate future with
greater deliberation.</p>

<p>Since August 8th, the Corps front had already advanced<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[207]</a></span>
twenty-five miles, and it was not long before I had to abandon
the luxurious château of the Marquis de Clermont-Tonnere, at
Bertangles, whose spacious halls and spreading parks had formed
so pleasant a habitation for the whole of my Corps Headquarters.</p>

<p>The scale of comfort possible for all senior Commanders and
Staffs rapidly declined as the advance developed. Generals of
Corps, Divisions and Brigades had to be content with living and
office quarters in a steadily descending gradation of convenience.
From château to humbler dwelling house, and thence into bare
wooden huts, and later still into mere holes hollowed out in the
sides of quarries or railway cuttings, were the stages of progress
in this downward scale.</p>

<p>My Headquarters moved from Bertangles to a group of village
houses at Glisy on August 13th; thence on August 31st to Méricourt,
where the best had to be made of a derelict, much battered
and almost roofless château, which the Germans had rifled of
every stick of furniture, and even of all doors and windows, in
order to equip a large collection of dug-outs in a neighbouring
hill-side.</p>

<p>Again on September 8th I moved into the very centre of the
devastated area lying in the Somme bend, on to a small rise near
Assevillers, where a number of tiny wooden huts served us as
bedrooms by night and offices by day. Only one hut, more pretentiously
brick-walled and evidently built for the use of some
German officer of high rank, was available to fulfil the duties of
hospitality.</p>

<p>In spite of such discomforts, the daily life at Corps Headquarters
flowed on uninterruptedly in its several quite distinct
activities. On the one hand, there was the grim business of
fighting, the detailed conduct of the battle of to-day, the troop
and artillery movements for that of to-morrow, the planning of the
one to be undertaken still later; rounds of conferences and consultations;
visits to Divisions and Brigades, and to Artillery;
reconnaissances to the forward zone; and an intent and ceaseless
study of maps and Intelligence summaries.</p>

<p>Hourly contact with Headquarters of Fourth Army and of
flank Corps had to be maintained. Then, following the day's<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[208]</a></span>
strenuous activities out of doors, there was at nights a never-diminishing
mass of administrative work, disciplinary questions,
honours, awards, appointments, promotions, and a formidable
correspondence which must not be allowed to fall into arrear.</p>

<p>Again, in the back areas there were the unemployed Divisions
of the Corps, who must be regularly visited, both at training and
at play. There were medals and ribbons to be distributed to the
gallant winners; addresses to be delivered; and the work of
reorganizing and refitting the resting units to be supervised.
Still further in rear, demonstrations of new experiments in tactics
or in weapons, or in mechanical warfare, had frequently to be
attended, for study and criticism.</p>

<p>And lastly there was the social life of the Corps; for its performances
were beginning to attract attention beyond the limited,
if select, circles of the Fourth Army. A steady stream of visitors
began to set in. It was a necessary burden that suitable arrangements
for their reception and entertainment had to be maintained.</p>

<p>The duties of hospitality had been simple at a time when Corps
Headquarters was still housed in palatial châteaux, situated in
country hitherto untouched by the war, and within easy reach of
all supplies. It was a very different matter to offer even reasonable
comfort to a visitor at a time when Government rations
constituted the backbone of our fare, when there were only bare
floors to sleep upon for those who were not fortunate enough to
possess a camp bed or valise, and when even an extra blanket
or pillow or towel was at a premium.</p>

<p>Yet we were always most glad to see visitors, and those of them
who were soldiers had, of course, a full understanding of our
limitations. It was not always so with others who, in the earlier
years of the war, when all Corps had a fixed location and had
achieved a high standard of domestic comfort, had been accustomed
to an adequate reception.</p>

<p>Upon the whole, our guests were indulgent, and understood
that the stress of current events placed a very strict limit upon
the amount of time that the members of my Staff or I could
devote to them.</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/map-f.jpg" width="1200" height="610" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">Map F</span></p></div>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[209]</a></span>

Among many other distinguished men whom I had the honour
to receive were members of the War Cabinet, such as Lord
Milner, then Secretary of State for War, and Mr. Winston
Churchill, the Minister of Munitions; public men, such as Sir
Horace Plunkett and Robert Blatchford; eminent authors, such
as Sir Conan Doyle, Sir Gilbert Parker and Ian Hay; famous
artists, such as Louis Raemakers, Streeton and Longstaff;
celebrated journalists, like Viscount Burnham, Thomas Marlowe
and Cope Cornford; together with many representatives of
the Royal Navy, and of the armies of our Allies, and Attachés
from all the Allied Embassies.</p>

<p>The Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Haig, was a frequent
caller, and never departed without leaving a stimulating impression
of his placid, hopeful and undaunted personality, nor without
a generous recognition of the work which the Corps was doing.</p>

<p>General Birdwood, also, the former Corps Commander, who
now commanded the Fifth Army, paid several visits to the Corps,
travelling long distances in order to speak a few encouraging words
to the Commanders and troops with whom he had formerly been
so long and so closely associated. He, too, was always a most
welcome visitor. Although since the previous May he had ceased
to control the fighting activities of the Corps, this did not lessen
the intense pride which he took in its daily successes.</p>

<p>Many of our civilian visitors thirsted for the noise and tumult
of battle, and were most keen to get under fire, even if only of
long-range artillery fire. This was a constant source of anxiety
to me, for it was an unwritten law that the responsibility of their
safe sojourn in the Corps area rested with me. More often than
not they had to be dissuaded from visiting the forward zone, and
induced to spend their available time in inspecting some of our
show spots in the rearward areas, such as the Calibration ranges,
or the Corps central telegraph station, or the Tank park, or even
the Prisoner of War Cages, and the numerous depots of captured
guns and war trophies.</p>

<p>The Corps prisoners' cage was always, throughout the period
of our active fighting, a scene both of great interest and much
activity. Although all prisoners of war had to be evacuated to
the rear usually within about twenty-four hours of their admission,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[210]</a></span>
and every day a batch marched out under escort, yet the
Corps cage between July and October was never empty.</p>

<p>When early in July the stream of prisoners began to flow in,
and thereafter grew steadily stronger, my Intelligence Service,
headed by Major S. A. Hunn, rose thoroughly to the occasion.
Among our troops sufficient numbers of all ranks proficient in the
German language were speedily found. After a little training
they learned to deal expeditiously with the lengthy searchings
and interrogations which followed the arrival of all new-comers.</p>

<p>Documents of every description found upon prisoners excepting
their pay-books, were seized and examined. The German
soldier is an inveterate sender and recipient of picture postcards.
It was surprising how much information of an invaluable character
could be gleaned from a postcard. A date, a place name, the
number of a Unit or Regiment, the name of a Commander,
reference to a train journey or a fight, are often sufficient, when
read by an expert in relation to the context, to furnish definite
information of the whereabouts of a Division, or of the fact that
it has been or is about to be disbanded, or of its intended movement
to some other part of the front, or of the losses which it has
suffered.</p>

<p>All these scraps of information, when compared with similar
items gathered on other fronts, soon enabled the whole story of
all movement that was going on behind the enemy's lines to be
deduced from day to day with wonderful completeness.</p>

<p>So, also, maps, sketches, copies of orders, or of battle instructions,
and the contents of note-books and of personal diaries
always repaid the closest scrutiny. Such study produced results
which, even if not of immediate value to me, were nevertheless
passed on to the Army, and by them broadly promulgated, in
daily summaries, for the benefit of all our other Corps.</p>

<p>The oral interrogation of the prisoners, particularly of officers,
often produced results of first-class importance. Information
as to dispositions, intentions, new tactical methods or new weapons
frequently emerged from these inquiries. It was rare that
prisoners refused to talk, and rarer still for them to attempt to
mislead with false information. If they did attempt it, the interrogating<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[211]</a></span>
officer was usually sufficiently well-informed upon the
subject of inquiry to be able to detect the inconsistency.</p>

<p>As the prisoners were invariably examined separately, it was
never difficult to discriminate between the true, upon which the
majority of them were in agreement, and the false, upon which
the minority never agreed.</p>

<p>Should the prisoner prove uncommunicative or deceitful,
then if he were of sufficient education to make it worth while,
the Intelligence Officer had yet another method, besides direct
questioning, at his disposal.</p>

<p>For a certain number of our own men, who could speak German
fluently, and who had been carefully tutored in their rôle, were
provided with enemy uniforms, and allowed to grow a three-days'
beard, so as to impersonate prisoners of war. These men, so
equipped, were called "pigeons." A pigeon would be ostentatiously
brought under escort into the prisoners' cage, and would
sojourn for a day or more in a compartment of it among the
specially selected genuine prisoners. He would indicate by a
secret sign the time when he should himself be led to the Intelligence
Office for interrogation. It was seldom that he came away
empty-handed.</p>

<p>The demeanour of our captives, on reaching the cages, varied
widely, according to the stress which they had undergone. Some
wore an air of abject misery, and were thoroughly cowed and
subservient. Others were defiant, sulky and even arrogant.</p>

<p>Our treatment of them was firm, but humane. Physically,
they had nothing to complain of; they were fed and quartered
on the same standard as our own men. But they were given to
understand from the very outset that we would stand no
nonsense, and that they must do exactly what they were told.
Few of them ever gave us any real trouble.</p>

<p>The subsequent employment of prisoners of war did not come
under my jurisdiction, and it was seldom that any prisoner
working parties were available to me. My Corps area rarely
extended sufficiently far back from the front line to carry it
beyond the zone in which, by agreement between the belligerents,
the employment of prisoners of war was forbidden.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[212]</a></span></p>

<p>Australian soldiers are nothing if not sportsmen, and no case
ever came under my notice of brutality or inhumanity to prisoners.
Upon the contrary, when once a man's surrender had been
accepted, and he had been fully disarmed, he was treated with
marked kindness. The front line troops were always ready to
share their water and rations with their prisoners, and cigarettes
were distributed with a liberal hand.</p>

<p>On the other hand, the souvenir-hunting instinct of the
Australian led him to help himself freely to such mementos
as our orders had not forbidden him to touch. Prisoners rarely
got as far as the Corps cage with a full outfit of regimental buttons,
cockades, shoulder-straps, or other accoutrements. Personal
trinkets, pay-books, money and other individual belongings were,
however, invariably respected; unless, as often happened, the
prisoners themselves were anxious to trade them away to their
captors, or escorts, for tobacco, chocolates, or other luxuries.</p>

<p>Before I leave the subject of prisoners I should mention my
impression of the German officers, particularly of those who were
more senior in rank. Whenever a Regimental or Battalion Commander
was captured, and time permitted, he was brought before
me for a further interrogation. It was an experience which was
almost universal that such officers were willing to give me little
information which might injure their cause; on the other hand,
they exhibited an altogether exaggerated air of wounded pride
at their capture, and at the defeat of the troops whom they had
commanded.</p>

<p>It was that feeling of professional pique which dominated their
whole demeanour. They were always volubly full of excuses,
the weather, the fog, the poor <i>moral</i> of their own men, the unexpectedness
of our attack, the Tanks, errors in their maps&mdash;anything
at all but a frank admission of their own military
inferiority.</p>

<p>There were two amusing exceptions to this experience. The
day after the fighting for Péronne, when a large batch of the
prisoners then taken was being got ready to march out of the
Corps cage, officers in one enclosure, other ranks in another,
the senior German officer, a Regimental Commander, formally<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[213]</a></span>
requested permission to address some eighty other officers present
in the cage. This request was granted.</p>

<p>He told them that they had fought a good fight, that their
capture was not to their discredit, and that he would report
favourably upon them to his superiors at the first opportunity.
He then went on to say that on his own and on their behalf he
desired to tender to the Australians an expression of his admiration
for their prowess, and to make a frank acknowledgment to
them that he fully recognized that on this occasion his garrison
had been outclassed, out-man&oelig;uvred, and out-fought. The whole
assembly expressed their acquiescence in these observations by
collectively bowing gravely to the small group of my Intelligence
Officers who were amused spectators of the scene.</p>

<p>On another occasion&mdash;it was just after the battle of September
18th&mdash;I was asking a German Battalion Commander whether he
could explain why it was that his men had that day surrendered
in such large numbers without much show of resistance. "Well,
you see," said he, with a twinkle in his eye, "they are dreadfully
afraid of the Australians. So they are of the Tanks. But when
they saw both of them coming at them <i>together</i>, they thought it
was high time to throw up their hands."</p>

<p>But this story is slightly anticipatory. The short breathing-space
which had been afforded by our more leisurely advance
towards the Hindenburg system was over. By September 12th
I was once again immersed in all the perplexities of shaping means
to ends. I had to decide, in collaboration with the Army Staff
and the Corps on my flanks, first, the extent of the resources which
would be required, and second, the successive stages which would
offer promise of success in overthrowing the last great defensive
system of all those which the enemy had created upon the tortured
soil of France.</p>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[214]</a></span></p>




<h2>CHAPTER XIII<br />

HARGICOURT</h2>


<p>The great Hindenburg system, by which name it has come
to be known to English readers, or the "Siegfried Line,"
as it is called by the Germans, was brought into existence during
the winter of 1916 and early spring of 1917 in order to fulfil a
very definite strategic purpose. This was to put into effect, on a
stupendous scale, a very elementary principle of minor tactics,
namely, that field works are constructed for the purpose of reducing
the number of men required to defend a given front or
locality.</p>

<p>In themselves, field fortifications have, of course, no offensive
value whatever, but their use permits a reduced number of men
to defend one place, in order that a greater number of men may be
available to attack another place.</p>

<p>The German High Command proceeded to make use of this
principle on a scale previously unknown in history. The whole
of the Western front, in Belgium and France, was to be held
defensively throughout 1917. The military resources required
to defend that front were to be reduced to a minimum, by the
provision of a line of defences protected by powerful field works,
believed to be impregnable. This would liberate the greatest
possible resources for the Eastern front, where an end could be
made of the Russians and Roumanians there. As soon as these
were disposed of, those troops, guns and aeroplanes could again be
transferred to the West, in order similarly to dispose of the remainder
of our Alliance.</p>

<p>This great strategic plan was carried out in its entirety until
the middle of 1918. It was the great Hindenburg line which had
been the kernel of the whole conception, and, until the days which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[215]</a></span>
we are now approaching, it had remained, practically over its
whole length, an impregnable barrier against the assaults of the
French and British.</p>

<p>It is to be remembered that the very basis which justified the
expenditure of such enormous labour on the creation of these
defences was the saving in man-power. It is an accepted principle
of tactics that in any given battle the advantage always
rests heavily on the side of the defence. Where numbers, resources
and <i>moral</i> are equal, no attack can hope to succeed.</p>

<p>If, in the teachings before the war, it was correct to say that
a Commander should hesitate to attack unless he had a preponderance
of men and guns of at least two to one, such a dictum
assuredly did not take into account field defences of the permanent
and elaborate character of the Hindenburg Line. I
should hardly venture to fix a ratio of relative strength appropriate
in such circumstances.</p>

<p>But this much is clear. The Germans had once already relied
successfully upon the impregnability of this great work. They
had every justification for believing that it would once again
serve them to keep us at bay for just a few weeks longer. Winter
was very near, and the Entente peoples might not have been able
to hold together to face another year of war.</p>

<p>We, on our part also, had as much justification for the resolve
that every sacrifice must be made to overthrow these defences
before the end of 1918, and for believing that it would require a
great, concerted and intense effort to succeed in this.</p>

<p>It is quite necessary, for a due appreciation of the magnitude
of the effort which was actually made, and of the wonderful
success with which it was rewarded, that the nature of the
defences of the Hindenburg Line should be clearly understood.
This can best be done, I think, by making an endeavour to realize
the sense of security which the possession of such a line of defence
must have afforded to the enemy. We are here interested only
in that portion of the line which extends from St. Quentin northwards
towards Cambrai.</p>

<p>Between these two cities the country is higher than that adjoining
it on the north and the south. It forms, therefore, a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[216]</a></span>
watershed, dividing the basin of the Somme from that of the
Scheldt. Early in the nineteenth century, Napoleon realized
the ambitious project of connecting these two river systems by a
great Canal scheme, cutting right through this high country from
south to north.</p>

<p>The canal is called, in its southern reaches, Canal de St.
Quentin. Before Cambrai is reached it merges into the Canal
de l'Escaut. Throughout the whole of that portion which
concerns us, it runs in a deep cutting, reaching, for great stretches,
a depth of 50 to 60 feet. In certain places where the ground
rises still higher, the canal passes through in great tunnels. The
southernmost, or Le Tronquoy Tunnel, near St. Quentin, is but
short; the northern boasts of the imposing length of 6,000 yards,
and extends from Bellicourt,<a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> at its southern portal, to Le Catelet
at its northern one. From that point northwards the canal
flows in "open cut" which gradually becomes shallower as
Cambrai is approached.</p>

<p>The canal excavation&mdash;except where the tunnels occur&mdash;itself
affords an excellent military obstacle, the passage of which
could be stoutly contested by resolute troops well dug in on its
eastern banks, for the descent and ascent of the slopes could be
obstructed by wire entanglements, and swept with fire. The
water alone, which is too deep to be waded, would seriously impede
infantry, while the passage of tanks, guns and vehicles would
be impossible once the few high level bridges over the canal had
been destroyed.</p>

<p>Such an obstacle would not, however, of itself fulfil the requirements
of modern war, with its searching and destructive Artillery
fire. It was to be regarded more as the foundation upon which
a complete system of defences could be built, and as a last line of
resistance <i>à outrance</i>.</p>

<p>The canal had been, naturally, located by its engineers, in the
lowest ground available, so that its course closely follows the
lines of the minor valleys and depressions of the ground. On
both sides, therefore, the canal is flanked by somewhat higher
ground, from which its immediate banks can be overlooked. On
the western side particularly, there is a regular line of such higher
plateaux on which the villages of Villeret, Hargicourt and
Ronssoy once stood.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[217]</a></span></p>
<p>It was clearly desirable both to deprive a besieger of such
vantage ground, and also to provide the canal defences with a
stout outpost defence. For these reasons, the Germans had constructed
an elaborate system of trenches on a line generally parallel
to and on the average a full mile west of the canal. These
trenches had been perfected with dug-outs, concrete machine
gun and mortar emplacements, and underground shelters. They
were protected by belt after belt of barbed wire entanglements,
in a fashion which no one understood better, or achieved more
thoroughly, than the Germans.</p>

<p>But much more remained. Deep communication trenches
led back to the canal banks, in the sides of which tier upon tier
of comfortable living quarters for the troops had been tunnelled
out. Here support and reserve troops could live in safety and
defy our heaviest bombardments. They could be secretly hurried
to the front trenches whenever danger threatened.</p>

<p>There was, indeed, a perfect tangle of underground shelters
and passages. Roomy dug-outs were provided with tunnelled
ways which led to cunningly hidden machine-gun posts, and the
best of care was taken to provide numerous exits, so that the
occupants should not be imprisoned by the blocking of one or
other of them by our bombardment. But it was the barbed wire
which formed the groundwork of the defence. It was everywhere,
and ran in all directions, cleverly disposed so as to herd the
attackers into the very jaws of the machine guns.</p>

<p>The stretch of 6,000 yards of the canal which had been
tunnelled was, however, both a hindrance and a benefit to the
perfection of the scheme. On the one hand, the advantage of
the open cut, as a last obstacle, was lost. Its place had to be
taken by a second complete system of trench and wire defences,
roughly following the line of the tunnel, but of course far above
the latter. On the other hand, the tunnel itself afforded secure
living accommodation for a substantial garrison.</p>

<p>The Germans had collected large numbers of canal barges,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[218]</a></span>
and had towed them into the interior of the tunnel, mooring
them end to end. They served as living quarters and as depots
for stores and munitions. It was no great business to provide
electric lighting for the tunnel. Indeed, the leads for this
purpose had been in existence before the war. Here, again,
underground shafts and ways were cut to enable the troops
rapidly to man the trenches and machine guns, and as rapidly to
seek a safe asylum from the heaviest shell fire.</p>

<p>The whole scheme produced, in fact, a veritable fortress&mdash;not
one, in the popular acceptation of the term, consisting of massive
walls and battlements, which, as was proved in the early days of
the war at Liége and Namur, can speedily be blown to pieces
by modern heavy artillery&mdash;but one defying destruction by any
powers of gunnery, and presenting the most formidable difficulties
to the bravest of Infantry.</p>

<p>Even this was not all. On the east side of the St. Quentin
Canal and parallel to it were built still two further trench lines,
both fully protected by wire entanglements, and capable of determined
defence. The first of these is the Le Catelet line, about
one mile distant from the canal. It skirts and embraces the villages
of Nauroy and Le Catelet, while two miles still further east
is the Beaurevoir line, the last or most easterly of all the prepared
defences which the Germans had in France.</p>

<p>Neither of these latter trench systems was nearly so formidably
prepared as the main systems previously described, but together
with them they go to make up the whole Hindenburg defensive
system. In this region that system runs generally due north
and south, with many minor convolutions in its line. It is altogether
some 4&frac12; miles across from west to east.</p>

<p>As its overthrow could not be attempted in a single operation,
it is necessary for clearness of description to give definite names
to each of the successive lines of trenches which go to form the
whole defence system. Taking them in the order in which we
attacked them, from west to east, they will be referred to as:</p>

<blockquote>
<p>
The Hindenburg Outpost line (known also in this part of the field as the Hargicourt line).<br />
The Hindenburg main line (<i>i.e.</i>, the Canal and Tunnel line).<br />
The Le Catelet line.<br />
The Beaurevoir line.<br />
</p>
</blockquote>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_218fp.jpg" width="1200" height="778" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>Australian Artillery&mdash;going into action at Cressaire Wood.</p></div>
</div>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_219fp.jpg" width="1200" height="780" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>Battle of August 8th, 1918&mdash;German prisoners being brought out of the battle under the fire of their own artillery.</p></div>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[219]</a></span></p>

<p>During the winter of 1917-1918 the British Fifth Army and
the Germans had faced each other in this region for many
months. On our side, also, a system of field defences had been
developed. They fell far short, indeed, of the completeness and
ingenuity of the German works, because the latter had been
constructed at leisure, long before, while ours had been built
under the very fire of the German guns.</p>

<p>For months the opposing Artilleries had pounded the country
to pieces, effaced every sign of civilization, and churned up the
ground in all directions over a belt some three miles wide.
Heaps of broken bricks marked the sites of once prosperous
villages. Broken telegraph poles, charred tree trunks, twisted
rails, a chaos of mangled machinery, were the only remains of
what had once been gardens, orchards, railways and factories.
The whole territory presented the aspect of a rolling, tumbled
desert from which life itself had been banished.</p>

<p>This was the region whose western verge the vanguard of the
Australian advance approached on September 11th, on a frontage
of about 8,000 yards, the northern extremity directed on Bellicourt,
the southern on Bellenglise. That is to say, if our further
advance had but continued unimpeded in the same due easterly
direction, it would have brought us square upon the open
excavation of the canal, and just clear and to the south of the
Bellicourt&mdash;Le Catelet tunnel. Some significance attached to this
circumstance, as will later appear.</p>

<p>Now, some little time before, an event of peculiar interest had
occurred. This was the capture, on another front, of a very
ordinary-looking transport vehicle loaded high with miscellaneous
baggage. Little escaped the inquisitive eyes of the
British Intelligence Service, which speedily discovered that
among this baggage there safely reposed a large collection of
maps and documents. On examination these proved to be
nothing less than the complete Defence Scheme of the whole<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[220]</a></span>
"Siegfried" system, in that very sector which now lay before
the Australian Corps.</p>

<p>These papers were carefully overhauled and arranged. There
were dozens of accurately drawn detailed maps, and minute
descriptions of every tactical feature of the defences. The
position of every gun emplacement was given; every searchlight,
machine-gun pit, observation post, telephone exchange,
command station and mortar emplacement was clearly marked;
the topographical and tactical features of the ground were discussed
in minute detail, and plans for the action of every
individual unit of the garrisons were fully displayed.</p>

<p>Naturally, an army of translators and copying clerks was
set to work upon this precious find, and my Intelligence Service
was kept busy for many days in making for me digests of those
items likely to prove of special interest. It had, of course, to
be remembered that the Defence Scheme had been brought into
operation for the campaign of 1917, and it remained to be seen
to what extent it might by now have become obsolete.</p>

<p>It was hardly to be expected that the enemy would adhere
to it in its entirety, especially if he were aware, as I was bound
to assume that he was, that all this information had fallen into
our hands. But the Scheme contained a full exposition of many
important topographical facts which it was in any case beyond
his power to alter, and which it was of priceless value for me to
know.</p>

<p>Although I had to devote hour upon hour to a concentrated
study of these papers, it proved to be in greater part labour in
vain so far as the Australian Corps was concerned, because it
ultimately came about that although I did carry out the attack
upon the Hindenburg outpost line in my present sector, the
attack upon the Hindenburg main line, which I was, later,
called upon to make, took place in the next adjoining sector to
the north, <i>i.e.</i>, the Bellicourt tunnel sector, to which these
captured documents only incidentally referred. Nevertheless,
the Ninth Corps, under Braithwaite, ultimately got the full benefit
of these discoveries.</p>

<p>The production of these documents on September 10th formed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[221]</a></span>
the starting point of the discussions which were now initiated in
the Fourth Army upon the question of the series of operations
necessary to overthrow the Hindenburg defences. General
Rawlinson, on September 13th, asked his three Corps Commanders
(Butler, now restored to health and back at duty, Braithwaite
and myself) to meet him at my newly-installed hutted camp
at Assevillers. There, quite informally, over a cup of afternoon
tea, the great series of operations took birth which so directly
helped to finish the war.</p>

<p>It was decided that the operation must necessarily be divided
into two main phases&mdash;separated in point of time by an interval
of several days for further preparation. All of us recognized the
impossibility of overrunning, in a single day, so deep and formidable
a system of defences, in such tortured country, and in
weather which was already becoming unsettled.</p>

<p>The first phase was to be an attempt to capture the Hindenburg
outpost line, along the whole Army front. The French and
the Third British Armies were to be asked to make a synchronized
attack on the same objective. The three Corps of the Fourth
Army were to attack upon the frontages and in the sectors on
which they then stood. The date was left undecided, but all
were to be ready at three days' notice.</p>

<p>One important consideration was the meagre supply of Tanks
available. The operations of August had been costly, not to say
extravagant, in Tanks, and General Elles' repair workshops,
manned largely by very competent Chinese coolie mechanics,
had been working night and day ever since to repair the minor
damages, and new Tanks were steadily arriving from England
to replace those damaged beyond repair. But no large contingent
of Tanks was to be expected until towards the end of
the month. The upshot was that I was to be content with only
eight Tanks for use in the contemplated operation.</p>

<p>Late the same afternoon I communicated to Generals Maclagan
and Glasgow an outline of the probable rôle of their respective
Divisions in the very near future.</p>

<p>In the meantime, the front-line troops had not been idle.
My orders were that the First and Fourth Divisions were to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[222]</a></span>
carry the line forward as far as possible towards the Hindenburg
outpost line, without committing the Corps to an organized
attack. They were to operate by vigorous patrol action against
enemy points of resistance, for the enemy had evidently no
intention of quietly giving up the ground which lay between us
and the Hindenburg outpost line. On the contrary, he had
posted strong rearguards on every point of tactical value, and
did his best to keep us as long as possible at arm's length, and
beyond striking distance of his first great line of defence.</p>

<p>These orders were entirely to the taste of the two Divisions now
in the line. The First Division had served its apprenticeship
to that very kind of fighting in the Merris area in the previous
spring, and the Fourth Division did not mean to be a second
best. Each Division stood on a one-Brigade front, being ordered
to keep its other two Brigades well out of harm's way and
resting, for any great effort that might be required.</p>

<p>The next few days witnessed some daring exploits on the
part of the 13th Brigade of the Fourth Division and the 2nd
Brigade of the First Division in the capture of tactical points,
and in the bloody repulse of all attempts by the enemy to
recapture them. In this way our line was carried up to and a
little beyond what had been the old British reserve line of
trenches of March, 1918, which lay within 5,000 yards of the
final objective of the first phase of the contemplated operations.</p>

<p>On September 16th I called together the whole of the Commanders
who were to participate in the next great battle,
Maclagan (Fourth Division), Glasgow (First Division), Courage
(Tanks), Chamier (Air Force), Fraser (Heavy Artillery), and the
four Generals of my own Staff. The conference took place in a
Y.M.C.A. marquee erected near Maclagan's Headquarters, and
I was able to announce that the date had been fixed for September
18th.</p>

<p>The contemplated battle presented only a few novel features.
The methods of the Corps were becoming stereotyped, and by this
time we all began to understand each other so well that most of
what I had to say could almost be taken for granted. Each<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[223]</a></span>
Commander was ready to anticipate the action that would be
required of him, almost as soon as I had unfolded the general
plan.</p>

<p>The shortage of Tanks was a source of much anxiety to me.
I felt that it would mean a heavier risk to the Infantry, and the
contemplation of losses among our splendid men, which might
be lessened by the more liberal use of mechanical aids, always
sorely troubled me. I endeavoured to meet the situation by
adopting two unusual expedients.</p>

<p>The first was to <i>double</i> the machine-gun resources of the two
battle Divisions. This was effected by bringing up the complete
machine-gun battalions of the Third and Fifth Divisions, and
adding them to those of the line Divisions. This gave me a
total of 256 Vickers Machine Guns on a frontage now reduced
to 7,000 yards. It enabled me to deliver so dense a machine-gun
barrage, advancing 300 yards ahead of the infantry, that to
quote the words of a German Battalion Commander who was
captured on September 18th: "The small-arms fire was absolutely
too terrible for words. There was nothing to be done but
to crouch down in our trenches and wait for you to come and
take us."</p>

<p>The other expedient was amusing, although no less effective.
This was to make up for the shortage of real Tanks by fabricating
a number of dummy ones. As soon as the word went
round Engineers and Pioneers vied with each other in rapid
"Tank" manufacture. Dumps and stores were clandestinely
robbed of hessian, paint, wire nails, and battens, and some
weird monstrosities were produced. The best and most plausible
of them were selected, and actually used on the day of the battle.
Four men dragged out each dummy, before dawn, into a position
from which it was bound to be seen by the enemy and there
abandoned it. There is little doubt that this trick contributed
its share to the day's astonishing success.</p>

<p>Once again, also, I put into practice the principle of an Artillery
barrage plan reduced to the utmost simplicity. This, as already
described, consisted in having the line, on which were to fall
the shells from the whole of the barrage guns employed, perfectly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[224]</a></span>
straight across the whole front, so as to avoid all complexities
in fire direction.</p>

<p>The first line on which the barrage fell was called the Artillery
"Start Line," and from such a line the barrage advanced, by
regular leaps or "lifts" of 100 yards at a time, in perfectly parallel
lines, until the final objective was reached. Now, experience had
shown that such a start line for the Artillery should be at least
200 yards in advance of the line on which the Infantry were to
form up ready for the assault. A liberal margin of space had to
be allowed, in order to minimize the risks to our own Infantry.</p>

<p>The Artillery "Start Line" was defined on our fighting maps.
The guns were laid upon it by methods which depended upon
accurate surveys, on the ground, of the exact position of every
gun. When that had been determined, the map and compass
helped to decide the range and alignment upon which the gun
should open fire.</p>

<p>On the map, also, was drawn another line 200 yards short of,
or on our side of the Artillery "Start Line," and this was called
the Infantry "Start Line." It then became necessary to determine,
upon the actual ground, the position of this Infantry
Start Line, and to mark it in such a way that the Infantry would
be enabled to take up their correct positions. This would ensure
that the Infantry would know that the fall of our opening barrage
would be 200 yards in advance of the line so marked.</p>

<p>This delicate work of marking out of the Infantry Start Line
on the ground was invariably entrusted to the Engineers attached
to the Brigades co-operating in the attack. The marking was
done by laying out and pegging down broad tapes of white linen,
which could be recognized in the dim light of early dawn. The
whole work, had, of course, to be done unobserved by the enemy,
and it was always a dangerous task.</p>

<p>Only the fact that we were in possession of reliable large scale
maps, recording every feature of the ground, made it possible
for the Engineers, resourceful as they were, to do this delicate
work with reasonable accuracy. The battered condition of the
country was always a difficulty; for it was never easy to recognize,
on the ground, reference points, such as a road intersection, or
the corner of a field, or a crucifix or similar land mark, which might
aid the surveyors in getting their bearings.</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 826px;">
<img src="images/map-g.jpg" width="826" height="1200" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">Map G</span></p></div>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[225]</a></span></p>

<p>The Infantry Start Line had, naturally, to be located so that
the ground upon which the tapes were to be pegged down was
ground which was already within our possession, or accessible
to us without coming dangerously near the enemy. It was
a necessary consequence that portions of our always irregular
front line of posts or trenches would lie beyond or on the
enemy's side of the tape line.</p>

<p>It was always a rule of our practice, therefore, that any Infantry
posted in advance of the taped line should be withdrawn, behind
the tapes, an hour before the time of Zero. It was also customary
to order that all assaulting troops should be spread, in their
appropriate dispositions, along the tape line, also one hour
before Zero.</p>

<p>The result of these arrangements was that for the last hour
before the actual opening of the battle, all Infantry intended to
take part in the assault was deployed along the tapes in a perfectly
straight line, all along the battle front, while no troops
previously in occupation of posts or trenches in advance of the
tapes were left out in front, exposed to the risk of either being
hit by our own Artillery, or mistaken, in the half light of dawn, for
enemies by our own Infantry.</p>

<p>Complex and difficult as these arrangements may appear
from this description, they worked out in actual practice with
the utmost smoothness. The resulting simplification of the
Artillery plans, in this as in similar previous battles, more than
justified their adoption.</p>

<p>A liberal use was also made of direction boards, which marked
the routes by which each separate body of assaulting Infantry
should, during the last night, march from its place of assembly
to the taped line or "jumping off" line, and also to mark the position
which it was to take up upon that line. Each board had
painted upon it the name of the unit to which it referred. Such
preparatory measures, troublesome as they were, greatly reduced
the risk of any confusion or mistake, and lessened the fatigue of
the assaulting troops.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[226]</a></span></p>

<p>The moon would set, on the morning of the battle, at 3.37 a.m.,
and the sun would rise at 6.27 a.m. Zero hour, for the opening
of the attack, was therefore fixed for twenty minutes past five.</p>

<p>Operations began inauspiciously. A soaking rain set in some
two hours before, and made movement over the broken, clayey
surface anything but pleasant. Although the troops were soon
drenched to the skin, this did not in any way damp their spirits.
It probably added much to the misery of the enemy, who could
hardly fail to realize that, on any morning, a fresh attack might
break upon him.</p>

<p>Modern war is in many ways unlike the wars of previous days,
but in nothing so much as in the employment of what I have
more than once referred to as "set-piece" operations. The term
is one which should convey its own meaning. It is the direct
result of the great extension, which this war has introduced,
of mechanical warfare. It is a "set-piece" because the stage
is elaborately set, parts are written for all the performers, and
carefully rehearsed by many of them. The whole performance
is controlled by a time-table, and, so long as all goes according to
plan, there is no likelihood of unexpected happenings, or of
interesting developments.</p>

<p>The Artillery barrage advances from line to line, in regular
leaps, at regulated intervals of time, determined beforehand,
and incapable of alteration once the battle has begun. Should
the rate prove too slow and the Infantry could have advanced
more quickly, it cannot be helped, and no great harm is done.
On the other hand, if there be any risk of the barrage rate being
too fast, one or two halts of ten or fifteen minutes are often
introduced into the time-table to allow the infantry line, or any
part of it which may be hung up for any reason, to catch up.</p>

<p>Following the barrage, comes line upon line of infantry in
skirmishing order, together with the line of Tanks when such are
used. The foremost lines advance to capture and hold the
ground, the lines in rear to "mop up" and deal with the enemy
either showing fight or hiding underground, the rearmost lines
collect prisoners or our own wounded, or carry supplies, tools
and ammunition.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[227]</a></span></p>

<p>In a well-planned battle of this nature, fully organized, powerfully
covered by Artillery and Machine Gun barrages, given a resolute
Infantry and that the enemy's guns are kept successfully
silenced by our own counter-battery Artillery, nothing happens,
nothing can happen, except the regular progress of the advance
according to the plan arranged. The whole battle sweeps relentlessly
and methodically across the ground until it reaches the line
laid down as the final objective.</p>

<p>Such a set-piece battle lasts usually, from first to last, for
80 to 100 minutes; seldom for more. When the Artillery
programme is ended the battle is either completely won, or
to all intents and purposes completely lost. If the barrage
for any reason gets away from our Infantry, and they are relegated
to hand to hand fighting in order to complete their advance,
the battle immediately assumes a totally different character,
and is no longer a set-piece affair.</p>

<p>It will be obvious, therefore, that the more nearly such a
battle proceeds according to plan, the more free it is from any
incidents awakening any human interest. Only the externals
and only the large aspects of such battles can be successfully
recorded. It is for this reason that no stirring accounts exist
of the more intimate details of such great set-pieces as Messines,
Vimy, Hamel and many others. They will never be written, for
there is no material upon which to base them. The story of what
did take place on the day of battle would be a mere paraphrase
of the battle orders prescribing all that was to take
place.</p>

<p>On the other hand battles such as the second phase of August
8th, the battle for Mont St. Quentin, and the later battles of
Bony and Beaurevoir were not set-piece operations. Therefore
the developments from hour to hour, and even from moment
to moment, are full of intense human interest, and replete with
tales of individual courage and initiative. Some day, when all
the material has been gathered, an abler pen than mine will
write their story.</p>

<p>If the reader will bear in mind all these considerations, with
special reference to the battle of Hargicourt on September 18th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[228]</a></span>
he will realize that, in describing the dispositions, the objectives,
the time-table and the preparations for the battle, I have told
practically all that there is to tell of the course it took, except only
as regards the results actually achieved, in ground won and
prisoners taken.</p>

<p>It has been difficult, nevertheless, to refrain from dwelling in
detail upon the performances and experiences in battle of the
individual fighting men. Any attempt to do so would, however,
prove hopelessly inadequate. The numbers engaged were always
so large, their activities so varied, the conditions of each battle
so different in detail, that to do adequate justice and avoid
unfair discrimination would make impossible demands upon the
space available to me.</p>

<p>Popular interest naturally centres upon the Infantry, not only
because they are the most numerous, but also because they are
invariably in the forefront of the battle and often in immediate
contact with the enemy. Without the slightest disparagement
to the important rôle of the Infantryman and to the valour
which its performance demands, it must never be forgotten that
the work of the Artillery, Engineers, Pioneers, Machine Gunners,
Trench Mortars, Air Service and Tanks is in every way equally
important and essential to the success of any battle operation.
Yet it is equally true that no battle can be won without the
Infantry.</p>

<p>In a deliberately prepared battle it is not too much to say that
the rôle of the Infantry is not, as a rule, the paramount one,
provided that all goes well and that there is no breakdown in any
part of the battle plan. That does not, however, imply that the
Infantry task makes no high demand upon courage and resolution.
On the contrary, these are the essentials upon which
the success of the Infantry rôle and therefore of the whole battle
depends.</p>

<p>The primary duty of the Infantry, in an assault covered by an
Artillery barrage, is to follow up the barrage closely. The
barrage is nothing more nor less than a steady shower of shells,
bursting over the very heads of the leading lines of Infantry, and
striking the ground some 80 to 120 yards in front of them. This<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[229]</a></span>
shower is usually so dense that three to four shells per minute
fall on every twenty yards of frontage. It is so intense a fire that
no enemy, however courageous, could remain exposed to it. It
falls on one line for three or four minutes, while the Infantry lie
down flat. Suddenly, the barrage "lifts" or advances 100 yards.
At a signal from the platoon or company commander the whole
line rises and rushes at top speed to catch up to the barrage, again
to throw itself flat upon the ground.</p>

<p>So long as no enemy are encountered, these successive rushes
may go on without check for hundreds of yards. If during the
course of any rush, trenches or strong points are met with and
they contain enemy who do not immediately surrender, prompt
use must be made of rifle and bayonet. But it is the primary
business of the leading line of Infantry to push on and not to
delay by engaging in close combat. The second and third lines
of Infantry are there to "mop up," that is, to dispose, by destruction
or capture, of any enemy overrun or ignored by the
leading line. Where Tanks co-operate that is also their special
business, and when it has been attended to they go forward at
top speed to rejoin the leading line.</p>

<p>In such a methodical way the advance continues until the
final objective is reached. This event can be recognized by the
Infantry in any of three ways, firstly by reference to the clock
time; for the arrival of the barrage at any line on the map or
ground occurs in pursuance of a definite time-table; secondly by
the topographical features, and thirdly by the expedient of
maintaining the barrage stationary at the final objective for
fifteen to thirty minutes. In some battles, I also adopted the
device of firing from every gun in the barrage, three rounds of
smoke shell in rapid succession, as a signal to the Commanders
of the leading line of Infantry to call the final halt, to select a good
line for trenches, and to dig-in rapidly, a process technically
called "consolidation."</p>

<p>It would be too much to hope that in an attack covering
a front of four or five miles, every part of the line should be able
to advance without any check whatever up to the final halting
place. But the expectation always is that by far the greater<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[230]</a></span>
part of the whole line will be able to do so. If, here and there
along the front, platoons or even whole companies were to be
held up or delayed by special difficulties or obstacles such as
thickets, or copses strongly manned by the enemy, or by belts
of wire, or village ruins, such breaks in the general line of advance
would matter but little to the success of the operations as
a whole. The gaps discovered in the leading line of Infantry,
when it had come to a halt at the final objective, would be
speedily filled by supporting troops from both flanks of the gap,
and thereby the enemy holding out further back, would be completely
enveloped. His surrender would follow as soon as he
realized his position, and that he had been cut off from any
contact with his friends in his rear.</p>

<p>Such is the normal course of the Infantry action in a pitched
battle. It makes great demands upon the iron resolution of
the Infantryman to push on vigorously against all obstacles, and
to put forth his utmost physical powers to keep up with the
barrage, especially when the ground is wet and sticky, or when
uncut wire has to be crawled through. All this he must do,
utterly regardless of the enemy fire which may be directed against
him, whether from Artillery or machine guns. His best hope
of immunity is always to make his rush rapidly and determinedly,
and to get to ground immediately that he reaches the halting
place, close up to the barrage, when signalled by his officer.</p>

<p>Very different from such a stereotyped procedure is the action
of the Infantry in any operation or any part of an operation
which partakes of the character of open warfare. The main
tactical purpose is still, as before, to advance to the seizure of an
appointed objective, but there is no barrage, no time-table, no
fixity of route, no prescribed formation or procedure. Everything
must be left to the judgment, initiative and enterprise of
the leader on the spot.</p>

<p>The tactical unit of Infantry is the platoon. The action of a
whole battalion is compounded merely of the separate actions of
its sixteen platoons, each performing the separate rôle, in a
general plan, that may be laid down by the Battalion Commanders,
some to advance and fight, some to act in support, some to lie<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[231]</a></span>
in reserve, some to engage in a flank attack, others to fetch and
carry food, water and munitions.</p>

<p>The platoon is commanded by a Lieutenant and comprises
four sections, each under a Sergeant or Corporal. There are two
sections of riflemen, a Lewis gun section and a section of rifle
grenadiers. Each section may consist of from five to eight
men. Let it be supposed that it is the business of the platoon to
capture a small farmhouse which the enemy has fortified and in
which he is holding out. Always supposing that the enemy
garrison is not of a strength requiring more than one platoon
for its capture the normal action of the attacking platoon would
be somewhat as follows. The Lewis gun section would, from a
concealed position, on one flank, keep the place under steady
fire. The rifle grenadiers from the same or another flank would
fire smoke grenades to make a smoke screen. One section of
riflemen would endeavour to sneak up depressions and ditches
or along hedges, so as to get well behind the farm and threaten
it by fire from the rear. The other section of riflemen would
choose some direct line of attack, over ground which offered concealment
to them until they were close enough to take the objective
with a rush.</p>

<p>Such in very bare outline is merely an imaginary example,
but it is sufficient to show the amount of skill, resource and
energy required on the part not only of the leader, but also of
every man in the platoon. The secret of success of the Australian
open fighting lay in the extraordinary vigour, judgment and team-work
which characterized the many hundreds of little platoon
battles which were fought on just such lines as I have tried to
suggest in this example.</p>

<p>It will be readily seen that no comprehensive description
is possible which would present an adequate picture of the widely
varying activities of the Australian Infantryman in this campaign.
There is only one source from which reliable narratives of individual
fighting can be gathered, and that source is so voluminous
that space forbids any but a meagre attempt to supply extracts
from it. I refer to the recommendations made by Commanders
for honours and rewards for individual acts of gallantry. A<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[232]</a></span>
very small selection of these has been made and is presented in an
appendix to this book.<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a></p>

<p>But to return to my narrative of September 18th. On that
day each Division attacked on a frontage of two Brigades. No
serious opposition was encountered except at La Verguier, which
was not far from our start line. Nevertheless, the whole of the
"red" line, which was the objective of the "set-piece" phase of
the day's battle, was in our possession, throughout the whole
length of the Corps front, well before 10 o'clock.</p>

<p>This gave us complete possession of the old British front line
of March, 1918; but the Hindenburg outpost line yet lay before
us, still distant another 1,500 to 2,000 yards. This latter line
was to be the ultimate or exploitation objective of the day's
operations, and I could hardly have dared to hope that a trench
system of such considerable strength, which had defied the Fifth
Army for so long, would fall into our hands so easily as it did.</p>

<p>Glasgow's Division pushed on without pause, and before
nightfall had overwhelmed the garrison of the Hindenburg
outpost line along its front. Maclagan's Division also fought
its way forward to within 500 yards of that line. But the troops
were by then very exhausted; all movement was in full view
of the enemy; and the ground was very difficult. After a
consultation with Maclagan I decided to rest the troops, and to
make an attempt to reach the final objective (blue line) that same
night.</p>

<p>Advantage was taken of this pause to advance the Artillery,
so that the enemy's defences could be thoroughly bombarded
before the final assault. At 11 o'clock the same night, the
Fourth Division again attacked, and after severe fighting also
captured the whole of the objective trench system.</p>

<p>It was a great victory. The Hindenburg outpost line had been
vanquished. From it we could now look down upon the St.
Quentin Canal, and sweep with fire the whole of the sloping
ground which lay between us and the Canal, denying the use of
that ground to the enemy, and making it impossible for him to
withdraw the guns and stores which littered the area.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[233]</a></span></p>
<p>The overwhelming nature of the success can best be realized
by the following almost incredible analysis of the material results
of the day's fighting. The First Division attacked with a total
strength of 2,854 Infantry. They suffered only 490 casualties
(killed and wounded). They captured 1,700 prisoners, apart
from the large numbers who were killed, and the wounded enemy
who made good their escape.</p>

<p>The Fourth Division had a total assaulting strength of 3,048
of all ranks, of whom 532 became casualties. Their captures
of live prisoners amounted to 2,543.</p>

<p>In addition, the Corps gathered in upwards of 80 guns, which
had been overrun, and had to be abandoned by the enemy.</p>

<p>There is no record in this war of any previous success on such
a scale, won with so little loss.</p>

<p>The Corps on either flank of me had successes of varying
quality. The Ninth Corps on the south had reached the red line,
but the exploitation phase of the operation was not pressed
until a later day. The Third Corps, on my left, however, made
indifferent progress. Their line still bent back sharply from my
left flank, and none of the enemy's outpost system had been
gained. This portion of the Army front was that which lay
square opposite the Bellicourt tunnel, and the fact that in this
part of the field the Fourth Army had not yet mastered the
Hindenburg outpost system was to be fraught with very serious
difficulties for me, not many days later.</p>

<p>The general plan propounded by General Rawlinson on
September 13th had been realized in part, although not in its
entirety. The successes gained on September 18th were nevertheless
sufficiently important and decisive to justify immediate
preparations for working out the plan for a great, combined and
final effort to sweep the enemy out of the remainder of the last
lines of defence which he had established in France.</p>

<p>The First and Fourth Australian Divisions had, however,
as it turned out, fought their last fight in the war. Their long
and brilliant fighting career, which had been opened three and a
half years before, the one on the cliffs of Gallipoli, and the other
in the desert of Egypt, thus ended in a blaze of glory. Although<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[234]</a></span>
a number of the officers and non-commissioned officers of both
these Divisions were called upon, very shortly after, to render
one more valuable service to the Australian Corps, the Divisions
themselves were destined, because of the termination of hostilities,
not again to make their appearance on any battle front. Their
labours ended, the troops were taken by motor bus and railway
to a coastal district lying to the south-west of Amiens, there to
rest and recuperate in the contemplation of a noble past devoted
to the service of the Empire.</p>

<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a name="Footnote_19_19" id="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> See Map H.</p></div>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a name="Footnote_20_20" id="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> See Appendix B.</p></div></div>


<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[235]</a></span></p>


<h2>CHAPTER XIV<br />

AMERICA JOINS IN</h2>


<p>I had foreseen that the battle to be fought on September 18th
was the last in which the First and Fourth Divisions could
be called upon to participate during the remainder of the 1918
campaigning season. The wastage of their Battalions had gone
on faster than the inflow of fresh drafts, or the return of convalescent
sick and wounded. These two Divisions contained
the original sixteen Battalions who had immortalized themselves,
in 1915, in the landing on Gallipoli. I was strongly averse from
disbanding any one of them to furnish drafts for the remainder.
My hope then was that, if these Divisions could be allowed to rest
over the winter, they could be sufficiently replenished by the spring
of 1919 to be able to maintain all sixteen Battalions at a satisfactory
fighting strength.</p>

<p>Of the remaining three Divisions, the Third and Fifth required
at least another week's rest; and I had promised the Second
Division that after their heroic efforts at Mont St. Quentin, they
would not be again called upon until towards the end of September.
I would thus be left with insufficient resources to maintain an
immediate continuance of the pressure upon the enemy.</p>

<p>On explaining the situation to General Rawlinson, he suggested
the interesting possibility of being able to obtain, very shortly,
the services of the Second American Corps of two Divisions, and
asked me whether I would be prepared to accept the responsibility
of taking this large force under my command for the continuance
of the operations.</p>

<p>I had no reason to hesitate. My experience of the quality
of the American troops, both at the battle of Hamel and on the
Chipilly spur, had been eminently satisfactory. It was true that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[236]</a></span>
this new American Corps had no previous battle service, but
measures were possible to supply them with any technical guidance
which they might lack.</p>

<p>I therefore accepted the suggestion, and Rawlinson then asked
me to submit a proposal for a joint operation to take place towards
the end of the month by these two American and the remaining
three Australian Divisions, with the object of completing the
task, so well begun, of breaking through the Hindenburg
defences. I was to propose my objectives, to show how I intended
to employ each of the five Divisions, and also to set out my requirements
in Artillery, Tanks and other services.</p>

<p>It was anything but an easy task, and it had to be undertaken
at a time when the preparations for the battle of Hargicourt
were uppermost in my mind. Much time also had to be devoted
to numerous distinguished visitors.</p>

<p>The outcome was a letter to the Fourth Army which foreshadowed,
almost in its entirety, the battle plan which subsequently
was actually employed. The substance of this letter
is here reproduced. The text has been modified only by the
omission of the reference letters to a large coloured map which
accompanied it:</p>

<blockquote>
<div class="right">
Corps Headquarters,<br />
18th September, 1918.<br />
</div>

<p><i>Fourth Army.</i></p>

<p>1. I beg to submit the outlines of a plan for a series of
operations for the capture of the Hindenburg Line in the
Sector Bellicourt-Vendhuille, based upon the expectation
that two American Divisions will be available immediately
to supplement this Corps.</p>

<p>2. The resources of the Corps in Infantry, which will
be available, are exclusive of the First and Fourth Australian
Divisions, although the Artillery, Technical Troops
and Machine Gun Battalions of those Divisions will continue
to be available.</p>

<p>3. The plan is based upon the assumption that the
objective Blue Line of the operations of September 18th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[237]</a></span>
is in our possession all along the Army Front, or can be
seized in the very near future.</p>

<p>4. The accompanying Map shows the coloured lines
referred to in the following description, as also the reference
letters in blue.</p>

<p>5. This plan is in outline only, and the various objective
lines and boundaries suggested are merely tentative, to form
the basis for a general plan.</p>

<p>6. The Blue Line is the line of eventual exploitation for
the operations of September 18th.</p>

<p>7. The present Corps front on the Blue Line extends
a distance of 6,000 yards. It is suggested, either that the
Corps front should be extended to a total frontage of 10,000
yards, or that it should be side-slipped northwards to a
frontage of 6,000 yards. The latter would obviously be
preferable, so far as the Corps is concerned, as enabling all
its resources to be concentrated upon a smaller frontage.</p>

<p>8. The major outlines of the plan are as follows:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>(a) An attack by two American Divisions for the
capture of the Green Line.</p>

<p>(b) A subsequent attack by two Australian Divisions
for the capture of the Red Line.</p>

<p>(c) Exploitation by the Cavalry from the Red Line,
in an Easterly and north-easterly direction.</p>

<p>(d) A turning movement by the Ninth Corps, through
Bellicourt and Nauroy to turn the Canal defences,
operating from north to south&mdash;or alternatively.</p>

<p>(e) A turning movement by the Third Corps, operating
through Le Catelet northwards.</p></blockquote>

<p>9. The details of the above plan will run on the following
lines:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>(a) The new Corps front to be taken over at the
earliest possible moment by two American Divisions,
each Division deploying for this purpose only one
Regiment of one Brigade. This will place in Line six
Battalions on the Corps front, giving each Battalion
about 1,000 yards. These troops will hold the line
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[238]</a></span>defensively, and will, with the assistance of technical
troops, prepare the battle front.</p>

<p>(b) The battle troops of the two American Divisions
will thus comprise three Regiments or nine Battalions
for each Division. The allocation of objectives to these
troops will be as follows:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>(i) One Brigade (two Regiments) of the right
Division to advance 4,500 yards on a frontage of
3,000 yards. This Brigade (six Battalions) would
attack with four Battalions in Line (750 yards
frontage each) and two Battalions in support for
"mopping up" duties. Its principal objective,
apart from the main trench systems, is Bellicourt.</p>

<p>(ii) Similarly, one Brigade (two Regiments) of
the left Division, with similar dispositions. Its
principal objective, apart from the main trench
systems, is Catelet.</p>

<p>(iii) The odd Regiment of the right Division to
be responsible for forming the south defensive flank.</p>

<p>(iv) The odd Regiment of the left Division to be
responsible for forming the north defensive flank.</p></blockquote>

<p>(c) It will be noted that the Green Line has been
drawn so as to include all ground giving good observation
northward, eastward and southwards, and to
deny observation to the enemy. It is probable that
the Field Artillery barrage will not be able to penetrate
to the extreme limits of this proposed objective along
the whole battle front without moving forward some of
the batteries, particularly in the Northern Divisional
Sector. This will probably necessitate a halt of an
hour or an hour and a half, to enable Artillery to be
advanced.</p>

<p>(d) Assuming that the battle opens about 6 a.m., the
Green Line should be reached by 10 a.m. or earlier.
By mobilizing ample resources in technical troops,
both American and Australian, and ample tools and
engineering material, it should be easily possible to
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[239]</a></span>construct not less than four roads, sufficiently developed
for horse transport, from the Blue Line to the Green
Line, by 2 p.m. These roads would be located so as
to make use of existing roads, and trench crossings
would be made by filling in with earth and not by
bridging. It is estimated, therefore, that Mobile
Artillery could move forward not later than 2 p.m. on
Zero day.</p>

<p>(e) The Australian Infantry of two Divisions would
move at such an hour as would enable them to reach and
be deployed upon the Green Line by 2 p.m., shortly
after which hour they would be joined by the necessary
Mobile Artillery. This phase of the operation would
also involve the capture of the Beaurevoir Line. It is
assumed that Tanks would be available to deal with
the crossing of the wire entanglements covering this
line.</p>

<p>(f) The completion of the defensive flanks would be
allocated to American troops.</p>

<p>(g) As soon as the Australian Infantry had passed the
Green Line, the four American Regiments who had
participated in the capture of the Green Line, would
be concentrated, refitted and rested for operations
eastwards.</p></blockquote>

<p>10. The following considerations should be kept in view,
in connection with this plan.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>(a) There should be sufficient Field Artillery, not
merely to provide an effective barrage for the time-table
advance to the Green Line and its flanks, but also,
in addition, sufficient Mobile Field Artillery, not
employed in the barrage, to enable the Australian
Infantry to be provided with at least six Artillery
Brigades for the exploitation phase of the operation.</p>

<p>(b) There should be at least 60 Tanks available
for the first phase, in order absolutely to guarantee
the breaching of the main Hindenburg trench systems.
There should, in addition, be available not less than
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[240]</a></span>30 Tanks to assist the Australian Infantry through
the Beaurevoir Line.</p></blockquote>

<p>11. There should be a systematic destructive bombardment
of the whole of the Hindenburg trench system on the
battle front, lasting at least four days, in order not merely
to destroy the defensive organization, but also to demoralize
and starve the trench garrisons. This destructive bombardment
should extend a considerable distance to the
north and south of the battle front.</p>

<p>12. The rapid construction of usable roads, both for
horse transport and mechanical transport, across the Canal
tunnel, would have to be a special feature of the organization,
so that the whole of our battle organization could be
rapidly carried forward to maintain the battle eastward of
the Red Line. This would involve the mobilization of a
large amount of mechanical transport, ready loaded with
road-stone, so that road-making can commence after Zero
hour without any delay. For these works, there would be
available the greater part of the Australian and American
technical troops of seven Divisions, as well as Army Troops
Companies.</p>

<div class="right">
<span class="smcap">John Monash</span>,<br />
Lieut.-General.<br />
Commanding Australian Corps.<br />
</div>
</blockquote>

<p>Some comment is necessary upon this proposal. The composition
of the American Divisions, following the French and not
the British precedent, differed materially from my own Divisions.
The American Division consisted of two Brigades, each of two
Regiments, each of three Battalions. Its total strength was
nearly double that of an English Division.</p>

<p>It will be noted that my proposal involved a concentrated
attack, not upon the canal, but upon that sector of 6,000 yards
which lay over the Bellicourt-Catelet tunnel. This zone at that
time lay clear of and to the north of my Corps area, and that is
what involved the necessity of "side-slipping" the Corps front
to the north.</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_240fp.jpg" width="1200" height="766" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>Mont St. Quentin&mdash;Collecting Australian wounded under the protection of the Red Cross flag, September 1st, 1918.</p></div>
</div>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_241fp.jpg" width="1200" height="765" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>An Ammunition Dump&mdash;established in Warfusee village on August 8th, 1918, after its capture the same morning.</p></div>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[241]</a></span></p>

<p>Moreover, I put forward no suggestion that the Canal sector,
then in front of me, should be the subject of a frontal attack at
all. My proposal was that it should be taken by envelopment,
through the breach to be made over the tunnel. At the time I
regarded it as unlikely that the deep canal itself could be stormed
except at great cost. I was not prepared to commit any Australian
troops under my command to such an enterprise, and
therefore naturally hesitated to propose that any other Corps
should attempt it. For this reason I submitted an alternative
plan of envelopment.</p>

<p>This was, however, a matter for the Army Commander to
decide. My business was merely to show that the proposed action
of my own Corps permitted of the co-operation of the other Corps
of the Army in a specified way.</p>

<p>General Rawlinson's decisions were given on September 19th,
at a conference which he assembled at my Headquarters. My
plan for the action of the Australian and American Corps was to
be adopted in its entirety, with the sole exception that the
capture of the Beaurevoir line, on the first day of battle, was not
to be included in the plan. It was to be left to await the results
of the prior stages. In this modification I could readily concur.</p>

<p>As regards the action of the flank Corps, General Rawlinson
held the view that a direct assault on the canal itself ought to be
attempted, and that this should be entrusted to the Ninth Corps.
He was doubtless influenced, in this view, by the knowledge,
disclosed to us for the first time on that day, that he intended
to propose that the attack on the Hindenburg Line would, if
undertaken, extend over the front of at least three Armies, the
French on the south, and the Fourth and Third British Armies.
Such a simultaneous attack, over a very wide front, would
naturally increase the prospects of success for every Corps
participating.</p>

<p>As to the Third Corps, it was to take part only in the preliminaries
of the battle, and not in the battle itself. Another
Corps, the Thirteenth (Lieut.-General Sir T. L. N. Morland)
was to join the Fourth Army. If the Australian Corps succeeded
in effecting the breach of the Hindenburg Line as I had proposed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[242]</a></span>
to do, it was to be the Thirteenth Corps, and not the Third Corps,
which, pouring through the breach, was to envelop the flank of
the Hindenburg Line towards the north.</p>

<p>The main consideration that affected me was the approval of
my plan for the action of the two American and three Australian
Divisions. I was able to begin immediately the development
in detail of that plan, a task which proved at once the most
arduous, the most responsible, and the most difficult of any that
I have had to undertake throughout the whole of the war.</p>

<p>The first step was to get the American Divisions into the line
opposite their prospective battle fronts, and the next was to hand
over what had hitherto been the Australian Corps front to the
Ninth Corps.</p>

<p>The Ninth Corps battle front was to extend from Bellenglise to
Bellicourt, mine from opposite Bellicourt to opposite Le Catelet.</p>

<p>The necessary troop movements and inter-divisional reliefs
required nearly a week for their completion. By the evening
of September 23rd, the last of the two Australian Divisions had
been relieved by the Americans and the Ninth Corps, and on that
night these stood on their respective battle frontages. I took over
command of this new front, thus manned by Americans, in the
forenoon of September 25th.</p>

<p>It is a somewhat noteworthy circumstance, but one which
attracted no attention at the time, that between September
25th and September 29th, there was a period of five days during
which <i>no</i> Australian troops were in the front line in any part of
the French theatre of war. This was a situation which had never
arisen since the first contingent of Australians arrived from Egypt
in April, 1916. For nearly two and a half years, there had never
previously been a moment when some Australians had not been
confronting the enemy, somewhere or other in the long battle
front in France.</p>

<p>I have said that I had been called upon to undertake the
responsibility of directing in a great battle two Divisions (the
27th and 30th) of United States troops, numbering altogether
some 50,000 men. These had been organized into a Corps, called
the Second American Corps, and commanded by Major-General G.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[243]</a></span>
W. Read. It was certainly anomalous that a whole organized
Corps should pass under the orders of a Corps Headquarters of
another nationality, but in authorizing such an arrangement,
General Rawlinson relied upon the good sense and mutual forbearance
of the Corps Commanders concerned.</p>

<p>I am bound to say that the arrangement caused me no anxiety
or difficulty. General Read and his Staff most readily adapted
themselves to the situation. He established his Headquarters
quite close to my own, and gave me perfect freedom of action in
dealing direct with his two Divisional Commanders, so far as I
found it necessary to do so. Read was a man of sound common
sense and clear judgment, a reserved but agreeable and courteous
personality. His only desire was the success of his Divisions, and
he very generously took upon himself the role of an interested
spectator, so that I might not be hampered in issuing orders or
instructions to his troops. At the same time, I am sure that in his
quiet, forceful way he did much to ensure on the part of his
Divisional Commanders and Brigadiers a sympathetic attitude
towards me and the demands I had to make upon them.</p>

<p>The Australian Corps had specialized in comprehensive and
careful preparations for battle. Its methods had been reduced to
a quite definite code of practice, with which every Staff Officer
and Battalion Adjutant had, by experience, become intimately
familiar. All this procedure was a closed book to the American
troops, and they were severely handicapped accordingly.</p>

<p>I therefore proposed to General Read, and he gratefully
accepted, the creation of an "Australian Mission" to his Corps,
whose rôle would be to act as a body of expert advisers on all
questions of tactical technique, and of supply and maintenance.
This idea once accepted was worked out on a fully elaborated
scale.</p>

<p>To the head of this Mission I appointed Major-General
Maclagan, not only to command the personnel of the Mission
itself, but also to live with and act as adviser to General Read's
own Staff. The Mission comprised a total of 217 men, chosen
from the First and Fourth Australian Divisions, and consisted of
specially selected and very experienced officers and N.C.O.'s.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[244]</a></span>
The American Corps Headquarters was provided with a Major-General,
assisted by one General Staff, one Administrative, one
Signal, one Intelligence, and one Machine Gun Staff Officer.
Each American Division had assigned to it an Australian
Brigadier-General, assisted by several Staff Officers; each American
Brigade had an Australian Battalion Commander and Signal
Officer; and so on down the chain. Each American Battalion,
even, had four highly expert Warrant or Non-commissioned
officers to advise on every detail of supply, equipment and tactical
employment of the troops.</p>

<p>By such an arrangement it became possible to talk to the whole
American Corps in our own technical language. This saved me
and my Staff a vast amount of time and energy, because the
members of this Mission acted as interpreters of the technical
terms and usages customary in the orders and maps of the
Australian Corps, which were necessarily quite unfamiliar to the
American troops.</p>

<p>Maclagan was a man eminently fitted for this task. In
appearance and in temperament he is every inch a soldier. Of
all my Divisional Commanders he was the only one who, immediately
before the war, was a professional soldier of the Imperial
Army. Although not Australian born, he was whole-heartedly
Australian, for he had spent some years as Director of Military
Training at the Royal Military College at Duntroon. On the outbreak
of war he received the command of the 3rd Australian Brigade,
and with it carried out the most difficult preliminary phase
of the landing on the Gallipoli peninsula. He commanded the
Fourth Australian Division from the autumn of 1917 until the
conclusion of hostilities. His characteristic attitude of mind, so
strongly in contrast to that of Rosenthal, was pessimistic. But
that was not because he looked for difficulties, but because he
preferred squarely to recognize and face all the difficulties there
were. Yet he never failed in performance, and invariably contrived
to do what he had urged could not be done. One could
not afford to take him at his own modest estimate of himself.
Both he and his Division always bettered any promise they
gave.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[245]</a></span></p>

<p>I entertain no kind of doubt that it was only because of the
creation of this Australian Mission to the Americans, and of
Maclagan's tact, industry and judgment in controlling it, that the
combined action of the two Corps in the great battle of the closing
days of September proved as successful as it did. Under no other
conditions would it have been possible to bring about any reasonable
degree of co-operation between two forces whose war experiences,
outlook, attitude towards their problems, training and
temperament were so fundamentally different.</p>

<p>It is not necessary to indulge in either a panegyric or a condemnation
of these American Divisions. Neither would be deserved
or appropriate. They showed a fine spirit, a keen desire to
learn, magnificent individual bravery, and splendid comradeship.
But they were lacking in war experience, in training, and in knowledge
of technique. They had not yet learned the virtues of
unquestioning obedience, of punctuality, of quick initiative, of
anticipating the next action. They were, many of them, unfamiliar
with the weapons and instruments of fighting, with the
numerous kinds of explosive materials, or with the routine of
preparing and promulgating clear orders. They seriously underrated
the necessity for a well-organized system of supply, particularly
of food and water, to the battle troops. They hardly, as
yet, appreciated the tactical expedients available for reducing
losses in battle.</p>

<p>Yet all these shortcomings were the results only of inexperience,
and it is perhaps unfair to contrast them with the Australian
troops who had seen front-line service in France for two and a
half years continuously, and whose leaders, high and low, had
served a long and graduated apprenticeship in every branch of
their duties.</p>

<p>The Australian Mission assisted greatly to minimize these
difficulties. Although its members were vested with no executive
powers, their advice and help were eagerly sought, and
zealously adopted. In many ways, large and small, their assistance
must have proved invaluable. How to interpret orders
from above and how to issue them to those below, how to draw
stores and how to distribute them, how to organize the signal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[246]</a></span>
service and how to ensure a flow of information&mdash;these ranked
among the greater matters. In quite small things also, help was
needed, such as the way to detonate mortar bombs, to equip the
infantryman for battle, to organize and use the messenger (<i>i.e.</i>,
runner) service, and to keep battle stations clear of people who had
no urgent business there.</p>

<p>It is not, of course, intended to convey that all these defects
were present in every regiment. Some, however, were met with,
by the officers of the Australian Mission, in all of them.</p>

<p>It greatly added to the burden cast upon the American Divisions
that they were called upon to fight almost as soon as they had
taken up duty in the line. The necessity for this was really a
legacy from the Third Corps, whom they had relieved, and it is
essential for an understanding of the course of events during these
days to narrate them in proper chronological order.</p>

<p>I have explained that as the result of the battle of Hargicourt,
the Australian Corps had succeeded in mastering the whole of
the Hindenburg outpost line opposite its front, as far as a point
a little north of and opposite to Bellicourt. The advance of
the Third Corps, however, had failed to reach the same line, and
had stopped short of it by an average distance of nearly a thousand
yards. On my pointing out that the front I had taken
over did not comply with the stipulations which I had made
in my battle plan,<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> the Army Commander decided that prior
to the main attack, the northern of the two American Divisions
should make good this shortage, by an attack aiming at the
capture of the remainder of the Hindenburg outpost line opposite
the tunnel sector.</p>

<p>I must now anticipate an explanation of the main outlines of
the plan which I had prepared for the great battle, by a brief
reference to the situation and disposition of troops on September
25th. The two American Divisions were respectively the 30th,
commanded by Major-General Lewis, on the right or south,
and the 27th, commanded by Major-General O'Ryan, on the
left or north, each lying on a frontage of three thousand yards.
These two Divisions comprised, in all, eight regiments, each of
three battalions. I had instructed each of them to place one
regiment in the line, and to keep the remaining three, <i>i.e.</i>, six
in all, in reserve, for the main operation.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[247]</a></span></p>
<p>My first Corps conference dealing with the forthcoming operations
was held at my Headquarters at Assevillers, on September
23rd. The American Generals Read, Lewis and O'Ryan, with
their respective Staffs, attended, as also did the Australian
Generals Maclagan, Brand and Mackay, who were members
of the Australian Mission to the American Corps. None of
the Australian Commanders destined to take part in the operations
attended on this day, for two reasons, firstly, because I
intended to confine myself entirely to that portion of the operation
which concerned the American troops only, and secondly,
because the date of the battle had not then been decided, and
I wished to run no risk of confusing executive action by any
premature announcements to the Australians, which subsequent
events might modify.</p>

<p>The American rôle, had, however, sufficiently crystallized to
enable me to explain it to the assembled Generals in great detail.
As will subsequently appear, it was a plan which had, intentionally,
been reduced to the simplest possible elements. It
was to be a straightforward trench to trench attack, from a
perfectly straight "jumping off" line to a perfectly straight
objective line, under a dense Artillery and Machine-Gun barrage,
and with the assistance of a large contingent of Tanks.</p>

<p>The advance was to be at a deliberate pace, and if due regard
were had to a few elementary precautions, should prove a simple
task for the American Infantry. It was, indeed, on quite
stereotyped lines, such as had so often carried the Australian
Infantry to victory in set-piece battles such as Messines, Broodseinde,
Hamel and the first phase of August 8th.</p>

<p>It was, however, borne in upon me, very soon after this Conference
opened, that I was now confronted with quite a different
proposition from that to which I had been accustomed in the
conferences attended by my own Divisional Generals. The
exposition of the plan itself was brief and simple, but it elicited
such a rain of questions, that in the end I found myself compelled<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[248]</a></span>
to embark upon a very detailed exposition of the fundamental
principles of my battle practice.</p>

<p>With blackboard and chalk, maps and diagrams, I had to
speak for more than three hours in an endeavour to explain
methods and reasons, mistakes and remedies, dangers and precautions,
procedures and expedients. The proceedings left me
with no doubt that the American Generals became fully informed
as to the tasks and duties allotted to them, and fully understood
them.</p>

<p>In the light of after events, I am not so sure that they succeeded
in passing on the information to their subordinates&mdash;not
by reason of any shortcomings on their own part, for they impressed
me as able, strong men&mdash;but because their Divisions had
not yet learned the methods and machinery of effectively and
rapidly conveying instructions to large bodies of troops.</p>

<p>In one particular, subordinate though vital, there certainly
was a serious failure to reach the troops. The enemy had, during
1916, met our assault tactics with an answer which proved
disastrously effective against us until we had learned how to
meet it. He provided his trench systems with many and roomy
shell-proof dug-outs. Whenever our barrage fell upon his
trenches, his garrisons promptly took cover in these dug-outs.
When our assaulting infantry reached the enemy trenches
they found but few of the enemy there, and they rushed headlong
forward to the next objective trenches. From out of their
dug-outs streamed the enemy, faced about, attacked our assaulting
lines in rear and withered them with fire. Many an attack
by the British on the Somme failed for just such reasons.</p>

<p>In 1917 we evolved, and applied for the first time at the battle
of Messines, an effective answer to such tactics. Close on the
heels of our first line of assaulting troops came a second line,
whose rôle was to occupy the captured trench immediately,
and to "mop it up." This meant the killing or disarming of
all enemy found in hiding, the picketing of the entrances and
exits of all dug-outs, and laying siege to them until their occupants
surrendered, a course to which they were encouraged by
a liberal use of phosphorus bombs or Mills's grenades.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[249]</a></span></p>

<p>This process of "mopping up" became an integral part of
our attack procedure. Australian infantry soon learned its
importance, and practised the method with a thoroughness and
efficiency to which I remember no exception. Even a junior
sergeant commanding a dozen men could be relied on to take
all measures necessary to ensure that no enemy was ever left
in hiding and unguarded behind his little party as they advanced.</p>

<p>In the forthcoming attack upon the Hindenburg defences,
the process of "mopping up" became of supreme importance,
because of the very fact, of which we had become well aware,
that the whole defensive system had been provided, on quite
an exceptional scale, with underground shelters, galleries,
passages and dug-outs. I made the most of this knowledge in
my talks to the Americans, emphasized the dangers as strongly
as I was able, insisted that the "mopping up" organization of
their infantry must be absolutely perfected, and ordered that
of the total Infantry participating in the assault, not less than
one-half should have the special role of safeguarding all underground
exits and entrances.</p>

<p>The great fear was, of course, that these new troops, eager to
show their mettle, would be carried away in the excitement of
the moment, and would rush headlong forward, regardless of
the dangers that lurked behind them. It is, after all, no small
demand to make upon the discipline of an Infantry soldier, to
expect him patiently and obediently to stand guard over some
dug-out entrance, allowing the battle to sweep on, and his comrades
to go forward to the excitement and glory of achieving the
final objectives.</p>

<p>So indeed it happened. The American Infantry had either
not been sufficiently tutored in this important matter, or the
need of it had not penetrated their understanding. In the
attacks carried out by these troops, while under my command,
the "mopping up" was always badly done, even in the few
cases where it was attempted. The result was failure to achieve
a clean success, and a great addition to their own casualty list.
This criticism will be fully borne out by the narrative of the great
battle itself.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[250]</a></span></p>

<p>A second and much larger conference was held at my Headquarters
on September 26th, for the really complete and final
co-ordination of the whole of the procedure for the forthcoming
battle. It was attended not only by the American Divisional
Generals and Brigadiers, but also by the Commanders of the
Second, Third and Fifth Australian Divisions, their Staffs, the
Tanks, Air Force and Cavalry.</p>

<p>It was much the largest and was also destined to be the last
of any assemblage of Commanders that it had been my privilege
to call together in the course of this memorable campaign.</p>

<p>No one present will soon forget the tense interest and confident
expectancy which characterized that meeting. America,
a great English-speaking democracy on one shore of the Pacific,
was to co-operate with Australia, its younger sister democracy
on the opposite shore, in what was the greatest and what might
be the most decisive battle of the great European War. Few
present doubted that, if we were successful, the war could not
last much longer&mdash;because the loss of the Hindenburg system
would inevitably mean for the enemy his final enforced withdrawal
from France.</p>

<p>While the conference was in full swing, the Field Marshal
himself paid me a call. He had come to wish me success in the
task before me. He was interested to find so many Divisional
Commanders assembled, and was persuaded to address a few
words to the gathering.</p>

<p>The conduct of the proceedings of this conference was a heavy
strain. The main battle was to take place on September 29th,
or within seventy-two hours, and part of my front line still stood
a thousand yards west of the Hindenburg outpost lines. General
Rawlinson had decided that this defect was to be made good
prior to the main operation, and the attempt to do so had been
timed to take place on September 27th, the day after the conference.</p>

<p>I had, therefore, to complete my organization upon the basis
of a set of precedent conditions which had not yet been entirely
realized. It was a new and a difficult situation. The whole of
the powerful Artillery at my disposal for the battle, amounting<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[251]</a></span>
now to over a thousand guns, was naturally clamouring for final
decisions, so that final barrage maps could be submitted for my
approval, printed by my very diligent and competent body of
lithographic draughtsmen, and circulated to all the batteries
and Infantry.</p>

<p>To await the result of the operation of the next day would
have allowed insufficient time to complete the necessary maps
and to distribute them before nightfall on September 28th.
There was no option but to assume that General O'Ryan (27th
American Division) would succeed in capturing the northern
section of the outpost line still in enemy hands, and upon that
assumption to fix the Artillery "start line" as falling to the east
of that objective. For the first time I had to gamble on a
chance. It was contrary to the policy which had governed
all my previous battle plans, in which <i>nothing</i> had been left to
chance.</p>

<p>At 5.30 a.m. next morning the 27th American Division
carried out the attack, under a barrage, and assisted by Tanks.
The principal objective points in the trench system under attack
were Quennemont Farm and Gillemont Farm. Every trace of
these once prosperous homesteads and plantations had, of course,
long since disappeared. The names alone remained as memories
of the fighting there of 1917.</p>

<p>What happened on that day will never be accurately known.
For once, the information from the air did not harmonize with
the claims made on behalf of the assaulting troops, perhaps
because the troops, being untrained in the use of flares, or having
been left unsupplied with them, failed to assist the aeroplanes in
identifying their correct positions. However that may be, it
became sufficiently clear, as the day proceeded, that no proper
success for the operation could be claimed.</p>

<p>There remained no doubt that some enemy were still left in
occupation of trenches on our side of the objective for that day,
and such American troops as may have gained their objective
could not therefore be reached. It appeared afterwards that
small parties of Americans had reached the vicinity of their
objectives and had very gallantly maintained themselves there,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[252]</a></span>
although surrounded on all sides, until relieved by the Australians
on September 29th.</p>

<p>The non-success of this operation of September 27th appeared
undoubtedly to be due to a failure to carry out "mopping up"
duties satisfactorily. It considerably embarrassed the preparations
for the main attack on the 29th. The knowledge
that a number of American wounded were still lying out in front,
and the suspicion that some of the American troops had succeeded
in reaching Gillemont Farm, precluded any alteration of
the Artillery plans for September 29th, even if there had still
been time to do so without creating untold confusion. To have
brought the Artillery start line, proposed for September 29th,
back to the start line of September 27th would have brought our
own barrage down upon these forward troops of ours.</p>

<p>I hastened to the Army Commander to put the position before
him, stating that I felt grave concern for the success of the main
operation, in view of the fact that my Artillery barrage would
have to come down fully a thousand yards in front of what was
still the front of the 27th Division. I suggested a postponement
for a day to give this Division, which had ample resources in
troops, another opportunity of retrieving the position. He
explained, however, that it was now too late to alter the programme,
because three whole Armies were committed to the
date first appointed. He said that he was, under the circumstances,
quite prepared for a partial failure at this point, and
requested me to do my best to pursue the original plan, in spite
of this difficult situation.</p>

<p>He agreed, however, to my further request, that additional
Tanks, out of Army reserves, should be placed at my disposal,
so that I might allot them to the 27th Division, to assist them
in passing over the thousand yards which would bring them up
level with the Artillery barrage. I hoped that this would enable
the Division to catch up with the southern half of the battle line.</p>

<p>It was an unsatisfactory expedient, and gave no promise of
certain success. It proved futile, and gravely affected the
actual course, although not the ultimate success, of the battle
still to come. It was the only occasion in the campaign on which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[253]</a></span>
I was compelled to accept preliminary arrangements which were
not such as would absolutely guarantee success.</p>

<p>The genesis of the difficulty thus created had, however, been
the failure of the Third Corps to complete their programme of
September 18th. It had been confirmed by the subsequent
failure of the 27th American Division to make up the deficiency
on September 27th. I still think, as I then urged, that I should
have been allowed to accept the situation as I found it on taking
over this front on September 25th, and that the 27th Division
should not have been called upon, at the eleventh hour, to
endeavour to establish that new situation which had been
originally assumed as the basis for the battle plan of September
29th. My original proposal of September 18th, in my letter of
that date, paragraph 3 (see above), had, of course, been made
before I could foresee that the Third Corps would fail to capture
the start line contemplated in my first plan.</p>

<p>Of course, all is well that ends well. But, for an anxious and
turbulent period of twenty-four hours on September 29th and
30th, the issue of the battle hung in grave doubt. The operation,
although successful, did <i>not</i> proceed "according to plan"
in its entirety, and it was due to the wonderful gallantry and
skilful leading of the Third Australian Division that a very ugly
situation was retrieved, a result to which the Fifth Australian
Division also contributed in no small degree.</p>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[254]</a></span></p>

<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a name="Footnote_21_21" id="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> See paragraph 3 of same.</p></div></div>




<h2>CHAPTER XV<br />

BELLICOURT AND BONY</h2>


<p>A full account of the battle plan for the forcing of the
main Hindenburg Line, on the front of the Australian
Corps, would alone fill a volume. Nothing but brief references
to the main outlines of the plan can be attempted here.</p>

<p>The forces now at my disposal, for immediate use, were greater
than I had ever before committed to a single operation. They
comprised, in all, five Divisions, of which two were American
and three Australian, besides the whole of the Corps troops.
The total personnel employed on that occasion, under my orders
in one capacity or another, almost reached 200,000 men.</p>

<p>Besides 58 Battalions of Infantry, there were over 20,000
technical troops, including Engineers, Pioneers and Signallers,
upwards of 1,000 guns of all calibres, more than 500 Machine
Guns, over 200 Tanks, a Brigade of Cavalry, a Battalion of
Armoured Cars, and numerous Air Squadrons. The subsidiary
services made an imposing array, comprising observation
balloons, supply trains, ammunition columns, auxiliary horse
transport, ambulances, motor convoys and mechanical transport,
together with railway, veterinary, sanitary and labour units.</p>

<p>It was no small task correctly to apportion to each fighting
unit and to each service its appropriate place in the general
scheme, so that these great resources should be employed to the
best advantage, without overtaxing the capacity of any one of
them. I had also to secure the greatest measure of co-operation
between them all, and the punctual performance by each of the
work prescribed.</p>

<p>In contrast with the great battle of August 8th, there was on
this occasion no possibility of securing any advantage from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[255]</a></span>
surprise. The enemy command was bound to know quite as
well as we did that we intended to deliver an attack on a gigantic
scale, and there is no doubt that they put forth their utmost
efforts, and marshalled their fullest resources in men and guns,
to meet it.</p>

<p>There was, therefore, no object to be served by any measures
of concealment, and our task could not be made any the harder
through heralding the approach of the actual attack by adequate
Artillery preparation.</p>

<p>The programme, therefore, began on the night of September
26th. There was an intense Artillery action, extending over
some sixty hours, with every gun that could be brought to bear.
This does not, of course, imply that every individual gun or
battery remained in action during the whole of this period;
ammunition supplies were not inexhaustible, and gun detachments
required periods of rest. But the programme of times
and targets was so arranged, and the tasks were so distributed
over the available batteries, that throughout this period there
was no respite for the enemy in any part of the field.</p>

<p>For some days prior to the opening of this bombardment,
railway trains and motor lorries had been working at the highest
possible pressure, to enable gunners to accumulate at their gun
pits and in all their dumps a sufficient supply of Artillery
ammunition for this purpose. In the short period which had
elapsed since the forcing of the Somme, in the early days of
September, the railway diversion from Bray to Péronne had
been completed. The railway from Péronne to Roisel, although
seriously damaged by the enemy in many places, had been
restored, and Roisel had become the railhead for the delivery
of ammunition. It was a noteworthy performance, for all the
Corps services concerned, to carry out the whole supply of this
battle in so smooth and expeditious a manner.</p>

<p>The first phase of this bombardment was of a novel character.
For over two years the enemy had been using a shell containing
an irritant and poisonous gas known to us as "mustard" gas.
It was so called only because of the smell. For a long time we
had been promised that the British Artillery service would shortly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[256]</a></span>
be supplied with a gas shell, of similar character, but even more
potent. It was, moreover, anticipated that the German gas mask
would prove no adequate protection against this kind of gas.</p>

<p>At last the new shell was forthcoming, and the first shipment
from England, amounting to some fifty thousand rounds, was
placed at the disposal of the Australian Corps. My Artillery
action, therefore, opened with a concentrated gas bombardment
for twelve hours, attacking probable living quarters, occupied
defences, and all known or suspected approaches to them. Apart
from being the first occasion, I believe that it was also the only
occasion during the war when our "mustard" gas shell was
used. No suitable opportunity for further use occurred before
the close of hostilities.</p>

<p>The gas bombardment was followed by forty-eight hours'
destructive bombardment with high explosive shell. This was
directed partly against the enemy's Artillery, as far as the short
time available had permitted us to locate his batteries.</p>

<p>Another part of the bombardment was devoted to the
approaches from the enemy's rear to his forward defences. The
object was to render his roads and tracks unusable, and thereby
to prevent the delivery of rations, or, at any rate, of hot food to
his garrisons, or of ammunition to his guns. By these means we
expected, by partially starving him out, to impair the enemy's
<i>moral</i>.</p>

<p>The main weight of the bombardment was, however, devoted
to the destruction of the enemy's defences, of which his barbed wire
entanglements were for us the most formidable feature.
Much of this wire was disposed in concealed positions, either in
depressions of the ground, or in sunken moats, artificially prepared.
It was, therefore, difficult to locate, and still more
difficult for my gunners to direct their fire upon it. Nevertheless,
there was a considerable quantity of wire which was
plainly visible, and every band of entanglements through which
breaches could be blown was so much to the good, in clearing the
path for the Infantry assault.</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_256fp.jpg" width="1200" height="775" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>Australian Light Horse&mdash;the 13th A.L.H. Regiment riding into action on August 17th, 1918.</p></div>
</div>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_257fp.jpg" width="1200" height="766" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>The Sniper sniped&mdash;an enemy sniper disposed of by an Australian Sharp-shooter, August 22nd, 1918.</p></div>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[257]</a></span></p>

<p>In earlier years it had been the custom to attack barbed wire
with our lighter guns, using shrapnel shell. This shell is, however,
essentially a "man-killing" projectile, and has no great
destructive power against field works. On the other hand, our
heavier guns were scarcely more useful for wire cutting, because
the great craters which were made by the explosion of their
shells destroyed the wire only very locally, and, by upheaving
the ground, increased rather than reduced the difficulties of the
Infantry.</p>

<p>This was due to the employment of fuses, which permitted
the projectile, after striking, to bury itself in the ground for a
small fraction of time before igniting the explosive charge which
it contained. Hence the great shell craters. It was a very
proper fuse to use for destroying trenches, dug-outs, gun-pits and
emplacements, but of little use for cutting wire.</p>

<p>In due course the British service evolved an "instantaneous"
fuse, which became known to the gunners as the "106 Fuse."
This had the merit of being perfectly safe to handle, up to the
moment of firing the gun, but by means of a most ingenious
mechanism it became highly sensitive while the projectile was
in flight between the gun and the target. The result was that
the very slightest obstacle met with, even a strand of wire, was
sufficient to set off the fuse and explode the shell. Even if the
shell met no obstacle before striking the earth, the explosion
would take place above instead of below the surface of the
ground, and would exert so great a horizontal force in all directions
that great bands of wire entanglements would be bodily
uprooted, over considerable areas, and literally blown to one
side in a jumbled mass.</p>

<p>Our heavy guns, therefore, using 106 Fuses, became ideal wire
cutters, and it was in this way that much of the Artillery action
during the forty-eight hours prior to the battle was applied.</p>

<p>The Infantry and Field Artillery plan, which I prepared, was
very similar in its general character to the battle plan of August
8th. It differed only in subordinate details due to local topographical
variations from the former conditions.</p>

<p>Of the five Divisions available, one&mdash;the Second Australian&mdash;was
to remain in Corps reserve, but handy. For that purpose it
was brought up from its rest near Cappy, by motor bus, to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[258]</a></span>
vicinity of Péronne, the move being completed by nightfall on
September 27th.</p>

<p>The battle Divisions and their prior dispositions were as
follows:</p>

<p><i>Line Divisions:</i></p>

<blockquote>

<p>On the right, the 30th American Division, to attack
with the 60th Brigade, and to employ the 59th Brigade
to form a southern defensive flank in the event of the
failure of the Ninth Corps to cross the Canal.</p>

<p>On the left, the 27th American Division, to attack with
the 54th Brigade, and to employ the 53rd Brigade to form
a northern defensive flank, until such time as the Thirteenth
Corps was ready to pass through in a north-easterly
direction.</p></blockquote>

<p><i>"Exploitation" Divisions:</i></p>

<blockquote>

<p>On the right, the 5th Australian Division, with the
8th and 15th Brigades in the first line and the 14th Brigade
following in support.</p>

<p>On the left, the Third Australian Division, with the
10th and 11th Brigades in the first line and the 9th
Brigade following in support.</p></blockquote>

<p>The total frontage was equally divided between the two pairs
of Divisions, being about 3,500 yards to each. The battle was
to be divided into two phases, the first to be executed by the
Americans, under a timed barrage, the second, under open
warfare conditions, by the Australians. It was intended that
the Americans should penetrate to the "green line," an average
distance of 3,500 yards, which took in the villages of Bellicourt,
Nauroy, Bony and Gouy.</p>

<p>The Australians were to exploit eastward, but were limited
to a further advance of 4,000 yards, overrunning Joncourt,
Estrées and Beaurevoir. Should they reach that objective on
the first day, they would have passed the last-known wired line,
and the country beyond would be suitable for Cavalry. Accordingly,
I allotted to the 5th Cavalry Brigade, which had been<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[259]</a></span>
placed under my orders, the rôle of passing through the Australian
Divisions, and carrying the exploitation still further
east, in the direction of Montbrehain and Brancourt.</p>

<p>As it turned out, the whole of the objectives named were in
our possession only on the forenoon of October 5th, instead of,
as planned, by September 30th. The actual battle developed
on totally different lines from those which I had planned, for
reasons which I shall relate in due course. Little object would
therefore be served in an explanation of the considerable mass
of detailed arrangements which the original plan involved;
these would also, by reason of their technical character, be more
suitable for a text-book on tactics.</p>

<p>Suffice it to say that elaborate arrangements were made&mdash;and
also partly utilized&mdash;for the rapid construction of four main
roads from west to east, through the full width of the Hindenburg
system. This work was to follow on the heels of the
advance. The rôles assigned to the Tanks, the Barrage Artillery,
the Mobile Artillery, the Heavy Artillery and the Armoured
Cars were similar in character, although differing in detail from
those carried out by them on August 8th.</p>

<p>On no previous occasion had the labour of preparation and
the stress upon all Commanders and Staffs been so heavy, but
all responded nobly. There were none who did not count the
hours till zero hour, which was fixed for 5.50 a.m. on September
29th.</p>

<p>In appraising the long sustained fighting on the front of the
Fourth Army which began on that day, and lasted a full week,
regard must be had to contemporary events. The American
First Army attack on St. Mihiel on September 11th had wrought
fresh dislocation to the enemy's resources, and had created another
sore spot on his long front. On September 26th the Americans
and French again successfully attacked between Verdun and
Rheims. On September 27th, the First and Third British Armies
opened a great attack on a front of thirteen miles before Cambrai
and the magnificent Canadian Corps captured Bourlon Wood
and advanced to within a mile of Cambrai city. On September
28th, the Second British Army and the Belgians attacked between<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[260]</a></span>
Ypres and the sea. All British Armies, except the Fifth, had,
therefore, by that time developed active battle fronts. On September
29th the first French Army would co-operate with us,
and on that day the battle front was to cover a total length of
twenty-five miles.</p>

<p>The simultaneous engagement of so large a portion of the
enemy's line in Belgium and France during the preceding three
days had piled difficulty upon difficulty for him, and it was
therefore not unreasonable to entertain two expectations&mdash;firstly,
that our task would be rendered easier by the wide dispersion of
the enemy's defensive energies, and, secondly, that he could
hardly hope to survive a definite breach in his great defensive
line at so critical a place as the Bellicourt tunnel. If that went
he would be secure nowhere, and his next possibility of making a
stand would be on the line of the Meuse, even if not the line
of the Rhine.</p>

<p>The day broke with a familiar mist, and the attack was
launched punctually at the appointed time. Quite early in the
day news came in that the Ninth Corps on my right hand had
achieved an astonishing success, that Bellenglise had been
captured, and that the deep canal had been successfully crossed
in several places. It was the 46th Imperial Division to which
this great success was chiefly due, a success achieved by most
careful preparation and gallant execution. Lifebelts, rafts,
boats, mats, portable bridges, and every device which ingenuity
could suggest had been prepared beforehand for the actual
crossing of the water in the canal. There can be no doubt that
this success, conceived at first as a demonstration to distract
attention from the Australian Corps front, materially assisted
me in the situation in which I was placed later on the same
day.</p>

<p>The first reports from my own front were in every way satisfactory,
and it looked as if everything were going strictly to
schedule. That morning the stream of messages pouring into
my Headquarters office, from special observers, from the air,
from the line divisions, from the Artillery, and from my liaison
officers with neighbouring Corps, exceeded in volume and import<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[261]</a></span>
anything I had met with in my previous war experience. I have
the typewritten précis of the "inwards" signal traffic before me
as I write. Those received and laid before me on that day
cover thirty closely typewritten foolscap pages.</p>

<p>The burden of the earlier messages all pointed to the same
conclusion: "30th Division crossed the Canal on time;"
"1,000 prisoners, all going well;" "Bony captured;" "Tanks
fighting round Bellicourt at 9 a.m.;" "Bellicourt taken."</p>

<p>Those, omitting formal parts, were the burden of all the telegrams
up to 10 a.m. They continued in such a favourable strain
during the whole of the time that the two American Divisions
had command of the battle front.</p>

<p>The time for their arrival at the first objective&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, the
"green" line&mdash;had been computed to be at 9 a.m. The Australian
Divisions were to cross the green line at 11 a.m., and at
the same hour to take over the command on the front of the
battle. Two telegrams then came in which caused me serious
anxiety. It may be of interest to set them out in detail:</p>

<p>Received at 11.10 a.m. from 30th American Division:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"Fighting in Bellicourt, owing to Germans having come
down along the Canal from the north. Fifth Australian
Division hung up."</p></blockquote>

<p>Received at 11.12 a.m. from Third Australian Division:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"We are dug in on west side of tunnel. Americans are
held up in front of us."</p></blockquote>

<p>These were only the first symptoms of a miscarriage of the
plans. Evidences rapidly multiplied that all was not going well.
But, concurrently, there came a stream of messages from the
air that our troops and some of our Tanks were east of both
Bellicourt and Le Catelet.</p>

<p>The situation was therefore confused and uncertain, and it
had to be diagnosed without delay. I hastened forward with all
possible speed to get into personal touch with the situation and
the Divisional Commanders. I soon formed the conclusion that
probably both American Divisions had successfully followed our
barrage, and that numbers of their troops had really reached the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[262]</a></span>
green line, but that, once again, the "mopping up" procedure
had been neglected. The enemy had reappeared in strength
from underground <i>behind</i> the Americans, and was holding up
the advance of the two Australian Divisions to the second phase
of the operation.</p>

<p>Subsequent developments and further inquiries entirely bore
out these conclusions. On the front of the 27th American
Division there had been difficulty from the start. A number
of Tanks allotted to that Division had been put out of action,
some by direct hits from Artillery, others by land mines. It
was currently believed that these were not enemy mines, but
some which had been laid months before by our own Fifth Army
as a measure of protection against the possible use of Tanks by
the enemy.</p>

<p>This had given the 27th Division a bad start. Only two out
of its six assaulting Battalions had managed to catch up with
and follow the barrage. The remainder could not get forward as
far even as the Artillery start line. Those Americans who did
follow the barrage apparently forgot all about "mopping up."
They reached Le Catelet and Gouy and entered those villages,
only to find themselves surrounded on all sides by the enemy.
A German officer prisoner informed us next day that 1,200 of
these Americans had been taken prisoner.</p>

<p>The 30th American Division did not fare so badly. They got
a good start with the barrage, but the broken condition of the
ground, the intricate trench system and the confusion of wire
and dug-outs brought about a loss of cohesion and of control.
By the time Bellicourt was reached, the attacking troops had
fallen some distance behind the barrage, and most of the weight
had gone out of the attack.</p>

<p>Meanwhile, in this part of the field also, the enemy had
reappeared from underground, and was still in strength on the
west side of Bellicourt, now in the hands of the Americans,
when the advanced guard of the Fifth Australian Division came
upon them.</p>

<p>It was an unexpected situation for the Fifth Division. But
without a moment's hesitation the leading troops took its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[263]</a></span>
measure. They deployed from the Artillery formation<a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> in which
they had been previously advancing into lines of skirmishers.
After hard fighting in the face of most vigorous resistance, they
cleared away all opposition which lay between them and Bellicourt,
and, sweeping forward through that village, carefully
"mopping up" as they went, carried with them considerable
numbers of the Americans whom they found there.</p>

<p>While this was happening, the Third Australian Division,
deprived of the assistance either of Artillery or of Tanks, and
in broad daylight, found themselves confronted with the difficult
problem of carrying out the whole of the task which had
been set for the 27th Division, because the reappearance of the
enemy upon the ground successfully passed over by some of
the Americans earlier in the day nullified all the value of that
success.</p>

<p>It was about 2 p.m. before I had succeeded in gathering sufficient
reliable information about the situation to enable me to
arrive at a decision how to deal with it. By that hour the Fifth
Division had advanced through Nauroy, and had passed across
the Le Catelet line in that vicinity. The Third Division had
managed to get obliquely astride of the line of the tunnel, its
right being well across the main Hindenburg wire, while its left
was still in the vicinity of the American start line of that morning.
They had, however, succeeded in finally capturing Quennemont
Farm. The whole of their advance into such a position had
been hotly contested.</p>

<p>My troops were therefore, to all intents and purposes, astride
of the Hindenburg main line, one Division wholly on the east
and the other Division mainly on the west of it. The southern
end of the tunnel was in my possession, the northern end was
not.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[264]</a></span></p>
<p>My decision was forthwith to abandon the original plan
which had taken so many days and so much labour to prepare,
to take immediate measures for securing our gains for the day,
and to organize a continuation of the battle next day on totally
different lines. These were to conquer the remainder of the
main Hindenburg trench system, in which the ruin of the village
of Bony was the key position, by attacking it from the south
towards the north, instead of from the west towards the
east.</p>

<p>The first step in this plan was to ensure effective tactical
contact between the right flank of the Third Division and the
left flank of the Fifth Division. I framed an order that both
Divisions should take immediate steps to such an end. Telephone
communication with both Gellibrand and Hobbs being
momentarily interrupted, I was about to forward written orders
by dispatch rider to each of them to the effect mentioned.</p>

<p>Before the messenger had time to leave, however, messages
came in from both Divisional Commanders, each reporting that
he had just secured tactical touch with the other in exactly the
way which I wanted. I consider this a remarkable example of
unity of thought. Each, without being able to consult the other
or myself, had taken the very course which each correctly anticipated
that I should decide to have taken. The German
General Staff used to boast in their writings that no other Army
approached theirs in this capacity for initiative by subordinates
on lines in thorough unison with each other and with the
policies of the higher command.</p>

<p>That the situation on my front, now held exclusively by
Australians, would have been secure that night against a determined
counter-attack I did not doubt, even though the fourteen
Australian Battalions now holding a line of some 9,000 yards
would scarcely average 400 rifles apiece. However, nothing
more than small local counter-attacks was attempted, and the
hold which I had gained upon the main defences was not
slackened. I feel sure, nevertheless, that the success of the
Ninth Corps on my right in swarming across the canal from
Bellenglise to Bellicourt had much to do with my immunity
from interference; the enemy probably found himself with quite
enough to do there in trying to re-establish his line further in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[265]</a></span>
rear, and this forbade him to materialize sufficient troops for
any general counter-attack.</p>

<p>While I have felt obliged to state the facts in regard to the
partial failure of the two American Divisions to carry out their
part of my battle plan, I desire, nevertheless, to do full justice
to these troops. I have no hesitation in saying that they fought
most bravely, and advanced to the assault most fearlessly;
that the leaders, from the Divisional Generals downwards, did
the utmost within their powers to ensure success. Nor must the
very bad conditions under which the 27th Division had to start
be forgotten. Our American Allies are, all things considered,
entitled to high credit for a fine effort.</p>

<p>But it is, nevertheless, true that in this battle they demonstrated
their inexperience in war, and their ignorance of some
of the elementary methods of fighting employed on the French
front. For these shortcomings they paid a heavy price. Their
sacrifices, nevertheless, contributed quite definitely to the
partial success of the day's operations, and although the comprehensive
plan, which was to have carried my front beyond
Beaurevoir on the very first day, had to be abandoned, the day's
fighting ended with the two Australian Divisions in quite a
satisfactory position for a continuance of the operations on the
next day.</p>

<p>To this there was, however, one important qualification.
Air observers continued to report the presence of American troops
between the Hindenburg Line and Le Catelet, and also in the
latter village. Late that night an Australian Artillery liaison
officer managed to make his way back into our lines with the
story that he had actually advanced with a battalion of
Americans into Le Catelet, and that they were still there, although
practically surrounded.</p>

<p>The 27th Division made many attempts to get into communication
with them, but without avail. Beyond the report
previously alluded to that they had subsequently been made
prisoner, I have no information of their ultimate fate; but
when patrols of the Third Division entered the village forty-eight
hours later, there was no longer any sign of them. A<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[266]</a></span>
number of small parties of Americans were, however, encountered
and relieved as the further advance of the Third Division progressed
during the next two days.</p>

<p>The situation was profoundly embarrassing. With the mass
of Artillery at my disposal, it would have been a simple matter
to cover the further advance of the Third Division so amply as
to make it easy to master the northern half of the tunnel
defences, especially if attacked end on. But so long as American
troops or wounded were presumed to be lying out in front, I
dared not use Artillery at all, except on a very restricted scale.
I felt justified, however, in bombarding isolated localities which
patrols had definitely ascertained to be still in enemy hands;
but nothing in the shape of adequate artillery support to the
Infantry could be attempted.</p>

<p>During the night of September 29th orders were issued to the
Second American Corps to withdraw all advanced troops that
could be reached, and to concentrate their regiments for rest
and reorganization, so as to be ready as soon as possible for
re-employment. Very considerable numbers of American soldiers
had become mixed up with the Australian Battalions, and,
in their eagerness, had gone forward with them, regardless of
the particular rôles or objectives which had been originally
assigned to them. It was found to be a matter of some difficulty
to induce these men to withdraw from the fighting and to rejoin
their own units, so keen were they to continue their advance.</p>

<p>I also ordered the Second Australian Division to be brought
up by bus from the Péronne area, and to take up a position of
readiness just west of the Hindenburg Line. I foresaw that
with the nature of the fighting before the Third and Fifth Divisions,
it would not be very long before they would have to be
relieved, and there was still the Beaurevoir line of trenches to
be overcome before the Hindenburg system could be claimed
as taken in its entirety. This move was duly carried out, and
the Second Division became available by the evening of October
1st in close support of the battle front.</p>

<p>The orders to the two line Divisions for September 30th were
to attack generally in a north-easterly direction. The immediate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[267]</a></span>
objectives of the Third Division were Bony village, the "Knob"
and the northern entrance to the tunnel. The flanks of the
two Divisions were to meet on the Railway Spur, and the right
of the Fifth Division was to swing forward in the direction of
Joncourt, in sympathy with any advance made by the Ninth
Corps to the south of them.</p>

<p>There was, as explained, no possibility of attempting anything
like a methodical advance covered by a co-ordinated
Artillery barrage. Progress would depend upon the tenacity and
skilful leading of the front-line troops, and reliance must be had
more upon the bayonet and the bomb than upon external aids.
It was, in a peculiar degree, a private soldier's battle.</p>

<p>The night of September 29th brought steady rain, and everybody
was drenched to the skin. September 30th was a day of
intense effort, slow and methodical hand-to-hand fighting, in a
perfect tangle of trenches, with every yard of the advance
vigorously contested; but by nightfall the line of the Third
Division had advanced fully 1,000 yards. Its left had pivoted
on the "Knoll," to the west of the Hindenburg Line. Gillemont
Farm was by then securely in their hands; they had reached
the southern outskirts of Bony village. Their right was well
across the line of the canal, and joined the left flank of the Fifth
Division on the Railway Spur. The Fifth Division had cleared
the Le Catelet trench line of the enemy, and its right was by
now well to the east of Nauroy.</p>

<p>Another day's fighting was still before both Divisions, but the
effect of the successful efforts of September 30th was speedily
felt on October 1st. Overnight the enemy must have made
up his mind that it was hopeless to try to retain any further
hold upon the tunnel line, and his further resistance melted
rapidly away. On October 1st events moved quickly; by 10
a.m. the Fifth Division reported the capture of Joncourt.
By midday the whole of the village of Bony was in our hands,
and at the same hour the air observers reported our patrols
rapidly approaching the "Knob" and Le Catelet village.</p>

<p>By nightfall of October 1st the whole operation had been
successfully completed. The northern entrance to the tunnel,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[268]</a></span>
the "Knob" and the whole of the Railway Spur were in our
hands; our line ran just west of Le Catelet and east of Estrées
and Joncourt; all isolated parties of Americans and all
American wounded had been gathered in, and the whole situation
had been satisfactorily cleared up from an Artillery point of
view.</p>

<p>Later the same night our patrols entered Le Catelet, which
lay in a hollow below us, and found the village deserted except
for a number of enemy wounded. The enemy, during that day,
relinquished his last hold upon the famous tunnel defences, and
withdrew precipitately eastwards to the Beaurevoir hill and
northwards towards Aubencheul. Our total captures during
the three days' operations amounted to 3,057 prisoners and
35 guns.</p>

<p>It had been a stiff fight, and the endurance of the Infantry
had been highly tested. The skill displayed by the Third Division
in the course of the close trench fighting of September 30th
was particularly noteworthy. The stress upon Major-General
Gellibrand and his Staff and Infantry Brigadiers had been severe.
The several Brigades and Battalions had unavoidably become
seriously mixed up. Control became very difficult, but was
never completely lost.</p>

<p>This was illustrated by the following incident of the day's
fighting. I had ascertained that the whole of the Infantry of
the Division had been committed, and there were no reserves
in the hands of the Divisional Commander. One Battalion of
the 9th Brigade was fighting under the orders of the 11th Brigade,
another under that of the 10th Brigade. I took exception to
this, and directed that a Divisional reserve should be immediately
reconstituted. In spite of the difficulties of communication,
Gellibrand contrived to carry this intricate order into effect
during the very climax of the fight.</p>

<p>Gellibrand was a man of interesting personality, more a philosopher
and student than a man of action. His great personal
bravery and his high sense of duty compensated in a great
measure for some tendency to uncertainty in executive action.
He had been a professional soldier, but before the war had retired<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[269]</a></span>
into civil life. When the call came, he received a junior Staff
appointment with the First Division, but his outstanding merits
soon gained him promotion. As a Brigadier, he had, during
1916 and 1917, successfully led several of the Australian Brigades.
His command of the Third Division during the last five months
of active fighting was characterized by complete success in
battle. His temperament and methods sometimes involved
him in embarrassments on the administrative side of his work;
but he succeeded in retaining to the last the whole-hearted
confidence of his troops.</p>

<p>I feel certain from my close observation of the course of events
on September 30th and October 1st, that much of the success
of the battle was due to Gellibrand's personal tenacity, and the
assiduous manner in which he kept himself in personal touch
from hour to hour with the forward situation and progress of
his troops.</p>

<p>Immediately upon the conclusion of the fighting I issued the
following message:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"Please convey to all Commanders, Staffs and troops
of the Third and Fifth Australian Divisions my sincere
appreciation of and thanks for their fine work of the past
three days. Confronted at the outset of the operations
with a critical situation of great difficulty, and hampered
by inability to make full use of our Artillery resources,
these Divisions succeeded in completely overwhelming a
stubborn defence in the most strongly fortified sector of the
Western Front. This was due to the determination and
resource of the leaders and the grit, endurance and fighting
spirit of the troops. Nothing more praiseworthy has been
done by Australian troops in this war."</p></blockquote>

<p>The operations entrusted to the Corps had, by the night of
October 1st, been substantially completed. Although the Beaurevoir
defence line still lay to the east of us, the main canal
defences, as far as the Le Catelet line, had been pierced, and
a way had been opened for the Thirteenth Corps to pass across
the line of the tunnel to be launched upon its task of turning the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[270]</a></span>
enemy out of the northern continuation of the Hindenburg Line
by envelopment from the south.</p>

<p>It was impossible to call upon the Third and Fifth Divisions
for any further effort. Their work had been most exhausting.
Furthermore, the steady drain upon their resources, after sixty
days of almost continuous battle activity, had so reduced their
fighting strength, that a very drastic reorganization had become
necessary. This could only be effected by a complete withdrawal
from the fighting zone.</p>

<p>Accordingly, arrangements were put in hand for the immediate
relief of these two Divisions. The Fifth Australian was relieved
by the Second Australian Division, and the Third Australian
Division by a Division of the Thirteenth Corps. Both the
relieved Divisions, in the course of the next few days, followed
the First and Fourth Australian Divisions into the grateful
rest area which had been provided to the west and south-west
of Amiens, and before they were again called upon for further
front-line service hostilities had ended.</p>

<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a name="Footnote_22_22" id="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> "Artillery Formation" is an advance in numerous small infantry columns
irregularly spaced both in frontage and depth. "Line of Skirmishers" is an
advance in successive lines of men, the intervals between the men being from
two to five paces, and between the lines from 50 to 100 paces.</p></div></div>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[271]</a></span></p>




<h2>CHAPTER XVI<br />

MONTBREHAIN AND AFTER</h2>


<p>The successive withdrawals of the First, Fourth, Third
and Fifth Australian Divisions from the battle zone
during the period from September 22nd to October 2nd had
been arranged with the Fourth Army Commander about the
middle of September. The Corps had been continuously
employed on front-line duty since April, and had already accomplished
a considerable advance, for every inch of which it had
been obliged to fight.</p>

<p>This consideration alone had earned for the Corps a period
of rest. But other important questions arose which affected
the situation.</p>

<p>I have mentioned that early in 1918 all Brigades of the
Imperial Service had, owing to failing man-power, been reduced
from four to three Battalions each. In this reduction the
Australian Brigades participated only to a small extent during
the fighting period. Every one of the Australian battalions had
created great traditions; regimental <i>esprit</i> and pride of unit
were very strong. The private soldier valued his Battalion
colour patch almost more than any other decoration.</p>

<p>My predecessor in the Corps Command had, during May, 1918,
directed the disbandment of one Battalion each of the 9th, 12th
and 13th Brigades. This was due to the wastage resulting from
the heavy fighting by these Brigades on the Villers-Bretonneux
front. The residues of the disbanded battalions were used as
drafts to replenish the remaining three Battalions of each
Brigade. It was doubtless a measure directed by necessity, as
the flow of reinforcements was steadily diminishing.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[272]</a></span></p>

<p>Much lamentation was, however, caused among the officers
and men who thus lost their battalion identity, both among
those remaining in the field and those convalescing from wounds
and sickness, who were thereby deprived of the hope of rejoining
their former units.</p>

<p>Through all these events I became fully alive to the difficulties
which would present themselves when the evil day
should arrive on which the fate of still other battalions would
have to be decided. It was a day whose advent I was anxious
to stave off until the last possible moment.</p>

<p>Throughout the summer and autumn it became incumbent
upon me to keep a close watch upon the fighting strengths of all
the 57 Australian Infantry Battalions in the field. I had to
consider the numbers actually present with the unit, the numbers
likely to join from time to time from convalescent camps and
hospitals, and the flow of new recruits from the Australian
Depots in England. Almost daily forecasts had to be made as
to the probable strengths available on a given date in all the
Battalions likely to be employed in a given operation.</p>

<p>The full official strength of a Battalion of Infantry was 1,000
at the outbreak of the war, but a reduction to 900 had been
authorized in July, 1918. No battalion in the Army was ever
for long able to maintain itself at a strength of 900. Indeed,
experience went to show that so long as the strength did not fall
below 600, a unit could quite well carry out, in battle, a normal
battalion task, provided that frequent periods of short rest
could be assured.</p>

<p>Towards the middle of September, 1918, the successful course
of the fighting, and the moderate rate of net wastage&mdash;by which
I mean the excess of battle losses over replenishments from the
rear&mdash;had convinced me that there was every reason to hope
that the strengths of the 57 battalions could be maintained at
a useful standard until the end of the campaigning season of
that year. If the war were to go on into 1919, and provided that
the Australian Corps could be kept out of the line over the
three winter months, thereby avoiding the daily wastage of
trench duty, I felt able to guarantee that by the spring of 1919
the whole of these battalions would again have become replenished
to a sufficient extent for a spring campaign.</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/map-h.jpg" width="1200" height="911" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">Map H</span></p></div>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[273]</a></span></p>

<p>It may have been an optimistic view; it may have savoured
of a desire to postpone the evil day. But I felt assured that the
disbandment of a number of additional battalions would seriously
impair the fighting spirit of the whole Australian Corps. I was
prepared to take the chance of being able to carry on until the
end of 1918 with the whole 57 battalions retained intact.</p>

<p>But I was not permitted to do so. At various times during
the period June to August, 1918, an unimaginative department
at G.H.Q. kept harassing me with inquiries as to when it was
proposed to conform to the new Imperial organization in which
all Brigades were to be reduced to three Battalions each. These
inquiries were at first ignored, but early in September the
Adjutant-General became insistent for a reply.</p>

<p>I set out the whole position as I saw it, and strongly urged a
postponement of the question until the Corps should have completed
the vitally important series of fighting operations on which
it was then engaged. Looking back upon the course of events
of that time, it is hardly credible now that, having regard to
the reasons given, these representations should have been ignored.
I procrastinated. Suddenly I received instructions from the
War Office that some 6,000 men of the Corps, who had served
continuously since 1914, were to be given six months' furlough
to Australia, and that they were to be held in readiness to
entrain en route for Australia at forty-eight hours' notice.</p>

<p>These orders were received only two days before the battle of
Hargicourt. The First and Fourth Divisions, destined to fight
in that battle, were those most affected by such a withdrawal of
men, because these Divisions contained the battalions and
batteries which had been longest in the field. I could not,
obviously, take up any attitude which would postpone the
well-earned furlough of these veterans; nor had I the smallest
inclination to do so. My case against the main proposal for an
immediate extinction of additional battalions, was, however,
weakened thereby.</p>

<p>The responsible authorities overruled my objections, and on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[274]</a></span>
September 19th I received peremptory instructions to disband
eight additional battalions forthwith. With many misgivings,
I had no option but to comply. I called my Divisional Commanders
together, and with them decided which battalions should
suffer extinction.</p>

<p>It was a difficult choice, and created a situation of great
difficulty. The whole of the personnel affected raised a very
subordinate but none the less determined protest. One battalion
after another very respectfully but very firmly took the stand
that they did not wish to disband, and would prefer not to fight
as dismembered and scattered portions of other battalions.</p>

<p>This attitude, perhaps, bordered upon insubordination, but
it was conceived for a very worthy purpose. It was a pathetic
effort, and elicited much sympathy from the senior Commanders
and myself.</p>

<p>On the eve of the great operations for the overthrow of the
Hindenburg Line I found myself, therefore, in a sea of troubles,
and threatened with the possibility of internal disaffection. To
outsiders who could have no understanding of the situation
this might imperil the fair fame and prestige of the Australian
Army Corps.</p>

<p>Up to this stage the Fourth Army Commander had been in no
way concerned in the matter. The pressure upon me had come
from the War Office and the Adjutant-General's Department.
Lord Rawlinson's interests, however, now became vitally
involved. I submitted the whole position to him. I pointed out
how inopportune the time was for risking trouble of this nature.
The order for disbandment, having been given, must of course
stand, and obedience must be insisted upon; but a postponement
of further action for fourteen days was desirable, if the opportunity
of a decisive blow against the enemy was not to be imperilled
by an impairment of the fighting spirit and goodwill of
the Australian Corps.</p>

<p>Rawlinson accepted my views in their entirety, and used his
authority and influence with the Commander-in-Chief. A postponement
of action was authorized, and all the Battalions which
had been threatened with extinction, with one exception, were
permitted to remain intact during the remainder of the fighting
period. The exception was made in the case of the 59th and
60th Battalions (of the 15th Brigade), whose men most loyally
made no demur at the immediate amalgamation of the two
battalions for the purposes of the forthcoming operations.</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_274fp.jpg" width="1200" height="769" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>German Prisoners&mdash;captured at the battle of Chuignes, August 23rd, 1918.</p></div>
</div>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_275fp.jpg" width="1200" height="773" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>Captured German Guns&mdash;Park of Ordnance captured by the Australians during August, 1918.</p></div>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[275]</a></span></p>

<p>By the end of September, therefore, three separate factors
were operating to make a short withdrawal of the Corps from
the battle zone desirable.</p>

<p>These were, the long unbroken period of line service, the
orders for the reorganization of the Brigades on a three-Battalion
basis, and the granting of Australian furlough to the veterans.</p>

<p>These were the reasons which brought about the decision that
the whole of the Australian Corps should be sent for a period of
rest in a coastal area as soon as the battle operations on which
it had embarked had been brought to a successful conclusion.</p>

<p>Those operations were, on October 1st, almost completed.
Only the Beaurevoir line still remained to be mastered, and
the Second Australian Division, which had been resting since
its successes at Mont St. Quentin, was available to undertake
that task. For the next three days the Australian Corps became,
therefore, reduced to only one Division (the Second Australian)
in the line, with the 27th and 30th American Divisions in support.</p>

<p>The Second Division occupied the night of October 1st and
the greater part of October 2nd in the process of taking over
line duty from the Fifth Division, and in preparing for an attack
timed for the next morning upon the Beaurevoir defences. I
handed over the northern part of what had been the Australian
Corps front, on the day previous, to the 50th Division (of the
Thirteenth Corps), which had by now effected the passage of
the tunnel line, and had deployed upon my left, facing north
and north-east.</p>

<p>After these adjustments were made, the Corps front, on the
night of October 2nd, extended from Mont St. Martin through
the eastern outskirts of Estrées and Joncourt, where I joined
with the 32nd Division (now belonging to the Ninth Corps).
It was a frontage of nearly 6,000 yards, an extraordinary length
for the battle front of a single Division. Our line lay parallel to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[276]</a></span>
and about 1,000 yards to the west of the Beaurevoir line, and the
attack for next day was designed to be delivered in a north-easterly
direction. If the Beaurevoir line itself were captured,
the attack was to be pushed on beyond, in the endeavour to
sweep the enemy off the prominent hill on which was situated
the village of Beaurevoir. Concurrently the Thirteenth Corps
would attack Prospect Hill, lying to the north-east of Gouy
village.</p>

<p>The Beaurevoir line was a fully-developed defensive system,
with front, support and communication trenches, thoroughly
traversed, well wired in, and still in good condition. In 1917
it would have been considered impossible to capture such a line
of defence by such a force on such a frontage.</p>

<p>The Second Division deployed two of its Brigades, the 5th
on the right and the 7th on the left, with the 6th Brigade in
reserve. The 5th Tank Brigade, now greatly reduced in
numbers, and some Whippet Tanks co-operated in the attack.
The assault was launched at 6.5 a.m. under a Field Artillery
barrage. Considerable opposition was met with. The trenches
were found strongly held, particularly with machine guns, and
the uncut wire seriously impeded the Infantry.</p>

<p>The frontal attack of the 5th Brigade, nevertheless, achieved
almost immediate success, although in some parts of the line
there were centres of resistance which had to be enveloped before
they yielded. The performance of the Tanks on this day was
disappointing. Most of the heavier Tanks were disabled by
Artillery fire, while the Whippets found the Beaurevoir trench
lines too wide to straddle. Nevertheless, the spirited action of the
Artillery made up for the loss of the assistance of the Tanks,
and by 11 a.m. the whole of the Beaurevoir line in front of the
5th Brigade had been captured.</p>

<p>Further to the north, the 7th Brigade found the trenches
almost end on to the direction of their advance, and the battle
here speedily took on the form of pure trench fighting with bomb
and bayonet, a type of fighting in which the Australian excels.
Steady progress northwards was made.</p>

<p>The whole of the Beaurevoir line over the full extent of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[277]</a></span>
Corps front was taken before midday, and although already
very tired, the assaulting Brigades pushed on beyond, to the
ascent of the Beaurevoir spur. On a knoll at its south-western
extremity stood the stone base of the now wrecked Beaurevoir
Mill, a prominent landmark visible for miles.</p>

<p>The spur and the vicinity of the Mill were found to be strongly
held, probably by fugitives driven out that morning from the
Beaurevoir trenches. The weight of our attack spent itself on
the slopes of the spur. The 6th Brigade was therefore launched
at Beaurevoir Mill and village. Although some portion of our
attack passed the Mill and reached the village, our available
Infantry strength was not sufficient to mop it up satisfactorily,
and the Brigadier decided to establish for the night a secure line
about 1,000 yards south-west of the village.</p>

<p>The total captures by the Second Division on this day exceeded
a thousand prisoners and many machine guns&mdash;an astonishing
performance for three weak brigades, fighting under open and
exposed conditions.</p>

<p>The attack on Beaurevoir hill had been undertaken chiefly to
keep the enemy engaged and on the move, while an additional
Division of the Thirteenth Corps could be brought across the
line of the tunnel and deployed into the battle line. The direction
of the attack had been to the north-east. It now became
necessary to readjust the general easterly line of advance by
redistributing the Army front between the three Corps now in
line. The greater part of October 4th was occupied in carrying
out these arrangements, and the Second Division availed itself of
the period to improve its line and the positions of parts of it by
local attacks and the capture of tactical points along its front.
On this day the Division gathered in a further 800 prisoners and
five guns.</p>

<p>By nightfall on October 4th the Corps front, now reduced to
4,000 yards, ran generally north and south, well east of Wiancourt
and just east of Ramicourt. The task of the Second Division
and of the Australian Corps was completed, and in pursuance
of arrangements previously made, the initial steps were
taken on that day to hand over the Australian Corps front to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[278]</a></span>
27th and 30th American Divisions, which had, in the days intervening
since September 29th, been reorganized and rested. They
were to be given a place in the front battle line under the direct
orders of their own Corps Headquarters (General Read).</p>

<p>To cover the interval of time necessary to enable the first of
the American Divisions (30th) to move up into line, General
Rawlinson desired me to retain control of the battle front for
one day longer, and avail myself of the time to make an endeavour
to advance our line still further to the east.</p>

<p>I selected as a suitable objective the village of Montbrehain,
which stood on a plateau that dominated any further advance.</p>

<p>The Second Division was instructed to carry out this attack
early on October 5th, and I allotted to them one company of
Tanks, which was all that could be materialized in fighting trim
at such short notice.</p>

<p>Rosenthal launched his attack at five minutes past six in the
morning of October 5th. It was the 6th Brigade which led it.
The village was full of machine guns, but the gallant Brigade
dashed in with the bayonet, and methodically worked its way
through the village to its eastern outskirts. A counter-attack
developed about noon, and for a time about 400 yards of ground
had to be yielded, but our foremost line was speedily restored
with the assistance of a battalion of the 5th Brigade.</p>

<p>By nightfall our line ran completely around the eastern outskirts
of the village of Montbrehain, the whole of which was
in our possession. We took from it over 600 prisoners belonging
to nine different German regiments.</p>

<p>What was even more interesting was that we came for the
first time in the war upon French civilians, who had been under
the domination of the enemy since the autumn of 1914. These
unfortunate folk were found hidden away in cellars and underground
shelters, and their joy at their deliverance from foreign
bondage was pathetic. It was evident that the enemy had not
had time to carry out the evacuation of the civilians, as had been
his practice throughout the whole area over which the Australian
Corps had hitherto advanced.</p>

<p>By the night of October 5th the Corps had, by the victory of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[279]</a></span>
Montbrehain, advanced its line to a point six miles to the east
of the Bellicourt Tunnel, and had thereby confirmed the irretrievable
collapse of the whole of the Hindenburg defences.</p>

<p>This achievement is, above everything else, an illustration,
which should become classic, of the maxim that in war the
<i>moral</i> is to the material as three to one. The enemy had all the
advantages of position, of carefully prepared field works, of
highly-organized defences, of detailed acquaintance with our
lines of approach from the west, and of all the other tactical
benefits of the defence.</p>

<p>Yet we had the advantage of moral factors. For the past
nine weeks the enemy had suffered defeat after defeat. He had
at one time been surprised and overwhelmed. He had at
another time been driven from strong positions under conditions
when surprise played no part. He had been defeated in gunnery,
in the air, and in close Infantry fighting. The <i>moral</i>
of his troops had steadily declined. They no longer hoped for
victory, but anticipated defeat. They knew that they were a
beaten army.</p>

<p>The victory won in the series of battles from September 29th
to October 5th was a victory of <i>moral</i>, the resolute determination
of our troops to overcome all obstacles prevailing
against the failing spirits of the defenders. It was a signal
illustration that no defences, however powerful, can resist an
energetically pressed assault, unless the defenders meet the attack
with equal resolution. Verdun and the cliffs of Gallipoli are examples
of resolute defence. Port Arthur and the Hindenburg
line are equally striking instances of the collapse of formidable
field works through failure of the <i>moral</i> of the defenders.</p>

<p>Montbrehain was the last Australian battle in the Great War,
and the fighting career of the Australian Army Corps had, as
events turned out, come to an end. On that same day my
Second Division was relieved by the 30th American Division,
and I handed over command of the battle front to General Read.
I had borne continuous responsibility, as a Corps Commander,
for a section of the battle front in France varying from four
to eleven miles for 128 consecutive days without a break.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[280]</a></span></p>

<p>On that same day, too, Prince Max of Baden accepted the
programme of the President of the United States of America,
and requested him to take in hand the restoration of peace.
On behalf of the German Government he also asked for an
immediate Armistice on Land, Water and in the Air.</p>

<p>The long-drawn-out negotiations which followed need only a
brief reference. It was first necessary for the Entente Powers
to agree upon a common line of action; then followed negotiations
between the plenipotentiaries of the belligerents, and
hostilities did not actually cease until after the conditions of
the Armistice had been signed in the early morning of November
11th.</p>

<p>During this period of five weeks, however, fighting went on.
It was of an altogether different character from that in which
the Australian Corps had been engaged. The enemy had no line
of defence left in France. He was compelled to a retreat which
became general along his whole front, and gathered momentum
day by day. He gave up Lens, Armentières and the Aubers Ridge
without a struggle, thus enabling the Second and Fifth Armies
to advance to the occupation of Lille and the adjacent industrial
centres.</p>

<p>A great army recoiling rapidly upon itself is beset with even
greater difficulties than an army sweeping rapidly forward. If
its retreat is not to be converted into a rout, time must be
allowed for the methodical withdrawal, in proper sequence, of
the whole complex organization in rear of the battle front.
Headquarters and hospitals, workshops and aerodromes, depots
and supplies must be dismantled, packed and re-established
further in rear; guns, transport and reserve troops must be
withdrawn stage by stage, and, last of all, the fighting line must
fall back in sympathy with the rate of withdrawal of all in rear.</p>

<p>Every hour's delay is an hour gained. Roads become congested,
bridges overtaxed, cohesion and discipline are imperilled.
An enforced withdrawal on so large a scale is one of the most
difficult operations of war.</p>

<p>The enemy's tactics during this period were, therefore, purely
those of delay, achieved by the methodical destruction of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[281]</a></span>
bridges, tearing up of railways, and the blowing of great craters
at every important road intersection. These methods impeded
the advance of our armies quite as much as his rearguards,
who invariably yielded to the smallest demonstration of force.</p>

<p>Battles on the grand scale were now a thing of the past, and
from the completion of the capture of the Hindenburg defences
up to the signing of the Armistice there was no event in France
of outstanding military importance.</p>

<p>The pursuit of the enemy towards the eastern frontiers of
France and Belgium was, however, exhausting to the British
and American troops on the front which the Australian Corps
had vacated. It was only a question of time for the Corps to
be again called upon, this time to take its share of pursuit. The
Armistice negotiations were dragging out, and it was uncertain
that they would be satisfactorily concluded. The Australian
Corps had had a month for a pleasant rest along the banks of
the Somme, between Amiens and Abbeville. It had had time
to carry out the extensive reorganizations required by the War
Office. On November 5th orders came for the Corps once
again to move up to the front.</p>

<p>The First and Fourth Divisions led the return to the battle
zone. The remaining three Divisions were to follow. My Corps
Headquarters, on November 10th, commenced its move to Le
Cateau, to occupy the very château which had been inhabited
by General von der Marwitz, the Commander of the Second
German Army, against whom the Australian Corps had for so
long been operating. I was actually on the way there on
November 11th when the order arrived for the cessation of
hostilities.</p>

<p>The Australian Army Corps was therefore not again employed,
either in the final stages of pursuing the enemy out of France,
or as part of the Army of Occupation on German territory.</p>

<p>The Prime Minister of Australia forwarded to me, the day
after my arrival at Le Cateau, the following message:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>The Government and the people of Australia extend
their heartiest congratulations on the triumphant conclusion<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[282]</a></span>
of your great efforts. I am specially requested to
convey to you their heartfelt thanks and deep admiration
for your brilliant and great leadership, and for the way in
which you and the brave men associated with you have
borne the sufferings and trials of the past four years, and
in common with the troops of all the Allied Nations brought
the civilized peoples of the world through adversity to
victorious peace. On behalf of the Government and the
people of the Commonwealth, I assure you, and every
Australian soldier in the field, that the Commonwealth is
full of pride and admiration of their endurance and sacrifice.
The Australian soldiers are entitled to, and shall
receive, not only the thanks of a grateful people, but that
treatment which their great services deserve.</p>

<div class="right">
<span class="smcap">W. M. Hughes.</span><br />
</div>
</blockquote>

<p>Not long after the conclusion of hostilities I was called upon
by my Government to undertake the organization and direction
of a special department to carry out the repatriation of the
whole of the Australian Imperial Force, in Europe, Egypt, Salonika
and Mesopotamia. This compelled me to sever, with much regret,
my close and intimate association with the personnel of the
Army Corps.</p>

<p>Before proceeding to England to establish the new department,
I issued the following Farewell Order:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>Upon relinquishing the command of the Australian Army
Corps, in order to take up the important and difficult work
of the Repatriation and Demobilization of the Australian
Imperial Force, which has been entrusted to me by the
Commonwealth Government, I desire to offer to all ranks of
the Corps a heartfelt expression of my gratitude to all for
the splendid and loyal support which they have rendered
to me during the past six months.</p>

<p>It has been the period during which the Corps has attained
its highest development, as a fighting organism, of cohesion
and efficiency. This has been brought about alike by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[283]</a></span>
valour of the troops of all arms and services, and by the
splendid devotion of Commanders, Staffs, and Regimental
Officers, and has resulted in the series of brilliant victories
which have contributed in so high a measure to the overthrow
and utter collapse of our principal enemy.</p>

<p>For the remainder of the period during which the Corps
will continue to act as a military body, held in readiness
for any emergency that may arise during the peace negotiations,
I am confident that every man will strive to do all
in his power to uphold the great renown which the Corps
has so worthily won.</p>

<p>But, having completed our task in the main object which
brought us from our distant homeland, and having thereby
safeguarded the future of our Nation by the conquest of our
most formidable enemy, we are now faced with another
and an equally important task, namely, to prepare ourselves
to resume our duties of citizenship and to assist individually
and collectively in the reconstruction of the Australian
Nation. Our numbers and our prestige place this opportunity
in our hands, and impose upon us this great
responsibility.</p>

<p>I feel sure that every man in the Corps will in this also
worthily respond to the call of duty, and will co-operate
loyally and self-sacrificingly in the realization of all plans
and projects which will be developed to so worthy an end.</p></blockquote>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[284]</a></span></p>

<h2>CHAPTER XVII<br />

RESULTS</h2>


<p>The time has arrived when it is proper to take stock of
gains and losses, and to endeavour to appraise, at its
true value, the work done by the Australian Army Corps during
its long-sustained effort of the last six months of its fighting
career.</p>

<p>It has become customary to regard the actual captures of
prisoners and guns as a true index of the degree of success
which has attended any series of battle operations. Every
soldier knows, however, that such a standard of judgment,
applied alone, would render but scant justice. The actual
captures in any engagement depend more upon the state of
<i>moral</i> of the enemy and the temperament of the attacking troops
than upon the military quality of the battle effort considered as
a whole. While large captures necessarily imply great victories,
it does not by any means follow that small captures imply the
reverse.</p>

<p>Nevertheless, judged by such a purely arbitrary standard,
the performances of the Australian Army Corps during the
period under review are worthy of being set out in particular
detail.</p>

<p>From March 27th, when Australian troops were for the first
time interposed to arrest the German advance, until October 5th,
when they were finally withdrawn from the line, the total
captures made by them were:</p>


<div class="center">
<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary="">
<tr><td align="left">Prisoners&nbsp;&nbsp;</td><td align="right">29,144</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Guns</td><td align="right">338</td></tr>
</table>
</div>

<p>No accurate record was ever kept of the capture of machine<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[285]</a></span>
guns, trench mortars, searchlights, vehicles and travelling
kitchens or pharmacies, nor of the quantity of Artillery ammunition,
which alone must have amounted to millions of rounds.</p>

<p>During the advance, from August 8th to October 5th, the
Australian Corps recaptured and released no less than 116 towns
and villages. Every one of these was defended more or less
stoutly. This count of them does not include a very large
number of minor hamlets, which were unnamed on the maps,
nor farms, brickfields, factories, sugar refineries, and similar
isolated groups of buildings, every one of which had been fortified
and converted by the enemy into a stronghold of resistance.</p>

<p>Although the amount of territory reoccupied, taken by itself,
is ordinarily no criterion of value, the whole circumstances of
the relentless advance of the Australian Corps make it a convenient
standard of comparison. The total area of all the
ground fought over, from the occupation of which the enemy
was ejected, amounted in the period under consideration to 394
square miles.</p>

<p>A much more definite and crucial basis for evaluating the
military successes of the Corps is the number of enemy Divisions
actually engaged and defeated in the course of the operations.
Very accurate records of these have been kept, and every one of
them was identified by a substantial contribution to the list
of prisoners taken. An analysis of this investigation produced
the following results:</p>

<p>The total number of separate enemy divisions engaged was
thirty-nine. Of these, twenty were engaged once only, twelve
were engaged twice, six three times, and one four times. Each
time "engaged" represents a separate and distinct period of
line duty for the enemy Division referred to.</p>

<p>Up to the time of the Armistice we had definitely ascertained
that at least six of these thirty-nine enemy Divisions had been
entirely disbanded as the result of the battering which they
had received. Their numberings have already been given. It
is more than probable that several other Divisions shared the
same fate, by reason of the number of prisoners actually taken,
and the other casualties known to have been inflicted. Up to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[286]</a></span>
the time when the signing of the Armistice precluded further
inquiries, absolutely conclusive evidence of their disappearance
had not been obtained.</p>

<p>In such an analysis it is possible to go even further, and to
compare the tangible results achieved with the relative strength
of the forces engaged. The Australian Army Corps of five
Divisions represented 9&frac12; per cent. of the whole of the remaining
53 Divisions of the British Army engaged on the Western Front.
Its captures in prisoners, by the same comparison, and within
the period reviewed&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, March 27th to October 5th&mdash;was
23 per cent., in guns 23&frac12; per cent., and in territory reoccupied
was 21&frac12; per cent. of the whole of the rest of the British Army.</p>

<p>The ratio, therefore, of the results to the strengths, as between
the five Australian Divisions and the whole of the rest of the
British Army, was as follows:</p>

<div class="center">
<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary="">
<tr><td align="left">Prisoners</td><td align="right">2.42</td><td align="center">times.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Territory&nbsp;&nbsp;</td><td align="right">2.24</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Guns</td><td align="right">2.47</td><td align="center">"</td></tr>
</table></div>

<p>It is not, however, by the mere numerical results disclosed
by such a comparison that the work of the Australian Army
Corps should be judged. If a broad survey be made of the
whole of the 1918 campaign, I think that the decisive part which
the Corps took in it will emerge even more convincingly.</p>

<p>Such a survey will show that the whole sequence of events
may be divided into five very definite and clearly-marked
stages. The first was the arrest and bringing to naught of the
great German spring offensive; the second was the conversion
of the enemy's offensive strategy into a distinct and unqualified
defensive. Next followed the great, initial and irredeemable
defeat of August 8th, which, according to the enemy's own
admissions, was the beginning of the end. Then came the denial
to the enemy of the respite which he sought on the line of the
Somme, which might well have helped him to recover himself
for another year of war; and, finally, there was the overthrow
of his great defensive system, on which he relied as a last bulwark
to safeguard his hold upon French soil, a hold which would
have enabled him to bargain for terms.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[287]</a></span></p>

<p>It must never be forgotten that whatever claims may be made
to the contrary, Germany's surrender was precipitated by reason
of her military defeat in the field. Her submarine campaign,
disappointing to her expectations as it had been, was still a
potent weapon. Her fleet was yet intact. Our blockade was
grievous, but she did in fact survive it, even though it continued
in force for a full eight months after her surrender. The
defection of Bulgaria and the collapse of Turkey might conceivably
be a source of increased military strength, even if one
of greater political weakness. Had she been able to hold us at
bay in France and Belgium for but another month or six weeks,
she could have been assured of a respite of three months of
winter in which to organize a levy en masse. Who can say that
the stress of another winter and the prospect of another year
of war might not have destroyed the Entente combination
against her?</p>

<p>On these grounds I believe that the real and immediate reason
for the precipitate surrender of Germany on October 5th, 1918,
was the defeat of her Army in the field. It followed so closely
upon the breaching of the Hindenburg defences on September
29th to October 4th, that it cannot be dissociated from that
event as a final determining cause.</p>

<p>Whether this view be correct or not, I think that the claim may
fairly be made for the Australian Army Corps, that in each of
the stages of the operations which led to this military overthrow,
the Corps played an important, and in some of them a predominating,
part. No better testimony for such a conclusion
can be adduced than the admissions of Ludendorff himself.</p>

<p>Narrowing our survey of the closing events of the campaign
to a consideration of the fighting activities of the Australian
Corps, I would like to emphasize the remarkable character of that
effort. Deprived of the advantage of a regular inflow of trained
recruits, and relying practically entirely for any replenishments
upon the return of its own sick and wounded, the Corps was
able to maintain an uninterrupted fighting activity over a period
of six months. For the last sixty days of this period the Corps
maintained an unchecked advance of thirty-seven miles against<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[288]</a></span>
the powerful and determined opposition of a still formidable
enemy, who employed all the mechanical and scientific resources
at his disposal.</p>

<p>Such a result alone, considered in the abstract and quite apart
from any comparison with the performances of other forces, is
a testimony, on the one hand, to the pre-eminent fighting
qualities of the Australian soldier considered individually, and,
on the other hand, to the collective capacity and efficiency of
the military effort made by the Corps. I doubt whether there
is any parallel for such a performance in the whole range of
military history.</p>

<p>As regards the troops themselves, the outstanding feature
of the campaign was their steadily rising <i>moral</i>. Always high,
it was, in spite of fatigue and stress, never higher than in the
closing days. A stage had been reached when they regarded
their adversary no longer with cautious respect but with undisguised
contempt.</p>

<p>On the part of the troops it was a remarkable feat of physical
and mental endurance to face again and yet again the stress of
battle. To the infantry a certain measure of periodical rest was
accorded, but the Artillery and technical services had scarcely any
respite at all. Almost every day of the whole period they
worked and fought, night and day, under the fire of the enemy's
batteries, and under his drenching, suffocating gas attacks,
for our battery positions were the favourite targets for his gas
bombardments.</p>

<p>On the part of the staffs it was a period of ceaseless toil, both
mental and physical. The perfection of the staff work, its precision,
its completeness, its rapidity, its whole-souled devotion
to the service of the troops, were the necessary conditions for
the victories which were won.</p>

<p>Another outstanding feature was the uniformity of standard
achieved by all the five Divisions, as well as the wonderful comradeship
which they displayed towards each other. Omitting
altogether the performances of any one of them in the previous
years of the war, it is noteworthy that all so fully seized the
opportunities that presented themselves, that each could boast of
outstanding achievements during this period&mdash;the First Division
for its capture of Lihons and the battles of Chuignes and Hargicourt,
the Second Division for Mont St. Quentin and Montbrehain,
the Third for Bray, Bouchavesnes and Bony, the Fourth for
Hamel and Hargicourt, and the Fifth for Péronne and Bellicourt.</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/map-j.jpg" width="1200" height="803" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">Map J.</span></p></div>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[289]</a></span></p>

<p>I must also pass in brief review the losses which the Corps
suffered during its advance. From August 8th to October 5th
the total battle casualties were as follows:</p>

<div class="center">
<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary="">
<tr><td align="left">Killed</td><td align="right">3,566</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Died of wounds&nbsp;&nbsp;</td><td align="right">1,432</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Wounded</td><td align="right">16,166</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Missing</td><td align="right">79</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="right">&mdash;&mdash;&mdash;</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Total</td><td align="right">21,243</td></tr>
</table>
</div>

<p>Averaging these losses over all five Divisions for the whole
period, they amount to a wastage from all causes of seventy
men per Division per day, which must be regarded as extraordinarily
moderate, having regard to the strenuous nature of
the fighting, the great results achieved, and the much higher
rate of losses incurred by Australian troops during the previous
years of the war. Even during periods of sedentary trench
warfare the losses averaged forty per Division per day.</p>

<p>The total losses of the Army Corps during this period were,
indeed, only a small fraction of Australia's contribution to the
casualty roll for the whole period of the war. It was the least
costly period, for Australia, of all the fighting that her soldiers
underwent. Had it been otherwise, the effort could not have
been maintained for so long, nor could the spirit of the troops
have been sustained. It was the low cost of victory after
victory which spurred them on to still greater efforts.</p>

<p>Of the causes which contributed to so gratifying a result,
much credit must be given to the great development in 1918 of
mechanical aids, in the form of Tanks, and to a considerable
augmentation of aeroplanes, Artillery and Lewis guns. Of all
these the Corps proved eager to avail itself to the full.</p>

<p>But the main cause is, after all, the recognition of a principle
of text-book simplicity, which is that a vigorous offensive is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[290]</a></span>
in the long run cheaper than a timorous defensive. No war can
be decided by defensive tactics. The fundamental doctrine of
the German conception of war was the pursuit of the unrelenting
offensive; it was only when the Entente Armies, on their part,
were able and willing themselves to put such a doctrine into
practice that our formidable enemies were overcome.</p>

<p>It may be that hereafter I may be charged with responsibility
for so relentlessly and for so long committing the troops of the
Corps to a sustained aggressive policy. Such criticisms have
already been whispered in some quarters. But I am sure that
they will not be shared by any of the men whom it was my privilege
to command. They knew that an offensive policy was the
cheapest policy, and the proof that they accepted it as the
right one was their ever-rising <i>moral</i> as the campaign developed.</p>

<p>"Feed your troops on victory," is a maxim which does not
appear in any text-book, but it is nevertheless true. The aim
and end of all the efforts and of all the heavy sacrifices of the
Australian nation was victory in the field. Nothing that could
be done could lead more swiftly and more directly to its fulfilment
than an energetic offensive policy. The troops themselves
recognized this. They learned to believe, because of success
heaped upon success, that they were invincible. They were
right, and I believe that I was right in shaping a course which
would give them the opportunity of proving it.</p>

<p>There are some aspects of the Australian campaign to which,
before closing this memoir, I should like to make brief reference.
Success depended first and foremost upon the military proficiency
of the Australian private soldier and his glorious spirit of heroism.
I do not propose to attempt here an exhaustive analysis of the
causes which led to the making of him. The democratic institutions
under which he was reared, the advanced system of education
by which he was trained&mdash;teaching him to think for himself
and to apply what he had been taught to practical ends&mdash;the
instinct of sport and adventure which is his national heritage,
his pride in his young country, and the opportunity which came
to him of creating a great national tradition, were all factors
which made him what he was.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[291]</a></span></p>

<p>Physically the Australian Army was composed of the flower
of the youth of the continent. A volunteer army&mdash;the only
purely volunteer army that fought in the Great War&mdash;it was
composed of men carefully selected according to a high physical
standard, from which, happily, no departure was made, even
although recruiting began to fall off in the last year of the war,
and there were some who had proposed a more lenient recruiting
examination. The cost to Australia of delivering each fighting
man, fully trained, to the battle front was too great to permit
of any doubt whether the physical quality of the raw material
would survive the wear and tear of war.</p>

<p>Mentally, the Australian soldier was well endowed. In him
there was a curious blend of a capacity for independent judgment
with a readiness to submit to self-effacement in a common
cause. He had a personal dignity all his own. He had the
political sense highly developed, and was always a keen critic
of the way in which his battalion or battery was "run," and of
the policies which guided his destinies from day to day.</p>

<p>His intellectual gifts and his "handiness" made him an apt
pupil. It was always a delight to see the avidity with which
he mastered the technique of the weapons which were placed in
his hands. Machine guns, Lewis guns, Mills' bombs, Stokes'
mortars, rifle grenades, flares, fuses, detonators, Very lights,
signal rockets, German machine guns, German stick bombs,
never for long remained a mystery to him.</p>

<p>At all schools and classes he proved a diligent scholar, and
astonished his instructors by the speed with which he absorbed
and bettered his instruction. Conservatism in military methods
was no part of his creed. He was always mentally alert to adopt
new ideas and often to invent them.</p>

<p>His adaptability spared him much hardship. He knew how
to make himself comfortable. To light a fire and cook his food
was a natural instinct. A sheet of corrugated iron, a batten or
two, and a few strands of wire were enough to enable him to
fabricate a home in which he could live at ease.</p>

<p>Psychologically, he was easy to lead but difficult to drive.
His imagination was readily fired. War was to him a game,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[292]</a></span>
and he played for his side with enthusiasm. His bravery was
founded upon his sense of duty to his unit, comradeship to his
fellows, emulation to uphold his traditions, and a combative
spirit to avenge his hardships and sufferings upon the
enemy.</p>

<p>Taking him all in all, the Australian soldier was, when once
understood, not difficult to handle. But he required a sympathetic
handling, which appealed to his intelligence and satisfied
his instinct for a "square deal."</p>

<p>Very much and very stupid comment has been made upon
the discipline of the Australian soldier. That was because the
very conception and purpose of discipline have been misunderstood.
It is, after all, only a means to an end, and that end is
the power to secure co-ordinated action among a large number
of individuals for the achievement of a definite purpose. It does
not mean lip service, nor obsequious homage to superiors, nor
servile observance of forms and customs, nor a suppression of
individuality.</p>

<p>Such may have been the outward manifestations of discipline
in times gone by. If they achieved the end in view, it must
have been because the individual soldier had acquired in those
days no capacity to act intelligently and because he could be
considered only in the mass. But modern war makes high
demands upon the intelligence of the private soldier and upon
his individual initiative. Any method of training which tends
to suppress that individuality will tend to reduce his efficiency
and value. The proverbial "iron discipline" of the Prussian
military ideal ultimately broke down completely under the test
of a great war.</p>

<p>In the Australian Forces no strong insistence was ever made
upon the mere outward forms of discipline. The soldier was
taught that personal cleanliness was necessary to ensure his
health and well-being, that a soldierly bearing meant a moral and
physical uplift which would help him to rise superior to his
squalid environment, that punctuality meant economy of effort,
that unquestioning obedience was the only road to successful
collective action. He acquired these military qualities because<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[293]</a></span>
his intelligence taught him that the reasons given him were true
ones.</p>

<p>In short, the Australian Army is a proof that individualism
is the best and not the worst foundation upon which to build up
collective discipline. The Australian is accustomed to team-work.
He learns it in the sporting field, in his industrial organizations,
and in his political activities. The team-work which he
developed in the war was of the highest order of efficiency.
Each man understood his part and understood also that the
part which others had to play depended upon the proper performance
of his own.</p>

<p>The gunner knew that the success of the infantry depended
upon his own punctilious performance of his task, its accuracy,
its punctuality, its conscientious thoroughness. The runner
knew what depended upon the rapid delivery at the right
destination of the message which he carried. The mule driver
knew that the load of ammunition entrusted to him must be
delivered, at any sacrifice, to its destined battery; the infantryman
knew that he must be at his tape line at the appointed
moment, and that he must not overrun his allotted objective.</p>

<p>The truest test of battle discipline was the confidence which
every leader in the field always felt that he could rely upon
every man to perform the duty which had been prescribed for
him, as long as breath lasted, and that he would perform it faithfully
even when there was no possibility of any supervision.</p>

<p>Thus the sense of duty was always very high, and so also was
the instinct of comradeship. A soldier, a platoon, a whole
battalion would sooner sacrifice themselves than "let down"
a comrade or another unit. There was no finer example of individual
self-sacrifice, for the benefit of comrades, than the
Stretcher-bearer service, which suffered exceedingly in its noble
work of succouring the wounded, and exposed itself unflinchingly
to every danger.</p>

<p>The relations between the officers and men of the Australian
Army were also of a nature which is deserving of notice. From
almost the earliest days of the war violence was done to a deep-rooted
tradition of the British Army, which discouraged any<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[294]</a></span>
promotion from the ranks, and stringently forbade, in cases
where it was given, promotion in the same unit. It was rare
to recognize the distinguished service of a ranker; it was impossible
for him to secure a commission in his own regiment.</p>

<p>The Australian Imperial Force changed all that. Those
privates, corporals and sergeants who displayed, under battle
conditions, a notable capacity for leadership were earmarked
for preferment. If their standard of education was good, they
received commissions as soon as there were vacancies to fill;
if not, they were sent to Oxford or Cambridge to be given an
opportunity of improving both their general and their special
military knowledge.</p>

<p>As a general rule, they came back as commissioned officers
to the very unit in which they had enlisted or served. They
afforded to all its men a tangible and visible proof of the recognition
of merit and capacity, and their example was always a
powerful stimulus to all their former comrades.</p>

<p>There was thus no officer caste, no social distinction in the
whole force. In not a few instances, men of humble origin and
belonging to the artisan class rose, during the war, from privates
to the command of Battalions. The efficiency of the force
suffered in no way in consequence. On the contrary, the whole
Australian Army became automatically graded into leaders and
followers according to the individual merits of every man, and
there grew a wonderful understanding between them.</p>

<p>The duties and responsibilities of the officers were always put
upon a high plane. They had, during all military service with
troops, to dress like the men, to live among them in the trenches,
to share their hardships and privations, and to be responsible
for their welfare. No officer dared to look after his own comfort
until every man or horse or mule had been fed and quartered,
as well as the circumstances of the moment permitted. The
battle prowess of the Australian regimental officer and the
magnificent example he set have become household words.</p>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_294fp.jpg" width="1200" height="761" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>The Toll of Battle&mdash;an Australian gun-team destroyed by an enemy shell, September 1st, 1918.</p></div>
</div>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_295fp.jpg" width="1200" height="776" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>Inter-Divisional Relief&mdash;The 30th American and the 3rd Australian Divisions passing each other in the "Roo de
Kanga," Péronne, during the "relief" after the capture of the Hindenburg Line, October 4th, 1918.</p></div>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[295]</a></span></p>

<p>Then there must be a word of recognition of the work of the
devoted and able Staffs. It was upon them, after all, that the
principal burden of the campaign rested. Upon them, their
skill and industry, depended the adequacy of all supplies and
their proper distribution, the precision of all arrangements for
battle, the accuracy of all maps, orders and instructions, the
clearness of messages and reports, the completeness of the
information on which the Commander must base his decisions,
and the correct calculations of time and space for the movement
of troops, guns and transport. Their watchword was
"efficiency."</p>

<p>"The Staff Officer is the servant of the troops." This was
the ritual pronounced at the initiation of every Staff Officer.
It was a doctrine which contributed powerfully to the success of
the staff work as a whole. It meant that the Staff Officer's duties
extended far beyond the mere transmission of orders. It became
his business to see that they were understood, and rightly acted
upon, and to assist in removing every kind of difficulty in their
due execution. The importance of accurate and reliable staff
work can be understood when it is realized that no mistake can
happen without ultimately imposing an added stress upon the
most subordinate and most helpless of all the components of
an Army&mdash;the private soldier. An error in a clock time, the
miscarriage of a message, the neglect to issue an instruction, a
misreading of an order, an omission from a list of names, a
mistake in a computation, an incomplete inventory, are bound
in the long run to involve an added burden somewhere upon
some private soldier.</p>

<p>The Staff of the Australian Army Corps, its Divisions and
Brigades, consisted during the last six months almost entirely
of Australians, many of them belonging to the permanent military
forces of the Commonwealth, but more still men who, before the
war, followed civilian occupations. Among both categories
the quality of the staff work steadily grew in efficiency, speed
and accuracy, and during the last period of active fighting it
reached a very high standard indeed.</p>

<p>Had it been otherwise, I could not have carried out either the
rapid preparations for several of the greater battles, or the
frequent and complex interchanges of Divisions which alone
rendered it possible for me to keep up a continuous pressure on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[296]</a></span>
the enemy, or the readjustments throughout the whole of the
very large area always under my jurisdiction which became
necessary as the advance proceeded.</p>

<p>No reference to the staff work of the Australian Corps during
the period of my command would be complete without a tribute
to the work and personality of Brigadier-General T. A. Blamey,
my Chief of Staff. He possessed a mind cultured far above the
average, widely informed, alert and prehensile. He had an
infinite capacity for taking pains. A Staff College graduate, but
not on that account a pedant, he was thoroughly versed in the
technique of staff work, and in the minutiæ of all procedure.</p>

<p>He served me with an exemplary loyalty, for which I owe him
a debt of gratitude which cannot be repaid. Our temperaments
adapted themselves to each other in a manner which was ideal.
He had an extraordinary faculty of self-effacement, posing
always and conscientiously as the instrument to give effect to
my policies and decisions. Really helpful whenever his advice
was invited, he never obtruded his own opinions, although I
knew that he did not always agree with me.</p>

<p>Some day the orders which he drafted for the long series of
history-making military operations upon which we collaborated
will become a model for Staff Colleges and Schools for military
instruction. They were accurate, lucid in language, perfect in
detail, and always an exact interpretation of my intention. It
was seldom that I thought that my orders or instructions could
have been better expressed, and no Commander could have been
more exacting than I was in the matter of the use of clear
language to express thought.</p>

<p>Blamey was a man of inexhaustible industry, and accepted
every task with placid readiness. Nothing was ever too much
trouble. He worked late and early, and set a high standard for
the remainder of the large Corps Staff of which he was the head.
The personal support which he accorded to me was of a nature of
which I could always feel the real substance. I was able to lean
on him in times of trouble, stress and difficulty, to a degree which
was an inexpressible comfort to me.</p>

<p>To the Commanders of the Five Divisions I have already made<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[297]</a></span>
detailed allusion. They were all renowned leaders. To all the
Brigadiers of Infantry and Artillery and to the Heads of the
Administrative Services who laboured under them, the limitations
of space forbid my making any individual reference. But
they were all of them men to whose splendid services Australia
owes a deep debt of gratitude. In their hands the honour of
Australia's fighting men and the prestige of her arms were in
safe keeping.</p>

<p>None but men of character and self-devotion could have
carried the burden which they had to bear during the last six
months of the war. In spite of stress and difficulty, unremitting
toil and wasted effort, weary days and sleepless nights, fresh
task piling upon the task but just begun, labouring even harder
during periods of so-called rest than when their troops were
actually in the line, this gallant band of leaders remained steadfast
of purpose, never faltered, never lost their faith in final
victory, never failed to impress their optimism and their unflinching
fighting spirit upon the men whom they commanded.</p>

<p>It may be appropriate to end this memoir on a personal note.
I have permitted myself a tone of eulogy for the triumphant
achievements of the Australian Army Corps in 1918, which I
have endeavoured faithfully to portray. Let it not be assumed
on that account that the humble part which it fell to my lot to
perform afforded me any satisfaction or prompted any enthusiasm
for war. Quite the contrary.</p>

<p>From the far-off days of 1914, when the call first came, until
the last shot was fired, every day was filled with loathing, horror,
and distress. I deplored all the time the loss of precious life
and the waste of human effort. Nothing could have been more
repugnant to me than the realization of the dreadful inefficiency
and the misspent energy of war. Yet it had to be, and the
thought always uppermost was the earnest prayer that Australia
might for ever be spared such a horror on her own soil.</p>

<p>There is, in my belief, only one way to realize such a prayer.
The nation that wishes to defend its land and its honour must
spare no effort, refuse no sacrifice to make itself so formidable<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[298]</a></span>
that no enemy will dare to assail it. A League of Nations may
be an instrument for the preservation of peace, but an efficient
Army is a far more potent one.</p>

<p>The essential components of such an Army are a qualified
Staff, an adequate equipment and a trained soldiery. I state
them in what I believe to be their order of importance, and my
belief is based upon the lessons which this war has taught me.
In that way alone can Australia secure the sanctity of her
territory and the preservation of her independent liberties.</p>

<p>Such a creed is not militarism, but is of the very essence of
national self-preservation. For long years before the war it
was the creed of a small handful of men in Australia, who braved
the indifference and even the ridicule of public opinion in order
to try to qualify themselves for the test when it should come.
Four dreadful years of war have served to convince me of the
truth of that creed, and to confirm me in the belief that the men
of the coming generation, if they love their country, must take
up the burden which these men have had to bear.</p>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[299]</a></span></p>

<h2>APPENDIX A<br />
<span class="smcap">Grouping into Australian Divisions of Artillery and<br />
Infantry Brigades, during the period May to October,<br />
1918, and the General Officers commanding them.</span><br />
</h2>


<div class="center">
<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary="">
<tr><td align="left"><span class="smcap">First Division</span> (Glasgow):</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><i>Artillery</i>,</td><td align="right">1st and 2nd</td><td align="center">Brigades</td><td align="left">(Anderson).</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><i>Infantry</i>,</td><td align="right">1st</td><td align="center">Brigade</td><td align="left">(Mackay).</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="right">2nd</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="left">(Heane).</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="right">3rd</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="left">(Bennett).</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Second Division</span> (Rosenthal):</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><i>Artillery</i>,</td><td align="right">4th and 5th</td><td align="center">Brigades</td><td align="left">(Phillips).</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><i>Infantry</i>,</td><td align="right">5th</td><td align="center">Brigade</td><td align="left">(Martin).</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="right">6th</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="left">(Robertson).</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="right">7th</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="left">(Wisdom).</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Third Division</span> (Gellibrand):</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><i>Artillery</i>,</td><td align="right">7th and 8th</td><td align="center">Brigades</td><td align="left">(Grimwade).</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><i>Infantry</i>,</td><td align="right">9th</td><td align="center">Brigade</td><td align="left">(Goddard).</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="right">10th</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="left">(McNicoll).</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="right">11th</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="left">(Cannan).</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Fourth Division</span> (Maclagan):</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><i>Artillery</i>,</td><td align="right">10th and 11th</td><td align="center">Brigades</td><td align="left">(Burgess).</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><i>Infantry</i>,</td><td align="right">4th</td><td align="center">Brigade</td><td align="left">(Brand).</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="right">12th</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="left">(Leane).</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="right">13th</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="left">(Herring).</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Fifth Division</span> (Hobbs):</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><i>Artillery</i>,</td><td align="right">13th and 14th</td><td align="center">Brigades</td><td align="left">(Bessel-Browne).</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left"><i>Infantry</i>,</td><td align="right">8th</td><td align="center">Brigade</td><td align="left">(Tivey).</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="right">14th</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="left">(Stewart).</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="right">15th</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="left">(Elliott).</td></tr>
</table></div>

<p>The 3rd, 6th and 12th Artillery Brigades were Corps Troops
not forming part of any Division. The 9th Artillery Brigade
was disbanded at the end of 1916.</p>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[300]</a></span></p>

<h2>APPENDIX B</h2>


<p>In order to illustrate the nature of the individual fighting carried
out by the Australian Corps, during the period covered by this
book, the following very small selection has been made from
the official records of deeds of gallantry by individual soldiers.
In every one of these twenty-nine cases, the <span class="smcap">Victoria Cross</span> has
been awarded by His Majesty the King:</p>

<p>No. 4061, <span class="smcap">Sergeant Stanley Robert MacDougall</span>,
47th Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"At <span class="smcap">Dernancourt</span>, on morning of 28th March, 1918, the enemy
attacked our line, and his first wave succeeded in gaining an entry.
Sergt. MacDougall, who was at a post in a flank company, realized the
situation, and at once charged the enemy's second wave single-handed
with rifle and bayonet, killing 7 and capturing Machine Gun which they
had. This he turned on to them, firing from the hip, causing many
casualties, and routing that wave. He then turned his attention to
those who had entered, until his ammunition had run out, all the time
firing at close quarters, when he seized a bayonet and charged again,
killing three men and a German officer, who was just about to kill one of
our officers. He then used a Lewis Gun on the enemy, killing many
and enabling us to capture 33 prisoners. His prompt action saved the
line and enabled us to stop the enemy advance."</p></blockquote>

<p><span class="smcap">Lieutenant Percy Valentine Storkey</span>,
19th Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"Lieut. Storkey was in charge of a platoon which took part in the
attack at <span class="smcap">Bois de Hangard</span> on morning of 7th April, 1918. On
emerging from the wood, the enemy trench line was encountered, and
Lieut. Storkey found himself with 6 men. While continuing his move
forward, a large enemy party&mdash;about 80 to 100 strong&mdash;armed with
several machine guns, was noticed to be holding up the advance of the
troops on the right. Lieut. Storkey immediately decided to attack this
party from the flank and rear, and while moving forward to the attack,
was joined by Lieut. Lipscomb and four men. Under the leadership of
Lieut. Storkey, this small party of 2 officers and 10 other ranks charged
the enemy position with fixed bayonets, driving the enemy out, killing
and wounding about 30 and capturing the remainder, viz.: 3 officers
and 50 men, also one machine gun."</p></blockquote>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[301]</a></span></p>

<p><span class="smcap">Lieutenant Clifford William King Sadlier</span>,
51st Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"For conspicuous gallantry on the night of 24-25th April, 1918, during
a counter-attack by his Battalion on strong enemy positions south of
<span class="smcap">Villers-Bretonneux</span>, east of Amiens. Lieut. Sadlier's platoon, which
was on the left of the Battalion, had to advance through a wood, where
they encountered a strong enemy machine-gun post, which caused
casualties and prevented the platoon from advancing. Although himself
wounded, this officer at once collected his bombing section, and led them
against the machine guns, succeeding in killing the crews and capturing
two of the guns. By this time Lieut. Sadlier's party were all casualties,
and he alone attacked a third enemy machine gun with his revolver,
killing the crew of four and taking the gun. In doing so, he was again
wounded, and unable to go on."</p></blockquote>

<p>No. 1914, <span class="smcap">Sergeant William Ruthven</span>,
22nd Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"For most conspicuous bravery and daring in action during the attack
at <span class="smcap">Ville-sur-Ancre</span>, near Albert, on 19th May, 1918. During the advance
Sergeant Ruthven's Company suffered numerous casualties, and his
Company Commander was severely wounded. He then assumed command
of his portion of the assault, took charge of the Company Headquarters,
and rallied the sections in his vicinity. As the leading wave
approached its objective, it was subjected to heavy fire from an enemy
Machine Gun at 30 to 40 yards' range, directly in front. This N.C.O.,
without hesitation, at once sprang out, threw a bomb which landed
beside the post, and immediately rushed the position, bayoneting one of
the crew and capturing the gun. He then encountered some of the
enemy coming out of a shelter. He wounded two, captured six others
in the same position, and handed them over to an escort from the leading
wave, which had now reached the objective. Sergeant Ruthven then
reorganized our men in his vicinity, and established a post in the second
objective. Enemy movement was then seen in a sunken road about 150
yards distant. Without hesitation, and armed only with a revolver, he
went over the open alone and rushed the position, shooting two Germans
who refused to come out of their dug-out. He then single-handed
mopped up this post, and captured the whole of the garrison, amounting
in all to 32, and kept them until assistance arrived to escort them back
to our lines. During the remainder of the day this gallant N.C.O. set
a splendid example of leadership, moving up and down his position under
fire, supervising consolidation and encouraging his men."</p></blockquote>

<p>No. 1327, <span class="smcap">Corporal Phillip Davey</span>, M.M.,
10th Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"In a daylight operation against the enemy position near <span class="smcap">Merris</span>
on June 28th, 1918, Corporal Davey's platoon advanced 200 yards and
captured part of enemy line. While the platoon was consolidating, the
enemy pushed a machine gun forward under cover of a hedge, and opened
fire from close range, inflicting heavy casualties and hampering work.
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[302]</a></span>Alone Corporal Davey moved forward in the face of a fierce point-blank
fire, and attacked the gun with hand grenades, putting half the crew
out of action. Having used all available grenades, he returned to the
original jumping-off trench, secured a further supply and again attacked
the gun, the crew of which had in the meantime been reinforced. He
killed the crew, 8 in all, and captured the gun. This gallant N.C.O.
then mounted the gun in the new post and used it in repelling a determined
counter-attack, during which he was severely wounded in both
legs, back and stomach."</p></blockquote>

<p>No. 3399, <span class="smcap">Private (Lance-Corporal) Thomas Leslie
Axford</span>, M.M.,
16th Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"For conspicuous gallantry and initiative during the operations
against <span class="smcap">Vaire</span> and <span class="smcap">Hamel Woods</span>, east of Corbie, on the morning of the
4th July, 1918. When the barrage lifted and the Infantry advance commenced,
the platoon of which he is a member was able to reach the first
enemy defences through gaps which had been cut in the wires. The
adjoining platoon got delayed in uncut barbed wire. This delay enabled
the enemy machine guns to get into action, and enabled them to inflict
a number of casualties among the men struggling through the wires,
including the Company Commander, who was killed. L.-Corporal
Axford, with great initiative and magnificent courage, at once dashed
to the flank, threw his bombs amongst the machine-gun crews; followed
up his bombs by jumping into the trench, and charging with his bayonet.
Unaided he killed ten of the enemy and took 6 prisoners; he threw
the machine guns over the parapet, and called out to the delayed platoon
to come on. He then rejoined his own platoon, and fought with it during
the remainder of the operations. Prior to the incidents above-mentioned,
he had assisted in the laying out of the tapes for the jumping-off position,
which was within 100 yards of the enemy. When the tapes were laid, he
remained out as a special patrol to ensure that the enemy did not discover
any unusual movement on our side."</p></blockquote>

<p>No. 1936, <span class="smcap">Private Henry Dalziel</span>,
15th Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"For his magnificent bravery and devotion to duty during operations
near <span class="smcap">Hamel Wood</span>, east of Corbie, on 4th July, 1918. He was No. 2
of a Lewis Gun Section, and at the commencement of our advance his
Company met with determined resistance from Pear Trench strong
point, which was strongly garrisoned and manned by numerous machine
guns. This strong point, undamaged by our artillery fire, was protected
by strong wire entanglements. A heavy concentration of machine-gun
fire caused heavy casualties and held up our advance. His Lewis Gun
came into action and silenced enemy guns in one direction, when another
enemy gun opened up from another direction. Private Dalziel dashed
at it, and with his revolver killed or captured the entire crew and gun,
and allowed our advance to continue. He was severely wounded in the
hand, but carried on and took part in the capture of the final objective.
He twice went over open ground under heavy enemy artillery and
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[303]</a></span>machine-gun fire to where our aeroplanes had dropped some boxes of
ammunition, and carried back a box on each occasion to his gun, and
though suffering from considerable loss of blood, he filled magazines and
served his gun until severely wounded through the head."</p></blockquote>

<p>No. 1689A, <span class="smcap">Corporal Walter Ernest Brown</span>, D.C.M.,
20th Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"For gallant service on the morning of 6th July, 1918, north-east of
<span class="smcap">Villers-Bretonneux</span>, east of Amiens. This N.C.O. was one of an
advanced party from his Battalion making arrangements with the Battalion
then in the line for relief by his own Battalion. As such he was
under no obligation to participate in any offensive operations before
his Battalion took over the line. During the night of 5th-6th July the
Company to which he was attached carried out a minor operation resulting
in the capture of a small system of enemy trench. Early on the
morning of 6th July an enemy strong post, about 70 yards distant, caused
the occupants of the newly-captured trench great inconvenience by
persistent sniping. It was decided to rush this post. Hearing of this,
Corporal Brown, on his own initiative, crept out along the shallow trench
towards the enemy post, and then made a dash across No Man's Land
towards this post. An enemy machine gun opened fire from another
trench, and he had to take cover by lying down. He later made another
dash forward, and succeeded in reaching his objective. With a Mills
grenade in his hand, he stood at the door of a dug-out and called on the
occupants to surrender. One of the enemy rushed out, a scuffle ensued,
and Corporal Brown knocked him down with his fist. Loud cries of
'Kamerad' were then heard, and from the dug-out an officer and
eleven other ranks appeared. Driving them before him, Corporal Brown
brought back the complete party as prisoners to our line."</p></blockquote>

<p><span class="smcap">Lieutenant Albert Chalmers Borella</span>, M.M.,
26th Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"For exceptional gallantry in the attack near <span class="smcap">Villers-Bretonneux</span>,
on the 17th-18th July, 1918. Whilst leading his platoon with the first
wave, Lieut. Borella noticed an enemy machine gun firing through our
barrage&mdash;he ran out ahead of his men into the barrage, shot two German
machine gunners with his revolver, and captured the gun. He then led
his party, now reduced to ten men and two Lewis Guns, further on,
against <span class="smcap">Jaffa Trench</span>, which was very strongly held, but using his
revolver, and later a rifle, with great effect, Lieut. Borella shot down
the enemy right and left, and set such a splendid example, that the
garrison were quickly shot and captured. Two large dug-outs were
bombed here and thirty prisoners taken. After reorganization the
enemy counter-attacked twice in strong force, on the second occasion
outnumbering Lieut. Borella's platoon by ten to one; but he showed
such coolness and determination, that the men put up an heroic resistance,
and twice repulsed the enemy with very heavy loss. It is estimated
that from 100 to 150 Germans were killed in this vicinity. When
Lieut. Borella refused his left flank about 40 yards during the first counter-attack
he sent his men back one at a time, and was himself the last to
leave, under heavy fire."</p></blockquote>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[304]</a></span></p>

<p><span class="smcap">Lieutenant Alfred Edward Gaby</span>,
28th Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"During the attack east of <span class="smcap">Villers-Bretonneux</span>, near Amiens, on
the morning of 8th August, 1918, this officer led his Company with great
dash, being well in front. On reaching the wire in front of the enemy
trench, strong opposition was encountered. The enemy were holding a
strong point in force about 40 yards beyond the wire, and commanded
the gap with four machine guns and rifles. The advance was at once
checked. Lieut. Gaby found another gap in the wire, and entirely by
himself approached the strong point, while machine guns and rifles were
still being fired from it. Running along the parapet, still alone, and
at point-blank range, he emptied his revolver into the garrison, drove
the crews from their guns, and compelled the surrender of 50 of the enemy,
with four machine guns. He then quickly reorganized his men and led
them on to his final objective, which he captured and consolidated.
On the morning of the 11th August, 1918, during an attack east of
<span class="smcap">Framerville</span>, Lieut. Gaby again led his Company with great dash on to
the objective. The enemy brought heavy rifle and machine-gun fire to
bear upon the line, but in the face of this heavy fire Lieut. Gaby walked
along his line of posts, encouraging his men to quickly consolidate the
line. While engaged on this duty he was killed by an enemy sniper."</p></blockquote>

<p>No. 2742, <span class="smcap">Private Robert Matthew Beatham</span>,
8th Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during the attack
north of <span class="smcap">Rosières</span> on 9th August, 1918. Private Beatham showed such
heroism and courage, that he inspired all officers and men in his vicinity
in a wonderful manner. When the advance was held up by heavy
machine-gun fire, Private Beatham dashed forward and, assisted by one
man, bombed and fought the crews of four enemy machine guns, killing
ten of them and capturing ten others. The bravery of the action greatly
facilitated the advance of the whole Battalion and prevented casualties.
In fighting the crew of the first gun he was shot through the right leg,
but continued in the advance. When the final objective was reached
and fierce fighting was taking place, he again dashed forward and bombed
the machine gun that was holding our men off, getting riddled with bullets
and killed in doing so."</p></blockquote>

<p>No. 506, <span class="smcap">Sergeant Percy Clyde Statton</span>, M.M.,
40th Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"For most conspicuous gallantry and initiative in action near <span class="smcap">Proyart</span>
on 12th August, 1918. The platoon commanded by Sergeant Statton
reached its objective, but the remainder of the Battalion was held up
by heavy machine-gun fire. He skilfully engaged two machine-gun
posts with Lewis Gun fire, enabling the remainder of his Battalion to
advance. The advance of the Battalion on his left had been brought to
a standstill by the heavy enemy machine-gun fire, and the first of our
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[305]</a></span>assaulting detachments to reach the machine-gun posts were put out
of action in taking the first gun. Armed only with a revolver, in broad
daylight, Sergeant Statton at once rushed four enemy machine-gun posts
in succession, disposing of two of them, killing five of the enemy. The
remaining two posts retired and were wiped out by Lewis Gun fire. This
N.C.O.'s act had a very inspiring effect on the troops who had been held
up, and they cheered him as he returned. By his daring exploit he
enabled the attacking troops to gain their objective. Later in the
evening, under heavy machine-gun fire, he went out again and brought
in two badly-wounded men."</p></blockquote>

<p><span class="smcap">Lieutenant Lawrence Dominic McCarthy</span>,
16th Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"This officer is especially brought to notice for his wonderful gallantry,
initiative and leadership on the morning of the 23rd August, 1918, when
an attack was being made near <span class="smcap">Madame Wood</span>, west of Vernandivukkers.
The objectives of this Battalion were attained without serious opposition.
The Battalion on the left flank were less fortunate. Here several
well-posted machine-gun posts were holding up the attack, and heavy
fire was being brought to bear on our left flank. When Lieut. McCarthy
realized the situation, he at once engaged the nearest machine-gun post;
but still the attacking troops failed to get forward. This officer then
determined to attack the nearest post. Leaving his men to continue the
fire fight, he, with two others, dashed across the open and dropped into
a disused trench which had been blocked. One of his two men was killed
whilst doing this. He was now right under the block over which the
enemy machine gun was firing. The presence of head cover prevented
the use of bombs. He therefore tunnelled a hole through the bottom of
the block, through which he inserted his head and one arm. He at
once shot dead the two men firing the gun. He then crawled through
the hole he had made, and by himself charged down the trench. He
threw his limited number of Mills bombs among the German garrison
and inflicted more casualties. He then came in contact with two German
officers, who fired on him with their revolvers. One of these he shot
dead with his revolver, the other he seriously wounded. He then charged
down the trench, using his revolver and throwing enemy stick bombs,
and capturing three more enemy machine guns. At this stage, some
700 yards from his starting point, he was joined by the N.C.O., whom he
had outdistanced when he crawled through the hole in the trench block
mentioned above. Together they continued to bomb up the trench, until
touch was established with the Lancashire Fusiliers, and in the meanwhile
yet another machine gun had been captured. A total of 5 machine
guns and 50 prisoners (37 unwounded and 13 wounded) was captured,
while Lieut. McCarthy during his most amazing and daring feat had,
single-handed, killed 20 of the enemy. Having cleared up a dangerous
situation, he proceeded to establish a garrison in the line. Whilst doing
this he saw a number of the enemy getting away from neighbouring
trenches. He at once seized a Lewis Gun and inflicted further casualties
on the enemy."</p></blockquote>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[306]</a></span></p>

<p><span class="smcap">Lieutenant William Donovan Joynt</span>,
8th Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during the attack
on <span class="smcap">Herleville Wood</span>, near Chuignes, on 23rd August, 1918. Early in
the advance Lieut. Joynt's Company Commander was killed; he immediately
took charge of the Company and led them with courage and skill.
A great deal of the success of the operation in this portion of the sector
was directly due to his magnificent work. When the advance was commenced
the Battalion was moving into support to another Battalion.
On approaching Herleville Wood, the troops of the leading Battalion lost
all their officers and became disorganized. Under very heavy fire, and
having no leaders, they appeared certain to be annihilated. Lieut. Joynt
grasped the situation, and rushed forward in the teeth of very heavy
machine-gun and artillery fire over the open. He got the remaining
men under control, and worked them into a piece of dead ground, until
he could reform them. He man&oelig;uvred his own men forward, and
linked them up with the men of the other Battalion. He then made
a personal reconnaissance, and found that the fire from the wood was
holding the whole advance up, the troops on his flanks suffering very
heavy casualties. Dashing out in front of his men, he called them on,
and by sheer force of example inspired them into a magnificent frontal
bayonet attack on the wood. The audacity of the move over the open
staggered the enemy, and Lieut. Joynt succeeded in penetrating the wood
and working through it. By his leadership and courage a very critical
situation was saved, and on this officer rests to the greatest extent the
success of the Brigade's attack. When the Battalion on our left was
held up on Plateau Wood, and was suffering severe casualties, Lieut.
Joynt, with a small party of volunteers, worked right forward against
heavy opposition, and by means of hand-to-hand fighting forced his way
round the rear of the wood, penetrating it from that side, and demoralizing
the enemy to such an extent that a very stubborn and victorious defensive
was changed into an abject surrender. He was always in the hardest
pressed parts of the line, and seemed to bear a charmed life. He was
constantly ready to run any personal risk and to assist flank units. He
continually showed magnificent leadership, and his example to his men
had a wonderful effect on them, causing them to follow him cheerfully
in his most daring exploits. He continued to do magnificent work
until he was badly wounded by shell fire in the legs."</p></blockquote>

<p>No. 23, <span class="smcap">Private (Lance-Corporal) Bernard Sydney
Gordon</span>,
41st Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"During the operations of the 26-27th August, 1918, east of <span class="smcap">Bray</span>,
this N.C.O. showed most conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty in
the face of the enemy. He led his section through heavy enemy shelling
to its objective, which he consolidated. Then single-handed he attacked
an enemy machine gun which was enfilading the Company on his right,
killed the man on the gun, and captured the post, which contained one
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[307]</a></span>officer (a Captain) and 10 men. After handing these over at Company
Headquarters, he returned alone to the old system of trenches, in which
were many machine guns; entered a trench and proceeded to mop it
up, returning with 15 prisoners in one squad and 14 in another, together
with two machine guns. Again he returned to the system, this time
with a Trench Mortar gun and crew, and proceeded to mop up a further
portion of the trench, bringing in 22 prisoners, including one officer
and 3 machine guns. This last capture enabled the British troops on
our left to advance, which they had not been able to do owing to machine-gun
fire from these posts. His total captures were thus 2 officers and
61 other ranks, together with 6 machine guns, and with the exception of
the Trench Mortar assistance, it was absolutely an individual effort and
done entirely on his own initiative."</p></blockquote>

<p>No. 726, <span class="smcap">Private George Cartwright</span>,
33rd Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"For most conspicuous valour and devotion to duty. On the morning
of the 31st August, 1918, during the attack on <span class="smcap">Road Wood</span>, south-west
of Bouchavesnes, near Péronne, Private Cartwright displayed exceptional
gallantry and supreme disregard for personal danger in the face
of a most withering machine-gun fire. Two Companies were held up by
a machine-gun firing from the south-western edge of the wood. Without
hesitation, this man stood up, and walking towards the gun, fired his
rifle from his shoulder. He shot the No. 1 Gunner; another German
manned the gun, and he killed him; a third attempted to fire the gun
and him he also killed. Private Cartwright then threw a bomb at the
post, and on its exploding, he rushed forward, captured the gun and nine
Germans. Our line then immediately rushed forward, loudly cheering
him. This magnificent deed had a most inspiring effect on the whole
line; all strove to emulate his gallantry. Throughout the operation
Private Cartwright displayed wonderful dash, grim determination and
courage of the highest order."</p></blockquote>

<p><span class="smcap">Lieutenant Edgar Thomas Towner</span>, M.C.,
2nd Australian Machine Gun Battalion.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"On 1st September, 1918, in the attack on <span class="smcap">Mont St. Quentin</span>, near
Péronne, this officer was in charge of 4 Vickers guns operating on a
front of 1,500 yards. During the early stages of the advance an enemy
machine gun was causing casualties to our advancing Infantry. Locating
the gun, Lieut. Towner dashed ahead alone, and succeeded in killing the
crew with his revolver, capturing the gun, and then, by turning it against
the enemy, inflicted heavy casualties on them. Advancing then past
a copse from which the enemy were firing, he brought his guns into
action, placing his fire behind the enemy and cutting them off. On their
attempting to retire before the advancing Infantry, and finding they were
prevented by this machine-gun fire, the party of 25 Germans surrendered.
He then reconnoitred alone over open ground exposed to heavy
machine-gun and snipers' fire, and by the energy, foresight and the
promptitude with which he brought fire to bear on further enemy groups,
enabled the Infantry to reach a sunken road. On moving his guns up
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[308]</a></span>to the sunken road, he found himself short of ammunition, so went back
across the open under heavy fire and obtained a German gun, and brought
it and boxes of ammunition into the sunken road. Here he mounted and
fired the gun in full view of the enemy, causing the enemy to retire
further, and enabling Infantry on the flank, who were previously held up,
to advance. Enemy machine gunners having direct observation, flicked
the earth round and under this gun, and played a tattoo along the top
of the bank. Though one bullet went into his helmet and inflicted a
gaping scalp wound, he continued firing. Subsequently he refused to go
out to have his wound attended to, as the situation was critical and his
place was with his men. Later in the day the Infantry were obliged to
retire slightly, and one gun was left behind. Lieut. Towner, seeing
this, dashed back over the open, carried the gun back in spite of terrific
fire, and brought it into action again. He continued to engage the
enemy wherever they appeared, and put an enemy machine gun out of
action. During the following night he insisted on doing his tour of duty
along with the other officers, and his coolness and cheerfulness set an
example which had a great effect on the men. To steady and calm the
men of a small detached outpost, he crawled out among the enemy posts
to investigate. He remained out about an hour, though enemy machine
guns fired continuously on the sector, and the Germans were moving
about him. He moved one gun up in support of the Infantry post, and
patrolled the communication saps which ran off this post into the German
line during the remainder of the night. Next morning, after his guns
assisted in dispersing a large party of the enemy, he was led away utterly
exhausted, 30 hours after being wounded."</p></blockquote>

<p>No. 2358, <span class="smcap">Sergeant Albert David Lowerson</span>,
21st Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"At <span class="smcap">Mont St, Quentin</span>, north of Péronne, on the 1st September,
1918, this N.C.O. displayed courage and tactical skill of the very highest
order during the attack on this village. Very strong opposition was met
with early in the attack, and every foot of ground was stubbornly contested
by the enemy located in very strong positions. This N.C.O.'s
example during the fighting was of the greatest value. He moved about,
regardless of the heavy enemy machine-gun fire, directing his men,
encouraging them to still greater effort, and finally led them on to the
objective. On reaching the objective, he saw that the left attacking
party had not met with success, and that the attack was held up by an
enemy strong post, heavily manned with 12 machine guns. Under the
heaviest sniping and machine gun fire Sergeant Lowerson rallied seven
men around him into a storming party, and deployed them to attack
the post from both flanks, one party of three being killed immediately.
He himself then rushed the strong point, and, with effective bombing,
inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, and captured the post containing
12 machine guns and 30 prisoners. Though severely wounded in the right
thigh, he refused to leave the front line until the prisoners had been dispatched
to the rear, and the organization and consolidation of the post
by our men had been completed. When he saw that the position was
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[309]</a></span>thoroughly secure, he returned to the rear, but refused to leave the Battalion
until forced to evacuate two days later by the seriousness of his
wound. This act was the culminating point of a series of most gallant
performances by this N.C.O. during the fighting extending over a week."</p></blockquote>

<p>No. 1584<span class="smcap">A</span>, <span class="smcap">Private William Matthew Currey</span>,
53rd Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"During the attack on <span class="smcap">Péronne</span>, on the morning of 1st September,
1918, Private Currey displayed most conspicuous gallantry and daring.
During the early stage of the advance the Battalion was suffering heavy
casualties from a 77 mm. Field Gun, that was firing over sights at very
close range. Private Currey, without hesitation, rushed forward, and
despite a withering machine-gun fire that was directed on him from
either flank, succeeded in capturing the gun single-handed after killing
the entire crew. Later, when continuing the advance, an enemy strong
point, containing 30 men and two machine guns, was noticed, which
was holding up the advance of the left flank. Private Currey crept
around the flank, and engaged the post with a Lewis Gun, causing many
casualties. Finally, he rushed the post single-handed, killing four,
wounding two, and taking one prisoner, the survivors running away.
It was entirely owing to his gallant conduct that the situation was
relieved, and the advance enabled to continue. After the final stage of
the attack, it was imperative that one of the Companies that had become
isolated should be withdrawn. This man at once volunteered to carry
the message, although the ground to be crossed was very heavily shelled and
continuously swept by machine-gun fire. He crossed the shell and bullet-swept
area three times in the effort to locate the Company, and on one
occasion his box respirator was shot through by machine-gun bullets,
and he was gassed. Nevertheless, he remained on duty, and after
finding the isolated Company, delivered the message, and returned with
very valuable information from the Company Commander. Owing to
the gas poisoning from which he was suffering Currey had shortly afterwards
to be evacuated."</p></blockquote>

<p>No. 6939, <span class="smcap">Private Robert Mactier</span>,
23rd Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"On the morning of 1st September, 1918, during the operation
entailing capture of <span class="smcap">Mont St. Quentin</span>, this man stands out for the
greatest bravery and devotion to duty. Fifteen minutes before zero
two bombing patrols were sent to clear up several enemy strong points
close to our line, but they met with very stubborn resistance and no
success, and the Battalion was unable to move on to its Jumping Off
Trench. Mactier, single-handed and in daylight, then jumped out of
the trench from the leading Company, rushed past the block, closed with
and killed the machine-gun garrison of 8 men with his revolver and
bombs, and threw the enemy machine gun over the parapet. He rushed
forward another 20 yards and jumped into another strong point held
by a garrison of 6 men, who immediately surrendered. Continuing to
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[310]</a></span>the next block through the trench, an enemy gun, which had been
enfilading our flank advancing troops, was swung on to him; but he
jumped out of the trench into the open, and disposed of this third post
and gun crew by bombing them from the rear. Before he could get into
this trench, he was killed by enemy machine gun at close range. In the
three posts which Mactier rushed, 15 of the enemy were found killed and
30 taken prisoners."</p></blockquote>

<p>No. 1876, <span class="smcap">Corporal Alexander Henry Buckley</span>,
54th Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"For most conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty at <span class="smcap">Péronne</span>
during the operations on 1st-2nd September, 1918. After passing the
first objective, his half Company and part of the Company on the flank
were held up by an enemy machine-gun nest. With one man he rushed
the post, shooting 4 of the occupants and taking 22 prisoners. Later
on, reaching a moat, another machine-gun nest commanded the only
available foot-bridge. Whilst this was being engaged from a flank, this
N.C.O. endeavoured to cross the bridge and rush the post, but was killed
in the attempt. Throughout the advance he had displayed great
initiative, resource and courage, being a great inspiration to his men.
In order to avert casualties amongst his comrades and to permit of their advance,
he voluntarily essayed a task which practically meant certain death.
He set a fine example of self-sacrificing devotion to duty and bravery."</p></blockquote>

<p>No. 2631, <span class="smcap">Corporal Arthur Charles Hall</span>,
54th Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"For most conspicuous gallantry, brilliant leadership and devotion
to duty during the operations at <span class="smcap">Péronne</span> on 1st and 2nd September, 1918.
A machine-gun post in the enemy front line was holding up the advance;
alone, this N.C.O. rushed the position, shot 4 of the occupants as he
advanced, and captured 9 others and 2 machine guns. Then, crossing
the objective with a small party, he reconnoitred the approaches to the
town, covering the infiltration of the remainder of the Company. During
the mopping up he continuously&mdash;in advance of the main party&mdash;located
enemy posts of resistance, and then personally led parties to the assault.
In this way he captured many small parties of prisoners and machine-guns.
On the morning of 2nd September, during a heavy barrage on the
newly consolidated position, a man of his platoon was severely wounded.
Seeing that only immediate medical attention could save him, Corporal
Hall volunteered and carried the man out of the barrage, handed him
to a stretcher-bearer, and immediately returned to his post. This
Company was heavily engaged throughout the day, only one Officer
remaining unwounded."</p></blockquote>

<p>No. 1153, <span class="smcap">Private (Lance-Corporal) Laurence Carthage
Weathers</span>,
43rd Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"On the 2nd September, 1918, during operations north of <span class="smcap">Péronne</span>,
Lance-Corporal Weathers was one of an advanced bombing party
operating well forward of our attacking troops. Just before the attack
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[311]</a></span>reached its final objective it was held up by the enemy, who occupied a
trench in great numbers. After an hour's continuous fighting Lance-Corporal
Weathers went forward alone in face of heavy enemy fire and
located a large body of them. He immediately attacked the enemy
with bombs and killed the senior officer; then made his way back to our
lines and, securing a further supply of bombs and taking three men with
him, he went forward and again attacked under very heavy fire. On
reaching the enemy position, he jumped up on the parapet of the trench
and threw bombs among the Bosche. He then signalled for his comrades
to come up, and the remainder of the enemy, seeing this, surrendered.
When counted, the number of prisoners totalled 100 and 3 machine guns."</p></blockquote>

<p>No. 3244, <span class="smcap">Private James Park Woods</span>,
48th Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during the operations
near <span class="smcap">Le Verguier</span>, north-west of St. Quentin, on the 18th September,
1918. Woods formed one of a party of three to patrol the
right flank. He encountered a very formidable enemy strong point,
consisting of about 25 men with four heavy and two light machine guns.
This strong point commanded the greater portion of our position, and it
was of the utmost importance to us, insomuch as it gave us a commanding
view of the whole canal system. The strong point was situated at the
junction of four enemy fire trenches, apparently sited with a view to
protecting the approaches to the village of Bellenglise. Private Woods,
appreciating the great importance of this position, and realizing the
necessity for its immediate capture, fearlessly attacked with his rifle
and bayonet, capturing one of the enemy and wounding the second with
his bayonet, forcing the remainder to retire. After the capture of the
strong point, it was found that one of the party was wounded. Private
Woods, although himself slightly gassed, stubbornly defended the post.
The enemy ascertaining that only two men opposed them, immediately
attempted to recapture the strong point. The counter-attack by the
enemy was carried out with at least 30 men attacking up the three
trenches and across the open ground. This meant that Private Woods
was attacked from both flanks and the front. He fearlessly jumped on
the parapet, and opened fire on the attacking enemy, inflicting several
casualties. During this operation he was exposed to very heavy machine-gun,
rifle fire and bombing, but with dogged determination he kept up his
fire, thus holding up the enemy until help arrived, enabling the enemy
counter-attack to be repulsed with heavy losses. The capture of this
strong post was the means of securing our flank, which had previously been
in the air, and also enabled us to get in touch with the troops on our flank."</p></blockquote>

<p>No. 6594, <span class="smcap">Sergeant Gerald Sexton</span>,
13th Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"In the attack near <span class="smcap">Le Verguier</span>, north-west of St. Quentin, on the
18th September, 1918, Sergeant Sexton displayed the most conspicuous
bravery and performed deeds which, apart from their gallant nature,
were in a great measure responsible for the Battalion's success. On the
southern edge of the village of Le Verguier the enemy fought hard, and
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[312]</a></span>serious opposition had to be crushed. During the whole period of the
advance, Sergeant Sexton was to the fore dealing with enemy machine
guns by firing from the hip as he advanced, rushing enemy posts, and
performing feats of bravery and endurance, which are better appreciated
when one realizes that all the time he fired his Lewis Gun from the hip
without faltering or for a moment taking cover. Immediately the attack
commenced, Sergeant Sexton's Lewis Gun Section was confronted by
an enemy machine gun. He called out to his section to follow, rushed
the machine gun and killed the crew. He then called out to the rest
of the Company to follow, but they had not gone far when they encountered
some bombers and riflemen about 70 yards in front of the Company.
Sexton rushed the trench, firing his gun from the hip, and killed or took
prisoner all the members of the post. Continuing, he entered a copse, and
killed or took prisoner another party of the enemy. The advance continued
over the ridge at Le Verguier to where Sexton was met by Lieut.
Price, who pointed out a party of the enemy manning a bank, and a
field gun in action which was causing casualties and holding up a Company.
There was also a trench mortar in action. Sergeant Sexton did
not wait, but firing a few short bursts as he advanced, and calling out to
his section to follow, rushed down the bank and killed the gunners on
the field gun. Dashing out on to a flat under fire from two hostile
machine guns directed on him, he killed 12 more of the enemy. Paying
no heed to the machine-gun fire, he returned to the bank, and after firing
down some dug-outs, induced about 30 of the enemy to surrender.
Owing to his action the Company on the left of the Battalion was able
to continue the advance where they had been definitely held up, and
were suffering from the effects of the field gun. When the advance was
continued from the first to the second objective, the Company was again
held up by two machine guns on the right and one on the left. In conjunction
with a Platoon, Sexton engaged the machine gun on the left,
firing all the while from the upright position, a fearless figure which,
according to eye-witnesses, inspired everyone. To have taken cover
would have been more prudent, but Sexton realized that prompt action
was essential, and did not wait to assume the prone position. Silencing
this gun, he turned his attention to the two machine guns on the right
and silenced them. He then moved forward into a trench, killing quite
a number of the enemy and, advancing along a sap, took a few prisoners.
Further on he was responsible for a few more small posts, and, on the
final objective, being given a responsible post on the left of his Company,
he engaged a machine gun which was firing across the Company front,
and thus enabled his Company to dig in. This completed, he went
forward down a sunken road and captured several more prisoners."</p></blockquote>

<p><span class="smcap">Major Blair Anderson Wark</span>, D.S.O.,
32nd Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"During the period 29th September-1st October, 1918, in the operations
against the <span class="smcap">Hindenburg Line</span> at <span class="smcap">Bellicourt</span>, and the advance
through <span class="smcap">Nauroy</span>, <span class="smcap">Etricourt</span>, <span class="smcap">Magny la Fosse</span> and <span class="smcap">Joncourt</span>, Major
Wark, in command of the 32nd Battalion, displayed most conspicuous
gallantry and set a fine example of personal bravery, energy, coolness,
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[313]</a></span>and control under extremely difficult conditions. On 29th September,
under heavy artillery and machine-gun fire at very close range from all
sides and in a dense fog, Major Wark, finding that the situation was
critical, moved quickly forward alone and obtained sufficient information
regarding the situation in front to be able to lead his command forward.
At this time American troops were at a standstill and disorganized, and
Major Wark quickly organized more than 200 of them, and attached them
to his leading Companies and pressed forward. By his prompt action
in the early stages of the battle he narrowly averted what would have
resulted in great confusion on the part of the attack-troops. Still
moving fearlessly at the head of his leading Companies, and at most
times far out in advance, attended only by a runner, he cheered his men
on, and they swept through the Hindenburg defences towards Nauroy.
Pushing quickly through Nauroy, and mopping up the southern portion
of the village, the process yielding 50 prisoners, the Battalion swung
towards Etricourt. Still leading his assaulting Companies, he observed
a battery of 77 mm. guns firing point-blank into his rear Companies and
causing heavy casualties. Calling on a few of his men to him he rushed
the battery, capturing the 4 guns and 10 of the crew; the remainder of
the crew fled or were killed. Moving rapidly forward with only two
N.C.O.'s, he surprised and captured 50 Germans near Magny la Fosse.
Quickly seizing this opportunity, he pushed one Company forward
through the village and made good the position. Having captured his
objectives for the day, and personally reconnoitring to see that his
flanks were safe, he found his command in a very difficult and dangerous
position, his left flank being exposed to the extent of 3,000 yards on
account of the 31st Battalion not being able to advance. He, after a
strenuous day's fighting, set about the selection and reorganization of a
new position, and effected a junction with British troops on the right
and 31st Battalion on the left, and made his line secure. At 6 a.m. on
30th September, he again led his command forward to allow of the troops
on the right being able to advance. The men were tired and had suffered
heavily, but he personally led them, and his presence amongst them
inspired them to further efforts. On October 1st, 1918, his Battalion
was ordered to advance at very short notice. He gave his orders for the
attack, and personally led his troops forward. A nest of machine guns
was encountered, causing casualties to his men. Without hesitation
and regardless of personal risk, he dashed forward practically into the
muzzles of the guns and under an exceptionally heavy fire and silenced
them, killing or capturing the entire crews. Joncourt and Mill Ridge
were then quickly captured and his line consolidated. His men were
practically exhausted after the three days' heavy fighting, but he moved
amongst them from post to post, across country swept by heavy and
continuous shell and machine-gun fire at point-blank range, urged them
on and the line was made secure. Throughout he displayed the greatest
courage and devotion to duty, coupled with great tact and skill, and his
work, together with the reports based on his own personal observations,
which he forwarded, were invaluable to the Brigade. It is beyond doubt
that the success achieved by the Brigade during the heavy fighting on
29th and 30th September and 1st October was due to this officer's gallantry,
determination, skill and great courage."</p></blockquote>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[314]</a></span></p>

<p>No. 1717, <span class="smcap">Private John Ryan</span>,
55th Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty, and for saving a very
dangerous situation under particularly gallant circumstances during
an attack against the Hindenburg defences on 30th September, 1918.
In the initial assault on the enemy's positions this soldier went forward
with great dash and determination, and was one of the first men of his
Company to reach the trench which was their objective. Seeing him rush
in with his bayonet with such exceptional skill and daring, his comrades
were inspired and followed his example. Although the enemy shell and
machine-gun fire was extremely heavy, the enemy trench garrison was
soon overcome. In the assault the attacking troops were weakened by
casualties, and, as they were too few to cover the whole front of attack,
a considerable gap was left between Private Ryan's Battalion's left and
the unit on the flank. The enemy counter-attacked soon after the
objective was reached, and a few succeeded in infiltrating through the
gap, and taking up a position of cover in rear of our men, where they
commenced bombing operations. The section of trench occupied by
Private Ryan and his comrades was now under fire from front and rear,
and for a time it seemed that the enemy was certain to force his way
through. The situation was critical and necessitated prompt action by
someone in authority. Private Ryan found that there were no officers
or N.C.O.'s near; they had become casualties in the assault. Appreciating
the situation at once, he organized the few men nearest him,
and led them out to attack the enemy with bomb and bayonet. Some of
his party fell victims to the enemy's bombs, and he finally dashed into the
enemy position of cover with only 3 men. The enemy were three times
their number, but by skilful bayonet work they succeeded in killing the
first three Germans on the enemy's flank. Moving along the embankment,
Private Ryan alone rushed the remainder of the enemy with
bombs. It was while thus engaged he fell wounded, but his dashing
bombing assault drove the enemy clear of our positions. Those who
were not killed or wounded by his bombs fell victims to our Lewis Gunners
as they retired across No Man's Land. A particularly dangerous
situation had been saved by this gallant soldier, whose display of determined
bravery and initiative was witnessed by the men of the two
attacking Battalions, who, inspired and urged by it, fought skilfully and
bravely for two days."</p></blockquote>

<p><span class="smcap">Lieutenant Joseph Maxwell</span>, M.C., D.C.M.,
18th Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"On 3rd October, 1918, he took part as a Platoon Commander in an
attack on the <span class="smcap">Beaurevoir-Fonsomme</span> Line near Estrées, north of St.
Quentin. His Company Commander was severely wounded soon after
the jump off, and Lieut. Maxwell at once took charge of the Company.
When the enemy wire was reached, they were met by a hail of machine-gun
fire, and suffered considerable casualties, including all other officers
of the Company. The wire at this point was six belts thick, each belt
being 20 to 25 feet wide. Lieut. Maxwell pushed forward single-handed
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[315]</a></span>through the wire, and attacked the most dangerous machine gun. He
personally killed three of the crew, and the remaining four men in the
post surrendered to him with a machine gun. His Company followed
him through the wire and captured the trenches forming their objective.
Later, it was noticed that the Company on his left was held up in the
wire by a very strong force on the left flank of the Battalion. He at
once organized a party and moved to the left to endeavour to attack
the enemy from the rear. Heavy machine-gun fire met them. Lieut.
Maxwell again dashed forward single-handed at the foremost machine
gun, and with his revolver shot five of its crew, so silencing the gun.
Owing to the work of this party, the left Company was then able to work
a small force through the wire, and eventually to occupy the objective
and mop up the trenches. In the fighting prior to the mopping up, an
English-speaking prisoner, who was captured, stated that the remainder
of the enemy were willing to surrender. Lieut. Maxwell and two men,
with this prisoner, walked to a post containing more than twenty
Germans. The latter at once seized and disarmed our men. Lieut.
Maxwell waited his chance, and then with an automatic pistol which he
had concealed in his box respirator, shot two of the enemy and with the
two men escaped. They were pursued by rifle fire, and one was wounded.
However, Lieut. Maxwell organized a small party at once, attacked and
captured the post."</p></blockquote>

<p><span class="smcap">Second Lieutenant George Morby Ingram</span>, M.M.,
24th Battalion, A.I.F.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"During the attack on <span class="smcap">Montbrehain</span>, east of Péronne, on 5th October,
1918, this officer was in charge of a platoon. About 100 yards from
the Jumping Off Trench severe enemy machine-gun fire was encountered
from a strong post which had escaped our Artillery fire, and the advance
was thus held up. Lieut. Ingram dashed out, and, under cover of the fire
of a Lewis Gun, rushed the post at the head of his men. This post contained
9 machine guns and 42 Germans, who fought until our men were
within 3 yards of them. They were killed to a man&mdash;Lieut. Ingram
accounting for no less than 18 of them. A number of enemy posts were
then observed to be firing on our men from about 150 yards further
forward, and the Company moved forward to attack them, but severe
casualties were sustained. The Company Commander had been badly
wounded, and the Company Sergeant-Major and several others, who
attempted to lead the advance, were killed. Our barrage had passed on,
and no Tanks were near. Lieut. Ingram quickly seized the situation,
rallied his men in the face of murderous fire, and, with magnificent courage
and resolution, led them forward. He himself rushed the first post,
shot 6 of the enemy, and captured a machine gun, thus overcoming a
very serious resistance. By this time the Company had been reduced
from 90 to about 30 other ranks; but this officer, seeing enemy fire
coming from a quarry, to his left front, again led his men forward and
rushed the quarry. He jumped into the quarry amongst enemy wire,
and his men followed and proceeded to mop up a large number of the
enemy who were in bivouacs there. He then observed an enemy machine
gun firing from the ventilator of a cellar, through a gap in the wall of
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[316]</a></span>a house about 20 yards away. Without hesitation and entirely alone
he scrambled up the edge of the quarry, ran round the rear of the house,
and entering from the far side, shot the enemy gunner through the ventilator
of the cellar. He fired several more shots into the cellar, then,
seeing some enemy jumping out of the window of the house, he burst
open a door, rushed to the head of the stairs leading into the cellar, and
forced 62 of the enemy to surrender. He now found he was out of touch
with the Company on his left flank, so went out alone and made a personal
reconnaissance under heavy fire, and succeeded in gaining touch with the
left Company, which had lost all its officers. Having returned to his
Company, he personally placed a post on his left flank to ensure its
safety, and then reconnoitred and established two posts on his right flank.
All this was done in the face of continuous machine-gun and shell fire."</p></blockquote>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_316fp.jpg" width="1200" height="758" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>Australian Artillery&mdash;moving up to the front, through the Hindenburg wire, October 2nd, 1918.</p></div>
</div>

<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;">
<img src="images/i_b_317fp.jpg" width="1200" height="777" alt="" />
<div class="caption"><p>Advance during Battle&mdash;Third Division Infantry and Tanks advancing to the capture of Bony, October 1st, 1918.</p></div>
</div>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[317]</a></span></p>

<h2>APPENDIX C<br />

CORPS ORDERS FOR THE BATTLE OF AUGUST 8TH, 1918</h2>


<p>The following were the complete orders issued by the Australian
Army Corps for the Battle of August 8th, 1918. They form
only a small part of the whole of the orders which were required
for the operation. There were, in addition, detailed orders by
the Corps Artillery Headquarters, the Heavy Artillery, the
Chief Engineer, and each of the five Divisions and fifteen Brigades,
and also by the Administrative Services of the Corps.</p>

<p>On the question of the form of the orders, the most expedient
course was found to be the one here adopted&mdash;namely, that of
issuing a numbered series of Battle Instructions, each dealing
comprehensively with a separate subject matter:</p>


<p><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 1</span></p>

<p>1.  The Australian Corps will attack the enemy from the
<span class="smcap">Villers-Bretonneux&mdash;Chaulnes</span> Railway exclusive to the
River <span class="smcap">Somme</span>, inclusive, at a date and hour to be notified.</p>

<p>The Canadian Corps will co-operate on the right, south of the
railway (inclusive), and the Third Corps on the left, north of
the <span class="smcap">Somme</span>.</p>

<p>2.  <i>General Method of Attack.</i>&mdash;The Australian Corps will
attack on a two-division front. The attack will be carried out
in three phases. Divisional boundaries and objectives are shown
on the attached map.</p>

<blockquote>

<p>(i) <i>First Phase.</i>&mdash;The 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions
will form up on a taped line prior to <span class="smcap">ZERO</span>, and will attack
with Tanks under a creeping artillery barrage. Their
objective is shown by a <span class="smcap">GREEN</span> line on the attached map.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[318]</a></span></p>
<p>On arrival at their objective they will consolidate.</p>

<p>(ii)  <i>Second Phase.</i>&mdash;The 5th and 4th Australian Divisions,
organized in brigade groups, will advance in open warfare
formations, from the first objective passing through 2nd
and 3rd Australian Divisions respectively. Their objective
is shown in <span class="smcap">RED</span> on the map.</p>

<p>(iii)  <i>Third Phase.</i>&mdash;The 5th and 4th Australian Divisions
will exploit their success and seize the old British line of
Defences marked <span class="smcap">BLUE</span> on the map, and establish themselves
defensively on this line.</p>

<p>(iv)  The 1st Australian Division will be in Corps Reserve.</p>

<p>(v)  A detailed programme of the action will be issued.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>3.  <i>Assembly.</i>&mdash;In order to free as many troops from line duty
as possible, 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions will arrange to
hold the front with one infantry brigade on each Divisional
sector. This will be completed before daybreak on 5th August.</p>

<p>To prevent any troops arriving at their objectives in an
exhausted condition through a long march, troops detailed to
the farthest objectives must be quartered nearest the starting
line prior to <span class="smcap">ZERO</span>.</p>

<p>The brigades of 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions not holding
the line will be quartered in rear of all brigades of 5th and 4th
Australian Divisions respectively prior to <span class="smcap">ZERO</span> night. This will
be completed before daybreak on 5th August.</p>

<p>The allotment of areas for quartering during this stage will
be made by mutual arrangement between Divisional Commanders
concerned. The allotment of routes and times of movement
in accordance with the Corps programme will be arranged
similarly.</p>

<p>On <span class="smcap">ZERO</span> night the brigades of 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions
not in the line will make their approach march to their
tape lines through the area occupied by 5th and 4th Australian
Divisions respectively.</p>

<p>4.  <i>Artillery.</i></p>

<blockquote>

<p>(i) The Artillery available consists of:</p>

<p>
18 Field Artillery Brigades.<br />
12 Heavy Artillery Brigades.<br />
</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[319]</a></span></p>

<p>(ii)  G.O.C., R.A., Aust. Corps, will command all artillery
of the Corps during the first phase of the operation.</p>

<p>(iii)  For the second phase G.O.C., R.A., Aust. Corps,
will allot:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>(<i>a</i>)  Three Field Artillery Brigades to 5th and 4th
Aust. Divisions for distribution to infantry brigade
groups. These will include the 5th and 4th Aust.
Divisional Artillery respectively.</p>

<p>(<i>b</i>)  Three brigades of Field Artillery and one battery
of 60-pdr. Heavy Artillery allotted to each of the 5th
and 4th Aust. Divisions for employment as may be
ordered by the Divisional Commanders.</p>

<p>(<i>c</i>) The remainder of the Field Artillery and the
Heavy Artillery to Corps Reserve.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>(iv)  Heavy Artillery will be pushed forward by G.O.C.,
R.A., to protect the troops in the second objective.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>5.  <i>Tanks.</i>&mdash;Instructions for the distribution and employment
of Tanks will be issued later.</p>

<p>6.  <i>Engineers.</i>&mdash;Engineers and Pioneers will be distributed for
work as follows from midnight on 6th-7th instant:</p>

<blockquote>
<p>
(i)  Corps Pool under Chief Engineer&mdash;</p>
<blockquote>
<p>
1 Field Coy. from 4th Aust. Div.<br />
1  Field Coy. from 5th Aust. Div.<br />
2  Field Coys. from 2nd Aust. Div.<br />
2  Field Coys. from 3rd Aust. Div.<br />
3  Army Troops Coys. Engineers.<br />
5th Aust. Pioneer Bn.<br />
3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn.<br />
</p>
</blockquote>

<p>(ii)  With Divisions:</p>

<p>2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn. will serve 2nd and 3rd Aust.
Divisions. 2 Coys. to each.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[320]</a></span></p>

<p>4th Aust. Pioneer Bn. will serve 4th and 5th Aust.
Divisions. 2 Coys. to each.</p>

<p>Divisional Commanders will control:</p>

<p>
2nd Aust. Division&mdash;1 Field Coy. and 2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn. (less 2 Coys.).<br />
3rd Aust. Division&mdash;1 Field Coy. and 2 Coys. 2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.<br />
4th Aust. Division&mdash;2 Field Coys. and 4th Aust. Pioneer Bn. (less 2 Coys.).<br />
5th Aust. Division&mdash;2 Field Coys. and 2 Coys. 4th Aust. Pioneer Bn.<br />
</p>

<p>Tunnellers will be detailed to each division for dug-out
exploration.</p>

<p>Chief Engineer, Aust. Corps, will arrange for the distribution
in accordance with this.</p>

<p>Chief Engineer will issue instructions for the withdrawal
and storing of demolition charges of bridges for which the
Corps is responsible, and for the return of engineer personnel
employed on this work to their units.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>7. Deputy Director of Medical Services will arrange for the
distribution of medical units.</p>


<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 2</span><br />
SECRECY</div>

<p>(<i>a</i>) It is of first importance that secrecy should be observed
and the operation carried out as a surprise.</p>

<p>Commanders will take all possible steps to prevent the scope
or date of the operation becoming known except to those taking
part. Any officer, N.C.O., or man discussing the operation in
public, or communicating details regarding it to any person,
either soldier or civilian, not immediately concerned, will be
severely dealt with.</p>

<p>(<i>b</i>) All movement of troops and transport will take place by
night, whether in the forward or back areas of the Australian<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[321]</a></span>
Corps, on and after 1st August, except where absolutely necessary
to move by day.</p>

<p>(<i>c</i>)  O.C., No. 3 Squadron, A.F.C., will arrange for aeroplanes
to fly over the Australian Corps Army area during days when
flying is possible, and to report to Corps H.Q. any abnormal
movement of troops or transport within our lines.</p>

<p>(<i>d</i>)  Work on back lines will be continued as at present, so that
there may be no apparent change in our attitude.</p>

<p>(<i>e</i>)  Commanders will ensure that the numbers of officers
reconnoitring the enemy's positions is limited to those for whom
such reconnaissance is essential.</p>

<p>Nothing attracts attention to an offensive more than a large
number of officers with maps looking over the parapet and
visiting Observation Posts.</p>

<p>Commanding Officers of units holding the front line should
report at once to higher authority any disregard of these orders.</p>

<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 3</span><br />
COMMUNICATIONS AND HEADQUARTERS</div>

<p>1.  Communications will be carefully organized to ensure the
maintenance of communication throughout the advance and
after its conclusion.</p>

<p>2.  (i) Headquarters of Divisions will be established as follows:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>
2nd Australian Division&mdash;<span class="smcap">Glisy</span>.<br />
5th Australian Division&mdash;<span class="smcap">Blangy-Tronville</span> Château. Advanced Headquarters in dug-outs at Railway cutting.<br />
3rd Australian Division&mdash;<span class="smcap">Bussy</span>.<br />
4th Australian Division&mdash;<span class="smcap">Corbie</span>.<br />
</p>

<p>(ii) Headquarters of Brigades and battalions will be
selected in advance, as far as this can be done, and all
concerned will be notified of their proposed locations.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>3.  Report Centres in advance of the heads of buried cables
will be selected in each Divisional Sector and details prepared
for the organization of communications back to cable head.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[322]</a></span></p>

<p>4.  The following mounted troops are detailed to Divisions:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>
To 2nd Australian Division&mdash;1 Troop 13th L.H.<br />
3rd Australian Division&mdash;1 Troop 13th L.H.<br />
4th Australian Division&mdash;2 Troops 13th L.H.<br />
5th Australian Division&mdash;2 Troops 13th L.H.<br />
</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Divisions will inform O.C., 13th Light Horse, as to the time and
place at which the Light Horse will report.</p>

<p>The Cyclist Section now with Divisions will remain.</p>

<p>5. The employment of wireless will be exploited to the full.</p>

<p>6. Popham panels will be employed for communication between
Infantry and Aeroplanes.</p>


<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 4</span><br />
ARTILLERY</div>

<p>(<i>a</i>)  Ammunition will be dumped at or near gun positions as
follows:</p>


<div class="center">
<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary="">
<tr><td align="left">18-pdr.</td><td align="left">600 rounds.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">4.5" Howitzer</td><td align="left">500 rounds.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">60-pdr.</td><td align="left">400 rounds.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">6" guns</td><td align="left">400 rounds.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">6" Howitzers</td><td align="left">400 rounds.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">8" Howitzers</td><td align="left">400 rounds.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">9.2" Howitzers&nbsp;&nbsp;</td><td align="left">400 rounds.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">12" Howitzers</td><td align="left">200 rounds.</td></tr>
</table></div>

<p>Arrangements should be made to commence dumping this
ammunition as soon as feasible. Echelons will be kept full.</p>

<p>(<i>b</i>) Boundaries between Corps as regards bombardment and
counter-battery work coincide with the boundaries between
Corps shown on map issued with Australian Corps "Battle
Instructions No. 1," dated 1st August, 1918.</p>

<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 5</span><br />
TANKS</div>

<p>1. Tanks are available as follows:</p>

<p><i>5<sup>th</sup> Tank Brigade.</i></p>
<blockquote>
<p>
Mark V. Tanks&mdash;2nd Battalion&mdash;Lieut.-Col. <span class="smcap">E. D. Bryce</span>, D.S.O.<br />
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[323]</a></span><br />
Mark V. Tanks&mdash;8th Battalion&mdash;Lieut.-Col. The Hon. <span class="smcap">J. D. Y. Bingham</span>, D.S.O.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 7em;">13th Battalion&mdash;Lieut.-Col. <span class="smcap">P. Lyon</span>.</span><br />
Mark V. (Star) Tanks&mdash;15th Battalion&mdash;Lieut.-Colonel <span class="smcap">Ramsey-Fairfax</span>.<br />
No. 1 G.C.Coy. (24 Carrying Tanks)&mdash;Major <span class="smcap">W. Partington</span>, M.C.<br />
</p>
</blockquote>

<p>2. <i>Mark V. Tanks</i> are allotted as follows:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>13th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. <span class="smcap">Lyon</span>), less one company, to
3rd Australian Division.</p>

<p>2nd Battalion (Lieut.-Col. <span class="smcap">Bryce</span>), plus one company
13th Battalion attached, to be employed with the
two right Divisions&mdash;two companies to be allotted
to each Division.</p>

<p>8th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. The Hon. <span class="smcap">J. D. Y. Bingham</span>)
to 4th Australian Division.</p></blockquote>

<p>One company of the 8th Battalion will be employed in support.
It will be specially charged with the function of maintaining
the attack at the junction of Divisions throughout the
advance as far as the second objective.</p>

<p>Command will be effected through Battalion Commanders in
each case except that Lieut.-Col. <span class="smcap">Bryce</span> will be responsible for
command of all Mark V. Tanks allotted to both 2nd and 5th
Australian Divisions.</p>

<p>3.  After the capture of the first objective, Tanks detailed to
2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions will rally and will be employed
to support the advance of the 5th and 4th Australian Divisions
respectively.</p>

<p>4.  After the capture of the second objective, Tanks will rally.
One company will remain in close support in each divisional
sector; the remainder will be withdrawn to positions to be
arranged between Divisional and Tank Commanders.</p>

<p>5.  Mark V. (Star) Tanks are allotted as follows:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>
1&frac12; companies (18 tanks) to the 5th Australian Division.<br />
1&frac12; companies (18 tanks) to the 4th Australian Division.<br />
</p>
</blockquote>

<p>These tanks are allotted for the capture of the blue line.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[324]</a></span></p>

<p><i>6. Carrying Tanks</i> are allotted as follows:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions&mdash;3 tanks each.</p>

<p>4th and 5th Australian Divisions&mdash;9 tanks each.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>7. Orders for forming up and movement to the Start Line
will be issued by G.O.C., 5th Tank Brigade.</p>

<p>Battalion Commanders detailed to Divisions will be responsible
for all liaison duty in connection with the Tanks.</p>

<p>8. For tactical purposes Tanks will be placed under the command
of Infantry Commanders to whose commands they are
allotted.</p>

<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 5A</span><br />
ASSEMBLY OF TANKS</div>

<p><i>1. Preliminary Movement.</i></p>

<p>Tanks will be assembled in concealed positions in the forward
area under the orders of the 5th Tank Brigade prior to night
Y/Z.</p>

<p><i>2. Advance to Start Line.</i></p>

<p>On night Y/Z the Tanks allotted to troops attacking the
first objective will commence to move forward at 9.30 p.m. to
the Tank Start Line. They will move with full engines to a line
not nearer to the Tank Start Line than 3,000 yards. From there
they will continue the movement forward to the Tank Start
Line, moving at a slow rate and as quietly as possible. The
Tank Start Line will be approximately 1,000 yards in rear of the
Infantry taped line.</p>

<p>Tanks will leave the Tank Start Line at such times as will
allow them to catch up to the Infantry as the barrage lifts at
zero plus three minutes.</p>

<p><i>3. Concealment of Engine Noise.</i></p>

<p>To conceal the noise of the engines during the advance of
the Tanks, the 5th Brigade R.A.F. will arrange to have planes
flying continuously over the Corps area from 9.30 p.m. until
midnight on Y/Z night, and from zero minus one hour onward
to zero.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[325]</a></span></p>

<p><i>4. Tanks allotted to Second Objective.</i></p>

<p>The Tanks allotted to the second objective will form up
independently under the orders of the 5th Tank Brigade in consultation
with G.O.'s C., 4th and 5th Australian Divisions.
These Tanks will be formed up when the aeroplanes are in the
air during the hours laid down in para. 3.</p>

<p><i>5. Liaison Company.</i></p>

<p>The company of the 8th Tank Battalion detailed to act in
support, and to ensure liaison in the battle line at the junction of
Divisions, will detail a half-company to each wave of Tanks,
vide paras. 2 and 4 above.</p>

<p>Divisions will detail special liaison parties of Infantry to work
in co-operation with this company.</p>

<p><i>6. Re-assembly.</i></p>

<p>As soon as the blue line has been reached, G.O.C. 5th Australian
Division will arrange to release the 2nd Tank Battalion,
less the attached company. This battalion will then be withdrawn.
The remainder of the Tanks, less one company allotted
to remain in support of each of the 4th and 5th Australian
Divisions, will be withdrawn when ordered by Divisional Commanders,
vide Battle Instructions No. 5, para. 4.</p>

<p><i>7. Smoke Grenades.</i></p>

<p>Divisions will ensure that a proportion of smoke rifle grenades
accompanies each Infantry detachment detailed to the blue line
and which accompanies each of the Mark V. (Star) Tanks.</p>

<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 6</span><br />
ARTILLERY</div>

<p><i>1. Preparation.</i></p>

<p>Active counter-battery work and harassing fire will be
maintained.</p>

<p>Such registration as is necessary will be carried out under
cover of this fire. A detailed programme for this will be arranged
in each divisional sector.</p>

<p>The necessity for concealing the increase in the number of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[326]</a></span>
guns on the front must be borne in mind, and on no account
should a large number of guns be employed at any one time.
Counter preparation and S.O.S. plans during the period of preparation
for the attack will be drawn up accordingly.</p>

<p>Normal fire should, so far as possible, be carried out from
positions other than those in which batteries will be emplaced
during the battle.</p>

<p><i>2. Heavy Artillery.</i></p>

<blockquote>

<p>(<i>a</i>) In view of the nature of the enemy's defences, the fire
of the majority of the heavy howitzers, employed for purposes
other than counter-battery work, will be used during
the barrage to engage special strong points or localities.</p>

<p>(<i>b</i>) Throughout the advance beyond the green line enemy
centres of resistance will be kept under fire until such time
as the progress of the Infantry renders this inadvisable. A
map will be issued to show the times at which heavy
artillery fire will cease on zones and special localities.</p>

<p>(<i>c</i>) At least two-thirds of the available Heavy Artillery
will be employed for counter-battery purposes.</p>

<p>Heavy concentrations of fire will be directed on the
different groups of enemy artillery.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>3. G.O.C., R.A., will prepare plans for dealing with a heavy
development of hostile fire on zero night. He will also prepare
a plan to deal with any attempt at a deliberate gas bombardment
of the <span class="smcap">Villers-Bretonneux</span> area on zero night.</p>

<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 7</span><br />
PROGRAMME OF ACTION</div>

<p><i>1. Capture of First Objective.</i></p>

<p>(<i>a</i>) Forming-up troops detailed to the capture of the first
objective will be deployed on the Forming-up Line one hour
before zero hour.</p>

<p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Artillery Programme.</i></p>

<blockquote>

<p>(i) The field artillery 18-pdr. barrage will open at zero
200 yards in advance of the forming-up line. At zero plus<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[327]</a></span>
three minutes the barrage will commence to advance;
lifts will be 100 yards at 2-minute intervals. There will
be two lifts at this rate.</p>

<p>The rate will then decrease to lifts of 100 yards every
3 minutes. There will be eight lifts at this rate.</p>

<p>From the eleventh lift inclusive until the green line is
reached lifts will be of 100 yards each at 4-minute intervals.</p>

<p>(ii) The 4.5" Howitzer barrage will move 200 yards in
advance of the 18-pdr. barrage.</p>

<p>(iii) A protective barrage will be maintained in front of the
green line until zero plus four hours. During this period
approximately fifty per cent. (50%) of the guns remaining
in the barrage will be employed in a protective line barrage;
the remainder will be employed to search and sweep deeply
into the enemy's position. At zero plus four hours all
barrage fire will cease.</p>

<p>Barrage Maps will be issued later.</p></blockquote>

<p><i>2. Capture of Second and Third Objectives.</i></p>

<p>(<i>a</i>) <i>Assembly.</i>&mdash;5th and 4th Australian Divisions will select
and mark positions for the assembly of their troops.</p>

<p>These areas will be selected in liaison with Tank Commanders
and with the 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions respectively, to
prevent movement to them clashing with the approach march of
these divisions and that of the Tanks.</p>

<p>This requires careful co-ordination between each pair of
Divisions and Tank Commanders.</p>

<p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Command.</i>&mdash;At zero plus four hours, responsibility for the
battle front will pass to G.O.C., 5th Australian Division, in the
right sector, and to G.O.C., 4th Australian Division, in the left
sector.</p>

<p>(<i>c</i>) <i>The Advance.</i>&mdash;5th and 4th Australian Divisions will time
their advance so that the leading troops cross the first objective
(green line) at zero plus four hours.</p>

<p>(<i>d</i>) From zero plus four hours the advance will be continued
under the conditions of open warfare.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[328]</a></span></p>

<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 8</span><br />
ROADS</div>

<p>1. A map is forwarded herewith showing the organization of
the road system in the captured territory.</p>

<p>2. The Chief Engineer will issue the necessary instructions for
the preparation of these roads for traffic.</p>

<p>3. All light traffic which is capable of moving across country
will do so and will avoid main roads.</p>

<p>4. Mule tracks will be a divisional responsibility.</p>

<p>5. Artillery advancing with the 5th and 4th Australian
Divisions will carry forward a proportion of bridges. Arrangements
should be made as soon as possible for the development of
tracks, making use of the routes taken by the artillery over these
bridges.</p>

<p>6. The <span class="smcap">Amiens</span>&mdash;<span class="smcap">Longueau</span>&mdash;<span class="smcap">Villers-Bretonneux</span> main road,
as far east as the cross roads in N.26.c., will be reserved for the
exclusive use of the Cavalry Corps from 9.30 p.m. on Y/Z night
until 8 a.m. on Z day. After 8 a.m. on Z day it will be available
for the Australian and Cavalry Corps.</p>

<p>Assistant Provost Marshal, Australian Corps, will arrange
for the control of the traffic on this road throughout.</p>

<p>Chief Engineer, Australian Corps, will prepare short avoiding
roads at the cross roads at N.26.c. to cross the north-east or
south-west corner to avoid congestion at this spot.</p>

<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 9</span><br />
LIGHT SIGNALS, MESSAGE ROCKETS, SMOKE</div>

<p><i>1. Light Signals.</i></p>

<blockquote>

<p>(<i>a</i>) <i>Australian Corps.</i></p>

<p>The following Light Signals will be employed in the
Australian Corps:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>S.O.S. Signal, No. 32 grenade&mdash;showing green over
green over green. Allotment 500 per Division.</p>

<p>Success Signal, No. 32 grenade&mdash;showing white over
white over white. Allotment 600 per Division.</p>
</blockquote>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[329]</a></span></p>

<p>A small reserve of each of these grenades is held at Corps
Headquarters.</p>

<p>No other Light Signals will be laid down by Corps. There
is no objection to the use within Divisions of a Very Light
for the local indication of targets between Infantry and
Tanks.</p>

<p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Other Formations.</i></p>

<p>Light Signals of other formations are as follows:</p>


<div class="center">
<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary="">
<tr><td align="center"><i>Formation.</i></td><td align="center"><i>Signal.</i></td><td align="center"><i>Meaning.</i></td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">(i) Cavalry Corps.</td><td align="left">White star turning</td><td align="left">"Advanced troops</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">to red on a parachute</td><td align="left">of Cavalry are</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">fired from</td><td align="left">here."</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">1&frac12;" Very pistol.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">(ii) Third Corps.</td><td align="left">No. 32 grenade,</td><td align="left">"S.O.S."</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">green over green</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">over green.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">No. 32 grenade,</td><td align="left">"Success signal,</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">white over white</td><td align="left"><i>i.e.</i>, we have</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">over white.</td><td align="left">reached objective."</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">One white Very</td><td align="left">"Barrage is about</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">light.</td><td align="left">to lift."</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">(iii) Canadian Corps</td><td align="left">No. 32 grenade,</td><td align="left">"S.O.S." will also</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">red over red</td><td align="left">mean (<i>a</i>) "We are</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">over red.</td><td align="left">held up and cannot</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">advance without</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">help." (<i>b</i>) "Enemy</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">is counter-attacking."</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">No. 32 grenade,</td><td align="left">"(<i>a</i>) Lift your fire.</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">green over green</td><td align="left">We are going to</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">over green.</td><td align="left">advance. (<i>b</i>) Stop</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">firing."</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">Three white Very</td><td align="left">"We have reached</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">lights in quick</td><td align="left">this point."</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="left">succession.</td></tr>
</table>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[330]</a></span></p>

<p><i>Remark.</i>&mdash;In the case of (<i>a</i>) a smoke rocket (No. 27
grenade) will also be fired in the direction of the obstruction
to indicate its position.</p>

<p>(<i>c</i>) Special care must be taken by the Artillery on the
right flank of the Corps that all officers and N.C.O.'s are
acquainted with these signals, so that no mistake may arise
as regards the difference in the S.O.S. Signals of the Australian
and Canadian Corps.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>2. <i>Message-carrying Rockets.</i></p>

<p>Allotment of Message-carrying Rockets is 80 per Division.</p>

<p>3. <i>Smoke.</i></p>

<blockquote>
<p>(<i>a</i>) Artillery smoke will be as follows:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>(<i>i</i>) 3 rounds per gun will be fired during the first three
minutes of the artillery barrage.</p>

<p>(<i>ii</i>) 3 rounds per gun will be fired in quick succession on
the arrival of the field artillery barrage at the artillery
halt line covering the first objective.</p>

<p>(<i>iii</i>) In the event of wet weather a small proportion of
smoke will be used in the barrage to replace the
smoke and dust caused by the burst of the shells in
dry weather. This will not be sufficient to confuse the
effect with that of the smoke shells prescribed in
paragraph 3 (<i>a</i>) (i) and (ii).</p>
</blockquote>

<p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Screening beyond the First Objective.</i></p>

<p>15th Wing, Royal Air Force, will arrange to screen the
advance of the Tanks and Infantry from special localities
in advance of their first objective by dropping phosphorus
bombs.</p>

<p>Divisions and G.O.C., 5th Tank Brigade, will inform
Australian Corps Headquarters as early as possible of the
localities which they desire screened.</p>

<p>A map will be issued showing times at which it is anticipated
that the Infantry will make good certain zones.
Phosphorus bombs will not be dropped within these zones
at any time after it is anticipated that the Infantry will
have occupied them.</p>
</blockquote>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[331]</a></span></p>

<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 10</span><br />
INTELLIGENCE AND DISPOSAL OF PRISONERS OF WAR</div>


<p>1. <i>Battalion Intelligence Police.</i></p>

<p>One German speaker and two searchers will be allotted to
each battalion for use as follows:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>(<i>a</i>) <i>German Speaker.</i></p>

<blockquote>

<p>(i) To secure immediate identifications quickly, so that
identifications will reach Corps Headquarters as speedily
as possible of enemy units on the battle front.</p>

<p>(ii) To secure immediate information required by the
Battalion Commander as regards enemy dispositions,
assembly positions, orders for counter-attack, etc.</p>

<p>(iii) To be in charge of the two searchers and separate
important documents, orders, maps, etc., translate and
convey information of moment to the immediate Commander.</p></blockquote>

<p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Two Searchers.</i></p>

<p>The two searchers under the German speaker systematically
search the battlefield, enemy positions, suspected headquarters,
dead, etc., for papers, documents, maps, etc.,
have them packed in sandbags, and sent through the usual
channels to the Corps Cage as quickly as possible.</p>

<p>This personnel should carry torches and, besides rifles
or revolvers, bombs are recommended as being useful for
dealing with any of the enemy who may be found in
dug-outs.</p></blockquote>


<p>2. <i>Divisional Intelligence Officers.</i></p>

<p>Divisional Intelligence Officers will go forward to an Advanced
Divisional Collecting Cage, with a view to obtaining, as soon as
possible, information of immediate tactical importance.</p>

<p>The Cage will be connected by telephone to Divisional H.Q.,
and important information obtained should be transmitted as
quickly as possible to Divisional and Brigade H.Q.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[332]</a></span></p>

<p>The main points on which immediate information is required
from prisoners are: The Order of Battle, Units seen, Distribution
of the Enemy's Forces, Method of holding the Line, Assembly
Positions, Counter-attack Orders and Intentions.</p>

<p>This information will be wired to their respective Divisional
Headquarters and repeated to Corps Headquarters and Corps
Cage by Divisional Intelligence Officers.</p>

<p>Divisional Intelligence Officers will not detain prisoners longer
than is necessary to obtain this tactical information of immediate
importance.</p>

<p>In case a large number of prisoners are captured, they will
detain only one or two from each regiment, and will not delay
the passage of the remainder to the Corps Cage.</p>

<p>Any further information required from prisoners by Divisions
or lower formations can always be obtained by telephone from
the Corps Cage.</p>

<p>3. <i>Searching of Prisoners.</i></p>

<blockquote>

<p>(<i>a</i>) <i>Officers and N.C.O.'s.</i></p>

<p>Officers and N.C.O.'s will be searched as soon as possible
after capture by a responsible officer or N.C.O., and all
documents taken from them sent back with them (in sacks,
labelled by regiments, if a number are captured) to the
Divisional Intelligence Officer, at such place as this officer
has prearranged.</p>

<p>It is left to the discretion of Divisional Intelligence
Officers as to what documents, maps, etc., taken from
prisoners they hold back for the information of Brigade
and Divisional Commanders. When this is done, Corps
"I" will be informed by wire, priority if necessary, of the
nature of the documents, etc., held back, and of any
points of immediate tactical importance they may
contain.</p>

<p>As soon as possible after information has been extracted
from them, the documents will be forwarded on to the Corps
Cage. Arrangements can be made by Corps, if notified that
documents are ready to be sent on, to fetch them by motorcyclist
or cycle.</p></blockquote>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[333]</a></span></p>

<blockquote>

<p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Other Ranks.</i></p>

<p>Prisoners other than officers and N.C.O.'s will be searched
on their arrival at the Corps Cage. Their papers, etc.,
will be taken from them and put into sacks labelled according
to regiments.</p>

<p>(<i>c</i>) All ranks should understand that a prisoner's pay-book,
identity disc, and personal belongings should not be
taken from him. Escorts and guards will be warned to
take special precautions to prevent prisoners from destroying
papers.</p></blockquote>

<p>4. <i>Separation of Officers, N.C.O.'s and Men.</i></p>

<p>Care will be taken that officers, N.C.O.'s and privates are all
separated from one another at once, and are not allowed to
communicate with one another. Prisoners who have been
interrogated should not be allowed to mix with those who have
not yet been interrogated.</p>

<p>5. <i>Notification of Locality of Capture.</i></p>

<p>It is essential that, when prisoners are sent back, information
be sent with them which will show where they were captured.
Information as to the battalion which made the capture is a
useful indication.</p>

<p>6. <i>Authorized Persons only to converse with Prisoners.</i></p>

<p>It is most important that no officer or N.C.O., except those
duly authorized, be allowed to interrogate or converse with
prisoners.</p>

<p>7. <i>Prisoners of War Cage.</i></p>

<p>The Advanced Corps Cage will be situated at <span class="smcap">Vecquemont</span>,
N.11.b.8.7. and the Rear Corps Cage at N.2.c.3.7.</p>

<p>Intelligence Officers and personnel will be stationed here, and
will carry out a more detailed interrogation and sort out captured
documents.</p>

<p>The Advanced Corps Cage will be connected by telephone to
Corps H.Q.</p>

<p>8. <i>Prisoners.</i></p>

<p>The following procedure will be adopted for the disposal of
prisoners:</p>

<p>After capture they will be escorted to the Advanced Divisional<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[334]</a></span>
Collecting Cage, for examination by the Divisional Intelligence
Officer, who, after he has finished with them, will send them
back to the Advanced Corps Cage.</p>

<p>The sending back of prisoners should be carried out as quickly
as possible, and several escorts should be arranged for them to
be passed back without any unusual delay. Instructions should
be issued to ensure that too many men are not employed on
escort duty.</p>

<p>In the forward area directing notices should be placed to show
the route to be taken to the Advanced Divisional Collecting
Cage.</p>

<p>Traffic control personnel should be conversant with the method
of disposing of prisoners.</p>

<p>9. <i>Identifications.</i></p>

<p>The importance of passing on all identifications as speedily
as possible to Corps "I" cannot be too strongly impressed on
all concerned. It is essential that special efforts be made to wire
at once, as soon as identifications are made and the locality in
which obtained.</p>

<p>10.<i> Maps and Photographs.</i></p>

<blockquote>

<p>The following maps are being issued:</p>

<p>(i) A large issue of 1/20,000 No. 62.D. South-East regular
series for distribution to all officers.</p>

<p>(ii) 1/20,000 Map Message Form, for distribution down
to N.C.O.'s.</p>

<p>(iii) A small issue of 1/10,000 Maps of forward area
only.</p>

<p>(iv) 1/20,000 Barrage Map, for distribution down to
Company Commanders.</p>

<p>(v) 1/40,000 Organization Map, together with notes on
the enemy.</p></blockquote>

<p>The following special photographs are being issued:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>(<i>a</i>) A Mosaic of each Divisional front, squared and contoured
and freely annotated, for distribution down to
N.C.O.'s.</p>

<p>(<i>b</i>) Oblique Photographs of each Divisional front, for distribution
to all officers.</p>
</blockquote>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[335]</a></span></p>

<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 11</span><br />
CO-OPERATION OF INFANTRY AND AIRCRAFT</div>

<p>1. <i>Contact Aeroplanes.</i></p>

<blockquote>

<p>(i) <i>Indication of position by flares.</i></p>

<blockquote>

<p>(<i>a</i>) Red ground flares will be used to indicate the
infantry positions to contact aeroplanes. They will
be lit by infantry in the most advanced line only.</p>

<p>(<i>b</i>) A contact aeroplane will fly along the line of the
first objective at zero plus 2 hours 30 minutes. Flares
will be called for by the aeroplane sounding a succession
of "A's" on the Klaxon horn and by firing a white Very
Light. If the aeroplane fails to mark the line accurately,
it will repeat its call ten minutes later.</p>

<p>Should the infantry not have reached the line of the
objective at the time laid down above, the contact
aeroplane will return at half-hour intervals until flares
are shown.</p>

<p>(<i>c</i>) A contact aeroplane will fly along the line of
the second objective at zero plus 6 hours 30 minutes.
It will call for flares, and the same procedure will be
followed on this objective as on the first objective until
the flares are seen.</p>

<p>(<i>d</i>) A contact aeroplane will fly over third objective
at zero plus 7 hours, when the procedure laid down for
the first objective will be observed until the flares are
shown.</p>

<p>(<i>e</i>) Divisions will organize message-dropping stations in
the vicinity of their Headquarters.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>(ii) <i>Other means of identifying the position of the Infantry.</i></p>

<blockquote>

<p>(<i>a</i>) <i>Rifles.</i>&mdash;Three or four rifles laid parallel across the
top of the trench.</p>

<p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Metal Discs.</i>&mdash;Metal discs will be used as reflectors
by flashing in the sun. This method has been successful
even on days which have not been particularly bright.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[336]</a></span></p>

<p>The disc is most easily carried sewn to the Small Box
Respirator, and can be used in this way without inconvenience.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>2. <i>Counter-attack Planes.</i></p>

<blockquote>

<p>(<i>a</i>) From zero hour counter-attack planes will be constantly
in the air, with the object of observing hostile concentrations
or abnormal movement.</p>

<p>(<i>b</i>) In the event of an enemy concentration indicating a
counter-attack, the counter-attack aeroplane will signal
this information to the Artillery by wireless. In the case of
a counter-attack actually developing a white parachute
flare will be fired by the aeroplane in the direction of the
troops moving for the impending counter-attack, for the
information of the Infantry.</p></blockquote>

<p>3. <i>Ammunition-carrying Aeroplanes.</i></p>

<blockquote>

<p>(<i>a</i>) Aeroplanes will be detailed to transport ammunition
from zero plus 2 hours 30 minutes.</p>

<p>(<i>b</i>) Vickers guns will display a white "V" at the point
where ammunition is to be dropped. The arms of the
"V" to be 6 feet in length and 1 foot in width. The apex
of the "V" to point towards the enemy.</p>

<p>(<i>c</i>) Ammunition aeroplanes will have the under-side of the
lower planes painted black for a distance of 2&frac12; feet from the
tips.</p>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>

<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 12</span><br />
CONSOLIDATION</div>

<p>1. <i>Divisions allotted to First Objective.</i></p>
<blockquote>
<p>(<i>a</i>) <i>Consolidation.</i>&mdash;As soon as the first objective has been
captured troops will dig in.</p>

<p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Troops holding present front line.</i>&mdash;The brigades of 2nd and
3rd Australian Divisions holding the line on the night prior to
zero will remain in their battle positions until all troops detailed
to the attack have passed through. They will then be organized
and prepared to move to meet any emergency.</p>

<p>2nd Australian Division will be prepared to detach its brigade<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[337]</a></span>
to act in support of 5th Australian Division, and 3rd Australian
Division to detach its brigade in support of 4th Australian
Division.</p>

<p>(<i>c</i>) <i>Reorganization of Troops on First Objective.</i>&mdash;As soon as
the whole of the troops detailed to the capture of second (red
line) and third (blue line) objectives have passed through the
line of the first objective, 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions will
organize the defence of their sectors on the first objective in
depth in each brigade sub-sector. Units will be reorganized,
and those not detailed to the defence of the line will be withdrawn
into support and held in readiness for eventualities. At
least one battalion in each brigade sub-sector should be withdrawn
in this way.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>2. <i>Second Objective.</i></p>

<p><i>Consolidation.</i>&mdash;As soon as the second objective (the red line)
has been captured, the position will be thoroughly consolidated.
Arrangements will be made to ensure a supply of engineering
material for this.</p>

<p>3. <i>Main Line of Resistance.</i></p>
<blockquote>
<p>(<i>a</i>) When the third objective (the blue line) is attained, it will
be organized and consolidated as the main line of resistance.</p>

<p>(<i>b</i>) If the enemy is able to develop an immediate counter-attack,
or if he has a definite plan, and the troops available in
close reserve for the defence of the blue line, it may not be
possible to reach the third objective. In this case the second
objective (red line) will become the main line of resistance, and
will be consolidated and organized in depth accordingly.</p>

<p>(<i>c</i>) Definite plans will be prepared to deal with either case.
The Corps must be prepared, as early as possible, to fight a stiff
defensive battle on the main line of resistance.</p>
</blockquote>

<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 13</span></div>

<p>1. The 5th Australian Division will move into its assembly
area by Brigade Groups as follows:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>"A" Brigade Group on the night 4th-5th August from
<span class="smcap">Montières</span> to <span class="smcap">Camon</span> and <span class="smcap">Rivery</span> area. Quarters<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[338]</a></span>
have been arranged for one brigade, less one battalion.
Shelters will be drawn from Area Commandant,
<span class="smcap">Camon</span>, for this battalion.</p>

<p>"B" Brigade Group from <span class="smcap">Allonville</span> area to forward area.</p>

<p>"C" Brigade Group from <span class="smcap">Vaux</span> area to <span class="smcap">Allonville</span> area.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>2. For the purposes of staging, <span class="smcap">Poulainville</span> will be included
as one of the battalion areas of the <span class="smcap">Allonville</span> brigade area.</p>

<p>The camp in <span class="smcap">Bois de Mai</span> has been allotted for the use of the
5th Division nucleus.</p>

<p>It is left to the discretion of the G.O.C., 5th Australian Division,
as to whether the Battalion at <span class="smcap">Poulainville</span> moves on the
night of 4th August.</p>

<p>3. On the night 5th-6th August the 5th Australian Division will
continue its move into its allotted assembly grounds in the
forward area.</p>

<p>4. Rear parties are to be left in charge of all camps until
handed over to the Area Commandant.</p>

<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 14</span><br />
ARMOURED CAR BATTALION</div>

<p>1. The 17th Armoured Car Battalion has been placed at the
disposal of the Australian Corps, and will join the 5th Tank
Brigade shortly.</p>

<p>2. This battalion is organized in two companies of eight (8)
armoured cars each. Each armoured car carries one forward and
one rear Hotchkiss gun.</p>

<p>3. One and a half (1&frac12;) companies are allotted to the 5th
Australian Division, and half (&frac12;) a company will remain in
Corps Reserve.</p>

<p>The half company detailed to remain in Corps Reserve will
select a position of assembly in Square 0.26, and will occupy this
position by 9.30 p.m. on Y/Z night. During the action its
orders will be transmitted through the 5th Australian Divisional
Signal Service. The Commander will arrange with the
5th Australian Division accordingly.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[339]</a></span></p>

<p>4. As soon as the Battalion Commander or his representative
reports to the 5th Tank Brigade, he will be instructed to report
to the General Staff, Australian Corps, and then to Headquarters,
5th Australian Division.</p>

<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 14a</span><br />
ARMOURED CAR BATTALION</div>

<p>1. The 17th Armoured Car Battalion is being given definite
rôles in accordance with paragraph 3 of Battle Instructions No.
14. The rôles assigned to this battalion may carry the cars
forward for a considerable distance into enemy territory, and
may necessitate their returning through other Divisional Sectors
than that of the 5th Australian Division.</p>

<p>2. British Armoured Cars can be recognized by the red and
white band markings which are similar to those of the British
Tanks.</p>

<p>3. All troops will be warned of the possibility of our armoured
cars coming into our own sector, and of the way in which they
are marked.</p>

<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 15</span><br />
ZERO HOUR&mdash;SYNCHRONIZATION OF WATCHES</div>

<p>1. <i>Zero Hour.</i></p>

<p>Zero hour will be notified in writing from Australian Corps
Headquarters by noon on the day prior to zero.</p>

<p>2. <i>Synchronization of Watches.</i></p>

<p>Watches will be synchronized by officers detailed by Australian
Corps Headquarters, who will visit Headquarters in the following
order, leaving Corps Headquarters shortly after noon and
6 p.m. on Y day:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>(<i>a</i>) One officer to Headquarters Heavy Artillery, 3rd Australian
Division and 4th Australian Division.</p>

<p>(<i>b</i>) One officer to 2nd Australian Division and 5th Australian
Division.</p>
</blockquote>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">[340]</a></span></p>

<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 16</span><br />
AIRCRAFT</div>

<p>1. The Air Forces which will operate on the Australian Corps
front during the battle will be as follows:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>(<i>a</i>) Corps Squadron&mdash;3rd Australian Squadron.</p>

<p>(<i>b</i>) 5th Tank Brigade&mdash;8th Squadron.</p>

<p>(<i>c</i>) The 22nd Wing, consisting of eight Scout Squadrons,
which will be exclusively employed in engaging ground
targets by bombing and machine-gunning along the
whole Army front.</p>

<p>(<i>d</i>) One night-bombing squadron&mdash;101st Bombing Squadron.</p>

<p>(<i>e</i>) One Reconnaissance Squadron&mdash;48th Squadron.</p></blockquote>

<p>Four additional day-bombing squadrons and three additional
night-bombing squadrons are being obtained from other Wings
for co-operation with the above, making 19 Squadrons in all.</p>

<p>2. <i>Low-flying Scouts.</i></p>

<p>The low-flying scouts of the 22nd Wing are being detailed
on an even distribution to the Corps front. They will operate
in two phases, viz.:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>(<i>a</i>) From zero to zero plus four hours eastward from the
green line.</p>

<p>(<i>b</i>) From zero plus four hours onwards eastwards from the
red line.</p></blockquote>

<p>In each phase favourable targets will be engaged in addition
to the targets marked by the green and red lines.</p>

<p>3. <i>Markings on Planes.</i></p>

<p>The following will be the special markings of machines allotted
to special duties:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>(<i>a</i>) Contact patrol machines&mdash;Rectangular panels 2' by 1' on
both lower planes about three feet from the fuselage.</p>

<p>(<i>b</i>) Machines working with Tanks&mdash;Black band on middle of
right side of tail.</p></blockquote>

<p>4. <i>Ammunition-carrying Squadron.</i></p>

<p>Aeroplanes carrying small arms ammunition will drop it at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[341]</a></span>
points as laid down in Battle Instructions No. 11, para. 3 (b).
The first ammunition-carrying planes will arrive over the battlefield
at zero plus seven hours.</p>

<p>5. <i>Aeroplane Smoke Screens.</i></p>

<p>In addition to carrying small arms ammunition, this Squadron
will be employed to drop phosphorus smoke bombs to obstruct
the enemy's view. The areas to be screened and the time at
which the screening in each case shall cease in order not to
interfere with the advance of the Infantry will be shown on a
map to be issued later.</p>

<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 17</span><br />
ARTILLERY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE LAST NIGHT BEFORE ZERO</div>

<p>1. <i>S.O.S.</i></p>

<blockquote>

<p>(<i>i</i>) Each line division will arrange for four field artillery
brigades, or an equivalent number of guns, to fire
on S.O.S. lines at any time up to zero minus fifteen
minutes.</p>

<p>(<i>ii</i>) From zero minus fifteen minutes until zero hour S.O.S.
arrangements will be inoperative.</p></blockquote>

<p>2. <i>Heavy Artillery.</i></p>

<p>In the event of the enemy opening a gas bombardment on
the <span class="smcap">Villers-Bretonneux</span> area, arrangements have been made
for the co-operation of the Canadian Corps Heavy Artillery in an
artillery counter-attack on enemy batteries. The Canadian
Corps will deal with the enemy artillery about <span class="smcap">Wiencourt</span> and
<span class="smcap">Marcelcave</span>. Fire will be opened, on application, direct
between the two Corps Headquarters.</p>

<p>G.O.C., R.A., Australian Corps, will arrange details with
G.O.C., R.A., Canadian Corps.</p>

<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 18</span><br />
These are not reproduced. They refer only to Wireless Code
Calls prescribed for all units.</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[342]</a></span></p>

<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 19</span><br />
LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS</div>

<p>1. Officers are detailed for liaison duties as follows:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>(<i>a</i>) At Canadian Corps Headquarters&mdash;Capt. <span class="smcap">Shearman</span>, D.S.O.,
M.C.</p>

<p>(<i>b</i>) At Third Corps Headquarters&mdash;Major <span class="smcap">R. Morrell</span>, D.S.O.</p>

<p>(<i>c</i>) With 1st Australian Division&mdash;To be notified.</p>

<p>(<i>d</i>) With 2nd Australian Division&mdash;Major <span class="smcap">H. Page</span>, M.C.</p>

<p>(<i>e</i>) With 3rd Australian Division&mdash;Lt.-Col. <span class="smcap">A. R. Woolcock</span>,
D.S.O.</p>

<p>(<i>f</i>) With 4th Australian Division&mdash;Major <span class="smcap">G. F. Dickinson</span>,
D.S.O.</p>

<p>(<i>g</i>) With 5th Australian Division&mdash;Lt.-Col. <span class="smcap">N. Marshall</span>,
D.S.O.</p></blockquote>

<p>2. The main function of the liaison officer is to relieve the
Staff of the fighting formation of the necessity of:</p>

<blockquote>

<p>(<i>a</i>) Supplying information to Australian Corps Headquarters.</p>

<p>(<i>b</i>) Collecting information from Corps Headquarters for
transmission to the formation for whom they are carrying
out liaison duties. It is their function to save the Staff as
far as possible, and not to get in the way. At the same time,
they are expected to keep Corps Headquarters and the
formation to which they are attached fully informed of
events.</p></blockquote>

<p>3. Direct telephone lines exist between Australian Corps
Headquarters and neighbouring Corps.</p>

<p>For the battle there is a special General Staff switchboard
with direct lines to 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Australian Divisions.</p>

<p>4. An information bureau will be established in a marquee to
be erected on the lawn in front of the Headquarters offices.
Major <span class="smcap">W. W. Berry</span> will be in charge of this bureau. It will be
provided with a telephone, writing material, maps, etc.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[343]</a></span></p>

<p>Liaison officers from other formation at Australian Corps
Headquarters will be accommodated in this marquee.</p>

<p>During the battle officers whose business does not require
them to visit the General Staff Office will make all inquiries at
this office for information as to the progress of the operations.</p>

<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 20</span><br />
CAVALRY</div>

<p>1. The First Cavalry Brigade, plus one company of Whippet
Tanks attached, comes under the command of the Australian
Corps Commander at 9 p.m. on Y/Z night.</p>

<p>2. Its function is to assist in carrying out the main Cavalry
rôle by seizing any opportunity which may occur to push
through this Corps front.</p>

<p>3. The First Cavalry Brigade will operate north of the
<span class="smcap">Amiens&mdash;Chaulnes</span> railway in conjunction with 5th Australian
Division. It will move from its assembly position in Square
n.32 under orders of G.O.C., 1st Cavalry Division, via the
southern side of <span class="smcap">Bois de l'Abbé</span>.</p>

<p>It will cross to the north side of the railway east of <span class="smcap">Villers-Bretonneux</span>.</p>

<p>It will push forward patrols to keep in touch with 8th and
15th Australian Brigades.</p>

<p>After crossing the railway the main body of 1st Cavalry
Brigade will march roughly parallel to it, keeping close touch
with the remainder of 1st Cavalry Division to the south.</p>

<p>4. If a break in enemy's resistance occurs, the remainder of
the 1st Cavalry Division may be employed in support of 1st
Cavalry Brigade.</p>

<p>5. Command of 1st Cavalry Brigade will pass from Australian
Corps to the 1st Cavalry Division when the Infantry reaches the
red line unless the brigade is required in the area south of the
Australian Corps to exploit success gained before that hour.
This will be determined by G.O.C., 1st Cavalry Division, who
will inform Australian Corps and 5th Australian Division, and
issue orders direct to 1st Cavalry Brigade.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[344]</a></span></p>

<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 21</span><br />
NOTIFICATION OF DATE AND TIME OF BATTLE</div>

<p>1. Reference paragraph 1 of General Staff Memo. No. AC/42,
dated 7th instant, <span class="smcap">ZERO</span> will be 4.20 a.m. 8th instant.</p>

<hr class="chap" />

<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[345]</a></span></p>

<h2>INDEX</h2>


<p>
Administrative Services, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>.<br />
<br />
Aeroplanes first used to carry small arms ammunition, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">As noise camouflage, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Air Force, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>.<br />
<br />
Albert, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>.<br />
<br />
Allied Offensive, Aug. 8th:<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Conference at Flexicourt, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Outline of plan, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>-<a href="#Page_80">80</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Three phases, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Disposition of brigades, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>-<a href="#Page_94">94</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Artillery calibration, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tanks, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Armoured cars, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Intelligence Service, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Air Squadron, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Day before battle, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Zero hour, 4.20 a.m., <a href="#Page_120">120</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Guns begin, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">First phase completed, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"Outwards" telegrams, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Enemy completely surprised, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Third Corps failed to reach objective, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Armoured cars, sensational report, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Guns and booty captured, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Ludendorff's comments, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">General meeting at Villers-Bretonneux, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">The King at Bertangles, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.</span><br />
<br />
American Army's first great attack, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">First offensive battle, Hamel, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Second Corps, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">To join Fourth British Army, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">1,200 taken prisoners, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">131st Regt., <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">27th Div., <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">30th Div., <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">33rd Div., <a href="#Page_52">52</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Amiens, defence of, <a href="#Page_26">26</a> <i>et seq.</i><br />
<br />
Anzac, First and Second Corps, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Corps, abolition of, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Day, 3rd anniversary, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Arcy Wood, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>.<br />
<br />
Armistice requested by enemy, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>.<br />
<br />
Army Corps improvised, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Constitution and scope, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Artillery barrage, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>-<a href="#Page_229">229</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Classification of, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Assevillers, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>.<br />
<br />
Aubigny, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>.<br />
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[346]</a></span><br />
Australian Army Corps constituted, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">United, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Australian Corps Headquarters, Bertangles, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>.<br />
<br />
Australian Soldier's high <i>moral</i>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Adaptability, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Instinct for "square deal," 292.</span><br />
<br />
Australian Staff watchword, "Efficiency," 295.<br />
<br />
Australia's five Divisions, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>.<br />
<br />
Authie, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />
Bapaume, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>.<br />
<br />
Basseux, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>.<br />
<br />
Battles on grand scale finished, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.<br />
<br />
Beaurevoir, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>.<br />
<br />
Bell, Maj.-Gen. John, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>.<br />
<br />
Bellenglise, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Captured, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Bellicourt taken, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.<br />
<br />
Bellicourt Tunnel, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>.<br />
<br />
Bertangles, Australian Corps H.Q., <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.<br />
<br />
Biaches, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>.<br />
<br />
Bingham, Lt.-Col., <a href="#Page_106">106</a>.<br />
<br />
Birdwood, Gen., <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.<br />
<br />
Birdwood, Gen. Sir William:<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Commands First Anzac Corps, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Appointed Commander Australian Imperial Force, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Appointed Commander Fifth British Army, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Blamey, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_296">296</a>.<br />
<br />
Bony captured, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>.<br />
<br />
Bouchavesnes, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>.<br />
<br />
Bourlon Wood, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.<br />
<br />
Braithwaite, Lieut.-Gen., <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>.<br />
<br />
Brancourt, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.<br />
<br />
Bray, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>.<br />
<br />
Brie, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>.<br />
<br />
Brigade reductions, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>.<br />
<br />
British Fifth Army, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>.<br />
<br />
Brown, Corpl. W., captures officer and 11 men, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>.<br />
<br />
Bryce, Lt.-Col., <a href="#Page_106">106</a>.<br />
<br />
Bussy, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>.<br />
<br />
Butler, Gen., Third Corps, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>.<br />
<br />
Byng, Gen., <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />
Calibration, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>.<br />
<br />
Cambrai, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.<br />
<br />
Canadians, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.<br />
<br />
Canadian Troops, fixed constitution, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>.<br />
<br />
Cannan, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_27">27</a>.<br />
<br />
Cappy, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>.<br />
<br />
Captive Balloon Service, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>.<br />
<br />
Carter, Lieut.-Col. E. J., <a href="#Page_108">108</a>.<br />
<br />
Cavalry first employed, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>.<br />
<br />
Cerisy, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>.<br />
<br />
Cessation of hostilities, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.<br />
<br />
Chamier, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>.<br />
<br />
Château-Thierry, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">End of German offensive, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>.</span><br />
<br />
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[347]</a></span>Chipilly, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>.<br />
<br />
Chuignes, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>.<br />
<br />
Churchill, Mr. Winston, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>.<br />
<br />
Clemenceau, M.:<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Speech to troops after Hamel battle, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">After Aug. 8th, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Cléry, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>-<a href="#Page_180">180</a>.<br />
<br />
Combles, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>.<br />
<br />
Commanders and Staffs, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>-<a href="#Page_17">17</a>.<br />
<br />
Congreve, Gen., his first order, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>.<br />
<br />
Contact aeroplanes, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>.<br />
<br />
Cook, Sir Joseph, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>.<br />
<br />
Corps Cavalry, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>.<br />
<br />
Corps Commander's responsibilities, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>.<br />
<br />
Corps Conferences, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>.<br />
<br />
Corps Signal Troops, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>.<br />
<br />
Corps Troops, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>.<br />
<br />
Couin, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>.<br />
<br />
Courage, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>.<br />
<br />
Couturelle, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>.<br />
<br />
Cox, Maj.-Gen. Sir H. W., <a href="#Page_9">9</a>.<br />
<br />
Crossing the Somme, plan for, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>.<br />
<br />
Cummings, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_29">29</a>.<br />
<br />
Curlu, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>.<br />
<br />
Currie, Gen., <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />
Dernancourt, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>.<br />
<br />
Difficulties of Army in retreat, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>.<br />
<br />
Disorganized British retreat, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>.<br />
<br />
Division, the fighting unit, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>.<br />
<br />
Division I., <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Last fight, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Division II., <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Last fight, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Division III., <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Last fight, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Division IV., <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Last fight, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Division V., <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Last fight, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Doullens, population prepare to evacuate, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">First move, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>-<a href="#Page_23">23</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Dummy Tanks, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />
Efficient Army more potent than League of Nations, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>.<br />
<br />
Elles, Gen., <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>.<br />
<br />
End of German offensive, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>.<br />
<br />
Enemy attack in the South, July 15th, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Comments on our successes, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>-<a href="#Page_67">67</a>.</span><br />
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[348]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Discover our movement South, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Move from Russian to Western Front, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"On the run," <a href="#Page_168">168</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Propaganda, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Reserves melting away, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Reserves absorbed, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Secure our "Recruiting</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Cable," <a href="#Page_159">159</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Withdraws in disorder, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Engineers, Companies of, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>.<br />
<br />
Estries, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>.<br />
<br />
Eterpigny, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>.<br />
<br />
Etinehem, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />
Fairfax, Lieut.-Col. Ramsay-, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>.<br />
<br />
Farewell Order to Third Division, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>.<br />
<br />
Farewell Order, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>.<br />
<br />
Feuillancourt, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>.<br />
<br />
Feuillères, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>.<br />
<br />
Fifth Army defensive unduly attenuated, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>.<br />
<br />
Fifth British Army, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>.<br />
<br />
First Australian Division, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>.<br />
<br />
First British Army attack, Aug. 26th, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>.<br />
<br />
First Order from 10th Corps, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>.<br />
<br />
Flamicourt, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>.<br />
<br />
Flanders' liquid mud, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>.<br />
<br />
Flexicourt Conference, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>.<br />
<br />
Foch, Marshal, appointed Supreme Commander, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>; <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>.<br />
<br />
Fontaine, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>.<br />
<br />
Foott, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_196">196</a>.<br />
<br />
Forty-sixth Imperial Division, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>.<br />
<br />
Foucaucourt, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>.<br />
<br />
Fourth Army enlarged, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">British flank with French, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Fourth and Fifth Australian Divisions, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>.<br />
<br />
Framerville, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>.<br />
<br />
Franvillers, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>.<br />
<br />
Fraser, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>.<br />
<br />
French Army's different outlook, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>.<br />
<br />
Frevent, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>.<br />
<br />
"Fuse 106" as wire cutter, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />
Garenne Wood, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>.<br />
<br />
Gellibrand, Maj.-Gen., <a href="#Page_268">268</a>.<br />
<br />
German attack, March 21st, 1918, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Propaganda, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Withdrawal general on all fronts, Sept. 4th, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Germany's "Black Day," <a href="#Page_130">130</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Crack regiments opposed to Australians, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Surrender due to military defeat, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Determining cause, breach of Hindenburg defences, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Gillemont Farm, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>.<br />
<br />
Glasgow, Maj.-Gen., <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>.<br />
<br />
Godley, Lieut.-Gen. Sir A., commands Second Anzac Corps, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>.<br />
<br />
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[349]</a></span>Gouy, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>.<br />
<br />
Grimwade, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_30">30</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />
Haig, Brig.-Gen. Neil, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Field Marshal, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Hamel, proposed operation against, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>-<a href="#Page_48">48</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Battle of, planned, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Zero fixed, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Over in 93 minutes, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Official commentary, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Americans' first offensive battle, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">No gas shells used, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Congratulatory messages, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">M. Clemenceau's speech, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>-<a href="#Page_63">3</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Dinner at Amiens to celebrate victory, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>-<a href="#Page_64">64</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">End of British defensive, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Hamel Wood, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>.<br />
<br />
Hangard, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>.<br />
<br />
Hargicourt, Zero hour, 5.20 a.m. Sept. 8th, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Red line reached before 10 o'clock, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Outpost line captured, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Haut Allaines, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>.<br />
<br />
Hautcloque, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>.<br />
<br />
Hazebrouck, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>.<br />
<br />
Headquarters of Army Corps, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>.<br />
<br />
Hebuterne, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>.<br />
<br />
Heilly, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>.<br />
<br />
Hem, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>.<br />
<br />
Herleville, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>.<br />
<br />
Hill 90, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>.<br />
<br />
Hill 104, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>.<br />
<br />
Hindenburg Line, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Purpose of, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">St. Quentin-Cambrai section, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Germans' elaborate system of trenches, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hargicourt line, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Capture of plans of German defence scheme, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Plan for attacking, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Machine gun barrage, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Dummy tanks, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tapes for Infantry start line, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Direction boards, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Plan for further advance, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>-<a href="#Page_240">240</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">America's Second Corps in battle front, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Australian and American Divisions, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Mustard gas first used, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Destroying wire entanglements, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Disposition of Divisions, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Two phases, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Zero hour, 5.50 a.m. Sept. 29th, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Fifth Australians hung up, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Americans held up, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Forget to mop up, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Change of plan, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Enemy relinquish tunnel defences, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>.</span><br />
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[350]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Collapse of the whole defences, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Hobbs, Maj.-Gen., <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>.<br />
<br />
Hughes, W. M., <a href="#Page_55">55</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Message from, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Hunn, Maj. A. S., <a href="#Page_210">210</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />
Infantry advance behind barrage, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>.<br />
<br />
Infantry Brigade reductions, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>.<br />
<br />
"Instantaneous" fuse, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />
Joncourt, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>.<br />
<br />
July 18th, French and American counter-stroke, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />
Kavanagh, Gen., Cavalry Corps, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.<br />
<br />
King, the, at Bertangles, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.<br />
<br />
Knob, the, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>.<br />
<br />
Knoll, the, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />
Labour Corps, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>.<br />
<br />
La Flaque, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>.<br />
<br />
La Neuville, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>.<br />
<br />
Last Australian battle in Great War, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>.<br />
<br />
La Verguier, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>.<br />
<br />
League of Nations less potent than efficient Army, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>.<br />
<br />
"Leap Frog" tactics, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>.<br />
<br />
Le Cateau, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.<br />
<br />
Le Catelet, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.<br />
<br />
Leslie, Brig.-Gen. W. B., <a href="#Page_9">9</a>.<br />
<br />
Lewis, Maj.-Gen., <a href="#Page_246">246</a>.<br />
<br />
Lewis Gun detachments, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>.<br />
<br />
"Liaison Force," <a href="#Page_143">143</a>.<br />
<br />
Lihons, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>.<br />
<br />
Losses, comparison of, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>.<br />
<br />
Ludendorff's comments on Aug. 8th attack, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>.<br />
<br />
Lyon, Lt.-Col., <a href="#Page_106">106</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />
Maclagan, Maj.-Gen., <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>.<br />
<br />
McNicoll, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>.<br />
<br />
March 22nd, 1918, first move, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>.<br />
<br />
Marett Wood, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>.<br />
<br />
Martin, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_185">185</a>.<br />
<br />
Marwitz, Gen. von der, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.<br />
<br />
Maurepas, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>.<br />
<br />
Max (Prince) of Baden, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>.<br />
<br />
Mechanical Transport, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>.<br />
<br />
Méricourt, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>.<br />
<br />
Mills's grenades, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>.<br />
<br />
Minor battles begun, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Result, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>-<a href="#Page_39">39</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Monash, Lieut.-Gen., Sir John:<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">In command First Australian Div., <a href="#Page_5">5</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Third Australian Div., <a href="#Page_6">6</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Australian Army Corps, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">17th Imperial Div., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">32nd Imperial Div., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">27th American Div., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">30th American Div., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Without orders, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Honoured by the King, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hands over command to General Read, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Mondicourt, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>.<br />
<br />
Monster German Naval 15-inch gun captured, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>.<br />
<br />
Montbrehain, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Last Australian battle, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>.</span><br />
<br />
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[351]</a></span>Montgomery, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.<br />
<br />
Mont St. Martin, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>.<br />
<br />
Mont St. Quentin, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Second Prussian Guards defend, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Captured, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Monument Wood, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>.<br />
<br />
Mopping up, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Result of neglecting, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Morain, M., entertains British and French Army officers after Hamel, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>.<br />
<br />
<i>Moral v.</i> material, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>.<br />
<br />
Motor Ambulance Corps, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>.<br />
<br />
Mound, the, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>.<br />
<br />
Mullens, Maj.-Gen., letter of appreciation, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>.<br />
<br />
Mustard gas, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />
Nauroy, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>.<br />
<br />
Nielles-lez-Blequin, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>.<br />
<br />
Noise camouflage, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>.<br />
<br />
Nollet, Gen., <a href="#Page_164">164</a>.<br />
<br />
Noyons, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />
Officers and men, relations between, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>.<br />
<br />
Ommiécourt, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>.<br />
<br />
O'Ryan Maj.-Gen., <a href="#Page_246">246</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />
Partington, Major, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>.<br />
<br />
Pas, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>.<br />
<br />
Péronne, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Enemy defence of, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Taken, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Poulainville, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>.<br />
<br />
Prince Max of Baden, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>.<br />
<br />
Prisoners, treatment of, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Excuses for surrender, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Cages, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"Pigeons" employed to gain information, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Proyart, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>.<br />
<br />
Prussian Guards hold Mont St. Quentin, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />
Quennemont Farm, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />
Ramicourt, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>.<br />
<br />
Ramsay-Fairfax, Lieut.-Col., <a href="#Page_106">106</a>.<br />
<br />
Rawlinson, Gen. Lord, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>-<a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>.<br />
<br />
Read, Maj.-Gen. G. W., <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>.<br />
<br />
Reorganization of Brigades, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>-<a href="#Page_273">3</a>.<br />
<br />
Repatriation of Australian Forces, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>.<br />
<br />
Results, analysis of, <a href="#Page_284">284</a> <i>et seq.</i><br />
<br />
Rheims, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.<br />
<br />
Robertson, Maj. P. R., <a href="#Page_142">142</a>.<br />
<br />
Roisel, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>.<br />
<br />
Rosenthal, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>.<br />
<br />
Rosières, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>.<br />
<br />
Roye, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />
Sailly-Laurette, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>.<br />
<br />
Sailly-le-Sec, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>.<br />
<br />
Second Australian Division, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>.<br />
<br />
"Set-piece" operations, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>.<br />
<br />
"Siegfried Line," <a href="#Page_214">214</a>.<br />
<br />
Skene, Brig.-Gen. P. G. M., <a href="#Page_9">9</a>.<br />
<br />
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[352]</a></span>Smoke shells, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>.<br />
<br />
Smyth, Sir N. M., V.C., <a href="#Page_9">9</a>.<br />
<br />
Soissons, German withdrawal, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>.<br />
<br />
Somme Canal, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Line of, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Enemy retreat, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Somme, North, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Plan for crossing, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">South, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>.</span><br />
<br />
St. Christ, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>.<br />
<br />
St. Denis, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>.<br />
<br />
St. Gratien, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>.<br />
<br />
St. Mihiel Salient attack, Sept. 11th, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>.<br />
<br />
St. Quentin Canal, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />
Tanks, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Improved type, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Dummy, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"Star," <a href="#Page_91">91</a>.</span><br />
<br />
Teamwork, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>.<br />
<br />
Third Australian Division, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>.<br />
<br />
Third British Army attack Aug. 21st, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>.<br />
<br />
Time-table for successive Army engagements impossible, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>.<br />
<br />
Tivoli Wood, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>.<br />
<br />
Toulorge, Gen., <a href="#Page_42">42</a>.<br />
<br />
Treux Wood, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>.<br />
<br />
Tunnellers, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />
Underground shelters, galleries and dug-outs, German, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />
Vaire Wood, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>.<br />
<br />
Vaux, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>.<br />
<br />
Vauxvillers, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>.<br />
<br />
Verdun, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.<br />
<br />
Vermandovillers, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>.<br />
<br />
Villers-Bretonneux, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>.<br />
<br />
Visitors to Corps, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Lord Milner, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Mr. Winston Churchill, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>.</span><br />
<br />
<br />
Wackett, Capt., Australian Flying Corps, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>.<br />
<br />
Walker, Maj.-Gen. Sir H. B., <a href="#Page_9">9</a>.<br />
<br />
Warneton, early 1918, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>.<br />
<br />
Whippet tanks, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>.<br />
<br />
Wiancourt, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>.<br />
<br />
Wilson, Sir Henry, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.<br />
<br />
Wisdom, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_143">143</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />
Ypres, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>.<br />
<br />
<br />
Zero hour, Aug. 8th, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>.<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hamel, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hargicourt, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hindenburg Line, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.</span><br />
</p>

<div class="center">
<br />
<i>Printed at The Chapel River Press, Kingston, Surrey.</i><br />
</div>

<hr class="chap" />
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>

<div class="transnote">
<h2>Transcriber's Note</h2>
<p>Obvious errors of punctuation and diacritical markings were corrected.</p>

<p>Inconsistent hyphenation was made consistent.</p>

<p>P. 123: No correction made to "Sent at 2.5 p.m."</p>
</div>

<p>&nbsp;</p>
<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 51163 ***</div>
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