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diff --git a/old/51163.txt b/old/51163.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 45b659e..0000000 --- a/old/51163.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14727 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Australian Victories in France in 1918, -by Sir John Monash - - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - - -Title: The Australian Victories in France in 1918 - - -Author: Sir John Monash - - - -Release Date: February 10, 2016 [eBook #51163] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII) - - -***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE AUSTRALIAN VICTORIES IN FRANCE -IN 1918*** - - -E-text prepared by Brian Coe, Moti Ben-Ari, and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images generously made -available by Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries -(https://archive.org/details/toronto) - - - -Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this - file which includes the original illustrations and maps. - See 51163-h.htm or 51163-h.zip: - (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/51163/51163-h/51163-h.htm) - or - (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/51163/51163-h.zip) - - - Images of the original pages are available through - Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries. See - https://archive.org/details/australianvictor00mona - - - - - -THE AUSTRALIAN VICTORIES IN FRANCE IN 1918 - - -[Illustration: Lieut.-General Sir John Monash, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., V.D., -D.C.L., LL.D.] - - -THE AUSTRALIAN VICTORIES IN FRANCE IN 1918 - -by - -LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR JOHN MONASH, -G.C.M.G., K.C.B., V.D., D.C.L., LL.D. - -With 9 Folding Maps in Colour and 31 Illustrations - - - - - - - -London: Hutchinson & Co. -Paternoster Row - - - - - DEDICATED - to the - AUSTRALIAN SOLDIER - who by his military virtues, and by his deeds - in battle, has earned for himself a - place in history which none - can challenge - - - - -PREFACE - - -The following pages, of which I began the compilation when still -engaged in the arduous work of Repatriation of the Australian troops -in all theatres of war, were intended to be something in the nature -of a consecutive and comprehensive story of the Australian Imperial -Force in France during the closing phases of the Great War. I soon -found that the time at my disposal was far too limited to allow me to -make full use of the very voluminous documentary material which I had -collected during the campaign. The realization of such a project must -await a time of greater leisure. So much as I have had the opportunity -of setting down has, therefore, inevitably taken the form rather of -an individual memoir of this stirring period. While I feel obliged to -ask the indulgence of the reader for the personal character of the -present narrative, this may not be altogether a disadvantage. Having -regard to the responsibilities which it fell to my lot to bear, it may, -indeed, be desirable that I should in all candour set down what was -passing in my mind, and should attempt to describe the ever-changing -external circumstances which operated to guide and form the judgments -and decisions which it became my duty to make from day to day. It may -be that hereafter my exercise of command in the field and the manner in -which I made use of the opportunities which presented themselves will -be the subject of criticism. I welcome this, provided that the facts -and the events of the time are known to and duly weighed by the critic. - -My purpose has been to describe in broad outline the part played by -the Australian Army Corps in the closing months of the war, and I have -based upon that record somewhat large claims on behalf of the Corps. It -would have overloaded the story to include in it any larger number of -extracts from original documents than has been done. I may, however, -assert with confidence that the statements, statistics and deductions -made can be verified by reference to authoritative sources. - -The photographs have been selected from a very large number taken, -during the fighting and often under fire, by Captain G. H. Wilkins, -M.C. The maps have been prepared under my personal supervision, and are -compiled from the official battle maps in actual use by me during the -operations. - - JOHN MONASH. - - - - -CONTENTS - - - CHAP. PAGE - PREFACE v - INTRODUCTION--THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY CORPS 1 - I.--BACK TO THE SOMME 18 - II.--THE DEFENCE OF AMIENS 36 - III.--HAMEL 51 - IV.--TURNING THE TIDE 69 - V.--THE BATTLE PLAN 81 - VI.--THE BATTLE PLAN (_continued_) 97 - VII.--THE CHASE BEGINS 115 - VIII.--EXPLOITATION 133 - IX.--CHUIGNES 148 - X.--PURSUIT 164 - XI.--MONT ST. QUENTIN AND PERONNE 182 - XII.--A LULL 198 - XIII.--HARGICOURT 214 - XIV.--AMERICA JOINS IN 235 - XV.--BELLICOURT AND BONY 254 - XVI.--MONTBREHAIN AND AFTER 271 - XVII.--RESULTS 284 - APPENDIX A 299 - APPENDIX B 300 - APPENDIX C 317 - INDEX 345 - - - - -LIST OF MAPS - - - A--The Advances of the Third Division--March to - May, 1918 _Facing page_ 32 - B--Battle of Hamel, July 4th, 1918 " 64 - C--Battle of August 8th, 1918 " 144 - D--Battle of Chuignes and Bray, August 23rd, 1918 " 160 - E--Peronne and Mont St. Quentin " 192 - F--Advances of Australian Corps, September 2nd to - 17th, 1918 " 208 - G--Battle of September 18th, 1918 " 224 - H--Breaching of Hindenburg Defences " 272 - J--Australian Corps Campaign " 288 - - - - -LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS - - - Lieut.-General Sir John Monash, G.C.M.G., - K.C.B., V.D., D.C.L., LL.D. _Frontispiece_ - 1.--The Australian Corps Commander--with the - Generals of his Staff _Facing page_ 14 - 2.--The Valley of the Somme--looking east towards - Bray, which was then still in enemy hands " 15 - 3.--German Prisoners--taken by the Corps at - Hamel, being marched to the rear " 40 - 4.--Visit of M. Clemenceau--group taken at Bussy, - July 7th, 1918 " 41 - 5.--Railway Gun, 11.2-inch Bore--captured near - Rosieres on August 8th, 1918 " 66 - 6.--German Depot of Stores--captured on August - 8th, 1918 " 67 - 7.--Tanks marching into Battle " 96 - 8.--Morcourt Valley--the Australian attack swept - across this on August 8th, 1918 " 97 - 9.--Dug-outs at Froissy-Beacon--being "mopped - up" during battle " 112 - 10.--Peronne--barricade in main street " 113 - 11.--Burning Villages--east of Peronne " 128 - 12.--Dummy Tank Manufacture " 129 - 13.--The Canal and Tunnel at Bellicourt--looking - north " 152 - 14.--The Hindenburg Line--a characteristic belt of - sunken wire " 153 - 15.--Final Instructions to the Platoon--an incident - of the battle of August 8th, 1918. The - platoon is waiting to advance to Phase B of - the battle " 176 - 16.--An Armoured Car--disabled near Bony, during - the battle of September 29th, 1918 " 177 - 17.--The Hindenburg Line Wire--near Bony " 198 - 18.--The 15-inch Naval Gun--captured at Chuignes - August 23rd, 1918 " 199 - 19.--Australian Artillery--going into action at - Cressaire Wood " 218 - 20.--Battle of August 8th, 1918--German prisoners - being brought out of the battle under the fire - of their own Artillery " 219 - 21.--Mont St. Quentin--collecting Australian - wounded under protection of the Red Cross - flag, September 1st, 1918 " 240 - 22.--An Ammunition Dump--established in Warfusee - village on August 8th, 1918, after its - capture the same morning " 241 - 23.--Australian Light Horse--the 13th A.L.H. - Regiment riding into action on August 17th, 1918 " 256 - 24.--The Sniper sniped--an enemy sniper disposed - of by an Australian Sharp-shooter, - August 22nd, 1918 " 257 - 25.--German Prisoners--captured at the battle of - Chuignes, August 23rd, 1918 " 274 - 26.--Captured German Guns--Park of Ordnance, - captured by the Australians during August, 1918 " 275 - 27.--The Toll of Battle--an Australian gun-team - destroyed by an enemy shell, September 1st, 1918 " 294 - 28.--Inter-Divisional Relief--the 30th American - and the 3rd Australian Divisions passing each - other in the "Roo de Kanga," Peronne, - during the "relief" after the capture of the - Hindenburg Line, October 4th, 1918 " 295 - 29.--Australian Artillery--moving up to the front, - through the Hindenburg wire, October 2nd, 1918 " 316 - 30.--Advance during Battle--Third Division Infantry - and Tanks advancing to the capture of Bony, - October 1st, 1918 " 317 - - - - -The Australian Victories in France in 1918 - - - - -INTRODUCTION - -THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY CORPS - - -The renown of the Australians as individual fighters, in all theatres -of the Great War, has loomed large in the minds and imagination of the -people of the Empire. - -Many stories of the work they did have been published in the daily -Press and in book form. But it is seldom that any appreciation can be -discovered of the fact that the Australians in France gradually became, -as the war progressed, moulded into a single, complete and fully -organized Army Corps. - -Seldom has any stress been laid upon the fact that because it thus -became a formation fixed and stable in composition, fighting under a -single command, and provided with all accessory arms and services, the -Corps was able successfully to undertake fighting operations on the -grandest scale. - -There can be little question, however, that it was this development -which constituted the paramount and precedent condition for the -brilliant successes achieved by these splendid troops during the summer -and autumn of 1918--successes which far overshadowed those of any -earlier period of the war. - -For a complete understanding of all the factors which contributed -to those successes, and for an intelligent grasp of the course of -events following so dramatically upon the outbreak of the great -German offensive of March 21st of that year, I propose to trace, very -briefly, the genesis and ultimate development of the Corps, as it -became constituted when, on August 8th, it was launched upon its great -enterprise of opening, in close collaboration with the Army Corps of -its sister Dominion of Canada, that remarkable counter-offensive, which -it maintained, without pause, without check, and without reverse, for -sixty consecutive days--a period full of glorious achievement--which -contributed, as I shall show in these pages, in the most direct and -decisive manner, to the final collapse and surrender of the enemy. - -In the days before the war, there was in the British Service no -recognized or authorized organization known as an Army Corps. When -the Expeditionary Force was launched into the conflict in 1914, the -Army Corps organization was hastily improvised, and consisted at first -merely of an Army Corps Staff, with a small allotment of special Corps -Troops and services, and of a fluctuating number of Divisions. - -It was the _Division_[1] and not the _Corps_, which was then the -strategical unit of the Army. Even when the necessity for the formation -of Army Corps was recognized, it was still a fundamental conception -that it was the Division, and not the Army Corps, which constituted the -fighting unit. - -To each Army Corps were allotted at first only two, but later as many -as four Divisions, according to the needs and circumstances of the -moment. But the component Divisions never, for long, remained the same. -The actual composition of every Army Corps was subject to constant -changes and interchanges, and it was rare for any given Division to -remain for more than a few weeks in any one Army Corps. - -The disadvantages of such an arrangement are sufficiently obvious to -require no great elaboration; at the same time, it has to be recognized -that, during the first three years of the war, at any rate, the Army -was undergoing a process of rapid expansion, and that, on grounds of -expediency, it was neither possible nor desirable to adopt a policy of -a fixed and immutable composition for so large a formation as an Army -Corps. - -Moreover, the special conditions of trench warfare made it imperative -to create, under the respective Armies, and in the respective zones -of those Armies, a subordinate administrative and tactical authority -with a more or less fixed geographical jurisdiction. Thus, the frontage -held by each of the five British Armies became subdivided into a -series of Corps frontages, and each Corps Commander had allotted to -him a definite frontage, a definite depth and a definite area, for his -administrative and executive direction. - -It was within this Corps area that he exercised entire control of all -functions of a purely local and geographical character: such as the -maintenance of all roads, railways, canals, telegraphs and telephones; -the control of all traffic; the apportionment of all billeting and -quartering facilities; the allocation and employment of all means of -transport; the collection and distribution of all supplies, comprising -food, forage, munitions and engineering materials; the conservation -and distribution of all water supply; the sanitation of the area; the -whole medical administration within, and the evacuation of sick and -wounded from the area; the establishment and working of shops of all -descriptions, both for general engineering and for Ordnance purposes; -also of laundries, bathing establishments and rest camps; the creation -of facilities for the entertainment and recreation of resting troops, -and of schools for their military training and for the education of -their leaders. - -The Corps Commander was, in addition, directly responsible to the Army -Commander for the tactical defence of his whole area, for the creation -and maintenance of the entire system of field defences covering his -frontage, comprising trench systems in numerous successive zones and -field fortifications of all descriptions; for preparations for the -demolition of railways and bridges to meet the eventuality of an -enforced withdrawal; and for detailed plans for an advance into the -enemy's territory whenever the opportune moment should arrive. - -The extensive responsibilities thus imposed upon the Corps Commander, -and upon the whole of his Staff, obviously demanded an intimate study -and knowledge of the whole of the Corps area, such as could be acquired -only by continuous occupation of one and the same area for a period -extending over many months. It would therefore have been in the highest -degree inconvenient to move such a complex organization as an Army -Corps Staff from one area to another at short intervals of time. On the -other hand, the several Divisions allotted to any given Corps for the -actual occupation and maintenance of the defences could not be called -upon to carry out without relief or rest, trench duty for continuous -periods longer than a few weeks at a time. - -During the first three years the number of Divisions at the disposal -of the British High Command was never adequate to provide each Army -Corps in the front line with sufficient Divisions to permit of a -regular alternation out of its own resources of periods of trench duty -and periods of rest. For a Corps holding a two-Division frontage, for -example, it would have been necessary to provide a permanent strength -of at least four Divisions in order to permit of such a rotation. - -The expedient generally adopted, therefore, was to withdraw altogether -from the Army Corps, each Division in turn, as it became due for a rest -behind the line or was required for duty elsewhere, and to substitute -some other available Division from G.H.Q. or Army Reserve. The broad -result was that such an deal as that of a fixed composition for an Army -Corps proved quite unattainable, and there was a constant interchange -of nearly the whole of the Divisions of the Army, who served in -succession, for short periods, in many different Corps, and under many -different Commanders. - -To this general rule there was, from the outset of its formation, one -striking exception, in the case of the Canadian Army Corps, consisting -of the four Canadian Divisions, which, with rare exceptions, and these -only for short periods and for quite special purposes, invariably -fought as a complete Corps of fixed constitution. - -It is impossible to overvalue the advantages which accrued to the -Canadian troops from this close and constant association of all the -four Divisions with each other, with the Corps Commander and his Staff, -and with all the accessory Corps services. It meant mutual knowledge -of each other among all Commanders, all Staffs, all arms and services, -and the mutual trust and confidence born of that knowledge. It was the -prime factor in achieving the brilliant conquest of the Vimy Ridge by -that Corps in the early spring of 1917. - -The consummation, so long and so ardently hoped for, of a similar -welding together of all Australian units in the field in France into a -single Corps was not achieved in its entirety until a full year later, -and it will be interesting to trace briefly the steps by which such a -result, strongly pressed as it was by the Australian Government, was -finally brought about. - -Australia put into the field and maintained until the end, altogether -five Divisions of Infantry, complete with all requisite Artillery, -Engineers, Pioneers and all Supply, Medical and Veterinary Services, in -full conformity with the Imperial War Establishments laid down for such -Divisions. But the method and time of their formation and organization, -the manner and circumstances of their war preparation, and their -employment as part of a Corps varied considerably. - -The First Australian Division, together with the Fourth Infantry -Brigade, which was then under my command and subsequently became the -nucleus of the Fourth Australian Division, were raised in Australia -in 1914, immediately after the outbreak of war, were transported to -Egypt, where they underwent their war training in the winter of 1915, -and ultimately formed, with the New Zealand Contingent, the body known -as the "Anzac" Corps, which carried out, on April 25th, the memorable -landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula. - -The Second Australian Division speedily followed, being raised in -Australia during 1915, and the greater part of this Second Contingent -joined the Anzac Corps in the later stages of the Dardanelles -Expedition. Another independent Brigade (the Eighth) was also sent to -Egypt in that year. - -The raising of the Third Australian Division, early in 1916, was the -magnificent answer which Australia made when public men and the Press -declared that the Australian people would resent the Evacuation from -Gallipoli, and the seemingly fruitless sacrifices which it entailed. -This Division was shipped direct to England, and assembled on Salisbury -Plain during the summer of 1916, where I assumed the command of -it. There it underwent its war training under conditions far more -advantageous than those which confronted the First and Second Divisions -in the Egyptian desert. The Third Division entered the theatre of war -in France in November, 1916. - -In the meantime, the Evacuation of the Peninsula, in December, 1915, -led to the assembly in Egypt of the First and Second Australian -Divisions, the Fourth and Eighth independent Infantry Brigades and some -thirty thousand reinforcements and convalescents. - -Out of this supply of fighting material it was then decided to -constitute two additional complete Divisions, the Fourth Brigade -forming the nucleus of the Fourth Australian Division, while the 8th -Brigade formed that of the Fifth Australian Division; the remaining -Brigades and the Divisional troops were drawn from reinforcements, -stiffened by a considerable contribution of veterans taken from the -four Infantry Brigades who had carried out the landing on Gallipoli. - -The Fourth and Fifth Divisions were thus formed in Egypt in February -and March, 1916, and the conditions of their war training were -even less satisfactory than those which had confronted the earlier -Divisions. The hot season speedily arrived; equipment, munitions -and animals materialized slowly; training equipment and suitable -training grounds were of the most meagre character; and upon all -these difficulties supervened the urgent obligation to undertake the -strenuous toil of organizing and executing, on the Sinai desert, the -field fortifications required for the defence of the Suez Canal zone. - -The method in which the Divisions then available in Egypt were to be -grouped for the purposes of Corps Command was ripe for decision. It -was then that the determination was reached to constitute two separate -Army Corps, to be called respectively "First Anzac" and "Second Anzac." -The former embodied the First, Second and Fifth Australian Divisions, -under General Sir William Birdwood; the latter comprised the Fourth -Australian and the New Zealand Divisions under Lieut.-General Sir -Alexander Godley. - -This was the organization of the Australian troops when the time -arrived, in May, 1916, for their transfer by sea from Egypt to the -scene of the titanic conflict which had been for nearly two years -raging on the soil of France and Belgium. - -This grouping did not, however, persist for more than a few weeks. The -opening of the great Somme offensive in July 1916 found the First, -Second and Fourth Divisions operating under First Anzac in the valley -of the Somme, while the Fifth Australian and the New Zealand Division -constituted the Second Anzac Corps in the Armentieres-Fleurbaix sector. -There followed other interchanges as the campaign developed, and by -November of 1916, the grouping stood with First Anzac employing the -First, Second, Fourth and Fifth Divisions, while Second Anzac comprised -the Third Australian, the New Zealand and the Thirty-Fourth British -Divisions. - -The series of offensive operations opening with the great and -successful battle of Messines on June 7th, 1917, found the Fourth -Australian Division once again under the command of General Godley, -only to be again withdrawn before the concluding phases of the -Third Battle of Ypres, in September and October, 1917. The autumn -offensive of 1917, aiming at the capture of the Passchendaele ridge, -was the first occasion on which the whole of the five Divisions were -simultaneously engaged in the same locality in a common enterprise; -but even on that occasion they still remained distributed under two -different Corps Commands, and had not yet achieved the long-desired -unity of command and of policy. - -This constant interchange of these Divisions, unavoidable as it -probably was, undoubtedly militated against the attainment of the -highest standard of efficiency. Uniform in scope and purpose as -military administration and tactical policy aims to be when considered -on broad lines, yet in a thousand and one matters of detail, many of -them of dominating importance, the personality and the individual -idiosyncrasies of the Corps Commander and of his principal executive -Staff Officers, are calculated to exercise a powerful influence upon -the functioning of the whole Corps. - -Under each Corps Commander there grew up in course of time a particular -code of rules, and policies, of technical methods and even of technical -jargon--most of it in an unwritten form. This nevertheless tended -towards efficiency so long as the whole of the component personnel of -the Corps remained stable, but imposed many difficulties upon Divisions -and other units which joined and remained under the Corps for a short -period only. - -The result was that a Divisional Commander and his Staff, accustomed -to work in one environment, often found great difficulty, and occupied -some appreciable period of time, in accommodating themselves to a new -environment, in which doctrines of attack or defence, counter-attack or -trench routine, supply or maintenance were, some or all of them, widely -different from those to which they had formerly become accustomed. - -But, in the case of Dominion troops, there was a motive far -overshadowing the desire for a removal of difficulties of merely a -technical nature. It was one founded upon a sense of Nationhood, which -prompted the wish, vaguely formed early in the war, and steadily -crystallizing in the minds both of the Australian people and of the -troops themselves, that all the Australian Divisions should be brought -together under a single leadership. - -This ideal was associated with the hope that the Commanders and Staffs -should to as large an extent as possible, consist solely of Australian -Officers, as soon as ever men sufficiently qualified became available. -It is difficult to emphasize such a desire without appearing to display -ingratitude to a number of brilliant General and other officers of -the Imperial Regular Service. These men, at a time when Australia was -still able to produce only few officers with the necessary training and -experience to justify their appointment to the command of Divisions -and Brigades, or to the senior Administrative and General Staffs, -bore these burdens in a manner which reflected upon them the greatest -credit, and earned for them the gratitude of the Australian people. - -I refer, among many others, particularly to General Sir W. Birdwood, -Major-Generals Sir H. B. Walker, Sir N. M. Smyth, V.C. and Sir H. V. -Cox and Brigadier-Generals W. B. Lesslie and P. G. M. Skene. But as the -war went on, this aspect of the national aspiration became steadily -realized; one by one, the senior commands and staff appointments were -taken over by Australian Officers who had proved their aptitude and -suitability for such responsibilities. - -The other ideal of unity of command and close association with each -other of all Australian units, proved slower of realization. All -concerned thought and hoped that it had been, at last, achieved in -December, 1917, when it was decided to abolish the two "Anzac" Corps, -and to constitute a single Australian Army Corps. This was effected -by the transfer of the Third Australian Division from Second to First -Anzac Corps, by altering the title of "Second Anzac" to "XXII. Corps," -and by substituting for the name "First Anzac" the name "Australian -Army Corps," which name it bore until the termination of the war. - -The only regrettable feature of this development was the dissolution -of the close comradeship which had existed between the troops from the -sister Dominions of Australia and New Zealand. - -Even then all hopes were doomed to disappointment. For the next four -months the Corps contained five Divisions in name only. Almost at once, -the Fourth Australian Division was withdrawn to serve under the VII. -Corps in connection with the operations before Cambrai. Not many weeks -later, when the German avalanche was loosed, the whole five Divisions -became widely scattered, and, for a time, the Third and Fourth -Divisions served under the VII. British Corps, the Fifth Division under -the III. Corps, and the First Division under the XV. Corps. It was not -until April, 1918, that four out of the five Divisions again came -together under the control of the Australian Corps Commander, at that -time General Sir William Birdwood. - -About the middle of May, 1918, this popular Commander was appointed -to the leadership of the Fifth British Army. In deference to his long -association with the Australian Imperial Force, he was asked to retain -his status as G.O.C., A.I.F. His responsibilities as the Commander of -an Army, and its removal to quite a different area in the theatre of -war, made it, however, impossible for him to take any active part in -the direction of the further operations of the Australian Corps. - -Owing to the vacancy thus created, the Commander-in-Chief, with the -concurrence of the Commonwealth Government, did me the great honour to -appoint me to the command of the Australian Army Corps, a command which -I took over during the closing days of May and retained until after the -Armistice. - -At that juncture the First Australian Division was still involved in -heavy fighting, under the XV. Corps, in the Hazebrouck sector, and no -amount of pressure which I could bring to bear succeeded in prevailing -upon G.H.Q. to release this Division. It was not until early in August, -1918, on the very eve of the opening of the great offensive, that, at -long last, all the five Australian Divisions became united into one -Corps, never to be again separated. From that date onwards all five -Divisions embarked (for the first time in their history) upon a series -of combined offensive operations, the story of which I have set myself -the task of unfolding in these pages. - -The Australian Army Corps had by that time evolved from a mere -geographical organization into one which, over and above its component -Infantry Divisions, had acquired a large number of accessory arms and -services, called Corps Troops, which formed no part of a Division. It -is desirable for the complete understanding of the battle plans of the -offensive period, to consider the extent and nature of the whole of the -fighting and maintenance resources of the Corps. - -These fell theoretically into two categories, comprising on the one -hand those units properly designated as "Corps Troops," which possessed -a fixed and unalterable constitution, and, on the other hand, those -additional units, known as "Army Troops," whose number and character -fluctuated in accordance with the varying needs of the situation, and -with the requirements of the various operations. - -These Army Troops, whenever detailed to act under the orders of the -Corps Commander, became an integral part of the Corps, and were -to all intents and purposes Corps Troops, until such time as they -had completed the tasks allotted to them. The Corps Troops were -multifarious in character, and amounted in the aggregate to large -numbers, occasionally exceeding 50,000, a number as great as that of -three additional Divisions, whose normal strength in the closing phases -of the war never exceeded 17,000. - -The Headquarters of the Army Corps comprised upwards of 300 Staff -and assistant Staff Officers, clerks, orderlies, draughtsmen, motor -drivers, grooms, batmen, cooks and general helpers. The Corps Cavalry -consisted, in the case of the Australian Army Corps, of the 13th -Regiment of Australian Light Horse, and was employed, in conjunction -with the Australian Cyclist Battalion, for reconnaissance, escort and -dispatch rider duty. - -The Corps Signal Troops were an extensive organization, and controlled -the whole of the Signal communications throughout the Corps area -(except within the Divisions themselves), being responsible for the -establishment, upkeep and working of every method of communication, -whether by telegraph, telephone, wireless, pigeons, messenger dogs, -aeroplane, or dispatch rider. Apart from telegraphists, mechanics and -electrical experts in considerable numbers, adequate for the very heavy -signal traffic during battle, and even during periods of comparative -quiet, Corps Signals also operated two Motor Air Line and two Cable -Sections, for the laying out and maintenance of wires. Those within the -Corps Area, at any one place and time, amounted to several hundreds of -miles. - -The whole of the Mechanical Transport, consisting of hundreds of motor -lorries, for the collection and distribution of ammunition, food, -forage and ordnance stores of all descriptions, was also under the -direct control of Corps Headquarters. So also were some half-dozen -mobile Ordnance Workshops, for the repair of weapons and vehicles of -all kinds. All these were permanent Corps Troops, but represented only -a fraction of those serving under the orders of the Corps Commander. - -Among the Administrative Services there was a large contingent of the -Labour Corps comprising some 20 Companies, for the construction and -maintenance of all roads, and water supply installations, and for -the handling, daily, of a formidable bulk and weight of Artillery -ammunition; also two or more Motor Ambulance Convoys, for the -evacuation of the sick and wounded out of the Corps area, and a number -of Army Troops Companies of Engineers, as well as two Companies of -Australian Tunnellers, who were usually employed upon the construction -and maintenance of bridges, locks, water transport mechanism, deep -dug-outs and battle stations. - -But the fighting units of the Corps Troops formed by far the -largest proportion, and comprised Artillery, Heavy Trench Mortars, -Air Squadrons and Tanks. The Artillery alone merits more detailed -consideration. It comprised a vast array of many different classes -of guns for many different purposes, and classified into various -categories by reference either to their calibres, their mobility or -their tactical purposes. - -Grouped according to calibre, all guns and howitzers of 41/2-inch bore -or less were strictly considered as Field Artillery which, although -administered by the Divisions, was almost invariably fought under the -direct orders of the Corps Commander. All guns and howitzers of greater -bore, up to the giant 15-inch, were known as Heavy and Siege Artillery. - -Regarded from the point of view of mobility, all field guns and that -wonderfully useful weapon, the 60-pounder, were horse-drawn, the larger -ordnance were tractor-drawn, and the very largest were mounted on -railway trains and hauled by steam locomotive. - -Finally, as regards tactical utilization, some natures of ordnance -were invariably employed for barrage or harassing fire, others for -bombardment, others for counter-battery fighting, and yet others for -anti-aircraft purposes. - -The total ordnance under the orders of the Australian Army Corps -naturally fluctuated according to the daily battle requirements, but -amounted at times, during the period of the war under consideration, to -as many as 1,200 guns of all natures and calibres, grouped in Brigades -each of four to six Batteries, each of four to six guns. - -This very formidable Artillery equipment far transcended in quantity -and dynamic power anything that had been envisaged in the previous -years of the war, or in any previous war, as possible of administrative -or tactical control under a single Commander. It undoubtedly became -a paramount factor in the victories which the Corps achieved. The -Artillery of the Corps is entitled to the proud boast that it earned -the confidence and gratitude of the Infantry. - -It must be left to the imagination to conceive the complexity of the -task of keeping this enormous mass of Artillery regularly supplied -with its ammunition, of multifarious types and in adequate quantities -of each, of allocating to each Brigade and even to each Battery its -appropriate task in the general plan, and of advancing the whole -organization over half-ruined roads and broken bridges, in order to -keep up with the Infantry as the battle moved forward from day to day. -It would defy a detailed description intelligible to any but gunnery -experts. - -The Air Force had, by the summer of 1918, also achieved a great -development. The numerous Air Squadrons had embarked upon a policy of -specialization in tactical employment, in accordance with the build -and capacities of the aeroplanes with which they were equipped. Thus -gradually the whole range of utilization became covered, from the -small fast single-seater fighting scout, intended to engage and drive -off enemy 'planes, to the slower two-seater reconnaissance machines, -employed chiefly for photography and for the direction of Artillery -fire, and the giant long-distance bombing machines. - -The Australian Corps had at its exclusive disposal at all times the -No. 3 Squadron of the Australian Flying Corps, and employed the -machines for reconnaissance prior to and after battle, and for contact -and counter-attack work and Artillery observation during battle. -But, whenever the scope of the operations rendered it necessary, the -resources of the Corps in aircraft were enormously increased, and as -many as a dozen squadrons were on occasions employed, during battle, -in low flying pursuit of enemy infantry and transport, in production -of smoke screens, in bombing, in ammunition carrying, and in dispatch -bearing--over and above usual reconnaissance work designed to keep -Corps and Divisional Headquarters rapidly and minutely informed, from -moment to moment, of the situation of the Infantry in actual contact -with the enemy. - -Another branch of the Air Force activities under the direct control -of the Corps was the Captive Balloon Service. Some five large captive -or kite balloons, carrying trained Artillery Observers, regularly -ascended along the Corps front whenever the weather and the conditions -of visibility permitted, to a height of from 2,000 to 3,000 feet, and -with the aid of powerful telescopes and of telephone wires woven into -the anchoring cables, kept the Artillery regularly notified of all -visible enemy movement, and of the occurrence of all suitable targets -of opportunity, such as the flashes from enemy guns in action. - -During battle one such balloon was invariably sent up well forward -to observe as closely as possible the progress of the fighting, but -the results were almost uniformly disappointing, because the smoke -and dust of the barrage and the general murk of battle usually proved -impenetrable to the air observer, tied as he was to a fixed position. -The reports of these observers were usually confined to the laconic -observation: "Can't see much, but all apparently going well." - -The last of the major fighting units of Corps Troops remaining to -be mentioned are the Tanks. These extraordinary products of the war -underwent a remarkable evolution during the two years which followed -their first introduction on the battlefield in the Somme campaign of -1916. The standard of efficiency which had been reached by the early -summer of 1918, in the most developed types of these curious monsters, -as far outclassed that of the earlier types in both mechanical and -fighting properties as the modern service rifle compared with the old -Brown Bess of the Peninsular War. The Tank crews had improved in like -proportion, both in skill, enterprise and adaptability. - -[Illustration: The Australian Corps Commander--with the Generals of his -Staff.] - -[Illustration: The Valley of the Somme--looking East towards Bray, -which was then still in enemy hands.] - -Nothing can be more unstinted than the acknowledgment which the -Australian Corps makes of its obligation to the Tank Corps for its -powerful assistance throughout the whole of the great offensive. -Commencing with the battle of Hamel, a large contingent of Tanks -participated in every important "set-piece" engagement which the Corps -undertook. The Tanks were organized into Brigades, each of three -Battalions, each of three Companies, each of twelve Tanks. During the -opening phases, early in August, the Tank contingent comprised a whole -Brigade of Mark V. Tanks, a Battalion of Mark V. (Star) Tanks, and -a Battalion of fast Armoured Cars; in the later phases, during the -assault on the Hindenburg Line, a second Brigade of Mark V. Tanks and -a Battalion of Whippets also co-operated. - -Such was the formidable array of fighting resources under the direct -orders of the Australian Corps Commander, and, together with the five -Australian Divisions, formed a fighting organization of great strength -and solidarity. It became an instrument for offensive warfare, as has -been said by a high authority, which for size and power excelled all -Corps organizations which either this or any previous war had produced. -It was an instrument which it was a great responsibility, as also a -great honour, to wield in the task of shattering the still formidable -military power of the enemy. For in the early summer of 1918, that -power appeared to be still unimpaired, and still capable of inflicting -serious reverses upon the Allied cause. - -Early in 1918, owing to the depletion of human material, the Imperial -Divisions were reconstituted by a reduction of their Infantry Brigades -from a four-battalion to a three-battalion basis, thus reducing the -available infantry by twenty-five per cent. But in this reduction, the -Australian Divisions during the fighting period shared only to a very -small extent. In March the strength of the 15 Brigades of Australian -Infantry in the field was still 60 Battalions. The heavy fighting of -March and April compelled the extinction of 3 Battalions, one each -respectively in the 9th, 12th and 13th Infantry Brigades; but the -remaining 57 Battalions of Infantry remained intact until after the -close of the actual fighting operations early in October. The Corps was -therefore enabled to maintain an additional twelve battalions over and -above the then prevailing corresponding Imperial organization. - -It was thus the largest of all Army Corps ever organized, in this or -any other war, by any of the combatants--the largest both in point of -numbers and of military resources of all descriptions, approaching, and -in one case exceeding, a full Army command. - -But even these great resources and responsibilities were added to, -during the course of the operations, by the allocation, at successive -times, to the Australian Corps of the 17th Imperial Division, the 32nd -Imperial Division and the 27th and 30th American Divisions. Thus, -during the closing days of September, 1918, the Corps numbered a total -of nearly 200,000 men, exceeding more than fourfold the whole of the -British troops under the command of the Duke of Wellington at the -Battle of Waterloo. - -Of this total about one-half comprised Australian troops, the Heavy -Artillery and other Army units attached to the Corps consisting of -Imperial troops. The Commanders and Staffs from June, 1918, until the -end consisted almost entirely of Australian officers, among whom the -following were the senior: - - Corps Commander Lieut.-General Sir J. Monash, - G.C.M.G., K.C.B., V.D. - Corps Chief-of-Staff Brigadier-General T. A. Blamey, - C.M.G., D.S.O. - Corps Artillery Commander Brigadier-General W. A. Coxen, - C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. - Chief Engineer Brigadier-General C. H. Foott, - C.B., C.M.G. - - 1st Div. Commander Major-General Sir T. W. Glasgow, - K.C.B., D.S.O. - General Staff Officer Lieut.-Colonel A. M. Ross, C.M.G., - D.S.O. - Chief Admin. Officer Lieut.-Colonel H. G. Viney, - C.M.G., D.S.O. - - 2nd Div. Commander Major-General Sir C. Rosenthal, - K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. - General Staff Officer Lieut.-Colonel C. G. N. Miles, - C.M.G., D.S.O. - Chief Admin. Officer Lieut.-Colonel J. M. A. Durrant, - C.M.G., D.S.O. - - 3rd Div. Commander Major-General Sir J. Gellibrand, - K.C.B., D.S.O. - General Staff Officer Lieut.-Colonel C. H. Jess, C.M.G., - D.S.O. - Chief Admin. Officer Lieut.-Colonel R. E. Jackson, - D.S.O. - - 4th Div. Commander Major-General E. G. Sinclair-Maclagan, - C.B., D.S.O. - General Staff Officer Lieut.-Colonel J. D. Lavarack, - C.M.G., D.S.O. - Chief Admin. Officer Lieutenant-Colonel R. Dowse, - D.S.O. - - 5th Div. Commander Major-General Sir J. J. T. Hobbs, - K.C.B., K.C.M.G., V.D. - General Staff Officer Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Peck, C.M.G., - D.S.O. - and later Lieut.-Colonel J. T. McColl, - O.B.E., M.C. - Chief Admin. Officer Colonel J. H. Bruche, C.B., C.M.G. - -All the above were Australian Officers, and most of them were of -Australian birth. There were also two senior staff officers of the -Regular Army, Brigadier-General R. A. Carruthers, C.B., C.M.G., who -was Chief of the Administrative Services, and Brigadier-General L. -D. Fraser, C.B., C.M.G., who was in immediate command of the Heavy -Artillery of the Corps.[2] - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] A _Division_ consists of three Infantry Brigades, Divisional -Artillery, three Field Companies of Engineers, three Field Ambulances, -a Pioneer Battalion, a Machine Gun Battalion, together with Supply, -Sanitary and Veterinary Services. Its nominal strength is 20,000. - -An _Infantry Brigade_ consists of four Infantry Battalions, each of -1,000 men, and a Light Trench Mortar Battery. - -Divisional Artillery comprises two Brigades each of four batteries, -each of six guns or howitzers, also one Heavy and three medium Trench -Mortar Batteries, and the Divisional Ammunition Column. - -This composition of a Division was modified in detail during the course -of the war. - -[2] For grouping of Australian Brigades into Divisions, see Appendix -"A." - - - - -CHAPTER I - -BACK TO THE SOMME - - -The early days of the year 1918 found the Australian Corps consisting -of the First, Second, Third and Fifth Australian Divisions, while -the Fourth had been transferred far south to co-operate in the later -developments of the Cambrai fighting. The Corps was then holding, -defensively, a sector of the line in Flanders, which had in the -previous years of the war become, at various times, familiar to all -our Divisions, and which extended from the river Lys at Armentieres, -northwards, as far as to include the southern half of the Messines -Ridge. - -It was, indeed, that very stretch of country, which in June, 1917, -had been captured by our Third Division, in co-operation with the New -Zealanders. Opposite its centre lay the town of Warneton, still in the -hands of the enemy. Excepting for a small area of undulating ground in -the extreme north of the Corps sector, the country was a forbidding -expanse of devastation, flat and woebegone, with long stretches of -the front line submerged waist deep after every freshet in the river -Lys, and with the greater part of our trench system like nothing but a -series of canals of liquid mud. - -This unsavoury region formed, however, the most obvious line of -approach for an enemy who, debouching from the direction of Warneton, -aimed at the high land between us and the Channel Ports; so that, -tactically useless as were these mud flats, it was imperative that -they should be strongly defended, in order to protect from capture -the important heights of Messines, Kemmel, Hill 63, Mont des Cats and -Cassel. - -During the fighting of the preceding summer and early autumn, which -gave the Australian troops possession of this territory, the locality -was dry, practicable for movement, and reasonably comfortable for the -front line troops. Now it was water-logged, often ice-bound, bleak -and inhospitable. The precious months of dry weather, between August -and October, 1917, had been allowed to pass without any comprehensive -attempt on the part of those Divisions which had relieved the Second -Anzac Corps after its capture of this ground to perfect the defences of -the newly-conquered territory. At any rate, there was little to show -for any work that may have been attempted. - -Now, in the very depth of the worst season of the year, the demand -came to prepare the region for defence and resistance to the last; -for the threat of a great German offensive in the opening of the -1918 campaigning season was already beginning to take shape. It was -the Australian Corps which was called upon to answer that demand. -There followed week after week of heart-breaking labour, much of it -necessarily by night, in draining the flat land, in erecting acre upon -acre of wire entanglements, in constructing hundreds of strong points, -and concrete machine gun emplacements. Trenches had to be dug, although -the sides collapsed unless immediately revetted with fascines or sheet -iron; roads had to be repaired, and vain attempts were made to provide -the trench garrisons with dry and bearable underground living quarters. - -The monotony of all this labour, which long after--when the Australians -had disappeared from the scene and were again fighting on the -Somme--proved to have been undertaken all in vain, was relieved only -by an occasional raid, undertaken by one or other of our front line -Divisions, for the purpose of molesting the enemy and gathering -information. The Corps front was held by two Divisions in line, one in -support, and one resting in a back area; the rotation of trench duty -gave each Division about six weeks in the line. - -My own command at that juncture still comprised the Third Australian -Division, which I had organized and trained in England, eighteen -months before. Although this Division had never been on the Somme, -it had seen a great deal of fighting in Flanders during 1917. During -this period, therefore, and until the outbreak of the storm in the -last days of March, 1918, my interest centred chiefly in the doings of -the Third Division, although for a very short period I had the honour -of commanding the Corps during the temporary absence of Sir William -Birdwood. - -The information at our disposal led to the inevitable conclusion that, -during January and February, the enemy was busy in transferring a great -mass of military resources from the Russian to the Western Front. No -one capable of reading the signs entertained the smallest doubt that he -contemplated taking the offensive, in the spring, on a large scale. The -only questions were, at what point would he strike? and what tactics -would he employ? - -Every responsible Australian Commander, accordingly, during those -months, applied himself diligently to these problems, formulated his -doctrines of obstinate defence, and of the defensive offensive; and saw -to it that his troops received such precognition in these matters as -was possible at such a time and in such an environment. The principles -of defence in successive zones, of the rapid development of Infantry -and Artillery fire power, of the correct distribution of machine guns, -of rearguard tactics, and questions of the best equipment for long -marches and rapid movement were debated and resolved upon, in both -official and unofficial conferences of officers. - -All this discussion bore good fruit. Among the possible roles which -the Australian Divisions might be called upon to fill, when the great -issue was joined, were those which involved these very matters. And so -the event proved; and the Australians then approached their new and -unfamiliar tasks, not wholly unprepared by training and study for the -difficulties involved. - -It was on March 8th that the Third Division bade a last but by no -means a regretful farewell to the mud of Flanders and Belgium--regions -which it had inhabited almost continuously for the preceding sixteen -months. The Division moved back for a well-earned rest, to a pleasant -countryside at Nielles-lez-Blequin, not far from Boulogne. It was lying -there, enjoying the first signs of dawning spring when, on March 21st, -the curtain was rung up for a great drama, in which the Australian -troops were destined to play no subordinate part. - -There followed many weeks of crowded and strenuous days, and the -story of this time must, of necessity, assume the form of a personal -narrative. Events followed one upon the other so rapidly, and the -centre of interest changed so quickly from place to place and from hour -to hour, that no recital except that of the future historian writing -with a wealth of collected material at his disposal, could take upon -itself any other guise than that of a record of individual experience. - -The Germans attacked the front of the Fifth British Army on March -21st. The information which was at the disposal of our High Command -was not of such a nature that the promulgation of it would have been -calculated to elevate the spirits of the Army; consequently Divisions -situated as we were, in Reserve, and, for the time being, entirely out -of the picture, had to depend for our news partly upon rumour, which -was always unreliable, and partly upon severely censored communiques, -framed so as to allay public anxiety. Nothing definite emerged from -such sources, except that things were going ill and that fighting was -taking place on ground far behind what had been our front line near -St. Quentin. This hint was enough to justify the expectation that my -Division would not be left for long unemployed; and on the same day, -March 21st, instructions were issued for all units to prepare for a -move, to dump unessential baggage, to fill up all mobile supplies, and -to stand by in readiness to march at a few hours' notice. - -Orders came to move on March 22nd. The Division was to move _east_, -that is, back into Flanders, and not south to the Somme Valley, as all -had hoped. The prescribed move duly started, but by March 24th had -been arrested, for orders had come to cancel the move and await fresh -orders. Advanced parties, for billeting duty, were to proceed next -morning by motor lorry to Doullens, and there await orders. Later came -detailed instructions that the Division was to be transferred from the -Australian Corps to the Tenth Corps, which latter was to be G.H.Q. -Reserve, and that the whole Division was to be moved the next night to -the Doullens[3] area, the dismounted troops by rail, and the Artillery -and other mounted units by route-march. - -It was evident that the plans of the High Command were the subject -of rapid changes, in sympathy, probably, with fluctuations in the -situation, which were not ascertainable by me. There followed a night -and day of strenuous activity, during which arrangements were completed -to entrain the three Infantry Brigades and the Pioneers at three -different railway stations, to start off the whole of the mounted units -on their long march by road, and to ensure that all fighting troops -were properly equipped with munitions, food and water, all ready for -immediate employment. It was well that my Staff responded capably to -the heavy demands made upon them, and that all this preparatory work -was efficiently done. - -The entrainments commenced at midnight on the 25th and continued all -night. At break of day on the 26th, after assuring myself that everyone -was correctly on the move, I proceeded south by motor-car, in the -endeavour to find the Tenth Corps Headquarters, and to report to them -for orders. My fruitless search of that forenoon revealed to me the -first glimpse of the true reason for that far-reaching disorganization -and confusion which confronted me during the next twenty-four hours. - -Over three years of trench warfare had accustomed the whole Army to -fixed locations for all Headquarters, and to settled routes and lines -of inter-communication. The powerful German onslaught and the recoil of -a broad section of our fighting front had suddenly disturbed the whole -of this complex organization. The Headquarters of Brigades, Divisions, -and even Corps, ceased to have fixed locations where they could be -found, or assured lines of telegraph or telephone communications, by -which they could be reached. Everything was in a state of flux, and the -process of getting into personal contact with each other suddenly took -responsible leaders hours where it had previously taken minutes. - -In its broad result, this disorganization affected most seriously -the retiring troops, by depriving them of the advantages of rapidly -disseminated orders for properly co-ordinated action by a large number -of Corps and Divisions withdrawing side by side. The consequence -was, I am convinced, that the recoil--which may have been inevitable -at first by reason of the intensity of the German attack, and -because the defensive organization of the Fifth Army had been unduly -attenuated--was allowed to extend over a much greater distance, and to -continue for longer, in point of time, than ought to have been the case. - -Between Albert and St. Quentin there were in existence several lines -of defence, which by reason of their topographical features, or the -existence of trenches and entanglements, were eminently suitable for -making a stand. Yet no stand was made, at any rate on a broad front, -because there was no co-ordination in the spasmodic attempts to do so. -I subsequently learned of more than one instance where Brigades of -Infantry or of Artillery found themselves perfectly well able to hold -on, but were compelled to a continued retirement by the melting away of -the units on their flanks. - -I sought the Tenth Corps at Hautcloque, where they were to be. They -were not there. I proceeded to Frevent, where they were said to have -been the night before. They had already left. In despair, I proceeded -to Doullens, resolved at least to ensure the orderly detrainment of my -Division and their quartering for the following night, and there to -await further orders. A despatch rider was sent off to G.H.Q. to report -my whereabouts, and the fact that I was without orders. - -Arriving at Doullens, I tumbled into a scene of indescribable -confusion. The population were preparing to evacuate the town _en -masse_, and an exhausted and hungry soldiery was pouring into the -town from the east and south-east, with excited tales that the German -cavalry was on their heels. Influenced by the persistency of these -reports, I determined to make, immediately, dispositions to cover the -detrainment of my troops, so that some show of resistance could be made. - -In the midst of all this stress and anxiety, I was favoured by a run -of good luck. Within half an hour of my reaching Doullens, the first -of my railway trains arrived, bringing Brigadier-General Rosenthal -and a battalion of the 9th Brigade, sufficient troops, at any rate, -to furnish a strong outpost line for covering the eastern approaches -of Doullens, while the remainder of the Brigade should arrive. These -arrangements made, I motored to Mondicourt, where almost immediately -afterwards a train arrived, bringing Brigadier-General McNicoll and the -first battalion of the 10th Brigade. - -There also arrived, almost simultaneously, that rumour with the -ridiculous _denouement_, that German armoured motor-cars were -approaching along the road from Albert and were within three miles of -that point. Those Armoured Cars proved ultimately to be a train of -French agricultural implements which a wheezy and rumbling traction -engine was doing its best to salve. McNicoll likewise received orders -to put out a line of outposts to cover Mondicourt railway station. - -At this point, too, endless streams of dust-begrimed soldiers were -straggling westwards. McNicoll collected many hundreds of them, and did -not omit, by very direct methods, to prevail upon all of them who had -not yet lost their rifles and essential equipment, to call a halt and -join his own troops in the defensive dispositions which he was making. - -My next business was to select a suitable central point at which to -establish my Headquarters, preferably where I could find a still intact -telephone service. Again by good luck I found a most suitable location -in a small chateau at Couturelle, whose owner hospitably provided a -much needed meal. - -It was there, soon after my arrival, that I learned of the presence -in the neighbourhood of Major-General Maclagan; this news, implying -as it did the presence also of some at least of the Fourth Australian -Division, was a gleam of sunshine in an otherwise gloomy prospect. -Report said that he was at Basseux, and thither I proceeded, in order -to arrange, by personal conference with him, some plan for co-ordinated -action. - -Basseux rests on the main road from Doullens to Arras, which lies -roughly parallel to the line along which, as subsequently transpired, -the vanguard of the enemy was endeavouring to advance at that part of -the front. That main road I found packed, for the whole of the length -which I had to traverse, with a steadily retreating collection of -heterogeneous units, service vehicles and guns of all imaginable types -and sizes, intermingled with hundreds of civilian refugees, and farm -waggons, carts, trollies and barrows packed high with pathetic loads of -household effects. The retrograde movement was orderly and methodical -enough, and there was nothing in the nature of a rout, but it was -nevertheless a determined movement to the rear which evidenced nothing -but a desire to keep moving. - -I found Maclagan at about four o'clock. His Division had already been -on the move, by bus and route march, for three days without rest. The -position to the east and south-east of him was obscure, and he also had -posted a line of outposts in the supposed direction of the enemy, and -was arranging to despatch his 4th Brigade to Hebuterne (which the enemy -was reported to have entered), with orders to recapture that town. That -the enemy was not very far away became evident from the fact that the -vicinity of the hut in which we were conferring presently came under -desultory long-range shell-fire. - -There was nothing to be done except to arrange jointly to keep up -an effective and as far as possible continuous line of outposts -towards the south-east, and to await developments. Having made these -arrangements I returned along the same crowded road, which was now also -being leisurely shelled by the enemy, to Couturelle. There I found that -the principal officers of my Staff had arrived. - -Thereupon orders were issued for the concentration, after detrainment, -of my three Brigades in the following areas, each with due outpost -precautions, viz.: 9th Brigade at Pas, 10th Brigade at Authie, and 11th -Brigade at Couin. My Artillery was still distant a full day's march by -road. - -About nine o'clock that evening I received, by telephone, my first -order from the Tenth Corps. It ran as follows: "A Staff Officer has -left some time ago on his way to you, carrying instructions for you to -report personally at once to Corbie for orders. We have since heard -that you are to go to Montigny instead." - -It was nearly an hour before the Staff Officer arrived, having been -delayed on the road by congestion of traffic. The instructions he -carried transferred my Division from the Tenth to the Seventh Corps, -to whom I was to report personally, without delay, at Corbie. It was -evident from the later telephone message that the Seventh Corps had -been compelled to withdraw from Corbie, and was proceeding to Montigny. - -This was the second stroke of good luck that day; for if the telephone -message above recited had not overtaken the Staff Officer, it is quite -probable that I should have already started for a wrong destination, -and have had to waste valuable time at a most critical juncture. Had -I failed to find General Congreve, the Seventh Corps Commander, _that -same night_, it is almost certain that my Division would have arrived -on the Somme too late to prevent the capture of Amiens. - -Setting out from Couturelle shortly after ten o'clock that night, -accompanied by four of my Staff and two despatch-riders, with two -motor-cars and two motor cycles, in black darkness, on unfamiliar roads -congested with refugee traffic, I did not reach Montigny until after -midnight. I found General Congreve in the corner of a bare salon of -stately proportions, in a deserted chateau by the roadside, seated -with his Chief of Staff at a small table, and examining a map by the -flickering light of a candle. The rest of the chateau was in darkness, -but heaps of hastily dumped Staff baggage impeded all the corridors. - -General Congreve was brief and to the point. What he said amounted to -this: "At four o'clock to-day my Corps was holding a line from Albert -to Bray, when the line gave way. The enemy is now pushing westwards -and if not stopped to-morrow will certainly secure all the heights -overlooking Amiens. What you must try and do is to get your Division -deployed across his path. The valleys of the Ancre and the Somme offer -good points for your flanks to rest upon. You must, of course, get as -far east as you can, but I know of a good line of old trenches, which -I believe are still in good condition, running from Mericourt-l'Abbe -towards Sailly-le-Sec. Occupy them, if you can't get further east." - -At that juncture General Maclagan arrived and received similar crisp -orders to bring his Division into a position of support on the high -land in the bend of the Ancre to the west of Albert. I gleaned further -that the Seventh Corps was now the south flank Corps of the Third Army, -and that as the Fifth Army, south of the Somme, had practically melted -away, while the French were retiring south-westerly and leaving an -hourly increasing gap between their north flank and the Somme, General -Byng had resolved to make every effort not only to maintain the flank -of his Third Army on the Somme, but also to prevent it being turned -from the south, while the Commander-in-Chief was taking other measures -to attempt next day to fill the gap above alluded to. - -It was already 1 a.m. of March 27th, and I had left my Division twenty -miles away. Everything depended now on quick decision and faultless -executive action. It was fortunate that a telephone line to G.H.Q. -had been found in good working order, and that the services of three -large motor bus convoys could be arranged for to proceed at once to -the Doullens area, in order to transport my Infantry during the night -to the place appointed. I worked with my Staff till nearly break of -day, considering and settling all detailed arrangements, and we then -separated in various directions to our appointed tasks. - -I proceeded myself a little after dawn, with one Staff Officer, to -Franvillers, which had been decided upon as the point for leaving the -buses. There was yet no sign of any Australian troops, and the village -was being hastily evacuated by the terror-stricken inhabitants. But -there were ample and visible signs, far away on the high plateau beyond -the Ancre Valley, that the German line of skirmishers was already on -the move, slowly driving back the few troops of British Cavalry who -were, most valiantly, trying to delay their advance. - -The next hour was one of intense suspense and expectancy; but my -anxiety was relieved when there rolled into the village from the -north, a motor bus convoy of thirty vehicles, crowded with good -staunch Australian Infantry of the 11th Brigade, and bringing also -Brigadier-General Cannan and some of his Brigade Staff. It was not the -first time in the war that the London motor-bus--after abandoning the -population of the great metropolis to enforced pedestrianism--had -helped to save a most critical situation. - -Almost immediately after, there arrived McNicoll, with a battalion of -his 10th Brigade. Hour after hour a steady stream of omnibus convoys -came in. No time was lost in assembling the troops, and in directing -the Infantry--company after company--down the steep, winding road to -the little village of Heilly, and thence across the Ancre, to deploy on -the selected line of defence indicated in the orders above recited. - -The spectacle of that Infantry will be ever memorable to me, as one -of the most inspiring sights of the whole war. Here was the Third -Division--the "new chum" Division, which, in spite of its great -successes in Belgium and Flanders, had never been able to boast, like -its sister Divisions, that it had been "down on the Somme"--come into -its own at last, and called upon to prove its mettle. And then there -was the thought that they were going to measure themselves, man to man, -against an enemy who, skulking behind his field works, had for so long -pounded them to pieces in their trenches, poisoned them with gas, and -bombed them as they slept in their billets. - -That, at any rate, was the point of view of the private soldier, and no -one who saw those battalions, in spite of the fatigue of two sleepless -nights, marching on that crisp, clear spring morning, with head erect -and the swing and precision of a Royal review parade, could doubt -that not a man of them would flinch from any assault that was likely -to fall upon them. Nor was there a man who did not fully grasp that -upon him and his comrades was about to fall the whole responsibility -of frustrating the German attempt to capture Amiens and separate the -Allied Armies. - -By midday, the situation was already well in hand, and by four o'clock -I was able to report to the Seventh Corps that no less than six -Battalions were already deployed, astride of the triangle formed by the -Ancre and the Somme, on the line Mericourt--Sailly-le-Sec, distributed -in a series of "localities" defended by rifles and Lewis guns. As yet -no Artillery was available. - -The 11th Brigade occupied this line to the south of the main road from -Corbie to Bray, the 10th Brigade continued it to the north of the road, -while the 9th Brigade was leaving the buses and assembling in the -neighbourhood of Heilly. - -So far, the pressure of the enemy upon my front had not been serious. -It was obvious that he had, as yet, very little Artillery at his -disposal. We had not, however, found our front totally devoid of -defenders. During the forenoon, a few troops of our cavalry, and a -force under Brigadier-General Cummings, comprising about 1,500 mixed -infantry, the remnants of a large number of different units of the -Third Army, were slowly withdrawing under pressure from the advancing -German patrols. These valiant "die-hards," deserving of the greatest -praise in comparison with the many thousands of their comrades who had -withdrawn from any further attempt to stem the onflowing tide, were now -ordered to retire through my outpost line, thus leaving the Australian -Infantry at last face to face with the enemy. - -These dispositions were completed only in the nick of time. All that -afternoon the enemy appeared over the sky-line in front of us, both in -lines of skirmishers and in numerous small patrols, endeavouring to -work forward in the folds of the ground, and to sneak towards us in the -gullies. But all of them were received with well directed rifle fire -and the enemy suffered many losses. Towards nightfall the attempts to -continue his advance died away. - -That was, literally, the end of the great German advance in this part -of the field, and although, as will be told later, the enemy renewed -the attempt on several subsequent occasions to reach Amiens, he gained -not a single inch of ground, but, on the contrary, was compelled in -front of us to undertake a slow but steady retrograde movement. - -Our reconnoitring patrols discovered, however, that the enemy already -had possession of the village of Sailly-Laurette, and of Marett and -Treux Woods, but that he was not yet in great strength on the crest -of the plateau. Orders were issued to perfect the organization of our -defensive line, put out wire entanglements, dig-in machine guns, and -rest the troops in relays during the coming night, but not to attempt -any forward movement until the next night. - -My Artillery and other mounted units were still half a day's march -away; but Brigadier-General Grimwade, their Commander, had been -instructed to push on in advance, with the whole of the Commanders of -his Brigades and Batteries. They arrived on the scene in sufficient -time to enable the whole situation to be examined in the daylight, and -for detailed action to be decided upon. The Artillery kept coming in -during the whole of the following night, and although men and horses -were almost exhausted after two days of forced marching, their spirits -were never higher. Next morning found the guns already in action, and -engaging all bodies of the enemy who dared to expose themselves to view. - -I must now turn to the Fourth Australian Division. They had been less -fortunate in several respects. Maclagan was directed to leave behind -his 4th Brigade, which had on the 26th speedily become committed to -important operations under the 62nd Division in front of Hebuterne, -from which village this Brigade had driven the enemy. This left him -with only two Brigades, the 12th and 13th. He was faced with the -obligation of bringing his already over-tired infantry, by route march, -down from the Basseux area, to the high ground west and south-west of -Albert. That town had fallen and the situation there had, by the 26th, -also become very critical. - -This march was, however, accomplished in strict accordance with orders, -and was a remarkable feat of endurance by the troops of the 12th and -13th Brigades. There can be no doubt, however, that the effort was more -than justified, for the mere presence, in a position of readiness, -of these two Australian Brigades, did much to steady the situation -opposite Albert, by heartening the line troops and stimulating their -Commanders to hang on for a little longer. It was this last effort -which brought to a standstill the German advance north of the Ancre, as -the entry of the Third Division had stopped that to the south of that -river. - -After his two Brigades had had only four hours' rest, Maclagan -took over, with them, the control of the fighting front, opposite -Dernancourt and Albert, which the Seventh Corps had allotted to him. - -Thus, by the night of the 27th, as the result of the rapid movements -which I have described and the ready response of the troops, there was -already in position the nucleus of a stout defence by five Australian -Brigades, stretching almost continuously from Hebuterne to the Somme, -while another Australian Brigade, the 9th, remained still uncommitted. - -But the situation south of the Somme gave cause for the gravest -anxiety. The north flank of the French was hourly retiring in a -south-westerly direction, and the ever widening gap was filled only by -a scratch force of odd units supported and assisted by a few elements -of the First Cavalry Division. The right flank of our Third Army, -therefore, lay exposed to the danger of being turned, if the enemy -should succeed in pressing his advantage as far west as Corbie, and in -crossing the river at or west of that town. - -It was for this reason that, after a conference with General Congreve, -late in the day, I decided to deploy my 9th Brigade along the Somme -from Sailly-le-Sec westward as far as Aubigny,[4]--far too extended a -front for one Brigade, but at least an effort to dispute the passage by -the enemy of the existing bridges and lock-gates over the Somme. - -The two following days were full of toil and hard travelling in -establishing touch with Divisional Headquarters to the north and south -of me, in arranging for co-ordinated action with them, and in gleaning -all possible information as to the situation, and as to the number and -condition of other troops available in an emergency. - -It was an especial pleasure for the Australian troops to find -themselves fighting in these days in close association with famous -British Cavalry Regiments, and that these feelings were reciprocated -may be gathered from the following letter from Major-General Mullens, -who commanded the First Cavalry Division, which was devoting its -energies to covering the gap between the Somme and the French flank: - - "MY DEAR MONASH, - - "I was hoping to have come to see you, when the battle allowed, to - thank you, your Artillery Commander, and your Brigadiers who were - alongside of my Division, for your most valuable and encouraging - support and assistance, especially on the 30th March, when we - had a hard fight to keep the Bosche out of our position. I was - very much struck by the courtesy of yourself and your officers - in coming to see me personally, and for your own and their keen - desire to do everything in their power to help. As you know, we - had a curious collection of units to deal with, and it was a very - real relief to know that I had your stout-hearted fellows on my - left flank and that all worry was therefore eliminated as to the - safety of my flanks. Your order for the placing of your heavy guns - and batteries so as to cover my front was of very real assistance, - and incidentally they killed a lot of Huns, and what they did was - much appreciated by us all. Will you convey to all concerned my own - appreciation, and that of all ranks of the 1st Cavalry Division. It - was a pleasure and an honour to be fighting alongside troops who - displayed such magnificent _moral_. I only hope we may have the - chance of co-operating with you again, and under more favourable - circumstances. - - "Yours sincerely, - (Sgnd.) "R. L. MULLENS." - -On the night of March 29th I advanced my line, pivotting on my right, -until my left rested on the Ancre east of Buire, an extreme advance of -over 2,000 yards, meeting some opposition and taking a few prisoners. -This deprived the enemy of over a mile of valuable vantage ground on -the crest of the plateau along which ran the main road from Corbie to -Bray. - -[Illustration: MAP A.] - -By that time it was apparent that the enemy's Artillery resources -were hourly accumulating, and on the next afternoon he delivered a -determined attack along my whole front, employing two Divisions. The -attack was completely repelled, with an estimated loss to the enemy of -at least 3,000 killed. My Artillery were firing over open sights and -had never in their previous experience had such tempting targets. - -On the previous day, however, the situation between the Somme and -Villers-Bretonneux, and still further to the south, had become -desperate; and much to my discomfiture I was ordered to hand over my -9th Brigade (Rosenthal) for duty with the 61st Division, in order to -reinforce that dissolving sector. My importunity as to the necessity -for maintaining the defence of my river flank, however, led the -Seventh Corps Commander to let me have, in exchange, the 15th Brigade -(Elliott), which was the first Brigade of the Fifth Australian Division -to arrive from Flanders on the present scene of operations. This -interchange of Brigades was completed by the 30th. - -That day was further marked by a concentrated bombardment of the -village of Franvillers, in which I had established my Headquarters. -Although no serious loss was suffered, the responsible work of my Staff -was disturbed. On reporting the occurrence to General Congreve, he -insisted upon my moving my Headquarters back to St. Gratien, which move -was completed the next day. - -On April 4th the enemy attacked, in force, south of the Somme, and the -village of Hamel was lost to us by the rout of the remnants of a very -exhausted British Division which had been sent in the night before to -defend it. This success gave the enemy a footing upon a portion of Hill -104, and brought him to the eastern outskirts of Villers-Bretonneux. -Three months later it cost the Australian Corps a concentrated effort -to compel him to surrender these advantages. - -One last and final attempt to break through the Australian phalanx -north of the Somme was made by the enemy on April 5th. The full weight -of this blow fell chiefly upon the gallant Fourth Australian Division. -The battle of Dernancourt will live long in the annals of military -history as an example of dogged and successful defence. The whole day -long the enemy expended Division after Division in the vain endeavour -to compel two weak Australian Brigades to loosen their hold on the -important high ground lying west of Albert. He well knew that the -capture by him of these heights involved the inevitable withdrawal of -the Third Australian Division also, and that thereby the path to Amiens -would again lie open. - -The great German blow against the important railway centre of Amiens -had been parried, and from this time onwards interest in this sphere -of operations rapidly waned. It blazed up again for a few hours only -when, three weeks later, the enemy made his final attempt to reach -his goal, on this occasion by way of Villers-Bretonneux. North of -the Somme, his activity quickly died down, and the attitude of both -combatants gradually assumed the old familiar aspect of trench warfare, -with its endless digging of trenches, line behind line, its weary -trench routine, and its elaborate installation of permanent lines of -communication and of administrative establishments of all descriptions. - -South of the Somme, the Fifth Australian Division came into the line on -April 5th, relieving a Cavalry Division on a frontage of about 5,000 -yards, and thereby obviating any further necessity for the maintenance -of my flank river defence. This duty had been performed for me in -succession by the 15th Australian, the 104th Imperial and the 13th -Australian Brigades (the latter then under Glasgow). My 9th Brigade -still remained detached from me, operating under both the 18th and 61st -British Divisions, and performed prodigies of valorous fighting in a -series of desperate local attacks and counter-attacks, which took place -between Villers-Bretonneux and Hangard, where the French northern flank -then lay. In this service the 9th Brigade received gallant co-operation -from the 5th Australian Brigade (of the 2nd Australian Division), which -was now also arriving in this area, after having been relieved from -trench garrison duty in the Messines--Warneton sector in Flanders. - -The Fifth Division and these two detached Brigades were, during -this period, serving under the Third Corps (Butler), which had been -reconstituted to fill the gap between the Somme and the flank of -the French Army. The First Australian Division was already well on -the way to follow the Second Division, when, on April 11th, it was -hurriedly re-transferred to Flanders to assist in stemming the new -German flood which was inundating the whole of that region, and which -was not arrested until it had almost reached Hazebrouck. This task the -First Australian Division performed most valiantly, thereby upholding -the reputation already earned by its younger sister Divisions for a -capacity for rapid, ordered movement and decisive intervention at a -critical juncture. - -For some days there had been rumours that the Australian Corps -Headquarters would shortly be transferred to the Amiens area, and -would once again gather under its control the numerous elements of -the four Australian Divisions which were by now widely scattered, and -had been fighting under the orders of three different Army Corps. -There was the still more interesting and pregnant rumour that General -Lord Rawlinson--relinquishing his post of British representative on -the Supreme War Council at Versailles--was soon to arrive and to form -and command a reconstituted Fourth British Army,[5] which was to be -composed of the Australian and the Third (British) Army Corps. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[3] The majority of the place-names mentioned in the remainder of this -chapter will be found on Maps A or J. - -[4] Two miles west of Corbie. - -[5] The Fourth Army had disappeared when, in 1917, General Rawlinson -went to Versailles. The Fifth Army was not revived until June, 1918. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -THE DEFENCE OF AMIENS - - -The Australian Corps Headquarters, under General Birdwood, commenced -its activities at Villers-Bocage on April 7th, but soon after removed -to the handsome seventeenth-century Chateau at Bertangles, with its -pleasant grounds and spacious parks. One by one the detached Australian -Brigades rejoined their Divisions, and the Divisions themselves came -back under the orders of their own Corps. - -The comparative calm which had supervened upon all the excitement of -the closing days of March and the first weeks of April was rudely -broken when, before daybreak on April 24th, the enemy began a furious -bombardment of the whole region extending from opposite Albert to a -point as far south as Hangard. It was certain that this demonstration -was the prelude of an infantry attack in force, but it was not until -well after midday that the situation clarified, and it became known -that the attack had been confined to the country south of the Somme, -that it had struck the southern flank of the Fifth Australian Division, -which had stood firm and had thereby saved the loss of the remainder of -the tactically important Hill 104. But the town of Villers-Bretonneux, -lying beyond the Australian sector, had fallen and the Germans were in -possession of it. - -It was imperative to retrieve this situation, or at least to make an -attempt to do so. The nearest available reserve Brigades of Infantry -were Australian, the 13th under Glasgow, and the 15th under Elliott. -They were placed under the orders of the Third Corps, and by them -directed to recapture the town. - -Both Brigades had to make long marches to reach the battleground. It -was already dark before they had deployed on the appointed lines of -departure. The details of this enthralling and wonderful night attack -form too lengthy a story to find a place in this brief narrative; -suffice it to say that when the sun rose on the third Anniversary of -Anzac Day, it looked down upon the Australians in full possession of -the whole town, and standing upon our original lines of twenty-four -hours before, with nearly 1,000 German prisoners to their credit. - -In this summary fashion, the last German attempt to split in two the -Allied Armies failed ignominiously, and the attempt was never again -renewed. - -A comprehensive rearrangement of the whole Front in this much-contested -region then took place. The appointment of Marshal Foch as Supreme -Commander on the Western Front bore, as one of its first fruits, a -clear decision as to the final point of junction between the French and -the British Armies. This was fixed just south of Villers-Bretonneux, -and not at the Somme Valley, as was thought desirable by some of the -British Commanders. - -The new Fourth Army became the flank British Army in contact with the -French. The Australian Corps became the south flank of that Army. Its -sector extended, from the point named, northwards as far as the Ancre. -The Third Corps was transferred to the north of the Ancre, opposite -Albert, and those two Corps comprised, for some time to come, the whole -of the Fourth Army resources. - -The Australian Corps now organized its front with three Divisions in -line and one in reserve. My occupation, with the Third Australian -Division, of the original sector between the Ancre and the Somme -remained undisturbed, and my front line remained for a time stationary -on the alignment gained on March 29th. - -But the Third Division had had enough of stationary warfare, and -the troops were athirst for adventure. They were tired of raids, -which meant a mere incursion into enemy territory, and a subsequent -withdrawal, after doing as much damage as possible. - -Accordingly, I resolved to embark upon a series of minor battles, -designed not merely to capture prisoners and machine guns, but also -to hold on to the ground gained. This would invite counter-attacks -which I knew could only enhance the balance in our favour, and would -seriously disorganize the enemy's whole defensive system, while wearing -out his nerves and lowering the _moral_ of his troops. - -Four such miniature battles[6] were fought in rapid succession, on -April 30th and May 3rd, 6th and 7th, by the 9th and 10th Brigades, who -were then in line. These yielded most satisfactory results. Not only -did we capture several hundred prisoners and numerous machine guns, but -also advanced our whole line an average total distance of a mile. This -deprived the enemy of valuable observation, and forced back his whole -Artillery organization. - -But these combats, and the numerous offensive patrol operations, which -were also nightly undertaken along my whole front, did a great deal -more. They yielded a constant stream of prisoners, who at this stage of -the war had become sufficiently demoralized by their disappointments to -talk freely, and impart a mass of valuable information as to movements -and conditions behind the German lines. - -The following list of 41 separate identifications, covering a total -of over 300 prisoners, represents the fruits of these efforts during -the period from March 27th to May 11th. From these it will be seen -that during these six weeks I had been confronted by no less than six -different German Divisions: - - _No._ _Date._ _Identification._ - 1 28.3.18 3 Gren. R. 1st Div. - 2 " 13 I.R. 13 " - 3 " 3 Gren. R. 1st " - 4 " 1 I.R. 1st " - " 13 I.R. 13 " - 5 " 86 Fus. R. 18 " - 6 " 1 I.R. 1st " - 7 30.3.18 13 I.R. 13 " - 8 " 31 I.R. 18 " - 9 31.3.18 18 " - 10 1.4.18 20 Foot Arty. - 11 2.4.18 3 " " - 12 2/3.4.18 1 R.R.Bav. Ft. Arty. - 13 " 13 I.R. 13 Div. - 14 4/5.4.18 1 M.W.Coy. 1st Div. - 15 6/7.4.18 3 Jaeger Bn. - 16 9/10.4.18 31 I.R. 18 " - 17 11/12.4.18 31 I.R. 18 " - 18 13/14.4.18 86 Fus. R. 18 " - 19 " 31 I.R. 18 " - 20 14/15.4.18 85 I.R. 18 " - 21 " 31 I.R. 18 " - 22 17/18.4.18 229 R.I.R. 30 " - 23 18/19.4.18 231 R.I.R. 50 " - 24 " 85 I.R. 18 " - 25 19/20.4.18 85 I.R. 18 " - 26 25/26.4.18 246 R.I.R. 54 Res. Div. - 27 27/28.4.18 229 R.I.R. 50 " " - 28 28/29.4.18 247 R.I.R. 54 " " - 29 30/1.5.18 247 R.I.R. 54 " " - 30 3/4.5.18 357 I.R. 199 Div. - 31 4/5.5.18 114 I.R. 199 " - 32 " 31 I.R. 18 " - 33 5/6.5.18 237 R.I.R. 199 " - 34 " 114 I.R. 199 " - 35 6/7.5.18 237 R.I.R. 199 " - 36 7/8.5.18 114 I.R. 199 " - 37 8/9.5.18 114 I.R. 199 " - 38 " 237 R.I.R. 199 " - 39 " 31 I.R. 18 " - 40 " 357 I.R. 199 " - 41 " 357 I.R. 199 " - - I.R.=Infantry Regiment; R.I.R.=Reserve ditto. - -While I was thus exerting a steady pressure on the enemy and gaining -ground easterly, the Australian Corps line south of the Somme remained -stationary, and each successive advance north of the river served only -to accentuate the deep re-entrant which had been formed on the day when -the loss of Hamel forced the British front line back along the Somme as -far as Vaire-sous-Corbie. - -While this was not very serious from the point of view of observation, -because I was in possession of much the higher ground, and was able to -look down, almost as upon a map, on to the enemy in the Hamel basin, -yet I was beginning to feel very seriously the inconvenience of having, -square on to my flank, such excellent concealed Artillery positions as -Vaire and Hamel Woods, which the enemy did not long delay in occupying. - -Moreover, the whole of the slopes of the valley on my side of the river -remained useless to me, because they were exposed to the full view of -the enemy, so long as he was permitted to occupy the Hamel salient, -which he had on April 5th driven into the very middle of what was now -the Corps front. I therefore made more than one attempt to persuade the -then Corps Commander to undertake an operation for the elimination in -whole or in part of this inconvenient bend, but, for reasons doubtless -satisfactory at that time, he declined to accept the suggestion. It -fell to my lot myself to carry out this operation nearly two months -later. - -The Third Division was, however, relieved in the line by our Second -Division on May 11th, and was withdrawn for a short but well-earned -rest after six weeks of trench duty, following its first fateful rush -into the thick of the battle. - -It was on May 12th that I received the first intimation from General -Sir William Birdwood that he was to be appointed to the command of a -new Fifth Army, which the British War Council had decided to form, and -that, upon his taking up these new duties, the task of leading the -Australian Army Corps would devolve upon me. - -In consequence of this and other changes, it was shortly afterwards -decided, in consultation, that Glasgow should take over the command of -the First Division, then still fighting at Hazebrouck, that Rosenthal -should command the Second Division, and that Gellibrand should succeed -me at the head of the Third Division. - -Far, therefore, from being permitted a little respite from the -strenuous labours of the preceding six weeks, I found myself confronted -with responsibilities which, in point of numbers alone, exceeded -sixfold those which I had previously had to bear, but which, in point -of difficulty, involved an even higher ratio. - -There were numerous Arms and Services, under the Corps, with whose -detailed functions and methods of operation I had not been previously -concerned. The other Divisional Commanders had hitherto been my -colleagues, and I was now called upon to consider their personalities -and temperaments as my subordinates. There was a vastly increased -territory for whose administration and defence I would become -responsible. I had to be prepared to enter an atmosphere of policy -higher and larger than that which surrounded me as the Commander of a -Division. And finally there was the selection of my new Staff. - -[Illustration: German Prisoners--taken by the Corps at Hamel, being -marched to the rear.] - -[Illustration: Visit of Monsieur Clemenceau--group taken at Bussy on -July 7th, 1918.] - -My last executive work with the Third Division was the process -of putting this Division back into the line, this time in the -Villers-Bretonneux sector of our front. After handing over the Division -and all its outstanding current affairs to Major-General Gellibrand, -I assumed command of the Australian Army Corps on May 30th, with -Brigadier-General Blamey as my Chief-of-Staff.[7] - -I very soon became aware that, as Corps Commander, I was privileged to -have access to a very large body of interesting secret information, -which was methodically distributed daily by G.H.Q. Intelligence. This -comprised detailed information of the true facts of all happenings -on the fronts of all the Allies, the gist of the reports of our -Secret Service, and very full particulars from which the nature and -distribution of the enemy's military resources could be deduced with -fair accuracy. - -The numberings and locations of all his Corps and Divisions actually -in the front line, on all the Allied fronts, was, of course, quite -definitely known from day to day. The numberings of all Formations -lying in Reserve were known with equal certainty, although their actual -positions on any date were largely a matter of deduction by expert -investigators. Of particular importance were the further deductions -which could be drawn as to the condition of readiness or exhaustion -of such reserve Divisions, from known facts as to their successive -appearance and experiences on any active battle front. - -Our experts were thus able to classify the enemy Divisions, and to -determine from day to day the probable number, and even the probable -numberings, of fit Divisions actually available (after one, or after -two, or after three days) to reinforce any portion of the front which -was to be the object of an attack by us. They could also compute the -number of fit Divisions which the enemy had at his disposal at any time -for launching an offensive against us. - -All such data had a very direct bearing, not only on the probable -course of the campaign in the immediate future, but also upon the -responsibility which always weighed upon a Corps Commander of keeping -his own sector in preparedness to meet an attack or to prevent such an -attack from coming upon him as a surprise. He must therefore be alert -to watch the signs and astute to read them aright. - -One striking feature of the information at our disposal during the -early part of June was the steady melting away of the enemy reserves -as the consequence of his resultless, even if locally successful, -assaults during the preceding two and a half months, against Amiens, -in Flanders, and on the Chemin des Dames. But it was apparent that he -still held formidable Reserves of Infantry, and a practically intact -Artillery, which he was bound to employ for at least one great and -final effort to gain a decision. - -The junction of the French and British Armies still offered a tempting -point of weakness. As mine was now the flank British Corps, in -immediate contact with General Toulorge's 31st French Corps, I could -not afford to relax any of the precautions of vigilance or preparation -which had been initiated by my predecessor for meeting such an attack. -Consequently, during June, 1918, I ordered on the part of all my line -Divisions a maintenance of their energetic efforts to perfect the -defensive organizations. I also undertook out of other Corps labour -resources the development of further substantial rear systems of -defence, so that Amiens need not, in the event of a renewed attack, be -abandoned to its fate without a prolonged struggle. - -The First Australian Division was not yet a part of my new Command, -its continued presence in the Hazebrouck and Merris area, under the -Fifteenth Corps, being still considered indispensable. My Corps front -now extended over a total length of ten miles, and I had but four -Divisions at my disposal to defend it. Three Divisions held the line, -one to the north and two to the south of the Somme. Only one Division -at a time could therefore be permitted a short rest, and this Division -formed my only tactical reserve. - -All this added to the anxieties of the situation, and focussed the -energies of the whole command on a constant scrutiny of all signs and -symptoms that the enemy might be preparing to deliver his next blow -against us. Active patrolling was maintained and continued to yield -a steady stream of prisoners. A well conceived and planned minor -enterprise by the Second Division, which was carried out on June 10th, -and was Rosenthal's first Divisional operation, gave us possession -of a further slice of the important ridge between Sailly-Laurette -and Morlancourt. It gained us 330 prisoners and 33 machine guns. But -no sign of any preparations on the part of the enemy for an attack -upon us, in this zone, emerged from the careful investigations which -followed this operation. - -The days passed and evidences increased that the enemy was now -beginning to devote his further attentions to the French front far to -the south of us. At any rate, he continued to leave us unmolested, and -the interrogations of our numerous prisoners all confirmed the absence -of any preparations for an attack. - -The defensive attitude which the situation thus forced upon us did -not for long suit the present temper of the Australian troops, and -I sought for a promising enterprise on which again to test their -offensive power, on a scale larger than we had yet attempted in the -year's campaign. There had been no Allied offensive, of any appreciable -size, on any of our fronts, in any of the many theatres of war, since -the close of the Passchendaele fighting in the autumn of 1917. - -It was high time that the anxiety and nervousness of the public, at -the sinister encroachments of the enemy upon regions which he had -never previously trodden, should be allayed by a demonstration that -there was still some kick left in the British Army. It was high time, -too, that some Commanders on our side of No Man's Land should begin to -"think offensively," and cease to look over their shoulders in order to -estimate how far it still was to the coast. - -I was ambitious that any such kick should be administered, first, -at any rate, by the Australians. A visit which I was privileged to -pay to General Elles, Commander of the Tank Corps, when he gave me -a demonstration of the capacities of the newer types of Tanks, only -confirmed me in this ambition. Finally, the Hamel re-entrant had for -two months been, as I have already explained, a source of annoyance and -anxiety to me. It was for these reasons that I resolved to propose an -operation for the recapture of Hamel, conditional upon being supplied -with the assistance of Tanks, a small increase of my Artillery and an -addition to my air resources. - -I thereupon set about preparing a general plan for such a battle, -which was to be my first Corps operation. Having mentioned the matter -first verbally to Lord Rawlinson, he requested me to submit a concrete -proposal in writing. The communication is here reproduced, and will -serve to convey an idea of the complexities involved in even so -relatively small an undertaking: - - Australian Corps. - 21st June, 1918. - - _Fourth Army._ - - HAMEL OFFENSIVE - -1. With reference to my proposal for an offensive operation on the -front of the "A" and "B" Divisions of this Corps, with a view to -the capture of HAMEL Village and VAIRE and HAMEL WOOD, etc., the -accompanying map shows, in blue, the proposed ultimate objective -line. This line has been chosen as representing the minimum -operation that would appear to be worth undertaking, while offering -a prospect of substantial advantages. - -2. These advantages may be briefly summarized thus: - (a) Straightening of our line. - (b) Shortening of our line. - (c) Deepening our forward defensive zone, particularly east of Hill - 104. - (d) Improvement of jumping-off position for future operations. - (e) Advancement of our artillery, south of the SOMME. - (f) Denial to enemy of observation of ground near VAUX-SUR-SOMME, - valuable for battery positions. - (g) Facilitating subsequent further minor advances north of the - SOMME. - (h) Disorganization of enemy defences. - (i) Disorganization of possible enemy offensive preparations. - (j) Inflicting losses on enemy personnel and material. - (k) Improvement of our observation. - (l) Maintenance of our initiative on this Corps front. - -3. The disadvantages are those arising from the necessity of bringing -into rapid existence a new defensive system on a frontage of 7,000 -yards and also the particular incidence, at the present juncture, of -the inevitable losses, small or large, of such an operation in this -Corps. - -4. In view of the unsatisfactory position of Australian reinforcements, -any substantial losses would precipitate the time when the question of -the reduction in the number of Australian Divisions would have to be -seriously considered. It is for higher authority to decide whether a -portion of the present resources in Australian man-power in this Corps -would be more profitably ventured upon such an operation as this, which -is in itself a very attractive proposition, rather than to conserve -such resources for employment elsewhere. - -5. Detailed plans can only be prepared after I have had conferences -with representatives of all Arms and Services involved, but the -following proposals are submitted as the basis of further elaboration: - - (a) The operation will be primarily a Tank operation--at least one - and preferably two Battalions of Tanks to be employed. - (b) The whole battle front will be placed temporarily under command - of one Divisional Commander--by a temporary readjustment of - inter-Divisional boundaries. - (c) The infantry employed will comprise one Division plus a - Brigade, _i.e._, 4 Infantry Brigades, totalling, say, 7,500 - bayonets; about one-half of this force to be employed in the - advance and the other half to hold our present front defensively, - taking over the captured territory within 48 hours after Zero.[8] - (d) The action will be designed on lines to permit of the Tanks - effecting the capture of the ground; the roles of the Infantry - following the Tanks will be: - (i) to assist in reducing strong points and localities. - (ii) to "mop up." - (iii) to consolidate the ground captured. - (e) Apart from neutralizing all enemy artillery likely to engage our - troops, our artillery will be employed to keep under fire enemy - centres of resistance and selected targets--in front of the advance - of the Tanks. Artillery detailed for close targets will work on a - prearranged and detailed time-table which will be adjusted to the - time-table of the Tank and Infantry advance. Sufficient "silent" - field artillery supplied before the battle should be emplaced in - advanced positions, to ensure an effective protective barrage - to cover consolidation on the blue line,[9] and to engage all - localities from which enemy counter-attacks can be launched. It is - estimated that, in addition to the resources of the Corps, four - Field Artillery Brigades will be required for, say, four days in - all. - (f) Engineer stores in sufficient quantities to provide for the - complete organization of the new defences will require to be dumped - beforehand as far forward as practicable. - (g) No additional machine guns, outside of Corps resources, will be - required, - (h) Contact and counter-attack planes and low-flying bombing planes - prior to and during advance must be arranged for. - (i) Artillery and mortar smoke to screen the operations from view of - all ground north of the Somme in the SAILLY-LAURETTE locality are - required. - -6. As to the date of the operations, the necessary preparations will -occupy at least seven days after authority to proceed has been given. -As an inter-Divisional relief is planned to occur on June 28th-29th and -29th-30th, it would seem that this operation cannot take place earlier -than the first week in July. The postponement of this relief would not -be desirable for several reasons. - -7. Valuable training in the joint action of Tanks and Infantry can be -arranged, probably in the territory west of the HALLUE Valley--provided -that one or two Tank Companies can be detached for such a purpose. -Thorough liaison prior to and during the operation between all Tank -and all Infantry Commanders would have to be a special feature. For -this reason only Infantry units not in the line can be considered as -available to undergo the necessary preparation. - - (Sgd.) JOHN MONASH, - Lieut.-General. - Cmdg. Australian Corps. - -Approval to these proposals was given without delay; the additional -resources were promised, and preparations for the battle were -immediately put in hand. As I hope, in a later context, to attempt to -describe the evolution of a battle plan, and the comprehensive measures -which are associated with such an enterprise, it will not be necessary -to do so here. - -It was the straightening of the Corps front, as an essential -preliminary to any offensive operations on a still larger scale, to -be undertaken when the opportune moment should arrive, that made the -Hamel proposal tactically attractive; it was the availability of an -improved type of Tank that gave it promise of success, without pledging -important resources, or risking serious losses. - -The new Mark V. Tank had not previously been employed in battle. It -marked a great advance upon the earlier types. The epicyclic gearing -with which it was now furnished, the greater power of its engines, -the improved balance of its whole design gave it increased mobility, -facility in turning and immunity from foundering in ground even of the -most broken and uneven character. It could be driven and steered by one -man, where it previously took four; and it rarely suffered suspended -animation from engine trouble. - -But, above all, the men of the Tank Corps had, by the training which -they had undergone, and by the spirited leadership of Generals Elles, -Courage, Hankey and other Tank Commanders, achieved a higher standard -of skill, enterprise and moral; they were now, more than ever, on their -mettle to uphold the prestige of the Tank Corps. - -All the same, the Tanks had become anathema to the Australian troops. -For, at Bullecourt more than a year before, they had failed badly, -and had "let down" the gallant Infantry, who suffered heavily in -consequence; a failure due partly to the mechanical defects of the -Tanks of those days, partly to the inexperience of the crews, and -partly to indifferent staff arrangements, in the co-ordination of the -combined action of the Infantry and the Tanks. - -It was not an easy problem to restore to the Australian soldier his -lost confidence, or to teach him the sympathetic dependence upon the -due performance by the Tanks of the roles to be allotted to them, which -was essential to a complete utilization of the possibilities which were -now opening up. That the Tanks, appropriately utilized, were destined -to exert a paramount influence upon the course of the war, was apparent -to those who could envisage the future. - -This problem was intensified because the battalions of the Fourth -Division who were to carry out the Infantry tasks at Hamel were the -very units who had undergone that unfortunate experience at Bullecourt. -But, on the principle of restoring the nerves of the unseated rider by -remounting him to continue the hunt, it was especially important to -wean the Fourth Division from their prejudices. - -Battalion after battalion of the 4th, 6th and 11th Brigades of Infantry -was brought by bus to Vaux, a little village tucked away in a quiet -valley, north-west of Amiens, there to spend the day at play with the -Tanks. The Tanks kept open house, and, in the intervals of more formal -rehearsals of tactical schemes of attack, the Infantry were taken -over the field for "joy rides," were allowed to clamber all over the -monsters, inside and out, and even to help to drive them and put them -through their paces. Platoon and Company leaders met dozens of Tank -officers face to face, and they argued each other to a standstill upon -every aspect that arose. - -Set-piece manoeuvre exercises on the scale of a battalion were designed -and rehearsed over and over again; red flags marked enemy machine-gun -posts; real wire entanglements were laid out to show how easily the -Tanks could mow them down; real trenches were dug for the Tanks to -leap and straddle and search with fire; real rifle grenades were fired -by the Infantry to indicate to the Tanks the enemy strong points -which were molesting and impeding their advance. The Tanks would throw -themselves upon these places, and, pirouetting round and round, would -blot them out, much as a man's heel would crush a scorpion. - -It was invaluable as mere training for battle, but the effect upon the -spirits of the men was remarkable. The fame of the Tanks, and all the -wonderful things they could do, spread rapidly throughout the Corps. -The "digger" took the Tank to his heart, and ever after, each Tank -was given a pet name by the Company of Infantry which it served in -battle, a name which was kept chalked on its iron sides, together with -a panegyric commentary upon its prowess. - -There remained, however, much to be arranged, and many difficult -questions to be settled, as regards the tactical employment of the -Tanks. I can never be sufficiently grateful to Brigadier-General -Courage, of the 5th Tank Brigade, for his diligent assistance, and -for his loyal acceptance of the onerous conditions which the tactical -methods that I finally decided upon imposed upon the Tanks. - -These methods involved two entirely new principles. Firstly, each -Tank was, for tactical purposes, to be treated as an Infantry weapon; -from the moment that it entered the battle until the objective had -been gained it was to be under the exclusive orders of the Infantry -Commander to whom it had been assigned. - -Secondly, the deployed line of Tanks was to advance, _level with the -Infantry_, and pressing close up to the barrage. This, of course, -subjected the Tanks, which towered high above the heads of the -neighbouring infantry, to the danger of being struck by any of our own -shells which happened to fall a little short. Tank experts, consulted -beforehand, considered therefore that it was not practicable for Tanks -to follow close behind an artillery barrage. The battle of Hamel proved -that it was. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[6] See Map A. - -[7] A farewell order to the Third Division was issued in the following -terms: - -"As I am about to take up other duties the time has come when I must -relinquish the command of the Division. - -"Closely associated with you as I have been, since the days of your -first assembly and War Training in ENGLAND, and, later, throughout all -your magnificent work during the past nineteen months in the war zone, -it is naturally a severe wrench for me to part from you. - -"I find it quite impossible to give adequate expression to my feelings -of gratitude towards all ranks for the splendid and loyal support which -you have, at all times, accorded to me. I am deeply indebted to my -Staff, to all Commanders and to the officers and troops of all Arms and -Services for a whole-hearted co-operation upon which, more than upon -any other factor, the success of the Division has depended. - -"It is my earnest hope, and also my sincere conviction, that the fine -spirit and the high efficiency of the Division will be maintained -under the leadership of my successor, Brigadier-General Gellibrand; -and if the men of the Division feel, as I trust they do, an obligation -to perpetuate for my sake the traditions built up by them during the -period of my command, they can do so in no better way than by rendering -to him a service as thorough and a support as loyal as I have been -privileged to enjoy at their hands. - -"In formally wishing the Division good-bye and good luck, I wish -simply, but none the less sincerely, to thank each and all of you, for -all that you have done. - - "(Signed) JOHN MONASH, - Major-General." - -[8] "Zero" refers to the day and hour, not yet determined, on which the -battle is to begin. - -[9] "Blue Line," arbitrarily so called, because this line was drawn on -the accompanying map in blue. It was to be the final objective for the -day. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -HAMEL - - -The larger questions relating to the employment of the Tanks at the -battle of Hamel having been disposed of, the remaining arrangements -for the battle presented few novel aspects. Their manner of execution, -however, brought into prominence some features which became fundamental -doctrines in the Australian Corps then and thereafter. - -Although complete written orders were invariably prepared and issued by -a General Staff whose skill and industry left nothing to be desired, -very great importance was attached to the holding of conferences, at -which were assembled every one of the Senior Commanders and heads of -Departments concerned in the impending operation. At these I personally -explained every detail of the plan, and assured myself that all present -applied an identical interpretation to all orders that had been issued. - -Questions were invited; difficulties were cleared up; and the -conflicting views of the different services on matters of technical -detail were ventilated. The points brought to an issue were invariably -decided on the spot. The battle plan having been thus crystallized, -no subsequent alterations were permissible, under any circumstances, -no matter how tempting. This fixity of plan engendered a confidence -throughout the whole command which facilitated the work of every -Commander and Staff Officer. It obviated the vicious habit of -postponing action until the last possible moment, lest counter orders -should necessitate some alternative action. It was a powerful factor -in the gaining of time, usually all too short for the extensive -preparations necessary. - -The final Corps Conference for the battle of Hamel was held at -Bertangles on June 30th, and the date of the battle itself was fixed -for July 4th. This selection was prompted partly by the desire to allow -ample time for the completion of all arrangements; but there were also -sentimental grounds, because this was the anniversary of the American -national holiday, and a considerable contingent of the United States -Army was to co-operate in the fight. - -For some weeks previously the 33rd American Division, under -Major-General John Bell, had been training in the Fourth Army area, -and its several regiments had been distributed, for training and -trench experience, to the Australian and the III. Corps. I had applied -to the Fourth Army and had received approval to employ in the battle -a contingent equivalent in strength to two British battalions, or a -total of about 2,000 men, organized in eight companies. The very proper -condition was attached, however, that these Americans should not be -split up and scattered individually among the Australians, but should -fight at least as complete platoons, under their own platoon leaders. - -All went well until three days before the appointed date, when General -Rawlinson conveyed to me the instruction that, the matter having been -reconsidered, only 1,000 Americans were to be used. Strongly averse, -as I was, from embarrassing the Infantry plans of General Maclagan, to -whom I had entrusted the conduct of the actual assault, it was not then -too late to rearrange the distribution. - -The four companies of United States troops who, under this decision, -had to be withdrawn were loud in their lamentations, but the remaining -four companies were distributed by platoons among the troops of the -three Australian Brigades who were to carry out the attack--each -American platoon being assigned a definite place in the line of battle. -The dispositions of the main body of Australian infantry were based -upon this arrangement. - -In the meantime, somewhere in the upper realms of high control, a -discussion must have been going on as to the propriety of after -all allowing any American troops at all to participate in the -forthcoming operations. Whether the objections were founded upon -policy, or upon an under-estimate of the fitness of these troops for -offensive fighting, I have never been able to ascertain; but, to my -consternation, I received about four o'clock on the afternoon of July -3rd, a telephone message from Lord Rawlinson to the effect that it had -now been decided that _no_ American troops were to be used the next day. - -I was, at the moment, while on my daily round of visits to Divisions -and Brigades, at the Headquarters of the Third Division, at Glisy, and -far from my own station. I could only request that the Army Commander -might be so good as to come at once to the forward area and meet me at -Bussy-les-Daours, the Headquarters of Maclagan--he being the Commander -immediately affected by this proposed change of plan. In due course we -all met at five o'clock, Rawlinson being accompanied by Montgomery, his -Chief-of-Staff. - -It was a meeting full of tense situations--and of grave import. At that -moment of time, the whole of the Infantry destined for the assault at -dawn next morning, including those very Americans, was already well -on its way to its battle stations; the Artillery was in the act of -dissolving its defensive organization with a view to moving forward -into its battle emplacements as soon as dusk should fall; I well knew -that even if orders could still with certainty reach the battalions -concerned, the withdrawal of those Americans would result in untold -confusion and in dangerous gaps in our line of battle. - -Even had I been ready to risk the success of the battle by going ahead -without them, I could not afford to take the further risk of the -occurrence of something in the nature of an "international incident" -between the troops concerned, whose respective points of view about the -resulting situation could be readily surmised. So I resolved to take a -firm stand and press my views as strongly as I dared; for even a Corps -Commander must use circumspection when presuming to argue with an Army -Commander. - -However, disguised in the best diplomatic language that I was able to -command, my representations amounted to this: firstly, that it was -already too late to carry out the order; secondly, that the battle -would have to go on either with the Americans participating, or not -at all; thirdly, that unless I were expressly ordered to abandon the -battle, I intended to go on as originally planned; and lastly, that -unless I received such a cancellation order before 6.30 p.m. it would -in any case be too late to stop the battle, the preliminary phases of -which were just on the point of beginning. - -As always, Lord Rawlinson's charming and sympathetic personality made -it easy to lay my whole case before him. He was good enough to say -that while he entirely agreed with me, he felt himself bound by the -terms of a clear order from the Commander-in-Chief. My last resource, -then, was to urge the argument that I felt perfectly sure that the -Commander-in-Chief when giving such an order could not have had -present to his mind the probability that compliance with it meant the -abandonment of the battle, and that, under the circumstances, it was -competent for the senior Commander on the spot to act in the light of -the situation as known to him, even to the extent of disobeying an -order. - -Rawlinson agreed that this view was correct provided the -Commander-in-Chief was not accessible for reference. Repeated attempts -to raise General Headquarters from Bussy eventually elicited the -information that the Field Marshal was then actually on his way from -Versailles, and expected to arrive in half an hour. Thereupon Rawlinson -promised a decision by 6.30, and we separated to rejoin our respective -Headquarters. - -In due course, the Army Commander telephoned that he had succeeded -in speaking to the Field Marshal, who explained that he had directed -the withdrawal of the Americans in deference to the wish of General -Pershing, but that, as matters stood, he now wished everything to go on -as originally planned. And so--the crisis passed as suddenly as it had -appeared. For, to me it had taken the form of a very serious crisis, -feeling confident as I did of the success of the forthcoming battle, -and of the far-reaching consequences which would be certain to follow. -It appeared to me at the time that great issues had hung for an hour or -so upon the chance of my being able to carry my point. - -An interesting episode, intimately bound up with the story of this -battle, was the visit to the Corps area on July 2nd of the Prime -Minister of the Commonwealth, Mr. W. M. Hughes, and Sir Joseph Cook, -the Minister of the Navy. They arrived all unconscious of the impending -enterprise, but only by taking them fully into my confidence could I -justify my evident preoccupation with other business of first-class -importance. Most readily, however, did they accommodate themselves to -the exigencies of the situation. - -Both Ministers accompanied me that afternoon on a tour of inspection -of the eight battalions who were then already parading in full battle -array, and on the point of moving off to the assembly positions from -which next day they would march into battle. The stirring addresses -delivered to the men by both Ministers did much to hearten and -stimulate them. As they were on their way to an Inter-Allied War -Council at Versailles, the personal contact of the Ministers with the -actual battle preparations had the subsequent result of focussing upon -the outcome of the battle a good deal of interest on the part of the -whole War Council. - -The fixing of the exact moment for the opening of a battle has always -been the subject of much controversy. As in many other matters, it -becomes in the end the responsibility of one man to make the fatal -decision. The Australians always favoured the break of day, as this -gave them the protection of the hours of darkness for the assembly of -the assaulting troops in battle order in our front trenches. But there -must be at least sufficient light to see one's way for two hundred -yards or so, otherwise direction is lost and confusion ensues. - -The season of the year, the presence and altitude of the moon, the -prospect of fog or ground mist, the state of the weather, and the -nature and condition of the ground are all factors which affect the -proper choice of the correct moment. To aid a decision, careful -observations were usually made on three or four mornings preceding the -chosen day. A new factor on this occasion was the strong appeal by the -Tanks for an extra five minutes of dawning light, to ensure a true line -of approach upon the allotted objective, whether a ruined village, or -a thicket, or a field work. - -The decision actually given by me was that "Zero" would be ten minutes -past three, and every watch had been carefully synchronized to the -second, to ensure simultaneous action. A perfected modern battle plan -is like nothing so much as a score for an orchestral composition, where -the various arms and units are the instruments, and the tasks they -perform are their respective musical phrases. Every individual unit -must make its entry precisely at the proper moment, and play its phrase -in the general harmony. The whole programme is controlled by an exact -time-table, to which every infantryman, every heavy or light gun, every -mortar and machine gun, every tank and aeroplane must respond with -punctuality; otherwise there will be discords which will impair the -success of the operation, and increase the cost of it. - -The morning of July 4th was ushered in with a heavy ground mist. -This impeded observation and made guidance difficult, but it greatly -enhanced the surprise. The unexpected occurrence of this fog lessened -the importance of the elaborate care which had been taken to introduce -into the Artillery barrage a due percentage of smoke shell, and to form -smoke screens by the use of mortars on the flanks of the attack. But -the fog largely accounted for the cheap price at which the victory was -bought. - -No battle within my previous experience, not even Messines, passed off -so smoothly, so exactly to time-table, or was so free from any kind of -hitch. It was all over in ninety-three minutes. It was the perfection -of team work. It attained all its objectives; and it yielded great -results. The actual assault was delivered, from right to left, by two -battalions of the 6th Brigade, three battalions of the 4th Brigade, -and three battalions of the 11th Brigade. It was also part of the plan -that advantage was taken by a battalion of the 15th Brigade to snatch -from the enemy another slice of territory far away in the Ancre Valley, -opposite Dernancourt, and so, by extending the battle front, further to -distract him. - -The attack was a complete surprise, and swept without check across the -whole of the doomed territory. Vaire and Hamel Woods fell to the 4th -Brigade, while the 11th Brigade, with its allotted Tanks, speedily -mastered Hamel Village itself. The selected objective line was reached -in the times prescribed for its various parts, and was speedily -consolidated. It gave us possession of the whole of the Hamel Valley, -and landed us on the forward or eastern slope of the last ridge, from -which the enemy had been able to overlook any of the country held by us. - -Still more important results were that we gathered in no less than -1,500 prisoners, and killed and disabled at least as many more, besides -taking a great deal of booty, including two field guns, 26 mortars -and 171 machine guns--at a cost to us of less than 800 casualties -of all kinds, the great majority of whom were walking wounded. The -Tanks fulfilled every expectation, and the suitability of the tactics -employed was fully demonstrated. Of the 60 Tanks utilized, only 3 were -disabled, and even these 3 were taken back to their rallying points -under their own power the very next night. Their moral effect was also -proved, and, with the exception of a few enemy machine-gun teams, -who bravely stood their ground to the very last, most of the enemy -encountered by the Tanks readily surrendered. - -Shortly after the battle, G.H.Q. paid the Australian Corps the -compliment of publishing to the whole British Army a General Staff -brochure,[10] containing the complete text of the orders, and a -full and detailed description of the whole of the battle plans and -preparations, with an official commentary upon them. The last paragraph -of this document, which follows, expresses tersely the conclusions -reached by our High Command: - - "81. The success of the attack was due: - - (a) To the care and skill as regards every detail with which the - plan was drawn up by the Corps, Division, Brigade and Battalion - Staffs. - (b) The excellent co-operation between the infantry, machine - gunners, artillery, tanks and R.A.F. - (c) The complete surprise of the enemy, resulting from the manner - in which the operation had been kept secret up till zero hour. - (d) The precautions which were taken and successfully carried out - by which no warning was given to the enemy by any previous activity - which was not normal. - (e) The effective counter-battery work and accurate barrage. - (f) The skill and dash with which the tanks were handled, and the - care taken over details in bringing them up to the starting line. - (g) Last, but most important of all, the skill, determination and - fine fighting spirit of the infantry carrying out the attack." - -Of the extent to which the tactical principles, and the methods of -preparation which had been employed at Hamel, came to be utilized by -other Corps in the later fighting of 1918 no reliable record is yet -available to me. But within the Corps itself this comparatively small -operation became the model for all enterprises of a similar character, -which it afterwards fell to the lot of the Corps to carry out. - -The operation was a small one, however, only by contrast with the -events which followed, although not in comparison with some of the -major operations which had preceded it--by reference to the number -of troops engaged, although not to the extent of territory or booty -captured. Although only eight Battalions (or the equivalent of less -than one Division) were committed in the actual assault, the territory -recovered was more than four times that which was, in the pitched -battles of 1917, customarily allotted as an objective to a single -Division. The number of prisoners in relation to our own casualties was -also far higher than had been the experience of previous years. Both -of these new standards which had thus been set up may be regarded as -flowing directly from the employment of the Tanks. - -Among other aspects of this battle which are worthy of mention is the -fact that it was the first occasion in the war that the American -troops fought in an offensive battle. The contingent of them who joined -us acquitted themselves most gallantly and were ever after received by -the Australians as blood brothers--a fraternity which operated to great -mutual advantage nearly three months later. - -This was the first occasion, also, on which the experiment was made of -using aeroplanes for the purpose of carrying and delivering small-arms -ammunition. The "consolidation" of a newly-captured territory implies, -in its broadest sense, its organization for defence against recapture. -For such a purpose the most rapidly realizable expedient had been -found to be the placing of a predetermined number of machine guns in -previously chosen positions, arranged chequer-wise over the captured -ground. According to such a plan, suitable localities were selected by -an examination of the map and a specified number of Vickers machine-gun -crews were specially told off for the duty of making, during the -battle, by the most direct route, to the selected localities, there -promptly digging in, and preparing to deal with any attempt on the part -of the enemy to press a counter-attack. - -The main difficulty affecting the use of machine guns is the -maintenance for them of a regular and adequate supply of ammunition. -Heretofore this function had to be performed by infantry ammunition -carrying parties. It required two men to carry one ammunition box, -holding a thousand rounds, which a machine gun in action could easily -expend in less than five minutes. Those carrying parties had to travel -probably not less than two to three miles in the double journey across -the open, exposed both to view and fire. Casualties among ammunition -carriers were always substantial. - -It was therefore decided to attempt the distribution of this class of -ammunition by aeroplane. Most of the machines of the Corps Squadron -were fitted with bomb racks and releasing levers. It required no great -ingenuity to adapt this gear for the carrying by each plane of two -boxes of ammunition simultaneously, and to arrange for its release, -by hand lever, at the appropriate time. It remained to determine, by -experiment, the correct size and mode of attachment for a parachute for -each box of ammunition, so that the box would descend from the air -slowly, and reach the ground without severe impact. - -It was Captain Wackett, of the Australian Flying Corps, who perfected -these ideas, and who trained the pilots to put them into practice. Each -machine-gun crew, upon reaching its appointed locality, spread upon -the ground a large V-shaped canvas (V representing the word "Vickers") -as an intimation to the air of their whereabouts, and that they needed -ammunition. After a very little training, the air-pilots were able -to drop this ammunition from a height of at least 1,000 feet to well -within 100 yards of the appointed spot. In this way, at least 100,000 -rounds of ammunition were successfully distributed during this battle, -with obvious economy in lives and wounds. The method thus initiated -became general during later months. - -The Corps also put into practice, on this occasion, a stratagem which -had frequently on a smaller scale been employed in connection with -trench raids. Our Artillery was supplied with many different types -of projectile, but among them were both gas shell and smoke shell. -The latter were designed to create a very palpable smoke cloud, to be -employed for the purpose of screening an assault, but were otherwise -harmless. The former burst, on the other hand, with very little -evolution of smoke, but with a pronounced and easily recognized smell, -and their gas was very deadly. - -My practice was, therefore, during the ordinary harassing fire in -periods between offensive activities, always to fire both classes of -shell _together_, so that the enemy became accustomed to the belief -at the least that our smoke shells were invariably accompanied by gas -shell, even if he did not believe that it was the smoke shell which -alone gave out the warning smell. The effect upon him of either belief -was, however, the same; for it compelled him in any case to put on his -gas mask in order to protect himself from gas poisoning. - -On the actual battle day, however, we fired smoke shell _only_, as we -dared not vitiate the air through which our own men would shortly pass. -But the enemy had no rapid means of becoming aware that we were firing -only harmless smoke shell. He would, therefore, promptly don his gas -mask, which would obscure his vision, hamper his freedom of action, -and reduce his powers of resistance. On July 4th both the 4th and 11th -Brigades accordingly took prisoner large numbers of men who were found -actually wearing their gas masks. The stratagem had worked out exactly -as planned. - -The battle was over, and when the results were made known there -followed the inevitable flow of congratulatory messages from superiors, -and colleagues and friends, from all parts of the Front and from -England. The following telegrams received from the Commonwealth Prime -Minister were particularly gratifying: - - 1. "On behalf of Prime Minister of Britain, and also of Prime - Ministers of Canada, New Zealand and Newfoundland, attending - VERSAILLES Council, I am commissioned to offer you our warmest - congratulations upon brilliant success of Australian Forces under - your command, and to say that the victory achieved by your Troops - is worthy to rank with greatest achievements of Australian Armies." - - 2. "My personal congratulations and those of the Government of - Commonwealth on brilliant success of battle. Please convey to - Officers and Men participating in attack warmest admiration of - their valour and dash and manner in which they have maintained - highest traditions of Australian Army. I am sure that achievement - will have most considerable military and political effect upon - Allies and neutrals, and will heighten _moral_ of all Imperial - Forces." - - 3. "In company with Mr. Lloyd George and General Rawlinson to-day - saw several hundred of prisoners taken by Australian Troops in - battle before Hamel. Rawlinson expressed to me the opinion that - the operation was a brilliant piece of work. Please convey this to - troops." - -The following message transmitted to me by the Commander of the Fourth -Army was also received from the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief: - - "Will you please convey to Lieutenant-General Sir John Monash and - all Ranks under his command, including the Tanks and the detachment - of 33rd American Division, my warm congratulations on the success - which attended the operation carried out this morning, and on the - skill and gallantry with which it was conducted. - - "D. HAIG." - -A steady stream of visitors also set in, including numbers of General -Staff Officers, who had been sent down from other Corps and Armies to -gather information as to the methods employed. Everyone, of course, -recognized that there was only one War, and that it was to the mutual -benefit of all that all expedients calculated to accelerate the end of -it should become the common property of all. My Staff were accordingly -kept busy for many days with maps and diagrams explaining the lines on -which the enterprise had been carried out. - -The most distinguished and most welcome of all our visitors, however, -was Monsieur Clemenceau, the veteran statesman of France, who, in spite -of the physical effort, immediately after the sitting of the Versailles -War Council had closed, made haste to travel to the Amiens area, and -to visit the Corps for the special purpose of thanking the troops. He -arrived on July 7th, and a large assemblage of Australian soldiers who -had participated in the battle, and who were resting from their labours -near General Maclagan's Headquarters at Bussy, were privileged to hear -him address them in English in the following terms: - - "I am glad to be able to speak at least this small amount of - English, because it enables me to tell you what all French people - think of you. They expected a great deal of you, because they have - heard what you have accomplished in the development of your own - country. I should not like to say that they are surprised that you - have fulfilled their expectations. By that high standard they judge - you, and admire you that you have reached it. We have all been - fighting the same battle of freedom in these old battlegrounds. - You have all heard the names of them in history. But it is a great - wonder, too, in history that you should be here fighting on the old - battlefields, which you never thought, perhaps, to see. The work of - our fathers, which we wanted to hand down unharmed to our children, - the Germans tried to take from us. They tried to rob us of all - that is dearest in modern human society. But men were the same in - Australia, England, France, Italy, and all countries proud of being - the home of free people. That is what made you come; that is what - made us greet you when you came. We knew you would fight a real - fight, but we did not know that from the very beginning you would - astonish the whole Continent with your valour. I have come here - for the simple purpose of seeing the Australians and telling them - this. I shall go back to-morrow and say to my countrymen: 'I have - seen the Australians; I have looked into their eyes. I know that - they, men who have fought great battles in the cause of freedom, - will fight on alongside us, till the freedom for which we are all - fighting is guaranteed for us and our children.'" - -The French inhabitants of the Amiens district were also highly elated -at the victory. The city itself had been, for some weeks, completely -evacuated, by official order. Not only had it become the object of -nightly visitations by flights of Gothas; but also, somewhere in the -east and far beyond the reach of my longest range guns, the enemy had -succeeded in emplacing a cannon of exceptionally large calibre, range -and power, which took its daily toll of the buildings of this beautiful -city. - -The anniversary of the French national fete was approaching, and the -Prefect of the Department of the Somme, Monsieur Morain--appreciating -the significance of the Hamel victory as a definite step towards the -ultimate disengagement of the city from the German terror--determined -to make the celebration of this fete not only a compliment to the -Australian Corps, but also a proof of the unquenchable fortitude of the -people of his Department. - -Accordingly, in the Hotel de Ville, in the very heart of the deserted -city, amidst the crumbling ruins of its upper stories, and of the -devastation of the surrounding city blocks, he presided at a humble -but memorable repast, which had been spread in an undamaged apartment, -inviting to his board a bare twenty representatives of the French and -British Armies, and of the city of Amiens. While we toasted the King -and the Republic, and voiced the firm resolve of both Allies to see -the struggle through to the bitter end, the enemy shells were still -thundering overhead. - -But other matters than rejoicings in a task thus happily accomplished -compelled my chief attention during the remaining days of this July. I -had to study and gauge accurately the tactical and strategical results -of the victory of Hamel, and to lose no time in using the advantage -gained. The moral results both on the enemy and on ourselves were far -more important, and deserve far more emphasis than do the material -gains. - -It was, as I have said, the first offensive operation, on any -substantial scale, that had been fought by any of the Allies since the -previous autumn. Its effect was electric, and it stimulated many men -to the realization that the enemy was, after all, not invulnerable, in -spite of the formidable increase in his resources which he had brought -from Russia. It marked the termination, once and for all, of the purely -defensive attitude of the British front. It incited in many quarters an -examination of the possibilities of offensive action on similar lines -by similar means--a changed attitude of mind, which bore a rich harvest -only a very few weeks later. - -But its effect on the enemy was even more startling. His whole front -from the Ancre to Villers-Bretonneux had become unstable, and was -reeling from the blow. It was only the consideration that I had still -to defend a ten-mile front, and had still only one Division in reserve -in case of emergency, that deterred me from embarking at once upon -another blow on an even larger scale. But I seized every occasion to -importune the Army Commander either to narrow my front, or to let the -First Division from Hazebrouck join my command, or both; but so far -without result. - -[Illustration: MAP B.] - -The only course that remained open to me was to initiate immediate -measures for taking the fullest advantage of the enemy's demoralization -by exploiting the success obtained to the utmost possible extent. No -later than on the afternoon of the battle of Hamel itself, orders were -issued to all three line Divisions to commence most vigorous offensive -patrolling all along the Corps front, with a view not merely to prevent -the enemy from re-establishing an organized defensive system, but -also ourselves to penetrate the enemy's ground by the establishment -therein of isolated posts, as a nucleus for subsequent more effective -occupation. - -Enterprise of such a nature appeals strongly to the sporting instinct -of the Australian soldier. Divisions, Brigades and Battalions vied -with each other in predatory expeditions, even in broad daylight, into -the enemy's ground, and a steady stream of prisoners and machine guns -flowed in. On the nights of July 5th and 6th, the Fifth Division, now -in the sector between the Ancre and the Somme, possessed themselves -with very little effort of a strip of some three hundred acres of -hostile positions, bringing our front line so near to Morlancourt as to -make that village no longer tenable by the enemy. - -On the same nights, and again on July 8th and 9th, the Second and -Fourth Divisions advanced their lines by an average of two hundred to -three hundred yards along their respective fronts, and this advance -was, in the case of the Second Division, particularly valuable in -carrying our front line over the crest of the plateau of Hill 104, and -giving us clear and unbroken observation far into the enemy's country, -in the directions of Warfusee and Marcelcave. - -It was a period replete with instances of individual enterprise and -daring adventure. One incident, characteristic of the varied efforts -of these days, was the capture, single-handed, and in broad daylight, -by Corporal W. Brown, V.C., of the 20th Battalion, Second Division, of -an officer and eleven men of the German Army, whom he stalked as they -lay skulking in a trench dug-out not far from his observation post, and -terrorized into submission by the threat of throwing a bomb at them. - -But perhaps the best testimony of the successful activities of my -troops during this period, and of the serious impression which -they made upon the enemy, can be gathered by extracts from his own -documents, a number of which were captured during this and subsequent -fighting. Of these, the following, issued by the Second German Army -Headquarters (Von der Marwitz), are among the more interesting: - - "The enemy has in his minor enterprises again taken prisoner a - complete front line battalion and part of a support battalion. The - reason is our faulty leadership." - - "The enemy penetrated the forward zone of the 108th Division - by means of large patrols at midnight, on July 8th, 1918, - without any artillery preparation, and again on the same - night at 11 p.m., with artillery preparation, astride of the - Marcelcave--Villers-Bretonneux railway. He occupied the trenches - where our most advanced outposts lay, and took the occupants, - comprising fifteen men, prisoner. The larger part of the forward - zone has been lost." - - "In the case of the present trench Division, it has often happened - that _complete_ picquets have disappeared from the forward zone - without a trace." - -All the above refers to the period between July 4th and 12th. We read -again under date July 13th: - - "During the last few days the Australians have succeeded in - penetrating, or taking prisoner, single posts or picquets. They - have gradually--sometimes even in daylight--succeeded in getting - possession of the majority of the forward zone of a whole Division." - - "Troops must fight. They must not give way at every opportunity and - seek to avoid fighting, otherwise they will get the feeling that - the enemy are superior to them." - -[Illustration: Railway Gun, 11.2-inch Bore--captured near Rosieres on -August 8th, 1918.] - -[Illustration: German Depot of Stores--captured on August 8th, 1918.] - -One last extract from these interesting papers: - - "The best way to make the enemy more careful in his attempt to - drive us bit by bit out of the outpost line and forward zone is to - do active reconnaissance and carry out patrol encounters oneself. - In this respect absolutely nothing seems to have been done. If the - enemy can succeed in scoring a success without any special support - by artillery or assistance from special troops, we must be in a - position to do the same." - -Our line in front of Villers-Bretonneux had for months run very close -to the eastern outskirts of that town, a circumstance which cramped and -embarrassed our defence of it. The enemy could peer into its streets -and sweep them with machine guns. He had held in strength a locality -known as Monument Wood, the ruins of a once prosperous orchard, and his -possession of it had been a source of annoyance both to us and to the -French, for it lay just opposite the international boundary posts. - -The time seemed opportune for a set-piece operation designed to -advance our line opposite the town by 1,000 yards, on a broad front, -to dislodge the enemy from Monument Wood, gain valuable elbow room, -and obtain mastery of the remainder of the plateau on which the town -was built. I had actually completed the draft of a plan for such an -operation, and had held a preliminary conference with my Staff to -discuss it, when it became apparent that the nightly encroachments -which the Second Division were effecting in this region would, in -the course of a few days, achieve the capture of the whole of this -territory without any special organized effort at all. - -And so it proved; for before the middle of July, Rosenthal had -succeeded in possessing himself, by such a process of "peaceful -penetration," of the whole of the coveted area. It was a further -evidence of the serious demoralization which our aggressive attitude of -the preceding months had wrought among the German forces opposed to us. - -The era of minor aggression by the Australian Corps was, however, about -to draw to a close, and the situation was rapidly beginning to shape -itself for greater events. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[10] Staff-Sheet No. 218: "Operations of the Australian Corps against -Hamel, etc.," published July, 1918. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -TURNING THE TIDE - - -The course of events during June and July pointed to the conclusions, -firstly, that the enemy contemplated no further offensive operations in -the Somme Valley, and, secondly, that the condition of the whole German -Second Army, astride of the Somme, offered every temptation to us to -seize the initiative against it. - -So far as the Australian Corps was concerned, however, my total -frontage, which had been increased (as the result of our exploitation) -to over eleven miles, precluded the possibility, with only four -Divisions at my disposal, of maintaining, even if I could succeed in -initiating, an ambitious offensive. The time was nevertheless ripe for -action on a scale far more decisive than had become orthodox in the -British Army in the past. Efforts on that method had been confined to a -thrust, limited in point both of distance and of time, and followed by -a period of inaction; they had often given the enemy ample leisure to -recover, and to reorganize his order of battle. - -To maintain an offensive, day after day, indefinitely, would require -sufficient resources, particularly in infantry, to allow Divisions to -be used alternatingly. Only in such a way, by having rested Divisions -always available to alternate with tired Divisions, could a continuous -pressure be maintained. - -I took every opportunity of pressing these views upon the Army -Commander, and expressed the readiness of the Australian Corps to -undertake and maintain a long sustained offensive, provided that -arrangements could be made to shorten my frontage from a three to a -two-Division battle front, and to increase my resources, from the -present four, to five or even six Divisions. It was further essential -that in any advances attempted by us, other Corps must co-operate on -both flanks. - -It would be bad tactics to drive into the enemy's front a salient -with a narrow base, for such a salient would make our situation worse -instead of better, affording to the enemy the opportunity of artillery -attack upon it from both its flanks as well as from its front. The -salient must therefore be broad based in relation to its depth, and the -base must ever widen as the head of the salient advances. - -This principle implied that a large-scale operation of such a nature -must be begun on a whole Army front, and that, even at its inception, -at least three Corps must co-operate, to be aided by the entry of -additional Corps on the outer flanks as the central depth developed. In -other words, it was a project implying a large commitment of resources, -and the urgent question was whether the time was yet ripe for taking -the risks involved. - -The matter, however, now became a subject at least worthy of practical -discussion, and, during the days which followed Hamel, the Staffs of -both the Corps and Army were kept busy with the investigation of data, -maps, and information, while the availability of additional resources -in guns, tanks and aeroplanes became the subject of anxious inquiry. - -A circumstance which troubled me sorely was the fact that my Corps -stood on the flank of the British Army, and that the troops on my right -belonged to the French Army. The relations between the Australian -troops and the Tirailleurs and Zouaves of the 31st French Corps -(General Toulorge) had always been the very friendliest, and the joint -"international" posts had been the scenes of hearty fraternization and -of the evolution of a strange common vernacular. - -This comradeship of "poilu" with "digger" did not, however, lessen -the difficulties incidental to the joint conduct of a major Operation -of War by two Corps of different nationalities, speaking different -languages, with diverse tactical conceptions, and, above all, of -substantially divergent temperaments. The French are irresistible in -attack as they are dogged in defence, but whether they will attack or -defend depends greatly on their temperament of the moment. In this -they are totally unlike the British or Australian soldier who will at -any time philosophically accept either role that may be prescribed for -him. - -In short, it was not possible to hope for an effective co-ordination -of effort, controlled particularly by the minute observance of a -time-table, on the part of the Australian and its adjacent French -Corps, and I felt quite unprepared to count upon it. It was for -this reason that I expressed to the Army Commander the hope that a -British Corps might be obtainable to operate on my right flank in any -undertaking that should be decided upon. Understanding that the greater -part of the Canadian Corps was then unemployed, resting in a back area, -I ventured to hope that this Corps might be made available, in the -event of a decision that the proposal should be proceeded with. - -My hesitation to accept the French as colleagues in such a battle -was based not altogether on theoretical or sentimental grounds. -The steady progress in mopping up enemy territory to the east of -Villers-Bretonneux, which had been made by my south flank Division -(the Second) as the aftermath of Hamel, soon produced a contortion of -the Allied front line at this point which bade fair to prove just as -troublesome to me as had been the great re-entrant opposite Hamel, -which that battle had been specially undertaken to eliminate. - -No persuasions on my part, or on that of my flank Division, could -induce the adjacent French Division to extend any co-operation in these -advances or to adopt any measures to flatten out the re-entrant which, -growing deeper every day, threatened to expose my right flank. I am -convinced that such hesitation was based upon no timidity, but was the -result wholly of an entirely different outlook and policy from those -which the Australian Corps was doing its best to interpret. But the -experience of it made the prospect of punctual co-operation on their -part in much more serious undertakings distinctly less encouraging. - -The proposed offensive involved, therefore, far-reaching -redispositions, comprising a substantial displacement southwards of -the inter-Allied boundary, a lengthening by several miles of the whole -British Western front, and an entire rearrangement of the respective -fronts of the Third and Fourth British Armies. It is not surprising -that a decision was deferred, while the project was being critically -investigated from every point of view. - -Then, suddenly, a new situation arose. On July 15th, the enemy opened -a fresh attack against the French in the south. The scale on which -he undertook it immediately made it patent to all students of the -situation that he was probably employing his whole remaining reserves -of fit, rested Divisions; that he meant this to be his decisive blow; -and that whether he gained a decision or not, it would be his last -effort on the grand scale. - -It did not succeed; for just as he had once again reached the line -of the Marne and had on July 17th achieved his "furthest south" at -Chateau-Thierry, a beautifully timed counter-stroke by the French and -Americans upon the western face of the salient, extending from Soissons -to the Marne, resulted on July 18th in the capture by the Allies on -that day alone, of 15,000 prisoners and 200 guns. - -It was the end of German offensive in the war. Their mobile reserves -were exhausted, and they were compelled slowly to recede from the -Chateau-Thierry salient. The appropriate moment, for which Foch and -Haig had doubtless been waiting for months, had at last arrived to -begin an Allied counter offensive, and it was only a question of -deciding at what point along the Franco-British front the effort should -be made, and on what date it should open. - -Doubtless influenced by the reasons already discussed, the choice -fell upon that portion of the front of the Fourth Army which lay -south of the Somme; in other words upon the southern portion of the -Australian Corps front. The date remained undecided, but the requisite -redisposition of Armies and Corps was so extensive that no time was to -be lost in making a beginning. - -It was on July 21st that General Rawlinson first called together the -Corps Commanders who were to be entrusted with this portentous task. -The strictest secrecy was enjoined, and never was a secret better kept; -with the exception of the Field Marshal and his Army Commanders, none -outside of the Fourth Army had any inkling of what was afoot until the -actual moment for action had arrived. - -Yet an observant enemy agent, if any such there had been in the -vicinity, might well have drawn a shrewd conclusion that some -mischief was brewing, had he happened along the main street of the -prettily-situated village of Flexicourt, on the Somme, on that -bright summer afternoon, and had observed in front of a pretentious -white mansion, over which floated the black and red flag of an Army -Commander, a quite unusual procession of motor-cars, ostentatiously -flying the Canadian and Australian flags and the red-and-white pennants -of two other Corps Commanders. - -There were present at that conference, General Currie, the Canadian, -General Butler, of the Third Corps, General Kavanagh, of the Cavalry -Corps, and myself, while senior representatives of the Tanks and Air -Force also attended. Rawlinson unfolded the outline of the whole Army -plan, and details were discussed at great length in the light of -the views held by each Corps Commander as to the tasks which he was -prepared to undertake with the resources in his hands or promised to -him. - -The conditions which I had sought in my previous negotiations with -the Army Commander were, I found, conceded to me almost to the full -extent. My battle front was to be reduced from eleven miles to a little -over 7,000 yards. It would, in fact, extend from the Somme, as the -northern, to the main Peronne railway, as the southern flank. And--what -was equally important, and profoundly welcome--the First Australian -Division was shortly to be relieved in Flanders, and would at last join -my Corps, thus for the first time in the war bringing all Australian -field units in France under one command. - -The Canadians were to operate on my right, and further south again the -First French Army (Debenay) was to supply a Corps to form a defensive -flank for the Canadians. The Third British Corps was to carry out for -me a similar function on my northern flank. Thus, four Corps in line -were to operate, the two central Corps carrying out the main advance, -while the two outer flank Corps would be employed further to broaden -the base of the great salient which the operation would create. - -The Cavalry Corps would appear in the battle area also, with all -preparations made for a rapid exploitation of any success achieved. -The utility of the Cavalry in modern war, at any rate in a European -theatre, has been the subject of endless controversy. It is one into -which I do not propose to enter. There is no doubt that, given suitable -ground and an absence of wire entanglements, Cavalry can move rapidly, -and undertake important turning or enveloping movements. Yet it has -been argued that the rarity of such suitable conditions negatives any -justification for superimposing so unwieldy a burden as a large body -of Cavalry--on the bare chance that it _might_ be useful--upon already -overpopulated areas, billets, watering places and roads. - -I may, however, anticipate the event by saying that the First Cavalry -Brigade was duly allotted to me, and did its best to prove its utility; -but I am bound to say that the results achieved, in what proved to be -very unsuitable country beyond the range of the Infantry advance, did -not justify the effort expended either by this gallant Brigade or by -the other arms and services upon whom the very presence of the Cavalry -proved an added burden. - -For the full understanding of subsequent developments both during and -after the battle it becomes of special importance to consider the -proposed role of the Third Corps in relation to my left flank. It is -to be remembered that the Fourth Army decided that the River Somme was -to be the tactical boundary between the two Northern Corps. It was not -competent for me to criticize this decision at the time, but I am free -now to say that I believed such a boundary to have been unsuitable, and -the event speedily proved that it was. - -It is always, in my opinion, undesirable to select any bold natural -or artificial feature--such as a river, ravine, ridge, road or -railway--as a boundary. It creates, at once, a divided responsibility, -and necessitates between two independent commanders, and at a critical -point, a degree of effective co-operation which can rarely be hoped -for. It is much better boldly to place a unit, however large or small, -_astride_ of such a feature, so that both sides of it may come under -the control of one and the same Commander. - -This was especially the case in this part of the Somme Valley which -is broad, and has an ill-defined central line, tortuous, and with -the slopes on either side tactically interdependent; but most of all -because, as I have already described, the high plateau on the north -completely overlooks the relatively lower flats on the south of the -river. The point I am trying to make should be borne in mind, for I -believe it has been fully borne out by subsequent events. - -The decision standing, however, as it did, it fell to the task of -the Third Corps to make an assault (concurrently with that of the -Australian Corps south of the river) for the capture of the whole of -that reach of the river known as the Chipilly Bend, and of all the high -ground on the spur which that bend enfolds. The object was to deprive -the enemy of all ground from which he could look down upon my advancing -left flank, or from which he could bring rifle or artillery fire to -bear upon it. - -The Third Corps was to operate on the front of one Division, the 58th, -which, pivoting its left upon the Corbie--Bray road, was to advance -its right--in sympathy with the advance of the left of the Australian -Corps--until it rested upon the river about one mile downstream from -Etinehem. It was a movement the success of which was rendered promising -by the nature of the ground and the disorganized condition of the enemy -between the Ancre and the Somme. - -As regards my right flank, this was to rest as stated upon the main -railway. The Canadian Corps, of four Divisions, would take over from -the French a frontage of about 6,000 yards and deliver a thrust -parallel to and south of the railway, in the direction of Caix and -Beaucourt, and would aim at the seizure of the important Hill 102, -immediately to the west of the latter locality. At no time did any -question of the security of my right flank furnish me with any cause -for anxiety; the prowess of the Canadian Corps was well known to all -Australians, and I knew that, to use his own expressive vernacular, it -was General Currie's invariable habit to "deliver the goods." - -The comprehensive project thus outlined at the conference of July 21st -involved, as a preliminary step, a far-reaching redisposition of very -large bodies of troops over a very wide front. With the readjustment of -the boundaries between the Third and Fourth British Armies we are not -particularly concerned, because this affected a region, north of the -Ancre, which lay well outside of the battle area. Nor did the internal -readjustment of the northern part of the Fourth Army front present -any difficulty, as it meant nothing more than a routine "relief" by -the 58th Division of the Fifth Australian Division which was at this -juncture holding that part of my Corps sector which lay between the -Somme and the Ancre. - -But the southern half was a very different matter. The First French -Army was to give up to the British a section of about four miles, -extending from Villers-Bretonneux to Thennes. This was ultimately to -be taken over by the Canadian Corps as a battle front, but that Corps -still had two of its Divisions in the line in the neighbourhood of -Arras. - -Moreover, it was of the utmost importance to conceal from the enemy -until the last possible moment any change in our dispositions. This -meant concealing them from our own troops also, because the loss by us -of a single talkative prisoner would have been sufficient to disclose -to the enemy at least the suspicion, if not the certainty, that an -attack was in preparation. - -After examining the problem and discussing several alternative -solutions, it was ultimately decided at this conference that, five -or six days before the date fixed for the attack, the French would -be relieved in this sector by a Division, not of Canadians, but of -Australians; that under cover of and behind this Australian Division, -the Canadian Corps would come in from the north, and would proceed -to carry out its battle preparations; and finally that the actual -appearance of Canadian troops in the front line would not ensue until -three days before the battle. - -During the preceding two days, the Australian troops would be gradually -withdrawn from the sector, leaving only one Brigade in occupation of -the line, to be backed up by the incoming Canadians in the unexpected -contingency of an attack by the enemy. This last Brigade would quietly -melt away, leaving the Canadians in full possession of the field. - -It was hoped that, during the days of the temporary Australian -occupation of the sector, nothing would happen which might disclose -to the enemy that the French had left it; and even if we were to have -the misfortune to lose from this sector any Australian prisoners to -the enemy, it was further hoped that, if kept in total ignorance of -the inflow of Canadians, such prisoners would be unable to make any -embarrassing disclosures. The _denouement_, which will be told later, -showed that this judgment of possibilities was a shrewd one, and that -such precautions were not taken in vain. - -At this period of the war, large numbers of Americans had already -arrived in France, but only few of them were yet ready to take their -places in the line of battle. The time had not yet arrived, therefore, -when, by taking over large sections of the Western front they could -help to shorten the French and British frontages. The British front -was, therefore, still so extended that the mobile reserve Divisions at -the disposal of the Field Marshal were few. - -This consideration made the contemplated reliefs and interchanges -of Corps and Divisions, and their transference from one part of our -front to another a matter of great complexity, and one which required -time to execute. Each stage of the process was contingent upon the -due completion of a previous stage. It is, moreover, a process which -cannot be unduly hastened, without serious discomfort and fatigue to -the troops and animals concerned. - -Troops destined for battle must be kept in the highest physical -condition. This means good feeding, comfortable housing, and adequate -rest. A couple of weary days and sleepless nights spent in crowded -railway trains, with cold food and little exercise, are sufficient to -play havoc with the fighting trim of even a crack battalion. So, the -daily stages of the journey must be short, and comfortable billets must -be in readiness for each night's halt. The day's supplies must arrive -punctually and at the right railhead, to ensure hot, well-cooked meals. - -With the very limited number of serviceable railway lines which -remained available behind the British front--and with the congestion -of traffic resulting from the daily transportation of many thousands -of tons of artillery ammunition and other war stores--it was not -surprising that as the result of the deliberations of the conference -it was resolved to advise the Commander-in-Chief that it would take -not less than five days to rearrange our order of battle on the lines -decided upon, and another five days, after Corps and Divisions had -taken over their battle fronts, to enable them to complete their -preparations. - -Thus, the Fourth Army could be ready at ten days' notice, and the -conference broke up, pledged to secrecy and complete inaction, until -formal approval had been given to the proposals and a date fixed for -their realization. - -The remainder of July passed with no very startling occurrences. In the -south the German withdrawal from the Soissons salient and the Marne -continued steadily, with the French and Americans on their heels; but -it was a methodical retreat, which would bring about a substantial -shortening of the German line, and so release Divisions to rest and -refit, which might conceivably become available for a fresh assault -elsewhere. - -But there was still no sign of any such design upon that always tender -spot, the Allied junction at Villers-Bretonneux. On the contrary, my -second Division still continued to make free with the enemy's advanced -patrols, and in a very brilliant little infantry operation by the 7th -Brigade captured the "Mound," a long spoilbank beside the railway at a -point about a mile east of the town, which dominated the landscape in -every direction. The ardour of his troops was only enhanced when they -heard that General Rosenthal himself, while reconnoitring from the -Mound, had been sniped at and had received a nasty wound in the arm. - -The enemy attempted nothing in the way of infantry retaliation. But -whenever he had been thoroughly angered, he treated my front to a -liberal drenching of mustard gas, fired by his artillery. His supplies -of mustard gas shell seemed inexhaustible, and he would frequently -expend as many as 10,000 of them in a single night upon the half-ruined -town of Villers-Bretonneux or on the Bois l'Abbe and other woods which -he suspected were sheltering my reserve infantry. - -These gas attacks were annoying and troublesome, in the extreme. During -the actual bombardments, troops wore their gas masks as a matter of -course, but doffed them when the characteristic smell of the gas -had disappeared. But it was warm weather, and as the sun rose, the -poisonous liquid, which had spattered the ground over immense areas, -would volatilize, and rise in sufficient volume still to attack all -whose business took them to and fro across this ground. In this way -hundreds of our men became incapacitated; although there were a few -serious cases, most of the men would be fit to rejoin in two or three -weeks. But this form of attack, and the constant dread of it, made life -in the forward areas anything but endurable. - -I was beset by quite another trepidation also. Prisoners captured -during the German withdrawal from the Marne, which was then in -progress, told tales of contemplated withdrawals on other fronts, and -some even asserted that a withdrawal opposite my own front was being -talked of. Judged by subsequent events, it is more than probable that -these stories were stimulated by the many articles which were at -that time appearing in the German newspapers from the pens of press -strategists, who, in order to allay public anxiety, were representing -these withdrawals as deliberate, and as a masterpiece of strategy, -compelling the Allies to a costly pursuit over difficult and worthless -ground. - -Opposite Albert, signs that such a withdrawal was actually in progress -also began to appear, although it subsequently transpired that, in its -early stages, this procedure was merely prompted by a purely local -consideration, namely, the desire of the enemy to improve his tactical -position by abandoning the outposts, which he had been maintaining in -the valley of the Ancre, and transferring them to the higher and better -ground on the east of that river. - -It was only natural that those of us who knew of the impending attack, -and of the immense effort which its preparation would involve, felt -nervous lest the enemy might forestall us by withdrawing his whole -line to some methodically prepared position of defence in the rear, -just as he had done once before in 1917 on so large a scale in the -Bapaume region. It would probably have been a sound measure of -military policy, but it would assuredly, at that juncture, have had -as disastrous an effect upon the _moral_ of the German people as his -enforced withdrawal, which was soon to begin, actually produced not -long after. - -The order to prepare the attack, and fixing the date of it for August -8th, came in the closing days of July, and at once all was bustle and -excitement in the Australian Corps. Commanders, Staff Officers, and -Intelligence Service, the Artillery, the Corps Flying Squadron, the -map and photography sections spent busy days in reconnaissance, and -toilsome nights in office work. The vast extent of the detailed work -involved, particularly upon the administrative services, can only be -appreciated by a study of the plan for the battle, which it fell to my -lot, as Corps Commander, first to formulate, and then to expound to a -series of conferences which were held at Bertangles on July 30th, and -on August 2nd and 4th. - -It is, therefore, perhaps appropriate that I should now attempt to -repeat, in non-technical language, an exposition of the outlines of -that plan. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -THE BATTLE PLAN - - -My plan for the impending battle involved the employment of four -Divisions in the actual assault, with one Division in reserve. The -Reserve Division was to be available for use in one of two ways; either -as a reserve of fresh troops to exploit any successes gained upon the -first day, or else to take over and hold defensively the ground won, if -the assaulting Divisions should have become too exhausted to be relied -upon for successful resistance to a counter-attack in force. - -The frontage allotted to the Corps was 7,000 yards, and this extent of -front accommodated itself naturally to the employment of two first-line -Divisions, each on a 3,500 yard front, each Division having two -Brigades in the front line, with one Brigade in reserve. - -As four Divisions were available to me for immediate use in the -battle, I decided to undertake, for the first time in the war, on -so comprehensive a scale, the tactical expedient of a "leapfrog" by -Divisions over each other. - -This term had, long before, passed into the homely phraseology of the -war, in order to describe a procedure by which one body of troops, -having reached its objective, was there halted, as at a completed task, -while a second body of troops, of similar order of importance, but -under an entirely separate Commander, advanced over the ground won, -reached the foremost battle line, took over the tactical responsibility -for the fighting front, and after a prescribed interval of time -continued the advance to a further and more distant objective. - -This conception of an advance by a process of "leapfrog" had been -evolved early in 1917 in connection with a method of assault on -successive lines of trenches. It was intended at the outset to be -applied only to very small bodies of infantry, such as platoons. A -normal battle plan for a company of infantry of four platoons was for -the first two platoons to capture and hold the front line trench, -while the next two following platoons would leap over this trench and -over the troops who had gained it, and then pass beyond to the capture -of the second, or support trench. The method was used, for the first -time, on such a modest scale, at the battle of Messines, in June, 1917, -and later on in the same year was adopted for bodies as large even -as Battalions, in the fighting for the Broodseinde and Passchendaele -heights. - -But on no previous occasion had such a principle been applied to whole -Divisions. It is true that at the battle of Messines, the Fourth -Australian Division passed through the New Zealand Division after the -latter had completed the capture of the main Messines ridge, but this -was really exploitation, undertaken in order to take advantage of the -temporary confusion of the enemy, and for the purpose of gaining ground -upon the eastern slopes of the captured ridge. It was not a movement -which was really part of the main assault, and it was confined to a -single Division. - -On the present occasion my purpose was to carry out a clear and -definite process of "leapfrogging," not only simultaneously by two -Divisions side by side, but also as an essential part of the time-table -programme for the main battle, and before the exploitation stage of -the fighting was timed to be reached. It was, undeniably, a daring -proposal, involving very definite risks, enormously increasing the -labour of preparation and the mass of detailed precautions which had to -be undertaken in order to obviate the possibility of great confusion. - -The preparations necessary for a single Division proposing to advance -alone, to a prescribed distance, over country much of which was usually -visible to us from our front line, are sufficiently complex, relating -as they do, not only to the establishment of numerous protected -headquarters for Brigades and Battalions, of miles upon miles of buried -and ground cables, of dumps of all kinds of supplies, and of dressing -stations and medical aid posts; but also to the disposition, in -concealed positions, of all the assaulting units, down to the smallest -of them, of Infantry Engineers and Pioneers. All these preparations -assume a tenfold complexity when a second Division has to make -arrangements exactly similar in character, variety and extent, using -exactly the same territory for the purpose and at the same time, and -planning to advance over more distant country, entirely beyond visual -range and preliminary reconnaissance. - -The project also involved a much greater crowding of troops into -the areas immediately behind our line of departure, and, therefore, -enormously increased the risk of premature detection by the enemy, -both from ground and from air observation, of unusual movement and of -other symptoms which presaged the possibility of an attack by us. The -plan also necessitated the closest possible co-ordination of effort, -and mutual sympathy and understanding, between the Commanders and -Staffs of the twin Divisions having a common jurisdiction over one -and the same area of preparation, and one and the same battle front. -This was a degree of co-operation which could not have been looked -for unless the personnel concerned had already established, from long -and close association with each other, the most cordial personal -relations. And dominating all other difficulties were those involved -in the proposal to execute this difficult and untried operation of a -Divisional leapfrog, not singly but in a duplex manner, necessitating -the assurance of exactly similar simultaneous action, similarly timed -in every stage, both before and during battle, by each of two separate -pairs of Divisions. - -These threatening difficulties were surely formidable enough, but I -knew that I could rely upon the goodwill of the Divisions towards each -other, and upon the loyal support of them all. This seemed to me to -justify the attempt, and to minimize the risks; having regard above all -else to the results which I stood to gain if the operation could be -executed as planned. - -On no previous occasion in the war had an attempt ever been made to -effect a penetration into the enemy's defences at the first blow, and -on the first day, greater than a mile or two. Rarely had any previous -set-piece attack succeeded in reaching the enemy's line of field-guns. -The result had been that the bulk of his Artillery had been withdrawn -at his leisure, and his losses had been confined to a few hundred acres -of shattered territory. But the task I had set myself was not only -to reach, at the first onslaught, the whole of the enemy's Artillery -positions, but greatly to overrun them with a view to obliterating, by -destruction or capture, the whole of his defensive organizations and -the whole of the fighting resources which they contained, along the -full extent of my Corps front. - -To achieve this object I prepared my plans upon the basis of a total -advance, on the first day, of not less than 9,000 yards. This was to be -divided into three separate stages, as follows: - - Phase A--Set-piece attack with barrage, 3,000 yards. - Phase B--Open-warfare advance, 4,500 " - Phase C--Exploitation, 1,500 " - ----- - Total distance to final objective, 9,000 yards. - ----- - -The opening phase involved no novel or unusual features so far as -the infantry were concerned, and was conceived on lines with which -the fighting of 1917 had familiarized me, modified further by the -accumulated experience gained from earlier mistakes in the technical -details of such an enterprise. The recent battle of Hamel became -the model for this phase, the conditions of that battle being now -reproduced on a much enlarged scale. - -But there was one very important feature which distinguished the -present undertaking from the battles of Messines and Broodseinde, and -that was in regard to the frontage allotted for attack to a single -Division. At Messines, the Divisional battle front was 2,000 yards; -in the third battle of Ypres it differed but little from the same -standard. For the present battle, I adopted a battle front of two miles -for each assaulting Division, or a mile for each of the four assaulting -Brigades. - -This innovation seemed to me to be justified by four principal -factors. The first of these was that the weather, which was dry, and -the state of the ground, which was hard, made the "going" easy and the -stress upon the infantry comparatively light. Next, the condition of -the enemy's defensive works was undeveloped and stagnant, as clearly -disclosed by the air photographs which the Corps Air Squadron produced -in great numbers on every fine day. No doubt this was due to the -encroachments we had made on his forward works during the fighting -at Hamel and in the remaining weeks of July. Thirdly, the powerful -assistance anticipated from a contingent of four Battalions of Tanks -which General Rawlinson had arranged to place under my orders led me -to estimate that I might greatly reduce the number of men per yard of -front. Lastly, the plan was justified by the known distribution of the -enemy's infantry and guns along the frontage under attack. For all -these reasons, I felt prepared to impose on the infantry a task which, -computed solely upon the factor of frontage, was more than twice that -demanded by me on any previous occasion. - -At the same time, so extended a frontage involved the employment of a -much higher ratio of barrage artillery to the number of battalions of -Infantry actually engaged. Success depended more upon the efficiency of -the fire power of the barrage than upon any other factor, and I could -not afford to incur any risk by weakening the density of the barrage. -For this reason, I adhered to the standard which previous experience -of several major battles and many minor raids had shown to be adequate -for covering the assaulting infantry, and for keeping down the enemy's -fire. This standard never fluctuated widely from one field-gun per -twenty yards of front, and involved the employment, on this occasion, -of some 432 field-guns in the barrage alone. This result could not have -been achieved if the Fourth Army authorities had not seen their way to -place at my disposal five additional Brigades of Field Artillery over -and above the thirteen Australian Brigades which formed a permanent -part of the whole Artillery of the Corps. - -Phase A, as already stated, involved a penetration of 3,000 yards, -and the objective line for this phase, which came to be known as the -"green" line (from the colour employed to delineate it upon all the -fighting maps propounded by the Corps), was chosen, after an exhaustive -study of all aeroplane photographs, and of the results of numerous -observations, by many diverse means, of the locations of the enemy's -Artillery, so as to make certain that during this phase the whole mass -of the enemy's forward Artillery would be overrun, and captured or put -out of action. - -The green line was, in fact, located along the crest of the spur -running north-easterly from Lamotte-en-Santerre in the direction of -Cerisy-Gailly, with the object of carrying the battle well to the east -of the Cerisy valley, in which large numbers of the enemy's guns had -been definitely located. This would give us, by the capture of this -valley, suitable concealed positions in which the Infantry destined -for Phase B could rest for a short "breather;" and would land the -Infantry of the original assault in a position from which they could -detect and forestall any attempt on the part of the enemy to launch a -counter-attack before the time for the opening of Phase B had arrived. - -The task of executing Phase A of the battle fell to the Second and -Third Australian Divisions, in that order from south to north, the -southern flank of the Second Division resting upon the main railway -line from Amiens to Peronne, and being there in contact with the -Canadian Corps, under General Currie. The northern flank of the Third -Division rested on the River Somme, and was there in contact with the -Third British Corps under General Butler, while the inter-divisional -boundary was at the southern edge of the Bois-d'Accroche. - -These two Divisions were the line Divisions during the period -immediately preceding the battle, and had been holding the line each -with two Brigades in line and one Brigade in support. Three days prior -to the battle, however, it was arranged that each Division should hold -its front with only one Brigade, thereby making available two Brigades -each for the actual carrying out of Phase A of the attack. These -assaulting Brigades were the 7th, 5th, 9th and 11th, in that order from -south to north, each Brigade having its due allotment of Tanks and -machine guns, etc. - -The total estimated time for the completion of Phase A was to be 143 -minutes after the opening of the barrage at "zero" hour; and there was -then to be a pause of 100 minutes to allow time for the advance and -deployment into battle order of the succeeding two Divisions, who were -to carry out the process of "leapfrogging" and to execute Phases B and -C of the battle. - -The planning of Phase B, or the advance from the "green" to the "red" -line, involved a totally different tactical conception and the adoption -of a type of warfare which had almost entirely disappeared from the -Western theatre of war since those far-off days in the late autumn of -1914, when the German Army first dug itself in, in France and Belgium, -and committed both combatants to the prolonged agony of over three -years of stationary warfare. I allude to the moving battle, or as it -is called in text-book language, "open warfare;" a type of fighting in -which few of the British Forces formed since the original Expeditionary -Force had any experience except on the manoeuvre ground under peace -conditions--a disability which applied equally to the Australian -troops. Confident, however, in their adaptability and in their power -of initiative under novel conditions, I did not hesitate to prescribe, -for this second phase of the battle, the adoption of the principles and -methods of open warfare. - -In two very important respects in particular, this type of fighting -involved conditions to which the troops had not been accustomed, -and under which they had no previous experience in battle. In -trench warfare, and in a deliberate attack on entrenched defences, -the positions of all headquarters, medical aid posts, supply dumps -and signal stations remained fixed and immovable. The whole of the -internal communications by telegraph and telephone could, therefore, -be completely installed beforehand, down to the last detail, and the -transmission of all messages, reports, orders and instructions, during -the course of the battle, was rapid and assured. But in a moving -battle no such comprehensive or stable signalling arrangements are -possible, and reliance must be placed upon the much slower and much -more uncertain methods of transmission by flag and lamp signalling, by -dispatch riders, pigeons and runners. - -Divisional Headquarters would, therefore, almost as soon as the battle -commenced, fall out of touch with Brigades, and they in turn with their -Battalions; information as to the actual situation at the fighting -front would travel slowly, and would reach those responsible for making -consequential decisions often long after an entire alteration in the -situation had removed the need for action. Thus, a greatly enhanced -responsibility would come to be imposed upon subordinate leaders to -decide for themselves, without waiting for guidance or orders from -higher authority, and to grasp the initiative by taking all possible -action on the spot in the light of the circumstances and situation of -the moment. - -Again, the nature of the Artillery action is, in the moving battle, -fundamentally different from that which prevails during trench warfare. -To begin with, only that portion of the Artillery which is in the -strictest sense mobile can participate to any extent in open warfare. -The employment of Artillery is, therefore, confined to a few and to -the smaller natures of Ordnance, namely, the 18-pounder field-gun, the -41/2-inch field howitzer and the 60-pounder, which are all horse drawn -and which are capable of being moved off the roads and across all but -the most broken country. Heavier guns, from 6-inch upwards, are in -practice confined to roads, and are too slow and cumbersome to keep -pace with the Infantry. The Artillery fire action is also intrinsically -different, because the guns can be sighted directly upon their targets, -while in trench warfare they are always laid by indirect methods, with -the use of the map and compass, and without observation, at any rate by -the crew of the gun, of the objects fired at. - -The decision which I had to take of carrying out the second phase of -this great battle on the principles of open warfare was, therefore, -one which also involved a certain element of risk. But it was a risk -which I felt justified in taking, in spite of the fact that the German -High Command had more than once expressed itself in contemptuous -terms of the capacity of any British troops successfully to undertake -any operation of open warfare. My justification lay primarily in my -confidence in the ability of the subordinate commanders and troops to -work satisfactorily under these novel conditions--a confidence which -the event abundantly justified. But I was placed in the position of -having either to accept this risk, or else abandon altogether the -project of a quite unprecedented penetration of enemy country to be -completed on the first day. It would have been clearly impossible to -continue the advance beyond the green line without an interval of at -least forty-eight hours, which would have been necessary to enable the -Artillery to be redisposed for barrage fire in forward positions and -provided with the necessary supplies of ammunition for such a purpose. - -The Divisions which were told off to carry out the "leapfrog" -enterprise and to execute Phase B of the battle were the Fifth -Australian Division on the south and the Fourth Australian Division on -the north, the outer flanks of the attack remaining as before, _i.e._, -the Peronne Railway on the south and the River Somme on the north. -Each of these Divisions was directed to deploy, on its own frontage, -two Infantry Brigades. Its third Brigade was to be kept intact and to -advance during Phase B at some distance behind, as a support to the -fighting line, and to be employed in the subsequent phase, if it were -found that Phase B could be completed without calling upon this spare -Brigade. The actual dispositions of the Brigades finally proposed by -the respective Divisional Commanders and approved by me brought about -the arrangement that the four first-line mobile Infantry Brigades were -successively, from south to north, the 15th, 8th, 12th and 4th, while -the 14th and 1st Brigades followed as supports in a second line. - -To each of these Infantry Brigades I allotted a Brigade of Field -Artillery, to be employed under the direct orders of the Infantry -Brigade Commander, and, in addition, three Artillery Brigades as -well as one Battery of 60-pounders, to each Divisional Commander. As -my resources in Artillery were not unlimited, the twelve Artillery -Brigades, so disposed of, were necessarily drawn from the original -eighteen Brigades which were to fire the covering Artillery barrage -for Phase A of the battle. The orders to that portion of the Field -Artillery which was to become mobile in pursuance of this plan, -accordingly, were that immediately upon the completion of their -original tasks, by the capture of the green line, they were to "pull -out of the barrage." - -This meant, in effect, that all the teams, limbers, battery wagons, -and ammunition wagons of these twelve Brigades, waiting in their wagon -lines far in rear, fully harnessed up and hooked in at the opening of -the battle, had to advance during the progress of the first phase, -so as to reach their guns just at the right time, but no earlier, -to enable these guns to be limbered up, and the batteries to become -completely mobile in order to join and advance with the Infantry of the -second phase. - -This was an operation which required the greatest nicety in timing, -and the greatest accuracy in execution. No Australian Artillery had -ever previously undertaken such an operation, except perhaps on the -manoeuvre ground, and then only on the very limited scale of a Brigade -or two at a time. That this rapid transition from the completely -stationary to the completely mobile battle was carried out, during the -very crisis of a great engagement, without the slightest hitch, and -with only the trifling loss of two or three gun horse teams from shell -fire, reflects the very highest credit upon every officer and man of -the Australian Field Artillery. - -The open warfare Infantry Brigades were also to be provided, out of -their own divisional resources, each with a Company of Engineers, -a Company of Machine Guns, a Field Ambulance, and a detachment of -Pioneers, so that, in the most complete sense, they became a Brigade -Group of all arms, capable of dealing, out of their own resources -and on their own ground, with any situation that might arise during -their advance of nearly three miles from the green to the red line. A -detachment of nine tanks completed the fighting equipment of each of -the four front line Brigades destined to capture the red line. - -I must now briefly describe the nature of Phase C, the third and last -stage in this ambitious and complex battle programme. This phase was -to consist of "exploitation," which implies that it was a provisional -preparation, which was to be carried out only if complete success -attended the two preceding phases. The objective of Phase C was the -"blue" line, which I had located about one mile to the east of the red -line, along a system of old French trenches extending from the river at -a point near Mericourt, and running southerly to the railway at a point -a little to the south-east of Harbonnieres. This line gave promise of -furnishing a good defensive position in which to deal with any possible -counter-attack. It also gave a good line of departure for subsequent -operations, and provided ideal artillery positions in a series of -valleys, running parallel and a little to the west of the line itself. - -The troops earmarked for this Exploitation Phase were the two second -line Brigades of the two Divisions which were to capture the red line, -namely, the 14th and 1st Brigades, and the orders to the Divisional -Commanders were that if the red line was reached without mishap, -without undue loss of time, and without involving the Reserve Brigades, -but not otherwise, these Reserve Brigades were to push on with the -utmost determination to secure and hold the blue line until such time -as they could be reinforced. - -Each of these exploitation Brigades was equipped similarly to the red -line Brigades in all respects except that they were provided with -a special contingent of 18 Mark V. (Star) Tanks of the very latest -design. These differed from the Mark V. Tank employed at Hamel and in -the other stages of the present operation, in that they were longer -and had sufficient internal space to carry, as passengers, over and -above their own crews, two complete infantry Lewis gun detachments -each. It was expected that this infantry fire power, added to the fire -power from the machine guns carried by these 36 Tanks themselves and -operated by the Tank crews, would go far to compensate for the somewhat -attenuated line of probably tired Infantry spread in two Brigades over -an ultimate frontage of over 10,000 yards. - -No definite time-table was laid down for the closing phases of the -battle, except for the regulation of the times when our Heavy Artillery -should "lift off" designated targets--such as villages, farms, and -known gun positions--and lengthen its range so as not to obstruct the -further advance of our own Infantry. But it was estimated that, from -the opening of the battle, the green line would be reached in two and -a half hours, the red line in six hours, and the blue line in eight -hours. As the battle was to open at the first streak of dawn, it would, -if all went well, be completed according to plan by about midday. - -In every battle plan, whether great or small, it is necessary first of -all to map out the whole of the intended action of the Infantry, at any -rate on the general lines indicated above. When that has been done the -next step is to work backwards, and to test the feasibility of each -body of infantry being able to reach its allotted point of departure, -punctually, without undue stress on the troops, and without crossing -or impeding the line of movement of any other body of infantry. It is -often necessary to test minutely, by reference to calculations of time -and space, more than one alternative plan for marshalling the Infantry -prior to battle, and for the successive movements, day by day, and from -point to point, of every battalion engaged. - -The present case was no exception, and, indeed, presented quite special -difficulties. The whole of the area for a depth of many thousands of -yards behind our then front line was open rolling country, devoid of -any cover, and (except in the actual valley of the Somme) with every -village, hamlet, farmhouse, factory and wood obliterated. The plan -involved the assembly, in this confined area, fully exposed by day to -the view of any inquisitive enemy aircraft, of no less than 45 Infantry -Battalions, with all their paraphernalia of war; not to speak of our -600 guns of all calibres, their wagon lines, horse lines and motor -parks, together with Engineers, Pioneers, Tanks, Medical and Supply -Units amounting to tens of thousands of men and animals. - -A new factor which, however, ultimately controlled the final decision -which I had to make as to the nature of the dispositions prior to -battle, lay in the consideration of the maximum distances which would -have to be covered by the foot soldiers in such a far-flung battle. I -had little difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the obvious and -normal arrangement was on this occasion a totally wrong arrangement. -If the assaulting Brigades had been arranged, from front to rear, in -their assembly areas prior to battle, in the same order as that in -which they would have to come into action, this would have involved -that the individual man, who was to be required to march and fight his -way furthest into enemy country, and, therefore, was to be the last to -enter the fight, would also be called upon to march furthest from his -rearmost position of assembly before even reaching the battle zone. The -maximum distance to be traversed on the day of battle by infantry would -have amounted, according to such a plan, to over ten miles. While this -is an easy day's march on a good road, under tranquil conditions, it -would have been an altogether unreasonable demand upon any infantryman -during the stress and nervous excitement of battle. It would have been -courting a breakdown from over-fatigue, among the very troops upon whom -I had to rely most to defend the captured territory against any serious -enemy reaction. - -I therefore adopted the not very obvious course of completely reversing -the normal procedure, and of disposing the Brigades in depth, from -front to rear, in exactly the _reverse_ of the order in which, in point -of time, they would enter the battle. - -The following represents, diagrammatically, the disposition of all -twelve Brigades after having been fully _deployed_ in the actual course -of the battle: - - ^ (4th Division) | (5th Division) - | Direction 4 -- 12 | 8 -- 15 - | of North 1 Inter- 14 South - | enemy. (3rd Division) Divisional (2nd Division) - | 11 -- 9 Boundary. 5 -- 7 - | | Our front line - |----------------------------------+--------------------------------- - | | before battle - | 10 (in our trenches) | 6 (in our trenches) - -The next diagram shows how the twelve Brigades were disposed while -Phase A of the battle was in progress, and before the second Phase had -begun: - - (3rd Division) | (2nd Division) - 11 -- 9 | 5 -- 7 - Inter- Our front line - --------------------------------Divisional--------------------------- - Boundary. before battle - 10 (in our trenches) | 6 (in our trenches) - (4th Division) | (5th Division) - 4 -- 12 | 8 -- 15 - 1 | 14 - -But the following diagram represents, in a similar manner, the order -of disposition of the same Brigades, in the territory under our own -occupation, immediately _prior_ to the battle: - - ^ (3rd Division) | (2nd Division) - | | Our front line - |-----------------------------------+--------------------------------- - | Direction Inter- before battle - | of 10 (in our trenches) Divisional 6 (in our trenches) - | enemy. (4th Division) Boundary. (5th Division) - | 4 -- 12 | 8 -- 15 - | North 1 | 14 South - | (3rd Division) | (2nd Division) - | 11 -- 9 | 5 -- 7 - -A little consideration will show that this apparently paradoxical -procedure brought about the desired result of more nearly equalizing -the stress upon the whole of the Infantry engaged, in point, at least, -of the maximum distance to be traversed in the day's operations. But it -produced something else, also, of much greater concern, which was that -the scheme involved a leapfrogging of Divisions during the approach -march into the battle, in addition to a second leapfrogging, to which -I was already committed, to occur at a later stage during the battle -itself. - -Thus I was confronted with the dilemma that the only scheme of -disposition which promised success for the subsequent battle was -also that scheme which made the greatest possible demands upon the -intelligence of the troops and the sympathetic, loyal and efficient -co-operation of my own Corps Staff, and those of the Commanders acting -under me. Influenced once again by the confidence which I felt in my -whole command, I did not hesitate to increase the complexity of the -plans for the Infantry action by calling upon the four Divisions to -execute a manoeuvre which is unique in the history of war, namely, a -"double leapfrog," simultaneously carried out by two separate pairs of -Divisions, operating side by side. The first leap was to take place -during the approach to the battle, the second during the progress of -the battle itself. - -This expedient, which I finally decided to adopt, in spite of the -dangers involved in its complexity and in the absence of any precedent, -was, however, as logical analysis and the event itself proved, the very -keynote of the success of the entire project. The whole plan, thanks to -an intelligent interpretation by all Commanders and Staffs concerned, -worked like a well-oiled machine, with smoothness, precision and -punctuality, and achieved to the fullest extent the advantages aimed at. - -On the one hand, the stress upon the troops was reduced to a minimum. -By the reduction of physical fatigue, it conserved the energies -of whole Divisions in a manner which permitted of their speedy -re-employment in subsequent decisive operations. And on the other -hand, by the great depth of penetration which it rendered possible, it -ensured a victory which amounted to so crushing a blow to the enemy -that its momentum hurled him into a retrograde movement, not only -along the whole front under attack, but also for many miles on either -flank. This recoil he was never able to arrest, as we followed up our -victory by blow after blow delivered while he was still reeling from -the effects of the first onslaught of August 8th. - -But, so far, I have written of the Infantry plan only; and much remains -to be told of the simultaneous action designed to be taken by all the -other arms, which rendered possible and emphasized the success of the -Infantry. No one can rival me in my admiration for the transcendant -military virtues of the Australian Infantryman, for his bravery, his -battle discipline, his absolute reliability, his individual resource, -his initiative and endurance. But I had formed the theory that the true -role of the Infantry was not to expend itself upon heroic physical -effort, nor to wither away under merciless machine-gun fire, nor to -impale itself on hostile bayonets, nor to tear itself to pieces in -hostile entanglements--(I am thinking of Pozieres and Stormy Trench and -Bullecourt, and other bloody fields)--but, on the contrary, to advance -under the maximum possible protection of the maximum possible array of -mechanical resources, in the form of guns, machine guns, tanks, mortars -and aeroplanes; to advance with as little impediment as possible; to -be relieved as far as possible of the obligation to _fight_ their -way forward; to march, resolutely, regardless of the din and tumult -of battle, to the appointed goal; and there to hold and defend the -territory gained; and to gather in the form of prisoners, guns and -stores, the fruits of victory. - -It is my purpose, therefore, to emphasize particularly the extent to -which this theory was realized in the battle under review, by the -achievement of a great and decisive victory at a trifling cost. That -result was due primarily to the very ample resources in mechanical -aids which the foresight and confidence of the Fourth Army Commander, -General Rawlinson, entrusted to me; but it was due partly, also, to the -manner in which those resources were employed. And that is why I shall -attempt to describe the remainder of the Corps plan. - -[Illustration: Tanks marching into Battle.] - -[Illustration: Morcourt Valley--the Australian attack swept across this -on August 8th, 1918.] - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -The battle plan (_continued_) - - -Surprise has been, from time immemorial, one of the most potent weapons -in the armoury of the tactician. It can be achieved not merely by -doing that which the enemy least anticipates, but also by acting at -a time when he least expects any action. It was a weapon which had -been employed only rarely in the previous greater battles of this war. -The offensive before Cambrai, planned by General Sir Julian Byng, and -the battle of Hamel, were rare exceptions to our general procedure of -heralding the approach of an offensive by feverish and obvious activity -on our part, and by a long sustained preliminary bombardment of the -enemy's defences, designed to destroy his works and impair his _moral_. - -The situation on the Fourth Army front, early in August, 1918, offered -a rare opportunity for the employment of surprise tactics on the -boldest scale. The incessant "nibbling" activities of the Australian -troops during the preceding three months had been of such a consistent -nature as to suggest that our resources were not equal to any greater -effort upon such an extended front as we were then holding, from the -Ancre down to and beyond Villers-Bretonneux. On the other hand, the -passivity of the first French Army, to the south of the latter town, -conveyed no suggestion of any offensive enterprise on the part of our -Ally in this region. - -The problem, therefore, was to convert an extensive front from a state -of passive defence to a state of complete preparedness for an attack on -the largest scale, and to keep the enemy--who, as always, was alert and -observant both from the ground and from the air--in complete ignorance -of every portion of these extensive preparations, until the very moment -when the battle was to burst upon him. It was, of course, a question -not merely of deceiving the enemy troops in their trenches immediately -opposed to us, but also of arousing in the minds of the German High -Command no suspicions which might have prompted them to hold in a -state of readiness, or to put into motion towards the threatened zone, -any of the reserve Divisions forming part of their still considerable -resources. - -The following memorandum, which was issued to the whole of the senior -commanders in the Australian Corps on August 1st, gives in outline some -of the measures adopted to this end: - -"SECRECY. - -"1. The first essential to success is the maintenance of secrecy. -The means to be adopted are as follows: - - (i) No person is to be told or informed in any part or way until - such time as the development of the plan demands action from him. - This is the main principle and will be pursued throughout, down to - the lowest formation. - - (ii) Divisional Commanders will work out their reliefs in such a - way as will ensure that the troops in the line know nothing of - the proposed operation until the last possible moment. This will - apply in particular to any troops who may be employed in the area - south of the AMIENS--VILLERS-BRETONNEUX railway. - -"2. In order to conceal the intention to carry out a large operation on -this front the following plan has been adopted: - -"The Australian Corps has been relieved of one divisional sector by -the Third Corps, and takes over a divisional sector from the French -Corps. The object of this is to lead the enemy, and our own people, -too, to believe that the action of the French in the SOISSONS salient -has been so costly as to demand that further French troops had to be -made available, and that this is the apparent cause of the extension of -the Australian Corps front to the south. - -"3. (a) The idea is being circulated that the Canadian Corps is being -brought to the south to take over the role of Reserve Corps at the -junction of the British and French Armies in replacement of the 22nd -Corps, which occupied that role until it was ordered to the CHAMPAGNE -front. In order that the enemy may be deceived as to the destination -of the Canadian Corps in the event of his discovering that it has been -withdrawn from the ARRAS front, Canadian wireless personnel has been -sent to the Second Army area,[11] where they have taken over certain -wireless zones. - -"(b) To prevent the enemy from discovering the arrival of the Canadian -Corps in this region, they will not take over from the 4th Australian -Division until 'Y' night. This will necessitate a proportion of the -troops of the Fourth Australian Division remaining in the line in this -sector until 'Y' night. As the Fourth Australian Division will be -required to participate in the attack it is proposed to distribute one -brigade to hold the whole of the line from 'W' night onwards. This will -enable the remaining two Brigades to be withdrawn, given a day or two's -rest, and allow of their part in the operation being fully explained to -them. The place of these two Brigades in rear of the line Brigade will -be taken over by Canadian Divisions. - -"(c) In order to deceive our own troops as to the cause of the coming -down here of the Canadians, a rumour is going abroad that the Canadian -Corps is being brought down with the object of relieving the Australian -Corps in the line. To most of the Australian Corps this would appear to -be an obvious reason for their coming, as the idea has been mooted on -former occasions. While it is not intended that this rumour should be -promulgated, it is not desired that anyone should disclose the actual -facts. This idea, together with the idea put forth in paragraph 3 (a), -should do much to prevent the real facts from becoming known."[12] - -The references to "W," "X," "Y" and "Z" days and nights in the above -memo, are to the successive days preceding Zero day--known briefly as -"Z" day, on which the battle was to open. The actual _date_ of "Z" -day was kept a close secret by the Army Commander and the three Corps -Commanders concerned, until a few days before the actual date; while -the actual moment of assault, or "Zero" hour, was not determined or -made known until noon on the day preceding the battle, after a close -study of the conditions of visibility before and after break of day, on -the three preceding mornings. - -But these arrangements were directed only towards the prevention of -a premature disclosure of our intention to attack to the enemy, to -our own troops, and through them to the civilian public, and to enemy -agents, whose presence among us had always to be reckoned with. It -still remained to carry out our battle preparations in a manner which -would preclude the possibility of detection by enemy aircraft, either -through direct observation, or by the help of photography. - -Accordingly I issued orders that all movements of troops and of -transport of all descriptions, should take place only during the -hours of darkness, whether in the forward or in the rear areas; and -in order to keep an effective control over the faithful execution of -these difficult orders, I arranged for relays of "police" aeroplanes, -furnished by our No. 3 Squadron, to fly continuously, by day, over -the whole of the Corps area, in order to detect and report upon any -observed unusual movement. - -At the same time, the normal work on the construction of new lines of -defence, covering Amiens, in my rear areas, which had been continuously -in progress for many weeks and was still far from complete, was to -continue, with a full display of activity; so that the enemy should -be unable to infer, from a stoppage of such works, any change in our -attitude. - -Orders were also given to discourage the usual stream of officers who -ordinarily visited our front trenches prior to an operation, and who -often, thoughtlessly, made a great display of unusual activity, under -the very noses of the enemy front line observers, by the flourishing -of maps and field-glasses, and by bobbing up above our parapets -to catch fleeting glimpses of the country to be fought over. Such -reconnaissance, however desirable, was to be confined to a few senior -Commanders and Staff Officers. All subordinates were to rely upon -the very large number of admirable photographs, taken regularly from -the air, both vertically and obliquely, by the indefatigable Corps -Air Squadron. These served excellently as a substitute for visual -observation from the ground. - -The prohibition against the movement of any transport in the daylight -naturally very seriously hampered the freedom of action of the troops -of all arms and services, but was felt in quite a special degree by the -whole of the Artillery. Over 600 guns of all natures had to be dragged -to and emplaced in their battle positions, and there camouflaged, -each gun involving the concurrent movement of a number of associated -vehicles. A full supply of ammunition had to be collected from -railhead, distributed by mechanical transport to great main dumps, and -thence taken by horsed vehicles for distribution to the numerous actual -gun-pits. - -As the amount of ammunition to be held in readiness for the opening of -the battle averaged 500 rounds per gun, it became necessary to handle -a total of about 300,000 rounds of shells and a similar number of -cartridges of all calibres, from 31/2 to 12 inches, not to mention fuses -and primers, or the immense bulk and weight of infantry and machine-gun -ammunition, bombs, flares, rockets, and the like, for the supply of all -of which the artillery was equally responsible.[13] The great amount of -movement involved in the handling and dumping of all these munitions, -and the deterrent difficulties of carrying out all such work only -during the short hours of darkness, must be left to the imagination. - -The artillery was, however, confronted, for the first time, with a -difficulty of quite a different nature. In the previous years of the -war every gun, _after_ being placed in its fighting pit or position, -had to be carefully "registered," by firing a series of rounds at -previously identified reference points, and noting the errors in line -or range due to the instrumental error of the gun, which error varied -with the gradual wearing-out of the gun barrel. By these means, battery -commanders were enabled to compute the necessary corrections to be -applied to any given gun, at any one time or place, so as to ensure -that the gun would fire true to the task set. - -Such registration naturally involved, for a large number of guns, a -very considerable volume of Artillery fire, the extent of which would -speedily disclose to the enemy the presence of a largely increased mass -of Artillery, and would inevitably lead him to the conclusion that -some mischief was afoot. Fortunately, however, the rapid evolution -during the war of scientific methods had by this juncture placed at my -disposal a means of ascertaining the instrumental error of the guns -on a testing ground located many miles behind the battle zone. This -method was known as "calibration," and consisted of the firing of the -gun through a series of wired screens, placed successively at known -distances from the muzzle of the gun. The whole elements of the flight -of the projectile could then be accurately determined by recording the -intervals of time between its passage through the respective screens. -From these data could be deduced the muzzle velocity, the jump, the -droop and the lateral error of each gun. - -Simple and obvious as was the principle of such an experiment, the -merit of the new process of calibration lay in the remarkable rapidity -and accuracy with which the electric and photographic mechanism -employed made the necessary delicate time observations, correct to -small fractions of a second, and automatically deduced the mathematical -results required. The calibration hut, in which this mechanism was -housed, became one of the show spots to which visitors to the Corps -area were taken to be overawed by the scientific methods of our gunners. - -In the early days of August the calibration range of the Australian -Corps was a scene of feverish activity. All day long, battery after -battery of guns could be seen route-marching to the testing ground, -going through the performance of firing six rounds per gun, and then -route-marching back again the same night to its allotted battle -position. So rapid was the procedure that long before he had reached -his destination the Battery Commander had received the full error sheet -of every one of his guns, and by means of it was enabled to go into -action whenever required without any previous registration whatever. -This great advance in the art of gunnery contributed in the most direct -manner to the result that when these 600 guns opened their tornado of -fire upon the enemy at daybreak on August 8th, the very presence in -this area of most of them remained totally unsuspected. - -The manner of the employment of the ponderous mass of Heavy Artillery -at my disposal will be referred to later. The action of that portion of -the Field Artillery which was to become mobile in the concluding phases -of the battle has already been dealt with. It remains only to describe, -in outline, the arrangements made for the normal barrage fire of the -Field Artillery during the first phase. - -It has been my invariable practice to reduce the barrage plan to -the simplest possible elements, avoiding in every direction the -over-elaboration so frequently encountered. By following these -principles not only is the actual preparatory work of the Artillery -greatly reduced in bulk and simplified in quality, but also the -liability to mistake and to erratic shooting of individual batteries or -guns, and consequent risks of damage to our own Infantry, are greatly -diminished. These advantages are bought at the small price of calling -upon the Infantry to undertake, before the battle, such rectifications -and adjustments of our front line as would accommodate themselves to -a straight and simple barrage line. This is in sharp contrast to the -much more usual procedure which prevailed (and persisted in other -Corps to the end of the war) of complicating the barrage enormously -in an attempt to make it conform to the tortuous configuration of our -Infantry front line. - -For the present battle it was accordingly arranged that the barrage -should open on a line which was _dead straight_ for the whole 7,000 -yards of our front, and the Infantry tape lines,[14] which were to mark -the alignment of the Infantry at the moment of launching the assault, -were to be laid exactly 200 yards in rear of this Artillery "start -line." The barrage was to advance, in exactly parallel lines, 100 yards -at a time, at equal rates along the whole frontage. These rates were -100 yards every 3 minutes, for the first 24 minutes, and thereafter 100 -yards every 4 minutes, until the conclusion of the time-table at 143 -minutes after Zero. By such a simple plan every one of the 432 field -guns engaged was given a task of uniform character. - -Great as was the care necessary to conceal all Artillery preparations, -it required still greater thought and consideration to keep entirely -secret the presence behind the battle front of some 160 Tanks, and -particularly to conceal their approach march into the battle. To both -combatants, the arrival of a Tank, or anything that could be mistaken -on an air photograph for a Tank, had for long been regarded as a sure -indication of coming trouble. And, therefore, imputing to the enemy the -same keenness to detect, in good time, the presence of Tanks, and the -same nervousness which we had been accustomed to feel when prisoners' -tales of the coming into the war of enormous hordes of German monsters -had been crystallized by the reports of some excited observer into a -definite suspicion that the fateful hour had arrived, I considered -it wise to repeat on a much elaborated scale all the precautions of -secrecy first employed for this purpose at Hamel. - -It is quite easy to detect from an air photograph the broad, corrugated -track made by a Tank, if the ground be soft and muddy enough to record -such an impression. Consequently, Tanks were forbidden to move across -ploughed fields or marshy land, and were confined to hard surface. -They moved only in small bodies, and only at night, and were carefully -stabled, during the daylight, in the midst of village ruins, or under -the deep shade of woods and thickets. Thus, by daily stages, and by -cautious bounds, each Tank or group of Tanks ultimately reached its -appointed assembly ground, from which it was to make its last leap into -the thick of the battle, where it would arrive precisely at Zero hour. - -But that last leap was just the whole difficulty. For the Tank is -a noisy brute, and it was just as imperative to make him inaudible -as to make him invisible. By a fortunate chance, the noise and buzz -made by the powerful petrol engines of a Tank are so similar to -those of the engines of a large-sized bombing plane, as for example -of the Handley-Page type, especially if the latter be flying at a -comparatively low altitude, that from a little distance off it is quite -impossible to distinguish the one sound from the other. - -It was therefore possible to adopt the conjurer's trick of directing -the special attention of the observer to those things which do not -particularly matter, in order to distract his attention from other -things which really do matter very much. In other words, a flight of -high-power bombing planes was kept flying backwards and forwards over -the battle front during the whole of that very hour, just before dawn, -during which our 160 Tanks were loudly and fussily buzzing their way -forward, along carefully reconnoitred routes, marked by special black -and white tapes, across that last mile of country which brought them up -level with the infantry at the precise moment when the great battle was -ushered in by the belching forth of a volcano of Artillery fire. - -The subterfuge succeeded to perfection, as was obvious to observers and -confirmed by the subsequent narratives of prisoners. The German trench -garrisons and trench observers were fully occupied in listening to the -hum of the bombing planes, in watching their threatened visitation for -their customary "egg" dropping performances, in engaging them with -rifle fire, and in holding themselves in readiness to duck for cover -should they come too near. They never suspected for a moment that this -was merely a new stratagem of "noise camouflage," and that the real -danger was stalking steadily and relentlessly towards them over the -whole front, upon the surface of the ground, instead of in the air. - -But the trick would not have succeeded so well, or would perhaps have -failed altogether, if the employment of those planes had been confined -to the morning of the battle. Such an unusual demonstration might have -aroused vague suspicions sufficient to justify a "stand to arms" and -a preparedness for some further activity on our part. And what we had -most to fear was the danger of "giving the show away" in the last ten -minutes. For it would have taken much less than that time for nervous -German trench sentries, by the firing of signal rockets, to bring down -upon our front line trenches, crowded as they were with expectant -fighters, a murderous fire from the German Artillery. - -Consequently the puzzled enemy was treated to the spectacle of an -early morning promenade by these same bombing planes on every morning, -for an hour before dawn, during several mornings preceding the actual -battle day. Doubtless the first morning's exhibition of such apparently -aimless air activity in the darkness really startled him. After two -or three repetitions, it merely earned his contempt. By the time -the actual date arrived he treated it as negligible. All prisoners -interrogated subsequently agreed that neither the presence nor the -noisy approach of so mighty a phalanx of Tanks had been in the least -suspected up to the very moment when they plunged into view out of the -darkness, just as day was breaking. - -The force of Tanks placed at my disposal for the purposes of this -battle comprised the 2nd, 8th and 13th Tank Battalions, commanded -respectively by Lieut.-Colonels Bryce, Bingham and Lyon, all under the -5th Tank Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General Courage. All these -Tanks were of the Mark V. type, as used at Hamel; but there were also -attached to the same Brigade a Battalion of Mark V. (Star) Tanks, of -still later design, under Lieut.-Colonel Ramsay-Fairfax, and also -a full Company of 24 Carrying Tanks, under Major Partington. These -Carrying Tanks were not employed in fighting, but were of wonderful -utility in the rapid transport of stores of all descriptions across the -battle zone; and in carrying the wounded out of the battle on their -return journey. I am confident that each of these Tanks was capable of -doing the work of at least 200 men, with an almost complete immunity -from casualty. - -There were thus available to me 168 Tanks in all, and their -dispositions have been already indicated in sufficient detail in -Chapter V. It was a definite feature of the whole plan of battle that -the combined Tank and Infantry tactics which had proved so successful -in the Hamel operation, and which have been described in Chapter II., -were to be employed and exploited to their utmost. Each Tank became -thereby definitely associated with a specified body of Infantry, and -acted during the actual battle under the immediate orders of the -Commander of that body: the working rule was "one Tank, one Company." - -To this was added the second working principle of "one Tank, one task," -which rules meant, in their practical application, that no individual -Tank was to be relied upon to serve more than one body of Infantry, nor -to carry out more than one phase of the battle. Elementary as this may -sound, it involved this striking advantage that, in the event of any -one Tank becoming disabled, its loss would impair no portion of the -battle plan other than that fraction of it to which that Tank had been -allotted. - -Thus, the whole of the Infantry operating in Phases B and C of the -battle had each their own adequate equipment of Tanks, which would -be certain to be available to them, even if the whole of the Tanks -employed during Phase A had been knocked out. At the same time clear -orders were issued, and due arrangements were made, that all Tanks -which survived Phase A, and whose crews were not by then too exhausted, -were to rally (during the 100 minutes' pause on the green line) in -order to co-operate in the succeeding phases of the fight. - -There was still another Unit, coming under the jurisdiction of the Tank -Corps, which proved of wonderful utility to me, and which deserved -quite special mention. This was the 17th Armoured Car Battalion, -organized into two companies of eight cars each. Each car carried one -forward and one rear Hotchkiss gun. It was heavily armoured, and the -crew operating the guns, as also the car driver, were protected from -all except direct hits by Artillery. The cars had a speed of 20 miles -per hour, either forwards or backwards. The Battalion was under the -command of Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Carter, an officer of the British -Cavalry. I allotted 12 cars to the use of the 5th Australian Division, -under Major-General Hobbs, who would be likely to find specially useful -employment for them, in scouring the network of roads beyond his final -objective; and retained four cars in Corps reserve for a special -reconnaissance enterprise. - -Full of promise of usefulness as were the speed and armament of these -cars, they suffered from one serious disability. Their top hamper was -so heavy compared to their light chassis that they could not be relied -upon to travel without premature breakdown across country, or indeed -on anything but moderately good roads. Now, such roads were certainly -available, as was evident from aeroplane photographs, in the enemy's -back country, after a zone for a mile or two immediately behind his -front line was passed; but all the subsidiary roads in that zone had -been practically obliterated by shell-craters, and even the great main -road from Villers-Bretonneux to Saint Quentin, which is a Roman Road -and substantially constructed throughout, was known to have been cut up -and traversed by numerous trenches both on our side and on the enemy's -side of "No Man's Land." There was also every expectation that the few -remaining trees which flanked this great road would be felled by our -bombardment, and some of them would surely fall across and obstruct the -roadway. - -That road was, however, the only possible outlet into enemy country for -the armoured cars, and I resolved upon a special programme, and the -allotment of a special body of troops for its execution. The object -was to ensure that the cars could be taken across the impracticable -and obstructed stretch of roadway already described, and launched at -the enemy at its eastern extremity, at the earliest possible moment of -time. Then, before the numerous enemy Corps and Divisional Headquarters -and all their rear organization had time to get clear intelligence of -what was happening at the front, or to recover from the first shock of -surprise, these Armoured Cars would fall upon them, and, travelling -hither and thither at great speed, would spread death, destruction and -confusion in all directions. - -A whole Battalion of Pioneers, and detachments of other technical -troops, with an adequate amount of road-repairing material, were got -ready, under the direct orders of my Chief Engineer, to carry out this -special task. All trenches in that portion of the road lying within our -own zone of occupation were bridged or filled in and all obstructions -cleared away before the day of the battle. But as to the more distant -stretch of the road, still in the hands of the enemy, elaborate -preparations were made, by a careful and detailed distribution of tasks -to small gangs of men, and by a fully worked-out time-table. The plan -was that from the moment of the opening of the battle, this road repair -work was to commence, and its advance was to synchronize with the -advance of the Artillery barrage and Infantry skirmishing line. - -A pilot armoured car was to follow the working gangs in order to test -the sufficiency of the repair work, and arrangements were made for -sending back signals to the remainder of the cars, lying waiting in -readiness in the shelter of Villers-Bretonneux. It was planned that the -first two miles of road would, by these means, be cleared and repaired -to a sufficient width, within four hours after the opening of the -battle. - -I am tempted to anticipate the narrative of the battle by saying that -the whole plan worked out with complete success to the last detail. The -cars got through punctually to time, and the story of their subsequent -adventures, as told later, reads like a romance. As indicating the -importance which I attached to this little enterprise, which in -magnitude was quite a small "side-show," but which in its results had -the most far-reaching consequence, I reproduce below the full text -(omitting merely formal portions) of one of the several orders issued -by me on this subject: - - Australian Corps, - 7th August, 1918. - - 1. The detachment of the 17th Armoured Car Battalion held in Corps - Reserve (2 sections each of 2 cars), will be employed on the - special duty of long distance reconnaissance on "Z" day. - - 2. These sections will be sent forward under the orders of the - C.O., 17th Armoured Car Battalion, passing the green line as soon - as practicable after Zero plus four hours, and proceeding eastward, - following the lifts of our Heavy Artillery bombardment, so as to - pass the blue line at or after Zero plus five hours. - - 3. The area to be reconnoitred lies in the bend of the Somme, north - of the Villers-Bretonneux--Chaulnes Railway; but the old Somme - battlefield lying N.E. of Chaulnes need not be entered. - - 4. Information is required as to presence, distribution and - movement of enemy supporting and reserve troops, and his defensive - organizations within this area. - - 5. While the primary function of this detachment is to reconnoitre - and not to fight, except defensively, advantage should be taken of - every opportunity to damage the enemy's telephonic and telegraphic - communications. - - 6. The following information as to enemy organizations is thought - to be reliable: - - Vauvillers Billets and Detraining point. - Proyart Divisional H.Q. and billets. - Chuignolles Divisional H.Q. and billets. - Framerville Corps H.Q. - Rainecourt Billets. - Cappy Aerodrome and dumps. - Foucaucourt Corps H.Q., dump, billets. - Chaulnes Important railway junction. - Ommiecourt Dumps. - Fontaine Aerodrome, Div. H.Q. and dump. - -The Heavy Artillery of the Corps was divided, for this battle as -normally, into two distinct groups, of which the one, or Bombardment -Group, was to devote its energies to destructive attack, throughout the -course of the battle, upon known enemy centres of resistance, suspected -Headquarters, and telephone or telegraph exchanges, villages believed -to be housing support and reserve troops, railway junctions and the -like. The selection of all such targets depended upon a judicious -choice of many tempting objectives disclosed by the very comprehensive -records of the highly efficient Intelligence Officers belonging to my -Heavy Artillery Headquarters. After that selection was made, all that -remained was to draw up a time-table for the action of all bombardment -guns which would ensure that they would lift off any given target just -before our own Infantry would be likely to reach it, and then to apply -their fire to a more distant locality. - -The second group of Heavy Guns was known as the Counter-battery Group, -and was at all times under the direction of a special staff, especially -skilled in all the scientific means at our disposal for determining the -position and distribution of the enemy's Artillery, and in the methods -and artifices for silencing or totally destroying it. Just as it was -the special role of the Tanks to deal with the enemy machine guns, so -it was the special role of our Counter-battery Artillery to deal with -the enemy's field and heavy guns and howitzers. These--the guns and the -machine guns--were the only things that troubled us; because, for the -German soldier individually, our Australian infantryman is and always -has been more than a match. - -Very special care was, therefore, devoted to the whole of the -arrangements, first for carefully ascertaining beforehand the actual or -probable position of every enemy gun that could be brought to bear on -our Infantry, and then for allocating as many heavy guns as could be -spared, each with a task appropriate to its range and hitting-power, to -the destruction or suppression of the selected target. For it served -the immediate purpose of eliminating the causes of molestation to our -advancing Infantry equally well, whether the enemy gun was merely -silenced by a sustained fire of shrapnel or high explosives which drove -off the gun detachment, or by a flood of gas which compelled them to -put on their gas masks, or whether it was actually destroyed by a -direct hit and rendered permanently useless. - -The days before the battle were of supreme interest in this particular -aspect. Each day I visited the Counter-battery Staff Officer, in his -modest shanty, hidden away in the interior of a leafy wood, where -in constant touch, by telephone, with all balloons, observers and -sound-ranging stations, and surrounded by an imposing array of maps, -studded with pins of many shapes and colours, he made his daily report -to me of the enemy gun positions definitely identified or located, or -found to have been vacated. And here again there was an opportunity for -the display of a modest little stratagem. Having suspected or verified -the fact that the enemy had altered the location of any given battery, -leaving the empty gun pits as a tempting bait to us, fruitlessly to -expend our energies and ammunition upon them--it would have been the -worst of folly to prove to him that he had failed to fool us, by -engaging his battery in its new position. - -On the contrary, we deliberately allowed ourselves to be fooled; and -for several days before the great battle we intentionally committed -the stupid error of methodically engaging all his empty gun positions. -No doubt the German gunners laughed consumedly as they watched, from a -safe distance, our wasted efforts; but they did not, doubtless, laugh -quite so heartily when at dawn on the great day, the whole weight of -our attack from over a hundred of my heaviest Counter-battery guns -fells upon them in the new positions, which they believed that we had -failed to detect. - -The Intelligence Service of the Corps was an extensive and highly -organized department, whose jurisdiction extended throughout all the -Divisions, Brigades and Battalions. Its routine work comprised the -collection and collation of the daily flow of information from a -large staff of observers in the forward zone, from the interrogation -of prisoners, from the examination of documents and maps, and from -neighbouring Corps and Armies. Before and during battle, however, a -greatly added burden fell upon the shoulders of the Intelligence Staff. - -Closely associated with this branch of the Staff work were two -activities of quite special interest. The Australian Corps organized a -Topographical Section, manned by expert draftsmen and lithographers, -who compiled and printed all the maps required throughout the whole -Corps, and it was their business to keep all battle maps, barrage maps -and topographical data recorded and corrected up to date. This alone -proved a heavy task when pace had to be kept with a rapid advance. At -such times the maps prepared on one day became obsolete two or three -days later. - -[Illustration: Dug-outs at Froissy Beacon--being "mopped up" during -battle.] - -[Illustration: Peronne--barricade in main street.] - -The issue of such maps was not confined to Commanders and Staffs. For -all important operations, large numbers of handy sectional maps were -struck off, so that they could be placed in the hands even of the -subordinate officers and non-commissioned officers. These maps not only -enabled the most junior leaders to study their objectives and tasks -in detail before every battle, but also became a convenient vehicle -for sending back reports as to the positions reached or occupied by -front-line troops or detached parties. On occasions as many as five -thousand of such maps would be struck off for the use of the troops, in -a single operation. - -There was also a branch of the Intelligence Staff attached to the -No. 3 Australian Air Squadron. Its special business was to print and -distribute large numbers of photographs, both vertical and oblique, -taken from the air over the territory to be captured--showing trenches, -wire, roads, hedges and many other features of paramount interest to -the troops. Thousands of such photographs were distributed before every -battle. - -The important considerations, in regard both to maps and photographs, -were that on the one hand, they were of priceless value to all who -understood how to read and use them, and on the other hand, the event -proved that their issue was in no sense labour in vain, for the keen -interest taken, even by the private soldiers, in these facilities -contributed powerfully to the success and precision with which all -battle orders were carried out, and this more than repaid us for the -additional trouble involved. It was inspiriting to me to see, on the -eve of every great battle, as I made my round of the troops, numerous -small groups of men gathered around their sergeant or corporal, -eagerly discussing these maps and the photographs and the things they -disclosed, the lie of the land, the wire, the trenches, the probable -machine-gun posts, the dug-outs and the suspected enemy strong points. - -My account of the details prepared for the battle of August 8th is not -nearly complete; but the demands of space forbid any more informative -reference to numerous other essential ingredients of the plan than a -mere recital of some of them. Thus, for example, it was necessary to -decide the action of all Machine Guns, both those used collectively -under Corps control, and those left to be handled by the Divisions; -the employment of Smoke Tactics, by the use of smoke screens created -both by mortars from the ground and by phosphorus bombs dropped from -the air; the use to be made of all the technical troops (Engineers -and Pioneers) in bridging, road and railway repairs and field -fortifications; the arrangements for the medical evacuation of the -wounded, and for the collection and safe-keeping of the anticipated -haul of prisoners, the synchronization of watches throughout the whole -command, so that action should occur punctually at a common clock time; -and last, but not least, the establishment of the machinery of liaison -internally between all the numerous formations of the Australian Corps, -and also externally with my flank Corps, the Canadians, under Currie, -on my right, and the British Third Corps, under Butler, on my left. - -Such, in outline, were my battle plans and my preparations for what I -hoped would prove an operation of decisive influence upon the future -of the campaign. The immediate results, which could be estimated on -the spot and at the time, and the admissions of Ludendorff, which came -to light only many months afterwards, combine to show that I was not -mistaken. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[11] This was in Flanders and Belgium. - -[12] The secret was, indeed, so well kept, and the "camouflage" stories -circulated proved so effective, that the King of the Belgians forwarded -a strong protest to Marshal Foch because the Canadians were about to -deliver an attack in his country, without his having been consulted -or made aware of the plans; and the Canadian Headquarters in London -complained to the War Office that the Canadian Forces were being -divided, and were being sent by detachments to different parts of the -front, instead of being always kept together as the Canadian Government -desired. It is said that even Mr. Lloyd George knew nothing of the -intention to attack until late on the day before the battle. - -[13] The weight of supplies of all kinds exceeded 10,000 tons. - -[14] See Chapter XIII. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -THE CHASE BEGINS - - -The preliminary movements of Divisions were duly carried out without -special difficulty. The Fifth Australian Division was relieved on -August 1st by a Division of the Third Corps, in that part of the Corps -front which lay north of the Somme, and passed into Corps Reserve, in a -rear area, there to undergo training with Tanks, and to prepare itself -for the work which it had to do. - -The Fourth Australian Division, from Corps Reserve, took over the -French front, as far south as the Amiens--Roye road on August 2nd, and -on the next night took over from the Second Australian Division all -that part of its front which lay south of the railway, thus disposing -itself upon what was ultimately to become the battle front of the -Canadian Corps. - -On the same night, the Second and Third Divisions, who had thus been -left in sole occupation of the sector which was to be the Australian -Corps battle front, carried out a readjustment of their own mutual -boundary, which would place each of these two Divisions upon its own -proper battle front. - -On the night of August 4th, the Second and Third Divisions rearranged -their defensive dispositions so that each of them deployed only a -single Brigade for the passive defence of its front, and withdrew to -its rear area its remaining two Brigades, who were thus afforded three -clear days to complete their internal preparations. - -The Canadian Corps commenced to arrive, and on August 4th two Canadian -Brigades relieved two Brigades of the Fourth Division, thereby -releasing them so that they also might commence to prepare for the -battle. It was originally intended that the last Brigade of the Fourth -Division should also be relieved by Canadians on August 6th, when -an untoward incident happened, which caused considerable alarm and -speculation; and it led to a modification of this part of the plan. - -The 13th Australian Brigade (of the Fourth Division) was on August 4th -spread out upon a front of over six thousand yards. It had no option -but to leave the greater part of the front-line trenches unoccupied, -and to defend its area with a series of small, but isolated, posts. -On that night, one of these posts, in the vicinity of the road to -Roye,[15] was raided by the enemy, and the whole of its occupants, -comprising a sergeant and four or five men, were surrounded and taken -prisoner. - -It was an unusual display of enterprise on the part of the enemy, at -this point of time and in this locality. Whether it had been inspired -by sneering criticisms from behind his line of the nature which have -been quoted, or whether signs of unusual movement or a changed attitude -on the part of our trench garrison had instigated a suspicion that -something was happening which required investigation, could only be -surmised. But the fact remained that five Australians had been taken, -at a place several miles south of the southernmost point hitherto -occupied by "the English." - -The side-stepping of the Australian Corps southwards had thereby become -known to the enemy, and it was necessary to estimate the deductions -which he would be likely to draw from that discovery. Much depended -upon the behaviour of these prisoners. Would they talk? and, if so, -what did they know? That Australian captives would not volunteer -information likely to imperil the lives of their comrades, might be -taken for granted, but German Intelligence Officers had means at their -disposal to draw from prisoners, unwittingly, anything they might know. - -We could only hope, under the circumstances, that these men really did -know nothing of our intention to attack; and that, if they had become -aware of the presence of Canadian troops in the rear areas, they would -believe the story which we had sedulously spread, that the Canadians -were merely coming to relieve the Australian Corps, so that it might -have a long rest after its heroic labours. - -Not many weeks afterwards it was my good fortune to capture a German -Headquarters, in which were found Intelligence Reports containing a -narrative of this very incident. The importance of the capture of these -men had been recognized, and they had been taken far behind the lines -for an exhaustive examination. But, despite all efforts of the German -Intelligence Staff, they had refused to disclose anything whatever but -their names and units--which they were bound to do under the rules -of war. The report went on to praise their soldierly bearing and -loyal reticence, and held up these brave Australians as a model to be -followed by their own men, adding that such a demeanour could only earn -the respect of an enemy. - -The alarm which this untoward happening created on our side of the line -led to a determination to redouble our precautions. The Army Commander -proposed, and I agreed, that the relief of the 13th Brigade by -Canadians, _prior_ to the eve of the battle, was out of the question, -as being too risky. It was decided that the 13th Brigade must remain in -the line until the very last. - -This decision deprived General Maclagan of one of his three Brigades, -and as it would be asking too much of the Fourth Division to carry out -the role which had been allotted to it in the battle, with only two -Brigades, I decided that the only thing to be done was to transfer to -the Fourth Division, temporarily, one of the Brigades of the First -Division, which was to arrive from the north in the course of the next -three days. - -Urgent telegrams were therefore despatched to accelerate the arrival -of one of the Brigades of the First Division. In due course the First -Australian Brigade (Mackay) arrived by four special trains on the -night of August 6th, in sufficient time to enable it to take its place -in General Maclagan's order of battle, in substitution for the 13th -Brigade. The 13th Brigade was destined to have some further stirring -adventures before it again joined its own Division. - -The day preceding the great battle arrived all too soon. The prospect -of an advance had sent a thrill through all ranks and expectation -became tense. The use of the telephone had been ordered to be -restricted, especially in the forward areas; for it was known that the -enemy was in possession of listening apparatus, similar to our own, by -which conversations on the telephone could be tapped, and unguarded -references to the impending operations could be overheard. - -Final inspections had, therefore, to be made, and final injunctions -administered, by Commanders and Staffs traversing long distances over -the extensive Corps area by motor car and horse, and even on foot. A -strange and ominous quiet pervaded the scene; it was only when the -explosion of a stray enemy shell would cause hundreds of heads to peer -out from trenches, gun-pits and underground shelters, that one became -aware that the whole country was really packed thick with a teeming -population carefully hidden away. - -Later in the afternoon of that last day came another note of alarm. To -the Fourth and Fifth Australian Divisions had been allotted eighteen -Store and Carrying Tanks. These had been brought the night before, -into a small plantation lying about half a mile to the north of -Villers-Bretonneux, loaded to their utmost capacity with battle stores -of all descriptions: reserves of food and water, rifle ammunition, and -a large reserve of Stokes Mortar bombs; also considerable supplies of -petrol, to satisfy the ravenous appetites of the Tanks themselves. - -This locality suddenly became the object of the closest attention by -the enemy's Artillery. He began to deluge it with such a volume of fire -that in less than half an hour a great conflagration had been started, -which did not subside until fifteen of the Tanks and all their valuable -cargo had been reduced to irretrievable ruin. - -Had some unusually keen enemy observer perceived the presence of -Tanks in our area, and would that knowledge have disclosed to him -our jealously guarded secret? Fortunately, my Artillery Commander, -Brigadier-General Coxen, making his last rounds of the Battery -positions, was an eye-witness of the whole occurrence, and was able -to reassure me. A chance shell--the last of a dozen fired entirely at -random into our area--fell into the very centre of this group of Tanks, -and set fire to some of the petrol. The resulting cloud of smoke became -a signal to the enemy that something was burning which our men would -probably attempt to salve; and in consonance with an entirely correct -Artillery procedure, he at once concentrated a heavy fire upon the spot. - -That incident is typical of the perturbations through which all -responsible Commanders have to pass on such occasions. The occurrence -was explained as accidental, and implied no premature discovery by the -enemy. Nothing remained but to repair the damage, and make special -arrangements to replenish the Stores which these Divisions had lost. - -On the forenoon of the day before the battle, the following message was -promulgated to all the troops: - - Corps Headquarters, - August 7th, 1918. - - TO THE SOLDIERS OF THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY CORPS. - - For the first time in the history of this Corps, all five - Australian Divisions will to-morrow engage in the largest and most - important battle operation ever undertaken by the Corps. - - They will be supported by an exceptionally powerful Artillery, and - by Tanks and Aeroplanes on a scale never previously attempted. The - full resources of our sister Dominion, the Canadian Corps, will - also operate on our right, while two British Divisions will guard - our left flank. - - The many successful offensives which the Brigades and Battalions - of this Corps have so brilliantly executed during the past four - months have been but the prelude to, and the preparation for, this - greatest and culminating effort. - - Because of the completeness of our plans and dispositions, of the - magnitude of the operations, of the number of troops employed, and - of the depth to which we intend to overrun the enemy's positions, - this battle will be one of the most memorable of the whole war; - and there can be no doubt that, by capturing our objectives, we - shall inflict blows upon the enemy which will make him stagger, and - will bring the end appreciably nearer. - - I entertain no sort of doubt that every Australian soldier will - worthily rise to so great an occasion, and that every man, imbued - with the spirit of victory, will, in spite of every difficulty - that may confront him, be animated by no other resolve than grim - determination to see through to a clean finish, whatever his task - may be. - - The work to be done to-morrow will perhaps make heavy demands upon - the endurance and staying powers of many of you; but I am confident - that, in spite of excitement, fatigue, and physical strain, every - man will carry on to the utmost of his powers until his goal is - won; for the sake of AUSTRALIA, the Empire and our cause. - - I earnestly wish every soldier of the Corps the best of good - fortune, and a glorious and decisive victory, the story of which - will re-echo throughout the world, and will live for ever in the - history of our home land. - - JOHN MONASH, - Lieut.-General. - Cmdg. Australian Corps. - -Not many days afterwards a copy of this order fell into the hands -of the enemy, and the use he tried to make of it, to his own grave -discomfiture, as the event proved, is an interesting story which will -be told in due course. - -Zero hour was fixed for twenty minutes past four, on the morning -of August 8th. It needs a pen more facile than I can command to -describe, and an imagination more vivid to realize the stupendous -import of the last ten minutes. In black darkness, a hundred thousand -infantry, deployed over twelve miles of front, are standing grimly, -silently, expectantly, in readiness to advance, or are already crawling -stealthily forward to get within eighty yards of the line on which the -barrage will fall; all feel to make sure that their bayonets are firmly -locked, or to set their steel helmets firmly on their heads; Company -and Platoon Commanders, their whistles ready to hand, are nervously -glancing at their luminous watches, waiting for minute after minute -to go by--and giving a last look over their commands--ensuring that -their runners are by their sides, their observers alert, and that the -officers detailed to control direction have their compasses set and -ready. Carrying parties shoulder their burdens, and adjust the straps; -pioneers grasp their picks and shovels; engineers take up their stores -of explosives and primers and fuses; machine and Lewis gunners whisper -for the last time to the carriers of their magazines and belt boxes -to be sure and follow up. The Stokes Mortar carrier slings his heavy -load, and his loading numbers fumble to see that their haversacks of -cartridges are handy. Overhead drone the aeroplanes, and from the -rear, in swelling chorus, the buzzing and clamour of the Tanks grows -every moment louder and louder. Scores of telegraph operators sit by -their instruments with their message forms and registers ready to -hand, bracing themselves for the rush of signal traffic which will set -in a few moments later; dozens of Staff Officers spread their maps -in readiness, to record with coloured pencils the stream of expected -information. In hundreds of pits, the guns are already run up, loaded -and laid on their opening lines of fire; the sergeant is checking the -range for the last time; the layer stands silently with the lanyard in -his hand. The section officer, watch on wrist, counts the last seconds: -"A minute to go"--"Thirty seconds"--"Ten seconds"--"Fire." - -And, suddenly, with a mighty roar, more than a thousand guns begin -the symphony. A great illumination lights up the Eastern horizon; -and instantly the whole complex organization, extending far back to -areas almost beyond earshot of the guns, begins to move forward; every -man, every unit, every vehicle and every Tank on their appointed -tasks and to their designated goals; sweeping onward relentlessly and -irresistibly. Viewed from a high vantage point and in the glimmer of -the breaking day, a great Artillery barrage surely surpasses in dynamic -splendour any other manifestation of collective human effort. - -The Artillery barrage dominates the battle, and the landscape. The -field is speedily covered with a cloak of dust, and smoke and spume, -making impossible any detailed observation, at the time, of the course -of the battle as a whole. The story can only be indifferently pieced -together, long after, by an attempted compilation of the reports of -a hundred different participants, whose narratives are usually much -impaired by personal bias, by the nervous excitement of the moment, and -by an all too limited range of vision. That is why no comprehensive -account yet exists of some of the major battles of the war, and why -those partial narratives hitherto produced are so often in conflict. - -In so great a battle as this, only the broad facts and tangible results -can be placed on record without danger of controversy. The whole -immense operation proceeded according to plan in every detail, with a -single exception, to which I must specially refer later on. The first -phase, controlled as it was by the barrage time-table, necessarily -ended punctually, and with the whole of the green line objective in our -hands. This success gave us possession of nearly all the enemy's guns, -so that his artillery retaliation speedily died down. - -The captures in this phase were considerable, and few of the garrisons -of the enemy's forward offensive zone escaped destruction or capture. -The Second and Third Divisions had a comparative "walk over," and they -had come to a halt, with their tasks completed, before 7 a.m. - -The "open warfare" phase commenced at twenty minutes past eight, -and both the red and the blue lines were captured in succession -half-an-hour ahead of scheduled time. This capture covered the whole -length of my front except the extreme left, where a half expected -difficulty arose, but one which exercised no influence upon the day's -success. - -The Canadians, on my right, had a similar story to tell; they had -driven far into the enemy's defences, exactly as planned. In spite of -the difficulties of observation, the recurrence of a ground mist of the -same nature as we had experienced at Hamel, and the long distances over -which messages and reports had to travel--the stream of information -which reached me, by telegraph, telephone, pigeon and aeroplane was so -full and ample that I was not left for a moment out of touch with the -situation. - -The "inwards" messages are, naturally, far too voluminous for -reproduction; but a brief selection from the many "outwards" messages -telegraphed during that day to the Fourth Army Headquarters, and which, -on a point of responsibility, I made it an invariable rule to draft -myself, will give some indication of the course of events as they -became known: - - _Sent at 7 a.m._: "Everything going well at 6.45 a.m. Heavy ground - mist facilitating our advance, but delaying information. Infantry - and Tanks got away punctually. Our attack was a complete surprise. - Gailly Village and Accroche Wood captured. Enemy artillery has - ceased along my whole front. Flanks Corps apparently doing well." - - _Sent at 8.30 a.m._: "Although not definitely confirmed, no doubt - that our first objective green line captured along whole Corps - front including Gailly, Warfusee, Lamotte and whole Cerisy Valley. - Many guns and prisoners taken. Infantry and Artillery for second - phase moving up to green line." - - _Sent at 10.55 a.m._: "Fifteenth Battalion has captured Cerisy with - 300 prisoners. Advance to red line going well." - - _Sent at 11.10 a.m._: "Have taken Morcourt and Bayonvillers and - many additional prisoners and guns. We are nearing our second - objective and have reached it in places. My Cavalry Brigade has - passed across our red line. We are now advancing to our final - objective blue line." - - _Sent at 12.15 p.m._: "Hobbs has captured Harbonnieres and reached - blue line final objective on his whole front." - - _Sent at 1.15 p.m._: "Australian flag hoisted over Harbonnieres - at midday to-day. Should be glad if Chief would cable this to our - Governor-General on behalf of Australian Corps." - - _Sent at 2.5 p.m._: "Total Australian casualties through dressing - stations up to 12 noon under 600. Prisoners actually counted exceed - 4,000. Many more coming in." - - _Sent at 4.40 p.m._: "Captured enemy Corps H.Q. near Framerville - shortly after noon to-day." (This was the 51st German Corps). - - _Sent at 8 p.m._: "Corps captures will greatly exceed 6,000 - prisoners, 100 guns, including heavy and railway guns, thousands of - machine guns, a railway train, and hundreds of vehicles and teams - of regimental transport. Total casualties for whole Corps will not - exceed 1,200." - -The vital information, which it is imperative for the Corps Commander -to have accurately and rapidly delivered throughout the course of a -battle, is that relating to the actual position, at any given moment -of time, of our front line troops; showing the locations which they -have reached, and whether they are stationary, advancing or retiring. -For it has to be remembered that the whole Artillery resources of the -Corps were pooled and kept under his own hand; and it was imperative -that any changes in the Artillery action or employment must be quickly -made, so as to extend the utmost help to any Infantry which might get -into difficulties. - -Thus, for example, the failure of any body of Infantry to enter and -pass beyond a wood or a village, would be a sure indication that -such locality was still held in strength by the enemy, and it would -be appropriate to "switch" Artillery fire upon it, in order to drive -him out. But such a proceeding would be anything but prudent if the -information on which such action was to be based were already an hour -old. - -Transmission of messages from the front line troops to the -nearest telephone terminal is usually slow and uncertain, and the -retransmission of such messages, in succession, by Battalions, -Brigades and Divisions only prolongs the delay. The normal process is -in consequence far too dilatory for the exigencies of actual battle -control. - -A vastly superior method had therefore to be devised, and recourse -was had to the use of aeroplanes. The No. 3 Australian Squadron soon -acquired great proficiency in this work. They were equipped with -two-seater planes, carrying both pilot and observer, and the work was -called "Contact Patrol." - -The "plane" flying quite low, usually at not more than 500 feet, the -observer would mark down by conventional signs on a map the actual -positions of our Infantry, of enemy Infantry or other facts of prime -importance, and he often had time to scribble a few informative notes -also. The "plane" then flew back at top speed to Corps H.Q., and the -map, with or without an added report, was dropped in the middle of an -adjacent field, wrapped in a weighted streamer of many colours. It was -then brought by cyclists into the Staff Office. - -Relays of Contact planes were on such service all day on every battle -day, and although it was a hazardous duty few planes were lost. The -total time which elapsed between the making of the observation at the -front line and the arrival of the information in the hands of the Corps -Staff was seldom more than ten minutes. - -There can be no doubt that the whole operation was a complete surprise -both to the troops opposed to us and to the German High Command. -It became abundantly clear, in the following days, that no proper -arrangements existed for rapidly reinforcing this part of the front in -the event of an attack by us, but that these had to be extemporized -after the event. This discovery points to the conclusion that the -enemy had once again come to regard the British Army as a negligible -quantity, a mistake for which he paid an even heavier price than when -he made it in the early days of the war. - -As an indication that even the Divisions in the line whose duty it -primarily was to know, had no suspicions of an impending attack, comes -the story of a German medical officer who was captured in his pyjamas -in Warfusee village, and who confessed that being awakened by our -bombardment and thinking it was merely a raid, he left his dug-out to -see what was afoot, and thought he must be still dreaming when he saw -our Pioneers a few hundred feet away, busily at work repairing the main -road. - -There was only one blemish in the whole day's operations. Not serious -in relation to the whole, it nevertheless gravely hampered the work -of the left Brigade of the Fourth Division. In short, the Third Corps -Infantry failed to reach their ultimate objective line, and the enemy -remained in possession of the Chipilly spur and of all the advantages -which that possession conferred upon him. - -The advance of my left flank, from the green to the red line, along the -margin of the plateau bordering the Somme, was left exposed to his full -view, while the river valley itself remained under the domination of -his rifle fire, at quite moderate ranges. But worse than all, a battery -of his Field Artillery emplaced just above the village of Chipilly -remained in action, and one after another, six of the nine Tanks which -had been allotted to the 4th Brigade were put out of action by direct -hits from these guns. - -The possibility was one which had been considered and measures to meet -it were promptly taken. Maclagan, whose right Brigade in due course -reached the blue line according to programme, making in its progress a -splendid haul of prisoners and guns, took immediate steps to "refuse" -his left flank, _i.e._, to bend it back towards Morcourt, and to -establish, with a reserve battalion, a flank defence along the river, -facing north from Cerisy to Morcourt. - -Both these villages were, however, successfully captured, and "mopped -up," which meant that all the enemy and machine guns lurking in them -were accounted for. But the river valley was not captured, and became, -until the situation was ultimately cleared up, a kind of No Man's Land -between the enemy still holding the Chipilly spur on the north, and the -Fourth Division on the south of the river. - -The ultimate conquest of the Chipilly Bend forms no part of that -day's story. What were the reasons for the failure of the Third Corps -to complete its allotted task may have been the subject of internal -inquiry, but the result of any such was not made known. The official -report for the day was to the effect that the enemy on this front -had resisted strongly, that fighting had been fierce, and that no -progress could be made. But one is compelled to recognize that -such language was often an euphemistic method of describing faulty -Staff co-ordination, or faulty local leadership. There would be no -justification, however, for questioning the bravery of the troops -themselves. - -It has already been foreshadowed that the experiences on that day of -the contingent of sixteen Armoured Motor-cars under Lieutenant-Colonel -Carter would form sensational reading, and the story of August 8th -would not be complete without at least a brief reference to their -exploits. - -It was nearly midnight when Carter, with a Staff Officer, got back to -Corps H.Q. to render their report. They were scarcely recognizable, -covered as they were from head to feet, with grime and grease. They had -had a busy time. The substance of what they had to tell was taken down -at the time almost verbatim, and reads as follows: - - "Got Armoured Cars through to Warfusee-Abancourt. When we reached - the other side of No Man's Land we found that the road was good - but a number of trees (large and small) had been shot down and - lay right across it in places. Obstacles removed by chopping up - the smaller trees and hauling off the big ones by means of a - Tank. Pioneers helped us to clear the road all the way down. We - did not come up to our advancing troops until they were almost - near the Red Line. When we got past our leading Infantry we came - upon quite a number of Huns and dealt with them. Had then to wait - a little on account of our barrage, but went through a light - barrage. When we got to Blue Line we detached three sections to - run down to Framerville. When they got there they found all the - Boche horse transport and many lorries drawn up in the main road - ready to move off. Head of column tried to bolt in one direction - and other vehicles in another. Complete confusion. Our men killed - the lot (using 3,000 rounds) and left them there; four Staff - Officers on horseback shot also. The cars then ran down to the - east side of Harbonnieres, on the south-east road to Vauvillers, - and met there a number of steam wagons; fired into their boilers - causing an impassable block. Had a lot of good shooting around - Vauvillers. Then came back to main road. Two sections of cars went - on to Foucaucourt and came in contact with a Boche gun in a wood - north-east of Foucaucourt. This gun blew the wheels off one car and - also hit three others. However, three of the cars were got away. - Two other cars went to Proyart and found a lot of troops billeted - there having lunch in the houses. Our cars shot through the windows - into the houses, killing quite a lot of the enemy. Another section - went towards Chuignolles and found it full of German soldiers. - Our cars shot them. Found rest billets and old trenches also with - troops in them. Engaged them. Had quite a battle there. Extent of - damage not known, but considerable. Cars then came back to main - road. We were then well in advance of Blue Line. Everything was now - perfectly quiet--no shell-fire of any kind. - - "I went a quarter of a mile beyond La Flaque. There was a big dump - there, and Huns kept continually coming out and surrendering, and - we brought quite a lot of them back as prisoners. It was then - about 10.30 a.m. A party of Hun prisoners was detailed to tow back - my disabled car. I saw no sign of any wired system anywhere. Old - overgrown trenches but no organized trench system. I proceeded to - some rising ground near Framerville. Did not go into Framerville, - but could see that the roofs of the houses were intact. Saw no - trace of any organized system of defence of any kind and no troops. - My people saw no formed bodies of troops of any kind during the day - coming towards us, but very large numbers of fugitives hastening in - the opposite direction. Engaged as many of them as could be reached - from the roads. I saw, from the hill, open country with a certain - amount of vegetation on it." - -The consternation and disorganization caused by the sudden onslaught of -these cars, at places fully ten miles behind the enemy's front line of -that morning, may be left to the imagination. It was a feat of daring -and resolute performance, which deserves to be remembered. - -[Illustration: The Burning Villages--east of Peronne.] - -[Illustration: Dummy Tank Manufacture.] - -Throughout the whole day, surrenders by the enemy, particularly of -troops in rear or reserve positions, were on a wholesale scale. The -total number of live prisoners actually counted up to nightfall in -the Divisional and Corps Prisoner-of-War Cages exceeded 8,000 and the -Canadians had gathered in at least as many more. - -The Australian Corps also captured 173 guns capable of being hauled -away, not counting those which had been blown to pieces. These captures -included two "railway" guns, one of 9-inch and the other of 11.2-inch -bore. The latter was an imposing affair. The gun itself rested on -two great bogie carriages, each on eight axles; it was provided -with a whole train of railway trucks fitted some to carry its giant -ammunition, others as workshops, and others as living quarters for the -gun detachment. The outfit was completed by a locomotive to haul the -gun forward to its daily task of shelling Amiens, and hauling it back -to its garage when its ugly work was done. - -The captures of machine guns and of trench mortars of all types and -sizes were on so extensive a scale that no attempt was ever made to -make even an approximate count of them. They were ultimately collected -into numerous dumps, and German prisoners were employed for many weeks -in cleaning and oiling them for transport to Australia as trophies of -war. - -But the booty comprised a large and varied assortment of many other -kinds of warlike stores. The huge dumps of engineering material at -Rosieres and La Flaque served all the needs of the Corps for the -remainder of the war. There were horses, wagons, lorries and tractors -by the hundred, including field searchlights, mobile pharmacies, motor -ambulances, travelling kitchens, mess carts, limbers, and ammunition -wagons, and there were literally hundreds of thousands of rounds of -artillery ammunition scattered all over the captured territory in dumps -both large and small. - -For the next two days all roads leading from the battle area back -towards the Army Cage at Poulainville, where railway trains were -waiting to receive them, were congested with column after column of -German prisoners, roughly organized into companies--tangible evidences -to the civilians of the district, as to our own troops, that a great -victory had been won. - -The tactical value of the victory was immense, and has never yet been -fully appreciated by the public of the Empire, perhaps because our -censorship at the time strove to conceal the intention to follow it up -immediately with further attacks. But no better testimony is needed -than that of Ludendorff himself, who calls it Germany's "black day," -after which he himself gave up all hope of a German victory. - -Ludendorff in his "Memoirs," republished in the _Times_ of August 22nd, -1919, writes: - - "August 8th was the black day of the German Army in the history - of the war. This was the worst experience I had to go through.... - Early on August 8th, in a dense fog that had been rendered still - thicker by artificial means, the British, mainly with Australian - and Canadian Divisions, and French, attacked between Albert and - Moreuil with strong squadrons of Tanks, but for the rest with - no great superiority. They broke between the Somme and the Luce - deep into our front. The Divisions in line allowed themselves - to be completely overwhelmed. Divisional Staffs were surprised - in their Headquarters by enemy Tanks" [_sic_, our armoured cars - were meant].... "The exhausted [_sic_] Divisions that had been - relieved a few days earlier and that were lying in the region - south-west of Peronne were immediately alarmed and set in motion - by the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Army. At the same time - he brought forward towards the breach all available troops. The - Rupprecht Army Group dispatched reserves thither by train. The - 18th Army threw its own reserves directly into the battle from the - south-east.... On an order from me, the 9th Army too, although - itself in danger, had to contribute. Days of course elapsed before - the troops from a further distance could reach the spot.... It - was a very gloomy situation.... Six or seven Divisions that were - quite fairly to be described as effective had been completely - battered.... The situation was uncommonly serious. If they - continued to attack with even comparative vigour, we should no - longer be able to maintain ourselves west of the Somme.... The - wastage of the Second Army had been very great. Heavy toll had - also been taken of the reserves which had been thrown in.... Owing - to the deficit created our losses had reached such proportions - that the Supreme Command was faced with the necessity of having - to disband a series of Divisions, in order to furnish drafts.... - The enemy had also captured documentary material of inestimable - value to him.... The General Staff Officer whom I had dispatched to - the battlefield on August 8th, gave me such an account that I was - deeply confounded.... August 8th made things clear for both Army - Commands, both for the German and for that of the enemy." - -A hole had been driven on a width of nearly twelve miles, right through -the German defence, and had blotted out, at one blow, the whole of -the military resources which it had contained. The obligation which -was thereby cast upon the enemy to throw into the gap troops and guns -hastily collected from every part of his front, imposed upon him also -an increased vulnerability at every other point which had to be so -denuded. - -It was no part of our programme to rest content upon our oars, and -allow the enemy time to collect himself at leisure. The resources of -the Australian Corps had suffered scarcely any impairment as the result -of that glorious day. Such small losses as had been incurred were more -than counter-balanced by the elation of these volunteer troops at this -further demonstration of their moral and physical superiority over the -professional soldiers of a militarist enemy nation. - -On that very day all necessary measures were taken to maintain the -battle without pause. But, in order not to interrupt the continuity of -the story of subsequent developments, it will be convenient to mention, -in this place, two events which cannot be dissociated from the great -battle, and which will be memorable to those who participated in them. - -The first was an accidental meeting together of a number of -the most distinguished figures in the war. On August 11th, the -Commander-in-Chief was to come to congratulate the Corps and to -thank the troops through their Commanders. I called the Divisional -Generals together at the Red Chateau at Villers-Bretonneux to meet him -that afternoon. In the meantime General Rawlinson invited his Corps -Commanders to meet him in the same village for a battle conference, -and chose the same hour and a spot in the open, under a spreading -beech, where his Generals sat informally around the maps spread upon -the grass. At this meeting were Rawlinson, Currie, Kavanagh, Godley, -myself, Montgomery and Budworth. The Field Marshal, with Laurence, -the Chief of his General Staff, on their way to the Red Chateau, soon -arrived. Shortly after Sir Henry Wilson, happening to pass in his car, -also joined the party; and not many moments afterwards there arrived, -again entirely without previous arrangement, Clemenceau and his Finance -Minister Klotz. - -Villers-Bretonneux, only three days before reeking with gas and -unapproachable, and now delivered from its bondage, was the lodestone -which had attracted the individual members of this remarkable -assemblage; and the more serious business in hand was perforce -postponed while Rawlinson, Currie and I had to listen to the generous -felicitations of all these great war leaders. - -The second event was the visit of His Majesty the King, on August 12th, -to Bertangles, when he conferred on me the honour of Knighthood, in -the presence of selected detachments of five hundred of the men who -had fought in the battle, a hundred from each of my Five Divisions. -A representative collection of guns and other war trophies had been -hauled in from the battlefield to line the avenues by which the King -approached. His Majesty was particularly interested in the German -transport horses, expressing the hope that they would soon learn the -Australian language; a pleasantry which he well remembered when I had -the honour of an audience with him, on the anniversary of that very -day. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[15] See Map J. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -EXPLOITATION - - -The Fourth British Army had opened the great Allied counter-offensive -with a brilliant stroke. It remained to see in what fashion the Allied -High Command would proceed to exploit the victory. Would the Fourth -Army be called upon, with added resources, at once to thrust due east, -with the object of drawing upon itself the German reserves, and dealing -with them as they arrived; or would blows now be delivered on other -fronts with a view to keeping those reserves dispersed? - -The immediate decision, communicated to me by the Army Commander on -the afternoon of August 8th, was that, while the whole situation was -being considered, and troop movements were in progress to enable the -necessary concentrations to be made elsewhere, the Fourth Army would -continue its advance forthwith; but that, instead of driving due east, -the thrust was to be made in a south-easterly direction. - -The object was to aim at Roye, and either by the capture of that -important railway centre, or at least by the threat of its capture, -to precipitate a withdrawal by the enemy from the great salient which -he had in his April and May advances pressed into the French front -opposite Moreuil and Montdidier, a salient which could be kept supplied -by that railway alone. - -The Australian Corps front on the evening of August 8th lay roughly -on a north and south line, just east of Mericourt and just west of -Vauvillers. But the Canadian Corps front bent back sharply from the -latter point in a south-westerly direction. The Canadians were, -therefore, to advance between the railway and the Amiens--Roye road to -the general line Lihons-Le Quesnoy. The role of the Australian Corps -was to make a defensive flank to this advance, by pivotting its left -on the Somme in the vicinity of Mericourt, but advancing its right -along the railway, in the direction of Lihons. - -It was a decision which was unpalatable to me, for it condemned me to -leaving the whole of the great bend of the Somme, on which lay Bray, -Peronne and Brie, in the undisturbed possession of the enemy; and in -view of the reports sent in from the front and confirmed later by the -Armoured Cars, it appeared to me that the resumption of a vigorous -advance due east next day would give us, without fighting, possession, -or at least command, of the whole of this bend; while if we allowed the -enemy to take breath and recover from his shock, he would probably have -time to rally the fugitives, and turn again to face us. - -This same great bend of the river had been the scene of two years -of sedentary warfare, in 1915 and 1916, when the French and German -artillery had converted it into a barren wilderness. It was, in -its eastern part, scored with trenches, and bristled with wire -entanglements in every direction; it was devoid of villages, woods, or -any kind of shelter--a forbidding expanse of devastation. - -But between our front lines of that day and the western edge of this -wilderness, there still lay a belt of some six or seven miles of -practically unharmed country over which the retreat of our Fifth Army -in March had carried them without much fighting. I should have welcomed -an order to push on the next morning, in open warfare formation, to -gain possession of the whole of this belt, and force the enemy to make -any attempt to reorganize his line on the inhospitable ground which lay -beyond. - -The order stood, however; and instructions were issued for the First -Australian Division to be drawn into the fight, and to take upon -themselves the task of conforming to the advance of the Canadians along -the railway. The first phase of this advance was to have been carried -out at 11 a.m. on August 9th by the First Division passing through the -right Brigade of the Fifth Division. - -The 1st Brigade of the First Australian Division had, as already -related, arrived from the North in time to participate in the fighting -of the day before; but the remaining two Brigades arrived so late, -and had to perform so long a march from their detraining station near -Amiens to our now greatly advanced battle front, that it soon became -evident that they could not arrive at the line of departure in time to -synchronize with the Canadian advance. - -In consequence, the Fifth Division was instructed to detail its right -line Brigade to begin this duty; and in due course the 15th Brigade -carried out the first part of the task and advanced our line to -include the capture of Vauvillers, an operation which was successfully -completed by midday. - -It will be remembered that the Second and Third Divisions had been -given a task for the previous day which was limited in time, though -not in difficulty, and that this task had been completed, as it proved -with very little stress, by 7 a.m. These Divisions had thus had a whole -day in which to rest and reorganize. The Second Division was therefore -placed under orders to participate in the advance of August 9th. - -In due course, the First Division arrived at our fighting front, and -that afternoon both the First and Second Divisions advanced in battle -order, the former passing through the right Brigade of the Fifth -Division, and the latter through its left Brigade. This operation -carried our front line in this part of the field to the foot of -the Lihons hill, and gave us complete possession of the village of -Framerville. It also incidentally released the Fifth Division from -further line duty. - -The opposition met with during this day's operations varied -considerably along the battle front, which extended in this part of -the field over about 6,000 yards. The Lihons ridge was found to be -strongly held, and much fire both from field guns and machine guns was -encountered. It was evident that, over-night, the enemy had succeeded -in organizing sufficient troops for the local defence of this important -point. - -Upon the front of the Second Division, however, there was little -opposition and the enemy gave up Framerville almost without a -struggle. Three Battalions of Tanks co-operated in the day's fighting, -but several of them were disabled by direct fire from Lihons. The task -assigned to the Corps for that day was, none the less, carried out in -its entirety, and by nightfall contact had been made with the Second -Canadian Division on the railway about a mile east of Rosieres. - -The situation on the left flank of the Australian Corps was, however, -anything but satisfactory. The Chipilly spur was still in the hands of -the enemy, all the efforts over-night on the part of the 58th Division -(Third Corps) to dislodge them having failed. General Butler, the Corps -Commander, in pursuance of arrangements come to some days before, was -to proceed on sick leave, as he had for some time been far from well; -and General Godley (my former chief of the 22nd Corps) was temporarily -to take his place. I therefore persuaded the Army Commander to avail -himself of this change to allow me to take in hand the situation at -Chipilly, and to give me, for this purpose, a limited jurisdiction over -the north bank of the Somme. This was merely getting in the thin edge -of the wedge; and not many hours later, I found myself where I had so -strongly desired to be from the first, namely, astride of the Somme -valley. - -Accordingly, the 13th Australian Brigade, after a day's rest from the -anxious duty of acting as a screen for the Canadians on the eve of the -main battle, were told off to deal with the Chipilly spur. Before, -however, they could reach the locality, and in the late afternoon of -August 9th, the 131st American Regiment (of Bell's Division), which was -still under the orders of the Third Corps, very gallantly advanced in -broad daylight and took possession practically of the whole spur. - -In the meantime the 13th Brigade arrived, sending a Battalion across -the Somme at Cerisy, and, joining the Americans, helped to clear up -the whole situation. This made my left flank more secure, and enabled -Maclagan to withdraw the defensive flank which he had deployed along -the river from Cerisy to Morcourt. That night I took over the 131st -American Regiment from the Third Corps, attached it, as a temporary -measure, to the Fourth Division, and placed Maclagan in charge of the -newly captured front, which extended north of the river as far as the -Corbie--Bray road. - -The day ended with Divisions in the line from south to north in the -following order, viz.:--First, Second and Fourth, the last named having -been augmented by an American Regiment, having had its own 13th Brigade -restored to it, and having in exchange yielded up to the First Division -the 1st Brigade of the latter. - -The Fourth Division had had comparatively much the worst of it, up to -this stage, of any of my Divisions, and I felt that they were due for -a short rest. Accordingly, I issued orders that same night for the -Third Division, which, like the Second, had been resting since the -previous forenoon, to relieve the Fourth Division on that part of the -front which lay between the Somme and the main St. Quentin road on the -following day, but for the time being leaving the newly captured ground -north of the Somme still in Maclagan's hands. - -After an examination of the ground and a study of the situation, the -opportunity for a further immediate local operation, certain to gain -valuable tactical ground, and likely also to yield a good number of -prisoners, presented itself to me. A further attraction was that it -would permit of a useful advance of my left flank on the south of the -Somme. This project, being of some tactical interest, demands a short -explanatory reference to the terrain. - -The river Somme, from Cerisy as far east as Peronne, flows in a -tortuous valley which describes a succession of bends, almost uniform -in size and regular in disposition. These bends face with their bases -alternately north and south, and average a depth of two miles, by a -width across the base of about a mile and a half. Each came to be known -to us by the name of one of the villages which reposed in its folds, -such as Chipilly, Etinehem, Bray, Cappy, Feuilleres, and Ommiecourt; -all these have become names to be remembered in the subsequent conquest -of this part of the Somme valley. - -The valley itself is in this region a mile broad; its sides are steep -and often precipitous, and the adjoining plateaus rise some 200 feet -above its bed. Through this valley winds, in ordered curves, the canal -for barge traffic; it is flanked by vast stretches of backwaters and -heavily grassed morasses, in which the river loses itself. The valley -can be traversed only by the few bridges and the lock gates of the -canal, and the causeways leading to them from either bank. - -It would be difficult country for a fight on a general scale, but ideal -for guerilla warfare. The whole succession of villages clinging to -the sides of the valley were in the hands of the enemy, and in use by -him for the housing and shelter of his troops. To attack and overcome -them one by one, by fighting up the winding valley, would have been a -costly business. But it suggested itself that they might all be won by -a species of investment. - -Taking any one of these U-shaped bends singly, by drawing a cordon -across its base, the whole of any enemy forces who might be occupying -the bend would be denied escape from it, except by _crossing_ the river -into the adjacent bend. But if a semi-cordon had been simultaneously -drawn across the base of that next bend also, even that loophole would -be closed, and moreover such troops as inhabited the second bend would -find themselves surrounded also. - -Immediately before my left flank lay the Mericourt bend on the south of -the river and the Etinehem bend to the north of it. Both were held by -the enemy, doubtless fugitives from the great battle, who had sought -food, water and underground shelter in the numerous dug-outs which -honeycombed the sides of the valley. The design was to capture the -whole of these with little effort. It was a good plan, and only an -unforeseen accident prevented its full realization. - -Early on the morning of the 10th, I summoned a conference at Maclagan's -Headquarters in Corbie, which was attended by the Commanders and -certain Brigadiers of the Third and Fourth Divisions. It was arranged -that on the north of the river, the 13th Brigade would that night get -astride of the Etinehem spur on the north, while simultaneously the -10th Brigade, by making a side sweep skirting Proyart, would advance -our line till its left rested on the river a mile east of Mericourt. - -Columns were to move along defined routes, leaving the objectives -well to the flanks, and then to encircle the enemy positions. Each -column was to be accompanied by Tanks and was to move in an easterly -direction and then wheel in towards the Somme. Although Tanks had never -previously been used at night, as their utility was uncertain, it was -thought that the effect of the noise they made would lead to the speedy -collapse of the defence. - -The plan succeeded to perfection on the north of the river, and the -Etinehem spur and village with all its defenders fell to us almost -without a blow. Four Tanks amused themselves by racing up and down the -main Corbie--Bray road at top speed, and the clamour they made cleared -the path for the marching infantry. - -On the south, however, just after nightfall, a sudden onslaught by a -flight of enemy bombing planes, threw the head of the 10th Brigade -column into confusion, and its Commander was killed. Two of the -Tanks were also disabled by direct hits from Artillery. This delayed -the progress of the operation, and the next day broke with the task -uncompleted. The 9th and 11th Brigades were, however, at once sent up -to reinforce, and during the following day all three Brigades completed -the operation by possessing themselves of the villages of Mericourt and -Proyart and the woods adjoining the river. - -This series of local operations yielded some 300 prisoners, and -entirely cleared up the confused and unsatisfactory situation which had -existed on my left flank, as the aftermath of the Chipilly spur failure -of the first day. It also brought my line up more square to the Somme, -and so somewhat shortened my already expanding front. But my left flank -was at last quite secure. - -I must now turn to the extreme right flank, which was, on this same -day, also the scene of very severe fighting. I have related the -progress of the First Division to the foot of the Lihons ridge the -night before. On August 10th and 11th the advance was continued by the -First and Second Divisions in sympathy with the advance of the Canadian -Corps on the south of the railway. There were only a few Tanks left -available to assist in this advance; and the resistance of the enemy in -the neighbourhood of Lihons had stiffened considerably. - -The devastated area had already been reached by us in this part of -the field, and the terrain was a labyrinth of old trenches, and a sea -of shell-holes; the remains of old wire entanglements spread in every -direction, and the whole area had been covered by a rank growth of -thistles and brambles. It furnished numerous harbours for machine-guns, -and it was country over which it was difficult to preserve the -semblance of an organized battle formation during an advance. - -The enemy fought hard and determinedly to retain Lihons, and in some -parts of the line the battle swayed to and fro. But before the morning -was well advanced, we had taken possession of the whole of the Lihons -Knoll, of Auger Wood, and of the villages of Lihons and Rainecourt, -while the Canadians had passed through Chilly just south of the -railway. All that afternoon the enemy made repeated counter-attacks, -particularly directed against Lihons and Rainecourt; but they were all -successfully driven off by rifle and machine-gun fire without the loss -of any ground. - -It was a great feat to the credit of the First Australian Division, and -ranks among its best performances during the war. Some 20 field-guns -and hundreds of machine-guns were captured. Such a battle, with such -results, would, in 1917, have been placarded as a victory of the first -magnitude. Now, with the new standards set up by the great battle of -August 8th, it was reckoned merely as a local skirmish. - -General Currie, operating on my right, had had a similar experience -of slow, although definite, progress, against hourly stiffening -opposition, and the fighting by the methods of open warfare was growing -daily more costly. The enemy had recovered from his first surprise, -our resources in Tanks had been greatly diminished, and much of our -heavy Artillery had not yet had time to get into its forward positions. -In other words, the possibility of further cheap exploitation of the -success of August 8th had come to an end. - -It was decided, therefore, to recommend to the Army Commander that a -temporary halt should be called on the line thus reached, and that -rested troops should be brought up to relieve the line Divisions. -He concurred and decided that we should prepare for the delivery on -August 15th of another combined "set-piece" blow, which would have the -probable effect of again putting the enemy on the run, so that the -moving battle could be resumed. - -This plan was never actually carried into effect, for reasons which -did not at once appear. But it transpired later that General Currie -had made very strong private representations to the Fourth Army -against the plan. He questioned the wisdom of expending the resources -of the Canadian Corps upon an attempt to repeat, over such broken -country, covered as it was with entanglements and other obstacles, -the great success of August 8th. He urged that the Canadian Corps -should be transferred back to the Arras district--which they knew so -well. It was country lending itself admirably to operations requiring -careful organization, which none understood better than Currie and his -admirable Staff. - -It was an issue in which I was not greatly concerned, for my share -in the proposed operation of August 15th was to be quite subsidiary. -It was to consist merely in once again advancing my right flank, in -sympathy with the Canadian advance, as far as to include Chaulnes Hill -and the very important railway junction at that town. In ignorance of -the fact that the matter was under discussion, I prepared complete -plans for the co-operation of the Australian Corps, and detailed the -Fourth and Fifth Australian Divisions to carry them out. Fortunately, -before any actual executive action had been initiated, orders came that -the project was to be abandoned. - -It soon became known that still larger questions were being discussed. -The British front, which in July reached south as far only as -Villers-Bretonneux, had now been extended to the latitude of Roye. -The Field Marshal was urging reduction, so as to liberate Divisions -for offensive operations elsewhere, and Marshal Foch agreed that, as -by the elimination of the Soissons salient the French front had been -shortened, this could be done. In due course confidential announcements -were made that, as soon as it could be arranged, the Canadians would be -withdrawn from the line, and their places taken by French troops. This -would once again make my Corps the south flank Corps of the British -Army, and I would junction with the French on the Lihons Hill. - -The halt thus called gave me breathing time to consider a thorough -reorganization of my whole Corps front. This had, by August 12th, again -grown to a total length of over 16,000 yards. This increase had been -the result, firstly, of my having, as narrated, taken over ground to -the north of the Somme, secondly, by reason of the fact that during -the advances of the last four days my right had hugged the railway, -while my left had continued to rest on the Somme, two lines which were -rapidly diverging from each other, and thirdly, because my front line -now lay sharply oblique to my general line of advance. - -Even with a fifth Division, which I now had at my disposal, a front of -16,000 yards was far too attenuated for Corps operations on the grand -scale, and even for more localized operations, by one or two Divisions -at a time, there was little opportunity to provide the troops with -adequate intervals of rest. I therefore strongly urged upon General -Rawlinson either a shortening of my front, or a further increase in my -resources. - -He chose the latter alternative, and on August 12th placed under my -orders, provisionally, the 17th British Division (Major-General P. R. -Robertson), coupled with the condition that while it might be employed -as a line Division, it was not to be used for offensive operations. The -reason, confidentially given, was that it was shortly to be employed in -a large scale offensive in course of preparation by the Third British -Army. - -It was, for me, a most opportune measure of relief from a difficult -situation; for the Third Australian Division was now also badly in need -of a rest. Prior to the great advance, it had been longest of any of -the Divisions in the line, and had subsequently had a hard time in -fighting its way forward from Mericourt to Proyart. It was therefore -relieved in the line on August 13th by the 17th Division and went into -Corps Reserve. - -On the same day I put into effect a project of organization which the -necessities of the case forced upon me. North of the river stood the -13th Australian Brigade, and the 131st American Regiment, both still -under the command of General Maclagan, the remainder of whose Division -was resting, and this Division might be required at short notice for -operations at a totally different part of the front. (I had, in fact, -earmarked it for the proposed attack on August 15th to which I have -referred.) - -To overcome this anomalous position, I decided to constitute, for a -brief period, an independent force, composed of the two units north -of the river which I have named, to appoint to the command of it -Brigadier-General Wisdom (of the 7th Brigade), and to supply him with -a nucleus Staff, some Artillery, and supply and signal services. It -became, in fact, to all intents and purposes, an additional Division -with a Headquarters directly responsible to me. - -This force received the name of "Liaison Force" and continued in -existence for about eight days. Its functions were to keep tactical -touch and liaison with the Third Corps, to protect my left flank -by guarding the Etinehem spur from recapture, and to act as a kind -of loose link between the two Corps, advancing its northern or its -southern flanks, or both, in sympathy with any forward movement to -be made by either Corps. While, during its existence as a separate -force, no operations of first magnitude took place, yet the Liaison -Force served me well in the very useful function of a custodian of my -tactical ownership of the Somme valley, an ownership which I succeeded -in retaining to the immense advantage of the operations of the Corps -less than three weeks later. - -By August 13th, therefore, my responsibilities included the control -of seven separate Divisions as well as all the Corps Troops, and Army -Troops attached. The next week was occupied in local operations by -the front line Divisions to straighten our front, and to dispose of -a number of strong points, small woods, and village ruins which, so -long as they were in enemy hands, were a source of annoyance to us. The -attitude of the enemy was alert but not aggressive, and an important -point was that he showed every desire to stand his ground, and to -contest our further advance. There was as yet no indication of any -comprehensive withdrawal out of the great river bend. Each day brought -its useful toll of prisoners, all of whom, however, corroborated the -view that the enemy meant to hold on, and that the troops opposing us -were more than a mere rearguard intended to delay our advance. - -The period from August 13th to 20th was also occupied in carrying -out a number of inter-divisional reliefs--events of merely technical -interest to the student of military history, but imposing an immense -amount of detailed work upon the Staff of the Corps and upon the -Commanders and Staffs of the Divisions concerned. It was my own special -responsibility, and one which I could not delegate, to decide the date -of the relief of each Division and by which other Division it should be -relieved. Such decisions involved a close inquiry into, and a just and -humane appreciation of the condition of the troops, almost from hour -to hour every day, a duty in the discharge of which I was able to rely -upon the loyal help of the Divisional Commanders and Brigadiers. - -The time that had elapsed since last they had rested, the marching -they had since done, the fighting they had undertaken and its nature, -the mental and physical stress which they had undergone, and the -probable nature and date of their future employment were all factors -which had to be weighed carefully, and set against the advantages or -disadvantages of cutting short the period of rest of the troops who -were available to relieve them. It was a function which had to be -exercised, at all times, with the greatest circumspection, and the -strictest justice; for troops are very ready to acquire the impression -that they are being called upon to do more than their fair share. - -[Illustration: MAP C.] - -An actual inter-divisional relief usually occupied two nights and the -intervening day. Incoming units, both fighting and technical, had to -be shown all over the sector, to be taught the dispositions and the -exact situation in front of us; maps, orders and photographs had to be -explained and handed over; stores and dumps had to be inventoried and -receipts passed; while on the other hand the outgoing troops expected -to find their billets, offices, stables, wagon lines, bathing-places -and entertainment rooms in the rear area all allocated and ready for -their occupation. - -Each such mutual relief meant the movement of upwards of 20,000 men, -and separate roads had to be allotted for their use. Frequently in -so large a Corps as this, two such inter-divisional reliefs would -synchronize or overlap, and the danger of congestion and the Staff work -necessary to avoid it would be thereby more than doubled. And all this -work would have to go on smoothly even if the Corps front were in the -throes of an actual battle at the time. - -Although much of the routine of such reliefs, which had become almost a -ritual during the preceding years of trench warfare, was now scrapped, -it is a matter of pride to the Australian Corps and its Divisions, that -all such relief operations, even amid all the stress of these busy -fighting months of August and September, were, until the end, carried -out with precision, freedom from irritating hitches, and a minimum of -stress on the troops. - -The decisions which had to be given regarding the times and -alternations of these Divisional reliefs became from now on really of -basic importance, and affected the main framework of the whole of my -future plans. It was no longer merely a question of earmarking certain -Divisions for a specified single operation; but of planning, many -days ahead, the rotation in which the Divisions were to be employed -in a continuous series of operations. I regarded it as a fundamental -principle to employ whenever possible absolutely fresh and rested -troops for an operation of any magnitude or importance. To carry such a -principle into effect involved the necessity of making the best surmise -that was possible as to the course of events a week or even two weeks -ahead. - -As I shall endeavour to make clear in the course of the following -pages, the really outstanding and exceptional features of the work -of the Corps in its last sixty days were the sustained vigour of its -fighting, and the unbroken continuity of its collective effort. Those -results would clearly depend more on the manner in which the resources -in troops were manipulated than upon any other factor. Each Division -had to be kept employed until the last ounce of effort, consistent with -speedy recovery, had been yielded, and each Division had to rest a -sufficient time to enable it fully to recover its spirit and tone, and -yet had to be ready by the time it was wanted. - -The fulfilment of such conditions involved, as a little reflection -will show, a great deal more than a mere mechanical rotation of -employment; for the problem was, always to have available an adequate -supply of sufficiently rested troops for a prospective demand which, -although varying always in accordance with the changing situation, had -nevertheless to be predicted or conjectured. - -August 21st found our front line much about the same as that of August -13th, although generally more advanced and straightened out. The Corps -frontage was still over 16,000 yards, and upon the completion of the -series of reliefs to which I have alluded the dispositions of the Corps -were as follows: The Fourth Australian Division from Lihons to just -south of Herleville, the 32nd British Division opposite Herleville, the -Fifth Australian Division in front of Proyart, and the Third Australian -Division on the north of the river. The First and Second Divisions were -in Corps Reserve, the former having by then had a good rest from its -Lihons fighting. The Liaison Force had been broken up; and the 32nd -British Division (Major-General T. S. Lambert) had joined my command in -substitution for the 17th Division, which had been withdrawn to join -the Third Army. - -Such was the situation of the Australian Corps, when on August 21st -the short period of comparative inactivity came to a close, and it -was destined soon to go forward to further decisive events. On the -previous day the French opened a great attack in the south, which -yielded 10,000 prisoners on the first day, and on the day in question -the Third British Army delivered north of Albert the attack which -had been expected for some days. Thus the enemy would have his hands -full in endeavouring to parry those fresh blows; and the time seemed -appropriate for another stroke on the front of the Fourth Army. - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -CHUIGNES - - -Allusion has been made to the great bend which occurs in the course of -the River Somme. It is indeed a geographical circumstance which must be -borne in mind, if the phraseology current at this epoch in the war is -to be clearly comprehended. - -The river flows in an almost due northerly direction from the -neighbourhood of Roye as far as Peronne, and then bends quite sharply, -at that locality, in a western direction, past Bray, Corbie and Amiens, -towards the sea, beyond Abbeville. In the story of the fighting of -the period from March to August we have been concerned only with that -portion of the river valley which ran parallel to our line of advance; -but interest will henceforth focus itself largely upon that other reach -of the Somme which runs on a north and south line, upstream, from the -town of Peronne. - -This latter stretch of the river lies squarely athwart the direction in -which the Corps had been advancing, and the obstacle to that advance -which the river would presently constitute was continued in a northerly -direction from Peronne by an unfinished work of a great canalization -scheme to be called the "Canal du Nord." This canal was already wide -and deep, and formed a tactical obstacle of some significance, for the -excavations incidental to this project had been almost completed before -the war. - -The "line of the Somme," as it was understood in the tactical -discussions of the period now to be dealt with, meant, in short, the -line formed by that part of the river which lay upstream (_i.e._, to -the south of Peronne), and the continuation northwards of that line -by the Canal du Nord. Both features being military obstacles, they -and the highlands to the east of them together afforded an eminently -suitable continuous line on which the enemy might, if he were permitted -to do so, establish himself in a defensive attitude in order to bar our -eastward progress. - -The autumn was upon us; not more than another eight or nine weeks of -campaigning weather could be relied upon. A quite definite possibility -existed that the enemy might be able to put forth so powerful an effort -to contest our further advance, inch by inch, that he would gain -sufficient time to prepare the line of the Somme for a stout defence, -and hold us up until the arrival of winter compelled a suspension of -large operations. - -There were at that time, indeed, some who contended that as we had -apparently succeeded in putting an end to the German offensive we -should rest content with the year's work; that our soundest strategy -would be to permit the enemy to take up such a line of defence; -and then quietly to wait over the winter until 1919 for the full -development of the American effort, now only in its inception. - -So far, the enemy had given no indication of any readiness to undertake -a precipitate withdrawal from the great bend west of the Somme. On the -contrary, his resistance had stiffened to such an extent that little -further progress was to be hoped for from the methods of open warfare -which I had employed since August 8th. - -If, however, another powerful blow could be delivered, to be followed -by energetic exploitation, it was quite possible that the enemy might -be hustled across the Somme, that this might be achieved at such a rate -that I could gain a firm footing on the east bank, and that thereby the -value to him of the line of the Somme, as a winter defence, might be -destroyed. - -This was the very project on which I now embarked. The First Division -was in Corps Reserve, had rested and was fresh. The 32nd Division had -only just come into the line. By handing over a substantial sector to -the French, my frontage south of the Somme was about to be shortened -to 7,000 yards, a very suitable front for a deliberate attack by two -Divisions. - -I held a conference at Fouilloy, near Corbie, in the afternoon of -August 21st to announce the plan, and to settle all details with the -Commanders and services concerned. The Infantry assault was to be -entrusted to Glasgow and Lambert, attacking side by side; but the -former had allotted to him much the larger share of the battle front, -at the northern end, the corollary role of the 32nd Division being to -seize Herleville and carry our line just to the east of it. - -The date of the attack was fixed for August 23rd, and the Second and -Fifth Divisions were warned to be in readiness to come into the line -a day or two after the battle, in order to commence immediately the -process of keeping the enemy on the run, and hustling him clean out of -the river bend and across the line of the Somme. - -The conference of that day was of special interest, in that I had to -deal with two Divisions which had not participated in any of those -Corps Conferences, previously held, which had initiated a fully -organized Corps operation. The Commanders and Staffs were strangers -to each other and, some of them, to me and my Staff. Nearly all of -them were yet unfamiliar with the special methods of the Corps. The -conference was therefore a lengthy one, for many problems of tactical -mechanism, which had been settled in connection with the preceding -battles of Hamel and August 8th, had to be reopened and elucidated. - -These regular battle conferences were in the Australian Corps an -innovation from the time the command of it devolved upon me. They -proved a powerful instrument for the moulding of a uniformity of -tactical thought and method throughout the command. They brought -together men who met face to face but seldom, and they permitted -of an exhaustive and educative interchange of views. They led to a -development of "team-work" of a very high order of efficiency. - -The work of preparing for, and the actual conduct of, these conferences -was always a very arduous business; but they more than repaid me for -the effort they entailed. They served two paramount purposes. They -enabled me to apply the requisite driving force to all subordinates -collectively, instead of individually, and thereby created a -responsive spirit which was competitive. In addition, each Commander or -Service had the advantage not only of receiving instructions regarding -his own action, but also of hearing in full detail the instructions -conveyed to his colleagues. He knew, not merely what his colleagues had -to do, but also knew that they had been told what to do; and he had an -opportunity of considering the effect of their action on his own. - -The senior representative of the Heavy Artillery, Tank and Air Services -invariably attended, and listened to all the points discussed with the -Divisions, and the Divisional Commanders heard all matters arranged -with these services. In this way, each arm acquired in the most direct -manner a steadily expanding knowledge of the technology of all the -other arms. - -My reason for emphasizing these matters in the present context is that, -on this particular occasion, an attempt was to be made to carry out a -major Corps operation at little more than thirty-six hours' notice; and -the Division which was to have assigned to it the principal role was -still in Corps Reserve and a day's march from the battle front. - -That, in spite of these handicaps, the battle proved brilliantly -successful is a testimony to the valuable part which these Corps -conferences played in securing rapid and efficiently co-ordinated -action; a result which would, I am confident, have been unattainable -under the stated conditions by the mere issue of formal written orders. - -Although only two out of the seven Divisions of the Corps were to -participate in this operation, it was my intention to employ, for -the full assistance of the Infantry, the whole resources of the -Corps in Artillery, Tanks and Aircraft. That was a principle which I -always regarded as fundamental, and one from which I never permitted -any exception to be made, although the pressure upon me to rest a -substantial portion of these ancillary services was always very great. - -The general plan for the battle ran briefly as follows. The 32nd -Division would attack with one Infantry Brigade, under a barrage, on -a frontage of 1,000 yards; the capture of the village of Herleville, -which was still strongly held, being its principal objective. - -The 1st Australian Division would attack on a frontage of 4,500 yards, -with two Brigades in line, and one Brigade in reserve. The attack would -be carried out in three phases. - -The first phase was a normal assault, under an Artillery barrage, and -with the assistance of Tanks, to a predetermined line, which would -carry us beyond the Chuignes Valley; the second phase was in the nature -of exploitation by the two line Brigades, but was expressly limited to -a maximum distance of 1,000 yards beyond the main first objective. - -The third phase was to be contingent upon the complete success of -the preceding phases, and would consist of an advance by the Reserve -Brigade for a further exploitation of success, by the seizure of the -whole of the Cappy bend of the river, including the towering hill close -to the Somme Canal known as Froissy Beacon. - -All arrangements for the forthcoming battle having thus been completed, -the First Division duly relieved the Fifth Division on the night of -August 21st, and hastened forward its preparations for the attack, -which had been fixed for 4.45 a.m. on August 23rd. - -In the meantime, the first attack which any British Army other than the -Fourth had made since August 8th was at last launched on August 21st -along the whole front of the Third British Army, northwards from Albert. - -It has come to be an article of faith that the whole of the successive -stages of the great closing offensive of the war had been the subject -of most careful timing, and of minute organization on the part of the -Allied High Command, and of our own G.H.Q. Much eulogistic writing -has been devoted to an attempted analysis of the comprehensive and -far-reaching plans which resulted in the delivery of blow upon blow, -in a prescribed order of time and for the achievement of definite -strategical or tactical ends. - -[Illustration: The Canal and Tunnel at Bellicourt--looking north.] - -[Illustration: The Hindenburg Line--a characteristic belt of sunken -wire.] - -All who played any part in these great events well know that it -was nothing of the kind; that nothing in the nature of a detailed -time-table to control so vast a field of effort was possible. All -Commanders, and the most exalted of them in a higher degree even -than those wielding lesser forces, became opportunists, and bent -their energies, not to the realization of a great general plan for a -succession of timed attacks, but upon the problem of hitting whenever -and wherever an opportunity offered, and the means were ready to hand. - -In these matters it was the force of circumstances which controlled -the sequence of events, and nothing else. An elaborate time-table -controlled by definite dates and sequences for the successive -engagement of a series of Armies would have been quite impossible of -realization. Even a Corps Commander had difficulty in forecasting -within a day or two when he would be ready to launch an attack on any -given part of the front. For an Army Commander it was a matter of a -week or even two. - -All attempted time-tables were controlled by our Artillery -requirements; both the assembling of the necessary guns--often drawn -from distant fronts--and the accumulating of the requisite "head" of -ammunition to see a battle through, were processes whose duration could -only be very roughly forecasted. - -The dumping, in the gun pits and in ammunition stores, of the necessary -500 or 600 rounds per gun meant days of labour in collection and -distribution on the part of the railways and motor lorries. The -breakdown of a few motor lorries at a critical time, or the dropping -of a single bomb upon an important railway junction, were disturbing -factors quite sufficient to have arrested the flow of ammunition, and -to have postponed, indefinitely, any programme based upon its prompt -delivery. - -It will be obvious, therefore, that no reliance could be placed, days -or weeks beforehand, upon a given attack taking place on a given day; -therefore no plans could be made which depended upon such attacks -taking place in a predetermined sequence. - -Shortly put, therefore, the decisions of the High Command were -confined to questions such as where an attack should be made, in -what direction, and by what forces. The date was always a matter of -uncertainty, and the only control that could be exercised was by -postponement, and never by acceleration. - -For the greater part of the offensive period it was therefore -necessarily left to the Commanders of the Armies to conform to a -general policy of attack, the time and method being left to their -own decision or recommendation. And they, in turn, relied upon their -Corps Commanders to seize the initiative in the pursuit of such a -policy. Naturally, the Army at all times made every effort to secure -co-ordinated action by its several Corps; but it rarely happened that -more than one Corps at a time carried through the main effort--the -other Corps performing subsidiary roles. The great battle of September -29th to October 1st, which completed the final rupture of the -Hindenburg line, was, however, a signal exception to this rule. - -The attack by the Third British Army on August 21st is a case which -illustrates the delays inseparable from battle preparations. The -project of such an attack had already been mooted on August 11th, when -General Byng (Third Army) paid me a visit to discuss my battle plan -of August 8th, and I gathered on that occasion that he hoped to begin -within four or five days. The event showed that the operation actually -took ten days to materialize. No criticism is suggested. The conditions -of transport of troops and munitions doubtless made its earlier -realization quite impossible. - -The attack coming when it did, however, considerably eased the -situation of the Fourth Army, upon whose front Ludendorff had flung all -his available reserves, drawn from all parts of the German front, in -his endeavours to bring the Australians and Canadians to a halt. - -He was now suddenly confronted with the prospect of another "break -through" in a different part of his line, and the German people had -been taught by their press correspondents to believe that a "break -through" was the one thing most to be resisted by the German Supreme -Command, and the one thing impossible of achievement by us. - -There can be no doubt, therefore, that the success of the Third Army -on August 21st, although not comparable in its results with the battle -of August 8th, did materially assist the prospects of my own success in -the operations upon which I was then embarking. - -The immediate effect of it was already felt the very next day. For the -Third Corps, which was still the left flank Corps of the Fourth Army, -and which had made very little progress since August 8th, was enabled -to advance its line a little past Albert and Meaulte. - -The Third Australian Division, which, it will be remembered, had -taken over the front and the role of the now disbanded Liaison Force, -participated, by arrangement, in this attack and, swinging up its left, -brought my front line, north of the river, square to the Somme Valley, -and just to the forward slopes of the high plateau overlooking Bray -and La Neuville. The Third Pioneer Battalion at once got to work on -restoring the broken crossings over the Somme, to the south of Bray, -and put out a series of advanced posts upon the left bank of the river, -which gave us practical control of the great island on which stands La -Neuville. - -Meanwhile, on the left flank of the 9th Brigade, which had carried -out the Third Divisional attack, there was serious trouble. The enemy -counter-attacked in the late afternoon. The 9th Brigade stood firm; -but the 47th Division (of the Third Corps) yielded ground, leaving the -flank of the 9th Brigade in the air. A chalk pit, which we had seized, -formed a welcome redoubt which enabled the 33rd Battalion to hang on -for sufficiently long to permit of the 34th Battalion coming up to form -a defensive flank, facing north. - -In this way the gallant 9th Brigade (Goddard) was able to retain the -whole of its gains of that day; but the risk of an immediate further -advance was too great while the situation to the north remained obscure -and unsatisfactory. The capture of the village of Bray, which was still -strongly held by the enemy, had, therefore, to be postponed, although -it had been part of my plan to capture it that same day as a measure of -precaution, seeing that I calculated upon being able the next day to -advance my line south of the Somme to a point well to the east of Bray. - -The great attack by the First Division supported by the 32nd Division, -which has come to be known as the battle of Chuignes, was launched at -dawn on August 23rd, and was an unqualified success. - -The main valley of the Somme in this region is flanked by a number of -tributary valleys, which run generally in a north and south direction, -extending back from the river four or five miles. They are broad, -with heavily-wooded sides, and harbour a number of villages, such as -Proyart, Chuignolles, Herleville and Chuignes, which cluster on their -slopes. - -One such valley, larger and longer than any of those which, in our -previous advances, we had yet crossed, lay before our front line of -that morning, and square across our path. It ran from Herleville, -northwards, past Chuignes, to join the Somme in the Bray bend. It -was the most easterly of all the tributary valleys to which I have -referred, and it was also the last piece of habitable country before -the devastated area of 1916 was reached, just a mile to the east of it. - -The valley afforded excellent cover for the enemy's guns, and the -expectation was that some of them would be overrun by our attack. It -was also ideal country for machine-gun defence, for the numerous woods, -hedges and copses afforded excellent cover, and had in all probability -been amply fortified with barbed wire. It was a formidable proposition -to attack such a position on such a frontage with only two Brigades. - -The 2nd Brigade (Heane) attacked on the right, the 1st Brigade (Mackay) -on the left, and the first phase was completed to time-table, with the -green objective line, located on the east side of the long valley, -in our possession. The only temporary hitch in the advance along the -whole front was at Robert Wood, where the enemy held out, and had to be -completely enveloped from both flanks before surrendering. - -Then came the second phase, and no difficulty was experienced in -advancing our line 1,000 yards east of the green line, nor in -establishing there a firm line of outposts for the night. - -The third phase presented a great deal more difficulty than I had -anticipated. It was to have been undertaken by the 3rd Brigade -(Bennett) pushing without delay through the 1st Brigade, and advancing -in open warfare formation north-easterly towards Cappy, for the seizure -of Hill 90, overlooking that village and on the south-west of it, and -terminating at its northern extremity in the high bluff of Froissy -Beacon. - -There was, however, some unexplained delay in the initiation of this -advance, and it was not until about 2 o'clock that the 3rd Brigade -moved forward to the assault of the long slope of the Chuignes Valley, -which still lay before them in this part of the field. The enemy, under -the impression that our attack had spent itself, had occupied the -plateau in great strength, and at first little progress could be made. - -Mobile Artillery was, however, promptly pushed up, and this proved -of great assistance to the infantry. Garenne Wood, on the top of the -plateau, into which large numbers of the enemy had withdrawn, proved -a difficult obstacle, and incapable of capture by frontal attack. -It, too, was conquered by enveloping tactics, and with its fall the -resistance of the enemy rapidly subsided, and the 3rd Brigade had the -satisfaction of hunting the fugitives clean off the plateau into the -Cappy Valley. - -The whole of this phase of the battle was an especially fine piece -of work on the part of the Regimental Officers. It was open warfare -of the most complete character, and the victory was won by excellent -battle control on the part of the Battalion Commanders, by splendid -co-operation between the four Battalions of the Brigade, and by -intelligent and gallant leadership on the part of the Company and -Platoon Commanders. - -Beset as I had been by many anxieties during the early afternoon as -to how the Third Brigade would fare in the difficult task which had -been given it, rendered more difficult by the delay of which I have -spoken, I had the satisfaction that night of contemplating a victory -far greater than I had calculated upon. - -For the 32nd Division had successfully captured Herleville, and the -First Division had seized the whole country for a depth of 11/2 miles -up to a line extending from Herleville to the western edge of Cappy. -The whole Chuignes Valley was ours. By its capture the enemy had been -despoiled of all habitable areas, and had been relegated to a waste of -broken and ruined country between us and the line of the Somme. - -We took that day 21 guns and over 3,100 prisoners from ten different -regiments. The slaughter of the enemy in the tangled valleys was -considerable, for our Infantry are always vigorous bayonet fighters. -They received much assistance from the Tanks in disposing of the -numerous machine gun detachments which held their ground to the last. - -It was a smashing blow, and far exceeded in its results any previous -record in my experience, having regard to the number of troops engaged. -Its immediate result, the same night, was the capture of Bray by the -Third Division, north of the river, thus completing the work of that -Division which the failure of the 47th Division on their left the day -before had compelled them to leave unfinished. The 40th Battalion took -200 prisoners, with trifling loss to themselves. - -A more remote result, which made itself apparent in the next few days, -was that it compelled the enemy to abandon all hope of retaining a hold -of any country west of the line of the Somme; it impelled him at last -to an evacuation of the great bend of the river, a process which he -began in a very few days. - -Such was the battle of Chuignes. Much of the success of this brilliant -engagement was due to the personality of the Divisional Commander, -Major-General Glasgow. He had commenced his career in the war as a -Major of Light Horse, and had participated in the earliest stages of -the fighting on the Gallipoli Peninsula. - -Speedily gaining promotion during that campaign, his outstanding merits -as a leader gained him an appointment to the command of the 13th -Brigade, when the latter was formed in Egypt in the spring of 1916. For -two years he led that Brigade through all its arduous experiences on -the Somme, at Messines and in the third battle of Ypres. - -This fine record was but the prelude to the history-making -performances of the 13th Brigade in 1918 at Dernancourt and -Villers-Bretonneux, and Glasgow seemed easily the most promising, among -all the Brigadiers of that time, as a prospective Divisional Commander: -a judgment which fully justified itself. - -Of strong though not heavy build and of energetic demeanour, Glasgow -succeeded not so much by exceptional mental gifts, or by tactical -skill of any very high order, as by his personal driving force and -determination, which impressed themselves upon all his subordinates. -He always got where he wanted to get--was consistently loyal to the -Australian ideal, and intensely proud of the Australian soldier. - -The number of prisoners captured on this day, and the total numbers of -the enemy encountered in the course of an advance which was relatively -small, pointed to a disposition of troops which was unusual on the part -of the enemy. - -According to the principles so strongly emphasized by Ludendorff, -in instructions which he had issued, and copies of which duly fell -into my hands, there was to be, in his scheme of defensive tactics, -a "fore-field" relatively lightly held by outposts and machine guns. -The main line of resistance was to be well in rear, and there the main -concentration of troops was to be effected. - -Why had this dictum been so widely disregarded on this occasion? It was -a question worthy of close inquiry, and two German Battalion Commanders -who were captured by us on that day supplied the answer. - -Reference has already been made to the message which I issued to the -Corps on the eve of the great opening battle; and to the fact that a -copy of this message had fallen into the hands of the enemy, probably -by the capture of an officer in the close fighting which took place at -Lihons on August 9th and 10th. - -In due course the substance of this message was published in the German -wireless news, and in the German press of the time, but cleverly -mistranslated to convey a colouring desirable for the German public. - -It so happened that not long before the opening of our offensive I -had, at the request of the authorities, sent to Australia a recruiting -cable, which appealed to the Australian public for a maintenance of -supplies of fighting men.[16] That the full text of this cable also -became speedily known to the enemy is a testimony to the far-flung -alertness of their Intelligence Service. It, also, was published in -their press. - -Basing their editorial comments on this material, the _Berliner -Tageblatt_ of August 17th, 1918, a copy of which I captured, and -another journal whose name was not ascertainable, because in the copy -captured the title had been torn off, both indulged in arguments, which -were long, and intended to be convincing, to prove to the German people -that I had promised my troops a "break-through;" that I had failed, and -that, admittedly, the "proud" Australian Corps had been shattered, had -come to the end of its resources and was no longer to be taken into -calculation as an instrument of attack by the "English." - -It was perfectly legitimate, if clumsy, propaganda. But it was a -curious example of a propaganda which recoiled upon the heads of its -propounders. The Battalion Commanders, who, like all German officers -whom we captured, were always voluble in excuses for their defeat, -pleaded that they had been deceived by the utterances of their own -journals into believing that the Australian offensive effort had come -to an end, once and for all, and that no further attack by this Corps -was possible. - -[Illustration: MAP D] - -It was this belief which, they said, had prompted their respective -Divisions (for each of them represented a separate one) to disregard -Ludendorff's prescription; their Divisional Generals had felt justified -in availing themselves of the very excellent living quarters which -existed in the Chuignes Valley, near the German front line of August -22nd, to quarter all their support and reserve Battalions. - -It was there that we found them--increasing the population of the front -zone far beyond that which we had been accustomed to find. Was there -ever a more diverting example of a propaganda which recoiled upon those -who uttered it? Intended to deceive the German public, it ended in -deceiving the German front line troops, to their own lamentable undoing. - -Among the captures of the battle of Chuignes, which, as usual, -comprised a large and varied assortment of warlike stores, including -another great dump of engineering materials near Froissy Beacon, and -two complete railway trains, was the monster naval gun of 15-inch bore, -which had been so systematically bombarding the city of Amiens, and had -wrought such havoc among its buildings and monuments. - -It was first reached by the 3rd Australian Battalion (1st Brigade) -during a bayonet charge which cleared Arcy Wood, in the shelter of -which the giant gun had been erected. An imposing amount of labour had -been expended upon its installation, and the most cursory examination -of the effort involved was sufficient to make it evident that the enemy -entertained no expectation of ever being hurled back from the region -which it dominated. - -The gun with its carriage, platform and concrete foundations weighed -over 500 tons. It was a naval gun, obviously of the type in use on -the German Dreadnoughts, and never intended by its original designers -for use on land. It had a range of over twenty-four miles, fired a -projectile weighing nearly a ton, and the barrel was seventy feet long. - -It had been installed with the elaborate completeness of German -methods. A double railway track, several miles long, had been built -to the site, for the transport of the gun and its parts. It was -electrically trained and elevated. Its ammunition was handled and -loaded by mechanical means. The adjacent hill-side had been tunnelled -to receive the operating machinery, and the supplies of shells, -cartridges and fuses. - -The gun and its mounting, when captured, were found to have been -completely disabled. A heavy charge of explosive had burst the chamber -of the gun, and had torn off the projecting muzzle end, which lay with -its nose helplessly buried in the mud. The giant carriage had been -burst asunder, and over acres all around was strewn the debris of the -explosion. - -For some time, some of my gunner experts favoured the theory that the -gun had burst accidentally, but the view which ultimately prevailed was -that the demolition had been intentional. Many months afterwards, the -full story of the gun and its performances was elicited from a prisoner -who had belonged to the No. 4 (German) Heavy Artillery Regiment, and it -was circumstantial enough to be credible. - -The story is worthy of repetition, not only because no authentic -account of this wonderful trophy has yet been published, but also -because the history of this gun curiously illuminates the enemy's -plans, intentions and expectations between the dates of his onslaught -in March and his recoil in August. - -The substance of the story is as follows: The gun came from Krupp's. -Work on the position was started early in April, 1918--only a few days -after the site had fallen into the enemy's hands. It was completed -and ready for action on the morning of June 2nd. Its maximum firing -capacity was twenty-eight rounds per day. It fired continuously until -June 28th. By this time the original gun was worn out, having fired -over 350 rounds at Amiens. A new piece was ordered from Krupp's. It -arrived on August 7th, and was ready to fire by 7 p.m. It fired its -first round on August 8th at 2 a.m. and kept on firing till August -9th, firing thirty-five rounds in all. At 7 a.m. on August 9th, all -hands were ordered to remove everything that was portable and of value. -Demolition charges were laid and fired about 9 a.m. on August 9th. The -crew returned to Krupp's. - -It is to be inferred from this narrative that the enemy's defeat at -Hamel on July 4th did not deter him from his enterprise of replacing -the original worn gun, but that after August 8th, he quite definitely -accepted the certainty that he would be allowed no time to remove the -gun intact, and so he destroyed it in order that we might not be able -to use it against him. - -This is the largest single trophy of war won by any Commander during -the war, and it was a matter of great regret to me that the cost of its -transportation to Australia was prohibitive. The gun, as it stands, -was, therefore, fenced in, and it has been formally presented to the -City of Amiens as a souvenir of the Australian Army Corps. - -So long as any Australian soldiers remained in France, this spot was -a Mecca to which thousands of pilgrims wandered; and soon there was, -over the whole of the immense structure, not one square inch upon which -the "diggers" had not inscribed their names and sentiments. There, in -the shade of Arcy Wood, the great ruin rests, a memorial alike of the -sufferings of Amiens and of the great Australian victory of Chuignes. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[16] The cablegram in question was dated July 13th, and was in the -following terms: - -"Since the opening of the German offensive in March every Division -of the Australian Army in France has been engaged and always with -decisive success. The men of Australia, wherever and whenever they -have entered this mighty conflict, have invariably brought the enemy -to a standstill, and have made him pay dearly for each futile attempt -to pass them on the roads to Amiens and to the Channel Ports. Their -reputation as skilful, disciplined and gallant soldiers has never -stood higher throughout the Empire than it does to-day. Those who are -privileged to lead in battle such splendid men are animated with a -pride and admiration which is tempered only by concern at their waning -numbers. Already some battalions which have made historic traditions -have ceased to exist as fighting units, and others must follow unless -the Australian nation stands by us and sees to it that our ranks are -kept filled. We refuse to believe that the men and women of Australia -will suffer their famous Divisions to decay, or that the young manhood -still remaining in our homeland will not wish to share in the renown -of their brothers in France. Nothing matters now but to see this job -through to the end, and we appeal to every man to come, and come -quickly, to help in our work, and to share in our glorious endeavour. - - "MONASH, Lieutenant-General." - - - - - -CHAPTER X - -PURSUIT - - -The design which I had formed after the battle of August 8th of driving -the enemy completely out of the bend of the Somme--but which I was -obliged to abandon for the time being because of the decision of the -Fourth Army to thrust in a south-easterly direction--was now about to -be realized. The effect of the battle of Chuignes, following so closely -upon the advance of the Third Army two days before, made it probable -that the enemy would decide upon a definite withdrawal to the line of -the Somme. - -It now became my object to ensure, if he should attempt to do so, -firstly, that his withdrawal should be more precipitate than would -be agreeable to him, and, secondly, that when he reached that line -he should be accorded no breathing time to establish upon it a firm -defence from which he could hold us at bay for the remainder of the -fine weather. - -The French Army took over from me on the night of the 23rd August the -whole of that portion of my front which still extended south of Lihons. -General Nollet, Commander of the 36th French Corps (34th and 35th -French Divisions), became my southern neighbour, displacing my Fourth -Division, and also a Canadian Division, for whose sector I had become -responsible since the departure of General Currie, a few days before. - -During these redispositions, probably induced to do so by evidences -patent to him that large troop movements were in progress, the enemy -carried out a very heavy gas bombardment and maintained it for some -hours over the whole of the front which was being taken over by the -French. - -The wind blowing from the south, the gas, which was unusually dense, -drifted over the whole areas both of the Fourth Australian and the 32nd -British Divisions, and caused a large number of gas casualties, which -weakened the available garrisons of these sectors. - -The Second and Fifth Divisions were brought up on the night of August -26th to relieve the First Division, which had worthily earned a rest, -and by these redispositions my whole frontage, which, in spite of the -reduction effected, still exceeded nine miles, was organized to be -held by four Divisions, counting from south to north as follows: 32nd -Division, Fifth Division, Second Division and Third Division, the -latter lying north of the River Somme. - -The First and Fourth Divisions were each sent back, the former to -a pleasant reach of the Somme near Chipilly, and the latter to the -neighbourhood of Amiens, there to have a long rest and to recuperate -after their strenuous labours. These two Divisions were, I had -resolved, to be kept in reserve for any _tour de force_, the need -for which might arise later. This disposition was based on intuition -rather than on reasoning; but the event proved that it was a fortunate -decision; for, at a juncture, three weeks later, when a great -opportunity presented itself, these two Divisions, then fully rested, -proved of priceless value. - -The Third Division held my front north of the Somme, and their presence -there ensured my unchallenged tactical control of that important -river valley. Numerous crossings had been systematically destroyed -by the enemy, as he was being driven back from bend to bend, and as -systematically repaired by my indefatigable engineer and pioneer -services, as fast as the ground passed under our control. - -Reconstruction of bridges and culverts is as tedious a business as -their demolition is expeditious. A charge of gun-cotton, placed in the -right spot, a primer, a short length of fuse, or an electric lead to -a press button are all that are needed, and a single sapper standing -by with a match, to be lighted at the last moment, can do all that is -necessary to provide three days' work for a whole Company of Engineers. - -Nevertheless, the control of the river valley was of inestimable -advantage, for it enabled me to carry out a policy of continuous and -rapid repair. Consequently, during the whole of our subsequent advance, -every means of traversing the valley from south to north, which had -been tampered with, was soon restored, as fast as my infantry had made -good their advance beyond the ruined crossing. - -This facility was to have an important bearing upon my freedom of -action, not many days later, when the Corps came head on to the north -and south stretch of the Somme, and found every bridge gone. That -circumstance alone would have proved an irretrievable misfortune, if -I had not had already available numerous restored crossings upon the -east and west reach of the river. For by that means, my ability to -pass troops and guns rapidly from one bank of the Somme to the other -remained unimpaired. - -Before leaving the line, the First Division had captured Cappy and -advanced its line on the right to the western outskirts of Foucaucourt, -while the Third Division had possessed itself of Suzanne. This was -the situation when, on the night of August 26th, the Second and Fifth -Divisions came into the line. Conferences with the four line Divisions -were held both on the 25th and 26th August, in order to ensure -co-ordinate action for the process of hustling the enemy across the -Somme. - -I was, at this stage, sorely perplexed by the uncertain attitude of -the Fourth Army. I was all for pushing on energetically, and received -General Rawlinson's approval to do so on August 24th; but on the very -next day he enunciated a diametrically opposite policy, which greatly -embarrassed me. - -The gist of the Army attitude on the 25th may be thus expressed. The -presence of a new German Division, the 41st, of whom we had taken many -prisoners in Cappy, pointed to an intention on the part of the enemy -to reinforce. This negatived any intention to undertake a withdrawal. -This conclusion justified a revision of the Fourth Army policy. The -Army had done its fair share; it had drawn in upon its front all the -loose German reserves. Its resources in Tanks had been depleted, and -it would take a month to replace them. Other Armies would now take up -the burden, and the Fourth Army would now mark time, and await events -elsewhere. There was no object in hastening the enemy's evacuation of -the bad ground in the bend of the Somme, or in our taking possession -of it. There was a possibility of the French taking over more frontage -from us, and the Australian Corps front might in consequence be reduced -to a three-Division front, with three Divisions in Corps Reserve. - -The course of events, in the next seven days, convinced me that the -results which were then achieved were totally unexpected by the Fourth -Army, and very vitally influenced the whole subsequent course of the -campaign. In point of fact, Lord Rawlinson quite frankly conceded to -me as much in express terms a week later. The appreciation made at -the time was doubtless an intentionally conservative one, but it did -not take into account the reserve of striking power which remained in -the Australian Corps, even after the past eighteen days of continuous -fighting, and even without the assistance of the Tanks. - -There was only one saving clause in the Army attitude, and this -fortunately gave all the loophole necessary for the continued activity -which I desired to pursue. It was this: "Touch must be kept with -the enemy." This was of course a mere formality of tactics, and was -intended as no more than such. But it was sufficient to justify an -aggressive policy on my part. - -As the result of my redispositions, completed by the night of August -27th, and of my conferences with the line Divisions, each Division -stood on that morning on a single Brigade front, with its two remaining -Brigades arranged in depth behind it. My orders were that in the event -of the enemy giving way, the line Brigade was to push on energetically, -and was to be kept in the line until it had reached the limits of its -endurance. The other two Brigades were to follow up more leisurely, but -to be prepared, each in turn, to relieve the line Brigade. - -I had calculated that, by this method, each Brigade should be able to -function for at least two days on the frontage allotted; and that, -therefore, the present line Divisions could continue for at least six -days; and if the stress upon the troops had not been severe, they could -carry out a second rotation of Brigades for a second tour of six days. -The calculation was, in general terms, fully realized; and all of the -four line Divisions of that day did actually carry on for twelve days, -and two of them for an additional six days. - -The Artillery resources of the Corps were throughout the whole of this -period fully maintained at the standard of the early days of August. -I still had at my disposal eighteen Brigades of Field Artillery; and -so was able to allot four Brigades of Artillery to each line Division, -while keeping two in Corps Reserve. - -Early on the morning of August 27th, a policy of vigorous patrolling -all along our front was initiated. At several points, enemy posts which -were known to have been strongly held the night before were found to be -now unoccupied. Although reports varied along my front, they so fully -confirmed my anticipations, that without waiting to make any reference -to the Army, I ordered an immediate general advance along my whole -front. - -There followed a merry and exciting three days of pursuit; for the -enemy was really on the run, and by nightfall on August 29th, not -a German who was not a prisoner remained west of the Somme between -Peronne and Brie. - -In previous years, during the enemy's retreat from Bapaume to the -Hindenburg Line, we had had experience of his methods of withdrawal. -Then they were deliberate, and his rearguards so methodically and -resolutely held up the British advance, that the enemy had been able -not only to remove from the evacuated area every particle of his -warlike stores, which were of any value, but also to carry out a -systematic devastation of the whole area, even to the felling of all -the fruit trees, and the tearing up of all the railways for miles. - -The present withdrawal was of a very different character. To begin -with, it had been forced upon him by the battle of Chuignes, and he -had to undertake it precipitately and without adequate preparation. -Secondly, he had an impassable river behind him, which could be crossed -only at three points, Brie, Eterpigny, and Peronne. Thirdly, he had in -front of him a Corps flushed with its recent victories, while he had -been suffering a succession of defeats and heavy losses. - -Nevertheless, he put up a good fight, and employed well-considered -tactics. The German Machine Gun Corps was much the best of all his -services. The manner in which the machine gunners stood their ground, -serving their guns to the very last, and defying even the Juggernaut -menace of the Tanks, won the unstinted admiration of our men. During -these three days of retreat the enemy used his machine guns to the best -advantage, and they constituted the only obstacle to our rapid advance. - -These tactics were not unexpected by me, and I had an answer ready. -Defying the whole traditions of Artillery tactics in open warfare, I -insisted upon two somewhat startling innovations. The first was to -break up battery control, by detaching even sections (two guns), to -come under the direct orders of Infantry Commanders for the purpose of -engaging with direct fire any machine-gun nest which was holding them -up. - -The second was to insist that all batteries should carry 20 per cent. -of smoke shell. This elicited a storm of protest from the gunners. -Every shell carried which was not a high explosive or shrapnel shell -meant a shell less of destructive power, and, therefore, a shell -wasted. That had been the Gunnery School doctrine. But I imagine that -the test made at this epoch of the liberal use of smoke shell against -machine guns will lead to a revision of that doctrine. - -Smoke shell proved of inestimable value in blinding the German machine -gunners. A few rounds judiciously placed screened the approach of our -Infantry, and many a machine-gun post was thereby rushed by us from -the flanks or even from the rear. General Hobbs (Fifth Division) and -General Rosenthal (Second Division), both of whom had formerly been -gunners, proved the strongest advocates for these smoke tactics. - -By such means an energetic and successful pursuit was launched and -maintained. By the night of August 27th, our line already lay to the -east of the villages of Vermandovillers, Foucaucourt (on the main road) -and Fontaine. We also mastered the whole of the Cappy bend, including -the crossings of the Somme at Eclusier. The Fifth Division had a -particularly hard fight at Foucaucourt, which did not fall to us until -we had subjected it to a considerable bombardment. Tivoli Wood was the -chief obstacle encountered that day by the Second Division. The advance -of the 32nd Division also progressed smoothly. - -During August 28th our advance was continued methodically, -and by that night the Corps front had reached the line -Genermont--Berry-en-Santerre--Estrees--Frise. - -On August 29th the line of the Somme was reached, and all three -Divisions south of the Somme stood upon the high ground sloping down to -the Somme, with the river in sight from opposite Clery, past Peronne -and as far south as St. Christ. - -In the meantime the Third Division north of the Somme had marched -forward, in sympathetic step with the southern advance, successively -seizing Suzanne, Vaux, Curlu, Hem and Clery. The Third Corps on my left -had followed up the general advance, though always lagging a little in -rear, thus keeping my left flank secure; and beyond the Third Corps, -the Third Army was approaching the line of the Canal du Nord, which -lay, as explained, in prolongation of the south-north course of the -Somme. - -The war correspondents of this time were given to representing the -progress of the Australian Corps during these three days as a leisurely -advance, regulated in its pace by the speed of the retiring enemy. But -it was nothing of the kind. - -On the contrary, it was his withdrawal which was regulated by the speed -of our advance. There was not a foot of ground which was not contested -by all the effort which the enemy was able to put forth. It is quite -true that his withdrawal was intentional; but it is not true that it -was conducted at the deliberate rate which was necessary to enable him -to withdraw in good order. - -He was compelled to fight all the time and to withdraw in disorder. He -was forced to abandon guns and huge quantities of stores. The amount -of derelict artillery ammunition found scattered over the whole of -this considerable area alone reached hundreds of thousands of rounds, -distributed in hundreds of dumps and depots, as well as scores of tons -of empty artillery cartridge-cases, the brass of which had become of -priceless value to the enemy. - -Regimental and even Divisional Headquarters were abandoned as they -stood, with all their furniture and mess equipment left intact. Signal -wire and telephone equipment remained installed in all directions, -hospitals and dressing-stations were left to their fate. The advance -yielded to us over 600 prisoners, some half-dozen field-guns, and large -numbers of smaller weapons. - -The last two days of the advance led us across a maze of trenches and -the debris of the 1916 campaign. The weather was unfavourable, there -was much rain and an entire absence of any kind of shelter. As a result -the line Brigades had to put forth all their powers of endurance and -reached the Somme in a very tired condition. - -In the meantime my air squadron had an exceptionally busy time. Contact -patrols were maintained throughout every hour of daylight. Difficult as -it was to identify the positions reached by our leading troops during -an organized battle, where their approximate positions and ultimate -objective lines were known beforehand, it was doubly so when no guide -whatever existed as to the probable extent of each day's advance, or as -to the amount of resistance likely to be encountered at different parts -of the front. - -Yet it was just under these circumstances that rapid and reliable -information as to the progress of the various elements of our front -line troops was more important than ever, and no means for obtaining -such information was so expeditious as the Contact Aeroplane. - -To assist the air observer in identifying our troops, the latter were -provided with flares, of colours which were varied from time to time -in order to minimize the risk of imitation by the enemy. The method of -their employment, whether singly or in pairs, or three at a time, was -also frequently varied. - -These flares on being lit gave out a dense cloud of coloured smoke, -easily distinguishable from a moderate height. The contact plane, which -would carry coloured streamers so that the infantry could identify it -as flying on that particular duty, would, when ready to observe, blow -its horn and thereupon the foremost infantry would light their flares. - -It was a method of inter-communication between air and ground, which, -after a little practice, came to be well understood and intelligently -carried out. By its means a Divisional or Brigade Commander was kept -accurately informed, with great promptitude, of the progress of each of -his front line units, in relation to the various woods, ruined mills, -and other obstacles which lay spread across their path. - -But the Air Force had another interesting duty, which was to watch -the roads leading back from the enemy's front line to his rear areas. -During tranquil times little movement could ever be seen on the enemy's -roads in the hours of daylight, for the very good reason that he took -care to carry out all his transportation to and from his front zone -under cover of darkness. - -Now, however, his needs pressed sorely upon him; and our air reports, -from this time onwards, became almost monotonous in their iteration of -the fact that large columns of transport were to be seen moving back in -an easterly direction. These were his retiring batteries or his convoys -of wagons carrying such stores as he was able to salve. - -Occasionally, too, came reports of convoys, which looked like motor -lorries or buses, moving hurriedly westward towards the German front. -These were generally diagnosed by us as reinforcements which were being -continually hurried forward to replace his human wastage, which was -considerable both by direct losses from death, wounds and capture and -by reason of the fatigue of such a strenuous and nerve-racking retreat. - -All this movement in the enemy's rearward areas was a legitimate object -of interest to my Artillery. But, unfortunately, most of it lay well -beyond the range of my lighter Ordnance. The mobile Field Artillery -was effective at no greater range than about four miles. The longer -range 60-pounders found it a formidable task to traverse such broken -country, while the still heavier tractor-drawn 6-inch guns found it -quite impossible. - -The latter, and all the Heavy and Super-Heavy guns and howitzers were -tied down to the roads, and it proved a tremendous business to advance -them in sufficient time and numbers to make their influence felt upon -the present situation. I have nothing but praise for the admirable -manner in which Brigadier-General Fraser and his Heavy Artillery -Headquarters carried out the forward moves of the whole of his -extensive Artillery equipment and organization from August 8th onwards -to August 23rd. But the rapid advance of the battle line during the -last week of August left the great bulk of Heavy Artillery far behind. - -This was not entirely or even appreciably a question of the rate of -movement of the great lumbering steam or motor-drawn heavy guns. -They could quite easily march their eight or ten miles a day if they -could have a clear road upon which to do it. But it was this question -of roads that dominated the whole situation during this period, and -subsequently until the end of the campaign of the Corps. - -The construction and upkeep of roads throughout the Corps area had -been, even in the days of stationary warfare, a difficult problem. At a -time like the present, when the battle was moving forward from day to -day, it became one of the first magnitude. - -The rate of our advance was controlled almost as much by the speed with -which main and secondary roads could be made practicable for traffic -as by the degree of resistance offered by the enemy. Obstacles had to -be removed, the debris of war cleared to one side, shell holes solidly -filled in, craters of mine explosions bridged or circumvented, culverts -repaired and drains freed of obstructions. - -The road surfaces, speedily deteriorating under the strain and wear -of heavy motor lorry traffic, had to be kept constantly under repair. -The transportation of the necessary road stone for this purpose alone, -imposed a heavy burden upon the roads and impeded other urgent traffic. -The amount of road construction and reconstruction actually in hand -within the Corps area, at any one time, far exceeded that normally -required in peace time for any great city district. - -The traffic on the roads was always of the most dense and varied -character. For the proper maintenance and supply of a large Army Corps -at least three good main roads, leading back to our sources of supply, -would have been no more than adequate; but I seldom had at my disposal -more than one such main road, which had often to be shared with an -adjoining Corps. - -There was ever an endless stream of traffic, labouring slowly along -in both directions. On such a road as that leading east from Amiens -towards the battle front, the congestion was always extreme. Ammunition -lorries, regimental horsed transport, motor dispatch riders, marching -infantry, long strings of horses and mules going to and from water, -traction engines, convoy after convoy of motor buses, supply wagons, -mess carts, signal motor tenders, complete batteries of Artillery, -motor tractors, tanks, Staff motor cars and gangs of coolie labourers -surged steadily forward, in an amazing jumble, with never a moment's -pause. - -Such were some of the difficulties with which I was beset in the rear -of my battle line. They were negligible compared with those which now -loomed in front of it. - -The reach of the Somme which runs northerly from Ham past Brie to -Peronne and there turns westerly, differs entirely in its topographical -features from that picturesque Somme Valley along both of whose banks -the Corps had been fighting its way forward. The steep banks have -disappeared, and for a mile or so on either side the ground slopes -gently towards the river bed. - -The river itself is not less than 1,000 yards wide, being, in fact, a -broad marsh, studded with islets which are overgrown with rushes, while -the stream of the river threads its way in numerous channels between -them. The marsh itself is no more than waist-deep, but the flowing -water is too deep to be waded. - -Along the western side of this marsh runs the canalized river, or, as -it is here known, the Somme Canal, flowing between masonry-lined banks. -The construction of a crossing of such a marsh was, even in peace time, -a troublesome business. It meant, to begin with, a causeway solidly -founded upon a firm masonry bed sunk deep into the mud of the valley -bed. The canal itself and each rivulet required its separate bridge, in -spans varying from thirty to sixty feet. - -What, therefore, came to be known as the Brie Bridge, situated on the -line of the main road from Amiens to St. Quentin, really consisted of -no less than eight separate bridges disposed at irregular intervals -along the line of the causeway, between the western and eastern banks -of the valley. The demolition of even the smallest of these eight -bridges would render the whole causeway unusable, and would prohibit -all traffic. - -There exists an almost exactly similar arrangement of bridges at St. -Christ, about two miles to the south of Brie, but no other traffic -crossing to the north of Brie until Peronne is reached. There, both the -main road and the railway, which cross side by side, are provided with -large span lattice girder bridges, over the main canal, while the marsh -has been reclaimed where the town has encroached upon it. The river -overflow is led through the town in several smaller canals or drains, -all of them liberally bridged where crossed by roads and streets. - -The Peronne bridges are, therefore, no less indispensable, and no less -easily rendered useless than those at Brie. Should such crossings be -denied to me, it would be just possible to pass infantry across the -valley, by night, by wading and swimming, or by the use of rafts, -always provided that no opposition were to be met with. But to pass -tanks or heavy guns, or even vehicles of the lightest description -across the marsh, would have been quite impossible. - -The Somme threatened, therefore, to be a most formidable obstacle to my -further advance. It was incumbent upon me to assume that at the very -least one of each series of bridges would be demolished by the enemy in -his retreat. It would have been criminal folly on his part were it to -have been otherwise; and I had had previous evidence of the efficiency -of his engineer services. - -Reconnaissances pushed out on the night of August 29th speedily -verified the assumption that some at least of the bridges had been -wrecked. It was ultimately ascertained that every single bridge -in every one of the crossings named had been methodically and -systematically blown to pieces. - -There was only one tactical method by which such an obstacle could be -forced by a frontal operation. By bringing up sufficient Artillery to -dominate the enemy's defences on the east bank of the river valley, -it might have been possible to pass across sufficient infantry to -establish a wide bridge-head, behind which the ruined crossings could -be restored, probably under enemy Artillery fire. - -But it would have been a costly enterprise, and fraught with every -prospect of failure, should the enemy be prepared to put up any sort of -a fight to prevent it. - -The value to me of the possession of the whole of the Somme Valley from -Clery westwards, and the rapid repair of the bridges therein which I -had been able to effect, will now become apparent. For it permitted the -crystallizing into action of a project for dealing with the present -situation, which had been vaguely forming in my mind ever since the day -when I took over the Chipilly spur. - -This was the plan of turning the line of the Somme from the north, -instead of forcing it by direct assault from the west. - -It may be argued that such a plan would have been equally practicable, -even if the left flank of the Australian Corps had hitherto remained -and now still lay south of the Somme, instead of well to the north -of it. In that case other Corps on the north would have carried out -that identical plan, which ultimately did achieve this important and -decisive result. - -I very much doubt it. - -I had also had some experience of the futility of relying too much upon -the sympathetic action of flank Corps, who usually had their hands full -enough with their own problems, and had little time to devote to the -needs of their neighbours. It would, moreover, have been disagreeable -and inexpedient in the extreme to seek a right of way through the -territory over which another Corps held jurisdiction. Corps Commanders -were inclined to be jealous of any encroachment upon their frontiers, -or upon the tactical problems in front of them. - -Moreover, I wanted, more than anything else, that this should be an -exclusively Australian achievement. - -The situation being as it was, I possessed freedom of action, elbow -room, and control not only of all the territory which I should require -to use, but also of all the Somme crossings west of Clery. - -[Illustration: Final Instructions to the Platoon--an incident of the -battle of August 8th, 1918. The platoon is waiting to advance to Phase -B of the battle.] - -[Illustration: An Armoured Car--disabled near Bony, during the battle -of September 29th, 1918.] - -The strategic object in view was to make the line of the Somme useless -to the enemy as a defensive line, and thereby render probable his -immediate further enforced retreat to the Hindenburg line. - -The tactical process by which this was to be achieved was to be an -attack upon and the seizure of the key position of the whole line, the -dominating hill of Mont St. Quentin. - -But the paramount consideration was that the attack must be delivered -_without delay_ and that the enemy should not be allowed a single hour -longer than necessary to establish himself upon that hill. - -Often since those days, wondering at the success which came to the -Australian Corps at Mont St. Quentin, I have tried justly to estimate -the causes which won us that success. And I have always come back -to the same conclusion, that it was due firstly and chiefly to the -wonderful gallantry of the men who participated, secondly to the -rapidity with which our plans were put into action, and thirdly to the -sheer daring of the attempt. - -Mont St. Quentin lies a mile north of Peronne. It stands as a sentinel -guarding the northern and western approaches to the town, a bastion of -solid defence against any advance from the west designed to encircle -it. The paintings and drawings of many artists who have visited the -historic spot will familiarize the world with its gentle contours. - -Viewed from the west, from the vantage point of the high ground near -Biaches in the very angle of the bend of the river, Mont St. Quentin -constitutes no striking feature in the landscape. But standing upon the -hill itself one speedily realizes how fully its possession dominates -the whole of the approaches to it. So placed that both stretches -of the river can from it be commanded by fire, and giving full and -uninterrupted observation over all the country to the west and north -and south of it, the hill is ringed around with line upon line of wire -entanglements, and its forward slopes are glacis-like and bare of -almost any cover. - -Estimated by the eye of an expert in tactics, it would surely be -reckoned as completely impregnable to the assault, unaided by Tanks, of -any infantry that should attempt it. - -It was the seizure, by a sudden attack, of this tactical key that -was the kernel of the plan which now had to be evolved. The capture -of the town of Peronne was consequential upon it, though little less -formidable a task. The effect of both captures would be completely to -turn the whole line of the Somme to the south, and the line of the -Canal du Nord; to open a wide gate through which the remainder of the -Fourth and Third Armies could pour, so as to roll up the enemy's line -in both directions. - -In view of the historical importance of the occasion, and the -controversies which have already risen regarding the genesis of the -conception of these plans, I make no apology for reproducing, _in -extenso_, a literal copy of the notes used at the conference which I -held in the late afternoon of August 29th at the Headquarters of the -Fifth Division, then situated in a group of bare sheds--but recently -vacated by the enemy--on the main east and west road, just south of -Proyart. The conference was attended by Lambert (32nd Division), Hobbs -(Fifth Division), Rosenthal (Second Division), and Gellibrand (Third -Division). Neither "Tanks" nor "Heavy Artillery" attended as they could -not, in any event, co-operate in the execution of the plan. - - 29. 8. 18. - - PLAN FOR CROSSING THE SOMME - - A. ALTERATION OF FRONTAGES. - - _Defensive Front_: 32nd Division to take over on 30th from Fifth - Division front as far north as Ferme Lamire, total 7,500 yards, to - hold same defensively, place outposts on river line, demonstrate - actively as if aiming to cross Somme; if no resistance, endeavour - establish posts on far bank; otherwise demonstrate only. Use only - one Brigade; remainder of Division to rest and refit. - - _Offensive Frontages_: Fifth Division to extend along canal bank - from Ferme Lamire to Biaches, frontage 4,000 yards. Second - Division to extend from Biaches for 4,700 yards to bridge at - Ommiecourt. Third Division: present front north of river. - - B. OBJECTIVES. - - All Divisions to continue eastward advance. Each Division to have - an immediate and an ultimate objective, thus: - - Third Division: Immediate: High ground north-east of Clery. - Ultimate: Bouchavesnes Spur. - - Second Division: Immediate: Bridge Head at Halle. If - crossing there impossible - then cross behind front - of Third Division. - Ultimate: Mont St. Quentin. - - Fifth Division: Immediate: Force crossing at Peronne - Bridges; if bridges gone, - follow Second Division - and aim at high ground - south of Peronne. - Ultimate: Wooded spur east of Peronne. - - Whichever Division first succeeds in crossing Somme Valley, the - other Divisions to have right of way over the same crossings. - - Each Division to employ only one Brigade until a satisfactory - footing is established on immediate objective. - - Second Division to lead the north-east movement. - - Artillery to stand as at present allotted, but liable to - re-allotment by me as operation develops. - -The above brief notes require but little elucidation. It is to -be remembered that at the time they were prepared, no definite -information had yet been received as to the condition of any of the -Somme crossings, because at that hour the river bank had not yet been -reached, and fighting on the west bank of the Somme was still going on. - -It has also to be remembered that these notes were only for my own -guidance in verbally expounding the plan, and were not actually issued -as written orders. Naturally many details, left unexpressed by the -notes, were filled in during the conference. Moreover I anticipated -that the whole operation would be one of a nature in which I would have -to intervene as the battle proceeded, in accordance with the varying -situation from time to time, and this actually proved to be necessary. - -It will be noted that on August 29th I had already reached the definite -decision not to attempt to force the passage of the Somme south of -Peronne; the 32nd Division was, however, instructed to make every -demonstration of a desire to attempt it, the object being to divert the -attention of the enemy from the real point of attack. - -This was to be launched from the direction of Clery. In preparation for -it, the Second Division sent its reserve Brigade, the 5th (Martin), to -cross the river at Feuilleres, on August 30th, to pass through the area -and front of the Third Division, and secure a bridge head on the Clery -side of the river, opposite to the Ommiecourt bend. The object was to -exploit the possibility of using the Ommiecourt crossing, and if it -were found to be intact to use it for the purpose of crossing with the -remaining two Brigades that same night. - -This move was successfully accomplished, although the 5th Brigade found -portion of the village of Clery still occupied, and that the trench -systems to the east of it were still held in strength. After much -skilful fighting, the Brigade reached its allotted destination, with -slight casualties, capturing seven machine guns and 120 prisoners. - -The bridge at Ommiecourt was found to be damaged, but repairable so -as to be usable by infantry on foot, and this work was at once put -in hand. The same night the rearrangement of the fronts of all four -Divisions in the line was carried out, and all was in readiness for the -daring attempt to break the line of the Somme. - -During the afternoon of August 30th, General Rawlinson came to see me, -and I unfolded to him the details of the operations contemplated and -the arrangements made for the next day. I have already referred to the -pleasant and attractive personality of this distinguished soldier. His -qualities of broad outlook, searching insight, great sagacity, and -strong determination, tempered by a wise restraint, never failed to -impress me deeply. He always listened sympathetically, and responded -convincingly. On this occasion he was pleased to be pleasantly -satirical. "And so you think you're going to take Mont St. Quentin with -three battalions! What presumption! However, I don't think I ought to -stop you! So, go ahead, and try!--and I wish you luck!" - - - - -CHAPTER XI - -MONT ST. QUENTIN AND PERONNE - - -From early dawn on Saturday, August 31st, until the evening of -September 3rd, three Divisions of the Australian Corps engaged in a -heroic combat which will ever be memorable in Australian history. - -At its conclusion we emerged complete masters of the situation. Mont -St. Quentin, the Bouchavesnes spur, the large town of Peronne, and the -high ground overlooking it from the east and north-east, were in our -possession. A wide breach had been driven into the line of defence -which the enemy had endeavoured to establish on the series of heights -lying to the east of the Somme and of the Canal du Nord. - -From the edges of this breach, the flanks of that portion of his line -which were still intact were being threatened with envelopment. For -him there was nothing for it, but finally to abandon the line of the -Somme, and to resume his retreat helter-skelter to the hoped-for secure -protection of the great Hindenburg Line. - -The extraordinary character of this Australian feat of arms can best be -appreciated by a realization of the supreme efforts which the enemy put -forward to prevent it. - -The shower of blows which he had received on the front of his -Second Army from August 8th onwards, had wrought upon it a grievous -disorganization. The battered remnants of his line Divisions had been -reinforced from day to day by fresh units, scraped up from other parts -of his front, and thrown into the fight as fast as they could be made -available. - -Sometimes they were complete Divisions from Reserve, often single -reserve Regiments of Divisions already deeply involved, and -sometimes even single Battalions torn from other Regiments--Pioneer -Battalions, units of the Labour Corps, Army Troops, Minenwerfer -Companies had all been thrown in, indiscriminately. - -This brought about a heterogeneous jumble of units, and of German -nationalities, for Prussians, Bavarians, Saxons and Wuertembergers were -captured side by side. The tactical control of such mixed forces, -during a hasty and enforced retreat, and their daily maintenance, must -have presented sore perplexities to the Headquarters of the German -Second Army in those fateful days. - -To meet the crisis with which Ludendorff was now confronted, he -determined to throw in one of the finest of the reserve Divisions still -left at his disposal. The Second Prussian Guards Division was sent -forward to occupy the key position of Mont St. Quentin, and to hold it -at all costs. - -This famous Division comprised among its units, the Kaiserin Augusta -and the Kaiser Alexander Regiments, almost as famous in history and -rich in tradition as are our own Grenadiers and Coldstreams. There is -no doubt that this celebrated Division fought desperately to obey its -instructions. - -For the defence of Peronne, the enemy command went even further, and -called for volunteers, forming with them a strong garrison of picked -men drawn from many different line Regiments, to man the ramparts which -surround the town. Dozens of machine guns were posted in vantage points -from which the approaches could be swept. - -All over the river flats lying in the angle of the Somme between -Clery, Mont St. Quentin and Peronne ran line upon line of barbed wire -entanglements, a legacy from the 1916 fighting, and much of this was -still intact, although breaches had been made in many places both -by the French in 1917 and by the Germans themselves, to facilitate -movement over the ground, during their respective re-occupations of -this territory. - -The terrain, which was in greater part open, and exposed in every -direction to full view from the heights, sloped gently upwards -towards the commanding knoll. Cover was scarce, and the few ruins of -brickfields and sugar refineries which dotted the landscape had also -been garrisoned by the enemy as centres of resistance, designed to -break up and dislocate any general attack. - -Our infantry was deprived of the assistance of any Tanks, for the heavy -casualties which had been suffered by this Arm made it imperative to -allow the Tank Corps time for repairs, renewals and the training of -fresh crews. Nor was any appreciable quantity of Heavy Artillery yet -available, since the congested and dilapidated condition of the roads -prevented the advance of all but a few of the lighter varieties of -heavy guns. - -The fighting of these four days was, therefore, essentially a pure -infantry combat, assisted only by such mobile Artillery of lesser -calibres as was available. - -Such was the formidable nature of the task, and of the disabilities -under which the Second, Third and Fifth Divisions approached it. -That they overcame all obstacles, gained all their objectives, and -captured nearly 2,000 prisoners, mainly from crack Prussian regiments, -constitutes an achievement memorable in military annals and standing to -the everlasting glory of the troops who took part in it.[17] - -It is difficult to write a connected and consecutive account of the -details of the fighting which took place. The most that is possible -in the brief space available is to indicate on general lines the -successive stages of the battle. Indeed, a minute account of the action -of each of the 35 Battalions engaged would only prove wearisome and -confusing. The best method of presenting a general picture of the -course of the engagement is to follow the fortunes of each Brigade in -turn. - -First in order of time, and of most importance in relation to its -immediate results, was the action of the Second Division. It was the -5th Brigade (Martin) which Major-General Rosenthal had detailed to open -the attack. The remaining two Brigades of the Divisions (6th and 7th) -received orders to rest the troops as much as possible, but to be in -readiness to move at the shortest notice. - -A Machine Gun Company (16 guns) was placed at the disposal of -Brigadier-General Martin, while the Artillery at the disposal of -the Division, comprising five Brigades of Field Artillery and one -Brigade of Heavy Artillery, remained under the personal control of the -Divisional Commander. - -The attack opened with three Battalions of the 5th Brigade in the -first line, and one Battalion in support. The total strength of the -assaulting Infantry of this whole Brigade was on this day not more than -70 Officers and 1,250 other ranks. The centre Battalion was directed -straight at the highest knoll of Mont St. Quentin, while the right -Battalion prolonged the line to the right. The left Battalion had -assigned to it as an immediate objective the ruins of the village of -Feuillaucourt, from which it was hoped that a flank attack upon the -Mount could be developed. - -The advance began at 5 a.m. It was a dull morning and still quite dark. -The two right Battalions advanced with as much noise as possible, a -ruse which secured the surrender of numbers of the enemy lying out in -advanced outpost positions. A nest of seven Machine Guns was rushed and -captured without any loss to us. - -At the appointed hour, our Artillery opened on selected targets, the -ranges being lengthened from moment to moment in sympathy with the -advance of the Infantry. Although during the advance a great deal of -machine gun fire was encountered, all went well. The centre and left -Battalions gained a footing respectively in Feuillaucourt and on the -main hill, but the progress of the right Battalion was arrested by -heavy machine gun fire from St. Denis. This was the site of a ruined -sugar refinery, and lay on the main road between Peronne and Mont -St. Quentin. It was a strong point that presented a great deal of -difficulty and held out to the last. - -The centre Battalion had by 7 a.m. passed through the ruins of Mont -St. Quentin village and had crossed the main road from Peronne to -Bouchavesnes. It now had to receive the full brunt of a determined -counter attack, at a moment when it was still disorganized and -breathless from its difficult assault. The Battalion was therefore -withdrawn across the road and firmly established itself in an old -trench system to the west of it. - -In this position it beat off five successive counter attacks, -inflicting most severe losses upon the enemy. The Brigade maintained -its position until nightfall. Its losses for the day were 380. - -In the meantime the 6th Brigade (Robertson) of the Second Division had -been ordered to cross the Somme and move up behind the 5th Brigade, -in readiness to carry on the attack, and obtain possession of the -remainder of the main spur of Mont St. Quentin. As this Brigade only -entered into the fight at a later hour, I must revert to the events of -the forenoon of August 31st. - -It was about 8 a.m. that I was able to report to General Rawlinson, -by telephone, that we had obtained a footing on Mont St. Quentin -itself. He was at first totally incredulous, but soon generously -congratulatory, proclaiming that the event was calculated to have a -most important influence upon the immediate future course of the war. -He expressed the hope that we should be able to hold on to all that we -had gained. - -To this task I now had to bend myself, and I found it necessary to put -a severe strain upon the endurance and capacity of the troops. Great as -had always been my concern in the pitched battles of the days recently -passed to reduce to very definite limits the demands made upon the -physical powers of the Infantry soldier, a juncture had arrived and -a situation had been created, which demanded the utmost rapidity in -decision and action, and a relentless insistence upon prompt response -by the troops. - -The 5th Brigade had been thrust out nearly two miles beyond our -general line. Its flanks were in the air. It was undoubtedly fatigued. -Everything must be done and done promptly to render it adequate -support, to take advantage of its success, and to ensure that its -effort had not been in vain. - -It will be remembered that the Fifth and Second Divisions had both been -instructed to endeavour to secure a crossing over the river. Whichever -Division first succeeded was to accord right of way to its neighbour. -No success had yet attended the efforts of the Fifth Division, the main -Peronne bridges being still inaccessible from the south. The bridge -sites were under the enemy's fire, which precluded the possibility of -repair; and the approaches to them were also swept by Machine Gun fire. - -The Second Division, on the other hand, had during the past 48 hours -succeeded in making the Feuilleres bridge traffickable for guns and -vehicles, and those at Buscourt and Ommiecourt for foot traffic. It -transpired later that the enemy, rightly suspecting that I would -attempt to use this latter crossing, kept it under heavy Artillery fire -all day. - -As soon as I had formed a judgment on the situation, about 8.30 a.m. -(August 31st), I issued instructions to General Hobbs immediately to -put in motion his reserve Brigade, the 14th (Stewart). He was to direct -it towards the Ommiecourt crossing, and later in the day to pass it -across the river and through the ground won that morning by the 5th -Brigade, with a view to developing at the earliest possible moment an -attack in a south-easterly direction upon the town of Peronne itself. -The ultimate objective was still to be the high ground south and east -of Peronne. His 8th Brigade was also to be held ready to move at the -shortest notice. - -It was a serious performance to demand, and it was fraught with many -risks. There was no time to assemble responsible Commanders concerned, -separated as they were by long distances over bad and congested roads. -In the absence of properly co-ordinated action, there was every chance -of confusion, and cross-purposes, and even of collision of authority -arising from the troops of one Division passing over ground under the -tactical control of another Division. - -But the only alternative was to do nothing and attempt nothing. That -would have been the worst of bad generalship, and it was an occasion -when risks must be taken. - -The course of subsequent events fully demonstrated that the only true -solution was the one chosen, for the whole of the defences of Peronne -were thereby taken with a rush, while they were still being organized -by the enemy. The delay of only a day or two would have meant that -the capture of Peronne would have been many times more costly than it -actually proved to be. - -The 14th Brigade had before it a march of some seven miles to -bring it into a position in which it could deploy for an attack on -Peronne. Working according to text book such a march could have been -accomplished in something under three hours. It took the Brigade over -ten hours. For the line of march lay across the very worst of the -shell-torn, tangled country enclosed in the great bend of the Somme, -and progress was most difficult and exhausting. Frequent halts were -necessary to rest the men, and restore order to the struggling columns. - -Discovering the impossibility of crossing the river at Ommiecourt, the -Brigade made a wide detour to cross by the newly established bridge at -Buscourt. It arrived there just at the same time as the 7th Brigade -(Wisdom), which Rosenthal had also directed to the same point for the -same purpose. This occurrence illustrates the nature of the risks of -a hastily developed tactical plan. However, the good sense of the -Commanders on the spot obviated any serious confusion and the 7th -Brigade gave the 14th Brigade the right of way. - -The 14th Brigade completed its march during the hours of falling -darkness and, passing through Clery, came up on the right of the 6th -Brigade, in readiness for the combined attack by the two Divisions at -dawn on September 1st. - -The night that followed was a stressful one for all Commanders. -Divisional Generals had to co-ordinate all action between their -Brigadiers, and their Artillery. The Brigadiers in turn had afterwards -to assemble their Battalion Commanders, and decide on detailed plans -of action for each separate unit. Distances were long, the country was -strange, roads were few and unfamiliar; so that it is not surprising -that the last conferences did not break up until well into the small -hours of September 1st. There was no sleep that night for any senior -officer in the battle area. - -September 1st was a day full of great happenings and bloody hand to -hand fighting. The assault by the 6th Brigade passing over the line -won the day before by the 5th Brigade carried it well over the crest -of Mont St. Quentin, and confirmed for good and all our hold on that -imperious fortress. Few prisoners were taken, for it was bayonet work -over every inch of the advance, and the field was strewn all over with -enemy dead. The impetus of the 6th Brigade assault carried our line 600 -yards to the east of the summit of the knoll. - -It is difficult to allocate, in due proportion, the credit for the -capture of this important stronghold between the two gallant Brigades -concerned. It is true that the 6th Brigade did on September 1st achieve -the summit of the Mount; but it is equally true that it only completed -what the 5th Brigade had so wonderfully begun the day before. No one -will grudge to either of the two Brigades their share of the honour -that is due to both. - -The action of the Second Division on that day was completed by the -bringing up of the 7th Brigade into a position of support behind the -6th Brigade, thereby relieving the 5th Brigade from further line duty. - -Although the action of the individual Brigades of all the three battle -Divisions must necessarily be narrated separately and with some -attempt at a proper chronological sequence, yet it would be a mistake -to suppose that their actions were independent of each other. On the -contrary, they all operated as part of a comprehensive battle plan, -which necessarily took full account of the interdependence of the -course of events in different parts of the field. - -Thus the advance on this day of the 6th Brigade materially assisted -the attack on Peronne by the 14th Brigade, while the progress of the -latter removed much trouble from the southern flank of the 6th Brigade. - -The men of the 14th Brigade that day had their mettle up to a degree -which was astonishing. On the occasion of the great attack of August -8th, and ever since, it had been the cruel fate of this Brigade to be -the reserve unit of its Division on every occasion when there was any -serious fighting in hand. The Brigade felt its position very keenly. -As one Company Commander, who distinguished himself in that day's -fighting, afterwards picturesquely put it: "You see! We'd been trying -to buy a fight off the other fellows for a matter of three weeks. On -that day we got what we'd been looking for, and we made the most of -it."[18] - -The 14th Brigade advanced to the assault at 6 a.m. concurrently with -the eastern thrust of the 6th Brigade. One Battalion, with two others -in support, was directed against St. Denis, while the fourth made -a direct attack on Peronne. Many belts of wire had to be struggled -through. There was much machine gun fire, from front and flanks, and -it looked as if further progress would be impossible. Nevertheless, -this gallant Brigade, by persistent effort, made itself master of the -western half of Peronne. - -The attack on St. Denis at first made very slow progress, the enemy -holding out resolutely in the ruins of that hamlet, and in the adjacent -brickfields. During the day, the 15th Brigade made spirited attempts to -effect the crossing of the river, and to co-operate from the south. - -The records of the events of these three days are confused and -discontinuous. Many of the men who could have filled in the gaps of the -story were unfortunately killed or evacuated as casualties. But from -the mass of reports, the salient facts emerge clearly. - -The 15th Brigade succeeded, on September 2nd, in putting a Battalion -across the river, and this assisted the 14th Brigade to "mop up" the -remainder of the town of Peronne. Later the rest of the 15th Brigade -and two Battalions of the 8th Brigade (Tivey) were also drawn into the -fighting. St. Denis and the brickfields fell to us during this period. - -Although the situation, from the point of view of the advance -eastwards, remained almost stationary, it was a time of fierce local -fighting. Many deeds of valour and sacrifice adorn the story. - -It was late on September 3rd that the effects of this long-sustained -struggle became apparent. The whole of Peronne and most of the high -ground in its vicinity were, by then, definitely in our hands, and -although the little suburb of Flamicourt held out determinedly for -another day, the further resistance of the enemy began to fade away. - -Doubtless the loss of Mont St. Quentin was a controlling factor in the -decision which was forced upon him to undertake a retreat, for with -that eminence in our possession, he could not have maintained himself -for many days in the town, nor would its retention have been of any -tactical value to him. - -As an immediate result, the high ground of the Flamicourt spur just -south of Peronne fell into our hands on September 3rd, and the enemy -outposts spread along the banks of the marsh in front of the 32nd -Division sought safety from complete envelopment by a hasty withdrawal; -a number of their isolated posts were, however, left unwarned of this -retreat, so that these were, later on, captured by us from the rear. - -I must now briefly turn to the doings of the Third Australian Division -during these four epic days. Its three Brigades (9th, 10th and 11th) -daily performed prodigies of valour. The Division carried our line, -inexorably, up the Bouchavesnes spur in a north-easterly direction. The -seizure of this very important ground not only powerfully aided but -also strongly confirmed our seizure of Mont St. Quentin. - -The Division, having been given its general role, was necessarily left -to a large extent to decide for itself its detailed action from day to -day, seeing that it still had to perform the function, inevitable for a -flank Division, of a link with my neighbouring Corps. Fortunately the -arrival of a new, fresh Division (the 74th) from the Eastern theatre -of war, which came into the Third Corps and was promptly thrown in, -enabled that Corps to keep up fairly well with the general advance. - -The British Third Army, too, was now beginning to make its pressure -felt, and was approaching the line of the Canal du Nord over a wide -front. The Third Division was therefore free to conform its forward -movement to that of the rest of the Australian Corps; its energetic -action gave me elbow room for the manoeuvring of so many Brigades in -the region of Clery, and its capture of so much valuable ground east of -the Canal du Nord served greatly to widen the breach. - -By the night of September 3rd, the main tactical purposes on which -the Corps had been launched on August 29th had been achieved in their -entirety. Their execution furnishes the finest example in the war -of spirited and successful Infantry action conducted by three whole -Divisions operating simultaneously side by side. - -Lord Rawlinson has more than once referred to the operation as the -finest single feat of the war. Inevitably the dramatic and unlooked -for success of the Second Division in the rapid storming of the Mount -enthrals the imagination and overshadows all the other noteworthy -incidents of these pregnant days. But none will begrudge the rain of -congratulations which fell upon the head of Major-General Rosenthal. -A massive man, whose build belies his extraordinary physical energy, -he always was an egregious optimist, incapable of recognizing the -possibility of failure. That is why he invariably succeeded in all -that he undertook, and often embarked upon the apparently impossible. -An architect before the war, he served for the first two years as an -Artillery officer, both as a Brigade Commander and as a General of -Divisional Artillery. He gained his Infantry experience as Commander -of the 9th Brigade, and so was well qualified by versatile service to -assume the command of the Second Division. His leadership of the latter -contributed in no small measure to the fame which it has won. - -The text of the congratulatory message issued on this occasion by the -Fourth Army read as follows: - - "The capture of Mont St. Quentin by the Second Division is a feat - of arms worthy of the highest praise. The natural strength of the - position is immense, and the tactical value of it, in reference - to Peronne and the whole system of the Somme defences, cannot be - over-estimated. I am filled with admiration at the gallantry and - surpassing daring of the Second Division in winning this important - fortress, and I congratulate them with all my heart. - - "RAWLINSON." - -[Illustration: MAP E] - -I am concerned nevertheless that the fine performance of the Fifth -Division should not be underrated. The circumstances under which -General Hobbs was called upon to intervene in the battle, at very short -notice, imposed upon him, personally, difficulties of no mean order. I -am prepared to admit quite frankly that the demands which I had to make -upon him, his Staff and his Division were severe. - -Following upon four days of arduous pursuit, his troops were called -upon to undertake a long and difficult march over a most broken -country, to be followed by three days of intensive fighting of the most -severe character. - -General Hobbs was, first and foremost, a lover of the Australian -soldiers, and their devoted servitor. He belonged to that type of -citizen-soldier who, before the war, had spent long years in preparing -himself for a day when his country would surely require his military -services. Like several of the most successful of Australia's generals, -he had specialized in Artillery, and was, in fact, selected as the -senior Artillery Commander of Australia's first contingent. That -fact alone was the stamp of his ability. While he would be the last -to lay claim to special brilliance, or outstanding military genius, -he nevertheless succeeded fully as the Commander of a Division, by -his sound common sense, and his sane attitude towards every problem -that confronted him. He possessed also the virtue of a large-hearted -sympathy for all subordinate to him; and that gave him a loyal -following, which carried him successfully through several great crises -in the affairs of the Fifth Division. - -This period was one of those crises. When, late on the afternoon of -August 31st, he urged upon me with much earnestness the stress upon his -troops, and repeated the anxious representations of his Brigadiers--I -was compelled to harden my heart and to insist that it was imperative -to recognize a great opportunity and to seize it unflinchingly. His -response was loyal and whole-hearted. His Division followed the lead -which he thus gave them, and he led them to imperishable fame. - -Considerable redispositions followed upon the transfer of my battle -front to the country east of the Somme. These, and the reasons which -governed their nature, chief among which was the resumption of the -enemy's rearward movement, I shall deal with in due course. - -Battle problems on the grand scale were, for the moment, relegated to -the background, and there now arose a multitude of other problems, -almost equally burdensome, relating to the supply and maintenance of -the Corps. - -Every Corps must be based upon a thoroughly reliable and efficient line -of supply, and for this a railway in first-class operating condition is -a prime essential. Every kind of requisite must be carried by rail to -some advanced distribution point called a "railhead." Thence supplies -are distributed by motor lorry to the areas still further forward. - -The appropriate distance of the railhead behind the battle front is -conditioned by the available supply of motor lorries, and their range -of action. If the distance be too great the stress upon the mechanical -transport becomes so severe that it rapidly deteriorates, and an undue -proportion of lorries daily falls out of service. As the facilities -for repair in the mobile workshops are strictly limited, an excessive -rate of wastage among these vehicles soon dislocates the whole supply -arrangements. - -The experience hitherto gained had demonstrated that a railhead could -not conveniently be allowed to fall behind our advance more than ten or -twelve miles. This limit had already been reached when the Corps front -arrived on the west bank of the Somme, and the strain upon the lorry -service was already great. - -For a further deep advance of the whole Corps in pursuit of the enemy -towards the Hindenburg Line, still distant another fifteen miles, it -became imperative, therefore, that the railway service to Peronne -and beyond should be speedily reopened, or some equally efficient -alternative provided. The great lattice girder railway bridge at -Peronne had been irretrievably demolished. Engineers estimated that it -would take two months to restore it, and at least a month to provide -even a temporary deviation and crossing. Nevertheless, the work was put -in hand without delay. - -An alternative possibility was to construct a new line of railway to -connect the existing military line at Bray to the Peronne railway -station, a length of new construction amounting to some six miles. It -was estimated that such a link could be built in a fortnight, and this -work also was commenced forthwith. - -There was a third possibility. This was speedily to repair that -portion of the railway which lay west of the Somme, and to establish -a railhead near Peronne, but on the opposite bank of the river. This -proposal involved only a few days' work, for extensive sidings already -existed on the west bank, and had been left more or less undamaged by -the enemy. But it also involved the complete restoration of all road -traffic bridges, both at Peronne and at Brie, for the service of the -intense traffic which would ensue across the Somme from such a point of -departure. - -The rebuilding of the crossings was, in any case, a matter of urgent -necessity. By this time all my heaviest guns had already been brought -up to the vicinity of the west bank of the Somme, and had there -perforce to wait; for a long detour, on the densely-crowded roads, to -cross the Somme, say as far back as Corbie, where bridges were strong -and grades were easy, was out of the question. - -The problem, therefore, involved a stable and comprehensive -reconstruction; half measures would not meet the case. But half -measures were an inevitable necessity of the situation, to begin -with, because troops had to be fed, and their supplies could be -carried in no lighter way, in adequate quantities, than in the normal -horse-transport wagons. - -The order of procedure had, therefore, to be, firstly, hastily to -reconstruct some sort of bridging, based generally upon the wreckage -of the original bridge, and strong enough to carry loads up to those -of horsed wagons; next to stay, strut and strengthen these temporary -bridges to fit them for the passage of the lighter guns, and finally to -reconstruct them in their entirety for the heaviest loads. - -At a point such as the southern entrance to Peronne, where the -approaches could not be conveniently deviated, the difficulties of -such successive reconstructions, while the flow of traffic had to be -maintained, can hardly be fully realized. - -For many days, in the early part of September, Brie, Eterpigny and -Peronne were scenes of feverish activity. Every available technical -unit that could be spared from other urgent duty was concentrated upon -this vital work. Most of the Engineer Field Companies, three of the -five Pioneer Battalions, both Tunnelling Companies, and all the Army -Troops Companies, laboured in relays, night and day. - -Hundreds of tons of steel girders, of all lengths and sections, were -hurried up, by special lorry service. Pile-driving gear was hastily -improvised. The wreckage of the original bridges was overhauled for -sound, useful timbers. The torn and twisted steelwork was dragged out -of the way by horse or steam power, and tumbled in a confused mass into -the river bed. Hammer, saw and axe were wielded with a zest and vigour -rarely seen in peace-time construction. The whole work was supervised -by my Chief Engineer, Brigadier-General Foott, and was later, when the -advance of the Corps was resumed, completed by the Army authorities. -The speed and punctuality with which the first temporary viaducts were -completed and ready for use were exemplary, and reflect every credit -upon Foott and his helpers. Within forty-eight hours bridges usable for -ordinary supplies and for field guns became available, and thereafter -were rapidly strengthened by successive stages. - -The whole work of restoration, in which the Australian technical -services played so prominent a part, won the highest praise from the -Field Marshal, who expressed his appreciation in a special message of -thanks to these services. - -The congestion of traffic at the Peronne bottleneck was, however, -serious. Blocks occurred, reminiscent of those which are familiar in -the heart of London when the dense traffic is temporarily held up by -a passing procession. Marching troops always had the right of way; -and a Division on the move up to or back from the line meant a severe -super-load upon the already overtaxed road capacity. - -Sometimes a block of traffic would occur for an hour at a time, and a -motley collection of vehicles, stretching back for miles, would pile up -on the roads. The capabilities of a very able road and traffic control -service, numbering hundreds of officers and men, acting under the -direction of my Provost Marshal, were often severely tested. More than -once my own motor car was unavoidably held up at this bottleneck for -half an hour at a time, on occasions, too, when the situation required -my urgent presence at some important meeting. - -All these minor embarrassments arising from the passage by the -Australian Corps of a great military obstacle such as the Somme were, -however, soon dissipated. The Somme had loomed large, for many days, in -the minds of all of us--first as a problem of tactics, and next as a -problem of engineering. Before the end of the first week of September -the Somme had ceased to hold our further interest. It had become a -thing that was behind us, both in thought and in actuality. - -The enemy was once more on the move, and it became our business to -press relentlessly on his heels. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[17] The following telegram, selected at random from the files of -September 1st, indicates the extraordinary mixture of units which the -enemy had collected to defend this vital point: - - "To Australian Corps Intelligence from 2nd Division--sent September - 1st at 7 p.m. Identifications from prisoners examined since noon: - 28th R.I.R.; 65th I.R.; 161st I.R.; 94th I.R.; 95th I.R.; 96th - I.R.; Alexander Regt.; Augusta Regt.; 4th Bav. I.R.; 8th Bav. I.R.; - 25th Bav. I.R.; 447th I.R.; 2nd G. Guard F.A.R.; 221st F.A.R.; 2nd - Co. M.G. Corps; 67th Pioneer Co.; 3rd Army Troops; 102nd Pioneer - Bn. of 2nd Guards Div.; 402nd M.W.Co.; 185th R.I.R. A pioneer of - the 23rd Co. has been retained for 5th Aust. Div. to remove charges - from bridges not yet blown. Prisoner 96th I.R. says Regt. came - up for counter-attack night 31-1 to retake Mt. St. Quentin, but - counter-attack did not come off, owing to attack expected from - us. All prisoners interrogated agree that line was to be held - at all costs. Regiments are now considerably intermingled and - disorganized." - -(NOTE.--I.R.--Infanterie Regiment; R.I.R.--Reserve Infanterie Regiment; -M.W.Co.--Minenwerfer Compagnie; Bav.--Bavarian.) - -[18] Mr. Hughes, the Commonwealth Prime Minister, visited the -battlefield of Mont St. Quentin, with a distinguished company, on -September 14th. The officer in question, standing near the summit -of the hill, was about to relate his experiences, and this was his -preamble. - - - - -CHAPTER XII - -A LULL - - -During the closing days of August events had commenced to move rapidly; -for the offensive activities initiated by the Fourth Army, three weeks -earlier, began to spread in both directions along the Allied front. - -The Third British Army had entered the fray on August 21st; the First -British Army was ready with its offensive on August 26th, on which -date the Canadian Corps, restored to its old familiar battleground, -delivered a great attack opposite Arras. - -The French, who, on my right flank, had along their front followed up -the enemy retirement begun after the battle of Chuignes, reached Roye -on August 27th, and Noyon on August 28th. Their line, however, still -bore back south-westerly from the vicinity of the river near Brie and -St. Christ. - -By August 29th the line of the First Army had reached and passed -Bapaume, and that of the Third Army cut through Combles. The Third -Corps, on my immediate left, had made good its advance as far as -Maurepas. - -Thus, the thrust of the Australian Corps beyond the Canal du Nord, on -August 31st to September 3rd, formed the spearhead which pierced the -Somme line, and the Corps was still leading the advance both of the -French and the British. - -From the morning of September 4th the evidences of the enemy's -resolution to withdraw to the Hindenburg Line became hourly more -unmistakable. His Artillery fire died down considerably, particularly -that from his long range and high velocity guns. These were probably -already on the move to the rear, in order to clear the roads for his -lighter traffic. - -[Illustration: The Hindenburg Line Wire--near Bony.] - -[Illustration: The 15-inch Naval Gun--captured at Chuignes, August -23rd, 1918.] - -The high ground near Biaches (west of Peronne) provided a vantage point -from which an extensive view of the whole country could be obtained. -There lay before us, beyond the Somme, a belt about eight miles deep, -which had scarcely suffered at all from the ravages of the previous -years of war. - -It was gently undulating country, liberally watered, and heavily -wooded, especially in the minor valleys, in which snuggled numerous -villages still almost intact and habitable, although, of course, -entirely deserted by the civilian population. - -Beyond this agreeable region there began again an area of devastation, -which grew in awful thoroughness as the great Hindenburg Line was -approached some six miles further on. For, through the autumn and -winter of 1917, and up to the moment of the German offensive in March, -1918, it was there that the British Fifth Army had faced the enemy in -intensive trench fighting. - -In all directions over this still habitable belt there were now signs -of unusual life and activity. Columns of smoke began to rise in the -direction of all the villages. Sounds of great explosions rent the air. -These were sure indications that the enemy was burning the stores which -he could not hope to salve, and was destroying his ammunition dumps -lest they should fall into our hands. - -A vigorous pursuit was now the policy most to be desired. But my troops -in the line were very tired from the exertions of a great struggle, -and many of the units, by reason of their battle losses, required time -to reorganize and refit. It was also essential that no rapid advance -should be attempted until the arrangements for supply, depending upon -the completion of the Somme crossings, had been assured. - -The general line of advance of the Corps had, during August, been in a -due easterly direction. The operations about Peronne had necessitated -a drive north-easterly, and the advance of my Third Division up the -Bouchavesnes spur had carried them square across the line of advance of -the Third Corps. - -The first step was to restore our original Corps boundaries, and to -resume the original line of advance. By arrangement with General -Godley, his 74th Division took over the ground captured by my Third -Division, which was thereby released and enabled to concentrate, for a -couple of days' rest, in the Clery region. The Second Division employed -its 7th Brigade on September 2nd and 3rd to advance our line beyond -Haut Allaines, another two miles east of Mont St. Quentin, routing from -the trenches of that spur the strong rearguards which the enemy had -posted for the purpose of delaying us. - -On the night of September 4th the 74th Division took over the Haut -Allaines spur also, thereby releasing my Second Division, and the -latter was withdrawn to the Cappy area for a thorough and well-deserved -rest. - -Meanwhile, the 32nd Imperial Division, availing itself of the temporary -crossings which had hastily been effected over the Somme, brought its -front up, on the eastern bank of the river, level with the line which -had by September 4th been reached by the Fifth Australian Division. - -On September 5th, therefore, I had, east of the Somme, two Divisions in -the line, the 32nd on the right or south, the Fifth Australian on the -left or north, each operating on a frontage of two Brigades, with one -Brigade in reserve. This was, however, quite a temporary arrangement, -devised merely to allow time for the Third Division to reorganize and -resume its place in the front line of the general advance. - -The general withdrawal of the enemy, over a very wide front, now began -to effect a very substantial reduction of the length of frontage which -he had to defend. The enemy communiques and wireless propaganda of that -time busied themselves with the explanation that the withdrawals in -progress were being deliberately carried out for the very purpose of -releasing forces from the line to form a great strategic reserve. - -These protestations did not deceive us, nor did we on our part fail -also to take full advantage of the steady shortenings of the Allied -front. Marshal Foch decided once again to readjust the international -boundary, and my own front was thereby considerably shortened. The -French took over from the 32nd Division all ground south of the main -Amiens--St. Quentin road; and that road henceforth became my southern -boundary. - -This, coupled with the readjustment of the northern boundary with the -Third Corps, as already narrated, reduced the total frontage for which -I remained responsible to about ten thousand yards, an extent which -was never again exceeded. It was still, however, in my judgment, too -long a frontage for an effective pursuit by only two Divisions, and -arrangements were initiated on the same day to bring back the Third -Division into line. - -During September 5th I advanced my front to the line Athies--Le -Mesnil--Doingt--Bussu. Severe fighting took place near Doingt. -Opposition came mainly from machine guns; but isolated field-guns -also gave us trouble. We captured that day about a hundred and fifty -prisoners. - -Next day my Third Division came into the line on the north. I divided -my frontage equally between the three Divisions, placing each on a -single Brigade front. This was, in fact, a repetition of the order of -battle which had carried us so successfully and rapidly up to the Somme. - -Each front line Brigade took up the role of Advanced Guard to its -Division. The 11th Brigade led the Third Division; the 8th Brigade led -the Fifth Division, while the 97th Brigade covered the 32nd Imperial -Division. - -For the first time in the war I found an opportunity of employing -my Corps Cavalry (13th Australian Light Horse) on other than their -habitual duty of carrying despatches, or providing mounted escorts to -convoys of prisoners of war. Here at last was a chance for bold mounted -tactics, as the county was mainly open and free of wire and trenches. - -To each Division I therefore allotted a squadron of Light Horse for -vanguard duty, together with detachments of the Australian Cyclist -Battalion. These troops more than justified their employment by -bold, forward reconnaissance, and energetic pressure upon the enemy -rearguards. - -So promising, indeed, was the prospect of the useful employment of -cavalry, that I prevailed upon the Army Commander to endeavour to -secure for my use a whole Cavalry Brigade. Brigadier-General Neil Haig -(cousin of the Field Marshal) was actually sent for and placed under -my orders. I duly arranged a plan of action with him, but before the -1st Cavalry Brigade, stationed many miles away, had completed its -long march into my area, the situation had already changed, and the -employment of Cavalry on the Fourth Army front had to be postponed -until a much later date. - -A juncture had arrived when it became imperative for me to consider the -possibility of affording some relief to the three line Divisions; all -of them had been fighting without respite since August 27th. The troops -were so tired from want of sleep and physical strain that many of them -could be seen by the roadside, fast asleep. These three Divisions had -almost reached the limits of their endurance. - -It was essential, however, that they should be called upon to yield -up the last particle of effort of which they were capable. Every mile -by which they could approach nearer to the Hindenburg defences meant -a saving of effort on the part of the fresh waiting Divisions, whom -I had earmarked for the first stage of our contemplated assault upon -that formidable system; a system which I knew to be too deep to be -overwhelmed in a single operation. - -It was for this reason that I was compelled to disregard the evident -signs of overstrain which were brought to my notice by the Divisional -Generals and their Brigadiers, and which were patent to my own -observation of the condition of the troops. I arranged, however, two -measures of immediate relief, the first being to set a definite limit -of time for the further demands to be made upon the line Divisions. -This was fixed for September 10th. The second was to issue orders that -the rate of our further advance was to be controlled by consideration -for the well-being of our own troops, and not by the rate of the -enemy's retreat. If, in consequence, any gap should eventuate, touch -with the enemy was to be kept by the mounted troops and cyclists. - -The preliminary steps for effecting the reliefs thus promised for -September 10th were begun on September 5th. The Corps was, as stated, -on a three Division front. I had only two fit Divisions in Corps -Reserve (_i.e._, the First and Fourth), the Second Division being -not yet rested. My representations to the Army Commander on this -matter bore immediate fruit; for he placed under my orders the Sixth -(Imperial) Division (one of the first seven Divisions of the original -Expeditionary Force). Before, however, I could take advantage of -this windfall, the constitution of the Fourth Army underwent a vital -alteration, of which more will be told later. - -The First and Fourth Divisions had been resting since August 26th. They -had had time to reorganize their units, to reclothe and refit their -troops, to receive and absorb reinforcements, and to fill vacancies -among leaders. Staffs had been able to deal with a mass of arrears. The -men had enjoyed a pleasant holiday in the now peaceful Somme Valley, -far in rear, a holiday devoted to games and aquatic sports. Horse and -man, alike, were refreshed, and had been inspired by the continued -successes of the remainder of the Corps. - -They were however, by now, far in rear; and it was out of the question -to tax their restored energies by calling upon them to march back to -the battle zone. The Fourth Army, as always, extended its sympathetic -help; two motor bus convoys, each capable of dealing with a Brigade -group a day, were speedily materialized from the resources of G.H.Q. - -The completion of the moves of these two Divisions from the back area -to within easy marching distance of the battle front therefore occupied -three days. The use of mechanical transport for the execution of troop -movements has now entirely passed the experimental stage, and in future -wars, calculations of time and space will be vitally affected, whenever -an ample supply of lorries or buses and suitable roads are available -for the rapid concentration or dispersal of large bodies of troops. - -The Australian soldier is individually philosophic and stoical, but -in the mass he is sensitive to a degree; and he is intelligent enough -to realize how he is used or misused. It was the subject of complaint -among the troops during the earlier years of the war, that while they -were indulgently carried by lorries into the battle at a time when they -were fresh and fit, they were invariably left to march long distances, -out of the battle, when they were on the verge of exhaustion. I -therefore tried, whenever possible, to provide tired troops with the -means of transport to their rest areas, a facility which was always -highly appreciated by them. - -By the time the First and Fourth Divisions had thus been assembled in -the forward areas, ready to relieve the Third and Fifth Divisions, -these latter, together with the 32nd Division, had advanced our front -approximately to the line Vermand--Vendelles--Hesbecourt, carrying -it to within three miles of the front line of the Hindenburg defence -system. - -There can be no doubt, however, that the rate of our advance, retarded -as it had been for the reasons already explained, had proceeded much -more rapidly than suited the enemy. - -A steady stream of prisoners kept pouring in, captured in twos and -threes, all along my front, by my energetic patrols. Numerous machine -guns were taken; and in the vicinity of Roisel, fully three hundred -transport vehicles and much engineering material were captured, which -the enemy had been compelled to abandon in haste. - -At this juncture the British High Command arrived at the important -decision to enlarge the Fourth Army, by adding another Corps; doubtless -contemplating the possibility of operations on a large scale against -the Hindenburg defences in the near future. - -A new Corps Headquarters, the Ninth, was to be reconstituted under -Lieut.-General Braithwaite, and he was to become my neighbour on my -southern flank, interposed between me and the French. Braithwaite -had been Chief of Staff to Sir Ian Hamilton during the Dardanelles -Expedition, and I had seen much of him there. I was to have the -advantage, therefore, of having old Gallipoli comrades on either flank, -Braithwaite on the south, and Godley on the north. - -The immediate result of this decision, which came into effect early on -September 12th, was that the 32nd Division, which had been under my -orders for nearly four weeks, passed over to the Ninth Corps. Lambert, -his Staff and his Division had served me well and efficiently, and I -was sorry to lose them out of my Corps. - -With the impending further shortening of my front, I had no -justification for pressing to be permitted to retain this Division. On -the contrary, my representations to General Rawlinson had always been -in favour of shortening my frontage to the effective battle standard -of August 8th, so that the Corps might at any time be in a position to -embark on a major operation, with its whole resources in Artillery and -Infantry concentrated, as on that occasion, upon a relatively narrow -objective. My greatly extended front, and the direct control of the -affairs of six separate Divisions, had been a heavy burden, involving -great and manifold responsibilities. - -According to my promises to the remaining two line Divisions, the Fifth -and Third, these were duly relieved on September 10th by the First and -Fourth Divisions, the former on the north, the latter on the south. -Each Division had a frontage of about four thousand yards, but this was -to diminish rapidly, if the advance of the Corps continued, by reason -of the fact that my southern boundary now became the Omignon River, -whose course ran obliquely from the north-east. - -While all these changes in dispositions were being effected, there -was breathing time to give attention to a heavy mass of arrears of -work; for there could be no question of undertaking an attack on the -Hindenburg defences without most careful and exhaustive preparation. - -For this the time was not yet ripe. It would still take some days to -bring forward the remainder of my heaviest Artillery, to advance the -railheads, to replenish the ammunition depots and supply dumps, and to -re-establish telegraph and telephone communications. - -Another good reason for a more leisurely policy on the front of the -Fourth Army lay in the events on other portions of the Allied fronts. -By September 4th the German withdrawal had become general on all fronts. - -It had become clear that the enemy's retirement to his former position -of March, 1918, was not to be confined to those fronts on which he had -been receiving such punishment. All evidence pointed to the fact that -his present strategy was to take up as speedily as possible a strong -defensive attitude, behind the great system of field works, which had -already served him so well during 1917, at a time when a considerable -proportion of his military resources was still involved on the Russian -and Roumanian fronts. - -His retirement before the First and Third British Armies was proceeding -methodically, and on September 5th the French were crossing the Vesle, -between Rheims and Soissons. All was going well; and those in the -confidence of our High Command knew that, on any day now, news might be -expected of the first great attack to be made by the American Army, to -be directed against the St. Mihiel Salient on the Alsace front. - -This latter attack actually opened on September 11th, and it was -clearly sound military policy to wait for a few days, in order -correctly to diagnose the effect of these operations upon the enemy's -distribution of forces. - -Information as to the locations and movements of all the enemy -Divisions was in these days voluminous, accurate and speedy. Prisoners -and documents were daily falling into the hands of the Allies over the -whole length of the Western Front. His Divisions in the front line were -identified daily by actual contact. As to those resting or refitting -or in reserve, accurate deductions could be made from the mass of -information at our disposal. - -It was at this time that it began to be made clear to us that the -enemy's mobile reserves had been almost completely absorbed into the -front line. One Division after another, particularly among those which -had been engaged against the Australian Corps in August, was being -disbanded. Among these were the 109th, 225th, 233rd, 54th Reserve, and -14th Bavarian Divisions. - -The strength of the enemy's remaining Divisions was also rapidly -diminishing. From prisoners we learned that many Battalions now -had only three Companies instead of four, many Regiments only two -Battalions instead of three, and even the Company strengths were at a -low ebb. - -We could well afford to approach the immediate future with greater -deliberation. - -Since August 8th, the Corps front had already advanced twenty-five -miles, and it was not long before I had to abandon the luxurious -chateau of the Marquis de Clermont-Tonnere, at Bertangles, whose -spacious halls and spreading parks had formed so pleasant a habitation -for the whole of my Corps Headquarters. - -The scale of comfort possible for all senior Commanders and Staffs -rapidly declined as the advance developed. Generals of Corps, Divisions -and Brigades had to be content with living and office quarters in a -steadily descending gradation of convenience. From chateau to humbler -dwelling house, and thence into bare wooden huts, and later still into -mere holes hollowed out in the sides of quarries or railway cuttings, -were the stages of progress in this downward scale. - -My Headquarters moved from Bertangles to a group of village houses at -Glisy on August 13th; thence on August 31st to Mericourt, where the -best had to be made of a derelict, much battered and almost roofless -chateau, which the Germans had rifled of every stick of furniture, and -even of all doors and windows, in order to equip a large collection of -dug-outs in a neighbouring hill-side. - -Again on September 8th I moved into the very centre of the devastated -area lying in the Somme bend, on to a small rise near Assevillers, -where a number of tiny wooden huts served us as bedrooms by night and -offices by day. Only one hut, more pretentiously brick-walled and -evidently built for the use of some German officer of high rank, was -available to fulfil the duties of hospitality. - -In spite of such discomforts, the daily life at Corps Headquarters -flowed on uninterruptedly in its several quite distinct activities. On -the one hand, there was the grim business of fighting, the detailed -conduct of the battle of to-day, the troop and artillery movements -for that of to-morrow, the planning of the one to be undertaken still -later; rounds of conferences and consultations; visits to Divisions and -Brigades, and to Artillery; reconnaissances to the forward zone; and an -intent and ceaseless study of maps and Intelligence summaries. - -Hourly contact with Headquarters of Fourth Army and of flank -Corps had to be maintained. Then, following the day's strenuous -activities out of doors, there was at nights a never-diminishing mass -of administrative work, disciplinary questions, honours, awards, -appointments, promotions, and a formidable correspondence which must -not be allowed to fall into arrear. - -Again, in the back areas there were the unemployed Divisions of -the Corps, who must be regularly visited, both at training and at -play. There were medals and ribbons to be distributed to the gallant -winners; addresses to be delivered; and the work of reorganizing -and refitting the resting units to be supervised. Still further in -rear, demonstrations of new experiments in tactics or in weapons, or -in mechanical warfare, had frequently to be attended, for study and -criticism. - -And lastly there was the social life of the Corps; for its performances -were beginning to attract attention beyond the limited, if select, -circles of the Fourth Army. A steady stream of visitors began to set -in. It was a necessary burden that suitable arrangements for their -reception and entertainment had to be maintained. - -The duties of hospitality had been simple at a time when Corps -Headquarters was still housed in palatial chateaux, situated in country -hitherto untouched by the war, and within easy reach of all supplies. -It was a very different matter to offer even reasonable comfort to a -visitor at a time when Government rations constituted the backbone of -our fare, when there were only bare floors to sleep upon for those who -were not fortunate enough to possess a camp bed or valise, and when -even an extra blanket or pillow or towel was at a premium. - -Yet we were always most glad to see visitors, and those of them who -were soldiers had, of course, a full understanding of our limitations. -It was not always so with others who, in the earlier years of the war, -when all Corps had a fixed location and had achieved a high standard of -domestic comfort, had been accustomed to an adequate reception. - -Upon the whole, our guests were indulgent, and understood that the -stress of current events placed a very strict limit upon the amount of -time that the members of my Staff or I could devote to them. - -[Illustration: MAP F] - -Among many other distinguished men whom I had the honour to receive -were members of the War Cabinet, such as Lord Milner, then Secretary of -State for War, and Mr. Winston Churchill, the Minister of Munitions; -public men, such as Sir Horace Plunkett and Robert Blatchford; eminent -authors, such as Sir Conan Doyle, Sir Gilbert Parker and Ian Hay; -famous artists, such as Louis Raemakers, Streeton and Longstaff; -celebrated journalists, like Viscount Burnham, Thomas Marlowe and Cope -Cornford; together with many representatives of the Royal Navy, and of -the armies of our Allies, and Attaches from all the Allied Embassies. - -The Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Haig, was a frequent caller, and -never departed without leaving a stimulating impression of his placid, -hopeful and undaunted personality, nor without a generous recognition -of the work which the Corps was doing. - -General Birdwood, also, the former Corps Commander, who now commanded -the Fifth Army, paid several visits to the Corps, travelling long -distances in order to speak a few encouraging words to the Commanders -and troops with whom he had formerly been so long and so closely -associated. He, too, was always a most welcome visitor. Although since -the previous May he had ceased to control the fighting activities of -the Corps, this did not lessen the intense pride which he took in its -daily successes. - -Many of our civilian visitors thirsted for the noise and tumult -of battle, and were most keen to get under fire, even if only of -long-range artillery fire. This was a constant source of anxiety to -me, for it was an unwritten law that the responsibility of their safe -sojourn in the Corps area rested with me. More often than not they -had to be dissuaded from visiting the forward zone, and induced to -spend their available time in inspecting some of our show spots in the -rearward areas, such as the Calibration ranges, or the Corps central -telegraph station, or the Tank park, or even the Prisoner of War Cages, -and the numerous depots of captured guns and war trophies. - -The Corps prisoners' cage was always, throughout the period of our -active fighting, a scene both of great interest and much activity. -Although all prisoners of war had to be evacuated to the rear usually -within about twenty-four hours of their admission, and every day a -batch marched out under escort, yet the Corps cage between July and -October was never empty. - -When early in July the stream of prisoners began to flow in, and -thereafter grew steadily stronger, my Intelligence Service, headed by -Major S. A. Hunn, rose thoroughly to the occasion. Among our troops -sufficient numbers of all ranks proficient in the German language -were speedily found. After a little training they learned to deal -expeditiously with the lengthy searchings and interrogations which -followed the arrival of all new-comers. - -Documents of every description found upon prisoners excepting their -pay-books, were seized and examined. The German soldier is an -inveterate sender and recipient of picture postcards. It was surprising -how much information of an invaluable character could be gleaned from -a postcard. A date, a place name, the number of a Unit or Regiment, -the name of a Commander, reference to a train journey or a fight, are -often sufficient, when read by an expert in relation to the context, -to furnish definite information of the whereabouts of a Division, or -of the fact that it has been or is about to be disbanded, or of its -intended movement to some other part of the front, or of the losses -which it has suffered. - -All these scraps of information, when compared with similar items -gathered on other fronts, soon enabled the whole story of all movement -that was going on behind the enemy's lines to be deduced from day to -day with wonderful completeness. - -So, also, maps, sketches, copies of orders, or of battle instructions, -and the contents of note-books and of personal diaries always repaid -the closest scrutiny. Such study produced results which, even if not of -immediate value to me, were nevertheless passed on to the Army, and by -them broadly promulgated, in daily summaries, for the benefit of all -our other Corps. - -The oral interrogation of the prisoners, particularly of officers, -often produced results of first-class importance. Information as -to dispositions, intentions, new tactical methods or new weapons -frequently emerged from these inquiries. It was rare that prisoners -refused to talk, and rarer still for them to attempt to mislead with -false information. If they did attempt it, the interrogating officer -was usually sufficiently well-informed upon the subject of inquiry to -be able to detect the inconsistency. - -As the prisoners were invariably examined separately, it was never -difficult to discriminate between the true, upon which the majority of -them were in agreement, and the false, upon which the minority never -agreed. - -Should the prisoner prove uncommunicative or deceitful, then if he -were of sufficient education to make it worth while, the Intelligence -Officer had yet another method, besides direct questioning, at his -disposal. - -For a certain number of our own men, who could speak German fluently, -and who had been carefully tutored in their role, were provided with -enemy uniforms, and allowed to grow a three-days' beard, so as to -impersonate prisoners of war. These men, so equipped, were called -"pigeons." A pigeon would be ostentatiously brought under escort -into the prisoners' cage, and would sojourn for a day or more in a -compartment of it among the specially selected genuine prisoners. He -would indicate by a secret sign the time when he should himself be led -to the Intelligence Office for interrogation. It was seldom that he -came away empty-handed. - -The demeanour of our captives, on reaching the cages, varied widely, -according to the stress which they had undergone. Some wore an air of -abject misery, and were thoroughly cowed and subservient. Others were -defiant, sulky and even arrogant. - -Our treatment of them was firm, but humane. Physically, they had -nothing to complain of; they were fed and quartered on the same -standard as our own men. But they were given to understand from the -very outset that we would stand no nonsense, and that they must do -exactly what they were told. Few of them ever gave us any real trouble. - -The subsequent employment of prisoners of war did not come under my -jurisdiction, and it was seldom that any prisoner working parties were -available to me. My Corps area rarely extended sufficiently far back -from the front line to carry it beyond the zone in which, by agreement -between the belligerents, the employment of prisoners of war was -forbidden. - -Australian soldiers are nothing if not sportsmen, and no case ever -came under my notice of brutality or inhumanity to prisoners. Upon the -contrary, when once a man's surrender had been accepted, and he had -been fully disarmed, he was treated with marked kindness. The front -line troops were always ready to share their water and rations with -their prisoners, and cigarettes were distributed with a liberal hand. - -On the other hand, the souvenir-hunting instinct of the Australian -led him to help himself freely to such mementos as our orders had not -forbidden him to touch. Prisoners rarely got as far as the Corps cage -with a full outfit of regimental buttons, cockades, shoulder-straps, -or other accoutrements. Personal trinkets, pay-books, money and other -individual belongings were, however, invariably respected; unless, as -often happened, the prisoners themselves were anxious to trade them -away to their captors, or escorts, for tobacco, chocolates, or other -luxuries. - -Before I leave the subject of prisoners I should mention my impression -of the German officers, particularly of those who were more senior in -rank. Whenever a Regimental or Battalion Commander was captured, and -time permitted, he was brought before me for a further interrogation. -It was an experience which was almost universal that such officers were -willing to give me little information which might injure their cause; -on the other hand, they exhibited an altogether exaggerated air of -wounded pride at their capture, and at the defeat of the troops whom -they had commanded. - -It was that feeling of professional pique which dominated their whole -demeanour. They were always volubly full of excuses, the weather, the -fog, the poor _moral_ of their own men, the unexpectedness of our -attack, the Tanks, errors in their maps--anything at all but a frank -admission of their own military inferiority. - -There were two amusing exceptions to this experience. The day after -the fighting for Peronne, when a large batch of the prisoners then -taken was being got ready to march out of the Corps cage, officers in -one enclosure, other ranks in another, the senior German officer, a -Regimental Commander, formally requested permission to address some -eighty other officers present in the cage. This request was granted. - -He told them that they had fought a good fight, that their capture was -not to their discredit, and that he would report favourably upon them -to his superiors at the first opportunity. He then went on to say that -on his own and on their behalf he desired to tender to the Australians -an expression of his admiration for their prowess, and to make a frank -acknowledgment to them that he fully recognized that on this occasion -his garrison had been outclassed, out-manoeuvred, and out-fought. The -whole assembly expressed their acquiescence in these observations by -collectively bowing gravely to the small group of my Intelligence -Officers who were amused spectators of the scene. - -On another occasion--it was just after the battle of September 18th--I -was asking a German Battalion Commander whether he could explain why it -was that his men had that day surrendered in such large numbers without -much show of resistance. "Well, you see," said he, with a twinkle in -his eye, "they are dreadfully afraid of the Australians. So they are of -the Tanks. But when they saw both of them coming at them _together_, -they thought it was high time to throw up their hands." - -But this story is slightly anticipatory. The short breathing-space -which had been afforded by our more leisurely advance towards the -Hindenburg system was over. By September 12th I was once again immersed -in all the perplexities of shaping means to ends. I had to decide, in -collaboration with the Army Staff and the Corps on my flanks, first, -the extent of the resources which would be required, and second, the -successive stages which would offer promise of success in overthrowing -the last great defensive system of all those which the enemy had -created upon the tortured soil of France. - - - - -CHAPTER XIII - -HARGICOURT - - -The great Hindenburg system, by which name it has come to be known -to English readers, or the "Siegfried Line," as it is called by the -Germans, was brought into existence during the winter of 1916 and early -spring of 1917 in order to fulfil a very definite strategic purpose. -This was to put into effect, on a stupendous scale, a very elementary -principle of minor tactics, namely, that field works are constructed -for the purpose of reducing the number of men required to defend a -given front or locality. - -In themselves, field fortifications have, of course, no offensive value -whatever, but their use permits a reduced number of men to defend one -place, in order that a greater number of men may be available to attack -another place. - -The German High Command proceeded to make use of this principle on a -scale previously unknown in history. The whole of the Western front, -in Belgium and France, was to be held defensively throughout 1917. The -military resources required to defend that front were to be reduced -to a minimum, by the provision of a line of defences protected by -powerful field works, believed to be impregnable. This would liberate -the greatest possible resources for the Eastern front, where an end -could be made of the Russians and Roumanians there. As soon as these -were disposed of, those troops, guns and aeroplanes could again be -transferred to the West, in order similarly to dispose of the remainder -of our Alliance. - -This great strategic plan was carried out in its entirety until the -middle of 1918. It was the great Hindenburg line which had been the -kernel of the whole conception, and, until the days which we are now -approaching, it had remained, practically over its whole length, an -impregnable barrier against the assaults of the French and British. - -It is to be remembered that the very basis which justified the -expenditure of such enormous labour on the creation of these defences -was the saving in man-power. It is an accepted principle of tactics -that in any given battle the advantage always rests heavily on the side -of the defence. Where numbers, resources and _moral_ are equal, no -attack can hope to succeed. - -If, in the teachings before the war, it was correct to say that a -Commander should hesitate to attack unless he had a preponderance -of men and guns of at least two to one, such a dictum assuredly did -not take into account field defences of the permanent and elaborate -character of the Hindenburg Line. I should hardly venture to fix a -ratio of relative strength appropriate in such circumstances. - -But this much is clear. The Germans had once already relied -successfully upon the impregnability of this great work. They had every -justification for believing that it would once again serve them to -keep us at bay for just a few weeks longer. Winter was very near, and -the Entente peoples might not have been able to hold together to face -another year of war. - -We, on our part also, had as much justification for the resolve that -every sacrifice must be made to overthrow these defences before the end -of 1918, and for believing that it would require a great, concerted and -intense effort to succeed in this. - -It is quite necessary, for a due appreciation of the magnitude of the -effort which was actually made, and of the wonderful success with which -it was rewarded, that the nature of the defences of the Hindenburg Line -should be clearly understood. This can best be done, I think, by making -an endeavour to realize the sense of security which the possession of -such a line of defence must have afforded to the enemy. We are here -interested only in that portion of the line which extends from St. -Quentin northwards towards Cambrai. - -Between these two cities the country is higher than that adjoining -it on the north and the south. It forms, therefore, a watershed, -dividing the basin of the Somme from that of the Scheldt. Early in -the nineteenth century, Napoleon realized the ambitious project of -connecting these two river systems by a great Canal scheme, cutting -right through this high country from south to north. - -The canal is called, in its southern reaches, Canal de St. Quentin. -Before Cambrai is reached it merges into the Canal de l'Escaut. -Throughout the whole of that portion which concerns us, it runs in a -deep cutting, reaching, for great stretches, a depth of 50 to 60 feet. -In certain places where the ground rises still higher, the canal passes -through in great tunnels. The southernmost, or Le Tronquoy Tunnel, -near St. Quentin, is but short; the northern boasts of the imposing -length of 6,000 yards, and extends from Bellicourt,[19] at its southern -portal, to Le Catelet at its northern one. From that point northwards -the canal flows in "open cut" which gradually becomes shallower as -Cambrai is approached. - -The canal excavation--except where the tunnels occur--itself affords -an excellent military obstacle, the passage of which could be stoutly -contested by resolute troops well dug in on its eastern banks, for -the descent and ascent of the slopes could be obstructed by wire -entanglements, and swept with fire. The water alone, which is too deep -to be waded, would seriously impede infantry, while the passage of -tanks, guns and vehicles would be impossible once the few high level -bridges over the canal had been destroyed. - -Such an obstacle would not, however, of itself fulfil the requirements -of modern war, with its searching and destructive Artillery fire. -It was to be regarded more as the foundation upon which a complete -system of defences could be built, and as a last line of resistance _a -outrance_. - -The canal had been, naturally, located by its engineers, in the lowest -ground available, so that its course closely follows the lines of the -minor valleys and depressions of the ground. On both sides, therefore, -the canal is flanked by somewhat higher ground, from which its -immediate banks can be overlooked. On the western side particularly, -there is a regular line of such higher plateaux on which the villages -of Villeret, Hargicourt and Ronssoy once stood. - -It was clearly desirable both to deprive a besieger of such vantage -ground, and also to provide the canal defences with a stout outpost -defence. For these reasons, the Germans had constructed an elaborate -system of trenches on a line generally parallel to and on the average -a full mile west of the canal. These trenches had been perfected with -dug-outs, concrete machine gun and mortar emplacements, and underground -shelters. They were protected by belt after belt of barbed wire -entanglements, in a fashion which no one understood better, or achieved -more thoroughly, than the Germans. - -But much more remained. Deep communication trenches led back to the -canal banks, in the sides of which tier upon tier of comfortable living -quarters for the troops had been tunnelled out. Here support and -reserve troops could live in safety and defy our heaviest bombardments. -They could be secretly hurried to the front trenches whenever danger -threatened. - -There was, indeed, a perfect tangle of underground shelters and -passages. Roomy dug-outs were provided with tunnelled ways which led to -cunningly hidden machine-gun posts, and the best of care was taken to -provide numerous exits, so that the occupants should not be imprisoned -by the blocking of one or other of them by our bombardment. But it was -the barbed wire which formed the groundwork of the defence. It was -everywhere, and ran in all directions, cleverly disposed so as to herd -the attackers into the very jaws of the machine guns. - -The stretch of 6,000 yards of the canal which had been tunnelled was, -however, both a hindrance and a benefit to the perfection of the -scheme. On the one hand, the advantage of the open cut, as a last -obstacle, was lost. Its place had to be taken by a second complete -system of trench and wire defences, roughly following the line of the -tunnel, but of course far above the latter. On the other hand, the -tunnel itself afforded secure living accommodation for a substantial -garrison. - -The Germans had collected large numbers of canal barges, and had towed -them into the interior of the tunnel, mooring them end to end. They -served as living quarters and as depots for stores and munitions. It -was no great business to provide electric lighting for the tunnel. -Indeed, the leads for this purpose had been in existence before the -war. Here, again, underground shafts and ways were cut to enable the -troops rapidly to man the trenches and machine guns, and as rapidly to -seek a safe asylum from the heaviest shell fire. - -The whole scheme produced, in fact, a veritable fortress--not one, -in the popular acceptation of the term, consisting of massive walls -and battlements, which, as was proved in the early days of the war -at Liege and Namur, can speedily be blown to pieces by modern heavy -artillery--but one defying destruction by any powers of gunnery, and -presenting the most formidable difficulties to the bravest of Infantry. - -Even this was not all. On the east side of the St. Quentin Canal and -parallel to it were built still two further trench lines, both fully -protected by wire entanglements, and capable of determined defence. The -first of these is the Le Catelet line, about one mile distant from the -canal. It skirts and embraces the villages of Nauroy and Le Catelet, -while two miles still further east is the Beaurevoir line, the last or -most easterly of all the prepared defences which the Germans had in -France. - -Neither of these latter trench systems was nearly so formidably -prepared as the main systems previously described, but together with -them they go to make up the whole Hindenburg defensive system. In this -region that system runs generally due north and south, with many minor -convolutions in its line. It is altogether some 41/2 miles across from -west to east. - -As its overthrow could not be attempted in a single operation, it is -necessary for clearness of description to give definite names to each -of the successive lines of trenches which go to form the whole defence -system. Taking them in the order in which we attacked them, from west -to east, they will be referred to as: - - The Hindenburg Outpost line (known also in this part of - the field as the Hargicourt - line). - The Hindenburg main line (_i.e._, the Canal and Tunnel line). - The Le Catelet line. - The Beaurevoir line. - -[Illustration: Australian Artillery--going into action at Cressaire -Wood.] - -[Illustration: Battle of August 8th, 1918--German prisoners being -brought out of the battle under the fire of their own artillery.] - -During the winter of 1917-1918 the British Fifth Army and the Germans -had faced each other in this region for many months. On our side, also, -a system of field defences had been developed. They fell far short, -indeed, of the completeness and ingenuity of the German works, because -the latter had been constructed at leisure, long before, while ours had -been built under the very fire of the German guns. - -For months the opposing Artilleries had pounded the country to pieces, -effaced every sign of civilization, and churned up the ground in all -directions over a belt some three miles wide. Heaps of broken bricks -marked the sites of once prosperous villages. Broken telegraph poles, -charred tree trunks, twisted rails, a chaos of mangled machinery, were -the only remains of what had once been gardens, orchards, railways -and factories. The whole territory presented the aspect of a rolling, -tumbled desert from which life itself had been banished. - -This was the region whose western verge the vanguard of the Australian -advance approached on September 11th, on a frontage of about 8,000 -yards, the northern extremity directed on Bellicourt, the southern on -Bellenglise. That is to say, if our further advance had but continued -unimpeded in the same due easterly direction, it would have brought us -square upon the open excavation of the canal, and just clear and to the -south of the Bellicourt--Le Catelet tunnel. Some significance attached -to this circumstance, as will later appear. - -Now, some little time before, an event of peculiar interest had -occurred. This was the capture, on another front, of a very -ordinary-looking transport vehicle loaded high with miscellaneous -baggage. Little escaped the inquisitive eyes of the British -Intelligence Service, which speedily discovered that among this baggage -there safely reposed a large collection of maps and documents. On -examination these proved to be nothing less than the complete Defence -Scheme of the whole "Siegfried" system, in that very sector which now -lay before the Australian Corps. - -These papers were carefully overhauled and arranged. There were -dozens of accurately drawn detailed maps, and minute descriptions of -every tactical feature of the defences. The position of every gun -emplacement was given; every searchlight, machine-gun pit, observation -post, telephone exchange, command station and mortar emplacement was -clearly marked; the topographical and tactical features of the ground -were discussed in minute detail, and plans for the action of every -individual unit of the garrisons were fully displayed. - -Naturally, an army of translators and copying clerks was set to work -upon this precious find, and my Intelligence Service was kept busy for -many days in making for me digests of those items likely to prove of -special interest. It had, of course, to be remembered that the Defence -Scheme had been brought into operation for the campaign of 1917, and it -remained to be seen to what extent it might by now have become obsolete. - -It was hardly to be expected that the enemy would adhere to it in its -entirety, especially if he were aware, as I was bound to assume that -he was, that all this information had fallen into our hands. But the -Scheme contained a full exposition of many important topographical -facts which it was in any case beyond his power to alter, and which it -was of priceless value for me to know. - -Although I had to devote hour upon hour to a concentrated study of -these papers, it proved to be in greater part labour in vain so far -as the Australian Corps was concerned, because it ultimately came -about that although I did carry out the attack upon the Hindenburg -outpost line in my present sector, the attack upon the Hindenburg -main line, which I was, later, called upon to make, took place in the -next adjoining sector to the north, _i.e._, the Bellicourt tunnel -sector, to which these captured documents only incidentally referred. -Nevertheless, the Ninth Corps, under Braithwaite, ultimately got the -full benefit of these discoveries. - -The production of these documents on September 10th formed the -starting point of the discussions which were now initiated in the -Fourth Army upon the question of the series of operations necessary -to overthrow the Hindenburg defences. General Rawlinson, on September -13th, asked his three Corps Commanders (Butler, now restored to -health and back at duty, Braithwaite and myself) to meet him at my -newly-installed hutted camp at Assevillers. There, quite informally, -over a cup of afternoon tea, the great series of operations took birth -which so directly helped to finish the war. - -It was decided that the operation must necessarily be divided into -two main phases--separated in point of time by an interval of several -days for further preparation. All of us recognized the impossibility -of overrunning, in a single day, so deep and formidable a system of -defences, in such tortured country, and in weather which was already -becoming unsettled. - -The first phase was to be an attempt to capture the Hindenburg outpost -line, along the whole Army front. The French and the Third British -Armies were to be asked to make a synchronized attack on the same -objective. The three Corps of the Fourth Army were to attack upon the -frontages and in the sectors on which they then stood. The date was -left undecided, but all were to be ready at three days' notice. - -One important consideration was the meagre supply of Tanks available. -The operations of August had been costly, not to say extravagant, in -Tanks, and General Elles' repair workshops, manned largely by very -competent Chinese coolie mechanics, had been working night and day ever -since to repair the minor damages, and new Tanks were steadily arriving -from England to replace those damaged beyond repair. But no large -contingent of Tanks was to be expected until towards the end of the -month. The upshot was that I was to be content with only eight Tanks -for use in the contemplated operation. - -Late the same afternoon I communicated to Generals Maclagan and Glasgow -an outline of the probable role of their respective Divisions in the -very near future. - -In the meantime, the front-line troops had not been idle. My orders -were that the First and Fourth Divisions were to carry the line -forward as far as possible towards the Hindenburg outpost line, without -committing the Corps to an organized attack. They were to operate by -vigorous patrol action against enemy points of resistance, for the -enemy had evidently no intention of quietly giving up the ground which -lay between us and the Hindenburg outpost line. On the contrary, he -had posted strong rearguards on every point of tactical value, and did -his best to keep us as long as possible at arm's length, and beyond -striking distance of his first great line of defence. - -These orders were entirely to the taste of the two Divisions now in the -line. The First Division had served its apprenticeship to that very -kind of fighting in the Merris area in the previous spring, and the -Fourth Division did not mean to be a second best. Each Division stood -on a one-Brigade front, being ordered to keep its other two Brigades -well out of harm's way and resting, for any great effort that might be -required. - -The next few days witnessed some daring exploits on the part of the -13th Brigade of the Fourth Division and the 2nd Brigade of the First -Division in the capture of tactical points, and in the bloody repulse -of all attempts by the enemy to recapture them. In this way our line -was carried up to and a little beyond what had been the old British -reserve line of trenches of March, 1918, which lay within 5,000 -yards of the final objective of the first phase of the contemplated -operations. - -On September 16th I called together the whole of the Commanders -who were to participate in the next great battle, Maclagan (Fourth -Division), Glasgow (First Division), Courage (Tanks), Chamier (Air -Force), Fraser (Heavy Artillery), and the four Generals of my own -Staff. The conference took place in a Y.M.C.A. marquee erected near -Maclagan's Headquarters, and I was able to announce that the date had -been fixed for September 18th. - -The contemplated battle presented only a few novel features. The -methods of the Corps were becoming stereotyped, and by this time we -all began to understand each other so well that most of what I had to -say could almost be taken for granted. Each Commander was ready to -anticipate the action that would be required of him, almost as soon as -I had unfolded the general plan. - -The shortage of Tanks was a source of much anxiety to me. I felt that -it would mean a heavier risk to the Infantry, and the contemplation -of losses among our splendid men, which might be lessened by the -more liberal use of mechanical aids, always sorely troubled me. I -endeavoured to meet the situation by adopting two unusual expedients. - -The first was to _double_ the machine-gun resources of the two battle -Divisions. This was effected by bringing up the complete machine-gun -battalions of the Third and Fifth Divisions, and adding them to those -of the line Divisions. This gave me a total of 256 Vickers Machine Guns -on a frontage now reduced to 7,000 yards. It enabled me to deliver -so dense a machine-gun barrage, advancing 300 yards ahead of the -infantry, that to quote the words of a German Battalion Commander who -was captured on September 18th: "The small-arms fire was absolutely too -terrible for words. There was nothing to be done but to crouch down in -our trenches and wait for you to come and take us." - -The other expedient was amusing, although no less effective. This was -to make up for the shortage of real Tanks by fabricating a number of -dummy ones. As soon as the word went round Engineers and Pioneers vied -with each other in rapid "Tank" manufacture. Dumps and stores were -clandestinely robbed of hessian, paint, wire nails, and battens, and -some weird monstrosities were produced. The best and most plausible of -them were selected, and actually used on the day of the battle. Four -men dragged out each dummy, before dawn, into a position from which -it was bound to be seen by the enemy and there abandoned it. There -is little doubt that this trick contributed its share to the day's -astonishing success. - -Once again, also, I put into practice the principle of an Artillery -barrage plan reduced to the utmost simplicity. This, as already -described, consisted in having the line, on which were to fall the -shells from the whole of the barrage guns employed, perfectly straight -across the whole front, so as to avoid all complexities in fire -direction. - -The first line on which the barrage fell was called the Artillery -"Start Line," and from such a line the barrage advanced, by regular -leaps or "lifts" of 100 yards at a time, in perfectly parallel lines, -until the final objective was reached. Now, experience had shown that -such a start line for the Artillery should be at least 200 yards in -advance of the line on which the Infantry were to form up ready for -the assault. A liberal margin of space had to be allowed, in order to -minimize the risks to our own Infantry. - -The Artillery "Start Line" was defined on our fighting maps. The guns -were laid upon it by methods which depended upon accurate surveys, -on the ground, of the exact position of every gun. When that had -been determined, the map and compass helped to decide the range and -alignment upon which the gun should open fire. - -On the map, also, was drawn another line 200 yards short of, or on our -side of the Artillery "Start Line," and this was called the Infantry -"Start Line." It then became necessary to determine, upon the actual -ground, the position of this Infantry Start Line, and to mark it in -such a way that the Infantry would be enabled to take up their correct -positions. This would ensure that the Infantry would know that the fall -of our opening barrage would be 200 yards in advance of the line so -marked. - -This delicate work of marking out of the Infantry Start Line on the -ground was invariably entrusted to the Engineers attached to the -Brigades co-operating in the attack. The marking was done by laying out -and pegging down broad tapes of white linen, which could be recognized -in the dim light of early dawn. The whole work, had, of course, to be -done unobserved by the enemy, and it was always a dangerous task. - -Only the fact that we were in possession of reliable large scale -maps, recording every feature of the ground, made it possible for -the Engineers, resourceful as they were, to do this delicate work -with reasonable accuracy. The battered condition of the country was -always a difficulty; for it was never easy to recognize, on the -ground, reference points, such as a road intersection, or the corner -of a field, or a crucifix or similar land mark, which might aid the -surveyors in getting their bearings. - -[Illustration: MAP G] - -The Infantry Start Line had, naturally, to be located so that the -ground upon which the tapes were to be pegged down was ground which -was already within our possession, or accessible to us without coming -dangerously near the enemy. It was a necessary consequence that -portions of our always irregular front line of posts or trenches would -lie beyond or on the enemy's side of the tape line. - -It was always a rule of our practice, therefore, that any Infantry -posted in advance of the taped line should be withdrawn, behind the -tapes, an hour before the time of Zero. It was also customary to order -that all assaulting troops should be spread, in their appropriate -dispositions, along the tape line, also one hour before Zero. - -The result of these arrangements was that for the last hour before the -actual opening of the battle, all Infantry intended to take part in -the assault was deployed along the tapes in a perfectly straight line, -all along the battle front, while no troops previously in occupation -of posts or trenches in advance of the tapes were left out in front, -exposed to the risk of either being hit by our own Artillery, or -mistaken, in the half light of dawn, for enemies by our own Infantry. - -Complex and difficult as these arrangements may appear from this -description, they worked out in actual practice with the utmost -smoothness. The resulting simplification of the Artillery plans, in -this as in similar previous battles, more than justified their adoption. - -A liberal use was also made of direction boards, which marked the -routes by which each separate body of assaulting Infantry should, -during the last night, march from its place of assembly to the taped -line or "jumping off" line, and also to mark the position which it was -to take up upon that line. Each board had painted upon it the name of -the unit to which it referred. Such preparatory measures, troublesome -as they were, greatly reduced the risk of any confusion or mistake, and -lessened the fatigue of the assaulting troops. - -The moon would set, on the morning of the battle, at 3.37 a.m., and the -sun would rise at 6.27 a.m. Zero hour, for the opening of the attack, -was therefore fixed for twenty minutes past five. - -Operations began inauspiciously. A soaking rain set in some two hours -before, and made movement over the broken, clayey surface anything but -pleasant. Although the troops were soon drenched to the skin, this did -not in any way damp their spirits. It probably added much to the misery -of the enemy, who could hardly fail to realize that, on any morning, a -fresh attack might break upon him. - -Modern war is in many ways unlike the wars of previous days, but in -nothing so much as in the employment of what I have more than once -referred to as "set-piece" operations. The term is one which should -convey its own meaning. It is the direct result of the great extension, -which this war has introduced, of mechanical warfare. It is a -"set-piece" because the stage is elaborately set, parts are written for -all the performers, and carefully rehearsed by many of them. The whole -performance is controlled by a time-table, and, so long as all goes -according to plan, there is no likelihood of unexpected happenings, or -of interesting developments. - -The Artillery barrage advances from line to line, in regular leaps, at -regulated intervals of time, determined beforehand, and incapable of -alteration once the battle has begun. Should the rate prove too slow -and the Infantry could have advanced more quickly, it cannot be helped, -and no great harm is done. On the other hand, if there be any risk of -the barrage rate being too fast, one or two halts of ten or fifteen -minutes are often introduced into the time-table to allow the infantry -line, or any part of it which may be hung up for any reason, to catch -up. - -Following the barrage, comes line upon line of infantry in skirmishing -order, together with the line of Tanks when such are used. The foremost -lines advance to capture and hold the ground, the lines in rear to "mop -up" and deal with the enemy either showing fight or hiding underground, -the rearmost lines collect prisoners or our own wounded, or carry -supplies, tools and ammunition. - -In a well-planned battle of this nature, fully organized, powerfully -covered by Artillery and Machine Gun barrages, given a resolute -Infantry and that the enemy's guns are kept successfully silenced by -our own counter-battery Artillery, nothing happens, nothing can happen, -except the regular progress of the advance according to the plan -arranged. The whole battle sweeps relentlessly and methodically across -the ground until it reaches the line laid down as the final objective. - -Such a set-piece battle lasts usually, from first to last, for 80 to -100 minutes; seldom for more. When the Artillery programme is ended -the battle is either completely won, or to all intents and purposes -completely lost. If the barrage for any reason gets away from our -Infantry, and they are relegated to hand to hand fighting in order -to complete their advance, the battle immediately assumes a totally -different character, and is no longer a set-piece affair. - -It will be obvious, therefore, that the more nearly such a battle -proceeds according to plan, the more free it is from any incidents -awakening any human interest. Only the externals and only the large -aspects of such battles can be successfully recorded. It is for this -reason that no stirring accounts exist of the more intimate details of -such great set-pieces as Messines, Vimy, Hamel and many others. They -will never be written, for there is no material upon which to base -them. The story of what did take place on the day of battle would be a -mere paraphrase of the battle orders prescribing all that was to take -place. - -On the other hand battles such as the second phase of August 8th, -the battle for Mont St. Quentin, and the later battles of Bony and -Beaurevoir were not set-piece operations. Therefore the developments -from hour to hour, and even from moment to moment, are full of intense -human interest, and replete with tales of individual courage and -initiative. Some day, when all the material has been gathered, an abler -pen than mine will write their story. - -If the reader will bear in mind all these considerations, with special -reference to the battle of Hargicourt on September 18th he will -realize that, in describing the dispositions, the objectives, the -time-table and the preparations for the battle, I have told practically -all that there is to tell of the course it took, except only as regards -the results actually achieved, in ground won and prisoners taken. - -It has been difficult, nevertheless, to refrain from dwelling in detail -upon the performances and experiences in battle of the individual -fighting men. Any attempt to do so would, however, prove hopelessly -inadequate. The numbers engaged were always so large, their activities -so varied, the conditions of each battle so different in detail, that -to do adequate justice and avoid unfair discrimination would make -impossible demands upon the space available to me. - -Popular interest naturally centres upon the Infantry, not only because -they are the most numerous, but also because they are invariably in -the forefront of the battle and often in immediate contact with the -enemy. Without the slightest disparagement to the important role of the -Infantryman and to the valour which its performance demands, it must -never be forgotten that the work of the Artillery, Engineers, Pioneers, -Machine Gunners, Trench Mortars, Air Service and Tanks is in every way -equally important and essential to the success of any battle operation. -Yet it is equally true that no battle can be won without the Infantry. - -In a deliberately prepared battle it is not too much to say that the -role of the Infantry is not, as a rule, the paramount one, provided -that all goes well and that there is no breakdown in any part of the -battle plan. That does not, however, imply that the Infantry task makes -no high demand upon courage and resolution. On the contrary, these -are the essentials upon which the success of the Infantry role and -therefore of the whole battle depends. - -The primary duty of the Infantry, in an assault covered by an Artillery -barrage, is to follow up the barrage closely. The barrage is nothing -more nor less than a steady shower of shells, bursting over the very -heads of the leading lines of Infantry, and striking the ground some 80 -to 120 yards in front of them. This shower is usually so dense that -three to four shells per minute fall on every twenty yards of frontage. -It is so intense a fire that no enemy, however courageous, could remain -exposed to it. It falls on one line for three or four minutes, while -the Infantry lie down flat. Suddenly, the barrage "lifts" or advances -100 yards. At a signal from the platoon or company commander the whole -line rises and rushes at top speed to catch up to the barrage, again to -throw itself flat upon the ground. - -So long as no enemy are encountered, these successive rushes may go -on without check for hundreds of yards. If during the course of any -rush, trenches or strong points are met with and they contain enemy -who do not immediately surrender, prompt use must be made of rifle and -bayonet. But it is the primary business of the leading line of Infantry -to push on and not to delay by engaging in close combat. The second and -third lines of Infantry are there to "mop up," that is, to dispose, by -destruction or capture, of any enemy overrun or ignored by the leading -line. Where Tanks co-operate that is also their special business, and -when it has been attended to they go forward at top speed to rejoin the -leading line. - -In such a methodical way the advance continues until the final -objective is reached. This event can be recognized by the Infantry -in any of three ways, firstly by reference to the clock time; for -the arrival of the barrage at any line on the map or ground occurs -in pursuance of a definite time-table; secondly by the topographical -features, and thirdly by the expedient of maintaining the barrage -stationary at the final objective for fifteen to thirty minutes. In -some battles, I also adopted the device of firing from every gun in the -barrage, three rounds of smoke shell in rapid succession, as a signal -to the Commanders of the leading line of Infantry to call the final -halt, to select a good line for trenches, and to dig-in rapidly, a -process technically called "consolidation." - -It would be too much to hope that in an attack covering a front of four -or five miles, every part of the line should be able to advance without -any check whatever up to the final halting place. But the expectation -always is that by far the greater part of the whole line will be able -to do so. If, here and there along the front, platoons or even whole -companies were to be held up or delayed by special difficulties or -obstacles such as thickets, or copses strongly manned by the enemy, or -by belts of wire, or village ruins, such breaks in the general line of -advance would matter but little to the success of the operations as a -whole. The gaps discovered in the leading line of Infantry, when it -had come to a halt at the final objective, would be speedily filled by -supporting troops from both flanks of the gap, and thereby the enemy -holding out further back, would be completely enveloped. His surrender -would follow as soon as he realized his position, and that he had been -cut off from any contact with his friends in his rear. - -Such is the normal course of the Infantry action in a pitched battle. -It makes great demands upon the iron resolution of the Infantryman to -push on vigorously against all obstacles, and to put forth his utmost -physical powers to keep up with the barrage, especially when the ground -is wet and sticky, or when uncut wire has to be crawled through. All -this he must do, utterly regardless of the enemy fire which may be -directed against him, whether from Artillery or machine guns. His best -hope of immunity is always to make his rush rapidly and determinedly, -and to get to ground immediately that he reaches the halting place, -close up to the barrage, when signalled by his officer. - -Very different from such a stereotyped procedure is the action of the -Infantry in any operation or any part of an operation which partakes -of the character of open warfare. The main tactical purpose is still, -as before, to advance to the seizure of an appointed objective, but -there is no barrage, no time-table, no fixity of route, no prescribed -formation or procedure. Everything must be left to the judgment, -initiative and enterprise of the leader on the spot. - -The tactical unit of Infantry is the platoon. The action of a whole -battalion is compounded merely of the separate actions of its sixteen -platoons, each performing the separate role, in a general plan, that -may be laid down by the Battalion Commanders, some to advance and -fight, some to act in support, some to lie in reserve, some to engage -in a flank attack, others to fetch and carry food, water and munitions. - -The platoon is commanded by a Lieutenant and comprises four sections, -each under a Sergeant or Corporal. There are two sections of riflemen, -a Lewis gun section and a section of rifle grenadiers. Each section may -consist of from five to eight men. Let it be supposed that it is the -business of the platoon to capture a small farmhouse which the enemy -has fortified and in which he is holding out. Always supposing that the -enemy garrison is not of a strength requiring more than one platoon -for its capture the normal action of the attacking platoon would be -somewhat as follows. The Lewis gun section would, from a concealed -position, on one flank, keep the place under steady fire. The rifle -grenadiers from the same or another flank would fire smoke grenades to -make a smoke screen. One section of riflemen would endeavour to sneak -up depressions and ditches or along hedges, so as to get well behind -the farm and threaten it by fire from the rear. The other section of -riflemen would choose some direct line of attack, over ground which -offered concealment to them until they were close enough to take the -objective with a rush. - -Such in very bare outline is merely an imaginary example, but it is -sufficient to show the amount of skill, resource and energy required on -the part not only of the leader, but also of every man in the platoon. -The secret of success of the Australian open fighting lay in the -extraordinary vigour, judgment and team-work which characterized the -many hundreds of little platoon battles which were fought on just such -lines as I have tried to suggest in this example. - -It will be readily seen that no comprehensive description is possible -which would present an adequate picture of the widely varying -activities of the Australian Infantryman in this campaign. There is -only one source from which reliable narratives of individual fighting -can be gathered, and that source is so voluminous that space forbids -any but a meagre attempt to supply extracts from it. I refer to -the recommendations made by Commanders for honours and rewards for -individual acts of gallantry. A very small selection of these has been -made and is presented in an appendix to this book.[20] - -But to return to my narrative of September 18th. On that day each -Division attacked on a frontage of two Brigades. No serious opposition -was encountered except at La Verguier, which was not far from our -start line. Nevertheless, the whole of the "red" line, which was the -objective of the "set-piece" phase of the day's battle, was in our -possession, throughout the whole length of the Corps front, well before -10 o'clock. - -This gave us complete possession of the old British front line of -March, 1918; but the Hindenburg outpost line yet lay before us, still -distant another 1,500 to 2,000 yards. This latter line was to be the -ultimate or exploitation objective of the day's operations, and I could -hardly have dared to hope that a trench system of such considerable -strength, which had defied the Fifth Army for so long, would fall into -our hands so easily as it did. - -Glasgow's Division pushed on without pause, and before nightfall had -overwhelmed the garrison of the Hindenburg outpost line along its -front. Maclagan's Division also fought its way forward to within -500 yards of that line. But the troops were by then very exhausted; -all movement was in full view of the enemy; and the ground was very -difficult. After a consultation with Maclagan I decided to rest the -troops, and to make an attempt to reach the final objective (blue line) -that same night. - -Advantage was taken of this pause to advance the Artillery, so that -the enemy's defences could be thoroughly bombarded before the final -assault. At 11 o'clock the same night, the Fourth Division again -attacked, and after severe fighting also captured the whole of the -objective trench system. - -It was a great victory. The Hindenburg outpost line had been -vanquished. From it we could now look down upon the St. Quentin Canal, -and sweep with fire the whole of the sloping ground which lay between -us and the Canal, denying the use of that ground to the enemy, and -making it impossible for him to withdraw the guns and stores which -littered the area. - -The overwhelming nature of the success can best be realized by the -following almost incredible analysis of the material results of the -day's fighting. The First Division attacked with a total strength of -2,854 Infantry. They suffered only 490 casualties (killed and wounded). -They captured 1,700 prisoners, apart from the large numbers who were -killed, and the wounded enemy who made good their escape. - -The Fourth Division had a total assaulting strength of 3,048 of all -ranks, of whom 532 became casualties. Their captures of live prisoners -amounted to 2,543. - -In addition, the Corps gathered in upwards of 80 guns, which had been -overrun, and had to be abandoned by the enemy. - -There is no record in this war of any previous success on such a scale, -won with so little loss. - -The Corps on either flank of me had successes of varying quality. The -Ninth Corps on the south had reached the red line, but the exploitation -phase of the operation was not pressed until a later day. The Third -Corps, on my left, however, made indifferent progress. Their line still -bent back sharply from my left flank, and none of the enemy's outpost -system had been gained. This portion of the Army front was that which -lay square opposite the Bellicourt tunnel, and the fact that in this -part of the field the Fourth Army had not yet mastered the Hindenburg -outpost system was to be fraught with very serious difficulties for me, -not many days later. - -The general plan propounded by General Rawlinson on September 13th had -been realized in part, although not in its entirety. The successes -gained on September 18th were nevertheless sufficiently important and -decisive to justify immediate preparations for working out the plan -for a great, combined and final effort to sweep the enemy out of the -remainder of the last lines of defence which he had established in -France. - -The First and Fourth Australian Divisions had, however, as it turned -out, fought their last fight in the war. Their long and brilliant -fighting career, which had been opened three and a half years before, -the one on the cliffs of Gallipoli, and the other in the desert of -Egypt, thus ended in a blaze of glory. Although a number of the -officers and non-commissioned officers of both these Divisions were -called upon, very shortly after, to render one more valuable service to -the Australian Corps, the Divisions themselves were destined, because -of the termination of hostilities, not again to make their appearance -on any battle front. Their labours ended, the troops were taken by -motor bus and railway to a coastal district lying to the south-west of -Amiens, there to rest and recuperate in the contemplation of a noble -past devoted to the service of the Empire. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[19] See Map H. - -[20] See Appendix B. - - - - -CHAPTER XIV - -AMERICA JOINS IN - - -I had foreseen that the battle to be fought on September 18th was the -last in which the First and Fourth Divisions could be called upon -to participate during the remainder of the 1918 campaigning season. -The wastage of their Battalions had gone on faster than the inflow -of fresh drafts, or the return of convalescent sick and wounded. -These two Divisions contained the original sixteen Battalions who had -immortalized themselves, in 1915, in the landing on Gallipoli. I was -strongly averse from disbanding any one of them to furnish drafts for -the remainder. My hope then was that, if these Divisions could be -allowed to rest over the winter, they could be sufficiently replenished -by the spring of 1919 to be able to maintain all sixteen Battalions at -a satisfactory fighting strength. - -Of the remaining three Divisions, the Third and Fifth required at least -another week's rest; and I had promised the Second Division that after -their heroic efforts at Mont St. Quentin, they would not be again -called upon until towards the end of September. I would thus be left -with insufficient resources to maintain an immediate continuance of the -pressure upon the enemy. - -On explaining the situation to General Rawlinson, he suggested the -interesting possibility of being able to obtain, very shortly, the -services of the Second American Corps of two Divisions, and asked me -whether I would be prepared to accept the responsibility of taking this -large force under my command for the continuance of the operations. - -I had no reason to hesitate. My experience of the quality of the -American troops, both at the battle of Hamel and on the Chipilly spur, -had been eminently satisfactory. It was true that this new American -Corps had no previous battle service, but measures were possible to -supply them with any technical guidance which they might lack. - -I therefore accepted the suggestion, and Rawlinson then asked me -to submit a proposal for a joint operation to take place towards -the end of the month by these two American and the remaining three -Australian Divisions, with the object of completing the task, so well -begun, of breaking through the Hindenburg defences. I was to propose -my objectives, to show how I intended to employ each of the five -Divisions, and also to set out my requirements in Artillery, Tanks and -other services. - -It was anything but an easy task, and it had to be undertaken at a time -when the preparations for the battle of Hargicourt were uppermost in -my mind. Much time also had to be devoted to numerous distinguished -visitors. - -The outcome was a letter to the Fourth Army which foreshadowed, almost -in its entirety, the battle plan which subsequently was actually -employed. The substance of this letter is here reproduced. The text has -been modified only by the omission of the reference letters to a large -coloured map which accompanied it: - - Corps Headquarters, - 18th September, 1918. - - _Fourth Army._ - -1. I beg to submit the outlines of a plan for a series of -operations for the capture of the Hindenburg Line in the Sector -Bellicourt-Vendhuille, based upon the expectation that two American -Divisions will be available immediately to supplement this Corps. - -2. The resources of the Corps in Infantry, which will be available, -are exclusive of the First and Fourth Australian Divisions, -although the Artillery, Technical Troops and Machine Gun Battalions -of those Divisions will continue to be available. - -3. The plan is based upon the assumption that the objective Blue -Line of the operations of September 18th is in our possession all -along the Army Front, or can be seized in the very near future. - -4. The accompanying Map shows the coloured lines referred to in the -following description, as also the reference letters in blue. - -5. This plan is in outline only, and the various objective lines -and boundaries suggested are merely tentative, to form the basis -for a general plan. - -6. The Blue Line is the line of eventual exploitation for the -operations of September 18th. - -7. The present Corps front on the Blue Line extends a distance of -6,000 yards. It is suggested, either that the Corps front should be -extended to a total frontage of 10,000 yards, or that it should be -side-slipped northwards to a frontage of 6,000 yards. The latter -would obviously be preferable, so far as the Corps is concerned, -as enabling all its resources to be concentrated upon a smaller -frontage. - -8. The major outlines of the plan are as follows: - - (a) An attack by two American Divisions for the capture of the - Green Line. - - (b) A subsequent attack by two Australian Divisions for the capture - of the Red Line. - - (c) Exploitation by the Cavalry from the Red Line, in an Easterly - and north-easterly direction. - - (d) A turning movement by the Ninth Corps, through Bellicourt - and Nauroy to turn the Canal defences, operating from north to - south--or alternatively. - - (e) A turning movement by the Third Corps, operating through Le - Catelet northwards. - -9. The details of the above plan will run on the following lines: - - (a) The new Corps front to be taken over at the earliest possible - moment by two American Divisions, each Division deploying for this - purpose only one Regiment of one Brigade. This will place in Line - six Battalions on the Corps front, giving each Battalion about - 1,000 yards. These troops will hold the line defensively, and - will, with the assistance of technical troops, prepare the battle - front. - - (b) The battle troops of the two American Divisions will thus - comprise three Regiments or nine Battalions for each Division. The - allocation of objectives to these troops will be as follows: - - (i) One Brigade (two Regiments) of the right Division to advance - 4,500 yards on a frontage of 3,000 yards. This Brigade (six - Battalions) would attack with four Battalions in Line (750 yards - frontage each) and two Battalions in support for "mopping up" - duties. Its principal objective, apart from the main trench - systems, is Bellicourt. - - (ii) Similarly, one Brigade (two Regiments) of the left Division, - with similar dispositions. Its principal objective, apart from the - main trench systems, is Catelet. - - (iii) The odd Regiment of the right Division to be responsible for - forming the south defensive flank. - - (iv) The odd Regiment of the left Division to be responsible for - forming the north defensive flank. - - (c) It will be noted that the Green Line has been drawn so as to - include all ground giving good observation northward, eastward and - southwards, and to deny observation to the enemy. It is probable that - the Field Artillery barrage will not be able to penetrate to the - extreme limits of this proposed objective along the whole battle front - without moving forward some of the batteries, particularly in the - Northern Divisional Sector. This will probably necessitate a halt of - an hour or an hour and a half, to enable Artillery to be advanced. - - (d) Assuming that the battle opens about 6 a.m., the Green Line should - be reached by 10 a.m. or earlier. By mobilizing ample resources in - technical troops, both American and Australian, and ample tools and - engineering material, it should be easily possible to construct not - less than four roads, sufficiently developed for horse transport, from - the Blue Line to the Green Line, by 2 p.m. These roads would be - located so as to make use of existing roads, and trench crossings - would be made by filling in with earth and not by bridging. It is - estimated, therefore, that Mobile Artillery could move forward not - later than 2 p.m. on Zero day. - - (e) The Australian Infantry of two Divisions would move at such an hour - as would enable them to reach and be deployed upon the Green Line by 2 - p.m., shortly after which hour they would be joined by the necessary - Mobile Artillery. This phase of the operation would also involve the - capture of the Beaurevoir Line. It is assumed that Tanks would be - available to deal with the crossing of the wire entanglements covering - this line. - - (f) The completion of the defensive flanks would be allocated to - American troops. - - (g) As soon as the Australian Infantry had passed the Green Line, the - four American Regiments who had participated in the capture of the - Green Line, would be concentrated, refitted and rested for operations - eastwards. - -10. The following considerations should be kept in view, in connection -with this plan. - - (a) There should be sufficient Field Artillery, not merely to - provide an effective barrage for the time-table advance to the - Green Line and its flanks, but also, in addition, sufficient - Mobile Field Artillery, not employed in the barrage, to enable the - Australian Infantry to be provided with at least six Artillery - Brigades for the exploitation phase of the operation. - - (b) There should be at least 60 Tanks available for the first - phase, in order absolutely to guarantee the breaching of the main - Hindenburg trench systems. There should, in addition, be available - not less than 30 Tanks to assist the Australian Infantry through - the Beaurevoir Line. - -11. There should be a systematic destructive bombardment of the -whole of the Hindenburg trench system on the battle front, lasting -at least four days, in order not merely to destroy the defensive -organization, but also to demoralize and starve the trench garrisons. -This destructive bombardment should extend a considerable distance to -the north and south of the battle front. - -12. The rapid construction of usable roads, both for horse transport -and mechanical transport, across the Canal tunnel, would have to be a -special feature of the organization, so that the whole of our battle -organization could be rapidly carried forward to maintain the battle -eastward of the Red Line. This would involve the mobilization of a -large amount of mechanical transport, ready loaded with road-stone, -so that road-making can commence after Zero hour without any delay. -For these works, there would be available the greater part of the -Australian and American technical troops of seven Divisions, as well as -Army Troops Companies. - - JOHN MONASH, - Lieut.-General. - Commanding Australian Corps. - -Some comment is necessary upon this proposal. The composition of the -American Divisions, following the French and not the British precedent, -differed materially from my own Divisions. The American Division -consisted of two Brigades, each of two Regiments, each of three -Battalions. Its total strength was nearly double that of an English -Division. - -It will be noted that my proposal involved a concentrated attack, not -upon the canal, but upon that sector of 6,000 yards which lay over the -Bellicourt-Catelet tunnel. This zone at that time lay clear of and to -the north of my Corps area, and that is what involved the necessity of -"side-slipping" the Corps front to the north. - -[Illustration: Mont St. Quentin--Collecting Australian wounded under -the protection of the Red Cross flag, September 1st, 1918.] - -[Illustration: An Ammunition Dump--established in Warfusee village on -August 8th, 1918, after its capture the same morning.] - -Moreover, I put forward no suggestion that the Canal sector, then in -front of me, should be the subject of a frontal attack at all. My -proposal was that it should be taken by envelopment, through the breach -to be made over the tunnel. At the time I regarded it as unlikely that -the deep canal itself could be stormed except at great cost. I was not -prepared to commit any Australian troops under my command to such an -enterprise, and therefore naturally hesitated to propose that any other -Corps should attempt it. For this reason I submitted an alternative -plan of envelopment. - -This was, however, a matter for the Army Commander to decide. My -business was merely to show that the proposed action of my own Corps -permitted of the co-operation of the other Corps of the Army in a -specified way. - -General Rawlinson's decisions were given on September 19th, at a -conference which he assembled at my Headquarters. My plan for the -action of the Australian and American Corps was to be adopted in its -entirety, with the sole exception that the capture of the Beaurevoir -line, on the first day of battle, was not to be included in the plan. -It was to be left to await the results of the prior stages. In this -modification I could readily concur. - -As regards the action of the flank Corps, General Rawlinson held the -view that a direct assault on the canal itself ought to be attempted, -and that this should be entrusted to the Ninth Corps. He was doubtless -influenced, in this view, by the knowledge, disclosed to us for the -first time on that day, that he intended to propose that the attack on -the Hindenburg Line would, if undertaken, extend over the front of at -least three Armies, the French on the south, and the Fourth and Third -British Armies. Such a simultaneous attack, over a very wide front, -would naturally increase the prospects of success for every Corps -participating. - -As to the Third Corps, it was to take part only in the preliminaries of -the battle, and not in the battle itself. Another Corps, the Thirteenth -(Lieut.-General Sir T. L. N. Morland) was to join the Fourth Army. -If the Australian Corps succeeded in effecting the breach of the -Hindenburg Line as I had proposed to do, it was to be the Thirteenth -Corps, and not the Third Corps, which, pouring through the breach, was -to envelop the flank of the Hindenburg Line towards the north. - -The main consideration that affected me was the approval of my plan for -the action of the two American and three Australian Divisions. I was -able to begin immediately the development in detail of that plan, a -task which proved at once the most arduous, the most responsible, and -the most difficult of any that I have had to undertake throughout the -whole of the war. - -The first step was to get the American Divisions into the line opposite -their prospective battle fronts, and the next was to hand over what had -hitherto been the Australian Corps front to the Ninth Corps. - -The Ninth Corps battle front was to extend from Bellenglise to -Bellicourt, mine from opposite Bellicourt to opposite Le Catelet. - -The necessary troop movements and inter-divisional reliefs required -nearly a week for their completion. By the evening of September 23rd, -the last of the two Australian Divisions had been relieved by the -Americans and the Ninth Corps, and on that night these stood on their -respective battle frontages. I took over command of this new front, -thus manned by Americans, in the forenoon of September 25th. - -It is a somewhat noteworthy circumstance, but one which attracted no -attention at the time, that between September 25th and September 29th, -there was a period of five days during which _no_ Australian troops -were in the front line in any part of the French theatre of war. This -was a situation which had never arisen since the first contingent of -Australians arrived from Egypt in April, 1916. For nearly two and -a half years, there had never previously been a moment when some -Australians had not been confronting the enemy, somewhere or other in -the long battle front in France. - -I have said that I had been called upon to undertake the responsibility -of directing in a great battle two Divisions (the 27th and 30th) of -United States troops, numbering altogether some 50,000 men. These had -been organized into a Corps, called the Second American Corps, and -commanded by Major-General G. W. Read. It was certainly anomalous -that a whole organized Corps should pass under the orders of a Corps -Headquarters of another nationality, but in authorizing such an -arrangement, General Rawlinson relied upon the good sense and mutual -forbearance of the Corps Commanders concerned. - -I am bound to say that the arrangement caused me no anxiety or -difficulty. General Read and his Staff most readily adapted themselves -to the situation. He established his Headquarters quite close to my -own, and gave me perfect freedom of action in dealing direct with his -two Divisional Commanders, so far as I found it necessary to do so. -Read was a man of sound common sense and clear judgment, a reserved but -agreeable and courteous personality. His only desire was the success of -his Divisions, and he very generously took upon himself the role of an -interested spectator, so that I might not be hampered in issuing orders -or instructions to his troops. At the same time, I am sure that in his -quiet, forceful way he did much to ensure on the part of his Divisional -Commanders and Brigadiers a sympathetic attitude towards me and the -demands I had to make upon them. - -The Australian Corps had specialized in comprehensive and careful -preparations for battle. Its methods had been reduced to a quite -definite code of practice, with which every Staff Officer and Battalion -Adjutant had, by experience, become intimately familiar. All this -procedure was a closed book to the American troops, and they were -severely handicapped accordingly. - -I therefore proposed to General Read, and he gratefully accepted, the -creation of an "Australian Mission" to his Corps, whose role would -be to act as a body of expert advisers on all questions of tactical -technique, and of supply and maintenance. This idea once accepted was -worked out on a fully elaborated scale. - -To the head of this Mission I appointed Major-General Maclagan, not -only to command the personnel of the Mission itself, but also to live -with and act as adviser to General Read's own Staff. The Mission -comprised a total of 217 men, chosen from the First and Fourth -Australian Divisions, and consisted of specially selected and very -experienced officers and N.C.O.'s. The American Corps Headquarters -was provided with a Major-General, assisted by one General Staff, one -Administrative, one Signal, one Intelligence, and one Machine Gun -Staff Officer. Each American Division had assigned to it an Australian -Brigadier-General, assisted by several Staff Officers; each American -Brigade had an Australian Battalion Commander and Signal Officer; and -so on down the chain. Each American Battalion, even, had four highly -expert Warrant or Non-commissioned officers to advise on every detail -of supply, equipment and tactical employment of the troops. - -By such an arrangement it became possible to talk to the whole American -Corps in our own technical language. This saved me and my Staff a vast -amount of time and energy, because the members of this Mission acted -as interpreters of the technical terms and usages customary in the -orders and maps of the Australian Corps, which were necessarily quite -unfamiliar to the American troops. - -Maclagan was a man eminently fitted for this task. In appearance and in -temperament he is every inch a soldier. Of all my Divisional Commanders -he was the only one who, immediately before the war, was a professional -soldier of the Imperial Army. Although not Australian born, he was -whole-heartedly Australian, for he had spent some years as Director of -Military Training at the Royal Military College at Duntroon. On the -outbreak of war he received the command of the 3rd Australian Brigade, -and with it carried out the most difficult preliminary phase of the -landing on the Gallipoli peninsula. He commanded the Fourth Australian -Division from the autumn of 1917 until the conclusion of hostilities. -His characteristic attitude of mind, so strongly in contrast to that -of Rosenthal, was pessimistic. But that was not because he looked for -difficulties, but because he preferred squarely to recognize and face -all the difficulties there were. Yet he never failed in performance, -and invariably contrived to do what he had urged could not be done. One -could not afford to take him at his own modest estimate of himself. -Both he and his Division always bettered any promise they gave. - -I entertain no kind of doubt that it was only because of the creation -of this Australian Mission to the Americans, and of Maclagan's tact, -industry and judgment in controlling it, that the combined action of -the two Corps in the great battle of the closing days of September -proved as successful as it did. Under no other conditions would it have -been possible to bring about any reasonable degree of co-operation -between two forces whose war experiences, outlook, attitude towards -their problems, training and temperament were so fundamentally -different. - -It is not necessary to indulge in either a panegyric or a condemnation -of these American Divisions. Neither would be deserved or appropriate. -They showed a fine spirit, a keen desire to learn, magnificent -individual bravery, and splendid comradeship. But they were lacking in -war experience, in training, and in knowledge of technique. They had -not yet learned the virtues of unquestioning obedience, of punctuality, -of quick initiative, of anticipating the next action. They were, many -of them, unfamiliar with the weapons and instruments of fighting, with -the numerous kinds of explosive materials, or with the routine of -preparing and promulgating clear orders. They seriously underrated the -necessity for a well-organized system of supply, particularly of food -and water, to the battle troops. They hardly, as yet, appreciated the -tactical expedients available for reducing losses in battle. - -Yet all these shortcomings were the results only of inexperience, -and it is perhaps unfair to contrast them with the Australian troops -who had seen front-line service in France for two and a half years -continuously, and whose leaders, high and low, had served a long and -graduated apprenticeship in every branch of their duties. - -The Australian Mission assisted greatly to minimize these difficulties. -Although its members were vested with no executive powers, their advice -and help were eagerly sought, and zealously adopted. In many ways, -large and small, their assistance must have proved invaluable. How to -interpret orders from above and how to issue them to those below, how -to draw stores and how to distribute them, how to organize the signal -service and how to ensure a flow of information--these ranked among the -greater matters. In quite small things also, help was needed, such as -the way to detonate mortar bombs, to equip the infantryman for battle, -to organize and use the messenger (_i.e._, runner) service, and to keep -battle stations clear of people who had no urgent business there. - -It is not, of course, intended to convey that all these defects were -present in every regiment. Some, however, were met with, by the -officers of the Australian Mission, in all of them. - -It greatly added to the burden cast upon the American Divisions that -they were called upon to fight almost as soon as they had taken up duty -in the line. The necessity for this was really a legacy from the Third -Corps, whom they had relieved, and it is essential for an understanding -of the course of events during these days to narrate them in proper -chronological order. - -I have explained that as the result of the battle of Hargicourt, the -Australian Corps had succeeded in mastering the whole of the Hindenburg -outpost line opposite its front, as far as a point a little north of -and opposite to Bellicourt. The advance of the Third Corps, however, -had failed to reach the same line, and had stopped short of it by an -average distance of nearly a thousand yards. On my pointing out that -the front I had taken over did not comply with the stipulations which I -had made in my battle plan,[21] the Army Commander decided that prior -to the main attack, the northern of the two American Divisions should -make good this shortage, by an attack aiming at the capture of the -remainder of the Hindenburg outpost line opposite the tunnel sector. - -I must now anticipate an explanation of the main outlines of the plan -which I had prepared for the great battle, by a brief reference to the -situation and disposition of troops on September 25th. The two American -Divisions were respectively the 30th, commanded by Major-General Lewis, -on the right or south, and the 27th, commanded by Major-General O'Ryan, -on the left or north, each lying on a frontage of three thousand yards. -These two Divisions comprised, in all, eight regiments, each of three -battalions. I had instructed each of them to place one regiment in the -line, and to keep the remaining three, _i.e._, six in all, in reserve, -for the main operation. - -My first Corps conference dealing with the forthcoming operations -was held at my Headquarters at Assevillers, on September 23rd. The -American Generals Read, Lewis and O'Ryan, with their respective Staffs, -attended, as also did the Australian Generals Maclagan, Brand and -Mackay, who were members of the Australian Mission to the American -Corps. None of the Australian Commanders destined to take part in the -operations attended on this day, for two reasons, firstly, because I -intended to confine myself entirely to that portion of the operation -which concerned the American troops only, and secondly, because the -date of the battle had not then been decided, and I wished to run no -risk of confusing executive action by any premature announcements to -the Australians, which subsequent events might modify. - -The American role, had, however, sufficiently crystallized to enable -me to explain it to the assembled Generals in great detail. As -will subsequently appear, it was a plan which had, intentionally, -been reduced to the simplest possible elements. It was to be a -straightforward trench to trench attack, from a perfectly straight -"jumping off" line to a perfectly straight objective line, under a -dense Artillery and Machine-Gun barrage, and with the assistance of a -large contingent of Tanks. - -The advance was to be at a deliberate pace, and if due regard were had -to a few elementary precautions, should prove a simple task for the -American Infantry. It was, indeed, on quite stereotyped lines, such as -had so often carried the Australian Infantry to victory in set-piece -battles such as Messines, Broodseinde, Hamel and the first phase of -August 8th. - -It was, however, borne in upon me, very soon after this Conference -opened, that I was now confronted with quite a different proposition -from that to which I had been accustomed in the conferences attended by -my own Divisional Generals. The exposition of the plan itself was brief -and simple, but it elicited such a rain of questions, that in the end -I found myself compelled to embark upon a very detailed exposition of -the fundamental principles of my battle practice. - -With blackboard and chalk, maps and diagrams, I had to speak for more -than three hours in an endeavour to explain methods and reasons, -mistakes and remedies, dangers and precautions, procedures and -expedients. The proceedings left me with no doubt that the American -Generals became fully informed as to the tasks and duties allotted to -them, and fully understood them. - -In the light of after events, I am not so sure that they succeeded in -passing on the information to their subordinates--not by reason of any -shortcomings on their own part, for they impressed me as able, strong -men--but because their Divisions had not yet learned the methods and -machinery of effectively and rapidly conveying instructions to large -bodies of troops. - -In one particular, subordinate though vital, there certainly was a -serious failure to reach the troops. The enemy had, during 1916, met -our assault tactics with an answer which proved disastrously effective -against us until we had learned how to meet it. He provided his trench -systems with many and roomy shell-proof dug-outs. Whenever our barrage -fell upon his trenches, his garrisons promptly took cover in these -dug-outs. When our assaulting infantry reached the enemy trenches they -found but few of the enemy there, and they rushed headlong forward to -the next objective trenches. From out of their dug-outs streamed the -enemy, faced about, attacked our assaulting lines in rear and withered -them with fire. Many an attack by the British on the Somme failed for -just such reasons. - -In 1917 we evolved, and applied for the first time at the battle of -Messines, an effective answer to such tactics. Close on the heels of -our first line of assaulting troops came a second line, whose role -was to occupy the captured trench immediately, and to "mop it up." -This meant the killing or disarming of all enemy found in hiding, the -picketing of the entrances and exits of all dug-outs, and laying siege -to them until their occupants surrendered, a course to which they were -encouraged by a liberal use of phosphorus bombs or Mills's grenades. - -This process of "mopping up" became an integral part of our attack -procedure. Australian infantry soon learned its importance, and -practised the method with a thoroughness and efficiency to which I -remember no exception. Even a junior sergeant commanding a dozen men -could be relied on to take all measures necessary to ensure that no -enemy was ever left in hiding and unguarded behind his little party as -they advanced. - -In the forthcoming attack upon the Hindenburg defences, the process of -"mopping up" became of supreme importance, because of the very fact, -of which we had become well aware, that the whole defensive system -had been provided, on quite an exceptional scale, with underground -shelters, galleries, passages and dug-outs. I made the most of this -knowledge in my talks to the Americans, emphasized the dangers as -strongly as I was able, insisted that the "mopping up" organization of -their infantry must be absolutely perfected, and ordered that of the -total Infantry participating in the assault, not less than one-half -should have the special role of safeguarding all underground exits and -entrances. - -The great fear was, of course, that these new troops, eager to show -their mettle, would be carried away in the excitement of the moment, -and would rush headlong forward, regardless of the dangers that -lurked behind them. It is, after all, no small demand to make upon -the discipline of an Infantry soldier, to expect him patiently and -obediently to stand guard over some dug-out entrance, allowing the -battle to sweep on, and his comrades to go forward to the excitement -and glory of achieving the final objectives. - -So indeed it happened. The American Infantry had either not been -sufficiently tutored in this important matter, or the need of it had -not penetrated their understanding. In the attacks carried out by these -troops, while under my command, the "mopping up" was always badly done, -even in the few cases where it was attempted. The result was failure -to achieve a clean success, and a great addition to their own casualty -list. This criticism will be fully borne out by the narrative of the -great battle itself. - -A second and much larger conference was held at my Headquarters on -September 26th, for the really complete and final co-ordination of the -whole of the procedure for the forthcoming battle. It was attended not -only by the American Divisional Generals and Brigadiers, but also by -the Commanders of the Second, Third and Fifth Australian Divisions, -their Staffs, the Tanks, Air Force and Cavalry. - -It was much the largest and was also destined to be the last of any -assemblage of Commanders that it had been my privilege to call together -in the course of this memorable campaign. - -No one present will soon forget the tense interest and confident -expectancy which characterized that meeting. America, a great -English-speaking democracy on one shore of the Pacific, was to -co-operate with Australia, its younger sister democracy on the opposite -shore, in what was the greatest and what might be the most decisive -battle of the great European War. Few present doubted that, if we were -successful, the war could not last much longer--because the loss of -the Hindenburg system would inevitably mean for the enemy his final -enforced withdrawal from France. - -While the conference was in full swing, the Field Marshal himself paid -me a call. He had come to wish me success in the task before me. He was -interested to find so many Divisional Commanders assembled, and was -persuaded to address a few words to the gathering. - -The conduct of the proceedings of this conference was a heavy strain. -The main battle was to take place on September 29th, or within -seventy-two hours, and part of my front line still stood a thousand -yards west of the Hindenburg outpost lines. General Rawlinson had -decided that this defect was to be made good prior to the main -operation, and the attempt to do so had been timed to take place on -September 27th, the day after the conference. - -I had, therefore, to complete my organization upon the basis of a set -of precedent conditions which had not yet been entirely realized. -It was a new and a difficult situation. The whole of the powerful -Artillery at my disposal for the battle, amounting now to over a -thousand guns, was naturally clamouring for final decisions, so that -final barrage maps could be submitted for my approval, printed by my -very diligent and competent body of lithographic draughtsmen, and -circulated to all the batteries and Infantry. - -To await the result of the operation of the next day would have allowed -insufficient time to complete the necessary maps and to distribute them -before nightfall on September 28th. There was no option but to assume -that General O'Ryan (27th American Division) would succeed in capturing -the northern section of the outpost line still in enemy hands, and upon -that assumption to fix the Artillery "start line" as falling to the -east of that objective. For the first time I had to gamble on a chance. -It was contrary to the policy which had governed all my previous battle -plans, in which _nothing_ had been left to chance. - -At 5.30 a.m. next morning the 27th American Division carried out the -attack, under a barrage, and assisted by Tanks. The principal objective -points in the trench system under attack were Quennemont Farm and -Gillemont Farm. Every trace of these once prosperous homesteads and -plantations had, of course, long since disappeared. The names alone -remained as memories of the fighting there of 1917. - -What happened on that day will never be accurately known. For once, -the information from the air did not harmonize with the claims made -on behalf of the assaulting troops, perhaps because the troops, being -untrained in the use of flares, or having been left unsupplied with -them, failed to assist the aeroplanes in identifying their correct -positions. However that may be, it became sufficiently clear, as the -day proceeded, that no proper success for the operation could be -claimed. - -There remained no doubt that some enemy were still left in occupation -of trenches on our side of the objective for that day, and such -American troops as may have gained their objective could not therefore -be reached. It appeared afterwards that small parties of Americans -had reached the vicinity of their objectives and had very gallantly -maintained themselves there, although surrounded on all sides, until -relieved by the Australians on September 29th. - -The non-success of this operation of September 27th appeared -undoubtedly to be due to a failure to carry out "mopping up" duties -satisfactorily. It considerably embarrassed the preparations for the -main attack on the 29th. The knowledge that a number of American -wounded were still lying out in front, and the suspicion that some of -the American troops had succeeded in reaching Gillemont Farm, precluded -any alteration of the Artillery plans for September 29th, even if there -had still been time to do so without creating untold confusion. To have -brought the Artillery start line, proposed for September 29th, back to -the start line of September 27th would have brought our own barrage -down upon these forward troops of ours. - -I hastened to the Army Commander to put the position before him, -stating that I felt grave concern for the success of the main -operation, in view of the fact that my Artillery barrage would have to -come down fully a thousand yards in front of what was still the front -of the 27th Division. I suggested a postponement for a day to give this -Division, which had ample resources in troops, another opportunity -of retrieving the position. He explained, however, that it was now -too late to alter the programme, because three whole Armies were -committed to the date first appointed. He said that he was, under the -circumstances, quite prepared for a partial failure at this point, and -requested me to do my best to pursue the original plan, in spite of -this difficult situation. - -He agreed, however, to my further request, that additional Tanks, out -of Army reserves, should be placed at my disposal, so that I might -allot them to the 27th Division, to assist them in passing over the -thousand yards which would bring them up level with the Artillery -barrage. I hoped that this would enable the Division to catch up with -the southern half of the battle line. - -It was an unsatisfactory expedient, and gave no promise of certain -success. It proved futile, and gravely affected the actual course, -although not the ultimate success, of the battle still to come. It -was the only occasion in the campaign on which I was compelled to -accept preliminary arrangements which were not such as would absolutely -guarantee success. - -The genesis of the difficulty thus created had, however, been the -failure of the Third Corps to complete their programme of September -18th. It had been confirmed by the subsequent failure of the 27th -American Division to make up the deficiency on September 27th. I still -think, as I then urged, that I should have been allowed to accept the -situation as I found it on taking over this front on September 25th, -and that the 27th Division should not have been called upon, at the -eleventh hour, to endeavour to establish that new situation which had -been originally assumed as the basis for the battle plan of September -29th. My original proposal of September 18th, in my letter of that -date, paragraph 3 (see above), had, of course, been made before I could -foresee that the Third Corps would fail to capture the start line -contemplated in my first plan. - -Of course, all is well that ends well. But, for an anxious and -turbulent period of twenty-four hours on September 29th and 30th, -the issue of the battle hung in grave doubt. The operation, although -successful, did _not_ proceed "according to plan" in its entirety, and -it was due to the wonderful gallantry and skilful leading of the Third -Australian Division that a very ugly situation was retrieved, a result -to which the Fifth Australian Division also contributed in no small -degree. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[21] See paragraph 3 of same. - - - - -CHAPTER XV - -BELLICOURT AND BONY - - -A full account of the battle plan for the forcing of the main -Hindenburg Line, on the front of the Australian Corps, would alone fill -a volume. Nothing but brief references to the main outlines of the plan -can be attempted here. - -The forces now at my disposal, for immediate use, were greater than I -had ever before committed to a single operation. They comprised, in -all, five Divisions, of which two were American and three Australian, -besides the whole of the Corps troops. The total personnel employed -on that occasion, under my orders in one capacity or another, almost -reached 200,000 men. - -Besides 58 Battalions of Infantry, there were over 20,000 technical -troops, including Engineers, Pioneers and Signallers, upwards of 1,000 -guns of all calibres, more than 500 Machine Guns, over 200 Tanks, a -Brigade of Cavalry, a Battalion of Armoured Cars, and numerous Air -Squadrons. The subsidiary services made an imposing array, comprising -observation balloons, supply trains, ammunition columns, auxiliary -horse transport, ambulances, motor convoys and mechanical transport, -together with railway, veterinary, sanitary and labour units. - -It was no small task correctly to apportion to each fighting unit and -to each service its appropriate place in the general scheme, so that -these great resources should be employed to the best advantage, without -overtaxing the capacity of any one of them. I had also to secure the -greatest measure of co-operation between them all, and the punctual -performance by each of the work prescribed. - -In contrast with the great battle of August 8th, there was on this -occasion no possibility of securing any advantage from surprise. -The enemy command was bound to know quite as well as we did that we -intended to deliver an attack on a gigantic scale, and there is no -doubt that they put forth their utmost efforts, and marshalled their -fullest resources in men and guns, to meet it. - -There was, therefore, no object to be served by any measures of -concealment, and our task could not be made any the harder through -heralding the approach of the actual attack by adequate Artillery -preparation. - -The programme, therefore, began on the night of September 26th. There -was an intense Artillery action, extending over some sixty hours, with -every gun that could be brought to bear. This does not, of course, -imply that every individual gun or battery remained in action during -the whole of this period; ammunition supplies were not inexhaustible, -and gun detachments required periods of rest. But the programme of -times and targets was so arranged, and the tasks were so distributed -over the available batteries, that throughout this period there was no -respite for the enemy in any part of the field. - -For some days prior to the opening of this bombardment, railway trains -and motor lorries had been working at the highest possible pressure, to -enable gunners to accumulate at their gun pits and in all their dumps -a sufficient supply of Artillery ammunition for this purpose. In the -short period which had elapsed since the forcing of the Somme, in the -early days of September, the railway diversion from Bray to Peronne had -been completed. The railway from Peronne to Roisel, although seriously -damaged by the enemy in many places, had been restored, and Roisel had -become the railhead for the delivery of ammunition. It was a noteworthy -performance, for all the Corps services concerned, to carry out the -whole supply of this battle in so smooth and expeditious a manner. - -The first phase of this bombardment was of a novel character. For over -two years the enemy had been using a shell containing an irritant -and poisonous gas known to us as "mustard" gas. It was so called -only because of the smell. For a long time we had been promised that -the British Artillery service would shortly be supplied with a gas -shell, of similar character, but even more potent. It was, moreover, -anticipated that the German gas mask would prove no adequate protection -against this kind of gas. - -At last the new shell was forthcoming, and the first shipment from -England, amounting to some fifty thousand rounds, was placed at the -disposal of the Australian Corps. My Artillery action, therefore, -opened with a concentrated gas bombardment for twelve hours, attacking -probable living quarters, occupied defences, and all known or suspected -approaches to them. Apart from being the first occasion, I believe that -it was also the only occasion during the war when our "mustard" gas -shell was used. No suitable opportunity for further use occurred before -the close of hostilities. - -The gas bombardment was followed by forty-eight hours' destructive -bombardment with high explosive shell. This was directed partly against -the enemy's Artillery, as far as the short time available had permitted -us to locate his batteries. - -Another part of the bombardment was devoted to the approaches from -the enemy's rear to his forward defences. The object was to render -his roads and tracks unusable, and thereby to prevent the delivery -of rations, or, at any rate, of hot food to his garrisons, or of -ammunition to his guns. By these means we expected, by partially -starving him out, to impair the enemy's _moral_. - -The main weight of the bombardment was, however, devoted to the -destruction of the enemy's defences, of which his barbed wire -entanglements were for us the most formidable feature. Much of this -wire was disposed in concealed positions, either in depressions of the -ground, or in sunken moats, artificially prepared. It was, therefore, -difficult to locate, and still more difficult for my gunners to direct -their fire upon it. Nevertheless, there was a considerable quantity of -wire which was plainly visible, and every band of entanglements through -which breaches could be blown was so much to the good, in clearing the -path for the Infantry assault. - -[Illustration: Australian Light Horse--the 13th A.L.H. Regiment riding -into action on August 17th, 1918.] - -[Illustration: The Sniper sniped--an enemy sniper disposed of by an -Australian Sharp-shooter, August 22nd, 1918.] - -In earlier years it had been the custom to attack barbed wire with our -lighter guns, using shrapnel shell. This shell is, however, essentially -a "man-killing" projectile, and has no great destructive power against -field works. On the other hand, our heavier guns were scarcely more -useful for wire cutting, because the great craters which were made by -the explosion of their shells destroyed the wire only very locally, -and, by upheaving the ground, increased rather than reduced the -difficulties of the Infantry. - -This was due to the employment of fuses, which permitted the -projectile, after striking, to bury itself in the ground for a small -fraction of time before igniting the explosive charge which it -contained. Hence the great shell craters. It was a very proper fuse to -use for destroying trenches, dug-outs, gun-pits and emplacements, but -of little use for cutting wire. - -In due course the British service evolved an "instantaneous" fuse, -which became known to the gunners as the "106 Fuse." This had the merit -of being perfectly safe to handle, up to the moment of firing the gun, -but by means of a most ingenious mechanism it became highly sensitive -while the projectile was in flight between the gun and the target. The -result was that the very slightest obstacle met with, even a strand of -wire, was sufficient to set off the fuse and explode the shell. Even -if the shell met no obstacle before striking the earth, the explosion -would take place above instead of below the surface of the ground, and -would exert so great a horizontal force in all directions that great -bands of wire entanglements would be bodily uprooted, over considerable -areas, and literally blown to one side in a jumbled mass. - -Our heavy guns, therefore, using 106 Fuses, became ideal wire cutters, -and it was in this way that much of the Artillery action during the -forty-eight hours prior to the battle was applied. - -The Infantry and Field Artillery plan, which I prepared, was very -similar in its general character to the battle plan of August 8th. -It differed only in subordinate details due to local topographical -variations from the former conditions. - -Of the five Divisions available, one--the Second Australian--was to -remain in Corps reserve, but handy. For that purpose it was brought up -from its rest near Cappy, by motor bus, to the vicinity of Peronne, -the move being completed by nightfall on September 27th. - -The battle Divisions and their prior dispositions were as follows: - -_Line Divisions:_ - - On the right, the 30th American Division, to attack with the - 60th Brigade, and to employ the 59th Brigade to form a southern - defensive flank in the event of the failure of the Ninth Corps to - cross the Canal. - - On the left, the 27th American Division, to attack with the - 54th Brigade, and to employ the 53rd Brigade to form a northern - defensive flank, until such time as the Thirteenth Corps was ready - to pass through in a north-easterly direction. - -_"Exploitation" Divisions:_ - - On the right, the 5th Australian Division, with the 8th and 15th - Brigades in the first line and the 14th Brigade following in - support. - - On the left, the Third Australian Division, with the 10th and 11th - Brigades in the first line and the 9th Brigade following in support. - -The total frontage was equally divided between the two pairs of -Divisions, being about 3,500 yards to each. The battle was to be -divided into two phases, the first to be executed by the Americans, -under a timed barrage, the second, under open warfare conditions, by -the Australians. It was intended that the Americans should penetrate to -the "green line," an average distance of 3,500 yards, which took in the -villages of Bellicourt, Nauroy, Bony and Gouy. - -The Australians were to exploit eastward, but were limited to a further -advance of 4,000 yards, overrunning Joncourt, Estrees and Beaurevoir. -Should they reach that objective on the first day, they would have -passed the last-known wired line, and the country beyond would be -suitable for Cavalry. Accordingly, I allotted to the 5th Cavalry -Brigade, which had been placed under my orders, the role of passing -through the Australian Divisions, and carrying the exploitation still -further east, in the direction of Montbrehain and Brancourt. - -As it turned out, the whole of the objectives named were in our -possession only on the forenoon of October 5th, instead of, as planned, -by September 30th. The actual battle developed on totally different -lines from those which I had planned, for reasons which I shall -relate in due course. Little object would therefore be served in an -explanation of the considerable mass of detailed arrangements which the -original plan involved; these would also, by reason of their technical -character, be more suitable for a text-book on tactics. - -Suffice it to say that elaborate arrangements were made--and also -partly utilized--for the rapid construction of four main roads from -west to east, through the full width of the Hindenburg system. This -work was to follow on the heels of the advance. The roles assigned -to the Tanks, the Barrage Artillery, the Mobile Artillery, the Heavy -Artillery and the Armoured Cars were similar in character, although -differing in detail from those carried out by them on August 8th. - -On no previous occasion had the labour of preparation and the stress -upon all Commanders and Staffs been so heavy, but all responded nobly. -There were none who did not count the hours till zero hour, which was -fixed for 5.50 a.m. on September 29th. - -In appraising the long sustained fighting on the front of the Fourth -Army which began on that day, and lasted a full week, regard must be -had to contemporary events. The American First Army attack on St. -Mihiel on September 11th had wrought fresh dislocation to the enemy's -resources, and had created another sore spot on his long front. On -September 26th the Americans and French again successfully attacked -between Verdun and Rheims. On September 27th, the First and Third -British Armies opened a great attack on a front of thirteen miles -before Cambrai and the magnificent Canadian Corps captured Bourlon Wood -and advanced to within a mile of Cambrai city. On September 28th, the -Second British Army and the Belgians attacked between Ypres and the -sea. All British Armies, except the Fifth, had, therefore, by that time -developed active battle fronts. On September 29th the first French Army -would co-operate with us, and on that day the battle front was to cover -a total length of twenty-five miles. - -The simultaneous engagement of so large a portion of the enemy's -line in Belgium and France during the preceding three days had -piled difficulty upon difficulty for him, and it was therefore not -unreasonable to entertain two expectations--firstly, that our task -would be rendered easier by the wide dispersion of the enemy's -defensive energies, and, secondly, that he could hardly hope to survive -a definite breach in his great defensive line at so critical a place as -the Bellicourt tunnel. If that went he would be secure nowhere, and his -next possibility of making a stand would be on the line of the Meuse, -even if not the line of the Rhine. - -The day broke with a familiar mist, and the attack was launched -punctually at the appointed time. Quite early in the day news came -in that the Ninth Corps on my right hand had achieved an astonishing -success, that Bellenglise had been captured, and that the deep canal -had been successfully crossed in several places. It was the 46th -Imperial Division to which this great success was chiefly due, a -success achieved by most careful preparation and gallant execution. -Lifebelts, rafts, boats, mats, portable bridges, and every device -which ingenuity could suggest had been prepared beforehand for the -actual crossing of the water in the canal. There can be no doubt -that this success, conceived at first as a demonstration to distract -attention from the Australian Corps front, materially assisted me in -the situation in which I was placed later on the same day. - -The first reports from my own front were in every way satisfactory, -and it looked as if everything were going strictly to schedule. That -morning the stream of messages pouring into my Headquarters office, -from special observers, from the air, from the line divisions, from -the Artillery, and from my liaison officers with neighbouring Corps, -exceeded in volume and import anything I had met with in my previous -war experience. I have the typewritten precis of the "inwards" signal -traffic before me as I write. Those received and laid before me on that -day cover thirty closely typewritten foolscap pages. - -The burden of the earlier messages all pointed to the same conclusion: -"30th Division crossed the Canal on time;" "1,000 prisoners, all going -well;" "Bony captured;" "Tanks fighting round Bellicourt at 9 a.m.;" -"Bellicourt taken." - -Those, omitting formal parts, were the burden of all the telegrams up -to 10 a.m. They continued in such a favourable strain during the whole -of the time that the two American Divisions had command of the battle -front. - -The time for their arrival at the first objective--_i.e._, the "green" -line--had been computed to be at 9 a.m. The Australian Divisions were -to cross the green line at 11 a.m., and at the same hour to take over -the command on the front of the battle. Two telegrams then came in -which caused me serious anxiety. It may be of interest to set them out -in detail: - -Received at 11.10 a.m. from 30th American Division: - - "Fighting in Bellicourt, owing to Germans having come down along - the Canal from the north. Fifth Australian Division hung up." - -Received at 11.12 a.m. from Third Australian Division: - - "We are dug in on west side of tunnel. Americans are held up in - front of us." - -These were only the first symptoms of a miscarriage of the plans. -Evidences rapidly multiplied that all was not going well. But, -concurrently, there came a stream of messages from the air that our -troops and some of our Tanks were east of both Bellicourt and Le -Catelet. - -The situation was therefore confused and uncertain, and it had to be -diagnosed without delay. I hastened forward with all possible speed -to get into personal touch with the situation and the Divisional -Commanders. I soon formed the conclusion that probably both American -Divisions had successfully followed our barrage, and that numbers of -their troops had really reached the green line, but that, once again, -the "mopping up" procedure had been neglected. The enemy had reappeared -in strength from underground _behind_ the Americans, and was holding up -the advance of the two Australian Divisions to the second phase of the -operation. - -Subsequent developments and further inquiries entirely bore out these -conclusions. On the front of the 27th American Division there had been -difficulty from the start. A number of Tanks allotted to that Division -had been put out of action, some by direct hits from Artillery, others -by land mines. It was currently believed that these were not enemy -mines, but some which had been laid months before by our own Fifth Army -as a measure of protection against the possible use of Tanks by the -enemy. - -This had given the 27th Division a bad start. Only two out of its -six assaulting Battalions had managed to catch up with and follow -the barrage. The remainder could not get forward as far even as the -Artillery start line. Those Americans who did follow the barrage -apparently forgot all about "mopping up." They reached Le Catelet and -Gouy and entered those villages, only to find themselves surrounded on -all sides by the enemy. A German officer prisoner informed us next day -that 1,200 of these Americans had been taken prisoner. - -The 30th American Division did not fare so badly. They got a good start -with the barrage, but the broken condition of the ground, the intricate -trench system and the confusion of wire and dug-outs brought about a -loss of cohesion and of control. By the time Bellicourt was reached, -the attacking troops had fallen some distance behind the barrage, and -most of the weight had gone out of the attack. - -Meanwhile, in this part of the field also, the enemy had reappeared -from underground, and was still in strength on the west side of -Bellicourt, now in the hands of the Americans, when the advanced guard -of the Fifth Australian Division came upon them. - -It was an unexpected situation for the Fifth Division. But without a -moment's hesitation the leading troops took its measure. They deployed -from the Artillery formation[22] in which they had been previously -advancing into lines of skirmishers. After hard fighting in the face -of most vigorous resistance, they cleared away all opposition which -lay between them and Bellicourt, and, sweeping forward through that -village, carefully "mopping up" as they went, carried with them -considerable numbers of the Americans whom they found there. - -While this was happening, the Third Australian Division, deprived of -the assistance either of Artillery or of Tanks, and in broad daylight, -found themselves confronted with the difficult problem of carrying out -the whole of the task which had been set for the 27th Division, because -the reappearance of the enemy upon the ground successfully passed over -by some of the Americans earlier in the day nullified all the value of -that success. - -It was about 2 p.m. before I had succeeded in gathering sufficient -reliable information about the situation to enable me to arrive at -a decision how to deal with it. By that hour the Fifth Division had -advanced through Nauroy, and had passed across the Le Catelet line -in that vicinity. The Third Division had managed to get obliquely -astride of the line of the tunnel, its right being well across the -main Hindenburg wire, while its left was still in the vicinity of the -American start line of that morning. They had, however, succeeded in -finally capturing Quennemont Farm. The whole of their advance into such -a position had been hotly contested. - -My troops were therefore, to all intents and purposes, astride of the -Hindenburg main line, one Division wholly on the east and the other -Division mainly on the west of it. The southern end of the tunnel was -in my possession, the northern end was not. - -My decision was forthwith to abandon the original plan which had taken -so many days and so much labour to prepare, to take immediate measures -for securing our gains for the day, and to organize a continuation of -the battle next day on totally different lines. These were to conquer -the remainder of the main Hindenburg trench system, in which the ruin -of the village of Bony was the key position, by attacking it from the -south towards the north, instead of from the west towards the east. - -The first step in this plan was to ensure effective tactical contact -between the right flank of the Third Division and the left flank of -the Fifth Division. I framed an order that both Divisions should take -immediate steps to such an end. Telephone communication with both -Gellibrand and Hobbs being momentarily interrupted, I was about to -forward written orders by dispatch rider to each of them to the effect -mentioned. - -Before the messenger had time to leave, however, messages came in from -both Divisional Commanders, each reporting that he had just secured -tactical touch with the other in exactly the way which I wanted. I -consider this a remarkable example of unity of thought. Each, without -being able to consult the other or myself, had taken the very course -which each correctly anticipated that I should decide to have taken. -The German General Staff used to boast in their writings that no other -Army approached theirs in this capacity for initiative by subordinates -on lines in thorough unison with each other and with the policies of -the higher command. - -That the situation on my front, now held exclusively by Australians, -would have been secure that night against a determined counter-attack -I did not doubt, even though the fourteen Australian Battalions now -holding a line of some 9,000 yards would scarcely average 400 rifles -apiece. However, nothing more than small local counter-attacks was -attempted, and the hold which I had gained upon the main defences was -not slackened. I feel sure, nevertheless, that the success of the -Ninth Corps on my right in swarming across the canal from Bellenglise -to Bellicourt had much to do with my immunity from interference; the -enemy probably found himself with quite enough to do there in trying -to re-establish his line further in rear, and this forbade him to -materialize sufficient troops for any general counter-attack. - -While I have felt obliged to state the facts in regard to the partial -failure of the two American Divisions to carry out their part of my -battle plan, I desire, nevertheless, to do full justice to these -troops. I have no hesitation in saying that they fought most bravely, -and advanced to the assault most fearlessly; that the leaders, from the -Divisional Generals downwards, did the utmost within their powers to -ensure success. Nor must the very bad conditions under which the 27th -Division had to start be forgotten. Our American Allies are, all things -considered, entitled to high credit for a fine effort. - -But it is, nevertheless, true that in this battle they demonstrated -their inexperience in war, and their ignorance of some of the -elementary methods of fighting employed on the French front. For these -shortcomings they paid a heavy price. Their sacrifices, nevertheless, -contributed quite definitely to the partial success of the day's -operations, and although the comprehensive plan, which was to have -carried my front beyond Beaurevoir on the very first day, had to be -abandoned, the day's fighting ended with the two Australian Divisions -in quite a satisfactory position for a continuance of the operations on -the next day. - -To this there was, however, one important qualification. Air observers -continued to report the presence of American troops between the -Hindenburg Line and Le Catelet, and also in the latter village. Late -that night an Australian Artillery liaison officer managed to make his -way back into our lines with the story that he had actually advanced -with a battalion of Americans into Le Catelet, and that they were still -there, although practically surrounded. - -The 27th Division made many attempts to get into communication with -them, but without avail. Beyond the report previously alluded to that -they had subsequently been made prisoner, I have no information of -their ultimate fate; but when patrols of the Third Division entered the -village forty-eight hours later, there was no longer any sign of them. -A number of small parties of Americans were, however, encountered and -relieved as the further advance of the Third Division progressed during -the next two days. - -The situation was profoundly embarrassing. With the mass of Artillery -at my disposal, it would have been a simple matter to cover the further -advance of the Third Division so amply as to make it easy to master the -northern half of the tunnel defences, especially if attacked end on. -But so long as American troops or wounded were presumed to be lying out -in front, I dared not use Artillery at all, except on a very restricted -scale. I felt justified, however, in bombarding isolated localities -which patrols had definitely ascertained to be still in enemy hands; -but nothing in the shape of adequate artillery support to the Infantry -could be attempted. - -During the night of September 29th orders were issued to the Second -American Corps to withdraw all advanced troops that could be reached, -and to concentrate their regiments for rest and reorganization, so as -to be ready as soon as possible for re-employment. Very considerable -numbers of American soldiers had become mixed up with the Australian -Battalions, and, in their eagerness, had gone forward with them, -regardless of the particular roles or objectives which had been -originally assigned to them. It was found to be a matter of some -difficulty to induce these men to withdraw from the fighting and to -rejoin their own units, so keen were they to continue their advance. - -I also ordered the Second Australian Division to be brought up by bus -from the Peronne area, and to take up a position of readiness just west -of the Hindenburg Line. I foresaw that with the nature of the fighting -before the Third and Fifth Divisions, it would not be very long before -they would have to be relieved, and there was still the Beaurevoir -line of trenches to be overcome before the Hindenburg system could be -claimed as taken in its entirety. This move was duly carried out, and -the Second Division became available by the evening of October 1st in -close support of the battle front. - -The orders to the two line Divisions for September 30th were to attack -generally in a north-easterly direction. The immediate objectives -of the Third Division were Bony village, the "Knob" and the northern -entrance to the tunnel. The flanks of the two Divisions were to meet -on the Railway Spur, and the right of the Fifth Division was to swing -forward in the direction of Joncourt, in sympathy with any advance made -by the Ninth Corps to the south of them. - -There was, as explained, no possibility of attempting anything like -a methodical advance covered by a co-ordinated Artillery barrage. -Progress would depend upon the tenacity and skilful leading of the -front-line troops, and reliance must be had more upon the bayonet and -the bomb than upon external aids. It was, in a peculiar degree, a -private soldier's battle. - -The night of September 29th brought steady rain, and everybody was -drenched to the skin. September 30th was a day of intense effort, slow -and methodical hand-to-hand fighting, in a perfect tangle of trenches, -with every yard of the advance vigorously contested; but by nightfall -the line of the Third Division had advanced fully 1,000 yards. Its -left had pivoted on the "Knoll," to the west of the Hindenburg Line. -Gillemont Farm was by then securely in their hands; they had reached -the southern outskirts of Bony village. Their right was well across the -line of the canal, and joined the left flank of the Fifth Division on -the Railway Spur. The Fifth Division had cleared the Le Catelet trench -line of the enemy, and its right was by now well to the east of Nauroy. - -Another day's fighting was still before both Divisions, but the effect -of the successful efforts of September 30th was speedily felt on -October 1st. Overnight the enemy must have made up his mind that it -was hopeless to try to retain any further hold upon the tunnel line, -and his further resistance melted rapidly away. On October 1st events -moved quickly; by 10 a.m. the Fifth Division reported the capture of -Joncourt. By midday the whole of the village of Bony was in our hands, -and at the same hour the air observers reported our patrols rapidly -approaching the "Knob" and Le Catelet village. - -By nightfall of October 1st the whole operation had been successfully -completed. The northern entrance to the tunnel, the "Knob" and the -whole of the Railway Spur were in our hands; our line ran just west of -Le Catelet and east of Estrees and Joncourt; all isolated parties of -Americans and all American wounded had been gathered in, and the whole -situation had been satisfactorily cleared up from an Artillery point of -view. - -Later the same night our patrols entered Le Catelet, which lay in a -hollow below us, and found the village deserted except for a number of -enemy wounded. The enemy, during that day, relinquished his last hold -upon the famous tunnel defences, and withdrew precipitately eastwards -to the Beaurevoir hill and northwards towards Aubencheul. Our total -captures during the three days' operations amounted to 3,057 prisoners -and 35 guns. - -It had been a stiff fight, and the endurance of the Infantry had -been highly tested. The skill displayed by the Third Division in the -course of the close trench fighting of September 30th was particularly -noteworthy. The stress upon Major-General Gellibrand and his Staff -and Infantry Brigadiers had been severe. The several Brigades and -Battalions had unavoidably become seriously mixed up. Control became -very difficult, but was never completely lost. - -This was illustrated by the following incident of the day's fighting. I -had ascertained that the whole of the Infantry of the Division had been -committed, and there were no reserves in the hands of the Divisional -Commander. One Battalion of the 9th Brigade was fighting under the -orders of the 11th Brigade, another under that of the 10th Brigade. -I took exception to this, and directed that a Divisional reserve -should be immediately reconstituted. In spite of the difficulties of -communication, Gellibrand contrived to carry this intricate order into -effect during the very climax of the fight. - -Gellibrand was a man of interesting personality, more a philosopher -and student than a man of action. His great personal bravery and his -high sense of duty compensated in a great measure for some tendency to -uncertainty in executive action. He had been a professional soldier, -but before the war had retired into civil life. When the call came, -he received a junior Staff appointment with the First Division, but -his outstanding merits soon gained him promotion. As a Brigadier, he -had, during 1916 and 1917, successfully led several of the Australian -Brigades. His command of the Third Division during the last five months -of active fighting was characterized by complete success in battle. His -temperament and methods sometimes involved him in embarrassments on the -administrative side of his work; but he succeeded in retaining to the -last the whole-hearted confidence of his troops. - -I feel certain from my close observation of the course of events on -September 30th and October 1st, that much of the success of the battle -was due to Gellibrand's personal tenacity, and the assiduous manner -in which he kept himself in personal touch from hour to hour with the -forward situation and progress of his troops. - -Immediately upon the conclusion of the fighting I issued the following -message: - - "Please convey to all Commanders, Staffs and troops of the Third - and Fifth Australian Divisions my sincere appreciation of and - thanks for their fine work of the past three days. Confronted at - the outset of the operations with a critical situation of great - difficulty, and hampered by inability to make full use of our - Artillery resources, these Divisions succeeded in completely - overwhelming a stubborn defence in the most strongly fortified - sector of the Western Front. This was due to the determination - and resource of the leaders and the grit, endurance and fighting - spirit of the troops. Nothing more praiseworthy has been done by - Australian troops in this war." - -The operations entrusted to the Corps had, by the night of October 1st, -been substantially completed. Although the Beaurevoir defence line -still lay to the east of us, the main canal defences, as far as the -Le Catelet line, had been pierced, and a way had been opened for the -Thirteenth Corps to pass across the line of the tunnel to be launched -upon its task of turning the enemy out of the northern continuation of -the Hindenburg Line by envelopment from the south. - -It was impossible to call upon the Third and Fifth Divisions for any -further effort. Their work had been most exhausting. Furthermore, -the steady drain upon their resources, after sixty days of almost -continuous battle activity, had so reduced their fighting strength, -that a very drastic reorganization had become necessary. This could -only be effected by a complete withdrawal from the fighting zone. - -Accordingly, arrangements were put in hand for the immediate relief of -these two Divisions. The Fifth Australian was relieved by the Second -Australian Division, and the Third Australian Division by a Division -of the Thirteenth Corps. Both the relieved Divisions, in the course of -the next few days, followed the First and Fourth Australian Divisions -into the grateful rest area which had been provided to the west and -south-west of Amiens, and before they were again called upon for -further front-line service hostilities had ended. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[22] "Artillery Formation" is an advance in numerous small infantry -columns irregularly spaced both in frontage and depth. "Line of -Skirmishers" is an advance in successive lines of men, the intervals -between the men being from two to five paces, and between the lines -from 50 to 100 paces. - - - - -CHAPTER XVI - -MONTBREHAIN AND AFTER - - -The successive withdrawals of the First, Fourth, Third and Fifth -Australian Divisions from the battle zone during the period from -September 22nd to October 2nd had been arranged with the Fourth -Army Commander about the middle of September. The Corps had been -continuously employed on front-line duty since April, and had already -accomplished a considerable advance, for every inch of which it had -been obliged to fight. - -This consideration alone had earned for the Corps a period of rest. But -other important questions arose which affected the situation. - -I have mentioned that early in 1918 all Brigades of the Imperial -Service had, owing to failing man-power, been reduced from four to -three Battalions each. In this reduction the Australian Brigades -participated only to a small extent during the fighting period. -Every one of the Australian battalions had created great traditions; -regimental _esprit_ and pride of unit were very strong. The private -soldier valued his Battalion colour patch almost more than any other -decoration. - -My predecessor in the Corps Command had, during May, 1918, directed the -disbandment of one Battalion each of the 9th, 12th and 13th Brigades. -This was due to the wastage resulting from the heavy fighting by -these Brigades on the Villers-Bretonneux front. The residues of the -disbanded battalions were used as drafts to replenish the remaining -three Battalions of each Brigade. It was doubtless a measure directed -by necessity, as the flow of reinforcements was steadily diminishing. - -Much lamentation was, however, caused among the officers and men who -thus lost their battalion identity, both among those remaining in the -field and those convalescing from wounds and sickness, who were thereby -deprived of the hope of rejoining their former units. - -Through all these events I became fully alive to the difficulties which -would present themselves when the evil day should arrive on which the -fate of still other battalions would have to be decided. It was a day -whose advent I was anxious to stave off until the last possible moment. - -Throughout the summer and autumn it became incumbent upon me to keep -a close watch upon the fighting strengths of all the 57 Australian -Infantry Battalions in the field. I had to consider the numbers -actually present with the unit, the numbers likely to join from time -to time from convalescent camps and hospitals, and the flow of new -recruits from the Australian Depots in England. Almost daily forecasts -had to be made as to the probable strengths available on a given date -in all the Battalions likely to be employed in a given operation. - -The full official strength of a Battalion of Infantry was 1,000 at the -outbreak of the war, but a reduction to 900 had been authorized in -July, 1918. No battalion in the Army was ever for long able to maintain -itself at a strength of 900. Indeed, experience went to show that so -long as the strength did not fall below 600, a unit could quite well -carry out, in battle, a normal battalion task, provided that frequent -periods of short rest could be assured. - -Towards the middle of September, 1918, the successful course of the -fighting, and the moderate rate of net wastage--by which I mean -the excess of battle losses over replenishments from the rear--had -convinced me that there was every reason to hope that the strengths of -the 57 battalions could be maintained at a useful standard until the -end of the campaigning season of that year. If the war were to go on -into 1919, and provided that the Australian Corps could be kept out -of the line over the three winter months, thereby avoiding the daily -wastage of trench duty, I felt able to guarantee that by the spring of -1919 the whole of these battalions would again have become replenished -to a sufficient extent for a spring campaign. - -[Illustration: MAP H] - -It may have been an optimistic view; it may have savoured of a desire -to postpone the evil day. But I felt assured that the disbandment of -a number of additional battalions would seriously impair the fighting -spirit of the whole Australian Corps. I was prepared to take the chance -of being able to carry on until the end of 1918 with the whole 57 -battalions retained intact. - -But I was not permitted to do so. At various times during the period -June to August, 1918, an unimaginative department at G.H.Q. kept -harassing me with inquiries as to when it was proposed to conform to -the new Imperial organization in which all Brigades were to be reduced -to three Battalions each. These inquiries were at first ignored, but -early in September the Adjutant-General became insistent for a reply. - -I set out the whole position as I saw it, and strongly urged a -postponement of the question until the Corps should have completed the -vitally important series of fighting operations on which it was then -engaged. Looking back upon the course of events of that time, it is -hardly credible now that, having regard to the reasons given, these -representations should have been ignored. I procrastinated. Suddenly -I received instructions from the War Office that some 6,000 men of -the Corps, who had served continuously since 1914, were to be given -six months' furlough to Australia, and that they were to be held in -readiness to entrain en route for Australia at forty-eight hours' -notice. - -These orders were received only two days before the battle of -Hargicourt. The First and Fourth Divisions, destined to fight in that -battle, were those most affected by such a withdrawal of men, because -these Divisions contained the battalions and batteries which had been -longest in the field. I could not, obviously, take up any attitude -which would postpone the well-earned furlough of these veterans; nor -had I the smallest inclination to do so. My case against the main -proposal for an immediate extinction of additional battalions, was, -however, weakened thereby. - -The responsible authorities overruled my objections, and on September -19th I received peremptory instructions to disband eight additional -battalions forthwith. With many misgivings, I had no option but to -comply. I called my Divisional Commanders together, and with them -decided which battalions should suffer extinction. - -It was a difficult choice, and created a situation of great difficulty. -The whole of the personnel affected raised a very subordinate but -none the less determined protest. One battalion after another very -respectfully but very firmly took the stand that they did not wish to -disband, and would prefer not to fight as dismembered and scattered -portions of other battalions. - -This attitude, perhaps, bordered upon insubordination, but it was -conceived for a very worthy purpose. It was a pathetic effort, and -elicited much sympathy from the senior Commanders and myself. - -On the eve of the great operations for the overthrow of the Hindenburg -Line I found myself, therefore, in a sea of troubles, and threatened -with the possibility of internal disaffection. To outsiders who could -have no understanding of the situation this might imperil the fair fame -and prestige of the Australian Army Corps. - -Up to this stage the Fourth Army Commander had been in no way concerned -in the matter. The pressure upon me had come from the War Office and -the Adjutant-General's Department. Lord Rawlinson's interests, however, -now became vitally involved. I submitted the whole position to him. I -pointed out how inopportune the time was for risking trouble of this -nature. The order for disbandment, having been given, must of course -stand, and obedience must be insisted upon; but a postponement of -further action for fourteen days was desirable, if the opportunity -of a decisive blow against the enemy was not to be imperilled by an -impairment of the fighting spirit and goodwill of the Australian Corps. - -Rawlinson accepted my views in their entirety, and used his authority -and influence with the Commander-in-Chief. A postponement of action -was authorized, and all the Battalions which had been threatened with -extinction, with one exception, were permitted to remain intact during -the remainder of the fighting period. The exception was made in the -case of the 59th and 60th Battalions (of the 15th Brigade), whose men -most loyally made no demur at the immediate amalgamation of the two -battalions for the purposes of the forthcoming operations. - -[Illustration: German Prisoners--captured at the battle of Chuignes, -August 23rd, 1918.] - -[Illustration: Captured German Guns--Park of Ordnance captured by the -Australians during August, 1918.] - -By the end of September, therefore, three separate factors were -operating to make a short withdrawal of the Corps from the battle zone -desirable. - -These were, the long unbroken period of line service, the orders for -the reorganization of the Brigades on a three-Battalion basis, and the -granting of Australian furlough to the veterans. - -These were the reasons which brought about the decision that the whole -of the Australian Corps should be sent for a period of rest in a -coastal area as soon as the battle operations on which it had embarked -had been brought to a successful conclusion. - -Those operations were, on October 1st, almost completed. Only the -Beaurevoir line still remained to be mastered, and the Second -Australian Division, which had been resting since its successes at -Mont St. Quentin, was available to undertake that task. For the next -three days the Australian Corps became, therefore, reduced to only one -Division (the Second Australian) in the line, with the 27th and 30th -American Divisions in support. - -The Second Division occupied the night of October 1st and the greater -part of October 2nd in the process of taking over line duty from the -Fifth Division, and in preparing for an attack timed for the next -morning upon the Beaurevoir defences. I handed over the northern part -of what had been the Australian Corps front, on the day previous, to -the 50th Division (of the Thirteenth Corps), which had by now effected -the passage of the tunnel line, and had deployed upon my left, facing -north and north-east. - -After these adjustments were made, the Corps front, on the night -of October 2nd, extended from Mont St. Martin through the eastern -outskirts of Estrees and Joncourt, where I joined with the 32nd -Division (now belonging to the Ninth Corps). It was a frontage of -nearly 6,000 yards, an extraordinary length for the battle front of a -single Division. Our line lay parallel to and about 1,000 yards to the -west of the Beaurevoir line, and the attack for next day was designed -to be delivered in a north-easterly direction. If the Beaurevoir -line itself were captured, the attack was to be pushed on beyond, in -the endeavour to sweep the enemy off the prominent hill on which was -situated the village of Beaurevoir. Concurrently the Thirteenth Corps -would attack Prospect Hill, lying to the north-east of Gouy village. - -The Beaurevoir line was a fully-developed defensive system, with front, -support and communication trenches, thoroughly traversed, well wired -in, and still in good condition. In 1917 it would have been considered -impossible to capture such a line of defence by such a force on such a -frontage. - -The Second Division deployed two of its Brigades, the 5th on the right -and the 7th on the left, with the 6th Brigade in reserve. The 5th -Tank Brigade, now greatly reduced in numbers, and some Whippet Tanks -co-operated in the attack. The assault was launched at 6.5 a.m. under -a Field Artillery barrage. Considerable opposition was met with. The -trenches were found strongly held, particularly with machine guns, and -the uncut wire seriously impeded the Infantry. - -The frontal attack of the 5th Brigade, nevertheless, achieved almost -immediate success, although in some parts of the line there were -centres of resistance which had to be enveloped before they yielded. -The performance of the Tanks on this day was disappointing. Most of the -heavier Tanks were disabled by Artillery fire, while the Whippets found -the Beaurevoir trench lines too wide to straddle. Nevertheless, the -spirited action of the Artillery made up for the loss of the assistance -of the Tanks, and by 11 a.m. the whole of the Beaurevoir line in front -of the 5th Brigade had been captured. - -Further to the north, the 7th Brigade found the trenches almost end on -to the direction of their advance, and the battle here speedily took -on the form of pure trench fighting with bomb and bayonet, a type of -fighting in which the Australian excels. Steady progress northwards was -made. - -The whole of the Beaurevoir line over the full extent of the Corps -front was taken before midday, and although already very tired, the -assaulting Brigades pushed on beyond, to the ascent of the Beaurevoir -spur. On a knoll at its south-western extremity stood the stone base of -the now wrecked Beaurevoir Mill, a prominent landmark visible for miles. - -The spur and the vicinity of the Mill were found to be strongly held, -probably by fugitives driven out that morning from the Beaurevoir -trenches. The weight of our attack spent itself on the slopes of the -spur. The 6th Brigade was therefore launched at Beaurevoir Mill and -village. Although some portion of our attack passed the Mill and -reached the village, our available Infantry strength was not sufficient -to mop it up satisfactorily, and the Brigadier decided to establish for -the night a secure line about 1,000 yards south-west of the village. - -The total captures by the Second Division on this day exceeded a -thousand prisoners and many machine guns--an astonishing performance -for three weak brigades, fighting under open and exposed conditions. - -The attack on Beaurevoir hill had been undertaken chiefly to keep the -enemy engaged and on the move, while an additional Division of the -Thirteenth Corps could be brought across the line of the tunnel and -deployed into the battle line. The direction of the attack had been -to the north-east. It now became necessary to readjust the general -easterly line of advance by redistributing the Army front between the -three Corps now in line. The greater part of October 4th was occupied -in carrying out these arrangements, and the Second Division availed -itself of the period to improve its line and the positions of parts of -it by local attacks and the capture of tactical points along its front. -On this day the Division gathered in a further 800 prisoners and five -guns. - -By nightfall on October 4th the Corps front, now reduced to 4,000 -yards, ran generally north and south, well east of Wiancourt and -just east of Ramicourt. The task of the Second Division and of the -Australian Corps was completed, and in pursuance of arrangements -previously made, the initial steps were taken on that day to hand -over the Australian Corps front to the 27th and 30th American -Divisions, which had, in the days intervening since September 29th, -been reorganized and rested. They were to be given a place in the front -battle line under the direct orders of their own Corps Headquarters -(General Read). - -To cover the interval of time necessary to enable the first of the -American Divisions (30th) to move up into line, General Rawlinson -desired me to retain control of the battle front for one day longer, -and avail myself of the time to make an endeavour to advance our line -still further to the east. - -I selected as a suitable objective the village of Montbrehain, which -stood on a plateau that dominated any further advance. - -The Second Division was instructed to carry out this attack early on -October 5th, and I allotted to them one company of Tanks, which was all -that could be materialized in fighting trim at such short notice. - -Rosenthal launched his attack at five minutes past six in the morning -of October 5th. It was the 6th Brigade which led it. The village was -full of machine guns, but the gallant Brigade dashed in with the -bayonet, and methodically worked its way through the village to its -eastern outskirts. A counter-attack developed about noon, and for a -time about 400 yards of ground had to be yielded, but our foremost line -was speedily restored with the assistance of a battalion of the 5th -Brigade. - -By nightfall our line ran completely around the eastern outskirts of -the village of Montbrehain, the whole of which was in our possession. -We took from it over 600 prisoners belonging to nine different German -regiments. - -What was even more interesting was that we came for the first time in -the war upon French civilians, who had been under the domination of -the enemy since the autumn of 1914. These unfortunate folk were found -hidden away in cellars and underground shelters, and their joy at their -deliverance from foreign bondage was pathetic. It was evident that the -enemy had not had time to carry out the evacuation of the civilians, -as had been his practice throughout the whole area over which the -Australian Corps had hitherto advanced. - -By the night of October 5th the Corps had, by the victory of -Montbrehain, advanced its line to a point six miles to the east of the -Bellicourt Tunnel, and had thereby confirmed the irretrievable collapse -of the whole of the Hindenburg defences. - -This achievement is, above everything else, an illustration, which -should become classic, of the maxim that in war the _moral_ is to the -material as three to one. The enemy had all the advantages of position, -of carefully prepared field works, of highly-organized defences, of -detailed acquaintance with our lines of approach from the west, and of -all the other tactical benefits of the defence. - -Yet we had the advantage of moral factors. For the past nine weeks -the enemy had suffered defeat after defeat. He had at one time been -surprised and overwhelmed. He had at another time been driven from -strong positions under conditions when surprise played no part. He had -been defeated in gunnery, in the air, and in close Infantry fighting. -The _moral_ of his troops had steadily declined. They no longer hoped -for victory, but anticipated defeat. They knew that they were a beaten -army. - -The victory won in the series of battles from September 29th to October -5th was a victory of _moral_, the resolute determination of our troops -to overcome all obstacles prevailing against the failing spirits of -the defenders. It was a signal illustration that no defences, however -powerful, can resist an energetically pressed assault, unless the -defenders meet the attack with equal resolution. Verdun and the cliffs -of Gallipoli are examples of resolute defence. Port Arthur and the -Hindenburg line are equally striking instances of the collapse of -formidable field works through failure of the _moral_ of the defenders. - -Montbrehain was the last Australian battle in the Great War, and the -fighting career of the Australian Army Corps had, as events turned out, -come to an end. On that same day my Second Division was relieved by the -30th American Division, and I handed over command of the battle front -to General Read. I had borne continuous responsibility, as a Corps -Commander, for a section of the battle front in France varying from -four to eleven miles for 128 consecutive days without a break. - -On that same day, too, Prince Max of Baden accepted the programme -of the President of the United States of America, and requested him -to take in hand the restoration of peace. On behalf of the German -Government he also asked for an immediate Armistice on Land, Water and -in the Air. - -The long-drawn-out negotiations which followed need only a brief -reference. It was first necessary for the Entente Powers to agree -upon a common line of action; then followed negotiations between the -plenipotentiaries of the belligerents, and hostilities did not actually -cease until after the conditions of the Armistice had been signed in -the early morning of November 11th. - -During this period of five weeks, however, fighting went on. It was of -an altogether different character from that in which the Australian -Corps had been engaged. The enemy had no line of defence left in -France. He was compelled to a retreat which became general along -his whole front, and gathered momentum day by day. He gave up Lens, -Armentieres and the Aubers Ridge without a struggle, thus enabling the -Second and Fifth Armies to advance to the occupation of Lille and the -adjacent industrial centres. - -A great army recoiling rapidly upon itself is beset with even greater -difficulties than an army sweeping rapidly forward. If its retreat -is not to be converted into a rout, time must be allowed for the -methodical withdrawal, in proper sequence, of the whole complex -organization in rear of the battle front. Headquarters and hospitals, -workshops and aerodromes, depots and supplies must be dismantled, -packed and re-established further in rear; guns, transport and reserve -troops must be withdrawn stage by stage, and, last of all, the fighting -line must fall back in sympathy with the rate of withdrawal of all in -rear. - -Every hour's delay is an hour gained. Roads become congested, bridges -overtaxed, cohesion and discipline are imperilled. An enforced -withdrawal on so large a scale is one of the most difficult operations -of war. - -The enemy's tactics during this period were, therefore, purely those -of delay, achieved by the methodical destruction of bridges, tearing -up of railways, and the blowing of great craters at every important -road intersection. These methods impeded the advance of our armies -quite as much as his rearguards, who invariably yielded to the smallest -demonstration of force. - -Battles on the grand scale were now a thing of the past, and from the -completion of the capture of the Hindenburg defences up to the signing -of the Armistice there was no event in France of outstanding military -importance. - -The pursuit of the enemy towards the eastern frontiers of France and -Belgium was, however, exhausting to the British and American troops -on the front which the Australian Corps had vacated. It was only a -question of time for the Corps to be again called upon, this time to -take its share of pursuit. The Armistice negotiations were dragging -out, and it was uncertain that they would be satisfactorily concluded. -The Australian Corps had had a month for a pleasant rest along the -banks of the Somme, between Amiens and Abbeville. It had had time to -carry out the extensive reorganizations required by the War Office. On -November 5th orders came for the Corps once again to move up to the -front. - -The First and Fourth Divisions led the return to the battle zone. The -remaining three Divisions were to follow. My Corps Headquarters, on -November 10th, commenced its move to Le Cateau, to occupy the very -chateau which had been inhabited by General von der Marwitz, the -Commander of the Second German Army, against whom the Australian Corps -had for so long been operating. I was actually on the way there on -November 11th when the order arrived for the cessation of hostilities. - -The Australian Army Corps was therefore not again employed, either in -the final stages of pursuing the enemy out of France, or as part of the -Army of Occupation on German territory. - -The Prime Minister of Australia forwarded to me, the day after my -arrival at Le Cateau, the following message: - - The Government and the people of Australia extend their heartiest - congratulations on the triumphant conclusion of your great - efforts. I am specially requested to convey to you their heartfelt - thanks and deep admiration for your brilliant and great leadership, - and for the way in which you and the brave men associated with - you have borne the sufferings and trials of the past four - years, and in common with the troops of all the Allied Nations - brought the civilized peoples of the world through adversity to - victorious peace. On behalf of the Government and the people of the - Commonwealth, I assure you, and every Australian soldier in the - field, that the Commonwealth is full of pride and admiration of - their endurance and sacrifice. The Australian soldiers are entitled - to, and shall receive, not only the thanks of a grateful people, - but that treatment which their great services deserve. - - W. M. HUGHES. - -Not long after the conclusion of hostilities I was called upon by -my Government to undertake the organization and direction of a -special department to carry out the repatriation of the whole of the -Australian Imperial Force, in Europe, Egypt, Salonika and Mesopotamia. -This compelled me to sever, with much regret, my close and intimate -association with the personnel of the Army Corps. - -Before proceeding to England to establish the new department, I issued -the following Farewell Order: - - Upon relinquishing the command of the Australian Army Corps, - in order to take up the important and difficult work of the - Repatriation and Demobilization of the Australian Imperial Force, - which has been entrusted to me by the Commonwealth Government, I - desire to offer to all ranks of the Corps a heartfelt expression of - my gratitude to all for the splendid and loyal support which they - have rendered to me during the past six months. - - It has been the period during which the Corps has attained its - highest development, as a fighting organism, of cohesion and - efficiency. This has been brought about alike by the valour of - the troops of all arms and services, and by the splendid devotion - of Commanders, Staffs, and Regimental Officers, and has resulted - in the series of brilliant victories which have contributed in so - high a measure to the overthrow and utter collapse of our principal - enemy. - - For the remainder of the period during which the Corps will - continue to act as a military body, held in readiness for any - emergency that may arise during the peace negotiations, I am - confident that every man will strive to do all in his power to - uphold the great renown which the Corps has so worthily won. - - But, having completed our task in the main object which brought - us from our distant homeland, and having thereby safeguarded the - future of our Nation by the conquest of our most formidable enemy, - we are now faced with another and an equally important task, - namely, to prepare ourselves to resume our duties of citizenship - and to assist individually and collectively in the reconstruction - of the Australian Nation. Our numbers and our prestige place - this opportunity in our hands, and impose upon us this great - responsibility. - - I feel sure that every man in the Corps will in this also worthily - respond to the call of duty, and will co-operate loyally and - self-sacrificingly in the realization of all plans and projects - which will be developed to so worthy an end. - - - - -CHAPTER XVII - -RESULTS - - -The time has arrived when it is proper to take stock of gains and -losses, and to endeavour to appraise, at its true value, the work done -by the Australian Army Corps during its long-sustained effort of the -last six months of its fighting career. - -It has become customary to regard the actual captures of prisoners and -guns as a true index of the degree of success which has attended any -series of battle operations. Every soldier knows, however, that such a -standard of judgment, applied alone, would render but scant justice. -The actual captures in any engagement depend more upon the state of -_moral_ of the enemy and the temperament of the attacking troops than -upon the military quality of the battle effort considered as a whole. -While large captures necessarily imply great victories, it does not by -any means follow that small captures imply the reverse. - -Nevertheless, judged by such a purely arbitrary standard, the -performances of the Australian Army Corps during the period under -review are worthy of being set out in particular detail. - -From March 27th, when Australian troops were for the first time -interposed to arrest the German advance, until October 5th, when they -were finally withdrawn from the line, the total captures made by them -were: - - Prisoners 29,144 - Guns 338 - -No accurate record was ever kept of the capture of machine guns, -trench mortars, searchlights, vehicles and travelling kitchens or -pharmacies, nor of the quantity of Artillery ammunition, which alone -must have amounted to millions of rounds. - -During the advance, from August 8th to October 5th, the Australian -Corps recaptured and released no less than 116 towns and villages. -Every one of these was defended more or less stoutly. This count of -them does not include a very large number of minor hamlets, which -were unnamed on the maps, nor farms, brickfields, factories, sugar -refineries, and similar isolated groups of buildings, every one of -which had been fortified and converted by the enemy into a stronghold -of resistance. - -Although the amount of territory reoccupied, taken by itself, is -ordinarily no criterion of value, the whole circumstances of the -relentless advance of the Australian Corps make it a convenient -standard of comparison. The total area of all the ground fought over, -from the occupation of which the enemy was ejected, amounted in the -period under consideration to 394 square miles. - -A much more definite and crucial basis for evaluating the military -successes of the Corps is the number of enemy Divisions actually -engaged and defeated in the course of the operations. Very accurate -records of these have been kept, and every one of them was identified -by a substantial contribution to the list of prisoners taken. An -analysis of this investigation produced the following results: - -The total number of separate enemy divisions engaged was thirty-nine. -Of these, twenty were engaged once only, twelve were engaged twice, -six three times, and one four times. Each time "engaged" represents -a separate and distinct period of line duty for the enemy Division -referred to. - -Up to the time of the Armistice we had definitely ascertained that -at least six of these thirty-nine enemy Divisions had been entirely -disbanded as the result of the battering which they had received. -Their numberings have already been given. It is more than probable -that several other Divisions shared the same fate, by reason of the -number of prisoners actually taken, and the other casualties known to -have been inflicted. Up to the time when the signing of the Armistice -precluded further inquiries, absolutely conclusive evidence of their -disappearance had not been obtained. - -In such an analysis it is possible to go even further, and to compare -the tangible results achieved with the relative strength of the forces -engaged. The Australian Army Corps of five Divisions represented 91/2 -per cent. of the whole of the remaining 53 Divisions of the British -Army engaged on the Western Front. Its captures in prisoners, by the -same comparison, and within the period reviewed--_i.e._, March 27th to -October 5th--was 23 per cent., in guns 231/2 per cent., and in territory -reoccupied was 211/2 per cent. of the whole of the rest of the British -Army. - -The ratio, therefore, of the results to the strengths, as between the -five Australian Divisions and the whole of the rest of the British -Army, was as follows: - - Prisoners 2.42 times. - Territory 2.24 " - Guns 2.47 " - -It is not, however, by the mere numerical results disclosed by such a -comparison that the work of the Australian Army Corps should be judged. -If a broad survey be made of the whole of the 1918 campaign, I think -that the decisive part which the Corps took in it will emerge even more -convincingly. - -Such a survey will show that the whole sequence of events may be -divided into five very definite and clearly-marked stages. The first -was the arrest and bringing to naught of the great German spring -offensive; the second was the conversion of the enemy's offensive -strategy into a distinct and unqualified defensive. Next followed the -great, initial and irredeemable defeat of August 8th, which, according -to the enemy's own admissions, was the beginning of the end. Then came -the denial to the enemy of the respite which he sought on the line of -the Somme, which might well have helped him to recover himself for -another year of war; and, finally, there was the overthrow of his great -defensive system, on which he relied as a last bulwark to safeguard his -hold upon French soil, a hold which would have enabled him to bargain -for terms. - -It must never be forgotten that whatever claims may be made to the -contrary, Germany's surrender was precipitated by reason of her -military defeat in the field. Her submarine campaign, disappointing to -her expectations as it had been, was still a potent weapon. Her fleet -was yet intact. Our blockade was grievous, but she did in fact survive -it, even though it continued in force for a full eight months after -her surrender. The defection of Bulgaria and the collapse of Turkey -might conceivably be a source of increased military strength, even if -one of greater political weakness. Had she been able to hold us at bay -in France and Belgium for but another month or six weeks, she could -have been assured of a respite of three months of winter in which to -organize a levy en masse. Who can say that the stress of another winter -and the prospect of another year of war might not have destroyed the -Entente combination against her? - -On these grounds I believe that the real and immediate reason for the -precipitate surrender of Germany on October 5th, 1918, was the defeat -of her Army in the field. It followed so closely upon the breaching -of the Hindenburg defences on September 29th to October 4th, that it -cannot be dissociated from that event as a final determining cause. - -Whether this view be correct or not, I think that the claim may fairly -be made for the Australian Army Corps, that in each of the stages of -the operations which led to this military overthrow, the Corps played -an important, and in some of them a predominating, part. No better -testimony for such a conclusion can be adduced than the admissions of -Ludendorff himself. - -Narrowing our survey of the closing events of the campaign to a -consideration of the fighting activities of the Australian Corps, -I would like to emphasize the remarkable character of that effort. -Deprived of the advantage of a regular inflow of trained recruits, -and relying practically entirely for any replenishments upon the -return of its own sick and wounded, the Corps was able to maintain -an uninterrupted fighting activity over a period of six months. For -the last sixty days of this period the Corps maintained an unchecked -advance of thirty-seven miles against the powerful and determined -opposition of a still formidable enemy, who employed all the mechanical -and scientific resources at his disposal. - -Such a result alone, considered in the abstract and quite apart from -any comparison with the performances of other forces, is a testimony, -on the one hand, to the pre-eminent fighting qualities of the -Australian soldier considered individually, and, on the other hand, to -the collective capacity and efficiency of the military effort made by -the Corps. I doubt whether there is any parallel for such a performance -in the whole range of military history. - -As regards the troops themselves, the outstanding feature of the -campaign was their steadily rising _moral_. Always high, it was, in -spite of fatigue and stress, never higher than in the closing days. A -stage had been reached when they regarded their adversary no longer -with cautious respect but with undisguised contempt. - -On the part of the troops it was a remarkable feat of physical and -mental endurance to face again and yet again the stress of battle. To -the infantry a certain measure of periodical rest was accorded, but -the Artillery and technical services had scarcely any respite at all. -Almost every day of the whole period they worked and fought, night and -day, under the fire of the enemy's batteries, and under his drenching, -suffocating gas attacks, for our battery positions were the favourite -targets for his gas bombardments. - -On the part of the staffs it was a period of ceaseless toil, both -mental and physical. The perfection of the staff work, its precision, -its completeness, its rapidity, its whole-souled devotion to the -service of the troops, were the necessary conditions for the victories -which were won. - -Another outstanding feature was the uniformity of standard achieved -by all the five Divisions, as well as the wonderful comradeship which -they displayed towards each other. Omitting altogether the performances -of any one of them in the previous years of the war, it is noteworthy -that all so fully seized the opportunities that presented themselves, -that each could boast of outstanding achievements during this -period--the First Division for its capture of Lihons and the battles of -Chuignes and Hargicourt, the Second Division for Mont St. Quentin and -Montbrehain, the Third for Bray, Bouchavesnes and Bony, the Fourth for -Hamel and Hargicourt, and the Fifth for Peronne and Bellicourt. - -[Illustration: MAP J.] - -I must also pass in brief review the losses which the Corps suffered -during its advance. From August 8th to October 5th the total battle -casualties were as follows: - - Killed 3,566 - Died of wounds 1,432 - Wounded 16,166 - Missing 79 - ------ - Total 21,243 - -Averaging these losses over all five Divisions for the whole period, -they amount to a wastage from all causes of seventy men per Division -per day, which must be regarded as extraordinarily moderate, having -regard to the strenuous nature of the fighting, the great results -achieved, and the much higher rate of losses incurred by Australian -troops during the previous years of the war. Even during periods of -sedentary trench warfare the losses averaged forty per Division per day. - -The total losses of the Army Corps during this period were, indeed, -only a small fraction of Australia's contribution to the casualty roll -for the whole period of the war. It was the least costly period, for -Australia, of all the fighting that her soldiers underwent. Had it been -otherwise, the effort could not have been maintained for so long, nor -could the spirit of the troops have been sustained. It was the low cost -of victory after victory which spurred them on to still greater efforts. - -Of the causes which contributed to so gratifying a result, much credit -must be given to the great development in 1918 of mechanical aids, in -the form of Tanks, and to a considerable augmentation of aeroplanes, -Artillery and Lewis guns. Of all these the Corps proved eager to avail -itself to the full. - -But the main cause is, after all, the recognition of a principle of -text-book simplicity, which is that a vigorous offensive is in the -long run cheaper than a timorous defensive. No war can be decided by -defensive tactics. The fundamental doctrine of the German conception of -war was the pursuit of the unrelenting offensive; it was only when the -Entente Armies, on their part, were able and willing themselves to put -such a doctrine into practice that our formidable enemies were overcome. - -It may be that hereafter I may be charged with responsibility for -so relentlessly and for so long committing the troops of the Corps -to a sustained aggressive policy. Such criticisms have already been -whispered in some quarters. But I am sure that they will not be shared -by any of the men whom it was my privilege to command. They knew that -an offensive policy was the cheapest policy, and the proof that they -accepted it as the right one was their ever-rising _moral_ as the -campaign developed. - -"Feed your troops on victory," is a maxim which does not appear in -any text-book, but it is nevertheless true. The aim and end of all -the efforts and of all the heavy sacrifices of the Australian nation -was victory in the field. Nothing that could be done could lead more -swiftly and more directly to its fulfilment than an energetic offensive -policy. The troops themselves recognized this. They learned to believe, -because of success heaped upon success, that they were invincible. They -were right, and I believe that I was right in shaping a course which -would give them the opportunity of proving it. - -There are some aspects of the Australian campaign to which, before -closing this memoir, I should like to make brief reference. Success -depended first and foremost upon the military proficiency of the -Australian private soldier and his glorious spirit of heroism. I do -not propose to attempt here an exhaustive analysis of the causes -which led to the making of him. The democratic institutions under -which he was reared, the advanced system of education by which he was -trained--teaching him to think for himself and to apply what he had -been taught to practical ends--the instinct of sport and adventure -which is his national heritage, his pride in his young country, and the -opportunity which came to him of creating a great national tradition, -were all factors which made him what he was. - -Physically the Australian Army was composed of the flower of the -youth of the continent. A volunteer army--the only purely volunteer -army that fought in the Great War--it was composed of men carefully -selected according to a high physical standard, from which, happily, -no departure was made, even although recruiting began to fall off in -the last year of the war, and there were some who had proposed a more -lenient recruiting examination. The cost to Australia of delivering -each fighting man, fully trained, to the battle front was too great to -permit of any doubt whether the physical quality of the raw material -would survive the wear and tear of war. - -Mentally, the Australian soldier was well endowed. In him there was a -curious blend of a capacity for independent judgment with a readiness -to submit to self-effacement in a common cause. He had a personal -dignity all his own. He had the political sense highly developed, and -was always a keen critic of the way in which his battalion or battery -was "run," and of the policies which guided his destinies from day to -day. - -His intellectual gifts and his "handiness" made him an apt pupil. It -was always a delight to see the avidity with which he mastered the -technique of the weapons which were placed in his hands. Machine guns, -Lewis guns, Mills' bombs, Stokes' mortars, rifle grenades, flares, -fuses, detonators, Very lights, signal rockets, German machine guns, -German stick bombs, never for long remained a mystery to him. - -At all schools and classes he proved a diligent scholar, and astonished -his instructors by the speed with which he absorbed and bettered his -instruction. Conservatism in military methods was no part of his creed. -He was always mentally alert to adopt new ideas and often to invent -them. - -His adaptability spared him much hardship. He knew how to make himself -comfortable. To light a fire and cook his food was a natural instinct. -A sheet of corrugated iron, a batten or two, and a few strands of wire -were enough to enable him to fabricate a home in which he could live at -ease. - -Psychologically, he was easy to lead but difficult to drive. His -imagination was readily fired. War was to him a game, and he played -for his side with enthusiasm. His bravery was founded upon his sense -of duty to his unit, comradeship to his fellows, emulation to uphold -his traditions, and a combative spirit to avenge his hardships and -sufferings upon the enemy. - -Taking him all in all, the Australian soldier was, when once -understood, not difficult to handle. But he required a sympathetic -handling, which appealed to his intelligence and satisfied his instinct -for a "square deal." - -Very much and very stupid comment has been made upon the discipline -of the Australian soldier. That was because the very conception and -purpose of discipline have been misunderstood. It is, after all, only -a means to an end, and that end is the power to secure co-ordinated -action among a large number of individuals for the achievement of a -definite purpose. It does not mean lip service, nor obsequious homage -to superiors, nor servile observance of forms and customs, nor a -suppression of individuality. - -Such may have been the outward manifestations of discipline in times -gone by. If they achieved the end in view, it must have been because -the individual soldier had acquired in those days no capacity to act -intelligently and because he could be considered only in the mass. But -modern war makes high demands upon the intelligence of the private -soldier and upon his individual initiative. Any method of training -which tends to suppress that individuality will tend to reduce his -efficiency and value. The proverbial "iron discipline" of the Prussian -military ideal ultimately broke down completely under the test of a -great war. - -In the Australian Forces no strong insistence was ever made upon the -mere outward forms of discipline. The soldier was taught that personal -cleanliness was necessary to ensure his health and well-being, that a -soldierly bearing meant a moral and physical uplift which would help -him to rise superior to his squalid environment, that punctuality meant -economy of effort, that unquestioning obedience was the only road to -successful collective action. He acquired these military qualities -because his intelligence taught him that the reasons given him were -true ones. - -In short, the Australian Army is a proof that individualism is the -best and not the worst foundation upon which to build up collective -discipline. The Australian is accustomed to team-work. He learns it -in the sporting field, in his industrial organizations, and in his -political activities. The team-work which he developed in the war was -of the highest order of efficiency. Each man understood his part and -understood also that the part which others had to play depended upon -the proper performance of his own. - -The gunner knew that the success of the infantry depended upon his own -punctilious performance of his task, its accuracy, its punctuality, -its conscientious thoroughness. The runner knew what depended upon -the rapid delivery at the right destination of the message which he -carried. The mule driver knew that the load of ammunition entrusted -to him must be delivered, at any sacrifice, to its destined battery; -the infantryman knew that he must be at his tape line at the appointed -moment, and that he must not overrun his allotted objective. - -The truest test of battle discipline was the confidence which every -leader in the field always felt that he could rely upon every man to -perform the duty which had been prescribed for him, as long as breath -lasted, and that he would perform it faithfully even when there was no -possibility of any supervision. - -Thus the sense of duty was always very high, and so also was the -instinct of comradeship. A soldier, a platoon, a whole battalion would -sooner sacrifice themselves than "let down" a comrade or another unit. -There was no finer example of individual self-sacrifice, for the -benefit of comrades, than the Stretcher-bearer service, which suffered -exceedingly in its noble work of succouring the wounded, and exposed -itself unflinchingly to every danger. - -The relations between the officers and men of the Australian Army were -also of a nature which is deserving of notice. From almost the earliest -days of the war violence was done to a deep-rooted tradition of the -British Army, which discouraged any promotion from the ranks, and -stringently forbade, in cases where it was given, promotion in the same -unit. It was rare to recognize the distinguished service of a ranker; -it was impossible for him to secure a commission in his own regiment. - -The Australian Imperial Force changed all that. Those privates, -corporals and sergeants who displayed, under battle conditions, a -notable capacity for leadership were earmarked for preferment. If their -standard of education was good, they received commissions as soon as -there were vacancies to fill; if not, they were sent to Oxford or -Cambridge to be given an opportunity of improving both their general -and their special military knowledge. - -As a general rule, they came back as commissioned officers to the very -unit in which they had enlisted or served. They afforded to all its men -a tangible and visible proof of the recognition of merit and capacity, -and their example was always a powerful stimulus to all their former -comrades. - -There was thus no officer caste, no social distinction in the whole -force. In not a few instances, men of humble origin and belonging -to the artisan class rose, during the war, from privates to the -command of Battalions. The efficiency of the force suffered in no -way in consequence. On the contrary, the whole Australian Army -became automatically graded into leaders and followers according -to the individual merits of every man, and there grew a wonderful -understanding between them. - -The duties and responsibilities of the officers were always put upon -a high plane. They had, during all military service with troops, to -dress like the men, to live among them in the trenches, to share their -hardships and privations, and to be responsible for their welfare. No -officer dared to look after his own comfort until every man or horse -or mule had been fed and quartered, as well as the circumstances of -the moment permitted. The battle prowess of the Australian regimental -officer and the magnificent example he set have become household words. - -[Illustration: The Toll of Battle--an Australian gun-team destroyed by -an enemy shell, September 1st, 1918.] - -[Illustration: Inter-Divisional Relief--The 30th American and the 3rd -Australian Divisions passing each other in the "Roo de Kanga," Peronne, -during the "relief" after the capture of the Hindenburg Line, October -4th, 1918.] - -Then there must be a word of recognition of the work of the devoted and -able Staffs. It was upon them, after all, that the principal burden of -the campaign rested. Upon them, their skill and industry, depended the -adequacy of all supplies and their proper distribution, the precision -of all arrangements for battle, the accuracy of all maps, orders and -instructions, the clearness of messages and reports, the completeness -of the information on which the Commander must base his decisions, and -the correct calculations of time and space for the movement of troops, -guns and transport. Their watchword was "efficiency." - -"The Staff Officer is the servant of the troops." This was the ritual -pronounced at the initiation of every Staff Officer. It was a doctrine -which contributed powerfully to the success of the staff work as a -whole. It meant that the Staff Officer's duties extended far beyond -the mere transmission of orders. It became his business to see that -they were understood, and rightly acted upon, and to assist in removing -every kind of difficulty in their due execution. The importance of -accurate and reliable staff work can be understood when it is realized -that no mistake can happen without ultimately imposing an added stress -upon the most subordinate and most helpless of all the components of an -Army--the private soldier. An error in a clock time, the miscarriage -of a message, the neglect to issue an instruction, a misreading of an -order, an omission from a list of names, a mistake in a computation, -an incomplete inventory, are bound in the long run to involve an added -burden somewhere upon some private soldier. - -The Staff of the Australian Army Corps, its Divisions and Brigades, -consisted during the last six months almost entirely of Australians, -many of them belonging to the permanent military forces of the -Commonwealth, but more still men who, before the war, followed civilian -occupations. Among both categories the quality of the staff work -steadily grew in efficiency, speed and accuracy, and during the last -period of active fighting it reached a very high standard indeed. - -Had it been otherwise, I could not have carried out either the rapid -preparations for several of the greater battles, or the frequent and -complex interchanges of Divisions which alone rendered it possible -for me to keep up a continuous pressure on the enemy, or the -readjustments throughout the whole of the very large area always under -my jurisdiction which became necessary as the advance proceeded. - -No reference to the staff work of the Australian Corps during the -period of my command would be complete without a tribute to the work -and personality of Brigadier-General T. A. Blamey, my Chief of Staff. -He possessed a mind cultured far above the average, widely informed, -alert and prehensile. He had an infinite capacity for taking pains. -A Staff College graduate, but not on that account a pedant, he was -thoroughly versed in the technique of staff work, and in the minutiae of -all procedure. - -He served me with an exemplary loyalty, for which I owe him a debt of -gratitude which cannot be repaid. Our temperaments adapted themselves -to each other in a manner which was ideal. He had an extraordinary -faculty of self-effacement, posing always and conscientiously as the -instrument to give effect to my policies and decisions. Really helpful -whenever his advice was invited, he never obtruded his own opinions, -although I knew that he did not always agree with me. - -Some day the orders which he drafted for the long series of -history-making military operations upon which we collaborated will -become a model for Staff Colleges and Schools for military instruction. -They were accurate, lucid in language, perfect in detail, and always -an exact interpretation of my intention. It was seldom that I thought -that my orders or instructions could have been better expressed, and no -Commander could have been more exacting than I was in the matter of the -use of clear language to express thought. - -Blamey was a man of inexhaustible industry, and accepted every task -with placid readiness. Nothing was ever too much trouble. He worked -late and early, and set a high standard for the remainder of the large -Corps Staff of which he was the head. The personal support which he -accorded to me was of a nature of which I could always feel the real -substance. I was able to lean on him in times of trouble, stress and -difficulty, to a degree which was an inexpressible comfort to me. - -To the Commanders of the Five Divisions I have already made detailed -allusion. They were all renowned leaders. To all the Brigadiers of -Infantry and Artillery and to the Heads of the Administrative Services -who laboured under them, the limitations of space forbid my making any -individual reference. But they were all of them men to whose splendid -services Australia owes a deep debt of gratitude. In their hands the -honour of Australia's fighting men and the prestige of her arms were in -safe keeping. - -None but men of character and self-devotion could have carried the -burden which they had to bear during the last six months of the war. -In spite of stress and difficulty, unremitting toil and wasted effort, -weary days and sleepless nights, fresh task piling upon the task but -just begun, labouring even harder during periods of so-called rest -than when their troops were actually in the line, this gallant band of -leaders remained steadfast of purpose, never faltered, never lost their -faith in final victory, never failed to impress their optimism and -their unflinching fighting spirit upon the men whom they commanded. - -It may be appropriate to end this memoir on a personal note. I have -permitted myself a tone of eulogy for the triumphant achievements of -the Australian Army Corps in 1918, which I have endeavoured faithfully -to portray. Let it not be assumed on that account that the humble part -which it fell to my lot to perform afforded me any satisfaction or -prompted any enthusiasm for war. Quite the contrary. - -From the far-off days of 1914, when the call first came, until the -last shot was fired, every day was filled with loathing, horror, and -distress. I deplored all the time the loss of precious life and the -waste of human effort. Nothing could have been more repugnant to me -than the realization of the dreadful inefficiency and the misspent -energy of war. Yet it had to be, and the thought always uppermost was -the earnest prayer that Australia might for ever be spared such a -horror on her own soil. - -There is, in my belief, only one way to realize such a prayer. The -nation that wishes to defend its land and its honour must spare no -effort, refuse no sacrifice to make itself so formidable that no enemy -will dare to assail it. A League of Nations may be an instrument for -the preservation of peace, but an efficient Army is a far more potent -one. - -The essential components of such an Army are a qualified Staff, an -adequate equipment and a trained soldiery. I state them in what I -believe to be their order of importance, and my belief is based upon -the lessons which this war has taught me. In that way alone can -Australia secure the sanctity of her territory and the preservation of -her independent liberties. - -Such a creed is not militarism, but is of the very essence of national -self-preservation. For long years before the war it was the creed of a -small handful of men in Australia, who braved the indifference and even -the ridicule of public opinion in order to try to qualify themselves -for the test when it should come. Four dreadful years of war have -served to convince me of the truth of that creed, and to confirm me in -the belief that the men of the coming generation, if they love their -country, must take up the burden which these men have had to bear. - - - - -APPENDIX A - - GROUPING INTO AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONS OF ARTILLERY AND - INFANTRY BRIGADES, DURING THE PERIOD MAY TO OCTOBER, - 1918, AND THE GENERAL OFFICERS COMMANDING THEM. - -FIRST DIVISION (Glasgow): - - _Artillery_, 1st and 2nd Brigades (Anderson). - _Infantry_, 1st Brigade (Mackay). - 2nd " (Heane). - 3rd " (Bennett). - -SECOND DIVISION (Rosenthal): - - _Artillery_, 4th and 5th Brigades (Phillips). - _Infantry_, 5th Brigade (Martin). - 6th " (Robertson). - 7th " (Wisdom). - -THIRD DIVISION (Gellibrand): - - _Artillery_, 7th and 8th Brigades (Grimwade). - _Infantry_, 9th Brigade (Goddard). - 10th " (McNicoll). - 11th " (Cannan). - -FOURTH DIVISION (Maclagan): - - _Artillery_, 10th and 11th Brigades (Burgess). - _Infantry_, 4th Brigade (Brand). - 12th " (Leane). - 13th " (Herring). - -FIFTH DIVISION (Hobbs): - - _Artillery_, 13th and 14th Brigades (Bessel-Browne). - _Infantry_, 8th Brigade (Tivey). - 14th " (Stewart). - 15th " (Elliott). - -The 3rd, 6th and 12th Artillery Brigades were Corps Troops not forming -part of any Division. The 9th Artillery Brigade was disbanded at the -end of 1916. - - - - -APPENDIX B - - -In order to illustrate the nature of the individual fighting carried -out by the Australian Corps, during the period covered by this book, -the following very small selection has been made from the official -records of deeds of gallantry by individual soldiers. In every one of -these twenty-nine cases, the VICTORIA CROSS has been awarded by His -Majesty the King: - - No. 4061, SERGEANT STANLEY ROBERT MACDOUGALL, 47th Battalion, A.I.F. - - "At DERNANCOURT, on morning of 28th March, 1918, the enemy - attacked our line, and his first wave succeeded in gaining an - entry. Sergt. MacDougall, who was at a post in a flank company, - realized the situation, and at once charged the enemy's second - wave single-handed with rifle and bayonet, killing 7 and capturing - Machine Gun which they had. This he turned on to them, firing - from the hip, causing many casualties, and routing that wave. He - then turned his attention to those who had entered, until his - ammunition had run out, all the time firing at close quarters, when - he seized a bayonet and charged again, killing three men and a - German officer, who was just about to kill one of our officers. He - then used a Lewis Gun on the enemy, killing many and enabling us to - capture 33 prisoners. His prompt action saved the line and enabled - us to stop the enemy advance." - -LIEUTENANT PERCY VALENTINE STORKEY, 19th Battalion, A.I.F. - - "Lieut. Storkey was in charge of a platoon which took part in - the attack at BOIS DE HANGARD on morning of 7th April, 1918. On - emerging from the wood, the enemy trench line was encountered, and - Lieut. Storkey found himself with 6 men. While continuing his move - forward, a large enemy party--about 80 to 100 strong--armed with - several machine guns, was noticed to be holding up the advance of - the troops on the right. Lieut. Storkey immediately decided to - attack this party from the flank and rear, and while moving forward - to the attack, was joined by Lieut. Lipscomb and four men. Under - the leadership of Lieut. Storkey, this small party of 2 officers - and 10 other ranks charged the enemy position with fixed bayonets, - driving the enemy out, killing and wounding about 30 and capturing - the remainder, viz.: 3 officers and 50 men, also one machine gun." - - LIEUTENANT CLIFFORD WILLIAM KING SADLIER, 51st Battalion, A.I.F. - - "For conspicuous gallantry on the night of 24-25th April, 1918, - during a counter-attack by his Battalion on strong enemy positions - south of VILLERS-BRETONNEUX, east of Amiens. Lieut. Sadlier's - platoon, which was on the left of the Battalion, had to advance - through a wood, where they encountered a strong enemy machine-gun - post, which caused casualties and prevented the platoon from - advancing. Although himself wounded, this officer at once collected - his bombing section, and led them against the machine guns, - succeeding in killing the crews and capturing two of the guns. By - this time Lieut. Sadlier's party were all casualties, and he alone - attacked a third enemy machine gun with his revolver, killing the - crew of four and taking the gun. In doing so, he was again wounded, - and unable to go on." - -No. 1914, SERGEANT WILLIAM RUTHVEN, 22nd Battalion, A.I.F. - - "For most conspicuous bravery and daring in action during the - attack at VILLE-SUR-ANCRE, near Albert, on 19th May, 1918. - During the advance Sergeant Ruthven's Company suffered numerous - casualties, and his Company Commander was severely wounded. He then - assumed command of his portion of the assault, took charge of the - Company Headquarters, and rallied the sections in his vicinity. - As the leading wave approached its objective, it was subjected to - heavy fire from an enemy Machine Gun at 30 to 40 yards' range, - directly in front. This N.C.O., without hesitation, at once sprang - out, threw a bomb which landed beside the post, and immediately - rushed the position, bayoneting one of the crew and capturing the - gun. He then encountered some of the enemy coming out of a shelter. - He wounded two, captured six others in the same position, and - handed them over to an escort from the leading wave, which had now - reached the objective. Sergeant Ruthven then reorganized our men in - his vicinity, and established a post in the second objective. Enemy - movement was then seen in a sunken road about 150 yards distant. - Without hesitation, and armed only with a revolver, he went over - the open alone and rushed the position, shooting two Germans who - refused to come out of their dug-out. He then single-handed mopped - up this post, and captured the whole of the garrison, amounting in - all to 32, and kept them until assistance arrived to escort them - back to our lines. During the remainder of the day this gallant - N.C.O. set a splendid example of leadership, moving up and down his - position under fire, supervising consolidation and encouraging his - men." - -No. 1327, CORPORAL PHILLIP DAVEY, M.M., 10th Battalion, A.I.F. - - "In a daylight operation against the enemy position near MERRIS on - June 28th, 1918, Corporal Davey's platoon advanced 200 yards and - captured part of enemy line. While the platoon was consolidating, - the enemy pushed a machine gun forward under cover of a hedge, - and opened fire from close range, inflicting heavy casualties and - hampering work. Alone Corporal Davey moved forward in the face of - a fierce point-blank fire, and attacked the gun with hand grenades, - putting half the crew out of action. Having used all available - grenades, he returned to the original jumping-off trench, secured - a further supply and again attacked the gun, the crew of which had - in the meantime been reinforced. He killed the crew, 8 in all, and - captured the gun. This gallant N.C.O. then mounted the gun in the - new post and used it in repelling a determined counter-attack, - during which he was severely wounded in both legs, back and - stomach." - -No. 3399, PRIVATE (LANCE-CORPORAL) THOMAS LESLIE AXFORD, M.M., 16th -Battalion, A.I.F. - - "For conspicuous gallantry and initiative during the operations - against VAIRE and HAMEL WOODS, east of Corbie, on the morning - of the 4th July, 1918. When the barrage lifted and the Infantry - advance commenced, the platoon of which he is a member was able - to reach the first enemy defences through gaps which had been cut - in the wires. The adjoining platoon got delayed in uncut barbed - wire. This delay enabled the enemy machine guns to get into action, - and enabled them to inflict a number of casualties among the men - struggling through the wires, including the Company Commander, - who was killed. L.-Corporal Axford, with great initiative and - magnificent courage, at once dashed to the flank, threw his bombs - amongst the machine-gun crews; followed up his bombs by jumping - into the trench, and charging with his bayonet. Unaided he killed - ten of the enemy and took 6 prisoners; he threw the machine - guns over the parapet, and called out to the delayed platoon to - come on. He then rejoined his own platoon, and fought with it - during the remainder of the operations. Prior to the incidents - above-mentioned, he had assisted in the laying out of the tapes for - the jumping-off position, which was within 100 yards of the enemy. - When the tapes were laid, he remained out as a special patrol to - ensure that the enemy did not discover any unusual movement on our - side." - -No. 1936, PRIVATE HENRY DALZIEL, 15th Battalion, A.I.F. - - "For his magnificent bravery and devotion to duty during operations - near HAMEL WOOD, east of Corbie, on 4th July, 1918. He was No. 2 - of a Lewis Gun Section, and at the commencement of our advance his - Company met with determined resistance from Pear Trench strong - point, which was strongly garrisoned and manned by numerous machine - guns. This strong point, undamaged by our artillery fire, was - protected by strong wire entanglements. A heavy concentration of - machine-gun fire caused heavy casualties and held up our advance. - His Lewis Gun came into action and silenced enemy guns in one - direction, when another enemy gun opened up from another direction. - Private Dalziel dashed at it, and with his revolver killed or - captured the entire crew and gun, and allowed our advance to - continue. He was severely wounded in the hand, but carried on and - took part in the capture of the final objective. He twice went - over open ground under heavy enemy artillery and machine-gun fire - to where our aeroplanes had dropped some boxes of ammunition, - and carried back a box on each occasion to his gun, and though - suffering from considerable loss of blood, he filled magazines and - served his gun until severely wounded through the head." - -No. 1689A, CORPORAL WALTER ERNEST BROWN, D.C.M., 20th Battalion, A.I.F. - - "For gallant service on the morning of 6th July, 1918, north-east - of VILLERS-BRETONNEUX, east of Amiens. This N.C.O. was one of an - advanced party from his Battalion making arrangements with the - Battalion then in the line for relief by his own Battalion. As - such he was under no obligation to participate in any offensive - operations before his Battalion took over the line. During the - night of 5th-6th July the Company to which he was attached - carried out a minor operation resulting in the capture of a small - system of enemy trench. Early on the morning of 6th July an enemy - strong post, about 70 yards distant, caused the occupants of the - newly-captured trench great inconvenience by persistent sniping. - It was decided to rush this post. Hearing of this, Corporal Brown, - on his own initiative, crept out along the shallow trench towards - the enemy post, and then made a dash across No Man's Land towards - this post. An enemy machine gun opened fire from another trench, - and he had to take cover by lying down. He later made another dash - forward, and succeeded in reaching his objective. With a Mills - grenade in his hand, he stood at the door of a dug-out and called - on the occupants to surrender. One of the enemy rushed out, a - scuffle ensued, and Corporal Brown knocked him down with his fist. - Loud cries of 'Kamerad' were then heard, and from the dug-out an - officer and eleven other ranks appeared. Driving them before him, - Corporal Brown brought back the complete party as prisoners to our - line." - -LIEUTENANT ALBERT CHALMERS BORELLA, M.M., 26th Battalion, A.I.F. - - "For exceptional gallantry in the attack near VILLERS-BRETONNEUX, - on the 17th-18th July, 1918. Whilst leading his platoon with the - first wave, Lieut. Borella noticed an enemy machine gun firing - through our barrage--he ran out ahead of his men into the barrage, - shot two German machine gunners with his revolver, and captured the - gun. He then led his party, now reduced to ten men and two Lewis - Guns, further on, against JAFFA TRENCH, which was very strongly - held, but using his revolver, and later a rifle, with great effect, - Lieut. Borella shot down the enemy right and left, and set such a - splendid example, that the garrison were quickly shot and captured. - Two large dug-outs were bombed here and thirty prisoners taken. - After reorganization the enemy counter-attacked twice in strong - force, on the second occasion outnumbering Lieut. Borella's platoon - by ten to one; but he showed such coolness and determination, that - the men put up an heroic resistance, and twice repulsed the enemy - with very heavy loss. It is estimated that from 100 to 150 Germans - were killed in this vicinity. When Lieut. Borella refused his left - flank about 40 yards during the first counter-attack he sent his - men back one at a time, and was himself the last to leave, under - heavy fire." - - LIEUTENANT ALFRED EDWARD GABY, 28th Battalion, A.I.F. - - "During the attack east of VILLERS-BRETONNEUX, near Amiens, on the - morning of 8th August, 1918, this officer led his Company with - great dash, being well in front. On reaching the wire in front of - the enemy trench, strong opposition was encountered. The enemy were - holding a strong point in force about 40 yards beyond the wire, and - commanded the gap with four machine guns and rifles. The advance - was at once checked. Lieut. Gaby found another gap in the wire, - and entirely by himself approached the strong point, while machine - guns and rifles were still being fired from it. Running along the - parapet, still alone, and at point-blank range, he emptied his - revolver into the garrison, drove the crews from their guns, and - compelled the surrender of 50 of the enemy, with four machine guns. - He then quickly reorganized his men and led them on to his final - objective, which he captured and consolidated. On the morning of - the 11th August, 1918, during an attack east of FRAMERVILLE, Lieut. - Gaby again led his Company with great dash on to the objective. The - enemy brought heavy rifle and machine-gun fire to bear upon the - line, but in the face of this heavy fire Lieut. Gaby walked along - his line of posts, encouraging his men to quickly consolidate the - line. While engaged on this duty he was killed by an enemy sniper." - -No. 2742, PRIVATE ROBERT MATTHEW BEATHAM, 8th Battalion, A.I.F. - - "For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during the attack - north of ROSIERES on 9th August, 1918. Private Beatham showed - such heroism and courage, that he inspired all officers and men - in his vicinity in a wonderful manner. When the advance was held - up by heavy machine-gun fire, Private Beatham dashed forward and, - assisted by one man, bombed and fought the crews of four enemy - machine guns, killing ten of them and capturing ten others. The - bravery of the action greatly facilitated the advance of the whole - Battalion and prevented casualties. In fighting the crew of the - first gun he was shot through the right leg, but continued in the - advance. When the final objective was reached and fierce fighting - was taking place, he again dashed forward and bombed the machine - gun that was holding our men off, getting riddled with bullets and - killed in doing so." - -No. 506, SERGEANT PERCY CLYDE STATTON, M.M., 40th Battalion, A.I.F. - - "For most conspicuous gallantry and initiative in action near - PROYART on 12th August, 1918. The platoon commanded by Sergeant - Statton reached its objective, but the remainder of the Battalion - was held up by heavy machine-gun fire. He skilfully engaged two - machine-gun posts with Lewis Gun fire, enabling the remainder of - his Battalion to advance. The advance of the Battalion on his left - had been brought to a standstill by the heavy enemy machine-gun - fire, and the first of our assaulting detachments to reach the - machine-gun posts were put out of action in taking the first gun. - Armed only with a revolver, in broad daylight, Sergeant Statton at - once rushed four enemy machine-gun posts in succession, disposing - of two of them, killing five of the enemy. The remaining two posts - retired and were wiped out by Lewis Gun fire. This N.C.O.'s act had - a very inspiring effect on the troops who had been held up, and - they cheered him as he returned. By his daring exploit he enabled - the attacking troops to gain their objective. Later in the evening, - under heavy machine-gun fire, he went out again and brought in two - badly-wounded men." - -LIEUTENANT LAWRENCE DOMINIC MCCARTHY, 16th Battalion, A.I.F. - - "This officer is especially brought to notice for his wonderful - gallantry, initiative and leadership on the morning of the 23rd - August, 1918, when an attack was being made near MADAME WOOD, west - of Vernandivukkers. The objectives of this Battalion were attained - without serious opposition. The Battalion on the left flank were - less fortunate. Here several well-posted machine-gun posts were - holding up the attack, and heavy fire was being brought to bear on - our left flank. When Lieut. McCarthy realized the situation, he at - once engaged the nearest machine-gun post; but still the attacking - troops failed to get forward. This officer then determined to - attack the nearest post. Leaving his men to continue the fire - fight, he, with two others, dashed across the open and dropped - into a disused trench which had been blocked. One of his two men - was killed whilst doing this. He was now right under the block - over which the enemy machine gun was firing. The presence of head - cover prevented the use of bombs. He therefore tunnelled a hole - through the bottom of the block, through which he inserted his head - and one arm. He at once shot dead the two men firing the gun. He - then crawled through the hole he had made, and by himself charged - down the trench. He threw his limited number of Mills bombs among - the German garrison and inflicted more casualties. He then came - in contact with two German officers, who fired on him with their - revolvers. One of these he shot dead with his revolver, the other - he seriously wounded. He then charged down the trench, using his - revolver and throwing enemy stick bombs, and capturing three more - enemy machine guns. At this stage, some 700 yards from his starting - point, he was joined by the N.C.O., whom he had outdistanced when - he crawled through the hole in the trench block mentioned above. - Together they continued to bomb up the trench, until touch was - established with the Lancashire Fusiliers, and in the meanwhile - yet another machine gun had been captured. A total of 5 machine - guns and 50 prisoners (37 unwounded and 13 wounded) was captured, - while Lieut. McCarthy during his most amazing and daring feat - had, single-handed, killed 20 of the enemy. Having cleared up a - dangerous situation, he proceeded to establish a garrison in the - line. Whilst doing this he saw a number of the enemy getting away - from neighbouring trenches. He at once seized a Lewis Gun and - inflicted further casualties on the enemy." - - LIEUTENANT WILLIAM DONOVAN JOYNT, 8th Battalion, A.I.F. - - "For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during the attack - on HERLEVILLE WOOD, near Chuignes, on 23rd August, 1918. Early - in the advance Lieut. Joynt's Company Commander was killed; he - immediately took charge of the Company and led them with courage - and skill. A great deal of the success of the operation in this - portion of the sector was directly due to his magnificent work. - When the advance was commenced the Battalion was moving into - support to another Battalion. On approaching Herleville Wood, - the troops of the leading Battalion lost all their officers and - became disorganized. Under very heavy fire, and having no leaders, - they appeared certain to be annihilated. Lieut. Joynt grasped - the situation, and rushed forward in the teeth of very heavy - machine-gun and artillery fire over the open. He got the remaining - men under control, and worked them into a piece of dead ground, - until he could reform them. He manoeuvred his own men forward, - and linked them up with the men of the other Battalion. He then - made a personal reconnaissance, and found that the fire from the - wood was holding the whole advance up, the troops on his flanks - suffering very heavy casualties. Dashing out in front of his men, - he called them on, and by sheer force of example inspired them into - a magnificent frontal bayonet attack on the wood. The audacity - of the move over the open staggered the enemy, and Lieut. Joynt - succeeded in penetrating the wood and working through it. By his - leadership and courage a very critical situation was saved, and - on this officer rests to the greatest extent the success of the - Brigade's attack. When the Battalion on our left was held up on - Plateau Wood, and was suffering severe casualties, Lieut. Joynt, - with a small party of volunteers, worked right forward against - heavy opposition, and by means of hand-to-hand fighting forced his - way round the rear of the wood, penetrating it from that side, and - demoralizing the enemy to such an extent that a very stubborn and - victorious defensive was changed into an abject surrender. He was - always in the hardest pressed parts of the line, and seemed to - bear a charmed life. He was constantly ready to run any personal - risk and to assist flank units. He continually showed magnificent - leadership, and his example to his men had a wonderful effect on - them, causing them to follow him cheerfully in his most daring - exploits. He continued to do magnificent work until he was badly - wounded by shell fire in the legs." - -No. 23, PRIVATE (LANCE-CORPORAL) BERNARD SYDNEY GORDON, 41st Battalion, -A.I.F. - - "During the operations of the 26-27th August, 1918, east of BRAY, - this N.C.O. showed most conspicuous gallantry and devotion to - duty in the face of the enemy. He led his section through heavy - enemy shelling to its objective, which he consolidated. Then - single-handed he attacked an enemy machine gun which was enfilading - the Company on his right, killed the man on the gun, and captured - the post, which contained one officer (a Captain) and 10 men. - After handing these over at Company Headquarters, he returned alone - to the old system of trenches, in which were many machine guns; - entered a trench and proceeded to mop it up, returning with 15 - prisoners in one squad and 14 in another, together with two machine - guns. Again he returned to the system, this time with a Trench - Mortar gun and crew, and proceeded to mop up a further portion of - the trench, bringing in 22 prisoners, including one officer and - 3 machine guns. This last capture enabled the British troops on - our left to advance, which they had not been able to do owing to - machine-gun fire from these posts. His total captures were thus 2 - officers and 61 other ranks, together with 6 machine guns, and with - the exception of the Trench Mortar assistance, it was absolutely an - individual effort and done entirely on his own initiative." - -No. 726, PRIVATE GEORGE CARTWRIGHT, 33rd Battalion, A.I.F. - - "For most conspicuous valour and devotion to duty. On the morning - of the 31st August, 1918, during the attack on ROAD WOOD, - south-west of Bouchavesnes, near Peronne, Private Cartwright - displayed exceptional gallantry and supreme disregard for - personal danger in the face of a most withering machine-gun - fire. Two Companies were held up by a machine-gun firing from - the south-western edge of the wood. Without hesitation, this man - stood up, and walking towards the gun, fired his rifle from his - shoulder. He shot the No. 1 Gunner; another German manned the gun, - and he killed him; a third attempted to fire the gun and him he - also killed. Private Cartwright then threw a bomb at the post, and - on its exploding, he rushed forward, captured the gun and nine - Germans. Our line then immediately rushed forward, loudly cheering - him. This magnificent deed had a most inspiring effect on the whole - line; all strove to emulate his gallantry. Throughout the operation - Private Cartwright displayed wonderful dash, grim determination and - courage of the highest order." - -LIEUTENANT EDGAR THOMAS TOWNER, M.C., 2nd Australian Machine Gun -Battalion. - - "On 1st September, 1918, in the attack on MONT ST. QUENTIN, near - Peronne, this officer was in charge of 4 Vickers guns operating on - a front of 1,500 yards. During the early stages of the advance an - enemy machine gun was causing casualties to our advancing Infantry. - Locating the gun, Lieut. Towner dashed ahead alone, and succeeded - in killing the crew with his revolver, capturing the gun, and - then, by turning it against the enemy, inflicted heavy casualties - on them. Advancing then past a copse from which the enemy were - firing, he brought his guns into action, placing his fire behind - the enemy and cutting them off. On their attempting to retire - before the advancing Infantry, and finding they were prevented by - this machine-gun fire, the party of 25 Germans surrendered. He then - reconnoitred alone over open ground exposed to heavy machine-gun - and snipers' fire, and by the energy, foresight and the promptitude - with which he brought fire to bear on further enemy groups, enabled - the Infantry to reach a sunken road. On moving his guns up to - the sunken road, he found himself short of ammunition, so went - back across the open under heavy fire and obtained a German gun, - and brought it and boxes of ammunition into the sunken road. Here - he mounted and fired the gun in full view of the enemy, causing - the enemy to retire further, and enabling Infantry on the flank, - who were previously held up, to advance. Enemy machine gunners - having direct observation, flicked the earth round and under this - gun, and played a tattoo along the top of the bank. Though one - bullet went into his helmet and inflicted a gaping scalp wound, he - continued firing. Subsequently he refused to go out to have his - wound attended to, as the situation was critical and his place - was with his men. Later in the day the Infantry were obliged to - retire slightly, and one gun was left behind. Lieut. Towner, seeing - this, dashed back over the open, carried the gun back in spite of - terrific fire, and brought it into action again. He continued to - engage the enemy wherever they appeared, and put an enemy machine - gun out of action. During the following night he insisted on doing - his tour of duty along with the other officers, and his coolness - and cheerfulness set an example which had a great effect on the - men. To steady and calm the men of a small detached outpost, he - crawled out among the enemy posts to investigate. He remained out - about an hour, though enemy machine guns fired continuously on the - sector, and the Germans were moving about him. He moved one gun up - in support of the Infantry post, and patrolled the communication - saps which ran off this post into the German line during the - remainder of the night. Next morning, after his guns assisted in - dispersing a large party of the enemy, he was led away utterly - exhausted, 30 hours after being wounded." - -No. 2358, SERGEANT ALBERT DAVID LOWERSON, 21st Battalion, A.I.F. - - "At MONT ST, QUENTIN, north of Peronne, on the 1st September, - 1918, this N.C.O. displayed courage and tactical skill of the - very highest order during the attack on this village. Very strong - opposition was met with early in the attack, and every foot of - ground was stubbornly contested by the enemy located in very - strong positions. This N.C.O.'s example during the fighting was - of the greatest value. He moved about, regardless of the heavy - enemy machine-gun fire, directing his men, encouraging them to - still greater effort, and finally led them on to the objective. - On reaching the objective, he saw that the left attacking party - had not met with success, and that the attack was held up by an - enemy strong post, heavily manned with 12 machine guns. Under the - heaviest sniping and machine gun fire Sergeant Lowerson rallied - seven men around him into a storming party, and deployed them to - attack the post from both flanks, one party of three being killed - immediately. He himself then rushed the strong point, and, with - effective bombing, inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, and - captured the post containing 12 machine guns and 30 prisoners. - Though severely wounded in the right thigh, he refused to leave the - front line until the prisoners had been dispatched to the rear, and - the organization and consolidation of the post by our men had been - completed. When he saw that the position was thoroughly secure, - he returned to the rear, but refused to leave the Battalion until - forced to evacuate two days later by the seriousness of his wound. - This act was the culminating point of a series of most gallant - performances by this N.C.O. during the fighting extending over a - week." - -No. 1584A, PRIVATE WILLIAM MATTHEW CURREY, 53rd Battalion, A.I.F. - - "During the attack on PERONNE, on the morning of 1st September, - 1918, Private Currey displayed most conspicuous gallantry and - daring. During the early stage of the advance the Battalion was - suffering heavy casualties from a 77 mm. Field Gun, that was - firing over sights at very close range. Private Currey, without - hesitation, rushed forward, and despite a withering machine-gun - fire that was directed on him from either flank, succeeded in - capturing the gun single-handed after killing the entire crew. - Later, when continuing the advance, an enemy strong point, - containing 30 men and two machine guns, was noticed, which was - holding up the advance of the left flank. Private Currey crept - around the flank, and engaged the post with a Lewis Gun, causing - many casualties. Finally, he rushed the post single-handed, - killing four, wounding two, and taking one prisoner, the survivors - running away. It was entirely owing to his gallant conduct that - the situation was relieved, and the advance enabled to continue. - After the final stage of the attack, it was imperative that one of - the Companies that had become isolated should be withdrawn. This - man at once volunteered to carry the message, although the ground - to be crossed was very heavily shelled and continuously swept by - machine-gun fire. He crossed the shell and bullet-swept area three - times in the effort to locate the Company, and on one occasion his - box respirator was shot through by machine-gun bullets, and he was - gassed. Nevertheless, he remained on duty, and after finding the - isolated Company, delivered the message, and returned with very - valuable information from the Company Commander. Owing to the gas - poisoning from which he was suffering Currey had shortly afterwards - to be evacuated." - -No. 6939, PRIVATE ROBERT MACTIER, 23rd Battalion, A.I.F. - - "On the morning of 1st September, 1918, during the operation - entailing capture of MONT ST. QUENTIN, this man stands out for - the greatest bravery and devotion to duty. Fifteen minutes before - zero two bombing patrols were sent to clear up several enemy - strong points close to our line, but they met with very stubborn - resistance and no success, and the Battalion was unable to move on - to its Jumping Off Trench. Mactier, single-handed and in daylight, - then jumped out of the trench from the leading Company, rushed past - the block, closed with and killed the machine-gun garrison of 8 men - with his revolver and bombs, and threw the enemy machine gun over - the parapet. He rushed forward another 20 yards and jumped into - another strong point held by a garrison of 6 men, who immediately - surrendered. Continuing to the next block through the trench, an - enemy gun, which had been enfilading our flank advancing troops, - was swung on to him; but he jumped out of the trench into the open, - and disposed of this third post and gun crew by bombing them from - the rear. Before he could get into this trench, he was killed by - enemy machine gun at close range. In the three posts which Mactier - rushed, 15 of the enemy were found killed and 30 taken prisoners." - -No. 1876, CORPORAL ALEXANDER HENRY BUCKLEY, 54th Battalion, A.I.F. - - "For most conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty at PERONNE - during the operations on 1st-2nd September, 1918. After passing - the first objective, his half Company and part of the Company on - the flank were held up by an enemy machine-gun nest. With one man - he rushed the post, shooting 4 of the occupants and taking 22 - prisoners. Later on, reaching a moat, another machine-gun nest - commanded the only available foot-bridge. Whilst this was being - engaged from a flank, this N.C.O. endeavoured to cross the bridge - and rush the post, but was killed in the attempt. Throughout the - advance he had displayed great initiative, resource and courage, - being a great inspiration to his men. In order to avert casualties - amongst his comrades and to permit of their advance, he voluntarily - essayed a task which practically meant certain death. He set a fine - example of self-sacrificing devotion to duty and bravery." - -No. 2631, CORPORAL ARTHUR CHARLES HALL, 54th Battalion, A.I.F. - - "For most conspicuous gallantry, brilliant leadership and devotion - to duty during the operations at PERONNE on 1st and 2nd September, - 1918. A machine-gun post in the enemy front line was holding up - the advance; alone, this N.C.O. rushed the position, shot 4 of the - occupants as he advanced, and captured 9 others and 2 machine guns. - Then, crossing the objective with a small party, he reconnoitred - the approaches to the town, covering the infiltration of the - remainder of the Company. During the mopping up he continuously--in - advance of the main party--located enemy posts of resistance, and - then personally led parties to the assault. In this way he captured - many small parties of prisoners and machine-guns. On the morning - of 2nd September, during a heavy barrage on the newly consolidated - position, a man of his platoon was severely wounded. Seeing that - only immediate medical attention could save him, Corporal Hall - volunteered and carried the man out of the barrage, handed him to - a stretcher-bearer, and immediately returned to his post. This - Company was heavily engaged throughout the day, only one Officer - remaining unwounded." - -No. 1153, PRIVATE (LANCE-CORPORAL) LAURENCE CARTHAGE WEATHERS, 43rd -Battalion, A.I.F. - - "On the 2nd September, 1918, during operations north of PERONNE, - Lance-Corporal Weathers was one of an advanced bombing party - operating well forward of our attacking troops. Just before the - attack reached its final objective it was held up by the enemy, - who occupied a trench in great numbers. After an hour's continuous - fighting Lance-Corporal Weathers went forward alone in face of - heavy enemy fire and located a large body of them. He immediately - attacked the enemy with bombs and killed the senior officer; then - made his way back to our lines and, securing a further supply of - bombs and taking three men with him, he went forward and again - attacked under very heavy fire. On reaching the enemy position, - he jumped up on the parapet of the trench and threw bombs among - the Bosche. He then signalled for his comrades to come up, and the - remainder of the enemy, seeing this, surrendered. When counted, the - number of prisoners totalled 100 and 3 machine guns." - -No. 3244, PRIVATE JAMES PARK WOODS, 48th Battalion, A.I.F. - - "For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during the - operations near LE VERGUIER, north-west of St. Quentin, on the 18th - September, 1918. Woods formed one of a party of three to patrol - the right flank. He encountered a very formidable enemy strong - point, consisting of about 25 men with four heavy and two light - machine guns. This strong point commanded the greater portion of - our position, and it was of the utmost importance to us, insomuch - as it gave us a commanding view of the whole canal system. The - strong point was situated at the junction of four enemy fire - trenches, apparently sited with a view to protecting the approaches - to the village of Bellenglise. Private Woods, appreciating the - great importance of this position, and realizing the necessity - for its immediate capture, fearlessly attacked with his rifle and - bayonet, capturing one of the enemy and wounding the second with - his bayonet, forcing the remainder to retire. After the capture of - the strong point, it was found that one of the party was wounded. - Private Woods, although himself slightly gassed, stubbornly - defended the post. The enemy ascertaining that only two men opposed - them, immediately attempted to recapture the strong point. The - counter-attack by the enemy was carried out with at least 30 men - attacking up the three trenches and across the open ground. This - meant that Private Woods was attacked from both flanks and the - front. He fearlessly jumped on the parapet, and opened fire on - the attacking enemy, inflicting several casualties. During this - operation he was exposed to very heavy machine-gun, rifle fire - and bombing, but with dogged determination he kept up his fire, - thus holding up the enemy until help arrived, enabling the enemy - counter-attack to be repulsed with heavy losses. The capture of - this strong post was the means of securing our flank, which had - previously been in the air, and also enabled us to get in touch - with the troops on our flank." - -No. 6594, SERGEANT GERALD SEXTON, 13th Battalion, A.I.F. - - "In the attack near LE VERGUIER, north-west of St. Quentin, on - the 18th September, 1918, Sergeant Sexton displayed the most - conspicuous bravery and performed deeds which, apart from their - gallant nature, were in a great measure responsible for the - Battalion's success. On the southern edge of the village of Le - Verguier the enemy fought hard, and serious opposition had to - be crushed. During the whole period of the advance, Sergeant - Sexton was to the fore dealing with enemy machine guns by firing - from the hip as he advanced, rushing enemy posts, and performing - feats of bravery and endurance, which are better appreciated when - one realizes that all the time he fired his Lewis Gun from the - hip without faltering or for a moment taking cover. Immediately - the attack commenced, Sergeant Sexton's Lewis Gun Section was - confronted by an enemy machine gun. He called out to his section - to follow, rushed the machine gun and killed the crew. He then - called out to the rest of the Company to follow, but they had not - gone far when they encountered some bombers and riflemen about 70 - yards in front of the Company. Sexton rushed the trench, firing - his gun from the hip, and killed or took prisoner all the members - of the post. Continuing, he entered a copse, and killed or took - prisoner another party of the enemy. The advance continued over the - ridge at Le Verguier to where Sexton was met by Lieut. Price, who - pointed out a party of the enemy manning a bank, and a field gun - in action which was causing casualties and holding up a Company. - There was also a trench mortar in action. Sergeant Sexton did not - wait, but firing a few short bursts as he advanced, and calling - out to his section to follow, rushed down the bank and killed the - gunners on the field gun. Dashing out on to a flat under fire from - two hostile machine guns directed on him, he killed 12 more of the - enemy. Paying no heed to the machine-gun fire, he returned to the - bank, and after firing down some dug-outs, induced about 30 of the - enemy to surrender. Owing to his action the Company on the left - of the Battalion was able to continue the advance where they had - been definitely held up, and were suffering from the effects of the - field gun. When the advance was continued from the first to the - second objective, the Company was again held up by two machine guns - on the right and one on the left. In conjunction with a Platoon, - Sexton engaged the machine gun on the left, firing all the while - from the upright position, a fearless figure which, according to - eye-witnesses, inspired everyone. To have taken cover would have - been more prudent, but Sexton realized that prompt action was - essential, and did not wait to assume the prone position. Silencing - this gun, he turned his attention to the two machine guns on the - right and silenced them. He then moved forward into a trench, - killing quite a number of the enemy and, advancing along a sap, - took a few prisoners. Further on he was responsible for a few more - small posts, and, on the final objective, being given a responsible - post on the left of his Company, he engaged a machine gun which - was firing across the Company front, and thus enabled his Company - to dig in. This completed, he went forward down a sunken road and - captured several more prisoners." - -MAJOR BLAIR ANDERSON WARK, D.S.O., 32nd Battalion, A.I.F. - - "During the period 29th September-1st October, 1918, in the - operations against the HINDENBURG LINE at BELLICOURT, and the - advance through NAUROY, ETRICOURT, MAGNY LA FOSSE and JONCOURT, - Major Wark, in command of the 32nd Battalion, displayed most - conspicuous gallantry and set a fine example of personal bravery, - energy, coolness, and control under extremely difficult - conditions. On 29th September, under heavy artillery and - machine-gun fire at very close range from all sides and in a dense - fog, Major Wark, finding that the situation was critical, moved - quickly forward alone and obtained sufficient information regarding - the situation in front to be able to lead his command forward. At - this time American troops were at a standstill and disorganized, - and Major Wark quickly organized more than 200 of them, and - attached them to his leading Companies and pressed forward. By - his prompt action in the early stages of the battle he narrowly - averted what would have resulted in great confusion on the part - of the attack-troops. Still moving fearlessly at the head of his - leading Companies, and at most times far out in advance, attended - only by a runner, he cheered his men on, and they swept through the - Hindenburg defences towards Nauroy. Pushing quickly through Nauroy, - and mopping up the southern portion of the village, the process - yielding 50 prisoners, the Battalion swung towards Etricourt. - Still leading his assaulting Companies, he observed a battery of - 77 mm. guns firing point-blank into his rear Companies and causing - heavy casualties. Calling on a few of his men to him he rushed the - battery, capturing the 4 guns and 10 of the crew; the remainder of - the crew fled or were killed. Moving rapidly forward with only two - N.C.O.'s, he surprised and captured 50 Germans near Magny la Fosse. - Quickly seizing this opportunity, he pushed one Company forward - through the village and made good the position. Having captured - his objectives for the day, and personally reconnoitring to see - that his flanks were safe, he found his command in a very difficult - and dangerous position, his left flank being exposed to the extent - of 3,000 yards on account of the 31st Battalion not being able - to advance. He, after a strenuous day's fighting, set about the - selection and reorganization of a new position, and effected a - junction with British troops on the right and 31st Battalion on the - left, and made his line secure. At 6 a.m. on 30th September, he - again led his command forward to allow of the troops on the right - being able to advance. The men were tired and had suffered heavily, - but he personally led them, and his presence amongst them inspired - them to further efforts. On October 1st, 1918, his Battalion was - ordered to advance at very short notice. He gave his orders for the - attack, and personally led his troops forward. A nest of machine - guns was encountered, causing casualties to his men. Without - hesitation and regardless of personal risk, he dashed forward - practically into the muzzles of the guns and under an exceptionally - heavy fire and silenced them, killing or capturing the entire - crews. Joncourt and Mill Ridge were then quickly captured and his - line consolidated. His men were practically exhausted after the - three days' heavy fighting, but he moved amongst them from post - to post, across country swept by heavy and continuous shell and - machine-gun fire at point-blank range, urged them on and the line - was made secure. Throughout he displayed the greatest courage and - devotion to duty, coupled with great tact and skill, and his work, - together with the reports based on his own personal observations, - which he forwarded, were invaluable to the Brigade. It is beyond - doubt that the success achieved by the Brigade during the heavy - fighting on 29th and 30th September and 1st October was due to this - officer's gallantry, determination, skill and great courage." - -No. 1717, PRIVATE JOHN RYAN, 55th Battalion, A.I.F. - - "For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty, and for saving a - very dangerous situation under particularly gallant circumstances - during an attack against the Hindenburg defences on 30th September, - 1918. In the initial assault on the enemy's positions this - soldier went forward with great dash and determination, and was - one of the first men of his Company to reach the trench which - was their objective. Seeing him rush in with his bayonet with - such exceptional skill and daring, his comrades were inspired and - followed his example. Although the enemy shell and machine-gun fire - was extremely heavy, the enemy trench garrison was soon overcome. - In the assault the attacking troops were weakened by casualties, - and, as they were too few to cover the whole front of attack, a - considerable gap was left between Private Ryan's Battalion's left - and the unit on the flank. The enemy counter-attacked soon after - the objective was reached, and a few succeeded in infiltrating - through the gap, and taking up a position of cover in rear of - our men, where they commenced bombing operations. The section of - trench occupied by Private Ryan and his comrades was now under fire - from front and rear, and for a time it seemed that the enemy was - certain to force his way through. The situation was critical and - necessitated prompt action by someone in authority. Private Ryan - found that there were no officers or N.C.O.'s near; they had become - casualties in the assault. Appreciating the situation at once, he - organized the few men nearest him, and led them out to attack the - enemy with bomb and bayonet. Some of his party fell victims to the - enemy's bombs, and he finally dashed into the enemy position of - cover with only 3 men. The enemy were three times their number, - but by skilful bayonet work they succeeded in killing the first - three Germans on the enemy's flank. Moving along the embankment, - Private Ryan alone rushed the remainder of the enemy with bombs. - It was while thus engaged he fell wounded, but his dashing bombing - assault drove the enemy clear of our positions. Those who were not - killed or wounded by his bombs fell victims to our Lewis Gunners - as they retired across No Man's Land. A particularly dangerous - situation had been saved by this gallant soldier, whose display of - determined bravery and initiative was witnessed by the men of the - two attacking Battalions, who, inspired and urged by it, fought - skilfully and bravely for two days." - -LIEUTENANT JOSEPH MAXWELL, M.C., D.C.M., 18th Battalion, A.I.F. - - "On 3rd October, 1918, he took part as a Platoon Commander in an - attack on the BEAUREVOIR-FONSOMME Line near Estrees, north of St. - Quentin. His Company Commander was severely wounded soon after the - jump off, and Lieut. Maxwell at once took charge of the Company. - When the enemy wire was reached, they were met by a hail of - machine-gun fire, and suffered considerable casualties, including - all other officers of the Company. The wire at this point was six - belts thick, each belt being 20 to 25 feet wide. Lieut. Maxwell - pushed forward single-handed through the wire, and attacked the - most dangerous machine gun. He personally killed three of the crew, - and the remaining four men in the post surrendered to him with a - machine gun. His Company followed him through the wire and captured - the trenches forming their objective. Later, it was noticed that - the Company on his left was held up in the wire by a very strong - force on the left flank of the Battalion. He at once organized a - party and moved to the left to endeavour to attack the enemy from - the rear. Heavy machine-gun fire met them. Lieut. Maxwell again - dashed forward single-handed at the foremost machine gun, and - with his revolver shot five of its crew, so silencing the gun. - Owing to the work of this party, the left Company was then able - to work a small force through the wire, and eventually to occupy - the objective and mop up the trenches. In the fighting prior to - the mopping up, an English-speaking prisoner, who was captured, - stated that the remainder of the enemy were willing to surrender. - Lieut. Maxwell and two men, with this prisoner, walked to a post - containing more than twenty Germans. The latter at once seized and - disarmed our men. Lieut. Maxwell waited his chance, and then with - an automatic pistol which he had concealed in his box respirator, - shot two of the enemy and with the two men escaped. They were - pursued by rifle fire, and one was wounded. However, Lieut. Maxwell - organized a small party at once, attacked and captured the post." - -SECOND LIEUTENANT GEORGE MORBY INGRAM, M.M., 24th Battalion, A.I.F. - - "During the attack on MONTBREHAIN, east of Peronne, on 5th October, - 1918, this officer was in charge of a platoon. About 100 yards - from the Jumping Off Trench severe enemy machine-gun fire was - encountered from a strong post which had escaped our Artillery - fire, and the advance was thus held up. Lieut. Ingram dashed out, - and, under cover of the fire of a Lewis Gun, rushed the post at - the head of his men. This post contained 9 machine guns and 42 - Germans, who fought until our men were within 3 yards of them. - They were killed to a man--Lieut. Ingram accounting for no less - than 18 of them. A number of enemy posts were then observed to be - firing on our men from about 150 yards further forward, and the - Company moved forward to attack them, but severe casualties were - sustained. The Company Commander had been badly wounded, and the - Company Sergeant-Major and several others, who attempted to lead - the advance, were killed. Our barrage had passed on, and no Tanks - were near. Lieut. Ingram quickly seized the situation, rallied his - men in the face of murderous fire, and, with magnificent courage - and resolution, led them forward. He himself rushed the first post, - shot 6 of the enemy, and captured a machine gun, thus overcoming a - very serious resistance. By this time the Company had been reduced - from 90 to about 30 other ranks; but this officer, seeing enemy - fire coming from a quarry, to his left front, again led his men - forward and rushed the quarry. He jumped into the quarry amongst - enemy wire, and his men followed and proceeded to mop up a large - number of the enemy who were in bivouacs there. He then observed an - enemy machine gun firing from the ventilator of a cellar, through a - gap in the wall of a house about 20 yards away. Without hesitation - and entirely alone he scrambled up the edge of the quarry, ran - round the rear of the house, and entering from the far side, shot - the enemy gunner through the ventilator of the cellar. He fired - several more shots into the cellar, then, seeing some enemy jumping - out of the window of the house, he burst open a door, rushed to - the head of the stairs leading into the cellar, and forced 62 of - the enemy to surrender. He now found he was out of touch with the - Company on his left flank, so went out alone and made a personal - reconnaissance under heavy fire, and succeeded in gaining touch - with the left Company, which had lost all its officers. Having - returned to his Company, he personally placed a post on his left - flank to ensure its safety, and then reconnoitred and established - two posts on his right flank. All this was done in the face of - continuous machine-gun and shell fire." - -[Illustration: Australian Artillery--moving up to the front, through -the Hindenburg wire, October 2nd, 1918.] - -[Illustration: Advance during Battle--Third Division Infantry and Tanks -advancing to the capture of Bony, October 1st, 1918.] - - - - -APPENDIX C - -CORPS ORDERS FOR THE BATTLE OF AUGUST 8TH, 1918 - - -The following were the complete orders issued by the Australian Army -Corps for the Battle of August 8th, 1918. They form only a small part -of the whole of the orders which were required for the operation. There -were, in addition, detailed orders by the Corps Artillery Headquarters, -the Heavy Artillery, the Chief Engineer, and each of the five Divisions -and fifteen Brigades, and also by the Administrative Services of the -Corps. - -On the question of the form of the orders, the most expedient course -was found to be the one here adopted--namely, that of issuing a -numbered series of Battle Instructions, each dealing comprehensively -with a separate subject matter: - - -BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 1 - -1. The Australian Corps will attack the enemy from the -VILLERS-BRETONNEUX--CHAULNES Railway exclusive to the River SOMME, -inclusive, at a date and hour to be notified. - -The Canadian Corps will co-operate on the right, south of the railway -(inclusive), and the Third Corps on the left, north of the SOMME. - -2. _General Method of Attack._--The Australian Corps will attack on a -two-division front. The attack will be carried out in three phases. -Divisional boundaries and objectives are shown on the attached map. - - (i) _First Phase._--The 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions will form - up on a taped line prior to ZERO, and will attack with Tanks under - a creeping artillery barrage. Their objective is shown by a GREEN - line on the attached map. - - On arrival at their objective they will consolidate. - - (ii) _Second Phase._--The 5th and 4th Australian Divisions, - organized in brigade groups, will advance in open warfare - formations, from the first objective passing through 2nd and 3rd - Australian Divisions respectively. Their objective is shown in RED - on the map. - - (iii) _Third Phase._--The 5th and 4th Australian Divisions will - exploit their success and seize the old British line of Defences - marked BLUE on the map, and establish themselves defensively on - this line. - - (iv) The 1st Australian Division will be in Corps Reserve. - - (v) A detailed programme of the action will be issued. - -3. _Assembly._--In order to free as many troops from line duty as -possible, 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions will arrange to hold the -front with one infantry brigade on each Divisional sector. This will be -completed before daybreak on 5th August. - -To prevent any troops arriving at their objectives in an exhausted -condition through a long march, troops detailed to the farthest -objectives must be quartered nearest the starting line prior to ZERO. - -The brigades of 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions not holding the line -will be quartered in rear of all brigades of 5th and 4th Australian -Divisions respectively prior to ZERO night. This will be completed -before daybreak on 5th August. - -The allotment of areas for quartering during this stage will be made -by mutual arrangement between Divisional Commanders concerned. The -allotment of routes and times of movement in accordance with the Corps -programme will be arranged similarly. - -On ZERO night the brigades of 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions not in -the line will make their approach march to their tape lines through the -area occupied by 5th and 4th Australian Divisions respectively. - -4. _Artillery._ - - (i) The Artillery available consists of: - - 18 Field Artillery Brigades. - 12 Heavy Artillery Brigades. - - (ii) G.O.C., R.A., Aust. Corps, will command all artillery of the - Corps during the first phase of the operation. - - (iii) For the second phase G.O.C., R.A., Aust. Corps, will allot: - - (_a_) Three Field Artillery Brigades to 5th and 4th Aust. Divisions - for distribution to infantry brigade groups. These will include the - 5th and 4th Aust. Divisional Artillery respectively. - - (_b_) Three brigades of Field Artillery and one battery of 60-pdr. - Heavy Artillery allotted to each of the 5th and 4th Aust. Divisions - for employment as may be ordered by the Divisional Commanders. - - (_c_) The remainder of the Field Artillery and the Heavy Artillery - to Corps Reserve. - - (iv) Heavy Artillery will be pushed forward by G.O.C., R.A., to - protect the troops in the second objective. - -5. _Tanks._--Instructions for the distribution and employment of Tanks -will be issued later. - -6. _Engineers._--Engineers and Pioneers will be distributed for work as -follows from midnight on 6th-7th instant: - - (i) Corps Pool under Chief Engineer-- - 1 Field Coy. from 4th Aust. Div. - 1 Field Coy. from 5th Aust. Div. - 2 Field Coys. from 2nd Aust. Div. - 2 Field Coys. from 3rd Aust. Div. - 3 Army Troops Coys. Engineers. - 5th Aust. Pioneer Bn. - 3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn. - - (ii) With Divisions: - - 2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn. will serve 2nd and 3rd Aust. Divisions. 2 - Coys. to each. - - 4th Aust. Pioneer Bn. will serve 4th and 5th Aust. Divisions. 2 - Coys. to each. - -Divisional Commanders will control: - - 2nd Aust. Division--1 Field Coy. and 2nd Aust. Pioneer - Bn. (less 2 Coys.). - - 3rd Aust. Division--1 Field Coy. and 2 Coys. 2nd Aust. - Pioneer Bn. - - 4th Aust. Division--2 Field Coys. and 4th Aust. Pioneer - Bn. (less 2 Coys.). - - 5th Aust. Division--2 Field Coys. and 2 Coys. 4th Aust. - Pioneer Bn. - -Tunnellers will be detailed to each division for dug-out exploration. - -Chief Engineer, Aust. Corps, will arrange for the distribution in -accordance with this. - -Chief Engineer will issue instructions for the withdrawal and storing -of demolition charges of bridges for which the Corps is responsible, -and for the return of engineer personnel employed on this work to their -units. - -7. Deputy Director of Medical Services will arrange for the -distribution of medical units. - - -BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 2 - -SECRECY - -(_a_) It is of first importance that secrecy should be observed and the -operation carried out as a surprise. - -Commanders will take all possible steps to prevent the scope or date of -the operation becoming known except to those taking part. Any officer, -N.C.O., or man discussing the operation in public, or communicating -details regarding it to any person, either soldier or civilian, not -immediately concerned, will be severely dealt with. - -(_b_) All movement of troops and transport will take place by night, -whether in the forward or back areas of the Australian Corps, on and -after 1st August, except where absolutely necessary to move by day. - -(_c_) O.C., No. 3 Squadron, A.F.C., will arrange for aeroplanes to -fly over the Australian Corps Army area during days when flying is -possible, and to report to Corps H.Q. any abnormal movement of troops -or transport within our lines. - -(_d_) Work on back lines will be continued as at present, so that there -may be no apparent change in our attitude. - -(_e_) Commanders will ensure that the numbers of officers reconnoitring -the enemy's positions is limited to those for whom such reconnaissance -is essential. - -Nothing attracts attention to an offensive more than a large number of -officers with maps looking over the parapet and visiting Observation -Posts. - -Commanding Officers of units holding the front line should report at -once to higher authority any disregard of these orders. - - -BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 3 - -COMMUNICATIONS AND HEADQUARTERS - -1. Communications will be carefully organized to ensure the maintenance -of communication throughout the advance and after its conclusion. - -2. (i) Headquarters of Divisions will be established as follows: - - 2nd Australian Division--GLISY. - - 5th Australian Division--BLANGY-TRONVILLE Chateau. - Advanced Headquarters in - dug-outs at Railway cutting. - - 3rd Australian Division--BUSSY. - - 4th Australian Division--CORBIE. - -(ii) Headquarters of Brigades and battalions will be selected in -advance, as far as this can be done, and all concerned will be notified -of their proposed locations. - -3. Report Centres in advance of the heads of buried cables will be -selected in each Divisional Sector and details prepared for the -organization of communications back to cable head. - -4. The following mounted troops are detailed to Divisions: - - To 2nd Australian Division--1 Troop 13th L.H. - - 3rd Australian Division--1 Troop 13th L.H. - - 4th Australian Division--2 Troops 13th L.H. - - 5th Australian Division--2 Troops 13th L.H. - -Divisions will inform O.C., 13th Light Horse, as to the time and place -at which the Light Horse will report. - -The Cyclist Section now with Divisions will remain. - -5. The employment of wireless will be exploited to the full. - -6. Popham panels will be employed for communication between Infantry -and Aeroplanes. - - -BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 4 - -ARTILLERY - -(_a_) Ammunition will be dumped at or near gun positions as follows: - - 18-pdr. 600 rounds. - 4.5" Howitzer 500 rounds. - 60-pdr. 400 rounds. - 6" guns 400 rounds. - 6" Howitzers 400 rounds. - 8" Howitzers 400 rounds. - 9.2" Howitzers 400 rounds. - 12" Howitzers 200 rounds. - -Arrangements should be made to commence dumping this ammunition as soon -as feasible. Echelons will be kept full. - -(_b_) Boundaries between Corps as regards bombardment and -counter-battery work coincide with the boundaries between Corps shown -on map issued with Australian Corps "Battle Instructions No. 1," dated -1st August, 1918. - - -BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 5 - -TANKS - -1. Tanks are available as follows: - - _5th Tank Brigade._ - - Mark V. Tanks--2nd Battalion--Lieut.-Col. E. D. - BRYCE, D.S.O. - - Mark V. Tanks--8th Battalion--Lieut.-Col. The Hon. - J. D. Y. BINGHAM, - D.S.O. - - 13th Battalion--Lieut.-Col. P. LYON. - - Mark V. (Star) Tanks--15th Battalion--Lieut.-Colonel - RAMSEY-FAIRFAX. - - No. 1 G.C.Coy. (24 Carrying Tanks)--Major W. PARTINGTON, - M.C. - - -2. _Mark V. Tanks_ are allotted as follows: - - 13th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. LYON), less one company, to 3rd - Australian Division. - - 2nd Battalion (Lieut.-Col. BRYCE), plus one company 13th Battalion - attached, to be employed with the two right Divisions--two - companies to be allotted to each Division. - - 8th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. The Hon. J. D. Y. BINGHAM) to 4th - Australian Division. - -One company of the 8th Battalion will be employed in support. It will -be specially charged with the function of maintaining the attack at -the junction of Divisions throughout the advance as far as the second -objective. - -Command will be effected through Battalion Commanders in each case -except that Lieut.-Col. BRYCE will be responsible for command of all -Mark V. Tanks allotted to both 2nd and 5th Australian Divisions. - -3. After the capture of the first objective, Tanks detailed to 2nd and -3rd Australian Divisions will rally and will be employed to support the -advance of the 5th and 4th Australian Divisions respectively. - -4. After the capture of the second objective, Tanks will rally. One -company will remain in close support in each divisional sector; the -remainder will be withdrawn to positions to be arranged between -Divisional and Tank Commanders. - -5. Mark V. (Star) Tanks are allotted as follows: - - 11/2 companies (18 tanks) to the 5th Australian Division. - 11/2 companies (18 tanks) to the 4th Australian Division. - -These tanks are allotted for the capture of the blue line. - -_6. Carrying Tanks_ are allotted as follows: - - 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions--3 tanks each. - - 4th and 5th Australian Divisions--9 tanks each. - -7. Orders for forming up and movement to the Start Line will be issued -by G.O.C., 5th Tank Brigade. - -Battalion Commanders detailed to Divisions will be responsible for all -liaison duty in connection with the Tanks. - -8. For tactical purposes Tanks will be placed under the command of -Infantry Commanders to whose commands they are allotted. - - -BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 5A - -ASSEMBLY OF TANKS - -_1. Preliminary Movement._ - -Tanks will be assembled in concealed positions in the forward area -under the orders of the 5th Tank Brigade prior to night Y/Z. - -_2. Advance to Start Line._ - -On night Y/Z the Tanks allotted to troops attacking the first objective -will commence to move forward at 9.30 p.m. to the Tank Start Line. They -will move with full engines to a line not nearer to the Tank Start Line -than 3,000 yards. From there they will continue the movement forward to -the Tank Start Line, moving at a slow rate and as quietly as possible. -The Tank Start Line will be approximately 1,000 yards in rear of the -Infantry taped line. - -Tanks will leave the Tank Start Line at such times as will allow them -to catch up to the Infantry as the barrage lifts at zero plus three -minutes. - -_3. Concealment of Engine Noise._ - -To conceal the noise of the engines during the advance of the Tanks, -the 5th Brigade R.A.F. will arrange to have planes flying continuously -over the Corps area from 9.30 p.m. until midnight on Y/Z night, and -from zero minus one hour onward to zero. - -_4. Tanks allotted to Second Objective._ - -The Tanks allotted to the second objective will form up independently -under the orders of the 5th Tank Brigade in consultation with G.O.'s -C., 4th and 5th Australian Divisions. These Tanks will be formed up -when the aeroplanes are in the air during the hours laid down in para. -3. - -_5. Liaison Company._ - -The company of the 8th Tank Battalion detailed to act in support, and -to ensure liaison in the battle line at the junction of Divisions, will -detail a half-company to each wave of Tanks, vide paras. 2 and 4 above. - -Divisions will detail special liaison parties of Infantry to work in -co-operation with this company. - -_6. Re-assembly._ - -As soon as the blue line has been reached, G.O.C. 5th Australian -Division will arrange to release the 2nd Tank Battalion, less the -attached company. This battalion will then be withdrawn. The remainder -of the Tanks, less one company allotted to remain in support of each of -the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions, will be withdrawn when ordered by -Divisional Commanders, vide Battle Instructions No. 5, para. 4. - -_7. Smoke Grenades._ - -Divisions will ensure that a proportion of smoke rifle grenades -accompanies each Infantry detachment detailed to the blue line and -which accompanies each of the Mark V. (Star) Tanks. - - -BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 6 - -ARTILLERY - -_1. Preparation._ - -Active counter-battery work and harassing fire will be maintained. - -Such registration as is necessary will be carried out under cover of -this fire. A detailed programme for this will be arranged in each -divisional sector. - -The necessity for concealing the increase in the number of guns on the -front must be borne in mind, and on no account should a large number -of guns be employed at any one time. Counter preparation and S.O.S. -plans during the period of preparation for the attack will be drawn up -accordingly. - -Normal fire should, so far as possible, be carried out from positions -other than those in which batteries will be emplaced during the battle. - -_2. Heavy Artillery._ - - (_a_) In view of the nature of the enemy's defences, the fire of - the majority of the heavy howitzers, employed for purposes other - than counter-battery work, will be used during the barrage to - engage special strong points or localities. - - (_b_) Throughout the advance beyond the green line enemy centres of - resistance will be kept under fire until such time as the progress - of the Infantry renders this inadvisable. A map will be issued to - show the times at which heavy artillery fire will cease on zones - and special localities. - - (_c_) At least two-thirds of the available Heavy Artillery will be - employed for counter-battery purposes. - - Heavy concentrations of fire will be directed on the different - groups of enemy artillery. - -3. G.O.C., R.A., will prepare plans for dealing with a heavy -development of hostile fire on zero night. He will also prepare a -plan to deal with any attempt at a deliberate gas bombardment of the -VILLERS-BRETONNEUX area on zero night. - - -BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 7 - -PROGRAMME OF ACTION - -_1. Capture of First Objective._ - -(_a_) Forming-up troops detailed to the capture of the first objective -will be deployed on the Forming-up Line one hour before zero hour. - -(_b_) _Artillery Programme._ - - (i) The field artillery 18-pdr. barrage will open at zero 200 yards - in advance of the forming-up line. At zero plus three minutes - the barrage will commence to advance; lifts will be 100 yards at - 2-minute intervals. There will be two lifts at this rate. - - The rate will then decrease to lifts of 100 yards every 3 minutes. - There will be eight lifts at this rate. - - From the eleventh lift inclusive until the green line is reached - lifts will be of 100 yards each at 4-minute intervals. - - (ii) The 4.5" Howitzer barrage will move 200 yards in advance of - the 18-pdr. barrage. - - (iii) A protective barrage will be maintained in front of the green - line until zero plus four hours. During this period approximately - fifty per cent. (50%) of the guns remaining in the barrage will - be employed in a protective line barrage; the remainder will be - employed to search and sweep deeply into the enemy's position. At - zero plus four hours all barrage fire will cease. - - Barrage Maps will be issued later. - -_2. Capture of Second and Third Objectives._ - -(_a_) _Assembly._--5th and 4th Australian Divisions will select and -mark positions for the assembly of their troops. - -These areas will be selected in liaison with Tank Commanders and with -the 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions respectively, to prevent movement -to them clashing with the approach march of these divisions and that of -the Tanks. - -This requires careful co-ordination between each pair of Divisions and -Tank Commanders. - -(_b_) _Command._--At zero plus four hours, responsibility for the -battle front will pass to G.O.C., 5th Australian Division, in the right -sector, and to G.O.C., 4th Australian Division, in the left sector. - -(_c_) _The Advance._--5th and 4th Australian Divisions will time their -advance so that the leading troops cross the first objective (green -line) at zero plus four hours. - -(_d_) From zero plus four hours the advance will be continued under the -conditions of open warfare. - - -BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 8 - -ROADS - -1. A map is forwarded herewith showing the organization of the road -system in the captured territory. - -2. The Chief Engineer will issue the necessary instructions for the -preparation of these roads for traffic. - -3. All light traffic which is capable of moving across country will do -so and will avoid main roads. - -4. Mule tracks will be a divisional responsibility. - -5. Artillery advancing with the 5th and 4th Australian Divisions will -carry forward a proportion of bridges. Arrangements should be made -as soon as possible for the development of tracks, making use of the -routes taken by the artillery over these bridges. - -6. The AMIENS--LONGUEAU--VILLERS-BRETONNEUX main road, as far east as -the cross roads in N.26.c., will be reserved for the exclusive use of -the Cavalry Corps from 9.30 p.m. on Y/Z night until 8 a.m. on Z day. -After 8 a.m. on Z day it will be available for the Australian and -Cavalry Corps. - -Assistant Provost Marshal, Australian Corps, will arrange for the -control of the traffic on this road throughout. - -Chief Engineer, Australian Corps, will prepare short avoiding roads at -the cross roads at N.26.c. to cross the north-east or south-west corner -to avoid congestion at this spot. - - -BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 9 - -LIGHT SIGNALS, MESSAGE ROCKETS, SMOKE - -_1. Light Signals._ - - (_a_) _Australian Corps._ - - The following Light Signals will be employed in the Australian - Corps: - - S.O.S. Signal, No. 32 grenade--showing green over green over green. - Allotment 500 per Division. - - Success Signal, No. 32 grenade--showing white over white over - white. Allotment 600 per Division. - -A small reserve of each of these grenades is held at Corps Headquarters. - -No other Light Signals will be laid down by Corps. There is no -objection to the use within Divisions of a Very Light for the local -indication of targets between Infantry and Tanks. - - (_b_) _Other Formations._ - - Light Signals of other formations are as follows: - - _Formation._ _Signal._ _Meaning._ - - (i) Cavalry Corps. White star turning "Advanced troops - to red on a parachute of Cavalry are - fired from here." - 11/2" Very pistol. - - (ii) Third Corps. No. 32 grenade, "S.O.S." - green over green - over green. - No. 32 grenade, "Success signal, - white over white _i.e._, we have - over white. reached objective." - One white Very "Barrage is about - light. to lift." - - (iii) Canadian Corps No. 32 grenade, "S.O.S." will also - red over red mean (_a_) "We are - over red. held up and cannot - advance without - help." (_b_) "Enemy - is counter-attacking." - No. 32 grenade, "(_a_) Lift your fire. - green over green We are going to - over green. advance. (_b_) Stop - firing." - Three white Very "We have reached - lights in quick this point." - succession. - - _Remark._--In the case of (_a_) a smoke rocket (No. 27 grenade) - will also be fired in the direction of the obstruction to indicate - its position. - - (_c_) Special care must be taken by the Artillery on the right - flank of the Corps that all officers and N.C.O.'s are acquainted - with these signals, so that no mistake may arise as regards the - difference in the S.O.S. Signals of the Australian and Canadian - Corps. - - 2. _Message-carrying Rockets._ - - Allotment of Message-carrying Rockets is 80 per Division. - - 3. _Smoke._ - - (_a_) Artillery smoke will be as follows: - - (_i_) 3 rounds per gun will be fired during the first three minutes - of the artillery barrage. - - (_ii_) 3 rounds per gun will be fired in quick succession on the - arrival of the field artillery barrage at the artillery halt line - covering the first objective. - - (_iii_) In the event of wet weather a small proportion of smoke - will be used in the barrage to replace the smoke and dust caused by - the burst of the shells in dry weather. This will not be sufficient - to confuse the effect with that of the smoke shells prescribed in - paragraph 3 (_a_) (i) and (ii). - -(_b_) _Screening beyond the First Objective._ - -15th Wing, Royal Air Force, will arrange to screen the advance of the -Tanks and Infantry from special localities in advance of their first -objective by dropping phosphorus bombs. - -Divisions and G.O.C., 5th Tank Brigade, will inform Australian Corps -Headquarters as early as possible of the localities which they desire -screened. - -A map will be issued showing times at which it is anticipated that the -Infantry will make good certain zones. Phosphorus bombs will not be -dropped within these zones at any time after it is anticipated that the -Infantry will have occupied them. - - -BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 10 - -INTELLIGENCE AND DISPOSAL OF PRISONERS OF WAR - - -1. _Battalion Intelligence Police._ - -One German speaker and two searchers will be allotted to each battalion -for use as follows: - - (_a_) _German Speaker._ - - (i) To secure immediate identifications quickly, so that - identifications will reach Corps Headquarters as speedily as - possible of enemy units on the battle front. - - (ii) To secure immediate information required by the Battalion - Commander as regards enemy dispositions, assembly positions, orders - for counter-attack, etc. - - (iii) To be in charge of the two searchers and separate important - documents, orders, maps, etc., translate and convey information of - moment to the immediate Commander. - -(_b_) _Two Searchers._ - -The two searchers under the German speaker systematically search the -battlefield, enemy positions, suspected headquarters, dead, etc., for -papers, documents, maps, etc., have them packed in sandbags, and sent -through the usual channels to the Corps Cage as quickly as possible. - -This personnel should carry torches and, besides rifles or revolvers, -bombs are recommended as being useful for dealing with any of the enemy -who may be found in dug-outs. - -2. _Divisional Intelligence Officers._ - -Divisional Intelligence Officers will go forward to an Advanced -Divisional Collecting Cage, with a view to obtaining, as soon as -possible, information of immediate tactical importance. - -The Cage will be connected by telephone to Divisional H.Q., and -important information obtained should be transmitted as quickly as -possible to Divisional and Brigade H.Q. - -The main points on which immediate information is required from -prisoners are: The Order of Battle, Units seen, Distribution of the -Enemy's Forces, Method of holding the Line, Assembly Positions, -Counter-attack Orders and Intentions. - -This information will be wired to their respective Divisional -Headquarters and repeated to Corps Headquarters and Corps Cage by -Divisional Intelligence Officers. - -Divisional Intelligence Officers will not detain prisoners longer -than is necessary to obtain this tactical information of immediate -importance. - -In case a large number of prisoners are captured, they will detain only -one or two from each regiment, and will not delay the passage of the -remainder to the Corps Cage. - -Any further information required from prisoners by Divisions or lower -formations can always be obtained by telephone from the Corps Cage. - -3. _Searching of Prisoners._ - - (_a_) _Officers and N.C.O.'s._ - - Officers and N.C.O.'s will be searched as soon as possible after - capture by a responsible officer or N.C.O., and all documents taken - from them sent back with them (in sacks, labelled by regiments, if - a number are captured) to the Divisional Intelligence Officer, at - such place as this officer has prearranged. - - It is left to the discretion of Divisional Intelligence Officers as - to what documents, maps, etc., taken from prisoners they hold back - for the information of Brigade and Divisional Commanders. When this - is done, Corps "I" will be informed by wire, priority if necessary, - of the nature of the documents, etc., held back, and of any points - of immediate tactical importance they may contain. - - As soon as possible after information has been extracted from them, - the documents will be forwarded on to the Corps Cage. Arrangements - can be made by Corps, if notified that documents are ready to be - sent on, to fetch them by motorcyclist or cycle. - - (_b_) _Other Ranks._ - - Prisoners other than officers and N.C.O.'s will be searched on - their arrival at the Corps Cage. Their papers, etc., will be taken - from them and put into sacks labelled according to regiments. - - (_c_) All ranks should understand that a prisoner's pay-book, - identity disc, and personal belongings should not be taken from - him. Escorts and guards will be warned to take special precautions - to prevent prisoners from destroying papers. - -4. _Separation of Officers, N.C.O.'s and Men._ - -Care will be taken that officers, N.C.O.'s and privates are all -separated from one another at once, and are not allowed to communicate -with one another. Prisoners who have been interrogated should not be -allowed to mix with those who have not yet been interrogated. - -5. _Notification of Locality of Capture._ - -It is essential that, when prisoners are sent back, information be sent -with them which will show where they were captured. Information as to -the battalion which made the capture is a useful indication. - -6. _Authorized Persons only to converse with Prisoners._ - -It is most important that no officer or N.C.O., except those duly -authorized, be allowed to interrogate or converse with prisoners. - -7. _Prisoners of War Cage._ - -The Advanced Corps Cage will be situated at VECQUEMONT, N.11.b.8.7. and -the Rear Corps Cage at N.2.c.3.7. - -Intelligence Officers and personnel will be stationed here, and will -carry out a more detailed interrogation and sort out captured documents. - -The Advanced Corps Cage will be connected by telephone to Corps H.Q. - -8. _Prisoners._ - -The following procedure will be adopted for the disposal of prisoners: - -After capture they will be escorted to the Advanced Divisional -Collecting Cage, for examination by the Divisional Intelligence -Officer, who, after he has finished with them, will send them back to -the Advanced Corps Cage. - -The sending back of prisoners should be carried out as quickly as -possible, and several escorts should be arranged for them to be passed -back without any unusual delay. Instructions should be issued to ensure -that too many men are not employed on escort duty. - -In the forward area directing notices should be placed to show the -route to be taken to the Advanced Divisional Collecting Cage. - -Traffic control personnel should be conversant with the method of -disposing of prisoners. - -9. _Identifications._ - -The importance of passing on all identifications as speedily as -possible to Corps "I" cannot be too strongly impressed on all -concerned. It is essential that special efforts be made to wire at -once, as soon as identifications are made and the locality in which -obtained. - -10._ Maps and Photographs._ - - The following maps are being issued: - - (i) A large issue of 1/20,000 No. 62.D. South-East regular series - for distribution to all officers. - - (ii) 1/20,000 Map Message Form, for distribution down to N.C.O.'s. - - (iii) A small issue of 1/10,000 Maps of forward area only. - - (iv) 1/20,000 Barrage Map, for distribution down to Company - Commanders. - - (v) 1/40,000 Organization Map, together with notes on the enemy. - -The following special photographs are being issued: - - (_a_) A Mosaic of each Divisional front, squared and contoured and - freely annotated, for distribution down to N.C.O.'s. - - (_b_) Oblique Photographs of each Divisional front, for - distribution to all officers. - - -BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 11 - -CO-OPERATION OF INFANTRY AND AIRCRAFT - -1. _Contact Aeroplanes._ - - (i) _Indication of position by flares._ - - (_a_) Red ground flares will be used to indicate the infantry - positions to contact aeroplanes. They will be lit by infantry in - the most advanced line only. - - (_b_) A contact aeroplane will fly along the line of the first - objective at zero plus 2 hours 30 minutes. Flares will be called - for by the aeroplane sounding a succession of "A's" on the Klaxon - horn and by firing a white Very Light. If the aeroplane fails to - mark the line accurately, it will repeat its call ten minutes later. - - Should the infantry not have reached the line of the objective at - the time laid down above, the contact aeroplane will return at - half-hour intervals until flares are shown. - - (_c_) A contact aeroplane will fly along the line of the second - objective at zero plus 6 hours 30 minutes. It will call for flares, - and the same procedure will be followed on this objective as on the - first objective until the flares are seen. - - (_d_) A contact aeroplane will fly over third objective at zero - plus 7 hours, when the procedure laid down for the first objective - will be observed until the flares are shown. - - (_e_) Divisions will organize message-dropping stations in the - vicinity of their Headquarters. - - (ii) _Other means of identifying the position of the Infantry._ - - (_a_) _Rifles._--Three or four rifles laid parallel across the top - of the trench. - - (_b_) _Metal Discs._--Metal discs will be used as reflectors by - flashing in the sun. This method has been successful even on days - which have not been particularly bright. - - The disc is most easily carried sewn to the Small Box Respirator, - and can be used in this way without inconvenience. - -2. _Counter-attack Planes._ - - (_a_) From zero hour counter-attack planes will be constantly in - the air, with the object of observing hostile concentrations or - abnormal movement. - - (_b_) In the event of an enemy concentration indicating a - counter-attack, the counter-attack aeroplane will signal this - information to the Artillery by wireless. In the case of a - counter-attack actually developing a white parachute flare will be - fired by the aeroplane in the direction of the troops moving for - the impending counter-attack, for the information of the Infantry. - -3. _Ammunition-carrying Aeroplanes._ - - (_a_) Aeroplanes will be detailed to transport ammunition from zero - plus 2 hours 30 minutes. - - (_b_) Vickers guns will display a white "V" at the point where - ammunition is to be dropped. The arms of the "V" to be 6 feet in - length and 1 foot in width. The apex of the "V" to point towards - the enemy. - - (_c_) Ammunition aeroplanes will have the under-side of the lower - planes painted black for a distance of 21/2 feet from the tips. - - -BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 12 - -CONSOLIDATION - -1. _Divisions allotted to First Objective._ - -(_a_) _Consolidation._--As soon as the first objective has been -captured troops will dig in. - -(_b_) _Troops holding present front line._--The brigades of 2nd and -3rd Australian Divisions holding the line on the night prior to zero -will remain in their battle positions until all troops detailed to the -attack have passed through. They will then be organized and prepared to -move to meet any emergency. - -2nd Australian Division will be prepared to detach its brigade to act -in support of 5th Australian Division, and 3rd Australian Division to -detach its brigade in support of 4th Australian Division. - -(_c_) _Reorganization of Troops on First Objective._--As soon as the -whole of the troops detailed to the capture of second (red line) and -third (blue line) objectives have passed through the line of the -first objective, 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions will organize the -defence of their sectors on the first objective in depth in each -brigade sub-sector. Units will be reorganized, and those not detailed -to the defence of the line will be withdrawn into support and held in -readiness for eventualities. At least one battalion in each brigade -sub-sector should be withdrawn in this way. - -2. _Second Objective._ - -_Consolidation._--As soon as the second objective (the red line) -has been captured, the position will be thoroughly consolidated. -Arrangements will be made to ensure a supply of engineering material -for this. - -3. _Main Line of Resistance._ - -(_a_) When the third objective (the blue line) is attained, it will be -organized and consolidated as the main line of resistance. - -(_b_) If the enemy is able to develop an immediate counter-attack, or -if he has a definite plan, and the troops available in close reserve -for the defence of the blue line, it may not be possible to reach -the third objective. In this case the second objective (red line) -will become the main line of resistance, and will be consolidated and -organized in depth accordingly. - -(_c_) Definite plans will be prepared to deal with either case. -The Corps must be prepared, as early as possible, to fight a stiff -defensive battle on the main line of resistance. - - -BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 13 - -1. The 5th Australian Division will move into its assembly area by -Brigade Groups as follows: - - "A" Brigade Group on the night 4th-5th August from MONTIERES - to CAMON and RIVERY area. Quarters have been arranged for one - brigade, less one battalion. Shelters will be drawn from Area - Commandant, CAMON, for this battalion. - - "B" Brigade Group from ALLONVILLE area to forward area. - - "C" Brigade Group from VAUX area to ALLONVILLE area. - -2. For the purposes of staging, POULAINVILLE will be included as one of -the battalion areas of the ALLONVILLE brigade area. - -The camp in BOIS DE MAI has been allotted for the use of the 5th -Division nucleus. - -It is left to the discretion of the G.O.C., 5th Australian Division, -as to whether the Battalion at POULAINVILLE moves on the night of 4th -August. - -3. On the night 5th-6th August the 5th Australian Division will -continue its move into its allotted assembly grounds in the forward -area. - -4. Rear parties are to be left in charge of all camps until handed over -to the Area Commandant. - - -BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 14 - -ARMOURED CAR BATTALION - -1. The 17th Armoured Car Battalion has been placed at the disposal of -the Australian Corps, and will join the 5th Tank Brigade shortly. - -2. This battalion is organized in two companies of eight (8) armoured -cars each. Each armoured car carries one forward and one rear Hotchkiss -gun. - -3. One and a half (11/2) companies are allotted to the 5th Australian -Division, and half (1/2) a company will remain in Corps Reserve. - -The half company detailed to remain in Corps Reserve will select a -position of assembly in Square 0.26, and will occupy this position -by 9.30 p.m. on Y/Z night. During the action its orders will be -transmitted through the 5th Australian Divisional Signal Service. The -Commander will arrange with the 5th Australian Division accordingly. - -4. As soon as the Battalion Commander or his representative reports to -the 5th Tank Brigade, he will be instructed to report to the General -Staff, Australian Corps, and then to Headquarters, 5th Australian -Division. - - -BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 14A - -ARMOURED CAR BATTALION - - -1. The 17th Armoured Car Battalion is being given definite roles -in accordance with paragraph 3 of Battle Instructions No. 14. The -roles assigned to this battalion may carry the cars forward for a -considerable distance into enemy territory, and may necessitate their -returning through other Divisional Sectors than that of the 5th -Australian Division. - -2. British Armoured Cars can be recognized by the red and white band -markings which are similar to those of the British Tanks. - -3. All troops will be warned of the possibility of our armoured cars -coming into our own sector, and of the way in which they are marked. - - -BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 15 - -ZERO HOUR--SYNCHRONIZATION OF WATCHES - -1. _Zero Hour._ - -Zero hour will be notified in writing from Australian Corps -Headquarters by noon on the day prior to zero. - -2. _Synchronization of Watches._ - -Watches will be synchronized by officers detailed by Australian Corps -Headquarters, who will visit Headquarters in the following order, -leaving Corps Headquarters shortly after noon and 6 p.m. on Y day: - - (_a_) One officer to Headquarters Heavy Artillery, 3rd Australian - Division and 4th Australian Division. - - (_b_) One officer to 2nd Australian Division and 5th Australian - Division. - - -BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 16 - -AIRCRAFT - -1. The Air Forces which will operate on the Australian Corps front -during the battle will be as follows: - - (_a_) Corps Squadron--3rd Australian Squadron. - - (_b_) 5th Tank Brigade--8th Squadron. - - (_c_) The 22nd Wing, consisting of eight Scout Squadrons, which - will be exclusively employed in engaging ground targets by bombing - and machine-gunning along the whole Army front. - - (_d_) One night-bombing squadron--101st Bombing Squadron. - - (_e_) One Reconnaissance Squadron--48th Squadron. - -Four additional day-bombing squadrons and three additional -night-bombing squadrons are being obtained from other Wings for -co-operation with the above, making 19 Squadrons in all. - -2. _Low-flying Scouts._ - -The low-flying scouts of the 22nd Wing are being detailed on an even -distribution to the Corps front. They will operate in two phases, viz.: - - (_a_) From zero to zero plus four hours eastward from the green - line. - - (_b_) From zero plus four hours onwards eastwards from the red line. - -In each phase favourable targets will be engaged in addition to the -targets marked by the green and red lines. - -3. _Markings on Planes._ - -The following will be the special markings of machines allotted to -special duties: - - (_a_) Contact patrol machines--Rectangular panels 2' by 1' on both - lower planes about three feet from the fuselage. - - (_b_) Machines working with Tanks--Black band on middle of right - side of tail. - -4. _Ammunition-carrying Squadron._ - -Aeroplanes carrying small arms ammunition will drop it at points -as laid down in Battle Instructions No. 11, para. 3 (b). The first -ammunition-carrying planes will arrive over the battlefield at zero -plus seven hours. - -5. _Aeroplane Smoke Screens._ - -In addition to carrying small arms ammunition, this Squadron will be -employed to drop phosphorus smoke bombs to obstruct the enemy's view. -The areas to be screened and the time at which the screening in each -case shall cease in order not to interfere with the advance of the -Infantry will be shown on a map to be issued later. - - -BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 17 - -ARTILLERY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE LAST NIGHT BEFORE ZERO - -1. _S.O.S._ - - (_i_) Each line division will arrange for four field artillery - brigades, or an equivalent number of guns, to fire on S.O.S. lines - at any time up to zero minus fifteen minutes. - - (_ii_) From zero minus fifteen minutes until zero hour S.O.S. - arrangements will be inoperative. - -2. _Heavy Artillery._ - -In the event of the enemy opening a gas bombardment on the -VILLERS-BRETONNEUX area, arrangements have been made for the -co-operation of the Canadian Corps Heavy Artillery in an artillery -counter-attack on enemy batteries. The Canadian Corps will deal with -the enemy artillery about WIENCOURT and MARCELCAVE. Fire will be -opened, on application, direct between the two Corps Headquarters. - -G.O.C., R.A., Australian Corps, will arrange details with G.O.C., R.A., -Canadian Corps. - - -BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 18 - -These are not reproduced. They refer only to Wireless Code Calls -prescribed for all units. - - -BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 19 - -LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS - -1. Officers are detailed for liaison duties as follows: - - - (_a_) At Canadian Corps Headquarters--Capt. SHEARMAN, D.S.O., M.C. - - (_b_) At Third Corps Headquarters--Major R. MORRELL, D.S.O. - - (_c_) With 1st Australian Division--To be notified. - - (_d_) With 2nd Australian Division--Major H. PAGE, M.C. - - (_e_) With 3rd Australian Division--Lt.-Col. A. R. WOOLCOCK, D.S.O. - - (_f_) With 4th Australian Division--Major G. F. DICKINSON, D.S.O. - - (_g_) With 5th Australian Division--Lt.-Col. N. MARSHALL, D.S.O. - -2. The main function of the liaison officer is to relieve the Staff of -the fighting formation of the necessity of: - - (_a_) Supplying information to Australian Corps Headquarters. - - (_b_) Collecting information from Corps Headquarters for - transmission to the formation for whom they are carrying out - liaison duties. It is their function to save the Staff as far as - possible, and not to get in the way. At the same time, they are - expected to keep Corps Headquarters and the formation to which they - are attached fully informed of events. - -3. Direct telephone lines exist between Australian Corps Headquarters -and neighbouring Corps. - -For the battle there is a special General Staff switchboard with direct -lines to 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Australian Divisions. - -4. An information bureau will be established in a marquee to be erected -on the lawn in front of the Headquarters offices. Major W. W. BERRY -will be in charge of this bureau. It will be provided with a telephone, -writing material, maps, etc. - -Liaison officers from other formation at Australian Corps Headquarters -will be accommodated in this marquee. - -During the battle officers whose business does not require them to -visit the General Staff Office will make all inquiries at this office -for information as to the progress of the operations. - - -BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 20 - -CAVALRY - -1. The First Cavalry Brigade, plus one company of Whippet Tanks -attached, comes under the command of the Australian Corps Commander at -9 p.m. on Y/Z night. - -2. Its function is to assist in carrying out the main Cavalry role by -seizing any opportunity which may occur to push through this Corps -front. - -3. The First Cavalry Brigade will operate north of the AMIENS--CHAULNES -railway in conjunction with 5th Australian Division. It will move -from its assembly position in Square n.32 under orders of G.O.C., 1st -Cavalry Division, via the southern side of BOIS DE L'ABBE. - -It will cross to the north side of the railway east of -VILLERS-BRETONNEUX. - -It will push forward patrols to keep in touch with 8th and 15th -Australian Brigades. - -After crossing the railway the main body of 1st Cavalry Brigade will -march roughly parallel to it, keeping close touch with the remainder of -1st Cavalry Division to the south. - -4. If a break in enemy's resistance occurs, the remainder of the 1st -Cavalry Division may be employed in support of 1st Cavalry Brigade. - -5. Command of 1st Cavalry Brigade will pass from Australian Corps to -the 1st Cavalry Division when the Infantry reaches the red line unless -the brigade is required in the area south of the Australian Corps to -exploit success gained before that hour. This will be determined by -G.O.C., 1st Cavalry Division, who will inform Australian Corps and 5th -Australian Division, and issue orders direct to 1st Cavalry Brigade. - - -BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 21 - -NOTIFICATION OF DATE AND TIME OF BATTLE - -1. Reference paragraph 1 of General Staff Memo. No. AC/42, dated 7th -instant, ZERO will be 4.20 a.m. 8th instant. - - - - -INDEX - - - Administrative Services, 12. - - Aeroplanes first used to carry small arms ammunition, 59. - As noise camouflage, 105. - - Air Force, 13, 171. - - Albert, 30, 36, 79. - - Allied Offensive, Aug. 8th: - Conference at Flexicourt, 73. - Outline of plan, 73-80. - Three phases, 84. - Disposition of brigades, 93-94. - Artillery calibration, 102. - Tanks, 104. - Armoured cars, 107. - Intelligence Service, 112. - Air Squadron, 113. - Day before battle, 119. - Zero hour, 4.20 a.m., 120. - Guns begin, 121. - First phase completed, 122. - "Outwards" telegrams, 123. - Enemy completely surprised, 125. - Third Corps failed to reach objective, 126. - Armoured cars, sensational report, 127. - Guns and booty captured, 129. - Ludendorff's comments, 130. - General meeting at Villers-Bretonneux, 132. - The King at Bertangles, 132. - - American Army's first great attack, 206, 259. - First offensive battle, Hamel, 59. - Second Corps, 235. - To join Fourth British Army, 236, 243, 254. - 1,200 taken prisoners, 262. - 131st Regt., 136, 143. - 27th Div., 275, 278. - 30th Div., 275, 278. - 33rd Div., 52. - - Amiens, defence of, 26 _et seq._ - - Anzac, First and Second Corps, 7. - Corps, abolition of, 9. - Day, 3rd anniversary, 37. - - Arcy Wood, 161, 163. - - Armistice requested by enemy, 280. - - Army Corps improvised, 2. - Constitution and scope, 3. - - Artillery barrage, 228-229. - Classification of, 12. - - Assevillers, 221, 247. - - Aubigny, 31. - - Australian Army Corps constituted, 9. - United, 10. - - Australian Corps Headquarters, Bertangles, 35. - - Australian Soldier's high _moral_, 288. - Adaptability, 291. - Instinct for "square deal," 292. - - Australian Staff watchword, "Efficiency," 295. - - Australia's five Divisions, 5. - - Authie, 25. - - - Bapaume, 198. - - Basseux, 24. - - Battles on grand scale finished, 281. - - Beaurevoir, 218, 258, 276. - - Bell, Maj.-Gen. John, 52, 136. - - Bellenglise, 219. - Captured, 260. - - Bellicourt taken, 261. - - Bellicourt Tunnel, 219, 237. - - Bertangles, Australian Corps H.Q., 35, 52, 132. - - Biaches, 198. - - Bingham, Lt.-Col., 106. - - Birdwood, Gen., 9, 36, 40, 132. - - Birdwood, Gen. Sir William: - Commands First Anzac Corps, 7. - Appointed Commander Australian Imperial Force, 10. - Appointed Commander Fifth British Army, 10, 40, 209. - - Blamey, Brig.-Gen., 296. - - Bony captured, 267. - - Bouchavesnes, 182. - - Bourlon Wood, 259. - - Braithwaite, Lieut.-Gen., 204, 221. - - Brancourt, 259. - - Bray, 137, 148, 155, 158, 195. - - Brie, 196, 198. - - Brigade reductions, 15. - - British Fifth Army, 40, 219. - - Brown, Corpl. W., captures officer and 11 men, 66. - - Bryce, Lt.-Col., 106. - - Bussy, 62. - - Butler, Gen., Third Corps, 73, 136, 221. - - Byng, Gen., 27, 134. - - - Calibration, 102. - - Cambrai, 259. - - Canadians, 73, 75, 76, 115, 122, 129, 133, 134, 136, 139, 140, 198, 259. - - Canadian Troops, fixed constitution, 5. - - Cannan, Brig.-Gen., 27. - - Cappy, 137, 157, 166. - - Captive Balloon Service, 14. - - Carter, Lieut.-Col. E. J., 108. - - Cavalry first employed, 201. - - Cerisy, 136. - - Cessation of hostilities, 281. - - Chamier, 22. - - Chateau-Thierry, 72. - End of German offensive, 72. - - Chipilly, 126, 136, 137. - - Chuignes, 152, 156. - - Churchill, Mr. Winston, 209. - - Clemenceau, M.: - Speech to troops after Hamel battle, 62. - After Aug. 8th, 132. - - Clery, 170-180. - - Combles, 198. - - Commanders and Staffs, 16-17. - - Congreve, Gen., his first order, 26. - - Contact aeroplanes, 171. - - Cook, Sir Joseph, 55. - - Corps Cavalry, 11. - - Corps Commander's responsibilities, 4. - - Corps Conferences, 150. - - Corps Signal Troops, 11. - - Corps Troops, 11. - - Couin, 25. - - Courage, Brig.-Gen., 50, 106, 222. - - Couturelle, 24. - - Cox, Maj.-Gen. Sir H. W., 9. - - Crossing the Somme, plan for, 178. - - Cummings, Brig.-Gen., 29. - - Curlu, 170. - - Currie, Gen., 73, 132, 140. - - - Dernancourt, 31, 33. - - Difficulties of Army in retreat, 280. - - Disorganized British retreat, 23. - - Division, the fighting unit, 2. - - Division I., 18, 34, 40, 43, 73, 117, 134, 139, 140, 146, 152, 166, - 203, 205, 221, 232, 243, 281. - Last fight, 233. - - Division II., 18, 34, 40, 43, 65, 67, 71, 86, 115, 122, 135, 139, - 146, 165, 170, 184, 257, 266, 270, 275, 277, 279. - Last fight, 279. - - Division III., 18, 20, 31, 37, 40, 53, 86, 115, 122, 126, 137, 142, - 146, 155, 158, 165, 170, 184, 191, 200, 201, 205, 235, 253, 261, - 263, 265, 268, 270. - Last fight, 270. - - Division IV., 18, 24, 30, 33, 65, 89, 115, 117, 126, 137, 146, 164, - 203, 205, 221, 232, 233, 243, 281. - Last fight, 233. - - Division V., 18, 34, 65, 76, 89, 115, 134, 146, 165, 169, 184, 193, - 235, 253, 261, 262, 267. - Last fight, 270. - - Doullens, population prepare to evacuate, 23. - First move, 22-23. - - Dummy Tanks, 223. - - - Efficient Army more potent than League of Nations, 298. - - Elles, Gen., 44, 221. - - End of German offensive, 72. - - Enemy attack in the South, July 15th, 72. - Comments on our successes, 66-67. - Discover our movement South, 116. - Move from Russian to Western Front, 20. - "On the run," 168. - Propaganda, 160. - Reserves melting away, 42. - Reserves absorbed, 206. - Secure our "Recruiting - Cable," 159. - Withdraws in disorder, 170. - - Engineers, Companies of, 12. - - Estries, 258. - - Eterpigny, 196. - - Etinehem, 137. - - - Fairfax, Lieut.-Col. Ramsay-, 106. - - Farewell Order to Third Division, 41. - - Farewell Order, 282. - - Feuillancourt, 185. - - Feuilleres, 137. - - Fifth Army defensive unduly attenuated, 23. - - Fifth British Army, 21. - - First Australian Division, 5. - - First British Army attack, Aug. 26th, 198. - - First Order from 10th Corps, 25. - - Flamicourt, 191. - - Flanders' liquid mud, 18, 20. - - Flexicourt Conference, 73. - - Foch, Marshal, appointed Supreme Commander, 37; 142, 200. - - Fontaine, 169. - - Foott, Brig.-Gen., 196. - - Forty-sixth Imperial Division, 260. - - Foucaucourt, 169. - - Fourth Army enlarged, 204. - British flank with French, 37. - - Fourth and Fifth Australian Divisions, 6. - - Framerville, 135. - - Franvillers, 27, 33. - - Fraser, Brig.-Gen., 173, 222. - - French Army's different outlook, 71. - - Frevent, 23. - - "Fuse 106" as wire cutter, 257. - - - Garenne Wood, 157. - - Gellibrand, Maj.-Gen., 268. - - German attack, March 21st, 1918, 21. - Propaganda, 160. - Withdrawal general on all fronts, Sept. 4th, 205. - - Germany's "Black Day," 130. - Crack regiments opposed to Australians, 183. - Surrender due to military defeat, 287. - Determining cause, breach of Hindenburg defences, 287. - - Gillemont Farm, 251, 267. - - Glasgow, Maj.-Gen., 158, 221. - - Godley, Lieut.-Gen. Sir A., commands Second Anzac Corps, - 7, 132, 136, 199, 204. - - Gouy, 262. - - Grimwade, Brig.-Gen., 30. - - - Haig, Brig.-Gen. Neil, 201. - Field Marshal, 54, 62, 132, 209, 250. - - Hamel, proposed operation against, 44-48. - Battle of, planned, 51. - Zero fixed, 56. - Over in 93 minutes, 56. - Official commentary, 57. - Americans' first offensive battle, 59. - No gas shells used, 60. - Congratulatory messages, 61. - M. Clemenceau's speech, 62-3. - Dinner at Amiens to celebrate victory, 63-64. - End of British defensive, 64. - - Hamel Wood, 33, 39, 44, 56. - - Hangard, 34, 36. - - Hargicourt, Zero hour, 5.20 a.m. Sept. 8th, 226. - Red line reached before 10 o'clock, 232. - Outpost line captured, 232. - - Haut Allaines, 200. - - Hautcloque, 23. - - Hazebrouck, 35. - - Headquarters of Army Corps, 11. - - Hebuterne, 25. - - Heilly, 28. - - Hem, 170. - - Herleville, 152. - - Hill 90, 157. - - Hill 104, 33, 36, 65. - - Hindenburg Line, 199. - Purpose of, 214. - St. Quentin-Cambrai section, 215. - Germans' elaborate system of trenches, 217. - Hargicourt line, 218. - Capture of plans of German defence scheme, 219. - Plan for attacking, 221. - Machine gun barrage, 223. - Dummy tanks, 223. - Tapes for Infantry start line, 224. - Direction boards, 225. - Plan for further advance, 236-240. - America's Second Corps in battle front, 242. - Australian and American Divisions, 254. - Mustard gas first used, 256. - Destroying wire entanglements, 256. - Disposition of Divisions, 258. - Two phases, 258. - Zero hour, 5.50 a.m. Sept. 29th, 259. - Fifth Australians hung up, 261. - Americans held up, 261. - Forget to mop up, 262. - Change of plan, 264. - Enemy relinquish tunnel defences, 268. - Collapse of the whole defences, 279. - - Hobbs, Maj.-Gen., 108, 169, 193. - - Hughes, W. M., 55. - Message from, 61, 281. - - Hunn, Maj. A. S., 210. - - - Infantry advance behind barrage, 229. - - Infantry Brigade reductions, 15. - - "Instantaneous" fuse, 257. - - - Joncourt, 258, 267. - - July 18th, French and American counter-stroke, 72. - - - Kavanagh, Gen., Cavalry Corps, 73, 132. - - King, the, at Bertangles, 132. - - Knob, the, 267. - - Knoll, the, 267. - - - Labour Corps, 12. - - La Flaque, 129. - - La Neuville, 155. - - Last Australian battle in Great War, 279. - - La Verguier, 232. - - League of Nations less potent than efficient Army, 298. - - "Leap Frog" tactics, 81. - - Le Cateau, 281. - - Le Catelet, 218, 261. - - Leslie, Brig.-Gen. W. B., 9. - - Lewis, Maj.-Gen., 246. - - Lewis Gun detachments, 91. - - "Liaison Force," 143. - - Lihons, 135. - - Losses, comparison of, 289. - - Ludendorff's comments on Aug. 8th attack, 130. - - Lyon, Lt.-Col., 106. - - - Maclagan, Maj.-Gen., 24, 26, 30, 52, 136, 221, 243, 247. - - McNicoll, Brig.-Gen., 24, 28. - - March 22nd, 1918, first move, 21. - - Marett Wood, 29. - - Martin, Brig.-Gen., 185. - - Marwitz, Gen. von der, 281. - - Maurepas, 198. - - Max (Prince) of Baden, 280. - - Mechanical Transport, 11. - - Mericourt, 133, 139. - - Mills's grenades, 248. - - Minor battles begun, 37. - Result, 38-39. - - Monash, Lieut.-Gen., Sir John: - In command First Australian Div., 5. - Third Australian Div., 6. - Australian Army Corps, 10. - 17th Imperial Div., 16. - 32nd Imperial Div., 16. - 27th American Div., 16. - 30th American Div., 16. - Without orders, 23. - Honoured by the King, 132. - Hands over command to General Read, 279. - - Mondicourt, 24. - - Monster German Naval 15-inch gun captured, 161. - - Montbrehain, 278. - Last Australian battle, 279. - - Montgomery, 132. - - Mont St. Martin, 275. - - Mont St. Quentin, 177, 182. - Second Prussian Guards defend, 183. - Captured, 184, 193. - - Monument Wood, 67. - - Mopping up, 229, 248. - Result of neglecting, 252, 262. - - Morain, M., entertains British and French Army officers after Hamel, - 64. - - _Moral v._ material, 279. - - Motor Ambulance Corps, 12. - - Mound, the, 78. - - Mullens, Maj.-Gen., letter of appreciation, 31. - - Mustard gas, 78, 255. - - - Nauroy, 218, 263, 267. - - Nielles-lez-Blequin, 20. - - Noise camouflage, 105. - - Nollet, Gen., 164. - - Noyons, 198. - - - Officers and men, relations between, 293. - - Ommiecourt, 137. - - O'Ryan Maj.-Gen., 246. - - - Partington, Major, 106. - - Pas, 25. - - Peronne, 148, 182. - Enemy defence of, 183. - Taken, 191. - - Poulainville, 129. - - Prince Max of Baden, 280. - - Prisoners, treatment of, 210. - Excuses for surrender, 213. - Cages, 209. - "Pigeons" employed to gain information, 211. - - Proyart, 139. - - Prussian Guards hold Mont St. Quentin, 183. - - - Quennemont Farm, 251, 263. - - - Ramicourt, 277. - - Ramsay-Fairfax, Lieut.-Col., 106. - - Rawlinson, Gen. Lord, 35-44, 52, 72, 73, 96, 132, 166, 181, - 192, 221, 235, 236, 241, 250, 274, 278. - - Read, Maj.-Gen. G. W., 243, 278, 279. - - Reorganization of Brigades, 272-3. - - Repatriation of Australian Forces, 282. - - Results, analysis of, 284 _et seq._ - - Rheims, 259. - - Robertson, Maj. P. R., 142. - - Roisel, 204. - - Rosenthal, Brig.-Gen., 24, 43, 67, 169, 192, 278. - - Rosieres, 129. - - Roye, 133, 141, 198. - - - Sailly-Laurette, 29. - - Sailly-le-Sec, 31. - - Second Australian Division, 5. - - "Set-piece" operations, 226. - - "Siegfried Line," 214. - - Skene, Brig.-Gen. P. G. M., 9. - - Smoke shells, 169. - - Smyth, Sir N. M., V.C., 9. - - Soissons, German withdrawal, 78. - - Somme Canal, 174. - Line of, 148. - Enemy retreat, 182. - - Somme, North, 34. - Plan for crossing, 178. - South, 34. - - St. Christ, 198. - - St. Denis, 190. - - St. Gratien, 33. - - St. Mihiel Salient attack, Sept. 11th, 206. - - St. Quentin Canal, 216, 232. - - - Tanks, 14, 44, 48, 49, 91, 104, 276. - Improved type, 48. - Dummy, 223. - "Star," 91. - - Teamwork, 150. - - Third Australian Division, 6. - - Third British Army attack Aug. 21st, 154, 198, 221. - - Time-table for successive Army engagements impossible, 153. - - Tivoli Wood, 170. - - Toulorge, Gen., 42. - - Treux Wood, 29. - - Tunnellers, 12. - - - Underground shelters, galleries and dug-outs, German, 249. - - - Vaire Wood, 39, 56. - - Vaux, 49. - - Vauxvillers, 133, 135. - - Verdun, 259. - - Vermandovillers, 169. - - Villers-Bretonneux, 33, 36, 37, 64, 67, 78. - - Visitors to Corps, 208. - Lord Milner, 209. - Mr. Winston Churchill, 209. - - - Wackett, Capt., Australian Flying Corps, 60. - - Walker, Maj.-Gen. Sir H. B., 9. - - Warneton, early 1918, 18. - - Whippet tanks, 276. - - Wiancourt, 277. - - Wilson, Sir Henry, 132. - - Wisdom, Brig.-Gen., 143. - - - Ypres, 260. - - - Zero hour, Aug. 8th, 120. - Hamel, 56. - Hargicourt, 226. - Hindenburg Line, 259. - - _Printed at The Chapel River Press, Kingston, Surrey._ - - - - - - * * * * * * - - - - -Transcriber's note: - -Obvious errors of punctuation and diacritical markings were corrected. - -Inconsistent hyphenation was made consistent. - -P. 123: No correction made to "Sent at 2.5 p.m." - - - -***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE AUSTRALIAN VICTORIES IN FRANCE -IN 1918*** - - -******* This file should be named 51163.txt or 51163.zip ******* - - -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: -http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/5/1/1/6/51163 - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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