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diff --git a/old/51163-h/51163-h.htm b/old/51163-h/51163-h.htm deleted file mode 100644 index f9b125e..0000000 --- a/old/51163-h/51163-h.htm +++ /dev/null @@ -1,16555 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" - "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> -<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> -<head> -<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1" /> -<title>The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Australian Victories in France in 1918, by Sir John Monash</title> -<link rel="coverpage" href="images/cover.jpg" /> -<style type="text/css"> - -body { - margin-left: 10%; - margin-right: 10%; -} - - h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 { - text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ - clear: both; -} - -p { - margin-top: .51em; - text-align: justify; - margin-bottom: .49em; -} - -hr { - width: 33%; - margin-top: 2em; - margin-bottom: 2em; - margin-left: auto; - margin-right: auto; - clear: both; -} - -hr.tb {width: 45%;} -hr.chap {width: 65%} - -table { - margin-left: auto; - margin-right: auto; -} - -.pagenum { /* uncomment the next line for invisible page numbers */ - /* visibility: hidden; */ - position: absolute; - left: 92%; - font-size: smaller; - text-align: right; -} /* page numbers */ - -.center {text-align: center;} - -.right {text-align: right;} - -.smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} - -.u {text-decoration: underline;} - -.caption {font-weight: bold;} - -/* Images */ -.figcenter { - margin: auto; - text-align: center; -} - -.figcenter p {text-align: center;} - -/* Footnotes */ -.footnotes {border: dashed 1px;} - -.footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 0.9em;} - -.footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 84%; text-align: right;} - -.fnanchor { - vertical-align: super; - font-size: .8em; - text-decoration: - none; -} - -/* Poetry */ -.poem { - margin-left:10%; - margin-right:10%; - text-align: left; -} - -/* Transcriber's notes */ -.transnote {background-color: #E6E6FA; - color: black; - font-size:smaller; - padding:0.5em; - margin-bottom:5em; - font-family:sans-serif, serif; } - -/********** CSS taken from HTML best practices ***********/ -h1 -{ - text-align: center; - font-size: x-large; - font-weight: bold; - line-height: 1.6; -} - -h1 small -{ - font-size: small; -} - -h2 -{ - text-align: center; - font-weight: bold; - line-height: 1.5; -} - -.spaced -{ - line-height: 1.5; -} - -.space-above -{ - margin-top: 3em; -} - -#half-title -{ - text-align: center; - font-size: large; -} - -@media print, handheld -{ - #half-title - { - page-break-before: always; - page-break-after: always; - margin: 0; - padding-top: 6em; - } -} - - -/********** CSS taken from HTML best practices ***********/ - - h1.pg { font-size: 190%; - line-height: 1; } - h2.pg { line-height: 1; } - hr.full { width: 100%; - margin-top: 3em; - margin-bottom: 0em; - margin-left: auto; - margin-right: auto; - height: 4px; - border-width: 4px 0 0 0; /* remove all borders except the top one */ - border-style: solid; - border-color: #000000; - clear: both; } - </style> -</head> -<body> -<h1 class="pg">The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Australian Victories in France in 1918, -by Sir John Monash</h1> -<p>This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States -and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no -restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it -under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this -eBook or online at <a -href="http://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you are not -located in the United States, you'll have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this ebook.</p> -<p>Title: The Australian Victories in France in 1918</p> -<p>Author: Sir John Monash</p> -<p>Release Date: February 10, 2016 [eBook #51163]</p> -<p>Language: English</p> -<p>Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1</p> -<p>***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE AUSTRALIAN VICTORIES IN FRANCE IN 1918***</p> -<p> </p> -<h4>E-text prepared by Brian Coe, Moti Ben-Ari,<br /> - and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team<br /> - (<a href="http://www.pgdp.net">http://www.pgdp.net</a>)<br /> - from page images generously made available by<br /> - Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries<br /> - (<a href="https://archive.org/details/toronto">https://archive.org/details/toronto</a>)</h4> -<p> </p> -<table border="0" style="background-color: #ccccff;margin: 0 auto;" cellpadding="10"> - <tr> - <td valign="top"> - Note: - </td> - <td> - Images of the original pages are available through - Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries. See - <a href="https://archive.org/details/australianvictor00mona"> - https://archive.org/details/australianvictor00mona</a> - </td> - </tr> -</table> -<p> </p> -<hr class="full" /> -<p> </p> -<p> </p> -<p> </p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_i" id="Page_i">[i]</a></span></p> - -<p id="half-title"> <i>The Australian Victories -in France in 1918</i></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ii" id="Page_ii">[ii]</a></span></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 763px;"> -<a name="frontispiece" id="frontispiece"><img src="images/i_a_frontispiece.jpg" width="763" height="1200" alt="" /></a> -<div class="caption"><p>Lieut.-General Sir John Monash, <span class="smcap">G.C.M.G.</span>, -<span class="smcap">K.C.B.</span>, <span class="smcap">V.D.</span>, <span class="smcap">D.C.L.</span>, <span class="smcap">LL.D.</span></p></div> -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iii" id="Page_iii">[iii]</a></span></p> -<h1><i>The Australian Victories in France in 1918</i></h1> - -<p class="center spaced space-above"> -<i>By</i><br /> -<i>Lieutenant-General Sir John Monash</i>,<br /> -<i>G.C.M.G.</i>, <i>K.C.B.</i>, <i>V.D.</i>, <i>D.C.L.</i>, <i>LL.D.</i><br /> -</p> - -<p class="center spaced space-above"> -<i>WITH 9 FOLDING MAPS IN COLOUR<br /> -AND 31 ILLUSTRATIONS</i><br /> -</p> - -<p class="center spaced space-above"> -<i>LONDON: HUTCHINSON & CO.<br /> -PATERNOSTER ROW</i><br /> -</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iv" id="Page_iv">[iv]</a></span></p> - -<div class="center"> -DEDICATED<br /> -to the<br /> -AUSTRALIAN SOLDIER<br /> -who by his military virtues, and by his deeds<br /> -in battle, has earned for himself a<br /> -place in history which none<br /> -can challenge<br /> -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[v]</a></span></p> - -<h2>PREFACE</h2> - - -<p>The following pages, of which I began the compilation when still -engaged in the arduous work of Repatriation of the Australian troops -in all theatres of war, were intended to be something in the nature -of a consecutive and comprehensive story of the Australian Imperial -Force in France during the closing phases of the Great War. I soon -found that the time at my disposal was far too limited to allow me -to make full use of the very voluminous documentary material which -I had collected during the campaign. The realization of such a -project must await a time of greater leisure. So much as I have had -the opportunity of setting down has, therefore, inevitably taken the -form rather of an individual memoir of this stirring period. While I -feel obliged to ask the indulgence of the reader for the personal -character of the present narrative, this may not be altogether a disadvantage. -Having regard to the responsibilities which it fell to -my lot to bear, it may, indeed, be desirable that I should in all candour -set down what was passing in my mind, and should attempt to describe -the ever-changing external circumstances which operated to guide and -form the judgments and decisions which it became my duty to make -from day to day. It may be that hereafter my exercise of command -in the field and the manner in which I made use of the opportunities -which presented themselves will be the subject of criticism. I welcome -this, provided that the facts and the events of the time are -known to and duly weighed by the critic.</p> - -<p>My purpose has been to describe in broad outline the part played -by the Australian Army Corps in the closing months of the war, and -I have based upon that record somewhat large claims on behalf of -the Corps. It would have overloaded the story to include in it any -larger number of extracts from original documents than has been done. -I may, however, assert with confidence that the statements, statistics -and deductions made can be verified by reference to authoritative -sources.</p> - -<p>The photographs have been selected from a very large number -taken, during the fighting and often under fire, by Captain G. H. -Wilkins, M.C. The maps have been prepared under my personal -supervision, and are compiled from the official battle maps in actual -use by me during the operations.</p> - -<div class="right"><span class="smcap">John Monash.</span></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">[vi]</a></span></p> - -<h2>CONTENTS</h2> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="right">CHAP.</td><td align="left"> </td><td align="right">PAGE</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Preface</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_v">v</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Introduction—The Australian Army Corps</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">I.—</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Back to the Somme</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_18">18</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">II.—</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">The Defence of Amiens</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_36">36</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">III.—</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Hamel</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_51">51</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">IV.—</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Turning the Tide</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_69">69</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">V.—</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">The Battle Plan</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_81">81</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">VI.—</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">The Battle Plan</span> (<i>continued</i>) </td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_97">97</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">VII.—</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">The Chase begins</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_115">115</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">VIII.—</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Exploitation</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_133">133</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">IX.—</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Chuignes</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_148">148</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">X.—</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Pursuit</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_164">164</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">XI.—</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Mont St. Quentin and Péronne</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_182">182</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">XII.—</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">A Lull</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_198">198</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">XIII.—</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Hargicourt</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_214">214</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">XIV.—</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">America joins in</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_235">235</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">XV.—</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Bellicourt and Bony</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_254">254</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">XVI.—</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Montbrehain and after</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_271">271</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">XVII.—</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Results</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_284">284</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Appendix A</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_299">299</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Appendix B</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_300">300</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Appendix C</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_317">317</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Index</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_345">345</a></td></tr> -</table> -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<h2>LIST OF MAPS</h2> - - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="right">A—</td><td align="left">The Advances of the Third Division—March to May, 1918</td><td align="center"><i>Facing page</i></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_32">32</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">B—</td><td align="left">Battle of Hamel, July 4th, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_64">64</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">C—</td><td align="left">Battle of August 8th, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_144">144</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">D—</td><td align="left">Battle of Chuignes and Bray, August 23rd, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_160">160</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">E—</td><td align="left">Péronne and Mont St. Quentin</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_192">192</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">F—</td><td align="left">Advances of Australian Corps, September 2nd to 17th, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_208">208</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">G—</td><td align="left">Battle of September 18th, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_224">224</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">H—</td><td align="left">Breaching of Hindenburg Defences</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_272">272</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">J—</td><td align="left">Australian Corps Campaign</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_288">288</a></td></tr> -</table></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[vii]</a></span></p> - -<h2>LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS</h2> - - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">Lieut.-General Sir John Monash, G.C.M.G.,</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">K.C.B., V.D., D.C.L., LL.D.</td><td align="center"> </td><td align="right"><a href="#frontispiece"><i>Frontispiece</i></a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">1.—</td><td align="left">The Australian Corps Commander—with the</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">Generals of his Staff</td><td align="center"><i>Facing page</i></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_14">14</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">2.—</td><td align="left">The Valley of the Somme—looking east towards</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">Bray, which was then still in enemy hands</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_15">15</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">3.—</td><td align="left">German Prisoners—taken by the Corps at</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">Hamel, being marched to the rear</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_40">40</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">4.—</td><td align="left">Visit of M. Clemenceau—group taken at Bussy,</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">July 7th, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_41">41</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">5.—</td><td align="left">Railway Gun, 11.2-inch Bore—captured near</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">Rosières on August 8th, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_66">66</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">6.—</td><td align="left">German Depot of Stores—captured on August</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">8th, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_67">67</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">7.—</td><td align="left">Tanks marching into Battle</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_96">96</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">8.—</td><td align="left">Morcourt Valley—the Australian attack swept</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">across this on August 8th, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_97">97</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">9.—</td><td align="left">Dug-outs at Froissy-Beacon—being "mopped</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">up" during battle</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_112">112</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">10.—</td><td align="left">Péronne—barricade in main street</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_113">113</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">11.—</td><td align="left">Burning Villages—east of Péronne</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_128">128</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">12.—</td><td align="left">Dummy Tank Manufacture</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_129">129</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">13.—</td><td align="left">The Canal and Tunnel at Bellicourt—looking north</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_152">152</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">14.—</td><td align="left">The Hindenburg Line—a characteristic belt of</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">sunken wire</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_153">153</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">15.—</td><td align="left">Final Instructions to the Platoon—an incident</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">of the battle of August 8th, 1918. The</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">platoon is waiting to advance to Phase B of the battle</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_176">176</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">16.—</td><td align="left">An Armoured Car—disabled near Bony, during</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">the battle of September 29th, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_177">177</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">17.—</td><td align="left">The Hindenburg Line Wire—near Bony</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_198">198</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">18.—</td><td align="left">The 15-inch Naval Gun—captured at Chuignes</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">August 23rd, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_199">199</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">19.—</td><td align="left">Australian Artillery—going into action at</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">Cressaire Wood</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_218">218</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">20.—</td><td align="left">Battle of August 8th, 1918—German prisoners<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[viii]</a></span></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">being brought out of the battle under the fire</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">of their own Artillery</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_219">219</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">21.—</td><td align="left">Mont St. Quentin—collecting Australian</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">wounded under protection of the Red Cross</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">flag, September 1st, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_240">240</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">22.—</td><td align="left">An Ammunition Dump—established in Warfusee</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">village on August 8th, 1918, after its</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">capture the same morning</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_241">241</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">23.—</td><td align="left">Australian Light Horse—the 13th A.L.H.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">Regiment riding into action on August 17th, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_256">256</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">24.—</td><td align="left">The Sniper sniped—an enemy sniper disposed</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">of by an Australian Sharp-shooter, August 22nd, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_257">257</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">25.—</td><td align="left">German Prisoners—captured at the battle of</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">Chuignes, August 23rd, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_274">274</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">26.—</td><td align="left">Captured German Guns—Park of Ordnance,</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">captured by the Australians during August, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_275">275</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">27.—</td><td align="left">The Toll of Battle—an Australian gun-team</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">destroyed by an enemy shell, September 1st, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_294">294</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">28.—</td><td align="left">Inter-Divisional Relief—the 30th American</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">and the 3rd Australian Divisions passing each</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">other in the "Roo de Kanga," Péronne,</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">during the "relief" after the capture of the</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">Hindenburg Line, October 4th, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_295">295</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">29.—</td><td align="left">Australian Artillery—moving up to the front,</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">through the Hindenburg wire, October 2nd, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_316">316</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">30.—</td><td align="left">Advance during Battle—Third Division Infantry</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">and Tanks advancing to the capture of Bony,</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left">October 1st, 1918</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_317">317</a></td></tr> -</table></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[1]</a></span></p> - -<div class="center"><big>The Australian Victories in France in 1918</big></div> - -<h2>INTRODUCTION<br /> -THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY CORPS</h2> - - -<p>The renown of the Australians as individual fighters, in -all theatres of the Great War, has loomed large in the -minds and imagination of the people of the Empire.</p> - -<p>Many stories of the work they did have been published in -the daily Press and in book form. But it is seldom that any -appreciation can be discovered of the fact that the Australians -in France gradually became, as the war progressed, moulded -into a single, complete and fully organized Army Corps.</p> - -<p>Seldom has any stress been laid upon the fact that because -it thus became a formation fixed and stable in composition, fighting -under a single command, and provided with all accessory -arms and services, the Corps was able successfully to undertake -fighting operations on the grandest scale.</p> - -<p>There can be little question, however, that it was this development -which constituted the paramount and precedent condition -for the brilliant successes achieved by these splendid troops -during the summer and autumn of 1918—successes which far -overshadowed those of any earlier period of the war.</p> - -<p>For a complete understanding of all the factors which contributed -to those successes, and for an intelligent grasp of the -course of events following so dramatically upon the outbreak of -the great German offensive of March 21st of that year, I propose -to trace, very briefly, the genesis and ultimate development of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[2]</a></span> -the Corps, as it became constituted when, on August 8th, it was -launched upon its great enterprise of opening, in close collaboration -with the Army Corps of its sister Dominion of Canada, that -remarkable counter-offensive, which it maintained, without pause, -without check, and without reverse, for sixty consecutive days—a -period full of glorious achievement—which contributed, as -I shall show in these pages, in the most direct and decisive manner, -to the final collapse and surrender of the enemy.</p> - -<p>In the days before the war, there was in the British Service no -recognized or authorized organization known as an Army Corps. -When the Expeditionary Force was launched into the conflict -in 1914, the Army Corps organization was hastily improvised, -and consisted at first merely of an Army Corps Staff, with a small -allotment of special Corps Troops and services, and of a fluctuating -number of Divisions.</p> - -<p>It was the <i>Division</i><a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> and not the <i>Corps</i>, which was then the -strategical unit of the Army. Even when the necessity for the -formation of Army Corps was recognized, it was still a fundamental -conception that it was the Division, and not the Army -Corps, which constituted the fighting unit.</p> - -<p>To each Army Corps were allotted at first only two, but later -as many as four Divisions, according to the needs and circumstances -of the moment. But the component Divisions never, -for long, remained the same. The actual composition of every -Army Corps was subject to constant changes and interchanges, -and it was rare for any given Division to remain for more than -a few weeks in any one Army Corps.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[3]</a></span></p> -<p>The disadvantages of such an arrangement are sufficiently -obvious to require no great elaboration; at the same time, -it has to be recognized that, during the first three years of the -war, at any rate, the Army was undergoing a process of rapid -expansion, and that, on grounds of expediency, it was neither -possible nor desirable to adopt a policy of a fixed and immutable -composition for so large a formation as an Army Corps.</p> - -<p>Moreover, the special conditions of trench warfare made it -imperative to create, under the respective Armies, and in the -respective zones of those Armies, a subordinate administrative -and tactical authority with a more or less fixed geographical -jurisdiction. Thus, the frontage held by each of the five British -Armies became subdivided into a series of Corps frontages, and -each Corps Commander had allotted to him a definite frontage, -a definite depth and a definite area, for his administrative and -executive direction.</p> - -<p>It was within this Corps area that he exercised entire control -of all functions of a purely local and geographical character: -such as the maintenance of all roads, railways, canals, telegraphs -and telephones; the control of all traffic; the apportionment of -all billeting and quartering facilities; the allocation and employment -of all means of transport; the collection and distribution -of all supplies, comprising food, forage, munitions and engineering -materials; the conservation and distribution of all water -supply; the sanitation of the area; the whole medical administration -within, and the evacuation of sick and wounded from -the area; the establishment and working of shops of all descriptions, -both for general engineering and for Ordnance purposes; -also of laundries, bathing establishments and rest camps; the -creation of facilities for the entertainment and recreation of -resting troops, and of schools for their military training and for -the education of their leaders.</p> - -<p>The Corps Commander was, in addition, directly responsible -to the Army Commander for the tactical defence of his whole -area, for the creation and maintenance of the entire system of field -defences covering his frontage, comprising trench systems in -numerous successive zones and field fortifications of all descriptions; -for preparations for the demolition of railways and bridges<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[4]</a></span> -to meet the eventuality of an enforced withdrawal; and for -detailed plans for an advance into the enemy's territory whenever -the opportune moment should arrive.</p> - -<p>The extensive responsibilities thus imposed upon the Corps -Commander, and upon the whole of his Staff, obviously demanded -an intimate study and knowledge of the whole of the Corps area, -such as could be acquired only by continuous occupation of one -and the same area for a period extending over many months. -It would therefore have been in the highest degree inconvenient -to move such a complex organization as an Army Corps Staff -from one area to another at short intervals of time. On the -other hand, the several Divisions allotted to any given Corps for -the actual occupation and maintenance of the defences could -not be called upon to carry out without relief or rest, trench -duty for continuous periods longer than a few weeks at a time.</p> - -<p>During the first three years the number of Divisions at the -disposal of the British High Command was never adequate to -provide each Army Corps in the front line with sufficient Divisions -to permit of a regular alternation out of its own resources of -periods of trench duty and periods of rest. For a Corps holding -a two-Division frontage, for example, it would have been necessary -to provide a permanent strength of at least four Divisions -in order to permit of such a rotation.</p> - -<p>The expedient generally adopted, therefore, was to withdraw -altogether from the Army Corps, each Division in turn, as it -became due for a rest behind the line or was required for duty -elsewhere, and to substitute some other available Division from -G.H.Q. or Army Reserve. The broad result was that such an -deal as that of a fixed composition for an Army Corps proved -quite unattainable, and there was a constant interchange of -nearly the whole of the Divisions of the Army, who served in -succession, for short periods, in many different Corps, and under -many different Commanders.</p> - -<p>To this general rule there was, from the outset of its formation, -one striking exception, in the case of the Canadian Army -Corps, consisting of the four Canadian Divisions, which, with -rare exceptions, and these only for short periods and for quite<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[5]</a></span> -special purposes, invariably fought as a complete Corps of fixed -constitution.</p> - -<p>It is impossible to overvalue the advantages which accrued -to the Canadian troops from this close and constant association -of all the four Divisions with each other, with the Corps Commander -and his Staff, and with all the accessory Corps services. -It meant mutual knowledge of each other among all Commanders, -all Staffs, all arms and services, and the mutual trust and confidence -born of that knowledge. It was the prime factor in -achieving the brilliant conquest of the Vimy Ridge by that Corps -in the early spring of 1917.</p> - -<p>The consummation, so long and so ardently hoped for, of a -similar welding together of all Australian units in the field in -France into a single Corps was not achieved in its entirety until -a full year later, and it will be interesting to trace briefly the -steps by which such a result, strongly pressed as it was by the -Australian Government, was finally brought about.</p> - -<p>Australia put into the field and maintained until the end, -altogether five Divisions of Infantry, complete with all requisite -Artillery, Engineers, Pioneers and all Supply, Medical and -Veterinary Services, in full conformity with the Imperial War -Establishments laid down for such Divisions. But the method -and time of their formation and organization, the manner and -circumstances of their war preparation, and their employment as -part of a Corps varied considerably.</p> - -<p>The First Australian Division, together with the Fourth -Infantry Brigade, which was then under my command and -subsequently became the nucleus of the Fourth Australian Division, -were raised in Australia in 1914, immediately after the -outbreak of war, were transported to Egypt, where they underwent -their war training in the winter of 1915, and ultimately -formed, with the New Zealand Contingent, the body known as -the "Anzac" Corps, which carried out, on April 25th, the -memorable landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula.</p> - -<p>The Second Australian Division speedily followed, being raised -in Australia during 1915, and the greater part of this Second -Contingent joined the Anzac Corps in the later stages of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[6]</a></span> -Dardanelles Expedition. Another independent Brigade (the -Eighth) was also sent to Egypt in that year.</p> - -<p>The raising of the Third Australian Division, early in 1916, -was the magnificent answer which Australia made when public -men and the Press declared that the Australian people would -resent the Evacuation from Gallipoli, and the seemingly fruitless -sacrifices which it entailed. This Division was shipped direct -to England, and assembled on Salisbury Plain during the summer -of 1916, where I assumed the command of it. There it underwent -its war training under conditions far more advantageous -than those which confronted the First and Second Divisions in -the Egyptian desert. The Third Division entered the theatre -of war in France in November, 1916.</p> - -<p>In the meantime, the Evacuation of the Peninsula, in December, -1915, led to the assembly in Egypt of the First and Second -Australian Divisions, the Fourth and Eighth independent -Infantry Brigades and some thirty thousand reinforcements and -convalescents.</p> - -<p>Out of this supply of fighting material it was then decided to -constitute two additional complete Divisions, the Fourth Brigade -forming the nucleus of the Fourth Australian Division, while -the 8th Brigade formed that of the Fifth Australian Division; -the remaining Brigades and the Divisional troops were drawn -from reinforcements, stiffened by a considerable contribution -of veterans taken from the four Infantry Brigades who had -carried out the landing on Gallipoli.</p> - -<p>The Fourth and Fifth Divisions were thus formed in Egypt -in February and March, 1916, and the conditions of their war -training were even less satisfactory than those which had confronted -the earlier Divisions. The hot season speedily arrived; -equipment, munitions and animals materialized slowly; training -equipment and suitable training grounds were of the most -meagre character; and upon all these difficulties supervened -the urgent obligation to undertake the strenuous toil of organizing -and executing, on the Sinai desert, the field fortifications required -for the defence of the Suez Canal zone.</p> - -<p>The method in which the Divisions then available in Egypt<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[7]</a></span> -were to be grouped for the purposes of Corps Command was -ripe for decision. It was then that the determination was reached -to constitute two separate Army Corps, to be called respectively -"First Anzac" and "Second Anzac." The former embodied -the First, Second and Fifth Australian Divisions, under General -Sir William Birdwood; the latter comprised the Fourth Australian -and the New Zealand Divisions under Lieut.-General -Sir Alexander Godley.</p> - -<p>This was the organization of the Australian troops when the -time arrived, in May, 1916, for their transfer by sea from Egypt -to the scene of the titanic conflict which had been for nearly two -years raging on the soil of France and Belgium.</p> - -<p>This grouping did not, however, persist for more than a few -weeks. The opening of the great Somme offensive in July 1916 -found the First, Second and Fourth Divisions operating under -First Anzac in the valley of the Somme, while the Fifth Australian -and the New Zealand Division constituted the Second -Anzac Corps in the Armentières-Fleurbaix sector. There followed -other interchanges as the campaign developed, and by -November of 1916, the grouping stood with First Anzac employing -the First, Second, Fourth and Fifth Divisions, while Second -Anzac comprised the Third Australian, the New Zealand and -the Thirty-Fourth British Divisions.</p> - -<p>The series of offensive operations opening with the great -and successful battle of Messines on June 7th, 1917, found the -Fourth Australian Division once again under the command of -General Godley, only to be again withdrawn before the concluding -phases of the Third Battle of Ypres, in September and -October, 1917. The autumn offensive of 1917, aiming at the -capture of the Passchendaele ridge, was the first occasion on -which the whole of the five Divisions were simultaneously -engaged in the same locality in a common enterprise; but -even on that occasion they still remained distributed under -two different Corps Commands, and had not yet achieved the -long-desired unity of command and of policy.</p> - -<p>This constant interchange of these Divisions, unavoidable -as it probably was, undoubtedly militated against the attainment<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[8]</a></span> -of the highest standard of efficiency. Uniform in scope -and purpose as military administration and tactical policy aims -to be when considered on broad lines, yet in a thousand and one -matters of detail, many of them of dominating importance, the -personality and the individual idiosyncrasies of the Corps Commander -and of his principal executive Staff Officers, are calculated -to exercise a powerful influence upon the functioning of -the whole Corps.</p> - -<p>Under each Corps Commander there grew up in course of time -a particular code of rules, and policies, of technical methods -and even of technical jargon—most of it in an unwritten form. -This nevertheless tended towards efficiency so long as the whole -of the component personnel of the Corps remained stable, but -imposed many difficulties upon Divisions and other units which -joined and remained under the Corps for a short period only.</p> - -<p>The result was that a Divisional Commander and his Staff, -accustomed to work in one environment, often found great difficulty, -and occupied some appreciable period of time, in accommodating -themselves to a new environment, in which doctrines -of attack or defence, counter-attack or trench routine, supply or -maintenance were, some or all of them, widely different from -those to which they had formerly become accustomed.</p> - -<p>But, in the case of Dominion troops, there was a motive far -overshadowing the desire for a removal of difficulties of merely -a technical nature. It was one founded upon a sense of Nationhood, -which prompted the wish, vaguely formed early in the war, -and steadily crystallizing in the minds both of the Australian -people and of the troops themselves, that all the Australian -Divisions should be brought together under a single leadership.</p> - -<p>This ideal was associated with the hope that the Commanders -and Staffs should to as large an extent as possible, consist solely -of Australian Officers, as soon as ever men sufficiently qualified -became available. It is difficult to emphasize such a desire -without appearing to display ingratitude to a number of brilliant -General and other officers of the Imperial Regular Service. These -men, at a time when Australia was still able to produce only -few officers with the necessary training and experience to justify<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[9]</a></span> -their appointment to the command of Divisions and Brigades, -or to the senior Administrative and General Staffs, bore these -burdens in a manner which reflected upon them the greatest -credit, and earned for them the gratitude of the Australian -people.</p> - -<p>I refer, among many others, particularly to General Sir W. -Birdwood, Major-Generals Sir H. B. Walker, Sir N. M. Smyth, -V.C. and Sir H. V. Cox and Brigadier-Generals W. B. Lesslie and -P. G. M. Skene. But as the war went on, this aspect of the -national aspiration became steadily realized; one by one, the -senior commands and staff appointments were taken over by -Australian Officers who had proved their aptitude and suitability -for such responsibilities.</p> - -<p>The other ideal of unity of command and close association with -each other of all Australian units, proved slower of realization. All -concerned thought and hoped that it had been, at last, achieved -in December, 1917, when it was decided to abolish the two -"Anzac" Corps, and to constitute a single Australian Army -Corps. This was effected by the transfer of the Third Australian -Division from Second to First Anzac Corps, by altering the title -of "Second Anzac" to "XXII. Corps," and by substituting -for the name "First Anzac" the name "Australian Army -Corps," which name it bore until the termination of the war.</p> - -<p>The only regrettable feature of this development was the -dissolution of the close comradeship which had existed between -the troops from the sister Dominions of Australia and New -Zealand.</p> - -<p>Even then all hopes were doomed to disappointment. For -the next four months the Corps contained five Divisions in name -only. Almost at once, the Fourth Australian Division was -withdrawn to serve under the VII. Corps in connection with the -operations before Cambrai. Not many weeks later, when the -German avalanche was loosed, the whole five Divisions became -widely scattered, and, for a time, the Third and Fourth Divisions -served under the VII. British Corps, the Fifth Division under -the III. Corps, and the First Division under the XV. Corps. -It was not until April, 1918, that four out of the five Divisions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[10]</a></span> -again came together under the control of the Australian Corps -Commander, at that time General Sir William Birdwood.</p> - -<p>About the middle of May, 1918, this popular Commander was -appointed to the leadership of the Fifth British Army. In deference -to his long association with the Australian Imperial Force, -he was asked to retain his status as G.O.C., A.I.F. His responsibilities -as the Commander of an Army, and its removal to quite -a different area in the theatre of war, made it, however, impossible -for him to take any active part in the direction of the further -operations of the Australian Corps.</p> - -<p>Owing to the vacancy thus created, the Commander-in-Chief, -with the concurrence of the Commonwealth Government, did me -the great honour to appoint me to the command of the Australian -Army Corps, a command which I took over during the closing -days of May and retained until after the Armistice.</p> - -<p>At that juncture the First Australian Division was still -involved in heavy fighting, under the XV. Corps, in the Hazebrouck -sector, and no amount of pressure which I could bring to -bear succeeded in prevailing upon G.H.Q. to release this Division. -It was not until early in August, 1918, on the very eve of the -opening of the great offensive, that, at long last, all the five -Australian Divisions became united into one Corps, never to be -again separated. From that date onwards all five Divisions -embarked (for the first time in their history) upon a series of -combined offensive operations, the story of which I have set -myself the task of unfolding in these pages.</p> - -<p>The Australian Army Corps had by that time evolved from -a mere geographical organization into one which, over and -above its component Infantry Divisions, had acquired a large -number of accessory arms and services, called Corps Troops, -which formed no part of a Division. It is desirable for the -complete understanding of the battle plans of the offensive period, -to consider the extent and nature of the whole of the fighting -and maintenance resources of the Corps.</p> - -<p>These fell theoretically into two categories, comprising on -the one hand those units properly designated as "Corps Troops," -which possessed a fixed and unalterable constitution, and, on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[11]</a></span> -the other hand, those additional units, known as "Army Troops," -whose number and character fluctuated in accordance with the -varying needs of the situation, and with the requirements of -the various operations.</p> - -<p>These Army Troops, whenever detailed to act under the -orders of the Corps Commander, became an integral part of the -Corps, and were to all intents and purposes Corps Troops, until -such time as they had completed the tasks allotted to them. -The Corps Troops were multifarious in character, and amounted -in the aggregate to large numbers, occasionally exceeding 50,000, -a number as great as that of three additional Divisions, whose -normal strength in the closing phases of the war never exceeded -17,000.</p> - -<p>The Headquarters of the Army Corps comprised upwards of -300 Staff and assistant Staff Officers, clerks, orderlies, draughtsmen, -motor drivers, grooms, batmen, cooks and general helpers. -The Corps Cavalry consisted, in the case of the Australian Army -Corps, of the 13th Regiment of Australian Light Horse, and was -employed, in conjunction with the Australian Cyclist Battalion, -for reconnaissance, escort and dispatch rider duty.</p> - -<p>The Corps Signal Troops were an extensive organization, and -controlled the whole of the Signal communications throughout -the Corps area (except within the Divisions themselves), being -responsible for the establishment, upkeep and working of every -method of communication, whether by telegraph, telephone, -wireless, pigeons, messenger dogs, aeroplane, or dispatch rider. -Apart from telegraphists, mechanics and electrical experts in -considerable numbers, adequate for the very heavy signal -traffic during battle, and even during periods of comparative -quiet, Corps Signals also operated two Motor Air Line and two -Cable Sections, for the laying out and maintenance of wires. -Those within the Corps Area, at any one place and time, -amounted to several hundreds of miles.</p> - -<p>The whole of the Mechanical Transport, consisting of hundreds -of motor lorries, for the collection and distribution of ammunition, -food, forage and ordnance stores of all descriptions, was -also under the direct control of Corps Headquarters. So also<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[12]</a></span> -were some half-dozen mobile Ordnance Workshops, for the -repair of weapons and vehicles of all kinds. All these were permanent -Corps Troops, but represented only a fraction of those -serving under the orders of the Corps Commander.</p> - -<p>Among the Administrative Services there was a large contingent -of the Labour Corps comprising some 20 Companies, for -the construction and maintenance of all roads, and water supply -installations, and for the handling, daily, of a formidable bulk -and weight of Artillery ammunition; also two or more Motor -Ambulance Convoys, for the evacuation of the sick and wounded -out of the Corps area, and a number of Army Troops Companies -of Engineers, as well as two Companies of Australian Tunnellers, -who were usually employed upon the construction and maintenance -of bridges, locks, water transport mechanism, deep -dug-outs and battle stations.</p> - -<p>But the fighting units of the Corps Troops formed by far the -largest proportion, and comprised Artillery, Heavy Trench -Mortars, Air Squadrons and Tanks. The Artillery alone merits -more detailed consideration. It comprised a vast array of -many different classes of guns for many different purposes, and -classified into various categories by reference either to their -calibres, their mobility or their tactical purposes.</p> - -<p>Grouped according to calibre, all guns and howitzers of -4½-inch bore or less were strictly considered as Field Artillery -which, although administered by the Divisions, was almost -invariably fought under the direct orders of the Corps Commander. -All guns and howitzers of greater bore, up to the giant 15-inch, -were known as Heavy and Siege Artillery.</p> - -<p>Regarded from the point of view of mobility, all field guns and -that wonderfully useful weapon, the 60-pounder, were horse-drawn, -the larger ordnance were tractor-drawn, and the very -largest were mounted on railway trains and hauled by steam -locomotive.</p> - -<p>Finally, as regards tactical utilization, some natures of ordnance -were invariably employed for barrage or harassing fire, -others for bombardment, others for counter-battery fighting, and -yet others for anti-aircraft purposes.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[13]</a></span></p> - -<p>The total ordnance under the orders of the Australian Army -Corps naturally fluctuated according to the daily battle requirements, -but amounted at times, during the period of the war -under consideration, to as many as 1,200 guns of all natures and -calibres, grouped in Brigades each of four to six Batteries, each -of four to six guns.</p> - -<p>This very formidable Artillery equipment far transcended -in quantity and dynamic power anything that had been envisaged -in the previous years of the war, or in any previous war, as -possible of administrative or tactical control under a single Commander. -It undoubtedly became a paramount factor in the -victories which the Corps achieved. The Artillery of the Corps -is entitled to the proud boast that it earned the confidence and -gratitude of the Infantry.</p> - -<p>It must be left to the imagination to conceive the complexity -of the task of keeping this enormous mass of Artillery regularly -supplied with its ammunition, of multifarious types and in -adequate quantities of each, of allocating to each Brigade and -even to each Battery its appropriate task in the general plan, -and of advancing the whole organization over half-ruined roads -and broken bridges, in order to keep up with the Infantry as -the battle moved forward from day to day. It would defy a -detailed description intelligible to any but gunnery experts.</p> - -<p>The Air Force had, by the summer of 1918, also achieved -a great development. The numerous Air Squadrons had embarked -upon a policy of specialization in tactical employment, -in accordance with the build and capacities of the aeroplanes -with which they were equipped. Thus gradually the whole -range of utilization became covered, from the small fast single-seater -fighting scout, intended to engage and drive off enemy -'planes, to the slower two-seater reconnaissance machines, -employed chiefly for photography and for the direction of Artillery -fire, and the giant long-distance bombing machines.</p> - -<p>The Australian Corps had at its exclusive disposal at all -times the No. 3 Squadron of the Australian Flying Corps, and -employed the machines for reconnaissance prior to and after -battle, and for contact and counter-attack work and Artillery<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[14]</a></span> -observation during battle. But, whenever the scope of the -operations rendered it necessary, the resources of the Corps in -aircraft were enormously increased, and as many as a dozen -squadrons were on occasions employed, during battle, in low -flying pursuit of enemy infantry and transport, in production of -smoke screens, in bombing, in ammunition carrying, and in -dispatch bearing—over and above usual reconnaissance work -designed to keep Corps and Divisional Headquarters rapidly and -minutely informed, from moment to moment, of the situation of -the Infantry in actual contact with the enemy.</p> - -<p>Another branch of the Air Force activities under the direct -control of the Corps was the Captive Balloon Service. Some five -large captive or kite balloons, carrying trained Artillery Observers, -regularly ascended along the Corps front whenever the -weather and the conditions of visibility permitted, to a height -of from 2,000 to 3,000 feet, and with the aid of powerful telescopes -and of telephone wires woven into the anchoring cables, -kept the Artillery regularly notified of all visible enemy movement, -and of the occurrence of all suitable targets of opportunity, -such as the flashes from enemy guns in action.</p> - -<p>During battle one such balloon was invariably sent up well -forward to observe as closely as possible the progress of the -fighting, but the results were almost uniformly disappointing, -because the smoke and dust of the barrage and the general murk -of battle usually proved impenetrable to the air observer, tied -as he was to a fixed position. The reports of these observers -were usually confined to the laconic observation: "Can't see -much, but all apparently going well."</p> - -<p>The last of the major fighting units of Corps Troops remaining -to be mentioned are the Tanks. These extraordinary products -of the war underwent a remarkable evolution during the -two years which followed their first introduction on the battlefield -in the Somme campaign of 1916. The standard of efficiency -which had been reached by the early summer of 1918, -in the most developed types of these curious monsters, as far outclassed -that of the earlier types in both mechanical and fighting -properties as the modern service rifle compared with the old -Brown Bess of the Peninsular War. The Tank crews had -improved in like proportion, both in skill, enterprise and -adaptability.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_014fp.jpg" width="1200" height="780" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>The Australian Corps Commander—with the Generals of his Staff.</p></div> -</div> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_015fp.jpg" width="1200" height="768" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>The Valley of the Somme—looking East towards Bray, which was then still in enemy hands.</p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[15]</a></span></p> - -<p>Nothing can be more unstinted than the acknowledgment -which the Australian Corps makes of its obligation to the Tank -Corps for its powerful assistance throughout the whole of the great -offensive. Commencing with the battle of Hamel, a large contingent -of Tanks participated in every important "set-piece" -engagement which the Corps undertook. The Tanks were -organized into Brigades, each of three Battalions, each of three -Companies, each of twelve Tanks. During the opening phases, -early in August, the Tank contingent comprised a whole Brigade -of Mark V. Tanks, a Battalion of Mark V. (Star) Tanks, and a -Battalion of fast Armoured Cars; in the later phases, during the -assault on the Hindenburg Line, a second Brigade of Mark V. -Tanks and a Battalion of Whippets also co-operated.</p> - -<p>Such was the formidable array of fighting resources under -the direct orders of the Australian Corps Commander, and, -together with the five Australian Divisions, formed a fighting -organization of great strength and solidarity. It became an -instrument for offensive warfare, as has been said by a high -authority, which for size and power excelled all Corps organizations -which either this or any previous war had produced. It -was an instrument which it was a great responsibility, as also -a great honour, to wield in the task of shattering the still formidable -military power of the enemy. For in the early summer -of 1918, that power appeared to be still unimpaired, and still -capable of inflicting serious reverses upon the Allied cause.</p> - -<p>Early in 1918, owing to the depletion of human material, -the Imperial Divisions were reconstituted by a reduction of their -Infantry Brigades from a four-battalion to a three-battalion -basis, thus reducing the available infantry by twenty-five per -cent. But in this reduction, the Australian Divisions during the -fighting period shared only to a very small extent. In March -the strength of the 15 Brigades of Australian Infantry in the -field was still 60 Battalions. The heavy fighting of March and -April compelled the extinction of 3 Battalions, one each<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[16]</a></span> -respectively in the 9th, 12th and 13th Infantry Brigades; but -the remaining 57 Battalions of Infantry remained intact until -after the close of the actual fighting operations early in October. -The Corps was therefore enabled to maintain an additional -twelve battalions over and above the then prevailing corresponding -Imperial organization.</p> - -<p>It was thus the largest of all Army Corps ever organized, in -this or any other war, by any of the combatants—the largest -both in point of numbers and of military resources of all descriptions, -approaching, and in one case exceeding, a full Army -command.</p> - -<p>But even these great resources and responsibilities were -added to, during the course of the operations, by the allocation, -at successive times, to the Australian Corps of the 17th Imperial -Division, the 32nd Imperial Division and the 27th and 30th -American Divisions. Thus, during the closing days of September, -1918, the Corps numbered a total of nearly 200,000 men, exceeding -more than fourfold the whole of the British troops under the -command of the Duke of Wellington at the Battle of Waterloo.</p> - -<p>Of this total about one-half comprised Australian troops, -the Heavy Artillery and other Army units attached to the Corps -consisting of Imperial troops. The Commanders and Staffs -from June, 1918, until the end consisted almost entirely of -Australian officers, among whom the following were the -senior:</p> - - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left">Corps Commander</td><td align="left">Lieut.-General Sir J. Monash,</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">G.C.M.G., K.C.B., V.D.</span></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Corps Chief-of-Staff</span></td><td align="left">Brigadier-General T. A. Blamey,</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">C.M.G., D.S.O.</span></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Corps Artillery Commander</span></td><td align="left">Brigadier-General W. A. Coxen,</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.</span></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chief Engineer</span></td><td align="left">Brigadier-General C. H. Foott,</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">C.B., C.M.G.</span></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">1st Div. Commander</td><td align="left">Major-General Sir T. W. Glasgow,</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">K.C.B., D.S.O.</span> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[17]</a></span></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">General Staff Officer</span></td><td align="left">Lieut.-Colonel A. M. Ross, C.M.G., D.S.O.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chief Admin. Officer</span></td><td align="left">Lieut.-Colonel H. G. Viney,</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">C.M.G., D.S.O.</span></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">2nd Div. Commander</td><td align="left">Major-General Sir C. Rosenthal,</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.</span></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">General Staff Officer</span></td><td align="left">Lieut.-Colonel C. G. N. Miles,</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">C.M.G., D.S.O.</span></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chief Admin. Officer</span></td><td align="left">Lieut.-Colonel J. M. A. Durrant,</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">C.M.G., D.S.O.</span></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">3rd Div. Commander</td><td align="left">Major-General Sir J. Gellibrand,</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">K.C.B., D.S.O.</span></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">General Staff Officer</span></td><td align="left">Lieut.-Colonel C. H. Jess, C.M.G., D.S.O.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chief Admin. Officer</span></td><td align="left">Lieut.-Colonel R. E. Jackson, D.S.O.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">4th Div. Commander</td><td align="left">Major-General E. G. Sinclair-Maclagan,</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">C.B., D.S.O.</span></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">General Staff Officer</span></td><td align="left">Lieut.-Colonel J. D. Lavarack,</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">C.M.G., D.S.O.</span></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chief Admin. Officer</span></td><td align="left">Lieutenant-Colonel R. Dowse, D.S.O.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">5th Div. Commander</td><td align="left">Major-General Sir J. J. T. Hobbs,</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">K.C.B., K.C.M.G., V.D.</span></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">General Staff Officer</span></td><td align="left">Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Peck, C.M.G., D.S.O.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 2em;">and later</span></td><td align="left">Lieut.-Colonel J. T. McColl, O.B.E., M.C.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chief Admin. Officer</span></td><td align="left">Colonel J. H. Bruche, C.B., C.M.G.</td></tr> -</table></div> - -<p>All the above were Australian Officers, and most of them were -of Australian birth. There were also two senior staff officers -of the Regular Army, Brigadier-General R. A. Carruthers, C.B., -C.M.G., who was Chief of the Administrative Services, and -Brigadier-General L. D. Fraser, C.B., C.M.G., who was in immediate -command of the Heavy Artillery of the Corps.<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> A <i>Division</i> consists of three Infantry Brigades, Divisional Artillery, three -Field Companies of Engineers, three Field Ambulances, a Pioneer Battalion, a -Machine Gun Battalion, together with Supply, Sanitary and Veterinary -Services. Its nominal strength is 20,000. -</p> -<p> -An <i>Infantry Brigade</i> consists of four Infantry Battalions, each of 1,000 men, -and a Light Trench Mortar Battery. -</p> -<p> -Divisional Artillery comprises two Brigades each of four batteries, each of six -guns or howitzers, also one Heavy and three medium Trench Mortar Batteries, -and the Divisional Ammunition Column. -</p> -<p> -This composition of a Division was modified in detail during the course of -the war.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> For grouping of Australian Brigades into Divisions, see Appendix "A."</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[18]</a></span></p> - - - -<h2>CHAPTER I<br /> - -BACK TO THE SOMME</h2> - - -<p>The early days of the year 1918 found the Australian Corps -consisting of the First, Second, Third and Fifth Australian -Divisions, while the Fourth had been transferred far south -to co-operate in the later developments of the Cambrai fighting. -The Corps was then holding, defensively, a sector of the line -in Flanders, which had in the previous years of the war become, -at various times, familiar to all our Divisions, and which extended -from the river Lys at Armentières, northwards, as far as to include -the southern half of the Messines Ridge.</p> - -<p>It was, indeed, that very stretch of country, which in June, -1917, had been captured by our Third Division, in co-operation -with the New Zealanders. Opposite its centre lay the town of -Warneton, still in the hands of the enemy. Excepting for a -small area of undulating ground in the extreme north of the -Corps sector, the country was a forbidding expanse of devastation, -flat and woebegone, with long stretches of the front line -submerged waist deep after every freshet in the river Lys, and -with the greater part of our trench system like nothing but a -series of canals of liquid mud.</p> - -<p>This unsavoury region formed, however, the most obvious -line of approach for an enemy who, debouching from the direction -of Warneton, aimed at the high land between us and the Channel -Ports; so that, tactically useless as were these mud flats, it was -imperative that they should be strongly defended, in order to -protect from capture the important heights of Messines, Kemmel, -Hill 63, Mont des Cats and Cassel.</p> - -<p>During the fighting of the preceding summer and early autumn, -which gave the Australian troops possession of this territory,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[19]</a></span> -the locality was dry, practicable for movement, and reasonably -comfortable for the front line troops. Now it was water-logged, -often ice-bound, bleak and inhospitable. The precious months -of dry weather, between August and October, 1917, had been -allowed to pass without any comprehensive attempt on the part -of those Divisions which had relieved the Second Anzac Corps -after its capture of this ground to perfect the defences of the -newly-conquered territory. At any rate, there was little to -show for any work that may have been attempted.</p> - -<p>Now, in the very depth of the worst season of the year, the -demand came to prepare the region for defence and resistance -to the last; for the threat of a great German offensive in the -opening of the 1918 campaigning season was already beginning -to take shape. It was the Australian Corps which was called -upon to answer that demand. There followed week after week -of heart-breaking labour, much of it necessarily by night, in -draining the flat land, in erecting acre upon acre of wire entanglements, -in constructing hundreds of strong points, and -concrete machine gun emplacements. Trenches had to be dug, -although the sides collapsed unless immediately revetted with -fascines or sheet iron; roads had to be repaired, and vain attempts -were made to provide the trench garrisons with dry and -bearable underground living quarters.</p> - -<p>The monotony of all this labour, which long after—when the -Australians had disappeared from the scene and were again -fighting on the Somme—proved to have been undertaken all in -vain, was relieved only by an occasional raid, undertaken by one -or other of our front line Divisions, for the purpose of molesting -the enemy and gathering information. The Corps front was -held by two Divisions in line, one in support, and one resting -in a back area; the rotation of trench duty gave each Division -about six weeks in the line.</p> - -<p>My own command at that juncture still comprised the Third -Australian Division, which I had organized and trained in -England, eighteen months before. Although this Division had -never been on the Somme, it had seen a great deal of fighting -in Flanders during 1917. During this period, therefore, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[20]</a></span> -until the outbreak of the storm in the last days of March, 1918, -my interest centred chiefly in the doings of the Third Division, -although for a very short period I had the honour of commanding -the Corps during the temporary absence of Sir William -Birdwood.</p> - -<p>The information at our disposal led to the inevitable conclusion -that, during January and February, the enemy was busy -in transferring a great mass of military resources from the -Russian to the Western Front. No one capable of reading the -signs entertained the smallest doubt that he contemplated -taking the offensive, in the spring, on a large scale. The only -questions were, at what point would he strike? and what tactics -would he employ?</p> - -<p>Every responsible Australian Commander, accordingly, during -those months, applied himself diligently to these problems, -formulated his doctrines of obstinate defence, and of the defensive -offensive; and saw to it that his troops received such precognition -in these matters as was possible at such a time and in -such an environment. The principles of defence in successive -zones, of the rapid development of Infantry and Artillery fire -power, of the correct distribution of machine guns, of rearguard -tactics, and questions of the best equipment for long marches -and rapid movement were debated and resolved upon, in both -official and unofficial conferences of officers.</p> - -<p>All this discussion bore good fruit. Among the possible rôles -which the Australian Divisions might be called upon to fill, -when the great issue was joined, were those which involved these -very matters. And so the event proved; and the Australians -then approached their new and unfamiliar tasks, not wholly -unprepared by training and study for the difficulties involved.</p> - -<p>It was on March 8th that the Third Division bade a last but -by no means a regretful farewell to the mud of Flanders and -Belgium—regions which it had inhabited almost continuously for -the preceding sixteen months. The Division moved back for -a well-earned rest, to a pleasant countryside at Nielles-lez-Blequin, -not far from Boulogne. It was lying there, enjoying<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[21]</a></span> -the first signs of dawning spring when, on March 21st, the -curtain was rung up for a great drama, in which the Australian -troops were destined to play no subordinate part.</p> - -<p>There followed many weeks of crowded and strenuous days, -and the story of this time must, of necessity, assume the form -of a personal narrative. Events followed one upon the other -so rapidly, and the centre of interest changed so quickly from -place to place and from hour to hour, that no recital except that -of the future historian writing with a wealth of collected material -at his disposal, could take upon itself any other guise than that -of a record of individual experience.</p> - -<p>The Germans attacked the front of the Fifth British Army on -March 21st. The information which was at the disposal of our -High Command was not of such a nature that the promulgation -of it would have been calculated to elevate the spirits of the -Army; consequently Divisions situated as we were, in Reserve, -and, for the time being, entirely out of the picture, had to depend -for our news partly upon rumour, which was always unreliable, -and partly upon severely censored communiqués, framed so as -to allay public anxiety. Nothing definite emerged from such -sources, except that things were going ill and that fighting was -taking place on ground far behind what had been our front line -near St. Quentin. This hint was enough to justify the expectation -that my Division would not be left for long unemployed; -and on the same day, March 21st, instructions were issued for all -units to prepare for a move, to dump unessential baggage, to fill -up all mobile supplies, and to stand by in readiness to march at -a few hours' notice.</p> - -<p>Orders came to move on March 22nd. The Division was to -move <i>east</i>, that is, back into Flanders, and not south to the Somme -Valley, as all had hoped. The prescribed move duly started, but -by March 24th had been arrested, for orders had come to cancel -the move and await fresh orders. Advanced parties, for billeting -duty, were to proceed next morning by motor lorry to Doullens, -and there await orders. Later came detailed instructions that -the Division was to be transferred from the Australian Corps to -the Tenth Corps, which latter was to be G.H.Q. Reserve, and that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[22]</a></span> -the whole Division was to be moved the next night to the Doullens<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> -area, the dismounted troops by rail, and the Artillery and other -mounted units by route-march.</p> - -<p>It was evident that the plans of the High Command were the -subject of rapid changes, in sympathy, probably, with fluctuations -in the situation, which were not ascertainable by me. There -followed a night and day of strenuous activity, during which -arrangements were completed to entrain the three Infantry -Brigades and the Pioneers at three different railway stations, to -start off the whole of the mounted units on their long march by -road, and to ensure that all fighting troops were properly equipped -with munitions, food and water, all ready for immediate employment. -It was well that my Staff responded capably to the heavy -demands made upon them, and that all this preparatory work was -efficiently done.</p> - -<p>The entrainments commenced at midnight on the 25th and -continued all night. At break of day on the 26th, after assuring -myself that everyone was correctly on the move, I proceeded -south by motor-car, in the endeavour to find the Tenth Corps Headquarters, -and to report to them for orders. My fruitless search -of that forenoon revealed to me the first glimpse of the true reason -for that far-reaching disorganization and confusion which -confronted me during the next twenty-four hours.</p> - -<p>Over three years of trench warfare had accustomed the whole -Army to fixed locations for all Headquarters, and to settled -routes and lines of inter-communication. The powerful German -onslaught and the recoil of a broad section of our fighting front -had suddenly disturbed the whole of this complex organization. -The Headquarters of Brigades, Divisions, and even Corps, ceased -to have fixed locations where they could be found, or assured lines -of telegraph or telephone communications, by which they could -be reached. Everything was in a state of flux, and the process -of getting into personal contact with each other suddenly took -responsible leaders hours where it had previously taken minutes.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[23]</a></span></p> -<p>In its broad result, this disorganization affected most seriously -the retiring troops, by depriving them of the advantages of -rapidly disseminated orders for properly co-ordinated action by a -large number of Corps and Divisions withdrawing side by side. The -consequence was, I am convinced, that the recoil—which may have -been inevitable at first by reason of the intensity of the German -attack, and because the defensive organization of the Fifth Army -had been unduly attenuated—was allowed to extend over a much -greater distance, and to continue for longer, in point of time, than -ought to have been the case.</p> - -<p>Between Albert and St. Quentin there were in existence several -lines of defence, which by reason of their topographical features, -or the existence of trenches and entanglements, were eminently -suitable for making a stand. Yet no stand was made, at any rate -on a broad front, because there was no co-ordination in the -spasmodic attempts to do so. I subsequently learned of more -than one instance where Brigades of Infantry or of Artillery found -themselves perfectly well able to hold on, but were compelled to -a continued retirement by the melting away of the units on their -flanks.</p> - -<p>I sought the Tenth Corps at Hautcloque, where they were to -be. They were not there. I proceeded to Frevent, where they -were said to have been the night before. They had already left. -In despair, I proceeded to Doullens, resolved at least to ensure -the orderly detrainment of my Division and their quartering for -the following night, and there to await further orders. A despatch -rider was sent off to G.H.Q. to report my whereabouts, and the -fact that I was without orders.</p> - -<p>Arriving at Doullens, I tumbled into a scene of indescribable -confusion. The population were preparing to evacuate the -town <i>en masse</i>, and an exhausted and hungry soldiery was pouring -into the town from the east and south-east, with excited tales that -the German cavalry was on their heels. Influenced by the -persistency of these reports, I determined to make, immediately, -dispositions to cover the detrainment of my troops, so that some -show of resistance could be made.</p> - -<p>In the midst of all this stress and anxiety, I was favoured by a -run of good luck. Within half an hour of my reaching Doullens,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[24]</a></span> -the first of my railway trains arrived, bringing Brigadier-General -Rosenthal and a battalion of the 9th Brigade, sufficient troops, -at any rate, to furnish a strong outpost line for covering the eastern -approaches of Doullens, while the remainder of the Brigade should -arrive. These arrangements made, I motored to Mondicourt, -where almost immediately afterwards a train arrived, bringing -Brigadier-General McNicoll and the first battalion of the 10th -Brigade.</p> - -<p>There also arrived, almost simultaneously, that rumour with -the ridiculous <i>dénouement</i>, that German armoured motor-cars -were approaching along the road from Albert and were within -three miles of that point. Those Armoured Cars proved ultimately -to be a train of French agricultural implements which a -wheezy and rumbling traction engine was doing its best to salve. -McNicoll likewise received orders to put out a line of outposts -to cover Mondicourt railway station.</p> - -<p>At this point, too, endless streams of dust-begrimed soldiers -were straggling westwards. McNicoll collected many hundreds -of them, and did not omit, by very direct methods, to prevail -upon all of them who had not yet lost their rifles and essential -equipment, to call a halt and join his own troops in the defensive -dispositions which he was making.</p> - -<p>My next business was to select a suitable central point at which -to establish my Headquarters, preferably where I could find a -still intact telephone service. Again by good luck I found a -most suitable location in a small château at Couturelle, whose -owner hospitably provided a much needed meal.</p> - -<p>It was there, soon after my arrival, that I learned of the -presence in the neighbourhood of Major-General Maclagan; -this news, implying as it did the presence also of some at least of -the Fourth Australian Division, was a gleam of sunshine in an -otherwise gloomy prospect. Report said that he was at Basseux, -and thither I proceeded, in order to arrange, by personal conference -with him, some plan for co-ordinated action.</p> - -<p>Basseux rests on the main road from Doullens to Arras, which -lies roughly parallel to the line along which, as subsequently -transpired, the vanguard of the enemy was endeavouring to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[25]</a></span> -advance at that part of the front. That main road I found packed, -for the whole of the length which I had to traverse, with a steadily -retreating collection of heterogeneous units, service vehicles and -guns of all imaginable types and sizes, intermingled with hundreds -of civilian refugees, and farm waggons, carts, trollies and barrows -packed high with pathetic loads of household effects. The retrograde -movement was orderly and methodical enough, and there -was nothing in the nature of a rout, but it was nevertheless a -determined movement to the rear which evidenced nothing but a -desire to keep moving.</p> - -<p>I found Maclagan at about four o'clock. His Division had -already been on the move, by bus and route march, for three days -without rest. The position to the east and south-east of him -was obscure, and he also had posted a line of outposts in the -supposed direction of the enemy, and was arranging to despatch -his 4th Brigade to Hebuterne (which the enemy was reported to -have entered), with orders to recapture that town. That the -enemy was not very far away became evident from the fact that -the vicinity of the hut in which we were conferring presently -came under desultory long-range shell-fire.</p> - -<p>There was nothing to be done except to arrange jointly to keep -up an effective and as far as possible continuous line of outposts -towards the south-east, and to await developments. Having -made these arrangements I returned along the same crowded -road, which was now also being leisurely shelled by the enemy, to -Couturelle. There I found that the principal officers of my Staff -had arrived.</p> - -<p>Thereupon orders were issued for the concentration, after -detrainment, of my three Brigades in the following areas, each -with due outpost precautions, viz.: 9th Brigade at Pas, 10th -Brigade at Authie, and 11th Brigade at Couin. My Artillery was -still distant a full day's march by road.</p> - -<p>About nine o'clock that evening I received, by telephone, my -first order from the Tenth Corps. It ran as follows: "A Staff -Officer has left some time ago on his way to you, carrying instructions -for you to report personally at once to Corbie for orders. -We have since heard that you are to go to Montigny instead."</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[26]</a></span></p> - -<p>It was nearly an hour before the Staff Officer arrived, having -been delayed on the road by congestion of traffic. The instructions -he carried transferred my Division from the Tenth to the -Seventh Corps, to whom I was to report personally, without delay, -at Corbie. It was evident from the later telephone message that -the Seventh Corps had been compelled to withdraw from Corbie, -and was proceeding to Montigny.</p> - -<p>This was the second stroke of good luck that day; for if the -telephone message above recited had not overtaken the Staff -Officer, it is quite probable that I should have already started -for a wrong destination, and have had to waste valuable time at a -most critical juncture. Had I failed to find General Congreve, -the Seventh Corps Commander, <i>that same night</i>, it is almost -certain that my Division would have arrived on the Somme too -late to prevent the capture of Amiens.</p> - -<p>Setting out from Couturelle shortly after ten o'clock that night, -accompanied by four of my Staff and two despatch-riders, with -two motor-cars and two motor cycles, in black darkness, on unfamiliar -roads congested with refugee traffic, I did not reach Montigny -until after midnight. I found General Congreve in the -corner of a bare salon of stately proportions, in a deserted -château by the roadside, seated with his Chief of Staff at a small -table, and examining a map by the flickering light of a candle. -The rest of the château was in darkness, but heaps of hastily -dumped Staff baggage impeded all the corridors.</p> - -<p>General Congreve was brief and to the point. What he said -amounted to this: "At four o'clock to-day my Corps was holding -a line from Albert to Bray, when the line gave way. The enemy -is now pushing westwards and if not stopped to-morrow will -certainly secure all the heights overlooking Amiens. What you -must try and do is to get your Division deployed across his path. -The valleys of the Ancre and the Somme offer good points for -your flanks to rest upon. You must, of course, get as far east as -you can, but I know of a good line of old trenches, which I believe -are still in good condition, running from Méricourt-l'Abbé towards -Sailly-le-Sec. Occupy them, if you can't get further east."</p> - -<p>At that juncture General Maclagan arrived and received<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[27]</a></span> -similar crisp orders to bring his Division into a position of support -on the high land in the bend of the Ancre to the west of Albert. -I gleaned further that the Seventh Corps was now the south flank -Corps of the Third Army, and that as the Fifth Army, south of -the Somme, had practically melted away, while the French were -retiring south-westerly and leaving an hourly increasing gap -between their north flank and the Somme, General Byng had -resolved to make every effort not only to maintain the flank of -his Third Army on the Somme, but also to prevent it being turned -from the south, while the Commander-in-Chief was taking other -measures to attempt next day to fill the gap above alluded to.</p> - -<p>It was already 1 a.m. of March 27th, and I had left my Division -twenty miles away. Everything depended now on quick decision -and faultless executive action. It was fortunate that a telephone -line to G.H.Q. had been found in good working order, and that -the services of three large motor bus convoys could be arranged -for to proceed at once to the Doullens area, in order to transport -my Infantry during the night to the place appointed. I worked -with my Staff till nearly break of day, considering and settling -all detailed arrangements, and we then separated in various -directions to our appointed tasks.</p> - -<p>I proceeded myself a little after dawn, with one Staff Officer, -to Franvillers, which had been decided upon as the point for -leaving the buses. There was yet no sign of any Australian -troops, and the village was being hastily evacuated by the terror-stricken -inhabitants. But there were ample and visible signs, -far away on the high plateau beyond the Ancre Valley, that the -German line of skirmishers was already on the move, slowly -driving back the few troops of British Cavalry who were, most -valiantly, trying to delay their advance.</p> - -<p>The next hour was one of intense suspense and expectancy; -but my anxiety was relieved when there rolled into the village -from the north, a motor bus convoy of thirty vehicles, crowded -with good staunch Australian Infantry of the 11th Brigade, and -bringing also Brigadier-General Cannan and some of his Brigade -Staff. It was not the first time in the war that the London motor-bus—after -abandoning the population of the great metropolis<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[28]</a></span> -to enforced pedestrianism—had helped to save a most critical -situation.</p> - -<p>Almost immediately after, there arrived McNicoll, with a -battalion of his 10th Brigade. Hour after hour a steady stream -of omnibus convoys came in. No time was lost in assembling -the troops, and in directing the Infantry—company after company—down -the steep, winding road to the little village of Heilly, and -thence across the Ancre, to deploy on the selected line of defence -indicated in the orders above recited.</p> - -<p>The spectacle of that Infantry will be ever memorable to me, -as one of the most inspiring sights of the whole war. Here was -the Third Division—the "new chum" Division, which, in spite -of its great successes in Belgium and Flanders, had never been -able to boast, like its sister Divisions, that it had been "down on -the Somme"—come into its own at last, and called upon to prove -its mettle. And then there was the thought that they were going -to measure themselves, man to man, against an enemy who, -skulking behind his field works, had for so long pounded them to -pieces in their trenches, poisoned them with gas, and bombed -them as they slept in their billets.</p> - -<p>That, at any rate, was the point of view of the private soldier, -and no one who saw those battalions, in spite of the fatigue of -two sleepless nights, marching on that crisp, clear spring morning, -with head erect and the swing and precision of a Royal review -parade, could doubt that not a man of them would flinch from -any assault that was likely to fall upon them. Nor was there a -man who did not fully grasp that upon him and his comrades -was about to fall the whole responsibility of frustrating the -German attempt to capture Amiens and separate the Allied -Armies.</p> - -<p>By midday, the situation was already well in hand, and by -four o'clock I was able to report to the Seventh Corps that no less -than six Battalions were already deployed, astride of the -triangle formed by the Ancre and the Somme, on the line Méricourt—Sailly-le-Sec, -distributed in a series of "localities" -defended by rifles and Lewis guns. As yet no Artillery was available.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[29]</a></span></p> - -<p>The 11th Brigade occupied this line to the south of the main -road from Corbie to Bray, the 10th Brigade continued it to the -north of the road, while the 9th Brigade was leaving the buses -and assembling in the neighbourhood of Heilly.</p> - -<p>So far, the pressure of the enemy upon my front had not been -serious. It was obvious that he had, as yet, very little Artillery -at his disposal. We had not, however, found our front totally -devoid of defenders. During the forenoon, a few troops of our -cavalry, and a force under Brigadier-General Cummings, comprising -about 1,500 mixed infantry, the remnants of a large -number of different units of the Third Army, were slowly withdrawing -under pressure from the advancing German patrols. -These valiant "die-hards," deserving of the greatest praise in -comparison with the many thousands of their comrades who -had withdrawn from any further attempt to stem the onflowing -tide, were now ordered to retire through my outpost line, thus -leaving the Australian Infantry at last face to face with the -enemy.</p> - -<p>These dispositions were completed only in the nick of time. All -that afternoon the enemy appeared over the sky-line in front of -us, both in lines of skirmishers and in numerous small patrols, -endeavouring to work forward in the folds of the ground, and to -sneak towards us in the gullies. But all of them were received -with well directed rifle fire and the enemy suffered many losses. -Towards nightfall the attempts to continue his advance died away.</p> - -<p>That was, literally, the end of the great German advance in -this part of the field, and although, as will be told later, the enemy -renewed the attempt on several subsequent occasions to reach -Amiens, he gained not a single inch of ground, but, on the contrary, -was compelled in front of us to undertake a slow but steady -retrograde movement.</p> - -<p>Our reconnoitring patrols discovered, however, that the enemy -already had possession of the village of Sailly-Laurette, and of -Marett and Treux Woods, but that he was not yet in great -strength on the crest of the plateau. Orders were issued to perfect -the organization of our defensive line, put out wire entanglements, -dig-in machine guns, and rest the troops in relays during<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[30]</a></span> -the coming night, but not to attempt any forward movement -until the next night.</p> - -<p>My Artillery and other mounted units were still half a day's -march away; but Brigadier-General Grimwade, their Commander, -had been instructed to push on in advance, with the -whole of the Commanders of his Brigades and Batteries. They -arrived on the scene in sufficient time to enable the whole situation -to be examined in the daylight, and for detailed action to -be decided upon. The Artillery kept coming in during the whole -of the following night, and although men and horses were almost -exhausted after two days of forced marching, their spirits were -never higher. Next morning found the guns already in action, -and engaging all bodies of the enemy who dared to expose themselves -to view.</p> - -<p>I must now turn to the Fourth Australian Division. They -had been less fortunate in several respects. Maclagan was -directed to leave behind his 4th Brigade, which had on the -26th speedily become committed to important operations under -the 62nd Division in front of Hebuterne, from which village this -Brigade had driven the enemy. This left him with only two -Brigades, the 12th and 13th. He was faced with the obligation -of bringing his already over-tired infantry, by route march, down -from the Basseux area, to the high ground west and south-west of -Albert. That town had fallen and the situation there had, by the -26th, also become very critical.</p> - -<p>This march was, however, accomplished in strict accordance -with orders, and was a remarkable feat of endurance by the -troops of the 12th and 13th Brigades. There can be no doubt, -however, that the effort was more than justified, for the mere -presence, in a position of readiness, of these two Australian -Brigades, did much to steady the situation opposite Albert, by -heartening the line troops and stimulating their Commanders -to hang on for a little longer. It was this last effort which -brought to a standstill the German advance north of the Ancre, -as the entry of the Third Division had stopped that to the south -of that river.</p> - -<p>After his two Brigades had had only four hours' rest, Maclagan<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[31]</a></span> -took over, with them, the control of the fighting front, opposite -Dernancourt and Albert, which the Seventh Corps had allotted -to him.</p> - -<p>Thus, by the night of the 27th, as the result of the rapid movements -which I have described and the ready response of the -troops, there was already in position the nucleus of a stout defence -by five Australian Brigades, stretching almost continuously from -Hebuterne to the Somme, while another Australian Brigade, the -9th, remained still uncommitted.</p> - -<p>But the situation south of the Somme gave cause for the -gravest anxiety. The north flank of the French was hourly -retiring in a south-westerly direction, and the ever widening gap -was filled only by a scratch force of odd units supported and -assisted by a few elements of the First Cavalry Division. The -right flank of our Third Army, therefore, lay exposed to the danger -of being turned, if the enemy should succeed in pressing his -advantage as far west as Corbie, and in crossing the river at or -west of that town.</p> - -<p>It was for this reason that, after a conference with General -Congreve, late in the day, I decided to deploy my 9th Brigade -along the Somme from Sailly-le-Sec westward as far as Aubigny,<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>—far -too extended a front for one Brigade, but at least an effort -to dispute the passage by the enemy of the existing bridges and -lock-gates over the Somme.</p> - -<p>The two following days were full of toil and hard travelling -in establishing touch with Divisional Headquarters to the north -and south of me, in arranging for co-ordinated action with them, -and in gleaning all possible information as to the situation, and -as to the number and condition of other troops available in an -emergency.</p> - -<p>It was an especial pleasure for the Australian troops to find -themselves fighting in these days in close association with famous -British Cavalry Regiments, and that these feelings were reciprocated -may be gathered from the following letter from Major-General -Mullens, who commanded the First Cavalry Division, -which was devoting its energies to covering the gap between the -Somme and the French flank:</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[32]</a></span></p> -<blockquote> - -<p>"<span class="smcap">My dear Monash</span>,</p> - -<p>"I was hoping to have come to see you, when the -battle allowed, to thank you, your Artillery Commander, -and your Brigadiers who were alongside of my Division, -for your most valuable and encouraging support and assistance, -especially on the 30th March, when we had a hard -fight to keep the Bosche out of our position. I was very -much struck by the courtesy of yourself and your officers -in coming to see me personally, and for your own and their -keen desire to do everything in their power to help. As -you know, we had a curious collection of units to deal with, -and it was a very real relief to know that I had your stout-hearted -fellows on my left flank and that all worry was -therefore eliminated as to the safety of my flanks. Your -order for the placing of your heavy guns and batteries so as -to cover my front was of very real assistance, and incidentally -they killed a lot of Huns, and what they did was much -appreciated by us all. Will you convey to all concerned my -own appreciation, and that of all ranks of the 1st Cavalry -Division. It was a pleasure and an honour to be fighting -alongside troops who displayed such magnificent <i>moral</i>. -I only hope we may have the chance of co-operating with you -again, and under more favourable circumstances.</p> - -<div class="right"> -"Yours sincerely,<br /> -(Sgnd.) "<span class="smcap">R. L. Mullens</span>."<br /> -</div> -</blockquote> - -<p>On the night of March 29th I advanced my line, pivotting on my -right, until my left rested on the Ancre east of Buire, an extreme -advance of over 2,000 yards, meeting some opposition and taking -a few prisoners. This deprived the enemy of over a mile of -valuable vantage ground on the crest of the plateau along which -ran the main road from Corbie to Bray.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/map-a.jpg" width="1200" height="906" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">Map A.</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[33]</a></span></p> - -<p>By that time it was apparent that the enemy's Artillery -resources were hourly accumulating, and on the next afternoon -he delivered a determined attack along my whole front, employing -two Divisions. The attack was completely repelled, with an -estimated loss to the enemy of at least 3,000 killed. My Artillery -were firing over open sights and had never in their previous -experience had such tempting targets.</p> - -<p>On the previous day, however, the situation between the Somme -and Villers-Bretonneux, and still further to the south, had become -desperate; and much to my discomfiture I was ordered to hand -over my 9th Brigade (Rosenthal) for duty with the 61st Division, -in order to reinforce that dissolving sector. My importunity -as to the necessity for maintaining the defence of my river flank, -however, led the Seventh Corps Commander to let me have, in -exchange, the 15th Brigade (Elliott), which was the first Brigade -of the Fifth Australian Division to arrive from Flanders on the -present scene of operations. This interchange of Brigades was -completed by the 30th.</p> - -<p>That day was further marked by a concentrated bombardment -of the village of Franvillers, in which I had established my -Headquarters. Although no serious loss was suffered, the responsible -work of my Staff was disturbed. On reporting the -occurrence to General Congreve, he insisted upon my moving -my Headquarters back to St. Gratien, which move was completed -the next day.</p> - -<p>On April 4th the enemy attacked, in force, south of the Somme, -and the village of Hamel was lost to us by the rout of the remnants -of a very exhausted British Division which had been sent -in the night before to defend it. This success gave the enemy -a footing upon a portion of Hill 104, and brought him to the eastern -outskirts of Villers-Bretonneux. Three months later it cost the -Australian Corps a concentrated effort to compel him to surrender -these advantages.</p> - -<p>One last and final attempt to break through the Australian -phalanx north of the Somme was made by the enemy on April 5th. -The full weight of this blow fell chiefly upon the gallant Fourth -Australian Division. The battle of Dernancourt will live long -in the annals of military history as an example of dogged and -successful defence. The whole day long the enemy expended<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[34]</a></span> -Division after Division in the vain endeavour to compel two weak -Australian Brigades to loosen their hold on the important high -ground lying west of Albert. He well knew that the capture by -him of these heights involved the inevitable withdrawal of the -Third Australian Division also, and that thereby the path to -Amiens would again lie open.</p> - -<p>The great German blow against the important railway centre -of Amiens had been parried, and from this time onwards interest -in this sphere of operations rapidly waned. It blazed up again -for a few hours only when, three weeks later, the enemy made -his final attempt to reach his goal, on this occasion by way of -Villers-Bretonneux. North of the Somme, his activity quickly -died down, and the attitude of both combatants gradually assumed -the old familiar aspect of trench warfare, with its endless digging -of trenches, line behind line, its weary trench routine, and its -elaborate installation of permanent lines of communication and -of administrative establishments of all descriptions.</p> - -<p>South of the Somme, the Fifth Australian Division came into -the line on April 5th, relieving a Cavalry Division on a frontage -of about 5,000 yards, and thereby obviating any further -necessity for the maintenance of my flank river defence. This -duty had been performed for me in succession by the 15th -Australian, the 104th Imperial and the 13th Australian Brigades -(the latter then under Glasgow). My 9th Brigade still remained -detached from me, operating under both the 18th and 61st British -Divisions, and performed prodigies of valorous fighting in a -series of desperate local attacks and counter-attacks, which took -place between Villers-Bretonneux and Hangard, where the -French northern flank then lay. In this service the 9th Brigade -received gallant co-operation from the 5th Australian Brigade -(of the 2nd Australian Division), which was now also arriving -in this area, after having been relieved from trench garrison duty -in the Messines—Warneton sector in Flanders.</p> - -<p>The Fifth Division and these two detached Brigades were, -during this period, serving under the Third Corps (Butler), -which had been reconstituted to fill the gap between the Somme -and the flank of the French Army. The First Australian Division<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[35]</a></span> -was already well on the way to follow the Second Division, when, -on April 11th, it was hurriedly re-transferred to Flanders to assist -in stemming the new German flood which was inundating the -whole of that region, and which was not arrested until it had -almost reached Hazebrouck. This task the First Australian -Division performed most valiantly, thereby upholding the reputation -already earned by its younger sister Divisions for a capacity -for rapid, ordered movement and decisive intervention at a -critical juncture.</p> - -<p>For some days there had been rumours that the Australian -Corps Headquarters would shortly be transferred to the Amiens -area, and would once again gather under its control the numerous -elements of the four Australian Divisions which were by now -widely scattered, and had been fighting under the orders of three -different Army Corps. There was the still more interesting and -pregnant rumour that General Lord Rawlinson—relinquishing -his post of British representative on the Supreme War Council -at Versailles—was soon to arrive and to form and command a -reconstituted Fourth British Army,<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> which was to be composed -of the Australian and the Third (British) Army Corps.</p> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> The majority of the place-names mentioned in the remainder of this chapter -will be found on Maps A or J.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Two miles west of Corbie.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> The Fourth Army had disappeared when, in 1917, General Rawlinson went -to Versailles. The Fifth Army was not revived until June, 1918.</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[36]</a></span></p> - - -<h2>CHAPTER II<br /> - -THE DEFENCE OF AMIENS</h2> - - -<p>The Australian Corps Headquarters, under General Birdwood, -commenced its activities at Villers-Bocage on -April 7th, but soon after removed to the handsome seventeenth-century -Château at Bertangles, with its pleasant grounds and -spacious parks. One by one the detached Australian Brigades -rejoined their Divisions, and the Divisions themselves came back -under the orders of their own Corps.</p> - -<p>The comparative calm which had supervened upon all the -excitement of the closing days of March and the first weeks of -April was rudely broken when, before daybreak on April 24th, -the enemy began a furious bombardment of the whole region -extending from opposite Albert to a point as far south as Hangard. -It was certain that this demonstration was the prelude -of an infantry attack in force, but it was not until well after midday -that the situation clarified, and it became known that the -attack had been confined to the country south of the Somme, that -it had struck the southern flank of the Fifth Australian Division, -which had stood firm and had thereby saved the loss of the -remainder of the tactically important Hill 104. But the town of -Villers-Bretonneux, lying beyond the Australian sector, had -fallen and the Germans were in possession of it.</p> - -<p>It was imperative to retrieve this situation, or at least -to make an attempt to do so. The nearest available reserve -Brigades of Infantry were Australian, the 13th under Glasgow, -and the 15th under Elliott. They were placed under the orders -of the Third Corps, and by them directed to recapture the town.</p> - -<p>Both Brigades had to make long marches to reach the battleground. -It was already dark before they had deployed on the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[37]</a></span> -appointed lines of departure. The details of this enthralling and -wonderful night attack form too lengthy a story to find a place -in this brief narrative; suffice it to say that when the sun rose on -the third Anniversary of Anzac Day, it looked down upon the -Australians in full possession of the whole town, and standing -upon our original lines of twenty-four hours before, with nearly -1,000 German prisoners to their credit.</p> - -<p>In this summary fashion, the last German attempt to split -in two the Allied Armies failed ignominiously, and the attempt -was never again renewed.</p> - -<p>A comprehensive rearrangement of the whole Front in this -much-contested region then took place. The appointment of -Marshal Foch as Supreme Commander on the Western Front -bore, as one of its first fruits, a clear decision as to the final point -of junction between the French and the British Armies. This -was fixed just south of Villers-Bretonneux, and not at the Somme -Valley, as was thought desirable by some of the British Commanders.</p> - -<p>The new Fourth Army became the flank British Army in -contact with the French. The Australian Corps became the -south flank of that Army. Its sector extended, from the point -named, northwards as far as the Ancre. The Third Corps was -transferred to the north of the Ancre, opposite Albert, and those -two Corps comprised, for some time to come, the whole of the -Fourth Army resources.</p> - -<p>The Australian Corps now organized its front with three Divisions -in line and one in reserve. My occupation, with the Third -Australian Division, of the original sector between the Ancre -and the Somme remained undisturbed, and my front line remained -for a time stationary on the alignment gained on March 29th.</p> - -<p>But the Third Division had had enough of stationary warfare, -and the troops were athirst for adventure. They were tired of -raids, which meant a mere incursion into enemy territory, and a -subsequent withdrawal, after doing as much damage as possible.</p> - -<p>Accordingly, I resolved to embark upon a series of minor battles, -designed not merely to capture prisoners and machine guns, but -also to hold on to the ground gained. This would invite counter-attacks<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[38]</a></span> -which I knew could only enhance the balance in our favour, -and would seriously disorganize the enemy's whole defensive -system, while wearing out his nerves and lowering the <i>moral</i> -of his troops.</p> - -<p>Four such miniature battles<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> were fought in rapid succession, -on April 30th and May 3rd, 6th and 7th, by the 9th and 10th -Brigades, who were then in line. These yielded most satisfactory -results. Not only did we capture several hundred prisoners and -numerous machine guns, but also advanced our whole line an -average total distance of a mile. This deprived the enemy of -valuable observation, and forced back his whole Artillery organization.</p> - -<p>But these combats, and the numerous offensive patrol operations, -which were also nightly undertaken along my whole -front, did a great deal more. They yielded a constant stream -of prisoners, who at this stage of the war had become sufficiently -demoralized by their disappointments to talk freely, and impart -a mass of valuable information as to movements and conditions -behind the German lines.</p> - -<p>The following list of 41 separate identifications, covering -a total of over 300 prisoners, represents the fruits of these efforts -during the period from March 27th to May 11th. From these it -will be seen that during these six weeks I had been confronted by -no less than six different German Divisions:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="right"><i>No.</i></td><td align="center"><i>Date.</i></td><td align="center" colspan="4"><i>Identification.</i></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">1</td><td align="center">28.3.18</td><td align="right">3</td><td align="left">Gren. R.</td><td align="right">1st</td><td align="center">Div.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">2</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">13</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">13</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">3</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">3</td><td align="left">Gren. R.</td><td align="right">1st</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">4</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">1</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">1st</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">13</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">13</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">5</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">86</td><td align="left">Fus. R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">6</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">1</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">1st</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">7</td><td align="center">30.3.18</td><td align="right">13</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">13</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">8</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">31</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">9</td><td align="center">31.3.18</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="left">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">10</td><td align="center">1.4.18</td><td align="right">20</td><td align="left">Foot Arty.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">11</td><td align="center">2.4.18</td><td align="right">3</td><td align="left">"</td><td align="right">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">12</td><td align="center">2/3.4.18</td><td align="right">1</td><td align="left" colspan="3">R.R.Bav. Ft. Arty.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">13</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">13</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">13</td><td align="center">Div.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[39]</a></span></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">14</td><td align="center">4/5.4.18</td><td align="right">1</td><td align="left">M.W.Coy.</td><td align="right">1st</td><td align="center">Div.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">15</td><td align="center">6/7.4.18</td><td align="right">3</td><td align="left">Jäger Bn.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">16</td><td align="center">9/10.4.18</td><td align="right">31</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">17</td><td align="center">11/12.4.18</td><td align="right">31</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">13/14.4.18</td><td align="right">86</td><td align="left">Fus. R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">19</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">31</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">20</td><td align="center">14/15.4.18</td><td align="right">85</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">21</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">31</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">22</td><td align="center">17/18.4.18</td><td align="right">229</td><td align="left">R.I.R.</td><td align="right">30</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">23</td><td align="center">18/19.4.18</td><td align="right">231</td><td align="left">R.I.R.</td><td align="right">50</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">24</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">85</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">25</td><td align="center">19/20.4.18</td><td align="right">85</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">26</td><td align="center">25/26.4.18</td><td align="right">246</td><td align="left">R.I.R.</td><td align="right">54</td><td align="center">Res. Div.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">27</td><td align="center">27/28.4.18</td><td align="right">229</td><td align="left">R.I.R.</td><td align="right">50</td><td align="center">" "</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">28</td><td align="center">28/29.4.18</td><td align="right">247</td><td align="left">R.I.R.</td><td align="right">54</td><td align="center">" "</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">29</td><td align="center">30/1.5.18</td><td align="right">247</td><td align="left">R.I.R.</td><td align="right">54</td><td align="center">" "</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">30</td><td align="center">3/4.5.18</td><td align="right">357</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">199</td><td align="center">Div.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">31</td><td align="center">4/5.5.18</td><td align="right">114</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">199</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">32</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">31</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">33</td><td align="center">5/6.5.18</td><td align="right">237</td><td align="left">R.I.R.</td><td align="right">199</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">34</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">114</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">199</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">35</td><td align="center">6/7.5.18</td><td align="right">237</td><td align="left">R.I.R.</td><td align="right">199</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">36</td><td align="center">7/8.5.18</td><td align="right">114</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">199</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">37</td><td align="center">8/9.5.18</td><td align="right">114</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">199</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">38</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">237</td><td align="left">R.I.R.</td><td align="right">199</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">39</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">31</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">18</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">40</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">357</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right">199</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">41</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right"> 357</td><td align="left">I.R.</td><td align="right"> 199</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left" colspan="6">I.R.=Infantry Regiment; R.I.R.=Reserve ditto.</td></tr> -</table></div> - -<p>While I was thus exerting a steady pressure on the enemy -and gaining ground easterly, the Australian Corps line south of -the Somme remained stationary, and each successive advance -north of the river served only to accentuate the deep re-entrant -which had been formed on the day when the loss of Hamel forced -the British front line back along the Somme as far as Vaire-sous-Corbie.</p> - -<p>While this was not very serious from the point of view of -observation, because I was in possession of much the higher -ground, and was able to look down, almost as upon a map, on to -the enemy in the Hamel basin, yet I was beginning to feel very -seriously the inconvenience of having, square on to my flank, such -excellent concealed Artillery positions as Vaire and Hamel Woods, -which the enemy did not long delay in occupying.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[40]</a></span></p> -<p>Moreover, the whole of the slopes of the valley on my side of -the river remained useless to me, because they were exposed to -the full view of the enemy, so long as he was permitted to occupy -the Hamel salient, which he had on April 5th driven into the very -middle of what was now the Corps front. I therefore made more -than one attempt to persuade the then Corps Commander to -undertake an operation for the elimination in whole or in part of -this inconvenient bend, but, for reasons doubtless satisfactory -at that time, he declined to accept the suggestion. It fell to my -lot myself to carry out this operation nearly two months later.</p> - -<p>The Third Division was, however, relieved in the line by our -Second Division on May 11th, and was withdrawn for a short -but well-earned rest after six weeks of trench duty, following -its first fateful rush into the thick of the battle.</p> - -<p>It was on May 12th that I received the first intimation from -General Sir William Birdwood that he was to be appointed to -the command of a new Fifth Army, which the British War Council -had decided to form, and that, upon his taking up these new -duties, the task of leading the Australian Army Corps would -devolve upon me.</p> - -<p>In consequence of this and other changes, it was shortly -afterwards decided, in consultation, that Glasgow should take -over the command of the First Division, then still fighting at -Hazebrouck, that Rosenthal should command the Second -Division, and that Gellibrand should succeed me at the head of -the Third Division.</p> - -<p>Far, therefore, from being permitted a little respite from the -strenuous labours of the preceding six weeks, I found myself -confronted with responsibilities which, in point of numbers -alone, exceeded sixfold those which I had previously had to bear, -but which, in point of difficulty, involved an even higher ratio.</p> - -<p>There were numerous Arms and Services, under the Corps, -with whose detailed functions and methods of operation I had not -been previously concerned. The other Divisional Commanders -had hitherto been my colleagues, and I was now called upon to -consider their personalities and temperaments as my subordinates. -There was a vastly increased territory for whose administration -and defence I would become responsible. I had to be -prepared to enter an atmosphere of policy higher and larger than -that which surrounded me as the Commander of a Division. And -finally there was the selection of my new Staff.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_040fp.jpg" width="1200" height="798" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>German Prisoners—taken by the Corps at Hamel, being marched to the rear.</p></div> -</div> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_041fp.jpg" width="1200" height="770" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>Visit of Monsieur Clemenceau—group taken at Bussy on July 7th, 1918.</p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[41]</a></span></p> - -<p>My last executive work with the Third Division was the process -of putting this Division back into the line, this time in the Villers-Bretonneux -sector of our front. After handing over the Division -and all its outstanding current affairs to Major-General Gellibrand, -I assumed command of the Australian Army Corps on -May 30th, with Brigadier-General Blamey as my Chief-of-Staff.<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p> - -<p>I very soon became aware that, as Corps Commander, I was -privileged to have access to a very large body of interesting -secret information, which was methodically distributed daily by -G.H.Q. Intelligence. This comprised detailed information of -the true facts of all happenings on the fronts of all the Allies, -the gist of the reports of our Secret Service, and very full particulars -from which the nature and distribution of the enemy's military -resources could be deduced with fair accuracy.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[42]</a></span></p> -<p>The numberings and locations of all his Corps and Divisions -actually in the front line, on all the Allied fronts, was, of course, -quite definitely known from day to day. The numberings of all -Formations lying in Reserve were known with equal certainty, -although their actual positions on any date were largely a matter -of deduction by expert investigators. Of particular importance -were the further deductions which could be drawn as to the -condition of readiness or exhaustion of such reserve Divisions, -from known facts as to their successive appearance and experiences -on any active battle front.</p> - -<p>Our experts were thus able to classify the enemy Divisions, -and to determine from day to day the probable number, and -even the probable numberings, of fit Divisions actually available -(after one, or after two, or after three days) to reinforce any portion -of the front which was to be the object of an attack by us. -They could also compute the number of fit Divisions which the -enemy had at his disposal at any time for launching an offensive -against us.</p> - -<p>All such data had a very direct bearing, not only on the probable -course of the campaign in the immediate future, but also -upon the responsibility which always weighed upon a Corps -Commander of keeping his own sector in preparedness to meet an -attack or to prevent such an attack from coming upon him as a -surprise. He must therefore be alert to watch the signs and -astute to read them aright.</p> - -<p>One striking feature of the information at our disposal during -the early part of June was the steady melting away of the enemy -reserves as the consequence of his resultless, even if locally successful, -assaults during the preceding two and a half months, -against Amiens, in Flanders, and on the Chemin des Dames. -But it was apparent that he still held formidable Reserves of -Infantry, and a practically intact Artillery, which he was bound -to employ for at least one great and final effort to gain a decision.</p> - -<p>The junction of the French and British Armies still offered a -tempting point of weakness. As mine was now the flank British -Corps, in immediate contact with General Toulorge's 31st French -Corps, I could not afford to relax any of the precautions of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[43]</a></span> -vigilance or preparation which had been initiated by my -predecessor for meeting such an attack. Consequently, during -June, 1918, I ordered on the part of all my line Divisions a -maintenance of their energetic efforts to perfect the defensive -organizations. I also undertook out of other Corps labour -resources the development of further substantial rear systems of -defence, so that Amiens need not, in the event of a renewed -attack, be abandoned to its fate without a prolonged struggle.</p> - -<p>The First Australian Division was not yet a part of my new Command, -its continued presence in the Hazebrouck and Merris area, -under the Fifteenth Corps, being still considered indispensable. -My Corps front now extended over a total length of ten miles, -and I had but four Divisions at my disposal to defend it. Three -Divisions held the line, one to the north and two to the south of -the Somme. Only one Division at a time could therefore be -permitted a short rest, and this Division formed my only tactical -reserve.</p> - -<p>All this added to the anxieties of the situation, and focussed -the energies of the whole command on a constant scrutiny of all -signs and symptoms that the enemy might be preparing to -deliver his next blow against us. Active patrolling was maintained -and continued to yield a steady stream of prisoners. A -well conceived and planned minor enterprise by the Second -Division, which was carried out on June 10th, and was Rosenthal's -first Divisional operation, gave us possession of a further -slice of the important ridge between Sailly-Laurette and Morlancourt. -It gained us 330 prisoners and 33 machine guns. But -no sign of any preparations on the part of the enemy for an attack -upon us, in this zone, emerged from the careful investigations -which followed this operation.</p> - -<p>The days passed and evidences increased that the enemy -was now beginning to devote his further attentions to the French -front far to the south of us. At any rate, he continued to leave -us unmolested, and the interrogations of our numerous prisoners -all confirmed the absence of any preparations for an attack.</p> - -<p>The defensive attitude which the situation thus forced upon -us did not for long suit the present temper of the Australian<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[44]</a></span> -troops, and I sought for a promising enterprise on which again to -test their offensive power, on a scale larger than we had yet -attempted in the year's campaign. There had been no Allied -offensive, of any appreciable size, on any of our fronts, in any of -the many theatres of war, since the close of the Passchendaele -fighting in the autumn of 1917.</p> - -<p>It was high time that the anxiety and nervousness of the -public, at the sinister encroachments of the enemy upon regions -which he had never previously trodden, should be allayed by a -demonstration that there was still some kick left in the British -Army. It was high time, too, that some Commanders on our -side of No Man's Land should begin to "think offensively," and -cease to look over their shoulders in order to estimate how far -it still was to the coast.</p> - -<p>I was ambitious that any such kick should be administered, -first, at any rate, by the Australians. A visit which I was -privileged to pay to General Elles, Commander of the Tank Corps, -when he gave me a demonstration of the capacities of the newer -types of Tanks, only confirmed me in this ambition. Finally, -the Hamel re-entrant had for two months been, as I have already -explained, a source of annoyance and anxiety to me. It was for -these reasons that I resolved to propose an operation for the recapture -of Hamel, conditional upon being supplied with the -assistance of Tanks, a small increase of my Artillery and an addition -to my air resources.</p> - -<p>I thereupon set about preparing a general plan for such a battle, -which was to be my first Corps operation. Having mentioned the -matter first verbally to Lord Rawlinson, he requested me to -submit a concrete proposal in writing. The communication is -here reproduced, and will serve to convey an idea of the complexities -involved in even so relatively small an undertaking:</p> - -<blockquote> -<div class="right"> -Australian Corps.<br /> -21st June, 1918.<br /> -</div> - -<p><i>Fourth Army.</i></p> - -<div class="center">HAMEL OFFENSIVE</div> - -<p>1. With reference to my proposal for an offensive operation -on the front of the "A" and "B" Divisions of this -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[45]</a></span>Corps, with a view to the capture of <span class="smcap">Hamel</span> Village and -<span class="smcap">Vaire</span> and <span class="smcap">Hamel Wood</span>, etc., the accompanying map -shows, in blue, the proposed ultimate objective line. This -line has been chosen as representing the minimum operation -that would appear to be worth undertaking, while offering -a prospect of substantial advantages.</p> - -<p>2. These advantages may be briefly summarized thus:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(a) Straightening of our line.</p> - -<p>(b) Shortening of our line.</p> - -<p>(c) Deepening our forward defensive zone, particularly -east of Hill 104.</p> - -<p>(d) Improvement of jumping-off position for future -operations.</p> - -<p>(e) Advancement of our artillery, south of the <span class="smcap">Somme</span>.</p> - -<p>(f) Denial to enemy of observation of ground near -<span class="smcap">Vaux-sur-Somme</span>, valuable for battery positions.</p> - -<p>(g) Facilitating subsequent further minor advances -north of the <span class="smcap">Somme</span>.</p> - -<p>(h) Disorganization of enemy defences.</p> - -<p>(i) Disorganization of possible enemy offensive preparations.</p> - -<p>(j) Inflicting losses on enemy personnel and material.</p> - -<p>(k) Improvement of our observation.</p> - -<p>(l) Maintenance of our initiative on this Corps front.</p></blockquote> - -<p>3. The disadvantages are those arising from the necessity -of bringing into rapid existence a new defensive system on -a frontage of 7,000 yards and also the particular incidence, -at the present juncture, of the inevitable losses, small or -large, of such an operation in this Corps.</p> - -<p>4. In view of the unsatisfactory position of Australian -reinforcements, any substantial losses would precipitate the -time when the question of the reduction in the number of -Australian Divisions would have to be seriously considered. -It is for higher authority to decide whether a portion of the -present resources in Australian man-power in this Corps -would be more profitably ventured upon such an operation -as this, which is in itself a very attractive proposition, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[46]</a></span>rather than to conserve such resources for employment -elsewhere.</p> - -<p>5. Detailed plans can only be prepared after I have -had conferences with representatives of all Arms and Services -involved, but the following proposals are submitted -as the basis of further elaboration:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(a) The operation will be primarily a Tank operation—at -least one and preferably two Battalions of -Tanks to be employed.</p> - -<p>(b) The whole battle front will be placed temporarily -under command of one Divisional Commander—by -a temporary readjustment of inter-Divisional -boundaries.</p> - -<p>(c) The infantry employed will comprise one Division -plus a Brigade, <i>i.e.</i>, 4 Infantry Brigades, totalling, -say, 7,500 bayonets; about one-half of this force -to be employed in the advance and the other half -to hold our present front defensively, taking over -the captured territory within 48 hours after -Zero.<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p> - -<p>(d) The action will be designed on lines to permit of -the Tanks effecting the capture of the ground; -the rôles of the Infantry following the Tanks -will be:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(i) to assist in reducing strong points and localities.</p> - -<p>(ii) to "mop up."</p> - -<p>(iii) to consolidate the ground captured.</p></blockquote> - -<p>(e) Apart from neutralizing all enemy artillery likely -to engage our troops, our artillery will be employed -to keep under fire enemy centres of resistance and -selected targets—in front of the advance of the -Tanks. Artillery detailed for close targets will -work on a prearranged and detailed time-table -which will be adjusted to the time-table of the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[47]</a></span>Tank and Infantry advance. Sufficient "silent" -field artillery supplied before the battle should -be emplaced in advanced positions, to ensure an -effective protective barrage to cover consolidation -on the blue line,<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> and to engage all localities -from which enemy counter-attacks can be -launched. It is estimated that, in addition to -the resources of the Corps, four Field Artillery -Brigades will be required for, say, four days in all.</p> - -<p>(f) Engineer stores in sufficient quantities to provide -for the complete organization of the new defences -will require to be dumped beforehand as far forward -as practicable.</p> - -<p>(g) No additional machine guns, outside of Corps -resources, will be required,</p> - -<p>(h) Contact and counter-attack planes and low-flying -bombing planes prior to and during advance -must be arranged for.</p> - -<p>(i) Artillery and mortar smoke to screen the operations -from view of all ground north of the Somme -in the <span class="smcap">Sailly-Laurette</span> locality are required.</p></blockquote> - -<p>6. As to the date of the operations, the necessary preparations -will occupy at least seven days after authority -to proceed has been given. As an inter-Divisional relief -is planned to occur on June 28th-29th and 29th-30th, it would -seem that this operation cannot take place earlier than the -first week in July. The postponement of this relief would -not be desirable for several reasons.</p> - -<p>7. Valuable training in the joint action of Tanks and -Infantry can be arranged, probably in the territory west of -the <span class="smcap">Hallue</span> Valley—provided that one or two Tank Companies -can be detached for such a purpose. Thorough -liaison prior to and during the operation between all Tank -and all Infantry Commanders would have to be a special -feature. For this reason only Infantry units not in the line -can be considered as available to undergo the necessary -preparation.</p> - -<div class="right"> -(Sgd.) <span class="smcap">John Monash</span>,<br /> -Lieut.-General.<br /> -Cmdg. Australian Corps.<br /> -</div> -</blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[48]</a></span></p> - -<p>Approval to these proposals was given without delay; the -additional resources were promised, and preparations for the -battle were immediately put in hand. As I hope, in a later -context, to attempt to describe the evolution of a battle plan, -and the comprehensive measures which are associated with such -an enterprise, it will not be necessary to do so here.</p> - -<p>It was the straightening of the Corps front, as an essential -preliminary to any offensive operations on a still larger scale, -to be undertaken when the opportune moment should arrive, -that made the Hamel proposal tactically attractive; it was the -availability of an improved type of Tank that gave it promise of -success, without pledging important resources, or risking serious -losses.</p> - -<p>The new Mark V. Tank had not previously been employed in -battle. It marked a great advance upon the earlier types. The -epicyclic gearing with which it was now furnished, the greater -power of its engines, the improved balance of its whole design -gave it increased mobility, facility in turning and immunity from -foundering in ground even of the most broken and uneven character. -It could be driven and steered by one man, where it previously -took four; and it rarely suffered suspended animation -from engine trouble.</p> - -<p>But, above all, the men of the Tank Corps had, by the training -which they had undergone, and by the spirited leadership of -Generals Elles, Courage, Hankey and other Tank Commanders, -achieved a higher standard of skill, enterprise and moral; they -were now, more than ever, on their mettle to uphold the prestige -of the Tank Corps.</p> - -<p>All the same, the Tanks had become anathema to the Australian -troops. For, at Bullecourt more than a year before, -they had failed badly, and had "let down" the gallant Infantry,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[49]</a></span> -who suffered heavily in consequence; a failure due partly to the -mechanical defects of the Tanks of those days, partly to the -inexperience of the crews, and partly to indifferent staff arrangements, -in the co-ordination of the combined action of the Infantry -and the Tanks.</p> - -<p>It was not an easy problem to restore to the Australian soldier -his lost confidence, or to teach him the sympathetic dependence -upon the due performance by the Tanks of the rôles to be allotted -to them, which was essential to a complete utilization of the possibilities -which were now opening up. That the Tanks, appropriately -utilized, were destined to exert a paramount influence -upon the course of the war, was apparent to those who could -envisage the future.</p> - -<p>This problem was intensified because the battalions of the -Fourth Division who were to carry out the Infantry tasks at -Hamel were the very units who had undergone that unfortunate -experience at Bullecourt. But, on the principle of restoring the -nerves of the unseated rider by remounting him to continue the -hunt, it was especially important to wean the Fourth Division -from their prejudices.</p> - -<p>Battalion after battalion of the 4th, 6th and 11th Brigades of -Infantry was brought by bus to Vaux, a little village tucked away -in a quiet valley, north-west of Amiens, there to spend the day at -play with the Tanks. The Tanks kept open house, and, in the -intervals of more formal rehearsals of tactical schemes of attack, -the Infantry were taken over the field for "joy rides," were -allowed to clamber all over the monsters, inside and out, and even -to help to drive them and put them through their paces. -Platoon and Company leaders met dozens of Tank officers face -to face, and they argued each other to a standstill upon every -aspect that arose.</p> - -<p>Set-piece manœuvre exercises on the scale of a battalion were -designed and rehearsed over and over again; red flags marked -enemy machine-gun posts; real wire entanglements were laid -out to show how easily the Tanks could mow them down; real -trenches were dug for the Tanks to leap and straddle and search -with fire; real rifle grenades were fired by the Infantry to indicate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[50]</a></span> -to the Tanks the enemy strong points which were molesting -and impeding their advance. The Tanks would throw themselves -upon these places, and, pirouetting round and round, would blot -them out, much as a man's heel would crush a scorpion.</p> - -<p>It was invaluable as mere training for battle, but the effect -upon the spirits of the men was remarkable. The fame of the -Tanks, and all the wonderful things they could do, spread rapidly -throughout the Corps. The "digger" took the Tank to his -heart, and ever after, each Tank was given a pet name by the -Company of Infantry which it served in battle, a name which was -kept chalked on its iron sides, together with a panegyric commentary -upon its prowess.</p> - -<p>There remained, however, much to be arranged, and many -difficult questions to be settled, as regards the tactical employment -of the Tanks. I can never be sufficiently grateful to -Brigadier-General Courage, of the 5th Tank Brigade, for his -diligent assistance, and for his loyal acceptance of the onerous -conditions which the tactical methods that I finally decided -upon imposed upon the Tanks.</p> - -<p>These methods involved two entirely new principles. Firstly, -each Tank was, for tactical purposes, to be treated as an Infantry -weapon; from the moment that it entered the battle -until the objective had been gained it was to be under the -exclusive orders of the Infantry Commander to whom it had been -assigned.</p> - -<p>Secondly, the deployed line of Tanks was to advance, <i>level -with the Infantry</i>, and pressing close up to the barrage. This, -of course, subjected the Tanks, which towered high above the -heads of the neighbouring infantry, to the danger of being -struck by any of our own shells which happened to fall a little -short. Tank experts, consulted beforehand, considered therefore -that it was not practicable for Tanks to follow close behind -an artillery barrage. The battle of Hamel proved that it was.</p> - - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> See Map A.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> A farewell order to the Third Division was issued in the following terms: -</p> -<p> -"As I am about to take up other duties the time has come when I must relinquish -the command of the Division. -</p> -<p> -"Closely associated with you as I have been, since the days of your first -assembly and War Training in <span class="smcap">England</span>, and, later, throughout all your magnificent -work during the past nineteen months in the war zone, it is naturally -a severe wrench for me to part from you. -</p> -<p> -"I find it quite impossible to give adequate expression to my feelings of -gratitude towards all ranks for the splendid and loyal support which you have, -at all times, accorded to me. I am deeply indebted to my Staff, to all Commanders -and to the officers and troops of all Arms and Services for a whole-hearted -co-operation upon which, more than upon any other factor, the success -of the Division has depended. -</p> -<p> -"It is my earnest hope, and also my sincere conviction, that the fine spirit -and the high efficiency of the Division will be maintained under the leadership -of my successor, Brigadier-General Gellibrand; and if the men of the Division -feel, as I trust they do, an obligation to perpetuate for my sake the traditions -built up by them during the period of my command, they can do so in no better -way than by rendering to him a service as thorough and a support as loyal -as I have been privileged to enjoy at their hands. -</p> -<p> -"In formally wishing the Division good-bye and good luck, I wish simply, -but none the less sincerely, to thank each and all of you, for all that you have -done. -</p> -<div class="right"> -"(Signed) <span class="smcap">John Monash</span>,<br /> -Major-General."<br /> -</div> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> "Zero" refers to the day and hour, not yet determined, on which the battle -is to begin.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> "Blue Line," arbitrarily so called, because this line was drawn on the -accompanying map in blue. It was to be the final objective for the day.</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[51]</a></span></p> - -<h2>CHAPTER III<br /> - -HAMEL</h2> - - -<p>The larger questions relating to the employment of the -Tanks at the battle of Hamel having been disposed of, -the remaining arrangements for the battle presented few novel -aspects. Their manner of execution, however, brought into -prominence some features which became fundamental doctrines -in the Australian Corps then and thereafter.</p> - -<p>Although complete written orders were invariably prepared and -issued by a General Staff whose skill and industry left nothing -to be desired, very great importance was attached to the holding -of conferences, at which were assembled every one of the Senior -Commanders and heads of Departments concerned in the impending -operation. At these I personally explained every detail of -the plan, and assured myself that all present applied an identical -interpretation to all orders that had been issued.</p> - -<p>Questions were invited; difficulties were cleared up; and the -conflicting views of the different services on matters of technical -detail were ventilated. The points brought to an issue were -invariably decided on the spot. The battle plan having been -thus crystallized, no subsequent alterations were permissible, -under any circumstances, no matter how tempting. This fixity -of plan engendered a confidence throughout the whole command -which facilitated the work of every Commander and Staff Officer. -It obviated the vicious habit of postponing action until the last -possible moment, lest counter orders should necessitate some -alternative action. It was a powerful factor in the gaining of -time, usually all too short for the extensive preparations -necessary.</p> - -<p>The final Corps Conference for the battle of Hamel was held at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[52]</a></span> -Bertangles on June 30th, and the date of the battle itself was -fixed for July 4th. This selection was prompted partly by the -desire to allow ample time for the completion of all arrangements; -but there were also sentimental grounds, because this -was the anniversary of the American national holiday, and a -considerable contingent of the United States Army was to co-operate -in the fight.</p> - -<p>For some weeks previously the 33rd American Division, -under Major-General John Bell, had been training in the Fourth -Army area, and its several regiments had been distributed, for -training and trench experience, to the Australian and the III. -Corps. I had applied to the Fourth Army and had received -approval to employ in the battle a contingent equivalent in -strength to two British battalions, or a total of about 2,000 -men, organized in eight companies. The very proper condition -was attached, however, that these Americans should not be split -up and scattered individually among the Australians, but should -fight at least as complete platoons, under their own platoon -leaders.</p> - -<p>All went well until three days before the appointed date, when -General Rawlinson conveyed to me the instruction that, the -matter having been reconsidered, only 1,000 Americans were to -be used. Strongly averse, as I was, from embarrassing the -Infantry plans of General Maclagan, to whom I had entrusted the -conduct of the actual assault, it was not then too late to rearrange -the distribution.</p> - -<p>The four companies of United States troops who, under this -decision, had to be withdrawn were loud in their lamentations, -but the remaining four companies were distributed by platoons -among the troops of the three Australian Brigades who were -to carry out the attack—each American platoon being assigned a -definite place in the line of battle. The dispositions of the main -body of Australian infantry were based upon this arrangement.</p> - -<p>In the meantime, somewhere in the upper realms of high control, -a discussion must have been going on as to the propriety of -after all allowing any American troops at all to participate in the -forthcoming operations. Whether the objections were founded<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[53]</a></span> -upon policy, or upon an under-estimate of the fitness of these -troops for offensive fighting, I have never been able to ascertain; -but, to my consternation, I received about four o'clock on the -afternoon of July 3rd, a telephone message from Lord Rawlinson -to the effect that it had now been decided that <i>no</i> American troops -were to be used the next day.</p> - -<p>I was, at the moment, while on my daily round of visits to -Divisions and Brigades, at the Headquarters of the Third -Division, at Glisy, and far from my own station. I could only -request that the Army Commander might be so good as to come -at once to the forward area and meet me at Bussy-les-Daours, -the Headquarters of Maclagan—he being the Commander immediately -affected by this proposed change of plan. In due course -we all met at five o'clock, Rawlinson being accompanied by -Montgomery, his Chief-of-Staff.</p> - -<p>It was a meeting full of tense situations—and of grave import. -At that moment of time, the whole of the Infantry destined for -the assault at dawn next morning, including those very Americans, -was already well on its way to its battle stations; the Artillery -was in the act of dissolving its defensive organization with a view -to moving forward into its battle emplacements as soon as dusk -should fall; I well knew that even if orders could still with -certainty reach the battalions concerned, the withdrawal of those -Americans would result in untold confusion and in dangerous -gaps in our line of battle.</p> - -<p>Even had I been ready to risk the success of the battle by going -ahead without them, I could not afford to take the further risk -of the occurrence of something in the nature of an "international -incident" between the troops concerned, whose respective points -of view about the resulting situation could be readily surmised. -So I resolved to take a firm stand and press my views as strongly -as I dared; for even a Corps Commander must use circumspection -when presuming to argue with an Army Commander.</p> - -<p>However, disguised in the best diplomatic language that I -was able to command, my representations amounted to this: -firstly, that it was already too late to carry out the order; -secondly, that the battle would have to go on either with the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[54]</a></span> -Americans participating, or not at all; thirdly, that unless I -were expressly ordered to abandon the battle, I intended to go on -as originally planned; and lastly, that unless I received such a -cancellation order before 6.30 p.m. it would in any case be too -late to stop the battle, the preliminary phases of which were just -on the point of beginning.</p> - -<p>As always, Lord Rawlinson's charming and sympathetic -personality made it easy to lay my whole case before him. He -was good enough to say that while he entirely agreed with me, -he felt himself bound by the terms of a clear order from the -Commander-in-Chief. My last resource, then, was to urge the -argument that I felt perfectly sure that the Commander-in-Chief -when giving such an order could not have had present to -his mind the probability that compliance with it meant the -abandonment of the battle, and that, under the circumstances, -it was competent for the senior Commander on the spot to act -in the light of the situation as known to him, even to the extent -of disobeying an order.</p> - -<p>Rawlinson agreed that this view was correct provided the -Commander-in-Chief was not accessible for reference. Repeated -attempts to raise General Headquarters from Bussy eventually -elicited the information that the Field Marshal was then actually -on his way from Versailles, and expected to arrive in half an -hour. Thereupon Rawlinson promised a decision by 6.30, and -we separated to rejoin our respective Headquarters.</p> - -<p>In due course, the Army Commander telephoned that he had -succeeded in speaking to the Field Marshal, who explained that -he had directed the withdrawal of the Americans in deference -to the wish of General Pershing, but that, as matters stood, he -now wished everything to go on as originally planned. And so—the -crisis passed as suddenly as it had appeared. For, to me -it had taken the form of a very serious crisis, feeling confident -as I did of the success of the forthcoming battle, and of the far-reaching -consequences which would be certain to follow. It -appeared to me at the time that great issues had hung for an -hour or so upon the chance of my being able to carry my point.</p> - -<p>An interesting episode, intimately bound up with the story<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[55]</a></span> -of this battle, was the visit to the Corps area on July 2nd of the -Prime Minister of the Commonwealth, Mr. W. M. Hughes, and -Sir Joseph Cook, the Minister of the Navy. They arrived all -unconscious of the impending enterprise, but only by taking -them fully into my confidence could I justify my evident preoccupation -with other business of first-class importance. Most -readily, however, did they accommodate themselves to the -exigencies of the situation.</p> - -<p>Both Ministers accompanied me that afternoon on a tour of -inspection of the eight battalions who were then already parading -in full battle array, and on the point of moving off to the assembly -positions from which next day they would march into battle. -The stirring addresses delivered to the men by both Ministers -did much to hearten and stimulate them. As they were on -their way to an Inter-Allied War Council at Versailles, the personal -contact of the Ministers with the actual battle preparations -had the subsequent result of focussing upon the outcome of -the battle a good deal of interest on the part of the whole War -Council.</p> - -<p>The fixing of the exact moment for the opening of a battle -has always been the subject of much controversy. As in many -other matters, it becomes in the end the responsibility of one -man to make the fatal decision. The Australians always -favoured the break of day, as this gave them the protection of -the hours of darkness for the assembly of the assaulting troops -in battle order in our front trenches. But there must be at -least sufficient light to see one's way for two hundred yards or -so, otherwise direction is lost and confusion ensues.</p> - -<p>The season of the year, the presence and altitude of the moon, -the prospect of fog or ground mist, the state of the weather, -and the nature and condition of the ground are all factors which -affect the proper choice of the correct moment. To aid a decision, -careful observations were usually made on three or four mornings -preceding the chosen day. A new factor on this occasion was -the strong appeal by the Tanks for an extra five minutes of -dawning light, to ensure a true line of approach upon the allotted -objective, whether a ruined village, or a thicket, or a field work.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[56]</a></span></p> - -<p>The decision actually given by me was that "Zero" would -be ten minutes past three, and every watch had been carefully -synchronized to the second, to ensure simultaneous action. -A perfected modern battle plan is like nothing so much as a -score for an orchestral composition, where the various arms and -units are the instruments, and the tasks they perform are their -respective musical phrases. Every individual unit must make -its entry precisely at the proper moment, and play its phrase -in the general harmony. The whole programme is controlled -by an exact time-table, to which every infantryman, every -heavy or light gun, every mortar and machine gun, every tank -and aeroplane must respond with punctuality; otherwise there -will be discords which will impair the success of the operation, -and increase the cost of it.</p> - -<p>The morning of July 4th was ushered in with a heavy ground -mist. This impeded observation and made guidance difficult, -but it greatly enhanced the surprise. The unexpected occurrence -of this fog lessened the importance of the elaborate care which -had been taken to introduce into the Artillery barrage a due -percentage of smoke shell, and to form smoke screens by the use -of mortars on the flanks of the attack. But the fog largely -accounted for the cheap price at which the victory was bought.</p> - -<p>No battle within my previous experience, not even Messines, -passed off so smoothly, so exactly to time-table, or was so free -from any kind of hitch. It was all over in ninety-three minutes. -It was the perfection of team work. It attained all its objectives; -and it yielded great results. The actual assault was -delivered, from right to left, by two battalions of the 6th Brigade, -three battalions of the 4th Brigade, and three battalions of the -11th Brigade. It was also part of the plan that advantage was -taken by a battalion of the 15th Brigade to snatch from the -enemy another slice of territory far away in the Ancre Valley, -opposite Dernancourt, and so, by extending the battle front, -further to distract him.</p> - -<p>The attack was a complete surprise, and swept without check -across the whole of the doomed territory. Vaire and Hamel -Woods fell to the 4th Brigade, while the 11th Brigade, with its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[57]</a></span> -allotted Tanks, speedily mastered Hamel Village itself. The -selected objective line was reached in the times prescribed for -its various parts, and was speedily consolidated. It gave us -possession of the whole of the Hamel Valley, and landed us on -the forward or eastern slope of the last ridge, from which the -enemy had been able to overlook any of the country held by us.</p> - -<p>Still more important results were that we gathered in no less -than 1,500 prisoners, and killed and disabled at least as many -more, besides taking a great deal of booty, including two field -guns, 26 mortars and 171 machine guns—at a cost to us of less -than 800 casualties of all kinds, the great majority of whom were -walking wounded. The Tanks fulfilled every expectation, and -the suitability of the tactics employed was fully demonstrated. -Of the 60 Tanks utilized, only 3 were disabled, and even these -3 were taken back to their rallying points under their own power -the very next night. Their moral effect was also proved, and, -with the exception of a few enemy machine-gun teams, who -bravely stood their ground to the very last, most of the enemy -encountered by the Tanks readily surrendered.</p> - -<p>Shortly after the battle, G.H.Q. paid the Australian Corps -the compliment of publishing to the whole British Army a General -Staff brochure,<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> containing the complete text of the orders, and -a full and detailed description of the whole of the battle plans -and preparations, with an official commentary upon them. The -last paragraph of this document, which follows, expresses tersely -the conclusions reached by our High Command:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"81. The success of the attack was due:</p> - -<p>(a) To the care and skill as regards every detail with -which the plan was drawn up by the Corps, -Division, Brigade and Battalion Staffs.</p> - -<p>(b) The excellent co-operation between the infantry, -machine gunners, artillery, tanks and R.A.F.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[58]</a></span></p> -<p>(c) The complete surprise of the enemy, resulting -from the manner in which the operation had -been kept secret up till zero hour.</p> - -<p>(d) The precautions which were taken and successfully -carried out by which no warning was given to -the enemy by any previous activity which was -not normal.</p> - -<p>(e) The effective counter-battery work and accurate -barrage.</p> - -<p>(f) The skill and dash with which the tanks were -handled, and the care taken over details in bringing -them up to the starting line.</p> - -<p>(g) Last, but most important of all, the skill, determination -and fine fighting spirit of the infantry -carrying out the attack."</p></blockquote> - -<p>Of the extent to which the tactical principles, and the methods -of preparation which had been employed at Hamel, came to be -utilized by other Corps in the later fighting of 1918 no reliable -record is yet available to me. But within the Corps itself this -comparatively small operation became the model for all enterprises -of a similar character, which it afterwards fell to the lot -of the Corps to carry out.</p> - -<p>The operation was a small one, however, only by contrast with -the events which followed, although not in comparison with -some of the major operations which had preceded it—by reference -to the number of troops engaged, although not to the extent of -territory or booty captured. Although only eight Battalions -(or the equivalent of less than one Division) were committed -in the actual assault, the territory recovered was more than four -times that which was, in the pitched battles of 1917, customarily -allotted as an objective to a single Division. The number of -prisoners in relation to our own casualties was also far higher -than had been the experience of previous years. Both of these -new standards which had thus been set up may be regarded as -flowing directly from the employment of the Tanks.</p> - -<p>Among other aspects of this battle which are worthy of -mention is the fact that it was the first occasion in the war that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[59]</a></span> -the American troops fought in an offensive battle. The contingent -of them who joined us acquitted themselves most gallantly -and were ever after received by the Australians as blood brothers—a -fraternity which operated to great mutual advantage nearly -three months later.</p> - -<p>This was the first occasion, also, on which the experiment was -made of using aeroplanes for the purpose of carrying and delivering -small-arms ammunition. The "consolidation" of a newly-captured -territory implies, in its broadest sense, its organization -for defence against recapture. For such a purpose the most -rapidly realizable expedient had been found to be the placing of -a predetermined number of machine guns in previously chosen -positions, arranged chequer-wise over the captured ground. -According to such a plan, suitable localities were selected by -an examination of the map and a specified number of Vickers -machine-gun crews were specially told off for the duty of making, -during the battle, by the most direct route, to the selected -localities, there promptly digging in, and preparing to deal with -any attempt on the part of the enemy to press a counter-attack.</p> - -<p>The main difficulty affecting the use of machine guns is the -maintenance for them of a regular and adequate supply of ammunition. -Heretofore this function had to be performed by infantry -ammunition carrying parties. It required two men to carry -one ammunition box, holding a thousand rounds, which a machine -gun in action could easily expend in less than five minutes. -Those carrying parties had to travel probably not less than -two to three miles in the double journey across the open, exposed -both to view and fire. Casualties among ammunition carriers -were always substantial.</p> - -<p>It was therefore decided to attempt the distribution of this -class of ammunition by aeroplane. Most of the machines of -the Corps Squadron were fitted with bomb racks and releasing -levers. It required no great ingenuity to adapt this gear for -the carrying by each plane of two boxes of ammunition simultaneously, -and to arrange for its release, by hand lever, at the -appropriate time. It remained to determine, by experiment, -the correct size and mode of attachment for a parachute for each<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[60]</a></span> -box of ammunition, so that the box would descend from the air -slowly, and reach the ground without severe impact.</p> - -<p>It was Captain Wackett, of the Australian Flying Corps, who -perfected these ideas, and who trained the pilots to put them -into practice. Each machine-gun crew, upon reaching its -appointed locality, spread upon the ground a large V-shaped -canvas (V representing the word "Vickers") as an intimation -to the air of their whereabouts, and that they needed ammunition. -After a very little training, the air-pilots were able to -drop this ammunition from a height of at least 1,000 feet to well -within 100 yards of the appointed spot. In this way, at least -100,000 rounds of ammunition were successfully distributed -during this battle, with obvious economy in lives and wounds. -The method thus initiated became general during later months.</p> - -<p>The Corps also put into practice, on this occasion, a stratagem -which had frequently on a smaller scale been employed in connection -with trench raids. Our Artillery was supplied with -many different types of projectile, but among them were both -gas shell and smoke shell. The latter were designed to create -a very palpable smoke cloud, to be employed for the purpose of -screening an assault, but were otherwise harmless. The former -burst, on the other hand, with very little evolution of smoke, -but with a pronounced and easily recognized smell, and their -gas was very deadly.</p> - -<p>My practice was, therefore, during the ordinary harassing fire -in periods between offensive activities, always to fire both classes -of shell <i>together</i>, so that the enemy became accustomed to the -belief at the least that our smoke shells were invariably accompanied -by gas shell, even if he did not believe that it was the -smoke shell which alone gave out the warning smell. The effect -upon him of either belief was, however, the same; for it compelled -him in any case to put on his gas mask in order to protect -himself from gas poisoning.</p> - -<p>On the actual battle day, however, we fired smoke shell <i>only</i>, -as we dared not vitiate the air through which our own men would -shortly pass. But the enemy had no rapid means of becoming -aware that we were firing only harmless smoke shell. He would,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[61]</a></span> -therefore, promptly don his gas mask, which would obscure his -vision, hamper his freedom of action, and reduce his powers of -resistance. On July 4th both the 4th and 11th Brigades accordingly -took prisoner large numbers of men who were found actually -wearing their gas masks. The stratagem had worked out exactly -as planned.</p> - -<p>The battle was over, and when the results were made known -there followed the inevitable flow of congratulatory messages -from superiors, and colleagues and friends, from all parts of the -Front and from England. The following telegrams received -from the Commonwealth Prime Minister were particularly -gratifying:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>1. "On behalf of Prime Minister of Britain, and also of -Prime Ministers of Canada, New Zealand and Newfoundland, -attending <span class="smcap">Versailles</span> Council, I am commissioned -to offer you our warmest congratulations upon brilliant -success of Australian Forces under your command, and to -say that the victory achieved by your Troops is worthy to -rank with greatest achievements of Australian Armies."</p> - -<p>2. "My personal congratulations and those of the Government -of Commonwealth on brilliant success of battle. -Please convey to Officers and Men participating in attack -warmest admiration of their valour and dash and manner -in which they have maintained highest traditions of Australian -Army. I am sure that achievement will have most -considerable military and political effect upon Allies and -neutrals, and will heighten <i>moral</i> of all Imperial Forces."</p> - -<p>3. "In company with Mr. Lloyd George and General -Rawlinson to-day saw several hundred of prisoners taken -by Australian Troops in battle before Hamel. Rawlinson -expressed to me the opinion that the operation was a brilliant -piece of work. Please convey this to troops."</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[62]</a></span></p> - -<p>The following message transmitted to me by the Commander -of the Fourth Army was also received from the Field Marshal -Commanding-in-Chief:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"Will you please convey to Lieutenant-General Sir John -Monash and all Ranks under his command, including the -Tanks and the detachment of 33rd American Division, my -warm congratulations on the success which attended the -operation carried out this morning, and on the skill and -gallantry with which it was conducted.</p> - -<div class="right">"<span class="smcap">D. Haig.</span>"</div> -</blockquote> - -<p>A steady stream of visitors also set in, including numbers of -General Staff Officers, who had been sent down from other -Corps and Armies to gather information as to the methods -employed. Everyone, of course, recognized that there was -only one War, and that it was to the mutual benefit of all that -all expedients calculated to accelerate the end of it should become -the common property of all. My Staff were accordingly kept -busy for many days with maps and diagrams explaining the -lines on which the enterprise had been carried out.</p> - -<p>The most distinguished and most welcome of all our visitors, -however, was Monsieur Clemenceau, the veteran statesman of -France, who, in spite of the physical effort, immediately after -the sitting of the Versailles War Council had closed, made haste -to travel to the Amiens area, and to visit the Corps for the special -purpose of thanking the troops. He arrived on July 7th, and a -large assemblage of Australian soldiers who had participated in -the battle, and who were resting from their labours near General -Maclagan's Headquarters at Bussy, were privileged to hear him -address them in English in the following terms:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"I am glad to be able to speak at least this small amount -of English, because it enables me to tell you what all French -people think of you. They expected a great deal of you, -because they have heard what you have accomplished in -the development of your own country. I should not like -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[63]</a></span>to say that they are surprised that you have fulfilled their -expectations. By that high standard they judge you, and -admire you that you have reached it. We have all been -fighting the same battle of freedom in these old battlegrounds. -You have all heard the names of them in history. -But it is a great wonder, too, in history that you should -be here fighting on the old battlefields, which you never -thought, perhaps, to see. The work of our fathers, which -we wanted to hand down unharmed to our children, the -Germans tried to take from us. They tried to rob us of all -that is dearest in modern human society. But men were -the same in Australia, England, France, Italy, and all -countries proud of being the home of free people. That is -what made you come; that is what made us greet you -when you came. We knew you would fight a real fight, but -we did not know that from the very beginning you would -astonish the whole Continent with your valour. I have -come here for the simple purpose of seeing the Australians -and telling them this. I shall go back to-morrow and say -to my countrymen: 'I have seen the Australians; I have -looked into their eyes. I know that they, men who have -fought great battles in the cause of freedom, will fight on -alongside us, till the freedom for which we are all fighting -is guaranteed for us and our children.'"</p></blockquote> - -<p>The French inhabitants of the Amiens district were also -highly elated at the victory. The city itself had been, for some -weeks, completely evacuated, by official order. Not only had -it become the object of nightly visitations by flights of Gothas; -but also, somewhere in the east and far beyond the reach of my -longest range guns, the enemy had succeeded in emplacing a -cannon of exceptionally large calibre, range and power, which -took its daily toll of the buildings of this beautiful city.</p> - -<p>The anniversary of the French national fête was approaching, -and the Prefect of the Department of the Somme, Monsieur -Morain—appreciating the significance of the Hamel victory as -a definite step towards the ultimate disengagement of the city<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[64]</a></span> -from the German terror—determined to make the celebration -of this fête not only a compliment to the Australian Corps, but -also a proof of the unquenchable fortitude of the people of his -Department.</p> - -<p>Accordingly, in the Hôtel de Ville, in the very heart of the -deserted city, amidst the crumbling ruins of its upper stories, -and of the devastation of the surrounding city blocks, he presided -at a humble but memorable repast, which had been spread -in an undamaged apartment, inviting to his board a bare twenty -representatives of the French and British Armies, and of the -city of Amiens. While we toasted the King and the Republic, -and voiced the firm resolve of both Allies to see the struggle -through to the bitter end, the enemy shells were still thundering -overhead.</p> - -<p>But other matters than rejoicings in a task thus happily -accomplished compelled my chief attention during the remaining -days of this July. I had to study and gauge accurately the -tactical and strategical results of the victory of Hamel, and to -lose no time in using the advantage gained. The moral results -both on the enemy and on ourselves were far more important, -and deserve far more emphasis than do the material gains.</p> - -<p>It was, as I have said, the first offensive operation, on any -substantial scale, that had been fought by any of the Allies -since the previous autumn. Its effect was electric, and it stimulated -many men to the realization that the enemy was, after all, -not invulnerable, in spite of the formidable increase in his -resources which he had brought from Russia. It marked the -termination, once and for all, of the purely defensive attitude of -the British front. It incited in many quarters an examination -of the possibilities of offensive action on similar lines by similar -means—a changed attitude of mind, which bore a rich harvest -only a very few weeks later.</p> - -<p>But its effect on the enemy was even more startling. His -whole front from the Ancre to Villers-Bretonneux had become -unstable, and was reeling from the blow. It was only the consideration -that I had still to defend a ten-mile front, and had -still only one Division in reserve in case of emergency, that -deterred me from embarking at once upon another blow on an -even larger scale. But I seized every occasion to importune the -Army Commander either to narrow my front, or to let the First -Division from Hazebrouck join my command, or both; but so -far without result.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 789px;"> -<img src="images/map-b.jpg" width="789" height="1200" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">Map B.</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[65]</a></span></p> - -<p>The only course that remained open to me was to initiate -immediate measures for taking the fullest advantage of the -enemy's demoralization by exploiting the success obtained to -the utmost possible extent. No later than on the afternoon -of the battle of Hamel itself, orders were issued to all three -line Divisions to commence most vigorous offensive patrolling -all along the Corps front, with a view not merely to prevent the -enemy from re-establishing an organized defensive system, but -also ourselves to penetrate the enemy's ground by the establishment -therein of isolated posts, as a nucleus for subsequent -more effective occupation.</p> - -<p>Enterprise of such a nature appeals strongly to the sporting -instinct of the Australian soldier. Divisions, Brigades and -Battalions vied with each other in predatory expeditions, even in -broad daylight, into the enemy's ground, and a steady stream of -prisoners and machine guns flowed in. On the nights of July -5th and 6th, the Fifth Division, now in the sector between the -Ancre and the Somme, possessed themselves with very little -effort of a strip of some three hundred acres of hostile positions, -bringing our front line so near to Morlancourt as to make that -village no longer tenable by the enemy.</p> - -<p>On the same nights, and again on July 8th and 9th, the Second -and Fourth Divisions advanced their lines by an average of -two hundred to three hundred yards along their respective fronts, -and this advance was, in the case of the Second Division, particularly -valuable in carrying our front line over the crest of the -plateau of Hill 104, and giving us clear and unbroken observation -far into the enemy's country, in the directions of Warfusee -and Marcelcave.</p> - -<p>It was a period replete with instances of individual enterprise -and daring adventure. One incident, characteristic of the varied -efforts of these days, was the capture, single-handed, and in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[66]</a></span> -broad daylight, by Corporal W. Brown, V.C., of the 20th Battalion, -Second Division, of an officer and eleven men of the German -Army, whom he stalked as they lay skulking in a trench dug-out -not far from his observation post, and terrorized into submission -by the threat of throwing a bomb at them.</p> - -<p>But perhaps the best testimony of the successful activities -of my troops during this period, and of the serious impression -which they made upon the enemy, can be gathered by extracts -from his own documents, a number of which were captured -during this and subsequent fighting. Of these, the following, -issued by the Second German Army Headquarters (Von der -Marwitz), are among the more interesting:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"The enemy has in his minor enterprises again taken -prisoner a complete front line battalion and part of a support -battalion. The reason is our faulty leadership."</p> - -<p>"The enemy penetrated the forward zone of the 108th -Division by means of large patrols at midnight, on July 8th, -1918, without any artillery preparation, and again on the -same night at 11 p.m., with artillery preparation, astride of -the Marcelcave—Villers-Bretonneux railway. He occupied -the trenches where our most advanced outposts lay, and -took the occupants, comprising fifteen men, prisoner. The -larger part of the forward zone has been lost."</p> - -<p>"In the case of the present trench Division, it has often -happened that <i>complete</i> picquets have disappeared from the -forward zone without a trace."</p></blockquote> - -<p>All the above refers to the period between July 4th and 12th. -We read again under date July 13th:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"During the last few days the Australians have succeeded -in penetrating, or taking prisoner, single posts or picquets. -They have gradually—sometimes even in daylight—succeeded -in getting possession of the majority of the forward -zone of a whole Division."</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[67]</a></span></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"Troops must fight. They must not give way at every -opportunity and seek to avoid fighting, otherwise they will -get the feeling that the enemy are superior to them."</p> -</blockquote> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_066fp.jpg" width="1200" height="781" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>Railway Gun, 11.2-inch Bore—captured near Rosières on August 8th, 1918.</p></div> -</div> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_067fp.jpg" width="1200" height="787" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>German Depot of Stores—captured on August 8th, 1918.</p></div> -</div> - -<p>One last extract from these interesting papers:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"The best way to make the enemy more careful in his -attempt to drive us bit by bit out of the outpost line and -forward zone is to do active reconnaissance and carry out -patrol encounters oneself. In this respect absolutely nothing -seems to have been done. If the enemy can succeed in -scoring a success without any special support by artillery -or assistance from special troops, we must be in a position -to do the same."</p></blockquote> - -<p>Our line in front of Villers-Bretonneux had for months run -very close to the eastern outskirts of that town, a circumstance -which cramped and embarrassed our defence of it. The enemy -could peer into its streets and sweep them with machine guns. He -had held in strength a locality known as Monument Wood, the -ruins of a once prosperous orchard, and his possession of it -had been a source of annoyance both to us and to the French, -for it lay just opposite the international boundary posts.</p> - -<p>The time seemed opportune for a set-piece operation designed -to advance our line opposite the town by 1,000 yards, on a broad -front, to dislodge the enemy from Monument Wood, gain valuable -elbow room, and obtain mastery of the remainder of the plateau -on which the town was built. I had actually completed the draft -of a plan for such an operation, and had held a preliminary conference -with my Staff to discuss it, when it became apparent that -the nightly encroachments which the Second Division were -effecting in this region would, in the course of a few days, achieve -the capture of the whole of this territory without any special -organized effort at all.</p> - -<p>And so it proved; for before the middle of July, Rosenthal -had succeeded in possessing himself, by such a process of "peaceful -penetration," of the whole of the coveted area. It was a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[68]</a></span> -further evidence of the serious demoralization which our aggressive -attitude of the preceding months had wrought among the -German forces opposed to us.</p> - -<p>The era of minor aggression by the Australian Corps was, however, -about to draw to a close, and the situation was rapidly -beginning to shape itself for greater events.</p> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Staff-Sheet No. 218: "Operations of the Australian Corps against Hamel, -etc.," published July, 1918.</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[69]</a></span></p> - -<h2>CHAPTER IV<br /> - -TURNING THE TIDE</h2> - - -<p>The course of events during June and July pointed to the -conclusions, firstly, that the enemy contemplated no -further offensive operations in the Somme Valley, and, secondly, -that the condition of the whole German Second Army, astride -of the Somme, offered every temptation to us to seize the initiative -against it.</p> - -<p>So far as the Australian Corps was concerned, however, my -total frontage, which had been increased (as the result of our -exploitation) to over eleven miles, precluded the possibility, with -only four Divisions at my disposal, of maintaining, even if I could -succeed in initiating, an ambitious offensive. The time was -nevertheless ripe for action on a scale far more decisive than -had become orthodox in the British Army in the past. Efforts -on that method had been confined to a thrust, limited in point -both of distance and of time, and followed by a period of -inaction; they had often given the enemy ample leisure to -recover, and to reorganize his order of battle.</p> - -<p>To maintain an offensive, day after day, indefinitely, would -require sufficient resources, particularly in infantry, to allow -Divisions to be used alternatingly. Only in such a way, by having -rested Divisions always available to alternate with tired Divisions, -could a continuous pressure be maintained.</p> - -<p>I took every opportunity of pressing these views upon the -Army Commander, and expressed the readiness of the Australian -Corps to undertake and maintain a long sustained offensive, -provided that arrangements could be made to shorten my frontage -from a three to a two-Division battle front, and to increase my -resources, from the present four, to five or even six Divisions. It<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[70]</a></span> -was further essential that in any advances attempted by us, other -Corps must co-operate on both flanks.</p> - -<p>It would be bad tactics to drive into the enemy's front a salient -with a narrow base, for such a salient would make our situation -worse instead of better, affording to the enemy the opportunity -of artillery attack upon it from both its flanks as well as from -its front. The salient must therefore be broad based in relation -to its depth, and the base must ever widen as the head of the -salient advances.</p> - -<p>This principle implied that a large-scale operation of such a -nature must be begun on a whole Army front, and that, even -at its inception, at least three Corps must co-operate, to be aided -by the entry of additional Corps on the outer flanks as the central -depth developed. In other words, it was a project implying a -large commitment of resources, and the urgent question was -whether the time was yet ripe for taking the risks involved.</p> - -<p>The matter, however, now became a subject at least worthy -of practical discussion, and, during the days which followed Hamel, -the Staffs of both the Corps and Army were kept busy with -the investigation of data, maps, and information, while the -availability of additional resources in guns, tanks and aeroplanes -became the subject of anxious inquiry.</p> - -<p>A circumstance which troubled me sorely was the fact that -my Corps stood on the flank of the British Army, and that the -troops on my right belonged to the French Army. The relations -between the Australian troops and the Tirailleurs and Zouaves of -the 31st French Corps (General Toulorge) had always been the -very friendliest, and the joint "international" posts had been -the scenes of hearty fraternization and of the evolution of a strange -common vernacular.</p> - -<p>This comradeship of "poilu" with "digger" did not, however, -lessen the difficulties incidental to the joint conduct of a major -Operation of War by two Corps of different nationalities, speaking -different languages, with diverse tactical conceptions, and, above -all, of substantially divergent temperaments. The French are -irresistible in attack as they are dogged in defence, but whether -they will attack or defend depends greatly on their temperament<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[71]</a></span> -of the moment. In this they are totally unlike the British or -Australian soldier who will at any time philosophically accept -either rôle that may be prescribed for him.</p> - -<p>In short, it was not possible to hope for an effective co-ordination -of effort, controlled particularly by the minute observance -of a time-table, on the part of the Australian and its adjacent -French Corps, and I felt quite unprepared to count upon it. It -was for this reason that I expressed to the Army Commander -the hope that a British Corps might be obtainable to operate on -my right flank in any undertaking that should be decided upon. -Understanding that the greater part of the Canadian Corps was -then unemployed, resting in a back area, I ventured to hope that -this Corps might be made available, in the event of a decision -that the proposal should be proceeded with.</p> - -<p>My hesitation to accept the French as colleagues in such a -battle was based not altogether on theoretical or sentimental -grounds. The steady progress in mopping up enemy territory -to the east of Villers-Bretonneux, which had been made by my -south flank Division (the Second) as the aftermath of Hamel, -soon produced a contortion of the Allied front line at this point -which bade fair to prove just as troublesome to me as had been -the great re-entrant opposite Hamel, which that battle had been -specially undertaken to eliminate.</p> - -<p>No persuasions on my part, or on that of my flank Division, -could induce the adjacent French Division to extend any co-operation -in these advances or to adopt any measures to flatten -out the re-entrant which, growing deeper every day, threatened -to expose my right flank. I am convinced that such hesitation -was based upon no timidity, but was the result wholly of an -entirely different outlook and policy from those which the Australian -Corps was doing its best to interpret. But the experience -of it made the prospect of punctual co-operation on their part -in much more serious undertakings distinctly less encouraging.</p> - -<p>The proposed offensive involved, therefore, far-reaching redispositions, -comprising a substantial displacement southwards -of the inter-Allied boundary, a lengthening by several miles -of the whole British Western front, and an entire rearrangement<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[72]</a></span> -of the respective fronts of the Third and Fourth British Armies. -It is not surprising that a decision was deferred, while the -project was being critically investigated from every point of -view.</p> - -<p>Then, suddenly, a new situation arose. On July 15th, the enemy -opened a fresh attack against the French in the south. The scale -on which he undertook it immediately made it patent to all -students of the situation that he was probably employing his -whole remaining reserves of fit, rested Divisions; that he meant -this to be his decisive blow; and that whether he gained a decision -or not, it would be his last effort on the grand scale.</p> - -<p>It did not succeed; for just as he had once again reached the -line of the Marne and had on July 17th achieved his "furthest -south" at Château-Thierry, a beautifully timed counter-stroke -by the French and Americans upon the western face of the salient, -extending from Soissons to the Marne, resulted on July 18th in -the capture by the Allies on that day alone, of 15,000 prisoners -and 200 guns.</p> - -<p>It was the end of German offensive in the war. Their mobile -reserves were exhausted, and they were compelled slowly to -recede from the Château-Thierry salient. The appropriate -moment, for which Foch and Haig had doubtless been waiting -for months, had at last arrived to begin an Allied counter offensive, -and it was only a question of deciding at what point along the -Franco-British front the effort should be made, and on what -date it should open.</p> - -<p>Doubtless influenced by the reasons already discussed, the -choice fell upon that portion of the front of the Fourth Army -which lay south of the Somme; in other words upon the southern -portion of the Australian Corps front. The date remained undecided, -but the requisite redisposition of Armies and Corps was -so extensive that no time was to be lost in making a beginning.</p> - -<p>It was on July 21st that General Rawlinson first called together -the Corps Commanders who were to be entrusted with this portentous -task. The strictest secrecy was enjoined, and never -was a secret better kept; with the exception of the Field Marshal -and his Army Commanders, none outside of the Fourth Army<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[73]</a></span> -had any inkling of what was afoot until the actual moment -for action had arrived.</p> - -<p>Yet an observant enemy agent, if any such there had been -in the vicinity, might well have drawn a shrewd conclusion that -some mischief was brewing, had he happened along the main -street of the prettily-situated village of Flexicourt, on the Somme, -on that bright summer afternoon, and had observed in front of a -pretentious white mansion, over which floated the black and red -flag of an Army Commander, a quite unusual procession of motor-cars, -ostentatiously flying the Canadian and Australian flags and -the red-and-white pennants of two other Corps Commanders.</p> - -<p>There were present at that conference, General Currie, the -Canadian, General Butler, of the Third Corps, General Kavanagh, -of the Cavalry Corps, and myself, while senior representatives of -the Tanks and Air Force also attended. Rawlinson unfolded -the outline of the whole Army plan, and details were discussed -at great length in the light of the views held by each Corps Commander -as to the tasks which he was prepared to undertake -with the resources in his hands or promised to him.</p> - -<p>The conditions which I had sought in my previous negotiations -with the Army Commander were, I found, conceded to me almost -to the full extent. My battle front was to be reduced from eleven -miles to a little over 7,000 yards. It would, in fact, extend from -the Somme, as the northern, to the main Péronne railway, as the -southern flank. And—what was equally important, and profoundly -welcome—the First Australian Division was shortly -to be relieved in Flanders, and would at last join my Corps, thus -for the first time in the war bringing all Australian field units in -France under one command.</p> - -<p>The Canadians were to operate on my right, and further south -again the First French Army (Debenay) was to supply a Corps -to form a defensive flank for the Canadians. The Third British -Corps was to carry out for me a similar function on my northern -flank. Thus, four Corps in line were to operate, the two central -Corps carrying out the main advance, while the two outer flank -Corps would be employed further to broaden the base of the -great salient which the operation would create.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[74]</a></span></p> - -<p>The Cavalry Corps would appear in the battle area also, with -all preparations made for a rapid exploitation of any success -achieved. The utility of the Cavalry in modern war, at any rate -in a European theatre, has been the subject of endless controversy. -It is one into which I do not propose to enter. There is -no doubt that, given suitable ground and an absence of wire -entanglements, Cavalry can move rapidly, and undertake important -turning or enveloping movements. Yet it has been argued -that the rarity of such suitable conditions negatives any justification -for superimposing so unwieldy a burden as a large body of -Cavalry—on the bare chance that it <i>might</i> be useful—upon -already overpopulated areas, billets, watering places and roads.</p> - -<p>I may, however, anticipate the event by saying that the -First Cavalry Brigade was duly allotted to me, and did its best to -prove its utility; but I am bound to say that the results achieved, -in what proved to be very unsuitable country beyond the range -of the Infantry advance, did not justify the effort expended either -by this gallant Brigade or by the other arms and services upon -whom the very presence of the Cavalry proved an added burden.</p> - -<p>For the full understanding of subsequent developments both -during and after the battle it becomes of special importance -to consider the proposed rôle of the Third Corps in relation to my -left flank. It is to be remembered that the Fourth Army decided -that the River Somme was to be the tactical boundary between -the two Northern Corps. It was not competent for me to criticize -this decision at the time, but I am free now to say that I believed -such a boundary to have been unsuitable, and the event speedily -proved that it was.</p> - -<p>It is always, in my opinion, undesirable to select any bold -natural or artificial feature—such as a river, ravine, ridge, road -or railway—as a boundary. It creates, at once, a divided responsibility, -and necessitates between two independent commanders, -and at a critical point, a degree of effective co-operation which -can rarely be hoped for. It is much better boldly to place a unit, -however large or small, <i>astride</i> of such a feature, so that both -sides of it may come under the control of one and the same -Commander.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[75]</a></span></p> - -<p>This was especially the case in this part of the Somme Valley -which is broad, and has an ill-defined central line, tortuous, and -with the slopes on either side tactically interdependent; but most -of all because, as I have already described, the high plateau on -the north completely overlooks the relatively lower flats on the -south of the river. The point I am trying to make should be -borne in mind, for I believe it has been fully borne out by subsequent -events.</p> - -<p>The decision standing, however, as it did, it fell to the task of -the Third Corps to make an assault (concurrently with that of -the Australian Corps south of the river) for the capture of the -whole of that reach of the river known as the Chipilly Bend, and -of all the high ground on the spur which that bend enfolds. The -object was to deprive the enemy of all ground from which he could -look down upon my advancing left flank, or from which he could -bring rifle or artillery fire to bear upon it.</p> - -<p>The Third Corps was to operate on the front of one Division, -the 58th, which, pivoting its left upon the Corbie—Bray road, -was to advance its right—in sympathy with the advance of the -left of the Australian Corps—until it rested upon the river about -one mile downstream from Etinehem. It was a movement -the success of which was rendered promising by the nature of the -ground and the disorganized condition of the enemy between the -Ancre and the Somme.</p> - -<p>As regards my right flank, this was to rest as stated upon the -main railway. The Canadian Corps, of four Divisions, would -take over from the French a frontage of about 6,000 yards and -deliver a thrust parallel to and south of the railway, in the direction -of Caix and Beaucourt, and would aim at the seizure of the -important Hill 102, immediately to the west of the latter locality. -At no time did any question of the security of my right flank -furnish me with any cause for anxiety; the prowess of the Canadian -Corps was well known to all Australians, and I knew that, -to use his own expressive vernacular, it was General Currie's -invariable habit to "deliver the goods."</p> - -<p>The comprehensive project thus outlined at the conference -of July 21st involved, as a preliminary step, a far-reaching redisposition<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[76]</a></span> -of very large bodies of troops over a very wide front. -With the readjustment of the boundaries between the Third and -Fourth British Armies we are not particularly concerned, because -this affected a region, north of the Ancre, which lay well outside -of the battle area. Nor did the internal readjustment of the -northern part of the Fourth Army front present any difficulty, -as it meant nothing more than a routine "relief" by the 58th -Division of the Fifth Australian Division which was at this juncture -holding that part of my Corps sector which lay between the -Somme and the Ancre.</p> - -<p>But the southern half was a very different matter. The First -French Army was to give up to the British a section of about four -miles, extending from Villers-Bretonneux to Thennes. This -was ultimately to be taken over by the Canadian Corps as a -battle front, but that Corps still had two of its Divisions in the -line in the neighbourhood of Arras.</p> - -<p>Moreover, it was of the utmost importance to conceal from -the enemy until the last possible moment any change in our dispositions. -This meant concealing them from our own troops -also, because the loss by us of a single talkative prisoner would -have been sufficient to disclose to the enemy at least the suspicion, -if not the certainty, that an attack was in preparation.</p> - -<p>After examining the problem and discussing several alternative -solutions, it was ultimately decided at this conference that, five -or six days before the date fixed for the attack, the French -would be relieved in this sector by a Division, not of Canadians, -but of Australians; that under cover of and behind this Australian -Division, the Canadian Corps would come in from the north, -and would proceed to carry out its battle preparations; and -finally that the actual appearance of Canadian troops in the -front line would not ensue until three days before the battle.</p> - -<p>During the preceding two days, the Australian troops would -be gradually withdrawn from the sector, leaving only one Brigade -in occupation of the line, to be backed up by the incoming Canadians -in the unexpected contingency of an attack by the enemy. -This last Brigade would quietly melt away, leaving the Canadians -in full possession of the field.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[77]</a></span></p> - -<p>It was hoped that, during the days of the temporary Australian -occupation of the sector, nothing would happen which might -disclose to the enemy that the French had left it; and even if -we were to have the misfortune to lose from this sector any -Australian prisoners to the enemy, it was further hoped that, -if kept in total ignorance of the inflow of Canadians, such prisoners -would be unable to make any embarrassing disclosures. The -<i>dénouement</i>, which will be told later, showed that this judgment -of possibilities was a shrewd one, and that such precautions were -not taken in vain.</p> - -<p>At this period of the war, large numbers of Americans had -already arrived in France, but only few of them were yet ready -to take their places in the line of battle. The time had not yet -arrived, therefore, when, by taking over large sections of the -Western front they could help to shorten the French and British -frontages. The British front was, therefore, still so extended -that the mobile reserve Divisions at the disposal of the Field -Marshal were few.</p> - -<p>This consideration made the contemplated reliefs and interchanges -of Corps and Divisions, and their transference from -one part of our front to another a matter of great complexity, -and one which required time to execute. Each stage of the process -was contingent upon the due completion of a previous stage. -It is, moreover, a process which cannot be unduly hastened, -without serious discomfort and fatigue to the troops and animals -concerned.</p> - -<p>Troops destined for battle must be kept in the highest physical -condition. This means good feeding, comfortable housing, and -adequate rest. A couple of weary days and sleepless nights spent -in crowded railway trains, with cold food and little exercise, are -sufficient to play havoc with the fighting trim of even a crack -battalion. So, the daily stages of the journey must be short, -and comfortable billets must be in readiness for each night's halt. -The day's supplies must arrive punctually and at the right railhead, -to ensure hot, well-cooked meals.</p> - -<p>With the very limited number of serviceable railway lines -which remained available behind the British front—and with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[78]</a></span> -the congestion of traffic resulting from the daily transportation -of many thousands of tons of artillery ammunition and other war -stores—it was not surprising that as the result of the deliberations -of the conference it was resolved to advise the Commander-in-Chief -that it would take not less than five days to rearrange our -order of battle on the lines decided upon, and another five days, -after Corps and Divisions had taken over their battle fronts, to -enable them to complete their preparations.</p> - -<p>Thus, the Fourth Army could be ready at ten days' notice, -and the conference broke up, pledged to secrecy and complete -inaction, until formal approval had been given to the proposals -and a date fixed for their realization.</p> - -<p>The remainder of July passed with no very startling occurrences. -In the south the German withdrawal from the Soissons salient -and the Marne continued steadily, with the French and Americans -on their heels; but it was a methodical retreat, which would -bring about a substantial shortening of the German line, and so -release Divisions to rest and refit, which might conceivably become -available for a fresh assault elsewhere.</p> - -<p>But there was still no sign of any such design upon that always -tender spot, the Allied junction at Villers-Bretonneux. On -the contrary, my second Division still continued to make free -with the enemy's advanced patrols, and in a very brilliant little -infantry operation by the 7th Brigade captured the "Mound," -a long spoilbank beside the railway at a point about a mile east -of the town, which dominated the landscape in every direction. -The ardour of his troops was only enhanced when they heard that -General Rosenthal himself, while reconnoitring from the Mound, -had been sniped at and had received a nasty wound in the arm.</p> - -<p>The enemy attempted nothing in the way of infantry retaliation. -But whenever he had been thoroughly angered, he treated -my front to a liberal drenching of mustard gas, fired by his -artillery. His supplies of mustard gas shell seemed inexhaustible, -and he would frequently expend as many as 10,000 of them -in a single night upon the half-ruined town of Villers-Bretonneux -or on the Bois l'Abbé and other woods which he suspected were -sheltering my reserve infantry.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[79]</a></span></p> - -<p>These gas attacks were annoying and troublesome, in the -extreme. During the actual bombardments, troops wore their -gas masks as a matter of course, but doffed them when the -characteristic smell of the gas had disappeared. But it was -warm weather, and as the sun rose, the poisonous liquid, which -had spattered the ground over immense areas, would volatilize, -and rise in sufficient volume still to attack all whose business -took them to and fro across this ground. In this way hundreds of -our men became incapacitated; although there were a few serious -cases, most of the men would be fit to rejoin in two or three weeks. -But this form of attack, and the constant dread of it, made life -in the forward areas anything but endurable.</p> - -<p>I was beset by quite another trepidation also. Prisoners -captured during the German withdrawal from the Marne, which -was then in progress, told tales of contemplated withdrawals -on other fronts, and some even asserted that a withdrawal opposite -my own front was being talked of. Judged by subsequent -events, it is more than probable that these stories were stimulated -by the many articles which were at that time appearing in the -German newspapers from the pens of press strategists, who, in -order to allay public anxiety, were representing these withdrawals -as deliberate, and as a masterpiece of strategy, compelling the -Allies to a costly pursuit over difficult and worthless ground.</p> - -<p>Opposite Albert, signs that such a withdrawal was actually -in progress also began to appear, although it subsequently transpired -that, in its early stages, this procedure was merely prompted -by a purely local consideration, namely, the desire of the enemy -to improve his tactical position by abandoning the outposts, -which he had been maintaining in the valley of the Ancre, and -transferring them to the higher and better ground on the east -of that river.</p> - -<p>It was only natural that those of us who knew of the impending -attack, and of the immense effort which its preparation would -involve, felt nervous lest the enemy might forestall us by withdrawing -his whole line to some methodically prepared position -of defence in the rear, just as he had done once before in 1917 -on so large a scale in the Bapaume region. It would probably<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[80]</a></span> -have been a sound measure of military policy, but it would -assuredly, at that juncture, have had as disastrous an effect -upon the <i>moral</i> of the German people as his enforced withdrawal, -which was soon to begin, actually produced not long after.</p> - -<p>The order to prepare the attack, and fixing the date of it -for August 8th, came in the closing days of July, and at once -all was bustle and excitement in the Australian Corps. Commanders, -Staff Officers, and Intelligence Service, the Artillery, -the Corps Flying Squadron, the map and photography sections -spent busy days in reconnaissance, and toilsome nights in office -work. The vast extent of the detailed work involved, particularly -upon the administrative services, can only be appreciated -by a study of the plan for the battle, which it fell to my lot, as -Corps Commander, first to formulate, and then to expound to a -series of conferences which were held at Bertangles on July 30th, -and on August 2nd and 4th.</p> - -<p>It is, therefore, perhaps appropriate that I should now attempt -to repeat, in non-technical language, an exposition of the outlines -of that plan.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[81]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER V<br /> - -THE BATTLE PLAN</h2> - - -<p>My plan for the impending battle involved the employment -of four Divisions in the actual assault, with one Division -in reserve. The Reserve Division was to be available for use -in one of two ways; either as a reserve of fresh troops to exploit -any successes gained upon the first day, or else to take over and -hold defensively the ground won, if the assaulting Divisions -should have become too exhausted to be relied upon for successful -resistance to a counter-attack in force.</p> - -<p>The frontage allotted to the Corps was 7,000 yards, and this -extent of front accommodated itself naturally to the employment -of two first-line Divisions, each on a 3,500 yard front, -each Division having two Brigades in the front line, with one -Brigade in reserve.</p> - -<p>As four Divisions were available to me for immediate use in -the battle, I decided to undertake, for the first time in the war, -on so comprehensive a scale, the tactical expedient of a "leapfrog" -by Divisions over each other.</p> - -<p>This term had, long before, passed into the homely phraseology -of the war, in order to describe a procedure by which one -body of troops, having reached its objective, was there halted, -as at a completed task, while a second body of troops, of similar -order of importance, but under an entirely separate Commander, -advanced over the ground won, reached the foremost battle line, -took over the tactical responsibility for the fighting front, and -after a prescribed interval of time continued the advance to a -further and more distant objective.</p> - -<p>This conception of an advance by a process of "leapfrog" -had been evolved early in 1917 in connection with a method of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[82]</a></span> -assault on successive lines of trenches. It was intended at the -outset to be applied only to very small bodies of infantry, such -as platoons. A normal battle plan for a company of infantry -of four platoons was for the first two platoons to capture and hold -the front line trench, while the next two following platoons would -leap over this trench and over the troops who had gained it, and -then pass beyond to the capture of the second, or support trench. -The method was used, for the first time, on such a modest scale, -at the battle of Messines, in June, 1917, and later on in the -same year was adopted for bodies as large even as Battalions, -in the fighting for the Broodseinde and Passchendaele -heights.</p> - -<p>But on no previous occasion had such a principle been applied -to whole Divisions. It is true that at the battle of Messines, -the Fourth Australian Division passed through the New Zealand -Division after the latter had completed the capture of the main -Messines ridge, but this was really exploitation, undertaken in -order to take advantage of the temporary confusion of the enemy, -and for the purpose of gaining ground upon the eastern slopes -of the captured ridge. It was not a movement which was really -part of the main assault, and it was confined to a single Division.</p> - -<p>On the present occasion my purpose was to carry out a clear -and definite process of "leapfrogging," not only simultaneously -by two Divisions side by side, but also as an essential part of the -time-table programme for the main battle, and before the exploitation -stage of the fighting was timed to be reached. It was, undeniably, -a daring proposal, involving very definite risks, enormously -increasing the labour of preparation and the mass of -detailed precautions which had to be undertaken in order to -obviate the possibility of great confusion.</p> - -<p>The preparations necessary for a single Division proposing -to advance alone, to a prescribed distance, over country much -of which was usually visible to us from our front line, are sufficiently -complex, relating as they do, not only to the establishment -of numerous protected headquarters for Brigades and Battalions, -of miles upon miles of buried and ground cables, of dumps of -all kinds of supplies, and of dressing stations and medical aid<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[83]</a></span> -posts; but also to the disposition, in concealed positions, of -all the assaulting units, down to the smallest of them, of Infantry -Engineers and Pioneers. All these preparations assume a -tenfold complexity when a second Division has to make arrangements -exactly similar in character, variety and extent, using -exactly the same territory for the purpose and at the same -time, and planning to advance over more distant country, entirely -beyond visual range and preliminary reconnaissance.</p> - -<p>The project also involved a much greater crowding of troops -into the areas immediately behind our line of departure, and, -therefore, enormously increased the risk of premature detection -by the enemy, both from ground and from air observation, of -unusual movement and of other symptoms which presaged the -possibility of an attack by us. The plan also necessitated the -closest possible co-ordination of effort, and mutual sympathy -and understanding, between the Commanders and Staffs of the -twin Divisions having a common jurisdiction over one and the -same area of preparation, and one and the same battle front. -This was a degree of co-operation which could not have been -looked for unless the personnel concerned had already established, -from long and close association with each other, the most -cordial personal relations. And dominating all other difficulties -were those involved in the proposal to execute this difficult -and untried operation of a Divisional leapfrog, not singly -but in a duplex manner, necessitating the assurance of exactly -similar simultaneous action, similarly timed in every stage, both -before and during battle, by each of two separate pairs of -Divisions.</p> - -<p>These threatening difficulties were surely formidable enough, -but I knew that I could rely upon the goodwill of the Divisions -towards each other, and upon the loyal support of them all. -This seemed to me to justify the attempt, and to minimize the -risks; having regard above all else to the results which I stood -to gain if the operation could be executed as planned.</p> - -<p>On no previous occasion in the war had an attempt ever been -made to effect a penetration into the enemy's defences at the -first blow, and on the first day, greater than a mile or two. Rarely<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[84]</a></span> -had any previous set-piece attack succeeded in reaching the -enemy's line of field-guns. The result had been that the bulk -of his Artillery had been withdrawn at his leisure, and his losses -had been confined to a few hundred acres of shattered territory. -But the task I had set myself was not only to reach, at the first -onslaught, the whole of the enemy's Artillery positions, but greatly -to overrun them with a view to obliterating, by destruction -or capture, the whole of his defensive organizations and the -whole of the fighting resources which they contained, along the -full extent of my Corps front.</p> - -<p>To achieve this object I prepared my plans upon the basis -of a total advance, on the first day, of not less than 9,000 yards. -This was to be divided into three separate stages, as follows:</p> - - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left">Phase A—Set-piece attack with barrage,</td><td align="right">3,000</td><td align="center">yards.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Phase B—Open-warfare advance,</td><td align="right">4,500</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Phase C—Exploitation,</td><td align="right">1,500</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="right">——</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Total distance to final objective,</td><td align="right">9,000</td><td align="center">yards.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="right">——</td></tr> -</table> -</div> - -<p>The opening phase involved no novel or unusual features so -far as the infantry were concerned, and was conceived on lines -with which the fighting of 1917 had familiarized me, modified -further by the accumulated experience gained from earlier mistakes -in the technical details of such an enterprise. The recent -battle of Hamel became the model for this phase, the conditions -of that battle being now reproduced on a much enlarged -scale.</p> - -<p>But there was one very important feature which distinguished -the present undertaking from the battles of Messines and Broodseinde, -and that was in regard to the frontage allotted for attack -to a single Division. At Messines, the Divisional battle front -was 2,000 yards; in the third battle of Ypres it differed but little -from the same standard. For the present battle, I adopted a -battle front of two miles for each assaulting Division, or a mile -for each of the four assaulting Brigades.</p> - -<p>This innovation seemed to me to be justified by four principal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[85]</a></span> -factors. The first of these was that the weather, which was -dry, and the state of the ground, which was hard, made the -"going" easy and the stress upon the infantry comparatively -light. Next, the condition of the enemy's defensive works was -undeveloped and stagnant, as clearly disclosed by the air photographs -which the Corps Air Squadron produced in great numbers -on every fine day. No doubt this was due to the encroachments -we had made on his forward works during the fighting at Hamel -and in the remaining weeks of July. Thirdly, the powerful assistance -anticipated from a contingent of four Battalions of Tanks -which General Rawlinson had arranged to place under my orders -led me to estimate that I might greatly reduce the number of -men per yard of front. Lastly, the plan was justified by the -known distribution of the enemy's infantry and guns along the -frontage under attack. For all these reasons, I felt prepared to -impose on the infantry a task which, computed solely upon the -factor of frontage, was more than twice that demanded by me -on any previous occasion.</p> - -<p>At the same time, so extended a frontage involved the employment -of a much higher ratio of barrage artillery to the number -of battalions of Infantry actually engaged. Success depended -more upon the efficiency of the fire power of the barrage than -upon any other factor, and I could not afford to incur any risk -by weakening the density of the barrage. For this reason, I -adhered to the standard which previous experience of several -major battles and many minor raids had shown to be adequate -for covering the assaulting infantry, and for keeping down the -enemy's fire. This standard never fluctuated widely from one -field-gun per twenty yards of front, and involved the employment, -on this occasion, of some 432 field-guns in the barrage -alone. This result could not have been achieved if the Fourth -Army authorities had not seen their way to place at my disposal -five additional Brigades of Field Artillery over and above the -thirteen Australian Brigades which formed a permanent part -of the whole Artillery of the Corps.</p> - -<p>Phase A, as already stated, involved a penetration of 3,000 -yards, and the objective line for this phase, which came to be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[86]</a></span> -known as the "green" line (from the colour employed to delineate -it upon all the fighting maps propounded by the Corps), -was chosen, after an exhaustive study of all aeroplane photographs, -and of the results of numerous observations, by many -diverse means, of the locations of the enemy's Artillery, so as -to make certain that during this phase the whole mass of the -enemy's forward Artillery would be overrun, and captured or -put out of action.</p> - -<p>The green line was, in fact, located along the crest of the spur -running north-easterly from Lamotte-en-Santerre in the direction -of Cerisy-Gailly, with the object of carrying the battle well -to the east of the Cerisy valley, in which large numbers of the -enemy's guns had been definitely located. This would give us, -by the capture of this valley, suitable concealed positions in which -the Infantry destined for Phase B could rest for a short -"breather;" and would land the Infantry of the original assault -in a position from which they could detect and forestall any -attempt on the part of the enemy to launch a counter-attack -before the time for the opening of Phase B had -arrived.</p> - -<p>The task of executing Phase A of the battle fell to the Second -and Third Australian Divisions, in that order from south to -north, the southern flank of the Second Division resting upon the -main railway line from Amiens to Péronne, and being there in -contact with the Canadian Corps, under General Currie. The -northern flank of the Third Division rested on the River Somme, -and was there in contact with the Third British Corps under -General Butler, while the inter-divisional boundary was at the -southern edge of the Bois-d'Accroche.</p> - -<p>These two Divisions were the line Divisions during the period -immediately preceding the battle, and had been holding the line -each with two Brigades in line and one Brigade in support. -Three days prior to the battle, however, it was arranged that -each Division should hold its front with only one Brigade, thereby -making available two Brigades each for the actual carrying -out of Phase A of the attack. These assaulting Brigades were -the 7th, 5th, 9th and 11th, in that order from south to north,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[87]</a></span> -each Brigade having its due allotment of Tanks and machine -guns, etc.</p> - -<p>The total estimated time for the completion of Phase A was to -be 143 minutes after the opening of the barrage at "zero" hour; -and there was then to be a pause of 100 minutes to allow time -for the advance and deployment into battle order of the succeeding -two Divisions, who were to carry out the process of "leapfrogging" -and to execute Phases B and C of the battle.</p> - -<p>The planning of Phase B, or the advance from the "green" -to the "red" line, involved a totally different tactical conception -and the adoption of a type of warfare which had almost -entirely disappeared from the Western theatre of war since -those far-off days in the late autumn of 1914, when the German -Army first dug itself in, in France and Belgium, and committed -both combatants to the prolonged agony of over three years -of stationary warfare. I allude to the moving battle, or as it -is called in text-book language, "open warfare;" a type of -fighting in which few of the British Forces formed since the original -Expeditionary Force had any experience except on the manœuvre -ground under peace conditions—a disability which applied -equally to the Australian troops. Confident, however, in their -adaptability and in their power of initiative under novel conditions, -I did not hesitate to prescribe, for this second phase of -the battle, the adoption of the principles and methods of open -warfare.</p> - -<p>In two very important respects in particular, this type of -fighting involved conditions to which the troops had not been -accustomed, and under which they had no previous experience -in battle. In trench warfare, and in a deliberate attack on entrenched -defences, the positions of all headquarters, medical -aid posts, supply dumps and signal stations remained fixed and -immovable. The whole of the internal communications by -telegraph and telephone could, therefore, be completely installed -beforehand, down to the last detail, and the transmission -of all messages, reports, orders and instructions, during the course -of the battle, was rapid and assured. But in a moving battle -no such comprehensive or stable signalling arrangements are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[88]</a></span> -possible, and reliance must be placed upon the much slower -and much more uncertain methods of transmission by flag -and lamp signalling, by dispatch riders, pigeons and runners.</p> - -<p>Divisional Headquarters would, therefore, almost as soon as -the battle commenced, fall out of touch with Brigades, and they -in turn with their Battalions; information as to the actual -situation at the fighting front would travel slowly, and would -reach those responsible for making consequential decisions -often long after an entire alteration in the situation had removed -the need for action. Thus, a greatly enhanced responsibility -would come to be imposed upon subordinate leaders to decide -for themselves, without waiting for guidance or orders from higher -authority, and to grasp the initiative by taking all possible -action on the spot in the light of the circumstances and situation -of the moment.</p> - -<p>Again, the nature of the Artillery action is, in the moving -battle, fundamentally different from that which prevails during -trench warfare. To begin with, only that portion of the Artillery -which is in the strictest sense mobile can participate to any extent -in open warfare. The employment of Artillery is, therefore, -confined to a few and to the smaller natures of Ordnance, namely, -the 18-pounder field-gun, the 4½-inch field howitzer and the -60-pounder, which are all horse drawn and which are capable -of being moved off the roads and across all but the most broken -country. Heavier guns, from 6-inch upwards, are in practice confined -to roads, and are too slow and cumbersome to keep pace -with the Infantry. The Artillery fire action is also intrinsically -different, because the guns can be sighted directly upon their -targets, while in trench warfare they are always laid by indirect -methods, with the use of the map and compass, and without -observation, at any rate by the crew of the gun, of the objects -fired at.</p> - -<p>The decision which I had to take of carrying out the second -phase of this great battle on the principles of open warfare was, -therefore, one which also involved a certain element of risk. -But it was a risk which I felt justified in taking, in spite of the -fact that the German High Command had more than once expressed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[89]</a></span> -itself in contemptuous terms of the capacity of any -British troops successfully to undertake any operation of open -warfare. My justification lay primarily in my confidence in -the ability of the subordinate commanders and troops to work -satisfactorily under these novel conditions—a confidence which -the event abundantly justified. But I was placed in the position -of having either to accept this risk, or else abandon altogether -the project of a quite unprecedented penetration of enemy -country to be completed on the first day. It would have been -clearly impossible to continue the advance beyond the green line -without an interval of at least forty-eight hours, which would -have been necessary to enable the Artillery to be redisposed for -barrage fire in forward positions and provided with the necessary -supplies of ammunition for such a purpose.</p> - -<p>The Divisions which were told off to carry out the "leapfrog" -enterprise and to execute Phase B of the battle were the Fifth -Australian Division on the south and the Fourth Australian -Division on the north, the outer flanks of the attack remaining -as before, <i>i.e.</i>, the Péronne Railway on the south and the River -Somme on the north. Each of these Divisions was directed to -deploy, on its own frontage, two Infantry Brigades. Its third -Brigade was to be kept intact and to advance during Phase B -at some distance behind, as a support to the fighting line, and to -be employed in the subsequent phase, if it were found that Phase -B could be completed without calling upon this spare Brigade. -The actual dispositions of the Brigades finally proposed by the -respective Divisional Commanders and approved by me brought -about the arrangement that the four first-line mobile Infantry -Brigades were successively, from south to north, the 15th, -8th, 12th and 4th, while the 14th and 1st Brigades followed as -supports in a second line.</p> - -<p>To each of these Infantry Brigades I allotted a Brigade of -Field Artillery, to be employed under the direct orders of the -Infantry Brigade Commander, and, in addition, three Artillery -Brigades as well as one Battery of 60-pounders, to each Divisional -Commander. As my resources in Artillery were not unlimited, -the twelve Artillery Brigades, so disposed of, were necessarily<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[90]</a></span> -drawn from the original eighteen Brigades which were to fire -the covering Artillery barrage for Phase A of the battle. The -orders to that portion of the Field Artillery which was to become -mobile in pursuance of this plan, accordingly, were that immediately -upon the completion of their original tasks, by the capture -of the green line, they were to "pull out of the barrage."</p> - -<p>This meant, in effect, that all the teams, limbers, battery -wagons, and ammunition wagons of these twelve Brigades, -waiting in their wagon lines far in rear, fully harnessed up and -hooked in at the opening of the battle, had to advance during -the progress of the first phase, so as to reach their guns just at -the right time, but no earlier, to enable these guns to be limbered -up, and the batteries to become completely mobile in order to -join and advance with the Infantry of the second phase.</p> - -<p>This was an operation which required the greatest nicety in -timing, and the greatest accuracy in execution. No Australian -Artillery had ever previously undertaken such an operation, -except perhaps on the manœuvre ground, and then only on the -very limited scale of a Brigade or two at a time. That this rapid -transition from the completely stationary to the completely -mobile battle was carried out, during the very crisis of a great -engagement, without the slightest hitch, and with only the -trifling loss of two or three gun horse teams from shell fire, reflects -the very highest credit upon every officer and man of the Australian -Field Artillery.</p> - -<p>The open warfare Infantry Brigades were also to be provided, -out of their own divisional resources, each with a Company of -Engineers, a Company of Machine Guns, a Field Ambulance, and -a detachment of Pioneers, so that, in the most complete sense, -they became a Brigade Group of all arms, capable of dealing, -out of their own resources and on their own ground, with any -situation that might arise during their advance of nearly three -miles from the green to the red line. A detachment of nine -tanks completed the fighting equipment of each of the four front -line Brigades destined to capture the red line.</p> - -<p>I must now briefly describe the nature of Phase C, the third -and last stage in this ambitious and complex battle programme.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[91]</a></span> -This phase was to consist of "exploitation," which implies that -it was a provisional preparation, which was to be carried out -only if complete success attended the two preceding phases. -The objective of Phase C was the "blue" line, which I had -located about one mile to the east of the red line, along a system -of old French trenches extending from the river at a point near -Méricourt, and running southerly to the railway at a point a -little to the south-east of Harbonnières. This line gave promise -of furnishing a good defensive position in which to deal with any -possible counter-attack. It also gave a good line of departure -for subsequent operations, and provided ideal artillery positions -in a series of valleys, running parallel and a little to the west of -the line itself.</p> - -<p>The troops earmarked for this Exploitation Phase were the -two second line Brigades of the two Divisions which were to -capture the red line, namely, the 14th and 1st Brigades, and the -orders to the Divisional Commanders were that if the red line -was reached without mishap, without undue loss of time, and -without involving the Reserve Brigades, but not otherwise, these -Reserve Brigades were to push on with the utmost determination -to secure and hold the blue line until such time as they could -be reinforced.</p> - -<p>Each of these exploitation Brigades was equipped similarly -to the red line Brigades in all respects except that they were -provided with a special contingent of 18 Mark V. (Star) Tanks -of the very latest design. These differed from the Mark V. Tank -employed at Hamel and in the other stages of the present operation, -in that they were longer and had sufficient internal space -to carry, as passengers, over and above their own crews, two -complete infantry Lewis gun detachments each. It was expected -that this infantry fire power, added to the fire power from the -machine guns carried by these 36 Tanks themselves and operated -by the Tank crews, would go far to compensate for the somewhat -attenuated line of probably tired Infantry spread in -two Brigades over an ultimate frontage of over 10,000 -yards.</p> - -<p>No definite time-table was laid down for the closing phases<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[92]</a></span> -of the battle, except for the regulation of the times when our -Heavy Artillery should "lift off" designated targets—such as -villages, farms, and known gun positions—and lengthen its range -so as not to obstruct the further advance of our own Infantry. -But it was estimated that, from the opening of the battle, the -green line would be reached in two and a half hours, the red line -in six hours, and the blue line in eight hours. As the battle was -to open at the first streak of dawn, it would, if all went well, -be completed according to plan by about midday.</p> - -<p>In every battle plan, whether great or small, it is necessary -first of all to map out the whole of the intended action of the -Infantry, at any rate on the general lines indicated above. When -that has been done the next step is to work backwards, and to -test the feasibility of each body of infantry being able to reach -its allotted point of departure, punctually, without undue -stress on the troops, and without crossing or impeding the line -of movement of any other body of infantry. It is often necessary -to test minutely, by reference to calculations of time and space, -more than one alternative plan for marshalling the Infantry -prior to battle, and for the successive movements, day by day, -and from point to point, of every battalion engaged.</p> - -<p>The present case was no exception, and, indeed, presented -quite special difficulties. The whole of the area for a depth -of many thousands of yards behind our then front line was open -rolling country, devoid of any cover, and (except in the actual -valley of the Somme) with every village, hamlet, farmhouse, -factory and wood obliterated. The plan involved the assembly, -in this confined area, fully exposed by day to the view of any -inquisitive enemy aircraft, of no less than 45 Infantry Battalions, -with all their paraphernalia of war; not to speak of our 600 -guns of all calibres, their wagon lines, horse lines and motor -parks, together with Engineers, Pioneers, Tanks, Medical and -Supply Units amounting to tens of thousands of men and animals.</p> - -<p>A new factor which, however, ultimately controlled the final -decision which I had to make as to the nature of the dispositions -prior to battle, lay in the consideration of the maximum distances -which would have to be covered by the foot soldiers in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[93]</a></span> -such a far-flung battle. I had little difficulty in coming to the -conclusion that the obvious and normal arrangement was on -this occasion a totally wrong arrangement. If the assaulting -Brigades had been arranged, from front to rear, in their assembly -areas prior to battle, in the same order as that in which they would -have to come into action, this would have involved that the -individual man, who was to be required to march and fight his -way furthest into enemy country, and, therefore, was to be the -last to enter the fight, would also be called upon to march furthest -from his rearmost position of assembly before even reaching -the battle zone. The maximum distance to be traversed on the -day of battle by infantry would have amounted, according to -such a plan, to over ten miles. While this is an easy day's march -on a good road, under tranquil conditions, it would have been an -altogether unreasonable demand upon any infantryman during -the stress and nervous excitement of battle. It would have -been courting a breakdown from over-fatigue, among the very -troops upon whom I had to rely most to defend the captured -territory against any serious enemy reaction.</p> - -<p>I therefore adopted the not very obvious course of completely -reversing the normal procedure, and of disposing the Brigades -in depth, from front to rear, in exactly the <i>reverse</i> of the order in -which, in point of time, they would enter the battle.</p> - -<p>The following represents, diagrammatically, the disposition of -all twelve Brigades after having been fully <i>deployed</i> in the actual -course of the battle:</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 944px;"> -<img src="images/diagram1.png" width="944" height="357" alt="" /> -</div> - -<pre> -^ (4th Division) | (5th Division) -| Direction 4 -- 12 | 8 -- 15 -| of North 1 Inter- 14 South -| enemy. (3rd Division) Divisional (2nd Division) -| 11 -- 9 Boundary. 5 -- 7 -| | Our front line -|----------------------------------+------------------------------- -| | before battle -| 10 (in our trenches) | 6 (in our trenches) -</pre> - -<p>The next diagram shows how the twelve Brigades were disposed while<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[94]</a></span> -Phase A of the battle was in progress, and before the second Phase had -begun:</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 918px;"> -<img src="images/diagram2.png" width="918" height="372" alt="" /> -</div> - -<pre> - (3rd Division) | (2nd Division) - 11 -- 9 | 5 -- 7 - Inter- Our front line ------------------------Divisional--------------------------- - Boundary. before battle - 10 (in our trenches) | 6 (in our trenches) - (4th Division) | (5th Division) - 4 -- 12 | 8 -- 15 - 1 | 14 -</pre> - -<p>But the following diagram represents, in a similar manner, the order -of disposition of the same Brigades, in the territory under our own -occupation, immediately <i>prior</i> to the battle:</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 940px;"> -<img src="images/diagram3.png" width="940" height="416" alt="" /> -</div> - -<pre> -^ (3rd Division) | (2nd Division) -| | Our front line -|-----------------------------------+----------------------------- -| Direction Inter- before battle -| of 10 (in our trenches) Divisional 6 (in our trenches) -| enemy. (4th Division) Boundary. (5th Division) -| 4 -- 12 | 8 -- 15 -| North 1 | 14 South -| (3rd Division) | (2nd Division) -| 11 -- 9 | 5 -- 7 -</pre> - -<p>A little consideration will show that this apparently paradoxical -procedure brought about the desired result of more nearly -equalizing the stress upon the whole of the Infantry engaged, -in point, at least, of the maximum distance to be traversed in -the day's operations. But it produced something else, also, -of much greater concern, which was that the scheme involved -a leapfrogging of Divisions during the approach march into the -battle, in addition to a second leapfrogging, to which I was already -committed, to occur at a later stage during the battle itself.</p> - -<p>Thus I was confronted with the dilemma that the only scheme<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[95]</a></span> -of disposition which promised success for the subsequent battle -was also that scheme which made the greatest possible demands -upon the intelligence of the troops and the sympathetic, loyal -and efficient co-operation of my own Corps Staff, and those of -the Commanders acting under me. Influenced once again by -the confidence which I felt in my whole command, I did not -hesitate to increase the complexity of the plans for the Infantry -action by calling upon the four Divisions to execute a manœuvre -which is unique in the history of war, namely, a "double leapfrog," -simultaneously carried out by two separate pairs of Divisions, -operating side by side. The first leap was to take place -during the approach to the battle, the second during the progress -of the battle itself.</p> - -<p>This expedient, which I finally decided to adopt, in spite of the -dangers involved in its complexity and in the absence of any -precedent, was, however, as logical analysis and the event itself -proved, the very keynote of the success of the entire project. -The whole plan, thanks to an intelligent interpretation by all -Commanders and Staffs concerned, worked like a well-oiled machine, -with smoothness, precision and punctuality, and achieved -to the fullest extent the advantages aimed at.</p> - -<p>On the one hand, the stress upon the troops was reduced to -a minimum. By the reduction of physical fatigue, it conserved -the energies of whole Divisions in a manner which permitted of -their speedy re-employment in subsequent decisive operations. -And on the other hand, by the great depth of penetration which -it rendered possible, it ensured a victory which amounted to so -crushing a blow to the enemy that its momentum hurled him -into a retrograde movement, not only along the whole front -under attack, but also for many miles on either flank. This -recoil he was never able to arrest, as we followed up our victory -by blow after blow delivered while he was still reeling from the -effects of the first onslaught of August 8th.</p> - -<p>But, so far, I have written of the Infantry plan only; and -much remains to be told of the simultaneous action designed -to be taken by all the other arms, which rendered possible and -emphasized the success of the Infantry. No one can rival me<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[96]</a></span> -in my admiration for the transcendant military virtues of the -Australian Infantryman, for his bravery, his battle discipline, -his absolute reliability, his individual resource, his initiative and -endurance. But I had formed the theory that the true rôle -of the Infantry was not to expend itself upon heroic physical -effort, nor to wither away under merciless machine-gun fire, -nor to impale itself on hostile bayonets, nor to tear itself to pieces -in hostile entanglements—(I am thinking of Pozières and Stormy -Trench and Bullecourt, and other bloody fields)—but, on the contrary, -to advance under the maximum possible protection of the -maximum possible array of mechanical resources, in the form of -guns, machine guns, tanks, mortars and aeroplanes; to advance -with as little impediment as possible; to be relieved as far as -possible of the obligation to <i>fight</i> their way forward; to march, -resolutely, regardless of the din and tumult of battle, to the appointed -goal; and there to hold and defend the territory gained; -and to gather in the form of prisoners, guns and stores, the fruits -of victory.</p> - -<p>It is my purpose, therefore, to emphasize particularly the -extent to which this theory was realized in the battle under review, -by the achievement of a great and decisive victory at a trifling -cost. That result was due primarily to the very ample resources -in mechanical aids which the foresight and confidence of the -Fourth Army Commander, General Rawlinson, entrusted to me; -but it was due partly, also, to the manner in which those resources -were employed. And that is why I shall attempt to describe -the remainder of the Corps plan.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_096fp.jpg" width="1200" height="763" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>Tanks marching into Battle.</p></div> -</div> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_097fp.jpg" width="1200" height="763" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>Morcourt Valley—the Australian attack swept across this on August 8th, 1918.</p></div> -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[97]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER VI<br /> - -The battle plan (<i>continued</i>)</h2> - - -<p>Surprise has been, from time immemorial, one of the -most potent weapons in the armoury of the tactician. -It can be achieved not merely by doing that which the enemy -least anticipates, but also by acting at a time when he least -expects any action. It was a weapon which had been employed -only rarely in the previous greater battles of this war. The -offensive before Cambrai, planned by General Sir Julian Byng, -and the battle of Hamel, were rare exceptions to our general -procedure of heralding the approach of an offensive by feverish -and obvious activity on our part, and by a long sustained preliminary -bombardment of the enemy's defences, designed to -destroy his works and impair his <i>moral</i>.</p> - -<p>The situation on the Fourth Army front, early in August, -1918, offered a rare opportunity for the employment of surprise -tactics on the boldest scale. The incessant "nibbling" activities -of the Australian troops during the preceding three months -had been of such a consistent nature as to suggest that our -resources were not equal to any greater effort upon such an -extended front as we were then holding, from the Ancre down to -and beyond Villers-Bretonneux. On the other hand, the passivity -of the first French Army, to the south of the latter town, conveyed -no suggestion of any offensive enterprise on the part of our Ally -in this region.</p> - -<p>The problem, therefore, was to convert an extensive front -from a state of passive defence to a state of complete preparedness -for an attack on the largest scale, and to keep the enemy—who, -as always, was alert and observant both from the ground<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[98]</a></span> -and from the air—in complete ignorance of every portion of these -extensive preparations, until the very moment when the battle -was to burst upon him. It was, of course, a question not merely -of deceiving the enemy troops in their trenches immediately -opposed to us, but also of arousing in the minds of the German -High Command no suspicions which might have prompted them -to hold in a state of readiness, or to put into motion towards -the threatened zone, any of the reserve Divisions forming part of -their still considerable resources.</p> - -<p>The following memorandum, which was issued to the whole of -the senior commanders in the Australian Corps on August 1st, -gives in outline some of the measures adopted to this end:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"<span class="smcap">Secrecy.</span></p> - -<p>"1. The first essential to success is the maintenance of -secrecy. The means to be adopted are as follows:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(i) No person is to be told or informed in any part -or way until such time as the development of the plan -demands action from him. This is the main principle -and will be pursued throughout, down to the lowest -formation.</p> - -<p>(ii) Divisional Commanders will work out their reliefs -in such a way as will ensure that the troops in the line -know nothing of the proposed operation until the last -possible moment. This will apply in particular to any -troops who may be employed in the area south of the -<span class="smcap">Amiens</span>—<span class="smcap">Villers-Bretonneux</span> railway.</p></blockquote> - -<p>"2. In order to conceal the intention to carry out a -large operation on this front the following plan has been -adopted:</p> - -<p>"The Australian Corps has been relieved of one divisional -sector by the Third Corps, and takes over a divisional sector -from the French Corps. The object of this is to lead the -enemy, and our own people, too, to believe that the action -of the French in the <span class="smcap">Soissons</span> salient has been so costly as -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[99]</a></span>to demand that further French troops had to be made available, -and that this is the apparent cause of the extension of -the Australian Corps front to the south.</p> - -<p>"3. (a) The idea is being circulated that the Canadian -Corps is being brought to the south to take over the -rôle of Reserve Corps at the junction of the British and -French Armies in replacement of the 22nd Corps, which -occupied that rôle until it was ordered to the <span class="smcap">Champagne</span> -front. In order that the enemy may be deceived as to the -destination of the Canadian Corps in the event of his discovering -that it has been withdrawn from the <span class="smcap">Arras</span> front, -Canadian wireless personnel has been sent to the Second -Army area,<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> where they have taken over certain wireless -zones.</p> - -<p>"(b) To prevent the enemy from discovering the arrival -of the Canadian Corps in this region, they will not take over -from the 4th Australian Division until 'Y' night. This -will necessitate a proportion of the troops of the Fourth -Australian Division remaining in the line in this sector -until 'Y' night. As the Fourth Australian Division will -be required to participate in the attack it is proposed to -distribute one brigade to hold the whole of the line from -'W' night onwards. This will enable the remaining two -Brigades to be withdrawn, given a day or two's rest, and -allow of their part in the operation being fully explained -to them. The place of these two Brigades in rear of the line -Brigade will be taken over by Canadian Divisions.</p> - -<p>"(c) In order to deceive our own troops as to the cause -of the coming down here of the Canadians, a rumour is going -abroad that the Canadian Corps is being brought down -with the object of relieving the Australian Corps in the -line. To most of the Australian Corps this would appear -to be an obvious reason for their coming, as the idea has -been mooted on former occasions. While it is not intended -that this rumour should be promulgated, it is not desired -that anyone should disclose the actual facts. This idea, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[100]</a></span>together with the idea put forth in paragraph 3 (a), should -do much to prevent the real facts from becoming known."<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p></blockquote> - -<p>The references to "W," "X," "Y" and "Z" days and nights -in the above memo, are to the successive days preceding Zero -day—known briefly as "Z" day, on which the battle was to -open. The actual <i>date</i> of "Z" day was kept a close secret by -the Army Commander and the three Corps Commanders concerned, -until a few days before the actual date; while the actual -moment of assault, or "Zero" hour, was not determined or made -known until noon on the day preceding the battle, after a close -study of the conditions of visibility before and after break of -day, on the three preceding mornings.</p> - -<p>But these arrangements were directed only towards the prevention -of a premature disclosure of our intention to attack to -the enemy, to our own troops, and through them to the civilian -public, and to enemy agents, whose presence among us had -always to be reckoned with. It still remained to carry out our -battle preparations in a manner which would preclude the -possibility of detection by enemy aircraft, either through direct -observation, or by the help of photography.</p> - -<p>Accordingly I issued orders that all movements of troops and -of transport of all descriptions, should take place only during the -hours of darkness, whether in the forward or in the rear areas; -and in order to keep an effective control over the faithful execution -of these difficult orders, I arranged for relays of "police" -aeroplanes, furnished by our No. 3 Squadron, to fly continuously, -by day, over the whole of the Corps area, in order to detect and -report upon any observed unusual movement.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[101]</a></span></p> - -<p>At the same time, the normal work on the construction of new -lines of defence, covering Amiens, in my rear areas, which had -been continuously in progress for many weeks and was still -far from complete, was to continue, with a full display of activity; -so that the enemy should be unable to infer, from a stoppage of -such works, any change in our attitude.</p> - -<p>Orders were also given to discourage the usual stream of officers -who ordinarily visited our front trenches prior to an operation, -and who often, thoughtlessly, made a great display of unusual -activity, under the very noses of the enemy front line observers, -by the flourishing of maps and field-glasses, and by bobbing up -above our parapets to catch fleeting glimpses of the country to -be fought over. Such reconnaissance, however desirable, was to -be confined to a few senior Commanders and Staff Officers. -All subordinates were to rely upon the very large number of -admirable photographs, taken regularly from the air, both -vertically and obliquely, by the indefatigable Corps Air Squadron. -These served excellently as a substitute for visual observation -from the ground.</p> - -<p>The prohibition against the movement of any transport in -the daylight naturally very seriously hampered the freedom of -action of the troops of all arms and services, but was felt in quite -a special degree by the whole of the Artillery. Over 600 guns of -all natures had to be dragged to and emplaced in their battle positions, -and there camouflaged, each gun involving the concurrent -movement of a number of associated vehicles. A full supply -of ammunition had to be collected from railhead, distributed by -mechanical transport to great main dumps, and thence taken by -horsed vehicles for distribution to the numerous actual gun-pits.</p> - -<p>As the amount of ammunition to be held in readiness for the -opening of the battle averaged 500 rounds per gun, it became -necessary to handle a total of about 300,000 rounds of shells -and a similar number of cartridges of all calibres, from 3½ to -12 inches, not to mention fuses and primers, or the immense -bulk and weight of infantry and machine-gun ammunition, -bombs, flares, rockets, and the like, for the supply of all of which -the artillery was equally responsible.<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> The great amount of -movement involved in the handling and dumping of all these -munitions, and the deterrent difficulties of carrying out all such -work only during the short hours of darkness, must be left to the -imagination.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[102]</a></span></p> -<p>The artillery was, however, confronted, for the first time, with -a difficulty of quite a different nature. In the previous years of -the war every gun, <i>after</i> being placed in its fighting pit or position, -had to be carefully "registered," by firing a series of rounds at -previously identified reference points, and noting the errors in -line or range due to the instrumental error of the gun, which -error varied with the gradual wearing-out of the gun barrel. -By these means, battery commanders were enabled to compute -the necessary corrections to be applied to any given gun, at any -one time or place, so as to ensure that the gun would fire true to -the task set.</p> - -<p>Such registration naturally involved, for a large number of guns, -a very considerable volume of Artillery fire, the extent of which -would speedily disclose to the enemy the presence of a largely -increased mass of Artillery, and would inevitably lead him to the -conclusion that some mischief was afoot. Fortunately, however, -the rapid evolution during the war of scientific methods had by -this juncture placed at my disposal a means of ascertaining the -instrumental error of the guns on a testing ground located many -miles behind the battle zone. This method was known as "calibration," -and consisted of the firing of the gun through a series -of wired screens, placed successively at known distances from the -muzzle of the gun. The whole elements of the flight of the projectile -could then be accurately determined by recording the intervals -of time between its passage through the respective screens. -From these data could be deduced the muzzle velocity, the jump, -the droop and the lateral error of each gun.</p> - -<p>Simple and obvious as was the principle of such an experiment, -the merit of the new process of calibration lay in the remarkable -rapidity and accuracy with which the electric and photographic -mechanism employed made the necessary delicate time -observations, correct to small fractions of a second, and automatically -deduced the mathematical results required. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[103]</a></span> -calibration hut, in which this mechanism was housed, became one -of the show spots to which visitors to the Corps area were taken to -be overawed by the scientific methods of our gunners.</p> - -<p>In the early days of August the calibration range of the Australian -Corps was a scene of feverish activity. All day long, -battery after battery of guns could be seen route-marching to the -testing ground, going through the performance of firing six rounds -per gun, and then route-marching back again the same night to -its allotted battle position. So rapid was the procedure that long -before he had reached his destination the Battery Commander -had received the full error sheet of every one of his guns, and by -means of it was enabled to go into action whenever required without -any previous registration whatever. This great advance -in the art of gunnery contributed in the most direct manner -to the result that when these 600 guns opened their tornado of -fire upon the enemy at daybreak on August 8th, the very presence -in this area of most of them remained totally unsuspected.</p> - -<p>The manner of the employment of the ponderous mass of Heavy -Artillery at my disposal will be referred to later. The action of -that portion of the Field Artillery which was to become mobile -in the concluding phases of the battle has already been dealt with. -It remains only to describe, in outline, the arrangements made -for the normal barrage fire of the Field Artillery during the -first phase.</p> - -<p>It has been my invariable practice to reduce the barrage plan -to the simplest possible elements, avoiding in every direction the -over-elaboration so frequently encountered. By following these -principles not only is the actual preparatory work of the Artillery -greatly reduced in bulk and simplified in quality, but also the -liability to mistake and to erratic shooting of individual batteries -or guns, and consequent risks of damage to our own Infantry, -are greatly diminished. These advantages are bought at the -small price of calling upon the Infantry to undertake, before the -battle, such rectifications and adjustments of our front line as -would accommodate themselves to a straight and simple barrage -line. This is in sharp contrast to the much more usual procedure -which prevailed (and persisted in other Corps to the end of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[104]</a></span> -war) of complicating the barrage enormously in an attempt to -make it conform to the tortuous configuration of our Infantry -front line.</p> - -<p>For the present battle it was accordingly arranged that the -barrage should open on a line which was <i>dead straight</i> for the -whole 7,000 yards of our front, and the Infantry tape lines,<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> -which were to mark the alignment of the Infantry at the moment -of launching the assault, were to be laid exactly 200 yards in -rear of this Artillery "start line." The barrage was to advance, -in exactly parallel lines, 100 yards at a time, at equal rates along -the whole frontage. These rates were 100 yards every 3 minutes, -for the first 24 minutes, and thereafter 100 yards every 4 minutes, -until the conclusion of the time-table at 143 minutes after Zero. -By such a simple plan every one of the 432 field guns engaged was -given a task of uniform character.</p> - -<p>Great as was the care necessary to conceal all Artillery preparations, -it required still greater thought and consideration to keep -entirely secret the presence behind the battle front of some 160 -Tanks, and particularly to conceal their approach march into the -battle. To both combatants, the arrival of a Tank, or anything -that could be mistaken on an air photograph for a Tank, had for -long been regarded as a sure indication of coming trouble. And, -therefore, imputing to the enemy the same keenness to detect, -in good time, the presence of Tanks, and the same nervousness -which we had been accustomed to feel when prisoners' tales of -the coming into the war of enormous hordes of German monsters -had been crystallized by the reports of some excited observer into -a definite suspicion that the fateful hour had arrived, I considered -it wise to repeat on a much elaborated scale all the precautions of -secrecy first employed for this purpose at Hamel.</p> - -<p>It is quite easy to detect from an air photograph the broad, -corrugated track made by a Tank, if the ground be soft and muddy -enough to record such an impression. Consequently, Tanks were -forbidden to move across ploughed fields or marshy land, and were -confined to hard surface. They moved only in small bodies, -and only at night, and were carefully stabled, during the daylight, -in the midst of village ruins, or under the deep shade of woods and -thickets. Thus, by daily stages, and by cautious bounds, each Tank -or group of Tanks ultimately reached its appointed assembly -ground, from which it was to make its last leap into the thick of -the battle, where it would arrive precisely at Zero hour.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[105]</a></span></p> -<p>But that last leap was just the whole difficulty. For the Tank -is a noisy brute, and it was just as imperative to make him -inaudible as to make him invisible. By a fortunate chance, -the noise and buzz made by the powerful petrol engines of a Tank -are so similar to those of the engines of a large-sized bombing -plane, as for example of the Handley-Page type, especially if the -latter be flying at a comparatively low altitude, that from a -little distance off it is quite impossible to distinguish the one sound -from the other.</p> - -<p>It was therefore possible to adopt the conjurer's trick of directing -the special attention of the observer to those things which do -not particularly matter, in order to distract his attention from -other things which really do matter very much. In other words, -a flight of high-power bombing planes was kept flying backwards -and forwards over the battle front during the whole of that very -hour, just before dawn, during which our 160 Tanks were loudly -and fussily buzzing their way forward, along carefully reconnoitred -routes, marked by special black and white tapes, across that last -mile of country which brought them up level with the infantry -at the precise moment when the great battle was ushered in by the -belching forth of a volcano of Artillery fire.</p> - -<p>The subterfuge succeeded to perfection, as was obvious to -observers and confirmed by the subsequent narratives of prisoners. -The German trench garrisons and trench observers were fully -occupied in listening to the hum of the bombing planes, in -watching their threatened visitation for their customary "egg" -dropping performances, in engaging them with rifle fire, and in -holding themselves in readiness to duck for cover should they -come too near. They never suspected for a moment that this was -merely a new stratagem of "noise camouflage," and that the real -danger was stalking steadily and relentlessly towards them over the -whole front, upon the surface of the ground, instead of in the air.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[106]</a></span></p> - -<p>But the trick would not have succeeded so well, or would perhaps -have failed altogether, if the employment of those planes had -been confined to the morning of the battle. Such an unusual -demonstration might have aroused vague suspicions sufficient to -justify a "stand to arms" and a preparedness for some further -activity on our part. And what we had most to fear was the -danger of "giving the show away" in the last ten minutes. For -it would have taken much less than that time for nervous German -trench sentries, by the firing of signal rockets, to bring down -upon our front line trenches, crowded as they were with -expectant fighters, a murderous fire from the German -Artillery.</p> - -<p>Consequently the puzzled enemy was treated to the spectacle -of an early morning promenade by these same bombing planes on -every morning, for an hour before dawn, during several mornings -preceding the actual battle day. Doubtless the first morning's -exhibition of such apparently aimless air activity in the darkness -really startled him. After two or three repetitions, it merely -earned his contempt. By the time the actual date arrived he -treated it as negligible. All prisoners interrogated subsequently -agreed that neither the presence nor the noisy approach of so -mighty a phalanx of Tanks had been in the least suspected up to -the very moment when they plunged into view out of the darkness, -just as day was breaking.</p> - -<p>The force of Tanks placed at my disposal for the purposes of -this battle comprised the 2nd, 8th and 13th Tank Battalions, -commanded respectively by Lieut.-Colonels Bryce, Bingham -and Lyon, all under the 5th Tank Brigade, commanded by -Brigadier-General Courage. All these Tanks were of the Mark V. -type, as used at Hamel; but there were also attached to the same -Brigade a Battalion of Mark V. (Star) Tanks, of still later design, -under Lieut.-Colonel Ramsay-Fairfax, and also a full Company of -24 Carrying Tanks, under Major Partington. These Carrying -Tanks were not employed in fighting, but were of wonderful -utility in the rapid transport of stores of all descriptions across -the battle zone; and in carrying the wounded out of the battle -on their return journey. I am confident that each of these Tanks<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[107]</a></span> -was capable of doing the work of at least 200 men, with an almost -complete immunity from casualty.</p> - -<p>There were thus available to me 168 Tanks in all, and their -dispositions have been already indicated in sufficient detail in -Chapter V. It was a definite feature of the whole plan of battle -that the combined Tank and Infantry tactics which had proved -so successful in the Hamel operation, and which have been -described in Chapter II., were to be employed and exploited to their -utmost. Each Tank became thereby definitely associated with a -specified body of Infantry, and acted during the actual battle -under the immediate orders of the Commander of that body: -the working rule was "one Tank, one Company."</p> - -<p>To this was added the second working principle of "one Tank, -one task," which rules meant, in their practical application, -that no individual Tank was to be relied upon to serve more than -one body of Infantry, nor to carry out more than one phase of the -battle. Elementary as this may sound, it involved this striking -advantage that, in the event of any one Tank becoming disabled, -its loss would impair no portion of the battle plan other than -that fraction of it to which that Tank had been allotted.</p> - -<p>Thus, the whole of the Infantry operating in Phases B and C -of the battle had each their own adequate equipment of Tanks, -which would be certain to be available to them, even if the whole -of the Tanks employed during Phase A had been knocked out. -At the same time clear orders were issued, and due arrangements -were made, that all Tanks which survived Phase A, and whose -crews were not by then too exhausted, were to rally (during the -100 minutes' pause on the green line) in order to co-operate in the -succeeding phases of the fight.</p> - -<p>There was still another Unit, coming under the jurisdiction of -the Tank Corps, which proved of wonderful utility to me, and -which deserved quite special mention. This was the 17th -Armoured Car Battalion, organized into two companies of eight -cars each. Each car carried one forward and one rear Hotchkiss -gun. It was heavily armoured, and the crew operating the guns, -as also the car driver, were protected from all except direct hits -by Artillery. The cars had a speed of 20 miles per hour,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[108]</a></span> -either forwards or backwards. The Battalion was under the -command of Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Carter, an officer of the British -Cavalry. I allotted 12 cars to the use of the 5th Australian -Division, under Major-General Hobbs, who would be likely to -find specially useful employment for them, in scouring the network -of roads beyond his final objective; and retained four cars in -Corps reserve for a special reconnaissance enterprise.</p> - -<p>Full of promise of usefulness as were the speed and armament -of these cars, they suffered from one serious disability. Their -top hamper was so heavy compared to their light chassis that -they could not be relied upon to travel without premature breakdown -across country, or indeed on anything but moderately -good roads. Now, such roads were certainly available, as was -evident from aeroplane photographs, in the enemy's back country, -after a zone for a mile or two immediately behind his front line -was passed; but all the subsidiary roads in that zone had been -practically obliterated by shell-craters, and even the great main -road from Villers-Bretonneux to Saint Quentin, which is a Roman -Road and substantially constructed throughout, was known to -have been cut up and traversed by numerous trenches both on our -side and on the enemy's side of "No Man's Land." There was -also every expectation that the few remaining trees which flanked -this great road would be felled by our bombardment, and some of -them would surely fall across and obstruct the roadway.</p> - -<p>That road was, however, the only possible outlet into enemy -country for the armoured cars, and I resolved upon a special programme, -and the allotment of a special body of troops for its execution. -The object was to ensure that the cars could be taken -across the impracticable and obstructed stretch of roadway already -described, and launched at the enemy at its eastern extremity, -at the earliest possible moment of time. Then, before the -numerous enemy Corps and Divisional Headquarters and all their -rear organization had time to get clear intelligence of what was -happening at the front, or to recover from the first shock of -surprise, these Armoured Cars would fall upon them, and, travelling -hither and thither at great speed, would spread death, destruction -and confusion in all directions.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[109]</a></span></p> - -<p>A whole Battalion of Pioneers, and detachments of other technical -troops, with an adequate amount of road-repairing material, -were got ready, under the direct orders of my Chief Engineer, to -carry out this special task. All trenches in that portion of the -road lying within our own zone of occupation were bridged or -filled in and all obstructions cleared away before the day of the -battle. But as to the more distant stretch of the road, still in -the hands of the enemy, elaborate preparations were made, by a -careful and detailed distribution of tasks to small gangs of men, -and by a fully worked-out time-table. The plan was that from the -moment of the opening of the battle, this road repair work was to -commence, and its advance was to synchronize with the advance -of the Artillery barrage and Infantry skirmishing line.</p> - -<p>A pilot armoured car was to follow the working gangs in order -to test the sufficiency of the repair work, and arrangements -were made for sending back signals to the remainder of the cars, -lying waiting in readiness in the shelter of Villers-Bretonneux. -It was planned that the first two miles of road would, by these -means, be cleared and repaired to a sufficient width, within four -hours after the opening of the battle.</p> - -<p>I am tempted to anticipate the narrative of the battle by saying -that the whole plan worked out with complete success to the last -detail. The cars got through punctually to time, and the story -of their subsequent adventures, as told later, reads like a romance. -As indicating the importance which I attached to this little -enterprise, which in magnitude was quite a small "side-show," -but which in its results had the most far-reaching consequence, -I reproduce below the full text (omitting merely formal portions) -of one of the several orders issued by me on this subject:</p> - -<blockquote> -<div class="right"> -Australian Corps,<br /> -7th August, 1918.<br /> -</div> - -<p>1. The detachment of the 17th Armoured Car Battalion -held in Corps Reserve (2 sections each of 2 cars), will be -employed on the special duty of long distance reconnaissance -on "Z" day.</p> - -<p>2. These sections will be sent forward under the orders -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[110]</a></span>of the C.O., 17th Armoured Car Battalion, passing the -green line as soon as practicable after Zero plus four hours, -and proceeding eastward, following the lifts of our Heavy -Artillery bombardment, so as to pass the blue line at or -after Zero plus five hours.</p> - -<p>3. The area to be reconnoitred lies in the bend of the -Somme, north of the Villers-Bretonneux—Chaulnes Railway; -but the old Somme battlefield lying N.E. of Chaulnes -need not be entered.</p> - -<p>4. Information is required as to presence, distribution -and movement of enemy supporting and reserve troops, -and his defensive organizations within this area.</p> - -<p>5. While the primary function of this detachment is to -reconnoitre and not to fight, except defensively, advantage -should be taken of every opportunity to damage the -enemy's telephonic and telegraphic communications.</p> - -<p>6. The following information as to enemy organizations -is thought to be reliable:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left">Vauvillers</td><td align="left">Billets and Detraining point.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Proyart</td><td align="left">Divisional H.Q. and billets.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Chuignolles</td><td align="left">Divisional H.Q. and billets.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Framerville</td><td align="left">Corps H.Q.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Rainecourt</td><td align="left">Billets.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Cappy</td><td align="left">Aerodrome and dumps.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Foucaucourt</td><td align="left">Corps H.Q., dump, billets.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Chaulnes</td><td align="left">Important railway junction.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Ommiécourt</td><td align="left">Dumps.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Fontaine</td><td align="left">Aerodrome, Div. H.Q. and dump.</td></tr> -</table> -</div> -</blockquote> - -<p>The Heavy Artillery of the Corps was divided, for this battle -as normally, into two distinct groups, of which the one, or Bombardment -Group, was to devote its energies to destructive -attack, throughout the course of the battle, upon known enemy -centres of resistance, suspected Headquarters, and telephone or -telegraph exchanges, villages believed to be housing support -and reserve troops, railway junctions and the like. The selection<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[111]</a></span> -of all such targets depended upon a judicious choice of many -tempting objectives disclosed by the very comprehensive records -of the highly efficient Intelligence Officers belonging to my -Heavy Artillery Headquarters. After that selection was made, -all that remained was to draw up a time-table for the action of -all bombardment guns which would ensure that they would -lift off any given target just before our own Infantry would be -likely to reach it, and then to apply their fire to a more distant -locality.</p> - -<p>The second group of Heavy Guns was known as the Counter-battery -Group, and was at all times under the direction of a -special staff, especially skilled in all the scientific means at our -disposal for determining the position and distribution of the -enemy's Artillery, and in the methods and artifices for silencing -or totally destroying it. Just as it was the special rôle of the -Tanks to deal with the enemy machine guns, so it was the special -rôle of our Counter-battery Artillery to deal with the enemy's -field and heavy guns and howitzers. These—the guns and -the machine guns—were the only things that troubled us; -because, for the German soldier individually, our Australian -infantryman is and always has been more than a match.</p> - -<p>Very special care was, therefore, devoted to the whole of -the arrangements, first for carefully ascertaining beforehand the -actual or probable position of every enemy gun that could be -brought to bear on our Infantry, and then for allocating as many -heavy guns as could be spared, each with a task appropriate to -its range and hitting-power, to the destruction or suppression -of the selected target. For it served the immediate purpose of -eliminating the causes of molestation to our advancing Infantry -equally well, whether the enemy gun was merely silenced by a -sustained fire of shrapnel or high explosives which drove off the -gun detachment, or by a flood of gas which compelled them to -put on their gas masks, or whether it was actually destroyed by -a direct hit and rendered permanently useless.</p> - -<p>The days before the battle were of supreme interest in this -particular aspect. Each day I visited the Counter-battery -Staff Officer, in his modest shanty, hidden away in the interior<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[112]</a></span> -of a leafy wood, where in constant touch, by telephone, with all -balloons, observers and sound-ranging stations, and surrounded -by an imposing array of maps, studded with pins of many shapes -and colours, he made his daily report to me of the enemy gun -positions definitely identified or located, or found to have been -vacated. And here again there was an opportunity for the -display of a modest little stratagem. Having suspected or -verified the fact that the enemy had altered the location of any -given battery, leaving the empty gun pits as a tempting bait to -us, fruitlessly to expend our energies and ammunition upon them—it -would have been the worst of folly to prove to him that he -had failed to fool us, by engaging his battery in its new position.</p> - -<p>On the contrary, we deliberately allowed ourselves to be -fooled; and for several days before the great battle we intentionally -committed the stupid error of methodically engaging -all his empty gun positions. No doubt the German gunners -laughed consumedly as they watched, from a safe distance, our -wasted efforts; but they did not, doubtless, laugh quite so -heartily when at dawn on the great day, the whole weight of -our attack from over a hundred of my heaviest Counter-battery -guns fells upon them in the new positions, which they believed -that we had failed to detect.</p> - -<p>The Intelligence Service of the Corps was an extensive and -highly organized department, whose jurisdiction extended -throughout all the Divisions, Brigades and Battalions. Its -routine work comprised the collection and collation of the daily -flow of information from a large staff of observers in the forward -zone, from the interrogation of prisoners, from the examination -of documents and maps, and from neighbouring Corps and -Armies. Before and during battle, however, a greatly added -burden fell upon the shoulders of the Intelligence Staff.</p> - -<p>Closely associated with this branch of the Staff work were -two activities of quite special interest. The Australian Corps -organized a Topographical Section, manned by expert draftsmen -and lithographers, who compiled and printed all the maps -required throughout the whole Corps, and it was their business -to keep all battle maps, barrage maps and topographical data -recorded and corrected up to date. This alone proved a heavy -task when pace had to be kept with a rapid advance. At such -times the maps prepared on one day became obsolete two or -three days later.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_112fp.jpg" width="1200" height="776" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>Dug-outs at Froissy Beacon—being "mopped up" during battle.</p></div> -</div> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_113fp.jpg" width="1200" height="778" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>Péronne—barricade in main street.</p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[113]</a></span></p> - -<p>The issue of such maps was not confined to Commanders and -Staffs. For all important operations, large numbers of handy -sectional maps were struck off, so that they could be placed in -the hands even of the subordinate officers and non-commissioned -officers. These maps not only enabled the most junior leaders -to study their objectives and tasks in detail before every battle, -but also became a convenient vehicle for sending back reports -as to the positions reached or occupied by front-line troops or -detached parties. On occasions as many as five thousand of -such maps would be struck off for the use of the troops, in a -single operation.</p> - -<p>There was also a branch of the Intelligence Staff attached -to the No. 3 Australian Air Squadron. Its special business was -to print and distribute large numbers of photographs, both -vertical and oblique, taken from the air over the territory to be -captured—showing trenches, wire, roads, hedges and many -other features of paramount interest to the troops. Thousands -of such photographs were distributed before every battle.</p> - -<p>The important considerations, in regard both to maps and -photographs, were that on the one hand, they were of priceless -value to all who understood how to read and use them, and on -the other hand, the event proved that their issue was in no sense -labour in vain, for the keen interest taken, even by the private -soldiers, in these facilities contributed powerfully to the success -and precision with which all battle orders were carried out, and -this more than repaid us for the additional trouble involved. -It was inspiriting to me to see, on the eve of every great battle, -as I made my round of the troops, numerous small groups of -men gathered around their sergeant or corporal, eagerly discussing -these maps and the photographs and the things they -disclosed, the lie of the land, the wire, the trenches, the probable -machine-gun posts, the dug-outs and the suspected enemy -strong points.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[114]</a></span></p> - -<p>My account of the details prepared for the battle of August -8th is not nearly complete; but the demands of space forbid -any more informative reference to numerous other essential -ingredients of the plan than a mere recital of some of them. -Thus, for example, it was necessary to decide the action of all -Machine Guns, both those used collectively under Corps control, -and those left to be handled by the Divisions; the employment -of Smoke Tactics, by the use of smoke screens created both by -mortars from the ground and by phosphorus bombs dropped -from the air; the use to be made of all the technical troops -(Engineers and Pioneers) in bridging, road and railway repairs -and field fortifications; the arrangements for the medical -evacuation of the wounded, and for the collection and safe-keeping -of the anticipated haul of prisoners, the synchronization -of watches throughout the whole command, so that action should -occur punctually at a common clock time; and last, but not -least, the establishment of the machinery of liaison internally -between all the numerous formations of the Australian Corps, -and also externally with my flank Corps, the Canadians, under -Currie, on my right, and the British Third Corps, under Butler, -on my left.</p> - -<p>Such, in outline, were my battle plans and my preparations -for what I hoped would prove an operation of decisive influence -upon the future of the campaign. The immediate results, -which could be estimated on the spot and at the time, and the -admissions of Ludendorff, which came to light only many months -afterwards, combine to show that I was not mistaken.</p> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> This was in Flanders and Belgium.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> The secret was, indeed, so well kept, and the "camouflage" stories circulated -proved so effective, that the King of the Belgians forwarded a strong -protest to Marshal Foch because the Canadians were about to deliver an attack -in his country, without his having been consulted or made aware of the plans; -and the Canadian Headquarters in London complained to the War Office that -the Canadian Forces were being divided, and were being sent by detachments -to different parts of the front, instead of being always kept together as the -Canadian Government desired. It is said that even Mr. Lloyd George knew -nothing of the intention to attack until late on the day before the battle.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> The weight of supplies of all kinds exceeded 10,000 tons.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> See Chapter XIII.</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[115]</a></span></p> - - -<h2>CHAPTER VII<br /> - -THE CHASE BEGINS</h2> - - -<p>The preliminary movements of Divisions were duly carried -out without special difficulty. The Fifth Australian -Division was relieved on August 1st by a Division of the Third -Corps, in that part of the Corps front which lay north of the -Somme, and passed into Corps Reserve, in a rear area, there to -undergo training with Tanks, and to prepare itself for the work -which it had to do.</p> - -<p>The Fourth Australian Division, from Corps Reserve, took -over the French front, as far south as the Amiens—Roye road -on August 2nd, and on the next night took over from the Second -Australian Division all that part of its front which lay south -of the railway, thus disposing itself upon what was ultimately -to become the battle front of the Canadian Corps.</p> - -<p>On the same night, the Second and Third Divisions, who had -thus been left in sole occupation of the sector which was to be -the Australian Corps battle front, carried out a readjustment -of their own mutual boundary, which would place each of these -two Divisions upon its own proper battle front.</p> - -<p>On the night of August 4th, the Second and Third Divisions -rearranged their defensive dispositions so that each of them -deployed only a single Brigade for the passive defence of its -front, and withdrew to its rear area its remaining two Brigades, -who were thus afforded three clear days to complete their internal -preparations.</p> - -<p>The Canadian Corps commenced to arrive, and on August 4th -two Canadian Brigades relieved two Brigades of the Fourth -Division, thereby releasing them so that they also might commence -to prepare for the battle. It was originally intended<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[116]</a></span> -that the last Brigade of the Fourth Division should also be -relieved by Canadians on August 6th, when an untoward incident -happened, which caused considerable alarm and speculation; -and it led to a modification of this part of the plan.</p> - -<p>The 13th Australian Brigade (of the Fourth Division) was on -August 4th spread out upon a front of over six thousand yards. -It had no option but to leave the greater part of the front-line -trenches unoccupied, and to defend its area with a series of -small, but isolated, posts. On that night, one of these posts, -in the vicinity of the road to Roye,<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> was raided by the enemy, -and the whole of its occupants, comprising a sergeant and four -or five men, were surrounded and taken prisoner.</p> - -<p>It was an unusual display of enterprise on the part of the -enemy, at this point of time and in this locality. Whether it -had been inspired by sneering criticisms from behind his line -of the nature which have been quoted, or whether signs of -unusual movement or a changed attitude on the part of our -trench garrison had instigated a suspicion that something was -happening which required investigation, could only be surmised. -But the fact remained that five Australians had been -taken, at a place several miles south of the southernmost point -hitherto occupied by "the English."</p> - -<p>The side-stepping of the Australian Corps southwards had -thereby become known to the enemy, and it was necessary -to estimate the deductions which he would be likely to draw -from that discovery. Much depended upon the behaviour of -these prisoners. Would they talk? and, if so, what did they -know? That Australian captives would not volunteer information -likely to imperil the lives of their comrades, might be taken -for granted, but German Intelligence Officers had means at their -disposal to draw from prisoners, unwittingly, anything they -might know.</p> - -<p>We could only hope, under the circumstances, that these men -really did know nothing of our intention to attack; and that, -if they had become aware of the presence of Canadian troops -in the rear areas, they would believe the story which we had -sedulously spread, that the Canadians were merely coming to -relieve the Australian Corps, so that it might have a long rest -after its heroic labours.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[117]</a></span></p> -<p>Not many weeks afterwards it was my good fortune to capture -a German Headquarters, in which were found Intelligence Reports -containing a narrative of this very incident. The importance -of the capture of these men had been recognized, and they had -been taken far behind the lines for an exhaustive examination. -But, despite all efforts of the German Intelligence Staff, they -had refused to disclose anything whatever but their names and -units—which they were bound to do under the rules of war. -The report went on to praise their soldierly bearing and loyal -reticence, and held up these brave Australians as a model to -be followed by their own men, adding that such a demeanour -could only earn the respect of an enemy.</p> - -<p>The alarm which this untoward happening created on our -side of the line led to a determination to redouble our precautions. -The Army Commander proposed, and I agreed, that the -relief of the 13th Brigade by Canadians, <i>prior</i> to the eve of the -battle, was out of the question, as being too risky. It was -decided that the 13th Brigade must remain in the line until the -very last.</p> - -<p>This decision deprived General Maclagan of one of his three -Brigades, and as it would be asking too much of the Fourth -Division to carry out the rôle which had been allotted to it -in the battle, with only two Brigades, I decided that the only -thing to be done was to transfer to the Fourth Division, temporarily, -one of the Brigades of the First Division, which was to -arrive from the north in the course of the next three days.</p> - -<p>Urgent telegrams were therefore despatched to accelerate the -arrival of one of the Brigades of the First Division. In due -course the First Australian Brigade (Mackay) arrived by four -special trains on the night of August 6th, in sufficient time to -enable it to take its place in General Maclagan's order of battle, -in substitution for the 13th Brigade. The 13th Brigade was -destined to have some further stirring adventures before it -again joined its own Division.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[118]</a></span></p> - -<p>The day preceding the great battle arrived all too soon. The -prospect of an advance had sent a thrill through all ranks and -expectation became tense. The use of the telephone had been -ordered to be restricted, especially in the forward areas; for it -was known that the enemy was in possession of listening apparatus, -similar to our own, by which conversations on the telephone -could be tapped, and unguarded references to the impending -operations could be overheard.</p> - -<p>Final inspections had, therefore, to be made, and final injunctions -administered, by Commanders and Staffs traversing -long distances over the extensive Corps area by motor car and -horse, and even on foot. A strange and ominous quiet pervaded -the scene; it was only when the explosion of a stray enemy -shell would cause hundreds of heads to peer out from trenches, -gun-pits and underground shelters, that one became aware that -the whole country was really packed thick with a teeming -population carefully hidden away.</p> - -<p>Later in the afternoon of that last day came another note of -alarm. To the Fourth and Fifth Australian Divisions had been -allotted eighteen Store and Carrying Tanks. These had been -brought the night before, into a small plantation lying about -half a mile to the north of Villers-Bretonneux, loaded to their -utmost capacity with battle stores of all descriptions: reserves -of food and water, rifle ammunition, and a large reserve of Stokes -Mortar bombs; also considerable supplies of petrol, to satisfy -the ravenous appetites of the Tanks themselves.</p> - -<p>This locality suddenly became the object of the closest attention -by the enemy's Artillery. He began to deluge it with such -a volume of fire that in less than half an hour a great conflagration -had been started, which did not subside until fifteen of the -Tanks and all their valuable cargo had been reduced to irretrievable -ruin.</p> - -<p>Had some unusually keen enemy observer perceived the -presence of Tanks in our area, and would that knowledge have -disclosed to him our jealously guarded secret? Fortunately, -my Artillery Commander, Brigadier-General Coxen, making his -last rounds of the Battery positions, was an eye-witness of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[119]</a></span> -whole occurrence, and was able to reassure me. A chance shell—the -last of a dozen fired entirely at random into our area—fell -into the very centre of this group of Tanks, and set fire to -some of the petrol. The resulting cloud of smoke became a -signal to the enemy that something was burning which our -men would probably attempt to salve; and in consonance with -an entirely correct Artillery procedure, he at once concentrated -a heavy fire upon the spot.</p> - -<p>That incident is typical of the perturbations through which -all responsible Commanders have to pass on such occasions. -The occurrence was explained as accidental, and implied no -premature discovery by the enemy. Nothing remained but to -repair the damage, and make special arrangements to replenish -the Stores which these Divisions had lost.</p> - -<p>On the forenoon of the day before the battle, the following -message was promulgated to all the troops:</p> - -<blockquote> -<div class="right"> -Corps Headquarters,<br /> -August 7th, 1918.<br /> -</div> - -<p><span class="smcap">To the Soldiers of the Australian Army Corps.</span></p> - -<p>For the first time in the history of this Corps, all five -Australian Divisions will to-morrow engage in the largest -and most important battle operation ever undertaken by -the Corps.</p> - -<p>They will be supported by an exceptionally powerful -Artillery, and by Tanks and Aeroplanes on a scale never -previously attempted. The full resources of our sister -Dominion, the Canadian Corps, will also operate on our -right, while two British Divisions will guard our left flank.</p> - -<p>The many successful offensives which the Brigades and -Battalions of this Corps have so brilliantly executed during -the past four months have been but the prelude to, and the -preparation for, this greatest and culminating effort.</p> - -<p>Because of the completeness of our plans and dispositions, -of the magnitude of the operations, of the number of troops -employed, and of the depth to which we intend to overrun -the enemy's positions, this battle will be one of the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[120]</a></span>most memorable of the whole war; and there can be no -doubt that, by capturing our objectives, we shall inflict -blows upon the enemy which will make him stagger, and -will bring the end appreciably nearer.</p> - -<p>I entertain no sort of doubt that every Australian soldier -will worthily rise to so great an occasion, and that every -man, imbued with the spirit of victory, will, in spite of -every difficulty that may confront him, be animated by no -other resolve than grim determination to see through to -a clean finish, whatever his task may be.</p> - -<p>The work to be done to-morrow will perhaps make heavy -demands upon the endurance and staying powers of many of -you; but I am confident that, in spite of excitement, fatigue, -and physical strain, every man will carry on to the utmost -of his powers until his goal is won; for the sake of <span class="smcap">Australia</span>, -the Empire and our cause.</p> - -<p>I earnestly wish every soldier of the Corps the best of -good fortune, and a glorious and decisive victory, the story -of which will re-echo throughout the world, and will live -for ever in the history of our home land.</p> - -<div class="right"> -<span class="smcap">John Monash</span>,<br /> -Lieut.-General.<br /> -Cmdg. Australian Corps.<br /> -</div> -</blockquote> - -<p>Not many days afterwards a copy of this order fell into the -hands of the enemy, and the use he tried to make of it, to his -own grave discomfiture, as the event proved, is an interesting -story which will be told in due course.</p> - -<p>Zero hour was fixed for twenty minutes past four, on the -morning of August 8th. It needs a pen more facile than I can -command to describe, and an imagination more vivid to realize -the stupendous import of the last ten minutes. In black darkness, -a hundred thousand infantry, deployed over twelve miles -of front, are standing grimly, silently, expectantly, in readiness to -advance, or are already crawling stealthily forward to get within -eighty yards of the line on which the barrage will fall; all feel -to make sure that their bayonets are firmly locked, or to set<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[121]</a></span> -their steel helmets firmly on their heads; Company and Platoon -Commanders, their whistles ready to hand, are nervously glancing -at their luminous watches, waiting for minute after minute to go -by—and giving a last look over their commands—ensuring that -their runners are by their sides, their observers alert, and that -the officers detailed to control direction have their compasses -set and ready. Carrying parties shoulder their burdens, and -adjust the straps; pioneers grasp their picks and shovels; -engineers take up their stores of explosives and primers and -fuses; machine and Lewis gunners whisper for the last time -to the carriers of their magazines and belt boxes to be sure and -follow up. The Stokes Mortar carrier slings his heavy load, and -his loading numbers fumble to see that their haversacks of -cartridges are handy. Overhead drone the aeroplanes, and from -the rear, in swelling chorus, the buzzing and clamour of the -Tanks grows every moment louder and louder. Scores of telegraph -operators sit by their instruments with their message -forms and registers ready to hand, bracing themselves for the -rush of signal traffic which will set in a few moments later; -dozens of Staff Officers spread their maps in readiness, to record -with coloured pencils the stream of expected information. In -hundreds of pits, the guns are already run up, loaded and laid -on their opening lines of fire; the sergeant is checking the range -for the last time; the layer stands silently with the lanyard -in his hand. The section officer, watch on wrist, counts the last -seconds: "A minute to go"—"Thirty seconds"—"Ten seconds"—"Fire."</p> - -<p>And, suddenly, with a mighty roar, more than a thousand -guns begin the symphony. A great illumination lights up the -Eastern horizon; and instantly the whole complex organization, -extending far back to areas almost beyond earshot of the guns, -begins to move forward; every man, every unit, every vehicle -and every Tank on their appointed tasks and to their designated -goals; sweeping onward relentlessly and irresistibly. Viewed -from a high vantage point and in the glimmer of the breaking -day, a great Artillery barrage surely surpasses in dynamic -splendour any other manifestation of collective human effort.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[122]</a></span></p> - -<p>The Artillery barrage dominates the battle, and the landscape. -The field is speedily covered with a cloak of dust, and smoke and -spume, making impossible any detailed observation, at the time, -of the course of the battle as a whole. The story can only be -indifferently pieced together, long after, by an attempted compilation -of the reports of a hundred different participants, whose -narratives are usually much impaired by personal bias, by the -nervous excitement of the moment, and by an all too limited -range of vision. That is why no comprehensive account yet -exists of some of the major battles of the war, and why those -partial narratives hitherto produced are so often in conflict.</p> - -<p>In so great a battle as this, only the broad facts and tangible -results can be placed on record without danger of controversy. -The whole immense operation proceeded according to plan in -every detail, with a single exception, to which I must specially -refer later on. The first phase, controlled as it was by the -barrage time-table, necessarily ended punctually, and with the -whole of the green line objective in our hands. This success -gave us possession of nearly all the enemy's guns, so that his -artillery retaliation speedily died down.</p> - -<p>The captures in this phase were considerable, and few of the -garrisons of the enemy's forward offensive zone escaped destruction -or capture. The Second and Third Divisions had a comparative -"walk over," and they had come to a halt, with their -tasks completed, before 7 a.m.</p> - -<p>The "open warfare" phase commenced at twenty minutes -past eight, and both the red and the blue lines were captured in -succession half-an-hour ahead of scheduled time. This capture -covered the whole length of my front except the extreme left, -where a half expected difficulty arose, but one which exercised -no influence upon the day's success.</p> - -<p>The Canadians, on my right, had a similar story to tell; -they had driven far into the enemy's defences, exactly as planned. -In spite of the difficulties of observation, the recurrence of a -ground mist of the same nature as we had experienced at Hamel, -and the long distances over which messages and reports had to -travel—the stream of information which reached me, by telegraph,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[123]</a></span> -telephone, pigeon and aeroplane was so full and ample -that I was not left for a moment out of touch with the situation.</p> - -<p>The "inwards" messages are, naturally, far too voluminous for -reproduction; but a brief selection from the many "outwards" -messages telegraphed during that day to the Fourth Army -Headquarters, and which, on a point of responsibility, I made it -an invariable rule to draft myself, will give some indication of -the course of events as they became known:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p><i>Sent at 7 a.m.</i>: "Everything going well at 6.45 a.m. -Heavy ground mist facilitating our advance, but delaying -information. Infantry and Tanks got away punctually. -Our attack was a complete surprise. Gailly Village and -Accroche Wood captured. Enemy artillery has ceased -along my whole front. Flanks Corps apparently doing -well."</p> - -<p><i>Sent at 8.30 a.m.</i>: "Although not definitely confirmed, no -doubt that our first objective green line captured along -whole Corps front including Gailly, Warfusee, Lamotte and -whole Cerisy Valley. Many guns and prisoners taken. -Infantry and Artillery for second phase moving up to -green line."</p> - -<p><i>Sent at 10.55 a.m.</i>: "Fifteenth Battalion has captured -Cerisy with 300 prisoners. Advance to red line going -well."</p> - -<p><i>Sent at 11.10 a.m.</i>: "Have taken Morcourt and Bayonvillers -and many additional prisoners and guns. We are -nearing our second objective and have reached it in places. -My Cavalry Brigade has passed across our red line. We are -now advancing to our final objective blue line."</p> - -<p><i>Sent at 12.15 p.m.</i>: "Hobbs has captured Harbonnières -and reached blue line final objective on his whole -front."</p> - -<p><i>Sent at 1.15 p.m.</i>: "Australian flag hoisted over Harbonnières -at midday to-day. Should be glad if Chief would -cable this to our Governor-General on behalf of Australian -Corps."</p> - -<p><i>Sent at 2.5 p.m.</i>: "Total Australian casualties through -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[124]</a></span>dressing stations up to 12 noon under 600. Prisoners actually -counted exceed 4,000. Many more coming in."</p> - -<p><i>Sent at 4.40 p.m.</i>: "Captured enemy Corps H.Q. near -Framerville shortly after noon to-day." (This was the 51st -German Corps).</p> - -<p><i>Sent at 8 p.m.</i>: "Corps captures will greatly exceed -6,000 prisoners, 100 guns, including heavy and railway -guns, thousands of machine guns, a railway train, and -hundreds of vehicles and teams of regimental transport. -Total casualties for whole Corps will not exceed 1,200."</p></blockquote> - -<p>The vital information, which it is imperative for the Corps -Commander to have accurately and rapidly delivered throughout -the course of a battle, is that relating to the actual position, -at any given moment of time, of our front line troops; showing -the locations which they have reached, and whether they are -stationary, advancing or retiring. For it has to be remembered -that the whole Artillery resources of the Corps were pooled and -kept under his own hand; and it was imperative that any changes -in the Artillery action or employment must be quickly made, so -as to extend the utmost help to any Infantry which might get -into difficulties.</p> - -<p>Thus, for example, the failure of any body of Infantry to -enter and pass beyond a wood or a village, would be a sure -indication that such locality was still held in strength by the -enemy, and it would be appropriate to "switch" Artillery fire -upon it, in order to drive him out. But such a proceeding would -be anything but prudent if the information on which such action -was to be based were already an hour old.</p> - -<p>Transmission of messages from the front line troops to the -nearest telephone terminal is usually slow and uncertain, and the -retransmission of such messages, in succession, by Battalions, -Brigades and Divisions only prolongs the delay. The normal -process is in consequence far too dilatory for the exigencies of -actual battle control.</p> - -<p>A vastly superior method had therefore to be devised, and -recourse was had to the use of aeroplanes. The No. 3 Australian<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[125]</a></span> -Squadron soon acquired great proficiency in this work. They -were equipped with two-seater planes, carrying both pilot and -observer, and the work was called "Contact Patrol."</p> - -<p>The "plane" flying quite low, usually at not more than 500 feet, -the observer would mark down by conventional signs on a map -the actual positions of our Infantry, of enemy Infantry or other -facts of prime importance, and he often had time to scribble a few -informative notes also. The "plane" then flew back at top -speed to Corps H.Q., and the map, with or without an added report, -was dropped in the middle of an adjacent field, wrapped in -a weighted streamer of many colours. It was then brought by -cyclists into the Staff Office.</p> - -<p>Relays of Contact planes were on such service all day on -every battle day, and although it was a hazardous duty few -planes were lost. The total time which elapsed between the -making of the observation at the front line and the arrival of -the information in the hands of the Corps Staff was seldom -more than ten minutes.</p> - -<p>There can be no doubt that the whole operation was a complete -surprise both to the troops opposed to us and to the German -High Command. It became abundantly clear, in the following -days, that no proper arrangements existed for rapidly -reinforcing this part of the front in the event of an attack by us, -but that these had to be extemporized after the event. This -discovery points to the conclusion that the enemy had once -again come to regard the British Army as a negligible quantity, -a mistake for which he paid an even heavier price than when he -made it in the early days of the war.</p> - -<p>As an indication that even the Divisions in the line whose -duty it primarily was to know, had no suspicions of an impending -attack, comes the story of a German medical officer who was -captured in his pyjamas in Warfusee village, and who confessed -that being awakened by our bombardment and thinking it was -merely a raid, he left his dug-out to see what was afoot, and -thought he must be still dreaming when he saw our Pioneers -a few hundred feet away, busily at work repairing the main road.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[126]</a></span></p> - -<p>There was only one blemish in the whole day's operations. -Not serious in relation to the whole, it nevertheless gravely -hampered the work of the left Brigade of the Fourth Division. -In short, the Third Corps Infantry failed to reach their ultimate -objective line, and the enemy remained in possession of the -Chipilly spur and of all the advantages which that possession -conferred upon him.</p> - -<p>The advance of my left flank, from the green to the red line, -along the margin of the plateau bordering the Somme, was left -exposed to his full view, while the river valley itself remained -under the domination of his rifle fire, at quite moderate ranges. -But worse than all, a battery of his Field Artillery emplaced just -above the village of Chipilly remained in action, and one after -another, six of the nine Tanks which had been allotted to the -4th Brigade were put out of action by direct hits from these guns.</p> - -<p>The possibility was one which had been considered and measures -to meet it were promptly taken. Maclagan, whose right Brigade -in due course reached the blue line according to programme, -making in its progress a splendid haul of prisoners and guns, -took immediate steps to "refuse" his left flank, <i>i.e.</i>, to bend -it back towards Morcourt, and to establish, with a reserve -battalion, a flank defence along the river, facing north from Cerisy -to Morcourt.</p> - -<p>Both these villages were, however, successfully captured, -and "mopped up," which meant that all the enemy and machine -guns lurking in them were accounted for. But the river valley -was not captured, and became, until the situation was ultimately -cleared up, a kind of No Man's Land between the enemy still -holding the Chipilly spur on the north, and the Fourth Division -on the south of the river.</p> - -<p>The ultimate conquest of the Chipilly Bend forms no part -of that day's story. What were the reasons for the failure of -the Third Corps to complete its allotted task may have been -the subject of internal inquiry, but the result of any such was -not made known. The official report for the day was to the effect -that the enemy on this front had resisted strongly, that fighting -had been fierce, and that no progress could be made. But one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[127]</a></span> -is compelled to recognize that such language was often an euphemistic -method of describing faulty Staff co-ordination, or faulty -local leadership. There would be no justification, however, for -questioning the bravery of the troops themselves.</p> - -<p>It has already been foreshadowed that the experiences on -that day of the contingent of sixteen Armoured Motor-cars under -Lieutenant-Colonel Carter would form sensational reading, and -the story of August 8th would not be complete without at least -a brief reference to their exploits.</p> - -<p>It was nearly midnight when Carter, with a Staff Officer, got -back to Corps H.Q. to render their report. They were scarcely -recognizable, covered as they were from head to feet, with grime -and grease. They had had a busy time. The substance of what -they had to tell was taken down at the time almost verbatim, -and reads as follows:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"Got Armoured Cars through to Warfusee-Abancourt. -When we reached the other side of No Man's Land we -found that the road was good but a number of trees (large -and small) had been shot down and lay right across it -in places. Obstacles removed by chopping up the smaller -trees and hauling off the big ones by means of a Tank. -Pioneers helped us to clear the road all the way down. -We did not come up to our advancing troops until they -were almost near the Red Line. When we got past our -leading Infantry we came upon quite a number of Huns -and dealt with them. Had then to wait a little on account -of our barrage, but went through a light barrage. When -we got to Blue Line we detached three sections to run down -to Framerville. When they got there they found all the -Boche horse transport and many lorries drawn up in the -main road ready to move off. Head of column tried to -bolt in one direction and other vehicles in another. Complete -confusion. Our men killed the lot (using 3,000 rounds) -and left them there; four Staff Officers on horseback shot -also. The cars then ran down to the east side of Harbonnières, -on the south-east road to Vauvillers, and met<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[128]</a></span> -there a number of steam wagons; fired into their boilers -causing an impassable block. Had a lot of good shooting -around Vauvillers. Then came back to main road. Two -sections of cars went on to Foucaucourt and came in contact -with a Boche gun in a wood north-east of Foucaucourt. -This gun blew the wheels off one car and also hit three -others. However, three of the cars were got away. Two -other cars went to Proyart and found a lot of troops billeted -there having lunch in the houses. Our cars shot through -the windows into the houses, killing quite a lot of the enemy. -Another section went towards Chuignolles and found it full -of German soldiers. Our cars shot them. Found rest -billets and old trenches also with troops in them. Engaged -them. Had quite a battle there. Extent of damage not -known, but considerable. Cars then came back to main -road. We were then well in advance of Blue Line. Everything -was now perfectly quiet—no shell-fire of any kind.</p> - -<p>"I went a quarter of a mile beyond La Flaque. There -was a big dump there, and Huns kept continually coming -out and surrendering, and we brought quite a lot of them -back as prisoners. It was then about 10.30 a.m. A party -of Hun prisoners was detailed to tow back my disabled car. -I saw no sign of any wired system anywhere. Old overgrown -trenches but no organized trench system. I proceeded -to some rising ground near Framerville. Did not -go into Framerville, but could see that the roofs of the -houses were intact. Saw no trace of any organized system -of defence of any kind and no troops. My people saw no -formed bodies of troops of any kind during the day coming -towards us, but very large numbers of fugitives hastening -in the opposite direction. Engaged as many of them as -could be reached from the roads. I saw, from the hill, open -country with a certain amount of vegetation on it."</p></blockquote> - -<p>The consternation and disorganization caused by the sudden -onslaught of these cars, at places fully ten miles behind the -enemy's front line of that morning, may be left to the imagination. -It was a feat of daring and resolute performance, which -deserves to be remembered.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_128fp.jpg" width="1200" height="777" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>The Burning Villages—east of Péronne.</p></div> -</div> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_129fp.jpg" width="1200" height="774" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>Dummy Tank Manufacture.</p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[129]</a></span></p> - -<p>Throughout the whole day, surrenders by the enemy, particularly -of troops in rear or reserve positions, were on a wholesale -scale. The total number of live prisoners actually counted -up to nightfall in the Divisional and Corps Prisoner-of-War -Cages exceeded 8,000 and the Canadians had gathered in at -least as many more.</p> - -<p>The Australian Corps also captured 173 guns capable of being -hauled away, not counting those which had been blown to pieces. -These captures included two "railway" guns, one of 9-inch and -the other of 11.2-inch bore. The latter was an imposing affair. -The gun itself rested on two great bogie carriages, each on eight -axles; it was provided with a whole train of railway trucks -fitted some to carry its giant ammunition, others as workshops, -and others as living quarters for the gun detachment. The outfit -was completed by a locomotive to haul the gun forward to its -daily task of shelling Amiens, and hauling it back to its garage -when its ugly work was done.</p> - -<p>The captures of machine guns and of trench mortars of all -types and sizes were on so extensive a scale that no attempt -was ever made to make even an approximate count of them. -They were ultimately collected into numerous dumps, and -German prisoners were employed for many weeks in cleaning -and oiling them for transport to Australia as trophies of war.</p> - -<p>But the booty comprised a large and varied assortment of -many other kinds of warlike stores. The huge dumps of engineering -material at Rosières and La Flaque served all the -needs of the Corps for the remainder of the war. There were -horses, wagons, lorries and tractors by the hundred, including -field searchlights, mobile pharmacies, motor ambulances, travelling -kitchens, mess carts, limbers, and ammunition wagons, -and there were literally hundreds of thousands of rounds of -artillery ammunition scattered all over the captured territory in -dumps both large and small.</p> - -<p>For the next two days all roads leading from the battle area -back towards the Army Cage at Poulainville, where railway<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[130]</a></span> -trains were waiting to receive them, were congested with column -after column of German prisoners, roughly organized into companies—tangible -evidences to the civilians of the district, as to -our own troops, that a great victory had been won.</p> - -<p>The tactical value of the victory was immense, and has never -yet been fully appreciated by the public of the Empire, perhaps -because our censorship at the time strove to conceal the intention -to follow it up immediately with further attacks. But no -better testimony is needed than that of Ludendorff himself, who -calls it Germany's "black day," after which he himself gave -up all hope of a German victory.</p> - -<p>Ludendorff in his "Memoirs," republished in the <i>Times</i> of -August 22nd, 1919, writes:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"August 8th was the black day of the German Army -in the history of the war. This was the worst experience -I had to go through.... Early on August 8th, in a dense -fog that had been rendered still thicker by artificial means, -the British, mainly with Australian and Canadian Divisions, -and French, attacked between Albert and Moreuil with -strong squadrons of Tanks, but for the rest with no great -superiority. They broke between the Somme and the -Luce deep into our front. The Divisions in line allowed -themselves to be completely overwhelmed. Divisional -Staffs were surprised in their Headquarters by enemy Tanks" -[<i>sic</i>, our armoured cars were meant].... "The exhausted -[<i>sic</i>] Divisions that had been relieved a few days earlier -and that were lying in the region south-west of Péronne -were immediately alarmed and set in motion by the Commander-in-Chief -of the Second Army. At the same time -he brought forward towards the breach all available troops. -The Rupprecht Army Group dispatched reserves thither -by train. The 18th Army threw its own reserves directly -into the battle from the south-east.... On an order from -me, the 9th Army too, although itself in danger, had to -contribute. Days of course elapsed before the troops -from a further distance could reach the spot.... It was a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[131]</a></span> -very gloomy situation.... Six or seven Divisions that were -quite fairly to be described as effective had been completely -battered.... The situation was uncommonly -serious. If they continued to attack with even comparative -vigour, we should no longer be able to maintain ourselves -west of the Somme.... The wastage of the Second Army -had been very great. Heavy toll had also been taken of -the reserves which had been thrown in.... Owing to the -deficit created our losses had reached such proportions -that the Supreme Command was faced with the necessity -of having to disband a series of Divisions, in order to furnish -drafts.... The enemy had also captured documentary -material of inestimable value to him.... The General -Staff Officer whom I had dispatched to the battlefield on -August 8th, gave me such an account that I was deeply confounded.... -August 8th made things clear for both Army -Commands, both for the German and for that of the enemy."</p></blockquote> - -<p>A hole had been driven on a width of nearly twelve miles, -right through the German defence, and had blotted out, at one -blow, the whole of the military resources which it had contained. -The obligation which was thereby cast upon the enemy to -throw into the gap troops and guns hastily collected from every -part of his front, imposed upon him also an increased vulnerability -at every other point which had to be so denuded.</p> - -<p>It was no part of our programme to rest content upon our -oars, and allow the enemy time to collect himself at leisure. -The resources of the Australian Corps had suffered scarcely any -impairment as the result of that glorious day. Such small -losses as had been incurred were more than counter-balanced by -the elation of these volunteer troops at this further demonstration -of their moral and physical superiority over the professional -soldiers of a militarist enemy nation.</p> - -<p>On that very day all necessary measures were taken to maintain -the battle without pause. But, in order not to interrupt the -continuity of the story of subsequent developments, it will be -convenient to mention, in this place, two events which cannot<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[132]</a></span> -be dissociated from the great battle, and which will be memorable -to those who participated in them.</p> - -<p>The first was an accidental meeting together of a number -of the most distinguished figures in the war. On August 11th, -the Commander-in-Chief was to come to congratulate the Corps -and to thank the troops through their Commanders. I called -the Divisional Generals together at the Red Château at Villers-Bretonneux -to meet him that afternoon. In the meantime -General Rawlinson invited his Corps Commanders to meet him -in the same village for a battle conference, and chose the same -hour and a spot in the open, under a spreading beech, where -his Generals sat informally around the maps spread upon the -grass. At this meeting were Rawlinson, Currie, Kavanagh, -Godley, myself, Montgomery and Budworth. The Field Marshal, -with Laurence, the Chief of his General Staff, on their way to -the Red Château, soon arrived. Shortly after Sir Henry Wilson, -happening to pass in his car, also joined the party; and not many -moments afterwards there arrived, again entirely without previous -arrangement, Clemenceau and his Finance Minister Klotz.</p> - -<p>Villers-Bretonneux, only three days before reeking with gas -and unapproachable, and now delivered from its bondage, was -the lodestone which had attracted the individual members of -this remarkable assemblage; and the more serious business in -hand was perforce postponed while Rawlinson, Currie and I had -to listen to the generous felicitations of all these great war leaders.</p> - -<p>The second event was the visit of His Majesty the King, on -August 12th, to Bertangles, when he conferred on me the honour -of Knighthood, in the presence of selected detachments of five -hundred of the men who had fought in the battle, a hundred -from each of my Five Divisions. A representative collection -of guns and other war trophies had been hauled in from the -battlefield to line the avenues by which the King approached. -His Majesty was particularly interested in the German transport -horses, expressing the hope that they would soon learn the -Australian language; a pleasantry which he well remembered -when I had the honour of an audience with him, on the anniversary -of that very day.</p> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> See Map J.</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[133]</a></span></p> - - -<h2>CHAPTER VIII<br /> - -EXPLOITATION</h2> - - -<p>The Fourth British Army had opened the great Allied counter-offensive -with a brilliant stroke. It remained to see in -what fashion the Allied High Command would proceed to -exploit the victory. Would the Fourth Army be called upon, -with added resources, at once to thrust due east, with the object -of drawing upon itself the German reserves, and dealing with -them as they arrived; or would blows now be delivered on -other fronts with a view to keeping those reserves dispersed?</p> - -<p>The immediate decision, communicated to me by the Army -Commander on the afternoon of August 8th, was that, while the -whole situation was being considered, and troop movements were -in progress to enable the necessary concentrations to be made -elsewhere, the Fourth Army would continue its advance forthwith; -but that, instead of driving due east, the thrust was to -be made in a south-easterly direction.</p> - -<p>The object was to aim at Roye, and either by the capture -of that important railway centre, or at least by the threat of its -capture, to precipitate a withdrawal by the enemy from the -great salient which he had in his April and May advances pressed -into the French front opposite Moreuil and Montdidier, a salient -which could be kept supplied by that railway alone.</p> - -<p>The Australian Corps front on the evening of August 8th -lay roughly on a north and south line, just east of Méricourt -and just west of Vauvillers. But the Canadian Corps front -bent back sharply from the latter point in a south-westerly direction. -The Canadians were, therefore, to advance between the -railway and the Amiens—Roye road to the general line Lihons-Le Quesnoy. -The rôle of the Australian Corps was to make a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[134]</a></span> -defensive flank to this advance, by pivotting its left on the Somme -in the vicinity of Méricourt, but advancing its right along the -railway, in the direction of Lihons.</p> - -<p>It was a decision which was unpalatable to me, for it condemned -me to leaving the whole of the great bend of the Somme, -on which lay Bray, Péronne and Brie, in the undisturbed possession -of the enemy; and in view of the reports sent in from the -front and confirmed later by the Armoured Cars, it appeared -to me that the resumption of a vigorous advance due east next -day would give us, without fighting, possession, or at least -command, of the whole of this bend; while if we allowed the -enemy to take breath and recover from his shock, he would -probably have time to rally the fugitives, and turn again to face -us.</p> - -<p>This same great bend of the river had been the scene of two -years of sedentary warfare, in 1915 and 1916, when the French -and German artillery had converted it into a barren wilderness. -It was, in its eastern part, scored with trenches, and bristled -with wire entanglements in every direction; it was devoid of -villages, woods, or any kind of shelter—a forbidding expanse -of devastation.</p> - -<p>But between our front lines of that day and the western edge -of this wilderness, there still lay a belt of some six or seven -miles of practically unharmed country over which the retreat -of our Fifth Army in March had carried them without much -fighting. I should have welcomed an order to push on the next -morning, in open warfare formation, to gain possession of the -whole of this belt, and force the enemy to make any attempt to -reorganize his line on the inhospitable ground which lay -beyond.</p> - -<p>The order stood, however; and instructions were issued for -the First Australian Division to be drawn into the fight, and -to take upon themselves the task of conforming to the advance -of the Canadians along the railway. The first phase of this -advance was to have been carried out at 11 a.m. on August 9th -by the First Division passing through the right Brigade of the -Fifth Division.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[135]</a></span></p> - -<p>The 1st Brigade of the First Australian Division had, as already -related, arrived from the North in time to participate in the fighting -of the day before; but the remaining two Brigades arrived so -late, and had to perform so long a march from their detraining -station near Amiens to our now greatly advanced battle front, -that it soon became evident that they could not arrive at -the line of departure in time to synchronize with the Canadian -advance.</p> - -<p>In consequence, the Fifth Division was instructed to detail -its right line Brigade to begin this duty; and in due course -the 15th Brigade carried out the first part of the task and advanced -our line to include the capture of Vauvillers, an operation -which was successfully completed by midday.</p> - -<p>It will be remembered that the Second and Third Divisions -had been given a task for the previous day which was limited -in time, though not in difficulty, and that this task had been -completed, as it proved with very little stress, by 7 a.m. These -Divisions had thus had a whole day in which to rest and reorganize. -The Second Division was therefore placed under -orders to participate in the advance of August 9th.</p> - -<p>In due course, the First Division arrived at our fighting front, -and that afternoon both the First and Second Divisions advanced -in battle order, the former passing through the right Brigade -of the Fifth Division, and the latter through its left Brigade. -This operation carried our front line in this part of the field to -the foot of the Lihons hill, and gave us complete possession of -the village of Framerville. It also incidentally released the -Fifth Division from further line duty.</p> - -<p>The opposition met with during this day's operations varied -considerably along the battle front, which extended in this -part of the field over about 6,000 yards. The Lihons ridge was -found to be strongly held, and much fire both from field guns -and machine guns was encountered. It was evident that, over-night, -the enemy had succeeded in organizing sufficient troops -for the local defence of this important point.</p> - -<p>Upon the front of the Second Division, however, there was -little opposition and the enemy gave up Framerville almost<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[136]</a></span> -without a struggle. Three Battalions of Tanks co-operated in -the day's fighting, but several of them were disabled by direct -fire from Lihons. The task assigned to the Corps for that day -was, none the less, carried out in its entirety, and by nightfall -contact had been made with the Second Canadian Division on -the railway about a mile east of Rosières.</p> - -<p>The situation on the left flank of the Australian Corps was, -however, anything but satisfactory. The Chipilly spur was still -in the hands of the enemy, all the efforts over-night on the part -of the 58th Division (Third Corps) to dislodge them having failed. -General Butler, the Corps Commander, in pursuance of arrangements -come to some days before, was to proceed on sick leave, -as he had for some time been far from well; and General Godley -(my former chief of the 22nd Corps) was temporarily to take -his place. I therefore persuaded the Army Commander to -avail himself of this change to allow me to take in hand the -situation at Chipilly, and to give me, for this purpose, a limited -jurisdiction over the north bank of the Somme. This was merely -getting in the thin edge of the wedge; and not many hours later, -I found myself where I had so strongly desired to be from the -first, namely, astride of the Somme valley.</p> - -<p>Accordingly, the 13th Australian Brigade, after a day's rest -from the anxious duty of acting as a screen for the Canadians -on the eve of the main battle, were told off to deal with the -Chipilly spur. Before, however, they could reach the locality, -and in the late afternoon of August 9th, the 131st American -Regiment (of Bell's Division), which was still under the orders -of the Third Corps, very gallantly advanced in broad daylight and -took possession practically of the whole spur.</p> - -<p>In the meantime the 13th Brigade arrived, sending a Battalion -across the Somme at Cerisy, and, joining the Americans, helped -to clear up the whole situation. This made my left flank more -secure, and enabled Maclagan to withdraw the defensive flank -which he had deployed along the river from Cerisy to Morcourt. -That night I took over the 131st American Regiment from -the Third Corps, attached it, as a temporary measure, to the Fourth -Division, and placed Maclagan in charge of the newly captured<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[137]</a></span> -front, which extended north of the river as far as the Corbie—Bray -road.</p> - -<p>The day ended with Divisions in the line from south to north -in the following order, viz.:—First, Second and Fourth, the -last named having been augmented by an American Regiment, -having had its own 13th Brigade restored to it, and having in -exchange yielded up to the First Division the 1st Brigade of the -latter.</p> - -<p>The Fourth Division had had comparatively much the worst -of it, up to this stage, of any of my Divisions, and I felt that -they were due for a short rest. Accordingly, I issued orders -that same night for the Third Division, which, like the Second, -had been resting since the previous forenoon, to relieve the Fourth -Division on that part of the front which lay between the Somme -and the main St. Quentin road on the following day, but for the -time being leaving the newly captured ground north of the -Somme still in Maclagan's hands.</p> - -<p>After an examination of the ground and a study of the situation, -the opportunity for a further immediate local operation, certain -to gain valuable tactical ground, and likely also to yield a good -number of prisoners, presented itself to me. A further attraction -was that it would permit of a useful advance of my left flank on -the south of the Somme. This project, being of some tactical -interest, demands a short explanatory reference to the terrain.</p> - -<p>The river Somme, from Cerisy as far east as Péronne, flows -in a tortuous valley which describes a succession of bends, almost -uniform in size and regular in disposition. These bends face -with their bases alternately north and south, and average a -depth of two miles, by a width across the base of about a mile and -a half. Each came to be known to us by the name of one of the -villages which reposed in its folds, such as Chipilly, Etinehem, -Bray, Cappy, Feuillères, and Ommiécourt; all these have become -names to be remembered in the subsequent conquest of this part -of the Somme valley.</p> - -<p>The valley itself is in this region a mile broad; its sides are -steep and often precipitous, and the adjoining plateaus rise some -200 feet above its bed. Through this valley winds, in ordered<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[138]</a></span> -curves, the canal for barge traffic; it is flanked by vast stretches -of backwaters and heavily grassed morasses, in which the river -loses itself. The valley can be traversed only by the few bridges -and the lock gates of the canal, and the causeways leading to -them from either bank.</p> - -<p>It would be difficult country for a fight on a general scale, -but ideal for guerilla warfare. The whole succession of villages -clinging to the sides of the valley were in the hands of the enemy, -and in use by him for the housing and shelter of his troops. -To attack and overcome them one by one, by fighting up the -winding valley, would have been a costly business. But it -suggested itself that they might all be won by a species of investment.</p> - -<p>Taking any one of these U-shaped bends singly, by drawing -a cordon across its base, the whole of any enemy forces who might -be occupying the bend would be denied escape from it, except -by <i>crossing</i> the river into the adjacent bend. But if a semi-cordon -had been simultaneously drawn across the base of that -next bend also, even that loophole would be closed, and moreover -such troops as inhabited the second bend would find themselves -surrounded also.</p> - -<p>Immediately before my left flank lay the Méricourt bend -on the south of the river and the Etinehem bend to the north of -it. Both were held by the enemy, doubtless fugitives from the -great battle, who had sought food, water and underground -shelter in the numerous dug-outs which honeycombed the sides of -the valley. The design was to capture the whole of these with -little effort. It was a good plan, and only an unforeseen accident -prevented its full realization.</p> - -<p>Early on the morning of the 10th, I summoned a conference -at Maclagan's Headquarters in Corbie, which was attended by the -Commanders and certain Brigadiers of the Third and Fourth -Divisions. It was arranged that on the north of the river, the -13th Brigade would that night get astride of the Etinehem spur -on the north, while simultaneously the 10th Brigade, by making a -side sweep skirting Proyart, would advance our line till its left -rested on the river a mile east of Méricourt.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[139]</a></span></p> - -<p>Columns were to move along defined routes, leaving the objectives -well to the flanks, and then to encircle the enemy positions. -Each column was to be accompanied by Tanks and was to -move in an easterly direction and then wheel in towards the -Somme. Although Tanks had never previously been used at -night, as their utility was uncertain, it was thought that the -effect of the noise they made would lead to the speedy collapse -of the defence.</p> - -<p>The plan succeeded to perfection on the north of the river, -and the Etinehem spur and village with all its defenders fell -to us almost without a blow. Four Tanks amused themselves -by racing up and down the main Corbie—Bray road at top speed, -and the clamour they made cleared the path for the marching -infantry.</p> - -<p>On the south, however, just after nightfall, a sudden onslaught -by a flight of enemy bombing planes, threw the head of the -10th Brigade column into confusion, and its Commander was -killed. Two of the Tanks were also disabled by direct hits -from Artillery. This delayed the progress of the operation, and -the next day broke with the task uncompleted. The 9th and -11th Brigades were, however, at once sent up to reinforce, and -during the following day all three Brigades completed the operation -by possessing themselves of the villages of Méricourt and -Proyart and the woods adjoining the river.</p> - -<p>This series of local operations yielded some 300 prisoners, and -entirely cleared up the confused and unsatisfactory situation -which had existed on my left flank, as the aftermath of the -Chipilly spur failure of the first day. It also brought my -line up more square to the Somme, and so somewhat shortened -my already expanding front. But my left flank was at last quite -secure.</p> - -<p>I must now turn to the extreme right flank, which was, on this -same day, also the scene of very severe fighting. I have related -the progress of the First Division to the foot of the Lihons ridge -the night before. On August 10th and 11th the advance was -continued by the First and Second Divisions in sympathy with -the advance of the Canadian Corps on the south of the railway.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[140]</a></span> -There were only a few Tanks left available to assist in this advance; -and the resistance of the enemy in the neighbourhood of -Lihons had stiffened considerably.</p> - -<p>The devastated area had already been reached by us -in this part of the field, and the terrain was a labyrinth -of old trenches, and a sea of shell-holes; the remains of old -wire entanglements spread in every direction, and the whole -area had been covered by a rank growth of thistles and -brambles. It furnished numerous harbours for machine-guns, -and it was country over which it was difficult to preserve -the semblance of an organized battle formation during an -advance.</p> - -<p>The enemy fought hard and determinedly to retain Lihons, -and in some parts of the line the battle swayed to and fro. But -before the morning was well advanced, we had taken possession -of the whole of the Lihons Knoll, of Auger Wood, and of the -villages of Lihons and Rainecourt, while the Canadians had passed -through Chilly just south of the railway. All that afternoon the -enemy made repeated counter-attacks, particularly directed -against Lihons and Rainecourt; but they were all successfully -driven off by rifle and machine-gun fire without the loss of any -ground.</p> - -<p>It was a great feat to the credit of the First Australian Division, -and ranks among its best performances during the war. Some -20 field-guns and hundreds of machine-guns were captured. -Such a battle, with such results, would, in 1917, have been -placarded as a victory of the first magnitude. Now, with the -new standards set up by the great battle of August 8th, it was -reckoned merely as a local skirmish.</p> - -<p>General Currie, operating on my right, had had a similar experience -of slow, although definite, progress, against hourly -stiffening opposition, and the fighting by the methods of open -warfare was growing daily more costly. The enemy had recovered -from his first surprise, our resources in Tanks had been -greatly diminished, and much of our heavy Artillery had not yet -had time to get into its forward positions. In other words, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[141]</a></span> -possibility of further cheap exploitation of the success of August -8th had come to an end.</p> - -<p>It was decided, therefore, to recommend to the Army Commander -that a temporary halt should be called on the line thus -reached, and that rested troops should be brought up to relieve -the line Divisions. He concurred and decided that we should -prepare for the delivery on August 15th of another combined -"set-piece" blow, which would have the probable effect of -again putting the enemy on the run, so that the moving battle -could be resumed.</p> - -<p>This plan was never actually carried into effect, for reasons -which did not at once appear. But it transpired later that -General Currie had made very strong private representations -to the Fourth Army against the plan. He questioned the wisdom -of expending the resources of the Canadian Corps upon an attempt -to repeat, over such broken country, covered as it was with -entanglements and other obstacles, the great success of August -8th. He urged that the Canadian Corps should be transferred -back to the Arras district—which they knew so well. It was -country lending itself admirably to operations requiring careful -organization, which none understood better than Currie and his -admirable Staff.</p> - -<p>It was an issue in which I was not greatly concerned, for -my share in the proposed operation of August 15th was to be quite -subsidiary. It was to consist merely in once again advancing -my right flank, in sympathy with the Canadian advance, as far as -to include Chaulnes Hill and the very important railway junction -at that town. In ignorance of the fact that the matter was -under discussion, I prepared complete plans for the co-operation -of the Australian Corps, and detailed the Fourth and Fifth -Australian Divisions to carry them out. Fortunately, before any -actual executive action had been initiated, orders came that the -project was to be abandoned.</p> - -<p>It soon became known that still larger questions were being -discussed. The British front, which in July reached south as -far only as Villers-Bretonneux, had now been extended to the -latitude of Roye. The Field Marshal was urging reduction, so<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[142]</a></span> -as to liberate Divisions for offensive operations elsewhere, and -Marshal Foch agreed that, as by the elimination of the Soissons -salient the French front had been shortened, this could be done. -In due course confidential announcements were made that, as -soon as it could be arranged, the Canadians would be withdrawn -from the line, and their places taken by French troops. This -would once again make my Corps the south flank Corps of the -British Army, and I would junction with the French on the -Lihons Hill.</p> - -<p>The halt thus called gave me breathing time to consider a -thorough reorganization of my whole Corps front. This had, -by August 12th, again grown to a total length of over 16,000 -yards. This increase had been the result, firstly, of my having, -as narrated, taken over ground to the north of the Somme, -secondly, by reason of the fact that during the advances of the -last four days my right had hugged the railway, while my left -had continued to rest on the Somme, two lines which were -rapidly diverging from each other, and thirdly, because my front -line now lay sharply oblique to my general line of advance.</p> - -<p>Even with a fifth Division, which I now had at my disposal, -a front of 16,000 yards was far too attenuated for Corps operations -on the grand scale, and even for more localized operations, -by one or two Divisions at a time, there was little opportunity -to provide the troops with adequate intervals of rest. I therefore -strongly urged upon General Rawlinson either a shortening of -my front, or a further increase in my resources.</p> - -<p>He chose the latter alternative, and on August 12th placed -under my orders, provisionally, the 17th British Division -(Major-General P. R. Robertson), coupled with the condition -that while it might be employed as a line Division, it was not to -be used for offensive operations. The reason, confidentially -given, was that it was shortly to be employed in a large scale -offensive in course of preparation by the Third British -Army.</p> - -<p>It was, for me, a most opportune measure of relief from a -difficult situation; for the Third Australian Division was now -also badly in need of a rest. Prior to the great advance, it had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[143]</a></span> -been longest of any of the Divisions in the line, and had subsequently -had a hard time in fighting its way forward from -Méricourt to Proyart. It was therefore relieved in the line on -August 13th by the 17th Division and went into Corps Reserve.</p> - -<p>On the same day I put into effect a project of organization -which the necessities of the case forced upon me. North of the -river stood the 13th Australian Brigade, and the 131st American -Regiment, both still under the command of General Maclagan, -the remainder of whose Division was resting, and this Division -might be required at short notice for operations at a totally -different part of the front. (I had, in fact, earmarked it for the -proposed attack on August 15th to which I have referred.)</p> - -<p>To overcome this anomalous position, I decided to constitute, -for a brief period, an independent force, composed of the two -units north of the river which I have named, to appoint to the -command of it Brigadier-General Wisdom (of the 7th Brigade), -and to supply him with a nucleus Staff, some Artillery, and -supply and signal services. It became, in fact, to all intents -and purposes, an additional Division with a Headquarters -directly responsible to me.</p> - -<p>This force received the name of "Liaison Force" and continued -in existence for about eight days. Its functions were to -keep tactical touch and liaison with the Third Corps, to protect -my left flank by guarding the Etinehem spur from recapture, and -to act as a kind of loose link between the two Corps, advancing -its northern or its southern flanks, or both, in sympathy with any -forward movement to be made by either Corps. While, during -its existence as a separate force, no operations of first magnitude -took place, yet the Liaison Force served me well in the very useful -function of a custodian of my tactical ownership of the Somme -valley, an ownership which I succeeded in retaining to the immense -advantage of the operations of the Corps less than three -weeks later.</p> - -<p>By August 13th, therefore, my responsibilities included the -control of seven separate Divisions as well as all the Corps -Troops, and Army Troops attached. The next week was occupied -in local operations by the front line Divisions to straighten<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[144]</a></span> -our front, and to dispose of a number of strong points, small -woods, and village ruins which, so long as they were in enemy -hands, were a source of annoyance to us. The attitude of the -enemy was alert but not aggressive, and an important point -was that he showed every desire to stand his ground, and to contest -our further advance. There was as yet no indication of any -comprehensive withdrawal out of the great river bend. Each -day brought its useful toll of prisoners, all of whom, however, -corroborated the view that the enemy meant to hold on, and -that the troops opposing us were more than a mere rearguard -intended to delay our advance.</p> - -<p>The period from August 13th to 20th was also occupied in -carrying out a number of inter-divisional reliefs—events of -merely technical interest to the student of military history, but -imposing an immense amount of detailed work upon the Staff -of the Corps and upon the Commanders and Staffs of the Divisions -concerned. It was my own special responsibility, and one -which I could not delegate, to decide the date of the relief of -each Division and by which other Division it should be relieved. -Such decisions involved a close inquiry into, and a just and -humane appreciation of the condition of the troops, almost from -hour to hour every day, a duty in the discharge of which I was -able to rely upon the loyal help of the Divisional Commanders -and Brigadiers.</p> - -<p>The time that had elapsed since last they had rested, the -marching they had since done, the fighting they had undertaken -and its nature, the mental and physical stress which they had -undergone, and the probable nature and date of their future -employment were all factors which had to be weighed carefully, -and set against the advantages or disadvantages of cutting short -the period of rest of the troops who were available to relieve -them. It was a function which had to be exercised, at all times, -with the greatest circumspection, and the strictest justice; for -troops are very ready to acquire the impression that they are -being called upon to do more than their fair share.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/map-c.jpg" width="1200" height="629" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>MAP C.</p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[145]</a></span></p> - -<p>An actual inter-divisional relief usually occupied two nights -and the intervening day. Incoming units, both fighting and -technical, had to be shown all over the sector, to be taught the -dispositions and the exact situation in front of us; maps, orders -and photographs had to be explained and handed over; stores -and dumps had to be inventoried and receipts passed; while -on the other hand the outgoing troops expected to find their -billets, offices, stables, wagon lines, bathing-places and entertainment -rooms in the rear area all allocated and ready for their -occupation.</p> - -<p>Each such mutual relief meant the movement of upwards of -20,000 men, and separate roads had to be allotted for their use. -Frequently in so large a Corps as this, two such inter-divisional -reliefs would synchronize or overlap, and the danger of congestion -and the Staff work necessary to avoid it would be thereby more -than doubled. And all this work would have to go on smoothly -even if the Corps front were in the throes of an actual battle -at the time.</p> - -<p>Although much of the routine of such reliefs, which had become -almost a ritual during the preceding years of trench warfare, -was now scrapped, it is a matter of pride to the Australian Corps -and its Divisions, that all such relief operations, even amid all -the stress of these busy fighting months of August and September, -were, until the end, carried out with precision, freedom from -irritating hitches, and a minimum of stress on the troops.</p> - -<p>The decisions which had to be given regarding the times and -alternations of these Divisional reliefs became from now on -really of basic importance, and affected the main framework of -the whole of my future plans. It was no longer merely a question -of earmarking certain Divisions for a specified single operation; -but of planning, many days ahead, the rotation in which the -Divisions were to be employed in a continuous series of operations. -I regarded it as a fundamental principle to employ whenever -possible absolutely fresh and rested troops for an operation of -any magnitude or importance. To carry such a principle into -effect involved the necessity of making the best surmise that was -possible as to the course of events a week or even two weeks -ahead.</p> - -<p>As I shall endeavour to make clear in the course of the following<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[146]</a></span> -pages, the really outstanding and exceptional features of the -work of the Corps in its last sixty days were the sustained vigour -of its fighting, and the unbroken continuity of its collective -effort. Those results would clearly depend more on the manner -in which the resources in troops were manipulated than upon -any other factor. Each Division had to be kept employed until -the last ounce of effort, consistent with speedy recovery, had -been yielded, and each Division had to rest a sufficient time to -enable it fully to recover its spirit and tone, and yet had to be -ready by the time it was wanted.</p> - -<p>The fulfilment of such conditions involved, as a little reflection -will show, a great deal more than a mere mechanical rotation -of employment; for the problem was, always to have available -an adequate supply of sufficiently rested troops for a prospective -demand which, although varying always in accordance with the -changing situation, had nevertheless to be predicted or conjectured.</p> - -<p>August 21st found our front line much about the same as that -of August 13th, although generally more advanced and straightened -out. The Corps frontage was still over 16,000 yards, and -upon the completion of the series of reliefs to which I have -alluded the dispositions of the Corps were as follows: The -Fourth Australian Division from Lihons to just south of Herleville, -the 32nd British Division opposite Herleville, the Fifth Australian -Division in front of Proyart, and the Third Australian Division -on the north of the river. The First and Second Divisions -were in Corps Reserve, the former having by then had a good -rest from its Lihons fighting. The Liaison Force had been -broken up; and the 32nd British Division (Major-General T. S. -Lambert) had joined my command in substitution for the -17th Division, which had been withdrawn to join the Third -Army.</p> - -<p>Such was the situation of the Australian Corps, when on -August 21st the short period of comparative inactivity came to a -close, and it was destined soon to go forward to further decisive -events. On the previous day the French opened a great attack -in the south, which yielded 10,000 prisoners on the first day, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[147]</a></span> -on the day in question the Third British Army delivered north -of Albert the attack which had been expected for some days. -Thus the enemy would have his hands full in endeavouring to -parry those fresh blows; and the time seemed appropriate for -another stroke on the front of the Fourth Army.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[148]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER IX<br /> - -CHUIGNES</h2> - - -<p>Allusion has been made to the great bend which occurs -in the course of the River Somme. It is indeed a geographical -circumstance which must be borne in mind, if the -phraseology current at this epoch in the war is to be clearly -comprehended.</p> - -<p>The river flows in an almost due northerly direction from the -neighbourhood of Roye as far as Péronne, and then bends quite -sharply, at that locality, in a western direction, past Bray, -Corbie and Amiens, towards the sea, beyond Abbeville. In -the story of the fighting of the period from March to August we -have been concerned only with that portion of the river valley -which ran parallel to our line of advance; but interest will -henceforth focus itself largely upon that other reach of the Somme -which runs on a north and south line, upstream, from the town -of Péronne.</p> - -<p>This latter stretch of the river lies squarely athwart the -direction in which the Corps had been advancing, and the obstacle -to that advance which the river would presently constitute was -continued in a northerly direction from Péronne by an unfinished -work of a great canalization scheme to be called the "Canal du -Nord." This canal was already wide and deep, and formed a -tactical obstacle of some significance, for the excavations incidental -to this project had been almost completed before the -war.</p> - -<p>The "line of the Somme," as it was understood in the tactical -discussions of the period now to be dealt with, meant, in short, -the line formed by that part of the river which lay upstream (<i>i.e.</i>, -to the south of Péronne), and the continuation northwards of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[149]</a></span> -that line by the Canal du Nord. Both features being military -obstacles, they and the highlands to the east of them together -afforded an eminently suitable continuous line on which the -enemy might, if he were permitted to do so, establish himself in -a defensive attitude in order to bar our eastward progress.</p> - -<p>The autumn was upon us; not more than another eight or -nine weeks of campaigning weather could be relied upon. A -quite definite possibility existed that the enemy might be able -to put forth so powerful an effort to contest our further advance, -inch by inch, that he would gain sufficient time to prepare the -line of the Somme for a stout defence, and hold us up until the -arrival of winter compelled a suspension of large operations.</p> - -<p>There were at that time, indeed, some who contended that as -we had apparently succeeded in putting an end to the German -offensive we should rest content with the year's work; that our -soundest strategy would be to permit the enemy to take up such -a line of defence; and then quietly to wait over the winter until -1919 for the full development of the American effort, now only -in its inception.</p> - -<p>So far, the enemy had given no indication of any readiness -to undertake a precipitate withdrawal from the great bend west -of the Somme. On the contrary, his resistance had stiffened -to such an extent that little further progress was to be hoped for -from the methods of open warfare which I had employed since -August 8th.</p> - -<p>If, however, another powerful blow could be delivered, to be -followed by energetic exploitation, it was quite possible that the -enemy might be hustled across the Somme, that this might be -achieved at such a rate that I could gain a firm footing on the -east bank, and that thereby the value to him of the line of the -Somme, as a winter defence, might be destroyed.</p> - -<p>This was the very project on which I now embarked. The -First Division was in Corps Reserve, had rested and was fresh. -The 32nd Division had only just come into the line. By handing -over a substantial sector to the French, my frontage south of the -Somme was about to be shortened to 7,000 yards, a very suitable -front for a deliberate attack by two Divisions.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[150]</a></span></p> - -<p>I held a conference at Fouilloy, near Corbie, in the afternoon -of August 21st to announce the plan, and to settle all details with -the Commanders and services concerned. The Infantry assault -was to be entrusted to Glasgow and Lambert, attacking side by -side; but the former had allotted to him much the larger share -of the battle front, at the northern end, the corollary rôle of the -32nd Division being to seize Herleville and carry our line just -to the east of it.</p> - -<p>The date of the attack was fixed for August 23rd, and the -Second and Fifth Divisions were warned to be in readiness to -come into the line a day or two after the battle, in order to commence -immediately the process of keeping the enemy on the run, -and hustling him clean out of the river bend and across the line -of the Somme.</p> - -<p>The conference of that day was of special interest, in that I -had to deal with two Divisions which had not participated in -any of those Corps Conferences, previously held, which had -initiated a fully organized Corps operation. The Commanders -and Staffs were strangers to each other and, some of them, to -me and my Staff. Nearly all of them were yet unfamiliar with -the special methods of the Corps. The conference was therefore -a lengthy one, for many problems of tactical mechanism, which -had been settled in connection with the preceding battles of -Hamel and August 8th, had to be reopened and elucidated.</p> - -<p>These regular battle conferences were in the Australian Corps -an innovation from the time the command of it devolved upon -me. They proved a powerful instrument for the moulding of -a uniformity of tactical thought and method throughout the -command. They brought together men who met face to face -but seldom, and they permitted of an exhaustive and educative -interchange of views. They led to a development of "team-work" -of a very high order of efficiency.</p> - -<p>The work of preparing for, and the actual conduct of, these -conferences was always a very arduous business; but they more -than repaid me for the effort they entailed. They served two -paramount purposes. They enabled me to apply the requisite -driving force to all subordinates collectively, instead of individually,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[151]</a></span> -and thereby created a responsive spirit which was -competitive. In addition, each Commander or Service had the -advantage not only of receiving instructions regarding his own -action, but also of hearing in full detail the instructions conveyed -to his colleagues. He knew, not merely what his colleagues had -to do, but also knew that they had been told what to do; and -he had an opportunity of considering the effect of their action -on his own.</p> - -<p>The senior representative of the Heavy Artillery, Tank and -Air Services invariably attended, and listened to all the points -discussed with the Divisions, and the Divisional Commanders -heard all matters arranged with these services. In this way, -each arm acquired in the most direct manner a steadily expanding -knowledge of the technology of all the other arms.</p> - -<p>My reason for emphasizing these matters in the present context -is that, on this particular occasion, an attempt was to be made to -carry out a major Corps operation at little more than thirty-six -hours' notice; and the Division which was to have assigned to it -the principal rôle was still in Corps Reserve and a day's march -from the battle front.</p> - -<p>That, in spite of these handicaps, the battle proved brilliantly -successful is a testimony to the valuable part which these Corps -conferences played in securing rapid and efficiently co-ordinated -action; a result which would, I am confident, have been unattainable -under the stated conditions by the mere issue of formal -written orders.</p> - -<p>Although only two out of the seven Divisions of the Corps were -to participate in this operation, it was my intention to employ, -for the full assistance of the Infantry, the whole resources of the -Corps in Artillery, Tanks and Aircraft. That was a principle -which I always regarded as fundamental, and one from which -I never permitted any exception to be made, although the -pressure upon me to rest a substantial portion of these ancillary -services was always very great.</p> - -<p>The general plan for the battle ran briefly as follows. The -32nd Division would attack with one Infantry Brigade, under a -barrage, on a frontage of 1,000 yards; the capture of the village<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[152]</a></span> -of Herleville, which was still strongly held, being its principal -objective.</p> - -<p>The 1st Australian Division would attack on a frontage of -4,500 yards, with two Brigades in line, and one Brigade -in reserve. The attack would be carried out in three -phases.</p> - -<p>The first phase was a normal assault, under an Artillery barrage, -and with the assistance of Tanks, to a predetermined line, which -would carry us beyond the Chuignes Valley; the second phase -was in the nature of exploitation by the two line Brigades, but -was expressly limited to a maximum distance of 1,000 yards -beyond the main first objective.</p> - -<p>The third phase was to be contingent upon the complete -success of the preceding phases, and would consist of an advance -by the Reserve Brigade for a further exploitation of success, by -the seizure of the whole of the Cappy bend of the river, including -the towering hill close to the Somme Canal known as Froissy -Beacon.</p> - -<p>All arrangements for the forthcoming battle having thus been -completed, the First Division duly relieved the Fifth Division -on the night of August 21st, and hastened forward its preparations -for the attack, which had been fixed for 4.45 a.m. on -August 23rd.</p> - -<p>In the meantime, the first attack which any British Army -other than the Fourth had made since August 8th was at last -launched on August 21st along the whole front of the Third -British Army, northwards from Albert.</p> - -<p>It has come to be an article of faith that the whole of the -successive stages of the great closing offensive of the war had been -the subject of most careful timing, and of minute organization -on the part of the Allied High Command, and of our own G.H.Q. -Much eulogistic writing has been devoted to an attempted -analysis of the comprehensive and far-reaching plans which -resulted in the delivery of blow upon blow, in a prescribed order -of time and for the achievement of definite strategical or tactical -ends.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_152fp.jpg" width="1200" height="779" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>The Canal and Tunnel at Bellicourt—looking north.</p></div> -</div> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_153fp.jpg" width="1200" height="784" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>The Hindenburg Line—a characteristic belt of sunken wire.</p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[153]</a></span></p> - -<p>All who played any part in these great events well know that -it was nothing of the kind; that nothing in the nature of a detailed -time-table to control so vast a field of effort was possible. -All Commanders, and the most exalted of them in a higher degree -even than those wielding lesser forces, became opportunists, and -bent their energies, not to the realization of a great general plan -for a succession of timed attacks, but upon the problem of hitting -whenever and wherever an opportunity offered, and the means -were ready to hand.</p> - -<p>In these matters it was the force of circumstances which -controlled the sequence of events, and nothing else. An elaborate -time-table controlled by definite dates and sequences for the -successive engagement of a series of Armies would have been quite -impossible of realization. Even a Corps Commander had -difficulty in forecasting within a day or two when he would be -ready to launch an attack on any given part of the front. For -an Army Commander it was a matter of a week or even -two.</p> - -<p>All attempted time-tables were controlled by our Artillery -requirements; both the assembling of the necessary guns—often -drawn from distant fronts—and the accumulating of the -requisite "head" of ammunition to see a battle through, -were processes whose duration could only be very roughly forecasted.</p> - -<p>The dumping, in the gun pits and in ammunition stores, of -the necessary 500 or 600 rounds per gun meant days of labour -in collection and distribution on the part of the railways and -motor lorries. The breakdown of a few motor lorries at a critical -time, or the dropping of a single bomb upon an important railway -junction, were disturbing factors quite sufficient to have arrested -the flow of ammunition, and to have postponed, indefinitely, any -programme based upon its prompt delivery.</p> - -<p>It will be obvious, therefore, that no reliance could be placed, -days or weeks beforehand, upon a given attack taking place on -a given day; therefore no plans could be made which depended -upon such attacks taking place in a predetermined sequence.</p> - -<p>Shortly put, therefore, the decisions of the High Command -were confined to questions such as where an attack should be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[154]</a></span> -made, in what direction, and by what forces. The date was -always a matter of uncertainty, and the only control that could -be exercised was by postponement, and never by acceleration.</p> - -<p>For the greater part of the offensive period it was therefore -necessarily left to the Commanders of the Armies to conform -to a general policy of attack, the time and method being left to -their own decision or recommendation. And they, in turn, -relied upon their Corps Commanders to seize the initiative in -the pursuit of such a policy. Naturally, the Army at all times -made every effort to secure co-ordinated action by its several -Corps; but it rarely happened that more than one Corps at a -time carried through the main effort—the other Corps performing -subsidiary rôles. The great battle of September 29th to October -1st, which completed the final rupture of the Hindenburg line, -was, however, a signal exception to this rule.</p> - -<p>The attack by the Third British Army on August 21st is a case -which illustrates the delays inseparable from battle preparations. -The project of such an attack had already been mooted on -August 11th, when General Byng (Third Army) paid me a visit -to discuss my battle plan of August 8th, and I gathered on that -occasion that he hoped to begin within four or five days. The event -showed that the operation actually took ten days to materialize. -No criticism is suggested. The conditions of transport of troops -and munitions doubtless made its earlier realization quite impossible.</p> - -<p>The attack coming when it did, however, considerably eased -the situation of the Fourth Army, upon whose front Ludendorff -had flung all his available reserves, drawn from all parts of the -German front, in his endeavours to bring the Australians and -Canadians to a halt.</p> - -<p>He was now suddenly confronted with the prospect of -another "break through" in a different part of his line, and -the German people had been taught by their press correspondents -to believe that a "break through" was the one thing most to be -resisted by the German Supreme Command, and the one thing -impossible of achievement by us.</p> - -<p>There can be no doubt, therefore, that the success of the Third<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[155]</a></span> -Army on August 21st, although not comparable in its results -with the battle of August 8th, did materially assist the prospects -of my own success in the operations upon which I was then -embarking.</p> - -<p>The immediate effect of it was already felt the very next -day. For the Third Corps, which was still the left flank Corps of -the Fourth Army, and which had made very little progress since -August 8th, was enabled to advance its line a little past Albert -and Meaulte.</p> - -<p>The Third Australian Division, which, it will be remembered, -had taken over the front and the rôle of the now disbanded -Liaison Force, participated, by arrangement, in this attack and, -swinging up its left, brought my front line, north of the river, -square to the Somme Valley, and just to the forward slopes of -the high plateau overlooking Bray and La Neuville. The Third -Pioneer Battalion at once got to work on restoring the broken -crossings over the Somme, to the south of Bray, and put out -a series of advanced posts upon the left bank of the river, which -gave us practical control of the great island on which stands -La Neuville.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, on the left flank of the 9th Brigade, which had -carried out the Third Divisional attack, there was serious trouble. -The enemy counter-attacked in the late afternoon. The 9th -Brigade stood firm; but the 47th Division (of the Third Corps) -yielded ground, leaving the flank of the 9th Brigade in the air. -A chalk pit, which we had seized, formed a welcome redoubt -which enabled the 33rd Battalion to hang on for sufficiently -long to permit of the 34th Battalion coming up to form a defensive -flank, facing north.</p> - -<p>In this way the gallant 9th Brigade (Goddard) was able to -retain the whole of its gains of that day; but the risk of an -immediate further advance was too great while the situation to -the north remained obscure and unsatisfactory. The capture -of the village of Bray, which was still strongly held by the enemy, -had, therefore, to be postponed, although it had been part of -my plan to capture it that same day as a measure of precaution, -seeing that I calculated upon being able the next day to advance<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[156]</a></span> -my line south of the Somme to a point well to the east of -Bray.</p> - -<p>The great attack by the First Division supported by the 32nd -Division, which has come to be known as the battle of Chuignes, -was launched at dawn on August 23rd, and was an unqualified -success.</p> - -<p>The main valley of the Somme in this region is flanked by a -number of tributary valleys, which run generally in a north and -south direction, extending back from the river four or five miles. -They are broad, with heavily-wooded sides, and harbour a -number of villages, such as Proyart, Chuignolles, Herleville -and Chuignes, which cluster on their slopes.</p> - -<p>One such valley, larger and longer than any of those which, -in our previous advances, we had yet crossed, lay before our -front line of that morning, and square across our path. It ran -from Herleville, northwards, past Chuignes, to join the Somme in -the Bray bend. It was the most easterly of all the tributary -valleys to which I have referred, and it was also the last piece of -habitable country before the devastated area of 1916 was reached, -just a mile to the east of it.</p> - -<p>The valley afforded excellent cover for the enemy's guns, and -the expectation was that some of them would be overrun by -our attack. It was also ideal country for machine-gun defence, -for the numerous woods, hedges and copses afforded excellent -cover, and had in all probability been amply fortified with -barbed wire. It was a formidable proposition to attack such a -position on such a frontage with only two Brigades.</p> - -<p>The 2nd Brigade (Heane) attacked on the right, the 1st Brigade -(Mackay) on the left, and the first phase was completed to time-table, -with the green objective line, located on the east side of -the long valley, in our possession. The only temporary hitch -in the advance along the whole front was at Robert Wood, where -the enemy held out, and had to be completely enveloped from -both flanks before surrendering.</p> - -<p>Then came the second phase, and no difficulty was experienced -in advancing our line 1,000 yards east of the green line, nor in -establishing there a firm line of outposts for the night.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[157]</a></span></p> - -<p>The third phase presented a great deal more difficulty than I -had anticipated. It was to have been undertaken by the 3rd -Brigade (Bennett) pushing without delay through the 1st Brigade, -and advancing in open warfare formation north-easterly towards -Cappy, for the seizure of Hill 90, overlooking that village and on -the south-west of it, and terminating at its northern extremity -in the high bluff of Froissy Beacon.</p> - -<p>There was, however, some unexplained delay in the initiation -of this advance, and it was not until about 2 o'clock that the -3rd Brigade moved forward to the assault of the long slope of -the Chuignes Valley, which still lay before them in this part of -the field. The enemy, under the impression that our attack -had spent itself, had occupied the plateau in great strength, and -at first little progress could be made.</p> - -<p>Mobile Artillery was, however, promptly pushed up, and this -proved of great assistance to the infantry. Garenne Wood, on -the top of the plateau, into which large numbers of the enemy -had withdrawn, proved a difficult obstacle, and incapable of capture -by frontal attack. It, too, was conquered by enveloping -tactics, and with its fall the resistance of the enemy rapidly -subsided, and the 3rd Brigade had the satisfaction of hunting -the fugitives clean off the plateau into the Cappy Valley.</p> - -<p>The whole of this phase of the battle was an especially fine -piece of work on the part of the Regimental Officers. It was -open warfare of the most complete character, and the victory -was won by excellent battle control on the part of the Battalion -Commanders, by splendid co-operation between the four -Battalions of the Brigade, and by intelligent and gallant leadership -on the part of the Company and Platoon Commanders.</p> - -<p>Beset as I had been by many anxieties during the early afternoon -as to how the Third Brigade would fare in the difficult -task which had been given it, rendered more difficult by the delay -of which I have spoken, I had the satisfaction that night of -contemplating a victory far greater than I had calculated -upon.</p> - -<p>For the 32nd Division had successfully captured Herleville, -and the First Division had seized the whole country for a depth<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[158]</a></span> -of 1½ miles up to a line extending from Herleville to the western -edge of Cappy. The whole Chuignes Valley was ours. By its -capture the enemy had been despoiled of all habitable areas, and -had been relegated to a waste of broken and ruined country -between us and the line of the Somme.</p> - -<p>We took that day 21 guns and over 3,100 prisoners from ten -different regiments. The slaughter of the enemy in the tangled -valleys was considerable, for our Infantry are always vigorous -bayonet fighters. They received much assistance from the Tanks -in disposing of the numerous machine gun detachments which -held their ground to the last.</p> - -<p>It was a smashing blow, and far exceeded in its results any -previous record in my experience, having regard to the number -of troops engaged. Its immediate result, the same night, was the -capture of Bray by the Third Division, north of the river, thus -completing the work of that Division which the failure of the -47th Division on their left the day before had compelled them to -leave unfinished. The 40th Battalion took 200 prisoners, with -trifling loss to themselves.</p> - -<p>A more remote result, which made itself apparent in the next -few days, was that it compelled the enemy to abandon all hope -of retaining a hold of any country west of the line of the Somme; -it impelled him at last to an evacuation of the great bend of the -river, a process which he began in a very few days.</p> - -<p>Such was the battle of Chuignes. Much of the success of this -brilliant engagement was due to the personality of the Divisional -Commander, Major-General Glasgow. He had commenced his -career in the war as a Major of Light Horse, and had participated -in the earliest stages of the fighting on the Gallipoli -Peninsula.</p> - -<p>Speedily gaining promotion during that campaign, his outstanding -merits as a leader gained him an appointment to the -command of the 13th Brigade, when the latter was formed in -Egypt in the spring of 1916. For two years he led that Brigade -through all its arduous experiences on the Somme, at Messines -and in the third battle of Ypres.</p> - -<p>This fine record was but the prelude to the history-making<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[159]</a></span> -performances of the 13th Brigade in 1918 at Dernancourt and -Villers-Bretonneux, and Glasgow seemed easily the most promising, -among all the Brigadiers of that time, as a prospective -Divisional Commander: a judgment which fully justified itself.</p> - -<p>Of strong though not heavy build and of energetic demeanour, -Glasgow succeeded not so much by exceptional mental gifts, or -by tactical skill of any very high order, as by his personal driving -force and determination, which impressed themselves upon all his -subordinates. He always got where he wanted to get—was -consistently loyal to the Australian ideal, and intensely proud -of the Australian soldier.</p> - -<p>The number of prisoners captured on this day, and the total -numbers of the enemy encountered in the course of an advance -which was relatively small, pointed to a disposition of troops -which was unusual on the part of the enemy.</p> - -<p>According to the principles so strongly emphasized by Ludendorff, -in instructions which he had issued, and copies of which -duly fell into my hands, there was to be, in his scheme of defensive -tactics, a "fore-field" relatively lightly held by outposts and -machine guns. The main line of resistance was to be well in -rear, and there the main concentration of troops was to be effected.</p> - -<p>Why had this dictum been so widely disregarded on this -occasion? It was a question worthy of close inquiry, and two -German Battalion Commanders who were captured by us on that -day supplied the answer.</p> - -<p>Reference has already been made to the message which I -issued to the Corps on the eve of the great opening battle; and -to the fact that a copy of this message had fallen into the hands -of the enemy, probably by the capture of an officer in the close -fighting which took place at Lihons on August 9th and 10th.</p> - -<p>In due course the substance of this message was published -in the German wireless news, and in the German press of the time, -but cleverly mistranslated to convey a colouring desirable for -the German public.</p> - -<p>It so happened that not long before the opening of our offensive -I had, at the request of the authorities, sent to Australia a recruiting -cable, which appealed to the Australian public for a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[160]</a></span> -maintenance of supplies of fighting men.<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> That the full text -of this cable also became speedily known to the enemy is a -testimony to the far-flung alertness of their Intelligence Service. -It, also, was published in their press.</p> - -<p>Basing their editorial comments on this material, the <i>Berliner -Tageblatt</i> of August 17th, 1918, a copy of which I captured, and -another journal whose name was not ascertainable, because in -the copy captured the title had been torn off, both indulged -in arguments, which were long, and intended to be convincing, -to prove to the German people that I had promised my troops -a "break-through;" that I had failed, and that, admittedly, -the "proud" Australian Corps had been shattered, had come to -the end of its resources and was no longer to be taken into calculation -as an instrument of attack by the "English."</p> - -<p>It was perfectly legitimate, if clumsy, propaganda. But it -was a curious example of a propaganda which recoiled upon the -heads of its propounders. The Battalion Commanders, who, -like all German officers whom we captured, were always voluble -in excuses for their defeat, pleaded that they had been deceived -by the utterances of their own journals into believing that the -Australian offensive effort had come to an end, once and for all, -and that no further attack by this Corps was possible.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 808px;"> -<img src="images/map-d.jpg" width="808" height="1200" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">Map D</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[161]</a></span></p> - -<p>It was this belief which, they said, had prompted their respective -Divisions (for each of them represented a separate one) -to disregard Ludendorff's prescription; their Divisional Generals -had felt justified in availing themselves of the very excellent -living quarters which existed in the Chuignes Valley, near the -German front line of August 22nd, to quarter all their support -and reserve Battalions.</p> - -<p>It was there that we found them—increasing the population -of the front zone far beyond that which we had been accustomed -to find. Was there ever a more diverting example of a propaganda -which recoiled upon those who uttered it? Intended to -deceive the German public, it ended in deceiving the German -front line troops, to their own lamentable undoing.</p> - -<p>Among the captures of the battle of Chuignes, which, as usual, -comprised a large and varied assortment of warlike stores, including -another great dump of engineering materials near Froissy -Beacon, and two complete railway trains, was the monster -naval gun of 15-inch bore, which had been so systematically -bombarding the city of Amiens, and had wrought such havoc -among its buildings and monuments.</p> - -<p>It was first reached by the 3rd Australian Battalion (1st -Brigade) during a bayonet charge which cleared Arcy Wood, -in the shelter of which the giant gun had been erected. An -imposing amount of labour had been expended upon its installation, -and the most cursory examination of the effort involved -was sufficient to make it evident that the enemy entertained no -expectation of ever being hurled back from the region which -it dominated.</p> - -<p>The gun with its carriage, platform and concrete foundations -weighed over 500 tons. It was a naval gun, obviously of the type -in use on the German Dreadnoughts, and never intended by its -original designers for use on land. It had a range of over twenty-four -miles, fired a projectile weighing nearly a ton, and the barrel -was seventy feet long.</p> - -<p>It had been installed with the elaborate completeness of German -methods. A double railway track, several miles long, had -been built to the site, for the transport of the gun and its parts.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[162]</a></span> -It was electrically trained and elevated. Its ammunition was -handled and loaded by mechanical means. The adjacent hill-side -had been tunnelled to receive the operating machinery, and -the supplies of shells, cartridges and fuses.</p> - -<p>The gun and its mounting, when captured, were found to have -been completely disabled. A heavy charge of explosive had -burst the chamber of the gun, and had torn off the projecting -muzzle end, which lay with its nose helplessly buried in the mud. -The giant carriage had been burst asunder, and over acres all -around was strewn the debris of the explosion.</p> - -<p>For some time, some of my gunner experts favoured the -theory that the gun had burst accidentally, but the view which -ultimately prevailed was that the demolition had been intentional. -Many months afterwards, the full story of the gun and -its performances was elicited from a prisoner who had belonged -to the No. 4 (German) Heavy Artillery Regiment, and it was -circumstantial enough to be credible.</p> - -<p>The story is worthy of repetition, not only because no authentic -account of this wonderful trophy has yet been published, but -also because the history of this gun curiously illuminates the -enemy's plans, intentions and expectations between the dates -of his onslaught in March and his recoil in August.</p> - -<p>The substance of the story is as follows: The gun came from -Krupp's. Work on the position was started early in April, -1918—only a few days after the site had fallen into the enemy's -hands. It was completed and ready for action on the morning -of June 2nd. Its maximum firing capacity was twenty-eight -rounds per day. It fired continuously until June 28th. By this -time the original gun was worn out, having fired over 350 rounds -at Amiens. A new piece was ordered from Krupp's. It arrived -on August 7th, and was ready to fire by 7 p.m. It fired its first -round on August 8th at 2 a.m. and kept on firing till August -9th, firing thirty-five rounds in all. At 7 a.m. on August 9th, all -hands were ordered to remove everything that was portable -and of value. Demolition charges were laid and fired about -9 a.m. on August 9th. The crew returned to Krupp's.</p> - -<p>It is to be inferred from this narrative that the enemy's defeat<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[163]</a></span> -at Hamel on July 4th did not deter him from his enterprise of -replacing the original worn gun, but that after August 8th, he -quite definitely accepted the certainty that he would be allowed -no time to remove the gun intact, and so he destroyed it in order -that we might not be able to use it against him.</p> - -<p>This is the largest single trophy of war won by any Commander -during the war, and it was a matter of great regret to me that -the cost of its transportation to Australia was prohibitive. The -gun, as it stands, was, therefore, fenced in, and it has been -formally presented to the City of Amiens as a souvenir of the -Australian Army Corps.</p> - -<p>So long as any Australian soldiers remained in France, this -spot was a Mecca to which thousands of pilgrims wandered; -and soon there was, over the whole of the immense structure, -not one square inch upon which the "diggers" had not inscribed -their names and sentiments. There, in the shade of Arcy Wood, -the great ruin rests, a memorial alike of the sufferings of Amiens -and of the great Australian victory of Chuignes.</p> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> -The cablegram in question was dated July 13th, and was in the following terms: -</p> -<p> -"Since the opening of the German offensive in March every Division of the -Australian Army in France has been engaged and always with decisive success. -The men of Australia, wherever and whenever they have entered this mighty -conflict, have invariably brought the enemy to a standstill, and have made him -pay dearly for each futile attempt to pass them on the roads to Amiens and to -the Channel Ports. Their reputation as skilful, disciplined and gallant soldiers -has never stood higher throughout the Empire than it does to-day. Those who -are privileged to lead in battle such splendid men are animated with a pride -and admiration which is tempered only by concern at their waning numbers. -Already some battalions which have made historic traditions have ceased to -exist as fighting units, and others must follow unless the Australian nation -stands by us and sees to it that our ranks are kept filled. We refuse to believe -that the men and women of Australia will suffer their famous Divisions to decay, -or that the young manhood still remaining in our homeland will not wish to -share in the renown of their brothers in France. Nothing matters now but -to see this job through to the end, and we appeal to every man to come, and -come quickly, to help in our work, and to share in our glorious endeavour. -</p> -<div class="right"> -"<span class="smcap">Monash</span>, Lieutenant-General."<br /> -</div> -</div> -</div> - - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[164]</a></span></p> - -<h2>CHAPTER X<br /> - -PURSUIT</h2> - - -<p>The design which I had formed after the battle of August -8th of driving the enemy completely out of the bend -of the Somme—but which I was obliged to abandon for the time -being because of the decision of the Fourth Army to thrust in -a south-easterly direction—was now about to be realized. The -effect of the battle of Chuignes, following so closely upon the -advance of the Third Army two days before, made it probable -that the enemy would decide upon a definite withdrawal to the -line of the Somme.</p> - -<p>It now became my object to ensure, if he should attempt to -do so, firstly, that his withdrawal should be more precipitate -than would be agreeable to him, and, secondly, that when he -reached that line he should be accorded no breathing time to -establish upon it a firm defence from which he could hold us at -bay for the remainder of the fine weather.</p> - -<p>The French Army took over from me on the night of the -23rd August the whole of that portion of my front which still -extended south of Lihons. General Nollet, Commander of the -36th French Corps (34th and 35th French Divisions), became my -southern neighbour, displacing my Fourth Division, and also a -Canadian Division, for whose sector I had become responsible -since the departure of General Currie, a few days before.</p> - -<p>During these redispositions, probably induced to do so by -evidences patent to him that large troop movements were in -progress, the enemy carried out a very heavy gas bombardment -and maintained it for some hours over the whole of the front -which was being taken over by the French.</p> - -<p>The wind blowing from the south, the gas, which was unusually<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[165]</a></span> -dense, drifted over the whole areas both of the Fourth Australian -and the 32nd British Divisions, and caused a large number of -gas casualties, which weakened the available garrisons of these -sectors.</p> - -<p>The Second and Fifth Divisions were brought up on the night -of August 26th to relieve the First Division, which had worthily -earned a rest, and by these redispositions my whole frontage, -which, in spite of the reduction effected, still exceeded nine miles, -was organized to be held by four Divisions, counting from south -to north as follows: 32nd Division, Fifth Division, Second -Division and Third Division, the latter lying north of the River -Somme.</p> - -<p>The First and Fourth Divisions were each sent back, the -former to a pleasant reach of the Somme near Chipilly, and the -latter to the neighbourhood of Amiens, there to have a long -rest and to recuperate after their strenuous labours. These two -Divisions were, I had resolved, to be kept in reserve for any <i>tour -de force</i>, the need for which might arise later. This disposition -was based on intuition rather than on reasoning; but the event -proved that it was a fortunate decision; for, at a juncture, -three weeks later, when a great opportunity presented itself, -these two Divisions, then fully rested, proved of priceless value.</p> - -<p>The Third Division held my front north of the Somme, and -their presence there ensured my unchallenged tactical control -of that important river valley. Numerous crossings had been -systematically destroyed by the enemy, as he was being driven -back from bend to bend, and as systematically repaired by my -indefatigable engineer and pioneer services, as fast as the ground -passed under our control.</p> - -<p>Reconstruction of bridges and culverts is as tedious a business -as their demolition is expeditious. A charge of gun-cotton, -placed in the right spot, a primer, a short length of fuse, or an -electric lead to a press button are all that are needed, and a single -sapper standing by with a match, to be lighted at the last moment, -can do all that is necessary to provide three days' work for a -whole Company of Engineers.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless, the control of the river valley was of inestimable<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[166]</a></span> -advantage, for it enabled me to carry out a policy of continuous -and rapid repair. Consequently, during the whole of our subsequent -advance, every means of traversing the valley from south -to north, which had been tampered with, was soon restored, as -fast as my infantry had made good their advance beyond the -ruined crossing.</p> - -<p>This facility was to have an important bearing upon my -freedom of action, not many days later, when the Corps came -head on to the north and south stretch of the Somme, and -found every bridge gone. That circumstance alone would have -proved an irretrievable misfortune, if I had not had already -available numerous restored crossings upon the east and west -reach of the river. For by that means, my ability to pass -troops and guns rapidly from one bank of the Somme to the -other remained unimpaired.</p> - -<p>Before leaving the line, the First Division had captured Cappy -and advanced its line on the right to the western outskirts of -Foucaucourt, while the Third Division had possessed itself of -Suzanne. This was the situation when, on the night of August -26th, the Second and Fifth Divisions came into the line. Conferences -with the four line Divisions were held both on the 25th -and 26th August, in order to ensure co-ordinate action for the -process of hustling the enemy across the Somme.</p> - -<p>I was, at this stage, sorely perplexed by the uncertain attitude -of the Fourth Army. I was all for pushing on energetically, -and received General Rawlinson's approval to do so on -August 24th; but on the very next day he enunciated a diametrically -opposite policy, which greatly embarrassed me.</p> - -<p>The gist of the Army attitude on the 25th may be thus expressed. -The presence of a new German Division, the 41st, of -whom we had taken many prisoners in Cappy, pointed to an -intention on the part of the enemy to reinforce. This negatived -any intention to undertake a withdrawal. This conclusion -justified a revision of the Fourth Army policy. The Army had -done its fair share; it had drawn in upon its front all the loose -German reserves. Its resources in Tanks had been depleted, -and it would take a month to replace them. Other Armies would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[167]</a></span> -now take up the burden, and the Fourth Army would now mark -time, and await events elsewhere. There was no object in hastening -the enemy's evacuation of the bad ground in the bend of the -Somme, or in our taking possession of it. There was a possibility -of the French taking over more frontage from us, and the Australian -Corps front might in consequence be reduced to a three-Division -front, with three Divisions in Corps Reserve.</p> - -<p>The course of events, in the next seven days, convinced me -that the results which were then achieved were totally unexpected -by the Fourth Army, and very vitally influenced the whole -subsequent course of the campaign. In point of fact, Lord -Rawlinson quite frankly conceded to me as much in express -terms a week later. The appreciation made at the time was -doubtless an intentionally conservative one, but it did not take -into account the reserve of striking power which remained in -the Australian Corps, even after the past eighteen days of continuous -fighting, and even without the assistance of the Tanks.</p> - -<p>There was only one saving clause in the Army attitude, and -this fortunately gave all the loophole necessary for the continued -activity which I desired to pursue. It was this: "Touch -must be kept with the enemy." This was of course a mere -formality of tactics, and was intended as no more than such. -But it was sufficient to justify an aggressive policy on my part.</p> - -<p>As the result of my redispositions, completed by the night of -August 27th, and of my conferences with the line Divisions, -each Division stood on that morning on a single Brigade front, -with its two remaining Brigades arranged in depth behind it. -My orders were that in the event of the enemy giving way, the -line Brigade was to push on energetically, and was to be kept -in the line until it had reached the limits of its endurance. The -other two Brigades were to follow up more leisurely, but to be -prepared, each in turn, to relieve the line Brigade.</p> - -<p>I had calculated that, by this method, each Brigade should -be able to function for at least two days on the frontage allotted; -and that, therefore, the present line Divisions could continue -for at least six days; and if the stress upon the troops had not -been severe, they could carry out a second rotation of Brigades for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[168]</a></span> -a second tour of six days. The calculation was, in general terms, -fully realized; and all of the four line Divisions of that day did -actually carry on for twelve days, and two of them for an additional -six days.</p> - -<p>The Artillery resources of the Corps were throughout the whole -of this period fully maintained at the standard of the early days -of August. I still had at my disposal eighteen Brigades of Field -Artillery; and so was able to allot four Brigades of Artillery to -each line Division, while keeping two in Corps Reserve.</p> - -<p>Early on the morning of August 27th, a policy of vigorous -patrolling all along our front was initiated. At several points, -enemy posts which were known to have been strongly held the -night before were found to be now unoccupied. Although reports -varied along my front, they so fully confirmed my anticipations, -that without waiting to make any reference to the Army, I -ordered an immediate general advance along my whole front.</p> - -<p>There followed a merry and exciting three days of pursuit; -for the enemy was really on the run, and by nightfall on August -29th, not a German who was not a prisoner remained west of -the Somme between Péronne and Brie.</p> - -<p>In previous years, during the enemy's retreat from Bapaume -to the Hindenburg Line, we had had experience of his methods -of withdrawal. Then they were deliberate, and his rearguards -so methodically and resolutely held up the British advance, that -the enemy had been able not only to remove from the evacuated -area every particle of his warlike stores, which were of any value, -but also to carry out a systematic devastation of the whole area, -even to the felling of all the fruit trees, and the tearing up of all -the railways for miles.</p> - -<p>The present withdrawal was of a very different character. -To begin with, it had been forced upon him by the battle of -Chuignes, and he had to undertake it precipitately and without -adequate preparation. Secondly, he had an impassable river -behind him, which could be crossed only at three points, Brie, -Eterpigny, and Péronne. Thirdly, he had in front of him a -Corps flushed with its recent victories, while he had been suffering -a succession of defeats and heavy losses.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[169]</a></span></p> - -<p>Nevertheless, he put up a good fight, and employed well-considered -tactics. The German Machine Gun Corps was much -the best of all his services. The manner in which the machine -gunners stood their ground, serving their guns to the very last, -and defying even the Juggernaut menace of the Tanks, won the -unstinted admiration of our men. During these three days of -retreat the enemy used his machine guns to the best advantage, -and they constituted the only obstacle to our rapid -advance.</p> - -<p>These tactics were not unexpected by me, and I had an answer -ready. Defying the whole traditions of Artillery tactics in open -warfare, I insisted upon two somewhat startling innovations. -The first was to break up battery control, by detaching even -sections (two guns), to come under the direct orders of Infantry -Commanders for the purpose of engaging with direct fire any -machine-gun nest which was holding them up.</p> - -<p>The second was to insist that all batteries should carry 20 per -cent. of smoke shell. This elicited a storm of protest from the -gunners. Every shell carried which was not a high explosive or -shrapnel shell meant a shell less of destructive power, and, -therefore, a shell wasted. That had been the Gunnery School -doctrine. But I imagine that the test made at this epoch of the -liberal use of smoke shell against machine guns will lead to a -revision of that doctrine.</p> - -<p>Smoke shell proved of inestimable value in blinding the German -machine gunners. A few rounds judiciously placed screened the -approach of our Infantry, and many a machine-gun post was -thereby rushed by us from the flanks or even from the rear. -General Hobbs (Fifth Division) and General Rosenthal (Second -Division), both of whom had formerly been gunners, proved the -strongest advocates for these smoke tactics.</p> - -<p>By such means an energetic and successful pursuit was launched -and maintained. By the night of August 27th, our line already -lay to the east of the villages of Vermandovillers, Foucaucourt -(on the main road) and Fontaine. We also mastered the whole -of the Cappy bend, including the crossings of the Somme at -Eclusier. The Fifth Division had a particularly hard fight<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[170]</a></span> -at Foucaucourt, which did not fall to us until we had subjected -it to a considerable bombardment. Tivoli Wood was the chief -obstacle encountered that day by the Second Division. The -advance of the 32nd Division also progressed smoothly.</p> - -<p>During August 28th our advance was continued methodically, -and by that night the Corps front had reached the line Génermont—Berry-en-Santerre—Estrées—Frise.</p> - -<p>On August 29th the line of the Somme was reached, and all -three Divisions south of the Somme stood upon the high ground -sloping down to the Somme, with the river in sight from opposite -Cléry, past Péronne and as far south as St. Christ.</p> - -<p>In the meantime the Third Division north of the Somme -had marched forward, in sympathetic step with the southern -advance, successively seizing Suzanne, Vaux, Curlu, Hem and -Cléry. The Third Corps on my left had followed up the general -advance, though always lagging a little in rear, thus keeping -my left flank secure; and beyond the Third Corps, the Third -Army was approaching the line of the Canal du Nord, which -lay, as explained, in prolongation of the south-north course of -the Somme.</p> - -<p>The war correspondents of this time were given to representing -the progress of the Australian Corps during these three days -as a leisurely advance, regulated in its pace by the speed of the -retiring enemy. But it was nothing of the kind.</p> - -<p>On the contrary, it was his withdrawal which was regulated -by the speed of our advance. There was not a foot of ground -which was not contested by all the effort which the enemy was -able to put forth. It is quite true that his withdrawal was -intentional; but it is not true that it was conducted at the -deliberate rate which was necessary to enable him to withdraw -in good order.</p> - -<p>He was compelled to fight all the time and to withdraw in -disorder. He was forced to abandon guns and huge quantities -of stores. The amount of derelict artillery ammunition found -scattered over the whole of this considerable area alone reached -hundreds of thousands of rounds, distributed in hundreds of -dumps and depots, as well as scores of tons of empty artillery<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[171]</a></span> -cartridge-cases, the brass of which had become of priceless value -to the enemy.</p> - -<p>Regimental and even Divisional Headquarters were abandoned -as they stood, with all their furniture and mess equipment left -intact. Signal wire and telephone equipment remained installed -in all directions, hospitals and dressing-stations were left to their -fate. The advance yielded to us over 600 prisoners, some half-dozen -field-guns, and large numbers of smaller weapons.</p> - -<p>The last two days of the advance led us across a maze of -trenches and the debris of the 1916 campaign. The weather -was unfavourable, there was much rain and an entire absence -of any kind of shelter. As a result the line Brigades had to put -forth all their powers of endurance and reached the Somme in -a very tired condition.</p> - -<p>In the meantime my air squadron had an exceptionally -busy time. Contact patrols were maintained throughout every -hour of daylight. Difficult as it was to identify the positions -reached by our leading troops during an organized battle, where -their approximate positions and ultimate objective lines were -known beforehand, it was doubly so when no guide whatever -existed as to the probable extent of each day's advance, or as to -the amount of resistance likely to be encountered at different -parts of the front.</p> - -<p>Yet it was just under these circumstances that rapid and -reliable information as to the progress of the various elements -of our front line troops was more important than ever, and no -means for obtaining such information was so expeditious as the -Contact Aeroplane.</p> - -<p>To assist the air observer in identifying our troops, the latter -were provided with flares, of colours which were varied from -time to time in order to minimize the risk of imitation by the -enemy. The method of their employment, whether singly or -in pairs, or three at a time, was also frequently varied.</p> - -<p>These flares on being lit gave out a dense cloud of coloured -smoke, easily distinguishable from a moderate height. The -contact plane, which would carry coloured streamers so that -the infantry could identify it as flying on that particular duty,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[172]</a></span> -would, when ready to observe, blow its horn and thereupon -the foremost infantry would light their flares.</p> - -<p>It was a method of inter-communication between air and -ground, which, after a little practice, came to be well understood -and intelligently carried out. By its means a Divisional or -Brigade Commander was kept accurately informed, with great -promptitude, of the progress of each of his front line units, in -relation to the various woods, ruined mills, and other obstacles -which lay spread across their path.</p> - -<p>But the Air Force had another interesting duty, which was -to watch the roads leading back from the enemy's front line -to his rear areas. During tranquil times little movement could -ever be seen on the enemy's roads in the hours of daylight, for -the very good reason that he took care to carry out all his transportation -to and from his front zone under cover of darkness.</p> - -<p>Now, however, his needs pressed sorely upon him; and our -air reports, from this time onwards, became almost monotonous -in their iteration of the fact that large columns of transport -were to be seen moving back in an easterly direction. These -were his retiring batteries or his convoys of wagons carrying -such stores as he was able to salve.</p> - -<p>Occasionally, too, came reports of convoys, which looked -like motor lorries or buses, moving hurriedly westward towards -the German front. These were generally diagnosed by us as -reinforcements which were being continually hurried forward to -replace his human wastage, which was considerable both by -direct losses from death, wounds and capture and by reason of -the fatigue of such a strenuous and nerve-racking retreat.</p> - -<p>All this movement in the enemy's rearward areas was a legitimate -object of interest to my Artillery. But, unfortunately, most -of it lay well beyond the range of my lighter Ordnance. The -mobile Field Artillery was effective at no greater range than -about four miles. The longer range 60-pounders found it a -formidable task to traverse such broken country, while the still -heavier tractor-drawn 6-inch guns found it quite impossible.</p> - -<p>The latter, and all the Heavy and Super-Heavy guns and -howitzers were tied down to the roads, and it proved a tremendous<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[173]</a></span> -business to advance them in sufficient time and numbers to -make their influence felt upon the present situation. I have -nothing but praise for the admirable manner in which Brigadier-General -Fraser and his Heavy Artillery Headquarters carried -out the forward moves of the whole of his extensive Artillery -equipment and organization from August 8th onwards to August -23rd. But the rapid advance of the battle line during the last -week of August left the great bulk of Heavy Artillery far behind.</p> - -<p>This was not entirely or even appreciably a question of the -rate of movement of the great lumbering steam or motor-drawn -heavy guns. They could quite easily march their eight or ten -miles a day if they could have a clear road upon which to do it. -But it was this question of roads that dominated the whole -situation during this period, and subsequently until the end of the -campaign of the Corps.</p> - -<p>The construction and upkeep of roads throughout the Corps -area had been, even in the days of stationary warfare, a difficult -problem. At a time like the present, when the battle was -moving forward from day to day, it became one of the first -magnitude.</p> - -<p>The rate of our advance was controlled almost as much by -the speed with which main and secondary roads could be made -practicable for traffic as by the degree of resistance offered by -the enemy. Obstacles had to be removed, the debris of war -cleared to one side, shell holes solidly filled in, craters of mine -explosions bridged or circumvented, culverts repaired and drains -freed of obstructions.</p> - -<p>The road surfaces, speedily deteriorating under the strain -and wear of heavy motor lorry traffic, had to be kept constantly -under repair. The transportation of the necessary road stone -for this purpose alone, imposed a heavy burden upon the roads -and impeded other urgent traffic. The amount of road construction -and reconstruction actually in hand within the Corps -area, at any one time, far exceeded that normally required in -peace time for any great city district.</p> - -<p>The traffic on the roads was always of the most dense and -varied character. For the proper maintenance and supply of a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[174]</a></span> -large Army Corps at least three good main roads, leading back -to our sources of supply, would have been no more than adequate; -but I seldom had at my disposal more than one such main road, -which had often to be shared with an adjoining Corps.</p> - -<p>There was ever an endless stream of traffic, labouring slowly -along in both directions. On such a road as that leading east -from Amiens towards the battle front, the congestion was always -extreme. Ammunition lorries, regimental horsed transport, -motor dispatch riders, marching infantry, long strings of horses -and mules going to and from water, traction engines, convoy after -convoy of motor buses, supply wagons, mess carts, signal motor -tenders, complete batteries of Artillery, motor tractors, tanks, -Staff motor cars and gangs of coolie labourers surged steadily -forward, in an amazing jumble, with never a moment's pause.</p> - -<p>Such were some of the difficulties with which I was beset in -the rear of my battle line. They were negligible compared -with those which now loomed in front of it.</p> - -<p>The reach of the Somme which runs northerly from Ham -past Brie to Péronne and there turns westerly, differs entirely -in its topographical features from that picturesque Somme -Valley along both of whose banks the Corps had been fighting -its way forward. The steep banks have disappeared, and for -a mile or so on either side the ground slopes gently towards the -river bed.</p> - -<p>The river itself is not less than 1,000 yards wide, being, in fact, -a broad marsh, studded with islets which are overgrown with -rushes, while the stream of the river threads its way in numerous -channels between them. The marsh itself is no more than waist-deep, -but the flowing water is too deep to be waded.</p> - -<p>Along the western side of this marsh runs the canalized river, -or, as it is here known, the Somme Canal, flowing between -masonry-lined banks. The construction of a crossing of such -a marsh was, even in peace time, a troublesome business. It -meant, to begin with, a causeway solidly founded upon a firm -masonry bed sunk deep into the mud of the valley bed. The -canal itself and each rivulet required its separate bridge, in spans -varying from thirty to sixty feet.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[175]</a></span></p> - -<p>What, therefore, came to be known as the Brie Bridge, situated -on the line of the main road from Amiens to St. Quentin, really -consisted of no less than eight separate bridges disposed at -irregular intervals along the line of the causeway, between the -western and eastern banks of the valley. The demolition of -even the smallest of these eight bridges would render the whole -causeway unusable, and would prohibit all traffic.</p> - -<p>There exists an almost exactly similar arrangement of bridges -at St. Christ, about two miles to the south of Brie, but no other -traffic crossing to the north of Brie until Péronne is reached. -There, both the main road and the railway, which cross side by -side, are provided with large span lattice girder bridges, over the -main canal, while the marsh has been reclaimed where the town -has encroached upon it. The river overflow is led through the -town in several smaller canals or drains, all of them liberally -bridged where crossed by roads and streets.</p> - -<p>The Péronne bridges are, therefore, no less indispensable, and -no less easily rendered useless than those at Brie. Should -such crossings be denied to me, it would be just possible to pass -infantry across the valley, by night, by wading and swimming, -or by the use of rafts, always provided that no opposition were -to be met with. But to pass tanks or heavy guns, or even vehicles -of the lightest description across the marsh, would have been quite -impossible.</p> - -<p>The Somme threatened, therefore, to be a most formidable -obstacle to my further advance. It was incumbent upon me to -assume that at the very least one of each series of bridges would -be demolished by the enemy in his retreat. It would have been -criminal folly on his part were it to have been otherwise; and I -had had previous evidence of the efficiency of his engineer services.</p> - -<p>Reconnaissances pushed out on the night of August 29th -speedily verified the assumption that some at least of the bridges -had been wrecked. It was ultimately ascertained that every -single bridge in every one of the crossings named had been -methodically and systematically blown to pieces.</p> - -<p>There was only one tactical method by which such an obstacle -could be forced by a frontal operation. By bringing up sufficient<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[176]</a></span> -Artillery to dominate the enemy's defences on the east bank of -the river valley, it might have been possible to pass across -sufficient infantry to establish a wide bridge-head, behind which -the ruined crossings could be restored, probably under enemy -Artillery fire.</p> - -<p>But it would have been a costly enterprise, and fraught with -every prospect of failure, should the enemy be prepared to put -up any sort of a fight to prevent it.</p> - -<p>The value to me of the possession of the whole of the Somme -Valley from Cléry westwards, and the rapid repair of the bridges -therein which I had been able to effect, will now become apparent. -For it permitted the crystallizing into action of a project for -dealing with the present situation, which had been vaguely -forming in my mind ever since the day when I took over the -Chipilly spur.</p> - -<p>This was the plan of turning the line of the Somme from the -north, instead of forcing it by direct assault from the west.</p> - -<p>It may be argued that such a plan would have been equally -practicable, even if the left flank of the Australian Corps had -hitherto remained and now still lay south of the Somme, instead -of well to the north of it. In that case other Corps on the north -would have carried out that identical plan, which ultimately did -achieve this important and decisive result.</p> - -<p>I very much doubt it.</p> - -<p>I had also had some experience of the futility of relying too -much upon the sympathetic action of flank Corps, who usually -had their hands full enough with their own problems, and had -little time to devote to the needs of their neighbours. It would, -moreover, have been disagreeable and inexpedient in the extreme -to seek a right of way through the territory over which another -Corps held jurisdiction. Corps Commanders were inclined to be -jealous of any encroachment upon their frontiers, or upon the -tactical problems in front of them.</p> - -<p>Moreover, I wanted, more than anything else, that this should -be an exclusively Australian achievement.</p> - -<p>The situation being as it was, I possessed freedom of action, -elbow room, and control not only of all the territory which I -should require to use, but also of all the Somme crossings west -of Cléry.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_176fp.jpg" width="1200" height="768" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>Final Instructions to the Platoon—an incident of the battle of August 8th, 1918. The platoon is waiting to -advance to Phase B of the battle.</p></div> -</div> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_177fp.jpg" width="1200" height="776" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>An Armoured Car—disabled near Bony, during the battle of September 29th, 1918.</p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[177]</a></span></p> - -<p>The strategic object in view was to make the line of the Somme -useless to the enemy as a defensive line, and thereby render -probable his immediate further enforced retreat to the Hindenburg -line.</p> - -<p>The tactical process by which this was to be achieved was -to be an attack upon and the seizure of the key position of the -whole line, the dominating hill of Mont St. Quentin.</p> - -<p>But the paramount consideration was that the attack must -be delivered <i>without delay</i> and that the enemy should not be -allowed a single hour longer than necessary to establish himself -upon that hill.</p> - -<p>Often since those days, wondering at the success which came -to the Australian Corps at Mont St. Quentin, I have tried justly -to estimate the causes which won us that success. And I have -always come back to the same conclusion, that it was due firstly -and chiefly to the wonderful gallantry of the men who participated, -secondly to the rapidity with which our plans were put -into action, and thirdly to the sheer daring of the attempt.</p> - -<p>Mont St. Quentin lies a mile north of Péronne. It stands -as a sentinel guarding the northern and western approaches to -the town, a bastion of solid defence against any advance from -the west designed to encircle it. The paintings and drawings of -many artists who have visited the historic spot will familiarize -the world with its gentle contours.</p> - -<p>Viewed from the west, from the vantage point of the high -ground near Biaches in the very angle of the bend of the river, -Mont St. Quentin constitutes no striking feature in the landscape. -But standing upon the hill itself one speedily realizes how fully -its possession dominates the whole of the approaches to it. So -placed that both stretches of the river can from it be commanded -by fire, and giving full and uninterrupted observation over all -the country to the west and north and south of it, the hill is -ringed around with line upon line of wire entanglements, and its -forward slopes are glacis-like and bare of almost any cover.</p> - -<p>Estimated by the eye of an expert in tactics, it would surely<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[178]</a></span> -be reckoned as completely impregnable to the assault, unaided -by Tanks, of any infantry that should attempt it.</p> - -<p>It was the seizure, by a sudden attack, of this tactical key -that was the kernel of the plan which now had to be evolved. -The capture of the town of Péronne was consequential upon it, -though little less formidable a task. The effect of both captures -would be completely to turn the whole line of the Somme to the -south, and the line of the Canal du Nord; to open a wide gate -through which the remainder of the Fourth and Third Armies -could pour, so as to roll up the enemy's line in both directions.</p> - -<p>In view of the historical importance of the occasion, and the -controversies which have already risen regarding the genesis -of the conception of these plans, I make no apology for reproducing, -<i>in extenso</i>, a literal copy of the notes used at the conference -which I held in the late afternoon of August 29th at the -Headquarters of the Fifth Division, then situated in a group of -bare sheds—but recently vacated by the enemy—on the main -east and west road, just south of Proyart. The conference was -attended by Lambert (32nd Division), Hobbs (Fifth Division), -Rosenthal (Second Division), and Gellibrand (Third Division). -Neither "Tanks" nor "Heavy Artillery" attended as they -could not, in any event, co-operate in the execution of the plan.</p> - -<blockquote> -<div class="right">29. 8. 18.<br /></div> - -<div class="center">PLAN FOR CROSSING THE SOMME</div> - -<p>A. <span class="smcap">Alteration of Frontages.</span></p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>Defensive Front</i>: 32nd Division to take over on 30th -from Fifth Division front as far north as Ferme Lamire, -total 7,500 yards, to hold same defensively, place outposts -on river line, demonstrate actively as if aiming -to cross Somme; if no resistance, endeavour establish -posts on far bank; otherwise demonstrate only. Use -only one Brigade; remainder of Division to rest and -refit.</p> - -<p><i>Offensive Frontages</i>: Fifth Division to extend along -canal bank from Ferme Lamire to Biaches, frontage -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[179]</a></span>4,000 yards. Second Division to extend from Biaches -for 4,700 yards to bridge at Ommiécourt. Third Division: -present front north of river.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>B. <span class="smcap">Objectives.</span></p> - -<blockquote> -<p>All Divisions to continue eastward advance. Each -Division to have an immediate and an ultimate objective, -thus:</p> - -<p>Third Division:</p> -<blockquote> -<p>Immediate: High ground north-east of Cléry.</p> -<p>Ultimate: Bouchavesnes Spur.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>Second Division:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p>Immediate: Bridge Head at Halle. If crossing there impossible then cross behind front of Third Division.</p> -<p>Ultimate: Mont St. Quentin.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>Fifth Division:</p> -<blockquote> -<p>Immediate: Force crossing at Péronne Bridges; if bridges gone, follow Second Division -and aim at high ground south of Péronne.</p> -<p>Ultimate: Wooded spur east of Péronne.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>Whichever Division first succeeds in crossing Somme -Valley, the other Divisions to have right of way over -the same crossings.</p> - -<p>Each Division to employ only one Brigade until a satisfactory -footing is established on immediate objective.</p> - -<p>Second Division to lead the north-east movement.</p> - -<p>Artillery to stand as at present allotted, but liable to -re-allotment by me as operation develops.</p> -</blockquote> -</blockquote> - -<p>The above brief notes require but little elucidation. It is to -be remembered that at the time they were prepared, no definite -information had yet been received as to the condition of any of -the Somme crossings, because at that hour the river bank had -not yet been reached, and fighting on the west bank of the Somme -was still going on.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[180]</a></span></p> - -<p>It has also to be remembered that these notes were only for -my own guidance in verbally expounding the plan, and were -not actually issued as written orders. Naturally many details, -left unexpressed by the notes, were filled in during the conference. -Moreover I anticipated that the whole operation would be one of -a nature in which I would have to intervene as the battle proceeded, -in accordance with the varying situation from time to time, -and this actually proved to be necessary.</p> - -<p>It will be noted that on August 29th I had already reached -the definite decision not to attempt to force the passage of the -Somme south of Péronne; the 32nd Division was, however, instructed -to make every demonstration of a desire to attempt it, -the object being to divert the attention of the enemy from the -real point of attack.</p> - -<p>This was to be launched from the direction of Cléry. In -preparation for it, the Second Division sent its reserve Brigade, -the 5th (Martin), to cross the river at Feuillères, on August 30th, -to pass through the area and front of the Third Division, and -secure a bridge head on the Cléry side of the river, opposite to the -Ommiécourt bend. The object was to exploit the possibility of -using the Ommiécourt crossing, and if it were found to be intact -to use it for the purpose of crossing with the remaining two -Brigades that same night.</p> - -<p>This move was successfully accomplished, although the 5th -Brigade found portion of the village of Cléry still occupied, and -that the trench systems to the east of it were still held in strength. -After much skilful fighting, the Brigade reached its allotted destination, -with slight casualties, capturing seven machine guns and -120 prisoners.</p> - -<p>The bridge at Ommiécourt was found to be damaged, but repairable -so as to be usable by infantry on foot, and this work -was at once put in hand. The same night the rearrangement -of the fronts of all four Divisions in the line was carried out, and -all was in readiness for the daring attempt to break the line of the -Somme.</p> - -<p>During the afternoon of August 30th, General Rawlinson -came to see me, and I unfolded to him the details of the operations<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[181]</a></span> -contemplated and the arrangements made for the next day. I -have already referred to the pleasant and attractive personality -of this distinguished soldier. His qualities of broad outlook, -searching insight, great sagacity, and strong determination, -tempered by a wise restraint, never failed to impress me deeply. -He always listened sympathetically, and responded convincingly. -On this occasion he was pleased to be pleasantly satirical. "And -so you think you're going to take Mont St. Quentin with three -battalions! What presumption! However, I don't think I -ought to stop you! So, go ahead, and try!—and I wish you -luck!"</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[182]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER XI<br /> - -MONT ST. QUENTIN AND PÉRONNE</h2> - - -<p>From early dawn on Saturday, August 31st, until the evening -of September 3rd, three Divisions of the Australian -Corps engaged in a heroic combat which will ever be memorable -in Australian history.</p> - -<p>At its conclusion we emerged complete masters of the situation. -Mont St. Quentin, the Bouchavesnes spur, the large town of -Péronne, and the high ground overlooking it from the east and -north-east, were in our possession. A wide breach had been -driven into the line of defence which the enemy had endeavoured -to establish on the series of heights lying to the east of the Somme -and of the Canal du Nord.</p> - -<p>From the edges of this breach, the flanks of that portion of his -line which were still intact were being threatened with envelopment. -For him there was nothing for it, but finally to abandon -the line of the Somme, and to resume his retreat helter-skelter -to the hoped-for secure protection of the great Hindenburg Line.</p> - -<p>The extraordinary character of this Australian feat of arms -can best be appreciated by a realization of the supreme efforts -which the enemy put forward to prevent it.</p> - -<p>The shower of blows which he had received on the front of his -Second Army from August 8th onwards, had wrought upon it a -grievous disorganization. The battered remnants of his line -Divisions had been reinforced from day to day by fresh units, -scraped up from other parts of his front, and thrown into the -fight as fast as they could be made available.</p> - -<p>Sometimes they were complete Divisions from Reserve, often -single reserve Regiments of Divisions already deeply involved, -and sometimes even single Battalions torn from other Regiments—Pioneer<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[183]</a></span> -Battalions, units of the Labour Corps, Army Troops, -Minenwerfer Companies had all been thrown in, indiscriminately.</p> - -<p>This brought about a heterogeneous jumble of units, and of -German nationalities, for Prussians, Bavarians, Saxons and -Würtembergers were captured side by side. The tactical control -of such mixed forces, during a hasty and enforced retreat, and -their daily maintenance, must have presented sore perplexities -to the Headquarters of the German Second Army in those fateful -days.</p> - -<p>To meet the crisis with which Ludendorff was now confronted, -he determined to throw in one of the finest of the reserve Divisions -still left at his disposal. The Second Prussian Guards Division -was sent forward to occupy the key position of Mont St. Quentin, -and to hold it at all costs.</p> - -<p>This famous Division comprised among its units, the Kaiserin -Augusta and the Kaiser Alexander Regiments, almost as famous -in history and rich in tradition as are our own Grenadiers and -Coldstreams. There is no doubt that this celebrated Division -fought desperately to obey its instructions.</p> - -<p>For the defence of Péronne, the enemy command went even -further, and called for volunteers, forming with them a strong -garrison of picked men drawn from many different line Regiments, -to man the ramparts which surround the town. Dozens of machine -guns were posted in vantage points from which the approaches -could be swept.</p> - -<p>All over the river flats lying in the angle of the Somme between -Cléry, Mont St. Quentin and Péronne ran line upon line of barbed -wire entanglements, a legacy from the 1916 fighting, and much of -this was still intact, although breaches had been made in many -places both by the French in 1917 and by the Germans themselves, -to facilitate movement over the ground, during their respective -re-occupations of this territory.</p> - -<p>The terrain, which was in greater part open, and exposed in -every direction to full view from the heights, sloped gently -upwards towards the commanding knoll. Cover was scarce, and -the few ruins of brickfields and sugar refineries which dotted -the landscape had also been garrisoned by the enemy as centres<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[184]</a></span> -of resistance, designed to break up and dislocate any general -attack.</p> - -<p>Our infantry was deprived of the assistance of any Tanks, -for the heavy casualties which had been suffered by this Arm -made it imperative to allow the Tank Corps time for repairs, -renewals and the training of fresh crews. Nor was any appreciable -quantity of Heavy Artillery yet available, since the congested -and dilapidated condition of the roads prevented the -advance of all but a few of the lighter varieties of heavy guns.</p> - -<p>The fighting of these four days was, therefore, essentially a pure -infantry combat, assisted only by such mobile Artillery of lesser -calibres as was available.</p> - -<p>Such was the formidable nature of the task, and of the disabilities -under which the Second, Third and Fifth Divisions -approached it. That they overcame all obstacles, gained all -their objectives, and captured nearly 2,000 prisoners, mainly -from crack Prussian regiments, constitutes an achievement -memorable in military annals and standing to the everlasting -glory of the troops who took part in it.<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a></p> - -<p>It is difficult to write a connected and consecutive account -of the details of the fighting which took place. The most that -is possible in the brief space available is to indicate on general -lines the successive stages of the battle. Indeed, a minute -account of the action of each of the 35 Battalions engaged would -only prove wearisome and confusing. The best method of presenting -a general picture of the course of the engagement is to -follow the fortunes of each Brigade in turn.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[185]</a></span></p> -<p>First in order of time, and of most importance in relation to -its immediate results, was the action of the Second Division. -It was the 5th Brigade (Martin) which Major-General Rosenthal -had detailed to open the attack. The remaining two Brigades -of the Divisions (6th and 7th) received orders to rest the troops -as much as possible, but to be in readiness to move at the shortest -notice.</p> - -<p>A Machine Gun Company (16 guns) was placed at the disposal -of Brigadier-General Martin, while the Artillery at the disposal -of the Division, comprising five Brigades of Field Artillery and -one Brigade of Heavy Artillery, remained under the personal -control of the Divisional Commander.</p> - -<p>The attack opened with three Battalions of the 5th Brigade in -the first line, and one Battalion in support. The total strength -of the assaulting Infantry of this whole Brigade was on this day -not more than 70 Officers and 1,250 other ranks. The centre -Battalion was directed straight at the highest knoll of Mont -St. Quentin, while the right Battalion prolonged the line to the -right. The left Battalion had assigned to it as an immediate -objective the ruins of the village of Feuillaucourt, from -which it was hoped that a flank attack upon the Mount could be -developed.</p> - -<p>The advance began at 5 a.m. It was a dull morning and still -quite dark. The two right Battalions advanced with as much -noise as possible, a ruse which secured the surrender of numbers -of the enemy lying out in advanced outpost positions. A nest -of seven Machine Guns was rushed and captured without any loss -to us.</p> - -<p>At the appointed hour, our Artillery opened on selected -targets, the ranges being lengthened from moment to moment -in sympathy with the advance of the Infantry. Although during -the advance a great deal of machine gun fire was encountered, -all went well. The centre and left Battalions gained a footing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[186]</a></span> -respectively in Feuillaucourt and on the main hill, but the progress -of the right Battalion was arrested by heavy machine gun fire -from St. Denis. This was the site of a ruined sugar refinery, and -lay on the main road between Péronne and Mont St. Quentin. -It was a strong point that presented a great deal of difficulty -and held out to the last.</p> - -<p>The centre Battalion had by 7 a.m. passed through the ruins -of Mont St. Quentin village and had crossed the main road from -Péronne to Bouchavesnes. It now had to receive the full brunt of -a determined counter attack, at a moment when it was still disorganized -and breathless from its difficult assault. The Battalion -was therefore withdrawn across the road and firmly established -itself in an old trench system to the west of it.</p> - -<p>In this position it beat off five successive counter attacks, -inflicting most severe losses upon the enemy. The Brigade -maintained its position until nightfall. Its losses for the day were -380.</p> - -<p>In the meantime the 6th Brigade (Robertson) of the Second -Division had been ordered to cross the Somme and move up behind -the 5th Brigade, in readiness to carry on the attack, and obtain -possession of the remainder of the main spur of Mont St. Quentin. -As this Brigade only entered into the fight at a later hour, I must -revert to the events of the forenoon of August 31st.</p> - -<p>It was about 8 a.m. that I was able to report to General -Rawlinson, by telephone, that we had obtained a footing on Mont -St. Quentin itself. He was at first totally incredulous, but soon -generously congratulatory, proclaiming that the event was -calculated to have a most important influence upon the immediate -future course of the war. He expressed the hope that we should -be able to hold on to all that we had gained.</p> - -<p>To this task I now had to bend myself, and I found it necessary -to put a severe strain upon the endurance and capacity of the -troops. Great as had always been my concern in the pitched -battles of the days recently passed to reduce to very definite -limits the demands made upon the physical powers of the Infantry -soldier, a juncture had arrived and a situation had been -created, which demanded the utmost rapidity in decision and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[187]</a></span> -action, and a relentless insistence upon prompt response by the -troops.</p> - -<p>The 5th Brigade had been thrust out nearly two miles beyond -our general line. Its flanks were in the air. It was undoubtedly -fatigued. Everything must be done and done promptly to -render it adequate support, to take advantage of its success, and -to ensure that its effort had not been in vain.</p> - -<p>It will be remembered that the Fifth and Second Divisions had -both been instructed to endeavour to secure a crossing over the -river. Whichever Division first succeeded was to accord right -of way to its neighbour. No success had yet attended the efforts -of the Fifth Division, the main Péronne bridges being still -inaccessible from the south. The bridge sites were under the -enemy's fire, which precluded the possibility of repair; and the -approaches to them were also swept by Machine Gun fire.</p> - -<p>The Second Division, on the other hand, had during the past -48 hours succeeded in making the Feuillères bridge traffickable -for guns and vehicles, and those at Buscourt and Ommiécourt -for foot traffic. It transpired later that the enemy, rightly -suspecting that I would attempt to use this latter crossing, kept -it under heavy Artillery fire all day.</p> - -<p>As soon as I had formed a judgment on the situation, about -8.30 a.m. (August 31st), I issued instructions to General Hobbs immediately -to put in motion his reserve Brigade, the 14th (Stewart). -He was to direct it towards the Ommiécourt crossing, and later -in the day to pass it across the river and through the ground -won that morning by the 5th Brigade, with a view to developing -at the earliest possible moment an attack in a south-easterly -direction upon the town of Péronne itself. The ultimate objective -was still to be the high ground south and east of Péronne. -His 8th Brigade was also to be held ready to move at the shortest -notice.</p> - -<p>It was a serious performance to demand, and it was fraught -with many risks. There was no time to assemble responsible -Commanders concerned, separated as they were by long distances -over bad and congested roads. In the absence of properly co-ordinated -action, there was every chance of confusion, and cross-purposes,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[188]</a></span> -and even of collision of authority arising from the -troops of one Division passing over ground under the tactical -control of another Division.</p> - -<p>But the only alternative was to do nothing and attempt -nothing. That would have been the worst of bad generalship, -and it was an occasion when risks must be taken.</p> - -<p>The course of subsequent events fully demonstrated that the -only true solution was the one chosen, for the whole of the defences -of Péronne were thereby taken with a rush, while they were still -being organized by the enemy. The delay of only a day or two -would have meant that the capture of Péronne would have been -many times more costly than it actually proved to be.</p> - -<p>The 14th Brigade had before it a march of some seven miles to -bring it into a position in which it could deploy for an attack -on Péronne. Working according to text book such a march -could have been accomplished in something under three hours. -It took the Brigade over ten hours. For the line of march lay -across the very worst of the shell-torn, tangled country enclosed -in the great bend of the Somme, and progress was most difficult -and exhausting. Frequent halts were necessary to rest the men, -and restore order to the struggling columns.</p> - -<p>Discovering the impossibility of crossing the river at Ommiécourt, -the Brigade made a wide detour to cross by the newly -established bridge at Buscourt. It arrived there just at the same -time as the 7th Brigade (Wisdom), which Rosenthal had also -directed to the same point for the same purpose. This occurrence -illustrates the nature of the risks of a hastily developed tactical -plan. However, the good sense of the Commanders on the spot -obviated any serious confusion and the 7th Brigade gave the 14th -Brigade the right of way.</p> - -<p>The 14th Brigade completed its march during the hours of -falling darkness and, passing through Cléry, came up on the right -of the 6th Brigade, in readiness for the combined attack by the -two Divisions at dawn on September 1st.</p> - -<p>The night that followed was a stressful one for all Commanders. -Divisional Generals had to co-ordinate all action between their -Brigadiers, and their Artillery. The Brigadiers in turn had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[189]</a></span> -afterwards to assemble their Battalion Commanders, and decide -on detailed plans of action for each separate unit. Distances -were long, the country was strange, roads were few and unfamiliar; -so that it is not surprising that the last conferences did -not break up until well into the small hours of September 1st. -There was no sleep that night for any senior officer in the battle -area.</p> - -<p>September 1st was a day full of great happenings and bloody -hand to hand fighting. The assault by the 6th Brigade passing -over the line won the day before by the 5th Brigade carried it -well over the crest of Mont St. Quentin, and confirmed for good -and all our hold on that imperious fortress. Few prisoners were -taken, for it was bayonet work over every inch of the advance, -and the field was strewn all over with enemy dead. The impetus -of the 6th Brigade assault carried our line 600 yards to the east -of the summit of the knoll.</p> - -<p>It is difficult to allocate, in due proportion, the credit for the -capture of this important stronghold between the two gallant -Brigades concerned. It is true that the 6th Brigade did on -September 1st achieve the summit of the Mount; but it is equally -true that it only completed what the 5th Brigade had so wonderfully -begun the day before. No one will grudge to either -of the two Brigades their share of the honour that is due to both.</p> - -<p>The action of the Second Division on that day was completed -by the bringing up of the 7th Brigade into a position of support -behind the 6th Brigade, thereby relieving the 5th Brigade from -further line duty.</p> - -<p>Although the action of the individual Brigades of all the three -battle Divisions must necessarily be narrated separately and -with some attempt at a proper chronological sequence, yet it -would be a mistake to suppose that their actions were independent -of each other. On the contrary, they all operated as -part of a comprehensive battle plan, which necessarily took full -account of the interdependence of the course of events in -different parts of the field.</p> - -<p>Thus the advance on this day of the 6th Brigade materially -assisted the attack on Péronne by the 14th Brigade, while the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[190]</a></span> -progress of the latter removed much trouble from the southern -flank of the 6th Brigade.</p> - -<p>The men of the 14th Brigade that day had their mettle up -to a degree which was astonishing. On the occasion of the great -attack of August 8th, and ever since, it had been the cruel fate -of this Brigade to be the reserve unit of its Division on every -occasion when there was any serious fighting in hand. The -Brigade felt its position very keenly. As one Company Commander, -who distinguished himself in that day's fighting, afterwards -picturesquely put it: "You see! We'd been trying -to buy a fight off the other fellows for a matter of three weeks. -On that day we got what we'd been looking for, and we made the -most of it."<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> - -<p>The 14th Brigade advanced to the assault at 6 a.m. concurrently -with the eastern thrust of the 6th Brigade. One Battalion, -with two others in support, was directed against St. Denis, while -the fourth made a direct attack on Péronne. Many belts of wire -had to be struggled through. There was much machine gun fire, -from front and flanks, and it looked as if further progress would -be impossible. Nevertheless, this gallant Brigade, by persistent -effort, made itself master of the western half of Péronne.</p> - -<p>The attack on St. Denis at first made very slow progress, the -enemy holding out resolutely in the ruins of that hamlet, and in -the adjacent brickfields. During the day, the 15th Brigade made -spirited attempts to effect the crossing of the river, and to co-operate -from the south.</p> - -<p>The records of the events of these three days are confused -and discontinuous. Many of the men who could have filled in -the gaps of the story were unfortunately killed or evacuated as -casualties. But from the mass of reports, the salient facts -emerge clearly.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[191]</a></span></p> - -<p>The 15th Brigade succeeded, on September 2nd, in putting a -Battalion across the river, and this assisted the 14th Brigade -to "mop up" the remainder of the town of Péronne. Later the -rest of the 15th Brigade and two Battalions of the 8th Brigade -(Tivey) were also drawn into the fighting. St. Denis and the -brickfields fell to us during this period.</p> - -<p>Although the situation, from the point of view of the advance -eastwards, remained almost stationary, it was a time of fierce -local fighting. Many deeds of valour and sacrifice adorn the story.</p> - -<p>It was late on September 3rd that the effects of this long-sustained -struggle became apparent. The whole of Péronne and -most of the high ground in its vicinity were, by then, definitely -in our hands, and although the little suburb of Flamicourt held -out determinedly for another day, the further resistance of the -enemy began to fade away.</p> - -<p>Doubtless the loss of Mont St. Quentin was a controlling -factor in the decision which was forced upon him to undertake -a retreat, for with that eminence in our possession, he could not -have maintained himself for many days in the town, nor would -its retention have been of any tactical value to him.</p> - -<p>As an immediate result, the high ground of the Flamicourt -spur just south of Péronne fell into our hands on September 3rd, -and the enemy outposts spread along the banks of the marsh -in front of the 32nd Division sought safety from complete envelopment -by a hasty withdrawal; a number of their isolated -posts were, however, left unwarned of this retreat, so that these -were, later on, captured by us from the rear.</p> - -<p>I must now briefly turn to the doings of the Third Australian -Division during these four epic days. Its three Brigades (9th, -10th and 11th) daily performed prodigies of valour. The Division -carried our line, inexorably, up the Bouchavesnes spur in a -north-easterly direction. The seizure of this very important -ground not only powerfully aided but also strongly confirmed -our seizure of Mont St. Quentin.</p> - -<p>The Division, having been given its general rôle, was necessarily -left to a large extent to decide for itself its detailed -action from day to day, seeing that it still had to perform the -function, inevitable for a flank Division, of a link with my -neighbouring Corps. Fortunately the arrival of a new, fresh<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[192]</a></span> -Division (the 74th) from the Eastern theatre of war, which came -into the Third Corps and was promptly thrown in, enabled -that Corps to keep up fairly well with the general advance.</p> - -<p>The British Third Army, too, was now beginning to make its -pressure felt, and was approaching the line of the Canal du Nord -over a wide front. The Third Division was therefore free to -conform its forward movement to that of the rest of the Australian -Corps; its energetic action gave me elbow room for the -manœuvring of so many Brigades in the region of Cléry, and its -capture of so much valuable ground east of the Canal du Nord -served greatly to widen the breach.</p> - -<p>By the night of September 3rd, the main tactical purposes -on which the Corps had been launched on August 29th had been -achieved in their entirety. Their execution furnishes the finest -example in the war of spirited and successful Infantry action -conducted by three whole Divisions operating simultaneously -side by side.</p> - -<p>Lord Rawlinson has more than once referred to the operation -as the finest single feat of the war. Inevitably the dramatic -and unlooked for success of the Second Division in the rapid -storming of the Mount enthrals the imagination and overshadows -all the other noteworthy incidents of these pregnant days. But -none will begrudge the rain of congratulations which fell upon -the head of Major-General Rosenthal. A massive man, whose -build belies his extraordinary physical energy, he always was an -egregious optimist, incapable of recognizing the possibility of -failure. That is why he invariably succeeded in all that he -undertook, and often embarked upon the apparently impossible. -An architect before the war, he served for the first two years as -an Artillery officer, both as a Brigade Commander and as a -General of Divisional Artillery. He gained his Infantry experience -as Commander of the 9th Brigade, and so was well qualified -by versatile service to assume the command of the Second -Division. His leadership of the latter contributed in no small -measure to the fame which it has won.</p> - -<p>The text of the congratulatory message issued on this occasion -by the Fourth Army read as follows:</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 791px;"> -<img src="images/map-e.jpg" width="791" height="1200" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">Map E</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[193]</a></span></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"The capture of Mont St. Quentin by the Second -Division is a feat of arms worthy of the highest praise. -The natural strength of the position is immense, and the -tactical value of it, in reference to Péronne and the whole -system of the Somme defences, cannot be over-estimated. -I am filled with admiration at the gallantry and surpassing -daring of the Second Division in winning this important -fortress, and I congratulate them with all my heart.</p> - -<div class="right">"<span class="smcap">Rawlinson.</span>"</div> -</blockquote> - -<p>I am concerned nevertheless that the fine performance of the -Fifth Division should not be underrated. The circumstances -under which General Hobbs was called upon to intervene in the -battle, at very short notice, imposed upon him, personally, -difficulties of no mean order. I am prepared to admit quite -frankly that the demands which I had to make upon him, his -Staff and his Division were severe.</p> - -<p>Following upon four days of arduous pursuit, his troops were -called upon to undertake a long and difficult march over a most -broken country, to be followed by three days of intensive fighting -of the most severe character.</p> - -<p>General Hobbs was, first and foremost, a lover of the Australian -soldiers, and their devoted servitor. He belonged to that -type of citizen-soldier who, before the war, had spent long -years in preparing himself for a day when his country would -surely require his military services. Like several of the most -successful of Australia's generals, he had specialized in Artillery, -and was, in fact, selected as the senior Artillery Commander of -Australia's first contingent. That fact alone was the stamp of -his ability. While he would be the last to lay claim to special -brilliance, or outstanding military genius, he nevertheless succeeded -fully as the Commander of a Division, by his sound -common sense, and his sane attitude towards every problem that -confronted him. He possessed also the virtue of a large-hearted -sympathy for all subordinate to him; and that gave him a loyal -following, which carried him successfully through several great -crises in the affairs of the Fifth Division.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[194]</a></span></p> - -<p>This period was one of those crises. When, late on the afternoon -of August 31st, he urged upon me with much earnestness -the stress upon his troops, and repeated the anxious representations -of his Brigadiers—I was compelled to harden my heart and -to insist that it was imperative to recognize a great opportunity -and to seize it unflinchingly. His response was loyal and -whole-hearted. His Division followed the lead which he thus -gave them, and he led them to imperishable fame.</p> - -<p>Considerable redispositions followed upon the transfer of my -battle front to the country east of the Somme. These, and the -reasons which governed their nature, chief among which was -the resumption of the enemy's rearward movement, I shall deal -with in due course.</p> - -<p>Battle problems on the grand scale were, for the moment, -relegated to the background, and there now arose a multitude -of other problems, almost equally burdensome, relating to the -supply and maintenance of the Corps.</p> - -<p>Every Corps must be based upon a thoroughly reliable and -efficient line of supply, and for this a railway in first-class operating -condition is a prime essential. Every kind of requisite must be -carried by rail to some advanced distribution point called a -"railhead." Thence supplies are distributed by motor lorry to -the areas still further forward.</p> - -<p>The appropriate distance of the railhead behind the battle -front is conditioned by the available supply of motor lorries, -and their range of action. If the distance be too great the -stress upon the mechanical transport becomes so severe that it -rapidly deteriorates, and an undue proportion of lorries daily -falls out of service. As the facilities for repair in the mobile -workshops are strictly limited, an excessive rate of wastage -among these vehicles soon dislocates the whole supply arrangements.</p> - -<p>The experience hitherto gained had demonstrated that a railhead -could not conveniently be allowed to fall behind our advance -more than ten or twelve miles. This limit had already been -reached when the Corps front arrived on the west bank of the -Somme, and the strain upon the lorry service was already great.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[195]</a></span></p> - -<p>For a further deep advance of the whole Corps in pursuit of -the enemy towards the Hindenburg Line, still distant another -fifteen miles, it became imperative, therefore, that the railway -service to Péronne and beyond should be speedily reopened, or -some equally efficient alternative provided. The great lattice -girder railway bridge at Péronne had been irretrievably demolished. -Engineers estimated that it would take two months -to restore it, and at least a month to provide even a temporary -deviation and crossing. Nevertheless, the work was put in hand -without delay.</p> - -<p>An alternative possibility was to construct a new line of railway -to connect the existing military line at Bray to the Péronne -railway station, a length of new construction amounting -to some six miles. It was estimated that such a link could -be built in a fortnight, and this work also was commenced -forthwith.</p> - -<p>There was a third possibility. This was speedily to repair -that portion of the railway which lay west of the Somme, and -to establish a railhead near Péronne, but on the opposite bank -of the river. This proposal involved only a few days' work, for -extensive sidings already existed on the west bank, and had -been left more or less undamaged by the enemy. But it also -involved the complete restoration of all road traffic bridges, -both at Péronne and at Brie, for the service of the intense traffic -which would ensue across the Somme from such a point of -departure.</p> - -<p>The rebuilding of the crossings was, in any case, a matter -of urgent necessity. By this time all my heaviest guns had -already been brought up to the vicinity of the west bank of the -Somme, and had there perforce to wait; for a long detour, on -the densely-crowded roads, to cross the Somme, say as far -back as Corbie, where bridges were strong and grades were easy, -was out of the question.</p> - -<p>The problem, therefore, involved a stable and comprehensive -reconstruction; half measures would not meet the case. But -half measures were an inevitable necessity of the situation, to -begin with, because troops had to be fed, and their supplies could<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[196]</a></span> -be carried in no lighter way, in adequate quantities, than in the -normal horse-transport wagons.</p> - -<p>The order of procedure had, therefore, to be, firstly, hastily to -reconstruct some sort of bridging, based generally upon the -wreckage of the original bridge, and strong enough to carry loads -up to those of horsed wagons; next to stay, strut and strengthen -these temporary bridges to fit them for the passage of the -lighter guns, and finally to reconstruct them in their entirety -for the heaviest loads.</p> - -<p>At a point such as the southern entrance to Péronne, where -the approaches could not be conveniently deviated, the difficulties -of such successive reconstructions, while the flow of traffic had -to be maintained, can hardly be fully realized.</p> - -<p>For many days, in the early part of September, Brie, Eterpigny -and Péronne were scenes of feverish activity. Every available -technical unit that could be spared from other urgent duty -was concentrated upon this vital work. Most of the Engineer -Field Companies, three of the five Pioneer Battalions, both -Tunnelling Companies, and all the Army Troops Companies, -laboured in relays, night and day.</p> - -<p>Hundreds of tons of steel girders, of all lengths and sections, -were hurried up, by special lorry service. Pile-driving gear was -hastily improvised. The wreckage of the original bridges was -overhauled for sound, useful timbers. The torn and twisted -steelwork was dragged out of the way by horse or steam power, -and tumbled in a confused mass into the river bed. Hammer, -saw and axe were wielded with a zest and vigour rarely seen in -peace-time construction. The whole work was supervised by -my Chief Engineer, Brigadier-General Foott, and was later, -when the advance of the Corps was resumed, completed by the -Army authorities. The speed and punctuality with which the -first temporary viaducts were completed and ready for use -were exemplary, and reflect every credit upon Foott and his -helpers. Within forty-eight hours bridges usable for ordinary -supplies and for field guns became available, and thereafter -were rapidly strengthened by successive stages.</p> - -<p>The whole work of restoration, in which the Australian technical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[197]</a></span> -services played so prominent a part, won the highest praise -from the Field Marshal, who expressed his appreciation in a -special message of thanks to these services.</p> - -<p>The congestion of traffic at the Péronne bottleneck was, -however, serious. Blocks occurred, reminiscent of those which -are familiar in the heart of London when the dense traffic is -temporarily held up by a passing procession. Marching troops -always had the right of way; and a Division on the move up -to or back from the line meant a severe super-load upon the -already overtaxed road capacity.</p> - -<p>Sometimes a block of traffic would occur for an hour at a -time, and a motley collection of vehicles, stretching back for -miles, would pile up on the roads. The capabilities of a very -able road and traffic control service, numbering hundreds of -officers and men, acting under the direction of my Provost -Marshal, were often severely tested. More than once my own -motor car was unavoidably held up at this bottleneck for half -an hour at a time, on occasions, too, when the situation required -my urgent presence at some important meeting.</p> - -<p>All these minor embarrassments arising from the passage by -the Australian Corps of a great military obstacle such as the -Somme were, however, soon dissipated. The Somme had loomed -large, for many days, in the minds of all of us—first as a problem -of tactics, and next as a problem of engineering. Before the end -of the first week of September the Somme had ceased to hold -our further interest. It had become a thing that was behind -us, both in thought and in actuality.</p> - -<p>The enemy was once more on the move, and it became our -business to press relentlessly on his heels.</p> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> The following telegram, selected at random from the files of September 1st, -indicates the extraordinary mixture of units which the enemy had collected -to defend this vital point: -</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"To Australian Corps Intelligence from 2nd Division—sent September 1st -at 7 p.m. Identifications from prisoners examined since noon: 28th R.I.R.; -65th I.R.; 161st I.R.; 94th I.R.; 95th I.R.; 96th I.R.; Alexander Regt.; -Augusta Regt.; 4th Bav. I.R.; 8th Bav. I.R.; 25th Bav. I.R.; 447th I.R.; -2nd G. Guard F.A.R.; 221st F.A.R.; 2nd Co. M.G. Corps; 67th Pioneer Co.; -3rd Army Troops; 102nd Pioneer Bn. of 2nd Guards Div.; 402nd M.W.Co.; -185th R.I.R. A pioneer of the 23rd Co. has been retained for 5th Aust. Div. to -remove charges from bridges not yet blown. Prisoner 96th I.R. says Regt. -came up for counter-attack night 31-1 to retake Mt. St. Quentin, but counter-attack -did not come off, owing to attack expected from us. All prisoners -interrogated agree that line was to be held at all costs. Regiments are now -considerably intermingled and disorganized."</p> -</blockquote> - -<p> -(<span class="smcap">Note.</span>—I.R.—Infanterie Regiment; R.I.R.—Reserve Infanterie Regiment; -M.W.Co.—Minenwerfer Compagnie; Bav.—Bavarian.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_18" id="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> Mr. Hughes, the Commonwealth Prime Minister, visited the battlefield of -Mont St. Quentin, with a distinguished company, on September 14th. The -officer in question, standing near the summit of the hill, was about to relate his -experiences, and this was his preamble.</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[198]</a></span></p> - -<h2>CHAPTER XII<br /> - -A LULL</h2> - - -<p>During the closing days of August events had commenced -to move rapidly; for the offensive activities initiated -by the Fourth Army, three weeks earlier, began to spread in -both directions along the Allied front.</p> - -<p>The Third British Army had entered the fray on August 21st; -the First British Army was ready with its offensive on August -26th, on which date the Canadian Corps, restored to its old -familiar battleground, delivered a great attack opposite Arras.</p> - -<p>The French, who, on my right flank, had along their front -followed up the enemy retirement begun after the battle of -Chuignes, reached Roye on August 27th, and Noyon on August -28th. Their line, however, still bore back south-westerly from -the vicinity of the river near Brie and St. Christ.</p> - -<p>By August 29th the line of the First Army had reached and -passed Bapaume, and that of the Third Army cut through -Combles. The Third Corps, on my immediate left, had made -good its advance as far as Maurepas.</p> - -<p>Thus, the thrust of the Australian Corps beyond the Canal -du Nord, on August 31st to September 3rd, formed the spearhead -which pierced the Somme line, and the Corps was still -leading the advance both of the French and the British.</p> - -<p>From the morning of September 4th the evidences of the -enemy's resolution to withdraw to the Hindenburg Line became -hourly more unmistakable. His Artillery fire died down considerably, -particularly that from his long range and high velocity -guns. These were probably already on the move to the rear, -in order to clear the roads for his lighter traffic.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_198fp.jpg" width="1200" height="793" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>The Hindenburg Line Wire—near Bony.</p></div> -</div> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_199fp.jpg" width="1200" height="786" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>The 15-inch Naval Gun—captured at Chuignes, August 23rd, 1918.</p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[199]</a></span></p> - -<p>The high ground near Biaches (west of Péronne) provided a -vantage point from which an extensive view of the whole country -could be obtained. There lay before us, beyond the Somme, -a belt about eight miles deep, which had scarcely suffered at all -from the ravages of the previous years of war.</p> - -<p>It was gently undulating country, liberally watered, and -heavily wooded, especially in the minor valleys, in which snuggled -numerous villages still almost intact and habitable, although, of -course, entirely deserted by the civilian population.</p> - -<p>Beyond this agreeable region there began again an area of -devastation, which grew in awful thoroughness as the great -Hindenburg Line was approached some six miles further on. -For, through the autumn and winter of 1917, and up to the -moment of the German offensive in March, 1918, it was there -that the British Fifth Army had faced the enemy in intensive -trench fighting.</p> - -<p>In all directions over this still habitable belt there were now -signs of unusual life and activity. Columns of smoke began to -rise in the direction of all the villages. Sounds of great explosions -rent the air. These were sure indications that the -enemy was burning the stores which he could not hope to salve, -and was destroying his ammunition dumps lest they should -fall into our hands.</p> - -<p>A vigorous pursuit was now the policy most to be desired. -But my troops in the line were very tired from the exertions of -a great struggle, and many of the units, by reason of their battle -losses, required time to reorganize and refit. It was also essential -that no rapid advance should be attempted until the arrangements -for supply, depending upon the completion of the Somme -crossings, had been assured.</p> - -<p>The general line of advance of the Corps had, during August, -been in a due easterly direction. The operations about Péronne -had necessitated a drive north-easterly, and the advance of my -Third Division up the Bouchavesnes spur had carried them -square across the line of advance of the Third Corps.</p> - -<p>The first step was to restore our original Corps boundaries, -and to resume the original line of advance. By arrangement -with General Godley, his 74th Division took over the ground<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[200]</a></span> -captured by my Third Division, which was thereby released -and enabled to concentrate, for a couple of days' rest, in the -Cléry region. The Second Division employed its 7th Brigade -on September 2nd and 3rd to advance our line beyond Haut -Allaines, another two miles east of Mont St. Quentin, routing -from the trenches of that spur the strong rearguards which the -enemy had posted for the purpose of delaying us.</p> - -<p>On the night of September 4th the 74th Division took over -the Haut Allaines spur also, thereby releasing my Second -Division, and the latter was withdrawn to the Cappy area for a -thorough and well-deserved rest.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the 32nd Imperial Division, availing itself of the -temporary crossings which had hastily been effected over the -Somme, brought its front up, on the eastern bank of the river, -level with the line which had by September 4th been reached -by the Fifth Australian Division.</p> - -<p>On September 5th, therefore, I had, east of the Somme, two -Divisions in the line, the 32nd on the right or south, the Fifth -Australian on the left or north, each operating on a frontage of -two Brigades, with one Brigade in reserve. This was, however, -quite a temporary arrangement, devised merely to allow time -for the Third Division to reorganize and resume its place in the -front line of the general advance.</p> - -<p>The general withdrawal of the enemy, over a very wide front, -now began to effect a very substantial reduction of the length of -frontage which he had to defend. The enemy communiqués -and wireless propaganda of that time busied themselves with the -explanation that the withdrawals in progress were being deliberately -carried out for the very purpose of releasing forces -from the line to form a great strategic reserve.</p> - -<p>These protestations did not deceive us, nor did we on our -part fail also to take full advantage of the steady shortenings of -the Allied front. Marshal Foch decided once again to readjust -the international boundary, and my own front was thereby -considerably shortened. The French took over from the 32nd -Division all ground south of the main Amiens—St. Quentin road; -and that road henceforth became my southern boundary.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[201]</a></span></p> - -<p>This, coupled with the readjustment of the northern boundary -with the Third Corps, as already narrated, reduced the total -frontage for which I remained responsible to about ten thousand -yards, an extent which was never again exceeded. It was still, -however, in my judgment, too long a frontage for an effective -pursuit by only two Divisions, and arrangements were initiated -on the same day to bring back the Third Division into line.</p> - -<p>During September 5th I advanced my front to the line Athies—Le -Mesnil—Doingt—Bussu. Severe fighting took place near -Doingt. Opposition came mainly from machine guns; but -isolated field-guns also gave us trouble. We captured that day -about a hundred and fifty prisoners.</p> - -<p>Next day my Third Division came into the line on the north. -I divided my frontage equally between the three Divisions, -placing each on a single Brigade front. This was, in fact, a -repetition of the order of battle which had carried us so successfully -and rapidly up to the Somme.</p> - -<p>Each front line Brigade took up the rôle of Advanced Guard -to its Division. The 11th Brigade led the Third Division; the -8th Brigade led the Fifth Division, while the 97th Brigade covered -the 32nd Imperial Division.</p> - -<p>For the first time in the war I found an opportunity of employing -my Corps Cavalry (13th Australian Light Horse) on -other than their habitual duty of carrying despatches, or providing -mounted escorts to convoys of prisoners of war. Here -at last was a chance for bold mounted tactics, as the county -was mainly open and free of wire and trenches.</p> - -<p>To each Division I therefore allotted a squadron of Light -Horse for vanguard duty, together with detachments of the -Australian Cyclist Battalion. These troops more than justified -their employment by bold, forward reconnaissance, and energetic -pressure upon the enemy rearguards.</p> - -<p>So promising, indeed, was the prospect of the useful employment -of cavalry, that I prevailed upon the Army Commander -to endeavour to secure for my use a whole Cavalry Brigade. -Brigadier-General Neil Haig (cousin of the Field Marshal) was -actually sent for and placed under my orders. I duly arranged<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[202]</a></span> -a plan of action with him, but before the 1st Cavalry Brigade, -stationed many miles away, had completed its long march into -my area, the situation had already changed, and the employment -of Cavalry on the Fourth Army front had to be postponed -until a much later date.</p> - -<p>A juncture had arrived when it became imperative for me -to consider the possibility of affording some relief to the three -line Divisions; all of them had been fighting without respite -since August 27th. The troops were so tired from want of sleep -and physical strain that many of them could be seen by the -roadside, fast asleep. These three Divisions had almost reached -the limits of their endurance.</p> - -<p>It was essential, however, that they should be called upon -to yield up the last particle of effort of which they were capable. -Every mile by which they could approach nearer to the Hindenburg -defences meant a saving of effort on the part of the fresh -waiting Divisions, whom I had earmarked for the first stage of -our contemplated assault upon that formidable system; a -system which I knew to be too deep to be overwhelmed in a -single operation.</p> - -<p>It was for this reason that I was compelled to disregard the -evident signs of overstrain which were brought to my notice -by the Divisional Generals and their Brigadiers, and which -were patent to my own observation of the condition of the troops. -I arranged, however, two measures of immediate relief, the first -being to set a definite limit of time for the further demands to -be made upon the line Divisions. This was fixed for September -10th. The second was to issue orders that the rate of our further -advance was to be controlled by consideration for the well-being -of our own troops, and not by the rate of the enemy's retreat. -If, in consequence, any gap should eventuate, touch with the -enemy was to be kept by the mounted troops and cyclists.</p> - -<p>The preliminary steps for effecting the reliefs thus promised -for September 10th were begun on September 5th. The -Corps was, as stated, on a three Division front. I had only -two fit Divisions in Corps Reserve (<i>i.e.</i>, the First and Fourth), -the Second Division being not yet rested. My representations<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[203]</a></span> -to the Army Commander on this matter bore immediate fruit; -for he placed under my orders the Sixth (Imperial) Division -(one of the first seven Divisions of the original Expeditionary -Force). Before, however, I could take advantage of this windfall, -the constitution of the Fourth Army underwent a vital -alteration, of which more will be told later.</p> - -<p>The First and Fourth Divisions had been resting since August -26th. They had had time to reorganize their units, to reclothe -and refit their troops, to receive and absorb reinforcements, and -to fill vacancies among leaders. Staffs had been able to deal -with a mass of arrears. The men had enjoyed a pleasant holiday -in the now peaceful Somme Valley, far in rear, a holiday devoted -to games and aquatic sports. Horse and man, alike, were -refreshed, and had been inspired by the continued successes of -the remainder of the Corps.</p> - -<p>They were however, by now, far in rear; and it was out of -the question to tax their restored energies by calling upon them -to march back to the battle zone. The Fourth Army, as always, -extended its sympathetic help; two motor bus convoys, each -capable of dealing with a Brigade group a day, were speedily -materialized from the resources of G.H.Q.</p> - -<p>The completion of the moves of these two Divisions from the -back area to within easy marching distance of the battle front -therefore occupied three days. The use of mechanical transport -for the execution of troop movements has now entirely passed -the experimental stage, and in future wars, calculations of time -and space will be vitally affected, whenever an ample supply of -lorries or buses and suitable roads are available for the rapid -concentration or dispersal of large bodies of troops.</p> - -<p>The Australian soldier is individually philosophic and stoical, -but in the mass he is sensitive to a degree; and he is intelligent -enough to realize how he is used or misused. It was the subject -of complaint among the troops during the earlier years of the war, -that while they were indulgently carried by lorries into the battle -at a time when they were fresh and fit, they were invariably left -to march long distances, out of the battle, when they were on -the verge of exhaustion. I therefore tried, whenever possible,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[204]</a></span> -to provide tired troops with the means of transport to their -rest areas, a facility which was always highly appreciated by -them.</p> - -<p>By the time the First and Fourth Divisions had thus been -assembled in the forward areas, ready to relieve the Third and -Fifth Divisions, these latter, together with the 32nd Division, -had advanced our front approximately to the line Vermand—Vendelles—Hesbecourt, -carrying it to within three miles of the -front line of the Hindenburg defence system.</p> - -<p>There can be no doubt, however, that the rate of our advance, -retarded as it had been for the reasons already explained, had -proceeded much more rapidly than suited the enemy.</p> - -<p>A steady stream of prisoners kept pouring in, captured in -twos and threes, all along my front, by my energetic patrols. -Numerous machine guns were taken; and in the vicinity of -Roisel, fully three hundred transport vehicles and much engineering -material were captured, which the enemy had been compelled -to abandon in haste.</p> - -<p>At this juncture the British High Command arrived at the -important decision to enlarge the Fourth Army, by adding -another Corps; doubtless contemplating the possibility of operations -on a large scale against the Hindenburg defences in the -near future.</p> - -<p>A new Corps Headquarters, the Ninth, was to be reconstituted -under Lieut.-General Braithwaite, and he was to become my -neighbour on my southern flank, interposed between me and -the French. Braithwaite had been Chief of Staff to Sir Ian -Hamilton during the Dardanelles Expedition, and I had seen -much of him there. I was to have the advantage, therefore, of -having old Gallipoli comrades on either flank, Braithwaite on -the south, and Godley on the north.</p> - -<p>The immediate result of this decision, which came into effect -early on September 12th, was that the 32nd Division, which -had been under my orders for nearly four weeks, passed over -to the Ninth Corps. Lambert, his Staff and his Division had -served me well and efficiently, and I was sorry to lose them -out of my Corps.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[205]</a></span></p> - -<p>With the impending further shortening of my front, I had -no justification for pressing to be permitted to retain this Division. -On the contrary, my representations to General Rawlinson had -always been in favour of shortening my frontage to the effective -battle standard of August 8th, so that the Corps might at any -time be in a position to embark on a major operation, with its -whole resources in Artillery and Infantry concentrated, as on -that occasion, upon a relatively narrow objective. My greatly -extended front, and the direct control of the affairs of six separate -Divisions, had been a heavy burden, involving great and manifold -responsibilities.</p> - -<p>According to my promises to the remaining two line Divisions, -the Fifth and Third, these were duly relieved on September -10th by the First and Fourth Divisions, the former on the north, -the latter on the south. Each Division had a frontage of about -four thousand yards, but this was to diminish rapidly, if the -advance of the Corps continued, by reason of the fact that -my southern boundary now became the Omignon River, whose -course ran obliquely from the north-east.</p> - -<p>While all these changes in dispositions were being effected, -there was breathing time to give attention to a heavy mass of -arrears of work; for there could be no question of undertaking -an attack on the Hindenburg defences without most careful -and exhaustive preparation.</p> - -<p>For this the time was not yet ripe. It would still take some -days to bring forward the remainder of my heaviest Artillery, -to advance the railheads, to replenish the ammunition depots -and supply dumps, and to re-establish telegraph and telephone -communications.</p> - -<p>Another good reason for a more leisurely policy on the front -of the Fourth Army lay in the events on other portions of the -Allied fronts. By September 4th the German withdrawal -had become general on all fronts.</p> - -<p>It had become clear that the enemy's retirement to his former -position of March, 1918, was not to be confined to those fronts -on which he had been receiving such punishment. All evidence -pointed to the fact that his present strategy was to take up<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[206]</a></span> -as speedily as possible a strong defensive attitude, behind the -great system of field works, which had already served him so -well during 1917, at a time when a considerable proportion of -his military resources was still involved on the Russian and -Roumanian fronts.</p> - -<p>His retirement before the First and Third British Armies was -proceeding methodically, and on September 5th the French -were crossing the Vesle, between Rheims and Soissons. All -was going well; and those in the confidence of our High Command -knew that, on any day now, news might be expected of -the first great attack to be made by the American Army, to be -directed against the St. Mihiel Salient on the Alsace front.</p> - -<p>This latter attack actually opened on September 11th, and it -was clearly sound military policy to wait for a few days, in order -correctly to diagnose the effect of these operations upon the -enemy's distribution of forces.</p> - -<p>Information as to the locations and movements of all the enemy -Divisions was in these days voluminous, accurate and speedy. -Prisoners and documents were daily falling into the hands of the -Allies over the whole length of the Western Front. His Divisions -in the front line were identified daily by actual contact. As to -those resting or refitting or in reserve, accurate deductions could -be made from the mass of information at our disposal.</p> - -<p>It was at this time that it began to be made clear to us that -the enemy's mobile reserves had been almost completely absorbed -into the front line. One Division after another, particularly -among those which had been engaged against the Australian -Corps in August, was being disbanded. Among these were the -109th, 225th, 233rd, 54th Reserve, and 14th Bavarian Divisions.</p> - -<p>The strength of the enemy's remaining Divisions was also -rapidly diminishing. From prisoners we learned that many -Battalions now had only three Companies instead of four, many -Regiments only two Battalions instead of three, and even the -Company strengths were at a low ebb.</p> - -<p>We could well afford to approach the immediate future with -greater deliberation.</p> - -<p>Since August 8th, the Corps front had already advanced<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[207]</a></span> -twenty-five miles, and it was not long before I had to abandon -the luxurious château of the Marquis de Clermont-Tonnere, at -Bertangles, whose spacious halls and spreading parks had formed -so pleasant a habitation for the whole of my Corps Headquarters.</p> - -<p>The scale of comfort possible for all senior Commanders and -Staffs rapidly declined as the advance developed. Generals of -Corps, Divisions and Brigades had to be content with living and -office quarters in a steadily descending gradation of convenience. -From château to humbler dwelling house, and thence into bare -wooden huts, and later still into mere holes hollowed out in the -sides of quarries or railway cuttings, were the stages of progress -in this downward scale.</p> - -<p>My Headquarters moved from Bertangles to a group of village -houses at Glisy on August 13th; thence on August 31st to Méricourt, -where the best had to be made of a derelict, much battered -and almost roofless château, which the Germans had rifled of -every stick of furniture, and even of all doors and windows, in -order to equip a large collection of dug-outs in a neighbouring -hill-side.</p> - -<p>Again on September 8th I moved into the very centre of the -devastated area lying in the Somme bend, on to a small rise near -Assevillers, where a number of tiny wooden huts served us as -bedrooms by night and offices by day. Only one hut, more pretentiously -brick-walled and evidently built for the use of some -German officer of high rank, was available to fulfil the duties of -hospitality.</p> - -<p>In spite of such discomforts, the daily life at Corps Headquarters -flowed on uninterruptedly in its several quite distinct -activities. On the one hand, there was the grim business of -fighting, the detailed conduct of the battle of to-day, the troop -and artillery movements for that of to-morrow, the planning of the -one to be undertaken still later; rounds of conferences and consultations; -visits to Divisions and Brigades, and to Artillery; -reconnaissances to the forward zone; and an intent and ceaseless -study of maps and Intelligence summaries.</p> - -<p>Hourly contact with Headquarters of Fourth Army and of -flank Corps had to be maintained. Then, following the day's<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[208]</a></span> -strenuous activities out of doors, there was at nights a never-diminishing -mass of administrative work, disciplinary questions, -honours, awards, appointments, promotions, and a formidable -correspondence which must not be allowed to fall into arrear.</p> - -<p>Again, in the back areas there were the unemployed Divisions -of the Corps, who must be regularly visited, both at training and -at play. There were medals and ribbons to be distributed to the -gallant winners; addresses to be delivered; and the work of -reorganizing and refitting the resting units to be supervised. -Still further in rear, demonstrations of new experiments in tactics -or in weapons, or in mechanical warfare, had frequently to be -attended, for study and criticism.</p> - -<p>And lastly there was the social life of the Corps; for its performances -were beginning to attract attention beyond the limited, -if select, circles of the Fourth Army. A steady stream of visitors -began to set in. It was a necessary burden that suitable arrangements -for their reception and entertainment had to be maintained.</p> - -<p>The duties of hospitality had been simple at a time when Corps -Headquarters was still housed in palatial châteaux, situated in -country hitherto untouched by the war, and within easy reach of -all supplies. It was a very different matter to offer even reasonable -comfort to a visitor at a time when Government rations -constituted the backbone of our fare, when there were only bare -floors to sleep upon for those who were not fortunate enough to -possess a camp bed or valise, and when even an extra blanket -or pillow or towel was at a premium.</p> - -<p>Yet we were always most glad to see visitors, and those of them -who were soldiers had, of course, a full understanding of our -limitations. It was not always so with others who, in the earlier -years of the war, when all Corps had a fixed location and had -achieved a high standard of domestic comfort, had been accustomed -to an adequate reception.</p> - -<p>Upon the whole, our guests were indulgent, and understood -that the stress of current events placed a very strict limit upon -the amount of time that the members of my Staff or I could -devote to them.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/map-f.jpg" width="1200" height="610" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">Map F</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[209]</a></span> - -Among many other distinguished men whom I had the honour -to receive were members of the War Cabinet, such as Lord -Milner, then Secretary of State for War, and Mr. Winston -Churchill, the Minister of Munitions; public men, such as Sir -Horace Plunkett and Robert Blatchford; eminent authors, such -as Sir Conan Doyle, Sir Gilbert Parker and Ian Hay; famous -artists, such as Louis Raemakers, Streeton and Longstaff; -celebrated journalists, like Viscount Burnham, Thomas Marlowe -and Cope Cornford; together with many representatives of -the Royal Navy, and of the armies of our Allies, and Attachés -from all the Allied Embassies.</p> - -<p>The Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Haig, was a frequent -caller, and never departed without leaving a stimulating impression -of his placid, hopeful and undaunted personality, nor without -a generous recognition of the work which the Corps was doing.</p> - -<p>General Birdwood, also, the former Corps Commander, who -now commanded the Fifth Army, paid several visits to the Corps, -travelling long distances in order to speak a few encouraging words -to the Commanders and troops with whom he had formerly been -so long and so closely associated. He, too, was always a most -welcome visitor. Although since the previous May he had ceased -to control the fighting activities of the Corps, this did not lessen -the intense pride which he took in its daily successes.</p> - -<p>Many of our civilian visitors thirsted for the noise and tumult -of battle, and were most keen to get under fire, even if only of -long-range artillery fire. This was a constant source of anxiety -to me, for it was an unwritten law that the responsibility of their -safe sojourn in the Corps area rested with me. More often than -not they had to be dissuaded from visiting the forward zone, and -induced to spend their available time in inspecting some of our -show spots in the rearward areas, such as the Calibration ranges, -or the Corps central telegraph station, or the Tank park, or even -the Prisoner of War Cages, and the numerous depots of captured -guns and war trophies.</p> - -<p>The Corps prisoners' cage was always, throughout the period -of our active fighting, a scene both of great interest and much -activity. Although all prisoners of war had to be evacuated to -the rear usually within about twenty-four hours of their admission,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[210]</a></span> -and every day a batch marched out under escort, yet the -Corps cage between July and October was never empty.</p> - -<p>When early in July the stream of prisoners began to flow in, -and thereafter grew steadily stronger, my Intelligence Service, -headed by Major S. A. Hunn, rose thoroughly to the occasion. -Among our troops sufficient numbers of all ranks proficient in the -German language were speedily found. After a little training -they learned to deal expeditiously with the lengthy searchings -and interrogations which followed the arrival of all new-comers.</p> - -<p>Documents of every description found upon prisoners excepting -their pay-books, were seized and examined. The German -soldier is an inveterate sender and recipient of picture postcards. -It was surprising how much information of an invaluable character -could be gleaned from a postcard. A date, a place name, the -number of a Unit or Regiment, the name of a Commander, -reference to a train journey or a fight, are often sufficient, when -read by an expert in relation to the context, to furnish definite -information of the whereabouts of a Division, or of the fact that -it has been or is about to be disbanded, or of its intended movement -to some other part of the front, or of the losses which it has -suffered.</p> - -<p>All these scraps of information, when compared with similar -items gathered on other fronts, soon enabled the whole story of -all movement that was going on behind the enemy's lines to be -deduced from day to day with wonderful completeness.</p> - -<p>So, also, maps, sketches, copies of orders, or of battle instructions, -and the contents of note-books and of personal diaries -always repaid the closest scrutiny. Such study produced results -which, even if not of immediate value to me, were nevertheless -passed on to the Army, and by them broadly promulgated, in -daily summaries, for the benefit of all our other Corps.</p> - -<p>The oral interrogation of the prisoners, particularly of officers, -often produced results of first-class importance. Information -as to dispositions, intentions, new tactical methods or new weapons -frequently emerged from these inquiries. It was rare that -prisoners refused to talk, and rarer still for them to attempt to -mislead with false information. If they did attempt it, the interrogating<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[211]</a></span> -officer was usually sufficiently well-informed upon the -subject of inquiry to be able to detect the inconsistency.</p> - -<p>As the prisoners were invariably examined separately, it was -never difficult to discriminate between the true, upon which the -majority of them were in agreement, and the false, upon which -the minority never agreed.</p> - -<p>Should the prisoner prove uncommunicative or deceitful, -then if he were of sufficient education to make it worth while, -the Intelligence Officer had yet another method, besides direct -questioning, at his disposal.</p> - -<p>For a certain number of our own men, who could speak German -fluently, and who had been carefully tutored in their rôle, were -provided with enemy uniforms, and allowed to grow a three-days' -beard, so as to impersonate prisoners of war. These men, so -equipped, were called "pigeons." A pigeon would be ostentatiously -brought under escort into the prisoners' cage, and would -sojourn for a day or more in a compartment of it among the -specially selected genuine prisoners. He would indicate by a -secret sign the time when he should himself be led to the Intelligence -Office for interrogation. It was seldom that he came away -empty-handed.</p> - -<p>The demeanour of our captives, on reaching the cages, varied -widely, according to the stress which they had undergone. Some -wore an air of abject misery, and were thoroughly cowed and -subservient. Others were defiant, sulky and even arrogant.</p> - -<p>Our treatment of them was firm, but humane. Physically, -they had nothing to complain of; they were fed and quartered -on the same standard as our own men. But they were given to -understand from the very outset that we would stand no -nonsense, and that they must do exactly what they were told. -Few of them ever gave us any real trouble.</p> - -<p>The subsequent employment of prisoners of war did not come -under my jurisdiction, and it was seldom that any prisoner -working parties were available to me. My Corps area rarely -extended sufficiently far back from the front line to carry it -beyond the zone in which, by agreement between the belligerents, -the employment of prisoners of war was forbidden.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[212]</a></span></p> - -<p>Australian soldiers are nothing if not sportsmen, and no case -ever came under my notice of brutality or inhumanity to prisoners. -Upon the contrary, when once a man's surrender had been -accepted, and he had been fully disarmed, he was treated with -marked kindness. The front line troops were always ready to -share their water and rations with their prisoners, and cigarettes -were distributed with a liberal hand.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the souvenir-hunting instinct of the -Australian led him to help himself freely to such mementos -as our orders had not forbidden him to touch. Prisoners rarely -got as far as the Corps cage with a full outfit of regimental buttons, -cockades, shoulder-straps, or other accoutrements. Personal -trinkets, pay-books, money and other individual belongings were, -however, invariably respected; unless, as often happened, the -prisoners themselves were anxious to trade them away to their -captors, or escorts, for tobacco, chocolates, or other luxuries.</p> - -<p>Before I leave the subject of prisoners I should mention my -impression of the German officers, particularly of those who were -more senior in rank. Whenever a Regimental or Battalion Commander -was captured, and time permitted, he was brought before -me for a further interrogation. It was an experience which was -almost universal that such officers were willing to give me little -information which might injure their cause; on the other hand, -they exhibited an altogether exaggerated air of wounded pride -at their capture, and at the defeat of the troops whom they had -commanded.</p> - -<p>It was that feeling of professional pique which dominated their -whole demeanour. They were always volubly full of excuses, -the weather, the fog, the poor <i>moral</i> of their own men, the unexpectedness -of our attack, the Tanks, errors in their maps—anything -at all but a frank admission of their own military -inferiority.</p> - -<p>There were two amusing exceptions to this experience. The -day after the fighting for Péronne, when a large batch of the -prisoners then taken was being got ready to march out of the -Corps cage, officers in one enclosure, other ranks in another, -the senior German officer, a Regimental Commander, formally<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[213]</a></span> -requested permission to address some eighty other officers present -in the cage. This request was granted.</p> - -<p>He told them that they had fought a good fight, that their -capture was not to their discredit, and that he would report -favourably upon them to his superiors at the first opportunity. -He then went on to say that on his own and on their behalf he -desired to tender to the Australians an expression of his admiration -for their prowess, and to make a frank acknowledgment to -them that he fully recognized that on this occasion his garrison -had been outclassed, out-manœuvred, and out-fought. The whole -assembly expressed their acquiescence in these observations by -collectively bowing gravely to the small group of my Intelligence -Officers who were amused spectators of the scene.</p> - -<p>On another occasion—it was just after the battle of September -18th—I was asking a German Battalion Commander whether he -could explain why it was that his men had that day surrendered -in such large numbers without much show of resistance. "Well, -you see," said he, with a twinkle in his eye, "they are dreadfully -afraid of the Australians. So they are of the Tanks. But when -they saw both of them coming at them <i>together</i>, they thought it -was high time to throw up their hands."</p> - -<p>But this story is slightly anticipatory. The short breathing-space -which had been afforded by our more leisurely advance -towards the Hindenburg system was over. By September 12th -I was once again immersed in all the perplexities of shaping means -to ends. I had to decide, in collaboration with the Army Staff -and the Corps on my flanks, first, the extent of the resources which -would be required, and second, the successive stages which would -offer promise of success in overthrowing the last great defensive -system of all those which the enemy had created upon the tortured -soil of France.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[214]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER XIII<br /> - -HARGICOURT</h2> - - -<p>The great Hindenburg system, by which name it has come -to be known to English readers, or the "Siegfried Line," -as it is called by the Germans, was brought into existence during -the winter of 1916 and early spring of 1917 in order to fulfil a -very definite strategic purpose. This was to put into effect, on a -stupendous scale, a very elementary principle of minor tactics, -namely, that field works are constructed for the purpose of reducing -the number of men required to defend a given front or -locality.</p> - -<p>In themselves, field fortifications have, of course, no offensive -value whatever, but their use permits a reduced number of men -to defend one place, in order that a greater number of men may be -available to attack another place.</p> - -<p>The German High Command proceeded to make use of this -principle on a scale previously unknown in history. The whole -of the Western front, in Belgium and France, was to be held -defensively throughout 1917. The military resources required -to defend that front were to be reduced to a minimum, by the -provision of a line of defences protected by powerful field works, -believed to be impregnable. This would liberate the greatest -possible resources for the Eastern front, where an end could be -made of the Russians and Roumanians there. As soon as these -were disposed of, those troops, guns and aeroplanes could again be -transferred to the West, in order similarly to dispose of the remainder -of our Alliance.</p> - -<p>This great strategic plan was carried out in its entirety until -the middle of 1918. It was the great Hindenburg line which had -been the kernel of the whole conception, and, until the days which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[215]</a></span> -we are now approaching, it had remained, practically over its -whole length, an impregnable barrier against the assaults of the -French and British.</p> - -<p>It is to be remembered that the very basis which justified the -expenditure of such enormous labour on the creation of these -defences was the saving in man-power. It is an accepted principle -of tactics that in any given battle the advantage always -rests heavily on the side of the defence. Where numbers, resources -and <i>moral</i> are equal, no attack can hope to succeed.</p> - -<p>If, in the teachings before the war, it was correct to say that -a Commander should hesitate to attack unless he had a preponderance -of men and guns of at least two to one, such a dictum -assuredly did not take into account field defences of the permanent -and elaborate character of the Hindenburg Line. I -should hardly venture to fix a ratio of relative strength appropriate -in such circumstances.</p> - -<p>But this much is clear. The Germans had once already relied -successfully upon the impregnability of this great work. They -had every justification for believing that it would once again -serve them to keep us at bay for just a few weeks longer. Winter -was very near, and the Entente peoples might not have been able -to hold together to face another year of war.</p> - -<p>We, on our part also, had as much justification for the resolve -that every sacrifice must be made to overthrow these defences -before the end of 1918, and for believing that it would require a -great, concerted and intense effort to succeed in this.</p> - -<p>It is quite necessary, for a due appreciation of the magnitude -of the effort which was actually made, and of the wonderful -success with which it was rewarded, that the nature of the -defences of the Hindenburg Line should be clearly understood. -This can best be done, I think, by making an endeavour to realize -the sense of security which the possession of such a line of defence -must have afforded to the enemy. We are here interested only -in that portion of the line which extends from St. Quentin northwards -towards Cambrai.</p> - -<p>Between these two cities the country is higher than that adjoining -it on the north and the south. It forms, therefore, a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[216]</a></span> -watershed, dividing the basin of the Somme from that of the -Scheldt. Early in the nineteenth century, Napoleon realized -the ambitious project of connecting these two river systems by a -great Canal scheme, cutting right through this high country from -south to north.</p> - -<p>The canal is called, in its southern reaches, Canal de St. -Quentin. Before Cambrai is reached it merges into the Canal -de l'Escaut. Throughout the whole of that portion which -concerns us, it runs in a deep cutting, reaching, for great stretches, -a depth of 50 to 60 feet. In certain places where the ground -rises still higher, the canal passes through in great tunnels. The -southernmost, or Le Tronquoy Tunnel, near St. Quentin, is but -short; the northern boasts of the imposing length of 6,000 yards, -and extends from Bellicourt,<a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> at its southern portal, to Le Catelet -at its northern one. From that point northwards the canal -flows in "open cut" which gradually becomes shallower as -Cambrai is approached.</p> - -<p>The canal excavation—except where the tunnels occur—itself -affords an excellent military obstacle, the passage of which -could be stoutly contested by resolute troops well dug in on its -eastern banks, for the descent and ascent of the slopes could be -obstructed by wire entanglements, and swept with fire. The -water alone, which is too deep to be waded, would seriously impede -infantry, while the passage of tanks, guns and vehicles would -be impossible once the few high level bridges over the canal had -been destroyed.</p> - -<p>Such an obstacle would not, however, of itself fulfil the requirements -of modern war, with its searching and destructive Artillery -fire. It was to be regarded more as the foundation upon which -a complete system of defences could be built, and as a last line of -resistance <i>à outrance</i>.</p> - -<p>The canal had been, naturally, located by its engineers, in the -lowest ground available, so that its course closely follows the -lines of the minor valleys and depressions of the ground. On -both sides, therefore, the canal is flanked by somewhat higher -ground, from which its immediate banks can be overlooked. On -the western side particularly, there is a regular line of such higher -plateaux on which the villages of Villeret, Hargicourt and -Ronssoy once stood.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[217]</a></span></p> -<p>It was clearly desirable both to deprive a besieger of such -vantage ground, and also to provide the canal defences with a -stout outpost defence. For these reasons, the Germans had constructed -an elaborate system of trenches on a line generally parallel -to and on the average a full mile west of the canal. These -trenches had been perfected with dug-outs, concrete machine -gun and mortar emplacements, and underground shelters. They -were protected by belt after belt of barbed wire entanglements, -in a fashion which no one understood better, or achieved more -thoroughly, than the Germans.</p> - -<p>But much more remained. Deep communication trenches -led back to the canal banks, in the sides of which tier upon tier -of comfortable living quarters for the troops had been tunnelled -out. Here support and reserve troops could live in safety and -defy our heaviest bombardments. They could be secretly hurried -to the front trenches whenever danger threatened.</p> - -<p>There was, indeed, a perfect tangle of underground shelters -and passages. Roomy dug-outs were provided with tunnelled -ways which led to cunningly hidden machine-gun posts, and the -best of care was taken to provide numerous exits, so that the -occupants should not be imprisoned by the blocking of one or -other of them by our bombardment. But it was the barbed wire -which formed the groundwork of the defence. It was everywhere, -and ran in all directions, cleverly disposed so as to herd the -attackers into the very jaws of the machine guns.</p> - -<p>The stretch of 6,000 yards of the canal which had been -tunnelled was, however, both a hindrance and a benefit to the -perfection of the scheme. On the one hand, the advantage of -the open cut, as a last obstacle, was lost. Its place had to be -taken by a second complete system of trench and wire defences, -roughly following the line of the tunnel, but of course far above -the latter. On the other hand, the tunnel itself afforded secure -living accommodation for a substantial garrison.</p> - -<p>The Germans had collected large numbers of canal barges,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[218]</a></span> -and had towed them into the interior of the tunnel, mooring -them end to end. They served as living quarters and as depots -for stores and munitions. It was no great business to provide -electric lighting for the tunnel. Indeed, the leads for this -purpose had been in existence before the war. Here, again, -underground shafts and ways were cut to enable the troops -rapidly to man the trenches and machine guns, and as rapidly to -seek a safe asylum from the heaviest shell fire.</p> - -<p>The whole scheme produced, in fact, a veritable fortress—not -one, in the popular acceptation of the term, consisting of massive -walls and battlements, which, as was proved in the early days of -the war at Liége and Namur, can speedily be blown to pieces -by modern heavy artillery—but one defying destruction by any -powers of gunnery, and presenting the most formidable difficulties -to the bravest of Infantry.</p> - -<p>Even this was not all. On the east side of the St. Quentin -Canal and parallel to it were built still two further trench lines, -both fully protected by wire entanglements, and capable of determined -defence. The first of these is the Le Catelet line, about -one mile distant from the canal. It skirts and embraces the villages -of Nauroy and Le Catelet, while two miles still further east -is the Beaurevoir line, the last or most easterly of all the prepared -defences which the Germans had in France.</p> - -<p>Neither of these latter trench systems was nearly so formidably -prepared as the main systems previously described, but together -with them they go to make up the whole Hindenburg defensive -system. In this region that system runs generally due north -and south, with many minor convolutions in its line. It is altogether -some 4½ miles across from west to east.</p> - -<p>As its overthrow could not be attempted in a single operation, -it is necessary for clearness of description to give definite names -to each of the successive lines of trenches which go to form the -whole defence system. Taking them in the order in which we -attacked them, from west to east, they will be referred to as:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p> -The Hindenburg Outpost line (known also in this part of the field as the Hargicourt line).<br /> -The Hindenburg main line (<i>i.e.</i>, the Canal and Tunnel line).<br /> -The Le Catelet line.<br /> -The Beaurevoir line.<br /> -</p> -</blockquote> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_218fp.jpg" width="1200" height="778" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>Australian Artillery—going into action at Cressaire Wood.</p></div> -</div> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_219fp.jpg" width="1200" height="780" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>Battle of August 8th, 1918—German prisoners being brought out of the battle under the fire of their own artillery.</p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[219]</a></span></p> - -<p>During the winter of 1917-1918 the British Fifth Army and -the Germans had faced each other in this region for many -months. On our side, also, a system of field defences had been -developed. They fell far short, indeed, of the completeness and -ingenuity of the German works, because the latter had been -constructed at leisure, long before, while ours had been built -under the very fire of the German guns.</p> - -<p>For months the opposing Artilleries had pounded the country -to pieces, effaced every sign of civilization, and churned up the -ground in all directions over a belt some three miles wide. -Heaps of broken bricks marked the sites of once prosperous -villages. Broken telegraph poles, charred tree trunks, twisted -rails, a chaos of mangled machinery, were the only remains of -what had once been gardens, orchards, railways and factories. -The whole territory presented the aspect of a rolling, tumbled -desert from which life itself had been banished.</p> - -<p>This was the region whose western verge the vanguard of the -Australian advance approached on September 11th, on a frontage -of about 8,000 yards, the northern extremity directed on Bellicourt, -the southern on Bellenglise. That is to say, if our further -advance had but continued unimpeded in the same due easterly -direction, it would have brought us square upon the open -excavation of the canal, and just clear and to the south of the -Bellicourt—Le Catelet tunnel. Some significance attached to this -circumstance, as will later appear.</p> - -<p>Now, some little time before, an event of peculiar interest had -occurred. This was the capture, on another front, of a very -ordinary-looking transport vehicle loaded high with miscellaneous -baggage. Little escaped the inquisitive eyes of the -British Intelligence Service, which speedily discovered that -among this baggage there safely reposed a large collection of -maps and documents. On examination these proved to be -nothing less than the complete Defence Scheme of the whole<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[220]</a></span> -"Siegfried" system, in that very sector which now lay before -the Australian Corps.</p> - -<p>These papers were carefully overhauled and arranged. There -were dozens of accurately drawn detailed maps, and minute -descriptions of every tactical feature of the defences. The -position of every gun emplacement was given; every searchlight, -machine-gun pit, observation post, telephone exchange, -command station and mortar emplacement was clearly marked; -the topographical and tactical features of the ground were discussed -in minute detail, and plans for the action of every -individual unit of the garrisons were fully displayed.</p> - -<p>Naturally, an army of translators and copying clerks was -set to work upon this precious find, and my Intelligence Service -was kept busy for many days in making for me digests of those -items likely to prove of special interest. It had, of course, to -be remembered that the Defence Scheme had been brought into -operation for the campaign of 1917, and it remained to be seen -to what extent it might by now have become obsolete.</p> - -<p>It was hardly to be expected that the enemy would adhere -to it in its entirety, especially if he were aware, as I was bound -to assume that he was, that all this information had fallen into -our hands. But the Scheme contained a full exposition of many -important topographical facts which it was in any case beyond -his power to alter, and which it was of priceless value for me to -know.</p> - -<p>Although I had to devote hour upon hour to a concentrated -study of these papers, it proved to be in greater part labour in -vain so far as the Australian Corps was concerned, because it -ultimately came about that although I did carry out the attack -upon the Hindenburg outpost line in my present sector, the -attack upon the Hindenburg main line, which I was, later, -called upon to make, took place in the next adjoining sector to -the north, <i>i.e.</i>, the Bellicourt tunnel sector, to which these -captured documents only incidentally referred. Nevertheless, -the Ninth Corps, under Braithwaite, ultimately got the full benefit -of these discoveries.</p> - -<p>The production of these documents on September 10th formed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[221]</a></span> -the starting point of the discussions which were now initiated in -the Fourth Army upon the question of the series of operations -necessary to overthrow the Hindenburg defences. General -Rawlinson, on September 13th, asked his three Corps Commanders -(Butler, now restored to health and back at duty, Braithwaite -and myself) to meet him at my newly-installed hutted camp -at Assevillers. There, quite informally, over a cup of afternoon -tea, the great series of operations took birth which so directly -helped to finish the war.</p> - -<p>It was decided that the operation must necessarily be divided -into two main phases—separated in point of time by an interval -of several days for further preparation. All of us recognized the -impossibility of overrunning, in a single day, so deep and formidable -a system of defences, in such tortured country, and in -weather which was already becoming unsettled.</p> - -<p>The first phase was to be an attempt to capture the Hindenburg -outpost line, along the whole Army front. The French and -the Third British Armies were to be asked to make a synchronized -attack on the same objective. The three Corps of the Fourth -Army were to attack upon the frontages and in the sectors on -which they then stood. The date was left undecided, but all -were to be ready at three days' notice.</p> - -<p>One important consideration was the meagre supply of Tanks -available. The operations of August had been costly, not to say -extravagant, in Tanks, and General Elles' repair workshops, -manned largely by very competent Chinese coolie mechanics, -had been working night and day ever since to repair the minor -damages, and new Tanks were steadily arriving from England -to replace those damaged beyond repair. But no large contingent -of Tanks was to be expected until towards the end of -the month. The upshot was that I was to be content with only -eight Tanks for use in the contemplated operation.</p> - -<p>Late the same afternoon I communicated to Generals Maclagan -and Glasgow an outline of the probable rôle of their respective -Divisions in the very near future.</p> - -<p>In the meantime, the front-line troops had not been idle. -My orders were that the First and Fourth Divisions were to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[222]</a></span> -carry the line forward as far as possible towards the Hindenburg -outpost line, without committing the Corps to an organized -attack. They were to operate by vigorous patrol action against -enemy points of resistance, for the enemy had evidently no -intention of quietly giving up the ground which lay between us -and the Hindenburg outpost line. On the contrary, he had -posted strong rearguards on every point of tactical value, and -did his best to keep us as long as possible at arm's length, and -beyond striking distance of his first great line of defence.</p> - -<p>These orders were entirely to the taste of the two Divisions now -in the line. The First Division had served its apprenticeship -to that very kind of fighting in the Merris area in the previous -spring, and the Fourth Division did not mean to be a second -best. Each Division stood on a one-Brigade front, being ordered -to keep its other two Brigades well out of harm's way and -resting, for any great effort that might be required.</p> - -<p>The next few days witnessed some daring exploits on the -part of the 13th Brigade of the Fourth Division and the 2nd -Brigade of the First Division in the capture of tactical points, -and in the bloody repulse of all attempts by the enemy to -recapture them. In this way our line was carried up to and a -little beyond what had been the old British reserve line of -trenches of March, 1918, which lay within 5,000 yards of the -final objective of the first phase of the contemplated operations.</p> - -<p>On September 16th I called together the whole of the Commanders -who were to participate in the next great battle, -Maclagan (Fourth Division), Glasgow (First Division), Courage -(Tanks), Chamier (Air Force), Fraser (Heavy Artillery), and the -four Generals of my own Staff. The conference took place in a -Y.M.C.A. marquee erected near Maclagan's Headquarters, and -I was able to announce that the date had been fixed for September -18th.</p> - -<p>The contemplated battle presented only a few novel features. -The methods of the Corps were becoming stereotyped, and by this -time we all began to understand each other so well that most of -what I had to say could almost be taken for granted. Each<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[223]</a></span> -Commander was ready to anticipate the action that would be -required of him, almost as soon as I had unfolded the general -plan.</p> - -<p>The shortage of Tanks was a source of much anxiety to me. -I felt that it would mean a heavier risk to the Infantry, and the -contemplation of losses among our splendid men, which might -be lessened by the more liberal use of mechanical aids, always -sorely troubled me. I endeavoured to meet the situation by -adopting two unusual expedients.</p> - -<p>The first was to <i>double</i> the machine-gun resources of the two -battle Divisions. This was effected by bringing up the complete -machine-gun battalions of the Third and Fifth Divisions, and -adding them to those of the line Divisions. This gave me a -total of 256 Vickers Machine Guns on a frontage now reduced -to 7,000 yards. It enabled me to deliver so dense a machine-gun -barrage, advancing 300 yards ahead of the infantry, that to -quote the words of a German Battalion Commander who was -captured on September 18th: "The small-arms fire was absolutely -too terrible for words. There was nothing to be done but -to crouch down in our trenches and wait for you to come and -take us."</p> - -<p>The other expedient was amusing, although no less effective. -This was to make up for the shortage of real Tanks by fabricating -a number of dummy ones. As soon as the word went -round Engineers and Pioneers vied with each other in rapid -"Tank" manufacture. Dumps and stores were clandestinely -robbed of hessian, paint, wire nails, and battens, and some -weird monstrosities were produced. The best and most plausible -of them were selected, and actually used on the day of the battle. -Four men dragged out each dummy, before dawn, into a position -from which it was bound to be seen by the enemy and there -abandoned it. There is little doubt that this trick contributed -its share to the day's astonishing success.</p> - -<p>Once again, also, I put into practice the principle of an Artillery -barrage plan reduced to the utmost simplicity. This, as already -described, consisted in having the line, on which were to fall -the shells from the whole of the barrage guns employed, perfectly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[224]</a></span> -straight across the whole front, so as to avoid all complexities -in fire direction.</p> - -<p>The first line on which the barrage fell was called the Artillery -"Start Line," and from such a line the barrage advanced, by -regular leaps or "lifts" of 100 yards at a time, in perfectly parallel -lines, until the final objective was reached. Now, experience had -shown that such a start line for the Artillery should be at least -200 yards in advance of the line on which the Infantry were to -form up ready for the assault. A liberal margin of space had to -be allowed, in order to minimize the risks to our own Infantry.</p> - -<p>The Artillery "Start Line" was defined on our fighting maps. -The guns were laid upon it by methods which depended upon -accurate surveys, on the ground, of the exact position of every -gun. When that had been determined, the map and compass -helped to decide the range and alignment upon which the gun -should open fire.</p> - -<p>On the map, also, was drawn another line 200 yards short of, -or on our side of the Artillery "Start Line," and this was called -the Infantry "Start Line." It then became necessary to determine, -upon the actual ground, the position of this Infantry -Start Line, and to mark it in such a way that the Infantry would -be enabled to take up their correct positions. This would ensure -that the Infantry would know that the fall of our opening barrage -would be 200 yards in advance of the line so marked.</p> - -<p>This delicate work of marking out of the Infantry Start Line -on the ground was invariably entrusted to the Engineers attached -to the Brigades co-operating in the attack. The marking was -done by laying out and pegging down broad tapes of white linen, -which could be recognized in the dim light of early dawn. The -whole work, had, of course, to be done unobserved by the enemy, -and it was always a dangerous task.</p> - -<p>Only the fact that we were in possession of reliable large scale -maps, recording every feature of the ground, made it possible -for the Engineers, resourceful as they were, to do this delicate -work with reasonable accuracy. The battered condition of the -country was always a difficulty; for it was never easy to recognize, -on the ground, reference points, such as a road intersection, or -the corner of a field, or a crucifix or similar land mark, which might -aid the surveyors in getting their bearings.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 826px;"> -<img src="images/map-g.jpg" width="826" height="1200" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">Map G</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[225]</a></span></p> - -<p>The Infantry Start Line had, naturally, to be located so that -the ground upon which the tapes were to be pegged down was -ground which was already within our possession, or accessible -to us without coming dangerously near the enemy. It was -a necessary consequence that portions of our always irregular -front line of posts or trenches would lie beyond or on the -enemy's side of the tape line.</p> - -<p>It was always a rule of our practice, therefore, that any Infantry -posted in advance of the taped line should be withdrawn, behind -the tapes, an hour before the time of Zero. It was also customary -to order that all assaulting troops should be spread, in their -appropriate dispositions, along the tape line, also one hour -before Zero.</p> - -<p>The result of these arrangements was that for the last hour -before the actual opening of the battle, all Infantry intended to -take part in the assault was deployed along the tapes in a perfectly -straight line, all along the battle front, while no troops -previously in occupation of posts or trenches in advance of the -tapes were left out in front, exposed to the risk of either being -hit by our own Artillery, or mistaken, in the half light of dawn, for -enemies by our own Infantry.</p> - -<p>Complex and difficult as these arrangements may appear -from this description, they worked out in actual practice with -the utmost smoothness. The resulting simplification of the -Artillery plans, in this as in similar previous battles, more than -justified their adoption.</p> - -<p>A liberal use was also made of direction boards, which marked -the routes by which each separate body of assaulting Infantry -should, during the last night, march from its place of assembly -to the taped line or "jumping off" line, and also to mark the position -which it was to take up upon that line. Each board had -painted upon it the name of the unit to which it referred. Such -preparatory measures, troublesome as they were, greatly reduced -the risk of any confusion or mistake, and lessened the fatigue of -the assaulting troops.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[226]</a></span></p> - -<p>The moon would set, on the morning of the battle, at 3.37 a.m., -and the sun would rise at 6.27 a.m. Zero hour, for the opening -of the attack, was therefore fixed for twenty minutes past five.</p> - -<p>Operations began inauspiciously. A soaking rain set in some -two hours before, and made movement over the broken, clayey -surface anything but pleasant. Although the troops were soon -drenched to the skin, this did not in any way damp their spirits. -It probably added much to the misery of the enemy, who could -hardly fail to realize that, on any morning, a fresh attack might -break upon him.</p> - -<p>Modern war is in many ways unlike the wars of previous days, -but in nothing so much as in the employment of what I have -more than once referred to as "set-piece" operations. The term -is one which should convey its own meaning. It is the direct -result of the great extension, which this war has introduced, -of mechanical warfare. It is a "set-piece" because the stage -is elaborately set, parts are written for all the performers, and -carefully rehearsed by many of them. The whole performance -is controlled by a time-table, and, so long as all goes according to -plan, there is no likelihood of unexpected happenings, or of -interesting developments.</p> - -<p>The Artillery barrage advances from line to line, in regular -leaps, at regulated intervals of time, determined beforehand, -and incapable of alteration once the battle has begun. Should -the rate prove too slow and the Infantry could have advanced -more quickly, it cannot be helped, and no great harm is done. -On the other hand, if there be any risk of the barrage rate being -too fast, one or two halts of ten or fifteen minutes are often -introduced into the time-table to allow the infantry line, or any -part of it which may be hung up for any reason, to catch up.</p> - -<p>Following the barrage, comes line upon line of infantry in -skirmishing order, together with the line of Tanks when such are -used. The foremost lines advance to capture and hold the -ground, the lines in rear to "mop up" and deal with the enemy -either showing fight or hiding underground, the rearmost lines -collect prisoners or our own wounded, or carry supplies, tools -and ammunition.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[227]</a></span></p> - -<p>In a well-planned battle of this nature, fully organized, powerfully -covered by Artillery and Machine Gun barrages, given a resolute -Infantry and that the enemy's guns are kept successfully -silenced by our own counter-battery Artillery, nothing happens, -nothing can happen, except the regular progress of the advance -according to the plan arranged. The whole battle sweeps relentlessly -and methodically across the ground until it reaches the line -laid down as the final objective.</p> - -<p>Such a set-piece battle lasts usually, from first to last, for -80 to 100 minutes; seldom for more. When the Artillery -programme is ended the battle is either completely won, or -to all intents and purposes completely lost. If the barrage -for any reason gets away from our Infantry, and they are relegated -to hand to hand fighting in order to complete their advance, -the battle immediately assumes a totally different character, -and is no longer a set-piece affair.</p> - -<p>It will be obvious, therefore, that the more nearly such a -battle proceeds according to plan, the more free it is from any -incidents awakening any human interest. Only the externals -and only the large aspects of such battles can be successfully -recorded. It is for this reason that no stirring accounts exist -of the more intimate details of such great set-pieces as Messines, -Vimy, Hamel and many others. They will never be written, for -there is no material upon which to base them. The story of what -did take place on the day of battle would be a mere paraphrase -of the battle orders prescribing all that was to take -place.</p> - -<p>On the other hand battles such as the second phase of August -8th, the battle for Mont St. Quentin, and the later battles of -Bony and Beaurevoir were not set-piece operations. Therefore -the developments from hour to hour, and even from moment -to moment, are full of intense human interest, and replete with -tales of individual courage and initiative. Some day, when all -the material has been gathered, an abler pen than mine will -write their story.</p> - -<p>If the reader will bear in mind all these considerations, with -special reference to the battle of Hargicourt on September 18th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[228]</a></span> -he will realize that, in describing the dispositions, the objectives, -the time-table and the preparations for the battle, I have told -practically all that there is to tell of the course it took, except only -as regards the results actually achieved, in ground won and -prisoners taken.</p> - -<p>It has been difficult, nevertheless, to refrain from dwelling in -detail upon the performances and experiences in battle of the -individual fighting men. Any attempt to do so would, however, -prove hopelessly inadequate. The numbers engaged were always -so large, their activities so varied, the conditions of each battle -so different in detail, that to do adequate justice and avoid -unfair discrimination would make impossible demands upon the -space available to me.</p> - -<p>Popular interest naturally centres upon the Infantry, not only -because they are the most numerous, but also because they are -invariably in the forefront of the battle and often in immediate -contact with the enemy. Without the slightest disparagement -to the important rôle of the Infantryman and to the valour -which its performance demands, it must never be forgotten that -the work of the Artillery, Engineers, Pioneers, Machine Gunners, -Trench Mortars, Air Service and Tanks is in every way equally -important and essential to the success of any battle operation. -Yet it is equally true that no battle can be won without the -Infantry.</p> - -<p>In a deliberately prepared battle it is not too much to say that -the rôle of the Infantry is not, as a rule, the paramount one, -provided that all goes well and that there is no breakdown in any -part of the battle plan. That does not, however, imply that the -Infantry task makes no high demand upon courage and resolution. -On the contrary, these are the essentials upon which -the success of the Infantry rôle and therefore of the whole battle -depends.</p> - -<p>The primary duty of the Infantry, in an assault covered by an -Artillery barrage, is to follow up the barrage closely. The -barrage is nothing more nor less than a steady shower of shells, -bursting over the very heads of the leading lines of Infantry, and -striking the ground some 80 to 120 yards in front of them. This<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[229]</a></span> -shower is usually so dense that three to four shells per minute -fall on every twenty yards of frontage. It is so intense a fire that -no enemy, however courageous, could remain exposed to it. It -falls on one line for three or four minutes, while the Infantry lie -down flat. Suddenly, the barrage "lifts" or advances 100 yards. -At a signal from the platoon or company commander the whole -line rises and rushes at top speed to catch up to the barrage, again -to throw itself flat upon the ground.</p> - -<p>So long as no enemy are encountered, these successive rushes -may go on without check for hundreds of yards. If during the -course of any rush, trenches or strong points are met with and -they contain enemy who do not immediately surrender, prompt -use must be made of rifle and bayonet. But it is the primary -business of the leading line of Infantry to push on and not to -delay by engaging in close combat. The second and third lines -of Infantry are there to "mop up," that is, to dispose, by destruction -or capture, of any enemy overrun or ignored by the -leading line. Where Tanks co-operate that is also their special -business, and when it has been attended to they go forward at -top speed to rejoin the leading line.</p> - -<p>In such a methodical way the advance continues until the -final objective is reached. This event can be recognized by the -Infantry in any of three ways, firstly by reference to the clock -time; for the arrival of the barrage at any line on the map or -ground occurs in pursuance of a definite time-table; secondly by -the topographical features, and thirdly by the expedient of -maintaining the barrage stationary at the final objective for -fifteen to thirty minutes. In some battles, I also adopted the -device of firing from every gun in the barrage, three rounds of -smoke shell in rapid succession, as a signal to the Commanders -of the leading line of Infantry to call the final halt, to select a good -line for trenches, and to dig-in rapidly, a process technically -called "consolidation."</p> - -<p>It would be too much to hope that in an attack covering -a front of four or five miles, every part of the line should be able -to advance without any check whatever up to the final halting -place. But the expectation always is that by far the greater<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[230]</a></span> -part of the whole line will be able to do so. If, here and there -along the front, platoons or even whole companies were to be -held up or delayed by special difficulties or obstacles such as -thickets, or copses strongly manned by the enemy, or by belts -of wire, or village ruins, such breaks in the general line of advance -would matter but little to the success of the operations as -a whole. The gaps discovered in the leading line of Infantry, -when it had come to a halt at the final objective, would be -speedily filled by supporting troops from both flanks of the gap, -and thereby the enemy holding out further back, would be completely -enveloped. His surrender would follow as soon as he -realized his position, and that he had been cut off from any -contact with his friends in his rear.</p> - -<p>Such is the normal course of the Infantry action in a pitched -battle. It makes great demands upon the iron resolution of -the Infantryman to push on vigorously against all obstacles, and -to put forth his utmost physical powers to keep up with the -barrage, especially when the ground is wet and sticky, or when -uncut wire has to be crawled through. All this he must do, -utterly regardless of the enemy fire which may be directed against -him, whether from Artillery or machine guns. His best hope -of immunity is always to make his rush rapidly and determinedly, -and to get to ground immediately that he reaches the halting -place, close up to the barrage, when signalled by his officer.</p> - -<p>Very different from such a stereotyped procedure is the action -of the Infantry in any operation or any part of an operation -which partakes of the character of open warfare. The main -tactical purpose is still, as before, to advance to the seizure of an -appointed objective, but there is no barrage, no time-table, no -fixity of route, no prescribed formation or procedure. Everything -must be left to the judgment, initiative and enterprise of -the leader on the spot.</p> - -<p>The tactical unit of Infantry is the platoon. The action of a -whole battalion is compounded merely of the separate actions of -its sixteen platoons, each performing the separate rôle, in a -general plan, that may be laid down by the Battalion Commanders, -some to advance and fight, some to act in support, some to lie<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[231]</a></span> -in reserve, some to engage in a flank attack, others to fetch and -carry food, water and munitions.</p> - -<p>The platoon is commanded by a Lieutenant and comprises -four sections, each under a Sergeant or Corporal. There are two -sections of riflemen, a Lewis gun section and a section of rifle -grenadiers. Each section may consist of from five to eight -men. Let it be supposed that it is the business of the platoon to -capture a small farmhouse which the enemy has fortified and in -which he is holding out. Always supposing that the enemy -garrison is not of a strength requiring more than one platoon -for its capture the normal action of the attacking platoon would -be somewhat as follows. The Lewis gun section would, from a -concealed position, on one flank, keep the place under steady -fire. The rifle grenadiers from the same or another flank would -fire smoke grenades to make a smoke screen. One section of -riflemen would endeavour to sneak up depressions and ditches -or along hedges, so as to get well behind the farm and threaten -it by fire from the rear. The other section of riflemen would -choose some direct line of attack, over ground which offered concealment -to them until they were close enough to take the objective -with a rush.</p> - -<p>Such in very bare outline is merely an imaginary example, -but it is sufficient to show the amount of skill, resource and -energy required on the part not only of the leader, but also of -every man in the platoon. The secret of success of the Australian -open fighting lay in the extraordinary vigour, judgment and team-work -which characterized the many hundreds of little platoon -battles which were fought on just such lines as I have tried to -suggest in this example.</p> - -<p>It will be readily seen that no comprehensive description -is possible which would present an adequate picture of the widely -varying activities of the Australian Infantryman in this campaign. -There is only one source from which reliable narratives of individual -fighting can be gathered, and that source is so voluminous -that space forbids any but a meagre attempt to supply extracts -from it. I refer to the recommendations made by Commanders -for honours and rewards for individual acts of gallantry. A<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[232]</a></span> -very small selection of these has been made and is presented in an -appendix to this book.<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a></p> - -<p>But to return to my narrative of September 18th. On that -day each Division attacked on a frontage of two Brigades. No -serious opposition was encountered except at La Verguier, which -was not far from our start line. Nevertheless, the whole of the -"red" line, which was the objective of the "set-piece" phase of -the day's battle, was in our possession, throughout the whole -length of the Corps front, well before 10 o'clock.</p> - -<p>This gave us complete possession of the old British front line -of March, 1918; but the Hindenburg outpost line yet lay before -us, still distant another 1,500 to 2,000 yards. This latter line -was to be the ultimate or exploitation objective of the day's -operations, and I could hardly have dared to hope that a trench -system of such considerable strength, which had defied the Fifth -Army for so long, would fall into our hands so easily as it did.</p> - -<p>Glasgow's Division pushed on without pause, and before -nightfall had overwhelmed the garrison of the Hindenburg -outpost line along its front. Maclagan's Division also fought -its way forward to within 500 yards of that line. But the troops -were by then very exhausted; all movement was in full view -of the enemy; and the ground was very difficult. After a -consultation with Maclagan I decided to rest the troops, and to -make an attempt to reach the final objective (blue line) that same -night.</p> - -<p>Advantage was taken of this pause to advance the Artillery, -so that the enemy's defences could be thoroughly bombarded -before the final assault. At 11 o'clock the same night, the -Fourth Division again attacked, and after severe fighting also -captured the whole of the objective trench system.</p> - -<p>It was a great victory. The Hindenburg outpost line had been -vanquished. From it we could now look down upon the St. -Quentin Canal, and sweep with fire the whole of the sloping -ground which lay between us and the Canal, denying the use of -that ground to the enemy, and making it impossible for him to -withdraw the guns and stores which littered the area.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[233]</a></span></p> -<p>The overwhelming nature of the success can best be realized -by the following almost incredible analysis of the material results -of the day's fighting. The First Division attacked with a total -strength of 2,854 Infantry. They suffered only 490 casualties -(killed and wounded). They captured 1,700 prisoners, apart -from the large numbers who were killed, and the wounded enemy -who made good their escape.</p> - -<p>The Fourth Division had a total assaulting strength of 3,048 -of all ranks, of whom 532 became casualties. Their captures -of live prisoners amounted to 2,543.</p> - -<p>In addition, the Corps gathered in upwards of 80 guns, which -had been overrun, and had to be abandoned by the enemy.</p> - -<p>There is no record in this war of any previous success on such -a scale, won with so little loss.</p> - -<p>The Corps on either flank of me had successes of varying -quality. The Ninth Corps on the south had reached the red line, -but the exploitation phase of the operation was not pressed -until a later day. The Third Corps, on my left, however, made -indifferent progress. Their line still bent back sharply from my -left flank, and none of the enemy's outpost system had been -gained. This portion of the Army front was that which lay -square opposite the Bellicourt tunnel, and the fact that in this -part of the field the Fourth Army had not yet mastered the -Hindenburg outpost system was to be fraught with very serious -difficulties for me, not many days later.</p> - -<p>The general plan propounded by General Rawlinson on -September 13th had been realized in part, although not in its -entirety. The successes gained on September 18th were nevertheless -sufficiently important and decisive to justify immediate -preparations for working out the plan for a great, combined and -final effort to sweep the enemy out of the remainder of the last -lines of defence which he had established in France.</p> - -<p>The First and Fourth Australian Divisions had, however, -as it turned out, fought their last fight in the war. Their long -and brilliant fighting career, which had been opened three and a -half years before, the one on the cliffs of Gallipoli, and the other -in the desert of Egypt, thus ended in a blaze of glory. Although<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[234]</a></span> -a number of the officers and non-commissioned officers of both -these Divisions were called upon, very shortly after, to render -one more valuable service to the Australian Corps, the Divisions -themselves were destined, because of the termination of hostilities, -not again to make their appearance on any battle front. Their -labours ended, the troops were taken by motor bus and railway -to a coastal district lying to the south-west of Amiens, there to -rest and recuperate in the contemplation of a noble past devoted -to the service of the Empire.</p> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_19" id="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> See Map H.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_20" id="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> See Appendix B.</p></div></div> - - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[235]</a></span></p> - - -<h2>CHAPTER XIV<br /> - -AMERICA JOINS IN</h2> - - -<p>I had foreseen that the battle to be fought on September 18th -was the last in which the First and Fourth Divisions could -be called upon to participate during the remainder of the 1918 -campaigning season. The wastage of their Battalions had gone -on faster than the inflow of fresh drafts, or the return of convalescent -sick and wounded. These two Divisions contained -the original sixteen Battalions who had immortalized themselves, -in 1915, in the landing on Gallipoli. I was strongly averse from -disbanding any one of them to furnish drafts for the remainder. -My hope then was that, if these Divisions could be allowed to rest -over the winter, they could be sufficiently replenished by the spring -of 1919 to be able to maintain all sixteen Battalions at a satisfactory -fighting strength.</p> - -<p>Of the remaining three Divisions, the Third and Fifth required -at least another week's rest; and I had promised the Second -Division that after their heroic efforts at Mont St. Quentin, they -would not be again called upon until towards the end of September. -I would thus be left with insufficient resources to maintain an -immediate continuance of the pressure upon the enemy.</p> - -<p>On explaining the situation to General Rawlinson, he suggested -the interesting possibility of being able to obtain, very shortly, -the services of the Second American Corps of two Divisions, and -asked me whether I would be prepared to accept the responsibility -of taking this large force under my command for the continuance -of the operations.</p> - -<p>I had no reason to hesitate. My experience of the quality -of the American troops, both at the battle of Hamel and on the -Chipilly spur, had been eminently satisfactory. It was true that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[236]</a></span> -this new American Corps had no previous battle service, but -measures were possible to supply them with any technical guidance -which they might lack.</p> - -<p>I therefore accepted the suggestion, and Rawlinson then asked -me to submit a proposal for a joint operation to take place towards -the end of the month by these two American and the remaining -three Australian Divisions, with the object of completing the -task, so well begun, of breaking through the Hindenburg -defences. I was to propose my objectives, to show how I intended -to employ each of the five Divisions, and also to set out my requirements -in Artillery, Tanks and other services.</p> - -<p>It was anything but an easy task, and it had to be undertaken -at a time when the preparations for the battle of Hargicourt -were uppermost in my mind. Much time also had to be devoted -to numerous distinguished visitors.</p> - -<p>The outcome was a letter to the Fourth Army which foreshadowed, -almost in its entirety, the battle plan which subsequently -was actually employed. The substance of this letter -is here reproduced. The text has been modified only by the -omission of the reference letters to a large coloured map which -accompanied it:</p> - -<blockquote> -<div class="right"> -Corps Headquarters,<br /> -18th September, 1918.<br /> -</div> - -<p><i>Fourth Army.</i></p> - -<p>1. I beg to submit the outlines of a plan for a series of -operations for the capture of the Hindenburg Line in the -Sector Bellicourt-Vendhuille, based upon the expectation -that two American Divisions will be available immediately -to supplement this Corps.</p> - -<p>2. The resources of the Corps in Infantry, which will -be available, are exclusive of the First and Fourth Australian -Divisions, although the Artillery, Technical Troops -and Machine Gun Battalions of those Divisions will continue -to be available.</p> - -<p>3. The plan is based upon the assumption that the -objective Blue Line of the operations of September 18th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[237]</a></span> -is in our possession all along the Army Front, or can be -seized in the very near future.</p> - -<p>4. The accompanying Map shows the coloured lines -referred to in the following description, as also the reference -letters in blue.</p> - -<p>5. This plan is in outline only, and the various objective -lines and boundaries suggested are merely tentative, to form -the basis for a general plan.</p> - -<p>6. The Blue Line is the line of eventual exploitation for -the operations of September 18th.</p> - -<p>7. The present Corps front on the Blue Line extends -a distance of 6,000 yards. It is suggested, either that the -Corps front should be extended to a total frontage of 10,000 -yards, or that it should be side-slipped northwards to a -frontage of 6,000 yards. The latter would obviously be -preferable, so far as the Corps is concerned, as enabling all -its resources to be concentrated upon a smaller frontage.</p> - -<p>8. The major outlines of the plan are as follows:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(a) An attack by two American Divisions for the -capture of the Green Line.</p> - -<p>(b) A subsequent attack by two Australian Divisions -for the capture of the Red Line.</p> - -<p>(c) Exploitation by the Cavalry from the Red Line, -in an Easterly and north-easterly direction.</p> - -<p>(d) A turning movement by the Ninth Corps, through -Bellicourt and Nauroy to turn the Canal defences, -operating from north to south—or alternatively.</p> - -<p>(e) A turning movement by the Third Corps, operating -through Le Catelet northwards.</p></blockquote> - -<p>9. The details of the above plan will run on the following -lines:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(a) The new Corps front to be taken over at the -earliest possible moment by two American Divisions, -each Division deploying for this purpose only one -Regiment of one Brigade. This will place in Line six -Battalions on the Corps front, giving each Battalion -about 1,000 yards. These troops will hold the line -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[238]</a></span>defensively, and will, with the assistance of technical -troops, prepare the battle front.</p> - -<p>(b) The battle troops of the two American Divisions -will thus comprise three Regiments or nine Battalions -for each Division. The allocation of objectives to these -troops will be as follows:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(i) One Brigade (two Regiments) of the right -Division to advance 4,500 yards on a frontage of -3,000 yards. This Brigade (six Battalions) would -attack with four Battalions in Line (750 yards -frontage each) and two Battalions in support for -"mopping up" duties. Its principal objective, -apart from the main trench systems, is Bellicourt.</p> - -<p>(ii) Similarly, one Brigade (two Regiments) of -the left Division, with similar dispositions. Its -principal objective, apart from the main trench -systems, is Catelet.</p> - -<p>(iii) The odd Regiment of the right Division to -be responsible for forming the south defensive flank.</p> - -<p>(iv) The odd Regiment of the left Division to be -responsible for forming the north defensive flank.</p></blockquote> - -<p>(c) It will be noted that the Green Line has been -drawn so as to include all ground giving good observation -northward, eastward and southwards, and to -deny observation to the enemy. It is probable that -the Field Artillery barrage will not be able to penetrate -to the extreme limits of this proposed objective along -the whole battle front without moving forward some of -the batteries, particularly in the Northern Divisional -Sector. This will probably necessitate a halt of an -hour or an hour and a half, to enable Artillery to be -advanced.</p> - -<p>(d) Assuming that the battle opens about 6 a.m., the -Green Line should be reached by 10 a.m. or earlier. -By mobilizing ample resources in technical troops, -both American and Australian, and ample tools and -engineering material, it should be easily possible to -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[239]</a></span>construct not less than four roads, sufficiently developed -for horse transport, from the Blue Line to the Green -Line, by 2 p.m. These roads would be located so as -to make use of existing roads, and trench crossings -would be made by filling in with earth and not by -bridging. It is estimated, therefore, that Mobile -Artillery could move forward not later than 2 p.m. on -Zero day.</p> - -<p>(e) The Australian Infantry of two Divisions would -move at such an hour as would enable them to reach and -be deployed upon the Green Line by 2 p.m., shortly -after which hour they would be joined by the necessary -Mobile Artillery. This phase of the operation would -also involve the capture of the Beaurevoir Line. It is -assumed that Tanks would be available to deal with -the crossing of the wire entanglements covering this -line.</p> - -<p>(f) The completion of the defensive flanks would be -allocated to American troops.</p> - -<p>(g) As soon as the Australian Infantry had passed the -Green Line, the four American Regiments who had -participated in the capture of the Green Line, would -be concentrated, refitted and rested for operations -eastwards.</p></blockquote> - -<p>10. The following considerations should be kept in view, -in connection with this plan.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(a) There should be sufficient Field Artillery, not -merely to provide an effective barrage for the time-table -advance to the Green Line and its flanks, but also, -in addition, sufficient Mobile Field Artillery, not -employed in the barrage, to enable the Australian -Infantry to be provided with at least six Artillery -Brigades for the exploitation phase of the operation.</p> - -<p>(b) There should be at least 60 Tanks available -for the first phase, in order absolutely to guarantee -the breaching of the main Hindenburg trench systems. -There should, in addition, be available not less than -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[240]</a></span>30 Tanks to assist the Australian Infantry through -the Beaurevoir Line.</p></blockquote> - -<p>11. There should be a systematic destructive bombardment -of the whole of the Hindenburg trench system on the -battle front, lasting at least four days, in order not merely -to destroy the defensive organization, but also to demoralize -and starve the trench garrisons. This destructive bombardment -should extend a considerable distance to the -north and south of the battle front.</p> - -<p>12. The rapid construction of usable roads, both for -horse transport and mechanical transport, across the Canal -tunnel, would have to be a special feature of the organization, -so that the whole of our battle organization could be -rapidly carried forward to maintain the battle eastward of -the Red Line. This would involve the mobilization of a -large amount of mechanical transport, ready loaded with -road-stone, so that road-making can commence after Zero -hour without any delay. For these works, there would be -available the greater part of the Australian and American -technical troops of seven Divisions, as well as Army Troops -Companies.</p> - -<div class="right"> -<span class="smcap">John Monash</span>,<br /> -Lieut.-General.<br /> -Commanding Australian Corps.<br /> -</div> -</blockquote> - -<p>Some comment is necessary upon this proposal. The composition -of the American Divisions, following the French and not -the British precedent, differed materially from my own Divisions. -The American Division consisted of two Brigades, each of two -Regiments, each of three Battalions. Its total strength was -nearly double that of an English Division.</p> - -<p>It will be noted that my proposal involved a concentrated -attack, not upon the canal, but upon that sector of 6,000 yards -which lay over the Bellicourt-Catelet tunnel. This zone at that -time lay clear of and to the north of my Corps area, and that is -what involved the necessity of "side-slipping" the Corps front -to the north.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_240fp.jpg" width="1200" height="766" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>Mont St. Quentin—Collecting Australian wounded under the protection of the Red Cross flag, September 1st, 1918.</p></div> -</div> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_241fp.jpg" width="1200" height="765" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>An Ammunition Dump—established in Warfusee village on August 8th, 1918, after its capture the same morning.</p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[241]</a></span></p> - -<p>Moreover, I put forward no suggestion that the Canal sector, -then in front of me, should be the subject of a frontal attack at -all. My proposal was that it should be taken by envelopment, -through the breach to be made over the tunnel. At the time I -regarded it as unlikely that the deep canal itself could be stormed -except at great cost. I was not prepared to commit any Australian -troops under my command to such an enterprise, and -therefore naturally hesitated to propose that any other Corps -should attempt it. For this reason I submitted an alternative -plan of envelopment.</p> - -<p>This was, however, a matter for the Army Commander to -decide. My business was merely to show that the proposed action -of my own Corps permitted of the co-operation of the other Corps -of the Army in a specified way.</p> - -<p>General Rawlinson's decisions were given on September 19th, -at a conference which he assembled at my Headquarters. My -plan for the action of the Australian and American Corps was to -be adopted in its entirety, with the sole exception that the -capture of the Beaurevoir line, on the first day of battle, was not -to be included in the plan. It was to be left to await the results -of the prior stages. In this modification I could readily concur.</p> - -<p>As regards the action of the flank Corps, General Rawlinson -held the view that a direct assault on the canal itself ought to be -attempted, and that this should be entrusted to the Ninth Corps. -He was doubtless influenced, in this view, by the knowledge, -disclosed to us for the first time on that day, that he intended -to propose that the attack on the Hindenburg Line would, if -undertaken, extend over the front of at least three Armies, the -French on the south, and the Fourth and Third British Armies. -Such a simultaneous attack, over a very wide front, would -naturally increase the prospects of success for every Corps -participating.</p> - -<p>As to the Third Corps, it was to take part only in the preliminaries -of the battle, and not in the battle itself. Another -Corps, the Thirteenth (Lieut.-General Sir T. L. N. Morland) -was to join the Fourth Army. If the Australian Corps succeeded -in effecting the breach of the Hindenburg Line as I had proposed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[242]</a></span> -to do, it was to be the Thirteenth Corps, and not the Third Corps, -which, pouring through the breach, was to envelop the flank of -the Hindenburg Line towards the north.</p> - -<p>The main consideration that affected me was the approval of -my plan for the action of the two American and three Australian -Divisions. I was able to begin immediately the development -in detail of that plan, a task which proved at once the most -arduous, the most responsible, and the most difficult of any that -I have had to undertake throughout the whole of the war.</p> - -<p>The first step was to get the American Divisions into the line -opposite their prospective battle fronts, and the next was to hand -over what had hitherto been the Australian Corps front to the -Ninth Corps.</p> - -<p>The Ninth Corps battle front was to extend from Bellenglise to -Bellicourt, mine from opposite Bellicourt to opposite Le Catelet.</p> - -<p>The necessary troop movements and inter-divisional reliefs -required nearly a week for their completion. By the evening -of September 23rd, the last of the two Australian Divisions had -been relieved by the Americans and the Ninth Corps, and on that -night these stood on their respective battle frontages. I took over -command of this new front, thus manned by Americans, in the -forenoon of September 25th.</p> - -<p>It is a somewhat noteworthy circumstance, but one which -attracted no attention at the time, that between September -25th and September 29th, there was a period of five days during -which <i>no</i> Australian troops were in the front line in any part of -the French theatre of war. This was a situation which had never -arisen since the first contingent of Australians arrived from Egypt -in April, 1916. For nearly two and a half years, there had never -previously been a moment when some Australians had not been -confronting the enemy, somewhere or other in the long battle -front in France.</p> - -<p>I have said that I had been called upon to undertake the -responsibility of directing in a great battle two Divisions (the -27th and 30th) of United States troops, numbering altogether -some 50,000 men. These had been organized into a Corps, called -the Second American Corps, and commanded by Major-General G.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[243]</a></span> -W. Read. It was certainly anomalous that a whole organized -Corps should pass under the orders of a Corps Headquarters of -another nationality, but in authorizing such an arrangement, -General Rawlinson relied upon the good sense and mutual forbearance -of the Corps Commanders concerned.</p> - -<p>I am bound to say that the arrangement caused me no anxiety -or difficulty. General Read and his Staff most readily adapted -themselves to the situation. He established his Headquarters -quite close to my own, and gave me perfect freedom of action in -dealing direct with his two Divisional Commanders, so far as I -found it necessary to do so. Read was a man of sound common -sense and clear judgment, a reserved but agreeable and courteous -personality. His only desire was the success of his Divisions, and -he very generously took upon himself the role of an interested -spectator, so that I might not be hampered in issuing orders or -instructions to his troops. At the same time, I am sure that in his -quiet, forceful way he did much to ensure on the part of his -Divisional Commanders and Brigadiers a sympathetic attitude -towards me and the demands I had to make upon them.</p> - -<p>The Australian Corps had specialized in comprehensive and -careful preparations for battle. Its methods had been reduced to -a quite definite code of practice, with which every Staff Officer -and Battalion Adjutant had, by experience, become intimately -familiar. All this procedure was a closed book to the American -troops, and they were severely handicapped accordingly.</p> - -<p>I therefore proposed to General Read, and he gratefully -accepted, the creation of an "Australian Mission" to his Corps, -whose rôle would be to act as a body of expert advisers on all -questions of tactical technique, and of supply and maintenance. -This idea once accepted was worked out on a fully elaborated -scale.</p> - -<p>To the head of this Mission I appointed Major-General -Maclagan, not only to command the personnel of the Mission -itself, but also to live with and act as adviser to General Read's -own Staff. The Mission comprised a total of 217 men, chosen -from the First and Fourth Australian Divisions, and consisted of -specially selected and very experienced officers and N.C.O.'s.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[244]</a></span> -The American Corps Headquarters was provided with a Major-General, -assisted by one General Staff, one Administrative, one -Signal, one Intelligence, and one Machine Gun Staff Officer. -Each American Division had assigned to it an Australian -Brigadier-General, assisted by several Staff Officers; each American -Brigade had an Australian Battalion Commander and Signal -Officer; and so on down the chain. Each American Battalion, -even, had four highly expert Warrant or Non-commissioned -officers to advise on every detail of supply, equipment and tactical -employment of the troops.</p> - -<p>By such an arrangement it became possible to talk to the whole -American Corps in our own technical language. This saved me -and my Staff a vast amount of time and energy, because the -members of this Mission acted as interpreters of the technical -terms and usages customary in the orders and maps of the -Australian Corps, which were necessarily quite unfamiliar to the -American troops.</p> - -<p>Maclagan was a man eminently fitted for this task. In -appearance and in temperament he is every inch a soldier. Of -all my Divisional Commanders he was the only one who, immediately -before the war, was a professional soldier of the Imperial -Army. Although not Australian born, he was whole-heartedly -Australian, for he had spent some years as Director of Military -Training at the Royal Military College at Duntroon. On the outbreak -of war he received the command of the 3rd Australian Brigade, -and with it carried out the most difficult preliminary phase -of the landing on the Gallipoli peninsula. He commanded the -Fourth Australian Division from the autumn of 1917 until the -conclusion of hostilities. His characteristic attitude of mind, so -strongly in contrast to that of Rosenthal, was pessimistic. But -that was not because he looked for difficulties, but because he -preferred squarely to recognize and face all the difficulties there -were. Yet he never failed in performance, and invariably contrived -to do what he had urged could not be done. One could -not afford to take him at his own modest estimate of himself. -Both he and his Division always bettered any promise they -gave.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[245]</a></span></p> - -<p>I entertain no kind of doubt that it was only because of the -creation of this Australian Mission to the Americans, and of -Maclagan's tact, industry and judgment in controlling it, that the -combined action of the two Corps in the great battle of the closing -days of September proved as successful as it did. Under no other -conditions would it have been possible to bring about any reasonable -degree of co-operation between two forces whose war experiences, -outlook, attitude towards their problems, training and -temperament were so fundamentally different.</p> - -<p>It is not necessary to indulge in either a panegyric or a condemnation -of these American Divisions. Neither would be deserved -or appropriate. They showed a fine spirit, a keen desire to -learn, magnificent individual bravery, and splendid comradeship. -But they were lacking in war experience, in training, and in knowledge -of technique. They had not yet learned the virtues of -unquestioning obedience, of punctuality, of quick initiative, of -anticipating the next action. They were, many of them, unfamiliar -with the weapons and instruments of fighting, with the -numerous kinds of explosive materials, or with the routine of -preparing and promulgating clear orders. They seriously underrated -the necessity for a well-organized system of supply, particularly -of food and water, to the battle troops. They hardly, as -yet, appreciated the tactical expedients available for reducing -losses in battle.</p> - -<p>Yet all these shortcomings were the results only of inexperience, -and it is perhaps unfair to contrast them with the Australian -troops who had seen front-line service in France for two and a -half years continuously, and whose leaders, high and low, had -served a long and graduated apprenticeship in every branch of -their duties.</p> - -<p>The Australian Mission assisted greatly to minimize these -difficulties. Although its members were vested with no executive -powers, their advice and help were eagerly sought, and -zealously adopted. In many ways, large and small, their assistance -must have proved invaluable. How to interpret orders -from above and how to issue them to those below, how to draw -stores and how to distribute them, how to organize the signal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[246]</a></span> -service and how to ensure a flow of information—these ranked -among the greater matters. In quite small things also, help was -needed, such as the way to detonate mortar bombs, to equip the -infantryman for battle, to organize and use the messenger (<i>i.e.</i>, -runner) service, and to keep battle stations clear of people who had -no urgent business there.</p> - -<p>It is not, of course, intended to convey that all these defects -were present in every regiment. Some, however, were met with, -by the officers of the Australian Mission, in all of them.</p> - -<p>It greatly added to the burden cast upon the American Divisions -that they were called upon to fight almost as soon as they had -taken up duty in the line. The necessity for this was really a -legacy from the Third Corps, whom they had relieved, and it is -essential for an understanding of the course of events during these -days to narrate them in proper chronological order.</p> - -<p>I have explained that as the result of the battle of Hargicourt, -the Australian Corps had succeeded in mastering the whole of -the Hindenburg outpost line opposite its front, as far as a point -a little north of and opposite to Bellicourt. The advance of -the Third Corps, however, had failed to reach the same line, and -had stopped short of it by an average distance of nearly a thousand -yards. On my pointing out that the front I had taken -over did not comply with the stipulations which I had made -in my battle plan,<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> the Army Commander decided that prior -to the main attack, the northern of the two American Divisions -should make good this shortage, by an attack aiming at the -capture of the remainder of the Hindenburg outpost line opposite -the tunnel sector.</p> - -<p>I must now anticipate an explanation of the main outlines of -the plan which I had prepared for the great battle, by a brief -reference to the situation and disposition of troops on September -25th. The two American Divisions were respectively the 30th, -commanded by Major-General Lewis, on the right or south, -and the 27th, commanded by Major-General O'Ryan, on the -left or north, each lying on a frontage of three thousand yards. -These two Divisions comprised, in all, eight regiments, each of -three battalions. I had instructed each of them to place one -regiment in the line, and to keep the remaining three, <i>i.e.</i>, six -in all, in reserve, for the main operation.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[247]</a></span></p> -<p>My first Corps conference dealing with the forthcoming operations -was held at my Headquarters at Assevillers, on September -23rd. The American Generals Read, Lewis and O'Ryan, with -their respective Staffs, attended, as also did the Australian -Generals Maclagan, Brand and Mackay, who were members -of the Australian Mission to the American Corps. None of -the Australian Commanders destined to take part in the operations -attended on this day, for two reasons, firstly, because I -intended to confine myself entirely to that portion of the operation -which concerned the American troops only, and secondly, -because the date of the battle had not then been decided, and -I wished to run no risk of confusing executive action by any -premature announcements to the Australians, which subsequent -events might modify.</p> - -<p>The American rôle, had, however, sufficiently crystallized to -enable me to explain it to the assembled Generals in great detail. -As will subsequently appear, it was a plan which had, intentionally, -been reduced to the simplest possible elements. It -was to be a straightforward trench to trench attack, from a -perfectly straight "jumping off" line to a perfectly straight -objective line, under a dense Artillery and Machine-Gun barrage, -and with the assistance of a large contingent of Tanks.</p> - -<p>The advance was to be at a deliberate pace, and if due regard -were had to a few elementary precautions, should prove a simple -task for the American Infantry. It was, indeed, on quite -stereotyped lines, such as had so often carried the Australian -Infantry to victory in set-piece battles such as Messines, Broodseinde, -Hamel and the first phase of August 8th.</p> - -<p>It was, however, borne in upon me, very soon after this Conference -opened, that I was now confronted with quite a different -proposition from that to which I had been accustomed in the -conferences attended by my own Divisional Generals. The -exposition of the plan itself was brief and simple, but it elicited -such a rain of questions, that in the end I found myself compelled<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[248]</a></span> -to embark upon a very detailed exposition of the fundamental -principles of my battle practice.</p> - -<p>With blackboard and chalk, maps and diagrams, I had to -speak for more than three hours in an endeavour to explain -methods and reasons, mistakes and remedies, dangers and precautions, -procedures and expedients. The proceedings left me -with no doubt that the American Generals became fully informed -as to the tasks and duties allotted to them, and fully understood -them.</p> - -<p>In the light of after events, I am not so sure that they succeeded -in passing on the information to their subordinates—not -by reason of any shortcomings on their own part, for they impressed -me as able, strong men—but because their Divisions had -not yet learned the methods and machinery of effectively and -rapidly conveying instructions to large bodies of troops.</p> - -<p>In one particular, subordinate though vital, there certainly -was a serious failure to reach the troops. The enemy had, during -1916, met our assault tactics with an answer which proved -disastrously effective against us until we had learned how to -meet it. He provided his trench systems with many and roomy -shell-proof dug-outs. Whenever our barrage fell upon his -trenches, his garrisons promptly took cover in these dug-outs. -When our assaulting infantry reached the enemy trenches -they found but few of the enemy there, and they rushed headlong -forward to the next objective trenches. From out of their -dug-outs streamed the enemy, faced about, attacked our assaulting -lines in rear and withered them with fire. Many an attack -by the British on the Somme failed for just such reasons.</p> - -<p>In 1917 we evolved, and applied for the first time at the battle -of Messines, an effective answer to such tactics. Close on the -heels of our first line of assaulting troops came a second line, -whose rôle was to occupy the captured trench immediately, -and to "mop it up." This meant the killing or disarming of -all enemy found in hiding, the picketing of the entrances and -exits of all dug-outs, and laying siege to them until their occupants -surrendered, a course to which they were encouraged by -a liberal use of phosphorus bombs or Mills's grenades.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[249]</a></span></p> - -<p>This process of "mopping up" became an integral part of -our attack procedure. Australian infantry soon learned its -importance, and practised the method with a thoroughness and -efficiency to which I remember no exception. Even a junior -sergeant commanding a dozen men could be relied on to take -all measures necessary to ensure that no enemy was ever left -in hiding and unguarded behind his little party as they advanced.</p> - -<p>In the forthcoming attack upon the Hindenburg defences, -the process of "mopping up" became of supreme importance, -because of the very fact, of which we had become well aware, -that the whole defensive system had been provided, on quite -an exceptional scale, with underground shelters, galleries, -passages and dug-outs. I made the most of this knowledge in -my talks to the Americans, emphasized the dangers as strongly -as I was able, insisted that the "mopping up" organization of -their infantry must be absolutely perfected, and ordered that -of the total Infantry participating in the assault, not less than -one-half should have the special role of safeguarding all underground -exits and entrances.</p> - -<p>The great fear was, of course, that these new troops, eager to -show their mettle, would be carried away in the excitement of -the moment, and would rush headlong forward, regardless of -the dangers that lurked behind them. It is, after all, no small -demand to make upon the discipline of an Infantry soldier, to -expect him patiently and obediently to stand guard over some -dug-out entrance, allowing the battle to sweep on, and his comrades -to go forward to the excitement and glory of achieving the -final objectives.</p> - -<p>So indeed it happened. The American Infantry had either -not been sufficiently tutored in this important matter, or the -need of it had not penetrated their understanding. In the -attacks carried out by these troops, while under my command, -the "mopping up" was always badly done, even in the few -cases where it was attempted. The result was failure to achieve -a clean success, and a great addition to their own casualty list. -This criticism will be fully borne out by the narrative of the great -battle itself.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[250]</a></span></p> - -<p>A second and much larger conference was held at my Headquarters -on September 26th, for the really complete and final -co-ordination of the whole of the procedure for the forthcoming -battle. It was attended not only by the American Divisional -Generals and Brigadiers, but also by the Commanders of the -Second, Third and Fifth Australian Divisions, their Staffs, the -Tanks, Air Force and Cavalry.</p> - -<p>It was much the largest and was also destined to be the last -of any assemblage of Commanders that it had been my privilege -to call together in the course of this memorable campaign.</p> - -<p>No one present will soon forget the tense interest and confident -expectancy which characterized that meeting. America, -a great English-speaking democracy on one shore of the Pacific, -was to co-operate with Australia, its younger sister democracy -on the opposite shore, in what was the greatest and what might -be the most decisive battle of the great European War. Few -present doubted that, if we were successful, the war could not -last much longer—because the loss of the Hindenburg system -would inevitably mean for the enemy his final enforced withdrawal -from France.</p> - -<p>While the conference was in full swing, the Field Marshal -himself paid me a call. He had come to wish me success in the -task before me. He was interested to find so many Divisional -Commanders assembled, and was persuaded to address a few -words to the gathering.</p> - -<p>The conduct of the proceedings of this conference was a heavy -strain. The main battle was to take place on September 29th, -or within seventy-two hours, and part of my front line still stood -a thousand yards west of the Hindenburg outpost lines. General -Rawlinson had decided that this defect was to be made good -prior to the main operation, and the attempt to do so had been -timed to take place on September 27th, the day after the conference.</p> - -<p>I had, therefore, to complete my organization upon the basis -of a set of precedent conditions which had not yet been entirely -realized. It was a new and a difficult situation. The whole of -the powerful Artillery at my disposal for the battle, amounting<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[251]</a></span> -now to over a thousand guns, was naturally clamouring for final -decisions, so that final barrage maps could be submitted for my -approval, printed by my very diligent and competent body of -lithographic draughtsmen, and circulated to all the batteries -and Infantry.</p> - -<p>To await the result of the operation of the next day would -have allowed insufficient time to complete the necessary maps -and to distribute them before nightfall on September 28th. -There was no option but to assume that General O'Ryan (27th -American Division) would succeed in capturing the northern -section of the outpost line still in enemy hands, and upon that -assumption to fix the Artillery "start line" as falling to the east -of that objective. For the first time I had to gamble on a -chance. It was contrary to the policy which had governed -all my previous battle plans, in which <i>nothing</i> had been left to -chance.</p> - -<p>At 5.30 a.m. next morning the 27th American Division -carried out the attack, under a barrage, and assisted by Tanks. -The principal objective points in the trench system under attack -were Quennemont Farm and Gillemont Farm. Every trace of -these once prosperous homesteads and plantations had, of course, -long since disappeared. The names alone remained as memories -of the fighting there of 1917.</p> - -<p>What happened on that day will never be accurately known. -For once, the information from the air did not harmonize with -the claims made on behalf of the assaulting troops, perhaps -because the troops, being untrained in the use of flares, or having -been left unsupplied with them, failed to assist the aeroplanes in -identifying their correct positions. However that may be, it -became sufficiently clear, as the day proceeded, that no proper -success for the operation could be claimed.</p> - -<p>There remained no doubt that some enemy were still left in -occupation of trenches on our side of the objective for that day, -and such American troops as may have gained their objective -could not therefore be reached. It appeared afterwards that -small parties of Americans had reached the vicinity of their -objectives and had very gallantly maintained themselves there,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[252]</a></span> -although surrounded on all sides, until relieved by the Australians -on September 29th.</p> - -<p>The non-success of this operation of September 27th appeared -undoubtedly to be due to a failure to carry out "mopping up" -duties satisfactorily. It considerably embarrassed the preparations -for the main attack on the 29th. The knowledge -that a number of American wounded were still lying out in front, -and the suspicion that some of the American troops had succeeded -in reaching Gillemont Farm, precluded any alteration of -the Artillery plans for September 29th, even if there had still -been time to do so without creating untold confusion. To have -brought the Artillery start line, proposed for September 29th, -back to the start line of September 27th would have brought our -own barrage down upon these forward troops of ours.</p> - -<p>I hastened to the Army Commander to put the position before -him, stating that I felt grave concern for the success of the main -operation, in view of the fact that my Artillery barrage would -have to come down fully a thousand yards in front of what was -still the front of the 27th Division. I suggested a postponement -for a day to give this Division, which had ample resources in -troops, another opportunity of retrieving the position. He -explained, however, that it was now too late to alter the programme, -because three whole Armies were committed to the -date first appointed. He said that he was, under the circumstances, -quite prepared for a partial failure at this point, and -requested me to do my best to pursue the original plan, in spite -of this difficult situation.</p> - -<p>He agreed, however, to my further request, that additional -Tanks, out of Army reserves, should be placed at my disposal, -so that I might allot them to the 27th Division, to assist them -in passing over the thousand yards which would bring them up -level with the Artillery barrage. I hoped that this would enable -the Division to catch up with the southern half of the battle line.</p> - -<p>It was an unsatisfactory expedient, and gave no promise of -certain success. It proved futile, and gravely affected the -actual course, although not the ultimate success, of the battle -still to come. It was the only occasion in the campaign on which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[253]</a></span> -I was compelled to accept preliminary arrangements which were -not such as would absolutely guarantee success.</p> - -<p>The genesis of the difficulty thus created had, however, been -the failure of the Third Corps to complete their programme of -September 18th. It had been confirmed by the subsequent -failure of the 27th American Division to make up the deficiency -on September 27th. I still think, as I then urged, that I should -have been allowed to accept the situation as I found it on taking -over this front on September 25th, and that the 27th Division -should not have been called upon, at the eleventh hour, to -endeavour to establish that new situation which had been -originally assumed as the basis for the battle plan of September -29th. My original proposal of September 18th, in my letter of -that date, paragraph 3 (see above), had, of course, been made -before I could foresee that the Third Corps would fail to capture -the start line contemplated in my first plan.</p> - -<p>Of course, all is well that ends well. But, for an anxious and -turbulent period of twenty-four hours on September 29th and -30th, the issue of the battle hung in grave doubt. The operation, -although successful, did <i>not</i> proceed "according to plan" -in its entirety, and it was due to the wonderful gallantry and -skilful leading of the Third Australian Division that a very ugly -situation was retrieved, a result to which the Fifth Australian -Division also contributed in no small degree.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[254]</a></span></p> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_21" id="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> See paragraph 3 of same.</p></div></div> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER XV<br /> - -BELLICOURT AND BONY</h2> - - -<p>A full account of the battle plan for the forcing of the -main Hindenburg Line, on the front of the Australian -Corps, would alone fill a volume. Nothing but brief references -to the main outlines of the plan can be attempted here.</p> - -<p>The forces now at my disposal, for immediate use, were greater -than I had ever before committed to a single operation. They -comprised, in all, five Divisions, of which two were American -and three Australian, besides the whole of the Corps troops. -The total personnel employed on that occasion, under my orders -in one capacity or another, almost reached 200,000 men.</p> - -<p>Besides 58 Battalions of Infantry, there were over 20,000 -technical troops, including Engineers, Pioneers and Signallers, -upwards of 1,000 guns of all calibres, more than 500 Machine -Guns, over 200 Tanks, a Brigade of Cavalry, a Battalion of -Armoured Cars, and numerous Air Squadrons. The subsidiary -services made an imposing array, comprising observation -balloons, supply trains, ammunition columns, auxiliary horse -transport, ambulances, motor convoys and mechanical transport, -together with railway, veterinary, sanitary and labour units.</p> - -<p>It was no small task correctly to apportion to each fighting -unit and to each service its appropriate place in the general -scheme, so that these great resources should be employed to the -best advantage, without overtaxing the capacity of any one of -them. I had also to secure the greatest measure of co-operation -between them all, and the punctual performance by each of the -work prescribed.</p> - -<p>In contrast with the great battle of August 8th, there was on -this occasion no possibility of securing any advantage from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[255]</a></span> -surprise. The enemy command was bound to know quite as -well as we did that we intended to deliver an attack on a gigantic -scale, and there is no doubt that they put forth their utmost -efforts, and marshalled their fullest resources in men and guns, -to meet it.</p> - -<p>There was, therefore, no object to be served by any measures -of concealment, and our task could not be made any the harder -through heralding the approach of the actual attack by adequate -Artillery preparation.</p> - -<p>The programme, therefore, began on the night of September -26th. There was an intense Artillery action, extending over -some sixty hours, with every gun that could be brought to bear. -This does not, of course, imply that every individual gun or -battery remained in action during the whole of this period; -ammunition supplies were not inexhaustible, and gun detachments -required periods of rest. But the programme of times -and targets was so arranged, and the tasks were so distributed -over the available batteries, that throughout this period there -was no respite for the enemy in any part of the field.</p> - -<p>For some days prior to the opening of this bombardment, -railway trains and motor lorries had been working at the highest -possible pressure, to enable gunners to accumulate at their gun -pits and in all their dumps a sufficient supply of Artillery -ammunition for this purpose. In the short period which had -elapsed since the forcing of the Somme, in the early days of -September, the railway diversion from Bray to Péronne had -been completed. The railway from Péronne to Roisel, although -seriously damaged by the enemy in many places, had been -restored, and Roisel had become the railhead for the delivery -of ammunition. It was a noteworthy performance, for all the -Corps services concerned, to carry out the whole supply of this -battle in so smooth and expeditious a manner.</p> - -<p>The first phase of this bombardment was of a novel character. -For over two years the enemy had been using a shell containing -an irritant and poisonous gas known to us as "mustard" gas. -It was so called only because of the smell. For a long time we -had been promised that the British Artillery service would shortly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[256]</a></span> -be supplied with a gas shell, of similar character, but even more -potent. It was, moreover, anticipated that the German gas mask -would prove no adequate protection against this kind of gas.</p> - -<p>At last the new shell was forthcoming, and the first shipment -from England, amounting to some fifty thousand rounds, was -placed at the disposal of the Australian Corps. My Artillery -action, therefore, opened with a concentrated gas bombardment -for twelve hours, attacking probable living quarters, occupied -defences, and all known or suspected approaches to them. Apart -from being the first occasion, I believe that it was also the only -occasion during the war when our "mustard" gas shell was -used. No suitable opportunity for further use occurred before -the close of hostilities.</p> - -<p>The gas bombardment was followed by forty-eight hours' -destructive bombardment with high explosive shell. This was -directed partly against the enemy's Artillery, as far as the short -time available had permitted us to locate his batteries.</p> - -<p>Another part of the bombardment was devoted to the -approaches from the enemy's rear to his forward defences. The -object was to render his roads and tracks unusable, and thereby -to prevent the delivery of rations, or, at any rate, of hot food to -his garrisons, or of ammunition to his guns. By these means we -expected, by partially starving him out, to impair the enemy's -<i>moral</i>.</p> - -<p>The main weight of the bombardment was, however, devoted -to the destruction of the enemy's defences, of which his barbed wire -entanglements were for us the most formidable feature. -Much of this wire was disposed in concealed positions, either in -depressions of the ground, or in sunken moats, artificially prepared. -It was, therefore, difficult to locate, and still more -difficult for my gunners to direct their fire upon it. Nevertheless, -there was a considerable quantity of wire which was -plainly visible, and every band of entanglements through which -breaches could be blown was so much to the good, in clearing the -path for the Infantry assault.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_256fp.jpg" width="1200" height="775" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>Australian Light Horse—the 13th A.L.H. Regiment riding into action on August 17th, 1918.</p></div> -</div> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_257fp.jpg" width="1200" height="766" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>The Sniper sniped—an enemy sniper disposed of by an Australian Sharp-shooter, August 22nd, 1918.</p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[257]</a></span></p> - -<p>In earlier years it had been the custom to attack barbed wire -with our lighter guns, using shrapnel shell. This shell is, however, -essentially a "man-killing" projectile, and has no great -destructive power against field works. On the other hand, our -heavier guns were scarcely more useful for wire cutting, because -the great craters which were made by the explosion of their -shells destroyed the wire only very locally, and, by upheaving -the ground, increased rather than reduced the difficulties of the -Infantry.</p> - -<p>This was due to the employment of fuses, which permitted -the projectile, after striking, to bury itself in the ground for a -small fraction of time before igniting the explosive charge which -it contained. Hence the great shell craters. It was a very -proper fuse to use for destroying trenches, dug-outs, gun-pits and -emplacements, but of little use for cutting wire.</p> - -<p>In due course the British service evolved an "instantaneous" -fuse, which became known to the gunners as the "106 Fuse." -This had the merit of being perfectly safe to handle, up to the -moment of firing the gun, but by means of a most ingenious -mechanism it became highly sensitive while the projectile was -in flight between the gun and the target. The result was that -the very slightest obstacle met with, even a strand of wire, was -sufficient to set off the fuse and explode the shell. Even if the -shell met no obstacle before striking the earth, the explosion -would take place above instead of below the surface of the -ground, and would exert so great a horizontal force in all directions -that great bands of wire entanglements would be bodily -uprooted, over considerable areas, and literally blown to one -side in a jumbled mass.</p> - -<p>Our heavy guns, therefore, using 106 Fuses, became ideal wire -cutters, and it was in this way that much of the Artillery action -during the forty-eight hours prior to the battle was applied.</p> - -<p>The Infantry and Field Artillery plan, which I prepared, was -very similar in its general character to the battle plan of August -8th. It differed only in subordinate details due to local topographical -variations from the former conditions.</p> - -<p>Of the five Divisions available, one—the Second Australian—was -to remain in Corps reserve, but handy. For that purpose it -was brought up from its rest near Cappy, by motor bus, to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[258]</a></span> -vicinity of Péronne, the move being completed by nightfall on -September 27th.</p> - -<p>The battle Divisions and their prior dispositions were as -follows:</p> - -<p><i>Line Divisions:</i></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>On the right, the 30th American Division, to attack -with the 60th Brigade, and to employ the 59th Brigade -to form a southern defensive flank in the event of the -failure of the Ninth Corps to cross the Canal.</p> - -<p>On the left, the 27th American Division, to attack with -the 54th Brigade, and to employ the 53rd Brigade to form -a northern defensive flank, until such time as the Thirteenth -Corps was ready to pass through in a north-easterly -direction.</p></blockquote> - -<p><i>"Exploitation" Divisions:</i></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>On the right, the 5th Australian Division, with the -8th and 15th Brigades in the first line and the 14th Brigade -following in support.</p> - -<p>On the left, the Third Australian Division, with the -10th and 11th Brigades in the first line and the 9th -Brigade following in support.</p></blockquote> - -<p>The total frontage was equally divided between the two pairs -of Divisions, being about 3,500 yards to each. The battle was -to be divided into two phases, the first to be executed by the -Americans, under a timed barrage, the second, under open -warfare conditions, by the Australians. It was intended that -the Americans should penetrate to the "green line," an average -distance of 3,500 yards, which took in the villages of Bellicourt, -Nauroy, Bony and Gouy.</p> - -<p>The Australians were to exploit eastward, but were limited -to a further advance of 4,000 yards, overrunning Joncourt, -Estrées and Beaurevoir. Should they reach that objective on -the first day, they would have passed the last-known wired line, -and the country beyond would be suitable for Cavalry. Accordingly, -I allotted to the 5th Cavalry Brigade, which had been<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[259]</a></span> -placed under my orders, the rôle of passing through the Australian -Divisions, and carrying the exploitation still further -east, in the direction of Montbrehain and Brancourt.</p> - -<p>As it turned out, the whole of the objectives named were in -our possession only on the forenoon of October 5th, instead of, -as planned, by September 30th. The actual battle developed -on totally different lines from those which I had planned, for -reasons which I shall relate in due course. Little object would -therefore be served in an explanation of the considerable mass -of detailed arrangements which the original plan involved; -these would also, by reason of their technical character, be more -suitable for a text-book on tactics.</p> - -<p>Suffice it to say that elaborate arrangements were made—and -also partly utilized—for the rapid construction of four main -roads from west to east, through the full width of the Hindenburg -system. This work was to follow on the heels of the -advance. The rôles assigned to the Tanks, the Barrage Artillery, -the Mobile Artillery, the Heavy Artillery and the Armoured -Cars were similar in character, although differing in detail from -those carried out by them on August 8th.</p> - -<p>On no previous occasion had the labour of preparation and -the stress upon all Commanders and Staffs been so heavy, but -all responded nobly. There were none who did not count the -hours till zero hour, which was fixed for 5.50 a.m. on September -29th.</p> - -<p>In appraising the long sustained fighting on the front of the -Fourth Army which began on that day, and lasted a full week, -regard must be had to contemporary events. The American -First Army attack on St. Mihiel on September 11th had wrought -fresh dislocation to the enemy's resources, and had created another -sore spot on his long front. On September 26th the Americans -and French again successfully attacked between Verdun and -Rheims. On September 27th, the First and Third British Armies -opened a great attack on a front of thirteen miles before Cambrai -and the magnificent Canadian Corps captured Bourlon Wood -and advanced to within a mile of Cambrai city. On September -28th, the Second British Army and the Belgians attacked between<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[260]</a></span> -Ypres and the sea. All British Armies, except the Fifth, had, -therefore, by that time developed active battle fronts. On September -29th the first French Army would co-operate with us, -and on that day the battle front was to cover a total length of -twenty-five miles.</p> - -<p>The simultaneous engagement of so large a portion of the -enemy's line in Belgium and France during the preceding three -days had piled difficulty upon difficulty for him, and it was -therefore not unreasonable to entertain two expectations—firstly, -that our task would be rendered easier by the wide dispersion of -the enemy's defensive energies, and, secondly, that he could -hardly hope to survive a definite breach in his great defensive -line at so critical a place as the Bellicourt tunnel. If that went -he would be secure nowhere, and his next possibility of making a -stand would be on the line of the Meuse, even if not the line -of the Rhine.</p> - -<p>The day broke with a familiar mist, and the attack was -launched punctually at the appointed time. Quite early in the -day news came in that the Ninth Corps on my right hand had -achieved an astonishing success, that Bellenglise had been -captured, and that the deep canal had been successfully crossed -in several places. It was the 46th Imperial Division to which -this great success was chiefly due, a success achieved by most -careful preparation and gallant execution. Lifebelts, rafts, -boats, mats, portable bridges, and every device which ingenuity -could suggest had been prepared beforehand for the actual -crossing of the water in the canal. There can be no doubt that -this success, conceived at first as a demonstration to distract -attention from the Australian Corps front, materially assisted -me in the situation in which I was placed later on the same -day.</p> - -<p>The first reports from my own front were in every way satisfactory, -and it looked as if everything were going strictly to -schedule. That morning the stream of messages pouring into -my Headquarters office, from special observers, from the air, -from the line divisions, from the Artillery, and from my liaison -officers with neighbouring Corps, exceeded in volume and import<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[261]</a></span> -anything I had met with in my previous war experience. I have -the typewritten précis of the "inwards" signal traffic before me -as I write. Those received and laid before me on that day -cover thirty closely typewritten foolscap pages.</p> - -<p>The burden of the earlier messages all pointed to the same -conclusion: "30th Division crossed the Canal on time;" -"1,000 prisoners, all going well;" "Bony captured;" "Tanks -fighting round Bellicourt at 9 a.m.;" "Bellicourt taken."</p> - -<p>Those, omitting formal parts, were the burden of all the telegrams -up to 10 a.m. They continued in such a favourable strain -during the whole of the time that the two American Divisions -had command of the battle front.</p> - -<p>The time for their arrival at the first objective—<i>i.e.</i>, the -"green" line—had been computed to be at 9 a.m. The Australian -Divisions were to cross the green line at 11 a.m., and at -the same hour to take over the command on the front of the -battle. Two telegrams then came in which caused me serious -anxiety. It may be of interest to set them out in detail:</p> - -<p>Received at 11.10 a.m. from 30th American Division:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"Fighting in Bellicourt, owing to Germans having come -down along the Canal from the north. Fifth Australian -Division hung up."</p></blockquote> - -<p>Received at 11.12 a.m. from Third Australian Division:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"We are dug in on west side of tunnel. Americans are -held up in front of us."</p></blockquote> - -<p>These were only the first symptoms of a miscarriage of the -plans. Evidences rapidly multiplied that all was not going well. -But, concurrently, there came a stream of messages from the -air that our troops and some of our Tanks were east of both -Bellicourt and Le Catelet.</p> - -<p>The situation was therefore confused and uncertain, and it -had to be diagnosed without delay. I hastened forward with all -possible speed to get into personal touch with the situation and -the Divisional Commanders. I soon formed the conclusion that -probably both American Divisions had successfully followed our -barrage, and that numbers of their troops had really reached the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[262]</a></span> -green line, but that, once again, the "mopping up" procedure -had been neglected. The enemy had reappeared in strength -from underground <i>behind</i> the Americans, and was holding up -the advance of the two Australian Divisions to the second phase -of the operation.</p> - -<p>Subsequent developments and further inquiries entirely bore -out these conclusions. On the front of the 27th American -Division there had been difficulty from the start. A number -of Tanks allotted to that Division had been put out of action, -some by direct hits from Artillery, others by land mines. It -was currently believed that these were not enemy mines, but -some which had been laid months before by our own Fifth Army -as a measure of protection against the possible use of Tanks by -the enemy.</p> - -<p>This had given the 27th Division a bad start. Only two out -of its six assaulting Battalions had managed to catch up with -and follow the barrage. The remainder could not get forward as -far even as the Artillery start line. Those Americans who did -follow the barrage apparently forgot all about "mopping up." -They reached Le Catelet and Gouy and entered those villages, -only to find themselves surrounded on all sides by the enemy. -A German officer prisoner informed us next day that 1,200 of -these Americans had been taken prisoner.</p> - -<p>The 30th American Division did not fare so badly. They got -a good start with the barrage, but the broken condition of the -ground, the intricate trench system and the confusion of wire -and dug-outs brought about a loss of cohesion and of control. -By the time Bellicourt was reached, the attacking troops had -fallen some distance behind the barrage, and most of the weight -had gone out of the attack.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, in this part of the field also, the enemy had -reappeared from underground, and was still in strength on the -west side of Bellicourt, now in the hands of the Americans, -when the advanced guard of the Fifth Australian Division came -upon them.</p> - -<p>It was an unexpected situation for the Fifth Division. But -without a moment's hesitation the leading troops took its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[263]</a></span> -measure. They deployed from the Artillery formation<a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> in which -they had been previously advancing into lines of skirmishers. -After hard fighting in the face of most vigorous resistance, they -cleared away all opposition which lay between them and Bellicourt, -and, sweeping forward through that village, carefully -"mopping up" as they went, carried with them considerable -numbers of the Americans whom they found there.</p> - -<p>While this was happening, the Third Australian Division, -deprived of the assistance either of Artillery or of Tanks, and -in broad daylight, found themselves confronted with the difficult -problem of carrying out the whole of the task which had -been set for the 27th Division, because the reappearance of the -enemy upon the ground successfully passed over by some of -the Americans earlier in the day nullified all the value of that -success.</p> - -<p>It was about 2 p.m. before I had succeeded in gathering sufficient -reliable information about the situation to enable me to -arrive at a decision how to deal with it. By that hour the Fifth -Division had advanced through Nauroy, and had passed across -the Le Catelet line in that vicinity. The Third Division had -managed to get obliquely astride of the line of the tunnel, its -right being well across the main Hindenburg wire, while its left -was still in the vicinity of the American start line of that morning. -They had, however, succeeded in finally capturing Quennemont -Farm. The whole of their advance into such a position had -been hotly contested.</p> - -<p>My troops were therefore, to all intents and purposes, astride -of the Hindenburg main line, one Division wholly on the east -and the other Division mainly on the west of it. The southern -end of the tunnel was in my possession, the northern end was -not.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[264]</a></span></p> -<p>My decision was forthwith to abandon the original plan -which had taken so many days and so much labour to prepare, -to take immediate measures for securing our gains for the day, -and to organize a continuation of the battle next day on totally -different lines. These were to conquer the remainder of the -main Hindenburg trench system, in which the ruin of the village -of Bony was the key position, by attacking it from the south -towards the north, instead of from the west towards the -east.</p> - -<p>The first step in this plan was to ensure effective tactical -contact between the right flank of the Third Division and the -left flank of the Fifth Division. I framed an order that both -Divisions should take immediate steps to such an end. Telephone -communication with both Gellibrand and Hobbs being -momentarily interrupted, I was about to forward written orders -by dispatch rider to each of them to the effect mentioned.</p> - -<p>Before the messenger had time to leave, however, messages -came in from both Divisional Commanders, each reporting that -he had just secured tactical touch with the other in exactly the -way which I wanted. I consider this a remarkable example of -unity of thought. Each, without being able to consult the other -or myself, had taken the very course which each correctly anticipated -that I should decide to have taken. The German -General Staff used to boast in their writings that no other Army -approached theirs in this capacity for initiative by subordinates -on lines in thorough unison with each other and with the -policies of the higher command.</p> - -<p>That the situation on my front, now held exclusively by -Australians, would have been secure that night against a determined -counter-attack I did not doubt, even though the fourteen -Australian Battalions now holding a line of some 9,000 yards -would scarcely average 400 rifles apiece. However, nothing -more than small local counter-attacks was attempted, and the -hold which I had gained upon the main defences was not -slackened. I feel sure, nevertheless, that the success of the -Ninth Corps on my right in swarming across the canal from -Bellenglise to Bellicourt had much to do with my immunity -from interference; the enemy probably found himself with quite -enough to do there in trying to re-establish his line further in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[265]</a></span> -rear, and this forbade him to materialize sufficient troops for -any general counter-attack.</p> - -<p>While I have felt obliged to state the facts in regard to the -partial failure of the two American Divisions to carry out their -part of my battle plan, I desire, nevertheless, to do full justice -to these troops. I have no hesitation in saying that they fought -most bravely, and advanced to the assault most fearlessly; -that the leaders, from the Divisional Generals downwards, did -the utmost within their powers to ensure success. Nor must the -very bad conditions under which the 27th Division had to start -be forgotten. Our American Allies are, all things considered, -entitled to high credit for a fine effort.</p> - -<p>But it is, nevertheless, true that in this battle they demonstrated -their inexperience in war, and their ignorance of some -of the elementary methods of fighting employed on the French -front. For these shortcomings they paid a heavy price. Their -sacrifices, nevertheless, contributed quite definitely to the -partial success of the day's operations, and although the comprehensive -plan, which was to have carried my front beyond -Beaurevoir on the very first day, had to be abandoned, the day's -fighting ended with the two Australian Divisions in quite a -satisfactory position for a continuance of the operations on the -next day.</p> - -<p>To this there was, however, one important qualification. -Air observers continued to report the presence of American troops -between the Hindenburg Line and Le Catelet, and also in the -latter village. Late that night an Australian Artillery liaison -officer managed to make his way back into our lines with the -story that he had actually advanced with a battalion of -Americans into Le Catelet, and that they were still there, although -practically surrounded.</p> - -<p>The 27th Division made many attempts to get into communication -with them, but without avail. Beyond the report -previously alluded to that they had subsequently been made -prisoner, I have no information of their ultimate fate; but -when patrols of the Third Division entered the village forty-eight -hours later, there was no longer any sign of them. A<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[266]</a></span> -number of small parties of Americans were, however, encountered -and relieved as the further advance of the Third Division progressed -during the next two days.</p> - -<p>The situation was profoundly embarrassing. With the mass -of Artillery at my disposal, it would have been a simple matter -to cover the further advance of the Third Division so amply as -to make it easy to master the northern half of the tunnel -defences, especially if attacked end on. But so long as American -troops or wounded were presumed to be lying out in front, I -dared not use Artillery at all, except on a very restricted scale. -I felt justified, however, in bombarding isolated localities which -patrols had definitely ascertained to be still in enemy hands; -but nothing in the shape of adequate artillery support to the -Infantry could be attempted.</p> - -<p>During the night of September 29th orders were issued to the -Second American Corps to withdraw all advanced troops that -could be reached, and to concentrate their regiments for rest -and reorganization, so as to be ready as soon as possible for -re-employment. Very considerable numbers of American soldiers -had become mixed up with the Australian Battalions, and, -in their eagerness, had gone forward with them, regardless of -the particular rôles or objectives which had been originally -assigned to them. It was found to be a matter of some difficulty -to induce these men to withdraw from the fighting and to rejoin -their own units, so keen were they to continue their advance.</p> - -<p>I also ordered the Second Australian Division to be brought -up by bus from the Péronne area, and to take up a position of -readiness just west of the Hindenburg Line. I foresaw that -with the nature of the fighting before the Third and Fifth Divisions, -it would not be very long before they would have to be -relieved, and there was still the Beaurevoir line of trenches to -be overcome before the Hindenburg system could be claimed -as taken in its entirety. This move was duly carried out, and -the Second Division became available by the evening of October -1st in close support of the battle front.</p> - -<p>The orders to the two line Divisions for September 30th were -to attack generally in a north-easterly direction. The immediate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[267]</a></span> -objectives of the Third Division were Bony village, the "Knob" -and the northern entrance to the tunnel. The flanks of the -two Divisions were to meet on the Railway Spur, and the right -of the Fifth Division was to swing forward in the direction of -Joncourt, in sympathy with any advance made by the Ninth -Corps to the south of them.</p> - -<p>There was, as explained, no possibility of attempting anything -like a methodical advance covered by a co-ordinated -Artillery barrage. Progress would depend upon the tenacity and -skilful leading of the front-line troops, and reliance must be had -more upon the bayonet and the bomb than upon external aids. -It was, in a peculiar degree, a private soldier's battle.</p> - -<p>The night of September 29th brought steady rain, and everybody -was drenched to the skin. September 30th was a day of -intense effort, slow and methodical hand-to-hand fighting, in a -perfect tangle of trenches, with every yard of the advance -vigorously contested; but by nightfall the line of the Third -Division had advanced fully 1,000 yards. Its left had pivoted -on the "Knoll," to the west of the Hindenburg Line. Gillemont -Farm was by then securely in their hands; they had reached -the southern outskirts of Bony village. Their right was well -across the line of the canal, and joined the left flank of the Fifth -Division on the Railway Spur. The Fifth Division had cleared -the Le Catelet trench line of the enemy, and its right was by -now well to the east of Nauroy.</p> - -<p>Another day's fighting was still before both Divisions, but the -effect of the successful efforts of September 30th was speedily -felt on October 1st. Overnight the enemy must have made -up his mind that it was hopeless to try to retain any further -hold upon the tunnel line, and his further resistance melted -rapidly away. On October 1st events moved quickly; by 10 -a.m. the Fifth Division reported the capture of Joncourt. -By midday the whole of the village of Bony was in our hands, -and at the same hour the air observers reported our patrols -rapidly approaching the "Knob" and Le Catelet village.</p> - -<p>By nightfall of October 1st the whole operation had been -successfully completed. The northern entrance to the tunnel,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[268]</a></span> -the "Knob" and the whole of the Railway Spur were in our -hands; our line ran just west of Le Catelet and east of Estrées -and Joncourt; all isolated parties of Americans and all -American wounded had been gathered in, and the whole situation -had been satisfactorily cleared up from an Artillery point of -view.</p> - -<p>Later the same night our patrols entered Le Catelet, which -lay in a hollow below us, and found the village deserted except -for a number of enemy wounded. The enemy, during that day, -relinquished his last hold upon the famous tunnel defences, and -withdrew precipitately eastwards to the Beaurevoir hill and -northwards towards Aubencheul. Our total captures during -the three days' operations amounted to 3,057 prisoners and -35 guns.</p> - -<p>It had been a stiff fight, and the endurance of the Infantry -had been highly tested. The skill displayed by the Third Division -in the course of the close trench fighting of September 30th -was particularly noteworthy. The stress upon Major-General -Gellibrand and his Staff and Infantry Brigadiers had been severe. -The several Brigades and Battalions had unavoidably become -seriously mixed up. Control became very difficult, but was -never completely lost.</p> - -<p>This was illustrated by the following incident of the day's -fighting. I had ascertained that the whole of the Infantry of -the Division had been committed, and there were no reserves -in the hands of the Divisional Commander. One Battalion of -the 9th Brigade was fighting under the orders of the 11th Brigade, -another under that of the 10th Brigade. I took exception to -this, and directed that a Divisional reserve should be immediately -reconstituted. In spite of the difficulties of communication, -Gellibrand contrived to carry this intricate order into effect -during the very climax of the fight.</p> - -<p>Gellibrand was a man of interesting personality, more a philosopher -and student than a man of action. His great personal -bravery and his high sense of duty compensated in a great -measure for some tendency to uncertainty in executive action. -He had been a professional soldier, but before the war had retired<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[269]</a></span> -into civil life. When the call came, he received a junior Staff -appointment with the First Division, but his outstanding merits -soon gained him promotion. As a Brigadier, he had, during -1916 and 1917, successfully led several of the Australian Brigades. -His command of the Third Division during the last five months -of active fighting was characterized by complete success in -battle. His temperament and methods sometimes involved -him in embarrassments on the administrative side of his work; -but he succeeded in retaining to the last the whole-hearted -confidence of his troops.</p> - -<p>I feel certain from my close observation of the course of events -on September 30th and October 1st, that much of the success -of the battle was due to Gellibrand's personal tenacity, and the -assiduous manner in which he kept himself in personal touch -from hour to hour with the forward situation and progress of -his troops.</p> - -<p>Immediately upon the conclusion of the fighting I issued the -following message:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"Please convey to all Commanders, Staffs and troops -of the Third and Fifth Australian Divisions my sincere -appreciation of and thanks for their fine work of the past -three days. Confronted at the outset of the operations -with a critical situation of great difficulty, and hampered -by inability to make full use of our Artillery resources, -these Divisions succeeded in completely overwhelming a -stubborn defence in the most strongly fortified sector of the -Western Front. This was due to the determination and -resource of the leaders and the grit, endurance and fighting -spirit of the troops. Nothing more praiseworthy has been -done by Australian troops in this war."</p></blockquote> - -<p>The operations entrusted to the Corps had, by the night of -October 1st, been substantially completed. Although the Beaurevoir -defence line still lay to the east of us, the main canal -defences, as far as the Le Catelet line, had been pierced, and -a way had been opened for the Thirteenth Corps to pass across -the line of the tunnel to be launched upon its task of turning the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[270]</a></span> -enemy out of the northern continuation of the Hindenburg Line -by envelopment from the south.</p> - -<p>It was impossible to call upon the Third and Fifth Divisions -for any further effort. Their work had been most exhausting. -Furthermore, the steady drain upon their resources, after sixty -days of almost continuous battle activity, had so reduced their -fighting strength, that a very drastic reorganization had become -necessary. This could only be effected by a complete withdrawal -from the fighting zone.</p> - -<p>Accordingly, arrangements were put in hand for the immediate -relief of these two Divisions. The Fifth Australian was relieved -by the Second Australian Division, and the Third Australian -Division by a Division of the Thirteenth Corps. Both the -relieved Divisions, in the course of the next few days, followed -the First and Fourth Australian Divisions into the grateful -rest area which had been provided to the west and south-west -of Amiens, and before they were again called upon for further -front-line service hostilities had ended.</p> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_22" id="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> "Artillery Formation" is an advance in numerous small infantry columns -irregularly spaced both in frontage and depth. "Line of Skirmishers" is an -advance in successive lines of men, the intervals between the men being from -two to five paces, and between the lines from 50 to 100 paces.</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[271]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER XVI<br /> - -MONTBREHAIN AND AFTER</h2> - - -<p>The successive withdrawals of the First, Fourth, Third -and Fifth Australian Divisions from the battle zone -during the period from September 22nd to October 2nd had -been arranged with the Fourth Army Commander about the -middle of September. The Corps had been continuously -employed on front-line duty since April, and had already accomplished -a considerable advance, for every inch of which it had -been obliged to fight.</p> - -<p>This consideration alone had earned for the Corps a period -of rest. But other important questions arose which affected -the situation.</p> - -<p>I have mentioned that early in 1918 all Brigades of the -Imperial Service had, owing to failing man-power, been reduced -from four to three Battalions each. In this reduction the -Australian Brigades participated only to a small extent during -the fighting period. Every one of the Australian battalions had -created great traditions; regimental <i>esprit</i> and pride of unit -were very strong. The private soldier valued his Battalion -colour patch almost more than any other decoration.</p> - -<p>My predecessor in the Corps Command had, during May, 1918, -directed the disbandment of one Battalion each of the 9th, 12th -and 13th Brigades. This was due to the wastage resulting from -the heavy fighting by these Brigades on the Villers-Bretonneux -front. The residues of the disbanded battalions were used as -drafts to replenish the remaining three Battalions of each -Brigade. It was doubtless a measure directed by necessity, as -the flow of reinforcements was steadily diminishing.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[272]</a></span></p> - -<p>Much lamentation was, however, caused among the officers -and men who thus lost their battalion identity, both among -those remaining in the field and those convalescing from wounds -and sickness, who were thereby deprived of the hope of rejoining -their former units.</p> - -<p>Through all these events I became fully alive to the difficulties -which would present themselves when the evil day -should arrive on which the fate of still other battalions would -have to be decided. It was a day whose advent I was anxious -to stave off until the last possible moment.</p> - -<p>Throughout the summer and autumn it became incumbent -upon me to keep a close watch upon the fighting strengths of all -the 57 Australian Infantry Battalions in the field. I had to -consider the numbers actually present with the unit, the numbers -likely to join from time to time from convalescent camps and -hospitals, and the flow of new recruits from the Australian -Depots in England. Almost daily forecasts had to be made as -to the probable strengths available on a given date in all the -Battalions likely to be employed in a given operation.</p> - -<p>The full official strength of a Battalion of Infantry was 1,000 -at the outbreak of the war, but a reduction to 900 had been -authorized in July, 1918. No battalion in the Army was ever -for long able to maintain itself at a strength of 900. Indeed, -experience went to show that so long as the strength did not fall -below 600, a unit could quite well carry out, in battle, a normal -battalion task, provided that frequent periods of short rest -could be assured.</p> - -<p>Towards the middle of September, 1918, the successful course -of the fighting, and the moderate rate of net wastage—by which -I mean the excess of battle losses over replenishments from the -rear—had convinced me that there was every reason to hope -that the strengths of the 57 battalions could be maintained at -a useful standard until the end of the campaigning season of -that year. If the war were to go on into 1919, and provided that -the Australian Corps could be kept out of the line over the -three winter months, thereby avoiding the daily wastage of -trench duty, I felt able to guarantee that by the spring of 1919 -the whole of these battalions would again have become replenished -to a sufficient extent for a spring campaign.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/map-h.jpg" width="1200" height="911" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">Map H</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[273]</a></span></p> - -<p>It may have been an optimistic view; it may have savoured -of a desire to postpone the evil day. But I felt assured that the -disbandment of a number of additional battalions would seriously -impair the fighting spirit of the whole Australian Corps. I was -prepared to take the chance of being able to carry on until the -end of 1918 with the whole 57 battalions retained intact.</p> - -<p>But I was not permitted to do so. At various times during -the period June to August, 1918, an unimaginative department -at G.H.Q. kept harassing me with inquiries as to when it was -proposed to conform to the new Imperial organization in which -all Brigades were to be reduced to three Battalions each. These -inquiries were at first ignored, but early in September the -Adjutant-General became insistent for a reply.</p> - -<p>I set out the whole position as I saw it, and strongly urged a -postponement of the question until the Corps should have completed -the vitally important series of fighting operations on which -it was then engaged. Looking back upon the course of events -of that time, it is hardly credible now that, having regard to -the reasons given, these representations should have been ignored. -I procrastinated. Suddenly I received instructions from the -War Office that some 6,000 men of the Corps, who had served -continuously since 1914, were to be given six months' furlough -to Australia, and that they were to be held in readiness to -entrain en route for Australia at forty-eight hours' notice.</p> - -<p>These orders were received only two days before the battle of -Hargicourt. The First and Fourth Divisions, destined to fight -in that battle, were those most affected by such a withdrawal of -men, because these Divisions contained the battalions and -batteries which had been longest in the field. I could not, -obviously, take up any attitude which would postpone the -well-earned furlough of these veterans; nor had I the smallest -inclination to do so. My case against the main proposal for an -immediate extinction of additional battalions, was, however, -weakened thereby.</p> - -<p>The responsible authorities overruled my objections, and on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[274]</a></span> -September 19th I received peremptory instructions to disband -eight additional battalions forthwith. With many misgivings, -I had no option but to comply. I called my Divisional Commanders -together, and with them decided which battalions should -suffer extinction.</p> - -<p>It was a difficult choice, and created a situation of great -difficulty. The whole of the personnel affected raised a very -subordinate but none the less determined protest. One battalion -after another very respectfully but very firmly took the stand -that they did not wish to disband, and would prefer not to fight -as dismembered and scattered portions of other battalions.</p> - -<p>This attitude, perhaps, bordered upon insubordination, but -it was conceived for a very worthy purpose. It was a pathetic -effort, and elicited much sympathy from the senior Commanders -and myself.</p> - -<p>On the eve of the great operations for the overthrow of the -Hindenburg Line I found myself, therefore, in a sea of troubles, -and threatened with the possibility of internal disaffection. To -outsiders who could have no understanding of the situation -this might imperil the fair fame and prestige of the Australian -Army Corps.</p> - -<p>Up to this stage the Fourth Army Commander had been in no -way concerned in the matter. The pressure upon me had come -from the War Office and the Adjutant-General's Department. -Lord Rawlinson's interests, however, now became vitally -involved. I submitted the whole position to him. I pointed out -how inopportune the time was for risking trouble of this nature. -The order for disbandment, having been given, must of course -stand, and obedience must be insisted upon; but a postponement -of further action for fourteen days was desirable, if the opportunity -of a decisive blow against the enemy was not to be imperilled -by an impairment of the fighting spirit and goodwill of -the Australian Corps.</p> - -<p>Rawlinson accepted my views in their entirety, and used his -authority and influence with the Commander-in-Chief. A postponement -of action was authorized, and all the Battalions which -had been threatened with extinction, with one exception, were -permitted to remain intact during the remainder of the fighting -period. The exception was made in the case of the 59th and -60th Battalions (of the 15th Brigade), whose men most loyally -made no demur at the immediate amalgamation of the two -battalions for the purposes of the forthcoming operations.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_274fp.jpg" width="1200" height="769" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>German Prisoners—captured at the battle of Chuignes, August 23rd, 1918.</p></div> -</div> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_275fp.jpg" width="1200" height="773" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>Captured German Guns—Park of Ordnance captured by the Australians during August, 1918.</p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[275]</a></span></p> - -<p>By the end of September, therefore, three separate factors -were operating to make a short withdrawal of the Corps from -the battle zone desirable.</p> - -<p>These were, the long unbroken period of line service, the -orders for the reorganization of the Brigades on a three-Battalion -basis, and the granting of Australian furlough to the veterans.</p> - -<p>These were the reasons which brought about the decision that -the whole of the Australian Corps should be sent for a period of -rest in a coastal area as soon as the battle operations on which -it had embarked had been brought to a successful conclusion.</p> - -<p>Those operations were, on October 1st, almost completed. -Only the Beaurevoir line still remained to be mastered, and -the Second Australian Division, which had been resting since -its successes at Mont St. Quentin, was available to undertake -that task. For the next three days the Australian Corps became, -therefore, reduced to only one Division (the Second Australian) -in the line, with the 27th and 30th American Divisions in support.</p> - -<p>The Second Division occupied the night of October 1st and -the greater part of October 2nd in the process of taking over -line duty from the Fifth Division, and in preparing for an attack -timed for the next morning upon the Beaurevoir defences. I -handed over the northern part of what had been the Australian -Corps front, on the day previous, to the 50th Division (of the -Thirteenth Corps), which had by now effected the passage of -the tunnel line, and had deployed upon my left, facing north -and north-east.</p> - -<p>After these adjustments were made, the Corps front, on the -night of October 2nd, extended from Mont St. Martin through -the eastern outskirts of Estrées and Joncourt, where I joined -with the 32nd Division (now belonging to the Ninth Corps). -It was a frontage of nearly 6,000 yards, an extraordinary length -for the battle front of a single Division. Our line lay parallel to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[276]</a></span> -and about 1,000 yards to the west of the Beaurevoir line, and the -attack for next day was designed to be delivered in a north-easterly -direction. If the Beaurevoir line itself were captured, -the attack was to be pushed on beyond, in the endeavour to -sweep the enemy off the prominent hill on which was situated -the village of Beaurevoir. Concurrently the Thirteenth Corps -would attack Prospect Hill, lying to the north-east of Gouy -village.</p> - -<p>The Beaurevoir line was a fully-developed defensive system, -with front, support and communication trenches, thoroughly -traversed, well wired in, and still in good condition. In 1917 -it would have been considered impossible to capture such a line -of defence by such a force on such a frontage.</p> - -<p>The Second Division deployed two of its Brigades, the 5th -on the right and the 7th on the left, with the 6th Brigade in -reserve. The 5th Tank Brigade, now greatly reduced in -numbers, and some Whippet Tanks co-operated in the attack. -The assault was launched at 6.5 a.m. under a Field Artillery -barrage. Considerable opposition was met with. The trenches -were found strongly held, particularly with machine guns, and -the uncut wire seriously impeded the Infantry.</p> - -<p>The frontal attack of the 5th Brigade, nevertheless, achieved -almost immediate success, although in some parts of the line -there were centres of resistance which had to be enveloped before -they yielded. The performance of the Tanks on this day was -disappointing. Most of the heavier Tanks were disabled by -Artillery fire, while the Whippets found the Beaurevoir trench -lines too wide to straddle. Nevertheless, the spirited action of the -Artillery made up for the loss of the assistance of the Tanks, -and by 11 a.m. the whole of the Beaurevoir line in front of the -5th Brigade had been captured.</p> - -<p>Further to the north, the 7th Brigade found the trenches -almost end on to the direction of their advance, and the battle -here speedily took on the form of pure trench fighting with bomb -and bayonet, a type of fighting in which the Australian excels. -Steady progress northwards was made.</p> - -<p>The whole of the Beaurevoir line over the full extent of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[277]</a></span> -Corps front was taken before midday, and although already -very tired, the assaulting Brigades pushed on beyond, to the -ascent of the Beaurevoir spur. On a knoll at its south-western -extremity stood the stone base of the now wrecked Beaurevoir -Mill, a prominent landmark visible for miles.</p> - -<p>The spur and the vicinity of the Mill were found to be strongly -held, probably by fugitives driven out that morning from the -Beaurevoir trenches. The weight of our attack spent itself on -the slopes of the spur. The 6th Brigade was therefore launched -at Beaurevoir Mill and village. Although some portion of our -attack passed the Mill and reached the village, our available -Infantry strength was not sufficient to mop it up satisfactorily, -and the Brigadier decided to establish for the night a secure line -about 1,000 yards south-west of the village.</p> - -<p>The total captures by the Second Division on this day exceeded -a thousand prisoners and many machine guns—an astonishing -performance for three weak brigades, fighting under open and -exposed conditions.</p> - -<p>The attack on Beaurevoir hill had been undertaken chiefly to -keep the enemy engaged and on the move, while an additional -Division of the Thirteenth Corps could be brought across the -line of the tunnel and deployed into the battle line. The direction -of the attack had been to the north-east. It now became -necessary to readjust the general easterly line of advance by -redistributing the Army front between the three Corps now in -line. The greater part of October 4th was occupied in carrying -out these arrangements, and the Second Division availed itself of -the period to improve its line and the positions of parts of it by -local attacks and the capture of tactical points along its front. -On this day the Division gathered in a further 800 prisoners and -five guns.</p> - -<p>By nightfall on October 4th the Corps front, now reduced to -4,000 yards, ran generally north and south, well east of Wiancourt -and just east of Ramicourt. The task of the Second Division -and of the Australian Corps was completed, and in pursuance -of arrangements previously made, the initial steps were -taken on that day to hand over the Australian Corps front to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[278]</a></span> -27th and 30th American Divisions, which had, in the days intervening -since September 29th, been reorganized and rested. They -were to be given a place in the front battle line under the direct -orders of their own Corps Headquarters (General Read).</p> - -<p>To cover the interval of time necessary to enable the first of -the American Divisions (30th) to move up into line, General -Rawlinson desired me to retain control of the battle front for -one day longer, and avail myself of the time to make an endeavour -to advance our line still further to the east.</p> - -<p>I selected as a suitable objective the village of Montbrehain, -which stood on a plateau that dominated any further advance.</p> - -<p>The Second Division was instructed to carry out this attack -early on October 5th, and I allotted to them one company of -Tanks, which was all that could be materialized in fighting trim -at such short notice.</p> - -<p>Rosenthal launched his attack at five minutes past six in the -morning of October 5th. It was the 6th Brigade which led it. -The village was full of machine guns, but the gallant Brigade -dashed in with the bayonet, and methodically worked its way -through the village to its eastern outskirts. A counter-attack -developed about noon, and for a time about 400 yards of ground -had to be yielded, but our foremost line was speedily restored -with the assistance of a battalion of the 5th Brigade.</p> - -<p>By nightfall our line ran completely around the eastern outskirts -of the village of Montbrehain, the whole of which was -in our possession. We took from it over 600 prisoners belonging -to nine different German regiments.</p> - -<p>What was even more interesting was that we came for the -first time in the war upon French civilians, who had been under -the domination of the enemy since the autumn of 1914. These -unfortunate folk were found hidden away in cellars and underground -shelters, and their joy at their deliverance from foreign -bondage was pathetic. It was evident that the enemy had not -had time to carry out the evacuation of the civilians, as had been -his practice throughout the whole area over which the Australian -Corps had hitherto advanced.</p> - -<p>By the night of October 5th the Corps had, by the victory of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[279]</a></span> -Montbrehain, advanced its line to a point six miles to the east -of the Bellicourt Tunnel, and had thereby confirmed the irretrievable -collapse of the whole of the Hindenburg defences.</p> - -<p>This achievement is, above everything else, an illustration, -which should become classic, of the maxim that in war the -<i>moral</i> is to the material as three to one. The enemy had all the -advantages of position, of carefully prepared field works, of -highly-organized defences, of detailed acquaintance with our -lines of approach from the west, and of all the other tactical -benefits of the defence.</p> - -<p>Yet we had the advantage of moral factors. For the past -nine weeks the enemy had suffered defeat after defeat. He had -at one time been surprised and overwhelmed. He had at -another time been driven from strong positions under conditions -when surprise played no part. He had been defeated in gunnery, -in the air, and in close Infantry fighting. The <i>moral</i> -of his troops had steadily declined. They no longer hoped for -victory, but anticipated defeat. They knew that they were a -beaten army.</p> - -<p>The victory won in the series of battles from September 29th -to October 5th was a victory of <i>moral</i>, the resolute determination -of our troops to overcome all obstacles prevailing -against the failing spirits of the defenders. It was a signal -illustration that no defences, however powerful, can resist an -energetically pressed assault, unless the defenders meet the attack -with equal resolution. Verdun and the cliffs of Gallipoli are examples -of resolute defence. Port Arthur and the Hindenburg -line are equally striking instances of the collapse of formidable -field works through failure of the <i>moral</i> of the defenders.</p> - -<p>Montbrehain was the last Australian battle in the Great War, -and the fighting career of the Australian Army Corps had, as -events turned out, come to an end. On that same day my -Second Division was relieved by the 30th American Division, -and I handed over command of the battle front to General Read. -I had borne continuous responsibility, as a Corps Commander, -for a section of the battle front in France varying from four -to eleven miles for 128 consecutive days without a break.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[280]</a></span></p> - -<p>On that same day, too, Prince Max of Baden accepted the -programme of the President of the United States of America, -and requested him to take in hand the restoration of peace. -On behalf of the German Government he also asked for an -immediate Armistice on Land, Water and in the Air.</p> - -<p>The long-drawn-out negotiations which followed need only a -brief reference. It was first necessary for the Entente Powers -to agree upon a common line of action; then followed negotiations -between the plenipotentiaries of the belligerents, and -hostilities did not actually cease until after the conditions of -the Armistice had been signed in the early morning of November -11th.</p> - -<p>During this period of five weeks, however, fighting went on. -It was of an altogether different character from that in which -the Australian Corps had been engaged. The enemy had no line -of defence left in France. He was compelled to a retreat which -became general along his whole front, and gathered momentum -day by day. He gave up Lens, Armentières and the Aubers Ridge -without a struggle, thus enabling the Second and Fifth Armies -to advance to the occupation of Lille and the adjacent industrial -centres.</p> - -<p>A great army recoiling rapidly upon itself is beset with even -greater difficulties than an army sweeping rapidly forward. If -its retreat is not to be converted into a rout, time must be -allowed for the methodical withdrawal, in proper sequence, of -the whole complex organization in rear of the battle front. -Headquarters and hospitals, workshops and aerodromes, depots -and supplies must be dismantled, packed and re-established -further in rear; guns, transport and reserve troops must be -withdrawn stage by stage, and, last of all, the fighting line must -fall back in sympathy with the rate of withdrawal of all in rear.</p> - -<p>Every hour's delay is an hour gained. Roads become congested, -bridges overtaxed, cohesion and discipline are imperilled. -An enforced withdrawal on so large a scale is one of the most -difficult operations of war.</p> - -<p>The enemy's tactics during this period were, therefore, purely -those of delay, achieved by the methodical destruction of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[281]</a></span> -bridges, tearing up of railways, and the blowing of great craters -at every important road intersection. These methods impeded -the advance of our armies quite as much as his rearguards, -who invariably yielded to the smallest demonstration of force.</p> - -<p>Battles on the grand scale were now a thing of the past, and -from the completion of the capture of the Hindenburg defences -up to the signing of the Armistice there was no event in France -of outstanding military importance.</p> - -<p>The pursuit of the enemy towards the eastern frontiers of -France and Belgium was, however, exhausting to the British -and American troops on the front which the Australian Corps -had vacated. It was only a question of time for the Corps to -be again called upon, this time to take its share of pursuit. The -Armistice negotiations were dragging out, and it was uncertain -that they would be satisfactorily concluded. The Australian -Corps had had a month for a pleasant rest along the banks of -the Somme, between Amiens and Abbeville. It had had time -to carry out the extensive reorganizations required by the War -Office. On November 5th orders came for the Corps once -again to move up to the front.</p> - -<p>The First and Fourth Divisions led the return to the battle -zone. The remaining three Divisions were to follow. My Corps -Headquarters, on November 10th, commenced its move to Le -Cateau, to occupy the very château which had been inhabited -by General von der Marwitz, the Commander of the Second -German Army, against whom the Australian Corps had for so -long been operating. I was actually on the way there on -November 11th when the order arrived for the cessation of -hostilities.</p> - -<p>The Australian Army Corps was therefore not again employed, -either in the final stages of pursuing the enemy out of France, -or as part of the Army of Occupation on German territory.</p> - -<p>The Prime Minister of Australia forwarded to me, the day -after my arrival at Le Cateau, the following message:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>The Government and the people of Australia extend -their heartiest congratulations on the triumphant conclusion<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[282]</a></span> -of your great efforts. I am specially requested to -convey to you their heartfelt thanks and deep admiration -for your brilliant and great leadership, and for the way in -which you and the brave men associated with you have -borne the sufferings and trials of the past four years, and -in common with the troops of all the Allied Nations brought -the civilized peoples of the world through adversity to -victorious peace. On behalf of the Government and the -people of the Commonwealth, I assure you, and every -Australian soldier in the field, that the Commonwealth is -full of pride and admiration of their endurance and sacrifice. -The Australian soldiers are entitled to, and shall -receive, not only the thanks of a grateful people, but that -treatment which their great services deserve.</p> - -<div class="right"> -<span class="smcap">W. M. Hughes.</span><br /> -</div> -</blockquote> - -<p>Not long after the conclusion of hostilities I was called upon -by my Government to undertake the organization and direction -of a special department to carry out the repatriation of the -whole of the Australian Imperial Force, in Europe, Egypt, Salonika -and Mesopotamia. This compelled me to sever, with much regret, -my close and intimate association with the personnel of the -Army Corps.</p> - -<p>Before proceeding to England to establish the new department, -I issued the following Farewell Order:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>Upon relinquishing the command of the Australian Army -Corps, in order to take up the important and difficult work -of the Repatriation and Demobilization of the Australian -Imperial Force, which has been entrusted to me by the -Commonwealth Government, I desire to offer to all ranks of -the Corps a heartfelt expression of my gratitude to all for -the splendid and loyal support which they have rendered -to me during the past six months.</p> - -<p>It has been the period during which the Corps has attained -its highest development, as a fighting organism, of cohesion -and efficiency. This has been brought about alike by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[283]</a></span> -valour of the troops of all arms and services, and by the -splendid devotion of Commanders, Staffs, and Regimental -Officers, and has resulted in the series of brilliant victories -which have contributed in so high a measure to the overthrow -and utter collapse of our principal enemy.</p> - -<p>For the remainder of the period during which the Corps -will continue to act as a military body, held in readiness -for any emergency that may arise during the peace negotiations, -I am confident that every man will strive to do all -in his power to uphold the great renown which the Corps -has so worthily won.</p> - -<p>But, having completed our task in the main object which -brought us from our distant homeland, and having thereby -safeguarded the future of our Nation by the conquest of our -most formidable enemy, we are now faced with another -and an equally important task, namely, to prepare ourselves -to resume our duties of citizenship and to assist individually -and collectively in the reconstruction of the Australian -Nation. Our numbers and our prestige place this opportunity -in our hands, and impose upon us this great -responsibility.</p> - -<p>I feel sure that every man in the Corps will in this also -worthily respond to the call of duty, and will co-operate -loyally and self-sacrificingly in the realization of all plans -and projects which will be developed to so worthy an end.</p></blockquote> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[284]</a></span></p> - -<h2>CHAPTER XVII<br /> - -RESULTS</h2> - - -<p>The time has arrived when it is proper to take stock of -gains and losses, and to endeavour to appraise, at its -true value, the work done by the Australian Army Corps during -its long-sustained effort of the last six months of its fighting -career.</p> - -<p>It has become customary to regard the actual captures of -prisoners and guns as a true index of the degree of success -which has attended any series of battle operations. Every -soldier knows, however, that such a standard of judgment, -applied alone, would render but scant justice. The actual -captures in any engagement depend more upon the state of -<i>moral</i> of the enemy and the temperament of the attacking troops -than upon the military quality of the battle effort considered as -a whole. While large captures necessarily imply great victories, -it does not by any means follow that small captures imply the -reverse.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless, judged by such a purely arbitrary standard, -the performances of the Australian Army Corps during the -period under review are worthy of being set out in particular -detail.</p> - -<p>From March 27th, when Australian troops were for the first -time interposed to arrest the German advance, until October 5th, -when they were finally withdrawn from the line, the total -captures made by them were:</p> - - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left">Prisoners </td><td align="right">29,144</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Guns</td><td align="right">338</td></tr> -</table> -</div> - -<p>No accurate record was ever kept of the capture of machine<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[285]</a></span> -guns, trench mortars, searchlights, vehicles and travelling -kitchens or pharmacies, nor of the quantity of Artillery ammunition, -which alone must have amounted to millions of rounds.</p> - -<p>During the advance, from August 8th to October 5th, the -Australian Corps recaptured and released no less than 116 towns -and villages. Every one of these was defended more or less -stoutly. This count of them does not include a very large -number of minor hamlets, which were unnamed on the maps, -nor farms, brickfields, factories, sugar refineries, and similar -isolated groups of buildings, every one of which had been fortified -and converted by the enemy into a stronghold of resistance.</p> - -<p>Although the amount of territory reoccupied, taken by itself, -is ordinarily no criterion of value, the whole circumstances of -the relentless advance of the Australian Corps make it a convenient -standard of comparison. The total area of all the -ground fought over, from the occupation of which the enemy -was ejected, amounted in the period under consideration to 394 -square miles.</p> - -<p>A much more definite and crucial basis for evaluating the -military successes of the Corps is the number of enemy Divisions -actually engaged and defeated in the course of the operations. -Very accurate records of these have been kept, and every one of -them was identified by a substantial contribution to the list -of prisoners taken. An analysis of this investigation produced -the following results:</p> - -<p>The total number of separate enemy divisions engaged was -thirty-nine. Of these, twenty were engaged once only, twelve -were engaged twice, six three times, and one four times. Each -time "engaged" represents a separate and distinct period of -line duty for the enemy Division referred to.</p> - -<p>Up to the time of the Armistice we had definitely ascertained -that at least six of these thirty-nine enemy Divisions had been -entirely disbanded as the result of the battering which they -had received. Their numberings have already been given. It -is more than probable that several other Divisions shared the -same fate, by reason of the number of prisoners actually taken, -and the other casualties known to have been inflicted. Up to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[286]</a></span> -the time when the signing of the Armistice precluded further -inquiries, absolutely conclusive evidence of their disappearance -had not been obtained.</p> - -<p>In such an analysis it is possible to go even further, and to -compare the tangible results achieved with the relative strength -of the forces engaged. The Australian Army Corps of five -Divisions represented 9½ per cent. of the whole of the remaining -53 Divisions of the British Army engaged on the Western Front. -Its captures in prisoners, by the same comparison, and within -the period reviewed—<i>i.e.</i>, March 27th to October 5th—was -23 per cent., in guns 23½ per cent., and in territory reoccupied -was 21½ per cent. of the whole of the rest of the British Army.</p> - -<p>The ratio, therefore, of the results to the strengths, as between -the five Australian Divisions and the whole of the rest of the -British Army, was as follows:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left">Prisoners</td><td align="right">2.42</td><td align="center">times.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Territory </td><td align="right">2.24</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Guns</td><td align="right">2.47</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> -</table></div> - -<p>It is not, however, by the mere numerical results disclosed -by such a comparison that the work of the Australian Army -Corps should be judged. If a broad survey be made of the -whole of the 1918 campaign, I think that the decisive part which -the Corps took in it will emerge even more convincingly.</p> - -<p>Such a survey will show that the whole sequence of events -may be divided into five very definite and clearly-marked -stages. The first was the arrest and bringing to naught of the -great German spring offensive; the second was the conversion -of the enemy's offensive strategy into a distinct and unqualified -defensive. Next followed the great, initial and irredeemable -defeat of August 8th, which, according to the enemy's own -admissions, was the beginning of the end. Then came the denial -to the enemy of the respite which he sought on the line of the -Somme, which might well have helped him to recover himself -for another year of war; and, finally, there was the overthrow -of his great defensive system, on which he relied as a last bulwark -to safeguard his hold upon French soil, a hold which would -have enabled him to bargain for terms.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[287]</a></span></p> - -<p>It must never be forgotten that whatever claims may be made -to the contrary, Germany's surrender was precipitated by reason -of her military defeat in the field. Her submarine campaign, -disappointing to her expectations as it had been, was still a -potent weapon. Her fleet was yet intact. Our blockade was -grievous, but she did in fact survive it, even though it continued -in force for a full eight months after her surrender. The -defection of Bulgaria and the collapse of Turkey might conceivably -be a source of increased military strength, even if one -of greater political weakness. Had she been able to hold us at -bay in France and Belgium for but another month or six weeks, -she could have been assured of a respite of three months of -winter in which to organize a levy en masse. Who can say that -the stress of another winter and the prospect of another year -of war might not have destroyed the Entente combination -against her?</p> - -<p>On these grounds I believe that the real and immediate reason -for the precipitate surrender of Germany on October 5th, 1918, -was the defeat of her Army in the field. It followed so closely -upon the breaching of the Hindenburg defences on September -29th to October 4th, that it cannot be dissociated from that -event as a final determining cause.</p> - -<p>Whether this view be correct or not, I think that the claim may -fairly be made for the Australian Army Corps, that in each of -the stages of the operations which led to this military overthrow, -the Corps played an important, and in some of them a predominating, -part. No better testimony for such a conclusion -can be adduced than the admissions of Ludendorff himself.</p> - -<p>Narrowing our survey of the closing events of the campaign -to a consideration of the fighting activities of the Australian -Corps, I would like to emphasize the remarkable character of that -effort. Deprived of the advantage of a regular inflow of trained -recruits, and relying practically entirely for any replenishments -upon the return of its own sick and wounded, the Corps was -able to maintain an uninterrupted fighting activity over a period -of six months. For the last sixty days of this period the Corps -maintained an unchecked advance of thirty-seven miles against<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[288]</a></span> -the powerful and determined opposition of a still formidable -enemy, who employed all the mechanical and scientific resources -at his disposal.</p> - -<p>Such a result alone, considered in the abstract and quite apart -from any comparison with the performances of other forces, is -a testimony, on the one hand, to the pre-eminent fighting -qualities of the Australian soldier considered individually, and, -on the other hand, to the collective capacity and efficiency of -the military effort made by the Corps. I doubt whether there -is any parallel for such a performance in the whole range of -military history.</p> - -<p>As regards the troops themselves, the outstanding feature -of the campaign was their steadily rising <i>moral</i>. Always high, -it was, in spite of fatigue and stress, never higher than in the -closing days. A stage had been reached when they regarded -their adversary no longer with cautious respect but with undisguised -contempt.</p> - -<p>On the part of the troops it was a remarkable feat of physical -and mental endurance to face again and yet again the stress of -battle. To the infantry a certain measure of periodical rest was -accorded, but the Artillery and technical services had scarcely any -respite at all. Almost every day of the whole period they -worked and fought, night and day, under the fire of the enemy's -batteries, and under his drenching, suffocating gas attacks, -for our battery positions were the favourite targets for his gas -bombardments.</p> - -<p>On the part of the staffs it was a period of ceaseless toil, both -mental and physical. The perfection of the staff work, its precision, -its completeness, its rapidity, its whole-souled devotion -to the service of the troops, were the necessary conditions for -the victories which were won.</p> - -<p>Another outstanding feature was the uniformity of standard -achieved by all the five Divisions, as well as the wonderful comradeship -which they displayed towards each other. Omitting -altogether the performances of any one of them in the previous -years of the war, it is noteworthy that all so fully seized the -opportunities that presented themselves, that each could boast of -outstanding achievements during this period—the First Division -for its capture of Lihons and the battles of Chuignes and Hargicourt, -the Second Division for Mont St. Quentin and Montbrehain, -the Third for Bray, Bouchavesnes and Bony, the Fourth for -Hamel and Hargicourt, and the Fifth for Péronne and Bellicourt.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/map-j.jpg" width="1200" height="803" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">Map J.</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[289]</a></span></p> - -<p>I must also pass in brief review the losses which the Corps -suffered during its advance. From August 8th to October 5th -the total battle casualties were as follows:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left">Killed</td><td align="right">3,566</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Died of wounds </td><td align="right">1,432</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Wounded</td><td align="right">16,166</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Missing</td><td align="right">79</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="right">———</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Total</td><td align="right">21,243</td></tr> -</table> -</div> - -<p>Averaging these losses over all five Divisions for the whole -period, they amount to a wastage from all causes of seventy -men per Division per day, which must be regarded as extraordinarily -moderate, having regard to the strenuous nature of -the fighting, the great results achieved, and the much higher -rate of losses incurred by Australian troops during the previous -years of the war. Even during periods of sedentary trench -warfare the losses averaged forty per Division per day.</p> - -<p>The total losses of the Army Corps during this period were, -indeed, only a small fraction of Australia's contribution to the -casualty roll for the whole period of the war. It was the least -costly period, for Australia, of all the fighting that her soldiers -underwent. Had it been otherwise, the effort could not have -been maintained for so long, nor could the spirit of the troops -have been sustained. It was the low cost of victory after -victory which spurred them on to still greater efforts.</p> - -<p>Of the causes which contributed to so gratifying a result, -much credit must be given to the great development in 1918 of -mechanical aids, in the form of Tanks, and to a considerable -augmentation of aeroplanes, Artillery and Lewis guns. Of all -these the Corps proved eager to avail itself to the full.</p> - -<p>But the main cause is, after all, the recognition of a principle -of text-book simplicity, which is that a vigorous offensive is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[290]</a></span> -in the long run cheaper than a timorous defensive. No war can -be decided by defensive tactics. The fundamental doctrine of -the German conception of war was the pursuit of the unrelenting -offensive; it was only when the Entente Armies, on their part, -were able and willing themselves to put such a doctrine into -practice that our formidable enemies were overcome.</p> - -<p>It may be that hereafter I may be charged with responsibility -for so relentlessly and for so long committing the troops of the -Corps to a sustained aggressive policy. Such criticisms have -already been whispered in some quarters. But I am sure that -they will not be shared by any of the men whom it was my privilege -to command. They knew that an offensive policy was the -cheapest policy, and the proof that they accepted it as the -right one was their ever-rising <i>moral</i> as the campaign developed.</p> - -<p>"Feed your troops on victory," is a maxim which does not -appear in any text-book, but it is nevertheless true. The aim -and end of all the efforts and of all the heavy sacrifices of the -Australian nation was victory in the field. Nothing that could -be done could lead more swiftly and more directly to its fulfilment -than an energetic offensive policy. The troops themselves -recognized this. They learned to believe, because of success -heaped upon success, that they were invincible. They were -right, and I believe that I was right in shaping a course which -would give them the opportunity of proving it.</p> - -<p>There are some aspects of the Australian campaign to which, -before closing this memoir, I should like to make brief reference. -Success depended first and foremost upon the military proficiency -of the Australian private soldier and his glorious spirit of heroism. -I do not propose to attempt here an exhaustive analysis of the -causes which led to the making of him. The democratic institutions -under which he was reared, the advanced system of education -by which he was trained—teaching him to think for himself -and to apply what he had been taught to practical ends—the -instinct of sport and adventure which is his national heritage, -his pride in his young country, and the opportunity which came -to him of creating a great national tradition, were all factors -which made him what he was.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[291]</a></span></p> - -<p>Physically the Australian Army was composed of the flower -of the youth of the continent. A volunteer army—the only -purely volunteer army that fought in the Great War—it was -composed of men carefully selected according to a high physical -standard, from which, happily, no departure was made, even -although recruiting began to fall off in the last year of the war, -and there were some who had proposed a more lenient recruiting -examination. The cost to Australia of delivering each fighting -man, fully trained, to the battle front was too great to permit -of any doubt whether the physical quality of the raw material -would survive the wear and tear of war.</p> - -<p>Mentally, the Australian soldier was well endowed. In him -there was a curious blend of a capacity for independent judgment -with a readiness to submit to self-effacement in a common -cause. He had a personal dignity all his own. He had the -political sense highly developed, and was always a keen critic -of the way in which his battalion or battery was "run," and of -the policies which guided his destinies from day to day.</p> - -<p>His intellectual gifts and his "handiness" made him an apt -pupil. It was always a delight to see the avidity with which -he mastered the technique of the weapons which were placed in -his hands. Machine guns, Lewis guns, Mills' bombs, Stokes' -mortars, rifle grenades, flares, fuses, detonators, Very lights, -signal rockets, German machine guns, German stick bombs, -never for long remained a mystery to him.</p> - -<p>At all schools and classes he proved a diligent scholar, and -astonished his instructors by the speed with which he absorbed -and bettered his instruction. Conservatism in military methods -was no part of his creed. He was always mentally alert to adopt -new ideas and often to invent them.</p> - -<p>His adaptability spared him much hardship. He knew how -to make himself comfortable. To light a fire and cook his food -was a natural instinct. A sheet of corrugated iron, a batten or -two, and a few strands of wire were enough to enable him to -fabricate a home in which he could live at ease.</p> - -<p>Psychologically, he was easy to lead but difficult to drive. -His imagination was readily fired. War was to him a game,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[292]</a></span> -and he played for his side with enthusiasm. His bravery was -founded upon his sense of duty to his unit, comradeship to his -fellows, emulation to uphold his traditions, and a combative -spirit to avenge his hardships and sufferings upon the -enemy.</p> - -<p>Taking him all in all, the Australian soldier was, when once -understood, not difficult to handle. But he required a sympathetic -handling, which appealed to his intelligence and satisfied -his instinct for a "square deal."</p> - -<p>Very much and very stupid comment has been made upon -the discipline of the Australian soldier. That was because the -very conception and purpose of discipline have been misunderstood. -It is, after all, only a means to an end, and that end is -the power to secure co-ordinated action among a large number -of individuals for the achievement of a definite purpose. It does -not mean lip service, nor obsequious homage to superiors, nor -servile observance of forms and customs, nor a suppression of -individuality.</p> - -<p>Such may have been the outward manifestations of discipline -in times gone by. If they achieved the end in view, it must -have been because the individual soldier had acquired in those -days no capacity to act intelligently and because he could be -considered only in the mass. But modern war makes high -demands upon the intelligence of the private soldier and upon -his individual initiative. Any method of training which tends -to suppress that individuality will tend to reduce his efficiency -and value. The proverbial "iron discipline" of the Prussian -military ideal ultimately broke down completely under the test -of a great war.</p> - -<p>In the Australian Forces no strong insistence was ever made -upon the mere outward forms of discipline. The soldier was -taught that personal cleanliness was necessary to ensure his -health and well-being, that a soldierly bearing meant a moral and -physical uplift which would help him to rise superior to his -squalid environment, that punctuality meant economy of effort, -that unquestioning obedience was the only road to successful -collective action. He acquired these military qualities because<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[293]</a></span> -his intelligence taught him that the reasons given him were true -ones.</p> - -<p>In short, the Australian Army is a proof that individualism -is the best and not the worst foundation upon which to build up -collective discipline. The Australian is accustomed to team-work. -He learns it in the sporting field, in his industrial organizations, -and in his political activities. The team-work which he -developed in the war was of the highest order of efficiency. -Each man understood his part and understood also that the -part which others had to play depended upon the proper performance -of his own.</p> - -<p>The gunner knew that the success of the infantry depended -upon his own punctilious performance of his task, its accuracy, -its punctuality, its conscientious thoroughness. The runner -knew what depended upon the rapid delivery at the right -destination of the message which he carried. The mule driver -knew that the load of ammunition entrusted to him must be -delivered, at any sacrifice, to its destined battery; the infantryman -knew that he must be at his tape line at the appointed -moment, and that he must not overrun his allotted objective.</p> - -<p>The truest test of battle discipline was the confidence which -every leader in the field always felt that he could rely upon -every man to perform the duty which had been prescribed for -him, as long as breath lasted, and that he would perform it faithfully -even when there was no possibility of any supervision.</p> - -<p>Thus the sense of duty was always very high, and so also was -the instinct of comradeship. A soldier, a platoon, a whole -battalion would sooner sacrifice themselves than "let down" -a comrade or another unit. There was no finer example of individual -self-sacrifice, for the benefit of comrades, than the -Stretcher-bearer service, which suffered exceedingly in its noble -work of succouring the wounded, and exposed itself unflinchingly -to every danger.</p> - -<p>The relations between the officers and men of the Australian -Army were also of a nature which is deserving of notice. From -almost the earliest days of the war violence was done to a deep-rooted -tradition of the British Army, which discouraged any<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[294]</a></span> -promotion from the ranks, and stringently forbade, in cases -where it was given, promotion in the same unit. It was rare -to recognize the distinguished service of a ranker; it was impossible -for him to secure a commission in his own regiment.</p> - -<p>The Australian Imperial Force changed all that. Those -privates, corporals and sergeants who displayed, under battle -conditions, a notable capacity for leadership were earmarked -for preferment. If their standard of education was good, they -received commissions as soon as there were vacancies to fill; -if not, they were sent to Oxford or Cambridge to be given an -opportunity of improving both their general and their special -military knowledge.</p> - -<p>As a general rule, they came back as commissioned officers -to the very unit in which they had enlisted or served. They -afforded to all its men a tangible and visible proof of the recognition -of merit and capacity, and their example was always a -powerful stimulus to all their former comrades.</p> - -<p>There was thus no officer caste, no social distinction in the -whole force. In not a few instances, men of humble origin and -belonging to the artisan class rose, during the war, from privates -to the command of Battalions. The efficiency of the force -suffered in no way in consequence. On the contrary, the whole -Australian Army became automatically graded into leaders and -followers according to the individual merits of every man, and -there grew a wonderful understanding between them.</p> - -<p>The duties and responsibilities of the officers were always put -upon a high plane. They had, during all military service with -troops, to dress like the men, to live among them in the trenches, -to share their hardships and privations, and to be responsible -for their welfare. No officer dared to look after his own comfort -until every man or horse or mule had been fed and quartered, -as well as the circumstances of the moment permitted. The -battle prowess of the Australian regimental officer and the -magnificent example he set have become household words.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_294fp.jpg" width="1200" height="761" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>The Toll of Battle—an Australian gun-team destroyed by an enemy shell, September 1st, 1918.</p></div> -</div> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_295fp.jpg" width="1200" height="776" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>Inter-Divisional Relief—The 30th American and the 3rd Australian Divisions passing each other in the "Roo de -Kanga," Péronne, during the "relief" after the capture of the Hindenburg Line, October 4th, 1918.</p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[295]</a></span></p> - -<p>Then there must be a word of recognition of the work of the -devoted and able Staffs. It was upon them, after all, that the -principal burden of the campaign rested. Upon them, their -skill and industry, depended the adequacy of all supplies and -their proper distribution, the precision of all arrangements for -battle, the accuracy of all maps, orders and instructions, the -clearness of messages and reports, the completeness of the -information on which the Commander must base his decisions, -and the correct calculations of time and space for the movement -of troops, guns and transport. Their watchword was -"efficiency."</p> - -<p>"The Staff Officer is the servant of the troops." This was -the ritual pronounced at the initiation of every Staff Officer. -It was a doctrine which contributed powerfully to the success of -the staff work as a whole. It meant that the Staff Officer's duties -extended far beyond the mere transmission of orders. It became -his business to see that they were understood, and rightly acted -upon, and to assist in removing every kind of difficulty in their -due execution. The importance of accurate and reliable staff -work can be understood when it is realized that no mistake can -happen without ultimately imposing an added stress upon the -most subordinate and most helpless of all the components of -an Army—the private soldier. An error in a clock time, the -miscarriage of a message, the neglect to issue an instruction, a -misreading of an order, an omission from a list of names, a -mistake in a computation, an incomplete inventory, are bound -in the long run to involve an added burden somewhere upon -some private soldier.</p> - -<p>The Staff of the Australian Army Corps, its Divisions and -Brigades, consisted during the last six months almost entirely -of Australians, many of them belonging to the permanent military -forces of the Commonwealth, but more still men who, before the -war, followed civilian occupations. Among both categories -the quality of the staff work steadily grew in efficiency, speed -and accuracy, and during the last period of active fighting it -reached a very high standard indeed.</p> - -<p>Had it been otherwise, I could not have carried out either the -rapid preparations for several of the greater battles, or the -frequent and complex interchanges of Divisions which alone -rendered it possible for me to keep up a continuous pressure on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[296]</a></span> -the enemy, or the readjustments throughout the whole of the -very large area always under my jurisdiction which became -necessary as the advance proceeded.</p> - -<p>No reference to the staff work of the Australian Corps during -the period of my command would be complete without a tribute -to the work and personality of Brigadier-General T. A. Blamey, -my Chief of Staff. He possessed a mind cultured far above the -average, widely informed, alert and prehensile. He had an -infinite capacity for taking pains. A Staff College graduate, but -not on that account a pedant, he was thoroughly versed in the -technique of staff work, and in the minutiæ of all procedure.</p> - -<p>He served me with an exemplary loyalty, for which I owe him -a debt of gratitude which cannot be repaid. Our temperaments -adapted themselves to each other in a manner which was ideal. -He had an extraordinary faculty of self-effacement, posing -always and conscientiously as the instrument to give effect to -my policies and decisions. Really helpful whenever his advice -was invited, he never obtruded his own opinions, although I -knew that he did not always agree with me.</p> - -<p>Some day the orders which he drafted for the long series of -history-making military operations upon which we collaborated -will become a model for Staff Colleges and Schools for military -instruction. They were accurate, lucid in language, perfect in -detail, and always an exact interpretation of my intention. It -was seldom that I thought that my orders or instructions could -have been better expressed, and no Commander could have been -more exacting than I was in the matter of the use of clear -language to express thought.</p> - -<p>Blamey was a man of inexhaustible industry, and accepted -every task with placid readiness. Nothing was ever too much -trouble. He worked late and early, and set a high standard for -the remainder of the large Corps Staff of which he was the head. -The personal support which he accorded to me was of a nature of -which I could always feel the real substance. I was able to lean -on him in times of trouble, stress and difficulty, to a degree which -was an inexpressible comfort to me.</p> - -<p>To the Commanders of the Five Divisions I have already made<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[297]</a></span> -detailed allusion. They were all renowned leaders. To all the -Brigadiers of Infantry and Artillery and to the Heads of the -Administrative Services who laboured under them, the limitations -of space forbid my making any individual reference. But -they were all of them men to whose splendid services Australia -owes a deep debt of gratitude. In their hands the honour of -Australia's fighting men and the prestige of her arms were in -safe keeping.</p> - -<p>None but men of character and self-devotion could have -carried the burden which they had to bear during the last six -months of the war. In spite of stress and difficulty, unremitting -toil and wasted effort, weary days and sleepless nights, fresh -task piling upon the task but just begun, labouring even harder -during periods of so-called rest than when their troops were -actually in the line, this gallant band of leaders remained steadfast -of purpose, never faltered, never lost their faith in final -victory, never failed to impress their optimism and their unflinching -fighting spirit upon the men whom they commanded.</p> - -<p>It may be appropriate to end this memoir on a personal note. -I have permitted myself a tone of eulogy for the triumphant -achievements of the Australian Army Corps in 1918, which I -have endeavoured faithfully to portray. Let it not be assumed -on that account that the humble part which it fell to my lot to -perform afforded me any satisfaction or prompted any enthusiasm -for war. Quite the contrary.</p> - -<p>From the far-off days of 1914, when the call first came, until -the last shot was fired, every day was filled with loathing, horror, -and distress. I deplored all the time the loss of precious life -and the waste of human effort. Nothing could have been more -repugnant to me than the realization of the dreadful inefficiency -and the misspent energy of war. Yet it had to be, and the -thought always uppermost was the earnest prayer that Australia -might for ever be spared such a horror on her own soil.</p> - -<p>There is, in my belief, only one way to realize such a prayer. -The nation that wishes to defend its land and its honour must -spare no effort, refuse no sacrifice to make itself so formidable<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[298]</a></span> -that no enemy will dare to assail it. A League of Nations may -be an instrument for the preservation of peace, but an efficient -Army is a far more potent one.</p> - -<p>The essential components of such an Army are a qualified -Staff, an adequate equipment and a trained soldiery. I state -them in what I believe to be their order of importance, and my -belief is based upon the lessons which this war has taught me. -In that way alone can Australia secure the sanctity of her -territory and the preservation of her independent liberties.</p> - -<p>Such a creed is not militarism, but is of the very essence of -national self-preservation. For long years before the war it -was the creed of a small handful of men in Australia, who braved -the indifference and even the ridicule of public opinion in order -to try to qualify themselves for the test when it should come. -Four dreadful years of war have served to convince me of the -truth of that creed, and to confirm me in the belief that the men -of the coming generation, if they love their country, must take -up the burden which these men have had to bear.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[299]</a></span></p> - -<h2>APPENDIX A<br /> -<span class="smcap">Grouping into Australian Divisions of Artillery and<br /> -Infantry Brigades, during the period May to October,<br /> -1918, and the General Officers commanding them.</span><br /> -</h2> - - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left"><span class="smcap">First Division</span> (Glasgow):</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><i>Artillery</i>,</td><td align="right">1st and 2nd</td><td align="center">Brigades</td><td align="left">(Anderson).</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><i>Infantry</i>,</td><td align="right">1st</td><td align="center">Brigade</td><td align="left">(Mackay).</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="right">2nd</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="left">(Heane).</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="right">3rd</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="left">(Bennett).</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Second Division</span> (Rosenthal):</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><i>Artillery</i>,</td><td align="right">4th and 5th</td><td align="center">Brigades</td><td align="left">(Phillips).</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><i>Infantry</i>,</td><td align="right">5th</td><td align="center">Brigade</td><td align="left">(Martin).</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="right">6th</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="left">(Robertson).</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="right">7th</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="left">(Wisdom).</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Third Division</span> (Gellibrand):</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><i>Artillery</i>,</td><td align="right">7th and 8th</td><td align="center">Brigades</td><td align="left">(Grimwade).</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><i>Infantry</i>,</td><td align="right">9th</td><td align="center">Brigade</td><td align="left">(Goddard).</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="right">10th</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="left">(McNicoll).</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="right">11th</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="left">(Cannan).</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Fourth Division</span> (Maclagan):</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><i>Artillery</i>,</td><td align="right">10th and 11th</td><td align="center">Brigades</td><td align="left">(Burgess).</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><i>Infantry</i>,</td><td align="right">4th</td><td align="center">Brigade</td><td align="left">(Brand).</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="right">12th</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="left">(Leane).</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="right">13th</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="left">(Herring).</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Fifth Division</span> (Hobbs):</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><i>Artillery</i>,</td><td align="right">13th and 14th</td><td align="center">Brigades</td><td align="left">(Bessel-Browne).</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"><i>Infantry</i>,</td><td align="right">8th</td><td align="center">Brigade</td><td align="left">(Tivey).</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="right">14th</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="left">(Stewart).</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="right">15th</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="left">(Elliott).</td></tr> -</table></div> - -<p>The 3rd, 6th and 12th Artillery Brigades were Corps Troops -not forming part of any Division. The 9th Artillery Brigade -was disbanded at the end of 1916.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[300]</a></span></p> - -<h2>APPENDIX B</h2> - - -<p>In order to illustrate the nature of the individual fighting carried -out by the Australian Corps, during the period covered by this -book, the following very small selection has been made from -the official records of deeds of gallantry by individual soldiers. -In every one of these twenty-nine cases, the <span class="smcap">Victoria Cross</span> has -been awarded by His Majesty the King:</p> - -<p>No. 4061, <span class="smcap">Sergeant Stanley Robert MacDougall</span>, -47th Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"At <span class="smcap">Dernancourt</span>, on morning of 28th March, 1918, the enemy -attacked our line, and his first wave succeeded in gaining an entry. -Sergt. MacDougall, who was at a post in a flank company, realized the -situation, and at once charged the enemy's second wave single-handed -with rifle and bayonet, killing 7 and capturing Machine Gun which they -had. This he turned on to them, firing from the hip, causing many -casualties, and routing that wave. He then turned his attention to -those who had entered, until his ammunition had run out, all the time -firing at close quarters, when he seized a bayonet and charged again, -killing three men and a German officer, who was just about to kill one of -our officers. He then used a Lewis Gun on the enemy, killing many -and enabling us to capture 33 prisoners. His prompt action saved the -line and enabled us to stop the enemy advance."</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Lieutenant Percy Valentine Storkey</span>, -19th Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"Lieut. Storkey was in charge of a platoon which took part in the -attack at <span class="smcap">Bois de Hangard</span> on morning of 7th April, 1918. On -emerging from the wood, the enemy trench line was encountered, and -Lieut. Storkey found himself with 6 men. While continuing his move -forward, a large enemy party—about 80 to 100 strong—armed with -several machine guns, was noticed to be holding up the advance of the -troops on the right. Lieut. Storkey immediately decided to attack this -party from the flank and rear, and while moving forward to the attack, -was joined by Lieut. Lipscomb and four men. Under the leadership of -Lieut. Storkey, this small party of 2 officers and 10 other ranks charged -the enemy position with fixed bayonets, driving the enemy out, killing -and wounding about 30 and capturing the remainder, viz.: 3 officers -and 50 men, also one machine gun."</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[301]</a></span></p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Lieutenant Clifford William King Sadlier</span>, -51st Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"For conspicuous gallantry on the night of 24-25th April, 1918, during -a counter-attack by his Battalion on strong enemy positions south of -<span class="smcap">Villers-Bretonneux</span>, east of Amiens. Lieut. Sadlier's platoon, which -was on the left of the Battalion, had to advance through a wood, where -they encountered a strong enemy machine-gun post, which caused -casualties and prevented the platoon from advancing. Although himself -wounded, this officer at once collected his bombing section, and led them -against the machine guns, succeeding in killing the crews and capturing -two of the guns. By this time Lieut. Sadlier's party were all casualties, -and he alone attacked a third enemy machine gun with his revolver, -killing the crew of four and taking the gun. In doing so, he was again -wounded, and unable to go on."</p></blockquote> - -<p>No. 1914, <span class="smcap">Sergeant William Ruthven</span>, -22nd Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"For most conspicuous bravery and daring in action during the attack -at <span class="smcap">Ville-sur-Ancre</span>, near Albert, on 19th May, 1918. During the advance -Sergeant Ruthven's Company suffered numerous casualties, and his -Company Commander was severely wounded. He then assumed command -of his portion of the assault, took charge of the Company Headquarters, -and rallied the sections in his vicinity. As the leading wave -approached its objective, it was subjected to heavy fire from an enemy -Machine Gun at 30 to 40 yards' range, directly in front. This N.C.O., -without hesitation, at once sprang out, threw a bomb which landed -beside the post, and immediately rushed the position, bayoneting one of -the crew and capturing the gun. He then encountered some of the -enemy coming out of a shelter. He wounded two, captured six others -in the same position, and handed them over to an escort from the leading -wave, which had now reached the objective. Sergeant Ruthven then -reorganized our men in his vicinity, and established a post in the second -objective. Enemy movement was then seen in a sunken road about 150 -yards distant. Without hesitation, and armed only with a revolver, he -went over the open alone and rushed the position, shooting two Germans -who refused to come out of their dug-out. He then single-handed -mopped up this post, and captured the whole of the garrison, amounting -in all to 32, and kept them until assistance arrived to escort them back -to our lines. During the remainder of the day this gallant N.C.O. set -a splendid example of leadership, moving up and down his position under -fire, supervising consolidation and encouraging his men."</p></blockquote> - -<p>No. 1327, <span class="smcap">Corporal Phillip Davey</span>, M.M., -10th Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"In a daylight operation against the enemy position near <span class="smcap">Merris</span> -on June 28th, 1918, Corporal Davey's platoon advanced 200 yards and -captured part of enemy line. While the platoon was consolidating, the -enemy pushed a machine gun forward under cover of a hedge, and opened -fire from close range, inflicting heavy casualties and hampering work. -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[302]</a></span>Alone Corporal Davey moved forward in the face of a fierce point-blank -fire, and attacked the gun with hand grenades, putting half the crew -out of action. Having used all available grenades, he returned to the -original jumping-off trench, secured a further supply and again attacked -the gun, the crew of which had in the meantime been reinforced. He -killed the crew, 8 in all, and captured the gun. This gallant N.C.O. -then mounted the gun in the new post and used it in repelling a determined -counter-attack, during which he was severely wounded in both -legs, back and stomach."</p></blockquote> - -<p>No. 3399, <span class="smcap">Private (Lance-Corporal) Thomas Leslie -Axford</span>, M.M., -16th Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"For conspicuous gallantry and initiative during the operations -against <span class="smcap">Vaire</span> and <span class="smcap">Hamel Woods</span>, east of Corbie, on the morning of the -4th July, 1918. When the barrage lifted and the Infantry advance commenced, -the platoon of which he is a member was able to reach the first -enemy defences through gaps which had been cut in the wires. The -adjoining platoon got delayed in uncut barbed wire. This delay enabled -the enemy machine guns to get into action, and enabled them to inflict -a number of casualties among the men struggling through the wires, -including the Company Commander, who was killed. L.-Corporal -Axford, with great initiative and magnificent courage, at once dashed -to the flank, threw his bombs amongst the machine-gun crews; followed -up his bombs by jumping into the trench, and charging with his bayonet. -Unaided he killed ten of the enemy and took 6 prisoners; he threw -the machine guns over the parapet, and called out to the delayed platoon -to come on. He then rejoined his own platoon, and fought with it during -the remainder of the operations. Prior to the incidents above-mentioned, -he had assisted in the laying out of the tapes for the jumping-off position, -which was within 100 yards of the enemy. When the tapes were laid, he -remained out as a special patrol to ensure that the enemy did not discover -any unusual movement on our side."</p></blockquote> - -<p>No. 1936, <span class="smcap">Private Henry Dalziel</span>, -15th Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"For his magnificent bravery and devotion to duty during operations -near <span class="smcap">Hamel Wood</span>, east of Corbie, on 4th July, 1918. He was No. 2 -of a Lewis Gun Section, and at the commencement of our advance his -Company met with determined resistance from Pear Trench strong -point, which was strongly garrisoned and manned by numerous machine -guns. This strong point, undamaged by our artillery fire, was protected -by strong wire entanglements. A heavy concentration of machine-gun -fire caused heavy casualties and held up our advance. His Lewis Gun -came into action and silenced enemy guns in one direction, when another -enemy gun opened up from another direction. Private Dalziel dashed -at it, and with his revolver killed or captured the entire crew and gun, -and allowed our advance to continue. He was severely wounded in the -hand, but carried on and took part in the capture of the final objective. -He twice went over open ground under heavy enemy artillery and -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[303]</a></span>machine-gun fire to where our aeroplanes had dropped some boxes of -ammunition, and carried back a box on each occasion to his gun, and -though suffering from considerable loss of blood, he filled magazines and -served his gun until severely wounded through the head."</p></blockquote> - -<p>No. 1689A, <span class="smcap">Corporal Walter Ernest Brown</span>, D.C.M., -20th Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"For gallant service on the morning of 6th July, 1918, north-east of -<span class="smcap">Villers-Bretonneux</span>, east of Amiens. This N.C.O. was one of an -advanced party from his Battalion making arrangements with the Battalion -then in the line for relief by his own Battalion. As such he was -under no obligation to participate in any offensive operations before -his Battalion took over the line. During the night of 5th-6th July the -Company to which he was attached carried out a minor operation resulting -in the capture of a small system of enemy trench. Early on the -morning of 6th July an enemy strong post, about 70 yards distant, caused -the occupants of the newly-captured trench great inconvenience by -persistent sniping. It was decided to rush this post. Hearing of this, -Corporal Brown, on his own initiative, crept out along the shallow trench -towards the enemy post, and then made a dash across No Man's Land -towards this post. An enemy machine gun opened fire from another -trench, and he had to take cover by lying down. He later made another -dash forward, and succeeded in reaching his objective. With a Mills -grenade in his hand, he stood at the door of a dug-out and called on the -occupants to surrender. One of the enemy rushed out, a scuffle ensued, -and Corporal Brown knocked him down with his fist. Loud cries of -'Kamerad' were then heard, and from the dug-out an officer and -eleven other ranks appeared. Driving them before him, Corporal Brown -brought back the complete party as prisoners to our line."</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Lieutenant Albert Chalmers Borella</span>, M.M., -26th Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"For exceptional gallantry in the attack near <span class="smcap">Villers-Bretonneux</span>, -on the 17th-18th July, 1918. Whilst leading his platoon with the first -wave, Lieut. Borella noticed an enemy machine gun firing through our -barrage—he ran out ahead of his men into the barrage, shot two German -machine gunners with his revolver, and captured the gun. He then led -his party, now reduced to ten men and two Lewis Guns, further on, -against <span class="smcap">Jaffa Trench</span>, which was very strongly held, but using his -revolver, and later a rifle, with great effect, Lieut. Borella shot down -the enemy right and left, and set such a splendid example, that the -garrison were quickly shot and captured. Two large dug-outs were -bombed here and thirty prisoners taken. After reorganization the -enemy counter-attacked twice in strong force, on the second occasion -outnumbering Lieut. Borella's platoon by ten to one; but he showed -such coolness and determination, that the men put up an heroic resistance, -and twice repulsed the enemy with very heavy loss. It is estimated -that from 100 to 150 Germans were killed in this vicinity. When -Lieut. Borella refused his left flank about 40 yards during the first counter-attack -he sent his men back one at a time, and was himself the last to -leave, under heavy fire."</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[304]</a></span></p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Lieutenant Alfred Edward Gaby</span>, -28th Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"During the attack east of <span class="smcap">Villers-Bretonneux</span>, near Amiens, on -the morning of 8th August, 1918, this officer led his Company with great -dash, being well in front. On reaching the wire in front of the enemy -trench, strong opposition was encountered. The enemy were holding a -strong point in force about 40 yards beyond the wire, and commanded -the gap with four machine guns and rifles. The advance was at once -checked. Lieut. Gaby found another gap in the wire, and entirely by -himself approached the strong point, while machine guns and rifles were -still being fired from it. Running along the parapet, still alone, and -at point-blank range, he emptied his revolver into the garrison, drove -the crews from their guns, and compelled the surrender of 50 of the enemy, -with four machine guns. He then quickly reorganized his men and led -them on to his final objective, which he captured and consolidated. -On the morning of the 11th August, 1918, during an attack east of -<span class="smcap">Framerville</span>, Lieut. Gaby again led his Company with great dash on to -the objective. The enemy brought heavy rifle and machine-gun fire to -bear upon the line, but in the face of this heavy fire Lieut. Gaby walked -along his line of posts, encouraging his men to quickly consolidate the -line. While engaged on this duty he was killed by an enemy sniper."</p></blockquote> - -<p>No. 2742, <span class="smcap">Private Robert Matthew Beatham</span>, -8th Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during the attack -north of <span class="smcap">Rosières</span> on 9th August, 1918. Private Beatham showed such -heroism and courage, that he inspired all officers and men in his vicinity -in a wonderful manner. When the advance was held up by heavy -machine-gun fire, Private Beatham dashed forward and, assisted by one -man, bombed and fought the crews of four enemy machine guns, killing -ten of them and capturing ten others. The bravery of the action greatly -facilitated the advance of the whole Battalion and prevented casualties. -In fighting the crew of the first gun he was shot through the right leg, -but continued in the advance. When the final objective was reached -and fierce fighting was taking place, he again dashed forward and bombed -the machine gun that was holding our men off, getting riddled with bullets -and killed in doing so."</p></blockquote> - -<p>No. 506, <span class="smcap">Sergeant Percy Clyde Statton</span>, M.M., -40th Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"For most conspicuous gallantry and initiative in action near <span class="smcap">Proyart</span> -on 12th August, 1918. The platoon commanded by Sergeant Statton -reached its objective, but the remainder of the Battalion was held up -by heavy machine-gun fire. He skilfully engaged two machine-gun -posts with Lewis Gun fire, enabling the remainder of his Battalion to -advance. The advance of the Battalion on his left had been brought to -a standstill by the heavy enemy machine-gun fire, and the first of our -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[305]</a></span>assaulting detachments to reach the machine-gun posts were put out -of action in taking the first gun. Armed only with a revolver, in broad -daylight, Sergeant Statton at once rushed four enemy machine-gun posts -in succession, disposing of two of them, killing five of the enemy. The -remaining two posts retired and were wiped out by Lewis Gun fire. This -N.C.O.'s act had a very inspiring effect on the troops who had been held -up, and they cheered him as he returned. By his daring exploit he -enabled the attacking troops to gain their objective. Later in the -evening, under heavy machine-gun fire, he went out again and brought -in two badly-wounded men."</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Lieutenant Lawrence Dominic McCarthy</span>, -16th Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"This officer is especially brought to notice for his wonderful gallantry, -initiative and leadership on the morning of the 23rd August, 1918, when -an attack was being made near <span class="smcap">Madame Wood</span>, west of Vernandivukkers. -The objectives of this Battalion were attained without serious opposition. -The Battalion on the left flank were less fortunate. Here several -well-posted machine-gun posts were holding up the attack, and heavy -fire was being brought to bear on our left flank. When Lieut. McCarthy -realized the situation, he at once engaged the nearest machine-gun post; -but still the attacking troops failed to get forward. This officer then -determined to attack the nearest post. Leaving his men to continue the -fire fight, he, with two others, dashed across the open and dropped into -a disused trench which had been blocked. One of his two men was killed -whilst doing this. He was now right under the block over which the -enemy machine gun was firing. The presence of head cover prevented -the use of bombs. He therefore tunnelled a hole through the bottom of -the block, through which he inserted his head and one arm. He at -once shot dead the two men firing the gun. He then crawled through -the hole he had made, and by himself charged down the trench. He -threw his limited number of Mills bombs among the German garrison -and inflicted more casualties. He then came in contact with two German -officers, who fired on him with their revolvers. One of these he shot -dead with his revolver, the other he seriously wounded. He then charged -down the trench, using his revolver and throwing enemy stick bombs, -and capturing three more enemy machine guns. At this stage, some -700 yards from his starting point, he was joined by the N.C.O., whom he -had outdistanced when he crawled through the hole in the trench block -mentioned above. Together they continued to bomb up the trench, until -touch was established with the Lancashire Fusiliers, and in the meanwhile -yet another machine gun had been captured. A total of 5 machine -guns and 50 prisoners (37 unwounded and 13 wounded) was captured, -while Lieut. McCarthy during his most amazing and daring feat had, -single-handed, killed 20 of the enemy. Having cleared up a dangerous -situation, he proceeded to establish a garrison in the line. Whilst doing -this he saw a number of the enemy getting away from neighbouring -trenches. He at once seized a Lewis Gun and inflicted further casualties -on the enemy."</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[306]</a></span></p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Lieutenant William Donovan Joynt</span>, -8th Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during the attack -on <span class="smcap">Herleville Wood</span>, near Chuignes, on 23rd August, 1918. Early in -the advance Lieut. Joynt's Company Commander was killed; he immediately -took charge of the Company and led them with courage and skill. -A great deal of the success of the operation in this portion of the sector -was directly due to his magnificent work. When the advance was commenced -the Battalion was moving into support to another Battalion. -On approaching Herleville Wood, the troops of the leading Battalion lost -all their officers and became disorganized. Under very heavy fire, and -having no leaders, they appeared certain to be annihilated. Lieut. Joynt -grasped the situation, and rushed forward in the teeth of very heavy -machine-gun and artillery fire over the open. He got the remaining -men under control, and worked them into a piece of dead ground, until -he could reform them. He manœuvred his own men forward, and -linked them up with the men of the other Battalion. He then made -a personal reconnaissance, and found that the fire from the wood was -holding the whole advance up, the troops on his flanks suffering very -heavy casualties. Dashing out in front of his men, he called them on, -and by sheer force of example inspired them into a magnificent frontal -bayonet attack on the wood. The audacity of the move over the open -staggered the enemy, and Lieut. Joynt succeeded in penetrating the wood -and working through it. By his leadership and courage a very critical -situation was saved, and on this officer rests to the greatest extent the -success of the Brigade's attack. When the Battalion on our left was -held up on Plateau Wood, and was suffering severe casualties, Lieut. -Joynt, with a small party of volunteers, worked right forward against -heavy opposition, and by means of hand-to-hand fighting forced his way -round the rear of the wood, penetrating it from that side, and demoralizing -the enemy to such an extent that a very stubborn and victorious defensive -was changed into an abject surrender. He was always in the hardest -pressed parts of the line, and seemed to bear a charmed life. He was -constantly ready to run any personal risk and to assist flank units. He -continually showed magnificent leadership, and his example to his men -had a wonderful effect on them, causing them to follow him cheerfully -in his most daring exploits. He continued to do magnificent work -until he was badly wounded by shell fire in the legs."</p></blockquote> - -<p>No. 23, <span class="smcap">Private (Lance-Corporal) Bernard Sydney -Gordon</span>, -41st Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"During the operations of the 26-27th August, 1918, east of <span class="smcap">Bray</span>, -this N.C.O. showed most conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty in -the face of the enemy. He led his section through heavy enemy shelling -to its objective, which he consolidated. Then single-handed he attacked -an enemy machine gun which was enfilading the Company on his right, -killed the man on the gun, and captured the post, which contained one -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[307]</a></span>officer (a Captain) and 10 men. After handing these over at Company -Headquarters, he returned alone to the old system of trenches, in which -were many machine guns; entered a trench and proceeded to mop it -up, returning with 15 prisoners in one squad and 14 in another, together -with two machine guns. Again he returned to the system, this time -with a Trench Mortar gun and crew, and proceeded to mop up a further -portion of the trench, bringing in 22 prisoners, including one officer -and 3 machine guns. This last capture enabled the British troops on -our left to advance, which they had not been able to do owing to machine-gun -fire from these posts. His total captures were thus 2 officers and -61 other ranks, together with 6 machine guns, and with the exception of -the Trench Mortar assistance, it was absolutely an individual effort and -done entirely on his own initiative."</p></blockquote> - -<p>No. 726, <span class="smcap">Private George Cartwright</span>, -33rd Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"For most conspicuous valour and devotion to duty. On the morning -of the 31st August, 1918, during the attack on <span class="smcap">Road Wood</span>, south-west -of Bouchavesnes, near Péronne, Private Cartwright displayed exceptional -gallantry and supreme disregard for personal danger in the face -of a most withering machine-gun fire. Two Companies were held up by -a machine-gun firing from the south-western edge of the wood. Without -hesitation, this man stood up, and walking towards the gun, fired his -rifle from his shoulder. He shot the No. 1 Gunner; another German -manned the gun, and he killed him; a third attempted to fire the gun -and him he also killed. Private Cartwright then threw a bomb at the -post, and on its exploding, he rushed forward, captured the gun and nine -Germans. Our line then immediately rushed forward, loudly cheering -him. This magnificent deed had a most inspiring effect on the whole -line; all strove to emulate his gallantry. Throughout the operation -Private Cartwright displayed wonderful dash, grim determination and -courage of the highest order."</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Lieutenant Edgar Thomas Towner</span>, M.C., -2nd Australian Machine Gun Battalion.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"On 1st September, 1918, in the attack on <span class="smcap">Mont St. Quentin</span>, near -Péronne, this officer was in charge of 4 Vickers guns operating on a -front of 1,500 yards. During the early stages of the advance an enemy -machine gun was causing casualties to our advancing Infantry. Locating -the gun, Lieut. Towner dashed ahead alone, and succeeded in killing the -crew with his revolver, capturing the gun, and then, by turning it against -the enemy, inflicted heavy casualties on them. Advancing then past -a copse from which the enemy were firing, he brought his guns into -action, placing his fire behind the enemy and cutting them off. On their -attempting to retire before the advancing Infantry, and finding they were -prevented by this machine-gun fire, the party of 25 Germans surrendered. -He then reconnoitred alone over open ground exposed to heavy -machine-gun and snipers' fire, and by the energy, foresight and the -promptitude with which he brought fire to bear on further enemy groups, -enabled the Infantry to reach a sunken road. On moving his guns up -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[308]</a></span>to the sunken road, he found himself short of ammunition, so went back -across the open under heavy fire and obtained a German gun, and brought -it and boxes of ammunition into the sunken road. Here he mounted and -fired the gun in full view of the enemy, causing the enemy to retire -further, and enabling Infantry on the flank, who were previously held up, -to advance. Enemy machine gunners having direct observation, flicked -the earth round and under this gun, and played a tattoo along the top -of the bank. Though one bullet went into his helmet and inflicted a -gaping scalp wound, he continued firing. Subsequently he refused to go -out to have his wound attended to, as the situation was critical and his -place was with his men. Later in the day the Infantry were obliged to -retire slightly, and one gun was left behind. Lieut. Towner, seeing -this, dashed back over the open, carried the gun back in spite of terrific -fire, and brought it into action again. He continued to engage the -enemy wherever they appeared, and put an enemy machine gun out of -action. During the following night he insisted on doing his tour of duty -along with the other officers, and his coolness and cheerfulness set an -example which had a great effect on the men. To steady and calm the -men of a small detached outpost, he crawled out among the enemy posts -to investigate. He remained out about an hour, though enemy machine -guns fired continuously on the sector, and the Germans were moving -about him. He moved one gun up in support of the Infantry post, and -patrolled the communication saps which ran off this post into the German -line during the remainder of the night. Next morning, after his guns -assisted in dispersing a large party of the enemy, he was led away utterly -exhausted, 30 hours after being wounded."</p></blockquote> - -<p>No. 2358, <span class="smcap">Sergeant Albert David Lowerson</span>, -21st Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"At <span class="smcap">Mont St, Quentin</span>, north of Péronne, on the 1st September, -1918, this N.C.O. displayed courage and tactical skill of the very highest -order during the attack on this village. Very strong opposition was met -with early in the attack, and every foot of ground was stubbornly contested -by the enemy located in very strong positions. This N.C.O.'s -example during the fighting was of the greatest value. He moved about, -regardless of the heavy enemy machine-gun fire, directing his men, -encouraging them to still greater effort, and finally led them on to the -objective. On reaching the objective, he saw that the left attacking -party had not met with success, and that the attack was held up by an -enemy strong post, heavily manned with 12 machine guns. Under the -heaviest sniping and machine gun fire Sergeant Lowerson rallied seven -men around him into a storming party, and deployed them to attack -the post from both flanks, one party of three being killed immediately. -He himself then rushed the strong point, and, with effective bombing, -inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, and captured the post containing -12 machine guns and 30 prisoners. Though severely wounded in the right -thigh, he refused to leave the front line until the prisoners had been dispatched -to the rear, and the organization and consolidation of the post -by our men had been completed. When he saw that the position was -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[309]</a></span>thoroughly secure, he returned to the rear, but refused to leave the Battalion -until forced to evacuate two days later by the seriousness of his -wound. This act was the culminating point of a series of most gallant -performances by this N.C.O. during the fighting extending over a week."</p></blockquote> - -<p>No. 1584<span class="smcap">A</span>, <span class="smcap">Private William Matthew Currey</span>, -53rd Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"During the attack on <span class="smcap">Péronne</span>, on the morning of 1st September, -1918, Private Currey displayed most conspicuous gallantry and daring. -During the early stage of the advance the Battalion was suffering heavy -casualties from a 77 mm. Field Gun, that was firing over sights at very -close range. Private Currey, without hesitation, rushed forward, and -despite a withering machine-gun fire that was directed on him from -either flank, succeeded in capturing the gun single-handed after killing -the entire crew. Later, when continuing the advance, an enemy strong -point, containing 30 men and two machine guns, was noticed, which -was holding up the advance of the left flank. Private Currey crept -around the flank, and engaged the post with a Lewis Gun, causing many -casualties. Finally, he rushed the post single-handed, killing four, -wounding two, and taking one prisoner, the survivors running away. -It was entirely owing to his gallant conduct that the situation was -relieved, and the advance enabled to continue. After the final stage of -the attack, it was imperative that one of the Companies that had become -isolated should be withdrawn. This man at once volunteered to carry -the message, although the ground to be crossed was very heavily shelled and -continuously swept by machine-gun fire. He crossed the shell and bullet-swept -area three times in the effort to locate the Company, and on one -occasion his box respirator was shot through by machine-gun bullets, -and he was gassed. Nevertheless, he remained on duty, and after -finding the isolated Company, delivered the message, and returned with -very valuable information from the Company Commander. Owing to -the gas poisoning from which he was suffering Currey had shortly afterwards -to be evacuated."</p></blockquote> - -<p>No. 6939, <span class="smcap">Private Robert Mactier</span>, -23rd Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"On the morning of 1st September, 1918, during the operation -entailing capture of <span class="smcap">Mont St. Quentin</span>, this man stands out for the -greatest bravery and devotion to duty. Fifteen minutes before zero -two bombing patrols were sent to clear up several enemy strong points -close to our line, but they met with very stubborn resistance and no -success, and the Battalion was unable to move on to its Jumping Off -Trench. Mactier, single-handed and in daylight, then jumped out of -the trench from the leading Company, rushed past the block, closed with -and killed the machine-gun garrison of 8 men with his revolver and -bombs, and threw the enemy machine gun over the parapet. He rushed -forward another 20 yards and jumped into another strong point held -by a garrison of 6 men, who immediately surrendered. Continuing to -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[310]</a></span>the next block through the trench, an enemy gun, which had been -enfilading our flank advancing troops, was swung on to him; but he -jumped out of the trench into the open, and disposed of this third post -and gun crew by bombing them from the rear. Before he could get into -this trench, he was killed by enemy machine gun at close range. In the -three posts which Mactier rushed, 15 of the enemy were found killed and -30 taken prisoners."</p></blockquote> - -<p>No. 1876, <span class="smcap">Corporal Alexander Henry Buckley</span>, -54th Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"For most conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty at <span class="smcap">Péronne</span> -during the operations on 1st-2nd September, 1918. After passing the -first objective, his half Company and part of the Company on the flank -were held up by an enemy machine-gun nest. With one man he rushed -the post, shooting 4 of the occupants and taking 22 prisoners. Later -on, reaching a moat, another machine-gun nest commanded the only -available foot-bridge. Whilst this was being engaged from a flank, this -N.C.O. endeavoured to cross the bridge and rush the post, but was killed -in the attempt. Throughout the advance he had displayed great -initiative, resource and courage, being a great inspiration to his men. -In order to avert casualties amongst his comrades and to permit of their advance, -he voluntarily essayed a task which practically meant certain death. -He set a fine example of self-sacrificing devotion to duty and bravery."</p></blockquote> - -<p>No. 2631, <span class="smcap">Corporal Arthur Charles Hall</span>, -54th Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"For most conspicuous gallantry, brilliant leadership and devotion -to duty during the operations at <span class="smcap">Péronne</span> on 1st and 2nd September, 1918. -A machine-gun post in the enemy front line was holding up the advance; -alone, this N.C.O. rushed the position, shot 4 of the occupants as he -advanced, and captured 9 others and 2 machine guns. Then, crossing -the objective with a small party, he reconnoitred the approaches to the -town, covering the infiltration of the remainder of the Company. During -the mopping up he continuously—in advance of the main party—located -enemy posts of resistance, and then personally led parties to the assault. -In this way he captured many small parties of prisoners and machine-guns. -On the morning of 2nd September, during a heavy barrage on the -newly consolidated position, a man of his platoon was severely wounded. -Seeing that only immediate medical attention could save him, Corporal -Hall volunteered and carried the man out of the barrage, handed him -to a stretcher-bearer, and immediately returned to his post. This -Company was heavily engaged throughout the day, only one Officer -remaining unwounded."</p></blockquote> - -<p>No. 1153, <span class="smcap">Private (Lance-Corporal) Laurence Carthage -Weathers</span>, -43rd Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"On the 2nd September, 1918, during operations north of <span class="smcap">Péronne</span>, -Lance-Corporal Weathers was one of an advanced bombing party -operating well forward of our attacking troops. Just before the attack -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[311]</a></span>reached its final objective it was held up by the enemy, who occupied a -trench in great numbers. After an hour's continuous fighting Lance-Corporal -Weathers went forward alone in face of heavy enemy fire and -located a large body of them. He immediately attacked the enemy -with bombs and killed the senior officer; then made his way back to our -lines and, securing a further supply of bombs and taking three men with -him, he went forward and again attacked under very heavy fire. On -reaching the enemy position, he jumped up on the parapet of the trench -and threw bombs among the Bosche. He then signalled for his comrades -to come up, and the remainder of the enemy, seeing this, surrendered. -When counted, the number of prisoners totalled 100 and 3 machine guns."</p></blockquote> - -<p>No. 3244, <span class="smcap">Private James Park Woods</span>, -48th Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during the operations -near <span class="smcap">Le Verguier</span>, north-west of St. Quentin, on the 18th September, -1918. Woods formed one of a party of three to patrol the -right flank. He encountered a very formidable enemy strong point, -consisting of about 25 men with four heavy and two light machine guns. -This strong point commanded the greater portion of our position, and it -was of the utmost importance to us, insomuch as it gave us a commanding -view of the whole canal system. The strong point was situated at the -junction of four enemy fire trenches, apparently sited with a view to -protecting the approaches to the village of Bellenglise. Private Woods, -appreciating the great importance of this position, and realizing the -necessity for its immediate capture, fearlessly attacked with his rifle -and bayonet, capturing one of the enemy and wounding the second with -his bayonet, forcing the remainder to retire. After the capture of the -strong point, it was found that one of the party was wounded. Private -Woods, although himself slightly gassed, stubbornly defended the post. -The enemy ascertaining that only two men opposed them, immediately -attempted to recapture the strong point. The counter-attack by the -enemy was carried out with at least 30 men attacking up the three -trenches and across the open ground. This meant that Private Woods -was attacked from both flanks and the front. He fearlessly jumped on -the parapet, and opened fire on the attacking enemy, inflicting several -casualties. During this operation he was exposed to very heavy machine-gun, -rifle fire and bombing, but with dogged determination he kept up his -fire, thus holding up the enemy until help arrived, enabling the enemy -counter-attack to be repulsed with heavy losses. The capture of this -strong post was the means of securing our flank, which had previously been -in the air, and also enabled us to get in touch with the troops on our flank."</p></blockquote> - -<p>No. 6594, <span class="smcap">Sergeant Gerald Sexton</span>, -13th Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"In the attack near <span class="smcap">Le Verguier</span>, north-west of St. Quentin, on the -18th September, 1918, Sergeant Sexton displayed the most conspicuous -bravery and performed deeds which, apart from their gallant nature, -were in a great measure responsible for the Battalion's success. On the -southern edge of the village of Le Verguier the enemy fought hard, and -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[312]</a></span>serious opposition had to be crushed. During the whole period of the -advance, Sergeant Sexton was to the fore dealing with enemy machine -guns by firing from the hip as he advanced, rushing enemy posts, and -performing feats of bravery and endurance, which are better appreciated -when one realizes that all the time he fired his Lewis Gun from the hip -without faltering or for a moment taking cover. Immediately the attack -commenced, Sergeant Sexton's Lewis Gun Section was confronted by -an enemy machine gun. He called out to his section to follow, rushed -the machine gun and killed the crew. He then called out to the rest -of the Company to follow, but they had not gone far when they encountered -some bombers and riflemen about 70 yards in front of the Company. -Sexton rushed the trench, firing his gun from the hip, and killed or took -prisoner all the members of the post. Continuing, he entered a copse, and -killed or took prisoner another party of the enemy. The advance continued -over the ridge at Le Verguier to where Sexton was met by Lieut. -Price, who pointed out a party of the enemy manning a bank, and a -field gun in action which was causing casualties and holding up a Company. -There was also a trench mortar in action. Sergeant Sexton did -not wait, but firing a few short bursts as he advanced, and calling out to -his section to follow, rushed down the bank and killed the gunners on -the field gun. Dashing out on to a flat under fire from two hostile -machine guns directed on him, he killed 12 more of the enemy. Paying -no heed to the machine-gun fire, he returned to the bank, and after firing -down some dug-outs, induced about 30 of the enemy to surrender. -Owing to his action the Company on the left of the Battalion was able -to continue the advance where they had been definitely held up, and -were suffering from the effects of the field gun. When the advance was -continued from the first to the second objective, the Company was again -held up by two machine guns on the right and one on the left. In conjunction -with a Platoon, Sexton engaged the machine gun on the left, -firing all the while from the upright position, a fearless figure which, -according to eye-witnesses, inspired everyone. To have taken cover -would have been more prudent, but Sexton realized that prompt action -was essential, and did not wait to assume the prone position. Silencing -this gun, he turned his attention to the two machine guns on the right -and silenced them. He then moved forward into a trench, killing quite -a number of the enemy and, advancing along a sap, took a few prisoners. -Further on he was responsible for a few more small posts, and, on the -final objective, being given a responsible post on the left of his Company, -he engaged a machine gun which was firing across the Company front, -and thus enabled his Company to dig in. This completed, he went -forward down a sunken road and captured several more prisoners."</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Major Blair Anderson Wark</span>, D.S.O., -32nd Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"During the period 29th September-1st October, 1918, in the operations -against the <span class="smcap">Hindenburg Line</span> at <span class="smcap">Bellicourt</span>, and the advance -through <span class="smcap">Nauroy</span>, <span class="smcap">Etricourt</span>, <span class="smcap">Magny la Fosse</span> and <span class="smcap">Joncourt</span>, Major -Wark, in command of the 32nd Battalion, displayed most conspicuous -gallantry and set a fine example of personal bravery, energy, coolness, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[313]</a></span>and control under extremely difficult conditions. On 29th September, -under heavy artillery and machine-gun fire at very close range from all -sides and in a dense fog, Major Wark, finding that the situation was -critical, moved quickly forward alone and obtained sufficient information -regarding the situation in front to be able to lead his command forward. -At this time American troops were at a standstill and disorganized, and -Major Wark quickly organized more than 200 of them, and attached them -to his leading Companies and pressed forward. By his prompt action -in the early stages of the battle he narrowly averted what would have -resulted in great confusion on the part of the attack-troops. Still -moving fearlessly at the head of his leading Companies, and at most -times far out in advance, attended only by a runner, he cheered his men -on, and they swept through the Hindenburg defences towards Nauroy. -Pushing quickly through Nauroy, and mopping up the southern portion -of the village, the process yielding 50 prisoners, the Battalion swung -towards Etricourt. Still leading his assaulting Companies, he observed -a battery of 77 mm. guns firing point-blank into his rear Companies and -causing heavy casualties. Calling on a few of his men to him he rushed -the battery, capturing the 4 guns and 10 of the crew; the remainder of -the crew fled or were killed. Moving rapidly forward with only two -N.C.O.'s, he surprised and captured 50 Germans near Magny la Fosse. -Quickly seizing this opportunity, he pushed one Company forward -through the village and made good the position. Having captured his -objectives for the day, and personally reconnoitring to see that his -flanks were safe, he found his command in a very difficult and dangerous -position, his left flank being exposed to the extent of 3,000 yards on -account of the 31st Battalion not being able to advance. He, after a -strenuous day's fighting, set about the selection and reorganization of a -new position, and effected a junction with British troops on the right -and 31st Battalion on the left, and made his line secure. At 6 a.m. on -30th September, he again led his command forward to allow of the troops -on the right being able to advance. The men were tired and had suffered -heavily, but he personally led them, and his presence amongst them -inspired them to further efforts. On October 1st, 1918, his Battalion -was ordered to advance at very short notice. He gave his orders for the -attack, and personally led his troops forward. A nest of machine guns -was encountered, causing casualties to his men. Without hesitation -and regardless of personal risk, he dashed forward practically into the -muzzles of the guns and under an exceptionally heavy fire and silenced -them, killing or capturing the entire crews. Joncourt and Mill Ridge -were then quickly captured and his line consolidated. His men were -practically exhausted after the three days' heavy fighting, but he moved -amongst them from post to post, across country swept by heavy and -continuous shell and machine-gun fire at point-blank range, urged them -on and the line was made secure. Throughout he displayed the greatest -courage and devotion to duty, coupled with great tact and skill, and his -work, together with the reports based on his own personal observations, -which he forwarded, were invaluable to the Brigade. It is beyond doubt -that the success achieved by the Brigade during the heavy fighting on -29th and 30th September and 1st October was due to this officer's gallantry, -determination, skill and great courage."</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[314]</a></span></p> - -<p>No. 1717, <span class="smcap">Private John Ryan</span>, -55th Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty, and for saving a very -dangerous situation under particularly gallant circumstances during -an attack against the Hindenburg defences on 30th September, 1918. -In the initial assault on the enemy's positions this soldier went forward -with great dash and determination, and was one of the first men of his -Company to reach the trench which was their objective. Seeing him rush -in with his bayonet with such exceptional skill and daring, his comrades -were inspired and followed his example. Although the enemy shell and -machine-gun fire was extremely heavy, the enemy trench garrison was -soon overcome. In the assault the attacking troops were weakened by -casualties, and, as they were too few to cover the whole front of attack, -a considerable gap was left between Private Ryan's Battalion's left and -the unit on the flank. The enemy counter-attacked soon after the -objective was reached, and a few succeeded in infiltrating through the -gap, and taking up a position of cover in rear of our men, where they -commenced bombing operations. The section of trench occupied by -Private Ryan and his comrades was now under fire from front and rear, -and for a time it seemed that the enemy was certain to force his way -through. The situation was critical and necessitated prompt action by -someone in authority. Private Ryan found that there were no officers -or N.C.O.'s near; they had become casualties in the assault. Appreciating -the situation at once, he organized the few men nearest him, -and led them out to attack the enemy with bomb and bayonet. Some of -his party fell victims to the enemy's bombs, and he finally dashed into the -enemy position of cover with only 3 men. The enemy were three times -their number, but by skilful bayonet work they succeeded in killing the -first three Germans on the enemy's flank. Moving along the embankment, -Private Ryan alone rushed the remainder of the enemy with -bombs. It was while thus engaged he fell wounded, but his dashing -bombing assault drove the enemy clear of our positions. Those who -were not killed or wounded by his bombs fell victims to our Lewis Gunners -as they retired across No Man's Land. A particularly dangerous -situation had been saved by this gallant soldier, whose display of determined -bravery and initiative was witnessed by the men of the two -attacking Battalions, who, inspired and urged by it, fought skilfully and -bravely for two days."</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Lieutenant Joseph Maxwell</span>, M.C., D.C.M., -18th Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"On 3rd October, 1918, he took part as a Platoon Commander in an -attack on the <span class="smcap">Beaurevoir-Fonsomme</span> Line near Estrées, north of St. -Quentin. His Company Commander was severely wounded soon after -the jump off, and Lieut. Maxwell at once took charge of the Company. -When the enemy wire was reached, they were met by a hail of machine-gun -fire, and suffered considerable casualties, including all other officers -of the Company. The wire at this point was six belts thick, each belt -being 20 to 25 feet wide. Lieut. Maxwell pushed forward single-handed -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[315]</a></span>through the wire, and attacked the most dangerous machine gun. He -personally killed three of the crew, and the remaining four men in the -post surrendered to him with a machine gun. His Company followed -him through the wire and captured the trenches forming their objective. -Later, it was noticed that the Company on his left was held up in the -wire by a very strong force on the left flank of the Battalion. He at -once organized a party and moved to the left to endeavour to attack -the enemy from the rear. Heavy machine-gun fire met them. Lieut. -Maxwell again dashed forward single-handed at the foremost machine -gun, and with his revolver shot five of its crew, so silencing the gun. -Owing to the work of this party, the left Company was then able to work -a small force through the wire, and eventually to occupy the objective -and mop up the trenches. In the fighting prior to the mopping up, an -English-speaking prisoner, who was captured, stated that the remainder -of the enemy were willing to surrender. Lieut. Maxwell and two men, -with this prisoner, walked to a post containing more than twenty -Germans. The latter at once seized and disarmed our men. Lieut. -Maxwell waited his chance, and then with an automatic pistol which he -had concealed in his box respirator, shot two of the enemy and with the -two men escaped. They were pursued by rifle fire, and one was wounded. -However, Lieut. Maxwell organized a small party at once, attacked and -captured the post."</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Second Lieutenant George Morby Ingram</span>, M.M., -24th Battalion, A.I.F.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"During the attack on <span class="smcap">Montbrehain</span>, east of Péronne, on 5th October, -1918, this officer was in charge of a platoon. About 100 yards from -the Jumping Off Trench severe enemy machine-gun fire was encountered -from a strong post which had escaped our Artillery fire, and the advance -was thus held up. Lieut. Ingram dashed out, and, under cover of the fire -of a Lewis Gun, rushed the post at the head of his men. This post contained -9 machine guns and 42 Germans, who fought until our men were -within 3 yards of them. They were killed to a man—Lieut. Ingram -accounting for no less than 18 of them. A number of enemy posts were -then observed to be firing on our men from about 150 yards further -forward, and the Company moved forward to attack them, but severe -casualties were sustained. The Company Commander had been badly -wounded, and the Company Sergeant-Major and several others, who -attempted to lead the advance, were killed. Our barrage had passed on, -and no Tanks were near. Lieut. Ingram quickly seized the situation, -rallied his men in the face of murderous fire, and, with magnificent courage -and resolution, led them forward. He himself rushed the first post, -shot 6 of the enemy, and captured a machine gun, thus overcoming a -very serious resistance. By this time the Company had been reduced -from 90 to about 30 other ranks; but this officer, seeing enemy fire -coming from a quarry, to his left front, again led his men forward and -rushed the quarry. He jumped into the quarry amongst enemy wire, -and his men followed and proceeded to mop up a large number of the -enemy who were in bivouacs there. He then observed an enemy machine -gun firing from the ventilator of a cellar, through a gap in the wall of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[316]</a></span>a house about 20 yards away. Without hesitation and entirely alone -he scrambled up the edge of the quarry, ran round the rear of the house, -and entering from the far side, shot the enemy gunner through the ventilator -of the cellar. He fired several more shots into the cellar, then, -seeing some enemy jumping out of the window of the house, he burst -open a door, rushed to the head of the stairs leading into the cellar, and -forced 62 of the enemy to surrender. He now found he was out of touch -with the Company on his left flank, so went out alone and made a personal -reconnaissance under heavy fire, and succeeded in gaining touch with the -left Company, which had lost all its officers. Having returned to his -Company, he personally placed a post on his left flank to ensure its -safety, and then reconnoitred and established two posts on his right flank. -All this was done in the face of continuous machine-gun and shell fire."</p></blockquote> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_316fp.jpg" width="1200" height="758" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>Australian Artillery—moving up to the front, through the Hindenburg wire, October 2nd, 1918.</p></div> -</div> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1200px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_317fp.jpg" width="1200" height="777" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p>Advance during Battle—Third Division Infantry and Tanks advancing to the capture of Bony, October 1st, 1918.</p></div> -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[317]</a></span></p> - -<h2>APPENDIX C<br /> - -CORPS ORDERS FOR THE BATTLE OF AUGUST 8TH, 1918</h2> - - -<p>The following were the complete orders issued by the Australian -Army Corps for the Battle of August 8th, 1918. They form -only a small part of the whole of the orders which were required -for the operation. There were, in addition, detailed orders by -the Corps Artillery Headquarters, the Heavy Artillery, the -Chief Engineer, and each of the five Divisions and fifteen Brigades, -and also by the Administrative Services of the Corps.</p> - -<p>On the question of the form of the orders, the most expedient -course was found to be the one here adopted—namely, that of -issuing a numbered series of Battle Instructions, each dealing -comprehensively with a separate subject matter:</p> - - -<p><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 1</span></p> - -<p>1. The Australian Corps will attack the enemy from the -<span class="smcap">Villers-Bretonneux—Chaulnes</span> Railway exclusive to the -River <span class="smcap">Somme</span>, inclusive, at a date and hour to be notified.</p> - -<p>The Canadian Corps will co-operate on the right, south of the -railway (inclusive), and the Third Corps on the left, north of -the <span class="smcap">Somme</span>.</p> - -<p>2. <i>General Method of Attack.</i>—The Australian Corps will -attack on a two-division front. The attack will be carried out -in three phases. Divisional boundaries and objectives are shown -on the attached map.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(i) <i>First Phase.</i>—The 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions -will form up on a taped line prior to <span class="smcap">ZERO</span>, and will attack -with Tanks under a creeping artillery barrage. Their -objective is shown by a <span class="smcap">GREEN</span> line on the attached map.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[318]</a></span></p> -<p>On arrival at their objective they will consolidate.</p> - -<p>(ii) <i>Second Phase.</i>—The 5th and 4th Australian Divisions, -organized in brigade groups, will advance in open warfare -formations, from the first objective passing through 2nd -and 3rd Australian Divisions respectively. Their objective -is shown in <span class="smcap">RED</span> on the map.</p> - -<p>(iii) <i>Third Phase.</i>—The 5th and 4th Australian Divisions -will exploit their success and seize the old British line of -Defences marked <span class="smcap">BLUE</span> on the map, and establish themselves -defensively on this line.</p> - -<p>(iv) The 1st Australian Division will be in Corps Reserve.</p> - -<p>(v) A detailed programme of the action will be issued.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>3. <i>Assembly.</i>—In order to free as many troops from line duty -as possible, 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions will arrange to -hold the front with one infantry brigade on each Divisional -sector. This will be completed before daybreak on 5th August.</p> - -<p>To prevent any troops arriving at their objectives in an -exhausted condition through a long march, troops detailed to -the farthest objectives must be quartered nearest the starting -line prior to <span class="smcap">ZERO</span>.</p> - -<p>The brigades of 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions not holding -the line will be quartered in rear of all brigades of 5th and 4th -Australian Divisions respectively prior to <span class="smcap">ZERO</span> night. This will -be completed before daybreak on 5th August.</p> - -<p>The allotment of areas for quartering during this stage will -be made by mutual arrangement between Divisional Commanders -concerned. The allotment of routes and times of movement -in accordance with the Corps programme will be arranged -similarly.</p> - -<p>On <span class="smcap">ZERO</span> night the brigades of 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions -not in the line will make their approach march to their -tape lines through the area occupied by 5th and 4th Australian -Divisions respectively.</p> - -<p>4. <i>Artillery.</i></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(i) The Artillery available consists of:</p> - -<p> -18 Field Artillery Brigades.<br /> -12 Heavy Artillery Brigades.<br /> -</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[319]</a></span></p> - -<p>(ii) G.O.C., R.A., Aust. Corps, will command all artillery -of the Corps during the first phase of the operation.</p> - -<p>(iii) For the second phase G.O.C., R.A., Aust. Corps, -will allot:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) Three Field Artillery Brigades to 5th and 4th -Aust. Divisions for distribution to infantry brigade -groups. These will include the 5th and 4th Aust. -Divisional Artillery respectively.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) Three brigades of Field Artillery and one battery -of 60-pdr. Heavy Artillery allotted to each of the 5th -and 4th Aust. Divisions for employment as may be -ordered by the Divisional Commanders.</p> - -<p>(<i>c</i>) The remainder of the Field Artillery and the -Heavy Artillery to Corps Reserve.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>(iv) Heavy Artillery will be pushed forward by G.O.C., -R.A., to protect the troops in the second objective.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>5. <i>Tanks.</i>—Instructions for the distribution and employment -of Tanks will be issued later.</p> - -<p>6. <i>Engineers.</i>—Engineers and Pioneers will be distributed for -work as follows from midnight on 6th-7th instant:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p> -(i) Corps Pool under Chief Engineer—</p> -<blockquote> -<p> -1 Field Coy. from 4th Aust. Div.<br /> -1 Field Coy. from 5th Aust. Div.<br /> -2 Field Coys. from 2nd Aust. Div.<br /> -2 Field Coys. from 3rd Aust. Div.<br /> -3 Army Troops Coys. Engineers.<br /> -5th Aust. Pioneer Bn.<br /> -3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn.<br /> -</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>(ii) With Divisions:</p> - -<p>2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn. will serve 2nd and 3rd Aust. -Divisions. 2 Coys. to each.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[320]</a></span></p> - -<p>4th Aust. Pioneer Bn. will serve 4th and 5th Aust. -Divisions. 2 Coys. to each.</p> - -<p>Divisional Commanders will control:</p> - -<p> -2nd Aust. Division—1 Field Coy. and 2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn. (less 2 Coys.).<br /> -3rd Aust. Division—1 Field Coy. and 2 Coys. 2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn.<br /> -4th Aust. Division—2 Field Coys. and 4th Aust. Pioneer Bn. (less 2 Coys.).<br /> -5th Aust. Division—2 Field Coys. and 2 Coys. 4th Aust. Pioneer Bn.<br /> -</p> - -<p>Tunnellers will be detailed to each division for dug-out -exploration.</p> - -<p>Chief Engineer, Aust. Corps, will arrange for the distribution -in accordance with this.</p> - -<p>Chief Engineer will issue instructions for the withdrawal -and storing of demolition charges of bridges for which the -Corps is responsible, and for the return of engineer personnel -employed on this work to their units.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>7. Deputy Director of Medical Services will arrange for the -distribution of medical units.</p> - - -<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 2</span><br /> -SECRECY</div> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) It is of first importance that secrecy should be observed -and the operation carried out as a surprise.</p> - -<p>Commanders will take all possible steps to prevent the scope -or date of the operation becoming known except to those taking -part. Any officer, N.C.O., or man discussing the operation in -public, or communicating details regarding it to any person, -either soldier or civilian, not immediately concerned, will be -severely dealt with.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) All movement of troops and transport will take place by -night, whether in the forward or back areas of the Australian<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[321]</a></span> -Corps, on and after 1st August, except where absolutely necessary -to move by day.</p> - -<p>(<i>c</i>) O.C., No. 3 Squadron, A.F.C., will arrange for aeroplanes -to fly over the Australian Corps Army area during days when -flying is possible, and to report to Corps H.Q. any abnormal -movement of troops or transport within our lines.</p> - -<p>(<i>d</i>) Work on back lines will be continued as at present, so that -there may be no apparent change in our attitude.</p> - -<p>(<i>e</i>) Commanders will ensure that the numbers of officers -reconnoitring the enemy's positions is limited to those for whom -such reconnaissance is essential.</p> - -<p>Nothing attracts attention to an offensive more than a large -number of officers with maps looking over the parapet and -visiting Observation Posts.</p> - -<p>Commanding Officers of units holding the front line should -report at once to higher authority any disregard of these orders.</p> - -<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 3</span><br /> -COMMUNICATIONS AND HEADQUARTERS</div> - -<p>1. Communications will be carefully organized to ensure the -maintenance of communication throughout the advance and -after its conclusion.</p> - -<p>2. (i) Headquarters of Divisions will be established as follows:</p> -<blockquote> -<p> -2nd Australian Division—<span class="smcap">Glisy</span>.<br /> -5th Australian Division—<span class="smcap">Blangy-Tronville</span> Château. Advanced Headquarters in dug-outs at Railway cutting.<br /> -3rd Australian Division—<span class="smcap">Bussy</span>.<br /> -4th Australian Division—<span class="smcap">Corbie</span>.<br /> -</p> - -<p>(ii) Headquarters of Brigades and battalions will be -selected in advance, as far as this can be done, and all -concerned will be notified of their proposed locations.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>3. Report Centres in advance of the heads of buried cables -will be selected in each Divisional Sector and details prepared -for the organization of communications back to cable head.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[322]</a></span></p> - -<p>4. The following mounted troops are detailed to Divisions:</p> -<blockquote> -<p> -To 2nd Australian Division—1 Troop 13th L.H.<br /> -3rd Australian Division—1 Troop 13th L.H.<br /> -4th Australian Division—2 Troops 13th L.H.<br /> -5th Australian Division—2 Troops 13th L.H.<br /> -</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>Divisions will inform O.C., 13th Light Horse, as to the time and -place at which the Light Horse will report.</p> - -<p>The Cyclist Section now with Divisions will remain.</p> - -<p>5. The employment of wireless will be exploited to the full.</p> - -<p>6. Popham panels will be employed for communication between -Infantry and Aeroplanes.</p> - - -<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 4</span><br /> -ARTILLERY</div> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) Ammunition will be dumped at or near gun positions as -follows:</p> - - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left">18-pdr.</td><td align="left">600 rounds.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">4.5" Howitzer</td><td align="left">500 rounds.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">60-pdr.</td><td align="left">400 rounds.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">6" guns</td><td align="left">400 rounds.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">6" Howitzers</td><td align="left">400 rounds.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">8" Howitzers</td><td align="left">400 rounds.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">9.2" Howitzers </td><td align="left">400 rounds.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">12" Howitzers</td><td align="left">200 rounds.</td></tr> -</table></div> - -<p>Arrangements should be made to commence dumping this -ammunition as soon as feasible. Echelons will be kept full.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) Boundaries between Corps as regards bombardment and -counter-battery work coincide with the boundaries between -Corps shown on map issued with Australian Corps "Battle -Instructions No. 1," dated 1st August, 1918.</p> - -<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 5</span><br /> -TANKS</div> - -<p>1. Tanks are available as follows:</p> - -<p><i>5<sup>th</sup> Tank Brigade.</i></p> -<blockquote> -<p> -Mark V. Tanks—2nd Battalion—Lieut.-Col. <span class="smcap">E. D. Bryce</span>, D.S.O.<br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[323]</a></span><br /> -Mark V. Tanks—8th Battalion—Lieut.-Col. The Hon. <span class="smcap">J. D. Y. Bingham</span>, D.S.O.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 7em;">13th Battalion—Lieut.-Col. <span class="smcap">P. Lyon</span>.</span><br /> -Mark V. (Star) Tanks—15th Battalion—Lieut.-Colonel <span class="smcap">Ramsey-Fairfax</span>.<br /> -No. 1 G.C.Coy. (24 Carrying Tanks)—Major <span class="smcap">W. Partington</span>, M.C.<br /> -</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>2. <i>Mark V. Tanks</i> are allotted as follows:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>13th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. <span class="smcap">Lyon</span>), less one company, to -3rd Australian Division.</p> - -<p>2nd Battalion (Lieut.-Col. <span class="smcap">Bryce</span>), plus one company -13th Battalion attached, to be employed with the -two right Divisions—two companies to be allotted -to each Division.</p> - -<p>8th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. The Hon. <span class="smcap">J. D. Y. Bingham</span>) -to 4th Australian Division.</p></blockquote> - -<p>One company of the 8th Battalion will be employed in support. -It will be specially charged with the function of maintaining -the attack at the junction of Divisions throughout the -advance as far as the second objective.</p> - -<p>Command will be effected through Battalion Commanders in -each case except that Lieut.-Col. <span class="smcap">Bryce</span> will be responsible for -command of all Mark V. Tanks allotted to both 2nd and 5th -Australian Divisions.</p> - -<p>3. After the capture of the first objective, Tanks detailed to -2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions will rally and will be employed -to support the advance of the 5th and 4th Australian Divisions -respectively.</p> - -<p>4. After the capture of the second objective, Tanks will rally. -One company will remain in close support in each divisional -sector; the remainder will be withdrawn to positions to be -arranged between Divisional and Tank Commanders.</p> - -<p>5. Mark V. (Star) Tanks are allotted as follows:</p> -<blockquote> -<p> -1½ companies (18 tanks) to the 5th Australian Division.<br /> -1½ companies (18 tanks) to the 4th Australian Division.<br /> -</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>These tanks are allotted for the capture of the blue line.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[324]</a></span></p> - -<p><i>6. Carrying Tanks</i> are allotted as follows:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions—3 tanks each.</p> - -<p>4th and 5th Australian Divisions—9 tanks each.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>7. Orders for forming up and movement to the Start Line -will be issued by G.O.C., 5th Tank Brigade.</p> - -<p>Battalion Commanders detailed to Divisions will be responsible -for all liaison duty in connection with the Tanks.</p> - -<p>8. For tactical purposes Tanks will be placed under the command -of Infantry Commanders to whose commands they are -allotted.</p> - -<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 5A</span><br /> -ASSEMBLY OF TANKS</div> - -<p><i>1. Preliminary Movement.</i></p> - -<p>Tanks will be assembled in concealed positions in the forward -area under the orders of the 5th Tank Brigade prior to night -Y/Z.</p> - -<p><i>2. Advance to Start Line.</i></p> - -<p>On night Y/Z the Tanks allotted to troops attacking the -first objective will commence to move forward at 9.30 p.m. to -the Tank Start Line. They will move with full engines to a line -not nearer to the Tank Start Line than 3,000 yards. From there -they will continue the movement forward to the Tank Start -Line, moving at a slow rate and as quietly as possible. The -Tank Start Line will be approximately 1,000 yards in rear of the -Infantry taped line.</p> - -<p>Tanks will leave the Tank Start Line at such times as will -allow them to catch up to the Infantry as the barrage lifts at -zero plus three minutes.</p> - -<p><i>3. Concealment of Engine Noise.</i></p> - -<p>To conceal the noise of the engines during the advance of -the Tanks, the 5th Brigade R.A.F. will arrange to have planes -flying continuously over the Corps area from 9.30 p.m. until -midnight on Y/Z night, and from zero minus one hour onward -to zero.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[325]</a></span></p> - -<p><i>4. Tanks allotted to Second Objective.</i></p> - -<p>The Tanks allotted to the second objective will form up -independently under the orders of the 5th Tank Brigade in consultation -with G.O.'s C., 4th and 5th Australian Divisions. -These Tanks will be formed up when the aeroplanes are in the -air during the hours laid down in para. 3.</p> - -<p><i>5. Liaison Company.</i></p> - -<p>The company of the 8th Tank Battalion detailed to act in -support, and to ensure liaison in the battle line at the junction of -Divisions, will detail a half-company to each wave of Tanks, -vide paras. 2 and 4 above.</p> - -<p>Divisions will detail special liaison parties of Infantry to work -in co-operation with this company.</p> - -<p><i>6. Re-assembly.</i></p> - -<p>As soon as the blue line has been reached, G.O.C. 5th Australian -Division will arrange to release the 2nd Tank Battalion, -less the attached company. This battalion will then be withdrawn. -The remainder of the Tanks, less one company allotted -to remain in support of each of the 4th and 5th Australian -Divisions, will be withdrawn when ordered by Divisional Commanders, -vide Battle Instructions No. 5, para. 4.</p> - -<p><i>7. Smoke Grenades.</i></p> - -<p>Divisions will ensure that a proportion of smoke rifle grenades -accompanies each Infantry detachment detailed to the blue line -and which accompanies each of the Mark V. (Star) Tanks.</p> - -<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 6</span><br /> -ARTILLERY</div> - -<p><i>1. Preparation.</i></p> - -<p>Active counter-battery work and harassing fire will be -maintained.</p> - -<p>Such registration as is necessary will be carried out under -cover of this fire. A detailed programme for this will be arranged -in each divisional sector.</p> - -<p>The necessity for concealing the increase in the number of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[326]</a></span> -guns on the front must be borne in mind, and on no account -should a large number of guns be employed at any one time. -Counter preparation and S.O.S. plans during the period of preparation -for the attack will be drawn up accordingly.</p> - -<p>Normal fire should, so far as possible, be carried out from -positions other than those in which batteries will be emplaced -during the battle.</p> - -<p><i>2. Heavy Artillery.</i></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) In view of the nature of the enemy's defences, the fire -of the majority of the heavy howitzers, employed for purposes -other than counter-battery work, will be used during -the barrage to engage special strong points or localities.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) Throughout the advance beyond the green line enemy -centres of resistance will be kept under fire until such time -as the progress of the Infantry renders this inadvisable. A -map will be issued to show the times at which heavy -artillery fire will cease on zones and special localities.</p> - -<p>(<i>c</i>) At least two-thirds of the available Heavy Artillery -will be employed for counter-battery purposes.</p> - -<p>Heavy concentrations of fire will be directed on the -different groups of enemy artillery.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>3. G.O.C., R.A., will prepare plans for dealing with a heavy -development of hostile fire on zero night. He will also prepare -a plan to deal with any attempt at a deliberate gas bombardment -of the <span class="smcap">Villers-Bretonneux</span> area on zero night.</p> - -<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 7</span><br /> -PROGRAMME OF ACTION</div> - -<p><i>1. Capture of First Objective.</i></p> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) Forming-up troops detailed to the capture of the first -objective will be deployed on the Forming-up Line one hour -before zero hour.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Artillery Programme.</i></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(i) The field artillery 18-pdr. barrage will open at zero -200 yards in advance of the forming-up line. At zero plus<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[327]</a></span> -three minutes the barrage will commence to advance; -lifts will be 100 yards at 2-minute intervals. There will -be two lifts at this rate.</p> - -<p>The rate will then decrease to lifts of 100 yards every -3 minutes. There will be eight lifts at this rate.</p> - -<p>From the eleventh lift inclusive until the green line is -reached lifts will be of 100 yards each at 4-minute intervals.</p> - -<p>(ii) The 4.5" Howitzer barrage will move 200 yards in -advance of the 18-pdr. barrage.</p> - -<p>(iii) A protective barrage will be maintained in front of the -green line until zero plus four hours. During this period -approximately fifty per cent. (50%) of the guns remaining -in the barrage will be employed in a protective line barrage; -the remainder will be employed to search and sweep deeply -into the enemy's position. At zero plus four hours all -barrage fire will cease.</p> - -<p>Barrage Maps will be issued later.</p></blockquote> - -<p><i>2. Capture of Second and Third Objectives.</i></p> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) <i>Assembly.</i>—5th and 4th Australian Divisions will select -and mark positions for the assembly of their troops.</p> - -<p>These areas will be selected in liaison with Tank Commanders -and with the 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions respectively, to -prevent movement to them clashing with the approach march of -these divisions and that of the Tanks.</p> - -<p>This requires careful co-ordination between each pair of -Divisions and Tank Commanders.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Command.</i>—At zero plus four hours, responsibility for the -battle front will pass to G.O.C., 5th Australian Division, in the -right sector, and to G.O.C., 4th Australian Division, in the left -sector.</p> - -<p>(<i>c</i>) <i>The Advance.</i>—5th and 4th Australian Divisions will time -their advance so that the leading troops cross the first objective -(green line) at zero plus four hours.</p> - -<p>(<i>d</i>) From zero plus four hours the advance will be continued -under the conditions of open warfare.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[328]</a></span></p> - -<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 8</span><br /> -ROADS</div> - -<p>1. A map is forwarded herewith showing the organization of -the road system in the captured territory.</p> - -<p>2. The Chief Engineer will issue the necessary instructions for -the preparation of these roads for traffic.</p> - -<p>3. All light traffic which is capable of moving across country -will do so and will avoid main roads.</p> - -<p>4. Mule tracks will be a divisional responsibility.</p> - -<p>5. Artillery advancing with the 5th and 4th Australian -Divisions will carry forward a proportion of bridges. Arrangements -should be made as soon as possible for the development of -tracks, making use of the routes taken by the artillery over these -bridges.</p> - -<p>6. The <span class="smcap">Amiens</span>—<span class="smcap">Longueau</span>—<span class="smcap">Villers-Bretonneux</span> main road, -as far east as the cross roads in N.26.c., will be reserved for the -exclusive use of the Cavalry Corps from 9.30 p.m. on Y/Z night -until 8 a.m. on Z day. After 8 a.m. on Z day it will be available -for the Australian and Cavalry Corps.</p> - -<p>Assistant Provost Marshal, Australian Corps, will arrange -for the control of the traffic on this road throughout.</p> - -<p>Chief Engineer, Australian Corps, will prepare short avoiding -roads at the cross roads at N.26.c. to cross the north-east or -south-west corner to avoid congestion at this spot.</p> - -<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 9</span><br /> -LIGHT SIGNALS, MESSAGE ROCKETS, SMOKE</div> - -<p><i>1. Light Signals.</i></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) <i>Australian Corps.</i></p> - -<p>The following Light Signals will be employed in the -Australian Corps:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>S.O.S. Signal, No. 32 grenade—showing green over -green over green. Allotment 500 per Division.</p> - -<p>Success Signal, No. 32 grenade—showing white over -white over white. Allotment 600 per Division.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[329]</a></span></p> - -<p>A small reserve of each of these grenades is held at Corps -Headquarters.</p> - -<p>No other Light Signals will be laid down by Corps. There -is no objection to the use within Divisions of a Very Light -for the local indication of targets between Infantry and -Tanks.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Other Formations.</i></p> - -<p>Light Signals of other formations are as follows:</p> - - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="center"><i>Formation.</i></td><td align="center"><i>Signal.</i></td><td align="center"><i>Meaning.</i></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">(i) Cavalry Corps.</td><td align="left">White star turning</td><td align="left">"Advanced troops</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">to red on a parachute</td><td align="left">of Cavalry are</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">fired from</td><td align="left">here."</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">1½" Very pistol.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">(ii) Third Corps.</td><td align="left">No. 32 grenade,</td><td align="left">"S.O.S."</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">green over green</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">over green.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">No. 32 grenade,</td><td align="left">"Success signal,</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">white over white</td><td align="left"><i>i.e.</i>, we have</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">over white.</td><td align="left">reached objective."</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">One white Very</td><td align="left">"Barrage is about</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">light.</td><td align="left">to lift."</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">(iii) Canadian Corps</td><td align="left">No. 32 grenade,</td><td align="left">"S.O.S." will also</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">red over red</td><td align="left">mean (<i>a</i>) "We are</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">over red.</td><td align="left">held up and cannot</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">advance without</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">help." (<i>b</i>) "Enemy</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">is counter-attacking."</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">No. 32 grenade,</td><td align="left">"(<i>a</i>) Lift your fire.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">green over green</td><td align="left">We are going to</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">over green.</td><td align="left">advance. (<i>b</i>) Stop</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">firing."</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">Three white Very</td><td align="left">"We have reached</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">lights in quick</td><td align="left">this point."</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"> </td><td align="left">succession.</td></tr> -</table> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[330]</a></span></p> - -<p><i>Remark.</i>—In the case of (<i>a</i>) a smoke rocket (No. 27 -grenade) will also be fired in the direction of the obstruction -to indicate its position.</p> - -<p>(<i>c</i>) Special care must be taken by the Artillery on the -right flank of the Corps that all officers and N.C.O.'s are -acquainted with these signals, so that no mistake may arise -as regards the difference in the S.O.S. Signals of the Australian -and Canadian Corps.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>2. <i>Message-carrying Rockets.</i></p> - -<p>Allotment of Message-carrying Rockets is 80 per Division.</p> - -<p>3. <i>Smoke.</i></p> - -<blockquote> -<p>(<i>a</i>) Artillery smoke will be as follows:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(<i>i</i>) 3 rounds per gun will be fired during the first three -minutes of the artillery barrage.</p> - -<p>(<i>ii</i>) 3 rounds per gun will be fired in quick succession on -the arrival of the field artillery barrage at the artillery -halt line covering the first objective.</p> - -<p>(<i>iii</i>) In the event of wet weather a small proportion of -smoke will be used in the barrage to replace the -smoke and dust caused by the burst of the shells in -dry weather. This will not be sufficient to confuse the -effect with that of the smoke shells prescribed in -paragraph 3 (<i>a</i>) (i) and (ii).</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Screening beyond the First Objective.</i></p> - -<p>15th Wing, Royal Air Force, will arrange to screen the -advance of the Tanks and Infantry from special localities -in advance of their first objective by dropping phosphorus -bombs.</p> - -<p>Divisions and G.O.C., 5th Tank Brigade, will inform -Australian Corps Headquarters as early as possible of the -localities which they desire screened.</p> - -<p>A map will be issued showing times at which it is anticipated -that the Infantry will make good certain zones. -Phosphorus bombs will not be dropped within these zones -at any time after it is anticipated that the Infantry will -have occupied them.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[331]</a></span></p> - -<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 10</span><br /> -INTELLIGENCE AND DISPOSAL OF PRISONERS OF WAR</div> - - -<p>1. <i>Battalion Intelligence Police.</i></p> - -<p>One German speaker and two searchers will be allotted to -each battalion for use as follows:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) <i>German Speaker.</i></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(i) To secure immediate identifications quickly, so that -identifications will reach Corps Headquarters as speedily -as possible of enemy units on the battle front.</p> - -<p>(ii) To secure immediate information required by the -Battalion Commander as regards enemy dispositions, -assembly positions, orders for counter-attack, etc.</p> - -<p>(iii) To be in charge of the two searchers and separate -important documents, orders, maps, etc., translate and -convey information of moment to the immediate Commander.</p></blockquote> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Two Searchers.</i></p> - -<p>The two searchers under the German speaker systematically -search the battlefield, enemy positions, suspected headquarters, -dead, etc., for papers, documents, maps, etc., -have them packed in sandbags, and sent through the usual -channels to the Corps Cage as quickly as possible.</p> - -<p>This personnel should carry torches and, besides rifles -or revolvers, bombs are recommended as being useful for -dealing with any of the enemy who may be found in -dug-outs.</p></blockquote> - - -<p>2. <i>Divisional Intelligence Officers.</i></p> - -<p>Divisional Intelligence Officers will go forward to an Advanced -Divisional Collecting Cage, with a view to obtaining, as soon as -possible, information of immediate tactical importance.</p> - -<p>The Cage will be connected by telephone to Divisional H.Q., -and important information obtained should be transmitted as -quickly as possible to Divisional and Brigade H.Q.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[332]</a></span></p> - -<p>The main points on which immediate information is required -from prisoners are: The Order of Battle, Units seen, Distribution -of the Enemy's Forces, Method of holding the Line, Assembly -Positions, Counter-attack Orders and Intentions.</p> - -<p>This information will be wired to their respective Divisional -Headquarters and repeated to Corps Headquarters and Corps -Cage by Divisional Intelligence Officers.</p> - -<p>Divisional Intelligence Officers will not detain prisoners longer -than is necessary to obtain this tactical information of immediate -importance.</p> - -<p>In case a large number of prisoners are captured, they will -detain only one or two from each regiment, and will not delay -the passage of the remainder to the Corps Cage.</p> - -<p>Any further information required from prisoners by Divisions -or lower formations can always be obtained by telephone from -the Corps Cage.</p> - -<p>3. <i>Searching of Prisoners.</i></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) <i>Officers and N.C.O.'s.</i></p> - -<p>Officers and N.C.O.'s will be searched as soon as possible -after capture by a responsible officer or N.C.O., and all -documents taken from them sent back with them (in sacks, -labelled by regiments, if a number are captured) to the -Divisional Intelligence Officer, at such place as this officer -has prearranged.</p> - -<p>It is left to the discretion of Divisional Intelligence -Officers as to what documents, maps, etc., taken from -prisoners they hold back for the information of Brigade -and Divisional Commanders. When this is done, Corps -"I" will be informed by wire, priority if necessary, of the -nature of the documents, etc., held back, and of any -points of immediate tactical importance they may -contain.</p> - -<p>As soon as possible after information has been extracted -from them, the documents will be forwarded on to the Corps -Cage. Arrangements can be made by Corps, if notified that -documents are ready to be sent on, to fetch them by motorcyclist -or cycle.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[333]</a></span></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Other Ranks.</i></p> - -<p>Prisoners other than officers and N.C.O.'s will be searched -on their arrival at the Corps Cage. Their papers, etc., -will be taken from them and put into sacks labelled according -to regiments.</p> - -<p>(<i>c</i>) All ranks should understand that a prisoner's pay-book, -identity disc, and personal belongings should not be -taken from him. Escorts and guards will be warned to -take special precautions to prevent prisoners from destroying -papers.</p></blockquote> - -<p>4. <i>Separation of Officers, N.C.O.'s and Men.</i></p> - -<p>Care will be taken that officers, N.C.O.'s and privates are all -separated from one another at once, and are not allowed to -communicate with one another. Prisoners who have been -interrogated should not be allowed to mix with those who have -not yet been interrogated.</p> - -<p>5. <i>Notification of Locality of Capture.</i></p> - -<p>It is essential that, when prisoners are sent back, information -be sent with them which will show where they were captured. -Information as to the battalion which made the capture is a -useful indication.</p> - -<p>6. <i>Authorized Persons only to converse with Prisoners.</i></p> - -<p>It is most important that no officer or N.C.O., except those -duly authorized, be allowed to interrogate or converse with -prisoners.</p> - -<p>7. <i>Prisoners of War Cage.</i></p> - -<p>The Advanced Corps Cage will be situated at <span class="smcap">Vecquemont</span>, -N.11.b.8.7. and the Rear Corps Cage at N.2.c.3.7.</p> - -<p>Intelligence Officers and personnel will be stationed here, and -will carry out a more detailed interrogation and sort out captured -documents.</p> - -<p>The Advanced Corps Cage will be connected by telephone to -Corps H.Q.</p> - -<p>8. <i>Prisoners.</i></p> - -<p>The following procedure will be adopted for the disposal of -prisoners:</p> - -<p>After capture they will be escorted to the Advanced Divisional<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[334]</a></span> -Collecting Cage, for examination by the Divisional Intelligence -Officer, who, after he has finished with them, will send them -back to the Advanced Corps Cage.</p> - -<p>The sending back of prisoners should be carried out as quickly -as possible, and several escorts should be arranged for them to -be passed back without any unusual delay. Instructions should -be issued to ensure that too many men are not employed on -escort duty.</p> - -<p>In the forward area directing notices should be placed to show -the route to be taken to the Advanced Divisional Collecting -Cage.</p> - -<p>Traffic control personnel should be conversant with the method -of disposing of prisoners.</p> - -<p>9. <i>Identifications.</i></p> - -<p>The importance of passing on all identifications as speedily -as possible to Corps "I" cannot be too strongly impressed on -all concerned. It is essential that special efforts be made to wire -at once, as soon as identifications are made and the locality in -which obtained.</p> - -<p>10.<i> Maps and Photographs.</i></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>The following maps are being issued:</p> - -<p>(i) A large issue of 1/20,000 No. 62.D. South-East regular -series for distribution to all officers.</p> - -<p>(ii) 1/20,000 Map Message Form, for distribution down -to N.C.O.'s.</p> - -<p>(iii) A small issue of 1/10,000 Maps of forward area -only.</p> - -<p>(iv) 1/20,000 Barrage Map, for distribution down to -Company Commanders.</p> - -<p>(v) 1/40,000 Organization Map, together with notes on -the enemy.</p></blockquote> - -<p>The following special photographs are being issued:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) A Mosaic of each Divisional front, squared and contoured -and freely annotated, for distribution down to -N.C.O.'s.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) Oblique Photographs of each Divisional front, for distribution -to all officers.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[335]</a></span></p> - -<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 11</span><br /> -CO-OPERATION OF INFANTRY AND AIRCRAFT</div> - -<p>1. <i>Contact Aeroplanes.</i></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(i) <i>Indication of position by flares.</i></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) Red ground flares will be used to indicate the -infantry positions to contact aeroplanes. They will -be lit by infantry in the most advanced line only.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) A contact aeroplane will fly along the line of the -first objective at zero plus 2 hours 30 minutes. Flares -will be called for by the aeroplane sounding a succession -of "A's" on the Klaxon horn and by firing a white Very -Light. If the aeroplane fails to mark the line accurately, -it will repeat its call ten minutes later.</p> - -<p>Should the infantry not have reached the line of the -objective at the time laid down above, the contact -aeroplane will return at half-hour intervals until flares -are shown.</p> - -<p>(<i>c</i>) A contact aeroplane will fly along the line of -the second objective at zero plus 6 hours 30 minutes. -It will call for flares, and the same procedure will be -followed on this objective as on the first objective until -the flares are seen.</p> - -<p>(<i>d</i>) A contact aeroplane will fly over third objective -at zero plus 7 hours, when the procedure laid down for -the first objective will be observed until the flares are -shown.</p> - -<p>(<i>e</i>) Divisions will organize message-dropping stations in -the vicinity of their Headquarters.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>(ii) <i>Other means of identifying the position of the Infantry.</i></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) <i>Rifles.</i>—Three or four rifles laid parallel across the -top of the trench.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Metal Discs.</i>—Metal discs will be used as reflectors -by flashing in the sun. This method has been successful -even on days which have not been particularly bright.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[336]</a></span></p> - -<p>The disc is most easily carried sewn to the Small Box -Respirator, and can be used in this way without inconvenience.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>2. <i>Counter-attack Planes.</i></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) From zero hour counter-attack planes will be constantly -in the air, with the object of observing hostile concentrations -or abnormal movement.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) In the event of an enemy concentration indicating a -counter-attack, the counter-attack aeroplane will signal -this information to the Artillery by wireless. In the case of -a counter-attack actually developing a white parachute -flare will be fired by the aeroplane in the direction of the -troops moving for the impending counter-attack, for the -information of the Infantry.</p></blockquote> - -<p>3. <i>Ammunition-carrying Aeroplanes.</i></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) Aeroplanes will be detailed to transport ammunition -from zero plus 2 hours 30 minutes.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) Vickers guns will display a white "V" at the point -where ammunition is to be dropped. The arms of the -"V" to be 6 feet in length and 1 foot in width. The apex -of the "V" to point towards the enemy.</p> - -<p>(<i>c</i>) Ammunition aeroplanes will have the under-side of the -lower planes painted black for a distance of 2½ feet from the -tips.</p> -</blockquote> -</blockquote> - -<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 12</span><br /> -CONSOLIDATION</div> - -<p>1. <i>Divisions allotted to First Objective.</i></p> -<blockquote> -<p>(<i>a</i>) <i>Consolidation.</i>—As soon as the first objective has been -captured troops will dig in.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Troops holding present front line.</i>—The brigades of 2nd and -3rd Australian Divisions holding the line on the night prior to -zero will remain in their battle positions until all troops detailed -to the attack have passed through. They will then be organized -and prepared to move to meet any emergency.</p> - -<p>2nd Australian Division will be prepared to detach its brigade<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[337]</a></span> -to act in support of 5th Australian Division, and 3rd Australian -Division to detach its brigade in support of 4th Australian -Division.</p> - -<p>(<i>c</i>) <i>Reorganization of Troops on First Objective.</i>—As soon as -the whole of the troops detailed to the capture of second (red -line) and third (blue line) objectives have passed through the -line of the first objective, 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions will -organize the defence of their sectors on the first objective in -depth in each brigade sub-sector. Units will be reorganized, -and those not detailed to the defence of the line will be withdrawn -into support and held in readiness for eventualities. At -least one battalion in each brigade sub-sector should be withdrawn -in this way.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>2. <i>Second Objective.</i></p> - -<p><i>Consolidation.</i>—As soon as the second objective (the red line) -has been captured, the position will be thoroughly consolidated. -Arrangements will be made to ensure a supply of engineering -material for this.</p> - -<p>3. <i>Main Line of Resistance.</i></p> -<blockquote> -<p>(<i>a</i>) When the third objective (the blue line) is attained, it will -be organized and consolidated as the main line of resistance.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) If the enemy is able to develop an immediate counter-attack, -or if he has a definite plan, and the troops available in -close reserve for the defence of the blue line, it may not be -possible to reach the third objective. In this case the second -objective (red line) will become the main line of resistance, and -will be consolidated and organized in depth accordingly.</p> - -<p>(<i>c</i>) Definite plans will be prepared to deal with either case. -The Corps must be prepared, as early as possible, to fight a stiff -defensive battle on the main line of resistance.</p> -</blockquote> - -<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 13</span></div> - -<p>1. The 5th Australian Division will move into its assembly -area by Brigade Groups as follows:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"A" Brigade Group on the night 4th-5th August from -<span class="smcap">Montières</span> to <span class="smcap">Camon</span> and <span class="smcap">Rivery</span> area. Quarters<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[338]</a></span> -have been arranged for one brigade, less one battalion. -Shelters will be drawn from Area Commandant, -<span class="smcap">Camon</span>, for this battalion.</p> - -<p>"B" Brigade Group from <span class="smcap">Allonville</span> area to forward area.</p> - -<p>"C" Brigade Group from <span class="smcap">Vaux</span> area to <span class="smcap">Allonville</span> area.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>2. For the purposes of staging, <span class="smcap">Poulainville</span> will be included -as one of the battalion areas of the <span class="smcap">Allonville</span> brigade area.</p> - -<p>The camp in <span class="smcap">Bois de Mai</span> has been allotted for the use of the -5th Division nucleus.</p> - -<p>It is left to the discretion of the G.O.C., 5th Australian Division, -as to whether the Battalion at <span class="smcap">Poulainville</span> moves on the -night of 4th August.</p> - -<p>3. On the night 5th-6th August the 5th Australian Division will -continue its move into its allotted assembly grounds in the -forward area.</p> - -<p>4. Rear parties are to be left in charge of all camps until -handed over to the Area Commandant.</p> - -<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 14</span><br /> -ARMOURED CAR BATTALION</div> - -<p>1. The 17th Armoured Car Battalion has been placed at the -disposal of the Australian Corps, and will join the 5th Tank -Brigade shortly.</p> - -<p>2. This battalion is organized in two companies of eight (8) -armoured cars each. Each armoured car carries one forward and -one rear Hotchkiss gun.</p> - -<p>3. One and a half (1½) companies are allotted to the 5th -Australian Division, and half (½) a company will remain in -Corps Reserve.</p> - -<p>The half company detailed to remain in Corps Reserve will -select a position of assembly in Square 0.26, and will occupy this -position by 9.30 p.m. on Y/Z night. During the action its -orders will be transmitted through the 5th Australian Divisional -Signal Service. The Commander will arrange with the -5th Australian Division accordingly.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[339]</a></span></p> - -<p>4. As soon as the Battalion Commander or his representative -reports to the 5th Tank Brigade, he will be instructed to report -to the General Staff, Australian Corps, and then to Headquarters, -5th Australian Division.</p> - -<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 14a</span><br /> -ARMOURED CAR BATTALION</div> - -<p>1. The 17th Armoured Car Battalion is being given definite -rôles in accordance with paragraph 3 of Battle Instructions No. -14. The rôles assigned to this battalion may carry the cars -forward for a considerable distance into enemy territory, and -may necessitate their returning through other Divisional Sectors -than that of the 5th Australian Division.</p> - -<p>2. British Armoured Cars can be recognized by the red and -white band markings which are similar to those of the British -Tanks.</p> - -<p>3. All troops will be warned of the possibility of our armoured -cars coming into our own sector, and of the way in which they -are marked.</p> - -<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 15</span><br /> -ZERO HOUR—SYNCHRONIZATION OF WATCHES</div> - -<p>1. <i>Zero Hour.</i></p> - -<p>Zero hour will be notified in writing from Australian Corps -Headquarters by noon on the day prior to zero.</p> - -<p>2. <i>Synchronization of Watches.</i></p> - -<p>Watches will be synchronized by officers detailed by Australian -Corps Headquarters, who will visit Headquarters in the following -order, leaving Corps Headquarters shortly after noon and -6 p.m. on Y day:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) One officer to Headquarters Heavy Artillery, 3rd Australian -Division and 4th Australian Division.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) One officer to 2nd Australian Division and 5th Australian -Division.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">[340]</a></span></p> - -<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 16</span><br /> -AIRCRAFT</div> - -<p>1. The Air Forces which will operate on the Australian Corps -front during the battle will be as follows:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) Corps Squadron—3rd Australian Squadron.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) 5th Tank Brigade—8th Squadron.</p> - -<p>(<i>c</i>) The 22nd Wing, consisting of eight Scout Squadrons, -which will be exclusively employed in engaging ground -targets by bombing and machine-gunning along the -whole Army front.</p> - -<p>(<i>d</i>) One night-bombing squadron—101st Bombing Squadron.</p> - -<p>(<i>e</i>) One Reconnaissance Squadron—48th Squadron.</p></blockquote> - -<p>Four additional day-bombing squadrons and three additional -night-bombing squadrons are being obtained from other Wings -for co-operation with the above, making 19 Squadrons in all.</p> - -<p>2. <i>Low-flying Scouts.</i></p> - -<p>The low-flying scouts of the 22nd Wing are being detailed -on an even distribution to the Corps front. They will operate -in two phases, viz.:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) From zero to zero plus four hours eastward from the -green line.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) From zero plus four hours onwards eastwards from the -red line.</p></blockquote> - -<p>In each phase favourable targets will be engaged in addition -to the targets marked by the green and red lines.</p> - -<p>3. <i>Markings on Planes.</i></p> - -<p>The following will be the special markings of machines allotted -to special duties:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) Contact patrol machines—Rectangular panels 2' by 1' on -both lower planes about three feet from the fuselage.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) Machines working with Tanks—Black band on middle of -right side of tail.</p></blockquote> - -<p>4. <i>Ammunition-carrying Squadron.</i></p> - -<p>Aeroplanes carrying small arms ammunition will drop it at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[341]</a></span> -points as laid down in Battle Instructions No. 11, para. 3 (b). -The first ammunition-carrying planes will arrive over the battlefield -at zero plus seven hours.</p> - -<p>5. <i>Aeroplane Smoke Screens.</i></p> - -<p>In addition to carrying small arms ammunition, this Squadron -will be employed to drop phosphorus smoke bombs to obstruct -the enemy's view. The areas to be screened and the time at -which the screening in each case shall cease in order not to -interfere with the advance of the Infantry will be shown on a -map to be issued later.</p> - -<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 17</span><br /> -ARTILLERY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE LAST NIGHT BEFORE ZERO</div> - -<p>1. <i>S.O.S.</i></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(<i>i</i>) Each line division will arrange for four field artillery -brigades, or an equivalent number of guns, to fire -on S.O.S. lines at any time up to zero minus fifteen -minutes.</p> - -<p>(<i>ii</i>) From zero minus fifteen minutes until zero hour S.O.S. -arrangements will be inoperative.</p></blockquote> - -<p>2. <i>Heavy Artillery.</i></p> - -<p>In the event of the enemy opening a gas bombardment on -the <span class="smcap">Villers-Bretonneux</span> area, arrangements have been made -for the co-operation of the Canadian Corps Heavy Artillery in an -artillery counter-attack on enemy batteries. The Canadian -Corps will deal with the enemy artillery about <span class="smcap">Wiencourt</span> and -<span class="smcap">Marcelcave</span>. Fire will be opened, on application, direct -between the two Corps Headquarters.</p> - -<p>G.O.C., R.A., Australian Corps, will arrange details with -G.O.C., R.A., Canadian Corps.</p> - -<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 18</span><br /> -These are not reproduced. They refer only to Wireless Code -Calls prescribed for all units.</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[342]</a></span></p> - -<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 19</span><br /> -LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS</div> - -<p>1. Officers are detailed for liaison duties as follows:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) At Canadian Corps Headquarters—Capt. <span class="smcap">Shearman</span>, D.S.O., -M.C.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) At Third Corps Headquarters—Major <span class="smcap">R. Morrell</span>, D.S.O.</p> - -<p>(<i>c</i>) With 1st Australian Division—To be notified.</p> - -<p>(<i>d</i>) With 2nd Australian Division—Major <span class="smcap">H. Page</span>, M.C.</p> - -<p>(<i>e</i>) With 3rd Australian Division—Lt.-Col. <span class="smcap">A. R. Woolcock</span>, -D.S.O.</p> - -<p>(<i>f</i>) With 4th Australian Division—Major <span class="smcap">G. F. Dickinson</span>, -D.S.O.</p> - -<p>(<i>g</i>) With 5th Australian Division—Lt.-Col. <span class="smcap">N. Marshall</span>, -D.S.O.</p></blockquote> - -<p>2. The main function of the liaison officer is to relieve the -Staff of the fighting formation of the necessity of:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) Supplying information to Australian Corps Headquarters.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) Collecting information from Corps Headquarters for -transmission to the formation for whom they are carrying -out liaison duties. It is their function to save the Staff as -far as possible, and not to get in the way. At the same time, -they are expected to keep Corps Headquarters and the -formation to which they are attached fully informed of -events.</p></blockquote> - -<p>3. Direct telephone lines exist between Australian Corps -Headquarters and neighbouring Corps.</p> - -<p>For the battle there is a special General Staff switchboard -with direct lines to 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Australian Divisions.</p> - -<p>4. An information bureau will be established in a marquee to -be erected on the lawn in front of the Headquarters offices. -Major <span class="smcap">W. W. Berry</span> will be in charge of this bureau. It will be -provided with a telephone, writing material, maps, etc.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[343]</a></span></p> - -<p>Liaison officers from other formation at Australian Corps -Headquarters will be accommodated in this marquee.</p> - -<p>During the battle officers whose business does not require -them to visit the General Staff Office will make all inquiries at -this office for information as to the progress of the operations.</p> - -<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 20</span><br /> -CAVALRY</div> - -<p>1. The First Cavalry Brigade, plus one company of Whippet -Tanks attached, comes under the command of the Australian -Corps Commander at 9 p.m. on Y/Z night.</p> - -<p>2. Its function is to assist in carrying out the main Cavalry -rôle by seizing any opportunity which may occur to push -through this Corps front.</p> - -<p>3. The First Cavalry Brigade will operate north of the -<span class="smcap">Amiens—Chaulnes</span> railway in conjunction with 5th Australian -Division. It will move from its assembly position in Square -n.32 under orders of G.O.C., 1st Cavalry Division, via the -southern side of <span class="smcap">Bois de l'Abbé</span>.</p> - -<p>It will cross to the north side of the railway east of <span class="smcap">Villers-Bretonneux</span>.</p> - -<p>It will push forward patrols to keep in touch with 8th and -15th Australian Brigades.</p> - -<p>After crossing the railway the main body of 1st Cavalry -Brigade will march roughly parallel to it, keeping close touch -with the remainder of 1st Cavalry Division to the south.</p> - -<p>4. If a break in enemy's resistance occurs, the remainder of -the 1st Cavalry Division may be employed in support of 1st -Cavalry Brigade.</p> - -<p>5. Command of 1st Cavalry Brigade will pass from Australian -Corps to the 1st Cavalry Division when the Infantry reaches the -red line unless the brigade is required in the area south of the -Australian Corps to exploit success gained before that hour. -This will be determined by G.O.C., 1st Cavalry Division, who -will inform Australian Corps and 5th Australian Division, and -issue orders direct to 1st Cavalry Brigade.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[344]</a></span></p> - -<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Battle Instructions No. 21</span><br /> -NOTIFICATION OF DATE AND TIME OF BATTLE</div> - -<p>1. Reference paragraph 1 of General Staff Memo. No. AC/42, -dated 7th instant, <span class="smcap">ZERO</span> will be 4.20 a.m. 8th instant.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[345]</a></span></p> - -<h2>INDEX</h2> - - -<p> -Administrative Services, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Aeroplanes first used to carry small arms ammunition, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">As noise camouflage, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Air Force, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Albert, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Allied Offensive, Aug. 8th:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Conference at Flexicourt, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Outline of plan, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>-<a href="#Page_80">80</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Three phases, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Disposition of brigades, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>-<a href="#Page_94">94</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Artillery calibration, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tanks, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Armoured cars, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Intelligence Service, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Air Squadron, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Day before battle, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Zero hour, 4.20 a.m., <a href="#Page_120">120</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Guns begin, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">First phase completed, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"Outwards" telegrams, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Enemy completely surprised, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Third Corps failed to reach objective, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Armoured cars, sensational report, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Guns and booty captured, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Ludendorff's comments, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">General meeting at Villers-Bretonneux, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">The King at Bertangles, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -American Army's first great attack, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">First offensive battle, Hamel, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Second Corps, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">To join Fourth British Army, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">1,200 taken prisoners, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">131st Regt., <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">27th Div., <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">30th Div., <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">33rd Div., <a href="#Page_52">52</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Amiens, defence of, <a href="#Page_26">26</a> <i>et seq.</i><br /> -<br /> -Anzac, First and Second Corps, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Corps, abolition of, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Day, 3rd anniversary, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Arcy Wood, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Armistice requested by enemy, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Army Corps improvised, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Constitution and scope, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Artillery barrage, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>-<a href="#Page_229">229</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Classification of, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Assevillers, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Aubigny, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>.<br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[346]</a></span><br /> -Australian Army Corps constituted, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">United, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Australian Corps Headquarters, Bertangles, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Australian Soldier's high <i>moral</i>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Adaptability, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Instinct for "square deal," 292.</span><br /> -<br /> -Australian Staff watchword, "Efficiency," 295.<br /> -<br /> -Australia's five Divisions, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Authie, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Bapaume, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Basseux, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Battles on grand scale finished, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Beaurevoir, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Bell, Maj.-Gen. John, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Bellenglise, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Captured, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Bellicourt taken, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Bellicourt Tunnel, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Bertangles, Australian Corps H.Q., <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Biaches, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Bingham, Lt.-Col., <a href="#Page_106">106</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Birdwood, Gen., <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Birdwood, Gen. Sir William:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Commands First Anzac Corps, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Appointed Commander Australian Imperial Force, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Appointed Commander Fifth British Army, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Blamey, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_296">296</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Bony captured, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Bouchavesnes, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Bourlon Wood, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Braithwaite, Lieut.-Gen., <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Brancourt, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Bray, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Brie, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Brigade reductions, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>.<br /> -<br /> -British Fifth Army, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Brown, Corpl. W., captures officer and 11 men, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Bryce, Lt.-Col., <a href="#Page_106">106</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Bussy, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Butler, Gen., Third Corps, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Byng, Gen., <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Calibration, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Cambrai, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Canadians, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Canadian Troops, fixed constitution, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Cannan, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_27">27</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Cappy, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Captive Balloon Service, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Carter, Lieut.-Col. E. J., <a href="#Page_108">108</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Cavalry first employed, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Cerisy, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Cessation of hostilities, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Chamier, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Château-Thierry, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">End of German offensive, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[347]</a></span>Chipilly, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Chuignes, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Churchill, Mr. Winston, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Clemenceau, M.:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Speech to troops after Hamel battle, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">After Aug. 8th, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Cléry, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>-<a href="#Page_180">180</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Combles, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Commanders and Staffs, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>-<a href="#Page_17">17</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Congreve, Gen., his first order, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Contact aeroplanes, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Cook, Sir Joseph, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Corps Cavalry, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Corps Commander's responsibilities, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Corps Conferences, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Corps Signal Troops, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Corps Troops, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Couin, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Courage, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Couturelle, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Cox, Maj.-Gen. Sir H. W., <a href="#Page_9">9</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Crossing the Somme, plan for, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Cummings, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_29">29</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Curlu, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Currie, Gen., <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Dernancourt, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Difficulties of Army in retreat, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Disorganized British retreat, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Division, the fighting unit, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Division I., <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Last fight, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Division II., <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Last fight, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Division III., <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Last fight, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Division IV., <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Last fight, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Division V., <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Last fight, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Doullens, population prepare to evacuate, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">First move, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>-<a href="#Page_23">23</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Dummy Tanks, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Efficient Army more potent than League of Nations, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Elles, Gen., <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>.<br /> -<br /> -End of German offensive, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Enemy attack in the South, July 15th, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Comments on our successes, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>-<a href="#Page_67">67</a>.</span><br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[348]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Discover our movement South, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Move from Russian to Western Front, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"On the run," <a href="#Page_168">168</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Propaganda, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Reserves melting away, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Reserves absorbed, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Secure our "Recruiting</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Cable," <a href="#Page_159">159</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Withdraws in disorder, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Engineers, Companies of, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Estries, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Eterpigny, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Etinehem, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Fairfax, Lieut.-Col. Ramsay-, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Farewell Order to Third Division, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Farewell Order, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Feuillancourt, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Feuillères, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Fifth Army defensive unduly attenuated, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Fifth British Army, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>.<br /> -<br /> -First Australian Division, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>.<br /> -<br /> -First British Army attack, Aug. 26th, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>.<br /> -<br /> -First Order from 10th Corps, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Flamicourt, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Flanders' liquid mud, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Flexicourt Conference, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Foch, Marshal, appointed Supreme Commander, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>; <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Fontaine, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Foott, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_196">196</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Forty-sixth Imperial Division, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Foucaucourt, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Fourth Army enlarged, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">British flank with French, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Fourth and Fifth Australian Divisions, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Framerville, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Franvillers, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Fraser, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>.<br /> -<br /> -French Army's different outlook, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Frevent, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>.<br /> -<br /> -"Fuse 106" as wire cutter, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Garenne Wood, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Gellibrand, Maj.-Gen., <a href="#Page_268">268</a>.<br /> -<br /> -German attack, March 21st, 1918, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Propaganda, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Withdrawal general on all fronts, Sept. 4th, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Germany's "Black Day," <a href="#Page_130">130</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Crack regiments opposed to Australians, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Surrender due to military defeat, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Determining cause, breach of Hindenburg defences, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Gillemont Farm, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Glasgow, Maj.-Gen., <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Godley, Lieut.-Gen. Sir A., commands Second Anzac Corps, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[349]</a></span>Gouy, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Grimwade, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_30">30</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Haig, Brig.-Gen. Neil, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Field Marshal, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Hamel, proposed operation against, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>-<a href="#Page_48">48</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Battle of, planned, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Zero fixed, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Over in 93 minutes, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Official commentary, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Americans' first offensive battle, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">No gas shells used, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Congratulatory messages, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">M. Clemenceau's speech, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>-<a href="#Page_63">3</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Dinner at Amiens to celebrate victory, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>-<a href="#Page_64">64</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">End of British defensive, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Hamel Wood, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Hangard, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Hargicourt, Zero hour, 5.20 a.m. Sept. 8th, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Red line reached before 10 o'clock, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Outpost line captured, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Haut Allaines, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Hautcloque, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Hazebrouck, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Headquarters of Army Corps, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Hebuterne, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Heilly, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Hem, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Herleville, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Hill 90, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Hill 104, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Hindenburg Line, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Purpose of, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">St. Quentin-Cambrai section, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Germans' elaborate system of trenches, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hargicourt line, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Capture of plans of German defence scheme, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Plan for attacking, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Machine gun barrage, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Dummy tanks, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Tapes for Infantry start line, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Direction boards, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Plan for further advance, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>-<a href="#Page_240">240</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">America's Second Corps in battle front, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Australian and American Divisions, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Mustard gas first used, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Destroying wire entanglements, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Disposition of Divisions, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Two phases, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Zero hour, 5.50 a.m. Sept. 29th, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Fifth Australians hung up, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Americans held up, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Forget to mop up, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Change of plan, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Enemy relinquish tunnel defences, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>.</span><br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[350]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Collapse of the whole defences, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Hobbs, Maj.-Gen., <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Hughes, W. M., <a href="#Page_55">55</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Message from, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Hunn, Maj. A. S., <a href="#Page_210">210</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Infantry advance behind barrage, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Infantry Brigade reductions, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>.<br /> -<br /> -"Instantaneous" fuse, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Joncourt, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>.<br /> -<br /> -July 18th, French and American counter-stroke, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Kavanagh, Gen., Cavalry Corps, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.<br /> -<br /> -King, the, at Bertangles, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Knob, the, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Knoll, the, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Labour Corps, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>.<br /> -<br /> -La Flaque, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>.<br /> -<br /> -La Neuville, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Last Australian battle in Great War, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>.<br /> -<br /> -La Verguier, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>.<br /> -<br /> -League of Nations less potent than efficient Army, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>.<br /> -<br /> -"Leap Frog" tactics, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Le Cateau, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Le Catelet, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Leslie, Brig.-Gen. W. B., <a href="#Page_9">9</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Lewis, Maj.-Gen., <a href="#Page_246">246</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Lewis Gun detachments, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>.<br /> -<br /> -"Liaison Force," <a href="#Page_143">143</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Lihons, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Losses, comparison of, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Ludendorff's comments on Aug. 8th attack, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Lyon, Lt.-Col., <a href="#Page_106">106</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Maclagan, Maj.-Gen., <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>.<br /> -<br /> -McNicoll, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>.<br /> -<br /> -March 22nd, 1918, first move, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Marett Wood, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Martin, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_185">185</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Marwitz, Gen. von der, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Maurepas, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Max (Prince) of Baden, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Mechanical Transport, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Méricourt, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Mills's grenades, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Minor battles begun, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Result, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>-<a href="#Page_39">39</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Monash, Lieut.-Gen., Sir John:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">In command First Australian Div., <a href="#Page_5">5</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Third Australian Div., <a href="#Page_6">6</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Australian Army Corps, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">17th Imperial Div., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">32nd Imperial Div., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">27th American Div., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">30th American Div., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Without orders, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Honoured by the King, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hands over command to General Read, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Mondicourt, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Monster German Naval 15-inch gun captured, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Montbrehain, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Last Australian battle, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[351]</a></span>Montgomery, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Mont St. Martin, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Mont St. Quentin, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Second Prussian Guards defend, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Captured, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Monument Wood, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Mopping up, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Result of neglecting, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Morain, M., entertains British and French Army officers after Hamel, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<i>Moral v.</i> material, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Motor Ambulance Corps, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Mound, the, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Mullens, Maj.-Gen., letter of appreciation, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Mustard gas, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Nauroy, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Nielles-lez-Blequin, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Noise camouflage, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Nollet, Gen., <a href="#Page_164">164</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Noyons, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Officers and men, relations between, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Ommiécourt, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>.<br /> -<br /> -O'Ryan Maj.-Gen., <a href="#Page_246">246</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Partington, Major, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Pas, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Péronne, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Enemy defence of, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Taken, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Poulainville, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Prince Max of Baden, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Prisoners, treatment of, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Excuses for surrender, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Cages, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"Pigeons" employed to gain information, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Proyart, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Prussian Guards hold Mont St. Quentin, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Quennemont Farm, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Ramicourt, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Ramsay-Fairfax, Lieut.-Col., <a href="#Page_106">106</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Rawlinson, Gen. Lord, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>-<a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Read, Maj.-Gen. G. W., <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Reorganization of Brigades, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>-<a href="#Page_273">3</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Repatriation of Australian Forces, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Results, analysis of, <a href="#Page_284">284</a> <i>et seq.</i><br /> -<br /> -Rheims, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Robertson, Maj. P. R., <a href="#Page_142">142</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Roisel, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Rosenthal, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Rosières, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Roye, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Sailly-Laurette, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Sailly-le-Sec, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Second Australian Division, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>.<br /> -<br /> -"Set-piece" operations, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>.<br /> -<br /> -"Siegfried Line," <a href="#Page_214">214</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Skene, Brig.-Gen. P. G. M., <a href="#Page_9">9</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[352]</a></span>Smoke shells, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Smyth, Sir N. M., V.C., <a href="#Page_9">9</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Soissons, German withdrawal, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Somme Canal, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Line of, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Enemy retreat, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Somme, North, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Plan for crossing, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">South, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -St. Christ, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>.<br /> -<br /> -St. Denis, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>.<br /> -<br /> -St. Gratien, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>.<br /> -<br /> -St. Mihiel Salient attack, Sept. 11th, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>.<br /> -<br /> -St. Quentin Canal, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Tanks, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Improved type, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Dummy, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"Star," <a href="#Page_91">91</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -Teamwork, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Third Australian Division, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Third British Army attack Aug. 21st, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Time-table for successive Army engagements impossible, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Tivoli Wood, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Toulorge, Gen., <a href="#Page_42">42</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Treux Wood, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Tunnellers, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Underground shelters, galleries and dug-outs, German, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Vaire Wood, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Vaux, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Vauxvillers, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Verdun, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Vermandovillers, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Villers-Bretonneux, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Visitors to Corps, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Lord Milner, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Mr. Winston Churchill, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>.</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Wackett, Capt., Australian Flying Corps, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Walker, Maj.-Gen. Sir H. B., <a href="#Page_9">9</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Warneton, early 1918, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Whippet tanks, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Wiancourt, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Wilson, Sir Henry, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.<br /> -<br /> -Wisdom, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_143">143</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Ypres, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>.<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Zero hour, Aug. 8th, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hamel, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hargicourt, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Hindenburg Line, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.</span><br /> -</p> - -<div class="center"> -<br /> -<i>Printed at The Chapel River Press, Kingston, Surrey.</i><br /> -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> -<p> </p> -<p> </p> - -<div class="transnote"> -<h2>Transcriber's Note</h2> -<p>Obvious errors of punctuation and diacritical markings were corrected.</p> - -<p>Inconsistent hyphenation was made consistent.</p> - -<p>P. 123: No correction made to "Sent at 2.5 p.m."</p> -</div> - -<p> </p> -<hr class="full" /> -<p>***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE AUSTRALIAN VICTORIES IN FRANCE IN 1918***</p> -<p>******* This file should be named 51163-h.htm or 51163-h.zip *******</p> -<p>This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:<br /> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/5/1/1/6/51163">http://www.gutenberg.org/5/1/1/6/51163</a></p> -<p> -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed.</p> - -<p>Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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