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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..54c39ef --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #50982 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/50982) diff --git a/old/50982-0.txt b/old/50982-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index b614ce9..0000000 --- a/old/50982-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6920 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Queen Elizabeth, by Edward Spencer Beesly - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: Queen Elizabeth - -Author: Edward Spencer Beesly - -Release Date: January 20, 2016 [EBook #50982] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK QUEEN ELIZABETH *** - - - - -Produced by Chuck Greif and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images available at The Internet Archive) - - - - - - - - - - - Twelve English Statesmen - - QUEEN ELIZABETH - - [Illustration: colophon] - - - - - QUEEN ELIZABETH - - BY - - EDWARD SPENCER BEESLY - - _Sine ira et studio, quorum causas procul habeo._ - TACITUS, Ann. I. 1. - - - London - MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED - NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - 1906 - - _All rights reserved_ - - FIRST EDITION PRINTED FEBRUARY 1892. - - REPRINTED MARCH 1892; 1895; 1897; 1900; 1903; 1906. - - - - -CONTENTS - - -CHAPTER I - - PAGE - -EARLY LIFE, 1533-1558 1 - -CHAPTER II - -THE CHANGE OF RELIGION, 1559 6 - -CHAPTER III - -FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1559-1563 18 - -CHAPTER IV - -ELIZABETH AND MARY STUART, 1559-1568 38 - -CHAPTER V - -ARISTOCRATIC PLOTS, 1568-1572 78 - -CHAPTER VI - -FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1572-1583 101 - -CHAPTER VII - -THE PAPAL ATTACK, 1570-1583 128 - -CHAPTER VIII - -PROTECTORATE OF THE NETHERLANDS, 1584-1586 156 - -CHAPTER IX - -EXECUTION OF THE QUEEN OF SCOTS: 1584-1587 174 - -CHAPTER X - -WAR WITH SPAIN, 1587-1603 188 - -CHAPTER XI - -DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, 1588-1601 211 - -CHAPTER XII - -LAST YEARS AND DEATH, 1601-1603 230 - -APPENDIX - -A.--SESSIONS OF PARLIAMENT IN THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH 243 - -B.--PRINCIPAL HOWARDS CONTEMPORARIES OF ELIZABETH 244 - -C.--PRINCIPAL BOLEYN RELATIONS OF ELIZABETH 245 - - - - -CHAPTER I - -EARLY LIFE: 1533-1558 - - -I have to deal, under strict limitations of space, with a long life, -almost the whole of its adult period passed in the exercise of -sovereignty--a life which is in effect the history of England during -forty-five years, abounding at the same time in personal interest, and -the subject, both in its public and private aspects, of fierce and -probably interminable controversies. Evidently a bird’s-eye view is all -that can be attempted: and the most important episodes alone can be -selected for consideration. - -The daughter of Henry VIII. and Anne Boleyn was born on September 6, -1533. Anne was niece of Thomas, third Duke of Norfolk, and all the great -Howard kinsmen attended at the baptism four days afterwards. Elizabeth -was two years and eight months old when her mother was beheaded, and she -herself was declared illegitimate by Act of Parliament. It is not -recorded that in after years she expressed any opinion about her mother -or ever mentioned her name. She never took any steps to get the Act of -attainder repealed; but perhaps she indirectly showed her belief in -Anne’s innocence by raising the son of Norris, her alleged paramour, to -the peerage, and by the great favour she always showed to his family. - -During her father’s life Elizabeth lived chiefly at Hatfield with her -brother Edward, under a governess. Henry had been empowered by -Parliament in 1536 to settle the succession by his will. In 1544 he -caused an Act to be passed placing Mary and Elizabeth next in order of -succession after Edward. By his will, made a few days before his death, -he repeated the provisions of the Act of 1544, and placed next to -Elizabeth the daughters of his younger sister, the Duchess of Suffolk, -tacitly passing over his elder sister, the Queen of Scotland. - -After her father’s death (Jan. 1547) Elizabeth, then a girl of thirteen, -went to reside with the Queen Dowager Catherine, who had not been many -weeks a widow before she married her old lover Thomas Seymour, the Lord -Admiral, brother of the Protector Somerset, described as “fierce in -courage, courtly in fashion, in personage stately, in voice magnificent, -but somewhat empty of matter.” The romping that soon began to go on -between this dangerous man and Elizabeth was of such a nature that early -in the next year Catherine found it necessary to send her away somewhat -abruptly. From that time she resided chiefly at Hatfield. - -In August 1548 Catherine died, and the Admiral at once formed the -project of marrying Elizabeth. This and other ambitious designs brought -him to the scaffold (March 1549). It does not appear that Elizabeth saw -or directly corresponded with him after he was a widower. But she -listened to his messages, and dropped remarks of an encouraging kind -which she meant to be repeated to him. She knew perfectly well that the -marriage would not be permitted. She was only flirting with a man old -enough to be her father just as she afterwards flirted with men young -enough to be her sons. We already get a glimpse of the utter absence -both of delicacy and depth of feeling which characterised her through -life. When she heard of the Admiral’s execution she simply remarked, -“This day died a man with much wit and very little judgment.” With -Elizabeth the heart never really spoke, and if the senses did, she had -them under perfect control. And this was why she never loved or was -loved, and never has been or will be regarded with enthusiasm by either -man or woman. For some time after this scandal she was evidently -somewhat under a cloud. She lived at her manor-houses of Ashridge, -Enfield, and Hatfield, diligently pursuing her studies under the -celebrated scholar Ascham. - -When Edward died (July 6, 1553) Elizabeth was nearly twenty. Although -Mary’s cause was her own, she remained carefully neutral during the -short queenship of Jane. On its collapse she hastened to congratulate -her sister, and rode by her side when she made her entry into London. -During the early part of Mary’s reign her life hung by a thread. The -slightest indiscretion would have been fatal to her. Wyatt’s -insurrection was made avowedly in her favour. But neither to that nor -any other conspiracy did she extend the smallest encouragement. Her -prudent and blameless conduct gave her the more right in after years to -deal severely with Mary Stuart, whose behaviour under precisely similar -circumstances was so very different. - -Renard, the Spanish ambassador, demanded her execution as the condition -of the Spanish match, and Mary assured him that she would do her best to -satisfy him. In the time of Henry VIII. such an intention on the part of -the sovereign would have been equivalent to a sentence of death. But -Mary was far from being as powerful as her father. The Council had to be -reckoned with, and in the Council independent and even peremptory -language was now to be heard. It was not without strong protests on the -part of some of the Lords that Elizabeth was sent to the Tower. Sussex, -a noble of the old blood, who was charged to conduct her there, took -upon him to delay her departure, that she might appeal to the Queen for -an interview. Mary was furious: “For their lives,” she said, “they durst -not have acted so in her father’s time; she wished he was alive and -among them for a single month.” But it was useless to storm. The -absolute monarchy had seen its best days. Sussex, fearing foul play, -warned the Lieutenant of the Tower to keep within his written -instructions. Howard of Effingham, the Lord Admiral, had done more than -any one else to place Mary on the throne. But he was Elizabeth’s -great-uncle, and he angrily insisted that her food in the Tower should -be prepared by her own servants. A proposal in Parliament to give the -Queen the power to nominate a successor was received with such disfavour -that it had to be withdrawn. Finally the judges declared that there was -no evidence to convict Elizabeth. Sullenly therefore the Queen had to -give way. Elizabeth was sent to Woodstock, where she resided for about -a year under guard. This was only reasonable. An heir to the throne, in -whose favour there had been plots, could not expect complete freedom. In -October 1555 she was allowed to go to Hatfield under the surveillance of -Sir Thomas Pope. During the rest of the reign she escaped molestation by -outward conformity to the Catholic religion, and by taking no part -whatever in politics. But as it became clear that her accession was at -hand there can be no doubt that she was engaged in studying the problems -with which she would have to deal. She was already in close intimacy -with Cecil, and it is evident that she mounted the throne with a policy -carefully thought out in its main lines. - -When Mary was known to be dying, the Spanish ambassador, Feria, called -on Elizabeth, and told her that his master had exerted his influence -with the Queen and Council on her behalf, and had secured her -succession. But she declined to be patronised, and told him that the -people and nobility were on her side. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -THE CHANGE OF RELIGION: 1559 - - -Mary died on the 17th of November 1558. Parliament was then sitting, -and, in communicating the event to both Houses, Archbishop Heath frankly -took the initiative in recognising Elizabeth, “of whose most lawful -right and title in the succession of the Crown, thanks be to God, we -need not to doubt.” He was a staunch Catholic, and two months later -refused to officiate at her coronation. But he was an Englishman, and -even the most convinced Catholics, though looking forward with -uneasiness to the religious policy of the new Queen, were sincerely glad -that there was no danger of a disputed succession. Besides, it was by no -means clear that Elizabeth would not accept the ecclesiastical -constitution as established in the late reign. That there would be an -end of burnings, and of the harassing tyranny of the bishops, every one -felt certain; but it seemed quite upon the cards that Elizabeth would -continue to recognise the headship of the Pope in a formal way and -maintain the Mass. It must be remembered that the religious changes had -only begun some thirty years before. All middle-aged men could remember -the time when the ecclesiastical fabric stood to all appearance -unbroken, as it had stood for centuries. Only twenty-four years had -passed since the Act of Supremacy had transferred the headship of the -Church from the Pope to the King; only eleven since the Protestant -doctrine and worship had been forced on the country by the Protector -Somerset, to the horror and disgust of the great majority of Englishmen. -The nation had sorrowed for the death of Edward VI., because it darkened -the prospects of the succession, and seemed likely sooner or later to -bring on a civil war. But apart from the hot Protestant minority, -chiefly to be found in London, the mass of the nation was conservative, -and welcomed the re-establishment of the old religion as a return to -order and common sense after a short and bitter experience of -revolutionary anarchy. There was a rooted objection to restore the old -meddlesome tyranny of the bishops, and the nobles and squires who had -got hold of the abbey lands would not hear of giving them up. But the -return to communion with the Catholic Church and the recognition of the -Pope as its head gave satisfaction to three-fourths, perhaps to -five-sixths, of the nation, and to a still larger proportion of its most -influential class, the great landed proprietors. Mary’s accession was -the great and unique opportunity for the old Church. If Mary and Pole -had been cool-headed politicians instead of excitable fanatics, if they -had contented themselves with restoring the old worship, depriving the -few Protestant clergy of their benefices, and punishing only outrageous -attacks on the State religion, Elizabeth would not have had the power, -it may be doubted whether she would have had the inclination, to undo -her sister’s work. - -This great opportunity was thrown away. Mary’s bishops came back -brooding over the long catalogue of humiliations and indignities which -their Church had suffered, and thirsting to avenge their own wrongs. For -six years they had their fling, and contrived to make the country forget -the period of Protestant mis-government. England had never before known -what it was to be governed by clergymen. It was a sort of rule as -hateful to most Catholic laymen as to Protestants. Catholics therefore -for the most part, as well as Protestants, hailed the accession of -Elizabeth. At any rate there would be an end of the clerical tyranny. -Nor were they without hope that she would maintain the old worship. She -had conformed to it for the last five years, and Philip had given the -word that she was to be supported. - -We are now accustomed to the Papal _non possumus_. No nation or Church -can hope that the smallest deviation from Roman doctrine or discipline -will be tolerated. But in 1558 the hard and fast line had not yet been -drawn. France was still pressing for such changes as communion in both -kinds, worship in the vulgar tongue, and marriage of priests. The -Council of Trent, it is true, had already in 1545 decided that Catholic -doctrine was contained in the Bible _and tradition_, and in 1551 had -defined transubstantiation and the sacraments. But in 1552 the Council -was prorogued, and it did not resume till 1562. Doctrine and discipline -therefore might be, and were still considered to be, in the melting-pot, -and no one could be certain what would come out. If Elizabeth had -contented herself with the French programme, and had joined France in -pressing it, the other sovereigns, who really cared for nothing but -uniformity, would probably have forced the Pope to compromise. The -Lutheran doctrine of consubstantiation might have been tolerated. The -Anglican formulæ have been held by many to be compatible with a belief -in the Real Presence. The formal severance of England from Catholic -unity might thus have been postponed--possibly avoided--in the same -sense that it has been avoided in France. After the completion of the -Council of Trent (1562-3) it was too late. - -Two years after her accession Elizabeth told the Spanish ambassador, De -Quadra, that her belief was the belief of all the Catholics in the -realm; and on his asking her how then she could have altered religion in -1559, she said she had been compelled to act as she did, and that, if he -knew how she had been driven to it, she was sure he would excuse her. -Seven years later she made the same statement to De Silva. Elizabeth was -habitually so regardless of truth that her assertions can be allowed -little weight when they are improbable. No doubt, as a matter of taste -and feeling, she preferred the Catholic worship. She was not pious. She -was not troubled with a tender conscience or tormented by a sense of -sin. She did not care to cultivate close personal relations with her -God. A religion of form and ceremony suited her better. But her training -had been such as to free her from all superstitious fear or prejudice, -and her religious convictions were determined by her sense of what was -most reasonable and convenient. There is not the least evidence that she -was a reluctant agent in the adoption of Protestantism in 1559. Who was -there to coerce her? The Protestants could not have set up a Protestant -competitor. The great nobles, though opposed to persecution and desirous -of minimising the Pope’s authority, would have preferred to leave -worship as it was. But upon one thing Elizabeth was determined. She -would resume the full ecclesiastical supremacy which her father had -annexed to the Crown. She judged, and she probably judged rightly, that -the only way to assure this was to make the breach with the old religion -complete. If she had placed herself in the hands of moderate Catholics -like Paget, possessed with the belief that she could only maintain -herself by the protection of Philip, they would have advised her to be -content with the practical authority over the English Church which many -an English king had known how to exercise. That was not enough for her. -She desired a position free from all ambiguity and possibility of -dispute, not one which would have to be defended with constant vigilance -and at the cost of incessant bickering. - -From the point of view of her foreign relations the moment might seem to -be a dangerous one for carrying out a religious revolution, and many a -statesman with a deserved reputation for prudence would have counselled -delay. But this disadvantage was more than counterbalanced by the -unpopularity which the cruelties and disasters of Mary’s last three -years had brought upon the most active Catholics. Again, Elizabeth no -doubt recognised that the Catholics, though at present the strongest, -were the declining party. The future was with the Protestants. It was -the young men who had fixed their hopes upon her in her sister’s time, -and who were ready to rally round her now. By her natural disposition, -and by her culture, she belonged to the Renaissance rather than to the -Reformation. But obscurantist as Calvinism essentially was, the -Calvinists, as a minority struggling for freedom to think and teach what -they believed, represented for a time the cause of light and -intellectual emancipation. Was she to put herself at the head of -reaction or progress? She did not love the Calvinists. They were too -much in earnest for her. Their narrow creed was as tainted with -superstition as that of Rome, and, at bottom, was less humane, less -favourable to progress. But whom else had she to work with? The -reasonable, secular-minded, tolerant sceptics are not always the best -fighting material; and at that time they were few in number and -tending--in England at least--to be ground out of existence between the -upper and nether millstones of the rival fanaticisms. If she broke with -Catholicism she would be sure of the ardent and unwavering support of -one-third of the nation; so sure, that she would have no need to take -any further pains to please them. As for the remaining two-thirds, she -hoped to conciliate most of them by posing as their protector against -the persecution which would have been pleasing to Protestant bigots. - -In the policy of a complete breach with Rome, Cecil was disposed to go -as far as the Queen, and further. Cecil was at this time thirty-eight. -For forty years he continued to be the confidential and faithful -servant of Elizabeth. One of those new men whom the Tudors most -trusted, he was first employed by Henry VIII. Under Edward he rose to be -Secretary of State, and was a pronounced Protestant. On the fall of his -patron Somerset he was for a short time sent to the Tower, but was soon -in office again--sooner, some thought, than was quite decent--under his -patron’s old enemy, Northumberland. He signed the letters-patent by -which the crown was conferred on Lady Jane Grey; but took an early -opportunity of going over to Mary. During her reign he conformed to the -old religion, and, though not holding any office, was consulted on -public business, and was one of the three commissioners who went to -fetch Cardinal Pole to England. Thoroughly capable in business, one of -those to whom power naturally falls because they know how to use it, a -shrewd balancer of probabilities, without a particle of fanaticism in -his composition and detesting it in others, though ready to make use of -it to serve his ends, entirely believing that “what-e’er is best -administered is best,” Cecil nevertheless had his religious -predilections, and they were all on the side of the Protestants. -Moreover he had a personal motive which, by the nature of the case, was -not present to the Queen. She might die prematurely; and if that event -should take place before the Protestant ascendancy was firmly -established his power would be at an end, and his very life would be in -danger. A time came when he and his party had so strengthened -themselves, if not in absolute numerical superiority, yet by the hold -they had established on all departments of Government from the highest -to the lowest, that they were in a condition to resist a Catholic -claimant to the throne, if need were, sword in hand. But during the -early years of the reign Cecil was working with the rope round his neck. -Hence he could not regard the progress of events with the imperturbable -_sang-froid_ which Elizabeth always displayed; and all his influence was -employed to push the religious revolution through as rapidly and -completely as possible. - -The story that Elizabeth was influenced in her attitude to Rome by an -arrogant reply from Pope Paul IV. to her official notification of her -accession, though refuted by Lingard and Hallam in their later editions, -has been repeated by recent historians. Her accession was notified to -every friendly sovereign except the Pope. He was studiously ignored from -the first. Equally unsupported by facts are all attempts to show that -during the early weeks of her reign she had not made up her mind as to -the course she would take about religion. All preaching, it is true, was -suspended by proclamation; and it was ordered that the established -worship should go on “until consultation might be had in Parliament by -the Queen and the three Estates.” In the meantime she had herself -crowned according to the ancient ritual by the Catholic Bishop of -Carlisle. But this is only what might have been expected from a strong -ruler who was not disposed to let important alterations be initiated by -popular commotion or the presumptuous forwardness of individual -clergymen. The impending change was quite sufficiently marked from the -first by the removal of the most bigoted Catholics from the Council and -by the appointment of Cecil and Bacon to the offices of Secretary and of -Lord Keeper. The new Parliament, Protestant candidates for which had -been recommended by the Government, met as soon as possible (Jan. 25, -1559). When it rose (May 8th) the great change had been legally and -decisively accomplished. - -The government, worship, and doctrine of the Established Church are the -most abiding marks left by Elizabeth on the national life of England. -Logically it might have been expected that the settlement of doctrine -would precede that of government and worship. It is characteristic of a -State Church that the inverse order should have been followed. For the -Queen the most important question was Church government; for the people, -worship. Both these matters were disposed of with great promptitude at -the beginning of 1559. Doctrine might interest the clergy; but it could -wait. The Thirty-nine Articles were not adopted by Convocation till -1563, and were not sanctioned by Parliament till 1571. - -The government of the Church was settled by the Act of Supremacy (April -1559). It revived the Act of Henry VIII., except that the Queen was -styled Supreme Governor of the Church instead of Supreme Head, although -the nature of the supremacy was precisely the same. The penalties were -relaxed. Henry’s oath of supremacy might be tendered to any subject, and -to decline it was high treason; Elizabeth’s oath was to be obligatory -only on persons holding spiritual or temporal office under the Crown, -and the penalty for declining was the loss of such office. Those who -chose to _attack_ the supremacy were still liable to the penalties of -treason on the third offence. - -Worship was settled with equal expedition by the Act of Uniformity -(April 1559), which imposed the second or more Protestant Prayer-book of -Edward VI., but with a few very important alterations. A deprecation in -the Litany of “the tyranny of the Bishop of Rome and all his detestable -enormities,” and a rubric which declared that by kneeling at the -Communion no adoration was intended to any real and essential presence -of Christ, were expunged. The words of administration in the present -communion service consist of two sentences. The first sentence, implying -real presence, belonged to Edward’s first Prayer-book; the second, -implying mere commemoration, belonged to his second Prayer-book. The -Prayer-book of 1559 simply pieced the two together, with a view to -satisfy both Catholics and Protestants. Lastly, the vestments prescribed -in Edward’s first Prayer-book were retained till further notice. These -alterations of Edward’s second Prayer-book, all of them designed to -propitiate the Catholics, were dictated by Elizabeth herself. In all -this legislation Convocation was entirely ignored. Both its houses -showed themselves strongly Catholic. But their opinion was not asked, -and no notice was taken of their remonstrances. - -While determining that England should have a purely national Church, and -for that reason casting in her lot with the Protestants, Elizabeth, as -we have seen, made very considerable sacrifices of logic and consistency -in order to induce Catholics to conform. Like a strong and wise -statesman, she did not allow herself to be driven into one concession -after another, but went at once as far as she intended to go. At the -same time the coercion applied to the Catholics, while sufficient to -influence the worldly-minded majority, was, during the early part of her -reign, very mild for those times. She wished no one to be molested who -did not go out of his way to invite it. Outward conformity was all she -wanted. And of this mere attendance at church was accepted as sufficient -evidence. The principal difficulty, of course, was with the clergy. From -them more than a mere passive conformity had to be exacted. To sign -declarations, take oaths, and officiate in church was a severer strain -on the conscience. It is said that less than 200 out of 9400 sacrificed -their benefices rather than conform, and that of these about 100 were -dignitaries. The number must be under-stated; for the chief difficulty -of the new bishops, for a long time, was to find clergymen for the -parish churches. But we cannot doubt that the large majority of the -parish clergy stuck to their livings, remaining Catholics at heart, and -avoiding, where they could, and as long as they could, compliance with -the new regulations. It must not be supposed that the enactment of -religious changes by Parliament was equivalent, as it would be at the -present day, to their immediate enforcement throughout the country; -especially in the north where the great proprietors and justices of the -peace did not carry out the law. A certain number of the ejected priests -continued to celebrate the ancient rites privately in the houses of the -more earnest Catholics; for which they were not unfrequently punished by -imprisonment. Of course this was persecution. But according to the -ideas of that day it was a very mild kind of persecution; and where it -occurred it seems to have been due to the zeal of some of the bishops, -and to private busybodies who set the law in motion, rather than to any -systematic action on the part of the Government. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -FOREIGN RELATIONS: 1559-1563 - - -The successful wars waged by Edward III. and Henry V. are apt to cause -an exaggerated estimate of the strength of England under the Tudors. The -population--Wales included--was probably not much more than four -millions. That of France was perhaps four times as large, and the -superiority in wealth was even greater.[1] Before the reign of Louis -XI., France, weakened by feudal disunion, had been an easy prey to her -smaller but better-organised neighbour. The work of concentration -effected by the greatest of French kings towards the close of the -fifteenth century, and the simultaneous rise of the great Spanish -empire, caused England to fall at once into the rank of a second-rate -power. Such she really was under Henry VIII., notwithstanding the rather -showy figure he managed to make by adhering alternately to Charles V. -and Francis I. Under the bad government of Edward and Mary the fighting -strength of England declined not only relatively, but absolutely, until -in the last year of Mary it touched the lowest point in our history. -Although we were at war with France, there were no soldiers, no -officers, no arms, no fortresses that could resist artillery, few ships, -a heavy debt, and deep discouragement. The loss of Calais, which had -been held for 200 years, was the simple and natural consequence of this -prostration. Justice will not be done to the great recovery under -Elizabeth unless we understand how low the country had sunk when she -came to the throne. - -During the early years of her reign, it was the universal opinion at -home and abroad that without Spanish protection she could not preserve -her throne against a French invasion in the interests of Mary Stuart. -Henry II. meant that, by the marriage of the Dauphin Francis with Mary, -the kingdoms of England and Scotland should be united to one another and -eventually to France. Philip would thus lose the command of the sea -route to the Netherlands, and the hereditary duel with the House of -Austria would be decided. This scheme could not seem fantastic in a -century which had seen such immense agglomerations of territory effected -by political marriages. Philip, on the other hand, made sure that the -danger from France must necessarily throw Elizabeth and England into his -arms. Notwithstanding the warnings he received from his ambassador Feria -that Elizabeth was a heretic, he felt certain that she would not venture -to alter religion at the risk of offending him. The only question with -him was whether he should marry her himself or bestow her on some sure -friend of his house. That she would refuse both himself and his nominee -was a contingency he never contemplated. - -Elizabeth, from the first, made up her mind that the cards in her hand -could be played to more advantage than Philip supposed. England, no -doubt, needed his protection for the present. But could he please -himself about granting it? Her bold calculation was that his own -interests would compel him, in any case, to prevent the execution of the -Stuart-Valois scheme, and that consequently she might settle religion -without reference to his wishes. - -The offer of marriage came in January 1559. In his letter to Feria, -Philip spoke as if Elizabeth would of course jump at it. After dwelling -on its many inconveniences, he said he had decided to make the sacrifice -on condition that Elizabeth would uphold the Catholic religion; but she -must not expect him to remain long with her; he would visit England -occasionally. Feria foolishly allowed this letter to be seen, and the -contents were reported to Elizabeth. She was as much amused as piqued. -Their ages were not unsuitable. Philip was thirty-two, and Elizabeth was -twenty-five. But she was as fastidious about men as her father was about -women; and for no political consideration would she have tied herself to -her ugly, disagreeable, little brother-in-law. After some fencing, she -replied that she did not mean to marry, and that she was not afraid of -France. - -Before the death of Mary, negotiations for a peace between France, -Spain, and England had already begun. Calais was almost the only -difficulty remaining to be settled. Our countrymen have never been able -to understand how their possession of a fortress within the natural -boundaries of another country can be disagreeable to its inhabitants. -Elizabeth shared the national feeling, and she wanted Philip to insist -on the restitution of Calais. He would have done so if she had pleased -him as to other matters. Even as it was, the presence of a French -garrison in Calais was so inconvenient to the master of the Netherlands -that he was ready to fight on if England would do her part. But -Elizabeth would only promise to fight Scotland--a very indirect and, -indeed, useless way of supporting Philip. When once this point was made -clear, peace was soon concluded between the three powers at Câteau, near -Cambray (March 1559); appearances being saved by a stipulation that -Calais should be restored in eight years, or half a million of crowns be -forfeited. - -In thus giving way Elizabeth showed her good sense. To have fought on -would have meant deeper debt, terrible exhaustion, and, what was worse, -dependence on Philip. Moreover, Calais could only have been recovered by -reducing France to helplessness, which would have been fatal to the -balance of power on which Elizabeth relied to make herself independent -of both her great neighbours. The peace of Câteau Cambresis was attended -with a secret compact between Philip II. and Henry II., that each -monarch should suppress heresy in his own dominions and not encourage it -in those of his neighbour. By the accession of Elizabeth, and the Scotch -Reformation which immediately followed, Protestantism reached its -high-water mark in Europe. The long wars of Charles V. with France had -enabled it to spread. Francis I. had intrigued with the Protestant -princes of the Empire, and Charles had been obliged to humour them. -Protestantism was victorious in Britain, Scandinavia, North Germany, the -Palatinate, and Swabia. It had spread widely in Poland, Hungary, the -Netherlands, and France. This rapid growth was now about to be checked. -In some of these countries the new religion was destined to succumb; in -some entirely to disappear. Men who could remember the first preachings -of Luther lived to see not only the high-water, but the ebb, of the -Protestant tide. The revolutionary tendencies inherent in Protestantism -began to alarm the sovereigns; and all the more because the Church in -Catholic, hardly less than in Protestant, countries was becoming a -department of the State. Kings had been jealous of the spiritual power -when it belonged to the Popes. They became jealous for it when it was -annexed to the throne. - -Notwithstanding its secret stipulations, the peace of Câteau Cambresis -relieved England from the most pressing and immediate perils by which -she was threatened. Neither French nor Spanish troops had made their -appearance on our soil. A breathing-time at least had been gained, -during which something might be done towards putting the country in a -state of defence, and restoring the finances. - -But the danger from France was by no means at an end. In the treaty with -England, the title of Elizabeth had been acknowledged. But in that with -Spain, the Dauphin had styled himself “King of Scotland, England, and -Ireland.” He and Mary had also assumed the English arms. If a French -army invaded England, it would come by way of Scotland. The English -Catholics, who had for the most part frankly accepted the succession of -Elizabeth, were disappointed and irritated by the change of religion. If -Mary should go to Scotland with a French force, it was to be apprehended -that a rebellion would immediately break out in the northern counties. -Philip, no doubt, would land in the south to drive out the Dauphiness. -But the remedy would be worse than the disease. For he was deeply -discontented with the conduct of Elizabeth, and would probably take the -opportunity of deposing her. To establish, therefore, her independence -of both her powerful neighbours, Elizabeth had to begin by destroying -French influence in Scotland. - -The wisest heads in Scotland had long seen the advantage of uniting -their country to England by marriage. The blundering and bullying policy -of the Protector Somerset had driven the Scotch to renew their ancient -alliance with France. But the attempts of the Regent Mary of Guise to -increase French influence, and to establish a small standing army, in -order at once to strengthen her authority, and to serve the designs of -Henry II. against England, had again made the French connection -unpopular, and caused a corresponding revival of friendly feeling -towards England. - -Nowhere was the Church so wealthy, relatively to the other estates, as -in Scotland. It was supposed to possess half the property of the -country. Nowhere were the clergy so immoral. Nowhere was superstition -so gross. But the doctrines of the Reformation were spreading among the -common people, and in 1557 some of the nobles, hungering for the wealth -of the Church, put themselves at the head of the Protestant movement. -They were known as the “Lords of the Congregation.” - -The Scotch Reformation began not from the Government, as in England, but -from the people. Hence, while change of supremacy was the main question -in England, change of doctrine and worship took the lead in Scotland. -The two parties were about equal in numbers, the Protestants being -strongest in the Lowlands. But, with the exception of the murder of -Beaton in 1546, there had, as yet, been no appeal to force, nor any -attempt to procure a public change of religion. The accession of -Elizabeth emboldened the Protestants. At Perth they took possession of -the churches and burnt a monastery. On the other hand, after the peace -of Câteau Cambresis, Henry II. directed the Regent to put down -Protestantism, both in pursuance of the agreement with Philip, and in -order to prepare for the Franco-Scottish invasion of England. The result -was that the Protestants rose in open rebellion (June 1559). The Lords -of the Congregation occupied Perth, Stirling, and Edinburgh. All over -the Lowlands abbeys were wrecked, monks harried, churches cleared of -images, the Mass abolished, and King Edward’s service established in its -place. In England the various changes of religion in the last thirty -years had always been effected legally by King and Parliament. In -Scotland the Catholic Church was overthrown by a simultaneous popular -outbreak. The catastrophe came later than in England; but popular -feeling was more prepared for it; and what was now cast down was never -set up again. - -It seemed at first as if the Regent and her handful of regular troops, -commanded by d’Oysel, would be swept away. But d’Oysel had fortified -Leith, and was even able to take the field. A French army was expected. -The tumultuary forces of the needy Scotch nobles could not be kept -together long, and it became clear that, unless supported by Elizabeth, -the rebellion would be crushed as soon as the French reinforcements -should arrive, if not sooner. - -Thus early did Elizabeth find herself confronted by the Scottish -difficulty, which was to cause her so much anxiety throughout the -greater part of her reign. The problem, though varying in minor details, -was always essentially the same. There was a Protestant faction looking -for support to England, and a Catholic faction looking to France. Two or -three of the Protestant leaders--Moray, Glencairn, Kirkaldy--did really -care something about a religious reformation. The rest thought more of -getting hold of Church lands and pursuing old family feuds. In the -experience of Elizabeth, they were a needy, greedy, treacherous crew, -always sponging on her treasury, and giving her very little service in -return for her money. Besides, the whole Scotch nation was so touchy in -its patriotism, so jealous of foreign interference, that foreign -soldiers present on its soil were sure to be regarded with an evil eye, -no matter for what purpose they had come, or by whom they had been -invited. - -The Lords of the Congregation invoked the protection of Elizabeth. They -suggested that she should marry the Earl of Arran, and that he and she -should be King and Queen of Great Britain. Arran was the eldest son of -the Duke of Chatelherault, who, Mary being as yet childless, was -heir-presumptive to the Scottish crown. There were many reasons why -Elizabeth should decline interference. It was throwing down the glove to -France. Interference in Scotland had always been disastrous. It might -drive the English Catholics to despair, as cutting off the hope of -Mary’s succession to the English crown. To make a Protestant match would -irritate Philip. He might invade England to forestall the French. Almost -all her Council--even Bacon--advised her to leave Scotland alone, marry -the Archduke Charles, and trust to the Spanish alliance for the defence -of England. - -These were serious considerations; and to them was to be joined another -which with Elizabeth always had great weight--more, naturally, than it -had with any of her advisers. She shrank from doing anything which might -have the practical effect of weakening the common cause of monarchs. She -felt instinctively that with Protestants reverence for the religious -basis of kingship must tend to become weaker than with Catholics. She -did not desire to encourage this tendency or to familiarise her own -subjects with it. Knox’s _First Blast of the Trumpet against the -Monstrous Regimen of Women_ had been directed against Mary. The Blasts -that were to follow had been dropped; but the first could not be treated -as unblown. And the arrogant preacher did not mend matters by writing to -Elizabeth that she was to consider her case as an exception “contrary -to nature,” allowed by God “for the comfort of His kirk,” but that if -she based her title on her birth or on law, “her felicity would be -short.” - -Nevertheless Elizabeth adopted the bolder course. The Lords of the -Congregation were assured that England would not see them crushed by -French arms. A small supply of money was sent to them. As to the -marriage with Arran, no positive answer was given; but he was sent for -to be looked at. When he came, he was found to be even a poorer creature -than his father; at times, indeed, not quite right in his mind. It was -hard upon the Hamiltons, among whom were so many able and daring men, -that, with the crown almost in their grasp, their chiefs should be such -incapables. To Elizabeth it was no doubt a relief to find that Arran was -an impossible husband. - -In the meantime 2000 French had arrived, and the Lords were urgent in -their demands for help. But Elizabeth determined, and rightly, that they -must do their own work if they could. She was willing to give them such -pecuniary help as was necessary. But the demand for troops was -unreasonable. Fighting men abounded in Scotland. Why should English -troops be sent to do their fighting for them, with the certainty of -earning black looks rather than thanks? If a large army was despatched -from France, she would attack it with her fleet. If it landed, she would -send an English army. But if the Lords of the Congregation did not beat -the handful of Frenchmen at Leith it must be because they were either -weak or treacherous. In either case Elizabeth might have to give up the -policy she preferred, leave Scotland alone, and fall back upon an -alliance with Philip. - -In order therefore to preserve this second string to her bow, and to let -the Scotch Anglophiles see that she possessed it, she reopened -negotiations for the Austrian marriage. Charles, in his turn, was -invited to come and be looked at. Much as she disliked the idea of -marriage, she knew that political reasons might make it necessary. But, -come what would, she would never marry a man who was not to her fancy as -a man. She would take no one on the strength of his picture. She had -heard that Charles was not over-wise, and that he had an extraordinarily -big head, “bigger than the Earl of Bedford’s.” - -The Scotch Lords, finding that Elizabeth was determined to have some -solid return for her money, went to work with more vigour. They -proclaimed the deposition of the Regent, drove her from Edinburgh, and -besieged her and her French garrison in Leith. But this burst of energy -was soon over. The Protestants were more ready to pull down images and -harry monks than make campaigns. Leith was not to be taken. In three -weeks their army dwindled away, and the little disciplined force of -Frenchmen re-entered Edinburgh. - -The position had become very critical for Elizabeth. A French army of -15,000 men was daily expected at Leith. If once it landed, the -Congregation would be crushed; the Hamiltons would make their peace; and -the disciplined army of d’Elbœuf, swelled by hordes of hungry -Scotchmen, would pour over the Border and proclaim Mary in the midst of -the Catholic population which ten years later rose in rebellion under -the northern Earls. - -In this difficulty the Spanish Ministers in the Netherlands were -consulted. If Elizabeth expelled the garrison at Leith, and so brought -upon herself a war with France, could she depend on Philip’s assistance? -The reply was menacing. Their master, for his own interest, could not -allow the Queen of France and Scotland to enforce her title to the -throne of England. But he would oppose it in his own way. If a French -army entered England from the north, a Spanish army would land on the -south coast. Turning to her own Council for advice, Elizabeth found no -encouragement. They recommended her to take Philip’s advice, and even to -retrace some of her steps in the matter of religion in order to -propitiate him. She made a personal appeal to the Duke of Norfolk to -take the command of the forces on the Border. But he declined to be the -instrument of a policy which he disapproved. - -We need not wonder if Elizabeth hesitated for a while. Some of these -councillors were not too well affected to her. But most of them were -thoroughly loyal, and there was really much to be said for the more -cautious policy. She herself was an eminently cautious politician, -inclined by nature to shrink from risky courses. Never, therefore, in -her whole career did she give greater proof of her large-minded -comprehension of the main lines of policy which it behoved her to follow -than when she determined to override the opinions of so many prudent -advisers, and expel the French force from the northern kingdom. - -England was not quite in the helpless, disabled position that it pleased -the Spaniards to believe. Twelve months of careful and energetic -administration had already done wonders. There had been wise economy and -wise expenditure. Money had been scraped together, and, though there was -still a heavy debt, the legacy of three wasteful reigns, the confidence -of the Antwerp money-lenders had revived, and they were willing to -advance considerable sums. A fleet had been equipped and manned; -shiploads of arms had been imported; forces had been collected on the -south coasts. The Border garrisons had been quietly raised in strength -till they were able to furnish an expeditionary force at a moment’s -notice. - -The smallest energy on the part of the Congregation might have finished -the war without the presence of an English force. Elizabeth had a right -to be angry. The Scotch Protestants expected to have the hardest part of -the work done for them, and to be paid for executing their own share of -it. Lord James and a few of the leaders were in earnest, but others were -selfish time-servers. As for the lower class, their Calvinism was still -new. It had not yet bred that fierce spirit of independence which before -long was to outweigh the force of nobles and gentry. But if the weakness -of the Anglophile party was disappointing, it had at all events shown -that Elizabeth must depend upon herself to ward off danger on that side; -and after some reasonable hesitation she decided to put through the work -she had begun. - -It says much for the patriotism of Elizabeth’s Council that when they -found she had made up her mind they did not stand sulkily aloof, but -co-operated heartily and vigorously in carrying out the policy they had -opposed. Norfolk himself accepted the command of the Border army, and -acted throughout the affair with fidelity and diligence. He was not a -man distinguished by ability of any kind, and the actual fighting was to -be done by Lord Grey, a firm and experienced, though not brilliant, -commander. But that the natural leader of the Conservative nobility -should be seen at the head of Elizabeth’s army was a useful lesson to -traitors at home and enemies abroad, who were telling each other that -her throne was insecure. - -An agreement between the English Queen and the Lords of the Congregation -was drawn up (February 27), with scrupulous care to avoid the appearance -of dictation and encroachment which had gathered all Scotland to Pinkie -Cleugh eleven years before. It set forth that the English troops were -entering Scotland for no other object than to assist the Duke of -Chatelherault, the heir-presumptive to the throne, and the other nobles, -to drive out the foreign invaders. They would build no fortress. There -was no intention to prejudice Mary’s lawful authority. Cecil appears to -have wanted to add something about “Christ’s true religion;” but -Elizabeth struck it out. Circumstances might compel her to be the -protector of foreign Protestants; but neither then nor at any other time -did she desire to pose in that character. - -A month later (March 28th) Lord Grey crossed the Border, and marched to -Leith. The siege of that place proved to be tedious. The Lords of the -Congregation gave very insufficient assistance; and, when an assault -had been repulsed with heavy loss, the citizens of Edinburgh would not -receive the wounded into their houses. At last, when food was running -short in the town, an envoy from France arrived with power to treat on -behalf of the Queen of Scots. Her mother, the Regent, had died during -the siege. After much haggling a treaty was signed. No French troops -were in future to be kept in Scotland. Offices of State were to be held -only by natives. The government during Mary’s absence was to be vested -in a Council of twelve noblemen; seven nominated by her and five by the -Estates. Elizabeth’s title to the kingdoms of England and Ireland was -recognised (July 1560). - -Such was the Treaty of Edinburgh, or of Leith, as it is sometimes -called, one of the most successful achievements of a successful reign. -It was gained by wise counsel and bold resolve; and its fruits, though -not completely fulfilling its promise, were solid and valuable. It was -not ratified by Mary. But her non-ratification in the long-run injured -no one but herself, besides putting her in the wrong, and giving -Elizabeth a standing excuse for treating her as an enemy. England was -permanently free from the menace of a disciplined French army in the -northern kingdom. Nothing was settled in the treaty about religion. But -this was equivalent to a confirmation of the violent change that had -recently taken place; in itself a guarantee of security to England. - -The moral effect of this success was even greater than its more tangible -results. It had been very generally believed, at all events abroad, that -Elizabeth was tottering on her throne; that the large majority were on -the point of rising to depose her; that, wriggle as she might, she would -find she was a mere _protégée_ of Philip, with no option but to follow -his directions and square her policy to his. Whatever small basis of -fact underlay this delusive estimate had been ridiculously exaggerated -in the reports sent to Philip by his ambassador De Quadra, a man who -evidently paid more attention to hole-and-corner tattle than to the -broad forces of English politics. - -All these imaginings were now proved to be vain. Elizabeth had shown -that she could protect herself by her own strength and in her own way. -She had civilly ignored Philip’s advice, or rather his injunctions. She -had thrown down the glove to France, and France had not taken it up. She -had placed in command of her armies the very man whom she was supposed -to fear, and he had done her bidding, and done it well. England once -more stood before Europe as an independent power, able to take care of -itself, aid its friends, and annoy its enemies. - -It is true that, as far as Elizabeth personally is concerned, her Scotch -policy had not always in its execution been as prompt and firm as could -be desired. Those who follow it in greater detail than is possible here -will find much in it that is irresolute and even vacillating. This -defect appears throughout Elizabeth’s career, though it will always be -ignored, as it ought to be ignored, by those who reserve their attention -for what is worth observing in the course of human affairs. - -In her intellectual grasp of European politics as a whole, and of the -interests of her own kingdom, Elizabeth was probably superior to any of -her counsellors. No one could better than she think out the general -idea of a political campaign. But theoretical and practical -qualifications are seldom, if ever, combined in equal excellence. Not -only are the qualities themselves naturally opposed, but the constant -exercise of either increases the disparity. Her sex obliged Elizabeth to -leave the large field of execution to others. Her practical gifts -therefore, whatever they were, deteriorated rather than advanced as she -grew older. In men, who every day and every hour of the day are engaged -in action, the habit of prompt decision and persistence in a course once -adopted, even if it be not quite the best, is naturally formed and -strengthened. It is a habit so valuable, so indispensable to continued -success, that in practice it largely compensates for some inferiority in -conception and design. Elizabeth’s irresolution and vacillation were -therefore a consequence of her position--that of an extremely able and -well-informed woman called upon to conduct a government in which so much -had to be decided by the sovereign at her own discretion. The abler she -was, the more disposed to make her will felt, the less steadiness and -consistency in action were to be expected from her. As the wife of a -king, upon whom the final responsibility would have rested--her inferior -perhaps in intellect and knowledge, but with the masculine habit of -making up his mind once for all, and then steering a straight -course--she would have been a wise and enlightened adviser, not afraid -of consistently maintaining principles, when the time, mode, and degree -of their application rested with another. As it was, Cecil and other -able statesmen who served her had not only to take their general course -of policy from their mistress--a wise course upon the whole, wiser -sometimes than they would have selected for themselves--but they were -embarrassed, in their loyal attempts to steer in the direction she had -prescribed, by her nervous habit of catching at the rudder-lines -whenever a new doubt occurred to her ingenious mind, or some private -feeling of the woman perverted the clear insight of the sovereign. - -The rivalry between France and Spain had hitherto been the safety of -England. Nothing but reasons of religion could bring those two powers to -suspend their political quarrel. This danger seemed to be averted for -the moment by the temporary ascendant of the Politiques after the death -of Francis II. But the fanaticism of both Catholics and Huguenots was -too bitter, and the nobles on both sides were too ambitious, to listen -to the dictates of reason and patriotism. The immense majority of the -nation, except in some districts of the south and south-west, was -profoundly Catholic. The Huguenots, strongest amongst the aristocracy -and the upper bourgeoisie, daring and intolerant like the Calvinists -everywhere, had no sooner received some countenance from Catherine than -they began to preach against the mass, to demand the spoliation of the -Church, the suppression of monasteries, the destruction of images, and -the expulsion of the Guises. Where they were strong enough they began to -carry out their programme. The Guises, on the other hand, forgetting the -glory they had won in the wars against Spain, were soliciting the -patronage of Philip, and urging him to put himself at the head of a -crusade against the heretics of all countries. To this appeal he -replied by formally summoning Catherine to put down heresy in France. An -accidental collision at Vassy, in which a number of Huguenots were -slain, brought on the first of those wars of religion which were to -desolate France for the next thirty years (March 1562). Both factions, -equally dead to patriotism, opened their country to foreigners. The -Guises called in the forces of Spain and the Pope. Condé applied to -Elizabeth and the Protestant princes of Germany. - -It was necessary to give the Huguenots just so much help as would -prevent them from being crushed. Aggressive in appearance, such -interference was in reality legitimate self-defence. But unfortunately -neither Elizabeth nor her Council had forgotten Calais, and they -extorted from Condé the surrender of Havre as a pledge for its -restoration. In the case of Scotland they had come, as we have seen, to -recognise that to establish a permanent war by holding fortified posts -on the territory of another nation is poor statesmanship. The possession -of Calais was of little military value as against France. It is true -that it would enable England to make sea communication between Spain and -the Netherlands very insecure, and would thus give Philip a powerful -motive for desiring to stand well with this country. But such a -calculation had less weight with Englishmen at that moment than pure -Jingoism--the longing to be again able to crow over their French enemy. - -The occupation of Havre (October 1562) gave to the Huguenot cause the -minimum of assistance, and brought upon it the maximum of odium. A -hollow reconciliation was soon patched up between the rival factions -(March 1563), and Elizabeth was summoned to evacuate Havre. She refused, -loudly complaining of the Huguenots for deserting her. She “had come to -the quiet possession of Havre without force or any other unlawful means, -and she had good reason to keep it.” Up to this time the fiction of -peace between the two nations had been maintained. It was now open war. -It is only fair to Elizabeth to say that all her Council and the whole -nation were even hotter than she was. The garrison of Havre, with their -commander Warwick, were eager for the fray. They would “make the French -cock cry Cuck,” they would “spend the last drop of their blood before -the French should fasten a foot in the town.” The inhabitants were all -expelled, and the siege began, Condé as well as the Catholics appearing -in the Queen-mother’s army. After a valiant defence the English, reduced -to a handful of men by typhus, sailed away (July 28, 1563). Peace was -concluded early in the next year (April 1564). Elizabeth did not repeat -her mistake. Thenceforward to the end of her reign we shall find her -carefully cultivating friendly relations with every ruler of France. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -ELIZABETH AND MARY STUART: 1559-1568 - - -When Elizabeth mounted the throne, it was taken for granted that she was -to marry, and marry with the least possible delay. This was expected of -her, not merely because in the event of her dying without issue there -would be a dispute whether the claim of Mary Stuart or that of Catherine -Grey was to prevail, but for a more general reason. The rule of an -unmarried woman, except provisionally during such short interval as -might be necessary to provide her with a husband, was regarded as quite -out of the question. It was the custom for the husbands of heiresses to -step into the property of their wives and stand in the shoes, so to -speak, of the last male proprietor, in order to perform those duties -which could not be efficiently performed by a woman. Elizabeth’s sister, -while a subject, had no thought of marrying. But her accession was -considered by herself and every one else to involve marriage. If the -nobles of England could have foreseen that Elizabeth would elude this -obligation, she would probably never have been allowed to mount the -throne. Her marriage was thought to be as much a matter of course, and -as necessary, as her coronation. - -Accordingly the House of Commons, which met a month after her accession, -immediately requested her to select a husband without delay. Her -declaration that she had no desire to change her state was supposed to -indicate only the real or affected coyness to be expected from a young -lady. There was no lack of suitors, foreign or English. The Archduke -Charles, son of the Emperor and cousin of Philip, would have been -welcomed by all Catholics and acquiesced in by political Protestants -like Cecil. The ardent Protestants were eager for Arran, and Cecil, till -he saw it was useless, worked his best for him, regardless of the -personal sacrifice his mistress must make in wedding a man who was not -always quite sane and eventually became a confirmed lunatic. - -Not many months of the new reign had passed before it began to be -suspected that Elizabeth’s partiality for Lord Robert Dudley had -something to do with her evident distaste for all her suitors. To her -Ministers and the public this partiality for a married man became a -cause of great disquietude. They not unnaturally feared that with a -young woman who had no relations to advise and keep watch over her, it -might lead to some disastrous scandal incompatible with her continuance -on the throne. Marriage with Dudley at this time was out of the -question. But within four months of her accession, the Spanish -ambassador mentions a report that Dudley’s wife had a cancer, and that -the Queen was only waiting for her death to marry him. - -About the humble extraction of Elizabeth’s favourite much nonsense was -talked in his lifetime by his ill-wishers, and has been duly repeated -since. He was as well born as most of the peerage of that time; very few -of whom could show nobility of any antiquity in the male line. The Duke -of Norfolk being the only Duke at Elizabeth’s accession, and in -possession of an ancient title, was looked on as the head of his order. -Yet it was only seventy-five years since a Howard had first reached the -peerage in consequence of having had the good fortune to marry the -heiress of the Mowbrays. Edmund Dudley, Minister of Henry VII. and -father of Northumberland, was grandson of John, fourth Lord Dudley; and -Northumberland, by his mother’s side, was sole heir and representative -of the ancient barony of De L’Isle, which title he bore before he -received his earldom and dukedom. In point of wealth and influence, -indeed, the favourite might be called an upstart. The younger son of an -attainted father, he had not an acre of land or a farthing of money -which he did not owe either to his wife or to the generosity of -Elizabeth. This it was that moved the sneers and ill-will of a people -with whom nobility has always been a composite idea implying, not only -birth and title, but territorial wealth. Moreover his grandfather, -though of good extraction, was a simple esquire, and had risen by -helping Henry VII. to trample on the old nobility. After his fall his -son had climbed to power under Henry VIII. and Edward VI. in the same -way. Lord Robert Dudley, again, had to begin at the bottom of the -ladder. - -No one will claim for Elizabeth’s favourite that he was a man of -distinguished ability or high character. He had a fine figure and a -handsome face. He bore himself well in manly exercises. His manners -were attractive when he wished to please. To these qualities he first -owed his favour with Elizabeth, who was never at any pains to conceal -her liking for good-looking men and her dislike of ugly ones. Finding -himself in favour, and inheriting to the full the pushing audacity of -his father and grandfather, he professed for the Queen a love which he -certainly did not feel, in order to serve his soaring ambition. -Elizabeth, it is my firm conviction, never loved Dudley or any other -man, in any sense of the word, high or low. She had neither a tender -heart nor a sensual temperament. But she had a more than feminine -appetite for admiration; and the more she was, unhappily for herself, a -stranger to the emotion of love, the more restlessly did she desire to -be thought capable of inspiring it. She was therefore easily taken in by -Dudley’s professions, and, though she did not care for him enough to -marry him, she liked to have him as well as several other handsome men, -dangling about her, “like her lap-dog,” to use her own expression. -Further she believed--and here came in the mischief--that his devotion -to her person would make him a specially faithful servant. - -We know, though Elizabeth did not, that in 1561, Dudley was promising -the Spanish ambassador to be Philip’s humble vassal, and to do his best -for Catholicism, if Philip would promote his marriage with the Queen; -that, in the same year, he was offering his services to the French -Huguenots for the same consideration; that at one time he posed as the -protector of the Puritans, while at another he was intriguing with the -captive Queen of Scots; whom, again, later on, he had a chief share in -bringing to the block. But we must remember that very few statesmen, -English or foreign, in the sixteenth century could have shown a record -free from similar blots. Those who, like Elizabeth and Cecil, were -undeniably actuated on the whole by public spirit, or by any principle -more respectable than pure selfishness, never hesitated to lie or play a -double game when it seemed to serve their turn. William of Orange is the -only eminent statesman, as far as I know, against whom this charge -cannot be made. When this was the standard of honour for consistent -politicians and real patriots, what was to be expected of lower natures? -Dudley’s conduct on several occasions was bad and contemptible; and he -must be judged with the more severity, because he sinned not only -against the code of duty binding on the ordinary man and citizen, but -against his professions of a tender sentiment by means of which he had -acquired his special influence. I have said that he was not a man of -great ability. But neither was he the empty-headed incapable trifler -that some writers have depicted him. He was not so judged by his -contemporaries. That Elizabeth, because she liked him, would have -selected a man of notorious incapacity to command her armies, both in -the Netherlands and when the Armada was expected, is one of those -hypotheses that do not become more credible by being often repeated. -Cecil himself, when it was not a question of the marriage--of which he -was a determined opponent--regarded him as a useful servant of the -Queen. I do not doubt that Elizabeth estimated his capacity at about its -right value. What she over-estimated was his affection for herself, and -consequently his trustworthiness. Sovereigns--and others--often place a -near relative in an important post, not as being the most capable person -they know, but as most likely to be true to them. Elizabeth had no near -relatives. If we grant--as we must grant--that she believed in Dudley’s -love, we cannot wonder that she employed him in positions of trust. A -female ruler will always be liable to make these mistakes, unless her -Ministers and captains are to be of her own sex. - -On the 3rd of September 1560, two months after the Treaty of Leith, -Elizabeth told De Quadra that she had made up her mind to marry the -Archduke Charles. On the 8th, Lady Robert Dudley died at Cumnor Hall. On -the 11th, Elizabeth told De Quadra that she had changed her mind. Dudley -neglected his wife, and never brought her to court. We cannot doubt that -he fretted under a tie which stood in the way of his ambition. Her death -had been predicted. It is not strange, therefore, that he should have -been suspected of having caused it. Nevertheless, not a particle of -evidence pointing in that direction has ever been produced, and it seems -most probable that the poor deserted creature committed suicide. A -coroner’s jury investigated the case diligently, and, it would seem, -with some animus against Foster, the owner of Cumnor Hall, but returned -a verdict of accidental death. - -Anyhow, Dudley was now free. The Scotch Estates were eagerly pressing -Arran’s suit, and the English Protestants were as eagerly backing them. -The opportunity was certainly unique. Though nothing was said about -deposing Mary, yet nothing could be more certain than that, if this -marriage took place, the Queen of France would never reign in Scotland. - -At her wits’ end how to escape a match so desirable for the Queen, so -repulsive to the woman, Elizabeth had announced her willingness to -espouse the Archduke in order to gain a short breathing-time. Vienna was -at least further than Edinburgh, and difficulties were sure to arise -when details began to be discussed. At this moment, by the sudden death -of his wife, Dudley became marriageable. If Elizabeth had been free to -marry or not, as she pleased, it seems to me in the highest degree -improbable that she would ever have thought of taking Dudley. But -believing that a husband was inevitable, and expecting that she would be -forced to take some one who was either unknown to her or positively -distasteful, it was most natural that she should ask herself whether it -was not the least of evils to put this cruel persecution to an end by -choosing a man whom at least she admired and liked, who loved her, as -she thought, for her own sake, and would be as obedient “as her -lap-dog.” When nations are ruled by women, and marriageable women, -feelings and motives which belong to the sphere of private life, and -should be confined to it, are apt to invade the domain of politics. If -Elizabeth’s subjects expected their sovereign to suppress all personal -feelings in choosing a consort, they ought to have established the Salic -law. No woman, queen or not queen, can be expected voluntarily to make -such a sacrifice. Her happiness is too deeply involved. - -In the autumn, then, of 1560, when Elizabeth had been not quite two -years on the throne, she seriously thought of marrying Dudley. It is -difficult to say how long she continued to think of it seriously. With -him, as with other suitors, she went on coquetting when she had -perfectly made up her mind that nothing was to come of it. Perhaps we -shall be right in saying that, as long as there was any question of the -Archduke Charles, she looked to Dudley as a possible refuge. This would -be till about the beginning of 1568. It seems to be always assumed, as a -matter of course, that Cecil played the part of Elizabeth’s good genius -in persistently dissuading her from marrying Dudley. I am not so sure of -this. If she had been a wife and a mother many of her difficulties would -have at once disappeared, and the weakest points in her character would -have no longer been brought out. It ended in her not marrying at all. I -am inclined to think that another enemy of Dudley, the Earl of Sussex, -showed more good sense and truer patriotism when he wrote in October -1560:-- - - “I wish not her Majesty to linger this matter of so great - importance, but to choose speedily; and therein to follow so much - her own affection as [that], by the looking upon him whom she - should choose, _omnes ejus sensus titillarentur_; which shall be - the readiest way, with the help of God, to bring us a blessed - prince which shall redeem us out of thraldom. If I knew that - England had other rightful inheritors I would then advise - otherwise, and seek to serve the time by a husband’s choice [seek - for an advantageous political alliance]. But seeing that she is - _ultimum refugium_, and that no riches, friendship, foreign - alliance, or any other present commodity that might come by a - husband, can serve our turn, without issue of her body, if the - Queen will love anybody, let her love where and whom she lists, so - much thirst I to see her love. And whomsoever she shall love and - choose, him will I love, honour, and serve to the uttermost.” - -Perhaps I may be excused for expressing the opinion that the ideal -husband for Elizabeth, if it had been possible, would have been Lord -James Stuart, afterwards Earl of Moray. Of sufficient capacity, kindly -heart, undaunted resolution, and unswerving rectitude of purpose, he -would have supplied just those elements that were wanting to correct her -defects. King of Scotland he perhaps could not be. Regent of Scotland he -did become. If he could, at the same time, have been Elizabeth’s -husband, the two crowns might have, in the next generation, been worn by -a Stuart of a nobler stock than the son of Mary and Darnley. - -When Mary Stuart, on the death of her husband Francis II., returned to -her own kingdom (August 1561), she found the Scotch nobles sore at the -rejection of Arran’s suit. Bent on giving a sovereign to England, in one -way or another, they were now ready, Protestants as well as Catholics, -to back Mary’s demand that she should be recognised as Elizabeth’s -heir-presumptive. To this the English Queen could not consent, for the -very sufficient reason, that not only would the Catholic party be -encouraged to hold together and give trouble, but the more bigoted and -desperate members of it would certainly attempt her life, lest she -should disappoint Mary’s hopes by marrying. “She was not so foolish,” -she said, “as to hang a winding-sheet before her eyes or make a funeral -feast whilst she was alive,” but she promised that she would neither do -anything nor allow anything to be done by Parliament to prejudice Mary’s -title. To this undertaking she adhered long after Mary’s hostile -conduct had given ample justification for treating her as an enemy. - -Openly Mary was claiming nothing but the succession. In reality she -cared little for a prospect so remote and uncertain. What she was -scheming for was to hurl Elizabeth from her throne. This was an object -for which she never ceased to work till her head was off her shoulders. -Her aims were more sharply defined than those of Elizabeth, and she was -remarkably free from that indecision which too often marred the action -of the English Queen. In ability and information she was not at all -inferior to Elizabeth; in promptitude and energy she was her superior. -These masculine qualities might have given her the victory in the bitter -duel, but that, in the all-important domain of feeling, her sex -indomitably asserted itself, and weighted her too heavily to match the -superb self-control of Elizabeth. She could love and she could hate; -Elizabeth had only likes and dislikes, and therefore played the cooler -game. When Mary really loved, which was only once, all selfish -calculations were flung to the winds; she was ready to sacrifice -everything, and not count the cost--body and soul, crown and life, -interest and honour. When she hated, which was often, rancour was apt to -get the better of prudence. And so at the fatal turning-point of her -career, when mad hate and madder love possessed her soul, she went down -before her great rival never to rise again. Here was a woman indeed. And -if, for that reason, she lost the battle in life, for that reason too -she still disputes it from the tomb. She has always had, and always will -have, the ardent sympathy of a host of champions, to whom the “fair -vestal throned by the west” is a mere politician, sexless, cold-blooded, -and repulsive. - -In 1564 Mary, as yet fancy-free, was seeking to match herself on purely -political grounds. She was not so fastidious as Elizabeth, for she does -not seem to have troubled herself at all about personal qualities, if a -match seemed otherwise eligible. The Hamiltons pressed Arran upon her. -But he was a Protestant. He was not heir to any throne but that of -Scotland; and, though a powerful family in Scotland, the Hamiltons could -give her no help elsewhere. Philip, who, now that the Guises had become -his _protégés_, was less jealous of her designs, wished her to marry his -cousin, the Archduke Charles of Austria. But this prince, whom Elizabeth -professed to find too much of a Catholic, was, in the eyes of Mary and -her more bigoted co-religionists, too nearly a Lutheran; and she doubted -whether Philip cared enough for him to risk a war for establishing him -and herself upon the English throne. For this reason the husband on whom -she had set her heart was Don Carlos, Philip’s own son, a sort of wild -beast. But Philip received her overtures doubtfully; the fact being that -he could not trust Don Carlos, whom he eventually put to death. -Catherine de’ Medici loved Mary as little as she did the other Guises, -but the prospect of the Spanish match filled her with such terror that -she proposed to make the Scottish Queen her daughter-in-law a second -time by a marriage with Charles IX., a lad under thirteen, if she would -wait two years for him. - -On the other hand, Elizabeth impressed upon Mary that, unless she -married a member of some Reformed Church, the English Parliament would -certainly demand that her title to the succession, whatever it was, -should be declared invalid. The House of Commons was strongly -Protestant, and had with difficulty been prevented from addressing the -Queen in favour of the succession of Lady Catherine Grey. Apart from -religion there was deep irritation against the whole Scotch nation. Sir -Ralph Sadler, who had been much employed in Scotland, denounced them as -“false, beggarly, and perjured, whom the very stones in the English -streets would rise against.” When Elizabeth was dangerously ill in -October 1562, the Council discussed whom they should proclaim in the -event of her death. Some were for the will of Henry VIII. and Catherine -Grey. Others, sick of female rulers, were for taking the Earl of -Huntingdon, a descendant of the Duke of Clarence. None were for Mary or -Darnley. Mary’s chief friends--Montagu, Northumberland, Westmoreland, -and Derby--were not on the Council. - -Parliament and the Council being against her, Mary could not afford to -quarrel with the Queen. Elizabeth told her that she would regard a -marriage with any Spanish, Austrian, or French prince as a declaration -of war. Help from those quarters was far away, and at the mercy of winds -and waves: the Border fortresses were near, and their garrisons always -ready to march. Besides, whichever of the two she might obtain--Charles -IX. or the Archduke--she drove the other into the arms of Elizabeth. - -But there was another possible husband who had crossed her mind from -time to time; not a prince indeed, yet of royal extraction in the -female line, and, what was more, not without pretensions to that very -succession which she coveted. Henry Lord Darnley, son of Matthew Stuart, -Earl of Lennox, was, by his father’s side, of the royal family of -Scotland, while his mother was the daughter of Margaret Tudor, sister of -Henry VIII., by her second husband, the Earl of Angus. Born and brought -up in England, where his father had been long an exile, he was reckoned -as an Englishman, which, in the opinion of many lawyers, was essential -as a qualification for the crown. He was also a Catholic, and if -Elizabeth had died at this time, it was perhaps Darnley, rather than -Mary, whom the Catholics would have tried to place on the throne. -Elizabeth had promised that, if Mary would marry an English nobleman, -she would do her best to get Mary’s title recognised by Parliament. To -Elizabeth, therefore, Mary now turned, with the request that she would -point out such a nobleman, not without a hope that she would name -Darnley (March 1564). But, to Mary’s mortification, she formally -recommended Lord Robert Dudley. - -This recommendation has often been treated as if it was a sorry joke -perpetrated by Elizabeth, who had never any intention of furthering, or -even permitting, such a match. But nothing is more certain than that -Elizabeth was most anxious to bring it about; and it affords a decisive -proof that her feeling for Dudley, whatever name she herself may have -put to it, was not what is usually called love. Cecil and all her most -intimate advisers entertained no doubt that she was sincere. She -undertook, if Mary would accept Dudley, to make him a duke; and, in the -meantime, she created him Earl of Leicester. She regarded him, so she -told Mary’s envoy Melville, as her brother and her friend; if he was -Mary’s husband she would have no suspicion or fear of any usurpation -before her death, being assured that he was so loving and trusty that he -would never permit anything to be attempted during her time. “But,” she -said, pointing to Darnley, who was present, “you like better yonder long -lad.” Her suspicion was correct. Melville had secret instructions to -procure permission for Darnley to go to Scotland. However, he answered -discreetly that “no woman of spirit could choose such an one who more -resembled a woman than a man.” - -How was Elizabeth to be persuaded to let Darnley leave England? There -was only one way to disarm suspicion: Mary declared herself ready to -marry Leicester (January 1565). Darnley immediately obtained leave of -absence for three months ostensibly to recover the forfeited Lennox -property. In Scotland the purpose of his coming was not mistaken, and it -roused the Protestants to fury. The Queen’s chapel, the only place in -the Lowlands where mass was said, was beset. Her priests were mobbed and -maltreated. Moray, who till lately had supported his sister with such -loyalty and energy that Knox had quarrelled with him, prepared, with the -other Lords of the Congregation, for resistance. Elizabeth, and Cecil -also, had been completely overreached. A prudent player sometimes gets -into difficulties by attributing equal prudence to a daring and reckless -antagonist. Elizabeth, as a patriotic ruler, desired nothing but peace -and security for her own kingdom. If she could have that, she had no -wish to meddle with Scotland. Mary, caring nothing for the interests of -her subjects, was facing civil war with a light heart; and, for the -chance of obtaining the more brilliant throne, was ready to risk her -own. - -Undeterred by Elizabeth’s threats, Mary married Darnley (July 29, 1565). -Moray and Argyll, having obtained a promise of assistance from England, -took arms; but most of the Lords of the Congregation showed themselves -even more powerless or perfidious than they had been five years before. -Morton, Ruthven, and Lindsay, stoutest of Protestants, were related to -Darnley, and were gratified by the elevation of their kinsman. Moray -failed to elicit a spark of spirit out of the priest-baiting citizens of -Edinburgh, and the Queen, riding steel cap on head and pistols at -saddle-bow, chased him into England. Lord Bedford, who was in command at -Berwick, could have stepped across the Border and scattered her -undisciplined array without difficulty. He implored Elizabeth to let him -do it; offered to do it on his own responsibility, and be disavowed. But -he found, to his mortification, that she had been playing a game of -brag. She had hoped that a threatening attitude would stop the marriage. -But as it was an accomplished fact she was not going to draw the sword. - -This was shabby treatment of Moray and his friends, and to some of her -councillors it seemed not only shameful but dangerous to show the white -feather. But judging from the course of events, Elizabeth’s policy was -the safe one. The English Catholics--some of them at all events, as -will be explained presently--were becoming more discontented and -dangerous. The northern earls were known to be disaffected. Mary -believed that in every county in England the Catholics had their -organisation and their leaders, and that, if she chose, she could march -to London. No doubt she was much deceived. In reluctance to resort to -violence and respect for constituted authority, England, even north of -the Humber, was at least two centuries ahead of Scotland, and, if she -had come attended by a horde of savage Highlanders and Border ruffians, -“the very stones in the streets would have risen against them.” It was -Elizabeth’s rule--and a very good rule too--never to engage in a war if -she could avoid it. From this rule she could not be drawn to swerve -either by passion or ambition, or that most fertile source of fighting, -a regard for honour. All the old objections to an invasion of Scotland -still subsisted in full strength, and were reinforced by others. It was -better to wait for an attack which might never come than go half-way to -meet it. An invasion of Scotland might drive the northern earls to -declare for Mary, which, unless compelled to choose sides, they might -never do. Some people are more perturbed by the expectation and -uncertainty of danger than by its declared presence. Not so Elizabeth. -Smouldering treason she could take coolly as long as it only smouldered. -As for the betrayal of the Scotch refugees, Elizabeth never allowed the -private interests of her own subjects, much less those of foreigners, to -weigh against the interests of England. Moray one of the most -magnanimous and self-sacrificing of statesmen, evidently felt that -Elizabeth’s course was wise, if not exactly chivalrous. He submitted to -her public rebuke without publicly contradicting her, and waited -patiently in exile till it should be convenient for her to help him and -his cause. Mary, too, though elated by her success, and never abandoning -her intention to push it further, found it best to halt for a while. -Philip wrote to her that he would help her secretly with money if -Elizabeth attacked her, but not otherwise, and warned her against any -premature clutch at the English crown. Elizabeth’s seeming tameness -could hardly have received a more complete justification. - -Mary had determined to espouse Darnley, before she had set eyes on him, -for purely political reasons. There is no reason to suppose she ever -cared for him. It is more likely, as Mr. Froude suggests, that for a -great political purpose she was doing an act which in itself she -loathed. A woman of twenty-two, already a widow, mature beyond her -years, exceptionally able, absorbed in the great game of politics, and -accustomed to admiration, was not likely to care for a raw lad of -nineteen, foolish, ignorant, ill-conditioned, vicious, and without a -single manly quality. One man we know she did love later on--loved -passionately and devotedly, no slim girl-faced youngster, but the -fierce, stout-limbed, dare-devil Bothwell; and Bothwell gradually made -his way to her heart by his readiness to undertake every desperate -service she required of him. What Mary admired, nay envied, in the other -sex was the stout heart and the strong arm. She loved herself to rough -it on the war-path. She surprised Randolph by her spirit:--“Never -thought I that stomach to be in her that I find. She repented nothing -but, when the Lords and others came in the morning from the watches, -that she was not a man, to know what life it was to lie all night in the -fields or to walk upon the causeway with a jack and a knapscap, a -Glasgow buckler and a broadsword.” “She desires much,” says Knollys, “to -hear of hardiness and valiancy, commending by name all approved hardy -men of her country, although they be her enemies; and she concealeth no -cowardice even in her friends.” Valuable to Mary as a man of action, -Bothwell was not worth much as an adviser. For advice she looked to the -Italian Rizzio, in whom she confided because, with the detachment of a -foreigner, he regarded Scotch ambitions, animosities, and intrigues only -as so much material to be utilised for the purpose of the combined -onslaught on Protestantism which the Pope was trying to organise. -Bothwell was at this time thirty, and Rizzio, according to Lesley, -fifty. - -In spite of all the prurient suggestions of writers who have fastened on -the story of Mary’s life as on a savoury morsel, there is no reason -whatever for thinking that she was a woman of a licentious disposition, -and there is strong evidence to the contrary. There was never anything -to her discredit in France. Her behaviour in the affair of Chastelard -was irreproachable. The charge of adultery with Rizzio is dismissed as -unworthy of belief even by Mr. Froude, the severest of her judges. -Bothwell indeed she loved, and, like many another woman who does not -deserve to be called licentious, she sacrificed her reputation to the -man she loved. But the most conclusive proof that she was no slave to -appetite is afforded by her nineteen years’ residence in England, which -began when she was only twenty-five. During almost the whole of that -time she was mixing freely in the society of the other sex, with the -fullest opportunity for misconduct had she been so inclined. It is not -to be supposed that she was fettered by any scruples of religion or -morality. Yet no charge of unchastity is made against her. - -When Darnley found that his wife, though she conferred on him the title -of King, did not procure for him the crown matrimonial or allow him the -smallest authority, he gave free vent to his anger. No less angry were -his kinsmen, Morton, Ruthven, and Lindsay. They had deserted the -Congregation in the expectation that when Darnley was King they would be -all-powerful. Instead of this they found themselves neglected; while the -Queen’s confidence was given to Catholics and to Bothwell, who, though -nominally a Protestant, always acted with the Catholics. The Protestant -seceders had in fact fallen between two stools. It was against Rizzio -that their rage burnt fiercest. Bothwell was only a bull-headed, -blundering swordsman. Rizzio was doubly detestable to them as the brain -of the Queen’s clique and as a low-born foreigner. Rizzio, therefore, -they determined to remove in the time-honoured Scottish fashion. Notice -of the day fixed for the murder was sent to the banished noblemen in -England, so that they might appear in Edinburgh immediately it was -accomplished Randolph, the English ambassador, and Bedford, who -commanded on the Border, were also taken into the secret, and they -communicated it to Cecil and Leicester. - -It is unnecessary here to repeat the well-known story of the murder of -Rizzio. It was part of a large scheme for bringing back the exiled -Protestant lords, closing the split in the Protestant party, and -securing the ascendancy of the Protestant religion. At first it appeared -to have succeeded. Bedford wrote to Cecil that “everything would now go -well.” But Mary, by simulating a return of wifely fondness, managed to -detach her weak husband from his confederates. By his aid she escaped -from their hands. Bothwell and her Catholic friends gathered round her -in arms. In a few days she re-entered Edinburgh in triumph, and Rizzio’s -murderers had to take refuge in England. - -But if the Protestant stroke had failed, Mary was obliged to recognise -that her plan for re-establishing the Catholic ascendancy in Scotland -could not be rushed in the high-handed way she had proposed as a mere -preliminary to the more important subjugation of England. At the very -moment when she seemed to stand victorious over all opposition, the -ground had yawned under her feet, and, while she was dreaming of -dethroning Elizabeth, she had found herself a helpless captive in the -hands of her own subjects. The lesson was a valuable one, and if she -could profit by it her prospects had never been so good. The barbarous -outrage of which, in the sixth month of pregnancy, she had been the -object could not but arouse wide-spread sympathy for her. She had -extricated herself from her difficulties with splendid courage and -cleverness. The loss of such an adviser as Rizzio was really a stroke -of luck for her. All she had to do was to abandon, or at all events -postpone, her design of re-establishing the Catholic religion in -Scotland, and to discontinue her intrigues against Elizabeth. - -Her prospects in England were still further improved when she gave birth -to a son (June 19, 1566). Once more there was an heir-male to the old -royal line, and, as Elizabeth continued to evade marriage, most people -who were not fierce Protestants began to think it would be more -reasonable and safe to abide by the rule of primogeniture than by the -will of Henry VIII., sanctioned though it was by Act of Parliament. -There can be no doubt that this was the opinion and intention of -Elizabeth, though she strongly objected to having anything settled -during her own lifetime. But she had herself gone a long way towards -settling it by her treatment of Mary’s only serious competitor. -Catherine Grey had contracted a secret marriage with the Earl of -Hertford, son of the Protector Somerset. Her pregnancy necessitated an -avowal. The clergyman who had married them was not forthcoming, and -Hertford’s sister, the only witness, was dead. Elizabeth chose to -disbelieve their story, though she would not have been able to prove -when, where, or by whom her own father and mother had been married. She -had a right to be angry; but when she sent the unhappy couple to the -Tower, and caused her tool, Archbishop Parker, to pronounce the union -invalid and its offspring illegitimate, she was playing Mary’s game. The -House of Commons elected in 1563 was still undissolved. It was strongly -Protestant, and it favoured Catherine’s title even after her disgrace. -In its second session, in the autumn of 1566, it made a determined -effort to compel Elizabeth to marry, and in the meanwhile to recognise -Catherine as the heir-presumptive. The zealous Protestants knew well -that the Peers were in favour of the Stuart title, and they feared that -a new House of Commons might agree with the Peers. To get rid of their -pertinacity Elizabeth dissolved Parliament, not without strong -expressions of displeasure (Jan. 2, 1567). Cecil himself earned the -thanks of Mary for his attitude on this occasion. It cannot be doubted -that he dreaded her succession; but he saw which way the tide was -running, and he thought it prudent to swim with it. - -It was at this moment that Mary flung away all her advantage, and -entered on the fatal course which led to her ruin. Her loathing for -Darnley, her fierce desire to avenge on him the insults and outrage she -had suffered, left no room in heart or mind for considerations of -policy. She would have been glad to obtain a divorce. But the Catholic -Church does not grant divorce for misconduct after marriage. Some -pretext must be found for alleging that the marriage was null from the -beginning. This did not suit Mary. It would have made her son -illegitimate, and would have placed her in exactly the position of -Catherine Grey. A mere separation _a toro_ would not have suited her any -better, for it would not have enabled her to contract another marriage. - -When Mary’s reliance on Bothwell grew into attachment, when her -attachment warmed into love, it is impossible to fix with any exactness. -Her infatuation presented itself to him as a grand opening for his -daring ambition. A notorious profligate, he loved her--if the word is to -be so degraded--as much or as little as he had loved twenty other women. -What, however, he desired in her case, was marriage. A more sensible man -would have foreseen that marriage would mean certain ruin for himself -and the Queen. But he was accustomed to despise all difficulties in his -path, being intellectually incapable of measuring them, and believing in -nothing but audacity and brute force. Husband of the Queen, why should -he not be master of the kingdom? Why not King? When such an idea had -once occurred to Bothwell, Darnley’s expectancy of life would be much -the same as that of a calf in the presence of the butcher. - -The wretched victim had alienated all his friends among the nobility. -Some owed him a deadly grudge for his treachery. Others had been -offended by his insolence. To all he was an encumbrance and a nuisance. -Several, therefore, of the leading personages were more or less engaged -in the compact for putting him out of the way. Moray, Argyll, and -Maitland offered to assist in ridding Mary of her husband by way of a -Protestant sentence of divorce, on condition that Morton and his friends -in exile should be pardoned and recalled. The bargain was struck, and -Mary assented to it. Nothing was said about murder. No one had any -interest in murder except Mary and Bothwell, whose project of marriage -was as yet unsuspected. At the same time, if Bothwell liked to kill -Darnley on his own responsibility, as no doubt he made it pretty plain -that he would--why, so much the better. It relieved the other lords of -all trouble. It was a simple, thorough, old-fashioned expedient, which -had never been attended with any discredit in Scotland, and had only one -inconvenience--that it usually saddled the murderer with a blood feud. -In the present case Lennox was the only peer who would feel the least -aggrieved; and he was in no condition to wage blood-feuds. Anyhow, that -was Bothwell’s look-out. - -So obvious was all this that it was hardly worth while to observe -secrecy except as to the exact occasion and mode of execution. Many -persons were more or less aware of what was going to be done; but none -cared to interfere. Moray was an honourable and conscientious man, if -judged by the standard of his environment--the only fair way of -estimating character. But Moray chose to leave Edinburgh the morning -before the deed; and thought it sufficient to be able to say afterwards -that “if any man said he was present when purposes [talk] were held in -his audience tending to any unlawful or dishonourable end, he spoke -wickedly and untruly.” The inner circle of the plot consisted of -Bothwell, Argyll, Huntly, Maitland, and Sir James Balfour. - -That Darnley was murdered by Bothwell is not disputed. That Mary was -cognisant of the plot, and lured him to the shambles, has been doubted -by few investigators at once competent and unbiassed. She lent herself -to this part not without compunction. Bothwell had the advantage over -her that the loved has over the lover; and he used it mercilessly for -his headlong ambition, hardly taking the trouble to pretend that he -cared for the unhappy woman who was sacrificing everything for him. He -in fact cared more for his lawful wife, whom he was preparing to -divorce, and to whom he had been married only six months. Mary was -tormented by jealousy of her after the divorce as well as before. - -The murder of Darnley (Feb. 10, 1567) was universally ascribed to Mary -at the time by Catholics as well as Protestants at home and abroad, and -it fatally damaged her cause in England and the rest of Europe. In -Scotland itself--such was the backward and barbarous state of the -country--it would probably not have shaken her throne if she had -followed it up with firm and prudent government. She might even have -indulged her illicit passion for Bothwell, with little pretence of -concealment, if she had not advanced him in place and power above his -equals. There was probably not a noble in Scotland, from Moray -downwards, who would have scrupled to be her Minister. The Protestant -commonalty indeed, who with all the national laxity as to the observance -of the sixth commandment, were shocked by any trifling with the seventh, -would no doubt have made their bark heard. But their bite had not yet -become formidable; and in any case they were not to be propitiated. - -What brought sudden and irretrievable ruin on Mary was not the murder of -Darnley, but the infatuation which made her the passive instrument of -Bothwell’s presumptuous ambition. The lords, Catholic and Protestant -alike, allowed the murder to pass uncondemned and unpunished; but they -were furious when they found that Darnley had only been removed to make -room for Bothwell, and that they were to have for their master a noble -of by no means the highest lineage, bankrupt in fortune, and generally -disliked for his arrogant and bullying demeanour. The project of -marriage was not disclosed till ten weeks after the murder (April 19, -1567). Five days later, Bothwell, fearing lest he should be frustrated -by public indignation or interference from England, carried off the -Queen, as had been previously arranged between them. His idea was that, -when Mary had been thus publicly outraged, it would be recognised as -impossible that she should marry any one but the ravisher. In this -coarse expedient, as in the clumsy means employed for disposing of -Darnley, we see the blundering fool-hardiness of the man. The marriage -ceremony was performed as soon as Bothwell’s divorce could be managed -(May 15). Just a month later Mary surrendered to the insurgent lords at -Carberry Hill, and Bothwell, flying for his life, disappears from -history. - -The feelings with which Elizabeth had contemplated the course of events -in Scotland during the last six months were no doubt of a mixed nature. -At the beginning of 1567, her seven-years’ duel with Mary appeared to be -ending in defeat. The last bold thrust, aimed in her interest if not by -her hand--the murder of Rizzio--had not improved her position. It seemed -that she would soon be obliged to make her choice between two equally -dreaded alternatives: she must either recognise Mary as her heir or take -a husband. From this unpleasant dilemma she was released by the headlong -descent of her rival in the first six months of 1567. But all other -feelings were soon swallowed up in alarm and indignation at the -spectacle of subjects in revolt against their sovereign. As tidings came -in rapid succession of Mary’s surrender at Carberry Hill, of her return -to Edinburgh amidst the insults and threats of the Calvinist mob, of her -imprisonment at Loch Leven, of the proposal to try and execute her, -Elizabeth’s anger waxed hotter, and she told the Scotch lords in her -most imperious tones that she could not, and would not, permit them to -use force with their sovereign. If they deposed or punished her, she -would revenge it upon them. If they could not prevail on her to do what -was right, they must “remit themselves to Almighty God, in whose hands -only princes’ hearts remain.” - -This language, addressed as it was to the only men in Scotland who were -disposed to support the English interest, was imprudent. In her -fellow-feeling for a sister sovereign, and her keen perception of the -revolutionary tendencies of the time, Elizabeth spoilt an unique -opportunity of placing her relations with Scotland on a footing of -permanent security, of providing for the English succession in a way at -once advantageous to the nation and free from risk to her own life, and -lastly, of escaping from the constant worry about her own marriage. She -had seen clearly enough what might be made of the situation. Throgmorton -had been despatched to Scotland with instructions to do his best to get -the infant Prince confided to her care. Once in England, she would -virtually have adopted him. She would have possessed a son and heir -without the inconvenience of marriage. To a Parliamentary recognition, -indeed, of his title she would assuredly not have consented. It would -have made him independent and dangerous. But if he behaved well to her, -his succession would be more certain than any Act of Parliament could -make it. Mary, if released and restored to power, would no longer be -formidable. If she were deposed or put to death, Elizabeth would -indirectly govern Scotland, at all events, till James should be of age. - -This splendid opportunity Elizabeth lost by her peremptory and -domineering language. The old Scotch pride took fire. The Anglophile -lords, who would have been glad enough to send the young Prince to -England, could not afford to appear less patriotic than the -Francophiles. Throgmorton’s attempt to get hold of James was as -unsuccessful as that of the Protector Somerset to get hold of James’s -mother had been twenty years before. He was told that, before the Prince -could be sent to England, his title to the English succession must be -recognised; a condition which Elizabeth could not grant. Her claim that -Mary should be restored without conditions was equally unacceptable to -the Anglophile lords. They might have been induced to release her if she -would have consented to give up Bothwell, or if they could have caught -and hanged him. But such was her devotion to him, that no threats or -promises availed to shake it. It was in vain that they offered to -produce letters of his to the divorced Lady Bothwell, in which he -assured her that he regarded her still as his lawful wife, and Mary -only as his concubine. The unhappy Queen had been aware even before her -marriage--as a pathetic letter to Bothwell shows--that her passionate -love was not returned. Two days after the marriage, his unkindness had -driven her to think of suicide. But nothing they could say could shake -her constancy. “She would not consent by any persuasion to abandon the -Lord Bothwell for her husband. She would live and die with him. If it -were put to her choice to relinquish her crown and kingdom or the Lord -Bothwell, she would leave her kingdom and dignity to go as a simple -damsel with him; and she will never consent that he shall fare worse or -have more harm than herself. Let them put Bothwell and herself on board -ship to go wherever fortune might carry them.” This temper made it -difficult for the Anglophile lords to know what to do with the prisoner -of Loch Leven. They were disappointed and angry that Elizabeth, instead -of approving their enterprise, and sending the money for which, as -usual, they were begging, should treat them as rebels, and even secretly -urge the Hamiltons to rescue Mary by force. The Hamiltons were in arms -at Dumbarton. They wanted either that the Prince should be proclaimed -King, with the Duke of Chatelherault for Regent, or that Mary should be -divorced from Bothwell and married to Lord John Hamilton, the Duke’s -second son, and, in default of the crazy Arran, his destined successor. -With Argyll, too, disgust at Mary’s crime was tempered by a desire to -marry her to his brother. Lady Douglas of Loch Leven herself, for whom -Sir Walter Scott has invented such magnificent tirades, desired nothing -better than to be her mother-in-law. - -The prompt action of the confederate lords foiled these schemes. By the -threat of a public trial on the charge of complicity in her husband’s -murder, or, as her advocates believe, by the fear of instant death, Mary -was compelled to abdicate in favour of her son, and to nominate Moray -Regent (July 29, 1567). Elizabeth would not recognise him; partly from a -natural fear lest she should be suspected of having been in collusion -with him all along, partly from genuine abhorrence of such revolutionary -proceedings. The French Government, on the other hand, casting principle -and sentiment alike to the winds, courted his alliance. He might keep -his sister in prison, or put her to death, or send her to be immured in -a French convent: only let him embrace the French interests, and an army -should be sent to support him--a Huguenot army if he did not like -Catholics. But Moray turned a deaf ear to these solicitations, and -waited patiently till Elizabeth’s ill-humour should give way to more -statesmanlike considerations. - -The escape of Mary from Loch Leven (May 2, 1568), and the rising of the -Hamiltons in her favour, were largely due to the unfriendly attitude -assumed by Elizabeth to the Regent’s government. After the defeat of -Langside (May 13) it would perhaps have been difficult for the fugitive -Queen to make her way to France or Spain. But it was not the difficulty -which deterred her from making the attempt. Both Catherine and Philip, -later on, were disposed to befriend her, or, rather, to make use of her; -but at the time of her escape from Scotland, she had nothing to expect -from them but severity. Elizabeth was the only sovereign who had tried -to help her. Moreover, Mary had always laboured under the delusion that -because most Englishmen regarded her as the next heir to the crown, and -a great many preferred the old religion to the new, she had as good a -party in England as Elizabeth herself, if not a better. During her -prosperity, she had made repeated applications to be allowed to visit -the southern kingdom. She was convinced that, if she once appeared on -English ground, Elizabeth’s throne would be shaken; and Elizabeth’s -unwillingness to receive the visit had confirmed her in her belief. If -she now crossed the Solway without waiting for the permission which she -had requested by letter, it was not because she was hard pressed. The -Regent had gone to Edinburgh after the battle. At Dundrennan, among the -Catholic Maxwells, Lord Herries guaranteed her safety for forty days; -and, at an hour’s notice, a boat would place her beyond pursuit. Her -haste was rather prompted by the expectation that Elizabeth, alarmed by -her application, would refuse to receive her. - -To Elizabeth the arrival of the Scottish Queen was, indeed, as unwelcome -as it was unexpected. For ten years she had governed successfully, -because she had managed to hold an even course between conflicting -principles and parties, and to avoid taking up a decisive attitude on -the most burning questions. The very indecision, which was the weak spot -in her character, and which so fretted her Ministers, had, it must be -confessed, contributed something to the result. Cecil might groan over -a policy of letting things drift. But it may be doubted whether they had -not often drifted better than Cecil would have steered them if he might -have had his way. To do nothing is not, indeed, the golden rule of -statesmanship. But at that time, England’s peculiar position between -France and Spain, and between Calvinism and Catholicism, enabled her -ruler to play a waiting game. This was the general rule applicable to -the situation. Elizabeth apprehended it more clearly than her Ministers -did, and she fell back on it again and again, when they flattered -themselves that they had committed her to a forward policy. It was safe. -It was cheap. It required coolness and intrepidity--qualities with which -Elizabeth was well furnished by nature. But it was not spirited: it was -not showy. Hence it has not found favour with historians, who insist -that it ought to have ended in disaster. As a matter of fact, England -was carried safely through unparalleled difficulties; and, when all is -said, Elizabeth is entitled to be judged by the general result of her -long reign. - -Mary’s arrival was unwelcome to Elizabeth, because it seemed likely to -force her hand. To do nothing would be no longer possible. The Catholic -nobles and gentry of the north flocked to Carlisle to pay court to the -heiress of the English crown. It was not that they believed her innocent -of her husband’s murder. The suspicion of her complicity was at that -time universal. But they supposed that it would never amount to more -than a suspicion. They did not expect that the charge would ever be -formally made. They were not aware that it could be supported by -overwhelming evidence. Later on, when the proofs were produced, they had -already committed themselves to her cause, and were bound not to be -convinced. - -If the attitude of these Catholics be thought to indicate some moral -callousness, it may be fairly argued that it was less cynical than that -of Elizabeth herself, who, while not unwilling that Mary should be -suspected, would not allow her to be convicted. Steady to her main -purpose, though hesitating, and even vacillating, in the means she -adopted, she still adhered, notwithstanding all that had lately taken -place, to her intention that Mary, if her survivor, should be her -successor. Like all the greatest statesmen of her time, she placed -secular interests before religious opinions. She was persuaded that the -maintenance of the principle of authority was all-important. Nothing -else could hold society together or prevent the rival fanaticisms from -tearing each other to pieces. For authority there was no other basis -left than the principle of hereditary succession by primogeniture. This -principle must, therefore, be treated as something sacred--not to be set -aside or tampered with in a short-sighted grasping at any seeming -immediate utility. To allow it to be called in question was to shake her -own title. Already, in France, the Jesuits were preaching that orthodoxy -and the will of the people were the only legitimate foundation of -sovereignty. Few English Catholics had learned that doctrine; but they -would not be slow to learn it if the hereditary claim of Mary was to be -set aside. - -If Mary had been content to claim what primogeniture gave her--the -right to the succession--there would have been no quarrel between her -and Elizabeth. But it was notorious that she had all along been plotting -to substitute herself for Elizabeth. Never had she cherished that dream -with more confidence than when the Percys and Nevilles crowded round her -at Carlisle. In her sanguine imagination, she already saw herself -mistress of a finer kingdom than that which had just expelled her, and -marching, at the head of her new subjects, to wreak vengeance on her old -ones. She seemed likely to be no less dangerous as an exile in England -than as a Queen in Scotland. - -Elizabeth had now reason to regret the unnecessary warmth with which she -had espoused Mary’s cause. To suppose that she had any sentimental -feelings for one whom she knew to be her deadly enemy is, in my -judgment, ridiculous. Elizabeth was not a generous woman--especially -towards other women; and in this case generosity would have been folly, -and culpable folly. She did not hate Mary--she was too cool and -self-reliant to hate an enemy--but she disliked her. She was jealous, -with a small feminine jealousy, of her beauty and fascinations. The -consciousness of this unworthy feeling made her all the more anxious not -to betray it. And so, at a time when she did not expect to have Mary on -her hands, she had been tempted to use language implying a pity, -sympathy, and affection which assuredly she did not feel, and which it -would not have been creditable to her to feel. Petty insincerities of -this kind have usually to be paid for sooner or later. She had now to -exchange the language of sympathy for the language of business with -what grace she could; and she has not escaped the charge, certainly -undeserved, of deliberate treachery. It was awkward, after such -exaggerated professions of sympathy, to be obliged to hold the fugitive -at arm’s-length, and even to put restraint on her movements. But no -other course was possible. No sovereign, at any time in history, has -allowed a pretender to the crown to move about freely in his dominions -and make a party among his subjects. - -Wince as she might, and did, under the reproach of treachery, Elizabeth -was not going to allow her unwise words to tie her to unwise action. -Only one arrangement appeared to her to be at once admissible in -principle and prudent in practice. Mary must be restored to the Scottish -throne; but in such a way that she should thenceforth be powerless for -mischief. She must be content with the title of Queen. The real -government must be in the hands of Moray. Thus the principle of -legitimacy and the sacredness of royalty would be saved, and the English -Catholics would be content to bide their time. - -Cecil, for his part, was also anxious to see Mary back in Scotland; but -not as Queen. Though regarded in Catholic circles as a desperate -heretic, he was really a _politique_, a worldly-minded man--I mean the -epithet to be laudatory--and he would probably have admitted in the -abstract the wisdom of Elizabeth’s opinion--that it was of more -importance to England to have a legitimate sovereign than a gospel -religion. But he was not prepared to submit frankly to the application -of this principle. His personal prospects were too deeply concerned. It -was all very well for Elizabeth to lay down a principle in which she -might be said to have a life-interest. She was thirteen years his -junior; but she might easily predecease him; and, with Mary on the -throne, his power would certainly go, and, not improbably, his head with -it. It was not in human nature, therefore, that he should cherish the -principle of primogeniture as his mistress did; and, as far as his dread -of her displeasure would allow him, he was always casting about for some -means of defeating Mary’s reversion. Her sudden plunge into crime was to -him a turn of good fortune beyond his dreams. If he could have had his -will she would have been promptly handed over to the Regent on the -understanding that she was to be consigned to perpetual imprisonment, -or, still better, to the scaffold. - -In order to carry out her plan, Elizabeth called on Mary and the Regent -to submit their respective cases to a Commission, consisting of the Duke -of Norfolk, the Earl of Sussex, and Sir Ralph Sadler. Mary was extremely -reluctant, as she well might be, to face any investigation; but she was -told that, until her character was formally cleared, she could not be -admitted to Elizabeth’s presence; and she was at the same time privately -assured that her restoration should, in any case, be managed without any -damage to her honour. Moray received an equally positive assurance that -if his sister was proved guilty, she should not be restored. The two -statements were not absolutely irreconcilable, because Elizabeth -intended to prevent the worst charges from being openly proved. Her -sole object--and we can hardly blame her--was to obtain security for -herself and her own kingdom. She did not wish the Queen of Scots to be -proved a murderess in open court; but she did desire that the charge -should be made, and also that the Commissioners should see the originals -of the casket letters. Any public disclosure of the evidence might be -prevented, and some sort of ambiguous acquittal pronounced, on grounds -which all the world would see to be nugatory: such, for instance, as the -culprit’s own solemn denial of the charge; which was, in fact, the only -answer Mary intended to make. What was known to the Commissioners would -come to be more or less known to all persons of influence in England, -and would surely discredit Mary to such a degree that even her warmest -partisans would cease to conspire in her favour. Mary herself (so -Elizabeth hoped), when made aware that this terrible weapon was in -reserve, and could at any moment be used against her, would be -permanently humbled and crippled, and would be glad to accept such terms -as Elizabeth would impose. - -The Commissioners opened their court at York (October 1568). But they -had not been sitting long before Elizabeth discovered that Norfolk was -scheming to marry Mary, and that the project was approved by many of the -English nobility. Their purpose was not, as yet, disloyal. They thought -that, married to the head of the English peerage, and residing in -England, Mary would have to give up her plots with France, while her -presence would strengthen the Conservative party, which desired to keep -up the old alliance with Spain, and looked for the re-establishment -sooner or later of the old religion. This scheme, though not disloyal, -was extremely alarming to Elizabeth. Norfolk was nominally a Protestant. -But she had placed him on the Commission as a representative of the -Conservative party, believing that, while he would lend himself to -hushing up Mary’s guilt, his eyes would be opened to her real character. -Yet here he was, like the Hamiltons, Campbells, and Douglases, ready to -take her with her smirched reputation, simply for the chance of her two -crowns. It was not a case of love, for he had never seen her. He seems -to have been staggered for a moment by the sight of the casket letters, -and to have doubted whether it was for his honour or even his safety to -marry such a woman. But in the end, as we shall see, he swallowed his -scruples. - -On discovering Norfolk’s intrigue, Elizabeth hastily revoked the -Commission, and ordered another investigation to be held by the most -important peers and statesmen of England. The casket letters and the -depositions were submitted to them. Mary’s able and zealous advocate, -the Bishop of Ross, could say nothing except that his mistress had sent -him on the supposition that Moray was to be the defendant: let her -appear in person before the Queen, and she would give reasons why Moray -ought not to be allowed to advance any charges against her. To make no -better answer than this was virtually to admit that the charges against -her were unanswerable. - -It was thought that she was now sufficiently frightened to be ready to -accept Elizabeth’s terms, and they were unofficially communicated to -her. Her return to Scotland was no longer contemplated, for Moray had -absolutely declined to charge her openly with the murder or produce the -letters unless she were detained in England. But in order to get rid of -the revolutionary proceedings at Loch Leven she herself, as it were of -her own free will, and on the ground that she was weary of government, -was to confer the crown on her son and the regency on Moray. James was -to be educated in England. She herself was to reside in England as long -as Elizabeth should find it convenient. It was not mentioned in the -communication, but it was probably intended, that she should marry some -Englishman of no political importance, in order to produce more children -who would succeed James if, as was likely enough, he should die in his -infancy. If she would accept these conditions the charges against her -should be “committed to perpetual silence;” if not, the trial must go -on, and the verdict could not be doubtful (December 1568). - -A woman less daring and less keen-sighted than Mary would assuredly, at -this point, have given up the game, and thankfully accepted the -conditions offered. They would not have prevented her from ascending the -English throne if she had outlived Elizabeth. But that was a delay which -she had always scouted as intolerable, and she was one to whom life was -worth nothing if it meant defeat, retirement, even for a time, from the -public scene, and the abandonment of long-cherished ambitions. Moreover -her quick wit had divined that Elizabeth was using a threat which she -did not mean to put into execution. There would be no verdict--not even -any publication to the world of the evidence. Guilty therefore as she -was, and aware that her guilt could be proved, she coolly faced “the -great extremities” at which Elizabeth had hinted, and rejected the -conditions. - -Perhaps even Mary’s daring would have flinched from this bold game but -for a quarrel between Elizabeth and Philip, to be mentioned presently. -Hitherto Philip, much to his credit, had declined to interfere in Mary’s -behalf. To him, as to every one else, Catholic as well as Protestant, -her guilt seemed evident. She had been only a scandal and embarrassment -to the Catholic cause. But if there was to be war with England, every -enemy of Elizabeth was a weapon to be used. Accordingly he now began, -though reluctantly, to think of helping the Queen of Scots, and even of -marrying her to his brother Don John of Austria. With the prospect of -such backing it was not wonderful that she declined to own herself -beaten. - -Elizabeth’s calculations, though reasonable, were thus disappointed. The -inquiry was dropped without any decision. The Regent was sent home with -a small sum of money, and Mary remained in England (January 1569). - - - - -CHAPTER V - -ARISTOCRATIC PLOTS: 1568-1572 - - -From the beginning of the reign Cecil had never ceased to impress upon -his mistress that a French or Spanish invasion on behalf of the Pope -might at any time be expected, and that she should hurry to meet it by -forming a league with the foreign Protestants of both Confessions, and -vigorously assisting them to carry on a war of religion on the -Continent. He was assuredly too well informed to believe that France and -Spain would cease to counteract each other’s designs on England, or that -Lutherans and Calvinists would heartily combine for mutual defence. The -enemies he really feared were his Catholic countrymen, with whom he -would have to fight for his head if Elizabeth should die. He therefore -desired to force on the struggle in her lifetime, when they would be -rebels, and he would wield the power of the Crown. - -Elizabeth, on the other hand, was against interference on the Continent, -because it would be the surest way to bring upon England the calamity of -invasion. She saw as plainly as Cecil did that it would compel her to -throw herself into the arms of her own Protestants and to become, like -her two predecessors, the mere chief of a party; whereas she meant to be -the Queen of all Englishmen, and to tranquillise the natural fears of -each party by letting it see that it would not be sacrificed to the -violence of the other. Moreover the unbridled ascendancy of the -Protestants would mean such alterations in the established worship as -would have driven from the parish churches thousands of the most -military class, peers, squires and their tenantry, who were enduring -Anglicanism with its episcopate, its semi-Catholic prayer-book, and its -claim to belong to the Universal Apostolic Church, because they could -persuade themselves that its variations from the old religion were -unimportant and temporary. And this again would increase the probability -of foreign invasion. For, though to Philip all forms of heresy were -equally damnable and equally marked out for extermination sooner or -later, yet he was in much less hurry to begin with the politically -harmless Lutherans or Anglicans than with the dangerous levellers who -derived their inspiration from Geneva. Now for Elizabeth to gain time -was everything. She had gained ten precious years already by her -moderation. She was to gain twenty more before the slow-moving Spaniard -decided to launch the great Armada. - -But though Elizabeth shunned war with Spain she nevertheless recognised -that Philip was the enemy, and that all ways of damaging him short of -war were for her advantage. English and Huguenot corsairs swarmed in the -Channel. Spanish ships were seized. The crews were hanged or made to -walk the plank; the prizes were carried into English ports, and there -sold without disguise or rebuke. These outrages were represented as -reprisals for cruelties inflicted on English sailors who occasionally -fell into the hands of the Inquisition. Practically a ship with a -valuable cargo was treated as fair game whatever its nationality. But -while in the case of other countries it was only individual traders who -suffered, to Spain it meant obstruction of her high road to her Belgic -dominions, then simmering with disaffection. - -The English nobles of the old blood disliked these proceedings. Even -Cecil did not conceal from himself that they fostered a spirit of -lawlessness. What the corsairs were doing he would have preferred to see -done by the royal navy. To that Elizabeth would not consent. The -activity of the corsairs gave her all the advantage she could hope to -have from war, without any of its disadvantages. Instead of laying out -her treasure on a navy, she was deriving an income from the piratical -ventures of Hawkins and Drake; while the ships and sailors of this -volunteer navy would be available for the defence of the country -whenever the need should arise. Whatever may be thought of the morality -of her plan, there can be no question as to its efficiency and economy. - -Since even these outrages, exasperating as they were, had not goaded -Philip to the point of declaring war, a still more daring provocation -now followed. Some ships, conveying a large sum of money borrowed by -Philip in Genoa for the payment of Alva’s army, having put into English -ports to avoid the corsairs, Elizabeth, with the hearty approval of -Cecil, took possession of the money, and said she would herself borrow -it from the Genoese (December 1568). The Minister hoped this would bring -on a war. The Queen audaciously but more correctly anticipated that -Philip’s resentment would still stop short of that extremity. He -remonstrated: he threatened: he seized all English ships and sailors in -his ports. Elizabeth, undismayed, swept all the Spaniards and Flemings -whom she could find in London into her prisons, and seized their goods, -to a value far greater than that of the English property in Philip’s -grasp. - -In striking contrast with this unflinching attitude towards Spain was -the behaviour of Elizabeth when threatened with war by France, unless -she undertook to close her harbours to the Huguenots, and to forbid her -own corsairs to prey on French commerce. The summons was promptly -obeyed. Full satisfaction was made (April 1569). Yet France was at the -moment a far less formidable antagonist than Spain. The French -government did not possess the means of invading England. On this side -of the Channel the old anti-French feeling was so persistent that all -parties were ready and willing for the fray. The defeat of the Huguenots -at Jarnac (April 1569) may have had something to do with Elizabeth’s -compliance. But what influenced her still more was her perception that -war with France would compel her to place herself under the protection -of Spain; whereas she desired to keep Spain at arm’s-length, and to -maintain a good understanding with France, as did Eliot, Pym, and -Cromwell afterwards, regardless of the rooted prejudices of their -countrymen. Elizabeth probably stood alone in her judgment on this -occasion. - -The quarrel with Philip had more serious results at home than abroad. It -was indirectly the cause of the only English rebellion that disturbed -the long reign of Elizabeth. - -Most of the nobility and gentry, even when professedly Protestants, -regretted the alienation of England from the Universal Church. If they -had all pulled together they must have had their way, for they were the -military and political class. But their discontent varied widely in its -intensity. There were nobles like Sussex who were resolved to serve -their Queen loyally and zealously, but who, all the same, wished her to -cultivate a good understanding with Philip, to marry the Archduke, to -abstain from assisting the Huguenots, to give no countenance to the -rovers, to recognise Mary as her heir-presumptive and marry her to -Norfolk. There were others like Norfolk, Montagu, Arundel, and -Southampton, who had treasonable relations with the Spanish ambassador, -and aimed at overthrowing Cecil, marrying Mary to Norfolk, and -compelling the Queen to restore the Catholic worship, or at least to -make such changes in the Anglican model as would facilitate a reunion -with Rome when Mary should succeed. A third party, headed by the -Catholic lords of the north, was plotting to depose Elizabeth in favour -of Mary, and to marry the latter to Don John of Austria. - -With these powerful nobles in opposition, who, before the Reformation, -could have hurled any sovereign from his throne, where was Elizabeth to -look for support? The town populations were Protestant--too Protestant -indeed for her taste. But the town populations were a minority, and -less military than the landowners and their tenants. She had her Cecils, -Bacons, Walsinghams, Hunsdons, Knollyses, Sadlers, Killegrews, Drurys, -capable and devoted servants, but new men without territorial wealth or -influence, and with no force except what they possessed as wielding the -power of the Crown. It would be difficult to name more than half-a-dozen -peers who zealously promoted her policy. Most of them looked on it -coldly, and would support her only as long as she seemed to be -strongest. - -Mary’s rejection of Elizabeth’s terms coincided with the quarrel with -Philip (December 1568). The disaffected nobles thought that the time was -now come for striking a blow. Conscious that the feudal devotion of the -gentry and yeomanry to their local chiefs had in Tudor times been -largely superseded by awe of the central government, they were -importuning Philip to give them the signal for rebellion by sending a -division of Alva’s army from the Netherlands. Philip, cautious as usual, -and afraid of driving England into alliance with France, declined to -send a soldier until either the Norfolk party had overthrown Cecil, or -the northern lords had carried off Mary. Between these two sets of -conspirators there was much jealousy and distrust. The Spanish -ambassador thought the southern scheme the most feasible. Not without -difficulty he persuaded the northern lords to wait till it should be -seen whether the Queen could be induced or compelled to sanction the -marriage of Mary with Norfolk. If she refused, they were to make a dash -on Wingfield, a seat of Lord Shrewsbury’s in Derbyshire where Mary was -staying, while Norfolk was to raise the eastern counties. - -All through the summer of 1569 these plots were brewing. Three times -Norfolk and his father-in-law Arundel went to the Council with the -intention of arresting Cecil. Three times their hearts failed them. The -northern lords, who were not members of the Council, came up to London -to see Norfolk bell the cat, but went back, more suspicious than ever, -to make their own preparations. Cecil himself seems to have been -hedging. In his private advice to the Queen he was opposing the Norfolk -marriage, pointing out that free or in prison, married or single, in -England or in Scotland, Mary must always be dangerous, and breathing for -the first time the suggestion that she might lawfully be put to death in -England for complicity in English plots. In the Council he concurred in -a vote that she should be married to an Englishman--in other words, to -Norfolk. - -If Elizabeth could have felt any confidence in Norfolk’s loyalty, it -seems probable that much as she disliked the marriage she would have -yielded to the almost unanimous pronouncement of the nobility in its -favour. But a sure instinct warned her of her danger. “If she consented -she would be in the Tower before four months were over.” After much -deliberation she commanded the Duke on his allegiance to renounce his -project. He gave his promise, but soon retired to his own county, and -sent word to the northern earls that “he would stand and abide the -venture.” But while he was shivering and hesitating, Elizabeth, for -once, was all promptitude and decision. Mary was hurried to Tutbury -Castle. Arundel and Pembroke were summoned to Windsor, and kept under -surveillance. Norfolk himself came in quietly, and was lodged in the -Tower. Thus the southern conspiracy collapsed (September-October 1569). - -The Catholic lords and gentlemen of the north who had been awaiting -Norfolk’s signal, were staggered by his tame surrender. Sussex, who was -in command at York, and who, being of the old blood himself, did not -care to see old houses crushed, advised Elizabeth to wink at their -half-begun treason, and be thankful it had not come to fighting. She -winked at the attempted flight to Alva of Southampton and Montagu, and -even affected to trust the latter with the command of the militia called -out in Sussex. She could afford to ignore the disaffection of a southern -noble. A Sussex squire or yeoman, even if he was not a Protestant, would -think twice before he cast in his lot with rebellion. The northern -counties were mainly Catholic. They were much behind the south in -civilisation. The Tudor sovereigns were never seen there. Great families -were still looked up to. Elizabeth knew that though rebellion might be -adjourned, might possibly never come off, it was a constant menace, -which crippled her policy. She determined therefore to have done with -it, once for all, and summoned Northumberland and Westmoreland to -London. - -Thus driven into a corner, the two earls burst into rebellion. They -entered Durham in arms, overthrew the communion table in the cathedral, -set up the old altar, and had mass said (Nov. 14, 1569). Next day they -marched south, with the object of rescuing Mary from Tutbury. But when -they were within fifty miles of that place, Shrewsbury and Huntingdon, -in obedience to hurried orders from London, conveyed her to Coventry. -Having thus missed their spring, the rebel earls halted irresolutely for -three days, and then turned back. Their followers dropped away from -them. Clinton and Warwick were on their track, with the musters of the -Midlands; and before the end of December they were fain to fly across -the Border. Northumberland was arrested by Moray. Two years later he was -given up to Elizabeth, and executed. Westmoreland, after being protected -for a time by Ker of Ferniehirst, escaped to the Netherlands, where he -died. England was not again disturbed by rebellion till the great civil -war. - -The failure of the northern earls to kindle a general rebellion was due -to the cautious and temporising policy for which Elizabeth has been so -severely blamed by heated partisans. The powerful party which preferred -a Spanish alliance, disliked religious innovation, and looked forward to -the succession of Mary, had not been driven to despair of accomplishing -those ends in a lawful way. Their avowed policy had not been -proscribed--had not even been repudiated. Some of their chief leaders -were on the Council--as we should say, were members of the Government; -others were employed and trusted and visited by the Queen. They objected -to being hurried into civil war by the northern lords, who were not of -the Council, who kept away from London, and were rebels by inheritance -and tradition. They would have nothing to do with the ill-advised -movement; and, as in those days neutrality in the presence of open -insurrection was no more permissible to a nobleman than it would be now -to an officer in the army, they had no choice but to range themselves on -the side of the Government. If Elizabeth had openly branded the Queen of -Scots as a murderess, if she had pointed to Huntingdon or the son of -Catherine Grey as her successor, if she had put herself at the head of a -Protestant league, she might possibly have come victorious out of a -civil war. But a civil war it would have been, and of the worst kind: -one party calling in the Spaniard, and the other, in all probability, -driven to call in the Frenchman. - -The assassination of Moray a few weeks later (Jan. 23, 1570) was a -severe blow to Elizabeth, and an irreparable disaster to his own -country. An attempt has been made to create an impression that the -English Queen was somehow responsible for his death, because she did not -march an army into Scotland to support him. He no more wished to receive -an English army into Scotland than Elizabeth wished to send one. Therein -they were both of them wiser than the critics of their own day, or this. -What he did ask for was money, and the recognition of James. The request -for money Elizabeth was willing to consider, though, as a rule, she did -not believe in paying for any work she could get done gratis. The -recognition of James seems a very simple thing to the critics. But it -was as difficult for Elizabeth as the recognition of the Prince of -Bulgaria is now to Austria, and for similar reasons. She was under no -obligation whatever to Moray. His own interest compelled him to play -her game. But she well knew his value. On hearing of his death she shut -herself up in her chamber, exclaiming, with tears, that she had lost the -best friend she had in the world. - -As long as Moray lived, and was able to keep the Marian lords in some -sort of check, Elizabeth judged, and rightly, that she had more to lose -than to gain by any open interference in Scotland. It was no business of -hers to put down anarchy there. Scotch anarchy did not imperil England. -What would imperil England would be the appearance of French troops in -Scotland; and she judged that nothing would be so likely to bring them -there as any pretension to establish an English protectorate. Her -Protestant councillors fretted at her _laisser faire_ policy. But then -they, for personal or at least for sectarian reasons, were eager for -that general European conflagration which she, with superior discernment -and larger patriotism, was trying to avert. - -The death of Moray so weakened the King’s party that it became necessary -to give them a little help. Elizabeth gave it in such a way as she -thought would be least likely to excite the jealousy of France. She told -the new Regent Lennox that, though she could not send an army to support -him, she would send one to chastise the Hamiltons and the Borderers, who -were harbouring her rebel the Earl of Westmoreland, and, along with him, -making raids into England. This was done sharply and thoroughly. The -robber holds on the Border, and Hamilton Castle itself, were one after -another taken and blown up by the English Wardens of the Marches (April -and May 1570). - -What Elizabeth desired more than anything else was to settle Scotch -affairs, in conjunction with France, on the terms that neither power -should interfere in Scotland. To Cecil this was unsatisfactory, because -the restoration of Mary, on any terms whatever, would, if she survived -Elizabeth, ensure her succession to the English throne, and the ruin of -Cecil himself. He did not want to conciliate Catholics at home or -abroad. He wanted to commit his mistress to an internecine war with -them. In an angry dispute with Arundel at the Council board about this -time, he blurted out his doctrine, that the Queen had no friends but the -Protestants, and that if she restored Mary she would lose them all. No -language could have been more displeasing to Elizabeth, especially in -the presence of crypto-Catholic lords, and she snubbed him unmercifully. -“Mr Secretary, I mean to have done with this business; I shall listen to -the proposals of the French King. I am not going to be tied any longer -to you and your brethren in Christ.” - -The peace of St. Germain between the French court and the Huguenots -(August 8, 1570), and the disgrace of the Guises, were followed by -negotiations for a tripartite treaty between England, France, and -Scotland on the basis of the restoration of Mary. Elizabeth, of course, -insisted on the guarantees she had often sketched out. She was -willing--nay, anxious--to leave Scotland alone, if the French would do -the same. The French, on the other hand, felt that the equality of such -an arrangement was more seeming than real, because there were always -English troops lying at Berwick, within sixty miles of Edinburgh. They -haggled over the guarantees, and in the meantime, notwithstanding the -real desire of Catherine and Charles IX. to conclude an alliance with -Elizabeth against Philip, they continued to send money and encouragement -to the Marian lords in Scotland. For if, for any reason, the English -alliance should not come off, they meant to take up Mary’s cause in -earnest, and detach her from her Guise relations by marrying her to the -Duke of Anjou, afterwards Henry III. - -All this was known to Elizabeth, and in her extreme anxiety for the -tripartite treaty, she thought the moment was come to dangle the bait -which she always reserved for occasions of special importance. She -informed the French ambassador that she was ready to marry Anjou -herself. It is not to be supposed that she had the least intention of -doing so. She had settled with herself from the first how she would get -out of her proposal when it had served its turn. - -A minor motive for this move was the hope that it would reconcile her -Protestant councillors to the restoration of Mary. She did not succeed -with all of them. Some continued to mutter that Anjou was a Papist, that -tripartite treaties were a delusion, and that the only safe course was -to grasp the Scotch nettle and uphold James with the whole force of -England. But upon Cecil the effect was almost comical. He jumped at the -plan. Anything that was likely to make Elizabeth a mother would be -salvation to him. Whether the Queen at the mature age of thirty-seven -was likely to be happy with a husband of twenty was a question that did -not give him a moment’s concern. She was not too old to have two or -three children, and, that result once achieved, Mary might go to -Scotland or anywhere else for what he cared, and do her worst. The -sanguine man already saw visions of a converted Valois heading an -Anglo-French crusade against Philip, and establishing the reformed faith -throughout Europe. Walsingham his right-hand man, then ambassador at -Paris, was equally bitten. This was in the year before the massacre of -St. Bartholomew. - -The overture of Elizabeth was very welcome to the French court. -Negotiations for the match were soon opened, and continued during the -first six months of 1571. At the same time, both the Scotch factions -were summoned to accept the tripartite arrangement. Mary was at first -eager for it, and instructed her agent, the Bishop of Ross, to swallow -every condition that might be imposed. She looked on it as the only -means of obtaining her release. But there is ample proof that she -intended to throw its stipulations to the winds and fight for her own -cause when once she should get back to Scotland. In playing this -perfidious game, she had confidently counted on the help of France. The -Regent’s party, however, declined the treaty. They dreaded Mary’s -return, and they had no wish to shake hands with the Marian lords or -admit them to a share in the Government. The tripartite scheme thus fell -through. Mary herself ceased to care for it as soon as she heard of the -projected match between Elizabeth and Anjou. She saw that if France was -going to co-operate heartily with England, her sovereignty in Scotland -would be merely nominal. She might almost as well remain with Lord -Shrewsbury. - -To remain quietly in England and be content with her position as -heir-presumptive to the English crown was indeed the best and safest -course open to her. She had only to acquiesce in it and give up -plotting, and she might have lived here in considerable magnificence, -and with as much freedom as she could desire. If she wished for a -husband, she might have married any Englishman of whose loyalty -Elizabeth could feel assured. It was of the greatest importance to both -countries that she should bear more children. For it must be remembered -that if James had died in his childhood, his next heir was a Hamilton, -who had no title to the English throne. - -If the proposed Anjou match had not produced the full results which -Elizabeth hoped, it had at least defeated the plans and disorganised the -party of her rival. It had served its turn; and all that now remained -was to get out of it as decently as possible. The old pretext for -breaking off the Austrian match was reproduced. Anjou could not be -allowed to have a private mass; and when, in its eagerness, the French -court seemed disposed to give way on this point, Elizabeth began to talk -about a restitution of Calais. Ruefully did poor Cecil watch the -vanishing of his dream. It was to no purpose that he tried to frighten -Elizabeth by representing that a jilted prince would be converted into -an angry enemy. She knew better. Anjou comprehended that she did not -mean to have him, and, to avoid the indignity of a refusal, himself -broke off negotiations. But, as Elizabeth had calculated, the new -alliance did not suffer. The French King went out of his way to say that -“for her upright dealing he would honour the Queen of England during -his life,” and Catherine, most unsentimental of women, had another -suitor to offer--her youngest son Alençon, then just turned seventeen! - -While the negotiations for the Anjou match were going on, what is known -as the Ridolfi Plot was hatching against Elizabeth. Ridolfi, an Italian -banker in London, and secretly an agent of the Pope, was in close -relations with Norfolk and the other peers who for two years had been -dabbling in treason. They were still pressing Philip to invade England; -but he and Alva were less than ever disposed to undertake the venture -since the pitiful collapse of the northern insurrection. In order to -impress Philip with the importance of the conspiracy, Ridolfi went to -Madrid, and showed Philip a letter purporting to be written by Norfolk, -to which was attached a list of noblemen stated to be favourable to the -cause. It contained the names of forty out of the sixty-seven peers then -existing, while, of the rest, some were marked as neutral, and fifteen -at most as true to Elizabeth. The classification was on the face of it -absurdly untrustworthy. But correct or incorrect, it did not weigh with -Philip. He wanted deeds, not lists of names, and Ridolfi was informed -that, unless Elizabeth were first assassinated or imprisoned, not a -Spanish soldier could be sent to England. - -Whatever secret disaffection might prevail among the peers, the temper -displayed by the new House of Commons, elected in the spring of 1571, -was not of a kind to encourage Elizabeth’s enemies at home or abroad. -So far as can be judged from its proceedings and debates, it was not -only entirely Protestant, but largely Puritan.[2] A bill was passed by -which any person refusing, on demand, to acknowledge Elizabeth’s right -to the crown was made incapable of succeeding her; a provision which, -though it did not name Mary, could apply to no one else. It was made -high treason to deny that the inheritance of the crown could be -determined by the Queen and Parliament. To affirm in writing that any -particular person was entitled to succeed the Queen, except the Queen’s -issue, or some one established by Parliament, was made punishable with -imprisonment for life, and forfeiture of all property for the second -offence. - -The plot which Ridolfi was so busily pushing in 1571 was, in fact, a -continuation of the twin aristocratic conspiracies, one of which had -exploded in the northern insurrection. By forcing that insurrection to -break out before the southern conspirators had made up their minds what -to do, the Government had effectually destroyed what chances of success -the disaffected nobles had ever had. Alva was right in his judgment -that, if the Percys, Nevilles, and Dacres could do so little, the Howard -group, whose estates, vast as they were, lay, for the most part, in more -orderly and civilised parts of the country, could do still less. There -was, indeed, some talk among them of seizing the Queen at the opening of -the Parliament of 1571, just as there had been a talk of arresting Cecil -two years before. But the truth was that insurrection was a played-out -game in England; and if Norfolk had been a ten-times abler and bolder -man than he was, it would have made no difference. - -The true history of the time is not to be read in the croakings and -wailings privately exchanged between Cecil, Walsingham, and the rest of -the Protestant junto, angry and alarmed because Elizabeth would not let -them play her cards for her. It is a strange perversity which persists -in adopting their view that she was on the brink of ruin, when the -patent fact is that Protestantism was making rapid strides, that the -Queen’s personal popularity was increasing every day, and that Spain, -France, and Scotland, the only countries with which she was concerned, -were all humble suitors for her alliance on almost any terms that it -might please her to exact. The correspondence of Philip with Alva is -there to prove, that while writhing under the repeated aggressions of -England, he was obliged to put up with them because a war would imperil -his hold on the Netherlands. To all the invitations of the Norfolks and -Northumberlands, the able and well-informed Alva turned a deaf ear, -because he believed Elizabeth too strong to be overthrown. A French -alliance she could always have as long as the Guises were excluded from -power. If they regained their influence the Huguenots would keep them -fully occupied. Scotland, unless foreign troops made their appearance -there, could be no source of danger to England. - -Elizabeth’s policy was thus, in its broad lines, as simple as it was -successful. At home it was her wisdom to wink as long as possible at the -disaffection of the few, to win the affection of the many by economical -government, to reserve the persecuting laws for special cases, while -preventing any general and sweeping application of them, and, lastly, to -drive no party to desperation by a too pronounced encouragement of its -opponents. Spain, as being the centre of reaction and the hope of her -disloyal nobles, she meant to harass and weaken as far as she could do -so without bringing on an open war. With Charles IX. and his mother she -desired a defensive alliance, and an understanding that neither country -should send troops into Scotland or permit Spain to do so. In its -general conception, I repeat, this policy was simple and coherent. How -it succeeded we know. There was nothing sentimental about it, though, -where individuals were concerned, Elizabeth’s judgment was sometimes -warped by sentiment. Upon the whole, she kept herself at the English -point of view. Whereas Cecil was compelled by personal considerations to -place himself too much at the point of view of his “brethren in Christ,” -both at home and abroad. - -However, a plot there was, and it was necessary that it should be -unravelled and punished. Almost from its inception, Cecil (created Lord -Burghley February 1571), had been more or less on the scent of it. Hints -had come from abroad: spies had been employed: suspected persons had -been closely watched: inferior agents had been imprisoned, questioned, -racked: and enough had been discovered to make it certain that -Englishmen of the highest rank were plotting treason. Who they were -might be suspected, but was not ascertained until a lucky arrest put the -Minister in possession of evidence incriminating Norfolk, Arundel, -Southampton, Lumley, Cobham, the Spanish ambassador, the Bishop of Ross, -and Mary herself (September 1571). Norfolk was sent to the Tower, and -the other peers placed under arrest. The ambassador was dismissed. The -Bishop made ample confessions. Mary, who had hitherto lived as the guest -of Lord Shrewsbury, enjoying field-sports, receiving her friends and -corresponding with whom she would, was confined to a single room, and -carefully cut off, for a time, from all communication with the outer -world. Both in England and abroad it was universally expected that she -would be brought to trial and executed. James was at length officially -styled “King” and his mother “late Queen.” Her partisans in Edinburgh -Castle were informed that she would never be restored, and that, if they -did not surrender the Castle to the Regent Mar, an English force would -be sent to take it. The casket letters had hitherto been withheld from -publication under pressure from Elizabeth; they were now at last given -to the world in the famous “Detection” of Buchanan. - -Under any other Tudor, or under the Stuarts, all the peers arrested -would undoubtedly have lost their heads. Norfolk alone was brought to -trial (January 1572). There was much in the proceedings which, according -to modern notions, was unfair to the accused. But the peers who tried -him felt sure that he was guilty, and they were right. Subsequent -investigations have established beyond a doubt that he had conspired to -bring a foreign army into the country--the worst form that treason can -take. He had done this with contemptible hypocrisy, for a purely selfish -object, and after the most lenient and generous construction had been -placed on his first steps in crime. And yet historians have been found -to make light of the offence, and to pity the malefactor as the victim -of a romantic attachment to a woman whom he had never seen, and whom he -believed to be an adulteress and a murderess. - -During the spring of 1572 Elizabeth hesitated to let justice take its -course. She had reigned fourteen years without taking the life of a -single noble. The scaffold on Tower Hill from such long disuse was -falling to pieces, and Norfolk’s sentence had made it necessary to erect -a new one. Elizabeth was loath to break the spell. - -Not knowing with any certainty how many of her nobles might have given -more or less approval to the Ridolfi plot, but confident that she could -cow them by letting the voice of the untitled aristocracy and middle -class be heard, she called a new Parliament (May 1572). The response -went beyond her expectation. Of Mary’s well-wishers, once so numerous, -all except a few fanatics had now given her up. Two alternative courses -of action with respect to her were submitted for consideration, with the -intimation that the Queen would accept whichever of them Parliament -should approve. The first was attainder. The second was that she should -be disabled from succession to the crown; that if she attempted treason -again she should “suffer pains of death without further trouble of -Parliament;” and that it should be treason if she assented to any -enterprise to deliver her out of prison. Both houses at once voted to -proceed with the attainder. Elizabeth, we may be sure, was not sorry -for this unmistakable exhibition of feeling. It would open the eyes of -her enemies both at home and abroad. But she had no intention of -proceeding to such extremities this time. Mary should have fair warning. -Accordingly Parliament was desired to “defer” the bill of attainder, and -to proceed with the second measure. But the Commons were in grim -earnest. They immediately resolved that the second bill would be useless -and even mischievous, as it would imply that at present Mary had a right -of succession, whereas she was already disabled by law; and that they -therefore preferred to proceed with the attainder. With this resolution -the Lords concurred. - -Here they were on dangerous ground. To rake up the law empowering Henry -VIII. to determine the succession was to disable all the Stuarts, James -included, and so to throw away the opportunity of uniting the crowns. -Elizabeth had always, for excellent reasons, refused to allow this -question to be raised. Accordingly she again directed the House to defer -the attainder; she would not have the Scottish Queen “either enabled or -disabled to or from any manner of _title_ to the crown,” nor “any other -_title_ to the same whatsoever touched at all;” to make sure of which -she would have the second bill drawn by her own law officers. To the -repeated demands of the Commons for the execution of Norfolk, she at -length gave way, and a few days later he was beheaded (June 2, 1572). -The second bill, as drawn by the law officers, passed both Houses. Its -exact terms are not known, for it never received the royal assent. - -Burghley who was of opinion (as some one afterwards said about -Strafford) that “stone dead hath no fellow,” bemoaned himself privately -to Walsingham on the disappointment of their hopes; and modern -historians, with whom his authority is final, are loud in their -condemnation of Elizabeth’s vacillation and blindness. Vacillation there -was really none. She had determined from the first not to allow Mary to -be punished. She had gained all she wanted when the temper of Parliament -had been ascertained and displayed to the world. There have always been -plenty of people to accuse her of treachery and cruelty because she put -Mary to death fifteen years later, for complicity in an assassination -plot. How would her name have gone down to posterity if the Scottish -Queen had been executed in 1572 merely for inviting a foreign army to -rescue her from captivity? - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -FOREIGN AFFAIRS: 1572-1583 - - -The year 1572 witnessed two events of capital importance in European -history: the rising in the Netherlands, which resulted in the -establishment of the Dutch Republic (April); and the massacre of St. -Bartholomew, which marked the decisive rejection of Protestantism by -France (August). - -In the beginning of that year--a few weeks before the proceedings in -Parliament just narrated--Elizabeth had at last concluded the defensive -alliance with France for which she had been so long negotiating (April -19). It cannot be too often repeated that this was the corner-stone of -her foreign policy. For the sake of its superior importance she had -abstained from the interference in Scotland which her Ministers were -always urging. The more she interfered there the more she would have to -interfere, till it would end in her having a rebellious province on her -hands in addition to the hostility of both France and Spain; whereas an -alliance with France would give her security on all sides, Scotland -included. In the treaty it was agreed that if either country were -invaded “under any pretence or cause, none excepted,” the other should -send 6000 troops to its assistance. This was accompanied with an -explanation, in the King’s handwriting, that “any cause” included -religion. The article relating to Scotland is not less significant. The -two sovereigns “shall make no innovations in Scotland, but defend it -against foreigners, not suffering strangers to enter, or foment the -factions in Scotland; but it shall be lawful for the Queen of England to -chastise by arms the Scots who shall countenance the English rebels now -in Scotland.” Mary was not mentioned. France therefore tacitly renounced -her cause. Immediately after the conclusion of the treaty Charles IX. -formally proposed a marriage between Elizabeth and his youngest brother, -Alençon. This proposal she managed to encourage and elude for eleven -years. - -It was just at this moment that the seizure of Brill by some Dutch -rovers, who had taken refuge on the sea from the cruelty of Alva, caused -most of the towns of Holland and Zealand to blaze into rebellion (April -1). Thus began the great war of liberation, which was to last -thirty-seven years. The Protestant party in England hailed the revolt -with enthusiasm. Large subscriptions were made to assist it, and -volunteers poured across to take part in the struggle. Charles IX. and -his mother, full of schemes of conquest in the Netherlands, urged -Elizabeth to join them in a war against Philip. But, with a sagacity and -self-restraint which do her infinite honour, she refused to be drawn -beyond the lines laid down in the recent defensive alliance. Security, -economy, fructification of the tax-payers’ money in the tax-payers’ -pocket--such were the guiding principles of her policy. She was not to -be dragged into dangerous enterprises either ambitious or Quixotic. -Schemes for the partition of the Netherlands were laid before her. -Zealand, it was said, would indemnify her for Calais. What Englishman -with any common sense does not now see that she was right to reject the -bribe? - -To Elizabeth no rebellion against a legitimate sovereign could be -welcome in itself. Since Philip was so possessed by religious bigotry as -to be dangerous to all Protestant States, she was not sorry that he -should wear out his crusading ardour in the Netherlands; and she was -ready to give just as much assistance to the Dutch, in an underhand way, -as would keep him fully occupied without bringing a declaration of war -upon herself. But she would have vastly preferred that he should repress -Catholic and Protestant fanatics alike, and get along quietly with the -mass of his subjects as his father had done before him. Charles IX. was -eager to strike in if she would join him. Those who blame her so -severely for her refusal seem to forget that a French conquest of the -Netherlands would have been far more dangerous to this country than -their possession by Spain. To keep them out of French hands has indeed -been the traditional policy of England during the whole of modern -history. - -But, it is said, such a war would have clinched the alliance recently -patched up between the French court and the Huguenots; there would have -been no Bartholomew Massacre; “on Elizabeth depended at that moment -whether the French Government would take its place once for all on the -side of the Reformation.” - -Whether it would have been for the advantage of European progress in the -long-run that France should settle down into Calvinism, I will forbear -to inquire. Fortunately for the immediate interests of England, -Elizabeth understood the situation in France better than some of her -critics do, even with the results before their eyes. The Huguenots were -but a small fraction of the nation. Whatever importance they possessed -they derived from their rank, their turbulence, and the ambition of -their leaders. In a few towns of the south and south-west they formed a -majority of the population. But everywhere else they were mostly -noblemen, full of the arrogance and reckless valour of their class, -anything but puritans in their morals, and ready to destroy the unity of -the kingdom for political no less than for religious objects. They had -been losing ground for several years. The mass of the people abhorred -their doctrines, and protested against any concession to their -pretensions. Charles and his mother were absolutely careless about -religion. Their feud with the Guises and their designs on the -Netherlands had led them to invite the Huguenot chiefs to court, and so -to give them a momentary influence in shaping the policy of France. It -was with nothing more solid to lean on than this ricketty and -short-lived combination that Burghley and Walsingham were eager to -launch England into a war with the most powerful monarchy in Europe. - -The massacre of St. Bartholomew (August 24) was a rude awakening from -these dreams. That thunder-clap did not show that, in signing the -treaty with England and in proposing an attack on Philip, the French -Government had been playing a treacherous game all along, in order to -lure the Huguenots to the shambles. But it did show that when the -Catholic sentiment in France was thoroughly roused, the dynasty itself -must bend before it or be swept away. England might help the Huguenots -to keep up a desultory and harassing civil war; she could no more enable -them to control the policy of the French nation and wield its force, -than she could at the present day restore the Bourbons or Bonapartes. - -The first idea of Elizabeth and her ministers, on receiving the news of -the massacre, naturally was that the French Government had been playing -them false from the first, that the Catholic League for the extirpation -of heresy in Europe, which had been so much talked of since the Bayonne -interview in 1565, was after all a reality, and that England might -expect an attack from the combined forces of Spain and France. Thanks to -the prudent policy of Elizabeth, England was in a far better position to -meet all dangers than she had been in 1565. The fleet was brought round -to the Downs. The coast was guarded by militia. An expedition was -organised to co-operate with the Dutch insurgents. Money was sent to the -Prince of Orange. Huguenot refugees were allowed to fit out a flotilla -to assist their co-religionists in Rochelle. The Scotch Regent Mar was -informed, with great secrecy, that if he would demand the extradition of -Mary, and undertake to punish her capitally for her husband’s murder, -she should be given up to him. - -A few weeks sufficed to show that there was no reason for panic. -Confidence, indeed, between the French and English Governments had been -severely shaken. Each stood suspiciously on its guard. But the alliance -was too well grounded in the interests of both parties to be lightly -cast aside. The French ambassador was instructed to excuse and deplore -the massacre as best he could, and to press on the Alençon marriage. -Elizabeth, dressed in deep mourning, gave him a stiff reception, but let -him see her desire to maintain the alliance. The massacre did not -restore the ascendancy of the Guises. To the Huguenots, as religious -reformers, it gave a blow from which they did not recover. But as a -political faction they were not crushed. Nay, their very weakness became -their salvation, since it compelled them to fall into the second rank -behind the _Politiques_, the true party of progress, who were before -long to find a victorious leader in Henry of Navarre. - -Philip, for his part, was equally far from any thought of a crusade -against England. Sir Humphrey Gilbert, commanding several companies of -English volunteers, with the hardly concealed sanction of his -government, was fighting against the Spaniards in Walcheren and hanging -all his prisoners. Sir John Hawkins, with twenty ships, had sailed to -intercept the Mexican treasure fleet. Yet Alva, though gnashing his -teeth, was obliged to advise his master to swallow it all, and to be -thankful if he could get Elizabeth to re-open commercial intercourse, -which had been prohibited on both sides since the quarrel about the -Genoese treasure. A treaty for this purpose was in fact concluded early -in 1573. Thus the chief result of the Bartholomew Massacre, as far as -Elizabeth was concerned, was to show how strong her position was, and -that she had no need either to truckle to Catholics or let her hand be -forced by Protestants. A balance of power on the Continent was what -suited her, as it has generally suited this country. Let her critics say -what they will, it was no business of hers to organise a Protestant -league, and so drive the Catholic sovereigns to sink their mutual -jealousies and combine against the common enemy. - -The Scotch Regent was quite ready to undertake the punishment of Mary, -but only on condition that Elizabeth would send the Earl of Bedford or -the Earl of Huntingdon with an army to be present at the execution and -to take Edinburgh Castle. It need hardly be said that there was also a -demand for money. Mar died during the negotiations, but they were -continued by his successor Morton. Elizabeth was determined to give no -open consent to Mary’s execution. She meant, no doubt, as soon as it -should be over, to protest, as she did fifteen years afterwards, that -there had been an unfortunate mistake, and to lay the blame of it on the -Scotch Government and her own agents. This part of the negotiation -therefore came to nothing. But money was sent to Morton, which enabled -him to establish a blockade of Edinburgh Castle, and by the mediation of -Elizabeth’s ambassador, the Hamiltons, Gordons, and all the other -Marians except those in the Castle, accepted the very favourable terms -offered them, and recognised James. - -All that remained was to reduce the Castle. Its defenders numbered less -than two hundred men. The city and the surrounding country were--as far -as preaching and praying went--vehemently anti-Marian. The Regent had -now no other military task on his hands. Elizabeth might well complain -when she was told that unless she sent an army and paid the Scotch -Protestants to co-operate with it, the Castle could not be taken. For -some time she resisted this thoroughly Scotch demand. But at last she -yielded to Morton’s importunity. Sir William Drury marched in from -Berwick, did the job, and marched back again (May 1573). Among the -captives were the brilliant Maitland of Lethington, once the most active -of Anglophiles, and Kirkaldy of Grange, who had begun the Scottish -Reformation by the murder of Cardinal Beaton, and had taken Mary -prisoner at Carberry Hill. A politician who did not turn his coat at -least once in his life was a rare bird in Scotland. Maitland died a few -days after his capture, probably by his own hand. Kirkaldy was hanged by -his old friend Morton. - -By taking Edinburgh Castle Elizabeth did not earn any gratitude from the -party who had called her in. What they wanted, and always would want, -was money. Morton himself, treading in the steps of his old leader -Moray, remained an unswerving Anglophile. But his coadjutors told the -English ambassador plainly that, if they could not get money from -England, they could and would earn it from France. Elizabeth’s -councillors were always teasing her to comply with these impudent -demands. If there had been a grown-up King on the throne, a man with a -will of his own, and whose right to govern could not be contested, it -might have been worth while to secure his good-will by a pension; and -this was what Elizabeth did when James became real ruler of the country. -But she did not believe in paying a clique of greedy lords to call -themselves the English party. An English party there was sure to be, if -only because there was a French party. Their services would be neither -greater nor smaller whether they were paid or unpaid. The French poured -money into Scotland, and were worse served than Elizabeth, who kept her -money in her treasury. It was no fault of Elizabeth if the conditions of -political life in Scotland during the King’s minority were such that a -firmly established government was in the nature of things impossible. - -As Mary was kept in strict seclusion during the panic that followed on -the Bartholomew Massacre, she did not know how narrow was her escape -from a shameful death on a Scottish scaffold. When the panic subsided -she was allowed to resume her former manner of life as the honoured -guest of Lord Shrewsbury, with full opportunities for communication with -all her friends at home and abroad. Any alarm she had felt speedily -disappeared. If Elizabeth had for a moment contemplated striking at her -life or title by parliamentary procedure, that intention was evidently -abandoned when the Parliament of 1572 was prorogued without any such -measure becoming law. The public assumed, and rightly, that Elizabeth -still regarded the Scottish Queen as her successor. Peter Wentworth in -the next session (1576) asserted, and probably with truth, that many -who had been loud in their demands for severity repented of their -forwardness when they found that Mary might yet be their Queen, and -tried to make their peace with her. Wentworth’s outburst (for which he -was sent to the Tower) was the only demonstration against Mary in that -session. She told the Archbishop of Glasgow that her prospects had never -been better, and when opportunities for secret escape were offered her -she declined to use them, thinking that it was for her interest to -remain in England. - -The desire of the English Queen to reinstate her rival arose principally -from an uneasy consciousness that, by detaining her in custody, she was -fatally impairing that religious respect for sovereigns which was the -main, if not the only, basis of their power. The scaffold of Fotheringay -was, in truth, the prelude to the scaffold of Whitehall. But as year -succeeded year, and Elizabeth became habituated to the situation which -had at first given her such qualms, she could not shut her eyes to the -fact that, troublesome and even dangerous as Mary’s presence in England -was, the trouble and the danger had been very much greater when she was -seated on the Scottish throne. The seething caldron of Scotch politics -had not, indeed, become a negligible quantity. It required watching. But -experience had shown that, while the King was a child, the Scots were -neither valuable as friends nor formidable as foes. This was a truth -quite as well understood at Paris and Madrid as at London, though the -French, no less keen in those days than they are now to maintain that -shadowy thing called “legitimate French influence” in countries with -which they had any historical connection, continued to intrigue and -waste their money among the hungry Scotch nobles. It was a fixed -principle with Elizabeth, as with all English statesmen, not to tolerate -the presence of foreign troops in Scotland. But she believed--and her -belief was justified by events--that a French expedition was not the -easy matter it had been when Mary of Guise was Regent of Scotland and -Mary Tudor Queen of England. And, more important still, in spite of much -treachery and distrust, the French and English Governments were bound -together by a treaty which was equally necessary to each of them. -Scotland, therefore, was no longer such a cause of anxiety to Elizabeth -as it had been during the first ten years of her reign. Her ministers -had neither her coolness nor her insight. Yet modern historians, proud -of having unearthed their croaking criticisms, ask us to judge -Elizabeth’s policy by prognostications which turned out to be false -rather than by the known results which so brilliantly justified it. - -How to deal with the Netherlands was a much more complicated and -difficult problem. Here again Elizabeth’s ministers were for carrying -matters with a high hand. In their view, England was in constant danger -of a Spanish invasion, which could only be averted by openly and -vigorously supporting the revolted provinces. They would have had -Elizabeth place herself at the head of a Protestant league, and dare the -worst that Philip could do. She, on the other hand, believed that every -year war could be delayed was so much gained for England. There were -many ways in which she could aid the Netherlands without openly -challenging Philip. A curious theory of international relations -prevailed in those days--an English Prime Minister, by the way, found it -convenient not long ago to revive it--according to which, to carry on -warlike operations against another country was a very different thing -from going to war with that country. Of this theory Elizabeth largely -availed herself. English generals were not only allowed, but encouraged, -to raise regiments of volunteers to serve in the Low Countries. When -there, they reported to the English Government, and received -instructions from it with hardly a pretence of concealment. Money was -openly furnished to the Prince of Orange. English fleets--also nominally -of volunteers--were encouraged to prey on Spanish commerce, Elizabeth -herself subscribing to their outfit and sharing in the booty. - -We are not to suppose, because the revolt of the Netherlands crippled -Philip for any attack on England, that Elizabeth welcomed it, or that -she contemplated the prolongation of the struggle with cold-blooded -satisfaction. Its immediate advantage to this country was obvious. But -Elizabeth had a sincere abhorrence of war and disorder. She was equally -provoked with Philip for persecuting the Dutch Protestants into -rebellion, and with the Dutch for insisting on religious concessions -which Philip could not be expected to grant, and which she herself was -not granting to Catholics in England. At any time during the struggle, -if Philip would have guaranteed liberty of conscience (as distinguished -from liberty of public worship), the restoration of the old charters, -and the removal of the Spanish troops, Elizabeth would not only have -withheld all help from the Dutch, but would have put pressure on them to -submit to Philip. The presence of Spanish veterans opposite the mouth of -the Thames was a standing menace to England. “As they are there,” argued -Burghley, “we must help the Dutch to keep them employed.” “If the Dutch -were not such impracticable fanatics,” rejoined Elizabeth, “the Spanish -veterans need not be there at all.” - -The “Pacification of Ghent” (November 1576), by which the Belgian -Netherlands, for a short time, made common cause with Holland and -Zealand, relieved Elizabeth, for a time, from the necessity of taking -any decisive step. Philip was still recognised as sovereign, but he was -required to be content with such powers as the old constitution gave -him. It seemed likely that Catholic bigots would have to give up -persecuting, and Protestant bigots to acquiesce in the official -establishment of the old religion. This was precisely the settlement -Elizabeth had always desired. It would get rid of the Spanish troops. It -would keep out the French. It would relieve her from the necessity of -interfering. If it put some restriction on the open profession of -Calvinism she would not be sorry. - -If this arrangement could have been carried out, would it in the -long-run have been for the benefit of Europe? Those who hold that the -conflict between Protestantism and Catholicism was simply a conflict -between truth and falsehood will, of course, have no difficulty in -giving their answer. Others may hold that freedom of conscience was all -that was needed at the time, and they may picture the many advantages -which Europe would have reaped during the last three centuries from the -existence of a united Netherlands, independent, as it must soon have -become, of Spain, and able to make its independence respected by its -neighbours. - -Short-lived as the coalition was destined to be, it secured for the -Dutch a breathing-time when they were most sorely pressed, and enabled -Elizabeth to avoid quarrelling with Spain. The first step of the newly -allied States was to apply to her for assistance and a loan of money. -The loan they obtained--£40,000--a very large sum in those days. But she -earnestly advised them that if the new Governor, Don John of Austria, -would accept the Pacification, they should use the money to pay the -arrears of the Spanish troops; otherwise they would refuse to leave the -country for Don John or any one else. This was done. Don John had -treachery in his heart. But the departure of the Spaniards was a solid -gain; and if the Protestants and Catholics of the Netherlands had been -able to tolerate each other, they would have achieved the practical -independence of their country, and achieved it by their own unaided -efforts. - -But Don John, the crusader, the victor of Lepanto, the half-brother of -Philip, was a man of soaring ambition. His dream was to invade England, -marry the Queen of Scots, and seat himself with her on the English -throne. It was in vain that Philip, who never wavered in his desire to -conciliate Elizabeth, and was jealous of his showy brother, had strictly -enjoined him to leave England alone. He persisted in his design, and -sent his confidant Escovedo to persuade Philip that to conquer the -Netherlands it was necessary to begin by conquering England. - -For a pair of determined enemies, Elizabeth and Philip were just now -upon most amicable, not to say affectionate, terms. She knew well that -he had incited assassins to take her life, and that nothing would at any -time give him greater pleasure than to hear that one of them had -succeeded. But she bore him no malice for that. She took it all in the -way of business, and intended, for her part, to go on robbing and -damaging him in every way she could short of going to war. Philip bore -it all meekly. Alva himself insisted that he could not afford to quarrel -with her. Diplomatic relations by means of resident ambassadors, which -had been broken off by the expulsion of De Espes in 1571, were resumed; -and English heretics in the prisons of the Inquisition were released in -spite of the outcries of the Grand Inquisitor. - -In the summer of 1577 it seemed as if Don John’s restless ambition would -interrupt this pacific policy which suited both monarchs. He had sent -for the Spanish troops again. He was known to be projecting an invasion -of England. He was said to have a promise of help from Guise. -Elizabeth’s ministers, as usual, believed that she was on the brink of -ruin, and implored her to send armies both to the Netherlands and to -France. But she refused to be hustled into any precipitate action, and -reasons soon appeared for maintaining an expectant attitude. The treaty -of Bergerac between Henry III. and Henry of Navarre (September 1577) -showed once more that the French King had no intention of letting the -Huguenots be crushed. The invitation of the Archduke Matthias by the -Belgian nobles showed that they were deeply jealous of English -interference. Here, surely, was matter for reflection. The most -Elizabeth could be got to do was to become security for a loan of -£100,000 to the States, on condition that Matthias should leave the real -direction of affairs to William of Orange, and to _promise_ armed -assistance (January 1578). At the same time she informed Philip that she -was obliged to do this for her own safety; that she had no desire to -contest his sovereignty of the Netherlands; on the contrary, she would -help him to maintain it if he would govern reasonably; but he ought to -remove Don John, who was her mortal enemy, and to appoint another -Governor of his own family; in other words, Matthias. Her policy could -not have been more candidly set forth, and Philip showed his disapproval -of Don John’s designs in a characteristic way--by causing Escovedo to be -assassinated. Don John himself died in the autumn, of a fever brought on -by disappointment, or, as some thought, of a complaint similar to -Escovedo’s (September 1578). - -When Elizabeth feared that Don John’s scheme was countenanced by his -brother, she had risked an open rupture by promising to send an army to -the Netherlands. The murder of Escovedo and the arrival of the Spanish -ambassador Mendoza (March 1578) reassured her. Philip was evidently -pacific to the point of tameness. Instead, therefore, of sending an -English army, she preferred to pay John Casimir, the Count Palatine, to -lead a German army to the assistance of the States. As far as military -strength went, they were probably no losers by the change. But what they -wanted was to see Elizabeth committed to open war with Philip, and that -was just what she desired to avoid. Indirect and underhand blows she was -prepared to deal him, for she knew by experience that he would put up -with them. Thus in the preceding autumn she had despatched Drake on his -famous expedition to the South Pacific. - -Don John was succeeded by his nephew, Alexander of Parma. The fine -prospects of the revolted provinces were now about to be dashed. In the -arts which smooth over difficulties and conciliate opposition, Parma had -few equals. He was a head and shoulders above all contemporary generals; -and no soldiers of that time were comparable to his Spanish and Italian -veterans. When he assumed the command, he was master of only a small -corner of the Low Countries. What he effected is represented by their -present division between Belgians and Dutch. The struggle in the -Netherlands continued, therefore, to be the principal object of -Elizabeth’s attention. - -Shortly before the death of Don John, the Duke of Alençon,[3] brother -and heir-presumptive of Henry III. had been invited by the Belgian -nobles to become their Protector, and Orange, in his anxiety for union, -had accepted their nominee. Alençon was to furnish 12,000 French troops. -It was hoped and believed that, though Henry had ostensibly disapproved -of his brother’s action, he would in the end give him open support, -thus resuming the enterprise which had been interrupted six years before -by the Bartholomew Massacre. - -Now, how was Elizabeth to deal with this new combination? The -Protectorship of Alençon might bring on annexation to France, the result -which most of all she wished to avoid. For a moment she thought of -offering her own protection (which Orange would have much preferred), -and an army equal to that promised by Alençon. But upon further -reflection, she determined to adhere to the policy of not throwing down -the glove to Philip, and to try whether she could not put Alençon in -harness, and make him do her work. One means of effecting this would be -to allow him subsidies--the means employed on such a vast scale by Pitt -in our wars with Napoleon. But Elizabeth intended to spend as little as -possible in this way. She relied chiefly on a revival of the marriage -comedy--now to be played positively for the last time; the lady being -forty-five, and her wooer twenty-four. - -A dignified policy it certainly was not. All that was ridiculous and -repulsive in her coquetry with Henry had now to be repeated and outdone -with his younger brother. To overcome the incredulity which her previous -performances had produced, she was obliged to exaggerate her -protestations, to admit a personal courtship, to simulate amorous -emotion, and to go through a tender pantomime of kisses and caresses. -But Elizabeth never let dignity stand in the way of business. What to -most women would have been an insupportable humiliation did not cost her -a pang. She even found amusement in it. From the nature of the case, -she could not take one of her counsellors into her confidence. There was -no chance of imposing upon foreigners unless she could persuade those -about her that she was in earnest. They were amazed that she should run -the risk of establishing the French in the Netherlands. She had no -intention of doing so. When Philip should be brought so low as to be -willing to concede a constitutional government, she could always throw -her weight on his side and get rid of the French. - -The match with Alençon had been proposed six years before. It had lately -slumbered. But there was no difficulty in whistling him back, and making -it appear that the renewed overture came from his side. After tedious -negotiations, protracted over twelve months, he at length paid his first -visit to Elizabeth (August 1579). He was an under-sized man with an -over-sized head, villainously ugly, with a face deeply seamed by -smallpox, a nose ending in a knob that made it look like two noses, and -a croaking voice. Elizabeth’s liking for big handsome men is well known. -But as she had not the least intention of marrying Alençon, it cost her -nothing to affirm that she was charmed with his appearance, and that he -was just the sort of man she could fancy for a husband. The only -agreeable thing about him was his conversation, in which he shone, so -that people who did not thoroughly know him always at first gave him -credit for more ability than he possessed. Elizabeth, who had a pet name -for all favourites, dubbed him her “frog”; and “Grenouille” he was fain -to subscribe himself in his love-letters. This first visit was a short -one, and he went away hopeful of success. - -The English people could only judge by appearances, and for the first -time in her reign Elizabeth was unpopular. The Puritan Stubbs published -his _Discovery of a Gaping Gulf wherein England is like to be swallowed -by another French Marriage_. But the excitement was by no means confined -to the Puritans. Hatred of Frenchmen long remained a ruling sentiment -with most Englishmen. Elizabeth vented her rage on Stubbs, who had been -so rude as to tell her that childbirth at her age would endanger her -life. He was sentenced to have his hand cut off. “I remember,” says -Camden, “being then present, that Stubbs, after his right hand was cut -off, put off his hat with his left, and said with a loud voice, ‘God -save the Queen,’ The multitude standing about was deeply silent.” - -Not long after Alençon’s visit, a treaty of marriage was signed -(November 1579), with a proviso that two months should be allowed for -the Queen’s subjects to become reconciled to it. If, at the end of that -time, Elizabeth did not ratify the treaty, it was to be null and void. -The appointed time came and went without ratification. Burghley, as -usual, predicted that the jilted suitor would become a deadly enemy, and -drew an alarming picture of the dangers that threatened England, with -the old exhortation to his mistress to form a Protestant league and -subsidise the Scotch Anglophiles. But in 1572 she had slipped out of the -Anjou marriage, and yet secured a French alliance. She confided in her -ability to play the same game now. Though she had not ratified the -marriage treaty, she continued to correspond with Alençon and keep up -his hopes, urging him at the same time to lead an army to the help of -the States. This, however, he was unwilling to do till he had secured -the marriage. The French King was ready, and even eager, to back his -brother. But he, too, insisted on the marriage, and that Elizabeth -should openly join him in war against Spain. - -In the summer of 1580, Philip conquered Portugal, thus not only rounding -off his Peninsular realm, but acquiring the enormous transmarine -dominions of the Portuguese crown. All Europe was profoundly impressed -and alarmed by this apparent increase of his power. Elizabeth -incessantly lectured Henry on the necessity of abating a preponderance -so dangerous to all other States, and tried to convince him that it was -specially incumbent on France to undertake the enterprise. But she -preached in vain. Henry steadily refused to stir unless England would -openly assist him with troops and money, of which the marriage was to be -the pledge. He did not conceal his suspicion that, when Elizabeth had -pushed him into war, she would “draw her neck out of the collar” and -leave him to bear the whole danger. - -This was, in fact, her intention. She believed that a war with France -would soon compel Philip to make proper concessions to the States; -whereupon she would interpose and dictate a peace. “Marry my brother,” -Henry kept saying, “and then I shall have security that you will bear -your fair share of the fighting and expenses.” “If I am to go to war,” -argued Elizabeth, “I cannot marry your brother; for my subjects will say -that I am dragged into it by my husband, and they will grudge the -expense. Suppose, instead of a marriage, we have an alliance not binding -me to open war; then I will furnish you with money _underhand_. You know -you have got to fight. You cannot afford to let Philip go on increasing -his power.” - -Henry remained doggedly firm. No marriage, no war. At last, finding she -could not stir him, Elizabeth again concluded a treaty of marriage, but -with the extraordinary proviso that six weeks should be left for private -explanations by letter between herself and Alençon. It soon appeared -what this meant. In these six weeks Elizabeth furnished her suitor with -money, and incited him to make a sudden attack on Parma, who was then -besieging Cambray, close to the French frontier. Alençon, thinking -himself now sure of the marriage, collected 15,000 men; and Henry, -though not openly assisting him, no longer prohibited the enterprise. -But, as soon as Elizabeth thought they were sufficiently committed, she -gave them to understand that the marriage must be again deferred, that -her subjects were discontented, that she could only join in a defensive -alliance, but that she would furnish money “in reasonable sort” -_underhand_. - -All this is very unscrupulous, very shameless, even for that shameless -age. Hardened liars like Henry and Alençon thought it too bad. _They_ -were ready for violence as well as fraud, and availed themselves of -whichever method came handiest. Elizabeth also used the weapon which -nature had given her. Being constitutionally averse from any but -peaceful methods, she made up for it by a double dose of fraud. _Dente -lupus, cornu taurus._ It would have been useless for a male statesman to -try to pass himself off as a fickle impulsive, susceptible being, swayed -from one moment to another in his political schemes by passions and -weaknesses that are thought natural in the other sex. This was -Elizabeth’s advantage, and she made the most of it. She was a masculine -woman simulating, when it suited her purpose, a feminine character. The -men against whom she was matched were never sure whether they were -dealing with a crafty and determined politician, or a vain, flighty, -amorous woman. This uncertainty was constantly putting them out in their -calculations. Alençon would never have been so taken in if he had not -told himself that any folly might be expected from an elderly woman -enamoured of a young man. - -On this occasion Elizabeth scored, if not the full success she had hoped -from her audacious mystification, yet no inconsiderable portion of it. -Henry managed to draw back just in time, and was not let in for a big -war. But Alençon, at the head of 15,000 men, and close to Cambray, could -not for very shame beat a retreat. Parma retired at his approach, and -the French army entered Cambray in triumph (August 1581). Alençon -therefore had been put in harness to some purpose. - -Though Henry III. had good reason to complain of the way he had been -treated, he did not make it a quarrel with Elizabeth. His interests, as -she saw all along, were too closely bound up with hers to permit him to -think of such a thing. On the contrary, he renewed the alliance of 1572 -in an ampler form, though it still remained strictly defensive. -Alençon, after relieving and victualling Cambray, disbanded his army, -and went over to England again to press for the marriage (Nov. 1581). -Thither he was followed by ambassadors from the States. By the advice of -Orange they had resolved to take him as their sovereign, and they were -now urgently pressing him to return to the Netherlands to be installed. -Elizabeth added her pressure; but he was unwilling to leave England -until he should have secured the marriage. For three months (Nov. -1581--Feb. 1582) did Elizabeth try every art to make him accept promise -for performance. She was thoroughly in her element. To win her game in -this way, not by the brutal arbitrament of war, or even by the ordinary -tricks of vicarious diplomacy, but by artifices personally executed, -feats of cajolery that might seem improbable on the stage,--this was -delightful in the highest degree. The more distrustful Alençon showed -himself, the keener was the pleasure of handling him. One day he is -hidden behind a curtain to view her elegant dancing; not, surely, that -he might be smitten with it, but that he might think she desired him to -be smitten. Another day she kisses him on the lips (_en la boca_) in the -presence of the French ambassador. She gives him a ring. She presents -him to her household as their future master. She orders the Bishop of -Lincoln to draw up a marriage service. It is a repulsive spectacle; but, -after all, we are not so much disgusted with the elderly woman who -pretends to be willing to marry the young man, as with the young man who -is really willing to marry the elderly woman. Unfortunately for -Elizabeth, her acting was so realistic that it not only took in -contemporaries, but has persuaded many modern writers that she was -really influenced by a degrading passion. - -Henry III. himself was at last induced to believe that Elizabeth was -this time in earnest. But he could not be driven from his determination -to risk nothing till he saw the marriage actually concluded. Pinart, the -French Secretary of State, was accordingly sent over to settle the -terms. Elizabeth demanded one concession after another, and finally -asked for the restitution of Calais. There was no mistaking what this -meant. Pinart, in the King’s name, formally forbade Alençon to proceed -to the Netherlands except as a married man, and tried to intimidate -Elizabeth by threatening that his master would ally himself with Philip. -But she laughed at him, and told him that _she_ could have the Spanish -alliance whenever she chose, which was perfectly true. Alençon himself -gave way. He felt that he was being played with. He had come over here, -with a _fatuité_ not uncommon among young Frenchmen, expecting to bend a -love-sick Queen to serve his political designs. He found himself, to his -intense mortification, bent to serve hers. Ashamed to show his face in -France without either his Belgian dominions or his English wife, he was -fain to accept Elizabeth’s solemn promise that she would marry him as -soon as she could, and allowed himself to be shipped off under the -escort of an English fleet to the Netherlands (Feb. 1582). - -According to Mr. Froude, “the Prince of Orange intimated that Alençon -was accepted by the States only as a pledge that England would support -them; if England failed them, they would not trust their fortunes to so -vain an idiot.” This statement appears to be drawn from the second-hand -tattle of Mendoza, and is probably, like much else from that source, -unworthy of credit. But whether Orange sent such an “intimation” or not, -it cannot be allowed to weigh against the ample evidence that Alençon -was accepted by him and by the States mainly for the sake of the French -forces he could raise on his own account, and the assistance which he -undertook to procure from his brother. Neither Orange nor any one else -regarded him as an idiot. Orange had not been led to expect that he -would bring any help from England except money supplied underhand; and -money Elizabeth did furnish in very considerable quantities. But the -Netherlanders now expected everything to be done for them, and were -backward with their contributions both in men and money. Clearly there -is something to be said for the let-alone policy to which Elizabeth -usually leant. - -The States intended Alençon’s sovereignty to be of the strictly -constitutional kind, such as it had been before the encroachments of -Philip and his father. This did not suit the young Frenchman, and at the -beginning of 1583 he attempted a _coup-d’état_, not without -encouragement from some of the Belgian Catholics. At Antwerp his French -troops were defeated with great bloodshed by the citizens, and the -general voice of the country was for sending him about his business. But -both Elizabeth and Orange, though disconcerted and disgusted by his -treachery, still saw nothing better to be done than to patch up the -breach and retain his services. Both of them urged this course on the -States--Orange with his usual dignified frankness; Elizabeth in the -crooked, blustering fashion which has brought upon her policy, in so -many instances, reproach which it does not really deserve. Norris, the -commander of the English volunteers, had discountenanced the -_coup-d’état_ and taken his orders from the States. Openly Elizabeth -reprimanded him, and ordered him to bring his men back to England. -Secretly she told him he had done well, and bade him remain where he -was. Norris was in fact there to protect the interests of England quite -as much against the French as against Spain. There is not the least -ground for the assertion that in promoting reconciliation with Alençon, -Orange acted under pressure from Elizabeth. Everything goes to show that -he, the wisest and noblest statesman of his time, thought it the only -course open to the States, unless they were prepared to submit to -Philip. Both Elizabeth and Orange felt that the first necessity was to -keep the quarrel alive between the Frenchman and the Spaniard. The -English Queen therefore continued to feed Alençon with hopes of -marriage, and the States patched up a reconciliation with him (March -1583). But his heart failed him. He saw Parma taking town after town. He -knew that he had made himself odious to the Netherlanders. He was -covered with shame. He was fatally stricken with consumption. In June -1583 he left Belgium never to return. Within a twelvemonth he was dead. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -THE PAPAL ATTACK: 1570-1583 - - -Sovereigns and statesmen in the sixteenth century are to be honoured or -condemned according to the degree in which they aimed on the one hand at -preserving political order, and on the other at allowing freedom of -opinion. It was not always easy to reconcile these two aims. The first -was a temporary necessity, and yet was the more urgent--as indeed is -always the case with the tasks of the statesman. He is responsible for -the present; it is not for him to attempt to provide for a remote -future. Political order and the material well-being of nations may be -disastrously impaired by the imprudence or weakness of a ruler. Thought, -after all, may be trusted to take care of itself in the long-run. - -To the modern Liberal, with his doctrine of absolute religious equality, -toleration seems an insult, and anything short of toleration is regarded -as persecution. In the sixteenth century the most advanced statesmen did -not see their way to proclaim freedom of public worship and of religious -discussion. It was much if they tolerated freedom of opinion, and -connived at a quiet, private propagation of other religions than those -established by law. It would be wrong to condemn and despise them as -actuated by superstition and narrow-minded prejudice. Their motives were -mainly political, and it is reasonable to suppose that they knew better -than we do whether a larger toleration was compatible with public order. - -We have seen that under the Act of Supremacy, in the first year of -Elizabeth, the oath was only tendered to persons holding office, -spiritual or temporal, under the crown, and that the penalty for -refusing it was only deprivation. But in her fifth year (1563), it was -enacted that the oath might be tendered to members of the House of -Commons, schoolmasters, and attorneys, who, if they refused it, might be -punished by forfeiture of property and perpetual imprisonment. To those -who had held any ecclesiastical office, or who should openly disapprove -of the established worship, or celebrate or hear mass, the oath might be -tendered a second time, with the penalties of high treason for refusal. - -That this law authorised an atrocious persecution cannot be disputed, -and there is no doubt that many zealous Protestants wished it to be -enforced. But the practical question is, Was it enforced? The government -wished to be armed with the power of using it, and for the purpose of -expelling Catholics from offices it was extensively used. But no one was -at this time visited with the severer penalties, the bishops having been -privately forbidden to tender the oath a second time to any one without -special instructions. - -The Act of Uniformity, passed in the first year of Elizabeth, -prohibited the use of any but the established liturgy, whether in public -or private, under pain of perpetual imprisonment for the third offence, -and imposed a fine of one shilling on recusants--that is, upon persons -who absented themselves from church on Sundays and holidays. To what -extent Catholics were interfered with under this Act has been a matter -of much dispute. Most of them, during the first eleven years of -Elizabeth, either from ignorance or worldliness, treated the Anglican -service as equivalent to the Catholic, and made no difficulty about -attending church, even after this compliance with the law had been -forbidden by Pius IV. in the sixth year of Elizabeth. Only the more -scrupulous absented themselves, and called in the ministrations of the -“old priests,” who with more or less secrecy said mass in private -houses. Some of these offenders were certainly punished before Elizabeth -had been two years on the throne. The enforcement of laws was by no -means so uniform in those days as it is now. Much depended on the -leanings of the noblemen and justices of the peace in different -localities. Both from disposition and policy Elizabeth desired, as a -general rule, to connive at Catholic nonconformity when it did not take -an aggressive and fanatical form. But she had no scruple about applying -the penalties of these Acts to individuals who for any reason, religious -or political, were specially obnoxious to her. - -So things went on till the northern insurrection: the laws authorising a -searching and sanguinary persecution; the Government, much to the -disgust of zealous Protestants, declining to put those laws in -execution. Judged by modern ideas, the position of the Catholics was -intolerable; but if measured by the principles of government then -universally accepted, or if compared with the treatment of persons ever -so slightly suspected of heresy in countries cursed with the -Inquisition, it was not a position of which they had any great reason to -complain; nor did the large majority of them complain. - -Pope Pius IV. (1559-1566) was comparatively cautious and circumspect in -his attitude towards Elizabeth. But his successor Pius V. (1566-1572), -having made up his mind that her destruction was the one thing necessary -for the defeat of heresy in Europe, strove to stir up against her -rebellion at home and invasion from abroad. A bull deposing her, and -absolving her subjects from their allegiance, was drawn up. But while -Pius, conscious of the offence which it would give to all the sovereigns -of Europe, delayed to issue it, the northern rebellion flared up and was -trampled out. The absence of such a bull was by many Catholics made an -excuse for holding aloof from the rebel earls. When it was too late the -bull was issued (Feb. 1570). Philip and Charles IX.--sovereigns first -and Catholics afterwards--refused to let it be published in their -dominions. - -After the northern insurrection the Queen issued a remarkable appeal to -her people, which was ordered to be placarded in every parish, and read -in every church. She could point with honest pride to eleven years of -such peace abroad and tranquillity at home as no living Englishman could -remember. Her economy had enabled her to conduct the government without -any of the illegal exactions to which former sovereigns had resorted. -“She had never sought the life, the blood, the goods, the houses, -estates or lands of any person in her dominions.” This happy state of -things the rebels had tried to disturb on pretext of religion. They had -no real grievance on that score. Attendance at parish church was indeed -obligatory by law, though, she might have added, it was very loosely -enforced. But she disclaimed any wish to pry into opinions, or to -inquire in what sense any one understood rites or ceremonies. In other -words, the language of the communion service was not incompatible with -the doctrine of transubstantiation, and loyal Catholics were at liberty, -were almost invited, to interpret it in that sense if they liked. - -This compromise between their religious and political obligations had in -fact been hitherto adopted by the large majority of English Catholics. -But a time was come when it was to be no longer possible for them. They -were summoned to make their choice between their duty as citizens and -their duty as Catholics. The summons had come, not from the Queen, but -from the Pope, and it is not strange that they had thenceforth a harder -time of it. Many of them, indignant with the Pope for bringing trouble -upon them, gave up the struggle and conformed to the Established Church. -The temper of the rest became more bitter and dangerous. The Puritan -Parliament of 1571 passed a bill to compel all persons not only to -attend church, but to receive the communion twice a year; and another -making formal reconciliation to the Church of Rome high treason both for -the convert and the priest who should receive him. Here we have the -persecuting spirit, which was as inherent in the zealous Protestant as -in the zealous Catholic. Attempts to excuse such legislation, as -prompted by political reasons, can only move the disgust of every -honest-minded man. The first of these bills did not receive the royal -assent, though Cecil--just made Lord Burghley--had strenuously pushed it -through the Upper House. Elizabeth probably saw that its only effect -would be to enable the Protestant zealots in every parish to enjoy the -luxury of harassing their quiet Catholic neighbours, who attended church -but would scruple to take the sacrament. - -The Protestant spirit of this House of Commons showed itself not only in -laws for strengthening the Government and persecuting the Catholics, but -in attempts to puritanise the Prayer-book, which much displeased the -Queen. Strickland, one of the Puritan leaders, was forbidden to attend -the House. But such was the irritation caused by this invasion of its -privileges, that the prohibition was removed after one day. It was in -this session of Parliament that the doctrines of the Church of England -were finally determined by the imposition on the clergy of the -Thirty-nine Articles, which, as every one knows, are much more -Protestant than the Prayer-book. Till then they had only had the -sanction of Convocation. - -During the first forty years or so, from the beginning of the -Reformation, Protestantism spread in most parts of Europe with great -rapidity. It was not merely an intellectual revolt against doctrines no -longer credible. The numbers of the reformers were swelled, and their -force intensified by the flocking in of pious souls, athirst for -personal holiness, and of many others who, without being high-wrought -enthusiasts, were by nature disposed to value whatever seemed to make -for a purer morality. The religion which had nurtured Bernard and À -Kempis was deserted, not merely as being untrue, but as incompatible -with the highest spiritual life--nay, as positively corrupting to -society. This imagination, of course, had but a short day. The return to -the Bible and the doctrines of primitive Christianity, the deliverance -from “the Bishop of Rome and his detestable enormities,” were not found -to be followed by any general improvement of morals in Protestant -countries. He that was unjust was unjust still; he that was filthy was -filthy still. The repulsive contrast too often seen between -sanctimonious professions and unscrupulous conduct contributed to the -disenchantment. - -In the meanwhile a great regeneration was going on within the Catholic -Church itself. Signs of this can be detected quite as early as the first -rise of Protestantism. It is, therefore, not to be attributed to -Protestant teaching and example, though doubtless the rivalry of the -younger religion stimulated the best energies of the older. No long time -elapsed before this regeneration had worked its way to the highest -places in the Church. The Popes by whom Elizabeth was confronted were -all men of pure lives and single-hearted devotion to the Catholic cause. - -The last two years of the Council of Trent (1562-3) were the -starting-point of the modern Catholic Church. Many proposals had been -made for compromise with Protestantism. But the Fathers of Trent saw -that the only chance of survival for a Church claiming to be Catholic -was to remain on the old lines. By the canons and decrees of the -Council, ratified by Pius IV., the old doctrines and discipline were -confirmed and definitely formulated. One branch indeed of the Papal -power was irretrievably gone. Royal authority had become absolute, and -the kings, including Philip II., refused to tolerate any interference -with it. The Papacy had to acquiesce in the loss of its power over -sovereigns. But as regards the bishops and clergy, and things strictly -appertaining to religion, its spiritual autocracy, which the great -councils of the last century had aimed at breaking, was re-established, -and has continued. The new situation, though it seemed to place the -Popes on a humbler footing than in the days of Gregory VII. or Innocent -III., was a healthy one. It confined them to their spiritual domain, and -drove them to make the best of it. - -Until the decrees of the Council of Trent, the split between Protestants -and Catholics was not definitely and irrevocably decided. Many on both -sides had shrunk from admitting it. The Catholic world might seem to be -narrowed by the defection of the Protestant States. But all the more -clearly did it appear that a Church claiming to be universal is not -concerned with political boundaries. The resistance to the spread of -heresy had hitherto consisted of many local struggles, in which the -repressive measures had emanated from the orthodox sovereigns, and had -therefore been fitful and unconnected. But not long after the Tridentine -reorganisation, the Pope appears again as commander-in-chief of the -Catholic forces, surveying and directing combined operations from one -end of Europe to the other. Pius IV. had been with difficulty prevented -by Philip from excommunicating Elizabeth. Pius V. had launched his bull, -as we have seen, a few months too late (1570); and even then it was not -allowed to be published in either Spain or France. The life of that Pope -was wasted in earnest remonstrances with the Catholic sovereigns for not -executing the sentence of the Church against the heretic Queen. Gregory -XIII., who succeeded him just before the Bartholomew Massacre, took the -attack into his own hands. He was a warm patron of the Jesuits, who were -especially devoted to the centralising system re-established at Trent. -He and they had made up their minds that England was the key of the -Protestant position; that until Elizabeth was removed no advance was to -be hoped for anywhere. - -The decline of a religion may be accompanied by a positive increase of -earnestness and activity on the part of its remaining votaries, deluding -them into a belief that they are but passing through, or have -successfully passed through, a period of temporary depression and -eclipse. Among the Catholics of the latter part of the sixteenth century -there was all the enthusiasm of a religious revival. In no place did -this show itself more than at Oxford. There the weak points of popular -movements have never been allowed to pass without challenge, and what is -really valuable or beautiful in time-worn faiths has been sure of -receiving fair-play and something more. The gloss of the Reformation was -already worn off. The worldly and carnal were its supporters and -directors. It no longer demanded enthusiasm and sacrifice. It walked in -purple and fine linen. Young men of quick intellect and high aspirations -who, a generation earlier, would have been captivated by its fair -promise and have thrown themselves into its current, yielded now to the -eternal spell of the older Church, cleansed as she was of her -pollutions, and purged of her dross by the discipline of adversity. - -The leader of these Oxford enthusiasts was a young fellow of Oriel, -William Allen. In the third year of Elizabeth, at the age of -twenty-eight, he resigned the Principalship of St. Mary Hall. The next -eight years were spent partly abroad, partly in secret missionary work -in England, carried on at the peril of his life. The old priests, who -with more or less concealment and danger continued to exercise their -office among the English Catholics, were gradually dying off. In order -to train successors to them, Allen founded an English seminary at Douai -(1568). To this important step it was mainly due that the Catholic -religion did not become extinct in this country. In the first five years -of its existence the college at Douai sent nearly a hundred priests to -England. - -It was the aim of Allen to put an end to the practical toleration -allowed to Catholic laymen of the quieter sort. The Catholic who began -by putting in the compulsory number of attendances at his parish church -was likely to end by giving up his faith altogether. If he did not, his -son would. Allen deliberately preferred a sweeping persecution--one that -would make the position of Catholics intolerable, and ripen them for -rebellion. He wanted martyrs. The ardent young men whom he trained at -Douai and (after 1578) at Rheims, went back to their native land with -the clear understanding that of all the services they could render to -the Church the greatest would be to die under the hangman’s knife. - -Gregory XIII. hoped great things from Allen’s seminary, and furnished -funds for its support. In 1579 Allen went to Rome, and enlisted the -support of Mercurian, General of the Jesuits. Two English Jesuits, -Robert Parsons and Edward Campion, ex-fellows of Balliol and St. John’s, -were selected as missionaries. Campion was eight years younger than -Allen. He had had a brilliant career at Oxford, being especially -distinguished for his eloquence. He was at that time personally known to -both Cecil and the Queen, and enjoyed their favour. He took deacon’s -orders in 1568, but not long afterwards joined Allen at Douai, and -formally abjured the Anglican Church. He had been six years a Jesuit -when he was despatched on his dangerous mission to England. - -Tired of waiting for the initiative of Philip, Gregory XIII. and the -Jesuits had planned a threefold attack on Elizabeth in England, -Scotland, and Ireland. In England a revivalist movement was to be -carried on among the Catholics by the missionaries. Catholic writers -have been at great pains to argue that this was a purely religious -movement, prosecuted with the single object of saving souls. The Jesuits -have always known their men and employed them with discrimination. -Saving of souls was very likely the simple object of a man of Campion’s -saintly and exalted nature. He himself declared that he had been -strictly forbidden to meddle with worldly concerns or affairs of State, -and nothing inconsistent with this declaration was proved against him at -his trial. But without laying any stress on statements extracted from -prisoners under torture, we cannot doubt that his employers aimed at -re-establishing Catholicism in England by rebellion and foreign -invasion. This was thoroughly understood by every missionary who crossed -the sea; and if Campion never alluded to it even in his most familiar -conversations he must have had an extraordinary control over his tongue. - -The evidence that the assassination of the Queen was a recognised part -of the Jesuit plan, determined by the master spirits and accepted by all -the subordinate agents, is perhaps not quite conclusive. If proved, it -would only show that they were not more scrupulous than most statesmen -and politicians of the time. Lax as sixteenth century notions were about -political murder, there were always some consciences more tender than -others. It is likely enough that Campion personally disapproved of such -projects, and that they were not thrust upon his attention. But he can -hardly have avoided being aware that they were contemplated by the less -squeamish of his brethren. - -Campion and Parsons came to England in disguise in the summer of 1580. -Their mission was not a success. It only served to show how much more -securely Elizabeth was seated on her throne than in the earlier years of -her reign. In his letters to Rome, Campion boasts of the welcome he met -with everywhere, the crowds that attended his preaching, the ardour of -the Catholics, and the disrepute into which Protestantism was falling. -He had evidently worked himself up to such a state of ecstasy that he -was living in a world of his own imagination, and was no competent -witness of facts. He crept about England in various disguises, and when -he was in districts where the nobles and gentry favoured the old -religion, he preached with a publicity which seems extraordinary to us -in these days when the laws are executed with prompt uniformity by means -of railways, telegraphs, and a well-organised police. In the sixteenth -century England had nothing that can be called an organised machinery -for the prevention and detection of crime. If an outbreak occurred the -Government collected militia, and trampled it out with an energy that -took no account of law and feared no consequences. But in ordinary times -it had to depend on the local justices of the peace and parish -constables, and if they were remiss the laws were a dead letter. There -were no newspapers. The high-roads were few and bad. One parish did not -know what was going on in the next. Campion could be passed on from one -gentleman’s house to another on horses quite as good as any officer of -the Government rode, and could travel all over England without ever -using a high-road or showing his face in a town. If he preached to a -hundred people in some Lancashire village, Lord Derby did not want to -know it, and before the news reached Burghley or Walsingham he would be -in another county, or perhaps back in London--then, as now, the safest -of all hiding-places. Thus, though a warrant was issued for his arrest -as soon as he arrived in England, it was not till July in the next year -(1581) that he was taken, after an unusually public and protracted -appearance in the neighbourhood of Oxford. - -He had little or nothing to show for his twelve months’ tour, and this -although the Government had, as Allen hoped, allowed itself to be -provoked into an increase of severity which seems to have been quite -unnecessary. The large majority of Catholic laymen would evidently have -preferred that both Seminarists and Jesuits should keep away. They did -not want civil war. They did not want to be persecuted. They were -against a foreign invasion, without which they knew very well that -Elizabeth could not be deposed. They were even loyal to her. They were -content to wait till she should disappear in the course of nature and -make room for the Queen of Scots. Mendoza writes to Philip that “they -place themselves in the hands of God, and are willing to sacrifice life -and all in the service, _but scarcely with that burning zeal which they -ought to show_.” - -By the bull of Pius V., Englishmen were forbidden to acknowledge -Elizabeth as their Queen; in other words, they were ordered to expose -themselves to the penalties of treason. If the Pope would be satisfied -with nothing less than this, it was quite certain that he would alienate -most of his followers in England. Gregory XIII. therefore had authorised -the Jesuits to explain that although the Protestants, by _willingly_ -acknowledging the Queen, were incurring the damnation pronounced by the -bull, Catholics would be excused for _unwillingly_ acknowledging her -until some opportunity arrived for dethroning her. Protestant writers -have exclaimed against this distinction as treacherous. It was perfectly -reasonable. It represents, for instance, the attitude of every Alsatian -who accords an unwilling recognition to the German Emperor. But the -English Government intolerantly and unwisely made it the occasion for -harassing the consciences of men who were most of them guiltless of any -intention to rebel. - -Amongst other persecuting laws passed early in 1581, was one which -raised the fine for non-attendance at church to twenty pounds a month. -Such a measure was calculated to excite much more wide-spread -disaffection than the hanging of a few priests. It was not intended to -be a _brutum fulmen_. The names of all recusants in each parish were -returned to the Council. They amounted to about 50,000, and the fines -exacted became a not inconsiderable item in the royal revenue. That -number certainly formed but a small portion of the Catholic population. -But if all the rest had been in the habit of going to church, contrary -to the Pope’s express injunction, rather than pay a small fine, the -Government ought to have seen that they were not the stuff of which -rebels are made. - -Campion, after being compelled by torture to disclose the names of his -hosts in different counties, was called on to maintain the Catholic -doctrines in a three days’ discussion before a large audience against -four Protestant divines, who do not seem to have been ashamed of -themselves. He was offered pardon if he would attend once in church. As -he steadfastly refused, he was racked again till his limbs were -dislocated. When he had partially recovered he was put on his trial, -along with several of his companions, not under any of the recent -anti-catholic laws but under the ordinary statute of Edward III., for -“compassing and imagining the Queen’s death”--such a horror had the -Burghleys and Walsinghams of anything like religious persecution! Being -unable to hold up his hand to plead Not Guilty, “two of his companions -raised it for him, first kissing the broken joints.” According to -Mendoza (whom on other occasions we are invited to accept as a witness -of truth), his nails had been torn from his fingers. Apart from his -religious belief nothing treasonable was proved against him in deed or -word. He acknowledged Elizabeth for his rightful sovereign, as the new -interpretation of the papal bull permitted him to do, but he declined to -give any opinion about the Pope’s right to depose princes. This was -enough for the judge and jury, and he was found guilty. At the place of -execution he was again offered his pardon if he would deny the papal -right of deposition, or even hear a Protestant sermon. He wished the -Queen a long and quiet reign and all prosperity, but more he would not -say. At the quartering “a drop of blood spirted on the clothes of a -youth named Henry Walpole, to whom it came as a divine command. Walpole, -converted on the spot, became a Jesuit, and soon after met the same fate -on the same spot.” - -Mr. Froude’s comment is that “if it be lawful in defence of national -independence to kill open enemies in war, it is more lawful to execute -the secret conspirator who is teaching doctrines in the name of God -which are certain to be fatal to it.” It would perhaps be enough to -remark that this reasoning amply justifies some of the worst atrocities -of the French Revolution. Hallam and Macaulay have condemned it by -anticipation in language which will commend itself to all who are not -swayed by religious, or, what is more offensive, anti-religious -bigotry.[4] - -Cruel as the English criminal law was, and long remained, it never -authorised the use of torture to extract confession. The rack in the -Tower is said to have made its appearance, with other innovations of -absolute government, in the reign of Edward IV. But it seems to have -been little used before the reign of Elizabeth, under whom it became the -ordinary preliminary to a political trial. For this the chief blame must -rest personally on Burghley. Opinions may differ as to his rank as a -statesman, but no one will contest his eminent talents as a minister of -police. In the former capacity he had sufficient sense of shame to -publish a Pecksniffian apology for his employment of the rack. “None,” -he says, “of those who were at any time put to the rack were asked, -during their torture, any question as to points of doctrine, but merely -concerning their plots and conspiracies, and the persons with whom they -had dealings, and _what was their own opinion_ as to the Pope’s right to -deprive the Queen of her crown.” What was this but a point of doctrine? -The wretched victim who conscientiously believed it (as all Christendom -once did), but wished to save himself by silence, was driven either to -tell a lie or to consign himself to rope and knife. “The Queen’s -servants, the warders, whose office and act it is to handle the rack, -were ever, by those that attended the examinations, specially charged to -use it in so charitable a manner as such a thing might be.” It may be -hoped that there are not many who would dissent from Hallam’s remark -that “such miserable excuses serve only to mingle contempt with our -detestation.” He adds: “It is due to Elizabeth to observe that she -ordered the torture to be disused.” I do not know what authority there -is for this statement. Three years later the Protestant Archbishop of -Dublin was puzzled how to torture the Catholic Archbishop of Cashel, -because there was no “rack or other engine” in Dublin. Walsingham, on -being consulted, suggested that his feet might be toasted against the -fire, which was accordingly done. Some of the Anglican bishops, as might -be expected from fanatics, were forward in recommending torture. But -Cecil was no more of a fanatic than his mistress. What both of them -cared for was not a particular religious belief--they had both of them -conformed to Popery under Queen Mary--but the sovereign’s claim to -prescribe religious belief, or rather religious profession, and they -were provoked with the missionaries for thwarting them. Provoking it -was, no doubt. But everything seems to show that it would have been -better to pursue the earlier policy of the reign; to be content with -enacting severe laws which practically were not put into execution. - -The English branch of the Jesuit attack was, for political purposes, a -dead failure. A few persons of rank, who at heart were Catholics before, -were formally reconciled to the Pope. Mendoza claims that among them -were six peers whose names he conceals. These peers, if he is to be -believed, were treasonable enough in their designs. But, even by his -account, they were determined not to stir unless a foreign army should -have first entered England. - -How far Mendoza’s master was from seeing his way to attack England at -this time was strikingly shown by his behaviour under the most audacious -outrage that Elizabeth had yet inflicted on him. Some twelve months -before (October 1580), Drake had returned from his famous voyage round -the world. That voyage was nothing else than a piratical expedition, for -which it was notorious that the funds had been mainly furnished by -Elizabeth and Leicester. On sea and land Drake had robbed Philip of -gold, silver, and precious stones to the value of at least £750,000. In -vain did Mendoza clamour for restitution and talk about war. Elizabeth -kept the booty, knighted Drake, and openly showed him every mark of -confidence and favour. When Mendoza told her that as she would not hear -words, they must come to cannon and see if she would hear them, she -replied (“quietly in her most natural voice”) that, if he used threats -of that kind, she would throw him into prison. The correspondence -between the Spanish ambassador and his master shows that, however big -they might talk about cannon, they felt themselves paralysed by -Elizabeth’s intimate relations with France. She had managed to keep free -from any offensive alliance with Henry III. But at the first sound of -the Spanish cannon she could have it. She was, therefore, secure. -Probably the whole history of diplomacy does not show another instance -of such a complicated balance of forces so dexterously manipulated. - -The Irish branch of the Papal attack, the landing of the legate Sanders, -the insurrection of Desmond (1579-1583), the massacre of the Pope’s -Italian soldiers at Smerwick (1580), must be passed over here. It is -enough to say that, in Ireland, too, the Catholics were beaten. We turn -now to their attempt to get hold of Scotland (1579-1582). - -Scotland was in a state of anarchy, from which it could only be rescued -by an able and courageous king. The nobles, instead of becoming weaker, -as elsewhere, had acquired a strength and independence greater even than -their fathers had enjoyed. Thirty years earlier, the Church had -possessed quite half the land of the country, and had steadily supported -the crown. Almost the whole of this wealth had been seized in one form -or another by the nobles. And though, as compared with English noblemen, -they were still poor in money, they were much bigger men relatively to -their sovereign. The power of the crown was extensive enough in theory. -What was wanted was a king who should know how to convert it into a -reality. That was more than any regent could do. Even Moray had not -succeeded. The house of Douglas was one of the most powerful in -Scotland, and Morton, who had been looked on as its head during the -minority of the Earl of Angus, was an able and daring man. But he had -not the large views, the public spirit, or the integrity of Moray. He -was feared by all, hated by many, respected by none. As a mere party -chief, no one would have been better able to hold his own. As -representing the crown, he had every man’s hand against him. To -subsidise such a man was perfectly useless. If Elizabeth was to make his -cause her own, she might just as well undertake the conquest of Scotland -at once. - -The essence of the good understanding between England and France was -that both countries should keep their hands off Scotland. Elizabeth, -knowing that if worst came to worst, she could always be beforehand with -France in the northern kingdom, could afford to respect this -arrangement, and she did mean to respect it. France, on the other hand, -being also well aware of the advantage given to England by geographical -situation, was always tempted to steal a march on her, and even when -most desirous of her alliance, never quite gave up intrigues in -Scotland. This was equally the case whatever party was uppermost at the -French court, whether its policy was being directed by the King or by -the Duke of Guise. - -The Jesuits looked on Guise as their fighting man, who was to do the -work which they could not prevail on crowned heads to undertake. James, -though only thirteen, had been declared of age. It was too late to think -of deposing him. If his character was feeble, his understanding and -acquirements were much beyond his years, and his preferences were -already a force to be reckoned with in Scotch politics. His interests -were evidently opposed to those of his mother. But the Jesuits hoped to -persuade him that his seat would never be secure unless he came to a -compromise with her on the terms that he was to accept the crown as her -gift and recognise her joint-sovereignty. This would throw him entirely -into the hands of the Catholic nobles, and would be a virtual -declaration of war against Elizabeth. He would have to proclaim himself -a Catholic, and call in the French. It was hoped that Philip, jealous -though he had always been of French interference, would not object to an -expedition warranted by the Jesuits and commanded by Guise, who was more -and more sinking into a tool of Spain and Rome. A combined army of -Scotch and French would pour across the Border. It would be joined by -the English Catholics. Elizabeth would be deposed, and Mary set on the -throne. - -It was a pretty scheme on paper, but certain to break down in every -stage of its execution. James might chaffer with his mother; but, young -as he was, he knew well that she meant to overreach him. He would be -glad enough to get rid of Morton, but he did not want to be a puppet in -the hands of the Marians. He did not like the Presbyterian preachers; -but the young pedant already valued himself on his skill in confuting -the apologists of Popery. He resented Elizabeth’s lectures; but he knew -that his succession to the English crown depended on her good will, and -he meant to keep on good terms with her. No approval of the scheme could -be obtained from Philip, and if he did not peremptorily forbid the -expedition, it was because he did not believe it would come off. If a -French army had appeared in Scotland, it would have been treated as all -foreigners were in that country. And finally, if, _per impossibile_, the -French and Scotch had entered England, they would have been overwhelmed -by such an unanimous uprising of the English people of all parties and -creeds as had never been witnessed in our history. - -Historians, who would have us believe that Elizabeth was constantly -bringing England to the verge of ruin by her stinginess and want of -spirit, represent this combination as highly formidable. It required -careful watching; but the only thing that could make it really dangerous -was rash and premature employment of force by England--the course -advocated not only by Burghley, but by the whole Council. Elizabeth -seems to have stood absolutely alone in her opinion; but here, as -always, though she allowed her ministers to speak their minds freely, -she did not fear to act on her own judgment against their unanimous -advice. - -To carry out their schemes, Guise and the Jesuits sent to Scotland a -nephew of the late Regent Lennox, Esmé Stuart, who had been brought up -in France, and bore the title of Count d’Aubigny (September 1579). He -speedily won the heart of the King, who created him Earl, and afterwards -Duke of Lennox. Elizabeth soon obtained proof of his designs, and urged -Morton to resist them by force. But the favourite, professing to be -converted to Protestantism, enlisted the preachers on his side, and, by -this unnatural coalition, Morton was brought to the scaffold (June -1581). During the interval between his arrest and execution, the English -Council were urgent with Elizabeth to invade Scotland, rescue the -Anglophile leader, and crush Lennox. She went all lengths in the way of -threats. Lord Hunsdon was even ordered to muster an army on the Border. -But this last step at once produced an energetic protest from the -French ambassador; and in Scotland there was a general rally of all -parties against the “auld enemies.” Elizabeth had never meant to make -her threats good, and Morton was left to his fate. She was quite right -not to invade Scotland; but, that being her intention, she should not -have tempted Morton to treason by the promise of her protection. No male -statesman would have been so insensible to dishonour. - -The death of the man who, next to Moray, had been the mainstay of the -Reformation and the scourge of the Marian party, was received with a -shout of exultation from Catholic Europe. Already in their heated -imaginations the Jesuits saw the Kirk overthrown and the vantage ground -gained for an attack on England. Some modern historians--with less -excuse, since they have the sequel before their eyes--make the same -blunder. The situation was really unchanged. Morton, who had the true -antipathy of a Scottish noble to clerics of all sorts, had plundered the -Kirk ministers, and tried to bring them under the episcopal yoke. He had -quarrelled with most of his old associates of the Congregation. It was -their enmity quite as much as the attack of Lennox that had pulled him -down. When he was out of the way they naturally reverted to an -Anglophile policy. The weakness of the Catholic party was plainly shown -by the fact that Lennox himself, the pupil of the Jesuits, never -ventured to throw off the disguise of a heretic. - -The further development of the Jesuit scheme met with difficulties on -all sides. Most even of the Catholic lords were alarmed by the -suggestion that James should hold the crown by the gift of his mother, -because it would imply that hitherto he had not been lawful King; and -this would invalidate their titles to all the lands they had grabbed -from Church and crown during the last fourteen years. It would seem -therefore that, if they had harassed the Government during all that -time, it was from a liking for anarchy rather than from attachment to -Mary. Two Jesuits, Crichton and Holt, who were sent in disguise to -Scotland, found Lennox desponding. He was obliged to confess that, -greatly as he had fascinated the King, he could not move him an inch in -his religious opinions. On the contrary, James imagined that his -controversial skill had converted Lennox, and was extremely proud of the -feat. The only course remaining was to seize him, and send him to France -or Spain, Lennox in the meantime administering the Government in the -name of Mary. But to carry out this stroke, Lennox said he must have a -foreign army. In view of the mutual jealousy of France and Spain it was -suggested that, if Philip would furnish money underhand, the Pope might -send an Italian army direct to Scotland, _viâ_ the Straits of Gibraltar. -Crichton went to Rome to arrange this precious scheme, and Holt was -proceeding to Madrid. But Philip forbade him to come. If Lennox could -convert James, or send him to Spain, well and good. But until one of -these preliminaries was accomplished he was to expect no help from -Philip. Nor were prospects more hopeful on the side of France. Mary from -her prison implored Guise to undertake the long-planned expedition. But -he would not venture it without the assent of his own sovereign and the -King of Spain. While he was hesitating, the Anglophiles patched up their -differences and got possession of the King’s person (Raid of Ruthven, -August 1582). His tears were unavailing. “Better bairns greet,” said the -Master of Glamis, “than bearded men.” The favourite fled to France, -where he died in the next year. - -Thus once more had it been clearly shown that if the Anglophiles were -left to depend on themselves they would not fail to do all that was -necessary to safeguard English interests. “Anglophiles” is a convenient -appellation. But, strictly speaking, there was no party in Scotland that -loved England. There was a religious party to whom it was of the highest -importance that Elizabeth should be safe and powerful. She was therefore -certain of its co-operation. This party would not be always uppermost; -for Scottish nobles were too selfish, too treacherous, too much -interested in disorder to permit any stability. But, whether in power or -in opposition, it would be able and it would be obliged to serve English -interests. There was only one way in which it could be paralysed or -alienated, and that was by a recurrence on the part of England to the -traditions of armed interference inherited by Elizabeth’s councillors -from Henry VIII. and the Protector Somerset. - -Such is the plain history of this Jesuit and Papal scheme which we are -asked to believe was so dangerous to England and so inadequately handled -by Elizabeth. She had not shown much concern for her honour. But her -coolness, her intrepidity, her correct estimate of the forces with which -she had to deal, her magnificent confidence in her own judgment, saved -England from the endless expenditure of blood and treasure into which -her advisers would have plunged, and prolonged the formal peace with her -three principal neighbours, a peace of already unexampled duration, and -of incalculable advantage to her country. - -The policy which Elizabeth had thus deliberately adopted towards -Scotland she persisted in. The successful Anglophiles clamoured for -pensions, and her ministers were for gratifying them. She was willing to -give a moderate pension to James, but not a penny to the nobles. “Her -servants and favourites,” she said, “professed to love her for her high -qualities, Alençon for her beauty, and the Scots for her crown; but they -all wanted the same thing in the end; they wanted nothing but her money, -and they should not have it.” She had ascertained that James regarded -his mother as his rival for the crowns of both kingdoms, and that, -whatever he might sometimes pretend, his real wish was that she should -be kept under lock and key. She had also satisfied herself that the -Scottish noblemen on whom Mary counted would, with very few exceptions, -throw every difficulty in the way of her restoration, out of regard for -their own private interests--the only _datum_ from which it was safe to -calculate in dealing with a Scottish nobleman. She therefore felt -herself secure. By communicating her knowledge to Mary she could show -her the hopelessness of her intrigues in Scotland; while a resumption of -friendly negotiations for her restoration would always be a cheap and -effectual way of intimidating James. Thus she could look on with -equanimity when his new favourite Stewart, Earl of Arran,[5] again -chased the Anglophiles into England (December 1583). Arran himself -urgently entreated her to accept him and his young master as the genuine -Anglophiles. Walsingham’s voice was still for war. But, with both -factions at her feet and suing for her favour, Elizabeth had good reason -to be satisfied with her policy of leaving the Scottish nobles to worry -it out among themselves. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -THE PROTECTORATE OF THE NETHERLANDS: 1584-86 - - -We are now approaching the great crisis of the reign--some may think of -English history--the grand struggle with Spain; a struggle which, if -Elizabeth had allowed herself to be guided by her most celebrated -counsellors, would have been entered upon a quarter of a century -earlier. England was then unarmed and weighed down with a load of debt, -the legacy of three thriftless and pugnacious reigns. The population was -still mainly Catholic. The great nobles still thought themselves a match -for the crown, and many of them longed to make one more effort to assert -their old position in the State. Trade and industry were languishing. -The poorer classes were suffering and discontented. Scotland was in the -hands of a most dangerous enemy, whose title to the English crown was -held by many to be better than Elizabeth’s. Philip II., as yet -unharassed by revolt, seemed almost to have drawn England as a sort of -satellite into the vast orbit of his empire. - -Nearly a generation had now passed away since Elizabeth ascended the -throne. Every year of it had seen some amendment in the condition of -the country. Under a pacific and thrifty Government taxation had been -light beyond precedent. All debts, even those of Henry VIII., had been -honourably paid off. While the lord of American gold mines and of the -richest commercial centres in Europe could not raise a loan on any -terms, Elizabeth could borrow when she pleased at five per cent. But she -had ceased to borrow, for she had a modest surplus stored in her -treasury, a department of the administration managed under her own close -personal supervision. A numerous militia had been enrolled and partially -trained. Large magazines of arms had been accumulated. A navy had been -created; not a large one indeed; but it did not need to be large, for -the warship of those days did not differ from the ordinary vessel of -commerce, nor was its crew differently trained. The royal navy could -therefore be indefinitely increased if need arose. Philip’s great -generals, Alva and Parma, had long come to the conclusion that the -conquest of England would be the most difficult enterprise their master -could undertake. The wealth of landed proprietors and traders had -increased enormously. New manufactures had been started by exiles from -the Netherlands. New branches of foreign commerce had been opened up. -The poor were well employed and contented. I believe it would be -impossible to find in the previous history of England, or, for that -matter, of Europe, since the fall of the Roman Empire, any instance of -peace, prosperity, and good government extending over so many years. - -Looking abroad we find that in all directions the strength and security -of Elizabeth’s position had been immensely increased. Her ministers, -especially Walsingham--for Burghley in his old age came at last to see -more with the eyes of his mistress--believed that by a more spirited -policy Scotland might have been converted into a submissive and valuable -ally. Elizabeth alone saw that this was impossible; that, so treated, -Scotland would become to England what Holland was to Philip, what “the -Spanish ulcer” was afterwards to Napoleon--a fatal drain on her strength -and resources. It was enough for Elizabeth if the northern kingdom was -so handled as to be harmless; and this, as I have shown, was in fact its -condition from the moment that the only Scottish ruler who could be -really dangerous was locked up in England. - -The Dutch revolt crippled Philip. The conquest of England was postponed -till the Dutch revolt should be suppressed. Why then, it has been asked, -did not Elizabeth support the Dutch more vigorously? The answer is a -simple one. If she had done so the suppression of the Dutch revolt would -have been postponed to the conquest of England. This is proved by the -events now to be related. Elizabeth was obliged by new circumstances to -intervene more vigorously in the Netherlands, and the result was the -Armada. If the attack had come ten or fifteen years earlier the fortune -of England might have been different. - -Elizabeth’s foreign policy has been judged unfavourably by writers who -have failed to keep in view how completely it turned on her relations -with France. Though her interests and those of Henry III. cannot be -called identical, they coincided sufficiently to make it possible to -keep up a good understanding which was of the highest advantage to both -countries. But to maintain this good understanding there was need of the -coolest temper and judgment on the part of the rulers; for the two -peoples were hopelessly hostile. They were like two gamecocks in -adjoining pens. The Spaniards were respected and liked by our -countrymen. Their grave dignity, even their stiff assumption of -intrinsic superiority, were too like our own not to awake a certain -appreciative sympathy. Whereas all Englishmen from peer to peasant would -at any time have enjoyed a tussle with France, until its burdens began -to be felt. - -Henry III., with whom the Valois dynasty was about to expire, was far -from being the incompetent driveller depicted by most historians. He had -good abilities, plenty of natural courage when roused, and a thorough -comprehension of the politics of his day. His aims and plans were well -conceived. But with no child to care for, and immersed in degrading -self-indulgence, he wearied of the exertions and sacrifices necessary -for carrying them through. Short spells of sensible and energetic action -were succeeded by periods of unworthy lassitude and pusillanimous -surrender. Before he came to the throne he had been the chief organiser -of the Bartholomew Massacre. As King he naturally inclined, like -Elizabeth, William of Orange, and Henry of Navarre, to make -considerations of religion subordinate to considerations of State. Both -he and Navarre would have been glad to throw over the fanatical or -factious partisans by whom they were surrounded, and rally the -_Politiques_ to their support. But it was a step that neither as yet -ventured openly to take. The one was obliged to affect zeal for the old -religion, the other for the new. - -Elizabeth’s ministers, with short-sighted animosity, had been urging her -throughout her reign to give vigorous support to the Huguenots. She -herself took a broader view of the situation. She preferred to deal with -the legitimate government of France recognised by the vast majority of -Frenchmen. Henry III., as she well knew, did not intend or desire to -exterminate the Huguenots. If that turbulent faction had been openly -abetted in its arrogant claims by English assistance, he would have been -obliged to become the mere instrument of Elizabeth’s worst enemies, -Guise and the Holy League. France would have ceased to be any -counterpoise to Spain. The English Queen had so skilfully played a most -difficult and delicate game that Henry of Navarre had been able to keep -his head above water; Guise had upon the whole been held in check; the -royal authority, though impaired, had still controlled the foreign -policy of France, and so, since 1572, had given England a firm and -useful ally. As long as this balanced situation could be maintained, -England was safe. - -But the time was now at hand when this nice equilibrium of forces would -be disturbed by events which neither Elizabeth nor any one else could -help. Alençon, the last of the Valois line, was dying. When he should be -gone, the next heir to the French King would be no other than the -Huguenot Henry of Bourbon, King of the tiny morsel of Navarre that lay -north of the Pyrenees. Henry III. wished to recognise his right. But it -was impossible that Guise or Philip, or the French nation itself, should -tolerate this prospect. Thus the great war of religion which Elizabeth -had so carefully abstained from stirring up was now inevitable. The -French alliance, the key-stone of her policy, was about to crumble away -with the authority of the French King which she had buttressed up. He -would be compelled either to become the mere instrument of the Papal -party or to combine openly with the Huguenot leader. In either case, -Guise, not Henry III., would be the virtual sovereign, and Elizabeth’s -alliance would not be with France but with a French faction. She would -thus be forced into the position which she had hitherto refused to -accept--that of sole protector of French and Dutch Protestants, and open -antagonist of Spain. The more showy part she was now to play has been -the chief foundation of her glory with posterity. It is a glory which -she deserves. The most industrious disparagement will never rob her of -it. But the sober student will be of opinion that her reputation as a -statesman has a more solid basis in the skill and firmness with which -during so many years she staved off the necessity for decisive action. - -Although the discovery of the Throgmorton plot (Nov. 1583), and the -consequent expulsion of the Spanish ambassador, Mendoza, were not -immediately followed by open war between England and Spain, yet the -course of events thenceforward tended directly to that issue. Elizabeth -immediately proposed to the Dutch States to form a naval alliance -against Spain, and to concert other measures for mutual defence. Orange -met the offer with alacrity, and pressed Elizabeth to accept the -sovereignty of Holland, Zealand, and Utrecht. Perhaps there was no -former ruler of England who would not have clutched at such an -opportunity of territorial aggrandisement. For Elizabeth it had no -charms. Every sensible person now will applaud the sobriety of her aims. -But though she eschewed territory, she desired to have military -occupation of one or more coast fortresses, at all events for a time, -both as a security for the fidelity of the Dutch to any engagements they -might make with her, and to enable her to treat on more equal terms with -France or Spain, if the Netherlands were destined, after all, to fall -into the hands of one of those powers. - -While these negotiations were in progress, William of Orange was -murdered (June 30/July 10, 1584). Alençon had died a month earlier. The -sovereignty of the revolted Netherlands was thus vacant. Elizabeth -advised a joint protectorate by France and England. But the Dutch had -small confidence in protectorates, especially of the joint kind. What -they wanted was a sovereign, and as Elizabeth would not accept them as -her subjects they offered themselves to Henry III. But after nibbling at -the offer for eight months Henry was obliged to refuse it. His openly -expressed intention to recognise the King of Navarre as his heir had -caused a revival of the Holy League. During the winter 1584-5 its -reorganisation was busily going on. Philip promised to subsidise it. -Mendoza, now ambassador at Paris, was its life and soul. The -insurrection was on the point of breaking out. Henry III. knew that the -vast majority of Frenchmen were Catholics. To accept the Dutch offer -would, he feared, drive them all into the ranks of the Holy League. He -therefore dismissed the Dutch envoys with the recommendation that they -should apply to England for protection (February 28/March 10, 1585). - -The manifesto of the Leaguers appeared at the end of March (1585). Henry -of Navarre was declared incapable, as a Protestant, of succeeding to the -crown. Henry III. was summoned to extirpate heresy. To enforce these -demands the Leaguers flew to arms all over France. Had Henry III. been a -man of spirit he would have placed himself at the head of the loyal -Catholics and fought it out. But by the compact of Nemours he conceded -all the demands of the League (June 28/July 7, 1585). Thus began the -last great war of religion, which lasted till Henry of Navarre was -firmly seated on the throne of France. - -Elizabeth had now finally lost the French alliance, the sheet-anchor of -her policy since 1572, and she prepared for the grand struggle which -could no longer be averted. As France failed her, she must make the best -of the Dutch alliance. She did not conceal from herself that she would -have to do her share of the fighting. But she was determined that the -Dutch should also do theirs. Deprived of all hope of help from France -they wished for annexation to the English crown, because solidarity -between the two countries would give them an unlimited claim upon -English resources. Elizabeth uniformly told them, first and last, that -nothing should induce her to accept that proposal. She would give them a -definite amount of assistance in men and money. But every farthing -would have to be repaid when the war was over; and in the meantime she -must have Flushing and Brill as security. They must also bind themselves -to make proper exertions in their own defence. Gilpin, her agent in -Zealand, had warned her that if she showed herself too forward they -would simply throw the whole burden of the war upon her. Splendid as had -often been the resistance of separate towns when besieged, there had -been, from the first, lamentable selfishness and apathy as to measures -for combined defence. The States had less than 6000 men in the -field--half of them English volunteers--at the very time when they were -assuring Elizabeth that, if she would come to their assistance, they -could and would furnish 15,000. She was justified in regarding their -fine promises with much distrust. - -While this discussion was going on, Antwerp was lost. The blame of the -delay, if blame there was, must be divided equally between the -bargainers. The truth is that, cavil as they might about details, the -strength of the English contingent was not the real object of concern to -either of them. Each was thinking of something else. Though Elizabeth -had so peremptorily refused the sovereignty offered by the United -Provinces, they were still bent on forcing it upon her. She, on the -other hand, had not given up the hope that her more decisive -intervention would drive Philip to make the concessions to his revolted -subjects which she had so often urged upon him. In her eyes, Philip’s -sovereignty over them was indefeasible. They were, perhaps, justified -in asserting their ancient constitutional rights. But if those were -guaranteed, continuance of the rebellion would be criminal. Moreover, -she held that elected deputies were but amateur statesmen, and had -better leave the _haute politique_ to princes to settle. “Princes,” she -once told a Dutch deputation, “are not to be charged with breach of -faith if they sometimes listen to both sides; for they transact business -in a princely way and with a princely understanding such as private -persons cannot have.” Her promise not to make peace behind their backs -was not to be interpreted as literally as if it had been made to a -brother prince. It merely bound her--so she contended--not to make peace -without safeguarding their interests; that is to say, what she -considered to be their true interests. Conduct based on such a theory -would not be tolerated now, and was not tamely acquiesced in by the -Dutch then. But to speak of it as base and treacherous is an abuse of -terms. - -It would be impossible to follow in detail the peace negotiations which -went on between Elizabeth and Parma up to the very sailing of the Armada -(1586-8). The terms on which the Queen was prepared to make peace never -varied substantially from first to last. We know very well what they -were. She claimed for the Protestants of the Netherlands (who were a -minority, perhaps, even in the rebel provinces) precisely the same -degree of toleration which she allowed to her own Catholics. They were -not to be questioned about their religion; but there was to be no public -worship or proselytising. The old constitution, as before Alva, was to -be restored, which would have involved the departure of the foreign -troops. These terms would not have satisfied the States, and if Philip -could have been induced to grant them, the States and Elizabeth must -have parted company. But, as he would make no concessions, the -Anglo-Dutch alliance could, and did, continue. The cautionary towns she -was determined never to give up to any one unless (first) she was repaid -her expenses for which they had been mortgaged, and (secondly) the -struggle in the Netherlands was brought to an end on terms which she -approved. There was, therefore, never any danger of their being -surrendered to Philip, and they did, in fact, remain in Elizabeth’s -hands till her death. - -Elizabeth has been severely censured for selecting Leicester to command -the English army in the Netherlands. It is certain that he was marked -out by public opinion as the fittest person. The Queen’s choice was -heartily approved by all her ministers, especially by Walsingham, who -kept up the most confidential relations with Leicester, and backed him -throughout. Custom prescribed that an English army should be commanded, -not by a professional soldier, but by a great nobleman. Among the -nobility there were a few who had done a little soldiering in a rough -way in Scotland or Ireland, but no one who could be called a -professional general. The momentous step which Elizabeth was taking -would have lost half its significance in the eyes of Europe if any less -conspicuous person than Leicester had been appointed. Moreover, it was -essential that the nobleman selected should be able and willing to spend -largely out of his own resources. By traditional usage, derived from -feudal times, peers who were employed on temporary services not only -received no salary, but were expected to defray their own expenses, and -defray them handsomely. Never did an English nobleman show more public -spirit in this respect than Leicester. He raised every penny he could by -mortgaging his estates. He not only paid his own personal expenses, but -advanced large sums for military purposes, which his mistress never -thought of repaying him. If he effected little as a general, it was -because he was not provided with the means. Serious mistakes he -certainly made, but they were not of a military kind. - -Leicester was now fifty-four, bald, white-bearded, and red-faced, but -still imposing in figure, carriage, and dress. To Elizabeth he was dear -as the friend of her youth, one who, she was persuaded, had loved her -for herself when they were both thirty years younger, and was still her -most devoted and trustworthy servant. Burghley she liked and trusted, -and all the more since he had become a more docile instrument of her -policy. Walsingham, a keener intellect and more independent character, -she could not but value, though impatient under his penetrating -suspicion and almost constant disapproval. Leicester was the intimate -friend, the frequent companion of her leisure hours. None of her younger -favourites had supplanted him in her regard. By long intimacy he knew -the _molles aditus et tempora_ when things might be said without offence -which were not acceptable at the council-board. The other ministers were -glad to use him for this purpose. There can be no question that his -appointment to the command in the Netherlands was meant as the most -decisive indication that could be given of Elizabeth’s determination to -face open war with Philip rather than allow him to establish absolute -government in that country. - -Since the deaths of Alençon and William of Orange, the United Provinces -had been without a ruler. The government had been provisionally carried -on by the “States,” or deputies from each province. Leicester had come -with no other title than that of Lieutenant-General of the Queen’s -troops. But what the States wanted was not so much a military leader as -a sovereign ruler. They therefore urged Leicester to accept the powers -and title of Governor-General, the office which had been held by the -representatives of Philip. From this it would follow, both logically and -practically, that Elizabeth herself stood in the place of Philip--in -other words, that she was committed to the sovereignty which she had so -peremptorily refused. - -The offer was accepted by Leicester almost immediately after his arrival -(Jan. 14/24, 1586). There can be little doubt that it was a preconcerted -plan between the States and Elizabeth’s ministers, who had all along -supported the Dutch proposals. Leicester, we know, had contemplated it -before leaving England. Davison, who was in Holland, hurried it on, and -undertook to carry the news to Elizabeth. Burghley and Walsingham -maintained that the step had been absolutely necessary, and implored her -not to undo it. Elizabeth herself had suspected that something of the -sort would be attempted, and had strictly enjoined Leicester at his -departure to accept no such title. It was not that she wished his -powers--that is to say, her own powers--to be circumscribed. On the -contrary, she desired that they should in practice be as large and -absolute as possible. What she objected to was the title, with all the -consequences it involved. And what enraged her most of all was the -attempt of her servants to push the thing through behind her back, on -the calculation that she would be obliged to accept the accomplished -fact. Her wrath vented itself on all concerned, on her ministers, on the -States, and on Leicester. To the latter she addressed a characteristic -letter:-- - - “_To my Lord of Leicester from the Queen by Sir Thomas Heneage._ - - “How contemptuously we conceive ourself to have been used by you, - you shall by this bearer understand, whom we have expressly sent - unto you to charge you withal. We could never have imagined, had we - not seen it fall out in experience, that a man raised up by ourself - and extraordinarily favoured by us above any other subject of this - land, would have in so contemptible [contemptuous] a sort, broken - our commandment, in a cause that so greatly toucheth us in honour; - whereof although you have showed yourself to make but little - account, in most undutiful a sort, you may not therefore think that - we have so little care of the reparation thereof as we mind to pass - so great a wrong in silence unredressed. And therefore our express - pleasure and command is that, all delays and excuses laid apart, - you do presently, on the duty of your allegiance, obey and fulfil - whatsoever the bearer hereof shall direct you to do in our name. - Whereof fail not, as you will answer the contrary at your uttermost - peril.” - -Nor were these cutting reproaches reserved for his private perusal. She -severely rebuked the States for encouraging “a creature of her own” to -disobey her injunctions, and, as a reparation from them and from him, -she required that he should make a public resignation of the government -in the place where he had accepted it. - -It is not to be wondered at that Elizabeth should think the vindication -of her outraged authority to be the most pressing requirement of the -moment. But the result was unfortunate for the object of the expedition. -The States had conferred “absolute” authority upon Leicester, and would -have thought it a cheap price to pay if, by their adroit manœuvre, -they had succeeded in forcing the Queen’s hand. But they did not care to -entrust absolute powers to a mere general of an English contingent. -After long discussion, Elizabeth was at length persuaded that the least -of evils was to allow him to retain the title which the States had -conferred on him (June 1586). But in the meantime they had repented of -their haste in letting power go out of their own hands. Their efforts -were thenceforth directed to explain away the term “absolute.” The long -displeasure of the Queen had destroyed the principal value of Leicester -in their eyes. He himself had soon incurred their dislike. Impetuous and -domineering, he could not endure opposition. Every man who did not fall -in with his plans was a malicious enemy, a traitor, a tool of Parma, who -ought to be hanged. He still enjoyed the favour of the democratic and -bigoted Calvinist party, especially in Utrecht, and he tried to play -them off against the States, thereby promoting the rise of the factions -which long afterwards distracted the United Provinces. The displeasure -of the Queen had taken the shape of not sending him money, and his -troops were in great distress and unable to move. Moreover, rumours of -the secret peace negotiations were craftily spread by Parma, who, -knowing well that they would come to nothing, turned them to the best -account by leading the States to suspect that they were being betrayed -to Spain. - -Elizabeth had sent her army abroad more as a warning to Philip than with -a view to active operations. It was no part of her plan to recover any -of the territory already conquered by Parma, even if it had lain in her -power. She knew that the majority of its inhabitants were Catholics and -royalists. She knew also that Parma’s attenuated army was considerably -outnumbered by the Anglo-Dutch forces, and that he was in dire distress -for food and money. The recovered provinces were completely ruined by -the war. Their commerce was swept from the sea. The mouths of their -great rivers were blockaded. The Protestants of Flanders and Brabant had -largely migrated to the unsubdued provinces, whose prosperity, -notwithstanding the burdens of war, was advancing by leaps and bounds. -Their population was about two millions. That of England itself was -little more than four. Religion was no longer the only or the chief -motive of their resistance. For even the Catholics among them, who were -still very numerous--some said a majority--keenly relished the material -prosperity which had grown with independence. Encouraged by English -protection, the States were in no humour to listen to compromise. But a -compromise was what Elizabeth desired. She was therefore not unwilling -that her forces should be confined to an attitude of observation, till -it should appear whether her open intervention would extract from -Philip such concessions as she deemed reasonable. - -Leicester was eager to get to work, and he was warmly supported by -Walsingham. Burghley’s conduct was less straightforward. He had long -found it advisable to cultivate amicable relations with the favourite. -He had probably concurred in the plan for making him Governor-General. -Even now he was professing to take his part. In reality he was not sorry -to see him under a cloud; and though he sympathised as much as ever with -the Dutch, he cared more for crippling his rival. Hence his activity in -those obscure peace negotiations which he so carefully concealed from -Leicester and Walsingham. To keep Walsingham long in the dark, on that -or any other subject, was indeed impossible. It was found necessary at -last to let him be present at an interview with the agents employed by -Burghley and Parma, which brought their back-stairs diplomacy to an -abrupt conclusion. “They that have been the employers of them,” he wrote -to Leicester, “are ashamed of the matter.” The negotiations went on -through other channels, but never made any serious progress. - -To compel Philip to listen to a compromise, without at the same time -emboldening the Dutch to turn a deaf ear to it--such was the problem -which Elizabeth had set herself. She therefore preferred to apply -pressure in other quarters. Towards the end of 1585, Drake appeared on -the coast of Spain itself, and plundered Vigo. Then crossing the -Atlantic, he sacked and burned St. Domingo and Carthagena. Again in -1587, he forced his way into Cadiz harbour, burnt all the shipping and -the stores collected for the Armada, and for two months plundered and -destroyed every vessel he met off the coast of Portugal. - -Philip had so long and so tamely submitted to the many injuries and -indignities which Elizabeth heaped upon him, that it is not wonderful if -she had come to think that he would never pluck up courage to retaliate. -This time she was wrong. The conquest of England had always had its -place in his overloaded programme. But it was to be in that hazy -ever-receding future, when he should have put down the Dutch rebellion -and neutralised France. Elizabeth’s open intervention in the Netherlands -at length induced him to change his plan. England, he now decided, must -be first dealt with. - -In the meantime, Parma’s operations in the Netherlands were starved -quite as much as Leicester’s. Plundering excursions, two or three petty -combats not deserving the name of battles, half-a-dozen small towns -captured on one side or the other--such is the military record from the -date of Elizabeth’s intervention to the arrival of the Armada. Parma had -somewhat the best of this work, such as it was. But the war in the -Netherlands was practically stagnant. - -At the end of the first year of Leicester’s government, events of the -highest importance obliged him to pay a visit to England (Nov. 1586). -The Queen of Scots had been found guilty of conspiring to assassinate -Elizabeth, and Parliament had been summoned to decide upon her fate. - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -EXECUTION OF THE QUEEN OF SCOTS: 1584-1587 - - -Throgmorton’s plot--of which the Queen of Scots was undoubtedly -cognisant, though it was not pressed against her--brought home to every -one the danger in which Elizabeth stood (1584). To the Catholic -conspiracy, the temptation to take her life was enormous. It was -becoming clear that, while she lived, the much talked of insurrection -would never come off. The large majority of Catholics would have nothing -to do with it--still less with foreign invasion. They would obey their -lawful sovereign. But if once Elizabeth were dead, by whatever means, -their lawful sovereign would be Mary. The rebels would be the -Protestants, if they should try to place any one else on the throne. The -Protestants had no organisation. They had no candidate for the crown -ready. It was to be feared that no great noble would step forward to -lead them. Burghley himself, though longing as much as ever for Mary’s -head, had with a prudent eye to all eventualities, contrived some time -before to persuade her that he was her well-wisher. Houses of Commons, -it is true, had shown themselves strongly and increasingly Protestant. -But with the demise of the crown, Parliament, if in being at the time, -would be _ipso facto_ dissolved. The Privy Council, in like manner, -would cease to have any legal existence. Burghley, Walsingham, and the -other new men of whom it was mostly composed, had no power or weight, -except as instruments of the sovereign. Her death would leave them -helpless. The country would take its direction not from them, but from -the great nobles of large ancestral possessions. Nor could they provide -for such an emergency by privately selecting a Protestant successor -beforehand, and privately organising their partisans. It would have been -as much as their lives were worth if their mistress had caught them -doing anything of the kind. - -In this dilemma an ingenious plan suggested itself to them. They drew up -a “Bond of Association,” by which the subscribers engaged that, if the -Queen were murdered, they would never accept as successor any one “by -whom _or for whom_” such act should be committed, but would “prosecute -such person to death.” - -This was a hypothetical way of excluding Mary and organising a -Protestant resistance to which Elizabeth could make no objection. But -the ministers knew that, as a merely voluntary association without -Parliamentary sanction, it would add little strength or confidence to -the Protestant party. It would not even test their numbers; for no -Marian ventured to refuse the oath. Mary herself desired to be allowed -to take it. The bond was therefore converted into a Statute by -Parliament, though not without some important alterations (March 1585). -It was enacted that if the realm was invaded, or a rebellion instigated, -by _or for_ any one pretending a title to the succession, or if the -Queen’s murder was plotted by any one, or with the privity of any one -that pretended title, such pretender, _after examination and judgment_ -by an extraordinary commission to be nominated by the Queen, and -consisting of at least twenty-four privy councillors and lords of -Parliament assisted by the chief judges, should be excluded from the -succession, and that, on proclamation of the sentence and direction by -the Queen, all subjects might and should pursue the offender to death. -If the Queen were murdered, the lords of the Council at the time of her -death, or the majority of them, should join to themselves at least -twelve other lords of Parliament not making title to the crown, and the -chief judges; and if, after examination, they should come to the -above-mentioned conclusion, they should without delay, by all forcible -and possible means, prosecute the guilty persons to death, and should -have power to raise and use such forces as should in that behalf be -needful and convenient; and no subjects should be liable to punishment -for anything done according to the tenor of the Statute. - -Here, then, was a legal way provided by which the Protestant ministers -might act against Mary if Elizabeth were murdered. They were in fact -creating a Provisional Government, with power to exclude Mary from the -throne. Whether they would have the courage or strength to do so -remained to be seen; but they would at least have formal law on their -side. - -It had never entered into Mary’s plans to wait for Elizabeth’s natural -death. She therefore read the new Act as a sentence of exclusion. -Another blow soon fell on her. In 1584, elated by her son’s victory -over the raiders of Ruthven, and believing that he was willing to -recognise her joint sovereignty and co-operate with a Guise invasion, -she had scornfully refused the last overtures that Elizabeth ever made -to her. She now learnt that he had never intended to accept association -with her, and that he had urged Elizabeth not to release her. In the -following year he had accepted an annual pension of £4000 with some -grumbling at its amount; and a defensive alliance was at length -concluded between the two countries, Mary’s name not being mentioned in -the treaty (July 1586). - -As the prospects of the Scottish Queen became darker both in England and -her own country, she grew more desperate and reckless. Early in 1586, -Walsingham contrived a way of regularly inspecting all her most secret -correspondence. He soon discovered that she was encouraging Babington’s -plot for assassinating Elizabeth. Some of the conspirators, though -avowed Catholics, had offices in the royal household; such was -Elizabeth’s easy-going confidence. It was hoped that Parma would at the -moment of the murder land troops on the east coast. Mendoza, now Spanish -ambassador in Paris, warmly encouraged the project. - -The Scottish Queen was now in the case contemplated by the Statute of -the previous year. But it required all the urgency of the Council to -prevail with Elizabeth to have her brought to trial. Elizabeth’s whole -conduct shows that she would even now have preferred to deal with her -rival as she did in the inquiry into the Darnley murder. She would have -been content to discredit her, to expose her guilt, and, if possible, to -bring her to her knees confessing her crimes and pleading for mercy. But -Mary was not of the temper to confess. Humiliation and effacement were -to her worse than death. She chose to brazen it out with a well-grounded -confidence that, as long as she asserted her innocence, people would -always be found to believe in it, let the evidence be what it would. -Besides, long impunity had convinced her that Elizabeth did not dare to -take her life. - -There was nothing for it, therefore, but to bring her to trial. A -Special Commission was nominated under the provisions of the Statute of -1585, consisting of forty-five persons--peers, privy councillors, and -judges--who proceeded to Fotheringay Castle, whither Mary had been -removed.[6] She at first refused their jurisdiction; but on being -informed that they would proceed in her absence, she appeared before -them under protest (October 14, 1586). After sitting at Fotheringay for -two days, the Court adjourned to Westminster, where it pronounced her -guilty (October 25).[7] A declaration was added that her -disqualification for the succession, which followed by the Statute, did -not affect any rights that her son might possess. The verdict was -immediately known; but its proclamation was deferred till Parliament -could be consulted. - -A general election had been held while the trial was going on, and -Parliament met four days after its conclusion (October 29). The whole -evidence was gone into afresh. Not a word seems to have been said in -Mary’s favour; and an address was presented to the Queen praying for -execution. If precedents were wanted for the capital punishment of an -anointed sovereign, there were the cases of Agag, Jezebel, Athaliah, -Deiotarus, king of Galatia, put to death by Julius Cæsar, Rhescuporis, -king of Thrace, by Tiberius, and Conradin by Charles of Anjou. In vain -did Elizabeth request them to reconsider their vote, and devise some -other expedient. Usually so deferential to her suggestions, they -reiterated their declaration that “the Queen’s safety could no way be -secured as long as the Queen of Scots lived.” - -Elizabeth’s hesitation has been generally set down to hypocrisy. It has -been taken for granted that she desired Mary’s death, and was glad to -have it pressed upon her by her subjects. I believe that her reluctance -was most genuine. If not of generous disposition, neither was she -revengeful or cruel. She had no animosity against her enemies. She -lacked gall. She was never in any hurry to punish the disaffected, or -even to weed them out of her service. She rather prided herself on -employing them even about her person. Since her accession only two -English peers had been put to death, though several had richly deserved -it. She could affirm with perfect truth that, for the last fifteen -years, she, and she alone, had stood between Mary and the scaffold, and -this at great and increasing risk to her own life. There had, perhaps, -been a time when to destroy the prospect of a Catholic succession would -have driven the Catholics into rebellion. But that time had long gone -by, as every one knew. Elizabeth had only two dangers now to fear, -invasion and assassination, the latter being the most threatening. There -would be little inducement to attempt it if Mary were not alive to -profit by it. Yet Elizabeth hesitated. The explanation of her reluctance -is very simple. She flinched from the obloquy, the undeserved obloquy, -which she saw was in store for her. Careless to an extraordinary degree -about her personal danger, she would have preferred, as far as she was -herself concerned, to let Mary live. It was her ministers and the -Protestant party who, for their own interest, were forcing her to shed -her cousin’s blood; and it seemed to her unfair that the undivided odium -should fall, as she foresaw it would fall, on her alone. - -The suspense continued through December and January. In the meantime it -became abundantly clear that no foreign court would interfere actively -to save Mary’s life. While she had been growing old in captivity, new -interests had sprung up, fresh schemes had been formed in which she had -no place. She stood in the way of half-a-dozen ambitions. Everybody was -weary of her and her wrongs and her pretensions. The Pope had felt less -interest of late in a princess whose rights, if established, would pass -to a Protestant heir. Philip could not intercede for her even if he had -desired to save her life. He was already at war with England, and, if -she had known it, not with any intention of supporting her claims.[8] -James by his recent treaty with England had tacitly treated his mother -as an enemy. Her scheme for kidnapping and disinheriting him, found -among her papers at Chartley, had been promptly communicated to him. -Decency required that he should make a show of remonstrance and menace. -But he had every reason to desire her death, and his only thought was to -use the opportunity for extorting from Elizabeth a recognition of his -title to the English crown and an increase of his pension. He sent the -Master of Gray to drive this bargain. The very choice of his envoy, the -man who had persuaded him to break with his mother, showed Elizabeth how -the land lay, and she did not think it worth her while to bribe him in -either way. The Marian nobles blustered and called for war. Not one of -them wanted to see Mary back in Scotland or cared what became of her; -but they had got an idea that Philip would pay them for a plundering -raid into England, and the doubly lucrative prospect was irresistible. -James, however, though pretending resentment and really sulky at his -rebuff, knew his own interests too well to quarrel with England. What -the action of the French King was is less certain. Openly he -remonstrated with considerable vigour and persistence; not entering into -the question of Mary’s guilt, but protesting against the punishment of a -Queen and a member of his family. Probably his efforts, so far as they -went, were sincere, for he instructed his ambassador to bribe the -English ministers if possible to save her life. But it was evident that, -however offended Henry III. might be by the execution of his -sister-in-law, he would not be provoked into playing the game of Spain. - -A warrant for the execution had been drawn soon after the adjournment of -Parliament, and all through December and January Elizabeth’s ministers -kept urging her to sign it. At length, when the Scotch and French -ambassadors were gone, and with them the last excuse for delay, she -signed it in the presence of Davison (who had lately been made -co-secretary with Walsingham), and directed him to have it sealed -(February 1). What else passed between them on that occasion must always -remain uncertain, because Davison’s four written statements, and his -answers at his trial, differ in important particulars not only from the -Queen’s account but from one another. So much, however, will to most -persons who examine the evidence be very clear. Elizabeth meant the -execution to take place. There is no reason to doubt Davison’s statement -that she “forbade him to trouble her any further, or let her hear any -more thereof till it was done, seeing that for her part she had now -performed all that either in law or reason could be required of her.” -But signing the warrant, as both of them knew, was not enough. The -formal delivery of it to some person, with direction to carry it out, -was the final step necessary. This, by Davison’s own admission, the -Queen managed to evade. He saw that she wished to thrust the -responsibility upon him and Walsingham, and he suspected that she meant -to disavow them. Although, therefore, she had enjoined strict secrecy, -he laid the matter before Hatton and Burghley. - -Burghley assembled in his own room the Earls of Derby and Leicester, -Lords Howard of Effingham, Hunsdon, and Cobham, Knollys, Hatton, -Walsingham, and Davison (February 3). These ten were probably the only -privy councillors then at Greenwich.[9] He laid before them Davison’s -statement of what had passed between the Queen and himself at both -interviews. He said that she had done as much as could be expected of -her; that she evidently wished her ministers to take whatever -responsibility remained upon themselves without informing her; and that -they ought to do so. His proposal was agreed to. A letter was written to -the Earls of Kent and Shrewsbury instructing them to carry out the -execution. This letter all the ten signed, and it was at once despatched -along with the warrant. They quite understood that Elizabeth would -disavow them. They saw that she wished to have a pretext for saying that -Mary had been put to death without her knowledge, and before she had -finally made up her mind. They were willing to furnish her with this -pretext. Of course there would be more or less of a storm to keep up the -make-believe. But ten privy councillors acting together could not well -be punished. - -On Thursday (February 9) the news of the execution arrived. Elizabeth -now learnt for the first time that the responsibility which she had -intended to fix on the two secretaries, one a nobody and the other no -favourite, had been shared by eight others of the Council, including -all its most important members. Storm at them she might and did, and all -the more furiously because they had combined for self-protection. But to -punish the whole ten was out of the question. Yet if no one were -punished, with what face could she tender her improbable explanation to -foreign courts? The unlucky Davison was singled out. He could be charged -with divulging what he had been ordered to keep secret and misleading -the others. He was tried before a Special Commission, fined 10,000 -marks, and imprisoned for some time in the Tower. The fine was rigidly -exacted, and it reduced him to poverty. Burghley, whose tool he had been -almost as much as Elizabeth’s, took pains to make his disgrace -permanent, because he wanted the secretaryship for his son, Robert -Cecil. - -The strange thing is, that Elizabeth not only expected her transparent -falsehoods to be formally accepted as satisfactory, but hoped that they -would be really believed. Her letter to James was an insult to his -understanding. “I would you knew (though not felt) the extreme dolour -that overwhelms my mind, for that miserable accident which (far contrary -to my meaning) hath befallen.... I beseech you that as God and many more -know how innocent I am in this case, so you will believe me that if I -had bid [bidden] ought I would have bid [abided] by it.... Thus assuring -yourself of me that as I know this [the execution] was deserved, yet if -I had meant it I would never lay it on others’ shoulders, no more will I -not damnify myself that thought it not.” - -Little as James cared what became of his mother, it was impossible that -he should not feel humiliated when he was expected to swallow such a -pill as this--and ungilded too. He had no intention of going to war with -the country of which he might now at any moment become the legitimate -King. But to let Elizabeth see that unless he was paid he could be -disagreeable, he winked at raids across the border and coquetted with -the faction who were inviting Philip to send a Spanish army to Scotland. -It was but a passing display of temper. The end of the year (1587) saw -him again drawing close to Elizabeth, and she was able to give her -undivided attention to the coming Armada. - -It cannot be seriously maintained that because Mary was not an English -subject she could not be lawfully tried and punished for crimes -committed in England. Those, if any there now be, who adopt her own -contention that, being an anointed Queen, she was not amenable to any -earthly tribunal, but to God alone, are beyond the reach of earthly -argument. The English government had a right to detain her as a -dangerous public enemy. She, on the other hand, had a right to resist -such restraint if she could, and she might have carried conspiracy very -far without incurring our blame. But for good reasons we draw a line at -conspiracy to murder. No government ever did or will let it pass -unpunished. If Napoleon at St. Helena had engaged in conspiracies for -seizing the island, no one could have blamed him, even though they might -have involved bloodshed. But if he had been convicted of plotting the -assassination of Sir Hudson Lowe, he would assuredly have been hanged. - -That the execution was a wise and opportune stroke of policy can hardly -be disputed. It broke up the Catholic party in England at the moment -when their disaffection was about to be tempted by the appearance of the -Armada. There had been a time when they had hopes of James. But he was -now known to be a stiff Protestant. Only the small Jesuitical faction -was prepared to accept Philip either as an heir of John of Gaunt or as -Mary’s legatee. There was no other Catholic with a shadow of a claim. -The bulk of the party therefore ceased to look forward to a restoration -of the old religion, and rallied to the cause of national independence. - - * * * * * - - _NOTE ON PAULET’S ALLEGED REFUSAL TO MURDER MARY._ - - - I have not alluded in the text to the story, generally repeated by - historians, that Elizabeth urged Paulet and Drury to murder Mary - privately. There is no doubt that, after the signature of the - warrant, Walsingham and Davison, by Elizabeth’s direction, urged - Paulet and Drury to put Mary to death, and that they refused. But - was it a private murder that was meant or a public execution - without delivery of the warrant? There is nothing in any of - Davison’s statements inconsistent with the latter and far more - probable explanation. The blacker charge is founded solely on the - two letters which are generally accepted as being those which - passed between the secretaries and Paulet, but which may be - confidently set down as impudent forgeries. They were first given - to the world in 1722 by Dr. George Mackenzie, a violent Marian, who - says that _a copy_ of them was sent him by Mr. Urry of Christ - Church, Oxford, and that they had been found among Paulet’s papers. - Two years later they were printed by Hearne, an Oxford Jacobite and - Nonjuror, who says he got them from _a copy_ furnished him by a - friend unnamed (Urry?), who told him he had _copied_ them in 1717 - from a MS. letter-book of Paulet’s. There is also a MS. _copy_ in - the Harleian collection, which contains erasures and - emendations--an extraordinary thing in a copy. It is said to be in - the handwriting of the Earl of Oxford himself. There is nothing to - show whence he copied it. - - No one has ever seen the originals of these letters. Neither has - any one, except Hearne’s unnamed friend, seen the “letter-book” - into which Paulet is supposed to have copied them. Where had this - “letter-book” been before 1717? Where was it in 1717? What became - of it after 1717? To none of these questions is there any answer. - The most rational conclusion is that the “letter-book” never - existed, and that the letters were fabricated in the reign of - George I. by some Oxford Jacobite, who thought it easier and more - prudent to circulate _copies_ than to attempt an imitation of - Paulet’s well-known handwriting, with all the other difficulties - involved in forging a manuscript. - - But it may be said, Do not the letters fit in with Davison’s - narrative? Of course they do. It was for the very purpose of - putting an odious meaning on that narrative that they were - fabricated. It was known that letters about putting Mary to death - had passed. The real letters had never been seen, and had doubtless - been destroyed. Here therefore was a fine opportunity for - manufacturing spurious ones. - - - - -CHAPTER X - -WAR WITH SPAIN: 1587-1603 - - -Elizabeth is not seen at her best in war. She did not easily resign -herself to its sacrifices. It frightened her to see the money which she -had painfully put together, pound by pound, during so many years, by -many a small economy, draining out at the rate of £17,000 a month into -the bottomless pit of military expenditure. When Leicester came back she -simply stopped all remittances to the Netherlands, making sure that if -she did not feed her soldiers some one else would have to do it. She saw -that Parma was not pressing forward. And though rumours of the enormous -preparations in Spain, which accounted for his inactivity, continued to -pour in, she still hoped that her intervention in the Netherlands was -bending Philip to concessions. All this time Parma was steadily carrying -out his master’s plans for the invasion. His little army was to be -trebled in the autumn by reinforcements principally from Italy. In the -meantime he was collecting a flotilla of flat-bottomed boats. As soon as -the Armada should appear they were to make the passage under its -protection. - -It would answer no useful purpose, even if my limits permitted it, to -enter into the particulars of Elizabeth’s policy towards the United -Provinces during the twelve months that preceded the appearance of the -Armada. Her proceedings were often tortuous, and by setting them forth -in minute detail her detractors have not found it difficult to represent -them as treacherous. But, living three centuries later, what have we to -consider but the general scope and drift of her policy? Looking at it as -a whole we shall find that, whether we approve of it or not, it was -simple, consistent, and undisguised. She had no intention of abandoning -the Provinces to Philip, still less of betraying them. But she did wish -them to return to their allegiance, if she could procure for them proper -guarantees for such liberties as they had been satisfied with before -Philip’s tyranny began. If Philip had been wise he would have made those -concessions. Elizabeth is not to be over-much blamed if she clung too -long to the belief that he could be persuaded or compelled to do what -was so much for his own interest. If she was deceived so was Burghley. -Walsingham is entitled to the credit of having from first to last -refused to believe that the negotiations were anything but a blind. - -Though Elizabeth desired peace, she did not cease to deal blows at -Philip. In the spring of 1587 (April-June), while she was most earnestly -pushing her negotiations with Parma, she despatched Drake on a new -expedition to the Spanish coast. He forced his way into the harbours of -Cadiz and Corunna, destroyed many ships and immense stores, and came -back loaded with plunder. The Armada had not been crippled, for most of -the ships that were to compose it were lying in the Tagus. But the -concentration had been delayed. Fresh stores had to be collected. Drake -calculated, and as it proved rightly, that another season at least would -be consumed in repairing the loss, and that England, for that summer and -autumn, could rest secure of invasion. - -The delay was most unwelcome to Philip. The expense of keeping such a -fleet and army on foot through the winter would be enormous. Spain was -maintaining not only the Armada but the army of Parma; for the resources -of the Netherlands, which had been the true El Dorado of the Spanish -monarchy, were completely dried up. So impatient was Philip--usually the -slowest of men--that he proposed to despatch the Armada even in -September, and actually wrote to Parma that he might expect it at any -moment. But, as Drake had calculated, September was gone before -everything was ready. The naval experts protested against the rashness -of facing the autumnal gales, with no friendly harbour on either side of -the Channel in which to take refuge. Philip then made the absurd -suggestion that the army from the Netherlands should cross by itself in -its flat-bottomed boats. But Parma told him that it was absolutely out -of the question. Four English ships could sink the whole flotilla. In -the meantime his soldiers, waiting on the Dunkirk Downs and exposed to -the severities of the weather, were dying off like flies. Philip and -Elizabeth resembled one another in this, that neither of them had any -personal experience of war either by land or sea. For a Queen this was -natural. For a King it was unnatural, and for an ambitious King -unprecedented. They did not understand the proper adaptation of means -to ends. Yet it was necessary to obtain their sanction before anything -could be done. Hence there was much mismanagement on both sides. Still -England was in no real danger during the summer and autumn of 1587, -because Philip’s preparations were not completed; and before the end of -the year the English fleet was lying in the Channel. But the Queen -grudged the expense of keeping the crews up to their full complement. -The supply of provisions and ammunition was also very inadequate. The -expensiveness of war is generally a sufficient reason for not going to -war; but to attempt to do war cheaply is always unwise. “Sparing and -war,” as Effingham observed, “have no affinity together.” - -Drake strongly urged that, instead of trying to guard the Channel, the -English fleet should make for the coast of Spain, and boldly assail the -Armada as soon as it put to sea. This was the advice of a man who had -all the shining qualities of Nelson, and seems to have been in no -respect his inferior. It was no counsel of desperation. He was confident -of success. Lord Howard of Effingham, the Admiral, was of the same -opinion. The negotiations were odious to him. For Burghley, who clings -to them, he has no more reverence than Hamlet had for Polonius. “Since -England was England,” he writes to Walsingham, “there was never such a -stratagem and mask to deceive her as this treaty of peace. I pray God -that we do not curse for this a long grey beard with a white head -witless, that will make all the world think us heartless. You know whom -I mean.” - -With the hopes and fears of these sea-heroes, it is instructive to -compare the forecast of the great soldier who was to conduct the -invasion. Always obedient and devoted to his sovereign, Parma played his -part in the deceptive negotiations with consummate skill. But his own -opinion was that it would be wise to negotiate in good faith and accept -the English terms. Though prepared to undertake the invasion, he took a -very serious view of the risks to be encountered. He tells Philip that -the English preparations are formidable both by land and sea. Even if -the passage should be safely accomplished, disembarkation would be -difficult. His army, reduced by the hardships of the winter from 30,000 -men, which he had estimated as the proper number, to less than 17,000, -was dangerously small for the work expected of it. He would have to -fight battle after battle, and the further he advanced the weaker would -his army become both from losses and from the necessity of protecting -his communications. - -Parma had carefully informed himself of the preparations in England. -From the beginning of Elizabeth’s reign, attention had been paid to the -organisation, training, and equipment of the militia, and especially -since the relations with Spain had become more hostile. On paper it -seems to have amounted to 117,000 men. Mobilisation was a local -business. Sir John Norris drew up the plan of defence. Beacon fires did -the work of the telegraph. Every man knew whither he was to repair when -their blaze should be seen. The districts to be abandoned, the positions -to be defended, the bridges to be broken, were all marked out. Three -armies, calculated to amount in the aggregate to 73,000 men, were -ordered to assemble in July. Whether so many were actually mustered is -doubtful. But Parma would certainly have found himself confronted by -forces vastly superior in numbers to his own, and would have had, as he -said, to fight battle after battle. The bow had not been entirely -abandoned, but the greater part of the archers--two-thirds in some -counties--had lately been armed with calivers. What was wanting in -discipline would have been to some extent made up by the spontaneous -cohesion of a force organised under its natural leaders, the nobles and -gentry of each locality, not a few of whom had seen service abroad. But, -after all, the greatest element of strength was the free spirit of the -people. England was, and had long been, a nation of freemen. There were -a few peers, and a great many knights and gentlemen. But there was no -noble caste, as on the Continent, separated by an impassable barrier of -birth and privilege from the mass of the people. All felt themselves -fellow-countrymen bound together by common sentiments, common interests, -and mutual respect. - -This spirit of freedom--one might almost say of equality--made itself -felt still more in the navy, and goes far to account for the cheerful -energy and dash with which every service was performed. “The English -officers lived on terms of sympathy with their men unknown to the -Spaniards, who raised between the commander and the commanded absurd -barriers of rank and blood which forbade to his pride any labour but -that of fighting. Drake touched the true mainspring of English success -when he once (in his voyage round the world) indignantly rebuked some -coxcomb gentlemen-adventurers with, ‘I should like to see the gentleman -that will refuse to set his hand to a rope. I must have the gentlemen to -hale and draw with the mariners.’”[10] Drake, Hawkins, Frobisher were -all born of humble parents. They rose by their own valour and capacity. -They had gentlemen of birth serving under them. To Howard and Cumberland -and Seymour they were brothers-in-arms. The master of every little -trading vessel was fired by their example, and hoped to climb as high. - -It is the pleasure of some writers to speak of Elizabeth’s naval -preparations as disgracefully insufficient, and to treat the triumphant -result as a sort of miracle. To their apprehension, indeed, her whole -reign is one long interference by Providence with the ordinary relations -of cause and effect. The number of royal ships as compared with those of -private owners in the fleet which met the great Armada--34 to 161--is -represented as discreditably small. By Englishmen of that day, it was -considered to be creditably large. Sir Edward Coke (who was thirty-eight -at the time of the Armada), writing under Charles I., when the royal -navy was much larger, says: “In the reign of Queen Elizabeth (I being -then acquainted with this business) there were thirty-three [royal -ships] besides pinnaces, which so guarded and regarded the navigation of -the merchants, as they had safe vent for their commodities, and trade -and traffic flourished.”[11] - -It seems to be overlooked that the royal navy, such as it was, was -almost the creation of Elizabeth. Her father was the first English king -who made any attempt to keep a standing navy of his own. He established -the Admiralty and the first royal dockyard. Under Edward and Mary the -navy, like everything else, went to ruin. Elizabeth’s ship-building, -humble as it seems to us, excited the admiration of her subjects, and -was regarded as one of the chief advances of her reign. The ships, when -not in commission, were kept in the Medway. The Queen personally paid -the greatest attention to them. They were always kept in excellent -condition, and could be fitted out for sea at very short notice. Economy -was enforced in this, as in other departments, but not at the expense of -efficiency. The wages of officers and men were very much augmented; but -in the short periods for which crews were enlisted, and in the -victualling, there seems to have been unwise parsimony in 1588. The -grumbling of alarmists about unpreparedness, apathy, stinginess, and -red-tape was precisely what it is in our own day. We know that some -allowance is to be made for it. - -The movements of the Armada were perfectly well known in England, and -all the dispositions to meet it at sea were completed in a leisurely -manner. Conferences were still going on at Ostend between English and -Spanish commissioners. On the part of Elizabeth there was sincerity, but -not blind credulity nor any disposition to make unworthy concessions. -Conferences quite as protracted have often been held between -belligerents while hostilities were being actively carried on. The large -majority of Englishmen were resolved to fight to the death against any -invader. But, as against Spain, there was not that eager pugnacity which -a war with France always called forth, except, perhaps, among the -sea-rovers; and even they would have contented themselves, if it had -been possible, with the unrecognised privateering which had so long -given them the profits of war with the immunities of peace. The rest of -the nation respected their Queen for her persevering endeavour to find a -way of reconciliation with an ancient ally, and to limit, in the -meantime, the area of hostilities. They were confident, and with good -reason, that she would surrender no important interest, and that -aggressive designs would be met, as they had always been met, more than -half-way. - -The story of the great victory is too well known to need repetition -here. But some comments are necessary. It is usual, for one reason or -other, to exaggerate the disparity of the opposing fleets, and to -represent England as only saved from impending ruin by the extraordinary -daring of her seamen, and a series of fortunate accidents. The final -destruction of the Armada, after the pursuit was over, was certainly the -work of wind and sea. But if we fairly weigh the available strength on -each side, we shall see that the English commanders might from the first -feel, as they did feel, a reasonable assurance of defeating the -invaders. - -Let us first compare the strength of the fleets: - - ENGLISH. _Ships._ _Tonnage._ _Guns._ _Mariners._ - - Royal 34 11850 837 6279 - Private 163 17894 not stated 9506 - ---- ------ === ------ - 197 29744 15785 - ==== ====== ====== - - SPANISH. 132 59120 3165 8766 - -The Armada carried besides 21,855 soldiers.[12] The first thing that -strikes us is the immense preponderance in tonnage on the part of the -Spaniards, and in sailors on the part of the English. This really goes -far to explain the result. Nothing is more certain than that the Spanish -ships, notwithstanding their superior size, were for fighting and -sailing purposes very inferior to the English. It had always been -believed that, to withstand the heavy seas of the Atlantic, a ship -should be constructed like a lofty fortress. The English builders were -introducing lower and longer hulls and a greater spread of canvas. Their -crews, as has always been the case in our navy, were equally handy as -sailors and gunners. The Spanish ships were under-manned. The soldiers -were not accustomed to work the guns, and were of no use unless it came -to boarding, which Howard ordered his captains to avoid. The English -guns, if fewer than the Spanish, were heavier and worked by more -practised men.[13] Their balls not only cut up the rigging of the -Spaniards but tore their hulls (which were supposed to be cannon-proof), -while the English ships were hardly touched. The slaughter among the -wretched soldiers crowded between decks was terrible. Blood was seen -pouring out of the lee-scuppers. “The English ships,” says a Spanish -officer, “were under such good management that they did with them what -they pleased.” The work was done almost entirely by the Queen’s ships. -“If you had seen,” says Sir William Winter, “the simple service done by -the merchants and coast ships, you would have said we had been little -helped by them, otherwise than that they did make a show.” - -The principal and final battle was fought off Gravelines (July 29/Aug. -8). The Armada therefore did arrive at its destination, but only to show -that the general plan of the invasion was an impracticable one. The -superiority in tonnage and number of guns on the morning of that day, -though not what it had been when the fighting began a week before, was -still immense, if superiority in those particulars had been of any use. -But with this battle the plan of Philip was finally shattered. So far -from being in a condition to cover Parma’s passage, the Spanish admiral -was glad to escape as best he could from the English pursuit. - -During the eight days’ fight, be it observed, the Armada had experienced -no unfavourable weather or other stroke of ill-fortune. The wind had -been mostly in the west, and not tempestuous. After the last battle, -when the crippled Spanish ships were drifting upon the Dutch shoals, it -opportunely shifted, and enabled them to escape into the North Sea. - -It would not be easy to find any great naval engagement in which the -victors suffered so little. In the last battle, when they came to close -quarters, they had about sixty killed. During the first seven days their -loss seems to have been almost _nil_. One vessel only--not belonging to -the Queen--became entangled among the enemy, and succumbed. Except the -master of this vessel not one of the captains was killed from first to -last. Many men of rank were serving in the fleet. It is not mentioned -that one of them was so much as wounded. - -Looking at all these facts, we can surely come to only one conclusion. -Philip’s plan was hopeless from the first. Barring accidents, the -English were bound to win. On no other occasion in our history was our -country so well prepared to meet her enemies. Never was her safety from -invasion so amply guaranteed. The defeat of the Great Armada was the -deserved and crowning triumph of thirty years of good government at home -and wise policy abroad; of careful provision for defence and sober -abstinence from adventure and aggression. - -Of the land preparations it is impossible to speak with equal -confidence, as they were never put to the test. If the Spaniards had -landed, Leicester’s militia would no doubt have experienced a bloody -defeat. London might have been taken and plundered. But Parma himself -never expected to become master of the country without the aid of a -great Catholic rising. This, we may affirm with confidence, would not -have taken place on even the smallest scale. Overwhelming forces would -soon have gathered round the Spaniards. They would probably have retired -to the coast, and there fortified some place from which it would have -been difficult to dislodge them as long as they retained the command of -the sea. - -Such seems to have been the utmost success which, in the most favourable -event, could have attended the invasion. A great disaster, no doubt, for -England, and one for which Elizabeth would have been judged by history -with more severity than justice; for Englishmen have always chosen to -risk it, down to our own time.[14] No government which insisted on -making adequate provision for the military defence of the country would -have been tolerated then, or, to all appearance, would be tolerated now. -We have always trusted to our navy. It were to be wished that our naval -superiority were as assured now as when we defeated the Armada. - -The arrangements for feeding the soldiers and sailors were very -defective. A praiseworthy system of control had been introduced to check -waste and peculation in time of peace. Of course it did not easily adapt -itself to the exigencies of war. Military operations are sure to suffer -where a certain, or rather uncertain, amount of waste and peculation is -not risked. We have not forgotten the “horrible and heart-rending” -sufferings of our army in the Crimea, which, like those of Elizabeth’s -fleet, had to be relieved by private effort. In the sixteenth century -the lot of the soldier and sailor everywhere was want and disease, -varied at intervals by plunder and excess. Philip’s soldiers and sailors -were worse off than Elizabeth’s, though he grudged no money for purposes -of war. - -Those who profess to be scandalised by the appointment of Leicester to -the command of the army should point out what fitter choice could have -been made. He was the only great nobleman with any military experience; -and to suppose that any one but a great nobleman could have been -appointed to such a command is to show a profound ignorance of the ideas -of the time. He had Sir John Norris, a really able soldier, as his -marshal of the camp. After all, no one has alleged that he did not do -his duty with energy and intelligence. The story that the Queen thought -of making him her “Lieutenant in the government of England and Ireland,” -but was dissuaded from it by Burghley and Hatton, rests on no authority -but that of Camden, who is fond of repeating spiteful gossip about -Leicester. No sensible person will believe that she meant to create a -sort of Grand Vizier. She may have thought of making him what we should -call “Commander-in-Chief.” There would be much to say for such a -concentration of authority while the kingdom was threatened with -invasion. The title of “Lieutenant” was a purely military one, and began -to be applied under the Tudors to the commanders of the militia in each -county. Leicester’s title for the time was “Lieutenant and -Captain-General of the Queen’s armies and companies.” But we find him -complaining to Walsingham that the patent of Hunsdon, the commander of -the Midland army, gave him independent powers. “I shall have wrong if he -absolutely command where my patent doth give me power. You may easily -conceive what absurd dealings are likely to fall out if you allow two -absolute commanders” (28 July). Camden’s story is probably a confused -echo of this dispute. - -Writers who are loth to admit that the trust, the gratitude, the -enthusiastic loyalty which Elizabeth inspired were the first and most -important cause of the great victory, have sought to belittle the -grandest moment of her life by pointing out that the famous speech at -Tilbury was made _after_ the battle of Gravelines. But the dispersal of -the Armada by the storm of August 5th was not yet known in England. -Drake, writing on the 8th and 10th, thinks that it is gone to Denmark to -refit, and begs the Queen not to diminish any of her forces. The -occasion of the speech on the 10th seems to have been the arrival of a -post on that day, while the Queen was at dinner in Leicester’s tent, -with a false alarm that Parma had embarked all his forces, and might be -expected in England immediately.[15] - -But the Lieutenant-General had reached the end of his career. Three -weeks after the Tilbury review he died of “a continued fever,” at the -age of fifty-six. He kept Elizabeth’s regard to the last, because she -believed--and during the latter part of his life, not wrongly--in his -fidelity and devotion. There is no sign that she at any time valued his -judgment or suffered him to sway her policy, except so far as he was the -mouthpiece of abler advisers; nor did she ever allow his enmities, -violent as they were, to prejudice her against any of her other -servants. His fortune was no doubt much above his deserts, and he has -paid the usual penalty. There are few personages in history about whom -so much malicious nonsense has been written. - -We cannot help looking on England as placed in a quite new position by -the defeat of the Armada--a position of security and independence. In -truth, what was changed was not so much the relative strength of England -and Spain as the opinion of it held by Englishmen and Spaniards, and -indeed by all Europe. The loss to Philip in mere ships, men, and -treasure was no doubt considerable. But his inability to conquer England -was demonstrated rather than caused by the destruction of the Armada. -Philip himself talked loftily about “placing another fleet upon the -seas.” But his subjects began to see that defence, not conquest, was now -their business--and had been for some time if they had only known it: - - Cervi, luporum præda rapacium, - Sectamur ultro quos opimus - Fallere et effugere est triumphus. - -Elizabeth’s attitude to Philip underwent a marked change. Till then she -had been unwilling to abandon the hope of a peaceful settlement. She had -dealt him not a few stinging blows, but always with a certain restraint -and forbearance, because they were meant for the purpose of bringing him -to reason. Thirty years of patience on his part had led her to believe -that he would never carry retaliation beyond assassination plots. At -last, in his slow way, he had gathered up all his strength and essayed -to crush her. Thenceforward she was a convert to Drake’s doctrine that -attack was the surest way of defence. She had still good reasons for -devolving this work as much as possible on the private enterprise of her -subjects. The burden fell on those who asked nothing better than to be -allowed to bear it. Thus arose that system, or rather practice, of -leaving national work to be executed by private enterprise, which has -had so much to do with the building up of the British Empire. Private -gain has been the mainspring of action. National defence and -aggrandisement have been almost incidental results. With Elizabeth -herself national and private aims could not be dissevered. The nation -and she had but one purse. She was cheaply defending England, and she -shared in the plunder. - -The favourite cruising-ground of the English adventurers was off the -Azores, where the Spanish treasure fleets always halted for fresh water -and provisions, on their way to Europe. Some of these expeditions were -on a large scale. But they were not so successful or profitable, in -proportion to their size, as the smaller ventures of Drake and Hawkins -earlier in the reign. The Spaniards were everywhere on the alert. The -harbours of the New World, which formerly lay in careless security, were -put into a state of defence. Treasure fleets made their voyages with -more caution. “Not a grain of gold, silver, or pearl, but what must be -got through the fire.” The day of great prizes was gone by. - -Two of these expeditions are distinguished by their importance. The -first was a joint-stock venture of Drake and Norris--the foremost sailor -and the foremost soldier among Englishmen of that day--in the year after -the great Armada (April 1589). They and some private backers found most -of the capital. The Queen contributed six royal ships and £20,000. This -fleet carried no less than 11,000 soldiers, for the aim was to wrest -Portugal from the Spaniard and set up Don Antonio, a representative of -the dethroned dynasty. Stopping on their way at Corunna, they took the -lower town, destroyed large stores, and defeated in the field a much -superior force marching to the relief of the place. Norris mined and -breached the walls of the upper town; but the storming parties having -been repulsed with great loss, the army re-embarked and pursued its -voyage. Landing at Peniché, Norris marched fifty miles by Vimiero and -Torres Vedras, names famous afterwards in the military annals of -England, and on the seventh day arrived before Lisbon. But he had no -battering train; for Drake, who had brought the fleet round to the mouth -of the Tagus, judged it dangerous to enter the river. Nor did the -Portuguese rise, as had been hoped. The army therefore, marching through -the suburbs of Lisbon, rejoined the fleet at Cascaes, and proceeded to -Vigo. That town was burnt, and the surrounding country plundered. This -was the last exploit of the expedition. Great loss and dishonour had -been inflicted on Spain; but no less than half of the soldiers and -sailors had perished by disease; and the booty, though said to have been -large, was a disappointment to the survivors. - -The other great expedition was in 1596. The capture of Calais in April -of that year by the Spaniards, had renewed the alarm of invasion, and it -was determined to meet the danger at a distance from home. A great -fleet, with 6000 soldiers on board, commanded by Essex and Howard of -Effingham sailed straight to Cadiz, the principal port and arsenal of -Spain. The harbour was forced by the fleet, the town and castle stormed -by the army, several men-of-war taken or destroyed, a large -merchant-fleet burnt, together with an immense quantity of stores and -merchandise; the total value being estimated at twenty millions of -ducats. This was by far the heaviest blow inflicted by England upon -Spain during the reign, and was so regarded in Europe; for though the -great Armada had been signally defeated by the English fleet, its -subsequent destruction was due to the winds and waves. Essex was -vehemently desirous to hold Cadiz; but Effingham and the Council of War -appointed by the Queen would not hear of it. The expedition accordingly -returned home, having effectually relieved England from the fear of -invasion. The burning of Penzance by four Spanish galleys (1595) was not -much to set against these great successes. - -One reason for the comparative impunity with which the English assailed -the unwieldy empire of Philip was the insane pursuit of the French -crown, to which he devoted all his resources after the murder of Henry -III. In 1598, with one foot in the grave, and no longer able to conceal -from himself that, with the exception of the conquest of Portugal, all -the ambitious schemes of his life had failed, he was fain to conclude -the peace of Vervins with Henry IV. Henry was ready to insist that -England and the United Provinces should be comprehended in the treaty. -Philip offered terms which Elizabeth would have welcomed ten years -earlier. He proposed that the whole of the Low Countries should be -constituted a separate sovereignty under his son-in-law the Archduke -Albert. The Dutch, who were prospering in war as well as in trade, -scouted the offer. English feeling was divided. There was a war-party -headed by Essex and Raleigh, personally bitter enemies, but both -athirst for glory, conquest, and empire, believing in no right but that -of the strongest, greedy for wealth, and disdaining the slower, more -laborious, and more legitimate modes of acquiring it. They were tired of -campaigning it in France and the Low Countries, where hard knocks and -beggarly plunder were all that a soldier had to look to. They proposed -to carry a great English army across the Atlantic, to occupy permanently -the isthmus of Panama, and from that central position to wrestle with -the Spaniard for the trade and plunder of the New World. The peace party -held that these ambitious schemes would bring no profit except possibly -to a few individuals; that the treasury would be exhausted and the -country irritated by taxation and the pressing of soldiers; that to -re-establish the old commercial intercourse with Spain would be more -reputable and attended with more solid advantage to the nation at large; -and finally, that the English arms would be much better employed in a -thorough conquest of Ireland. These were the views of Burghley; and they -were strongly supported by Buckhurst, the best of the younger statesmen -who now surrounded Elizabeth. - -Elizabeth always encouraged her ministers to speak their minds; but, as -Buckhurst said on this occasion, “when they have done their extreme duty -she wills what she wills.” She determined to maintain the treaty of 1585 -with the Dutch; but she took the opportunity of getting it amended in -such a way as to throw upon them a larger share of the expenses of the -war, and to provide more definitely for the ultimate repayment of her -advances. - -We have seen that three years before the Armada Elizabeth had lost the -French alliance, which had till then been the key-stone of her policy. -Since then, though aware that Henry III. wished her well, and that he -would thwart the Spanish faction as much as he dared, she had not been -able to count on him. He might at any moment be pushed by Guise into an -attack on England, either with or without the concurrence of Spain. The -accession, therefore, of Henry IV. afforded her great relief. In him she -had a sure ally. It is true that, like her other allies the Dutch, he -was more in a condition to require help than to afford it. But the more -work she provided for Philip in Holland or France, the safer England -would be. The armies of the Holy League might be formidable to Henry; -but as long as he could hold them at bay they were not dangerous to -England. She had never quite got over her scruple about helping the -Dutch against their lawful sovereign. But Henry IV. was the legitimate -King of France, and she could heartily aid him to put down his rebels. -From 2000 to 5000 English troops were therefore constantly serving in -France down to the peace of Vervins. - -Philip, in defiance of the Salic law, claimed the crown of France for -his daughter in right of her mother, who was a sister of Henry III. To -Brittany he alleged that she had a special claim, as being descended -from Anne of Brittany, which the Bourbons were not. Brittany, therefore, -he invaded at once by sea. Elizabeth, alarmed by the proximity of this -Spanish force, desired that her troops in France should be employed in -expelling it, and that they should be vigorously supported by Henry IV. -Henry, on the other hand, was always drawing away the English to serve -his more pressing needs in other parts of France. This brought upon him -many harsh rebukes and threats from the English Queen. But she had, for -the first time, met her match. He judged, and rightly, that she would -not desert him. So, with oft-repeated apologies, light promises, and -well-turned compliments, he just went on doing what suited him best, -getting all the fighting he could out of the English, and airily eluding -Elizabeth’s repeated demands for some coast town, which could be held, -like Brill and Flushing, as a security for her heavy subsidies. - -When Henry was reconciled to the Catholic Church, Elizabeth went through -the form of expressing surprise and regret at a step which she must have -long expected, and must have felt to be wise (1593). Her alliance with -Henry was not shaken. It was drawn even closer by a new treaty, each -sovereign engaging not to make peace without the consent of the other. -This engagement did not prevent Henry from concluding the separate peace -of Vervins five years later, when he judged that his interest required -it (1598). Elizabeth’s dissatisfaction was, this time, genuine enough. -But Henry was no longer her protégé, a homeless, landless, penniless -king, depending on English subsidies, roaming over the realm he called -his own with a few thousands, or sometimes hundreds, of undisciplined -cavaliers, who gathered and dispersed at their own pleasure. He was -master of a re-united France, and could no longer be either patronised -or threatened. Elizabeth might expostulate, and declare that “if there -was such a sin as that against the Holy Ghost it must needs be -ingratitude:” gratitude was a sentiment to which she was as much a -stranger as Henry. The only difference between them was the national -one: the Englishwoman preached; the Frenchman mocked. What made her so -sore was that he had, so to speak, stolen her policy from her. His -predecessor had always suspected her--and with good reason--of intending -“to draw her neck out of the collar” if once she could induce him to -undertake a joint war. The joint war had at length been undertaken by -Henry IV., and it was he who had managed to slip out of it first, while -Elizabeth, who longed for peace, was obliged to stand by the Dutch. - -The two sovereigns, however, knew their own interests too well to -quarrel. Henry gave Elizabeth to understand that his designs against -Spain had undergone no change; he was only halting for breath; he would -help the Dutch underhand--just what she used to say to Henry III. She -had now to deal with a French King as sagacious as herself, and a great -deal more prompt and vigorous in action; not the man to be made a -cat’s-paw by any one. She had to accept him as a partner, if not on her -own terms, then on his. Both sovereigns were thoroughly veracious--in -Carlyle’s sense of the word. That is to say, their policy was determined -not by passion, or vanity, or sentiment of any kind, but by enlightened -self-interest, and was therefore calculable by those who knew how to -calculate. - - - - -CHAPTER XI - -DOMESTIC AFFAIRS: 1588-1601 - - -It was a boast of Elizabeth that when once her servants were chosen she -did not lightly displace them. Difference of opinion from their -mistress, or from one another, did not involve resignation or dismissal, -because, though they were free to speak their minds, all had to carry -out with fidelity and even zeal, whatever policy the Queen prescribed. -This condition they accepted; not only the astute and compliant -Burghley, but the more eager and opinionated Walsingham; and therefore -they had practically a life-tenure of office. Soon after the Armada the -first generation of them began to disappear. Bacon, Sussex, and Bedford -were already gone. Leicester died in 1588; his brother Warwick, and -Mildmay in 1589; Walsingham and Randolph in 1591; Hatton in 1592; Grey -de Wilton in 1593; Knollys and Hunsdon in 1596. Of the trusty servants -with whom she began her reign, Burghley alone remained. The leading men -of the new generation were Robert Cecil, the Treasurer’s second son, -trained to business under his father’s eye, and of qualities similar, -though inferior; Nottingham (formerly Howard of Effingham), a -straightforward man of no great ability, but acceptable to the Queen for -his father’s services and his own (and not the less so for his fine -presence); the accomplished Buckhurst; the brilliant Raleigh; and, -younger than the rest, Essex. The last was the son of a man much -favoured by Elizabeth. Leicester was his step-father, Knollys his -grandfather, Hunsdon his great-uncle, Walsingham his father-in-law, -Burghley his guardian. Ardent, impulsive, presumptuous, a warm friend, a -rancorous enemy, profuse in expense, lawless in his amours, jealous of -his equals, brooking no superior, impatient of all rule or order that -delayed him from leaping at once to the highest place,--he was possessed -with a most exaggerated notion of his own capacity, which appears to -have been only moderate. As the ward of Burghley he had been much in the -company of his future enemy, Robert Cecil, whose sly prim ways were most -unlike his own. The contrast did him no harm with the public, to whom -the younger man was a Tom Jones and the elder a Blifil. Two vastly abler -men, Francis Bacon and Raleigh, less advantageously placed, but -unhampered with any scruples, were busily trying to profit by the -all-pervading animosity of Cecil and Essex. - -Belonging, as Essex did by his connections, to the inner circle who -stood closest to Elizabeth, it was natural that she should take an -interest in him, and give him opportunities for turning his showy -qualities to account. In 1586 he was sent to the Low Countries as -general of cavalry under his step-father, Leicester. He distinguished -himself by his fiery valour in the expeditions to Spain, and as -commander of the English army in France, though he does not seem to have -had any real military talent. But Elizabeth’s regard for him was soon -shaken by his presumptuous and unruly behaviour. When he fought a duel -with Sir Charles Blount because she had conferred some favour on the -latter, she swore “by God’s death it were fitting some one should take -him down and teach him better manners, or there were no rule with him.” -He displeased her by his quarrels with Cecil and Effingham, and his -discontented grumbling. She was highly dissatisfied with his management -of the Azores expedition in 1597. In July 1598, at a meeting of the -Council, she was provoked by his insolence to strike him; and though -after three months he obtained his pardon, he never regained her favour. - -It was at this time that Burghley died (August 4), in his seventy-eighth -year. Elizabeth, though she could call him “a froward old fool” about a -trifling matter (March 1596), could not but feel that much was changed -when she lost the able and faithful servant who had worked with her for -forty years. “She seemeth to take it very grievously, shedding of tears -and separating herself from all company.” Buckhurst was the new -Treasurer. - -Essex had for some time cast his eyes on Ireland as a field where glory -and power might be won. There can be little doubt that he was already -speculating on the advantage that the possession of an army might give -him in any difficulty with his rivals or with the Queen herself. Cecil -perfidiously advocated his appointment to a post which had been the -grave of so many reputations. The Queen at length consented, though -reluctantly. Essex was a popular favourite. He had managed--it is not -very clear how--to win the confidence of both Puritans and Papists. The -general belief was that, for the first time since she had mounted the -throne, Elizabeth was afraid of one of her subjects. - -During the whole of the reign Ireland had been a cause of trouble and -anxiety. Elizabeth’s treatment of that unhappy country was not more -creditable or successful than that of other English statesmen before and -after her. There was the same absence of any systematic policy steadily -carried out, the same wearisome and disreputable alternation between -bursts of savage repression and intervals of pusillanimity, concession, -and neglect. In the competition of the various departments of the public -service for attention and expenditure, Ireland generally came last. All -other needs had to be served first whether at home or abroad. - -In the early years of the reign the chief trouble lay in Ulster, then -the most purely Celtic part of Ireland, and practically untouched by -English conquest. Twice, in her weariness of the struggle with Shan -O’Neill, Elizabeth conceded to him something like a sub-kingship of -Ulster in return for his nominal submission. In the end he was beaten, -and his head was fixed on the walls of Dublin Castle (1566). But nothing -further was done to anglicise Ulster. During the attempt of the -Devonshire adventurers to colonise South Munster (1569-71), and the -consequent rebellion, the northern province remained an unconcerned -spectator. Nor did it join in the great Desmond rising (1579-83), which, -with the insurrection of the Catholic lords of the Pale and the landing -of the Pope’s Italians at Smerwick, was the Irish branch of the -threefold attack on Elizabeth directed by Gregory XIII. The attempt of -the elder Essex to colonise Antrim (1573-75) was a disastrous failure, -and Ulster still remained practically independent of the Dublin -Government. - -The most successful Deputy of the reign was Perrot (1584-87), a valiant -soldier and strict ruler, who, after long experience in the Irish wars, -had come to the conclusion that what Ireland most wanted was justice. -The native chiefs, released from the constant dread of spoliation, and -finding that English encroachment was repressed as inflexibly as Irish -disorder, became quiet and friendly. But this system did not suit the -dominant race. The Deputy was accused to the Queen of seeking to betray -the country to the Irish and the Spaniard. Recalled, and put upon his -trial for treason, he was found guilty on suborned evidence, and -sentenced to death. It is usually said that his real offence was some -disrespectful language about the Queen, which he confessed. But it seems -that she forbore to take his life precisely because she would not have -it thought that she was influenced by personal resentment. - -His successor, Fitzwilliam, was a Deputy of the old sort--greedy, -violent, careless of consequences, and always acting on the principle -that, as against an Englishman, a Celt had no rights. The execution of -MacMahon in Monaghan, and the confiscation of his lands on a trivial -pretext, alarmed the North. Ulster had not been bled white like the rest -of Ireland. The O’Neills had a nephew of their old hero Shan for their -chief, who had been brought up at the English Court and made Earl of -Tyrone by Elizabeth. An educated and remarkably able man, he had none of -his uncle’s illusions. He clung to his ancestral rights and dignity, but -he hoped to preserve them by zealously discharging his obligations as a -vassal of the Queen. He served in the war against Desmond, and exerted -himself to maintain order in Ulster. But he had no mind to sink into the -position of a mere dignified land-owner like the English nobles; nor -indeed, under such a Deputy as Fitzwilliam, was he likely to preserve -even his lands if he lost his power. Rather than that, he determined to -enter into what he knew was a most unequal struggle, on the off-chance -of pulling through by help from Spain. It is clear that he was driven -into rebellion against his inclination. But when he had once drawn the -sword he maintained the struggle against one Deputy after another with -wonderful tenacity and resource. For the first time in Irish history, -the rebel forces were disciplined and armed like those of the crown, and -stood up to them in equal numbers on equal terms. At length, in August -1598, Tyrone inflicted upon Sir Henry Bagnall near Armagh the severest -defeat that the English had ever suffered in Ireland; slaying 1500 of -his men, and capturing all his artillery and baggage. Insurrections at -once broke out all over Ireland. - -This was the situation with which Essex undertook to deal. He had loudly -blamed other Deputies for not vigorously attacking Tyrone in his own -country. Vigour was the one military quality which he himself possessed. -He went with the title of Lieutenant and Governor-General, and with -extraordinary powers, at the head of 21,000 men--such an army as had -never been sent to Ireland (April 1599). The Queen, who trembled at the -expense, and did not wish to see any of her nobles, least of all Essex, -permanently established in a great military command, enjoined him to -push at once into Ulster, as he had himself proposed, and finish the -war. Instead of doing this, he went south into districts that had been -depopulated and desolated by the savage warfare of the last thirty -years. Even here he met with discreditable reverses. When he got back to -Dublin (July) his army was reduced by disease and desertion to less than -5000 men. Disregarding the Queen’s express prohibition, he made his -friend Southampton General of horse. When she censured his bad -management, he replied with impertinent complaints about the favour she -was showing to Cecil, Raleigh, and Cobham, and began to consult with his -friends about carrying selected troops over to England to remove them. -Rumours of his intention to return reached the Queen. “We do charge -you,” she wrote, “as you tender our pleasure, that you adventure not to -come out of that kingdom.” He declared that he could not invade Ulster -without reinforcements. They were sent, and at length he marched into -Louth (September). There he was met by Tyrone, who, in an interview, -completely twisted him round his finger, and obtained a cessation of -arms and the promise of concessions amounting to what would now be -called Home Rule. A few days later, on receipt of an angry letter from -the Queen forbidding him to grant any terms without her permission, he -deserted his post and hurried to England. The first notice Elizabeth -received of this astounding piece of insubordination was his still more -astounding incursion into her bedroom, all muddy from his ride, before -she was completely dressed (September 28, 1599). - -Elizabeth seems to have been so much taken aback by the Earl’s -unparalleled presumption, that she did not blaze out as might have been -expected. She gave him audience an hour or two later, and heard what he -had to say. Probably he adopted an injured tone as usual, and inveighed -against “that knave Raleigh” and “that sycophant Cobham.” But his -insubordination had been gross, and no talking could make it anything -else. It was more dangerous than Leicester’s disobedience in 1586, -because it came from a vastly more dangerous person. The same afternoon -the Queen referred the matter to the Council. Essex was put under -arrest, and never saw her again. The more she reflected, the more -indignant and alarmed she became. “By God’s son,” she said to Harington, -“I am no Queen; this man is above me.” After a delay of nine months, -occasioned by his illness, the fallen favourite was brought before a -special Commission on the charge of contempt and disobedience, and -sentenced to be suspended from his offices and confined to his house -during the Queen’s pleasure (June 1600). In a few weeks he was released -from arrest, but he could not obtain permission to appear at court, -though he implored it in most abject letters. - -There are persons who consider themselves to be intolerably wronged and -persecuted if they cannot have precedence and power over their -fellow-citizens. Essex was such a person. Instead of being thankful that -he had escaped the punishment which under most sovereigns he would have -suffered, he entered into criminal plots for coercing, if not -overthrowing, the Queen. He urged the Scotch King to enforce the -recognition of his title by arms. He tried to persuade Mountjoy, his -successor in Ireland, to carry his army to Scotland to co-operate with -James. These intrigues were not known to the Government. But it did not -escape observation that he was collecting men of the sword in the -neighbourhood of his house; that he was holding consultations with -suspected nobles and gentlemen (some of whom were afterwards engaged in -the Gunpowder Plot); that the Puritan clergy were preaching and praying -for his cause; and that there was a certain ferment in the city. Essex -was therefore summoned to attend before the Council. Instead of obeying, -he flew to arms, with Lords Southampton, Rutland, Sandys, Cromwell, and -Monteagle, and about 300 gentlemen. But the citizens of London did not -respond to his appeal, and the insurrection was easily suppressed, less -than a dozen persons being slain on both sides (February 8, 1601). A -more senseless and profligate attempt to overthrow a good government it -would be difficult to find in history. It was not dignified by any -semblance of principle, and it would sufficiently stamp the character of -its author, even if it stood alone as an evidence of his vanity, -egotism, and want of common sense. - -The trial and execution of the principal malefactor followed as a matter -of course and without delay (February 25). It would have been scandalous -to spare him. Elizabeth had once been fond of him, and had no reason to -be ashamed of it. To talk of her “passion” and her “amorous -inclination,” as Hume and others have done, is revolting and malignant -nonsense. It is creditable to old age when it can take pleasure in the -unfolding of bright and promising youth. But royal favour was not good -for such a man as Essex. It developed the worst features in his showy -but faulty character. As he steadily deteriorated, her regard cooled; -but so much of it remained that she tried to amend him by chastisement, -“_ad correctionem_” as she said, “_non ad ruinam_.” She had long before -warned him that, though she had put up with much disrespect to her -person, he must not touch her sceptre, or he would be dealt with -according to the law of England. She was as good as her word, and, -though the memory of it was painful to her, there is not the smallest -evidence that she ever repented of having allowed the law to take its -course.[16] Only three of the accomplices of Essex were punished -capitally. The five peers, none of them powerful or formidable, -experienced Elizabeth’s accustomed clemency. - -It has been suggested by an admirer of Essex that he failed in Ireland -because his “sensitively attuned nature” shrank from the systematic -desolation and starvation afterwards employed by his successor. No -evidence is offered for this suggestion. In a letter to the Queen (June -25, 1599) he advocates “burning and spoiling the country _in all -places_,” which method “shall starve the rebels in one year.” This -course Mountjoy carried out. With means far inferior to those of Essex, -and notwithstanding the landing of 3000 Spaniards at Kinsale (September -1601), he was the first Englishman who completely subdued Ireland. -Tyrone surrendered a few days before the Queen’s death. - -Little has been said in these pages about parliamentary proceedings. The -real history of the reign does not lie there. The country was governed -wholly by the Queen, with the advice of her Council, and not at all by -Parliament. In the forty-five years of her reign there were only -thirteen sessions of Parliament. The functions of Parliament were to -vote grants of money when the ordinary revenues of the crown were -insufficient, and to make laws. Its right in these matters was -unquestioned. If the Queen had never wanted subsidies or penal laws -against her political and religious opponents (of other laws she often -said there were more than enough already), it would never have been -summoned at all; nor is there any reason to suppose that the country -would have complained as long as it was governed with prudence and -success. In fact, to do without Parliaments was distinctly popular, -because it meant doing without subsidies. - -In the thirty years preceding the Armada--the sessions of Parliament -being nine--Elizabeth applied for only eight subsidies, and of one of -them a portion was remitted. By her economy she not only defrayed the -expenses of government out of the ordinary revenue, which, at the end of -the reign was about £300,000 a year, but paid off old debts. It was not -till the twenty-fourth year of her reign that she discharged the last of -her father’s debts, up to which time she had been paying interest on it. -Subsequently she even accumulated a small reserve, which, as she told -Parliament, was a most necessary thing if she was not to be driven to -borrow on sudden emergency. But this reserve vanished immediately she -became involved in the great war with Spain; and during the last fifteen -years of her life, although she received twelve subsidies, she was -always in difficulty for money. She had to sell crown lands to the value -of £372,000. Parliament, which had voted the usual single subsidies -without complaint, grumbled and pretended poverty when she asked for -three and even four.[17] Bacon’s famous outburst (1593) about gentlemen -having to sell their plate and farmers their brass pots to pay the tax, -was a piece of claptrap. The nation was, relatively to former times, -rolling in wealth. But the old belief had still considerable -strength--that government being the affair of the King, not of his -subjects, he should provide for its expenses out of his hereditary -income, just as they paid their private expenses out of their private -incomes; that he had no more claim to dip into their pockets than they -had to dip into his; and that a subsidy, as its name imports, was an -occasional and extraordinary assistance furnished as a matter not of -duty but of good-will. - -This might have been healthy doctrine when kings were campaigning on the -Continent for personal or dynastic objects. It was out of place when a -large expenditure was indispensable for the interests and safety of the -country. The grumbling, therefore, about taxation towards the end of the -reign was unreasonable and discreditable to the grumblers. The Queen met -them with her usual good sense. She explained to them--though, as she -correctly said, she was under no constitutional obligation to do so--how -the money went, what she had spent on the Spanish war, on Ireland, and -in loans to the Dutch and the French King. The plea was unanswerable. -Her private expenditure was on a very modest scale. In particular she -had never indulged in that besetting and costly sin of princes, -palace-building; and this at a time when the noble mansions which still -testify to the wealth of the England of that day were rising in every -county. Her only extravagance was dress. Some have carped at her -collection of jewelry. But jewels, like the silver balustrades of -Frederick William I., were a mode of hoarding, and in her later years -she reconverted jewels into money to meet the expenses of the State. -Modern writers, who so airily blame her for not subsidising more -liberally her Scotch, Dutch, and French allies, would find it difficult, -if they condescended to particulars, to explain how she was able to give -them as much money as she did. - -It is common to make much of the debate on monopolies in the last -Parliament of Elizabeth (1601), as showing the rise of a spirit of -resistance to the royal prerogative. I do not think that the report of -that debate would convey such an impression to any one reading it -without preconceived views. None of the speakers contested the -prerogative. They only complained that it was being exercised in a way -prejudicial to the public interest. If the monopolies had been -unimportant, or if the patentees had used their privilege less greedily, -there would evidently have been no complaint as to the principle -involved. No course of action was decided on, because the Queen -intervened by a message in which she stated that she had not been aware -of the abuses prevailing, that she was as indignant at them as -Parliament could be, and that she would put a stop, not to monopolies, -but to such as were injurious. With this message the House of Commons -was more than satisfied. As a matter of fact monopolies went on till -dealt with by the declaratory statute in the twenty-first year of James -I. - -If the last Tudor handed down the English Constitution to the first -Stuart as she had received it from her predecessors, unchanged either in -theory or practice, it was far otherwise with the English Church. There -are two conflicting views as to the historical position of the Church in -this country. According to one it was, all through the Middle Age, -National as well as Catholic. The changes which took place at the -Reformation made no difference in that respect, and involved no break in -its continuity. It is not a Protestant Church. It is still National and -still Catholic, resting on precisely the same foundations, and existing -by the same title as it did in the days of Dunstan and Becket. According -to the other view, the epithets National and Catholic are contradictory. -A Church which undergoes radical changes of government, worship, and -doctrine is no longer the same Church but a new one, and must be held to -have been established by the authority which prescribed these changes, -which, in this case, was the Queen and Parliament. The word “Protestant” -was avoided in its formularies to make conformity easier for Catholics; -but it is a Protestant Church all the same. Whichever of these views is -nearer to the truth, it cannot be denied that, by the legislation of -Elizabeth the English Church became--what it was not in the Middle -Age--a spiritual organisation entirely dependent on the State. This it -remains still; the supremacy having been virtually transferred from the -crown to Parliament in the next century. I shall not venture to inquire -how far this condition of dependence has affected its ability and -inclination to perform the part of a true spiritual power. It is enough -to say that no act of will on the part of any English statesman has had -such important and lasting consequences, for good or for evil, as the -decision of Elizabeth to make the Church of England what it is. - -We have seen that the government and worship of the Church were -established by Act of Parliament in 1559, and its doctrines in 1571. But -when once Elizabeth had placed her ecclesiastical powers beyond dispute, -by obtaining statutory sanction for them, she allowed no further -interference by Parliament. All its attempts, even at mere discussion of -ecclesiastical matters, she peremptorily suppressed. She supplied any -further legislation that was needed by virtue of her supremacy, and she -exercised her ecclesiastical government by the Court of High Commission. -The new Anglican model was acquiesced in by the majority of the nation. -But it had, at first, no hearty support except from the Government. The -earnest religionists were either Catholics or Puritans. The object of -Elizabeth was to compel these two extreme parties to outward conformity -of worship. What their real beliefs were she did not care. - -The large majority of the Catholics showed a loyal and patriotic spirit -at the time of the Armada. But they were not treated with confidence by -the Government. Great numbers of them were imprisoned or confined in the -houses of Protestant gentlemen, by way of precaution, when the Armada -was approaching. No Catholic, I believe, was intrusted with any command -either by land or sea; and after the danger was over, the persecution, -in all its forms, became sharper than ever. There was the less reason -for this, inasmuch as it was no secret that the secular priests and the -great majority of the English Catholics had become bitterly hostile to -the small Jesuitical faction whose treasonable conspiracies had brought -so much trouble on their loyal co-religionists. - -The term “Puritan” is used loosely, though conveniently, to designate -several shades of belief. By far the larger number of those to whom it -is applied were, and meant to remain, members of the Established Church. -They objected to certain ceremonies and vestments. They hoped to procure -the abolition of these, and, in the meantime, evaded them when they -could. They were what would now be called the Evangelical or Low Church -party. They held Calvin’s distinctive doctrines on predestination, as -indeed did most of the bishops; but though preferring his Presbyterian -organisation, or something like it, they did not treat it as essential. -They were broadly distinguished from the Brownists or Independents, then -an insignificant minority, who held each congregation to be a church, -and therefore protested against the establishment of any national -church. - -Though Elizabeth persecuted the Catholics with a severity steadily -increasing in proportion as they became less numerous and formidable, -she remained to the last anxious to make conformity easy for them. This -was her reason for so obstinately refusing the concessions in the matter -of ritual and vestments--trifling as they appear to the modern -mind--which would have satisfied almost the whole of the Puritan party. -This policy (for policy it assuredly was rather than conviction), which -drove the most earnest Protestants into an attitude of opposition -destined in the next two reigns to have such serious consequences, has -been severely censured. But there can be no question that it did answer -the purpose she had in view, which for the moment was most important. It -did induce great numbers of Catholics to conform. She avoided a civil -war in her own time between Catholics and Anglicans at the price of a -civil war later on between Anglicans and Puritans. Looking at the great -drama as a whole, perhaps the Puritans of the Great Rebellion might -congratulate themselves on the part that Elizabeth chose to play in its -earlier acts. It cannot be doubted that a civil war in the sixteenth -century between Catholics and Protestants would have been waged with far -more ferocity than was displayed by either Cavaliers or Roundheads, and -would have been attended with the horrors of foreign invasion. To -conciliate the earnest religionists on both sides was impossible. -Elizabeth chose the _via media_, and the successful equilibrium which -she maintained during nearly half a century proves that she hit upon -what in her own day was the true centre of gravity. - -But while doing justice to Elizabeth’s insight and prudence, we may not -excuse her extreme severity to the nonconformists of either party. It -was not necessary. It seems to have been even impolitic. It arose from -her arbitrary temper--from a quality, that is to say, valuable in a -ruler, but apt, in great rulers, to be somewhat in excess. I have -condemned her persecution of the Catholics. Her persecution of the -Protestant nonconformists was marked by even greater injustice. Against -the Catholics it might at least be urged that their opinions logically -led to disloyalty. But the Independents, Barrow, Greenwood, and Penry, -were indisputably loyal men. They were put to death nominally for -spreading writings which, contrary to common sense, were held to be -seditious, but really for their religious opinions, which, in the case -of the first two, were extracted from them by the interrogatories of -Archbishop Whitgift, an Inquisitor as strenuous and merciless as -Torquemada. Some of the Council, especially Burghley and Knollys, were -strongly opposed to Whitgift’s proceedings. It must therefore be assumed -that he had the Queen’s personal approval. She had committed herself to -a struggle with intrepid and obstinate men. The crowded gaols were a -visible demonstration that she could not compel them to submit; and to -hang them all was out of the question. An Act was therefore passed in -1593, by which those who would not promise to attend church were to be -banished the country. Thus most of the Independents were at last got rid -of. The non-separatist Puritans, who aimed at less radical changes, and -hoped to effect them, if not under their present sovereign, yet under -her successor, kept on the windy side of the law, attending church once -a month, and not entering till the service was nearly over. Thus, at the -end of her reign, Elizabeth perhaps flattered herself that she was -within measurable distance of religious uniformity. - - - - -CHAPTER XII - -LAST YEARS AND DEATH: 1601-1603. - - -The death of Mary Stuart did something to simplify parties in Scotland; -and, if her son had possessed the qualities of a ruler, he would have -had a better chance of reducing his kingdom to order than any of his -predecessors, because a middle class was at length rising into -importance. As far as knowledge and discernment went, he was an able -politician, and on several occasions he showed not only skill in his -combinations, but--what he is not generally credited with by those who -study only his career in England--considerable energy and courage. But -he was wanting in perseverance, and a slave to idle pleasures. He had -always some favourite upon whom he lavished any money that came into his -hands. What was needed in his own interest and that of his country was -that he should exercise rigid economy, develop all the forces that made -for order, ally himself with the burghs and lower barons, cultivate good -relations with the Kirk, industriously attend to all the details of -government, and seize every opportunity to humble the great nobles of -whatever party or creed. Instead of this, he tried to maintain himself -by balancing rival parties, and employing one nobleman to execute his -vengeance on another. Instead of honestly and zealously seconding the -policy of Elizabeth, and so deserving her confidence and support, which -would have been of the utmost value to him, he tried to levy blackmail -on her by coquetting with Spain and the Catholics. - -Elizabeth is accused of deliberately encouraging Scottish factions in -order to keep the northern kingdom weak. She certainly supported -Stewart, Earl of Bothwell, a turbulent and unprincipled man, while he -was the antagonist of the Catholic nobles who were inviting the -Spaniard. But it is plain that she desired nothing so much as to see -James crush all aristocratic disorder, and make himself master of his -kingdom. Her exhortations to him on this subject are full of wisdom, and -expressed in most stirring language. But they only produced petitions -for money. Notwithstanding her own difficulties, she long allowed him -£3000 a year, which, in 1600, was increased to £6000. But ten times that -amount would have done him no good, because he would immediately have -squandered it. - -As Elizabeth grew old, James naturally became absorbed in the prospect -of his succession to the English crown. All Scotchmen shared his -eagerness. In England, feeling was almost unanimous in his favour, -though some of the Catholics continued to talk of the Infanta or -Arabella Stuart the niece of Darnley. By teasing Elizabeth to recognise -his title, intriguing with her courtiers, and calling on his own -subjects to furnish him with the means of asserting his rights, James -irritated the English Queen. But she had always intended that he should -succeed her, and she did nothing to prejudice his claim. - -The two leading men at the English court--Cecil and Raleigh--who had -been united in their hostility to Essex, were now secretly competing for -the favour of James. Each warned the Scottish King against the other, -and represented himself as the only trustworthy adviser. Cecil, from his -confidential relations with the Queen, had the most difficult game to -play, and it was not till her health was evidently failing that he -ventured to open private communications with James. Even then he did not -dare to correspond with him directly, but it was understood that -everything written by Lord Henry Howard (brother of the last Duke of -Norfolk) was to be taken as written by Cecil. To make up for his -previous backwardness, he lent James £10,000--a pledge of fidelity which -it was out of his rival’s power to emulate. - -The long career of Elizabeth was now drawing to its close. Her sun might -seem to be going down in calm splendour. She had triumphed over all her -enemies. She might say with Virgil’s heroine-- - - “Vixi, et quem dederat cursum fortuna, peregi; - Et nunc magna mei sub terras ibit imago.” - -The mighty Philip had gone to his grave five years before her (1598), a -beaten man, having failed in Holland, failed in France, failed against -England. Of the three great champions who withstood him, Elizabeth, if -not the most distinguished by high qualities, had yet, perhaps, the -largest share in saving Europe from the retrograde tyranny which menaced -it. The glorious resistance of William of Orange covered only sixteen -years (1568-84). That of Henry IV. can hardly be said to have had any -European importance before his accession to the French throne, from -which date to the peace of Vervins and the death of Philip is a period -of nine years (1589-98). But the whole of Elizabeth’s long reign was -spent in abating the power of Spain. It was the persistent, -never-relaxing pressure from an unassailable enemy which wore out -Philip, as it afterwards wore out Bonaparte. Elizabeth had found England -weak and distracted: she was leaving it united and powerful. Nor was she -of those to whom their due meed of praise is denied during life, and -accorded only by the tardy justice of posterity. Her wisdom and courage -were the admiration not of her own people alone, but of all Europe. “Her -very enemies,” says a French historian, “proclaimed her the most -glorious and fortunate of all women who ever wore a crown.” From the -point of view of public life, little or nothing was wanting--so Bacon -thought--to fill up the full measure of her felicity. - -Yet it seems that the last months of her life were clouded by -melancholy, and deformed by a querulous ill-temper. Some have suggested -that she suffered from remorse for her severity to Essex; others that -she felt herself out of sympathy with the Puritan tendencies of the -time. It is not necessary to resort to these unfounded or far-fetched -suppositions to account for her gloom. If we turn from her public to -her private life, what situation could be more profoundly pitiable? -Honour and obedience, indeed, still surrounded her. But that which also -should accompany old age, love and troops of friends, she might not look -to have. Near relations she had none. Alone she had chosen to live, and -alone she must die. As her time approached, she was haunted by the -consciousness that, among all those who treated her with so much -reverence, there was not one who had any reason to be attached to her or -to care that her life should be prolonged. Those who have not loved when -they were young must not expect to find love when they are old. While -health and strength remained, she had tasted the satisfaction of living -her own life and playing the great game of politics, for which she was -exceptionally gifted. But to a woman who has passed through life without -knowing what it is to love or be loved, who has no memory of even an -unrequited affection to feed on, who has never shared a husband’s joys -and sorrows, never borne the sweet burden of maternity, never suckled -babe or rocked cradle, who must finish her journey alone, sitting in the -solemn twilight before the last dark hour uncared for and uncaring, -without the cheer of children or the varied interests that gather round -the family--to such a one, what avails it that she has tasted the -excitement of public life, that she has borne a share in politics or -business--what even that her aims have been high or that she has done -the State some service, if she has renounced the crown of womanhood, and -turned from their appointed use those numbered years within which the -female heart can find present joy and lay up store of calm satisfaction -for declining age? - -Elizabeth had always enjoyed good health, thanks to her “exact -temperance both as to wine and diet, which, she used to say, was the -noblest part of physic,” and her active habits. In capacity for -resisting bodily fatigue and freedom from nervous ailments, she was like -a man. It was not till the beginning of 1602 that those about her -noticed any signs of failing strength. She still went on hunting and -dancing. In dancing she excelled, and she kept it up for exercise, as -many an old man keeps up his skating or tennis without being exposed to -ill-natured remarks. In December 1602 her godson Harington, an amusing -person, whose company she enjoyed, found her “in most pitiable state,” -both in body and mind. “She held in her hand a golden cup which she -often put to her lips; but in sooth her heart seemeth too full to lack -more filling.” He read her some verses he had written, “whereat she -smiled once,” but said, “When thou dost feel creeping Time at thy gate, -these fooleries will please thee less. I am past my relish for such -matters. Thou seest my bodily meat doth not suit me well. I have eaten -but one ill-tasted cake since yesternight.” Harington hastened to send a -present to the King of Scots, with the inscription, “_Domine memento mei -cum veneris in regnum_.” - -In the same month Robert Carey, son of her cousin Lord Hunsdon, visited -her, and professed to think her looking well. “No, Robin,” she said, “I -am not well,” and then “discoursed of her indisposition, and that her -heart had been sad and heavy for ten or twelve days, and in her -discourse she fetched not so few as forty or fifty great sighs.... -Hereupon I wrote to the King of Scots.”[18] Her melancholy was not -caused by any weakening of her mind. A long letter to James, dated -January 5, 1603, though hardly legible, is very vigorous and -characteristic. - -At the beginning of March 1603 she became much worse. There was some -disease of the throat, attended with swelling and a distressing -formation of phlegm, which made speaking difficult. The only relatives -about her were Robert Carey and his sister Lady Scrope, watching keenly -that they might be the first to inform James of her death. She could not -be brought by any of her Council to take food or go to bed. When in bed -she had been troubled by a visual illusion; “she saw her body -exceedingly lean and fearful in a light of fire.” At last Nottingham, -the Admiral, who was mourning the recent death of his wife, was sent -for. He was a second cousin of Anne Boleyn, and was the one person to -whom the dying Queen seemed to cling with some trust. He induced her to -take some broth. “For any of the rest,” says her maid-of-honour, -Mistress Southwell, “she would not answer them to any question, but said -softly to my Lord Admiral’s earnest persuasions that if he knew what she -had seen in her bed he would not persuade her as he did. And Secretary -Cecil, overhearing her, asked if her Majesty had seen any spirits; to -which she said she scorned to answer him so idle a question. Then he -told her how, to content the people, her Majesty must go to bed. To -which she smiled, wonderfully contemning him, saying that the word -_must_ was not to be used to princes; and thereupon said, ‘Little man, -little man, if your father had lived ye [he?] durst not have said so -much: but thou knowest I must die, and that maketh thee so -presumptuous.’ And presently commanding him and the rest to depart her -chamber, willed my Lord Admiral to stay; to whom she shook her head, and -with a pitiful voice said, ‘My Lord, I am tied with a chain of iron -about my neck.’ He alleging her wonted courage to her, she replied, ‘I -am tied, and the case is altered with me.’” At last, “what by fair -means,” says Carey, “what by force, he got her to bed.” - -It was perfectly understood that she meant James to be her successor. -The Admiral now told his colleagues that she had confided her intention -to him just before her illness took a serious turn. Two years before, in -conversation with Rosni, the minister of Henry IV., she had spoken of -the approaching union of the Scotch and English crowns as a matter of -course. But it was not till a few hours before her death that her -councillors ventured to question her on the subject. They gave out that -she indicated James by a sign; and this is also asserted by Carey, who, -however, does not seem to have been present, though probably his sister -was. Mistress Southwell seems to write as an eye-witness, but betrays a -Catholic bias, which may cast some doubt on her testimony. “The Council -sent to her the bishop of Canterbury and other of the prelates, upon -sight of whom she was much offended, cholericly rating them, bidding -them be packing, saying she was no atheist, but knew full well they were -hedge-priests, and took it for an indignity that they should speak to -her. Now being given over by all, and at the last gasp, keeping still -her sense in everything and giving ever when she spoke apt answers, -though she spake very seldom, having then a sore throat, she desired to -wash it, that she might answer more freely to what the Council demanded; -which was to know whom she would have king; but they, seeing her throat -troubled her so much, desired her to hold up her finger when they named -whom liked her. Whereupon they named the king of France, the king of -Scotland, at which she never stirred. They named my lord Beauchamp,[19] -whereto she said, ‘I will have no rascal’s son in my seat, but one -worthy to be a king.’ Hereupon instantly she died.” (March 23, -afternoon.) - -It is certain, however, that she lived several hours after this -characteristic outburst. Carey says that at six o’clock in the evening -he went into her room with the Archbishop; that, though speechless, she -showed by signs that she followed his prayers, and twice desired him to -remain when he was going away. She died in the early hours of Thursday, -March 24. - -There have been many greater statesmen than Elizabeth. She was far from -being an admirable type of womanhood. She does not, in my opinion, stand -first even among female sovereigns, for I should put that able ruler -and perfect woman, Isabella of Castile, above her. I admit, however, -that such comparisons are apt to be unjust. Few rulers have had to -contend with such formidable and complicated difficulties as the English -Queen. Few have surmounted them so triumphantly. This is the criterion, -and the sufficient criterion, which determines the judgment of practical -men. Research, if applied with fairness and common sense, may perhaps -modify, it can never set aside, the popular verdict. There are writers -who have made the discovery that Elizabeth was a very poor ruler, -selfish and wayward, shortsighted, easily duped, fainthearted, rash, -miserly, wasteful, and swayed by the pettiest impulses of vanity, spite, -and personal inclination. They have not explained, and never will, how -it was that a woman with all these disqualifications for government -should have ruled England with signal success for forty-four years. -Statesmen are indebted to good luck occasionally, like other people. But -when this explanation is offered again and again with dull regularity, -we are compelled to say, with one who had at once the best opportunity -and the highest capacity for estimating the greatness of Elizabeth: “It -is not to closet penmen that we are to look for guidance in such a case; -for men of that order being keen in style, poor in judgment, and partial -in feeling, are no faithful witnesses as to the real passages of -business. It is for ministers and great officers to judge of these -things, and those who have handled the helm of government and been -acquainted with the difficulties and mysteries of State business.”[20] - -The judgment of those who have handled the helm of government is to be -found in the words of her contemporary, the great Henry--“She was my -other self:” and of a greater still in the next generation--“Queen -Elizabeth of famous memory; we need not be ashamed to call her so!”[21] - - - - -APPENDIX - - - - -APPENDIX A. - -SESSIONS OF PARLIAMENT IN THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH. - - - +-------------+------------+-----------------+--------------+--------------+ - | | _Year_ | | | | - |_Parliament._| _of_ | _Began._ |_Prorogued._ | _Dissolved._| - | |_Elizabeth._| | | | - +-------------+------------+-----------------+--------------+--------------+ - | | | | | | - | I. | 1st | 25 Jan. 1558/9 | | 8 May 1559 | - | | | | | | - | II. | 5th | 12 Jan. 1562/3 |10 April 1563 | | - | | | | | | - | II. } | 8th |} | | | - | 2nd } | and |} 30 Sep. 1566 |30 Dec. 1566 | 2 Jan. 1566/7| - | Sess. } | 9th |} | | | - | | | | | | - | III. | 13th | 2 April 1571 | |29 May 1571 | - | | | | | | - | IV. | 14th | 8 April 1572 |30 June 1572 | | - | | | | | | - | IV. } | | | | | - | 2nd } | 18th | 8 Feb. 1575/6 |15 Mar. 1575/6| | - | S1 s. } | | | | | - | | | | | | - | V. } | | | | | - | 3rd } | 23rd | 16 Jan 1580/1 |18 Mar. 1580/1|19 April 1583 | - | Sess. } | | | | | - | | | | | | - | { | 27th |} | | | - | V. { | and |} 23 Nov. 1584{*}|29 Mar. 1585 |14 Sep. 1586 | - | { | 28th |} | | | - | | | | | | - | { | 28th |} | | | - | VI. { | and |} 15 Oct. 1586{*}|29 Oct. 1586 |23 Mar. 1586/7| - | { | 29th |} | | | - | | | | | | - | VII. | 31st | 4 Feb. 1588/9 | |29 Mar. 1589 | - | | | | | | - | VIII. | 35th | 19 Feb. 1592/3 | |10 April 1593 | - | | | | | | - | IX. | 39th | 24 Oct. 1597{*}| | 9 Feb. 1597/8| - | | | | | | - | X. | 43rd | 27 Oct. 1601 | |19 Dec. 1601 | - +-------------+------------+-----------------+--------------+--------------+ - -[* Adjourned over Christmas Vacation.] - - - - -APPENDIX B. - -THE PRINCIPAL HOWARDS CONTEMPORARIES OF ELIZABETH. - - - 2ND DUKE OF NORFOLK.[22] - | - ------------------------------------------------------------------------ - | | | | -3RD DUKE OF NORFOLK.[23] EDMUND. LADY BOLEYN.[30] WILLIAM 1ST LORD - | | | HOWARD OF EFFINGHAM.[31] - ---------------- | | | - | | | | | -MARY.[25] EARL OF SURREY.[24] Q. CATHERINE HOWARD. Q. ANNE BOLEYN. CHARLES 2ND - | | LORD EFFINGHAM.[32] - -------------------- | - | | | -4TH DUKE OF NORFOLK.[26] HENRY.[33] QUEEN ELIZABETH. - | - ---------------------------------- - | | | -EARL OF ARUNDEL.[27] LORD HOWARD[28] WILLIAM.[29] - OF WALDEN. - - - - -APPENDIX C. - -PRINCIPAL BOLEYN RELATIONS OF ELIZABETH. - - - SIR THOMAS BOLEYN[34] = LADY ELIZABETH HOWARD.[35] - | - ---------------------------------------------------------- - | | | -LORD ROCHFORD.[36] QUEEN ANNE. MARY = WILLIAM CAREY. - | | - | -------------- ------------------------ - | | | - QUEEN ELIZABETH. 1ST LORD HUNSDON.[37] CATHERINE = SIR FRANCIS - | | KNOLLYS. - -------------------------------------------------- | - | | | | | -2ND LORD HUNSDON. ROBERT.[38] LADY EFFINGHAM[39] LADY SCROPE. WALTER, EARL = LETTICE = EARL OF LEICESTER. - AND COUNTESS OF ESSEX. | - OF NOTTINGHAM. | - | - ROBERT, EARL OF ESSEX[40] = FRANCES SIDNEY.[41] - - Printed by T. and A. CONSTABLE, Printers to His Majesty - at the Edinburgh University Press - - * * * * * - - Twelve English Statesmen. - - EDITED BY JOHN MORLEY. - - _Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. each._ - -=WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR.= By EDWARD A. FREEMAN, D.C.L., LL.D. - -=Times.=--‘Gives with great picturesqueness ... the dramatic incidents of -a memorable career far removed from our times and our manner of -thinking.’ - -=HENRY II.= By Mrs. J. R. GREEN. - -=Times.=--‘It is delightfully real and readable, and in spite of severe -compression has the charm of a mediæval romance.’ - -=EDWARD I.= By T. F. TOUT, M.A., Professor of History, the Owens College, -Manchester. - -=Speaker.=--‘A truer or more life-like picture of the king, the conqueror, -the overlord, the duke, has never yet been drawn.’ - -=HENRY VII.= By JAMES GAIRDNER. - -=Athenæum.=--‘The best account of Henry VII. that has yet appeared.’ - -=CARDINAL WOLSEY.= By Bishop CREIGHTON, D.D. - -=Saturday Review.=--‘Is exactly what one of a series of short biographies -of English Statesmen ought to be.’ - -=ELIZABETH.= By E. S. BEESLY, M.A. - -=Manchester Guardian.=--‘It may be recommended as the best and briefest -and most trustworthy of the many books that in this generation have -dealt with the life and deeds of that “bright Occidental Star, Queen -Elizabeth of happy memory."’ - -=OLIVER CROMWELL.= By FREDERIC HARRISON. - -=Times.=--‘Gives a wonderfully vivid picture of events.’ - -=WILLIAM III.= By H. D. TRAILL. - -=Spectator.=--‘Mr. Traill has done his work well in the limited space at -his command. The narrative portion is clear and vivacious, and his -criticisms, although sometimes trenchant, are substantially just.’ - -=WALPOLE.= By JOHN MORLEY. - -=St. James’s Gazette.=--‘It deserves to be read, not only as a work of one -of the most prominent politicians of the day, but for its intrinsic -merits. It is a clever, thoughtful, and interesting biography.’ - -=PITT.= By LORD ROSEBERY. - -=Times.=--‘Brilliant and fascinating.... The style is terse, masculine, -nervous, articulate, and clear; the grasp of circumstance and character -is firm, penetrating, luminous, and unprejudiced; the judgment is broad, -generous, humane, and scrupulously candid.... It is not only a luminous -estimate of Pitt’s character and policy, it is also a brilliant gallery -of portraits. The portrait of Fox, for example, is a masterpiece.’ - -=PEEL.= By J. R. THURSFIELD, M.A. - -=Daily News.=--‘A model of what such a book should be. We can give it no -higher praise than to say that it is worthy to rank with Mr. John -Morley’s _Walpole_ in the same series.’ - -=CHATHAM.= By FREDERIC HARRISON. - - MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD., LONDON. - - * * * * * - - English Men of Action. - - _With Portraits. Crown 8vo, Cloth. 2s. 6d. each._ - - =NELSON.= By JOHN KNOX LAUGHTON. - - =Saturday Review.=--‘The obligation laid upon him to be brief, and - his own anxiety to leave untold nothing of first-rate importance, - have combined to give us an almost ideal short life of Nelson.’ - - =WOLFE.= By A. G. BRADLEY. - - =Times.=--‘It appears to us to be very well done. The narrative is - easy, the facts have been mastered and well marshalled, and Mr. - Bradley is excellent both in his geographical and in his - biographical details.’ - - =COLIN CAMPBELL= (=Lord Clyde=). By ARCHIBALD FORBES. - - =Times.=--‘A vigorous sketch of a great soldier, a fine character, - and a noble career.... Mr. Forbes writes with a practised and - lively pen, and his experience of warfare in many lands stands him - in good stead in describing Lord Clyde’s services and campaigns.’ - - =GENERAL GORDON.= By Colonel Sir WILLIAM BUTLER. - - =Spectator.=--‘This is beyond all question the best of the narratives - of the career of General Gordon that have yet been published.’ - - =HENRY THE FIFTH.= By Rev. A. J. CHURCH. - - =Scotsman.=--‘No page lacks interest; and whether the book is - regarded as a biographical sketch or as a chapter in English - military history it is equally attractive.’ - - =LIVINGSTONE.= By THOMAS HUGHES. - - =Spectator.=--‘The volume is an excellent instance of miniature - biography.’ - - =LORD LAWRENCE.= By Sir RICHARD TEMPLE. - - =Leeds Mercury.=--‘A lucid, temperate, and impressive summary.’ - - =WELLINGTON.= By GEORGE HOOPER. - - =Scotsman.=--‘The story of the great Duke’s life is admirably told by - Mr. Hooper.’ - - =DAMPIER.= By W. CLARK RUSSELL. - - =Athenæum.=--‘Mr. Clark Russell’s practical knowledge of the sea - enables him to discuss the seafaring life of two centuries ago with - intelligence and vigour. As a commentary on Dampier’s voyages this - little book is among the best.’ - - =MONK.= By JULIAN CORBETT. - - =Saturday Review.=--‘Mr. Corbett indeed gives you the real man.’ - - =STRAFFORD.= By H. D. TRAILL. - - =Athenæum.=--‘A clear and accurate summary of Strafford’s life, - especially as regards his Irish government.’ - - =WARREN HASTINGS.= By Sir ALFRED LYALL. - - =Daily News.=--‘May be pronounced without hesitation as the final and - decisive verdict of history on the conduct and career of Hastings.’ - - =PETERBOROUGH.= By W. STEBBING. - - =Saturday Review.=--‘An excellent piece of work.’ - - =CAPTAIN COOK.= By Sir WALTER BESANT. - - =Scottish Leader.=--‘It is simply the best and most readable account - of the great navigator yet published.’ - - =SIR HENRY HAVELOCK.= By ARCHIBALD FORBES. - - =Speaker.=--‘There is no lack of good writing in this book, and the - narrative is sympathetic as well as spirited.’ - - =CLIVE.= By Colonel Sir CHARLES WILSON. - - =Times.=--‘Sir Charles Wilson, whose literary skill is - unquestionable, does ample justice to a great and congenial theme.’ - - =SIR CHARLES NAPIER.= By Colonel Sir WILLIAM BUTLER. - - =Daily News.=--‘The “English Men of Action” series contains no volume - more fascinating, both in matter and in style.’ - - =WARWICK, THE KING-MAKER.= C. W. C. OMAN. - - =Glasgow Herald.=--‘One of the best and most discerning word-pictures - of the Wars of the Two Roses to be found in the whole range of - English literature.’ - - =DRAKE.= By JULIAN CORBETT. - - =Scottish Leader.=--‘Perhaps the most fascinating of all the fifteen - that have so far appeared.... Written really with excellent - judgment, in a breezy and buoyant style.’ - - =RODNEY.= By DAVID G. HANNAY. - - =Spectator.=--‘An admirable contribution to an admirable series.’ - - =MONTROSE.= By MOWBRAY MORRIS. - - =Times.=--‘A singularly vivid and careful picture of one of the most - romantic figures in Scottish history.’ - - =DUNDONALD.= By the Hon. JOHN W. FORTESCUE. - - =Daily News.=--‘There are many excellent volumes in the “English Men - of Action” Series; but none better written or more interesting than - this.’ - - =CAPTAIN JOHN SMITH.= By A. G. BRADLEY. - - =SIR WALTER RALEIGH.= By Sir RENNELL RODD. - - MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD., LONDON. - -FOOTNOTES: - - [1] Mr. Motley conjectures that the population of Spain and Portugal - may have been 12,000,000. - - [2] The oath of supremacy imposed on members of the House of Commons - in 1562 practically excluded conscientious Catholics. - - [3] He had received the Duchy of Anjou in addition to that of Alençon, - and some historians call him by the former title. - - [4] Hallam, _Constitutional History_, Chapter III. - Macaulay, _Essay on Hallam’s Constitutional History_. - - [5] James had given this man the title and estates of the exiled - Hamiltons. - - [6] Some persons whose names do not appear in the Commission sat on - the trial, while some who were appointed did not sit. - - [7] Those who wish to know the grounds on which Mary’s complicity in - Babington’s plot has been denied can consult Lingard, Tytler, and - Labanoff. In my opinion, their arguments are very feeble. - - [8] There was no formal proclamation of war on either side. - - [9] The remaining Privy Councillors were Archbishop Whitgift, Lord - Chancellor Bromley, the Earls of Shrewsbury and Warwick, Lord - Buckhurst, Sir James Crofts, Sir Ralph Sadler, Sir Walter Mildmay, Sir - Amyas Paulet, and the Latin Secretary, Wolley. - - [10] Kingsley, _Westward Ho_. - - [11] _Institutes_, Fourth Part, Chap. 1. - - [12] These figures are taken from Barrow’s Life of Drake. - - [13] We hear of thirty-three-pounders and even sixty-pounders in the - Queen’s ships. Whereas the Spanish admiral, sending to Parma for - balls, asks for nothing heavier than ten pounds. - - [14] The Earl of Sussex, after inspecting the preparations for defence - in Hampshire towards the end of 1587, writes to the Council that he - had found nothing ready. The “better sort” said, “We are much charged - many ways, and when the enemy comes we will provide for him; but he - will not come yet.” - - [15] Sir Edward Radcliffe to the Earl of Sussex.--_Ellis_, 2nd Series, - vol. iii. p. 142. - - [16] The story of the ring, said to have been intercepted by Lady - Nottingham, has been shown to be unworthy of belief. See Ranke, - _History of England_, vol. i. p. 352; transl. - - [17] The increase was not so great as it appears. A subsidy with two - tenths and fifteenths in the thirteenth year of the reign yielded - £175,000; in the forty-third only £134,000. - - [18] Elizabeth made large use of the courage and fidelity of her - kinsmen on the Boleyn side, but she did little to advance them either - in rank or wealth. Hunsdon had set his heart on regaining the Boleyn - Earldom of Wiltshire. When he was dying, Elizabeth brought the patent - and robes of an earl, and laid them on his bed; but the choleric old - man replied, “Madam, seeing you counted me not worthy of this honour - while I was living, I count myself unworthy of it now I am dying.” - - [19] Son of Catherine Grey by the Earl of Hertford. “Rascal” at that - time meant a person of low birth. - - [20] Bacon, _In felicem memoriam Elizabethæ_. - - [21] Carlyle, _Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell_, Speech v. - - [22] As Earl of Surrey commanded at Flodden. - - [23] Minister of Henry VIII. - - [24] The Poet. Beheaded by Henry VIII. - - [25] Married Duke of Richmond, natural son of Henry VIII. - - [26] Beheaded by Elizabeth. Title forfeited. - - [27] Earl of Arundel in right of his mother 1st wife of father. Died - in Tower. - - [28] Lord Walden in right of his mother 2nd wife of father. - - [29] “Belted Will,” married co-heiress of Lord Dacre of Naworth. - - [30] Elizabeth Howard married Sir Thomas Boleyn created Earl of - Wiltshire and Ormonde by Henry VIII. - - [31] Lord Admiral. Created Lord Effingham by Mary. - - [32] Lord Admiral. Commanded against Armada. Created Earl of - Nottingham by Elizabeth. - - [33] Created Earl of Northampton by James I. - - [34] Created Earl of Wiltshire and Ormonde by Henry - VIII. - - [35] Daughter of 2nd Duke of Norfolk. - - [36] Beheaded by Henry VIII. - - [37] Elizabeth’s Minister and General. - - [38] Carried news of Elizabeth’s death to James; created by him Earl - of Monmouth. - - [39] Said to have withheld Essex’s ring from Elizabeth. - - [40] Beheaded by Elizabeth. - - [41] Daughter of Sir Francis Walsingham and widow of Sir Philip Sidney. - -Typographical errors corrected by the etext transcriber: - -that to establish a permanent raw=> that to establish a permanent war -{pg 36} - -Mary believed that in every country=> Mary believed that in every county -{pg 53} - -They were in fact created a Provisional Government=> They were in fact -creating a Provisional Government {pg 176} - - - - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's Queen Elizabeth, by Edward Spencer Beesly - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK QUEEN ELIZABETH *** - -***** This file should be named 50982-0.txt or 50982-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/0/9/8/50982/ - -Produced by Chuck Greif and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images available at The Internet Archive) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: Queen Elizabeth - -Author: Edward Spencer Beesly - -Release Date: January 20, 2016 [EBook #50982] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK QUEEN ELIZABETH *** - - - - -Produced by Chuck Greif and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images available at The Internet Archive) - - - - - - -</pre> - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p class="eng">Twelve English Statesmen<br /> </p> - -<p class="cb">QUEEN ELIZABETH<br /> </p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/cover.jpg" width="269" height="450" alt="[images of the -book-cover not available]" /> -</div> - -<p class="c"><img src="images/colophon.png" -width="150" -height="51" -alt="[image not available]" /></p> - -<p> </p> - -<h1>QUEEN ELIZABETH</h1> - -<p class="c">BY<br /> -EDWARD SPENCER BEESLY</p> - -<p> </p> - -<div class="poetry"> -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<span class="i0"><i>Sine ira et studio, quorum causas procul habeo.</i><br /></span> -<span class="i12"><span class="smcap">Tacitus</span>, Ann. <small>I.</small> 1.<br /></span> -</div></div> -</div> - -<p class="c"> -<span class="eng">London</span><br /> -MACMILLAN AND CO., <span class="smcap">Limited</span><br /> -NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY<br /> -1906<br /> -<br /> -<i>All rights reserved</i><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">First Edition printed February 1892.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Reprinted March 1892; 1895; 1897; 1900; 1903; 1906.</span><br /> -</p> - -<h2><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS"></a>CONTENTS</h2> - -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><th colspan="2" align="center" class="c"><a href="#CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I</a></th></tr> - -<tr><td> </td><td align="right"><small>PAGE</small></td></tr> - -<tr><td valign="top"><span class="smcap">Early Life, 1533-1558</span></td><td align="right" valign="bottom"><a href="#page_1">1</a></td></tr> - -<tr><th colspan="2" align="center" class="c"><a href="#CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II</a></th></tr> - -<tr><td valign="top"><span class="smcap">The Change of Religion, 1559</span></td><td align="right" valign="bottom"><a href="#page_6">6</a></td></tr> - -<tr><th colspan="2" align="center" class="c"><a href="#CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III</a></th></tr> - -<tr><td valign="top"><span class="smcap">Foreign Relations, 1559-1563</span></td><td align="right" valign="bottom"><a href="#page_18">18</a></td></tr> - -<tr><th colspan="2" align="center" class="c"><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV</a></th></tr> - -<tr><td valign="top"><span class="smcap">Elizabeth and Mary Stuart, 1559-1568</span></td><td align="right" valign="bottom"><a href="#page_38">38</a></td></tr> - -<tr><th colspan="2" align="center" class="c"><a href="#CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V</a></th></tr> - -<tr><td valign="top"><span class="smcap">Aristocratic Plots, 1568-1572</span></td><td align="right" valign="bottom"><a href="#page_78">78</a></td></tr> - -<tr><th colspan="2" align="center" class="c"><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI</a></th></tr> - -<tr><td valign="top"><span class="smcap">Foreign Affairs, 1572-1583</span></td><td align="right" valign="bottom"><a href="#page_101">101</a></td></tr> - -<tr><th colspan="2" align="center" class="c"><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII</a></th></tr> - -<tr><td valign="top"><span class="smcap">The Papal Attack, 1570-1583</span></td><td align="right" valign="bottom"><a href="#page_128">128</a></td></tr> - -<tr><th colspan="2" align="center" class="c"><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII</a></th></tr> - -<tr><td valign="top"><span class="smcap">Protectorate of the Netherlands, 1584-1586</span></td><td align="right" valign="bottom"><a href="#page_156">156</a></td></tr> - -<tr><th colspan="2" align="center" class="c"><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX</a></th></tr> - -<tr><td valign="top"><span class="smcap">Execution of the Queen of Scots: 1584-1587</span></td><td align="right" valign="bottom"><a href="#page_174">174</a></td></tr> - -<tr><th colspan="2" align="center" class="c"><a href="#CHAPTER_X">CHAPTER X</a></th></tr> - -<tr><td valign="top"><span class="smcap">War with Spain, 1587-1603</span></td><td align="right" valign="bottom"><a href="#page_188">188</a></td></tr> - -<tr><th colspan="2" align="center" class="c"><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">CHAPTER XI</a></th></tr> - -<tr><td valign="top"><span class="smcap">Domestic Affairs, 1588-1601</span></td><td align="right" valign="bottom"><a href="#page_211">211</a></td></tr> - -<tr><th colspan="2" align="center" class="c"><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">CHAPTER XII</a></th></tr> - -<tr><td valign="top"><span class="smcap">Last Years and Death, 1601-1603</span></td><td align="right" valign="bottom"><a href="#page_230">230</a></td></tr> - -<tr><th colspan="2" align="center" class="c"><a href="#APPENDIX">APPENDIX</a></th></tr> - -<tr><td><a href="#APPENDIX_A">A.—</a><span class="smcap">Sessions of Parliament in the Reign of Elizabeth</span></td><td align="right" valign="bottom"><a href="#page_243">243</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td><a href="#APPENDIX_B">B.—</a><span class="smcap">Principal Howards Contemporaries of Elizabeth</span></td><td align="right" valign="bottom"><a href="#page_244">244</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td><a href="#APPENDIX_C">C.—</a><span class="smcap">Principal Boleyn Relations of Elizabeth</span></td><td align="right" valign="bottom"><a href="#page_245">245</a></td></tr> -</table> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="page_1" id="page_1"></a>{1}</span></p> - -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I"></a>CHAPTER I<br /><br /> -<small>EARLY LIFE: 1533-1558</small></h2> - -<p class="nind">I <small>HAVE</small> to deal, under strict limitations of space, with a long life, -almost the whole of its adult period passed in the exercise of -sovereignty—a life which is in effect the history of England during -forty-five years, abounding at the same time in personal interest, and -the subject, both in its public and private aspects, of fierce and -probably interminable controversies. Evidently a bird’s-eye view is all -that can be attempted: and the most important episodes alone can be -selected for consideration.</p> - -<p>The daughter of Henry <small>VIII.</small> and Anne Boleyn was born on September 6, -1533. Anne was niece of Thomas, third Duke of Norfolk, and all the great -Howard kinsmen attended at the baptism four days afterwards. Elizabeth -was two years and eight months old when her mother was beheaded, and she -herself was declared illegitimate by Act of Parliament. It is not -recorded that in after years she expressed any opinion about her mother -or ever mentioned her name. She never took any steps to get the Act of -attainder repealed; but perhaps she indirectly showed her belief<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_2" id="page_2"></a>{2}</span> in -Anne’s innocence by raising the son of Norris, her alleged paramour, to -the peerage, and by the great favour she always showed to his family.</p> - -<p>During her father’s life Elizabeth lived chiefly at Hatfield with her -brother Edward, under a governess. Henry had been empowered by -Parliament in 1536 to settle the succession by his will. In 1544 he -caused an Act to be passed placing Mary and Elizabeth next in order of -succession after Edward. By his will, made a few days before his death, -he repeated the provisions of the Act of 1544, and placed next to -Elizabeth the daughters of his younger sister, the Duchess of Suffolk, -tacitly passing over his elder sister, the Queen of Scotland.</p> - -<p>After her father’s death (Jan. 1547) Elizabeth, then a girl of thirteen, -went to reside with the Queen Dowager Catherine, who had not been many -weeks a widow before she married her old lover Thomas Seymour, the Lord -Admiral, brother of the Protector Somerset, described as “fierce in -courage, courtly in fashion, in personage stately, in voice magnificent, -but somewhat empty of matter.” The romping that soon began to go on -between this dangerous man and Elizabeth was of such a nature that early -in the next year Catherine found it necessary to send her away somewhat -abruptly. From that time she resided chiefly at Hatfield.</p> - -<p>In August 1548 Catherine died, and the Admiral at once formed the -project of marrying Elizabeth. This and other ambitious designs brought -him to the scaffold (March 1549). It does not appear that Elizabeth saw -or directly corresponded with him after he was a<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_3" id="page_3"></a>{3}</span> widower. But she -listened to his messages, and dropped remarks of an encouraging kind -which she meant to be repeated to him. She knew perfectly well that the -marriage would not be permitted. She was only flirting with a man old -enough to be her father just as she afterwards flirted with men young -enough to be her sons. We already get a glimpse of the utter absence -both of delicacy and depth of feeling which characterised her through -life. When she heard of the Admiral’s execution she simply remarked, -“This day died a man with much wit and very little judgment.” With -Elizabeth the heart never really spoke, and if the senses did, she had -them under perfect control. And this was why she never loved or was -loved, and never has been or will be regarded with enthusiasm by either -man or woman. For some time after this scandal she was evidently -somewhat under a cloud. She lived at her manor-houses of Ashridge, -Enfield, and Hatfield, diligently pursuing her studies under the -celebrated scholar Ascham.</p> - -<p>When Edward died (July 6, 1553) Elizabeth was nearly twenty. Although -Mary’s cause was her own, she remained carefully neutral during the -short queenship of Jane. On its collapse she hastened to congratulate -her sister, and rode by her side when she made her entry into London. -During the early part of Mary’s reign her life hung by a thread. The -slightest indiscretion would have been fatal to her. Wyatt’s -insurrection was made avowedly in her favour. But neither to that nor -any other conspiracy did she extend the smallest encouragement. Her -prudent and blameless conduct gave her the more right in after years to<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_4" id="page_4"></a>{4}</span> -deal severely with Mary Stuart, whose behaviour under precisely similar -circumstances was so very different.</p> - -<p>Renard, the Spanish ambassador, demanded her execution as the condition -of the Spanish match, and Mary assured him that she would do her best to -satisfy him. In the time of Henry <small>VIII.</small> such an intention on the part of -the sovereign would have been equivalent to a sentence of death. But -Mary was far from being as powerful as her father. The Council had to be -reckoned with, and in the Council independent and even peremptory -language was now to be heard. It was not without strong protests on the -part of some of the Lords that Elizabeth was sent to the Tower. Sussex, -a noble of the old blood, who was charged to conduct her there, took -upon him to delay her departure, that she might appeal to the Queen for -an interview. Mary was furious: “For their lives,” she said, “they durst -not have acted so in her father’s time; she wished he was alive and -among them for a single month.” But it was useless to storm. The -absolute monarchy had seen its best days. Sussex, fearing foul play, -warned the Lieutenant of the Tower to keep within his written -instructions. Howard of Effingham, the Lord Admiral, had done more than -any one else to place Mary on the throne. But he was Elizabeth’s -great-uncle, and he angrily insisted that her food in the Tower should -be prepared by her own servants. A proposal in Parliament to give the -Queen the power to nominate a successor was received with such disfavour -that it had to be withdrawn. Finally the judges declared that there was -no evidence to convict Elizabeth. Sullenly therefore the Queen had to -give way.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_5" id="page_5"></a>{5}</span> Elizabeth was sent to Woodstock, where she resided for about -a year under guard. This was only reasonable. An heir to the throne, in -whose favour there had been plots, could not expect complete freedom. In -October 1555 she was allowed to go to Hatfield under the surveillance of -Sir Thomas Pope. During the rest of the reign she escaped molestation by -outward conformity to the Catholic religion, and by taking no part -whatever in politics. But as it became clear that her accession was at -hand there can be no doubt that she was engaged in studying the problems -with which she would have to deal. She was already in close intimacy -with Cecil, and it is evident that she mounted the throne with a policy -carefully thought out in its main lines.</p> - -<p>When Mary was known to be dying, the Spanish ambassador, Feria, called -on Elizabeth, and told her that his master had exerted his influence -with the Queen and Council on her behalf, and had secured her -succession. But she declined to be patronised, and told him that the -people and nobility were on her side.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_6" id="page_6"></a>{6}</span></p> - -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II"></a>CHAPTER II<br /><br /> -<small>THE CHANGE OF RELIGION: 1559</small></h2> - -<p class="nind">M<small>ARY</small> died on the 17th of November 1558. Parliament was then sitting, -and, in communicating the event to both Houses, Archbishop Heath frankly -took the initiative in recognising Elizabeth, “of whose most lawful -right and title in the succession of the Crown, thanks be to God, we -need not to doubt.” He was a staunch Catholic, and two months later -refused to officiate at her coronation. But he was an Englishman, and -even the most convinced Catholics, though looking forward with -uneasiness to the religious policy of the new Queen, were sincerely glad -that there was no danger of a disputed succession. Besides, it was by no -means clear that Elizabeth would not accept the ecclesiastical -constitution as established in the late reign. That there would be an -end of burnings, and of the harassing tyranny of the bishops, every one -felt certain; but it seemed quite upon the cards that Elizabeth would -continue to recognise the headship of the Pope in a formal way and -maintain the Mass. It must be remembered that the religious changes had -only begun some thirty years before. All middle-aged men could<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_7" id="page_7"></a>{7}</span> remember -the time when the ecclesiastical fabric stood to all appearance -unbroken, as it had stood for centuries. Only twenty-four years had -passed since the Act of Supremacy had transferred the headship of the -Church from the Pope to the King; only eleven since the Protestant -doctrine and worship had been forced on the country by the Protector -Somerset, to the horror and disgust of the great majority of Englishmen. -The nation had sorrowed for the death of Edward <small>VI.</small>, because it darkened -the prospects of the succession, and seemed likely sooner or later to -bring on a civil war. But apart from the hot Protestant minority, -chiefly to be found in London, the mass of the nation was conservative, -and welcomed the re-establishment of the old religion as a return to -order and common sense after a short and bitter experience of -revolutionary anarchy. There was a rooted objection to restore the old -meddlesome tyranny of the bishops, and the nobles and squires who had -got hold of the abbey lands would not hear of giving them up. But the -return to communion with the Catholic Church and the recognition of the -Pope as its head gave satisfaction to three-fourths, perhaps to -five-sixths, of the nation, and to a still larger proportion of its most -influential class, the great landed proprietors. Mary’s accession was -the great and unique opportunity for the old Church. If Mary and Pole -had been cool-headed politicians instead of excitable fanatics, if they -had contented themselves with restoring the old worship, depriving the -few Protestant clergy of their benefices, and punishing only outrageous -attacks on the State religion, Elizabeth would not have had the<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_8" id="page_8"></a>{8}</span> power, -it may be doubted whether she would have had the inclination, to undo -her sister’s work.</p> - -<p>This great opportunity was thrown away. Mary’s bishops came back -brooding over the long catalogue of humiliations and indignities which -their Church had suffered, and thirsting to avenge their own wrongs. For -six years they had their fling, and contrived to make the country forget -the period of Protestant mis-government. England had never before known -what it was to be governed by clergymen. It was a sort of rule as -hateful to most Catholic laymen as to Protestants. Catholics therefore -for the most part, as well as Protestants, hailed the accession of -Elizabeth. At any rate there would be an end of the clerical tyranny. -Nor were they without hope that she would maintain the old worship. She -had conformed to it for the last five years, and Philip had given the -word that she was to be supported.</p> - -<p>We are now accustomed to the Papal <i>non possumus</i>. No nation or Church -can hope that the smallest deviation from Roman doctrine or discipline -will be tolerated. But in 1558 the hard and fast line had not yet been -drawn. France was still pressing for such changes as communion in both -kinds, worship in the vulgar tongue, and marriage of priests. The -Council of Trent, it is true, had already in 1545 decided that Catholic -doctrine was contained in the Bible <i>and tradition</i>, and in 1551 had -defined transubstantiation and the sacraments. But in 1552 the Council -was prorogued, and it did not resume till 1562. Doctrine and discipline -therefore might be, and were still considered to be, in the melting-pot, -and no one could be certain what<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_9" id="page_9"></a>{9}</span> would come out. If Elizabeth had -contented herself with the French programme, and had joined France in -pressing it, the other sovereigns, who really cared for nothing but -uniformity, would probably have forced the Pope to compromise. The -Lutheran doctrine of consubstantiation might have been tolerated. The -Anglican formulæ have been held by many to be compatible with a belief -in the Real Presence. The formal severance of England from Catholic -unity might thus have been postponed—possibly avoided—in the same -sense that it has been avoided in France. After the completion of the -Council of Trent (1562-3) it was too late.</p> - -<p>Two years after her accession Elizabeth told the Spanish ambassador, De -Quadra, that her belief was the belief of all the Catholics in the -realm; and on his asking her how then she could have altered religion in -1559, she said she had been compelled to act as she did, and that, if he -knew how she had been driven to it, she was sure he would excuse her. -Seven years later she made the same statement to De Silva. Elizabeth was -habitually so regardless of truth that her assertions can be allowed -little weight when they are improbable. No doubt, as a matter of taste -and feeling, she preferred the Catholic worship. She was not pious. She -was not troubled with a tender conscience or tormented by a sense of -sin. She did not care to cultivate close personal relations with her -God. A religion of form and ceremony suited her better. But her training -had been such as to free her from all superstitious fear or prejudice, -and her religious convictions were determined by her sense of what was<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_10" id="page_10"></a>{10}</span> -most reasonable and convenient. There is not the least evidence that she -was a reluctant agent in the adoption of Protestantism in 1559. Who was -there to coerce her? The Protestants could not have set up a Protestant -competitor. The great nobles, though opposed to persecution and desirous -of minimising the Pope’s authority, would have preferred to leave -worship as it was. But upon one thing Elizabeth was determined. She -would resume the full ecclesiastical supremacy which her father had -annexed to the Crown. She judged, and she probably judged rightly, that -the only way to assure this was to make the breach with the old religion -complete. If she had placed herself in the hands of moderate Catholics -like Paget, possessed with the belief that she could only maintain -herself by the protection of Philip, they would have advised her to be -content with the practical authority over the English Church which many -an English king had known how to exercise. That was not enough for her. -She desired a position free from all ambiguity and possibility of -dispute, not one which would have to be defended with constant vigilance -and at the cost of incessant bickering.</p> - -<p>From the point of view of her foreign relations the moment might seem to -be a dangerous one for carrying out a religious revolution, and many a -statesman with a deserved reputation for prudence would have counselled -delay. But this disadvantage was more than counterbalanced by the -unpopularity which the cruelties and disasters of Mary’s last three -years had brought upon the most active Catholics. Again, Elizabeth no -doubt recognised that the Catholics, though<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_11" id="page_11"></a>{11}</span> at present the strongest, -were the declining party. The future was with the Protestants. It was -the young men who had fixed their hopes upon her in her sister’s time, -and who were ready to rally round her now. By her natural disposition, -and by her culture, she belonged to the Renaissance rather than to the -Reformation. But obscurantist as Calvinism essentially was, the -Calvinists, as a minority struggling for freedom to think and teach what -they believed, represented for a time the cause of light and -intellectual emancipation. Was she to put herself at the head of -reaction or progress? She did not love the Calvinists. They were too -much in earnest for her. Their narrow creed was as tainted with -superstition as that of Rome, and, at bottom, was less humane, less -favourable to progress. But whom else had she to work with? The -reasonable, secular-minded, tolerant sceptics are not always the best -fighting material; and at that time they were few in number and -tending—in England at least—to be ground out of existence between the -upper and nether millstones of the rival fanaticisms. If she broke with -Catholicism she would be sure of the ardent and unwavering support of -one-third of the nation; so sure, that she would have no need to take -any further pains to please them. As for the remaining two-thirds, she -hoped to conciliate most of them by posing as their protector against -the persecution which would have been pleasing to Protestant bigots.</p> - -<p>In the policy of a complete breach with Rome, Cecil was disposed to go -as far as the Queen, and further. Cecil was at this time thirty-eight. -For forty years he continued to be the confidential and faithful -servant<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_12" id="page_12"></a>{12}</span> of Elizabeth. One of those new men whom the Tudors most -trusted, he was first employed by Henry <small>VIII.</small> Under Edward he rose to be -Secretary of State, and was a pronounced Protestant. On the fall of his -patron Somerset he was for a short time sent to the Tower, but was soon -in office again—sooner, some thought, than was quite decent—under his -patron’s old enemy, Northumberland. He signed the letters-patent by -which the crown was conferred on Lady Jane Grey; but took an early -opportunity of going over to Mary. During her reign he conformed to the -old religion, and, though not holding any office, was consulted on -public business, and was one of the three commissioners who went to -fetch Cardinal Pole to England. Thoroughly capable in business, one of -those to whom power naturally falls because they know how to use it, a -shrewd balancer of probabilities, without a particle of fanaticism in -his composition and detesting it in others, though ready to make use of -it to serve his ends, entirely believing that “what-e’er is best -administered is best,” Cecil nevertheless had his religious -predilections, and they were all on the side of the Protestants. -Moreover he had a personal motive which, by the nature of the case, was -not present to the Queen. She might die prematurely; and if that event -should take place before the Protestant ascendancy was firmly -established his power would be at an end, and his very life would be in -danger. A time came when he and his party had so strengthened -themselves, if not in absolute numerical superiority, yet by the hold -they had established on all departments of Government from the highest -to<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_13" id="page_13"></a>{13}</span> the lowest, that they were in a condition to resist a Catholic -claimant to the throne, if need were, sword in hand. But during the -early years of the reign Cecil was working with the rope round his neck. -Hence he could not regard the progress of events with the imperturbable -<i>sang-froid</i> which Elizabeth always displayed; and all his influence was -employed to push the religious revolution through as rapidly and -completely as possible.</p> - -<p>The story that Elizabeth was influenced in her attitude to Rome by an -arrogant reply from Pope Paul <small>IV.</small> to her official notification of her -accession, though refuted by Lingard and Hallam in their later editions, -has been repeated by recent historians. Her accession was notified to -every friendly sovereign except the Pope. He was studiously ignored from -the first. Equally unsupported by facts are all attempts to show that -during the early weeks of her reign she had not made up her mind as to -the course she would take about religion. All preaching, it is true, was -suspended by proclamation; and it was ordered that the established -worship should go on “until consultation might be had in Parliament by -the Queen and the three Estates.” In the meantime she had herself -crowned according to the ancient ritual by the Catholic Bishop of -Carlisle. But this is only what might have been expected from a strong -ruler who was not disposed to let important alterations be initiated by -popular commotion or the presumptuous forwardness of individual -clergymen. The impending change was quite sufficiently marked from the -first by the removal of the most bigoted Catholics from the<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_14" id="page_14"></a>{14}</span> Council and -by the appointment of Cecil and Bacon to the offices of Secretary and of -Lord Keeper. The new Parliament, Protestant candidates for which had -been recommended by the Government, met as soon as possible (Jan. 25, -1559). When it rose (May 8th) the great change had been legally and -decisively accomplished.</p> - -<p>The government, worship, and doctrine of the Established Church are the -most abiding marks left by Elizabeth on the national life of England. -Logically it might have been expected that the settlement of doctrine -would precede that of government and worship. It is characteristic of a -State Church that the inverse order should have been followed. For the -Queen the most important question was Church government; for the people, -worship. Both these matters were disposed of with great promptitude at -the beginning of 1559. Doctrine might interest the clergy; but it could -wait. The Thirty-nine Articles were not adopted by Convocation till -1563, and were not sanctioned by Parliament till 1571.</p> - -<p>The government of the Church was settled by the Act of Supremacy (April -1559). It revived the Act of Henry <small>VIII.</small>, except that the Queen was -styled Supreme Governor of the Church instead of Supreme Head, although -the nature of the supremacy was precisely the same. The penalties were -relaxed. Henry’s oath of supremacy might be tendered to any subject, and -to decline it was high treason; Elizabeth’s oath was to be obligatory -only on persons holding spiritual or temporal office under the Crown, -and the penalty for declining was the loss of such office. Those who<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_15" id="page_15"></a>{15}</span> -chose to <i>attack</i> the supremacy were still liable to the penalties of -treason on the third offence.</p> - -<p>Worship was settled with equal expedition by the Act of Uniformity -(April 1559), which imposed the second or more Protestant Prayer-book of -Edward <small>VI.</small>, but with a few very important alterations. A deprecation in -the Litany of “the tyranny of the Bishop of Rome and all his detestable -enormities,” and a rubric which declared that by kneeling at the -Communion no adoration was intended to any real and essential presence -of Christ, were expunged. The words of administration in the present -communion service consist of two sentences. The first sentence, implying -real presence, belonged to Edward’s first Prayer-book; the second, -implying mere commemoration, belonged to his second Prayer-book. The -Prayer-book of 1559 simply pieced the two together, with a view to -satisfy both Catholics and Protestants. Lastly, the vestments prescribed -in Edward’s first Prayer-book were retained till further notice. These -alterations of Edward’s second Prayer-book, all of them designed to -propitiate the Catholics, were dictated by Elizabeth herself. In all -this legislation Convocation was entirely ignored. Both its houses -showed themselves strongly Catholic. But their opinion was not asked, -and no notice was taken of their remonstrances.</p> - -<p>While determining that England should have a purely national Church, and -for that reason casting in her lot with the Protestants, Elizabeth, as -we have seen, made very considerable sacrifices of logic and consistency -in order to induce Catholics to conform. Like a strong and wise -statesman, she did not allow<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_16" id="page_16"></a>{16}</span> herself to be driven into one concession -after another, but went at once as far as she intended to go. At the -same time the coercion applied to the Catholics, while sufficient to -influence the worldly-minded majority, was, during the early part of her -reign, very mild for those times. She wished no one to be molested who -did not go out of his way to invite it. Outward conformity was all she -wanted. And of this mere attendance at church was accepted as sufficient -evidence. The principal difficulty, of course, was with the clergy. From -them more than a mere passive conformity had to be exacted. To sign -declarations, take oaths, and officiate in church was a severer strain -on the conscience. It is said that less than 200 out of 9400 sacrificed -their benefices rather than conform, and that of these about 100 were -dignitaries. The number must be under-stated; for the chief difficulty -of the new bishops, for a long time, was to find clergymen for the -parish churches. But we cannot doubt that the large majority of the -parish clergy stuck to their livings, remaining Catholics at heart, and -avoiding, where they could, and as long as they could, compliance with -the new regulations. It must not be supposed that the enactment of -religious changes by Parliament was equivalent, as it would be at the -present day, to their immediate enforcement throughout the country; -especially in the north where the great proprietors and justices of the -peace did not carry out the law. A certain number of the ejected priests -continued to celebrate the ancient rites privately in the houses of the -more earnest Catholics; for which they were not unfrequently punished by -imprisonment.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_17" id="page_17"></a>{17}</span> Of course this was persecution. But according to the -ideas of that day it was a very mild kind of persecution; and where it -occurred it seems to have been due to the zeal of some of the bishops, -and to private busybodies who set the law in motion, rather than to any -systematic action on the part of the Government.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_18" id="page_18"></a>{18}</span></p> - -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III"></a>CHAPTER III<br /><br /> -<small>FOREIGN RELATIONS: 1559-1563</small></h2> - -<p class="nind">T<small>HE</small> successful wars waged by Edward <small>III.</small> and Henry <small>V.</small> are apt to cause -an exaggerated estimate of the strength of England under the Tudors. The -population—Wales included—was probably not much more than four -millions. That of France was perhaps four times as large, and the -superiority in wealth was even greater.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> Before the reign of Louis -<small>XI.</small>, France, weakened by feudal disunion, had been an easy prey to her -smaller but better-organised neighbour. The work of concentration -effected by the greatest of French kings towards the close of the -fifteenth century, and the simultaneous rise of the great Spanish -empire, caused England to fall at once into the rank of a second-rate -power. Such she really was under Henry <small>VIII.</small>, notwithstanding the rather -showy figure he managed to make by adhering alternately to Charles <small>V.</small> -and Francis <small>I.</small> Under the bad government of Edward and Mary the fighting -strength of England declined not only relatively, but absolutely, until -in the last<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_19" id="page_19"></a>{19}</span> year of Mary it touched the lowest point in our history. -Although we were at war with France, there were no soldiers, no -officers, no arms, no fortresses that could resist artillery, few ships, -a heavy debt, and deep discouragement. The loss of Calais, which had -been held for 200 years, was the simple and natural consequence of this -prostration. Justice will not be done to the great recovery under -Elizabeth unless we understand how low the country had sunk when she -came to the throne.</p> - -<p>During the early years of her reign, it was the universal opinion at -home and abroad that without Spanish protection she could not preserve -her throne against a French invasion in the interests of Mary Stuart. -Henry <small>II.</small> meant that, by the marriage of the Dauphin Francis with Mary, -the kingdoms of England and Scotland should be united to one another and -eventually to France. Philip would thus lose the command of the sea -route to the Netherlands, and the hereditary duel with the House of -Austria would be decided. This scheme could not seem fantastic in a -century which had seen such immense agglomerations of territory effected -by political marriages. Philip, on the other hand, made sure that the -danger from France must necessarily throw Elizabeth and England into his -arms. Notwithstanding the warnings he received from his ambassador Feria -that Elizabeth was a heretic, he felt certain that she would not venture -to alter religion at the risk of offending him. The only question with -him was whether he should marry her himself or bestow her on some sure -friend of his house. That she would refuse both himself<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_20" id="page_20"></a>{20}</span> and his nominee -was a contingency he never contemplated.</p> - -<p>Elizabeth, from the first, made up her mind that the cards in her hand -could be played to more advantage than Philip supposed. England, no -doubt, needed his protection for the present. But could he please -himself about granting it? Her bold calculation was that his own -interests would compel him, in any case, to prevent the execution of the -Stuart-Valois scheme, and that consequently she might settle religion -without reference to his wishes.</p> - -<p>The offer of marriage came in January 1559. In his letter to Feria, -Philip spoke as if Elizabeth would of course jump at it. After dwelling -on its many inconveniences, he said he had decided to make the sacrifice -on condition that Elizabeth would uphold the Catholic religion; but she -must not expect him to remain long with her; he would visit England -occasionally. Feria foolishly allowed this letter to be seen, and the -contents were reported to Elizabeth. She was as much amused as piqued. -Their ages were not unsuitable. Philip was thirty-two, and Elizabeth was -twenty-five. But she was as fastidious about men as her father was about -women; and for no political consideration would she have tied herself to -her ugly, disagreeable, little brother-in-law. After some fencing, she -replied that she did not mean to marry, and that she was not afraid of -France.</p> - -<p>Before the death of Mary, negotiations for a peace between France, -Spain, and England had already begun. Calais was almost the only -difficulty remaining to be settled. Our countrymen have never been able<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_21" id="page_21"></a>{21}</span> -to understand how their possession of a fortress within the natural -boundaries of another country can be disagreeable to its inhabitants. -Elizabeth shared the national feeling, and she wanted Philip to insist -on the restitution of Calais. He would have done so if she had pleased -him as to other matters. Even as it was, the presence of a French -garrison in Calais was so inconvenient to the master of the Netherlands -that he was ready to fight on if England would do her part. But -Elizabeth would only promise to fight Scotland—a very indirect and, -indeed, useless way of supporting Philip. When once this point was made -clear, peace was soon concluded between the three powers at Câteau, near -Cambray (March 1559); appearances being saved by a stipulation that -Calais should be restored in eight years, or half a million of crowns be -forfeited.</p> - -<p>In thus giving way Elizabeth showed her good sense. To have fought on -would have meant deeper debt, terrible exhaustion, and, what was worse, -dependence on Philip. Moreover, Calais could only have been recovered by -reducing France to helplessness, which would have been fatal to the -balance of power on which Elizabeth relied to make herself independent -of both her great neighbours. The peace of Câteau Cambresis was attended -with a secret compact between Philip <small>II.</small> and Henry <small>II.</small>, that each -monarch should suppress heresy in his own dominions and not encourage it -in those of his neighbour. By the accession of Elizabeth, and the Scotch -Reformation which immediately followed, Protestantism reached its -high-water mark in Europe. The long wars of Charles <span class="pagenum"><a name="page_22" id="page_22"></a>{22}</span><small>V.</small> with France had -enabled it to spread. Francis <small>I.</small> had intrigued with the Protestant -princes of the Empire, and Charles had been obliged to humour them. -Protestantism was victorious in Britain, Scandinavia, North Germany, the -Palatinate, and Swabia. It had spread widely in Poland, Hungary, the -Netherlands, and France. This rapid growth was now about to be checked. -In some of these countries the new religion was destined to succumb; in -some entirely to disappear. Men who could remember the first preachings -of Luther lived to see not only the high-water, but the ebb, of the -Protestant tide. The revolutionary tendencies inherent in Protestantism -began to alarm the sovereigns; and all the more because the Church in -Catholic, hardly less than in Protestant, countries was becoming a -department of the State. Kings had been jealous of the spiritual power -when it belonged to the Popes. They became jealous for it when it was -annexed to the throne.</p> - -<p>Notwithstanding its secret stipulations, the peace of Câteau Cambresis -relieved England from the most pressing and immediate perils by which -she was threatened. Neither French nor Spanish troops had made their -appearance on our soil. A breathing-time at least had been gained, -during which something might be done towards putting the country in a -state of defence, and restoring the finances.</p> - -<p>But the danger from France was by no means at an end. In the treaty with -England, the title of Elizabeth had been acknowledged. But in that with -Spain, the Dauphin had styled himself “King of Scotland, England, and -Ireland.” He and Mary had also<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_23" id="page_23"></a>{23}</span> assumed the English arms. If a French -army invaded England, it would come by way of Scotland. The English -Catholics, who had for the most part frankly accepted the succession of -Elizabeth, were disappointed and irritated by the change of religion. If -Mary should go to Scotland with a French force, it was to be apprehended -that a rebellion would immediately break out in the northern counties. -Philip, no doubt, would land in the south to drive out the Dauphiness. -But the remedy would be worse than the disease. For he was deeply -discontented with the conduct of Elizabeth, and would probably take the -opportunity of deposing her. To establish, therefore, her independence -of both her powerful neighbours, Elizabeth had to begin by destroying -French influence in Scotland.</p> - -<p>The wisest heads in Scotland had long seen the advantage of uniting -their country to England by marriage. The blundering and bullying policy -of the Protector Somerset had driven the Scotch to renew their ancient -alliance with France. But the attempts of the Regent Mary of Guise to -increase French influence, and to establish a small standing army, in -order at once to strengthen her authority, and to serve the designs of -Henry <small>II.</small> against England, had again made the French connection -unpopular, and caused a corresponding revival of friendly feeling -towards England.</p> - -<p>Nowhere was the Church so wealthy, relatively to the other estates, as -in Scotland. It was supposed to possess half the property of the -country. Nowhere were the clergy so immoral. Nowhere was superstition<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_24" id="page_24"></a>{24}</span> -so gross. But the doctrines of the Reformation were spreading among the -common people, and in 1557 some of the nobles, hungering for the wealth -of the Church, put themselves at the head of the Protestant movement. -They were known as the “Lords of the Congregation.”</p> - -<p>The Scotch Reformation began not from the Government, as in England, but -from the people. Hence, while change of supremacy was the main question -in England, change of doctrine and worship took the lead in Scotland. -The two parties were about equal in numbers, the Protestants being -strongest in the Lowlands. But, with the exception of the murder of -Beaton in 1546, there had, as yet, been no appeal to force, nor any -attempt to procure a public change of religion. The accession of -Elizabeth emboldened the Protestants. At Perth they took possession of -the churches and burnt a monastery. On the other hand, after the peace -of Câteau Cambresis, Henry <small>II.</small> directed the Regent to put down -Protestantism, both in pursuance of the agreement with Philip, and in -order to prepare for the Franco-Scottish invasion of England. The result -was that the Protestants rose in open rebellion (June 1559). The Lords -of the Congregation occupied Perth, Stirling, and Edinburgh. All over -the Lowlands abbeys were wrecked, monks harried, churches cleared of -images, the Mass abolished, and King Edward’s service established in its -place. In England the various changes of religion in the last thirty -years had always been effected legally by King and Parliament. In -Scotland the Catholic Church was overthrown by a simultaneous popular -outbreak.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_25" id="page_25"></a>{25}</span> The catastrophe came later than in England; but popular -feeling was more prepared for it; and what was now cast down was never -set up again.</p> - -<p>It seemed at first as if the Regent and her handful of regular troops, -commanded by d’Oysel, would be swept away. But d’Oysel had fortified -Leith, and was even able to take the field. A French army was expected. -The tumultuary forces of the needy Scotch nobles could not be kept -together long, and it became clear that, unless supported by Elizabeth, -the rebellion would be crushed as soon as the French reinforcements -should arrive, if not sooner.</p> - -<p>Thus early did Elizabeth find herself confronted by the Scottish -difficulty, which was to cause her so much anxiety throughout the -greater part of her reign. The problem, though varying in minor details, -was always essentially the same. There was a Protestant faction looking -for support to England, and a Catholic faction looking to France. Two or -three of the Protestant leaders—Moray, Glencairn, Kirkaldy—did really -care something about a religious reformation. The rest thought more of -getting hold of Church lands and pursuing old family feuds. In the -experience of Elizabeth, they were a needy, greedy, treacherous crew, -always sponging on her treasury, and giving her very little service in -return for her money. Besides, the whole Scotch nation was so touchy in -its patriotism, so jealous of foreign interference, that foreign -soldiers present on its soil were sure to be regarded with an evil eye, -no matter for what purpose they had come, or by whom they had been -invited.</p> - -<p>The Lords of the Congregation invoked the protection<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_26" id="page_26"></a>{26}</span> of Elizabeth. They -suggested that she should marry the Earl of Arran, and that he and she -should be King and Queen of Great Britain. Arran was the eldest son of -the Duke of Chatelherault, who, Mary being as yet childless, was -heir-presumptive to the Scottish crown. There were many reasons why -Elizabeth should decline interference. It was throwing down the glove to -France. Interference in Scotland had always been disastrous. It might -drive the English Catholics to despair, as cutting off the hope of -Mary’s succession to the English crown. To make a Protestant match would -irritate Philip. He might invade England to forestall the French. Almost -all her Council—even Bacon—advised her to leave Scotland alone, marry -the Archduke Charles, and trust to the Spanish alliance for the defence -of England.</p> - -<p>These were serious considerations; and to them was to be joined another -which with Elizabeth always had great weight—more, naturally, than it -had with any of her advisers. She shrank from doing anything which might -have the practical effect of weakening the common cause of monarchs. She -felt instinctively that with Protestants reverence for the religious -basis of kingship must tend to become weaker than with Catholics. She -did not desire to encourage this tendency or to familiarise her own -subjects with it. Knox’s <i>First Blast of the Trumpet against the -Monstrous Regimen of Women</i> had been directed against Mary. The Blasts -that were to follow had been dropped; but the first could not be treated -as unblown. And the arrogant preacher did not mend matters by writing to -Elizabeth that she was to consider<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_27" id="page_27"></a>{27}</span> her case as an exception “contrary -to nature,” allowed by God “for the comfort of His kirk,” but that if -she based her title on her birth or on law, “her felicity would be -short.”</p> - -<p>Nevertheless Elizabeth adopted the bolder course. The Lords of the -Congregation were assured that England would not see them crushed by -French arms. A small supply of money was sent to them. As to the -marriage with Arran, no positive answer was given; but he was sent for -to be looked at. When he came, he was found to be even a poorer creature -than his father; at times, indeed, not quite right in his mind. It was -hard upon the Hamiltons, among whom were so many able and daring men, -that, with the crown almost in their grasp, their chiefs should be such -incapables. To Elizabeth it was no doubt a relief to find that Arran was -an impossible husband.</p> - -<p>In the meantime 2000 French had arrived, and the Lords were urgent in -their demands for help. But Elizabeth determined, and rightly, that they -must do their own work if they could. She was willing to give them such -pecuniary help as was necessary. But the demand for troops was -unreasonable. Fighting men abounded in Scotland. Why should English -troops be sent to do their fighting for them, with the certainty of -earning black looks rather than thanks? If a large army was despatched -from France, she would attack it with her fleet. If it landed, she would -send an English army. But if the Lords of the Congregation did not beat -the handful of Frenchmen at Leith it must be because they were either -weak or treacherous. In either case Elizabeth might have to give up<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_28" id="page_28"></a>{28}</span> the -policy she preferred, leave Scotland alone, and fall back upon an -alliance with Philip.</p> - -<p>In order therefore to preserve this second string to her bow, and to let -the Scotch Anglophiles see that she possessed it, she reopened -negotiations for the Austrian marriage. Charles, in his turn, was -invited to come and be looked at. Much as she disliked the idea of -marriage, she knew that political reasons might make it necessary. But, -come what would, she would never marry a man who was not to her fancy as -a man. She would take no one on the strength of his picture. She had -heard that Charles was not over-wise, and that he had an extraordinarily -big head, “bigger than the Earl of Bedford’s.”</p> - -<p>The Scotch Lords, finding that Elizabeth was determined to have some -solid return for her money, went to work with more vigour. They -proclaimed the deposition of the Regent, drove her from Edinburgh, and -besieged her and her French garrison in Leith. But this burst of energy -was soon over. The Protestants were more ready to pull down images and -harry monks than make campaigns. Leith was not to be taken. In three -weeks their army dwindled away, and the little disciplined force of -Frenchmen re-entered Edinburgh.</p> - -<p>The position had become very critical for Elizabeth. A French army of -15,000 men was daily expected at Leith. If once it landed, the -Congregation would be crushed; the Hamiltons would make their peace; and -the disciplined army of d’Elbœuf, swelled by hordes of hungry -Scotchmen, would pour over the Border and proclaim Mary in the midst of -the Catholic population<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_29" id="page_29"></a>{29}</span> which ten years later rose in rebellion under -the northern Earls.</p> - -<p>In this difficulty the Spanish Ministers in the Netherlands were -consulted. If Elizabeth expelled the garrison at Leith, and so brought -upon herself a war with France, could she depend on Philip’s assistance? -The reply was menacing. Their master, for his own interest, could not -allow the Queen of France and Scotland to enforce her title to the -throne of England. But he would oppose it in his own way. If a French -army entered England from the north, a Spanish army would land on the -south coast. Turning to her own Council for advice, Elizabeth found no -encouragement. They recommended her to take Philip’s advice, and even to -retrace some of her steps in the matter of religion in order to -propitiate him. She made a personal appeal to the Duke of Norfolk to -take the command of the forces on the Border. But he declined to be the -instrument of a policy which he disapproved.</p> - -<p>We need not wonder if Elizabeth hesitated for a while. Some of these -councillors were not too well affected to her. But most of them were -thoroughly loyal, and there was really much to be said for the more -cautious policy. She herself was an eminently cautious politician, -inclined by nature to shrink from risky courses. Never, therefore, in -her whole career did she give greater proof of her large-minded -comprehension of the main lines of policy which it behoved her to follow -than when she determined to override the opinions of so many prudent -advisers, and expel the French force from the northern kingdom.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_30" id="page_30"></a>{30}</span></p> - -<p>England was not quite in the helpless, disabled position that it pleased -the Spaniards to believe. Twelve months of careful and energetic -administration had already done wonders. There had been wise economy and -wise expenditure. Money had been scraped together, and, though there was -still a heavy debt, the legacy of three wasteful reigns, the confidence -of the Antwerp money-lenders had revived, and they were willing to -advance considerable sums. A fleet had been equipped and manned; -shiploads of arms had been imported; forces had been collected on the -south coasts. The Border garrisons had been quietly raised in strength -till they were able to furnish an expeditionary force at a moment’s -notice.</p> - -<p>The smallest energy on the part of the Congregation might have finished -the war without the presence of an English force. Elizabeth had a right -to be angry. The Scotch Protestants expected to have the hardest part of -the work done for them, and to be paid for executing their own share of -it. Lord James and a few of the leaders were in earnest, but others were -selfish time-servers. As for the lower class, their Calvinism was still -new. It had not yet bred that fierce spirit of independence which before -long was to outweigh the force of nobles and gentry. But if the weakness -of the Anglophile party was disappointing, it had at all events shown -that Elizabeth must depend upon herself to ward off danger on that side; -and after some reasonable hesitation she decided to put through the work -she had begun.</p> - -<p>It says much for the patriotism of Elizabeth’s Council that when they -found she had made up her mind<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_31" id="page_31"></a>{31}</span> they did not stand sulkily aloof, but -co-operated heartily and vigorously in carrying out the policy they had -opposed. Norfolk himself accepted the command of the Border army, and -acted throughout the affair with fidelity and diligence. He was not a -man distinguished by ability of any kind, and the actual fighting was to -be done by Lord Grey, a firm and experienced, though not brilliant, -commander. But that the natural leader of the Conservative nobility -should be seen at the head of Elizabeth’s army was a useful lesson to -traitors at home and enemies abroad, who were telling each other that -her throne was insecure.</p> - -<p>An agreement between the English Queen and the Lords of the Congregation -was drawn up (February 27), with scrupulous care to avoid the appearance -of dictation and encroachment which had gathered all Scotland to Pinkie -Cleugh eleven years before. It set forth that the English troops were -entering Scotland for no other object than to assist the Duke of -Chatelherault, the heir-presumptive to the throne, and the other nobles, -to drive out the foreign invaders. They would build no fortress. There -was no intention to prejudice Mary’s lawful authority. Cecil appears to -have wanted to add something about “Christ’s true religion;” but -Elizabeth struck it out. Circumstances might compel her to be the -protector of foreign Protestants; but neither then nor at any other time -did she desire to pose in that character.</p> - -<p>A month later (March 28th) Lord Grey crossed the Border, and marched to -Leith. The siege of that place proved to be tedious. The Lords of the -Congregation gave very insufficient assistance; and, when an assault<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_32" id="page_32"></a>{32}</span> -had been repulsed with heavy loss, the citizens of Edinburgh would not -receive the wounded into their houses. At last, when food was running -short in the town, an envoy from France arrived with power to treat on -behalf of the Queen of Scots. Her mother, the Regent, had died during -the siege. After much haggling a treaty was signed. No French troops -were in future to be kept in Scotland. Offices of State were to be held -only by natives. The government during Mary’s absence was to be vested -in a Council of twelve noblemen; seven nominated by her and five by the -Estates. Elizabeth’s title to the kingdoms of England and Ireland was -recognised (July 1560).</p> - -<p>Such was the Treaty of Edinburgh, or of Leith, as it is sometimes -called, one of the most successful achievements of a successful reign. -It was gained by wise counsel and bold resolve; and its fruits, though -not completely fulfilling its promise, were solid and valuable. It was -not ratified by Mary. But her non-ratification in the long-run injured -no one but herself, besides putting her in the wrong, and giving -Elizabeth a standing excuse for treating her as an enemy. England was -permanently free from the menace of a disciplined French army in the -northern kingdom. Nothing was settled in the treaty about religion. But -this was equivalent to a confirmation of the violent change that had -recently taken place; in itself a guarantee of security to England.</p> - -<p>The moral effect of this success was even greater than its more tangible -results. It had been very generally believed, at all events abroad, that -Elizabeth was tottering on her throne; that the large majority<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_33" id="page_33"></a>{33}</span> were on -the point of rising to depose her; that, wriggle as she might, she would -find she was a mere <i>protégée</i> of Philip, with no option but to follow -his directions and square her policy to his. Whatever small basis of -fact underlay this delusive estimate had been ridiculously exaggerated -in the reports sent to Philip by his ambassador De Quadra, a man who -evidently paid more attention to hole-and-corner tattle than to the -broad forces of English politics.</p> - -<p>All these imaginings were now proved to be vain. Elizabeth had shown -that she could protect herself by her own strength and in her own way. -She had civilly ignored Philip’s advice, or rather his injunctions. She -had thrown down the glove to France, and France had not taken it up. She -had placed in command of her armies the very man whom she was supposed -to fear, and he had done her bidding, and done it well. England once -more stood before Europe as an independent power, able to take care of -itself, aid its friends, and annoy its enemies.</p> - -<p>It is true that, as far as Elizabeth personally is concerned, her Scotch -policy had not always in its execution been as prompt and firm as could -be desired. Those who follow it in greater detail than is possible here -will find much in it that is irresolute and even vacillating. This -defect appears throughout Elizabeth’s career, though it will always be -ignored, as it ought to be ignored, by those who reserve their attention -for what is worth observing in the course of human affairs.</p> - -<p>In her intellectual grasp of European politics as a whole, and of the -interests of her own kingdom, Elizabeth was probably superior to any of -her counsellors.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_34" id="page_34"></a>{34}</span> No one could better than she think out the general -idea of a political campaign. But theoretical and practical -qualifications are seldom, if ever, combined in equal excellence. Not -only are the qualities themselves naturally opposed, but the constant -exercise of either increases the disparity. Her sex obliged Elizabeth to -leave the large field of execution to others. Her practical gifts -therefore, whatever they were, deteriorated rather than advanced as she -grew older. In men, who every day and every hour of the day are engaged -in action, the habit of prompt decision and persistence in a course once -adopted, even if it be not quite the best, is naturally formed and -strengthened. It is a habit so valuable, so indispensable to continued -success, that in practice it largely compensates for some inferiority in -conception and design. Elizabeth’s irresolution and vacillation were -therefore a consequence of her position—that of an extremely able and -well-informed woman called upon to conduct a government in which so much -had to be decided by the sovereign at her own discretion. The abler she -was, the more disposed to make her will felt, the less steadiness and -consistency in action were to be expected from her. As the wife of a -king, upon whom the final responsibility would have rested—her inferior -perhaps in intellect and knowledge, but with the masculine habit of -making up his mind once for all, and then steering a straight -course—she would have been a wise and enlightened adviser, not afraid -of consistently maintaining principles, when the time, mode, and degree -of their application rested with another. As it was, Cecil and other -able statesmen who served her<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_35" id="page_35"></a>{35}</span> had not only to take their general course -of policy from their mistress—a wise course upon the whole, wiser -sometimes than they would have selected for themselves—but they were -embarrassed, in their loyal attempts to steer in the direction she had -prescribed, by her nervous habit of catching at the rudder-lines -whenever a new doubt occurred to her ingenious mind, or some private -feeling of the woman perverted the clear insight of the sovereign.</p> - -<p>The rivalry between France and Spain had hitherto been the safety of -England. Nothing but reasons of religion could bring those two powers to -suspend their political quarrel. This danger seemed to be averted for -the moment by the temporary ascendant of the Politiques after the death -of Francis <small>II.</small> But the fanaticism of both Catholics and Huguenots was -too bitter, and the nobles on both sides were too ambitious, to listen -to the dictates of reason and patriotism. The immense majority of the -nation, except in some districts of the south and south-west, was -profoundly Catholic. The Huguenots, strongest amongst the aristocracy -and the upper bourgeoisie, daring and intolerant like the Calvinists -everywhere, had no sooner received some countenance from Catherine than -they began to preach against the mass, to demand the spoliation of the -Church, the suppression of monasteries, the destruction of images, and -the expulsion of the Guises. Where they were strong enough they began to -carry out their programme. The Guises, on the other hand, forgetting the -glory they had won in the wars against Spain, were soliciting the -patronage of Philip, and urging him to put himself at the head of a -crusade<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_36" id="page_36"></a>{36}</span> against the heretics of all countries. To this appeal he -replied by formally summoning Catherine to put down heresy in France. An -accidental collision at Vassy, in which a number of Huguenots were -slain, brought on the first of those wars of religion which were to -desolate France for the next thirty years (March 1562). Both factions, -equally dead to patriotism, opened their country to foreigners. The -Guises called in the forces of Spain and the Pope. Condé applied to -Elizabeth and the Protestant princes of Germany.</p> - -<p>It was necessary to give the Huguenots just so much help as would -prevent them from being crushed. Aggressive in appearance, such -interference was in reality legitimate self-defence. But unfortunately -neither Elizabeth nor her Council had forgotten Calais, and they -extorted from Condé the surrender of Havre as a pledge for its -restoration. In the case of Scotland they had come, as we have seen, to -recognise that to establish a permanent war by holding fortified posts -on the territory of another nation is poor statesmanship. The possession -of Calais was of little military value as against France. It is true -that it would enable England to make sea communication between Spain and -the Netherlands very insecure, and would thus give Philip a powerful -motive for desiring to stand well with this country. But such a -calculation had less weight with Englishmen at that moment than pure -Jingoism—the longing to be again able to crow over their French enemy.</p> - -<p>The occupation of Havre (October 1562) gave to the Huguenot cause the -minimum of assistance, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_37" id="page_37"></a>{37}</span> brought upon it the maximum of odium. A -hollow reconciliation was soon patched up between the rival factions -(March 1563), and Elizabeth was summoned to evacuate Havre. She refused, -loudly complaining of the Huguenots for deserting her. She “had come to -the quiet possession of Havre without force or any other unlawful means, -and she had good reason to keep it.” Up to this time the fiction of -peace between the two nations had been maintained. It was now open war. -It is only fair to Elizabeth to say that all her Council and the whole -nation were even hotter than she was. The garrison of Havre, with their -commander Warwick, were eager for the fray. They would “make the French -cock cry Cuck,” they would “spend the last drop of their blood before -the French should fasten a foot in the town.” The inhabitants were all -expelled, and the siege began, Condé as well as the Catholics appearing -in the Queen-mother’s army. After a valiant defence the English, reduced -to a handful of men by typhus, sailed away (July 28, 1563). Peace was -concluded early in the next year (April 1564). Elizabeth did not repeat -her mistake. Thenceforward to the end of her reign we shall find her -carefully cultivating friendly relations with every ruler of France.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_38" id="page_38"></a>{38}</span></p> - -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV"></a>CHAPTER IV<br /><br /> -<small>ELIZABETH AND MARY STUART: 1559-1568</small></h2> - -<p class="nind">W<small>HEN</small> Elizabeth mounted the throne, it was taken for granted that she was -to marry, and marry with the least possible delay. This was expected of -her, not merely because in the event of her dying without issue there -would be a dispute whether the claim of Mary Stuart or that of Catherine -Grey was to prevail, but for a more general reason. The rule of an -unmarried woman, except provisionally during such short interval as -might be necessary to provide her with a husband, was regarded as quite -out of the question. It was the custom for the husbands of heiresses to -step into the property of their wives and stand in the shoes, so to -speak, of the last male proprietor, in order to perform those duties -which could not be efficiently performed by a woman. Elizabeth’s sister, -while a subject, had no thought of marrying. But her accession was -considered by herself and every one else to involve marriage. If the -nobles of England could have foreseen that Elizabeth would elude this -obligation, she would probably never have been allowed to mount the -throne. Her marriage was thought to be as much a matter of course, and -as necessary, as her coronation.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_39" id="page_39"></a>{39}</span></p> - -<p>Accordingly the House of Commons, which met a month after her accession, -immediately requested her to select a husband without delay. Her -declaration that she had no desire to change her state was supposed to -indicate only the real or affected coyness to be expected from a young -lady. There was no lack of suitors, foreign or English. The Archduke -Charles, son of the Emperor and cousin of Philip, would have been -welcomed by all Catholics and acquiesced in by political Protestants -like Cecil. The ardent Protestants were eager for Arran, and Cecil, till -he saw it was useless, worked his best for him, regardless of the -personal sacrifice his mistress must make in wedding a man who was not -always quite sane and eventually became a confirmed lunatic.</p> - -<p>Not many months of the new reign had passed before it began to be -suspected that Elizabeth’s partiality for Lord Robert Dudley had -something to do with her evident distaste for all her suitors. To her -Ministers and the public this partiality for a married man became a -cause of great disquietude. They not unnaturally feared that with a -young woman who had no relations to advise and keep watch over her, it -might lead to some disastrous scandal incompatible with her continuance -on the throne. Marriage with Dudley at this time was out of the -question. But within four months of her accession, the Spanish -ambassador mentions a report that Dudley’s wife had a cancer, and that -the Queen was only waiting for her death to marry him.</p> - -<p>About the humble extraction of Elizabeth’s favourite much nonsense was -talked in his lifetime by his ill-wishers,<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_40" id="page_40"></a>{40}</span> and has been duly repeated -since. He was as well born as most of the peerage of that time; very few -of whom could show nobility of any antiquity in the male line. The Duke -of Norfolk being the only Duke at Elizabeth’s accession, and in -possession of an ancient title, was looked on as the head of his order. -Yet it was only seventy-five years since a Howard had first reached the -peerage in consequence of having had the good fortune to marry the -heiress of the Mowbrays. Edmund Dudley, Minister of Henry <small>VII.</small> and -father of Northumberland, was grandson of John, fourth Lord Dudley; and -Northumberland, by his mother’s side, was sole heir and representative -of the ancient barony of De L’Isle, which title he bore before he -received his earldom and dukedom. In point of wealth and influence, -indeed, the favourite might be called an upstart. The younger son of an -attainted father, he had not an acre of land or a farthing of money -which he did not owe either to his wife or to the generosity of -Elizabeth. This it was that moved the sneers and ill-will of a people -with whom nobility has always been a composite idea implying, not only -birth and title, but territorial wealth. Moreover his grandfather, -though of good extraction, was a simple esquire, and had risen by -helping Henry <small>VII.</small> to trample on the old nobility. After his fall his -son had climbed to power under Henry <small>VIII.</small> and Edward <small>VI.</small> in the same -way. Lord Robert Dudley, again, had to begin at the bottom of the -ladder.</p> - -<p>No one will claim for Elizabeth’s favourite that he was a man of -distinguished ability or high character. He had a fine figure and a -handsome face. He bore<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_41" id="page_41"></a>{41}</span> himself well in manly exercises. His manners -were attractive when he wished to please. To these qualities he first -owed his favour with Elizabeth, who was never at any pains to conceal -her liking for good-looking men and her dislike of ugly ones. Finding -himself in favour, and inheriting to the full the pushing audacity of -his father and grandfather, he professed for the Queen a love which he -certainly did not feel, in order to serve his soaring ambition. -Elizabeth, it is my firm conviction, never loved Dudley or any other -man, in any sense of the word, high or low. She had neither a tender -heart nor a sensual temperament. But she had a more than feminine -appetite for admiration; and the more she was, unhappily for herself, a -stranger to the emotion of love, the more restlessly did she desire to -be thought capable of inspiring it. She was therefore easily taken in by -Dudley’s professions, and, though she did not care for him enough to -marry him, she liked to have him as well as several other handsome men, -dangling about her, “like her lap-dog,” to use her own expression. -Further she believed—and here came in the mischief—that his devotion -to her person would make him a specially faithful servant.</p> - -<p>We know, though Elizabeth did not, that in 1561, Dudley was promising -the Spanish ambassador to be Philip’s humble vassal, and to do his best -for Catholicism, if Philip would promote his marriage with the Queen; -that, in the same year, he was offering his services to the French -Huguenots for the same consideration; that at one time he posed as the -protector of the Puritans, while at another he was intriguing with the -captive Queen of Scots; whom, again, later<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_42" id="page_42"></a>{42}</span> on, he had a chief share in -bringing to the block. But we must remember that very few statesmen, -English or foreign, in the sixteenth century could have shown a record -free from similar blots. Those who, like Elizabeth and Cecil, were -undeniably actuated on the whole by public spirit, or by any principle -more respectable than pure selfishness, never hesitated to lie or play a -double game when it seemed to serve their turn. William of Orange is the -only eminent statesman, as far as I know, against whom this charge -cannot be made. When this was the standard of honour for consistent -politicians and real patriots, what was to be expected of lower natures? -Dudley’s conduct on several occasions was bad and contemptible; and he -must be judged with the more severity, because he sinned not only -against the code of duty binding on the ordinary man and citizen, but -against his professions of a tender sentiment by means of which he had -acquired his special influence. I have said that he was not a man of -great ability. But neither was he the empty-headed incapable trifler -that some writers have depicted him. He was not so judged by his -contemporaries. That Elizabeth, because she liked him, would have -selected a man of notorious incapacity to command her armies, both in -the Netherlands and when the Armada was expected, is one of those -hypotheses that do not become more credible by being often repeated. -Cecil himself, when it was not a question of the marriage—of which he -was a determined opponent—regarded him as a useful servant of the -Queen. I do not doubt that Elizabeth estimated his capacity at about its -right value. What she over-estimated was his affection for<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_43" id="page_43"></a>{43}</span> herself, and -consequently his trustworthiness. Sovereigns—and others—often place a -near relative in an important post, not as being the most capable person -they know, but as most likely to be true to them. Elizabeth had no near -relatives. If we grant—as we must grant—that she believed in Dudley’s -love, we cannot wonder that she employed him in positions of trust. A -female ruler will always be liable to make these mistakes, unless her -Ministers and captains are to be of her own sex.</p> - -<p>On the 3rd of September 1560, two months after the Treaty of Leith, -Elizabeth told De Quadra that she had made up her mind to marry the -Archduke Charles. On the 8th, Lady Robert Dudley died at Cumnor Hall. On -the 11th, Elizabeth told De Quadra that she had changed her mind. Dudley -neglected his wife, and never brought her to court. We cannot doubt that -he fretted under a tie which stood in the way of his ambition. Her death -had been predicted. It is not strange, therefore, that he should have -been suspected of having caused it. Nevertheless, not a particle of -evidence pointing in that direction has ever been produced, and it seems -most probable that the poor deserted creature committed suicide. A -coroner’s jury investigated the case diligently, and, it would seem, -with some animus against Foster, the owner of Cumnor Hall, but returned -a verdict of accidental death.</p> - -<p>Anyhow, Dudley was now free. The Scotch Estates were eagerly pressing -Arran’s suit, and the English Protestants were as eagerly backing them. -The opportunity was certainly unique. Though nothing was said about -deposing Mary, yet nothing could be more<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_44" id="page_44"></a>{44}</span> certain than that, if this -marriage took place, the Queen of France would never reign in Scotland.</p> - -<p>At her wits’ end how to escape a match so desirable for the Queen, so -repulsive to the woman, Elizabeth had announced her willingness to -espouse the Archduke in order to gain a short breathing-time. Vienna was -at least further than Edinburgh, and difficulties were sure to arise -when details began to be discussed. At this moment, by the sudden death -of his wife, Dudley became marriageable. If Elizabeth had been free to -marry or not, as she pleased, it seems to me in the highest degree -improbable that she would ever have thought of taking Dudley. But -believing that a husband was inevitable, and expecting that she would be -forced to take some one who was either unknown to her or positively -distasteful, it was most natural that she should ask herself whether it -was not the least of evils to put this cruel persecution to an end by -choosing a man whom at least she admired and liked, who loved her, as -she thought, for her own sake, and would be as obedient “as her -lap-dog.” When nations are ruled by women, and marriageable women, -feelings and motives which belong to the sphere of private life, and -should be confined to it, are apt to invade the domain of politics. If -Elizabeth’s subjects expected their sovereign to suppress all personal -feelings in choosing a consort, they ought to have established the Salic -law. No woman, queen or not queen, can be expected voluntarily to make -such a sacrifice. Her happiness is too deeply involved.</p> - -<p>In the autumn, then, of 1560, when Elizabeth had been not quite two -years on the throne, she seriously<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_45" id="page_45"></a>{45}</span> thought of marrying Dudley. It is -difficult to say how long she continued to think of it seriously. With -him, as with other suitors, she went on coquetting when she had -perfectly made up her mind that nothing was to come of it. Perhaps we -shall be right in saying that, as long as there was any question of the -Archduke Charles, she looked to Dudley as a possible refuge. This would -be till about the beginning of 1568. It seems to be always assumed, as a -matter of course, that Cecil played the part of Elizabeth’s good genius -in persistently dissuading her from marrying Dudley. I am not so sure of -this. If she had been a wife and a mother many of her difficulties would -have at once disappeared, and the weakest points in her character would -have no longer been brought out. It ended in her not marrying at all. I -am inclined to think that another enemy of Dudley, the Earl of Sussex, -showed more good sense and truer patriotism when he wrote in October -1560:—</p> - -<div class="blockquot"><p>“I wish not her Majesty to linger this matter of so great -importance, but to choose speedily; and therein to follow so much -her own affection as [that], by the looking upon him whom she -should choose, <i>omnes ejus sensus titillarentur</i>; which shall be -the readiest way, with the help of God, to bring us a blessed -prince which shall redeem us out of thraldom. If I knew that -England had other rightful inheritors I would then advise -otherwise, and seek to serve the time by a husband’s choice [seek -for an advantageous political alliance]. But seeing that she is -<i>ultimum refugium</i>, and that no riches, friendship, foreign -alliance, or any other present commodity that might come by a -husband, can serve our turn, without issue of her body, if the -Queen will love anybody, let her love where and whom she lists, so -much thirst I to see her love. And whomsoever she shall love and -choose, him will I love, honour, and serve to the uttermost.”</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="page_46" id="page_46"></a>{46}</span></p> - -<p>Perhaps I may be excused for expressing the opinion that the ideal -husband for Elizabeth, if it had been possible, would have been Lord -James Stuart, afterwards Earl of Moray. Of sufficient capacity, kindly -heart, undaunted resolution, and unswerving rectitude of purpose, he -would have supplied just those elements that were wanting to correct her -defects. King of Scotland he perhaps could not be. Regent of Scotland he -did become. If he could, at the same time, have been Elizabeth’s -husband, the two crowns might have, in the next generation, been worn by -a Stuart of a nobler stock than the son of Mary and Darnley.</p> - -<p>When Mary Stuart, on the death of her husband Francis <small>II.</small>, returned to -her own kingdom (August 1561), she found the Scotch nobles sore at the -rejection of Arran’s suit. Bent on giving a sovereign to England, in one -way or another, they were now ready, Protestants as well as Catholics, -to back Mary’s demand that she should be recognised as Elizabeth’s -heir-presumptive. To this the English Queen could not consent, for the -very sufficient reason, that not only would the Catholic party be -encouraged to hold together and give trouble, but the more bigoted and -desperate members of it would certainly attempt her life, lest she -should disappoint Mary’s hopes by marrying. “She was not so foolish,” -she said, “as to hang a winding-sheet before her eyes or make a funeral -feast whilst she was alive,” but she promised that she would neither do -anything nor allow anything to be done by Parliament to prejudice Mary’s -title. To this undertaking she adhered long after Mary’s hostile<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_47" id="page_47"></a>{47}</span> -conduct had given ample justification for treating her as an enemy.</p> - -<p>Openly Mary was claiming nothing but the succession. In reality she -cared little for a prospect so remote and uncertain. What she was -scheming for was to hurl Elizabeth from her throne. This was an object -for which she never ceased to work till her head was off her shoulders. -Her aims were more sharply defined than those of Elizabeth, and she was -remarkably free from that indecision which too often marred the action -of the English Queen. In ability and information she was not at all -inferior to Elizabeth; in promptitude and energy she was her superior. -These masculine qualities might have given her the victory in the bitter -duel, but that, in the all-important domain of feeling, her sex -indomitably asserted itself, and weighted her too heavily to match the -superb self-control of Elizabeth. She could love and she could hate; -Elizabeth had only likes and dislikes, and therefore played the cooler -game. When Mary really loved, which was only once, all selfish -calculations were flung to the winds; she was ready to sacrifice -everything, and not count the cost—body and soul, crown and life, -interest and honour. When she hated, which was often, rancour was apt to -get the better of prudence. And so at the fatal turning-point of her -career, when mad hate and madder love possessed her soul, she went down -before her great rival never to rise again. Here was a woman indeed. And -if, for that reason, she lost the battle in life, for that reason too -she still disputes it from the tomb. She has always had, and always will -have, the ardent sympathy<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_48" id="page_48"></a>{48}</span> of a host of champions, to whom the “fair -vestal throned by the west” is a mere politician, sexless, cold-blooded, -and repulsive.</p> - -<p>In 1564 Mary, as yet fancy-free, was seeking to match herself on purely -political grounds. She was not so fastidious as Elizabeth, for she does -not seem to have troubled herself at all about personal qualities, if a -match seemed otherwise eligible. The Hamiltons pressed Arran upon her. -But he was a Protestant. He was not heir to any throne but that of -Scotland; and, though a powerful family in Scotland, the Hamiltons could -give her no help elsewhere. Philip, who, now that the Guises had become -his <i>protégés</i>, was less jealous of her designs, wished her to marry his -cousin, the Archduke Charles of Austria. But this prince, whom Elizabeth -professed to find too much of a Catholic, was, in the eyes of Mary and -her more bigoted co-religionists, too nearly a Lutheran; and she doubted -whether Philip cared enough for him to risk a war for establishing him -and herself upon the English throne. For this reason the husband on whom -she had set her heart was Don Carlos, Philip’s own son, a sort of wild -beast. But Philip received her overtures doubtfully; the fact being that -he could not trust Don Carlos, whom he eventually put to death. -Catherine de’ Medici loved Mary as little as she did the other Guises, -but the prospect of the Spanish match filled her with such terror that -she proposed to make the Scottish Queen her daughter-in-law a second -time by a marriage with Charles <small>IX.</small>, a lad under thirteen, if she would -wait two years for him.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, Elizabeth impressed upon Mary<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_49" id="page_49"></a>{49}</span> that, unless she -married a member of some Reformed Church, the English Parliament would -certainly demand that her title to the succession, whatever it was, -should be declared invalid. The House of Commons was strongly -Protestant, and had with difficulty been prevented from addressing the -Queen in favour of the succession of Lady Catherine Grey. Apart from -religion there was deep irritation against the whole Scotch nation. Sir -Ralph Sadler, who had been much employed in Scotland, denounced them as -“false, beggarly, and perjured, whom the very stones in the English -streets would rise against.” When Elizabeth was dangerously ill in -October 1562, the Council discussed whom they should proclaim in the -event of her death. Some were for the will of Henry <small>VIII.</small> and Catherine -Grey. Others, sick of female rulers, were for taking the Earl of -Huntingdon, a descendant of the Duke of Clarence. None were for Mary or -Darnley. Mary’s chief friends—Montagu, Northumberland, Westmoreland, -and Derby—were not on the Council.</p> - -<p>Parliament and the Council being against her, Mary could not afford to -quarrel with the Queen. Elizabeth told her that she would regard a -marriage with any Spanish, Austrian, or French prince as a declaration -of war. Help from those quarters was far away, and at the mercy of winds -and waves: the Border fortresses were near, and their garrisons always -ready to march. Besides, whichever of the two she might obtain—Charles -<small>IX.</small> or the Archduke—she drove the other into the arms of Elizabeth.</p> - -<p>But there was another possible husband who had crossed her mind from -time to time; not a prince<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_50" id="page_50"></a>{50}</span> indeed, yet of royal extraction in the -female line, and, what was more, not without pretensions to that very -succession which she coveted. Henry Lord Darnley, son of Matthew Stuart, -Earl of Lennox, was, by his father’s side, of the royal family of -Scotland, while his mother was the daughter of Margaret Tudor, sister of -Henry <small>VIII.</small>, by her second husband, the Earl of Angus. Born and brought -up in England, where his father had been long an exile, he was reckoned -as an Englishman, which, in the opinion of many lawyers, was essential -as a qualification for the crown. He was also a Catholic, and if -Elizabeth had died at this time, it was perhaps Darnley, rather than -Mary, whom the Catholics would have tried to place on the throne. -Elizabeth had promised that, if Mary would marry an English nobleman, -she would do her best to get Mary’s title recognised by Parliament. To -Elizabeth, therefore, Mary now turned, with the request that she would -point out such a nobleman, not without a hope that she would name -Darnley (March 1564). But, to Mary’s mortification, she formally -recommended Lord Robert Dudley.</p> - -<p>This recommendation has often been treated as if it was a sorry joke -perpetrated by Elizabeth, who had never any intention of furthering, or -even permitting, such a match. But nothing is more certain than that -Elizabeth was most anxious to bring it about; and it affords a decisive -proof that her feeling for Dudley, whatever name she herself may have -put to it, was not what is usually called love. Cecil and all her most -intimate advisers entertained no doubt that she was sincere. She -undertook, if Mary would accept<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_51" id="page_51"></a>{51}</span> Dudley, to make him a duke; and, in the -meantime, she created him Earl of Leicester. She regarded him, so she -told Mary’s envoy Melville, as her brother and her friend; if he was -Mary’s husband she would have no suspicion or fear of any usurpation -before her death, being assured that he was so loving and trusty that he -would never permit anything to be attempted during her time. “But,” she -said, pointing to Darnley, who was present, “you like better yonder long -lad.” Her suspicion was correct. Melville had secret instructions to -procure permission for Darnley to go to Scotland. However, he answered -discreetly that “no woman of spirit could choose such an one who more -resembled a woman than a man.”</p> - -<p>How was Elizabeth to be persuaded to let Darnley leave England? There -was only one way to disarm suspicion: Mary declared herself ready to -marry Leicester (January 1565). Darnley immediately obtained leave of -absence for three months ostensibly to recover the forfeited Lennox -property. In Scotland the purpose of his coming was not mistaken, and it -roused the Protestants to fury. The Queen’s chapel, the only place in -the Lowlands where mass was said, was beset. Her priests were mobbed and -maltreated. Moray, who till lately had supported his sister with such -loyalty and energy that Knox had quarrelled with him, prepared, with the -other Lords of the Congregation, for resistance. Elizabeth, and Cecil -also, had been completely overreached. A prudent player sometimes gets -into difficulties by attributing equal prudence to a daring and reckless -antagonist. Elizabeth, as a patriotic ruler, desired nothing but peace -and<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_52" id="page_52"></a>{52}</span> security for her own kingdom. If she could have that, she had no -wish to meddle with Scotland. Mary, caring nothing for the interests of -her subjects, was facing civil war with a light heart; and, for the -chance of obtaining the more brilliant throne, was ready to risk her -own.</p> - -<p>Undeterred by Elizabeth’s threats, Mary married Darnley (July 29, 1565). -Moray and Argyll, having obtained a promise of assistance from England, -took arms; but most of the Lords of the Congregation showed themselves -even more powerless or perfidious than they had been five years before. -Morton, Ruthven, and Lindsay, stoutest of Protestants, were related to -Darnley, and were gratified by the elevation of their kinsman. Moray -failed to elicit a spark of spirit out of the priest-baiting citizens of -Edinburgh, and the Queen, riding steel cap on head and pistols at -saddle-bow, chased him into England. Lord Bedford, who was in command at -Berwick, could have stepped across the Border and scattered her -undisciplined array without difficulty. He implored Elizabeth to let him -do it; offered to do it on his own responsibility, and be disavowed. But -he found, to his mortification, that she had been playing a game of -brag. She had hoped that a threatening attitude would stop the marriage. -But as it was an accomplished fact she was not going to draw the sword.</p> - -<p>This was shabby treatment of Moray and his friends, and to some of her -councillors it seemed not only shameful but dangerous to show the white -feather. But judging from the course of events, Elizabeth’s policy was -the safe one. The English<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_53" id="page_53"></a>{53}</span> Catholics—some of them at all events, as -will be explained presently—were becoming more discontented and -dangerous. The northern earls were known to be disaffected. Mary -believed that in every county in England the Catholics had their -organisation and their leaders, and that, if she chose, she could march -to London. No doubt she was much deceived. In reluctance to resort to -violence and respect for constituted authority, England, even north of -the Humber, was at least two centuries ahead of Scotland, and, if she -had come attended by a horde of savage Highlanders and Border ruffians, -“the very stones in the streets would have risen against them.” It was -Elizabeth’s rule—and a very good rule too—never to engage in a war if -she could avoid it. From this rule she could not be drawn to swerve -either by passion or ambition, or that most fertile source of fighting, -a regard for honour. All the old objections to an invasion of Scotland -still subsisted in full strength, and were reinforced by others. It was -better to wait for an attack which might never come than go half-way to -meet it. An invasion of Scotland might drive the northern earls to -declare for Mary, which, unless compelled to choose sides, they might -never do. Some people are more perturbed by the expectation and -uncertainty of danger than by its declared presence. Not so Elizabeth. -Smouldering treason she could take coolly as long as it only smouldered. -As for the betrayal of the Scotch refugees, Elizabeth never allowed the -private interests of her own subjects, much less those of foreigners, to -weigh against the interests of England. Moray<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_54" id="page_54"></a>{54}</span> one of the most -magnanimous and self-sacrificing of statesmen, evidently felt that -Elizabeth’s course was wise, if not exactly chivalrous. He submitted to -her public rebuke without publicly contradicting her, and waited -patiently in exile till it should be convenient for her to help him and -his cause. Mary, too, though elated by her success, and never abandoning -her intention to push it further, found it best to halt for a while. -Philip wrote to her that he would help her secretly with money if -Elizabeth attacked her, but not otherwise, and warned her against any -premature clutch at the English crown. Elizabeth’s seeming tameness -could hardly have received a more complete justification.</p> - -<p>Mary had determined to espouse Darnley, before she had set eyes on him, -for purely political reasons. There is no reason to suppose she ever -cared for him. It is more likely, as Mr. Froude suggests, that for a -great political purpose she was doing an act which in itself she -loathed. A woman of twenty-two, already a widow, mature beyond her -years, exceptionally able, absorbed in the great game of politics, and -accustomed to admiration, was not likely to care for a raw lad of -nineteen, foolish, ignorant, ill-conditioned, vicious, and without a -single manly quality. One man we know she did love later on—loved -passionately and devotedly, no slim girl-faced youngster, but the -fierce, stout-limbed, dare-devil Bothwell; and Bothwell gradually made -his way to her heart by his readiness to undertake every desperate -service she required of him. What Mary admired, nay envied, in the other -sex was the stout heart and the strong arm. She loved herself to rough<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_55" id="page_55"></a>{55}</span> -it on the war-path. She surprised Randolph by her spirit:—“Never -thought I that stomach to be in her that I find. She repented nothing -but, when the Lords and others came in the morning from the watches, -that she was not a man, to know what life it was to lie all night in the -fields or to walk upon the causeway with a jack and a knapscap, a -Glasgow buckler and a broadsword.” “She desires much,” says Knollys, “to -hear of hardiness and valiancy, commending by name all approved hardy -men of her country, although they be her enemies; and she concealeth no -cowardice even in her friends.” Valuable to Mary as a man of action, -Bothwell was not worth much as an adviser. For advice she looked to the -Italian Rizzio, in whom she confided because, with the detachment of a -foreigner, he regarded Scotch ambitions, animosities, and intrigues only -as so much material to be utilised for the purpose of the combined -onslaught on Protestantism which the Pope was trying to organise. -Bothwell was at this time thirty, and Rizzio, according to Lesley, -fifty.</p> - -<p>In spite of all the prurient suggestions of writers who have fastened on -the story of Mary’s life as on a savoury morsel, there is no reason -whatever for thinking that she was a woman of a licentious disposition, -and there is strong evidence to the contrary. There was never anything -to her discredit in France. Her behaviour in the affair of Chastelard -was irreproachable. The charge of adultery with Rizzio is dismissed as -unworthy of belief even by Mr. Froude, the severest of her judges. -Bothwell indeed she loved, and, like many another woman who does not -deserve to be<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_56" id="page_56"></a>{56}</span> called licentious, she sacrificed her reputation to the -man she loved. But the most conclusive proof that she was no slave to -appetite is afforded by her nineteen years’ residence in England, which -began when she was only twenty-five. During almost the whole of that -time she was mixing freely in the society of the other sex, with the -fullest opportunity for misconduct had she been so inclined. It is not -to be supposed that she was fettered by any scruples of religion or -morality. Yet no charge of unchastity is made against her.</p> - -<p>When Darnley found that his wife, though she conferred on him the title -of King, did not procure for him the crown matrimonial or allow him the -smallest authority, he gave free vent to his anger. No less angry were -his kinsmen, Morton, Ruthven, and Lindsay. They had deserted the -Congregation in the expectation that when Darnley was King they would be -all-powerful. Instead of this they found themselves neglected; while the -Queen’s confidence was given to Catholics and to Bothwell, who, though -nominally a Protestant, always acted with the Catholics. The Protestant -seceders had in fact fallen between two stools. It was against Rizzio -that their rage burnt fiercest. Bothwell was only a bull-headed, -blundering swordsman. Rizzio was doubly detestable to them as the brain -of the Queen’s clique and as a low-born foreigner. Rizzio, therefore, -they determined to remove in the time-honoured Scottish fashion. Notice -of the day fixed for the murder was sent to the banished noblemen in -England, so that they might appear in Edinburgh immediately it was -accomplished<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_57" id="page_57"></a>{57}</span> Randolph, the English ambassador, and Bedford, who -commanded on the Border, were also taken into the secret, and they -communicated it to Cecil and Leicester.</p> - -<p>It is unnecessary here to repeat the well-known story of the murder of -Rizzio. It was part of a large scheme for bringing back the exiled -Protestant lords, closing the split in the Protestant party, and -securing the ascendancy of the Protestant religion. At first it appeared -to have succeeded. Bedford wrote to Cecil that “everything would now go -well.” But Mary, by simulating a return of wifely fondness, managed to -detach her weak husband from his confederates. By his aid she escaped -from their hands. Bothwell and her Catholic friends gathered round her -in arms. In a few days she re-entered Edinburgh in triumph, and Rizzio’s -murderers had to take refuge in England.</p> - -<p>But if the Protestant stroke had failed, Mary was obliged to recognise -that her plan for re-establishing the Catholic ascendancy in Scotland -could not be rushed in the high-handed way she had proposed as a mere -preliminary to the more important subjugation of England. At the very -moment when she seemed to stand victorious over all opposition, the -ground had yawned under her feet, and, while she was dreaming of -dethroning Elizabeth, she had found herself a helpless captive in the -hands of her own subjects. The lesson was a valuable one, and if she -could profit by it her prospects had never been so good. The barbarous -outrage of which, in the sixth month of pregnancy, she had been the -object could not but arouse wide-spread sympathy for her. She had -extricated herself from her difficulties with splendid courage and -cleverness.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_58" id="page_58"></a>{58}</span> The loss of such an adviser as Rizzio was really a stroke -of luck for her. All she had to do was to abandon, or at all events -postpone, her design of re-establishing the Catholic religion in -Scotland, and to discontinue her intrigues against Elizabeth.</p> - -<p>Her prospects in England were still further improved when she gave birth -to a son (June 19, 1566). Once more there was an heir-male to the old -royal line, and, as Elizabeth continued to evade marriage, most people -who were not fierce Protestants began to think it would be more -reasonable and safe to abide by the rule of primogeniture than by the -will of Henry <small>VIII.</small>, sanctioned though it was by Act of Parliament. -There can be no doubt that this was the opinion and intention of -Elizabeth, though she strongly objected to having anything settled -during her own lifetime. But she had herself gone a long way towards -settling it by her treatment of Mary’s only serious competitor. -Catherine Grey had contracted a secret marriage with the Earl of -Hertford, son of the Protector Somerset. Her pregnancy necessitated an -avowal. The clergyman who had married them was not forthcoming, and -Hertford’s sister, the only witness, was dead. Elizabeth chose to -disbelieve their story, though she would not have been able to prove -when, where, or by whom her own father and mother had been married. She -had a right to be angry; but when she sent the unhappy couple to the -Tower, and caused her tool, Archbishop Parker, to pronounce the union -invalid and its offspring illegitimate, she was playing Mary’s game. The -House of Commons elected in 1563 was still undissolved. It was strongly -Protestant, and it<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_59" id="page_59"></a>{59}</span> favoured Catherine’s title even after her disgrace. -In its second session, in the autumn of 1566, it made a determined -effort to compel Elizabeth to marry, and in the meanwhile to recognise -Catherine as the heir-presumptive. The zealous Protestants knew well -that the Peers were in favour of the Stuart title, and they feared that -a new House of Commons might agree with the Peers. To get rid of their -pertinacity Elizabeth dissolved Parliament, not without strong -expressions of displeasure (Jan. 2, 1567). Cecil himself earned the -thanks of Mary for his attitude on this occasion. It cannot be doubted -that he dreaded her succession; but he saw which way the tide was -running, and he thought it prudent to swim with it.</p> - -<p>It was at this moment that Mary flung away all her advantage, and -entered on the fatal course which led to her ruin. Her loathing for -Darnley, her fierce desire to avenge on him the insults and outrage she -had suffered, left no room in heart or mind for considerations of -policy. She would have been glad to obtain a divorce. But the Catholic -Church does not grant divorce for misconduct after marriage. Some -pretext must be found for alleging that the marriage was null from the -beginning. This did not suit Mary. It would have made her son -illegitimate, and would have placed her in exactly the position of -Catherine Grey. A mere separation <i>a toro</i> would not have suited her any -better, for it would not have enabled her to contract another marriage.</p> - -<p>When Mary’s reliance on Bothwell grew into attachment, when her -attachment warmed into love, it is impossible to fix with any exactness. -Her infatuation<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_60" id="page_60"></a>{60}</span> presented itself to him as a grand opening for his -daring ambition. A notorious profligate, he loved her—if the word is to -be so degraded—as much or as little as he had loved twenty other women. -What, however, he desired in her case, was marriage. A more sensible man -would have foreseen that marriage would mean certain ruin for himself -and the Queen. But he was accustomed to despise all difficulties in his -path, being intellectually incapable of measuring them, and believing in -nothing but audacity and brute force. Husband of the Queen, why should -he not be master of the kingdom? Why not King? When such an idea had -once occurred to Bothwell, Darnley’s expectancy of life would be much -the same as that of a calf in the presence of the butcher.</p> - -<p>The wretched victim had alienated all his friends among the nobility. -Some owed him a deadly grudge for his treachery. Others had been -offended by his insolence. To all he was an encumbrance and a nuisance. -Several, therefore, of the leading personages were more or less engaged -in the compact for putting him out of the way. Moray, Argyll, and -Maitland offered to assist in ridding Mary of her husband by way of a -Protestant sentence of divorce, on condition that Morton and his friends -in exile should be pardoned and recalled. The bargain was struck, and -Mary assented to it. Nothing was said about murder. No one had any -interest in murder except Mary and Bothwell, whose project of marriage -was as yet unsuspected. At the same time, if Bothwell liked to kill -Darnley on his own responsibility, as no doubt he made it pretty plain -that he would—why, so<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_61" id="page_61"></a>{61}</span> much the better. It relieved the other lords of -all trouble. It was a simple, thorough, old-fashioned expedient, which -had never been attended with any discredit in Scotland, and had only one -inconvenience—that it usually saddled the murderer with a blood feud. -In the present case Lennox was the only peer who would feel the least -aggrieved; and he was in no condition to wage blood-feuds. Anyhow, that -was Bothwell’s look-out.</p> - -<p>So obvious was all this that it was hardly worth while to observe -secrecy except as to the exact occasion and mode of execution. Many -persons were more or less aware of what was going to be done; but none -cared to interfere. Moray was an honourable and conscientious man, if -judged by the standard of his environment—the only fair way of -estimating character. But Moray chose to leave Edinburgh the morning -before the deed; and thought it sufficient to be able to say afterwards -that “if any man said he was present when purposes [talk] were held in -his audience tending to any unlawful or dishonourable end, he spoke -wickedly and untruly.” The inner circle of the plot consisted of -Bothwell, Argyll, Huntly, Maitland, and Sir James Balfour.</p> - -<p>That Darnley was murdered by Bothwell is not disputed. That Mary was -cognisant of the plot, and lured him to the shambles, has been doubted -by few investigators at once competent and unbiassed. She lent herself -to this part not without compunction. Bothwell had the advantage over -her that the loved has over the lover; and he used it mercilessly for -his headlong ambition, hardly taking the trouble to pretend<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_62" id="page_62"></a>{62}</span> that he -cared for the unhappy woman who was sacrificing everything for him. He -in fact cared more for his lawful wife, whom he was preparing to -divorce, and to whom he had been married only six months. Mary was -tormented by jealousy of her after the divorce as well as before.</p> - -<p>The murder of Darnley (Feb. 10, 1567) was universally ascribed to Mary -at the time by Catholics as well as Protestants at home and abroad, and -it fatally damaged her cause in England and the rest of Europe. In -Scotland itself—such was the backward and barbarous state of the -country—it would probably not have shaken her throne if she had -followed it up with firm and prudent government. She might even have -indulged her illicit passion for Bothwell, with little pretence of -concealment, if she had not advanced him in place and power above his -equals. There was probably not a noble in Scotland, from Moray -downwards, who would have scrupled to be her Minister. The Protestant -commonalty indeed, who with all the national laxity as to the observance -of the sixth commandment, were shocked by any trifling with the seventh, -would no doubt have made their bark heard. But their bite had not yet -become formidable; and in any case they were not to be propitiated.</p> - -<p>What brought sudden and irretrievable ruin on Mary was not the murder of -Darnley, but the infatuation which made her the passive instrument of -Bothwell’s presumptuous ambition. The lords, Catholic and Protestant -alike, allowed the murder to pass uncondemned and unpunished; but they -were furious when they found that Darnley had<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_63" id="page_63"></a>{63}</span> only been removed to make -room for Bothwell, and that they were to have for their master a noble -of by no means the highest lineage, bankrupt in fortune, and generally -disliked for his arrogant and bullying demeanour. The project of -marriage was not disclosed till ten weeks after the murder (April 19, -1567). Five days later, Bothwell, fearing lest he should be frustrated -by public indignation or interference from England, carried off the -Queen, as had been previously arranged between them. His idea was that, -when Mary had been thus publicly outraged, it would be recognised as -impossible that she should marry any one but the ravisher. In this -coarse expedient, as in the clumsy means employed for disposing of -Darnley, we see the blundering fool-hardiness of the man. The marriage -ceremony was performed as soon as Bothwell’s divorce could be managed -(May 15). Just a month later Mary surrendered to the insurgent lords at -Carberry Hill, and Bothwell, flying for his life, disappears from -history.</p> - -<p>The feelings with which Elizabeth had contemplated the course of events -in Scotland during the last six months were no doubt of a mixed nature. -At the beginning of 1567, her seven-years’ duel with Mary appeared to be -ending in defeat. The last bold thrust, aimed in her interest if not by -her hand—the murder of Rizzio—had not improved her position. It seemed -that she would soon be obliged to make her choice between two equally -dreaded alternatives: she must either recognise Mary as her heir or take -a husband. From this unpleasant dilemma she was released by the headlong -descent of her<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_64" id="page_64"></a>{64}</span> rival in the first six months of 1567. But all other -feelings were soon swallowed up in alarm and indignation at the -spectacle of subjects in revolt against their sovereign. As tidings came -in rapid succession of Mary’s surrender at Carberry Hill, of her return -to Edinburgh amidst the insults and threats of the Calvinist mob, of her -imprisonment at Loch Leven, of the proposal to try and execute her, -Elizabeth’s anger waxed hotter, and she told the Scotch lords in her -most imperious tones that she could not, and would not, permit them to -use force with their sovereign. If they deposed or punished her, she -would revenge it upon them. If they could not prevail on her to do what -was right, they must “remit themselves to Almighty God, in whose hands -only princes’ hearts remain.”</p> - -<p>This language, addressed as it was to the only men in Scotland who were -disposed to support the English interest, was imprudent. In her -fellow-feeling for a sister sovereign, and her keen perception of the -revolutionary tendencies of the time, Elizabeth spoilt an unique -opportunity of placing her relations with Scotland on a footing of -permanent security, of providing for the English succession in a way at -once advantageous to the nation and free from risk to her own life, and -lastly, of escaping from the constant worry about her own marriage. She -had seen clearly enough what might be made of the situation. Throgmorton -had been despatched to Scotland with instructions to do his best to get -the infant Prince confided to her care. Once in England, she would -virtually have adopted him. She would have<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_65" id="page_65"></a>{65}</span> possessed a son and heir -without the inconvenience of marriage. To a Parliamentary recognition, -indeed, of his title she would assuredly not have consented. It would -have made him independent and dangerous. But if he behaved well to her, -his succession would be more certain than any Act of Parliament could -make it. Mary, if released and restored to power, would no longer be -formidable. If she were deposed or put to death, Elizabeth would -indirectly govern Scotland, at all events, till James should be of age.</p> - -<p>This splendid opportunity Elizabeth lost by her peremptory and -domineering language. The old Scotch pride took fire. The Anglophile -lords, who would have been glad enough to send the young Prince to -England, could not afford to appear less patriotic than the -Francophiles. Throgmorton’s attempt to get hold of James was as -unsuccessful as that of the Protector Somerset to get hold of James’s -mother had been twenty years before. He was told that, before the Prince -could be sent to England, his title to the English succession must be -recognised; a condition which Elizabeth could not grant. Her claim that -Mary should be restored without conditions was equally unacceptable to -the Anglophile lords. They might have been induced to release her if she -would have consented to give up Bothwell, or if they could have caught -and hanged him. But such was her devotion to him, that no threats or -promises availed to shake it. It was in vain that they offered to -produce letters of his to the divorced Lady Bothwell, in which he -assured her that he regarded her still as<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_66" id="page_66"></a>{66}</span> his lawful wife, and Mary -only as his concubine. The unhappy Queen had been aware even before her -marriage—as a pathetic letter to Bothwell shows—that her passionate -love was not returned. Two days after the marriage, his unkindness had -driven her to think of suicide. But nothing they could say could shake -her constancy. “She would not consent by any persuasion to abandon the -Lord Bothwell for her husband. She would live and die with him. If it -were put to her choice to relinquish her crown and kingdom or the Lord -Bothwell, she would leave her kingdom and dignity to go as a simple -damsel with him; and she will never consent that he shall fare worse or -have more harm than herself. Let them put Bothwell and herself on board -ship to go wherever fortune might carry them.” This temper made it -difficult for the Anglophile lords to know what to do with the prisoner -of Loch Leven. They were disappointed and angry that Elizabeth, instead -of approving their enterprise, and sending the money for which, as -usual, they were begging, should treat them as rebels, and even secretly -urge the Hamiltons to rescue Mary by force. The Hamiltons were in arms -at Dumbarton. They wanted either that the Prince should be proclaimed -King, with the Duke of Chatelherault for Regent, or that Mary should be -divorced from Bothwell and married to Lord John Hamilton, the Duke’s -second son, and, in default of the crazy Arran, his destined successor. -With Argyll, too, disgust at Mary’s crime was tempered by a desire to -marry her to his brother. Lady Douglas of Loch Leven herself, for whom -Sir Walter Scott has invented<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_67" id="page_67"></a>{67}</span> such magnificent tirades, desired nothing -better than to be her mother-in-law.</p> - -<p>The prompt action of the confederate lords foiled these schemes. By the -threat of a public trial on the charge of complicity in her husband’s -murder, or, as her advocates believe, by the fear of instant death, Mary -was compelled to abdicate in favour of her son, and to nominate Moray -Regent (July 29, 1567). Elizabeth would not recognise him; partly from a -natural fear lest she should be suspected of having been in collusion -with him all along, partly from genuine abhorrence of such revolutionary -proceedings. The French Government, on the other hand, casting principle -and sentiment alike to the winds, courted his alliance. He might keep -his sister in prison, or put her to death, or send her to be immured in -a French convent: only let him embrace the French interests, and an army -should be sent to support him—a Huguenot army if he did not like -Catholics. But Moray turned a deaf ear to these solicitations, and -waited patiently till Elizabeth’s ill-humour should give way to more -statesmanlike considerations.</p> - -<p>The escape of Mary from Loch Leven (May 2, 1568), and the rising of the -Hamiltons in her favour, were largely due to the unfriendly attitude -assumed by Elizabeth to the Regent’s government. After the defeat of -Langside (May 13) it would perhaps have been difficult for the fugitive -Queen to make her way to France or Spain. But it was not the difficulty -which deterred her from making the attempt. Both Catherine and Philip, -later on, were disposed to befriend her, or, rather, to make use of her; -but at<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_68" id="page_68"></a>{68}</span> the time of her escape from Scotland, she had nothing to expect -from them but severity. Elizabeth was the only sovereign who had tried -to help her. Moreover, Mary had always laboured under the delusion that -because most Englishmen regarded her as the next heir to the crown, and -a great many preferred the old religion to the new, she had as good a -party in England as Elizabeth herself, if not a better. During her -prosperity, she had made repeated applications to be allowed to visit -the southern kingdom. She was convinced that, if she once appeared on -English ground, Elizabeth’s throne would be shaken; and Elizabeth’s -unwillingness to receive the visit had confirmed her in her belief. If -she now crossed the Solway without waiting for the permission which she -had requested by letter, it was not because she was hard pressed. The -Regent had gone to Edinburgh after the battle. At Dundrennan, among the -Catholic Maxwells, Lord Herries guaranteed her safety for forty days; -and, at an hour’s notice, a boat would place her beyond pursuit. Her -haste was rather prompted by the expectation that Elizabeth, alarmed by -her application, would refuse to receive her.</p> - -<p>To Elizabeth the arrival of the Scottish Queen was, indeed, as unwelcome -as it was unexpected. For ten years she had governed successfully, -because she had managed to hold an even course between conflicting -principles and parties, and to avoid taking up a decisive attitude on -the most burning questions. The very indecision, which was the weak spot -in her character, and which so fretted her Ministers, had, it must be -confessed, contributed something to the result.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_69" id="page_69"></a>{69}</span> Cecil might groan over -a policy of letting things drift. But it may be doubted whether they had -not often drifted better than Cecil would have steered them if he might -have had his way. To do nothing is not, indeed, the golden rule of -statesmanship. But at that time, England’s peculiar position between -France and Spain, and between Calvinism and Catholicism, enabled her -ruler to play a waiting game. This was the general rule applicable to -the situation. Elizabeth apprehended it more clearly than her Ministers -did, and she fell back on it again and again, when they flattered -themselves that they had committed her to a forward policy. It was safe. -It was cheap. It required coolness and intrepidity—qualities with which -Elizabeth was well furnished by nature. But it was not spirited: it was -not showy. Hence it has not found favour with historians, who insist -that it ought to have ended in disaster. As a matter of fact, England -was carried safely through unparalleled difficulties; and, when all is -said, Elizabeth is entitled to be judged by the general result of her -long reign.</p> - -<p>Mary’s arrival was unwelcome to Elizabeth, because it seemed likely to -force her hand. To do nothing would be no longer possible. The Catholic -nobles and gentry of the north flocked to Carlisle to pay court to the -heiress of the English crown. It was not that they believed her innocent -of her husband’s murder. The suspicion of her complicity was at that -time universal. But they supposed that it would never amount to more -than a suspicion. They did not expect that the charge would ever be -formally made. They were not aware that it could be supported<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_70" id="page_70"></a>{70}</span> by -overwhelming evidence. Later on, when the proofs were produced, they had -already committed themselves to her cause, and were bound not to be -convinced.</p> - -<p>If the attitude of these Catholics be thought to indicate some moral -callousness, it may be fairly argued that it was less cynical than that -of Elizabeth herself, who, while not unwilling that Mary should be -suspected, would not allow her to be convicted. Steady to her main -purpose, though hesitating, and even vacillating, in the means she -adopted, she still adhered, notwithstanding all that had lately taken -place, to her intention that Mary, if her survivor, should be her -successor. Like all the greatest statesmen of her time, she placed -secular interests before religious opinions. She was persuaded that the -maintenance of the principle of authority was all-important. Nothing -else could hold society together or prevent the rival fanaticisms from -tearing each other to pieces. For authority there was no other basis -left than the principle of hereditary succession by primogeniture. This -principle must, therefore, be treated as something sacred—not to be set -aside or tampered with in a short-sighted grasping at any seeming -immediate utility. To allow it to be called in question was to shake her -own title. Already, in France, the Jesuits were preaching that orthodoxy -and the will of the people were the only legitimate foundation of -sovereignty. Few English Catholics had learned that doctrine; but they -would not be slow to learn it if the hereditary claim of Mary was to be -set aside.</p> - -<p>If Mary had been content to claim what primogeniture<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_71" id="page_71"></a>{71}</span> gave her—the -right to the succession—there would have been no quarrel between her -and Elizabeth. But it was notorious that she had all along been plotting -to substitute herself for Elizabeth. Never had she cherished that dream -with more confidence than when the Percys and Nevilles crowded round her -at Carlisle. In her sanguine imagination, she already saw herself -mistress of a finer kingdom than that which had just expelled her, and -marching, at the head of her new subjects, to wreak vengeance on her old -ones. She seemed likely to be no less dangerous as an exile in England -than as a Queen in Scotland.</p> - -<p>Elizabeth had now reason to regret the unnecessary warmth with which she -had espoused Mary’s cause. To suppose that she had any sentimental -feelings for one whom she knew to be her deadly enemy is, in my -judgment, ridiculous. Elizabeth was not a generous woman—especially -towards other women; and in this case generosity would have been folly, -and culpable folly. She did not hate Mary—she was too cool and -self-reliant to hate an enemy—but she disliked her. She was jealous, -with a small feminine jealousy, of her beauty and fascinations. The -consciousness of this unworthy feeling made her all the more anxious not -to betray it. And so, at a time when she did not expect to have Mary on -her hands, she had been tempted to use language implying a pity, -sympathy, and affection which assuredly she did not feel, and which it -would not have been creditable to her to feel. Petty insincerities of -this kind have usually to be paid for sooner or later. She had now to -exchange<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_72" id="page_72"></a>{72}</span> the language of sympathy for the language of business with -what grace she could; and she has not escaped the charge, certainly -undeserved, of deliberate treachery. It was awkward, after such -exaggerated professions of sympathy, to be obliged to hold the fugitive -at arm’s-length, and even to put restraint on her movements. But no -other course was possible. No sovereign, at any time in history, has -allowed a pretender to the crown to move about freely in his dominions -and make a party among his subjects.</p> - -<p>Wince as she might, and did, under the reproach of treachery, Elizabeth -was not going to allow her unwise words to tie her to unwise action. -Only one arrangement appeared to her to be at once admissible in -principle and prudent in practice. Mary must be restored to the Scottish -throne; but in such a way that she should thenceforth be powerless for -mischief. She must be content with the title of Queen. The real -government must be in the hands of Moray. Thus the principle of -legitimacy and the sacredness of royalty would be saved, and the English -Catholics would be content to bide their time.</p> - -<p>Cecil, for his part, was also anxious to see Mary back in Scotland; but -not as Queen. Though regarded in Catholic circles as a desperate -heretic, he was really a <i>politique</i>, a worldly-minded man—I mean the -epithet to be laudatory—and he would probably have admitted in the -abstract the wisdom of Elizabeth’s opinion—that it was of more -importance to England to have a legitimate sovereign than a gospel -religion. But he was not prepared to submit frankly to the application -of this principle. His personal<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_73" id="page_73"></a>{73}</span> prospects were too deeply concerned. It -was all very well for Elizabeth to lay down a principle in which she -might be said to have a life-interest. She was thirteen years his -junior; but she might easily predecease him; and, with Mary on the -throne, his power would certainly go, and, not improbably, his head with -it. It was not in human nature, therefore, that he should cherish the -principle of primogeniture as his mistress did; and, as far as his dread -of her displeasure would allow him, he was always casting about for some -means of defeating Mary’s reversion. Her sudden plunge into crime was to -him a turn of good fortune beyond his dreams. If he could have had his -will she would have been promptly handed over to the Regent on the -understanding that she was to be consigned to perpetual imprisonment, -or, still better, to the scaffold.</p> - -<p>In order to carry out her plan, Elizabeth called on Mary and the Regent -to submit their respective cases to a Commission, consisting of the Duke -of Norfolk, the Earl of Sussex, and Sir Ralph Sadler. Mary was extremely -reluctant, as she well might be, to face any investigation; but she was -told that, until her character was formally cleared, she could not be -admitted to Elizabeth’s presence; and she was at the same time privately -assured that her restoration should, in any case, be managed without any -damage to her honour. Moray received an equally positive assurance that -if his sister was proved guilty, she should not be restored. The two -statements were not absolutely irreconcilable, because Elizabeth -intended to prevent the worst charges from<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_74" id="page_74"></a>{74}</span> being openly proved. Her -sole object—and we can hardly blame her—was to obtain security for -herself and her own kingdom. She did not wish the Queen of Scots to be -proved a murderess in open court; but she did desire that the charge -should be made, and also that the Commissioners should see the originals -of the casket letters. Any public disclosure of the evidence might be -prevented, and some sort of ambiguous acquittal pronounced, on grounds -which all the world would see to be nugatory: such, for instance, as the -culprit’s own solemn denial of the charge; which was, in fact, the only -answer Mary intended to make. What was known to the Commissioners would -come to be more or less known to all persons of influence in England, -and would surely discredit Mary to such a degree that even her warmest -partisans would cease to conspire in her favour. Mary herself (so -Elizabeth hoped), when made aware that this terrible weapon was in -reserve, and could at any moment be used against her, would be -permanently humbled and crippled, and would be glad to accept such terms -as Elizabeth would impose.</p> - -<p>The Commissioners opened their court at York (October 1568). But they -had not been sitting long before Elizabeth discovered that Norfolk was -scheming to marry Mary, and that the project was approved by many of the -English nobility. Their purpose was not, as yet, disloyal. They thought -that, married to the head of the English peerage, and residing in -England, Mary would have to give up her plots with France, while her -presence would strengthen the Conservative party, which desired to keep -up the old<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_75" id="page_75"></a>{75}</span> alliance with Spain, and looked for the re-establishment -sooner or later of the old religion. This scheme, though not disloyal, -was extremely alarming to Elizabeth. Norfolk was nominally a Protestant. -But she had placed him on the Commission as a representative of the -Conservative party, believing that, while he would lend himself to -hushing up Mary’s guilt, his eyes would be opened to her real character. -Yet here he was, like the Hamiltons, Campbells, and Douglases, ready to -take her with her smirched reputation, simply for the chance of her two -crowns. It was not a case of love, for he had never seen her. He seems -to have been staggered for a moment by the sight of the casket letters, -and to have doubted whether it was for his honour or even his safety to -marry such a woman. But in the end, as we shall see, he swallowed his -scruples.</p> - -<p>On discovering Norfolk’s intrigue, Elizabeth hastily revoked the -Commission, and ordered another investigation to be held by the most -important peers and statesmen of England. The casket letters and the -depositions were submitted to them. Mary’s able and zealous advocate, -the Bishop of Ross, could say nothing except that his mistress had sent -him on the supposition that Moray was to be the defendant: let her -appear in person before the Queen, and she would give reasons why Moray -ought not to be allowed to advance any charges against her. To make no -better answer than this was virtually to admit that the charges against -her were unanswerable.</p> - -<p>It was thought that she was now sufficiently frightened to be ready to -accept Elizabeth’s terms, and they<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_76" id="page_76"></a>{76}</span> were unofficially communicated to -her. Her return to Scotland was no longer contemplated, for Moray had -absolutely declined to charge her openly with the murder or produce the -letters unless she were detained in England. But in order to get rid of -the revolutionary proceedings at Loch Leven she herself, as it were of -her own free will, and on the ground that she was weary of government, -was to confer the crown on her son and the regency on Moray. James was -to be educated in England. She herself was to reside in England as long -as Elizabeth should find it convenient. It was not mentioned in the -communication, but it was probably intended, that she should marry some -Englishman of no political importance, in order to produce more children -who would succeed James if, as was likely enough, he should die in his -infancy. If she would accept these conditions the charges against her -should be “committed to perpetual silence;” if not, the trial must go -on, and the verdict could not be doubtful (December 1568).</p> - -<p>A woman less daring and less keen-sighted than Mary would assuredly, at -this point, have given up the game, and thankfully accepted the -conditions offered. They would not have prevented her from ascending the -English throne if she had outlived Elizabeth. But that was a delay which -she had always scouted as intolerable, and she was one to whom life was -worth nothing if it meant defeat, retirement, even for a time, from the -public scene, and the abandonment of long-cherished ambitions. Moreover -her quick wit had divined that Elizabeth was using a threat which she -did not mean to put<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_77" id="page_77"></a>{77}</span> into execution. There would be no verdict—not even -any publication to the world of the evidence. Guilty therefore as she -was, and aware that her guilt could be proved, she coolly faced “the -great extremities” at which Elizabeth had hinted, and rejected the -conditions.</p> - -<p>Perhaps even Mary’s daring would have flinched from this bold game but -for a quarrel between Elizabeth and Philip, to be mentioned presently. -Hitherto Philip, much to his credit, had declined to interfere in Mary’s -behalf. To him, as to every one else, Catholic as well as Protestant, -her guilt seemed evident. She had been only a scandal and embarrassment -to the Catholic cause. But if there was to be war with England, every -enemy of Elizabeth was a weapon to be used. Accordingly he now began, -though reluctantly, to think of helping the Queen of Scots, and even of -marrying her to his brother Don John of Austria. With the prospect of -such backing it was not wonderful that she declined to own herself -beaten.</p> - -<p>Elizabeth’s calculations, though reasonable, were thus disappointed. The -inquiry was dropped without any decision. The Regent was sent home with -a small sum of money, and Mary remained in England (January 1569).<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_78" id="page_78"></a>{78}</span></p> - -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V"></a>CHAPTER V<br /><br /> -<small>ARISTOCRATIC PLOTS: 1568-1572</small></h2> - -<p class="nind">F<small>ROM</small> the beginning of the reign Cecil had never ceased to impress upon -his mistress that a French or Spanish invasion on behalf of the Pope -might at any time be expected, and that she should hurry to meet it by -forming a league with the foreign Protestants of both Confessions, and -vigorously assisting them to carry on a war of religion on the -Continent. He was assuredly too well informed to believe that France and -Spain would cease to counteract each other’s designs on England, or that -Lutherans and Calvinists would heartily combine for mutual defence. The -enemies he really feared were his Catholic countrymen, with whom he -would have to fight for his head if Elizabeth should die. He therefore -desired to force on the struggle in her lifetime, when they would be -rebels, and he would wield the power of the Crown.</p> - -<p>Elizabeth, on the other hand, was against interference on the Continent, -because it would be the surest way to bring upon England the calamity of -invasion. She saw as plainly as Cecil did that it would compel her to -throw herself into the arms of her own Protestants<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_79" id="page_79"></a>{79}</span> and to become, like -her two predecessors, the mere chief of a party; whereas she meant to be -the Queen of all Englishmen, and to tranquillise the natural fears of -each party by letting it see that it would not be sacrificed to the -violence of the other. Moreover the unbridled ascendancy of the -Protestants would mean such alterations in the established worship as -would have driven from the parish churches thousands of the most -military class, peers, squires and their tenantry, who were enduring -Anglicanism with its episcopate, its semi-Catholic prayer-book, and its -claim to belong to the Universal Apostolic Church, because they could -persuade themselves that its variations from the old religion were -unimportant and temporary. And this again would increase the probability -of foreign invasion. For, though to Philip all forms of heresy were -equally damnable and equally marked out for extermination sooner or -later, yet he was in much less hurry to begin with the politically -harmless Lutherans or Anglicans than with the dangerous levellers who -derived their inspiration from Geneva. Now for Elizabeth to gain time -was everything. She had gained ten precious years already by her -moderation. She was to gain twenty more before the slow-moving Spaniard -decided to launch the great Armada.</p> - -<p>But though Elizabeth shunned war with Spain she nevertheless recognised -that Philip was the enemy, and that all ways of damaging him short of -war were for her advantage. English and Huguenot corsairs swarmed in the -Channel. Spanish ships were seized. The crews were hanged or made to -walk the plank; the prizes were carried into English ports, and there<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_80" id="page_80"></a>{80}</span> -sold without disguise or rebuke. These outrages were represented as -reprisals for cruelties inflicted on English sailors who occasionally -fell into the hands of the Inquisition. Practically a ship with a -valuable cargo was treated as fair game whatever its nationality. But -while in the case of other countries it was only individual traders who -suffered, to Spain it meant obstruction of her high road to her Belgic -dominions, then simmering with disaffection.</p> - -<p>The English nobles of the old blood disliked these proceedings. Even -Cecil did not conceal from himself that they fostered a spirit of -lawlessness. What the corsairs were doing he would have preferred to see -done by the royal navy. To that Elizabeth would not consent. The -activity of the corsairs gave her all the advantage she could hope to -have from war, without any of its disadvantages. Instead of laying out -her treasure on a navy, she was deriving an income from the piratical -ventures of Hawkins and Drake; while the ships and sailors of this -volunteer navy would be available for the defence of the country -whenever the need should arise. Whatever may be thought of the morality -of her plan, there can be no question as to its efficiency and economy.</p> - -<p>Since even these outrages, exasperating as they were, had not goaded -Philip to the point of declaring war, a still more daring provocation -now followed. Some ships, conveying a large sum of money borrowed by -Philip in Genoa for the payment of Alva’s army, having put into English -ports to avoid the corsairs, Elizabeth, with the hearty approval of -Cecil, took possession of the money, and said she would herself<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_81" id="page_81"></a>{81}</span> borrow -it from the Genoese (December 1568). The Minister hoped this would bring -on a war. The Queen audaciously but more correctly anticipated that -Philip’s resentment would still stop short of that extremity. He -remonstrated: he threatened: he seized all English ships and sailors in -his ports. Elizabeth, undismayed, swept all the Spaniards and Flemings -whom she could find in London into her prisons, and seized their goods, -to a value far greater than that of the English property in Philip’s -grasp.</p> - -<p>In striking contrast with this unflinching attitude towards Spain was -the behaviour of Elizabeth when threatened with war by France, unless -she undertook to close her harbours to the Huguenots, and to forbid her -own corsairs to prey on French commerce. The summons was promptly -obeyed. Full satisfaction was made (April 1569). Yet France was at the -moment a far less formidable antagonist than Spain. The French -government did not possess the means of invading England. On this side -of the Channel the old anti-French feeling was so persistent that all -parties were ready and willing for the fray. The defeat of the Huguenots -at Jarnac (April 1569) may have had something to do with Elizabeth’s -compliance. But what influenced her still more was her perception that -war with France would compel her to place herself under the protection -of Spain; whereas she desired to keep Spain at arm’s-length, and to -maintain a good understanding with France, as did Eliot, Pym, and -Cromwell afterwards, regardless of the rooted prejudices of their -countrymen. Elizabeth probably stood alone in her judgment on this -occasion.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_82" id="page_82"></a>{82}</span></p> - -<p>The quarrel with Philip had more serious results at home than abroad. It -was indirectly the cause of the only English rebellion that disturbed -the long reign of Elizabeth.</p> - -<p>Most of the nobility and gentry, even when professedly Protestants, -regretted the alienation of England from the Universal Church. If they -had all pulled together they must have had their way, for they were the -military and political class. But their discontent varied widely in its -intensity. There were nobles like Sussex who were resolved to serve -their Queen loyally and zealously, but who, all the same, wished her to -cultivate a good understanding with Philip, to marry the Archduke, to -abstain from assisting the Huguenots, to give no countenance to the -rovers, to recognise Mary as her heir-presumptive and marry her to -Norfolk. There were others like Norfolk, Montagu, Arundel, and -Southampton, who had treasonable relations with the Spanish ambassador, -and aimed at overthrowing Cecil, marrying Mary to Norfolk, and -compelling the Queen to restore the Catholic worship, or at least to -make such changes in the Anglican model as would facilitate a reunion -with Rome when Mary should succeed. A third party, headed by the -Catholic lords of the north, was plotting to depose Elizabeth in favour -of Mary, and to marry the latter to Don John of Austria.</p> - -<p>With these powerful nobles in opposition, who, before the Reformation, -could have hurled any sovereign from his throne, where was Elizabeth to -look for support? The town populations were Protestant—too Protestant -indeed for her taste. But the town<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_83" id="page_83"></a>{83}</span> populations were a minority, and -less military than the landowners and their tenants. She had her Cecils, -Bacons, Walsinghams, Hunsdons, Knollyses, Sadlers, Killegrews, Drurys, -capable and devoted servants, but new men without territorial wealth or -influence, and with no force except what they possessed as wielding the -power of the Crown. It would be difficult to name more than half-a-dozen -peers who zealously promoted her policy. Most of them looked on it -coldly, and would support her only as long as she seemed to be -strongest.</p> - -<p>Mary’s rejection of Elizabeth’s terms coincided with the quarrel with -Philip (December 1568). The disaffected nobles thought that the time was -now come for striking a blow. Conscious that the feudal devotion of the -gentry and yeomanry to their local chiefs had in Tudor times been -largely superseded by awe of the central government, they were -importuning Philip to give them the signal for rebellion by sending a -division of Alva’s army from the Netherlands. Philip, cautious as usual, -and afraid of driving England into alliance with France, declined to -send a soldier until either the Norfolk party had overthrown Cecil, or -the northern lords had carried off Mary. Between these two sets of -conspirators there was much jealousy and distrust. The Spanish -ambassador thought the southern scheme the most feasible. Not without -difficulty he persuaded the northern lords to wait till it should be -seen whether the Queen could be induced or compelled to sanction the -marriage of Mary with Norfolk. If she refused, they were to make a dash -on Wingfield, a seat of Lord Shrewsbury’s in Derbyshire where Mary<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_84" id="page_84"></a>{84}</span> was -staying, while Norfolk was to raise the eastern counties.</p> - -<p>All through the summer of 1569 these plots were brewing. Three times -Norfolk and his father-in-law Arundel went to the Council with the -intention of arresting Cecil. Three times their hearts failed them. The -northern lords, who were not members of the Council, came up to London -to see Norfolk bell the cat, but went back, more suspicious than ever, -to make their own preparations. Cecil himself seems to have been -hedging. In his private advice to the Queen he was opposing the Norfolk -marriage, pointing out that free or in prison, married or single, in -England or in Scotland, Mary must always be dangerous, and breathing for -the first time the suggestion that she might lawfully be put to death in -England for complicity in English plots. In the Council he concurred in -a vote that she should be married to an Englishman—in other words, to -Norfolk.</p> - -<p>If Elizabeth could have felt any confidence in Norfolk’s loyalty, it -seems probable that much as she disliked the marriage she would have -yielded to the almost unanimous pronouncement of the nobility in its -favour. But a sure instinct warned her of her danger. “If she consented -she would be in the Tower before four months were over.” After much -deliberation she commanded the Duke on his allegiance to renounce his -project. He gave his promise, but soon retired to his own county, and -sent word to the northern earls that “he would stand and abide the -venture.” But while he was shivering and hesitating, Elizabeth, for -once, was all promptitude and decision.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_85" id="page_85"></a>{85}</span> Mary was hurried to Tutbury -Castle. Arundel and Pembroke were summoned to Windsor, and kept under -surveillance. Norfolk himself came in quietly, and was lodged in the -Tower. Thus the southern conspiracy collapsed (September-October 1569).</p> - -<p>The Catholic lords and gentlemen of the north who had been awaiting -Norfolk’s signal, were staggered by his tame surrender. Sussex, who was -in command at York, and who, being of the old blood himself, did not -care to see old houses crushed, advised Elizabeth to wink at their -half-begun treason, and be thankful it had not come to fighting. She -winked at the attempted flight to Alva of Southampton and Montagu, and -even affected to trust the latter with the command of the militia called -out in Sussex. She could afford to ignore the disaffection of a southern -noble. A Sussex squire or yeoman, even if he was not a Protestant, would -think twice before he cast in his lot with rebellion. The northern -counties were mainly Catholic. They were much behind the south in -civilisation. The Tudor sovereigns were never seen there. Great families -were still looked up to. Elizabeth knew that though rebellion might be -adjourned, might possibly never come off, it was a constant menace, -which crippled her policy. She determined therefore to have done with -it, once for all, and summoned Northumberland and Westmoreland to -London.</p> - -<p>Thus driven into a corner, the two earls burst into rebellion. They -entered Durham in arms, overthrew the communion table in the cathedral, -set up the old altar, and had mass said (Nov. 14, 1569). Next day they -marched south, with the object of rescuing Mary<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_86" id="page_86"></a>{86}</span> from Tutbury. But when -they were within fifty miles of that place, Shrewsbury and Huntingdon, -in obedience to hurried orders from London, conveyed her to Coventry. -Having thus missed their spring, the rebel earls halted irresolutely for -three days, and then turned back. Their followers dropped away from -them. Clinton and Warwick were on their track, with the musters of the -Midlands; and before the end of December they were fain to fly across -the Border. Northumberland was arrested by Moray. Two years later he was -given up to Elizabeth, and executed. Westmoreland, after being protected -for a time by Ker of Ferniehirst, escaped to the Netherlands, where he -died. England was not again disturbed by rebellion till the great civil -war.</p> - -<p>The failure of the northern earls to kindle a general rebellion was due -to the cautious and temporising policy for which Elizabeth has been so -severely blamed by heated partisans. The powerful party which preferred -a Spanish alliance, disliked religious innovation, and looked forward to -the succession of Mary, had not been driven to despair of accomplishing -those ends in a lawful way. Their avowed policy had not been -proscribed—had not even been repudiated. Some of their chief leaders -were on the Council—as we should say, were members of the Government; -others were employed and trusted and visited by the Queen. They objected -to being hurried into civil war by the northern lords, who were not of -the Council, who kept away from London, and were rebels by inheritance -and tradition. They would have nothing to do with the ill-advised -movement; and, as<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_87" id="page_87"></a>{87}</span> in those days neutrality in the presence of open -insurrection was no more permissible to a nobleman than it would be now -to an officer in the army, they had no choice but to range themselves on -the side of the Government. If Elizabeth had openly branded the Queen of -Scots as a murderess, if she had pointed to Huntingdon or the son of -Catherine Grey as her successor, if she had put herself at the head of a -Protestant league, she might possibly have come victorious out of a -civil war. But a civil war it would have been, and of the worst kind: -one party calling in the Spaniard, and the other, in all probability, -driven to call in the Frenchman.</p> - -<p>The assassination of Moray a few weeks later (Jan. 23, 1570) was a -severe blow to Elizabeth, and an irreparable disaster to his own -country. An attempt has been made to create an impression that the -English Queen was somehow responsible for his death, because she did not -march an army into Scotland to support him. He no more wished to receive -an English army into Scotland than Elizabeth wished to send one. Therein -they were both of them wiser than the critics of their own day, or this. -What he did ask for was money, and the recognition of James. The request -for money Elizabeth was willing to consider, though, as a rule, she did -not believe in paying for any work she could get done gratis. The -recognition of James seems a very simple thing to the critics. But it -was as difficult for Elizabeth as the recognition of the Prince of -Bulgaria is now to Austria, and for similar reasons. She was under no -obligation whatever to Moray. His own interest compelled him to<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_88" id="page_88"></a>{88}</span> play -her game. But she well knew his value. On hearing of his death she shut -herself up in her chamber, exclaiming, with tears, that she had lost the -best friend she had in the world.</p> - -<p>As long as Moray lived, and was able to keep the Marian lords in some -sort of check, Elizabeth judged, and rightly, that she had more to lose -than to gain by any open interference in Scotland. It was no business of -hers to put down anarchy there. Scotch anarchy did not imperil England. -What would imperil England would be the appearance of French troops in -Scotland; and she judged that nothing would be so likely to bring them -there as any pretension to establish an English protectorate. Her -Protestant councillors fretted at her <i>laisser faire</i> policy. But then -they, for personal or at least for sectarian reasons, were eager for -that general European conflagration which she, with superior discernment -and larger patriotism, was trying to avert.</p> - -<p>The death of Moray so weakened the King’s party that it became necessary -to give them a little help. Elizabeth gave it in such a way as she -thought would be least likely to excite the jealousy of France. She told -the new Regent Lennox that, though she could not send an army to support -him, she would send one to chastise the Hamiltons and the Borderers, who -were harbouring her rebel the Earl of Westmoreland, and, along with him, -making raids into England. This was done sharply and thoroughly. The -robber holds on the Border, and Hamilton Castle itself, were one after -another taken and blown up by the English Wardens of the Marches (April -and May 1570).</p> - -<p>What Elizabeth desired more than anything else<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_89" id="page_89"></a>{89}</span> was to settle Scotch -affairs, in conjunction with France, on the terms that neither power -should interfere in Scotland. To Cecil this was unsatisfactory, because -the restoration of Mary, on any terms whatever, would, if she survived -Elizabeth, ensure her succession to the English throne, and the ruin of -Cecil himself. He did not want to conciliate Catholics at home or -abroad. He wanted to commit his mistress to an internecine war with -them. In an angry dispute with Arundel at the Council board about this -time, he blurted out his doctrine, that the Queen had no friends but the -Protestants, and that if she restored Mary she would lose them all. No -language could have been more displeasing to Elizabeth, especially in -the presence of crypto-Catholic lords, and she snubbed him unmercifully. -“Mr Secretary, I mean to have done with this business; I shall listen to -the proposals of the French King. I am not going to be tied any longer -to you and your brethren in Christ.”</p> - -<p>The peace of St. Germain between the French court and the Huguenots -(August 8, 1570), and the disgrace of the Guises, were followed by -negotiations for a tripartite treaty between England, France, and -Scotland on the basis of the restoration of Mary. Elizabeth, of course, -insisted on the guarantees she had often sketched out. She was -willing—nay, anxious—to leave Scotland alone, if the French would do -the same. The French, on the other hand, felt that the equality of such -an arrangement was more seeming than real, because there were always -English troops lying at Berwick, within sixty miles of Edinburgh. They -haggled over the guarantees, and in the meantime, notwithstanding<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_90" id="page_90"></a>{90}</span> the -real desire of Catherine and Charles <small>IX.</small> to conclude an alliance with -Elizabeth against Philip, they continued to send money and encouragement -to the Marian lords in Scotland. For if, for any reason, the English -alliance should not come off, they meant to take up Mary’s cause in -earnest, and detach her from her Guise relations by marrying her to the -Duke of Anjou, afterwards Henry <small>III.</small></p> - -<p>All this was known to Elizabeth, and in her extreme anxiety for the -tripartite treaty, she thought the moment was come to dangle the bait -which she always reserved for occasions of special importance. She -informed the French ambassador that she was ready to marry Anjou -herself. It is not to be supposed that she had the least intention of -doing so. She had settled with herself from the first how she would get -out of her proposal when it had served its turn.</p> - -<p>A minor motive for this move was the hope that it would reconcile her -Protestant councillors to the restoration of Mary. She did not succeed -with all of them. Some continued to mutter that Anjou was a Papist, that -tripartite treaties were a delusion, and that the only safe course was -to grasp the Scotch nettle and uphold James with the whole force of -England. But upon Cecil the effect was almost comical. He jumped at the -plan. Anything that was likely to make Elizabeth a mother would be -salvation to him. Whether the Queen at the mature age of thirty-seven -was likely to be happy with a husband of twenty was a question that did -not give him a moment’s concern. She was not too old to have two or -three children, and, that result once<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_91" id="page_91"></a>{91}</span> achieved, Mary might go to -Scotland or anywhere else for what he cared, and do her worst. The -sanguine man already saw visions of a converted Valois heading an -Anglo-French crusade against Philip, and establishing the reformed faith -throughout Europe. Walsingham his right-hand man, then ambassador at -Paris, was equally bitten. This was in the year before the massacre of -St. Bartholomew.</p> - -<p>The overture of Elizabeth was very welcome to the French court. -Negotiations for the match were soon opened, and continued during the -first six months of 1571. At the same time, both the Scotch factions -were summoned to accept the tripartite arrangement. Mary was at first -eager for it, and instructed her agent, the Bishop of Ross, to swallow -every condition that might be imposed. She looked on it as the only -means of obtaining her release. But there is ample proof that she -intended to throw its stipulations to the winds and fight for her own -cause when once she should get back to Scotland. In playing this -perfidious game, she had confidently counted on the help of France. The -Regent’s party, however, declined the treaty. They dreaded Mary’s -return, and they had no wish to shake hands with the Marian lords or -admit them to a share in the Government. The tripartite scheme thus fell -through. Mary herself ceased to care for it as soon as she heard of the -projected match between Elizabeth and Anjou. She saw that if France was -going to co-operate heartily with England, her sovereignty in Scotland -would be merely nominal. She might almost as well remain with Lord -Shrewsbury.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_92" id="page_92"></a>{92}</span></p> - -<p>To remain quietly in England and be content with her position as -heir-presumptive to the English crown was indeed the best and safest -course open to her. She had only to acquiesce in it and give up -plotting, and she might have lived here in considerable magnificence, -and with as much freedom as she could desire. If she wished for a -husband, she might have married any Englishman of whose loyalty -Elizabeth could feel assured. It was of the greatest importance to both -countries that she should bear more children. For it must be remembered -that if James had died in his childhood, his next heir was a Hamilton, -who had no title to the English throne.</p> - -<p>If the proposed Anjou match had not produced the full results which -Elizabeth hoped, it had at least defeated the plans and disorganised the -party of her rival. It had served its turn; and all that now remained -was to get out of it as decently as possible. The old pretext for -breaking off the Austrian match was reproduced. Anjou could not be -allowed to have a private mass; and when, in its eagerness, the French -court seemed disposed to give way on this point, Elizabeth began to talk -about a restitution of Calais. Ruefully did poor Cecil watch the -vanishing of his dream. It was to no purpose that he tried to frighten -Elizabeth by representing that a jilted prince would be converted into -an angry enemy. She knew better. Anjou comprehended that she did not -mean to have him, and, to avoid the indignity of a refusal, himself -broke off negotiations. But, as Elizabeth had calculated, the new -alliance did not suffer. The French King went out of his way to say that -“for her upright<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_93" id="page_93"></a>{93}</span> dealing he would honour the Queen of England during -his life,” and Catherine, most unsentimental of women, had another -suitor to offer—her youngest son Alençon, then just turned seventeen!</p> - -<p>While the negotiations for the Anjou match were going on, what is known -as the Ridolfi Plot was hatching against Elizabeth. Ridolfi, an Italian -banker in London, and secretly an agent of the Pope, was in close -relations with Norfolk and the other peers who for two years had been -dabbling in treason. They were still pressing Philip to invade England; -but he and Alva were less than ever disposed to undertake the venture -since the pitiful collapse of the northern insurrection. In order to -impress Philip with the importance of the conspiracy, Ridolfi went to -Madrid, and showed Philip a letter purporting to be written by Norfolk, -to which was attached a list of noblemen stated to be favourable to the -cause. It contained the names of forty out of the sixty-seven peers then -existing, while, of the rest, some were marked as neutral, and fifteen -at most as true to Elizabeth. The classification was on the face of it -absurdly untrustworthy. But correct or incorrect, it did not weigh with -Philip. He wanted deeds, not lists of names, and Ridolfi was informed -that, unless Elizabeth were first assassinated or imprisoned, not a -Spanish soldier could be sent to England.</p> - -<p>Whatever secret disaffection might prevail among the peers, the temper -displayed by the new House of Commons, elected in the spring of 1571, -was not of a kind to encourage Elizabeth’s enemies at home <span class="pagenum"><a name="page_94" id="page_94"></a>{94}</span>or abroad. -So far as can be judged from its proceedings and debates, it was not -only entirely Protestant, but largely Puritan.<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> A bill was passed by -which any person refusing, on demand, to acknowledge Elizabeth’s right -to the crown was made incapable of succeeding her; a provision which, -though it did not name Mary, could apply to no one else. It was made -high treason to deny that the inheritance of the crown could be -determined by the Queen and Parliament. To affirm in writing that any -particular person was entitled to succeed the Queen, except the Queen’s -issue, or some one established by Parliament, was made punishable with -imprisonment for life, and forfeiture of all property for the second -offence.</p> - -<p>The plot which Ridolfi was so busily pushing in 1571 was, in fact, a -continuation of the twin aristocratic conspiracies, one of which had -exploded in the northern insurrection. By forcing that insurrection to -break out before the southern conspirators had made up their minds what -to do, the Government had effectually destroyed what chances of success -the disaffected nobles had ever had. Alva was right in his judgment -that, if the Percys, Nevilles, and Dacres could do so little, the Howard -group, whose estates, vast as they were, lay, for the most part, in more -orderly and civilised parts of the country, could do still less. There -was, indeed, some talk among them of seizing the Queen at the opening of -the Parliament of 1571, just as there had been a talk of arresting Cecil -two years before. But the truth was that insurrection was a played-out -game in England;<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_95" id="page_95"></a>{95}</span> and if Norfolk had been a ten-times abler and bolder -man than he was, it would have made no difference.</p> - -<p>The true history of the time is not to be read in the croakings and -wailings privately exchanged between Cecil, Walsingham, and the rest of -the Protestant junto, angry and alarmed because Elizabeth would not let -them play her cards for her. It is a strange perversity which persists -in adopting their view that she was on the brink of ruin, when the -patent fact is that Protestantism was making rapid strides, that the -Queen’s personal popularity was increasing every day, and that Spain, -France, and Scotland, the only countries with which she was concerned, -were all humble suitors for her alliance on almost any terms that it -might please her to exact. The correspondence of Philip with Alva is -there to prove, that while writhing under the repeated aggressions of -England, he was obliged to put up with them because a war would imperil -his hold on the Netherlands. To all the invitations of the Norfolks and -Northumberlands, the able and well-informed Alva turned a deaf ear, -because he believed Elizabeth too strong to be overthrown. A French -alliance she could always have as long as the Guises were excluded from -power. If they regained their influence the Huguenots would keep them -fully occupied. Scotland, unless foreign troops made their appearance -there, could be no source of danger to England.</p> - -<p>Elizabeth’s policy was thus, in its broad lines, as simple as it was -successful. At home it was her wisdom to wink as long as possible at the -disaffection of the few, to win the affection of the many by economical<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_96" id="page_96"></a>{96}</span> -government, to reserve the persecuting laws for special cases, while -preventing any general and sweeping application of them, and, lastly, to -drive no party to desperation by a too pronounced encouragement of its -opponents. Spain, as being the centre of reaction and the hope of her -disloyal nobles, she meant to harass and weaken as far as she could do -so without bringing on an open war. With Charles <small>IX.</small> and his mother she -desired a defensive alliance, and an understanding that neither country -should send troops into Scotland or permit Spain to do so. In its -general conception, I repeat, this policy was simple and coherent. How -it succeeded we know. There was nothing sentimental about it, though, -where individuals were concerned, Elizabeth’s judgment was sometimes -warped by sentiment. Upon the whole, she kept herself at the English -point of view. Whereas Cecil was compelled by personal considerations to -place himself too much at the point of view of his “brethren in Christ,” -both at home and abroad.</p> - -<p>However, a plot there was, and it was necessary that it should be -unravelled and punished. Almost from its inception, Cecil (created Lord -Burghley February 1571), had been more or less on the scent of it. Hints -had come from abroad: spies had been employed: suspected persons had -been closely watched: inferior agents had been imprisoned, questioned, -racked: and enough had been discovered to make it certain that -Englishmen of the highest rank were plotting treason. Who they were -might be suspected, but was not ascertained until a lucky arrest put the -Minister in possession of evidence<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_97" id="page_97"></a>{97}</span> incriminating Norfolk, Arundel, -Southampton, Lumley, Cobham, the Spanish ambassador, the Bishop of Ross, -and Mary herself (September 1571). Norfolk was sent to the Tower, and -the other peers placed under arrest. The ambassador was dismissed. The -Bishop made ample confessions. Mary, who had hitherto lived as the guest -of Lord Shrewsbury, enjoying field-sports, receiving her friends and -corresponding with whom she would, was confined to a single room, and -carefully cut off, for a time, from all communication with the outer -world. Both in England and abroad it was universally expected that she -would be brought to trial and executed. James was at length officially -styled “King” and his mother “late Queen.” Her partisans in Edinburgh -Castle were informed that she would never be restored, and that, if they -did not surrender the Castle to the Regent Mar, an English force would -be sent to take it. The casket letters had hitherto been withheld from -publication under pressure from Elizabeth; they were now at last given -to the world in the famous “Detection” of Buchanan.</p> - -<p>Under any other Tudor, or under the Stuarts, all the peers arrested -would undoubtedly have lost their heads. Norfolk alone was brought to -trial (January 1572). There was much in the proceedings which, according -to modern notions, was unfair to the accused. But the peers who tried -him felt sure that he was guilty, and they were right. Subsequent -investigations have established beyond a doubt that he had conspired to -bring a foreign army into the country—the worst form that treason can -take. He had done this with contemptible hypocrisy, for a purely selfish -object, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_98" id="page_98"></a>{98}</span> after the most lenient and generous construction had been -placed on his first steps in crime. And yet historians have been found -to make light of the offence, and to pity the malefactor as the victim -of a romantic attachment to a woman whom he had never seen, and whom he -believed to be an adulteress and a murderess.</p> - -<p>During the spring of 1572 Elizabeth hesitated to let justice take its -course. She had reigned fourteen years without taking the life of a -single noble. The scaffold on Tower Hill from such long disuse was -falling to pieces, and Norfolk’s sentence had made it necessary to erect -a new one. Elizabeth was loath to break the spell.</p> - -<p>Not knowing with any certainty how many of her nobles might have given -more or less approval to the Ridolfi plot, but confident that she could -cow them by letting the voice of the untitled aristocracy and middle -class be heard, she called a new Parliament (May 1572). The response -went beyond her expectation. Of Mary’s well-wishers, once so numerous, -all except a few fanatics had now given her up. Two alternative courses -of action with respect to her were submitted for consideration, with the -intimation that the Queen would accept whichever of them Parliament -should approve. The first was attainder. The second was that she should -be disabled from succession to the crown; that if she attempted treason -again she should “suffer pains of death without further trouble of -Parliament;” and that it should be treason if she assented to any -enterprise to deliver her out of prison. Both houses at once voted to -proceed with the<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_99" id="page_99"></a>{99}</span> attainder. Elizabeth, we may be sure, was not sorry -for this unmistakable exhibition of feeling. It would open the eyes of -her enemies both at home and abroad. But she had no intention of -proceeding to such extremities this time. Mary should have fair warning. -Accordingly Parliament was desired to “defer” the bill of attainder, and -to proceed with the second measure. But the Commons were in grim -earnest. They immediately resolved that the second bill would be useless -and even mischievous, as it would imply that at present Mary had a right -of succession, whereas she was already disabled by law; and that they -therefore preferred to proceed with the attainder. With this resolution -the Lords concurred.</p> - -<p>Here they were on dangerous ground. To rake up the law empowering Henry -<small>VIII.</small> to determine the succession was to disable all the Stuarts, James -included, and so to throw away the opportunity of uniting the crowns. -Elizabeth had always, for excellent reasons, refused to allow this -question to be raised. Accordingly she again directed the House to defer -the attainder; she would not have the Scottish Queen “either enabled or -disabled to or from any manner of <i>title</i> to the crown,” nor “any other -<i>title</i> to the same whatsoever touched at all;” to make sure of which -she would have the second bill drawn by her own law officers. To the -repeated demands of the Commons for the execution of Norfolk, she at -length gave way, and a few days later he was beheaded (June 2, 1572). -The second bill, as drawn by the law officers, passed both Houses. Its -exact terms are not known, for it never received the royal assent.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_100" id="page_100"></a>{100}</span></p> - -<p>Burghley who was of opinion (as some one afterwards said about -Strafford) that “stone dead hath no fellow,” bemoaned himself privately -to Walsingham on the disappointment of their hopes; and modern -historians, with whom his authority is final, are loud in their -condemnation of Elizabeth’s vacillation and blindness. Vacillation there -was really none. She had determined from the first not to allow Mary to -be punished. She had gained all she wanted when the temper of Parliament -had been ascertained and displayed to the world. There have always been -plenty of people to accuse her of treachery and cruelty because she put -Mary to death fifteen years later, for complicity in an assassination -plot. How would her name have gone down to posterity if the Scottish -Queen had been executed in 1572 merely for inviting a foreign army to -rescue her from captivity?<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_101" id="page_101"></a>{101}</span></p> - -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI"></a>CHAPTER VI<br /><br /> -<small>FOREIGN AFFAIRS: 1572-1583</small></h2> - -<p class="nind">T<small>HE</small> year 1572 witnessed two events of capital importance in European -history: the rising in the Netherlands, which resulted in the -establishment of the Dutch Republic (April); and the massacre of St. -Bartholomew, which marked the decisive rejection of Protestantism by -France (August).</p> - -<p>In the beginning of that year—a few weeks before the proceedings in -Parliament just narrated—Elizabeth had at last concluded the defensive -alliance with France for which she had been so long negotiating (April -19). It cannot be too often repeated that this was the corner-stone of -her foreign policy. For the sake of its superior importance she had -abstained from the interference in Scotland which her Ministers were -always urging. The more she interfered there the more she would have to -interfere, till it would end in her having a rebellious province on her -hands in addition to the hostility of both France and Spain; whereas an -alliance with France would give her security on all sides, Scotland -included. In the treaty it was agreed that if either country were -invaded<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_102" id="page_102"></a>{102}</span> “under any pretence or cause, none excepted,” the other should -send 6000 troops to its assistance. This was accompanied with an -explanation, in the King’s handwriting, that “any cause” included -religion. The article relating to Scotland is not less significant. The -two sovereigns “shall make no innovations in Scotland, but defend it -against foreigners, not suffering strangers to enter, or foment the -factions in Scotland; but it shall be lawful for the Queen of England to -chastise by arms the Scots who shall countenance the English rebels now -in Scotland.” Mary was not mentioned. France therefore tacitly renounced -her cause. Immediately after the conclusion of the treaty Charles <small>IX.</small> -formally proposed a marriage between Elizabeth and his youngest brother, -Alençon. This proposal she managed to encourage and elude for eleven -years.</p> - -<p>It was just at this moment that the seizure of Brill by some Dutch -rovers, who had taken refuge on the sea from the cruelty of Alva, caused -most of the towns of Holland and Zealand to blaze into rebellion (April -1). Thus began the great war of liberation, which was to last -thirty-seven years. The Protestant party in England hailed the revolt -with enthusiasm. Large subscriptions were made to assist it, and -volunteers poured across to take part in the struggle. Charles <small>IX.</small> and -his mother, full of schemes of conquest in the Netherlands, urged -Elizabeth to join them in a war against Philip. But, with a sagacity and -self-restraint which do her infinite honour, she refused to be drawn -beyond the lines laid down in the recent defensive alliance. Security, -economy, fructification of the tax-payers’ money in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_103" id="page_103"></a>{103}</span> tax-payers’ -pocket—such were the guiding principles of her policy. She was not to -be dragged into dangerous enterprises either ambitious or Quixotic. -Schemes for the partition of the Netherlands were laid before her. -Zealand, it was said, would indemnify her for Calais. What Englishman -with any common sense does not now see that she was right to reject the -bribe?</p> - -<p>To Elizabeth no rebellion against a legitimate sovereign could be -welcome in itself. Since Philip was so possessed by religious bigotry as -to be dangerous to all Protestant States, she was not sorry that he -should wear out his crusading ardour in the Netherlands; and she was -ready to give just as much assistance to the Dutch, in an underhand way, -as would keep him fully occupied without bringing a declaration of war -upon herself. But she would have vastly preferred that he should repress -Catholic and Protestant fanatics alike, and get along quietly with the -mass of his subjects as his father had done before him. Charles <small>IX.</small> was -eager to strike in if she would join him. Those who blame her so -severely for her refusal seem to forget that a French conquest of the -Netherlands would have been far more dangerous to this country than -their possession by Spain. To keep them out of French hands has indeed -been the traditional policy of England during the whole of modern -history.</p> - -<p>But, it is said, such a war would have clinched the alliance recently -patched up between the French court and the Huguenots; there would have -been no Bartholomew Massacre; “on Elizabeth depended at that moment -whether the French Government would<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_104" id="page_104"></a>{104}</span> take its place once for all on the -side of the Reformation.”</p> - -<p>Whether it would have been for the advantage of European progress in the -long-run that France should settle down into Calvinism, I will forbear -to inquire. Fortunately for the immediate interests of England, -Elizabeth understood the situation in France better than some of her -critics do, even with the results before their eyes. The Huguenots were -but a small fraction of the nation. Whatever importance they possessed -they derived from their rank, their turbulence, and the ambition of -their leaders. In a few towns of the south and south-west they formed a -majority of the population. But everywhere else they were mostly -noblemen, full of the arrogance and reckless valour of their class, -anything but puritans in their morals, and ready to destroy the unity of -the kingdom for political no less than for religious objects. They had -been losing ground for several years. The mass of the people abhorred -their doctrines, and protested against any concession to their -pretensions. Charles and his mother were absolutely careless about -religion. Their feud with the Guises and their designs on the -Netherlands had led them to invite the Huguenot chiefs to court, and so -to give them a momentary influence in shaping the policy of France. It -was with nothing more solid to lean on than this ricketty and -short-lived combination that Burghley and Walsingham were eager to -launch England into a war with the most powerful monarchy in Europe.</p> - -<p>The massacre of St. Bartholomew (August 24) was a rude awakening from -these dreams. That thunder-clap<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_105" id="page_105"></a>{105}</span> did not show that, in signing the -treaty with England and in proposing an attack on Philip, the French -Government had been playing a treacherous game all along, in order to -lure the Huguenots to the shambles. But it did show that when the -Catholic sentiment in France was thoroughly roused, the dynasty itself -must bend before it or be swept away. England might help the Huguenots -to keep up a desultory and harassing civil war; she could no more enable -them to control the policy of the French nation and wield its force, -than she could at the present day restore the Bourbons or Bonapartes.</p> - -<p>The first idea of Elizabeth and her ministers, on receiving the news of -the massacre, naturally was that the French Government had been playing -them false from the first, that the Catholic League for the extirpation -of heresy in Europe, which had been so much talked of since the Bayonne -interview in 1565, was after all a reality, and that England might -expect an attack from the combined forces of Spain and France. Thanks to -the prudent policy of Elizabeth, England was in a far better position to -meet all dangers than she had been in 1565. The fleet was brought round -to the Downs. The coast was guarded by militia. An expedition was -organised to co-operate with the Dutch insurgents. Money was sent to the -Prince of Orange. Huguenot refugees were allowed to fit out a flotilla -to assist their co-religionists in Rochelle. The Scotch Regent Mar was -informed, with great secrecy, that if he would demand the extradition of -Mary, and undertake to punish her capitally for her husband’s murder, -she should be given up to him.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_106" id="page_106"></a>{106}</span></p> - -<p>A few weeks sufficed to show that there was no reason for panic. -Confidence, indeed, between the French and English Governments had been -severely shaken. Each stood suspiciously on its guard. But the alliance -was too well grounded in the interests of both parties to be lightly -cast aside. The French ambassador was instructed to excuse and deplore -the massacre as best he could, and to press on the Alençon marriage. -Elizabeth, dressed in deep mourning, gave him a stiff reception, but let -him see her desire to maintain the alliance. The massacre did not -restore the ascendancy of the Guises. To the Huguenots, as religious -reformers, it gave a blow from which they did not recover. But as a -political faction they were not crushed. Nay, their very weakness became -their salvation, since it compelled them to fall into the second rank -behind the <i>Politiques</i>, the true party of progress, who were before -long to find a victorious leader in Henry of Navarre.</p> - -<p>Philip, for his part, was equally far from any thought of a crusade -against England. Sir Humphrey Gilbert, commanding several companies of -English volunteers, with the hardly concealed sanction of his -government, was fighting against the Spaniards in Walcheren and hanging -all his prisoners. Sir John Hawkins, with twenty ships, had sailed to -intercept the Mexican treasure fleet. Yet Alva, though gnashing his -teeth, was obliged to advise his master to swallow it all, and to be -thankful if he could get Elizabeth to re-open commercial intercourse, -which had been prohibited on both sides since the quarrel about the -Genoese treasure. A treaty for this purpose was in<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_107" id="page_107"></a>{107}</span> fact concluded early -in 1573. Thus the chief result of the Bartholomew Massacre, as far as -Elizabeth was concerned, was to show how strong her position was, and -that she had no need either to truckle to Catholics or let her hand be -forced by Protestants. A balance of power on the Continent was what -suited her, as it has generally suited this country. Let her critics say -what they will, it was no business of hers to organise a Protestant -league, and so drive the Catholic sovereigns to sink their mutual -jealousies and combine against the common enemy.</p> - -<p>The Scotch Regent was quite ready to undertake the punishment of Mary, -but only on condition that Elizabeth would send the Earl of Bedford or -the Earl of Huntingdon with an army to be present at the execution and -to take Edinburgh Castle. It need hardly be said that there was also a -demand for money. Mar died during the negotiations, but they were -continued by his successor Morton. Elizabeth was determined to give no -open consent to Mary’s execution. She meant, no doubt, as soon as it -should be over, to protest, as she did fifteen years afterwards, that -there had been an unfortunate mistake, and to lay the blame of it on the -Scotch Government and her own agents. This part of the negotiation -therefore came to nothing. But money was sent to Morton, which enabled -him to establish a blockade of Edinburgh Castle, and by the mediation of -Elizabeth’s ambassador, the Hamiltons, Gordons, and all the other -Marians except those in the Castle, accepted the very favourable terms -offered them, and recognised James.</p> - -<p>All that remained was to reduce the Castle. Its<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_108" id="page_108"></a>{108}</span> defenders numbered less -than two hundred men. The city and the surrounding country were—as far -as preaching and praying went—vehemently anti-Marian. The Regent had -now no other military task on his hands. Elizabeth might well complain -when she was told that unless she sent an army and paid the Scotch -Protestants to co-operate with it, the Castle could not be taken. For -some time she resisted this thoroughly Scotch demand. But at last she -yielded to Morton’s importunity. Sir William Drury marched in from -Berwick, did the job, and marched back again (May 1573). Among the -captives were the brilliant Maitland of Lethington, once the most active -of Anglophiles, and Kirkaldy of Grange, who had begun the Scottish -Reformation by the murder of Cardinal Beaton, and had taken Mary -prisoner at Carberry Hill. A politician who did not turn his coat at -least once in his life was a rare bird in Scotland. Maitland died a few -days after his capture, probably by his own hand. Kirkaldy was hanged by -his old friend Morton.</p> - -<p>By taking Edinburgh Castle Elizabeth did not earn any gratitude from the -party who had called her in. What they wanted, and always would want, -was money. Morton himself, treading in the steps of his old leader -Moray, remained an unswerving Anglophile. But his coadjutors told the -English ambassador plainly that, if they could not get money from -England, they could and would earn it from France. Elizabeth’s -councillors were always teasing her to comply with these impudent -demands. If there had been a grown-up King on the throne, a man with a -will<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_109" id="page_109"></a>{109}</span> of his own, and whose right to govern could not be contested, it -might have been worth while to secure his good-will by a pension; and -this was what Elizabeth did when James became real ruler of the country. -But she did not believe in paying a clique of greedy lords to call -themselves the English party. An English party there was sure to be, if -only because there was a French party. Their services would be neither -greater nor smaller whether they were paid or unpaid. The French poured -money into Scotland, and were worse served than Elizabeth, who kept her -money in her treasury. It was no fault of Elizabeth if the conditions of -political life in Scotland during the King’s minority were such that a -firmly established government was in the nature of things impossible.</p> - -<p>As Mary was kept in strict seclusion during the panic that followed on -the Bartholomew Massacre, she did not know how narrow was her escape -from a shameful death on a Scottish scaffold. When the panic subsided -she was allowed to resume her former manner of life as the honoured -guest of Lord Shrewsbury, with full opportunities for communication with -all her friends at home and abroad. Any alarm she had felt speedily -disappeared. If Elizabeth had for a moment contemplated striking at her -life or title by parliamentary procedure, that intention was evidently -abandoned when the Parliament of 1572 was prorogued without any such -measure becoming law. The public assumed, and rightly, that Elizabeth -still regarded the Scottish Queen as her successor. Peter Wentworth in -the next session (1576) asserted, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_110" id="page_110"></a>{110}</span> probably with truth, that many -who had been loud in their demands for severity repented of their -forwardness when they found that Mary might yet be their Queen, and -tried to make their peace with her. Wentworth’s outburst (for which he -was sent to the Tower) was the only demonstration against Mary in that -session. She told the Archbishop of Glasgow that her prospects had never -been better, and when opportunities for secret escape were offered her -she declined to use them, thinking that it was for her interest to -remain in England.</p> - -<p>The desire of the English Queen to reinstate her rival arose principally -from an uneasy consciousness that, by detaining her in custody, she was -fatally impairing that religious respect for sovereigns which was the -main, if not the only, basis of their power. The scaffold of Fotheringay -was, in truth, the prelude to the scaffold of Whitehall. But as year -succeeded year, and Elizabeth became habituated to the situation which -had at first given her such qualms, she could not shut her eyes to the -fact that, troublesome and even dangerous as Mary’s presence in England -was, the trouble and the danger had been very much greater when she was -seated on the Scottish throne. The seething caldron of Scotch politics -had not, indeed, become a negligible quantity. It required watching. But -experience had shown that, while the King was a child, the Scots were -neither valuable as friends nor formidable as foes. This was a truth -quite as well understood at Paris and Madrid as at London, though the -French, no less keen in those days than they are now to maintain that -shadowy<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_111" id="page_111"></a>{111}</span> thing called “legitimate French influence” in countries with -which they had any historical connection, continued to intrigue and -waste their money among the hungry Scotch nobles. It was a fixed -principle with Elizabeth, as with all English statesmen, not to tolerate -the presence of foreign troops in Scotland. But she believed—and her -belief was justified by events—that a French expedition was not the -easy matter it had been when Mary of Guise was Regent of Scotland and -Mary Tudor Queen of England. And, more important still, in spite of much -treachery and distrust, the French and English Governments were bound -together by a treaty which was equally necessary to each of them. -Scotland, therefore, was no longer such a cause of anxiety to Elizabeth -as it had been during the first ten years of her reign. Her ministers -had neither her coolness nor her insight. Yet modern historians, proud -of having unearthed their croaking criticisms, ask us to judge -Elizabeth’s policy by prognostications which turned out to be false -rather than by the known results which so brilliantly justified it.</p> - -<p>How to deal with the Netherlands was a much more complicated and -difficult problem. Here again Elizabeth’s ministers were for carrying -matters with a high hand. In their view, England was in constant danger -of a Spanish invasion, which could only be averted by openly and -vigorously supporting the revolted provinces. They would have had -Elizabeth place herself at the head of a Protestant league, and dare the -worst that Philip could do. She, on the other hand, believed that every -year war could be delayed was so much<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_112" id="page_112"></a>{112}</span> gained for England. There were -many ways in which she could aid the Netherlands without openly -challenging Philip. A curious theory of international relations -prevailed in those days—an English Prime Minister, by the way, found it -convenient not long ago to revive it—according to which, to carry on -warlike operations against another country was a very different thing -from going to war with that country. Of this theory Elizabeth largely -availed herself. English generals were not only allowed, but encouraged, -to raise regiments of volunteers to serve in the Low Countries. When -there, they reported to the English Government, and received -instructions from it with hardly a pretence of concealment. Money was -openly furnished to the Prince of Orange. English fleets—also nominally -of volunteers—were encouraged to prey on Spanish commerce, Elizabeth -herself subscribing to their outfit and sharing in the booty.</p> - -<p>We are not to suppose, because the revolt of the Netherlands crippled -Philip for any attack on England, that Elizabeth welcomed it, or that -she contemplated the prolongation of the struggle with cold-blooded -satisfaction. Its immediate advantage to this country was obvious. But -Elizabeth had a sincere abhorrence of war and disorder. She was equally -provoked with Philip for persecuting the Dutch Protestants into -rebellion, and with the Dutch for insisting on religious concessions -which Philip could not be expected to grant, and which she herself was -not granting to Catholics in England. At any time during the struggle, -if Philip would have guaranteed liberty of conscience (as distinguished -from liberty of public<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_113" id="page_113"></a>{113}</span> worship), the restoration of the old charters, -and the removal of the Spanish troops, Elizabeth would not only have -withheld all help from the Dutch, but would have put pressure on them to -submit to Philip. The presence of Spanish veterans opposite the mouth of -the Thames was a standing menace to England. “As they are there,” argued -Burghley, “we must help the Dutch to keep them employed.” “If the Dutch -were not such impracticable fanatics,” rejoined Elizabeth, “the Spanish -veterans need not be there at all.”</p> - -<p>The “Pacification of Ghent” (November 1576), by which the Belgian -Netherlands, for a short time, made common cause with Holland and -Zealand, relieved Elizabeth, for a time, from the necessity of taking -any decisive step. Philip was still recognised as sovereign, but he was -required to be content with such powers as the old constitution gave -him. It seemed likely that Catholic bigots would have to give up -persecuting, and Protestant bigots to acquiesce in the official -establishment of the old religion. This was precisely the settlement -Elizabeth had always desired. It would get rid of the Spanish troops. It -would keep out the French. It would relieve her from the necessity of -interfering. If it put some restriction on the open profession of -Calvinism she would not be sorry.</p> - -<p>If this arrangement could have been carried out, would it in the -long-run have been for the benefit of Europe? Those who hold that the -conflict between Protestantism and Catholicism was simply a conflict -between truth and falsehood will, of course, have no difficulty in -giving their answer. Others may hold that freedom of conscience was all -that was<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_114" id="page_114"></a>{114}</span> needed at the time, and they may picture the many advantages -which Europe would have reaped during the last three centuries from the -existence of a united Netherlands, independent, as it must soon have -become, of Spain, and able to make its independence respected by its -neighbours.</p> - -<p>Short-lived as the coalition was destined to be, it secured for the -Dutch a breathing-time when they were most sorely pressed, and enabled -Elizabeth to avoid quarrelling with Spain. The first step of the newly -allied States was to apply to her for assistance and a loan of money. -The loan they obtained—£40,000—a very large sum in those days. But she -earnestly advised them that if the new Governor, Don John of Austria, -would accept the Pacification, they should use the money to pay the -arrears of the Spanish troops; otherwise they would refuse to leave the -country for Don John or any one else. This was done. Don John had -treachery in his heart. But the departure of the Spaniards was a solid -gain; and if the Protestants and Catholics of the Netherlands had been -able to tolerate each other, they would have achieved the practical -independence of their country, and achieved it by their own unaided -efforts.</p> - -<p>But Don John, the crusader, the victor of Lepanto, the half-brother of -Philip, was a man of soaring ambition. His dream was to invade England, -marry the Queen of Scots, and seat himself with her on the English -throne. It was in vain that Philip, who never wavered in his desire to -conciliate Elizabeth, and was jealous of his showy brother, had strictly -enjoined him to leave England alone. He persisted in<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_115" id="page_115"></a>{115}</span> his design, and -sent his confidant Escovedo to persuade Philip that to conquer the -Netherlands it was necessary to begin by conquering England.</p> - -<p>For a pair of determined enemies, Elizabeth and Philip were just now -upon most amicable, not to say affectionate, terms. She knew well that -he had incited assassins to take her life, and that nothing would at any -time give him greater pleasure than to hear that one of them had -succeeded. But she bore him no malice for that. She took it all in the -way of business, and intended, for her part, to go on robbing and -damaging him in every way she could short of going to war. Philip bore -it all meekly. Alva himself insisted that he could not afford to quarrel -with her. Diplomatic relations by means of resident ambassadors, which -had been broken off by the expulsion of De Espes in 1571, were resumed; -and English heretics in the prisons of the Inquisition were released in -spite of the outcries of the Grand Inquisitor.</p> - -<p>In the summer of 1577 it seemed as if Don John’s restless ambition would -interrupt this pacific policy which suited both monarchs. He had sent -for the Spanish troops again. He was known to be projecting an invasion -of England. He was said to have a promise of help from Guise. -Elizabeth’s ministers, as usual, believed that she was on the brink of -ruin, and implored her to send armies both to the Netherlands and to -France. But she refused to be hustled into any precipitate action, and -reasons soon appeared for maintaining an expectant attitude. The treaty -of Bergerac between Henry <small>III.</small> and Henry of Navarre (September 1577) -showed once more that the French<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_116" id="page_116"></a>{116}</span> King had no intention of letting the -Huguenots be crushed. The invitation of the Archduke Matthias by the -Belgian nobles showed that they were deeply jealous of English -interference. Here, surely, was matter for reflection. The most -Elizabeth could be got to do was to become security for a loan of -£100,000 to the States, on condition that Matthias should leave the real -direction of affairs to William of Orange, and to <i>promise</i> armed -assistance (January 1578). At the same time she informed Philip that she -was obliged to do this for her own safety; that she had no desire to -contest his sovereignty of the Netherlands; on the contrary, she would -help him to maintain it if he would govern reasonably; but he ought to -remove Don John, who was her mortal enemy, and to appoint another -Governor of his own family; in other words, Matthias. Her policy could -not have been more candidly set forth, and Philip showed his disapproval -of Don John’s designs in a characteristic way—by causing Escovedo to be -assassinated. Don John himself died in the autumn, of a fever brought on -by disappointment, or, as some thought, of a complaint similar to -Escovedo’s (September 1578).</p> - -<p>When Elizabeth feared that Don John’s scheme was countenanced by his -brother, she had risked an open rupture by promising to send an army to -the Netherlands. The murder of Escovedo and the arrival of the Spanish -ambassador Mendoza (March 1578) reassured her. Philip was evidently -pacific to the point of tameness. Instead, therefore, of sending an -English army, she preferred to pay John Casimir, the Count Palatine, to -lead a German army to the assistance of<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_117" id="page_117"></a>{117}</span> the States. As far as military -strength went, they were probably no losers by the change. But what they -wanted was to see Elizabeth committed to open war with Philip, and that -was just what she desired to avoid. Indirect and underhand blows she was -prepared to deal him, for she knew by experience that he would put up -with them. Thus in the preceding autumn she had despatched Drake on his -famous expedition to the South Pacific.</p> - -<p>Don John was succeeded by his nephew, Alexander of Parma. The fine -prospects of the revolted provinces were now about to be dashed. In the -arts which smooth over difficulties and conciliate opposition, Parma had -few equals. He was a head and shoulders above all contemporary generals; -and no soldiers of that time were comparable to his Spanish and Italian -veterans. When he assumed the command, he was master of only a small -corner of the Low Countries. What he effected is represented by their -present division between Belgians and Dutch. The struggle in the -Netherlands continued, therefore, to be the principal object of -Elizabeth’s attention.</p> - -<p>Shortly before the death of Don John, the Duke of Alençon,<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> brother -and heir-presumptive of Henry <small>III.</small> had been invited by the Belgian -nobles to become their Protector, and Orange, in his anxiety for union, -had accepted their nominee. Alençon was to furnish 12,000 French troops. -It was hoped and believed that, though Henry had ostensibly disapproved -of his brother’s action, he would in the end give him open<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_118" id="page_118"></a>{118}</span> support, -thus resuming the enterprise which had been interrupted six years before -by the Bartholomew Massacre.</p> - -<p>Now, how was Elizabeth to deal with this new combination? The -Protectorship of Alençon might bring on annexation to France, the result -which most of all she wished to avoid. For a moment she thought of -offering her own protection (which Orange would have much preferred), -and an army equal to that promised by Alençon. But upon further -reflection, she determined to adhere to the policy of not throwing down -the glove to Philip, and to try whether she could not put Alençon in -harness, and make him do her work. One means of effecting this would be -to allow him subsidies—the means employed on such a vast scale by Pitt -in our wars with Napoleon. But Elizabeth intended to spend as little as -possible in this way. She relied chiefly on a revival of the marriage -comedy—now to be played positively for the last time; the lady being -forty-five, and her wooer twenty-four.</p> - -<p>A dignified policy it certainly was not. All that was ridiculous and -repulsive in her coquetry with Henry had now to be repeated and outdone -with his younger brother. To overcome the incredulity which her previous -performances had produced, she was obliged to exaggerate her -protestations, to admit a personal courtship, to simulate amorous -emotion, and to go through a tender pantomime of kisses and caresses. -But Elizabeth never let dignity stand in the way of business. What to -most women would have been an insupportable humiliation did not cost her -a<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_119" id="page_119"></a>{119}</span> pang. She even found amusement in it. From the nature of the case, -she could not take one of her counsellors into her confidence. There was -no chance of imposing upon foreigners unless she could persuade those -about her that she was in earnest. They were amazed that she should run -the risk of establishing the French in the Netherlands. She had no -intention of doing so. When Philip should be brought so low as to be -willing to concede a constitutional government, she could always throw -her weight on his side and get rid of the French.</p> - -<p>The match with Alençon had been proposed six years before. It had lately -slumbered. But there was no difficulty in whistling him back, and making -it appear that the renewed overture came from his side. After tedious -negotiations, protracted over twelve months, he at length paid his first -visit to Elizabeth (August 1579). He was an under-sized man with an -over-sized head, villainously ugly, with a face deeply seamed by -smallpox, a nose ending in a knob that made it look like two noses, and -a croaking voice. Elizabeth’s liking for big handsome men is well known. -But as she had not the least intention of marrying Alençon, it cost her -nothing to affirm that she was charmed with his appearance, and that he -was just the sort of man she could fancy for a husband. The only -agreeable thing about him was his conversation, in which he shone, so -that people who did not thoroughly know him always at first gave him -credit for more ability than he possessed. Elizabeth, who had a pet name -for all favourites, dubbed him her “frog”; and “Grenouille”<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_120" id="page_120"></a>{120}</span> he was fain -to subscribe himself in his love-letters. This first visit was a short -one, and he went away hopeful of success.</p> - -<p>The English people could only judge by appearances, and for the first -time in her reign Elizabeth was unpopular. The Puritan Stubbs published -his <i>Discovery of a Gaping Gulf wherein England is like to be swallowed -by another French Marriage</i>. But the excitement was by no means confined -to the Puritans. Hatred of Frenchmen long remained a ruling sentiment -with most Englishmen. Elizabeth vented her rage on Stubbs, who had been -so rude as to tell her that childbirth at her age would endanger her -life. He was sentenced to have his hand cut off. “I remember,” says -Camden, “being then present, that Stubbs, after his right hand was cut -off, put off his hat with his left, and said with a loud voice, ‘God -save the Queen,’ The multitude standing about was deeply silent.”</p> - -<p>Not long after Alençon’s visit, a treaty of marriage was signed -(November 1579), with a proviso that two months should be allowed for -the Queen’s subjects to become reconciled to it. If, at the end of that -time, Elizabeth did not ratify the treaty, it was to be null and void. -The appointed time came and went without ratification. Burghley, as -usual, predicted that the jilted suitor would become a deadly enemy, and -drew an alarming picture of the dangers that threatened England, with -the old exhortation to his mistress to form a Protestant league and -subsidise the Scotch Anglophiles. But in 1572 she had slipped out of the -Anjou marriage, and yet secured a French<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_121" id="page_121"></a>{121}</span> alliance. She confided in her -ability to play the same game now. Though she had not ratified the -marriage treaty, she continued to correspond with Alençon and keep up -his hopes, urging him at the same time to lead an army to the help of -the States. This, however, he was unwilling to do till he had secured -the marriage. The French King was ready, and even eager, to back his -brother. But he, too, insisted on the marriage, and that Elizabeth -should openly join him in war against Spain.</p> - -<p>In the summer of 1580, Philip conquered Portugal, thus not only rounding -off his Peninsular realm, but acquiring the enormous transmarine -dominions of the Portuguese crown. All Europe was profoundly impressed -and alarmed by this apparent increase of his power. Elizabeth -incessantly lectured Henry on the necessity of abating a preponderance -so dangerous to all other States, and tried to convince him that it was -specially incumbent on France to undertake the enterprise. But she -preached in vain. Henry steadily refused to stir unless England would -openly assist him with troops and money, of which the marriage was to be -the pledge. He did not conceal his suspicion that, when Elizabeth had -pushed him into war, she would “draw her neck out of the collar” and -leave him to bear the whole danger.</p> - -<p>This was, in fact, her intention. She believed that a war with France -would soon compel Philip to make proper concessions to the States; -whereupon she would interpose and dictate a peace. “Marry my brother,” -Henry kept saying, “and then I shall have security that you will bear -your fair share of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_122" id="page_122"></a>{122}</span> fighting and expenses.” “If I am to go to war,” -argued Elizabeth, “I cannot marry your brother; for my subjects will say -that I am dragged into it by my husband, and they will grudge the -expense. Suppose, instead of a marriage, we have an alliance not binding -me to open war; then I will furnish you with money <i>underhand</i>. You know -you have got to fight. You cannot afford to let Philip go on increasing -his power.”</p> - -<p>Henry remained doggedly firm. No marriage, no war. At last, finding she -could not stir him, Elizabeth again concluded a treaty of marriage, but -with the extraordinary proviso that six weeks should be left for private -explanations by letter between herself and Alençon. It soon appeared -what this meant. In these six weeks Elizabeth furnished her suitor with -money, and incited him to make a sudden attack on Parma, who was then -besieging Cambray, close to the French frontier. Alençon, thinking -himself now sure of the marriage, collected 15,000 men; and Henry, -though not openly assisting him, no longer prohibited the enterprise. -But, as soon as Elizabeth thought they were sufficiently committed, she -gave them to understand that the marriage must be again deferred, that -her subjects were discontented, that she could only join in a defensive -alliance, but that she would furnish money “in reasonable sort” -<i>underhand</i>.</p> - -<p>All this is very unscrupulous, very shameless, even for that shameless -age. Hardened liars like Henry and Alençon thought it too bad. <i>They</i> -were ready for violence as well as fraud, and availed themselves of -whichever method came handiest. Elizabeth also used the weapon which -nature had given her. Being<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_123" id="page_123"></a>{123}</span> constitutionally averse from any but -peaceful methods, she made up for it by a double dose of fraud. <i>Dente -lupus, cornu taurus.</i> It would have been useless for a male statesman to -try to pass himself off as a fickle impulsive, susceptible being, swayed -from one moment to another in his political schemes by passions and -weaknesses that are thought natural in the other sex. This was -Elizabeth’s advantage, and she made the most of it. She was a masculine -woman simulating, when it suited her purpose, a feminine character. The -men against whom she was matched were never sure whether they were -dealing with a crafty and determined politician, or a vain, flighty, -amorous woman. This uncertainty was constantly putting them out in their -calculations. Alençon would never have been so taken in if he had not -told himself that any folly might be expected from an elderly woman -enamoured of a young man.</p> - -<p>On this occasion Elizabeth scored, if not the full success she had hoped -from her audacious mystification, yet no inconsiderable portion of it. -Henry managed to draw back just in time, and was not let in for a big -war. But Alençon, at the head of 15,000 men, and close to Cambray, could -not for very shame beat a retreat. Parma retired at his approach, and -the French army entered Cambray in triumph (August 1581). Alençon -therefore had been put in harness to some purpose.</p> - -<p>Though Henry <small>III.</small> had good reason to complain of the way he had been -treated, he did not make it a quarrel with Elizabeth. His interests, as -she saw all along, were too closely bound up with hers to permit him to -think of such a thing. On the contrary, he renewed the alliance of 1572 -in an ampler<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_124" id="page_124"></a>{124}</span> form, though it still remained strictly defensive. -Alençon, after relieving and victualling Cambray, disbanded his army, -and went over to England again to press for the marriage (Nov. 1581). -Thither he was followed by ambassadors from the States. By the advice of -Orange they had resolved to take him as their sovereign, and they were -now urgently pressing him to return to the Netherlands to be installed. -Elizabeth added her pressure; but he was unwilling to leave England -until he should have secured the marriage. For three months (Nov. -1581—Feb. 1582) did Elizabeth try every art to make him accept promise -for performance. She was thoroughly in her element. To win her game in -this way, not by the brutal arbitrament of war, or even by the ordinary -tricks of vicarious diplomacy, but by artifices personally executed, -feats of cajolery that might seem improbable on the stage,—this was -delightful in the highest degree. The more distrustful Alençon showed -himself, the keener was the pleasure of handling him. One day he is -hidden behind a curtain to view her elegant dancing; not, surely, that -he might be smitten with it, but that he might think she desired him to -be smitten. Another day she kisses him on the lips (<i>en la boca</i>) in the -presence of the French ambassador. She gives him a ring. She presents -him to her household as their future master. She orders the Bishop of -Lincoln to draw up a marriage service. It is a repulsive spectacle; but, -after all, we are not so much disgusted with the elderly woman who -pretends to be willing to marry the young man, as with the young man who -is really<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_125" id="page_125"></a>{125}</span> willing to marry the elderly woman. Unfortunately for -Elizabeth, her acting was so realistic that it not only took in -contemporaries, but has persuaded many modern writers that she was -really influenced by a degrading passion.</p> - -<p>Henry <small>III.</small> himself was at last induced to believe that Elizabeth was -this time in earnest. But he could not be driven from his determination -to risk nothing till he saw the marriage actually concluded. Pinart, the -French Secretary of State, was accordingly sent over to settle the -terms. Elizabeth demanded one concession after another, and finally -asked for the restitution of Calais. There was no mistaking what this -meant. Pinart, in the King’s name, formally forbade Alençon to proceed -to the Netherlands except as a married man, and tried to intimidate -Elizabeth by threatening that his master would ally himself with Philip. -But she laughed at him, and told him that <i>she</i> could have the Spanish -alliance whenever she chose, which was perfectly true. Alençon himself -gave way. He felt that he was being played with. He had come over here, -with a <i>fatuité</i> not uncommon among young Frenchmen, expecting to bend a -love-sick Queen to serve his political designs. He found himself, to his -intense mortification, bent to serve hers. Ashamed to show his face in -France without either his Belgian dominions or his English wife, he was -fain to accept Elizabeth’s solemn promise that she would marry him as -soon as she could, and allowed himself to be shipped off under the -escort of an English fleet to the Netherlands (Feb. 1582).</p> - -<p>According to Mr. Froude, “the Prince of Orange<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_126" id="page_126"></a>{126}</span> intimated that Alençon -was accepted by the States only as a pledge that England would support -them; if England failed them, they would not trust their fortunes to so -vain an idiot.” This statement appears to be drawn from the second-hand -tattle of Mendoza, and is probably, like much else from that source, -unworthy of credit. But whether Orange sent such an “intimation” or not, -it cannot be allowed to weigh against the ample evidence that Alençon -was accepted by him and by the States mainly for the sake of the French -forces he could raise on his own account, and the assistance which he -undertook to procure from his brother. Neither Orange nor any one else -regarded him as an idiot. Orange had not been led to expect that he -would bring any help from England except money supplied underhand; and -money Elizabeth did furnish in very considerable quantities. But the -Netherlanders now expected everything to be done for them, and were -backward with their contributions both in men and money. Clearly there -is something to be said for the let-alone policy to which Elizabeth -usually leant.</p> - -<p>The States intended Alençon’s sovereignty to be of the strictly -constitutional kind, such as it had been before the encroachments of -Philip and his father. This did not suit the young Frenchman, and at the -beginning of 1583 he attempted a <i>coup-d’état</i>, not without -encouragement from some of the Belgian Catholics. At Antwerp his French -troops were defeated with great bloodshed by the citizens, and the -general voice of the country was for sending him about his business. But -both Elizabeth and Orange,<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_127" id="page_127"></a>{127}</span> though disconcerted and disgusted by his -treachery, still saw nothing better to be done than to patch up the -breach and retain his services. Both of them urged this course on the -States—Orange with his usual dignified frankness; Elizabeth in the -crooked, blustering fashion which has brought upon her policy, in so -many instances, reproach which it does not really deserve. Norris, the -commander of the English volunteers, had discountenanced the -<i>coup-d’état</i> and taken his orders from the States. Openly Elizabeth -reprimanded him, and ordered him to bring his men back to England. -Secretly she told him he had done well, and bade him remain where he -was. Norris was in fact there to protect the interests of England quite -as much against the French as against Spain. There is not the least -ground for the assertion that in promoting reconciliation with Alençon, -Orange acted under pressure from Elizabeth. Everything goes to show that -he, the wisest and noblest statesman of his time, thought it the only -course open to the States, unless they were prepared to submit to -Philip. Both Elizabeth and Orange felt that the first necessity was to -keep the quarrel alive between the Frenchman and the Spaniard. The -English Queen therefore continued to feed Alençon with hopes of -marriage, and the States patched up a reconciliation with him (March -1583). But his heart failed him. He saw Parma taking town after town. He -knew that he had made himself odious to the Netherlanders. He was -covered with shame. He was fatally stricken with consumption. In June -1583 he left Belgium never to return. Within a twelvemonth he was dead.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_128" id="page_128"></a>{128}</span></p> - -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII"></a>CHAPTER VII<br /><br /> -<small>THE PAPAL ATTACK: 1570-1583</small></h2> - -<p class="nind">S<small>OVEREIGNS</small> and statesmen in the sixteenth century are to be honoured or -condemned according to the degree in which they aimed on the one hand at -preserving political order, and on the other at allowing freedom of -opinion. It was not always easy to reconcile these two aims. The first -was a temporary necessity, and yet was the more urgent—as indeed is -always the case with the tasks of the statesman. He is responsible for -the present; it is not for him to attempt to provide for a remote -future. Political order and the material well-being of nations may be -disastrously impaired by the imprudence or weakness of a ruler. Thought, -after all, may be trusted to take care of itself in the long-run.</p> - -<p>To the modern Liberal, with his doctrine of absolute religious equality, -toleration seems an insult, and anything short of toleration is regarded -as persecution. In the sixteenth century the most advanced statesmen did -not see their way to proclaim freedom of public worship and of religious -discussion. It was much if they tolerated freedom of opinion, and -connived at<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_129" id="page_129"></a>{129}</span> a quiet, private propagation of other religions than those -established by law. It would be wrong to condemn and despise them as -actuated by superstition and narrow-minded prejudice. Their motives were -mainly political, and it is reasonable to suppose that they knew better -than we do whether a larger toleration was compatible with public order.</p> - -<p>We have seen that under the Act of Supremacy, in the first year of -Elizabeth, the oath was only tendered to persons holding office, -spiritual or temporal, under the crown, and that the penalty for -refusing it was only deprivation. But in her fifth year (1563), it was -enacted that the oath might be tendered to members of the House of -Commons, schoolmasters, and attorneys, who, if they refused it, might be -punished by forfeiture of property and perpetual imprisonment. To those -who had held any ecclesiastical office, or who should openly disapprove -of the established worship, or celebrate or hear mass, the oath might be -tendered a second time, with the penalties of high treason for refusal.</p> - -<p>That this law authorised an atrocious persecution cannot be disputed, -and there is no doubt that many zealous Protestants wished it to be -enforced. But the practical question is, Was it enforced? The government -wished to be armed with the power of using it, and for the purpose of -expelling Catholics from offices it was extensively used. But no one was -at this time visited with the severer penalties, the bishops having been -privately forbidden to tender the oath a second time to any one without -special instructions.</p> - -<p>The Act of Uniformity, passed in the first year of<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_130" id="page_130"></a>{130}</span> Elizabeth, -prohibited the use of any but the established liturgy, whether in public -or private, under pain of perpetual imprisonment for the third offence, -and imposed a fine of one shilling on recusants—that is, upon persons -who absented themselves from church on Sundays and holidays. To what -extent Catholics were interfered with under this Act has been a matter -of much dispute. Most of them, during the first eleven years of -Elizabeth, either from ignorance or worldliness, treated the Anglican -service as equivalent to the Catholic, and made no difficulty about -attending church, even after this compliance with the law had been -forbidden by Pius <small>IV.</small> in the sixth year of Elizabeth. Only the more -scrupulous absented themselves, and called in the ministrations of the -“old priests,” who with more or less secrecy said mass in private -houses. Some of these offenders were certainly punished before Elizabeth -had been two years on the throne. The enforcement of laws was by no -means so uniform in those days as it is now. Much depended on the -leanings of the noblemen and justices of the peace in different -localities. Both from disposition and policy Elizabeth desired, as a -general rule, to connive at Catholic nonconformity when it did not take -an aggressive and fanatical form. But she had no scruple about applying -the penalties of these Acts to individuals who for any reason, religious -or political, were specially obnoxious to her.</p> - -<p>So things went on till the northern insurrection: the laws authorising a -searching and sanguinary persecution; the Government, much to the -disgust of zealous Protestants, declining to put those laws in<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_131" id="page_131"></a>{131}</span> -execution. Judged by modern ideas, the position of the Catholics was -intolerable; but if measured by the principles of government then -universally accepted, or if compared with the treatment of persons ever -so slightly suspected of heresy in countries cursed with the -Inquisition, it was not a position of which they had any great reason to -complain; nor did the large majority of them complain.</p> - -<p>Pope Pius <small>IV.</small> (1559-1566) was comparatively cautious and circumspect in -his attitude towards Elizabeth. But his successor Pius <small>V.</small> (1566-1572), -having made up his mind that her destruction was the one thing necessary -for the defeat of heresy in Europe, strove to stir up against her -rebellion at home and invasion from abroad. A bull deposing her, and -absolving her subjects from their allegiance, was drawn up. But while -Pius, conscious of the offence which it would give to all the sovereigns -of Europe, delayed to issue it, the northern rebellion flared up and was -trampled out. The absence of such a bull was by many Catholics made an -excuse for holding aloof from the rebel earls. When it was too late the -bull was issued (Feb. 1570). Philip and Charles <small>IX.</small>—sovereigns first -and Catholics afterwards—refused to let it be published in their -dominions.</p> - -<p>After the northern insurrection the Queen issued a remarkable appeal to -her people, which was ordered to be placarded in every parish, and read -in every church. She could point with honest pride to eleven years of -such peace abroad and tranquillity at home as no living Englishman could -remember. Her economy had enabled her to conduct the government<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_132" id="page_132"></a>{132}</span> without -any of the illegal exactions to which former sovereigns had resorted. -“She had never sought the life, the blood, the goods, the houses, -estates or lands of any person in her dominions.” This happy state of -things the rebels had tried to disturb on pretext of religion. They had -no real grievance on that score. Attendance at parish church was indeed -obligatory by law, though, she might have added, it was very loosely -enforced. But she disclaimed any wish to pry into opinions, or to -inquire in what sense any one understood rites or ceremonies. In other -words, the language of the communion service was not incompatible with -the doctrine of transubstantiation, and loyal Catholics were at liberty, -were almost invited, to interpret it in that sense if they liked.</p> - -<p>This compromise between their religious and political obligations had in -fact been hitherto adopted by the large majority of English Catholics. -But a time was come when it was to be no longer possible for them. They -were summoned to make their choice between their duty as citizens and -their duty as Catholics. The summons had come, not from the Queen, but -from the Pope, and it is not strange that they had thenceforth a harder -time of it. Many of them, indignant with the Pope for bringing trouble -upon them, gave up the struggle and conformed to the Established Church. -The temper of the rest became more bitter and dangerous. The Puritan -Parliament of 1571 passed a bill to compel all persons not only to -attend church, but to receive the communion twice a year; and another -making formal reconciliation to the Church of Rome high treason both for -the convert and the priest who<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_133" id="page_133"></a>{133}</span> should receive him. Here we have the -persecuting spirit, which was as inherent in the zealous Protestant as -in the zealous Catholic. Attempts to excuse such legislation, as -prompted by political reasons, can only move the disgust of every -honest-minded man. The first of these bills did not receive the royal -assent, though Cecil—just made Lord Burghley—had strenuously pushed it -through the Upper House. Elizabeth probably saw that its only effect -would be to enable the Protestant zealots in every parish to enjoy the -luxury of harassing their quiet Catholic neighbours, who attended church -but would scruple to take the sacrament.</p> - -<p>The Protestant spirit of this House of Commons showed itself not only in -laws for strengthening the Government and persecuting the Catholics, but -in attempts to puritanise the Prayer-book, which much displeased the -Queen. Strickland, one of the Puritan leaders, was forbidden to attend -the House. But such was the irritation caused by this invasion of its -privileges, that the prohibition was removed after one day. It was in -this session of Parliament that the doctrines of the Church of England -were finally determined by the imposition on the clergy of the -Thirty-nine Articles, which, as every one knows, are much more -Protestant than the Prayer-book. Till then they had only had the -sanction of Convocation.</p> - -<p>During the first forty years or so, from the beginning of the -Reformation, Protestantism spread in most parts of Europe with great -rapidity. It was not merely an intellectual revolt against doctrines no -longer credible. The numbers of the reformers were swelled, and their<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_134" id="page_134"></a>{134}</span> -force intensified by the flocking in of pious souls, athirst for -personal holiness, and of many others who, without being high-wrought -enthusiasts, were by nature disposed to value whatever seemed to make -for a purer morality. The religion which had nurtured Bernard and À -Kempis was deserted, not merely as being untrue, but as incompatible -with the highest spiritual life—nay, as positively corrupting to -society. This imagination, of course, had but a short day. The return to -the Bible and the doctrines of primitive Christianity, the deliverance -from “the Bishop of Rome and his detestable enormities,” were not found -to be followed by any general improvement of morals in Protestant -countries. He that was unjust was unjust still; he that was filthy was -filthy still. The repulsive contrast too often seen between -sanctimonious professions and unscrupulous conduct contributed to the -disenchantment.</p> - -<p>In the meanwhile a great regeneration was going on within the Catholic -Church itself. Signs of this can be detected quite as early as the first -rise of Protestantism. It is, therefore, not to be attributed to -Protestant teaching and example, though doubtless the rivalry of the -younger religion stimulated the best energies of the older. No long time -elapsed before this regeneration had worked its way to the highest -places in the Church. The Popes by whom Elizabeth was confronted were -all men of pure lives and single-hearted devotion to the Catholic cause.</p> - -<p>The last two years of the Council of Trent (1562-3) were the -starting-point of the modern Catholic Church. Many proposals had been -made for compromise with<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_135" id="page_135"></a>{135}</span> Protestantism. But the Fathers of Trent saw -that the only chance of survival for a Church claiming to be Catholic -was to remain on the old lines. By the canons and decrees of the -Council, ratified by Pius <small>IV.</small>, the old doctrines and discipline were -confirmed and definitely formulated. One branch indeed of the Papal -power was irretrievably gone. Royal authority had become absolute, and -the kings, including Philip <small>II.</small>, refused to tolerate any interference -with it. The Papacy had to acquiesce in the loss of its power over -sovereigns. But as regards the bishops and clergy, and things strictly -appertaining to religion, its spiritual autocracy, which the great -councils of the last century had aimed at breaking, was re-established, -and has continued. The new situation, though it seemed to place the -Popes on a humbler footing than in the days of Gregory <small>VII.</small> or Innocent -<small>III.</small>, was a healthy one. It confined them to their spiritual domain, and -drove them to make the best of it.</p> - -<p>Until the decrees of the Council of Trent, the split between Protestants -and Catholics was not definitely and irrevocably decided. Many on both -sides had shrunk from admitting it. The Catholic world might seem to be -narrowed by the defection of the Protestant States. But all the more -clearly did it appear that a Church claiming to be universal is not -concerned with political boundaries. The resistance to the spread of -heresy had hitherto consisted of many local struggles, in which the -repressive measures had emanated from the orthodox sovereigns, and had -therefore been fitful and unconnected. But not long after the Tridentine -reorganisation, the Pope appears again as commander-in-chief<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_136" id="page_136"></a>{136}</span> of the -Catholic forces, surveying and directing combined operations from one -end of Europe to the other. Pius <small>IV.</small> had been with difficulty prevented -by Philip from excommunicating Elizabeth. Pius <small>V.</small> had launched his bull, -as we have seen, a few months too late (1570); and even then it was not -allowed to be published in either Spain or France. The life of that Pope -was wasted in earnest remonstrances with the Catholic sovereigns for not -executing the sentence of the Church against the heretic Queen. Gregory -<small>XIII.</small>, who succeeded him just before the Bartholomew Massacre, took the -attack into his own hands. He was a warm patron of the Jesuits, who were -especially devoted to the centralising system re-established at Trent. -He and they had made up their minds that England was the key of the -Protestant position; that until Elizabeth was removed no advance was to -be hoped for anywhere.</p> - -<p>The decline of a religion may be accompanied by a positive increase of -earnestness and activity on the part of its remaining votaries, deluding -them into a belief that they are but passing through, or have -successfully passed through, a period of temporary depression and -eclipse. Among the Catholics of the latter part of the sixteenth century -there was all the enthusiasm of a religious revival. In no place did -this show itself more than at Oxford. There the weak points of popular -movements have never been allowed to pass without challenge, and what is -really valuable or beautiful in time-worn faiths has been sure of -receiving fair-play and something more. The gloss of the Reformation was -already worn off. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_137" id="page_137"></a>{137}</span> worldly and carnal were its supporters and -directors. It no longer demanded enthusiasm and sacrifice. It walked in -purple and fine linen. Young men of quick intellect and high aspirations -who, a generation earlier, would have been captivated by its fair -promise and have thrown themselves into its current, yielded now to the -eternal spell of the older Church, cleansed as she was of her -pollutions, and purged of her dross by the discipline of adversity.</p> - -<p>The leader of these Oxford enthusiasts was a young fellow of Oriel, -William Allen. In the third year of Elizabeth, at the age of -twenty-eight, he resigned the Principalship of St. Mary Hall. The next -eight years were spent partly abroad, partly in secret missionary work -in England, carried on at the peril of his life. The old priests, who -with more or less concealment and danger continued to exercise their -office among the English Catholics, were gradually dying off. In order -to train successors to them, Allen founded an English seminary at Douai -(1568). To this important step it was mainly due that the Catholic -religion did not become extinct in this country. In the first five years -of its existence the college at Douai sent nearly a hundred priests to -England.</p> - -<p>It was the aim of Allen to put an end to the practical toleration -allowed to Catholic laymen of the quieter sort. The Catholic who began -by putting in the compulsory number of attendances at his parish church -was likely to end by giving up his faith altogether. If he did not, his -son would. Allen deliberately preferred a sweeping persecution—one that -would make the position of Catholics intolerable, and ripen<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_138" id="page_138"></a>{138}</span> them for -rebellion. He wanted martyrs. The ardent young men whom he trained at -Douai and (after 1578) at Rheims, went back to their native land with -the clear understanding that of all the services they could render to -the Church the greatest would be to die under the hangman’s knife.</p> - -<p>Gregory <small>XIII.</small> hoped great things from Allen’s seminary, and furnished -funds for its support. In 1579 Allen went to Rome, and enlisted the -support of Mercurian, General of the Jesuits. Two English Jesuits, -Robert Parsons and Edward Campion, ex-fellows of Balliol and St. John’s, -were selected as missionaries. Campion was eight years younger than -Allen. He had had a brilliant career at Oxford, being especially -distinguished for his eloquence. He was at that time personally known to -both Cecil and the Queen, and enjoyed their favour. He took deacon’s -orders in 1568, but not long afterwards joined Allen at Douai, and -formally abjured the Anglican Church. He had been six years a Jesuit -when he was despatched on his dangerous mission to England.</p> - -<p>Tired of waiting for the initiative of Philip, Gregory <small>XIII.</small> and the -Jesuits had planned a threefold attack on Elizabeth in England, -Scotland, and Ireland. In England a revivalist movement was to be -carried on among the Catholics by the missionaries. Catholic writers -have been at great pains to argue that this was a purely religious -movement, prosecuted with the single object of saving souls. The Jesuits -have always known their men and employed them with discrimination. -Saving of souls was very likely the simple object of a man of Campion’s -saintly and exalted<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_139" id="page_139"></a>{139}</span> nature. He himself declared that he had been -strictly forbidden to meddle with worldly concerns or affairs of State, -and nothing inconsistent with this declaration was proved against him at -his trial. But without laying any stress on statements extracted from -prisoners under torture, we cannot doubt that his employers aimed at -re-establishing Catholicism in England by rebellion and foreign -invasion. This was thoroughly understood by every missionary who crossed -the sea; and if Campion never alluded to it even in his most familiar -conversations he must have had an extraordinary control over his tongue.</p> - -<p>The evidence that the assassination of the Queen was a recognised part -of the Jesuit plan, determined by the master spirits and accepted by all -the subordinate agents, is perhaps not quite conclusive. If proved, it -would only show that they were not more scrupulous than most statesmen -and politicians of the time. Lax as sixteenth century notions were about -political murder, there were always some consciences more tender than -others. It is likely enough that Campion personally disapproved of such -projects, and that they were not thrust upon his attention. But he can -hardly have avoided being aware that they were contemplated by the less -squeamish of his brethren.</p> - -<p>Campion and Parsons came to England in disguise in the summer of 1580. -Their mission was not a success. It only served to show how much more -securely Elizabeth was seated on her throne than in the earlier years of -her reign. In his letters to Rome, Campion boasts of the welcome he met -with everywhere, the crowds that attended his preaching, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_140" id="page_140"></a>{140}</span> ardour of -the Catholics, and the disrepute into which Protestantism was falling. -He had evidently worked himself up to such a state of ecstasy that he -was living in a world of his own imagination, and was no competent -witness of facts. He crept about England in various disguises, and when -he was in districts where the nobles and gentry favoured the old -religion, he preached with a publicity which seems extraordinary to us -in these days when the laws are executed with prompt uniformity by means -of railways, telegraphs, and a well-organised police. In the sixteenth -century England had nothing that can be called an organised machinery -for the prevention and detection of crime. If an outbreak occurred the -Government collected militia, and trampled it out with an energy that -took no account of law and feared no consequences. But in ordinary times -it had to depend on the local justices of the peace and parish -constables, and if they were remiss the laws were a dead letter. There -were no newspapers. The high-roads were few and bad. One parish did not -know what was going on in the next. Campion could be passed on from one -gentleman’s house to another on horses quite as good as any officer of -the Government rode, and could travel all over England without ever -using a high-road or showing his face in a town. If he preached to a -hundred people in some Lancashire village, Lord Derby did not want to -know it, and before the news reached Burghley or Walsingham he would be -in another county, or perhaps back in London—then, as now, the safest -of all hiding-places. Thus, though a warrant was issued for his arrest -as soon as he arrived in<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_141" id="page_141"></a>{141}</span> England, it was not till July in the next year -(1581) that he was taken, after an unusually public and protracted -appearance in the neighbourhood of Oxford.</p> - -<p>He had little or nothing to show for his twelve months’ tour, and this -although the Government had, as Allen hoped, allowed itself to be -provoked into an increase of severity which seems to have been quite -unnecessary. The large majority of Catholic laymen would evidently have -preferred that both Seminarists and Jesuits should keep away. They did -not want civil war. They did not want to be persecuted. They were -against a foreign invasion, without which they knew very well that -Elizabeth could not be deposed. They were even loyal to her. They were -content to wait till she should disappear in the course of nature and -make room for the Queen of Scots. Mendoza writes to Philip that “they -place themselves in the hands of God, and are willing to sacrifice life -and all in the service, <i>but scarcely with that burning zeal which they -ought to show</i>.”</p> - -<p>By the bull of Pius <small>V.</small>, Englishmen were forbidden to acknowledge -Elizabeth as their Queen; in other words, they were ordered to expose -themselves to the penalties of treason. If the Pope would be satisfied -with nothing less than this, it was quite certain that he would alienate -most of his followers in England. Gregory <small>XIII.</small> therefore had authorised -the Jesuits to explain that although the Protestants, by <i>willingly</i> -acknowledging the Queen, were incurring the damnation pronounced by the -bull, Catholics would be excused for <i>unwillingly</i> acknowledging her -until some opportunity arrived for dethroning her. Protestant<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_142" id="page_142"></a>{142}</span> writers -have exclaimed against this distinction as treacherous. It was perfectly -reasonable. It represents, for instance, the attitude of every Alsatian -who accords an unwilling recognition to the German Emperor. But the -English Government intolerantly and unwisely made it the occasion for -harassing the consciences of men who were most of them guiltless of any -intention to rebel.</p> - -<p>Amongst other persecuting laws passed early in 1581, was one which -raised the fine for non-attendance at church to twenty pounds a month. -Such a measure was calculated to excite much more wide-spread -disaffection than the hanging of a few priests. It was not intended to -be a <i>brutum fulmen</i>. The names of all recusants in each parish were -returned to the Council. They amounted to about 50,000, and the fines -exacted became a not inconsiderable item in the royal revenue. That -number certainly formed but a small portion of the Catholic population. -But if all the rest had been in the habit of going to church, contrary -to the Pope’s express injunction, rather than pay a small fine, the -Government ought to have seen that they were not the stuff of which -rebels are made.</p> - -<p>Campion, after being compelled by torture to disclose the names of his -hosts in different counties, was called on to maintain the Catholic -doctrines in a three days’ discussion before a large audience against -four Protestant divines, who do not seem to have been ashamed of -themselves. He was offered pardon if he would attend once in church. As -he steadfastly refused, he was racked again till his limbs were -dislocated. When he had partially recovered he was put on his trial,<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_143" id="page_143"></a>{143}</span> -along with several of his companions, not under any of the recent -anti-catholic laws but under the ordinary statute of Edward <small>III.</small>, for -“compassing and imagining the Queen’s death”—such a horror had the -Burghleys and Walsinghams of anything like religious persecution! Being -unable to hold up his hand to plead Not Guilty, “two of his companions -raised it for him, first kissing the broken joints.” According to -Mendoza (whom on other occasions we are invited to accept as a witness -of truth), his nails had been torn from his fingers. Apart from his -religious belief nothing treasonable was proved against him in deed or -word. He acknowledged Elizabeth for his rightful sovereign, as the new -interpretation of the papal bull permitted him to do, but he declined to -give any opinion about the Pope’s right to depose princes. This was -enough for the judge and jury, and he was found guilty. At the place of -execution he was again offered his pardon if he would deny the papal -right of deposition, or even hear a Protestant sermon. He wished the -Queen a long and quiet reign and all prosperity, but more he would not -say. At the quartering “a drop of blood spirted on the clothes of a -youth named Henry Walpole, to whom it came as a divine command. Walpole, -converted on the spot, became a Jesuit, and soon after met the same fate -on the same spot.”</p> - -<p>Mr. Froude’s comment is that “if it be lawful in defence of national -independence to kill open enemies in war, it is more lawful to execute -the secret conspirator who is teaching doctrines in the name of God -which are certain to be fatal to it.” It would perhaps be enough to -remark that this reasoning amply justifies<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_144" id="page_144"></a>{144}</span> some of the worst atrocities -of the French Revolution. Hallam and Macaulay have condemned it by -anticipation in language which will commend itself to all who are not -swayed by religious, or, what is more offensive, anti-religious -bigotry.<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> - -<p>Cruel as the English criminal law was, and long remained, it never -authorised the use of torture to extract confession. The rack in the -Tower is said to have made its appearance, with other innovations of -absolute government, in the reign of Edward <small>IV.</small> But it seems to have -been little used before the reign of Elizabeth, under whom it became the -ordinary preliminary to a political trial. For this the chief blame must -rest personally on Burghley. Opinions may differ as to his rank as a -statesman, but no one will contest his eminent talents as a minister of -police. In the former capacity he had sufficient sense of shame to -publish a Pecksniffian apology for his employment of the rack. “None,” -he says, “of those who were at any time put to the rack were asked, -during their torture, any question as to points of doctrine, but merely -concerning their plots and conspiracies, and the persons with whom they -had dealings, and <i>what was their own opinion</i> as to the Pope’s right to -deprive the Queen of her crown.” What was this but a point of doctrine? -The wretched victim who conscientiously believed it (as all Christendom -once did), but wished to save himself by silence, was driven either to -tell a lie or to consign himself to rope and knife. “The Queen’s -servants, the warders, whose office and act it<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_145" id="page_145"></a>{145}</span> is to handle the rack, -were ever, by those that attended the examinations, specially charged to -use it in so charitable a manner as such a thing might be.” It may be -hoped that there are not many who would dissent from Hallam’s remark -that “such miserable excuses serve only to mingle contempt with our -detestation.” He adds: “It is due to Elizabeth to observe that she -ordered the torture to be disused.” I do not know what authority there -is for this statement. Three years later the Protestant Archbishop of -Dublin was puzzled how to torture the Catholic Archbishop of Cashel, -because there was no “rack or other engine” in Dublin. Walsingham, on -being consulted, suggested that his feet might be toasted against the -fire, which was accordingly done. Some of the Anglican bishops, as might -be expected from fanatics, were forward in recommending torture. But -Cecil was no more of a fanatic than his mistress. What both of them -cared for was not a particular religious belief—they had both of them -conformed to Popery under Queen Mary—but the sovereign’s claim to -prescribe religious belief, or rather religious profession, and they -were provoked with the missionaries for thwarting them. Provoking it -was, no doubt. But everything seems to show that it would have been -better to pursue the earlier policy of the reign; to be content with -enacting severe laws which practically were not put into execution.</p> - -<p>The English branch of the Jesuit attack was, for political purposes, a -dead failure. A few persons of rank, who at heart were Catholics before, -were formally reconciled to the Pope. Mendoza claims that<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_146" id="page_146"></a>{146}</span> among them -were six peers whose names he conceals. These peers, if he is to be -believed, were treasonable enough in their designs. But, even by his -account, they were determined not to stir unless a foreign army should -have first entered England.</p> - -<p>How far Mendoza’s master was from seeing his way to attack England at -this time was strikingly shown by his behaviour under the most audacious -outrage that Elizabeth had yet inflicted on him. Some twelve months -before (October 1580), Drake had returned from his famous voyage round -the world. That voyage was nothing else than a piratical expedition, for -which it was notorious that the funds had been mainly furnished by -Elizabeth and Leicester. On sea and land Drake had robbed Philip of -gold, silver, and precious stones to the value of at least £750,000. In -vain did Mendoza clamour for restitution and talk about war. Elizabeth -kept the booty, knighted Drake, and openly showed him every mark of -confidence and favour. When Mendoza told her that as she would not hear -words, they must come to cannon and see if she would hear them, she -replied (“quietly in her most natural voice”) that, if he used threats -of that kind, she would throw him into prison. The correspondence -between the Spanish ambassador and his master shows that, however big -they might talk about cannon, they felt themselves paralysed by -Elizabeth’s intimate relations with France. She had managed to keep free -from any offensive alliance with Henry <small>III.</small> But at the first sound of -the Spanish cannon she could have it. She was, therefore, secure. -Probably the whole history of diplomacy does not show another<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_147" id="page_147"></a>{147}</span> instance -of such a complicated balance of forces so dexterously manipulated.</p> - -<p>The Irish branch of the Papal attack, the landing of the legate Sanders, -the insurrection of Desmond (1579-1583), the massacre of the Pope’s -Italian soldiers at Smerwick (1580), must be passed over here. It is -enough to say that, in Ireland, too, the Catholics were beaten. We turn -now to their attempt to get hold of Scotland (1579-1582).</p> - -<p>Scotland was in a state of anarchy, from which it could only be rescued -by an able and courageous king. The nobles, instead of becoming weaker, -as elsewhere, had acquired a strength and independence greater even than -their fathers had enjoyed. Thirty years earlier, the Church had -possessed quite half the land of the country, and had steadily supported -the crown. Almost the whole of this wealth had been seized in one form -or another by the nobles. And though, as compared with English noblemen, -they were still poor in money, they were much bigger men relatively to -their sovereign. The power of the crown was extensive enough in theory. -What was wanted was a king who should know how to convert it into a -reality. That was more than any regent could do. Even Moray had not -succeeded. The house of Douglas was one of the most powerful in -Scotland, and Morton, who had been looked on as its head during the -minority of the Earl of Angus, was an able and daring man. But he had -not the large views, the public spirit, or the integrity of Moray. He -was feared by all, hated by many, respected by none. As a mere party -chief, no one would have been better<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_148" id="page_148"></a>{148}</span> able to hold his own. As -representing the crown, he had every man’s hand against him. To -subsidise such a man was perfectly useless. If Elizabeth was to make his -cause her own, she might just as well undertake the conquest of Scotland -at once.</p> - -<p>The essence of the good understanding between England and France was -that both countries should keep their hands off Scotland. Elizabeth, -knowing that if worst came to worst, she could always be beforehand with -France in the northern kingdom, could afford to respect this -arrangement, and she did mean to respect it. France, on the other hand, -being also well aware of the advantage given to England by geographical -situation, was always tempted to steal a march on her, and even when -most desirous of her alliance, never quite gave up intrigues in -Scotland. This was equally the case whatever party was uppermost at the -French court, whether its policy was being directed by the King or by -the Duke of Guise.</p> - -<p>The Jesuits looked on Guise as their fighting man, who was to do the -work which they could not prevail on crowned heads to undertake. James, -though only thirteen, had been declared of age. It was too late to think -of deposing him. If his character was feeble, his understanding and -acquirements were much beyond his years, and his preferences were -already a force to be reckoned with in Scotch politics. His interests -were evidently opposed to those of his mother. But the Jesuits hoped to -persuade him that his seat would never be secure unless he came to a -compromise with her on the terms that he was to accept the crown as her -gift and recognise her joint-sovereignty. This<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_149" id="page_149"></a>{149}</span> would throw him entirely -into the hands of the Catholic nobles, and would be a virtual -declaration of war against Elizabeth. He would have to proclaim himself -a Catholic, and call in the French. It was hoped that Philip, jealous -though he had always been of French interference, would not object to an -expedition warranted by the Jesuits and commanded by Guise, who was more -and more sinking into a tool of Spain and Rome. A combined army of -Scotch and French would pour across the Border. It would be joined by -the English Catholics. Elizabeth would be deposed, and Mary set on the -throne.</p> - -<p>It was a pretty scheme on paper, but certain to break down in every -stage of its execution. James might chaffer with his mother; but, young -as he was, he knew well that she meant to overreach him. He would be -glad enough to get rid of Morton, but he did not want to be a puppet in -the hands of the Marians. He did not like the Presbyterian preachers; -but the young pedant already valued himself on his skill in confuting -the apologists of Popery. He resented Elizabeth’s lectures; but he knew -that his succession to the English crown depended on her good will, and -he meant to keep on good terms with her. No approval of the scheme could -be obtained from Philip, and if he did not peremptorily forbid the -expedition, it was because he did not believe it would come off. If a -French army had appeared in Scotland, it would have been treated as all -foreigners were in that country. And finally, if, <i>per impossibile</i>, the -French and Scotch had entered England, they would have been overwhelmed -by such an unanimous<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_150" id="page_150"></a>{150}</span> uprising of the English people of all parties and -creeds as had never been witnessed in our history.</p> - -<p>Historians, who would have us believe that Elizabeth was constantly -bringing England to the verge of ruin by her stinginess and want of -spirit, represent this combination as highly formidable. It required -careful watching; but the only thing that could make it really dangerous -was rash and premature employment of force by England—the course -advocated not only by Burghley, but by the whole Council. Elizabeth -seems to have stood absolutely alone in her opinion; but here, as -always, though she allowed her ministers to speak their minds freely, -she did not fear to act on her own judgment against their unanimous -advice.</p> - -<p>To carry out their schemes, Guise and the Jesuits sent to Scotland a -nephew of the late Regent Lennox, Esmé Stuart, who had been brought up -in France, and bore the title of Count d’Aubigny (September 1579). He -speedily won the heart of the King, who created him Earl, and afterwards -Duke of Lennox. Elizabeth soon obtained proof of his designs, and urged -Morton to resist them by force. But the favourite, professing to be -converted to Protestantism, enlisted the preachers on his side, and, by -this unnatural coalition, Morton was brought to the scaffold (June -1581). During the interval between his arrest and execution, the English -Council were urgent with Elizabeth to invade Scotland, rescue the -Anglophile leader, and crush Lennox. She went all lengths in the way of -threats. Lord Hunsdon was even ordered to muster an army on the Border. -But this last step<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_151" id="page_151"></a>{151}</span> at once produced an energetic protest from the -French ambassador; and in Scotland there was a general rally of all -parties against the “auld enemies.” Elizabeth had never meant to make -her threats good, and Morton was left to his fate. She was quite right -not to invade Scotland; but, that being her intention, she should not -have tempted Morton to treason by the promise of her protection. No male -statesman would have been so insensible to dishonour.</p> - -<p>The death of the man who, next to Moray, had been the mainstay of the -Reformation and the scourge of the Marian party, was received with a -shout of exultation from Catholic Europe. Already in their heated -imaginations the Jesuits saw the Kirk overthrown and the vantage ground -gained for an attack on England. Some modern historians—with less -excuse, since they have the sequel before their eyes—make the same -blunder. The situation was really unchanged. Morton, who had the true -antipathy of a Scottish noble to clerics of all sorts, had plundered the -Kirk ministers, and tried to bring them under the episcopal yoke. He had -quarrelled with most of his old associates of the Congregation. It was -their enmity quite as much as the attack of Lennox that had pulled him -down. When he was out of the way they naturally reverted to an -Anglophile policy. The weakness of the Catholic party was plainly shown -by the fact that Lennox himself, the pupil of the Jesuits, never -ventured to throw off the disguise of a heretic.</p> - -<p>The further development of the Jesuit scheme met with difficulties on -all sides. Most even of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_152" id="page_152"></a>{152}</span> Catholic lords were alarmed by the -suggestion that James should hold the crown by the gift of his mother, -because it would imply that hitherto he had not been lawful King; and -this would invalidate their titles to all the lands they had grabbed -from Church and crown during the last fourteen years. It would seem -therefore that, if they had harassed the Government during all that -time, it was from a liking for anarchy rather than from attachment to -Mary. Two Jesuits, Crichton and Holt, who were sent in disguise to -Scotland, found Lennox desponding. He was obliged to confess that, -greatly as he had fascinated the King, he could not move him an inch in -his religious opinions. On the contrary, James imagined that his -controversial skill had converted Lennox, and was extremely proud of the -feat. The only course remaining was to seize him, and send him to France -or Spain, Lennox in the meantime administering the Government in the -name of Mary. But to carry out this stroke, Lennox said he must have a -foreign army. In view of the mutual jealousy of France and Spain it was -suggested that, if Philip would furnish money underhand, the Pope might -send an Italian army direct to Scotland, <i>viâ</i> the Straits of Gibraltar. -Crichton went to Rome to arrange this precious scheme, and Holt was -proceeding to Madrid. But Philip forbade him to come. If Lennox could -convert James, or send him to Spain, well and good. But until one of -these preliminaries was accomplished he was to expect no help from -Philip. Nor were prospects more hopeful on the side of France. Mary from -her prison implored Guise to undertake the<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_153" id="page_153"></a>{153}</span> long-planned expedition. But -he would not venture it without the assent of his own sovereign and the -King of Spain. While he was hesitating, the Anglophiles patched up their -differences and got possession of the King’s person (Raid of Ruthven, -August 1582). His tears were unavailing. “Better bairns greet,” said the -Master of Glamis, “than bearded men.” The favourite fled to France, -where he died in the next year.</p> - -<p>Thus once more had it been clearly shown that if the Anglophiles were -left to depend on themselves they would not fail to do all that was -necessary to safeguard English interests. “Anglophiles” is a convenient -appellation. But, strictly speaking, there was no party in Scotland that -loved England. There was a religious party to whom it was of the highest -importance that Elizabeth should be safe and powerful. She was therefore -certain of its co-operation. This party would not be always uppermost; -for Scottish nobles were too selfish, too treacherous, too much -interested in disorder to permit any stability. But, whether in power or -in opposition, it would be able and it would be obliged to serve English -interests. There was only one way in which it could be paralysed or -alienated, and that was by a recurrence on the part of England to the -traditions of armed interference inherited by Elizabeth’s councillors -from Henry <small>VIII.</small> and the Protector Somerset.</p> - -<p>Such is the plain history of this Jesuit and Papal scheme which we are -asked to believe was so dangerous to England and so inadequately handled -by Elizabeth. She had not shown much concern for her<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_154" id="page_154"></a>{154}</span> honour. But her -coolness, her intrepidity, her correct estimate of the forces with which -she had to deal, her magnificent confidence in her own judgment, saved -England from the endless expenditure of blood and treasure into which -her advisers would have plunged, and prolonged the formal peace with her -three principal neighbours, a peace of already unexampled duration, and -of incalculable advantage to her country.</p> - -<p>The policy which Elizabeth had thus deliberately adopted towards -Scotland she persisted in. The successful Anglophiles clamoured for -pensions, and her ministers were for gratifying them. She was willing to -give a moderate pension to James, but not a penny to the nobles. “Her -servants and favourites,” she said, “professed to love her for her high -qualities, Alençon for her beauty, and the Scots for her crown; but they -all wanted the same thing in the end; they wanted nothing but her money, -and they should not have it.” She had ascertained that James regarded -his mother as his rival for the crowns of both kingdoms, and that, -whatever he might sometimes pretend, his real wish was that she should -be kept under lock and key. She had also satisfied herself that the -Scottish noblemen on whom Mary counted would, with very few exceptions, -throw every difficulty in the way of her restoration, out of regard for -their own private interests—the only <i>datum</i> from which it was safe to -calculate in dealing with a Scottish nobleman. She therefore felt -herself secure. By communicating her knowledge to Mary she could show -her the hopelessness of her intrigues in Scotland; while a resumption of -friendly negotiations for her<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_155" id="page_155"></a>{155}</span> restoration would always be a cheap and -effectual way of intimidating James. Thus she could look on with -equanimity when his new favourite Stewart, Earl of Arran,<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> again -chased the Anglophiles into England (December 1583). Arran himself -urgently entreated her to accept him and his young master as the genuine -Anglophiles. Walsingham’s voice was still for war. But, with both -factions at her feet and suing for her favour, Elizabeth had good reason -to be satisfied with her policy of leaving the Scottish nobles to worry -it out among themselves.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_156" id="page_156"></a>{156}</span></p> - -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII"></a>CHAPTER VIII<br /><br /> -<small>THE PROTECTORATE OF THE NETHERLANDS: 1584-86</small></h2> - -<p class="nind">W<small>E</small> are now approaching the great crisis of the reign—some may think of -English history—the grand struggle with Spain; a struggle which, if -Elizabeth had allowed herself to be guided by her most celebrated -counsellors, would have been entered upon a quarter of a century -earlier. England was then unarmed and weighed down with a load of debt, -the legacy of three thriftless and pugnacious reigns. The population was -still mainly Catholic. The great nobles still thought themselves a match -for the crown, and many of them longed to make one more effort to assert -their old position in the State. Trade and industry were languishing. -The poorer classes were suffering and discontented. Scotland was in the -hands of a most dangerous enemy, whose title to the English crown was -held by many to be better than Elizabeth’s. Philip <small>II.</small>, as yet -unharassed by revolt, seemed almost to have drawn England as a sort of -satellite into the vast orbit of his empire.</p> - -<p>Nearly a generation had now passed away since Elizabeth ascended the -throne. Every year of it had<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_157" id="page_157"></a>{157}</span> seen some amendment in the condition of -the country. Under a pacific and thrifty Government taxation had been -light beyond precedent. All debts, even those of Henry <small>VIII.</small>, had been -honourably paid off. While the lord of American gold mines and of the -richest commercial centres in Europe could not raise a loan on any -terms, Elizabeth could borrow when she pleased at five per cent. But she -had ceased to borrow, for she had a modest surplus stored in her -treasury, a department of the administration managed under her own close -personal supervision. A numerous militia had been enrolled and partially -trained. Large magazines of arms had been accumulated. A navy had been -created; not a large one indeed; but it did not need to be large, for -the warship of those days did not differ from the ordinary vessel of -commerce, nor was its crew differently trained. The royal navy could -therefore be indefinitely increased if need arose. Philip’s great -generals, Alva and Parma, had long come to the conclusion that the -conquest of England would be the most difficult enterprise their master -could undertake. The wealth of landed proprietors and traders had -increased enormously. New manufactures had been started by exiles from -the Netherlands. New branches of foreign commerce had been opened up. -The poor were well employed and contented. I believe it would be -impossible to find in the previous history of England, or, for that -matter, of Europe, since the fall of the Roman Empire, any instance of -peace, prosperity, and good government extending over so many years.</p> - -<p>Looking abroad we find that in all directions the strength and security -of Elizabeth’s position had been<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_158" id="page_158"></a>{158}</span> immensely increased. Her ministers, -especially Walsingham—for Burghley in his old age came at last to see -more with the eyes of his mistress—believed that by a more spirited -policy Scotland might have been converted into a submissive and valuable -ally. Elizabeth alone saw that this was impossible; that, so treated, -Scotland would become to England what Holland was to Philip, what “the -Spanish ulcer” was afterwards to Napoleon—a fatal drain on her strength -and resources. It was enough for Elizabeth if the northern kingdom was -so handled as to be harmless; and this, as I have shown, was in fact its -condition from the moment that the only Scottish ruler who could be -really dangerous was locked up in England.</p> - -<p>The Dutch revolt crippled Philip. The conquest of England was postponed -till the Dutch revolt should be suppressed. Why then, it has been asked, -did not Elizabeth support the Dutch more vigorously? The answer is a -simple one. If she had done so the suppression of the Dutch revolt would -have been postponed to the conquest of England. This is proved by the -events now to be related. Elizabeth was obliged by new circumstances to -intervene more vigorously in the Netherlands, and the result was the -Armada. If the attack had come ten or fifteen years earlier the fortune -of England might have been different.</p> - -<p>Elizabeth’s foreign policy has been judged unfavourably by writers who -have failed to keep in view how completely it turned on her relations -with France. Though her interests and those of Henry <small>III.</small> cannot<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_159" id="page_159"></a>{159}</span> be -called identical, they coincided sufficiently to make it possible to -keep up a good understanding which was of the highest advantage to both -countries. But to maintain this good understanding there was need of the -coolest temper and judgment on the part of the rulers; for the two -peoples were hopelessly hostile. They were like two gamecocks in -adjoining pens. The Spaniards were respected and liked by our -countrymen. Their grave dignity, even their stiff assumption of -intrinsic superiority, were too like our own not to awake a certain -appreciative sympathy. Whereas all Englishmen from peer to peasant would -at any time have enjoyed a tussle with France, until its burdens began -to be felt.</p> - -<p>Henry <small>III.</small>, with whom the Valois dynasty was about to expire, was far -from being the incompetent driveller depicted by most historians. He had -good abilities, plenty of natural courage when roused, and a thorough -comprehension of the politics of his day. His aims and plans were well -conceived. But with no child to care for, and immersed in degrading -self-indulgence, he wearied of the exertions and sacrifices necessary -for carrying them through. Short spells of sensible and energetic action -were succeeded by periods of unworthy lassitude and pusillanimous -surrender. Before he came to the throne he had been the chief organiser -of the Bartholomew Massacre. As King he naturally inclined, like -Elizabeth, William of Orange, and Henry of Navarre, to make -considerations of religion subordinate to considerations of State. Both -he and Navarre would have been glad to throw over the fanatical or -factious partisans by whom they were<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_160" id="page_160"></a>{160}</span> surrounded, and rally the -<i>Politiques</i> to their support. But it was a step that neither as yet -ventured openly to take. The one was obliged to affect zeal for the old -religion, the other for the new.</p> - -<p>Elizabeth’s ministers, with short-sighted animosity, had been urging her -throughout her reign to give vigorous support to the Huguenots. She -herself took a broader view of the situation. She preferred to deal with -the legitimate government of France recognised by the vast majority of -Frenchmen. Henry <small>III.</small>, as she well knew, did not intend or desire to -exterminate the Huguenots. If that turbulent faction had been openly -abetted in its arrogant claims by English assistance, he would have been -obliged to become the mere instrument of Elizabeth’s worst enemies, -Guise and the Holy League. France would have ceased to be any -counterpoise to Spain. The English Queen had so skilfully played a most -difficult and delicate game that Henry of Navarre had been able to keep -his head above water; Guise had upon the whole been held in check; the -royal authority, though impaired, had still controlled the foreign -policy of France, and so, since 1572, had given England a firm and -useful ally. As long as this balanced situation could be maintained, -England was safe.</p> - -<p>But the time was now at hand when this nice equilibrium of forces would -be disturbed by events which neither Elizabeth nor any one else could -help. Alençon, the last of the Valois line, was dying. When he should be -gone, the next heir to the French King would be no other than the -Huguenot Henry of Bourbon, King of the tiny morsel of Navarre that lay<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_161" id="page_161"></a>{161}</span> -north of the Pyrenees. Henry <small>III.</small> wished to recognise his right. But it -was impossible that Guise or Philip, or the French nation itself, should -tolerate this prospect. Thus the great war of religion which Elizabeth -had so carefully abstained from stirring up was now inevitable. The -French alliance, the key-stone of her policy, was about to crumble away -with the authority of the French King which she had buttressed up. He -would be compelled either to become the mere instrument of the Papal -party or to combine openly with the Huguenot leader. In either case, -Guise, not Henry <small>III.</small>, would be the virtual sovereign, and Elizabeth’s -alliance would not be with France but with a French faction. She would -thus be forced into the position which she had hitherto refused to -accept—that of sole protector of French and Dutch Protestants, and open -antagonist of Spain. The more showy part she was now to play has been -the chief foundation of her glory with posterity. It is a glory which -she deserves. The most industrious disparagement will never rob her of -it. But the sober student will be of opinion that her reputation as a -statesman has a more solid basis in the skill and firmness with which -during so many years she staved off the necessity for decisive action.</p> - -<p>Although the discovery of the Throgmorton plot (Nov. 1583), and the -consequent expulsion of the Spanish ambassador, Mendoza, were not -immediately followed by open war between England and Spain, yet the -course of events thenceforward tended directly to that issue. Elizabeth -immediately proposed to the Dutch States to form a naval alliance -against Spain, and to concert other measures for mutual defence.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_162" id="page_162"></a>{162}</span> Orange -met the offer with alacrity, and pressed Elizabeth to accept the -sovereignty of Holland, Zealand, and Utrecht. Perhaps there was no -former ruler of England who would not have clutched at such an -opportunity of territorial aggrandisement. For Elizabeth it had no -charms. Every sensible person now will applaud the sobriety of her aims. -But though she eschewed territory, she desired to have military -occupation of one or more coast fortresses, at all events for a time, -both as a security for the fidelity of the Dutch to any engagements they -might make with her, and to enable her to treat on more equal terms with -France or Spain, if the Netherlands were destined, after all, to fall -into the hands of one of those powers.</p> - -<p>While these negotiations were in progress, William of Orange was -murdered (June 30/July 10, 1584). Alençon had died a month earlier. The -sovereignty of the revolted Netherlands was thus vacant. Elizabeth -advised a joint protectorate by France and England. But the Dutch had -small confidence in protectorates, especially of the joint kind. What -they wanted was a sovereign, and as Elizabeth would not accept them as -her subjects they offered themselves to Henry <small>III.</small> But after nibbling at -the offer for eight months Henry was obliged to refuse it. His openly -expressed intention to recognise the King of Navarre as his heir had -caused a revival of the Holy League. During the winter 1584-5 its -reorganisation was busily going on. Philip promised to subsidise it. -Mendoza, now ambassador at Paris, was its life and soul. The -insurrection was on the point of breaking out. Henry <span class="pagenum"><a name="page_163" id="page_163"></a>{163}</span><small>III.</small> knew that the -vast majority of Frenchmen were Catholics. To accept the Dutch offer -would, he feared, drive them all into the ranks of the Holy League. He -therefore dismissed the Dutch envoys with the recommendation that they -should apply to England for protection (February 28/March 10, 1585).</p> - -<p>The manifesto of the Leaguers appeared at the end of March (1585). Henry -of Navarre was declared incapable, as a Protestant, of succeeding to the -crown. Henry <small>III.</small> was summoned to extirpate heresy. To enforce these -demands the Leaguers flew to arms all over France. Had Henry <small>III.</small> been a -man of spirit he would have placed himself at the head of the loyal -Catholics and fought it out. But by the compact of Nemours he conceded -all the demands of the League (June 28/July 7, 1585). Thus began the -last great war of religion, which lasted till Henry of Navarre was -firmly seated on the throne of France.</p> - -<p>Elizabeth had now finally lost the French alliance, the sheet-anchor of -her policy since 1572, and she prepared for the grand struggle which -could no longer be averted. As France failed her, she must make the best -of the Dutch alliance. She did not conceal from herself that she would -have to do her share of the fighting. But she was determined that the -Dutch should also do theirs. Deprived of all hope of help from France -they wished for annexation to the English crown, because solidarity -between the two countries would give them an unlimited claim upon -English resources. Elizabeth uniformly told them, first and last, that -nothing should induce her to accept that proposal. She would give them a -definite amount of<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_164" id="page_164"></a>{164}</span> assistance in men and money. But every farthing -would have to be repaid when the war was over; and in the meantime she -must have Flushing and Brill as security. They must also bind themselves -to make proper exertions in their own defence. Gilpin, her agent in -Zealand, had warned her that if she showed herself too forward they -would simply throw the whole burden of the war upon her. Splendid as had -often been the resistance of separate towns when besieged, there had -been, from the first, lamentable selfishness and apathy as to measures -for combined defence. The States had less than 6000 men in the -field—half of them English volunteers—at the very time when they were -assuring Elizabeth that, if she would come to their assistance, they -could and would furnish 15,000. She was justified in regarding their -fine promises with much distrust.</p> - -<p>While this discussion was going on, Antwerp was lost. The blame of the -delay, if blame there was, must be divided equally between the -bargainers. The truth is that, cavil as they might about details, the -strength of the English contingent was not the real object of concern to -either of them. Each was thinking of something else. Though Elizabeth -had so peremptorily refused the sovereignty offered by the United -Provinces, they were still bent on forcing it upon her. She, on the -other hand, had not given up the hope that her more decisive -intervention would drive Philip to make the concessions to his revolted -subjects which she had so often urged upon him. In her eyes, Philip’s -sovereignty over them was indefeasible. They were, perhaps, justified -in<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_165" id="page_165"></a>{165}</span> asserting their ancient constitutional rights. But if those were -guaranteed, continuance of the rebellion would be criminal. Moreover, -she held that elected deputies were but amateur statesmen, and had -better leave the <i>haute politique</i> to princes to settle. “Princes,” she -once told a Dutch deputation, “are not to be charged with breach of -faith if they sometimes listen to both sides; for they transact business -in a princely way and with a princely understanding such as private -persons cannot have.” Her promise not to make peace behind their backs -was not to be interpreted as literally as if it had been made to a -brother prince. It merely bound her—so she contended—not to make peace -without safeguarding their interests; that is to say, what she -considered to be their true interests. Conduct based on such a theory -would not be tolerated now, and was not tamely acquiesced in by the -Dutch then. But to speak of it as base and treacherous is an abuse of -terms.</p> - -<p>It would be impossible to follow in detail the peace negotiations which -went on between Elizabeth and Parma up to the very sailing of the Armada -(1586-8). The terms on which the Queen was prepared to make peace never -varied substantially from first to last. We know very well what they -were. She claimed for the Protestants of the Netherlands (who were a -minority, perhaps, even in the rebel provinces) precisely the same -degree of toleration which she allowed to her own Catholics. They were -not to be questioned about their religion; but there was to be no public -worship or proselytising. The old constitution, as before Alva, was to -be restored, which would have<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_166" id="page_166"></a>{166}</span> involved the departure of the foreign -troops. These terms would not have satisfied the States, and if Philip -could have been induced to grant them, the States and Elizabeth must -have parted company. But, as he would make no concessions, the -Anglo-Dutch alliance could, and did, continue. The cautionary towns she -was determined never to give up to any one unless (first) she was repaid -her expenses for which they had been mortgaged, and (secondly) the -struggle in the Netherlands was brought to an end on terms which she -approved. There was, therefore, never any danger of their being -surrendered to Philip, and they did, in fact, remain in Elizabeth’s -hands till her death.</p> - -<p>Elizabeth has been severely censured for selecting Leicester to command -the English army in the Netherlands. It is certain that he was marked -out by public opinion as the fittest person. The Queen’s choice was -heartily approved by all her ministers, especially by Walsingham, who -kept up the most confidential relations with Leicester, and backed him -throughout. Custom prescribed that an English army should be commanded, -not by a professional soldier, but by a great nobleman. Among the -nobility there were a few who had done a little soldiering in a rough -way in Scotland or Ireland, but no one who could be called a -professional general. The momentous step which Elizabeth was taking -would have lost half its significance in the eyes of Europe if any less -conspicuous person than Leicester had been appointed. Moreover, it was -essential that the nobleman selected should be able and willing to spend -largely out of his own<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_167" id="page_167"></a>{167}</span> resources. By traditional usage, derived from -feudal times, peers who were employed on temporary services not only -received no salary, but were expected to defray their own expenses, and -defray them handsomely. Never did an English nobleman show more public -spirit in this respect than Leicester. He raised every penny he could by -mortgaging his estates. He not only paid his own personal expenses, but -advanced large sums for military purposes, which his mistress never -thought of repaying him. If he effected little as a general, it was -because he was not provided with the means. Serious mistakes he -certainly made, but they were not of a military kind.</p> - -<p>Leicester was now fifty-four, bald, white-bearded, and red-faced, but -still imposing in figure, carriage, and dress. To Elizabeth he was dear -as the friend of her youth, one who, she was persuaded, had loved her -for herself when they were both thirty years younger, and was still her -most devoted and trustworthy servant. Burghley she liked and trusted, -and all the more since he had become a more docile instrument of her -policy. Walsingham, a keener intellect and more independent character, -she could not but value, though impatient under his penetrating -suspicion and almost constant disapproval. Leicester was the intimate -friend, the frequent companion of her leisure hours. None of her younger -favourites had supplanted him in her regard. By long intimacy he knew -the <i>molles aditus et tempora</i> when things might be said without offence -which were not acceptable at the council-board. The other ministers were -glad to use him for this purpose. There can be no question<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_168" id="page_168"></a>{168}</span> that his -appointment to the command in the Netherlands was meant as the most -decisive indication that could be given of Elizabeth’s determination to -face open war with Philip rather than allow him to establish absolute -government in that country.</p> - -<p>Since the deaths of Alençon and William of Orange, the United Provinces -had been without a ruler. The government had been provisionally carried -on by the “States,” or deputies from each province. Leicester had come -with no other title than that of Lieutenant-General of the Queen’s -troops. But what the States wanted was not so much a military leader as -a sovereign ruler. They therefore urged Leicester to accept the powers -and title of Governor-General, the office which had been held by the -representatives of Philip. From this it would follow, both logically and -practically, that Elizabeth herself stood in the place of Philip—in -other words, that she was committed to the sovereignty which she had so -peremptorily refused.</p> - -<p>The offer was accepted by Leicester almost immediately after his arrival -(Jan. 14/24, 1586). There can be little doubt that it was a preconcerted -plan between the States and Elizabeth’s ministers, who had all along -supported the Dutch proposals. Leicester, we know, had contemplated it -before leaving England. Davison, who was in Holland, hurried it on, and -undertook to carry the news to Elizabeth. Burghley and Walsingham -maintained that the step had been absolutely necessary, and implored her -not to undo it. Elizabeth herself had suspected that something of the -sort would be attempted, and had strictly enjoined<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_169" id="page_169"></a>{169}</span> Leicester at his -departure to accept no such title. It was not that she wished his -powers—that is to say, her own powers—to be circumscribed. On the -contrary, she desired that they should in practice be as large and -absolute as possible. What she objected to was the title, with all the -consequences it involved. And what enraged her most of all was the -attempt of her servants to push the thing through behind her back, on -the calculation that she would be obliged to accept the accomplished -fact. Her wrath vented itself on all concerned, on her ministers, on the -States, and on Leicester. To the latter she addressed a characteristic -letter:—</p> - -<div class="blockquot"><p class="nind">“<i>To my Lord of Leicester from the Queen by Sir Thomas Heneage.</i></p> - -<p>“How contemptuously we conceive ourself to have been used by you, -you shall by this bearer understand, whom we have expressly sent -unto you to charge you withal. We could never have imagined, had we -not seen it fall out in experience, that a man raised up by ourself -and extraordinarily favoured by us above any other subject of this -land, would have in so contemptible [contemptuous] a sort, broken -our commandment, in a cause that so greatly toucheth us in honour; -whereof although you have showed yourself to make but little -account, in most undutiful a sort, you may not therefore think that -we have so little care of the reparation thereof as we mind to pass -so great a wrong in silence unredressed. And therefore our express -pleasure and command is that, all delays and excuses laid apart, -you do presently, on the duty of your allegiance, obey and fulfil -whatsoever the bearer hereof shall direct you to do in our name. -Whereof fail not, as you will answer the contrary at your uttermost -peril.”</p></div> - -<p>Nor were these cutting reproaches reserved for his private perusal. She -severely rebuked the States for encouraging “a creature of her own” to -disobey her injunctions, and, as a reparation from them and from him,<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_170" id="page_170"></a>{170}</span> -she required that he should make a public resignation of the government -in the place where he had accepted it.</p> - -<p>It is not to be wondered at that Elizabeth should think the vindication -of her outraged authority to be the most pressing requirement of the -moment. But the result was unfortunate for the object of the expedition. -The States had conferred “absolute” authority upon Leicester, and would -have thought it a cheap price to pay if, by their adroit manœuvre, -they had succeeded in forcing the Queen’s hand. But they did not care to -entrust absolute powers to a mere general of an English contingent. -After long discussion, Elizabeth was at length persuaded that the least -of evils was to allow him to retain the title which the States had -conferred on him (June 1586). But in the meantime they had repented of -their haste in letting power go out of their own hands. Their efforts -were thenceforth directed to explain away the term “absolute.” The long -displeasure of the Queen had destroyed the principal value of Leicester -in their eyes. He himself had soon incurred their dislike. Impetuous and -domineering, he could not endure opposition. Every man who did not fall -in with his plans was a malicious enemy, a traitor, a tool of Parma, who -ought to be hanged. He still enjoyed the favour of the democratic and -bigoted Calvinist party, especially in Utrecht, and he tried to play -them off against the States, thereby promoting the rise of the factions -which long afterwards distracted the United Provinces. The displeasure -of the Queen had taken the shape of not sending him money, and his -troops were in great distress and unable<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_171" id="page_171"></a>{171}</span> to move. Moreover, rumours of -the secret peace negotiations were craftily spread by Parma, who, -knowing well that they would come to nothing, turned them to the best -account by leading the States to suspect that they were being betrayed -to Spain.</p> - -<p>Elizabeth had sent her army abroad more as a warning to Philip than with -a view to active operations. It was no part of her plan to recover any -of the territory already conquered by Parma, even if it had lain in her -power. She knew that the majority of its inhabitants were Catholics and -royalists. She knew also that Parma’s attenuated army was considerably -outnumbered by the Anglo-Dutch forces, and that he was in dire distress -for food and money. The recovered provinces were completely ruined by -the war. Their commerce was swept from the sea. The mouths of their -great rivers were blockaded. The Protestants of Flanders and Brabant had -largely migrated to the unsubdued provinces, whose prosperity, -notwithstanding the burdens of war, was advancing by leaps and bounds. -Their population was about two millions. That of England itself was -little more than four. Religion was no longer the only or the chief -motive of their resistance. For even the Catholics among them, who were -still very numerous—some said a majority—keenly relished the material -prosperity which had grown with independence. Encouraged by English -protection, the States were in no humour to listen to compromise. But a -compromise was what Elizabeth desired. She was therefore not unwilling -that her forces should be confined to an attitude of observation, till -it should appear whether her open intervention<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_172" id="page_172"></a>{172}</span> would extract from -Philip such concessions as she deemed reasonable.</p> - -<p>Leicester was eager to get to work, and he was warmly supported by -Walsingham. Burghley’s conduct was less straightforward. He had long -found it advisable to cultivate amicable relations with the favourite. -He had probably concurred in the plan for making him Governor-General. -Even now he was professing to take his part. In reality he was not sorry -to see him under a cloud; and though he sympathised as much as ever with -the Dutch, he cared more for crippling his rival. Hence his activity in -those obscure peace negotiations which he so carefully concealed from -Leicester and Walsingham. To keep Walsingham long in the dark, on that -or any other subject, was indeed impossible. It was found necessary at -last to let him be present at an interview with the agents employed by -Burghley and Parma, which brought their back-stairs diplomacy to an -abrupt conclusion. “They that have been the employers of them,” he wrote -to Leicester, “are ashamed of the matter.” The negotiations went on -through other channels, but never made any serious progress.</p> - -<p>To compel Philip to listen to a compromise, without at the same time -emboldening the Dutch to turn a deaf ear to it—such was the problem -which Elizabeth had set herself. She therefore preferred to apply -pressure in other quarters. Towards the end of 1585, Drake appeared on -the coast of Spain itself, and plundered Vigo. Then crossing the -Atlantic, he sacked and burned St. Domingo and Carthagena. Again in -1587, he forced his way into Cadiz harbour, burnt all the shipping<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_173" id="page_173"></a>{173}</span> and -the stores collected for the Armada, and for two months plundered and -destroyed every vessel he met off the coast of Portugal.</p> - -<p>Philip had so long and so tamely submitted to the many injuries and -indignities which Elizabeth heaped upon him, that it is not wonderful if -she had come to think that he would never pluck up courage to retaliate. -This time she was wrong. The conquest of England had always had its -place in his overloaded programme. But it was to be in that hazy -ever-receding future, when he should have put down the Dutch rebellion -and neutralised France. Elizabeth’s open intervention in the Netherlands -at length induced him to change his plan. England, he now decided, must -be first dealt with.</p> - -<p>In the meantime, Parma’s operations in the Netherlands were starved -quite as much as Leicester’s. Plundering excursions, two or three petty -combats not deserving the name of battles, half-a-dozen small towns -captured on one side or the other—such is the military record from the -date of Elizabeth’s intervention to the arrival of the Armada. Parma had -somewhat the best of this work, such as it was. But the war in the -Netherlands was practically stagnant.</p> - -<p>At the end of the first year of Leicester’s government, events of the -highest importance obliged him to pay a visit to England (Nov. 1586). -The Queen of Scots had been found guilty of conspiring to assassinate -Elizabeth, and Parliament had been summoned to decide upon her fate.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_174" id="page_174"></a>{174}</span></p> - -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IX" id="CHAPTER_IX"></a>CHAPTER IX<br /><br /> -<small>EXECUTION OF THE QUEEN OF SCOTS: 1584-1587</small></h2> - -<p class="nind">T<small>HROGMORTON’S</small> plot—of which the Queen of Scots was undoubtedly -cognisant, though it was not pressed against her—brought home to every -one the danger in which Elizabeth stood (1584). To the Catholic -conspiracy, the temptation to take her life was enormous. It was -becoming clear that, while she lived, the much talked of insurrection -would never come off. The large majority of Catholics would have nothing -to do with it—still less with foreign invasion. They would obey their -lawful sovereign. But if once Elizabeth were dead, by whatever means, -their lawful sovereign would be Mary. The rebels would be the -Protestants, if they should try to place any one else on the throne. The -Protestants had no organisation. They had no candidate for the crown -ready. It was to be feared that no great noble would step forward to -lead them. Burghley himself, though longing as much as ever for Mary’s -head, had with a prudent eye to all eventualities, contrived some time -before to persuade her that he was her well-wisher. Houses of Commons, -it is true, had shown themselves strongly and increasingly Protestant.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_175" id="page_175"></a>{175}</span> -But with the demise of the crown, Parliament, if in being at the time, -would be <i>ipso facto</i> dissolved. The Privy Council, in like manner, -would cease to have any legal existence. Burghley, Walsingham, and the -other new men of whom it was mostly composed, had no power or weight, -except as instruments of the sovereign. Her death would leave them -helpless. The country would take its direction not from them, but from -the great nobles of large ancestral possessions. Nor could they provide -for such an emergency by privately selecting a Protestant successor -beforehand, and privately organising their partisans. It would have been -as much as their lives were worth if their mistress had caught them -doing anything of the kind.</p> - -<p>In this dilemma an ingenious plan suggested itself to them. They drew up -a “Bond of Association,” by which the subscribers engaged that, if the -Queen were murdered, they would never accept as successor any one “by -whom <i>or for whom</i>” such act should be committed, but would “prosecute -such person to death.”</p> - -<p>This was a hypothetical way of excluding Mary and organising a -Protestant resistance to which Elizabeth could make no objection. But -the ministers knew that, as a merely voluntary association without -Parliamentary sanction, it would add little strength or confidence to -the Protestant party. It would not even test their numbers; for no -Marian ventured to refuse the oath. Mary herself desired to be allowed -to take it. The bond was therefore converted into a Statute by -Parliament, though not without some important alterations (March 1585). -It was enacted that if the realm was invaded, or a rebellion instigated, -by <i>or for</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="page_176" id="page_176"></a>{176}</span> any one pretending a title to the succession, or if the -Queen’s murder was plotted by any one, or with the privity of any one -that pretended title, such pretender, <i>after examination and judgment</i> -by an extraordinary commission to be nominated by the Queen, and -consisting of at least twenty-four privy councillors and lords of -Parliament assisted by the chief judges, should be excluded from the -succession, and that, on proclamation of the sentence and direction by -the Queen, all subjects might and should pursue the offender to death. -If the Queen were murdered, the lords of the Council at the time of her -death, or the majority of them, should join to themselves at least -twelve other lords of Parliament not making title to the crown, and the -chief judges; and if, after examination, they should come to the -above-mentioned conclusion, they should without delay, by all forcible -and possible means, prosecute the guilty persons to death, and should -have power to raise and use such forces as should in that behalf be -needful and convenient; and no subjects should be liable to punishment -for anything done according to the tenor of the Statute.</p> - -<p>Here, then, was a legal way provided by which the Protestant ministers -might act against Mary if Elizabeth were murdered. They were in fact -creating a Provisional Government, with power to exclude Mary from the -throne. Whether they would have the courage or strength to do so -remained to be seen; but they would at least have formal law on their -side.</p> - -<p>It had never entered into Mary’s plans to wait for Elizabeth’s natural -death. She therefore read the new Act as a sentence of exclusion. -Another blow soon<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_177" id="page_177"></a>{177}</span> fell on her. In 1584, elated by her son’s victory -over the raiders of Ruthven, and believing that he was willing to -recognise her joint sovereignty and co-operate with a Guise invasion, -she had scornfully refused the last overtures that Elizabeth ever made -to her. She now learnt that he had never intended to accept association -with her, and that he had urged Elizabeth not to release her. In the -following year he had accepted an annual pension of £4000 with some -grumbling at its amount; and a defensive alliance was at length -concluded between the two countries, Mary’s name not being mentioned in -the treaty (July 1586).</p> - -<p>As the prospects of the Scottish Queen became darker both in England and -her own country, she grew more desperate and reckless. Early in 1586, -Walsingham contrived a way of regularly inspecting all her most secret -correspondence. He soon discovered that she was encouraging Babington’s -plot for assassinating Elizabeth. Some of the conspirators, though -avowed Catholics, had offices in the royal household; such was -Elizabeth’s easy-going confidence. It was hoped that Parma would at the -moment of the murder land troops on the east coast. Mendoza, now Spanish -ambassador in Paris, warmly encouraged the project.</p> - -<p>The Scottish Queen was now in the case contemplated by the Statute of -the previous year. But it required all the urgency of the Council to -prevail with Elizabeth to have her brought to trial. Elizabeth’s whole -conduct shows that she would even now have preferred to deal with her -rival as she did in the inquiry into the Darnley murder. She would<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_178" id="page_178"></a>{178}</span> have -been content to discredit her, to expose her guilt, and, if possible, to -bring her to her knees confessing her crimes and pleading for mercy. But -Mary was not of the temper to confess. Humiliation and effacement were -to her worse than death. She chose to brazen it out with a well-grounded -confidence that, as long as she asserted her innocence, people would -always be found to believe in it, let the evidence be what it would. -Besides, long impunity had convinced her that Elizabeth did not dare to -take her life.</p> - -<p>There was nothing for it, therefore, but to bring her to trial. A -Special Commission was nominated under the provisions of the Statute of -1585, consisting of forty-five persons—peers, privy councillors, and -judges—who proceeded to Fotheringay Castle, whither Mary had been -removed.<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> She at first refused their jurisdiction; but on being -informed that they would proceed in her absence, she appeared before -them under protest (October 14, 1586). After sitting at Fotheringay for -two days, the Court adjourned to Westminster, where it pronounced her -guilty (October 25).<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> A declaration was added that her -disqualification for the succession, which followed by the Statute, did -not affect any rights that her son might possess. The verdict was -immediately known; but its proclamation was deferred till Parliament -could be consulted.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_179" id="page_179"></a>{179}</span></p> - -<p>A general election had been held while the trial was going on, and -Parliament met four days after its conclusion (October 29). The whole -evidence was gone into afresh. Not a word seems to have been said in -Mary’s favour; and an address was presented to the Queen praying for -execution. If precedents were wanted for the capital punishment of an -anointed sovereign, there were the cases of Agag, Jezebel, Athaliah, -Deiotarus, king of Galatia, put to death by Julius Cæsar, Rhescuporis, -king of Thrace, by Tiberius, and Conradin by Charles of Anjou. In vain -did Elizabeth request them to reconsider their vote, and devise some -other expedient. Usually so deferential to her suggestions, they -reiterated their declaration that “the Queen’s safety could no way be -secured as long as the Queen of Scots lived.”</p> - -<p>Elizabeth’s hesitation has been generally set down to hypocrisy. It has -been taken for granted that she desired Mary’s death, and was glad to -have it pressed upon her by her subjects. I believe that her reluctance -was most genuine. If not of generous disposition, neither was she -revengeful or cruel. She had no animosity against her enemies. She -lacked gall. She was never in any hurry to punish the disaffected, or -even to weed them out of her service. She rather prided herself on -employing them even about her person. Since her accession only two -English peers had been put to death, though several had richly deserved -it. She could affirm with perfect truth that, for the last fifteen -years, she, and she alone, had stood between Mary and the scaffold, and -this at great and increasing risk to her own life.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_180" id="page_180"></a>{180}</span> There had, perhaps, -been a time when to destroy the prospect of a Catholic succession would -have driven the Catholics into rebellion. But that time had long gone -by, as every one knew. Elizabeth had only two dangers now to fear, -invasion and assassination, the latter being the most threatening. There -would be little inducement to attempt it if Mary were not alive to -profit by it. Yet Elizabeth hesitated. The explanation of her reluctance -is very simple. She flinched from the obloquy, the undeserved obloquy, -which she saw was in store for her. Careless to an extraordinary degree -about her personal danger, she would have preferred, as far as she was -herself concerned, to let Mary live. It was her ministers and the -Protestant party who, for their own interest, were forcing her to shed -her cousin’s blood; and it seemed to her unfair that the undivided odium -should fall, as she foresaw it would fall, on her alone.</p> - -<p>The suspense continued through December and January. In the meantime it -became abundantly clear that no foreign court would interfere actively -to save Mary’s life. While she had been growing old in captivity, new -interests had sprung up, fresh schemes had been formed in which she had -no place. She stood in the way of half-a-dozen ambitions. Everybody was -weary of her and her wrongs and her pretensions. The Pope had felt less -interest of late in a princess whose rights, if established, would pass -to a Protestant heir. Philip could not intercede for her even if he had -desired to save her life. He was already at war with England, and, if -she had known it, not with any intention of supporting her<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_181" id="page_181"></a>{181}</span> claims.<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> -James by his recent treaty with England had tacitly treated his mother -as an enemy. Her scheme for kidnapping and disinheriting him, found -among her papers at Chartley, had been promptly communicated to him. -Decency required that he should make a show of remonstrance and menace. -But he had every reason to desire her death, and his only thought was to -use the opportunity for extorting from Elizabeth a recognition of his -title to the English crown and an increase of his pension. He sent the -Master of Gray to drive this bargain. The very choice of his envoy, the -man who had persuaded him to break with his mother, showed Elizabeth how -the land lay, and she did not think it worth her while to bribe him in -either way. The Marian nobles blustered and called for war. Not one of -them wanted to see Mary back in Scotland or cared what became of her; -but they had got an idea that Philip would pay them for a plundering -raid into England, and the doubly lucrative prospect was irresistible. -James, however, though pretending resentment and really sulky at his -rebuff, knew his own interests too well to quarrel with England. What -the action of the French King was is less certain. Openly he -remonstrated with considerable vigour and persistence; not entering into -the question of Mary’s guilt, but protesting against the punishment of a -Queen and a member of his family. Probably his efforts, so far as they -went, were sincere, for he instructed his ambassador to bribe the -English ministers if possible to save her life. But it was evident that, -however offended Henry <small>III.</small> might be<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_182" id="page_182"></a>{182}</span> by the execution of his -sister-in-law, he would not be provoked into playing the game of Spain.</p> - -<p>A warrant for the execution had been drawn soon after the adjournment of -Parliament, and all through December and January Elizabeth’s ministers -kept urging her to sign it. At length, when the Scotch and French -ambassadors were gone, and with them the last excuse for delay, she -signed it in the presence of Davison (who had lately been made -co-secretary with Walsingham), and directed him to have it sealed -(February 1). What else passed between them on that occasion must always -remain uncertain, because Davison’s four written statements, and his -answers at his trial, differ in important particulars not only from the -Queen’s account but from one another. So much, however, will to most -persons who examine the evidence be very clear. Elizabeth meant the -execution to take place. There is no reason to doubt Davison’s statement -that she “forbade him to trouble her any further, or let her hear any -more thereof till it was done, seeing that for her part she had now -performed all that either in law or reason could be required of her.” -But signing the warrant, as both of them knew, was not enough. The -formal delivery of it to some person, with direction to carry it out, -was the final step necessary. This, by Davison’s own admission, the -Queen managed to evade. He saw that she wished to thrust the -responsibility upon him and Walsingham, and he suspected that she meant -to disavow them. Although, therefore, she had enjoined strict secrecy, -he laid the matter before Hatton and Burghley.</p> - -<p>Burghley assembled in his own room the Earls of<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_183" id="page_183"></a>{183}</span> Derby and Leicester, -Lords Howard of Effingham, Hunsdon, and Cobham, Knollys, Hatton, -Walsingham, and Davison (February 3). These ten were probably the only -privy councillors then at Greenwich.<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> He laid before them Davison’s -statement of what had passed between the Queen and himself at both -interviews. He said that she had done as much as could be expected of -her; that she evidently wished her ministers to take whatever -responsibility remained upon themselves without informing her; and that -they ought to do so. His proposal was agreed to. A letter was written to -the Earls of Kent and Shrewsbury instructing them to carry out the -execution. This letter all the ten signed, and it was at once despatched -along with the warrant. They quite understood that Elizabeth would -disavow them. They saw that she wished to have a pretext for saying that -Mary had been put to death without her knowledge, and before she had -finally made up her mind. They were willing to furnish her with this -pretext. Of course there would be more or less of a storm to keep up the -make-believe. But ten privy councillors acting together could not well -be punished.</p> - -<p>On Thursday (February 9) the news of the execution arrived. Elizabeth -now learnt for the first time that the responsibility which she had -intended to fix on the two secretaries, one a nobody and the other no -favourite, had been shared by eight others of the Council, including<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_184" id="page_184"></a>{184}</span> -all its most important members. Storm at them she might and did, and all -the more furiously because they had combined for self-protection. But to -punish the whole ten was out of the question. Yet if no one were -punished, with what face could she tender her improbable explanation to -foreign courts? The unlucky Davison was singled out. He could be charged -with divulging what he had been ordered to keep secret and misleading -the others. He was tried before a Special Commission, fined 10,000 -marks, and imprisoned for some time in the Tower. The fine was rigidly -exacted, and it reduced him to poverty. Burghley, whose tool he had been -almost as much as Elizabeth’s, took pains to make his disgrace -permanent, because he wanted the secretaryship for his son, Robert -Cecil.</p> - -<p>The strange thing is, that Elizabeth not only expected her transparent -falsehoods to be formally accepted as satisfactory, but hoped that they -would be really believed. Her letter to James was an insult to his -understanding. “I would you knew (though not felt) the extreme dolour -that overwhelms my mind, for that miserable accident which (far contrary -to my meaning) hath befallen.... I beseech you that as God and many more -know how innocent I am in this case, so you will believe me that if I -had bid [bidden] ought I would have bid [abided] by it.... Thus assuring -yourself of me that as I know this [the execution] was deserved, yet if -I had meant it I would never lay it on others’ shoulders, no more will I -not damnify myself that thought it not.”</p> - -<p>Little as James cared what became of his mother,<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_185" id="page_185"></a>{185}</span> it was impossible that -he should not feel humiliated when he was expected to swallow such a -pill as this—and ungilded too. He had no intention of going to war with -the country of which he might now at any moment become the legitimate -King. But to let Elizabeth see that unless he was paid he could be -disagreeable, he winked at raids across the border and coquetted with -the faction who were inviting Philip to send a Spanish army to Scotland. -It was but a passing display of temper. The end of the year (1587) saw -him again drawing close to Elizabeth, and she was able to give her -undivided attention to the coming Armada.</p> - -<p>It cannot be seriously maintained that because Mary was not an English -subject she could not be lawfully tried and punished for crimes -committed in England. Those, if any there now be, who adopt her own -contention that, being an anointed Queen, she was not amenable to any -earthly tribunal, but to God alone, are beyond the reach of earthly -argument. The English government had a right to detain her as a -dangerous public enemy. She, on the other hand, had a right to resist -such restraint if she could, and she might have carried conspiracy very -far without incurring our blame. But for good reasons we draw a line at -conspiracy to murder. No government ever did or will let it pass -unpunished. If Napoleon at St. Helena had engaged in conspiracies for -seizing the island, no one could have blamed him, even though they might -have involved bloodshed. But if he had been convicted of plotting the -assassination of Sir Hudson Lowe, he would assuredly have been hanged.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_186" id="page_186"></a>{186}</span></p> - -<p>That the execution was a wise and opportune stroke of policy can hardly -be disputed. It broke up the Catholic party in England at the moment -when their disaffection was about to be tempted by the appearance of the -Armada. There had been a time when they had hopes of James. But he was -now known to be a stiff Protestant. Only the small Jesuitical faction -was prepared to accept Philip either as an heir of John of Gaunt or as -Mary’s legatee. There was no other Catholic with a shadow of a claim. -The bulk of the party therefore ceased to look forward to a restoration -of the old religion, and rallied to the cause of national independence.</p> - -<hr style="width: 25%;" /> - -<div class="blockquot"><p class="c"><i>NOTE ON PAULET’S ALLEGED REFUSAL TO MURDER MARY.</i></p> - -<p>I have not alluded in the text to the story, generally repeated by -historians, that Elizabeth urged Paulet and Drury to murder Mary -privately. There is no doubt that, after the signature of the -warrant, Walsingham and Davison, by Elizabeth’s direction, urged -Paulet and Drury to put Mary to death, and that they refused. But -was it a private murder that was meant or a public execution -without delivery of the warrant? There is nothing in any of -Davison’s statements inconsistent with the latter and far more -probable explanation. The blacker charge is founded solely on the -two letters which are generally accepted as being those which -passed between the secretaries and Paulet, but which may be -confidently set down as impudent forgeries. They were first given -to the world in 1722 by Dr. George Mackenzie, a violent Marian, who -says that <i>a copy</i> of them was sent him by Mr. Urry of Christ -Church, Oxford, and that they had been found among Paulet’s papers. -Two years later they were printed by Hearne, an Oxford Jacobite and -Nonjuror, who says he got them from <i>a copy</i> furnished him by a -friend unnamed (Urry?), who told him he had <i>copied</i> them in 1717 -from a <small>MS.</small> letter-book of<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_187" id="page_187"></a>{187}</span> Paulet’s. There is also a <small>MS.</small> <i>copy</i> in -the Harleian collection, which contains erasures and -emendations—an extraordinary thing in a copy. It is said to be in -the handwriting of the Earl of Oxford himself. There is nothing to -show whence he copied it.</p> - -<p>No one has ever seen the originals of these letters. Neither has -any one, except Hearne’s unnamed friend, seen the “letter-book” -into which Paulet is supposed to have copied them. Where had this -“letter-book” been before 1717? Where was it in 1717? What became -of it after 1717? To none of these questions is there any answer. -The most rational conclusion is that the “letter-book” never -existed, and that the letters were fabricated in the reign of -George <small>I.</small> by some Oxford Jacobite, who thought it easier and more -prudent to circulate <i>copies</i> than to attempt an imitation of -Paulet’s well-known handwriting, with all the other difficulties -involved in forging a manuscript.</p> - -<p>But it may be said, Do not the letters fit in with Davison’s -narrative? Of course they do. It was for the very purpose of -putting an odious meaning on that narrative that they were -fabricated. It was known that letters about putting Mary to death -had passed. The real letters had never been seen, and had doubtless -been destroyed. Here therefore was a fine opportunity for -manufacturing spurious ones.</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="page_188" id="page_188"></a>{188}</span></p> - -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_X" id="CHAPTER_X"></a>CHAPTER X<br /><br /> -<small>WAR WITH SPAIN: 1587-1603</small></h2> - -<p class="nind">E<small>LIZABETH</small> is not seen at her best in war. She did not easily resign -herself to its sacrifices. It frightened her to see the money which she -had painfully put together, pound by pound, during so many years, by -many a small economy, draining out at the rate of £17,000 a month into -the bottomless pit of military expenditure. When Leicester came back she -simply stopped all remittances to the Netherlands, making sure that if -she did not feed her soldiers some one else would have to do it. She saw -that Parma was not pressing forward. And though rumours of the enormous -preparations in Spain, which accounted for his inactivity, continued to -pour in, she still hoped that her intervention in the Netherlands was -bending Philip to concessions. All this time Parma was steadily carrying -out his master’s plans for the invasion. His little army was to be -trebled in the autumn by reinforcements principally from Italy. In the -meantime he was collecting a flotilla of flat-bottomed boats. As soon as -the Armada should appear they were to make the passage under its -protection.</p> - -<p>It would answer no useful purpose, even if my limits permitted it, to -enter into the particulars of Elizabeth<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_189" id="page_189"></a>{189}</span>’s policy towards the United -Provinces during the twelve months that preceded the appearance of the -Armada. Her proceedings were often tortuous, and by setting them forth -in minute detail her detractors have not found it difficult to represent -them as treacherous. But, living three centuries later, what have we to -consider but the general scope and drift of her policy? Looking at it as -a whole we shall find that, whether we approve of it or not, it was -simple, consistent, and undisguised. She had no intention of abandoning -the Provinces to Philip, still less of betraying them. But she did wish -them to return to their allegiance, if she could procure for them proper -guarantees for such liberties as they had been satisfied with before -Philip’s tyranny began. If Philip had been wise he would have made those -concessions. Elizabeth is not to be over-much blamed if she clung too -long to the belief that he could be persuaded or compelled to do what -was so much for his own interest. If she was deceived so was Burghley. -Walsingham is entitled to the credit of having from first to last -refused to believe that the negotiations were anything but a blind.</p> - -<p>Though Elizabeth desired peace, she did not cease to deal blows at -Philip. In the spring of 1587 (April-June), while she was most earnestly -pushing her negotiations with Parma, she despatched Drake on a new -expedition to the Spanish coast. He forced his way into the harbours of -Cadiz and Corunna, destroyed many ships and immense stores, and came -back loaded with plunder. The Armada had not been crippled, for most of -the ships that were to compose it were lying in the Tagus. But the -concentration had been<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_190" id="page_190"></a>{190}</span> delayed. Fresh stores had to be collected. Drake -calculated, and as it proved rightly, that another season at least would -be consumed in repairing the loss, and that England, for that summer and -autumn, could rest secure of invasion.</p> - -<p>The delay was most unwelcome to Philip. The expense of keeping such a -fleet and army on foot through the winter would be enormous. Spain was -maintaining not only the Armada but the army of Parma; for the resources -of the Netherlands, which had been the true El Dorado of the Spanish -monarchy, were completely dried up. So impatient was Philip—usually the -slowest of men—that he proposed to despatch the Armada even in -September, and actually wrote to Parma that he might expect it at any -moment. But, as Drake had calculated, September was gone before -everything was ready. The naval experts protested against the rashness -of facing the autumnal gales, with no friendly harbour on either side of -the Channel in which to take refuge. Philip then made the absurd -suggestion that the army from the Netherlands should cross by itself in -its flat-bottomed boats. But Parma told him that it was absolutely out -of the question. Four English ships could sink the whole flotilla. In -the meantime his soldiers, waiting on the Dunkirk Downs and exposed to -the severities of the weather, were dying off like flies. Philip and -Elizabeth resembled one another in this, that neither of them had any -personal experience of war either by land or sea. For a Queen this was -natural. For a King it was unnatural, and for an ambitious King -unprecedented. They did not understand the proper adaptation<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_191" id="page_191"></a>{191}</span> of means -to ends. Yet it was necessary to obtain their sanction before anything -could be done. Hence there was much mismanagement on both sides. Still -England was in no real danger during the summer and autumn of 1587, -because Philip’s preparations were not completed; and before the end of -the year the English fleet was lying in the Channel. But the Queen -grudged the expense of keeping the crews up to their full complement. -The supply of provisions and ammunition was also very inadequate. The -expensiveness of war is generally a sufficient reason for not going to -war; but to attempt to do war cheaply is always unwise. “Sparing and -war,” as Effingham observed, “have no affinity together.”</p> - -<p>Drake strongly urged that, instead of trying to guard the Channel, the -English fleet should make for the coast of Spain, and boldly assail the -Armada as soon as it put to sea. This was the advice of a man who had -all the shining qualities of Nelson, and seems to have been in no -respect his inferior. It was no counsel of desperation. He was confident -of success. Lord Howard of Effingham, the Admiral, was of the same -opinion. The negotiations were odious to him. For Burghley, who clings -to them, he has no more reverence than Hamlet had for Polonius. “Since -England was England,” he writes to Walsingham, “there was never such a -stratagem and mask to deceive her as this treaty of peace. I pray God -that we do not curse for this a long grey beard with a white head -witless, that will make all the world think us heartless. You know whom -I mean.”</p> - -<p>With the hopes and fears of these sea-heroes, it is<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_192" id="page_192"></a>{192}</span> instructive to -compare the forecast of the great soldier who was to conduct the -invasion. Always obedient and devoted to his sovereign, Parma played his -part in the deceptive negotiations with consummate skill. But his own -opinion was that it would be wise to negotiate in good faith and accept -the English terms. Though prepared to undertake the invasion, he took a -very serious view of the risks to be encountered. He tells Philip that -the English preparations are formidable both by land and sea. Even if -the passage should be safely accomplished, disembarkation would be -difficult. His army, reduced by the hardships of the winter from 30,000 -men, which he had estimated as the proper number, to less than 17,000, -was dangerously small for the work expected of it. He would have to -fight battle after battle, and the further he advanced the weaker would -his army become both from losses and from the necessity of protecting -his communications.</p> - -<p>Parma had carefully informed himself of the preparations in England. -From the beginning of Elizabeth’s reign, attention had been paid to the -organisation, training, and equipment of the militia, and especially -since the relations with Spain had become more hostile. On paper it -seems to have amounted to 117,000 men. Mobilisation was a local -business. Sir John Norris drew up the plan of defence. Beacon fires did -the work of the telegraph. Every man knew whither he was to repair when -their blaze should be seen. The districts to be abandoned, the positions -to be defended, the bridges to be broken, were all marked out. Three -armies, calculated to<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_193" id="page_193"></a>{193}</span> amount in the aggregate to 73,000 men, were -ordered to assemble in July. Whether so many were actually mustered is -doubtful. But Parma would certainly have found himself confronted by -forces vastly superior in numbers to his own, and would have had, as he -said, to fight battle after battle. The bow had not been entirely -abandoned, but the greater part of the archers—two-thirds in some -counties—had lately been armed with calivers. What was wanting in -discipline would have been to some extent made up by the spontaneous -cohesion of a force organised under its natural leaders, the nobles and -gentry of each locality, not a few of whom had seen service abroad. But, -after all, the greatest element of strength was the free spirit of the -people. England was, and had long been, a nation of freemen. There were -a few peers, and a great many knights and gentlemen. But there was no -noble caste, as on the Continent, separated by an impassable barrier of -birth and privilege from the mass of the people. All felt themselves -fellow-countrymen bound together by common sentiments, common interests, -and mutual respect.</p> - -<p>This spirit of freedom—one might almost say of equality—made itself -felt still more in the navy, and goes far to account for the cheerful -energy and dash with which every service was performed. “The English -officers lived on terms of sympathy with their men unknown to the -Spaniards, who raised between the commander and the commanded absurd -barriers of rank and blood which forbade to his pride any labour but -that of fighting. Drake touched the true mainspring of English success -when he once (in his<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_194" id="page_194"></a>{194}</span> voyage round the world) indignantly rebuked some -coxcomb gentlemen-adventurers with, ‘I should like to see the gentleman -that will refuse to set his hand to a rope. I must have the gentlemen to -hale and draw with the mariners.’ ”<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> Drake, Hawkins, Frobisher were -all born of humble parents. They rose by their own valour and capacity. -They had gentlemen of birth serving under them. To Howard and Cumberland -and Seymour they were brothers-in-arms. The master of every little -trading vessel was fired by their example, and hoped to climb as high.</p> - -<p>It is the pleasure of some writers to speak of Elizabeth’s naval -preparations as disgracefully insufficient, and to treat the triumphant -result as a sort of miracle. To their apprehension, indeed, her whole -reign is one long interference by Providence with the ordinary relations -of cause and effect. The number of royal ships as compared with those of -private owners in the fleet which met the great Armada—34 to 161—is -represented as discreditably small. By Englishmen of that day, it was -considered to be creditably large. Sir Edward Coke (who was thirty-eight -at the time of the Armada), writing under Charles <small>I.</small>, when the royal -navy was much larger, says: “In the reign of Queen Elizabeth (I being -then acquainted with this business) there were thirty-three [royal -ships] besides pinnaces, which so guarded and regarded the navigation of -the merchants, as they had safe vent for their commodities, and trade -and traffic flourished.”<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p> - -<p>It seems to be overlooked that the royal navy,<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_195" id="page_195"></a>{195}</span> such as it was, was -almost the creation of Elizabeth. Her father was the first English king -who made any attempt to keep a standing navy of his own. He established -the Admiralty and the first royal dockyard. Under Edward and Mary the -navy, like everything else, went to ruin. Elizabeth’s ship-building, -humble as it seems to us, excited the admiration of her subjects, and -was regarded as one of the chief advances of her reign. The ships, when -not in commission, were kept in the Medway. The Queen personally paid -the greatest attention to them. They were always kept in excellent -condition, and could be fitted out for sea at very short notice. Economy -was enforced in this, as in other departments, but not at the expense of -efficiency. The wages of officers and men were very much augmented; but -in the short periods for which crews were enlisted, and in the -victualling, there seems to have been unwise parsimony in 1588. The -grumbling of alarmists about unpreparedness, apathy, stinginess, and -red-tape was precisely what it is in our own day. We know that some -allowance is to be made for it.</p> - -<p>The movements of the Armada were perfectly well known in England, and -all the dispositions to meet it at sea were completed in a leisurely -manner. Conferences were still going on at Ostend between English and -Spanish commissioners. On the part of Elizabeth there was sincerity, but -not blind credulity nor any disposition to make unworthy concessions. -Conferences quite as protracted have often been held between -belligerents while hostilities were being actively carried on. The large -majority of Englishmen were resolved to<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_196" id="page_196"></a>{196}</span> fight to the death against any -invader. But, as against Spain, there was not that eager pugnacity which -a war with France always called forth, except, perhaps, among the -sea-rovers; and even they would have contented themselves, if it had -been possible, with the unrecognised privateering which had so long -given them the profits of war with the immunities of peace. The rest of -the nation respected their Queen for her persevering endeavour to find a -way of reconciliation with an ancient ally, and to limit, in the -meantime, the area of hostilities. They were confident, and with good -reason, that she would surrender no important interest, and that -aggressive designs would be met, as they had always been met, more than -half-way.</p> - -<p>The story of the great victory is too well known to need repetition -here. But some comments are necessary. It is usual, for one reason or -other, to exaggerate the disparity of the opposing fleets, and to -represent England as only saved from impending ruin by the extraordinary -daring of her seamen, and a series of fortunate accidents. The final -destruction of the Armada, after the pursuit was over, was certainly the -work of wind and sea. But if we fairly weigh the available strength on -each side, we shall see that the English commanders might from the first -feel, as they did feel, a reasonable assurance of defeating the -invaders.</p> - -<p>Let us first compare the strength of the fleets:</p> - -<table border="0" cellpadding="1" cellspacing="2" summary=""> -<tr><td><span class="smcap">English</span>.</td> -<td align="center"><i>Ships.</i></td> -<td align="center"><i>Tonnage.</i></td> -<td align="center"><i>Guns.</i></td> -<td align="center"><i>Mariners.</i></td></tr> -<tr><td> Royal</td><td align="right">34</td><td align="right">11850</td><td align="center">837</td><td align="right">6279</td></tr> -<tr><td> Private</td><td align="right">163</td><td align="right">17894</td><td align="center">not stated</td><td align="right">9506</td></tr> -<tr><td> </td><td align="right" class="bt">197</td><td align="right" class="bt">29744</td><td align="right" class="bt"> </td><td align="right" class="bt">15785</td></tr> -<tr><td><span class="smcap">Spanish</span>.</td><td align="right" class="btb">132</td> -<td align="right" class="btb">59120</td> -<td align="center" class="btb">3165</td> -<td align="right" class="btb">8766</td></tr> -</table> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="page_197" id="page_197"></a>{197}</span></p> - -<p>The Armada carried besides 21,855 soldiers.<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> The first thing that -strikes us is the immense preponderance in tonnage on the part of the -Spaniards, and in sailors on the part of the English. This really goes -far to explain the result. Nothing is more certain than that the Spanish -ships, notwithstanding their superior size, were for fighting and -sailing purposes very inferior to the English. It had always been -believed that, to withstand the heavy seas of the Atlantic, a ship -should be constructed like a lofty fortress. The English builders were -introducing lower and longer hulls and a greater spread of canvas. Their -crews, as has always been the case in our navy, were equally handy as -sailors and gunners. The Spanish ships were under-manned. The soldiers -were not accustomed to work the guns, and were of no use unless it came -to boarding, which Howard ordered his captains to avoid. The English -guns, if fewer than the Spanish, were heavier and worked by more -practised men.<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> Their balls not only cut up the rigging of the -Spaniards but tore their hulls (which were supposed to be cannon-proof), -while the English ships were hardly touched. The slaughter among the -wretched soldiers crowded between decks was terrible. Blood was seen -pouring out of the lee-scuppers. “The English ships,” says a Spanish -officer, “were under such good management that they did with them what -they pleased.” The work was done almost entirely by the Queen’s ships. -“If you had<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_198" id="page_198"></a>{198}</span> seen,” says Sir William Winter, “the simple service done by -the merchants and coast ships, you would have said we had been little -helped by them, otherwise than that they did make a show.”</p> - -<p>The principal and final battle was fought off Gravelines (July 29/Aug. -8). The Armada therefore did arrive at its destination, but only to show -that the general plan of the invasion was an impracticable one. The -superiority in tonnage and number of guns on the morning of that day, -though not what it had been when the fighting began a week before, was -still immense, if superiority in those particulars had been of any use. -But with this battle the plan of Philip was finally shattered. So far -from being in a condition to cover Parma’s passage, the Spanish admiral -was glad to escape as best he could from the English pursuit.</p> - -<p>During the eight days’ fight, be it observed, the Armada had experienced -no unfavourable weather or other stroke of ill-fortune. The wind had -been mostly in the west, and not tempestuous. After the last battle, -when the crippled Spanish ships were drifting upon the Dutch shoals, it -opportunely shifted, and enabled them to escape into the North Sea.</p> - -<p>It would not be easy to find any great naval engagement in which the -victors suffered so little. In the last battle, when they came to close -quarters, they had about sixty killed. During the first seven days their -loss seems to have been almost <i>nil</i>. One vessel only—not belonging to -the Queen—became entangled among the enemy, and succumbed. Except the -master of this vessel not one of the captains was killed from first to -last. Many men of rank were serving in the fleet. It<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_199" id="page_199"></a>{199}</span> is not mentioned -that one of them was so much as wounded.</p> - -<p>Looking at all these facts, we can surely come to only one conclusion. -Philip’s plan was hopeless from the first. Barring accidents, the -English were bound to win. On no other occasion in our history was our -country so well prepared to meet her enemies. Never was her safety from -invasion so amply guaranteed. The defeat of the Great Armada was the -deserved and crowning triumph of thirty years of good government at home -and wise policy abroad; of careful provision for defence and sober -abstinence from adventure and aggression.</p> - -<p>Of the land preparations it is impossible to speak with equal -confidence, as they were never put to the test. If the Spaniards had -landed, Leicester’s militia would no doubt have experienced a bloody -defeat. London might have been taken and plundered. But Parma himself -never expected to become master of the country without the aid of a -great Catholic rising. This, we may affirm with confidence, would not -have taken place on even the smallest scale. Overwhelming forces would -soon have gathered round the Spaniards. They would probably have retired -to the coast, and there fortified some place from which it would have -been difficult to dislodge them as long as they retained the command of -the sea.</p> - -<p>Such seems to have been the utmost success which, in the most favourable -event, could have attended the invasion. A great disaster, no doubt, for -England, and one for which Elizabeth would have been judged by history -with more severity than justice; for Englishmen<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_200" id="page_200"></a>{200}</span> have always chosen to -risk it, down to our own time.<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> No government which insisted on -making adequate provision for the military defence of the country would -have been tolerated then, or, to all appearance, would be tolerated now. -We have always trusted to our navy. It were to be wished that our naval -superiority were as assured now as when we defeated the Armada.</p> - -<p>The arrangements for feeding the soldiers and sailors were very -defective. A praiseworthy system of control had been introduced to check -waste and peculation in time of peace. Of course it did not easily adapt -itself to the exigencies of war. Military operations are sure to suffer -where a certain, or rather uncertain, amount of waste and peculation is -not risked. We have not forgotten the “horrible and heart-rending” -sufferings of our army in the Crimea, which, like those of Elizabeth’s -fleet, had to be relieved by private effort. In the sixteenth century -the lot of the soldier and sailor everywhere was want and disease, -varied at intervals by plunder and excess. Philip’s soldiers and sailors -were worse off than Elizabeth’s, though he grudged no money for purposes -of war.</p> - -<p>Those who profess to be scandalised by the appointment of Leicester to -the command of the army should point out what fitter choice could have -been made. He was the only great nobleman with any military experience; -and to suppose that any one<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_201" id="page_201"></a>{201}</span> but a great nobleman could have been -appointed to such a command is to show a profound ignorance of the ideas -of the time. He had Sir John Norris, a really able soldier, as his -marshal of the camp. After all, no one has alleged that he did not do -his duty with energy and intelligence. The story that the Queen thought -of making him her “Lieutenant in the government of England and Ireland,” -but was dissuaded from it by Burghley and Hatton, rests on no authority -but that of Camden, who is fond of repeating spiteful gossip about -Leicester. No sensible person will believe that she meant to create a -sort of Grand Vizier. She may have thought of making him what we should -call “Commander-in-Chief.” There would be much to say for such a -concentration of authority while the kingdom was threatened with -invasion. The title of “Lieutenant” was a purely military one, and began -to be applied under the Tudors to the commanders of the militia in each -county. Leicester’s title for the time was “Lieutenant and -Captain-General of the Queen’s armies and companies.” But we find him -complaining to Walsingham that the patent of Hunsdon, the commander of -the Midland army, gave him independent powers. “I shall have wrong if he -absolutely command where my patent doth give me power. You may easily -conceive what absurd dealings are likely to fall out if you allow two -absolute commanders” (28 July). Camden’s story is probably a confused -echo of this dispute.</p> - -<p>Writers who are loth to admit that the trust, the gratitude, the -enthusiastic loyalty which Elizabeth inspired were the first and most -important cause of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_202" id="page_202"></a>{202}</span> great victory, have sought to belittle the -grandest moment of her life by pointing out that the famous speech at -Tilbury was made <i>after</i> the battle of Gravelines. But the dispersal of -the Armada by the storm of August 5th was not yet known in England. -Drake, writing on the 8th and 10th, thinks that it is gone to Denmark to -refit, and begs the Queen not to diminish any of her forces. The -occasion of the speech on the 10th seems to have been the arrival of a -post on that day, while the Queen was at dinner in Leicester’s tent, -with a false alarm that Parma had embarked all his forces, and might be -expected in England immediately.<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a></p> - -<p>But the Lieutenant-General had reached the end of his career. Three -weeks after the Tilbury review he died of “a continued fever,” at the -age of fifty-six. He kept Elizabeth’s regard to the last, because she -believed—and during the latter part of his life, not wrongly—in his -fidelity and devotion. There is no sign that she at any time valued his -judgment or suffered him to sway her policy, except so far as he was the -mouthpiece of abler advisers; nor did she ever allow his enmities, -violent as they were, to prejudice her against any of her other -servants. His fortune was no doubt much above his deserts, and he has -paid the usual penalty. There are few personages in history about whom -so much malicious nonsense has been written.</p> - -<p>We cannot help looking on England as placed in a quite new position by -the defeat of the Armada—a<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_203" id="page_203"></a>{203}</span> position of security and independence. In -truth, what was changed was not so much the relative strength of England -and Spain as the opinion of it held by Englishmen and Spaniards, and -indeed by all Europe. The loss to Philip in mere ships, men, and -treasure was no doubt considerable. But his inability to conquer England -was demonstrated rather than caused by the destruction of the Armada. -Philip himself talked loftily about “placing another fleet upon the -seas.” But his subjects began to see that defence, not conquest, was now -their business—and had been for some time if they had only known it:</p> - -<div class="poetry"> -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<span class="i0">Cervi, luporum præda rapacium,<br /></span> -<span class="i2">Sectamur ultro quos opimus<br /></span> -<span class="i3">Fallere et effugere est triumphus.<br /></span> -</div></div> -</div> - -<p class="nind">Elizabeth’s attitude to Philip underwent a marked change. Till then she -had been unwilling to abandon the hope of a peaceful settlement. She had -dealt him not a few stinging blows, but always with a certain restraint -and forbearance, because they were meant for the purpose of bringing him -to reason. Thirty years of patience on his part had led her to believe -that he would never carry retaliation beyond assassination plots. At -last, in his slow way, he had gathered up all his strength and essayed -to crush her. Thenceforward she was a convert to Drake’s doctrine that -attack was the surest way of defence. She had still good reasons for -devolving this work as much as possible on the private enterprise of her -subjects. The burden fell on those who asked nothing better than to be -allowed to bear it. Thus arose that system, or rather practice, of -leaving national work to be<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_204" id="page_204"></a>{204}</span> executed by private enterprise, which has -had so much to do with the building up of the British Empire. Private -gain has been the mainspring of action. National defence and -aggrandisement have been almost incidental results. With Elizabeth -herself national and private aims could not be dissevered. The nation -and she had but one purse. She was cheaply defending England, and she -shared in the plunder.</p> - -<p>The favourite cruising-ground of the English adventurers was off the -Azores, where the Spanish treasure fleets always halted for fresh water -and provisions, on their way to Europe. Some of these expeditions were -on a large scale. But they were not so successful or profitable, in -proportion to their size, as the smaller ventures of Drake and Hawkins -earlier in the reign. The Spaniards were everywhere on the alert. The -harbours of the New World, which formerly lay in careless security, were -put into a state of defence. Treasure fleets made their voyages with -more caution. “Not a grain of gold, silver, or pearl, but what must be -got through the fire.” The day of great prizes was gone by.</p> - -<p>Two of these expeditions are distinguished by their importance. The -first was a joint-stock venture of Drake and Norris—the foremost sailor -and the foremost soldier among Englishmen of that day—in the year after -the great Armada (April 1589). They and some private backers found most -of the capital. The Queen contributed six royal ships and £20,000. This -fleet carried no less than 11,000 soldiers, for the aim was to wrest -Portugal from the Spaniard and set up Don Antonio, a representative of -the dethroned dynasty.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_205" id="page_205"></a>{205}</span> Stopping on their way at Corunna, they took the -lower town, destroyed large stores, and defeated in the field a much -superior force marching to the relief of the place. Norris mined and -breached the walls of the upper town; but the storming parties having -been repulsed with great loss, the army re-embarked and pursued its -voyage. Landing at Peniché, Norris marched fifty miles by Vimiero and -Torres Vedras, names famous afterwards in the military annals of -England, and on the seventh day arrived before Lisbon. But he had no -battering train; for Drake, who had brought the fleet round to the mouth -of the Tagus, judged it dangerous to enter the river. Nor did the -Portuguese rise, as had been hoped. The army therefore, marching through -the suburbs of Lisbon, rejoined the fleet at Cascaes, and proceeded to -Vigo. That town was burnt, and the surrounding country plundered. This -was the last exploit of the expedition. Great loss and dishonour had -been inflicted on Spain; but no less than half of the soldiers and -sailors had perished by disease; and the booty, though said to have been -large, was a disappointment to the survivors.</p> - -<p>The other great expedition was in 1596. The capture of Calais in April -of that year by the Spaniards, had renewed the alarm of invasion, and it -was determined to meet the danger at a distance from home. A great -fleet, with 6000 soldiers on board, commanded by Essex and Howard of -Effingham sailed straight to Cadiz, the principal port and arsenal of -Spain. The harbour was forced by the fleet, the town and castle stormed -by the army, several men-of-war taken or destroyed, a large -merchant-fleet burnt, together with<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_206" id="page_206"></a>{206}</span> an immense quantity of stores and -merchandise; the total value being estimated at twenty millions of -ducats. This was by far the heaviest blow inflicted by England upon -Spain during the reign, and was so regarded in Europe; for though the -great Armada had been signally defeated by the English fleet, its -subsequent destruction was due to the winds and waves. Essex was -vehemently desirous to hold Cadiz; but Effingham and the Council of War -appointed by the Queen would not hear of it. The expedition accordingly -returned home, having effectually relieved England from the fear of -invasion. The burning of Penzance by four Spanish galleys (1595) was not -much to set against these great successes.</p> - -<p>One reason for the comparative impunity with which the English assailed -the unwieldy empire of Philip was the insane pursuit of the French -crown, to which he devoted all his resources after the murder of Henry -<small>III.</small> In 1598, with one foot in the grave, and no longer able to conceal -from himself that, with the exception of the conquest of Portugal, all -the ambitious schemes of his life had failed, he was fain to conclude -the peace of Vervins with Henry <small>IV.</small> Henry was ready to insist that -England and the United Provinces should be comprehended in the treaty. -Philip offered terms which Elizabeth would have welcomed ten years -earlier. He proposed that the whole of the Low Countries should be -constituted a separate sovereignty under his son-in-law the Archduke -Albert. The Dutch, who were prospering in war as well as in trade, -scouted the offer. English feeling was divided. There was a war-party -headed by Essex and Raleigh, personally bitter enemies,<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_207" id="page_207"></a>{207}</span> but both -athirst for glory, conquest, and empire, believing in no right but that -of the strongest, greedy for wealth, and disdaining the slower, more -laborious, and more legitimate modes of acquiring it. They were tired of -campaigning it in France and the Low Countries, where hard knocks and -beggarly plunder were all that a soldier had to look to. They proposed -to carry a great English army across the Atlantic, to occupy permanently -the isthmus of Panama, and from that central position to wrestle with -the Spaniard for the trade and plunder of the New World. The peace party -held that these ambitious schemes would bring no profit except possibly -to a few individuals; that the treasury would be exhausted and the -country irritated by taxation and the pressing of soldiers; that to -re-establish the old commercial intercourse with Spain would be more -reputable and attended with more solid advantage to the nation at large; -and finally, that the English arms would be much better employed in a -thorough conquest of Ireland. These were the views of Burghley; and they -were strongly supported by Buckhurst, the best of the younger statesmen -who now surrounded Elizabeth.</p> - -<p>Elizabeth always encouraged her ministers to speak their minds; but, as -Buckhurst said on this occasion, “when they have done their extreme duty -she wills what she wills.” She determined to maintain the treaty of 1585 -with the Dutch; but she took the opportunity of getting it amended in -such a way as to throw upon them a larger share of the expenses of the -war, and to provide more definitely for the ultimate repayment of her -advances.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_208" id="page_208"></a>{208}</span></p> - -<p>We have seen that three years before the Armada Elizabeth had lost the -French alliance, which had till then been the key-stone of her policy. -Since then, though aware that Henry <small>III.</small> wished her well, and that he -would thwart the Spanish faction as much as he dared, she had not been -able to count on him. He might at any moment be pushed by Guise into an -attack on England, either with or without the concurrence of Spain. The -accession, therefore, of Henry <small>IV.</small> afforded her great relief. In him she -had a sure ally. It is true that, like her other allies the Dutch, he -was more in a condition to require help than to afford it. But the more -work she provided for Philip in Holland or France, the safer England -would be. The armies of the Holy League might be formidable to Henry; -but as long as he could hold them at bay they were not dangerous to -England. She had never quite got over her scruple about helping the -Dutch against their lawful sovereign. But Henry <small>IV.</small> was the legitimate -King of France, and she could heartily aid him to put down his rebels. -From 2000 to 5000 English troops were therefore constantly serving in -France down to the peace of Vervins.</p> - -<p>Philip, in defiance of the Salic law, claimed the crown of France for -his daughter in right of her mother, who was a sister of Henry <small>III.</small> To -Brittany he alleged that she had a special claim, as being descended -from Anne of Brittany, which the Bourbons were not. Brittany, therefore, -he invaded at once by sea. Elizabeth, alarmed by the proximity of this -Spanish force, desired that her troops in France should be employed in -expelling it, and that they should be vigorously supported<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_209" id="page_209"></a>{209}</span> by Henry <small>IV.</small> -Henry, on the other hand, was always drawing away the English to serve -his more pressing needs in other parts of France. This brought upon him -many harsh rebukes and threats from the English Queen. But she had, for -the first time, met her match. He judged, and rightly, that she would -not desert him. So, with oft-repeated apologies, light promises, and -well-turned compliments, he just went on doing what suited him best, -getting all the fighting he could out of the English, and airily eluding -Elizabeth’s repeated demands for some coast town, which could be held, -like Brill and Flushing, as a security for her heavy subsidies.</p> - -<p>When Henry was reconciled to the Catholic Church, Elizabeth went through -the form of expressing surprise and regret at a step which she must have -long expected, and must have felt to be wise (1593). Her alliance with -Henry was not shaken. It was drawn even closer by a new treaty, each -sovereign engaging not to make peace without the consent of the other. -This engagement did not prevent Henry from concluding the separate peace -of Vervins five years later, when he judged that his interest required -it (1598). Elizabeth’s dissatisfaction was, this time, genuine enough. -But Henry was no longer her protégé, a homeless, landless, penniless -king, depending on English subsidies, roaming over the realm he called -his own with a few thousands, or sometimes hundreds, of undisciplined -cavaliers, who gathered and dispersed at their own pleasure. He was -master of a re-united France, and could no longer be either patronised -or threatened. Elizabeth might expostulate, and declare that “if there -was such a sin as that against the Holy<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_210" id="page_210"></a>{210}</span> Ghost it must needs be -ingratitude:” gratitude was a sentiment to which she was as much a -stranger as Henry. The only difference between them was the national -one: the Englishwoman preached; the Frenchman mocked. What made her so -sore was that he had, so to speak, stolen her policy from her. His -predecessor had always suspected her—and with good reason—of intending -“to draw her neck out of the collar” if once she could induce him to -undertake a joint war. The joint war had at length been undertaken by -Henry <small>IV.</small>, and it was he who had managed to slip out of it first, while -Elizabeth, who longed for peace, was obliged to stand by the Dutch.</p> - -<p>The two sovereigns, however, knew their own interests too well to -quarrel. Henry gave Elizabeth to understand that his designs against -Spain had undergone no change; he was only halting for breath; he would -help the Dutch underhand—just what she used to say to Henry <small>III.</small> She -had now to deal with a French King as sagacious as herself, and a great -deal more prompt and vigorous in action; not the man to be made a -cat’s-paw by any one. She had to accept him as a partner, if not on her -own terms, then on his. Both sovereigns were thoroughly veracious—in -Carlyle’s sense of the word. That is to say, their policy was determined -not by passion, or vanity, or sentiment of any kind, but by enlightened -self-interest, and was therefore calculable by those who knew how to -calculate.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_211" id="page_211"></a>{211}</span></p> - -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XI" id="CHAPTER_XI"></a>CHAPTER XI<br /><br /> -<small>DOMESTIC AFFAIRS: 1588-1601</small></h2> - -<p class="nind">I<small>T</small> was a boast of Elizabeth that when once her servants were chosen she -did not lightly displace them. Difference of opinion from their -mistress, or from one another, did not involve resignation or dismissal, -because, though they were free to speak their minds, all had to carry -out with fidelity and even zeal, whatever policy the Queen prescribed. -This condition they accepted; not only the astute and compliant -Burghley, but the more eager and opinionated Walsingham; and therefore -they had practically a life-tenure of office. Soon after the Armada the -first generation of them began to disappear. Bacon, Sussex, and Bedford -were already gone. Leicester died in 1588; his brother Warwick, and -Mildmay in 1589; Walsingham and Randolph in 1591; Hatton in 1592; Grey -de Wilton in 1593; Knollys and Hunsdon in 1596. Of the trusty servants -with whom she began her reign, Burghley alone remained. The leading men -of the new generation were Robert Cecil, the Treasurer’s second son, -trained to business under his father’s eye, and of qualities similar, -though inferior; Nottingham<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_212" id="page_212"></a>{212}</span> (formerly Howard of Effingham), a -straightforward man of no great ability, but acceptable to the Queen for -his father’s services and his own (and not the less so for his fine -presence); the accomplished Buckhurst; the brilliant Raleigh; and, -younger than the rest, Essex. The last was the son of a man much -favoured by Elizabeth. Leicester was his step-father, Knollys his -grandfather, Hunsdon his great-uncle, Walsingham his father-in-law, -Burghley his guardian. Ardent, impulsive, presumptuous, a warm friend, a -rancorous enemy, profuse in expense, lawless in his amours, jealous of -his equals, brooking no superior, impatient of all rule or order that -delayed him from leaping at once to the highest place,—he was possessed -with a most exaggerated notion of his own capacity, which appears to -have been only moderate. As the ward of Burghley he had been much in the -company of his future enemy, Robert Cecil, whose sly prim ways were most -unlike his own. The contrast did him no harm with the public, to whom -the younger man was a Tom Jones and the elder a Blifil. Two vastly abler -men, Francis Bacon and Raleigh, less advantageously placed, but -unhampered with any scruples, were busily trying to profit by the -all-pervading animosity of Cecil and Essex.</p> - -<p>Belonging, as Essex did by his connections, to the inner circle who -stood closest to Elizabeth, it was natural that she should take an -interest in him, and give him opportunities for turning his showy -qualities to account. In 1586 he was sent to the Low Countries as -general of cavalry under his step-father, Leicester. He distinguished -himself by his fiery valour in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_213" id="page_213"></a>{213}</span> expeditions to Spain, and as -commander of the English army in France, though he does not seem to have -had any real military talent. But Elizabeth’s regard for him was soon -shaken by his presumptuous and unruly behaviour. When he fought a duel -with Sir Charles Blount because she had conferred some favour on the -latter, she swore “by God’s death it were fitting some one should take -him down and teach him better manners, or there were no rule with him.” -He displeased her by his quarrels with Cecil and Effingham, and his -discontented grumbling. She was highly dissatisfied with his management -of the Azores expedition in 1597. In July 1598, at a meeting of the -Council, she was provoked by his insolence to strike him; and though -after three months he obtained his pardon, he never regained her favour.</p> - -<p>It was at this time that Burghley died (August 4), in his seventy-eighth -year. Elizabeth, though she could call him “a froward old fool” about a -trifling matter (March 1596), could not but feel that much was changed -when she lost the able and faithful servant who had worked with her for -forty years. “She seemeth to take it very grievously, shedding of tears -and separating herself from all company.” Buckhurst was the new -Treasurer.</p> - -<p>Essex had for some time cast his eyes on Ireland as a field where glory -and power might be won. There can be little doubt that he was already -speculating on the advantage that the possession of an army might give -him in any difficulty with his rivals or with the Queen herself. Cecil -perfidiously advocated his appointment to a post which had been the -grave of so<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_214" id="page_214"></a>{214}</span> many reputations. The Queen at length consented, though -reluctantly. Essex was a popular favourite. He had managed—it is not -very clear how—to win the confidence of both Puritans and Papists. The -general belief was that, for the first time since she had mounted the -throne, Elizabeth was afraid of one of her subjects.</p> - -<p>During the whole of the reign Ireland had been a cause of trouble and -anxiety. Elizabeth’s treatment of that unhappy country was not more -creditable or successful than that of other English statesmen before and -after her. There was the same absence of any systematic policy steadily -carried out, the same wearisome and disreputable alternation between -bursts of savage repression and intervals of pusillanimity, concession, -and neglect. In the competition of the various departments of the public -service for attention and expenditure, Ireland generally came last. All -other needs had to be served first whether at home or abroad.</p> - -<p>In the early years of the reign the chief trouble lay in Ulster, then -the most purely Celtic part of Ireland, and practically untouched by -English conquest. Twice, in her weariness of the struggle with Shan -O’Neill, Elizabeth conceded to him something like a sub-kingship of -Ulster in return for his nominal submission. In the end he was beaten, -and his head was fixed on the walls of Dublin Castle (1566). But nothing -further was done to anglicise Ulster. During the attempt of the -Devonshire adventurers to colonise South Munster (1569-71), and the -consequent rebellion, the northern province remained an unconcerned<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_215" id="page_215"></a>{215}</span> -spectator. Nor did it join in the great Desmond rising (1579-83), which, -with the insurrection of the Catholic lords of the Pale and the landing -of the Pope’s Italians at Smerwick, was the Irish branch of the -threefold attack on Elizabeth directed by Gregory <small>XIII.</small> The attempt of -the elder Essex to colonise Antrim (1573-75) was a disastrous failure, -and Ulster still remained practically independent of the Dublin -Government.</p> - -<p>The most successful Deputy of the reign was Perrot (1584-87), a valiant -soldier and strict ruler, who, after long experience in the Irish wars, -had come to the conclusion that what Ireland most wanted was justice. -The native chiefs, released from the constant dread of spoliation, and -finding that English encroachment was repressed as inflexibly as Irish -disorder, became quiet and friendly. But this system did not suit the -dominant race. The Deputy was accused to the Queen of seeking to betray -the country to the Irish and the Spaniard. Recalled, and put upon his -trial for treason, he was found guilty on suborned evidence, and -sentenced to death. It is usually said that his real offence was some -disrespectful language about the Queen, which he confessed. But it seems -that she forbore to take his life precisely because she would not have -it thought that she was influenced by personal resentment.</p> - -<p>His successor, Fitzwilliam, was a Deputy of the old sort—greedy, -violent, careless of consequences, and always acting on the principle -that, as against an Englishman, a Celt had no rights. The execution of -MacMahon in Monaghan, and the confiscation of his<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_216" id="page_216"></a>{216}</span> lands on a trivial -pretext, alarmed the North. Ulster had not been bled white like the rest -of Ireland. The O’Neills had a nephew of their old hero Shan for their -chief, who had been brought up at the English Court and made Earl of -Tyrone by Elizabeth. An educated and remarkably able man, he had none of -his uncle’s illusions. He clung to his ancestral rights and dignity, but -he hoped to preserve them by zealously discharging his obligations as a -vassal of the Queen. He served in the war against Desmond, and exerted -himself to maintain order in Ulster. But he had no mind to sink into the -position of a mere dignified land-owner like the English nobles; nor -indeed, under such a Deputy as Fitzwilliam, was he likely to preserve -even his lands if he lost his power. Rather than that, he determined to -enter into what he knew was a most unequal struggle, on the off-chance -of pulling through by help from Spain. It is clear that he was driven -into rebellion against his inclination. But when he had once drawn the -sword he maintained the struggle against one Deputy after another with -wonderful tenacity and resource. For the first time in Irish history, -the rebel forces were disciplined and armed like those of the crown, and -stood up to them in equal numbers on equal terms. At length, in August -1598, Tyrone inflicted upon Sir Henry Bagnall near Armagh the severest -defeat that the English had ever suffered in Ireland; slaying 1500 of -his men, and capturing all his artillery and baggage. Insurrections at -once broke out all over Ireland.</p> - -<p>This was the situation with which Essex undertook to deal. He had loudly -blamed other Deputies for<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_217" id="page_217"></a>{217}</span> not vigorously attacking Tyrone in his own -country. Vigour was the one military quality which he himself possessed. -He went with the title of Lieutenant and Governor-General, and with -extraordinary powers, at the head of 21,000 men—such an army as had -never been sent to Ireland (April 1599). The Queen, who trembled at the -expense, and did not wish to see any of her nobles, least of all Essex, -permanently established in a great military command, enjoined him to -push at once into Ulster, as he had himself proposed, and finish the -war. Instead of doing this, he went south into districts that had been -depopulated and desolated by the savage warfare of the last thirty -years. Even here he met with discreditable reverses. When he got back to -Dublin (July) his army was reduced by disease and desertion to less than -5000 men. Disregarding the Queen’s express prohibition, he made his -friend Southampton General of horse. When she censured his bad -management, he replied with impertinent complaints about the favour she -was showing to Cecil, Raleigh, and Cobham, and began to consult with his -friends about carrying selected troops over to England to remove them. -Rumours of his intention to return reached the Queen. “We do charge -you,” she wrote, “as you tender our pleasure, that you adventure not to -come out of that kingdom.” He declared that he could not invade Ulster -without reinforcements. They were sent, and at length he marched into -Louth (September). There he was met by Tyrone, who, in an interview, -completely twisted him round his finger, and obtained a cessation of -arms and the promise of concessions amounting to what<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_218" id="page_218"></a>{218}</span> would now be -called Home Rule. A few days later, on receipt of an angry letter from -the Queen forbidding him to grant any terms without her permission, he -deserted his post and hurried to England. The first notice Elizabeth -received of this astounding piece of insubordination was his still more -astounding incursion into her bedroom, all muddy from his ride, before -she was completely dressed (September 28, 1599).</p> - -<p>Elizabeth seems to have been so much taken aback by the Earl’s -unparalleled presumption, that she did not blaze out as might have been -expected. She gave him audience an hour or two later, and heard what he -had to say. Probably he adopted an injured tone as usual, and inveighed -against “that knave Raleigh” and “that sycophant Cobham.” But his -insubordination had been gross, and no talking could make it anything -else. It was more dangerous than Leicester’s disobedience in 1586, -because it came from a vastly more dangerous person. The same afternoon -the Queen referred the matter to the Council. Essex was put under -arrest, and never saw her again. The more she reflected, the more -indignant and alarmed she became. “By God’s son,” she said to Harington, -“I am no Queen; this man is above me.” After a delay of nine months, -occasioned by his illness, the fallen favourite was brought before a -special Commission on the charge of contempt and disobedience, and -sentenced to be suspended from his offices and confined to his house -during the Queen’s pleasure (June 1600). In a few weeks he was released -from arrest, but he could not obtain permission to appear at court, -though he implored it in most abject letters.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_219" id="page_219"></a>{219}</span></p> - -<p>There are persons who consider themselves to be intolerably wronged and -persecuted if they cannot have precedence and power over their -fellow-citizens. Essex was such a person. Instead of being thankful that -he had escaped the punishment which under most sovereigns he would have -suffered, he entered into criminal plots for coercing, if not -overthrowing, the Queen. He urged the Scotch King to enforce the -recognition of his title by arms. He tried to persuade Mountjoy, his -successor in Ireland, to carry his army to Scotland to co-operate with -James. These intrigues were not known to the Government. But it did not -escape observation that he was collecting men of the sword in the -neighbourhood of his house; that he was holding consultations with -suspected nobles and gentlemen (some of whom were afterwards engaged in -the Gunpowder Plot); that the Puritan clergy were preaching and praying -for his cause; and that there was a certain ferment in the city. Essex -was therefore summoned to attend before the Council. Instead of obeying, -he flew to arms, with Lords Southampton, Rutland, Sandys, Cromwell, and -Monteagle, and about 300 gentlemen. But the citizens of London did not -respond to his appeal, and the insurrection was easily suppressed, less -than a dozen persons being slain on both sides (February 8, 1601). A -more senseless and profligate attempt to overthrow a good government it -would be difficult to find in history. It was not dignified by any -semblance of principle, and it would sufficiently stamp the character of -its author, even if it stood alone as an evidence of his vanity, -egotism, and want of common sense.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_220" id="page_220"></a>{220}</span></p> - -<p>The trial and execution of the principal malefactor followed as a matter -of course and without delay (February 25). It would have been scandalous -to spare him. Elizabeth had once been fond of him, and had no reason to -be ashamed of it. To talk of her “passion” and her “amorous -inclination,” as Hume and others have done, is revolting and malignant -nonsense. It is creditable to old age when it can take pleasure in the -unfolding of bright and promising youth. But royal favour was not good -for such a man as Essex. It developed the worst features in his showy -but faulty character. As he steadily deteriorated, her regard cooled; -but so much of it remained that she tried to amend him by chastisement, -“<i>ad correctionem</i>” as she said, “<i>non ad ruinam</i>.” She had long before -warned him that, though she had put up with much disrespect to her -person, he must not touch her sceptre, or he would be dealt with -according to the law of England. She was as good as her word, and, -though the memory of it was painful to her, there is not the smallest -evidence that she ever repented of having allowed the law to take its -course.<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> Only three of the accomplices of Essex were punished -capitally. The five peers, none of them powerful or formidable, -experienced Elizabeth’s accustomed clemency.</p> - -<p>It has been suggested by an admirer of Essex that he failed in Ireland -because his “sensitively attuned nature” shrank from the systematic -desolation and starvation afterwards employed by his successor. No<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_221" id="page_221"></a>{221}</span> -evidence is offered for this suggestion. In a letter to the Queen (June -25, 1599) he advocates “burning and spoiling the country <i>in all -places</i>,” which method “shall starve the rebels in one year.” This -course Mountjoy carried out. With means far inferior to those of Essex, -and notwithstanding the landing of 3000 Spaniards at Kinsale (September -1601), he was the first Englishman who completely subdued Ireland. -Tyrone surrendered a few days before the Queen’s death.</p> - -<p>Little has been said in these pages about parliamentary proceedings. The -real history of the reign does not lie there. The country was governed -wholly by the Queen, with the advice of her Council, and not at all by -Parliament. In the forty-five years of her reign there were only -thirteen sessions of Parliament. The functions of Parliament were to -vote grants of money when the ordinary revenues of the crown were -insufficient, and to make laws. Its right in these matters was -unquestioned. If the Queen had never wanted subsidies or penal laws -against her political and religious opponents (of other laws she often -said there were more than enough already), it would never have been -summoned at all; nor is there any reason to suppose that the country -would have complained as long as it was governed with prudence and -success. In fact, to do without Parliaments was distinctly popular, -because it meant doing without subsidies.</p> - -<p>In the thirty years preceding the Armada—the sessions of Parliament -being nine—Elizabeth applied for only eight subsidies, and of one of -them a portion was remitted. By her economy she not only defrayed<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_222" id="page_222"></a>{222}</span> the -expenses of government out of the ordinary revenue, which, at the end of -the reign was about £300,000 a year, but paid off old debts. It was not -till the twenty-fourth year of her reign that she discharged the last of -her father’s debts, up to which time she had been paying interest on it. -Subsequently she even accumulated a small reserve, which, as she told -Parliament, was a most necessary thing if she was not to be driven to -borrow on sudden emergency. But this reserve vanished immediately she -became involved in the great war with Spain; and during the last fifteen -years of her life, although she received twelve subsidies, she was -always in difficulty for money. She had to sell crown lands to the value -of £372,000. Parliament, which had voted the usual single subsidies -without complaint, grumbled and pretended poverty when she asked for -three and even four.<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> Bacon’s famous outburst (1593) about gentlemen -having to sell their plate and farmers their brass pots to pay the tax, -was a piece of claptrap. The nation was, relatively to former times, -rolling in wealth. But the old belief had still considerable -strength—that government being the affair of the King, not of his -subjects, he should provide for its expenses out of his hereditary -income, just as they paid their private expenses out of their private -incomes; that he had no more claim to dip into their pockets than they -had to dip into his; and that a subsidy, as its name imports, was an -occasional and extraordinary assistance furnished as a matter not of -duty but of good-will.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_223" id="page_223"></a>{223}</span></p> - -<p>This might have been healthy doctrine when kings were campaigning on the -Continent for personal or dynastic objects. It was out of place when a -large expenditure was indispensable for the interests and safety of the -country. The grumbling, therefore, about taxation towards the end of the -reign was unreasonable and discreditable to the grumblers. The Queen met -them with her usual good sense. She explained to them—though, as she -correctly said, she was under no constitutional obligation to do so—how -the money went, what she had spent on the Spanish war, on Ireland, and -in loans to the Dutch and the French King. The plea was unanswerable. -Her private expenditure was on a very modest scale. In particular she -had never indulged in that besetting and costly sin of princes, -palace-building; and this at a time when the noble mansions which still -testify to the wealth of the England of that day were rising in every -county. Her only extravagance was dress. Some have carped at her -collection of jewelry. But jewels, like the silver balustrades of -Frederick William <small>I.</small>, were a mode of hoarding, and in her later years -she reconverted jewels into money to meet the expenses of the State. -Modern writers, who so airily blame her for not subsidising more -liberally her Scotch, Dutch, and French allies, would find it difficult, -if they condescended to particulars, to explain how she was able to give -them as much money as she did.</p> - -<p>It is common to make much of the debate on monopolies in the last -Parliament of Elizabeth (1601), as showing the rise of a spirit of -resistance to the royal prerogative. I do not think that the report of -that<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_224" id="page_224"></a>{224}</span> debate would convey such an impression to any one reading it -without preconceived views. None of the speakers contested the -prerogative. They only complained that it was being exercised in a way -prejudicial to the public interest. If the monopolies had been -unimportant, or if the patentees had used their privilege less greedily, -there would evidently have been no complaint as to the principle -involved. No course of action was decided on, because the Queen -intervened by a message in which she stated that she had not been aware -of the abuses prevailing, that she was as indignant at them as -Parliament could be, and that she would put a stop, not to monopolies, -but to such as were injurious. With this message the House of Commons -was more than satisfied. As a matter of fact monopolies went on till -dealt with by the declaratory statute in the twenty-first year of James -<small>I.</small></p> - -<p>If the last Tudor handed down the English Constitution to the first -Stuart as she had received it from her predecessors, unchanged either in -theory or practice, it was far otherwise with the English Church. There -are two conflicting views as to the historical position of the Church in -this country. According to one it was, all through the Middle Age, -National as well as Catholic. The changes which took place at the -Reformation made no difference in that respect, and involved no break in -its continuity. It is not a Protestant Church. It is still National and -still Catholic, resting on precisely the same foundations, and existing -by the same title as it did in the days of Dunstan and Becket. According -to the other view, the epithets National and Catholic are contradictory. -A Church which undergoes<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_225" id="page_225"></a>{225}</span> radical changes of government, worship, and -doctrine is no longer the same Church but a new one, and must be held to -have been established by the authority which prescribed these changes, -which, in this case, was the Queen and Parliament. The word “Protestant” -was avoided in its formularies to make conformity easier for Catholics; -but it is a Protestant Church all the same. Whichever of these views is -nearer to the truth, it cannot be denied that, by the legislation of -Elizabeth the English Church became—what it was not in the Middle -Age—a spiritual organisation entirely dependent on the State. This it -remains still; the supremacy having been virtually transferred from the -crown to Parliament in the next century. I shall not venture to inquire -how far this condition of dependence has affected its ability and -inclination to perform the part of a true spiritual power. It is enough -to say that no act of will on the part of any English statesman has had -such important and lasting consequences, for good or for evil, as the -decision of Elizabeth to make the Church of England what it is.</p> - -<p>We have seen that the government and worship of the Church were -established by Act of Parliament in 1559, and its doctrines in 1571. But -when once Elizabeth had placed her ecclesiastical powers beyond dispute, -by obtaining statutory sanction for them, she allowed no further -interference by Parliament. All its attempts, even at mere discussion of -ecclesiastical matters, she peremptorily suppressed. She supplied any -further legislation that was needed by virtue of her supremacy, and she -exercised her ecclesiastical government by the Court of High Commission. -The<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_226" id="page_226"></a>{226}</span> new Anglican model was acquiesced in by the majority of the nation. -But it had, at first, no hearty support except from the Government. The -earnest religionists were either Catholics or Puritans. The object of -Elizabeth was to compel these two extreme parties to outward conformity -of worship. What their real beliefs were she did not care.</p> - -<p>The large majority of the Catholics showed a loyal and patriotic spirit -at the time of the Armada. But they were not treated with confidence by -the Government. Great numbers of them were imprisoned or confined in the -houses of Protestant gentlemen, by way of precaution, when the Armada -was approaching. No Catholic, I believe, was intrusted with any command -either by land or sea; and after the danger was over, the persecution, -in all its forms, became sharper than ever. There was the less reason -for this, inasmuch as it was no secret that the secular priests and the -great majority of the English Catholics had become bitterly hostile to -the small Jesuitical faction whose treasonable conspiracies had brought -so much trouble on their loyal co-religionists.</p> - -<p>The term “Puritan” is used loosely, though conveniently, to designate -several shades of belief. By far the larger number of those to whom it -is applied were, and meant to remain, members of the Established Church. -They objected to certain ceremonies and vestments. They hoped to procure -the abolition of these, and, in the meantime, evaded them when they -could. They were what would now be called the Evangelical or Low Church -party. They held Calvin’s distinctive doctrines on predestination, as -indeed did<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_227" id="page_227"></a>{227}</span> most of the bishops; but though preferring his Presbyterian -organisation, or something like it, they did not treat it as essential. -They were broadly distinguished from the Brownists or Independents, then -an insignificant minority, who held each congregation to be a church, -and therefore protested against the establishment of any national -church.</p> - -<p>Though Elizabeth persecuted the Catholics with a severity steadily -increasing in proportion as they became less numerous and formidable, -she remained to the last anxious to make conformity easy for them. This -was her reason for so obstinately refusing the concessions in the matter -of ritual and vestments—trifling as they appear to the modern -mind—which would have satisfied almost the whole of the Puritan party. -This policy (for policy it assuredly was rather than conviction), which -drove the most earnest Protestants into an attitude of opposition -destined in the next two reigns to have such serious consequences, has -been severely censured. But there can be no question that it did answer -the purpose she had in view, which for the moment was most important. It -did induce great numbers of Catholics to conform. She avoided a civil -war in her own time between Catholics and Anglicans at the price of a -civil war later on between Anglicans and Puritans. Looking at the great -drama as a whole, perhaps the Puritans of the Great Rebellion might -congratulate themselves on the part that Elizabeth chose to play in its -earlier acts. It cannot be doubted that a civil war in the sixteenth -century between Catholics and Protestants would have been waged with far -more ferocity than was displayed<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_228" id="page_228"></a>{228}</span> by either Cavaliers or Roundheads, and -would have been attended with the horrors of foreign invasion. To -conciliate the earnest religionists on both sides was impossible. -Elizabeth chose the <i>via media</i>, and the successful equilibrium which -she maintained during nearly half a century proves that she hit upon -what in her own day was the true centre of gravity.</p> - -<p>But while doing justice to Elizabeth’s insight and prudence, we may not -excuse her extreme severity to the nonconformists of either party. It -was not necessary. It seems to have been even impolitic. It arose from -her arbitrary temper—from a quality, that is to say, valuable in a -ruler, but apt, in great rulers, to be somewhat in excess. I have -condemned her persecution of the Catholics. Her persecution of the -Protestant nonconformists was marked by even greater injustice. Against -the Catholics it might at least be urged that their opinions logically -led to disloyalty. But the Independents, Barrow, Greenwood, and Penry, -were indisputably loyal men. They were put to death nominally for -spreading writings which, contrary to common sense, were held to be -seditious, but really for their religious opinions, which, in the case -of the first two, were extracted from them by the interrogatories of -Archbishop Whitgift, an Inquisitor as strenuous and merciless as -Torquemada. Some of the Council, especially Burghley and Knollys, were -strongly opposed to Whitgift’s proceedings. It must therefore be assumed -that he had the Queen’s personal approval. She had committed herself to -a struggle with intrepid and obstinate men. The crowded gaols were a -visible demonstration that she could not compel them to<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_229" id="page_229"></a>{229}</span> submit; and to -hang them all was out of the question. An Act was therefore passed in -1593, by which those who would not promise to attend church were to be -banished the country. Thus most of the Independents were at last got rid -of. The non-separatist Puritans, who aimed at less radical changes, and -hoped to effect them, if not under their present sovereign, yet under -her successor, kept on the windy side of the law, attending church once -a month, and not entering till the service was nearly over. Thus, at the -end of her reign, Elizabeth perhaps flattered herself that she was -within measurable distance of religious uniformity.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_230" id="page_230"></a>{230}</span></p> - -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XII" id="CHAPTER_XII"></a>CHAPTER XII<br /><br /> -<small>LAST YEARS AND DEATH: 1601-1603.</small></h2> - -<p class="nind">T<small>HE</small> death of Mary Stuart did something to simplify parties in Scotland; -and, if her son had possessed the qualities of a ruler, he would have -had a better chance of reducing his kingdom to order than any of his -predecessors, because a middle class was at length rising into -importance. As far as knowledge and discernment went, he was an able -politician, and on several occasions he showed not only skill in his -combinations, but—what he is not generally credited with by those who -study only his career in England—considerable energy and courage. But -he was wanting in perseverance, and a slave to idle pleasures. He had -always some favourite upon whom he lavished any money that came into his -hands. What was needed in his own interest and that of his country was -that he should exercise rigid economy, develop all the forces that made -for order, ally himself with the burghs and lower barons, cultivate good -relations with the Kirk, industriously attend to all the details of -government, and seize every opportunity to humble the great nobles of -whatever party or creed. Instead<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_231" id="page_231"></a>{231}</span> of this, he tried to maintain himself -by balancing rival parties, and employing one nobleman to execute his -vengeance on another. Instead of honestly and zealously seconding the -policy of Elizabeth, and so deserving her confidence and support, which -would have been of the utmost value to him, he tried to levy blackmail -on her by coquetting with Spain and the Catholics.</p> - -<p>Elizabeth is accused of deliberately encouraging Scottish factions in -order to keep the northern kingdom weak. She certainly supported -Stewart, Earl of Bothwell, a turbulent and unprincipled man, while he -was the antagonist of the Catholic nobles who were inviting the -Spaniard. But it is plain that she desired nothing so much as to see -James crush all aristocratic disorder, and make himself master of his -kingdom. Her exhortations to him on this subject are full of wisdom, and -expressed in most stirring language. But they only produced petitions -for money. Notwithstanding her own difficulties, she long allowed him -£3000 a year, which, in 1600, was increased to £6000. But ten times that -amount would have done him no good, because he would immediately have -squandered it.</p> - -<p>As Elizabeth grew old, James naturally became absorbed in the prospect -of his succession to the English crown. All Scotchmen shared his -eagerness. In England, feeling was almost unanimous in his favour, -though some of the Catholics continued to talk of the Infanta or -Arabella Stuart the niece of Darnley. By teasing Elizabeth to recognise -his title, intriguing with her courtiers, and calling on his own<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_232" id="page_232"></a>{232}</span> -subjects to furnish him with the means of asserting his rights, James -irritated the English Queen. But she had always intended that he should -succeed her, and she did nothing to prejudice his claim.</p> - -<p>The two leading men at the English court—Cecil and Raleigh—who had -been united in their hostility to Essex, were now secretly competing for -the favour of James. Each warned the Scottish King against the other, -and represented himself as the only trustworthy adviser. Cecil, from his -confidential relations with the Queen, had the most difficult game to -play, and it was not till her health was evidently failing that he -ventured to open private communications with James. Even then he did not -dare to correspond with him directly, but it was understood that -everything written by Lord Henry Howard (brother of the last Duke of -Norfolk) was to be taken as written by Cecil. To make up for his -previous backwardness, he lent James £10,000—a pledge of fidelity which -it was out of his rival’s power to emulate.</p> - -<p>The long career of Elizabeth was now drawing to its close. Her sun might -seem to be going down in calm splendour. She had triumphed over all her -enemies. She might say with Virgil’s heroine—</p> - -<div class="poetry"> -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<span class="i0">“Vixi, et quem dederat cursum fortuna, peregi;<br /></span> -<span class="i1">Et nunc magna mei sub terras ibit imago.”<br /></span> -</div></div> -</div> - -<p class="nind">The mighty Philip had gone to his grave five years before her (1598), a -beaten man, having failed in Holland, failed in France, failed against -England. Of the three great champions who withstood him, Elizabeth, if -not the most distinguished by high<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_233" id="page_233"></a>{233}</span> qualities, had yet, perhaps, the -largest share in saving Europe from the retrograde tyranny which menaced -it. The glorious resistance of William of Orange covered only sixteen -years (1568-84). That of Henry <small>IV.</small> can hardly be said to have had any -European importance before his accession to the French throne, from -which date to the peace of Vervins and the death of Philip is a period -of nine years (1589-98). But the whole of Elizabeth’s long reign was -spent in abating the power of Spain. It was the persistent, -never-relaxing pressure from an unassailable enemy which wore out -Philip, as it afterwards wore out Bonaparte. Elizabeth had found England -weak and distracted: she was leaving it united and powerful. Nor was she -of those to whom their due meed of praise is denied during life, and -accorded only by the tardy justice of posterity. Her wisdom and courage -were the admiration not of her own people alone, but of all Europe. “Her -very enemies,” says a French historian, “proclaimed her the most -glorious and fortunate of all women who ever wore a crown.” From the -point of view of public life, little or nothing was wanting—so Bacon -thought—to fill up the full measure of her felicity.</p> - -<p>Yet it seems that the last months of her life were clouded by -melancholy, and deformed by a querulous ill-temper. Some have suggested -that she suffered from remorse for her severity to Essex; others that -she felt herself out of sympathy with the Puritan tendencies of the -time. It is not necessary to resort to these unfounded or far-fetched -suppositions to account for her gloom. If we turn from her public<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_234" id="page_234"></a>{234}</span> to -her private life, what situation could be more profoundly pitiable? -Honour and obedience, indeed, still surrounded her. But that which also -should accompany old age, love and troops of friends, she might not look -to have. Near relations she had none. Alone she had chosen to live, and -alone she must die. As her time approached, she was haunted by the -consciousness that, among all those who treated her with so much -reverence, there was not one who had any reason to be attached to her or -to care that her life should be prolonged. Those who have not loved when -they were young must not expect to find love when they are old. While -health and strength remained, she had tasted the satisfaction of living -her own life and playing the great game of politics, for which she was -exceptionally gifted. But to a woman who has passed through life without -knowing what it is to love or be loved, who has no memory of even an -unrequited affection to feed on, who has never shared a husband’s joys -and sorrows, never borne the sweet burden of maternity, never suckled -babe or rocked cradle, who must finish her journey alone, sitting in the -solemn twilight before the last dark hour uncared for and uncaring, -without the cheer of children or the varied interests that gather round -the family—to such a one, what avails it that she has tasted the -excitement of public life, that she has borne a share in politics or -business—what even that her aims have been high or that she has done -the State some service, if she has renounced the crown of womanhood, and -turned from their appointed use those numbered years within which the -female heart<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_235" id="page_235"></a>{235}</span> can find present joy and lay up store of calm satisfaction -for declining age?</p> - -<p>Elizabeth had always enjoyed good health, thanks to her “exact -temperance both as to wine and diet, which, she used to say, was the -noblest part of physic,” and her active habits. In capacity for -resisting bodily fatigue and freedom from nervous ailments, she was like -a man. It was not till the beginning of 1602 that those about her -noticed any signs of failing strength. She still went on hunting and -dancing. In dancing she excelled, and she kept it up for exercise, as -many an old man keeps up his skating or tennis without being exposed to -ill-natured remarks. In December 1602 her godson Harington, an amusing -person, whose company she enjoyed, found her “in most pitiable state,” -both in body and mind. “She held in her hand a golden cup which she -often put to her lips; but in sooth her heart seemeth too full to lack -more filling.” He read her some verses he had written, “whereat she -smiled once,” but said, “When thou dost feel creeping Time at thy gate, -these fooleries will please thee less. I am past my relish for such -matters. Thou seest my bodily meat doth not suit me well. I have eaten -but one ill-tasted cake since yesternight.” Harington hastened to send a -present to the King of Scots, with the inscription, “<i>Domine memento mei -cum veneris in regnum</i>.”</p> - -<p>In the same month Robert Carey, son of her cousin Lord Hunsdon, visited -her, and professed to think her looking well. “No, Robin,” she said, “I -am not well,” and then “discoursed of her indisposition, and that her -heart had been sad and heavy for ten<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_236" id="page_236"></a>{236}</span> or twelve days, and in her -discourse she fetched not so few as forty or fifty great sighs.... -Hereupon I wrote to the King of Scots.”<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> Her melancholy was not -caused by any weakening of her mind. A long letter to James, dated -January 5, 1603, though hardly legible, is very vigorous and -characteristic.</p> - -<p>At the beginning of March 1603 she became much worse. There was some -disease of the throat, attended with swelling and a distressing -formation of phlegm, which made speaking difficult. The only relatives -about her were Robert Carey and his sister Lady Scrope, watching keenly -that they might be the first to inform James of her death. She could not -be brought by any of her Council to take food or go to bed. When in bed -she had been troubled by a visual illusion; “she saw her body -exceedingly lean and fearful in a light of fire.” At last Nottingham, -the Admiral, who was mourning the recent death of his wife, was sent -for. He was a second cousin of Anne Boleyn, and was the one person to -whom the dying Queen seemed to cling with some trust. He induced her to -take some broth. “For any of the rest,” says her maid-of-honour, -Mistress Southwell, “she would not answer them to any question, but said -softly to my Lord Admiral’s earnest persuasions that if he knew what she -had seen in her bed he would not persuade<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_237" id="page_237"></a>{237}</span> her as he did. And Secretary -Cecil, overhearing her, asked if her Majesty had seen any spirits; to -which she said she scorned to answer him so idle a question. Then he -told her how, to content the people, her Majesty must go to bed. To -which she smiled, wonderfully contemning him, saying that the word -<i>must</i> was not to be used to princes; and thereupon said, ‘Little man, -little man, if your father had lived ye [he?] durst not have said so -much: but thou knowest I must die, and that maketh thee so -presumptuous.’ And presently commanding him and the rest to depart her -chamber, willed my Lord Admiral to stay; to whom she shook her head, and -with a pitiful voice said, ‘My Lord, I am tied with a chain of iron -about my neck.’ He alleging her wonted courage to her, she replied, ‘I -am tied, and the case is altered with me.’ ” At last, “what by fair -means,” says Carey, “what by force, he got her to bed.”</p> - -<p>It was perfectly understood that she meant James to be her successor. -The Admiral now told his colleagues that she had confided her intention -to him just before her illness took a serious turn. Two years before, in -conversation with Rosni, the minister of Henry <small>IV.</small>, she had spoken of -the approaching union of the Scotch and English crowns as a matter of -course. But it was not till a few hours before her death that her -councillors ventured to question her on the subject. They gave out that -she indicated James by a sign; and this is also asserted by Carey, who, -however, does not seem to have been present, though probably his sister -was. Mistress Southwell seems to write as an eye-witness, but betrays a -Catholic bias, which may cast some doubt on her testimony. “The Council -sent<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_238" id="page_238"></a>{238}</span> to her the bishop of Canterbury and other of the prelates, upon -sight of whom she was much offended, cholericly rating them, bidding -them be packing, saying she was no atheist, but knew full well they were -hedge-priests, and took it for an indignity that they should speak to -her. Now being given over by all, and at the last gasp, keeping still -her sense in everything and giving ever when she spoke apt answers, -though she spake very seldom, having then a sore throat, she desired to -wash it, that she might answer more freely to what the Council demanded; -which was to know whom she would have king; but they, seeing her throat -troubled her so much, desired her to hold up her finger when they named -whom liked her. Whereupon they named the king of France, the king of -Scotland, at which she never stirred. They named my lord Beauchamp,<a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> -whereto she said, ‘I will have no rascal’s son in my seat, but one -worthy to be a king.’ Hereupon instantly she died.” (March 23, -afternoon.)</p> - -<p>It is certain, however, that she lived several hours after this -characteristic outburst. Carey says that at six o’clock in the evening -he went into her room with the Archbishop; that, though speechless, she -showed by signs that she followed his prayers, and twice desired him to -remain when he was going away. She died in the early hours of Thursday, -March 24.</p> - -<p>There have been many greater statesmen than Elizabeth. She was far from -being an admirable type of womanhood. She does not, in my opinion, stand -first even among female sovereigns, for I should put<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_239" id="page_239"></a>{239}</span> that able ruler -and perfect woman, Isabella of Castile, above her. I admit, however, -that such comparisons are apt to be unjust. Few rulers have had to -contend with such formidable and complicated difficulties as the English -Queen. Few have surmounted them so triumphantly. This is the criterion, -and the sufficient criterion, which determines the judgment of practical -men. Research, if applied with fairness and common sense, may perhaps -modify, it can never set aside, the popular verdict. There are writers -who have made the discovery that Elizabeth was a very poor ruler, -selfish and wayward, shortsighted, easily duped, fainthearted, rash, -miserly, wasteful, and swayed by the pettiest impulses of vanity, spite, -and personal inclination. They have not explained, and never will, how -it was that a woman with all these disqualifications for government -should have ruled England with signal success for forty-four years. -Statesmen are indebted to good luck occasionally, like other people. But -when this explanation is offered again and again with dull regularity, -we are compelled to say, with one who had at once the best opportunity -and the highest capacity for estimating the greatness of Elizabeth: “It -is not to closet penmen that we are to look for guidance in such a case; -for men of that order being keen in style, poor in judgment, and partial -in feeling, are no faithful witnesses as to the real passages of -business. It is for ministers and great officers to judge of these -things, and those who have handled the helm of government and been -acquainted with the difficulties and mysteries of State business.”<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="page_240" id="page_240"></a>{240}</span></p> - -<p>The judgment of those who have handled the helm of government is to be -found in the words of her contemporary, the great Henry—“She was my -other self:” and of a greater still in the next generation—“Queen -Elizabeth of famous memory; we need not be ashamed to call her so!”<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="page_241" id="page_241"></a>{241}</span></p> - -<h2><a name="APPENDIX" id="APPENDIX"></a>APPENDIX<br /><br /> -<small><span class="pagenum"><a name="page_242" id="page_242"></a>{242}</span></small></h2> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="page_243" id="page_243"></a>{243}</span></p> - -<h2><a name="APPENDIX_A" id="APPENDIX_A"></a>APPENDIX A.<br /><br /> -<small>SESSIONS OF PARLIAMENT IN THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH.</small></h2> - -<table border="1" cellpadding="1" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="center"> -<i>Parliament.</i></td> - -<td align="center"> <i>Year</i><br /> - <i>of</i><br /> -<i>Elizabeth.</i></td> - -<td align="center"><i>Began.</i></td> - -<td align="center"><i>Prorogued.</i></td> -<td align="center"><i>Dissolved.</i></td></tr> - -<tr><td align="right">I.</td><td align="left"> 1st</td><td align="left"> 25 Jan. 1558/9</td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> 8 May 1559</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">II.</td><td align="left"> 5th</td><td align="left"> 12 Jan. 1562/3</td><td align="left"> 10 April 1563</td><td align="left"> </td></tr> -<tr><td class="filld" colspan="5"> </td></tr> - -<tr><td align="right">II. </td><td align="left"> 8th</td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">2nd </td><td align="left"> and</td><td align="left"> 30 Sep. 1566</td><td align="left"> 30 Dec. 1566</td><td align="left"> 2 Jan. 1566/7</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">Sess. </td><td align="left"> 9th</td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td></tr> -<tr><td class="filld" colspan="5"> </td></tr> - -<tr><td align="right">III.</td><td align="left"> 13th</td><td align="left"> 2 April 1571</td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> 29 May 1571</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">IV.</td><td align="left"> 14th</td><td align="left"> 8 April 1572</td><td align="left"> 30 June 1572</td><td align="left"> </td></tr> -<tr><td class="filld" colspan="5"> </td></tr> - -<tr><td align="right">IV. </td><td align="left"></td><td align="left"></td><td align="left"></td><td align="left"> </td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">2nd </td><td align="left"> 18th</td><td align="left"> 8 Feb. 1575/6</td><td align="left"> 15 Mar. 1575/6</td><td align="left"> </td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">S1 s. </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td></tr> -<tr><td class="filld" colspan="5"> </td></tr> - -<tr><td align="right">V. </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">3rd </td><td align="left"> 23rd</td><td align="left"> 16 Jan 1580/1</td><td align="left"> 18 Mar. 1580/1</td><td align="left"> 19 April 1583</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">Sess. </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td></tr> -<tr><td class="filld" colspan="5"> </td></tr> - -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left"> 27th</td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td></tr> - -<tr><td align="right">V. </td><td align="left"> and</td><td align="left"> 23 Nov. 1584{*}</td><td align="left"> 29 Mar. 1585</td><td align="left"> 14 Sep. 1586</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left"> 28th</td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td></tr> -<tr><td class="filld" colspan="5"> </td></tr> - -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left"> 28th</td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">VI. </td><td align="left"> and</td><td align="left"> 15 Oct. 1586{*}</td><td align="left"> 29 Oct. 1586</td><td align="left"> 23 Mar. 1586/7</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"> </td><td align="left"> 29th</td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> </td></tr> -<tr><td class="filld" colspan="5"> </td></tr> - -<tr><td align="right">VII.</td><td align="left"> 31st</td><td align="left"> 4 Feb. 1588/9</td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> 29 Mar. 1589</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">VIII.</td><td align="left"> 35th</td><td align="left"> 19 Feb. 1592/3</td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> 10 April 1593</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">IX.</td><td align="left"> 39th</td><td align="left"> 24 Oct. 1597{*}</td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> 9 Feb. 1597/8</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">X.</td><td align="left"> 43rd</td><td align="left"> 27 Oct. 1601</td><td align="left"> </td><td align="left"> 19 Dec. 1601</td></tr> -</table> - -<p class="c">[* Adjourned over Christmas Vacation.]</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="page_244" id="page_244"></a>{244}</span></p> - -<h2><a name="APPENDIX_B" id="APPENDIX_B"></a>APPENDIX B.<br /><br /> -<small>THE PRINCIPAL HOWARDS CONTEMPORARIES OF ELIZABETH.</small></h2> - -<pre> - <span class="smcap">2nd Duke of Norfolk.</span><a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> - | - -------------------------------------------------------------------------- - | | | | -<span class="smcap">3rd Duke of Norfolk.</span><a name="FNanchor_23_23" id="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> <span class="smcap">Edmund.</span> <span class="smcap">Lady Boleyn.</span><a name="FNanchor_30_30" id="FNanchor_30_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> <span class="smcap">William 1st Lord</span> - | | | <span class="smcap">Howard of Effingham.</span><a name="FNanchor_31_31" id="FNanchor_31_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> - ---------------- | | | - | | | | | -<span class="smcap">Mary.<a name="FNanchor_25_25" id="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> </span> <span class="smcap">Earl of Surrey.<a name="FNanchor_24_24" id="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> </span> <span class="smcap">Q. Catherine Howard.</span> <span class="smcap">Q. Anne Boleyn.</span> <span class="smcap">Charles 2nd Lord Effingham.</span><a name="FNanchor_32_32" id="FNanchor_32_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> - | | - -------------------- | - | | | -<span class="smcap">4th Duke of Norfolk.</span><a name="FNanchor_26_26" id="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> <span class="smcap">Henry.</span><a name="FNanchor_33_33" id="FNanchor_33_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> <span class="smcap">Queen Elizabeth.</span> - | - ---------------------------------- - | | | -<span class="smcap">Earl of Arundel.</span><a name="FNanchor_27_27" id="FNanchor_27_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> <span class="smcap">Lord Howard of Walden.</span><a name="FNanchor_28_28" id="FNanchor_28_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> <span class="smcap">William.</span><a name="FNanchor_29_29" id="FNanchor_29_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> - -</pre> - -<p class="c">[Original scanned table below]<br /><img src="images/appendix_B.png" -width="500" -height="257" -alt="[Image of the original scanned page of the table]" -/> -<br /><span class="nonvis"><a href="images/appendix_B_lg.png">[Larger image of the original scanned page of the table]</a></span></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="page_245" id="page_245"></a>{245}</span></p> - -<h2><a name="APPENDIX_C" id="APPENDIX_C"></a>APPENDIX C.<br /><br /> - -<small>PRINCIPAL BOLEYN RELATIONS OF ELIZABETH.</small></h2> - -<pre> - - <span class="smcap">Sir Thomas Boleyn</span><a name="FNanchor_34_34" id="FNanchor_34_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> = <span class="smcap">Lady Elizabeth Howard</span>.<a name="FNanchor_35_35" id="FNanchor_35_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> - | - ----------------------------------------------------------- - | | | -<span class="smcap">Lord Rochford.</span><a name="FNanchor_36_36" id="FNanchor_36_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> <span class="smcap">Queen Anne.</span> <span class="smcap">Mary</span> = <span class="smcap">William Carey</span>. - | | - | -------------------------------------- - | | | - <span class="smcap">Queen Elizabeth.</span> <span class="smcap">1st Lord Hunsdon.</span><a name="FNanchor_37_37" id="FNanchor_37_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> <span class="smcap">Catherine</span> = <span class="smcap">Sir Francis</span> <span class="smcap">Knollys</span>. - | | - --------------------------------------------------- | - | | | | | -<span class="smcap">2nd Lord Hunsdon.</span> <span class="smcap">Robert.</span><a name="FNanchor_38_38" id="FNanchor_38_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> <span class="smcap">Lady Effingham</span><a name="FNanchor_39_39" id="FNanchor_39_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> <span class="smcap">Lady Scrope.</span> <span class="smcap">Walter, Earl</span> = <span class="smcap">Lettice</span> = <span class="smcap">Earl of Leicester</span>. - <span class="smcap">and Countess</span> <span class="smcap">of Essex</span>.| - <span class="smcap">of Nottingham</span>. | - | - <span class="smcap">Robert, Earl of Essex</span><a name="FNanchor_40_40" id="FNanchor_40_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> = <span class="smcap">Frances Sidney</span>.<a name="FNanchor_41_41" id="FNanchor_41_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> -</pre> - -<p class="c">[Original scanned table below]<br /><img src="images/appendix_C.png" -width="500" -height="266" -alt="[Image of the original scanned page of the table]" -/><br /> -<span class="nonvis"><a href="images/appendix_C_lg.png">[Larger image of the original scanned page of the table]</a></span></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="page_246" id="page_246"></a>{246}</span></p> - -<p class="c"> -Printed by T. and A. <span class="smcap">Constable</span>, Printers to His Majesty<br /> -at the Edinburgh University Press<br /> -</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="page_247" id="page_247"></a>{247}</span></p> - -<hr style="width: 45%;" /> - -<p class="eng">Twelve English Statesmen.</p> - -<p class="c"><span class="smcap">Edited by</span> JOHN MORLEY.</p> - -<p class="c"><i>Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. each.</i></p> - -<p class="hang"><b>WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR.</b> By <span class="smcap">Edward A. Freeman</span>, D.C.L., LL.D.</p> - -<p><b>Times.</b>—‘Gives with great picturesqueness ... the dramatic incidents of -a memorable career far removed from our times and our manner of -thinking.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>HENRY II.</b> By Mrs. <span class="smcap">J. R. Green</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Times.</b>—‘It is delightfully real and readable, and in spite of severe -compression has the charm of a mediæval romance.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>EDWARD I.</b> By <span class="smcap">T. F. Tout</span>, M.A., Professor of History, the Owens College, -Manchester.</p> - -<p><b>Speaker.</b>—‘A truer or more life-like picture of the king, the conqueror, -the overlord, the duke, has never yet been drawn.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>HENRY VII.</b> By <span class="smcap">James Gairdner</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Athenæum.</b>—‘The best account of Henry <small>VII.</small> that has yet appeared.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>CARDINAL WOLSEY.</b> By Bishop <span class="smcap">Creighton</span>, D.D.</p> - -<p><b>Saturday Review.</b>—‘Is exactly what one of a series of short biographies -of English Statesmen ought to be.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>ELIZABETH.</b> By <span class="smcap">E. S. Beesly</span>, M.A.</p> - -<p><b>Manchester Guardian.</b>—‘It may be recommended as the best and briefest -and most trustworthy of the many books that in this generation have -dealt with the life and deeds of that “bright Occidental Star, Queen -Elizabeth of happy memory."’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>OLIVER CROMWELL.</b> By <span class="smcap">Frederic Harrison</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Times.</b>—‘Gives a wonderfully vivid picture of events.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>WILLIAM III.</b> By <span class="smcap">H. D. Traill</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Spectator.</b>—‘Mr. Traill has done his work well in the limited space at -his command. The narrative portion is clear and vivacious, and his -criticisms, although sometimes trenchant, are substantially just.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>WALPOLE.</b> By <span class="smcap">John Morley</span>.</p> - -<p><b>St. James’s Gazette.</b>—‘It deserves to be read, not only as a work of one -of the most prominent politicians of the day, but for its intrinsic -merits. It is a clever, thoughtful, and interesting biography.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>PITT.</b> By <span class="smcap">Lord Rosebery</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Times.</b>—‘Brilliant and fascinating.... The style is terse, masculine, -nervous, articulate, and clear; the grasp of circumstance and character -is firm, penetrating, luminous, and unprejudiced; the judgment is broad, -generous, humane, and scrupulously candid.... It is not only a luminous -estimate of Pitt’s character and policy, it is also a brilliant gallery -of portraits. The portrait of Fox, for example, is a masterpiece.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>PEEL.</b> By <span class="smcap">J. R. Thursfield</span>, M.A.</p> - -<p><b>Daily News.</b>—‘A model of what such a book should be. We can give it no -higher praise than to say that it is worthy to rank with Mr. John -Morley’s <i>Walpole</i> in the same series.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>CHATHAM.</b> By <span class="smcap">Frederic Harrison</span>.</p> - -<p class="c">MACMILLAN AND CO., <span class="smcap">Ltd.</span>, LONDON.<span class="pagenum"><a name="page_248" id="page_248"></a>{248}</span></p> - -<hr /> - -<p class="eng">English Men of Action.</p> - -<p class="c"><i>With Portraits. Crown 8vo, Cloth. 2s. 6d. each.</i></p> - -<p class="hang"><b>NELSON.</b> By <span class="smcap">John Knox Laughton</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Saturday Review.</b>—‘The obligation laid upon him to be brief, and -his own anxiety to leave untold nothing of first-rate importance, -have combined to give us an almost ideal short life of Nelson.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>WOLFE.</b> By <span class="smcap">A. G. Bradley</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Times.</b>—‘It appears to us to be very well done. The narrative is -easy, the facts have been mastered and well marshalled, and Mr. -Bradley is excellent both in his geographical and in his -biographical details.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>COLIN CAMPBELL</b> (<b>Lord Clyde</b>). By <span class="smcap">Archibald Forbes</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Times.</b>—‘A vigorous sketch of a great soldier, a fine character, -and a noble career.... Mr. Forbes writes with a practised and -lively pen, and his experience of warfare in many lands stands him -in good stead in describing Lord Clyde’s services and campaigns.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>GENERAL GORDON.</b> By Colonel Sir <span class="smcap">William Butler</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Spectator.</b>—‘This is beyond all question the best of the narratives -of the career of General Gordon that have yet been published.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>HENRY THE FIFTH.</b> By Rev. <span class="smcap">A. J. Church</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Scotsman.</b>—‘No page lacks interest; and whether the book is -regarded as a biographical sketch or as a chapter in English -military history it is equally attractive.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>LIVINGSTONE.</b> By <span class="smcap">Thomas Hughes</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Spectator.</b>—‘The volume is an excellent instance of miniature -biography.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>LORD LAWRENCE.</b> By Sir <span class="smcap">Richard Temple</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Leeds Mercury.</b>—‘A lucid, temperate, and impressive summary.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>WELLINGTON.</b> By <span class="smcap">George Hooper</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Scotsman.</b>—‘The story of the great Duke’s life is admirably told by -Mr. Hooper.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>DAMPIER.</b> By <span class="smcap">W. Clark Russell</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Athenæum.</b>—‘Mr. Clark Russell’s practical knowledge of the sea -enables him to discuss the seafaring life of two centuries ago with -intelligence and vigour. As a commentary on Dampier’s voyages this -little book is among the best.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>MONK.</b> By <span class="smcap">Julian Corbett</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Saturday Review.</b>—‘Mr. Corbett indeed gives you the real man.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>STRAFFORD.</b> By <span class="smcap">H. D. Traill</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Athenæum.</b>—‘A clear and accurate summary of Strafford’s life, -especially as regards his Irish government.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>WARREN HASTINGS.</b> By Sir <span class="smcap">Alfred Lyall</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Daily News.</b>—‘May be pronounced without hesitation as the final and -decisive verdict of history on the conduct and career of Hastings.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>PETERBOROUGH.</b> By <span class="smcap">W. Stebbing</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Saturday Review.</b>—‘An excellent piece of work.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>CAPTAIN COOK.</b> By Sir <span class="smcap">Walter Besant</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Scottish Leader.</b>—‘It is simply the best and most readable account -of the great navigator yet published.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>SIR HENRY HAVELOCK.</b> By <span class="smcap">Archibald Forbes</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Speaker.</b>—‘There is no lack of good writing in this book, and the -narrative is sympathetic as well as spirited.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>CLIVE.</b> By Colonel Sir <span class="smcap">Charles Wilson</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Times.</b>—‘Sir Charles Wilson, whose literary skill is -unquestionable, does ample justice to a great and congenial theme.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>SIR CHARLES NAPIER.</b> By Colonel Sir <span class="smcap">William Butler</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Daily News.</b>—‘The “English Men of Action” series contains no volume -more fascinating, both in matter and in style.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>WARWICK, THE KING-MAKER.</b> C. W. C. <span class="smcap">Oman.</span></p> - -<p><b>Glasgow Herald.</b>—‘One of the best and most discerning word-pictures -of the Wars of the Two Roses to be found in the whole range of -English literature.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>DRAKE.</b> By <span class="smcap">Julian Corbett</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Scottish Leader.</b>—‘Perhaps the most fascinating of all the fifteen -that have so far appeared.... Written really with excellent -judgment, in a breezy and buoyant style.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>RODNEY.</b> By <span class="smcap">David G. Hannay</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Spectator.</b>—‘An admirable contribution to an admirable series.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>MONTROSE.</b> By <span class="smcap">Mowbray Morris</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Times.</b>—‘A singularly vivid and careful picture of one of the most -romantic figures in Scottish history.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>DUNDONALD.</b> By the Hon. <span class="smcap">John W. Fortescue</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Daily News.</b>—‘There are many excellent volumes in the “English Men -of Action” Series; but none better written or more interesting than -this.’</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>CAPTAIN JOHN SMITH.</b> By <span class="smcap">A. G. Bradley</span>.</p> - -<p class="hang"><b>SIR WALTER RALEIGH.</b> By Sir <span class="smcap">Rennell Rodd</span>.</p> - -<p class="c"> -MACMILLAN AND CO., <span class="smcap">Ltd.</span>, LONDON.<br /> -</p> - -<div class="footnotes"><p class="cb">FOOTNOTES:</p> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Mr. Motley conjectures that the population of Spain and -Portugal may have been 12,000,000.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> The oath of supremacy imposed on members of the House of -Commons in 1562 practically excluded conscientious Catholics.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> He had received the Duchy of Anjou in addition to that of -Alençon, and some historians call him by the former title.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Hallam, <i>Constitutional History</i>, Chapter <small>III</small>. Macaulay, -<i>Essay on Hallam’s Constitutional History</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> James had given this man the title and estates of the -exiled Hamiltons.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Some persons whose names do not appear in the Commission -sat on the trial, while some who were appointed did not sit.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Those who wish to know the grounds on which Mary’s -complicity in Babington’s plot has been denied can consult Lingard, -Tytler, and Labanoff. In my opinion, their arguments are very feeble.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> There was no formal proclamation of war on either side.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> The remaining Privy Councillors were Archbishop Whitgift, -Lord Chancellor Bromley, the Earls of Shrewsbury and Warwick, Lord -Buckhurst, Sir James Crofts, Sir Ralph Sadler, Sir Walter Mildmay, Sir -Amyas Paulet, and the Latin Secretary, Wolley.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Kingsley, <i>Westward Ho</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>Institutes</i>, Fourth Part, Chap. 1.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> These figures are taken from Barrow’s Life of Drake.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> We hear of thirty-three-pounders and even sixty-pounders -in the Queen’s ships. Whereas the Spanish admiral, sending to Parma for -balls, asks for nothing heavier than ten pounds.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> The Earl of Sussex, after inspecting the preparations for -defence in Hampshire towards the end of 1587, writes to the Council that -he had found nothing ready. The “better sort” said, “We are much charged -many ways, and when the enemy comes we will provide for him; but he will -not come yet.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Sir Edward Radcliffe to the Earl of Sussex.—<i>Ellis</i>, 2nd -Series, vol. iii. p. 142.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> The story of the ring, said to have been intercepted by -Lady Nottingham, has been shown to be unworthy of belief. See Ranke, -<i>History of England</i>, vol. i. p. 352; transl.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> The increase was not so great as it appears. A subsidy -with two tenths and fifteenths in the thirteenth year of the reign -yielded £175,000; in the forty-third only £134,000.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_18_18" id="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> Elizabeth made large use of the courage and fidelity of -her kinsmen on the Boleyn side, but she did little to advance them -either in rank or wealth. Hunsdon had set his heart on regaining the -Boleyn Earldom of Wiltshire. When he was dying, Elizabeth brought the -patent and robes of an earl, and laid them on his bed; but the choleric -old man replied, “Madam, seeing you counted me not worthy of this honour -while I was living, I count myself unworthy of it now I am dying.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_19_19" id="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> Son of Catherine Grey by the Earl of Hertford. “Rascal” at -that time meant a person of low birth.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_20_20" id="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> Bacon, <i>In felicem memoriam Elizabethæ</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_21_21" id="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> Carlyle, <i>Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell</i>, Speech -v.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_22_22" id="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> As Earl of Surrey commanded at Flodden.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_23_23" id="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> Minister of Henry <small>VIII</small>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_24_24" id="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> The Poet. Beheaded by Henry <small>VIII</small>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_25_25" id="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> Married Duke of Richmond, natural son of Henry <small>VIII</small>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_26_26" id="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> Beheaded by Elizabeth. Title forfeited.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_27_27" id="Footnote_27_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> Earl of Arundel in right of his mother 1st wife of father. -Died in Tower.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_28_28" id="Footnote_28_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_28"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> Lord Walden in right of his mother 2nd wife of father.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_29_29" id="Footnote_29_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_29"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> “Belted Will,” married co-heiress of Lord Dacre of -Naworth.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_30_30" id="Footnote_30_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_30"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> Elizabeth Howard married Sir Thomas Boleyn created Earl of -Wiltshire and Ormonde by Henry <small>VIII</small>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_31_31" id="Footnote_31_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_31"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> Lord Admiral. Created Lord Effingham by Mary.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_32_32" id="Footnote_32_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_32"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> Lord Admiral. Commanded against Armada. Created Earl of -Nottingham by Elizabeth.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_33_33" id="Footnote_33_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_33"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> Created Earl of Northampton by James <small>I</small>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_34_34" id="Footnote_34_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_34"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> Created Earl of Wiltshire and Ormonde by Henry <small>VIII.</small></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_35_35" id="Footnote_35_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_35"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> Daughter of 2nd Duke of Norfolk.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_36_36" id="Footnote_36_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_36"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> Beheaded by Henry <small>VIII.</small></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_37_37" id="Footnote_37_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_37"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> Elizabeth’s Minister and General.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_38_38" id="Footnote_38_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_38"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> Carried news of Elizabeth’s death to James; created by him -Earl of Monmouth.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_39_39" id="Footnote_39_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_39"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> Said to have withheld Essex’s ring from Elizabeth.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_40_40" id="Footnote_40_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_40"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> Beheaded by Elizabeth.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_41_41" id="Footnote_41_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_41"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> Daughter of Sir Francis Walsingham and widow of Sir Philip -Sidney.</p></div> -</div> - -<p><a name="transcrib" id="transcrib"></a></p> - -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" summary="" -style="padding:2%;border:3px dotted gray;"> -<tr><th align="center">Typographical errors corrected by the etext transcriber:</th></tr> -<tr><td align="center">that to establish a permanent raw=> that to establish a permanent war {pg 36}</td></tr> -<tr><td align="center">Mary believed that in every country=> Mary believed that in every county {pg 53}</td></tr> -<tr><td align="center">They were in fact created a Provisional Government=> They were in fact creating a Provisional Government {pg 176}</td></tr> -</table> - -<hr class="full" /> - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's Queen Elizabeth, by Edward Spencer Beesly - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK QUEEN ELIZABETH *** - -***** This file should be named 50982-h.htm or 50982-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/0/9/8/50982/ - -Produced by Chuck Greif and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images available at The Internet Archive) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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