diff options
| author | nfenwick <nfenwick@pglaf.org> | 2025-02-05 06:30:53 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | nfenwick <nfenwick@pglaf.org> | 2025-02-05 06:30:53 -0800 |
| commit | 49b1da100dccc5f465eb941d085704d504a3eafe (patch) | |
| tree | 1cd48e800326edc7f99141bea91013d0fa4323b6 /old/50956-8.txt | |
| parent | 0b28a2a9994eadcb3de4af08d40a600b5f192600 (diff) | |
Diffstat (limited to 'old/50956-8.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | old/50956-8.txt | 1812 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1812 deletions
diff --git a/old/50956-8.txt b/old/50956-8.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 6f01326..0000000 --- a/old/50956-8.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1812 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook, Russia's Part in the World War, by C. M. -Shumsky-Solomonov - - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - - -Title: Russia's Part in the World War - - -Author: C. M. Shumsky-Solomonov - - - -Release Date: January 18, 2016 [eBook #50956] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - - -***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK RUSSIA'S PART IN THE WORLD WAR*** - - -E-text prepared by Brian Coe, Moti Ben-Ari, and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images generously made -available by Internet Archive (https://archive.org) - - - -Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this - file which includes the original illustrations. - See 50956-h.htm or 50956-h.zip: - (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/50956/50956-h/50956-h.htm) - or - (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/50956/50956-h.zip) - - - Images of the original pages are available through - Internet Archive. See - https://archive.org/details/russiaspartinwor00shum - - -Transcriber's note: - - Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_). - - Text enclosed by equal signs is in bold face (=bold=). - - - - - -RUSSIA'S PART IN THE WORLD WAR - -by - -COLONEL C. M. SHUMSKY-SOLOMONOV - - - - - - - -Published by the -Russian Information Bureau in the U. S. -Woolworth Building -New York City - -Copyright 1920 -by -Russian Information Bureau -New York - - - - -Introduction - - -The author of this pamphlet, Colonel C. M. Shumsky-Solomonov, is an -officer of the Russian Army, a distinguished soldier and an authority -on military problems. Col. Shumsky-Solomonov was one of the defenders -of Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War, and as a military expert -of the Petrograd daily, "Birjeviya Viedomosti", he was well known not -only in Russia but also throughout Europe. - -The purpose of this pamphlet is to present Russia's part in the recent -War. Russia at present lies in seas of blood and tears because of -her enormous sacrifices in the struggle against Prussian militarism. -The nightmare of Bolshevism was able to overtake Russia because she -was exhausted by three years of active participation in the War, -during which her casualties reached 12,000,000, and her economic life -became overstrained and partially destroyed. Russia's present pitiful -condition is the result of her self-sacrificing services to humanity. - -According to the data quoted by Col. Shumsky-Solomonov, of the -12,000,000 Russian casualties in the recent War, not less than -3,000,000 were in dead. "Russia's losses," says Col. Shumsky-Solomonov, -"are more than twice those of France, four-five times those of England, -and more than thirty-five times those of America. Russia's losses are -more than twice the total strength of the British Army, and three-four -times all the forces mustered by the United States. The number of -Russia's casualties is larger than the total population of any of -the following European countries: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, -Belgium, Holland or the Balkan States." - -If Russia had not sacrificed 3,000,000 of her best youth, now sleeping -on the battle-fields of Europe, a Prussian bayonet would now be ruling -the world. As Col. Shumsky-Solomonov points out, the great role -played by Russia in the recent struggle "became apparent at the very -beginning of the War, in the important aid she rendered in frustrating -the initial and most dangerous plan of the Germans, by her early -offensive in aid of the Allies. Russia, having diverted against herself -the entire Austrian army and part of the German, at the time of the -battle on the Marne, through her offensive in East Prussia and Galicia, -deprived the enemy of the opportunity to realize the fundamental idea -of Moltke's plan to fling 'all forces into France.'" - -"At the following attempt of the enemy to find a decision in France, -to break through to Calais, at Ypres," says Col. Shumsky-Solomonov, -"Russia, by the blows she delivered in Galicia, at Warsaw and in East -Prussia, contributed to the early termination of this second offensive -in France, so dangerous to England, and compelled the Germans for more -than a year to abstain from their main operations on the main decisive -front of the War--in France. - -"In 1915 Russia, having shouldered alone the whole burden of the -struggle against Germany, Austria and Turkey, although forced to -abandon Poland, still gave the Allies the opportunity to prepare -throughout a whole year for the coming German offensive at Verdun. -In 1916 Russia, thanks to the Brusilov offensive, saved Italy at -that critical moment when the Austrians, through their successful -offensive from Tyrol, in the rear of the Italians, threatened to -cut off a considerable portion of the Italian Army, at the same -time menacing Venice. Together with this, Russia by this offensive -greatly facilitated the operations of the Allies on the Somme, and was -instrumental in the final clearing of the Verdun forts. - -"In the same year Russia took upon herself the blows of Mackensen's and -Falkenhayn's armies, which had invaded Roumania, stopped the further -advance of the Germans, and undertook the defense of a considerable -stretch of the Roumanian front." - -In the beginning of the War, in August, 1914, there were, in addition -to the Austrian Army, only 14 German divisions engaged on the Russian -front. During the first Russian advance into Eastern Prussia, the -German General Staff was obliged, on the eve of the battle of the -Marne, to transfer 6 additional divisions to the Eastern front. -The number of German divisions engaged on the Russian front grew -continuously, and in October, 1914, there were 25 divisions, in -November--33 divisions, in December--43 divisions, and in January, -1915,--53 German divisions on the Russian front. The role played by -Russia and the services the Russian Armies rendered in the struggle -against Prussian Imperialism can be seen further from the fact that -during the spring of 1917 there were 162 German and Austrian divisions -engaged on the Russian front alone, while on all the other Allied -fronts together there were 205 German and Austrian divisions.[1] - -To this it must be added that Russia entered the War unprepared for a -modern struggle. As Col. Shumsky-Solomonov points out, "The Russian -Army consisted of millions, but bayonets and guns it had only for -one-tenth of its number." General Brusilov once said: "Our soldiers -had no shells with which to blast their way across barbed-wire -entanglements before an attack; so it was necessary for them to break -down the wires with their own bodies and thus to form a bridge for -the next attacking column." In the fall of 1917 the Russian Armies -collapsed after months of intensive German and Bolshevist propaganda, -but this cannot minimize the great heroism of the Russian soldiers -during the first three years of the War, heroism without which the -alliance of the democratic nations would never have been able to defeat -the Prussian militarism. - - A. J. SACK - _Director of the Russian Information - Bureau in the U. S._ - -May 25, 1920. - - - - -Russia's Part in the World War - - -Was it Possible for Germany to Win the War? - -In discussing Russia's role in the past World War, it is customary to -cite the losses sustained by the Russian Army, losses numbering many -millions. There is no doubt that Russia's sacrifices were great, and -it is just as true that her losses were greater than those sustained -by any of the other Allies. Nevertheless, these sacrifices are by far -not the only standard of measurement of Russia's participation in -this gigantic struggle. Russia's role must be gauged, first of all, -by the efforts made by the Russian Army to blast the German war plans -during the first years of the War, when neither America, nor Italy, nor -Roumania were among the belligerents, and the British Army was still in -the process of formation. - -Russia's role must in addition be gauged by the efforts put forth by -the Russian Army to save the situation at other critical moments of -the War. And of such, we know, there were not a few until the Allies -succeeded in gaining their victory over the stubborn and powerful enemy. - -Lastly, and this is the main thing, the role played by the Russian Army -must be considered also in this respect that the strenuous campaign -waged by Russia, with her 180 millions of inhabitants, for three years -against Germany, Austro-Hungary and Turkey, sapped the resources of -the enemy and thereby made possible the delivery of the final blow. -This weakening of the powers of the enemy by Russia was already bound -at various stages of the War to facilitate correspondingly the various -operations of the Allies. Therefore at the end of the War three years -of effort on the part of Russia, which had devoured the enemy's forces, -were destined to enable the Allies finally to crush the enemy. The -final catastrophe of the Central Powers was the direct consequence -of the offensive of the Allies in 1918, but Russia made possible this -collapse to a considerable degree, having effected, in common with the -others, the weakening of Germany, and having consumed during the three -years of strenuous fighting countless reserves, forces and resources of -the Central Powers. - -Could Germany have won the war? A careful analysis of this question -brings home the conviction that Germany was very close to victory, and -that it required unusual straining of efforts on the part of France and -Russia to prevent Germany from "winning out." - -The plan of the old Field Marshal, Moltke, was far from worthless. -It is a fact that it took from six weeks to two months to mobilize -the armed forces of Russia, during which period Russia was unprepared -for action. The population of Germany was 70 million and that of -Austria-Hungary 52 million, a total of 122 million persons. During -these two months of forced inaction those 122 millions of Teutons were -faced only by 40 million Frenchmen, for Russia was not yet ready. A -threefold superiority in numbers, in addition to an equal degree of -military skill, technical equipment and culture, was bound to crush -lone France. - -It is true that for the complete realization of this scheme it was -necessary that the Austrian Army, as well, involve France. This should -have been anticipated, as military science does not admit of the -division of forces. Just to the contrary, it demands "the concentration -of all forces in the decisive hour and at the deciding point,"--in -France, upon this particular occasion. - -It may be said that Russia could have occupied Galicia and East Prussia -had the Austrian Army left for France. Well, the fact is that both -these provinces were occupied by Russia anyhow. But if in the first -battle of the Marne, when the Germans felt the shortage of the two or -three corps dispatched back into Prussia, they would have had these -troops at their disposal in addition to half a million Austrians, -Joffre's condition would have been rendered critical. The loss of the -Marne would have been equivalent to the loss of the War by France, -and, consequently, to the loss of the entire War. - -The outcome was different. The concentrated attack upon France failed -because of the fact that of the 104 German divisions and the 50 -Austrian divisions only about 92 or 94 divisions were on the scene -of action in France. The Russian Army, unprepared for action for -another 40 days, nevertheless rushed into East Prussia in an impulse -of self-sacrifice and received in addition the full strength of the -blow from the Austro-Hungarian Army. This generous move on the part of -Russia destroyed the Moltke plan and his basic idea "the concentration -of _all forces_ against France", as a part of the German force had -been diverted from that front. The plan collapsed, and the only actual -chance which the Germans had of winning a victory was lost with it. -Later, when Russia was prepared, when the English Army began to grow, -and Italy, Roumania and America had abandoned their neutrality, -Germany's chances for a final victory vanished. - -It is the recognition of these facts that should prompt every impartial -historian of the War to admit that the self-sacrifice of the unprepared -Russian Army during the first days of the War played an enormous role -in the only period when Germany had victory almost within her grasp. It -is to be regretted that the extraordinary conditions which developed -in Russia towards the end of the War are obscuring the true historic -role of Russia in the sanguine World struggle. It is simple enough -to understand that during the two or three years, while the British -Army was still in the process of formation, and Italy, Roumania and -America were neutral, the entire burden of fighting the Central Powers -devolved upon the Armies of France and Russia. It is just as simple to -understand that during that period, when the enemy was most powerful -and undemoralized, when he was operating with his best troops, that the -most difficult and responsible part of the problem had to be performed. -It is just as easy--from an examination of the maps of the first three -years of the War, maps which speak only of two principal fronts, the -French and the Russian, and no other--to grasp the significance of the -gigantic role played in this War by great Russia and the millions of -sacrifices she consecrated to the common cause of the Allies. Sadly -enough, this only correct criterion of Russia's historic role in the -War is becoming more and more obscured from the public opinion of the -world. - -In the recently published memoirs of General Ludendorf, the defeated -German military leader, in an endeavor to clear himself, attempts -to slander the Russian Army and discredit all the great sacrifices -and heroic efforts contributed by Russia to the Allied cause. Taking -advantage of the scant familiarity of the general public with military -matters, Ludendorf uses false data, cites wrong figures and consciously -distorts the historic perspective of the War. - -It is difficult to understand how a serious-minded military leader can -stoop to employ, in a supposedly serious work, methods fit for the -yellow press, such as accusing Russian generals of treason, etc., etc. -These memoirs, as a whole, were met at the time of their publication by -sharp and adverse criticism in the foreign, and even the German, press. -Ludendorf's memoirs are especially misleading in the part describing -the first Russian advance in East Prussia, the advance that played such -a decisive role in the defeat which the Germans suffered on the Marne. -It should never be forgotten that this event proved fatal and brought -about the final defeat of the Germans in this sonov.[2] - - -Russia's Sacrifice - -Ludendorf commences his recital of events on the Russian front with -the statement that in 1914, in East Prussia, with a force of only two -German corps, he destroyed 250,000 Russians--six army corps--under the -command of General Samsonov, and that General Rennenkampf, who was only -within two or three days' march from Samsonov, had designedly failed to -aid Samsonov. - -This statement by General Ludendorf is absolutely false from beginning -to end. It can be very easily proven that Ludendorf attacked Samsonov -not with two army corps, but with more than 240,000 German troops. With -this army he attacked not 250,000 Russians, but only two Russian army -corps, i. e., 80,000 men--the 1st and the 6th Russian Army Corps. Thus, -Ludendorf had a force three times larger than his adversary. - -It may be easily seen from this that while Ludendorf gives Samsonov -twice as many men as he had in reality, he, at the same time, credits -Rennenkampf with three times the number he actually had. His own force -Ludendorf puts, on paper, at one-third of what he had in fact. - -Rennenkampf knew nothing about the events on the Samsonov front until -August 30, whereas the latter was surrounded on August 28. (See Gurko's -book, "War and Revolution.") - -The cause of the Russian defeat in that battle was not the "genius" -of Ludendorf, but lay rather in the fact that the Russian Army, _in -its eagerness to relieve Paris, advanced too quickly, with not fully -mobilized and insufficient forces, and in two separate Armies_, coupled -with the difficulty of reconnoitering and obtaining information about -the enemy in a country where the entire population was in a state of -armed belligerency. The death of Samsonov and of a part of his staff -and the disruption of liaison were other causes.[3] - -In her haste to aid her Allies, Russia risked much, and she lost a -battle on account of the precariousness of the operation, insufficiency -of forces and an unfortunate accident. But she succeeded in diverting -several German corps from France, and the Russian blood shed at -Tannenberg thus helped win the First Battle of the Marne. - -It may thus be seen from the descriptions of the first battles in -East Prussia that Ludendorf, for the sake of German martial glory and -probably also for the glorification of his own role, makes use of a -very primitive and naive expedient. He multiplies the number of Russian -troops several times, and also diminishes his own forces several times. -This creates the impression that Ludendorf with "inconsiderable" forces -smashed the "many times larger" forces of the Russians. As a matter of -fact, however, as we have seen, Ludendorf had in these engagements, -1½, 2, and sometimes even 3 times as many men as the Russians. How -excessive this superiority of numbers was may be inferred from the fact -that the Germans themselves went to France with but 1½ times as many -men and that they considered this sufficient for a decisive victory -over the French Army. However, no matter how much Ludendorf may distort -the facts in his memoirs, he cannot refrain, albeit only by 2-3 words, -from mentioning the strategical catastrophe which overtook Germany -through the invasion of East Prussia by the Russian troops. Ludendorf -himself admits that "_the transfer of the two army corps from the -French front to Eastern Prussia had fatal consequences for Germany. The -German advance on France was turned into a retreat._" - -This admission from Ludendorf characterizes the importance of all the -events of the first few weeks of the War and it contains an involuntary -appreciation of the historic role and self-sacrificing efforts of -Russia. The enemy, albeit indirectly, admits that Russian blood was -not shed in vain on the fields of East Prussia; it was precisely -for this reason that Germany was unable to win the War at the only -moment at which she could ever have won, taking advantage of Russia's -unpreparedness and the temporary isolation of France. - -In conclusion, we must also point out that from a formal standpoint -Russia was not bound to fling herself into a risky operation in East -Prussia. The Russian Army, like any other Army, was bound to take the -field actively only after the completion of her mobilization, and this -early assistance was still less her duty as she herself was at the time -invaded by Austrian forces. - -But Russia regarded her alliance with France from a higher standpoint -than mere formal obligations. The justice of History--not the "history" -of Ludendorf--will in its own time record how far Russia stood from -egotistic politics and egotistic strategy during those tragic days of -August and September, 1914, when the German masses, smashing every -obstacle in their path, moved through northern France on Paris. - - -The German Defeat at Warsaw - -The battle of Ypres, the determined operations of the Germans for the -capture of Calais, is the other critical moment in the history of the -World War, when Russia once more brought heavy sacrifices to the common -cause of the Allies. Ludendorf, in describing these difficult days for -the Germans, again makes use, we regret to say, of the same unsavory -expedient he used in describing the first engagements in East Prussia. - -Thus, for instance, he asserts that when he was defeated in October, -1914, at Warsaw, the Russians had 1,200,000 men,[4] while he had only -one German army--the 9th--and one Austrian army--the 1st. As a matter -of fact, the Russians were opposed, on the entire front, by five -Austrian armies and two German armies--the 8th and the 9th--by more -than 70 divisions approximating about 1,200,000 men. The Russians, -having left only a small force to oppose four Austrian armies, fell -with their three armies upon two enemy armies, one German and one -Austrian, near Warsaw. With a numerical superiority of one and a -quarter to one the Russians defeated the Germans, and threw them back -across the whole of Poland to Posen. The Germans saved themselves on -that occasion only by destroying the railroads back of them and by -burning the bridges. - -The significance of the operations at Warsaw and in Galicia in October, -and beyond Warsaw in November, 1914, is to be seen from Ludendorf's -own story. Referring to a conversation he had with General Falkenhayn, -who at that time was the main leader of all German Army operations, -he writes in his memoirs: "At the end of October, 1914, General von -Falkenhayn summoned me to Berlin.... _Gen. von Falkenhayn spoke -hopefully of the attack near Ypres_, and wanted to defer further -decisions." - -But already in the beginning of November, i. e., a few days after this -conversation, the operations of the Russian Armies in Galicia, the -Posen territory, and on the East Prussian front, greatly diminished -the hopefulness of Falkenhayn and _compelled him to slacken the -pressure against the Allies at Ypres and to transfer large forces -from France to the Russian front--to the detriment of the offensive -against Ypres_. Ludendorf himself figures these reinforcements which -arrived from France in the middle of November, and, consequently, must -have left there in the beginning of November, at 225,000 men. There -were 4 corps with 2 infantry divisions, which Ludendorf figures at -225,000 men. Besides, Ludendorf mentions right here the arrival of -Richthofen's Cavalry Corps, Hollen's Cavalry Corps, the 2nd and 4th -Cavalry Divisions. Still earlier Ludendorf mentions that the newly -formed 25th Reserve Corps and the 15th Reserve Corps were dispatched -to East Prussia. And finally, in still another place, we can find in -Ludendorf's account a number of other new divisions which had been sent -to the Russian front instead of to Ypres. - -In this manner it is easy to see, from the data furnished by Ludendorf -himself, that, "hopeful" at the end of October for the success of -the attack on Ypres, Falkenhayn found it necessary to dispatch from -France 300,000 additional soldiers to the Russian front, aside from -the reserves taken from the interior of Germany, which forces would -also have been welcome to the Germans during the fateful days at -Ypres. While the frontal attacks on Ypres, attended by considerable -casualties, demanded the presence of large German reserves, these -reserves were the very ones which were swallowed up entirely by the -Russian operations in the East, at Warsaw, Galicia and East Prussia. - -[Illustration: While the Russian troops were persecuting the defeated -Austrians in Galicia, General Hindenburg began an advance towards -Warsaw. The Russian General Staff transferred from Galicia three -armies for the defense of Warsaw, and these armies defeated the two -Austro-German armies and persecuted them through Poland up to the -border of Germany (October, 1914).] - -If the firmness of the Allies held back the Germans at Ypres and -prevented them from breaking through to Calais, the Russian Army also -played an important part in this strategic situation--compelling -the Germans to abandon the operation at Ypres much earlier than the -Germans and Falkenhayn had figured. But not in this alone was the role -of Russia apparent in the trying days of October and November, 1914. -Not only did Russia force the Germans to transfer 300,000 soldiers -to the East, and to abandon early the operations in France, but she -also compelled the Germans, by her operations in 1914, _to abandon for -more than a year all large offensives in the West_. This is attested -not only by the facts (as is well known, from the end of 1914 up to -February, 1916, the Germans did not start any offensive in France), but -by Ludendorf himself, notwithstanding all his endeavors to discredit -the Russian Army. - -Speaking of the weakness of the German front in the West in the month -of November, Ludendorf says that it was perfectly natural "that in -this situation our eyes should again turn to the East."... Further on -he adds that he had asked himself whether it were not better "once and -for all to restrict operations on the Western front to a defensive and -to carry out the contemplated operations against Russia with all our -available forces.... This point of view seemed to me to be the right -one, and I asked our High Command for reinforcements from the West...." -Thus, such facts as the abandonment by the Germans of all operations -in the West for more than a year, as well as Ludendorf's own words, -prove with absolute clearness and conclusiveness that the Germans, -partly through the firmness of the Allies, but mainly on account of -the hard blows from the Russian Army, found themselves compelled for a -long time to refrain from an offensive in France. There is no doubt -but that the Germans never abandoned entirely the attempt to crush -France, for we have seen how such a serious attempt was made by them -subsequently at Verdun. But if they were compelled at the end of 1914 -to defer this attempt at crushing France for more than a year, it is -obvious that the decisive part in this decision of the Germans was -played by Russia, in the increasing offensive of her Armies all along -the front from the Baltic to the Carpathians. - -[Illustration: This diagram shows that the Germans had calculated, at -first, to stop the Russian Army with the aid of the Austrian troops -and only 14 of their own divisions--13 infantry and one cavalry -divisions. Soon, in September, 1914, they were compelled to forward 6 -more divisions to the East,--during the Marne period. Later, when the -Austrians were defeated, the number of German relief columns increased -and numbered, at the end of 1914, 43 divisions, instead of the former -14 divisions,--three times as many. Early in 1915 the number of German -divisions grew to 53. During 1916 and 1917 the number of the German -troops on the Russian front was also increasing incessantly, at the -expense of German strength on the French front.] - -_Thus, if the taking of the field by unprepared Russia in the beginning -of the War contributed to the defeat of the most dangerous and main -plan of the Germans, in August and September, the new sacrifices -brought by Russia in October and November on the plains of Galicia, -Poland and East Prussia compelled the Germans to desist for more than a -year from all attempts to win the War in France. August and September, -1914, were the months in which the German forces were brought to a -standstill, and October and November saw them already much impaired._ -At both important, critical moments Russia played her decisive part. - -_At this same period, towards the close of 1914, the Germans were -compelled by the operations of the Russian Army to increase the number -of their troops on the Russian front up to 43 divisions. If the Germans -were unable in the beginning of the War to win out in France where they -had all their forces, allotting to the Russian front only 14 divisions -and the Austrian Army, so much the less could they have won at the end -of 1914, when the Russians had compelled them to have 43 divisions in -the field, that is, to treble their forces on the Russian front, to the -detriment of their French front._ - - -New Opportunities for the Allies - -The third great period of the world-conflict--1915--is the year of -Russia's single-handed fight against Germany, Austria and Turkey. This -year was hardest for Russia not only because all attention and all -efforts of the three enemy powers were directed against Russia alone, -but also because in 1915 Russia was less than ever before prepared -for the struggle--being without arms, shells and munitions. No matter -how much Ludendorf may distort the truth in his memoirs, the whole -world knows that in that year the Russian positions were covered not -by barbed wire entanglements, but by the naked breasts of the Russian -soldiers, and German charges were repulsed not by artillery barrages -but by the bayonet, by cold steel--reminding us of the times when the -Mexicans, armed only with spears, fought against the rifles and cannon -of the Spaniards under Fernando Cortez. - -Russia's loss of Poland in 1915 is altogether a result of this -situation, unprecedented in any of the wars fought by European nations. -It was hard to gain victory when the shortage of arms was so great that -some corps counted but 1,500 bayonets instead of 40,000, and at the -same time it was impossible to complement these corps with their quota -of men because these men had no rifles. - -Russia had called millions to the colors, but had rifles only for -one-tenth of her men. It is only too obvious that nothing could be -accomplished with millions of men of whom only one in ten was armed. -But in 1916, when Russia acquired rifles and artillery, Brusilov -launched his memorable offensive which netted more than 200,000 -prisoners. Another great offensive was in preparation for 1917, but the -Revolution interfered with its realization. - -However that may be, the Germans had planned to have done with Russia -by confronting it with Austrian armies and with four or five additional -German corps. But already in 1914 the Germans were compelled to keep 19 -corps in the East to the detriment and dislocation of their plans and -forces in France. (See diagrams No. 3,4.) Even during the days of the -Revolution the Germans were obliged to maintain 78½ divisions on the -Eastern front, in addition to 47 Austrian and 15 Turkish, altogether -140 infantry and 22 cavalry divisions, while on the Anglo-French -front the enemy had at that time only 142 divisions. If we take into -consideration all the Russian theatres of war, including those in Asia, -the enemy kept on the Russian fronts 164 infantry divisions and 28 -cavalry divisions,--altogether 192 divisions (in May, 1917) while on -the Anglo-French front the enemy had in May, 1917, only 142 divisions. - -[Illustration: THE NUMBER OF GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN DIVISIONS ON THE -RUSSIAN AND OTHER ALLIED FRONTS DURING SPRING OF 1917 - - INFANTRY CAVALRY TOTAL - ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT - IN EUROPE 125 22 147 - IN ASIA 15 15 - ---- - 162 - - ON OTHER ALLIED FRONTS - FRENCH-BELGIAN 140 2 142 - ITALIAN 36 36 - SALONIKI 17 17 - MESOPOTAMIAN 10 10 - ---- - 205 - -This diagram shows that in 1917--the beginning of the Russian -Revolution--there were 162 German, Austrian, Turkish and Bulgarian -divisions on the Russian front, 147 of whom were on the Russian front -in Europe. On the Anglo-French front there were at this time only 142 -German divisions. - -The enemy forces were thus divided as follows: on the Russian front, -44 per cent.; on the Anglo-French front, 39 per cent.; on the Italian -front, 10 per cent.; on the Salonika front, 4½ per cent., and on the -Mesopotamian front--about 2½ per cent. Thus, early in 1917 the Russian -Army had opposing it about one-half of all the forces of the Central -Powers. - -It is clearer that if these Teutonic forces would be able to -concentrate on the French front, it would mean an immediate breakdown -of the Allies and the triumph of the Prussian militarism throughout the -civilized world.] - -Notwithstanding the lack of arms and munitions the Russian Army -rendered the Allies, in the critical days of 1915, assistance that was -not less important and serious than that of the days of the Marne and -Ypres. Russia, by diverting upon herself, towards the close of 1914, -all the efforts of the Central Powers, thereby offered France and -England the opportunity for a whole year to prepare for the prosecution -of the War. Throughout 1915, when Germany, Austria and Turkey were -diverted by Russia, France was enabled quickly to accumulate new -reserves, munitions, shells, to recover from the serious wounds of -1914, and to prepare for that inevitable blow from Germany which -subsequently took the form of a determined offensive at Verdun in 1916. - -At the same time England, owing to the fact that Russia had in 1915 -taken upon herself the whole burden of the struggle, was enabled in -the course of one year to carry out Kitchener's stupendous plan of -expanding the small, 150 thousand-strong English Army of volunteers -into the four million-strong Army of the English nation in arms. On -the other hand Germany, having called to the colors new reserves, was -compelled by Russia to expend these reserves on the Russian front, and -not on the main front, in France, where the fate of the whole War was -to be decided for Germany. - -All these opportunities, all this stupendous preparation in the -creation and development of new armed forces by the Allies, took place -undisturbed and in favorable circumstances, solely because 1915 was -the year of Russia's single-handed fight against three enemy powers, -the year of the greatest self-sacrifice of the Russian Army for the -common cause. Who knows what might have been the result of the German -offensive in France had those German reserves which perished in Russia -broken through somewhere in the north of France simultaneously with the -storming of Verdun, in February. Who knows how far the German military -catastrophe might have been averted had all the fresh reserves of -the Germans, which were being incessantly swallowed up by the Russian -front, found themselves in the West! - -To these questions Ludendorf himself happens to give the answers in his -memoirs. Speaking of the offensive of the Germans at Verdun and of the -offensive of the Austrians in Italy, he says: "Both offensives suffered -from the fact that inadequate reserves prevented the first successes -from being followed up." - -Where did these reserves, which were lacking for the capture of Verdun, -where did they go to after Germany had in 1915 created a great many new -formations? _In 1915 they were swallowed up by the Russian front during -the German offensive in Poland, and the Verdun operation was frustrated -because, as Ludendorf declares, there were no reserves with which to -develop the first success of the Germans._ For this reason the unbiased -investigator will admit that Russia in 1915 contributed to a tremendous -extent towards the calm and systematic preparation of the Allies for -the decisive German blow, struck at Verdun, but planned to go beyond -Paris. If the firm stand of the French at Verdun, if the talent of -Castelnau, who stopped the withdrawal of the French to the other bank -of the Meuse, directly repulsed the attack of the Germans, the true -ally, Russia, certainly aided by diverting upon herself all the German -reserves in 1915 and giving the Allies a whole year of respite in which -to create new armed forces. - -_The Russian front incessantly drew to itself all new German formations -and reserves, and thereby automatically forced the German Army in the -West to carry on unproductive operations which never reached their -objective._ Not one single German operation in France could obtain -full development, and inevitably spent itself just because of lack of -reserves which were always opportunely swallowed by the Russian front. - -Turning to the operations of 1915 we see that the Germans, -notwithstanding all their efforts and partial successes, never gained -any decisive results on the Russian front. The Russian Army, having -neither munitions nor arms, was naturally unable to win at this time, -and was compelled to retreat from Poland. But the Russian Army was not -crushed, which, however, had been the main objective of Ludendorf's -offensive. - -In his memoirs Ludendorf plainly states: "The German General Staff now -resolved to try to obtain a decision against Russia." This, translated -from military parlance into plain English, simply means that it was the -object to settle, to "finish" with Russia, in other words, to crush -her Army, for otherwise there would have been no sense in starting -operations against Russia, and in wasting against her the reserves so -much needed on the main front, against France. Neither does Ludendorf -conceal this object further on in his memoirs, _but he admits that it -was not accomplished_. For this failure he blames General Falkenhayn, -the Chief of the General Staff, who, it was supposed, prevented -Ludendorf from crushing the Russian Army. We shall not enter into the -personal disputes between Ludendorf and Falkenhayn, whom Ludendorf -throughout criticises sharply. We shall only note that Ludendorf -attempted four times during the summer of 1915 to surround or break -through the several retreats of the Russian Army, but the latter in -every instance retreated in perfect order, carrying their arms with -them. In which one of these four instances, then, did Falkenhayn -interfere? How preposterous this shifting of the blame to Falkenhayn -is, may be seen even from Ludendorf's own statement: "Throughout the -whole War we never succeeded, either on the Eastern or Western front, -in exploiting a big break-through to the full!" In this way he himself -admits that the Germans did not even once succeed, at the proper time, -in utilizing a big success to the full, i. e., Falkenhayn's role was -immaterial. It is but natural that the resistance of the Russians in -1915 prevented the Germans from exploiting that success which they -regarded as a big one, but which, as a matter of fact, consisted -only in the systematic retreat of the Russian Army which was without -arms and munitions. However, the most inopportune statement made by -Ludendorf is contained in the following remark of his concerning the -operations against the Russians in 1915: "We had brought the final -overthrow of Russia a step nearer." - -The offensive of Brusilov in the following year, which netted him -more than 200,000 prisoners and made Ludendorf, as he himself says, -frequently worry about the fate of the entire Austro-German front in -Russia, demonstrates how the offensive of Ludendorf in 1915 hastened -"the final overthrow of Russia." On the contrary, this offensive which -cost Ludendorf a great many of his reserves, and afforded a year of -quiet preparation to the Allies, did, as we saw, hasten "the final -overthrow of Germany." - -_At this period of the campaign of 1915 there were on the Russian front -67 German divisions and up to 40 Austrian, altogether 107 divisions, -and on the French front about 110 divisions. The Germans could not -defeat the Allies in the beginning of the War, although they had -then in France almost all their forces. It is natural that in 1915, -when they had in France only 50 per cent. of their total forces, the -Germans, through the efforts of Russia, were finally deprived of any -chance of winning in France. It was only through Russia's military -operations that the Germans were driven to such an unfavorable, -hopeless grouping of their forces._ - - -Again Opportunities for the Allies - -In the following year, 1916, Russia once more came forward with -her assistance at a critical moment, when the Austrians had broken -the resistance of the Italian Armies on the Asiago-Arsiero front, -threatening a further development of their offensive in the rear of the -Italian Army, in the direction of Venice. At the same time Ludendorf in -his memoirs points out how great were the objects which the Austrians -were aiming at on the Italian front, and he says plainly: "In Italy it -was a question of an operation on a grand scale." - -However, the Russian Army in 1916 had no intention of launching an -offensive on the Austrian front, and prepared for an offensive in -an altogether different place, on the German front. Our General -Staff had prepared for the main offensive in the direction of Vilna, -and accordingly it was here that troops and munitions were being -concentrated. (See Gurko's "War and Revolution.") - -Everything was ready when the Italians, crushed by the Austrians, -appealed to Russia for aid. An offensive on the Austrian front held -no particular interest for Russia, which naturally had in view the -crushing of the main enemy--the Germans. Still, Russia, just as on -previous occasions, did not hesitate a minute to help her Allies. -Notwithstanding that nothing had been prepared for such an offensive, -General Brusilov launched it along a front two hundred miles long, -with the troops he just happened to have on the spot. Everybody -remembers this celebrated offensive of Brusilov, which netted hundreds -of thousands of prisoners, a great number of other trophies, and -which compelled the Austrians to immediately abandon their offensive -in Italy and to begin the transfer of troops to the Russian front. -"Austria gradually broke off the Italian offensive and sent troops to -the Eastern front," writes Ludendorf. "The Italian Army now started a -counter-offensive in the Tyrol," he remarks further on. - -Describing the period of Brusilov's offensive, Ludendorf does not -conceal the fact that they passed through some very bad and critical -moments. "Our G. H. Q. made heavy demands on both groups (group south -of Riga and Prince Leopold group) _and also withdrew divisions from -the West_," writes Ludendorf. "Even all the fresh divisions that -were thrown in were hardly sufficient to hold the front," says he in -describing the situation of the Austro-Germans after the Russian break -through at the Dniester. "This was one of the greatest crises on the -Eastern front," says he further on, in speaking of the new break by -Brusilov at Lutzk. - -The effects of Brusilov's offensive proved to be so far-reaching as to -affect not only the situation on the Italian front but also that on the -French main front. The Allies, in view of the difficult situation of -the Germans on the Russian front, launched an offensive at the Somme, -and towards fall they had finally cleared the forts of Verdun of the -Germans. - -So did Russia once more fulfill her obligation towards her allies, -as soon as her Army had received some quantity of munitions. This -quantity was not yet sufficient in 1916, and it was only in 1917 that -the Russian troops were at last more or less provided. The lack of -munitions during the period of Brusilov's offensive was pointed out -by the Russian Staff, and Ludendorf himself emphasizes it. He writes -that the situation was relieved thanks to the fact that "the Russians -were also contending against extraordinary difficulty of supply." From -this it may be seen that the Russian Army, having obtained only the -first consignments of inconsiderable and insufficient munitions, did -not hesitate, in 1916, to offer her allies generous assistance on the -largest scale. - - * * * * * - -Still earlier, during the Verdun period, the Russian Army, not yet -recuperated from the hard blows of 1915, did by no means stand by as an -idle onlooker of the heroic efforts of the French at Verdun. When at -the end of February, 1916, French Headquarters appealed to the Russian -Army for assistance, preparations were begun for an offensive. "The -Russian Army had not lost its spirit after the heavy fighting of 1915," -says Ludendorf. On the 16th of March operations were begun by the -Russian troops in the territory to the northwest of Dvinsk, continuing -until the 26th of March. This partial offensive, solely in aid of the -French, was attended by success of a local nature. Ludendorf criticises -this operation and says that "it was choked in swamps and blood." Of -course, the terrible weather conditions, the rains and the impassable -roads, interfered with a broad development of this offensive, but still -it had a sufficiently serious effect. "From the 11th to the 21st of -March," acknowledges Ludendorf, "the situation of the 10th (German) -army was critical." - - -Salvation of Roumania - -At the close of 1916 the Russian Army again had to offer most effective -assistance at the critical moment of Mackensen's and Falkenhayn's -invasion of Roumania. General Alexeiev pointed out to the Roumanian -High Command the excessive length of the Roumanian frontier line which -rendered operations in the border district difficult for the small -Roumanian Army. General Alexeiev, as well as the Allied military -experts, advised the Roumanians to shorten their front line, by means -of a retreat, to a shorter line in the East which could be held by the -comparatively small Roumanian Army. But the Roumanians, calculating -upon a weakening of the Austrians, preferred to choose a new plan and -invaded vast Transylvania. - -[Illustration: This map shows the four places in which the Russian -Army, led by Gen. Brussiloff, broke through the Austro-German front in -the summer of 1916.] - -This too daring move, which at first met but feeble resistance, -was, however, soon checked by the enemy. When thereupon the enemy -himself took the offensive and invaded Roumania and began to threaten -Bucharest, the Roumanian representative at Russian headquarters, -General Coanda, appealed to Russia for aid. - -The Russian Army had not yet succeeded in recuperating from the effects -of its great summer offensive of 1916. Russia's reserves and supplies -had been to a considerable extent spent during the period of Brusilov's -offensive. Nevertheless Russia, again as always, did not hesitate -for one minute to come to the assistance of the Allies. The Russians -even proposed to take upon themselves the defense of the Roumanian -capital--Bucharest--but this offer was turned down by the Roumanians -with some show of embarrassment; they pointed out that the railroads -leading to Bucharest were blocked with evacuated freights from the -capital and could not therefore carry the Russian troops. Probably -certain political considerations played not a small part in this. - -However that might be, Russia did not refuse her aid in the form -desired by the Roumanians. From the long Russian front which, in turn, -stood in need of reserves, troops were taken off and sent to Roumania. -Two armies, under Letchitzki and Sakharov, and the great mass of -cavalry under Mannerheim, were assigned by the Russians to assist the -retreating Roumanians. This effective help by Russia achieved its -purpose, stopping the offensive of the enemy, and towards 1917 the -Russian Armies also took upon themselves the none too easy task of -defending the greater part of the Roumanian front. - -For the following year, 1917, Russia prepared for a decisive offensive -on the German front, in common with the Allies. That was the first -year that the Russian Army had at last obtained sufficient armaments -and supplies. The Germans realized that most serious danger threatened -them, and the Germano-Bolshevist provocation was now chosen as the -means of disarming Russia. And yet, even during those terrible days -of the collapse of the Russian Army and the Revolution, Russia was -indispensable to the Allies. - -During those revolutionary days of 1917 Russia compelled the enemy to -maintain on the Russian front =162 divisions= of German, Austrian, -Turkish and Bulgarian troops, to the enemy's detriment on the French -main front. On this front the enemy was enabled to maintain only =140 -divisions=. - -Russia, although sapped by the Germano-Bolshevist conspiracy, was still -formidable, and the enemy did not risk the moving of any of his troops -from the Russian front. Russia was growing faint, but that honest -Russia which had saved her allies in East Prussia, Galicia, on the -fields of Poland, Lithuania, Roumania, in the Caucasus and Armenia, did -not lay down her arms to the very last moment, remaining true to her -obligations. - - -Russia's Losses--12,000,000 - -From this brief outline one can readily see what great and numerous -objects Russia accomplished in the World War, and how important was -her role in that final collapse of the Central Powers at which the -Allies had been aiming in the four-year long struggle. In full accord -with these efforts are the extraordinary sacrifices brought by Russia, -sacrifices in men, sacrifices in material resources and money, and -finally, that great upheaval through which the Russian people are now -passing, as a result of their over-exertion in the years of the World -War. - -Among these sacrifices, Russia's losses in men run into such great -numbers that the immense, extraordinary part played by Russia becomes -at once obvious to anyone. - -Of the many different figures quoted by various investigators the most -reliable are undoubtedly those furnished by the official statistics of -the Russian Army Staff. - -Among these figures made public in the press the most important are -those given by the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, -pertaining to the year 1916, concerning the total number of mobilized -soldiers and the number of those still in the service. According to -this information, the Russian War Ministry called to the colors from -the outbreak of the War up to the winter of 1916 more than 14 million -men; but the commissary department of the Army had towards the close of -1916 less than 10 million on its rolls. The difference of 4½ million -between these two figures constituted the absolute losses of the Army -during 3 campaigns (1914, 15, 16). This gave the Staff the basis for -calculating the yearly average total losses at 1½ million men. Adding, -accordingly, 1½ million losses for 1917, we obtain 6 million total -losses during the whole War. - -But these are only the men who were a total loss to the Army, i. e., -the losses in killed and prisoners, without the wounded, except a -moderate number of crippled who were no longer fit for service at the -front nor for service out of the ranks, and who therefore had to be -discharged from the Army entirely. - -The total number of Russian war-prisoners towards the end of the -War, according to figures compiled by the Russian Commission on War -Prisoners, amounted to about 2½ million. Deducting this number from -6 million, we obtain 3½ million in killed and the small number of -crippled who were discharged entirely. - -This number, 3½ million, obtained from official statistics, is the -basis of our calculations. The percentage of disabled was comparatively -small. German statistics during the War figured it to be 10 per cent. -Hence the figure of 3½ million must comprize only a little less than 3 -million in killed alone. The number of wounded is usually approximately -2½ times the number of killed.[5] Multiplying the number of wounded not -by 2½, but only by 2, we obtain about 6 million wounded. Thus we have -a total of 6 million killed and prisoners, and 6 million wounded, or a -grand total of not less than 12 million losses for Russia, in killed, -wounded and prisoners. - -These figures are rather minimized, for we have above underestimated -the number of wounded. These figures, based upon official statistics, -agree with those arrived at by the "Copenhagen Society for Studying -the Consequences of the War." This society estimates the losses at 9½ -million, exclusive of prisoners. As we have shown above, there were 2½ -million prisoners. - -Thus there can be no doubt but that the number of Russian casualties -was _not less than 12,000,000_, of which there were _3,000,000 in -killed_. - -These losses are almost equal to the combined losses of our Allies.[6] - -Russia's losses are more than twice those of France, 4-5 times those -of England, and more than 35 times those of America. These losses are -more than twice the total strength of the British Army, and 3-4 times -all the forces mustered by the United States. This number of casualties -alone is larger than the total population of any of the following -European countries: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Belgium, -Holland, or the Balkan States! - -Thus do simple figures tell us clearly and plainly that Russia -sacrificed in the common cause of the Allies the greatest number of -victims and that she ranks first in the sad roster of Allied casualties. - -[Illustration: THE DEATH TOLL IN THE ALLIED ARMIES - -3,000,000 Russia -1,300,000 France - 700,000 England - 450,000 Italy - 100,000 Belgium - 100,000 Rumania - 100,000 Serbia & Montenegro - 50,000 United States of America] - - -Conclusion - -From this brief outline may be seen how tremendous and important a role -was played by Russia in the world conflict. Summing up the general -facts cited above, we arrive at the following definite conclusions: - -1.) Russia's role in the World War was bound to be very serious and -important for this reason alone, that the participation of a nation -numbering 180 million souls could not fail to be significant in itself, -and was therefore bound to exercise a tremendous influence upon the -outcome of the World War. - -2.) Accordingly, Russia's role became apparent even at the very -beginning of the War, in the important aid she rendered in frustrating -the initial and most dangerous plan of the Germans, by her early -offensive in aid of the Allies. Russia, having diverted against herself -the entire Austrian army and part of the German, at the time of the -battle on the Marne, through her offensive in East Prussia and Galicia, -deprived the enemy of the opportunity to realize the fundamental idea -of Moltke's plan to fling "all forces into France." The enemy, having -contrary to his plan moved on France with only a part of his forces, -inevitably suffered defeat. This cooperation on the part of Russia was -of tremendous significance, for the Germans based their plan on the -idea that they would at first have to deal only with France alone, on -one front only, whereas Russia compelled them at once to start the -War on two fronts, both with Russia and France. This made the initial -German war plan useless because strategy says plainly: "Errors in the -strategic deploying of forces in the beginning of a war have a decisive -influence and cannot be rectified until the war is over." From this -rule of strategy it is plain that Russia's operations in the beginning -of the war at the outset condemned Germany to lose the war. - -3.) At the following attempt of the enemy to find a decision in France, -to break through to Calais, at Ypres, Russia, by the blows she -delivered in Galicia, at Warsaw and in East Prussia, contributed to the -early termination of this second offensive in France, so dangerous to -England, and compelled the Germans for more than a year to abstain from -their main operations on the main decisive front of the War--in France. - -4.) In 1915 Russia, having shouldered alone the whole burden of the -struggle against Germany, Austria and Turkey, although forced to -abandon Poland, still gave the Allies the opportunity to prepare -throughout a whole year for the coming German offensive at Verdun. -At the same time, having compelled the Germans during 1915 to spend -all their fresh formations and reserves on the Russian front, Russia -thereby deprived the Germans of the reserves they needed for Verdun and -their other operations in France. - -5.) In 1916 Russia, thanks to the Brusilov offensive, saved Italy at -that critical moment when the Austrians, through their successful -offensive from Tyrol in the rear of the Italians, threatened to cut -off a considerable portion of the Italian Army, at the same time -menacing Venice. Together with this, Russia by this offensive greatly -facilitated the operations of the Allies on the Somme, and was -instrumental in the final clearing of the Verdun forts. - -6.) In 1916 Russia took upon herself the blows of Mackensen's and -Falkenhayn's armies which had invaded Roumania, stopped the further -advance of the Germans, and undertook the defense of a considerable -stretch of the Roumanian front. - -7.) Through a period of three years of struggle against Germany, -Austria and Turkey, Russia, having diverted the forces of the enemy, -afforded the Allies a long period of quiet for the preparation and -strengthening of the Allied Armies and for the systematic creation of -a new 4 million British Army. - -8.) Throughout this period of three years of struggle _Russia compelled -the enemy to spend on the Russian front such a stupendous amount of -force, reserves and munitions_ as to hasten the inevitable fall of -the enemy, and _this immensely facilitated the delivery of the final, -decisive blows by the Allies_. - -9.) Russia, incessantly drawing upon herself the forces of the enemy, -did not give him the opportunity for one minute from the very beginning -of the War to gather sufficient force for a decisive blow on the main, -decisive front--in France. The role of Russia, therefore, was clearly -apparent in the fact that she deprived Germany throughout the War of -the possibility to win and rendered futile every effort of the enemy in -this respect. - -10.) Corresponding with the most important role that Russia played in -the War are her enormous sacrifices in men, material and treasure. -Her losses in men, amounting to 12,000,000, exceed several times the -casualties of any of the Allies; are almost equal to the losses of -all the Allies combined; exceed several times the total number of men -mobilized by any one of the Allies.... - -11.) Russia's role in the recent war was so important and extraordinary -that _without Russia the very idea of a struggle with German militarism -would have been impossible_. Germany would have been able to crush any -combination of the European Powers if Russia had not participated in -such combination. Were it not for Russia, Germany would now dominate -not only Europe, but probably the rest of the world as well. - -12.) Russia's great role in the World War is so much the greater since -she fought under extraordinary circumstances, lacking so indispensable -an asset as a great network of railways, with a backward technique, -industry, etc. In the hard first years of the War the Russian Armies, -as we have seen, in extraordinary circumstances and frequently without -arms and munitions, did everything possible, and, together with -failures, had also their successes. - -Ludendorf was able to achieve success on the Russian front only when -the Germans outnumbered their adversaries by at least three to two. At -Tannenberg the Germans had twice as many and, at certain stages, even -three times as many men as the Russians. Against Rennenkampf Ludendorf -had three men to every two of his enemy, and probably even as many -as two to one, as Rennenkampf had suffered severe losses during the -preceding days. - -It is equally true that the Russians were able to defeat the Germans -whenever they had even a small superiority of force. Near Warsaw -the Russians had less than five men to every four Germans and they -succeeded in defeating the latter and throwing them clear across all -Poland. - -It may seem strange that the Germans should have managed to have -numerical superiority over the Russians all the time. Regrettable as -it may be, it is nevertheless true, for the strength of an army is -determined not by the number of its men, but by the number of bayonets -(infantry), sabres (cavalry) and guns (artillery). The Russian Army -consisted of millions, but bayonets and guns it had only for one-tenth -of its number. In 1915 some Russian divisions numbered, instead of -20,000 bayonets, only a mere thousand, owing to disastrous losses. The -only employment of infantry during those days was as a screen for the -artillery, while the latter was quite useless for fighting purposes -because it had no ammunition whatever. Under such conditions many of -our corps often did not exceed the strength of a single regiment and -some armies numbered no more effectives than a single division. We -had plenty of men, but no arms and ammunition. Therefore, the Germans -frequently surpassed us not in men, but in bayonets and guns. - -The tragedy of the Russian situation lay in the cruel fact that Russia, -while only one-tenth of her Armies were armed, was facing Germany -and Austria, who were armed from head to foot. Not Ludendorf and not -his ordinary military skill were the causes of Russia's failures in -the first year of the War, but that simple and terrible truth which -Brusilov once expressed in the following words: "_The Russians had no -shells with which to blast their way across barbed-wire entanglements -before an attack; so it became necessary for them to break down the -wires with the bodies of Russian soldiers, and to form a bridge across -these dead bodies for the next attacking column._" - -[Illustration: The black line represents the Russian front in 1917. The -front stretched from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. The Roumanian -front was held also primarily by Russian troops.] - -We have concluded our sketch of Russia's participation in the World War -with 1917. But 1918 also has its story: in that year Russia was denied -a voice at the conference on that peace in the name of which Russia had -offered up so many sacrifices and made such efforts. - -We have seen how important and essential a part Russia played in the -overthrow of German militarism. Russia's tremendous role confirms -once more the elementary truth that in the future also Russia will -inevitably be a colossal factor of political and military equilibrium -in Europe. Whatever does happen to Russia, however they may dismember -her living body, the immense Russian nation, with 125 million souls of -pure Russian blood alone, will always remain that heavy military weight -which inevitably lowers that particular scale upon which it descends. - -It is true, Germany is now crushed and enfeebled. But we know that -victorious countries are now suffering not less, and some of them even -more, from the consequences of the most stupendous world conflict. - -Years will pass, and possibly but a few years, and again the world -will recuperate. We have no reason to expect that the active German -people will lag behind the rest in this work of reestablishing normal -conditions of life and labor. - -The Treaty of Versailles has not solved a good many problems, and among -them also those that were the cause of the World War. Notwithstanding -all partitioning, Germany still retains up to 60 million souls, but -France only a little more than 40 million. The population of Germany -has always been growing, while that of France, if it has not decreased, -has not increased. _After all, Germany has and will have a numerical -superiority over France of one and a half times._ - -France, well aware of that, tries to maintain an alliance with England, -and reckons upon the aid of America. But the statesmen of the West -realize how insufficient all this is, for they still remember well that -first critical month of the War when France was all alone and saved -herself only through extraordinary efforts. - -Until the United States arrives on the scene! Why, that inevitably -means months and months of waiting. Until the British Army is mobilized -and transported! Why, we know how difficult and tedious are the -conditions of embarkation and landing of troops, artillery, transport -columns, munitions, etc. We know that the 150,000 soldiers of the -British Army alone required, in August, 1914, more than three weeks for -disembarkation. And where? In three ports where everything was equipped -for disembarkation purposes, where ideal conditions prevailed such as -were hard to find in any other ports. - -Thus France, in the event of a new conflict with her old foe, will -again find herself for quite some time left all alone to face the -numerically superior enemy. Where will Russia be then? - -No Poland, no combination of any group of small States will be able to -take the place of Russia, for that would be a mere 15-20 millions; it -will be not Russia, but only one-seventh, a sixth, or fifth part of -that which Russia gave during the past War. These weak nations will -only become additional trophies to the enemy, just as Roumania, Serbia -and Belgium became his easy prey in the past War. - -Where will Russia be then? Not the present-day Russia bleeding to death -in its struggle against Bolshevism, but the future, once more powerful, -Russia?... - -Bolshevism, an abnormal phenomenon, is bound to come to an -end--somewhat earlier, or somewhat later. No matter how much may be -cut off from Russia, she will always remain an immense, great, rich, -and therefore powerful, country. Too much will depend upon what this -coming Russia may have to say, for any sensible statesman to refuse to -reckon with that eventuality. - -This question the statesmen of the West must ask of themselves clearly -and plainly--not those statesmen who think no further than the -following day and of the success of their fight against their political -opponents--but those wise leaders of the nations who really have at -heart the interests of their own countries, as well as of the entire -civilized world. "Ostrich politics" may least of all be applied in -dealing with that tremendous military and political factor which covers -one-sixth of the land surface of the globe and is called Russia. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] See diagrams on pp. 15 and 18. - -[2] See Appendixes No. I and II, in which an analysis of this part of -Ludendorf's Memoirs is given. - -[3] See Appendixes "Ludendorf--Samsonov" and "Ludendorf--Rennenkampf" -at the end of the pamphlet. - -[4] How preposterous is this figure of 1,200,000 men, supposed to have -been transferred by the Russians from Galicia to Warsaw, to oppose -Ludendorf, may be seen from the fact that only 3 railway lines run -from Galicia to Warsaw. It is not difficult to demonstrate that it is -impossible to carry 1,200,000 men on 3 railway lines within 2 weeks -(the offensive of the Germans against Warsaw began in the first days of -October, and the retreat began two weeks later, i. e., when the Russian -troops were transferred from Galicia to Warsaw). - -One army corps requires 140-150 trains. The best road in Russia can at -most carry 52 trains in 24 hours in one direction. Hence, to entrain -a corps would require 3 days. Consequently the most that could be -entrained within 15 days would be 5 corps to each railway line. Thus, -all 3 roads combined might have been able to carry up to 15 corps, but -actually, of course, they carried less than that. But even if we allow -the computation of 15 corps to stand, we have but 500-600 thousand men, -and not 1,200,000 as Mr. Ludendorf unhesitatingly allots. - -[5] According to figures submitted in 1916 by the army committee of -the German Reichstag, the German army lost during the first 12 months -of the War 604 thousand killed, 1,556,000 wounded, and 317 thousand -prisoners. This shows that the number of wounded is 2½ times the number -of killed. - -[6] According to the statistics of the "Copenhagen Society," the -French Army lost 1,350,000 in killed, the British--700,000, the -Italian--330,000, and each of the remaining Allies--100,000 and less. - - - - -Appendix No. I - -Ludendorf--Samsonov - - -1.) A careful perusal of Ludendorf's memoirs brings out the fact that -during the first Russian invasion of Eastern Prussia there participated -on the German side: the 1st, 17th, 20th and 1st Reserve Corps, the -3rd Reserve Division, the 6th Landwehr Brigade, Goltz's Division, the -garrisons of the Vistula fortresses,--Thorn, Kulm and Graudenitz, and a -brigade of cavalry. The German forces consisted, therefore, not of two -corps numbering 80,000 men but of more than 240,000, not counting the -masses of landsturm, which fact Ludendorf carefully conceals. - -2.) The Russians, on the other hand, advanced into East Prussia not -fully mobilized, as this battle took place twenty-seven days after -the War was declared, and the Russian mobilization was only completed -three--four weeks later. Samsonov had no six army corps under his -command, but only 4 corps: the 1st, the 6th, the 13th and the 15th, -and, figuring even at 40,000 men per army corps, this force could not -have exceeded 160,000 men. - -3.) It can be seen, therefore, that in this battle over 240,000 -Germans were opposing 160,000 Russians at most. However, as a matter -of positive fact, the attack of the 240,000 Germans was directed -against two Russian corps only, the 1st and the 6th, i. e., at only -approximately 80,000 men. - -4.) A force of Germans, three times as strong, overpowered two Russian -corps. During that attack Samsonov and a part of his staff were killed. -That, and the disruption of liaison, was the reason reinforcements were -not sent up from the other corps and the Germans succeeded in invading -the Russian rear (see map No. 1). - -5.) The remainder of Samsonov's army, about 80,000 men, became -surrounded by 240,000 Germans, and, left without leadership, in the -midst of an extremely critical and dangerous operation, on unfamiliar -territory, it was shattered. _Only under such an unfortunate -combination of circumstances could a threefold strong German force -win the battle in a tactical sense. But, from the strategic point of -view, the Germans lost in this stage of their campaign, as this battle -diverted a number of German corps from France and served a purpose of -the greatest importance._ - -[Illustration: The Russian troops are indicated on this map by white -squares; the Germans--by black. It can be seen from this map that the -army of Gen. Samsonov took up positions from Usdau to Biskofsburg. -The Germans attacked his flanks, i. e., Usdau, his left flank, and -Biskofsburg, his right. The 1st and 6th Russian Corps were located -there, as indicated by the map. - -It may be observed from the map that the 1st Corps was attacked by two -German corps, one division and the Vistula garrisons, i. e., about -120,000 Germans attacked 40,000 Russians. The 6th Corps at Biskofsburg -was put in a similar situation. Under pressure from a threefold -stronger German force, the 1st and 6th Corps retreated. Thereupon -the Germans fell under Neiderborg and Passenheim upon the rear of -Samsonov's remaining troops, the 13th and 15th Corps. These corps were -consequently surrounded by this threefold stronger force and were -defeated after a heroic fight of three days.] - -6.) It must be added that the entire population of East Prussia was -armed, and scouting was very difficult. The Russians knew nothing about -the enemy, while the latter was fully informed by the inhabitants -concerning the Russians and knew every step these were making. That is -why the German attack came as a surprise. - -7.) The assertion that Rennenkampf had 400,000 men and intentionally -did not come to Samsonov's aid is a downright misstatement. This can -be seen from the fact that the battle, which was begun on August 27, -was lost in 18 hours, on the morning of August 28, and Rennenkampf, -who with small forces was within three days' marching distance from -Samsonov--40 miles--could not have arrived in time, particularly when -we consider that he had to overcome on his way fortifications and -barbed-wire defenses manned by landsturm and by cavalry. - -8.) Ludendorf's assertion that Rennenkampf's force consisted of 24 -divisions, almost 400,000 men, is an obvious falsehood. A single -army is never made up of more than six army corps, for facility -and expediency in commanding, and this is a basic rule in military -organizations. Ludendorf knows this very well, but it appears that he -consciously misstated the truth in this case as well. - -9.) In reality Rennenkampf's army consisted of eight divisions or four -army corps,--the 2nd, the 3rd, the 4th and the 20th, and of six cavalry -divisions. Altogether his force consisted of about 160,000 men. The -bulk of his infantry could not have reached the front at that time, as -it was necessary to organize the rear and to coordinate the railway -movement in Prussia, as the Russian rail gauge is much wider than that -adopted by the German railway system. Rennenkampf's front, therefore, -was occupied largely by cavalry, supported only in section by weak -detachments of infantry. - -10.) Rennenkampf could not have aided Samsonov even if he had known -his situation, because he was already at a distance of 90 miles from -his own railway lines, and Ludendorf himself admits that it is not -possible to operate safely further than 80 miles from one's railroads. -Rennenkampf's army, therefore, without provisions and ammunition, had -to wait until its rear was made secure and was unable to move further. - - - - -Appendix No. II. - -Ludendorf--Rennenkampf - - -His second battle--with Rennenkampf--Ludendorf describes with a similar -distortion of facts. On this occasion he goes so far as to assert that -Rennenkampf had not 400,000 men but 600,000, and he states at the same -time that Rennenkampf was a traitor because he retreated too soon. As -we have already seen, Rennenkampf had only about 160,000 men, and he -was reinforced by one more corps, the 22nd,--about 40,000 additional -men; therefore his army could not have exceeded 200,000 men. Ludendorf -places his own army at 300,000 men, much less, of course, than his -actual strength, but even at that rate he attacked 200,000 Russians -with 300,000 German troops, outnumbering his adversary one and a half -times. - -That accounts for the ease with which Ludendorf was able to throw -200,000 men into the frontal attack and still was able to send up -100,000 men to get into Rennenkampf's rear (see map No. 2). Rennenkampf's -troops were kept engaged for seven days in repulsing Ludendorf's -attacks upon their front, and he had no troops left with which to parry -the attack on his rear. When the Germans invaded the Russian rear and -were threatening to cut off the Russian main line of retreat, the -Vershbolovo-Kovno Railroad, Rennenkampf was compelled to retreat so as -not to be cut off. In fact, had Rennenkampf not retreated at that time, -he would have committed the same act of treason that Marshal Bazaine -was guilty of in 1870, when he, under similar circumstances, did not -consent to escape from the steadily closing-up iron ring of Germans and -was finally captured with his entire army. Rennenkampf gave orders to -retreat only when the Germans were firing at the city of Gumbinnen and -at his rear railway lines. This was not too soon by any means, but may -have been rather a little late. - -[Illustration: Rennenkampf's troops are indicated between Welau and -Ingenburg (white square). Opposite them is the German army (black -square). - -Rennenkampf had 4 corps,--less than 160,000 men. He was attacked -frontally also by 4 corps which engaged all his effectives. Meanwhile -two German corps (the 17th and the 1st) that remained free began -invading his rear (these corps are indicated in black). When these two -corps approached Gumbinnen, they found themselves in a position to -cut Rennenkampf off from his only road, the Insterburg-Kovno railway. -Rennenkampf had no men to oppose these troops with, as all his units -were fighting at the front line of Welau-Ingenburg. Rennenkampf was -therefore compelled to retreat in order not to be cut off.] - -The 22nd Corps did not even succeed in getting near Rennenkampf, and -was halted by the Germans fifty miles away from the field of battle. -Rennenkampf had, therefore, not 200,000 men to Germany's 300,000, but -only 160,000,--about one-half. The cause of the defeat of Rennenkampf -was that that military operation had been calculated for the combined -armies of Samsonov and Rennenkampf, and was a risky undertaking at -that. When Rennenkampf was left alone, this operation was as a matter -of course doomed to defeat, and it required the tenacity of Rennenkampf -to have offered the obstinate resistance that he did in this battle. - - - - - * * * * * * - - - - -Transcriber's note: - -Obvious punctuation errors were corrected. - -Inconsistent hyphenation wss made consistent. - -Ludendorff consistently spelled Ludendorf but has not been corrected. - -p. 10: Apparent missing line in: "brought about the final defeat of the -Germans in this [newline] sonov." - -pp. 45-6: Several misspellings of Rennenkampf corrected. - -p. 46: He was atacked frontally -> He was attacked frontally. - - - -***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK RUSSIA'S PART IN THE WORLD WAR*** - - -******* This file should be named 50956-8.txt or 50956-8.zip ******* - - -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: -http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/5/0/9/5/50956 - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, -and may not be used if you charge for the eBooks, unless you receive -specific permission. If you do not charge anything for copies of this -eBook, complying with the rules is very easy. You may use this eBook -for nearly any purpose such as creation of derivative works, reports, -performances and research. They may be modified and printed and given -away--you may do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks -not protected by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the -trademark license, especially commercial redistribution. - -START: FULL LICENSE - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full -Project Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at -www.gutenberg.org/license. - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or -destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your -possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a -Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound -by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the -person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph -1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this -agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the -Foundation" or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection -of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual -works in the collection are in the public domain in the United -States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the -United States and you are located in the United States, we do not -claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, -displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as -all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope -that you will support the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting -free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm -works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the -Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with the work. You can easily -comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the -same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg-tm License when -you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are -in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, -check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this -agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, -distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any -other Project Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no -representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any -country outside the United States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other -immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear -prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work -on which the phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, -performed, viewed, copied or distributed: - - This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and - most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no - restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it - under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this - eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the - United States, you'll have to check the laws of the country where you - are located before using this ebook. - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is -derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not -contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the -copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in -the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are -redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply -either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or -obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any -additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms -will be linked to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works -posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the -beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including -any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access -to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format -other than "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official -version posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site -(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense -to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means -of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original "Plain -Vanilla ASCII" or other form. Any alternate format must include the -full Project Gutenberg-tm License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -provided that - -* You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed - to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he has - agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid - within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are - legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty - payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in - Section 4, "Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg - Literary Archive Foundation." - -* You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all - copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue - all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg-tm - works. - -* You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of - any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of - receipt of the work. - -* You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work or group of works on different terms than -are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing -from both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and The -Project Gutenberg Trademark LLC, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark. Contact the Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project -Gutenberg-tm collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may -contain "Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate -or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other -intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or -other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or -cannot be read by your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium -with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you -with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in -lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person -or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second -opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If -the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing -without further opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO -OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT -LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of -damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement -violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the -agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or -limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or -unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the -remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in -accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the -production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, -including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of -the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this -or any Project Gutenberg-tm work, (b) alteration, modification, or -additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any -Defect you cause. - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of -computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It -exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations -from people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future -generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see -Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at -www.gutenberg.org - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by -U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is in Fairbanks, Alaska, with the -mailing address: PO Box 750175, Fairbanks, AK 99775, but its -volunteers and employees are scattered throughout numerous -locations. Its business office is located at 809 North 1500 West, Salt -Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up to -date contact information can be found at the Foundation's web site and -official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -For additional contact information: - - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND -DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular -state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To -donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project -Gutenberg-tm concept of a library of electronic works that could be -freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and -distributed Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of -volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in -the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not -necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper -edition. - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search -facility: www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. - |