diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'old/50922-0.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | old/50922-0.txt | 6334 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 6334 deletions
diff --git a/old/50922-0.txt b/old/50922-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 5022439..0000000 --- a/old/50922-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6334 +0,0 @@ -Project Gutenberg's Perpetual Peace, by Immanuel Kant and Mary Campbell Smith - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: Perpetual Peace - A Philosophical Essay - -Author: Immanuel Kant - Mary Campbell Smith - -Release Date: January 14, 2016 [EBook #50922] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PERPETUAL PEACE *** - - - - -Produced by Turgut Dincer, Ramon Pajares Box and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - - - - - -TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE - - * Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_. - * Bold text is denoted by equals as in =bold=. - * Small caps are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS. - * Original spelling was kept, but variant spellings were made - consistent when a predominant usage was found. - * Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected. - - - - -PERPETUAL PEACE - - -[Illustration] - - - “For I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see, - Saw the Vision of the world, and all the wonder that would be; - Saw the heavens fill with commerce, argosies of magic sails, - Pilots of the purple twilight, dropping down with costly bales; - Heard the heavens fill with shouting, and there rain’d a ghastly dew - From the nations’ airy navies grappling in the central blue; - Far along the world-wide whisper of the south-wind rushing warm, - With the standards of the peoples plunging thro’ the thunder-storm; - Till the war-drum throbb’d no longer, and the battle-flags were furl’d - In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world. - There the common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm in awe, - And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law.” - - TENNYSON: _Locksley Hall_. - - - - - PERPETUAL PEACE - A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY - - BY - IMMANUEL KANT - - 1795 - - - TRANSLATED WITH INTRODUCTION - AND NOTES BY - M. CAMPBELL SMITH, M.A. - - _WITH A PREFACE BY PROFESSOR LATTA_ - - - LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD. - RUSKIN HOUSE 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C. - NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - - - - - _First Edition, 1903_ - _Second Impression, February 1915_ - _Third ” February 1917_ - - - - -PREFACE - - -This translation of Kant’s essay on _Perpetual Peace_ was undertaken -by Miss Mary Campbell Smith at the suggestion of the late Professor -Ritchie of St. Andrews, who had promised to write for it a preface, -indicating the value of Kant’s work in relation to recent discussions -regarding the possibility of “making wars to cease.” In view of the -general interest which these discussions have aroused and of the -vague thinking and aspiration which have too often characterised -them, it seemed to Professor Ritchie that a translation of this wise -and sagacious essay would be both opportune and valuable.[1] His -untimely death has prevented the fulfilment of his promise, and I -have been asked, in his stead, to introduce the translator’s work. - - [1] Cf. his _Studies in Political and Social Ethics_, pp. 169, - 170. - -This is, I think, the only complete translation into English of -Kant’s essay, including all the notes as well as the text, and the -translator has added a full historical Introduction, along with -numerous notes of her own, so as (in Professor Ritchie’s words) -“to meet the needs (1) of the student of Political Science who -wishes to understand the relation of Kant’s theories to those of -Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau etc., and (2) of the general reader -who wishes to understand the significance of Kant’s proposals -in connection with the ideals of Peace Congresses, and with the -development of International Law from the end of the Middle Ages to -the Hague Conference.” - -Although it is more than 100 years since Kant’s essay was written, -its substantial value is practically unimpaired. Anyone who is -acquainted with the general character of the mind of Kant will -expect to find in him sound common-sense, clear recognition of the -essential facts of the case and a remarkable power of analytically -exhibiting the conditions on which the facts necessarily depend. -These characteristics are manifest in the essay on _Perpetual Peace_. -Kant is not pessimist enough to believe that a perpetual peace is an -unrealisable dream or a consummation devoutly to be feared, nor is -he optimist enough to fancy that it is an ideal which could easily -be realised if men would but turn their hearts to one another. For -Kant perpetual peace is an ideal, not merely as a speculative Utopian -idea, with which in fancy we may play, but as a moral principle, -which ought to be, and therefore can be, realised. Yet he makes it -perfectly clear that we cannot hope to approach the realisation of -it unless we honestly face political facts and get a firm grasp of -the indispensable conditions of a lasting peace. To strive after the -ideal in contempt or in ignorance of these conditions is a labour -that must inevitably be either fruitless or destructive of its own -ends. Thus Kant demonstrates the hopelessness of any attempt to -secure perpetual peace between independent nations. Such nations may -make treaties; but these are binding only for so long as it is not -to the interest of either party to denounce them. To enforce them -is impossible while the nations remain independent. “There is,” as -Professor Ritchie put it (_Studies in Political and Social Ethics_, -p. 169), “only one way in which war between independent nations can -be prevented; and that is by the nations ceasing to be independent.” -But this does not necessarily mean the establishment of a despotism, -whether autocratic or democratic. On the other hand, Kant maintains -that just as peace between individuals within a state can only be -permanently secured by the institution of a “republican” (that is -to say, a representative) government, so the only real guarantee -of a permanent peace between nations is the establishment of a -federation of free “republican” states. Such a federation he regards -as practically possible. “For if Fortune ordains that a powerful -and enlightened people should form a republic—which by its very -nature is inclined to perpetual peace—this would serve as a centre -of federal union for other states wishing to join, and thus secure -conditions of freedom among the states in accordance with the idea of -the law of nations. Gradually, through different unions of this kind, -the federation would extend further and further.” - -Readers who are acquainted with the general philosophy of Kant -will find many traces of its influence in the essay on _Perpetual -Peace_. Those who have no knowledge of his philosophy may find some -of his forms of statement rather difficult to understand, and it -may therefore not be out of place for me to indicate very briefly -the meaning of some terms which he frequently uses, especially in -the Supplements and Appendices. Thus at the beginning of the First -Supplement, Kant draws a distinction between the mechanical and the -teleological view of things, between “nature” and “Providence”, -which depends upon his main philosophical position. According to -Kant, pure reason has two aspects, theoretical and practical. As -concerning knowledge, strictly so called, the _a priori_ principles -of reason (_e.g._ substance and attribute, cause and effect etc.) -are valid only within the realm of possible sense-experience. Such -ideas, for instance, cannot be extended to God, since He is not a -possible object of sense-experience. They are limited to the world -of phenomena. This world of phenomena (“nature” or the world of -sense-experience) is a purely mechanical system. But in order to -understand fully the phenomenal world, the pure theoretical reason -must postulate certain ideas (the ideas of the soul, the world and -God), the objects of which transcend sense-experience. These ideas -are not theoretically valid, but their validity is practically -established by the pure practical reason, which does not yield -speculative truth, but prescribes its principles “dogmatically” in -the form of imperatives to the will. The will is itself practical -reason, and thus it imposes its imperatives upon itself. The -fundamental imperative of the practical reason is stated by Kant in -Appendix I. (p. 175):—“Act so that thou canst will that thy maxim -should be a universal law, be the end of thy action what it will.” -If the end of perpetual peace is a duty, it must be necessarily -deduced from this general law. And Kant does regard it as a duty. “We -must desire perpetual peace not only as a material good, but also -as a state of things resulting from our recognition of the precepts -of duty” (_loc. cit._). This is further expressed in the maxim (p. -177):—“Seek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its -righteousness, and the object of your endeavour, the blessing of -perpetual peace, will be added unto you.” The distinction between -the moral politician and the political moralist, which is developed -in Appendix I., is an application of the general distinction -between duty and expediency, which is a prominent feature of the -Kantian ethics. Methods of expediency, omitting all reference to -the pure practical reason, can only bring about re-arrangements of -circumstances in the mechanical course of nature. They can never -guarantee the attainment of their end: they can never make it more -than a speculative ideal, which may or may not be practicable. But -if the end can be shown to be a duty, we have, from Kant’s point -of view, the only reasonable ground for a conviction that it is -realisable. We cannot, indeed, theoretically _know_ that it is -realisable. “Reason is not sufficiently enlightened to survey the -series of predetermining causes which would make it possible for us -to predict with certainty the good or bad results of human action, -as they follow from the mechanical laws of nature; although we may -hope that things will turn out as we should desire” (p. 163). On the -other hand, since the idea of perpetual peace is a moral ideal, an -“idea of duty”, we are entitled to believe that it is practicable. -“Nature guarantees the coming of perpetual peace, through the natural -course of human propensities; not indeed with sufficient certainty to -enable us to prophesy the future of this ideal theoretically, but yet -clearly enough for practical purposes” (p. 157). One might extend -this discussion indefinitely; but what has been said may suffice for -general guidance. - -The “wise and sagacious” thought of Kant is not expressed in a -simple style, and the translation has consequently been a very -difficult piece of work. But the translator has shown great skill in -manipulating the involutions, parentheses and prodigious sentences -of the original. In this she has had the valuable help of Mr. David -Morrison, M.A., who revised the whole translation with the greatest -care and to whom she owes the solution of a number of difficulties. -Her work will have its fitting reward if it succeeds in familiarising -the English-speaking student of politics with a political essay of -enduring value, written by one of the master thinkers of modern times. - - R. LATTA. - - _University of Glasgow_, May 1903. - - - - -CONTENTS - - - PAGE - - PREFACE BY PROFESSOR LATTA v - - TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION 1 - - PERPETUAL PEACE 106 - - FIRST SECTION CONTAINING THE PRELIMINARY ARTICLES OF - PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES 107 - - SECOND SECTION CONTAINING THE DEFINITIVE ARTICLES OF - PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES 117 - - FIRST SUPPLEMENT CONCERNING THE GUARANTEE OF PERPETUAL - PEACE 143 - - SECOND SUPPLEMENT—A SECRET ARTICLE FOR PERPETUAL PEACE 158 - - APPENDIX I.—ON THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN MORALS AND POLITICS - WITH REFERENCE TO PERPETUAL PEACE 161 - - APPENDIX II.—CONCERNING THE HARMONY OF POLITICS WITH MORALS - ACCORDING TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEA OF PUBLIC RIGHT 184 - - INDEX 197 - - - - -TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION - - -This is an age of unions. Not merely in the economic sphere, in -the working world of unworthy ends and few ideals do we find -great practical organizations; but law, medicine, science, art, -trade, commerce, politics and political economy—we might add -philanthropy—standing institutions, mighty forces in our social -and intellectual life, all have helped to swell the number of our -nineteenth century Conferences and Congresses. It is an age of -Peace Movements and Peace Societies, of peace-loving monarchs and -peace-seeking diplomats. This is not to say that we are preparing -for the millennium. Men are working together, there is a newborn -solidarity of interest, but rivalries between nation and nation, the -bitternesses and hatreds inseparable from competition are not less -keen; prejudice and misunderstanding not less frequent; subordinate -conflicting interests are not fewer, are perhaps, in view of changing -political conditions and an ever-growing international commerce, -multiplying with every year. The talisman is, perhaps, self-interest, -but, none the less, the spirit of union is there; it is impossible to -ignore a clearly marked tendency towards international federation, -towards political peace. This slow movement was not born with Peace -Societies; its consummation lies perhaps far off in the ages to come. -History at best moves slowly. But something of its past progress -we shall do well to know. No political idea seems to have so great -a future before it as this idea of a federation of the world. It -is bound to realise itself some day; let us consider what are the -chances that this day come quickly, what that it be long delayed. -What obstacles lie in the way, and how may they be removed? What -historical grounds have we for hoping that they may ever be removed? -What, in a word, is the origin and history of the idea of a perpetual -peace between nations, and what would be the advantage, what is the -prospect of realising it? - -The international relations of states find their expression, we are -told, in war and peace. What has been the part played by these great -counteracting forces in the history of nations? What has it been in -prehistoric times, in the life of man in what is called the “state -of nature”? “It is no easy enterprise,” says Rousseau, in more than -usually careful language, “to disentangle that which is original from -that which is artificial in the actual state of man, and to make -ourselves well acquainted with a state which no longer exists, which -perhaps never has existed and which probably never will exist in the -future.” (Preface to the _Discourse on the Causes of Inequality_, -1753, publ. 1754.) This is a difficulty which Rousseau surmounts only -too easily. A knowledge of history, a scientific spirit may fail him: -an imagination ever ready to pour forth detail never does. Man lived, -says he, “without industry, without speech, without habitation, -without war, without connection of any kind, without any need of -his fellows or without any desire to harm them ... sufficing to -himself.”[2] (_Discourse on the Sciences and Arts_, 1750.) Nothing, -we are now certain, is less probable. We cannot paint the life of -man at this stage of his development with any definiteness, but the -conclusion is forced upon us that our race had no golden age,[3] no -peaceful beginning, that this early state was indeed, as Hobbes -held, a state of war, of incessant war between individuals, families -and, finally, tribes. - - [2] For the inconsistency between the views expressed by Rousseau - on this subject in the _Discourses_ and in the _Contrat Social_ - (Cf. I. Chs. VI., VIII.) see Ritchie’s _Natural Right_, Ch. - III., pp. 48, 49; Caird’s essay on Rousseau in his _Essays on - Literature and Philosophy_, Vol. I.; and Morley’s _Rousseau_, - Vol. I., Ch. V.; Vol. II., Ch. XII. - - [3] The theory that the golden age was identical with the - state of nature, Professor D. G. Ritchie ascribes to Locke - (see _Natural Right_, Ch. II., p. 42). Locke, he says, “has an - idea of a golden age” existing even after government has come - into existence—a time when people did not need “to examine the - original and rights of government.” [_Civil Government_, II., § - 111.] A little confusion on the part of his readers (perhaps in - his own mind) makes it possible to regard the state of nature as - itself the golden age, and the way is prepared for the favourite - theory of the eighteenth century:— - - “Nor think in nature’s state they blindly trod; - The state of nature was the reign of God: - Self-love and social at her birth began, - Union the bond of all things and of man. - Pride then was not, nor arts that pride to aid; - Man walk’d with beast, joint tenant of the shade; - The same his table, and the same his bed; - No murder cloath’d him, and no murder fed.” - - [_Essay on Man_, III., 147 _seq._] - - In these lines of Pope’s the state of nature is identified with - the golden age of the Greek and Latin poets; and “the reign of - God” is an equivalent for Locke’s words, “has a law of nature to - govern it.” - - -_The Early Conditions of Society._ - -For the barbarian, war is the rule; peace the exception. His gods, -like those of Greece, are warlike gods; his spirit, at death, flees -to some Valhalla. For him life is one long battle; his arms go with -him even to the grave. Food and the means of existence he seeks -through plunder and violence. Here right is with might; the battle is -to the strong. Nature has given all an equal claim to all things, but -not everyone can have them. This state of fearful insecurity is bound -to come to an end. “Government,” says Locke, (_On Civil Government_, -Chap. VIII., § 105) “is hardly to be avoided amongst men that live -together.”[4] A constant dread of attack and a growing consciousness -of the necessity of presenting a united front against it result in -the choice of some leader—the head of a family perhaps—who acts, -it may be, only as captain of the hosts, as did Joshua in Israel, -or who may discharge the simple duties of a primitive governor or -king.[5] Peace within is found to be strength without. The civil -state is established, so that “if there needs must be war, it may -not yet be against all men, nor yet without some helps.” (Hobbes: -_On Liberty_, Chap. I., § 13.) This foundation of the state is the -first establishment in history of a peace institution. It changes the -character of warfare, it gives it method and system; but it does not -bring peace in its train. We have now, indeed, no longer a wholesale -war of all against all, a constant irregular raid and plunder of one -individual by another; but we have the systematic, deliberate war of -community against community, of nation against nation.[6] - - [4] Cf. _Republic_, II. 369. “A state,” says Socrates, “arises - out of the needs of mankind: no one is self-sufficing, but all of - us have many wants.” - - [5] See Hume’s account of the origin of government (_Treatise_, - III., Part II., Sect. VIII.). There are, he says, American - tribes “where men live in concord and amity among themselves - without any established government; and never pay submission - to any of their fellows, except in time of war, when their - captain enjoys a shadow of authority, which he loses after their - return from the field, and the establishment of peace with the - neighbouring tribes. This authority, however, instructs them in - the advantages of government, and teaches them to have recourse - to it, when either by the pillage of war, by commerce, or by any - fortuitous inventions, their riches and possessions have become - so considerable as to make them forget, on every emergence, the - interest they have in the preservation of peace and justice.... - Camps are the true mothers of cities; and as war cannot be - administered, by reason of the suddenness of every exigency, - without some authority in a single person, the same kind of - authority naturally takes place in that civil government, which - succeeds the military.” - - Cf. Cowper: _The Winter Morning Walk_:— - - “. . . . . . . . . . . . . . and ere long, - When man was multiplied and spread abroad - In tribes and clans, and had begun to call - These meadows and that range of hills his own, - The tasted sweets of property begat - Desire of more; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Thus wars began on earth. These fought for spoil, - And those in self-defence. Savage at first - The onset, and irregular. At length - One eminent above the rest, for strength, - For stratagem, or courage, or for all, - Was chosen leader. Him they served in war, - And him in peace for sake of warlike deeds - Rev’renced no less. . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Thus kings were first invented.” - - - [6] “Among uncivilised nations, there is but one profession - honourable, that of arms. All the ingenuity and vigour of the - human mind are exerted in acquiring military skill or address.” - Cf. Robertson’s _History of Charles V._, (_Works_, 1813, vol. V.) - Sect. I. vii. - - -_War in Classical Times._ - -In early times, there were no friendly neighbouring nations: beyond -the boundaries of every nation’s territory, lay the land of a -deadly foe. This was the way of thinking, even of so highly cultured -a people as the Greeks, who believed that a law of nature had made -every outsider, every barbarian their inferior and their enemy.[7] -Their treaties of peace, at the time of the Persian War, were frankly -of the kind denounced by Kant, mere armistices concluded for the -purpose of renewing their fighting strength. The ancient world is a -world of perpetual war in which defeat meant annihilation. In the -East no right was recognised in the enemy; and even in Greece and -Rome the fate of the unarmed was death or slavery.[8] The barbaric -or non-Grecian states had, according to Plato and Aristotle, no claim -upon humanity, no rights in fact of any kind. Among the Romans -things were little better. According to Mr. T. J. Lawrence—see his -_Principles of International Law_, III., §§ 21, 22—they were worse. -For Rome stood alone in the world: she was bound by ties of kinship -to no other state. She was, in other words, free from a sense of -obligation to other races. War, according to Roman ideas, was made -by the gods, apart altogether from the quarrels of rulers or races. -To disobey the sacred command, expressed in signs and auguries would -have been to hold in disrespect the law and religion of the land. -When, in the hour of victory, the Romans refrained from pressing -their rights against the conquered—rights recognised by all Roman -jurists—it was from no spirit of leniency, but in the pursuit of -a prudent and far-sighted policy, aiming at the growth of Roman -supremacy and the establishment of a world-embracing empire, shutting -out all war as it blotted out natural boundaries, reducing all rights -to the one right of imperial citizenship. There was no real _jus -belli_, even here in the cradle of international law; the only limits -to the fury of war were of a religious character. - - [7] Similarly we find that the original meaning of the Latin word - “_hostis_” was “a stranger.” - - [8] In Aristotle we find the high-water mark of Greek thinking - on this subject. “The object of military training,” says he, - (_Politics_, Bk. IV. Ch. XIV., Welldon’s translation—in older - editions Bk. VII.) “should be not to enslave persons who do - not deserve slavery, but firstly to secure ourselves against - becoming the slaves of others; secondly, to seek imperial power - not with a view to a universal despotic authority, but for the - benefit of the subjects whom we rule, and thirdly, to exercise - despotic power over those who are deserving to be slaves. That - the legislator should rather make it his object so to order his - legislation upon military and other matters as to promote leisure - and peace is a theory borne out by the facts of history.” ... - (_loc. cit._ Ch. XV.). “War, as we have remarked several times, - has its end in peace.” - - Aristotle strongly condemns the Lacedæmonians and Cretans for - regarding war and conquest as the sole ends to which all law and - education should be directed. Also in non-Greek tribes like the - Scythians, Persians, Thracians and Celts he says, only military - power is admired by the people and encouraged by the state. - “There was formerly too a law in Macedonia that any one who had - never slain an enemy should wear the halter about his neck.” - Among the Iberians too, a military people, “it is the custom to - set around the tomb of a deceased warrior a number of obelisks - corresponding to the number of enemies he has killed.... Yet - ... it may well appear to be a startling paradox that it should - be the function of a Statesman to succeed in devising the means - of rule and mastery over neighbouring peoples whether with or - against their own will. How can such action be worthy of a - statesman or legislator, when it has not even the sanction of - law?” (_op. cit._, IV. Ch. 2.) - - We see that Aristotle disapproves of a glorification of war for - its own sake, and regards it as justifiable only in certain - circumstances. Methods of warfare adopted and proved in the East - would not have been possible in Greece. An act of treachery, - for example, such as that of Jael, (_Judges_ IV. 17) which was - extolled in songs of praise by the Jews, (_loc. cit._ V. 24) the - Greek people would have been inclined to repudiate. The stories - of Roman history, the behaviour of Fabricius, for instance, - or Regulus and the honourable conduct of prisoners on various - occasions released on parole, show that this consciousness of - certain principles of honour in warfare was still more highly - developed in Rome. - - Socrates in the _Republic_ (V. 469, 470) gives expression to a - feeling which was gradually gaining ground in Greece, that war - between Hellenic tribes was much more serious than war between - Greeks and barbarians. In such civil warfare, he considered, - the defeated ought not to be reduced to slavery, nor the slain - despoiled, nor Hellenic territory devastated. For any difference - between Greek and Greek is to “be regarded by them as discord - only—a quarrel among friends, which is not to be called war”.... - “Our citizens [_i.e._ in the ideal republic] should thus deal - with their Hellenic enemies; and with barbarians as the Hellenes - now deal with one another.” (V. 471.) - - The views of Plato and Aristotle on this and other questions were - in advance of the custom and practice of their time. - -The treatment of a defeated enemy among the Jews rested upon a -similar religious foundation. In the East, we find a special cruelty -in the conduct of war. The wars of the Jews and Assyrians were wars -of extermination. The whole of the _Old Testament_, it has been said, -resounds with the clash of arms.[9] “An eye for an eye, a tooth for -a tooth!” was the command of Jehovah to his chosen people. Vengeance -was bound up in their very idea of the Creator. The Jews, unlike the -followers of Mahomet, attempted, and were commanded to attempt no -violent conversion[10]; they were then too weak a nation; but they -fought, and fought with success against the heathen of neighbouring -lands, the Lord of Hosts leading them forth to battle. The God of -Israel stood to his chosen people in a unique and peculiarly logical -relation. He had made a covenant with them; and, in return for their -obedience and allegiance, cared for their interests and advanced -their national prosperity. The blood of this elect people could -not be suffered to intermix with that of idolaters. Canaan must be -cleared of the heathen, on the coming of the children of Israel to -their promised land; and mercy to the conquered enemy, even to women, -children or animals was held by the Hebrew prophets to be treachery -to Jehovah. (_Sam._ XV.; _Josh._ VI. 21.) - - [9] “The Lord is a man of war,” said Moses (_Exodus_ XV. 3). Cf. - _Psalms_ XXIV. 8. He is “mighty in battle.” - - [10] This was bound up with the very essence of Islam; the devout - Mussulman could suffer the existence of no unbeliever. Tolerance - or indifference was an attitude which his faith made impossible. - “When ye encounter the unbelievers,” quoth the prophet (_Koran_, - ch. 47), “strike off their heads, until ye have made a great - slaughter among them.... Verily if God pleased he could take - vengeance on them without your assistance; but he commandeth you - to fight his battles.” - - The propagation of the faith by the sword was not only commanded - by the Mohammedan religion: it was that religion itself. - -Hence the attitude of the Jews to neighbouring nations[11] was still -more hostile than that of the Greeks. The cause of this difference -is bound up with the transition from polytheism to monotheism. The -most devout worshipper of the national gods of ancient times could -endure to see other gods than his worshipped in the next town or by -a neighbouring nation. There was no reason why all should not exist -side by side. Religious conflicts in polytheistic countries, when -they arose, were due not to the rivalry of conflicting faiths, but to -an occasional attempt to put one god above the others in importance. -There could be no interest here in the propagation of belief through -the sword. But, under the Jews, these relations were entirely -altered. Jehovah, their Creator, became the one invisible God. Such -an one can suffer no others near him; their existence is a continual -insult to him. Monotheism is, in its very nature, a religion of -intolerance. Its spirit among the Jews was warlike: it commanded -the subjugation of other nations, but its instrument was rather -extermination than conversion. - - [11] See _Acts_ X. 28:—“Ye know that it is an unlawful thing for - a man that is a Jew to keep company, or come unto one of another - nation.” - - -_The Attitude of Christianity and the Early Church to War._ - -From the standpoint of the peace of nations, we may say that the -Christian faith, compared with other prominent monotheistic religious -systems, occupies an intermediate position between two extremes—the -fanaticism of Islam, and to a less extent of Judaism, and the -relatively passive attitude of the Buddhist who thought himself -bound to propagate his religion, but held himself justified only -in the employment of peaceful means. Christianity, on the other -hand, contains no warlike principles: it can in no sense be called -a religion of the sword, but circumstances gave the history of the -Church, after the first few centuries of its existence, a character -which cannot be called peace-loving. - -This apparent contradiction between the spirit of the new religion -and its practical attitude to war has led to some difference of -opinion as to the actual teaching of Christ. The _New Testament_ -seems, at a superficial glance, to furnish support as readily to the -champions of war as to its denouncers. The Messiah is the Prince -of Peace (_Is._ IX. 6, 7; _Heb._ VI.), and here lies the way of -righteousness (_Rom._ III. 19): but Christ came not to bring peace, -but a sword (_Matth._ X. 34). Such statements may be given the -meaning which we wish them to bear—the quoting of Scripture is ever -an unsatisfactory form of evidence; but there is no direct statement -in the _New Testament_ in favour of war, no saying of Christ which, -fairly interpreted, could be understood too regard this proof of -human imperfection as less condemnable than any other.[12] When men -shall be without sin, nation shall rise up against nation no more. -But man the individual can attain peace only when he has overcome the -world, when, in the struggle with his lower self, he has come forth -victorious. This is the spiritual sword which Christ brought into -the world—strife, not with the unbeliever, but with the lower self: -meekness and the spirit of the Word of God are the weapons with which -man must fight for the Faith. - - [12] Neither, however, is there any which regards the soldier as - a murderer. - -An elect people there was no longer: Israel had rejected its Messiah. -Instead there was a complete brotherhood of all men, the bond and -the free, as children of one God. The aim of the Church was a -world-empire, bound together by a universal religion. In this sense, -as sowing the first seeds of a universal peace, we may speak of -Christianity as a re-establishment of peace among mankind. - -The later attitude of Christians to war, however, by no means -corresponds to the earliest tenets of the Church. Without doubt, -certain sects, from the beginning of our era and through the ages -up to the present time, held, like the Mennonites and Quakers -in our day, that the divine command, “Love your enemies,” could -not be reconciled with the profession of a soldier. The early -Christians were reproached under the Roman Emperors, before the -time of Constantine, with avoiding the citizen’s duty of military -service.[13] “To those enemies of our faith,” wrote Origen (_Contra -Celsum_, VIII., Ch. LXXIII., Anti-Nicene Christian Library), “who -require us to bear arms for the commonwealth, and to slay men, we -can reply: ‘Do not those who are priests at certain shrines, and -those who attend on certain gods, as you account them, keep their -hands free from blood, that they may with hands unstained and free -from human blood offer the appointed sacrifices to your gods; and -even when war is upon you, you never enlist the priests in the army. -If that, then, is a laudable custom, how much more so, that while -others are engaged in battle, these too should engage as the priests -and ministers of God, keeping their hands pure, and wrestling in -prayers to God on behalf of those who are fighting in a righteous -cause, and for the king who reigns righteously, that whatever is -opposed to those who act righteously may be destroyed!’ ... And we do -take our part in public affairs, when along with righteous prayers -we join self-denying exercises and meditations, which teach us to -despise pleasures, and not to be led away by them. And none fight -better for the king than we do. We do not indeed fight under him, -although he require it; but we fight on his behalf, forming a special -army—an army of piety—by offering our prayers to God.” The Fathers -of the Church, Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, -Ambrose and the rest gave the same testimony against war. The pagan -rites connected with the taking of the military oath had no doubt -some influence in determining the feeling of the pious with regard -to this life of bloodshed; but the reasons lay deeper. “Shall it be -held lawful,” asked Tertullian, (_De Corona_, p. 347) “to make an -occupation of the sword, when the Lord proclaims that he who uses the -sword shall perish by the sword? And shall the son of peace take -part in the battle when it does not become him even to sue at law? -And shall he apply the chain, and the prison, and the torture, and -the punishment, who is not the avenger even of his own wrongs?” - - [13] In the early centuries of our era Christians seem to - have occasionally refused to serve in the army from religious - scruples. But soldiers were not always required to change their - profession after baptism. And in _Acts_ X., for example, nothing - is said to indicate that the centurion, Cornelius, would have to - leave the Roman army. See Tertullian: _De Corona_ (Anti-Nicene - Christian Library), p. 348. - -The doctrine of the Church developed early in the opposite direction. -It was its fighting spirit and not a love of peace that made -Christianity a state religion under Constantine. Nor was Augustine -the first of the Church Fathers to regard military service as -permissible. To come to a later time, this change of attitude has -been ascribed partly to the rise of Mahometan power and the wave of -fanaticism which broke over Europe. To destroy these unbelievers with -fire and sword was regarded as a deed of piety pleasing to God. Hence -the wars of the Crusades against the infidel were holy wars, and -appear as a new element in the history of civilisation. The nations -of ancient times had known only civil and foreign war.[14] They had -rebelled at home, and they had fought mainly for material interests -abroad. In the Middle Ages there were, besides, religious wars and, -with the rise of Feudalism, private war:[15] among all the powers -of the Dark Ages and for centuries later, none was more aggressive -than the Catholic Church, nor a more active and untiring defender of -its rights and claims, spiritual or temporal. It was in some respects -a more warlike institution than the states of Greece and Rome. It -struggled through centuries with the Emperor:[16] it pronounced its -ban against disobedient states and disloyal cities: it pursued with -its vengeance each heretical or rebellious prince: unmindful of its -early traditions about peace, it showed in every crisis a fiercely -military spirit.[17] - - [14] There were so-called “Sacred Wars” in Greece, but these were - due mainly to disputes caused by the Amphictyonic League. They - were not religious, in the sense in which we apply the epithet to - the Thirty Years’ war. - - [15] “The administration of justice among rude illiterate people, - was not so accurate, or decisive, or uniform, as to induce men - to submit implicitly to its determinations. Every offended baron - buckled on his armour, and sought redress at the head of his - vassals. His adversary met him in like hostile array. Neither - of them appealed to impotent laws which could afford them no - protection. Neither of them would submit points, in which their - honour and their passions were warmly interested, to the slow - determination of a judicial inquiry. Both trusted to their swords - for the decision of the contest.” Robertson’s _History of Charles - V._, (_Works_, vol. V.) Sect. I., p. 38. - - [16] Erasmus in the “Ἰχθυοφαγία” (_Colloquies_, Bailey’s ed., - Vol. II., pp. 55, 56) puts forward the suggestion that a general - peace might be obtained in the Christian world, if the Emperor - would remit something of his right and the Pope some part of his. - - [17] Cf. Robertson, _op. cit._, Sect. III., p. 106, _seq._ - -For more than a thousand years the Church counted fighting -clergy[18] among its most active supporters. This strange anomaly -was, it must be said, at first rather suffered in deference to public -opinion than encouraged by ecclesiastical canons and councils, but it -gave rise to great discontent at the time of the Reformation.[19] The -whole question of the lawfulness of military service for Christians -was then raised again. “If there be anything in the affairs of -mortals,” wrote Erasmus at this time (_Opera_, II., _Prov._, 951 -C) “which it becomes us deliberately to attack, which we ought -indeed to shun by every possible means, to avert and to abolish, -it is certainly war, than which there is nothing more wicked, more -mischievous or more widely destructive in its effects, nothing harder -to be rid of, or more horrible and, in a word, more unworthy of a -man, not to say of a Christian.”[20] The mediæval Church indeed -succeeded, by the establishment of such institutions as the Truce -of God, in setting some limits to the fury of the soldier: but its -endeavours (and it made several to promote peace)[21] were only to -a trifling extent successful. Perhaps custom and public opinion in -feudal Europe were too strong, perhaps the Church showed a certain -apathy in denouncing the evils of a military society: no doubt the -theoretical tenets of its doctrine did less to hinder war than its -own strongly military tendency, its lust for power and the force of -its example did to encourage it. - - [18] Robertson (_op. cit._, Note XXI., p. 483) quotes the - following statement: “flamma, ferro, caede, possessiones - ecclesiarum praelati defendebant.” (Guido Abbas ap. Du Cange, p. - 179.) - - [19] J. A. Farrar, in a pamphlet, (reprinted from the - _Gentleman’s Magazine_, vol. 257, 1884) on _War and - Christianity_, quotes the following passage from Wycliffe in - which he protests against this blot upon the Church and Christian - professions.—“Friars now say that bishops can fight best of all - men, and that it falleth most properly to them, since they are - lords of all this world. They say Christ bade His disciples sell - their coats, and buy them swords; but whereto, if not to fight? - Thus friars make a great array, and stir up many men to fight. - But Christ taught not His apostles to fight with a sword of iron, - but with the sword of God’s Word, and which standeth in meekness - of heart and in the prudence of man’s tongue.... If man-slaying - in others be odious to God, much more in priests, who should be - vicars of Christ.” See also the passage where Erasmus points - out that King David was not permitted to build a temple to God, - because he was a man of blood. “Nolo clericos ullo sanguine - contaminari. Gravis impietas!” (_Opera_, IX., 370 B.) - - This question had already been considered by Thomas Aquinas, who - decided that the clergy ought not to be allowed to fight, because - the practices of warfare, although right and meritorious in - themselves, were not in accordance with a holy calling. (_Summa_, - II. 2: Qu. 40.) - - Aquinas held that war—excluding private war—is justifiable in a - just cause. So too did Luther, (cf. his pamphlet: _Ob Kriegsleute - auch in seligem Stande sein können?_) Calvin and Zwingli, the - last of whom died sword in hand. - - With regard to the question of a fighting clergy, the passage - quoted from Origen (pp. 14, 15, above) has considerable interest, - Origen looks upon the active participation of priests in warfare - as something which everyone would admit to be impossible. - - [20] See also the _Querela Pacis_, 630 B., (_Opera_, - IV.):—“Whosoever preaches Christ, preaches peace.” Erasmus even - goes the length of saying that the most iniquitous peace is - better than the most just war (_op. cit._, 636 C). - - [21] Cf. Robertson, _op. cit._, Note XXI. p. 483 and Sect. I., p. - 39. - -Hence, in spite of Christianity and its early vision of a brotherhood -of men, the history of the Middle Ages came nearer to a realization -of the idea of perpetual war than was possible in ancient times. -The tendency of the growth of Roman supremacy was to diminish the -number of wars, along with the number of possible causes of racial -friction. It united many nations in one great whole, and gave them, -to a certain extent, a common culture and common interests; even, -when this seemed prudent, a common right of citizenship. The fewer -the number of boundaries, the less the likelihood of war. The -establishment of great empires is of necessity a force, and a great -and permanent force working on the side of peace. With the fall of -Rome this guarantee was removed. - - -_The Development of the New Science of International Law._ - -Out of the ruins of the old feudal system arose the modern state -as a free independent unity. Private war between individuals or -classes of society was now branded as a breach of the peace: it -became the exclusive right of kings to appeal to force. War, wrote -Gentilis[22] towards the end of sixteenth century, is the just or -unjust conflict between states. Peace was now regarded as the normal -condition of society. As a result of these great developments in -which the name “state” acquired new meaning, jurisprudence freed -itself from the trammelling conditions of mediæval Scholasticism. Men -began to consider the problem of the rightfulness or wrongfulness of -war, to question even the possibility of a war on rightful grounds. -Out of theses new ideas—partly too as one of the fruits of the -Reformation,[23]—arose the first consciously formulated principles of -the science of international law, whose fuller, but not yet complete, -development belongs to modern times. - - [22] It is uncertain in what year the _De Jure Belli_ of Gentilis - was published—a work to which Grotius acknowledges considerable - indebtedness. Whewell, in the preface to his translation of - Grotius, gives the date 1598, but some writers suppose it to have - been ten years earlier. - - [23] This came about in two ways. The Church of Rome discouraged - the growth of national sentiment. At the Reformation the - independence and unity of the different nations were for the - first time recognised. That is to say, the Reformation laid the - foundation for a science of international law. But, from another - point of view, it not only made such a code of rules possible, - it made it necessary. The effect of the Reformation was not to - diminish the number of wars in which religious belief could play - a part. Moreover, it displaced the Pope from his former position - as arbiter in Europe without setting up any judicial tribunal in - his stead. - -From the beginning of history every age, every people has something -to show here, be it only a rudimentary sense of justice in their -dealings with one another. We may instance the Amphictyonic League -in Greece which, while it had a merely Hellenic basis and was -mainly a religious survival, shows the germ of some attempt at -arbitration between Greek states. Among the Romans we have the _jus -feciale_[24] and the _jus gentium_, as distinguished from the civil -law of Rome, and certain military regulations about the taking of -booty in war. Ambassadors were held inviolate in both countries; -the formal declaration of war was never omitted. Many Roman writers -held the necessity of a just cause for war. But nowhere do these -considerations form the subject matter of a special science. - - [24] Cf. Cicero: _De Officiis_, I. xi. “Belli quidem aequitas - sanctissime feciali populi Romani jure perscripta est.” (See the - reference to Lawrence’s comments on this subject, p. 9 above.) - - “Wars,” says Cicero, “are to be undertaken for this end, - that we may live in peace without being injured; but when we - obtain the victory, we must preserve those enemies who behaved - without cruelty or inhumanity during the war: for example, - our forefathers received, even as members of their state, the - Tuscans, the Æqui, the Volscians, the Sabines and the Hernici, - but utterly destroyed Carthage and Numantia.... And, while - we are bound to exercise consideration toward those whom we - have conquered by force, so those should be received into - our protection who throw themselves upon the honour of our - general, and lay down their arms,” (_op. cit._, I. xi., Bohn’s - Translation).... “In engaging in war we ought to make it appear - that we have no other view but peace.” (_op. cit._, I. xxiii.) - - In fulfilling a treaty we must not sacrifice the spirit to the - letter (_De Officiis_, I. x). “There are also rights of war, and - the faith of an oath is often to be kept with an enemy.” (_op. - cit._, III. xxix.) - - This is the first statement by a classical writer in which the - idea of justice being due to an enemy appears. Cicero goes - further. Particular states, he says, (_De Legibus_, I. i.) are - only members of a whole governed by reason. - -In the Middle Ages the development of these ideas received little -encouragement. All laws are silent in the time of war,[25] and this -was a period of war, both bloody and constant. There was no time -to think of the right or wrong of anything. Moreover, the Church -emphasised the lack of rights in unbelievers, and gave her blessing -on their annihilation.[26] The whole Christian world was filled with -the idea of a spiritual universal monarchy. Not such as that in -the minds of Greek and Jew and Roman who had been able to picture -international peace only under the form of a great national and -exclusive empire. In this great Christian state there were to be no -distinctions between nations; its sphere was bounded by the universe. -But, here, there was no room or recognition for independent national -states with equal and personal rights. This recognition, opposed -by the Roman Church, is the real basis of international law. The -Reformation was the means by which the personality of the peoples, -the unity and independence of the state were first openly admitted. -On this foundation, mainly at first in Protestant countries, the new -science developed rapidly. Like the civil state and the Christian -religion, international law may be called a peace institution. - - [25] The saying is attributed to Pompey:—“Shall I, when I am - preparing for war, think of the laws?” - - [26] This implied, however, the idea of a united Christendom as - against the infidel, with which we may compare the idea of a - united Hellas against Persia. In such things we have the germ not - only of international law, but of the ideal of federation. - - -_Grotius, Puffendorf and Vattel._ - -In the beginning of the seventeenth century, Grotius laid the -foundations of a code of universal law (_De Jure Belli et Pacis_, -1625) independent of differences of religion, in the hope that its -recognition might simplify the intercourse between the newly formed -nations. The primary object of this great work, written during the -misery and horrors of the Thirty Years’ war, was expressly to draw -attention to these evils and suggest some methods by which the -severity of warfare might be mitigated. Grotius originally meant to -explain only one chapter of the law of nations:[27] his book was -to be called _De Jure Belli_, but there is scarcely any subject of -international law which he leaves untouched. He obtained, moreover, -a general recognition for the doctrine of the Law of Nature which -exerted so strong an influence upon succeeding centuries; indeed, -between these two sciences, as between international law and -ethics, he draws no very sharp line of demarcation, although, on -the whole, in spite of an unscientific, scholastic use of quotation -from authorities, his treatment of the new field is clear and -comprehensive. Grotius made the attempt to set up an ethical -principle of right, in the stead of such doctrines of self-interest -as had been held by many of the ancient writers. There was a law, he -held, established in each state purely with a view to the interests -of that state, but, besides this, there was another higher law in -the interest of the whole society of nations. Its origin was divine; -the reason of man commanded his obedience. This was what we call -international law.[28] - - [27] See Maine’s _Ancient Law_, pp. 50-53: pp. 96-101. Grotius - wrongly understood “Jus Gentium,” (“a collection of rules - and principles, determined by observation to be common to - the institutions which prevailed among the various Italian - tribes”) to mean “Jus _inter_ gentes.” The Roman expression for - International Law was not “Jus Gentium,” but “Jus Feciale.” - - “Having adopted from the Antonine jurisconsults,” says Maine, - “the position that the Jus Gentium and the Jus Naturæ were - identical, Grotius, with his immediate predecessors and his - immediate successors, attributed to the Law of Nature an - authority which would never perhaps have been claimed for it, - if “Law of Nations” had not in that age been an ambiguous - expression. They laid down unreservedly that Natural Law is the - code of states, and thus put in operation a process which has - continued almost down to our own day, the process of engrafting - on the international system rules which are supposed to have - been evolved from the unassisted contemplation of the conception - of Nature. There is, too, one consequence of immense practical - importance to mankind which, though not unknown during the early - modern history of Europe, was never clearly or universally - acknowledged till the doctrines of the Grotian school had - prevailed. If the society of nations is governed by Natural - Law, the atoms which compose it must be absolutely equal. Men - under the sceptre of Nature are all equal, and accordingly - commonwealths are equal if the international state be one of - nature. The proposition that independent communities, however - different in size and power, are all equal in the view of the Law - of Nations, has largely contributed to the happiness of mankind, - though it is constantly threatened by the political tendencies - of each successive age. It is a doctrine which probably would - never have obtained a secure footing at all if International Law - had not been entirely derived from the majestic claims of Nature - by the Publicists who wrote after the revival of letters.” (_Op. - cit._, p. 100.) - - [28] The name “International Law” was first given to the law of - nations by Bentham. (_Principles of Morals and Legislation, XIX._ - § xxv.) - -Grotius distinctly holds, like Kant and Rousseau, and unlike Hobbes, -that the state can never be regarded as a unity or institution -separable from the people; the terms _civitas_, _communitas_, -_coetus_, _populus_, he uses indiscriminately. But these nations, -these independent units of society cannot live together side by side -just as they like; they must recognise one another as members of a -European society of states.[29] Law, he said, stands above force -even in war, “which may only be begun to pursue the right;” and the -beginning and manner of conduct of war rests on fixed laws and can be -justified only in certain cases. War is not to be done away with: -Grotius accepts it as fact,[30] (as Hobbes did later) as the natural -method for settling the disputes which were bound constantly to -arise between so many independent and sovereign nations. A terrible -scourge it must ever remain, but as the only available form of legal -procedure, it is sanctioned by the practice of states and not less by -the law of nature and of nations. Grotius did not advance beyond this -position. Every violation of the law of nations can be settled but in -one way—by war, the force of the stronger. - - [29] In the Peace of Westphalia, 1648, the balance of power in - Europe was recognised on the basis of terms such as these. - - [30] Grotius, however, is a painstaking student of Scripture, and - is willing to say something in favour of peace—not a permanent - peace, that is to say, the idea of which would scarcely be - likely to occur to anyone in the early years of the seventeenth - century—but a plea for fewer, shorter wars. “If therefore,” - he says, “a peace sufficiently safe can be had, it is not - ill secured by the condonation of offenses, and damages, and - expenses: especially among Christians, to whom the Lord has given - his peace as his legacy. And so St. Paul, his best interpreter, - exhorts us to live at peace with all men.... May God write these - lessons—He who alone can—on the hearts of all those who have - the affairs of Christendom in their hands.” (_De Jure Belli et - Pacis_, III. Ch. XXV., Whewell’s translation.) - - See also _op. cit._, II., Ch. XXIII., Sect. VIII., where - Grotius recommends that Congresses of Christian Powers should - be held with a view to the peaceful settlement of international - differences. - -The necessary distinction between law and ethics was drawn by -Puffendorf,[31] a successor of Grotius who gave an outwardly -systematic form to the doctrine of the great jurist, without adding -to it either strength or completeness. His views, when they were -not based upon the system of Grotius, were strongly influenced by -the speculation of Hobbes, his chronological predecessor, to whom we -shall have later occasion to refer. In the works of Vattel,[32] who -was, next to Rousseau, the most celebrated of Swiss publicists, we -find the theory of the customs and practice in war widely developed, -and the necessity for humanising its methods and limiting its -destructive effects upon neutral countries strongly emphasised. -Grotius and Puffendorf, while they recommend acts of mercy, hold that -there is legally no right which requires that a conquered enemy shall -be spared. This is a matter of humanity alone. It is to the praise -of Vattel that he did much to popularise among the highest and most -powerful classes of society, ideas of humanity in warfare, and of -the rights and obligations of nations. He is, moreover, the first to -make a clear separation between this science and the Law of Nature. -What, he asks, is international law as distinguished from the Law -of Nature? What are the powers of a state and the duties of nations -to one another? What are the causes of quarrel among nations, and -what the means by which they can be settled without any sacrifice of -dignity? - - [31] Puffendorf’s best known work, _De Jure Naturæ et Gentium_, - was published in 1672. - - [32] _Le Droit des Gens_ was published in 1758 and translated - into English by Joseph Chitty in 1797, (2nd ed., 1834). - -They are, in the first place, a friendly conciliatory attitude; and -secondly, such means of settlement as mediation, arbitration and -Peace Congresses. These are the refuges of a peace-loving nation, in -cases where vital interests are not at stake. “Nature gives us no -right to use force, except where mild and conciliatory measures are -useless.” (_Law of Nations_, II. Ch. xviii. § 331.) “Every power owes -it in this matter to the happiness of human society to show itself -ready for every means of reconciliation, in cases where the interests -at stake are neither vital nor important.” (_ibid._ § 332.) At the -same time, it is never advisable that a nation should forgive an -insult which it has not the power to resent. - - -_The Dream of a Perpetual Peace._ - -But side by side with this development and gradual popularisation -of the new science of International Law, ideas of a less practical, -but not less fruitful kind had been steadily making their way and -obtaining a strong hold upon the popular mind. The Decree of Eternal -Pacification of 1495 had abolished private war, one of the heavy -curses of the Middle Ages. Why should it not be extended to banish -warfare between states as well? Gradually one proposal after another -was made to attain this end, or, at least, to smooth the way for -its future realisation. The first of these in point of time is to -be found in a somewhat bare, vague form in Sully’s _Memoirs_,[33] -said to have been published in 1634. Half a century later the Quaker -William Penn suggested an international tribunal of arbitration in -the interests of peace.[34] But it was by the French Abbé St. Pierre -that the problem of perpetual peace was fairly introduced into -political literature: and this, in an age of cabinet and dynastic -wars, while the dreary cost of the war of the Spanish succession was -yet unpaid. St. Pierre was the first who really clearly realised and -endeavoured to prove that the establishment of a permanent state of -peace is not only in the interest of the weaker, but is required -by the European society of nations and by the reason of man. From -the beginning of the history of humanity, poets and prophets had -cherished the “sweet dream” of a peaceful civilisation: it is in the -form of a practical project that this idea is new. - - [33] _Mémoires ou Œconomies Royales D’Estat, Domestiques, - Politiques et Militaires de Henri le Grand, par Maximilian de - Bethune, Duc de Sully._ - - [34] See _International Tribunals_ (1899), p. 20 _seq._ Penn’s - _Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe_ was - written about 1693, but is not included in all editions of his - works. - -The ancient world actually represented a state of what was almost -perpetual war. This was the reality which confronted man, his -inevitable doom, it seemed, as it had been pronounced to the fallen -sinners of Eden. Peace was something which man had enjoyed once, but -forfeited. The myth- and poetry-loving Greeks, and, later, the poets -of Rome delighted to paint a state of eternal peace, not as something -to whose coming they could look forward in the future, but as a -golden age of purity whose records lay buried in the past, a paradise -which had been, but which was no more. Voices, more scientific, were -raised even in Greece in attempts, such as Aristotle’s, to show -that the evolution of man had been not a course of degeneration -from perfection, but of continual progress upwards from barbarism -to civilisation and culture. But the change in popular thinking on -this matter was due less to the arguments of philosophy than to a -practical experience of the causes which operate in the interests -of peace. The foundation of a universal empire under Alexander the -Great gave temporary rest to nations heretofore incessantly at war. -Here was a proof that the Divine Will had not decreed that man was -to work out his punishment under unchanging conditions of perpetual -warfare. This idea of a universal empire became the Greek ideal of a -perpetual peace. Such an empire was, in the language of the Stoics, a -world-state in which all men had rights of citizenship, in which all -other nations were absorbed. - -Parallel to this ideal among the Greeks, we find the hope in Israel -of a Messiah whose coming was to bring peace, not only to the Jewish -race, but to all the nations of the earth. This idea stands out -in the sharpest contrast to the early nationalism of the Hebrew -people, who regarded every stranger as an idolater and an enemy. -The prophecies of Judaism, combined with the cosmopolitan ideas -of Greece, were the source of the idea, which is expressed in the -teaching of Christ, of a spiritual world-empire, an empire held -together solely by the tie of a common religion. - -This hope of peace did not actually die during the first thousand -years of our era, nor even under the morally stagnating influences -of the Middle Ages. When feudalism and private war were abolished -in Europe, it wakened to a new life. Not merely in the mouths of -poets and religious enthusiasts was the cry raised against war, but -by scholars like Thomas More and Erasmus, jurists like Gentilis -and Grotius, men high in the state and in the eyes of Europe like -Henry IV. of France and the Duc de Sully or the Abbé de St. Pierre -whose _Projet de Paix Perpétuelle_ (1713)[35] obtained immediate -popularity and wide-spread fame. The first half of the eighteenth -century was already prepared to receive and mature a plan of this -kind. - - [35] _Projet de traité pour rendre la paix perpétuelle entre les - souverains chrétiens._ The first two volumes of this work were - published in 1713 (trans. London, 1714); a third volume followed - in 1717. - - -_Henry IV. and St. Pierre._ - -The _Grand Dessein_ of Henry IV. is supposed to have been formed by -that monarch and reproduced in Sully’s _Memoirs_, written in 1634 and -discovered nearly a century later by St. Pierre. The story goes that -the Abbé found the book buried in an old garden. It has been shewn, -however, that there is little likelihood that this project actually -originated with the king, who probably corresponded fairly well to -Voltaire’s picture of him as war hero of the _Henriade_. The plan was -more likely conceived by Sully, and ascribed to the popular king for -the sake of the better hearing and greater influence it might in this -way be likely to have, and also because, thereby, it might be less -likely to create offence in political circles. St. Pierre himself may -or may not have been acquainted with the facts. - -The so-called _Grand Dessein_ of Henry IV. was, shortly, as -follows.[36] It proposed to divide Europe between fifteen -Powers,[37] in such a manner that the balance of power should be -established and preserved. These were to form a Christian republic -on the basis of the freedom and equality of its members, the armed -forces of the federation being supported by fixed contribution. A -general council, consisting of representatives from the fifteen -states, was to make all laws necessary for cementing the union thus -formed and for maintaining the order once established. It would also -be the business of this senate to “deliberate on questions that might -arise, to occupy themselves with discussing different interests, to -settle quarrels amicably, to throw light upon and arrange all the -civil, political and religious affairs of Europe, whether internal or -foreign.” (_Mémoires_, vol. VI., p. 129 _seq._) - - [36] The main articles of this and other peace projects are to - be found in _International Tribunals_, published by the Peace - Society. - - [37] Professor Lorimer points out that Prussia, then the Duchy - of Brandenburg, is not mentioned. (_Institutes of the Law of - Nations_, II. Ch. VII., p. 219.) - -This scheme of the king or his minister was expanded with great -thoroughness and clear-sightedness by the Abbé St. Pierre: none of -the many later plans for a perpetual peace has been so perfect in -details. He proposes that there should be a permanent and perpetual -union between, if possible, all Christian sovereigns—of whom he -suggests nineteen, excluding the Czar—“to preserve unbroken peace in -Europe,” and that a permanent Congress or senate should be formed -by deputies of the federated states. The union should protect weak -sovereigns, minors during a regency, and so on, and should banish -civil as well as international war—it should “render prompt and -adequate assistance to rulers and chief magistrates against seditious -persons and rebels.” All warfare henceforth is to be waged between -the troops of the federation—each nation contributing an equal -number—and the enemies of European security, whether outsiders or -rebellious members of the union. Otherwise, where it is possible, -all disputes occurring within the union are to be settled by the -arbitration of the senate, and the combined military force of the -federation is to be applied to drive the Turks out of Europe. There -is to be a rational rearrangement of boundaries, but after this no -change is to be permitted in the map of Europe. The union should bind -itself to tolerate the different forms of faith. - -The objections to St. Pierre’s scheme are, many of them, obvious. He -himself produces sixty-two arguments likely to be raised against his -plan, and he examines these in turn with acuteness and eloquence. -But there are other criticisms which he was less likely to be able -to forestall. Of the nineteen states he names as a basis of the -federation, some have disappeared and the governments of others -have completely changed. Indeed St. Pierre’s scheme did not look -far beyond the present. But it has besides a too strongly political -character.[38] From this point of view, the Abbé’s plan amounts -practically to a European coalition against the Ottoman Empire. -Moreover, we notice with a smile that the French statesman and -patriot is not lost in the cosmopolitan political reformer. “The -kingdom of Spain shall not go out of the House of Bourbon!”[39] -France is to enjoy more than the privileges of honour; she is to reap -distinct material and political advantages from the union. Humanity -is to be a brotherhood, but, in the federation of nations, France is -to stand first.[40] We see that these “rêves d’un homme de bien,” -as Cardinal Dubois called them, are not without their practical -element. But the great mistake of St. Pierre is this: he actually -thought that his plan could be put into execution in the near future, -that an ideal of this kind was realisable at once.[41] “I, myself, -form’d it,” he says in the preface, “in full expectation to see it -one Day executed.” As Hobbes, says, “there can be nothing so absurd, -but may be found in the books of philosophers.”[42] St. Pierre was -not content to make his influence felt on the statesmen of his time -and prepare the way for the abolition of all arbitrary forms of -government. This was the flaw which drew down upon the good Abbé -Voltaire’s sneering epigram[43] and the irony of Leibniz.[44] Here, -above all, in this unpractical enthusiasm his scheme differs from -that of Kant. - - [38] The same objection was raised by Leibniz (see his - _Observations_ on St. Pierre’s _Projet_) to the scheme of Henry - IV., who, says Leibniz, thought more of overthrowing the house of - Austria than of establishing a society of sovereigns. - - [39] _Project_, Art. VI., Eng. trans. (1714), p. 119. - - [40] St. Pierre was not blind to this aspect of the question. - Among the critical objections which he anticipates to his plan is - this,—that it promises too great an increase of strength to the - house of France, and that therefore the author would have been - wiser to conceal his nationality. - - [41] St. Pierre, in what may be called an apology for the wording - of the title of his book (above, p. 32, _note_), justifies his - confidence in these words:—“The Pilot who himself seems uncertain - of the Success of his Voyage is not likely to persuade the - Passenger to embark.... I am persuaded, that it is not impossible - to find out Means sufficient and practicable to settle an - Everlasting Peace among Christians; and even believe, that the - Means which I have thought of are of that Nature.” (Preface to - _Project_, Eng. trans., 1714.) - - [42] _Leviathan_, I. Ch. V. - - [43] See too Voltaire’s allusion to St. Pierre in his - _Dictionary_, under “Religion.” - - [44] Leibniz regarded the project of St. Pierre with an - indifference, somewhat tinged with contempt. In a letter to - Grimarest, (_Leibnit. Opera_, Dutens’ ed., 1768, Vol. V., pp. - 65, 66: in _Epist._, ed. Kortholt., Vol. III., p. 327) he - writes:—“I have seen something of M. de St. Pierre’s plan for - maintaining perpetual peace in Europe. It reminds me of an - inscription outside of a churchyard which ran, ‘_Pax Perpetua_. - For the dead, it is true, fight no more. But the living, are of - another mind, and the mightiest among them have little respect - for tribunals.’” This is followed by the ironical suggestion - that a court of arbitration should be established at Rome of - which the Pope should be made president; while at the same time - the old spiritual authority should be restored to the Church, - and excommunication be the punishment of non-compliance with the - arbitral decree. “Such plans,” he adds, “are as likely to succeed - as that of M. de St. Pierre. But as we are allowed to write - novels, why should we find fault with fiction which would bring - back the golden age?” But see also _Observations sur le Projet - d’une Paix Perpétuelle de M. l’Abbé de St. Pierre_ (Dutens, V., - esp. p. 56) and the letter to Remond de Montmort (_ibid._ pp. 20, - 21) where Leibniz considers this project rather more seriously. - - -_Rousseau’s Criticism of St. Pierre._ - -Rousseau took St. Pierre’s project[45] much more seriously than -either Leibniz or Voltaire. But sovereigns, he thought, are deaf to -the voice of justice; the absolutism of princely power would never -allow a king to submit to a tribunal of nations. Moreover war was, -according to Rousseau’s experience, a matter not between nations, but -between princes and cabinets. It was one of the ordinary pleasures of -royal existence and one not likely to be voluntarily given up.[46] We -know that history has not supported Rousseau’s contention. Dynastic -wars are now no more. The Great Powers have shown themselves able -to impose their own conditions, where the welfare and security of -Europe have seemed to demand it. Such a development seemed impossible -enough in the eighteenth century. In the military organisation -of the nations of Europe and in the necessity of making their -internal development subordinate to the care for their external -security, Rousseau saw the cause of all the defects in their -administration.[47] The formation of unions on the model of the Swiss -Confederation or the German _Bund_ would, he thought, be in the -interest of all rulers. But great obstacles seemed to him to lie in -the way of the realisation of such a project as that of St. Pierre. -“Without doubt,” says Rousseau in conclusion, “the proposal of a -perpetual peace is at present an absurd one.... It can only be put -into effect by methods which are violent in themselves and dangerous -to humanity. One cannot conceive of the possibility of a federative -union being established, except by a revolution. And, that granted, -who among us would venture to say whether this European federation is -to be desired or to be feared? It would work, perhaps, more harm in a -moment than it would prevent in the course of centuries.” (_Jugement -sur la Paix Perpétuelle._) - - [45] “C’est un livre solide et sensé,” says Rousseau (_Jugement - sur la Paix Perpétuelle_), “et il est très important qu’il - existe.” [This _Jugement_ is appended to Rousseau’s _Extrait du - Projet de Paix Perpétuelle de Monsieur l’Abbé de Saint-Pierre_, - 1761.] - - [46] Cf. Cowper: _The Winter Morning Walk_:— - - “Great princes have great playthings. Some have play’d - At hewing mountains into men, and some - At building human wonders mountain high. - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Some seek diversion in the tented field, - And make the sorrows of mankind their sport. - But war’s a game, which, were their subjects wise, - Kings should not play at. Nations would do well - T’extort their truncheons from the puny hands - Of heroes, whose infirm and baby minds - Are gratified with mischief, and who spoil, - Because men suffer it, their toy the world.” - - - [47] “Les troupes réglées, peste et dépopulation de l’Europe, - ne sont bonnes qu’a deux fins: ou pour attaquer et conquérir - les voisins, ou pour enchâiner et asservir les citoyens.” - (_Gouvernement de Pologne_, Ch. XII.) - - -_The Position of Hobbes._ - -The most profound and searching analysis of this problem comes -from Immanuel Kant, whose indebtedness in the sphere of politics -to Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau it is difficult to -overestimate. Kant’s doctrine of the sovereignty of the people comes -to him from Locke through Rousseau. His explanation of the origin -of society is practically that of Hobbes. The direct influence on -politics of this philosopher, apart from his share in moulding the -Kantian theory of the state, is one we cannot afford to neglect. His -was a great influence on the new science just thrown on the world -by Grotius, and his the first clear and systematic statement we -have of the nature of society and the establishment of the state. -The natural state of man, says Hobbes, is a state of war,[48] a -_bellum omnium contra omnes_, where all struggle for honour and for -preferment and the prizes to which every individual is by natural -right equally entitled, but which can of necessity fall only to the -few, the foremost in the race. Men hate and fear the society of their -kind, but through this desire to excel are forced to seek it: only -where there are many can there be a first. This state of things, this -apparent sociability which is brought about by and coupled with the -least sociable of instincts, becomes unendurable. “It is necessary to -peace,” writes Hobbes (_On Dominion_, Ch. VI. 3) “that a man be so -far forth protected against the violence of others, that he may live -securely; that is, that he may have no just cause to fear others, so -long as he doth them no injury. Indeed, to make men altogether safe -from mutual harms, so as they cannot be hurt or injuriously killed, -is impossible; and, therefore, comes not within deliberation.” But to -protect them so far as is possible the state is formed. Hobbes has no -great faith in human contracts or promises. Man’s nature is malicious -and untrustworthy. A coercive power is necessary to guarantee this -long-desired security within the community. “We must therefore,” he -adds, “provide for our security, not by compacts, but by punishments; -and there is then sufficient provision made, when there are so great -punishments appointed for every injury, as apparently it prove a -greater evil to have done it, than not to have done it. For all men, -by a necessity of nature, choose that which to them appears to be the -less evil.” (_Op. cit._, Ch. VI. 4.) - - [48] Hobbes realises clearly that there probably never was such a - state of war all over the world nor a state of nature conforming - to a common type. The case is parallel to the use of the term - “original contract” as an explanation of the manner in which the - civil state came to be formed. (Cf. p. 52, _note_.) - - See also Hume (_Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals,_ - Sect. III. Part I.). “This _poetical_ fiction of the _golden age_ - is, in some respects, of a piece with the _philosophical_ fiction - of the _state of nature_; only that the former is represented - as the most charming and most peaceable condition, which can - possibly be imagined; whereas the latter is painted out as a - state of mutual war and violence, attended with the most extreme - necessity.” This fiction of a state of nature as a state of war, - says Hume, (in a note to this passage) is not the invention of - Hobbes. Plato (_Republic_, II. III. IV.) refutes a hypothesis - very like it, and Cicero (_Pro Sext._ l. 42) regards it as a fact - universally acknowledged. - - Cf. also Spinoza (_Tract. Pol._ c. ii. § 14): “Homines ex natura - hostes.” And (c. v. § 2): “Homines civiles non nascuntur sed - fiunt.” These expressions are to be understood, says Bluntschli - (_Theory of the State_, IV. Ch. vi., p. 284, _note_ a), “rather - as a logical statement of what _would be_ the condition of - man apart from civil society, than as distinctly implying a - historical theory.” - - While starting from the same premises, Spinoza carries Hobbes’ - political theories to their logical conclusion. If we admit that - right lies with might, then right is with the people in any - revolution successfully carried out. (But see Hobbes’ Preface to - the _Philosophical Rudiments_ and Kant’s _Perpetual Peace_, p. - 188, _note_.) Spinoza, in a letter, thus alludes to this point of - difference:—“As regards political theories, the difference which - you inquire about between Hobbes and myself, consists in this, - that I always preserve natural right intact, and only allot to - the chief magistrates in every state a right over their subjects - commensurate with the excess of their power over the power of - the subjects. This is what always takes place in the state of - nature.” (Epistle 50, _Works_, Bohn’s ed., Vol. II.) - -These precautions secure that relative peace within the state which -is one of the conditions of the safety of the people. But it is, -besides, the duty of a sovereign to guarantee an adequate protection -to his subjects against foreign enemies. A state of defence as -complete and perfect as possible is not only a national duty, but an -absolute necessity. The following statement of the relation of the -state to other states shows how closely Hobbes has been followed by -Kant. “There are two things necessary,” says Hobbes, (_On Dominion_, -Ch. XIII. 7) “for the people’s defence; to be warned and to be -forearmed. _For the state of commonwealths considered in themselves, -is natural, that is to say, hostile._[49] Neither, if they cease from -fighting, is it therefore to be called peace; but rather a breathing -time, in which one enemy observing the motion and countenance of the -other, values his security not according to pacts, but the forces and -counsels of his adversary.” - - [49] The italics are mine.—[Tr.] - -Hobbes is a practical philosopher: no man was less a dreamer, a -follower after ideals than he. He is, moreover, a pessimist, and -his doctrine of the state is a political absolutism,[50] the form -of government which above all has been, and is, favourable to war. -He would no doubt have ridiculed the idea of a perpetual peace -between nations, had such a project as that of St. Pierre—a practical -project, counting upon a realisation in the near future—been brought -before him. He might not even have accepted it in the very much -modified form which Kant adopts, that of an ideal—an unattainable -ideal—towards which humanity could not do better than work. He -expected the worst possible from man the individual. _Homo homini -lupus._ The strictest absolutism, amounting almost to despotism, -was required to keep the vicious propensities of the human animal -in check. States he looked upon as units of the same kind, members -also of a society. They had, and openly exhibited, the same faults -as individual men. They too might be driven with a strong enough -coercive force behind them, but not without it; and such a coercive -force as this did not exist in a society of nations. Federation and -federal troops are terms which represent ideas of comparatively -recent origin. Without something of this kind, any enduring peace -was not to be counted upon. International relations were and -must remain at least potentially warlike in character. Under no -circumstances could ideal conditions be possible either between the -members of a state or between the states themselves. Human nature -could form no satisfactory basis for a counsel of perfection. - - [50] Professor Paulsen (_Immanuel Kant_, 2nd ed., 1899, p. - 359—Eng. trans., p. 353) points out that pessimism and absolutism - usually go together in the doctrines of philosophers. He gives as - instances Hobbes, Kant and Schopenhauer. - - Hobbes (_On Dominion_, Ch. X. 3, _seq._) regarded an absolute - monarchy as the only proper form of government, while in the - opinion of Locke, (_On Civil Government_, II. Ch. VII. §§ 90, - 91) it was no better than a state of nature. Kant would not have - gone quite so far. As a philosopher, he upheld the sovereignty - of the people and rejected a monarchy which was not governed in - accordance with republican principles; as a citizen, he denied - the right of resistance to authority. (Cf. _Perpetual Peace_, pp. - 126, 188, _note_.) - -Hence Hobbes never thought of questioning the necessity of war. -It was in his eyes the natural condition of European society; but -certain rules were necessary both for its conduct and, where this -was compatible with a nation’s dignity and prosperity, for its -prevention. He held that international law was only a part of the -Law of Nature, and that this Law of Nature laid certain obligations -upon nations and their kings. Mediation must be employed between -disputants as much as possible, the person of the mediators of -peace being held inviolate; an umpire ought to be chosen to decide -a controversy, to whose judgment the parties in dispute agree to -submit themselves; such an arbiter must be impartial. These are all -what Hobbes calls precepts of the Law of Nature. And he appeals to -the Scriptures in confirmation of his assertion that peace is the -way of righteousness and that the laws of nature of which these are -a few are also laws of the heavenly kingdom. But peace is like the -straight path of Christian endeavour, difficult to find and difficult -to keep. We must seek after it where it may be found; but, having -done this and sought in vain, we have no alternative but to fall back -upon war. Reason requires “that every man ought to endeavour peace,” -(_Lev._ I. Ch. XIV.) “as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and -when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and -advantages of war.”[51] This, says Hobbes elsewhere, (_On Liberty_, -Ch. I. 15) is the dictate of right reason, the first and fundamental -law of nature. - - [51] We find the same rule laid down as early as the time of - Dante. Cf. _De Monarchia_, Bk. II. 9:—“When two nations quarrel - they are bound to try in every possible way to arrange the - quarrel by means of discussion: it is only when this is hopeless - that they may declare war.” - - -_Kant’s Idea of a Perpetual Peace._ - -With regard to the problems of international law, Kant is of course -a hundred and fifty years ahead of Hobbes. But he starts from the -same point: his theory of the beginning of society is practically -identical with that of the older philosopher. Men are by nature -imperfect creatures, unsociable and untrustworthy, cursed by a love -of glory, of possession, and of power, passions which make happiness -something for ever unattainable by them. Hobbes is content to leave -them here with their imperfections, and let a strong government -help them out as it may. But not so Kant. He looks beyond man -the individual, developing slowly by stages scarcely measurable, -progressing at one moment, and the next, as it seems, falling behind: -he looks beyond the individual, struggling and never attaining, to -the race. Here Kant is no pessimist. The capacities implanted in -man by nature are not all for evil: they are, he says, “destined to -unfold themselves completely in the course of time, and in accordance -with the end to which they are adapted.” (_Idea of a Universal -History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View_, 1784. Prop. 1.) This -end of humanity is the evolution of man from the stage of mere -self-satisfied animalism to a high state of civilisation. Through -his own reason man is to attain a perfect culture, intellectual and -moral. In this long period of struggle, the potential faculties -which nature or Providence has bestowed upon him reach their full -development. The process in which this evolution takes place is what -we call history. - -To man nature has given none of the perfect animal equipments for -self-preservation and self-defence which she has bestowed on others -of her creatures. But she has given to him reason and freedom of -will, and has determined that through these faculties and without the -aid of instinct he shall win for himself a complete development of -his capacities and natural endowments. It is, says Kant, no happy -life that nature has marked out for man. He is filled with desires -which he can never satisfy. His life is one of endeavour and not of -attainment: not even the consciousness of the well-fought battle is -his, for the struggle is more or less an unconscious one, the end -unseen. Only in the race, and not in the individual, can the natural -capacities of the human species reach full development. Reason, says -Kant, (Prop. 2, _op. cit._) “does not itself work by instinct, but -requires experiments, exercise and instruction in order to advance -gradually from one stage of insight to another. Hence each individual -man would necessarily have to live an enormous length of time, in -order to learn by himself how to make a complete use of all his -natural endowments. Or, if nature should have given him but a short -lease of life, as is actually the case, reason would then require an -almost interminable series of generations, the one handing down its -enlightenment to the other, in order that the seeds she has sown in -our species may be brought at last to a stage of development which -is in perfect accordance with her design.” Man the individual shall -travel towards the land of promise and fight for its possession, but -not he, nor his children, nor his children’s children shall inherit -the land. “Only the latest comers can have the good fortune of -inhabiting the dwelling which the long series of their predecessors -have toiled—though,” adds Kant, “without any conscious intent—to -build up without even the possibility of participating in the -happiness which they were preparing.” (Proposition 3.) - -The means which nature employs to bring about this development of -all the capacities implanted in men is their mutual antagonism in -society—what Kant calls the “unsocial sociableness of men, that is to -say, their inclination to enter into society, an inclination which -yet is bound up at every point with a resistance which threatens -continually to break up the society so formed.” (Proposition 4.) Man -hates society, and yet there alone he can develop his capacities; he -cannot live there peaceably, and yet cannot live without it. It is -the resistance which others offer to his inclinations and will—which -he, on his part, shows likewise to the desires of others—that awakens -all the latent powers of his nature and the determination to conquer -his natural propensity to indolence and love of material comfort -and to struggle for the first place among his fellow-creatures, to -satisfy, in outstripping them, his love of glory and possession and -power. “Without those, in themselves by no means lovely, qualities -which set man in social opposition to man, so that each finds his -selfish claims resisted by the selfishness of all the others, men -would have lived on in an Arcadian shepherd life, in perfect -harmony, contentment, and mutual love; but all their talents would -forever have remained hidden and undeveloped. Thus, kindly as the -sheep they tended, they would scarcely have given to their existence -a greater value than that of their cattle. And the place among the -ends of creation which was left for the development of rational -beings would not have been filled. Thanks be to nature for the -unsociableness, for the spiteful competition of vanity, for the -insatiate desires of gain and power! Without these, all the excellent -natural capacities of humanity would have slumbered undeveloped. -Man’s will is for harmony; but nature knows better what is good for -his species: her will is for dissension. He would like a life of -comfort and satisfaction, but nature wills that he should be dragged -out of idleness and inactive content and plunged into labour and -trouble, in order that he may be made to seek in his own prudence -for the means of again delivering himself from them. The natural -impulses which prompt this effort,—the causes of unsociableness and -mutual conflict, out of which so many evils spring,—are also in turn -the spurs which drive him to the development of his powers. Thus, -they really betray the providence of a wise Creator, and not the -interference of some evil spirit which has meddled with the world -which God has nobly planned, and enviously overturned its order.” -(Proposition 4: Caird’s translation in _The Critical Philosophy of -Kant_, Vol. II., pp. 550, 551.) - -The problem now arises, How shall men live together, each free to -work out his own development, without at the same time interfering -with a like liberty on the part of his neighbour? The solution -of this problem is the state. Here the liberty of each member is -guaranteed and its limits strictly defined. A perfectly just civil -constitution, administered according to the principles of right, -would be that under which the greatest possible amount of liberty -was left to each citizen within these limits. This is the ideal -of Kant, and here lies the greatest practical problem which has -presented itself to humanity. An ideal of this kind is difficult of -realisation. But nature imposes no such duty upon us. “Out of such -crooked material as man is made,” says Kant, “nothing can be hammered -quite straight.” (Proposition 6.) We must make our constitution as -good as we can and, with that, rest content. - -The direct cause of this transition from a state of nature and -conditions of unlimited freedom to civil society with its coercive -and restraining forces is found in the evils of that state of nature -as they are painted by Hobbes. A wild lawless freedom becomes -impossible for man: he is compelled to seek the protection of a -civil society. He lives in uncertainty and insecurity: his liberty -is so far worthless that he cannot peacefully enjoy it. For this -peace he voluntarily yields up some part of his independence. The -establishment of the state is in the interest of his development to -a higher civilisation. It is more—the guarantee of his existence -and self-preservation. This is the sense, says Professor Paulsen, -in which Kant like Hobbes regards the state as “resting on a -contract,”[52] that is to say, on the free will of all.[53] _Volenti -non fit injuria._ Only, adds Paulsen, we must remember that this -contract is not a historical fact, as it seemed to some writers of -the eighteenth century, but an “idea of reason”: we are speaking here -not of the history of the establishment of the state, but of the -reason of its existence. (Paulsen’s _Kant_, p. 354.)[54] - - [52] Rousseau (_Contrat Social_: I. vi.) regards the social - contract as tacitly implied in every actual society: its articles - “are the same everywhere, and are everywhere tacitly admitted - and recognised, even though they may never have found formal - expression” in any constitution. In the same way he speaks of - a state of nature “which no longer exists, which perhaps never - has existed.” (Preface to the _Discourse on the Causes of - Inequality_.) But Rousseau’s interpretation of these terms is, on - the whole, literal in spite of these single passages. He speaks - throughout the _Contrat Social_, as if history could actually - record the signing and drawing up of such documents. Hobbes, - Hooker, (_Ecclesiastical Polity_, I. sect. 10—see also Ritchie: - _Darwin and Hegel_, p. 210 _seq._) Hume and Kant use more careful - language. “It cannot be denied,” writes Hume, (_Of the Original - Contract_) “that all government is, at first, founded on a - contract and that the most ancient rude combinations of mankind - were formed chiefly by that principle. In vain are we asked in - what records this charter of our liberties is registered. It was - not written on parchment, nor yet on leaves or barks of trees. It - preceded the use of writing and all the other civilised arts of - life. But we trace it plainly in the nature of man, and in the - equality, or something approaching equality, which we find in all - the individuals of that species.” - - This fine passage expresses admirably the views of Kant on this - point. Cf. _Werke_, (Rosenkranz) IX. 160. The original contract - is merely an idea of reason, one of those ideas which we think - into things in order to explain them. - - Hobbes does not professedly make the contract historical, but in - Locke’s _Civil Government_ (II. Ch. VIII. § 102) there is some - attempt made to give it a historical basis.—By consent all were - equal, “till by the same consent they set rulers over themselves. - So that their politic societies all began from a voluntary union, - and the mutual agreement of men freely acting in the choice of - their governors, and forms of government.” - - Bluntschli points out (_Theory of the State_, IV. ix., p. 294 - and _note_) that the same theory of contract on which Hobbes’ - doctrine of an absolute government was based was made the - justification of violent resistance to the government at the time - of the French Revolution. The theory was differently applied by - Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. According to the first, men leave - the “state of nature” when they surrender their rights to a - sovereign, and return to that state during revolution. But, for - Rousseau, this sovereign authority is the people: a revolution - would be only a change of ministry. (See _Cont. Soc._, III. Ch. - xviii.) Again Locke holds revolution to be justifiable in all - cases where the governments have not fulfilled the trust reposed - by the people in them. (Cf. Kant’s _Perpetual Peace_, p. 188, - _note_). - - [53] “If you unite many men,” writes Rousseau, (_Cont. Soc._, IV. - I.) “and consider them as one body, they will have but one will; - and that will must be to promote the common safety and general - well-being of all.” This _volonté générale_, the common element - of all particular wills, cannot be in conflict with any of them. - (_Op. cit._, II. iii.) - - [54] In Eng. trans., see p. 348. - -In this civil union, self-sought, yet sought reluctantly, man is able -to turn his most unlovable qualities to a profitable use. They bind -this society together. They are the instrument by which he wins for -himself self-culture. It is here with men, says Kant, as it is with -the trees in a forest: “just because each one strives to deprive the -other of air and sun, they compel each other to seek both above, -and thus they grow beautiful and straight. Whereas those that, in -freedom and isolation from one another, shoot out their branches at -will, grow stunted and crooked and awry.” (Proposition 5, _op. cit._) -Culture, art, and all that is best in the social order are the fruits -of that self-loving unsociableness in man. - -The problem of the establishment of a perfect civil constitution -cannot be solved, says this treatise (_Idea for a Universal -History_), until the external relations of states are regulated -in accordance with principles of right. For, even if the ideal -internal constitution were attained, what end would it serve in the -evolution of humanity, if commonwealths themselves were to remain -like individuals in a state of nature, each existing in uncontrolled -freedom, a law unto himself? This condition of things again cannot -be permanent. Nature uses the same means as before to bring about a -state of law and order. War, present or near at hand, the strain -of constant preparation for a possible future campaign or the heavy -burden of debt and devastation left by the last,—these are the evils -which must drive states to leave a lawless, savage state of nature, -hostile to man’s inward development, and seek in union the end of -nature, peace. All wars are the attempts nature makes to bring about -new political relations between nations, relations which, in their -very nature, cannot be, and are not desired to be, permanent. These -combinations will go on succeeding each other, until at last a -federation of all powers is formed for the establishment of perpetual -peace. This is the end of humanity, demanded by reason. Justice -will reign, not only in the state, but in the whole human race when -perpetual peace exists between the nations of the world. - -This is the point of view of the _Idea for a Universal History_. But -equally, we may say, law and justice will reign between nations, -when a legally and morally perfect constitution adorns the state. -External perpetual peace presupposes internal peace—peace civil, -social, economic, religious. Now, when men are perfect—and what -would this be but perfection—how can there be war? Cardinal Fleury’s -only objection—no light one—to St. Pierre’s project was that, as -even the most peace-loving could not avoid war, all men must first -be men of noble character. This seems to be what is required in -the treatise on _Perpetual Peace_. Kant demands, to a certain -extent, the moral regeneration of man. There must be perfect honesty -in international dealings, good faith in the interpretation and -fulfilment of treaties and so on (Art. 1)[55]: and again, every state -must have a republican constitution—a term by which Kant understands -a constitution as nearly as possible in accordance with the spirit -of right. (Art. 1.)[56] This is to say that we have to start with -our reformation at home, look first to the culture and education -and morals of our citizens, then to our foreign relations. This is -a question of self-interest as well as of ethics. On the civil and -religious liberty of a state depends its commercial success. Kant -saw the day coming, when industrial superiority was to be identified -with political pre-eminence. The state which does not look to the -enlightenment and liberty of its subjects must fail in the race. But -the advantages of a high state of civilisation are not all negative. -The more highly developed the individuals who form a state, the more -highly developed is its consciousness of its obligations to other -nations. In the ignorance and barbarism of races lies the great -obstacle to a reign of law among states. Uncivilised states cannot -be conceived as members of a federation of Europe. First, the -perfect civil constitution according to right: then the federation of -these law-abiding Powers. This is the path which reason marks out. -The treatise on _Perpetual Peace_ seems to be in this respect more -practical than the _Idea for a Universal History_. But it matters -little which way we take it. The point of view is the same in both -cases: the end remains the development of man towards good, the order -of his steps in this direction is indifferent. - - [55] See p. 107. - - [56] See p. 120. - - -_The Political and Social Conditions of Kant’s Time._ - -The history of the human race, viewed as a whole, Kant regards -as the realisation of a hidden plan of nature to bring about a -political constitution internally and externally perfect—the only -condition under which the faculties of man can be fully developed. -Does experience support this theory? Kant thought that, to a certain -degree, it did. This conviction was not, however, a fruit of his -experience of citizenship in Prussia, an absolute dynastic state, -a military monarchy waging perpetual dynastic wars of the kind he -most hotly condemned. Kant had no feeling of love to Prussia,[57] -and little of a citizen’s patriotic pride, or even interest, in its -political achievements. This was partly because of his sympathy with -republican doctrines: partly due to his love of justice and peculiar -hatred of war,[58] a hatred based, no doubt, not less on principle -than on a close personal experience of the wretchedness it brings -with it. It was not the political and social conditions in which he -lived which fostered Kant’s love of liberty and gave him inspiration, -unless in the sense in which the mind reacts upon surrounding -influences. Looking beyond Prussia to America, in whose struggle -for independence he took a keen interest, and looking to France -where the old dynastic monarchy had been succeeded by a republican -state, Kant seemed to see the signs of a coming democratisation of -the old monarchical society of Europe. In this growing influence on -the state of the mass of the people who had everything to lose in -war and little to gain by victory, he saw the guarantee of a future -perpetual peace. Other forces too were at work to bring about this -consummation. There was a growing consciousness that war, this costly -means of settling a dispute, is not even a satisfactory method of -settlement. Hazardous and destructive in its effect, it is also -uncertain in its results. Victory is not always gain; it no longer -signifies a land to be plundered, a people to be sold to slavery. It -brings fresh responsibilities to a nation, at a time when it is not -always strong enough to bear them. But, above all, Kant saw, even at -the end of the eighteenth century, the nations of Europe so closely -bound together by commercial interests that a war—and especially a -maritime war where the scene of conflict cannot be to the same extent -localised as on land—between any two of them could not but seriously -affect the prosperity of the others.[59] He clearly realised that -the spirit of commerce was the strongest force in the service of the -maintenance of peace, and that in it lay a guarantee of future union. - - [57] Unlike Hegel whose ideal was the Prussian state, as it was - under Frederick the Great. An enthusiastic supporter of the power - of monarchy, he showed himself comparatively indifferent to the - progress of constitutional liberty. - - [58] Isolated passages are sometimes quoted from Kant in support - of a theory that the present treatise is at least half ironical[A] - and that his views on the question of perpetual peace did not - essentially differ from those of Leibniz. “Even war,” he says, - (_Kritik d. Urteilskraft_, I. Book ii. § 28.) “when conducted in - an orderly way and with reverence for the rights of citizens has - something of the sublime about it, and the more dangers a nation - which wages war in this manner is exposed to and can courageously - overcome, the nobler does its character grow. While, on the other - hand, a prolonged peace usually has the effect of giving free - play to a purely commercial spirit, and side by side with this, - to an ignoble self-seeking, to cowardice and effeminacy; and the - result of this is generally a degradation of national character.” - - [A] Cf. K. v. Stengel: _Der Ewige Friede_, Munich, 1899; also - Vaihinger: _Kantstudien_, Vol. IV., p. 58. - - This is certainly an admission that war which does not violate - the Law of Nations has a good side as well as a bad. We could - look for no less in so clear-sighted and unprejudiced a thinker. - Kant would have been the first to admit that under certain - conditions a nation can have no higher duty than to wage war. - War is necessary, but it is in contradiction to reason and the - spirit of right. The “scourge of mankind,” “making more bad men - than it takes away,” the “destroyer of every good,” Kant calls it - elsewhere. (_Theory of Ethics_, Abbott’s trans., 4th ed., p. 341, - _note_.) - - [59] Cf. _Idea for a Universal History_, Prop. 8; _Perpetual - Peace_, pp. 142, 157. - -This scheme of a federation of the nations of the world, in -accordance with principles which would put an end to war between -them, was one whose interest for Kant seemed to increase during the -last twenty years of his life.[60] It was according to him an idea -of reason, and, in his first essay on the subject—that of 1784—we -see the place this ideal of a perpetual peace held in the Kantian -system of philosophy. Its realisation is the realisation of the -highest good—the ethical and political _summum bonum_, for here the -aims of morals and politics coincide: only in a perfect development -of his faculties in culture and in morals can man at last find true -happiness. History is working towards the consummation of this end. A -moral obligation lies on man to strive to establish conditions which -bring its realisation nearer. It is the duty of statesmen to form a -federative union as it was formerly the duty of individuals to enter -the state. The moral law points the way here as clearly as in the -sphere of pure ethics:—“Thou can’st, therefore thou ought’st.” - - [60] The immediate stimulus to Kant’s active interest in this - subject as a practical question was the Peace of Basle (1795) - which ended the first stage in the series of wars which followed - the French Revolution. - -Let us be under no misapprehension as to Kant’s attitude to the -problem of perpetual peace. It is an ideal. He states plainly that he -so regards it[61] and that as such it is unattainable. But this is -the essence of all ideals: they have not the less value in shaping -the life and character of men and nations on that account. They are -not ends to be realised but ideas according to which we must live, -regulative principles. We cannot, says Kant, shape our life better -than in acting as if such ideas of reason have objective validity and -there be an immortal life in which man shall live according to the -laws of reason, in peace with his neighbour and in freedom from the -trammels of sense. - - [61] It is _eine unausführbare Idee_. See the passage quoted from - the _Rechtslehre_, p. 129, _note_. - -Hence we are concerned here, not with an end, but with the means by -which we might best set about attaining it, if it were attainable. -This is the subject matter of the _Treatise on Perpetual Peace_ -(1795), a less eloquent and less purely philosophical essay than that -of 1784, but throughout more systematic and practical. We have to do, -not with the favourite dream of philanthropists like St. Pierre and -Rousseau, but with a statement of the conditions on the fulfilment of -which the transition to a reign of peace and law depends. - - -_The Conditions of the Realisation of the Kantian Ideal._ - -These means are of two kinds. In the first place, what evils must -we set about removing? What are the negative conditions? And, -secondly, what are the general positive conditions which will make -the realisation of this idea possible and guarantee the permanence -of an international peace once attained? These negative and -positive conditions Kant calls Preliminary and Definitive Articles -respectively, the whole essay being carefully thrown into the form of -a treaty. The Preliminary Articles of a treaty for perpetual peace -are based on the principle that anything that hinders or threatens -the peaceful co-existence of nations must be abolished. These -conditions have been classified by Kuno Fischer. Kant, he points -out,[62] examines the principles of right governing the different -sets of circumstances in which nations find themselves—namely, (_a_) -while they are actually at war; (_b_) when the time comes to conclude -a treaty of peace; (_c_) when they are living in a state of peace. -The six Preliminary Articles fall naturally into these groups. War -must not be conducted in such a manner as to increase national -hatred and embitter a future peace. (Art. 6.)[63] The treaty which -brings hostilities to an end must be concluded in an honest desire -for peace. (Art. 1.)[64] Again a nation, when in a state of peace, -must do nothing to threaten the political independence of another -nation or endanger its existence, thereby giving the strongest of -all motives for a fresh war. A nation may commit this injury in -two ways: (1) indirectly, by causing danger to others through the -growth of its standing army (Art. 3)[65]—always a menace to the -state of peace—or by any unusual war preparations: and (2) through -too great a supremacy of another kind, by amassing money, the -most powerful of all weapons in warfare. The National Debt (Art. -4)[66] is another standing danger to the peaceful co-existence of -nations. But, besides, we have the danger of actual attack. There -is no right of intervention between nations. (Art. 5.)[67] Nor can -states be inherited or conquered (Art. 2),[68] or in any way treated -in a manner subversive of their independence and sovereignty as -individuals. For a similar reason, armed troops cannot be hired and -sold as things. - - [62] _Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_, (4th ed., 1899), Vol. - V., I. Ch. 12, p. 168 _seq._ - - [63] See p. 114. - - [64] See p. 107. - - [65] See p. 110. - - [66] See p. 111. - - [67] See p. 112. - - [68] See p. 108. - -These then are the negative conditions of peace.[69] There are, -besides, three positive conditions: - - [69] A large part of Kant’s requirements as they are expressed in - these Preliminary Articles has already been fulfilled. The first - (Art. 1) is recognised in theory at least by modern international - law. More cannot be said. A treaty of this kind is of necessity - more or less forced by the stronger on the weaker. The formal - ratification of peace in 1871 did not prevent France from longing - for the day when she might win back Alsace-Lorraine and be - revenged on Prussia. Not the treaty nor a consciousness of defeat - has kept the peace west of the Rhine, but a reluctant respect for - the fortress of Metz and the mighty army of united Germany. - - Articles 2 and 6 are already commonplaces of international - law. Article 2 refers to practices which have not survived the - gradual disappearance of dynastic war. Art. 6 is the basis of - our modern law of war. Art. 3 has been fulfilled in the literal - sense that the standing armies composed of mercenary troops to - which Kant alludes exist no longer. But it is to be feared that - Kant would not think that we have made things much better, nor - regard our present system of progressive armaments as a step in - the direction of perpetual peace. Art. 4 is not likely to be - fulfilled in the near future. It is long since Cobden denounced - the institution of National Debts—an institution which, as Kant - points out, owes its origin to the English, the “commercial - people” referred to in the text. Art. 5 no doubt came to Kant - through Vattel. “No nation,” says the Swiss publicist, (_Law of - Nations_, II. Ch. iv. § 54) “has the least right to interfere - with the government of another,” unless, he adds, (Ch. v. § - 70) in a case of anarchy or where the well-being of the human - race demands it. This is a recognised principle of modern - international law. Intervention is held to be justifiable only - where the obligation to respect another’s freedom of action comes - into conflict with the duty of self-preservation. - - Puffendorf leaves much more room for the exercise of benevolence. - The natural affinity and kinship between men is, says he, (_Les - Devoirs de l’homme et du citoien_, II. Ch. xvi. § xi.) “a - sufficient reason to authorise us to take up defence of every - person whom one sees unjustly oppressed, when he implores our - aid _and when we can do it conveniently_.” (The italics are - mine.—[Tr.]) - -(_a_) The intercourse of nations is to be confined to a right of -hospitality. (Art. 3.)[70] There is nothing new to us in this -assertion of a right of way. The right to free means of international -communication has in the last hundred years become a commonplace of -law. And the change has been brought about, as Kant anticipated, -not through an abstract respect for the idea of right, but through -the pressure of purely commercial interests. Since Kant’s time -the nations of Europe have all been more or less transformed from -agricultural to commercial states whose interests run mainly in the -same direction, whose existence and development depend necessarily -upon “conditions of universal hospitality.” Commerce depends upon -this freedom of international intercourse, and on commerce mainly -depends our hope of peace. - - [70] See p. 137. The main principle involved in this passage - comes from Vattel (_op. cit._, II. Ch. viii. §§ 104, 105: Ch. ix. - §§ 123, 125). A sovereign, he says, cannot object to a stranger - entering his state who at the same time respects its laws. No one - can be quite deprived of the right of way which has been handed - down from the time when the whole earth was common to all men. - -(_b_) The first Definitive Article[71] requires that the constitution -of every state should be republican. What Kant understands by this -term is that, in the state, law should rule above force and that -its constitution should be a representative one, guaranteeing -public justice and based on the freedom and equality of its members -and their mutual dependence on a common legislature. Kant’s demand -is independent of the _form_ of the government. A constitutional -monarchy like that of Prussia in the time of Frederick the Great, -who regarded himself as the first servant of the state and ruled -with the wisdom and forethought which the nation would have had -the right to demand from such an one—such a monarchy is not in -contradiction to the idea of a true republic. That the state should -have a constitution in accordance with the principles of right is -the essential point.[72] To make this possible, the law-giving -power must lie with the representatives of the people: there must be -a complete separation, such as Locke and Rousseau demand, between -the legislature and executive. Otherwise we have despotism. Hence, -while Kant admitted absolutism under certain conditions, he rejected -democracy where, in his opinion, the mass of the people was despot. - - [71] See p. 120. - - [72] Kant believed that, in the newly formed constitution of the - United States, his ideal with regard to the external forms of - the state as conforming to the spirit of justice was most nearly - realised. Professor Paulsen draws attention, in the following - passage, to the fact that Kant held the English government of - the eighteenth century in very low esteem. (_Kant_, p. 357, - _note_. See Eng. trans., p. 352, _note_.) It was not the English - state, he says, which furnished Kant with an illustration of - his theory:—“Rather in it he sees a form of despotism only - slightly veiled, not Parliamentary despotism, as some people - have thought, but monarchical despotism. Through bribery of the - Commons and the Press, the King had actually absolute power, as - was evident, above all, from the fact that he had often waged war - without, and in defiance of, the will of the people. Kant has - a very unfavourable opinion of the English state in every way. - Among the collected notes written by him in the last ten years - of the century and published by Reicke (_Lose Blätter_, I. 129) - the following appears:—‘The English nation (_gens_) regarded as - a people (_populus_) and looked upon side by side with other - races is, as a collection of individuals, of all mankind the - most highly to be esteemed. But as a state, compared with other - states, it is the most destructive, high-handed and tyrannical, - and the most provocative of war among them all.’” - - Kuno Fischer (_op. cit._, Vol. V., I. Ch. 11, pp. 150, 151) to - whom Professor Paulsen’s reference may here perhaps allude, - states that Kant’s objection to the English constitution is that - it was an oligarchy, Parliament being not only a legislative - body, but through its ministers also executive in the interests - of the ruling party or even of private individuals in that party. - It seems more likely that what most offended a keen observer of - the course of the American War of Independence was the arbitrary - and ill-directed power of the king. But see the passage quoted - by Fischer (pp. 152, 153) from the _Rechtslehre_ (Part II. Sect. - I.) which is, he says, unmistakeably directed against the English - constitution and certain temporary conditions in the political - history of the country. - -An internal constitution, firmly established on the principles of -right, would not only serve to kill the seeds of national hatred and -diminish the likelihood of foreign war. It would do more: it would -destroy sources of revolution and discontent within the state. Kant, -like many writers on this subject, does not directly allude to civil -war[73] and the means by which it may be prevented or abolished. -Actually to achieve this would be impossible: it is beyond the -power of either arbitration or disarmament. But in a representative -government and the liberty of a people lie the greatest safeguards -against internal discontent. Civil peace and international peace must -to a certain extent go hand in hand. - - [73] St. Pierre actually thought that his federation would - prevent civil war. See _Project_ (1714), p. 16. - -We come now to the central idea of the treatise: (_c_) the law of -nations must be based upon a federation of free states. (Art. 2.)[74] -This must be regarded as the end to which mankind is advancing. The -problem here is not out of many nations to make one. This would -be perhaps the surest way to attain peace, but it is scarcely -practicable, and, in certain forms, it is undesirable. Kant is -inclined to approve of the separation of nations by language and -religion, by historical and social tradition and physical boundaries: -nature seems to condemn the idea of a universal monarchy.[75] The -only footing on which a thorough-going, indubitable system of -international law is in practice possible is that of the society -of nations: not the world-republic[76] the Greeks dreamt of, but a -federation of states. Such a union in the interests of perpetual -peace between nations would be the “highest political good.” The -relation of the federated states to one another and to the whole -would be fixed by cosmopolitan law: the link of self-interest which -would bind them would again be the spirit of commerce. - - [74] See p. 128. - - [75] This was the ideal of Dante. Cf. _De Monarchia_, Bk. I. - 54:—“We shall not find at any time except under the divine - monarch Augustus, when a perfect monarchy existed, that the world - was everywhere quiet.” - - Bluntschli (_Theory of the State_, I. Ch. ii., p. 26 _seq._) - gives an admirable account of the different attempts made to - realise a universal empire in the past—the Empire of Alexander - the Great, based upon a plan of uniting the races of east and - west; the Roman Empire which sought vainly to stamp its national - character upon mankind; the Frankish Monarchy; the Holy Roman - Empire which fell to pieces through the want of a central - power strong enough to overcome the tendency to separation and - nationalisation; and finally the attempt of Napoleon I., whose - mistake was the same as that which wrecked the Roman Empire—a - neglect of the strength of foreign national sentiment. - - [76] Reason requires a State of nations. This is the ideal, - and Kant’s proposal of a federation of states is a practical - substitute from which we may work to higher things. Kant, like - Fichte, (_Werke_, VII. 467) strongly disapproves of a universal - monarchy such as that of which Dante dreamed—a modern Roman - Empire. The force of necessity, he says, will bring nations at - last to become members of a cosmopolitan state, “or if such a - state of universal peace proves (as has often been the case - with too great states) a greater danger to freedom from another - point of view, in that it introduces despotism of the most - terrible kind, then this same necessity must compel the nations - to enter a state which indeed has the form not of a cosmopolitan - commonwealth under one sovereign, but of a federation - regulated by legal principles determined by a common code of - international law.” (_Das mag in d. Theorie richtig sein_, - _Werke_, (Rosenkranz) VII., p. 225). Cf. also _Theory of Ethics_, - (Abbott), p. 341, _note_; _Perpetual Peace_, pp. 155, 156. - -This scheme of a perpetual peace had not escaped ridicule in the -eighteenth century: the name of Kant protected it henceforth. -The facts of history, even more conclusively than the voices of -philosophers, soldiers and princes, show how great has been the -progress of this idea in recent years. But it has not gained its -present hold upon the popular mind without great and lasting -opposition. Indeed we have here what must still be regarded as a -controversial question. There have been, and are still, men who -regard perpetual peace as a state of things as undesirable as -it is unattainable. For such persons, war is a necessity of our -civilisation: it is impossible that it should ever cease to exist. -All that we can do, and there is no harm, nor any contradiction in -the attempt, is to make wars shorter, fewer and more humane: the -whole question, beyond this, is without practical significance. -Others, on the other hand,—and these perhaps more thoughtful—regard -war as hostile to culture, an evil of the worst kind, although a -necessary evil. In peace, for them, lies the true ideal of humanity, -although in any perfect form this cannot be realised in the near -future. The extreme forms of these views are to be sought in what has -been called in Germany “the philosophy of the barracks” which comes -forward with a glorification of war for its own sake, and in the -attitude of modern Peace Societies which denounce all war wholesale, -without respect of causes or conditions. - - -_Hegel, Schiller and Moltke._ - -Hegel, the greatest of the champions of war, would have nothing -to do with Kant’s federation of nations formed in the interests -of peace. The welfare of a state, he held, is its own highest -law; and he refused to admit that this welfare was to be sought -in an international peace. Hegel lived in an age when all power -and order seemed to lie with the sword. Something of the charm of -Napoleonism seems to hang over him. He does not go the length of -writers like Joseph de Maistre, who see in war the finger of God or -an arrangement for the survival of the fittest—a theory, as far as -regards individuals, quite in contradiction with the real facts, -which show that it is precisely the physically unfit whom war, as a -method of extermination, cannot reach. But, like Schiller and Moltke, -Hegel sees in war an educative instrument, developing virtues in a -nation which could not be fully developed otherwise, (much as pain -and suffering bring patience and resignation and other such qualities -into play in the individual), and drawing the nation together, making -each citizen conscious of his citizenship, as no other influence can. -War, he holds, leaves a nation always stronger than it was before; -it buries causes of inner dissension, and consolidates the internal -power of the state.[77] No other trial can, in the same way, show -what is the real strength and weakness of a nation, what it _is_, not -merely materially, but physically, intellectually and morally. - - [77] See the _Philosophie d. Rechts_, (_Werke_, Vol. VIII.) Part - iii. § 324 and appendix. - -With this last statement most people will be inclined to agree. There -is only a part of the truth in Napoleon’s dictum that “God is on -the side of the biggest battalions”; or in the old saying that war -requires three necessaries—in the first place, money; in the second -place, money; and in the third, money. Money is a great deal: it is a -necessity; but what we call national back-bone and character is more. -So far we are with Hegel. But he goes further. In peace, says he, -mankind would grow effeminate and degenerate in luxury. This opinion -was expressed in forcible language in his own time by Schiller,[78] -and in more recent years by Count Moltke. “Perpetual peace,” says -a letter of the great general,[79] “is a dream and not a beautiful -dream either: war is part of the divine order of the world. During -war are developed the noblest virtues which belong to man—courage -and self-denial, fidelity to duty and the spirit of self-sacrifice: -the soldier is called upon to risk his life. Without war the world -would sink in materialism.”[80] “Want and misery, disease, suffering -and war,” he says elsewhere, “are all given elements in the Divine -order of the universe.” Moltke’s eulogy of war, however, is somewhat -modified by his additional statement that “the greatest kindness in -war lies in its being quickly ended.” (Letter to Bluntschli, 11th -Dec., 1880.)[81] The great forces which we recognise as factors -in the moral regeneration of mankind are always slow of action as -they are sure. War, if too quickly over, could not have the great -moral influence which has been attributed to it. The explanation -may be that it is not all that it naturally appears to a great and -successful general. Hegel, Moltke, Trendelenburg, Treitschke[82] -and the others—not Schiller[83] who was able to sing the blessings -of peace as eloquently as of war—were apt to forget that war is as -efficient a school for forming vices as virtues; and that, moreover, -those virtues which military life is said to cultivate—courage, -self-sacrifice and the rest—can be at least as perfectly developed in -other trials. There are in human life dangers every day bravely met -and overcome which are not less terrible than those which face the -soldier, in whom patriotism may be less a sentiment than a duty, and -whose cowardice must be dearly paid. - - [78] Cf. _Die Braut von Messina_:— - - “Denn der Mensch verkümmert im Frieden, - Müssige Ruh’ ist das Grab des Muths. - Das Gesetz ist der Freund des Schwachen, - Alles will es nur eben machen, - Möchte gerne die Welt verflachen; - Aber der Krieg lässt die Kraft erscheinen, - Alles erhebt er zum Ungemeinen, - Selber dem Feigen erzeugt er den Muth.” - - This passage perhaps scarcely gives a fair representation of - Schiller’s views on the question, which, if we judge from - _Wilhelm Tell_, must have been very moderate. War, he says, in - this oft-quoted passage, is sometimes a necessity. There is - a limit to the power of tyranny and, when the burden becomes - unbearable, an appeal to Heaven and the sword. - - _Wilhelm Tell_: Act. II. Sc. 2. - - “Nein, eine Grenze hat Tyrannenmacht. - Wenn der Gedrückte nirgends Recht kann finden, - Wenn unerträglich wird die Last greift er - Hinauf getrosten Muthes in den Himmel - Und holt herunter seine ew’gen Rechte, - Die droben hangen unveräusserlich - Und unzerbrechlich, wie die Sterne selbst— - Der alte Urstand der Natur kehrt wieder, - Wo Mensch dem Menschen gegenüber steht— - Zum letzten Mittel, wenn kein andres mehr - Verfangen will, ist ihm das Schwert gegeben.” - - [79] Letter to Bluntschli, dated Berlin, 11th Dec., 1880 - (published in Bluntschli’s _Gesammelte Kleine Schriften_, Vol. - II., p. 271). - - [80] Cf. Tennyson’s _Maud_: Part I., vi. and xiii. - - “Why do they prate of the blessings of Peace? we have made them a curse, - Pickpockets, each hand lusting for all that is not its own; - And lust of gain, in the spirit of Cain, is it better or worse - Than the heart of the citizen hissing in war on his own hearthstone? - For I trust if an enemy’s fleet came yonder round by the hill, - And the rushing battle-bolt sang from the three-decker out of the foam, - That the smooth-faced snub-nosed rogue would leap from his counter and till, - And strike, if he could, were it but with his cheating yardwand, home.” - - See too Part III., ii. and iv. - - “And it was but a dream, yet it lighten’d my despair - When I thought that a war would arise in defence of the right, - That an iron tyranny now should bend or cease, - The glory of manhood stand on his ancient height, - Nor Britain’s one sole God be the millionaire: - No more shall commerce be all in all, and Peace - Pipe on her pastoral hillock a languid note, - And watch her harvest ripen, her herd increase, - Nor the cannon-bullet rest on a slothful shore, - And the cobweb woven across the cannon’s throat - Shall shake its threaded tears in the wind no more. - - Let it go or stay, so I wake to the higher aims - Of a land that has lost for a little her lust of gold, - And love of a peace that was full of wrongs and shames, - Horrible, hateful, monstrous, not to be told; - And hail once more to the banner of battle unroll’d! - Tho’ many a light shall darken, and many shall weep - For those that are crush’d in the clash of jarring claims, - For God’s just wrath shall be wreak’d on a giant liar; - And many a darkness into the light shall leap, - And shine in the sudden making of splendid names, - And noble thought be freer under the sun, - And the heart of a people beat with one desire.” - - - [81] Moltke strangely enough was, at an earlier period, of the - opinion that war, even when it is successful, is a national - misfortune. Cf. Kehrbach’s preface to Kant’s essay, _Zum Ewigen - Frieden_, p. XVII. - - [82] See his discussion on constitutional monarchy in Germany. - (_Hist. u. Pol. Aufsätze_, Bd. III., p. 533 _seq._) - - [83] See _Die Piccolomini_: Act. I. Sc. 4. - - -_War under Altered Conditions._ - -The Peace Societies of our century, untiring supporters of a point of -view diametrically opposite to that of Hegel, owe their existence -in the first place to new ideas on the subject of the relative -advantages and disadvantages of war, which again were partly due to -changes in the character of war itself, partly to a new theory that -the warfare of the future should be a war of free competition for -industrial interests, or, in Herbert Spencer’s language, that the -warlike type of mankind should make room for an industrial type. -This theory, amounting in the minds of some thinkers to a fervid -conviction, and itself, in a sense, the source of what has been -contemptuously styled our British “shopkeeper’s policy” in Europe, -was based on something more solid than mere enthusiasm. The years of -peace which followed the downfall of Napoleon had brought immense -increase in material wealth to countries like France and Britain. -Something of the glamour had fallen away from the sword of the great -Emperor. The illusive excitement of a desire for conquest had died: -the glory of war had faded with it, but the burden still remained: -its cost was still there, something to be calmly reckoned up and not -soon to be forgotten. Europe was seen to be actually moving towards -ruin. “We shall have to get rid of war in all civilised countries,” -said Louis Philippe in 1843. “Soon no nation will be able to afford -it.” War was not only becoming more costly. New conditions had -altered it in other directions. With the development of technical -science and its application to the perfecting of methods and -instruments of destruction every new war was found to be bloodier -than the last; and the day seemed to be in sight, when this very -development would make war (with instruments of extermination) -impossible altogether. The romance and picturesqueness with which -it was invested in the days of hand-to-hand combat was gone. But, -above all, war was now waged for questions fewer and more important -than in the time of Kant. Napoleon’s successful appeal to the masses -had suggested to Prussia the idea of consciously nationalising the -army. Our modern national wars exact a sacrifice, necessarily much -more heavy, much more reluctantly made than those of the past which -were fought with mercenary troops. Such wars have not only greater -dignity: they are more earnest, and their issue, as in a sense the -issue of conflict between higher and lower types of civilisation, is -speedier and more decisive. - -In the hundred years since Kant’s death, much that he prophesied -has come to pass, although sometimes by different paths than he -anticipated. The strides made in recent years by commerce and the -growing power of the people in every state have had much of the -influence which he foretold. There is a greater reluctance to wage -war.[84] But, unfortunately, as Professor Paulsen points out, the -progress of democracy and the nationalisation of war have not worked -merely in the direction of progress towards peace. War has now become -popular for the first time. “The progress of democracy in states,” -he says, (_Kant_, p. 364[85]) “has not only not done away with war, -but has very greatly changed the feeling of people towards it. With -the universal military service, introduced by the Revolution, war -has become the people’s affair and popular, as it could not be in -the case of dynastic wars carried on with mercenary troops.” In the -people the love of peace is strong, but so too is the love of a -fight, the love of victory. - - [84] An admirable short account of popular feeling on this matter - is to be found in Lawrence’s _Principles of International Law_, § - 240. - - [85] The first Peace Society was founded in London in 1816, and - the first International Peace Congress held in 1843. - -It is in the contemplation of facts and conflicting tendencies like -these that Peace Societies[86] have been formed. The peace party is, -we may say, an eclectic body: it embraces many different sections -of political opinion. There are those who hold, for instance, that -peace is to be established on a basis of communism of property. -There are others who insist on the establishment throughout Europe -of a republican form of government, or again, on a redistribution -of European territory in which Alsace-Lorraine is restored to -France—changes of which at least the last two would be difficult to -carry out, unless through international warfare. But these are not -the fundamental general principles of peace workers. The members -of this party agree in rejecting the principle of intervention, in -demanding a complete or partial disarmament of the nations of Europe, -and in requiring that all disputes between nations—and they admit the -prospects of dispute—should be settled by means of arbitration. In -how far are these principles useful or practicable? - - [86] In Eng. trans. see p. 358. - - -_The Value of Arbitration._ - -There is a strong feeling in favour of arbitration on the part of all -classes of society. It is cheaper under all circumstances than war. -It is a judgment at once more certain and more complete, excluding -as far as possible the element of chance, leaving irritation perhaps -behind it, but none of the lasting bitterness which is the legacy -of every war. Arbitration has an important place in all peace -projects except that of Kant, whose federal union would naturally -fulfil the function of a tribunal of arbitration. St. Pierre, -Jeremy Bentham,[87] Bluntschli[88] the German publicist, Professor -Lorimer[89] and others among political writers,[90] and among rulers, -Louis Napoleon and the Emperor Alexander I. of Russia, have all made -proposals more or less ineffectual for the peaceful settlement of -international disputes. A number of cases have already been decided -by this means. But let us examine the questions which have been -at issue. Of a hundred and thirty matters of dispute settled by -arbitration since 1815 (cf. _International Tribunals_, published -by the Peace Society, 1899) it will be seen that all, with the -exception of one or two trifling cases of doubt as to the succession -to certain titles or principalities, can be classified roughly -under two heads—disputes as to the determination of boundaries or -the possession of certain territory, and questions of claims for -compensation and indemnities due either to individuals or states, -arising from the seizure of fleets or merchant vessels, the insult -or injury to private persons and so on—briefly, questions of money -or of territory. These may fairly be said to be trifling causes, -not touching national honour or great political questions. That they -should have been settled in this way, however, shows a great advance. -Smaller causes than these have made some of the bloodiest wars in -history. That arbitration should have been the means of preventing -even one war which would otherwise have been waged is a strong reason -why we should fully examine its claims. “Quand l’institution d’une -haute cour,” writes Laveleye, (_Des causes actuelles de guerre en -Europe et de l’arbitrage_) “n’éviterait qu’une guerre sur vingt, -il vaudrait encore la peine de l’établir.” But history shows us -that there is no single instance of a supreme conflict having been -settled otherwise than by war. Arbitration is a method admirably -adapted to certain cases: to those we have named, where it has been -successfully applied, to the interpretation of contracts, to offences -against the Law of Nations—some writers say to trivial questions of -honour—in all cases where the use of armed force would be impossible, -as, for instance, in any quarrel in which neutralised countries[91] -like Belgium or Luxembourg should take a principal part, or in a -difference between two nations, such as (to take an extreme case) -the United States and Switzerland, which could not easily engage in -actual combat. These cases, which we cannot too carefully examine, -show that what is here essential is that it should be possible to -formulate a juridical statement of the conflicting claims. In Germany -the _Bundestag_ had only power to decide questions of law. Other -disputes were left to be fought out. Questions on which the existence -and vital honour of a state depend—any question which nearly concerns -the disputants—cannot be reduced to any cut and dry legal formula -of right and wrong. We may pass over the consideration that in some -cases (as in the Franco-Prussian War) the delay caused by seeking -mediation of any kind would deprive a nation of the advantage its -state of military preparation deserved. And we may neglect the -problem of finding an impartial judge on some questions of dispute, -although its solution might be a matter of extreme difficulty, -so closely are the interests of modern nations bound up in one -another. How could the Eastern Question, for example, be settled by -arbitration? It is impossible that such a means should be sufficient -for every case. Arbitration in other words may prevent war, but can -never be a substitute for war. We cannot wonder that this is so. So -numerous and conflicting are the interests of states, so various -are the grades of civilisation to which they have attained and the -directions along which they are developing, that differences of the -most vital kind are bound to occur and these can never be settled -by any peaceful means at present known to Europe. This is above all -true where the self-preservation[92] or independence of a people are -concerned. Here the “good-will” of the nations who disagree would -necessarily be wanting: there could be no question of the arbitration -of an outsider. - - [87] See “A Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace” in the - _Principles of International Law_ (_Works_, Vol. II). One of - the main principles advocated by Bentham in this essay (written - between 1787 and 1789) is that every state should give up its - colonies. - - [88] See his _Kleine Schriften_. - - [89] _Institutes of the Law of Nations_ (1884), Vol. II., Ch. XIV. - - [90] John Stuart Mill holds that the multiplication of federal - unions would be a benefit to the world. [See his _Considerations - on Representative Government_ (1865), Ch. XVII., where he - discusses the conditions necessary to render such unions - successful.] But the Peace Society is scarcely justified, on the - strength of what is here, in including Mill among writers who - have made definite proposals of peace or federation. (See _Inter. - Trib._) - - [91] See what Lawrence says (_op. cit._, § 241) of neutralisation - and the limits of its usefulness as a remedy for war. - - [92] Montesquieu: _Esprit des Lois_, X. Ch. 2. “The life of - governments is like that of man. The latter has a right to kill - in case of natural defence: the former have a right to wage war - for their own preservation.” - - See also Vattel (_Law of Nations_, II. Ch. XVIII. § 332):—“But - if anyone would rob a nation of one of her essential rights, or - a right without which she could not hope to support her national - existence,—if an ambitious neighbour threatens the liberty of a - republic, if he attempts to subjugate and enslave her,—she will - take counsel only from her own courage. She will not even attempt - the method of conferences, in the case of a contention so odious - as this. She will, in such a quarrel, exert her utmost efforts, - exhaust every resource and lavish her blood to the last drop if - necessary. To listen to the slightest proposal in a matter of - this kind is to risk everything.” - -But, indeed, looking away from questions so vital and on which there -can be little difference of opinion, we are apt to forget, when we -allow ourselves to talk extravagantly of the future of arbitration, -that every nation thinks, or at least pretends to think, that it -is in the right in every dispute in which it appears (cf. Kant: -_Perpetual Peace_, p. 120.): and, as a matter of history, there has -never been a conflict between civilised states in which an appeal to -this “right” on the part of each has not been made. We talk glibly -of the right and wrong of this question or of that, of the justice -of this war, the iniquity of that. But what do these terms really -mean? _Do_ we know, in spite of the labour which has been spent on -this question by the older publicists, which are the causes that -justify a war? Is it not true that the same war might be just in one -set of circumstances and unjust in another? Practically all writers -on this subject, exclusive of those who apply the biblical doctrine -of non-resistance, agree in admitting that a nation is justified in -defending its own existence or independence, that this is even a -moral duty as it is a fundamental right of a state. Many, especially -the older writers, make the confident assertion that all wars of -defence are just. But will this serve as a standard? Gibbon tells us -somewhere, that Livy asserts that the Romans conquered the world in -self-defence. The distinction between wars of aggression and defence -is one very difficult to draw. The cause of a nation which waits -to be actually attacked is often lost: the critical moment in its -defence may be past. The essence of a state’s defensive power may -lie in a readiness to strike the first blow, or its whole interests -may be bound up in the necessity of fighting the matter out in its -enemy’s country, rather than at home. It is not in the strictly -military interpretation of the term “defensive”, but in its wider -ethical and political sense that we can speak of wars of defence as -just. But, indeed, we cannot judge these questions abstractly. Where -a war is necessary, it matters very little whether it is just or not. -Only the judgment of history can finally decide; and generally it -seems at the time that both parties have something of right on their -side, something perhaps too of wrong.[93] - - [93] The difficulties in the way of hard and fast judgments on a - complicated problem of this kind are convincingly demonstrated in - a recent essay by Professor D. G. Ritchie (_Studies in Political - and Social Ethics_, Sonnenschein, 1902). Professor Ritchie - considers in detail a number of concrete cases which occurred - in the century between 1770 and 1870. “Let any one take the - judgments he would pass on these or any similarly varied cases, - and I think he will find that we do not restrict our approval - to wars of self-defence, that we do not approve self-defence - under all circumstances, that there are some cases in which we - approve of absorption of smaller states by larger, that there - are cases in which we excuse intervention of third parties in - quarrels with which at first they had nothing to do, and that - we sometimes approve war even when begun without the authority - of any already existing sovereign. Can any principles be found - underlying such judgments? In the first place we ought not to - disguise from ourselves the fact that our judgments after the - result are based largely on success. ... I think it will be - found that our judgments on the wars of the century from 1770 to - 1870 turn very largely on the question, Which of the conflicting - forces was making for constitutional government and for social - progress? or, to put it in wider terms, Which represented the - higher civilisation? And thus it is that we may sometimes approve - the rise of a new state and sometimes the absorption of an old.” - (_Op. cit._, pp. 152, 155.) - -A consideration of difficulties like these brings us to a realisation -of the fact that the chances are small that a nation, in the heat of -a dispute, will admit the likelihood of its being in the wrong. To -refuse to admit this is generally tantamount to a refusal to submit -the difficulty to arbitration. And neither international law, nor the -moral force of public opinion can induce a state to act contrary to -what it believes to be its own interest. Moreover, as international -law now stands, it is not a duty to have recourse to arbitration. -This was made quite clear in the proceedings of the Peace Conference -at the Hague in 1899.[94] It was strongly recommended that -arbitration should be sought wherever it was possible, but, at the -same time definitely stated, that this course could in no case be -compulsory. In this respect things have not advanced beyond the -position of the Paris Congress of 1856.[95] The wars waged in Europe -subsequent to that date, have all been begun without previous attempt -at mediation. - - [94] See Fred. W. Holls: _The Peace Conference at the Hague_, - Macmillan, 1900. - - [95] The feeling of the Congress expressed itself thus - cautiously:—“Messieurs les plénipotentiaires n’hésitent pas à - exprimer, au nom de leur gouvernements, le voeu, que les Etats - entre lesquels s’éléverait un dissentiment sérieux, avant d’en - appeler aux armes, eussent recours, en tant que les circonstances - l’admettraient, aux bons offices d’une puissance amie.” - -But the work of the peace party regarding the humaner methods of -settlement is not to be neglected. The popular feeling which they -have been partly the means of stimulating has no doubt done something -to influence the action of statesmen towards extreme caution in -the treatment of questions likely to arouse national passions and -prejudices. Arbitration has undoubtedly made headway in recent -years. Britain and America, the two nations whose names naturally -suggest themselves to us as future centres of federative union, both -countries whose industrial interests are numerous and complicated, -have most readily, as they have most frequently, settled disputes -in this practical manner. It has shown itself to be a policy as -economical as it is business-like. Its value, in its proper place, -cannot be overrated by any Peace Congress or by any peace pamphlet; -but we have endeavoured to make it clear that this sphere is but a -limited one. The “good-will” may not be there when it ought perhaps -to appear: it will certainly not be there when any vital interest -is at stake. But, even if this were not so and arbitration were -the natural sequence of every dispute, no coercive force exists -to enforce the decree of the court. The moral restraint of public -opinion is here a poor substitute. Treaties, it is often said, -are in the same position; but treaties have been broken, and will -no doubt be broken again. We are moved to the conclusion that a -thoroughly logical peace programme cannot stop short of the principle -of federation. Federal troops are necessary to carry out the decrees -of a tribunal of arbitration, if that court is not to run a risk -of being held feeble and ineffectual. Except on some such basis, -arbitration, as a substitute for war, stands on but a weak footing. - - -_Disarmament._ - -The efforts of the Peace Society are directed with even less hope -of complete success against another evil of our time, the crushing -burden of modern armaments. We have peace at this moment, but at -a daily increasing cost. The Peace Society is rightly concerned -in pressing this point. It is not enough to keep off actual war: -there is a limit to the price we can afford to pay even for peace. -Probably no principle has cost Europe so much in the last century as -that handed down from Rome:—“Si vis pacem, para bellum.” It is now -a hundred and fifty years since Montesquieu[96] protested against -this “new distemper” which was spreading itself over Europe; but -never, in time of peace, has complaint been so loud or so general -as now: and this, not only against the universal burden of taxation -which weighs upon all nations alike, but, in continental countries, -against the waste of productive force due to compulsory military -service, a discontent which seems to strike at the very foundations -of society. Vattel relates that in early times a treaty of peace -generally stipulated that both parties should afterwards disarm. And -there is no doubt that Kant was right in regarding standing armies -as a danger to peace, not only as openly expressing the rivalry and -distrust between nation and nation which Hobbes regards as the basis -of international relations, but also as putting a power into the -hand of a nation which it may some day have the temptation to abuse. -A war-loving, overbearing spirit in a people thrives none the worse -for a consciousness that its army or navy can hold its own with any -other in Europe. Were it not the case that the essence of armed peace -is that a high state of efficiency should be general, the danger to -peace would be very great indeed. No doubt it is due to this fact -that France has kept quietly to her side of the Rhine during the last -thirty years. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was an immediate -stimulus to the increase of armaments; but otherwise, just because of -this greater efficiency and the slightly stronger military position -of Germany, it has been an influence on the side of peace. - - [96] _Esprit des Lois_, XIII. Chap. 17. “A new distemper has - spread itself over Europe: it has infected our princes, and - induces them to keep up an exorbitant number of troops. It has - its redoublings, and of necessity becomes contagious. For as - soon as one prince augments what he calls his troops, the rest - of course do the same: so that nothing is gained thereby but the - public ruin. Each monarch keeps as many armies on foot as if his - people were in danger of being exterminated: and they give the - name of Peace to this general effort of all against all.” - - Montesquieu is of course writing in the days of mercenary troops; - but the cost to the nation of our modern armies, both in time of - peace and of war, is incomparably greater. - -The Czar’s Rescript of 1898 gave a new stimulus to an interest in -this question which the subsequent conference at the Hague was -unable fully to satisfy. We are compelled to consider carefully -how a process of simultaneous disarmament can actually be carried -out, and what results might be anticipated from this step, with a -view not only to the present but the future. Can this be done in -accordance with the principles of justice? Organisations like a great -navy or a highly disciplined army have been built up, in the course -of centuries, at great cost and at much sacrifice to the nation. -They are the fruit of years of wise government and a high record -of national industry. Are such visible tokens of the culture and -character and worth of a people to be swept away and Britain, France, -Germany, Italy, Spain, Turkey to stand on the same level? And, even -if no such ethical considerations should arise, on what method are -we to proceed? The standard as well as the nature of armament depends -in every state on its geographical conditions and its historical -position. An ocean-bound empire like Britain is comparatively immune -from the danger of invasion: her army can be safely despatched to -the colonies, her fleet protects her at home, her position is one of -natural defence. But Germany and Austria find themselves in exactly -opposite circumstances, with the hard necessity imposed upon them of -guarding their frontiers on every side. The safety of a nation like -Germany is in the hands of its army: its military strength lies in an -almost perfect mastery of the science of attack. - -The Peace Society has hitherto made no attempt to face the -difficulties inseparable from any attempt to apply a uniform method -of treatment to peculiarities and conditions so conflicting and -various as these. Those who have been more conscientious have not -been very successful in solving them. Indeed, so constantly is -military technique changing that it is difficult to prophesy wherein -will lie, a few years hence, the essence of a state’s defensive power -or what part the modern navy will play in this defence. No careful -thinker would suggest, in the face of dangers threatening from the -East,[97] a complete disarmament. The simplest of many suggestions -made—but this on the basis of universal conscription—seems to be -that the number of years or months of compulsory military service -should be reduced to some fixed period. But this does not touch the -difficulty of colonial empires[98] like Britain which might to a -certain extent disarm, like their neighbours, in Europe, but would -be compelled to keep an army for the defence of their colonies -elsewhere. It is, in the meantime, inevitable that Europe should keep -up a high standard of armament—this is, (and even if we had European -federation, would remain) an absolute necessity as a protection -against the yellow races, and in Europe itself there are at present -elements hostile to the cause of peace. Alsace-Lorraine, Polish -Prussia, Russian Poland and Finland are still, to a considerable -degree, sources of discontent and dissatisfaction. But in Russia -itself lies the great obstacle to a future European peace or -European federation: we can scarcely picture Russia as a reliable -member of such a union. That Russia should disarm is scarcely -feasible, in view of its own interest: it has always to face the -danger of rebellion in Poland and anarchy at home. But that Europe -should disarm, before Russia has attained a higher civilisation, a -consciousness of its great future as a north-eastern, inter-oceanic -empire, and a government more favourable to the diffusion of liberty, -is still less practicable.[99] We have here to fall back upon -federation again. It is not impossible that, in the course of time, -this problem may be solved and that the contribution to the federal -troops of a European union may be regulated upon some equitable basis -the form of which we cannot now well prophesy. - - [97] Even St. Pierre was alive to this danger (_Projet_, - Art. VIII: in the English translation of 1714, p. 160):—“The - _European_ Union shall endeavour to obtain in _Asia_, a - _permanent_ society like that of _Europe_, that Peace may be - maintain’d There also; and especially that it may have no cause - to fear any _Asiatic_ Sovereign, either as to its tranquillity, - or its Commerce in _Asia_.” - - [98] Bentham’s suggestion would be useful here! See above, p. 79, - _note_. - - [99] The best thing for Europe might be that Russia (perhaps - including China) should be regarded as a serious danger by all - the civilised powers of the West. _That_ would bring us nearer to - the United States of Europe _and_ America (for the United States, - America, is Russia’s neighbour on the East) than anything else. - -European federation would likewise meet all difficulties where -a risk might be likely to occur of one nation intervening to -protect another. As we have said (above, p. 64, _note_) nations -are now-a-days slow to intervene in the interests of humanity: -they are in general constrained to do so only by strong motives -of self-interest, and when these are not at hand they are said to -refrain from respect for another’s right of independent action. -Actually a state which is actuated by less selfish impulses is apt to -lose considerably more than it gains, and the feeling of the people -expresses itself strongly against any quixotic or sentimental policy. -It is not impossible that the Powers may have yet to intervene to -protect Turkey against Russia. Such a step might well be dictated -purely by a proper care for the security of Europe; but wars of this -kind seem not likely to play an important part in the near future. - -We have said that the causes of difference which may be expected -to disturb the peace of Europe are now fewer. A modern sovereign -no longer spends his leisure time in the excitement of slaying or -seeing slain. He could not, if he would. His honour and his vanity -are protected by other means: they play no longer an important part -in the affairs of nations. The causes of war can no more be either -trifling or personal. Some crises there are, which are ever likely to -be fatal to peace. There present themselves, in the lives of nations, -ideal ends for which everything must be sacrificed: there are rights -which must at all cost be defended. The question of civil war we -may neglect: liberty and wise government are the only medicine for -social discontent, and much may be hoped from that in the future. -But now, looking beyond the state to the great family of civilised -nations, we may say that the one certain cause of war between them -or of rebellion within a future federated union will be a menace to -the sovereign rights, the independence and existence of any member -of that federation. Other causes of quarrel offer a more hopeful -prospect. Some questions have been seen to be specially fitted for -the legal procedure of a tribunal of arbitration, others to be such -as a federal court would quickly settle. The preservation of the -balance of power which Frederick the Great regarded as the talisman -of peace in Europe—a judgment surely not borne out by experience—is -happily one of the causes of war which are of the past. Wars of -colonisation, such as would be an attempt on the part of Russia to -conquer India, seem scarcely likely to recur except between higher -and lower races. The cost is now-a-days too great. Political wars, -wars for national union and unity, of which there were so many -during the past century, seem at present not to be near at hand; and -the integration of European nations—what may be called the great -mission of war—is, for the moment, practically complete; for it is -highly improbable that either Alsace-Lorraine or Poland—still less -Finland—will be the cause of a war of this kind. - -Our hope lies in a federated Europe. Its troops would serve to -preserve law and order in the country from which they were drawn and -to protect its colonies abroad; but their higher function would -be to keep peace in Europe, to protect the weaker members of the -Federation and to enforce the decision of the majority, either, if -necessary, by actual war, or by the mere threatening demonstrations -of fleets, such as have before proved effectual. - -We have carefully considered what has been attempted by peace -workers, and we have now to take note that all the results of the -last fifty years are not to be attributed to their conscientious -but often ill-directed labour. The diminution of the causes of war -is to be traced less to the efforts of the Peace Society, (except -indirectly, in so far as they have influenced the minds of the -masses) than to the increasing power of the people themselves. -The various classes of society are opposed to violent methods of -settlement, not in the main from a conviction as to the wrongfulness -of war or from any fanatical enthusiasm for a brotherhood of nations, -but from self-interest. War is death to the industrial interests of -a nation. It is vain to talk, in the language of past centuries, -of trade between civilised countries being advanced and markets -opened up or enlarged by this means.[100] Kings give up the dream -of military glory and accept instead the certainty of peaceful -labour and industrial progress, and all this (for we may believe -that to some monarchs it is much) from no enthusiastic appreciation -of the efforts of Peace Societies, from no careful examination of -the New Testament nor inspired interpretation of its teaching. It -is self-interest, the prosperity of the country—patriotism, if you -will—that seems better than war. - - [100] Trade in barbarous or savage countries is still increased - by war, especially on the French and German plan which leaves no - open door to other nations. Here the trade follows the flag. And - war, of course, among civilised races causes small nations to - disappear and their tariffs with them. _This_ is beneficial to - trade, but to a degree so trifling that it may here be neglected. - - -_What may be expected from Federation._ - -Federation and federation alone can help out the programme -of the Peace Society. It cannot be pretended that it will do -everything. To state the worst at once, it will not prevent war. -Even the federations of the states of Germany and America, bound -together by ties of blood and language and, in the latter case, of -sentiment, were not strong enough within to keep out dissension and -disunion.[101] Wars would not cease, but they would become much less -frequent. “Why is there no longer war between England and Scotland? -Why did Prussian and Hanoverian fight side by side in 1870, though -they had fought against each other only four years before?... If -we wish to know how war is to cease, we should ask ourselves how it -_has_ ceased” (Professor D. G. Ritchie, _op. cit._, p. 169). Wars -between different grades of civilisation are bound to exist as long -as civilisation itself exists. The history of culture and of progress -has been more or less a history of war. A calm acceptance of this -position may mean to certain short-sighted, enthusiastic theorists -an impossible sacrifice of the ideal; but, the sacrifice once made, -we stand on a better footing with regard to at least one class of -arguments against a federation of the world. Such a union will lead, -it is said, to an equality in culture, a sameness of interests fatal -to progress; all struggle and conflict will be cast out of the -state itself; national characteristics and individuality will be -obliterated; the lamb and the wolf will lie down together: stagnation -will result, intellectual progress will be at an end, politics will -be no more, history will stand still. This is a sweeping assertion, -an alarming prophecy. But a little thought will assure us that there -is small cause for apprehension. There can be no such standstill, -no millennium in human affairs. A gradual smoothing down of sharply -accentuated national characteristics there might be: this is a result -which a freer, more friendly intercourse between nations would be -very likely to produce. But conflicting interests, keen rivalry -in their pursuit, difference of culture and natural aptitude, and -all or much of the individuality which language and literature, -historical and religious traditions, even climatic and physical -conditions produce are bound to survive until the coming of some more -overwhelming and far-spreading revolution than this. It would not -be well if it were otherwise, if those “unconscious and invisible -peculiarities” in which Fichte sees the hand of God and the guarantee -of a nation’s future dignity, virtue and merit should be swept away. -(_Reden an die deutsche Nation_,[102] 1807.) Nor is stagnation to be -feared. “Strife,” said the old philosopher, “is the father of all -things.” There can be no lasting peace in the processes of nature and -existence. It has been in the constant rivalry between classes within -themselves, and in the struggle for existence with other races that -great nations have reached the highwater mark of their development. -A perpetual peace in international relations we may—nay, surely -will—one day have, but eternity will not see the end to the feverish -unrest within the state and the jealous competition and distrust -between individuals, groups and classes of society. Here there must -ever be perpetual war. - - [101] Cf. also the civil war of 1847 in Switzerland. - - [102] See _Werke_, VII., p. 467. - -It was only of this political peace between civilised nations that -Kant thought.[103] In this form it is bound to come. The federation -of Europe will follow the federation of Germany and of Italy, not -only because it offers a solution of many problems which have long -taxed Europe, but because great men and careful thinkers believe in -it.[104] It may not come quickly, but such men can afford to wait. -“If I were legislator,” cried Jean Jacques Rousseau, “I should not -say what ought to be done, but I would do it.” This is the attitude -of the unthinking, unpractical enthusiast. The wish is not enough: -the will is not enough. The mills of God must take their own time: no -hope or faith of ours, no struggle or labour even can hurry them. - - [103] The other he knew was impossible. Peace within the state - meant decay and death. In the antagonism of nations, he saw - nature’s means of educating the race: it was a law of existence, - a law of progress, and, as such, eternal. - - [104] For a vivid picture of the material advantages offered by - such a union and of the dismal future that may lie before an - unfederated Europe, we cannot do better than read Mr. Andrew - Carnegie’s recent Rectorial Address to the students of St. - Andrews University (Oct 1902). Unfortunately, Mr. Carnegie’s - enthusiasm stops here: he does not tell us by what means the - difficulties at present in the way of a federation, industrial or - political, are to be overcome. - -It is a misfortune that the Peace Society has identified itself -with so narrow and uncritical an attitude towards war, and that the -copious eloquence of its members is not based upon a consideration -of the practical difficulties of the case. This well-meaning, hard -working and enthusiastic body would like to do what is impossible -by an impossible method. The end which it sets for itself is an -unattainable one. But this need not be so. To make unjustifiable -aggression difficult, to banish unworthy pretexts for making war -might be a high enough ideal for any enthusiasm and offer scope wide -enough for the labours of any society. But the Peace Society has not -contented itself with this great work. Through its over-estimation -of the value of peace,[105] its cause has been injured and much of -its influence has been weakened or lost. Our age is one which sets -a high value upon human life; and to this change of thinking may be -traced our modern reform in the methods of war and all that has been -done for the alleviation of suffering by the great Conventions of -recent years. For the eyes of most people war is merely a hideous -spectacle of bloodshed and deliberate destruction of life: this is -its obvious side. But it is possible to exaggerate this confessedly -great evil. Peace has its sacrifices as well as war: the progress of -humanity requires that the individual should often be put aside for -the sake of lasting advantage to the whole. An opposite view can only -be reckoned individualistic, perhaps materialistic. “The reverence -for human life,” says Martineau, (_Studies of Christianity_, pp. 352, -354) “is carried to an immoral idolatry, when it is held more sacred -than justice and right, and when the spectacle of blood becomes -more horrible than the sight of desolating tyrannies and triumphant -hypocrisies.... We have, therefore, no more doubt that a war may be -right, than that a policeman may be a security for justice, and we -object to a fortress as little as to a handcuff.” - - [105] Professor D. G. Ritchie remarks that it is less an - over-estimation of the value of peace than a too easy-going - acceptance of abstract and unanalysed phrases about the rights of - nations that injures the work of the Peace Society. Cf. his note - on the principles of the Peace Congresses (_op. cit._, p. 172). - -The Peace Society are not of this opinion: they greatly doubt that a -war may be right, and they rarely fail to take their doubts to the -tribunal of Scripture. Their efforts are well meant, this piety may -be genuine enough; but a text is rarely a proof of anything, and in -any case serves one man in as good stead as another. We remember that -“the devil can cite Scripture for his purpose.” This unscientific -method of proof or persuasion has ever been widely popular. It is -a serious examination of the question that we want, a more careful -study of its actual history and of the possibilities of human nature; -less vague, exaggerated language about what ought to be done, and a -realisation of what has been actually achieved; above all, a clear -perception of what may fairly be asked from the future. - -It used to be said—is perhaps asserted still by the war-lovers—that -there was no path to civilisation which had not been beaten by the -force of arms, no height to which the sword had not led the way. The -inspiration of war was upon the great arts of civilisation: its hand -was upon the greatest of the sciences. These obligations extended -even to commerce. War not only created new branches of industry, it -opened new markets and enlarged the old. These are great claims, -according to which war might be called the moving principle of -history. If we keep our eyes fixed upon the history of the past, they -seem not only plausible: they are in a great sense true. Progress -did tread at the heels of the great Alexander’s army: the advance of -European culture stands in the closest connection with the Crusades. -But was this happy compensation for a miserable state of affairs not -due to the peculiarly unsocial conditions of early times and the -absence of every facility for the interchange of ideas or material -advantages? It is inconceivable that now-a-days[106] any aid to the -development of thought in Europe should come from war. The old -adage, in more than a literal sense, has but too often been proved -true:—“Inter arma, Musae silent.” Peace is for us the real promoter -of culture. - - [106] The day is past, when a nation could enjoy the exclusive - advantages of its own inventions. Vattel naively recommends that - we should keep the knowledge of certain kinds of trade, the - building of war-ships and the like, to ourselves. Prudence, he - says, prevents us from making an enemy stronger and the care of - our own safety forbids it. (_Law of Nations_, II. Ch. I. § 16.) - -We have to endeavour to take an intermediate course between -uncritical praise and wholesale condemnation, between extravagant -expectation and unjustifiable pessimism. War used to be the rule: it -is now an overwhelming and terrible exception—an interruption to the -peaceful prosperous course of things, inflicting unlimited suffering -and temporary or lasting loss. Its evils are on the surface, apparent -to the most unthinking observer. The day may yet dawn, when Europeans -will have learned to regard the force of arms as an instrument for -the civilisation of savage or half-savage races, and war within -their continent as civil war, necessary and justifiable sometimes -perhaps, but still a blot upon their civilisation and brotherhood as -men. Such a suggestion rings strangely. But the great changes, which -the roll of centuries has marked, once came upon the world not less -unexpectedly. How far off must the idea of a civil peace have seemed -to small towns and states of Europe in the fifteenth century! How -strange, only a century ago, would the idea of applying steam power -or electrical force have seemed to ourselves! Let us not despair. War -has played a great part in the history of the world: it has been ever -the great architect of nations, the true mother of cities. It has -justified itself to-day in the union of kindred peoples, the making -of great empires. It may be that one decisive war may yet be required -to unite Europe. May Europe survive that struggle and go forward -fearlessly to her great future! A peaceful future that may not be. It -must never be forgotten that war is sometimes a moral duty, that it -is ever the natural sequence of human passion and human prejudice. An -unbroken peace we cannot and do not expect; but it is this that we -must work for. As Kant says, we must keep it before us as an ideal. - - - - -TRANSLATION[107] - -“PERPETUAL PEACE”[108] - - - [107] The text used in this translation is that edited by - Kehrbach. [Tr.] - - [108] I have seen something of M. de St. Pierre’s plan for - maintaining perpetual peace in Europe. It reminds me of an - inscription outside of a churchyard, which ran “_Pax Perpetua._ - For the dead, it is true, fight no more. But the living are of - another mind, and the mightiest among them have little respect - for tribunals.” (Leibniz: _Letter to Grimarest_, quoted above, p. - 37, note 44.) [Tr.] - -We need not try to decide whether this satirical inscription, (once -found on a Dutch innkeeper’s sign-board above the picture of a -churchyard) is aimed at mankind in general, or at the rulers of -states in particular, unwearying in their love of war, or perhaps -only at the philosophers who cherish the sweet dream of perpetual -peace. The author of the present sketch would make one stipulation, -however. The practical politician stands upon a definite footing with -the theorist: with great self-complacency he looks down upon him as -a mere pedant whose empty ideas can threaten no danger to the state -(starting as it does from principles derived from experience), and -who may always be permitted to knock down his eleven skittles at -once without a worldly-wise statesman needing to disturb himself. -Hence, in the event of a quarrel arising between the two, the -practical statesman must always act consistently, and not scent -danger to the state behind opinions ventured by the theoretical -politician at random and publicly expressed. With which saving clause -(_clausula salvatoria_) the author will herewith consider himself -duly and expressly protected against all malicious misinterpretation. - - - - -_FIRST SECTION_ - -CONTAINING THE PRELIMINARY ARTICLES OF PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES - - -1.—“No treaty of peace shall be regarded as valid, if made with the -secret reservation of material for a future war.” - -For then it would be a mere truce, a mere suspension of hostilities, -not peace. A peace signifies the end of all hostilities and to attach -to it the epithet “eternal” is not only a verbal pleonasm, but -matter of suspicion. The causes of a future war existing, although -perhaps not yet known to the high contracting parties themselves, are -entirely annihilated by the conclusion of peace, however acutely -they may be ferreted out of documents in the public archives. There -may be a mental reservation of old claims to be thought out at a -future time, which are, none of them, mentioned at this stage, -because both parties are too much exhausted to continue the war, -while the evil intention remains of using the first favourable -opportunity for further hostilities. Diplomacy of this kind only -Jesuitical casuistry can justify: it is beneath the dignity of a -ruler, just as acquiescence in such processes of reasoning is beneath -the dignity of his minister, if one judges the facts as they really -are.[109] - - [109] On the honourable interpretation of treaties, see Vattel - (_op. cit._, II. Ch. XVII., esp. §§ 263-296, 291). See also what - he says of the validity of treaties and the necessity for holding - them sacred (II. Ch. XII. §§ 157, 158: II. Ch. XV). [Tr.] - -If, however, according to present enlightened ideas of political -wisdom, the true glory of a state lies in the uninterrupted -development of its power by every possible means, this judgment must -certainly strike one as scholastic and pedantic. - - -2.—“No state having an independent existence—whether it be great or -small—shall be acquired by another through inheritance, exchange, -purchase or donation.”[110] - - [110] “Even the smoothest way,” says Hume, (_Of the Original - Contract_) “by which a nation may receive a foreign master, by - marriage or a will, is not extremely honourable for the people; - but supposes them to be disposed of, like a dowry or a legacy, - according to the pleasure or interest of their rulers.” [Tr.] - -For a state is not a property (_patrimonium_), as may be the ground -on which its people are settled. It is a society of human beings -over whom no one but itself has the right to rule and to dispose. -Like the trunk of a tree, it has its own roots, and to graft it on -to another state is to do away with its existence as a moral person, -and to make of it a thing. Hence it is in contradiction to the idea -of the original contract without which no right over a people is -thinkable.[111] Everyone knows to what danger the bias in favour of -these modes of acquisition has brought Europe (in other parts of -the world it has never been known). The custom of marriage between -states, as if they were individuals, has survived even up to the most -recent times,[112] and is regarded partly as a new kind of industry -by which ascendency may be acquired through family alliances, without -any expenditure of strength; partly as a device for territorial -expansion. Moreover, the hiring out of the troops of one state to -another to fight against an enemy not at war with their native -country is to be reckoned in this connection; for the subjects are in -this way used and abused at will as personal property. - - [111] An hereditary kingdom is not a state which can be inherited - by another state, but one whose sovereign power can be inherited - by another physical person. The state then acquires a ruler, not - the ruler as such (that is, as one already possessing another - realm) the state. - - [112] This has been one of the causes of the extraordinary - admixture of races in the modern Austrian empire. Cf. the lines - of Matthias Corvinus of Hungary (quoted in Sir W. Stirling - Maxwell’s _Cloister Life of Charles the Fifth_, Ch. I., _note_):— - - “Bella gerant alii, tu, felix Austria, nube! - Nam quae Mars aliis, dat tibi regna Venus.” [Tr.] - - -3.—“Standing armies (_miles perpetuus_) shall be abolished in course -of time.” - -For they are always threatening other states with war by appearing -to be in constant readiness to fight. They incite the various states -to outrival one another in the number of their soldiers, and to this -number no limit can be set. Now, since owing to the sums devoted -to this purpose, peace at last becomes even more oppressive than a -short war, these standing armies are themselves the cause of wars of -aggression, undertaken in order to get rid of this burden. To which -we must add that the practice of hiring men to kill or to be killed -seems to imply a use of them as mere machines and instruments in the -hand of another (namely, the state) which cannot easily be reconciled -with the right of humanity in our own person.[113] The matter stands -quite differently in the case of voluntary periodical military -exercise on the part of citizens of the state, who thereby seek to -secure themselves and their country against attack from without. - - [113] A Bulgarian Prince thus answered the Greek Emperor who - magnanimously offered to settle a quarrel with him, not by - shedding the blood of his subjects, but by a duel:—“A smith who - has tongs will not take the red-hot iron from the fire with his - hands.” - - (This note is a-wanting in the second Edition of 1796. It is - repeated in Art. II., see p. 130.) [Tr.] - -The accumulation of treasure in a state would in the same way be -regarded by other states as a menace of war, and might compel them to -anticipate this by striking the first blow. For of the three forces, -the power of arms, the power of alliance and the power of money, the -last might well become the most reliable instrument of war, did not -the difficulty of ascertaining the amount stand in the way. - - -4.—“No national debts shall be contracted in connection with the -external affairs of the state.” - -This source of help is above suspicion, where assistance is sought -outside or within the state, on behalf of the economic administration -of the country (for instance, the improvement of the roads, the -settlement and support of new colonies, the establishment of -granaries to provide against seasons of scarcity, and so on). But, -as a common weapon used by the Powers against one another, a credit -system under which debts go on indefinitely increasing and are yet -always assured against immediate claims (because all the creditors -do not put in their claim at once) is a dangerous money power. This -ingenious invention of a commercial people in the present century -is, in other words, a treasure for the carrying on of war which may -exceed the treasures of all the other states taken together, and -can only be exhausted by a threatening deficiency in the taxes—an -event, however, which will long be kept off by the very briskness -of commerce resulting from the reaction of this system on industry -and trade. The ease, then, with which war may be waged, coupled with -the inclination of rulers towards it—an inclination which seems -to be implanted in human nature—is a great obstacle in the way of -perpetual peace. The prohibition of this system must be laid down as -a preliminary article of perpetual peace, all the more necessarily -because the final inevitable bankruptcy of the state in question -must involve in the loss many who are innocent; and this would be -a public injury to these states. Therefore other nations are at -least justified in uniting themselves against such an one and its -pretensions. - - -5.—“No state shall violently interfere with the constitution and -administration of another.” - -For what can justify it in so doing? The scandal which is here -presented to the subjects of another state? The erring state can -much more serve as a warning by exemplifying the great evils which a -nation draws down on itself through its own lawlessness. Moreover, -the bad example which one free person gives another, (as _scandalum -acceptum_) does no injury to the latter. In this connection, it is -true, we cannot count the case of a state which has become split up -through internal corruption into two parts, each of them representing -by itself an individual state which lays claim to the whole. Here -the yielding of assistance to one faction could not be reckoned as -interference on the part of a foreign state with the constitution of -another, for here anarchy prevails. So long, however, as the inner -strife has not yet reached this stage the interference of other -powers would be a violation of the rights of an independent nation -which is only struggling with internal disease.[114] It would -therefore itself cause a scandal, and make the autonomy of all states -insecure. - - [114] See Vattel: _Law of Nations_, II. Ch. IV. § 55. No - foreign power, he says, has a right to judge the conduct and - administration of any sovereign or oblige him to alter it. “If - he loads his subjects with taxes, or if he treats them with - severity, the nation alone is concerned; and no other is called - upon to offer redress for his behaviour, or oblige him to follow - more wise and equitable maxims.... But (_loc. cit._ § 56) when - the bands of the political society are broken, or at least - suspended, between the sovereign and his people, the contending - parties may then be considered at two distinct powers; and, since - they are both equally independent of all foreign authority, - nobody has a right to judge them. Either may be in the right; and - each of those who grant their assistance may imagine that he is - giving his support to the better cause.” [Tr.] - - -6.—“No state at war with another shall countenance such modes of -hostility as would make mutual confidence impossible in a subsequent -state of peace: such are the employment of assassins (_percussores_) -or of poisoners (_venefici_), breaches of capitulation, the -instigating and making use of treachery (_perduellio_) in the hostile -state.” - -These are dishonourable stratagems. For some kind of confidence in -the disposition of the enemy must exist even in the midst of war, -as otherwise peace could not be concluded, and the hostilities -would pass into a war of extermination (_bellum internecinum_). -War, however, is only our wretched expedient of asserting a right -by force, an expedient adopted in the state of nature, where no -court of justice exists which could settle the matter in dispute. In -circumstances like these, neither of the two parties can be called -an unjust enemy, because this form of speech presupposes a legal -decision: the issue of the conflict—just as in the case of the -so-called judgments of God—decides on which side right is. Between -states, however, no punitive war (_bellum punitivum_) is thinkable, -because between them a relation of superior and inferior does not -exist. Whence it follows that a war of extermination, where the -process of annihilation would strike both parties at once and all -right as well, would bring about perpetual peace only in the great -graveyard of the human race. Such a war then, and therefore also the -use of all means which lead to it, must be absolutely forbidden. -That the methods just mentioned do inevitably lead to this result -is obvious from the fact that these infernal arts, already vile in -themselves, on coming into use, are not long confined to the sphere -of war. Take, for example, the use of spies (_uti exploratoribus_). -Here only the dishonesty of others is made use of; but vices such -as these, when once encouraged, cannot in the nature of things be -stamped out and would be carried over into the state of peace, where -their presence would be utterly destructive to the purpose of that -state. - -Although the laws stated are, objectively regarded, (_i.e._ in so far -as they affect the action of rulers) purely prohibitive laws (_leges -prohibitivæ_), some of them (_leges strictæ_) are strictly valid -without regard to circumstances and urgently require to be enforced. -Such are Nos. 1, 5, 6. Others, again, (like Nos. 2, 3, 4) although -not indeed exceptions to the maxims of law, yet in respect of the -practical application of these maxims allow subjectively of a certain -latitude to suit particular circumstances. The enforcement of these -_leges latæ_ may be legitimately put off, so long as we do not lose -sight of the ends at which they aim. This purpose of reform does not -permit of the deferment of an act of restitution (as, for example, -the restoration to certain states of freedom of which they have been -deprived in the manner described in article 2) to an infinitely -distant date—as Augustus used to say, to the “Greek Kalends”, a day -that will never come. This would be to sanction non-restitution. -Delay is permitted only with the intention that restitution should -not be made too precipitately and so defeat the purpose we have -in view. For the prohibition refers here only to the _mode of -acquisition_ which is to be no longer valid, and not to the _fact of -possession_ which, although indeed it has not the necessary title of -right, yet at the time of so-called acquisition was held legal by all -states, in accordance with the public opinion of the time.[115] - - [115] It has been hitherto doubted, not without reason, whether - there can be laws of permission (_leges permissivæ_) of pure - reason as well as commands (_leges præceptivæ_) and prohibitions - (_leges prohibitivæ_). For law in general has a basis of - objective practical necessity: permission, on the other hand, is - based upon the contingency of certain actions in practice. It - follows that a law of permission would enforce what cannot be - enforced; and this would involve a contradiction, if the object - of the law should be the same in both cases. Here, however, - in the present case of a law of permission, the presupposed - prohibition is aimed merely at the future manner of acquisition - of a right—for example, acquisition through inheritance: the - exemption from this prohibition (_i.e._ the permission) refers - to the present state of possession. In the transition from a - state of nature to the civil state, this holding of property can - continue as a _bona fide_, if usurpatory, ownership, under the - new social conditions, in accordance with a permission of the Law - of Nature. Ownership of this kind, as soon as its true nature - becomes known, is seen to be mere nominal possession (_possessio - putativa_) sanctioned by opinion and customs in a natural state - of society. After the transition stage is passed, such modes of - acquisition are likewise forbidden in the subsequently evolved - civil state: and this power to remain in possession would not - be admitted if the supposed acquisition had taken place in the - civilized community. It would be bound to come to an end as an - injury to the right of others, the moment its illegality became - patent. - - I have wished here only by the way to draw the attention of - teachers of the Law of Nature to the idea of a _lex permissiva_ - which presents itself spontaneously in any system of rational - classification. I do so chiefly because use is often made of - this concept in civil law with reference to statutes; with this - difference, that the law of prohibition stands alone by itself, - while permission is not, as it ought to be, introduced into that - law as a limiting clause, but is thrown among the exceptions. - Thus “this or that is forbidden”,—say, Nos. 1, 2, 3, and so on - in an infinite progression,—while permissions are only added to - the law incidentally: they are not reached by the application of - some principle, but only by groping about among cases which have - actually occurred. Were this not so, qualifications would have - had to be brought into the formula of laws of prohibition which - would have immediately transformed them into laws of permission. - Count von Windischgrätz, a man whose wisdom was equal to his - discrimination, urged this very point in the form of a question - propounded by him for a prize essay. One must therefore regret - that this ingenious problem has been so soon neglected and left - unsolved. For the possibility of a formula similar to those of - mathematics is the sole real test of a legislation that would be - consistent. Without this, the so-called _jus certum_ will remain - forever a mere pious wish: we can have only general laws valid - on the whole; no general laws possessing the universal validity - which the concept law seems to demand. - - - - -_SECOND SECTION_ - -CONTAINING THE DEFINITIVE ARTICLES OF A PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES - -A state of peace among men who live side by side is not the natural -state (_status naturalis_), which is rather to be described as a -state of war:[116] that is to say, although there is not perhaps -always actual open hostility, yet there is a constant threatening -that an outbreak may occur. Thus the state of peace must be -_established_.[117] For the mere cessation of hostilities is no -guarantee of continued peaceful relations, and unless this guarantee -is given by every individual to his neighbour—which can only be done -in a state of society regulated by law—one man is at liberty to -challenge another and treat him as an enemy.[118] - - [116] “From this diffidence of one another, there is no way for - any man to secure himself, so reasonable, as anticipation; that - is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, - so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: - and this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is - generally allowed.” (Hobbes: _Lev._ I. Ch. XIII.) [Tr.] - - [117] Hobbes thus describes the establishment of the state. “A - _commonwealth_ is said to be _instituted_, when a _multitude_ - of men do agree, and _covenant, every one, with every one_, - that to whatsoever _man_, or _assembly of men_, shall be given - by the major part, the _right_ to _present_ the person of them - all, that is to say, to be their _representative_; everyone, - as well he that _voted for it_, as he that _voted against it_, - shall _authorize_ all the actions and judgments, of that man, or - assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to - the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected - against other men.” (_Lev._ II. Ch. XVIII.) - - There is a covenant between them, “as if every man should say to - every man, _I authorise and give up my right of governing myself, - to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that - thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in - like manner_.” (_Lev._ II. Ch. XVII.) [Tr.] - - [118] It is usually accepted that a man may not take hostile - steps against any one, unless the latter has already injured - him by act. This is quite accurate, if both are citizens of a - law-governed state. For, in becoming a member of this community, - each gives the other the security he demands against injury, by - means of the supreme authority exercising control over them both. - The individual, however, (or nation) who remains in a mere state - of nature deprives me of this security and does me injury, by - mere proximity. There is perhaps no active (_facto_) molestation, - but there is a state of lawlessness, (_status injustus_) which, - by its very existence, offers a continual menace to me. I can - therefore compel him, either to enter into relations with me - under which we are both subject to law, or to withdraw from my - neighbourhood. So that the postulate upon which the following - articles are based is:—“All men who have the power to exert - a mutual influence upon one another must be under a civil - government of some kind.” - - A legal constitution is, according to the nature of the - individuals who compose the state:— - - (1) A constitution formed in accordance with the right of - citizenship of the individuals who constitute a nation (_jus - civitatis_). - - (2) A constitution whose principle is international law which - determines the relations of states (_jus gentium_). - - (3) A constitution formed in accordance with cosmopolitan law, - in as far as individuals and states, standing in an external - relation of mutual reaction, may be regarded as citizens of one - world-state (_jus cosmopoliticum_). - - This classification is not an arbitrary one, but is necessary - with reference to the idea of perpetual peace. For, if even - one of these units of society were in a position physically to - influence another, while yet remaining a member of a primitive - order of society, then a state of war would be joined with these - primitive conditions; and from this it is our present purpose to - free ourselves. - - -FIRST DEFINITIVE ARTICLE OF PERPETUAL PEACE - -I.—“The civil constitution of each state shall be republican.” - -The only constitution which has its origin in the idea of the -original contract, upon which the lawful legislation of every nation -must be based, is the republican.[119] It is a constitution, in the -first place, founded in accordance with the principle of the freedom -of the members of society as human beings: secondly, in accordance -with the principle of the dependence of all, as subjects, on a common -legislation: and, thirdly, in accordance with the law of the equality -of the members as citizens. It is then, looking at the question of -right, the only constitution whose fundamental principles lie at the -basis of every form of civil constitution. And the only question for -us now is, whether it is also the one constitution which can lead to -perpetual peace. - - [119] Lawful, that is to say, external freedom cannot be defined, - as it so often is, as the right [_Befugniss_] “to do whatever one - likes, so long as this does not wrong anyone else.”[B] For what - is this right? It is the possibility of actions which do not lead - to the injury of others. So the explanation of a “right” would be - something like this:—“Freedom is the possibility of actions which - do not injure anyone. A man does not wrong another—whatever his - action—if he does not wrong another”: which is empty tautology. - My external (lawful) freedom is rather to be explained in - this way: it is the right through which I require not to obey - any external laws except those to which I could have given my - consent. In exactly the same way, external (legal) equality in a - state is that relation of the subjects in consequence of which - no individual can legally bind or oblige another to anything, - without at the same time submitting himself to the law which - ensures that he can, in his turn, be bound and obliged in like - manner by this other. - - [B] Hobbes’ definition of freedom is interesting. See _Lev._ II. - Ch. XXI.:—“A FREEMAN, _is he, that in those things, which by his - strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he - has a will to_.” [Tr.] - - The principle of lawful independence requires no explanation, - as it is involved in the general concept of a constitution. - The validity of this hereditary and inalienable right, which - belongs of necessity to mankind, is affirmed and ennobled by the - principle of a lawful relation between man himself and higher - beings, if indeed he believes in such beings. This is so, because - he thinks of himself, in accordance with these very principles, - as a citizen of a transcendental world as well as of the world - of sense. For, as far as my freedom goes, I am bound by no - obligation even with regard to Divine Laws—which are apprehended - by me only through my reason—except in so far as I could have - given my assent to them; for it is through the law of freedom - of my own reason that I first form for myself a concept of a - Divine Will. As for the principle of equality, in so far as it - applies to the most sublime being in the universe next to God—a - being I might perhaps figure to myself as a mighty emanation of - the Divine spirit,—there is no reason why, if I perform my duty - in the sphere in which I am placed, as that aeon does in his, - the duty of obedience alone should fall to my share, the right - to command to him. That this principle of equality, (unlike the - principle of freedom), does not apply to our relation to God is - due to the fact that, to this Being alone, the idea of duty does - not belong. - - As for the right to equality which belongs to all citizens as - subjects, the solution of the problem of the admissibility of - an hereditary nobility hinges on the following question:—“Does - social rank—acknowledged by the state to be higher in the case - of one subject than another—stand above desert, or does merit - take precedence of social standing?” Now it is obvious that, if - high position is combined with good family, it is quite uncertain - whether merit, that is to say, skill and fidelity in office, will - follow as well. This amounts to granting the favoured individual - a commanding position without any question of desert; and to - that, the universal will of the people—expressed in an original - contract which is the fundamental principle of all right—would - never consent. For it does not follow that a nobleman is a man - of noble character. In the case of the official nobility, as one - might term the rank of higher magistracy—which one must acquire - by merit—the social position is not attached like property to the - person but to his office, and equality is not thereby disturbed; - for, if a man gives up office, he lays down with it his official - rank and falls back into the rank of his fellows. - -Now the republican constitution apart from the soundness of its -origin, since it arose from the pure source of the concept of right, -has also the prospect of attaining the desired result, namely, -perpetual peace. And the reason is this. If, as must be so under this -constitution, the consent of the subjects is required to determine -whether there shall be war or not, nothing is more natural than that -they should weigh the matter well, before undertaking such a bad -business. For in decreeing war, they would of necessity be resolving -to bring down the miseries of war upon their country. This implies: -they must fight themselves; they must hand over the costs of the war -out of their own property; they must do their poor best to make good -the devastation which it leaves behind; and finally, as a crowning -ill, they have to accept a burden of debt which will embitter even -peace itself, and which they can never pay off on account of the new -wars which are always impending. On the other hand, in a government -where the subject is not a citizen holding a vote, (_i.e._ in a -constitution which is not republican), the plunging into war is the -least serious thing in the world. For the ruler is not a citizen, -but the owner of the state, and does not lose a whit by the war, -while he goes on enjoying the delights of his table or sport, or -of his pleasure palaces and gala days. He can therefore decide on -war for the most trifling reasons, as if it were a kind of pleasure -party.[120] Any justification of it that is necessary for the sake of -decency he can leave without concern to the diplomatic corps who are -always only too ready with their services. - - [120] Cf. Cowper: _The Winter Morning Walk_:— - - “But is it fit, or can it bear the shock - Of rational discussion, that a man, - Compounded and made up like other men - Of elements tumultuous, . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Should when he pleases, and on whom he will, - Wage war, with any or with no pretence - Of provocation giv’n or wrong sustain’d, - And force the beggarly last doit, by means - That his own humour dictates, from the clutch - Of poverty, that thus he may procure - His thousands, weary of penurious life, - A splendid opportunity to die?” - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - “He deems a thousand or ten thousand lives - Spent in the purchase of renown for him, - An easy reckoning.” [Tr.] - - - * * * * * - - -The following remarks must be made in order that we may not fall into -the common error of confusing the republican with the democratic -constitution. The forms of the state (_civitas_)[121] may be -classified according to either of two principles of division:—the -difference of the persons who hold the supreme authority in the -state, and the manner in which the people are governed by their -ruler whoever he may be. The first is properly called the form -of sovereignty (_forma imperii_), and there can be only three -constitutions differing in this respect: where, namely, the supreme -authority belongs to only one, to several individuals working -together, or to the whole people constituting the civil society. Thus -we have autocracy or the sovereignty of a monarch, aristocracy or -the sovereignty of the nobility, and democracy or the sovereignty -of the people. The second principle of division is the form of -government (_forma regiminis_), and refers to the way in which the -state makes use of its supreme power: for the manner of government -is based on the constitution, itself the act of that universal will -which transforms a multitude into a nation. In this respect the form -of government is either republican or despotic. Republicanism is the -political principle of severing the executive power of the government -from the legislature. Despotism is that principle in pursuance of -which the state arbitrarily puts into effect laws which it has itself -made: consequently it is the administration of the public will, but -this is identical with the private will of the ruler. Of these three -forms of a state, democracy, in the proper sense of the word, is -of necessity despotism, because it establishes an executive power, -since all decree regarding—and, if need be, against—any individual -who dissents from them. Therefore the “whole people”, so-called, who -carry their measure are really not all, but only a majority: so that -here the universal will is in contradiction with itself and with the -principle of freedom. - - [121] Cf. Hobbes: _On Dominion_, Ch. VII. § 1. “As for the - difference of cities, it is taken from the difference of the - persons to whom the supreme power is committed. This power is - committed either to _one man_, or _council_, or some _one court_ - consisting of many men.” [Tr.] - -Every form of government in fact which is not representative is -really no true constitution at all, because a law-giver may no more -be, in one and the same person, the administrator of his own will, -than the universal major premise of a syllogism may be, at the same -time, the subsumption under itself of the particulars contained -in the minor premise. And, although the other two constitutions, -autocracy and aristocracy, are always defective in so far as -they leave the way open for such a form of government, yet there -is at least always a possibility in these cases, that they may -take the form of a government in accordance with the spirit of a -representative system. Thus Frederick the Great used at least to -_say_ that he was “merely the highest servant of the state.”[122] The -democratic constitution, on the other hand, makes this impossible, -because under such a government every one wishes to be master. We -may therefore say that the smaller the staff of the executive—that -is to say, the number of rulers—and the more real, on the other -hand, their representation of the people, so much the more is the -government of the state in accordance with a possible republicanism; -and it may hope by gradual reforms to raise itself to that standard. -For this reason, it is more difficult under an aristocracy than -under a monarchy—while under a democracy it is impossible except by -a violent revolution—to attain to this, the one perfectly lawful -constitution. The kind of government,[123] however, is of infinitely -more importance to the people than the kind of constitution, -although the greater or less aptitude of a people for this ideal -greatly depends upon such external form. The form of government, -however, if it is to be in accordance with the idea of right, must -embody the representative system in which alone a republican form -of administration is possible and without which it is despotic -and violent, be the constitution what it may. None of the ancient -so-called republics were aware of this, and they necessarily slipped -into absolute despotism which, of all despotisms, is most endurable -under the sovereignty of one individual. - - [122] The lofty appellations which are often given to a - ruler—such as the Lord’s Anointed, the Administrator of the - Divine Will upon earth and Vicar of God—have been many times - censured as flattery gross enough to make one giddy. But it - seems to me without cause. Far from making a prince arrogant, - names like these must rather make him humble at heart, if he has - any intelligence—which we take for granted he has—and reflects - that he has undertaken an office which is too great for any - human being. For, indeed, it is the holiest which God has on - earth—namely, the right of ruling mankind: and he must ever live - in fear of injuring this treasure of God in some respect or other. - - [123] Mallet du Pan boasts in his seemingly brilliant but shallow - and superficial language that, after many years experience, he - has come at last to be convinced of the truth of the well known - saying of Pope [_Essay on Man_, III. 303]:— - - “For Forms of Government let fools contest; - Whate’er is best administered is best.” - - If this means that the best administered government is best - administered, then, in Swift’s phrase, he has cracked a nut to - find a worm in it. If it means, however, that the best conducted - government is also the best kind of government,—that is, the - best form of political constitution,—then it is utterly false: - for examples of wise administration are no proof of the kind of - government. Who ever ruled better than Titus and Marcus Aurelius, - and yet the one left Domitian, the other Commodus, as his - successor? This could not have happened where the constitution - was a good one, for their absolute unfitness for the position was - early enough known, and the power of the emperor was sufficiently - great to exclude them. - - -SECOND DEFINITIVE ARTICLE OF PERPETUAL PEACE - -II.—“The law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free -states.” - -Nations, as states, may be judged like individuals who, living in the -natural state of society—that is to say, uncontrolled by external -law—injure one another through their very proximity.[124] Every -state, for the sake of its own security, may—and ought to—demand -that its neighbour should submit itself to conditions, similar to -those of the civil society where the right of every individual is -guaranteed. This would give rise to a federation of nations which, -however, would not have to be a State of nations.[125] That would -involve a contradiction. For the term “state” implies the relation of -one who rules to those who obey—that is to say, of law-giver to the -subject people: and many nations in one state would constitute only -one nation, which contradicts our hypothesis, since here we have to -consider the right of one nation against another, in so far as they -are so many separate states and are not to be fused into one. - - [124] “For as amongst masterless men, there is perpetual war, of - every man against his neighbour; no inheritance, to transmit to - the son, nor to expect from the father; no propriety of goods, - or lands; no security; but a full and absolute liberty in every - particular man: so in states, and commonwealths not dependent on - one another, every commonwealth, not every man, has an absolute - liberty, to do what it shall judge, that is to say, what that - man, or assembly that representeth it, shall judge most conducing - to their benefit. But withal, they live in the condition of - a perpetual war, and upon the confines of battle, with their - frontiers armed, and cannons planted against their neighbours - round about.” (Hobbes: _Leviathan_, II. Ch. XXI.) [Tr.] - - [125] But see p. 136, where Kant seems to speak of a State of - nations as the ideal. Kant expresses himself, on this point, more - clearly in the _Rechtslehre_, Part. II. § 61:—“The natural state - of nations,” he says here, “like that of individual men, is a - condition which must be abandoned, in order that they may enter a - state regulated by law. Hence, before this can take place, every - right possessed by these nations and every external “mine” and - “thine” [_id est_, symbol of possession] which states acquire or - preserve through war are merely _provisional_, and can become - _peremptorily_ valid and constitute a true state of peace only - in a universal _union of states_, by a process analogous to that - through which a people becomes a state. Since, however, the too - great extension of such a State of nations over vast territories - must, in the long run, make the government of that union—and - therefore the protection of each of its members—impossible, a - multitude of such corporations will lead again to a state of war. - So that _perpetual peace_, the final goal of international law - as a whole, is really an impracticable idea [_eine unausführbare - Idee_]. The political principles, however, which are directed - towards this end, (that is to say, towards the establishment of - such unions of states as may serve as a continual approximation - to that ideal), are not impracticable; on the contrary, as this - approximation is required by duty and is therefore founded also - upon the rights of men and of states, these principles are, - without doubt, capable of practical realization.” [Tr.] - -The attachment of savages to their lawless liberty, the fact -that they would rather be at hopeless variance with one another -than submit themselves to a legal authority constituted by -themselves, that they therefore prefer their senseless freedom to a -reason-governed liberty, is regarded by us with profound contempt as -barbarism and uncivilisation and the brutal degradation of humanity. -So one would think that civilised races, each formed into a state by -itself, must come out of such an abandoned condition as soon as they -possibly can. On the contrary, however, every state thinks rather -that its majesty (the “majesty” of a people is an absurd expression) -lies just in the very fact that it is subject to no external legal -authority; and the glory of the ruler consists in this, that, without -his requiring to expose himself to danger, thousands stand at his -command ready to let themselves be sacrificed for a matter of no -concern to them.[126] The difference between the savages of Europe -and those of America lies chiefly in this, that, while many tribes of -the latter have been entirely devoured by their enemies, Europeans -know a better way of using the vanquished than by eating them; and -they prefer to increase through them the number of their subjects, -and so the number of instruments at their command for still more -widely spread war. - - [126] A Greek Emperor who magnanimously volunteered to settle by - a duel his quarrel with a Bulgarian Prince, got the following - answer:—“A smith who has tongs will not pluck the glowing iron - from the fire with his hands.” - -The depravity of human nature[127] shows itself without disguise -in the unrestrained relations of nations to each other, while in -the law-governed civil state much of this is hidden by the check -of government. This being so, it is astonishing that the word -“right” has not yet been entirely banished from the politics of -war as pedantic, and that no state has yet ventured to publicly -advocate this point of view. For Hugo Grotius, Puffendorf, Vattel -and others—Job’s comforters, all of them—are always quoted in good -faith to justify an attack, although their codes, whether couched -in philosophical or diplomatic terms, have not—nor can have—the -slightest legal force, because states, as such, are under no common -external authority; and there is no instance of a state having ever -been moved by argument to desist from its purpose, even when this -was backed up by the testimony of such great men. This homage which -every state renders—in words at least—to the idea of right, proves -that, although it may be slumbering, there is, notwithstanding, to -be found in man a still higher natural moral capacity by the aid of -which he will in time gain the mastery over the evil principle in his -nature, the existence of which he is unable to deny. And he hopes the -same of others; for otherwise the word “right” would never be uttered -by states who wish to wage war, unless to deride it like the Gallic -Prince who declared:—“The privilege which nature gives the strong is -that the weak must obey them.”[128] - - [127] “Both sayings are very true: that _man to man is a kind of - God_; and that _man to man is an arrant wolf_. The first is true, - if we compare citizens amongst themselves; and the second, if we - compare cities. In the one, there is some analogy of similitude - with the Deity; to wit, justice and charity, the twin sisters - of peace. But in the other, good men must defend themselves by - taking to them for a sanctuary the two daughters of war, deceit - and violence: that is, in plain terms, a mere brutal rapacity.” - (Hobbes: Epistle Dedicatory to the _Philosophical Rudiments - concerning Government and Society_.) [Tr.] - - [128] “The strongest are still never sufficiently strong to - ensure them the continual mastership, unless they find means of - transforming force into right, and obedience into duty. - - From the right of the strongest, right takes an ironical - appearance, and is rarely established as a principle.” (_Contrat - Social_, I. Ch. III.) [Tr.] - -The method by which states prosecute their rights can never be by -process of law—as it is where there is an external tribunal—but -only by war. Through this means, however, and its favourable issue, -victory, the question of right is never decided. A treaty of peace -makes, it may be, an end to the war of the moment, but not to the -conditions of war which at any time may afford a new pretext -for opening hostilities; and this we cannot exactly condemn as -unjust, because under these conditions everyone is his own judge. -Notwithstanding, not quite the same rule applies to states according -to the law of nations as holds good of individuals in a lawless -condition according to the law of nature, namely, “that they ought -to advance out of this condition.” This is so, because, as states, -they have already within themselves a legal constitution, and have -therefore advanced beyond the stage at which others, in accordance -with their ideas of right, can force them to come under a wider -legal constitution. Meanwhile, however, reason, from her throne of -the supreme law-giving moral power, absolutely condemns war[129] as -a morally lawful proceeding, and makes a state of peace, on the -other hand, an immediate duty. Without a compact between the nations, -however, this state of peace cannot be established or assured. Hence -there must be an alliance of a particular kind which we may call a -covenant of peace (_foedus pacificum_), which would differ from a -treaty of peace (_pactum pacis_) in this respect, that the latter -merely puts an end to one war, while the former would seek to put -an end to war for ever. This alliance does not aim at the gain of -any power whatsoever of the state, but merely at the preservation -and security of the freedom of the state for itself and of other -allied states at the same time.[130] The latter do not, however, -require, for this reason, to submit themselves like individuals in -the state of nature to public laws and coercion. The practicability -or objective reality of this idea of federation which is to extend -gradually over all states and so lead to perpetual peace can be -shewn. For, if Fortune ordains that a powerful and enlightened people -should form a republic,—which by its very nature is inclined to -perpetual peace—this would serve as a centre of federal union for -other states wishing to join, and thus secure conditions of freedom -among the states in accordance with the idea of the law of nations. -Gradually, through different unions of this kind, the federation -would extend further and further. - - [129] “The natural state,” says Hobbes, (_On Dominion_, Ch. VII. - § 18) “hath the same proportion to the civil, (I mean, liberty to - subjection), which passion hath to reason, or a beast to a man.” - - Locke speaks thus of man, when he puts himself into the state of - war with another:—“having quitted reason, which God hath given - to be the rule betwixt man and man, and the common bond whereby - human kind is united into one fellowship and society; and having - renounced the way of peace which that teaches, and made use of - the force of war, to compass his unjust ends upon another, where - he has no right; and so revolting from his own kind to that of - beasts, by making force, which is theirs, to be his rule of - right, he renders himself liable to be destroyed by the injured - person, and the rest of mankind that will join with him in the - execution of justice, as any other wild beast, or noxious brute, - with whom mankind can have neither society nor security.” (_Civil - Government_, Ch. XV. § 172.) [Tr.] - - [130] Cf. Rousseau: _Gouvernement de Pologne_, Ch. V. Federate - government is “the only one which unites in itself all the - advantages of great and small states.” [Tr.] - -It is quite comprehensible that a people should say:—“There shall be -no war among us, for we shall form ourselves into a state, that is to -say, constitute for ourselves a supreme legislative, administrative -and judicial power which will settle our disputes peaceably.” But if -this state says:—“There shall be no war between me and other states, -although I recognise no supreme law-giving power which will secure -me my rights and whose rights I will guarantee;” then it is not at -all clear upon what grounds I could base my confidence in my right, -unless it were the substitute for that compact on which civil society -is based—namely, free federation which reason must necessarily -connect with the idea of the law of nations, if indeed any meaning is -to be left in that concept at all. - -There is no intelligible meaning in the idea of the law of nations -as giving a right to make war; for that must be a right to decide -what is just, not in accordance with universal, external laws -limiting the freedom of each individual, but by means of one-sided -maxims applied by force. We must then understand by this that men of -such ways of thinking are quite justly served, when they destroy -one another, and thus find perpetual peace in the wide grave which -covers all the abominations of acts of violence as well as the -authors of such deeds. For states, in their relation to one another, -there can be, according to reason, no other way of advancing from -that lawless condition which unceasing war implies, than by giving -up their savage lawless freedom, just as individual men have done, -and yielding to the coercion of public laws. Thus they can form -a State of nations (_civitas gentium_), one, too, which will be -ever increasing and would finally embrace all the peoples of the -earth. States, however, in accordance with their understanding of -the law of nations, by no means desire this, and therefore reject -_in hypothesi_ what is correct _in thesi_. Hence, instead of the -positive idea of a world-republic, if all is not to be lost, only the -negative substitute for it, a federation averting war, maintaining -its ground and ever extending over the world may stop the current -of this tendency to war and shrinking from the control of law. But -even then there will be a constant danger that this propensity may -break out.[131] “Furor impius intus—fremit horridus ore cruento.” -(Virgil.)[132] - - [131] On the conclusion of peace at the end of a war, it might - not be unseemly for a nation to appoint a day of humiliation, - after the festival of thanksgiving, on which to invoke the - mercy of Heaven for the terrible sin which the human race are - guilty of, in their continued unwillingness to submit (in their - relations with other states) to a law-governed constitution, - preferring rather in the pride of their independence to use the - barbarous method of war, which after all does not really settle - what is wanted, namely, the right of each state in a quarrel. The - feasts of thanksgiving during a war for a victorious battle, the - hymns which are sung—to use the Jewish expression—“to the Lord - of Hosts” are not in less strong contrast to the ethical idea - of a father of mankind; for, apart from the indifference these - customs show to the way in which nations seek to establish their - rights—sad enough as it is—these rejoicings bring in an element - of exultation that a great number of lives, or at least the - happiness of many, has been destroyed. - - [132] Cf. _Aeneidos_, I. 294 _seq._ - - “Furor impius intus, - Saeva sedens super arma, et centum vinctus aënis - Post tergum nodis, fremet horridus ore cruento.” [Tr.] - - -THIRD DEFINITIVE ARTICLE OF PERPETUAL PEACE - -III.—“The rights of men, as citizens of the world, shall be limited -to the conditions of universal hospitality.” - -We are speaking here, as in the previous articles, not of -philanthropy, but of right; and in this sphere hospitality signifies -the claim of a stranger entering foreign territory to be treated by -its owner without hostility. The latter may send him away again, -if this can be done without causing his death; but, so long as he -conducts himself peaceably, he must not be treated as an enemy. -It is not a right to be treated as a guest to which the stranger -can lay claim—a special friendly compact on his behalf would be -required to make him for a given time an actual inmate—but he has -a right of visitation. This right[133] to present themselves to -society belongs to all mankind in virtue of our common right of -possession on the surface of the earth on which, as it is a globe, -we cannot be infinitely scattered, and must in the end reconcile -ourselves to existence side by side: at the same time, originally -no one individual had more right than another to live in any one -particular spot. Uninhabitable portions of the surface, ocean and -desert, split up the human community, but in such a way that ships -and camels—“the ship of the desert”—make it possible for men to come -into touch with one another across these unappropriated regions -and to take advantage of our common claim to the face of the earth -with a view to a possible intercommunication. The inhospitality of -the inhabitants of certain sea coasts—as, for example, the coast of -Barbary—in plundering ships in neighbouring seas or making slaves -of shipwrecked mariners; or the behaviour of the Arab Bedouins in -the deserts, who think that proximity to nomadic tribes constitutes -a right to rob, is thus contrary to the law of nature. This right -to hospitality, however—that is to say, the privilege of strangers -arriving on foreign soil—does not amount to more than what is implied -in a permission to make an attempt at intercourse with the original -inhabitants. In this way far distant territories may enter into -peaceful relations with one another. These relations may at last -come under the public control of law, and thus the human race may be -brought nearer the realisation of a cosmopolitan constitution. - - [133] Cf. Vattel (_op. cit._, II. ch. IX. § 123):—“The right of - passage is also a remnant of the primitive state of communion, - in which the entire earth was common to all mankind, and the - passage was everywhere free to each individual according to his - necessities. Nobody can be entirely deprived of this right.” See - also above, p. 65, _note_. [Tr.] - -Let us look now, for the sake of comparison, at the inhospitable -behaviour of the civilised nations, especially the commercial -states of our continent. The injustice which they exhibit on -visiting foreign lands and races—this being equivalent in their -eyes to conquest—is such as to fill us with horror. America, the -negro countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape etc. were, on being -discovered, looked upon as countries which belonged to nobody; for -the native inhabitants were reckoned as nothing. In Hindustan, under -the pretext of intending to establish merely commercial depots, the -Europeans introduced foreign troops; and, as a result, the different -states of Hindustan were stirred up to far-spreading wars. Oppression -of the natives followed, famine, insurrection, perfidy and all the -rest of the litany of evils which can afflict mankind. - -China[134] and Japan (Nipon) which had made an attempt at receiving -guests of this kind, have now taken a prudent step. Only to a single -European people, the Dutch, has China given the right of access to -her shores (but not of entrance into the country), while Japan has -granted both these concessions; but at the same time they exclude the -Dutch who enter, as if they were prisoners, from social intercourse -with the inhabitants. The worst, or from the standpoint of ethical -judgment the best, of all this is that no satisfaction is derived -from all this violence, that all these trading companies stand on -the verge of ruin, that the Sugar Islands, that seat of the most -horrible and deliberate slavery, yield no real profit, but only have -their use indirectly and for no very praiseworthy object—namely, that -of furnishing men to be trained as sailors for the men-of-war and -thereby contributing to the carrying on of war in Europe. And this -has been done by nations who make a great ado about their piety, and -who, while they are quite ready to commit injustice, would like, in -their orthodoxy, to be considered among the elect. - - [134] In order to call this great empire by the name which - it gives itself—namely, China, not Sina or a word of similar - sound—we have only to look at Georgii: _Alphab. Tibet._, pp. - 651-654, particularly _note_ b., below. According to the - observation of Professor Fischer of St. Petersburg, there is - really no particular name which it always goes by: the most - usual is the word _Kin_, _i.e._ gold, which the inhabitants of - Tibet call _Ser_. Hence the emperor is called the king of gold, - _i.e._ the king of the most splendid country in the world. This - word _Kin_ may probably be _Chin_ in the empire itself, but - be pronounced _Kin_ by the Italian missionaries on account of - the gutturals. Thus we see that the country of the Seres, so - often mentioned by the Romans, was China: the silk, however, - was despatched to Europe across Greater Tibet, probably through - Smaller Tibet and Bucharia, through Persia and then on. This - leads to many reflections as to the antiquity of this wonderful - state, as compared with Hindustan, at the time of its union with - Tibet and thence with Japan. On the other hand, the name Sina or - Tschina which is said to be given to this land by neighbouring - peoples leads to nothing. - - Perhaps we can explain the ancient intercourse of Europe with - Tibet—a fact at no time widely known—by looking at what Hesychius - has preserved on the matter. I refer to the shout, Κουξ Ομπαξ - (_Konx Ompax_), the cry of the Hierophants in the Eleusinian - mysteries (cf. _Travels of Anacharsis the Younger_, Part V., p. - 447, _seq._). For, according to Georgii _Alph. Tibet._, the word - _Concioa_ which bears a striking resemblance to _Konx_ means - God. _Pak-cio_ (_ib._ p. 520) which might easily be pronounced - by the Greeks like _pax_ means _promulgator legis_, the divine - principle permeating nature (called also, on p. 177, _Cencresi_). - _Om_, however, which La Croze translates by _benedictus_, - _i.e._ blessed, can when applied to the Deity mean nothing but - beatified (p. 507). Now P. Franc. Horatius, when he asked the - Lhamas of Tibet, as he often did, what they understood by God - (_Concioa_) always got the answer:—“it is the assembly of all the - saints,” _i.e._ the assembly of those blessed ones who have been - born again according to the faith of the Lama and, after many - wanderings in changing forms, have at last returned to God, to - Burchane: that is to say, they are beings to be worshipped, souls - which have undergone transmigration (p. 223). So the mysterious - expression _Konx Ompax_ ought probably to mean the holy (_Konx_), - blessed, (_Om_) and wise (_Pax_) supreme Being pervading the - universe, the personification of nature. Its use in the Greek - mysteries probably signified monotheism for the Epoptes, in - distinction from the polytheism of the people, although elsewhere - P. Horatius scented atheism here. How that mysterious word - came by way of Tibet to the Greeks may be explained as above; - and, on the other hand, in this way is made probable an early - intercourse of Europe with China across Tibet, earlier perhaps - than the communication with Hindustan. (There is some difference - of opinion as to the meaning of the words κόγξ ὄμπαξ—according - to Liddell and Scott, a corruption of κόγξ, ὁμοίως πάξ. Kant’s - inferences here seem to be more than far-fetched. Lobeck, in his - _Aglaophamus_ (p. 775), gives a quite different interpretation - which has, he says, been approved by scholars. And Whately - (_Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon Bonaparte_, 3rd. ed., - Postscript) uses Konx Ompax as a pseudonym. [Tr.]) - -The intercourse, more or less close, which has been everywhere -steadily increasing between the nations of the earth, has now -extended so enormously that a violation of right in one part of the -world is felt all over it. Hence the idea of a cosmopolitan right -is no fantastical, high-flown notion of right, but a complement of -the unwritten code of law—constitutional as well as international -law—necessary for the public rights of mankind in general and thus -for the realisation of perpetual peace. For only by endeavouring -to fulfil the conditions laid down by this cosmopolitan law can we -flatter ourselves that we are gradually approaching that ideal. - - - - -FIRST SUPPLEMENT - -CONCERNING THE GUARANTEE OF PERPETUAL PEACE - - -This guarantee is given by no less a power than the great artist -nature (_natura dædala rerum_) in whose mechanical course is clearly -exhibited a predetermined design to make harmony spring from human -discord, even against the will of man. Now this design, although -called Fate when looked upon as the compelling force of a cause, the -laws of whose operation are unknown to us, is, when considered as the -purpose manifested in the course of nature, called Providence,[135] -as the deep-lying wisdom of a Higher Cause, directing itself towards -the ultimate practical end of the human race and predetermining the -course of things with a view to its realisation. This Providence -we do not, it is true, perceive in the cunning contrivances -[_Kunstanstalten_] of nature; nor can we even conclude from the -fact of their existence that it is there; but, as in every relation -between the form of things and their final cause, we can, and must, -supply the thought of a Higher Wisdom, in order that we may be able -to form an idea of the possible existence of these products after -the analogy of human works of art [_Kunsthandlungen_].[136] The -representation to ourselves of the relation and agreement of these -formations of nature to the moral purpose for which they were made -and which reason directly prescribes to us, is an Idea, it is true, -which is in theory superfluous; but in practice it is dogmatic, and -its objective reality is well established.[137] Thus we see, for -example, with regard to the ideal [_Pflichtbegriff_] of perpetual -peace, that it is our duty to make use of the mechanism of nature -for the realisation of that end. Moreover, in a case like this where -we are interested merely in the theory and not in the religious -question, the use of the word “nature” is more appropriate than that -of “providence”, in view of the limitations of human reason, which, -in considering the relation of effects to their causes, must keep -within the limits of possible experience. And the term “nature” is -also less presumptuous than the other. To speak of a Providence -knowable by us would be boldly to put on the wings of Icarus in order -to draw near to the mystery of its unfathomable purpose. - - [135] In the mechanical system of nature to which man belongs as - a sentient being, there appears, as the underlying ground of its - existence, a certain _form_ which we cannot make intelligible - to ourselves except by thinking into the physical world the - idea of an end preconceived by the Author of the universe: this - predetermination of nature on the part of God we generally call - Divine Providence. In so far as this providence appears in the - origin of the universe, we speak of Providence as founder of the - world (_providentia conditrix; semel jussit, semper parent._ - Augustine). As it maintains the course of nature, however, - according to universal laws of adaptation to preconceived ends, - [_i.e._ teleological laws] we call it a ruling providence - (_providentia gubernatrix_). Further, we name it the guiding - providence (_providentia directrix_), as it appears in the - world for special ends, which we could not foresee, but suspect - only from the result. Finally, regarding particular events - as divine purposes, we speak no longer of providence, but of - dispensation (_directio extraordinaria_). As this term, however, - really suggests the idea of miracles, although the events are - not spoken of by this name, the desire to fathom dispensation, - as such, is a foolish presumption in men. For, from one single - occurrence, to jump at the conclusion that there is a particular - principle of efficient causes and that this event is an end and - not merely the natural [_naturmechanische_] sequence of a - design quite unknown to us is absurd and presumptuous, in however - pious and humble a spirit we may speak of it. In the same way to - distinguish between a universal and a particular providence when - regarding it _materialiter_, in its relation to actual objects - in the world (to say, for instance, that there may be, indeed, - a providence for the preservation of the different species of - creation, but that individuals are left to chance) is false and - contradictory. For providence is called universal for the very - reason that no single thing may be thought of as shut out from - its care. Probably the distinction of two kinds of providence, - _formaliter_ or subjectively considered, had reference to the - manner in which its purposes are fulfilled. So that we have - ordinary providence (_e.g._ the yearly decay and awakening to - new life in nature with change of season) and what we may call - unusual or special providence (_e.g._ the bringing of timber - by ocean currents to Arctic shores where it does not grow, and - where without this aid the inhabitants could not live). Here, - although we can quite well explain the physico-mechanical cause - of these phenomena—in this case, for example, the banks of the - rivers in temperate countries are over-grown with trees, some of - which fall into the water and are carried along, probably by the - Gulf Stream—we must not overlook the teleological cause which - points to the providential care of a ruling wisdom above nature. - But the concept, commonly used in the schools of philosophy, - of a co-operation on the part of the Deity or a concurrence - (_concursus_) in the operations going on in the world of sense, - must be dropped. For it is, firstly, self-contradictory to couple - the like and the unlike together (_gryphes jungere equis_) and - to let Him who is Himself the entire cause of the changes in the - universe make good any shortcomings in His own predetermining - providence (which to require this must be defective) during the - course of the world; for example, to say that the physician has - restored the sick with the help of God—that is to say that He - has been present as a support. For _causa solitaria non juvat_. - God created the physician as well as his means of healing; and - we must ascribe the result wholly to Him, if we will go back - to the supreme First Cause which, theoretically, is beyond our - comprehension. Or we can ascribe the result entirely to the - physician, in so far as we follow up this event, as explicable in - the chain of physical causes, according to the order of nature. - Secondly, moreover, such a way of looking at this question - destroys all the fixed principles by which we judge an effect. - But, from the ethico-practical point of view which looks entirely - to the transcendental side of things, the idea of a divine - concurrence is quite proper and even necessary: for example, - in the faith that God will make good the imperfection of our - human justice, if only our feelings and intentions are sincere; - and that He will do this by means beyond our comprehension, - and therefore we should not slacken our efforts after what is - good. Whence it follows, as a matter of course, that no one must - attempt to explain a good action as a mere event in time by this - _concursus_; for that would be to pretend a theoretical knowledge - of the supersensible and hence be absurd. - - [136] _Id est_, which we cannot dissever from the idea of a - creative skill capable of producing them. [Tr.] - - [137] See preface, p. ix. above. - -Before we determine the surety given by nature more exactly, we -must first look at what ultimately makes this guarantee of peace -necessary—the circumstances in which nature has carefully placed the -actors in her great theatre. In the next place, we shall proceed to -consider the manner in which she gives this surety. - -The provisions she has made are as follow: (1) she has taken -care that men _can_ live in all parts of the world; (2) she has -scattered them by means of war in all directions, even into the most -inhospitable regions, so that these too might be populated; (3) by -this very means she has forced them to enter into relations more or -less controlled by law. It is surely wonderful that, on the cold -wastes round the Arctic Ocean, there is always to be found moss -for the reindeer to scrape out from under the snow, the reindeer -itself either serving as food or to draw the sledge of the Ostiak or -Samoyedes. And salt deserts which would otherwise be left unutilised -have the camel, which seems as if created for travelling in such -lands. This evidence of design in things, however, is still more -clear when we come to know that, besides the fur-clad animals of the -shores of the Arctic Ocean, there are seals, walruses and whales -whose flesh furnishes food and whose oil fire for the dwellers in -these regions. But the providential care of nature excites our wonder -above all, when we hear of the driftwood which is carried—whence -no one knows—to these treeless shores: for without the aid of -this material the natives could neither construct their craft, nor -weapons, nor huts for shelter. Here too they have so much to do, -making war against wild animals, that they live at peace with one -another. But what drove them originally into these regions was -probably nothing but war. - -Of animals, used by us as instruments of war, the horse was the first -which man learned to tame and domesticate during the period of the -peopling of the earth; the elephant belongs to the later period of -the luxury of states already established. In the same way, the art -of cultivating certain grasses called cereals—no longer known to us -in their original form—and also the multiplication and improvement, -by transplanting and grafting, of the original kinds of fruit—in -Europe, probably only two species, the crab-apple and wild pear—could -only originate under the conditions accompanying established states -where the rights of property are assured. That is to say it would be -after man, hitherto existing in lawless liberty, had advanced beyond -the occupations of a hunter,[138] a fisherman or a shepherd to the -life of a tiller of the soil, when salt and iron were discovered,—to -become, perhaps, the first articles of commerce between different -peoples,—and were sought far and near. In this way the peoples would -be at first brought into peaceful relation with one another, and so -come to an understanding and the enjoyment of friendly intercourse, -even with their most distant neighbours. - - [138] Of all modes of livelihood the life of the hunter is - undoubtedly most incompatible with a civilised condition of - society. Because, to live by hunting, families must isolate - themselves from their neighbours, soon becoming estranged and - spread over widely scattered forests, to be before long on terms - of hostility, since each requires a great deal of space to obtain - food and raiment. - - God’s command to Noah not to shed blood (I. _Genesis_, IX. 4-6) - - [4. “But flesh with the life thereof, which is the blood - thereof, shall ye not eat. - - 5. And surely your blood of your lives will I require; at - the hand of every beast will I require it, and at the hand - of man; at the hand of every man’s brother will I require - the life of man. - - 6. Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be - shed: for in the image of God made he man.”] - - is frequently quoted, and was afterwards—in another connection it - is true—made by the baptised Jews a condition to which Christians, - newly converted from heathendom, had to conform. Cf. _Acts_ XV. 20; - XXI. 25. This command seems originally to have been nothing else - than a prohibition of the life of the hunter; for here the - possibility of eating raw flesh must often occur, and, in - forbidding the one custom, we condemn the other. - -Now while nature provided that men could live on all parts of -the earth, she also at the same time despotically willed that -they _should_ live everywhere on it, although against their own -inclination and even although this imperative did not presuppose an -idea of duty which would compel obedience to nature with the force -of a moral law. But, to attain this end, she has chosen war. So we -see certain peoples, widely separated, whose common descent is made -evident by affinity in their languages. Thus, for instance, we find -the Samoyedes on the Arctic Ocean, and again a people speaking a -similar language on the Altai Mts., 200 miles [_Meilen_][139] off, -between whom has pressed in a mounted tribe, warlike in character -and of Mongolian origin, which has driven one branch of the race -far from the other, into the most inhospitable regions where their -own inclination would certainly not have carried them.[140] In the -same way, through the intrusion of the Gothic and Sarmatian tribes, -the Finns in the most northerly regions of Europe, whom we call -Laplanders, have been separated by as great a distance from the -Hungarians, with whose language their own is allied. And what but war -can have brought the Esquimos to the north of America, a race quite -distinct from those of that country and probably European adventurers -of prehistoric times? And war too, nature’s method of populating -the earth, must have driven the Pescherais[141] in South America -as far as Patagonia. War itself, however, is in need of no special -stimulating cause, but seems engrafted in human nature, and is even -regarded as something noble in itself to which man is inspired by the -love of glory apart from motives of self-interest. Hence, among the -savages of America as well as those of Europe in the age of chivalry, -martial courage is looked upon as of great value itself, not merely -when a war is going on, as is reasonable enough, but in order that -there should be war: and thus war is often entered upon merely to -exhibit this quality. So that an intrinsic dignity is held to attach -to war in itself, and even philosophers eulogise it as an ennobling, -refining influence on humanity, unmindful of the Greek proverb, “War -is evil, in so far as it makes more bad people than it takes away.” - - [139] About 1000 English miles. - - [140] The question might be put:—“If it is nature’s will that - these Arctic shores should not remain unpopulated, what will - become of their inhabitants, if, as is to be expected, at some - time or other no more driftwood should be brought to them? For - we may believe that, with the advance of civilisation, the - inhabitants of temperate zones will utilise better the wood which - grows on the banks of their rivers, and not let it fall into the - stream and so be swept away.” I answer: the inhabitants of the - shores of the River Obi, the Yenisei, the Lena will supply them - with it through trade, and take in exchange the animal produce in - which the seas of Arctic shores are so rich—that is, if nature - has first of all brought about peace among them. - - [141] Cf. _Enc. Brit._ (9th ed.), art. “Indians”, in which there - is an allusion to “Fuegians, the _Pescherais_” of some writers. - [Tr.] - -So much, then, of what nature does for her own ends with regard -to the human race as members of the animal world. Now comes the -question which touches the essential points in this design of a -perpetual peace:—“What does nature do in this respect with reference -to the end which man’s own reason sets before him as a duty? and -consequently what does she do to further the realisation of his -moral purpose? How does she guarantee that what man, by the laws of -freedom, ought to do and yet fails to do, he will do, without any -infringement of his freedom by the compulsion of nature and that, -moreover, this shall be done in accordance with the three forms of -public right—constitutional or political law, international law and -cosmopolitan law?” When I say of nature that she _wills_ that this or -that should take place, I do not mean that she imposes upon us the -duty to do it—for only the free, unrestrained, practical reason can -do that—but that she does it herself, whether we will or not. “_Fata -volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt._” - -1. Even if a people were not compelled through internal discord -to submit to the restraint of public laws, war would bring this -about, working from without. For, according to the contrivance of -nature which we have mentioned, every people finds another tribe -in its neighbourhood, pressing upon it in such a manner that it -is compelled to form itself internally into a state to be able to -defend itself as a power should. Now the republican constitution -is the only one which is perfectly adapted to the rights of man, -but it is also the most difficult to establish and still more to -maintain. So generally is this recognised that people often say -the members of a republican state would require to be angels,[142] -because men, with their self-seeking propensities, are not fit for -a constitution of so sublime a form. But now nature comes to the -aid of the universal, reason-derived will which, much as we honour -it, is in practice powerless. And this she does, by means of these -very self-seeking propensities, so that it only depends—and so much -lies within the power of man—on a good organisation of the state -for their forces to be so pitted against one another, that the one -may check the destructive activity of the other or neutralise its -effect. And hence, from the standpoint of reason, the result will -be the same as if both forces did not exist, and each individual -is compelled to be, if not a morally good man, yet at least a good -citizen. The problem of the formation of the state, hard as it may -sound, is not insoluble, even for a race of devils, granted that -they have intelligence. It may be put thus:—“Given a multitude of -rational beings who, in a body, require general laws for their -own preservation, but each of whom, as an individual, is secretly -inclined to exempt himself from this restraint: how are we to order -their affairs and how establish for them a constitution such that, -although their private dispositions may be really antagonistic, -they may yet so act as a check upon one another, that, in their -public relations, the effect is the same as if they had no such evil -sentiments.” Such a problem must be capable of solution. For it -deals, not with the moral reformation of mankind, but only with the -mechanism of nature; and the problem is to learn how this mechanism -of nature can be applied to men, in order so to regulate the -antagonism of conflicting interests in a people that they may even -compel one another to submit to compulsory laws and thus necessarily -bring about the state of peace in which laws have force. We can see, -in states actually existing, although very imperfectly organised, -that, in externals, they already approximate very nearly to what -the Idea of right prescribes, although the principle of morality is -certainly not the cause. A good political constitution, however, is -not to be expected as a result of progress in morality; but rather, -conversely, the good moral condition of a nation is to be looked -for, as one of the first fruits of such a constitution. Hence the -mechanism of nature, working through the self-seeking propensities -of man (which of course counteract one another in their external -effects), may be used by reason as a means of making way for the -realisation of her own purpose, the empire of right, and, as far -as is in the power of the state, to promote and secure in this way -internal as well as external peace. We may say, then, that it is -the irresistible will of nature that right shall at last get the -supremacy. What one here fails to do will be accomplished in the long -run, although perhaps with much inconvenience to us. As Bouterwek -says, “If you bend the reed too much it breaks: he who would do too -much does nothing.” - - [142] Rousseau uses these terms in speaking of democracy. (_Cont. - Soc._, III. Ch. 4.) “If there were a nation of Gods, they might - be governed by a democracy: but so perfect a government will not - agree with men.” - - But he writes elsewhere of republican governments (_op. cit._, - II. Ch. 6):—“All lawful governments are republican.” And in a - footnote to this passage:—“I do not by the word ‘republic’ mean - an aristocracy or democracy only, but in general all governments - directed by the public will which is the law. If a government - is to be lawful, it must not be confused with the sovereign - power, but be considered as the administrator of that power: and - then monarchy itself is a republic.” This language has a close - affinity with that used by Kant. (Cf. above, p. 126.) [Tr.] - -2. The idea of international law presupposes the separate existence -of a number of neighbouring and independent states; and, although -such a condition of things is in itself already a state of war, (if -a federative union of these nations does not prevent the outbreak of -hostilities) yet, according to the Idea of reason, this is better -than that all the states should be merged into one under a power -which has gained the ascendency over its neighbours and gradually -become a universal monarchy.[143] For the wider the sphere of their -jurisdiction, the more laws lose in force; and soulless despotism, -when it has choked the seeds of good, at last sinks into anarchy. -Nevertheless it is the desire of every state, or of its ruler, to -attain to a permanent condition of peace in this very way; that is to -say, by subjecting the whole world as far as possible to its sway. -But nature wills it otherwise. She employs two means to separate -nations, and prevent them from intermixing: namely, the differences -of language and of religion.[144] These differences bring with them a -tendency to mutual hatred, and furnish pretexts for waging war. But, -none the less, with the growth of culture and the gradual advance -of men to greater unanimity of principle, they lead to concord in a -state of peace which, unlike the despotism we have spoken of, (the -churchyard of freedom) does not arise from the weakening of all -forces, but is brought into being and secured through the equilibrium -of these forces in their most active rivalry. - - [143] See above, p. 69, _note_, esp. reference to _Theory of - Ethics_. [Tr.] - - [144] Difference of religion! A strange expression, as if one - were to speak of different kinds of morality. There may indeed be - different historical forms of belief,—that is to say, the various - means which have been used in the course of time to promote - religion,—but they are mere subjects of learned investigation, - and do not really lie within the sphere of religion. In the same - way there are many religious works—the _Zendavesta_, _Veda_, - _Koran_ etc.—but there is only one religion, binding for all - men and for all times. These books are each no more than the - accidental mouthpiece of religion, and may be different according - to differences in time and place. - -3. As nature wisely separates nations which the will of each state, -sanctioned even by the principles of international law, would -gladly unite under its own sway by stratagem or force; in the same -way, on the other hand, she unites nations whom the principle of a -cosmopolitan right would not have secured against violence and war. -And this union she brings about through an appeal to their mutual -interests. The commercial spirit cannot co-exist with war, and sooner -or later it takes possession of every nation. For, of all the forces -which lie at the command of a state, the power of money is probably -the most reliable. Hence states find themselves compelled—not, it is -true, exactly from motives of morality—to further the noble end of -peace and to avert war, by means of mediation, wherever it threatens -to break out, just as if they had made a permanent league for this -purpose. For great alliances with a view to war can, from the nature -of things, only very rarely occur, and still more seldom succeed. - -In this way nature guarantees the coming of perpetual peace, through -the natural course of human propensities: not indeed with sufficient -certainty to enable us to prophesy the future of this ideal -theoretically, but yet clearly enough for practical purposes. And -thus this guarantee of nature makes it a duty that we should labour -for this end, an end which is no mere chimera. - - - - -SECOND SUPPLEMENT - -A SECRET ARTICLE FOR PERPETUAL PEACE - - -A secret article in negotiations concerning public right is, when -looked at objectively or with regard to the meaning of the term, -a contradiction. When we view it, however, from the subjective -standpoint, with regard to the character and condition of the person -who dictates it, we see that it might quite well involve some private -consideration, so that he would regard it as hazardous to his dignity -to acknowledge such an article as originating from him. - -The only article of this kind is contained in the following -proposition:—“The opinions of philosophers, with regard to the -conditions of the possibility of a public peace, shall be taken into -consideration by states armed for war.” - -It seems, however, to be derogatory to the dignity of the legislative -authority of a state—to which we must of course attribute all -wisdom—to ask advice from subjects (among whom stand philosophers) -about the rules of its behaviour to other states. At the same time, -it is very advisable that this should be done. Hence the state will -silently invite suggestion for this purpose, while at the same time -keeping the fact secret. This amounts to saying that the state will -allow philosophers to discuss freely and publicly the universal -principles governing the conduct of war and establishment of peace; -for they will do this of their own accord, if no prohibition is laid -upon them.[145] The arrangement between states, on this point, does -not require that a special agreement should be made, merely for -this purpose; for it is already involved in the obligation imposed -by the universal reason of man which gives the moral law. We would -not be understood to say that the state must give a preference to -the principles of the philosopher, rather than to the opinions of -the jurist, the representative of state authority; but only that he -should be heard. The latter, who has chosen for a symbol the scales -of right and the sword of justice,[146] generally uses that sword not -merely to keep off all outside influences from the scales; for, when -one pan of the balance will not go down, he throws his sword into it; -and then _Væ victis_! The jurist, not being a moral philosopher, is -under the greatest temptation to do this, because it is his business -only to apply existing laws and not to investigate whether these -are not themselves in need of improvement; and this actually lower -function of his profession he looks upon as the nobler, because it -is linked to power (as is the case also in both the other faculties, -theology and medicine). Philosophy occupies a very low position -compared with this combined power. So that it is said, for example, -that she is the handmaid of theology; and the same has been said of -her position with regard to law and medicine. It is not quite clear, -however, “whether she bears the torch before these gracious ladies, -or carries the train.” - - [145] Montesquieu speaks thus in praise of the English state:—“As - the enjoyment of liberty, and even its support and preservation, - consists in every man’s being allowed to speak his thoughts and - to lay open his sentiments, a citizen in this state will say or - write whatever the laws do not expressly forbid to be said or - written.” (_Esprit des Lois_, XIX. Ch. 27.) Hobbes is opposed to - all free discussion of political questions and to freedom as a - source of danger to the state. [Tr.] - - [146] Kant is thinking here not of the sword of justice, in the - moral sense, but of a sword which is symbolical of the executive - power of the actual law. [Tr.] - -That kings should philosophise, or philosophers become kings, is not -to be expected. But neither is it to be desired; for the possession -of power is inevitably fatal to the free exercise of reason. But -it is absolutely indispensable, for their enlightenment as to the -full significance of their vocations, that both kings and sovereign -nations, which rule themselves in accordance with laws of equality, -should not allow the class of philosophers to disappear, nor forbid -the expression of their opinions, but should allow them to speak -openly. And since this class of men, by their very nature, are -incapable of instigating rebellion or forming unions for purposes of -political agitation, they should not be suspected of propagandism. - - - - -APPENDIX I - -ON THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN MORALS AND POLITICS WITH REFERENCE TO -PERPETUAL PEACE - - -In an objective sense, morals is a practical science, as the sum of -laws exacting unconditional obedience, in accordance with which we -_ought_ to act. Now, once we have admitted the authority of this -idea of duty, it is evidently inconsistent that we should think of -saying that we _cannot_ act thus. For, in this case, the idea of duty -falls to the ground of itself; “_ultra posse nemo obligatur_.” Hence -there can be no quarrel between politics, as the practical science of -right, and morals, which is also a science of right, but theoretical. -That is, theory cannot come into conflict with practice. For, in that -case, we would need to understand under the term “ethics” or “morals” -a universal doctrine of expediency, or, in other words, a theory of -precepts which may guide us in choosing the best means for attaining -ends calculated for our advantage. This is to deny that a science of -morals exists. - -Politics says, “Be wise as serpents”; morals adds the limiting -condition, “and guileless as doves.” If these precepts cannot stand -together in one command, then there is a real quarrel between -politics and morals.[147] But if they can be completely brought into -accord, then the idea of any antagonism between them is absurd, -and the question of how best to make a compromise between the two -points of view ceases to be even raised. Although the saying, -“Honesty is the best policy,” expresses a theory which, alas, is -often contradicted in practice, yet the likewise theoretical maxim, -“Honesty is better than any policy,” is exalted high above every -possible objection, is indeed the necessary condition of all politics. - - [147] Cf. Aristotle: _Politics_, (Welldon’s trans.) IV. Ch. XIV. - “The same principles of morality are best both for individuals - and States.” - - Among the ancients the connection between politics and morals - was never questioned, although there were differences of opinion - as to which science stood first in importance. Thus, while Plato - put politics second to morals, Aristotle regarded politics as the - chief science and ethics as a part of politics. This connection - between the sciences was denied by Machiavelli, who lays down - the dictum that, in the relations of sovereigns and states, the - ordinary rules of morality do not apply. See _The Prince_, Ch. - XVIII. “A Prince,” he says, “and most of all a new Prince, cannot - observe all those rules of conduct in respect of which men are - accounted good, being frequently obliged, in order to preserve - his Princedom, to act in opposition to good faith, charity, - humanity, and religion. He must therefore keep his mind ready - to shift as the winds and tides of Fortune turn, and, as I have - already said, he ought not to quit good courses if he can help - it, but should know how to follow evil courses if he must.” - - Hume thought that laxer principles might be allowed to govern - states than private persons, because intercourse between them - was not so “necessary and advantageous” as between individuals. - “There is a system of morals,” he says, “calculated for princes, - much more free than that which ought to govern private persons,” - (_Treatise_, III., Part II., Sect. IX.) [Tr.] - -The Terminus of morals does not yield to Jupiter, the Terminus of -force; for the latter remains beneath the sway of Fate. In other -words, reason is not sufficiently enlightened to survey the series -of predetermining causes which would make it possible for us to -predict with certainty the good or bad results of human action, as -they follow from the mechanical laws of nature; although we may hope -that things will turn out as we should desire. But what we have to -do, in order to remain in the path of duty guided by the rules of -wisdom, reason makes everywhere perfectly clear, and does this for -the purpose of furthering her ultimate ends. - -The practical man, however, for whom morals is mere theory, even -while admitting that what ought to be can be, bases his dreary -verdict against our well-meant hopes really on this: he pretends -that he can foresee from his observation of human nature, that men -will never be willing to do what is required in order to bring -about the wished-for results leading to perpetual peace. It is -true that the will of all individual men to live under a legal -constitution according to the principles of liberty—that is to -say, the distributive unity of the wills of all—is not sufficient -to attain this end. We must have the collective unity of their -united will: all as a body must determine these new conditions. The -solution of this difficult problem is required in order that civil -society should be a whole. To all this diversity of individual wills -there must come a uniting cause, in order to produce a common will -which no distributive will is able to give. Hence, in the practical -realisation of that idea, no other beginning of a law-governed -society can be counted upon than one that is brought about by force: -upon this force, too, public law afterwards rests. This state of -things certainly prepares us to meet considerable deviation in actual -experience from the theoretical idea of perpetual peace, since we -cannot take into account the moral character and disposition of a -law-giver in this connection, or expect that, after he has united a -wild multitude into one people, he will leave it to them to bring -about a legal constitution by their common will. - -It amounts to this. Any ruler who has once got the power in his -hands will not let the people dictate laws for him. A state which -enjoys an independence of the control of external law will not -submit to the judgment of the tribunals of other states, when it -has to consider how to obtain its rights against them. And even a -continent, when it feels its superiority to another, whether this be -in its way or not, will not fail to take advantage of an opportunity -offered of strengthening its power by the spoliation or even conquest -of this territory. Hence all theoretical schemes, connected with -constitutional, international or cosmopolitan law, crumble away into -empty impracticable ideals. While, on the other hand, a practical -science, based on the empirical principles of human nature, which -does not disdain to model its maxims on an observation of actual -life, can alone hope to find a sure foundation on which to build up a -system of national policy. - -Now certainly, if there is neither freedom nor a moral law founded -upon it, and every actual or possible event happens in the mere -mechanical course of nature, then politics, as the art of making -use of this physical necessity in things for the government of -men, is the whole of practical wisdom and the idea of right is an -empty concept. If, on the other hand, we find that this idea of -right is necessarily to be conjoined with politics and even to be -raised to the position of a limiting condition of that science, then -the possibility of reconciling them must be admitted. I can thus -imagine a moral politician, that is to say, one who understands the -principles of statesmanship to be such as do not conflict with -morals; but I cannot conceive of a political moralist who fashions -for himself such a system of ethics as may serve the interest of -statesmen. - -The moral politician will always act upon the following -principle:—“If certain defects which could not have been avoided -are found in the political constitution or foreign relations of a -state, it is a duty for all, especially for the rulers of the state, -to apply their whole energy to correcting them as soon as possible, -and to bringing the constitution and political relations on these -points into conformity with the Law of Nature, as it is held up as a -model before us in the idea of reason; and this they should do even -at a sacrifice of their own interest.” Now it is contrary to all -politics—which is, in this particular, in agreement with morals—to -dissever any of the links binding citizens together in the state -or nations in cosmopolitan union, before a better constitution is -there to take the place of what has been thus destroyed. And hence -it would be absurd indeed to demand that every imperfection in -political matters must be violently altered on the spot. But, at the -same time, it may be required of a ruler at least that he should -earnestly keep the maxim in mind which points to the necessity of -such a change; so that he may go on constantly approaching the end -to be realised, namely, the best possible constitution according to -the laws of right. Even although it is still under despotic rule, -in accordance with its constitution as then existing, a state may -govern itself on republican lines, until the people gradually become -capable of being influenced by the mere idea of the authority of law, -just as if it had physical power. And they become accordingly capable -of self-legislation, their faculty for which is founded on original -right. But if, through the violence of revolution, the product of -a bad government, a constitution more in accord with the spirit of -law were attained even by unlawful means, it should no longer be -held justifiable to bring the people back to the old constitution, -although, while the revolution was going on, every one who took part -in it by use of force or stratagem, may have been justly punished -as a rebel. As regards the external relations of nations, a state -cannot be asked to give up its constitution, even although that be -a despotism (which is, at the same time, the strongest constitution -where foreign enemies are concerned), so long as it runs the risk of -being immediately swallowed up by other states. Hence, when such a -proposal is made, the state whose constitution is in question must -at least be allowed to defer acting upon it until a more convenient -time.[148] - - [148] These are _permissive_ laws of reason which allow us to - leave a system of public law, when it is tainted by injustice, to - remain just as it is, until everything is entirely revolutionised - through an internal development, either spontaneous, or fostered - and matured by peaceful influences. For any legal constitution - whatsoever, even although it conforms only slightly with the - spirit of law is better than none at all—that is to say, anarchy, - which is the fate of a precipitate reform. Hence, as things now - are, the wise politician will look upon it as his duty to make - reforms on the lines marked out by the ideal of public law. He - will not use revolutions, when these have been brought about - by natural causes, to extenuate still greater oppression than - caused them, but will regard them as the voice of nature, calling - upon him to make such thorough reforms as will bring about the - only lasting constitution, a lawful constitution based on the - principles of freedom. - -It is always possible that moralists who rule despotically, and are -at a loss in practical matters, will come into collision with the -rules of political wisdom in many ways, by adopting measures without -sufficient deliberation which show themselves afterwards to have been -overestimated. When they thus offend against nature, experience must -gradually lead them into a better track. But, instead of this being -the case, politicians who are fond of moralising do all they can to -make moral improvement impossible and to perpetuate violations of -law, by extenuating political principles which are antagonistic to -the idea of right, on the pretext that human nature is not capable of -good, in the sense of the ideal which reason prescribes. - -These politicians, instead of adopting an open, straightforward way -of doing things (as they boast), mix themselves up in intrigue. They -get at the authorities in power and say what will please them; -their sole bent is to sacrifice the nation, or even, if they can, -the whole world, with the one end in view that their own private -interest may be forwarded. This is the manner of regular jurists (I -mean the journeyman lawyer not the legislator), when they aspire to -politics. For, as it is not their business to reason too nicely over -legislation, but only to enforce the laws of the country, every legal -constitution in its existing form and, when this is changed by the -proper authorities, the one which takes its place, will always seem -to them the best possible. And the consequence is that everything -is purely mechanical. But this adroitness in suiting themselves -to any circumstances may lead them to the delusion that they are -also capable of giving an opinion about the principles of political -constitutions in general, in so far as they conform to ideas of -right, and are therefore not empirical, but _a priori_. And they may -therefore brag about their knowledge of men,—which indeed one expects -to find, since they have to deal with so many—without really knowing -the nature of man and what can be made of it, to gain which knowledge -a higher standpoint of anthropological observation than theirs is -required. Filled with ideas of this kind, if they trespass outside -their own sphere on the boundaries of political and international -law, looked upon as ideals which reason holds before us, they can -do so only in the spirit of chicanery. For they will follow their -usual method of making everything conform mechanically to compulsory -laws despotically made and enforced, even here, where the ideas of -reason recognise the validity of a legal compulsory force, only when -it is in accordance with the principles of freedom through which a -permanently valid constitution becomes first of all possible. The -would-be practical man, leaving out of account this idea of reason, -thinks that he can solve this problem empirically by looking to the -way in which those constitutions which have best survived the test -of time were established, even although the spirit of these may have -been generally contrary to the idea of right. The principles which -he makes use of here, although indeed he does not make them public, -amount pretty much to the following sophistical maxims. - -1. =Fac et excusa.= Seize the most favourable opportunity for -arbitrary usurpation—either of the authority of the state over its -own people or over a neighbouring people; the justification of the -act and extenuation of the use of force will come much more easily -and gracefully, when the deed is done, than if one has to think out -convincing reasons for taking this step and first hear through all -the objections which can be made against it. This is especially -true in the first case mentioned, where the supreme power in the -state also controls the legislature which we must obey without any -reasoning about it. Besides, this show of audacity in a statesman -even lends him a certain semblance of inward conviction of the -justice of his action; and once he has got so far the god of success -(_bonus eventus_) is his best advocate. - -2. =Si fecisti, nega.= As for any crime you have committed, such -as has, for instance, brought your people to despair and thence -to insurrection, deny that it has happened owing to any fault of -yours. Say rather that it is all caused by the insubordination of -your subjects, or, in the case of your having usurped a neighbouring -state, that human nature is to blame; for, if a man is not ready to -use force and steal a march upon his neighbour, he may certainly -count on the latter forestalling him and taking him prisoner. - -3. =Divide et impera.= That is to say, if there are certain -privileged persons, holding authority among the people, who have -merely chosen you for their sovereign as _primus inter pares_, bring -about a quarrel among them, and make mischief between them and the -people. Now back up the people with a dazzling promise of greater -freedom; everything will now depend unconditionally on your will. Or -again, if there is a difficulty with foreign states, then to stir -up dissension among them is a pretty sure means of subjecting first -one and then the other to your sway, under the pretext of aiding the -weaker. - -It is true that now-a-days no body is taken in by these political -maxims, for they are all familiar to everyone. Moreover, there is -no need of being ashamed of them, as if their injustice were too -patent. For the great Powers never feel shame before the judgment of -the common herd, but only before one another; so that as far as this -matter goes, it is not the revelation of these guiding principles of -policy that can make rulers ashamed, but only the unsuccessful use -of them. For as to the morality of these maxims, politicians are all -agreed. Hence there is always left political prestige on which they -can safely count; and this means the glory of increasing their power -by any means that offer.[149] - - [149] It is still sometimes denied that we find, in members of - a civilised community, a certain depravity rooted in the nature - of man;[C] and it might, indeed, be alleged with some show of - truth that not an innate corruptness in human nature, but the - barbarism of men, the defect of a not yet sufficiently developed - culture, is the cause of the evident antipathy to law which - their attitude indicates. In the external relations of states, - however, human wickedness shows itself incontestably, without any - attempt at concealment. Within the state, it is covered over by - the compelling authority of civil laws. For, working against the - tendency every citizen has to commit acts of violence against his - neighbour, there is the much stronger force of the government - which not only gives an appearance of morality to the whole - state (_causae non causae_), but, by checking the outbreak of - lawless propensities, actually aids the moral qualities of men - considerably, in their development of a direct respect for the - law. For every individual thinks that he himself would hold the - idea of right sacred and follow faithfully what it prescribes, - if only he could expect that everyone else would do the same. - This guarantee is in part given to him by the government; and - a great advance is made by this step which is not deliberately - moral, towards the ideal of fidelity to the concept of duty - for its own sake without thought of return. As, however, every - man’s good opinion of himself presupposes an evil disposition in - everyone else, we have an expression of their mutual judgment - of one another, namely, that when it comes to hard facts, none - of them are worth much; but whence this judgment comes remains - unexplained, as we cannot lay the blame on the nature of man, - since he is a being in the possession of freedom. The respect for - the idea of right, of which it is absolutely impossible for man - to divest himself, sanctions in the most solemn manner the theory - of our power to conform to its dictates. And hence every man sees - himself obliged to act in accordance with what the idea of right - prescribes, whether his neighbours fulfil their obligation or not. - - [C] This depravity of human nature is denied by Rousseau, who held - that the mind of man was naturally inclined to virtue, and that - good civil and social institutions are all that is required. - (_Discourse on the Sciences and Arts_, 1750.) Kant here takes - sides with Hobbes against Rousseau. See Kant’s _Theory of Ethics_, - Abbott’s trans. (4th ed., 1889), p. 339 _seq._—esp. p. 341 and - _note_. Cf. also Hooker’s _Ecclesiastical Polity_, I. § 10:—“Laws - politic, ordained for external order and regiment amongst men, are - never framed as they should be, unless presuming the will of man - to be inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all obedience - to the sacred laws of his nature; in a word, unless presuming man - to be, in regard of his depraved mind, little better than a wild - beast, they do accordingly provide, notwithstanding, so to frame - his outward actions, that they be no hindrance unto the common - good, for which societies are instituted.” [Tr.] - - - * * * * * - - -In all these twistings and turnings of an immoral doctrine of -expediency which aims at substituting a state of peace for the -warlike conditions in which men are placed by nature, so much at -least is clear;—that men cannot get away from the idea of right in -their private any more than in their public relations; and that they -do not dare (this is indeed most strikingly seen in the concept of -an international law) to base politics merely on the manipulations -of expediency and therefore to refuse all obedience to the idea of -a public right. On the contrary, they pay all fitting honour to the -idea of right in itself, even although they should, at the same time, -devise a hundred subterfuges and excuses to avoid it in practice, and -should regard force, backed up by cunning, as having the authority -which comes from being the source and unifying principle of all -right. It will be well to put an end to this sophistry, if not to -the injustice it extenuates, and to bring the false advocates of the -mighty of the earth to confess that it is not right but might in -whose interest they speak, and that it is the worship of might from -which they take their cue, as if in this matter they had a right to -command. In order to do this, we must first expose the delusion by -which they deceive themselves and others; then discover the ultimate -principle from which their plans for a perpetual peace proceed; -and thence show that all the evil which stands in the way of the -realisation of that ideal springs from the fact that the political -moralist begins where the moral politician rightly ends and that, by -subordinating principles to an end or putting the cart before the -horse, he defeats his intention of bringing politics into harmony -with morals. - -In order to make practical philosophy consistent with itself, we must -first decide the following question:—In dealing with the problems of -practical reason must we begin from its material principle—the end as -the object of free choice—or from its formal principle which is based -merely on freedom in its external relation?—from which comes the -following law:—“Act so that thou canst will that thy maxim should be -a universal law, be the end of thy action what it will.”[150] - - [150] With regard to the meaning of the moral law and its - significance in the Kantian system of ethics, see Abbott’s - translation of the _Theory of Ethics_ (1889), pp. 38, 45, 54, 55, - 119, 282. [Tr.] - -Without doubt, the latter determining principle of action must -stand first; for, as a principle of right, it carries unconditional -necessity with it, whereas the former is obligatory only if we assume -the empirical conditions of the end set before us,—that is to say, -that it is an end capable of being practically realised. And if -this end—as, for example, the end of perpetual peace—should be also -a duty, this same duty must necessarily have been deduced from the -formal principle governing the maxims which guide external action. -Now the first principle is the principle of the political moralist; -the problems of constitutional, international and cosmopolitan law -are mere technical problems (_problema technicum_). The second or -formal principle, on the other hand, as the principle of the moral -politician who regards it as a moral problem (_problema morale_), -differs widely from the other principle in its methods of bringing -about perpetual peace, which we desire not only as a material good, -but also as a state of things resulting from our recognition of the -precepts of duty.[151] - - [151] See Abbott’s trans., pp. 33, 34. [Tr.] - -To solve the first problem—that, namely, of political expediency—much -knowledge of nature is required, that her mechanical laws may be -employed for the end in view. And yet the result of all knowledge -of this kind is uncertain, as far as perpetual peace is concerned. -This we find to be so, whichever of the three departments of public -law we take. It is uncertain whether a people could be better kept -in obedience and at the same time prosperity by severity or by baits -held out to their vanity; whether they would be better governed -under the sovereignty of a single individual or by the authority of -several acting together; whether the combined authority might be -better secured merely, say, by an official nobility or by the power -of the people within the state; and, finally, whether such conditions -could be long maintained. There are examples to the contrary in -history in the case of all forms of government, with the exception -of the only true republican constitution, the idea of which can -occur only to a moral politician. Still more uncertain is a law of -nations, ostensibly established upon statutes devised by ministers; -for this amounts in fact to mere empty words, and rests on treaties -which, in the very act of ratification, contain a secret reservation -of the right to violate them. On the other hand, the solution of the -second problem—the problem of political wisdom—forces itself, we may -say, upon us; it is quite obvious to every one, and puts all crooked -dealings to shame; it leads, too, straight to the desired end, while -at the same time, discretion warns us not to drag in the conditions -of perpetual peace by force, but to take time and approach this ideal -gradually as favourable circumstances permit. - -This may be expressed in the following maxim:—“Seek ye first the -kingdom of pure practical reason and its righteousness, and the -object of your endeavour, the blessing of perpetual peace, will -be added unto you.” For the science of morals generally has this -peculiarity,—and it has it also with regard to the moral principles -of public law, and therefore with regard to a science of politics -knowable _a priori_,—that the less it makes a man’s conduct depend -on the end he has set before him, his purposed material or moral -gain, so much the more, nevertheless, does it conform in general -to this end. The reason for this is that it is just the universal -will, given _a priori_, which exists in a people or in the relation -of different peoples to one another, that alone determines what is -lawful among men. This union of individual wills, however, if we -proceed consistently in practice, in observance of the mechanical -laws of nature, may be at the same time the cause of bringing about -the result intended and practically realizing the idea of right. -Hence it is, for example, a principle of moral politics that a people -should unite into a state according to the only valid concepts of -right, the ideas of freedom and equality; and this principle is not -based on expediency, but upon duty. Political moralists, however, -do not deserve a hearing, much and sophistically as they may reason -about the existence, in a multitude of men forming a society, of -certain natural tendencies which would weaken those principles and -defeat their intention. They may endeavour to prove their assertion -by giving instances of badly organised constitutions, chosen both -from ancient and modern times, (as, for example, democracies without -a representative system); but such arguments are to be treated with -contempt, all the more, because a pernicious theory of this kind -may perhaps even bring about the evil which it prophesies. For, in -accordance with such reasoning, man is thrown into a class with all -other living machines which only require the consciousness that they -are not free creatures to make them in their own judgment the most -miserable of all beings. - -_Fiat justitia, pereat mundus._ This saying has become proverbial, -and although it savours a little of boastfulness, is also true. We -may translate it thus:—“Let justice rule on earth, although all the -rogues in the world should go to the bottom.” It is a good, honest -principle of right cutting off all the crooked ways made by knavery -or violence. It must not, however, be misunderstood as allowing -anyone to exercise his own rights with the utmost severity, a course -in contradiction to our moral duty; but we must take it to signify -an obligation, binding upon rulers, to refrain from refusing to -yield anyone his rights or from curtailing them, out of personal -feeling or sympathy for others. For this end, in particular, we -require, firstly, that a state should have an internal political -constitution, established according to the pure principles of -right; secondly, that a union should be formed between this state -and neighbouring or distant nations for a legal settlement of -their differences, after the analogy of the universal state. This -proposition means nothing more than this:—Political maxims must not -start from the idea of a prosperity and happiness which are to be -expected from observance of such precepts in every state; that is, -not from the end which each nation makes the object of its will -as the highest empirical principle of political wisdom; but they -must set out from the pure concept of the duty of right, from the -“_ought_” whose principle is given _a priori_ through pure reason. -This is the law, whatever the material consequences may be. The world -will certainly not perish by any means, because the number of wicked -people in it is becoming fewer. The morally bad has one peculiarity, -inseparable from its nature;—in its purposes, especially in relation -to other evil influences, it is in contradiction with itself, and -counteracts its own natural effect, and thus makes room for the moral -principle of good, although advance in this direction may be slow. - -Hence objectively, in theory, there is no quarrel between morals -and politics. But subjectively, in the self-seeking tendencies of -men (which we cannot actually call their morality, as we would a -course of action based on maxims of reason,) this disagreement in -principle exists and may always survive; for it serves as a whetstone -to virtue. According to the principle, _Tu ne cede malis, sed contra -audentior ito_, the true courage of virtue in the present case lies -not so much in facing the evils and self-sacrifices which must be met -here as in firmly confronting the evil principle in our own nature -and conquering its wiles. For this is a principle far more dangerous, -false, treacherous and sophistical which puts forward the weakness in -human nature as a justification for every transgression. - -In fact the political moralist may say that a ruler and people, or -nation and nation do _one another_ no wrong, when they enter on a war -with violence or cunning, although they do wrong, generally speaking, -in refusing to respect the idea of right which alone could establish -peace for all time. For, as both are equally wrongly disposed to one -another, each transgressing the duty he owes to his neighbour, they -are both quite rightly served, when they are thus destroyed in war. -This mutual destruction stops short at the point of extermination, -so that there are always enough of the race left to keep this game -going on through all the ages, and a far-off posterity may take -warning by them. The Providence that orders the course of the world -is hereby justified. For the moral principle in mankind never becomes -extinguished, and human reason, fitted for the practical realisation -of ideas of right according to that principle, grows continually in -fitness for that purpose with the ever advancing march of culture; -while at the same time, it must be said, the guilt of transgression -increases as well. But it seems that, by no theodicy or vindication -of the justice of God, can we justify Creation in putting such a -race of corrupt creatures into the world at all, if, that is, we -assume that the human race neither will nor can ever be in a happier -condition than it is now. This standpoint, however, is too high a -one for us to judge from, or to theorise, with the limited concepts -we have at our command, about the wisdom of that supreme Power which -is unknowable by us. We are inevitably driven to such despairing -conclusions as these, if we do not admit that the pure principles of -right have objective reality—that is to say, are capable of being -practically realised—and consequently that action must be taken on -the part of the people of a state and, further, by states in relation -to one another, whatever arguments empirical politics may bring -forward against this course. Politics in the real sense cannot take -a step forward without first paying homage to the principles of -morals. And, although politics, _per se_, is a difficult art,[152] -in its union with morals no art is required; for in the case of a -conflict arising between the two sciences, the moralist can cut -asunder the knot which politics is unable to untie. Right must be -held sacred by man, however great the cost and sacrifice to the -ruling power. Here is no half-and-half course. We cannot devise a -happy medium between right and expediency, a right pragmatically -conditioned. But all politics must bend the knee to the principle of -right, and may, in that way, hope to reach, although slowly perhaps, -a level whence it may shine upon men for all time. - - [152] Matthew Arnold defines politics somewhere as the art of - “making reason and the will of God prevail”—an art, one would - say, difficult enough. [Tr.] - - - - -APPENDIX II - -CONCERNING THE HARMONY OF POLITICS WITH MORALS ACCORDING TO THE -TRANSCENDENTAL IDEA OF PUBLIC RIGHT - - -If I look at public right from the point of view of most professors -of law, and abstract from its _matter_ or its empirical elements, -varying according to the circumstances given in our experience of -individuals in a state or of states among themselves, then there -remains the _form_ of publicity. The possibility of this publicity, -every legal title implies. For without it there could be no justice, -which can only be thought as before the eyes of men; and, without -justice, there would be no right, for, from justice only, right can -come. - -This characteristic of publicity must belong to every legal title. -Hence, as, in any particular case that occurs, there is no difficulty -in deciding whether this essential attribute is present or not, -(whether, that is, it is reconcilable with the principles of the -agent or not), it furnishes an easily applied criterion which is to -be found _a priori_ in the reason, so that in the particular case we -can at once recognise the falsity or illegality of a proposed claim -(_praetensio juris_), as it were by an experiment of pure reason. - -Having thus, as it were, abstracted from all the empirical elements -contained in the concept of a political and international law, such -as, for instance, the evil tendency in human nature which makes -compulsion necessary, we may give the following proposition as the -_transcendental formula_ of public right:—“All actions relating to -the rights of other men are wrong, if the maxims from which they -follow are inconsistent with publicity.” - -This principle must be regarded not merely as ethical, as belonging -to the doctrine of virtue, but also as juridical, referring to the -rights of men. For there is something wrong in a maxim of conduct -which I cannot divulge without at once defeating my purpose, a maxim -which must therefore be kept secret, if it is to succeed, and which -I could not publicly acknowledge without infallibly stirring up the -opposition of everyone. This necessary and universal resistance with -which everyone meets me, a resistance therefore evident _a priori_, -can be due to no other cause than the injustice with which such a -maxim threatens everyone. Further, this testing principle is merely -negative; that is, it serves only as a means by which we may know -when an action is unjust to others. Like axioms, it has a certainty -incapable of demonstration; it is besides easy of application as -appears from the following examples of public right. - -1.—=Constitutional Law.= Let us take in the first place the public -law of the state (_jus civitatis_), particularly in its application -to matters within the state. Here a question arises which many think -difficult to answer, but which the transcendental principle of -publicity solves quite readily:—“Is revolution a legitimate means for -a people to adopt, for the purpose of throwing off the oppressive -yoke of a so-called tyrant (_non titulo, sed exercitio talis_)?” -The rights of a nation are violated in a government of this kind, -and no wrong is done to the tyrant in dethroning him. Of this there -is no doubt. None the less, it is in the highest degree wrong of -the subjects to prosecute their rights in this way; and they would -be just as little justified in complaining, if they happened to be -defeated in their attempt and had to endure the severest punishment -in consequence. - -A great many reasons for and against both sides of this question -may be given, if we seek to settle it by a dogmatic deduction -of the principles of right. But the transcendental principle -of the publicity of public right can spare itself this diffuse -argumentation. For, according to that principle, the people would -ask themselves, before the civil contract was made, whether they -could venture to publish maxims, proposing insurrection when a -favourable opportunity should present itself. It is quite clear -that if, when a constitution is established, it were made a -condition that force may be exercised against the sovereign under -certain circumstances, the people would be obliged to claim a -lawful authority higher than his. But in that case, the so-called -sovereign would be no longer sovereign: or, if both powers, that of -the sovereign and that of the people, were made a condition of the -constitution of the state, then its establishment (which was the aim -of the people) would be impossible. The wrongfulness of revolution is -quite obvious from the fact that openly to acknowledge maxims which -justify this step would make attainment of the end at which they aim -impossible. We are obliged to keep them secret. But this secrecy -would not be necessary on the part of the head of the state. He may -say quite plainly that the ringleaders of every rebellion will be -punished by death, even although they may hold that it was he who -first transgressed the fundamental law. For, if a ruler is conscious -of possessing irresistible sovereign power (and this must be assumed -in every civil constitution, because a sovereign who has not power to -protect any individual member of the nation against his neighbour -has also not the right to exercise authority over him), then he need -have no fear that making known the maxims which guide him will cause -the defeat of his plans. And it is quite consistent with this view -to hold that, if the people are successful in their insurrection, -the sovereign must return to the rank of a subject, and refrain from -inciting rebellion with a view to regaining his lost sovereignty. At -the same time he need have no fear of being called to account for his -former administration.[153] - - [153] “When a king has dethroned himself,” says Locke, (_On Civil - Government_, Ch. XIX. § 239) “and put himself in a state of war - with his people, what shall hinder them from prosecuting him who - is no king, as they would any other man, who has put himself into - a state of war with them?” ... “The legislative being only a - fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains still _in - the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative_.” - (_Op. cit._, Ch. XIII. § 149.) And again, (_op. cit._, Ch. XI. § - 134.) we find the words, “... over whom [_i.e._ society] no body - can have a power to make laws, but by their own consent, and by - authority received from them.” Cf. also Ch. XIX. § 228 _seq._ - - Hobbes represents the opposite point of view. “How many kings,” - he wrote, (Preface to the _Philosophical Rudiments concerning - Government and Society_) “and those good men too, hath this one - error, that a tyrant king might lawfully be put to death, been - the slaughter of! How many throats hath this false position - cut, that a prince for some causes may by some certain men be - deposed! And what bloodshed hath not this erroneous doctrine - caused, that kings are not superiors to, but administrators for - the multitude!” This “erroneous doctrine” Kant received from - Locke through Rousseau. He advocated, or at least practised - as a citizen, a doctrine of passive obedience to the state. A - free press, he held, offered the only lawful outlet for protest - against tyranny. But, in theory, he was an enemy to absolute - monarchy. [Tr.] - -2.—=International Law.= There can be no question of an international -law, except on the assumption of some kind of a law-governed -state of things, the external condition under which any right can -belong to man. For the very idea of international law, as public -right, implies the publication of a universal will determining the -rights and property of each individual nation; and this _status -juridicus_ must spring out of a contract of some sort which may not, -like the contract to which the state owes its origin, be founded -upon compulsory laws, but may be, at the most, the agreement of a -permanent free association such as the federation of the different -states, to which we have alluded above. For, without the control -of law to some extent, to serve as an active bond of union among -different merely natural or moral individuals,—that is to say, in -a state of nature,—there can only be private law. And here we find -a disagreement between morals, regarded as the science of right, -and politics. The criterion, obtained by observing the effect of -publicity on maxims, is just as easily applied, but only when we -understand that this agreement binds the contracting states solely -with the object that peace may be preserved among them, and between -them and other states; in no sense with a view to the acquisition of -new territory or power. The following instances of antinomy occur -between politics and morals, which are given here with the solution -in each case. - -_a._ “When either of these states has promised something to another, -(as, for instance, assistance, or a relinquishment of certain -territory, or subsidies and such like), the question may arise -whether, in a case where the safety of the state thus bound depends -on its evading the fulfilment of this promise, it can do so by -maintaining a right to be regarded as a double person:—firstly, -as sovereign and accountable to no one in the state of which that -sovereign power is head; and, secondly, merely as the highest -official in the service of that state, who is obliged to answer to -the state for every action. And the result of this is that the state -is acquitted in its second capacity of any obligation to which it has -committed itself in the first.” But, if a nation or its sovereign -proclaimed these maxims, the natural consequence would be that every -other would flee from it, or unite with other states to oppose such -pretensions. And this is a proof that politics, with all its cunning, -defeats its own ends, if the test of making principles of action -public, which we have indicated, be applied. Hence the maxim we have -quoted must be wrong. - -_b._ “If a state which has increased its power to a formidable extent -(_potentia tremenda_) excites anxiety in its neighbours, is it right -to assume that, since it has the means, it will also have the will -to oppress others; and does that give less powerful states a right -to unite and attack the greater nation without any definite cause of -offence?” A state which would here answer openly in the affirmative -would only bring the evil about more surely and speedily. For the -greater power would forestall those smaller nations, and their union -would be but a weak reed of defence against a state which knew how -to apply the maxim, _divide et impera_. This maxim of political -expediency then, when openly acknowledged, necessarily defeats the -end at which it aims, and is therefore wrong. - -_c._ “If a smaller state by its geographical position breaks up -the territory of a greater, so as to prevent a unity necessary to -the preservation of that state, is the latter not justified in -subjugating its less powerful neighbour and uniting the territory in -question with its own?” We can easily see that the greater state dare -not publish such a maxim beforehand; for either all smaller states -would without loss of time unite against it, or other powers would -contend for this booty. Hence the impracticability of such a maxim -becomes evident under the light of publicity. And this is a sign -that it is wrong, and that in a very great degree; for, although the -victim of an act of injustice may be of small account, that does not -prevent the injustice done from being very great. - -3.—=Cosmopolitan Law.= We may pass over this department of right in -silence, for, owing to its analogy with international law, its maxims -are easily specified and estimated. - - - * * * * * - - -In this principle of the incompatibility of the maxims of -international law with their publicity, we have a good indication -of the non-agreement between politics and morals, regarded as a -science of right. Now we require to know under what conditions these -maxims do agree with the law of nations. For we cannot conclude that -the converse holds, and that all maxims which can bear publicity -are therefore just. For anyone who has a decided supremacy has no -need to make any secret about his maxims. The condition of a law of -nations being possible at all is that, in the first place, there -should be a law-governed state of things. If this is not so, there -can be no public right, and all right which we can think of outside -the law-governed state,—that is to say, in the state of nature,—is -mere private right. Now we have seen above that something of the -nature of a federation between nations, for the sole purpose of doing -away with war, is the only rightful condition of things reconcilable -with their individual freedom. Hence the agreement of politics and -morals is only possible in a federative union, a union which is -necessarily given _a priori_, according to the principles of right. -And the lawful basis of all politics can only be the establishment -of this union in its widest possible extent. Apart from this end, -all political sophistry is folly and veiled injustice. Now this sham -politics has a casuistry, not to be excelled in the best Jesuit -school. It has its mental reservation (_reservatio mentalis_): as -in the drawing up of a public treaty in such terms as we can, if we -will, interpret when occasion serves to our advantage; for example, -the distinction between the _status quo_ in fact (_de fait_) and -in right (_de droit_). Secondly, it has its probabilism; when it -pretends to discover evil intentions in another, or makes, the -probability of their possible future ascendency a lawful reason for -bringing about the destruction of other peaceful states. Finally, it -has its philosophical sin (_peccatum philosophicum_, _peccatillum_, -_baggatelle_) which is that of holding it a trifle easily pardoned -that a smaller state should be swallowed up, if this be to the gain -of a nation much more powerful; for such an increase in power is -supposed to tend to the greater prosperity of the whole world.[154] - - [154] We can find the voucher for maxims such as these in Herr - Hofrichter Garve’s essay, _On the Connection of Morals with - Politics_, 1788. This worthy scholar confesses at the very - beginning that he is unable to give a satisfactory answer to this - question. But his sanction of such maxims, even when coupled with - the admission that he cannot altogether clear away the arguments - raised against them, seems to be a greater concession in favour - of those who shew considerable inclination to abuse them, than it - might perhaps be wise to admit. - -Duplicity gives politics the advantage of using one branch or -the other of morals, just as suits its own ends. The love of our -fellowmen is a duty: so too is respect for their rights. But the -former is only conditional: the latter, on the other hand, an -unconditional, absolutely imperative duty; and anyone who would -give himself up to the sweet consciousness of well-doing must be -first perfectly assured that he has not transgressed its commands. -Politics has no difficulty in agreeing with morals in the first sense -of the term, as ethics, to secure that men should give to superiors -their rights. But when it comes to morals, in its second aspect, -as the science of right before which politics must bow the knee, -the politician finds it prudent to have nothing to do with compacts -and rather to deny all reality to morals in this sense, and reduce -all duty to mere benevolence. Philosophy could easily frustrate -the artifices of a politics like this, which shuns the light of -criticism, by publishing its maxims, if only statesmen would have the -courage to grant philosophers the right to ventilate their opinions. - -With this end in view, I propose another principle of public right, -which is at once transcendental and affirmative. Its formula would be -as follows:—“All maxims which require publicity, in order that they -may not fail to attain their end, are in agreement both with right -and politics.” - -For, if these maxims can only attain the end at which they aim by -being published, they must be in harmony with the universal end of -mankind, which is happiness; and to be in sympathy with this (to -make the people contented with their lot) is the real business of -politics. Now, if this end should be attainable only by publicity, or -in other words, through the removal of all distrust of the maxims of -politics, these must be in harmony with the right of the people; for -a union of the ends of all is only possible in a harmony with this -right. - -I must postpone the further development and discussion of this -principle till another opportunity. That it is a transcendental -formula is quite evident from the fact that all the empirical -conditions of a doctrine of happiness, or the _matter_ of law, are -absent, and that it has regard only to the _form_ of universal -conformity to law. - - - * * * * * - - -If it is our duty to realise a state of public right, if at the same -time there are good grounds for hope that this ideal may be realised, -although only by an approximation advancing _ad infinitum_, then -perpetual peace, following hitherto falsely so-called conclusions of -peace, which have been in reality mere cessations of hostilities, is -no mere empty idea. But rather we have here a problem which gradually -works out its own solution and, as the periods in which a given -advance takes place towards the realisation of the ideal of perpetual -peace will, we hope, become with the passing of time shorter and -shorter, we must approach ever nearer to this goal. - - - - -INDEX - - - A - - Absolutism; of Hobbes, 43, 44; - of Schopenhauer, 43; - according to Kant, 43, 44, 125-128; - to Locke, 44. - - Alexander I. of Russia; 80. - - Alexander the Great; 31, 103. - - Alsace-Lorraine; annexation of, 90, 92, 95. - - Ambrose, Saint; 15. - - Amphictyonic League; 16, 22. - - Aquinas, Thomas; on fighting clergy, 18; - on war, 18, 19. - - Arbitration; as a substitute for war, 79, 81, 87; - difficulties settled by, 80; - where it is useless, 82, 83, 86. - - Aristotle; on war, 7, 8; - and rights of an enemy, _ib._; 31; - on the relation between politics and ethics, 162. - - Assyrians; war among the, 9. - - Augustine, Saint; 16. - - - B - - Balance of power; 26, 95. - - Bentham, Jeremy; 26, 79, 92. - - Bluntschli, J. K.; 41, 73, 74, 80. - - - C - - Caird, Edward; 3, 51. - - Calvin, John; 19. - - Carnegie, Andrew; 100. - - China; a danger to Europe, 92, 93, 140, 141. - - Cicero; on the conduct of war, 22, 41. - - Clement of Alexandria; 15. - - Clergy, fighting; Origen on, 14, 15; - Wycliffe, 18; - Erasmus, _ib._; - Aquinas, _ib._ - - Cobden, Richard; 64. - - Corvinus, Matthias; 109. - - Cowper, William; 5, 38, 123. - - Crusades, wars of the; 16, 103. - - - D - - Dante, Alighieri; on mediation, 46; - on universal monarchy, 68, 69. - - Disarmament; 88-93; - Czar’s proposal of, 90; - practicability of, 90-93. - - Dubois, Cardinal; 36. - - - E - - Empire; of Rome, 9, 20, 68; - world-, spiritual, 23, 32, 69; - of Alexander the Great, 31, 68; - Frankish, 69; - Holy Roman 69; - of Napoleon I., 69. - - Erasmus, Desiderius; and European peace, 17; - on war, 18, 19; - on fighting clergy, 18, 32. - - - F - - Farrar, J. A.; 18. - - Federation; Kant’s idea of, 60, 68, 69, 128-137; 88, 92, 93, 95, 97; - probable results of, 98, 99, 100, 134. - - Fichte, J. G.; 69, 99. - - Finland; 92, 95. - - Fischer, Kuno; 62, 67. - - Fleury, Cardinal; 55. - - Frederick the Great; 66, 126. - - - G - - Gentilis, Albericus; 21, 32. - - Golden Age; 3, 41. - - Government; origin of, according to Plato, 5; - according to Hume, 5, 52; - to Cowper, 5, 6; - to Hobbes, 40-42, 118, 119; - to Kant, 51-54, 152-154; - to Rousseau, 52; - to Locke, 53; - representative, 65-68, 120, 121, 124-128. - - Greeks; their attitude to other nations, 7; - to an enemy, _ib._; - their Sacred Wars, 16; - the Amphictyonic League, 16. - - Grotius, Hugo; his _De Jure Belli et Pacis_, 24-27; - and the _Jus Gentium_, 24, 25; - and the Law of Nature, 25; - on peace, 27, 32, 40, 131. - - - H - - Hague Conference (1899); 86, 90. - - Hegel, G. W. F.; 57; - on war, 71, 72, 75. - - Henry IV. of France; 30, 32, 33, 36. - - Hobbes, Thomas; his theory of the state of nature and origin of - government, 4, 40-42, 51, 118, 119, 133; 6, 26, 27, 28, 37; - his influence on Kant, 40, 46; - his views on revolution, 41, 188; - of the relations between states, 43-46, 128, 131; - on the conduct of war, 45, 89, 120, 124, 159. - - Holls, Fred. W.; 86. - - Hooker, Richard; 52; - on the depravity of man, 173. - - Hume, David; on the origin of government, 5, 52; - on the state of nature, 40, 41; - on the original contract, 52, 108, 109, 162. - - - I - - International Law; the development of, 20-24; - its connection with the Reformation, 21, 24; - in Greece and Rome, 22, 23. - - Intervention; 64, 93, 94, 112, 113. - - - J - - Jews; war among the, 9-11; - their dream of peace, 32. - - Justin; 15. - - - K - - Kant, Immanuel; 26, 37; - his indebtedness to earlier political writers, 40, 46; - his theory of human development, 47-49; - and how this is possible, 49-51, 54; - on the foundation of the state, 51-54, 152-154; - the relations between states and individuals, 54, 55, 117-120, - 128, 173, 174; - the necessity for reform within the state, 55, 56, 168; - the political and social conditions of his time, 57-59; - his attitude to war, 58, 133, 135, 136, 137, 149-151; - on the growing power of commerce, 59, 65, 142, 157; - his idea of federation, 60, 68, 69, 128-137, 192; - and ideal of perpetual peace, 61, 129, 196; - the conditions of its realization, 62-69; - on representative and other constitutions, 65-68, 120-128, 152, - 153, 167; - his opinion of the English constitution, 66; - his disapproval of universal monarchy, 68, 69, 155, 156; 79, 83, - 89, 100, 105; - on the right of way, 137-142; - on nature’s guarantee of a perpetual peace, 143-157; - on the relation between politics and morals, 161-196; - on revolution, 167, 168, 186-188. - - - L - - Laveleye, Émile de; 81. - - Lawrence, T. J.; 9, 78, 81. - - Leibniz, Gottfried W.; 36; - his criticism of St. Pierre, 37, 38, 58, 106. - - Locke, John; and the golden age, 3, 4; - on the original contract, 53; - on revolution, 53, 188; 67, 133. - - Lorimer, James; 34, 80. - - Louis Philippe; 76. - - Luther, Martin; on war, 19. - - - M - - Machiavelli, Nicolo; 162. - - Maine, Henry; on Grotius and the _Jus Gentium_, 24, 25. - - Maistre, Joseph de; 71. - - Martineau, James; 102. - - Mennonites; and war, 14. - - Military service; of Christians, 14, 16, 18, 19; - compulsory, 89; - voluntary, 111. - - Mill, John Stuart; 80. - - Moltke, Graf von; 71, 73-75. - - Monarchy, universal; the ideal of Dante, 68, 69; - disapproved by Kant, 68, 69, 155, 156; - and Fichte, 69. - - Montesquieu, Baron de; on self-preservation, 83; - on armed peace, 88, 159. - - More, Thomas; 32. - - Morley, John; 3. - - - N - - Napoleon Bonaparte; Empire of, 69, 71, 72, 76, 77. - - Napoleon, Louis; 80. - - National Debt; 63, 64, 111, 112. - - - O - - Origen; on military service, 14, 15. - - Original Contract; 40; - as understood by Rousseau, 52; - by Hobbes, 52, 53; - by Hooker, 52; - by Hume, _ib._; - by Kant, _ib._; - by Locke, 53. - - - P - - Paris Congress (1856); 86. - - Paulsen, Friedrich; 43, 52, 53, 66, 78. - - Peace, perpetual; the dream of, 29-33; - projects of, by Penn, 30; - by Henry IV., 30, 33, 34; - by St. Pierre, 30, 32, 34-37; - Rousseau’s attitude to, 38-40, 106; - for Kant an ideal, 61, 129; - the articles of, 62-69, 107-142, 158-160; - the guarantee of, 143-157. - - Peace Societies; 70, 75, 78, 79, 80, 86, 87; - and disarmament, 88, 96, 97, 100, 101, 102. - - Penn, William; 30. - - Plato; on the origin of the state, 5; - on war, 8, 41; - on the relation between ethics and politics, 162. - - Poland; 92, 93, 95. - - Politics; and morals, according to Kant, 161-196; - to Plato, 162; - to Aristotle, _ib._; - to Hume, _ib._; - sophistical maxims of, 170-172. - - Pope, Alexander; 4, 127. - - Puffendorf, Samuel; 27; - on intervention, 64, 131. - - - Q - - Quakers; and war, 14. - - - R - - Reformation; and military service, 18; - and international law, 21, 24. - - Religion; Roman, and war, 9; - Jewish, 9-11; - Mohammedan, 10; - Buddhist, and conversion, 12; - Christian, and war, 12-20. - - Revolution, right of; according to Hobbes, 41, 53; - and Spinoza, 41; - according to Locke, 53; - to Rousseau, _ib._; - to Kant, 167, 186-188. - - Right of way; Vattel on, 65, 138; - Kant on, 65, 137-142. - - Ritchie, D. G.; on Rousseau, 3; - on Locke and the golden age, _ib._, 52, 85, 98. - - Robertson, William; 6, 17, 18, 19. - - Romans; and war, 7, 8, 9, 22, 23; - and international law, 22, 23. - - Rousseau, J. J.; and the state of nature, 2, 3, 52; 26, 28; - his criticism of St. Pierre, 38-40; - his views on militarism, 39; - on the original contract, 52; - on revolution, 53, 188; 61, 67, 100, 132, 134; - on democratic and republican governments, 153; - on the depravity of man, 173. - - Russia; Alexander I. of, 80; - the Czar of, 90; - the backward civilization of, 92, 93, 94, 95. - - - S - - Schiller, Friedrich von; on war and peace, 71, 72, 73, 75. - - Schopenhauer, Arthur; 43. - - Spencer, Herbert; 76. - - Spinoza, Benedict; on the state of nature, 41; - and revolution, _ib._ - - Standing armies; 63, 64, 89, 110. - - State of nature; according to Rousseau, 2, 3; - and the golden age, 3; - Hobbes’ theory of, 4, 40, 41, 118; - according to Hume a philosophical fiction, 41; - according to Kant, 117-120. - - States; transference of, 63, 108, 109; - marriage between, 109. - - St. Pierre, Castel de; 30, 32, 33; - his _Projet_, 34-37; - and Leibniz, 37, 38; - and Rousseau, 38-40; 61, 67, 79, 92, 106. - - Sully, Duke of; 30, 32, 33. - - - T - - Tennyson, Lord; 73, 74. - - Tertullian; 14, 15. - - Treaties of peace; in Greece, 7, 63, 64, 107, 108. - - Treitschke, H. von; 75. - - Trendelenburg, F. A.; 75. - - - V - - Vattel, Emerich; his _Droit des Gens_, 28, 29; - on intervention, 64, 113, 114; - on the right of way, 65; - of self-preservation, 83, 89, 103; - on treaties, 108; 131. - - Voltaire, François de; 33, 37, 38. - - - W - - War; religious, 16; - private, 17, 20, 29; - dynastic, 38, 57, 123; - Kant’s attitude to, 58, 133, 135, 136, 137, 149-151; - its influence on progress, 70, 96, 103; - views of Hegel on, 71, 72, 75; - of Schiller, 71, 72, 73, 75; - of Moltke, 71, 73, 74, 75; - under altered conditions, 76, 77, 78; - when just, 84, 85; - future probable causes of, 94, 95; - honorable conduct of, 114, 115. - - Wycliffe, John; and fighting clergy, 18. - - - Z - - Zwingli, Huldreich, 19. - - - - - _Printed in Great Britain by_ - UNWIN BROTHERS, LIMITED - WOKING AND LONDON - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Perpetual Peace, by -Immanuel Kant and Mary Campbell Smith - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PERPETUAL PEACE *** - -***** This file should be named 50922-0.txt or 50922-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/0/9/2/50922/ - -Produced by Turgut Dincer, Ramon Pajares Box and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, -set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to -copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to -protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project -Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you -charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you -do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the -rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose -such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and -research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do -practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is -subject to the trademark license, especially commercial -redistribution. - - - -*** START: FULL LICENSE *** - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project -Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at -http://gutenberg.org/license). - - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy -all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. -If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the -terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or -entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement -and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" -or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the -collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an -individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are -located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from -copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative -works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg -are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project -Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by -freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of -this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with -the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by -keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project -Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in -a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check -the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement -before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or -creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project -Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning -the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United -States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate -access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently -whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, -copied or distributed: - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived -from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is -posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied -and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees -or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work -with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the -work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 -through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the -Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or -1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional -terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked -to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the -permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any -word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or -distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than -"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version -posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), -you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a -copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon -request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other -form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided -that - -- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is - owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he - has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the - Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments - must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you - prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax - returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and - sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the - address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to - the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." - -- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or - destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium - and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of - Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any - money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days - of receipt of the work. - -- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set -forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from -both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael -Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the -Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm -collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain -"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or -corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual -property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a -computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by -your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with -your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with -the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a -refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity -providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to -receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy -is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further -opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER -WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO -WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. -If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the -law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be -interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by -the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any -provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance -with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, -promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, -harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, -that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do -or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm -work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any -Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. - - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers -including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists -because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from -people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need, are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. -To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation -and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 -and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org. - - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive -Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at -http://pglaf.org/fundraising. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent -permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. -Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered -throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at -809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email -business@pglaf.org. Email contact links and up to date contact -information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official -page at http://pglaf.org - -For additional contact information: - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To -SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any -particular state visit http://pglaf.org - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. -To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate - - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm -concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared -with anyone. For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project -Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. - - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. -unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily -keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. - - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: - - http://www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. |