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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..44aa015 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #50922 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/50922) diff --git a/old/50922-0.txt b/old/50922-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 5022439..0000000 --- a/old/50922-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6334 +0,0 @@ -Project Gutenberg's Perpetual Peace, by Immanuel Kant and Mary Campbell Smith - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: Perpetual Peace - A Philosophical Essay - -Author: Immanuel Kant - Mary Campbell Smith - -Release Date: January 14, 2016 [EBook #50922] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PERPETUAL PEACE *** - - - - -Produced by Turgut Dincer, Ramon Pajares Box and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - - - - - -TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE - - * Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_. - * Bold text is denoted by equals as in =bold=. - * Small caps are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS. - * Original spelling was kept, but variant spellings were made - consistent when a predominant usage was found. - * Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected. - - - - -PERPETUAL PEACE - - -[Illustration] - - - “For I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see, - Saw the Vision of the world, and all the wonder that would be; - Saw the heavens fill with commerce, argosies of magic sails, - Pilots of the purple twilight, dropping down with costly bales; - Heard the heavens fill with shouting, and there rain’d a ghastly dew - From the nations’ airy navies grappling in the central blue; - Far along the world-wide whisper of the south-wind rushing warm, - With the standards of the peoples plunging thro’ the thunder-storm; - Till the war-drum throbb’d no longer, and the battle-flags were furl’d - In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world. - There the common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm in awe, - And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law.” - - TENNYSON: _Locksley Hall_. - - - - - PERPETUAL PEACE - A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY - - BY - IMMANUEL KANT - - 1795 - - - TRANSLATED WITH INTRODUCTION - AND NOTES BY - M. CAMPBELL SMITH, M.A. - - _WITH A PREFACE BY PROFESSOR LATTA_ - - - LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD. - RUSKIN HOUSE 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C. - NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - - - - - _First Edition, 1903_ - _Second Impression, February 1915_ - _Third ” February 1917_ - - - - -PREFACE - - -This translation of Kant’s essay on _Perpetual Peace_ was undertaken -by Miss Mary Campbell Smith at the suggestion of the late Professor -Ritchie of St. Andrews, who had promised to write for it a preface, -indicating the value of Kant’s work in relation to recent discussions -regarding the possibility of “making wars to cease.” In view of the -general interest which these discussions have aroused and of the -vague thinking and aspiration which have too often characterised -them, it seemed to Professor Ritchie that a translation of this wise -and sagacious essay would be both opportune and valuable.[1] His -untimely death has prevented the fulfilment of his promise, and I -have been asked, in his stead, to introduce the translator’s work. - - [1] Cf. his _Studies in Political and Social Ethics_, pp. 169, - 170. - -This is, I think, the only complete translation into English of -Kant’s essay, including all the notes as well as the text, and the -translator has added a full historical Introduction, along with -numerous notes of her own, so as (in Professor Ritchie’s words) -“to meet the needs (1) of the student of Political Science who -wishes to understand the relation of Kant’s theories to those of -Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau etc., and (2) of the general reader -who wishes to understand the significance of Kant’s proposals -in connection with the ideals of Peace Congresses, and with the -development of International Law from the end of the Middle Ages to -the Hague Conference.” - -Although it is more than 100 years since Kant’s essay was written, -its substantial value is practically unimpaired. Anyone who is -acquainted with the general character of the mind of Kant will -expect to find in him sound common-sense, clear recognition of the -essential facts of the case and a remarkable power of analytically -exhibiting the conditions on which the facts necessarily depend. -These characteristics are manifest in the essay on _Perpetual Peace_. -Kant is not pessimist enough to believe that a perpetual peace is an -unrealisable dream or a consummation devoutly to be feared, nor is -he optimist enough to fancy that it is an ideal which could easily -be realised if men would but turn their hearts to one another. For -Kant perpetual peace is an ideal, not merely as a speculative Utopian -idea, with which in fancy we may play, but as a moral principle, -which ought to be, and therefore can be, realised. Yet he makes it -perfectly clear that we cannot hope to approach the realisation of -it unless we honestly face political facts and get a firm grasp of -the indispensable conditions of a lasting peace. To strive after the -ideal in contempt or in ignorance of these conditions is a labour -that must inevitably be either fruitless or destructive of its own -ends. Thus Kant demonstrates the hopelessness of any attempt to -secure perpetual peace between independent nations. Such nations may -make treaties; but these are binding only for so long as it is not -to the interest of either party to denounce them. To enforce them -is impossible while the nations remain independent. “There is,” as -Professor Ritchie put it (_Studies in Political and Social Ethics_, -p. 169), “only one way in which war between independent nations can -be prevented; and that is by the nations ceasing to be independent.” -But this does not necessarily mean the establishment of a despotism, -whether autocratic or democratic. On the other hand, Kant maintains -that just as peace between individuals within a state can only be -permanently secured by the institution of a “republican” (that is -to say, a representative) government, so the only real guarantee -of a permanent peace between nations is the establishment of a -federation of free “republican” states. Such a federation he regards -as practically possible. “For if Fortune ordains that a powerful -and enlightened people should form a republic—which by its very -nature is inclined to perpetual peace—this would serve as a centre -of federal union for other states wishing to join, and thus secure -conditions of freedom among the states in accordance with the idea of -the law of nations. Gradually, through different unions of this kind, -the federation would extend further and further.” - -Readers who are acquainted with the general philosophy of Kant -will find many traces of its influence in the essay on _Perpetual -Peace_. Those who have no knowledge of his philosophy may find some -of his forms of statement rather difficult to understand, and it -may therefore not be out of place for me to indicate very briefly -the meaning of some terms which he frequently uses, especially in -the Supplements and Appendices. Thus at the beginning of the First -Supplement, Kant draws a distinction between the mechanical and the -teleological view of things, between “nature” and “Providence”, -which depends upon his main philosophical position. According to -Kant, pure reason has two aspects, theoretical and practical. As -concerning knowledge, strictly so called, the _a priori_ principles -of reason (_e.g._ substance and attribute, cause and effect etc.) -are valid only within the realm of possible sense-experience. Such -ideas, for instance, cannot be extended to God, since He is not a -possible object of sense-experience. They are limited to the world -of phenomena. This world of phenomena (“nature” or the world of -sense-experience) is a purely mechanical system. But in order to -understand fully the phenomenal world, the pure theoretical reason -must postulate certain ideas (the ideas of the soul, the world and -God), the objects of which transcend sense-experience. These ideas -are not theoretically valid, but their validity is practically -established by the pure practical reason, which does not yield -speculative truth, but prescribes its principles “dogmatically” in -the form of imperatives to the will. The will is itself practical -reason, and thus it imposes its imperatives upon itself. The -fundamental imperative of the practical reason is stated by Kant in -Appendix I. (p. 175):—“Act so that thou canst will that thy maxim -should be a universal law, be the end of thy action what it will.” -If the end of perpetual peace is a duty, it must be necessarily -deduced from this general law. And Kant does regard it as a duty. “We -must desire perpetual peace not only as a material good, but also -as a state of things resulting from our recognition of the precepts -of duty” (_loc. cit._). This is further expressed in the maxim (p. -177):—“Seek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its -righteousness, and the object of your endeavour, the blessing of -perpetual peace, will be added unto you.” The distinction between -the moral politician and the political moralist, which is developed -in Appendix I., is an application of the general distinction -between duty and expediency, which is a prominent feature of the -Kantian ethics. Methods of expediency, omitting all reference to -the pure practical reason, can only bring about re-arrangements of -circumstances in the mechanical course of nature. They can never -guarantee the attainment of their end: they can never make it more -than a speculative ideal, which may or may not be practicable. But -if the end can be shown to be a duty, we have, from Kant’s point -of view, the only reasonable ground for a conviction that it is -realisable. We cannot, indeed, theoretically _know_ that it is -realisable. “Reason is not sufficiently enlightened to survey the -series of predetermining causes which would make it possible for us -to predict with certainty the good or bad results of human action, -as they follow from the mechanical laws of nature; although we may -hope that things will turn out as we should desire” (p. 163). On the -other hand, since the idea of perpetual peace is a moral ideal, an -“idea of duty”, we are entitled to believe that it is practicable. -“Nature guarantees the coming of perpetual peace, through the natural -course of human propensities; not indeed with sufficient certainty to -enable us to prophesy the future of this ideal theoretically, but yet -clearly enough for practical purposes” (p. 157). One might extend -this discussion indefinitely; but what has been said may suffice for -general guidance. - -The “wise and sagacious” thought of Kant is not expressed in a -simple style, and the translation has consequently been a very -difficult piece of work. But the translator has shown great skill in -manipulating the involutions, parentheses and prodigious sentences -of the original. In this she has had the valuable help of Mr. David -Morrison, M.A., who revised the whole translation with the greatest -care and to whom she owes the solution of a number of difficulties. -Her work will have its fitting reward if it succeeds in familiarising -the English-speaking student of politics with a political essay of -enduring value, written by one of the master thinkers of modern times. - - R. LATTA. - - _University of Glasgow_, May 1903. - - - - -CONTENTS - - - PAGE - - PREFACE BY PROFESSOR LATTA v - - TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION 1 - - PERPETUAL PEACE 106 - - FIRST SECTION CONTAINING THE PRELIMINARY ARTICLES OF - PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES 107 - - SECOND SECTION CONTAINING THE DEFINITIVE ARTICLES OF - PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES 117 - - FIRST SUPPLEMENT CONCERNING THE GUARANTEE OF PERPETUAL - PEACE 143 - - SECOND SUPPLEMENT—A SECRET ARTICLE FOR PERPETUAL PEACE 158 - - APPENDIX I.—ON THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN MORALS AND POLITICS - WITH REFERENCE TO PERPETUAL PEACE 161 - - APPENDIX II.—CONCERNING THE HARMONY OF POLITICS WITH MORALS - ACCORDING TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEA OF PUBLIC RIGHT 184 - - INDEX 197 - - - - -TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION - - -This is an age of unions. Not merely in the economic sphere, in -the working world of unworthy ends and few ideals do we find -great practical organizations; but law, medicine, science, art, -trade, commerce, politics and political economy—we might add -philanthropy—standing institutions, mighty forces in our social -and intellectual life, all have helped to swell the number of our -nineteenth century Conferences and Congresses. It is an age of -Peace Movements and Peace Societies, of peace-loving monarchs and -peace-seeking diplomats. This is not to say that we are preparing -for the millennium. Men are working together, there is a newborn -solidarity of interest, but rivalries between nation and nation, the -bitternesses and hatreds inseparable from competition are not less -keen; prejudice and misunderstanding not less frequent; subordinate -conflicting interests are not fewer, are perhaps, in view of changing -political conditions and an ever-growing international commerce, -multiplying with every year. The talisman is, perhaps, self-interest, -but, none the less, the spirit of union is there; it is impossible to -ignore a clearly marked tendency towards international federation, -towards political peace. This slow movement was not born with Peace -Societies; its consummation lies perhaps far off in the ages to come. -History at best moves slowly. But something of its past progress -we shall do well to know. No political idea seems to have so great -a future before it as this idea of a federation of the world. It -is bound to realise itself some day; let us consider what are the -chances that this day come quickly, what that it be long delayed. -What obstacles lie in the way, and how may they be removed? What -historical grounds have we for hoping that they may ever be removed? -What, in a word, is the origin and history of the idea of a perpetual -peace between nations, and what would be the advantage, what is the -prospect of realising it? - -The international relations of states find their expression, we are -told, in war and peace. What has been the part played by these great -counteracting forces in the history of nations? What has it been in -prehistoric times, in the life of man in what is called the “state -of nature”? “It is no easy enterprise,” says Rousseau, in more than -usually careful language, “to disentangle that which is original from -that which is artificial in the actual state of man, and to make -ourselves well acquainted with a state which no longer exists, which -perhaps never has existed and which probably never will exist in the -future.” (Preface to the _Discourse on the Causes of Inequality_, -1753, publ. 1754.) This is a difficulty which Rousseau surmounts only -too easily. A knowledge of history, a scientific spirit may fail him: -an imagination ever ready to pour forth detail never does. Man lived, -says he, “without industry, without speech, without habitation, -without war, without connection of any kind, without any need of -his fellows or without any desire to harm them ... sufficing to -himself.”[2] (_Discourse on the Sciences and Arts_, 1750.) Nothing, -we are now certain, is less probable. We cannot paint the life of -man at this stage of his development with any definiteness, but the -conclusion is forced upon us that our race had no golden age,[3] no -peaceful beginning, that this early state was indeed, as Hobbes -held, a state of war, of incessant war between individuals, families -and, finally, tribes. - - [2] For the inconsistency between the views expressed by Rousseau - on this subject in the _Discourses_ and in the _Contrat Social_ - (Cf. I. Chs. VI., VIII.) see Ritchie’s _Natural Right_, Ch. - III., pp. 48, 49; Caird’s essay on Rousseau in his _Essays on - Literature and Philosophy_, Vol. I.; and Morley’s _Rousseau_, - Vol. I., Ch. V.; Vol. II., Ch. XII. - - [3] The theory that the golden age was identical with the - state of nature, Professor D. G. Ritchie ascribes to Locke - (see _Natural Right_, Ch. II., p. 42). Locke, he says, “has an - idea of a golden age” existing even after government has come - into existence—a time when people did not need “to examine the - original and rights of government.” [_Civil Government_, II., § - 111.] A little confusion on the part of his readers (perhaps in - his own mind) makes it possible to regard the state of nature as - itself the golden age, and the way is prepared for the favourite - theory of the eighteenth century:— - - “Nor think in nature’s state they blindly trod; - The state of nature was the reign of God: - Self-love and social at her birth began, - Union the bond of all things and of man. - Pride then was not, nor arts that pride to aid; - Man walk’d with beast, joint tenant of the shade; - The same his table, and the same his bed; - No murder cloath’d him, and no murder fed.” - - [_Essay on Man_, III., 147 _seq._] - - In these lines of Pope’s the state of nature is identified with - the golden age of the Greek and Latin poets; and “the reign of - God” is an equivalent for Locke’s words, “has a law of nature to - govern it.” - - -_The Early Conditions of Society._ - -For the barbarian, war is the rule; peace the exception. His gods, -like those of Greece, are warlike gods; his spirit, at death, flees -to some Valhalla. For him life is one long battle; his arms go with -him even to the grave. Food and the means of existence he seeks -through plunder and violence. Here right is with might; the battle is -to the strong. Nature has given all an equal claim to all things, but -not everyone can have them. This state of fearful insecurity is bound -to come to an end. “Government,” says Locke, (_On Civil Government_, -Chap. VIII., § 105) “is hardly to be avoided amongst men that live -together.”[4] A constant dread of attack and a growing consciousness -of the necessity of presenting a united front against it result in -the choice of some leader—the head of a family perhaps—who acts, -it may be, only as captain of the hosts, as did Joshua in Israel, -or who may discharge the simple duties of a primitive governor or -king.[5] Peace within is found to be strength without. The civil -state is established, so that “if there needs must be war, it may -not yet be against all men, nor yet without some helps.” (Hobbes: -_On Liberty_, Chap. I., § 13.) This foundation of the state is the -first establishment in history of a peace institution. It changes the -character of warfare, it gives it method and system; but it does not -bring peace in its train. We have now, indeed, no longer a wholesale -war of all against all, a constant irregular raid and plunder of one -individual by another; but we have the systematic, deliberate war of -community against community, of nation against nation.[6] - - [4] Cf. _Republic_, II. 369. “A state,” says Socrates, “arises - out of the needs of mankind: no one is self-sufficing, but all of - us have many wants.” - - [5] See Hume’s account of the origin of government (_Treatise_, - III., Part II., Sect. VIII.). There are, he says, American - tribes “where men live in concord and amity among themselves - without any established government; and never pay submission - to any of their fellows, except in time of war, when their - captain enjoys a shadow of authority, which he loses after their - return from the field, and the establishment of peace with the - neighbouring tribes. This authority, however, instructs them in - the advantages of government, and teaches them to have recourse - to it, when either by the pillage of war, by commerce, or by any - fortuitous inventions, their riches and possessions have become - so considerable as to make them forget, on every emergence, the - interest they have in the preservation of peace and justice.... - Camps are the true mothers of cities; and as war cannot be - administered, by reason of the suddenness of every exigency, - without some authority in a single person, the same kind of - authority naturally takes place in that civil government, which - succeeds the military.” - - Cf. Cowper: _The Winter Morning Walk_:— - - “. . . . . . . . . . . . . . and ere long, - When man was multiplied and spread abroad - In tribes and clans, and had begun to call - These meadows and that range of hills his own, - The tasted sweets of property begat - Desire of more; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Thus wars began on earth. These fought for spoil, - And those in self-defence. Savage at first - The onset, and irregular. At length - One eminent above the rest, for strength, - For stratagem, or courage, or for all, - Was chosen leader. Him they served in war, - And him in peace for sake of warlike deeds - Rev’renced no less. . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Thus kings were first invented.” - - - [6] “Among uncivilised nations, there is but one profession - honourable, that of arms. All the ingenuity and vigour of the - human mind are exerted in acquiring military skill or address.” - Cf. Robertson’s _History of Charles V._, (_Works_, 1813, vol. V.) - Sect. I. vii. - - -_War in Classical Times._ - -In early times, there were no friendly neighbouring nations: beyond -the boundaries of every nation’s territory, lay the land of a -deadly foe. This was the way of thinking, even of so highly cultured -a people as the Greeks, who believed that a law of nature had made -every outsider, every barbarian their inferior and their enemy.[7] -Their treaties of peace, at the time of the Persian War, were frankly -of the kind denounced by Kant, mere armistices concluded for the -purpose of renewing their fighting strength. The ancient world is a -world of perpetual war in which defeat meant annihilation. In the -East no right was recognised in the enemy; and even in Greece and -Rome the fate of the unarmed was death or slavery.[8] The barbaric -or non-Grecian states had, according to Plato and Aristotle, no claim -upon humanity, no rights in fact of any kind. Among the Romans -things were little better. According to Mr. T. J. Lawrence—see his -_Principles of International Law_, III., §§ 21, 22—they were worse. -For Rome stood alone in the world: she was bound by ties of kinship -to no other state. She was, in other words, free from a sense of -obligation to other races. War, according to Roman ideas, was made -by the gods, apart altogether from the quarrels of rulers or races. -To disobey the sacred command, expressed in signs and auguries would -have been to hold in disrespect the law and religion of the land. -When, in the hour of victory, the Romans refrained from pressing -their rights against the conquered—rights recognised by all Roman -jurists—it was from no spirit of leniency, but in the pursuit of -a prudent and far-sighted policy, aiming at the growth of Roman -supremacy and the establishment of a world-embracing empire, shutting -out all war as it blotted out natural boundaries, reducing all rights -to the one right of imperial citizenship. There was no real _jus -belli_, even here in the cradle of international law; the only limits -to the fury of war were of a religious character. - - [7] Similarly we find that the original meaning of the Latin word - “_hostis_” was “a stranger.” - - [8] In Aristotle we find the high-water mark of Greek thinking - on this subject. “The object of military training,” says he, - (_Politics_, Bk. IV. Ch. XIV., Welldon’s translation—in older - editions Bk. VII.) “should be not to enslave persons who do - not deserve slavery, but firstly to secure ourselves against - becoming the slaves of others; secondly, to seek imperial power - not with a view to a universal despotic authority, but for the - benefit of the subjects whom we rule, and thirdly, to exercise - despotic power over those who are deserving to be slaves. That - the legislator should rather make it his object so to order his - legislation upon military and other matters as to promote leisure - and peace is a theory borne out by the facts of history.” ... - (_loc. cit._ Ch. XV.). “War, as we have remarked several times, - has its end in peace.” - - Aristotle strongly condemns the Lacedæmonians and Cretans for - regarding war and conquest as the sole ends to which all law and - education should be directed. Also in non-Greek tribes like the - Scythians, Persians, Thracians and Celts he says, only military - power is admired by the people and encouraged by the state. - “There was formerly too a law in Macedonia that any one who had - never slain an enemy should wear the halter about his neck.” - Among the Iberians too, a military people, “it is the custom to - set around the tomb of a deceased warrior a number of obelisks - corresponding to the number of enemies he has killed.... Yet - ... it may well appear to be a startling paradox that it should - be the function of a Statesman to succeed in devising the means - of rule and mastery over neighbouring peoples whether with or - against their own will. How can such action be worthy of a - statesman or legislator, when it has not even the sanction of - law?” (_op. cit._, IV. Ch. 2.) - - We see that Aristotle disapproves of a glorification of war for - its own sake, and regards it as justifiable only in certain - circumstances. Methods of warfare adopted and proved in the East - would not have been possible in Greece. An act of treachery, - for example, such as that of Jael, (_Judges_ IV. 17) which was - extolled in songs of praise by the Jews, (_loc. cit._ V. 24) the - Greek people would have been inclined to repudiate. The stories - of Roman history, the behaviour of Fabricius, for instance, - or Regulus and the honourable conduct of prisoners on various - occasions released on parole, show that this consciousness of - certain principles of honour in warfare was still more highly - developed in Rome. - - Socrates in the _Republic_ (V. 469, 470) gives expression to a - feeling which was gradually gaining ground in Greece, that war - between Hellenic tribes was much more serious than war between - Greeks and barbarians. In such civil warfare, he considered, - the defeated ought not to be reduced to slavery, nor the slain - despoiled, nor Hellenic territory devastated. For any difference - between Greek and Greek is to “be regarded by them as discord - only—a quarrel among friends, which is not to be called war”.... - “Our citizens [_i.e._ in the ideal republic] should thus deal - with their Hellenic enemies; and with barbarians as the Hellenes - now deal with one another.” (V. 471.) - - The views of Plato and Aristotle on this and other questions were - in advance of the custom and practice of their time. - -The treatment of a defeated enemy among the Jews rested upon a -similar religious foundation. In the East, we find a special cruelty -in the conduct of war. The wars of the Jews and Assyrians were wars -of extermination. The whole of the _Old Testament_, it has been said, -resounds with the clash of arms.[9] “An eye for an eye, a tooth for -a tooth!” was the command of Jehovah to his chosen people. Vengeance -was bound up in their very idea of the Creator. The Jews, unlike the -followers of Mahomet, attempted, and were commanded to attempt no -violent conversion[10]; they were then too weak a nation; but they -fought, and fought with success against the heathen of neighbouring -lands, the Lord of Hosts leading them forth to battle. The God of -Israel stood to his chosen people in a unique and peculiarly logical -relation. He had made a covenant with them; and, in return for their -obedience and allegiance, cared for their interests and advanced -their national prosperity. The blood of this elect people could -not be suffered to intermix with that of idolaters. Canaan must be -cleared of the heathen, on the coming of the children of Israel to -their promised land; and mercy to the conquered enemy, even to women, -children or animals was held by the Hebrew prophets to be treachery -to Jehovah. (_Sam._ XV.; _Josh._ VI. 21.) - - [9] “The Lord is a man of war,” said Moses (_Exodus_ XV. 3). Cf. - _Psalms_ XXIV. 8. He is “mighty in battle.” - - [10] This was bound up with the very essence of Islam; the devout - Mussulman could suffer the existence of no unbeliever. Tolerance - or indifference was an attitude which his faith made impossible. - “When ye encounter the unbelievers,” quoth the prophet (_Koran_, - ch. 47), “strike off their heads, until ye have made a great - slaughter among them.... Verily if God pleased he could take - vengeance on them without your assistance; but he commandeth you - to fight his battles.” - - The propagation of the faith by the sword was not only commanded - by the Mohammedan religion: it was that religion itself. - -Hence the attitude of the Jews to neighbouring nations[11] was still -more hostile than that of the Greeks. The cause of this difference -is bound up with the transition from polytheism to monotheism. The -most devout worshipper of the national gods of ancient times could -endure to see other gods than his worshipped in the next town or by -a neighbouring nation. There was no reason why all should not exist -side by side. Religious conflicts in polytheistic countries, when -they arose, were due not to the rivalry of conflicting faiths, but to -an occasional attempt to put one god above the others in importance. -There could be no interest here in the propagation of belief through -the sword. But, under the Jews, these relations were entirely -altered. Jehovah, their Creator, became the one invisible God. Such -an one can suffer no others near him; their existence is a continual -insult to him. Monotheism is, in its very nature, a religion of -intolerance. Its spirit among the Jews was warlike: it commanded -the subjugation of other nations, but its instrument was rather -extermination than conversion. - - [11] See _Acts_ X. 28:—“Ye know that it is an unlawful thing for - a man that is a Jew to keep company, or come unto one of another - nation.” - - -_The Attitude of Christianity and the Early Church to War._ - -From the standpoint of the peace of nations, we may say that the -Christian faith, compared with other prominent monotheistic religious -systems, occupies an intermediate position between two extremes—the -fanaticism of Islam, and to a less extent of Judaism, and the -relatively passive attitude of the Buddhist who thought himself -bound to propagate his religion, but held himself justified only -in the employment of peaceful means. Christianity, on the other -hand, contains no warlike principles: it can in no sense be called -a religion of the sword, but circumstances gave the history of the -Church, after the first few centuries of its existence, a character -which cannot be called peace-loving. - -This apparent contradiction between the spirit of the new religion -and its practical attitude to war has led to some difference of -opinion as to the actual teaching of Christ. The _New Testament_ -seems, at a superficial glance, to furnish support as readily to the -champions of war as to its denouncers. The Messiah is the Prince -of Peace (_Is._ IX. 6, 7; _Heb._ VI.), and here lies the way of -righteousness (_Rom._ III. 19): but Christ came not to bring peace, -but a sword (_Matth._ X. 34). Such statements may be given the -meaning which we wish them to bear—the quoting of Scripture is ever -an unsatisfactory form of evidence; but there is no direct statement -in the _New Testament_ in favour of war, no saying of Christ which, -fairly interpreted, could be understood too regard this proof of -human imperfection as less condemnable than any other.[12] When men -shall be without sin, nation shall rise up against nation no more. -But man the individual can attain peace only when he has overcome the -world, when, in the struggle with his lower self, he has come forth -victorious. This is the spiritual sword which Christ brought into -the world—strife, not with the unbeliever, but with the lower self: -meekness and the spirit of the Word of God are the weapons with which -man must fight for the Faith. - - [12] Neither, however, is there any which regards the soldier as - a murderer. - -An elect people there was no longer: Israel had rejected its Messiah. -Instead there was a complete brotherhood of all men, the bond and -the free, as children of one God. The aim of the Church was a -world-empire, bound together by a universal religion. In this sense, -as sowing the first seeds of a universal peace, we may speak of -Christianity as a re-establishment of peace among mankind. - -The later attitude of Christians to war, however, by no means -corresponds to the earliest tenets of the Church. Without doubt, -certain sects, from the beginning of our era and through the ages -up to the present time, held, like the Mennonites and Quakers -in our day, that the divine command, “Love your enemies,” could -not be reconciled with the profession of a soldier. The early -Christians were reproached under the Roman Emperors, before the -time of Constantine, with avoiding the citizen’s duty of military -service.[13] “To those enemies of our faith,” wrote Origen (_Contra -Celsum_, VIII., Ch. LXXIII., Anti-Nicene Christian Library), “who -require us to bear arms for the commonwealth, and to slay men, we -can reply: ‘Do not those who are priests at certain shrines, and -those who attend on certain gods, as you account them, keep their -hands free from blood, that they may with hands unstained and free -from human blood offer the appointed sacrifices to your gods; and -even when war is upon you, you never enlist the priests in the army. -If that, then, is a laudable custom, how much more so, that while -others are engaged in battle, these too should engage as the priests -and ministers of God, keeping their hands pure, and wrestling in -prayers to God on behalf of those who are fighting in a righteous -cause, and for the king who reigns righteously, that whatever is -opposed to those who act righteously may be destroyed!’ ... And we do -take our part in public affairs, when along with righteous prayers -we join self-denying exercises and meditations, which teach us to -despise pleasures, and not to be led away by them. And none fight -better for the king than we do. We do not indeed fight under him, -although he require it; but we fight on his behalf, forming a special -army—an army of piety—by offering our prayers to God.” The Fathers -of the Church, Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, -Ambrose and the rest gave the same testimony against war. The pagan -rites connected with the taking of the military oath had no doubt -some influence in determining the feeling of the pious with regard -to this life of bloodshed; but the reasons lay deeper. “Shall it be -held lawful,” asked Tertullian, (_De Corona_, p. 347) “to make an -occupation of the sword, when the Lord proclaims that he who uses the -sword shall perish by the sword? And shall the son of peace take -part in the battle when it does not become him even to sue at law? -And shall he apply the chain, and the prison, and the torture, and -the punishment, who is not the avenger even of his own wrongs?” - - [13] In the early centuries of our era Christians seem to - have occasionally refused to serve in the army from religious - scruples. But soldiers were not always required to change their - profession after baptism. And in _Acts_ X., for example, nothing - is said to indicate that the centurion, Cornelius, would have to - leave the Roman army. See Tertullian: _De Corona_ (Anti-Nicene - Christian Library), p. 348. - -The doctrine of the Church developed early in the opposite direction. -It was its fighting spirit and not a love of peace that made -Christianity a state religion under Constantine. Nor was Augustine -the first of the Church Fathers to regard military service as -permissible. To come to a later time, this change of attitude has -been ascribed partly to the rise of Mahometan power and the wave of -fanaticism which broke over Europe. To destroy these unbelievers with -fire and sword was regarded as a deed of piety pleasing to God. Hence -the wars of the Crusades against the infidel were holy wars, and -appear as a new element in the history of civilisation. The nations -of ancient times had known only civil and foreign war.[14] They had -rebelled at home, and they had fought mainly for material interests -abroad. In the Middle Ages there were, besides, religious wars and, -with the rise of Feudalism, private war:[15] among all the powers -of the Dark Ages and for centuries later, none was more aggressive -than the Catholic Church, nor a more active and untiring defender of -its rights and claims, spiritual or temporal. It was in some respects -a more warlike institution than the states of Greece and Rome. It -struggled through centuries with the Emperor:[16] it pronounced its -ban against disobedient states and disloyal cities: it pursued with -its vengeance each heretical or rebellious prince: unmindful of its -early traditions about peace, it showed in every crisis a fiercely -military spirit.[17] - - [14] There were so-called “Sacred Wars” in Greece, but these were - due mainly to disputes caused by the Amphictyonic League. They - were not religious, in the sense in which we apply the epithet to - the Thirty Years’ war. - - [15] “The administration of justice among rude illiterate people, - was not so accurate, or decisive, or uniform, as to induce men - to submit implicitly to its determinations. Every offended baron - buckled on his armour, and sought redress at the head of his - vassals. His adversary met him in like hostile array. Neither - of them appealed to impotent laws which could afford them no - protection. Neither of them would submit points, in which their - honour and their passions were warmly interested, to the slow - determination of a judicial inquiry. Both trusted to their swords - for the decision of the contest.” Robertson’s _History of Charles - V._, (_Works_, vol. V.) Sect. I., p. 38. - - [16] Erasmus in the “Ἰχθυοφαγία” (_Colloquies_, Bailey’s ed., - Vol. II., pp. 55, 56) puts forward the suggestion that a general - peace might be obtained in the Christian world, if the Emperor - would remit something of his right and the Pope some part of his. - - [17] Cf. Robertson, _op. cit._, Sect. III., p. 106, _seq._ - -For more than a thousand years the Church counted fighting -clergy[18] among its most active supporters. This strange anomaly -was, it must be said, at first rather suffered in deference to public -opinion than encouraged by ecclesiastical canons and councils, but it -gave rise to great discontent at the time of the Reformation.[19] The -whole question of the lawfulness of military service for Christians -was then raised again. “If there be anything in the affairs of -mortals,” wrote Erasmus at this time (_Opera_, II., _Prov._, 951 -C) “which it becomes us deliberately to attack, which we ought -indeed to shun by every possible means, to avert and to abolish, -it is certainly war, than which there is nothing more wicked, more -mischievous or more widely destructive in its effects, nothing harder -to be rid of, or more horrible and, in a word, more unworthy of a -man, not to say of a Christian.”[20] The mediæval Church indeed -succeeded, by the establishment of such institutions as the Truce -of God, in setting some limits to the fury of the soldier: but its -endeavours (and it made several to promote peace)[21] were only to -a trifling extent successful. Perhaps custom and public opinion in -feudal Europe were too strong, perhaps the Church showed a certain -apathy in denouncing the evils of a military society: no doubt the -theoretical tenets of its doctrine did less to hinder war than its -own strongly military tendency, its lust for power and the force of -its example did to encourage it. - - [18] Robertson (_op. cit._, Note XXI., p. 483) quotes the - following statement: “flamma, ferro, caede, possessiones - ecclesiarum praelati defendebant.” (Guido Abbas ap. Du Cange, p. - 179.) - - [19] J. A. Farrar, in a pamphlet, (reprinted from the - _Gentleman’s Magazine_, vol. 257, 1884) on _War and - Christianity_, quotes the following passage from Wycliffe in - which he protests against this blot upon the Church and Christian - professions.—“Friars now say that bishops can fight best of all - men, and that it falleth most properly to them, since they are - lords of all this world. They say Christ bade His disciples sell - their coats, and buy them swords; but whereto, if not to fight? - Thus friars make a great array, and stir up many men to fight. - But Christ taught not His apostles to fight with a sword of iron, - but with the sword of God’s Word, and which standeth in meekness - of heart and in the prudence of man’s tongue.... If man-slaying - in others be odious to God, much more in priests, who should be - vicars of Christ.” See also the passage where Erasmus points - out that King David was not permitted to build a temple to God, - because he was a man of blood. “Nolo clericos ullo sanguine - contaminari. Gravis impietas!” (_Opera_, IX., 370 B.) - - This question had already been considered by Thomas Aquinas, who - decided that the clergy ought not to be allowed to fight, because - the practices of warfare, although right and meritorious in - themselves, were not in accordance with a holy calling. (_Summa_, - II. 2: Qu. 40.) - - Aquinas held that war—excluding private war—is justifiable in a - just cause. So too did Luther, (cf. his pamphlet: _Ob Kriegsleute - auch in seligem Stande sein können?_) Calvin and Zwingli, the - last of whom died sword in hand. - - With regard to the question of a fighting clergy, the passage - quoted from Origen (pp. 14, 15, above) has considerable interest, - Origen looks upon the active participation of priests in warfare - as something which everyone would admit to be impossible. - - [20] See also the _Querela Pacis_, 630 B., (_Opera_, - IV.):—“Whosoever preaches Christ, preaches peace.” Erasmus even - goes the length of saying that the most iniquitous peace is - better than the most just war (_op. cit._, 636 C). - - [21] Cf. Robertson, _op. cit._, Note XXI. p. 483 and Sect. I., p. - 39. - -Hence, in spite of Christianity and its early vision of a brotherhood -of men, the history of the Middle Ages came nearer to a realization -of the idea of perpetual war than was possible in ancient times. -The tendency of the growth of Roman supremacy was to diminish the -number of wars, along with the number of possible causes of racial -friction. It united many nations in one great whole, and gave them, -to a certain extent, a common culture and common interests; even, -when this seemed prudent, a common right of citizenship. The fewer -the number of boundaries, the less the likelihood of war. The -establishment of great empires is of necessity a force, and a great -and permanent force working on the side of peace. With the fall of -Rome this guarantee was removed. - - -_The Development of the New Science of International Law._ - -Out of the ruins of the old feudal system arose the modern state -as a free independent unity. Private war between individuals or -classes of society was now branded as a breach of the peace: it -became the exclusive right of kings to appeal to force. War, wrote -Gentilis[22] towards the end of sixteenth century, is the just or -unjust conflict between states. Peace was now regarded as the normal -condition of society. As a result of these great developments in -which the name “state” acquired new meaning, jurisprudence freed -itself from the trammelling conditions of mediæval Scholasticism. Men -began to consider the problem of the rightfulness or wrongfulness of -war, to question even the possibility of a war on rightful grounds. -Out of theses new ideas—partly too as one of the fruits of the -Reformation,[23]—arose the first consciously formulated principles of -the science of international law, whose fuller, but not yet complete, -development belongs to modern times. - - [22] It is uncertain in what year the _De Jure Belli_ of Gentilis - was published—a work to which Grotius acknowledges considerable - indebtedness. Whewell, in the preface to his translation of - Grotius, gives the date 1598, but some writers suppose it to have - been ten years earlier. - - [23] This came about in two ways. The Church of Rome discouraged - the growth of national sentiment. At the Reformation the - independence and unity of the different nations were for the - first time recognised. That is to say, the Reformation laid the - foundation for a science of international law. But, from another - point of view, it not only made such a code of rules possible, - it made it necessary. The effect of the Reformation was not to - diminish the number of wars in which religious belief could play - a part. Moreover, it displaced the Pope from his former position - as arbiter in Europe without setting up any judicial tribunal in - his stead. - -From the beginning of history every age, every people has something -to show here, be it only a rudimentary sense of justice in their -dealings with one another. We may instance the Amphictyonic League -in Greece which, while it had a merely Hellenic basis and was -mainly a religious survival, shows the germ of some attempt at -arbitration between Greek states. Among the Romans we have the _jus -feciale_[24] and the _jus gentium_, as distinguished from the civil -law of Rome, and certain military regulations about the taking of -booty in war. Ambassadors were held inviolate in both countries; -the formal declaration of war was never omitted. Many Roman writers -held the necessity of a just cause for war. But nowhere do these -considerations form the subject matter of a special science. - - [24] Cf. Cicero: _De Officiis_, I. xi. “Belli quidem aequitas - sanctissime feciali populi Romani jure perscripta est.” (See the - reference to Lawrence’s comments on this subject, p. 9 above.) - - “Wars,” says Cicero, “are to be undertaken for this end, - that we may live in peace without being injured; but when we - obtain the victory, we must preserve those enemies who behaved - without cruelty or inhumanity during the war: for example, - our forefathers received, even as members of their state, the - Tuscans, the Æqui, the Volscians, the Sabines and the Hernici, - but utterly destroyed Carthage and Numantia.... And, while - we are bound to exercise consideration toward those whom we - have conquered by force, so those should be received into - our protection who throw themselves upon the honour of our - general, and lay down their arms,” (_op. cit._, I. xi., Bohn’s - Translation).... “In engaging in war we ought to make it appear - that we have no other view but peace.” (_op. cit._, I. xxiii.) - - In fulfilling a treaty we must not sacrifice the spirit to the - letter (_De Officiis_, I. x). “There are also rights of war, and - the faith of an oath is often to be kept with an enemy.” (_op. - cit._, III. xxix.) - - This is the first statement by a classical writer in which the - idea of justice being due to an enemy appears. Cicero goes - further. Particular states, he says, (_De Legibus_, I. i.) are - only members of a whole governed by reason. - -In the Middle Ages the development of these ideas received little -encouragement. All laws are silent in the time of war,[25] and this -was a period of war, both bloody and constant. There was no time -to think of the right or wrong of anything. Moreover, the Church -emphasised the lack of rights in unbelievers, and gave her blessing -on their annihilation.[26] The whole Christian world was filled with -the idea of a spiritual universal monarchy. Not such as that in -the minds of Greek and Jew and Roman who had been able to picture -international peace only under the form of a great national and -exclusive empire. In this great Christian state there were to be no -distinctions between nations; its sphere was bounded by the universe. -But, here, there was no room or recognition for independent national -states with equal and personal rights. This recognition, opposed -by the Roman Church, is the real basis of international law. The -Reformation was the means by which the personality of the peoples, -the unity and independence of the state were first openly admitted. -On this foundation, mainly at first in Protestant countries, the new -science developed rapidly. Like the civil state and the Christian -religion, international law may be called a peace institution. - - [25] The saying is attributed to Pompey:—“Shall I, when I am - preparing for war, think of the laws?” - - [26] This implied, however, the idea of a united Christendom as - against the infidel, with which we may compare the idea of a - united Hellas against Persia. In such things we have the germ not - only of international law, but of the ideal of federation. - - -_Grotius, Puffendorf and Vattel._ - -In the beginning of the seventeenth century, Grotius laid the -foundations of a code of universal law (_De Jure Belli et Pacis_, -1625) independent of differences of religion, in the hope that its -recognition might simplify the intercourse between the newly formed -nations. The primary object of this great work, written during the -misery and horrors of the Thirty Years’ war, was expressly to draw -attention to these evils and suggest some methods by which the -severity of warfare might be mitigated. Grotius originally meant to -explain only one chapter of the law of nations:[27] his book was -to be called _De Jure Belli_, but there is scarcely any subject of -international law which he leaves untouched. He obtained, moreover, -a general recognition for the doctrine of the Law of Nature which -exerted so strong an influence upon succeeding centuries; indeed, -between these two sciences, as between international law and -ethics, he draws no very sharp line of demarcation, although, on -the whole, in spite of an unscientific, scholastic use of quotation -from authorities, his treatment of the new field is clear and -comprehensive. Grotius made the attempt to set up an ethical -principle of right, in the stead of such doctrines of self-interest -as had been held by many of the ancient writers. There was a law, he -held, established in each state purely with a view to the interests -of that state, but, besides this, there was another higher law in -the interest of the whole society of nations. Its origin was divine; -the reason of man commanded his obedience. This was what we call -international law.[28] - - [27] See Maine’s _Ancient Law_, pp. 50-53: pp. 96-101. Grotius - wrongly understood “Jus Gentium,” (“a collection of rules - and principles, determined by observation to be common to - the institutions which prevailed among the various Italian - tribes”) to mean “Jus _inter_ gentes.” The Roman expression for - International Law was not “Jus Gentium,” but “Jus Feciale.” - - “Having adopted from the Antonine jurisconsults,” says Maine, - “the position that the Jus Gentium and the Jus Naturæ were - identical, Grotius, with his immediate predecessors and his - immediate successors, attributed to the Law of Nature an - authority which would never perhaps have been claimed for it, - if “Law of Nations” had not in that age been an ambiguous - expression. They laid down unreservedly that Natural Law is the - code of states, and thus put in operation a process which has - continued almost down to our own day, the process of engrafting - on the international system rules which are supposed to have - been evolved from the unassisted contemplation of the conception - of Nature. There is, too, one consequence of immense practical - importance to mankind which, though not unknown during the early - modern history of Europe, was never clearly or universally - acknowledged till the doctrines of the Grotian school had - prevailed. If the society of nations is governed by Natural - Law, the atoms which compose it must be absolutely equal. Men - under the sceptre of Nature are all equal, and accordingly - commonwealths are equal if the international state be one of - nature. The proposition that independent communities, however - different in size and power, are all equal in the view of the Law - of Nations, has largely contributed to the happiness of mankind, - though it is constantly threatened by the political tendencies - of each successive age. It is a doctrine which probably would - never have obtained a secure footing at all if International Law - had not been entirely derived from the majestic claims of Nature - by the Publicists who wrote after the revival of letters.” (_Op. - cit._, p. 100.) - - [28] The name “International Law” was first given to the law of - nations by Bentham. (_Principles of Morals and Legislation, XIX._ - § xxv.) - -Grotius distinctly holds, like Kant and Rousseau, and unlike Hobbes, -that the state can never be regarded as a unity or institution -separable from the people; the terms _civitas_, _communitas_, -_coetus_, _populus_, he uses indiscriminately. But these nations, -these independent units of society cannot live together side by side -just as they like; they must recognise one another as members of a -European society of states.[29] Law, he said, stands above force -even in war, “which may only be begun to pursue the right;” and the -beginning and manner of conduct of war rests on fixed laws and can be -justified only in certain cases. War is not to be done away with: -Grotius accepts it as fact,[30] (as Hobbes did later) as the natural -method for settling the disputes which were bound constantly to -arise between so many independent and sovereign nations. A terrible -scourge it must ever remain, but as the only available form of legal -procedure, it is sanctioned by the practice of states and not less by -the law of nature and of nations. Grotius did not advance beyond this -position. Every violation of the law of nations can be settled but in -one way—by war, the force of the stronger. - - [29] In the Peace of Westphalia, 1648, the balance of power in - Europe was recognised on the basis of terms such as these. - - [30] Grotius, however, is a painstaking student of Scripture, and - is willing to say something in favour of peace—not a permanent - peace, that is to say, the idea of which would scarcely be - likely to occur to anyone in the early years of the seventeenth - century—but a plea for fewer, shorter wars. “If therefore,” - he says, “a peace sufficiently safe can be had, it is not - ill secured by the condonation of offenses, and damages, and - expenses: especially among Christians, to whom the Lord has given - his peace as his legacy. And so St. Paul, his best interpreter, - exhorts us to live at peace with all men.... May God write these - lessons—He who alone can—on the hearts of all those who have - the affairs of Christendom in their hands.” (_De Jure Belli et - Pacis_, III. Ch. XXV., Whewell’s translation.) - - See also _op. cit._, II., Ch. XXIII., Sect. VIII., where - Grotius recommends that Congresses of Christian Powers should - be held with a view to the peaceful settlement of international - differences. - -The necessary distinction between law and ethics was drawn by -Puffendorf,[31] a successor of Grotius who gave an outwardly -systematic form to the doctrine of the great jurist, without adding -to it either strength or completeness. His views, when they were -not based upon the system of Grotius, were strongly influenced by -the speculation of Hobbes, his chronological predecessor, to whom we -shall have later occasion to refer. In the works of Vattel,[32] who -was, next to Rousseau, the most celebrated of Swiss publicists, we -find the theory of the customs and practice in war widely developed, -and the necessity for humanising its methods and limiting its -destructive effects upon neutral countries strongly emphasised. -Grotius and Puffendorf, while they recommend acts of mercy, hold that -there is legally no right which requires that a conquered enemy shall -be spared. This is a matter of humanity alone. It is to the praise -of Vattel that he did much to popularise among the highest and most -powerful classes of society, ideas of humanity in warfare, and of -the rights and obligations of nations. He is, moreover, the first to -make a clear separation between this science and the Law of Nature. -What, he asks, is international law as distinguished from the Law -of Nature? What are the powers of a state and the duties of nations -to one another? What are the causes of quarrel among nations, and -what the means by which they can be settled without any sacrifice of -dignity? - - [31] Puffendorf’s best known work, _De Jure Naturæ et Gentium_, - was published in 1672. - - [32] _Le Droit des Gens_ was published in 1758 and translated - into English by Joseph Chitty in 1797, (2nd ed., 1834). - -They are, in the first place, a friendly conciliatory attitude; and -secondly, such means of settlement as mediation, arbitration and -Peace Congresses. These are the refuges of a peace-loving nation, in -cases where vital interests are not at stake. “Nature gives us no -right to use force, except where mild and conciliatory measures are -useless.” (_Law of Nations_, II. Ch. xviii. § 331.) “Every power owes -it in this matter to the happiness of human society to show itself -ready for every means of reconciliation, in cases where the interests -at stake are neither vital nor important.” (_ibid._ § 332.) At the -same time, it is never advisable that a nation should forgive an -insult which it has not the power to resent. - - -_The Dream of a Perpetual Peace._ - -But side by side with this development and gradual popularisation -of the new science of International Law, ideas of a less practical, -but not less fruitful kind had been steadily making their way and -obtaining a strong hold upon the popular mind. The Decree of Eternal -Pacification of 1495 had abolished private war, one of the heavy -curses of the Middle Ages. Why should it not be extended to banish -warfare between states as well? Gradually one proposal after another -was made to attain this end, or, at least, to smooth the way for -its future realisation. The first of these in point of time is to -be found in a somewhat bare, vague form in Sully’s _Memoirs_,[33] -said to have been published in 1634. Half a century later the Quaker -William Penn suggested an international tribunal of arbitration in -the interests of peace.[34] But it was by the French Abbé St. Pierre -that the problem of perpetual peace was fairly introduced into -political literature: and this, in an age of cabinet and dynastic -wars, while the dreary cost of the war of the Spanish succession was -yet unpaid. St. Pierre was the first who really clearly realised and -endeavoured to prove that the establishment of a permanent state of -peace is not only in the interest of the weaker, but is required -by the European society of nations and by the reason of man. From -the beginning of the history of humanity, poets and prophets had -cherished the “sweet dream” of a peaceful civilisation: it is in the -form of a practical project that this idea is new. - - [33] _Mémoires ou Œconomies Royales D’Estat, Domestiques, - Politiques et Militaires de Henri le Grand, par Maximilian de - Bethune, Duc de Sully._ - - [34] See _International Tribunals_ (1899), p. 20 _seq._ Penn’s - _Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe_ was - written about 1693, but is not included in all editions of his - works. - -The ancient world actually represented a state of what was almost -perpetual war. This was the reality which confronted man, his -inevitable doom, it seemed, as it had been pronounced to the fallen -sinners of Eden. Peace was something which man had enjoyed once, but -forfeited. The myth- and poetry-loving Greeks, and, later, the poets -of Rome delighted to paint a state of eternal peace, not as something -to whose coming they could look forward in the future, but as a -golden age of purity whose records lay buried in the past, a paradise -which had been, but which was no more. Voices, more scientific, were -raised even in Greece in attempts, such as Aristotle’s, to show -that the evolution of man had been not a course of degeneration -from perfection, but of continual progress upwards from barbarism -to civilisation and culture. But the change in popular thinking on -this matter was due less to the arguments of philosophy than to a -practical experience of the causes which operate in the interests -of peace. The foundation of a universal empire under Alexander the -Great gave temporary rest to nations heretofore incessantly at war. -Here was a proof that the Divine Will had not decreed that man was -to work out his punishment under unchanging conditions of perpetual -warfare. This idea of a universal empire became the Greek ideal of a -perpetual peace. Such an empire was, in the language of the Stoics, a -world-state in which all men had rights of citizenship, in which all -other nations were absorbed. - -Parallel to this ideal among the Greeks, we find the hope in Israel -of a Messiah whose coming was to bring peace, not only to the Jewish -race, but to all the nations of the earth. This idea stands out -in the sharpest contrast to the early nationalism of the Hebrew -people, who regarded every stranger as an idolater and an enemy. -The prophecies of Judaism, combined with the cosmopolitan ideas -of Greece, were the source of the idea, which is expressed in the -teaching of Christ, of a spiritual world-empire, an empire held -together solely by the tie of a common religion. - -This hope of peace did not actually die during the first thousand -years of our era, nor even under the morally stagnating influences -of the Middle Ages. When feudalism and private war were abolished -in Europe, it wakened to a new life. Not merely in the mouths of -poets and religious enthusiasts was the cry raised against war, but -by scholars like Thomas More and Erasmus, jurists like Gentilis -and Grotius, men high in the state and in the eyes of Europe like -Henry IV. of France and the Duc de Sully or the Abbé de St. Pierre -whose _Projet de Paix Perpétuelle_ (1713)[35] obtained immediate -popularity and wide-spread fame. The first half of the eighteenth -century was already prepared to receive and mature a plan of this -kind. - - [35] _Projet de traité pour rendre la paix perpétuelle entre les - souverains chrétiens._ The first two volumes of this work were - published in 1713 (trans. London, 1714); a third volume followed - in 1717. - - -_Henry IV. and St. Pierre._ - -The _Grand Dessein_ of Henry IV. is supposed to have been formed by -that monarch and reproduced in Sully’s _Memoirs_, written in 1634 and -discovered nearly a century later by St. Pierre. The story goes that -the Abbé found the book buried in an old garden. It has been shewn, -however, that there is little likelihood that this project actually -originated with the king, who probably corresponded fairly well to -Voltaire’s picture of him as war hero of the _Henriade_. The plan was -more likely conceived by Sully, and ascribed to the popular king for -the sake of the better hearing and greater influence it might in this -way be likely to have, and also because, thereby, it might be less -likely to create offence in political circles. St. Pierre himself may -or may not have been acquainted with the facts. - -The so-called _Grand Dessein_ of Henry IV. was, shortly, as -follows.[36] It proposed to divide Europe between fifteen -Powers,[37] in such a manner that the balance of power should be -established and preserved. These were to form a Christian republic -on the basis of the freedom and equality of its members, the armed -forces of the federation being supported by fixed contribution. A -general council, consisting of representatives from the fifteen -states, was to make all laws necessary for cementing the union thus -formed and for maintaining the order once established. It would also -be the business of this senate to “deliberate on questions that might -arise, to occupy themselves with discussing different interests, to -settle quarrels amicably, to throw light upon and arrange all the -civil, political and religious affairs of Europe, whether internal or -foreign.” (_Mémoires_, vol. VI., p. 129 _seq._) - - [36] The main articles of this and other peace projects are to - be found in _International Tribunals_, published by the Peace - Society. - - [37] Professor Lorimer points out that Prussia, then the Duchy - of Brandenburg, is not mentioned. (_Institutes of the Law of - Nations_, II. Ch. VII., p. 219.) - -This scheme of the king or his minister was expanded with great -thoroughness and clear-sightedness by the Abbé St. Pierre: none of -the many later plans for a perpetual peace has been so perfect in -details. He proposes that there should be a permanent and perpetual -union between, if possible, all Christian sovereigns—of whom he -suggests nineteen, excluding the Czar—“to preserve unbroken peace in -Europe,” and that a permanent Congress or senate should be formed -by deputies of the federated states. The union should protect weak -sovereigns, minors during a regency, and so on, and should banish -civil as well as international war—it should “render prompt and -adequate assistance to rulers and chief magistrates against seditious -persons and rebels.” All warfare henceforth is to be waged between -the troops of the federation—each nation contributing an equal -number—and the enemies of European security, whether outsiders or -rebellious members of the union. Otherwise, where it is possible, -all disputes occurring within the union are to be settled by the -arbitration of the senate, and the combined military force of the -federation is to be applied to drive the Turks out of Europe. There -is to be a rational rearrangement of boundaries, but after this no -change is to be permitted in the map of Europe. The union should bind -itself to tolerate the different forms of faith. - -The objections to St. Pierre’s scheme are, many of them, obvious. He -himself produces sixty-two arguments likely to be raised against his -plan, and he examines these in turn with acuteness and eloquence. -But there are other criticisms which he was less likely to be able -to forestall. Of the nineteen states he names as a basis of the -federation, some have disappeared and the governments of others -have completely changed. Indeed St. Pierre’s scheme did not look -far beyond the present. But it has besides a too strongly political -character.[38] From this point of view, the Abbé’s plan amounts -practically to a European coalition against the Ottoman Empire. -Moreover, we notice with a smile that the French statesman and -patriot is not lost in the cosmopolitan political reformer. “The -kingdom of Spain shall not go out of the House of Bourbon!”[39] -France is to enjoy more than the privileges of honour; she is to reap -distinct material and political advantages from the union. Humanity -is to be a brotherhood, but, in the federation of nations, France is -to stand first.[40] We see that these “rêves d’un homme de bien,” -as Cardinal Dubois called them, are not without their practical -element. But the great mistake of St. Pierre is this: he actually -thought that his plan could be put into execution in the near future, -that an ideal of this kind was realisable at once.[41] “I, myself, -form’d it,” he says in the preface, “in full expectation to see it -one Day executed.” As Hobbes, says, “there can be nothing so absurd, -but may be found in the books of philosophers.”[42] St. Pierre was -not content to make his influence felt on the statesmen of his time -and prepare the way for the abolition of all arbitrary forms of -government. This was the flaw which drew down upon the good Abbé -Voltaire’s sneering epigram[43] and the irony of Leibniz.[44] Here, -above all, in this unpractical enthusiasm his scheme differs from -that of Kant. - - [38] The same objection was raised by Leibniz (see his - _Observations_ on St. Pierre’s _Projet_) to the scheme of Henry - IV., who, says Leibniz, thought more of overthrowing the house of - Austria than of establishing a society of sovereigns. - - [39] _Project_, Art. VI., Eng. trans. (1714), p. 119. - - [40] St. Pierre was not blind to this aspect of the question. - Among the critical objections which he anticipates to his plan is - this,—that it promises too great an increase of strength to the - house of France, and that therefore the author would have been - wiser to conceal his nationality. - - [41] St. Pierre, in what may be called an apology for the wording - of the title of his book (above, p. 32, _note_), justifies his - confidence in these words:—“The Pilot who himself seems uncertain - of the Success of his Voyage is not likely to persuade the - Passenger to embark.... I am persuaded, that it is not impossible - to find out Means sufficient and practicable to settle an - Everlasting Peace among Christians; and even believe, that the - Means which I have thought of are of that Nature.” (Preface to - _Project_, Eng. trans., 1714.) - - [42] _Leviathan_, I. Ch. V. - - [43] See too Voltaire’s allusion to St. Pierre in his - _Dictionary_, under “Religion.” - - [44] Leibniz regarded the project of St. Pierre with an - indifference, somewhat tinged with contempt. In a letter to - Grimarest, (_Leibnit. Opera_, Dutens’ ed., 1768, Vol. V., pp. - 65, 66: in _Epist._, ed. Kortholt., Vol. III., p. 327) he - writes:—“I have seen something of M. de St. Pierre’s plan for - maintaining perpetual peace in Europe. It reminds me of an - inscription outside of a churchyard which ran, ‘_Pax Perpetua_. - For the dead, it is true, fight no more. But the living, are of - another mind, and the mightiest among them have little respect - for tribunals.’” This is followed by the ironical suggestion - that a court of arbitration should be established at Rome of - which the Pope should be made president; while at the same time - the old spiritual authority should be restored to the Church, - and excommunication be the punishment of non-compliance with the - arbitral decree. “Such plans,” he adds, “are as likely to succeed - as that of M. de St. Pierre. But as we are allowed to write - novels, why should we find fault with fiction which would bring - back the golden age?” But see also _Observations sur le Projet - d’une Paix Perpétuelle de M. l’Abbé de St. Pierre_ (Dutens, V., - esp. p. 56) and the letter to Remond de Montmort (_ibid._ pp. 20, - 21) where Leibniz considers this project rather more seriously. - - -_Rousseau’s Criticism of St. Pierre._ - -Rousseau took St. Pierre’s project[45] much more seriously than -either Leibniz or Voltaire. But sovereigns, he thought, are deaf to -the voice of justice; the absolutism of princely power would never -allow a king to submit to a tribunal of nations. Moreover war was, -according to Rousseau’s experience, a matter not between nations, but -between princes and cabinets. It was one of the ordinary pleasures of -royal existence and one not likely to be voluntarily given up.[46] We -know that history has not supported Rousseau’s contention. Dynastic -wars are now no more. The Great Powers have shown themselves able -to impose their own conditions, where the welfare and security of -Europe have seemed to demand it. Such a development seemed impossible -enough in the eighteenth century. In the military organisation -of the nations of Europe and in the necessity of making their -internal development subordinate to the care for their external -security, Rousseau saw the cause of all the defects in their -administration.[47] The formation of unions on the model of the Swiss -Confederation or the German _Bund_ would, he thought, be in the -interest of all rulers. But great obstacles seemed to him to lie in -the way of the realisation of such a project as that of St. Pierre. -“Without doubt,” says Rousseau in conclusion, “the proposal of a -perpetual peace is at present an absurd one.... It can only be put -into effect by methods which are violent in themselves and dangerous -to humanity. One cannot conceive of the possibility of a federative -union being established, except by a revolution. And, that granted, -who among us would venture to say whether this European federation is -to be desired or to be feared? It would work, perhaps, more harm in a -moment than it would prevent in the course of centuries.” (_Jugement -sur la Paix Perpétuelle._) - - [45] “C’est un livre solide et sensé,” says Rousseau (_Jugement - sur la Paix Perpétuelle_), “et il est très important qu’il - existe.” [This _Jugement_ is appended to Rousseau’s _Extrait du - Projet de Paix Perpétuelle de Monsieur l’Abbé de Saint-Pierre_, - 1761.] - - [46] Cf. Cowper: _The Winter Morning Walk_:— - - “Great princes have great playthings. Some have play’d - At hewing mountains into men, and some - At building human wonders mountain high. - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Some seek diversion in the tented field, - And make the sorrows of mankind their sport. - But war’s a game, which, were their subjects wise, - Kings should not play at. Nations would do well - T’extort their truncheons from the puny hands - Of heroes, whose infirm and baby minds - Are gratified with mischief, and who spoil, - Because men suffer it, their toy the world.” - - - [47] “Les troupes réglées, peste et dépopulation de l’Europe, - ne sont bonnes qu’a deux fins: ou pour attaquer et conquérir - les voisins, ou pour enchâiner et asservir les citoyens.” - (_Gouvernement de Pologne_, Ch. XII.) - - -_The Position of Hobbes._ - -The most profound and searching analysis of this problem comes -from Immanuel Kant, whose indebtedness in the sphere of politics -to Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau it is difficult to -overestimate. Kant’s doctrine of the sovereignty of the people comes -to him from Locke through Rousseau. His explanation of the origin -of society is practically that of Hobbes. The direct influence on -politics of this philosopher, apart from his share in moulding the -Kantian theory of the state, is one we cannot afford to neglect. His -was a great influence on the new science just thrown on the world -by Grotius, and his the first clear and systematic statement we -have of the nature of society and the establishment of the state. -The natural state of man, says Hobbes, is a state of war,[48] a -_bellum omnium contra omnes_, where all struggle for honour and for -preferment and the prizes to which every individual is by natural -right equally entitled, but which can of necessity fall only to the -few, the foremost in the race. Men hate and fear the society of their -kind, but through this desire to excel are forced to seek it: only -where there are many can there be a first. This state of things, this -apparent sociability which is brought about by and coupled with the -least sociable of instincts, becomes unendurable. “It is necessary to -peace,” writes Hobbes (_On Dominion_, Ch. VI. 3) “that a man be so -far forth protected against the violence of others, that he may live -securely; that is, that he may have no just cause to fear others, so -long as he doth them no injury. Indeed, to make men altogether safe -from mutual harms, so as they cannot be hurt or injuriously killed, -is impossible; and, therefore, comes not within deliberation.” But to -protect them so far as is possible the state is formed. Hobbes has no -great faith in human contracts or promises. Man’s nature is malicious -and untrustworthy. A coercive power is necessary to guarantee this -long-desired security within the community. “We must therefore,” he -adds, “provide for our security, not by compacts, but by punishments; -and there is then sufficient provision made, when there are so great -punishments appointed for every injury, as apparently it prove a -greater evil to have done it, than not to have done it. For all men, -by a necessity of nature, choose that which to them appears to be the -less evil.” (_Op. cit._, Ch. VI. 4.) - - [48] Hobbes realises clearly that there probably never was such a - state of war all over the world nor a state of nature conforming - to a common type. The case is parallel to the use of the term - “original contract” as an explanation of the manner in which the - civil state came to be formed. (Cf. p. 52, _note_.) - - See also Hume (_Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals,_ - Sect. III. Part I.). “This _poetical_ fiction of the _golden age_ - is, in some respects, of a piece with the _philosophical_ fiction - of the _state of nature_; only that the former is represented - as the most charming and most peaceable condition, which can - possibly be imagined; whereas the latter is painted out as a - state of mutual war and violence, attended with the most extreme - necessity.” This fiction of a state of nature as a state of war, - says Hume, (in a note to this passage) is not the invention of - Hobbes. Plato (_Republic_, II. III. IV.) refutes a hypothesis - very like it, and Cicero (_Pro Sext._ l. 42) regards it as a fact - universally acknowledged. - - Cf. also Spinoza (_Tract. Pol._ c. ii. § 14): “Homines ex natura - hostes.” And (c. v. § 2): “Homines civiles non nascuntur sed - fiunt.” These expressions are to be understood, says Bluntschli - (_Theory of the State_, IV. Ch. vi., p. 284, _note_ a), “rather - as a logical statement of what _would be_ the condition of - man apart from civil society, than as distinctly implying a - historical theory.” - - While starting from the same premises, Spinoza carries Hobbes’ - political theories to their logical conclusion. If we admit that - right lies with might, then right is with the people in any - revolution successfully carried out. (But see Hobbes’ Preface to - the _Philosophical Rudiments_ and Kant’s _Perpetual Peace_, p. - 188, _note_.) Spinoza, in a letter, thus alludes to this point of - difference:—“As regards political theories, the difference which - you inquire about between Hobbes and myself, consists in this, - that I always preserve natural right intact, and only allot to - the chief magistrates in every state a right over their subjects - commensurate with the excess of their power over the power of - the subjects. This is what always takes place in the state of - nature.” (Epistle 50, _Works_, Bohn’s ed., Vol. II.) - -These precautions secure that relative peace within the state which -is one of the conditions of the safety of the people. But it is, -besides, the duty of a sovereign to guarantee an adequate protection -to his subjects against foreign enemies. A state of defence as -complete and perfect as possible is not only a national duty, but an -absolute necessity. The following statement of the relation of the -state to other states shows how closely Hobbes has been followed by -Kant. “There are two things necessary,” says Hobbes, (_On Dominion_, -Ch. XIII. 7) “for the people’s defence; to be warned and to be -forearmed. _For the state of commonwealths considered in themselves, -is natural, that is to say, hostile._[49] Neither, if they cease from -fighting, is it therefore to be called peace; but rather a breathing -time, in which one enemy observing the motion and countenance of the -other, values his security not according to pacts, but the forces and -counsels of his adversary.” - - [49] The italics are mine.—[Tr.] - -Hobbes is a practical philosopher: no man was less a dreamer, a -follower after ideals than he. He is, moreover, a pessimist, and -his doctrine of the state is a political absolutism,[50] the form -of government which above all has been, and is, favourable to war. -He would no doubt have ridiculed the idea of a perpetual peace -between nations, had such a project as that of St. Pierre—a practical -project, counting upon a realisation in the near future—been brought -before him. He might not even have accepted it in the very much -modified form which Kant adopts, that of an ideal—an unattainable -ideal—towards which humanity could not do better than work. He -expected the worst possible from man the individual. _Homo homini -lupus._ The strictest absolutism, amounting almost to despotism, -was required to keep the vicious propensities of the human animal -in check. States he looked upon as units of the same kind, members -also of a society. They had, and openly exhibited, the same faults -as individual men. They too might be driven with a strong enough -coercive force behind them, but not without it; and such a coercive -force as this did not exist in a society of nations. Federation and -federal troops are terms which represent ideas of comparatively -recent origin. Without something of this kind, any enduring peace -was not to be counted upon. International relations were and -must remain at least potentially warlike in character. Under no -circumstances could ideal conditions be possible either between the -members of a state or between the states themselves. Human nature -could form no satisfactory basis for a counsel of perfection. - - [50] Professor Paulsen (_Immanuel Kant_, 2nd ed., 1899, p. - 359—Eng. trans., p. 353) points out that pessimism and absolutism - usually go together in the doctrines of philosophers. He gives as - instances Hobbes, Kant and Schopenhauer. - - Hobbes (_On Dominion_, Ch. X. 3, _seq._) regarded an absolute - monarchy as the only proper form of government, while in the - opinion of Locke, (_On Civil Government_, II. Ch. VII. §§ 90, - 91) it was no better than a state of nature. Kant would not have - gone quite so far. As a philosopher, he upheld the sovereignty - of the people and rejected a monarchy which was not governed in - accordance with republican principles; as a citizen, he denied - the right of resistance to authority. (Cf. _Perpetual Peace_, pp. - 126, 188, _note_.) - -Hence Hobbes never thought of questioning the necessity of war. -It was in his eyes the natural condition of European society; but -certain rules were necessary both for its conduct and, where this -was compatible with a nation’s dignity and prosperity, for its -prevention. He held that international law was only a part of the -Law of Nature, and that this Law of Nature laid certain obligations -upon nations and their kings. Mediation must be employed between -disputants as much as possible, the person of the mediators of -peace being held inviolate; an umpire ought to be chosen to decide -a controversy, to whose judgment the parties in dispute agree to -submit themselves; such an arbiter must be impartial. These are all -what Hobbes calls precepts of the Law of Nature. And he appeals to -the Scriptures in confirmation of his assertion that peace is the -way of righteousness and that the laws of nature of which these are -a few are also laws of the heavenly kingdom. But peace is like the -straight path of Christian endeavour, difficult to find and difficult -to keep. We must seek after it where it may be found; but, having -done this and sought in vain, we have no alternative but to fall back -upon war. Reason requires “that every man ought to endeavour peace,” -(_Lev._ I. Ch. XIV.) “as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and -when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and -advantages of war.”[51] This, says Hobbes elsewhere, (_On Liberty_, -Ch. I. 15) is the dictate of right reason, the first and fundamental -law of nature. - - [51] We find the same rule laid down as early as the time of - Dante. Cf. _De Monarchia_, Bk. II. 9:—“When two nations quarrel - they are bound to try in every possible way to arrange the - quarrel by means of discussion: it is only when this is hopeless - that they may declare war.” - - -_Kant’s Idea of a Perpetual Peace._ - -With regard to the problems of international law, Kant is of course -a hundred and fifty years ahead of Hobbes. But he starts from the -same point: his theory of the beginning of society is practically -identical with that of the older philosopher. Men are by nature -imperfect creatures, unsociable and untrustworthy, cursed by a love -of glory, of possession, and of power, passions which make happiness -something for ever unattainable by them. Hobbes is content to leave -them here with their imperfections, and let a strong government -help them out as it may. But not so Kant. He looks beyond man -the individual, developing slowly by stages scarcely measurable, -progressing at one moment, and the next, as it seems, falling behind: -he looks beyond the individual, struggling and never attaining, to -the race. Here Kant is no pessimist. The capacities implanted in -man by nature are not all for evil: they are, he says, “destined to -unfold themselves completely in the course of time, and in accordance -with the end to which they are adapted.” (_Idea of a Universal -History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View_, 1784. Prop. 1.) This -end of humanity is the evolution of man from the stage of mere -self-satisfied animalism to a high state of civilisation. Through -his own reason man is to attain a perfect culture, intellectual and -moral. In this long period of struggle, the potential faculties -which nature or Providence has bestowed upon him reach their full -development. The process in which this evolution takes place is what -we call history. - -To man nature has given none of the perfect animal equipments for -self-preservation and self-defence which she has bestowed on others -of her creatures. But she has given to him reason and freedom of -will, and has determined that through these faculties and without the -aid of instinct he shall win for himself a complete development of -his capacities and natural endowments. It is, says Kant, no happy -life that nature has marked out for man. He is filled with desires -which he can never satisfy. His life is one of endeavour and not of -attainment: not even the consciousness of the well-fought battle is -his, for the struggle is more or less an unconscious one, the end -unseen. Only in the race, and not in the individual, can the natural -capacities of the human species reach full development. Reason, says -Kant, (Prop. 2, _op. cit._) “does not itself work by instinct, but -requires experiments, exercise and instruction in order to advance -gradually from one stage of insight to another. Hence each individual -man would necessarily have to live an enormous length of time, in -order to learn by himself how to make a complete use of all his -natural endowments. Or, if nature should have given him but a short -lease of life, as is actually the case, reason would then require an -almost interminable series of generations, the one handing down its -enlightenment to the other, in order that the seeds she has sown in -our species may be brought at last to a stage of development which -is in perfect accordance with her design.” Man the individual shall -travel towards the land of promise and fight for its possession, but -not he, nor his children, nor his children’s children shall inherit -the land. “Only the latest comers can have the good fortune of -inhabiting the dwelling which the long series of their predecessors -have toiled—though,” adds Kant, “without any conscious intent—to -build up without even the possibility of participating in the -happiness which they were preparing.” (Proposition 3.) - -The means which nature employs to bring about this development of -all the capacities implanted in men is their mutual antagonism in -society—what Kant calls the “unsocial sociableness of men, that is to -say, their inclination to enter into society, an inclination which -yet is bound up at every point with a resistance which threatens -continually to break up the society so formed.” (Proposition 4.) Man -hates society, and yet there alone he can develop his capacities; he -cannot live there peaceably, and yet cannot live without it. It is -the resistance which others offer to his inclinations and will—which -he, on his part, shows likewise to the desires of others—that awakens -all the latent powers of his nature and the determination to conquer -his natural propensity to indolence and love of material comfort -and to struggle for the first place among his fellow-creatures, to -satisfy, in outstripping them, his love of glory and possession and -power. “Without those, in themselves by no means lovely, qualities -which set man in social opposition to man, so that each finds his -selfish claims resisted by the selfishness of all the others, men -would have lived on in an Arcadian shepherd life, in perfect -harmony, contentment, and mutual love; but all their talents would -forever have remained hidden and undeveloped. Thus, kindly as the -sheep they tended, they would scarcely have given to their existence -a greater value than that of their cattle. And the place among the -ends of creation which was left for the development of rational -beings would not have been filled. Thanks be to nature for the -unsociableness, for the spiteful competition of vanity, for the -insatiate desires of gain and power! Without these, all the excellent -natural capacities of humanity would have slumbered undeveloped. -Man’s will is for harmony; but nature knows better what is good for -his species: her will is for dissension. He would like a life of -comfort and satisfaction, but nature wills that he should be dragged -out of idleness and inactive content and plunged into labour and -trouble, in order that he may be made to seek in his own prudence -for the means of again delivering himself from them. The natural -impulses which prompt this effort,—the causes of unsociableness and -mutual conflict, out of which so many evils spring,—are also in turn -the spurs which drive him to the development of his powers. Thus, -they really betray the providence of a wise Creator, and not the -interference of some evil spirit which has meddled with the world -which God has nobly planned, and enviously overturned its order.” -(Proposition 4: Caird’s translation in _The Critical Philosophy of -Kant_, Vol. II., pp. 550, 551.) - -The problem now arises, How shall men live together, each free to -work out his own development, without at the same time interfering -with a like liberty on the part of his neighbour? The solution -of this problem is the state. Here the liberty of each member is -guaranteed and its limits strictly defined. A perfectly just civil -constitution, administered according to the principles of right, -would be that under which the greatest possible amount of liberty -was left to each citizen within these limits. This is the ideal -of Kant, and here lies the greatest practical problem which has -presented itself to humanity. An ideal of this kind is difficult of -realisation. But nature imposes no such duty upon us. “Out of such -crooked material as man is made,” says Kant, “nothing can be hammered -quite straight.” (Proposition 6.) We must make our constitution as -good as we can and, with that, rest content. - -The direct cause of this transition from a state of nature and -conditions of unlimited freedom to civil society with its coercive -and restraining forces is found in the evils of that state of nature -as they are painted by Hobbes. A wild lawless freedom becomes -impossible for man: he is compelled to seek the protection of a -civil society. He lives in uncertainty and insecurity: his liberty -is so far worthless that he cannot peacefully enjoy it. For this -peace he voluntarily yields up some part of his independence. The -establishment of the state is in the interest of his development to -a higher civilisation. It is more—the guarantee of his existence -and self-preservation. This is the sense, says Professor Paulsen, -in which Kant like Hobbes regards the state as “resting on a -contract,”[52] that is to say, on the free will of all.[53] _Volenti -non fit injuria._ Only, adds Paulsen, we must remember that this -contract is not a historical fact, as it seemed to some writers of -the eighteenth century, but an “idea of reason”: we are speaking here -not of the history of the establishment of the state, but of the -reason of its existence. (Paulsen’s _Kant_, p. 354.)[54] - - [52] Rousseau (_Contrat Social_: I. vi.) regards the social - contract as tacitly implied in every actual society: its articles - “are the same everywhere, and are everywhere tacitly admitted - and recognised, even though they may never have found formal - expression” in any constitution. In the same way he speaks of - a state of nature “which no longer exists, which perhaps never - has existed.” (Preface to the _Discourse on the Causes of - Inequality_.) But Rousseau’s interpretation of these terms is, on - the whole, literal in spite of these single passages. He speaks - throughout the _Contrat Social_, as if history could actually - record the signing and drawing up of such documents. Hobbes, - Hooker, (_Ecclesiastical Polity_, I. sect. 10—see also Ritchie: - _Darwin and Hegel_, p. 210 _seq._) Hume and Kant use more careful - language. “It cannot be denied,” writes Hume, (_Of the Original - Contract_) “that all government is, at first, founded on a - contract and that the most ancient rude combinations of mankind - were formed chiefly by that principle. In vain are we asked in - what records this charter of our liberties is registered. It was - not written on parchment, nor yet on leaves or barks of trees. It - preceded the use of writing and all the other civilised arts of - life. But we trace it plainly in the nature of man, and in the - equality, or something approaching equality, which we find in all - the individuals of that species.” - - This fine passage expresses admirably the views of Kant on this - point. Cf. _Werke_, (Rosenkranz) IX. 160. The original contract - is merely an idea of reason, one of those ideas which we think - into things in order to explain them. - - Hobbes does not professedly make the contract historical, but in - Locke’s _Civil Government_ (II. Ch. VIII. § 102) there is some - attempt made to give it a historical basis.—By consent all were - equal, “till by the same consent they set rulers over themselves. - So that their politic societies all began from a voluntary union, - and the mutual agreement of men freely acting in the choice of - their governors, and forms of government.” - - Bluntschli points out (_Theory of the State_, IV. ix., p. 294 - and _note_) that the same theory of contract on which Hobbes’ - doctrine of an absolute government was based was made the - justification of violent resistance to the government at the time - of the French Revolution. The theory was differently applied by - Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. According to the first, men leave - the “state of nature” when they surrender their rights to a - sovereign, and return to that state during revolution. But, for - Rousseau, this sovereign authority is the people: a revolution - would be only a change of ministry. (See _Cont. Soc._, III. Ch. - xviii.) Again Locke holds revolution to be justifiable in all - cases where the governments have not fulfilled the trust reposed - by the people in them. (Cf. Kant’s _Perpetual Peace_, p. 188, - _note_). - - [53] “If you unite many men,” writes Rousseau, (_Cont. Soc._, IV. - I.) “and consider them as one body, they will have but one will; - and that will must be to promote the common safety and general - well-being of all.” This _volonté générale_, the common element - of all particular wills, cannot be in conflict with any of them. - (_Op. cit._, II. iii.) - - [54] In Eng. trans., see p. 348. - -In this civil union, self-sought, yet sought reluctantly, man is able -to turn his most unlovable qualities to a profitable use. They bind -this society together. They are the instrument by which he wins for -himself self-culture. It is here with men, says Kant, as it is with -the trees in a forest: “just because each one strives to deprive the -other of air and sun, they compel each other to seek both above, -and thus they grow beautiful and straight. Whereas those that, in -freedom and isolation from one another, shoot out their branches at -will, grow stunted and crooked and awry.” (Proposition 5, _op. cit._) -Culture, art, and all that is best in the social order are the fruits -of that self-loving unsociableness in man. - -The problem of the establishment of a perfect civil constitution -cannot be solved, says this treatise (_Idea for a Universal -History_), until the external relations of states are regulated -in accordance with principles of right. For, even if the ideal -internal constitution were attained, what end would it serve in the -evolution of humanity, if commonwealths themselves were to remain -like individuals in a state of nature, each existing in uncontrolled -freedom, a law unto himself? This condition of things again cannot -be permanent. Nature uses the same means as before to bring about a -state of law and order. War, present or near at hand, the strain -of constant preparation for a possible future campaign or the heavy -burden of debt and devastation left by the last,—these are the evils -which must drive states to leave a lawless, savage state of nature, -hostile to man’s inward development, and seek in union the end of -nature, peace. All wars are the attempts nature makes to bring about -new political relations between nations, relations which, in their -very nature, cannot be, and are not desired to be, permanent. These -combinations will go on succeeding each other, until at last a -federation of all powers is formed for the establishment of perpetual -peace. This is the end of humanity, demanded by reason. Justice -will reign, not only in the state, but in the whole human race when -perpetual peace exists between the nations of the world. - -This is the point of view of the _Idea for a Universal History_. But -equally, we may say, law and justice will reign between nations, -when a legally and morally perfect constitution adorns the state. -External perpetual peace presupposes internal peace—peace civil, -social, economic, religious. Now, when men are perfect—and what -would this be but perfection—how can there be war? Cardinal Fleury’s -only objection—no light one—to St. Pierre’s project was that, as -even the most peace-loving could not avoid war, all men must first -be men of noble character. This seems to be what is required in -the treatise on _Perpetual Peace_. Kant demands, to a certain -extent, the moral regeneration of man. There must be perfect honesty -in international dealings, good faith in the interpretation and -fulfilment of treaties and so on (Art. 1)[55]: and again, every state -must have a republican constitution—a term by which Kant understands -a constitution as nearly as possible in accordance with the spirit -of right. (Art. 1.)[56] This is to say that we have to start with -our reformation at home, look first to the culture and education -and morals of our citizens, then to our foreign relations. This is -a question of self-interest as well as of ethics. On the civil and -religious liberty of a state depends its commercial success. Kant -saw the day coming, when industrial superiority was to be identified -with political pre-eminence. The state which does not look to the -enlightenment and liberty of its subjects must fail in the race. But -the advantages of a high state of civilisation are not all negative. -The more highly developed the individuals who form a state, the more -highly developed is its consciousness of its obligations to other -nations. In the ignorance and barbarism of races lies the great -obstacle to a reign of law among states. Uncivilised states cannot -be conceived as members of a federation of Europe. First, the -perfect civil constitution according to right: then the federation of -these law-abiding Powers. This is the path which reason marks out. -The treatise on _Perpetual Peace_ seems to be in this respect more -practical than the _Idea for a Universal History_. But it matters -little which way we take it. The point of view is the same in both -cases: the end remains the development of man towards good, the order -of his steps in this direction is indifferent. - - [55] See p. 107. - - [56] See p. 120. - - -_The Political and Social Conditions of Kant’s Time._ - -The history of the human race, viewed as a whole, Kant regards -as the realisation of a hidden plan of nature to bring about a -political constitution internally and externally perfect—the only -condition under which the faculties of man can be fully developed. -Does experience support this theory? Kant thought that, to a certain -degree, it did. This conviction was not, however, a fruit of his -experience of citizenship in Prussia, an absolute dynastic state, -a military monarchy waging perpetual dynastic wars of the kind he -most hotly condemned. Kant had no feeling of love to Prussia,[57] -and little of a citizen’s patriotic pride, or even interest, in its -political achievements. This was partly because of his sympathy with -republican doctrines: partly due to his love of justice and peculiar -hatred of war,[58] a hatred based, no doubt, not less on principle -than on a close personal experience of the wretchedness it brings -with it. It was not the political and social conditions in which he -lived which fostered Kant’s love of liberty and gave him inspiration, -unless in the sense in which the mind reacts upon surrounding -influences. Looking beyond Prussia to America, in whose struggle -for independence he took a keen interest, and looking to France -where the old dynastic monarchy had been succeeded by a republican -state, Kant seemed to see the signs of a coming democratisation of -the old monarchical society of Europe. In this growing influence on -the state of the mass of the people who had everything to lose in -war and little to gain by victory, he saw the guarantee of a future -perpetual peace. Other forces too were at work to bring about this -consummation. There was a growing consciousness that war, this costly -means of settling a dispute, is not even a satisfactory method of -settlement. Hazardous and destructive in its effect, it is also -uncertain in its results. Victory is not always gain; it no longer -signifies a land to be plundered, a people to be sold to slavery. It -brings fresh responsibilities to a nation, at a time when it is not -always strong enough to bear them. But, above all, Kant saw, even at -the end of the eighteenth century, the nations of Europe so closely -bound together by commercial interests that a war—and especially a -maritime war where the scene of conflict cannot be to the same extent -localised as on land—between any two of them could not but seriously -affect the prosperity of the others.[59] He clearly realised that -the spirit of commerce was the strongest force in the service of the -maintenance of peace, and that in it lay a guarantee of future union. - - [57] Unlike Hegel whose ideal was the Prussian state, as it was - under Frederick the Great. An enthusiastic supporter of the power - of monarchy, he showed himself comparatively indifferent to the - progress of constitutional liberty. - - [58] Isolated passages are sometimes quoted from Kant in support - of a theory that the present treatise is at least half ironical[A] - and that his views on the question of perpetual peace did not - essentially differ from those of Leibniz. “Even war,” he says, - (_Kritik d. Urteilskraft_, I. Book ii. § 28.) “when conducted in - an orderly way and with reverence for the rights of citizens has - something of the sublime about it, and the more dangers a nation - which wages war in this manner is exposed to and can courageously - overcome, the nobler does its character grow. While, on the other - hand, a prolonged peace usually has the effect of giving free - play to a purely commercial spirit, and side by side with this, - to an ignoble self-seeking, to cowardice and effeminacy; and the - result of this is generally a degradation of national character.” - - [A] Cf. K. v. Stengel: _Der Ewige Friede_, Munich, 1899; also - Vaihinger: _Kantstudien_, Vol. IV., p. 58. - - This is certainly an admission that war which does not violate - the Law of Nations has a good side as well as a bad. We could - look for no less in so clear-sighted and unprejudiced a thinker. - Kant would have been the first to admit that under certain - conditions a nation can have no higher duty than to wage war. - War is necessary, but it is in contradiction to reason and the - spirit of right. The “scourge of mankind,” “making more bad men - than it takes away,” the “destroyer of every good,” Kant calls it - elsewhere. (_Theory of Ethics_, Abbott’s trans., 4th ed., p. 341, - _note_.) - - [59] Cf. _Idea for a Universal History_, Prop. 8; _Perpetual - Peace_, pp. 142, 157. - -This scheme of a federation of the nations of the world, in -accordance with principles which would put an end to war between -them, was one whose interest for Kant seemed to increase during the -last twenty years of his life.[60] It was according to him an idea -of reason, and, in his first essay on the subject—that of 1784—we -see the place this ideal of a perpetual peace held in the Kantian -system of philosophy. Its realisation is the realisation of the -highest good—the ethical and political _summum bonum_, for here the -aims of morals and politics coincide: only in a perfect development -of his faculties in culture and in morals can man at last find true -happiness. History is working towards the consummation of this end. A -moral obligation lies on man to strive to establish conditions which -bring its realisation nearer. It is the duty of statesmen to form a -federative union as it was formerly the duty of individuals to enter -the state. The moral law points the way here as clearly as in the -sphere of pure ethics:—“Thou can’st, therefore thou ought’st.” - - [60] The immediate stimulus to Kant’s active interest in this - subject as a practical question was the Peace of Basle (1795) - which ended the first stage in the series of wars which followed - the French Revolution. - -Let us be under no misapprehension as to Kant’s attitude to the -problem of perpetual peace. It is an ideal. He states plainly that he -so regards it[61] and that as such it is unattainable. But this is -the essence of all ideals: they have not the less value in shaping -the life and character of men and nations on that account. They are -not ends to be realised but ideas according to which we must live, -regulative principles. We cannot, says Kant, shape our life better -than in acting as if such ideas of reason have objective validity and -there be an immortal life in which man shall live according to the -laws of reason, in peace with his neighbour and in freedom from the -trammels of sense. - - [61] It is _eine unausführbare Idee_. See the passage quoted from - the _Rechtslehre_, p. 129, _note_. - -Hence we are concerned here, not with an end, but with the means by -which we might best set about attaining it, if it were attainable. -This is the subject matter of the _Treatise on Perpetual Peace_ -(1795), a less eloquent and less purely philosophical essay than that -of 1784, but throughout more systematic and practical. We have to do, -not with the favourite dream of philanthropists like St. Pierre and -Rousseau, but with a statement of the conditions on the fulfilment of -which the transition to a reign of peace and law depends. - - -_The Conditions of the Realisation of the Kantian Ideal._ - -These means are of two kinds. In the first place, what evils must -we set about removing? What are the negative conditions? And, -secondly, what are the general positive conditions which will make -the realisation of this idea possible and guarantee the permanence -of an international peace once attained? These negative and -positive conditions Kant calls Preliminary and Definitive Articles -respectively, the whole essay being carefully thrown into the form of -a treaty. The Preliminary Articles of a treaty for perpetual peace -are based on the principle that anything that hinders or threatens -the peaceful co-existence of nations must be abolished. These -conditions have been classified by Kuno Fischer. Kant, he points -out,[62] examines the principles of right governing the different -sets of circumstances in which nations find themselves—namely, (_a_) -while they are actually at war; (_b_) when the time comes to conclude -a treaty of peace; (_c_) when they are living in a state of peace. -The six Preliminary Articles fall naturally into these groups. War -must not be conducted in such a manner as to increase national -hatred and embitter a future peace. (Art. 6.)[63] The treaty which -brings hostilities to an end must be concluded in an honest desire -for peace. (Art. 1.)[64] Again a nation, when in a state of peace, -must do nothing to threaten the political independence of another -nation or endanger its existence, thereby giving the strongest of -all motives for a fresh war. A nation may commit this injury in -two ways: (1) indirectly, by causing danger to others through the -growth of its standing army (Art. 3)[65]—always a menace to the -state of peace—or by any unusual war preparations: and (2) through -too great a supremacy of another kind, by amassing money, the -most powerful of all weapons in warfare. The National Debt (Art. -4)[66] is another standing danger to the peaceful co-existence of -nations. But, besides, we have the danger of actual attack. There -is no right of intervention between nations. (Art. 5.)[67] Nor can -states be inherited or conquered (Art. 2),[68] or in any way treated -in a manner subversive of their independence and sovereignty as -individuals. For a similar reason, armed troops cannot be hired and -sold as things. - - [62] _Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_, (4th ed., 1899), Vol. - V., I. Ch. 12, p. 168 _seq._ - - [63] See p. 114. - - [64] See p. 107. - - [65] See p. 110. - - [66] See p. 111. - - [67] See p. 112. - - [68] See p. 108. - -These then are the negative conditions of peace.[69] There are, -besides, three positive conditions: - - [69] A large part of Kant’s requirements as they are expressed in - these Preliminary Articles has already been fulfilled. The first - (Art. 1) is recognised in theory at least by modern international - law. More cannot be said. A treaty of this kind is of necessity - more or less forced by the stronger on the weaker. The formal - ratification of peace in 1871 did not prevent France from longing - for the day when she might win back Alsace-Lorraine and be - revenged on Prussia. Not the treaty nor a consciousness of defeat - has kept the peace west of the Rhine, but a reluctant respect for - the fortress of Metz and the mighty army of united Germany. - - Articles 2 and 6 are already commonplaces of international - law. Article 2 refers to practices which have not survived the - gradual disappearance of dynastic war. Art. 6 is the basis of - our modern law of war. Art. 3 has been fulfilled in the literal - sense that the standing armies composed of mercenary troops to - which Kant alludes exist no longer. But it is to be feared that - Kant would not think that we have made things much better, nor - regard our present system of progressive armaments as a step in - the direction of perpetual peace. Art. 4 is not likely to be - fulfilled in the near future. It is long since Cobden denounced - the institution of National Debts—an institution which, as Kant - points out, owes its origin to the English, the “commercial - people” referred to in the text. Art. 5 no doubt came to Kant - through Vattel. “No nation,” says the Swiss publicist, (_Law of - Nations_, II. Ch. iv. § 54) “has the least right to interfere - with the government of another,” unless, he adds, (Ch. v. § - 70) in a case of anarchy or where the well-being of the human - race demands it. This is a recognised principle of modern - international law. Intervention is held to be justifiable only - where the obligation to respect another’s freedom of action comes - into conflict with the duty of self-preservation. - - Puffendorf leaves much more room for the exercise of benevolence. - The natural affinity and kinship between men is, says he, (_Les - Devoirs de l’homme et du citoien_, II. Ch. xvi. § xi.) “a - sufficient reason to authorise us to take up defence of every - person whom one sees unjustly oppressed, when he implores our - aid _and when we can do it conveniently_.” (The italics are - mine.—[Tr.]) - -(_a_) The intercourse of nations is to be confined to a right of -hospitality. (Art. 3.)[70] There is nothing new to us in this -assertion of a right of way. The right to free means of international -communication has in the last hundred years become a commonplace of -law. And the change has been brought about, as Kant anticipated, -not through an abstract respect for the idea of right, but through -the pressure of purely commercial interests. Since Kant’s time -the nations of Europe have all been more or less transformed from -agricultural to commercial states whose interests run mainly in the -same direction, whose existence and development depend necessarily -upon “conditions of universal hospitality.” Commerce depends upon -this freedom of international intercourse, and on commerce mainly -depends our hope of peace. - - [70] See p. 137. The main principle involved in this passage - comes from Vattel (_op. cit._, II. Ch. viii. §§ 104, 105: Ch. ix. - §§ 123, 125). A sovereign, he says, cannot object to a stranger - entering his state who at the same time respects its laws. No one - can be quite deprived of the right of way which has been handed - down from the time when the whole earth was common to all men. - -(_b_) The first Definitive Article[71] requires that the constitution -of every state should be republican. What Kant understands by this -term is that, in the state, law should rule above force and that -its constitution should be a representative one, guaranteeing -public justice and based on the freedom and equality of its members -and their mutual dependence on a common legislature. Kant’s demand -is independent of the _form_ of the government. A constitutional -monarchy like that of Prussia in the time of Frederick the Great, -who regarded himself as the first servant of the state and ruled -with the wisdom and forethought which the nation would have had -the right to demand from such an one—such a monarchy is not in -contradiction to the idea of a true republic. That the state should -have a constitution in accordance with the principles of right is -the essential point.[72] To make this possible, the law-giving -power must lie with the representatives of the people: there must be -a complete separation, such as Locke and Rousseau demand, between -the legislature and executive. Otherwise we have despotism. Hence, -while Kant admitted absolutism under certain conditions, he rejected -democracy where, in his opinion, the mass of the people was despot. - - [71] See p. 120. - - [72] Kant believed that, in the newly formed constitution of the - United States, his ideal with regard to the external forms of - the state as conforming to the spirit of justice was most nearly - realised. Professor Paulsen draws attention, in the following - passage, to the fact that Kant held the English government of - the eighteenth century in very low esteem. (_Kant_, p. 357, - _note_. See Eng. trans., p. 352, _note_.) It was not the English - state, he says, which furnished Kant with an illustration of - his theory:—“Rather in it he sees a form of despotism only - slightly veiled, not Parliamentary despotism, as some people - have thought, but monarchical despotism. Through bribery of the - Commons and the Press, the King had actually absolute power, as - was evident, above all, from the fact that he had often waged war - without, and in defiance of, the will of the people. Kant has - a very unfavourable opinion of the English state in every way. - Among the collected notes written by him in the last ten years - of the century and published by Reicke (_Lose Blätter_, I. 129) - the following appears:—‘The English nation (_gens_) regarded as - a people (_populus_) and looked upon side by side with other - races is, as a collection of individuals, of all mankind the - most highly to be esteemed. But as a state, compared with other - states, it is the most destructive, high-handed and tyrannical, - and the most provocative of war among them all.’” - - Kuno Fischer (_op. cit._, Vol. V., I. Ch. 11, pp. 150, 151) to - whom Professor Paulsen’s reference may here perhaps allude, - states that Kant’s objection to the English constitution is that - it was an oligarchy, Parliament being not only a legislative - body, but through its ministers also executive in the interests - of the ruling party or even of private individuals in that party. - It seems more likely that what most offended a keen observer of - the course of the American War of Independence was the arbitrary - and ill-directed power of the king. But see the passage quoted - by Fischer (pp. 152, 153) from the _Rechtslehre_ (Part II. Sect. - I.) which is, he says, unmistakeably directed against the English - constitution and certain temporary conditions in the political - history of the country. - -An internal constitution, firmly established on the principles of -right, would not only serve to kill the seeds of national hatred and -diminish the likelihood of foreign war. It would do more: it would -destroy sources of revolution and discontent within the state. Kant, -like many writers on this subject, does not directly allude to civil -war[73] and the means by which it may be prevented or abolished. -Actually to achieve this would be impossible: it is beyond the -power of either arbitration or disarmament. But in a representative -government and the liberty of a people lie the greatest safeguards -against internal discontent. Civil peace and international peace must -to a certain extent go hand in hand. - - [73] St. Pierre actually thought that his federation would - prevent civil war. See _Project_ (1714), p. 16. - -We come now to the central idea of the treatise: (_c_) the law of -nations must be based upon a federation of free states. (Art. 2.)[74] -This must be regarded as the end to which mankind is advancing. The -problem here is not out of many nations to make one. This would -be perhaps the surest way to attain peace, but it is scarcely -practicable, and, in certain forms, it is undesirable. Kant is -inclined to approve of the separation of nations by language and -religion, by historical and social tradition and physical boundaries: -nature seems to condemn the idea of a universal monarchy.[75] The -only footing on which a thorough-going, indubitable system of -international law is in practice possible is that of the society -of nations: not the world-republic[76] the Greeks dreamt of, but a -federation of states. Such a union in the interests of perpetual -peace between nations would be the “highest political good.” The -relation of the federated states to one another and to the whole -would be fixed by cosmopolitan law: the link of self-interest which -would bind them would again be the spirit of commerce. - - [74] See p. 128. - - [75] This was the ideal of Dante. Cf. _De Monarchia_, Bk. I. - 54:—“We shall not find at any time except under the divine - monarch Augustus, when a perfect monarchy existed, that the world - was everywhere quiet.” - - Bluntschli (_Theory of the State_, I. Ch. ii., p. 26 _seq._) - gives an admirable account of the different attempts made to - realise a universal empire in the past—the Empire of Alexander - the Great, based upon a plan of uniting the races of east and - west; the Roman Empire which sought vainly to stamp its national - character upon mankind; the Frankish Monarchy; the Holy Roman - Empire which fell to pieces through the want of a central - power strong enough to overcome the tendency to separation and - nationalisation; and finally the attempt of Napoleon I., whose - mistake was the same as that which wrecked the Roman Empire—a - neglect of the strength of foreign national sentiment. - - [76] Reason requires a State of nations. This is the ideal, - and Kant’s proposal of a federation of states is a practical - substitute from which we may work to higher things. Kant, like - Fichte, (_Werke_, VII. 467) strongly disapproves of a universal - monarchy such as that of which Dante dreamed—a modern Roman - Empire. The force of necessity, he says, will bring nations at - last to become members of a cosmopolitan state, “or if such a - state of universal peace proves (as has often been the case - with too great states) a greater danger to freedom from another - point of view, in that it introduces despotism of the most - terrible kind, then this same necessity must compel the nations - to enter a state which indeed has the form not of a cosmopolitan - commonwealth under one sovereign, but of a federation - regulated by legal principles determined by a common code of - international law.” (_Das mag in d. Theorie richtig sein_, - _Werke_, (Rosenkranz) VII., p. 225). Cf. also _Theory of Ethics_, - (Abbott), p. 341, _note_; _Perpetual Peace_, pp. 155, 156. - -This scheme of a perpetual peace had not escaped ridicule in the -eighteenth century: the name of Kant protected it henceforth. -The facts of history, even more conclusively than the voices of -philosophers, soldiers and princes, show how great has been the -progress of this idea in recent years. But it has not gained its -present hold upon the popular mind without great and lasting -opposition. Indeed we have here what must still be regarded as a -controversial question. There have been, and are still, men who -regard perpetual peace as a state of things as undesirable as -it is unattainable. For such persons, war is a necessity of our -civilisation: it is impossible that it should ever cease to exist. -All that we can do, and there is no harm, nor any contradiction in -the attempt, is to make wars shorter, fewer and more humane: the -whole question, beyond this, is without practical significance. -Others, on the other hand,—and these perhaps more thoughtful—regard -war as hostile to culture, an evil of the worst kind, although a -necessary evil. In peace, for them, lies the true ideal of humanity, -although in any perfect form this cannot be realised in the near -future. The extreme forms of these views are to be sought in what has -been called in Germany “the philosophy of the barracks” which comes -forward with a glorification of war for its own sake, and in the -attitude of modern Peace Societies which denounce all war wholesale, -without respect of causes or conditions. - - -_Hegel, Schiller and Moltke._ - -Hegel, the greatest of the champions of war, would have nothing -to do with Kant’s federation of nations formed in the interests -of peace. The welfare of a state, he held, is its own highest -law; and he refused to admit that this welfare was to be sought -in an international peace. Hegel lived in an age when all power -and order seemed to lie with the sword. Something of the charm of -Napoleonism seems to hang over him. He does not go the length of -writers like Joseph de Maistre, who see in war the finger of God or -an arrangement for the survival of the fittest—a theory, as far as -regards individuals, quite in contradiction with the real facts, -which show that it is precisely the physically unfit whom war, as a -method of extermination, cannot reach. But, like Schiller and Moltke, -Hegel sees in war an educative instrument, developing virtues in a -nation which could not be fully developed otherwise, (much as pain -and suffering bring patience and resignation and other such qualities -into play in the individual), and drawing the nation together, making -each citizen conscious of his citizenship, as no other influence can. -War, he holds, leaves a nation always stronger than it was before; -it buries causes of inner dissension, and consolidates the internal -power of the state.[77] No other trial can, in the same way, show -what is the real strength and weakness of a nation, what it _is_, not -merely materially, but physically, intellectually and morally. - - [77] See the _Philosophie d. Rechts_, (_Werke_, Vol. VIII.) Part - iii. § 324 and appendix. - -With this last statement most people will be inclined to agree. There -is only a part of the truth in Napoleon’s dictum that “God is on -the side of the biggest battalions”; or in the old saying that war -requires three necessaries—in the first place, money; in the second -place, money; and in the third, money. Money is a great deal: it is a -necessity; but what we call national back-bone and character is more. -So far we are with Hegel. But he goes further. In peace, says he, -mankind would grow effeminate and degenerate in luxury. This opinion -was expressed in forcible language in his own time by Schiller,[78] -and in more recent years by Count Moltke. “Perpetual peace,” says -a letter of the great general,[79] “is a dream and not a beautiful -dream either: war is part of the divine order of the world. During -war are developed the noblest virtues which belong to man—courage -and self-denial, fidelity to duty and the spirit of self-sacrifice: -the soldier is called upon to risk his life. Without war the world -would sink in materialism.”[80] “Want and misery, disease, suffering -and war,” he says elsewhere, “are all given elements in the Divine -order of the universe.” Moltke’s eulogy of war, however, is somewhat -modified by his additional statement that “the greatest kindness in -war lies in its being quickly ended.” (Letter to Bluntschli, 11th -Dec., 1880.)[81] The great forces which we recognise as factors -in the moral regeneration of mankind are always slow of action as -they are sure. War, if too quickly over, could not have the great -moral influence which has been attributed to it. The explanation -may be that it is not all that it naturally appears to a great and -successful general. Hegel, Moltke, Trendelenburg, Treitschke[82] -and the others—not Schiller[83] who was able to sing the blessings -of peace as eloquently as of war—were apt to forget that war is as -efficient a school for forming vices as virtues; and that, moreover, -those virtues which military life is said to cultivate—courage, -self-sacrifice and the rest—can be at least as perfectly developed in -other trials. There are in human life dangers every day bravely met -and overcome which are not less terrible than those which face the -soldier, in whom patriotism may be less a sentiment than a duty, and -whose cowardice must be dearly paid. - - [78] Cf. _Die Braut von Messina_:— - - “Denn der Mensch verkümmert im Frieden, - Müssige Ruh’ ist das Grab des Muths. - Das Gesetz ist der Freund des Schwachen, - Alles will es nur eben machen, - Möchte gerne die Welt verflachen; - Aber der Krieg lässt die Kraft erscheinen, - Alles erhebt er zum Ungemeinen, - Selber dem Feigen erzeugt er den Muth.” - - This passage perhaps scarcely gives a fair representation of - Schiller’s views on the question, which, if we judge from - _Wilhelm Tell_, must have been very moderate. War, he says, in - this oft-quoted passage, is sometimes a necessity. There is - a limit to the power of tyranny and, when the burden becomes - unbearable, an appeal to Heaven and the sword. - - _Wilhelm Tell_: Act. II. Sc. 2. - - “Nein, eine Grenze hat Tyrannenmacht. - Wenn der Gedrückte nirgends Recht kann finden, - Wenn unerträglich wird die Last greift er - Hinauf getrosten Muthes in den Himmel - Und holt herunter seine ew’gen Rechte, - Die droben hangen unveräusserlich - Und unzerbrechlich, wie die Sterne selbst— - Der alte Urstand der Natur kehrt wieder, - Wo Mensch dem Menschen gegenüber steht— - Zum letzten Mittel, wenn kein andres mehr - Verfangen will, ist ihm das Schwert gegeben.” - - [79] Letter to Bluntschli, dated Berlin, 11th Dec., 1880 - (published in Bluntschli’s _Gesammelte Kleine Schriften_, Vol. - II., p. 271). - - [80] Cf. Tennyson’s _Maud_: Part I., vi. and xiii. - - “Why do they prate of the blessings of Peace? we have made them a curse, - Pickpockets, each hand lusting for all that is not its own; - And lust of gain, in the spirit of Cain, is it better or worse - Than the heart of the citizen hissing in war on his own hearthstone? - For I trust if an enemy’s fleet came yonder round by the hill, - And the rushing battle-bolt sang from the three-decker out of the foam, - That the smooth-faced snub-nosed rogue would leap from his counter and till, - And strike, if he could, were it but with his cheating yardwand, home.” - - See too Part III., ii. and iv. - - “And it was but a dream, yet it lighten’d my despair - When I thought that a war would arise in defence of the right, - That an iron tyranny now should bend or cease, - The glory of manhood stand on his ancient height, - Nor Britain’s one sole God be the millionaire: - No more shall commerce be all in all, and Peace - Pipe on her pastoral hillock a languid note, - And watch her harvest ripen, her herd increase, - Nor the cannon-bullet rest on a slothful shore, - And the cobweb woven across the cannon’s throat - Shall shake its threaded tears in the wind no more. - - Let it go or stay, so I wake to the higher aims - Of a land that has lost for a little her lust of gold, - And love of a peace that was full of wrongs and shames, - Horrible, hateful, monstrous, not to be told; - And hail once more to the banner of battle unroll’d! - Tho’ many a light shall darken, and many shall weep - For those that are crush’d in the clash of jarring claims, - For God’s just wrath shall be wreak’d on a giant liar; - And many a darkness into the light shall leap, - And shine in the sudden making of splendid names, - And noble thought be freer under the sun, - And the heart of a people beat with one desire.” - - - [81] Moltke strangely enough was, at an earlier period, of the - opinion that war, even when it is successful, is a national - misfortune. Cf. Kehrbach’s preface to Kant’s essay, _Zum Ewigen - Frieden_, p. XVII. - - [82] See his discussion on constitutional monarchy in Germany. - (_Hist. u. Pol. Aufsätze_, Bd. III., p. 533 _seq._) - - [83] See _Die Piccolomini_: Act. I. Sc. 4. - - -_War under Altered Conditions._ - -The Peace Societies of our century, untiring supporters of a point of -view diametrically opposite to that of Hegel, owe their existence -in the first place to new ideas on the subject of the relative -advantages and disadvantages of war, which again were partly due to -changes in the character of war itself, partly to a new theory that -the warfare of the future should be a war of free competition for -industrial interests, or, in Herbert Spencer’s language, that the -warlike type of mankind should make room for an industrial type. -This theory, amounting in the minds of some thinkers to a fervid -conviction, and itself, in a sense, the source of what has been -contemptuously styled our British “shopkeeper’s policy” in Europe, -was based on something more solid than mere enthusiasm. The years of -peace which followed the downfall of Napoleon had brought immense -increase in material wealth to countries like France and Britain. -Something of the glamour had fallen away from the sword of the great -Emperor. The illusive excitement of a desire for conquest had died: -the glory of war had faded with it, but the burden still remained: -its cost was still there, something to be calmly reckoned up and not -soon to be forgotten. Europe was seen to be actually moving towards -ruin. “We shall have to get rid of war in all civilised countries,” -said Louis Philippe in 1843. “Soon no nation will be able to afford -it.” War was not only becoming more costly. New conditions had -altered it in other directions. With the development of technical -science and its application to the perfecting of methods and -instruments of destruction every new war was found to be bloodier -than the last; and the day seemed to be in sight, when this very -development would make war (with instruments of extermination) -impossible altogether. The romance and picturesqueness with which -it was invested in the days of hand-to-hand combat was gone. But, -above all, war was now waged for questions fewer and more important -than in the time of Kant. Napoleon’s successful appeal to the masses -had suggested to Prussia the idea of consciously nationalising the -army. Our modern national wars exact a sacrifice, necessarily much -more heavy, much more reluctantly made than those of the past which -were fought with mercenary troops. Such wars have not only greater -dignity: they are more earnest, and their issue, as in a sense the -issue of conflict between higher and lower types of civilisation, is -speedier and more decisive. - -In the hundred years since Kant’s death, much that he prophesied -has come to pass, although sometimes by different paths than he -anticipated. The strides made in recent years by commerce and the -growing power of the people in every state have had much of the -influence which he foretold. There is a greater reluctance to wage -war.[84] But, unfortunately, as Professor Paulsen points out, the -progress of democracy and the nationalisation of war have not worked -merely in the direction of progress towards peace. War has now become -popular for the first time. “The progress of democracy in states,” -he says, (_Kant_, p. 364[85]) “has not only not done away with war, -but has very greatly changed the feeling of people towards it. With -the universal military service, introduced by the Revolution, war -has become the people’s affair and popular, as it could not be in -the case of dynastic wars carried on with mercenary troops.” In the -people the love of peace is strong, but so too is the love of a -fight, the love of victory. - - [84] An admirable short account of popular feeling on this matter - is to be found in Lawrence’s _Principles of International Law_, § - 240. - - [85] The first Peace Society was founded in London in 1816, and - the first International Peace Congress held in 1843. - -It is in the contemplation of facts and conflicting tendencies like -these that Peace Societies[86] have been formed. The peace party is, -we may say, an eclectic body: it embraces many different sections -of political opinion. There are those who hold, for instance, that -peace is to be established on a basis of communism of property. -There are others who insist on the establishment throughout Europe -of a republican form of government, or again, on a redistribution -of European territory in which Alsace-Lorraine is restored to -France—changes of which at least the last two would be difficult to -carry out, unless through international warfare. But these are not -the fundamental general principles of peace workers. The members -of this party agree in rejecting the principle of intervention, in -demanding a complete or partial disarmament of the nations of Europe, -and in requiring that all disputes between nations—and they admit the -prospects of dispute—should be settled by means of arbitration. In -how far are these principles useful or practicable? - - [86] In Eng. trans. see p. 358. - - -_The Value of Arbitration._ - -There is a strong feeling in favour of arbitration on the part of all -classes of society. It is cheaper under all circumstances than war. -It is a judgment at once more certain and more complete, excluding -as far as possible the element of chance, leaving irritation perhaps -behind it, but none of the lasting bitterness which is the legacy -of every war. Arbitration has an important place in all peace -projects except that of Kant, whose federal union would naturally -fulfil the function of a tribunal of arbitration. St. Pierre, -Jeremy Bentham,[87] Bluntschli[88] the German publicist, Professor -Lorimer[89] and others among political writers,[90] and among rulers, -Louis Napoleon and the Emperor Alexander I. of Russia, have all made -proposals more or less ineffectual for the peaceful settlement of -international disputes. A number of cases have already been decided -by this means. But let us examine the questions which have been -at issue. Of a hundred and thirty matters of dispute settled by -arbitration since 1815 (cf. _International Tribunals_, published -by the Peace Society, 1899) it will be seen that all, with the -exception of one or two trifling cases of doubt as to the succession -to certain titles or principalities, can be classified roughly -under two heads—disputes as to the determination of boundaries or -the possession of certain territory, and questions of claims for -compensation and indemnities due either to individuals or states, -arising from the seizure of fleets or merchant vessels, the insult -or injury to private persons and so on—briefly, questions of money -or of territory. These may fairly be said to be trifling causes, -not touching national honour or great political questions. That they -should have been settled in this way, however, shows a great advance. -Smaller causes than these have made some of the bloodiest wars in -history. That arbitration should have been the means of preventing -even one war which would otherwise have been waged is a strong reason -why we should fully examine its claims. “Quand l’institution d’une -haute cour,” writes Laveleye, (_Des causes actuelles de guerre en -Europe et de l’arbitrage_) “n’éviterait qu’une guerre sur vingt, -il vaudrait encore la peine de l’établir.” But history shows us -that there is no single instance of a supreme conflict having been -settled otherwise than by war. Arbitration is a method admirably -adapted to certain cases: to those we have named, where it has been -successfully applied, to the interpretation of contracts, to offences -against the Law of Nations—some writers say to trivial questions of -honour—in all cases where the use of armed force would be impossible, -as, for instance, in any quarrel in which neutralised countries[91] -like Belgium or Luxembourg should take a principal part, or in a -difference between two nations, such as (to take an extreme case) -the United States and Switzerland, which could not easily engage in -actual combat. These cases, which we cannot too carefully examine, -show that what is here essential is that it should be possible to -formulate a juridical statement of the conflicting claims. In Germany -the _Bundestag_ had only power to decide questions of law. Other -disputes were left to be fought out. Questions on which the existence -and vital honour of a state depend—any question which nearly concerns -the disputants—cannot be reduced to any cut and dry legal formula -of right and wrong. We may pass over the consideration that in some -cases (as in the Franco-Prussian War) the delay caused by seeking -mediation of any kind would deprive a nation of the advantage its -state of military preparation deserved. And we may neglect the -problem of finding an impartial judge on some questions of dispute, -although its solution might be a matter of extreme difficulty, -so closely are the interests of modern nations bound up in one -another. How could the Eastern Question, for example, be settled by -arbitration? It is impossible that such a means should be sufficient -for every case. Arbitration in other words may prevent war, but can -never be a substitute for war. We cannot wonder that this is so. So -numerous and conflicting are the interests of states, so various -are the grades of civilisation to which they have attained and the -directions along which they are developing, that differences of the -most vital kind are bound to occur and these can never be settled -by any peaceful means at present known to Europe. This is above all -true where the self-preservation[92] or independence of a people are -concerned. Here the “good-will” of the nations who disagree would -necessarily be wanting: there could be no question of the arbitration -of an outsider. - - [87] See “A Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace” in the - _Principles of International Law_ (_Works_, Vol. II). One of - the main principles advocated by Bentham in this essay (written - between 1787 and 1789) is that every state should give up its - colonies. - - [88] See his _Kleine Schriften_. - - [89] _Institutes of the Law of Nations_ (1884), Vol. II., Ch. XIV. - - [90] John Stuart Mill holds that the multiplication of federal - unions would be a benefit to the world. [See his _Considerations - on Representative Government_ (1865), Ch. XVII., where he - discusses the conditions necessary to render such unions - successful.] But the Peace Society is scarcely justified, on the - strength of what is here, in including Mill among writers who - have made definite proposals of peace or federation. (See _Inter. - Trib._) - - [91] See what Lawrence says (_op. cit._, § 241) of neutralisation - and the limits of its usefulness as a remedy for war. - - [92] Montesquieu: _Esprit des Lois_, X. Ch. 2. “The life of - governments is like that of man. The latter has a right to kill - in case of natural defence: the former have a right to wage war - for their own preservation.” - - See also Vattel (_Law of Nations_, II. Ch. XVIII. § 332):—“But - if anyone would rob a nation of one of her essential rights, or - a right without which she could not hope to support her national - existence,—if an ambitious neighbour threatens the liberty of a - republic, if he attempts to subjugate and enslave her,—she will - take counsel only from her own courage. She will not even attempt - the method of conferences, in the case of a contention so odious - as this. She will, in such a quarrel, exert her utmost efforts, - exhaust every resource and lavish her blood to the last drop if - necessary. To listen to the slightest proposal in a matter of - this kind is to risk everything.” - -But, indeed, looking away from questions so vital and on which there -can be little difference of opinion, we are apt to forget, when we -allow ourselves to talk extravagantly of the future of arbitration, -that every nation thinks, or at least pretends to think, that it -is in the right in every dispute in which it appears (cf. Kant: -_Perpetual Peace_, p. 120.): and, as a matter of history, there has -never been a conflict between civilised states in which an appeal to -this “right” on the part of each has not been made. We talk glibly -of the right and wrong of this question or of that, of the justice -of this war, the iniquity of that. But what do these terms really -mean? _Do_ we know, in spite of the labour which has been spent on -this question by the older publicists, which are the causes that -justify a war? Is it not true that the same war might be just in one -set of circumstances and unjust in another? Practically all writers -on this subject, exclusive of those who apply the biblical doctrine -of non-resistance, agree in admitting that a nation is justified in -defending its own existence or independence, that this is even a -moral duty as it is a fundamental right of a state. Many, especially -the older writers, make the confident assertion that all wars of -defence are just. But will this serve as a standard? Gibbon tells us -somewhere, that Livy asserts that the Romans conquered the world in -self-defence. The distinction between wars of aggression and defence -is one very difficult to draw. The cause of a nation which waits -to be actually attacked is often lost: the critical moment in its -defence may be past. The essence of a state’s defensive power may -lie in a readiness to strike the first blow, or its whole interests -may be bound up in the necessity of fighting the matter out in its -enemy’s country, rather than at home. It is not in the strictly -military interpretation of the term “defensive”, but in its wider -ethical and political sense that we can speak of wars of defence as -just. But, indeed, we cannot judge these questions abstractly. Where -a war is necessary, it matters very little whether it is just or not. -Only the judgment of history can finally decide; and generally it -seems at the time that both parties have something of right on their -side, something perhaps too of wrong.[93] - - [93] The difficulties in the way of hard and fast judgments on a - complicated problem of this kind are convincingly demonstrated in - a recent essay by Professor D. G. Ritchie (_Studies in Political - and Social Ethics_, Sonnenschein, 1902). Professor Ritchie - considers in detail a number of concrete cases which occurred - in the century between 1770 and 1870. “Let any one take the - judgments he would pass on these or any similarly varied cases, - and I think he will find that we do not restrict our approval - to wars of self-defence, that we do not approve self-defence - under all circumstances, that there are some cases in which we - approve of absorption of smaller states by larger, that there - are cases in which we excuse intervention of third parties in - quarrels with which at first they had nothing to do, and that - we sometimes approve war even when begun without the authority - of any already existing sovereign. Can any principles be found - underlying such judgments? In the first place we ought not to - disguise from ourselves the fact that our judgments after the - result are based largely on success. ... I think it will be - found that our judgments on the wars of the century from 1770 to - 1870 turn very largely on the question, Which of the conflicting - forces was making for constitutional government and for social - progress? or, to put it in wider terms, Which represented the - higher civilisation? And thus it is that we may sometimes approve - the rise of a new state and sometimes the absorption of an old.” - (_Op. cit._, pp. 152, 155.) - -A consideration of difficulties like these brings us to a realisation -of the fact that the chances are small that a nation, in the heat of -a dispute, will admit the likelihood of its being in the wrong. To -refuse to admit this is generally tantamount to a refusal to submit -the difficulty to arbitration. And neither international law, nor the -moral force of public opinion can induce a state to act contrary to -what it believes to be its own interest. Moreover, as international -law now stands, it is not a duty to have recourse to arbitration. -This was made quite clear in the proceedings of the Peace Conference -at the Hague in 1899.[94] It was strongly recommended that -arbitration should be sought wherever it was possible, but, at the -same time definitely stated, that this course could in no case be -compulsory. In this respect things have not advanced beyond the -position of the Paris Congress of 1856.[95] The wars waged in Europe -subsequent to that date, have all been begun without previous attempt -at mediation. - - [94] See Fred. W. Holls: _The Peace Conference at the Hague_, - Macmillan, 1900. - - [95] The feeling of the Congress expressed itself thus - cautiously:—“Messieurs les plénipotentiaires n’hésitent pas à - exprimer, au nom de leur gouvernements, le voeu, que les Etats - entre lesquels s’éléverait un dissentiment sérieux, avant d’en - appeler aux armes, eussent recours, en tant que les circonstances - l’admettraient, aux bons offices d’une puissance amie.” - -But the work of the peace party regarding the humaner methods of -settlement is not to be neglected. The popular feeling which they -have been partly the means of stimulating has no doubt done something -to influence the action of statesmen towards extreme caution in -the treatment of questions likely to arouse national passions and -prejudices. Arbitration has undoubtedly made headway in recent -years. Britain and America, the two nations whose names naturally -suggest themselves to us as future centres of federative union, both -countries whose industrial interests are numerous and complicated, -have most readily, as they have most frequently, settled disputes -in this practical manner. It has shown itself to be a policy as -economical as it is business-like. Its value, in its proper place, -cannot be overrated by any Peace Congress or by any peace pamphlet; -but we have endeavoured to make it clear that this sphere is but a -limited one. The “good-will” may not be there when it ought perhaps -to appear: it will certainly not be there when any vital interest -is at stake. But, even if this were not so and arbitration were -the natural sequence of every dispute, no coercive force exists -to enforce the decree of the court. The moral restraint of public -opinion is here a poor substitute. Treaties, it is often said, -are in the same position; but treaties have been broken, and will -no doubt be broken again. We are moved to the conclusion that a -thoroughly logical peace programme cannot stop short of the principle -of federation. Federal troops are necessary to carry out the decrees -of a tribunal of arbitration, if that court is not to run a risk -of being held feeble and ineffectual. Except on some such basis, -arbitration, as a substitute for war, stands on but a weak footing. - - -_Disarmament._ - -The efforts of the Peace Society are directed with even less hope -of complete success against another evil of our time, the crushing -burden of modern armaments. We have peace at this moment, but at -a daily increasing cost. The Peace Society is rightly concerned -in pressing this point. It is not enough to keep off actual war: -there is a limit to the price we can afford to pay even for peace. -Probably no principle has cost Europe so much in the last century as -that handed down from Rome:—“Si vis pacem, para bellum.” It is now -a hundred and fifty years since Montesquieu[96] protested against -this “new distemper” which was spreading itself over Europe; but -never, in time of peace, has complaint been so loud or so general -as now: and this, not only against the universal burden of taxation -which weighs upon all nations alike, but, in continental countries, -against the waste of productive force due to compulsory military -service, a discontent which seems to strike at the very foundations -of society. Vattel relates that in early times a treaty of peace -generally stipulated that both parties should afterwards disarm. And -there is no doubt that Kant was right in regarding standing armies -as a danger to peace, not only as openly expressing the rivalry and -distrust between nation and nation which Hobbes regards as the basis -of international relations, but also as putting a power into the -hand of a nation which it may some day have the temptation to abuse. -A war-loving, overbearing spirit in a people thrives none the worse -for a consciousness that its army or navy can hold its own with any -other in Europe. Were it not the case that the essence of armed peace -is that a high state of efficiency should be general, the danger to -peace would be very great indeed. No doubt it is due to this fact -that France has kept quietly to her side of the Rhine during the last -thirty years. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was an immediate -stimulus to the increase of armaments; but otherwise, just because of -this greater efficiency and the slightly stronger military position -of Germany, it has been an influence on the side of peace. - - [96] _Esprit des Lois_, XIII. Chap. 17. “A new distemper has - spread itself over Europe: it has infected our princes, and - induces them to keep up an exorbitant number of troops. It has - its redoublings, and of necessity becomes contagious. For as - soon as one prince augments what he calls his troops, the rest - of course do the same: so that nothing is gained thereby but the - public ruin. Each monarch keeps as many armies on foot as if his - people were in danger of being exterminated: and they give the - name of Peace to this general effort of all against all.” - - Montesquieu is of course writing in the days of mercenary troops; - but the cost to the nation of our modern armies, both in time of - peace and of war, is incomparably greater. - -The Czar’s Rescript of 1898 gave a new stimulus to an interest in -this question which the subsequent conference at the Hague was -unable fully to satisfy. We are compelled to consider carefully -how a process of simultaneous disarmament can actually be carried -out, and what results might be anticipated from this step, with a -view not only to the present but the future. Can this be done in -accordance with the principles of justice? Organisations like a great -navy or a highly disciplined army have been built up, in the course -of centuries, at great cost and at much sacrifice to the nation. -They are the fruit of years of wise government and a high record -of national industry. Are such visible tokens of the culture and -character and worth of a people to be swept away and Britain, France, -Germany, Italy, Spain, Turkey to stand on the same level? And, even -if no such ethical considerations should arise, on what method are -we to proceed? The standard as well as the nature of armament depends -in every state on its geographical conditions and its historical -position. An ocean-bound empire like Britain is comparatively immune -from the danger of invasion: her army can be safely despatched to -the colonies, her fleet protects her at home, her position is one of -natural defence. But Germany and Austria find themselves in exactly -opposite circumstances, with the hard necessity imposed upon them of -guarding their frontiers on every side. The safety of a nation like -Germany is in the hands of its army: its military strength lies in an -almost perfect mastery of the science of attack. - -The Peace Society has hitherto made no attempt to face the -difficulties inseparable from any attempt to apply a uniform method -of treatment to peculiarities and conditions so conflicting and -various as these. Those who have been more conscientious have not -been very successful in solving them. Indeed, so constantly is -military technique changing that it is difficult to prophesy wherein -will lie, a few years hence, the essence of a state’s defensive power -or what part the modern navy will play in this defence. No careful -thinker would suggest, in the face of dangers threatening from the -East,[97] a complete disarmament. The simplest of many suggestions -made—but this on the basis of universal conscription—seems to be -that the number of years or months of compulsory military service -should be reduced to some fixed period. But this does not touch the -difficulty of colonial empires[98] like Britain which might to a -certain extent disarm, like their neighbours, in Europe, but would -be compelled to keep an army for the defence of their colonies -elsewhere. It is, in the meantime, inevitable that Europe should keep -up a high standard of armament—this is, (and even if we had European -federation, would remain) an absolute necessity as a protection -against the yellow races, and in Europe itself there are at present -elements hostile to the cause of peace. Alsace-Lorraine, Polish -Prussia, Russian Poland and Finland are still, to a considerable -degree, sources of discontent and dissatisfaction. But in Russia -itself lies the great obstacle to a future European peace or -European federation: we can scarcely picture Russia as a reliable -member of such a union. That Russia should disarm is scarcely -feasible, in view of its own interest: it has always to face the -danger of rebellion in Poland and anarchy at home. But that Europe -should disarm, before Russia has attained a higher civilisation, a -consciousness of its great future as a north-eastern, inter-oceanic -empire, and a government more favourable to the diffusion of liberty, -is still less practicable.[99] We have here to fall back upon -federation again. It is not impossible that, in the course of time, -this problem may be solved and that the contribution to the federal -troops of a European union may be regulated upon some equitable basis -the form of which we cannot now well prophesy. - - [97] Even St. Pierre was alive to this danger (_Projet_, - Art. VIII: in the English translation of 1714, p. 160):—“The - _European_ Union shall endeavour to obtain in _Asia_, a - _permanent_ society like that of _Europe_, that Peace may be - maintain’d There also; and especially that it may have no cause - to fear any _Asiatic_ Sovereign, either as to its tranquillity, - or its Commerce in _Asia_.” - - [98] Bentham’s suggestion would be useful here! See above, p. 79, - _note_. - - [99] The best thing for Europe might be that Russia (perhaps - including China) should be regarded as a serious danger by all - the civilised powers of the West. _That_ would bring us nearer to - the United States of Europe _and_ America (for the United States, - America, is Russia’s neighbour on the East) than anything else. - -European federation would likewise meet all difficulties where -a risk might be likely to occur of one nation intervening to -protect another. As we have said (above, p. 64, _note_) nations -are now-a-days slow to intervene in the interests of humanity: -they are in general constrained to do so only by strong motives -of self-interest, and when these are not at hand they are said to -refrain from respect for another’s right of independent action. -Actually a state which is actuated by less selfish impulses is apt to -lose considerably more than it gains, and the feeling of the people -expresses itself strongly against any quixotic or sentimental policy. -It is not impossible that the Powers may have yet to intervene to -protect Turkey against Russia. Such a step might well be dictated -purely by a proper care for the security of Europe; but wars of this -kind seem not likely to play an important part in the near future. - -We have said that the causes of difference which may be expected -to disturb the peace of Europe are now fewer. A modern sovereign -no longer spends his leisure time in the excitement of slaying or -seeing slain. He could not, if he would. His honour and his vanity -are protected by other means: they play no longer an important part -in the affairs of nations. The causes of war can no more be either -trifling or personal. Some crises there are, which are ever likely to -be fatal to peace. There present themselves, in the lives of nations, -ideal ends for which everything must be sacrificed: there are rights -which must at all cost be defended. The question of civil war we -may neglect: liberty and wise government are the only medicine for -social discontent, and much may be hoped from that in the future. -But now, looking beyond the state to the great family of civilised -nations, we may say that the one certain cause of war between them -or of rebellion within a future federated union will be a menace to -the sovereign rights, the independence and existence of any member -of that federation. Other causes of quarrel offer a more hopeful -prospect. Some questions have been seen to be specially fitted for -the legal procedure of a tribunal of arbitration, others to be such -as a federal court would quickly settle. The preservation of the -balance of power which Frederick the Great regarded as the talisman -of peace in Europe—a judgment surely not borne out by experience—is -happily one of the causes of war which are of the past. Wars of -colonisation, such as would be an attempt on the part of Russia to -conquer India, seem scarcely likely to recur except between higher -and lower races. The cost is now-a-days too great. Political wars, -wars for national union and unity, of which there were so many -during the past century, seem at present not to be near at hand; and -the integration of European nations—what may be called the great -mission of war—is, for the moment, practically complete; for it is -highly improbable that either Alsace-Lorraine or Poland—still less -Finland—will be the cause of a war of this kind. - -Our hope lies in a federated Europe. Its troops would serve to -preserve law and order in the country from which they were drawn and -to protect its colonies abroad; but their higher function would -be to keep peace in Europe, to protect the weaker members of the -Federation and to enforce the decision of the majority, either, if -necessary, by actual war, or by the mere threatening demonstrations -of fleets, such as have before proved effectual. - -We have carefully considered what has been attempted by peace -workers, and we have now to take note that all the results of the -last fifty years are not to be attributed to their conscientious -but often ill-directed labour. The diminution of the causes of war -is to be traced less to the efforts of the Peace Society, (except -indirectly, in so far as they have influenced the minds of the -masses) than to the increasing power of the people themselves. -The various classes of society are opposed to violent methods of -settlement, not in the main from a conviction as to the wrongfulness -of war or from any fanatical enthusiasm for a brotherhood of nations, -but from self-interest. War is death to the industrial interests of -a nation. It is vain to talk, in the language of past centuries, -of trade between civilised countries being advanced and markets -opened up or enlarged by this means.[100] Kings give up the dream -of military glory and accept instead the certainty of peaceful -labour and industrial progress, and all this (for we may believe -that to some monarchs it is much) from no enthusiastic appreciation -of the efforts of Peace Societies, from no careful examination of -the New Testament nor inspired interpretation of its teaching. It -is self-interest, the prosperity of the country—patriotism, if you -will—that seems better than war. - - [100] Trade in barbarous or savage countries is still increased - by war, especially on the French and German plan which leaves no - open door to other nations. Here the trade follows the flag. And - war, of course, among civilised races causes small nations to - disappear and their tariffs with them. _This_ is beneficial to - trade, but to a degree so trifling that it may here be neglected. - - -_What may be expected from Federation._ - -Federation and federation alone can help out the programme -of the Peace Society. It cannot be pretended that it will do -everything. To state the worst at once, it will not prevent war. -Even the federations of the states of Germany and America, bound -together by ties of blood and language and, in the latter case, of -sentiment, were not strong enough within to keep out dissension and -disunion.[101] Wars would not cease, but they would become much less -frequent. “Why is there no longer war between England and Scotland? -Why did Prussian and Hanoverian fight side by side in 1870, though -they had fought against each other only four years before?... If -we wish to know how war is to cease, we should ask ourselves how it -_has_ ceased” (Professor D. G. Ritchie, _op. cit._, p. 169). Wars -between different grades of civilisation are bound to exist as long -as civilisation itself exists. The history of culture and of progress -has been more or less a history of war. A calm acceptance of this -position may mean to certain short-sighted, enthusiastic theorists -an impossible sacrifice of the ideal; but, the sacrifice once made, -we stand on a better footing with regard to at least one class of -arguments against a federation of the world. Such a union will lead, -it is said, to an equality in culture, a sameness of interests fatal -to progress; all struggle and conflict will be cast out of the -state itself; national characteristics and individuality will be -obliterated; the lamb and the wolf will lie down together: stagnation -will result, intellectual progress will be at an end, politics will -be no more, history will stand still. This is a sweeping assertion, -an alarming prophecy. But a little thought will assure us that there -is small cause for apprehension. There can be no such standstill, -no millennium in human affairs. A gradual smoothing down of sharply -accentuated national characteristics there might be: this is a result -which a freer, more friendly intercourse between nations would be -very likely to produce. But conflicting interests, keen rivalry -in their pursuit, difference of culture and natural aptitude, and -all or much of the individuality which language and literature, -historical and religious traditions, even climatic and physical -conditions produce are bound to survive until the coming of some more -overwhelming and far-spreading revolution than this. It would not -be well if it were otherwise, if those “unconscious and invisible -peculiarities” in which Fichte sees the hand of God and the guarantee -of a nation’s future dignity, virtue and merit should be swept away. -(_Reden an die deutsche Nation_,[102] 1807.) Nor is stagnation to be -feared. “Strife,” said the old philosopher, “is the father of all -things.” There can be no lasting peace in the processes of nature and -existence. It has been in the constant rivalry between classes within -themselves, and in the struggle for existence with other races that -great nations have reached the highwater mark of their development. -A perpetual peace in international relations we may—nay, surely -will—one day have, but eternity will not see the end to the feverish -unrest within the state and the jealous competition and distrust -between individuals, groups and classes of society. Here there must -ever be perpetual war. - - [101] Cf. also the civil war of 1847 in Switzerland. - - [102] See _Werke_, VII., p. 467. - -It was only of this political peace between civilised nations that -Kant thought.[103] In this form it is bound to come. The federation -of Europe will follow the federation of Germany and of Italy, not -only because it offers a solution of many problems which have long -taxed Europe, but because great men and careful thinkers believe in -it.[104] It may not come quickly, but such men can afford to wait. -“If I were legislator,” cried Jean Jacques Rousseau, “I should not -say what ought to be done, but I would do it.” This is the attitude -of the unthinking, unpractical enthusiast. The wish is not enough: -the will is not enough. The mills of God must take their own time: no -hope or faith of ours, no struggle or labour even can hurry them. - - [103] The other he knew was impossible. Peace within the state - meant decay and death. In the antagonism of nations, he saw - nature’s means of educating the race: it was a law of existence, - a law of progress, and, as such, eternal. - - [104] For a vivid picture of the material advantages offered by - such a union and of the dismal future that may lie before an - unfederated Europe, we cannot do better than read Mr. Andrew - Carnegie’s recent Rectorial Address to the students of St. - Andrews University (Oct 1902). Unfortunately, Mr. Carnegie’s - enthusiasm stops here: he does not tell us by what means the - difficulties at present in the way of a federation, industrial or - political, are to be overcome. - -It is a misfortune that the Peace Society has identified itself -with so narrow and uncritical an attitude towards war, and that the -copious eloquence of its members is not based upon a consideration -of the practical difficulties of the case. This well-meaning, hard -working and enthusiastic body would like to do what is impossible -by an impossible method. The end which it sets for itself is an -unattainable one. But this need not be so. To make unjustifiable -aggression difficult, to banish unworthy pretexts for making war -might be a high enough ideal for any enthusiasm and offer scope wide -enough for the labours of any society. But the Peace Society has not -contented itself with this great work. Through its over-estimation -of the value of peace,[105] its cause has been injured and much of -its influence has been weakened or lost. Our age is one which sets -a high value upon human life; and to this change of thinking may be -traced our modern reform in the methods of war and all that has been -done for the alleviation of suffering by the great Conventions of -recent years. For the eyes of most people war is merely a hideous -spectacle of bloodshed and deliberate destruction of life: this is -its obvious side. But it is possible to exaggerate this confessedly -great evil. Peace has its sacrifices as well as war: the progress of -humanity requires that the individual should often be put aside for -the sake of lasting advantage to the whole. An opposite view can only -be reckoned individualistic, perhaps materialistic. “The reverence -for human life,” says Martineau, (_Studies of Christianity_, pp. 352, -354) “is carried to an immoral idolatry, when it is held more sacred -than justice and right, and when the spectacle of blood becomes -more horrible than the sight of desolating tyrannies and triumphant -hypocrisies.... We have, therefore, no more doubt that a war may be -right, than that a policeman may be a security for justice, and we -object to a fortress as little as to a handcuff.” - - [105] Professor D. G. Ritchie remarks that it is less an - over-estimation of the value of peace than a too easy-going - acceptance of abstract and unanalysed phrases about the rights of - nations that injures the work of the Peace Society. Cf. his note - on the principles of the Peace Congresses (_op. cit._, p. 172). - -The Peace Society are not of this opinion: they greatly doubt that a -war may be right, and they rarely fail to take their doubts to the -tribunal of Scripture. Their efforts are well meant, this piety may -be genuine enough; but a text is rarely a proof of anything, and in -any case serves one man in as good stead as another. We remember that -“the devil can cite Scripture for his purpose.” This unscientific -method of proof or persuasion has ever been widely popular. It is -a serious examination of the question that we want, a more careful -study of its actual history and of the possibilities of human nature; -less vague, exaggerated language about what ought to be done, and a -realisation of what has been actually achieved; above all, a clear -perception of what may fairly be asked from the future. - -It used to be said—is perhaps asserted still by the war-lovers—that -there was no path to civilisation which had not been beaten by the -force of arms, no height to which the sword had not led the way. The -inspiration of war was upon the great arts of civilisation: its hand -was upon the greatest of the sciences. These obligations extended -even to commerce. War not only created new branches of industry, it -opened new markets and enlarged the old. These are great claims, -according to which war might be called the moving principle of -history. If we keep our eyes fixed upon the history of the past, they -seem not only plausible: they are in a great sense true. Progress -did tread at the heels of the great Alexander’s army: the advance of -European culture stands in the closest connection with the Crusades. -But was this happy compensation for a miserable state of affairs not -due to the peculiarly unsocial conditions of early times and the -absence of every facility for the interchange of ideas or material -advantages? It is inconceivable that now-a-days[106] any aid to the -development of thought in Europe should come from war. The old -adage, in more than a literal sense, has but too often been proved -true:—“Inter arma, Musae silent.” Peace is for us the real promoter -of culture. - - [106] The day is past, when a nation could enjoy the exclusive - advantages of its own inventions. Vattel naively recommends that - we should keep the knowledge of certain kinds of trade, the - building of war-ships and the like, to ourselves. Prudence, he - says, prevents us from making an enemy stronger and the care of - our own safety forbids it. (_Law of Nations_, II. Ch. I. § 16.) - -We have to endeavour to take an intermediate course between -uncritical praise and wholesale condemnation, between extravagant -expectation and unjustifiable pessimism. War used to be the rule: it -is now an overwhelming and terrible exception—an interruption to the -peaceful prosperous course of things, inflicting unlimited suffering -and temporary or lasting loss. Its evils are on the surface, apparent -to the most unthinking observer. The day may yet dawn, when Europeans -will have learned to regard the force of arms as an instrument for -the civilisation of savage or half-savage races, and war within -their continent as civil war, necessary and justifiable sometimes -perhaps, but still a blot upon their civilisation and brotherhood as -men. Such a suggestion rings strangely. But the great changes, which -the roll of centuries has marked, once came upon the world not less -unexpectedly. How far off must the idea of a civil peace have seemed -to small towns and states of Europe in the fifteenth century! How -strange, only a century ago, would the idea of applying steam power -or electrical force have seemed to ourselves! Let us not despair. War -has played a great part in the history of the world: it has been ever -the great architect of nations, the true mother of cities. It has -justified itself to-day in the union of kindred peoples, the making -of great empires. It may be that one decisive war may yet be required -to unite Europe. May Europe survive that struggle and go forward -fearlessly to her great future! A peaceful future that may not be. It -must never be forgotten that war is sometimes a moral duty, that it -is ever the natural sequence of human passion and human prejudice. An -unbroken peace we cannot and do not expect; but it is this that we -must work for. As Kant says, we must keep it before us as an ideal. - - - - -TRANSLATION[107] - -“PERPETUAL PEACE”[108] - - - [107] The text used in this translation is that edited by - Kehrbach. [Tr.] - - [108] I have seen something of M. de St. Pierre’s plan for - maintaining perpetual peace in Europe. It reminds me of an - inscription outside of a churchyard, which ran “_Pax Perpetua._ - For the dead, it is true, fight no more. But the living are of - another mind, and the mightiest among them have little respect - for tribunals.” (Leibniz: _Letter to Grimarest_, quoted above, p. - 37, note 44.) [Tr.] - -We need not try to decide whether this satirical inscription, (once -found on a Dutch innkeeper’s sign-board above the picture of a -churchyard) is aimed at mankind in general, or at the rulers of -states in particular, unwearying in their love of war, or perhaps -only at the philosophers who cherish the sweet dream of perpetual -peace. The author of the present sketch would make one stipulation, -however. The practical politician stands upon a definite footing with -the theorist: with great self-complacency he looks down upon him as -a mere pedant whose empty ideas can threaten no danger to the state -(starting as it does from principles derived from experience), and -who may always be permitted to knock down his eleven skittles at -once without a worldly-wise statesman needing to disturb himself. -Hence, in the event of a quarrel arising between the two, the -practical statesman must always act consistently, and not scent -danger to the state behind opinions ventured by the theoretical -politician at random and publicly expressed. With which saving clause -(_clausula salvatoria_) the author will herewith consider himself -duly and expressly protected against all malicious misinterpretation. - - - - -_FIRST SECTION_ - -CONTAINING THE PRELIMINARY ARTICLES OF PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES - - -1.—“No treaty of peace shall be regarded as valid, if made with the -secret reservation of material for a future war.” - -For then it would be a mere truce, a mere suspension of hostilities, -not peace. A peace signifies the end of all hostilities and to attach -to it the epithet “eternal” is not only a verbal pleonasm, but -matter of suspicion. The causes of a future war existing, although -perhaps not yet known to the high contracting parties themselves, are -entirely annihilated by the conclusion of peace, however acutely -they may be ferreted out of documents in the public archives. There -may be a mental reservation of old claims to be thought out at a -future time, which are, none of them, mentioned at this stage, -because both parties are too much exhausted to continue the war, -while the evil intention remains of using the first favourable -opportunity for further hostilities. Diplomacy of this kind only -Jesuitical casuistry can justify: it is beneath the dignity of a -ruler, just as acquiescence in such processes of reasoning is beneath -the dignity of his minister, if one judges the facts as they really -are.[109] - - [109] On the honourable interpretation of treaties, see Vattel - (_op. cit._, II. Ch. XVII., esp. §§ 263-296, 291). See also what - he says of the validity of treaties and the necessity for holding - them sacred (II. Ch. XII. §§ 157, 158: II. Ch. XV). [Tr.] - -If, however, according to present enlightened ideas of political -wisdom, the true glory of a state lies in the uninterrupted -development of its power by every possible means, this judgment must -certainly strike one as scholastic and pedantic. - - -2.—“No state having an independent existence—whether it be great or -small—shall be acquired by another through inheritance, exchange, -purchase or donation.”[110] - - [110] “Even the smoothest way,” says Hume, (_Of the Original - Contract_) “by which a nation may receive a foreign master, by - marriage or a will, is not extremely honourable for the people; - but supposes them to be disposed of, like a dowry or a legacy, - according to the pleasure or interest of their rulers.” [Tr.] - -For a state is not a property (_patrimonium_), as may be the ground -on which its people are settled. It is a society of human beings -over whom no one but itself has the right to rule and to dispose. -Like the trunk of a tree, it has its own roots, and to graft it on -to another state is to do away with its existence as a moral person, -and to make of it a thing. Hence it is in contradiction to the idea -of the original contract without which no right over a people is -thinkable.[111] Everyone knows to what danger the bias in favour of -these modes of acquisition has brought Europe (in other parts of -the world it has never been known). The custom of marriage between -states, as if they were individuals, has survived even up to the most -recent times,[112] and is regarded partly as a new kind of industry -by which ascendency may be acquired through family alliances, without -any expenditure of strength; partly as a device for territorial -expansion. Moreover, the hiring out of the troops of one state to -another to fight against an enemy not at war with their native -country is to be reckoned in this connection; for the subjects are in -this way used and abused at will as personal property. - - [111] An hereditary kingdom is not a state which can be inherited - by another state, but one whose sovereign power can be inherited - by another physical person. The state then acquires a ruler, not - the ruler as such (that is, as one already possessing another - realm) the state. - - [112] This has been one of the causes of the extraordinary - admixture of races in the modern Austrian empire. Cf. the lines - of Matthias Corvinus of Hungary (quoted in Sir W. Stirling - Maxwell’s _Cloister Life of Charles the Fifth_, Ch. I., _note_):— - - “Bella gerant alii, tu, felix Austria, nube! - Nam quae Mars aliis, dat tibi regna Venus.” [Tr.] - - -3.—“Standing armies (_miles perpetuus_) shall be abolished in course -of time.” - -For they are always threatening other states with war by appearing -to be in constant readiness to fight. They incite the various states -to outrival one another in the number of their soldiers, and to this -number no limit can be set. Now, since owing to the sums devoted -to this purpose, peace at last becomes even more oppressive than a -short war, these standing armies are themselves the cause of wars of -aggression, undertaken in order to get rid of this burden. To which -we must add that the practice of hiring men to kill or to be killed -seems to imply a use of them as mere machines and instruments in the -hand of another (namely, the state) which cannot easily be reconciled -with the right of humanity in our own person.[113] The matter stands -quite differently in the case of voluntary periodical military -exercise on the part of citizens of the state, who thereby seek to -secure themselves and their country against attack from without. - - [113] A Bulgarian Prince thus answered the Greek Emperor who - magnanimously offered to settle a quarrel with him, not by - shedding the blood of his subjects, but by a duel:—“A smith who - has tongs will not take the red-hot iron from the fire with his - hands.” - - (This note is a-wanting in the second Edition of 1796. It is - repeated in Art. II., see p. 130.) [Tr.] - -The accumulation of treasure in a state would in the same way be -regarded by other states as a menace of war, and might compel them to -anticipate this by striking the first blow. For of the three forces, -the power of arms, the power of alliance and the power of money, the -last might well become the most reliable instrument of war, did not -the difficulty of ascertaining the amount stand in the way. - - -4.—“No national debts shall be contracted in connection with the -external affairs of the state.” - -This source of help is above suspicion, where assistance is sought -outside or within the state, on behalf of the economic administration -of the country (for instance, the improvement of the roads, the -settlement and support of new colonies, the establishment of -granaries to provide against seasons of scarcity, and so on). But, -as a common weapon used by the Powers against one another, a credit -system under which debts go on indefinitely increasing and are yet -always assured against immediate claims (because all the creditors -do not put in their claim at once) is a dangerous money power. This -ingenious invention of a commercial people in the present century -is, in other words, a treasure for the carrying on of war which may -exceed the treasures of all the other states taken together, and -can only be exhausted by a threatening deficiency in the taxes—an -event, however, which will long be kept off by the very briskness -of commerce resulting from the reaction of this system on industry -and trade. The ease, then, with which war may be waged, coupled with -the inclination of rulers towards it—an inclination which seems -to be implanted in human nature—is a great obstacle in the way of -perpetual peace. The prohibition of this system must be laid down as -a preliminary article of perpetual peace, all the more necessarily -because the final inevitable bankruptcy of the state in question -must involve in the loss many who are innocent; and this would be -a public injury to these states. Therefore other nations are at -least justified in uniting themselves against such an one and its -pretensions. - - -5.—“No state shall violently interfere with the constitution and -administration of another.” - -For what can justify it in so doing? The scandal which is here -presented to the subjects of another state? The erring state can -much more serve as a warning by exemplifying the great evils which a -nation draws down on itself through its own lawlessness. Moreover, -the bad example which one free person gives another, (as _scandalum -acceptum_) does no injury to the latter. In this connection, it is -true, we cannot count the case of a state which has become split up -through internal corruption into two parts, each of them representing -by itself an individual state which lays claim to the whole. Here -the yielding of assistance to one faction could not be reckoned as -interference on the part of a foreign state with the constitution of -another, for here anarchy prevails. So long, however, as the inner -strife has not yet reached this stage the interference of other -powers would be a violation of the rights of an independent nation -which is only struggling with internal disease.[114] It would -therefore itself cause a scandal, and make the autonomy of all states -insecure. - - [114] See Vattel: _Law of Nations_, II. Ch. IV. § 55. No - foreign power, he says, has a right to judge the conduct and - administration of any sovereign or oblige him to alter it. “If - he loads his subjects with taxes, or if he treats them with - severity, the nation alone is concerned; and no other is called - upon to offer redress for his behaviour, or oblige him to follow - more wise and equitable maxims.... But (_loc. cit._ § 56) when - the bands of the political society are broken, or at least - suspended, between the sovereign and his people, the contending - parties may then be considered at two distinct powers; and, since - they are both equally independent of all foreign authority, - nobody has a right to judge them. Either may be in the right; and - each of those who grant their assistance may imagine that he is - giving his support to the better cause.” [Tr.] - - -6.—“No state at war with another shall countenance such modes of -hostility as would make mutual confidence impossible in a subsequent -state of peace: such are the employment of assassins (_percussores_) -or of poisoners (_venefici_), breaches of capitulation, the -instigating and making use of treachery (_perduellio_) in the hostile -state.” - -These are dishonourable stratagems. For some kind of confidence in -the disposition of the enemy must exist even in the midst of war, -as otherwise peace could not be concluded, and the hostilities -would pass into a war of extermination (_bellum internecinum_). -War, however, is only our wretched expedient of asserting a right -by force, an expedient adopted in the state of nature, where no -court of justice exists which could settle the matter in dispute. In -circumstances like these, neither of the two parties can be called -an unjust enemy, because this form of speech presupposes a legal -decision: the issue of the conflict—just as in the case of the -so-called judgments of God—decides on which side right is. Between -states, however, no punitive war (_bellum punitivum_) is thinkable, -because between them a relation of superior and inferior does not -exist. Whence it follows that a war of extermination, where the -process of annihilation would strike both parties at once and all -right as well, would bring about perpetual peace only in the great -graveyard of the human race. Such a war then, and therefore also the -use of all means which lead to it, must be absolutely forbidden. -That the methods just mentioned do inevitably lead to this result -is obvious from the fact that these infernal arts, already vile in -themselves, on coming into use, are not long confined to the sphere -of war. Take, for example, the use of spies (_uti exploratoribus_). -Here only the dishonesty of others is made use of; but vices such -as these, when once encouraged, cannot in the nature of things be -stamped out and would be carried over into the state of peace, where -their presence would be utterly destructive to the purpose of that -state. - -Although the laws stated are, objectively regarded, (_i.e._ in so far -as they affect the action of rulers) purely prohibitive laws (_leges -prohibitivæ_), some of them (_leges strictæ_) are strictly valid -without regard to circumstances and urgently require to be enforced. -Such are Nos. 1, 5, 6. Others, again, (like Nos. 2, 3, 4) although -not indeed exceptions to the maxims of law, yet in respect of the -practical application of these maxims allow subjectively of a certain -latitude to suit particular circumstances. The enforcement of these -_leges latæ_ may be legitimately put off, so long as we do not lose -sight of the ends at which they aim. This purpose of reform does not -permit of the deferment of an act of restitution (as, for example, -the restoration to certain states of freedom of which they have been -deprived in the manner described in article 2) to an infinitely -distant date—as Augustus used to say, to the “Greek Kalends”, a day -that will never come. This would be to sanction non-restitution. -Delay is permitted only with the intention that restitution should -not be made too precipitately and so defeat the purpose we have -in view. For the prohibition refers here only to the _mode of -acquisition_ which is to be no longer valid, and not to the _fact of -possession_ which, although indeed it has not the necessary title of -right, yet at the time of so-called acquisition was held legal by all -states, in accordance with the public opinion of the time.[115] - - [115] It has been hitherto doubted, not without reason, whether - there can be laws of permission (_leges permissivæ_) of pure - reason as well as commands (_leges præceptivæ_) and prohibitions - (_leges prohibitivæ_). For law in general has a basis of - objective practical necessity: permission, on the other hand, is - based upon the contingency of certain actions in practice. It - follows that a law of permission would enforce what cannot be - enforced; and this would involve a contradiction, if the object - of the law should be the same in both cases. Here, however, - in the present case of a law of permission, the presupposed - prohibition is aimed merely at the future manner of acquisition - of a right—for example, acquisition through inheritance: the - exemption from this prohibition (_i.e._ the permission) refers - to the present state of possession. In the transition from a - state of nature to the civil state, this holding of property can - continue as a _bona fide_, if usurpatory, ownership, under the - new social conditions, in accordance with a permission of the Law - of Nature. Ownership of this kind, as soon as its true nature - becomes known, is seen to be mere nominal possession (_possessio - putativa_) sanctioned by opinion and customs in a natural state - of society. After the transition stage is passed, such modes of - acquisition are likewise forbidden in the subsequently evolved - civil state: and this power to remain in possession would not - be admitted if the supposed acquisition had taken place in the - civilized community. It would be bound to come to an end as an - injury to the right of others, the moment its illegality became - patent. - - I have wished here only by the way to draw the attention of - teachers of the Law of Nature to the idea of a _lex permissiva_ - which presents itself spontaneously in any system of rational - classification. I do so chiefly because use is often made of - this concept in civil law with reference to statutes; with this - difference, that the law of prohibition stands alone by itself, - while permission is not, as it ought to be, introduced into that - law as a limiting clause, but is thrown among the exceptions. - Thus “this or that is forbidden”,—say, Nos. 1, 2, 3, and so on - in an infinite progression,—while permissions are only added to - the law incidentally: they are not reached by the application of - some principle, but only by groping about among cases which have - actually occurred. Were this not so, qualifications would have - had to be brought into the formula of laws of prohibition which - would have immediately transformed them into laws of permission. - Count von Windischgrätz, a man whose wisdom was equal to his - discrimination, urged this very point in the form of a question - propounded by him for a prize essay. One must therefore regret - that this ingenious problem has been so soon neglected and left - unsolved. For the possibility of a formula similar to those of - mathematics is the sole real test of a legislation that would be - consistent. Without this, the so-called _jus certum_ will remain - forever a mere pious wish: we can have only general laws valid - on the whole; no general laws possessing the universal validity - which the concept law seems to demand. - - - - -_SECOND SECTION_ - -CONTAINING THE DEFINITIVE ARTICLES OF A PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES - -A state of peace among men who live side by side is not the natural -state (_status naturalis_), which is rather to be described as a -state of war:[116] that is to say, although there is not perhaps -always actual open hostility, yet there is a constant threatening -that an outbreak may occur. Thus the state of peace must be -_established_.[117] For the mere cessation of hostilities is no -guarantee of continued peaceful relations, and unless this guarantee -is given by every individual to his neighbour—which can only be done -in a state of society regulated by law—one man is at liberty to -challenge another and treat him as an enemy.[118] - - [116] “From this diffidence of one another, there is no way for - any man to secure himself, so reasonable, as anticipation; that - is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, - so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: - and this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is - generally allowed.” (Hobbes: _Lev._ I. Ch. XIII.) [Tr.] - - [117] Hobbes thus describes the establishment of the state. “A - _commonwealth_ is said to be _instituted_, when a _multitude_ - of men do agree, and _covenant, every one, with every one_, - that to whatsoever _man_, or _assembly of men_, shall be given - by the major part, the _right_ to _present_ the person of them - all, that is to say, to be their _representative_; everyone, - as well he that _voted for it_, as he that _voted against it_, - shall _authorize_ all the actions and judgments, of that man, or - assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to - the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected - against other men.” (_Lev._ II. Ch. XVIII.) - - There is a covenant between them, “as if every man should say to - every man, _I authorise and give up my right of governing myself, - to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that - thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in - like manner_.” (_Lev._ II. Ch. XVII.) [Tr.] - - [118] It is usually accepted that a man may not take hostile - steps against any one, unless the latter has already injured - him by act. This is quite accurate, if both are citizens of a - law-governed state. For, in becoming a member of this community, - each gives the other the security he demands against injury, by - means of the supreme authority exercising control over them both. - The individual, however, (or nation) who remains in a mere state - of nature deprives me of this security and does me injury, by - mere proximity. There is perhaps no active (_facto_) molestation, - but there is a state of lawlessness, (_status injustus_) which, - by its very existence, offers a continual menace to me. I can - therefore compel him, either to enter into relations with me - under which we are both subject to law, or to withdraw from my - neighbourhood. So that the postulate upon which the following - articles are based is:—“All men who have the power to exert - a mutual influence upon one another must be under a civil - government of some kind.” - - A legal constitution is, according to the nature of the - individuals who compose the state:— - - (1) A constitution formed in accordance with the right of - citizenship of the individuals who constitute a nation (_jus - civitatis_). - - (2) A constitution whose principle is international law which - determines the relations of states (_jus gentium_). - - (3) A constitution formed in accordance with cosmopolitan law, - in as far as individuals and states, standing in an external - relation of mutual reaction, may be regarded as citizens of one - world-state (_jus cosmopoliticum_). - - This classification is not an arbitrary one, but is necessary - with reference to the idea of perpetual peace. For, if even - one of these units of society were in a position physically to - influence another, while yet remaining a member of a primitive - order of society, then a state of war would be joined with these - primitive conditions; and from this it is our present purpose to - free ourselves. - - -FIRST DEFINITIVE ARTICLE OF PERPETUAL PEACE - -I.—“The civil constitution of each state shall be republican.” - -The only constitution which has its origin in the idea of the -original contract, upon which the lawful legislation of every nation -must be based, is the republican.[119] It is a constitution, in the -first place, founded in accordance with the principle of the freedom -of the members of society as human beings: secondly, in accordance -with the principle of the dependence of all, as subjects, on a common -legislation: and, thirdly, in accordance with the law of the equality -of the members as citizens. It is then, looking at the question of -right, the only constitution whose fundamental principles lie at the -basis of every form of civil constitution. And the only question for -us now is, whether it is also the one constitution which can lead to -perpetual peace. - - [119] Lawful, that is to say, external freedom cannot be defined, - as it so often is, as the right [_Befugniss_] “to do whatever one - likes, so long as this does not wrong anyone else.”[B] For what - is this right? It is the possibility of actions which do not lead - to the injury of others. So the explanation of a “right” would be - something like this:—“Freedom is the possibility of actions which - do not injure anyone. A man does not wrong another—whatever his - action—if he does not wrong another”: which is empty tautology. - My external (lawful) freedom is rather to be explained in - this way: it is the right through which I require not to obey - any external laws except those to which I could have given my - consent. In exactly the same way, external (legal) equality in a - state is that relation of the subjects in consequence of which - no individual can legally bind or oblige another to anything, - without at the same time submitting himself to the law which - ensures that he can, in his turn, be bound and obliged in like - manner by this other. - - [B] Hobbes’ definition of freedom is interesting. See _Lev._ II. - Ch. XXI.:—“A FREEMAN, _is he, that in those things, which by his - strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he - has a will to_.” [Tr.] - - The principle of lawful independence requires no explanation, - as it is involved in the general concept of a constitution. - The validity of this hereditary and inalienable right, which - belongs of necessity to mankind, is affirmed and ennobled by the - principle of a lawful relation between man himself and higher - beings, if indeed he believes in such beings. This is so, because - he thinks of himself, in accordance with these very principles, - as a citizen of a transcendental world as well as of the world - of sense. For, as far as my freedom goes, I am bound by no - obligation even with regard to Divine Laws—which are apprehended - by me only through my reason—except in so far as I could have - given my assent to them; for it is through the law of freedom - of my own reason that I first form for myself a concept of a - Divine Will. As for the principle of equality, in so far as it - applies to the most sublime being in the universe next to God—a - being I might perhaps figure to myself as a mighty emanation of - the Divine spirit,—there is no reason why, if I perform my duty - in the sphere in which I am placed, as that aeon does in his, - the duty of obedience alone should fall to my share, the right - to command to him. That this principle of equality, (unlike the - principle of freedom), does not apply to our relation to God is - due to the fact that, to this Being alone, the idea of duty does - not belong. - - As for the right to equality which belongs to all citizens as - subjects, the solution of the problem of the admissibility of - an hereditary nobility hinges on the following question:—“Does - social rank—acknowledged by the state to be higher in the case - of one subject than another—stand above desert, or does merit - take precedence of social standing?” Now it is obvious that, if - high position is combined with good family, it is quite uncertain - whether merit, that is to say, skill and fidelity in office, will - follow as well. This amounts to granting the favoured individual - a commanding position without any question of desert; and to - that, the universal will of the people—expressed in an original - contract which is the fundamental principle of all right—would - never consent. For it does not follow that a nobleman is a man - of noble character. In the case of the official nobility, as one - might term the rank of higher magistracy—which one must acquire - by merit—the social position is not attached like property to the - person but to his office, and equality is not thereby disturbed; - for, if a man gives up office, he lays down with it his official - rank and falls back into the rank of his fellows. - -Now the republican constitution apart from the soundness of its -origin, since it arose from the pure source of the concept of right, -has also the prospect of attaining the desired result, namely, -perpetual peace. And the reason is this. If, as must be so under this -constitution, the consent of the subjects is required to determine -whether there shall be war or not, nothing is more natural than that -they should weigh the matter well, before undertaking such a bad -business. For in decreeing war, they would of necessity be resolving -to bring down the miseries of war upon their country. This implies: -they must fight themselves; they must hand over the costs of the war -out of their own property; they must do their poor best to make good -the devastation which it leaves behind; and finally, as a crowning -ill, they have to accept a burden of debt which will embitter even -peace itself, and which they can never pay off on account of the new -wars which are always impending. On the other hand, in a government -where the subject is not a citizen holding a vote, (_i.e._ in a -constitution which is not republican), the plunging into war is the -least serious thing in the world. For the ruler is not a citizen, -but the owner of the state, and does not lose a whit by the war, -while he goes on enjoying the delights of his table or sport, or -of his pleasure palaces and gala days. He can therefore decide on -war for the most trifling reasons, as if it were a kind of pleasure -party.[120] Any justification of it that is necessary for the sake of -decency he can leave without concern to the diplomatic corps who are -always only too ready with their services. - - [120] Cf. Cowper: _The Winter Morning Walk_:— - - “But is it fit, or can it bear the shock - Of rational discussion, that a man, - Compounded and made up like other men - Of elements tumultuous, . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Should when he pleases, and on whom he will, - Wage war, with any or with no pretence - Of provocation giv’n or wrong sustain’d, - And force the beggarly last doit, by means - That his own humour dictates, from the clutch - Of poverty, that thus he may procure - His thousands, weary of penurious life, - A splendid opportunity to die?” - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - “He deems a thousand or ten thousand lives - Spent in the purchase of renown for him, - An easy reckoning.” [Tr.] - - - * * * * * - - -The following remarks must be made in order that we may not fall into -the common error of confusing the republican with the democratic -constitution. The forms of the state (_civitas_)[121] may be -classified according to either of two principles of division:—the -difference of the persons who hold the supreme authority in the -state, and the manner in which the people are governed by their -ruler whoever he may be. The first is properly called the form -of sovereignty (_forma imperii_), and there can be only three -constitutions differing in this respect: where, namely, the supreme -authority belongs to only one, to several individuals working -together, or to the whole people constituting the civil society. Thus -we have autocracy or the sovereignty of a monarch, aristocracy or -the sovereignty of the nobility, and democracy or the sovereignty -of the people. The second principle of division is the form of -government (_forma regiminis_), and refers to the way in which the -state makes use of its supreme power: for the manner of government -is based on the constitution, itself the act of that universal will -which transforms a multitude into a nation. In this respect the form -of government is either republican or despotic. Republicanism is the -political principle of severing the executive power of the government -from the legislature. Despotism is that principle in pursuance of -which the state arbitrarily puts into effect laws which it has itself -made: consequently it is the administration of the public will, but -this is identical with the private will of the ruler. Of these three -forms of a state, democracy, in the proper sense of the word, is -of necessity despotism, because it establishes an executive power, -since all decree regarding—and, if need be, against—any individual -who dissents from them. Therefore the “whole people”, so-called, who -carry their measure are really not all, but only a majority: so that -here the universal will is in contradiction with itself and with the -principle of freedom. - - [121] Cf. Hobbes: _On Dominion_, Ch. VII. § 1. “As for the - difference of cities, it is taken from the difference of the - persons to whom the supreme power is committed. This power is - committed either to _one man_, or _council_, or some _one court_ - consisting of many men.” [Tr.] - -Every form of government in fact which is not representative is -really no true constitution at all, because a law-giver may no more -be, in one and the same person, the administrator of his own will, -than the universal major premise of a syllogism may be, at the same -time, the subsumption under itself of the particulars contained -in the minor premise. And, although the other two constitutions, -autocracy and aristocracy, are always defective in so far as -they leave the way open for such a form of government, yet there -is at least always a possibility in these cases, that they may -take the form of a government in accordance with the spirit of a -representative system. Thus Frederick the Great used at least to -_say_ that he was “merely the highest servant of the state.”[122] The -democratic constitution, on the other hand, makes this impossible, -because under such a government every one wishes to be master. We -may therefore say that the smaller the staff of the executive—that -is to say, the number of rulers—and the more real, on the other -hand, their representation of the people, so much the more is the -government of the state in accordance with a possible republicanism; -and it may hope by gradual reforms to raise itself to that standard. -For this reason, it is more difficult under an aristocracy than -under a monarchy—while under a democracy it is impossible except by -a violent revolution—to attain to this, the one perfectly lawful -constitution. The kind of government,[123] however, is of infinitely -more importance to the people than the kind of constitution, -although the greater or less aptitude of a people for this ideal -greatly depends upon such external form. The form of government, -however, if it is to be in accordance with the idea of right, must -embody the representative system in which alone a republican form -of administration is possible and without which it is despotic -and violent, be the constitution what it may. None of the ancient -so-called republics were aware of this, and they necessarily slipped -into absolute despotism which, of all despotisms, is most endurable -under the sovereignty of one individual. - - [122] The lofty appellations which are often given to a - ruler—such as the Lord’s Anointed, the Administrator of the - Divine Will upon earth and Vicar of God—have been many times - censured as flattery gross enough to make one giddy. But it - seems to me without cause. Far from making a prince arrogant, - names like these must rather make him humble at heart, if he has - any intelligence—which we take for granted he has—and reflects - that he has undertaken an office which is too great for any - human being. For, indeed, it is the holiest which God has on - earth—namely, the right of ruling mankind: and he must ever live - in fear of injuring this treasure of God in some respect or other. - - [123] Mallet du Pan boasts in his seemingly brilliant but shallow - and superficial language that, after many years experience, he - has come at last to be convinced of the truth of the well known - saying of Pope [_Essay on Man_, III. 303]:— - - “For Forms of Government let fools contest; - Whate’er is best administered is best.” - - If this means that the best administered government is best - administered, then, in Swift’s phrase, he has cracked a nut to - find a worm in it. If it means, however, that the best conducted - government is also the best kind of government,—that is, the - best form of political constitution,—then it is utterly false: - for examples of wise administration are no proof of the kind of - government. Who ever ruled better than Titus and Marcus Aurelius, - and yet the one left Domitian, the other Commodus, as his - successor? This could not have happened where the constitution - was a good one, for their absolute unfitness for the position was - early enough known, and the power of the emperor was sufficiently - great to exclude them. - - -SECOND DEFINITIVE ARTICLE OF PERPETUAL PEACE - -II.—“The law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free -states.” - -Nations, as states, may be judged like individuals who, living in the -natural state of society—that is to say, uncontrolled by external -law—injure one another through their very proximity.[124] Every -state, for the sake of its own security, may—and ought to—demand -that its neighbour should submit itself to conditions, similar to -those of the civil society where the right of every individual is -guaranteed. This would give rise to a federation of nations which, -however, would not have to be a State of nations.[125] That would -involve a contradiction. For the term “state” implies the relation of -one who rules to those who obey—that is to say, of law-giver to the -subject people: and many nations in one state would constitute only -one nation, which contradicts our hypothesis, since here we have to -consider the right of one nation against another, in so far as they -are so many separate states and are not to be fused into one. - - [124] “For as amongst masterless men, there is perpetual war, of - every man against his neighbour; no inheritance, to transmit to - the son, nor to expect from the father; no propriety of goods, - or lands; no security; but a full and absolute liberty in every - particular man: so in states, and commonwealths not dependent on - one another, every commonwealth, not every man, has an absolute - liberty, to do what it shall judge, that is to say, what that - man, or assembly that representeth it, shall judge most conducing - to their benefit. But withal, they live in the condition of - a perpetual war, and upon the confines of battle, with their - frontiers armed, and cannons planted against their neighbours - round about.” (Hobbes: _Leviathan_, II. Ch. XXI.) [Tr.] - - [125] But see p. 136, where Kant seems to speak of a State of - nations as the ideal. Kant expresses himself, on this point, more - clearly in the _Rechtslehre_, Part. II. § 61:—“The natural state - of nations,” he says here, “like that of individual men, is a - condition which must be abandoned, in order that they may enter a - state regulated by law. Hence, before this can take place, every - right possessed by these nations and every external “mine” and - “thine” [_id est_, symbol of possession] which states acquire or - preserve through war are merely _provisional_, and can become - _peremptorily_ valid and constitute a true state of peace only - in a universal _union of states_, by a process analogous to that - through which a people becomes a state. Since, however, the too - great extension of such a State of nations over vast territories - must, in the long run, make the government of that union—and - therefore the protection of each of its members—impossible, a - multitude of such corporations will lead again to a state of war. - So that _perpetual peace_, the final goal of international law - as a whole, is really an impracticable idea [_eine unausführbare - Idee_]. The political principles, however, which are directed - towards this end, (that is to say, towards the establishment of - such unions of states as may serve as a continual approximation - to that ideal), are not impracticable; on the contrary, as this - approximation is required by duty and is therefore founded also - upon the rights of men and of states, these principles are, - without doubt, capable of practical realization.” [Tr.] - -The attachment of savages to their lawless liberty, the fact -that they would rather be at hopeless variance with one another -than submit themselves to a legal authority constituted by -themselves, that they therefore prefer their senseless freedom to a -reason-governed liberty, is regarded by us with profound contempt as -barbarism and uncivilisation and the brutal degradation of humanity. -So one would think that civilised races, each formed into a state by -itself, must come out of such an abandoned condition as soon as they -possibly can. On the contrary, however, every state thinks rather -that its majesty (the “majesty” of a people is an absurd expression) -lies just in the very fact that it is subject to no external legal -authority; and the glory of the ruler consists in this, that, without -his requiring to expose himself to danger, thousands stand at his -command ready to let themselves be sacrificed for a matter of no -concern to them.[126] The difference between the savages of Europe -and those of America lies chiefly in this, that, while many tribes of -the latter have been entirely devoured by their enemies, Europeans -know a better way of using the vanquished than by eating them; and -they prefer to increase through them the number of their subjects, -and so the number of instruments at their command for still more -widely spread war. - - [126] A Greek Emperor who magnanimously volunteered to settle by - a duel his quarrel with a Bulgarian Prince, got the following - answer:—“A smith who has tongs will not pluck the glowing iron - from the fire with his hands.” - -The depravity of human nature[127] shows itself without disguise -in the unrestrained relations of nations to each other, while in -the law-governed civil state much of this is hidden by the check -of government. This being so, it is astonishing that the word -“right” has not yet been entirely banished from the politics of -war as pedantic, and that no state has yet ventured to publicly -advocate this point of view. For Hugo Grotius, Puffendorf, Vattel -and others—Job’s comforters, all of them—are always quoted in good -faith to justify an attack, although their codes, whether couched -in philosophical or diplomatic terms, have not—nor can have—the -slightest legal force, because states, as such, are under no common -external authority; and there is no instance of a state having ever -been moved by argument to desist from its purpose, even when this -was backed up by the testimony of such great men. This homage which -every state renders—in words at least—to the idea of right, proves -that, although it may be slumbering, there is, notwithstanding, to -be found in man a still higher natural moral capacity by the aid of -which he will in time gain the mastery over the evil principle in his -nature, the existence of which he is unable to deny. And he hopes the -same of others; for otherwise the word “right” would never be uttered -by states who wish to wage war, unless to deride it like the Gallic -Prince who declared:—“The privilege which nature gives the strong is -that the weak must obey them.”[128] - - [127] “Both sayings are very true: that _man to man is a kind of - God_; and that _man to man is an arrant wolf_. The first is true, - if we compare citizens amongst themselves; and the second, if we - compare cities. In the one, there is some analogy of similitude - with the Deity; to wit, justice and charity, the twin sisters - of peace. But in the other, good men must defend themselves by - taking to them for a sanctuary the two daughters of war, deceit - and violence: that is, in plain terms, a mere brutal rapacity.” - (Hobbes: Epistle Dedicatory to the _Philosophical Rudiments - concerning Government and Society_.) [Tr.] - - [128] “The strongest are still never sufficiently strong to - ensure them the continual mastership, unless they find means of - transforming force into right, and obedience into duty. - - From the right of the strongest, right takes an ironical - appearance, and is rarely established as a principle.” (_Contrat - Social_, I. Ch. III.) [Tr.] - -The method by which states prosecute their rights can never be by -process of law—as it is where there is an external tribunal—but -only by war. Through this means, however, and its favourable issue, -victory, the question of right is never decided. A treaty of peace -makes, it may be, an end to the war of the moment, but not to the -conditions of war which at any time may afford a new pretext -for opening hostilities; and this we cannot exactly condemn as -unjust, because under these conditions everyone is his own judge. -Notwithstanding, not quite the same rule applies to states according -to the law of nations as holds good of individuals in a lawless -condition according to the law of nature, namely, “that they ought -to advance out of this condition.” This is so, because, as states, -they have already within themselves a legal constitution, and have -therefore advanced beyond the stage at which others, in accordance -with their ideas of right, can force them to come under a wider -legal constitution. Meanwhile, however, reason, from her throne of -the supreme law-giving moral power, absolutely condemns war[129] as -a morally lawful proceeding, and makes a state of peace, on the -other hand, an immediate duty. Without a compact between the nations, -however, this state of peace cannot be established or assured. Hence -there must be an alliance of a particular kind which we may call a -covenant of peace (_foedus pacificum_), which would differ from a -treaty of peace (_pactum pacis_) in this respect, that the latter -merely puts an end to one war, while the former would seek to put -an end to war for ever. This alliance does not aim at the gain of -any power whatsoever of the state, but merely at the preservation -and security of the freedom of the state for itself and of other -allied states at the same time.[130] The latter do not, however, -require, for this reason, to submit themselves like individuals in -the state of nature to public laws and coercion. The practicability -or objective reality of this idea of federation which is to extend -gradually over all states and so lead to perpetual peace can be -shewn. For, if Fortune ordains that a powerful and enlightened people -should form a republic,—which by its very nature is inclined to -perpetual peace—this would serve as a centre of federal union for -other states wishing to join, and thus secure conditions of freedom -among the states in accordance with the idea of the law of nations. -Gradually, through different unions of this kind, the federation -would extend further and further. - - [129] “The natural state,” says Hobbes, (_On Dominion_, Ch. VII. - § 18) “hath the same proportion to the civil, (I mean, liberty to - subjection), which passion hath to reason, or a beast to a man.” - - Locke speaks thus of man, when he puts himself into the state of - war with another:—“having quitted reason, which God hath given - to be the rule betwixt man and man, and the common bond whereby - human kind is united into one fellowship and society; and having - renounced the way of peace which that teaches, and made use of - the force of war, to compass his unjust ends upon another, where - he has no right; and so revolting from his own kind to that of - beasts, by making force, which is theirs, to be his rule of - right, he renders himself liable to be destroyed by the injured - person, and the rest of mankind that will join with him in the - execution of justice, as any other wild beast, or noxious brute, - with whom mankind can have neither society nor security.” (_Civil - Government_, Ch. XV. § 172.) [Tr.] - - [130] Cf. Rousseau: _Gouvernement de Pologne_, Ch. V. Federate - government is “the only one which unites in itself all the - advantages of great and small states.” [Tr.] - -It is quite comprehensible that a people should say:—“There shall be -no war among us, for we shall form ourselves into a state, that is to -say, constitute for ourselves a supreme legislative, administrative -and judicial power which will settle our disputes peaceably.” But if -this state says:—“There shall be no war between me and other states, -although I recognise no supreme law-giving power which will secure -me my rights and whose rights I will guarantee;” then it is not at -all clear upon what grounds I could base my confidence in my right, -unless it were the substitute for that compact on which civil society -is based—namely, free federation which reason must necessarily -connect with the idea of the law of nations, if indeed any meaning is -to be left in that concept at all. - -There is no intelligible meaning in the idea of the law of nations -as giving a right to make war; for that must be a right to decide -what is just, not in accordance with universal, external laws -limiting the freedom of each individual, but by means of one-sided -maxims applied by force. We must then understand by this that men of -such ways of thinking are quite justly served, when they destroy -one another, and thus find perpetual peace in the wide grave which -covers all the abominations of acts of violence as well as the -authors of such deeds. For states, in their relation to one another, -there can be, according to reason, no other way of advancing from -that lawless condition which unceasing war implies, than by giving -up their savage lawless freedom, just as individual men have done, -and yielding to the coercion of public laws. Thus they can form -a State of nations (_civitas gentium_), one, too, which will be -ever increasing and would finally embrace all the peoples of the -earth. States, however, in accordance with their understanding of -the law of nations, by no means desire this, and therefore reject -_in hypothesi_ what is correct _in thesi_. Hence, instead of the -positive idea of a world-republic, if all is not to be lost, only the -negative substitute for it, a federation averting war, maintaining -its ground and ever extending over the world may stop the current -of this tendency to war and shrinking from the control of law. But -even then there will be a constant danger that this propensity may -break out.[131] “Furor impius intus—fremit horridus ore cruento.” -(Virgil.)[132] - - [131] On the conclusion of peace at the end of a war, it might - not be unseemly for a nation to appoint a day of humiliation, - after the festival of thanksgiving, on which to invoke the - mercy of Heaven for the terrible sin which the human race are - guilty of, in their continued unwillingness to submit (in their - relations with other states) to a law-governed constitution, - preferring rather in the pride of their independence to use the - barbarous method of war, which after all does not really settle - what is wanted, namely, the right of each state in a quarrel. The - feasts of thanksgiving during a war for a victorious battle, the - hymns which are sung—to use the Jewish expression—“to the Lord - of Hosts” are not in less strong contrast to the ethical idea - of a father of mankind; for, apart from the indifference these - customs show to the way in which nations seek to establish their - rights—sad enough as it is—these rejoicings bring in an element - of exultation that a great number of lives, or at least the - happiness of many, has been destroyed. - - [132] Cf. _Aeneidos_, I. 294 _seq._ - - “Furor impius intus, - Saeva sedens super arma, et centum vinctus aënis - Post tergum nodis, fremet horridus ore cruento.” [Tr.] - - -THIRD DEFINITIVE ARTICLE OF PERPETUAL PEACE - -III.—“The rights of men, as citizens of the world, shall be limited -to the conditions of universal hospitality.” - -We are speaking here, as in the previous articles, not of -philanthropy, but of right; and in this sphere hospitality signifies -the claim of a stranger entering foreign territory to be treated by -its owner without hostility. The latter may send him away again, -if this can be done without causing his death; but, so long as he -conducts himself peaceably, he must not be treated as an enemy. -It is not a right to be treated as a guest to which the stranger -can lay claim—a special friendly compact on his behalf would be -required to make him for a given time an actual inmate—but he has -a right of visitation. This right[133] to present themselves to -society belongs to all mankind in virtue of our common right of -possession on the surface of the earth on which, as it is a globe, -we cannot be infinitely scattered, and must in the end reconcile -ourselves to existence side by side: at the same time, originally -no one individual had more right than another to live in any one -particular spot. Uninhabitable portions of the surface, ocean and -desert, split up the human community, but in such a way that ships -and camels—“the ship of the desert”—make it possible for men to come -into touch with one another across these unappropriated regions -and to take advantage of our common claim to the face of the earth -with a view to a possible intercommunication. The inhospitality of -the inhabitants of certain sea coasts—as, for example, the coast of -Barbary—in plundering ships in neighbouring seas or making slaves -of shipwrecked mariners; or the behaviour of the Arab Bedouins in -the deserts, who think that proximity to nomadic tribes constitutes -a right to rob, is thus contrary to the law of nature. This right -to hospitality, however—that is to say, the privilege of strangers -arriving on foreign soil—does not amount to more than what is implied -in a permission to make an attempt at intercourse with the original -inhabitants. In this way far distant territories may enter into -peaceful relations with one another. These relations may at last -come under the public control of law, and thus the human race may be -brought nearer the realisation of a cosmopolitan constitution. - - [133] Cf. Vattel (_op. cit._, II. ch. IX. § 123):—“The right of - passage is also a remnant of the primitive state of communion, - in which the entire earth was common to all mankind, and the - passage was everywhere free to each individual according to his - necessities. Nobody can be entirely deprived of this right.” See - also above, p. 65, _note_. [Tr.] - -Let us look now, for the sake of comparison, at the inhospitable -behaviour of the civilised nations, especially the commercial -states of our continent. The injustice which they exhibit on -visiting foreign lands and races—this being equivalent in their -eyes to conquest—is such as to fill us with horror. America, the -negro countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape etc. were, on being -discovered, looked upon as countries which belonged to nobody; for -the native inhabitants were reckoned as nothing. In Hindustan, under -the pretext of intending to establish merely commercial depots, the -Europeans introduced foreign troops; and, as a result, the different -states of Hindustan were stirred up to far-spreading wars. Oppression -of the natives followed, famine, insurrection, perfidy and all the -rest of the litany of evils which can afflict mankind. - -China[134] and Japan (Nipon) which had made an attempt at receiving -guests of this kind, have now taken a prudent step. Only to a single -European people, the Dutch, has China given the right of access to -her shores (but not of entrance into the country), while Japan has -granted both these concessions; but at the same time they exclude the -Dutch who enter, as if they were prisoners, from social intercourse -with the inhabitants. The worst, or from the standpoint of ethical -judgment the best, of all this is that no satisfaction is derived -from all this violence, that all these trading companies stand on -the verge of ruin, that the Sugar Islands, that seat of the most -horrible and deliberate slavery, yield no real profit, but only have -their use indirectly and for no very praiseworthy object—namely, that -of furnishing men to be trained as sailors for the men-of-war and -thereby contributing to the carrying on of war in Europe. And this -has been done by nations who make a great ado about their piety, and -who, while they are quite ready to commit injustice, would like, in -their orthodoxy, to be considered among the elect. - - [134] In order to call this great empire by the name which - it gives itself—namely, China, not Sina or a word of similar - sound—we have only to look at Georgii: _Alphab. Tibet._, pp. - 651-654, particularly _note_ b., below. According to the - observation of Professor Fischer of St. Petersburg, there is - really no particular name which it always goes by: the most - usual is the word _Kin_, _i.e._ gold, which the inhabitants of - Tibet call _Ser_. Hence the emperor is called the king of gold, - _i.e._ the king of the most splendid country in the world. This - word _Kin_ may probably be _Chin_ in the empire itself, but - be pronounced _Kin_ by the Italian missionaries on account of - the gutturals. Thus we see that the country of the Seres, so - often mentioned by the Romans, was China: the silk, however, - was despatched to Europe across Greater Tibet, probably through - Smaller Tibet and Bucharia, through Persia and then on. This - leads to many reflections as to the antiquity of this wonderful - state, as compared with Hindustan, at the time of its union with - Tibet and thence with Japan. On the other hand, the name Sina or - Tschina which is said to be given to this land by neighbouring - peoples leads to nothing. - - Perhaps we can explain the ancient intercourse of Europe with - Tibet—a fact at no time widely known—by looking at what Hesychius - has preserved on the matter. I refer to the shout, Κουξ Ομπαξ - (_Konx Ompax_), the cry of the Hierophants in the Eleusinian - mysteries (cf. _Travels of Anacharsis the Younger_, Part V., p. - 447, _seq._). For, according to Georgii _Alph. Tibet._, the word - _Concioa_ which bears a striking resemblance to _Konx_ means - God. _Pak-cio_ (_ib._ p. 520) which might easily be pronounced - by the Greeks like _pax_ means _promulgator legis_, the divine - principle permeating nature (called also, on p. 177, _Cencresi_). - _Om_, however, which La Croze translates by _benedictus_, - _i.e._ blessed, can when applied to the Deity mean nothing but - beatified (p. 507). Now P. Franc. Horatius, when he asked the - Lhamas of Tibet, as he often did, what they understood by God - (_Concioa_) always got the answer:—“it is the assembly of all the - saints,” _i.e._ the assembly of those blessed ones who have been - born again according to the faith of the Lama and, after many - wanderings in changing forms, have at last returned to God, to - Burchane: that is to say, they are beings to be worshipped, souls - which have undergone transmigration (p. 223). So the mysterious - expression _Konx Ompax_ ought probably to mean the holy (_Konx_), - blessed, (_Om_) and wise (_Pax_) supreme Being pervading the - universe, the personification of nature. Its use in the Greek - mysteries probably signified monotheism for the Epoptes, in - distinction from the polytheism of the people, although elsewhere - P. Horatius scented atheism here. How that mysterious word - came by way of Tibet to the Greeks may be explained as above; - and, on the other hand, in this way is made probable an early - intercourse of Europe with China across Tibet, earlier perhaps - than the communication with Hindustan. (There is some difference - of opinion as to the meaning of the words κόγξ ὄμπαξ—according - to Liddell and Scott, a corruption of κόγξ, ὁμοίως πάξ. Kant’s - inferences here seem to be more than far-fetched. Lobeck, in his - _Aglaophamus_ (p. 775), gives a quite different interpretation - which has, he says, been approved by scholars. And Whately - (_Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon Bonaparte_, 3rd. ed., - Postscript) uses Konx Ompax as a pseudonym. [Tr.]) - -The intercourse, more or less close, which has been everywhere -steadily increasing between the nations of the earth, has now -extended so enormously that a violation of right in one part of the -world is felt all over it. Hence the idea of a cosmopolitan right -is no fantastical, high-flown notion of right, but a complement of -the unwritten code of law—constitutional as well as international -law—necessary for the public rights of mankind in general and thus -for the realisation of perpetual peace. For only by endeavouring -to fulfil the conditions laid down by this cosmopolitan law can we -flatter ourselves that we are gradually approaching that ideal. - - - - -FIRST SUPPLEMENT - -CONCERNING THE GUARANTEE OF PERPETUAL PEACE - - -This guarantee is given by no less a power than the great artist -nature (_natura dædala rerum_) in whose mechanical course is clearly -exhibited a predetermined design to make harmony spring from human -discord, even against the will of man. Now this design, although -called Fate when looked upon as the compelling force of a cause, the -laws of whose operation are unknown to us, is, when considered as the -purpose manifested in the course of nature, called Providence,[135] -as the deep-lying wisdom of a Higher Cause, directing itself towards -the ultimate practical end of the human race and predetermining the -course of things with a view to its realisation. This Providence -we do not, it is true, perceive in the cunning contrivances -[_Kunstanstalten_] of nature; nor can we even conclude from the -fact of their existence that it is there; but, as in every relation -between the form of things and their final cause, we can, and must, -supply the thought of a Higher Wisdom, in order that we may be able -to form an idea of the possible existence of these products after -the analogy of human works of art [_Kunsthandlungen_].[136] The -representation to ourselves of the relation and agreement of these -formations of nature to the moral purpose for which they were made -and which reason directly prescribes to us, is an Idea, it is true, -which is in theory superfluous; but in practice it is dogmatic, and -its objective reality is well established.[137] Thus we see, for -example, with regard to the ideal [_Pflichtbegriff_] of perpetual -peace, that it is our duty to make use of the mechanism of nature -for the realisation of that end. Moreover, in a case like this where -we are interested merely in the theory and not in the religious -question, the use of the word “nature” is more appropriate than that -of “providence”, in view of the limitations of human reason, which, -in considering the relation of effects to their causes, must keep -within the limits of possible experience. And the term “nature” is -also less presumptuous than the other. To speak of a Providence -knowable by us would be boldly to put on the wings of Icarus in order -to draw near to the mystery of its unfathomable purpose. - - [135] In the mechanical system of nature to which man belongs as - a sentient being, there appears, as the underlying ground of its - existence, a certain _form_ which we cannot make intelligible - to ourselves except by thinking into the physical world the - idea of an end preconceived by the Author of the universe: this - predetermination of nature on the part of God we generally call - Divine Providence. In so far as this providence appears in the - origin of the universe, we speak of Providence as founder of the - world (_providentia conditrix; semel jussit, semper parent._ - Augustine). As it maintains the course of nature, however, - according to universal laws of adaptation to preconceived ends, - [_i.e._ teleological laws] we call it a ruling providence - (_providentia gubernatrix_). Further, we name it the guiding - providence (_providentia directrix_), as it appears in the - world for special ends, which we could not foresee, but suspect - only from the result. Finally, regarding particular events - as divine purposes, we speak no longer of providence, but of - dispensation (_directio extraordinaria_). As this term, however, - really suggests the idea of miracles, although the events are - not spoken of by this name, the desire to fathom dispensation, - as such, is a foolish presumption in men. For, from one single - occurrence, to jump at the conclusion that there is a particular - principle of efficient causes and that this event is an end and - not merely the natural [_naturmechanische_] sequence of a - design quite unknown to us is absurd and presumptuous, in however - pious and humble a spirit we may speak of it. In the same way to - distinguish between a universal and a particular providence when - regarding it _materialiter_, in its relation to actual objects - in the world (to say, for instance, that there may be, indeed, - a providence for the preservation of the different species of - creation, but that individuals are left to chance) is false and - contradictory. For providence is called universal for the very - reason that no single thing may be thought of as shut out from - its care. Probably the distinction of two kinds of providence, - _formaliter_ or subjectively considered, had reference to the - manner in which its purposes are fulfilled. So that we have - ordinary providence (_e.g._ the yearly decay and awakening to - new life in nature with change of season) and what we may call - unusual or special providence (_e.g._ the bringing of timber - by ocean currents to Arctic shores where it does not grow, and - where without this aid the inhabitants could not live). Here, - although we can quite well explain the physico-mechanical cause - of these phenomena—in this case, for example, the banks of the - rivers in temperate countries are over-grown with trees, some of - which fall into the water and are carried along, probably by the - Gulf Stream—we must not overlook the teleological cause which - points to the providential care of a ruling wisdom above nature. - But the concept, commonly used in the schools of philosophy, - of a co-operation on the part of the Deity or a concurrence - (_concursus_) in the operations going on in the world of sense, - must be dropped. For it is, firstly, self-contradictory to couple - the like and the unlike together (_gryphes jungere equis_) and - to let Him who is Himself the entire cause of the changes in the - universe make good any shortcomings in His own predetermining - providence (which to require this must be defective) during the - course of the world; for example, to say that the physician has - restored the sick with the help of God—that is to say that He - has been present as a support. For _causa solitaria non juvat_. - God created the physician as well as his means of healing; and - we must ascribe the result wholly to Him, if we will go back - to the supreme First Cause which, theoretically, is beyond our - comprehension. Or we can ascribe the result entirely to the - physician, in so far as we follow up this event, as explicable in - the chain of physical causes, according to the order of nature. - Secondly, moreover, such a way of looking at this question - destroys all the fixed principles by which we judge an effect. - But, from the ethico-practical point of view which looks entirely - to the transcendental side of things, the idea of a divine - concurrence is quite proper and even necessary: for example, - in the faith that God will make good the imperfection of our - human justice, if only our feelings and intentions are sincere; - and that He will do this by means beyond our comprehension, - and therefore we should not slacken our efforts after what is - good. Whence it follows, as a matter of course, that no one must - attempt to explain a good action as a mere event in time by this - _concursus_; for that would be to pretend a theoretical knowledge - of the supersensible and hence be absurd. - - [136] _Id est_, which we cannot dissever from the idea of a - creative skill capable of producing them. [Tr.] - - [137] See preface, p. ix. above. - -Before we determine the surety given by nature more exactly, we -must first look at what ultimately makes this guarantee of peace -necessary—the circumstances in which nature has carefully placed the -actors in her great theatre. In the next place, we shall proceed to -consider the manner in which she gives this surety. - -The provisions she has made are as follow: (1) she has taken -care that men _can_ live in all parts of the world; (2) she has -scattered them by means of war in all directions, even into the most -inhospitable regions, so that these too might be populated; (3) by -this very means she has forced them to enter into relations more or -less controlled by law. It is surely wonderful that, on the cold -wastes round the Arctic Ocean, there is always to be found moss -for the reindeer to scrape out from under the snow, the reindeer -itself either serving as food or to draw the sledge of the Ostiak or -Samoyedes. And salt deserts which would otherwise be left unutilised -have the camel, which seems as if created for travelling in such -lands. This evidence of design in things, however, is still more -clear when we come to know that, besides the fur-clad animals of the -shores of the Arctic Ocean, there are seals, walruses and whales -whose flesh furnishes food and whose oil fire for the dwellers in -these regions. But the providential care of nature excites our wonder -above all, when we hear of the driftwood which is carried—whence -no one knows—to these treeless shores: for without the aid of -this material the natives could neither construct their craft, nor -weapons, nor huts for shelter. Here too they have so much to do, -making war against wild animals, that they live at peace with one -another. But what drove them originally into these regions was -probably nothing but war. - -Of animals, used by us as instruments of war, the horse was the first -which man learned to tame and domesticate during the period of the -peopling of the earth; the elephant belongs to the later period of -the luxury of states already established. In the same way, the art -of cultivating certain grasses called cereals—no longer known to us -in their original form—and also the multiplication and improvement, -by transplanting and grafting, of the original kinds of fruit—in -Europe, probably only two species, the crab-apple and wild pear—could -only originate under the conditions accompanying established states -where the rights of property are assured. That is to say it would be -after man, hitherto existing in lawless liberty, had advanced beyond -the occupations of a hunter,[138] a fisherman or a shepherd to the -life of a tiller of the soil, when salt and iron were discovered,—to -become, perhaps, the first articles of commerce between different -peoples,—and were sought far and near. In this way the peoples would -be at first brought into peaceful relation with one another, and so -come to an understanding and the enjoyment of friendly intercourse, -even with their most distant neighbours. - - [138] Of all modes of livelihood the life of the hunter is - undoubtedly most incompatible with a civilised condition of - society. Because, to live by hunting, families must isolate - themselves from their neighbours, soon becoming estranged and - spread over widely scattered forests, to be before long on terms - of hostility, since each requires a great deal of space to obtain - food and raiment. - - God’s command to Noah not to shed blood (I. _Genesis_, IX. 4-6) - - [4. “But flesh with the life thereof, which is the blood - thereof, shall ye not eat. - - 5. And surely your blood of your lives will I require; at - the hand of every beast will I require it, and at the hand - of man; at the hand of every man’s brother will I require - the life of man. - - 6. Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be - shed: for in the image of God made he man.”] - - is frequently quoted, and was afterwards—in another connection it - is true—made by the baptised Jews a condition to which Christians, - newly converted from heathendom, had to conform. Cf. _Acts_ XV. 20; - XXI. 25. This command seems originally to have been nothing else - than a prohibition of the life of the hunter; for here the - possibility of eating raw flesh must often occur, and, in - forbidding the one custom, we condemn the other. - -Now while nature provided that men could live on all parts of -the earth, she also at the same time despotically willed that -they _should_ live everywhere on it, although against their own -inclination and even although this imperative did not presuppose an -idea of duty which would compel obedience to nature with the force -of a moral law. But, to attain this end, she has chosen war. So we -see certain peoples, widely separated, whose common descent is made -evident by affinity in their languages. Thus, for instance, we find -the Samoyedes on the Arctic Ocean, and again a people speaking a -similar language on the Altai Mts., 200 miles [_Meilen_][139] off, -between whom has pressed in a mounted tribe, warlike in character -and of Mongolian origin, which has driven one branch of the race -far from the other, into the most inhospitable regions where their -own inclination would certainly not have carried them.[140] In the -same way, through the intrusion of the Gothic and Sarmatian tribes, -the Finns in the most northerly regions of Europe, whom we call -Laplanders, have been separated by as great a distance from the -Hungarians, with whose language their own is allied. And what but war -can have brought the Esquimos to the north of America, a race quite -distinct from those of that country and probably European adventurers -of prehistoric times? And war too, nature’s method of populating -the earth, must have driven the Pescherais[141] in South America -as far as Patagonia. War itself, however, is in need of no special -stimulating cause, but seems engrafted in human nature, and is even -regarded as something noble in itself to which man is inspired by the -love of glory apart from motives of self-interest. Hence, among the -savages of America as well as those of Europe in the age of chivalry, -martial courage is looked upon as of great value itself, not merely -when a war is going on, as is reasonable enough, but in order that -there should be war: and thus war is often entered upon merely to -exhibit this quality. So that an intrinsic dignity is held to attach -to war in itself, and even philosophers eulogise it as an ennobling, -refining influence on humanity, unmindful of the Greek proverb, “War -is evil, in so far as it makes more bad people than it takes away.” - - [139] About 1000 English miles. - - [140] The question might be put:—“If it is nature’s will that - these Arctic shores should not remain unpopulated, what will - become of their inhabitants, if, as is to be expected, at some - time or other no more driftwood should be brought to them? For - we may believe that, with the advance of civilisation, the - inhabitants of temperate zones will utilise better the wood which - grows on the banks of their rivers, and not let it fall into the - stream and so be swept away.” I answer: the inhabitants of the - shores of the River Obi, the Yenisei, the Lena will supply them - with it through trade, and take in exchange the animal produce in - which the seas of Arctic shores are so rich—that is, if nature - has first of all brought about peace among them. - - [141] Cf. _Enc. Brit._ (9th ed.), art. “Indians”, in which there - is an allusion to “Fuegians, the _Pescherais_” of some writers. - [Tr.] - -So much, then, of what nature does for her own ends with regard -to the human race as members of the animal world. Now comes the -question which touches the essential points in this design of a -perpetual peace:—“What does nature do in this respect with reference -to the end which man’s own reason sets before him as a duty? and -consequently what does she do to further the realisation of his -moral purpose? How does she guarantee that what man, by the laws of -freedom, ought to do and yet fails to do, he will do, without any -infringement of his freedom by the compulsion of nature and that, -moreover, this shall be done in accordance with the three forms of -public right—constitutional or political law, international law and -cosmopolitan law?” When I say of nature that she _wills_ that this or -that should take place, I do not mean that she imposes upon us the -duty to do it—for only the free, unrestrained, practical reason can -do that—but that she does it herself, whether we will or not. “_Fata -volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt._” - -1. Even if a people were not compelled through internal discord -to submit to the restraint of public laws, war would bring this -about, working from without. For, according to the contrivance of -nature which we have mentioned, every people finds another tribe -in its neighbourhood, pressing upon it in such a manner that it -is compelled to form itself internally into a state to be able to -defend itself as a power should. Now the republican constitution -is the only one which is perfectly adapted to the rights of man, -but it is also the most difficult to establish and still more to -maintain. So generally is this recognised that people often say -the members of a republican state would require to be angels,[142] -because men, with their self-seeking propensities, are not fit for -a constitution of so sublime a form. But now nature comes to the -aid of the universal, reason-derived will which, much as we honour -it, is in practice powerless. And this she does, by means of these -very self-seeking propensities, so that it only depends—and so much -lies within the power of man—on a good organisation of the state -for their forces to be so pitted against one another, that the one -may check the destructive activity of the other or neutralise its -effect. And hence, from the standpoint of reason, the result will -be the same as if both forces did not exist, and each individual -is compelled to be, if not a morally good man, yet at least a good -citizen. The problem of the formation of the state, hard as it may -sound, is not insoluble, even for a race of devils, granted that -they have intelligence. It may be put thus:—“Given a multitude of -rational beings who, in a body, require general laws for their -own preservation, but each of whom, as an individual, is secretly -inclined to exempt himself from this restraint: how are we to order -their affairs and how establish for them a constitution such that, -although their private dispositions may be really antagonistic, -they may yet so act as a check upon one another, that, in their -public relations, the effect is the same as if they had no such evil -sentiments.” Such a problem must be capable of solution. For it -deals, not with the moral reformation of mankind, but only with the -mechanism of nature; and the problem is to learn how this mechanism -of nature can be applied to men, in order so to regulate the -antagonism of conflicting interests in a people that they may even -compel one another to submit to compulsory laws and thus necessarily -bring about the state of peace in which laws have force. We can see, -in states actually existing, although very imperfectly organised, -that, in externals, they already approximate very nearly to what -the Idea of right prescribes, although the principle of morality is -certainly not the cause. A good political constitution, however, is -not to be expected as a result of progress in morality; but rather, -conversely, the good moral condition of a nation is to be looked -for, as one of the first fruits of such a constitution. Hence the -mechanism of nature, working through the self-seeking propensities -of man (which of course counteract one another in their external -effects), may be used by reason as a means of making way for the -realisation of her own purpose, the empire of right, and, as far -as is in the power of the state, to promote and secure in this way -internal as well as external peace. We may say, then, that it is -the irresistible will of nature that right shall at last get the -supremacy. What one here fails to do will be accomplished in the long -run, although perhaps with much inconvenience to us. As Bouterwek -says, “If you bend the reed too much it breaks: he who would do too -much does nothing.” - - [142] Rousseau uses these terms in speaking of democracy. (_Cont. - Soc._, III. Ch. 4.) “If there were a nation of Gods, they might - be governed by a democracy: but so perfect a government will not - agree with men.” - - But he writes elsewhere of republican governments (_op. cit._, - II. Ch. 6):—“All lawful governments are republican.” And in a - footnote to this passage:—“I do not by the word ‘republic’ mean - an aristocracy or democracy only, but in general all governments - directed by the public will which is the law. If a government - is to be lawful, it must not be confused with the sovereign - power, but be considered as the administrator of that power: and - then monarchy itself is a republic.” This language has a close - affinity with that used by Kant. (Cf. above, p. 126.) [Tr.] - -2. The idea of international law presupposes the separate existence -of a number of neighbouring and independent states; and, although -such a condition of things is in itself already a state of war, (if -a federative union of these nations does not prevent the outbreak of -hostilities) yet, according to the Idea of reason, this is better -than that all the states should be merged into one under a power -which has gained the ascendency over its neighbours and gradually -become a universal monarchy.[143] For the wider the sphere of their -jurisdiction, the more laws lose in force; and soulless despotism, -when it has choked the seeds of good, at last sinks into anarchy. -Nevertheless it is the desire of every state, or of its ruler, to -attain to a permanent condition of peace in this very way; that is to -say, by subjecting the whole world as far as possible to its sway. -But nature wills it otherwise. She employs two means to separate -nations, and prevent them from intermixing: namely, the differences -of language and of religion.[144] These differences bring with them a -tendency to mutual hatred, and furnish pretexts for waging war. But, -none the less, with the growth of culture and the gradual advance -of men to greater unanimity of principle, they lead to concord in a -state of peace which, unlike the despotism we have spoken of, (the -churchyard of freedom) does not arise from the weakening of all -forces, but is brought into being and secured through the equilibrium -of these forces in their most active rivalry. - - [143] See above, p. 69, _note_, esp. reference to _Theory of - Ethics_. [Tr.] - - [144] Difference of religion! A strange expression, as if one - were to speak of different kinds of morality. There may indeed be - different historical forms of belief,—that is to say, the various - means which have been used in the course of time to promote - religion,—but they are mere subjects of learned investigation, - and do not really lie within the sphere of religion. In the same - way there are many religious works—the _Zendavesta_, _Veda_, - _Koran_ etc.—but there is only one religion, binding for all - men and for all times. These books are each no more than the - accidental mouthpiece of religion, and may be different according - to differences in time and place. - -3. As nature wisely separates nations which the will of each state, -sanctioned even by the principles of international law, would -gladly unite under its own sway by stratagem or force; in the same -way, on the other hand, she unites nations whom the principle of a -cosmopolitan right would not have secured against violence and war. -And this union she brings about through an appeal to their mutual -interests. The commercial spirit cannot co-exist with war, and sooner -or later it takes possession of every nation. For, of all the forces -which lie at the command of a state, the power of money is probably -the most reliable. Hence states find themselves compelled—not, it is -true, exactly from motives of morality—to further the noble end of -peace and to avert war, by means of mediation, wherever it threatens -to break out, just as if they had made a permanent league for this -purpose. For great alliances with a view to war can, from the nature -of things, only very rarely occur, and still more seldom succeed. - -In this way nature guarantees the coming of perpetual peace, through -the natural course of human propensities: not indeed with sufficient -certainty to enable us to prophesy the future of this ideal -theoretically, but yet clearly enough for practical purposes. And -thus this guarantee of nature makes it a duty that we should labour -for this end, an end which is no mere chimera. - - - - -SECOND SUPPLEMENT - -A SECRET ARTICLE FOR PERPETUAL PEACE - - -A secret article in negotiations concerning public right is, when -looked at objectively or with regard to the meaning of the term, -a contradiction. When we view it, however, from the subjective -standpoint, with regard to the character and condition of the person -who dictates it, we see that it might quite well involve some private -consideration, so that he would regard it as hazardous to his dignity -to acknowledge such an article as originating from him. - -The only article of this kind is contained in the following -proposition:—“The opinions of philosophers, with regard to the -conditions of the possibility of a public peace, shall be taken into -consideration by states armed for war.” - -It seems, however, to be derogatory to the dignity of the legislative -authority of a state—to which we must of course attribute all -wisdom—to ask advice from subjects (among whom stand philosophers) -about the rules of its behaviour to other states. At the same time, -it is very advisable that this should be done. Hence the state will -silently invite suggestion for this purpose, while at the same time -keeping the fact secret. This amounts to saying that the state will -allow philosophers to discuss freely and publicly the universal -principles governing the conduct of war and establishment of peace; -for they will do this of their own accord, if no prohibition is laid -upon them.[145] The arrangement between states, on this point, does -not require that a special agreement should be made, merely for -this purpose; for it is already involved in the obligation imposed -by the universal reason of man which gives the moral law. We would -not be understood to say that the state must give a preference to -the principles of the philosopher, rather than to the opinions of -the jurist, the representative of state authority; but only that he -should be heard. The latter, who has chosen for a symbol the scales -of right and the sword of justice,[146] generally uses that sword not -merely to keep off all outside influences from the scales; for, when -one pan of the balance will not go down, he throws his sword into it; -and then _Væ victis_! The jurist, not being a moral philosopher, is -under the greatest temptation to do this, because it is his business -only to apply existing laws and not to investigate whether these -are not themselves in need of improvement; and this actually lower -function of his profession he looks upon as the nobler, because it -is linked to power (as is the case also in both the other faculties, -theology and medicine). Philosophy occupies a very low position -compared with this combined power. So that it is said, for example, -that she is the handmaid of theology; and the same has been said of -her position with regard to law and medicine. It is not quite clear, -however, “whether she bears the torch before these gracious ladies, -or carries the train.” - - [145] Montesquieu speaks thus in praise of the English state:—“As - the enjoyment of liberty, and even its support and preservation, - consists in every man’s being allowed to speak his thoughts and - to lay open his sentiments, a citizen in this state will say or - write whatever the laws do not expressly forbid to be said or - written.” (_Esprit des Lois_, XIX. Ch. 27.) Hobbes is opposed to - all free discussion of political questions and to freedom as a - source of danger to the state. [Tr.] - - [146] Kant is thinking here not of the sword of justice, in the - moral sense, but of a sword which is symbolical of the executive - power of the actual law. [Tr.] - -That kings should philosophise, or philosophers become kings, is not -to be expected. But neither is it to be desired; for the possession -of power is inevitably fatal to the free exercise of reason. But -it is absolutely indispensable, for their enlightenment as to the -full significance of their vocations, that both kings and sovereign -nations, which rule themselves in accordance with laws of equality, -should not allow the class of philosophers to disappear, nor forbid -the expression of their opinions, but should allow them to speak -openly. And since this class of men, by their very nature, are -incapable of instigating rebellion or forming unions for purposes of -political agitation, they should not be suspected of propagandism. - - - - -APPENDIX I - -ON THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN MORALS AND POLITICS WITH REFERENCE TO -PERPETUAL PEACE - - -In an objective sense, morals is a practical science, as the sum of -laws exacting unconditional obedience, in accordance with which we -_ought_ to act. Now, once we have admitted the authority of this -idea of duty, it is evidently inconsistent that we should think of -saying that we _cannot_ act thus. For, in this case, the idea of duty -falls to the ground of itself; “_ultra posse nemo obligatur_.” Hence -there can be no quarrel between politics, as the practical science of -right, and morals, which is also a science of right, but theoretical. -That is, theory cannot come into conflict with practice. For, in that -case, we would need to understand under the term “ethics” or “morals” -a universal doctrine of expediency, or, in other words, a theory of -precepts which may guide us in choosing the best means for attaining -ends calculated for our advantage. This is to deny that a science of -morals exists. - -Politics says, “Be wise as serpents”; morals adds the limiting -condition, “and guileless as doves.” If these precepts cannot stand -together in one command, then there is a real quarrel between -politics and morals.[147] But if they can be completely brought into -accord, then the idea of any antagonism between them is absurd, -and the question of how best to make a compromise between the two -points of view ceases to be even raised. Although the saying, -“Honesty is the best policy,” expresses a theory which, alas, is -often contradicted in practice, yet the likewise theoretical maxim, -“Honesty is better than any policy,” is exalted high above every -possible objection, is indeed the necessary condition of all politics. - - [147] Cf. Aristotle: _Politics_, (Welldon’s trans.) IV. Ch. XIV. - “The same principles of morality are best both for individuals - and States.” - - Among the ancients the connection between politics and morals - was never questioned, although there were differences of opinion - as to which science stood first in importance. Thus, while Plato - put politics second to morals, Aristotle regarded politics as the - chief science and ethics as a part of politics. This connection - between the sciences was denied by Machiavelli, who lays down - the dictum that, in the relations of sovereigns and states, the - ordinary rules of morality do not apply. See _The Prince_, Ch. - XVIII. “A Prince,” he says, “and most of all a new Prince, cannot - observe all those rules of conduct in respect of which men are - accounted good, being frequently obliged, in order to preserve - his Princedom, to act in opposition to good faith, charity, - humanity, and religion. He must therefore keep his mind ready - to shift as the winds and tides of Fortune turn, and, as I have - already said, he ought not to quit good courses if he can help - it, but should know how to follow evil courses if he must.” - - Hume thought that laxer principles might be allowed to govern - states than private persons, because intercourse between them - was not so “necessary and advantageous” as between individuals. - “There is a system of morals,” he says, “calculated for princes, - much more free than that which ought to govern private persons,” - (_Treatise_, III., Part II., Sect. IX.) [Tr.] - -The Terminus of morals does not yield to Jupiter, the Terminus of -force; for the latter remains beneath the sway of Fate. In other -words, reason is not sufficiently enlightened to survey the series -of predetermining causes which would make it possible for us to -predict with certainty the good or bad results of human action, as -they follow from the mechanical laws of nature; although we may hope -that things will turn out as we should desire. But what we have to -do, in order to remain in the path of duty guided by the rules of -wisdom, reason makes everywhere perfectly clear, and does this for -the purpose of furthering her ultimate ends. - -The practical man, however, for whom morals is mere theory, even -while admitting that what ought to be can be, bases his dreary -verdict against our well-meant hopes really on this: he pretends -that he can foresee from his observation of human nature, that men -will never be willing to do what is required in order to bring -about the wished-for results leading to perpetual peace. It is -true that the will of all individual men to live under a legal -constitution according to the principles of liberty—that is to -say, the distributive unity of the wills of all—is not sufficient -to attain this end. We must have the collective unity of their -united will: all as a body must determine these new conditions. The -solution of this difficult problem is required in order that civil -society should be a whole. To all this diversity of individual wills -there must come a uniting cause, in order to produce a common will -which no distributive will is able to give. Hence, in the practical -realisation of that idea, no other beginning of a law-governed -society can be counted upon than one that is brought about by force: -upon this force, too, public law afterwards rests. This state of -things certainly prepares us to meet considerable deviation in actual -experience from the theoretical idea of perpetual peace, since we -cannot take into account the moral character and disposition of a -law-giver in this connection, or expect that, after he has united a -wild multitude into one people, he will leave it to them to bring -about a legal constitution by their common will. - -It amounts to this. Any ruler who has once got the power in his -hands will not let the people dictate laws for him. A state which -enjoys an independence of the control of external law will not -submit to the judgment of the tribunals of other states, when it -has to consider how to obtain its rights against them. And even a -continent, when it feels its superiority to another, whether this be -in its way or not, will not fail to take advantage of an opportunity -offered of strengthening its power by the spoliation or even conquest -of this territory. Hence all theoretical schemes, connected with -constitutional, international or cosmopolitan law, crumble away into -empty impracticable ideals. While, on the other hand, a practical -science, based on the empirical principles of human nature, which -does not disdain to model its maxims on an observation of actual -life, can alone hope to find a sure foundation on which to build up a -system of national policy. - -Now certainly, if there is neither freedom nor a moral law founded -upon it, and every actual or possible event happens in the mere -mechanical course of nature, then politics, as the art of making -use of this physical necessity in things for the government of -men, is the whole of practical wisdom and the idea of right is an -empty concept. If, on the other hand, we find that this idea of -right is necessarily to be conjoined with politics and even to be -raised to the position of a limiting condition of that science, then -the possibility of reconciling them must be admitted. I can thus -imagine a moral politician, that is to say, one who understands the -principles of statesmanship to be such as do not conflict with -morals; but I cannot conceive of a political moralist who fashions -for himself such a system of ethics as may serve the interest of -statesmen. - -The moral politician will always act upon the following -principle:—“If certain defects which could not have been avoided -are found in the political constitution or foreign relations of a -state, it is a duty for all, especially for the rulers of the state, -to apply their whole energy to correcting them as soon as possible, -and to bringing the constitution and political relations on these -points into conformity with the Law of Nature, as it is held up as a -model before us in the idea of reason; and this they should do even -at a sacrifice of their own interest.” Now it is contrary to all -politics—which is, in this particular, in agreement with morals—to -dissever any of the links binding citizens together in the state -or nations in cosmopolitan union, before a better constitution is -there to take the place of what has been thus destroyed. And hence -it would be absurd indeed to demand that every imperfection in -political matters must be violently altered on the spot. But, at the -same time, it may be required of a ruler at least that he should -earnestly keep the maxim in mind which points to the necessity of -such a change; so that he may go on constantly approaching the end -to be realised, namely, the best possible constitution according to -the laws of right. Even although it is still under despotic rule, -in accordance with its constitution as then existing, a state may -govern itself on republican lines, until the people gradually become -capable of being influenced by the mere idea of the authority of law, -just as if it had physical power. And they become accordingly capable -of self-legislation, their faculty for which is founded on original -right. But if, through the violence of revolution, the product of -a bad government, a constitution more in accord with the spirit of -law were attained even by unlawful means, it should no longer be -held justifiable to bring the people back to the old constitution, -although, while the revolution was going on, every one who took part -in it by use of force or stratagem, may have been justly punished -as a rebel. As regards the external relations of nations, a state -cannot be asked to give up its constitution, even although that be -a despotism (which is, at the same time, the strongest constitution -where foreign enemies are concerned), so long as it runs the risk of -being immediately swallowed up by other states. Hence, when such a -proposal is made, the state whose constitution is in question must -at least be allowed to defer acting upon it until a more convenient -time.[148] - - [148] These are _permissive_ laws of reason which allow us to - leave a system of public law, when it is tainted by injustice, to - remain just as it is, until everything is entirely revolutionised - through an internal development, either spontaneous, or fostered - and matured by peaceful influences. For any legal constitution - whatsoever, even although it conforms only slightly with the - spirit of law is better than none at all—that is to say, anarchy, - which is the fate of a precipitate reform. Hence, as things now - are, the wise politician will look upon it as his duty to make - reforms on the lines marked out by the ideal of public law. He - will not use revolutions, when these have been brought about - by natural causes, to extenuate still greater oppression than - caused them, but will regard them as the voice of nature, calling - upon him to make such thorough reforms as will bring about the - only lasting constitution, a lawful constitution based on the - principles of freedom. - -It is always possible that moralists who rule despotically, and are -at a loss in practical matters, will come into collision with the -rules of political wisdom in many ways, by adopting measures without -sufficient deliberation which show themselves afterwards to have been -overestimated. When they thus offend against nature, experience must -gradually lead them into a better track. But, instead of this being -the case, politicians who are fond of moralising do all they can to -make moral improvement impossible and to perpetuate violations of -law, by extenuating political principles which are antagonistic to -the idea of right, on the pretext that human nature is not capable of -good, in the sense of the ideal which reason prescribes. - -These politicians, instead of adopting an open, straightforward way -of doing things (as they boast), mix themselves up in intrigue. They -get at the authorities in power and say what will please them; -their sole bent is to sacrifice the nation, or even, if they can, -the whole world, with the one end in view that their own private -interest may be forwarded. This is the manner of regular jurists (I -mean the journeyman lawyer not the legislator), when they aspire to -politics. For, as it is not their business to reason too nicely over -legislation, but only to enforce the laws of the country, every legal -constitution in its existing form and, when this is changed by the -proper authorities, the one which takes its place, will always seem -to them the best possible. And the consequence is that everything -is purely mechanical. But this adroitness in suiting themselves -to any circumstances may lead them to the delusion that they are -also capable of giving an opinion about the principles of political -constitutions in general, in so far as they conform to ideas of -right, and are therefore not empirical, but _a priori_. And they may -therefore brag about their knowledge of men,—which indeed one expects -to find, since they have to deal with so many—without really knowing -the nature of man and what can be made of it, to gain which knowledge -a higher standpoint of anthropological observation than theirs is -required. Filled with ideas of this kind, if they trespass outside -their own sphere on the boundaries of political and international -law, looked upon as ideals which reason holds before us, they can -do so only in the spirit of chicanery. For they will follow their -usual method of making everything conform mechanically to compulsory -laws despotically made and enforced, even here, where the ideas of -reason recognise the validity of a legal compulsory force, only when -it is in accordance with the principles of freedom through which a -permanently valid constitution becomes first of all possible. The -would-be practical man, leaving out of account this idea of reason, -thinks that he can solve this problem empirically by looking to the -way in which those constitutions which have best survived the test -of time were established, even although the spirit of these may have -been generally contrary to the idea of right. The principles which -he makes use of here, although indeed he does not make them public, -amount pretty much to the following sophistical maxims. - -1. =Fac et excusa.= Seize the most favourable opportunity for -arbitrary usurpation—either of the authority of the state over its -own people or over a neighbouring people; the justification of the -act and extenuation of the use of force will come much more easily -and gracefully, when the deed is done, than if one has to think out -convincing reasons for taking this step and first hear through all -the objections which can be made against it. This is especially -true in the first case mentioned, where the supreme power in the -state also controls the legislature which we must obey without any -reasoning about it. Besides, this show of audacity in a statesman -even lends him a certain semblance of inward conviction of the -justice of his action; and once he has got so far the god of success -(_bonus eventus_) is his best advocate. - -2. =Si fecisti, nega.= As for any crime you have committed, such -as has, for instance, brought your people to despair and thence -to insurrection, deny that it has happened owing to any fault of -yours. Say rather that it is all caused by the insubordination of -your subjects, or, in the case of your having usurped a neighbouring -state, that human nature is to blame; for, if a man is not ready to -use force and steal a march upon his neighbour, he may certainly -count on the latter forestalling him and taking him prisoner. - -3. =Divide et impera.= That is to say, if there are certain -privileged persons, holding authority among the people, who have -merely chosen you for their sovereign as _primus inter pares_, bring -about a quarrel among them, and make mischief between them and the -people. Now back up the people with a dazzling promise of greater -freedom; everything will now depend unconditionally on your will. Or -again, if there is a difficulty with foreign states, then to stir -up dissension among them is a pretty sure means of subjecting first -one and then the other to your sway, under the pretext of aiding the -weaker. - -It is true that now-a-days no body is taken in by these political -maxims, for they are all familiar to everyone. Moreover, there is -no need of being ashamed of them, as if their injustice were too -patent. For the great Powers never feel shame before the judgment of -the common herd, but only before one another; so that as far as this -matter goes, it is not the revelation of these guiding principles of -policy that can make rulers ashamed, but only the unsuccessful use -of them. For as to the morality of these maxims, politicians are all -agreed. Hence there is always left political prestige on which they -can safely count; and this means the glory of increasing their power -by any means that offer.[149] - - [149] It is still sometimes denied that we find, in members of - a civilised community, a certain depravity rooted in the nature - of man;[C] and it might, indeed, be alleged with some show of - truth that not an innate corruptness in human nature, but the - barbarism of men, the defect of a not yet sufficiently developed - culture, is the cause of the evident antipathy to law which - their attitude indicates. In the external relations of states, - however, human wickedness shows itself incontestably, without any - attempt at concealment. Within the state, it is covered over by - the compelling authority of civil laws. For, working against the - tendency every citizen has to commit acts of violence against his - neighbour, there is the much stronger force of the government - which not only gives an appearance of morality to the whole - state (_causae non causae_), but, by checking the outbreak of - lawless propensities, actually aids the moral qualities of men - considerably, in their development of a direct respect for the - law. For every individual thinks that he himself would hold the - idea of right sacred and follow faithfully what it prescribes, - if only he could expect that everyone else would do the same. - This guarantee is in part given to him by the government; and - a great advance is made by this step which is not deliberately - moral, towards the ideal of fidelity to the concept of duty - for its own sake without thought of return. As, however, every - man’s good opinion of himself presupposes an evil disposition in - everyone else, we have an expression of their mutual judgment - of one another, namely, that when it comes to hard facts, none - of them are worth much; but whence this judgment comes remains - unexplained, as we cannot lay the blame on the nature of man, - since he is a being in the possession of freedom. The respect for - the idea of right, of which it is absolutely impossible for man - to divest himself, sanctions in the most solemn manner the theory - of our power to conform to its dictates. And hence every man sees - himself obliged to act in accordance with what the idea of right - prescribes, whether his neighbours fulfil their obligation or not. - - [C] This depravity of human nature is denied by Rousseau, who held - that the mind of man was naturally inclined to virtue, and that - good civil and social institutions are all that is required. - (_Discourse on the Sciences and Arts_, 1750.) Kant here takes - sides with Hobbes against Rousseau. See Kant’s _Theory of Ethics_, - Abbott’s trans. (4th ed., 1889), p. 339 _seq._—esp. p. 341 and - _note_. Cf. also Hooker’s _Ecclesiastical Polity_, I. § 10:—“Laws - politic, ordained for external order and regiment amongst men, are - never framed as they should be, unless presuming the will of man - to be inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all obedience - to the sacred laws of his nature; in a word, unless presuming man - to be, in regard of his depraved mind, little better than a wild - beast, they do accordingly provide, notwithstanding, so to frame - his outward actions, that they be no hindrance unto the common - good, for which societies are instituted.” [Tr.] - - - * * * * * - - -In all these twistings and turnings of an immoral doctrine of -expediency which aims at substituting a state of peace for the -warlike conditions in which men are placed by nature, so much at -least is clear;—that men cannot get away from the idea of right in -their private any more than in their public relations; and that they -do not dare (this is indeed most strikingly seen in the concept of -an international law) to base politics merely on the manipulations -of expediency and therefore to refuse all obedience to the idea of -a public right. On the contrary, they pay all fitting honour to the -idea of right in itself, even although they should, at the same time, -devise a hundred subterfuges and excuses to avoid it in practice, and -should regard force, backed up by cunning, as having the authority -which comes from being the source and unifying principle of all -right. It will be well to put an end to this sophistry, if not to -the injustice it extenuates, and to bring the false advocates of the -mighty of the earth to confess that it is not right but might in -whose interest they speak, and that it is the worship of might from -which they take their cue, as if in this matter they had a right to -command. In order to do this, we must first expose the delusion by -which they deceive themselves and others; then discover the ultimate -principle from which their plans for a perpetual peace proceed; -and thence show that all the evil which stands in the way of the -realisation of that ideal springs from the fact that the political -moralist begins where the moral politician rightly ends and that, by -subordinating principles to an end or putting the cart before the -horse, he defeats his intention of bringing politics into harmony -with morals. - -In order to make practical philosophy consistent with itself, we must -first decide the following question:—In dealing with the problems of -practical reason must we begin from its material principle—the end as -the object of free choice—or from its formal principle which is based -merely on freedom in its external relation?—from which comes the -following law:—“Act so that thou canst will that thy maxim should be -a universal law, be the end of thy action what it will.”[150] - - [150] With regard to the meaning of the moral law and its - significance in the Kantian system of ethics, see Abbott’s - translation of the _Theory of Ethics_ (1889), pp. 38, 45, 54, 55, - 119, 282. [Tr.] - -Without doubt, the latter determining principle of action must -stand first; for, as a principle of right, it carries unconditional -necessity with it, whereas the former is obligatory only if we assume -the empirical conditions of the end set before us,—that is to say, -that it is an end capable of being practically realised. And if -this end—as, for example, the end of perpetual peace—should be also -a duty, this same duty must necessarily have been deduced from the -formal principle governing the maxims which guide external action. -Now the first principle is the principle of the political moralist; -the problems of constitutional, international and cosmopolitan law -are mere technical problems (_problema technicum_). The second or -formal principle, on the other hand, as the principle of the moral -politician who regards it as a moral problem (_problema morale_), -differs widely from the other principle in its methods of bringing -about perpetual peace, which we desire not only as a material good, -but also as a state of things resulting from our recognition of the -precepts of duty.[151] - - [151] See Abbott’s trans., pp. 33, 34. [Tr.] - -To solve the first problem—that, namely, of political expediency—much -knowledge of nature is required, that her mechanical laws may be -employed for the end in view. And yet the result of all knowledge -of this kind is uncertain, as far as perpetual peace is concerned. -This we find to be so, whichever of the three departments of public -law we take. It is uncertain whether a people could be better kept -in obedience and at the same time prosperity by severity or by baits -held out to their vanity; whether they would be better governed -under the sovereignty of a single individual or by the authority of -several acting together; whether the combined authority might be -better secured merely, say, by an official nobility or by the power -of the people within the state; and, finally, whether such conditions -could be long maintained. There are examples to the contrary in -history in the case of all forms of government, with the exception -of the only true republican constitution, the idea of which can -occur only to a moral politician. Still more uncertain is a law of -nations, ostensibly established upon statutes devised by ministers; -for this amounts in fact to mere empty words, and rests on treaties -which, in the very act of ratification, contain a secret reservation -of the right to violate them. On the other hand, the solution of the -second problem—the problem of political wisdom—forces itself, we may -say, upon us; it is quite obvious to every one, and puts all crooked -dealings to shame; it leads, too, straight to the desired end, while -at the same time, discretion warns us not to drag in the conditions -of perpetual peace by force, but to take time and approach this ideal -gradually as favourable circumstances permit. - -This may be expressed in the following maxim:—“Seek ye first the -kingdom of pure practical reason and its righteousness, and the -object of your endeavour, the blessing of perpetual peace, will -be added unto you.” For the science of morals generally has this -peculiarity,—and it has it also with regard to the moral principles -of public law, and therefore with regard to a science of politics -knowable _a priori_,—that the less it makes a man’s conduct depend -on the end he has set before him, his purposed material or moral -gain, so much the more, nevertheless, does it conform in general -to this end. The reason for this is that it is just the universal -will, given _a priori_, which exists in a people or in the relation -of different peoples to one another, that alone determines what is -lawful among men. This union of individual wills, however, if we -proceed consistently in practice, in observance of the mechanical -laws of nature, may be at the same time the cause of bringing about -the result intended and practically realizing the idea of right. -Hence it is, for example, a principle of moral politics that a people -should unite into a state according to the only valid concepts of -right, the ideas of freedom and equality; and this principle is not -based on expediency, but upon duty. Political moralists, however, -do not deserve a hearing, much and sophistically as they may reason -about the existence, in a multitude of men forming a society, of -certain natural tendencies which would weaken those principles and -defeat their intention. They may endeavour to prove their assertion -by giving instances of badly organised constitutions, chosen both -from ancient and modern times, (as, for example, democracies without -a representative system); but such arguments are to be treated with -contempt, all the more, because a pernicious theory of this kind -may perhaps even bring about the evil which it prophesies. For, in -accordance with such reasoning, man is thrown into a class with all -other living machines which only require the consciousness that they -are not free creatures to make them in their own judgment the most -miserable of all beings. - -_Fiat justitia, pereat mundus._ This saying has become proverbial, -and although it savours a little of boastfulness, is also true. We -may translate it thus:—“Let justice rule on earth, although all the -rogues in the world should go to the bottom.” It is a good, honest -principle of right cutting off all the crooked ways made by knavery -or violence. It must not, however, be misunderstood as allowing -anyone to exercise his own rights with the utmost severity, a course -in contradiction to our moral duty; but we must take it to signify -an obligation, binding upon rulers, to refrain from refusing to -yield anyone his rights or from curtailing them, out of personal -feeling or sympathy for others. For this end, in particular, we -require, firstly, that a state should have an internal political -constitution, established according to the pure principles of -right; secondly, that a union should be formed between this state -and neighbouring or distant nations for a legal settlement of -their differences, after the analogy of the universal state. This -proposition means nothing more than this:—Political maxims must not -start from the idea of a prosperity and happiness which are to be -expected from observance of such precepts in every state; that is, -not from the end which each nation makes the object of its will -as the highest empirical principle of political wisdom; but they -must set out from the pure concept of the duty of right, from the -“_ought_” whose principle is given _a priori_ through pure reason. -This is the law, whatever the material consequences may be. The world -will certainly not perish by any means, because the number of wicked -people in it is becoming fewer. The morally bad has one peculiarity, -inseparable from its nature;—in its purposes, especially in relation -to other evil influences, it is in contradiction with itself, and -counteracts its own natural effect, and thus makes room for the moral -principle of good, although advance in this direction may be slow. - -Hence objectively, in theory, there is no quarrel between morals -and politics. But subjectively, in the self-seeking tendencies of -men (which we cannot actually call their morality, as we would a -course of action based on maxims of reason,) this disagreement in -principle exists and may always survive; for it serves as a whetstone -to virtue. According to the principle, _Tu ne cede malis, sed contra -audentior ito_, the true courage of virtue in the present case lies -not so much in facing the evils and self-sacrifices which must be met -here as in firmly confronting the evil principle in our own nature -and conquering its wiles. For this is a principle far more dangerous, -false, treacherous and sophistical which puts forward the weakness in -human nature as a justification for every transgression. - -In fact the political moralist may say that a ruler and people, or -nation and nation do _one another_ no wrong, when they enter on a war -with violence or cunning, although they do wrong, generally speaking, -in refusing to respect the idea of right which alone could establish -peace for all time. For, as both are equally wrongly disposed to one -another, each transgressing the duty he owes to his neighbour, they -are both quite rightly served, when they are thus destroyed in war. -This mutual destruction stops short at the point of extermination, -so that there are always enough of the race left to keep this game -going on through all the ages, and a far-off posterity may take -warning by them. The Providence that orders the course of the world -is hereby justified. For the moral principle in mankind never becomes -extinguished, and human reason, fitted for the practical realisation -of ideas of right according to that principle, grows continually in -fitness for that purpose with the ever advancing march of culture; -while at the same time, it must be said, the guilt of transgression -increases as well. But it seems that, by no theodicy or vindication -of the justice of God, can we justify Creation in putting such a -race of corrupt creatures into the world at all, if, that is, we -assume that the human race neither will nor can ever be in a happier -condition than it is now. This standpoint, however, is too high a -one for us to judge from, or to theorise, with the limited concepts -we have at our command, about the wisdom of that supreme Power which -is unknowable by us. We are inevitably driven to such despairing -conclusions as these, if we do not admit that the pure principles of -right have objective reality—that is to say, are capable of being -practically realised—and consequently that action must be taken on -the part of the people of a state and, further, by states in relation -to one another, whatever arguments empirical politics may bring -forward against this course. Politics in the real sense cannot take -a step forward without first paying homage to the principles of -morals. And, although politics, _per se_, is a difficult art,[152] -in its union with morals no art is required; for in the case of a -conflict arising between the two sciences, the moralist can cut -asunder the knot which politics is unable to untie. Right must be -held sacred by man, however great the cost and sacrifice to the -ruling power. Here is no half-and-half course. We cannot devise a -happy medium between right and expediency, a right pragmatically -conditioned. But all politics must bend the knee to the principle of -right, and may, in that way, hope to reach, although slowly perhaps, -a level whence it may shine upon men for all time. - - [152] Matthew Arnold defines politics somewhere as the art of - “making reason and the will of God prevail”—an art, one would - say, difficult enough. [Tr.] - - - - -APPENDIX II - -CONCERNING THE HARMONY OF POLITICS WITH MORALS ACCORDING TO THE -TRANSCENDENTAL IDEA OF PUBLIC RIGHT - - -If I look at public right from the point of view of most professors -of law, and abstract from its _matter_ or its empirical elements, -varying according to the circumstances given in our experience of -individuals in a state or of states among themselves, then there -remains the _form_ of publicity. The possibility of this publicity, -every legal title implies. For without it there could be no justice, -which can only be thought as before the eyes of men; and, without -justice, there would be no right, for, from justice only, right can -come. - -This characteristic of publicity must belong to every legal title. -Hence, as, in any particular case that occurs, there is no difficulty -in deciding whether this essential attribute is present or not, -(whether, that is, it is reconcilable with the principles of the -agent or not), it furnishes an easily applied criterion which is to -be found _a priori_ in the reason, so that in the particular case we -can at once recognise the falsity or illegality of a proposed claim -(_praetensio juris_), as it were by an experiment of pure reason. - -Having thus, as it were, abstracted from all the empirical elements -contained in the concept of a political and international law, such -as, for instance, the evil tendency in human nature which makes -compulsion necessary, we may give the following proposition as the -_transcendental formula_ of public right:—“All actions relating to -the rights of other men are wrong, if the maxims from which they -follow are inconsistent with publicity.” - -This principle must be regarded not merely as ethical, as belonging -to the doctrine of virtue, but also as juridical, referring to the -rights of men. For there is something wrong in a maxim of conduct -which I cannot divulge without at once defeating my purpose, a maxim -which must therefore be kept secret, if it is to succeed, and which -I could not publicly acknowledge without infallibly stirring up the -opposition of everyone. This necessary and universal resistance with -which everyone meets me, a resistance therefore evident _a priori_, -can be due to no other cause than the injustice with which such a -maxim threatens everyone. Further, this testing principle is merely -negative; that is, it serves only as a means by which we may know -when an action is unjust to others. Like axioms, it has a certainty -incapable of demonstration; it is besides easy of application as -appears from the following examples of public right. - -1.—=Constitutional Law.= Let us take in the first place the public -law of the state (_jus civitatis_), particularly in its application -to matters within the state. Here a question arises which many think -difficult to answer, but which the transcendental principle of -publicity solves quite readily:—“Is revolution a legitimate means for -a people to adopt, for the purpose of throwing off the oppressive -yoke of a so-called tyrant (_non titulo, sed exercitio talis_)?” -The rights of a nation are violated in a government of this kind, -and no wrong is done to the tyrant in dethroning him. Of this there -is no doubt. None the less, it is in the highest degree wrong of -the subjects to prosecute their rights in this way; and they would -be just as little justified in complaining, if they happened to be -defeated in their attempt and had to endure the severest punishment -in consequence. - -A great many reasons for and against both sides of this question -may be given, if we seek to settle it by a dogmatic deduction -of the principles of right. But the transcendental principle -of the publicity of public right can spare itself this diffuse -argumentation. For, according to that principle, the people would -ask themselves, before the civil contract was made, whether they -could venture to publish maxims, proposing insurrection when a -favourable opportunity should present itself. It is quite clear -that if, when a constitution is established, it were made a -condition that force may be exercised against the sovereign under -certain circumstances, the people would be obliged to claim a -lawful authority higher than his. But in that case, the so-called -sovereign would be no longer sovereign: or, if both powers, that of -the sovereign and that of the people, were made a condition of the -constitution of the state, then its establishment (which was the aim -of the people) would be impossible. The wrongfulness of revolution is -quite obvious from the fact that openly to acknowledge maxims which -justify this step would make attainment of the end at which they aim -impossible. We are obliged to keep them secret. But this secrecy -would not be necessary on the part of the head of the state. He may -say quite plainly that the ringleaders of every rebellion will be -punished by death, even although they may hold that it was he who -first transgressed the fundamental law. For, if a ruler is conscious -of possessing irresistible sovereign power (and this must be assumed -in every civil constitution, because a sovereign who has not power to -protect any individual member of the nation against his neighbour -has also not the right to exercise authority over him), then he need -have no fear that making known the maxims which guide him will cause -the defeat of his plans. And it is quite consistent with this view -to hold that, if the people are successful in their insurrection, -the sovereign must return to the rank of a subject, and refrain from -inciting rebellion with a view to regaining his lost sovereignty. At -the same time he need have no fear of being called to account for his -former administration.[153] - - [153] “When a king has dethroned himself,” says Locke, (_On Civil - Government_, Ch. XIX. § 239) “and put himself in a state of war - with his people, what shall hinder them from prosecuting him who - is no king, as they would any other man, who has put himself into - a state of war with them?” ... “The legislative being only a - fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains still _in - the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative_.” - (_Op. cit._, Ch. XIII. § 149.) And again, (_op. cit._, Ch. XI. § - 134.) we find the words, “... over whom [_i.e._ society] no body - can have a power to make laws, but by their own consent, and by - authority received from them.” Cf. also Ch. XIX. § 228 _seq._ - - Hobbes represents the opposite point of view. “How many kings,” - he wrote, (Preface to the _Philosophical Rudiments concerning - Government and Society_) “and those good men too, hath this one - error, that a tyrant king might lawfully be put to death, been - the slaughter of! How many throats hath this false position - cut, that a prince for some causes may by some certain men be - deposed! And what bloodshed hath not this erroneous doctrine - caused, that kings are not superiors to, but administrators for - the multitude!” This “erroneous doctrine” Kant received from - Locke through Rousseau. He advocated, or at least practised - as a citizen, a doctrine of passive obedience to the state. A - free press, he held, offered the only lawful outlet for protest - against tyranny. But, in theory, he was an enemy to absolute - monarchy. [Tr.] - -2.—=International Law.= There can be no question of an international -law, except on the assumption of some kind of a law-governed -state of things, the external condition under which any right can -belong to man. For the very idea of international law, as public -right, implies the publication of a universal will determining the -rights and property of each individual nation; and this _status -juridicus_ must spring out of a contract of some sort which may not, -like the contract to which the state owes its origin, be founded -upon compulsory laws, but may be, at the most, the agreement of a -permanent free association such as the federation of the different -states, to which we have alluded above. For, without the control -of law to some extent, to serve as an active bond of union among -different merely natural or moral individuals,—that is to say, in -a state of nature,—there can only be private law. And here we find -a disagreement between morals, regarded as the science of right, -and politics. The criterion, obtained by observing the effect of -publicity on maxims, is just as easily applied, but only when we -understand that this agreement binds the contracting states solely -with the object that peace may be preserved among them, and between -them and other states; in no sense with a view to the acquisition of -new territory or power. The following instances of antinomy occur -between politics and morals, which are given here with the solution -in each case. - -_a._ “When either of these states has promised something to another, -(as, for instance, assistance, or a relinquishment of certain -territory, or subsidies and such like), the question may arise -whether, in a case where the safety of the state thus bound depends -on its evading the fulfilment of this promise, it can do so by -maintaining a right to be regarded as a double person:—firstly, -as sovereign and accountable to no one in the state of which that -sovereign power is head; and, secondly, merely as the highest -official in the service of that state, who is obliged to answer to -the state for every action. And the result of this is that the state -is acquitted in its second capacity of any obligation to which it has -committed itself in the first.” But, if a nation or its sovereign -proclaimed these maxims, the natural consequence would be that every -other would flee from it, or unite with other states to oppose such -pretensions. And this is a proof that politics, with all its cunning, -defeats its own ends, if the test of making principles of action -public, which we have indicated, be applied. Hence the maxim we have -quoted must be wrong. - -_b._ “If a state which has increased its power to a formidable extent -(_potentia tremenda_) excites anxiety in its neighbours, is it right -to assume that, since it has the means, it will also have the will -to oppress others; and does that give less powerful states a right -to unite and attack the greater nation without any definite cause of -offence?” A state which would here answer openly in the affirmative -would only bring the evil about more surely and speedily. For the -greater power would forestall those smaller nations, and their union -would be but a weak reed of defence against a state which knew how -to apply the maxim, _divide et impera_. This maxim of political -expediency then, when openly acknowledged, necessarily defeats the -end at which it aims, and is therefore wrong. - -_c._ “If a smaller state by its geographical position breaks up -the territory of a greater, so as to prevent a unity necessary to -the preservation of that state, is the latter not justified in -subjugating its less powerful neighbour and uniting the territory in -question with its own?” We can easily see that the greater state dare -not publish such a maxim beforehand; for either all smaller states -would without loss of time unite against it, or other powers would -contend for this booty. Hence the impracticability of such a maxim -becomes evident under the light of publicity. And this is a sign -that it is wrong, and that in a very great degree; for, although the -victim of an act of injustice may be of small account, that does not -prevent the injustice done from being very great. - -3.—=Cosmopolitan Law.= We may pass over this department of right in -silence, for, owing to its analogy with international law, its maxims -are easily specified and estimated. - - - * * * * * - - -In this principle of the incompatibility of the maxims of -international law with their publicity, we have a good indication -of the non-agreement between politics and morals, regarded as a -science of right. Now we require to know under what conditions these -maxims do agree with the law of nations. For we cannot conclude that -the converse holds, and that all maxims which can bear publicity -are therefore just. For anyone who has a decided supremacy has no -need to make any secret about his maxims. The condition of a law of -nations being possible at all is that, in the first place, there -should be a law-governed state of things. If this is not so, there -can be no public right, and all right which we can think of outside -the law-governed state,—that is to say, in the state of nature,—is -mere private right. Now we have seen above that something of the -nature of a federation between nations, for the sole purpose of doing -away with war, is the only rightful condition of things reconcilable -with their individual freedom. Hence the agreement of politics and -morals is only possible in a federative union, a union which is -necessarily given _a priori_, according to the principles of right. -And the lawful basis of all politics can only be the establishment -of this union in its widest possible extent. Apart from this end, -all political sophistry is folly and veiled injustice. Now this sham -politics has a casuistry, not to be excelled in the best Jesuit -school. It has its mental reservation (_reservatio mentalis_): as -in the drawing up of a public treaty in such terms as we can, if we -will, interpret when occasion serves to our advantage; for example, -the distinction between the _status quo_ in fact (_de fait_) and -in right (_de droit_). Secondly, it has its probabilism; when it -pretends to discover evil intentions in another, or makes, the -probability of their possible future ascendency a lawful reason for -bringing about the destruction of other peaceful states. Finally, it -has its philosophical sin (_peccatum philosophicum_, _peccatillum_, -_baggatelle_) which is that of holding it a trifle easily pardoned -that a smaller state should be swallowed up, if this be to the gain -of a nation much more powerful; for such an increase in power is -supposed to tend to the greater prosperity of the whole world.[154] - - [154] We can find the voucher for maxims such as these in Herr - Hofrichter Garve’s essay, _On the Connection of Morals with - Politics_, 1788. This worthy scholar confesses at the very - beginning that he is unable to give a satisfactory answer to this - question. But his sanction of such maxims, even when coupled with - the admission that he cannot altogether clear away the arguments - raised against them, seems to be a greater concession in favour - of those who shew considerable inclination to abuse them, than it - might perhaps be wise to admit. - -Duplicity gives politics the advantage of using one branch or -the other of morals, just as suits its own ends. The love of our -fellowmen is a duty: so too is respect for their rights. But the -former is only conditional: the latter, on the other hand, an -unconditional, absolutely imperative duty; and anyone who would -give himself up to the sweet consciousness of well-doing must be -first perfectly assured that he has not transgressed its commands. -Politics has no difficulty in agreeing with morals in the first sense -of the term, as ethics, to secure that men should give to superiors -their rights. But when it comes to morals, in its second aspect, -as the science of right before which politics must bow the knee, -the politician finds it prudent to have nothing to do with compacts -and rather to deny all reality to morals in this sense, and reduce -all duty to mere benevolence. Philosophy could easily frustrate -the artifices of a politics like this, which shuns the light of -criticism, by publishing its maxims, if only statesmen would have the -courage to grant philosophers the right to ventilate their opinions. - -With this end in view, I propose another principle of public right, -which is at once transcendental and affirmative. Its formula would be -as follows:—“All maxims which require publicity, in order that they -may not fail to attain their end, are in agreement both with right -and politics.” - -For, if these maxims can only attain the end at which they aim by -being published, they must be in harmony with the universal end of -mankind, which is happiness; and to be in sympathy with this (to -make the people contented with their lot) is the real business of -politics. Now, if this end should be attainable only by publicity, or -in other words, through the removal of all distrust of the maxims of -politics, these must be in harmony with the right of the people; for -a union of the ends of all is only possible in a harmony with this -right. - -I must postpone the further development and discussion of this -principle till another opportunity. That it is a transcendental -formula is quite evident from the fact that all the empirical -conditions of a doctrine of happiness, or the _matter_ of law, are -absent, and that it has regard only to the _form_ of universal -conformity to law. - - - * * * * * - - -If it is our duty to realise a state of public right, if at the same -time there are good grounds for hope that this ideal may be realised, -although only by an approximation advancing _ad infinitum_, then -perpetual peace, following hitherto falsely so-called conclusions of -peace, which have been in reality mere cessations of hostilities, is -no mere empty idea. But rather we have here a problem which gradually -works out its own solution and, as the periods in which a given -advance takes place towards the realisation of the ideal of perpetual -peace will, we hope, become with the passing of time shorter and -shorter, we must approach ever nearer to this goal. - - - - -INDEX - - - A - - Absolutism; of Hobbes, 43, 44; - of Schopenhauer, 43; - according to Kant, 43, 44, 125-128; - to Locke, 44. - - Alexander I. of Russia; 80. - - Alexander the Great; 31, 103. - - Alsace-Lorraine; annexation of, 90, 92, 95. - - Ambrose, Saint; 15. - - Amphictyonic League; 16, 22. - - Aquinas, Thomas; on fighting clergy, 18; - on war, 18, 19. - - Arbitration; as a substitute for war, 79, 81, 87; - difficulties settled by, 80; - where it is useless, 82, 83, 86. - - Aristotle; on war, 7, 8; - and rights of an enemy, _ib._; 31; - on the relation between politics and ethics, 162. - - Assyrians; war among the, 9. - - Augustine, Saint; 16. - - - B - - Balance of power; 26, 95. - - Bentham, Jeremy; 26, 79, 92. - - Bluntschli, J. K.; 41, 73, 74, 80. - - - C - - Caird, Edward; 3, 51. - - Calvin, John; 19. - - Carnegie, Andrew; 100. - - China; a danger to Europe, 92, 93, 140, 141. - - Cicero; on the conduct of war, 22, 41. - - Clement of Alexandria; 15. - - Clergy, fighting; Origen on, 14, 15; - Wycliffe, 18; - Erasmus, _ib._; - Aquinas, _ib._ - - Cobden, Richard; 64. - - Corvinus, Matthias; 109. - - Cowper, William; 5, 38, 123. - - Crusades, wars of the; 16, 103. - - - D - - Dante, Alighieri; on mediation, 46; - on universal monarchy, 68, 69. - - Disarmament; 88-93; - Czar’s proposal of, 90; - practicability of, 90-93. - - Dubois, Cardinal; 36. - - - E - - Empire; of Rome, 9, 20, 68; - world-, spiritual, 23, 32, 69; - of Alexander the Great, 31, 68; - Frankish, 69; - Holy Roman 69; - of Napoleon I., 69. - - Erasmus, Desiderius; and European peace, 17; - on war, 18, 19; - on fighting clergy, 18, 32. - - - F - - Farrar, J. A.; 18. - - Federation; Kant’s idea of, 60, 68, 69, 128-137; 88, 92, 93, 95, 97; - probable results of, 98, 99, 100, 134. - - Fichte, J. G.; 69, 99. - - Finland; 92, 95. - - Fischer, Kuno; 62, 67. - - Fleury, Cardinal; 55. - - Frederick the Great; 66, 126. - - - G - - Gentilis, Albericus; 21, 32. - - Golden Age; 3, 41. - - Government; origin of, according to Plato, 5; - according to Hume, 5, 52; - to Cowper, 5, 6; - to Hobbes, 40-42, 118, 119; - to Kant, 51-54, 152-154; - to Rousseau, 52; - to Locke, 53; - representative, 65-68, 120, 121, 124-128. - - Greeks; their attitude to other nations, 7; - to an enemy, _ib._; - their Sacred Wars, 16; - the Amphictyonic League, 16. - - Grotius, Hugo; his _De Jure Belli et Pacis_, 24-27; - and the _Jus Gentium_, 24, 25; - and the Law of Nature, 25; - on peace, 27, 32, 40, 131. - - - H - - Hague Conference (1899); 86, 90. - - Hegel, G. W. F.; 57; - on war, 71, 72, 75. - - Henry IV. of France; 30, 32, 33, 36. - - Hobbes, Thomas; his theory of the state of nature and origin of - government, 4, 40-42, 51, 118, 119, 133; 6, 26, 27, 28, 37; - his influence on Kant, 40, 46; - his views on revolution, 41, 188; - of the relations between states, 43-46, 128, 131; - on the conduct of war, 45, 89, 120, 124, 159. - - Holls, Fred. W.; 86. - - Hooker, Richard; 52; - on the depravity of man, 173. - - Hume, David; on the origin of government, 5, 52; - on the state of nature, 40, 41; - on the original contract, 52, 108, 109, 162. - - - I - - International Law; the development of, 20-24; - its connection with the Reformation, 21, 24; - in Greece and Rome, 22, 23. - - Intervention; 64, 93, 94, 112, 113. - - - J - - Jews; war among the, 9-11; - their dream of peace, 32. - - Justin; 15. - - - K - - Kant, Immanuel; 26, 37; - his indebtedness to earlier political writers, 40, 46; - his theory of human development, 47-49; - and how this is possible, 49-51, 54; - on the foundation of the state, 51-54, 152-154; - the relations between states and individuals, 54, 55, 117-120, - 128, 173, 174; - the necessity for reform within the state, 55, 56, 168; - the political and social conditions of his time, 57-59; - his attitude to war, 58, 133, 135, 136, 137, 149-151; - on the growing power of commerce, 59, 65, 142, 157; - his idea of federation, 60, 68, 69, 128-137, 192; - and ideal of perpetual peace, 61, 129, 196; - the conditions of its realization, 62-69; - on representative and other constitutions, 65-68, 120-128, 152, - 153, 167; - his opinion of the English constitution, 66; - his disapproval of universal monarchy, 68, 69, 155, 156; 79, 83, - 89, 100, 105; - on the right of way, 137-142; - on nature’s guarantee of a perpetual peace, 143-157; - on the relation between politics and morals, 161-196; - on revolution, 167, 168, 186-188. - - - L - - Laveleye, Émile de; 81. - - Lawrence, T. J.; 9, 78, 81. - - Leibniz, Gottfried W.; 36; - his criticism of St. Pierre, 37, 38, 58, 106. - - Locke, John; and the golden age, 3, 4; - on the original contract, 53; - on revolution, 53, 188; 67, 133. - - Lorimer, James; 34, 80. - - Louis Philippe; 76. - - Luther, Martin; on war, 19. - - - M - - Machiavelli, Nicolo; 162. - - Maine, Henry; on Grotius and the _Jus Gentium_, 24, 25. - - Maistre, Joseph de; 71. - - Martineau, James; 102. - - Mennonites; and war, 14. - - Military service; of Christians, 14, 16, 18, 19; - compulsory, 89; - voluntary, 111. - - Mill, John Stuart; 80. - - Moltke, Graf von; 71, 73-75. - - Monarchy, universal; the ideal of Dante, 68, 69; - disapproved by Kant, 68, 69, 155, 156; - and Fichte, 69. - - Montesquieu, Baron de; on self-preservation, 83; - on armed peace, 88, 159. - - More, Thomas; 32. - - Morley, John; 3. - - - N - - Napoleon Bonaparte; Empire of, 69, 71, 72, 76, 77. - - Napoleon, Louis; 80. - - National Debt; 63, 64, 111, 112. - - - O - - Origen; on military service, 14, 15. - - Original Contract; 40; - as understood by Rousseau, 52; - by Hobbes, 52, 53; - by Hooker, 52; - by Hume, _ib._; - by Kant, _ib._; - by Locke, 53. - - - P - - Paris Congress (1856); 86. - - Paulsen, Friedrich; 43, 52, 53, 66, 78. - - Peace, perpetual; the dream of, 29-33; - projects of, by Penn, 30; - by Henry IV., 30, 33, 34; - by St. Pierre, 30, 32, 34-37; - Rousseau’s attitude to, 38-40, 106; - for Kant an ideal, 61, 129; - the articles of, 62-69, 107-142, 158-160; - the guarantee of, 143-157. - - Peace Societies; 70, 75, 78, 79, 80, 86, 87; - and disarmament, 88, 96, 97, 100, 101, 102. - - Penn, William; 30. - - Plato; on the origin of the state, 5; - on war, 8, 41; - on the relation between ethics and politics, 162. - - Poland; 92, 93, 95. - - Politics; and morals, according to Kant, 161-196; - to Plato, 162; - to Aristotle, _ib._; - to Hume, _ib._; - sophistical maxims of, 170-172. - - Pope, Alexander; 4, 127. - - Puffendorf, Samuel; 27; - on intervention, 64, 131. - - - Q - - Quakers; and war, 14. - - - R - - Reformation; and military service, 18; - and international law, 21, 24. - - Religion; Roman, and war, 9; - Jewish, 9-11; - Mohammedan, 10; - Buddhist, and conversion, 12; - Christian, and war, 12-20. - - Revolution, right of; according to Hobbes, 41, 53; - and Spinoza, 41; - according to Locke, 53; - to Rousseau, _ib._; - to Kant, 167, 186-188. - - Right of way; Vattel on, 65, 138; - Kant on, 65, 137-142. - - Ritchie, D. G.; on Rousseau, 3; - on Locke and the golden age, _ib._, 52, 85, 98. - - Robertson, William; 6, 17, 18, 19. - - Romans; and war, 7, 8, 9, 22, 23; - and international law, 22, 23. - - Rousseau, J. J.; and the state of nature, 2, 3, 52; 26, 28; - his criticism of St. Pierre, 38-40; - his views on militarism, 39; - on the original contract, 52; - on revolution, 53, 188; 61, 67, 100, 132, 134; - on democratic and republican governments, 153; - on the depravity of man, 173. - - Russia; Alexander I. of, 80; - the Czar of, 90; - the backward civilization of, 92, 93, 94, 95. - - - S - - Schiller, Friedrich von; on war and peace, 71, 72, 73, 75. - - Schopenhauer, Arthur; 43. - - Spencer, Herbert; 76. - - Spinoza, Benedict; on the state of nature, 41; - and revolution, _ib._ - - Standing armies; 63, 64, 89, 110. - - State of nature; according to Rousseau, 2, 3; - and the golden age, 3; - Hobbes’ theory of, 4, 40, 41, 118; - according to Hume a philosophical fiction, 41; - according to Kant, 117-120. - - States; transference of, 63, 108, 109; - marriage between, 109. - - St. Pierre, Castel de; 30, 32, 33; - his _Projet_, 34-37; - and Leibniz, 37, 38; - and Rousseau, 38-40; 61, 67, 79, 92, 106. - - Sully, Duke of; 30, 32, 33. - - - T - - Tennyson, Lord; 73, 74. - - Tertullian; 14, 15. - - Treaties of peace; in Greece, 7, 63, 64, 107, 108. - - Treitschke, H. von; 75. - - Trendelenburg, F. A.; 75. - - - V - - Vattel, Emerich; his _Droit des Gens_, 28, 29; - on intervention, 64, 113, 114; - on the right of way, 65; - of self-preservation, 83, 89, 103; - on treaties, 108; 131. - - Voltaire, François de; 33, 37, 38. - - - W - - War; religious, 16; - private, 17, 20, 29; - dynastic, 38, 57, 123; - Kant’s attitude to, 58, 133, 135, 136, 137, 149-151; - its influence on progress, 70, 96, 103; - views of Hegel on, 71, 72, 75; - of Schiller, 71, 72, 73, 75; - of Moltke, 71, 73, 74, 75; - under altered conditions, 76, 77, 78; - when just, 84, 85; - future probable causes of, 94, 95; - honorable conduct of, 114, 115. - - Wycliffe, John; and fighting clergy, 18. - - - Z - - Zwingli, Huldreich, 19. - - - - - _Printed in Great Britain by_ - UNWIN BROTHERS, LIMITED - WOKING AND LONDON - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Perpetual Peace, by -Immanuel Kant and Mary Campbell Smith - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PERPETUAL PEACE *** - -***** This file should be named 50922-0.txt or 50922-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/0/9/2/50922/ - -Produced by Turgut Dincer, Ramon Pajares Box and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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text-align: center; text-indent: 0; margin-bottom: 1em; } - - @media handheld - { - p { margin: 0; } - - hr { clear: both; width: 34%; margin-left: 33%; } - hr.chap { display: none; visibility: hidden; } - - .chapter { margin: 0 0 1em 0; } - .toc { font-size: 90%; width: 100%; } - .screenonly { display: none; } - .pagenum { display: none; } - .footnotes { margin: 3em 0; border: none; } - .footnote { margin: 1em 0; } - .aftit .poem { font-size: small; } - } - - </style> - </head> - <body> - - -<pre> - -Project Gutenberg's Perpetual Peace, by Immanuel Kant and Mary Campbell Smith - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: Perpetual Peace - A Philosophical Essay - -Author: Immanuel Kant - Mary Campbell Smith - -Release Date: January 14, 2016 [EBook #50922] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PERPETUAL PEACE *** - - - - -Produced by Turgut Dincer, Ramon Pajares Box and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - - - - - -</pre> - - -<div class="front"> - <p><a href="#tnote">Transcriber's note</a></p> - <p><a href="#ToC">Table of Contents</a></p> - <p><a href="#Index">Index</a></p> - <hr class="chap" /> -</div> - -<div class="screenonly"> - <div class="figcenter"> - <img src="images/cover.jpg" - alt="Book cover" /> - </div> -</div> - -<div class="aftit"> - <hr class="chap" /> - <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_i">[p. i]</span></p> - <h1>PERPETUAL PEACE</h1> - <div class="figright"> - <img src="images/logo.jpg" - alt="Publisher logotype" /> - </div> - <hr class="chap" /> -</div> - -<div class="aftit"> - <p class="p3"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_ii">[p. ii]</span></p> - - <div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> - <p class="i0">“For I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see,</p> - <p class="i0">Saw the Vision of the world, and all the wonder that would be;</p> - <p class="i0">Saw the heavens fill with commerce, argosies of magic sails,</p> - <p class="i0">Pilots of the purple twilight, dropping down with costly bales;</p> - <p class="i0">Heard the heavens fill with shouting, and there rain’d a ghastly dew</p> - <p class="i0">From the nations’ airy navies grappling in the central blue;</p> - <p class="i0">Far along the world-wide whisper of the south-wind rushing warm,</p> - <p class="i0">With the standards of the peoples plunging thro’ the thunder-storm;</p> - <p class="i0">Till the war-drum throbb’d no longer, and the battle-flags were furl’d</p> - <p class="i0">In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.</p> - <p class="i0">There the common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm in awe,</p> - <p class="i0">And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law.”</p> - </div> - <p class="dr"><span class="smcap">Tennyson</span>: <i>Locksley Hall</i>.</p> - </div> - - <hr class="chap" /> -</div> - -<div class="tit"> - <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_iii">[p. iii]</span></p> - - <p class="xxl">PERPETUAL PEACE<br /> - <span class="large">A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY</span></p> - - <p class="large p2"><span class="xs">BY</span><br /> - IMMANUEL KANT</p> - <p>1795</p> - - <p class="p2"><small>TRANSLATED WITH INTRODUCTION<br /> - AND NOTES BY</small><br /> - M. CAMPBELL SMITH, M.A.</p> - - <p class="small p3"><i>WITH A PREFACE BY PROFESSOR LATTA</i></p> - - <p class="p3">LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.<br /> - RUSKIN HOUSE 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C.<br /> - NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY</p> - - <hr class="chap" /> -</div> - -<div class="aftit"> - <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_iv">[p. iv]</span></p> - - <div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> - <p><i>First Edition</i>, 1903<br /> - <i>Second Impression, February</i> 1915<br /> - <i>Third ” February</i> 1917</p> - </div></div> - -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter"> - <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_v">[p. v]</span></p> - <h2 class="nobreak g1">PREFACE</h2> -</div> - -<p><span class="smcap">This</span> -translation of Kant’s essay on <i>Perpetual Peace</i> was undertaken by -Miss Mary Campbell Smith at the suggestion of the late Professor -Ritchie of St. Andrews, who had promised to write for it a preface, -indicating the value of Kant’s work in relation to recent discussions -regarding the possibility of “making wars to cease.” In view of the -general interest which these discussions have aroused and of the -vague thinking and aspiration which have too often characterised -them, it seemed to Professor Ritchie that a translation of this -wise and sagacious essay would be both opportune and valuable.<a -id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> His -untimely death has prevented the fulfilment of his promise, and I -have been asked, in his stead, to introduce the translator’s work.</p> - -<p>This is, I think, the only complete translation into English of -Kant’s essay, including all the notes as well as the text, and the -translator has added a full historical Introduction, along with -numerous notes of her own, so as (in Professor Ritchie’s words) “to -meet the needs (1) of the student of Political<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_vi">[p. vi]</span> Science who wishes to understand the -relation of Kant’s theories to those of Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, -Rousseau etc., and (2) of the general reader who wishes to understand -the significance of Kant’s proposals in connection with the ideals of -Peace Congresses, and with the development of International Law from -the end of the Middle Ages to the Hague Conference.”</p> - -<p>Although it is more than 100 years since Kant’s essay was written, -its substantial value is practically unimpaired. Anyone who is -acquainted with the general character of the mind of Kant will -expect to find in him sound common-sense, clear recognition of the -essential facts of the case and a remarkable power of analytically -exhibiting the conditions on which the facts necessarily depend. -These characteristics are manifest in the essay on <i>Perpetual -Peace</i>. Kant is not pessimist enough to believe that a perpetual -peace is an unrealisable dream or a consummation devoutly to be -feared, nor is he optimist enough to fancy that it is an ideal which -could easily be realised if men would but turn their hearts to one -another. For Kant perpetual peace is an ideal, not merely as a -speculative Utopian idea, with which in fancy we may play, but as a -moral principle, which ought to be, and therefore can be, realised. -Yet he makes it perfectly clear that we cannot hope to approach the -realisation<span class="pagenum" id="Page_vii">[p. vii]</span> of -it unless we honestly face political facts and get a firm grasp of -the indispensable conditions of a lasting peace. To strive after the -ideal in contempt or in ignorance of these conditions is a labour -that must inevitably be either fruitless or destructive of its own -ends. Thus Kant demonstrates the hopelessness of any attempt to -secure perpetual peace between independent nations. Such nations may -make treaties; but these are binding only for so long as it is not -to the interest of either party to denounce them. To enforce them -is impossible while the nations remain independent. “There is,” as -Professor Ritchie put it (<i>Studies in Political and Social Ethics</i>, -p. 169), “only one way in which war between independent nations can -be prevented; and that is by the nations ceasing to be independent.” -But this does not necessarily mean the establishment of a despotism, -whether autocratic or democratic. On the other hand, Kant maintains -that just as peace between individuals within a state can only be -permanently secured by the institution of a “republican” (that is -to say, a representative) government, so the only real guarantee -of a permanent peace between nations is the establishment of a -federation of free “republican” states. Such a federation he regards -as practically possible. “For if Fortune ordains that a powerful -and enlightened people should form a republic<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_viii">[p. viii]</span>—which by its very nature is inclined -to perpetual peace—this would serve as a centre of federal union for -other states wishing to join, and thus secure conditions of freedom -among the states in accordance with the idea of the law of nations. -Gradually, through different unions of this kind, the federation -would extend further and further.”</p> - -<p>Readers who are acquainted with the general philosophy of Kant -will find many traces of its influence in the essay on <i>Perpetual -Peace</i>. Those who have no knowledge of his philosophy may find some -of his forms of statement rather difficult to understand, and it -may therefore not be out of place for me to indicate very briefly -the meaning of some terms which he frequently uses, especially in -the Supplements and Appendices. Thus at the beginning of the First -Supplement, Kant draws a distinction between the mechanical and the -teleological view of things, between “nature” and “Providence”, which -depends upon his main philosophical position. According to Kant, pure -reason has two aspects, theoretical and practical. As concerning -knowledge, strictly so called, the <i>a priori</i> principles of reason -(<i>e.g.</i> substance and attribute, cause and effect etc.) are valid -only within the realm of possible sense-experience. Such ideas, for -instance, cannot be extended to God, since He is not a possible -object of sense-experience. They are limited<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_ix">[p. ix]</span> to the world of phenomena. This world of -phenomena (“nature” or the world of sense-experience) is a purely -mechanical system. But in order to understand fully the phenomenal -world, the pure theoretical reason must postulate certain ideas -(the ideas of the soul, the world and God), the objects of which -transcend sense-experience. These ideas are not theoretically valid, -but their validity is practically established by the pure practical -reason, which does not yield speculative truth, but prescribes its -principles “dogmatically” in the form of imperatives to the will. The -will is itself practical reason, and thus it imposes its imperatives -upon itself. The fundamental imperative of the practical reason is -stated by Kant in Appendix I. (p. 175):—“Act so that thou canst will -that thy maxim should be a universal law, be the end of thy action -what it will.” If the end of perpetual peace is a duty, it must be -necessarily deduced from this general law. And Kant does regard it as -a duty. “We must desire perpetual peace not only as a material good, -but also as a state of things resulting from our recognition of the -precepts of duty” (<i>loc. cit.</i>). This is further expressed in the -maxim (p. 177):—“Seek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason -and its righteousness, and the object of your endeavour, the blessing -of perpetual peace, will be added unto you.” The distinction between -the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_x">[p. x]</span> moral politician -and the political moralist, which is developed in Appendix I., is an -application of the general distinction between duty and expediency, -which is a prominent feature of the Kantian ethics. Methods of -expediency, omitting all reference to the pure practical reason, can -only bring about re-arrangements of circumstances in the mechanical -course of nature. They can never guarantee the attainment of their -end: they can never make it more than a speculative ideal, which may -or may not be practicable. But if the end can be shown to be a duty, -we have, from Kant’s point of view, the only reasonable ground for a -conviction that it is realisable. We cannot, indeed, theoretically -<i>know</i> that it is realisable. “Reason is not sufficiently enlightened -to survey the series of predetermining causes which would make it -possible for us to predict with certainty the good or bad results -of human action, as they follow from the mechanical laws of nature; -although we may hope that things will turn out as we should desire” -(p. 163). On the other hand, since the idea of perpetual peace -is a moral ideal, an “idea of duty”, we are entitled to believe -that it is practicable. “Nature guarantees the coming of perpetual -peace, through the natural course of human propensities; not indeed -with sufficient certainty to enable us to prophesy the future of -this ideal theoretically, but yet clearly<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_xi">[p. xi]</span> enough for practical purposes” (p. 157). -One might extend this discussion indefinitely; but what has been said -may suffice for general guidance.</p> - -<p>The “wise and sagacious” thought of Kant is not expressed in -a simple style, and the translation has consequently been a very -difficult piece of work. But the translator has shown great skill in -manipulating the involutions, parentheses and prodigious sentences -of the original. In this she has had the valuable help of Mr. David -Morrison, M.A., who revised the whole translation with the greatest -care and to whom she owes the solution of a number of difficulties. -Her work will have its fitting reward if it succeeds in familiarising -the English-speaking student of politics with a political essay of -enduring value, written by one of the master thinkers of modern -times.</p> - -<p class="firma">R. LATTA.</p> - -<p class="p1"><i>University of Glasgow</i>, May 1903.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="ToC"> - <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_xiii">[p. xiii]</span></p> - <h2 class="nobreak g1">CONTENTS</h2> -</div> - -<table class="toc" summary="table of contents"> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="tdr"><small>PAGE</small></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">PREFACE BY PROFESSOR LATTA</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_v">v</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl1">TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">PERPETUAL PEACE</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_106">106</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">FIRST SECTION CONTAINING THE PRELIMINARY - ARTICLES OF PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_107">107</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">SECOND SECTION CONTAINING THE DEFINITIVE - ARTICLES OF PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_117">117</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">FIRST SUPPLEMENT CONCERNING THE GUARANTEE - OF PERPETUAL PEACE</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_143">143</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">SECOND SUPPLEMENT—A SECRET ARTICLE FOR - PERPETUAL PEACE</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_158">158</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">APPENDIX I.—ON THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN - MORALS AND POLITICS WITH REFERENCE TO PERPETUAL PEACE</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_161">161</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">APPENDIX II.—CONCERNING THE HARMONY OF POLITICS - WITH MORALS ACCORDING TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEA OF PUBLIC RIGHT</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_184">184</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl1">INDEX</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_197">197</a></td> - </tr> -</table> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter"> - <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_1">[p. 1]</span></p> - <h2 class="nobreak">TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION</h2> -</div> - -<p><span class="smcap">This</span> -is an age of unions. Not merely in the economic sphere, in -the working world of unworthy ends and few ideals do we find -great practical organizations; but law, medicine, science, art, -trade, commerce, politics and political economy—we might add -philanthropy—standing institutions, mighty forces in our social -and intellectual life, all have helped to swell the number of our -nineteenth century Conferences and Congresses. It is an age of -Peace Movements and Peace Societies, of peace-loving monarchs and -peace-seeking diplomats. This is not to say that we are preparing -for the millennium. Men are working together, there is a newborn -solidarity of interest, but rivalries between nation and nation, -the bitternesses and hatreds inseparable from competition are -not less keen; prejudice and misunderstanding not less frequent; -subordinate conflicting interests are not fewer, are perhaps, in view -of changing political conditions and an ever-growing international -commerce, multiplying with every year. The talisman is, perhaps, -self-interest, but, none the less, the spirit of union is there; -it is impossible to ignore a clearly marked<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_2">[p. 2]</span> tendency towards international federation, -towards political peace. This slow movement was not born with Peace -Societies; its consummation lies perhaps far off in the ages to come. -History at best moves slowly. But something of its past progress -we shall do well to know. No political idea seems to have so great -a future before it as this idea of a federation of the world. It -is bound to realise itself some day; let us consider what are the -chances that this day come quickly, what that it be long delayed. -What obstacles lie in the way, and how may they be removed? What -historical grounds have we for hoping that they may ever be removed? -What, in a word, is the origin and history of the idea of a perpetual -peace between nations, and what would be the advantage, what is the -prospect of realising it?</p> - -<p>The international relations of states find their expression, we -are told, in war and peace. What has been the part played by these -great counteracting forces in the history of nations? What has it -been in prehistoric times, in the life of man in what is called -the “state of nature”? “It is no easy enterprise,” says Rousseau, -in more than usually careful language, “to disentangle that which -is original from that which is artificial in the actual state of -man, and to make ourselves well acquainted with a state which no -longer exists, which perhaps<span class="pagenum" id="Page_3">[p. -3]</span> never has existed and which probably never will exist in -the future.” (Preface to the <i>Discourse on the Causes of Inequality</i>, -1753, publ. 1754.) This is a difficulty which Rousseau surmounts -only too easily. A knowledge of history, a scientific spirit may -fail him: an imagination ever ready to pour forth detail never -does. Man lived, says he, “without industry, without speech, -without habitation, without war, without connection of any kind, -without any need of his fellows or without any desire to harm them -... sufficing to himself.”<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" -class="fnanchor">[2]</a> (<i>Discourse on the Sciences and Arts</i>, -1750.) Nothing, we are now certain, is less probable. We cannot -paint the life of man at this stage of his development with any -definiteness, but the conclusion is forced upon us that our -race had no golden age,<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" -class="fnanchor">[3]</a> no peaceful beginning, that this early state -was indeed, as<span class="pagenum" id="Page_4">[p. 4]</span> Hobbes -held, a state of war, of incessant war between individuals, families -and, finally, tribes.</p> - - -<p class="heading"><i>The Early Conditions of Society.</i></p> - -<p>For the barbarian, war is the rule; peace the exception. His -gods, like those of Greece, are warlike gods; his spirit, at death, -flees to some Valhalla. For him life is one long battle; his arms go -with him even to the grave. Food and the means of existence he seeks -through plunder and violence. Here right is with might; the battle is -to the strong. Nature has given all an equal claim to all things, but -not everyone can have them. This state of fearful insecurity is bound -to come to an end. “Government,” says Locke, (<i>On Civil Government</i>, -Chap. VIII., § 105) “is hardly to be<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_5">[p. 5]</span> avoided amongst men that live together.”<a -id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> A -constant dread of attack and a growing consciousness of the necessity -of presenting a united front against it result in the choice of some -leader—the head of a family perhaps—who acts, it may be, only as -captain of the hosts, as did Joshua in Israel, or who may discharge -the simple duties of a primitive governor or king.<a id="FNanchor_5" -href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> Peace within is found -to be strength without. The civil state is established, so that -“if there needs must be war, it may not yet<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_6">[p. 6]</span> be against all men, nor yet without some -helps.” (Hobbes: <i>On Liberty</i>, Chap. I., § 13.) This foundation -of the state is the first establishment in history of a peace -institution. It changes the character of warfare, it gives it method -and system; but it does not bring peace in its train. We have now, -indeed, no longer a wholesale war of all against all, a constant -irregular raid and plunder of one individual by another; but we -have the systematic, deliberate war of community against community, -of nation against nation.<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" -class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p> - - -<p class="heading"><i>War in Classical Times.</i></p> - -<p>In early times, there were no friendly neighbouring nations: -beyond the boundaries of every<span class="pagenum" id="Page_7">[p. -7]</span> nation’s territory, lay the land of a deadly foe. This -was the way of thinking, even of so highly cultured a people as the -Greeks, who believed that a law of nature had made every outsider, -every barbarian their inferior and their enemy.<a id="FNanchor_7" -href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> Their treaties of peace, -at the time of the Persian War, were frankly of the kind denounced -by Kant, mere armistices concluded for the purpose of renewing -their fighting strength. The ancient world is a world of perpetual -war in which defeat meant annihilation. In the East no right was -recognised in the enemy; and even in Greece and Rome the fate of the -unarmed was death or slavery.<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" -class="fnanchor">[8]</a> The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">[p. -8]</span> barbaric or non-Grecian states had, according to Plato -and Aristotle, no claim upon humanity, no<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_9">[p. 9]</span> rights in fact of any kind. Among the -Romans things were little better. According to Mr. T. J. Lawrence—see -his <i>Principles of International Law</i>, III., §§ 21, 22—they were -worse. For Rome stood alone in the world: she was bound by ties of -kinship to no other state. She was, in other words, free from a -sense of obligation to other races. War, according to Roman ideas, -was made by the gods, apart altogether from the quarrels of rulers -or races. To disobey the sacred command, expressed in signs and -auguries would have been to hold in disrespect the law and religion -of the land. When, in the hour of victory, the Romans refrained from -pressing their rights against the conquered—rights recognised by all -Roman jurists—it was from no spirit of leniency, but in the pursuit -of a prudent and far-sighted policy, aiming at the growth of Roman -supremacy and the establishment of a world-embracing empire, shutting -out all war as it blotted out natural boundaries, reducing all rights -to the one right of imperial citizenship. There was no real <i>jus -belli</i>, even here in the cradle of international law; the only limits -to the fury of war were of a religious character.</p> - -<p>The treatment of a defeated enemy among the Jews rested upon -a similar religious foundation. In the East, we find a special -cruelty in the conduct of war. The wars of the Jews and Assyrians -were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">[p. 10]</span> wars of -extermination. The whole of the <i>Old Testament</i>, it has been said, -resounds with the clash of arms.<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" -class="fnanchor">[9]</a> “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth!” -was the command of Jehovah to his chosen people. Vengeance was -bound up in their very idea of the Creator. The Jews, unlike the -followers of Mahomet, attempted, and were commanded to attempt -no violent conversion<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" -class="fnanchor">[10]</a>; they were then too weak a nation; but they -fought, and fought with success against the heathen of neighbouring -lands, the Lord of Hosts leading them forth to battle. The God -of Israel stood to his chosen people in a unique and peculiarly -logical relation. He had made a covenant with them; and, in return -for their obedience and allegiance, cared for their interests and -advanced their national prosperity. The blood of this elect people -could not be suffered to intermix with that of idolaters. Canaan -must be cleared of the heathen, on the coming<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_11">[p. 11]</span> of the children of Israel to their -promised land; and mercy to the conquered enemy, even to women, -children or animals was held by the Hebrew prophets to be treachery -to Jehovah. (<i>Sam.</i> XV.; <i>Josh.</i> VI. 21.)</p> - -<p>Hence the attitude of the Jews to neighbouring nations<a -id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> -was still more hostile than that of the Greeks. The cause of this -difference is bound up with the transition from polytheism to -monotheism. The most devout worshipper of the national gods of -ancient times could endure to see other gods than his worshipped -in the next town or by a neighbouring nation. There was no reason -why all should not exist side by side. Religious conflicts in -polytheistic countries, when they arose, were due not to the rivalry -of conflicting faiths, but to an occasional attempt to put one god -above the others in importance. There could be no interest here in -the propagation of belief through the sword. But, under the Jews, -these relations were entirely altered. Jehovah, their Creator, became -the one invisible God. Such an one can suffer no others near him; -their existence is a continual insult to him. Monotheism is, in its -very nature, a religion of intolerance. Its spirit among the Jews -was warlike: it commanded<span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">[p. -12]</span> the subjugation of other nations, but its instrument was -rather extermination than conversion.</p> - - -<p class="heading"><i>The Attitude of Christianity and the Early Church -to War.</i></p> - -<p>From the standpoint of the peace of nations, we may say that -the Christian faith, compared with other prominent monotheistic -religious systems, occupies an intermediate position between two -extremes—the fanaticism of Islam, and to a less extent of Judaism, -and the relatively passive attitude of the Buddhist who thought -himself bound to propagate his religion, but held himself justified -only in the employment of peaceful means. Christianity, on the other -hand, contains no warlike principles: it can in no sense be called -a religion of the sword, but circumstances gave the history of the -Church, after the first few centuries of its existence, a character -which cannot be called peace-loving.</p> - -<p>This apparent contradiction between the spirit of the new religion -and its practical attitude to war has led to some difference of -opinion as to the actual teaching of Christ. The <i>New Testament</i> -seems, at a superficial glance, to furnish support as readily to the -champions of war as to its denouncers. The Messiah is the Prince of -Peace (<i>Is.</i> IX. 6, 7; <i>Heb.</i> VI.), and here lies the way of<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_13">[p. 13]</span> righteousness (<i>Rom.</i> -III. 19): but Christ came not to bring peace, but a sword (<i>Matth.</i> -X. 34). Such statements may be given the meaning which we wish them -to bear—the quoting of Scripture is ever an unsatisfactory form of -evidence; but there is no direct statement in the <i>New Testament</i> in -favour of war, no saying of Christ which, fairly interpreted, could -be understood too regard this proof of human imperfection as less -condemnable than any other.<a id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" -class="fnanchor">[12]</a> When men shall be without sin, nation shall -rise up against nation no more. But man the individual can attain -peace only when he has overcome the world, when, in the struggle -with his lower self, he has come forth victorious. This is the -spiritual sword which Christ brought into the world—strife, not with -the unbeliever, but with the lower self: meekness and the spirit of -the Word of God are the weapons with which man must fight for the -Faith.</p> - -<p>An elect people there was no longer: Israel had rejected its -Messiah. Instead there was a complete brotherhood of all men, the -bond and the free, as children of one God. The aim of the Church -was a world-empire, bound together by a universal religion. In -this sense, as sowing the first seeds of a universal peace, we -may speak<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">[p. 14]</span> of -Christianity as a re-establishment of peace among mankind.</p> - -<p>The later attitude of Christians to war, however, by no means -corresponds to the earliest tenets of the Church. Without doubt, -certain sects, from the beginning of our era and through the ages -up to the present time, held, like the Mennonites and Quakers in -our day, that the divine command, “Love your enemies,” could not be -reconciled with the profession of a soldier. The early Christians -were reproached under the Roman Emperors, before the time of -Constantine, with avoiding the citizen’s duty of military service.<a -id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> “To -those enemies of our faith,” wrote Origen (<i>Contra Celsum</i>, VIII., -Ch. LXXIII., Anti-Nicene Christian Library), “who require us to -bear arms for the commonwealth, and to slay men, we can reply: -‘Do not those who are priests at certain shrines, and those who -attend on certain gods, as you account them, keep their hands free -from blood, that they may with hands unstained and free from human -blood offer the appointed sacrifices to your<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_15">[p. 15]</span> gods; and even when war is upon you, you -never enlist the priests in the army. If that, then, is a laudable -custom, how much more so, that while others are engaged in battle, -these too should engage as the priests and ministers of God, keeping -their hands pure, and wrestling in prayers to God on behalf of those -who are fighting in a righteous cause, and for the king who reigns -righteously, that whatever is opposed to those who act righteously -may be destroyed!’ ... And we do take our part in public affairs, -when along with righteous prayers we join self-denying exercises and -meditations, which teach us to despise pleasures, and not to be led -away by them. And none fight better for the king than we do. We do -not indeed fight under him, although he require it; but we fight on -his behalf, forming a special army—an army of piety—by offering our -prayers to God.” The Fathers of the Church, Justin Martyr, Clement -of Alexandria, Tertullian, Ambrose and the rest gave the same -testimony against war. The pagan rites connected with the taking of -the military oath had no doubt some influence in determining the -feeling of the pious with regard to this life of bloodshed; but the -reasons lay deeper. “Shall it be held lawful,” asked Tertullian, -(<i>De Corona</i>, p. 347) “to make an occupation of the sword, when -the Lord proclaims that he who uses the sword shall perish<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_16">[p. 16]</span> by the sword? And shall -the son of peace take part in the battle when it does not become him -even to sue at law? And shall he apply the chain, and the prison, and -the torture, and the punishment, who is not the avenger even of his -own wrongs?”</p> - -<p>The doctrine of the Church developed early in the opposite -direction. It was its fighting spirit and not a love of peace that -made Christianity a state religion under Constantine. Nor was -Augustine the first of the Church Fathers to regard military service -as permissible. To come to a later time, this change of attitude has -been ascribed partly to the rise of Mahometan power and the wave of -fanaticism which broke over Europe. To destroy these unbelievers -with fire and sword was regarded as a deed of piety pleasing to -God. Hence the wars of the Crusades against the infidel were holy -wars, and appear as a new element in the history of civilisation. -The nations of ancient times had known only civil and foreign war.<a -id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> -They had rebelled at home, and they had fought mainly for material -interests abroad. In the Middle Ages there were, besides, religious -wars and, with the rise of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">[p. -17]</span> Feudalism, private war:<a id="FNanchor_15" -href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> among all the powers -of the Dark Ages and for centuries later, none was more aggressive -than the Catholic Church, nor a more active and untiring defender of -its rights and claims, spiritual or temporal. It was in some respects -a more warlike institution than the states of Greece and Rome. It -struggled through centuries with the Emperor:<a id="FNanchor_16" -href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> it pronounced its -ban against disobedient states and disloyal cities: it pursued -with its vengeance each heretical or rebellious prince: unmindful -of its early traditions about peace, it showed in every crisis a -fiercely military spirit.<a id="FNanchor_17" href="#Footnote_17" -class="fnanchor">[17]</a></p> - -<p>For more than a thousand years the Church<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_18">[p. 18]</span> counted fighting clergy<a -id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> among -its most active supporters. This strange anomaly was, it must be -said, at first rather suffered in deference to public opinion than -encouraged by ecclesiastical canons and councils, but it gave rise to -great discontent at the time of the Reformation.<a id="FNanchor_19" -href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> The whole question of -the lawfulness of military service for Christians was then raised -again. “If there be anything in the affairs of mortals,” wrote -Erasmus at this time (<i>Opera</i>, II., <i>Prov.</i>, 951 C) “which it<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_19">[p. 19]</span> becomes us deliberately -to attack, which we ought indeed to shun by every possible means, -to avert and to abolish, it is certainly war, than which there is -nothing more wicked, more mischievous or more widely destructive -in its effects, nothing harder to be rid of, or more horrible and, -in a word, more unworthy of a man, not to say of a Christian.”<a -id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> -The mediæval Church indeed succeeded, by the establishment of -such institutions as the Truce of God, in setting some limits -to the fury of the soldier: but its endeavours (and it made -several to promote peace)<a id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21" -class="fnanchor">[21]</a> were only to a trifling extent successful. -Perhaps custom and public opinion in feudal Europe were too strong, -perhaps the Church showed a certain apathy in denouncing the evils of -a military society: no doubt the theoretical tenets of its doctrine -did less to hinder war than its own strongly military tendency, -its<span class="pagenum" id="Page_20">[p. 20]</span> lust for power -and the force of its example did to encourage it.</p> - -<p>Hence, in spite of Christianity and its early vision of a -brotherhood of men, the history of the Middle Ages came nearer to a -realization of the idea of perpetual war than was possible in ancient -times. The tendency of the growth of Roman supremacy was to diminish -the number of wars, along with the number of possible causes of -racial friction. It united many nations in one great whole, and gave -them, to a certain extent, a common culture and common interests; -even, when this seemed prudent, a common right of citizenship. The -fewer the number of boundaries, the less the likelihood of war. The -establishment of great empires is of necessity a force, and a great -and permanent force working on the side of peace. With the fall of -Rome this guarantee was removed.</p> - - -<p class="heading"><i>The Development of the New Science of -International Law.</i></p> - -<p>Out of the ruins of the old feudal system arose the modern -state as a free independent unity. Private war between -individuals or classes of society was now branded as a breach -of the peace: it became the exclusive right of kings to appeal -to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">[p. 21]</span> force. -War, wrote Gentilis<a id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" -class="fnanchor">[22]</a> towards the end of sixteenth century, -is the just or unjust conflict between states. Peace was now -regarded as the normal condition of society. As a result of these -great developments in which the name “state” acquired new meaning, -jurisprudence freed itself from the trammelling conditions of -mediæval Scholasticism. Men began to consider the problem of the -rightfulness or wrongfulness of war, to question even the possibility -of a war on rightful grounds. Out of theses new ideas—partly -too as one of the fruits of the Reformation,<a id="FNanchor_23" -href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a>—arose the first -consciously formulated principles of the science of international -law, whose fuller, but not yet complete, development belongs to -modern times.</p> - -<p>From the beginning of history every age, every<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_22">[p. 22]</span> people has something -to show here, be it only a rudimentary sense of justice in their -dealings with one another. We may instance the Amphictyonic League -in Greece which, while it had a merely Hellenic basis and was mainly -a religious survival, shows the germ of some attempt at arbitration -between Greek states. Among the Romans we have the <i>jus feciale</i><a -id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> -and the <i>jus gentium</i>, as distinguished from the civil law of -Rome, and certain military regulations about the taking of booty -in war. Ambassadors were held inviolate<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_23">[p. 23]</span> in both countries; the formal declaration -of war was never omitted. Many Roman writers held the necessity of -a just cause for war. But nowhere do these considerations form the -subject matter of a special science.</p> - -<p>In the Middle Ages the development of these ideas received -little encouragement. All laws are silent in the time of war,<a -id="FNanchor_25" href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> and -this was a period of war, both bloody and constant. There was no time -to think of the right or wrong of anything. Moreover, the Church -emphasised the lack of rights in unbelievers, and gave her blessing -on their annihilation.<a id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26" -class="fnanchor">[26]</a> The whole Christian world was filled with -the idea of a spiritual universal monarchy. Not such as that in -the minds of Greek and Jew and Roman who had been able to picture -international peace only under the form of a great national and -exclusive empire. In this great Christian state there were to be no -distinctions between nations; its sphere was bounded by the universe. -But, here, there was no room or recognition for independent national -states with equal and personal rights. This recognition, opposed by -the Roman<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">[p. 24]</span> Church, -is the real basis of international law. The Reformation was the means -by which the personality of the peoples, the unity and independence -of the state were first openly admitted. On this foundation, mainly -at first in Protestant countries, the new science developed rapidly. -Like the civil state and the Christian religion, international law -may be called a peace institution.</p> - - -<p class="heading"><i>Grotius, Puffendorf and Vattel.</i></p> - -<p>In the beginning of the seventeenth century, Grotius laid the -foundations of a code of universal law (<i>De Jure Belli et Pacis</i>, -1625) independent of differences of religion, in the hope that its -recognition might simplify the intercourse between the newly formed -nations. The primary object of this great work, written during the -misery and horrors of the Thirty Years’ war, was expressly to draw -attention to these evils and suggest some methods by which the -severity of warfare might be mitigated. Grotius originally meant to -explain only one chapter of the law of nations:<a id="FNanchor_27" -href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> his book was to<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_25">[p. 25]</span> be called <i>De Jure -Belli</i>, but there is scarcely any subject of international law which -he leaves untouched. He obtained, moreover, a general recognition -for the doctrine of the Law of Nature which exerted so strong an -influence upon succeeding centuries; indeed, between these two -sciences, as between international law and ethics, he draws no very -sharp line of demarcation, although, on the whole, in spite of an -unscientific, scholastic use of quotation from authorities, his -treatment of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">[p. 26]</span> -new field is clear and comprehensive. Grotius made the attempt to -set up an ethical principle of right, in the stead of such doctrines -of self-interest as had been held by many of the ancient writers. -There was a law, he held, established in each state purely with a -view to the interests of that state, but, besides this, there was -another higher law in the interest of the whole society of nations. -Its origin was divine; the reason of man commanded his obedience. -This was what we call international law.<a id="FNanchor_28" -href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a></p> - -<p>Grotius distinctly holds, like Kant and Rousseau, and unlike -Hobbes, that the state can never be regarded as a unity or -institution separable from the people; the terms <i>civitas</i>, -<i>communitas</i>, <i>coetus</i>, <i>populus</i>, he uses indiscriminately. But -these nations, these independent units of society cannot live -together side by side just as they like; they must recognise -one another as members of a European society of states.<a -id="FNanchor_29" href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> Law, -he said, stands above force even in war, “which may only be begun -to pursue the right;” and the beginning and manner of conduct of -war rests on fixed laws and can be justified only in certain cases. -War is not to be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">[p. 27]</span> -done away with: Grotius accepts it as fact,<a id="FNanchor_30" -href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> (as Hobbes did later) -as the natural method for settling the disputes which were bound -constantly to arise between so many independent and sovereign -nations. A terrible scourge it must ever remain, but as the only -available form of legal procedure, it is sanctioned by the practice -of states and not less by the law of nature and of nations. Grotius -did not advance beyond this position. Every violation of the law -of nations can be settled but in one way—by war, the force of the -stronger.</p> - -<p>The necessary distinction between law and ethics was -drawn by Puffendorf,<a id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31" -class="fnanchor">[31]</a> a successor of Grotius who gave an -outwardly systematic form to the doctrine of the great jurist, -without adding to it<span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">[p. -28]</span> either strength or completeness. His views, when they -were not based upon the system of Grotius, were strongly influenced -by the speculation of Hobbes, his chronological predecessor, to whom -we shall have later occasion to refer. In the works of Vattel,<a -id="FNanchor_32" href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> who -was, next to Rousseau, the most celebrated of Swiss publicists, we -find the theory of the customs and practice in war widely developed, -and the necessity for humanising its methods and limiting its -destructive effects upon neutral countries strongly emphasised. -Grotius and Puffendorf, while they recommend acts of mercy, hold that -there is legally no right which requires that a conquered enemy shall -be spared. This is a matter of humanity alone. It is to the praise -of Vattel that he did much to popularise among the highest and most -powerful classes of society, ideas of humanity in warfare, and of -the rights and obligations of nations. He is, moreover, the first to -make a clear separation between this science and the Law of Nature. -What, he asks, is international law as distinguished from the Law -of Nature? What are the powers of a state and the duties of nations -to one another? What are the causes of quarrel among nations, and -what the means by which they can be settled without any sacrifice of -dignity?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_29">[p. 29]</span></p> - -<p>They are, in the first place, a friendly conciliatory attitude; -and secondly, such means of settlement as mediation, arbitration and -Peace Congresses. These are the refuges of a peace-loving nation, in -cases where vital interests are not at stake. “Nature gives us no -right to use force, except where mild and conciliatory measures are -useless.” (<i>Law of Nations</i>, II. Ch. xviii. § 331.) “Every power owes -it in this matter to the happiness of human society to show itself -ready for every means of reconciliation, in cases where the interests -at stake are neither vital nor important.” (<i>ibid.</i> § 332.) At the -same time, it is never advisable that a nation should forgive an -insult which it has not the power to resent.</p> - - -<p class="heading"><i>The Dream of a Perpetual Peace.</i></p> - -<p>But side by side with this development and gradual popularisation -of the new science of International Law, ideas of a less practical, -but not less fruitful kind had been steadily making their way -and obtaining a strong hold upon the popular mind. The Decree of -Eternal Pacification of 1495 had abolished private war, one of the -heavy curses of the Middle Ages. Why should it not be extended -to banish warfare between states as well? Gradually one proposal -after another was made<span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">[p. -30]</span> to attain this end, or, at least, to smooth the way for -its future realisation. The first of these in point of time is to -be found in a somewhat bare, vague form in Sully’s <i>Memoirs</i>,<a -id="FNanchor_33" href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> said -to have been published in 1634. Half a century later the Quaker -William Penn suggested an international tribunal of arbitration -in the interests of peace.<a id="FNanchor_34" href="#Footnote_34" -class="fnanchor">[34]</a> But it was by the French Abbé St. Pierre -that the problem of perpetual peace was fairly introduced into -political literature: and this, in an age of cabinet and dynastic -wars, while the dreary cost of the war of the Spanish succession was -yet unpaid. St. Pierre was the first who really clearly realised and -endeavoured to prove that the establishment of a permanent state of -peace is not only in the interest of the weaker, but is required -by the European society of nations and by the reason of man. From -the beginning of the history of humanity, poets and prophets had -cherished the “sweet dream” of a peaceful civilisation: it is in the -form of a practical project that this idea is new.</p> - -<p>The ancient world actually represented a state<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_31">[p. 31]</span> of what was almost -perpetual war. This was the reality which confronted man, his -inevitable doom, it seemed, as it had been pronounced to the fallen -sinners of Eden. Peace was something which man had enjoyed once, but -forfeited. The myth- and poetry-loving Greeks, and, later, the poets -of Rome delighted to paint a state of eternal peace, not as something -to whose coming they could look forward in the future, but as a -golden age of purity whose records lay buried in the past, a paradise -which had been, but which was no more. Voices, more scientific, were -raised even in Greece in attempts, such as Aristotle’s, to show -that the evolution of man had been not a course of degeneration -from perfection, but of continual progress upwards from barbarism -to civilisation and culture. But the change in popular thinking on -this matter was due less to the arguments of philosophy than to a -practical experience of the causes which operate in the interests -of peace. The foundation of a universal empire under Alexander the -Great gave temporary rest to nations heretofore incessantly at war. -Here was a proof that the Divine Will had not decreed that man was -to work out his punishment under unchanging conditions of perpetual -warfare. This idea of a universal empire became the Greek ideal of a -perpetual peace. Such an empire was, in the language of the Stoics, -a world<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">[p. 32]</span>-state in -which all men had rights of citizenship, in which all other nations -were absorbed.</p> - -<p>Parallel to this ideal among the Greeks, we find the hope in -Israel of a Messiah whose coming was to bring peace, not only to -the Jewish race, but to all the nations of the earth. This idea -stands out in the sharpest contrast to the early nationalism of the -Hebrew people, who regarded every stranger as an idolater and an -enemy. The prophecies of Judaism, combined with the cosmopolitan -ideas of Greece, were the source of the idea, which is expressed in -the teaching of Christ, of a spiritual world-empire, an empire held -together solely by the tie of a common religion.</p> - -<p>This hope of peace did not actually die during the first thousand -years of our era, nor even under the morally stagnating influences -of the Middle Ages. When feudalism and private war were abolished -in Europe, it wakened to a new life. Not merely in the mouths of -poets and religious enthusiasts was the cry raised against war, but -by scholars like Thomas More and Erasmus, jurists like Gentilis -and Grotius, men high in the state and in the eyes of Europe like -Henry IV. of France and the Duc de Sully or the Abbé de St. Pierre -whose <i>Projet de Paix Perpétuelle</i> (1713)<a id="FNanchor_35" -href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a><span class="pagenum" -id="Page_33">[p. 33]</span> obtained immediate popularity and -wide-spread fame. The first half of the eighteenth century was -already prepared to receive and mature a plan of this kind.</p> - - -<p class="heading"><i>Henry IV. and St. Pierre.</i></p> - -<p>The <i>Grand Dessein</i> of Henry IV. is supposed to have been formed -by that monarch and reproduced in Sully’s <i>Memoirs</i>, written in 1634 -and discovered nearly a century later by St. Pierre. The story goes -that the Abbé found the book buried in an old garden. It has been -shewn, however, that there is little likelihood that this project -actually originated with the king, who probably corresponded fairly -well to Voltaire’s picture of him as war hero of the <i>Henriade</i>. The -plan was more likely conceived by Sully, and ascribed to the popular -king for the sake of the better hearing and greater influence it -might in this way be likely to have, and also because, thereby, it -might be less likely to create offence in political circles. St. -Pierre himself may or may not have been acquainted with the facts.</p> - -<p>The so-called <i>Grand Dessein</i> of Henry IV. was, shortly, -as follows.<a id="FNanchor_36" href="#Footnote_36" -class="fnanchor">[36]</a> It proposed to divide Europe<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_34">[p. 34]</span> between fifteen Powers,<a -id="FNanchor_37" href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> in -such a manner that the balance of power should be established and -preserved. These were to form a Christian republic on the basis -of the freedom and equality of its members, the armed forces of -the federation being supported by fixed contribution. A general -council, consisting of representatives from the fifteen states, -was to make all laws necessary for cementing the union thus formed -and for maintaining the order once established. It would also be -the business of this senate to “deliberate on questions that might -arise, to occupy themselves with discussing different interests, to -settle quarrels amicably, to throw light upon and arrange all the -civil, political and religious affairs of Europe, whether internal or -foreign.” (<i>Mémoires</i>, vol. VI., p. 129 <i>seq.</i>)</p> - -<p>This scheme of the king or his minister was expanded with great -thoroughness and clear-sightedness by the Abbé St. Pierre: none of -the many later plans for a perpetual peace has been so perfect in -details. He proposes that there should be a permanent and perpetual -union between, if possible, all Christian sovereigns—of whom he -suggests nineteen, excluding the Czar—“to preserve unbroken peace -in Europe,” and that a permanent Congress<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_35">[p. 35]</span> or senate should be formed by deputies -of the federated states. The union should protect weak sovereigns, -minors during a regency, and so on, and should banish civil as well -as international war—it should “render prompt and adequate assistance -to rulers and chief magistrates against seditious persons and -rebels.” All warfare henceforth is to be waged between the troops -of the federation—each nation contributing an equal number—and -the enemies of European security, whether outsiders or rebellious -members of the union. Otherwise, where it is possible, all disputes -occurring within the union are to be settled by the arbitration of -the senate, and the combined military force of the federation is -to be applied to drive the Turks out of Europe. There is to be a -rational rearrangement of boundaries, but after this no change is to -be permitted in the map of Europe. The union should bind itself to -tolerate the different forms of faith.</p> - -<p>The objections to St. Pierre’s scheme are, many of them, obvious. -He himself produces sixty-two arguments likely to be raised against -his plan, and he examines these in turn with acuteness and eloquence. -But there are other criticisms which he was less likely to be able -to forestall. Of the nineteen states he names as a basis of the -federation, some have disappeared and the governments of others -have completely changed. Indeed St. Pierre’s<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_36">[p. 36]</span> scheme did not look far beyond the -present. But it has besides a too strongly political character.<a -id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> -From this point of view, the Abbé’s plan amounts practically to -a European coalition against the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, we -notice with a smile that the French statesman and patriot is not -lost in the cosmopolitan political reformer. “The kingdom of Spain -shall not go out of the House of Bourbon!”<a id="FNanchor_39" -href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> France is to enjoy more -than the privileges of honour; she is to reap distinct material and -political advantages from the union. Humanity is to be a brotherhood, -but, in the federation of nations, France is to stand first.<a -id="FNanchor_40" href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> -We see that these “rêves d’un homme de bien,” as Cardinal Dubois -called them, are not without their practical element. But the -great mistake of St. Pierre is this: he actually thought that -his plan could be put into execution in the near future, that an -ideal of this kind was realisable at once.<a id="FNanchor_41" -href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> “I, myself,<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_37">[p. 37]</span> form’d it,” he says in -the preface, “in full expectation to see it one Day executed.” As -Hobbes, says, “there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in -the books of philosophers.”<a id="FNanchor_42" href="#Footnote_42" -class="fnanchor">[42]</a> St. Pierre was not content to make his -influence felt on the statesmen of his time and prepare the way for -the abolition of all arbitrary forms of government. This was the flaw -which drew down upon the good Abbé Voltaire’s sneering epigram<a -id="FNanchor_43" href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> -and the irony of Leibniz.<a id="FNanchor_44" href="#Footnote_44" -class="fnanchor">[44]</a> Here, above all, in this unpractical -enthusiasm his scheme differs from that of Kant.</p> - - -<p class="heading"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">[p. -38]</span><i>Rousseau’s Criticism of St. Pierre.</i></p> - -<p>Rousseau took St. Pierre’s project<a id="FNanchor_45" -href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> much more seriously -than either Leibniz or Voltaire. But sovereigns, he thought, are deaf -to the voice of justice; the absolutism of princely power would never -allow a king to submit to a tribunal of nations. Moreover war was, -according to Rousseau’s experience, a matter not between nations, but -between princes and cabinets. It was one of the ordinary pleasures -of royal existence and one not likely to be voluntarily given up.<a -id="FNanchor_46" href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> We -know that history has not supported Rousseau’s contention. Dynastic -wars are now no more. The Great Powers have shown themselves able -to impose their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">[p. 39]</span> -own conditions, where the welfare and security of Europe have seemed -to demand it. Such a development seemed impossible enough in the -eighteenth century. In the military organisation of the nations of -Europe and in the necessity of making their internal development -subordinate to the care for their external security, Rousseau saw the -cause of all the defects in their administration.<a id="FNanchor_47" -href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> The formation of -unions on the model of the Swiss Confederation or the German <i>Bund</i> -would, he thought, be in the interest of all rulers. But great -obstacles seemed to him to lie in the way of the realisation of such -a project as that of St. Pierre. “Without doubt,” says Rousseau in -conclusion, “the proposal of a perpetual peace is at present an -absurd one.... It can only be put into effect by methods which are -violent in themselves and dangerous to humanity. One cannot conceive -of the possibility of a federative union being established, except -by a revolution.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">[p. 40]</span> -And, that granted, who among us would venture to say whether this -European federation is to be desired or to be feared? It would work, -perhaps, more harm in a moment than it would prevent in the course of -centuries.” (<i>Jugement sur la Paix Perpétuelle.</i>)</p> - - -<p class="heading"><i>The Position of Hobbes.</i></p> - -<p>The most profound and searching analysis of this problem comes -from Immanuel Kant, whose indebtedness in the sphere of politics -to Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau it is difficult to -overestimate. Kant’s doctrine of the sovereignty of the people comes -to him from Locke through Rousseau. His explanation of the origin -of society is practically that of Hobbes. The direct influence on -politics of this philosopher, apart from his share in moulding the -Kantian theory of the state, is one we cannot afford to neglect. His -was a great influence on the new science just thrown on the world by -Grotius, and his the first clear and systematic statement we have of -the nature of society and the establishment of the state. The natural -state of man, says Hobbes, is a state of war,<a id="FNanchor_48" -href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> a<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_41">[p. 41]</span> <i>bellum omnium contra omnes</i>, where all -struggle for honour and for preferment and the prizes to which every -individual is by natural right equally entitled, but which can of -necessity fall only to the few, the foremost in the race. Men hate -and fear the society of their kind, but through this desire<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_42">[p. 42]</span> to excel are forced to -seek it: only where there are many can there be a first. This state -of things, this apparent sociability which is brought about by and -coupled with the least sociable of instincts, becomes unendurable. -“It is necessary to peace,” writes Hobbes (<i>On Dominion</i>, Ch. VI. -3) “that a man be so far forth protected against the violence of -others, that he may live securely; that is, that he may have no just -cause to fear others, so long as he doth them no injury. Indeed, to -make men altogether safe from mutual harms, so as they cannot be -hurt or injuriously killed, is impossible; and, therefore, comes not -within deliberation.” But to protect them so far as is possible the -state is formed. Hobbes has no great faith in human contracts or -promises. Man’s nature is malicious and untrustworthy. A coercive -power is necessary to guarantee this long-desired security within the -community. “We must therefore,” he adds, “provide for our security, -not by compacts, but by punishments; and there is then sufficient -provision made, when there are so great punishments appointed for -every injury, as apparently it prove a greater evil to have done it, -than not to have done it. For all men, by a necessity of nature, -choose that which to them appears to be the less evil.” (<i>Op. cit.</i>, -Ch. VI. 4.)</p> - -<p>These precautions secure that relative peace<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_43">[p. 43]</span> within the state which is one of the -conditions of the safety of the people. But it is, besides, the duty -of a sovereign to guarantee an adequate protection to his subjects -against foreign enemies. A state of defence as complete and perfect -as possible is not only a national duty, but an absolute necessity. -The following statement of the relation of the state to other states -shows how closely Hobbes has been followed by Kant. “There are -two things necessary,” says Hobbes, (<i>On Dominion</i>, Ch. XIII. 7) -“for the people’s defence; to be warned and to be forearmed. <i>For -the state of commonwealths considered in themselves, is natural, -that is to say, hostile.</i><a id="FNanchor_49" href="#Footnote_49" -class="fnanchor">[49]</a> Neither, if they cease from fighting, is it -therefore to be called peace; but rather a breathing time, in which -one enemy observing the motion and countenance of the other, values -his security not according to pacts, but the forces and counsels of -his adversary.”</p> - -<p>Hobbes is a practical philosopher: no man was less a dreamer, a -follower after ideals than he. He is, moreover, a pessimist, and his -doctrine of the state is a political absolutism,<a id="FNanchor_50" -href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> the form of -govern<span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">[p. 44]</span>ment which -above all has been, and is, favourable to war. He would no doubt have -ridiculed the idea of a perpetual peace between nations, had such -a project as that of St. Pierre—a practical project, counting upon -a realisation in the near future—been brought before him. He might -not even have accepted it in the very much modified form which Kant -adopts, that of an ideal—an unattainable ideal—towards which humanity -could not do better than work. He expected the worst possible from -man the individual. <i>Homo homini lupus.</i> The strictest absolutism, -amounting almost to despotism, was required to keep the vicious -propensities of the human animal in check. States he looked upon as -units of the same kind, members also of a society. They had, and -openly exhibited, the same faults as individual men. They too might -be driven with a strong enough coercive force behind them, but not -without it; and such a coercive force as this did not exist in a -society of nations. Federation and federal troops are terms which -represent ideas of comparatively recent origin.<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_45">[p. 45]</span> Without something of this kind, any -enduring peace was not to be counted upon. International relations -were and must remain at least potentially warlike in character. Under -no circumstances could ideal conditions be possible either between -the members of a state or between the states themselves. Human nature -could form no satisfactory basis for a counsel of perfection.</p> - -<p>Hence Hobbes never thought of questioning the necessity of war. -It was in his eyes the natural condition of European society; but -certain rules were necessary both for its conduct and, where this -was compatible with a nation’s dignity and prosperity, for its -prevention. He held that international law was only a part of the -Law of Nature, and that this Law of Nature laid certain obligations -upon nations and their kings. Mediation must be employed between -disputants as much as possible, the person of the mediators of -peace being held inviolate; an umpire ought to be chosen to decide -a controversy, to whose judgment the parties in dispute agree to -submit themselves; such an arbiter must be impartial. These are all -what Hobbes calls precepts of the Law of Nature. And he appeals to -the Scriptures in confirmation of his assertion that peace is the -way of righteousness and that the laws of nature of which these -are a few are also laws of the heavenly kingdom. But peace is like -the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">[p. 46]</span> straight path -of Christian endeavour, difficult to find and difficult to keep. -We must seek after it where it may be found; but, having done this -and sought in vain, we have no alternative but to fall back upon -war. Reason requires “that every man ought to endeavour peace,” -(<i>Lev.</i> I. Ch. XIV.) “as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and -when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, -and advantages of war.”<a id="FNanchor_51" href="#Footnote_51" -class="fnanchor">[51]</a> This, says Hobbes elsewhere, (<i>On Liberty</i>, -Ch. I. 15) is the dictate of right reason, the first and fundamental -law of nature.</p> - - -<p class="heading"><i>Kant’s Idea of a Perpetual Peace.</i></p> - -<p>With regard to the problems of international law, Kant is of -course a hundred and fifty years ahead of Hobbes. But he starts from -the same point: his theory of the beginning of society is practically -identical with that of the older philosopher. Men are by nature -imperfect creatures, unsociable and untrustworthy, cursed by a love -of glory, of possession, and of power, passions which make happiness -something for ever unattainable by them. Hobbes is content to leave -them here with their imperfections, and let a strong government<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_47">[p. 47]</span> help them out as it may. -But not so Kant. He looks beyond man the individual, developing -slowly by stages scarcely measurable, progressing at one moment, -and the next, as it seems, falling behind: he looks beyond the -individual, struggling and never attaining, to the race. Here Kant -is no pessimist. The capacities implanted in man by nature are not -all for evil: they are, he says, “destined to unfold themselves -completely in the course of time, and in accordance with the end -to which they are adapted.” (<i>Idea of a Universal History from a -Cosmopolitan Point of View</i>, 1784. Prop. 1.) This end of humanity is -the evolution of man from the stage of mere self-satisfied animalism -to a high state of civilisation. Through his own reason man is to -attain a perfect culture, intellectual and moral. In this long period -of struggle, the potential faculties which nature or Providence has -bestowed upon him reach their full development. The process in which -this evolution takes place is what we call history.</p> - -<p>To man nature has given none of the perfect animal equipments -for self-preservation and self-defence which she has bestowed -on others of her creatures. But she has given to him reason and -freedom of will, and has determined that through these faculties -and without the aid of instinct he shall win for himself a complete -development of his capacities and natural endowments. It is, -says<span class="pagenum" id="Page_48">[p. 48]</span> Kant, no happy -life that nature has marked out for man. He is filled with desires -which he can never satisfy. His life is one of endeavour and not of -attainment: not even the consciousness of the well-fought battle is -his, for the struggle is more or less an unconscious one, the end -unseen. Only in the race, and not in the individual, can the natural -capacities of the human species reach full development. Reason, says -Kant, (Prop. 2, <i>op. cit.</i>) “does not itself work by instinct, but -requires experiments, exercise and instruction in order to advance -gradually from one stage of insight to another. Hence each individual -man would necessarily have to live an enormous length of time, in -order to learn by himself how to make a complete use of all his -natural endowments. Or, if nature should have given him but a short -lease of life, as is actually the case, reason would then require an -almost interminable series of generations, the one handing down its -enlightenment to the other, in order that the seeds she has sown in -our species may be brought at last to a stage of development which -is in perfect accordance with her design.” Man the individual shall -travel towards the land of promise and fight for its possession, -but not he, nor his children, nor his children’s children shall -inherit the land. “Only the latest comers can have the good fortune -of inhabiting<span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">[p. 49]</span> -the dwelling which the long series of their predecessors have -toiled—though,” adds Kant, “without any conscious intent—to build up -without even the possibility of participating in the happiness which -they were preparing.” (Proposition 3.)</p> - -<p>The means which nature employs to bring about this development of -all the capacities implanted in men is their mutual antagonism in -society—what Kant calls the “unsocial sociableness of men, that is to -say, their inclination to enter into society, an inclination which -yet is bound up at every point with a resistance which threatens -continually to break up the society so formed.” (Proposition 4.) Man -hates society, and yet there alone he can develop his capacities; he -cannot live there peaceably, and yet cannot live without it. It is -the resistance which others offer to his inclinations and will—which -he, on his part, shows likewise to the desires of others—that awakens -all the latent powers of his nature and the determination to conquer -his natural propensity to indolence and love of material comfort -and to struggle for the first place among his fellow-creatures, to -satisfy, in outstripping them, his love of glory and possession and -power. “Without those, in themselves by no means lovely, qualities -which set man in social opposition to man, so that each finds his -selfish claims resisted by the selfishness of all the others, men -would have lived<span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">[p. 50]</span> -on in an Arcadian shepherd life, in perfect harmony, contentment, -and mutual love; but all their talents would forever have remained -hidden and undeveloped. Thus, kindly as the sheep they tended, they -would scarcely have given to their existence a greater value than -that of their cattle. And the place among the ends of creation which -was left for the development of rational beings would not have been -filled. Thanks be to nature for the unsociableness, for the spiteful -competition of vanity, for the insatiate desires of gain and power! -Without these, all the excellent natural capacities of humanity -would have slumbered undeveloped. Man’s will is for harmony; but -nature knows better what is good for his species: her will is for -dissension. He would like a life of comfort and satisfaction, but -nature wills that he should be dragged out of idleness and inactive -content and plunged into labour and trouble, in order that he may be -made to seek in his own prudence for the means of again delivering -himself from them. The natural impulses which prompt this effort,—the -causes of unsociableness and mutual conflict, out of which so many -evils spring,—are also in turn the spurs which drive him to the -development of his powers. Thus, they really betray the providence -of a wise Creator, and not the interference of some evil spirit -which has meddled with the world which God has<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_51">[p. 51]</span> nobly planned, and enviously overturned -its order.” (Proposition 4: Caird’s translation in <i>The Critical -Philosophy of Kant</i>, Vol. II., pp. 550, 551.)</p> - -<p>The problem now arises, How shall men live together, each free to -work out his own development, without at the same time interfering -with a like liberty on the part of his neighbour? The solution -of this problem is the state. Here the liberty of each member is -guaranteed and its limits strictly defined. A perfectly just civil -constitution, administered according to the principles of right, -would be that under which the greatest possible amount of liberty -was left to each citizen within these limits. This is the ideal -of Kant, and here lies the greatest practical problem which has -presented itself to humanity. An ideal of this kind is difficult of -realisation. But nature imposes no such duty upon us. “Out of such -crooked material as man is made,” says Kant, “nothing can be hammered -quite straight.” (Proposition 6.) We must make our constitution as -good as we can and, with that, rest content.</p> - -<p>The direct cause of this transition from a state of nature -and conditions of unlimited freedom to civil society with its -coercive and restraining forces is found in the evils of that -state of nature as they are painted by Hobbes. A wild lawless -freedom becomes impossible for man: he is compelled to<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_52">[p. 52]</span> seek the protection -of a civil society. He lives in uncertainty and insecurity: his -liberty is so far worthless that he cannot peacefully enjoy -it. For this peace he voluntarily yields up some part of his -independence. The establishment of the state is in the interest of -his development to a higher civilisation. It is more—the guarantee -of his existence and self-preservation. This is the sense, says -Professor Paulsen, in which Kant like Hobbes regards the state as -“resting on a contract,”<a id="FNanchor_52" href="#Footnote_52" -class="fnanchor">[52]</a> that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">[p. -53]</span> is to say, on the free will of all.<a id="FNanchor_53" -href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> <i>Volenti non fit -injuria.</i> Only, adds Paulsen, we must remember that this contract -is not a historical fact, as it seemed to some writers of the -eighteenth century, but an “idea of reason”: we are speaking here not -of the history of the establishment of the state, but of the reason -of its existence. (Paulsen’s <i>Kant</i>, p. 354.)<a id="FNanchor_54" -href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">[p. 54]</span></p> - -<p>In this civil union, self-sought, yet sought reluctantly, man is -able to turn his most unlovable qualities to a profitable use. They -bind this society together. They are the instrument by which he wins -for himself self-culture. It is here with men, says Kant, as it is -with the trees in a forest: “just because each one strives to deprive -the other of air and sun, they compel each other to seek both above, -and thus they grow beautiful and straight. Whereas those that, in -freedom and isolation from one another, shoot out their branches at -will, grow stunted and crooked and awry.” (Proposition 5, <i>op. cit.</i>) -Culture, art, and all that is best in the social order are the fruits -of that self-loving unsociableness in man.</p> - -<p>The problem of the establishment of a perfect civil constitution -cannot be solved, says this treatise (<i>Idea for a Universal -History</i>), until the external relations of states are regulated -in accordance with principles of right. For, even if the ideal -internal constitution were attained, what end would it serve in the -evolution of humanity, if commonwealths themselves were to remain -like individuals in a state of nature, each existing in uncontrolled -freedom, a law unto himself? This condition of things again cannot -be permanent. Nature uses the same means as before to bring about -a state of law and order. War, present or near at hand, the -strain<span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">[p. 55]</span> of constant -preparation for a possible future campaign or the heavy burden of -debt and devastation left by the last,—these are the evils which must -drive states to leave a lawless, savage state of nature, hostile to -man’s inward development, and seek in union the end of nature, peace. -All wars are the attempts nature makes to bring about new political -relations between nations, relations which, in their very nature, -cannot be, and are not desired to be, permanent. These combinations -will go on succeeding each other, until at last a federation of all -powers is formed for the establishment of perpetual peace. This is -the end of humanity, demanded by reason. Justice will reign, not only -in the state, but in the whole human race when perpetual peace exists -between the nations of the world.</p> - -<p>This is the point of view of the <i>Idea for a Universal History</i>. -But equally, we may say, law and justice will reign between -nations, when a legally and morally perfect constitution adorns the -state. External perpetual peace presupposes internal peace—peace -civil, social, economic, religious. Now, when men are perfect—and -what would this be but perfection—how can there be war? Cardinal -Fleury’s only objection—no light one—to St. Pierre’s project was -that, as even the most peace-loving could not avoid war, all men -must first be men of noble character. This seems to be what is -required<span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">[p. 56]</span> in the -treatise on <i>Perpetual Peace</i>. Kant demands, to a certain extent, -the moral regeneration of man. There must be perfect honesty in -international dealings, good faith in the interpretation and -fulfilment of treaties and so on (Art. 1)<a id="FNanchor_55" -href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a>: and again, every -state must have a republican constitution—a term by which Kant -understands a constitution as nearly as possible in accordance with -the spirit of right. (Art. 1.)<a id="FNanchor_56" href="#Footnote_56" -class="fnanchor">[56]</a> This is to say that we have to start with -our reformation at home, look first to the culture and education -and morals of our citizens, then to our foreign relations. This is -a question of self-interest as well as of ethics. On the civil and -religious liberty of a state depends its commercial success. Kant -saw the day coming, when industrial superiority was to be identified -with political pre-eminence. The state which does not look to the -enlightenment and liberty of its subjects must fail in the race. But -the advantages of a high state of civilisation are not all negative. -The more highly developed the individuals who form a state, the more -highly developed is its consciousness of its obligations to other -nations. In the ignorance and barbarism of races lies the great -obstacle to a reign of law among states. Uncivilised states cannot be -conceived as members of a federation of Europe.<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_57">[p. 57]</span> First, the perfect civil constitution -according to right: then the federation of these law-abiding Powers. -This is the path which reason marks out. The treatise on <i>Perpetual -Peace</i> seems to be in this respect more practical than the <i>Idea -for a Universal History</i>. But it matters little which way we take -it. The point of view is the same in both cases: the end remains -the development of man towards good, the order of his steps in this -direction is indifferent.</p> - - -<p class="heading"><i>The Political and Social Conditions of Kant’s -Time.</i></p> - -<p>The history of the human race, viewed as a whole, Kant regards -as the realisation of a hidden plan of nature to bring about a -political constitution internally and externally perfect—the only -condition under which the faculties of man can be fully developed. -Does experience support this theory? Kant thought that, to a certain -degree, it did. This conviction was not, however, a fruit of his -experience of citizenship in Prussia, an absolute dynastic state, -a military monarchy waging perpetual dynastic wars of the kind he -most hotly condemned. Kant had no feeling of love to Prussia,<a -id="FNanchor_57" href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a> -and little of a citizen’s patriotic pride, or even in<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_58">[p. 58]</span>terest, in its political -achievements. This was partly because of his sympathy with republican -doctrines: partly due to his love of justice and peculiar hatred of -war,<a id="FNanchor_58" href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> -a hatred based, no doubt, not less on principle than on a close -personal experience of the wretchedness it brings with it. It was -not the political and social conditions in which he lived which -fostered Kant’s love of liberty and gave him inspiration, unless -in the sense in which the mind reacts upon surrounding influences. -Looking beyond<span class="pagenum" id="Page_59">[p. 59]</span> -Prussia to America, in whose struggle for independence he took a keen -interest, and looking to France where the old dynastic monarchy had -been succeeded by a republican state, Kant seemed to see the signs of -a coming democratisation of the old monarchical society of Europe. In -this growing influence on the state of the mass of the people who had -everything to lose in war and little to gain by victory, he saw the -guarantee of a future perpetual peace. Other forces too were at work -to bring about this consummation. There was a growing consciousness -that war, this costly means of settling a dispute, is not even a -satisfactory method of settlement. Hazardous and destructive in its -effect, it is also uncertain in its results. Victory is not always -gain; it no longer signifies a land to be plundered, a people to -be sold to slavery. It brings fresh responsibilities to a nation, -at a time when it is not always strong enough to bear them. But, -above all, Kant saw, even at the end of the eighteenth century, the -nations of Europe so closely bound together by commercial interests -that a war—and especially a maritime war where the scene of conflict -cannot be to the same extent localised as on land—between any two of -them could not but seriously affect the prosperity of the others.<a -id="FNanchor_59" href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a> -He<span class="pagenum" id="Page_60">[p. 60]</span> clearly realised -that the spirit of commerce was the strongest force in the service of -the maintenance of peace, and that in it lay a guarantee of future -union.</p> - -<p>This scheme of a federation of the nations of the world, in -accordance with principles which would put an end to war between -them, was one whose interest for Kant seemed to increase during the -last twenty years of his life.<a id="FNanchor_60" href="#Footnote_60" -class="fnanchor">[60]</a> It was according to him an idea of reason, -and, in his first essay on the subject—that of 1784—we see the -place this ideal of a perpetual peace held in the Kantian system -of philosophy. Its realisation is the realisation of the highest -good—the ethical and political <i>summum bonum</i>, for here the aims -of morals and politics coincide: only in a perfect development of -his faculties in culture and in morals can man at last find true -happiness. History is working towards the consummation of this end. A -moral obligation lies on man to strive to establish conditions which -bring its realisation nearer. It is the duty of statesmen to form a -federative union as it was formerly the duty of individuals to enter -the state. The moral law points the way here as clearly as in the -sphere of pure ethics:—“Thou can’st, therefore thou ought’st.”</p> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_61">[p. 61]</span></p> <p>Let us -be under no misapprehension as to Kant’s attitude to the problem of -perpetual peace. It is an ideal. He states plainly that he so regards -it<a id="FNanchor_61" href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> -and that as such it is unattainable. But this is the essence of -all ideals: they have not the less value in shaping the life and -character of men and nations on that account. They are not ends to -be realised but ideas according to which we must live, regulative -principles. We cannot, says Kant, shape our life better than in -acting as if such ideas of reason have objective validity and there -be an immortal life in which man shall live according to the laws of -reason, in peace with his neighbour and in freedom from the trammels -of sense.</p> - -<p>Hence we are concerned here, not with an end, but with the means -by which we might best set about attaining it, if it were attainable. -This is the subject matter of the <i>Treatise on Perpetual Peace</i> -(1795), a less eloquent and less purely philosophical essay than that -of 1784, but throughout more systematic and practical. We have to do, -not with the favourite dream of philanthropists like St. Pierre and -Rousseau, but with a statement of the conditions on the fulfilment of -which the transition to a reign of peace and law depends.</p> - - -<p class="heading"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">[p. -62]</span><i>The Conditions of the Realisation of the Kantian -Ideal.</i></p> - -<p>These means are of two kinds. In the first place, what evils -must we set about removing? What are the negative conditions? And, -secondly, what are the general positive conditions which will make -the realisation of this idea possible and guarantee the permanence -of an international peace once attained? These negative and -positive conditions Kant calls Preliminary and Definitive Articles -respectively, the whole essay being carefully thrown into the form of -a treaty. The Preliminary Articles of a treaty for perpetual peace -are based on the principle that anything that hinders or threatens -the peaceful co-existence of nations must be abolished. These -conditions have been classified by Kuno Fischer. Kant, he points -out,<a id="FNanchor_62" href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> -examines the principles of right governing the different sets of -circumstances in which nations find themselves—namely, (<i>a</i>) while -they are actually at war; (<i>b</i>) when the time comes to conclude a -treaty of peace; (<i>c</i>) when they are living in a state of peace. -The six Preliminary Articles fall naturally into these groups. War -must not be conducted in such a manner as to increase national -hatred and embitter a future<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">[p. -63]</span> peace. (Art. 6.)<a id="FNanchor_63" href="#Footnote_63" -class="fnanchor">[63]</a> The treaty which brings hostilities to an -end must be concluded in an honest desire for peace. (Art. 1.)<a -id="FNanchor_64" href="#Footnote_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a> Again -a nation, when in a state of peace, must do nothing to threaten the -political independence of another nation or endanger its existence, -thereby giving the strongest of all motives for a fresh war. A nation -may commit this injury in two ways: (1) indirectly, by causing -danger to others through the growth of its standing army (Art. 3)<a -id="FNanchor_65" href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a>—always -a menace to the state of peace—or by any unusual war preparations: -and (2) through too great a supremacy of another kind, by -amassing money, the most powerful of all weapons in warfare. The -National Debt (Art. 4)<a id="FNanchor_66" href="#Footnote_66" -class="fnanchor">[66]</a> is another standing danger to the peaceful -co-existence of nations. But, besides, we have the danger of actual -attack. There is no right of intervention between nations. (Art. -5.)<a id="FNanchor_67" href="#Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a> -Nor can states be inherited or conquered (Art. 2),<a id="FNanchor_68" -href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a> or in any way treated -in a manner subversive of their independence and sovereignty as -individuals. For a similar reason, armed troops cannot be hired and -sold as things.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_64">[p. 64]</span></p> - -<p>These then are the negative conditions of peace.<a -id="FNanchor_69" href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> -There are, besides, three positive conditions:</p> <p><span -class="pagenum" id="Page_65">[p. 65]</span></p> <p>(<i>a</i>) -The intercourse of nations is to be confined to a right of -hospitality. (Art. 3.)<a id="FNanchor_70" href="#Footnote_70" -class="fnanchor">[70]</a> There is nothing new to us in this -assertion of a right of way. The right to free means of international -communication has in the last hundred years become a commonplace of -law. And the change has been brought about, as Kant anticipated, -not through an abstract respect for the idea of right, but through -the pressure of purely commercial interests. Since Kant’s time -the nations of Europe have all been more or less transformed from -agricultural to commercial states whose interests run mainly in the -same direction, whose existence and development depend necessarily -upon “conditions of universal hospitality.” Commerce depends upon -this freedom of international intercourse, and on commerce mainly -depends our hope of peace.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) The first Definitive Article<a id="FNanchor_71" -href="#Footnote_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a> requires that the -constitution of every state should be republican. What Kant -understands by this term is that, in the state, law should rule -above force and that its<span class="pagenum" id="Page_66">[p. -66]</span> constitution should be a representative one, guaranteeing -public justice and based on the freedom and equality of its members -and their mutual dependence on a common legislature. Kant’s demand -is independent of the <i>form</i> of the government. A constitutional -monarchy like that of Prussia in the time of Frederick the Great, -who regarded himself as the first servant of the state and ruled -with the wisdom and forethought which the nation would have had -the right to demand from such an one—such a monarchy is not in -contradiction to the idea of a true republic. That the state should -have a constitution in accordance with the principles of right -is the essential point.<a id="FNanchor_72" href="#Footnote_72" -class="fnanchor">[72]</a> To make<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_67">[p. 67]</span> this possible, the law-giving power -must lie with the representatives of the people: there must be a -complete separation, such as Locke and Rousseau demand, between -the legislature and executive. Otherwise we have despotism. Hence, -while Kant admitted absolutism under certain conditions, he rejected -democracy where, in his opinion, the mass of the people was -despot.</p> - -<p>An internal constitution, firmly established on the principles of -right, would not only serve to kill the seeds of national hatred and -diminish the likelihood of foreign war. It would do more: it would -destroy sources of revolution and discontent within the state. Kant, -like many writers on this subject, does not directly allude to civil -war<a id="FNanchor_73" href="#Footnote_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a> -and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_68">[p. 68]</span> the means by -which it may be prevented or abolished. Actually to achieve this -would be impossible: it is beyond the power of either arbitration or -disarmament. But in a representative government and the liberty of a -people lie the greatest safeguards against internal discontent. Civil -peace and international peace must to a certain extent go hand in -hand.</p> - -<p>We come now to the central idea of the treatise: (<i>c</i>) the law -of nations must be based upon a federation of free states. (Art. -2.)<a id="FNanchor_74" href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a> -This must be regarded as the end to which mankind is advancing. The -problem here is not out of many nations to make one. This would -be perhaps the surest way to attain peace, but it is scarcely -practicable, and, in certain forms, it is undesirable. Kant is -inclined to approve of the separation of nations by language and -religion, by historical and social tradition and physical boundaries: -nature seems to condemn the idea of a universal monarchy.<a -id="FNanchor_75" href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> The -only footing<span class="pagenum" id="Page_69">[p. 69]</span> -on which a thorough-going, indubitable system of international -law is in practice possible is that of the society of nations: -not the world-republic<a id="FNanchor_76" href="#Footnote_76" -class="fnanchor">[76]</a> the Greeks dreamt of, but a federation of -states. Such a union in the interests of perpetual peace between -nations would be the “highest political good.” The relation of the -federated states to one another and to the whole would be fixed by -cosmopolitan law: the link of self-interest which would bind them -would again be the spirit of commerce.</p> - -<p>This scheme of a perpetual peace had not escaped ridicule -in the eighteenth century: the name of<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_70">[p. 70]</span> Kant protected it henceforth. The facts -of history, even more conclusively than the voices of philosophers, -soldiers and princes, show how great has been the progress of this -idea in recent years. But it has not gained its present hold upon the -popular mind without great and lasting opposition. Indeed we have -here what must still be regarded as a controversial question. There -have been, and are still, men who regard perpetual peace as a state -of things as undesirable as it is unattainable. For such persons, -war is a necessity of our civilisation: it is impossible that it -should ever cease to exist. All that we can do, and there is no -harm, nor any contradiction in the attempt, is to make wars shorter, -fewer and more humane: the whole question, beyond this, is without -practical significance. Others, on the other hand,—and these perhaps -more thoughtful—regard war as hostile to culture, an evil of the -worst kind, although a necessary evil. In peace, for them, lies the -true ideal of humanity, although in any perfect form this cannot be -realised in the near future. The extreme forms of these views are to -be sought in what has been called in Germany “the philosophy of the -barracks” which comes forward with a glorification of war for its own -sake, and in the attitude of modern Peace Societies which denounce -all war wholesale, without respect of causes or conditions.</p> - - -<p class="heading"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_71">[p. -71]</span><i>Hegel, Schiller and Moltke.</i></p> - -<p>Hegel, the greatest of the champions of war, would have nothing -to do with Kant’s federation of nations formed in the interests -of peace. The welfare of a state, he held, is its own highest -law; and he refused to admit that this welfare was to be sought -in an international peace. Hegel lived in an age when all power -and order seemed to lie with the sword. Something of the charm of -Napoleonism seems to hang over him. He does not go the length of -writers like Joseph de Maistre, who see in war the finger of God -or an arrangement for the survival of the fittest—a theory, as -far as regards individuals, quite in contradiction with the real -facts, which show that it is precisely the physically unfit whom -war, as a method of extermination, cannot reach. But, like Schiller -and Moltke, Hegel sees in war an educative instrument, developing -virtues in a nation which could not be fully developed otherwise, -(much as pain and suffering bring patience and resignation and other -such qualities into play in the individual), and drawing the nation -together, making each citizen conscious of his citizenship, as no -other influence can. War, he holds, leaves a nation always stronger -than it was before; it buries causes of inner dissension, and -consolidates the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">[p. 72]</span> -internal power of the state.<a id="FNanchor_77" href="#Footnote_77" -class="fnanchor">[77]</a> No other trial can, in the same way, show -what is the real strength and weakness of a nation, what it <i>is</i>, not -merely materially, but physically, intellectually and morally.</p> - -<p>With this last statement most people will be inclined to agree. -There is only a part of the truth in Napoleon’s dictum that “God is -on the side of the biggest battalions”; or in the old saying that war -requires three necessaries—in the first place, money; in the second -place, money; and in the third, money. Money is a great deal: it is a -necessity; but what we call national back-bone and character is more. -So far we are with Hegel. But he goes further. In peace, says he, -mankind would grow effeminate and degenerate in luxury. This opinion -was expressed in forcible language in his own time by Schiller,<a -id="FNanchor_78" href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a> -and in more<span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">[p. 73]</span> -recent years by Count Moltke. “Perpetual peace,” says a letter -of the great general,<a id="FNanchor_79" href="#Footnote_79" -class="fnanchor">[79]</a> “is a dream and not a beautiful dream -either: war is part of the divine order of the world. During war -are developed the noblest virtues which belong to man—courage and -self-denial, fidelity to duty and the spirit of self-sacrifice: -the soldier is called upon to risk his life. Without war the world -would sink in materialism.”<a id="FNanchor_80" href="#Footnote_80" -class="fnanchor">[80]</a> “Want and misery, disease, suffering -and war,” he says elsewhere, “are all<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_74">[p. 74]</span> given elements in the Divine order -of the universe.” Moltke’s eulogy of war, however, is somewhat -modified by his additional statement that “the greatest kindness in -war lies in its being quickly ended.” (Letter to Bluntschli, 11th -Dec.,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">[p. 75]</span> 1880.)<a -id="FNanchor_81" href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> The -great forces which we recognise as factors in the moral regeneration -of mankind are always slow of action as they are sure. War, if too -quickly over, could not have the great moral influence which has been -attributed to it. The explanation may be that it is not all that it -naturally appears to a great and successful general. Hegel, Moltke, -Trendelenburg, Treitschke<a id="FNanchor_82" href="#Footnote_82" -class="fnanchor">[82]</a> and the others—not Schiller<a -id="FNanchor_83" href="#Footnote_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a> who -was able to sing the blessings of peace as eloquently as of war—were -apt to forget that war is as efficient a school for forming vices -as virtues; and that, moreover, those virtues which military life -is said to cultivate—courage, self-sacrifice and the rest—can be at -least as perfectly developed in other trials. There are in human -life dangers every day bravely met and overcome which are not less -terrible than those which face the soldier, in whom patriotism may -be less a sentiment than a duty, and whose cowardice must be dearly -paid.</p> - - -<p class="heading"><i>War under Altered Conditions.</i></p> - -<p>The Peace Societies of our century, untiring supporters of a point -of view diametrically opposite<span class="pagenum" id="Page_76">[p. -76]</span> to that of Hegel, owe their existence in the first -place to new ideas on the subject of the relative advantages and -disadvantages of war, which again were partly due to changes in the -character of war itself, partly to a new theory that the warfare -of the future should be a war of free competition for industrial -interests, or, in Herbert Spencer’s language, that the warlike type -of mankind should make room for an industrial type. This theory, -amounting in the minds of some thinkers to a fervid conviction, -and itself, in a sense, the source of what has been contemptuously -styled our British “shopkeeper’s policy” in Europe, was based on -something more solid than mere enthusiasm. The years of peace which -followed the downfall of Napoleon had brought immense increase in -material wealth to countries like France and Britain. Something of -the glamour had fallen away from the sword of the great Emperor. The -illusive excitement of a desire for conquest had died: the glory of -war had faded with it, but the burden still remained: its cost was -still there, something to be calmly reckoned up and not soon to be -forgotten. Europe was seen to be actually moving towards ruin. “We -shall have to get rid of war in all civilised countries,” said Louis -Philippe in 1843. “Soon no nation will be able to afford it.” War -was not only becoming more costly. New conditions had altered it in -other directions.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">[p. 77]</span> -With the development of technical science and its application to the -perfecting of methods and instruments of destruction every new war -was found to be bloodier than the last; and the day seemed to be in -sight, when this very development would make war (with instruments of -extermination) impossible altogether. The romance and picturesqueness -with which it was invested in the days of hand-to-hand combat was -gone. But, above all, war was now waged for questions fewer and more -important than in the time of Kant. Napoleon’s successful appeal -to the masses had suggested to Prussia the idea of consciously -nationalising the army. Our modern national wars exact a sacrifice, -necessarily much more heavy, much more reluctantly made than those -of the past which were fought with mercenary troops. Such wars have -not only greater dignity: they are more earnest, and their issue, as -in a sense the issue of conflict between higher and lower types of -civilisation, is speedier and more decisive.</p> - -<p>In the hundred years since Kant’s death, much that he prophesied -has come to pass, although sometimes by different paths than he -anticipated. The strides made in recent years by commerce and -the growing power of the people in every state have had much of -the influence which he foretold. There is a greater reluctance -to wage<span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">[p. 78]</span> war.<a -id="FNanchor_84" href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a> -But, unfortunately, as Professor Paulsen points out, the progress -of democracy and the nationalisation of war have not worked merely -in the direction of progress towards peace. War has now become -popular for the first time. “The progress of democracy in states,” -he says, (<i>Kant</i>, p. 364<a id="FNanchor_85" href="#Footnote_85" -class="fnanchor">[85]</a>) “has not only not done away with war, -but has very greatly changed the feeling of people towards it. With -the universal military service, introduced by the Revolution, war -has become the people’s affair and popular, as it could not be in -the case of dynastic wars carried on with mercenary troops.” In the -people the love of peace is strong, but so too is the love of a -fight, the love of victory.</p> - -<p>It is in the contemplation of facts and conflicting -tendencies like these that Peace Societies<a id="FNanchor_86" -href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a> have been formed. -The peace party is, we may say, an eclectic body: it embraces many -different sections of political opinion. There are those who hold, -for instance, that peace is to be established on a basis of communism -of property. There are others who insist on the establishment -throughout Europe of a republican form of government, or again, on -a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_79">[p. 79]</span> redistribution -of European territory in which Alsace-Lorraine is restored to -France—changes of which at least the last two would be difficult to -carry out, unless through international warfare. But these are not -the fundamental general principles of peace workers. The members -of this party agree in rejecting the principle of intervention, in -demanding a complete or partial disarmament of the nations of Europe, -and in requiring that all disputes between nations—and they admit the -prospects of dispute—should be settled by means of arbitration. In -how far are these principles useful or practicable?</p> - - -<p class="heading"><i>The Value of Arbitration.</i></p> - -<p>There is a strong feeling in favour of arbitration on the part -of all classes of society. It is cheaper under all circumstances -than war. It is a judgment at once more certain and more complete, -excluding as far as possible the element of chance, leaving -irritation perhaps behind it, but none of the lasting bitterness -which is the legacy of every war. Arbitration has an important place -in all peace projects except that of Kant, whose federal union -would naturally fulfil the function of a tribunal of arbitration. -St. Pierre, Jeremy Bentham,<a id="FNanchor_87" href="#Footnote_87" -class="fnanchor">[87]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">[p. -80]</span> Bluntschli<a id="FNanchor_88" href="#Footnote_88" -class="fnanchor">[88]</a> the German publicist, Professor Lorimer<a -id="FNanchor_89" href="#Footnote_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a> -and others among political writers,<a id="FNanchor_90" -href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a> and among rulers, -Louis Napoleon and the Emperor Alexander I. of Russia, have all made -proposals more or less ineffectual for the peaceful settlement of -international disputes. A number of cases have already been decided -by this means. But let us examine the questions which have been -at issue. Of a hundred and thirty matters of dispute settled by -arbitration since 1815 (cf. <i>International Tribunals</i>, published -by the Peace Society, 1899) it will be seen that all, with the -exception of one or two trifling cases of doubt as to the succession -to certain titles or principalities, can be classified roughly -under two heads—disputes as to the determination of boundaries or -the possession of certain territory, and questions of claims for -compensation and indemnities due either to individuals or states, -arising from the seizure of fleets or merchant vessels, the insult -or injury to private persons and so on—briefly, questions of money -or of territory.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_81">[p. 81]</span> -These may fairly be said to be trifling causes, not touching -national honour or great political questions. That they should have -been settled in this way, however, shows a great advance. Smaller -causes than these have made some of the bloodiest wars in history. -That arbitration should have been the means of preventing even one -war which would otherwise have been waged is a strong reason why -we should fully examine its claims. “Quand l’institution d’une -haute cour,” writes Laveleye, (<i>Des causes actuelles de guerre en -Europe et de l’arbitrage</i>) “n’éviterait qu’une guerre sur vingt, -il vaudrait encore la peine de l’établir.” But history shows us -that there is no single instance of a supreme conflict having been -settled otherwise than by war. Arbitration is a method admirably -adapted to certain cases: to those we have named, where it has been -successfully applied, to the interpretation of contracts, to offences -against the Law of Nations—some writers say to trivial questions of -honour—in all cases where the use of armed force would be impossible, -as, for instance, in any quarrel in which neutralised countries<a -id="FNanchor_91" href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a> -like Belgium or Luxembourg should take a principal part, or in a -difference between two nations, such as (to take an extreme case) the -United States and Switzerland,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">[p. -82]</span> which could not easily engage in actual combat. These -cases, which we cannot too carefully examine, show that what is here -essential is that it should be possible to formulate a juridical -statement of the conflicting claims. In Germany the <i>Bundestag</i> had -only power to decide questions of law. Other disputes were left to be -fought out. Questions on which the existence and vital honour of a -state depend—any question which nearly concerns the disputants—cannot -be reduced to any cut and dry legal formula of right and wrong. -We may pass over the consideration that in some cases (as in the -Franco-Prussian War) the delay caused by seeking mediation of any -kind would deprive a nation of the advantage its state of military -preparation deserved. And we may neglect the problem of finding an -impartial judge on some questions of dispute, although its solution -might be a matter of extreme difficulty, so closely are the interests -of modern nations bound up in one another. How could the Eastern -Question, for example, be settled by arbitration? It is impossible -that such a means should be sufficient for every case. Arbitration in -other words may prevent war, but can never be a substitute for war. -We cannot wonder that this is so. So numerous and conflicting are -the interests of states, so various are the grades of civilisation -to which they have attained and the directions<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_83">[p. 83]</span> along which they are developing, that -differences of the most vital kind are bound to occur and these can -never be settled by any peaceful means at present known to Europe. -This is above all true where the self-preservation<a id="FNanchor_92" -href="#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a> or independence of -a people are concerned. Here the “good-will” of the nations who -disagree would necessarily be wanting: there could be no question of -the arbitration of an outsider.</p> - -<p>But, indeed, looking away from questions so vital and on which -there can be little difference of opinion, we are apt to forget, -when we allow ourselves to talk extravagantly of the future of -arbitration, that every nation thinks, or at least pretends to think, -that it is in the right in every dispute in which it appears (cf. -Kant: <i>Perpetual Peace</i>, p. 120.): and, as a matter of history, -there<span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">[p. 84]</span> has never -been a conflict between civilised states in which an appeal to this -“right” on the part of each has not been made. We talk glibly of -the right and wrong of this question or of that, of the justice of -this war, the iniquity of that. But what do these terms really mean? -<i>Do</i> we know, in spite of the labour which has been spent on this -question by the older publicists, which are the causes that justify -a war? Is it not true that the same war might be just in one set -of circumstances and unjust in another? Practically all writers on -this subject, exclusive of those who apply the biblical doctrine of -non-resistance, agree in admitting that a nation is justified in -defending its own existence or independence, that this is even a -moral duty as it is a fundamental right of a state. Many, especially -the older writers, make the confident assertion that all wars of -defence are just. But will this serve as a standard? Gibbon tells -us somewhere, that Livy asserts that the Romans conquered the world -in self-defence. The distinction between wars of aggression and -defence is one very difficult to draw. The cause of a nation which -waits to be actually attacked is often lost: the critical moment -in its defence may be past. The essence of a state’s defensive -power may lie in a readiness to strike the first blow, or its whole -interests may be bound up in the necessity of fighting the matter -out in its<span class="pagenum" id="Page_85">[p. 85]</span> enemy’s -country, rather than at home. It is not in the strictly military -interpretation of the term “defensive”, but in its wider ethical -and political sense that we can speak of wars of defence as just. -But, indeed, we cannot judge these questions abstractly. Where a -war is necessary, it matters very little whether it is just or not. -Only the judgment of history can finally decide; and generally it -seems at the time that both parties have something of right on -their side, something perhaps too of wrong.<a id="FNanchor_93" -href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a></p> <p><span -class="pagenum" id="Page_86">[p. 86]</span></p> <p>A consideration -of difficulties like these brings us to a realisation of the fact -that the chances are small that a nation, in the heat of a dispute, -will admit the likelihood of its being in the wrong. To refuse -to admit this is generally tantamount to a refusal to submit the -difficulty to arbitration. And neither international law, nor the -moral force of public opinion can induce a state to act contrary to -what it believes to be its own interest. Moreover, as international -law now stands, it is not a duty to have recourse to arbitration. -This was made quite clear in the proceedings of the Peace Conference -at the Hague in 1899.<a id="FNanchor_94" href="#Footnote_94" -class="fnanchor">[94]</a> It was strongly recommended that -arbitration should be sought wherever it was possible, but, at the -same time definitely stated, that this course could in no case -be compulsory. In this respect things have not advanced beyond -the position of the Paris Congress of 1856.<a id="FNanchor_95" -href="#Footnote_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a> The wars waged in -Europe subsequent to that date, have all been begun without previous -attempt at mediation.</p> - -<p>But the work of the peace party regarding the<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_87">[p. 87]</span> humaner methods of -settlement is not to be neglected. The popular feeling which they -have been partly the means of stimulating has no doubt done something -to influence the action of statesmen towards extreme caution in -the treatment of questions likely to arouse national passions and -prejudices. Arbitration has undoubtedly made headway in recent -years. Britain and America, the two nations whose names naturally -suggest themselves to us as future centres of federative union, both -countries whose industrial interests are numerous and complicated, -have most readily, as they have most frequently, settled disputes -in this practical manner. It has shown itself to be a policy as -economical as it is business-like. Its value, in its proper place, -cannot be overrated by any Peace Congress or by any peace pamphlet; -but we have endeavoured to make it clear that this sphere is but a -limited one. The “good-will” may not be there when it ought perhaps -to appear: it will certainly not be there when any vital interest -is at stake. But, even if this were not so and arbitration were -the natural sequence of every dispute, no coercive force exists -to enforce the decree of the court. The moral restraint of public -opinion is here a poor substitute. Treaties, it is often said, are in -the same position; but treaties have been broken, and will no doubt -be broken again. We<span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">[p. 88]</span> -are moved to the conclusion that a thoroughly logical peace programme -cannot stop short of the principle of federation. Federal troops are -necessary to carry out the decrees of a tribunal of arbitration, if -that court is not to run a risk of being held feeble and ineffectual. -Except on some such basis, arbitration, as a substitute for war, -stands on but a weak footing.</p> - - -<p class="heading"><i>Disarmament.</i></p> - -<p>The efforts of the Peace Society are directed with even less hope -of complete success against another evil of our time, the crushing -burden of modern armaments. We have peace at this moment, but at -a daily increasing cost. The Peace Society is rightly concerned -in pressing this point. It is not enough to keep off actual war: -there is a limit to the price we can afford to pay even for peace. -Probably no principle has cost Europe so much in the last century -as that handed down from Rome:—“Si vis pacem, para bellum.” It is -now a hundred and fifty years since Montesquieu<a id="FNanchor_96" -href="#Footnote_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a> protested<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_89">[p. 89]</span> against this “new -distemper” which was spreading itself over Europe; but never, in -time of peace, has complaint been so loud or so general as now: -and this, not only against the universal burden of taxation which -weighs upon all nations alike, but, in continental countries, -against the waste of productive force due to compulsory military -service, a discontent which seems to strike at the very foundations -of society. Vattel relates that in early times a treaty of peace -generally stipulated that both parties should afterwards disarm. And -there is no doubt that Kant was right in regarding standing armies -as a danger to peace, not only as openly expressing the rivalry and -distrust between nation and nation which Hobbes regards as the basis -of international relations, but also as putting a power into the -hand of a nation which it may some day have the temptation to abuse. -A war-loving, overbearing spirit in a people thrives none the worse -for a consciousness that its army or navy can hold its own with any -other in Europe. Were it not the case that the essence of armed peace -is that a high state of efficiency should be<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_90">[p. 90]</span> general, the danger to peace would be -very great indeed. No doubt it is due to this fact that France has -kept quietly to her side of the Rhine during the last thirty years. -The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was an immediate stimulus to the -increase of armaments; but otherwise, just because of this greater -efficiency and the slightly stronger military position of Germany, it -has been an influence on the side of peace.</p> - -<p>The Czar’s Rescript of 1898 gave a new stimulus to an interest -in this question which the subsequent conference at the Hague was -unable fully to satisfy. We are compelled to consider carefully -how a process of simultaneous disarmament can actually be carried -out, and what results might be anticipated from this step, with a -view not only to the present but the future. Can this be done in -accordance with the principles of justice? Organisations like a -great navy or a highly disciplined army have been built up, in the -course of centuries, at great cost and at much sacrifice to the -nation. They are the fruit of years of wise government and a high -record of national industry. Are such visible tokens of the culture -and character and worth of a people to be swept away and Britain, -France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Turkey to stand on the same level? -And, even if no such ethical considerations should arise, on what -method are<span class="pagenum" id="Page_91">[p. 91]</span> we to -proceed? The standard as well as the nature of armament depends -in every state on its geographical conditions and its historical -position. An ocean-bound empire like Britain is comparatively immune -from the danger of invasion: her army can be safely despatched to -the colonies, her fleet protects her at home, her position is one of -natural defence. But Germany and Austria find themselves in exactly -opposite circumstances, with the hard necessity imposed upon them of -guarding their frontiers on every side. The safety of a nation like -Germany is in the hands of its army: its military strength lies in an -almost perfect mastery of the science of attack.</p> - -<p>The Peace Society has hitherto made no attempt to face the -difficulties inseparable from any attempt to apply a uniform method -of treatment to peculiarities and conditions so conflicting and -various as these. Those who have been more conscientious have not -been very successful in solving them. Indeed, so constantly is -military technique changing that it is difficult to prophesy wherein -will lie, a few years hence, the essence of a state’s defensive -power or what part the modern navy will play in this defence. No -careful thinker would suggest, in the face of dangers threatening -from the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_92">[p. 92]</span> East,<a -id="FNanchor_97" href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a> a -complete disarmament. The simplest of many suggestions made—but -this on the basis of universal conscription—seems to be that the -number of years or months of compulsory military service should -be reduced to some fixed period. But this does not touch the -difficulty of colonial empires<a id="FNanchor_98" href="#Footnote_98" -class="fnanchor">[98]</a> like Britain which might to a certain -extent disarm, like their neighbours, in Europe, but would be -compelled to keep an army for the defence of their colonies -elsewhere. It is, in the meantime, inevitable that Europe should keep -up a high standard of armament—this is, (and even if we had European -federation, would remain) an absolute necessity as a protection -against the yellow races, and in Europe itself there are at present -elements hostile to the cause of peace. Alsace-Lorraine, Polish -Prussia, Russian Poland and Finland are still, to a considerable -degree, sources of discontent and dissatisfaction. But in Russia -itself lies the great obstacle to a future European peace or -European federation: we can scarcely picture Russia as a reliable -member of such a union. That Russia should disarm is scarcely<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_93">[p. 93]</span> feasible, in view of its -own interest: it has always to face the danger of rebellion in Poland -and anarchy at home. But that Europe should disarm, before Russia has -attained a higher civilisation, a consciousness of its great future -as a north-eastern, inter-oceanic empire, and a government more -favourable to the diffusion of liberty, is still less practicable.<a -id="FNanchor_99" href="#Footnote_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a> We -have here to fall back upon federation again. It is not impossible -that, in the course of time, this problem may be solved and that -the contribution to the federal troops of a European union may be -regulated upon some equitable basis the form of which we cannot now -well prophesy.</p> - -<p>European federation would likewise meet all difficulties where a -risk might be likely to occur of one nation intervening to protect -another. As we have said (above, <a href="#Footnote_69">p. 64, -<i>note</i></a>) nations are now-a-days slow to intervene in the interests -of humanity: they are in general constrained to do so only by strong -motives of self-interest, and when these are not at hand they are -said to refrain from respect for another’s right of independent -action. Actually a state which is actuated by less selfish impulses -is apt to lose considerably more than it<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_94">[p. 94]</span> gains, and the feeling of the people -expresses itself strongly against any quixotic or sentimental policy. -It is not impossible that the Powers may have yet to intervene to -protect Turkey against Russia. Such a step might well be dictated -purely by a proper care for the security of Europe; but wars of this -kind seem not likely to play an important part in the near future.</p> - -<p>We have said that the causes of difference which may be expected -to disturb the peace of Europe are now fewer. A modern sovereign -no longer spends his leisure time in the excitement of slaying or -seeing slain. He could not, if he would. His honour and his vanity -are protected by other means: they play no longer an important part -in the affairs of nations. The causes of war can no more be either -trifling or personal. Some crises there are, which are ever likely to -be fatal to peace. There present themselves, in the lives of nations, -ideal ends for which everything must be sacrificed: there are rights -which must at all cost be defended. The question of civil war we -may neglect: liberty and wise government are the only medicine for -social discontent, and much may be hoped from that in the future. -But now, looking beyond the state to the great family of civilised -nations, we may say that the one certain cause of war between them -or of rebellion within a future federated union will be a<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_95">[p. 95]</span> menace to the sovereign -rights, the independence and existence of any member of that -federation. Other causes of quarrel offer a more hopeful prospect. -Some questions have been seen to be specially fitted for the legal -procedure of a tribunal of arbitration, others to be such as a -federal court would quickly settle. The preservation of the balance -of power which Frederick the Great regarded as the talisman of peace -in Europe—a judgment surely not borne out by experience—is happily -one of the causes of war which are of the past. Wars of colonisation, -such as would be an attempt on the part of Russia to conquer India, -seem scarcely likely to recur except between higher and lower races. -The cost is now-a-days too great. Political wars, wars for national -union and unity, of which there were so many during the past century, -seem at present not to be near at hand; and the integration of -European nations—what may be called the great mission of war—is, for -the moment, practically complete; for it is highly improbable that -either Alsace-Lorraine or Poland—still less Finland—will be the cause -of a war of this kind.</p> - -<p>Our hope lies in a federated Europe. Its troops would serve to -preserve law and order in the country from which they were drawn and -to protect its colonies abroad; but their higher function would<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_96">[p. 96]</span> be to keep peace in -Europe, to protect the weaker members of the Federation and to -enforce the decision of the majority, either, if necessary, by actual -war, or by the mere threatening demonstrations of fleets, such as -have before proved effectual.</p> - -<p>We have carefully considered what has been attempted by peace -workers, and we have now to take note that all the results of the -last fifty years are not to be attributed to their conscientious -but often ill-directed labour. The diminution of the causes of war -is to be traced less to the efforts of the Peace Society, (except -indirectly, in so far as they have influenced the minds of the -masses) than to the increasing power of the people themselves. -The various classes of society are opposed to violent methods of -settlement, not in the main from a conviction as to the wrongfulness -of war or from any fanatical enthusiasm for a brotherhood of -nations, but from self-interest. War is death to the industrial -interests of a nation. It is vain to talk, in the language of past -centuries, of trade between civilised countries being advanced and -markets opened up or enlarged by this means.<a id="FNanchor_100" -href="#Footnote_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a><span class="pagenum" -id="Page_97">[p. 97]</span> Kings give up the dream of military glory -and accept instead the certainty of peaceful labour and industrial -progress, and all this (for we may believe that to some monarchs it -is much) from no enthusiastic appreciation of the efforts of Peace -Societies, from no careful examination of the New Testament nor -inspired interpretation of its teaching. It is self-interest, the -prosperity of the country—patriotism, if you will—that seems better -than war.</p> - - -<p class="heading"><i>What may be expected from Federation.</i></p> - -<p>Federation and federation alone can help out the programme of the -Peace Society. It cannot be pretended that it will do everything. -To state the worst at once, it will not prevent war. Even the -federations of the states of Germany and America, bound together by -ties of blood and language and, in the latter case, of sentiment, -were not strong enough within to keep out dissension and disunion.<a -id="FNanchor_101" href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a> -Wars would not cease, but they would become much less frequent. -“Why is there no longer war between England and Scotland? Why did -Prussian and Hanoverian fight side by side in 1870, though they had -fought<span class="pagenum" id="Page_98">[p. 98]</span> against -each other only four years before?... If we wish to know how war is -to cease, we should ask ourselves how it <i>has</i> ceased” (Professor -D. G. Ritchie, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 169). Wars between different grades -of civilisation are bound to exist as long as civilisation itself -exists. The history of culture and of progress has been more or less -a history of war. A calm acceptance of this position may mean to -certain short-sighted, enthusiastic theorists an impossible sacrifice -of the ideal; but, the sacrifice once made, we stand on a better -footing with regard to at least one class of arguments against a -federation of the world. Such a union will lead, it is said, to an -equality in culture, a sameness of interests fatal to progress; -all struggle and conflict will be cast out of the state itself; -national characteristics and individuality will be obliterated; -the lamb and the wolf will lie down together: stagnation will -result, intellectual progress will be at an end, politics will be -no more, history will stand still. This is a sweeping assertion, an -alarming prophecy. But a little thought will assure us that there -is small cause for apprehension. There can be no such standstill, -no millennium in human affairs. A gradual smoothing down of sharply -accentuated national characteristics there might be: this is a result -which a freer, more friendly intercourse between nations would be -very<span class="pagenum" id="Page_99">[p. 99]</span> likely to -produce. But conflicting interests, keen rivalry in their pursuit, -difference of culture and natural aptitude, and all or much of -the individuality which language and literature, historical and -religious traditions, even climatic and physical conditions produce -are bound to survive until the coming of some more overwhelming and -far-spreading revolution than this. It would not be well if it were -otherwise, if those “unconscious and invisible peculiarities” in -which Fichte sees the hand of God and the guarantee of a nation’s -future dignity, virtue and merit should be swept away. (<i>Reden an -die deutsche Nation</i>,<a id="FNanchor_102" href="#Footnote_102" -class="fnanchor">[102]</a> 1807.) Nor is stagnation to be feared. -“Strife,” said the old philosopher, “is the father of all things.” -There can be no lasting peace in the processes of nature and -existence. It has been in the constant rivalry between classes within -themselves, and in the struggle for existence with other races that -great nations have reached the highwater mark of their development. -A perpetual peace in international relations we may—nay, surely -will—one day have, but eternity will not see the end to the feverish -unrest within the state and the jealous competition and distrust -between individuals, groups and classes of society. Here there must -ever be perpetual war.</p> - -<p>It was only of this political peace between civil<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_100">[p. 100]</span>ised nations -that Kant thought.<a id="FNanchor_103" href="#Footnote_103" -class="fnanchor">[103]</a> In this form it is bound to come. The -federation of Europe will follow the federation of Germany and -of Italy, not only because it offers a solution of many problems -which have long taxed Europe, but because great men and careful -thinkers believe in it.<a id="FNanchor_104" href="#Footnote_104" -class="fnanchor">[104]</a> It may not come quickly, but such men can -afford to wait. “If I were legislator,” cried Jean Jacques Rousseau, -“I should not say what ought to be done, but I would do it.” This is -the attitude of the unthinking, unpractical enthusiast. The wish is -not enough: the will is not enough. The mills of God must take their -own time: no hope or faith of ours, no struggle or labour even can -hurry them.</p> - -<p>It is a misfortune that the Peace Society has identified -itself with so narrow and uncritical an attitude towards war, -and that the copious elo<span class="pagenum" id="Page_101">[p. -101]</span>quence of its members is not based upon a consideration -of the practical difficulties of the case. This well-meaning, hard -working and enthusiastic body would like to do what is impossible -by an impossible method. The end which it sets for itself is an -unattainable one. But this need not be so. To make unjustifiable -aggression difficult, to banish unworthy pretexts for making war -might be a high enough ideal for any enthusiasm and offer scope wide -enough for the labours of any society. But the Peace Society has not -contented itself with this great work. Through its over-estimation -of the value of peace,<a id="FNanchor_105" href="#Footnote_105" -class="fnanchor">[105]</a> its cause has been injured and much of -its influence has been weakened or lost. Our age is one which sets -a high value upon human life; and to this change of thinking may be -traced our modern reform in the methods of war and all that has been -done for the alleviation of suffering by the great Conventions of -recent years. For the eyes of most people war is merely a hideous -spectacle of bloodshed and deliberate destruction of life: this is -its obvious side. But it is possible to exaggerate this confessedly -great evil. Peace has its sacrifices as well as war: the<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_102">[p. 102]</span> progress of humanity -requires that the individual should often be put aside for the sake -of lasting advantage to the whole. An opposite view can only be -reckoned individualistic, perhaps materialistic. “The reverence for -human life,” says Martineau, (<i>Studies of Christianity</i>, pp. 352, -354) “is carried to an immoral idolatry, when it is held more sacred -than justice and right, and when the spectacle of blood becomes -more horrible than the sight of desolating tyrannies and triumphant -hypocrisies.... We have, therefore, no more doubt that a war may be -right, than that a policeman may be a security for justice, and we -object to a fortress as little as to a handcuff.”</p> - -<p>The Peace Society are not of this opinion: they greatly doubt that -a war may be right, and they rarely fail to take their doubts to the -tribunal of Scripture. Their efforts are well meant, this piety may -be genuine enough; but a text is rarely a proof of anything, and in -any case serves one man in as good stead as another. We remember that -“the devil can cite Scripture for his purpose.” This unscientific -method of proof or persuasion has ever been widely popular. It is -a serious examination of the question that we want, a more careful -study of its actual history and of the possibilities of human nature; -less vague, exaggerated language about what ought to be done, and a -realisation of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">[p. 103]</span> -what has been actually achieved; above all, a clear perception of -what may fairly be asked from the future.</p> - -<p>It used to be said—is perhaps asserted still by the -war-lovers—that there was no path to civilisation which had not -been beaten by the force of arms, no height to which the sword -had not led the way. The inspiration of war was upon the great -arts of civilisation: its hand was upon the greatest of the -sciences. These obligations extended even to commerce. War not -only created new branches of industry, it opened new markets and -enlarged the old. These are great claims, according to which -war might be called the moving principle of history. If we keep -our eyes fixed upon the history of the past, they seem not only -plausible: they are in a great sense true. Progress did tread at -the heels of the great Alexander’s army: the advance of European -culture stands in the closest connection with the Crusades. But -was this happy compensation for a miserable state of affairs not -due to the peculiarly unsocial conditions of early times and the -absence of every facility for the interchange of ideas or material -advantages? It is inconceivable that now-a-days<a id="FNanchor_106" -href="#Footnote_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a> any aid to the -development of thought in Europe should come from war. The<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_104">[p. 104]</span> old adage, in more than -a literal sense, has but too often been proved true:—“Inter arma, -Musae silent.” Peace is for us the real promoter of culture.</p> - -<p>We have to endeavour to take an intermediate course between -uncritical praise and wholesale condemnation, between extravagant -expectation and unjustifiable pessimism. War used to be the rule: it -is now an overwhelming and terrible exception—an interruption to the -peaceful prosperous course of things, inflicting unlimited suffering -and temporary or lasting loss. Its evils are on the surface, apparent -to the most unthinking observer. The day may yet dawn, when Europeans -will have learned to regard the force of arms as an instrument for -the civilisation of savage or half-savage races, and war within -their continent as civil war, necessary and justifiable sometimes -perhaps, but still a blot upon their civilisation and brotherhood -as men. Such a suggestion rings strangely. But the great changes, -which the roll of centuries has marked, once came upon the world not -less unexpectedly. How far off must the idea of a civil peace have -seemed to small towns and states of Europe in the fifteenth century! -How strange, only a century<span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">[p. -105]</span> ago, would the idea of applying steam power or electrical -force have seemed to ourselves! Let us not despair. War has played a -great part in the history of the world: it has been ever the great -architect of nations, the true mother of cities. It has justified -itself to-day in the union of kindred peoples, the making of great -empires. It may be that one decisive war may yet be required to unite -Europe. May Europe survive that struggle and go forward fearlessly to -her great future! A peaceful future that may not be. It must never -be forgotten that war is sometimes a moral duty, that it is ever the -natural sequence of human passion and human prejudice. An unbroken -peace we cannot and do not expect; but it is this that we must work -for. As Kant says, we must keep it before us as an ideal.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter"> - <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">[p. 106]</span></p> - <h2 class="nobreak" title="PERPETUAL PEACE">TRANSLATION<a - id="FNanchor_107" href="#Footnote_107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a><br /> - <small>“PERPETUAL PEACE”<a id="FNanchor_108" href="#Footnote_108" - class="fnanchor">[108]</a></small></h2> -</div> - -<p><span class="smcap">We</span> need not try to decide whether this -satirical inscription, (once found on a Dutch innkeeper’s sign-board -above the picture of a churchyard) is aimed at mankind in general, or -at the rulers of states in particular, unwearying in their love of -war, or perhaps only at the philosophers who cherish the sweet dream -of perpetual peace. The author of the present sketch would make one -stipulation, however. The practical politician stands upon a definite -footing with the theorist: with great self-complacency he looks down -upon him as a mere pedant whose empty ideas can threaten no danger -to the state (starting as it does from principles derived from -experience), and who may always be permitted to<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_107">[p. 107]</span> knock down his eleven skittles at once -without a worldly-wise statesman needing to disturb himself. Hence, -in the event of a quarrel arising between the two, the practical -statesman must always act consistently, and not scent danger to the -state behind opinions ventured by the theoretical politician at -random and publicly expressed. With which saving clause (<i>clausula -salvatoria</i>) the author will herewith consider himself duly and -expressly protected against all malicious misinterpretation.</p> - -<h3 title="FIRST SECTION CONTAINING THE PRELIMINARY ARTICLES OF -PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES"><i>FIRST SECTION</i></h3> - -<p class="subh3">CONTAINING THE PRELIMINARY ARTICLES OF PERPETUAL -PEACE BETWEEN STATES</p> - - -<p>1.—“No treaty of peace shall be regarded as -valid, if made with the secret reservation of material -for a future war.”</p> - -<p class="p1">For then it would be a mere truce, a mere suspension -of hostilities, not peace. A peace signifies the end of all -hostilities and to attach to it the epithet “eternal” is not -only a verbal pleonasm, but matter of suspicion. The causes of a -future war existing, although perhaps not yet known to the high -contracting parties themselves, are entirely<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_108">[p. 108]</span> annihilated by the conclusion of -peace, however acutely they may be ferreted out of documents in the -public archives. There may be a mental reservation of old claims to -be thought out at a future time, which are, none of them, mentioned -at this stage, because both parties are too much exhausted to -continue the war, while the evil intention remains of using the -first favourable opportunity for further hostilities. Diplomacy -of this kind only Jesuitical casuistry can justify: it is beneath -the dignity of a ruler, just as acquiescence in such processes of -reasoning is beneath the dignity of his minister, if one judges the -facts as they really are.<a id="FNanchor_109" href="#Footnote_109" -class="fnanchor">[109]</a></p> - -<p>If, however, according to present enlightened ideas of political -wisdom, the true glory of a state lies in the uninterrupted -development of its power by every possible means, this judgment must -certainly strike one as scholastic and pedantic.</p> - - -<p class="p2">2.—“No state having an independent existence—whether -it be great or small—shall be acquired by another through -inheritance, exchange, purchase or donation.”<a id="FNanchor_110" -href="#Footnote_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a></p> <p><span -class="pagenum" id="Page_109">[p. 109]</span></p> - -<p class="p1">For a state is not a property (<i>patrimonium</i>), as may -be the ground on which its people are settled. It is a society of -human beings over whom no one but itself has the right to rule and -to dispose. Like the trunk of a tree, it has its own roots, and to -graft it on to another state is to do away with its existence as a -moral person, and to make of it a thing. Hence it is in contradiction -to the idea of the original contract without which no right over -a people is thinkable.<a id="FNanchor_111" href="#Footnote_111" -class="fnanchor">[111]</a> Everyone knows to what danger the bias in -favour of these modes of acquisition has brought Europe (in other -parts of the world it has never been known). The custom of marriage -between states, as if they were individuals, has survived even up -to the most recent times,<a id="FNanchor_112" href="#Footnote_112" -class="fnanchor">[112]</a> and is regarded partly as a new kind -of industry by which ascendency may be acquired through family -alliances, without any expenditure of strength; partly<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_110">[p. 110]</span> as a device for -territorial expansion. Moreover, the hiring out of the troops of one -state to another to fight against an enemy not at war with their -native country is to be reckoned in this connection; for the subjects -are in this way used and abused at will as personal property.</p> - - -<p class="p2">3.—“Standing armies (<i>miles perpetuus</i>) shall be -abolished in course of time.”</p> - -<p class="p1">For they are always threatening other states with -war by appearing to be in constant readiness to fight. They incite -the various states to outrival one another in the number of their -soldiers, and to this number no limit can be set. Now, since owing -to the sums devoted to this purpose, peace at last becomes even more -oppressive than a short war, these standing armies are themselves the -cause of wars of aggression, undertaken in order to get rid of this -burden. To which we must add that the practice of hiring men to kill -or to be killed seems to imply a use of them as mere machines and -instruments in the hand of another (namely, the state) which cannot -easily be reconciled with the right of humanity in our own person.<a -id="FNanchor_113" href="#Footnote_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a> -The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_111">[p. 111]</span> matter stands -quite differently in the case of voluntary periodical military -exercise on the part of citizens of the state, who thereby seek to -secure themselves and their country against attack from without.</p> - -<p>The accumulation of treasure in a state would in the same way be -regarded by other states as a menace of war, and might compel them to -anticipate this by striking the first blow. For of the three forces, -the power of arms, the power of alliance and the power of money, the -last might well become the most reliable instrument of war, did not -the difficulty of ascertaining the amount stand in the way.</p> - - -<p class="p2">4.—“No national debts shall be contracted in connection -with the external affairs of the state.”</p> - -<p class="p1">This source of help is above suspicion, where -assistance is sought outside or within the state, on behalf of the -economic administration of the country (for instance, the improvement -of the roads, the settlement and support of new colonies, the -establishment of granaries to provide against seasons of scarcity, -and so on). But, as a common weapon used by the Powers against -one another, a credit system under which debts go on indefinitely -in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">[p. 112]</span>creasing and -are yet always assured against immediate claims (because all the -creditors do not put in their claim at once) is a dangerous money -power. This ingenious invention of a commercial people in the -present century is, in other words, a treasure for the carrying on -of war which may exceed the treasures of all the other states taken -together, and can only be exhausted by a threatening deficiency in -the taxes—an event, however, which will long be kept off by the very -briskness of commerce resulting from the reaction of this system on -industry and trade. The ease, then, with which war may be waged, -coupled with the inclination of rulers towards it—an inclination -which seems to be implanted in human nature—is a great obstacle in -the way of perpetual peace. The prohibition of this system must be -laid down as a preliminary article of perpetual peace, all the more -necessarily because the final inevitable bankruptcy of the state in -question must involve in the loss many who are innocent; and this -would be a public injury to these states. Therefore other nations are -at least justified in uniting themselves against such an one and its -pretensions.</p> - - -<p class="p2">5.—“No state shall violently interfere with the -constitution and administration of another.”</p> - -<p class="p1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_113">[p. 113]</span>For -what can justify it in so doing? The scandal which is here presented -to the subjects of another state? The erring state can much more -serve as a warning by exemplifying the great evils which a nation -draws down on itself through its own lawlessness. Moreover, the -bad example which one free person gives another, (as <i>scandalum -acceptum</i>) does no injury to the latter. In this connection, it is -true, we cannot count the case of a state which has become split up -through internal corruption into two parts, each of them representing -by itself an individual state which lays claim to the whole. Here -the yielding of assistance to one faction could not be reckoned as -interference on the part of a foreign state with the constitution of -another, for here anarchy prevails. So long, however, as the inner -strife has not yet reached this stage the interference of other -powers would be a violation of the rights of an independent nation -which is only struggling with internal disease.<a id="FNanchor_114" -href="#Footnote_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a> It would<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_114">[p. 114]</span> therefore itself cause -a scandal, and make the autonomy of all states insecure.</p> - - -<p class="p2">6.—“No state at war with another shall countenance -such modes of hostility as would make mutual confidence impossible -in a subsequent state of peace: such are the employment of -assassins (<i>percussores</i>) or of poisoners (<i>venefici</i>), breaches -of capitulation, the instigating and making use of treachery -(<i>perduellio</i>) in the hostile state.”</p> - -<p class="p1">These are dishonourable stratagems. For some kind -of confidence in the disposition of the enemy must exist even in -the midst of war, as otherwise peace could not be concluded, and -the hostilities would pass into a war of extermination (<i>bellum -internecinum</i>). War, however, is only our wretched expedient of -asserting a right by force, an expedient adopted in the state of -nature, where no court of justice exists which could settle the -matter in dispute. In circumstances like these, neither of the two -parties can be called an unjust enemy, because this form of speech -presupposes a legal decision: the issue of the conflict—just as in -the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">[p. 115]</span> case of the -so-called judgments of God—decides on which side right is. Between -states, however, no punitive war (<i>bellum punitivum</i>) is thinkable, -because between them a relation of superior and inferior does not -exist. Whence it follows that a war of extermination, where the -process of annihilation would strike both parties at once and all -right as well, would bring about perpetual peace only in the great -graveyard of the human race. Such a war then, and therefore also the -use of all means which lead to it, must be absolutely forbidden. -That the methods just mentioned do inevitably lead to this result -is obvious from the fact that these infernal arts, already vile in -themselves, on coming into use, are not long confined to the sphere -of war. Take, for example, the use of spies (<i>uti exploratoribus</i>). -Here only the dishonesty of others is made use of; but vices such -as these, when once encouraged, cannot in the nature of things be -stamped out and would be carried over into the state of peace, where -their presence would be utterly destructive to the purpose of that -state.</p> - -<p>Although the laws stated are, objectively regarded, (<i>i.e.</i> in -so far as they affect the action of rulers) purely prohibitive laws -(<i>leges prohibitivæ</i>), some of them (<i>leges strictæ</i>) are strictly -valid without regard to circumstances and urgently require to be -enforced. Such are Nos. 1, 5, 6. Others, again, (like Nos. 2,<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_116">[p. 116]</span> 3, 4) although not -indeed exceptions to the maxims of law, yet in respect of the -practical application of these maxims allow subjectively of a certain -latitude to suit particular circumstances. The enforcement of these -<i>leges latæ</i> may be legitimately put off, so long as we do not lose -sight of the ends at which they aim. This purpose of reform does not -permit of the deferment of an act of restitution (as, for example, -the restoration to certain states of freedom of which they have been -deprived in the manner described in article 2) to an infinitely -distant date—as Augustus used to say, to the “Greek Kalends”, a day -that will never come. This would be to sanction non-restitution. -Delay is permitted only with the intention that restitution should -not be made too precipitately and so defeat the purpose we have -in view. For the prohibition refers here only to the <i>mode of -acquisition</i> which is to be no longer valid, and not to the <i>fact of -possession</i> which, although indeed it has not the necessary title -of right, yet at the time of so-called acquisition was held legal -by all states, in accordance with the public opinion of the time.<a -id="FNanchor_115" href="#Footnote_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a></p> - - -<h3 title="SECOND SECTION CONTAINING THE DEFINITIVE ARTICLES -OF A PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES"><span class="pagenum" -id="Page_117">[p. 117]</span><i>SECOND SECTION</i></h3> - -<p class="subh3">CONTAINING THE DEFINITIVE ARTICLES OF A PERPETUAL -PEACE BETWEEN STATES</p> - -<p>A state of peace among men who live side by side is not the -natural state (<i>status naturalis</i>), which<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_118">[p. 118]</span> is rather to be described as -a state of war:<a id="FNanchor_116" href="#Footnote_116" -class="fnanchor">[116]</a> that is to say, although there is not -perhaps always actual open hostility, yet there is a constant -threatening that an outbreak may occur. Thus the state of peace -must be <i>established</i>.<a id="FNanchor_117" href="#Footnote_117" -class="fnanchor">[117]</a> For the mere<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_119">[p. 119]</span> cessation of hostilities is no -guarantee of continued peaceful relations, and unless this guarantee -is given by every individual to his neighbour—which can only be -done in a state of society regulated by law—one man is at liberty -to challenge another and treat him as an enemy.<a id="FNanchor_118" -href="#Footnote_118" class="fnanchor">[118]</a></p> - - -<p class="centra p2"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_120">[p. -120]</span><small>FIRST DEFINITIVE ARTICLE OF PERPETUAL -PEACE</small></p> - -<p class="centra p1">I.—“The civil constitution of each state shall be -republican.”</p> - -<p class="p1">The only constitution which has its origin in the -idea of the original contract, upon which the lawful legislation of -every nation must be based, is the republican.<a id="FNanchor_119" -href="#Footnote_119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a> It is a constitution, -in the first place,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">[p. -121]</span> founded in accordance with the principle of the freedom -of the members of society as human beings: secondly, in accordance -with the principle of the dependence of all, as subjects, on a common -legislation: and, thirdly, in accordance with the law of the equality -of the members as citizens. It is then, looking at the question of -right, the only constitution whose fundamental principles lie at the -basis of every form of civil constitution. And the only question for -us now is, whether it is also the one constitution which can lead to -perpetual peace.</p> - -<p>Now the republican constitution apart from the soundness -of its origin, since it arose from the<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_122">[p. 122]</span> pure source of the concept of right, -has also the prospect of attaining the desired result, namely, -perpetual peace. And the reason is this. If, as must be so under this -constitution, the consent of the subjects is required to determine -whether there shall be war or not, nothing is more natural than that -they should weigh the matter well, before undertaking such a bad -business. For in decreeing war, they would of necessity be resolving -to bring down the miseries of war upon their country. This implies: -they must fight themselves; they must hand over the costs of the war -out of their own<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">[p. 123]</span> -property; they must do their poor best to make good the devastation -which it leaves behind; and finally, as a crowning ill, they have -to accept a burden of debt which will embitter even peace itself, -and which they can never pay off on account of the new wars which -are always impending. On the other hand, in a government where the -subject is not a citizen holding a vote, (<i>i.e.</i> in a constitution -which is not republican), the plunging into war is the least serious -thing in the world. For the ruler is not a citizen, but the owner -of the state, and does not lose a whit by the war, while he goes -on enjoying the delights of his table or sport, or of his pleasure -palaces and gala days. He can therefore decide on war for the -most trifling reasons, as if it were a kind of pleasure party.<a -id="FNanchor_120" href="#Footnote_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a> Any -justification of it that is necessary for the sake of decency he can -leave without concern to the diplomatic corps who are always only too -ready with their services.</p> - -<p class="tb"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">[p. 124]</span>* * *</p> - -<p>The following remarks must be made in order that we may not fall -into the common error of confusing the republican with the democratic -constitution. The forms of the state (<i>civitas</i>)<a id="FNanchor_121" -href="#Footnote_121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a> may be classified -according to either of two principles of division:—the difference -of the persons who hold the supreme authority in the state, and the -manner in which the people are governed by their ruler whoever he -may be. The first is properly called the form of sovereignty (<i>forma -imperii</i>), and there can be only three constitutions differing -in this respect: where, namely, the supreme authority belongs to -only one, to several individuals working together, or to the whole -people constituting the civil society. Thus we have autocracy -or the sovereignty of a monarch, aristocracy or the sovereignty -of the nobility, and democracy or the<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_125">[p. 125]</span> sovereignty of the people. The -second principle of division is the form of government (<i>forma -regiminis</i>), and refers to the way in which the state makes use of -its supreme power: for the manner of government is based on the -constitution, itself the act of that universal will which transforms -a multitude into a nation. In this respect the form of government -is either republican or despotic. Republicanism is the political -principle of severing the executive power of the government from the -legislature. Despotism is that principle in pursuance of which the -state arbitrarily puts into effect laws which it has itself made: -consequently it is the administration of the public will, but this is -identical with the private will of the ruler. Of these three forms of -a state, democracy, in the proper sense of the word, is of necessity -despotism, because it establishes an executive power, since all -decree regarding—and, if need be, against—any individual who dissents -from them. Therefore the “whole people”, so-called, who carry their -measure are really not all, but only a majority: so that here the -universal will is in contradiction with itself and with the principle -of freedom.</p> - -<p>Every form of government in fact which is not representative -is really no true constitution at all, because a law-giver may -no more be, in one and the same person, the administrator of his -own<span class="pagenum" id="Page_126">[p. 126]</span> will, than -the universal major premise of a syllogism may be, at the same time, -the subsumption under itself of the particulars contained in the -minor premise. And, although the other two constitutions, autocracy -and aristocracy, are always defective in so far as they leave the -way open for such a form of government, yet there is at least -always a possibility in these cases, that they may take the form -of a government in accordance with the spirit of a representative -system. Thus Frederick the Great used at least to <i>say</i> that he -was “merely the highest servant of the state.”<a id="FNanchor_122" -href="#Footnote_122" class="fnanchor">[122]</a> The democratic -constitution, on the other hand, makes this impossible, because -under such a government every one wishes to be master. We may -therefore say that the smaller the staff of the executive—that -is to say, the number of rulers—and the more real, on the other -hand, their representation of the people, so much the more is the -government of the state in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">[p. -127]</span> accordance with a possible republicanism; and it may -hope by gradual reforms to raise itself to that standard. For this -reason, it is more difficult under an aristocracy than under a -monarchy—while under a democracy it is impossible except by a violent -revolution—to attain to this, the one perfectly lawful constitution. -The kind of government,<a id="FNanchor_123" href="#Footnote_123" -class="fnanchor">[123]</a> however, is of infinitely more importance -to the people than the kind of constitution, although the greater or -less aptitude of a people for this ideal greatly depends upon such -external form. The form of government, however, if it is to be in -accordance with the idea of right, must embody the representative -system in which alone a republican form of administration is -pos<span class="pagenum" id="Page_128">[p. 128]</span>sible and -without which it is despotic and violent, be the constitution what -it may. None of the ancient so-called republics were aware of -this, and they necessarily slipped into absolute despotism which, -of all despotisms, is most endurable under the sovereignty of one -individual.</p> - - -<p class="centra p2"><small>SECOND DEFINITIVE ARTICLE OF PERPETUAL -PEACE</small></p> - -<p class="centra p1">II.—“The law of nations shall be founded on a -federation of free states.”</p> - -<p class="p1">Nations, as states, may be judged like individuals who, -living in the natural state of society—that is to say, uncontrolled -by external law—injure one another through their very proximity.<a -id="FNanchor_124" href="#Footnote_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a> -Every state, for the sake of its own security, may—and ought -to—demand that its neighbour should submit itself to conditions, -similar to those of the civil society where the right of every -individual is guaranteed.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_129">[p. -129]</span> This would give rise to a federation of nations which, -however, would not have to be a State of nations.<a id="FNanchor_125" -href="#Footnote_125" class="fnanchor">[125]</a> That would involve -a contradiction. For the term “state” implies the relation of one -who rules to those who obey—that is to say, of law-giver to the -subject people: and many nations in one state would constitute only -one nation, which contradicts our hypothesis, since here we have to -consider the right of one nation against another, in so far as they -are so many separate states and are not to be fused into one.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_130">[p. 130]</span>The attachment -of savages to their lawless liberty, the fact that they would rather -be at hopeless variance with one another than submit themselves to a -legal authority constituted by themselves, that they therefore prefer -their senseless freedom to a reason-governed liberty, is regarded by -us with profound contempt as barbarism and uncivilisation and the -brutal degradation of humanity. So one would think that civilised -races, each formed into a state by itself, must come out of such an -abandoned condition as soon as they possibly can. On the contrary, -however, every state thinks rather that its majesty (the “majesty” -of a people is an absurd expression) lies just in the very fact that -it is subject to no external legal authority; and the glory of the -ruler consists in this, that, without his requiring to expose himself -to danger, thousands stand at his command ready to let themselves be -sacrificed for a matter of no concern to them.<a id="FNanchor_126" -href="#Footnote_126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a> The difference -between the savages of Europe and those of America lies chiefly -in this, that, while many tribes of the latter have been entirely -devoured by their enemies, Europeans know a better way of using the -vanquished than by eating<span class="pagenum" id="Page_131">[p. -131]</span> them; and they prefer to increase through them the number -of their subjects, and so the number of instruments at their command -for still more widely spread war.</p> - -<p>The depravity of human nature<a id="FNanchor_127" -href="#Footnote_127" class="fnanchor">[127]</a> shows itself without -disguise in the unrestrained relations of nations to each other, -while in the law-governed civil state much of this is hidden by -the check of government. This being so, it is astonishing that the -word “right” has not yet been entirely banished from the politics -of war as pedantic, and that no state has yet ventured to publicly -advocate this point of view. For Hugo Grotius, Puffendorf, Vattel -and others—Job’s comforters, all of them—are always quoted in good -faith to justify an attack, although their codes, whether couched -in philosophical or diplomatic terms, have not—nor can have—the -slightest legal force, because states, as such, are under no common -external authority; and there is no instance of a state having -ever<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">[p. 132]</span> been moved -by argument to desist from its purpose, even when this was backed -up by the testimony of such great men. This homage which every -state renders—in words at least—to the idea of right, proves that, -although it may be slumbering, there is, notwithstanding, to be found -in man a still higher natural moral capacity by the aid of which -he will in time gain the mastery over the evil principle in his -nature, the existence of which he is unable to deny. And he hopes -the same of others; for otherwise the word “right” would never be -uttered by states who wish to wage war, unless to deride it like -the Gallic Prince who declared:—“The privilege which nature gives -the strong is that the weak must obey them.”<a id="FNanchor_128" -href="#Footnote_128" class="fnanchor">[128]</a></p> - -<p>The method by which states prosecute their rights can never be -by process of law—as it is where there is an external tribunal—but -only by war. Through this means, however, and its favourable issue, -victory, the question of right is never decided. A treaty of peace -makes, it may be, an end to the war of the moment, but not to the -conditions<span class="pagenum" id="Page_133">[p. 133]</span> of war -which at any time may afford a new pretext for opening hostilities; -and this we cannot exactly condemn as unjust, because under these -conditions everyone is his own judge. Notwithstanding, not quite -the same rule applies to states according to the law of nations -as holds good of individuals in a lawless condition according to -the law of nature, namely, “that they ought to advance out of this -condition.” This is so, because, as states, they have already -within themselves a legal constitution, and have therefore advanced -beyond the stage at which others, in accordance with their ideas -of right, can force them to come under a wider legal constitution. -Meanwhile, however, reason, from her throne of the supreme -law-giving moral power, absolutely condemns war<a id="FNanchor_129" -href="#Footnote_129" class="fnanchor">[129]</a> as a morally lawful -proceeding,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_134">[p. 134]</span> -and makes a state of peace, on the other hand, an immediate duty. -Without a compact between the nations, however, this state of peace -cannot be established or assured. Hence there must be an alliance -of a particular kind which we may call a covenant of peace (<i>foedus -pacificum</i>), which would differ from a treaty of peace (<i>pactum -pacis</i>) in this respect, that the latter merely puts an end to one -war, while the former would seek to put an end to war for ever. This -alliance does not aim at the gain of any power whatsoever of the -state, but merely at the preservation and security of the freedom of -the state for itself and of other allied states at the same time.<a -id="FNanchor_130" href="#Footnote_130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a> -The latter do not, however, require, for this reason, to submit -themselves like individuals in the state of nature to public laws -and coercion. The practicability or objective reality of this idea -of federation which is to extend gradually over all states and so -lead to perpetual peace can be shewn. For, if Fortune ordains that -a powerful and enlightened people should form a republic,—which by -its very nature is inclined to perpetual peace—this would serve as a -centre of federal union for other states wishing to join, and thus -secure conditions of freedom<span class="pagenum" id="Page_135">[p. -135]</span> among the states in accordance with the idea of the law -of nations. Gradually, through different unions of this kind, the -federation would extend further and further.</p> - -<p>It is quite comprehensible that a people should say:—“There -shall be no war among us, for we shall form ourselves into a state, -that is to say, constitute for ourselves a supreme legislative, -administrative and judicial power which will settle our disputes -peaceably.” But if this state says:—“There shall be no war between me -and other states, although I recognise no supreme law-giving power -which will secure me my rights and whose rights I will guarantee;” -then it is not at all clear upon what grounds I could base my -confidence in my right, unless it were the substitute for that -compact on which civil society is based—namely, free federation which -reason must necessarily connect with the idea of the law of nations, -if indeed any meaning is to be left in that concept at all.</p> - -<p>There is no intelligible meaning in the idea of the law of -nations as giving a right to make war; for that must be a right to -decide what is just, not in accordance with universal, external -laws limiting the freedom of each individual, but by means of -one-sided maxims applied by force. We must then understand by -this that men of such ways of thinking are quite justly served, -when they<span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">[p. 136]</span> -destroy one another, and thus find perpetual peace in the wide -grave which covers all the abominations of acts of violence as -well as the authors of such deeds. For states, in their relation -to one another, there can be, according to reason, no other way of -advancing from that lawless condition which unceasing war implies, -than by giving up their savage lawless freedom, just as individual -men have done, and yielding to the coercion of public laws. Thus -they can form a State of nations (<i>civitas gentium</i>), one, too, -which will be ever increasing and would finally embrace all the -peoples of the earth. States, however, in accordance with their -understanding of the law of nations, by no means desire this, and -therefore reject <i>in hypothesi</i> what is correct <i>in thesi</i>. Hence, -instead of the positive idea of a world-republic, if all is not -to be lost, only the negative substitute for it, a federation -averting war, maintaining its ground and ever extending over the -world may stop the current of this tendency to war and shrinking -from the control of law. But even then there will be a constant -danger that this propensity may break out.<a id="FNanchor_131" -href="#Footnote_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a><span class="pagenum" -id="Page_137">[p. 137]</span> “Furor impius intus—fremit horridus -ore cruento.” (Virgil.)<a id="FNanchor_132" href="#Footnote_132" -class="fnanchor">[132]</a></p> - - -<p class="centra p2"><small>THIRD DEFINITIVE ARTICLE OF PERPETUAL -PEACE</small></p> - -<p class="centra p1">III.—“The rights of men, as citizens of the world, -shall be limited to the conditions of universal hospitality.”</p> - -<p class="p1">We are speaking here, as in the previous articles, -not of philanthropy, but of right; and in this sphere hospitality -signifies the claim of a stranger entering foreign territory to be -treated by its owner without hostility. The latter may send him -away again, if this can be done without causing his death; but, so -long as he conducts himself peaceably, he must not be treated as -an enemy. It is not a right to be treated as a guest to which the -stranger can lay<span class="pagenum" id="Page_138">[p. 138]</span> -claim—a special friendly compact on his behalf would be required -to make him for a given time an actual inmate—but he has a right -of visitation. This right<a id="FNanchor_133" href="#Footnote_133" -class="fnanchor">[133]</a> to present themselves to society belongs -to all mankind in virtue of our common right of possession on -the surface of the earth on which, as it is a globe, we cannot -be infinitely scattered, and must in the end reconcile ourselves -to existence side by side: at the same time, originally no one -individual had more right than another to live in any one particular -spot. Uninhabitable portions of the surface, ocean and desert, -split up the human community, but in such a way that ships and -camels—“the ship of the desert”—make it possible for men to come -into touch with one another across these unappropriated regions -and to take advantage of our common claim to the face of the earth -with a view to a possible intercommunication. The inhospitality of -the inhabitants of certain sea coasts—as, for example, the coast of -Barbary—in plundering ships in neighbouring seas or making slaves -of shipwrecked mariners; or the behaviour of the Arab Bedouins in -the deserts, who think that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">[p. -139]</span> proximity to nomadic tribes constitutes a right to rob, -is thus contrary to the law of nature. This right to hospitality, -however—that is to say, the privilege of strangers arriving on -foreign soil—does not amount to more than what is implied in a -permission to make an attempt at intercourse with the original -inhabitants. In this way far distant territories may enter into -peaceful relations with one another. These relations may at last -come under the public control of law, and thus the human race may be -brought nearer the realisation of a cosmopolitan constitution.</p> - -<p>Let us look now, for the sake of comparison, at the inhospitable -behaviour of the civilised nations, especially the commercial -states of our continent. The injustice which they exhibit on -visiting foreign lands and races—this being equivalent in their -eyes to conquest—is such as to fill us with horror. America, the -negro countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape etc. were, on being -discovered, looked upon as countries which belonged to nobody; for -the native inhabitants were reckoned as nothing. In Hindustan, under -the pretext of intending to establish merely commercial depots, the -Europeans introduced foreign troops; and, as a result, the different -states of Hindustan were stirred up to far-spreading wars. Oppression -of the natives followed, famine, insurrection, perfidy and all<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_140">[p. 140]</span> the rest of the litany -of evils which can afflict mankind.</p> - -<p>China<a id="FNanchor_134" href="#Footnote_134" -class="fnanchor">[134]</a> and Japan (Nipon) which had made -an attempt at receiving guests of this kind, have now<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_141">[p. 141]</span> taken a prudent step. -Only to a single European people, the Dutch, has China given the -right of access to her shores (but not of entrance into the country), -while Japan has granted both these concessions; but at the same -time they exclude the Dutch who enter, as if they were prisoners, -from social intercourse with the inhabitants. The worst, or from -the standpoint of ethical judgment the best, of all this is that -no satisfaction is derived from all this violence, that all these -trading companies stand on the verge of ruin, that the Sugar Islands, -that seat of the most horrible and delib<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_142">[p. 142]</span>erate slavery, yield no real profit, -but only have their use indirectly and for no very praiseworthy -object—namely, that of furnishing men to be trained as sailors for -the men-of-war and thereby contributing to the carrying on of war in -Europe. And this has been done by nations who make a great ado about -their piety, and who, while they are quite ready to commit injustice, -would like, in their orthodoxy, to be considered among the elect.</p> - -<p>The intercourse, more or less close, which has been everywhere -steadily increasing between the nations of the earth, has now -extended so enormously that a violation of right in one part of the -world is felt all over it. Hence the idea of a cosmopolitan right -is no fantastical, high-flown notion of right, but a complement of -the unwritten code of law—constitutional as well as international -law—necessary for the public rights of mankind in general and thus -for the realisation of perpetual peace. For only by endeavouring -to fulfil the conditions laid down by this cosmopolitan law can we -flatter ourselves that we are gradually approaching that ideal.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter"> - <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_143">[p. 143]</span></p> - <h2 class="nobreak" title="FIRST SUPPLEMENT CONCERNING THE - GUARANTEE OF PERPETUAL PEACE">FIRST SUPPLEMENT</h2> - <p class="subh3">CONCERNING THE GUARANTEE OF PERPETUAL PEACE</p> -</div> - -<p><span class="smcap">This</span> -guarantee is given by no less a power than the great artist nature -(<i>natura dædala rerum</i>) in whose mechanical course is clearly -exhibited a predetermined design to make harmony spring from human -discord, even against the will of man. Now this design, although -called Fate when looked upon as the compelling force of a cause, the -laws of whose operation are unknown to us, is, when considered as -the purpose manifested in the course of nature, called Providence,<a -id="FNanchor_135" href="#Footnote_135" class="fnanchor">[135]</a> as -the deep<span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">[p. 144]</span>-lying -wisdom of a Higher Cause, directing itself towards the ultimate -practical end of the human race and predetermining the course of -things with a view to its realisation. This Providence we do<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_145">[p. 145]</span> not, it is true, -perceive in the cunning contrivances [<i>Kunstanstalten</i>] of nature; -nor can we even conclude from the fact of their existence that it -is there; but, as in every relation between the form of things -and their final cause, we can, and must, supply the thought of a -Higher Wisdom, in order that we may be able to form an idea of the -possible existence of these products after the analogy of human -works of art [<i>Kunsthand<span class="pagenum" id="Page_146">[p. -146]</span>lungen</i>].<a id="FNanchor_136" href="#Footnote_136" -class="fnanchor">[136]</a> The representation to ourselves of -the relation and agreement of these formations of nature to the -moral purpose for which they were made and which reason directly -prescribes to us, is an Idea, it is true, which is in theory -superfluous; but in practice it is dogmatic, and its objective -reality is well established.<a id="FNanchor_137" href="#Footnote_137" -class="fnanchor">[137]</a> Thus we see, for example, with regard to -the ideal [<i>Pflichtbegriff</i>] of perpetual peace, that it is our duty -to make use of the mechanism of nature for the realisation of that -end. Moreover, in a case like this where we are interested merely in -the theory and not in the religious question, the use of the word -“nature” is more appropriate than that of “providence”, in view of -the limitations of human reason, which, in considering the relation -of effects to their causes, must keep within the limits of possible -experience. And the term “nature” is also less presumptuous than the -other. To speak of a Providence knowable by us would be boldly to put -on the wings of Icarus in order to draw near to the mystery of its -unfathomable purpose.</p> - -<p>Before we determine the surety given by nature more exactly, we -must first look at what ultimately makes this guarantee of peace -necessary—the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_147">[p. 147]</span> -circumstances in which nature has carefully placed the actors in her -great theatre. In the next place, we shall proceed to consider the -manner in which she gives this surety.</p> - -<p>The provisions she has made are as follow: (1) she has taken -care that men <i>can</i> live in all parts of the world; (2) she has -scattered them by means of war in all directions, even into the most -inhospitable regions, so that these too might be populated; (3) by -this very means she has forced them to enter into relations more or -less controlled by law. It is surely wonderful that, on the cold -wastes round the Arctic Ocean, there is always to be found moss -for the reindeer to scrape out from under the snow, the reindeer -itself either serving as food or to draw the sledge of the Ostiak or -Samoyedes. And salt deserts which would otherwise be left unutilised -have the camel, which seems as if created for travelling in such -lands. This evidence of design in things, however, is still more -clear when we come to know that, besides the fur-clad animals of the -shores of the Arctic Ocean, there are seals, walruses and whales -whose flesh furnishes food and whose oil fire for the dwellers in -these regions. But the providential care of nature excites our wonder -above all, when we hear of the driftwood which is carried—whence -no one knows—to these treeless shores: for without the<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_148">[p. 148]</span> aid of this material -the natives could neither construct their craft, nor weapons, nor -huts for shelter. Here too they have so much to do, making war -against wild animals, that they live at peace with one another. But -what drove them originally into these regions was probably nothing -but war.</p> - -<p>Of animals, used by us as instruments of war, the horse was the -first which man learned to tame and domesticate during the period of -the peopling of the earth; the elephant belongs to the later period -of the luxury of states already established. In the same way, the art -of cultivating certain grasses called cereals—no longer known to us -in their original form—and also the multiplication and improvement, -by transplanting and grafting, of the original kinds of fruit—in -Europe, probably only two species, the crab-apple and wild pear—could -only originate under the conditions accompanying established states -where the rights of property are assured. That is to say it would be -after man, hitherto existing in lawless liberty, had advanced beyond -the occupations of a hunter,<a id="FNanchor_138" href="#Footnote_138" -class="fnanchor">[138]</a> a fisherman<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_149">[p. 149]</span> or a shepherd to the life of a tiller -of the soil, when salt and iron were discovered,—to become, perhaps, -the first articles of commerce between different peoples,—and were -sought far and near. In this way the peoples would be at first -brought into peaceful relation with one another, and so come to an -understanding and the enjoyment of friendly intercourse, even with -their most distant neighbours.</p> - -<p>Now while nature provided that men could live on all parts of -the earth, she also at the same time despotically willed that -they <i>should</i> live everywhere on it, although against their own -inclination and even although this imperative did not presuppose -an idea of duty which would compel obedience to nature with the -force of a moral law. But, to attain this end, she has chosen war. -So we see certain peoples, widely separated, whose common<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_150">[p. 150]</span> descent is made -evident by affinity in their languages. Thus, for instance, we find -the Samoyedes on the Arctic Ocean, and again a people speaking -a similar language on the Altai Mts., 200 miles [<i>Meilen</i>]<a -id="FNanchor_139" href="#Footnote_139" class="fnanchor">[139]</a> -off, between whom has pressed in a mounted tribe, warlike in -character and of Mongolian origin, which has driven one branch of -the race far from the other, into the most inhospitable regions -where their own inclination would certainly not have carried them.<a -id="FNanchor_140" href="#Footnote_140" class="fnanchor">[140]</a> -In the same way, through the intrusion of the Gothic and Sarmatian -tribes, the Finns in the most northerly regions of Europe, whom we -call Laplanders, have been separated by as great a distance from the -Hungarians, with whose language their own is allied. And what but war -can have brought the Esquimos to the north of America, a race quite -distinct from those of that country and probably European adventurers -of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_151">[p. 151]</span> prehistoric -times? And war too, nature’s method of populating the earth, must -have driven the Pescherais<a id="FNanchor_141" href="#Footnote_141" -class="fnanchor">[141]</a> in South America as far as Patagonia. War -itself, however, is in need of no special stimulating cause, but -seems engrafted in human nature, and is even regarded as something -noble in itself to which man is inspired by the love of glory apart -from motives of self-interest. Hence, among the savages of America as -well as those of Europe in the age of chivalry, martial courage is -looked upon as of great value itself, not merely when a war is going -on, as is reasonable enough, but in order that there should be war: -and thus war is often entered upon merely to exhibit this quality. -So that an intrinsic dignity is held to attach to war in itself, and -even philosophers eulogise it as an ennobling, refining influence on -humanity, unmindful of the Greek proverb, “War is evil, in so far as -it makes more bad people than it takes away.”</p> - -<p>So much, then, of what nature does for her own ends with regard -to the human race as members of the animal world. Now comes the -question which touches the essential points in this design of a -perpetual peace:—“What does nature do in this respect with reference -to the end which man’s own<span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">[p. -152]</span> reason sets before him as a duty? and consequently what -does she do to further the realisation of his moral purpose? How does -she guarantee that what man, by the laws of freedom, ought to do and -yet fails to do, he will do, without any infringement of his freedom -by the compulsion of nature and that, moreover, this shall be done -in accordance with the three forms of public right—constitutional or -political law, international law and cosmopolitan law?” When I say -of nature that she <i>wills</i> that this or that should take place, I -do not mean that she imposes upon us the duty to do it—for only the -free, unrestrained, practical reason can do that—but that she does -it herself, whether we will or not. “<i>Fata volentem ducunt, nolentem -trahunt.</i>”</p> - -<p>1. Even if a people were not compelled through internal discord to -submit to the restraint of public laws, war would bring this about, -working from without. For, according to the contrivance of nature -which we have mentioned, every people finds another tribe in its -neighbourhood, pressing upon it in such a manner that it is compelled -to form itself internally into a state to be able to defend itself as -a power should. Now the republican constitution is the only one which -is perfectly adapted to the rights of man, but it is also the most -difficult to establish and still more to maintain. So generally is -this recognised that people<span class="pagenum" id="Page_153">[p. -153]</span> often say the members of a republican state would -require to be angels,<a id="FNanchor_142" href="#Footnote_142" -class="fnanchor">[142]</a> because men, with their self-seeking -propensities, are not fit for a constitution of so sublime a form. -But now nature comes to the aid of the universal, reason-derived -will which, much as we honour it, is in practice powerless. And this -she does, by means of these very self-seeking propensities, so that -it only depends—and so much lies within the power of man—on a good -organisation of the state for their forces to be so pitted against -one another, that the one may check the destructive activity of the -other or neutralise its effect. And hence, from the standpoint of -reason, the result will be the same as if both forces did not exist, -and each individual is compelled to be, if not a morally good man, -yet at least a good citizen. The problem of the formation of the -state, hard as it may sound, is not insoluble, even for a<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_154">[p. 154]</span> race of devils, granted -that they have intelligence. It may be put thus:—“Given a multitude -of rational beings who, in a body, require general laws for their -own preservation, but each of whom, as an individual, is secretly -inclined to exempt himself from this restraint: how are we to order -their affairs and how establish for them a constitution such that, -although their private dispositions may be really antagonistic, -they may yet so act as a check upon one another, that, in their -public relations, the effect is the same as if they had no such evil -sentiments.” Such a problem must be capable of solution. For it -deals, not with the moral reformation of mankind, but only with the -mechanism of nature; and the problem is to learn how this mechanism -of nature can be applied to men, in order so to regulate the -antagonism of conflicting interests in a people that they may even -compel one another to submit to compulsory laws and thus necessarily -bring about the state of peace in which laws have force. We can see, -in states actually existing, although very imperfectly organised, -that, in externals, they already approximate very nearly to what -the Idea of right prescribes, although the principle of morality is -certainly not the cause. A good political constitution, however, is -not to be expected as a result of progress in morality; but rather, -conversely, the good moral condition of a nation is to be looked for, -as one of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_155">[p. 155]</span> the -first fruits of such a constitution. Hence the mechanism of nature, -working through the self-seeking propensities of man (which of course -counteract one another in their external effects), may be used by -reason as a means of making way for the realisation of her own -purpose, the empire of right, and, as far as is in the power of the -state, to promote and secure in this way internal as well as external -peace. We may say, then, that it is the irresistible will of nature -that right shall at last get the supremacy. What one here fails to -do will be accomplished in the long run, although perhaps with much -inconvenience to us. As Bouterwek says, “If you bend the reed too -much it breaks: he who would do too much does nothing.”</p> - -<p>2. The idea of international law presupposes the separate -existence of a number of neighbouring and independent states; and, -although such a condition of things is in itself already a state -of war, (if a federative union of these nations does not prevent -the outbreak of hostilities) yet, according to the Idea of reason, -this is better than that all the states should be merged into one -under a power which has gained the ascendency over its neighbours -and gradually become a universal monarchy.<a id="FNanchor_143" -href="#Footnote_143" class="fnanchor">[143]</a> For the wider the -sphere of their jurisdic<span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">[p. -156]</span>tion, the more laws lose in force; and soulless despotism, -when it has choked the seeds of good, at last sinks into anarchy. -Nevertheless it is the desire of every state, or of its ruler, to -attain to a permanent condition of peace in this very way; that is to -say, by subjecting the whole world as far as possible to its sway. -But nature wills it otherwise. She employs two means to separate -nations, and prevent them from intermixing: namely, the differences -of language and of religion.<a id="FNanchor_144" href="#Footnote_144" -class="fnanchor">[144]</a> These differences bring with them a -tendency to mutual hatred, and furnish pretexts for waging war. But, -none the less, with the growth of culture and the gradual advance -of men to greater unanimity of principle, they lead to concord in a -state of peace which, unlike the despotism we have spoken of, (the -churchyard of freedom) does not arise from the weakening of all -forces, but is brought into being and secured through the equilibrium -of these forces in their most active rivalry.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">[p. 157]</span>3. As nature -wisely separates nations which the will of each state, sanctioned -even by the principles of international law, would gladly unite under -its own sway by stratagem or force; in the same way, on the other -hand, she unites nations whom the principle of a cosmopolitan right -would not have secured against violence and war. And this union -she brings about through an appeal to their mutual interests. The -commercial spirit cannot co-exist with war, and sooner or later it -takes possession of every nation. For, of all the forces which lie -at the command of a state, the power of money is probably the most -reliable. Hence states find themselves compelled—not, it is true, -exactly from motives of morality—to further the noble end of peace -and to avert war, by means of mediation, wherever it threatens to -break out, just as if they had made a permanent league for this -purpose. For great alliances with a view to war can, from the nature -of things, only very rarely occur, and still more seldom succeed.</p> - -<p>In this way nature guarantees the coming of perpetual peace, -through the natural course of human propensities: not indeed with -sufficient certainty to enable us to prophesy the future of this -ideal theoretically, but yet clearly enough for practical purposes. -And thus this guarantee of nature makes it a duty that we should -labour for this end, an end which is no mere chimera.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter"> - <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">[p. 158]</span></p> - <h2 class="nobreak" title="SECOND SUPPLEMENT—A SECRET ARTICLE FOR - PERPETUAL PEACE">SECOND SUPPLEMENT</h2> - <p class="subh3">A SECRET ARTICLE FOR PERPETUAL PEACE</p> -</div> - -<p><span class="smcap">A secret</span> -article in negotiations concerning public right is, when looked -at objectively or with regard to the meaning of the term, a -contradiction. When we view it, however, from the subjective -standpoint, with regard to the character and condition of the person -who dictates it, we see that it might quite well involve some private -consideration, so that he would regard it as hazardous to his dignity -to acknowledge such an article as originating from him.</p> - -<p>The only article of this kind is contained in the following -proposition:—“The opinions of philosophers, with regard to the -conditions of the possibility of a public peace, shall be taken into -consideration by states armed for war.”</p> - -<p>It seems, however, to be derogatory to the dignity of the -legislative authority of a state—to which we must of course -attribute all wisdom—to ask advice from subjects (among whom stand -philosophers) about the rules of its behaviour to other states. At -the same time, it is very advisable that this should be done. Hence -the state will silently invite suggestion for this purpose, while -at the same time keeping the fact secret. This amounts to<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_159">[p. 159]</span> saying that the state -will allow philosophers to discuss freely and publicly the universal -principles governing the conduct of war and establishment of peace; -for they will do this of their own accord, if no prohibition -is laid upon them.<a id="FNanchor_145" href="#Footnote_145" -class="fnanchor">[145]</a> The arrangement between states, on this -point, does not require that a special agreement should be made, -merely for this purpose; for it is already involved in the obligation -imposed by the universal reason of man which gives the moral law. We -would not be understood to say that the state must give a preference -to the principles of the philosopher, rather than to the opinions -of the jurist, the representative of state authority; but only -that he should be heard. The latter, who has chosen for a symbol -the scales of right and the sword of justice,<a id="FNanchor_146" -href="#Footnote_146" class="fnanchor">[146]</a> generally uses that -sword not merely to keep off all outside influences from the scales; -for, when one pan of the balance will not go down, he throws his -sword into it; and then <i>Væ victis</i>! The jurist, not being<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_160">[p. 160]</span> a moral philosopher, is -under the greatest temptation to do this, because it is his business -only to apply existing laws and not to investigate whether these -are not themselves in need of improvement; and this actually lower -function of his profession he looks upon as the nobler, because it -is linked to power (as is the case also in both the other faculties, -theology and medicine). Philosophy occupies a very low position -compared with this combined power. So that it is said, for example, -that she is the handmaid of theology; and the same has been said of -her position with regard to law and medicine. It is not quite clear, -however, “whether she bears the torch before these gracious ladies, -or carries the train.”</p> - -<p>That kings should philosophise, or philosophers become kings, -is not to be expected. But neither is it to be desired; for the -possession of power is inevitably fatal to the free exercise of -reason. But it is absolutely indispensable, for their enlightenment -as to the full significance of their vocations, that both kings and -sovereign nations, which rule themselves in accordance with laws of -equality, should not allow the class of philosophers to disappear, -nor forbid the expression of their opinions, but should allow -them to speak openly. And since this class of men, by their very -nature, are incapable of instigating rebellion or forming unions for -purposes of political agitation, they should not be suspected of -propagandism.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter"> - <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">[p. 161]</span></p> - <h2 class="nobreak" title="APPENDIX I—ON THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN - MORALS AND POLITICS WITH REFERENCE TO PERPETUAL PEACE">APPENDIX I</h2> - <p class="subh3">ON THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN MORALS AND POLITICS WITH - REFERENCE TO PERPETUAL PEACE</p> -</div> - -<p><span class="smcap">In</span> -an objective sense, morals is a practical science, as the sum of -laws exacting unconditional obedience, in accordance with which we -<i>ought</i> to act. Now, once we have admitted the authority of this -idea of duty, it is evidently inconsistent that we should think of -saying that we <i>cannot</i> act thus. For, in this case, the idea of duty -falls to the ground of itself; “<i>ultra posse nemo obligatur</i>.” Hence -there can be no quarrel between politics, as the practical science of -right, and morals, which is also a science of right, but theoretical. -That is, theory cannot come into conflict with practice. For, in that -case, we would need to understand under the term “ethics” or “morals” -a universal doctrine of expediency, or, in other words, a theory of -precepts which may guide us in choosing the best means for attaining -ends calculated for our advantage. This is to deny that a science of -morals exists.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_162">[p. 162]</span></p> - -<p>Politics says, “Be wise as serpents”; morals adds the limiting -condition, “and guileless as doves.” If these precepts cannot stand -together in one command, then there is a real quarrel between -politics and morals.<a id="FNanchor_147" href="#Footnote_147" -class="fnanchor">[147]</a> But if they can be completely brought into -accord, then the idea of any antagonism between them is absurd, and -the question of how best to make a compromise between the two points -of view ceases to be even raised. Although the saying, “Honesty is -the best policy,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_163">[p. 163]</span>” -expresses a theory which, alas, is often contradicted in practice, -yet the likewise theoretical maxim, “Honesty is better than any -policy,” is exalted high above every possible objection, is indeed -the necessary condition of all politics.</p> - -<p>The Terminus of morals does not yield to Jupiter, the Terminus -of force; for the latter remains beneath the sway of Fate. In other -words, reason is not sufficiently enlightened to survey the series -of predetermining causes which would make it possible for us to -predict with certainty the good or bad results of human action, as -they follow from the mechanical laws of nature; although we may hope -that things will turn out as we should desire. But what we have to -do, in order to remain in the path of duty guided by the rules of -wisdom, reason makes everywhere perfectly clear, and does this for -the purpose of furthering her ultimate ends.</p> - -<p>The practical man, however, for whom morals is mere theory, even -while admitting that what ought to be can be, bases his dreary -verdict against our well-meant hopes really on this: he pretends -that he can foresee from his observation of human nature, that men -will never be willing to do what is required in order to bring about -the wished-for results leading to perpetual peace. It is true that -the will of all individual men to live under a legal constitution -according to the principles of liberty<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_164">[p. 164]</span>—that is to say, the distributive -unity of the wills of all—is not sufficient to attain this end. We -must have the collective unity of their united will: all as a body -must determine these new conditions. The solution of this difficult -problem is required in order that civil society should be a whole. -To all this diversity of individual wills there must come a uniting -cause, in order to produce a common will which no distributive will -is able to give. Hence, in the practical realisation of that idea, no -other beginning of a law-governed society can be counted upon than -one that is brought about by force: upon this force, too, public law -afterwards rests. This state of things certainly prepares us to meet -considerable deviation in actual experience from the theoretical -idea of perpetual peace, since we cannot take into account the moral -character and disposition of a law-giver in this connection, or -expect that, after he has united a wild multitude into one people, he -will leave it to them to bring about a legal constitution by their -common will.</p> - -<p>It amounts to this. Any ruler who has once got the power in his -hands will not let the people dictate laws for him. A state which -enjoys an independence of the control of external law will not -submit to the judgment of the tribunals of other states, when it has -to consider how to obtain<span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">[p. -165]</span> its rights against them. And even a continent, when -it feels its superiority to another, whether this be in its way -or not, will not fail to take advantage of an opportunity offered -of strengthening its power by the spoliation or even conquest of -this territory. Hence all theoretical schemes, connected with -constitutional, international or cosmopolitan law, crumble away into -empty impracticable ideals. While, on the other hand, a practical -science, based on the empirical principles of human nature, which -does not disdain to model its maxims on an observation of actual -life, can alone hope to find a sure foundation on which to build up a -system of national policy.</p> - -<p>Now certainly, if there is neither freedom nor a moral law -founded upon it, and every actual or possible event happens in -the mere mechanical course of nature, then politics, as the -art of making use of this physical necessity in things for the -government of men, is the whole of practical wisdom and the idea -of right is an empty concept. If, on the other hand, we find that -this idea of right is necessarily to be conjoined with politics -and even to be raised to the position of a limiting condition of -that science, then the possibility of reconciling them must be -admitted. I can thus imagine a moral politician, that is to say, one -who understands the principles of statesmanship to be such as do -not<span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">[p. 166]</span> conflict with -morals; but I cannot conceive of a political moralist who fashions -for himself such a system of ethics as may serve the interest of -statesmen.</p> - -<p>The moral politician will always act upon the following -principle:—“If certain defects which could not have been avoided -are found in the political constitution or foreign relations of a -state, it is a duty for all, especially for the rulers of the state, -to apply their whole energy to correcting them as soon as possible, -and to bringing the constitution and political relations on these -points into conformity with the Law of Nature, as it is held up as a -model before us in the idea of reason; and this they should do even -at a sacrifice of their own interest.” Now it is contrary to all -politics—which is, in this particular, in agreement with morals—to -dissever any of the links binding citizens together in the state -or nations in cosmopolitan union, before a better constitution is -there to take the place of what has been thus destroyed. And hence -it would be absurd indeed to demand that every imperfection in -political matters must be violently altered on the spot. But, at the -same time, it may be required of a ruler at least that he should -earnestly keep the maxim in mind which points to the necessity of -such a change; so that he may go on constantly approaching the end -to be realised,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_167">[p. 167]</span> -namely, the best possible constitution according to the laws of -right. Even although it is still under despotic rule, in accordance -with its constitution as then existing, a state may govern itself -on republican lines, until the people gradually become capable of -being influenced by the mere idea of the authority of law, just as -if it had physical power. And they become accordingly capable of -self-legislation, their faculty for which is founded on original -right. But if, through the violence of revolution, the product of -a bad government, a constitution more in accord with the spirit of -law were attained even by unlawful means, it should no longer be -held justifiable to bring the people back to the old constitution, -although, while the revolution was going on, every one who took -part in it by use of force or stratagem, may have been justly -punished as a rebel. As regards the external relations of nations, -a state cannot be asked to give up its constitution, even although -that be a despotism (which is, at the same time, the strongest -constitution where foreign enemies are concerned), so long as it -runs the risk of being immediately swallowed up by other states. -Hence, when such a proposal is made, the state whose constitution is -in question must at least be allowed to defer acting upon it until -a more convenient time.<a id="FNanchor_148" href="#Footnote_148" -class="fnanchor">[148]</a></p> <p><span class="pagenum" -id="Page_168">[p. 168]</span></p> <p>It is always possible that -moralists who rule despotically, and are at a loss in practical -matters, will come into collision with the rules of political wisdom -in many ways, by adopting measures without sufficient deliberation -which show themselves afterwards to have been overestimated. When -they thus offend against nature, experience must gradually lead them -into a better track. But, instead of this being the case, politicians -who are fond of moralising do all they can to make moral improvement -impossible and to perpetuate violations of law, by extenuating -political principles which are antagonistic to the idea of right, on -the pretext that human nature is not capable of good, in the sense of -the ideal which reason prescribes.</p> - -<p>These politicians, instead of adopting an open, straightforward -way of doing things (as they boast), mix themselves up in intrigue. -They get at the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_169">[p. 169]</span> -authorities in power and say what will please them; their sole -bent is to sacrifice the nation, or even, if they can, the whole -world, with the one end in view that their own private interest -may be forwarded. This is the manner of regular jurists (I mean -the journeyman lawyer not the legislator), when they aspire to -politics. For, as it is not their business to reason too nicely over -legislation, but only to enforce the laws of the country, every -legal constitution in its existing form and, when this is changed -by the proper authorities, the one which takes its place, will -always seem to them the best possible. And the consequence is that -everything is purely mechanical. But this adroitness in suiting -themselves to any circumstances may lead them to the delusion that -they are also capable of giving an opinion about the principles of -political constitutions in general, in so far as they conform to -ideas of right, and are therefore not empirical, but <i>a priori</i>. And -they may therefore brag about their knowledge of men,—which indeed -one expects to find, since they have to deal with so many—without -really knowing the nature of man and what can be made of it, to gain -which knowledge a higher standpoint of anthropological observation -than theirs is required. Filled with ideas of this kind, if they -trespass outside their own sphere on the boundaries of political -and international law,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_170">[p. -170]</span> looked upon as ideals which reason holds before us, they -can do so only in the spirit of chicanery. For they will follow their -usual method of making everything conform mechanically to compulsory -laws despotically made and enforced, even here, where the ideas of -reason recognise the validity of a legal compulsory force, only when -it is in accordance with the principles of freedom through which a -permanently valid constitution becomes first of all possible. The -would-be practical man, leaving out of account this idea of reason, -thinks that he can solve this problem empirically by looking to the -way in which those constitutions which have best survived the test -of time were established, even although the spirit of these may have -been generally contrary to the idea of right. The principles which -he makes use of here, although indeed he does not make them public, -amount pretty much to the following sophistical maxims.</p> - -<p>1. <b>Fac et excusa.</b> Seize the most favourable opportunity for -arbitrary usurpation—either of the authority of the state over its -own people or over a neighbouring people; the justification of the -act and extenuation of the use of force will come much more easily -and gracefully, when the deed is done, than if one has to think -out convincing reasons for taking this step and first hear through -all the objections which can be made against it. This is<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_171">[p. 171]</span> especially true in -the first case mentioned, where the supreme power in the state also -controls the legislature which we must obey without any reasoning -about it. Besides, this show of audacity in a statesman even lends -him a certain semblance of inward conviction of the justice of -his action; and once he has got so far the god of success (<i>bonus -eventus</i>) is his best advocate.</p> - -<p>2. <b>Si fecisti, nega.</b> As for any crime you have committed, -such as has, for instance, brought your people to despair and thence -to insurrection, deny that it has happened owing to any fault of -yours. Say rather that it is all caused by the insubordination of -your subjects, or, in the case of your having usurped a neighbouring -state, that human nature is to blame; for, if a man is not ready to -use force and steal a march upon his neighbour, he may certainly -count on the latter forestalling him and taking him prisoner.</p> - -<p>3. <b>Divide et impera.</b> That is to say, if there are certain -privileged persons, holding authority among the people, who have -merely chosen you for their sovereign as <i>primus inter pares</i>, -bring about a quarrel among them, and make mischief between them -and the people. Now back up the people with a dazzling promise of -greater freedom; everything will now depend unconditionally on your -will. Or again, if there is a difficulty with<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_172">[p. 172]</span> foreign states, then to stir up -dissension among them is a pretty sure means of subjecting first one -and then the other to your sway, under the pretext of aiding the -weaker.</p> - -<p>It is true that now-a-days no body is taken in by these political -maxims, for they are all familiar to everyone. Moreover, there is -no need of being ashamed of them, as if their injustice were too -patent. For the great Powers never feel shame before the judgment of -the common herd, but only before one another; so that as far as this -matter goes, it is not the revelation of these guiding principles of -policy that can make rulers ashamed, but only the unsuccessful use -of them. For as to the morality of these maxims, politicians are all -agreed. Hence there is always left political prestige on which they -can safely count; and this means the glory of increasing their power -by any means that offer.<a id="FNanchor_149" href="#Footnote_149" -class="fnanchor">[149]</a></p> - -<p class="tb">* * *</p> - -<p>In all these twistings and turnings of an immoral doctrine of -expediency which aims at substituting a state of peace for the -warlike conditions in which men are placed by nature, so much at -least is clear;—that men cannot get away from<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_173">[p. 173]</span> the idea of right in their private any -more than in their public relations; and that they do not dare (this -is indeed most strikingly seen in the concept of an international -law) to base politics<span class="pagenum" id="Page_174">[p. -174]</span> merely on the manipulations of expediency and therefore -to refuse all obedience to the idea of a public right. On the -contrary, they pay all fitting honour to the idea of right in itself, -even although they should, at the same time, devise a hundred -subterfuges and excuses to avoid it in practice, and should regard -force, backed up by cunning, as having the authority which comes -from being the source and unifying principle of all right. It will -be well to put an end to this sophistry, if not to the injustice it -extenuates, and to bring the false advocates of the mighty of the -earth to confess that it is not right but might in whose interest -they speak, and that it is the worship of might from which they take -their cue, as if in this matter they had a right to command. In order -to do this, we must first expose the delusion by which they deceive -them<span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">[p. 175]</span>selves and -others; then discover the ultimate principle from which their plans -for a perpetual peace proceed; and thence show that all the evil -which stands in the way of the realisation of that ideal springs -from the fact that the political moralist begins where the moral -politician rightly ends and that, by subordinating principles to an -end or putting the cart before the horse, he defeats his intention of -bringing politics into harmony with morals.</p> - -<p>In order to make practical philosophy consistent with itself, -we must first decide the following question:—In dealing with the -problems of practical reason must we begin from its material -principle—the end as the object of free choice—or from its formal -principle which is based merely on freedom in its external -relation?—from which comes the following law:—“Act so that thou -canst will that thy maxim should be a universal law, be the end of -thy action what it will.”<a id="FNanchor_150" href="#Footnote_150" -class="fnanchor">[150]</a></p> - -<p>Without doubt, the latter determining principle of action must -stand first; for, as a principle of right, it carries unconditional -necessity with it, whereas the former is obligatory only if we -assume the empirical conditions of the end set before us,—that is -to say, that it is an end capable of being<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_176">[p. 176]</span> practically realised. And if this -end—as, for example, the end of perpetual peace—should be also a -duty, this same duty must necessarily have been deduced from the -formal principle governing the maxims which guide external action. -Now the first principle is the principle of the political moralist; -the problems of constitutional, international and cosmopolitan law -are mere technical problems (<i>problema technicum</i>). The second or -formal principle, on the other hand, as the principle of the moral -politician who regards it as a moral problem (<i>problema morale</i>), -differs widely from the other principle in its methods of bringing -about perpetual peace, which we desire not only as a material good, -but also as a state of things resulting from our recognition of -the precepts of duty.<a id="FNanchor_151" href="#Footnote_151" -class="fnanchor">[151]</a></p> - -<p>To solve the first problem—that, namely, of political -expediency—much knowledge of nature is required, that her mechanical -laws may be employed for the end in view. And yet the result of all -knowledge of this kind is uncertain, as far as perpetual peace is -concerned. This we find to be so, whichever of the three departments -of public law we take. It is uncertain whether a people could be -better kept in obedience and at the same time prosperity by severity -or by baits held out to their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">[p. -177]</span> vanity; whether they would be better governed under the -sovereignty of a single individual or by the authority of several -acting together; whether the combined authority might be better -secured merely, say, by an official nobility or by the power of the -people within the state; and, finally, whether such conditions could -be long maintained. There are examples to the contrary in history -in the case of all forms of government, with the exception of the -only true republican constitution, the idea of which can occur only -to a moral politician. Still more uncertain is a law of nations, -ostensibly established upon statutes devised by ministers; for this -amounts in fact to mere empty words, and rests on treaties which, -in the very act of ratification, contain a secret reservation of -the right to violate them. On the other hand, the solution of the -second problem—the problem of political wisdom—forces itself, we may -say, upon us; it is quite obvious to every one, and puts all crooked -dealings to shame; it leads, too, straight to the desired end, while -at the same time, discretion warns us not to drag in the conditions -of perpetual peace by force, but to take time and approach this ideal -gradually as favourable circumstances permit.</p> - -<p>This may be expressed in the following maxim:—“Seek ye first -the kingdom of pure practical reason and its righteousness, and -the object of your en<span class="pagenum" id="Page_178">[p. -178]</span>deavour, the blessing of perpetual peace, will be -added unto you.” For the science of morals generally has this -peculiarity,—and it has it also with regard to the moral principles -of public law, and therefore with regard to a science of politics -knowable <i>a priori</i>,—that the less it makes a man’s conduct depend -on the end he has set before him, his purposed material or moral -gain, so much the more, nevertheless, does it conform in general -to this end. The reason for this is that it is just the universal -will, given <i>a priori</i>, which exists in a people or in the relation -of different peoples to one another, that alone determines what is -lawful among men. This union of individual wills, however, if we -proceed consistently in practice, in observance of the mechanical -laws of nature, may be at the same time the cause of bringing about -the result intended and practically realizing the idea of right. -Hence it is, for example, a principle of moral politics that a people -should unite into a state according to the only valid concepts -of right, the ideas of freedom and equality; and this principle -is not based on expediency, but upon duty. Political moralists, -however, do not deserve a hearing, much and sophistically as they -may reason about the existence, in a multitude of men forming a -society, of certain natural tendencies which would weaken those -principles and defeat their intention. They<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_179">[p. 179]</span> may endeavour to prove their assertion -by giving instances of badly organised constitutions, chosen both -from ancient and modern times, (as, for example, democracies without -a representative system); but such arguments are to be treated with -contempt, all the more, because a pernicious theory of this kind -may perhaps even bring about the evil which it prophesies. For, in -accordance with such reasoning, man is thrown into a class with all -other living machines which only require the consciousness that they -are not free creatures to make them in their own judgment the most -miserable of all beings.</p> - -<p><i>Fiat justitia, pereat mundus.</i> This saying has become proverbial, -and although it savours a little of boastfulness, is also true. We -may translate it thus:—“Let justice rule on earth, although all the -rogues in the world should go to the bottom.” It is a good, honest -principle of right cutting off all the crooked ways made by knavery -or violence. It must not, however, be misunderstood as allowing -anyone to exercise his own rights with the utmost severity, a course -in contradiction to our moral duty; but we must take it to signify an -obligation, binding upon rulers, to refrain from refusing to yield -anyone his rights or from curtailing them, out of personal feeling -or sympathy for others. For this end, in particular, we require, -firstly, that a state<span class="pagenum" id="Page_180">[p. -180]</span> should have an internal political constitution, -established according to the pure principles of right; secondly, -that a union should be formed between this state and neighbouring or -distant nations for a legal settlement of their differences, after -the analogy of the universal state. This proposition means nothing -more than this:—Political maxims must not start from the idea of a -prosperity and happiness which are to be expected from observance -of such precepts in every state; that is, not from the end which -each nation makes the object of its will as the highest empirical -principle of political wisdom; but they must set out from the pure -concept of the duty of right, from the “<i>ought</i>” whose principle -is given <i>a priori</i> through pure reason. This is the law, whatever -the material consequences may be. The world will certainly not -perish by any means, because the number of wicked people in it is -becoming fewer. The morally bad has one peculiarity, inseparable from -its nature;—in its purposes, especially in relation to other evil -influences, it is in contradiction with itself, and counteracts its -own natural effect, and thus makes room for the moral principle of -good, although advance in this direction may be slow.</p> - -<p>Hence objectively, in theory, there is no quarrel between morals -and politics. But subjectively, in the self-seeking tendencies of men -(which we cannot<span class="pagenum" id="Page_181">[p. 181]</span> -actually call their morality, as we would a course of action based -on maxims of reason,) this disagreement in principle exists and may -always survive; for it serves as a whetstone to virtue. According -to the principle, <i>Tu ne cede malis, sed contra audentior ito</i>, the -true courage of virtue in the present case lies not so much in facing -the evils and self-sacrifices which must be met here as in firmly -confronting the evil principle in our own nature and conquering its -wiles. For this is a principle far more dangerous, false, treacherous -and sophistical which puts forward the weakness in human nature as a -justification for every transgression.</p> - -<p>In fact the political moralist may say that a ruler and people, -or nation and nation do <i>one another</i> no wrong, when they enter on -a war with violence or cunning, although they do wrong, generally -speaking, in refusing to respect the idea of right which alone could -establish peace for all time. For, as both are equally wrongly -disposed to one another, each transgressing the duty he owes to his -neighbour, they are both quite rightly served, when they are thus -destroyed in war. This mutual destruction stops short at the point of -extermination, so that there are always enough of the race left to -keep this game going on through all the ages, and a far-off posterity -may take warning<span class="pagenum" id="Page_182">[p. 182]</span> -by them. The Providence that orders the course of the world is -hereby justified. For the moral principle in mankind never becomes -extinguished, and human reason, fitted for the practical realisation -of ideas of right according to that principle, grows continually in -fitness for that purpose with the ever advancing march of culture; -while at the same time, it must be said, the guilt of transgression -increases as well. But it seems that, by no theodicy or vindication -of the justice of God, can we justify Creation in putting such a -race of corrupt creatures into the world at all, if, that is, we -assume that the human race neither will nor can ever be in a happier -condition than it is now. This standpoint, however, is too high a -one for us to judge from, or to theorise, with the limited concepts -we have at our command, about the wisdom of that supreme Power which -is unknowable by us. We are inevitably driven to such despairing -conclusions as these, if we do not admit that the pure principles of -right have objective reality—that is to say, are capable of being -practically realised—and consequently that action must be taken on -the part of the people of a state and, further, by states in relation -to one another, whatever arguments empirical politics may bring -forward against this course. Politics in the real sense cannot take -a step forward without first paying homage<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_183">[p. 183]</span> to the principles of morals. And, -although politics, <i>per se</i>, is a difficult art,<a id="FNanchor_152" -href="#Footnote_152" class="fnanchor">[152]</a> in its union with -morals no art is required; for in the case of a conflict arising -between the two sciences, the moralist can cut asunder the knot -which politics is unable to untie. Right must be held sacred by man, -however great the cost and sacrifice to the ruling power. Here is no -half-and-half course. We cannot devise a happy medium between right -and expediency, a right pragmatically conditioned. But all politics -must bend the knee to the principle of right, and may, in that way, -hope to reach, although slowly perhaps, a level whence it may shine -upon men for all time.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter"> - <p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_184">[p. 184]</span></p> - <h2 class="nobreak" title="APPENDIX II—CONCERNING THE HARMONY OF - POLITICS WITH MORALS ACCORDING TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEA OF PUBLIC - RIGHT">APPENDIX II</h2> - <p class="subh3">CONCERNING THE HARMONY OF POLITICS WITH MORALS - ACCORDING TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEA OF PUBLIC RIGHT</p> -</div> - -<p><span class="smcap">If</span> -I look at public right from the point of view of most professors -of law, and abstract from its <i>matter</i> or its empirical elements, -varying according to the circumstances given in our experience of -individuals in a state or of states among themselves, then there -remains the <i>form</i> of publicity. The possibility of this publicity, -every legal title implies. For without it there could be no justice, -which can only be thought as before the eyes of men; and, without -justice, there would be no right, for, from justice only, right can -come.</p> - -<p>This characteristic of publicity must belong to every legal -title. Hence, as, in any particular case that occurs, there is no -difficulty in deciding whether this essential attribute is present -or not, (whether, that is, it is reconcilable with the principles of -the agent or not), it furnishes an easily applied criterion<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_185">[p. 185]</span> which is to be found <i>a -priori</i> in the reason, so that in the particular case we can at once -recognise the falsity or illegality of a proposed claim (<i>praetensio -juris</i>), as it were by an experiment of pure reason.</p> - -<p>Having thus, as it were, abstracted from all the empirical -elements contained in the concept of a political and international -law, such as, for instance, the evil tendency in human nature which -makes compulsion necessary, we may give the following proposition as -the <i>transcendental formula</i> of public right:—“All actions relating -to the rights of other men are wrong, if the maxims from which they -follow are inconsistent with publicity.”</p> - -<p>This principle must be regarded not merely as ethical, as -belonging to the doctrine of virtue, but also as juridical, referring -to the rights of men. For there is something wrong in a maxim of -conduct which I cannot divulge without at once defeating my purpose, -a maxim which must therefore be kept secret, if it is to succeed, and -which I could not publicly acknowledge without infallibly stirring up -the opposition of everyone. This necessary and universal resistance -with which everyone meets me, a resistance therefore evident <i>a -priori</i>, can be due to no other cause than the injustice with which -such a maxim threatens everyone. Further, this testing principle is -merely negative; that is, it serves only as a means by which we may -know<span class="pagenum" id="Page_186">[p. 186]</span> when an -action is unjust to others. Like axioms, it has a certainty incapable -of demonstration; it is besides easy of application as appears from -the following examples of public right.</p> - -<p>1.—<b>Constitutional Law.</b> Let us take in the first place -the public law of the state (<i>jus civitatis</i>), particularly in its -application to matters within the state. Here a question arises -which many think difficult to answer, but which the transcendental -principle of publicity solves quite readily:—“Is revolution a -legitimate means for a people to adopt, for the purpose of throwing -off the oppressive yoke of a so-called tyrant (<i>non titulo, sed -exercitio talis</i>)?” The rights of a nation are violated in a -government of this kind, and no wrong is done to the tyrant in -dethroning him. Of this there is no doubt. None the less, it is in -the highest degree wrong of the subjects to prosecute their rights in -this way; and they would be just as little justified in complaining, -if they happened to be defeated in their attempt and had to endure -the severest punishment in consequence.</p> - -<p>A great many reasons for and against both sides of this -question may be given, if we seek to settle it by a dogmatic -deduction of the principles of right. But the transcendental -principle of the publicity of public right can spare itself this -diffuse argumentation. For, according to that principle, the<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_187">[p. 187]</span> people would ask -themselves, before the civil contract was made, whether they could -venture to publish maxims, proposing insurrection when a favourable -opportunity should present itself. It is quite clear that if, when -a constitution is established, it were made a condition that force -may be exercised against the sovereign under certain circumstances, -the people would be obliged to claim a lawful authority higher than -his. But in that case, the so-called sovereign would be no longer -sovereign: or, if both powers, that of the sovereign and that of -the people, were made a condition of the constitution of the state, -then its establishment (which was the aim of the people) would be -impossible. The wrongfulness of revolution is quite obvious from -the fact that openly to acknowledge maxims which justify this step -would make attainment of the end at which they aim impossible. We are -obliged to keep them secret. But this secrecy would not be necessary -on the part of the head of the state. He may say quite plainly -that the ringleaders of every rebellion will be punished by death, -even although they may hold that it was he who first transgressed -the fundamental law. For, if a ruler is conscious of possessing -irresistible sovereign power (and this must be assumed in every civil -constitution, because a sovereign who has not power to protect any -individual member<span class="pagenum" id="Page_188">[p. 188]</span> -of the nation against his neighbour has also not the right to -exercise authority over him), then he need have no fear that making -known the maxims which guide him will cause the defeat of his plans. -And it is quite consistent with this view to hold that, if the people -are successful in their insurrection, the sovereign must return to -the rank of a subject, and refrain from inciting rebellion with a -view to regaining his lost sovereignty. At the same time he need have -no fear of being called to account for his former administration.<a -id="FNanchor_153" href="#Footnote_153" class="fnanchor">[153]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_189">[p. 189]</span></p> -<p>2.—<b>International Law.</b> There can be no question of an -international law, except on the assumption of some kind of a -law-governed state of things, the external condition under which any -right can belong to man. For the very idea of international law, as -public right, implies the publication of a universal will determining -the rights and property of each individual nation; and this <i>status -juridicus</i> must spring out of a contract of some sort which may not, -like the contract to which the state owes its origin, be founded -upon compulsory laws, but may be, at the most, the agreement of a -permanent free association such as the federation of the different -states, to which we have alluded above. For, without the control -of law to some extent, to serve as an active bond of union among -different merely natural or moral individuals,—that is to say, in -a state of nature,—there can only be private law. And here we find -a disagreement between morals, regarded as the science of right, -and politics. The criterion, obtained by observing the effect of -publicity on maxims, is just as easily applied, but only when we -understand that this agreement binds the contracting states solely -with the object that peace may be preserved among them, and between -them and other states; in no sense with a view to the acquisition of -new territory or power. The following instances of antinomy occur -between<span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">[p. 190]</span> politics -and morals, which are given here with the solution in each case.</p> - -<p><i>a.</i> “When either of these states has promised something to -another, (as, for instance, assistance, or a relinquishment of -certain territory, or subsidies and such like), the question may -arise whether, in a case where the safety of the state thus bound -depends on its evading the fulfilment of this promise, it can do so -by maintaining a right to be regarded as a double person:—firstly, -as sovereign and accountable to no one in the state of which that -sovereign power is head; and, secondly, merely as the highest -official in the service of that state, who is obliged to answer to -the state for every action. And the result of this is that the state -is acquitted in its second capacity of any obligation to which it has -committed itself in the first.” But, if a nation or its sovereign -proclaimed these maxims, the natural consequence would be that every -other would flee from it, or unite with other states to oppose such -pretensions. And this is a proof that politics, with all its cunning, -defeats its own ends, if the test of making principles of action -public, which we have indicated, be applied. Hence the maxim we have -quoted must be wrong.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> “If a state which has increased its power to a formidable -extent (<i>potentia tremenda</i>) excites anxiety in its neighbours, is it -right to assume<span class="pagenum" id="Page_191">[p. 191]</span> -that, since it has the means, it will also have the will to oppress -others; and does that give less powerful states a right to unite and -attack the greater nation without any definite cause of offence?” A -state which would here answer openly in the affirmative would only -bring the evil about more surely and speedily. For the greater power -would forestall those smaller nations, and their union would be but -a weak reed of defence against a state which knew how to apply the -maxim, <i>divide et impera</i>. This maxim of political expediency then, -when openly acknowledged, necessarily defeats the end at which it -aims, and is therefore wrong.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> “If a smaller state by its geographical position breaks -up the territory of a greater, so as to prevent a unity necessary -to the preservation of that state, is the latter not justified in -subjugating its less powerful neighbour and uniting the territory -in question with its own?” We can easily see that the greater state -dare not publish such a maxim beforehand; for either all smaller -states would without loss of time unite against it, or other powers -would contend for this booty. Hence the impracticability of such a -maxim becomes evident under the light of publicity. And this is a -sign that it is wrong, and that in a very great degree; for, although -the victim of an act of injustice may be<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_192">[p. 192]</span> of small account, that does not prevent -the injustice done from being very great.</p> - -<p>3.—<b>Cosmopolitan Law.</b> We may pass over this department of -right in silence, for, owing to its analogy with international law, -its maxims are easily specified and estimated.</p> - -<p class="tb">* * *</p> - -<p>In this principle of the incompatibility of the maxims of -international law with their publicity, we have a good indication -of the non-agreement between politics and morals, regarded as a -science of right. Now we require to know under what conditions these -maxims do agree with the law of nations. For we cannot conclude that -the converse holds, and that all maxims which can bear publicity -are therefore just. For anyone who has a decided supremacy has -no need to make any secret about his maxims. The condition of a -law of nations being possible at all is that, in the first place, -there should be a law-governed state of things. If this is not so, -there can be no public right, and all right which we can think of -outside the law-governed state,—that is to say, in the state of -nature,—is mere private right. Now we have seen<span class="pagenum" -id="Page_193">[p. 193]</span> above that something of the nature of -a federation between nations, for the sole purpose of doing away -with war, is the only rightful condition of things reconcilable -with their individual freedom. Hence the agreement of politics and -morals is only possible in a federative union, a union which is -necessarily given <i>a priori</i>, according to the principles of right. -And the lawful basis of all politics can only be the establishment -of this union in its widest possible extent. Apart from this end, -all political sophistry is folly and veiled injustice. Now this sham -politics has a casuistry, not to be excelled in the best Jesuit -school. It has its mental reservation (<i>reservatio mentalis</i>): as -in the drawing up of a public treaty in such terms as we can, if we -will, interpret when occasion serves to our advantage; for example, -the distinction between the <i>status quo</i> in fact (<i>de fait</i>) and -in right (<i>de droit</i>). Secondly, it has its probabilism; when it -pretends to discover evil intentions in another, or makes, the -probability of their possible future ascendency a lawful reason -for bringing about the destruction of other peaceful states. -Finally, it has its philosophical sin (<i>peccatum philosophicum</i>, -<i>peccatillum</i>, <i>baggatelle</i>) which is that of holding it a trifle -easily pardoned that a smaller state should be swallowed up, if this -be to the gain of a nation much more powerful; for such an increase -in power is<span class="pagenum" id="Page_194">[p. 194]</span> -supposed to tend to the greater prosperity of the whole world.<a -id="FNanchor_154" href="#Footnote_154" class="fnanchor">[154]</a></p> - -<p>Duplicity gives politics the advantage of using one branch or -the other of morals, just as suits its own ends. The love of our -fellowmen is a duty: so too is respect for their rights. But the -former is only conditional: the latter, on the other hand, an -unconditional, absolutely imperative duty; and anyone who would -give himself up to the sweet consciousness of well-doing must be -first perfectly assured that he has not transgressed its commands. -Politics has no difficulty in agreeing with morals in the first sense -of the term, as ethics, to secure that men should give to superiors -their rights. But when it comes to morals, in its second aspect, -as the science of right before which politics must bow the knee, -the politician finds it prudent to have nothing to do with compacts -and rather to deny all reality to morals in this sense, and reduce -all duty to mere benevolence. Philosophy could easily frustrate the -artifices of a politics like<span class="pagenum" id="Page_195">[p. -195]</span> this, which shuns the light of criticism, by publishing -its maxims, if only statesmen would have the courage to grant -philosophers the right to ventilate their opinions.</p> - -<p>With this end in view, I propose another principle of public -right, which is at once transcendental and affirmative. Its formula -would be as follows:—“All maxims which require publicity, in order -that they may not fail to attain their end, are in agreement both -with right and politics.”</p> - -<p>For, if these maxims can only attain the end at which they aim -by being published, they must be in harmony with the universal end -of mankind, which is happiness; and to be in sympathy with this (to -make the people contented with their lot) is the real business of -politics. Now, if this end should be attainable only by publicity, or -in other words, through the removal of all distrust of the maxims of -politics, these must be in harmony with the right of the people; for -a union of the ends of all is only possible in a harmony with this -right.</p> - -<p>I must postpone the further development and discussion of this -principle till another opportunity. That it is a transcendental -formula is quite evident from the fact that all the empirical -conditions of a doctrine of happiness, or the <i>matter</i> of law, are -absent, and that it has regard only to the <i>form</i> of universal -conformity to law.</p> - -<p class="tb"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_196">[p. 196]</span>* - * *</p> - -<p>If it is our duty to realise a state of public right, if at the -same time there are good grounds for hope that this ideal may be -realised, although only by an approximation advancing <i>ad infinitum</i>, -then perpetual peace, following hitherto falsely so-called -conclusions of peace, which have been in reality mere cessations of -hostilities, is no mere empty idea. But rather we have here a problem -which gradually works out its own solution and, as the periods in -which a given advance takes place towards the realisation of the -ideal of perpetual peace will, we hope, become with the passing -of time shorter and shorter, we must approach ever nearer to this -goal.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="chapter" id="Index"> - <h2 class="nobreak" title="INDEX"><span class="pagenum" - id="Page_197">[p. 197]</span>INDEX</h2> -</div> - - -<p class="ndx">A</p> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Absolutism; of Hobbes, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>of Schopenhauer, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>;</li> - <li>according to Kant, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>-<a href="#Page_128">128</a>;</li> - <li>to Locke, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Alexander I. of Russia; <a href="#Page_80">80</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Alexander the Great; <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Alsace-Lorraine; annexation of, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Ambrose, Saint; <a href="#Page_15">15</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Amphictyonic League; <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Aquinas, Thomas; on fighting clergy, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>on war, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Arbitration; as a substitute for war, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>difficulties settled by, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>;</li> - <li>where it is useless, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Aristotle; on war, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>and rights of an enemy, <a href="#Page_8"><i>ib.</i></a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>;</li> - <li>on the relation between politics and ethics, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Assyrians; war among the, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Augustine, Saint; <a href="#Page_16">16</a>.</li> -</ul> - - -<p class="ndx">B</p> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Balance of power; <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Bentham, Jeremy; <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Bluntschli, J. K.; <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>.</li> -</ul> - - -<p class="ndx">C</p> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Caird, Edward; <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Calvin, John; <a href="#Page_19">19</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Carnegie, Andrew; <a href="#Page_100">100</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>China; a danger to Europe, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li><span class="pagenum" id="Page_198">[p. 198]</span>Cicero; on the conduct of war, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Clement of Alexandria; <a href="#Page_15">15</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Clergy, fighting; Origen on, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>Wycliffe, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>;</li> - <li>Erasmus, <a href="#Page_18"><i>ib.</i></a>;</li> - <li>Aquinas, <a href="#Page_18"><i>ib.</i></a></li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Cobden, Richard; <a href="#Page_64">64</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Corvinus, Matthias; <a href="#Page_109">109</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Cowper, William; <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Crusades, wars of the; <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>.</li> -</ul> - - -<p class="ndx">D</p> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Dante, Alighieri; on mediation, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>on universal monarchy, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Disarmament; <a href="#Page_88">88</a>-<a href="#Page_93">93</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>Czar’s proposal of, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>;</li> - <li>practicability of, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>-<a href="#Page_93">93</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Dubois, Cardinal; <a href="#Page_36">36</a>.</li> -</ul> - - -<p class="ndx">E</p> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Empire; of Rome, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>world-, spiritual, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>;</li> - <li>of Alexander the Great, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>;</li> - <li>Frankish, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>;</li> - <li>Holy Roman <a href="#Page_69">69</a>;</li> - <li>of Napoleon I., <a href="#Page_69">69</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Erasmus, Desiderius; and European peace, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>on war, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>;</li> - <li>on fighting clergy, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - - -<p class="ndx">F</p> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Farrar, J. A.; <a href="#Page_18">18</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Federation; Kant’s idea of, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>-<a href="#Page_137">137</a>; <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>probable results of, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Fichte, J. G.; <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Finland; <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Fischer, Kuno; <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Fleury, Cardinal; <a href="#Page_55">55</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Frederick the Great; <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>.</li> -</ul> - - -<p class="ndx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_199">[p. 199]</span>G</p> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Gentilis, Albericus; <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Golden Age; <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Government; origin of, according to Plato, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>according to Hume, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</li> - <li>to Cowper, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;</li> - <li>to Hobbes, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>-<a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>;</li> - <li>to Kant, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>-<a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>-<a href="#Page_154">154</a>;</li> - <li>to Rousseau, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</li> - <li>to Locke, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>;</li> - <li>representative, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>-<a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>-<a href="#Page_128">128</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Greeks; their attitude to other nations, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>to an enemy, <a href="#Page_7"><i>ib.</i></a>;</li> - <li>their Sacred Wars, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>;</li> - <li>the Amphictyonic League, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Grotius, Hugo; his <i>De Jure Belli et Pacis</i>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>-<a href="#Page_27">27</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>and the <i>Jus Gentium</i>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>;</li> - <li>and the Law of Nature, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>;</li> - <li>on peace, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - - -<p class="ndx">H</p> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Hague Conference (1899); <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Hegel, G. W. F.; <a href="#Page_57">57</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>on war, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Henry IV. of France; <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Hobbes, Thomas; his theory of the state of nature and origin of government, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>-<a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>; <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>his influence on Kant, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>;</li> - <li>his views on revolution, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>;</li> - <li>of the relations between states, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>-<a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>;</li> - <li>on the conduct of war, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Holls, Fred. W.; <a href="#Page_86">86</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Hooker, Richard; <a href="#Page_52">52</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>on the depravity of man, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Hume, David; on the origin of government, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>on the state of nature, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>;</li> - <li>on the original contract, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - - -<p class="ndx">I</p> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>International Law; the development of, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>-<a href="#Page_24">24</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>its connection with the Reformation, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>;</li> - <li>in Greece and Rome, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Intervention; <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>.</li> -</ul> - - -<p class="ndx">J</p> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Jews; war among the, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>-<a href="#Page_11">11</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>their dream of peace, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Justin; <a href="#Page_15">15</a>.</li> -</ul> - - -<p class="ndx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_200">[p. 200]</span>K</p> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Kant, Immanuel; <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>his indebtedness to earlier political writers, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>;</li> - <li>his theory of human development, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>-<a href="#Page_49">49</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>and how this is possible, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>-<a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>;</li> - </ul></li> - <li>on the foundation of the state, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>-<a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>-<a href="#Page_154">154</a>;</li> - <li>the relations between states and individuals, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>-<a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>;</li> - <li>the necessity for reform within the state, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>;</li> - <li>the political and social conditions of his time, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>-<a href="#Page_59">59</a>;</li> - <li>his attitude to war, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>-<a href="#Page_151">151</a>;</li> - <li>on the growing power of commerce, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>;</li> - <li>his idea of federation, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>-<a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>and ideal of perpetual peace, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>;</li> - </ul></li> - <li>the conditions of its realization, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>-<a href="#Page_69">69</a>;</li> - <li>on representative and other constitutions, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>-<a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>-<a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>;</li> - <li>his opinion of the English constitution, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>;</li> - <li>his disapproval of universal monarchy, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>; <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>;</li> - <li>on the right of way, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>-<a href="#Page_142">142</a>;</li> - <li>on nature’s guarantee of a perpetual peace, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>-<a href="#Page_157">157</a>;</li> - <li>on the relation between politics and morals, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>-<a href="#Page_196">196</a>;</li> - <li>on revolution, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>-<a href="#Page_188">188</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - - -<p class="ndx">L</p> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Laveleye, Émile de; <a href="#Page_81">81</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Lawrence, T. J.; <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Leibniz, Gottfried W.; <a href="#Page_36">36</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>his criticism of St. Pierre, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Locke, John; and the golden age, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>on the original contract, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>;</li> - <li>on revolution, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>; <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Lorimer, James; <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Louis Philippe; <a href="#Page_76">76</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Luther, Martin; on war, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>.</li> -</ul> - - -<p class="ndx">M</p> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Machiavelli, Nicolo; <a href="#Page_162">162</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Maine, Henry; on Grotius and the <i>Jus Gentium</i>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Maistre, Joseph de; <a href="#Page_71">71</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Martineau, James; <a href="#Page_102">102</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Mennonites; and war, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li><span class="pagenum" id="Page_201">[p. 201]</span>Military service; of Christians, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>compulsory, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>;</li> - <li>voluntary, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Mill, John Stuart; <a href="#Page_80">80</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Moltke, Graf von; <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>-<a href="#Page_75">75</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Monarchy, universal; the ideal of Dante, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>disapproved by Kant, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>;</li> - <li>and Fichte, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Montesquieu, Baron de; on self-preservation, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>on armed peace, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>More, Thomas; <a href="#Page_32">32</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Morley, John; <a href="#Page_3">3</a>.</li> -</ul> - - -<p class="ndx">N</p> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Napoleon Bonaparte; Empire of, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Napoleon, Louis; <a href="#Page_80">80</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>National Debt; <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>.</li> -</ul> - - -<p class="ndx">O</p> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Origen; on military service, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Original Contract; <a href="#Page_40">40</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>as understood by Rousseau, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</li> - <li>by Hobbes, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>;</li> - <li>by Hooker, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</li> - <li>by Hume, <a href="#Page_52"><i>ib.</i></a>;</li> - <li>by Kant, <a href="#Page_52"><i>ib.</i></a>;</li> - <li>by Locke, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - - -<p class="ndx">P</p> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Paris Congress (1856); <a href="#Page_86">86</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Paulsen, Friedrich; <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Peace, perpetual; the dream of, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>-<a href="#Page_33">33</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>projects of, by Penn, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>;</li> - <li>by Henry IV., <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>;</li> - <li>by St. Pierre, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>-<a href="#Page_37">37</a>;</li> - <li>Rousseau’s attitude to, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>-<a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>;</li> - <li>for Kant an ideal, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>;</li> - <li>the articles of, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>-<a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>-<a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>-<a href="#Page_160">160</a>;</li> - <li>the guarantee of, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>-<a href="#Page_157">157</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Peace Societies; <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>and disarmament, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Penn, William; <a href="#Page_30">30</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Plato; on the origin of the state, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>on war, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>;</li> - <li>on the relation between ethics and politics, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Poland; <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li><span class="pagenum" id="Page_202">[p. 202]</span>Politics; and morals, according to Kant, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>-<a href="#Page_196">196</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>to Plato, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>;</li> - <li>to Aristotle, <a href="#Page_162"><i>ib.</i></a>;</li> - <li>to Hume, <a href="#Page_162"><i>ib.</i></a>;</li> - <li>sophistical maxims of, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>-<a href="#Page_172">172</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Pope, Alexander; <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Puffendorf, Samuel; <a href="#Page_27">27</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>on intervention, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - - -<p class="ndx">Q</p> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Quakers; and war, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>.</li> -</ul> - - -<p class="ndx">R</p> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Reformation; and military service, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>and international law, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Religion; Roman, and war, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>Jewish, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>-<a href="#Page_11">11</a>;</li> - <li>Mohammedan, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>;</li> - <li>Buddhist, and conversion, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>;</li> - <li>Christian, and war, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>-<a href="#Page_20">20</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Revolution, right of; according to Hobbes, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>and Spinoza, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>;</li> - <li>according to Locke, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>;</li> - <li>to Rousseau, <a href="#Page_53"><i>ib.</i></a>;</li> - <li>to Kant, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>-<a href="#Page_188">188</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Right of way; Vattel on, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>Kant on, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>-<a href="#Page_142">142</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Ritchie, D. G.; on Rousseau, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>on Locke and the golden age, <a href="#Page_3"><i>ib.</i></a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Robertson, William; <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Romans; and war, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>and international law, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Rousseau, J. J.; and the state of nature, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>; <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>his criticism of St. Pierre, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>-<a href="#Page_40">40</a>;</li> - <li>his views on militarism, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>;</li> - <li>on the original contract, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</li> - <li>on revolution, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>; <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>;</li> - <li>on democratic and republican governments, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>;</li> - <li>on the depravity of man, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Russia; Alexander I. of, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>the Czar of, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>;</li> - <li>the backward civilization of, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - - -<p class="ndx">S</p> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Schiller, Friedrich von; on war and peace, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Schopenhauer, Arthur; <a href="#Page_43">43</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Spencer, Herbert; <a href="#Page_76">76</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Spinoza, Benedict; on the state of nature, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>and revolution, <a href="#Page_41"><i>ib.</i></a></li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Standing armies; <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li><span class="pagenum" id="Page_203">[p. 203]</span>State of nature; according to Rousseau, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>and the golden age, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>;</li> - <li>Hobbes’ theory of, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>;</li> - <li>according to Hume a philosophical fiction, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>;</li> - <li>according to Kant, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>-<a href="#Page_120">120</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>States; transference of, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>marriage between, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>St. Pierre, Castel de; <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>his <i>Projet</i>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>-<a href="#Page_37">37</a>;</li> - <li>and Leibniz, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;</li> - <li>and Rousseau, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>-<a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Sully, Duke of; <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>.</li> -</ul> - - -<p class="ndx">T</p> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Tennyson, Lord; <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Tertullian; <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Treaties of peace; in Greece, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Treitschke, H. von; <a href="#Page_75">75</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Trendelenburg, F. A.; <a href="#Page_75">75</a>.</li> -</ul> - - -<p class="ndx">V</p> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Vattel, Emerich; his <i>Droit des Gens</i>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>on intervention, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>;</li> - <li>on the right of way, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>;</li> - <li>of self-preservation, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>;</li> - <li>on treaties, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>; <a href="#Page_131">131</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Voltaire, François de; <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>.</li> -</ul> - - -<p class="ndx">W</p> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>War; religious, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>; - <ul class="IX"> - <li>private, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>;</li> - <li>dynastic, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>;</li> - <li>Kant’s attitude to, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>-<a href="#Page_151">151</a>;</li> - <li>its influence on progress, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>;</li> - <li>views of Hegel on, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>;</li> - <li>of Schiller, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>;</li> - <li>of Moltke, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>;</li> - <li>under altered conditions, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>;</li> - <li>when just, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>;</li> - <li>future probable causes of, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>;</li> - <li>honorable conduct of, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>.</li> - </ul></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Wycliffe, John; and fighting clergy, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>.</li> -</ul> - - -<p class="ndx">Z</p> - -<ul class="IX"> -<li>Zwingli, Huldreich, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>.</li> -</ul> - - - -<div class="aftit"> - <hr class="chap" /> - <p class="pi"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_204">[p. 204]</span><i>Printed - in Great Britain by</i><br /> - <small>UNWIN BROTHERS, LIMITED<br /> - WOKING AND LONDON</small></p> - <hr class="chap" /> -</div> - - - -<div class="footnotes"> - -<p class="xl centra">FOOTNOTES</p> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_1"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_1">[1]</a></span> Cf. his <i>Studies in Political and -Social Ethics</i>, pp. 169, 170.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_2"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_2">[2]</a></span> For the inconsistency between the -views expressed by Rousseau on this subject in the <i>Discourses</i> -and in the <i>Contrat Social</i> (Cf. I. Chs. VI., VIII.) see Ritchie’s -<i>Natural Right</i>, Ch. III., pp. 48, 49; Caird’s essay on Rousseau in -his <i>Essays on Literature and Philosophy</i>, Vol. I.; and Morley’s -<i>Rousseau</i>, Vol. I., Ch. V.; Vol. II., Ch. XII.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_3"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_3">[3]</a></span> The theory that the golden age was -identical with the state of nature, Professor D. G. Ritchie ascribes -to Locke (see <i>Natural Right</i>, Ch. II., p. 42). Locke, he says, “has -an idea of a golden age” existing even after government has come into -existence—a time when people did not need “to examine the original -and rights of government.” [<i>Civil Government</i>, II., § 111.] A little -confusion on the part of his readers (perhaps in his own mind) makes -it possible to regard the state of nature as itself the golden age, -and the way is prepared for the favourite theory of the eighteenth -century:—</p> - -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<p class="i0">“Nor think in nature’s state they blindly trod;</p> -<p class="i0">The state of nature was the reign of God:</p> -<p class="i0">Self-love and social at her birth began,</p> -<p class="i0">Union the bond of all things and of man.</p> -<p class="i0">Pride then was not, nor arts that pride to aid;</p> -<p class="i0">Man walk’d with beast, joint tenant of the shade;</p> -<p class="i0">The same his table, and the same his bed;</p> -<p class="i0">No murder cloath’d him, and no murder fed.”</p> -</div> -<p class="dr">[<i>Essay on Man</i>, III., 147 <i>seq.</i>]</p> -</div> - -<p class="ti1">In these lines of Pope’s the state of nature is -identified with the golden age of the Greek and Latin poets; and -“the reign of God” is an equivalent for Locke’s words, “has a law of -nature to govern it.”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_4"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_4">[4]</a></span> Cf. <i>Republic</i>, II. 369. “A state,” -says Socrates, “arises out of the needs of mankind: no one is -self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants.”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_5"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_5">[5]</a></span> See Hume’s account of the origin -of government (<i>Treatise</i>, III., Part II., Sect. VIII.). There -are, he says, American tribes “where men live in concord and amity -among themselves without any established government; and never pay -submission to any of their fellows, except in time of war, when -their captain enjoys a shadow of authority, which he loses after -their return from the field, and the establishment of peace with the -neighbouring tribes. This authority, however, instructs them in the -advantages of government, and teaches them to have recourse to it, -when either by the pillage of war, by commerce, or by any fortuitous -inventions, their riches and possessions have become so considerable -as to make them forget, on every emergence, the interest they have -in the preservation of peace and justice.... Camps are the true -mothers of cities; and as war cannot be administered, by reason of -the suddenness of every exigency, without some authority in a single -person, the same kind of authority naturally takes place in that -civil government, which succeeds the military.”</p> - -<p class="ti1">Cf. Cowper: <i>The Winter Morning Walk</i>:—</p> - -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<p class="i0">“<span class="g4">...........</span>and ere long,</p> -<p class="i0">When man was multiplied and spread abroad</p> -<p class="i0">In tribes and clans, and had begun to call</p> -<p class="i0">These meadows and that range of hills his own,</p> -<p class="i0">The tasted sweets of property begat</p> -<p class="i0">Desire of more;<span class="g4"> .........</span></p> -<p class="i0"><span class="g4">...............</span></p> -<p class="i0">Thus wars began on earth. These fought for spoil,</p> -<p class="i0">And those in self-defence. Savage at first</p> -<p class="i0">The onset, and irregular. At length</p> -<p class="i0">One eminent above the rest, for strength,</p> -<p class="i0">For stratagem, or courage, or for all,</p> -<p class="i0">Was chosen leader. Him they served in war,</p> -<p class="i0">And him in peace for sake of warlike deeds</p> -<p class="i0">Rev’renced no less<span class="g4">.........</span></p> -<p class="i0"><span class="g4">...............</span></p> -<p class="i0">Thus kings were first invented.”</p> -</div></div> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_6"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_6">[6]</a></span> “Among uncivilised nations, there -is but one profession honourable, that of arms. All the ingenuity and -vigour of the human mind are exerted in acquiring military skill or -address.” Cf. Robertson’s <i>History of Charles V.</i>, (<i>Works</i>, 1813, -vol. V.) Sect. I. vii.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_7"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_7">[7]</a></span> Similarly we find that the original -meaning of the Latin word “<i>hostis</i>” was “a stranger.”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_8"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_8">[8]</a></span> In Aristotle we find the high-water -mark of Greek thinking on this subject. “The object of military -training,” says he, (<i>Politics</i>, Bk. IV. Ch. XIV., Welldon’s -translation—in older editions Bk. VII.) “should be not to enslave -persons who do not deserve slavery, but firstly to secure ourselves -against becoming the slaves of others; secondly, to seek imperial -power not with a view to a universal despotic authority, but for -the benefit of the subjects whom we rule, and thirdly, to exercise -despotic power over those who are deserving to be slaves. That -the legislator should rather make it his object so to order his -legislation upon military and other matters as to promote leisure -and peace is a theory borne out by the facts of history.” ... (<i>loc. -cit.</i> Ch. XV.). “War, as we have remarked several times, has its end -in peace.”</p> - -<p class="ti1">Aristotle strongly condemns the Lacedæmonians and -Cretans for regarding war and conquest as the sole ends to which all -law and education should be directed. Also in non-Greek tribes like -the Scythians, Persians, Thracians and Celts he says, only military -power is admired by the people and encouraged by the state. “There -was formerly too a law in Macedonia that any one who had never slain -an enemy should wear the halter about his neck.” Among the Iberians -too, a military people, “it is the custom to set around the tomb of -a deceased warrior a number of obelisks corresponding to the number -of enemies he has killed.... Yet ... it may well appear to be a -startling paradox that it should be the function of a Statesman to -succeed in devising the means of rule and mastery over neighbouring -peoples whether with or against their own will. How can such action -be worthy of a statesman or legislator, when it has not even the -sanction of law?” (<i>op. cit.</i>, IV. Ch. 2.)</p> - -<p class="ti1">We see that Aristotle disapproves of a glorification -of war for its own sake, and regards it as justifiable only in -certain circumstances. Methods of warfare adopted and proved in the -East would not have been possible in Greece. An act of treachery, for -example, such as that of Jael, (<i>Judges</i> IV. 17) which was extolled -in songs of praise by the Jews, (<i>loc. cit.</i> V. 24) the Greek -people would have been inclined to repudiate. The stories of Roman -history, the behaviour of Fabricius, for instance, or Regulus and -the honourable conduct of prisoners on various occasions released on -parole, show that this consciousness of certain principles of honour -in warfare was still more highly developed in Rome.</p> - -<p class="ti1">Socrates in the <i>Republic</i> (V. 469, 470) gives -expression to a feeling which was gradually gaining ground in Greece, -that war between Hellenic tribes was much more serious than war -between Greeks and barbarians. In such civil warfare, he considered, -the defeated ought not to be reduced to slavery, nor the slain -despoiled, nor Hellenic territory devastated. For any difference -between Greek and Greek is to “be regarded by them as discord only—a -quarrel among friends, which is not to be called war”.... “Our -citizens [<i>i.e.</i> in the ideal republic] should thus deal with their -Hellenic enemies; and with barbarians as the Hellenes now deal with -one another.” (V. 471.)</p> - -<p class="ti1">The views of Plato and Aristotle on this and other -questions were in advance of the custom and practice of their -time.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_9"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_9">[9]</a></span> “The Lord is a man of war,” said -Moses (<i>Exodus</i> XV. 3). Cf. <i>Psalms</i> XXIV. 8. He is “mighty in -battle.”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_10"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_10">[10]</a></span> This was bound up with the very -essence of Islam; the devout Mussulman could suffer the existence of -no unbeliever. Tolerance or indifference was an attitude which his -faith made impossible. “When ye encounter the unbelievers,” quoth the -prophet (<i>Koran</i>, ch. 47), “strike off their heads, until ye have -made a great slaughter among them.... Verily if God pleased he could -take vengeance on them without your assistance; but he commandeth you -to fight his battles.”</p> - -<p class="ti1">The propagation of the faith by the sword was not only -commanded by the Mohammedan religion: it was that religion itself.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_11"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_11">[11]</a></span> See <i>Acts</i> X. 28:—“Ye know that -it is an unlawful thing for a man that is a Jew to keep company, or -come unto one of another nation.”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_12"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_12">[12]</a></span> Neither, however, is there any -which regards the soldier as a murderer.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_13"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_13">[13]</a></span> In the early centuries of our era -Christians seem to have occasionally refused to serve in the army -from religious scruples. But soldiers were not always required to -change their profession after baptism. And in <i>Acts</i> X., for example, -nothing is said to indicate that the centurion, Cornelius, would have -to leave the Roman army. See Tertullian: <i>De Corona</i> (Anti-Nicene -Christian Library), p. 348.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_14"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_14">[14]</a></span> There were so-called “Sacred -Wars” in Greece, but these were due mainly to disputes caused by the -Amphictyonic League. They were not religious, in the sense in which -we apply the epithet to the Thirty Years’ war.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_15"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_15">[15]</a></span> “The administration of justice -among rude illiterate people, was not so accurate, or decisive, or -uniform, as to induce men to submit implicitly to its determinations. -Every offended baron buckled on his armour, and sought redress at -the head of his vassals. His adversary met him in like hostile -array. Neither of them appealed to impotent laws which could afford -them no protection. Neither of them would submit points, in which -their honour and their passions were warmly interested, to the slow -determination of a judicial inquiry. Both trusted to their swords for -the decision of the contest.” Robertson’s <i>History of Charles V.</i>, -(<i>Works</i>, vol. V.) Sect. I., p. 38.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_16"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_16">[16]</a></span> Erasmus in the “Ἰχθυοφαγία” -(<i>Colloquies</i>, Bailey’s ed., Vol. II., pp. 55, 56) puts forward the -suggestion that a general peace might be obtained in the Christian -world, if the Emperor would remit something of his right and the Pope -some part of his.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_17"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_17">[17]</a></span> Cf. Robertson, <i>op. cit.</i>, Sect. -III., p. 106, <i>seq.</i></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_18"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_18">[18]</a></span> Robertson (<i>op. cit.</i>, Note -XXI., p. 483) quotes the following statement: “flamma, ferro, caede, -possessiones ecclesiarum praelati defendebant.” (Guido Abbas ap. Du -Cange, p. 179.)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_19"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_19">[19]</a></span> J. A. Farrar, in a pamphlet, -(reprinted from the <i>Gentleman’s Magazine</i>, vol. 257, 1884) on <i>War -and Christianity</i>, quotes the following passage from Wycliffe in -which he protests against this blot upon the Church and Christian -professions.—“Friars now say that bishops can fight best of all men, -and that it falleth most properly to them, since they are lords of -all this world. They say Christ bade His disciples sell their coats, -and buy them swords; but whereto, if not to fight? Thus friars make a -great array, and stir up many men to fight. But Christ taught not His -apostles to fight with a sword of iron, but with the sword of God’s -Word, and which standeth in meekness of heart and in the prudence of -man’s tongue.... If man-slaying in others be odious to God, much more -in priests, who should be vicars of Christ.” See also the passage -where Erasmus points out that King David was not permitted to build -a temple to God, because he was a man of blood. “Nolo clericos ullo -sanguine contaminari. Gravis impietas!” (<i>Opera</i>, IX., 370 B.)</p> - -<p class="ti1">This question had already been considered by Thomas -Aquinas, who decided that the clergy ought not to be allowed -to fight, because the practices of warfare, although right and -meritorious in themselves, were not in accordance with a holy -calling. (<i>Summa</i>, II. 2: Qu. 40.)</p> - -<p class="ti1">Aquinas held that war—excluding private war—is -justifiable in a just cause. So too did Luther, (cf. his pamphlet: -<i>Ob Kriegsleute auch in seligem Stande sein können?</i>) Calvin and -Zwingli, the last of whom died sword in hand.</p> - -<p class="ti1">With regard to the question of a fighting clergy, -the passage quoted from Origen (pp. 14, 15, above) has considerable -interest, Origen looks upon the active participation of priests in -warfare as something which everyone would admit to be impossible.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_20"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_20">[20]</a></span> See also the <i>Querela Pacis</i>, -630 B., (<i>Opera</i>, IV.):—“Whosoever preaches Christ, preaches peace.” -Erasmus even goes the length of saying that the most iniquitous peace -is better than the most just war (<i>op. cit.</i>, 636 C).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_21"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_21">[21]</a></span> Cf. Robertson, <i>op. cit.</i>, Note -XXI. p. 483 and Sect. I., p. 39.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_22"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_22">[22]</a></span> It is uncertain in what year the -<i>De Jure Belli</i> of Gentilis was published—a work to which Grotius -acknowledges considerable indebtedness. Whewell, in the preface to -his translation of Grotius, gives the date 1598, but some writers -suppose it to have been ten years earlier.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_23"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_23">[23]</a></span> This came about in two ways. The -Church of Rome discouraged the growth of national sentiment. At the -Reformation the independence and unity of the different nations were -for the first time recognised. That is to say, the Reformation laid -the foundation for a science of international law. But, from another -point of view, it not only made such a code of rules possible, it -made it necessary. The effect of the Reformation was not to diminish -the number of wars in which religious belief could play a part. -Moreover, it displaced the Pope from his former position as arbiter -in Europe without setting up any judicial tribunal in his stead.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_24"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_24">[24]</a></span> Cf. Cicero: <i>De Officiis</i>, I. -xi. “Belli quidem aequitas sanctissime feciali populi Romani jure -perscripta est.” (See the reference to Lawrence’s comments on this -subject, p. 9 above.)</p> - -<p class="ti1">“Wars,” says Cicero, “are to be undertaken for this -end, that we may live in peace without being injured; but when we -obtain the victory, we must preserve those enemies who behaved -without cruelty or inhumanity during the war: for example, our -forefathers received, even as members of their state, the Tuscans, -the Æqui, the Volscians, the Sabines and the Hernici, but utterly -destroyed Carthage and Numantia.... And, while we are bound to -exercise consideration toward those whom we have conquered by force, -so those should be received into our protection who throw themselves -upon the honour of our general, and lay down their arms,” (<i>op. -cit.</i>, I. xi., Bohn’s Translation).... “In engaging in war we ought -to make it appear that we have no other view but peace.” (<i>op. cit.</i>, -I. xxiii.)</p> - -<p class="ti1">In fulfilling a treaty we must not sacrifice the -spirit to the letter (<i>De Officiis</i>, I. x). “There are also rights -of war, and the faith of an oath is often to be kept with an enemy.” -(<i>op. cit.</i>, III. xxix.)</p> - -<p class="ti1">This is the first statement by a classical writer in -which the idea of justice being due to an enemy appears. Cicero goes -further. Particular states, he says, (<i>De Legibus</i>, I. i.) are only -members of a whole governed by reason.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_25"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_25">[25]</a></span> The saying is attributed to -Pompey:—“Shall I, when I am preparing for war, think of the laws?”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_26"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_26">[26]</a></span> This implied, however, the idea -of a united Christendom as against the infidel, with which we may -compare the idea of a united Hellas against Persia. In such things -we have the germ not only of international law, but of the ideal of -federation.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_27"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_27">[27]</a></span> See Maine’s <i>Ancient Law</i>, pp. -50-53: pp. 96-101. Grotius wrongly understood “Jus Gentium,” (“a -collection of rules and principles, determined by observation to be -common to the institutions which prevailed among the various Italian -tribes”) to mean “Jus <i>inter</i> gentes.” The Roman expression for -International Law was not “Jus Gentium,” but “Jus Feciale.”</p> - -<p class="ti1">“Having adopted from the Antonine jurisconsults,” says -Maine, “the position that the Jus Gentium and the Jus Naturæ were -identical, Grotius, with his immediate predecessors and his immediate -successors, attributed to the Law of Nature an authority which -would never perhaps have been claimed for it, if “Law of Nations” -had not in that age been an ambiguous expression. They laid down -unreservedly that Natural Law is the code of states, and thus put in -operation a process which has continued almost down to our own day, -the process of engrafting on the international system rules which are -supposed to have been evolved from the unassisted contemplation of -the conception of Nature. There is, too, one consequence of immense -practical importance to mankind which, though not unknown during the -early modern history of Europe, was never clearly or universally -acknowledged till the doctrines of the Grotian school had prevailed. -If the society of nations is governed by Natural Law, the atoms -which compose it must be absolutely equal. Men under the sceptre -of Nature are all equal, and accordingly commonwealths are equal -if the international state be one of nature. The proposition that -independent communities, however different in size and power, are -all equal in the view of the Law of Nations, has largely contributed -to the happiness of mankind, though it is constantly threatened by -the political tendencies of each successive age. It is a doctrine -which probably would never have obtained a secure footing at all if -International Law had not been entirely derived from the majestic -claims of Nature by the Publicists who wrote after the revival of -letters.” (<i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 100.)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_28"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_28">[28]</a></span> The name “International Law” was -first given to the law of nations by Bentham. (<i>Principles of Morals -and Legislation, XIX.</i> § xxv.)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_29"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_29">[29]</a></span> In the Peace of Westphalia, 1648, -the balance of power in Europe was recognised on the basis of terms -such as these.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_30"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_30">[30]</a></span> Grotius, however, is a -painstaking student of Scripture, and is willing to say something -in favour of peace—not a permanent peace, that is to say, the idea -of which would scarcely be likely to occur to anyone in the early -years of the seventeenth century—but a plea for fewer, shorter wars. -“If therefore,” he says, “a peace sufficiently safe can be had, it -is not ill secured by the condonation of offenses, and damages, and -expenses: especially among Christians, to whom the Lord has given his -peace as his legacy. And so St. Paul, his best interpreter, exhorts -us to live at peace with all men.... May God write these lessons—He -who alone can—on the hearts of all those who have the affairs of -Christendom in their hands.” (<i>De Jure Belli et Pacis</i>, III. Ch. -XXV., Whewell’s translation.)</p> - -<p class="ti1">See also <i>op. cit.</i>, II., Ch. XXIII., Sect. VIII., -where Grotius recommends that Congresses of Christian Powers should -be held with a view to the peaceful settlement of international -differences.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_31"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_31">[31]</a></span> Puffendorf’s best known work, <i>De -Jure Naturæ et Gentium</i>, was published in 1672.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_32"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_32">[32]</a></span> <i>Le Droit des Gens</i> was published -in 1758 and translated into English by Joseph Chitty in 1797, (2nd -ed., 1834).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_33"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_33">[33]</a></span> <i>Mémoires ou Œconomies Royales -D’Estat, Domestiques, Politiques et Militaires de Henri le Grand, par -Maximilian de Bethune, Duc de Sully.</i></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_34"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_34">[34]</a></span> See <i>International Tribunals</i> -(1899), p. 20 <i>seq.</i> Penn’s <i>Essay towards the Present and Future -Peace of Europe</i> was written about 1693, but is not included in all -editions of his works.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_35"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_35">[35]</a></span> <i>Projet de traité pour rendre -la paix perpétuelle entre les souverains chrétiens.</i> The first two -volumes of this work were published in 1713 (trans. London, 1714); a -third volume followed in 1717.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_36"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_36">[36]</a></span> The main articles of this and -other peace projects are to be found in <i>International Tribunals</i>, -published by the Peace Society.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_37"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_37">[37]</a></span> Professor Lorimer points out -that Prussia, then the Duchy of Brandenburg, is not mentioned. -(<i>Institutes of the Law of Nations</i>, II. Ch. VII., p. 219.)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_38"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_38">[38]</a></span> The same objection was raised -by Leibniz (see his <i>Observations</i> on St. Pierre’s <i>Projet</i>) to the -scheme of Henry IV., who, says Leibniz, thought more of overthrowing -the house of Austria than of establishing a society of sovereigns.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_39"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_39">[39]</a></span> <i>Project</i>, Art. VI., Eng. trans. -(1714), p. 119.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_40"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_40">[40]</a></span> St. Pierre was not blind to -this aspect of the question. Among the critical objections which -he anticipates to his plan is this,—that it promises too great an -increase of strength to the house of France, and that therefore the -author would have been wiser to conceal his nationality.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_41"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_41">[41]</a></span> St. Pierre, in what may be called -an apology for the wording of the title of his book (above, <a -href="#Footnote_35">p. 32, <i>note</i></a>), justifies his confidence in -these words:—“The Pilot who himself seems uncertain of the Success of -his Voyage is not likely to persuade the Passenger to embark.... I am -persuaded, that it is not impossible to find out Means sufficient and -practicable to settle an Everlasting Peace among Christians; and even -believe, that the Means which I have thought of are of that Nature.” -(Preface to <i>Project</i>, Eng. trans., 1714.)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_42"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_42">[42]</a></span> <i>Leviathan</i>, I. Ch. V.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_43"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_43">[43]</a></span> See too Voltaire’s allusion to -St. Pierre in his <i>Dictionary</i>, under “Religion.”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_44"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_44">[44]</a></span> Leibniz regarded the project -of St. Pierre with an indifference, somewhat tinged with contempt. -In a letter to Grimarest, (<i>Leibnit. Opera</i>, Dutens’ ed., 1768, -Vol. V., pp. 65, 66: in <i>Epist.</i>, ed. Kortholt., Vol. III., p. -327) he writes:—“I have seen something of M. de St. Pierre’s plan -for maintaining perpetual peace in Europe. It reminds me of an -inscription outside of a churchyard which ran, ‘<i>Pax Perpetua</i>. -For the dead, it is true, fight no more. But the living, are of -another mind, and the mightiest among them have little respect for -tribunals.’” This is followed by the ironical suggestion that a -court of arbitration should be established at Rome of which the Pope -should be made president; while at the same time the old spiritual -authority should be restored to the Church, and excommunication be -the punishment of non-compliance with the arbitral decree. “Such -plans,” he adds, “are as likely to succeed as that of M. de St. -Pierre. But as we are allowed to write novels, why should we find -fault with fiction which would bring back the golden age?” But see -also <i>Observations sur le Projet d’une Paix Perpétuelle de M. l’Abbé -de St. Pierre</i> (Dutens, V., esp. p. 56) and the letter to Remond de -Montmort (<i>ibid.</i> pp. 20, 21) where Leibniz considers this project -rather more seriously.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_45"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_45">[45]</a></span> “C’est un livre solide et sensé,” -says Rousseau (<i>Jugement sur la Paix Perpétuelle</i>), “et il est très -important qu’il existe.” [This <i>Jugement</i> is appended to Rousseau’s -<i>Extrait du Projet de Paix Perpétuelle de Monsieur l’Abbé de -Saint-Pierre</i>, 1761.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_46"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_46">[46]</a></span> Cf. Cowper: <i>The Winter Morning -Walk</i>:—</p> - -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<p class="i0">“Great princes have great playthings. Some have play’d</p> -<p class="i0">At hewing mountains into men, and some</p> -<p class="i0">At building human wonders mountain high.</p> -<p class="i0"><span class="g4">...............</span></p> -<p class="i0"><span class="g4">...............</span></p> -<p class="i0">Some seek diversion in the tented field,</p> -<p class="i0">And make the sorrows of mankind their sport.</p> -<p class="i0">But war’s a game, which, were their subjects wise,</p> -<p class="i0">Kings should not play at. Nations would do well</p> -<p class="i0">T’extort their truncheons from the puny hands</p> -<p class="i0">Of heroes, whose infirm and baby minds</p> -<p class="i0">Are gratified with mischief, and who spoil,</p> -<p class="i0">Because men suffer it, their toy the world.”</p> -</div></div> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_47"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_47">[47]</a></span> “Les troupes réglées, peste et -dépopulation de l’Europe, ne sont bonnes qu’a deux fins: ou pour -attaquer et conquérir les voisins, ou pour enchâiner et asservir les -citoyens.” (<i>Gouvernement de Pologne</i>, Ch. XII.)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_48"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_48">[48]</a></span> Hobbes realises clearly that -there probably never was such a state of war all over the world nor -a state of nature conforming to a common type. The case is parallel -to the use of the term “original contract” as an explanation of -the manner in which the civil state came to be formed. (Cf. p. 52, -<i>note</i>.)</p> - -<p class="ti1">See also Hume (<i>Inquiry concerning the Principles of -Morals,</i> Sect. III. Part I.). “This <i>poetical</i> fiction of the <i>golden -age</i> is, in some respects, of a piece with the <i>philosophical</i> -fiction of the <i>state of nature</i>; only that the former is represented -as the most charming and most peaceable condition, which can possibly -be imagined; whereas the latter is painted out as a state of mutual -war and violence, attended with the most extreme necessity.” This -fiction of a state of nature as a state of war, says Hume, (in a note -to this passage) is not the invention of Hobbes. Plato (<i>Republic</i>, -II. III. IV.) refutes a hypothesis very like it, and Cicero (<i>Pro -Sext.</i> l. 42) regards it as a fact universally acknowledged.</p> - -<p class="ti1">Cf. also Spinoza (<i>Tract. Pol.</i> c. ii. § 14): “Homines -ex natura hostes.” And (c. v. § 2): “Homines civiles non nascuntur -sed fiunt.” These expressions are to be understood, says Bluntschli -(<i>Theory of the State</i>, IV. Ch. vi., p. 284, <i>note</i> a), “rather as a -logical statement of what <i>would be</i> the condition of man apart from -civil society, than as distinctly implying a historical theory.”</p> - -<p class="ti1">While starting from the same premises, Spinoza -carries Hobbes’ political theories to their logical conclusion. If -we admit that right lies with might, then right is with the people -in any revolution successfully carried out. (But see Hobbes’ Preface -to the <i>Philosophical Rudiments</i> and Kant’s <i>Perpetual Peace</i>, p. -188, <i>note</i>.) Spinoza, in a letter, thus alludes to this point of -difference:—“As regards political theories, the difference which you -inquire about between Hobbes and myself, consists in this, that I -always preserve natural right intact, and only allot to the chief -magistrates in every state a right over their subjects commensurate -with the excess of their power over the power of the subjects. This -is what always takes place in the state of nature.” (Epistle 50, -<i>Works</i>, Bohn’s ed., Vol. II.)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_49"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_49">[49]</a></span> The italics are mine.—[Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_50"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_50">[50]</a></span> Professor Paulsen (<i>Immanuel -Kant</i>, 2nd ed., 1899, p. 359—Eng. trans., p. 353) points out that -pessimism and absolutism usually go together in the doctrines of -philosophers. He gives as instances Hobbes, Kant and Schopenhauer.</p> - -<p class="ti1">Hobbes (<i>On Dominion</i>, Ch. X. 3, <i>seq.</i>) regarded an -absolute monarchy as the only proper form of government, while in the -opinion of Locke, (<i>On Civil Government</i>, II. Ch. VII. §§ 90, 91) -it was no better than a state of nature. Kant would not have gone -quite so far. As a philosopher, he upheld the sovereignty of the -people and rejected a monarchy which was not governed in accordance -with republican principles; as a citizen, he denied the right of -resistance to authority. (Cf. <i>Perpetual Peace</i>, pp. 126, 188, -<i>note</i>.)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_51"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_51">[51]</a></span> We find the same rule laid down -as early as the time of Dante. Cf. <i>De Monarchia</i>, Bk. II. 9:—“When -two nations quarrel they are bound to try in every possible way to -arrange the quarrel by means of discussion: it is only when this is -hopeless that they may declare war.”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_52"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_52">[52]</a></span> Rousseau (<i>Contrat Social</i>: I. -vi.) regards the social contract as tacitly implied in every actual -society: its articles “are the same everywhere, and are everywhere -tacitly admitted and recognised, even though they may never have -found formal expression” in any constitution. In the same way he -speaks of a state of nature “which no longer exists, which perhaps -never has existed.” (Preface to the <i>Discourse on the Causes of -Inequality</i>.) But Rousseau’s interpretation of these terms is, on -the whole, literal in spite of these single passages. He speaks -throughout the <i>Contrat Social</i>, as if history could actually record -the signing and drawing up of such documents. Hobbes, Hooker, -(<i>Ecclesiastical Polity</i>, I. sect. 10—see also Ritchie: <i>Darwin and -Hegel</i>, p. 210 <i>seq.</i>) Hume and Kant use more careful language. “It -cannot be denied,” writes Hume, (<i>Of the Original Contract</i>) “that -all government is, at first, founded on a contract and that the most -ancient rude combinations of mankind were formed chiefly by that -principle. In vain are we asked in what records this charter of our -liberties is registered. It was not written on parchment, nor yet on -leaves or barks of trees. It preceded the use of writing and all the -other civilised arts of life. But we trace it plainly in the nature -of man, and in the equality, or something approaching equality, which -we find in all the individuals of that species.”</p> - -<p class="ti1">This fine passage expresses admirably the views of -Kant on this point. Cf. <i>Werke</i>, (Rosenkranz) IX. 160. The original -contract is merely an idea of reason, one of those ideas which we -think into things in order to explain them.</p> - -<p class="ti1">Hobbes does not professedly make the contract -historical, but in Locke’s <i>Civil Government</i> (II. Ch. VIII. § -102) there is some attempt made to give it a historical basis.—By -consent all were equal, “till by the same consent they set rulers -over themselves. So that their politic societies all began from a -voluntary union, and the mutual agreement of men freely acting in the -choice of their governors, and forms of government.”</p> - -<p class="ti1">Bluntschli points out (<i>Theory of the State</i>, IV. -ix., p. 294 and <i>note</i>) that the same theory of contract on which -Hobbes’ doctrine of an absolute government was based was made the -justification of violent resistance to the government at the time of -the French Revolution. The theory was differently applied by Hobbes, -Locke and Rousseau. According to the first, men leave the “state of -nature” when they surrender their rights to a sovereign, and return -to that state during revolution. But, for Rousseau, this sovereign -authority is the people: a revolution would be only a change of -ministry. (See <i>Cont. Soc.</i>, III. Ch. xviii.) Again Locke holds -revolution to be justifiable in all cases where the governments have -not fulfilled the trust reposed by the people in them. (Cf. Kant’s -<i>Perpetual Peace</i>, p. 188, <i>note</i>).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_53"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_53">[53]</a></span> “If you unite many men,” writes -Rousseau, (<i>Cont. Soc.</i>, IV. <span class="smcap">I.</span>) “and -consider them as one body, they will have but one will; and that will -must be to promote the common safety and general well-being of all.” -This <i>volonté générale</i>, the common element of all particular wills, -cannot be in conflict with any of them. (<i>Op. cit.</i>, II. iii.)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_54"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_54">[54]</a></span> In Eng. trans., see p. 348.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_55"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_55">[55]</a></span> See <a href="#Page_107">p. -107</a>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_56"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_56">[56]</a></span> See <a href="#Page_120">p. -120</a>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_57"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_57">[57]</a></span> Unlike Hegel whose ideal was the -Prussian state, as it was under Frederick the Great. An enthusiastic -supporter of the power of monarchy, he showed himself comparatively -indifferent to the progress of constitutional liberty.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_58"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_58">[58]</a></span> Isolated passages are sometimes -quoted from Kant in support of a theory that the present treatise -is at least half ironical<a id="FNanchor_A" href="#Footnote_A" -class="fnanchor">[A]</a> and that his views on the question of -perpetual peace did not essentially differ from those of Leibniz. -“Even war,” he says, (<i>Kritik d. Urteilskraft</i>, I. Book ii. § 28.) -“when conducted in an orderly way and with reverence for the rights -of citizens has something of the sublime about it, and the more -dangers a nation which wages war in this manner is exposed to and can -courageously overcome, the nobler does its character grow. While, on -the other hand, a prolonged peace usually has the effect of giving -free play to a purely commercial spirit, and side by side with this, -to an ignoble self-seeking, to cowardice and effeminacy; and the -result of this is generally a degradation of national character.”</p> - -<p class="ti1">This is certainly an admission that war which does -not violate the Law of Nations has a good side as well as a bad. -We could look for no less in so clear-sighted and unprejudiced a -thinker. Kant would have been the first to admit that under certain -conditions a nation can have no higher duty than to wage war. War -is necessary, but it is in contradiction to reason and the spirit -of right. The “scourge of mankind,” “making more bad men than it -takes away,” the “destroyer of every good,” Kant calls it elsewhere. -(<i>Theory of Ethics</i>, Abbott’s trans., 4th ed., p. 341, <i>note</i>.)</p> - -<p class="p1" id="Footnote_A"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_A">[A]</a></span> Cf. K. v. Stengel: <i>Der Ewige -Friede</i>, Munich, 1899; also Vaihinger: <i>Kantstudien</i>, Vol. IV., p. -58.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_59"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_59">[59]</a></span> Cf. <i>Idea for a Universal -History</i>, Prop. 8; <i>Perpetual Peace</i>, pp. 142, 157.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_60"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_60">[60]</a></span> The immediate stimulus to Kant’s -active interest in this subject as a practical question was the Peace -of Basle (1795) which ended the first stage in the series of wars -which followed the French Revolution.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_61"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_61">[61]</a></span> It is <i>eine unausführbare Idee</i>. -See the passage quoted from the <i>Rechtslehre</i>, p. 129, <i>note</i>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_62"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_62">[62]</a></span> <i>Geschichte der neueren -Philosophie</i>, (4th ed., 1899), Vol. V., I. Ch. 12, p. 168 <i>seq.</i></p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_63"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_63">[63]</a></span> See <a href="#Page_114">p. -114</a>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_64"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_64">[64]</a></span> See <a href="#Page_107">p. -107</a>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_65"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_65">[65]</a></span> See <a href="#Page_110">p. -110</a>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_66"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_66">[66]</a></span> See <a href="#Page_111">p. -111</a>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_67"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_67">[67]</a></span> See <a href="#Page_112">p. -112</a>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_68"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_68">[68]</a></span> See <a href="#Page_108">p. -108</a>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_69"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_69">[69]</a></span> A large part of Kant’s -requirements as they are expressed in these Preliminary Articles -has already been fulfilled. The first (Art. 1) is recognised in -theory at least by modern international law. More cannot be said. -A treaty of this kind is of necessity more or less forced by the -stronger on the weaker. The formal ratification of peace in 1871 -did not prevent France from longing for the day when she might win -back Alsace-Lorraine and be revenged on Prussia. Not the treaty nor -a consciousness of defeat has kept the peace west of the Rhine, but -a reluctant respect for the fortress of Metz and the mighty army of -united Germany.</p> - -<p class="ti1">Articles 2 and 6 are already commonplaces of -international law. Article 2 refers to practices which have not -survived the gradual disappearance of dynastic war. Art. 6 is the -basis of our modern law of war. Art. 3 has been fulfilled in the -literal sense that the standing armies composed of mercenary troops -to which Kant alludes exist no longer. But it is to be feared that -Kant would not think that we have made things much better, nor -regard our present system of progressive armaments as a step in the -direction of perpetual peace. Art. 4 is not likely to be fulfilled in -the near future. It is long since Cobden denounced the institution -of National Debts—an institution which, as Kant points out, owes its -origin to the English, the “commercial people” referred to in the -text. Art. 5 no doubt came to Kant through Vattel. “No nation,” says -the Swiss publicist, (<i>Law of Nations</i>, II. Ch. iv. § 54) “has the -least right to interfere with the government of another,” unless, he -adds, (Ch. v. § 70) in a case of anarchy or where the well-being of -the human race demands it. This is a recognised principle of modern -international law. Intervention is held to be justifiable only where -the obligation to respect another’s freedom of action comes into -conflict with the duty of self-preservation.</p> - -<p class="ti1">Puffendorf leaves much more room for the exercise of -benevolence. The natural affinity and kinship between men is, says -he, (<i>Les Devoirs de l’homme et du citoien</i>, II. Ch. xvi. § xi.) “a -sufficient reason to authorise us to take up defence of every person -whom one sees unjustly oppressed, when he implores our aid <i>and when -we can do it conveniently</i>.” (The italics are mine.—[Tr.])</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_70"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_70">[70]</a></span> See <a href="#Page_137">p. -137</a>. The main principle involved in this passage comes from -Vattel (<i>op. cit.</i>, II. Ch. viii. §§ 104, 105: Ch. ix. §§ 123, 125). -A sovereign, he says, cannot object to a stranger entering his state -who at the same time respects its laws. No one can be quite deprived -of the right of way which has been handed down from the time when the -whole earth was common to all men.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_71"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_71">[71]</a></span> See <a href="#Page_120">p. -120</a>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_72"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_72">[72]</a></span> Kant believed that, in the newly -formed constitution of the United States, his ideal with regard -to the external forms of the state as conforming to the spirit of -justice was most nearly realised. Professor Paulsen draws attention, -in the following passage, to the fact that Kant held the English -government of the eighteenth century in very low esteem. (<i>Kant</i>, -p. 357, <i>note</i>. See Eng. trans., p. 352, <i>note</i>.) It was not the -English state, he says, which furnished Kant with an illustration of -his theory:—“Rather in it he sees a form of despotism only slightly -veiled, not Parliamentary despotism, as some people have thought, but -monarchical despotism. Through bribery of the Commons and the Press, -the King had actually absolute power, as was evident, above all, from -the fact that he had often waged war without, and in defiance of, -the will of the people. Kant has a very unfavourable opinion of the -English state in every way. Among the collected notes written by him -in the last ten years of the century and published by Reicke (<i>Lose -Blätter</i>, I. 129) the following appears:—‘The English nation (<i>gens</i>) -regarded as a people (<i>populus</i>) and looked upon side by side with -other races is, as a collection of individuals, of all mankind the -most highly to be esteemed. But as a state, compared with other -states, it is the most destructive, high-handed and tyrannical, and -the most provocative of war among them all.’”</p> - -<p class="ti1">Kuno Fischer (<i>op. cit.</i>, Vol. V., I. Ch. 11, pp. 150, -151) to whom Professor Paulsen’s reference may here perhaps allude, -states that Kant’s objection to the English constitution is that it -was an oligarchy, Parliament being not only a legislative body, but -through its ministers also executive in the interests of the ruling -party or even of private individuals in that party. It seems more -likely that what most offended a keen observer of the course of the -American War of Independence was the arbitrary and ill-directed -power of the king. But see the passage quoted by Fischer (pp. 152, -153) from the <i>Rechtslehre</i> (Part II. Sect. I.) which is, he says, -unmistakeably directed against the English constitution and certain -temporary conditions in the political history of the country.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_73"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_73">[73]</a></span> St. Pierre actually thought that -his federation would prevent civil war. See <i>Project</i> (1714), p. -16.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_74"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_74">[74]</a></span> See <a href="#Page_128">p. -128</a>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_75"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_75">[75]</a></span> This was the ideal of Dante. Cf. -<i>De Monarchia</i>, Bk. I. 54:—“We shall not find at any time except -under the divine monarch Augustus, when a perfect monarchy existed, -that the world was everywhere quiet.”</p> - -<p class="ti1">Bluntschli (<i>Theory of the State</i>, I. Ch. ii., p. 26 -<i>seq.</i>) gives an admirable account of the different attempts made -to realise a universal empire in the past—the Empire of Alexander -the Great, based upon a plan of uniting the races of east and west; -the Roman Empire which sought vainly to stamp its national character -upon mankind; the Frankish Monarchy; the Holy Roman Empire which -fell to pieces through the want of a central power strong enough to -overcome the tendency to separation and nationalisation; and finally -the attempt of Napoleon I., whose mistake was the same as that -which wrecked the Roman Empire—a neglect of the strength of foreign -national sentiment.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_76"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_76">[76]</a></span> Reason requires a State of -nations. This is the ideal, and Kant’s proposal of a federation of -states is a practical substitute from which we may work to higher -things. Kant, like Fichte, (<i>Werke</i>, VII. 467) strongly disapproves -of a universal monarchy such as that of which Dante dreamed—a modern -Roman Empire. The force of necessity, he says, will bring nations at -last to become members of a cosmopolitan state, “or if such a state -of universal peace proves (as has often been the case with too great -states) a greater danger to freedom from another point of view, in -that it introduces despotism of the most terrible kind, then this -same necessity must compel the nations to enter a state which indeed -has the form not of a cosmopolitan commonwealth under one sovereign, -but of a federation regulated by legal principles determined by a -common code of international law.” (<i>Das mag in d. Theorie richtig -sein</i>, <i>Werke</i>, (Rosenkranz) VII., p. 225). Cf. also <i>Theory of -Ethics</i>, (Abbott), p. 341, <i>note</i>; <i>Perpetual Peace</i>, pp. 155, -156.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_77"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_77">[77]</a></span> See the <i>Philosophie d. Rechts</i>, -(<i>Werke</i>, Vol. VIII.) Part iii. § 324 and appendix.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_78"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_78">[78]</a></span> Cf. <i>Die Braut von Messina</i>:— -</p> - -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<p class="i0">“Denn der Mensch verkümmert im Frieden,</p> -<p class="i0">Müssige Ruh’ ist das Grab des Muths.</p> -<p class="i0">Das Gesetz ist der Freund des Schwachen,</p> -<p class="i0">Alles will es nur eben machen,</p> -<p class="i0">Möchte gerne die Welt verflachen;</p> -<p class="i0">Aber der Krieg lässt die Kraft erscheinen,</p> -<p class="i0">Alles erhebt er zum Ungemeinen,</p> -<p class="i0">Selber dem Feigen erzeugt er den Muth.”</p> -</div></div> - -<p class="ti1">This passage perhaps scarcely gives a fair -representation of Schiller’s views on the question, which, if we -judge from <i>Wilhelm Tell</i>, must have been very moderate. War, he -says, in this oft-quoted passage, is sometimes a necessity. There -is a limit to the power of tyranny and, when the burden becomes -unbearable, an appeal to Heaven and the sword.</p> - -<p class="ti1"><i>Wilhelm Tell</i>: Act. II. Sc. 2.</p> - -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<p class="i0">“Nein, eine Grenze hat Tyrannenmacht.</p> -<p class="i0">Wenn der Gedrückte nirgends Recht kann finden,</p> -<p class="i0">Wenn unerträglich wird die Last greift er</p> -<p class="i0">Hinauf getrosten Muthes in den Himmel</p> -<p class="i0">Und holt herunter seine ew’gen Rechte,</p> -<p class="i0">Die droben hangen unveräusserlich</p> -<p class="i0">Und unzerbrechlich, wie die Sterne selbst—</p> -<p class="i0">Der alte Urstand der Natur kehrt wieder,</p> -<p class="i0">Wo Mensch dem Menschen gegenüber steht—</p> -<p class="i0">Zum letzten Mittel, wenn kein andres mehr</p> -<p class="i0">Verfangen will, ist ihm das Schwert gegeben.”</p> -</div></div> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_79"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_79">[79]</a></span> Letter to Bluntschli, dated -Berlin, 11th Dec., 1880 (published in Bluntschli’s <i>Gesammelte Kleine -Schriften</i>, Vol. II., p. 271).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_80"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_80">[80]</a></span> Cf. Tennyson’s <i>Maud</i>: Part I., -vi. and xiii.</p> - -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<p class="i0">“Why do they prate of the blessings of Peace? we have made them a curse,</p> -<p class="i0">Pickpockets, each hand lusting for all that is not its own;</p> -<p class="i0">And lust of gain, in the spirit of Cain, is it better or worse</p> -<p class="i0">Than the heart of the citizen hissing in war on his own hearthstone?</p> -<p class="i0">For I trust if an enemy’s fleet came yonder round by the hill,</p> -<p class="i0">And the rushing battle-bolt sang from the three-decker out of the foam,</p> -<p class="i0">That the smooth-faced snub-nosed rogue would leap from his counter and till,</p> -<p class="i0">And strike, if he could, were it but with his cheating yardwand, home.”</p> -</div></div> - -<p class="ti1">See too Part III., ii. and iv.</p> - -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<p class="i0">“And it was but a dream, yet it lighten’d my despair</p> -<p class="i0">When I thought that a war would arise in defence of the right,</p> -<p class="i0">That an iron tyranny now should bend or cease,</p> -<p class="i0">The glory of manhood stand on his ancient height,</p> -<p class="i0">Nor Britain’s one sole God be the millionaire:</p> -<p class="i0">No more shall commerce be all in all, and Peace</p> -<p class="i0">Pipe on her pastoral hillock a languid note,</p> -<p class="i0">And watch her harvest ripen, her herd increase,</p> -<p class="i0">Nor the cannon-bullet rest on a slothful shore,</p> -<p class="i0">And the cobweb woven across the cannon’s throat</p> -<p class="i0">Shall shake its threaded tears in the wind no more.</p> - -<p class="i0 p05">Let it go or stay, so I wake to the higher aims</p> -<p class="i0">Of a land that has lost for a little her lust of gold,</p> -<p class="i0">And love of a peace that was full of wrongs and shames,</p> -<p class="i0">Horrible, hateful, monstrous, not to be told;</p> -<p class="i0">And hail once more to the banner of battle unroll’d!</p> -<p class="i0">Tho’ many a light shall darken, and many shall weep</p> -<p class="i0">For those that are crush’d in the clash of jarring claims,</p> -<p class="i0">For God’s just wrath shall be wreak’d on a giant liar;</p> -<p class="i0">And many a darkness into the light shall leap,</p> -<p class="i0">And shine in the sudden making of splendid names,</p> -<p class="i0">And noble thought be freer under the sun,</p> -<p class="i0">And the heart of a people beat with one desire.”</p> -</div></div> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_81"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_81">[81]</a></span> Moltke strangely enough was, -at an earlier period, of the opinion that war, even when it is -successful, is a national misfortune. Cf. Kehrbach’s preface to -Kant’s essay, <i>Zum Ewigen Frieden</i>, p. XVII.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_82"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_82">[82]</a></span> See his discussion on -constitutional monarchy in Germany. (<i>Hist. u. Pol. Aufsätze</i>, Bd. -III., p. 533 <i>seq.</i>)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_83"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_83">[83]</a></span> See <i>Die Piccolomini</i>: Act. I. -Sc. 4.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_84"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_84">[84]</a></span> An admirable short account -of popular feeling on this matter is to be found in Lawrence’s -<i>Principles of International Law</i>, § 240.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_85"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_85">[85]</a></span> The first Peace Society was -founded in London in 1816, and the first International Peace Congress -held in 1843.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_86"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_86">[86]</a></span> In Eng. trans. see p. 358.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_87"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_87">[87]</a></span> See “A Plan for a Universal and -Perpetual Peace” in the <i>Principles of International Law</i> (<i>Works</i>, -Vol. II). One of the main principles advocated by Bentham in this -essay (written between 1787 and 1789) is that every state should give -up its colonies.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_88"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_88">[88]</a></span> See his <i>Kleine Schriften</i>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_89"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_89">[89]</a></span> <i>Institutes of the Law of -Nations</i> (1884), Vol. II., Ch. XIV.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_90"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_90">[90]</a></span> John Stuart Mill holds that the -multiplication of federal unions would be a benefit to the world. -[See his <i>Considerations on Representative Government</i> (1865), Ch. -XVII., where he discusses the conditions necessary to render such -unions successful.] But the Peace Society is scarcely justified, on -the strength of what is here, in including Mill among writers who -have made definite proposals of peace or federation. (See <i>Inter. -Trib.</i>)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_91"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_91">[91]</a></span> See what Lawrence says (<i>op. -cit.</i>, § 241) of neutralisation and the limits of its usefulness as a -remedy for war.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_92"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_92">[92]</a></span> Montesquieu: <i>Esprit des Lois</i>, -X. Ch. 2. “The life of governments is like that of man. The latter -has a right to kill in case of natural defence: the former have a -right to wage war for their own preservation.”</p> - -<p class="ti1">See also Vattel (<i>Law of Nations</i>, II. Ch. XVIII. -§ 332):—“But if anyone would rob a nation of one of her essential -rights, or a right without which she could not hope to support her -national existence,—if an ambitious neighbour threatens the liberty -of a republic, if he attempts to subjugate and enslave her,—she will -take counsel only from her own courage. She will not even attempt -the method of conferences, in the case of a contention so odious as -this. She will, in such a quarrel, exert her utmost efforts, exhaust -every resource and lavish her blood to the last drop if necessary. To -listen to the slightest proposal in a matter of this kind is to risk -everything.”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_93"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_93">[93]</a></span> The difficulties in the way -of hard and fast judgments on a complicated problem of this kind -are convincingly demonstrated in a recent essay by Professor D. G. -Ritchie (<i>Studies in Political and Social Ethics</i>, Sonnenschein, -1902). Professor Ritchie considers in detail a number of concrete -cases which occurred in the century between 1770 and 1870. “Let any -one take the judgments he would pass on these or any similarly varied -cases, and I think he will find that we do not restrict our approval -to wars of self-defence, that we do not approve self-defence under -all circumstances, that there are some cases in which we approve -of absorption of smaller states by larger, that there are cases -in which we excuse intervention of third parties in quarrels with -which at first they had nothing to do, and that we sometimes approve -war even when begun without the authority of any already existing -sovereign. Can any principles be found underlying such judgments? In -the first place we ought not to disguise from ourselves the fact that -our judgments after the result are based largely on success. ... I -think it will be found that our judgments on the wars of the century -from 1770 to 1870 turn very largely on the question, Which of the -conflicting forces was making for constitutional government and for -social progress? or, to put it in wider terms, Which represented the -higher civilisation? And thus it is that we may sometimes approve the -rise of a new state and sometimes the absorption of an old.” (<i>Op. -cit.</i>, pp. 152, 155.)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_94"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_94">[94]</a></span> See Fred. W. Holls: <i>The Peace -Conference at the Hague</i>, Macmillan, 1900.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_95"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_95">[95]</a></span> The feeling of the Congress -expressed itself thus cautiously:—“Messieurs les plénipotentiaires -n’hésitent pas à exprimer, au nom de leur gouvernements, le voeu, -que les Etats entre lesquels s’éléverait un dissentiment sérieux, -avant d’en appeler aux armes, eussent recours, en tant que les -circonstances l’admettraient, aux bons offices d’une puissance -amie.”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_96"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_96">[96]</a></span> <i>Esprit des Lois</i>, XIII. Chap. -17. “A new distemper has spread itself over Europe: it has infected -our princes, and induces them to keep up an exorbitant number of -troops. It has its redoublings, and of necessity becomes contagious. -For as soon as one prince augments what he calls his troops, the -rest of course do the same: so that nothing is gained thereby but -the public ruin. Each monarch keeps as many armies on foot as if his -people were in danger of being exterminated: and they give the name -of Peace to this general effort of all against all.”</p> - -<p class="ti1">Montesquieu is of course writing in the days of -mercenary troops; but the cost to the nation of our modern armies, -both in time of peace and of war, is incomparably greater.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_97"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_97">[97]</a></span> Even St. Pierre was alive to -this danger (<i>Projet</i>, Art. VIII: in the English translation of -1714, p. 160):—“The <i>European</i> Union shall endeavour to obtain in -<i>Asia</i>, a <i>permanent</i> society like that of <i>Europe</i>, that Peace may -be maintain’d There also; and especially that it may have no cause to -fear any <i>Asiatic</i> Sovereign, either as to its tranquillity, or its -Commerce in <i>Asia</i>.”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_98"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_98">[98]</a></span> Bentham’s suggestion would be -useful here! See above, <a href="#Footnote_87">p. 79, <i>note</i></a>.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_99"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_99">[99]</a></span> The best thing for Europe might -be that Russia (perhaps including China) should be regarded as a -serious danger by all the civilised powers of the West. <i>That</i> would -bring us nearer to the United States of Europe <i>and</i> America (for -the United States, America, is Russia’s neighbour on the East) than -anything else.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_100"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_100">[100]</a></span> Trade in barbarous or savage -countries is still increased by war, especially on the French and -German plan which leaves no open door to other nations. Here the -trade follows the flag. And war, of course, among civilised races -causes small nations to disappear and their tariffs with them. <i>This</i> -is beneficial to trade, but to a degree so trifling that it may here -be neglected.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_101"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_101">[101]</a></span> Cf. also the civil war of 1847 -in Switzerland.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_102"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_102">[102]</a></span> See <i>Werke</i>, VII., p. 467.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_103"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_103">[103]</a></span> The other he knew was -impossible. Peace within the state meant decay and death. In the -antagonism of nations, he saw nature’s means of educating the -race: it was a law of existence, a law of progress, and, as such, -eternal.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_104"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_104">[104]</a></span> For a vivid picture of the -material advantages offered by such a union and of the dismal future -that may lie before an unfederated Europe, we cannot do better -than read Mr. Andrew Carnegie’s recent Rectorial Address to the -students of St. Andrews University (Oct 1902). Unfortunately, Mr. -Carnegie’s enthusiasm stops here: he does not tell us by what means -the difficulties at present in the way of a federation, industrial or -political, are to be overcome.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_105"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_105">[105]</a></span> Professor D. G. Ritchie remarks -that it is less an over-estimation of the value of peace than a too -easy-going acceptance of abstract and unanalysed phrases about the -rights of nations that injures the work of the Peace Society. Cf. -his note on the principles of the Peace Congresses (<i>op. cit.</i>, p. -172).</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_106"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_106">[106]</a></span> The day is past, when a nation -could enjoy the exclusive advantages of its own inventions. Vattel -naively recommends that we should keep the knowledge of certain kinds -of trade, the building of war-ships and the like, to ourselves. -Prudence, he says, prevents us from making an enemy stronger and the -care of our own safety forbids it. (<i>Law of Nations</i>, II. Ch. I. § -16.)</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_107"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_107">[107]</a></span> The text used in this -translation is that edited by Kehrbach. [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_108"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_108">[108]</a></span> I have seen something of M. -de St. Pierre’s plan for maintaining perpetual peace in Europe. It -reminds me of an inscription outside of a churchyard, which ran “<i>Pax -Perpetua.</i> For the dead, it is true, fight no more. But the living -are of another mind, and the mightiest among them have little respect -for tribunals.” (Leibniz: <i>Letter to Grimarest</i>, quoted above, <a -href="#Footnote_44">p. 37, note 44</a>.) [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_109"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_109">[109]</a></span> On the honourable -interpretation of treaties, see Vattel (<i>op. cit.</i>, II. Ch. XVII., -esp. §§ 263-296, 291). See also what he says of the validity of -treaties and the necessity for holding them sacred (II. Ch. XII. §§ -157, 158: II. Ch. XV). [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_110"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_110">[110]</a></span> “Even the smoothest way,” says -Hume, (<i>Of the Original Contract</i>) “by which a nation may receive a -foreign master, by marriage or a will, is not extremely honourable -for the people; but supposes them to be disposed of, like a dowry or -a legacy, according to the pleasure or interest of their rulers.” -[Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_111"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_111">[111]</a></span> An hereditary kingdom is not -a state which can be inherited by another state, but one whose -sovereign power can be inherited by another physical person. The -state then acquires a ruler, not the ruler as such (that is, as one -already possessing another realm) the state.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_112"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_112">[112]</a></span> This has been one of the causes -of the extraordinary admixture of races in the modern Austrian -empire. Cf. the lines of Matthias Corvinus of Hungary (quoted in Sir -W. Stirling Maxwell’s <i>Cloister Life of Charles the Fifth</i>, Ch. I., -<i>note</i>):—</p> - -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<p class="i0">“Bella gerant alii, tu, felix Austria, nube!</p> -<p class="i0">Nam quae Mars aliis, dat tibi regna Venus.” [Tr.]</p> -</div></div> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_113"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_113">[113]</a></span> A Bulgarian Prince thus -answered the Greek Emperor who magnanimously offered to settle a -quarrel with him, not by shedding the blood of his subjects, but by a -duel:—“A smith who has tongs will not take the red-hot iron from the -fire with his hands.”</p> - -<p class="ti1">(This note is a-wanting in the second Edition of 1796. -It is repeated in Art. II., see p. 130.) [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_114"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_114">[114]</a></span> See Vattel: <i>Law of Nations</i>, -II. Ch. IV. § 55. No foreign power, he says, has a right to judge the -conduct and administration of any sovereign or oblige him to alter -it. “If he loads his subjects with taxes, or if he treats them with -severity, the nation alone is concerned; and no other is called upon -to offer redress for his behaviour, or oblige him to follow more -wise and equitable maxims.... But (<i>loc. cit.</i> § 56) when the bands -of the political society are broken, or at least suspended, between -the sovereign and his people, the contending parties may then be -considered at two distinct powers; and, since they are both equally -independent of all foreign authority, nobody has a right to judge -them. Either may be in the right; and each of those who grant their -assistance may imagine that he is giving his support to the better -cause.” [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_115"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_115">[115]</a></span> It has been hitherto doubted, -not without reason, whether there can be laws of permission (<i>leges -permissivæ</i>) of pure reason as well as commands (<i>leges præceptivæ</i>) -and prohibitions (<i>leges prohibitivæ</i>). For law in general has a -basis of objective practical necessity: permission, on the other -hand, is based upon the contingency of certain actions in practice. -It follows that a law of permission would enforce what cannot be -enforced; and this would involve a contradiction, if the object of -the law should be the same in both cases. Here, however, in the -present case of a law of permission, the presupposed prohibition -is aimed merely at the future manner of acquisition of a right—for -example, acquisition through inheritance: the exemption from this -prohibition (<i>i.e.</i> the permission) refers to the present state of -possession. In the transition from a state of nature to the civil -state, this holding of property can continue as a <i>bona fide</i>, if -usurpatory, ownership, under the new social conditions, in accordance -with a permission of the Law of Nature. Ownership of this kind, as -soon as its true nature becomes known, is seen to be mere nominal -possession (<i>possessio putativa</i>) sanctioned by opinion and customs -in a natural state of society. After the transition stage is passed, -such modes of acquisition are likewise forbidden in the subsequently -evolved civil state: and this power to remain in possession would -not be admitted if the supposed acquisition had taken place in the -civilized community. It would be bound to come to an end as an injury -to the right of others, the moment its illegality became patent.</p> - -<p class="ti1">I have wished here only by the way to draw the -attention of teachers of the Law of Nature to the idea of a <i>lex -permissiva</i> which presents itself spontaneously in any system of -rational classification. I do so chiefly because use is often made -of this concept in civil law with reference to statutes; with this -difference, that the law of prohibition stands alone by itself, -while permission is not, as it ought to be, introduced into that -law as a limiting clause, but is thrown among the exceptions. -Thus “this or that is forbidden”,—say, Nos. 1, 2, 3, and so on in -an infinite progression,—while permissions are only added to the -law incidentally: they are not reached by the application of some -principle, but only by groping about among cases which have actually -occurred. Were this not so, qualifications would have had to be -brought into the formula of laws of prohibition which would have -immediately transformed them into laws of permission. Count von -Windischgrätz, a man whose wisdom was equal to his discrimination, -urged this very point in the form of a question propounded by him for -a prize essay. One must therefore regret that this ingenious problem -has been so soon neglected and left unsolved. For the possibility of -a formula similar to those of mathematics is the sole real test of -a legislation that would be consistent. Without this, the so-called -<i>jus certum</i> will remain forever a mere pious wish: we can have only -general laws valid on the whole; no general laws possessing the -universal validity which the concept law seems to demand.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_116"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_116">[116]</a></span> “From this diffidence of -one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself, so -reasonable, as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master -the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power -great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his own -conservation requireth, and is generally allowed.” (Hobbes: <i>Lev.</i> I. -Ch. XIII.) [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_117"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_117">[117]</a></span> Hobbes thus describes the -establishment of the state. “A <i>commonwealth</i> is said to be -<i>instituted</i>, when a <i>multitude</i> of men do agree, and <i>covenant, -every one, with every one</i>, that to whatsoever <i>man</i>, or <i>assembly -of men</i>, shall be given by the major part, the <i>right</i> to <i>present</i> -the person of them all, that is to say, to be their <i>representative</i>; -everyone, as well he that <i>voted for it</i>, as he that <i>voted against -it</i>, shall <i>authorize</i> all the actions and judgments, of that man, or -assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the -end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against -other men.” (<i>Lev.</i> II. Ch. XVIII.)</p> - -<p class="ti1">There is a covenant between them, “as if every man -should say to every man, <i>I authorise and give up my right of -governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this -condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his -actions in like manner</i>.” (<i>Lev.</i> II. Ch. XVII.) [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_118"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_118">[118]</a></span> It is usually accepted that a -man may not take hostile steps against any one, unless the latter -has already injured him by act. This is quite accurate, if both are -citizens of a law-governed state. For, in becoming a member of this -community, each gives the other the security he demands against -injury, by means of the supreme authority exercising control over -them both. The individual, however, (or nation) who remains in a mere -state of nature deprives me of this security and does me injury, by -mere proximity. There is perhaps no active (<i>facto</i>) molestation, -but there is a state of lawlessness, (<i>status injustus</i>) which, by -its very existence, offers a continual menace to me. I can therefore -compel him, either to enter into relations with me under which we are -both subject to law, or to withdraw from my neighbourhood. So that -the postulate upon which the following articles are based is:—“All -men who have the power to exert a mutual influence upon one another -must be under a civil government of some kind.”</p> - -<p class="ti1">A legal constitution is, according to the nature of -the individuals who compose the state:— </p> - -<p class="ti1">(1) A constitution formed in accordance with the right -of citizenship of the individuals who constitute a nation (<i>jus -civitatis</i>). </p> - -<p class="ti1">(2) A constitution whose principle is international -law which determines the relations of states (<i>jus gentium</i>). </p> - -<p class="ti1">(3) A constitution formed in accordance with -cosmopolitan law, in as far as individuals and states, standing in an -external relation of mutual reaction, may be regarded as citizens of -one world-state (<i>jus cosmopoliticum</i>). - -</p> <p class="ti1">This classification is not an arbitrary one, but -is necessary with reference to the idea of perpetual peace. For, if -even one of these units of society were in a position physically -to influence another, while yet remaining a member of a primitive -order of society, then a state of war would be joined with these -primitive conditions; and from this it is our present purpose to free -ourselves.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_119"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_119">[119]</a></span> Lawful, that is to say, -external freedom cannot be defined, as it so often is, as the -right [<i>Befugniss</i>] “to do whatever one likes, so long as this -does not wrong anyone else.”<a id="FNanchor_B" href="#Footnote_B" -class="fnanchor">[B]</a> For what is this right? It is the -possibility of actions which do not lead to the injury of others. So -the explanation of a “right” would be something like this:—“Freedom -is the possibility of actions which do not injure anyone. A man does -not wrong another—whatever his action—if he does not wrong another”: -which is empty tautology. My external (lawful) freedom is rather to -be explained in this way: it is the right through which I require not -to obey any external laws except those to which I could have given -my consent. In exactly the same way, external (legal) equality in a -state is that relation of the subjects in consequence of which no -individual can legally bind or oblige another to anything, without -at the same time submitting himself to the law which ensures that -he can, in his turn, be bound and obliged in like manner by this -other.</p> - -<p class="ti1">The principle of lawful independence requires -no explanation, as it is involved in the general concept of a -constitution. The validity of this hereditary and inalienable right, -which belongs of necessity to mankind, is affirmed and ennobled by -the principle of a lawful relation between man himself and higher -beings, if indeed he believes in such beings. This is so, because he -thinks of himself, in accordance with these very principles, as a -citizen of a transcendental world as well as of the world of sense. -For, as far as my freedom goes, I am bound by no obligation even -with regard to Divine Laws—which are apprehended by me only through -my reason—except in so far as I could have given my assent to them; -for it is through the law of freedom of my own reason that I first -form for myself a concept of a Divine Will. As for the principle of -equality, in so far as it applies to the most sublime being in the -universe next to God—a being I might perhaps figure to myself as a -mighty emanation of the Divine spirit,—there is no reason why, if -I perform my duty in the sphere in which I am placed, as that aeon -does in his, the duty of obedience alone should fall to my share, the -right to command to him. That this principle of equality, (unlike -the principle of freedom), does not apply to our relation to God is -due to the fact that, to this Being alone, the idea of duty does not -belong.</p> - -<p class="ti1">As for the right to equality which belongs to -all citizens as subjects, the solution of the problem of the -admissibility of an hereditary nobility hinges on the following -question:—“Does social rank—acknowledged by the state to be higher -in the case of one subject than another—stand above desert, or does -merit take precedence of social standing?” Now it is obvious that, -if high position is combined with good family, it is quite uncertain -whether merit, that is to say, skill and fidelity in office, will -follow as well. This amounts to granting the favoured individual a -commanding position without any question of desert; and to that, the -universal will of the people—expressed in an original contract which -is the fundamental principle of all right—would never consent. For it -does not follow that a nobleman is a man of noble character. In the -case of the official nobility, as one might term the rank of higher -magistracy—which one must acquire by merit—the social position is not -attached like property to the person but to his office, and equality -is not thereby disturbed; for, if a man gives up office, he lays -down with it his official rank and falls back into the rank of his -fellows.</p> - -<p class="p1" id="Footnote_B"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_B">[B]</a></span> Hobbes’ definition of -freedom is interesting. See <i>Lev.</i> II. Ch. XXI.:—“A <span -class="smcap">Freeman</span>, <i>is he, that in those things, which by -his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he -has a will to</i>.” [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_120"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_120">[120]</a></span> Cf. Cowper: <i>The Winter Morning -Walk</i>:—</p> - -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<p class="i0">“But is it fit, or can it bear the shock</p> -<p class="i0">Of rational discussion, that a man,</p> -<p class="i0">Compounded and made up like other men</p> -<p class="i0">Of elements tumultuous, <span class="g4">.......</span></p> -<p class="i0"><span class="g4">...............</span></p> -<p class="i0">Should when he pleases, and on whom he will,</p> -<p class="i0">Wage war, with any or with no pretence</p> -<p class="i0">Of provocation giv’n or wrong sustain’d,</p> -<p class="i0">And force the beggarly last doit, by means</p> -<p class="i0">That his own humour dictates, from the clutch</p> -<p class="i0">Of poverty, that thus he may procure</p> -<p class="i0">His thousands, weary of penurious life,</p> -<p class="i0">A splendid opportunity to die?”</p> -<p class="i0"><span class="g4">...............</span></p> -<p class="i0"><span class="g4">...............</span></p> -<p class="i0">“He deems a thousand or ten thousand lives</p> -<p class="i0">Spent in the purchase of renown for him,</p> -<p class="i0">An easy reckoning.” [Tr.]</p> -</div></div> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_121"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_121">[121]</a></span> Cf. Hobbes: <i>On Dominion</i>, Ch. -VII. § 1. “As for the difference of cities, it is taken from the -difference of the persons to whom the supreme power is committed. -This power is committed either to <i>one man</i>, or <i>council</i>, or some -<i>one court</i> consisting of many men.” [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_122"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_122">[122]</a></span> The lofty appellations -which are often given to a ruler—such as the Lord’s Anointed, the -Administrator of the Divine Will upon earth and Vicar of God—have -been many times censured as flattery gross enough to make one giddy. -But it seems to me without cause. Far from making a prince arrogant, -names like these must rather make him humble at heart, if he has any -intelligence—which we take for granted he has—and reflects that he -has undertaken an office which is too great for any human being. For, -indeed, it is the holiest which God has on earth—namely, the right -of ruling mankind: and he must ever live in fear of injuring this -treasure of God in some respect or other.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_123"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_123">[123]</a></span> Mallet du Pan boasts in his -seemingly brilliant but shallow and superficial language that, -after many years experience, he has come at last to be convinced of -the truth of the well known saying of Pope [<i>Essay on Man</i>, III. -303]:—</p> - -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<p class="i0">“For Forms of Government let fools contest;</p> -<p class="i0">Whate’er is best administered is best.”</p> -</div></div> - -<p>If this means that the best administered government is best -administered, then, in Swift’s phrase, he has cracked a nut to find a -worm in it. If it means, however, that the best conducted government -is also the best kind of government,—that is, the best form -of political constitution,—then it is utterly false: for examples of -wise administration are no proof of the kind of government. Who -ever ruled better than Titus and Marcus Aurelius, and yet the one -left Domitian, the other Commodus, as his successor? This could -not have happened where the constitution was a good one, for -their absolute unfitness for the position was early enough known, -and the power of the emperor was sufficiently great to exclude them.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_124"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_124">[124]</a></span> “For as amongst masterless -men, there is perpetual war, of every man against his neighbour; no -inheritance, to transmit to the son, nor to expect from the father; -no propriety of goods, or lands; no security; but a full and absolute -liberty in every particular man: so in states, and commonwealths -not dependent on one another, every commonwealth, not every man, -has an absolute liberty, to do what it shall judge, that is to say, -what that man, or assembly that representeth it, shall judge most -conducing to their benefit. But withal, they live in the condition -of a perpetual war, and upon the confines of battle, with their -frontiers armed, and cannons planted against their neighbours round -about.” (Hobbes: <i>Leviathan</i>, II. Ch. XXI.) [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_125"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_125">[125]</a></span> But see <a href="#Page_136">p. -136</a>, where Kant seems to speak of a State of nations as the -ideal. Kant expresses himself, on this point, more clearly in the -<i>Rechtslehre</i>, Part. II. § 61:—“The natural state of nations,” -he says here, “like that of individual men, is a condition which -must be abandoned, in order that they may enter a state regulated -by law. Hence, before this can take place, every right possessed -by these nations and every external “mine” and “thine” [<i>id est</i>, -symbol of possession] which states acquire or preserve through -war are merely <i>provisional</i>, and can become <i>peremptorily</i> valid -and constitute a true state of peace only in a universal <i>union -of states</i>, by a process analogous to that through which a people -becomes a state. Since, however, the too great extension of such a -State of nations over vast territories must, in the long run, make -the government of that union—and therefore the protection of each of -its members—impossible, a multitude of such corporations will lead -again to a state of war. So that <i>perpetual peace</i>, the final goal of -international law as a whole, is really an impracticable idea [<i>eine -unausführbare Idee</i>]. The political principles, however, which are -directed towards this end, (that is to say, towards the establishment -of such unions of states as may serve as a continual approximation -to that ideal), are not impracticable; on the contrary, as this -approximation is required by duty and is therefore founded also upon -the rights of men and of states, these principles are, without doubt, -capable of practical realization.” [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_126"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_126">[126]</a></span> A Greek Emperor who -magnanimously volunteered to settle by a duel his quarrel with a -Bulgarian Prince, got the following answer:—“A smith who has tongs -will not pluck the glowing iron from the fire with his hands.”</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_127"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_127">[127]</a></span> “Both sayings are very true: -that <i>man to man is a kind of God</i>; and that <i>man to man is an arrant -wolf</i>. The first is true, if we compare citizens amongst themselves; -and the second, if we compare cities. In the one, there is some -analogy of similitude with the Deity; to wit, justice and charity, -the twin sisters of peace. But in the other, good men must defend -themselves by taking to them for a sanctuary the two daughters of -war, deceit and violence: that is, in plain terms, a mere brutal -rapacity.” (Hobbes: Epistle Dedicatory to the <i>Philosophical -Rudiments concerning Government and Society</i>.) [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_128"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_128">[128]</a></span> “The strongest are still never -sufficiently strong to ensure them the continual mastership, unless -they find means of transforming force into right, and obedience into -duty.</p> - -<p class="ti1">From the right of the strongest, right takes an -ironical appearance, and is rarely established as a principle.” -(<i>Contrat Social</i>, I. Ch. III.) [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_129"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_129">[129]</a></span> “The natural state,” says -Hobbes, (<i>On Dominion</i>, Ch. VII. § 18) “hath the same proportion to -the civil, (I mean, liberty to subjection), which passion hath to -reason, or a beast to a man.”</p> - -<p class="ti1">Locke speaks thus of man, when he puts himself into -the state of war with another:—“having quitted reason, which God hath -given to be the rule betwixt man and man, and the common bond whereby -human kind is united into one fellowship and society; and having -renounced the way of peace which that teaches, and made use of the -force of war, to compass his unjust ends upon another, where he has -no right; and so revolting from his own kind to that of beasts, by -making force, which is theirs, to be his rule of right, he renders -himself liable to be destroyed by the injured person, and the rest -of mankind that will join with him in the execution of justice, as -any other wild beast, or noxious brute, with whom mankind can have -neither society nor security.” (<i>Civil Government</i>, Ch. XV. § 172.) -[Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_130"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_130">[130]</a></span> Cf. Rousseau: <i>Gouvernement de -Pologne</i>, Ch. V. Federate government is “the only one which unites in -itself all the advantages of great and small states.” [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_131"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_131">[131]</a></span> On the conclusion of peace at -the end of a war, it might not be unseemly for a nation to appoint -a day of humiliation, after the festival of thanksgiving, on which -to invoke the mercy of Heaven for the terrible sin which the human -race are guilty of, in their continued unwillingness to submit (in -their relations with other states) to a law-governed constitution, -preferring rather in the pride of their independence to use the -barbarous method of war, which after all does not really settle what -is wanted, namely, the right of each state in a quarrel. The feasts -of thanksgiving during a war for a victorious battle, the hymns -which are sung—to use the Jewish expression—“to the Lord of Hosts” -are not in less strong contrast to the ethical idea of a father of -mankind; for, apart from the indifference these customs show to -the way in which nations seek to establish their rights—sad enough -as it is—these rejoicings bring in an element of exultation that a -great number of lives, or at least the happiness of many, has been -destroyed.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_132"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_132">[132]</a></span> Cf. <i>Aeneidos</i>, I. 294 -<i>seq.</i></p> - -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<p class="i28">“Furor impius intus,</p> -<p class="i0">Saeva sedens super arma, et centum vinctus aënis</p> -<p class="i0">Post tergum nodis, fremet horridus ore cruento.” [Tr.]</p> -</div></div> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_133"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_133">[133]</a></span> Cf. Vattel (<i>op. cit.</i>, II. -ch. IX. § 123):—“The right of passage is also a remnant of the -primitive state of communion, in which the entire earth was common to -all mankind, and the passage was everywhere free to each individual -according to his necessities. Nobody can be entirely deprived of this -right.” See also above, p. 65, <i>note</i>. [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_134"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_134">[134]</a></span> In order to call this great -empire by the name which it gives itself—namely, China, not Sina or -a word of similar sound—we have only to look at Georgii: <i>Alphab. -Tibet.</i>, pp. 651-654, particularly <i>note</i> b., below. According to the -observation of Professor Fischer of St. Petersburg, there is really -no particular name which it always goes by: the most usual is the -word <i>Kin</i>, <i>i.e.</i> gold, which the inhabitants of Tibet call <i>Ser</i>. -Hence the emperor is called the king of gold, <i>i.e.</i> the king of the -most splendid country in the world. This word <i>Kin</i> may probably be -<i>Chin</i> in the empire itself, but be pronounced <i>Kin</i> by the Italian -missionaries on account of the gutturals. Thus we see that the -country of the Seres, so often mentioned by the Romans, was China: -the silk, however, was despatched to Europe across Greater Tibet, -probably through Smaller Tibet and Bucharia, through Persia and -then on. This leads to many reflections as to the antiquity of this -wonderful state, as compared with Hindustan, at the time of its union -with Tibet and thence with Japan. On the other hand, the name Sina -or Tschina which is said to be given to this land by neighbouring -peoples leads to nothing.</p> - -<p class="ti1">Perhaps we can explain the ancient intercourse of -Europe with Tibet—a fact at no time widely known—by looking at what -Hesychius has preserved on the matter. I refer to the shout, Κουξ -Ομπαξ (<i>Konx Ompax</i>), the cry of the Hierophants in the Eleusinian -mysteries (cf. <i>Travels of Anacharsis the Younger</i>, Part V., p. 447, -<i>seq.</i>). For, according to Georgii <i>Alph. Tibet.</i>, the word <i>Concioa</i> -which bears a striking resemblance to <i>Konx</i> means God. <i>Pak-cio</i> -(<i>ib.</i> p. 520) which might easily be pronounced by the Greeks like -<i>pax</i> means <i>promulgator legis</i>, the divine principle permeating -nature (called also, on p. 177, <i>Cencresi</i>). <i>Om</i>, however, which -La Croze translates by <i>benedictus</i>, <i>i.e.</i> blessed, can when -applied to the Deity mean nothing but beatified (p. 507). Now P. -Franc. Horatius, when he asked the Lhamas of Tibet, as he often did, -what they understood by God (<i>Concioa</i>) always got the answer:—“it -is the assembly of all the saints,” <i>i.e.</i> the assembly of those -blessed ones who have been born again according to the faith of the -Lama and, after many wanderings in changing forms, have at last -returned to God, to Burchane: that is to say, they are beings to -be worshipped, souls which have undergone transmigration (p. 223). -So the mysterious expression <i>Konx Ompax</i> ought probably to mean -the holy (<i>Konx</i>), blessed, (<i>Om</i>) and wise (<i>Pax</i>) supreme Being -pervading the universe, the personification of nature. Its use in the -Greek mysteries probably signified monotheism for the Epoptes, in -distinction from the polytheism of the people, although elsewhere P. -Horatius scented atheism here. How that mysterious word came by way -of Tibet to the Greeks may be explained as above; and, on the other -hand, in this way is made probable an early intercourse of Europe -with China across Tibet, earlier perhaps than the communication -with Hindustan. (There is some difference of opinion as to the -meaning of the words κόγξ ὄμπαξ—according to Liddell and Scott, a -corruption of κόγξ, ὁμοίως πάξ. Kant’s inferences here seem to be -more than far-fetched. Lobeck, in his <i>Aglaophamus</i> (p. 775), gives -a quite different interpretation which has, he says, been approved -by scholars. And Whately (<i>Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon -Bonaparte</i>, 3rd. ed., Postscript) uses Konx Ompax as a pseudonym. -[Tr.])</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_135"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_135">[135]</a></span> In the mechanical system of -nature to which man belongs as a sentient being, there appears, as -the underlying ground of its existence, a certain <i>form</i> which we -cannot make intelligible to ourselves except by thinking into the -physical world the idea of an end preconceived by the Author of -the universe: this predetermination of nature on the part of God -we generally call Divine Providence. In so far as this providence -appears in the origin of the universe, we speak of Providence -as founder of the world (<i>providentia conditrix; semel jussit, -semper parent.</i> Augustine). As it maintains the course of nature, -however, according to universal laws of adaptation to preconceived -ends, [<i>i.e.</i> teleological laws] we call it a ruling providence -(<i>providentia gubernatrix</i>). Further, we name it the guiding -providence (<i>providentia directrix</i>), as it appears in the world for -special ends, which we could not foresee, but suspect only from the -result. Finally, regarding particular events as divine purposes, -we speak no longer of providence, but of dispensation (<i>directio -extraordinaria</i>). As this term, however, really suggests the idea of -miracles, although the events are not spoken of by this name, the -desire to fathom dispensation, as such, is a foolish presumption -in men. For, from one single occurrence, to jump at the conclusion -that there is a particular principle of efficient causes and that -this event is an end and not merely the natural [<i>naturmechanische</i>] -sequence of a design quite unknown to us is absurd and presumptuous, -in however pious and humble a spirit we may speak of it. In the same -way to distinguish between a universal and a particular providence -when regarding it <i>materialiter</i>, in its relation to actual objects -in the world (to say, for instance, that there may be, indeed, a -providence for the preservation of the different species of creation, -but that individuals are left to chance) is false and contradictory. -For providence is called universal for the very reason that no single -thing may be thought of as shut out from its care. Probably the -distinction of two kinds of providence, <i>formaliter</i> or subjectively -considered, had reference to the manner in which its purposes are -fulfilled. So that we have ordinary providence (<i>e.g.</i> the yearly -decay and awakening to new life in nature with change of season) and -what we may call unusual or special providence (<i>e.g.</i> the bringing -of timber by ocean currents to Arctic shores where it does not -grow, and where without this aid the inhabitants could not live). -Here, although we can quite well explain the physico-mechanical -cause of these phenomena—in this case, for example, the banks of -the rivers in temperate countries are over-grown with trees, some -of which fall into the water and are carried along, probably by -the Gulf Stream—we must not overlook the teleological cause which -points to the providential care of a ruling wisdom above nature. -But the concept, commonly used in the schools of philosophy, of a -co-operation on the part of the Deity or a concurrence (<i>concursus</i>) -in the operations going on in the world of sense, must be dropped. -For it is, firstly, self-contradictory to couple the like and the -unlike together (<i>gryphes jungere equis</i>) and to let Him who is -Himself the entire cause of the changes in the universe make good -any shortcomings in His own predetermining providence (which to -require this must be defective) during the course of the world; for -example, to say that the physician has restored the sick with the -help of God—that is to say that He has been present as a support. For -<i>causa solitaria non juvat</i>. God created the physician as well as his -means of healing; and we must ascribe the result wholly to Him, if -we will go back to the supreme First Cause which, theoretically, is -beyond our comprehension. Or we can ascribe the result entirely to -the physician, in so far as we follow up this event, as explicable -in the chain of physical causes, according to the order of nature. -Secondly, moreover, such a way of looking at this question destroys -all the fixed principles by which we judge an effect. But, from -the ethico-practical point of view which looks entirely to the -transcendental side of things, the idea of a divine concurrence is -quite proper and even necessary: for example, in the faith that God -will make good the imperfection of our human justice, if only our -feelings and intentions are sincere; and that He will do this by -means beyond our comprehension, and therefore we should not slacken -our efforts after what is good. Whence it follows, as a matter of -course, that no one must attempt to explain a good action as a mere -event in time by this <i>concursus</i>; for that would be to pretend a -theoretical knowledge of the supersensible and hence be absurd.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_136"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_136">[136]</a></span> <i>Id est</i>, which we cannot -dissever from the idea of a creative skill capable of producing them. -[Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_137"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_137">[137]</a></span> See preface, <a -href="#Page_ix">p. ix</a>. above.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_138"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_138">[138]</a></span> Of all modes of livelihood the -life of the hunter is undoubtedly most incompatible with a civilised -condition of society. Because, to live by hunting, families must -isolate themselves from their neighbours, soon becoming estranged and -spread over widely scattered forests, to be before long on terms of -hostility, since each requires a great deal of space to obtain food -and raiment.</p> - -<p class="ti1">God’s command to Noah not to shed blood (I. <i>Genesis</i>, -IX. 4-6)</p> - -<blockquote> - <p>[4. “But flesh with the life thereof, which is the blood - thereof, shall ye not eat.</p> - - <p>5. And surely your blood of your lives will I require; - at the hand of every beast will I require it, and at the - hand of man; at the hand of every man’s brother will I - require the life of man.</p> - - <p>6. Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be - shed: for in the image of God made he man.”]</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>is frequently quoted, and was afterwards—in another -connection it is true—made by the baptised Jews a condition to -which Christians, newly converted from heathendom, had to conform. -Cf. <i>Acts</i> XV. 20; XXI. 25. This command seems originally to have -been nothing else than a prohibition of the life of the hunter; for -here the possibility of eating raw flesh must often occur, and, in -forbidding the one custom, we condemn the other.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_139"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_139">[139]</a></span> About 1000 English miles.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_140"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_140">[140]</a></span> The question might be put:—“If -it is nature’s will that these Arctic shores should not remain -unpopulated, what will become of their inhabitants, if, as is to be -expected, at some time or other no more driftwood should be brought -to them? For we may believe that, with the advance of civilisation, -the inhabitants of temperate zones will utilise better the wood which -grows on the banks of their rivers, and not let it fall into the -stream and so be swept away.” I answer: the inhabitants of the shores -of the River Obi, the Yenisei, the Lena will supply them with it -through trade, and take in exchange the animal produce in which the -seas of Arctic shores are so rich—that is, if nature has first of all -brought about peace among them.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_141"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_141">[141]</a></span> Cf. <i>Enc. Brit.</i> (9th ed.), -art. “Indians”, in which there is an allusion to “Fuegians, the -<i>Pescherais</i>” of some writers. [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_142"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_142">[142]</a></span> Rousseau uses these terms in -speaking of democracy. (<i>Cont. Soc.</i>, III. Ch. 4.) “If there were a -nation of Gods, they might be governed by a democracy: but so perfect -a government will not agree with men.”</p> - -<p class="ti1">But he writes elsewhere of republican governments -(<i>op. cit.</i>, II. Ch. 6):—“All lawful governments are republican.” -And in a footnote to this passage:—“I do not by the word ‘republic’ -mean an aristocracy or democracy only, but in general all governments -directed by the public will which is the law. If a government is to -be lawful, it must not be confused with the sovereign power, but be -considered as the administrator of that power: and then monarchy -itself is a republic.” This language has a close affinity with that -used by Kant. (Cf. above, <a href="#Page_126">p. 126</a>.) [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_143"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_143">[143]</a></span> See above, <a -href="#Footnote_76">p. 69, <i>note</i></a>, esp. reference to <i>Theory of -Ethics</i>. [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_144"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_144">[144]</a></span> Difference of religion! A -strange expression, as if one were to speak of different kinds -of morality. There may indeed be different historical forms of -belief,—that is to say, the various means which have been used in -the course of time to promote religion,—but they are mere subjects -of learned investigation, and do not really lie within the sphere -of religion. In the same way there are many religious works—the -<i>Zendavesta</i>, <i>Veda</i>, <i>Koran</i> etc.—but there is only one religion, -binding for all men and for all times. These books are each no more -than the accidental mouthpiece of religion, and may be different -according to differences in time and place.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_145"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_145">[145]</a></span> Montesquieu speaks thus in -praise of the English state:—“As the enjoyment of liberty, and even -its support and preservation, consists in every man’s being allowed -to speak his thoughts and to lay open his sentiments, a citizen in -this state will say or write whatever the laws do not expressly -forbid to be said or written.” (<i>Esprit des Lois</i>, XIX. Ch. 27.) -Hobbes is opposed to all free discussion of political questions and -to freedom as a source of danger to the state. [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_146"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_146">[146]</a></span> Kant is thinking here not of -the sword of justice, in the moral sense, but of a sword which is -symbolical of the executive power of the actual law. [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_147"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_147">[147]</a></span> Cf. Aristotle: <i>Politics</i>, -(Welldon’s trans.) IV. Ch. XIV. “The same principles of morality are -best both for individuals and States.”</p> - -<p class="ti1">Among the ancients the connection between politics -and morals was never questioned, although there were differences of -opinion as to which science stood first in importance. Thus, while -Plato put politics second to morals, Aristotle regarded politics as -the chief science and ethics as a part of politics. This connection -between the sciences was denied by Machiavelli, who lays down the -dictum that, in the relations of sovereigns and states, the ordinary -rules of morality do not apply. See <i>The Prince</i>, Ch. XVIII. “A -Prince,” he says, “and most of all a new Prince, cannot observe all -those rules of conduct in respect of which men are accounted good, -being frequently obliged, in order to preserve his Princedom, to act -in opposition to good faith, charity, humanity, and religion. He must -therefore keep his mind ready to shift as the winds and tides of -Fortune turn, and, as I have already said, he ought not to quit good -courses if he can help it, but should know how to follow evil courses -if he must.”</p> - -<p class="ti1">Hume thought that laxer principles might be allowed -to govern states than private persons, because intercourse between -them was not so “necessary and advantageous” as between individuals. -“There is a system of morals,” he says, “calculated for princes, -much more free than that which ought to govern private persons,” -(<i>Treatise</i>, III., Part II., Sect. IX.) [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_148"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_148">[148]</a></span> These are <i>permissive</i> laws -of reason which allow us to leave a system of public law, when it -is tainted by injustice, to remain just as it is, until everything -is entirely revolutionised through an internal development, either -spontaneous, or fostered and matured by peaceful influences. For -any legal constitution whatsoever, even although it conforms only -slightly with the spirit of law is better than none at all—that is -to say, anarchy, which is the fate of a precipitate reform. Hence, -as things now are, the wise politician will look upon it as his duty -to make reforms on the lines marked out by the ideal of public law. -He will not use revolutions, when these have been brought about by -natural causes, to extenuate still greater oppression than caused -them, but will regard them as the voice of nature, calling upon him -to make such thorough reforms as will bring about the only lasting -constitution, a lawful constitution based on the principles of -freedom.</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_149"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_149">[149]</a></span> It is still sometimes -denied that we find, in members of a civilised community, a -certain depravity rooted in the nature of man;<a id="FNanchor_C" -href="#Footnote_C" class="fnanchor">[C]</a> and it might, indeed, -be alleged with some show of truth that not an innate corruptness -in human nature, but the barbarism of men, the defect of a not yet -sufficiently developed culture, is the cause of the evident antipathy -to law which their attitude indicates. In the external relations of -states, however, human wickedness shows itself incontestably, without -any attempt at concealment. Within the state, it is covered over by -the compelling authority of civil laws. For, working against the -tendency every citizen has to commit acts of violence against his -neighbour, there is the much stronger force of the government which -not only gives an appearance of morality to the whole state (<i>causae -non causae</i>), but, by checking the outbreak of lawless propensities, -actually aids the moral qualities of men considerably, in their -development of a direct respect for the law. For every individual -thinks that he himself would hold the idea of right sacred and -follow faithfully what it prescribes, if only he could expect that -everyone else would do the same. This guarantee is in part given -to him by the government; and a great advance is made by this step -which is not deliberately moral, towards the ideal of fidelity to -the concept of duty for its own sake without thought of return. As, -however, every man’s good opinion of himself presupposes an evil -disposition in everyone else, we have an expression of their mutual -judgment of one another, namely, that when it comes to hard facts, -none of them are worth much; but whence this judgment comes remains -unexplained, as we cannot lay the blame on the nature of man, since -he is a being in the possession of freedom. The respect for the idea -of right, of which it is absolutely impossible for man to divest -himself, sanctions in the most solemn manner the theory of our power -to conform to its dictates. And hence every man sees himself obliged -to act in accordance with what the idea of right prescribes, whether -his neighbours fulfil their obligation or not.</p> - -<p class="p1" id="Footnote_C"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_C">[C]</a></span> This depravity of human nature -is denied by Rousseau, who held that the mind of man was naturally -inclined to virtue, and that good civil and social institutions -are all that is required. (<i>Discourse on the Sciences and Arts</i>, -1750.) Kant here takes sides with Hobbes against Rousseau. See -Kant’s <i>Theory of Ethics</i>, Abbott’s trans. (4th ed., 1889), p. 339 -<i>seq.</i>—esp. p. 341 and <i>note</i>. Cf. also Hooker’s <i>Ecclesiastical -Polity</i>, I. § 10:—“Laws politic, ordained for external order and -regiment amongst men, are never framed as they should be, unless -presuming the will of man to be inwardly obstinate, rebellious, -and averse from all obedience to the sacred laws of his nature; -in a word, unless presuming man to be, in regard of his depraved -mind, little better than a wild beast, they do accordingly provide, -notwithstanding, so to frame his outward actions, that they be no -hindrance unto the common good, for which societies are instituted.” -[Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_150"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_150">[150]</a></span> With regard to the meaning of -the moral law and its significance in the Kantian system of ethics, -see Abbott’s translation of the <i>Theory of Ethics</i> (1889), pp. 38, -45, 54, 55, 119, 282. [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_151"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_151">[151]</a></span> See Abbott’s trans., pp. 33, -34. [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_152"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_152">[152]</a></span> Matthew Arnold defines -politics somewhere as the art of “making reason and the will of God -prevail”—an art, one would say, difficult enough. [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_153"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_153">[153]</a></span> “When a king has dethroned -himself,” says Locke, (<i>On Civil Government</i>, Ch. XIX. § 239) “and -put himself in a state of war with his people, what shall hinder them -from prosecuting him who is no king, as they would any other man, who -has put himself into a state of war with them?” ... “The legislative -being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains -still <i>in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the -legislative</i>.” (<i>Op. cit.</i>, Ch. XIII. § 149.) And again, (<i>op. cit.</i>, -Ch. XI. § 134.) we find the words, “... over whom [<i>i.e.</i> society] no -body can have a power to make laws, but by their own consent, and by -authority received from them.” Cf. also Ch. XIX. § 228 <i>seq.</i></p> - -<p class="ti1">Hobbes represents the opposite point of view. “How -many kings,” he wrote, (Preface to the <i>Philosophical Rudiments -concerning Government and Society</i>) “and those good men too, hath -this one error, that a tyrant king might lawfully be put to death, -been the slaughter of! How many throats hath this false position cut, -that a prince for some causes may by some certain men be deposed! And -what bloodshed hath not this erroneous doctrine caused, that kings -are not superiors to, but administrators for the multitude!” This -“erroneous doctrine” Kant received from Locke through Rousseau. He -advocated, or at least practised as a citizen, a doctrine of passive -obedience to the state. A free press, he held, offered the only -lawful outlet for protest against tyranny. But, in theory, he was an -enemy to absolute monarchy. [Tr.]</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p id="Footnote_154"><span class="label"><a -href="#FNanchor_154">[154]</a></span> We can find the voucher for -maxims such as these in Herr Hofrichter Garve’s essay, <i>On the -Connection of Morals with Politics</i>, 1788. This worthy scholar -confesses at the very beginning that he is unable to give a -satisfactory answer to this question. But his sanction of such -maxims, even when coupled with the admission that he cannot -altogether clear away the arguments raised against them, seems to -be a greater concession in favour of those who shew considerable -inclination to abuse them, than it might perhaps be wise to admit.</p> -</div> - -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="transnote" id="tnote"> - <p class="tnotetit">Transcriber's note</p> - <ul> - <li>Original spelling was kept, but variant spellings were made consistent when a predominant usage was found.</li> - <li>Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected.</li> - <li>Blank pages have been skipped.</li> - <li>Footnotes have been renumbered and moved to the end of the book.</li> - </ul> -</div> - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Perpetual Peace, by -Immanuel Kant and Mary Campbell Smith - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PERPETUAL PEACE *** - -***** This file should be named 50922-h.htm or 50922-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/0/9/2/50922/ - -Produced by Turgut Dincer, Ramon Pajares Box and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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