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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bd68e84 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #50750 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/50750) diff --git a/old/50750-0.txt b/old/50750-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 80209a6..0000000 --- a/old/50750-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3870 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Officer's Manual, by Napoleon Bonaparte - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Officer's Manual - Napoleon's Maxims of War - -Author: Napoleon Bonaparte - -Release Date: December 23, 2015 [EBook #50750] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE OFFICER'S MANUAL *** - - - - -Produced by Shaun Pinder, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - - - - - - - - - THE OFFICER’S MANUAL. - - NAPOLEON’S - MAXIMS OF WAR. - - - RICHMOND, VA.: - WEST & JOHNSTON. - 1862. - - - - - EVANS & COGSWELL, PRINTERS. - NO. 3 BROAD ST., CHARLESTON, S. C. - - - - -RECOMMENDATION. - - -“After refreshing my memory by looking over again ‘The Officer’s -Manual,’ or ‘Maxims of Napoleon,’ I think I may safely recommend the -republication, in America, of the work in English, as likely to be -called for by many officers, regular and volunteer. It contains a -circle of maxims, deduced from the highest source of military science -and experience, with practical illustrations of the principles taken -from the most celebrated campaigns of modern times. The study of the -book cannot fail to set all young officers on a course of inquiry and -reflection greatly to their improvement. - - “WINFIELD SCOTT.” - - - - -PREFACE. - - -The publisher has reissued this little volume as a publication timely -for the occasion. A collection of maxims which directed the military -operations of the greatest captain of modern times, cannot fail to -prove of great use to such young officers as really desire a knowledge -of the art of war. The maxims are illustrated by instances drawn from -the campaigns of Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Frederick, and Napoleon. -These great men were all governed by the same principles, and it is by -applying these principles to the perusal of their respective campaigns, -that every military man will recognize their wisdom, and make such use -of them hereafter as his own particular genius shall point out. - -“And here, perhaps,” says the translator, Col. D’Aguilar, “my task -might have been considered finished; but perceiving how incomplete -the collection was alone, I have endeavored to supply the deficiency -by having recourse for further illustration to the memoirs of -Montécuculli, and the instructions of Frederick to his generals. The -analogy of their principles with those of Napoleon, has convinced me -that the art of war is susceptible of two points of view: one, which -relates entirely to the acquirements and genius of the general; the -other, which refers to matters of detail. - -“The first is the same in all ages, and with all nations, whatever be -the arms with which they fight. Hence it follows that, in every age, -great commanders have been governed by the same principles. - -“The business of detail, on the contrary, is controlled by existing -circumstances. It varies with the character of a people, and the -quality of their arms. - -“It is with a view to impress the justice of this remark, that I have -sought for facts in different periods of history, to illustrate these -maxims, and to prove that nothing is _problematical_ in war; but that -failure and success in military operations depend almost always on the -natural genius and science of the chief.” - - - - -NAPOLEON’S - -MAXIMS OF WAR. - - - - -MAXIM I. - - -The frontiers of states are either large rivers, or chains of -mountains, or deserts. Of all these obstacles to the march of an army, -the most difficult to overcome is the desert; mountains come next, and -broad rivers occupy the third place. - - -NOTE. - -Napoleon, in his military career, appears to have been called upon to -surmount every difficulty which can occur in wars of invasion. - -In Egypt he traversed deserts, and vanquished and destroyed the -Mamelukes, so celebrated for their address and courage. His genius -knew how to accommodate itself to all the dangers of this distant -enterprise, in a country ill adapted to supply the wants of his troops. - -In the conquest of Italy, he twice crossed the Alps by the most -difficult passes, and at a season, too, which rendered this undertaking -still more formidable. In three months he passed the Pyrenees, defeated -and dispersed four Spanish armies. In short, from the Rhine to the -Borysthenes, no natural obstacle could be found to arrest the rapid -march of his victorious army. - - - - -MAXIM II. - - -In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee -everything the enemy may do, and to be prepared with the necessary -means to counteract it. - -Plans of campaign may be modified _ad infinitum_ according to -circumstances--the genius of the general, the character of the troops, -and the topography of the theatre of action. - - -NOTE. - -Sometimes we see a hazardous campaign succeed, the plan of which is -directly at variance with the principles of the art of war. But this -success depends generally on the caprice of fortune, or upon faults -committed by the enemy--two things upon which a general must never -count. Sometimes the plan of a campaign, although based on sound -principles of war, runs the risk of failing at the outset if opposed -by an adversary who acts at first on the defensive, and then, suddenly -seizing the initiative, surprises by the skilfulness of his manœuvres. -Such was the fate of the plan laid down by the Aulic council for the -campaign of 1796, under the command of Marshal Wurmser. From his -great numerical superiority, the marshal had calculated on the entire -destruction of the French army, by cutting off its retreat. He founded -his operations on the defensive attitude of his adversary, who was -posted on the line of the Adige, and had to cover the siege of Mantua, -as well as central and lower Italy. - -Wurmser, supposing the French army fixed in the neighborhood of -Mantua, divided his forces into three corps, which marched separately, -intending to unite at that place. Napoleon, having penetrated the -design of the Austrian general, perceived the advantage to be derived -from striking the first blow against an army divided into three corps, -with no communication between them. He hastened, therefore, to raise -the siege of Mantua, assembled the whole of his forces, and by this -means became superior to the imperialists, whose divisions he attacked -and beat in detail. Thus Wurmser, who fancied he had only to march -to certain victory, saw himself compelled, after ten days campaign, -to retire with the remains of his army into the Tyrol, after a loss -of twenty-five thousand men in killed and wounded, fifteen thousand -prisoners, nine stand of colors, and seventy pieces of cannon. - -Hence, nothing is so difficult as to prescribe beforehand to a general -the line of conduct he shall pursue during the course of a campaign. -Success must often depend on circumstances that cannot be foreseen; -and it should be remembered, likewise, that nothing cramps so much the -efforts of genius as compelling the head of an army to be governed by -any will but his own. - - - - -MAXIM III. - - -An army which undertakes the conquest of a country, has its two -wings resting either upon neutral territories, or upon great natural -obstacles, such as rivers or chains of mountains. It happens in some -cases that only one wing is so supported; and in others that both are -exposed. - -In the first instance cited, viz., where both wings are protected, -a general has only to protect his front from being penetrated. In -the second, where one wing only is supported, he should rest upon -the supported wing. In the third, where both wings are exposed, he -should depend upon a central formation, and never allow the different -corps under his command to depart from this: for if it be difficult -to contend with the disadvantage of having _two_ flanks exposed, -the inconvenience is doubled by having _four_, trebled if there be -_six_--that is to say, if the army is divided into two or three -different corps. In the first instance, then, as above quoted, the line -of operation may rest indifferently on the right or on the left. In -the second, it should be directed toward the wing in support. In the -third, it should be perpendicular to the centre of the army’s line of -march. But in all these cases it is necessary, at a distance of every -five or six days march, to have a strong post or an entrenched position -upon the line of operation, in order to collect military stores and -provisions, to organize convoys, to form of it a centre of movement, -and establish a point of defence to shorten the line of operation of -the army. - - -NOTE. - -These general principles in the art of war were entirely unknown, or -lost sight of, in the middle ages. The crusaders in their incursions -into Palestine appear to have had no object but to fight and to -conquer, so little pains did they take to profit by their victories. -Hence, innumerable armies perished in Syria, without any other -advantage than that derived from the momentary success obtained by -superior numbers. - -It was by the neglect of these principles, also, that Charles XII, -abandoning his line of operation and all communication with Sweden, -threw himself into the Ukraine, and lost the greater part of his army -by the fatigue of a winter campaign in a barren country destitute of -resources. - -Defeated at Pultawa, he was obliged to seek refuge in Turkey, after -crossing the Nieper with the remains of his army, diminished to little -more than one thousand men. - -Gustavus Adolphus was the first who brought back the art of war to its -true principles. His operations in Germany were bold, rapid, and well -executed. He made success at all times conducive to future security, -and established his line of operation so as to prevent the possibility -of any interruption in his communications with Sweden. His campaigns -form a new era in the art of war. - - - - -MAXIM IV. - - -When the conquest of a country is undertaken by two or three armies, -which have each their separate line of operation, until they arrive at -a point fixed upon for their concentration, it should be laid down as a -principle, that the union of these different corps should never take -place near the enemy; because the enemy, in uniting his forces, may not -only prevent this junction, but may beat the armies in detail. - - -NOTE. - -In the campaign of 1757, Frederick, marching to the conquest of Bohemia -with two armies, which had each their separate line of operation, -succeeded, notwithstanding, in uniting them in sight of the Duke of -Lorraine, who covered Prague with the imperial army; but his example -should not be followed. The success of this march depended entirely on -the inaction of the duke, who, at the head of seventy thousand men, did -nothing to prevent the junction of the two Prussian armies. - - - - -MAXIM V. - - -All wars should be governed by certain principles, for every war should -have a definite object, and be conducted according to the rules of -art. (A war should only be undertaken with forces proportioned to the -obstacles to be overcome.) - - -NOTE. - -It was a saying of Marshal Villars, that when war is decided on, it is -necessary to have exact information of the number of troops the enemy -can bring into the field, since it is impossible to lay down any solid -plan of offensive or defensive operation without an accurate knowledge -of what you have to expect and fear. “When the first shot is fired,” -observes Marshal Villars, “no one can calculate what will be the issue -of the war. It is, therefore, of vast importance to reflect maturely -before we begin it.” When once, however, this is decided, the marshal -observes that the boldest and most extended plans are generally the -wisest and the most successful. “When we are determined upon war,” he -adds, “we should carry it on vigorously and without trifling.” - - - - -MAXIM VI. - - -At the commencement of a campaign, to _advance_ or _not to advance_, -is a matter for grave consideration; but when once the offensive has -been assumed, it must be sustained to the last extremity. However -skilful the manœuvres in a retreat, it will always weaken the _morale_ -of an army, because, in losing the chances of success, these last are -transferred to the enemy. Besides, retreats always cost more men and -_materiel_ than the most bloody engagements; with this difference, that -in a battle the enemy’s loss is nearly equal to your own--whereas in a -retreat the loss is on your side only. - - -NOTE. - -Marshal Saxe remarks, that no retreats are so favorable as those which -are made before a languid and unenterprising enemy, for when he pursues -with vigor, the retreat soon degenerates into a rout. “Upon this -principle it is a great error,” says the marshal, “to adhere to the -proverb which recommends us to build a bridge of gold for a retreating -enemy. No; follow him up with spirit, and he is destroyed!” - - - - -MAXIM VII. - - -An army should be ready every day, every night, and at all times of the -day and night, to oppose all the resistance of which it is capable. -With this view, the soldier should always be furnished completely -with arms and ammunition; the infantry should never be without its -artillery, its cavalry, and its generals; and the different divisions -of the army should be constantly in a state to support, to be -supported, and to protect itself. - -The troops, whether halted, or encamped, or on the march, should be -always in favorable positions, possessing the essentials required for -a field of battle; for example, the flanks should be well covered, and -all the artillery so placed as to have free range, and to play with the -greatest advantage. When an army is in column of march, it should have -advanced guards and flanking parties, to examine well the country in -front, to the right, and to the left, and always at such distance as -to enable the main body to deploy into position. - - -NOTE. - -The following maxims, taken from the memoirs of Montécuculli, appear -to me well suited to this place, and calculated to form a useful -commentary on the general principles laid down in the preceding maxim: - -1. When war has been once decided on, the moment is past for doubts and -scruples. On the contrary, we are bound to hope that all the evil which -may ensue, will not; that Providence, or our own wisdom, may avert it; -or that the want of talent on the part of the enemy may prevent him -from benefiting by it. The first security for success is to confer the -command on one individual. When the authority is divided, the opinions -of the commanders often vary, and the operations are deprived of that -_ensemble_ which is the first essential to victory. Besides, when an -enterprise is common to many, and not confined to a single person, it -is conducted without vigor, and less interest is attached to the result. - -After having strictly conformed to all the rules of war, and satisfied -ourselves that nothing has been omitted to ensure eventual success, -we must then leave the issue in the hands of Providence, and repose -ourselves tranquilly in the decision of a higher power. - -Let what will arrive, it is the part of a general-in-chief to remain -firm and constant in his purposes; he must not allow himself to be -elated by prosperity, nor to be depressed by adversity: for in war good -and bad and fortune succeed each other by turns, form the ebb and flow -of military operations. - -2. When your own army is strong and inured to service, and that of the -enemy is weak and consists of new levies, or of troops enervated by -long inaction, then you should exert every means to bring him to battle. - -If, on the other hand, your adversary has the advantage in troops, a -decisive combat is to be avoided, and you must be content to impede -his progress, by encamping advantageously, and fortifying favorable -passes. When armies are nearly equal in force, it is desirable _not_ to -avoid a battle, but only to attempt to fight one to advantage. For this -purpose, care should be taken to encamp always in front of the enemy; -to move when he moves, and occupy the heights and advantageous grounds -that lie upon his line of march; to seize upon all the buildings and -roads adjoining to his camp, and post yourself advantageously in the -places by which he must pass. It is always something gained to make -_him_ lose time, to thwart his designs, or to retard their progress -and execution. If, however, an army is altogether inferior to that -of the enemy, and there is no possibility of manœuvring against him -with success, then the campaign must be abandoned, and the troops must -retire into the fortresses. - -3. The principal object of a general-in-chief, in the moment of battle, -should be to secure the flanks of his army. It is true that natural -positions may be found to effect this object, but these positions being -fixed and immovable in themselves, they are only advantageous to a -general who wishes to wait the shock of the enemy, and not to one who -marches to the attack. - -A general can, therefore, rely only on the proper arrangement of his -troops, to enable him to repel any attempt the adversary may make upon -the front, or flanks, or rear of his army. - -If one flank of an army rests upon a river, or an impassable ravine, -the whole of the cavalry may be posted with the other wing, in order to -envelop the enemy more easily by its superiority in numbers. - -If the enemy has his flanks supported by woods, light cavalry or -infantry should be despatched to attack him in flank or in rear during -the heat of the battle. If practicable, also, an attack should be made -upon the baggage, to add to his confusion. - -If you desire to beat the enemy’s left with your right wing, or his -right with your left wing, the wing with which you attack should be -reinforced by the _élite_ of your army. At the same moment, the other -wing should avoid battle, and the attacking wing brought rapidly -forward, so as to overwhelm the enemy. If the nature of the ground -admits, he should be approached by stealth, and attacked before he -is on his guard. If any signs of fear are discoverable in the enemy, -and which are always to be detected by confusion or disorder in his -movements, he should be pursued immediately, without allowing him -time to recover himself. It is now the cavalry should be brought into -action, and manœuvre so as to surprise and cut off his artillery and -baggage. - -4. The order of march should always be subservient to the order of -battle, which last should be arranged beforehand. The march of an army -is always well regulated when it is governed by the distance to be -accomplished, and by the time required for its performance. The front -of the column of march should be diminished or increased according -to the nature of the country, taking care that the artillery always -proceeds by the main road. - -When a river is to be passed, the artillery should be placed in battery -upon the bank opposite the point of crossing. - -It is a great advantage, when a river forms a sweep or angle, and -when a ford is to be found near the place where you wish to effect a -passage. As the construction of the bridge proceeds, infantry should -be advanced to cover the workmen, by keeping up a fire on the opposite -bank; but the moment it is finished, a corps of infantry and cavalry, -and some field-pieces, should be pushed across. The infantry should -entrench itself immediately at the head of the bridge, and it is -prudent, moreover, to fortify on the same side of the river, in order -to protect the bridge in case the enemy should venture an offensive -movement. - -The advanced guard of an army should be always provided with trusty -guides, and with a corps of pioneers: the first to point out the best -roads, the second to render these roads more practicable. - -If the army marches in detachments, the commander of each detachment -should be furnished with the name of the place in writing, where the -whole are to be reassembled; the place should be sufficiently removed -from the enemy to prevent him from occupying it before the junction of -all the detachments. To this end, it is of importance to keep the name -a secret. - -From the moment an army approaches the enemy, it should march in -the order in which it is intended to fight. If anything is to be -apprehended, precautions are necessary in proportion to the degree of -the danger. When a defile is to be passed, the troops should be halted -beyond the extremity, until the whole army has quitted the defile. - -In order to conceal the movements of an army, it is necessary to march -by night through woods and valleys, by the most retired roads, and out -of reach of all inhabited places. No fires should be allowed; and, to -favor the design still more, the troops should move by verbal order. -When the object of the march is to carry a post, or to relieve a place -that is besieged, the advanced guard should march within musket shot of -the main body, because then you are prepared for an immediate attack, -and ready to overthrow all before you. - -When a march is made to force a pass guarded by the enemy, it is -desirable to make a feint upon one point, while, by a rapid movement, -you bring your real attack to bear upon another. - -Sometimes success is obtained by pretending to fall back upon the -original line of march, and, by a sudden countermarch, seizing upon -the pass, before the enemy is able to reoccupy it. Some generals have -gained their point by manœuvring so as to deceive the enemy, while a -detachment under the cover of high grounds has surprised the passage by -a stolen march. The enemy being engaged in watching the movements of -the main body, the detachment has an opportunity of entrenching itself -in its new position. - -5. An army regulates its mode of encampment according to the greater or -less degree of precaution, when circumstances require. In a friendly -country the troops are divided, to afford better accommodation and -supplies. But with the enemy in front, an army should always encamp in -order of battle. With this view, it is of the highest importance to -cover one part of the camp, as far as practicable, by natural defences, -such as a river, a chain of rocks, or a ravine. Care should be taken -also that the camp is not commanded, and that there is no obstacle to a -free communication between the different corps, and which can prevent -the troops from mutually succoring each other. - -When an army occupies a fixed camp, it is necessary to be well supplied -with provisions and ammunition, or at least that these should be -within certain reach and easily obtained. To insure this, the line of -communication must be well established, and care taken not to leave an -enemy’s fortress in your rear. - -When an army is established in winter quarters, its safety is best -secured either by fortifying a camp (for which purpose a spot should be -selected near a large commercial town, or a river affording facility -of transport), or by distributing it in close cantonments, so that the -troops should be near together, and capable of affording each other -mutual support. - -The winter quarters of an army should be protected, likewise, by -constructing small covered works on all the lines of approach to the -cantonments, and by posting advanced guards of cavalry to observe the -motions of the enemy. - -6. A battle is to be sought, when there is reason to hope for victory, -or when an army runs the risk of being ruined without fighting; also -when a besieged place is to be relieved, or when you desire to prevent -a reinforcement from reaching the enemy. Battles are useful, likewise, -when we wish to profit by a favorable opportunity which offers, to -secure a certain advantage, such as seizing upon an undefended point or -pass, attacking the enemy when he has committed a fault, or when some -misunderstanding among his generals favors the undertaking. - -If an enemy declines an engagement, he may be compelled to it, either -by besieging a place of importance, or by falling upon him unawares, -and when he cannot easily effect his retreat. Or (after pretending to -retire), by making a rapid countermarch, attacking him vigorously and -forcing him to action. - -The different circumstances under which a battle should be avoided -or declined, are, when there is greater danger to be apprehended -from defeat than advantage to be derived from victory; when you -are very inferior to your adversary in numbers, and are expecting -reinforcements; above all, when the enemy is advantageously posted, or -when he is contributing to his own ruin by some inherent defect in his -position, or by the errors and divisions of his generals. - -To gain a battle, each arm must be advantageously posted, and have the -means of engaging its front and in flank. The wings must be protected -by natural obstacles, where these present themselves, or by having -recourse when necessary to the aid of art. - -The troops must be able to assist each other without confusion, and -care must be taken that the broken corps do not fall back upon, and -throw the rest into disorder. Above all, the intervals between the -different corps must be sufficiently small to prevent the enemy from -penetrating between them, for in that case you would be obliged to -employ your reserves, and run the risk of being entirely overwhelmed. -Sometimes victory is obtained by creating a diversion in the middle of -a battle, or even by depriving the soldier of all hope of retreat, and -placing him in a situation where he is reduced to the necessity either -to conquer or die. - -At the commencement of a battle, if the ground is level, you should -advance to meet the enemy, in order to inspire the soldier with -courage; but if you are well posted, and your artillery advantageously -placed, then wait for him with determination: remembering always to -fight resolutely, to succor opportunely those who require it, and never -to bring your reserves into action except in the last extremity; and -even then to preserve some support, behind which the broken corps may -rally. - -When it is necessary to attack with your whole force, the battle -should commence toward evening; because then, whatever be the issue, -night will arrive to separate the combatants before your troops are -exhausted. By this means, an opportunity is afforded of affecting an -orderly retreat if the result of the battle requires it. - -During an action, the general-in-chief should occupy some spot whence -he can, as far as possible, overlook his whole army. He should be -informed, immediately, of everything that passes in the different -divisions. He should be ready, in order to render success more -complete, to operate with fresh troops upon those points where the -enemy is giving way, and also to reinforce his own corps wherever they -are inclined to yield. When the enemy is beaten, he must pursue him -instantly, without giving him a moment to rally; on the other hand, if -he is himself defeated, or despairs of victory, he must retreat in the -best possible order. - -7. It shows great talent in a general to bring troops, who are prepared -for action, into collision with those who are not: for example, fresh -troops against those which are exhausted--brave and disciplined men -against recruits. He must likewise be ready always to fall with his -army upon a weak or detached corps, to follow the track of the enemy, -and charge him among defiles before he can face about and get into -position. - -8. A position is good when the different corps are so placed as to be -engaged with advantage, and without any remaining unemployed. If you -are superior in cavalry, positions are to be taken in plains and open -ground; if in infantry, in an enclosed and covered country. If inferior -in numbers, in confined and narrow places; if superior, in a spacious -and extensive field. With a very inferior army, a difficult pass must -be selected to occupy and fortify. - -9. In order to obtain every possible advantage from a diversion, we -should ascertain first, that the country in which it is to be created -is easily penetrated. A diversion should be made vigorously, and on -those points where it is calculated to do the greatest mischief to the -enemy. - -10. To make war with success, the following principles should never be -departed from: - -To be superior to your enemy in numbers, as well as in _morale_; to -fight battles in order to spread terror in the country; to divide your -army into as many corps as may be effected without risk, in order to -undertake several objects at the same time; to treat WELL those who -yield, to ILL treat those who resist; to secure your rear, and occupy -and strengthen yourself at the outset in some post which shall serve -as a central point for the support of your future movements; to -guard against desertion; to make yourself master of the great rivers -and principal passes, and to establish your line of communication by -getting possession of the fortresses, by laying siege to them, and -of the open country, by giving battle; for it is vain to expect that -conquests are to be achieved without combats; although when a victory -is won, they will be best maintained by uniting mildness with valor. - - - - -MAXIM VIII. - - -A general-in-chief should ask himself frequently in the day: “What -should I do if the enemy’s army appeared now in my front, or on my -right, or my left?” If he have any difficulty in answering these -questions, his position is bad, and he should seek to remedy it. - - -NOTE. - -In the campaign of 1758, the position of the Prussian army at Hohen -Kirk, being commanded by the batteries of the enemy, who occupied all -the heights, was eminently defective; notwithstanding, Frederick, -who saw his rear menaced by the corps of Laudon, remained six days -in his camp without seeking to correct his position. It would seem, -indeed, that he was ignorant of his real danger: for Marshal Daun, -having manœuvred during the night in order to attack by daybreak, -surprised the Prussians in their lines before they were able to defend -themselves, and by this means surrounded them completely. - -Frederick succeeded, however, in effecting his retreat with regularity, -but not without the loss of ten thousand men, many general officers, -and almost all of his artillery. If Marshal Daun had followed up his -victory with greater boldness, the king of Prussia would never have -been able to rally his army. On this occasion, Frederick’s good fortune -balanced his imprudence. - -Marshal Saxe remarks, that there is more talent than is dreamt of in -bad dispositions, if we possess the art of converting them into good -ones when the favorable moment arrives. Nothing astonishes the enemy -so much as this manœuvre; he has counted upon _something_; all his -arrangements have been founded upon it accordingly--and at the moment -of attack it escapes him! “I must repeat,” says the marshal, “there -is nothing that so completely disconcerts an enemy as this, or leads -him to commit so many errors; for it follows, that if he does _not_ -change his arrangements, he is beaten; and if he _does_ change them, in -presence of his adversary, he is equally undone.” - -It seems to me, however, that a general who should rest the success of -a battle upon such a principle, would be more likely to lose than to -gain by it; for if he had to deal with a skilful adversary and an alert -tactician, the latter would find time to take advantage of the previous -bad arrangements, before he would be able to remedy them. - - - - -MAXIM IX. - - -The strength of an army, like the power in mechanics, is estimated -by multiplying the mass by the rapidity; a rapid march augments the -_morale_ of an army, and increases its means of victory. Press on! - - -NOTE. - -“Rapidity,” says Montécuculli, “is of importance in concealing the -movements of an army, because it leaves no time to divulge the -intention of its chief. It is, therefore, an advantage to attack the -enemy unexpectedly, to take him off his guard, to surprise him, and -let him feel the thunder before he sees the flash; but if too great -celerity exhausts your troops, while, on the other hand, delay deprives -you of the favorable moment, you must weigh the advantage against the -disadvantage, and choose between.” - -Marshal Villars observes, that “in war everything depends upon being -able to deceive the enemy; and having once gained this point, in never -allowing him time to recover himself.” Villars has united practice to -precept. His bold and rapid marches were almost always crowned with -success. - -It was the opinion of Frederick that all wars should be short and -rapid; because a long war insensibly relaxes discipline, depopulates -the state, and exhausts its resources. - - - - -MAXIM X. - - -When an army is inferior in number, inferior in cavalry, and in -artillery, it is essential to avoid a general action. The first -deficiency should be supplied by rapidity of movement; the want of -artillery, by the nature of the manœuvres; and the inferiority in -cavalry, by the choice of positions. In such circumstances, the -_morale_ of the soldier does much. - - -NOTE. - -The campaign of 1814 in France was skilfully executed upon these -principles. Napoleon, with an army inferior in number, an army -discouraged by the disastrous retreats of Moscow and of Leipzig, and -still more by the presence of the enemy in the French territory, -contrived, notwithstanding, to supply his vast inequality of force by -the rapidity and combination of his movements. By the success obtained -at Champ-Aubert, Montmirail, Montereau, and Rheims, he began to restore -the _morale_ of the French army. The numerous recruits of which it -was composed, had already acquired that steadiness of which the old -regiments afforded them an example, when the capture of Paris, and the -astonishing revolution it produced, compelled Napoleon to lay down his -arms. - -But this consequence resulted rather from the force of circumstances -than from any absolute necessity; for Napoleon, by carrying his army to -the other side of the Loire, might easily have formed a junction with -the armies of the Alps and Pyrenees, and have reappeared on the field -of battle at the head of a hundred thousand men. Such a force would -have amply sufficed to re-establish the chances of war in his favor; -more especially as the armies of the allied sovereigns were obliged to -manœuvre upon the French territory with all the strong places of Italy -and France in their rear. - - - - -MAXIM XI. - - -To direct operations with lines far removed from each other, and -without communications, is to commit a fault which always gives birth -to a second. The detached column has only its orders for the first -day. Its operations on the following day depend upon what may have -happened to the main body. Thus, this column either loses time upon -emergency, in waiting for orders, or it will act without them, and at -hazard. Let it therefore be held as a principle, that an army should -always keep its columns so united as to prevent the enemy from passing -between them with impunity. Whenever, for particular reasons, this -principle is departed from, the detached corps should be independent in -their operations. They should move toward a point fixed upon for their -future junction. They should advance without hesitating, and without -waiting for fresh orders; and every precaution should be taken to -prevent an attack upon them in detail. - - -NOTE. - -The Austrian army, commanded by Field-marshal Alvinzi, was divided into -two corps, destined to act independently, until they should accomplish -their junction before Mantua. The first of these corps, consisting -of forty-five thousand men, was under the orders of Alvinzi. It was -to debouch by Monte Baldo, upon the positions occupied by the French -army on the Adige. The second corps, commanded by General Provéra, -was destined to act upon the lower Adige, and to raise the blockade -of Mantua. Napoleon, informed of the enemy’s movements, but not -entirely comprehending his projects, confined himself to concentrating -his masses, and giving orders to the troops to hold themselves in -readiness to manœuvre. In the meantime, fresh information satisfied the -general-in-chief of the French army that the corps which had debouched -by La Coronna, over Monte Baldo, was endeavoring to form a junction -with its cavalry and artillery--both which, having crossed the Adige at -Dolce, were directing their march upon the plateau of Rivoli, by the -great road leading by Incanole. - -Napoleon immediately foresaw that, by having possession of the plateau, -he should be able to prevent this junction, and obtain all the -advantages of the initiative. He accordingly put his troops in motion, -and at two o’clock in the morning occupied that important position. -Once master of the point fixed upon for the junction of the Austrian -columns, success followed all his dispositions. He repulsed every -attack, made seven thousand prisoners, and took several standards and -twelve pieces of cannon. At two o’clock in the afternoon, the battle of -Rivoli was already gained, when Napoleon, learning that General Provéra -had passed the Adige at Anghiari, and was directing his march upon -Mantua, left to his generals the charge of following up the retreat of -Alvinzi, and placed himself at the head of a division for the purpose -of defeating the designs of Provéra. - -By a rapid march, he again succeeded in the initiatory movement, and -in preventing the garrison of Mantua from uniting its force with -the relieving army. The corps intrusted with the blockade, eager to -distinguish itself under the eyes of the conqueror of Rivoli, compelled -the garrison to retire into the place, while the division of Victor, -forgetting the fatigues of a forced march, rushed with impetuosity on -the relieving army in front. At this moment a sortie from the lines -of St. George took him in flank, while the corps of Augereau, which -had followed the march of the Austrian general, attacked him in rear. -Provéra, surrounded on all sides, capitulated. The result of these two -battles cost the Austrians three thousand men in killed and wounded, -twenty-two thousand prisoners, twenty-four standards, and forty-six -pieces of cannon. - - - - -MAXIM XII. - - -An army ought to have only one line of operation. This should be -preserved with care, and never abandoned but in the last extremity. - - -NOTE. - -“The line of communication of an army,” says Montécuculli, “must be -certain and well established, for every army that acts from a distant -base, and is not careful to keep this line perfectly open, marches upon -a precipice. It moves to certain ruin, as may be seen by an infinity -of examples. In fact, if the road by which provisions, ammunition and -reinforcements are to be brought up, is not entirely secured--if the -magazines, the hospitals, the depôts of arms, and the places of supply -are not fixed and commodiously situated--not only the army cannot keep -the field, but it will be exposed to the greatest dangers.” - - - - -MAXIM XIII. - - -The distances permitted between corps of an army upon the march must be -governed by the localities, by circumstances, and by the object in view. - - -NOTE. - -When an army moves at a distance from the enemy, the columns may be -disposed along the road so as to favor the artillery and baggage. But -when it is marching into action, the different corps must be formed in -close columns in order of battle. The generals must take care that the -heads of the columns, which are to attack together, do not outstep each -other, and that in approaching the field of action they preserve the -relative intervals required for deployment. - -“The marches that are made preparatory to a battle require,” says -Frederick, “the greatest precaution.” With this view, he recommends -his generals to be particularly on their guard, and to reconnoitre -the ground at successive distances, in order to secure the initiative -by occupying those positions most calculated to favor an attack. On -a retreat, it is the opinion of many generals that an army should -concentrate its forces, and march in close columns if it is still -strong enough to resume the offensive; for by this means it is easy -to form the line when a favorable opportunity presents itself, either -for holding the enemy in check or for attacking him if he is not in a -situation to accept battle. - -Such was Moreau’s retreat after the passage of the Adda by the -Austro-Russian army. The French general, after having covered the -evacuation of Milan, took up a position between the Po and the Tanaro. - -His camp rested upon Alexandria and Valentia, two capital fortresses, -and had the advantage of covering the roads to Turin and Savona, by -which he could effect his retreat in case he was unable to accomplish a -junction with the _corps d’armee_ of Macdonald, who had been ordered to -quit the kingdom of Naples, and hasten his march into Tuscany. - -Forced to abandon his position in consequence of the insurrection in -Piedmont and Tuscany, Moreau retired upon Asti, where he learned that -his communication with the river of Genoa had just been cut off by the -capture of Ceva. After several ineffectual attempts to retake this -place, he saw that his only safety depended upon throwing himself into -the mountains. - -To effect this object, he directed the whole of his battering train -and heavy baggage by the Col de Fenestrelle upon France; then opening -himself a way over the St. Bernard, he gained Loano with his light -artillery and the small proportion of field equipment he had been able -to preserve. - -By this skilful movement, he not only retained his communications with -France, but was enabled to observe the motions of the army from Naples, -and to facilitate his junction with it by directing the whole of his -force upon the points necessary for that purpose. - -Macdonald, in the meantime, whose only chance of success depended on -concentrating his little army, neglected this precaution, and was -beaten in three successive actions at the Trebia. - -By this retardment of his march, he rendered all Moreau’s measures to -unite the two armies in the plains of the Po useless, and his retreat, -after his brilliant but fruitless efforts at the Trebia, defeated the -other arrangements, also, which the former had made to come to his -support. The inactivity of Marshal Suwarrow, however, finally enabled -the French general to accomplish his junction with the remains of the -army from Naples. Moreau then concentrated his whole force upon the -Appenines, and placed himself in a situation to defend the important -positions of Liguria, until the chances of war should afford him an -opportunity of resuming the offensive. - -When, after a decisive battle, an army has lost its artillery and -equipments, and is consequently no longer in a state to assume the -offensive, or even to arrest the pursuit of the enemy, it would -seem most desirable to divide what remains into several corps, and -order them to march by separate and distant routes upon the base of -operation, and throw themselves into the fortresses. This is the only -means of safety: for the enemy, uncertain as to the precise direction -taken by the vanquished army, is ignorant in the first instance which -corps to pursue, and it is in this moment of indecision that a march is -gained upon him. Besides, the movements of a small body being so much -easier than those of a larger one, these separate lines of march are -all in favor of a retreating army. - - - - -MAXIM XIV. - - -Among mountains, a great number of positions are always to be found -very strong in themselves, and which it is dangerous to attack. The -character of this mode of warfare consists in occupying camps on the -flanks or in the rear of the enemy, leaving him only the alternative -of abandoning his position without fighting, to take up another in -the rear, or to descend from it in order to attack you. In mountain -warfare, the assailant has always the disadvantage; even in offensive -warfare in the open field, the great secret consists in defensive -combats, and in obliging the enemy to attack. - - -NOTE. - -During the campaign of 1793, in the Maritime Alps, the French army, -under the orders of General Brunet, did all in its power to get -possession of the camps at Raus and at Fourches, by an attack in front. -But these useless efforts served only to increase the courage of the -Piedmontese, and to destroy the _élite_ of the grenadiers of the -republican army. The manœuvres by which Napoleon, without fighting, -compelled the enemy to evacuate these positions in 1796, suffice to -establish the truth of these principles, and to prove how much success -in war depends upon the genius of the general as well as on the courage -of the soldier. - - - - -MAXIM XV. - - -The first consideration with a general who offers battle, should be the -glory and honor of his arms; the safety and preservation of his men is -only the second; but it is in the enterprise and courage resulting -from the former, that the latter will most assuredly be found. In a -retreat, besides the honor of the army, the loss of life is often -greater than in two battles. For this reason, we should never despair -while brave men are to be found with their colors. It is by this means -that we obtain victory, and deserve to obtain it. - - -NOTE. - -In 1645, the French army, under the orders of the Prince of Condé, was -on the march to lay siege to Nordlingen, when it was discovered that -Count Merci, who commanded the Bavarians, had foreseen this intention, -and had entrenched himself in a strong position which defended -Nordlingen at the same time that it covered Donawerth. - -Notwithstanding the favorable position of the enemy, Condé ordered the -attack. The combat was terrible. All the infantry in the centre and on -the right, after being successively engaged, was routed and dispersed, -in spite of the efforts of the cavalry and the reserve, which were -likewise carried away with the fugitives. The battle was lost. Condé, -in despair, having no longer either centre or right to depend upon, -collected the remnants of his battalions, and directed his march to the -left, where Turenne was still engaged. This perseverance reanimated -the ardor of the troops. They broke the right wing of the enemy, -and Turenne, by a change of front, returned to the attack upon his -centre. Night, too, favored the boldness of Condé. An entire corps of -Bavarians, fancying themselves cut off, laid down their arms; and the -obstinacy of the French general in this struggle for victory was repaid -by possession of the field of battle, together with a great number of -prisoners, and almost all the enemy’s artillery. The Bavarian army beat -a retreat, and the next day Nordlingen capitulated. - - - - -MAXIM XVI. - - -It is an approved maxim in war, never to do what the enemy wishes you -to do, for this reason alone, that he desires it. A field of battle, -therefore, which he has previously studied and reconnoitred, should -be avoided, and double care should be taken where he has had time to -fortify and entrench. One consequence deducible from this principle is, -never to attack a position in front which you can gain by turning. - - -NOTE. - -It was without due regard to this principle, that Marshal Villeroi, on -assuming the command of the army of Italy, during the campaign of 1701, -attacked, with unwarrantable presumption, Prince Eugene, of Savoy, in -his entrenched position of Chiavi, on the Oglio. The French generals, -Catinat among the rest, considered the post unassailable, but Villeroi -insisted, and the result of this otherwise unimportant battle was the -loss of the _élite_ of the French army. It would have been greater -still, but for Catinat’s exertions. - -It was by neglecting the same principle, that the Prince of Condé, in -the campaign of 1644, failed in all his attacks upon the entrenched -position of the Bavarian army. The Count Merci, who commanded the -latter, had drawn up his cavalry skilfully upon the plain, resting -upon Freyberg, while his infantry occupied the mountain. After many -fruitless attempts, the Prince of Condé, seeing the impossibility of -dislodging the enemy, began to menace his communications--but the -moment Merci perceived this, he broke up his camp and retired beyond -the Black mountains. - - - - -MAXIM XVII. - - -In a war of march and manœuvre, if you would avoid a battle with a -superior army, it is necessary to entrench every night, and occupy a -good defensive position. Those natural positions which are ordinarily -met with, are not sufficient to protect an army against superior -numbers without recourse to art. - - -NOTE. - -The campaign of the French and Spanish army, commanded by the Duke -of Berwick, against the Portuguese, in the year 1706, affords a good -lesson on this subject. The two armies made almost the tour of Spain. -They began the campaign near Badajoz, and after manœuvring across both -Castiles, finished it in the kingdoms of Valencia and Murcia. The -Duke of Berwick encamped his army eighty-five times, and although the -campaign passed without a general action, he took about ten thousand -prisoners from the enemy. Marshal Turenne also made a fine campaign of -manœuvre against the Count Montécuculli, in 1675. - -The imperial army having made its arrangements to pass the Rhine at -Strasburg, Turenne used all diligence, and, throwing a bridge over the -river near the village of Ottenheim, three leagues below Strasburg, he -crossed with the French army, and encamped close to the little town -of Vilstet, which he occupied. This position covered the bridge of -Strasburg, so that, by this manœuvre, Turenne deprived the enemy of all -approach to that city. - -Upon this, Montécuculli made a movement with his whole army, -threatening the bridge at Ottenheim, by which the French received their -provisions from upper Alsace. - -As soon as Turenne discovered the design of the enemy, he left a -detachment at Vilstet, and made a rapid march with his whole force -upon the village of Altenheim. This intermediate position between -the two bridges, which he wished to preserve, gave him the advantage -of being able to succor either of these posts before the enemy had -time to carry them. Montécuculli seeing that any successful attack -upon the bridges was not to be expected, resolved to pass the Rhine -below Strasburg, and with this view returned to his first position -at Offenburg. Marshal Turenne, who followed all the movements of the -Austrian army, brought back his army also to Vilstet. - -In the meantime, this attempt of the enemy having convinced the French -general of the danger to which his bridge had exposed him, removed it -nearer to that of Strasburg, in order to diminish the extent of ground -he had to defend. - -Montécuculli, having commanded the magistrates of Strasburg to collect -materials for a bridge, moved to Scherzheim to receive them; but -Turenne again defeated his projects by taking a position at Freistett, -where he occupied the islands of the Rhine, and immediately constructed -a stockade. - -Thus it was that, during the whole of this campaign, Turenne succeeded -in gaining the initiative of the enemy, and obliging him to follow -his movements. He succeeded, also, by a rapid march, in cutting off -Montécuculli from the Town of Offenburg, whence he drew his supplies, -and would no doubt have prevented the Austrian general from effecting -his junction with the corps of Caprara, had not a cannon-shot -terminated this great man’s life. - - - - -MAXIM XVIII. - - -A general of ordinary talent occupying a bad position, and surprised -by a superior force, seeks his safety in retreat; but a great captain -supplies all deficiencies by his courage, and marches boldly to meet -the attack. By this means he disconcerts his adversary; and if the -latter shows any irresolution in his movements, a skilful leader, -profiting by his indecision, may even hope for victory, or at least -employ the day in manœuvring--at night he entrenches himself, or falls -back to a better position. By this determined conduct he maintains the -honor of his arms, the first essential to all military superiority. - - -NOTE. - -In 1653, Marshal Turenne was surprised by the Prince of Condé, in a -position where his army was completely compromised. He had the power, -indeed, by an immediate retreat, of covering himself by the Somme, -which he possessed the means of crossing at Peronne, and whence he -was distant only half a league; but, fearing the influence of this -retrograde movement on the _morale_ of his army, Turenne balanced all -disadvantages by his courage, and marched boldly to meet the enemy with -very inferior forces. After marching a league, he found an advantageous -position, where he made every disposition for a battle. It was three -o’clock in the afternoon; but the Spaniards, exhausted with fatigue, -hesitated to attack him, and Turenne having covered himself with -entrenchments during the night, the enemy no longer dared to risk a -general action, and broke up his camp. - - - - -MAXIM XIX. - - -The transition from the defensive to the offensive is one of the most -delicate operations. - - -NOTE. - -By studying the first campaign of Napoleon in Italy, we can learn -what genius and boldness may effect in passing with an army from the -_defensive_ to the _offensive_. The army of the allies, commanded by -General Beaulieu, was provided with every means that could render it -formidable. Its force amounted to eighty thousand men, and two hundred -pieces of cannon. The French army, on the contrary, could number -scarcely thirty thousand men under arms, and thirty pieces of cannon. -For some time there had been no issue of meat, and even the bread -was irregularly supplied. The infantry was ill clothed, the cavalry -wretchedly mounted. All the draught-horses had perished from want, so -that the service of the artillery was performed by mules. To remedy -these evils, large disbursements were necessary; and such was the state -of the finances, that the government had only been able to furnish two -thousand louis in specie for the opening of the campaign. The French -army could not possibly exist in this state. To advance or retreat was -absolutely necessary. Aware of the advantage of surprising the enemy -at the very outset of the campaign by some decisive blow, Napoleon -prepared for it by recasting the _morale_ of his army. - -In a proclamation full of energy, he reminded them that an ignoble -death alone remained for them, if they continued on the defensive; -that they had nothing to expect from France, but everything to hope -from victory. “Abundance courts you in the fertile plains of Italy,” -said he; “are you deficient, soldiers, in constancy or in courage?” -Profiting by the moment of enthusiasm which he had inspired, Napoleon -concentrated his forces in order to fall with his whole weight on the -different corps of the enemy. Immediately afterward, the battles of -Montenotte, Milesimo, and Mondovi, added fresh confidence to the high -opinion already entertained by the soldier for his chief; and that army -which only a few days ago was encamped amid barren rocks, and consumed -by famine, already aspired to the conquest of Italy. In one month -after the opening of the campaign, Napoleon had terminated the war with -the King of Sardinia, and conquered the Milanese. Rich cantonments soon -dispelled from the recollection of the French soldier the misery and -fatigue attendant on this rapid march, while a vigilant administration -of the resources of the country reorganized the _materiel_ of the -French army, and created the means necessary for the attainment of -future success. - - - - -MAXIM XX. - - -It may be laid down as a principle, that the line of operation should -not be abandoned; but it is one of the most skilful manœuvres in war, -to know how to change it, when circumstances authorize or render this -necessary. An army which changes skilfully its line of operation -deceives the enemy, who becomes ignorant where to look for its rear, or -upon what weak points it is assailable. - - -NOTE. - -Frederick sometimes changed his line of operation in the middle of a -campaign; but he was enabled to do this, because he was manœuvring at -that time in the centre of Germany--an abundant country, capable of -supplying all the wants of his army in case his communications with -Prussia were intercepted. - -Marshal Turenne, in the campaign of 1746, gave up his line of -communication to the allies in the same manner; but, like Frederick, -he was carrying on the war at this time in the centre of Germany, and -having fallen with his whole forces upon Rain, he took the precaution -of securing to himself a depôt upon which to establish his base of -operation. - -By a series of manœuvres, marked alike by audacity and genius, he -subsequently compelled the imperial army to abandon its magazines, and -retire into Austria for winter quarters. - -But these are examples which it appears to me should only be imitated -when we have taken full measure of the capacity of our adversary, and -above all, when we see no reason to apprehend an insurrection in the -country to which we transfer the theatre of war. - - - - -MAXIM XXI. - - -When an army carries with it a battering train, or large convoys of -sick and wounded, it cannot march by too short a line upon its depôts. - - -NOTE. - -It is above all in mountainous countries, and in those interspersed -with woods and marshes, that it is of importance to observe this maxim; -for, the convoys and means of transport being frequently embarrassed -in defiles, an enemy by manœuvring may easily disperse the escorts, or -make even a successful attack upon the whole army, when it is obliged, -from the nature of the country, to march in an extended column. - - - - -MAXIM XXII. - - -The art of encamping in position is the same as taking up the line in -order of battle in this position. To this end, the artillery should be -advantageously placed, ground should be selected which is not commanded -or liable to be turned, and, as far as possible, the guns should cover -and command the surrounding country. - - -NOTE. - -Frederick has remarked that, in order to be assured that your camp is -well placed, you should see if, by making a small movement, you can -oblige the enemy to make a greater; or, if after having forced him to -retrograde one march you can compel him to fall back another. - -In defensive war, all camps should be entrenched in the front and -wings of the position they occupy, and care should be taken that the -rear is left perfectly open. If you are threatened with being turned, -arrangements should be made beforehand for taking up a more distant -position; and you should profit by any disorder in the enemy’s line of -march, to make an attempt upon his artillery or baggage. - - - - -MAXIM XXIII. - - -When you are occupying a position which the enemy threatens to -surround, collect all your force immediately, and menace _him_ with -an offensive movement. By this manœuvre, you will prevent him from -detaching and annoying your flanks in case you should judge it -necessary to retire. - - -NOTE. - -This was the manœuvre practised by General Desaix, in 1798, near -Radstadt. He made up for inferiority in numbers by audacity, and -maintained himself the whole day in position in spite of the vigorous -attacks of the Archduke Charles. At night he effected his retreat in -good order, and took up a position in the rear. - -It was in accordance, also, with this principle, in the same campaign, -that General Moreau gave battle at Biberach, to secure his retreat -by the passes of the Black mountains. A few days after, he fought at -Schliengen with the same object. Placed in a good defensive position, -he menaced the Archduke Charles by a sudden return to the offensive, -while his artillery and baggage were passing the Rhine by the bridge of -Huningen, and he was making all the necessary arrangements for retiring -behind that river himself. - -Here, however, I would observe, that the execution of such offensive -demonstrations should be deferred always till toward the evening, in -order that you may not be compromised by engaging too early in a combat -which you cannot long maintain with success. - -Night, and the uncertainty of the enemy after an affair of this kind, -will always favor your retreat, if it is judged necessary; but, -with a view to mask the operation more effectually, fires should be -lighted all along the lines, to deceive the enemy and prevent him from -discovering this retrograde movement, for in a retreat it is a great -advantage to gain a march upon your adversary. - - - - -MAXIM XXIV. - - -Never lose sight of this maxim: that you should establish your -cantonments at the most distant and best-protected point from the -enemy, especially where a surprise is possible. By this means you will -have time to unite all your forces before he can attack you. - - -NOTE. - -In the campaign of 1745, Marshal Turenne lost the battle of Marienthal, -by neglecting this principle; for if, instead of reassembling his -divisions at Erbsthausen, he had rallied his troops at Mergentheim, -behind the Tauber, his army would have been much sooner reunited; and -Count Merci, in place of finding only three thousand men to fight at -Erbsthausen (of which he was well informed), would have had the whole -French army to attack in a position covered by a river. - -Some one having indiscreetly asked Viscount Turenne how he had lost the -battle of Marienthal: “By my own fault,” replied the marshal; “but,” -added he, “when a man has committed no faults in war, he can only have -been engaged in it but a short time.” - - - - -MAXIM XXV. - - -When two armies are in order of battle, and one has to retire over a -bridge, while the other has the circumference of the circle open, all -the advantages are in favor of the latter. It is then a general should -show boldness, strike a decided blow, and manœuvre upon the flank of -his enemy. The victory is in his hands. - - -NOTE. - -This was the position of the French army at the famous battle of -Leipzig, which terminated the campaign of 1813 so fatally for Napoleon; -for the battle of Hanau was of no consequence, comparatively, in the -desperate situation of that army. - -It strikes me that, in a situation like that of the French army -previous to the battle of Leipzig, a general should never calculate -upon any of those lucky chances which may arise out of a return to the -offensive, but that he should rather adopt every possible means to -secure his retreat. With this view, he should immediately cover himself -with good entrenchments, to enable him to repel with inferior numbers -the attack of the enemy, while his own equipments are crossing the -river. As fast as the troops reach the other side, they should occupy -positions to protect the passage of the rear guard, and this last -should be covered by a _tête de pont_ as soon as the army breaks up its -camp. During the wars of the Revolution, too little regard was paid -to entrenchments; and it is for this reason we have seen large armies -dispersed after a single reverse, and the fate of nations compromised -by the issue of one battle. - - - - -MAXIM XXVI. - - -It is contrary to all true principle, to make corps, which have no -communication with each other, act separately against a central force -whose communications are cut off. - - -NOTE. - -The Austrians lost the battle of Hohenlinden by neglecting this -principle. The imperial army, under the orders of the archduke John, -was divided into four columns, which had to march through an immense -forest, previous to their junction in the plain of Anzing, where they -intended to surprise the French. But these different corps, having no -direct communication, found themselves compelled to engage separately -with an enemy who had taken the precaution of concentrating his masses, -and who could move them with facility in a country with which he had -been long previously acquainted. - -Thus the Austrian army, enclosed in the defiles of the forest with its -whole train of artillery and baggage, was attacked in its flanks and -rear, and the archduke John was only enabled to rally his dispersed and -shattered divisions under cover of the night. - -The trophies obtained by the French army on this day were immense. They -consisted of eleven thousand prisoners, one hundred pieces of cannon, -several stand of colors, and all the baggage of the enemy. - -The battle of Hohenlinden decided the fate of the campaign of 1800, and -Moreau’s brilliant and well-merited success placed him in the rank of -the first general of the age. - - - - -MAXIM XXVII. - - -When an army is driven from a first position, the retreating columns -should rally always sufficiently in the rear, to prevent any -interruption from the enemy. The greatest disaster that can happen, is -when the columns are attacked in detail, and before their junction. - - -NOTE. - -One great advantage which results from rallying your columns on a point -far removed from the field of battle, or from the position previously -occupied, is, that the enemy is uncertain as to the direction you mean -to take. - -If he divides his force to pursue you, he exposes himself to see his -detachments beaten in detail, especially if you have exerted all due -diligence, and have effected the junction of your troops in sufficient -time to get between his columns and disperse them one after the other. - -It was by a manœuvre of this kind in the campaign of Italy, in 1799, -that General Melas gained the battle of Genola. - -General Championet commanded the French army, and endeavored to cut off -the communication of the Austrians with Turin, by employing corps which -manœuvred separately to get into their rear. Melas, who divined his -project, made a retrograde march, by which he persuaded his adversary -he was in full retreat, although the real object of his movement was -to concentrate his forces at the point fixed for the junction of -the different detachments of the French army, and which he beat and -dispersed, one after another, by his great superiority in numbers. The -result of this manœuvre, in which the Austrian general displayed vigor, -decision, and foresight, secured to him the peaceable possession of -Piedmont. - -It was also by the neglect of this principle that General Beaulieu, who -commanded the Austro-Sardinian army in the campaign of 1796, lost the -battle of Milesimo after that of Montenotte. - -His object, in endeavoring to rally his different corps upon Milesimo, -was, to cover the high roads of Turin and Milan; but Napoleon, aware of -the advantages arising from the ardor of troops emboldened by recent -success, attacked him before he could assemble his divisions, and, by -a series of skilful manœuvres, succeeded in separating the combined -armies. They retired in the greatest disorder--the one by the road of -Milan, the other by that of Turin. - - - - -MAXIM XXVIII. - - -No force should be detached on the eve of a battle, because affairs may -change during the night, either by the retreat of the enemy, or by the -arrival of large reinforcements to enable him to resume the offensive, -and counteract your previous arrangements. - - -NOTE. - -In 1796, the army of the Sambre and Meuse, commanded by General -Jourdan, effected a retreat, which was rendered still more difficult -by the loss of his line of communication. Seeing, however, that the -forces of the archduke Charles were scattered, Jourdan, in order to -accomplish his retreat upon Frankfort, resolved to open himself a way -by Wurtzburg, where there were at that moment only two divisions of -the Austrian army. This movement would have been attended with success, -if the French general, believing he had simply these two divisions to -contend with, had not committed the error of separating himself from -the corps of Lefevre--which he left at Schweinfurt to cover the only -direct communication of the army with its base of operation. - -The commission of this fault at the outset, added to some slowness in -the march of the French general, secured the victory to the archduke, -who hastened to concentrate his forces. - -The arrival of the two divisions, also, of Kray and Wartesleben, during -the battle, enabled him to oppose fifty thousand men to the French -army, which scarcely numbered thirty thousand combatants. This last -was consequently beaten, and obliged to continue its retreat by the -mountains of Fuldes, where the badness of the roads could be equalled -only by the difficulty of the country. - -The division of Lefevre, amounting to fourteen thousand men, would, -in all probability, have turned the scale in favor of Jourdan, had -the latter not unfortunately conceived that two divisions only were -opposing his passage to Wurtzburg. - - - - -MAXIM XXIX. - - -When you have resolved to fight a battle, collect your whole force. -Dispense with nothing. A single battalion sometimes decides the day. - - -NOTE. - -I think it here desirable to observe, that it is prudent before a -battle to fix upon some point in rear of the reserve for the junction -of the different detachments; for if, from unforeseen circumstances, -these detachments should be prevented from joining before the action -has commenced, they might be exposed, in case a retrograde movement -should be found necessary, to the masses of the enemy. It is desirable -also to keep the enemy in ignorance of these reinforcements, in order -to employ them with greater effect. “A seasonable reinforcement,” says -Frederick, “renders the success of a battle certain, because the enemy -will always imagine it stronger than it really is, and lose courage -accordingly.” - - - - -MAXIM XXX. - - -Nothing is so rash or so contrary to principle, as to make a flank -march before an army in position, especially when this army occupies -heights at the foot of which you are forced to defile. - - -NOTE. - -It was by a neglect of this principle that Frederick was beaten at -Kollin in the first campaign of 1757. Notwithstanding prodigies of -valor, the Prussians lost fifteen thousand men and a great portion of -their artillery, while the loss of the Austrians did not exceed five -thousand men. The consequence of this battle was more unfortunate -still, since it obliged the King of Prussia to raise the siege of -Prague, and to evacuate Bohemia. - -It was also by making a flank march before the Prussian army, that the -French lost the disgraceful battle of Rosbach. - -This imprudent movement was still more to be reprehended, because the -Prince de Soubise, who commanded the French army, was so negligent as -to manœuvre, without either advanced guards or flanking corps, in -presence of the enemy. The result was, that his army, consisting of -fifty thousand men, was beaten by six battalions and thirty squadrons. -The French lost seven thousand men, twenty-seven standards, and a great -number of cannon. The Prussians had only three hundred men disabled. - -Thus, by having forgotten this principle, _that a flank march is never -to be made before an enemy in line of battle_, Frederick lost his army -at Kollin; and Soubise, at Rosbach, lost both his army and his honor. - - - - -MAXIM XXXI. - - -When you determine to risk a battle, reserve to yourself every possible -chance of success, more particularly if you have to deal with an -adversary of superior talent; for if you are beaten, even in the midst -of your magazines and your communications, wo to the vanquished! - - -NOTE. - -“We should make war,” says Marshal Saxe, “without leaving anything -to hazard, and in this especially consists the talent of a general. -But when we have incurred the risk of a battle, we should know how to -profit by the victory, and not merely content ourselves, according to -custom, with possession of the field.” - -It was by neglecting to follow up the first success, that the Austrian -army, after gaining the field of Marengo, saw itself compelled on the -following day to evacuate the whole of Italy. - -General Melas, observing the French in retreat, left the direction -of the movements of his army to the chief of his staff, and retired -to Alexandria to repose from the fatigues of the day. Colonel Zach, -equally convinced with his general that the French army was completely -broken, and consisted only of fugitives, formed the divisions in column -of route. - -By this arrangement, the imperial army prepared to enter upon its -victorious march in a formation not less than three miles in depth. - -It was near four o’clock when General Desaix rejoined the French army -with his division. His presence restored in some degree an equality -between the contending forces; and yet Napoleon hesitated for a moment -whether to resume the offensive, or to make use of this corps to secure -his retreat. The ardor of the troops to return to the charge, decided -his irresolution. He rode rapidly along the front of his divisions, and -addressing the soldiers--“We have retired far enough for to-day,” said -he; “you know I always sleep upon the field of battle!” - -The army, with unanimous shout, proclaimed to him a promise of -victory. Napoleon resumed the offensive. The Austrian advance guard, -panic-struck at the sight of a formidable and unbroken body presenting -itself suddenly at a point where, a few moments before, only fugitives -were to be seen, went to the right about, and carried disorder into the -mass of its columns. Attacked immediately afterward, with impetuosity, -in its front and flanks, the Austrian army was completely routed. - -Marshal Daun experienced nearly the same fate as General Melas, at the -battle of Torgau, in the campaign of 1760. - -The position of the Austrian army was excellent. It had its left upon -Torgau, its right on the plateau of Siptitz, and its front covered by a -large sheet of water. - -Frederick proposed to turn its right in order to make an attack upon -the rear. For this purpose he divided his army into two corps, the one -under the orders of Ziethen, with instructions to attack in front, -following the edge of the water; the other under his own immediate -command, with which he set out to turn the right of the Austrians. -But Marshal Daun having had intimation of the movements of the enemy, -changed his front by countermarching, and was thus enabled to repel -the attacks of Frederick, whom he obliged to retreat. The two corps -of the Prussian army had been acting without communication. Ziethen, -in the meantime, hearing the fire recede, concluded that the king had -been beaten, and commenced a movement by his left in order to rejoin -him; but falling in with two battalions of the reserve, the Prussian -general profited by this reinforcement to resume the offensive. -Accordingly he renewed the attack with vigor, got possession of the -plateau of Siptitz, and soon after of the whole field of battle. The -sun had already set when the King of Prussia received the news of this -unexpected good fortune. He returned in all haste, took advantage of -the night to restore order in his disorganized army, and the day after -the battle occupied Torgau. - -Marshal Daun was receiving congratulations upon his victory, when he -heard that the Prussians had resumed the offensive. He immediately -commanded a retreat, and at daybreak the Austrians repassed the Elbe -with the loss of twelve thousand men, eight thousand prisoners, and -forty-five pieces of cannon. - -After the battle of Marengo, General Melas, although in the midst -of his fortresses and magazines, saw himself compelled to abandon -everything, in order to save the wreck of his army. - -General Mack capitulated after the battle of Ulm, although in the -centre of his own country. - -The Prussians, in spite of their depôts and reserves, were obliged, -after the battle of Jena, and the French after that of Waterloo, to lay -down their arms. - -Hence, we may conclude that the misfortune that results from the loss -of a battle, does not consist so much in the destruction of men and of -_materiel_ as in the discouragement which follows this disaster. The -courage and confidence of the victors augment in proportion as those -of the vanquished diminish; and whatever may be the resources of an -army, it will be found that a retreat will degenerate rapidly into a -rout unless the general-in-chief shall succeed, by combining boldness -with skill, and perseverance with firmness, in restoring the _morale_ -of his army. - - - - -MAXIM XXXII. - - -The duty of an advanced guard does not consist in advancing or -retiring, but in manœuvring. An advanced guard should be composed -of light cavalry, supported by a reserve of heavy cavalry, and by -battalions of infantry, supported also by artillery. An advanced guard -should consist of picked troops, and the general officers, officers -and men, should be selected for their respective capabilities and -knowledge. A corps deficient in instruction is only an embarrassment to -an advanced guard. - - -NOTE. - -It was the opinion of Frederick that an advanced guard should be -composed of detachments of troops of all arms. The commander should -possess skill in the choice of ground, and he should take care to be -instantly informed, by means of numerous patrols, of everything passing -in the enemy’s camp. - -In war, it is not the business of an advanced guard to fight, but to -observe the enemy, in order to cover the movements of the army. When in -pursuit, the advanced guard should charge with vigor, and cut off the -baggage and insulated corps of the retiring enemy. For this purpose, it -should be reinforced with all the disposable light cavalry of the army. - - - - -MAXIM XXXIII. - - -It is contrary to the usages of war to allow parks or batteries of -artillery to enter a defile, unless you hold the other extremity. In -case of retreat, the guns will embarrass your movements and be lost. -They should be left in position, under a sufficient escort, until you -are master of the opening. - - -NOTE. - -Nothing encumbers the march of an army so much as a quantity of -baggage. In the campaign of 1796, Napoleon abandoned his battering -train under the walls of Mantua, after spiking the guns and destroying -the carriages. By this sacrifice, he acquired a facility of manœuvring -rapidly his little army, and obtained the initiative as well as a -general superiority over the numerous but divided forces of Marshal -Wurmser. - -In 1799, during his retreat in Italy, General Moreau being compelled -to manœuvre among the mountains, preferred separating himself entirely -from his reserve artillery, which he directed upon France by the Col -de Fenestrelle, rather than embarrass his march with this part of his -equipment. - -These are the examples we should follow; for if, by a rapidity of -march, and a facility of concentration upon decisive points, the -victory is gained, the _materiel_ of an army is soon re-established. -But if, on the other hand, we are beaten and compelled to retreat, it -will be difficult to save our equipments, and we may have reason to -congratulate ourselves that we abandoned them in time to prevent them -from augmenting the trophies of the enemy. - - - - -MAXIM XXXIV. - - -It should be laid down as a principle, never to leave intervals by -which the enemy can penetrate between corps formed in order of battle, -unless it be to draw him into a snare. - - -NOTE. - -In the campaign of 1757, the Prince of Lorraine, who was covering -Prague with the Austrian army, perceived the Prussians threatening, by -a flank movement, to turn his right. He immediately ordered a partial -change of front by throwing back the infantry of that wing, so as to -form a right angle with the rest of the line. But this manœuvre being -executed in presence of the enemy, was not effected without some -disorder. The heads of the columns having marched too quick, caused -the rear to lengthen out, and when the line was formed to the right, -a large interval appeared at the salient angle. Frederick, observing -this error, hastened to take advantage of it. He directed his centre -corps, commanded by the Duke of Bevern, to throw itself into this -opening, and by this manœuvre decided the fate of the battle. - -The Prince of Lorraine returned to Prague, beaten and pursued, with the -loss of sixteen thousand men and two hundred pieces of cannon. - -It should be observed at the same time, that this operation of throwing -a corps into the intervals made by an army in time of battle, should -never be attempted unless you are at least equal in force, and have -an opportunity of outflanking the enemy on the one side or the other; -for it is then only you can hope to divide his army in the centre, and -insulate the wings entirely. If you are inferior in number, you run the -risk of being stopped by the reverses, and overpowered by the enemy’s -wings, which may deploy upon your flanks and surround you. - -It was by this manœuvre that the Duke of Berwick gained the battle of -Almanza, in the year 1707, in Spain. - -The Anglo-Portuguese army, under the command of Lord Galloway, came to -invest Villena. Marshal Berwick, who commanded the French and Spanish -army, quitted his camp at Montalegre, and moved upon this town to -raise the siege. At his approach, the English general, eager to fight -a battle, advanced to meet him in the plains of Almanza. The issue was -long doubtful. The first line, commanded by the Duke of Popoli, having -been broken, the Chevalier d’Asfeldt, who had charge of the second, -drew up his masses with large intervals between them; and when the -English, who were in pursuit of the first line, reached these reserves, -he took advantage of their disorder to attack them in flank and -defeated them entirely. - -Marshal Berwick, perceiving the success of this manœuvre, threw open -his front, and deploying upon the enemy’s flanks, while the reserve -sustained the attack in front, and the cavalry manœuvred in their rear, -obtained a complete victory. - -Lord Galloway, wounded and pursued, collected with difficulty the -remains of his army, and took shelter with them in Tortosa. - - - - -MAXIM XXXV. - - -Encampments of the same army should always be formed so as to protect -each other. - - -NOTE. - -At the battle of Dresden, in the campaign of 1813, the camp of the -allies, although advantageously placed upon the heights on the left -bank of the Elbe, was nevertheless extremely defective, from being -traversed longitudinally by a deep ravine, which separated the left -wing completely from the centre and the right. This vicious arrangement -did not escape the penetrating eye of Napoleon. He instantly directed -the whole of his cavalry and two corps of infantry against the -insulated wing, attacked it with superior numbers, overthrew it, and -took ten thousand prisoners, before it was possible to come to its -support. - - - - -MAXIM XXXVI. - - -When the enemy’s army is covered by a river, upon which he holds -several _têtes de pont_, do not attack in front. This would divide -your force and expose you to be turned. Approach the river in echelon -of columns, in such a manner that the leading column shall be the -only one the enemy can attack, without offering you his flank. In -the meantime, let your light troops occupy the bank, and when you -have decided on the point of passage, rush upon it and fling across -your bridge. Observe that the point of passage should be always at a -distance from the leading echelon, in order to deceive the enemy. - - -NOTE. - -If you occupy a town or a village on the bank of a river, opposite -to that held by the enemy, it is an advantage to make this spot the -crossing point, because it is easier to cover your carriages and -reserve artillery, as well as to mask the construction of your bridge, -in a town, than in the open country. It is also a great advantage -to pass a river opposite a village, when the latter is only weakly -occupied by the enemy; because as soon as the advanced guard reaches -the other side, it carries this post, makes a lodgment, and by -throwing up a few defensive works, converts it easily into a _tête de -pont_. By this means, the rest of the army is enabled to effect the -passage with facility. - - - - -MAXIM XXXVII. - - -From the moment you are master of a position which commands the -opposite bank, facilities are acquired for effecting the passage of -the river; above all, if this position is sufficiently extensive to -place upon it artillery in force. This advantage is diminished, if -the river is more than three hundred toises (or six hundred yards) -in breadth, because the distance being out of the range of grape, it -is easy for the troops which defend the passage to line the bank and -get under cover. Hence it follows that if the grenadiers, ordered to -pass the river for the protection of the bridge, should reach the -other side, they would be destroyed by the fire of the enemy; because -his batteries, placed at the distance of two hundred toises from the -landing, are capable of a most destructive effect, although removed -above five hundred toises from the batteries of the crossing force. -Thus the advantage of the artillery would be exclusively his. For -the same reason, the passage is impracticable, unless you succeed in -surprising the enemy, and are protected by an intermediate island, or, -unless you are able to take advantage of an angle in the river, to -establish a crossfire upon his works. In this case, the island or angle -forms a natural _tête de pont_, and gives the advantage in artillery to -the attacking army. - -When a river is less than sixty toises (or one hundred and twenty -yards) in breadth, and you have a post upon the other side, the troops -which are thrown across derive such advantages from the protection of -your artillery, that, however small the angle may be, it is impossible -for the enemy to prevent the establishment of a bridge. In this case, -the most skilful generals, when they have discovered the project of -their adversary, and brought their own army to the point of crossing, -usually content themselves with opposing the passage of the bridge, by -forming a semicircle round its extremity, as round the opening of a -defile, and removing to the distance of three or four hundred toises -from the fire of the opposite side. - - -NOTE. - -Frederick observes, that “the passage of great rivers in the presence -of the enemy is one of the most delicate operations in war.” Success on -these occasions depends on secrecy, on the rapidity of the manœuvres, -and the punctual execution of the orders given for the movements of -each division. To pass such an obstacle in presence of an enemy, and -without his knowledge, it is necessary not only that the previous -dispositions should be well conceived, but that they should be executed -without confusion. - -In the campaign of 1705, Prince Eugene, of Savoy, wishing to come to -the assistance of the Prince of Piedmont, sought for a favorable point -at which to force the passage of the Adda, defended at that time by -the French army, under the command of the Duke de Vendome. - -After having selected an advantageous situation, Prince Eugene erected -a battery of twenty pieces of cannon on a position which commanded the -entire of the opposite bank, and covered his infantry by a line of -entrenched parallels constructed on the slope of the declivity. - -They were working vigorously at the bridge, when the Duke de Vendome -appeared with his whole army. At first he seemed determined to oppose -its construction, but after having examined the position of Prince -Eugene, he judged this to be impracticable. - -He therefore placed his army out of reach of the prince’s batteries, -resting both his wings upon the river, so as to form a bow, of which -the Adda was the cord. He then covered himself with entrenchments and -abattis, and was thus enabled to charge the enemy’s columns whenever -they debouched from the bridge, and to beat them in detail. - -Eugene, having reconnoitred the position of the French, considered the -passage impossible. He therefore withdrew the bridge, and broke up his -camp during the night. - -It was by this manœuvre, also, that, in the campaign of 1809, the -Archduke Charles compelled the French to reoccupy the isle of Lobau, -after having debouched on the left bank of the Danube. The march of the -Archduke Charles was wholly concentric. He menaced Grosaspern with his -right, Esling with his centre, and Enzersdorf with his left. - -His army, with both wings resting on the Danube, formed a semicircle -around Esling. Napoleon immediately attacked and broke the centre of -the Austrians; but after having forced their first line, he found -himself arrested by the reserves. In the meantime, the bridges upon -the Danube had been destroyed, and several of his corps, with their -parks of artillery, were still on the right bank. This disappointment, -joined to the favorable position of the Austrians, decided Napoleon -to re-enter the isle of Lobau, where he had previously constructed a -line of field-works, so as to give it all the advantages of a well -entrenched camp. - - - - -MAXIM XXXVIII. - - -It is difficult to prevent an enemy, supplied with pontoons, from -crossing a river. When the object of an army, which defends the -passage, is to cover a siege, the moment the general has ascertained -his inability to oppose the passage, he should take measures to arrive -before the enemy, at an intermediate position between the river he -defends and the place he desires to cover. - - -NOTE. - -Here we may observe, that this intermediate position should be -reconnoitred, or rather, well entrenched beforehand; for the enemy will -be unable to make an offensive movement against the corps employed in -the siege, until he has beaten the army of observation; and the latter, -under cover of its camp, may always await a favorable opportunity to -attack him in flank or in rear. - -Besides, the army which is once entrenched in this manner, has the -advantage of being concentrated; while that of the enemy must act in -detachments, if he wishes to cover his bridge, and watch the movements -of the army of observation, so as to enable him to attack the besieging -corps in its lines, without being exposed to an attempt on his rear, or -being menaced with the loss of his bridge. - - - - -MAXIM XXXIX. - - -In the campaign of 1645, Turenne was attacked with his army before -Philipsburg by a very superior force. There was no bridge here over -the Rhine, but he took advantage of the ground between the river and -the place to establish his camp. This should serve as a lesson to -engineer officers, not merely in the construction of fortresses, but -of _têtes de pont_. A space should always be left between the fortress -and the river, where an army may form and rally without being obliged -to throw itself into the place, and thereby compromise its security. -An army retiring upon Mayence before a pursuing enemy, is necessarily -compromised; for this reason, because it requires more than a day to -pass the bridge, and because the lines of Cassel are too confined to -admit an army to remain there without being blocked up. Two hundred -toises should have been left between that place and the Rhine. It -is essential that all _têtes de pont_ before great rivers should be -constructed upon this principle, otherwise they will prove a very -inefficient assistance to protect the passage of a retreating army. -_Têtes de pont_, as laid down in our schools, are of use only for small -rivers, the passage of which is comparatively short. - - -NOTE. - -Marshal Saxe, in the campaign of 1741, having passed the Moldau in -quest of a detached corps of fourteen thousand men, which was about to -throw itself into Prague, left a thousand infantry upon that river, -with orders to entrench themselves upon a height directly opposite the -_tête de pont_. By this precaution, the marshal secured his retreat, -and also the facility of repassing the bridge without disorder, by -rallying his divisions between the entrenched height and the _tête de -pont_. - -Were these examples unknown to the generals of modern times, or are -they disposed to think such precautions superfluous? - - - - -MAXIM XL. - - -Fortresses are equally useful in offensive and defensive warfare. It -is true, they will not in themselves arrest an army, but they are an -excellent means of retarding, embarrassing, weakening and annoying a -victorious enemy. - - -NOTE. - -The brilliant success of the allied armies in the campaign of 1814, has -given to many military men a false idea of the real value of fortresses. - -The formidable bodies which crossed the Rhine and the Alps at this -period, were enabled to spare large detachments to blockade the strong -places that covered the frontiers of France, without materially -affecting the numerical superiority of the army which marched upon the -capital. This army was in a condition, therefore, to act, without the -fear of being menaced in its line of retreat. - -But at no period of military history were the armies of Europe so -combined before, or governed so entirely by one common mind in the -attainment of a single object. Under these circumstances, the line of -fortresses which surround France was rendered unavailable during the -campaign; but it would be very imprudent, therefore, to conclude that -a frontier guarded by numerous fortresses may be passed with impunity; -or that battles may be fought with these places in your rear, without -previously besieging, or at least investing them with sufficient forces. - - - - -MAXIM XLI. - - -There are only two ways of insuring the success of a siege. The first, -to begin by beating the enemy’s army employed to cover the place, -forcing it out of the field, and throwing its remains beyond some great -natural obstacle, such as a chain of mountains, or large river. Having -accomplished this object, an army of observation should be placed -behind the natural obstacle, until the trenches are finished and the -place taken. - -But if it be desired to take the place in presence of a relieving army, -without risking a battle, then the whole _materiel_ and equipment for -a siege are necessary to begin with, together with ammunition and -provisions for the presumed period of its duration, and also lines of -contravallation and circumvallation, aided by all the localities of -heights, woods, marshes and inundations. - -Having no longer occasion to keep up communications with your depôts, -it is now only requisite to hold in check the relieving army. For -this purpose, an army of observation should be formed, whose business -it is never to lose sight of that of the enemy, and which, while it -effectually bars all access to the place, has always time enough to -arrive upon his flanks or rear in case he should attempt to steal a -march. - -It is to be remembered, too, that by profiting judiciously by the -lines of contravallation, a portion of the besieging army will always -be available in giving battle to the approaching enemy. - -Upon the same general principle, when a place is to be besieged in -presence of an enemy’s army, it is necessary to cover the siege by -lines of _circumvallation_. - -If the besieging force is of numerical strength enough (after leaving -a corps before the place four times the amount of the garrison) to -cope with the relieving army, it may remove more than one day’s march -from the place; but if it be inferior in numbers after providing for -the siege, as above stated, it should remain only a short day’s march -from the spot, in order to fall back upon its lines, if necessary, or -receive succor in case of attack. - -If the investing corps and army of observation are only equal when -united to the relieving force, the besieging army should remain entire -within, or near its lines, and push the works and the siege with the -greatest activity. - - -NOTE. - -“When we undertake a siege,” says Montécuculli, “we should not seek to -place ourselves opposite the weakest part of the fortress, but at the -point most favorable for establishing a camp and executing the designs -we have in view.” - -This maxim was well understood by the Duke of Berwick. Sent to form -the siege of Nice in 1706, he determined to attack on the side of -Montalban, contrary to the advice of Vauban, and even to the orders -of the king. Having a very small army at his disposal, he began by -securing his camp. This he did by constructing redoubts upon the -heights that shut in the space between the Var and the Paillon, -two rivers which supported his flanks. By this means, he protected -himself against a surprise; for the Duke of Savoy, having the power -of debouching suddenly by the Col de Tende, it was necessary that -the marshal should be enabled to assemble his forces, so as to move -rapidly upon his adversary, and fight him before he got into position; -otherwise his inferiority in numbers would have obliged him to raise -the siege. - -When Marshal Saxe was besieging Brussels, with only twenty-eight -thousand men, opposed to a garrison of twelve thousand, he received -intelligence that the Prince of Waldeck was assembling his forces -to raise the siege. Not being strong enough to form an army of -observation, the marshal reconnoitred a field of battle on the little -river Voluve, and made all the necessary dispositions for moving -rapidly to the spot, in case of the approach of the enemy. By this -means he was prepared to receive his adversary without discontinuing -the operations of the siege. - - - - -MAXIM XLII. - - -Feuquière says that “we should never wait for the enemy in the lines -of circumvallation, but we should go out and attack him.” He is in -error. There is no authority in war without exception; and it would be -dangerous to proscribe the principle of awaiting the enemy within the -lines of circumvallation. - - -NOTE. - -During the siege of Mons, in 1691, the Prince of Orange assembled -his army, and advanced as far as Notre Dame de Halle, making a -demonstration to succor the place. Louis XIV, who commanded the siege -in person, called a council of war to deliberate on what was to be -done in case the Prince of Orange approached. The opinion of Marshal -Luxembourg was to remain within the lines of circumvallation, and that -opinion prevailed. - -The marshal laid it down as a principle that, when the besieging army -is not strong enough to defend the whole extent of circumvallation, it -should quit the lines and advance to meet the enemy; but when it is -strong enough to encamp in two lines around a place, that it is better -to profit by a good entrenchment--more especially as by this means the -siege is not interrupted. - -In 1658, Marshal Turenne was besieging Dunkirk. He had already opened -the trenches, when the Spanish army, under the orders of the Prince Don -Juan, Condé, and D’Hocquincourt, appeared in sight, and took post upon -the Downs, at a distance of a league from his lines. Turenne had the -superiority in numbers, and he determined to quit his entrenchments. -He had other advantages also. The enemy was without artillery, and -their superiority in cavalry was rendered useless by the unfavorable -nature of the ground. It was, therefore, of great importance to beat -the Spanish army before it had time to entrench itself and bring up its -artillery. The victory gained by the French on this occasion justified -all the combinations of Marshal Turenne. - -When Marshal Berwick was laying siege to Philipsburg, in 1733, he had -reason to apprehend that the Prince of Savoy would attack him with -all the forces of the empire before its termination. The marshal, -therefore, after having made his disposition of the troops intended for -the siege, formed, with the rest of his army, a corps of observation to -make head against Prince Eugene, in case the latter should choose to -attack him in his lines, or attempt a diversion on the Moselle or Upper -Rhine. Prince Eugene, having arrived in front of the besieging army, -some general officers were of opinion that it was better not to await -the enemy in the lines, but to move forward and attack him. But Marshal -Berwick, who agreed with the Duke of Luxembourg, that an army which -can occupy, completely, good entrenchments is not liable to be forced, -persisted in remaining within his works. The result proved that this -was also the opinion of Prince Eugene, for he did not dare to attack -the entrenchments, which he would not have failed to do if he had any -hopes of success. - - - - -MAXIM XLIII. - - -Those who proscribe lines of circumvallation, and all the assistance -which the science of the engineer can afford, deprive themselves -gratuitously of an auxiliary which is never injurious, almost always -useful, and often indispensable. It must be admitted, at the same time, -that the principles of field-fortification require improvement. This -important branch of the art of war has made no progress since the time -of the ancients. It is even inferior at this day to what it was two -thousand years ago. Engineer officers should be encouraged in bringing -this branch of their art to perfection, and in placing it upon a level -with the rest. - - -NOTE. - -“If we are inferior in numbers,” says Marshal Saxe, “entrenchments -are of no use, for the enemy will bring all his forces to bear upon -particular points. If we are of equal strength they are unnecessary -also. If we are superior, we do not want them. Then why give ourselves -the trouble to entrench?” Notwithstanding this opinion of the inutility -of entrenchments, Marshal Saxe often had recourse to them. - -In 1797, Generals Provéra and Hohenzollern having presented themselves -before Mantua (where Marshal Wurmser was shut up), for the purpose of -raising the siege, they were stopped by the lines of contravallation of -St. George. This slight obstacle sufficed to afford Napoleon time to -arrive from Rivoli and defeat their enterprise. It was in consequence -of neglecting to entrench themselves that the French had been obliged -to raise the siege in the preceding campaign. - - - - -MAXIM XLIV. - - -If circumstances prevent a sufficient garrison being left to defend -a fortified town, which contains an hospital and magazines, at least -every means should be employed to secure the citadel against a _coup -de main_. - - -NOTE. - -A few battalions dispersed about a town, inspire no terror; but shut -up in the more narrow outline of a citadel, they assume an imposing -attitude. For this reason it appears to me that such a precaution -is always necessary, not only in fortresses, but wherever there are -hospitals or depôts of any kind. Where there is no citadel, some -quarter of the town should be fixed upon most favorable for defence, -and entrenched in such a manner as to oppose the greatest resistance -possible. - - - - -MAXIM XLV. - - -A fortified place can only protect the garrison and detain the enemy -for a certain time. When this time has elapsed, and the defences of -the place are destroyed, the garrison should lay down its arms. All -civilized nations are agreed on this point, and there never has been -an argument except with reference to the greater or less degree of -defence which a governor is bound to make before he capitulates. At the -same time, there are generals--Villars among the number--who are of -opinion that a governor should never surrender, but that in the last -extremity he should blow up the fortifications, and take advantage of -the night to cut his way through the besieging army. Where he is unable -to blow up the fortifications, he may always retire, they say, with his -garrison, and save the men. - -Officers who have adopted this line of conduct, have often brought off -three-fourths of their garrison. - - -NOTE. - -In 1705, the French, who were besieged in Haguenau by Count Thungen, -found themselves incapable of sustaining an assault. Péri, the -governor, who had already distinguished himself by a vigorous defence, -despairing of being allowed to capitulate on any terms short of -becoming prisoner of war, resolved to abandon the place and cut his way -through the besiegers. - -In order to conceal his intention more effectually, and while he -deceived the enemy, to sound at the same time the disposition of his -officers, he assembled a council of war and declared his resolution to -die in the breach. Then, under pretext of the extremity to which he was -reduced, he commanded the whole garrison under arms; and leaving only a -few sharpshooters in the breach, gave the order to march, and set out -in silence, under cover of the night, from Haguenau. This audacious -enterprise was crowned with success, and Péri reached Saverne without -having suffered the smallest loss. - -Two fine instances of defence in later times are those of Massena at -Genoa, and of Palafox at Saragossa. - -The first marched out with arms and baggage, and all the honors of -war, after rejecting every summons, and defending himself until hunger -alone compelled him to capitulate. The second only yielded after having -buried his garrison amid the ruins of the city, which he defended from -house to house, until famine and death left him no alternative but to -surrender. This siege, which was equally honorable to the French as -to the Spaniards, is one of the most memorable in the history of war. -In the course of it, Palafox displayed every possible resource which -courage and obstinacy can supply in the defence of a fortress. - -All real strength is founded in the mind; and on this account I am of -opinion that we should be directed in the choice of a governor, less by -his genius than his personal character. His most essential qualities -should be courage, perseverance, and soldierlike devotedness. Above -all, he should possess the talent not only of infusing courage into -the garrison, but of kindling a spirit of resistance in the whole -population. Where the latter is wanting, however art may multiply the -defences of a place, the garrison will be compelled to capitulate after -having sustained the first, or at most, the second assault. - - - - -MAXIM XLVI. - - -The keys of a fortress are well worth the retirement of the garrison, -when it is resolved to yield only on those conditions. On this -principle it is always wiser to grant an honorable capitulation to a -garrison which has made a vigorous resistance, than to risk an assault. - - -NOTE. - -Marshal Villars has justly observed, that “no governor of a place -should be permitted to excuse himself for surrendering, on the ground -of wishing to preserve the king’s troops. Every garrison that displays -courage will escape being prisoners of war. For there is no general -who, however well assured of carrying a place by assault, will not -prefer granting terms of capitulation rather than risk the loss of a -thousand men in forcing determined troops to surrender.” - - - - -MAXIM XLVII. - - -Infantry, cavalry, and artillery, are nothing without each other; -therefore, they should always be so disposed in cantonments as to -assist each other in case of surprise. - - -NOTE. - -“A general,” says Frederick, “should direct his whole attention to -the tranquility of his cantonments, in order that the soldier may be -relieved from all anxiety, and repose in security from his fatigues. -With this view, care should be taken that the troops are able to form -rapidly upon ground which has been previously reconnoitered; that the -generals remain always with their divisions or brigades, and that the -service is carried on throughout with exactness.” - -Marshal Saxe is of opinion that an army should not be in a hurry to -quit its cantonments, but that it should wait till the enemy has -exhausted himself with marching, and be ready to fall upon him with -fresh troops when he is overcome with fatigue. - -I believe, however, that it would be dangerous to trust implicitly -to this high authority, for there are many occasions where all the -advantage lies in the initiative, more especially when the enemy has -been compelled to extend his cantonments, from scarcity of subsistence, -and can be attacked before he has time to concentrate his forces. - - - - -MAXIM XLVIII. - - -The formation of infantry in line should be always in two ranks, -because the length of the musket only admits of an effective fire in -this formation. The discharge of the third rank is not only uncertain, -but frequently dangerous to the ranks in its front. In drawing up -infantry in two ranks, there should be a supernumerary behind every -fourth or fifth file. A reserve should likewise be placed twenty-five -paces in rear of each flank. - - -NOTE. - -I am of opinion, if circumstances require a line of infantry to resort -to a square, that two-deep is too light a formation to resist the -shock of cavalry. However useless the third rank may appear for the -purpose of file-firing, it is, notwithstanding necessary, in order to -replace the men who fall in the ranks in front; otherwise you would -be obliged to close in the files, and by this means leave intervals -between the companies, which the cavalry would not fail to penetrate. -It appears to me, also, that when infantry is formed in two ranks, the -columns will be found to open out in marching to a flank. If it should -be considered advantageous behind entrenchments to keep the infantry -in two ranks, the third rank should be placed in reserve, and brought -forward to relieve the front rank when fatigued, or when the fire is -observed to slacken. I am induced to make these remarks, because I have -seen an excellent pamphlet which proposes the two-deep formation for -infantry as the best. The author supports his opinion by a variety of -plausible reasons, but not sufficient, as it appears to me, to answer -all the objections that may be offered to this practice. - - - - -MAXIM XLIX. - - -The practice of mixing small bodies of infantry and cavalry together is -a bad one, and attended with many inconveniences. The cavalry loses its -power of action. It becomes fettered in all its movements. Its energy -is destroyed; even the infantry itself is compromised, for on the -first movement of the cavalry it is left without support. The best mode -of protecting cavalry is to cover its flank. - - -NOTE. - -This also was the opinion of Marshal Saxe. “The weakness of the above -formation,” says he, “is sufficient in itself to intimidate the -platoons of infantry, because they must be lost if the cavalry is -beaten.” - -The cavalry, also, which depends on the infantry for succor, is -disconcerted the moment a brisk forward movement carries them out of -sight of their supports. Marshal Turenne, and the generals of his time, -sometimes employed this order of formation; but that does not, in my -opinion, justify a modern author for recommending it in an essay, -entitled “_Considerations sur l’Art de la Guerre_.” In fact, this -formation has long been abandoned; and, since the introduction of light -artillery, it appears to me almost ridiculous to propose it. - - - - -MAXIM L. - - -Charges of cavalry are equally useful at the beginning, the middle, and -the end of a battle. They should be made always, if possible, on the -flanks of the infantry, especially when the latter is engaged in front. - - -NOTE. - -The Archduke Charles, in speaking of cavalry, recommends that it should -be brought in mass upon a decisive point, when the moment for employing -it arrives; that is to say, when it can attack with a certainty of -success. As the rapidity of its movement enables cavalry to act along -the whole line in the same day, the general who commands it should -keep it together as much as possible, and avoid dividing it into many -detachments. When the nature of the ground admits of cavalry being -employed on all points of the line, it is desirable to form it in -column behind the infantry, and in a position whence it may be easily -directed wherever it is required. If cavalry is intended to cover a -position, it should be placed sufficiently in the rear to meet at full -speed any advance of troops coming to attack that position. If it is -destined to cover the flank of the infantry, it should, for the same -reason, be placed directly behind it. As the object of cavalry is -purely offensive, it should be a rule to form it at such a distance -only from the point of collision as to enable it to acquire its utmost -impulse, and arrive at the top of its speed into action. With respect -to the cavalry reserve, this should only be employed at the end of a -battle, either to render the success more decisive, or to cover the -retreat. Napoleon remarks that, at the battle of Waterloo, the cavalry -of the guard which composed the reserve, was engaged against his -orders. He complains of having been deprived from five o’clock of the -use of this reserve, which, when well employed, had so often insured -him the victory. - - - - -MAXIM LI. - - -It is the business of cavalry to follow up the victory, and to prevent -the beaten enemy from rallying. - - -NOTE. - -Victor or vanquished, it is of the greatest importance to have a body -of cavalry in reserve, either to take advantage of victory, or to -secure a retreat. The most decisive battles lose half their value to -the conqueror, when the want of cavalry prevents him from following up -his success, and depriving the enemy of the power of rallying. - -When a retiring army is pursued, it is more especially upon the flanks -that the weight of cavalry should fall, if you are strong enough in -that arm to cut off his retreat. - - - - -MAXIM LII. - - -Artillery is more essential to cavalry than to infantry, because -cavalry has no fire for its defence, but depends upon the sabre. -It is to remedy this deficiency that recourse has been had to -horse-artillery. Cavalry, therefore, should never be without cannon, -whether when attacking, rallying, or in position. - - -NOTE. - -Horse-artillery is an invention of Frederick. Austria lost no time in -introducing it into her armies, although in an imperfect degree. It was -only in 1792 that this arm was adopted in France, where it was brought -rapidly to its present perfection. - -The services of this arm during the wars of the Revolution were -immense. It may be said to have changed to a certain extent the -character of tactics, because its facility of movement enables it to -bear with rapidity on every point where artillery can be employed -with success. Napoleon has remarked in his memoirs that a flanking -battery which strikes and rakes the enemy obliquely, is capable of -deciding a victory in itself. To this we may add that, independent of -the advantages which cavalry derives from horse-artillery in securing -its flanks, and in opening the way for a successful charge by the -destructiveness of its fire, it is desirable that these two arms -should never be separated, but ready at all times to seize upon points -where it may be necessary to employ cannon. On these occasions, the -cavalry masks the march of the artillery, protects its establishment in -position, and covers it from the attack of the enemy, until it is ready -to open its fire. - - - - -MAXIM LIII. - - -In march, or in position, the greater part of the artillery should -be with the divisions of infantry and cavalry. The rest should be in -reserve. Each gun should have with it three hundred rounds, without -including the limber. This is about the complement for two battles. - - -NOTE. - -The better infantry is, the more important it is to support it by -artillery, with a view to its preservation. - -It is essential, also, that the batteries attached to divisions should -march in the front, because this has a strong influence on the _morale_ -of the soldier. He attacks always with confidence when he sees the -flanks of the column well covered with cannon. - -The artillery reserve should be kept for a decisive moment, and then -employed in full force, for it will be difficult for the enemy at such -a time to presume to attack it. - -There is scarcely an instance of a battery of sixty pieces of cannon -having been carried by a charge of infantry or cavalry, unless where -it was entirely without support, or in a position to be easily turned. - - - - -MAXIM LIV. - - -Artillery should always be placed in the most advantageous positions, -and as far in front of the line of cavalry and infantry as possible, -without compromising the safety of the guns. - -Field batteries should command the whole country round from the level -of the platform. They should on no account be masked on the right and -left, but have free range in every direction. - - -NOTE. - -The battery of eighteen pieces of cannon, which covered the centre of -the Russian army at the battle of La Moskwa (Borodino), may be cited as -an example. - -Its position, upon a circular height which commanded the field in every -direction, added so powerfully to its effect, that its fire alone -sufficed, for a considerable time, to paralyze the vigorous attack -made by the French with their right. Although twice broken, the left -of the Russian army closed to this battery, as to a pivot, and twice -recovered its former position. After repeated attacks, conducted with -a rare intrepidity, the battery was at length carried by the French, -but not till they had lost the _élite_ of their army, and with it the -Generals Caulincourt and Montbrun. Its capture decided the retreat of -the Russian left. - -I might advert likewise to another instance, in the campaign of 1809, -and to the terrible effect produced by the hundred pieces of cannon of -the Guard which General Lauriston directed, at the battle of Wagram, -against the right of the Austrian army. - - - - -MAXIM LV. - - -A General should never put his army into cantonments, when he has the -means of collecting supplies of forage and provisions, and of thus -providing for the wants of the soldier in the field. - - -NOTE. - -One great advantage which results from having an army in camp is, -that it is easier to direct its spirit and maintain its discipline -there. The soldier in cantonments abandons himself to repose; he ends -by finding a pleasure in idleness, and in fearing to return to the -field. The reverse takes place in a camp. There, a feeling of _ennui_, -and a severer discipline, make him anxious for the opening of the -campaign, to interrupt the monotony of the service and relieve it with -the chances and variety of war. Besides, an army in camp is much more -secure from a surprise than in cantonments--the defect of which usually -consists in their occupying too great an extent of ground. When an army -is obliged to go into quarters, the Marquis de Feuquière recommends -a camp to be selected in front of the line, where the troops can be -frequently assembled--sometimes suddenly, in order to exercise their -vigilance, or for the sole purpose of bringing the different corps -together. - - - - -MAXIM LVI. - - -A good general, a well-organized system, good instructions, and severe -discipline, aided by effective establishments, will always make good -troops, independently of the cause for which they fight. - -At the same time, a love of country, a spirit of enthusiasm, a sense of -national honor, and fanaticism, will operate upon young soldiers with -advantage. - - -NOTE. - -This remark appears to me less applicable to officers than to soldiers, -for as war is not a state of things natural to man, it follows -that those who maintain its cause must be governed by some strong -excitement. Much enthusiasm and devotedness are required on the part -of the troops for the general who commands, to induce an army to -perform great actions in a war in which it takes no interest. This is -sufficiently proved by the apathy of auxiliaries, unless when inspired -by the conduct of their chief. - - - - -MAXIM LVII. - - -When a nation is without establishments and a military system, it is -very difficult to organize an army. - - -NOTE. - -This is an unanswerable truth, more particularly with reference to an -army intended to act upon the system of modern war, and in which order, -precision, and rapidity of movement, are the principal essentials to -success. - - - - -MAXIM LVIII. - - -The first qualification of a soldier is fortitude under fatigue and -privation. Courage is only the second; hardship, poverty and want, are -the best school for a soldier. - - -NOTE. - -Valor belongs to the young soldier as well as to the veteran; but in -the former it is more evanescent. It is only by habits of service, and -after several campaigns, that the soldier acquires that moral courage -which makes him support the fatigues and privations of war without a -murmur. Experience by this time has instructed him to supply his own -wants. He is satisfied with what he can procure, because he knows that -success is only to be obtained by fortitude and perseverance. Well -might Napoleon say that misery and want were the best school for a -soldier; for as nothing could be compared with the total destitution -of the army of the Alps, when he assumed the command, so nothing -could equal the brilliant success which he obtained with this army -in the first campaign in Italy. The conquerors of Montenotte, Lodi, -Castiglione, Bassano, Arcole and Rivoli had beheld, only a few months -before, whole battalions covered with rags, and deserting for the want -of subsistence. - - - - -MAXIM LIX. - - -There are five things the soldier should never be without--his musket, -his ammunition, his knapsack, his provisions (for at least four days), -and his entrenching-tool. The knapsack may be reduced to the smallest -size possible, if it be thought proper, but the soldier should always -have it with him. - - -NOTE. - -It is fortunate that Napoleon has recognized the advantage of giving -to every soldier an entrenching-tool. His authority is the best answer -to the ridicule which has been thrown upon those who proposed it. An -axe will be found to inconvenience the foot-soldier as little as the -sword he wears at his side, and it will be infinitely more useful. When -axes are given out to companies, or are carried by fatigue-men during -a campaign, they are soon lost; and it often happens, when a camp is -to be formed, that a difficulty arises in cutting wood and building -huts for the soldier; whereas, by making the axe a part of every man’s -appointments, he is obliged to have it always with him; and whether -the object be to entrench himself in a village, or to erect huts in a -camp, the commander of a corps will speedily see the advantage of this -innovation. - -When once the axe has been generally adopted, we shall, perhaps, -see the desirability of issuing pickaxes and shovels to particular -companies, and also the benefit of more frequent entrenchments. It is -more particularly during retreats that it is important to entrench when -the army has reached a good position; for an entrenched camp not only -furnishes the means of rallying troops which are pursued, but if it be -fortified in such a manner as to render the issue of an attack doubtful -to the enemy, it will not only sustain the _morale_ of the soldier in -the retreat, but afford the general-in-chief opportunities for resuming -the offensive, and profiting by the first false movement on the part of -his adversary. It will be recollected how Frederick, in the campaign of -1761, when surrounded by two Russian and Austrian armies, whose united -force was quadruple his own, saved his army by entrenching himself in -the camp of Buntzalvitz. - - - - -MAXIM LX. - - -Every means should be taken to attach the soldier to his colors. This -is best accomplished by showing consideration and respect to the old -soldier. His pay likewise should increase with his length of service. -It is the height of injustice not to pay a veteran more than a recruit. - - -NOTE. - -Some modern writers have recommended, on the other hand, to limit the -period of service, in order to bring the whole youth of a country -successively under arms. By this means they purpose to have the levies, -_en masse_, all ready trained and capable of resisting successfully -a war of invasion. But however advantageous at first sight such a -military system may appear, I believe it will be found to have many -objections. - -In the first place, the soldier fatigued with the minutiæ of discipline -in a garrison, will not feel much inclined to re-enlist after he has -received his discharge, more especially since, having served the -prescribed time, he will consider himself to have fulfilled all the -duties of a citizen to his country. Returning to his friends, he will -probably marry, or establish himself in a trade. From that moment his -military spirit declines, and he soon becomes ill adapted to the -business of war. On the contrary, the soldier who serves long, becomes -attached to his regiment as to a new family. He submits to the yoke of -discipline, accustoms himself to the privations his situation imposes, -and ends by finding his condition agreeable. There are few officers -that have seen service who have not discovered the difference between -old and young soldiers, with reference to their power of supporting -the fatigues of a long campaign, to the determined courage that -characterizes the attack, or to the ease with which they rally after -being broken. - -Montécuculli observes, that “it takes time to discipline an army; more -to inure it to war; and still more to constitute veterans.” For this -reason, he recommends that great consideration should be shown to old -soldiers; that they should be carefully provided for, and a large -body of them kept always on foot. It seems to me, also, that it is -not enough to increase the pay of the soldier according to his period -of service, but that it is highly essential to confer on him some -mark of distinction that shall secure to him privileges calculated to -encourage him to grow gray under arms, and, above all, to do so with -honor. - - - - -MAXIM LXI. - - -It is not set speeches at the moment of battle that render soldiers -brave. The veteran scarcely listens to them, and the recruit forgets -them at the first discharge. If discourses and harangues are useful, it -is during the campaign: to do away unfavorable impressions, to correct -false reports, to keep alive a proper spirit in the camp, and to -furnish materials and amusement for the bivouac. All printed orders of -the day should keep in view these objects. - - -NOTE. - -The opinion of the general-in-chief, energetically expressed, is, -notwithstanding, productive of great effect on the _morale_ of the -soldier. - -In 1703, at the attack of Hornbec, Marshal Villars, seeing the troops -advancing without spirit, threw himself at their head: “What!” said -he, “is it expected that I, a marshal of France, should be the first to -escalade, when I order YOU to attack?” - -These few words rekindled their ardor; officers and soldiers rushed -upon the works, and the town was taken almost without loss. - -“We have retired far enough for to-day; you know I always sleep upon -the field of battle!” said Napoleon, as he flew through the ranks -at the moment of resuming the offensive at Marengo. These few words -sufficed to revive the courage of the soldiers, and to make them forget -the fatigues of the day, during which almost every man had been engaged. - - - - -MAXIM LXII. - - -Tents are unfavorable to health. The soldier is best when he bivouacs, -because he sleeps with his feet to the fire, which speedily dries the -ground on which he lies. A few planks, or a little straw, shelter him -from the wind. - -On the other hand, tents are necessary for the superior officers, who -have to write and to consult their maps. Tents should, therefore, -be issued to these, with directions to them never to sleep in a -house. Tents are always objects of observation to the enemy’s staff. -They afford information in regard to your numbers and the ground you -occupy; while an army bivouacking in two or three lines, is only -distinguishable from afar by the smoke which mingles with the clouds. -It is impossible to count the number of the fires. - - -NOTE. - -The acknowledged advantage of bivouacking is another reason for -adding an entrenching-tool to the equipment of the soldier; for, with -the assistance of the axe and shovel, he can hut himself without -difficulty. I have seen huts erected with the branches of trees, -covered with turf, where the soldier was perfectly sheltered from the -cold and wet, even in the worst season. - - - - -MAXIM LXIII. - - -All information obtained from prisoners should be received with -caution, and estimated at its real value. A soldier seldom sees -anything beyond his company; and an officer can afford intelligence of -little more than the position and movements of the division to which -his regiment belongs. On this account, the general of an army should -never depend upon the information derived from prisoners, unless it -agrees with the reports received from the advanced guards, in reference -to the position, etc., of the enemy. - - -NOTE. - -Montécuculli wisely observes that “prisoners should be interrogated -separately, in order to ascertain, by the agreement in their answers, -how far they may be endeavoring to mislead you.” Generally speaking, -the information required from officers who are prisoners, should have -reference to the strength and resources of the enemy, and sometimes to -his localities and position. Frederick recommends that prisoners should -be menaced with instant death if they are found attempting to deceive -by false reports. - - - - -MAXIM LXIV. - - -Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command; for this -reason, when war is carried on against a single power, there should be -only one army, acting upon one base, and conducted by one chief. - - -NOTE. - -“Success,” says the Archduke Charles, “is only to be obtained by -simultaneous efforts, directed upon a given point, sustained with -constancy, and executed with decision.” It rarely happens that any -number of men who desire the same object are perfectly agreed as to the -means of attaining it; and if the will of one individual is not allowed -to predominate, there can be no _ensemble_ in the execution of their -operations; neither will they attain the end proposed. It is useless to -confirm this maxim by examples. History abounds in them. - -Prince Eugene and Marlborough would never have been so successful in -the campaigns which they directed in concert, if a spirit of intrigue -and difference of opinion had not constantly disorganized the armies -opposed to them. - - - - -MAXIM LXV. - - -The same consequences which have uniformly attended long discussions -and councils of war, will follow at all times. They will terminate -in the adoption of the worst course, which in war is always the most -timid, or, if you will, the most prudent. The only true wisdom in a -general is determined courage. - - -NOTE. - -Prince Eugene used to say that councils of war “are only useful when -you want an excuse for attempting _nothing_.” This was also the opinion -of Villars. A general-in-chief should avoid, therefore, assembling -a council on occasions of difficulty, and should confine himself to -consulting separately his most experienced generals in order to benefit -by their advice, while he is governed at the same time in his decision -by his own judgment. By this means, he becomes responsible, it is true, -for the measures he pursues; but he has the advantage also of acting -upon his own conviction, and of being certain that the secret of his -operations will not be divulged, as is usually the case where it is -discussed by a council of war. - - - - -MAXIM LXVI. - - -In war, the general alone can judge of certain arrangements. It depends -on him alone to conquer difficulties by his own superior talents and -resolution. - - -NOTE. - -The officer who obeys, whatever may be the nature or extent of his -command, will always stand excused for executing implicitly the -orders which have been given to him. This is not the case with the -general-in-chief, on whom the safety of the army and the success of the -campaign depend. Occupied, without intermission, in the whole process -of observation and reflection, it is easy to conceive that he will -acquire by degrees a solidity of judgment which will enable him to see -things in a clearer and more enlarged point of view than his inferior -generals. - -Marshal Villars, in his campaigns, acted almost always in opposition -to the advice of his generals, and he was almost always fortunate. -So true it is, that a general, who feels confident in his talent for -command, must follow the dictates of his own genius if he wishes to -achieve success. - - - - -MAXIM LXVII. - - -To authorize generals or other officers to lay down their arms in -virtue of a particular capitulation, under any other circumstances -than when they are composing the garrison of a fortress, affords a -dangerous latitude. It is destructive of all military character in a -nation to open such a door to the cowardly, the weak, or even to the -misdirected brave. Great extremities require extraordinary resolution. -The more obstinate the resistance of an army, the greater the chances -of assistance or of success. - -How many seeming impossibilities have been accomplished by men whose -only resource was death! - - -NOTE. - -In the campaign of 1759, Frederick directed General Fink, with eighteen -thousand men, upon Maxen, for the purpose of cutting off the Austrian -army from the defiles of Bohemia. Surrounded by twice his numbers, Fink -capitulated after a sharp action, and fourteen thousand men laid down -their arms. This conduct was the more disgraceful, because General -Winch, who commanded the cavalry, cut his way through the enemy. The -whole blame of the surrender fell, therefore, upon Fink, who was -tried afterward by a court-martial, and sentenced to be cashiered and -imprisoned for two years. - -In the campaign of Italy in 1796, the Austrian General Provéra -capitulated with two thousand men in the castle of Cossaria. -Subsequently, at the battle of La Favorite, the same general -capitulated with a corps of six thousand men. I scarcely dare to revert -to the shameful defection of General Mack in the capitulation of Ulm -in 1805, where thirty thousand Austrians laid down their arms--when we -have seen, during the wars of the Revolution, so many generals open -themselves a way by a vigorous effort through the enemy, supported only -by a few battalions. - - - - -MAXIM LXVIII. - - -There is no security for any sovereign, for any nation, or for any -general, if officers are permitted to capitulate in the open field, -and to lay down their arms in virtue of conditions favorable to the -contracting party, but contrary to the interests of the army at large. -To withdraw from danger, and thereby to involve their comrades in -greater peril, is the height of cowardice. Such conduct should be -proscribed, declared infamous, and made punishable with death. All -generals, officers and soldiers, who capitulate in battle to save their -own lives, should be decimated. - -He who gives the order, and those who obey, are alike traitors, and -deserve capital punishment. - - -NOTE. - -Soldiers, who are almost always ignorant of the designs of their -chief, cannot be responsible for his conduct. If he orders them to -lay down their arms, they must do so; otherwise they fail in that law -of discipline which is more essential to an army than thousands of -men. It appears to me, therefore, under these circumstances, that the -chiefs alone are responsible, and liable to the punishment due to their -cowardice. We have no example of soldiers being wanting in their duty -in the most desperate situations, where they are commanded by officers -of approved resolution. - - - - -MAXIM LXIX. - - -There is but one honorable mode of becoming prisoner of war. That -is, by being taken separately; by which is meant, by being cut off -entirely, and when we can no longer make use of our arms. In this case, -there can be no conditions, for honor can impose none. We yield to an -irresistible necessity. - - -NOTE. - -There is always time enough to surrender prisoner of war. This should -be deferred, therefore, till the last extremity. And here I may be -permitted to cite an example of rare obstinacy in defence, which has -been related to me by ocular witnesses. The captain of grenadiers, -Dubrenil, of the thirty-seventh regiment of the line, having been -sent on detachment with his company, was stopped on the march by a -large party of Cossacks, who surrounded him on every side. Dubrenil -formed his little force into square, and endeavored to gain the skirts -of a wood (within a few muskets’ shot of the spot where he had been -attacked), and reached it with very little loss. But as soon as the -grenadiers saw this refuge secured to them, they broke and fled, -leaving their captain and a few brave men, who were resolved not to -abandon him, at the mercy of the enemy. In the meantime, the fugitives, -who had rallied in the depth of the wood, ashamed of having forsaken -their leader, came to the resolution of rescuing him from the enemy, -if a prisoner, or of carrying off his body if he had fallen. With this -view, they formed once more upon the outskirts, and opening a passage -with their bayonets through the cavalry, penetrated to their captain, -who, notwithstanding seventeen wounds, was defending himself still. -They immediately surrounded him, and regained the wood with little -loss. Such examples are not rare in the wars of the Revolution, and -it were desirable to see them collected by some contemporary, that -soldiers might learn how much is to be achieved in war by determined -energy and sustained resolution. - - - - -MAXIM LXX. - - -The conduct of a general in a conquered country is full of -difficulties. If severe, he irritates and increases the number of his -enemies. If lenient, he gives birth to expectations which only render -the abuses and vexations, inseparable from war, the more intolerable. -A victorious general must know how to employ severity, justice and -mildness by turns, if he would allay sedition or prevent it. - - -NOTE. - -Among the Romans, generals were only permitted to arrive at the command -of armies after having exercised the different functions of the -magistracy. Thus by a previous knowledge of administration, they were -prepared to govern the conquered provinces with all that discretion -which a newly-acquired power, supported by arbitrary force, demands. - -In the military institutions of modern times, the generals, instructed -only in what concerns the operation of strategy and tactics, are -obliged to intrust the civil departments of the war to inferior agents, -who, without belonging to the army, render all those abuses and -vexations, inseparable from its operations, still more intolerable. - -This observation, which I do little more than repeat, seems to me, -notwithstanding, deserving of particular attention; for if the leisure -of general officers was directed in time of peace to the study of -diplomacy--if they were employed in the different embassies which -sovereigns send to foreign courts--they would acquire a knowledge of -the laws and of the government of these countries, in which they may -be called hereafter to carry on the war. They would learn also to -distinguish those points of interest on which all treaties must be -based, which have for their object the advantageous termination of a -campaign. By the aid of this information they would obtain certain -and positive results, since all the springs of action, as well as the -machinery of war, would be in their hands. We have seen Prince Eugene, -and Marshal Villars, each fulfilling with equal ability the duties of a -general and a negotiator. - -When an army which occupies a conquered province observes strict -discipline, there are few examples of insurrection among the people, -unless indeed resistance is provoked (as but too often happens), by the -exactions of inferior agents employed in the civil administration. - -It is to this point, therefore, that the general-in-chief should -principally direct his attention, in order that the contributions -imposed by the wants of the army may be levied with impartiality; and -above all, that they may be applied to their true object, instead of -serving to enrich the collectors, as is ordinarily the case. - - - - -MAXIM LXXI. - - -Nothing can excuse a general who takes advantage of the knowledge -acquired in the service of his country, to deliver up her frontier and -her towns to foreigners. This is a crime reprobated by every principle -of religion, morality and honor. - - -NOTE. - -Ambitious men who, listening only to their passions, arm natives of -the same land against each other (under the deceitful pretext of -the public good), are still more criminal. For however arbitrary a -government, the institutions which have been consolidated by time, are -always preferable to civil war, and to that anarchy which the latter is -obliged to create for the justification of its crimes. - -To be faithful to his sovereign, and to respect the established -government, are the first principles which ought to distinguish a -soldier and a man of honor. - - - - -MAXIM LXXII. - - -A general-in-chief has no right to shelter his mistakes in war under -cover of his sovereign, or of a minister, when these are both distant -from the scene of operation, and must consequently be either ill -informed or wholly ignorant of the actual state of things. - -Hence, it follows, that every general is culpable who undertakes the -execution of a plan which he considers faulty. It is his duty to -represent his reasons, to insist upon a change of plan, in short, to -give in his resignation, rather than allow himself to be made the -instrument of his army’s ruin. Every general-in-chief who fights a -battle in consequence of superior orders, with the certainty of losing -it, is equally blamable. - -In this last-mentioned case, the general ought to refuse obedience; -because a blind obedience is due only to a military command given -by a superior present on the spot at the moment of action. Being in -possession of the real state of things, the superior has it then in his -power to afford the necessary explanations to the person who executes -his orders. - -But supposing a general-in-chief to receive positive order from -his sovereign, directing him to fight a battle, with the further -injunction, to yield to his adversary, and allow himself to be -defeated--ought he to obey it? No. If the general should be able to -comprehend the meaning or utility of such an order, he should execute -it; otherwise he should refuse to obey it. - - -NOTE. - -In the campaign of 1697, Prince Eugene caused the courier to be -intercepted, who was bringing him orders from the emperor forbidding -him to hazard a battle, for which everything had been prepared, and -which he foresaw would prove decisive. He considered, therefore, -that he did his duty in evading the orders of his sovereign; and the -victory of Zanta, in which the Turks lost about thirty thousand men, -and four thousand prisoners, rewarded his audacity. In the meantime, -notwithstanding the immense advantages which accrued from this victory -to the imperial arms, Eugene was disgraced on his arrival at Vienna. - -In 1793, General Hoche, having received orders to move upon Treves with -an army harassed by constant marches in a mountainous and difficult -country, refused to obey. He observed, with reason, that in order to -obtain possession of an unimportant fortress, they were exposing his -army to inevitable ruin. He caused, therefore, his troops to return -into winter quarters, and preferred the preservation of his army, upon -which the success of the future campaign depended, to his own safety. -Recalled to Paris, he was thrown into a dungeon, which he only quitted -on the downfall of Robespierre. - -I dare not decide if such examples are to be imitated; but it seems to -me highly desirable that a question so new and so important, should be -discussed by men who are capable of determining its merits. - - - - -MAXIM LXXIII. - - -The first qualification in a general-in-chief is a cool head--that -is, a head which receives just impressions, and estimates things and -objects at their real value. He must not allow himself to be elated by -good news, or depressed by bad. - -The impressions he receives either successively or simultaneously in -the course of the day, should be so classed as to take up only the -exact place in his mind which they deserve to occupy; since it is upon -a just comparison and consideration of the weight due to different -impressions, that the power of reasoning and of right judgment depends. - -Some men are so physically and morally constituted as to see everything -through a highly-colored medium. They raise up a picture in the mind on -every slight occasion, and give to every trivial occurrence a dramatic -interest. But whatever knowledge, or talent, or courage, or other good -qualities such men may possess, nature has not formed them for the -command of armies, or the direction of great military operations. - - -NOTE. - -“The first quality in a general-in-chief,” says Montécuculli, “is a -great knowledge of the art of war. This is not intuitive, but the -result of experience. A man is not born a commander. He must become -one. Not to be anxious; to be always cool; to avoid confusion in his -commands; never to change countenance; to give his orders in the midst -of battle with as much composure as if he were perfectly at ease. These -are the proofs of valor in a general. - -“To encourage the timid; to increase the number of the truly brave; to -revive the drooping ardor of the troops in battle; to rally those who -are broken; to bring back to the charge those who are repulsed; to find -resources in difficulty, and success even amid disaster; to be ready at -a moment to devote himself, if necessary, for the welfare of the state. -These are the actions which acquire for a general distinction and -renown.” - -To this enumeration may be added, the talent of discriminating -character, and of employing every man in the particular post which -nature has qualified him to fill. “My principal attention,” said -Marshal Villars, “was always directed to the study of the younger -generals. Such a one I found, by the boldness of his character, fit -to lead a column of attack; another, from a disposition naturally -cautious, but without being deficient in courage, more perfectly to -be relied on for the defence of a country.” It is only by a just -application of these personal qualities to their respective objects, -that it is possible to command success in war. - - - - -MAXIM LXXIV. - - -The leading qualifications which should distinguish an officer selected -for the head of the staff, are, to know the country thoroughly; to -be able to conduct a _reconnoissance_ with skill; to superintend the -transmission of orders promptly; to lay down the most complicated -movements intelligibly, but in a few words, and with simplicity. - - -NOTE. - -Formerly, the duties of the chiefs of the staff were confined to the -necessary preparations for carrying the plan of the campaign, and -the operations resolved on by the general-in-chief, into effect. -In a battle, they were only employed in directing movements and -superintending their execution. But in the late wars, the officers -of the staff were frequently intrusted with the command of a column -of attack, or of large detachments, when the general-in-chief feared -to disclose the secret of his plans by the transmission of orders or -instructions. Great advantages have resulted from this innovation, -although it was long resisted. By this means, the staff have been -enabled to perfect their theory by practice, and they have acquired, -moreover, the esteem of the soldiers and junior officers of the -line, who are easily led to think lightly of their superiors, whom -they do not see fighting in the ranks. The generals who have held -the arduous situation of chief of the staff during the wars of the -Revolution, have almost always been employed in the different branches -of the profession. Marshal Berthier, who filled so conspicuously this -appointment to Napoleon, was distinguished by all the essentials of a -general. He possessed calm, and at the same time brilliant courage, -excellent judgment, and approved experience. He bore arms during half -a century, made war in the four quarters of the globe, opened and -terminated thirty-two campaigns. In his youth he acquired, under the -eye of his father, who was an engineer officer, the talent of tracing -plans and finishing them with exactness, as well as the preliminary -qualifications necessary to form a staff-officer. Admitted by the -Prince de Lambesq into his regiment of dragoons, he was taught the -skilful management of his horse and his sword--accomplishments so -important to a soldier. Attached afterward to the staff of Count -Rochambeau, he made his first campaign in America, where he soon began -to distinguish himself by his valor, activity and talents. Having at -length attained superior rank in the staff-corps formed by Marshal de -Segur, he visited the camps of the King of Prussia, and discharged the -duties of chief of the staff under the Baron de Bezenval. - -During nineteen years, consumed in sixteen campaigns, the history -of Marshal Berthier’s life was little else but that of the wars of -Napoleon, all the details of which he directed, both in the cabinet -and the field. A stranger to the intrigues of politics, he labored -with indefatigable activity; seized with promptitude and sagacity -upon general views, and gave the necessary orders for attaining them -with prudence, perspicuity, and conciseness. Discreet, impenetrable, -modest; he was just, exact, and even severe, in everything that -regarded the service; but he always set an example of vigilance and -zeal in his own person, and knew how to maintain discipline, and to -cause his authority to be respected by every rank under his orders. - - - - -MAXIM LXXV. - - -A commandant of artillery should understand well the general principles -of each branch of the service, since he is called upon to supply -arms and ammunition to the different corps of which it is composed. -His correspondence with the commanding officers of artillery at the -advanced posts, should put him in possession of all the movements of -the army, and the disposition and management of the great park of -artillery should depend upon this information. - - -NOTE. - -After having recognized the advantage of intrusting the supply of -arms and ammunition for an army to a military body, it appears to -me extraordinary that the same regulation does not extend to that of -provisions and forage, instead of leaving it in the hands of a separate -administration, as is the practice at present. - -The civil establishments attached to armies are formed almost always at -the commencement of a war, and composed of persons strangers to those -laws of discipline which they are but too much inclined to disregard. -These men are little esteemed by the military, because they serve only -to enrich themselves, without respect to the means. They consider only -their private interest in a service whose glory they cannot share, -although some portion of its success depends upon their zeal. The -disorders and defalcations incident to these establishments would -assuredly cease, if they were confided to men who had been employed -in the army, and who, in return for their labors, were permitted to -partake with their fellow-soldiers the triumph of their success. - - - - -MAXIM LXXVI. - - -The qualities which distinguish a good general of advanced posts, are, -to reconnoitre accurately defiles and fords of every description; to -provide guides that may be depended on; to interrogate the _curé_ -and postmaster; to establish rapidly a good understanding with the -inhabitants; to send out spies; to intercept public and private -letters; to translate and analyze their contents; in a word, to be able -to answer every question of the general-in-chief, when he arrives with -the whole army. - - -NOTE. - -Foraging parties, composed of small detachments, and which were usually -intrusted to young officers, served formerly to make good officers -of advanced posts; but now the army is supplied with provisions by -regular contributions: it is only in a course of partisan warfare that -the necessary experience can be acquired to fill these situations with -success. - -A chief of partisans is, to a certain extent, independent of the army. -He receives neither pay nor provisions from it, and rarely succor, and -is abandoned during the whole campaign to his own resources. - -An officer so circumstanced must unite address with courage, and -boldness with discretion, if he wishes to collect plunder without -measuring the strength of his little corps with superior forces. Always -harassed, always surrounded by dangers, which it is his business to -foresee and surmount, a leader of partisans acquires in a short time an -experience in the details of war rarely to be obtained by an officer -of the line; because the latter is almost always under the guidance of -superior authority, which directs the whole of his movements, while -the talent and genius of the partisan are developed and sustained by a -dependence on his own resources. - - - - -MAXIM LXXVII. - - -Generals-in-chief must be guided by their own experience, or their -genius. Tactics, evolutions, the duties and knowledge of an engineer -or artillery officer, may be learned in treatises, but the science -of strategy is only to be acquired by experience, and by studying the -campaigns of all the great captains. - -Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, and Frederick, as well as Alexander, -Hannibal, and Cæsar, have all acted upon the same principles. These -have been: to keep their forces united; to leave no weak part -unguarded; to seize with rapidity on important points. - -Such are the principles which lead to victory, and which, by inspiring -terror at the reputation of your arms, will at once maintain fidelity -and secure subjection. - - -NOTE. - -“A great captain can only be formed,” says the Archduke Charles, “by -long experience and intense study: neither is his own experience -enough--for whose life is there sufficiently fruitful of events to -render his knowledge universal?” It is, therefore, by augmenting his -information from the stock of others, by appreciating justly the -discoveries of his predecessors, and by taking for his standard of -comparison those great military exploits, in connection with their -political results, in which the history of war abounds, that he can -alone become a great commander. - - - - -MAXIM LXXVIII. - - -Peruse again and again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, -Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick. Model yourself -upon them. This is the only means of becoming a great captain, and -of acquiring the secret of the art of war. Your own genius will be -enlightened and improved by this study, and you will learn to reject -all maxims foreign to the principles of these great commanders. - - -NOTE. - -It is in order to facilitate this object that I have formed the present -collection. It is after reading and meditating upon the history of -modern war that I have endeavored to illustrate, by examples, how the -maxims of a great captain may be most successfully applied to this -study. May the end I have had in view be accomplished! - - - - -Transcriber’s Notes - - -Cover created by Transcriber and placed in the Public Domain. - -Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a -predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not -changed, except as noted below. - -Unusual and archaic spellings were not changed. - -Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced -quotation marks retained. - -Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. - -Page 32: “spacious and extensive” was printed as “entensive” but -changed here. - -Page 60: “1746” is a misprint; the correct date must be in the 1600's, -perhaps “1646”. - -Page 63: “1798” may be a misprint for “1796”. - -Page 65: “1745” is a misprint; the correct year is “1645”. - -Page 75: “wo to the vanquished” was printed that way. - -Page 100: “Vauban” was printed as “Vanban” but changed here. - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's The Officer's Manual, by Napoleon Bonaparte - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE OFFICER'S MANUAL *** - -***** This file should be named 50750-0.txt or 50750-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/0/7/5/50750/ - -Produced by Shaun Pinder, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Officer's Manual - Napoleon's Maxims of War - -Author: Napoleon Bonaparte - -Release Date: December 23, 2015 [EBook #50750] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE OFFICER'S MANUAL *** - - - - -Produced by Shaun Pinder, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - - - - - -</pre> - - -<div class="transnote center"> -<p class="center bold">Transcriber’s Note</p> -<p class="covernote center">Cover created by Transcriber and placed into the Public Domain.</p> -<p class="center">Table of Contents created by Transcriber and placed into the Public Domain.</p> -</div> - -<h1 class="vspace"> -<span class="small">THE OFFICER’S MANUAL.</span><br /><br /> -NAPOLEON’S<br /> -<span class="larger gesperrt">MAXIMS OF WAR.</span></h1> - -<p class="p2 center vspace2"><span class="gesperrt">RICHMOND, VA.:<br /> -WEST & JOHNSTON.</span><br /> -1862. -</p> - -<p class="p2 center smaller vspace2"> -<span class="smcap">Evans & Cogswell, Printers.<br /> -No. 3 Broad St., Charleston, S. C.</span> -</p> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS</h2> - -<div class="center"><div class="center-block vspacetoc"> -<a href="#RECOMMENDATION">RECOMMENDATION.</a><br /> -<a href="#PREFACE">PREFACE.</a><br /> -<a href="#NAPOLEONS">NAPOLEON’S</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_I">MAXIM I.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_II">MAXIM II.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_III">MAXIM III.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_IV">MAXIM IV.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_V">MAXIM V.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_VI">MAXIM VI.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_VII">MAXIM VII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_VIII">MAXIM VIII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_IX">MAXIM IX.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_X">MAXIM X.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XI">MAXIM XI.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XII">MAXIM XII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XIII">MAXIM XIII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XIV">MAXIM XIV.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XV">MAXIM XV.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XVI">MAXIM XVI.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XVII">MAXIM XVII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XVIII">MAXIM XVIII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XIX">MAXIM XIX.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XX">MAXIM XX.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XXI">MAXIM XXI.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XXII">MAXIM XXII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XXIII">MAXIM XXIII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XXIV">MAXIM XXIV.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XXV">MAXIM XXV.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XXVI">MAXIM XXVI.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XXVII">MAXIM XXVII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XXVIII">MAXIM XXVIII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XXIX">MAXIM XXIX.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XXX">MAXIM XXX.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XXXI">MAXIM XXXI.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XXXII">MAXIM XXXII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XXXIII">MAXIM XXXIII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XXXIV">MAXIM XXXIV.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XXXV">MAXIM XXXV.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XXXVI">MAXIM XXXVI.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XXXVII">MAXIM XXXVII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XXXVIII">MAXIM XXXVIII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XXXIX">MAXIM XXXIX.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XL">MAXIM XL.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XLI">MAXIM XLI.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XLII">MAXIM XLII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XLIII">MAXIM XLIII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XLIV">MAXIM XLIV.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XLV">MAXIM XLV.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XLVI">MAXIM XLVI.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XLVII">MAXIM XLVII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XLVIII">MAXIM XLVIII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_XLIX">MAXIM XLIX.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_L">MAXIM L.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LI">MAXIM LI.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LII">MAXIM LII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LIII">MAXIM LIII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LIV">MAXIM LIV.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LV">MAXIM LV.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LVI">MAXIM LVI.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LVII">MAXIM LVII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LVIII">MAXIM LVIII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LIX">MAXIM LIX.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LX">MAXIM LX.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LXI">MAXIM LXI.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LXII">MAXIM LXII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LXIII">MAXIM LXIII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LXIV">MAXIM LXIV.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LXV">MAXIM LXV.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LXVI">MAXIM LXVI.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LXVII">MAXIM LXVII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LXVIII">MAXIM LXVIII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LXIX">MAXIM LXIX.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LXX">MAXIM LXX.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LXXI">MAXIM LXXI.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LXXII">MAXIM LXXII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LXXIII">MAXIM LXXIII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LXXIV">MAXIM LXXIV.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LXXV">MAXIM LXXV.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LXXVI">MAXIM LXXVI.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LXXVII">MAXIM LXXVII.</a><br /> -<a href="#MAXIM_LXXVIII">MAXIM LXXVIII.</a><br /> -<a href="#Transcribers_Notes">Transcriber’s Notes</a> -</div></div> - -</div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="RECOMMENDATION"></a>RECOMMENDATION.</h2> - -<p>“After refreshing my memory by looking over -again ‘The Officer’s Manual,’ or ‘Maxims of Napoleon,’ -I think I may safely recommend the republication, -in America, of the work in English, as likely to -be called for by many officers, regular and volunteer. -It contains a circle of maxims, deduced from the -highest source of military science and experience, -with practical illustrations of the principles taken -from the most celebrated campaigns of modern times. -The study of the book cannot fail to set all young -officers on a course of inquiry and reflection greatly -to their improvement.</p> - -<p class="sigright"> -“WINFIELD SCOTT.” -</p> - -</div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_5">5</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="PREFACE"></a>PREFACE.</h2> - -<p>The publisher has reissued this little -volume as a publication timely for the -occasion. A collection of maxims which -directed the military operations of the -greatest captain of modern times, cannot -fail to prove of great use to such young -officers as really desire a knowledge of -the art of war. The maxims are illustrated -by instances drawn from the campaigns -of Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, -Frederick, and Napoleon. These great -men were all governed by the same -principles, and it is by applying these -principles to the perusal of their respective -campaigns, that every military man -will recognize their wisdom, and make<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_6">6</a></span> -such use of them hereafter as his own -particular genius shall point out.</p> - -<p>“And here, perhaps,” says the translator, -Col. D’Aguilar, “my task might -have been considered finished; but perceiving -how incomplete the collection -was alone, I have endeavored to supply -the deficiency by having recourse for -further illustration to the memoirs of -Montécuculli, and the instructions of -Frederick to his generals. The analogy -of their principles with those of Napoleon, -has convinced me that the art of -war is susceptible of two points of view: -one, which relates entirely to the acquirements -and genius of the general; the -other, which refers to matters of detail.</p> - -<p>“The first is the same in all ages, and -with all nations, whatever be the arms -with which they fight. Hence it follows -that, in every age, great commanders -have been governed by the same principles.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_7">7</a></span></p> - -<p>“The business of detail, on the contrary, -is controlled by existing circumstances. -It varies with the character of -a people, and the quality of their arms.</p> - -<p>“It is with a view to impress the justice -of this remark, that I have sought -for facts in different periods of history, -to illustrate these maxims, and to prove -that nothing is <em>problematical</em> in war; but -that failure and success in military operations -depend almost always on the natural -genius and science of the chief.”</p> - -</div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_9">9</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="vspace"><a id="NAPOLEONS"></a>NAPOLEON’S<br /> -<span class="larger gesperrt wspace">MAXIMS OF WAR.</span></h2> - -</div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="nobreak"><a id="MAXIM_I"></a>MAXIM I.</h2> - -<p>The frontiers of states are either large -rivers, or chains of mountains, or deserts. -Of all these obstacles to the march of an -army, the most difficult to overcome is -the desert; mountains come next, and -broad rivers occupy the third place.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>Napoleon, in his military career, appears -to have been called upon to surmount every -difficulty which can occur in wars of invasion.</p> - -<p>In Egypt he traversed deserts, and vanquished -and destroyed the Mamelukes, so -celebrated for their address and courage. -His genius knew how to accommodate itself -to all the dangers of this distant enterprise,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_10">10</a></span> -in a country ill adapted to supply the wants -of his troops.</p> - -<p>In the conquest of Italy, he twice crossed -the Alps by the most difficult passes, and at -a season, too, which rendered this undertaking -still more formidable. In three months -he passed the Pyrenees, defeated and dispersed -four Spanish armies. In short, from -the Rhine to the Borysthenes, no natural -obstacle could be found to arrest the rapid -march of his victorious army.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_II"></a>MAXIM II.</h2> - -<p>In forming the plan of a campaign, it -is requisite to foresee everything the enemy -may do, and to be prepared with the -necessary means to counteract it.</p> - -<p>Plans of campaign may be modified -<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ad infinitum</i> according to circumstances—the -genius of the general, the character -of the troops, and the topography of the -theatre of action.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>Sometimes we see a hazardous campaign -succeed, the plan of which is directly at variance<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_11">11</a></span> -with the principles of the art of war. -But this success depends generally on the -caprice of fortune, or upon faults committed -by the enemy—two things upon which a general -must never count. Sometimes the plan -of a campaign, although based on sound -principles of war, runs the risk of failing at -the outset if opposed by an adversary who -acts at first on the defensive, and then, suddenly -seizing the initiative, surprises by the -skilfulness of his manœuvres. Such was the -fate of the plan laid down by the Aulic council -for the campaign of 1796, under the command -of Marshal Wurmser. From his great -numerical superiority, the marshal had calculated -on the entire destruction of the French -army, by cutting off its retreat. He founded -his operations on the defensive attitude of -his adversary, who was posted on the line -of the Adige, and had to cover the siege of -Mantua, as well as central and lower Italy.</p> - -<p>Wurmser, supposing the French army fixed -in the neighborhood of Mantua, divided -his forces into three corps, which marched -separately, intending to unite at that place. -Napoleon, having penetrated the design of -the Austrian general, perceived the advantage -to be derived from striking the first<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_12">12</a></span> -blow against an army divided into three -corps, with no communication between them. -He hastened, therefore, to raise the siege of -Mantua, assembled the whole of his forces, -and by this means became superior to the -imperialists, whose divisions he attacked and -beat in detail. Thus Wurmser, who fancied -he had only to march to certain victory, -saw himself compelled, after ten days campaign, -to retire with the remains of his army -into the Tyrol, after a loss of twenty-five -thousand men in killed and wounded, fifteen -thousand prisoners, nine stand of colors, and -seventy pieces of cannon.</p> - -<p>Hence, nothing is so difficult as to prescribe -beforehand to a general the line of -conduct he shall pursue during the course -of a campaign. Success must often depend -on circumstances that cannot be foreseen; -and it should be remembered, likewise, that -nothing cramps so much the efforts of genius -as compelling the head of an army to be -governed by any will but his own.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_III"></a>MAXIM III.</h2> - -<p>An army which undertakes the conquest -of a country, has its two wings<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_13">13</a></span> -resting either upon neutral territories, or -upon great natural obstacles, such as rivers -or chains of mountains. It happens -in some cases that only one wing is so -supported; and in others that both are -exposed.</p> - -<p>In the first instance cited, viz., where -both wings are protected, a general has -only to protect his front from being penetrated. -In the second, where one wing -only is supported, he should rest upon -the supported wing. In the third, where -both wings are exposed, he should depend -upon a central formation, and never allow -the different corps under his command to -depart from this: for if it be difficult to -contend with the disadvantage of having -<em>two</em> flanks exposed, the inconvenience is -doubled by having <em>four</em>, trebled if there -be <em>six</em>—that is to say, if the army is divided -into two or three different corps. -In the first instance, then, as above quoted, -the line of operation may rest indifferently -on the right or on the left. In -the second, it should be directed toward -the wing in support. In the third, it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_14">14</a></span> -should be perpendicular to the centre of -the army’s line of march. But in all -these cases it is necessary, at a distance -of every five or six days march, to have -a strong post or an entrenched position -upon the line of operation, in order to -collect military stores and provisions, to -organize convoys, to form of it a centre -of movement, and establish a point of -defence to shorten the line of operation -of the army.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>These general principles in the art of war -were entirely unknown, or lost sight of, in -the middle ages. The crusaders in their incursions -into Palestine appear to have had -no object but to fight and to conquer, so little -pains did they take to profit by their -victories. Hence, innumerable armies perished -in Syria, without any other advantage -than that derived from the momentary -success obtained by superior numbers.</p> - -<p>It was by the neglect of these principles, -also, that Charles XII, abandoning his line -of operation and all communication with -Sweden, threw himself into the Ukraine,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_15">15</a></span> -and lost the greater part of his army by the -fatigue of a winter campaign in a barren -country destitute of resources.</p> - -<p>Defeated at Pultawa, he was obliged to -seek refuge in Turkey, after crossing the -Nieper with the remains of his army, diminished -to little more than one thousand men.</p> - -<p>Gustavus Adolphus was the first who -brought back the art of war to its true principles. -His operations in Germany were -bold, rapid, and well executed. He made -success at all times conducive to future -security, and established his line of operation -so as to prevent the possibility of any -interruption in his communications with -Sweden. His campaigns form a new era in -the art of war.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_IV"></a>MAXIM IV.</h2> - -<p>When the conquest of a country is -undertaken by two or three armies, -which have each their separate line of -operation, until they arrive at a point -fixed upon for their concentration, it -should be laid down as a principle, that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_16">16</a></span> -the union of these different corps should -never take place near the enemy; because -the enemy, in uniting his forces, -may not only prevent this junction, but -may beat the armies in detail.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>In the campaign of 1757, Frederick, -marching to the conquest of Bohemia with -two armies, which had each their separate -line of operation, succeeded, notwithstanding, -in uniting them in sight of the Duke -of Lorraine, who covered Prague with the -imperial army; but his example should not -be followed. The success of this march -depended entirely on the inaction of the -duke, who, at the head of seventy thousand -men, did nothing to prevent the junction of -the two Prussian armies.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_V"></a>MAXIM V.</h2> - -<p>All wars should be governed by certain -principles, for every war should have a -definite object, and be conducted according -to the rules of art. (A war should<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_17">17</a></span> -only be undertaken with forces proportioned -to the obstacles to be overcome.)</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>It was a saying of Marshal Villars, that -when war is decided on, it is necessary to -have exact information of the number of -troops the enemy can bring into the field, -since it is impossible to lay down any solid -plan of offensive or defensive operation -without an accurate knowledge of what -you have to expect and fear. “When the -first shot is fired,” observes Marshal Villars, -“no one can calculate what will be the issue -of the war. It is, therefore, of vast -importance to reflect maturely before we -begin it.” When once, however, this is -decided, the marshal observes that the boldest -and most extended plans are generally -the wisest and the most successful. “When -we are determined upon war,” he adds, “we -should carry it on vigorously and without -trifling.”</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_VI"></a>MAXIM VI.</h2> - -<p>At the commencement of a campaign, -to <em>advance</em> or <em>not to advance</em>, is a matter<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_18">18</a></span> -for grave consideration; but when once -the offensive has been assumed, it must -be sustained to the last extremity. However -skilful the manœuvres in a retreat, -it will always weaken the <em>morale</em> of an -army, because, in losing the chances of -success, these last are transferred to the -enemy. Besides, retreats always cost -more men and <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">materiel</i> than the most -bloody engagements; with this difference, -that in a battle the enemy’s loss is -nearly equal to your own—whereas in a -retreat the loss is on your side only.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>Marshal Saxe remarks, that no retreats -are so favorable as those which are made -before a languid and unenterprising enemy, -for when he pursues with vigor, the retreat -soon degenerates into a rout. “Upon this -principle it is a great error,” says the -marshal, “to adhere to the proverb which -recommends us to build a bridge of gold for -a retreating enemy. No; follow him up -with spirit, and he is destroyed!”</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_19">19</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_VII"></a>MAXIM VII.</h2> - -<p>An army should be ready every day, -every night, and at all times of the day -and night, to oppose all the resistance -of which it is capable. With this view, -the soldier should always be furnished -completely with arms and ammunition; -the infantry should never be without its -artillery, its cavalry, and its generals; -and the different divisions of the army -should be constantly in a state to support, -to be supported, and to protect -itself.</p> - -<p>The troops, whether halted, or encamped, -or on the march, should be -always in favorable positions, possessing -the essentials required for a field of battle; -for example, the flanks should be -well covered, and all the artillery so -placed as to have free range, and to play -with the greatest advantage. When an -army is in column of march, it should -have advanced guards and flanking parties, -to examine well the country in front, -to the right, and to the left, and always<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_20">20</a></span> -at such distance as to enable the main -body to deploy into position.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>The following maxims, taken from the -memoirs of Montécuculli, appear to me well -suited to this place, and calculated to form a -useful commentary on the general principles -laid down in the preceding maxim:</p> - -<p>1. When war has been once decided on, -the moment is past for doubts and scruples. -On the contrary, we are bound to hope that -all the evil which may ensue, will not; that -Providence, or our own wisdom, may avert -it; or that the want of talent on the part of -the enemy may prevent him from benefiting -by it. The first security for success is to -confer the command on one individual. -When the authority is divided, the opinions -of the commanders often vary, and the operations -are deprived of that <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">ensemble</i> which -is the first essential to victory. Besides, -when an enterprise is common to many, and -not confined to a single person, it is conducted -without vigor, and less interest is -attached to the result.</p> - -<p>After having strictly conformed to all the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_21">21</a></span> -rules of war, and satisfied ourselves that -nothing has been omitted to ensure eventual -success, we must then leave the issue in the -hands of Providence, and repose ourselves -tranquilly in the decision of a higher power.</p> - -<p>Let what will arrive, it is the part of a -general-in-chief to remain firm and constant -in his purposes; he must not allow himself -to be elated by prosperity, nor to be depressed -by adversity: for in war good and -bad and fortune succeed each other by turns, -form the ebb and flow of military operations.</p> - -<p>2. When your own army is strong and -inured to service, and that of the enemy is -weak and consists of new levies, or of troops -enervated by long inaction, then you should -exert every means to bring him to battle.</p> - -<p>If, on the other hand, your adversary has -the advantage in troops, a decisive combat -is to be avoided, and you must be content to -impede his progress, by encamping advantageously, -and fortifying favorable passes. -When armies are nearly equal in force, it is -desirable <em>not</em> to avoid a battle, but only to -attempt to fight one to advantage. For this -purpose, care should be taken to encamp always -in front of the enemy; to move when -he moves, and occupy the heights and advantageous<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_22">22</a></span> -grounds that lie upon his line of -march; to seize upon all the buildings and -roads adjoining to his camp, and post yourself -advantageously in the places by which -he must pass. It is always something gained -to make <em>him</em> lose time, to thwart his designs, -or to retard their progress and execution. -If, however, an army is altogether -inferior to that of the enemy, and there is no -possibility of manœuvring against him with -success, then the campaign must be abandoned, -and the troops must retire into the -fortresses.</p> - -<p>3. The principal object of a general-in-chief, -in the moment of battle, should be to -secure the flanks of his army. It is true -that natural positions may be found to effect -this object, but these positions being fixed -and immovable in themselves, they are only -advantageous to a general who wishes to -wait the shock of the enemy, and not to one -who marches to the attack.</p> - -<p>A general can, therefore, rely only on the -proper arrangement of his troops, to enable -him to repel any attempt the adversary may -make upon the front, or flanks, or rear of -his army.</p> - -<p>If one flank of an army rests upon a river,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_23">23</a></span> -or an impassable ravine, the whole of the -cavalry may be posted with the other wing, -in order to envelop the enemy more easily -by its superiority in numbers.</p> - -<p>If the enemy has his flanks supported by -woods, light cavalry or infantry should be -despatched to attack him in flank or in rear -during the heat of the battle. If practicable, -also, an attack should be made upon the -baggage, to add to his confusion.</p> - -<p>If you desire to beat the enemy’s left with -your right wing, or his right with your -left wing, the wing with which you attack -should be reinforced by the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">élite</i> of your -army. At the same moment, the other wing -should avoid battle, and the attacking wing -brought rapidly forward, so as to overwhelm -the enemy. If the nature of the ground -admits, he should be approached by stealth, -and attacked before he is on his guard. If -any signs of fear are discoverable in the enemy, -and which are always to be detected -by confusion or disorder in his movements, -he should be pursued immediately, without -allowing him time to recover himself. It is -now the cavalry should be brought into action, -and manœuvre so as to surprise and -cut off his artillery and baggage.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_24">24</a></span></p> - -<p>4. The order of march should always be -subservient to the order of battle, which last -should be arranged beforehand. The march -of an army is always well regulated when it -is governed by the distance to be accomplished, -and by the time required for its performance. -The front of the column of march -should be diminished or increased according -to the nature of the country, taking care -that the artillery always proceeds by the -main road.</p> - -<p>When a river is to be passed, the artillery -should be placed in battery upon the bank -opposite the point of crossing.</p> - -<p>It is a great advantage, when a river -forms a sweep or angle, and when a ford is -to be found near the place where you wish -to effect a passage. As the construction of -the bridge proceeds, infantry should be advanced -to cover the workmen, by keeping -up a fire on the opposite bank; but the moment -it is finished, a corps of infantry and -cavalry, and some field-pieces, should be -pushed across. The infantry should entrench -itself immediately at the head of the bridge, -and it is prudent, moreover, to fortify on the -same side of the river, in order to protect -the bridge in case the enemy should venture -an offensive movement.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_25">25</a></span></p> - -<p>The advanced guard of an army should -be always provided with trusty guides, and -with a corps of pioneers: the first to point -out the best roads, the second to render -these roads more practicable.</p> - -<p>If the army marches in detachments, the -commander of each detachment should be -furnished with the name of the place in -writing, where the whole are to be reassembled; -the place should be sufficiently removed -from the enemy to prevent him from -occupying it before the junction of all the -detachments. To this end, it is of importance -to keep the name a secret.</p> - -<p>From the moment an army approaches -the enemy, it should march in the order in -which it is intended to fight. If anything is -to be apprehended, precautions are necessary -in proportion to the degree of the danger. -When a defile is to be passed, the troops -should be halted beyond the extremity, until -the whole army has quitted the defile.</p> - -<p>In order to conceal the movements of an -army, it is necessary to march by night -through woods and valleys, by the most retired -roads, and out of reach of all inhabited -places. No fires should be allowed; and, to -favor the design still more, the troops should<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_26">26</a></span> -move by verbal order. When the object of -the march is to carry a post, or to relieve a -place that is besieged, the advanced guard -should march within musket shot of the -main body, because then you are prepared -for an immediate attack, and ready to overthrow -all before you.</p> - -<p>When a march is made to force a pass -guarded by the enemy, it is desirable to -make a feint upon one point, while, by a -rapid movement, you bring your real attack -to bear upon another.</p> - -<p>Sometimes success is obtained by pretending -to fall back upon the original line of -march, and, by a sudden countermarch, seizing -upon the pass, before the enemy is able -to reoccupy it. Some generals have gained -their point by manœuvring so as to deceive -the enemy, while a detachment under the -cover of high grounds has surprised the passage -by a stolen march. The enemy being -engaged in watching the movements of the -main body, the detachment has an opportunity -of entrenching itself in its new position.</p> - -<p>5. An army regulates its mode of encampment -according to the greater or less degree -of precaution, when circumstances require. -In a friendly country the troops are divided,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_27">27</a></span> -to afford better accommodation and supplies. -But with the enemy in front, an army should -always encamp in order of battle. With -this view, it is of the highest importance to -cover one part of the camp, as far as practicable, -by natural defences, such as a river, a -chain of rocks, or a ravine. Care should be -taken also that the camp is not commanded, -and that there is no obstacle to a free communication -between the different corps, and -which can prevent the troops from mutually -succoring each other.</p> - -<p>When an army occupies a fixed camp, it is -necessary to be well supplied with provisions -and ammunition, or at least that these should -be within certain reach and easily obtained. -To insure this, the line of communication -must be well established, and care taken not -to leave an enemy’s fortress in your rear.</p> - -<p>When an army is established in winter -quarters, its safety is best secured either by -fortifying a camp (for which purpose a spot -should be selected near a large commercial -town, or a river affording facility of transport), -or by distributing it in close cantonments, -so that the troops should be near -together, and capable of affording each other -mutual support.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_28">28</a></span></p> - -<p>The winter quarters of an army should be -protected, likewise, by constructing small -covered works on all the lines of approach -to the cantonments, and by posting advanced -guards of cavalry to observe the motions of -the enemy.</p> - -<p>6. A battle is to be sought, when there is -reason to hope for victory, or when an army -runs the risk of being ruined without fighting; -also when a besieged place is to be -relieved, or when you desire to prevent -a reinforcement from reaching the enemy. -Battles are useful, likewise, when we wish -to profit by a favorable opportunity which -offers, to secure a certain advantage, such as -seizing upon an undefended point or pass, -attacking the enemy when he has committed -a fault, or when some misunderstanding -among his generals favors the undertaking.</p> - -<p>If an enemy declines an engagement, he -may be compelled to it, either by besieging -a place of importance, or by falling upon -him unawares, and when he cannot easily -effect his retreat. Or (after pretending to -retire), by making a rapid countermarch, -attacking him vigorously and forcing him to -action.</p> - -<p>The different circumstances under which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_29">29</a></span> -a battle should be avoided or declined, are, -when there is greater danger to be apprehended -from defeat than advantage to be -derived from victory; when you are very -inferior to your adversary in numbers, and -are expecting reinforcements; above all, -when the enemy is advantageously posted, -or when he is contributing to his own ruin -by some inherent defect in his position, or -by the errors and divisions of his generals.</p> - -<p>To gain a battle, each arm must be advantageously -posted, and have the means -of engaging its front and in flank. The -wings must be protected by natural obstacles, -where these present themselves, or by -having recourse when necessary to the aid -of art.</p> - -<p>The troops must be able to assist each -other without confusion, and care must be -taken that the broken corps do not fall -back upon, and throw the rest into disorder. -Above all, the intervals between -the different corps must be sufficiently small -to prevent the enemy from penetrating between -them, for in that case you would be -obliged to employ your reserves, and run -the risk of being entirely overwhelmed. -Sometimes victory is obtained by creating<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_30">30</a></span> -a diversion in the middle of a battle, or -even by depriving the soldier of all hope -of retreat, and placing him in a situation -where he is reduced to the necessity either -to conquer or die.</p> - -<p>At the commencement of a battle, if the -ground is level, you should advance to meet -the enemy, in order to inspire the soldier -with courage; but if you are well posted, -and your artillery advantageously placed, -then wait for him with determination: remembering -always to fight resolutely, to -succor opportunely those who require it, -and never to bring your reserves into action -except in the last extremity; and -even then to preserve some support, behind -which the broken corps may rally.</p> - -<p>When it is necessary to attack with your -whole force, the battle should commence -toward evening; because then, whatever -be the issue, night will arrive to separate -the combatants before your troops are exhausted. -By this means, an opportunity -is afforded of affecting an orderly retreat -if the result of the battle requires it.</p> - -<p>During an action, the general-in-chief -should occupy some spot whence he can, -as far as possible, overlook his whole army.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_31">31</a></span> -He should be informed, immediately, of -everything that passes in the different -divisions. He should be ready, in order to -render success more complete, to operate -with fresh troops upon those points where -the enemy is giving way, and also to reinforce -his own corps wherever they are inclined -to yield. When the enemy is beaten, -he must pursue him instantly, without -giving him a moment to rally; on the -other hand, if he is himself defeated, or -despairs of victory, he must retreat in the -best possible order.</p> - -<p>7. It shows great talent in a general -to bring troops, who are prepared for action, -into collision with those who are -not: for example, fresh troops against those -which are exhausted—brave and disciplined -men against recruits. He must likewise be -ready always to fall with his army upon -a weak or detached corps, to follow the -track of the enemy, and charge him among -defiles before he can face about and get into -position.</p> - -<p>8. A position is good when the different -corps are so placed as to be engaged with -advantage, and without any remaining unemployed. -If you are superior in cavalry,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_32">32</a></span> -positions are to be taken in plains and -open ground; if in infantry, in an enclosed -and covered country. If inferior in -numbers, in confined and narrow places; -if superior, in a spacious and extensive -field. With a very inferior army, a difficult -pass must be selected to occupy and -fortify.</p> - -<p>9. In order to obtain every possible advantage -from a diversion, we should ascertain -first, that the country in which it is to -be created is easily penetrated. A diversion -should be made vigorously, and on those -points where it is calculated to do the greatest -mischief to the enemy.</p> - -<p>10. To make war with success, the following -principles should never be departed -from:</p> - -<p>To be superior to your enemy in numbers, -as well as in <em>morale</em>; to fight battles in order -to spread terror in the country; to divide -your army into as many corps as may be -effected without risk, in order to undertake -several objects at the same time; to treat -<span class="smcap smaller">WELL</span> those who yield, to <span class="smcap smaller">ILL</span> treat those who -resist; to secure your rear, and occupy and -strengthen yourself at the outset in some -post which shall serve as a central point for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_33">33</a></span> -the support of your future movements; to -guard against desertion; to make yourself -master of the great rivers and principal -passes, and to establish your line of communication -by getting possession of the fortresses, -by laying siege to them, and of the -open country, by giving battle; for it is vain -to expect that conquests are to be achieved -without combats; although when a victory -is won, they will be best maintained by -uniting mildness with valor.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_VIII"></a>MAXIM VIII.</h2> - -<p>A general-in-chief should ask himself -frequently in the day: “What should I -do if the enemy’s army appeared now in -my front, or on my right, or my left?” -If he have any difficulty in answering -these questions, his position is bad, and -he should seek to remedy it.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>In the campaign of 1758, the position of -the Prussian army at Hohen Kirk, being -commanded by the batteries of the enemy, -who occupied all the heights, was eminently<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_34">34</a></span> -defective; notwithstanding, Frederick, who -saw his rear menaced by the corps of Laudon, -remained six days in his camp without seeking -to correct his position. It would seem, -indeed, that he was ignorant of his real danger: -for Marshal Daun, having manœuvred -during the night in order to attack by daybreak, -surprised the Prussians in their lines -before they were able to defend themselves, -and by this means surrounded them completely.</p> - -<p>Frederick succeeded, however, in effecting -his retreat with regularity, but not without -the loss of ten thousand men, many general -officers, and almost all of his artillery. If -Marshal Daun had followed up his victory -with greater boldness, the king of Prussia -would never have been able to rally his -army. On this occasion, Frederick’s good -fortune balanced his imprudence.</p> - -<p>Marshal Saxe remarks, that there is more -talent than is dreamt of in bad dispositions, -if we possess the art of converting them into -good ones when the favorable moment -arrives. Nothing astonishes the enemy so -much as this manœuvre; he has counted -upon <em>something</em>; all his arrangements have -been founded upon it accordingly—and at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_35">35</a></span> -the moment of attack it escapes him! “I -must repeat,” says the marshal, “there is -nothing that so completely disconcerts an -enemy as this, or leads him to commit so -many errors; for it follows, that if he does -<em>not</em> change his arrangements, he is beaten; -and if he <em>does</em> change them, in presence of -his adversary, he is equally undone.”</p> - -<p>It seems to me, however, that a general -who should rest the success of a battle upon -such a principle, would be more likely to -lose than to gain by it; for if he had to deal -with a skilful adversary and an alert tactician, -the latter would find time to take advantage -of the previous bad arrangements, -before he would be able to remedy them.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_IX"></a>MAXIM IX.</h2> - -<p>The strength of an army, like the -power in mechanics, is estimated by multiplying -the mass by the rapidity; a rapid -march augments the <em>morale</em> of an army, -and increases its means of victory. Press -on!</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_36">36</a></span></p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>“Rapidity,” says Montécuculli, “is of importance -in concealing the movements of an -army, because it leaves no time to divulge -the intention of its chief. It is, therefore, -an advantage to attack the enemy unexpectedly, -to take him off his guard, to surprise -him, and let him feel the thunder before he -sees the flash; but if too great celerity exhausts -your troops, while, on the other hand, -delay deprives you of the favorable moment, -you must weigh the advantage against the -disadvantage, and choose between.”</p> - -<p>Marshal Villars observes, that “in war -everything depends upon being able to deceive -the enemy; and having once gained -this point, in never allowing him time to -recover himself.” Villars has united practice -to precept. His bold and rapid marches -were almost always crowned with success.</p> - -<p>It was the opinion of Frederick that all -wars should be short and rapid; because a -long war insensibly relaxes discipline, depopulates -the state, and exhausts its resources.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_37">37</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_X"></a>MAXIM X.</h2> - -<p>When an army is inferior in number, -inferior in cavalry, and in artillery, it is -essential to avoid a general action. The -first deficiency should be supplied by rapidity -of movement; the want of artillery, -by the nature of the manœuvres; -and the inferiority in cavalry, by the -choice of positions. In such circumstances, -the <em>morale</em> of the soldier does much.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>The campaign of 1814 in France was skilfully -executed upon these principles. Napoleon, -with an army inferior in number, an -army discouraged by the disastrous retreats -of Moscow and of Leipzig, and still more by -the presence of the enemy in the French -territory, contrived, notwithstanding, to supply -his vast inequality of force by the rapidity -and combination of his movements. By -the success obtained at Champ-Aubert, Montmirail, -Montereau, and Rheims, he began to -restore the <em>morale</em> of the French army. The -numerous recruits of which it was composed,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_38">38</a></span> -had already acquired that steadiness -of which the old regiments afforded them -an example, when the capture of Paris, and -the astonishing revolution it produced, compelled -Napoleon to lay down his arms.</p> - -<p>But this consequence resulted rather from -the force of circumstances than from any absolute -necessity; for Napoleon, by carrying -his army to the other side of the Loire, -might easily have formed a junction with -the armies of the Alps and Pyrenees, and -have reappeared on the field of battle at the -head of a hundred thousand men. Such a -force would have amply sufficed to re-establish -the chances of war in his favor; more -especially as the armies of the allied sovereigns -were obliged to manœuvre upon the -French territory with all the strong places -of Italy and France in their rear.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XI"></a>MAXIM XI.</h2> - -<p>To direct operations with lines far removed -from each other, and without communications, -is to commit a fault which -always gives birth to a second. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_39">39</a></span> -detached column has only its orders for -the first day. Its operations on the following -day depend upon what may have -happened to the main body. Thus, this -column either loses time upon emergency, -in waiting for orders, or it will act without -them, and at hazard. Let it therefore -be held as a principle, that an army -should always keep its columns so united -as to prevent the enemy from passing between -them with impunity. Whenever, -for particular reasons, this principle is -departed from, the detached corps should -be independent in their operations. They -should move toward a point fixed upon -for their future junction. They should -advance without hesitating, and without -waiting for fresh orders; and every precaution -should be taken to prevent an -attack upon them in detail.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>The Austrian army, commanded by Field-marshal -Alvinzi, was divided into two corps, -destined to act independently, until they -should accomplish their junction before Mantua.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_40">40</a></span> -The first of these corps, consisting of -forty-five thousand men, was under the orders -of Alvinzi. It was to debouch by Monte -Baldo, upon the positions occupied by the -French army on the Adige. The second -corps, commanded by General Provéra, was -destined to act upon the lower Adige, and -to raise the blockade of Mantua. Napoleon, -informed of the enemy’s movements, -but not entirely comprehending his projects, -confined himself to concentrating his masses, -and giving orders to the troops to hold -themselves in readiness to manœuvre. In -the meantime, fresh information satisfied the -general-in-chief of the French army that the -corps which had debouched by La Coronna, -over Monte Baldo, was endeavoring to form -a junction with its cavalry and artillery—both -which, having crossed the Adige at -Dolce, were directing their march upon the -plateau of Rivoli, by the great road leading -by Incanole.</p> - -<p>Napoleon immediately foresaw that, by -having possession of the plateau, he should -be able to prevent this junction, and obtain -all the advantages of the initiative. He accordingly -put his troops in motion, and at -two o’clock in the morning occupied that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_41">41</a></span> -important position. Once master of the point -fixed upon for the junction of the Austrian -columns, success followed all his dispositions. -He repulsed every attack, made seven thousand -prisoners, and took several standards -and twelve pieces of cannon. At two o’clock -in the afternoon, the battle of Rivoli was -already gained, when Napoleon, learning -that General Provéra had passed the Adige -at Anghiari, and was directing his march -upon Mantua, left to his generals the charge -of following up the retreat of Alvinzi, and -placed himself at the head of a division for -the purpose of defeating the designs of Provéra.</p> - -<p>By a rapid march, he again succeeded in -the initiatory movement, and in preventing -the garrison of Mantua from uniting its force -with the relieving army. The corps intrusted -with the blockade, eager to distinguish -itself under the eyes of the conqueror of -Rivoli, compelled the garrison to retire into -the place, while the division of Victor, forgetting -the fatigues of a forced march, rushed -with impetuosity on the relieving army in -front. At this moment a sortie from the lines -of St. George took him in flank, while the -corps of Augereau, which had followed the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_42">42</a></span> -march of the Austrian general, attacked him -in rear. Provéra, surrounded on all sides, -capitulated. The result of these two battles -cost the Austrians three thousand men in -killed and wounded, twenty-two thousand -prisoners, twenty-four standards, and forty-six -pieces of cannon.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XII"></a>MAXIM XII.</h2> - -<p>An army ought to have only one line -of operation. This should be preserved -with care, and never abandoned but in -the last extremity.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>“The line of communication of an army,” -says Montécuculli, “must be certain and -well established, for every army that acts -from a distant base, and is not careful to -keep this line perfectly open, marches upon -a precipice. It moves to certain ruin, as may -be seen by an infinity of examples. In fact, -if the road by which provisions, ammunition -and reinforcements are to be brought up, is -not entirely secured—if the magazines, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_43">43</a></span> -hospitals, the depôts of arms, and the places -of supply are not fixed and commodiously -situated—not only the army cannot keep the -field, but it will be exposed to the greatest -dangers.”</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XIII"></a>MAXIM XIII.</h2> - -<p>The distances permitted between corps -of an army upon the march must be governed -by the localities, by circumstances, -and by the object in view.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>When an army moves at a distance from -the enemy, the columns may be disposed -along the road so as to favor the artillery -and baggage. But when it is marching into -action, the different corps must be formed in -close columns in order of battle. The generals -must take care that the heads of the -columns, which are to attack together, do not -outstep each other, and that in approaching -the field of action they preserve the relative -intervals required for deployment.</p> - -<p>“The marches that are made preparatory<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_44">44</a></span> -to a battle require,” says Frederick, “the -greatest precaution.” With this view, he -recommends his generals to be particularly -on their guard, and to reconnoitre the ground -at successive distances, in order to secure the -initiative by occupying those positions most -calculated to favor an attack. On a retreat, -it is the opinion of many generals that an -army should concentrate its forces, and -march in close columns if it is still strong -enough to resume the offensive; for by this -means it is easy to form the line when a -favorable opportunity presents itself, either -for holding the enemy in check or for attacking -him if he is not in a situation to -accept battle.</p> - -<p>Such was Moreau’s retreat after the passage -of the Adda by the Austro-Russian -army. The French general, after having -covered the evacuation of Milan, took up a -position between the Po and the Tanaro.</p> - -<p>His camp rested upon Alexandria and -Valentia, two capital fortresses, and had the -advantage of covering the roads to Turin -and Savona, by which he could effect his -retreat in case he was unable to accomplish a -junction with the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">corps d’armee</i> of Macdonald, -who had been ordered to quit the kingdom<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_45">45</a></span> -of Naples, and hasten his march into -Tuscany.</p> - -<p>Forced to abandon his position in consequence -of the insurrection in Piedmont and -Tuscany, Moreau retired upon Asti, where -he learned that his communication with the -river of Genoa had just been cut off by the -capture of Ceva. After several ineffectual -attempts to retake this place, he saw that -his only safety depended upon throwing himself -into the mountains.</p> - -<p>To effect this object, he directed the whole -of his battering train and heavy baggage by -the Col de Fenestrelle upon France; then -opening himself a way over the St. Bernard, -he gained Loano with his light artillery and -the small proportion of field equipment he -had been able to preserve.</p> - -<p>By this skilful movement, he not only retained -his communications with France, but -was enabled to observe the motions of the -army from Naples, and to facilitate his junction -with it by directing the whole of his -force upon the points necessary for that -purpose.</p> - -<p>Macdonald, in the meantime, whose only -chance of success depended on concentrating -his little army, neglected this precaution,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_46">46</a></span> -and was beaten in three successive actions -at the Trebia.</p> - -<p>By this retardment of his march, he rendered -all Moreau’s measures to unite the -two armies in the plains of the Po useless, -and his retreat, after his brilliant but fruitless -efforts at the Trebia, defeated the other -arrangements, also, which the former had -made to come to his support. The inactivity -of Marshal Suwarrow, however, finally enabled -the French general to accomplish his -junction with the remains of the army from -Naples. Moreau then concentrated his whole -force upon the Appenines, and placed himself -in a situation to defend the important -positions of Liguria, until the chances of -war should afford him an opportunity of resuming -the offensive.</p> - -<p>When, after a decisive battle, an army has -lost its artillery and equipments, and is consequently -no longer in a state to assume the -offensive, or even to arrest the pursuit of -the enemy, it would seem most desirable to -divide what remains into several corps, and -order them to march by separate and distant -routes upon the base of operation, and -throw themselves into the fortresses. This -is the only means of safety: for the enemy,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_47">47</a></span> -uncertain as to the precise direction taken -by the vanquished army, is ignorant in the -first instance which corps to pursue, and it -is in this moment of indecision that a march -is gained upon him. Besides, the movements -of a small body being so much easier -than those of a larger one, these separate -lines of march are all in favor of a retreating -army.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XIV"></a>MAXIM XIV.</h2> - -<p>Among mountains, a great number of -positions are always to be found very -strong in themselves, and which it is dangerous -to attack. The character of this -mode of warfare consists in occupying -camps on the flanks or in the rear of the -enemy, leaving him only the alternative -of abandoning his position without fighting, -to take up another in the rear, or to -descend from it in order to attack you. -In mountain warfare, the assailant has -always the disadvantage; even in offensive -warfare in the open field, the great<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_48">48</a></span> -secret consists in defensive combats, and -in obliging the enemy to attack.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>During the campaign of 1793, in the Maritime -Alps, the French army, under the orders -of General Brunet, did all in its power -to get possession of the camps at Raus and -at Fourches, by an attack in front. But -these useless efforts served only to increase -the courage of the Piedmontese, and to destroy -the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">élite</i> of the grenadiers of the republican -army. The manœuvres by which Napoleon, -without fighting, compelled the enemy -to evacuate these positions in 1796, suffice to -establish the truth of these principles, and -to prove how much success in war depends -upon the genius of the general as well as on -the courage of the soldier.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XV"></a>MAXIM XV.</h2> - -<p>The first consideration with a general -who offers battle, should be the glory and -honor of his arms; the safety and preservation -of his men is only the second; but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_49">49</a></span> -it is in the enterprise and courage resulting -from the former, that the latter will -most assuredly be found. In a retreat, -besides the honor of the army, the loss of -life is often greater than in two battles. -For this reason, we should never despair -while brave men are to be found with -their colors. It is by this means that we -obtain victory, and deserve to obtain it.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>In 1645, the French army, under the orders -of the Prince of Condé, was on the -march to lay siege to Nordlingen, when it -was discovered that Count Merci, who commanded -the Bavarians, had foreseen this -intention, and had entrenched himself in a -strong position which defended Nordlingen -at the same time that it covered Donawerth.</p> - -<p>Notwithstanding the favorable position of -the enemy, Condé ordered the attack. The -combat was terrible. All the infantry in -the centre and on the right, after being -successively engaged, was routed and dispersed, -in spite of the efforts of the cavalry -and the reserve, which were likewise carried -away with the fugitives. The battle was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_50">50</a></span> -lost. Condé, in despair, having no longer -either centre or right to depend upon, collected -the remnants of his battalions, and -directed his march to the left, where Turenne -was still engaged. This perseverance reanimated -the ardor of the troops. They -broke the right wing of the enemy, and -Turenne, by a change of front, returned to -the attack upon his centre. Night, too, -favored the boldness of Condé. An entire -corps of Bavarians, fancying themselves cut -off, laid down their arms; and the obstinacy -of the French general in this struggle for -victory was repaid by possession of the field -of battle, together with a great number of -prisoners, and almost all the enemy’s artillery. -The Bavarian army beat a retreat, -and the next day Nordlingen capitulated.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XVI"></a>MAXIM XVI.</h2> - -<p>It is an approved maxim in war, never -to do what the enemy wishes you to do, -for this reason alone, that he desires it. -A field of battle, therefore, which he -has previously studied and reconnoitred,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_51">51</a></span> -should be avoided, and double care should -be taken where he has had time to fortify -and entrench. One consequence deducible -from this principle is, never to attack -a position in front which you can gain by -turning.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>It was without due regard to this principle, -that Marshal Villeroi, on assuming the -command of the army of Italy, during the -campaign of 1701, attacked, with unwarrantable -presumption, Prince Eugene, of -Savoy, in his entrenched position of Chiavi, -on the Oglio. The French generals, Catinat -among the rest, considered the post unassailable, -but Villeroi insisted, and the result -of this otherwise unimportant battle was -the loss of the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">élite</i> of the French army. It -would have been greater still, but for Catinat’s -exertions.</p> - -<p>It was by neglecting the same principle, -that the Prince of Condé, in the campaign -of 1644, failed in all his attacks upon the -entrenched position of the Bavarian army. -The Count Merci, who commanded the latter, -had drawn up his cavalry skilfully upon the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_52">52</a></span> -plain, resting upon Freyberg, while his infantry -occupied the mountain. After many -fruitless attempts, the Prince of Condé, -seeing the impossibility of dislodging the -enemy, began to menace his communications—but -the moment Merci perceived this, -he broke up his camp and retired beyond -the Black mountains.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XVII"></a>MAXIM XVII.</h2> - -<p>In a war of march and manœuvre, if -you would avoid a battle with a superior -army, it is necessary to entrench every -night, and occupy a good defensive position. -Those natural positions which are -ordinarily met with, are not sufficient to -protect an army against superior numbers -without recourse to art.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>The campaign of the French and Spanish -army, commanded by the Duke of Berwick, -against the Portuguese, in the year 1706, -affords a good lesson on this subject. The -two armies made almost the tour of Spain.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_53">53</a></span> -They began the campaign near Badajoz, and -after manœuvring across both Castiles, finished -it in the kingdoms of Valencia and -Murcia. The Duke of Berwick encamped -his army eighty-five times, and although the -campaign passed without a general action, -he took about ten thousand prisoners from -the enemy. Marshal Turenne also made a -fine campaign of manœuvre against the -Count Montécuculli, in 1675.</p> - -<p>The imperial army having made its arrangements -to pass the Rhine at Strasburg, -Turenne used all diligence, and, throwing a -bridge over the river near the village of -Ottenheim, three leagues below Strasburg, -he crossed with the French army, and encamped -close to the little town of Vilstet, -which he occupied. This position covered -the bridge of Strasburg, so that, by this -manœuvre, Turenne deprived the enemy of -all approach to that city.</p> - -<p>Upon this, Montécuculli made a movement -with his whole army, threatening the bridge -at Ottenheim, by which the French received -their provisions from upper Alsace.</p> - -<p>As soon as Turenne discovered the design -of the enemy, he left a detachment at Vilstet, -and made a rapid march with his whole<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_54">54</a></span> -force upon the village of Altenheim. This -intermediate position between the two -bridges, which he wished to preserve, gave -him the advantage of being able to succor -either of these posts before the enemy had -time to carry them. Montécuculli seeing -that any successful attack upon the bridges -was not to be expected, resolved to pass -the Rhine below Strasburg, and with this -view returned to his first position at Offenburg. -Marshal Turenne, who followed all -the movements of the Austrian army, brought -back his army also to Vilstet.</p> - -<p>In the meantime, this attempt of the -enemy having convinced the French general -of the danger to which his bridge had exposed -him, removed it nearer to that of -Strasburg, in order to diminish the extent -of ground he had to defend.</p> - -<p>Montécuculli, having commanded the magistrates -of Strasburg to collect materials -for a bridge, moved to Scherzheim to receive -them; but Turenne again defeated his projects -by taking a position at Freistett, where -he occupied the islands of the Rhine, and -immediately constructed a stockade.</p> - -<p>Thus it was that, during the whole of -this campaign, Turenne succeeded in gaining<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_55">55</a></span> -the initiative of the enemy, and obliging -him to follow his movements. He succeeded, -also, by a rapid march, in cutting off Montécuculli -from the Town of Offenburg, whence -he drew his supplies, and would no doubt -have prevented the Austrian general from -effecting his junction with the corps of Caprara, -had not a cannon-shot terminated this -great man’s life.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XVIII"></a>MAXIM XVIII.</h2> - -<p>A general of ordinary talent occupying -a bad position, and surprised by a superior -force, seeks his safety in retreat; but -a great captain supplies all deficiencies -by his courage, and marches boldly to -meet the attack. By this means he disconcerts -his adversary; and if the latter -shows any irresolution in his movements, -a skilful leader, profiting by his indecision, -may even hope for victory, or at least -employ the day in manœuvring—at night -he entrenches himself, or falls back to a -better position. By this determined conduct<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_56">56</a></span> -he maintains the honor of his arms, -the first essential to all military superiority.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>In 1653, Marshal Turenne was surprised -by the Prince of Condé, in a position where -his army was completely compromised. He -had the power, indeed, by an immediate -retreat, of covering himself by the Somme, -which he possessed the means of crossing at -Peronne, and whence he was distant only -half a league; but, fearing the influence of -this retrograde movement on the <em>morale</em> of -his army, Turenne balanced all disadvantages -by his courage, and marched boldly to -meet the enemy with very inferior forces. -After marching a league, he found an advantageous -position, where he made every disposition -for a battle. It was three o’clock -in the afternoon; but the Spaniards, exhausted -with fatigue, hesitated to attack -him, and Turenne having covered himself -with entrenchments during the night, the -enemy no longer dared to risk a general -action, and broke up his camp.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_57">57</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XIX"></a>MAXIM XIX.</h2> - -<p>The transition from the defensive to -the offensive is one of the most delicate -operations.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>By studying the first campaign of Napoleon -in Italy, we can learn what genius and -boldness may effect in passing with an army -from the <em>defensive</em> to the <em>offensive</em>. The army -of the allies, commanded by General Beaulieu, -was provided with every means that -could render it formidable. Its force amounted -to eighty thousand men, and two hundred -pieces of cannon. The French army, -on the contrary, could number scarcely thirty -thousand men under arms, and thirty pieces -of cannon. For some time there had been -no issue of meat, and even the bread was -irregularly supplied. The infantry was ill -clothed, the cavalry wretchedly mounted. -All the draught-horses had perished from -want, so that the service of the artillery was -performed by mules. To remedy these evils, -large disbursements were necessary; and -such was the state of the finances, that the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_58">58</a></span> -government had only been able to furnish -two thousand louis in specie for the opening -of the campaign. The French army could -not possibly exist in this state. To advance -or retreat was absolutely necessary. Aware -of the advantage of surprising the enemy at -the very outset of the campaign by some -decisive blow, Napoleon prepared for it by -recasting the <em>morale</em> of his army.</p> - -<p>In a proclamation full of energy, he reminded -them that an ignoble death alone -remained for them, if they continued on the -defensive; that they had nothing to expect -from France, but everything to hope from -victory. “Abundance courts you in the fertile -plains of Italy,” said he; “are you deficient, -soldiers, in constancy or in courage?” -Profiting by the moment of enthusiasm -which he had inspired, Napoleon concentrated -his forces in order to fall with his -whole weight on the different corps of the -enemy. Immediately afterward, the battles -of Montenotte, Milesimo, and Mondovi, added -fresh confidence to the high opinion -already entertained by the soldier for his -chief; and that army which only a few days -ago was encamped amid barren rocks, and -consumed by famine, already aspired to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_59">59</a></span> -conquest of Italy. In one month after the -opening of the campaign, Napoleon had terminated -the war with the King of Sardinia, -and conquered the Milanese. Rich cantonments -soon dispelled from the recollection of -the French soldier the misery and fatigue -attendant on this rapid march, while a vigilant -administration of the resources of the -country reorganized the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">materiel</i> of the -French army, and created the means necessary -for the attainment of future success.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XX"></a>MAXIM XX.</h2> - -<p>It may be laid down as a principle, -that the line of operation should not be -abandoned; but it is one of the most -skilful manœuvres in war, to know how -to change it, when circumstances authorize -or render this necessary. An army -which changes skilfully its line of operation -deceives the enemy, who becomes -ignorant where to look for its rear, or -upon what weak points it is assailable.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_60">60</a></span></p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>Frederick sometimes changed his line of -operation in the middle of a campaign; but -he was enabled to do this, because he was -manœuvring at that time in the centre of -Germany—an abundant country, capable of -supplying all the wants of his army in case -his communications with Prussia were intercepted.</p> - -<p>Marshal Turenne, in the campaign of -1746, gave up his line of communication to -the allies in the same manner; but, like -Frederick, he was carrying on the war at -this time in the centre of Germany, and -having fallen with his whole forces upon -Rain, he took the precaution of securing -to himself a depôt upon which to establish -his base of operation.</p> - -<p>By a series of manœuvres, marked alike -by audacity and genius, he subsequently -compelled the imperial army to abandon -its magazines, and retire into Austria for -winter quarters.</p> - -<p>But these are examples which it appears to -me should only be imitated when we have -taken full measure of the capacity of our -adversary, and above all, when we see no<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_61">61</a></span> -reason to apprehend an insurrection in the -country to which we transfer the theatre -of war.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXI"></a>MAXIM XXI.</h2> - -<p>When an army carries with it a battering -train, or large convoys of sick and -wounded, it cannot march by too short -a line upon its depôts.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>It is above all in mountainous countries, -and in those interspersed with woods and -marshes, that it is of importance to observe -this maxim; for, the convoys and means of -transport being frequently embarrassed in -defiles, an enemy by manœuvring may easily -disperse the escorts, or make even a successful -attack upon the whole army, when it is -obliged, from the nature of the country, to -march in an extended column.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXII"></a>MAXIM XXII.</h2> - -<p>The art of encamping in position is the -same as taking up the line in order of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_62">62</a></span> -battle in this position. To this end, the -artillery should be advantageously placed, -ground should be selected which is not -commanded or liable to be turned, and, -as far as possible, the guns should cover -and command the surrounding country.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>Frederick has remarked that, in order to -be assured that your camp is well placed, -you should see if, by making a small movement, -you can oblige the enemy to make a -greater; or, if after having forced him to -retrograde one march you can compel him to -fall back another.</p> - -<p>In defensive war, all camps should be entrenched -in the front and wings of the position -they occupy, and care should be taken -that the rear is left perfectly open. If you -are threatened with being turned, arrangements -should be made beforehand for taking -up a more distant position; and you should -profit by any disorder in the enemy’s line of -march, to make an attempt upon his artillery -or baggage.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_63">63</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXIII"></a>MAXIM XXIII.</h2> - -<p>When you are occupying a position -which the enemy threatens to surround, -collect all your force immediately, and -menace <em>him</em> with an offensive movement. -By this manœuvre, you will prevent him -from detaching and annoying your flanks -in case you should judge it necessary to -retire.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>This was the manœuvre practised by General -Desaix, in 1798, near Radstadt. He made -up for inferiority in numbers by audacity, -and maintained himself the whole day in -position in spite of the vigorous attacks of -the Archduke Charles. At night he effected -his retreat in good order, and took up a position -in the rear.</p> - -<p>It was in accordance, also, with this principle, -in the same campaign, that General -Moreau gave battle at Biberach, to secure -his retreat by the passes of the Black mountains. -A few days after, he fought at Schliengen -with the same object. Placed in a -good defensive position, he menaced the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_64">64</a></span> -Archduke Charles by a sudden return to the -offensive, while his artillery and baggage -were passing the Rhine by the bridge of -Huningen, and he was making all the necessary -arrangements for retiring behind that -river himself.</p> - -<p>Here, however, I would observe, that the -execution of such offensive demonstrations -should be deferred always till toward the -evening, in order that you may not be compromised -by engaging too early in a combat -which you cannot long maintain with success.</p> - -<p>Night, and the uncertainty of the enemy -after an affair of this kind, will always favor -your retreat, if it is judged necessary; but, -with a view to mask the operation more -effectually, fires should be lighted all along -the lines, to deceive the enemy and prevent -him from discovering this retrograde movement, -for in a retreat it is a great advantage -to gain a march upon your adversary.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXIV"></a>MAXIM XXIV.</h2> - -<p>Never lose sight of this maxim: that -you should establish your cantonments at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_65">65</a></span> -the most distant and best-protected point -from the enemy, especially where a surprise -is possible. By this means you will -have time to unite all your forces before -he can attack you.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>In the campaign of 1745, Marshal Turenne -lost the battle of Marienthal, by neglecting -this principle; for if, instead of -reassembling his divisions at Erbsthausen, -he had rallied his troops at Mergentheim, -behind the Tauber, his army would have -been much sooner reunited; and Count Merci, -in place of finding only three thousand -men to fight at Erbsthausen (of which he -was well informed), would have had the -whole French army to attack in a position -covered by a river.</p> - -<p>Some one having indiscreetly asked Viscount -Turenne how he had lost the battle of -Marienthal: “By my own fault,” replied the -marshal; “but,” added he, “when a man has -committed no faults in war, he can only -have been engaged in it but a short time.”</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_66">66</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXV"></a>MAXIM XXV.</h2> - -<p>When two armies are in order of battle, -and one has to retire over a bridge, -while the other has the circumference of -the circle open, all the advantages are in -favor of the latter. It is then a general -should show boldness, strike a decided -blow, and manœuvre upon the flank of -his enemy. The victory is in his hands.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>This was the position of the French army -at the famous battle of Leipzig, which terminated -the campaign of 1813 so fatally for -Napoleon; for the battle of Hanau was of -no consequence, comparatively, in the desperate -situation of that army.</p> - -<p>It strikes me that, in a situation like that -of the French army previous to the battle -of Leipzig, a general should never calculate -upon any of those lucky chances which may -arise out of a return to the offensive, but -that he should rather adopt every possible -means to secure his retreat. With this view, -he should immediately cover himself with -good entrenchments, to enable him to repel<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_67">67</a></span> -with inferior numbers the attack of the enemy, -while his own equipments are crossing -the river. As fast as the troops reach the -other side, they should occupy positions to -protect the passage of the rear guard, and -this last should be covered by a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête de pont</i> -as soon as the army breaks up its camp. -During the wars of the Revolution, too little -regard was paid to entrenchments; and it is -for this reason we have seen large armies -dispersed after a single reverse, and the fate -of nations compromised by the issue of one -battle.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXVI"></a>MAXIM XXVI.</h2> - -<p>It is contrary to all true principle, to -make corps, which have no communication -with each other, act separately against -a central force whose communications are -cut off.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>The Austrians lost the battle of Hohenlinden -by neglecting this principle. The -imperial army, under the orders of the archduke -John, was divided into four columns,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_68">68</a></span> -which had to march through an immense -forest, previous to their junction in the plain -of Anzing, where they intended to surprise -the French. But these different corps, having -no direct communication, found themselves -compelled to engage separately with -an enemy who had taken the precaution of -concentrating his masses, and who could -move them with facility in a country with -which he had been long previously acquainted.</p> - -<p>Thus the Austrian army, enclosed in the -defiles of the forest with its whole train of -artillery and baggage, was attacked in its -flanks and rear, and the archduke John was -only enabled to rally his dispersed and shattered -divisions under cover of the night.</p> - -<p>The trophies obtained by the French army -on this day were immense. They consisted -of eleven thousand prisoners, one hundred -pieces of cannon, several stand of colors, and -all the baggage of the enemy.</p> - -<p>The battle of Hohenlinden decided the fate -of the campaign of 1800, and Moreau’s brilliant -and well-merited success placed him in -the rank of the first general of the age.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_69">69</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXVII"></a>MAXIM XXVII.</h2> - -<p>When an army is driven from a first -position, the retreating columns should -rally always sufficiently in the rear, to -prevent any interruption from the enemy. -The greatest disaster that can happen, is -when the columns are attacked in detail, -and before their junction.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>One great advantage which results from -rallying your columns on a point far removed -from the field of battle, or from the position -previously occupied, is, that the enemy is -uncertain as to the direction you mean to -take.</p> - -<p>If he divides his force to pursue you, he -exposes himself to see his detachments beaten -in detail, especially if you have exerted all -due diligence, and have effected the junction -of your troops in sufficient time to get between -his columns and disperse them one -after the other.</p> - -<p>It was by a manœuvre of this kind in the -campaign of Italy, in 1799, that General -Melas gained the battle of Genola.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_70">70</a></span></p> - -<p>General Championet commanded the -French army, and endeavored to cut off the -communication of the Austrians with Turin, -by employing corps which manœuvred separately -to get into their rear. Melas, who -divined his project, made a retrograde march, -by which he persuaded his adversary he was -in full retreat, although the real object of his -movement was to concentrate his forces at -the point fixed for the junction of the different -detachments of the French army, and -which he beat and dispersed, one after -another, by his great superiority in numbers. -The result of this manœuvre, in which the -Austrian general displayed vigor, decision, -and foresight, secured to him the peaceable -possession of Piedmont.</p> - -<p>It was also by the neglect of this principle -that General Beaulieu, who commanded the -Austro-Sardinian army in the campaign of -1796, lost the battle of Milesimo after that -of Montenotte.</p> - -<p>His object, in endeavoring to rally his -different corps upon Milesimo, was, to cover -the high roads of Turin and Milan; but -Napoleon, aware of the advantages arising -from the ardor of troops emboldened by -recent success, attacked him before he could<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_71">71</a></span> -assemble his divisions, and, by a series of -skilful manœuvres, succeeded in separating -the combined armies. They retired in the -greatest disorder—the one by the road of -Milan, the other by that of Turin.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXVIII"></a>MAXIM XXVIII.</h2> - -<p>No force should be detached on the eve -of a battle, because affairs may change -during the night, either by the retreat of -the enemy, or by the arrival of large reinforcements -to enable him to resume the -offensive, and counteract your previous -arrangements.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>In 1796, the army of the Sambre and -Meuse, commanded by General Jourdan, -effected a retreat, which was rendered still -more difficult by the loss of his line of communication. -Seeing, however, that the forces -of the archduke Charles were scattered, -Jourdan, in order to accomplish his retreat -upon Frankfort, resolved to open himself a -way by Wurtzburg, where there were at that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_72">72</a></span> -moment only two divisions of the Austrian -army. This movement would have been attended -with success, if the French general, -believing he had simply these two divisions -to contend with, had not committed the error -of separating himself from the corps of Lefevre—which -he left at Schweinfurt to cover -the only direct communication of the army -with its base of operation.</p> - -<p>The commission of this fault at the outset, -added to some slowness in the march of the -French general, secured the victory to the -archduke, who hastened to concentrate his -forces.</p> - -<p>The arrival of the two divisions, also, of -Kray and Wartesleben, during the battle, -enabled him to oppose fifty thousand men to -the French army, which scarcely numbered -thirty thousand combatants. This last was -consequently beaten, and obliged to continue -its retreat by the mountains of Fuldes, where -the badness of the roads could be equalled -only by the difficulty of the country.</p> - -<p>The division of Lefevre, amounting to fourteen -thousand men, would, in all probability, -have turned the scale in favor of Jourdan, -had the latter not unfortunately conceived -that two divisions only were opposing his -passage to Wurtzburg.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_73">73</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXIX"></a>MAXIM XXIX.</h2> - -<p>When you have resolved to fight a -battle, collect your whole force. Dispense -with nothing. A single battalion -sometimes decides the day.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>I think it here desirable to observe, that it -is prudent before a battle to fix upon some -point in rear of the reserve for the junction -of the different detachments; for if, from -unforeseen circumstances, these detachments -should be prevented from joining before the -action has commenced, they might be exposed, -in case a retrograde movement should -be found necessary, to the masses of the -enemy. It is desirable also to keep the -enemy in ignorance of these reinforcements, -in order to employ them with greater effect. -“A seasonable reinforcement,” says Frederick, -“renders the success of a battle certain, -because the enemy will always imagine -it stronger than it really is, and lose courage -accordingly.”</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_74">74</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXX"></a>MAXIM XXX.</h2> - -<p>Nothing is so rash or so contrary to -principle, as to make a flank march before -an army in position, especially when -this army occupies heights at the foot -of which you are forced to defile.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>It was by a neglect of this principle that -Frederick was beaten at Kollin in the first -campaign of 1757. Notwithstanding prodigies -of valor, the Prussians lost fifteen -thousand men and a great portion of their -artillery, while the loss of the Austrians did -not exceed five thousand men. The consequence -of this battle was more unfortunate -still, since it obliged the King of Prussia to -raise the siege of Prague, and to evacuate -Bohemia.</p> - -<p>It was also by making a flank march -before the Prussian army, that the French -lost the disgraceful battle of Rosbach.</p> - -<p>This imprudent movement was still more -to be reprehended, because the Prince de -Soubise, who commanded the French army, -was so negligent as to manœuvre, without<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_75">75</a></span> -either advanced guards or flanking corps, in -presence of the enemy. The result was, -that his army, consisting of fifty thousand -men, was beaten by six battalions and thirty -squadrons. The French lost seven thousand -men, twenty-seven standards, and a great -number of cannon. The Prussians had only -three hundred men disabled.</p> - -<p>Thus, by having forgotten this principle, -<em>that a flank march is never to be made before -an enemy in line of battle</em>, Frederick lost his -army at Kollin; and Soubise, at Rosbach, -lost both his army and his honor.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXI"></a>MAXIM XXXI.</h2> - -<p>When you determine to risk a battle, -reserve to yourself every possible chance -of success, more particularly if you have -to deal with an adversary of superior -talent; for if you are beaten, even in the -midst of your magazines and your communications, -wo to the vanquished!</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>“We should make war,” says Marshal -Saxe, “without leaving anything to hazard,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_76">76</a></span> -and in this especially consists the talent of a -general. But when we have incurred the -risk of a battle, we should know how to -profit by the victory, and not merely content -ourselves, according to custom, with -possession of the field.”</p> - -<p>It was by neglecting to follow up the first -success, that the Austrian army, after gaining -the field of Marengo, saw itself compelled -on the following day to evacuate the whole -of Italy.</p> - -<p>General Melas, observing the French in -retreat, left the direction of the movements -of his army to the chief of his staff, and -retired to Alexandria to repose from the -fatigues of the day. Colonel Zach, equally -convinced with his general that the French -army was completely broken, and consisted -only of fugitives, formed the divisions in -column of route.</p> - -<p>By this arrangement, the imperial army -prepared to enter upon its victorious march -in a formation not less than three miles in -depth.</p> - -<p>It was near four o’clock when General -Desaix rejoined the French army with his -division. His presence restored in some -degree an equality between the contending<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_77">77</a></span> -forces; and yet Napoleon hesitated for a -moment whether to resume the offensive, -or to make use of this corps to secure his -retreat. The ardor of the troops to return -to the charge, decided his irresolution. He -rode rapidly along the front of his divisions, -and addressing the soldiers—“We have retired -far enough for to-day,” said he; “you -know I always sleep upon the field of -battle!”</p> - -<p>The army, with unanimous shout, proclaimed -to him a promise of victory. Napoleon -resumed the offensive. The Austrian -advance guard, panic-struck at the sight of -a formidable and unbroken body presenting -itself suddenly at a point where, a few moments -before, only fugitives were to be seen, -went to the right about, and carried disorder -into the mass of its columns. Attacked immediately -afterward, with impetuosity, in its -front and flanks, the Austrian army was -completely routed.</p> - -<p>Marshal Daun experienced nearly the -same fate as General Melas, at the battle -of Torgau, in the campaign of 1760.</p> - -<p>The position of the Austrian army was -excellent. It had its left upon Torgau, its -right on the plateau of Siptitz, and its front -covered by a large sheet of water.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_78">78</a></span></p> - -<p>Frederick proposed to turn its right in -order to make an attack upon the rear. For -this purpose he divided his army into two -corps, the one under the orders of Ziethen, -with instructions to attack in front, following -the edge of the water; the other under -his own immediate command, with which he -set out to turn the right of the Austrians. -But Marshal Daun having had intimation of -the movements of the enemy, changed his -front by countermarching, and was thus -enabled to repel the attacks of Frederick, -whom he obliged to retreat. The two corps -of the Prussian army had been acting without -communication. Ziethen, in the meantime, -hearing the fire recede, concluded that -the king had been beaten, and commenced a -movement by his left in order to rejoin him; -but falling in with two battalions of the -reserve, the Prussian general profited by this -reinforcement to resume the offensive. Accordingly -he renewed the attack with vigor, -got possession of the plateau of Siptitz, and -soon after of the whole field of battle. The -sun had already set when the King of Prussia -received the news of this unexpected -good fortune. He returned in all haste, took -advantage of the night to restore order in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_79">79</a></span> -his disorganized army, and the day after the -battle occupied Torgau.</p> - -<p>Marshal Daun was receiving congratulations -upon his victory, when he heard that -the Prussians had resumed the offensive. -He immediately commanded a retreat, and -at daybreak the Austrians repassed the Elbe -with the loss of twelve thousand men, eight -thousand prisoners, and forty-five pieces of -cannon.</p> - -<p>After the battle of Marengo, General Melas, -although in the midst of his fortresses -and magazines, saw himself compelled to -abandon everything, in order to save the -wreck of his army.</p> - -<p>General Mack capitulated after the battle -of Ulm, although in the centre of his own -country.</p> - -<p>The Prussians, in spite of their depôts -and reserves, were obliged, after the battle -of Jena, and the French after that of Waterloo, -to lay down their arms.</p> - -<p>Hence, we may conclude that the misfortune -that results from the loss of a battle, -does not consist so much in the destruction -of men and of <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">materiel</i> as in the discouragement -which follows this disaster. The courage -and confidence of the victors augment<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_80">80</a></span> -in proportion as those of the vanquished -diminish; and whatever may be the resources -of an army, it will be found that a retreat -will degenerate rapidly into a rout unless -the general-in-chief shall succeed, by combining -boldness with skill, and perseverance -with firmness, in restoring the <em>morale</em> of his -army.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXII"></a>MAXIM XXXII.</h2> - -<p>The duty of an advanced guard does -not consist in advancing or retiring, but -in manœuvring. An advanced guard -should be composed of light cavalry, supported -by a reserve of heavy cavalry, and -by battalions of infantry, supported also -by artillery. An advanced guard should -consist of picked troops, and the general -officers, officers and men, should be selected -for their respective capabilities and -knowledge. A corps deficient in instruction -is only an embarrassment to an advanced -guard.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>It was the opinion of Frederick that an -advanced guard should be composed of detachments<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_81">81</a></span> -of troops of all arms. The commander -should possess skill in the choice of -ground, and he should take care to be instantly -informed, by means of numerous -patrols, of everything passing in the enemy’s -camp.</p> - -<p>In war, it is not the business of an advanced -guard to fight, but to observe the -enemy, in order to cover the movements of -the army. When in pursuit, the advanced -guard should charge with vigor, and cut off -the baggage and insulated corps of the retiring -enemy. For this purpose, it should be -reinforced with all the disposable light cavalry -of the army.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXIII"></a>MAXIM XXXIII.</h2> - -<p>It is contrary to the usages of war to -allow parks or batteries of artillery to -enter a defile, unless you hold the other -extremity. In case of retreat, the guns -will embarrass your movements and be -lost. They should be left in position, -under a sufficient escort, until you are -master of the opening.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_82">82</a></span></p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>Nothing encumbers the march of an army -so much as a quantity of baggage. In the -campaign of 1796, Napoleon abandoned his -battering train under the walls of Mantua, -after spiking the guns and destroying the -carriages. By this sacrifice, he acquired a -facility of manœuvring rapidly his little -army, and obtained the initiative as well as -a general superiority over the numerous but -divided forces of Marshal Wurmser.</p> - -<p>In 1799, during his retreat in Italy, General -Moreau being compelled to manœuvre -among the mountains, preferred separating -himself entirely from his reserve artillery, -which he directed upon France by the Col -de Fenestrelle, rather than embarrass his -march with this part of his equipment.</p> - -<p>These are the examples we should follow; -for if, by a rapidity of march, and a facility -of concentration upon decisive points, the -victory is gained, the <em>materiel</em> of an army is -soon re-established. But if, on the other -hand, we are beaten and compelled to retreat, -it will be difficult to save our equipments, -and we may have reason to congratulate<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_83">83</a></span> -ourselves that we abandoned them in time -to prevent them from augmenting the trophies -of the enemy.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXIV"></a>MAXIM XXXIV.</h2> - -<p>It should be laid down as a principle, -never to leave intervals by which the enemy -can penetrate between corps formed -in order of battle, unless it be to draw -him into a snare.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>In the campaign of 1757, the Prince of -Lorraine, who was covering Prague with -the Austrian army, perceived the Prussians -threatening, by a flank movement, to turn -his right. He immediately ordered a partial -change of front by throwing back the infantry -of that wing, so as to form a right angle -with the rest of the line. But this manœuvre -being executed in presence of the enemy, -was not effected without some disorder. -The heads of the columns having marched -too quick, caused the rear to lengthen out, -and when the line was formed to the right, -a large interval appeared at the salient angle.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_84">84</a></span> -Frederick, observing this error, hastened -to take advantage of it. He directed his -centre corps, commanded by the Duke of -Bevern, to throw itself into this opening, -and by this manœuvre decided the fate of -the battle.</p> - -<p>The Prince of Lorraine returned to Prague, -beaten and pursued, with the loss of sixteen -thousand men and two hundred pieces of -cannon.</p> - -<p>It should be observed at the same time, -that this operation of throwing a corps into -the intervals made by an army in time of -battle, should never be attempted unless you -are at least equal in force, and have an opportunity -of outflanking the enemy on the -one side or the other; for it is then only you -can hope to divide his army in the centre, -and insulate the wings entirely. If you are -inferior in number, you run the risk of being -stopped by the reverses, and overpowered -by the enemy’s wings, which may deploy -upon your flanks and surround you.</p> - -<p>It was by this manœuvre that the Duke of -Berwick gained the battle of Almanza, in -the year 1707, in Spain.</p> - -<p>The Anglo-Portuguese army, under the -command of Lord Galloway, came to invest<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_85">85</a></span> -Villena. Marshal Berwick, who commanded -the French and Spanish army, quitted his -camp at Montalegre, and moved upon this -town to raise the siege. At his approach, -the English general, eager to fight a battle, -advanced to meet him in the plains of Almanza. -The issue was long doubtful. The -first line, commanded by the Duke of Popoli, -having been broken, the Chevalier d’Asfeldt, -who had charge of the second, drew up his -masses with large intervals between them; -and when the English, who were in pursuit -of the first line, reached these reserves, he -took advantage of their disorder to attack -them in flank and defeated them entirely.</p> - -<p>Marshal Berwick, perceiving the success -of this manœuvre, threw open his front, and -deploying upon the enemy’s flanks, while -the reserve sustained the attack in front, -and the cavalry manœuvred in their rear, -obtained a complete victory.</p> - -<p>Lord Galloway, wounded and pursued, -collected with difficulty the remains of his -army, and took shelter with them in Tortosa.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_86">86</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXV"></a>MAXIM XXXV.</h2> - -<p>Encampments of the same army should -always be formed so as to protect each -other.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>At the battle of Dresden, in the campaign -of 1813, the camp of the allies, although advantageously -placed upon the heights on -the left bank of the Elbe, was nevertheless -extremely defective, from being traversed -longitudinally by a deep ravine, which separated -the left wing completely from the centre -and the right. This vicious arrangement -did not escape the penetrating eye of Napoleon. -He instantly directed the whole of -his cavalry and two corps of infantry against -the insulated wing, attacked it with superior -numbers, overthrew it, and took ten thousand -prisoners, before it was possible to -come to its support.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXVI"></a>MAXIM XXXVI.</h2> - -<p>When the enemy’s army is covered by -a river, upon which he holds several <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">têtes de pont</i>, <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_87">87</a></span> -do not attack in front. This -would divide your force and expose you -to be turned. Approach the river in -echelon of columns, in such a manner -that the leading column shall be the only -one the enemy can attack, without offering -you his flank. In the meantime, let -your light troops occupy the bank, and -when you have decided on the point of -passage, rush upon it and fling across -your bridge. Observe that the point of -passage should be always at a distance -from the leading echelon, in order to deceive -the enemy.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>If you occupy a town or a village on the -bank of a river, opposite to that held by the -enemy, it is an advantage to make this spot -the crossing point, because it is easier to -cover your carriages and reserve artillery, -as well as to mask the construction of your -bridge, in a town, than in the open country. -It is also a great advantage to pass a river -opposite a village, when the latter is only -weakly occupied by the enemy; because as -soon as the advanced guard reaches the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_88">88</a></span> -other side, it carries this post, makes a lodgment, -and by throwing up a few defensive -works, converts it easily into a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête de pont</i>. -By this means, the rest of the army is enabled -to effect the passage with facility.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXVII"></a>MAXIM XXXVII.</h2> - -<p>From the moment you are master of a -position which commands the opposite -bank, facilities are acquired for effecting -the passage of the river; above all, if this -position is sufficiently extensive to place -upon it artillery in force. This advantage -is diminished, if the river is more than -three hundred toises (or six hundred -yards) in breadth, because the distance -being out of the range of grape, it is easy -for the troops which defend the passage -to line the bank and get under cover. -Hence it follows that if the grenadiers, -ordered to pass the river for the protection -of the bridge, should reach the other -side, they would be destroyed by the -fire of the enemy; because his batteries,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_89">89</a></span> -placed at the distance of two hundred -toises from the landing, are capable of a -most destructive effect, although removed -above five hundred toises from the batteries -of the crossing force. Thus the -advantage of the artillery would be exclusively -his. For the same reason, the -passage is impracticable, unless you succeed -in surprising the enemy, and are -protected by an intermediate island, or, -unless you are able to take advantage of -an angle in the river, to establish a crossfire -upon his works. In this case, the -island or angle forms a natural <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête de pont</i>, -and gives the advantage in artillery to -the attacking army.</p> - -<p>When a river is less than sixty toises -(or one hundred and twenty yards) in -breadth, and you have a post upon the -other side, the troops which are thrown -across derive such advantages from the -protection of your artillery, that, however -small the angle may be, it is impossible -for the enemy to prevent the establishment -of a bridge. In this case, the most -skilful generals, when they have discovered<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_90">90</a></span> -the project of their adversary, and -brought their own army to the point of -crossing, usually content themselves with -opposing the passage of the bridge, by -forming a semicircle round its extremity, -as round the opening of a defile, and removing -to the distance of three or four -hundred toises from the fire of the opposite -side.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>Frederick observes, that “the passage of -great rivers in the presence of the enemy is -one of the most delicate operations in war.” -Success on these occasions depends on secrecy, -on the rapidity of the manœuvres, -and the punctual execution of the orders -given for the movements of each division. -To pass such an obstacle in presence of an -enemy, and without his knowledge, it is -necessary not only that the previous dispositions -should be well conceived, but that -they should be executed without confusion.</p> - -<p>In the campaign of 1705, Prince Eugene, -of Savoy, wishing to come to the assistance -of the Prince of Piedmont, sought for a -favorable point at which to force the passage<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_91">91</a></span> -of the Adda, defended at that time by the -French army, under the command of the -Duke de Vendome.</p> - -<p>After having selected an advantageous -situation, Prince Eugene erected a battery -of twenty pieces of cannon on a position -which commanded the entire of the opposite -bank, and covered his infantry by a line of -entrenched parallels constructed on the -slope of the declivity.</p> - -<p>They were working vigorously at the -bridge, when the Duke de Vendome appeared -with his whole army. At first he seemed -determined to oppose its construction, but -after having examined the position of Prince -Eugene, he judged this to be impracticable.</p> - -<p>He therefore placed his army out of reach -of the prince’s batteries, resting both his -wings upon the river, so as to form a bow, -of which the Adda was the cord. He then -covered himself with entrenchments and -abattis, and was thus enabled to charge the -enemy’s columns whenever they debouched -from the bridge, and to beat them in detail.</p> - -<p>Eugene, having reconnoitred the position -of the French, considered the passage impossible. -He therefore withdrew the bridge, -and broke up his camp during the night.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_92">92</a></span></p> - -<p>It was by this manœuvre, also, that, in the -campaign of 1809, the Archduke Charles -compelled the French to reoccupy the isle -of Lobau, after having debouched on the -left bank of the Danube. The march of the -Archduke Charles was wholly concentric. -He menaced Grosaspern with his right, Esling -with his centre, and Enzersdorf with -his left.</p> - -<p>His army, with both wings resting on the -Danube, formed a semicircle around Esling. -Napoleon immediately attacked and broke -the centre of the Austrians; but after having -forced their first line, he found himself -arrested by the reserves. In the meantime, -the bridges upon the Danube had been destroyed, -and several of his corps, with their -parks of artillery, were still on the right -bank. This disappointment, joined to the -favorable position of the Austrians, decided -Napoleon to re-enter the isle of Lobau, where -he had previously constructed a line of field-works, -so as to give it all the advantages of -a well entrenched camp.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_93">93</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXVIII"></a>MAXIM XXXVIII.</h2> - -<p>It is difficult to prevent an enemy, -supplied with pontoons, from crossing -a river. When the object of an army, -which defends the passage, is to cover a -siege, the moment the general has ascertained -his inability to oppose the passage, -he should take measures to arrive before -the enemy, at an intermediate position -between the river he defends and the -place he desires to cover.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>Here we may observe, that this intermediate -position should be reconnoitred, or -rather, well entrenched beforehand; for the -enemy will be unable to make an offensive -movement against the corps employed in -the siege, until he has beaten the army of -observation; and the latter, under cover of -its camp, may always await a favorable -opportunity to attack him in flank or in -rear.</p> - -<p>Besides, the army which is once entrenched -in this manner, has the advantage of being<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_94">94</a></span> -concentrated; while that of the enemy must -act in detachments, if he wishes to cover his -bridge, and watch the movements of the -army of observation, so as to enable him to -attack the besieging corps in its lines, without -being exposed to an attempt on his rear, -or being menaced with the loss of his bridge.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXIX"></a>MAXIM XXXIX.</h2> - -<p>In the campaign of 1645, Turenne was -attacked with his army before Philipsburg -by a very superior force. There was no -bridge here over the Rhine, but he took -advantage of the ground between the river -and the place to establish his camp. This -should serve as a lesson to engineer officers, -not merely in the construction of fortresses, -but of <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">têtes de pont</i>. A space should -always be left between the fortress and -the river, where an army may form and -rally without being obliged to throw itself -into the place, and thereby compromise -its security. An army retiring upon Mayence -before a pursuing enemy, is necessarily -compromised; for this reason, because<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_95">95</a></span> -it requires more than a day to pass the -bridge, and because the lines of Cassel are -too confined to admit an army to remain -there without being blocked up. Two -hundred toises should have been left between -that place and the Rhine. It is -essential that all <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">têtes de pont</i> before -great rivers should be constructed upon -this principle, otherwise they will prove a -very inefficient assistance to protect the -passage of a retreating army. <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Têtes de -pont</i>, as laid down in our schools, are of -use only for small rivers, the passage of -which is comparatively short.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>Marshal Saxe, in the campaign of 1741, -having passed the Moldau in quest of a detached -corps of fourteen thousand men, which -was about to throw itself into Prague, left a -thousand infantry upon that river, with orders -to entrench themselves upon a height -directly opposite the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête de pont</i>. By this -precaution, the marshal secured his retreat, -and also the facility of repassing the bridge -without disorder, by rallying his divisions -between the entrenched height and the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête -de pont</i>.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_96">96</a></span></p> - -<p>Were these examples unknown to the generals -of modern times, or are they disposed -to think such precautions superfluous?</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XL"></a>MAXIM XL.</h2> - -<p>Fortresses are equally useful in offensive -and defensive warfare. It is true, -they will not in themselves arrest an -army, but they are an excellent means of -retarding, embarrassing, weakening and -annoying a victorious enemy.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>The brilliant success of the allied armies in -the campaign of 1814, has given to many -military men a false idea of the real value of -fortresses.</p> - -<p>The formidable bodies which crossed the -Rhine and the Alps at this period, were enabled -to spare large detachments to blockade -the strong places that covered the frontiers -of France, without materially affecting the -numerical superiority of the army which -marched upon the capital. This army was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_97">97</a></span> -in a condition, therefore, to act, without the -fear of being menaced in its line of retreat.</p> - -<p>But at no period of military history were -the armies of Europe so combined before, or -governed so entirely by one common mind in -the attainment of a single object. Under -these circumstances, the line of fortresses -which surround France was rendered unavailable -during the campaign; but it would -be very imprudent, therefore, to conclude -that a frontier guarded by numerous fortresses -may be passed with impunity; or -that battles may be fought with these places -in your rear, without previously besieging, -or at least investing them with sufficient -forces.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLI"></a>MAXIM XLI.</h2> - -<p>There are only two ways of insuring the -success of a siege. The first, to begin by -beating the enemy’s army employed to -cover the place, forcing it out of the field, -and throwing its remains beyond some -great natural obstacle, such as a chain of -mountains, or large river. Having accomplished<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_98">98</a></span> -this object, an army of observation -should be placed behind the natural -obstacle, until the trenches are finished -and the place taken.</p> - -<p>But if it be desired to take the place in -presence of a relieving army, without risking -a battle, then the whole <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">materiel</i> and -equipment for a siege are necessary to -begin with, together with ammunition and -provisions for the presumed period of its -duration, and also lines of contravallation -and circumvallation, aided by all the localities -of heights, woods, marshes and -inundations.</p> - -<p>Having no longer occasion to keep up -communications with your depôts, it is -now only requisite to hold in check the -relieving army. For this purpose, an army -of observation should be formed, whose -business it is never to lose sight of that of -the enemy, and which, while it effectually -bars all access to the place, has always -time enough to arrive upon his flanks or -rear in case he should attempt to steal a -march.</p> - -<p>It is to be remembered, too, that by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_99">99</a></span> -profiting judiciously by the lines of contravallation, -a portion of the besieging -army will always be available in giving -battle to the approaching enemy.</p> - -<p>Upon the same general principle, when -a place is to be besieged in presence of an -enemy’s army, it is necessary to cover the -siege by lines of <em>circumvallation</em>.</p> - -<p>If the besieging force is of numerical -strength enough (after leaving a corps -before the place four times the amount -of the garrison) to cope with the relieving -army, it may remove more than one -day’s march from the place; but if it be -inferior in numbers after providing for -the siege, as above stated, it should remain -only a short day’s march from the -spot, in order to fall back upon its lines, -if necessary, or receive succor in case of -attack.</p> - -<p>If the investing corps and army of -observation are only equal when united -to the relieving force, the besieging army -should remain entire within, or near its -lines, and push the works and the siege -with the greatest activity.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_100">100</a></span></p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>“When we undertake a siege,” says Montécuculli, -“we should not seek to place ourselves -opposite the weakest part of the fortress, -but at the point most favorable for -establishing a camp and executing the designs -we have in view.”</p> - -<p>This maxim was well understood by the -Duke of Berwick. Sent to form the siege of -Nice in 1706, he determined to attack on the -side of Montalban, contrary to the advice of -Vauban, and even to the orders of the king. -Having a very small army at his disposal, -he began by securing his camp. This he did -by constructing redoubts upon the heights -that shut in the space between the Var and -the Paillon, two rivers which supported his -flanks. By this means, he protected himself -against a surprise; for the Duke of Savoy, -having the power of debouching suddenly -by the Col de Tende, it was necessary that -the marshal should be enabled to assemble -his forces, so as to move rapidly upon his -adversary, and fight him before he got into -position; otherwise his inferiority in numbers -would have obliged him to raise the -siege.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_101">101</a></span></p> - -<p>When Marshal Saxe was besieging Brussels, -with only twenty-eight thousand men, -opposed to a garrison of twelve thousand, -he received intelligence that the Prince of -Waldeck was assembling his forces to raise -the siege. Not being strong enough to form -an army of observation, the marshal reconnoitred -a field of battle on the little river Voluve, -and made all the necessary dispositions -for moving rapidly to the spot, in case of -the approach of the enemy. By this means -he was prepared to receive his adversary -without discontinuing the operations of the -siege.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLII"></a>MAXIM XLII.</h2> - -<p>Feuquière says that “we should never -wait for the enemy in the lines of circumvallation, -but we should go out and attack -him.” He is in error. There is no authority -in war without exception; and it -would be dangerous to proscribe the principle -of awaiting the enemy within the -lines of circumvallation.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>During the siege of Mons, in 1691, the -Prince of Orange assembled his army, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_102">102</a></span> -advanced as far as Notre Dame de Halle, -making a demonstration to succor the place. -Louis XIV, who commanded the siege in -person, called a council of war to deliberate -on what was to be done in case the Prince -of Orange approached. The opinion of -Marshal Luxembourg was to remain within -the lines of circumvallation, and that opinion -prevailed.</p> - -<p>The marshal laid it down as a principle -that, when the besieging army is not strong -enough to defend the whole extent of circumvallation, -it should quit the lines and -advance to meet the enemy; but when it is -strong enough to encamp in two lines around -a place, that it is better to profit by a good -entrenchment—more especially as by this -means the siege is not interrupted.</p> - -<p>In 1658, Marshal Turenne was besieging -Dunkirk. He had already opened the -trenches, when the Spanish army, under -the orders of the Prince Don Juan, Condé, -and D’Hocquincourt, appeared in sight, and -took post upon the Downs, at a distance of -a league from his lines. Turenne had the -superiority in numbers, and he determined -to quit his entrenchments. He had other -advantages also. The enemy was without<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_103">103</a></span> -artillery, and their superiority in cavalry -was rendered useless by the unfavorable -nature of the ground. It was, therefore, of -great importance to beat the Spanish army -before it had time to entrench itself and -bring up its artillery. The victory gained -by the French on this occasion justified all -the combinations of Marshal Turenne.</p> - -<p>When Marshal Berwick was laying siege -to Philipsburg, in 1733, he had reason to -apprehend that the Prince of Savoy would -attack him with all the forces of the empire -before its termination. The marshal, therefore, -after having made his disposition of -the troops intended for the siege, formed, -with the rest of his army, a corps of observation -to make head against Prince Eugene, -in case the latter should choose to attack -him in his lines, or attempt a diversion on -the Moselle or Upper Rhine. Prince Eugene, -having arrived in front of the besieging -army, some general officers were of -opinion that it was better not to await the -enemy in the lines, but to move forward -and attack him. But Marshal Berwick, who -agreed with the Duke of Luxembourg, that -an army which can occupy, completely, good -entrenchments is not liable to be forced, persisted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_104">104</a></span> -in remaining within his works. The -result proved that this was also the opinion of -Prince Eugene, for he did not dare to attack -the entrenchments, which he would not have -failed to do if he had any hopes of success.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLIII"></a>MAXIM XLIII.</h2> - -<p>Those who proscribe lines of circumvallation, -and all the assistance which the -science of the engineer can afford, deprive -themselves gratuitously of an auxiliary -which is never injurious, almost always -useful, and often indispensable. It must -be admitted, at the same time, that the -principles of field-fortification require improvement. -This important branch of -the art of war has made no progress since -the time of the ancients. It is even inferior -at this day to what it was two thousand -years ago. Engineer officers should -be encouraged in bringing this branch of -their art to perfection, and in placing it -upon a level with the rest.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>“If we are inferior in numbers,” says -Marshal Saxe, “entrenchments are of no<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_105">105</a></span> -use, for the enemy will bring all his forces -to bear upon particular points. If we are -of equal strength they are unnecessary also. -If we are superior, we do not want them. -Then why give ourselves the trouble to entrench?” -Notwithstanding this opinion of -the inutility of entrenchments, Marshal Saxe -often had recourse to them.</p> - -<p>In 1797, Generals Provéra and Hohenzollern -having presented themselves before -Mantua (where Marshal Wurmser was shut -up), for the purpose of raising the siege, -they were stopped by the lines of contravallation -of St. George. This slight obstacle -sufficed to afford Napoleon time to arrive -from Rivoli and defeat their enterprise. It -was in consequence of neglecting to entrench -themselves that the French had been -obliged to raise the siege in the preceding -campaign.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLIV"></a>MAXIM XLIV.</h2> - -<p>If circumstances prevent a sufficient -garrison being left to defend a fortified -town, which contains an hospital and -magazines, at least every means should<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_106">106</a></span> -be employed to secure the citadel against -a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">coup de main</i>.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>A few battalions dispersed about a town, -inspire no terror; but shut up in the more -narrow outline of a citadel, they assume an -imposing attitude. For this reason it appears -to me that such a precaution is always -necessary, not only in fortresses, but -wherever there are hospitals or depôts of any -kind. Where there is no citadel, some quarter -of the town should be fixed upon most -favorable for defence, and entrenched in such -a manner as to oppose the greatest resistance -possible.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLV"></a>MAXIM XLV.</h2> - -<p>A fortified place can only protect the -garrison and detain the enemy for a certain -time. When this time has elapsed, -and the defences of the place are destroyed, -the garrison should lay down its arms. -All civilized nations are agreed on this -point, and there never has been an argument<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_107">107</a></span> -except with reference to the greater -or less degree of defence which a governor -is bound to make before he capitulates. -At the same time, there are generals—Villars -among the number—who are of -opinion that a governor should never surrender, -but that in the last extremity he -should blow up the fortifications, and take -advantage of the night to cut his way -through the besieging army. Where he -is unable to blow up the fortifications, he -may always retire, they say, with his garrison, -and save the men.</p> - -<p>Officers who have adopted this line of -conduct, have often brought off three-fourths -of their garrison.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>In 1705, the French, who were besieged in -Haguenau by Count Thungen, found themselves -incapable of sustaining an assault. -Péri, the governor, who had already distinguished -himself by a vigorous defence, -despairing of being allowed to capitulate on -any terms short of becoming prisoner of -war, resolved to abandon the place and cut -his way through the besiegers.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_108">108</a></span></p> - -<p>In order to conceal his intention more -effectually, and while he deceived the enemy, -to sound at the same time the disposition of -his officers, he assembled a council of war -and declared his resolution to die in the -breach. Then, under pretext of the extremity -to which he was reduced, he commanded -the whole garrison under arms; and -leaving only a few sharpshooters in the -breach, gave the order to march, and set out -in silence, under cover of the night, from -Haguenau. This audacious enterprise was -crowned with success, and Péri reached Saverne -without having suffered the smallest -loss.</p> - -<p>Two fine instances of defence in later times -are those of Massena at Genoa, and of Palafox -at Saragossa.</p> - -<p>The first marched out with arms and baggage, -and all the honors of war, after rejecting -every summons, and defending himself -until hunger alone compelled him to capitulate. -The second only yielded after having -buried his garrison amid the ruins of the -city, which he defended from house to house, -until famine and death left him no alternative -but to surrender. This siege, which -was equally honorable to the French as to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_109">109</a></span> -the Spaniards, is one of the most memorable -in the history of war. In the course of it, -Palafox displayed every possible resource -which courage and obstinacy can supply in -the defence of a fortress.</p> - -<p>All real strength is founded in the mind; -and on this account I am of opinion that we -should be directed in the choice of a governor, -less by his genius than his personal -character. His most essential qualities should -be courage, perseverance, and soldierlike devotedness. -Above all, he should possess the -talent not only of infusing courage into the -garrison, but of kindling a spirit of resistance -in the whole population. Where the latter -is wanting, however art may multiply the -defences of a place, the garrison will be compelled -to capitulate after having sustained -the first, or at most, the second assault.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLVI"></a>MAXIM XLVI.</h2> - -<p>The keys of a fortress are well worth -the retirement of the garrison, when it is -resolved to yield only on those conditions. -On this principle it is always wiser to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_110">110</a></span> -grant an honorable capitulation to a garrison -which has made a vigorous resistance, -than to risk an assault.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>Marshal Villars has justly observed, that -“no governor of a place should be permitted -to excuse himself for surrendering, on the -ground of wishing to preserve the king’s -troops. Every garrison that displays courage -will escape being prisoners of war. For there -is no general who, however well assured of -carrying a place by assault, will not prefer -granting terms of capitulation rather than -risk the loss of a thousand men in forcing -determined troops to surrender.”</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLVII"></a>MAXIM XLVII.</h2> - -<p>Infantry, cavalry, and artillery, are nothing -without each other; therefore, they -should always be so disposed in cantonments -as to assist each other in case of -surprise.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>“A general,” says Frederick, “should direct -his whole attention to the tranquility of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_111">111</a></span> -his cantonments, in order that the soldier -may be relieved from all anxiety, and repose -in security from his fatigues. With this -view, care should be taken that the troops -are able to form rapidly upon ground which -has been previously reconnoitered; that the -generals remain always with their divisions -or brigades, and that the service is carried -on throughout with exactness.”</p> - -<p>Marshal Saxe is of opinion that an army -should not be in a hurry to quit its cantonments, -but that it should wait till the -enemy has exhausted himself with marching, -and be ready to fall upon him with -fresh troops when he is overcome with -fatigue.</p> - -<p>I believe, however, that it would be dangerous -to trust implicitly to this high authority, -for there are many occasions where -all the advantage lies in the initiative, more -especially when the enemy has been compelled -to extend his cantonments, from scarcity -of subsistence, and can be attacked -before he has time to concentrate his forces.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_112">112</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLVIII"></a>MAXIM XLVIII.</h2> - -<p>The formation of infantry in line should -be always in two ranks, because the -length of the musket only admits of an -effective fire in this formation. The discharge -of the third rank is not only uncertain, -but frequently dangerous to the -ranks in its front. In drawing up infantry -in two ranks, there should be a supernumerary -behind every fourth or fifth -file. A reserve should likewise be placed -twenty-five paces in rear of each flank.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>I am of opinion, if circumstances require -a line of infantry to resort to a square, that -two-deep is too light a formation to resist -the shock of cavalry. However useless the -third rank may appear for the purpose of -file-firing, it is, notwithstanding necessary, -in order to replace the men who fall in the -ranks in front; otherwise you would be -obliged to close in the files, and by this -means leave intervals between the companies, -which the cavalry would not fail to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_113">113</a></span> -penetrate. It appears to me, also, that when -infantry is formed in two ranks, the columns -will be found to open out in marching to a -flank. If it should be considered advantageous -behind entrenchments to keep the infantry -in two ranks, the third rank should -be placed in reserve, and brought forward -to relieve the front rank when fatigued, or -when the fire is observed to slacken. I am -induced to make these remarks, because I -have seen an excellent pamphlet which proposes -the two-deep formation for infantry as -the best. The author supports his opinion -by a variety of plausible reasons, but not -sufficient, as it appears to me, to answer all -the objections that may be offered to this -practice.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLIX"></a>MAXIM XLIX.</h2> - -<p>The practice of mixing small bodies of -infantry and cavalry together is a bad -one, and attended with many inconveniences. -The cavalry loses its power of action. -It becomes fettered in all its movements. -Its energy is destroyed; even -the infantry itself is compromised, for on<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_114">114</a></span> -the first movement of the cavalry it is -left without support. The best mode of -protecting cavalry is to cover its flank.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>This also was the opinion of Marshal -Saxe. “The weakness of the above formation,” -says he, “is sufficient in itself to intimidate -the platoons of infantry, because -they must be lost if the cavalry is beaten.”</p> - -<p>The cavalry, also, which depends on the -infantry for succor, is disconcerted the moment -a brisk forward movement carries -them out of sight of their supports. Marshal -Turenne, and the generals of his time, -sometimes employed this order of formation; -but that does not, in my opinion, -justify a modern author for recommending -it in an essay, entitled “<cite>Considerations sur -l’Art de la Guerre</cite>.” In fact, this formation -has long been abandoned; and, since the introduction -of light artillery, it appears to -me almost ridiculous to propose it.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_L"></a>MAXIM L.</h2> - -<p>Charges of cavalry are equally useful -at the beginning, the middle, and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_115">115</a></span> -end of a battle. They should be made -always, if possible, on the flanks of the -infantry, especially when the latter is engaged -in front.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>The Archduke Charles, in speaking of cavalry, -recommends that it should be brought -in mass upon a decisive point, when the moment -for employing it arrives; that is to -say, when it can attack with a certainty of -success. As the rapidity of its movement -enables cavalry to act along the whole line -in the same day, the general who commands -it should keep it together as much as possible, -and avoid dividing it into many detachments. -When the nature of the ground -admits of cavalry being employed on all -points of the line, it is desirable to form it -in column behind the infantry, and in a position -whence it may be easily directed -wherever it is required. If cavalry is intended -to cover a position, it should be -placed sufficiently in the rear to meet at full -speed any advance of troops coming to -attack that position. If it is destined to -cover the flank of the infantry, it should, for -the same reason, be placed directly behind<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_116">116</a></span> -it. As the object of cavalry is purely offensive, -it should be a rule to form it at such a -distance only from the point of collision as -to enable it to acquire its utmost impulse, -and arrive at the top of its speed into action. -With respect to the cavalry reserve, -this should only be employed at the end of -a battle, either to render the success more -decisive, or to cover the retreat. Napoleon -remarks that, at the battle of Waterloo, the -cavalry of the guard which composed the -reserve, was engaged against his orders. -He complains of having been deprived from -five o’clock of the use of this reserve, which, -when well employed, had so often insured -him the victory.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LI"></a>MAXIM LI.</h2> - -<p>It is the business of cavalry to follow -up the victory, and to prevent the beaten -enemy from rallying.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>Victor or vanquished, it is of the greatest -importance to have a body of cavalry in -reserve, either to take advantage of victory,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_117">117</a></span> -or to secure a retreat. The most decisive -battles lose half their value to the conqueror, -when the want of cavalry prevents him -from following up his success, and depriving -the enemy of the power of rallying.</p> - -<p>When a retiring army is pursued, it is -more especially upon the flanks that the -weight of cavalry should fall, if you are -strong enough in that arm to cut off his -retreat.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LII"></a>MAXIM LII.</h2> - -<p>Artillery is more essential to cavalry -than to infantry, because cavalry has no -fire for its defence, but depends upon the -sabre. It is to remedy this deficiency -that recourse has been had to horse-artillery. -Cavalry, therefore, should never -be without cannon, whether when attacking, -rallying, or in position.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>Horse-artillery is an invention of Frederick. -Austria lost no time in introducing -it into her armies, although in an imperfect -degree. It was only in 1792 that this<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_118">118</a></span> -arm was adopted in France, where it was -brought rapidly to its present perfection.</p> - -<p>The services of this arm during the wars -of the Revolution were immense. It may -be said to have changed to a certain extent -the character of tactics, because its facility -of movement enables it to bear with rapidity -on every point where artillery can be -employed with success. Napoleon has remarked -in his memoirs that a flanking battery -which strikes and rakes the enemy -obliquely, is capable of deciding a victory -in itself. To this we may add that, independent -of the advantages which cavalry -derives from horse-artillery in securing its -flanks, and in opening the way for a successful -charge by the destructiveness of its -fire, it is desirable that these two arms -should never be separated, but ready at all -times to seize upon points where it may -be necessary to employ cannon. On these -occasions, the cavalry masks the march of -the artillery, protects its establishment in -position, and covers it from the attack of -the enemy, until it is ready to open its -fire.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_119">119</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LIII"></a>MAXIM LIII.</h2> - -<p>In march, or in position, the greater -part of the artillery should be with the -divisions of infantry and cavalry. The -rest should be in reserve. Each gun -should have with it three hundred rounds, -without including the limber. This is -about the complement for two battles.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>The better infantry is, the more important -it is to support it by artillery, with a view to -its preservation.</p> - -<p>It is essential, also, that the batteries attached -to divisions should march in the -front, because this has a strong influence on -the <em>morale</em> of the soldier. He attacks always -with confidence when he sees the flanks of -the column well covered with cannon.</p> - -<p>The artillery reserve should be kept for a -decisive moment, and then employed in full -force, for it will be difficult for the enemy at -such a time to presume to attack it.</p> - -<p>There is scarcely an instance of a battery -of sixty pieces of cannon having been carried<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_120">120</a></span> -by a charge of infantry or cavalry, -unless where it was entirely without support, -or in a position to be easily turned.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LIV"></a>MAXIM LIV.</h2> - -<p>Artillery should always be placed in -the most advantageous positions, and as -far in front of the line of cavalry and -infantry as possible, without compromising -the safety of the guns.</p> - -<p>Field batteries should command the -whole country round from the level of -the platform. They should on no account -be masked on the right and left, -but have free range in every direction.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>The battery of eighteen pieces of cannon, -which covered the centre of the Russian -army at the battle of La Moskwa (Borodino), -may be cited as an example.</p> - -<p>Its position, upon a circular height which -commanded the field in every direction, added -so powerfully to its effect, that its fire alone -sufficed, for a considerable time, to paralyze<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_121">121</a></span> -the vigorous attack made by the French -with their right. Although twice broken, -the left of the Russian army closed to this -battery, as to a pivot, and twice recovered -its former position. After repeated attacks, -conducted with a rare intrepidity, the battery -was at length carried by the French, -but not till they had lost the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">élite</i> of their -army, and with it the Generals Caulincourt -and Montbrun. Its capture decided the retreat -of the Russian left.</p> - -<p>I might advert likewise to another instance, -in the campaign of 1809, and to the -terrible effect produced by the hundred -pieces of cannon of the Guard which General -Lauriston directed, at the battle of -Wagram, against the right of the Austrian -army.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LV"></a>MAXIM LV.</h2> - -<p>A General should never put his army -into cantonments, when he has the means -of collecting supplies of forage and provisions, -and of thus providing for the -wants of the soldier in the field.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_122">122</a></span></p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>One great advantage which results from -having an army in camp is, that it is easier -to direct its spirit and maintain its discipline -there. The soldier in cantonments abandons -himself to repose; he ends by finding a -pleasure in idleness, and in fearing to return -to the field. The reverse takes place in a -camp. There, a feeling of <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">ennui</i>, and a -severer discipline, make him anxious for the -opening of the campaign, to interrupt the -monotony of the service and relieve it with -the chances and variety of war. Besides, an -army in camp is much more secure from a -surprise than in cantonments—the defect of -which usually consists in their occupying too -great an extent of ground. When an army -is obliged to go into quarters, the Marquis de -Feuquière recommends a camp to be selected -in front of the line, where the troops can be -frequently assembled—sometimes suddenly, -in order to exercise their vigilance, or for -the sole purpose of bringing the different -corps together.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_123">123</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LVI"></a>MAXIM LVI.</h2> - -<p>A good general, a well-organized system, -good instructions, and severe discipline, -aided by effective establishments, -will always make good troops, independently -of the cause for which they fight.</p> - -<p>At the same time, a love of country, a -spirit of enthusiasm, a sense of national -honor, and fanaticism, will operate upon -young soldiers with advantage.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>This remark appears to me less applicable -to officers than to soldiers, for as war is not -a state of things natural to man, it follows -that those who maintain its cause must be -governed by some strong excitement. Much -enthusiasm and devotedness are required on -the part of the troops for the general who -commands, to induce an army to perform -great actions in a war in which it takes -no interest. This is sufficiently proved by -the apathy of auxiliaries, unless when inspired -by the conduct of their chief.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_124">124</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LVII"></a>MAXIM LVII.</h2> - -<p>When a nation is without establishments -and a military system, it is very -difficult to organize an army.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>This is an unanswerable truth, more particularly -with reference to an army intended -to act upon the system of modern war, and -in which order, precision, and rapidity of -movement, are the principal essentials to -success.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LVIII"></a>MAXIM LVIII.</h2> - -<p>The first qualification of a soldier is -fortitude under fatigue and privation. -Courage is only the second; hardship, -poverty and want, are the best school -for a soldier.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>Valor belongs to the young soldier as -well as to the veteran; but in the former -it is more evanescent. It is only by habits<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_125">125</a></span> -of service, and after several campaigns, -that the soldier acquires that moral courage -which makes him support the fatigues and -privations of war without a murmur. Experience -by this time has instructed him to -supply his own wants. He is satisfied with -what he can procure, because he knows that -success is only to be obtained by fortitude -and perseverance. Well might Napoleon -say that misery and want were the best -school for a soldier; for as nothing could be -compared with the total destitution of the -army of the Alps, when he assumed the -command, so nothing could equal the brilliant -success which he obtained with this -army in the first campaign in Italy. The -conquerors of Montenotte, Lodi, Castiglione, -Bassano, Arcole and Rivoli had beheld, only -a few months before, whole battalions covered -with rags, and deserting for the want -of subsistence.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LIX"></a>MAXIM LIX.</h2> - -<p>There are five things the soldier should -never be without—his musket, his ammunition, -his knapsack, his provisions<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_126">126</a></span> -(for at least four days), and his entrenching-tool. -The knapsack may be reduced -to the smallest size possible, if it be -thought proper, but the soldier should -always have it with him.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>It is fortunate that Napoleon has recognized -the advantage of giving to every soldier -an entrenching-tool. His authority is -the best answer to the ridicule which has -been thrown upon those who proposed it. -An axe will be found to inconvenience the -foot-soldier as little as the sword he wears -at his side, and it will be infinitely more -useful. When axes are given out to companies, -or are carried by fatigue-men during -a campaign, they are soon lost; and it -often happens, when a camp is to be formed, -that a difficulty arises in cutting wood and -building huts for the soldier; whereas, by -making the axe a part of every man’s appointments, -he is obliged to have it always -with him; and whether the object be to -entrench himself in a village, or to erect huts -in a camp, the commander of a corps will -speedily see the advantage of this innovation.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_127">127</a></span></p> - -<p>When once the axe has been generally -adopted, we shall, perhaps, see the desirability -of issuing pickaxes and shovels to -particular companies, and also the benefit of -more frequent entrenchments. It is more -particularly during retreats that it is important -to entrench when the army has reached -a good position; for an entrenched camp -not only furnishes the means of rallying -troops which are pursued, but if it be fortified -in such a manner as to render the issue -of an attack doubtful to the enemy, it will -not only sustain the <em>morale</em> of the soldier in -the retreat, but afford the general-in-chief -opportunities for resuming the offensive, and -profiting by the first false movement on the -part of his adversary. It will be recollected -how Frederick, in the campaign of 1761, -when surrounded by two Russian and Austrian -armies, whose united force was quadruple -his own, saved his army by entrenching -himself in the camp of Buntzalvitz.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LX"></a>MAXIM LX.</h2> - -<p>Every means should be taken to attach -the soldier to his colors. This is best<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_128">128</a></span> -accomplished by showing consideration -and respect to the old soldier. His pay -likewise should increase with his length -of service. It is the height of injustice -not to pay a veteran more than a recruit.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>Some modern writers have recommended, -on the other hand, to limit the period of -service, in order to bring the whole youth -of a country successively under arms. By -this means they purpose to have the levies, -<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">en masse</i>, all ready trained and capable of -resisting successfully a war of invasion. But -however advantageous at first sight such a -military system may appear, I believe it -will be found to have many objections.</p> - -<p>In the first place, the soldier fatigued with -the minutiæ of discipline in a garrison, will -not feel much inclined to re-enlist after he -has received his discharge, more especially -since, having served the prescribed time, he -will consider himself to have fulfilled all the -duties of a citizen to his country. Returning -to his friends, he will probably marry, -or establish himself in a trade. From that -moment his military spirit declines, and he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_129">129</a></span> -soon becomes ill adapted to the business of -war. On the contrary, the soldier who -serves long, becomes attached to his regiment -as to a new family. He submits to -the yoke of discipline, accustoms himself to -the privations his situation imposes, and -ends by finding his condition agreeable. -There are few officers that have seen service -who have not discovered the difference -between old and young soldiers, with reference -to their power of supporting the -fatigues of a long campaign, to the determined -courage that characterizes the attack, -or to the ease with which they rally after -being broken.</p> - -<p>Montécuculli observes, that “it takes time -to discipline an army; more to inure it to -war; and still more to constitute veterans.” -For this reason, he recommends that great -consideration should be shown to old soldiers; -that they should be carefully provided -for, and a large body of them kept -always on foot. It seems to me, also, that -it is not enough to increase the pay of the -soldier according to his period of service, -but that it is highly essential to confer on -him some mark of distinction that shall -secure to him privileges calculated to encourage<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_130">130</a></span> -him to grow gray under arms, -and, above all, to do so with honor.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXI"></a>MAXIM LXI.</h2> - -<p>It is not set speeches at the moment of -battle that render soldiers brave. The -veteran scarcely listens to them, and the -recruit forgets them at the first discharge. -If discourses and harangues are useful, it -is during the campaign: to do away unfavorable -impressions, to correct false -reports, to keep alive a proper spirit in -the camp, and to furnish materials and -amusement for the bivouac. All printed -orders of the day should keep in view -these objects.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>The opinion of the general-in-chief, energetically -expressed, is, notwithstanding, productive -of great effect on the <em>morale</em> of the -soldier.</p> - -<p>In 1703, at the attack of Hornbec, Marshal -Villars, seeing the troops advancing -without spirit, threw himself at their head:<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_131">131</a></span> -“What!” said he, “is it expected that I, a -marshal of France, should be the first to -escalade, when I order YOU to attack?”</p> - -<p>These few words rekindled their ardor; -officers and soldiers rushed upon the works, -and the town was taken almost without loss.</p> - -<p>“We have retired far enough for to-day; -you know I always sleep upon the field of -battle!” said Napoleon, as he flew through -the ranks at the moment of resuming the -offensive at Marengo. These few words sufficed -to revive the courage of the soldiers, -and to make them forget the fatigues of the -day, during which almost every man had -been engaged.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXII"></a>MAXIM LXII.</h2> - -<p>Tents are unfavorable to health. The -soldier is best when he bivouacs, because -he sleeps with his feet to the fire, which -speedily dries the ground on which he -lies. A few planks, or a little straw, shelter -him from the wind.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, tents are necessary -for the superior officers, who have to write -and to consult their maps. Tents should,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_132">132</a></span> -therefore, be issued to these, with directions -to them never to sleep in a house. -Tents are always objects of observation -to the enemy’s staff. They afford information -in regard to your numbers and -the ground you occupy; while an army -bivouacking in two or three lines, is only -distinguishable from afar by the smoke -which mingles with the clouds. It is impossible -to count the number of the fires.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>The acknowledged advantage of bivouacking -is another reason for adding an entrenching-tool -to the equipment of the soldier; for, -with the assistance of the axe and shovel, -he can hut himself without difficulty. I have -seen huts erected with the branches of trees, -covered with turf, where the soldier was perfectly -sheltered from the cold and wet, even -in the worst season.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXIII"></a>MAXIM LXIII.</h2> - -<p>All information obtained from prisoners -should be received with caution, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_133">133</a></span> -estimated at its real value. A soldier -seldom sees anything beyond his company; -and an officer can afford intelligence -of little more than the position and -movements of the division to which his -regiment belongs. On this account, the -general of an army should never depend -upon the information derived from prisoners, -unless it agrees with the reports -received from the advanced guards, in -reference to the position, etc., of the -enemy.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>Montécuculli wisely observes that “prisoners -should be interrogated separately, in -order to ascertain, by the agreement in their -answers, how far they may be endeavoring -to mislead you.” Generally speaking, the information -required from officers who are prisoners, -should have reference to the strength -and resources of the enemy, and sometimes -to his localities and position. Frederick recommends -that prisoners should be menaced -with instant death if they are found attempting -to deceive by false reports.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_134">134</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXIV"></a>MAXIM LXIV.</h2> - -<p>Nothing is so important in war as an -undivided command; for this reason, -when war is carried on against a single -power, there should be only one army, -acting upon one base, and conducted by -one chief.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>“Success,” says the Archduke Charles, “is -only to be obtained by simultaneous efforts, -directed upon a given point, sustained with -constancy, and executed with decision.” It -rarely happens that any number of men -who desire the same object are perfectly -agreed as to the means of attaining it; and -if the will of one individual is not allowed to -predominate, there can be no <em>ensemble</em> in the -execution of their operations; neither will -they attain the end proposed. It is useless -to confirm this maxim by examples. History -abounds in them.</p> - -<p>Prince Eugene and Marlborough would -never have been so successful in the campaigns -which they directed in concert, if a -spirit of intrigue and difference of opinion -had not constantly disorganized the armies -opposed to them.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_135">135</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXV"></a>MAXIM LXV.</h2> - -<p>The same consequences which have -uniformly attended long discussions and -councils of war, will follow at all times. -They will terminate in the adoption of the -worst course, which in war is always the -most timid, or, if you will, the most prudent. -The only true wisdom in a general -is determined courage.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>Prince Eugene used to say that councils of -war “are only useful when you want an -excuse for attempting <em>nothing</em>.” This was -also the opinion of Villars. A general-in-chief -should avoid, therefore, assembling a -council on occasions of difficulty, and should -confine himself to consulting separately his -most experienced generals in order to benefit -by their advice, while he is governed at -the same time in his decision by his own -judgment. By this means, he becomes responsible, -it is true, for the measures he -pursues; but he has the advantage also of -acting upon his own conviction, and of being<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_136">136</a></span> -certain that the secret of his operations -will not be divulged, as is usually the case -where it is discussed by a council of war.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXVI"></a>MAXIM LXVI.</h2> - -<p>In war, the general alone can judge of -certain arrangements. It depends on him -alone to conquer difficulties by his own -superior talents and resolution.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>The officer who obeys, whatever may be -the nature or extent of his command, will -always stand excused for executing implicitly -the orders which have been given to him. -This is not the case with the general-in-chief, -on whom the safety of the army and the success -of the campaign depend. Occupied, without -intermission, in the whole process of -observation and reflection, it is easy to conceive -that he will acquire by degrees a -solidity of judgment which will enable him -to see things in a clearer and more enlarged -point of view than his inferior generals.</p> - -<p>Marshal Villars, in his campaigns, acted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_137">137</a></span> -almost always in opposition to the advice of -his generals, and he was almost always fortunate. -So true it is, that a general, who feels -confident in his talent for command, must -follow the dictates of his own genius if he -wishes to achieve success.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXVII"></a>MAXIM LXVII.</h2> - -<p>To authorize generals or other officers -to lay down their arms in virtue of a particular -capitulation, under any other circumstances -than when they are composing -the garrison of a fortress, affords a dangerous -latitude. It is destructive of all -military character in a nation to open such -a door to the cowardly, the weak, or even -to the misdirected brave. Great extremities -require extraordinary resolution. The -more obstinate the resistance of an army, -the greater the chances of assistance or of -success.</p> - -<p>How many seeming impossibilities have -been accomplished by men whose only -resource was death!</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_138">138</a></span></p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>In the campaign of 1759, Frederick directed -General Fink, with eighteen thousand -men, upon Maxen, for the purpose of cutting -off the Austrian army from the defiles of Bohemia. -Surrounded by twice his numbers, -Fink capitulated after a sharp action, and -fourteen thousand men laid down their arms. -This conduct was the more disgraceful, because -General Winch, who commanded the -cavalry, cut his way through the enemy. -The whole blame of the surrender fell, therefore, -upon Fink, who was tried afterward by -a court-martial, and sentenced to be cashiered -and imprisoned for two years.</p> - -<p>In the campaign of Italy in 1796, the Austrian -General Provéra capitulated with two -thousand men in the castle of Cossaria. Subsequently, -at the battle of La Favorite, the -same general capitulated with a corps of six -thousand men. I scarcely dare to revert to -the shameful defection of General Mack in -the capitulation of Ulm in 1805, where thirty -thousand Austrians laid down their arms—when -we have seen, during the wars of the -Revolution, so many generals open themselves -a way by a vigorous effort through -the enemy, supported only by a few battalions.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_139">139</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXVIII"></a>MAXIM LXVIII.</h2> - -<p>There is no security for any sovereign, -for any nation, or for any general, if officers -are permitted to capitulate in the -open field, and to lay down their arms in -virtue of conditions favorable to the contracting -party, but contrary to the interests -of the army at large. To withdraw -from danger, and thereby to involve their -comrades in greater peril, is the height of -cowardice. Such conduct should be proscribed, -declared infamous, and made punishable -with death. All generals, officers -and soldiers, who capitulate in battle to -save their own lives, should be decimated.</p> - -<p>He who gives the order, and those who -obey, are alike traitors, and deserve capital -punishment.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>Soldiers, who are almost always ignorant -of the designs of their chief, cannot be responsible -for his conduct. If he orders them -to lay down their arms, they must do so; -otherwise they fail in that law of discipline<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_140">140</a></span> -which is more essential to an army than -thousands of men. It appears to me, therefore, -under these circumstances, that the -chiefs alone are responsible, and liable to the -punishment due to their cowardice. We have -no example of soldiers being wanting in their -duty in the most desperate situations, where -they are commanded by officers of approved -resolution.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXIX"></a>MAXIM LXIX.</h2> - -<p>There is but one honorable mode of -becoming prisoner of war. That is, by -being taken separately; by which is meant, -by being cut off entirely, and when we -can no longer make use of our arms. In -this case, there can be no conditions, for -honor can impose none. We yield to an -irresistible necessity.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>There is always time enough to surrender -prisoner of war. This should be deferred, -therefore, till the last extremity. And here -I may be permitted to cite an example of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_141">141</a></span> -rare obstinacy in defence, which has been -related to me by ocular witnesses. The captain -of grenadiers, Dubrenil, of the thirty-seventh -regiment of the line, having been -sent on detachment with his company, was -stopped on the march by a large party of -Cossacks, who surrounded him on every side. -Dubrenil formed his little force into square, -and endeavored to gain the skirts of a wood -(within a few muskets’ shot of the spot -where he had been attacked), and reached -it with very little loss. But as soon as the -grenadiers saw this refuge secured to them, -they broke and fled, leaving their captain -and a few brave men, who were resolved not -to abandon him, at the mercy of the enemy. -In the meantime, the fugitives, who had rallied -in the depth of the wood, ashamed of -having forsaken their leader, came to the -resolution of rescuing him from the enemy, -if a prisoner, or of carrying off his body if -he had fallen. With this view, they formed -once more upon the outskirts, and opening -a passage with their bayonets through the -cavalry, penetrated to their captain, who, -notwithstanding seventeen wounds, was defending -himself still. They immediately surrounded -him, and regained the wood with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_142">142</a></span> -little loss. Such examples are not rare in -the wars of the Revolution, and it were desirable -to see them collected by some contemporary, -that soldiers might learn how -much is to be achieved in war by determined -energy and sustained resolution.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXX"></a>MAXIM LXX.</h2> - -<p>The conduct of a general in a conquered -country is full of difficulties. If severe, -he irritates and increases the number of -his enemies. If lenient, he gives birth to -expectations which only render the abuses -and vexations, inseparable from war, the -more intolerable. A victorious general -must know how to employ severity, justice -and mildness by turns, if he would allay -sedition or prevent it.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>Among the Romans, generals were only -permitted to arrive at the command of armies -after having exercised the different functions -of the magistracy. Thus by a previous -knowledge of administration, they were prepared<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_143">143</a></span> -to govern the conquered provinces -with all that discretion which a newly-acquired -power, supported by arbitrary force, -demands.</p> - -<p>In the military institutions of modern -times, the generals, instructed only in what -concerns the operation of strategy and tactics, -are obliged to intrust the civil departments -of the war to inferior agents, who, -without belonging to the army, render all -those abuses and vexations, inseparable from -its operations, still more intolerable.</p> - -<p>This observation, which I do little more -than repeat, seems to me, notwithstanding, -deserving of particular attention; for if the -leisure of general officers was directed in -time of peace to the study of diplomacy—if -they were employed in the different embassies -which sovereigns send to foreign courts—they -would acquire a knowledge of the -laws and of the government of these countries, -in which they may be called hereafter -to carry on the war. They would learn also -to distinguish those points of interest on -which all treaties must be based, which have -for their object the advantageous termination -of a campaign. By the aid of this -information they would obtain certain and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_144">144</a></span> -positive results, since all the springs of action, -as well as the machinery of war, would -be in their hands. We have seen Prince -Eugene, and Marshal Villars, each fulfilling -with equal ability the duties of a general -and a negotiator.</p> - -<p>When an army which occupies a conquered -province observes strict discipline, there are -few examples of insurrection among the people, -unless indeed resistance is provoked (as -but too often happens), by the exactions of -inferior agents employed in the civil administration.</p> - -<p>It is to this point, therefore, that the general-in-chief -should principally direct his -attention, in order that the contributions -imposed by the wants of the army may be -levied with impartiality; and above all, that -they may be applied to their true object, instead -of serving to enrich the collectors, as -is ordinarily the case.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXI"></a>MAXIM LXXI.</h2> - -<p>Nothing can excuse a general who -takes advantage of the knowledge acquired -in the service of his country, to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_145">145</a></span> -deliver up her frontier and her towns to -foreigners. This is a crime reprobated -by every principle of religion, morality -and honor.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>Ambitious men who, listening only to -their passions, arm natives of the same land -against each other (under the deceitful pretext -of the public good), are still more criminal. -For however arbitrary a government, -the institutions which have been consolidated -by time, are always preferable to civil -war, and to that anarchy which the latter is -obliged to create for the justification of its -crimes.</p> - -<p>To be faithful to his sovereign, and to -respect the established government, are the -first principles which ought to distinguish a -soldier and a man of honor.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXII"></a>MAXIM LXXII.</h2> - -<p>A general-in-chief has no right to shelter -his mistakes in war under cover of his -sovereign, or of a minister, when these -are both distant from the scene of operation,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_146">146</a></span> -and must consequently be either ill -informed or wholly ignorant of the actual -state of things.</p> - -<p>Hence, it follows, that every general is -culpable who undertakes the execution of -a plan which he considers faulty. It is -his duty to represent his reasons, to insist -upon a change of plan, in short, to give -in his resignation, rather than allow himself -to be made the instrument of his -army’s ruin. Every general-in-chief who -fights a battle in consequence of superior -orders, with the certainty of losing it, is -equally blamable.</p> - -<p>In this last-mentioned case, the general -ought to refuse obedience; because a -blind obedience is due only to a military -command given by a superior present on -the spot at the moment of action. Being -in possession of the real state of things, -the superior has it then in his power to -afford the necessary explanations to the -person who executes his orders.</p> - -<p>But supposing a general-in-chief to receive -positive order from his sovereign, -directing him to fight a battle, with the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_147">147</a></span> -further injunction, to yield to his adversary, -and allow himself to be defeated—ought -he to obey it? No. If the general -should be able to comprehend the meaning -or utility of such an order, he should -execute it; otherwise he should refuse to -obey it.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>In the campaign of 1697, Prince Eugene -caused the courier to be intercepted, who -was bringing him orders from the emperor -forbidding him to hazard a battle, for which -everything had been prepared, and which -he foresaw would prove decisive. He considered, -therefore, that he did his duty in -evading the orders of his sovereign; and the -victory of Zanta, in which the Turks lost -about thirty thousand men, and four thousand -prisoners, rewarded his audacity. In -the meantime, notwithstanding the immense -advantages which accrued from this victory -to the imperial arms, Eugene was disgraced -on his arrival at Vienna.</p> - -<p>In 1793, General Hoche, having received -orders to move upon Treves with an army -harassed by constant marches in a mountainous -and difficult country, refused to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_148">148</a></span> -obey. He observed, with reason, that in order -to obtain possession of an unimportant -fortress, they were exposing his army to -inevitable ruin. He caused, therefore, his -troops to return into winter quarters, and -preferred the preservation of his army, upon -which the success of the future campaign -depended, to his own safety. Recalled to -Paris, he was thrown into a dungeon, which -he only quitted on the downfall of Robespierre.</p> - -<p>I dare not decide if such examples are to -be imitated; but it seems to me highly desirable -that a question so new and so important, -should be discussed by men who are -capable of determining its merits.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXIII"></a>MAXIM LXXIII.</h2> - -<p>The first qualification in a general-in-chief -is a cool head—that is, a head which -receives just impressions, and estimates -things and objects at their real value. -He must not allow himself to be elated -by good news, or depressed by bad.</p> - -<p>The impressions he receives either successively<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_149">149</a></span> -or simultaneously in the course -of the day, should be so classed as to -take up only the exact place in his mind -which they deserve to occupy; since it is -upon a just comparison and consideration -of the weight due to different impressions, -that the power of reasoning and of -right judgment depends.</p> - -<p>Some men are so physically and morally -constituted as to see everything -through a highly-colored medium. They -raise up a picture in the mind on every -slight occasion, and give to every trivial -occurrence a dramatic interest. But -whatever knowledge, or talent, or courage, -or other good qualities such men -may possess, nature has not formed them -for the command of armies, or the direction -of great military operations.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>“The first quality in a general-in-chief,” -says Montécuculli, “is a great knowledge -of the art of war. This is not intuitive, -but the result of experience. A man is not -born a commander. He must become one.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_150">150</a></span> -Not to be anxious; to be always cool; to -avoid confusion in his commands; never to -change countenance; to give his orders in -the midst of battle with as much composure -as if he were perfectly at ease. These are -the proofs of valor in a general.</p> - -<p>“To encourage the timid; to increase the -number of the truly brave; to revive the -drooping ardor of the troops in battle; to -rally those who are broken; to bring back -to the charge those who are repulsed; to -find resources in difficulty, and success even -amid disaster; to be ready at a moment to -devote himself, if necessary, for the welfare -of the state. These are the actions which -acquire for a general distinction and renown.”</p> - -<p>To this enumeration may be added, the -talent of discriminating character, and of -employing every man in the particular post -which nature has qualified him to fill. “My -principal attention,” said Marshal Villars, -“was always directed to the study of the -younger generals. Such a one I found, by -the boldness of his character, fit to lead a -column of attack; another, from a disposition -naturally cautious, but without being -deficient in courage, more perfectly to be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_151">151</a></span> -relied on for the defence of a country.” It -is only by a just application of these personal -qualities to their respective objects, -that it is possible to command success in -war.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXIV"></a>MAXIM LXXIV.</h2> - -<p>The leading qualifications which should -distinguish an officer selected for the -head of the staff, are, to know the country -thoroughly; to be able to conduct a -<em>reconnoissance</em> with skill; to superintend -the transmission of orders promptly; to -lay down the most complicated movements -intelligibly, but in a few words, -and with simplicity.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>Formerly, the duties of the chiefs of the -staff were confined to the necessary preparations -for carrying the plan of the campaign, -and the operations resolved on by -the general-in-chief, into effect. In a battle, -they were only employed in directing movements -and superintending their execution.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_152">152</a></span> -But in the late wars, the officers of the staff -were frequently intrusted with the command -of a column of attack, or of large detachments, -when the general-in-chief feared to -disclose the secret of his plans by the transmission -of orders or instructions. Great -advantages have resulted from this innovation, -although it was long resisted. By this -means, the staff have been enabled to perfect -their theory by practice, and they have -acquired, moreover, the esteem of the soldiers -and junior officers of the line, who are -easily led to think lightly of their superiors, -whom they do not see fighting in the ranks. -The generals who have held the arduous -situation of chief of the staff during the -wars of the Revolution, have almost always -been employed in the different branches of -the profession. Marshal Berthier, who filled -so conspicuously this appointment to Napoleon, -was distinguished by all the essentials -of a general. He possessed calm, and at -the same time brilliant courage, excellent -judgment, and approved experience. He -bore arms during half a century, made war -in the four quarters of the globe, opened -and terminated thirty-two campaigns. In -his youth he acquired, under the eye of his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_153">153</a></span> -father, who was an engineer officer, the talent -of tracing plans and finishing them with -exactness, as well as the preliminary qualifications -necessary to form a staff-officer. -Admitted by the Prince de Lambesq into -his regiment of dragoons, he was taught -the skilful management of his horse and his -sword—accomplishments so important to a -soldier. Attached afterward to the staff of -Count Rochambeau, he made his first campaign -in America, where he soon began to -distinguish himself by his valor, activity -and talents. Having at length attained -superior rank in the staff-corps formed by -Marshal de Segur, he visited the camps of -the King of Prussia, and discharged the duties -of chief of the staff under the Baron -de Bezenval.</p> - -<p>During nineteen years, consumed in sixteen -campaigns, the history of Marshal Berthier’s -life was little else but that of the -wars of Napoleon, all the details of which he -directed, both in the cabinet and the field. -A stranger to the intrigues of politics, he -labored with indefatigable activity; seized -with promptitude and sagacity upon general -views, and gave the necessary orders for -attaining them with prudence, perspicuity,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_154">154</a></span> -and conciseness. Discreet, impenetrable, -modest; he was just, exact, and even severe, -in everything that regarded the service; -but he always set an example of -vigilance and zeal in his own person, and -knew how to maintain discipline, and to -cause his authority to be respected by every -rank under his orders.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXV"></a>MAXIM LXXV.</h2> - -<p>A commandant of artillery should understand -well the general principles of -each branch of the service, since he is -called upon to supply arms and ammunition -to the different corps of which it is -composed. His correspondence with the -commanding officers of artillery at the -advanced posts, should put him in possession -of all the movements of the army, -and the disposition and management of -the great park of artillery should depend -upon this information.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>After having recognized the advantage of -intrusting the supply of arms and ammunition<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_155">155</a></span> -for an army to a military body, it -appears to me extraordinary that the same -regulation does not extend to that of provisions -and forage, instead of leaving it in -the hands of a separate administration, as is -the practice at present.</p> - -<p>The civil establishments attached to armies -are formed almost always at the commencement -of a war, and composed of persons -strangers to those laws of discipline -which they are but too much inclined to -disregard. These men are little esteemed -by the military, because they serve only to -enrich themselves, without respect to the -means. They consider only their private -interest in a service whose glory they cannot -share, although some portion of its success -depends upon their zeal. The disorders -and defalcations incident to these establishments -would assuredly cease, if they were -confided to men who had been employed in -the army, and who, in return for their labors, -were permitted to partake with their -fellow-soldiers the triumph of their success.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_156">156</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXVI"></a>MAXIM LXXVI.</h2> - -<p>The qualities which distinguish a good -general of advanced posts, are, to reconnoitre -accurately defiles and fords of every -description; to provide guides that may -be depended on; to interrogate the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">curé</i> -and postmaster; to establish rapidly a -good understanding with the inhabitants; -to send out spies; to intercept public and -private letters; to translate and analyze -their contents; in a word, to be able to -answer every question of the general-in-chief, -when he arrives with the whole -army.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>Foraging parties, composed of small detachments, -and which were usually intrusted -to young officers, served formerly to make -good officers of advanced posts; but now the -army is supplied with provisions by regular -contributions: it is only in a course of partisan -warfare that the necessary experience -can be acquired to fill these situations with -success.</p> - -<p>A chief of partisans is, to a certain extent,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_157">157</a></span> -independent of the army. He receives -neither pay nor provisions from it, and -rarely succor, and is abandoned during the -whole campaign to his own resources.</p> - -<p>An officer so circumstanced must unite -address with courage, and boldness with -discretion, if he wishes to collect plunder -without measuring the strength of his little -corps with superior forces. Always harassed, -always surrounded by dangers, which -it is his business to foresee and surmount, a -leader of partisans acquires in a short time -an experience in the details of war rarely to -be obtained by an officer of the line; because -the latter is almost always under the guidance -of superior authority, which directs -the whole of his movements, while the talent -and genius of the partisan are developed -and sustained by a dependence on his own -resources.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXVII"></a>MAXIM LXXVII.</h2> - -<p>Generals-in-chief must be guided by -their own experience, or their genius. -Tactics, evolutions, the duties and knowledge -of an engineer or artillery officer,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_158">158</a></span> -may be learned in treatises, but the -science of strategy is only to be acquired -by experience, and by studying the campaigns -of all the great captains.</p> - -<p>Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, and Frederick, -as well as Alexander, Hannibal, and -Cæsar, have all acted upon the same principles. -These have been: to keep their -forces united; to leave no weak part -unguarded; to seize with rapidity on -important points.</p> - -<p>Such are the principles which lead to -victory, and which, by inspiring terror at -the reputation of your arms, will at once -maintain fidelity and secure subjection.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>“A great captain can only be formed,” -says the Archduke Charles, “by long experience -and intense study: neither is his own -experience enough—for whose life is there -sufficiently fruitful of events to render his -knowledge universal?” It is, therefore, by -augmenting his information from the stock -of others, by appreciating justly the discoveries -of his predecessors, and by taking for -his standard of comparison those great military<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_159">159</a></span> -exploits, in connection with their political -results, in which the history of war -abounds, that he can alone become a great -commander.</p> - -</div></div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXVIII"></a>MAXIM LXXVIII.</h2> - -<p>Peruse again and again the campaigns -of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus -Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick. -Model yourself upon them. This -is the only means of becoming a great -captain, and of acquiring the secret of the -art of war. Your own genius will be -enlightened and improved by this study, -and you will learn to reject all maxims -foreign to the principles of these great -commanders.</p> - -<div class="note"> -<h3>NOTE.</h3> - -<p>It is in order to facilitate this object that -I have formed the present collection. It is -after reading and meditating upon the history -of modern war that I have endeavored -to illustrate, by examples, how the maxims -of a great captain may be most successfully -applied to this study. May the end I have -had in view be accomplished!</p> - -</div></div> - -<div class="chapter"> -<div class="transnote"> -<h2 class="nobreak p1"><a id="Transcribers_Notes"></a>Transcriber’s Notes</h2> - -<p>Cover created by Transcriber and placed in the Public Domain.</p> - -<p>Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant -preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed, -except as noted below.</p> - -<p>Unusual and archaic spellings were not changed.</p> - -<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced -quotation marks retained.</p> - -<p>Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.</p> - -<p>Page <a href="#Page_32">32</a>: “spacious and extensive” was printed as “entensive” -but changed here.</p> - -<p>Page <a href="#Page_60">60</a>: “1746” is a misprint; the correct date must be in the 1600's, -perhaps “1646”.</p> - -<p>Page <a href="#Page_63">63</a>: “1798” may be a misprint for “1796”.</p> - -<p>Page <a href="#Page_65">65</a>: “1745” is a misprint; the correct year is “1645”.</p> - -<p>Page <a href="#Page_75">75</a>: “wo to the vanquished” was printed that way.</p> - -<p>Page <a href="#Page_100">100</a>: “Vauban” was printed as “Vanban” but changed here.</p> -</div> -</div> - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's The Officer's Manual, by Napoleon Bonaparte - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE OFFICER'S MANUAL *** - -***** This file should be named 50750-h.htm or 50750-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/0/7/5/50750/ - -Produced by Shaun Pinder, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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