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<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 50465 ***</div>
<h1>The Project Gutenberg eBook, The China of Chiang K'ai-Shek, by Paul Myron
Anthony Linebarger</h1>
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<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;">
<img src="images/i_frontis.jpg" width="400" height="555" alt="Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek" />
<span class="caption"><i>Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek</i></span>
</div>
<hr class="chap" />
<h1><i>THE CHINA</i><br />
<i><small>OF</small></i><br />
<i>CHIANG K'AI-SHEK:</i><br />
<i><small>A Political Study</small></i></h1>
<p class="center space-above space-below">BY<br />
<big>PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER</big><br />
<i>Duke University</i></p>
<div class="figcenter" style="width: 52px;">
<img src="images/i_logo_i.jpg" width="52" height="60" alt="Logo" />
</div>
<p class="center"><big>GREENWOOD PRESS, PUBLISHERS</big><br />
WESTPORT, CONNECTICUT</p>
<hr class="chap" />
<blockquote>
<p><i>The Library of Congress has catalogued this publication as follows</i>:</p>
<hr class="pub" />
<p><b>Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data</b></p>
<p>Linebarger, Paul Myron Anthony, 1913-1966.<br />
<span style="margin-left:1em;">The China of Chiang K'ai-shek; a political study.</span></p>
<p><span style="margin-left:1em;">Reprint of the 1943 ed. published by World Peace Foundation, Boston.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left:1em;">Includes bibliographical references.</span><br />
<span style="margin-left:1em;">1. China—Politics and government—1912-1949.</span><br />
2. Chiang, Kai-shek, 1886-<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span><span style="margin-left:1em;">I.</span> Title.<br />
DS774.L48 1973<span style="margin-left:1em;">320.9'51'042</span><span style="margin-left:1em;">73-725</span><br />
ISBN 0-8371-6779-5</p>
<hr class="pub" />
</blockquote>
<p class="space-above"><i>Copyright</i> 1942 by World Peace Foundation</p>
<p>Originally published in 1943<br />
by World Peace Foundation, Boston</p>
<p>Reprinted with the permission<br />
of World Peace Foundation</p>
<p>First Greenwood Reprinting 1973</p>
<p>Library of Congress Catalogue Card Number 73-725</p>
<p>ISBN 0-8371-6779-5</p>
<p>Printed in the United States of America</p>
<hr class="chap" />
<p class="center">TO MY MOTHER<br />
<i>With Love</i></p>
<hr class="chap" />
<h2>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</h2>
<p>Acknowledgments, for a work of this type, are always insufficient
and often ungracious. Today, political and military
conditions forbid mention of some of the persons to
whom I am most indebted. Furthermore, it is unfeasible to
thank those teachers and friends who have prepared me in
years past for the present work. Nevertheless, courtesy and
candor demand that I indicate the extent of my obligation,
and tender these inadequate thanks.</p>
<p>For interviews, hospitality and other kindnesses shown
me in Western China I wish to thank Generalissimo and
Mme. Chiang K'ai-shek; Their Excellencies, Sun K'ê, Yü
Yu-jen, H. H. Kung, Wang Ch'ung-hui, Chang Chia-ngau,
T. F. Tsiang, Yeh Ch'u-tsang, Kan Nai-kuang, Ch'ên Kuo-fu,
Wang Shih-chieh, Ch'u Chia-hua, Hollington Tong, and
Ma Chao-chun; Major Generals J. L. Huang and Ch'u
Shih-ming; Bishop Paul Yu-pin; and Messrs. Foo Ping-shêng,
Chên Ming-shu, Lo Chia-lun, Edward Bing-shuey
Lee, Han Lih-wu, P. C. Kuo, Ch'ên Chih-mai, Kinn-wei
Shaw, James Y. C. Yen, Wang Shen-tsu, Shuming T. Liu, Jen
Shieh, Li Ch'in-shui, and Ma P'in-ho. Among the foreign
community, I wish to thank the American Ambassador, Mr.
Nelson Johnson, and Mr. E. F. Drumwright for their kind
reception; and to thank Mr. Tillman Durdin, Mr. Theodore
White, Mr. George Fitch, Dr. J. B. Tayler, Professor Frank
Price, and Professor and Mrs. J. B. Slocum.</p>
<p>I feel myself peculiarly fortunate in having three such
good, loyal friends as Drs. Chu Djang, Miao Chung-yi, and
Yin Pao-yü, whose kindnesses to me have continued ever
since our student days together at the Johns Hopkins.</p>
<p>Dean Shen Ch'un-lu, Mr. Tso T'ao-fên and their associates
in the National Salvation movement; Colonel Ch'in Po-k'u
of the Communist Party; Mr. Chang Peh-chuen of the Third
Party; Dr. Carson Chang of the National Socialist Party,
and other spokesmen for minority and unofficial groups
were most generous with their time and information.</p>
<p>Messrs. You Shoo-tseng, Yang Chun, Wu Hsüeh-ping,
Hawthorne Chen and others translated Chinese materials
for or with me. Save for their help, so liberally and painstakingly
rendered, this book would have been delayed for
months if not years. These gentlemen are not to be held
responsible for the selection of materials, nor for the translations
in their present form, since I have sought to check
and revise this work as far as time and my imperfect command
of written Chinese have permitted.</p>
<p>The International Peace Campaign (China Branch),
The People's Foreign Relations Association, The Chinese-American
Institute for Cultural Relations, and other institutions
in Free China were generous with their hospitality
and facilities. I owe particular thanks to the Central Bank
of China for the high courtesy shown me through the
Chief Secretary and the following gentlemen: Mr. T. T.
Wang, Chief of the Engineering Division; Mr. Ch'ên Yin-sung,
Manager, Kiating Branch; and Mr. Yang Hsia-tz'ŭ,
Manager, Chengtu Branch. The officers of the Bank went
to enormous pains to ensure my timely, safe return to
Chungking when I was ill, hurried, tardy, and in danger of
missing my prearranged bookings back to America. Special
acknowledgment must also be offered to Mr. C. C. Chi,
for his unfailing kindness in providing interviews and trips,
and to the China National Aviation Corporation for their
unusual courtesies.</p>
<p>In Hong Kong, I was assisted by Dr. Eugene Chen, Dr.
Wên Yüan-ning, Dr. Ch'en Han-seng, and Mr. Liu Yu-wan.</p>
<p>In Shanghai, Mr. T. Nakada of the Japanese consulate-general
was most helpful.</p>
<p>In Nanking, Messrs. Wên Chung-yao, Kiang Kang-hu,
Tsu Min-yi, Lin Pai-shêng, Li Shêng-wu, Hsü Liang, George
Wên, P. C. Huang, T'ang Leang-li, K. S. James Woo and
L. K. Kentwell were most hospitable. Mr. M. Kimura, of
the Japanese Embassy in Nanking, was kind and courteous.
I wish to thank these gentlemen for their friendliness to an
alien scholar who had just come from the other side of the
war.</p>
<p>In Tokyo, Messrs. Yokachiro Suma, Yoji Hirota, Kaneo
Tsuchida, and Nobuo Fujimura of the Foreign Office were
hospitable and informative.</p>
<p>Mr. Robert Kempton, Mr. George Giffen, and Dr. Louis
Wilkinson showed me great kindness on my journey.</p>
<p>In the United States, I am indebted for introductions and
advice to Dr. Hu Shih, the Chinese Ambassador; Professor
George Taylor, of the University of Washington; and Mr.
Frederick V. Field, of the American Council of the Institute
of Pacific Relations.</p>
<p>My colleagues and friends at Duke University have been
very helpful. Professors Homer Dubs and Paul H. Clyde,
my colleagues in the Far Eastern field, read the manuscript
and made invaluable suggestions; Professor Dubs' command
of Chinese has saved me from many predicaments. Professor
Robert R. Wilson has been unfailing in his encouragement,
sympathetic interest, and facilitation of my plans.</p>
<p>The Duke University Research Council has assisted me
with annual grants for the collections of documentary materials
on Chinese politics. Save for this, I have received no
financial aid or subsidy from any institution, person, or
government whatever.</p>
<p>Mr. J. C. Yang, Mr. and Mrs. R. E. Hosack, Mrs. Freda
Townsend, and Mrs. Margaret Linebarger have assisted me
with manuscripts and proof.</p>
<p>I wish to thank the Director, Dr. S. Shepard Jones, and
the staff of the World Peace Foundation for their patience,
and helpfulness during the preparation of this work for the
press. Miss Marie J. Carroll has been especially helpful.</p>
<p>All opinions and statements herein expressed are my
own, unless clearly indicated as quotation. These acknowledgments
are a record of thanks. I assume sole and complete
responsibility for the contents of this book.</p>
<p class="right">P. M. A. L.</p>
<p><i>Durham, North Carolina<br />
March 31, 1941</i></p>
<hr class="chap" />
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<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="5" summary="World Peace Foundation">
<tr><td align="left" class="bor_right_yes"><i>Board of Trustees</i><br />
<span class="smcap">George H. Blakeslee</span>, <i>President</i><br />
<span class="smcap">Frank Aydelotte</span><br />
<span class="smcap">James Phinney Baxter</span>, 3d<br />
<span class="smcap">Harvey H. Bundy</span><br />
<span class="smcap">Leonard W. Cronkhite</span><br />
<span class="smcap">Stephen Duggan</span><br />
<span class="smcap">Harry A. Garfield</span><br />
<span class="smcap">Christian A. Herter</span><br />
<span class="smcap">Bruce C. Hopper</span><br />
<span class="smcap">Manley O. Hudson</span><br />
<span class="smcap">A. Lawrence Lowell</span><br />
<span class="smcap">J. Grafton Rogers</span><br />
<span class="smcap">Charles Seymour</span><br />
<span class="smcap">John H. Williams</span><br />
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<br />
<i>General Staff</i><br />
<span class="smcap">S. Shepard Jones</span>, <i>Director</i><br />
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<td align="left">The World Peace Foundation is a
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policy.</td></tr>
</table></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<h2>CONTENTS</h2>
<div class="center">
<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="Contents">
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left"><i>Frontispiece</i>—Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3"></td><td align="right"><small>PAGE</small></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td colspan="2" align="left"><span class="smcap">Introduction</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Chinese Political Inheritance: Some Continuing Aspects</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">China at the Outbreak of War</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_6">6</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Beginning of Active Hostilities</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_11">11</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Hankow Period</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_15">15</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Chungking Period</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_19">19</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2" align="right">I.</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">The Constitution</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_21">21</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The <i>Yüeh-fa</i> of 1931</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_22">22</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Draft Permanent or Double Five Constitution</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_25">25</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Issue of Constitutional Change</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_31">31</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2" align="right">II.</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">The Political Organs of the National Government</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_41">41</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Five-Power Constitution</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_42">42</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Supreme National Defense Council</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_46">46</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The President of the National Government</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_52">52</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Council of State</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_53">53</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Executive <i>Yüan</i></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_56">56</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Military Affairs Commission</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_60">60</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Judicial, Legislative, Examination and Control <i>Yüan</i></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_65">65</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2" align="right">III.</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Consultative and Administrative Organs</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_69">69</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The People's Political Council</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_69">69</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Administrative Pattern</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_79">79</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Political Ministries</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_81">81</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Social and Cultural Agencies</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_83">83</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Economic Ministries</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_85">85</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2" align="right">IV.</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Provincial, Local, and Special-Area Government</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_98">98</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Chart on Provincial and Urban Government</td><td align="right">facing <a href="#Page_98">98</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Provinces</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_99">99</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Local Government</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_103">103</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Communist Zone</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_111">111</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Guerrilla Governments</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_116">116</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2" align="right">V.</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">The Kuomintang</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_124">124</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Party Constitutional System</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_125">125</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Party Organization</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_129">129</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Kuomintang Bid for Leadership</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_140">140</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Intra-Kuomintang Politics</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_142">142</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The New Life Movement and Other Affiliates</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_149">149</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2" align="right">VI.</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">The Communist and Minor Parties</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_159">159</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Chinese Communists: Party and Leaders</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_160">160</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Communism: Patriotism or Betrayal?</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_171">171</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The National Salvation Movement</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_175">175</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Third Party</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_178">178</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Chinese National Socialist Party</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_179">179</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Social Democrats and <i>La Jeunesse</i></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_181">181</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2" align="right">VII.</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Governing Institutions of the Japanese and Pro-Japanese</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_183">183</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Japanese Army as a Chinese Government</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_185">185</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Problem of Puppet States</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_188">188</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Provisional and Reformed Governments</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_192">192</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Reorganized National Government of Wang Ch'ing-wei</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_197">197</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2" align="right">VIII.</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Extra-Political Forces</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_211">211</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Foundations of Chinese Government</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_212">212</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Mass Education</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_214">214</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Rural Reconstruction</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_218">218</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Chinese Industrial Cooperatives</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_223">223</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Unorganized Pressure</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_234">234</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2" align="right">IX.</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Sun Yat-sen and Chiang K'ai-shek</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_239">239</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Sun Yat-sen</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_240">240</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The <i>San Min Chu I</i></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_250">250</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Chiang K'ai-shek</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_254">254</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Chinese Appraisals of Chiang</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_266">266</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Ideology of Chiang</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_269">269</a></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td colspan="2" align="left"><span class="smcap">Conclusion</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_273">273</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Chief Alternatives in China</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_274">274</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The United States in Chinese Politics</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_277">277</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3"><hr class="tb" /></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">APPENDICES</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3"></td><td align="right"><small>PAGE</small></td></tr>
<tr><td align="left" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Appendix I: Government Documents</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_283">283</a></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">A.</td><td align="left">The Government Draft of the Proposed Constitution</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_283">283</a></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">B.</td><td align="left">The System of Organization of the National Congress</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_300">300</a></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">C.</td><td align="left">Act of the Legislative <i>Yüan</i>, April 31, XXVI (1937) Governing the Election of Representatives to the National Congress</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_302">302</a></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">D.</td><td align="left">The Program of Resistance and Reconstruction</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_309">309</a></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">E.</td><td align="left">An Outline of War-time Controlment</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_313">313</a></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">F.</td><td align="left">A Chart of the Control <i>Yüan</i> from July 1937 to June 1940</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_318">318</a></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">G.</td><td align="left">Regulations Concerning the Organization of the Various Classifications of <i>Hsien</i></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_324">324</a></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">H.</td><td align="left">A Chart of Government Organization</td><td align="right">facing <a href="#Page_330">330</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="left" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Appendix II: Documents on Party Politics</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_331">331</a></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">A.</td><td align="left">A Chart on Kuomintang Organization</td><td align="right">facing <a href="#Page_331">331</a></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">B.</td><td align="left">Constitution of the <i>San Min Chu I</i> Youth Corps, Year XXVII (1938)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_331">331</a></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">C.</td><td align="left">The Duties and General Activities of the <i>San Min Chu I</i> Youth Corps (Ch'ên Ch'êng)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_340">340</a></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">D.</td><td align="left">The <i>Hsiao-tsu</i> (Small Group) Training Program</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_354">354</a></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">E.</td><td align="left">Party Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_359">359</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="left" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Appendix III: Materials on Policy</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_371">371</a></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">A.</td><td align="left">Reply to Questions (Chiang K'ai-shek)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_371">371</a></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">B.</td><td align="left">What I Mean by Action, or A Philosophy of Action (Chiang K'ai-shek)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_373">373</a></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">C.</td><td align="left">Definition of the Problems Concerning the Organization of the Various Classifications of <i>Hsien</i> (Chiang K'ai-shek)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_388">388</a></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Chart on <i>Hsien</i> Classifications</td><td align="right">facing <a href="#Page_388">388</a></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">D.</td><td align="left">A Discussion of Mao Tsê-tung's Comments on the Present State of International Relations (Ch'ên Kuo-hsin)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_403">403</a></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">E.</td><td align="left">China's Long-range Diplomatic Orientation (Wang Ch'ung-hui)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_418">418</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="left" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Glossary</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_423">423</a></td></tr>
<tr><td align="left" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Index</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_435">435</a></td></tr>
</table></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p>
<h2>INTRODUCTION</h2>
<p>The National Government of the Republic of
China, located at the auxiliary capital of Chungking,
is one of the most important governments in contemporary
world affairs. It has provided fairly effective
unification for the largest nation on earth, and has
fought a great power to a standstill.</p>
<p>The present work is an analysis of this government.
Not a biography of Chiang K'ai-shek, it is instead a
delineation of the institutions, the parties and movements,
and the armies which today determine the
Chinese destiny. Free China, mutilated as it is, is still
far more populous and complex than the Soviet Union
or Germany. Its political institutions cannot be reduced
to the terms of one man's caprice, and the personality
of Chiang—while brilliantly conspicuous—is not the
entire picture of China. Generalissimo Chiang works,
perhaps because he wishes to, certainly because he must,
within the framework of a triune organization: the National
Government, the central armies and the Kuomintang.
These institutions have developed to their present
efficacy only by means of thirty years of war, preceded
by almost thirty years more of conspiracy. They have
become the norm of contemporary China and, whatever
their particular future, significant determinants of
China's eventual development.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Chinese Political Inheritance:
Some Continuing Aspects</span></h3>
<p>Because of cultural and historical differences between
China and the West, the application of identical terms
to both is probably either wrong or meaningless.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span>
Nevertheless, Westerners can live in China, deal with
the Chinese, scrutinize their affairs, and transpose these
to such Western descriptions as may suit the purpose.
In reading of China, however, one should keep in mind
the fact that the words are English, freighted with special
meanings, and are used not by scientific choice but for
lack of others. Part of this difference can be bridged if
one recalls the salient peculiarities of China as against
the Western world.</p>
<p>No other society comparable in size, duration and
extent has ever existed; the Chinese Empire, from the
beginning of the Ch'in (221 <span class="smcap lowercase">B.C.</span>) to the end of the
Manchus (<span class="smcap lowercase">A.D.</span> 1911), remains the greatest social edifice
mankind has yet brought forth. As such, its modern
successor is everywhere stamped with archaic catholic
traits which are today both obsolescent and futuristic.
To these must be added the characteristics of China
as a special area—a cultural zone seeking national form;
fragmented economies working their way out of backwardness
in technology and helplessness in world economics;
a people in quest of government which will
give them power without enslaving them. This modern
"Chinese Republic," a Western-form state only by
diplomatic courtesy in the years succeeding 1912, has
been the widest zone of anarchy in the modern world;
the Japanese attack on its emergent institutions has
helped immeasurably to re-identify the Chinese-speaking
people and the officers who presume to govern
them.</p>
<p>To understand Chinese government in war time, one
might first check the outstanding points of old Chinese
development and their modern derivatives.</p>
<p>Pre-eminently, China has been <i>pro forma</i> Confucian
ever since the tenth century after Christ. This has
meant an ordering of classes in society based on the
ideal of scholarship and public administration, rather
than on ideals of valor, piety or acquisitiveness. By<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span>
setting the requirements of the examinations, and
through concealed but sharp discouragement of heterodoxy
or wilful originality, the governing mechanism
made of itself a vast machine of scholars which—because
its authority rested in tradition, in language, in social
usages—was able to ride out domestic revolution and
foreign invasion, and was in a position to ensure its
own perpetuation despite political or military interruption.</p>
<p>The traditions of scholastic bureaucracy working in
a pluralistic society have left the Chinese people largely
independent of the routine functioning of government.
The Western state becomes the articulation of society.
The government of old China was pseudomorphic as a
state, having only some of the functions of the Western
state, and its governing power was the residual capacity
of an organization devoted to the ends of ceremony,
exemplarization, education and the cultivation of personality.
Administration was confined chiefly to revenue
collection, flood control and defense. In the West, the
most important purposes of society are framed in
law after discussion, and are executed as policy; in
China these purposes, defined by the Confucian ideology,
were known throughout the society, with scholar-officials
as their expositors. Fulfillment was by no
means a prerogative of government alone. By contrast
with the Confucian standards, the Western states,
whether democracies or not, are capricious, despotic
and nonmoral; by Western standards, Chinese society
was unresponsive, sanctimonious and amorphous.</p>
<p>This political excellence and stability was accompanied
by economic phenomena which are, by modern
standards, less desirable. Overcrowding and a slow rate
of progress have been fairly constant features of Chinese
society since the Han. Owen Lattimore has recently
appraised the economics behind the dynastic cycle in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span>
China.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> Each community in old China was cell-like,
largely autonomous and autarkic. Hence, the increase
of wealth was sought within the cell, and not within a
larger framework of economic advance—such as commerce
or invention would provide—and the economically
predominant class (the landowners) possessed a
vested interest in overpopulation (which cheapened
agricultural labor and maintained a high, even urgent,
demand for food products). Equilibrium was reached,
and a cycle of diminishing returns initiated, when population
began to outrun the land's subsistence maximum.
This drop in returns, in the face of continued population
rise, led to peasant rebellion, distributism and
a reinauguration of the same type of state—made necessary
by the monopoly of managerial expertness (essential
to water conservancy, land wealth and the familiar
intensive cultivation) in the ideographically literate
class. Control of the richest water-conservancy region
meant the hegemony of China.</p>
<p>The impact of Western imperialism has struck China
in the past century, during the critical or revolutionary
phase of this immemorial cycle. Chinese politics took
the color of a back-country struggle. The centers of
modern power were beyond Chinese administrative
reach. The emergent Chinese state, deprived of its foci
of power in the metropolises, was promised control
thereof only when it had become an effective and complete
state—a condition largely unobtainable without
control of Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow, and the British
Crown Colony of Hong Kong.</p>
<p>In theory, the Chinese Republic was established January
1, 1912. In practice, the name <i>Republic</i> has masked
a <i>mêlée</i> of governments and power-organizations, ranging
from bandit gangs with pretentious political color to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span>
authentic regional governments administering large
areas. This culminated in the National Government
which, beginning as a conspiracy, becoming the leading
regional government, is now in the position of <i>de facto</i>
government for virtually all Free China, the Chinese
dominions, and much of the occupied area. None of
these governments has ever held an election based on
wide suffrage; none has systematically subordinated policy
to law; none has possessed a treasury, fleet or air force
worthy of a second-class power, until the present war.
Out of these unpromising materials the counter-attacking
Chinese state has arisen; only by legal formula is it
the same Republic as its predecessors; only by courtesy
is this the Year XXX (1941) of the Republic.<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p>
<p>The governmental developments of the Republican
era fall conveniently into four periods: the period of
establishment, 1911-1916; the period of <i>tuchünism</i>,
1917-1926; the rule of the National Government, 1927-1936;
the period of invasion, 1937 to the present. The
turning points between these periods are, respectively,
the fall of the Manchu Empire of China (1911), the
death of the dictator-President Yüan Shih-k'ai (1916),
the Great Revolution under Kuomintang-Communist
leadership (culminating, 1927), and the Sian affair
(December 1936) followed by full-scale invasion (July
1937).</p>
<p>The present governments of China are accordingly
the successors of a wide variety of decaying imperial administration,
experimental modernism and outright
confusion. Any change in China had to be made at the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span>
expense of the <i>haves</i>—the Western powers and Japan.
Japan, in seeking the control of China, is fighting China
and the Western powers; China, in fighting back, must
fight Japan, and behind Japan the whole structure of
imperialism. Most Chinese have abandoned hope of
surviving as a people without eventually triumphing as
a state. In the past, they absorbed conquerors whose
bases were transferred to China; today, they cannot accommodate
invaders who come as transients from an
overseas base. The Chinese war of resistance is a revolution.
It is a continuation of the Nationalist revolution,
begun against the Manchus, continued against the imperialist
powers, and now directed against the Japanese
and their Chinese associates. At the same time, this revolution
struggles to incorporate in its dynamics the drive
of an endemic peasant rebellion, Communist in its extreme
phase. Nationalist in supreme emphasis, the
revolution finds its highest expression in the articulation
of an effective state—something not known in China
for twenty-two centuries.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">China at the Outbreak of War</span></h3>
<p>Sun Yat-sen's legacy of doctrine included a program
of revolution by three stages:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(1) the military conquest of power by the Kuomintang;</p>
<p>(2) the tutelary dictatorship of the Kuomintang
while democracy was being instilled and adopted from
the bottom up; and</p>
<p>(3) constitutionalism, requiring abdication of the
Kuomintang in favor of a popularly elected government.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p>
</blockquote>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span></p>
<p>Upon coming to power in Nanking, the National
Government had begun promising a short period of tutelage
and had made various gestures in favor of experimental
popular government. A Provisional Constitution
was adopted by a <i>Kuo-min Hui-i</i> (commonly
termed, National People's Convention) in 1931,
operating under complete government supervision; a
transition instrument, self-acknowledged as such, it anticipated
a Permanent Constitution upon the accomplishment
of constitutional government in a majority
of provinces (Articles 86, 87).<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> Although the Kuomintang
has ruled parts of China for more than fifteen years,
and is by profession the party of democracy, it has not
yet relinquished power. The period of tutelage is still
legally in force.</p>
<p>In the years immediately preceding the outbreak of
war, this monopoly of governmental power by the
Kuomintang was not only an important political irritant
but also an obstacle to effective Chinese unity. Discontent
was aggravated by inelasticity of the Party. Overweighted
with petty bureaucracy, it offered too few
up-channel opportunities for potential leaders. Since
Nationalists were the Ins, Kuomintang membership
carried privileges rather than obligations. Many distinguished
and active citizens either refused to join, or
let their purely nominal membership ride along. The
Party was saved from complete decline because it included
most of the government personnel, and new
recruits to government service gave it some freshness,
vigor and inward criticism.</p>
<p>The leading difficulty of both state-building and
democratization had been overcome by the creation of
a government which was well-designed, functioning <i>de
facto</i> and able to meet most of the specialized problems
of modern administration. The regime was far from
being a crude hierarchy of soldiers and taxgatherers,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span>
but had accrued about its policy-making core the essential
staff and line services of modern rule. Inadequacies
lay not in absolute lack of species of personnel
or structure, but in the relative weakness of many key
functions. During the third decade of the Republic the
then Nanking Government, under Chiang's leadership,
gave China its first modern national government.</p>
<p>Despite this beginning, which—without the invasion—stood
a very good chance of evolving into a paternalistic
oligarchy in democratic form, such as Brazil, there
were enormous difficulties still facing genuine China-wide
government. First among these difficulties was the
question of regional autonomy—lingering vestiges of
<i>tuchünism</i>, reinforced by a vigorous provincialism.
Whole regions of China were under the merely nominal
control of the National Government.</p>
<p>The second difficulty was that of personal politics.
Modern China has had ample politics of principle. It
is a rare ideological cult, of any kind, anywhere, which
does not have its Chinese affiliates. No other nation has
known such a wide choice of doctrines, each represented
by armed forces and by definite political leadership. At
the same time, this ideological struggle was and is paralleled
by the politics of individuals and cliques. This
made the National Government function as an oligarchy
based on three patterns of control:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(1) ideological eminence, orthodoxy, appeal and
timeliness;</p>
<p>(2) military or economic control of power in the
form of soldiers or cash, the two being for the most part
interchangeable; and</p>
<p>(3) governmental incumbency.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A man like Hu Han-min could owe his importance almost
altogether to his past associations with the Party
and with Dr. Sun, to his authority as an exponent of the
<i>San Min Chu I</i>, and to his appeal to the sense of
prestige, dignity and stability on the part of other people<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span>
who did not possess such power, which was exercised in
the name of the Kuomintang and its ideology. T. V.
Soong, in money matters, or Chang Hsüeh-liang, in military
matters, were important because they had under
their immediate influence so much cash or so many
troops, the availability and mobility of which from day
to day determined their actual share of power. Lastly,
these same men possessed political authority by narrowly
lawful means, i.e., by the governmental offices
which they held.</p>
<p>Thirdly, the government was deeply out of harmony
with an overwhelming majority of college students,
much of the professional and intellectual classes, and a
broad section of the articulate farmer and labor groups.
In the pre-war years of strain, unofficial persons could
follow world fashions in ideas associated with Leftism.
Although the full Western pattern of Right, Center, and
Left was not imposed upon Chinese politics, many of
the most active publicists wrote in these terms. There
was, accordingly, a traditional China and a Leftist
China; the latter faithfully imported European concepts
and did much to change the language of Chinese political
struggle. The government—itself Left from the point
of view of the pre-existent order, yet committed to
modes of thought and policy formally little more radical
than the American New Deal—was constantly recalled
to the most cold-blooded of <i>realpolitische</i> considerations.</p>
<p>Fourthly, the student movement—in some phases a
part of the general Leftist drive—proved a constant
source of difficulty and trouble. Chinese students (both
collegiate and secondary) are self-conscious, frequently
arrogant inheritors of the Chinese tradition of rule by
<i>literati</i>. Their influence over the masses is impressive;
their patriotism, however unreflective, is ardent; and
their interest in international affairs is violent.<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span></p>
<p>Fifthly, Chinese society, accustomed to acting independently
of government, urged varied foreign policies
and sought wars. Almost every kind of organization,
from archaic guilds and secret societies to business
groups, sought to wage its own attack on Japan. Uncanalized,
counter-attacked, dammed up, these efforts
might have undone the government. Toward the end,
the government raced frenziedly with time, losing power
through unpopularity, and increasing power through
rearmament and technical preparation. The vigorous
extra-governmental pressure of a populace accustomed
to spontaneous mass action is a factor which qualifies
and will probably continue to qualify Chinese foreign
policy. It is often left out of account in Western comment
on China.</p>
<p>Sixthly, in the winter and spring of 1936-37, the
National Government was under pressure from its own
subjects to begin the negotiation of national unity, starting
with a Communist armistice and continuing with
the incorporation of as many regions as possible into the
sphere of the government; but despite such increasing
pressure, the government took no effective step in this
direction until after the kidnapping of Chiang at Sian.<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span>
As a result of this melodramatic affair, however, the
National Government revised policies which had become
traditions ten years old and agreed to an armistice
with the Communists. The Kuomintang—bearing
full responsibility for an actual emergent state—found
intra-Chinese diplomacy as perplexing as foreign.</p>
<p>Thus, at the outbreak of war, the National Government
had reached a higher level of actual political and
administrative power than its predecessors, but was faced
with grave problems. In any other country the government
would presumably have been on the verge of ruin.
Controlling only major sections of its internationally
recognized territory; faced by autonomous provinces,
half-legal military satrapies and outright warlord despotism,
all backed by vehement provincialism, great distances,
linguistic difficulties and mutual geographical
isolation; unpopular with its own student, intellectual
and professional elites; ridden by personal politics; just
emerging from a ten years' civil war—with these handicaps,
a second-rate power undertook to challenge the
greatest power of Asia to an irreversibly fateful war.
The Chinese went further: they sought in the war not
only victory, but unity, democracy and prosperity as
well! This background of purpose makes China's internal
politics richly meaningful in relation to the
world scene.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Beginning of Active Hostilities</span></h3>
<p>After nearly six years of military and political conflict,
a full quasi-war<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> broke out with the episode at Loukouchiao<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span>
on the night of July 7-8, 1937. It was the evident
intention of the Japanese to end an unsatisfactory
state of affairs (i.e., Chinese control) in that area once
and for all, although they were perfectly willing to express
temporary amity and <i>ad interim</i> non-aggression
toward what was left of China. The National Government,
after a few days of uncertainty, began real preparations
for war. Since the government's appeasement policy
had accustomed many to think of resistance in terms
of the Left, there was an enormous inflation of Leftist
sentiment, not deflated for about eighteen months.</p>
<p>While new mass organizations were formed, the Chinese
military command framed a plan for a three-stage
war:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(1) a period of resistance by heavy regular forces
fighting positionally;</p>
<p>(2) a period of stalemate wherein enemy forces, immobilized
by opposing regular armies, found lines of
communication, supplies and business harassed by guerrillas
and saboteurs;</p>
<p>(3) a period of counter-attack in which the Chinese,
having prepared themselves technologically during the
stalemate and having weakened the enemy by a test of
endurance, should drive the Japanese back into the sea.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The strategy of this type of war was based upon the
plan of retreating in space in order to advance in time—that
is, to yield area slowly and purposefully, without
too great cost to oneself, in order to outlast the enemy
and reach victory. In thus purchasing time by the mile,
the Chinese could not afford to yield intact cities, factories,
communications, mines, docks, warehouses and
the other goods of business; such cessions would only
profit Japan: hence <i>the scorched earth</i> policy. The
strategy was obviously suited to a country rich in territory
and population, but poor in <i>matériel</i>. It not only
made both regulars and guerrillas effective against Japan
but made each truly reliant upon the other. Without<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span>
the Nationalist regular armies, who in attempting to
suppress the Communists had done almost everything
which the Japanese now had to do—guarding railroads,
pacifying disaffected and hostile rural areas, promoting
industries and watching agitation—the Japanese forces
might disperse enough to enable Japan to patrol and
pacify enough of China to pay for the occupation.
Chiang had to hold the Japanese together, immobilize
large bodies of their troops, keep their war expenses up,
and wait for the time to counter-attack. Meanwhile the
guerrillas, together with the Communist veterans, were
to prevent the Japanese from settling down, to worry
them with agitation, to sabotage their economic efforts
and to wear them out for Chiang's <i>révanche</i>.</p>
<p>One of the first governmental changes in wartime was
the re-institution of an effective propaganda service under
the Political Department of the Military Affairs
Commission. In this Department, many of China's most
active controversialists, censored or exiled for years,
found officially sanctioned scope for their energies.
Formal unity came slowly. Although Shanghai was attacked
on August 13, 1937, it was not until September
10 following that a fairly definitive arrangement was
reached in regard to the Communist-occupied zone in
the Northwest.</p>
<p>The settlement transformed a pre-existing armistice
into an intranational alliance; technically it amounted
to submission by the Communists and their incorporation
into the national government and armies. The area
of the Chinese Soviet Republic assumed the name
Special Regional Government of the Chinese Republic
(<i>Chunghua Min-kuo T'ê-ch'ü Chêng-fu</i>), which it had
been using informally for months; the Chinese Red
Army became the Eighth Route Army (<i>Pa-lu-chün</i>);
and the Chinese Communist Party accepted the <i>San Min
Chu I</i> as the constitutional state ideology of China,
abandoning immediate measures of class war and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span>
expropriation. The settlement was in the form of a Communist
reply to Kuomintang terms offered in February
1937 and the reply of the Generalissimo as Chief of
the Kuomintang to the Communist declaration.<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p>
<p>For the first few months the war kept its quasi-European
pattern. The greater part of the fighting was
done in the Shanghai area, while Japanese forces proceeded
down from North China. The Japanese still
had some expectation of localizing the North China
and the Shanghai conflicts. At most, they expected the
war to be a short one, not extending beyond the capture
of Nanking. Occupation of the capital was counted on
for the ruin of the central government, the end of
Chiang and the reversion of China to a condition of
malleable anarchy.</p>
<p>December 1937 was the blackest month of the war for
the Chinese. The Japanese advanced toward Nanking,
with Chinese resistance crumbling; part of the armies
withdrew in good order, but on occasion there were
hopeless, panicky routs. To this month the Japanese
looked for victory, and were so confident that they
formed the pro-Japanese Provisional Government of the
Republic of China, in Peking on December 11.<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> Four
days later the Japanese forces entered Nanking, and the
ensuing fortnight set the record for atrocity in the
modern world. The Japanese forces were preoccupied
with their own disorder. The National Government<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span>
escaped up-river to Hankow, where it promptly began
to function under the three-headquarters plan: some
offices at Hankow, some at Changsha and some at
Chungking. The presence of the foreign affairs, propaganda,
and military agencies at Hankow made this the
practical capital of China, although Nanking was and is
the constitutional capital.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Hankow Period</span></h3>
<p>The greatest part of the year XXVII (1938) was spent
in continuation of slow retreat and heavy frontal resistance.
Until October communications with the outside
world were wide open through the railroad to
Canton. Heavy supplies could arrive by the shipload.
Hundreds of Japanese air attacks on the railroad disrupted
schedules but never led to serious suspension of
service. Leftist influence became overwhelming in Hankow.
That city had been the capital of the ill-fated
Wu-han Kuomintang-Communist government, which
fell with the secession of Chiang to Nanking eleven
years before; its connotations still lingered. Even conservative
Kuomintang leaders, who had gone to lengths
of appeasement at which Neville Chamberlain would
have blanched, tried to talk like Negrin or Alvarez del
Vayo.</p>
<p>In January 1938, two organizations were formed
which, along with the Communist zone in the Northwest,
were to be among the most active agencies of guerrilla
leadership. The first of these was the New Fourth
Army (<i>Hsin-ssŭ-chün</i>), which emerged in the area just
south of the Japanese forces at the Yangtze mouth. It
was composed of peasant and student militia, of regular
army fragments, and of some Kuomintang volunteers,
under the leadership of Communist remnants which
had hidden away, banditti-fashion, when the Red Army
trekked Northwest. Its emergence was recognized by
legal order of the National Military Affairs<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span>
Commission.<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> The other organization was the Provisional Executive
Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border
Region (<i>Chin-ch'a-chi Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih Hsing-chêng
Wei-yüan-hui</i>), established by a conference at Fup'ing,
January 8-15, and authorized by central government
mandate. This agency also sprang from Leftist organizations—in
this case, a bold, determined, student-peasant
guerrilla army—which had first developed despite government
opposition. It was designed to provide an
emergency guerrilla government for those portions of
the three provinces which were under occupation by
the Japanese. Unoccupied portions of the provinces
retained their existing administrations.</p>
<p>In the next month, February 1938, there was established
an agency of supreme importance, the Supreme
National Defense Council.<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> This replaced the Central
Political Council,<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> which had exercised routine functions
of the Party's sovereign control over the government;
like its predecessor, the Supreme National Defense
Council tended to act as the supreme governmental
organ, although it was technically a Party organ.
The Council provided and provides a unified civilian-military
control for the duration of the war; but the
Kuomintang shares its power with other groups only
in the consultative organs of state, not in the executive.</p>
<p>March 1938 followed with another political step
forward—the Emergency Session of the Kuomintang<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span>
Party Congress. The Party Congress had the functions
of a special constituent assembly in part, and in part
those of a restricted parliament; in this session two
further actions were taken. The first was the adoption
of the momentous Program of National Resistance and
Reconstruction (<i>K'ang-chan Chien-kuo Kang-ling</i>),<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a>
which provides a plan for the war and commits the
Kuomintang and the National Government to a policy
of victory, of industrialization, and of economic reform
as a means to war.</p>
<p>The second step taken by this important Congress
was the provision for a People's Political Council (<i>Kuo-min
Ts'an-chêng Hui</i>, also translatable as People's Advisory
Political Council). This was the first breach in
the Kuomintang monopoly of government since the establishment
of the Party dictatorship.<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> The government,
through the constitutional fiction of appointing
members as representative individuals, provided a
rough, approximate, but fair representation of the active
political forces in China.</p>
<p>While the Emergency Session of the Party Congress
took these steps for further national defense, the Japanese
were collecting a coterie of ex-politicians, friends
of Japan, and old men to serve as the Reformed Government
of the Republic of China at Nanking. They
disregarded the anomaly of having two "Chinese" national
governments—the Provisional Government in Peiping
being undisturbed by these measures—and continued
to seek the division of China, even on the level
of the pro-Japanese States. The Reformed Government
was established on March 27, 1938.</p>
<p>The autumn of 1938 brought another phase of discouragement.
Relying on the prestige of British power<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span>
and the nearness of Hong Kong, the Chinese were not
watchful in the Canton area. The Japanese landed almost
unopposed. Chinese negligence, corruption, and
a little treachery worked in their favor. The landing
forces performed almost superhuman feats of endurance
in forced marches overland; on several occasions Japanese
advance troops ran so far ahead of schedule that
Japanese warplanes, thinking them disguised Chinese,
strafed them!<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> Canton fell without a major battle.
Hankow, the great radical capital, scene of the 1926-27
Leftist upsurge and of the anti-Fascist enthusiasm of
1938, was entered by the Imperial Japanese army, and
the entire Wu-han area was lost to China.</p>
<p>Not only was the Hankow period ended. By breaking
the last rail connection of the Chinese government and
the outside world, and by driving the Chinese leadership
into the remote interior, Japan shut off the ready
play of international influence on domestic Chinese
politics. Foreign visitors became more rare. The government,
moving to the mountain fastnesses of Szechuan,
found a home on the great Gibraltar-like promontory
of Chungking city, tiered along cliffs above
the Yangtze and Kialing rivers. The last withdrawal
was a final test of strength. Hankow, six hundred miles
up-river, was commercially, architecturally, and politically
a coastal city. It was still an outpost of world
imperialism and of modern technology. With the next
remove the Chinese government found itself beyond
tangible Western influence; for the first time since 1860
the capital was out of the military reach of Western<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span>
powers, and in a city which had only slight traces of
Western influence.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Chungking Period</span></h3>
<p>The Chungking period began with the transfer of further
government offices to the West, to join President
Lin Shên, and marks a distinct phase in the process of
government-building in China. As the Chungking regime,
the National Government took new forms of
temper and character. Government, Kuomintang, Communists—all
were in the position of an inner-Asiatic
state, without convenient access to the sea, seeking to
fight an oceanic nation whose trade reached every port
in the world. Foreign imperialism could no longer be
blamed for the demoralizations of the hour; foreign aid
was too tenuous and remote to qualify the inner play of
Chinese political growth. Politically, the Chinese had
to stand on their own feet.</p>
<p>The second phase of the war had begun. Chinese
armies stood front-to-front against the Japanese, and
kept hundreds of thousands of invading troops immobilized.
The guerrillas got to work. Most of all,
the machinery of modernization began functioning; all
the programs had been completed, and the task was
clear. The international developments of the time—the
first American loan, $25,000,000 in 1938; the brief Manchoukuo-Outer
Mongol war of 1939, wherein Japan and
Russia fought each other through their respective dependencies;
even the outbreak of the European war—were
remote from this far inland scene. Military events
had some effect, but nothing comparable to the Japanese
victories at Shanghai, Nanking, Canton, and Hankow
recurred. The Japanese invaded Kwangsi in the
fall of 1939; they left a year later, when their drive into
French Indo-China made it unnecessary to cut those
colonies off from China. In South Hunan the Japanese
suffered catastrophically when they advanced boldly and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span>
contemptuously into non-modern areas and were encircled
by the Chinese. Even the flight and treason of
Wang Ch'ing-wei at the year's end of 1938, and his open
cooperation with Japan in March 1940, did not change
the general picture. The emphasis was no longer on
sudden changes, on personality, on dramatic shifts of
power. It was on construction—on the development of
a modern, democratic, technically equipped Chinese
state out of the vast resources of China's hinterland.
The China which was to win had to be created before it
could counter-attack.<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a></p>
<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Lattimore, Owen, <i>Inner Asian Frontiers of China</i>, New York, 1940,
p. 45 and <i>passim</i>. The author, a noted geographer, presents significant
new analyses of the interconnections of Chinese economics and culture.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Detailed descriptions of the political history of the period are to
be found, <i>inter alia</i>, in Holcombe, Arthur N., <i>The Chinese Revolution</i>,
Cambridge, 1930; MacNair, Harley F., <i>China in Revolution</i>, Chicago,
1931; and, most popularly, Escarra, Jean, <i>China Then and Now</i>, Peiping,
1940. Descriptions of the government are Wu Chih-fang, <i>Chinese Government
and Politics</i>, Shanghai, 1934; Lum Kalfred Dip, <i>Chinese Government</i>,
Shanghai, 1934; and Linebarger, Paul M. A., <i>Government in
Republican China</i>, New York and London, 1938.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> This is given in the <i>Chien Kuo Ta Kang</i> (Outline of National Reconstruction),
of April 12, XIII (1924), particularly points 3, 5, 6, 7, and
23. Translations are to be found in Hsü, Leonard Shihlien, <i>Sun Yat-sen:
His Political and Social Ideals</i>, Los Angeles, 1933, and Wu Chih-fang,
work cited, p. 430 <i>ff.</i></p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> For the text of this constitution, see Wu Chih-fang, cited, p. 430 <i>ff.</i></p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> In particular, see Freyn, Hubert, <i>Prelude to War: The Chinese
Student Rebellion of 1935-1936</i>, Shanghai, 1939. Reference to contemporary
Left-liberal and Left publications in Europe and America
will disclose numerous sympathetic eyewitness accounts of the troubles
and the fortitude of the students. Some of these accounts now possess
a wry, inadvertent humor in their characterization of Chiang as a
willing accomplice of Japan.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> For the Generalissimo's own diary of the kidnapping, together
with a narrative by his wife, see Chiang, Mme. Mayling Soong, <i>Sian:
A Coup d'Etat</i>, bound with Chiang K'ai-shek, <i>A Fortnight in Sian:
Extracts from a Diary</i>, Shanghai, 1938. The Chinese edition of this appeared
as Chiang Wei-yüan-chang [Chairman Chiang], <i>Hsi-an Pan
Yüeh-chi</i> [A Fortnight's Diary from Sian], Shanghai, XXVI (1937). A
first-hand Western account is Bertram, James M., <i>First Act in China</i>,
New York, 1938. Edgar Snow, in <i>Red Star over China</i>, New York, 1938,
p. 395 <i>ff.</i>, gives an account sympathetic to the Left; Harold Isaacs, in
<i>The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution</i>, London, 1938, p. 445 <i>ff.</i>, presents
a penetrating Trotskyist critique. An excellent factual summary
of this crucial year, written by a well-known writer who visited the
scene at first hand, is to be found in Bisson, T. A., <i>Japan in China</i>,
New York, 1938.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> "War" used to mean the reciprocal application of violence by public,
armed bodies; private and informal homicide was termed "murder"
or was otherwise clearly designated. Today these distinctions are less
clear. The author must enter a <i>caveat lector</i>: no term is employed in
other than a general (i.e., literary) meaning, except upon special notice.
The Sino-Japanese hostilities differ greatly from war in several interesting
but technical respects; they are a very special Japanese invention.
Yet it would be cumbersome to refer to Chinese changes in Conflict-time,
or to speak meticulously of armies engaged in an Incident.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> See Council of International Affairs, <i>The Chinese Year Book,
1938-39</i> [Hong Kong], 1939; article by Chu Chia-hua, "Consolidation of
Democracy in China," Chapter IV; "Reconciliation with the Communists,"
p. 339-40. This Council is an informal and extra-legal offshoot
of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; accordingly the
annual, rich in official materials, provides insufficient data on Communist,
guerrilla, and unofficial activities. See also, Epstein, I., <i>The
People's War</i> [Shanghai], 1939, p. 88 <i>ff.</i>, for an excellent, clear account
of this period.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> See below, p. <a href="#Page_193">193</a>. See also Taylor, George E., <i>The Struggle for
North China</i>, New York, 1940, in the Inquiry Series of the Institute of
Pacific Relations.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> See Epstein, I., work cited, p. 235 <i>ff.</i> and <i>The Chinese Year Book
1938-39</i>, cited, article by the late P. C. Nyi, "Plans for Political and Economic
Hegemony in China"; this includes a full administrative description
of the Border Region, p. 254 <i>ff.</i> The North China zone is arbitrarily
translated "Border Region," to distinguish it from the quondam
Chinese Soviet Republic in the Northwest, translated as "Frontier
Area."</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> See below, p. <a href="#Page_46">46</a>.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> See chart on p. <a href="#Page_47">47</a>. Descriptions of the pre-war Central Political
Council are to be found in the texts cited on p. 5, n. 2, and in the
first two issues of <i>The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36</i> and <i>1936-37</i>, Shanghai,
<i>passim</i>.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> See Appendix, p. <a href="#Page_309">309</a>.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> See below, p. <a href="#Page_69">69</a>. This is to be distinguished from the various
constitutional conventions, the proposed national congress (<i>kuo-min
ta-hui</i>) which exists only in contemplation of the constitutional drafters,
and the Kuomintang Party Congress.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> An engrossing first-hand account of this is to be found in Hino,
Ashihei, <i>Sea and Soldiers</i>, Tokyo, 1940. This, with its three companion
volumes, <i>Mud and Soldiers</i>, <i>Flower and Soldiers</i>, and <i>Barley and
Soldiers</i>, Tokyo, 1939 and 1940, forms an eloquent, humane, sensitive
narrative of a young Japanese writer serving with the Imperial forces
in China. The series ranks with the great narratives of the European
war of 1914-18, and expresses the Japanolatrist devoutness, the naïveté,
and bewildering courage of much of the Japanese infantry, but does so
through the medium of a literary craftsmanship rare in any army.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> The literature of the war and of the struggles of Free China has
already reached an enormous extent. The present work makes no attempt
to present a step-by-step account of the interplay of personal
politics, the progress of the armies, or to provide a first-hand personal
account. Observers other than the author have presented these topics
exceedingly well. A few of the outstanding works may be mentioned,
however; a Shanghai press line usually signifies that the book was
reprinted there from a British or North American edition. Epstein, I.,
<i>The People's War</i>, London, 1939, is a spirited, detailed account of
development down to the spring of 1939, particularly useful for the
New Fourth Army and the Border Region. Among accounts of the
war are Bertram, J. M., <i>Unconquered</i>, New York, 1939; Oliver, Frank,
<i>Special Undeclared War</i>, London, 1939, containing interesting accounts,
in particular, of Japanese military and political behavior in China.
Andersson, J. G., <i>China Fights for the World</i> [Shanghai], 1939; Utley,
Freda, <i>China at War</i> [Shanghai], 1939, a significant personal account
with special interest for the Hankow period; Mowrer, Edgar, <i>Mowrer in
China</i>, Harmondsworth (England), 1938, published in America as
<i>The Dragon Wakes</i>, New York, 1939; Booker, Edna Lee, <i>News Is My
Job</i> [Shanghai], 1940, a reminiscent anecdotage; Lady Hosie, <i>Brave New
China</i>, [Shanghai], n.d., a far more informed work than most of the
autobiographical accounts, by the daughter and widow of two British
Orientalists, herself a distinguished literary writer on China. On the
North China situation, four popular works stand out: Snow, Edgar,
<i>Red Star Over China</i>, New York, 1938, the great "scoop" on the Communists;
and three other books based on first-hand reconnaissance:
Bisson, T. A., work cited above; Hanson, Haldore, "<i>Humane Endeavour</i>"
[Shanghai], n.d.; and Carlson, Evans Fordyce, <i>Twin Stars of
China</i>, New York, 1940, the work of the U. S. Marine Corps Observer in
the guerrilla area, unique in its value as professional military interpretation.
Gunther, John, <i>Inside Asia</i>, New York, 1939, contains much of
great interest. Very special viewpoints are represented in the account
of a National-Socialist German observer, Urach, Fürst A., <i>Ostasien,
Kampf um das Kommende Grossreich</i>, Berlin, 1940; the commentary
of two British poets, Auden, W. H., and Isherwood, Christopher,
<i>Journey to a War</i>, New York, 1939; and the reportage of a distinguished
Soviet fellow-traveller, Strong, Anna Louise, <i>One-Fifth of Mankind</i>,
New York, 1938.</p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span></p>
<h2><span class="smcap">Chapter I</span><br />
THE CONSTITUTION</h2>
<p>The constitutional system, basic in most Western
states, plays a peculiar, subordinate role in China.
Consideration of the issue of constitutionalism high-lights
the most practical aspects of the issues of full
democracy. Although the purely legal aspects of constitutional
development are still unimportant in the internal
power politics of China, further constitutional
development involves a very real shift in the domestic
balance of power. The fullness of national unity, and
therefore the effectiveness of resistance against Japan,
depend in part on the successful solution or compromise
of the problems of constitutionalism.</p>
<p>Ever since the beginnings of political modernization
in China, demands for constitutional government have
included a written constitution as an imperative prerequisite.
The formidable Empress Dowager was
troubled in her last days by the Imperial constitution,
a rather unimaginative plagiarism of the Japanese Constitution
of 1889. Since the Republic began in 1912,
China has continued constitutional drafting, amendment,
replacement, and suppression; many of these
constitutions have gone into legal effect. Law being
what it was, practical politics flowed on untroubled.<a name="FNanchor_1_17" id="FNanchor_1_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_17" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span>
Only with the establishment of the National Government
at Nanking did constitutional structure and actual
government develop similarities.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The</span> <i>Yüeh Fa</i>
<span class="smcap">of 1931</span></h3>
<p>In 1931, after three years' operation under an Organic
Law, the National Government adopted the <i>Yüeh
Fa</i> (Provisional Constitution),<a name="FNanchor_2_18" id="FNanchor_2_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_18" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> designed to cover the
period between the first stage of the revolution, <i>military
conquest</i>, and the final one of <i>constitutional government</i>.
This intermediate period was formally labelled
the stage of <i>political tutelage</i>, although in fact the military
unification of the country continued. The Provisional
Constitution, designed for five years' use, has
continued in force to the present (March 1941). It
possesses the merit of attempting to make actual practice
and constitutional form correspond. Grandiloquent,
unenforceable provisions concerning elections are omitted,
and full exercise of the powers of sovereignty are
frankly entrusted to the tutelary Party, the Kuomintang.
Such a constitution, formally making the Kuomintang
different from and higher than any other party
in China—and, for all that, in the world, since the Fascist,
National Socialist, and Communist parties are not formally
the constitutional superiors of their respective governments—and
giving the Party unrestricted authority,
has provided China with government realistic if not
libertarian.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span></p>
<p>The constitutional basis of the present Party-dictatorship
in China is well summarized by the distinguished
constitutional commentator, Dr. Wang Shih-chieh:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>According to Sun Chung-shan's<a name="FNanchor_3_19" id="FNanchor_3_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_19" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> <i>Chien-kuo Ta-kang</i>
[Outlines of National Reconstruction], China should pass
through a period of political tutelage under the Chinese
Kuomintang,<a name="FNanchor_4_20" id="FNanchor_4_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_20" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> before the stage of constitutional government
be reached. The National Government is merely an organization
through which a true republic may be formed. Hence,
in order to demonstrate the structure of the National Government
clearly, we must first understand the meaning of
<i>tang chih</i> [party government].</p>
<p>"Party government," so-called, signifies that the whole
system of government is under the control or dictatorship
of one political party only. The only difference between
party government and dictatorship is that the former is
under the dictatorship of an entire political party, while
the latter is under that of a single person. Party government
is of course different from democracy, inasmuch as
with democracy, all policies are to be decided by the entire
body of citizens, while with party government, policies are
to be decided by all the members of the particular party
only. In other words, the entire party as one man can exercise
political dictatorship, without taking into consideration
the opinions of those who are not the members of
the party. Any resolution passed by that party is considered
a law not only in fact, but sometimes even in name; moreover,
the party may cancel or change a law by a resolution
passed in a meeting.</p>
<p>The above-mentioned points are phenomena common to
countries under party governments.</p>
<p>After the Chinese Kuomintang has come into power, the
system of party government is not only a fact, but even
prescribed in laws. The <i>Laws Governing the System of
Organization of the National Government of the Republic
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span>of China</i> promulgated for the first time on July 1, Year
XIV (1925) were originally formulated by the Political
Council of the Chinese Kuomintang. Article I in this code
of laws provided: "The National Government discharges
all the political affairs of the entire country, under the
direction and superintendency of the Chinese Kuomintang."
The said code has been constantly amended since its first
promulgation, but this article has always remained unchanged.
By the summer of Year XVII (1928), when the
successful Northern Expedition undertaken by the National
Revolutionary Army unified China under one government,
the period of political tutelage of the Chinese Kuomintang
began with the formulation and promulgation of
the <i>Outlines of Political Tutelage</i> on October 3, Year XVII
(1928). Article I of the said "Outlines" provided: "During
the period of political tutelage of the Republic of
China, the National Party Congress of the Chinese Kuomintang
will take the place of the National Convention to
lead the people and enforce all policies." By the beginning
of June, in Year XX (1931), when the <i>Provisional Constitution</i>
for the period of political tutelage was promulgated,
the <i>Outlines of Political Tutelage</i> were again formed into
a part of the <i>Provisional Constitution</i>, thereby giving party
government a constitutional recognition. Besides the <i>Outlines
of Political Tutelage</i>, Article 72 ("The National
Government [Council of State] has a President and a certain
number of state councillors, appointed by the Central
Executive Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang."), and
Article 58 ("The Central Executive Committee of the
Chinese Kuomintang is vested with the power of interpreting
this Provisional Constitution.") of the <i>Provisional
Constitution</i>, and Article 10 ("The National Government
has a President, twenty-four to thirty-six state councillors, a
President and a Vice-President of every <i>Yüan</i>, appointed
by the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang."),
and Article 15 ("Before the promulgation of
the Constitution, the Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Examination
and Control <i>Yüan</i> will each be responsible to the
Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang.")
of the <i>Laws Governing the System of Organization
of the National Government</i> (December 30, Year XX
[1931]) now being enforced, form the legal basis for party
government.<a name="FNanchor_5_21" id="FNanchor_5_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_21" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p></blockquote>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span></p>
<p>Under Kuomintang trusteeship, demands have been
heard within and without the Party, for the promised
abdication of the Party and for the initiation of popular
government. Since the Kuomintang, unlike European
one-party groups, established itself only for the formal
purpose of democratic training, and was pledged to
tolerate multi-party government as soon as possible, the
continued monopoly of power was a frustration of the
Party ideology and programs. The frustration was serious;
involving much loss of popular sympathy for the
government, this and appeasement rather demoralized
the Party in the years preceding the invasion.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Draft Permanent or Double Five Constitution</span></h3>
<p>The Legislative <i>Yüan</i> brought forth on May 5, 1936
(in Chinese chronology, 5/5/XXV, or double-five
twenty-five), the celebrated <i>Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an</i> (Draft
Permanent Constitution), which was promptly dubbed
the Double Five Constitution. Ever since its first
promulgation, this document has formed the center of
all Chinese constitutional debate, and—with very minor
modifications—still stands as the official proposal for a
permanent constitution, awaiting ratification by the
<i>Kuo-min Ta-hui</i> (National [Constituent] Congress),
when and if that long-postponed body ever convenes.<a name="FNanchor_6_22" id="FNanchor_6_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_22" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>
The Draft Constitution is the joint work of many outstanding
legal scholars. A product of collective research<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span>
and study, it thereby resembles collective private codification
of municipal and international law in the West
more than it does the creation of a deliberative assembly.
The celebrated Chinese jurist, Dr. John C. H.
Wu, prepared the first informal draft,<a name="FNanchor_7_23" id="FNanchor_7_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_23" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> and the 5/5/XXV
version represents the fourth draft of the Legislative
<i>Yüan</i>. The preparation of the various drafts has not,
from the scholastic point of view, been secretive or
private; but broad popular participation has neither
been offered nor solicited.</p>
<p>The Constitution consists of eight Chapters, comprising
one hundred and forty-seven articles. Chapter I
defines the Chinese state as "a San Min Chu I Republic"
(<i>Art.</i> 1), declares sovereignty to be "vested in the whole
body of its citizens" (<i>Art.</i> 2), defines the territories of
the republic, specifies racial equality for the "races of
the Republic of China," designates the national flag,
and declares Nanking to be the capital. Chapter II
covers, in nineteen very specific articles, the entire field
of private rights and of the civic privileges of individuals.
Most specifications carry the qualification, "in
accordance with law" or "except in accordance with
law." Since law is defined further in the Constitution
as "that which has been passed by the Legislative <i>Yüan</i>
and promulgated by the President," the qualification<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span>
impresses many persons as sinister rather than encouraging.
Except for this point, the specific constitutional
guarantees exceed in number and specificity those of
almost any other modern constitution.</p>
<p>The <i>Kuo-min Ta-hui</i> (either "National Congress" or
"People's Congress") is the subject of Chapter III. This
body has a function unlike that of any Western agency;
the nearest equivalent is the National Assembly of the
Third French Republic. This Congress is an electoral
and constituent body with fundamental legislative
powers. It is not intended to usurp the functions of the
Legislative <i>Yüan</i> by fulfilling the role of a United States
Congress, French Deputies and Senate, or a British Parliament.
Meeting once every three years for a one-month
session, it will be manifestly unable to act as a routine
Western-type legislature.</p>
<p>The Central Government is the topic of the fourth
Chapter. The first section of the Chapter describes the
Presidency; the remaining five, the five <i>Yüan</i>. This applies
the five-fold separation of powers. Sun Yat-sen
held that a three-fold separation of powers, as known in
the West and applied to American government, was
efficacious; he also considered that the Imperial Chinese
separation of powers (an implicit one only) was also
desirable. The West had executive, legislative, judicial;
old China combined these three into the governing
power, and joined thereto the examinative power and
the <i>chien-ch'a</i><a name="FNanchor_8_24" id="FNanchor_8_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_24" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> power. (The <i>chien-ch'a</i> power involved
the functions of the traditional Chinese censorate; overt
and active expressions are found in auditing and in the
lodgment of impeachment charges. The term is fundamentally
untranslatable, but if the tribunician connotations
of <i>Censor</i> or the emergency meaning of <i>Control</i> be
recalled, either of these terms will serve.) Sun Yat-sen<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span>
combined the Western and the old-Chinese separations,
developing a theory of the five powers. The Draft Constitution,
like its two working predecessors, is a five-power
constitution, with five great <i>Yüan</i> (Boards, Presidencies,
or Courts), each headed by a <i>Yüan-chang</i> (<i>Yüan</i>
President). The fourth Chapter, by including the
President and all five <i>Yüan</i>, almost covers the full reach
of Chinese government.</p>
<p>This Chapter contemplates the creation of a strong
President. In the Organic Law of 1928, the five Presidents
of the <i>Yüan</i> were relatively less strong, and the
Chairman of the <i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui</i> (National
Government Council; or, Council of State) was
the key figure in the government. Most of this time,
Chiang himself was Chairman. In the 1931 Provisional
Constitution, now in force, the Chairman of the National
Government—termed President by courtesy—is
an officer comparable to the President of the Third
French Republic; the President of the Executive <i>Yüan</i>
is a more active officer: Chiang K'ai-shek is President of
the Executive <i>Yüan</i>. The new President, under the
Draft Constitution, is one of the world's most powerful
officers. Holding office for six years, eligible for re-election,
commander of all armed forces, declarer of war,
negotiator of peace, treaty-maker, chief appointing and
removing officer of the state, holder of an emergency
power greater than that conveyed by Article 48 of the
German Weimar Constitution, and superior to the executive,
legislative, judicial, examinative and control
branches of the government—such a President is fully
responsible to the triennial People's Congress, and to
that only! Since the proposed President may be recalled
at any time by the People's Congress, he is in that respect
similar to parliamentary chiefs of state.<a name="FNanchor_9_25" id="FNanchor_9_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_25" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span></p>
<p>The President of the Executive <i>Yüan</i>, together with
his subordinates, is to be appointed and removed by
the President of the Republic. The <i>Yüan</i> includes
Cabinet Ministers—appointed to their posts from among
a special group of Executive Members of the <i>Yüan</i>,
thereby providing a simple, rational equivalent of Cabinet
and Privy Council, as in Japan or (less similarly)
in Great Britain.</p>
<p>The Legislative <i>Yüan</i> is an interesting semi-cameral
legislative body, which seeks to embody the better
features of legislative research organs and of representative
bodies. The Judicial <i>Yüan</i> rationalizes the structure
and administration of courts and of judicial process.</p>
<p>The Control [or Censor] <i>Yüan</i> is, like the Legislative
<i>Yüan</i>, a quasi-cameral body, with indirect election of
members by the People's Congress from territorial electorates.
Its functions are audit, inquiry, and impeachment,
with such ancillary powers as practice to date has
already indicated.<a name="FNanchor_10_26" id="FNanchor_10_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_26" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p>
<p>Chapter V of the Draft Permanent Constitution deals
with local government. The institutions of provincial
government are wittingly minimized, because of recent
trouble with provincial satrapies and the dangerously
centrifugal effect of provincial autonomism. In contrast
to this, government at the district (<i>hsien</i>) level is designed
in strict accordance with the realities of twenty-odd
centuries' experience. It is probable that no other
constitution in the world provides for such careful
guarantee of district, county, canton, or <i>Kreis</i> autonomy.
The old Imperial Chinese system was a loose pseudo-centralized
federation of two thousand near-autarkic and
near-autonomous commonwealths; the Draft Constitution
attempts to reinstitute (at the political level) this
vigorous cooperative independence of the <i>hsien</i>. The
<i>hsien</i> meeting, extrapolitical, unsystematic, and occasional
in the past, is made the foundation for the new<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span>
legal structure. (These proposed reforms are now being
anticipated under the Provisional Constitution and
current statutory changes.<a name="FNanchor_11_27" id="FNanchor_11_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_27" class="fnanchor">[11]</a>)</p>
<p>Chapter VI provides that the economic system shall
rest on Sun Yat-sen's principle of <i>min shêng</i> (<i>q.v.</i>, below).
Willing to apply whatever worked best, Sun himself
had no theoretical objections to capitalism, communism,
state socialism, or any other economic doctrine.
Hence, proletarian ownership of the means of
production is not guaranteed; yet state ownership is not
restricted, and is specifically required in the case of "all
public utilities and enterprises of a monopolistic nature"
(<i>Art.</i> 123). Henry George's influence on Sun is
shown by mandatory taxation of unearned increment
(<i>Art.</i> 119). Room for free future adaptation from corporative
economic techniques successful in the outside
world is assured (<i>Art.</i> 125): "Labor and capital shall, in
accordance with the principles of mutual help and cooperation,
develop together productive enterprises." It
is likely that any imaginable economic system would
be constitutional on this basis, provided that it was initiated
by due legal procedure and without hardships
irresponsibly imposed.</p>
<p>Chapter VII, on Education, opens: "The educational
aim of the Republic of China shall be to develop a national
spirit, to cultivate a national morality, to train
the people for self-government and to increase their
ability to earn a livelihood, and thereby to build up a
sound and healthy body of citizens" (<i>Art.</i> 131), and continues,
"Every citizen of the Republic of China shall
have an equal opportunity to receive education" (<i>Art.</i>
132). State, secular control of educational policy is
assured. Articles 134 and 135 provide for tuition-free
elementary education for children and free elementary
education for previously non-privileged adults. (The
constitutional guarantee concerning tuition is indicative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span>
of the scholastic traditions of the Chinese, of the modern
educational revolution, and is reminiscent of <i>Art.</i> 12
of the 1931 Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic:
"The Soviet Government in China shall guarantee
to all workers, peasants, and the toiling masses the right
to education. The Soviet Government will, as far as
possible, begin at once to introduce free universal education.")<a name="FNanchor_12_28" id="FNanchor_12_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_28" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p>
<p>Chapter VIII deals with the interpretation and enforcement
of the Constitution. It was a labor of love
by shrewd legal theorists, and defines terms with great
clarity. Interpretive power is vested in the Judicial
<i>Yüan</i>.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Issue of Constitutional Change</span></h3>
<p>Nowhere in China is there outright denial of a need
for constitutional change. The need exists; the Double
Five Draft is the government's answer. Yet there are
few patent demerits in the existing constitutional system;
the present political structure is more realistic,
more broadly national, more expressive of effective
opinion than any other in modern China. The question
arises from commitments (dating back to the Empire)
promising to create actual constitutional government.
The National Government was established on the basis
of this pledge. The democratic ideology, whatever sects
it may include, has a clean sweep of the field of doctrine
in China. No one seriously advocates monarchy, separatism,
or permanent dictatorship. The only question is:
how and when?</p>
<p>At the close of the third session of the advisory People's
Political Council, Chiang K'ai-shek replied to demands
for immediate broadening of popular control<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span>
over the government by reaffirmation of his adherence to
the democratic dogma of Sun Yat-sen, together with the
following warnings:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The democracy which <i>Tsung-Li</i> [The Leader, i.e., Sun
Yat-sen] wished to establish was of the purest kind without
the slightest vestige of make-believe or artificiality. Unfortunately,
the Chinese people, having inherited all the
evil practices handed down throughout the numerous
dynasties of autocratic rule, were then at a low ebb both
in intelligence and in vitality. The people were used to
disorganization and selfishness....</p>
<p>We have to wait until our lost territories have been
recovered and domestic disorders liquidated before we can
have political tutelage and prepare ourselves for constitutionalism....</p>
<p>People at that time [the inauguration of the Republic
in 1912] made the mistake of neglecting the necessary
procedures and instead they rivalled each other in talking
about democracy.... As a result, democracy has remained
an ideal....</p>
<p>We must make it clear to our people that democracy
is not a synonym for lack of law and order, or for anarchy.</p>
<p>The public opinion on which democracy is based must
be sound, collective, and representative of the majority
of the people's wills. The freedom which democracy endows
on people should not conflict with public welfare, nor
should it go beyond the sphere as marked by laws of the
State. With our nation facing the worst invasion in history,
we must teach the people to respect the absolute authority
of laws of the State.<a name="FNanchor_13_29" id="FNanchor_13_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_29" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p></blockquote>
<p>The clamor for a constitution continued. The difficulties
of introducing mass suffrage to Western China
were apparent to everyone, but many leaders felt that
the advantages of constitutionalism would outweigh the
inescapable loss of efficiency, and would mobilize public
opinion behind the war and further democratic progress.
The Generalissimo found this view hard to reconcile
with his military, direct notions of doing first things<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span>
first, as he saw them, but he yielded in the fourth session
of the People's Political Council and accepted the demand.
He stated:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In China ... [democratization] is a tremendously heavy
task which cannot be completed within a few days. I think
that the Constitution and laws may as well be promulgated
at an earlier date. But, gentlemen, please do not forget
the <i>Tsung-li's</i> painful consideration ... [of the necessity
of an intermediate stage of real democratic training].
Political tutelage does not end with the training of the
citizens by the government. It requires training of the
citizens by themselves.</p>
<p>Today we should understand our object: to start the
building of a constitutional government. This means laying
a permanently sound basis for the nation. We are not
concerned with the time of starting constitutional government.
Whether to start it early or later does not matter
much. What we are really concerned with is, do we have a
real intention of forming a constitutional government? If
we are truly so minded, we might as well promulgate the
Constitution before the labor of political tutelage is completed.<a name="FNanchor_14_30" id="FNanchor_14_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_30" class="fnanchor">[14]</a></p></blockquote>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span></p>
<p>Chiang thus reconciled the beginning of constitutionalism
and the continuance of political tutelage, although
implying acquiescence, not recommendation. A
theorist holding all men to be driven by "a perpetuall
and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth
only in Death,"<a name="FNanchor_15_31" id="FNanchor_15_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_31" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> might consistently suppose that
Chiang merely dissimulated an inward lust for authority;
more plausible is the postulation that a man who
has for years lived with and for a doctrine, giving his
life and future reputation to the fulfilment of a program,
would incline to prudence and realism in climaxing that
doctrine and program. In Chiang's case this is Sun
Yat-sen's <i>San Min Chu I</i>. Chiang's reluctance to apply
democracy then and there is understandable whatever
the inmost motive; so, too, is his yielding to a widespread
demand.</p>
<p>The convening of a special <i>Kuo-min Ta-hui</i> as a
national constituent assembly was set for November 12,
1940; this day was chosen because it was traditionally
the seventy-fourth birthday of Sun Yat-sen. Administrative
machinery for preparation of a hall, secretariat, publications,
and other necessities was established and set
in motion. Following the severe fires of August 19-20,
and the subsequent large-scale demolition of above-ground
downtown Chungking by raids, indefinite postponement
of the Congress was announced on September
25—on the grounds that military hazard prevented adequate
assembly of delegates, and no reasonably safe place
for such a meeting could be found.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, recent years have seen an uproar of constitutional
debate. This may be summarized briefly,
with the case against the Constitution stated first:</p>
<p>Constitutionalization would lead to the legalization
of other parties, instead of a mere condition of non-prosecution;
this would disrupt the orderliness required<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span>
of a people at war. Why add discord in war time?
<i>Reply</i>: legitimization of other parties is not a struggle
for power but an act of union. It would widen the
periphery of cooperation.<a name="FNanchor_16_32" id="FNanchor_16_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_32" class="fnanchor">[16]</a></p>
<p>Sun Yat-sen required three stages of the revolution:
conquest, tutelage, constitution. China is not ready for
mass suffrage. The majority of the people are not yet
literate. Public opinion is just developing. The nation
is, in fact, still in the period of military recapture of national
territories. <i>Reply</i>: Sun Yat-sen must not be interpreted
mechanically. If this is done, tutelage will
never end, and Sun's cherished democracy will remain
forever in the future. Furthermore, the guerrillas, the
Border Region, and other instances have shown that the
Chinese masses can and will practice democracy right
now. Again, the issue has already been decided; the
government has been committed to the immediate inauguration
of the Constitution. First it was to be 1939;
the elections were held in part, until the war finally
stopped them on August 13, 1937. It is too late to raise
the issue: is China ready? Everyone—government, Kuomintang,
independent groups—has decided that China is.</p>
<p>Why change constitutions? The present one is satisfactory.
If a war-time amplification of the <i>Yüeh Fa</i> is
needed, it can be found in the <i>Program of Resistance
and Reconstruction</i>.<a name="FNanchor_17_33" id="FNanchor_17_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_33" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> If a convocation of the talents
is needed, the People's Political Council is already there.
What is the use of a constitutional change in war time?
<i>Reply</i>: the constitutionalist movement is no new development.
The <i>Program</i> was a democratic advance.
"Besides, formation of the People's Political Council
was a step toward democracy. The constitutional<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span>
movement was not forced on the government, but was an
outgrowth of the war; it has not appeared overnight,
but has a clear historical background. As soon as the
Sino-Japanese hostilities broke out, it was evident that
more democratic rule was necessary. As the war became
prolonged, the preliminary steps proved inadequate. A
more perfect constitution, whereby the whole people
can be mobilized, is imminent. This fact was duly
recognized by the people and is the motive power of the
present constitutional movement." (This is the comment
of an independent writer.)<a name="FNanchor_18_34" id="FNanchor_18_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_34" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p>
<p>A pointed question is raised and answered by Tso
Tao-fen, one of the Seven Gentlemen (<i>Ch'i Chüntzu</i>)
who led the National Salvationists:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Some say that as a matter of fact, the people themselves
do not want a constitution. And—to put it more bluntly—that
the people do not know what a constitution is. Therefore,
the constitutional movement represents the desires of
only a minority of the people, not the majority. You have
a certain element of truth if you say that most of the people
do not know what a constitution is, but it is not true that
they do not want a constitution. In the present war period,
the burden on the people is enormous. They should not
be denied any privileges to which they are entitled. All the
proposed constitutional stipulations concerning the duties,
rights, economic status, and education of the people have
an immediate effect on and relation to the people. Why do
they not want a constitution? If you proceed to ask one
of the common people, say a peasant, and you talk with
him, professorially as though you were in a classroom, about
the constitutional movement, he may be at a loss. But if
you bother to ask him about his daily life—the work he is
doing, his hopes, his bitterness, the cruelties inflicted on him
by unscrupulous officials and landlords and gentry—and
if he enjoys the freedom of speech, he will give you a good
talk!... If you say that the people do not know what a
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span>constitution is, you should enlighten them about the close
relationship between themselves and the constitution, not
discontinue the constitutional movement.<a name="FNanchor_19_35" id="FNanchor_19_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_35" class="fnanchor">[19]</a></p></blockquote>
<p>Other questions relate to specific points in the Draft
Constitution. In the opinion of some, the phrase "according
to law" which follows every guarantee of popular
rights is a dangerous phrase, particularly in view of
the neat but arbitrary definition of "law" (<i>Art.</i> 139).
Others, remembering the Weimar Article 48, mistrust
the emergency power of the President. The President's
sharing of the budgetary, pardoning, and war powers
with the Legislative <i>Yüan</i> seems illogical to some critics,
who feel that these powers should be within reach of
a more popular body, not a technically legislative organ.</p>
<p>Further discussion deals with the competence of the
<i>Kuo-min Ta-hui</i>. Many of the critics, particularly those
of the Communist and independent Left group, believe
the long-heralded epoch of democracy would open badly
if it began with mechanical ratification of a dictated constitution.
A Communist leader said, "We want a Constitution,
a democratic Constitution—a <i>real</i> democratic
Constitution!" and pointed out that the first Congress
was too large, not truly representative of the common
people, and not given enough time to work out a constitution
by its own action; its task, as he supposed the
government intended, would be to rubber-stamp the
Double Five Draft. In his opinion, this Draft had many
defects—chief of which was unresponsiveness of the
central government to popular control. The proposed
Congress could not do much with a mere triennial
check; the five-power system as projected was unsatisfactory.
Democratic rights were insufficiently assured.
He added that the Communist Party of China was for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span>
a democracy, but that the Double Five Draft was not
"the constitution of a democracy."<a name="FNanchor_20_36" id="FNanchor_20_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_36" class="fnanchor">[20]</a></p>
<p>Furthermore, the representativeness of the proposed
constitution-adopting <i>Kuo-min Ta-hui</i> is called into
question. The present plan calls for 665 delegates from
geographical constituencies, 380 from occupational, 155
"by special methods," 240 by government appointment,
and a large number of Kuomintang Party-officers <i>ex
officio</i> (241 by a recent count).<a name="FNanchor_21_37" id="FNanchor_21_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_37" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> The present administration
would obviously have a whip hand over all proceedings.
The division into groups has been criticized.
A demand, for example, for 120 women members has
been made. Under the circumstances, with 1681 members
already scheduled, mere additional size could be
no handicap.</p>
<p>The question of qualifications has also been raised.
About 900 of the representatives had been elected when
war broke out. These include men who have since died,
or have changed their opinions, or are reported missing,
and even a few traitors. Are all the available elected
representatives to be gathered together, years later?
or is a new election to be held? Whatever occurs, the
supreme agency on qualifications is the Election Committee
for Representatives to the People's [Constituent]
Congress, attached directly to the Council of State.</p>
<p>The constitutional issue in China is no simple problem
of reaction versus progressivism. The vast majority
of the population is not literate, and is unprepared to
deal with a complicated machinery of opinion and
election. Wire-pulling, corruption, adherence to form
instead of deed—these are all widespread in China.
Democracy abruptly established might frustrate further
improvement, since sham-democracy would have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span>
established itself. The opponents of sudden action also press
the telling point that the common people do not know
they want immediate democracy, although believing
in the term as a symbol and approving its trial application.
The Generalissimo remains clearly mistrustful
about creating new organs of opinion, or using new
political processes; he would prefer to wait until the nation
is unified, better administered, and more literate.
Hence his and the Kuomintang's insistence on indirect
elections, remoteness of policy-making authorities from
the electorate, and self-sufficient government.</p>
<p>China did have, it is argued, an excellent democratic
constitution in 1912, many more in the warlord years.
All had admirable balances of power, guarantees to the
individual, libertarian and progressive provisions. Like
Chinese social legislation, they lifted China to the level
of the rest of the modern world—<i>de jure</i>, and that only!
These elevated documents remained elevated; life went
on beneath them, and the tragic gap between law and
life was so enormous that no one thought of bridging
it. The nation would have been humiliated by legislation
which limited the working day to fourteen hours,
prohibited the mutilation or slavery of children, or
required that torture be administered in the presence
of a physician. Hence it had eight, ten, or twelve-hour
laws, good child legislation, and absolute prohibition of
torture for any purpose; these were unenforceable.</p>
<p>To counsels of caution, advocates of immediately responsive
institutions reply that the Chinese common
people are better democrats than their rulers, citing
concrete cases in proof. They mention the general
strikes, strong peasant cooperation, the startling phenomena
of coordinate mass action—tens and hundreds
of thousands strong—in political protest, boycotts, or
civic immobility. (In past years many a warlord has
been stopped by empty streets and closed houses: no
business, no traffic, no talking, no meetings—only the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span>
silence, and somewhere, conspicuously inconspicuous, a
committee of plenipotentiaries!) They refer to the
Frontier Area, the Border Region, the New Fourth
Zone, the guerrillas, the industrial cooperatives, and
the wealth of leadership called up from the millions by
the war. They quote to the Kuomintang its own professions
of democracy, and the words of its late Leader.
Told that the masses do not understand modern administration,
modern economics, modern war, and that
the peasantry and workers would proceed to arbitrary
class legislation, economic levelling, and social revolution,
they reply, "What do you want—democracy?" It
is most unlikely that the Communists would sweep the
country under free elections, but they and other dissidents,
as the political Outs, would be free to criticize the
incumbents in a way sure to bring support and involve
new alignments of power. Some Kuomintang leaders
wish to shut out any group with foreign connections;
the Chinese face—despite their definite movement
toward constitutionalism—the question of the limits of
democratic toleration</p>
<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_17" id="Footnote_1_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_17"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> On the Manchu constitutional programs, see <i>Columbia University
Studies in Political Science</i>, Vol. XL, No. 1: Yen, Hawkling L., "A
Survey of Constitutional Development in China"; Vinacke, Harold
Monk, <i>Modern Constitutional Development in China</i>, Princeton, 1920;
Cameron, Meribeth, <i>The Reform Movement in China, 1898-1912</i>,
Stanford University, 1931; and Hsieh, Pao Chao, <i>The Government of
China (1644-1911)</i>, Baltimore, 1925. The earlier constitutional developments
under the Republic are summarized in Escarra, Jean, <i>Le Droit</i>
<i>Chinois</i>, Paris and Peiping, 1936, which includes excellent bibliographies;
Tsêng Yu-hao, <i>Modern Chinese Legal and Political Philosophy</i>,
Shanghai, 1934, Ch. VI, "The Law of Modern Chinese Constitutions";
a characteristic proposal for a pre-Kuomintang constitution is Bau,
Mingchien Joshua, <i>Modern Democracy in China</i>, Shanghai, 1927; and
the works of Lum, Wu, and Linebarger, cited above.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_2_18" id="Footnote_2_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_18"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> The text of the <i>Yüeh Fa</i> is to be found in <i>The China Year Book,
1932</i>, Shanghai, 1932, and in Lum, work cited, p. 161 <i>ff.</i>, and Wu Chih-fang,
work cited, p. 410 <i>ff.</i> The Chinese texts of all outstanding Chinese
constitutions, from the Imperial programs down to the Double Five
Draft of the <i>Hsien Fa</i> are to be found in Wang Shih-chieh, <i>Pi-chiao
Hsien-fa</i>, Shanghai, 1937, p. 699-796.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_3_19" id="Footnote_3_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_19"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> I.e., Sun Yat-sen; Chung-shan was a revolutionary alias, which
became a ceremonial posthumous name.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_4_20" id="Footnote_4_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_20"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> The term "Chinese Kuomintang" is not a redundancy; the original
is <i>Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang</i>, "Central-Realm Realm-people-association,"
and could be translated as the Chinese Nationalist Populist Party, National
Democratic Party, the Nation's People's Party, etc. Several
Japanese organizations have had exceedingly similar names; hence
the formal style for the Kuomintang is always prefaced by <i>China</i>.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_5_21" id="Footnote_5_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_21"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Wang Shih-chieh, work cited, p. 649-50.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_6_22" id="Footnote_6_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_22"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> The Double Five Draft Constitution is to be found in Chinese in
Wang Shih-chieh, work cited, and in English in Council of International
Affairs, <i>Information Bulletin</i>, Vol. III, No. 10 (April 11, 1937), Nanking;
Hsia, C. L., "Background and Features of the Draft Constitution
of China"; in Legislative <i>Yüan</i>, "Draft of the Constitution of the Republic
of China," Nanking, 1937; in <i>The China Year Book</i>, Shanghai,
and <i>The Chinese Year Book</i>, Shanghai and Hong Kong, <i>v.i.</i> and <i>v.d.</i>
The latest version of the Draft Constitution is reprinted below. Appendix
I (A), p. <a href="#Page_283">283</a>; the latest Chinese annotated version of this is
the Legislative <i>Yüan</i>, <i>Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an Shuo-ming-shu</i>
(An Elucidation of the Draft Permanent Constitution of the
Chinese Republic), [Chungking], XXIX (1940).</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_7_23" id="Footnote_7_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_23"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> For a critique and appreciation of the final Draft Constitution, see
Wu, John C. H., "Notes on the Final Draft Constitution" in <i>Tien Hsia
Monthly</i>, Vol. X, No. 5 (May 1940), p. 409-26. (Dr. Wu is one of the
most extraordinary personages of the modern world; he has taken all
knowledge—East Asiatic and Western—for his province. He writes a
spirited, graceful English and is capable of discussing anything from
modern politics or abstruse points of Anglo-American law to ancient
Chinese hedonism or the philosophical implications of the <i>Autobiography</i>
of St. Thérèse of Lisieux. Dr. Wu, in a bomb-shelter, possesses
much of the moral poise and profound personal assurance for which
such Westerners as T. S. Eliot seek in vain.) See also Hsia, C. L.,
"A Comparative Study of China's Draft Constitution with That of Other
Modern States," in <i>The China Quarterly</i>, Vol. 2, 1936-7, No. 1 (Summer),
p. 89-101 and Hoh Chih-hsiang, "A History of Constitution
Making in China," the same, Vol. 1, 1935-6, No. 4 (Summer), p. 105-117.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_8_24" id="Footnote_8_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_24"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> For a more extended discussion of this point, see the author's
<i>The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen: An Exposition of the San Min
Chu I</i>, Baltimore, 1937, p. 218 <i>ff.</i>, and also p. 96 <i>ff.</i></p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_9_25" id="Footnote_9_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_25"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> See Sun Fo [President of the Legislative <i>Yüan</i>, and son of Sun Yat-sen],
"The Spirit of the Draft Permanent Constitution," in <i>The China
Quarterly</i>, Vol. V, No. 3 (April 1940), Shanghai, p. 377-84.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_10_26" id="Footnote_10_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_26"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> See Appendix I (F), p. <a href="#Page_318">318</a>-<a href="#Page_324">24</a>, below.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_11_27" id="Footnote_11_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_27"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> See below, p. <a href="#Page_106">106</a> <i>ff.</i>, and Appendix I (G), p. <a href="#Page_324">324</a>.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_12_28" id="Footnote_12_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_28"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> This constitution is available in Yakhontoff, Victor A., <i>The Chinese
Soviets</i>, New York, 1934, p. 217-21, and in Kun, Bela [prefator],
<i>Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic</i>, New York, 1934,
p. 17-24. The writer has been unable to secure the Chinese text of this
document.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_13_29" id="Footnote_13_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_29"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> China Information Committee, Chungking, <i>News Release</i>, No. 351
(February 25, 1939), p. 2269-71.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_14_30" id="Footnote_14_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_30"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> [Chiang K'ai-shek], <i>Tsung-ts'ai Chien-kuo Yen-lun Hsüan-chi</i> (The
Party Chief's Utterances on Reconstruction), Chungking, 1940, p. 237-43.
The Generalissimo concluded his speech with a homiletic touch
which is so characteristic that it may be included here; it also explains
his relative lack of interest in the Constitution: "Lastly, I have another
point to tell you gentlemen. I have already repeated this, again and
again, many times. Desiring to complete our revolutionary work and
national reconstruction, and to have a constitutional government as
seen in many modern states as soon as possible, I often study the
causes of the weakness and disorder which exist in our country.... [He
cites the traditional political vigor and excellence of the centuries
before the time of Christ, with the "degeneration" and "departure from
order" of the following centuries.] The departure is not simply due to
the failures in politics and education and to the deprivation of the
popular rights by a few tyrannical kings and lords since the Ch'in and
Han periods. It is due to the fact that before the Chou, we had
government by law [<i>fa chih</i>] as a mere supplement to government by
social standards [<i>li chih</i>, also translatable as ideological control, or
control through moral indoctrination]. We had social organization as
the foundation of political organization. Everything was then well-organized
and well-trained. Everywhere, in schools, in armies, in
families, in society, order and the forms of propriety [i.e., social
standards] were regarded as most important. No citizen could evade his
duty and obligation."</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_15_31" id="Footnote_15_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_31"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Thomas Hobbes, <i>Leviathan</i>, New York and London, 1934 (Everyman's
Edition), p. 49.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_16_32" id="Footnote_16_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_32"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> The writer is indebted for much of the material in this chapter
to Dr. Djang Chu, of the New Life Movement Headquarters, Chungking,
who supplied it to him in the form of a lecture and other
memoranda. Dr. Djang is, of course, not responsible for any reinterpretations
here made.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_17_33" id="Footnote_17_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_33"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> See Appendix I (D), p. <a href="#Page_309">309</a>.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_18_34" id="Footnote_18_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_34"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> Liu Shih, "Chung-kuo Hsien-chêng Yün-tung-ti Chi-ko Chieh-tuan"
(Stages of the Chinese Constitutional Movement) in <i>Li-lun yü
Hsien-shih</i> (Theory and Reality), Vol. 1, No. 3, November 15, 1939,
p. 13 <i>ff.</i></p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_19_35" id="Footnote_19_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_35"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> From Tso Tao-fen, "A Few Questions Regarding the Constitution"
in Ch'üan-min K'ang-chan Shê [The United Front Club], <i>Hsien-chêng
Yün-tung Lun-wên Hsüan-chi</i> (A Symposium on the Constitutional
Movement), Chungking, 1940, p. 1 <i>ff.</i></p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_20_36" id="Footnote_20_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_36"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> Statement of Col. Ch'in Po-k'u at the Chungking office of the
18th [Communist] Army Corps Headquarters, on July 29, 1940, to the
author.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_21_37" id="Footnote_21_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_37"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <i>China at War</i>, Vol. IV, No. 5 (June 1940), p. 79 <i>ff.</i></p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span></p>
<h2><span class="smcap">Chapter II</span><br />
THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT</h2>
<p>By constitutional stipulation, and by dogma legally
established, the National Government of the Chinese
Republic is a Kuomintang Party-dictatorship over
the Chinese nation. This rule is formally dictatorship
by a minority democracy over the absolutely governed
majority, since the Party constitution requires intra-Party
democracy. No pretense is made of further formal
democracy. Actual experience of the past ten years
has shown the government to be a broad, loosely organized
oligarchy in which the Party, the Government, the
Army and regional military, and independent leaders
(such as bankers, college professors and presidents,
secret society chiefs, community spokesmen) have
shared power. The center of gravity has stayed somewhere
near Chiang K'ai-shek, who as co-leader and then
formal Chief (<i>Tsung-ts'ai</i>, "general ruler") of the Party
and creator of the central army has combined two of
the chief sources of influence. Variety in the sources,
nature, and incidence of political power in recent
Chinese affairs has, however, not destroyed the constitutional
theory: Party-dictatorship pledged to national
democracy.</p>
<p>The state machinery—as it has been since promulgation
of the Provisional Constitution, 1931—is among the
most elaborate in the modern world, but is nevertheless
effective. One may justly regard the present government
as the most efficacious, generally powerful, and
growing Chinese government since the mid-eighteenth<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span>
century. This government is pre-eminently the creation
of the Kuomintang, and of Kuomintang leaders. A war
which threatens China's national existence accordingly
threatens the leaders as government officers, as Party
members, as patriotic citizens, and as members of the
Chinese race. At the time that they fight an alien enemy,
they must simultaneously increase state power and diffuse
it so that a democracy may emerge and survive.</p>
<p>China's leadership is therefore posed a two-fold problem:
to perpetuate a regime, successful in one period of
relative peace, through years of invasion to a period of
even deeper peace; and to permit popular access to
policy-forming agencies, allowing freer operation of
pressures, without endangering resistance and reconstruction
thereby. To the Western political scientist, it
is amazing that they have carried into the years of
catastrophic war a unique, complex constitutional system,
treasuring it like an ark of the covenant. This is
the five-power system.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Five-Power Constitution</span></h3>
<p>The five-power constitution (<i>wu-ch'üan hsien-fa</i>) is
a legacy of Sun Yat-sen, and is one of the cardinal dogmas
of the <i>San Min Chu I</i>. Distinctively, two new powers
are added to the familiar three: namely, the examinative
and the control powers. Westerners might question the
importance of segregating the impeaching, auditing and
critical powers, unifying them into a new agency of
government, along with a glorified, independent civil
service system. Yet the five-fold division is to China a
key point of governmental development.</p>
<p>The five-power system is based on the notions Sun
Yat-sen had of democracy. He anticipated by a generation
the need of strengthening democratic machinery
to compete with Caesarian techniques. Merely to have
qualified the suffrage, or to have narrowed the limits
of popular action, would not have sufficed, for it was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span>
authentic democracy—government both representative
and popular—which he desired, not an empty shell of
nominal republicanism. In an effort to solve this
dilemma, he employed the concepts <i>ch'üan</i> and <i>nêng</i>,<a name="FNanchor_1_38" id="FNanchor_1_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_38" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>
which may be translated "power" and "capacity," although
the rendering would necessarily vary in accordance
with the connotations to be encompassed.<a name="FNanchor_2_39" id="FNanchor_2_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_39" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>
He felt that it was a major discovery to apply in modern
politics a distinction between the power which the
people should have over government and the capability
they had of operating the machine of state. Abandoning
the state to the vagaries of public opinion, allowing
the citizens free access to the powerful, complex controls
of modern governance, or assuming that anyone and
everyone had an expert's qualifications on all political
subjects—this would, in Sun Yat-sen's opinion, wreck
the government. Nevertheless, the people had to reserve
a final power over policies and personnel of government,
although they are themselves unqualified to operate the
state mechanism. Hence the people were to exercise <i>the
four powers</i> over the government: initiative, referendum,
election, and recall. Compensatingly, the government
was to possess the <i>five rights</i> over the people, based on
the new separation of powers. To Sun, as a Chinese, the
state was not the hand of the people; it was a separate
institution above other institutions, democratic only in
allowing access to itself and in justifying its authority
by the ultimate sanction of popular vote. The new government
could not be kept clean, prompt, and high-minded
by the freak, casual operation of popular censure,
nor staffed by whomever a mass fancy threw into<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span>
office. It was, instead, to be a traditionally Chinese self-perpetuating
bureaucracy, differing from the past only
in being controlled and revised by popular instead of
imperial will.</p>
<p>Accordingly, the ideal toward which the Chungking
government strives may be epitomized as <i>perfect bureaucracy
subject to complete popular control</i>. The two
powers new to the West—examination and control—are
to replace public opinion at levels of obscurity, technicality,
and persistence where outside criticism could not
reach; the plan of Sun Yat-sen provides for as much use
of power through voting as is found in any Western
state. This attempted solution strikes near the core
problems of any modern government, wherever it may
operate and whatever its conditions.</p>
<p>The five-power constitution posits a government of
educated, expert men, in which qualifying examinations
will precede election for administrative posts, and in
which the examination and control <i>yüan</i> will—professionally,
officially—replace the haphazard play of sentiment,
anger, fancy, envy upon which Western peoples
count to keep their democracy healthy and intact. The
United States Government is the most complex and important
institution in the United States, possessing inquisitorial
powers wider and deeper than those of any
private person or institution. Yet the Americans have
no unceasing, professional, expert investigation of their
government by their government, nor does a merit system
extend to offices where it might have the drastic
effect of thwarting operation of public opinion locally
or temporarily debased.</p>
<p>This function, specializing power to strengthen it, explains
the war-time survival of the five-power system as
a fundamental theory of state. The Chinese have suffered
from weak government for decades. Absence of
dictatorship was largely owing to an inability to designate
a dictator. The five-power system was preceded by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span>
a Nationalist government which employed the soviet
form of organization—the one instance outside the
Soviet Union of such application.<a name="FNanchor_3_40" id="FNanchor_3_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_40" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> This had been set up
for rapid, decisive action; thirteen years' preliminary
application of the five-power system has shown this to
be no less swift and effectual. Even the Communist
leaders in China today are reconciled to the retention
of the five-power system, although they would certainly
like to modify its present organization.<a name="FNanchor_4_41" id="FNanchor_4_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_41" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p>
<p>Reference to the general chart of government organization
(see p. <a href="#Page_330">330</a>) shows the intricate pre-democratic
system of government now applied. Consideration of
the sources of policy in such a structure have, therefore,
to appraise not merely two agencies—executive and
legislative, with only a glance at the judiciary—as in
America, but to examine a whole hierarchy of Party,
general governmental, military-governmental, and autonomous
policy-making agencies. Were it not for the
thousands of miles, the unrelatedness in cultures, the
complexities of language, and the inescapable awareness
of race, Americans might long since have looked to
China as the decisive, fresh political experiment of our
times.</p>
<p>One further trait of the Chinese, which in Japan has
been carried to the point of a national mania, is the
respect for the constitutional (or Imperial) system as
a symbol of purity and order. Western governments are
like machines in common use; they operate for the general
convenience and subject to the criticism of their
members. Even dictatorships try to seem practical.
The Confucian traditions of government by indoctrination,
and particularly that of government indoctrinating<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span>
through conspicuous example, motivated heavy ceremonialization
of state functions. This often led a
Chinese Emperor to become more and more majestic
and aloof, to strive for archetypal perfection, until he
became so much a model that he disappeared from public
sight altogether, swilling and carousing himself to
death in the gardens of the Forbidden City; his successors,
if they came from the people, would seem practical
and workable for a few generations, until they too succumbed
to their own majesty. Some atrophy through
majesty occurs even in the relatively new Chinese National
Government, arrested but not eradicated by war-time
vigor.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Supreme National Defense Council</span></h3>
<p>The highest political agency in China is the Supreme
National Defense Council (<i>Kuo-fang Tsui-kao Wei-yüan-hui</i>).<a name="FNanchor_5_42" id="FNanchor_5_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_42" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>
This is not a part of the government, <i>de
jure</i>, since it is the war-time replacement of the Kuomintang
Central Political Council (<i>Chung-yang
Chêng-chih Wei-yüan-hui</i>), the high Party organ charged
with exercise of the Party's sovereign powers in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span>
government. The liberalization of the policy-framing
agencies in war-time cannot be better illustrated than
by the fact that this new Supreme National Defense
Council reportedly includes non-Party members, and
acts in fact as a central board or council of government,
superseding not only the Kuomintang Central Political
Council but its governmental counterpart, the Council
of State (<i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui</i>) as well.
Reference to the chart below will clarify the relationship
of these agencies:</p>
<p class="center">The KUOMINTANG, as a Party,<br />
exercises sovereign powers through<br />
[The CENTRAL POLITICAL COUNCIL, superseded in war-time by]<br />
The SUPREME NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL,<br />
which transmits commands<br />
to<br />
The COUNCIL OF STATE, highest governmental agency,
which transforms these commands into government
orders applicable<br />
to<br />
NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL, or LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES,<br />
in the form of<br />
ORDERS, ORDINANCES, and LAWS</p>
<p>The power of the Kuomintang is exercised by its Chief
[<i>Tsung-ts'ai</i>] and its Central Executive Committee, Central
Committee, and their respective Standing Committees
(discussed below, p. <a href="#Page_125">125</a> <i>ff.</i>).</p>
<p>Secretiveness in a nation's highest policy-making organ
is somewhat unusual in the modern world. In most
states the invisible government of practical acquaintance
and association between leaders provides a meeting
ground, and traditions require a formal, open exercise
of public authority. As a matter of fact, a few generally
accepted data concerning the Supreme National Defense
Council are readily apparent to the observer in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span>
Chungking. In the first place, it is what its title implies—the
highest agency of political control. Its meetings
are the constant source of new policy and tangible control.
Secondly, one finds a universal belief that the
Generalissimo, who attends these meetings in the multiple
capacity of Chairman of the Council, Party Chief
of the Kuomintang, President of the Executive <i>Yüan</i>,
Chairman of the People's Political Council, Commander-in-Chief
of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces, etc.,
faithfully employs Council meetings for very real debate
and discussion of government and Party policy,
and for the conduct of the war. He is not believed to
take any important step arbitrarily, without consulting
the Council. (In the past, he has been known to act with
dramatic and concealed swiftness, opening his mind to
no one before the crucial consummation of his plans, but
at the present time this has apparently disappeared.<a name="FNanchor_6_43" id="FNanchor_6_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_43" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>)</p>
<p>Third, the Council, while extending beyond the men
who are primarily Party leaders and including military
and political figures who (irrespective of nominal Party
membership) are independent, has transformed the
arcanum of Party power into a body more representative
of the entire nation. Fourth, significant in connection
with the Japanese charge of Chungking Bolshevization,
the Communists and other Leftists, while
fairly represented in advisory and even in military
bodies, are presumed to have no representation whatever
on the Supreme National Defense Council, nor is
such representation regarded as probable in the near
future. Chiang K'ai-shek has at hand a counselling and
co-governing body whose fundamental purposes are
completely one with his own.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span></p>
<p>A nice consistency would demand that the Supreme
National Defense Council (as a Party agency) should
transmit its commands to the Council of State (its government
counterpart) for transformation into law.
This is actually done, whenever possible, but the frequency
of crises and of needs for immediate action have—in
the period of hostilities—led to the occasional issuance
of commands direct to the Ministry or other governmental
organ concerned.<a name="FNanchor_7_44" id="FNanchor_7_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_44" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> To the degree that the
Supreme National Defense Council does so, it becomes
a directly governing authority, and instead of perpetuating
Party authority <i>over</i> government, it is itself government.</p>
<p>Since a cloud of military secrecy covers the functions
of the Council, some notion of its operation and working
authority may be found by analogy with the role of
the Central Political Council, which it has displaced.
According to the leading Chinese constitutional writer
on the subject, the Central Political Council (also
called [Central] Political Committee)—for which read
Supreme National Defense Council today—acted as follows:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>According to Article IV of the <i>Principles Governing the
Organization of the C. E. C.</i> [of the Kuomintang] passed
... December 6, XXIV (1935), "the Central Executive
Committee organizes a Political Committee, composed of
a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman, and nineteen to twenty-five
members, appointed by the Central Executive Committee,
from among the members of the Central Executive Committee
and the Control Committee." ... "During a session
of the Political Committee, the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen
of the Central Standing Committees, the President
of the National Government, the Presidents and Vice-Presidents
of the Five <i>Yüan</i>, and the President and Vice-President
of the Military Affairs Commission should be
present, while the leading members of the special technical
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span>committees under the [control] Political Committee, and
other higher officials of the National Government may be
notified if necessary to attend the sessions." [The author
explains that, on the basis of actual experience, "may be
notified" signifies "shall attend if matters relevant to their
functions arise."] ...</p>
<p>It was originally fixed that the Political Committee
should meet once every week, but since December XXIV
(1935), it holds meetings either weekly or fortnightly. The
number of members required to constitute a forum is not
fixed, and resolutions have never been put in the form of
motions requiring formal vote. Regarding the proposition
of a motion, and the discussion of motions proposed <i>ex-tempore</i>,
the Political Committee has never fixed any rigid
regulations; moreover, even if a rule had been established
at one time, it has not been followed closely later. Before
being put to a decision, a motion is either studied and
examined beforehand, or it is not. There is no definite rule
as to whether every motion should be so studied or not, but
the Committee possesses the power to decide this point
<i>ad hoc</i>. The entire wording of a motion passed in a meeting
is rarely fully read, and is then read in the following session
as the minutes of the previous session. <i>Hence the Chairman
and the Secretary-General have a certain liberty in the
framing of the wording of resolutions. Judging from above
circumstances, important resolutions passed in the Political
Committee must actually represent the opinions of the
Chairman and a small number of influential members....</i>
[Italics added in translation.]<a name="FNanchor_8_45" id="FNanchor_8_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_45" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p></blockquote>
<p>Many of these features may reasonably be conjectured
to have continued in the Supreme National Defense
Council, although the regular meetings—whatever others
there may be—seem to be considerably less frequent,
occurring presumably about once in five weeks.<a name="FNanchor_9_46" id="FNanchor_9_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_46" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> In the
matter of authority, again, some continuity may be supposed
between the earlier agency and the later. Wang
Shih-chieh continues:</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span></p>
<blockquote>
<p>The authority of the Political Committee (or the Political
Council) has undergone very few changes since its establishment.
To speak concisely, the Political Committee is the
highest directing organ of all governmental policies. Putting
it in more detail, we may say that this Committee has
the power to decide the basic principles of legislation, of
governmental policies and their execution, and has also
the power to appoint and dismiss governmental officials.... [A
footnote adds the following detail.] According to
the outlines of organization now being enforced, there are
still five kinds of affairs that should be discussed and decided
by the Political Committee: (1) the basic principles of legislation,
(2) the general plans of executing government
policies, (3) important plans concerning military affairs,
(4) financial plans, (5) the appointment of officials of the
Especially Appointed category and of other governmental
officials, and (6) [<i>sic</i>] cases submitted for discussion by the
Central Executive Committee. The first four may be collectively
classified under the two names of execution and
legislation.<a name="FNanchor_10_47" id="FNanchor_10_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_47" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p></blockquote>
<p>Only from such description by analogy may the foreigner
penetrate to the inmost source of Chinese policy.
This ambiguous and all-powerful agency, a Party organ
which controls government, a committee constellated
about its charismatic Chairman, is the heir both of the
Grand Council of the Manchu Empire and of the soviets
established by Nationalists during the entente with
Soviet Russia. Should the fortune of war remove the
Generalissimo from the scene, this Council would become
the storm center of power; under his guidance
and leadership, this agency above all others distinguishes
China from an outright dictatorship. Chiang, unlike
many other national leaders, has consistently shrunk
from the regalia of arbitrary power. In the highest matters,
and at the ultimate control, his action is veiled in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span>
the Supreme National Defense Council. The actual
play of personalities and power is hidden from us, his
contemporaries. Only the future may discover the exact
degrees and <i>modus operandi</i> of his authority.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The President of the National Government</span></h3>
<p>The term National Government (<i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu</i>)
is employed in two senses. In the broad sense, it refers
to the entire central government of China. In the narrow
sense, it is a synonym for National Government
Committee (<i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui</i>), commonly
translated as Council of State. The highest governmental
officer of China is the <i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu
Chu-hsi</i>—literally, the Chairman of the National Government.
Since this officer is the formal head of the National
Government in both senses of the term, his office
may with equal appropriateness be described as Chairmanship
of the Council of State and as Presidency of
the National Government. The latter has been most
commonly accepted, although it obscured the clarity of
the Chinese governmental pattern. It is essential to
note, however, that in the National Government period
there has been no <i>President of the Chinese Republic</i>;
the highest officer has been the <i>President of the National
Government of the Chinese Republic</i>, and as such the
titular head of the Chinese state for international purposes.
This officer possesses prestige rather than power,
and is roughly analogous to the President of the Third
French Republic.</p>
<p>In his official capacity, the President acts as chairman
of the meetings of the Council of State, performs the
ceremonial functions entailed by his office, and serves
as the custodian of the symbols of continuity and legitimacy.
Wang Shih-chieh writes: "... the Chairman
more or less occupies a nominal position. At most, he
can give occasional advice, only within certain limits, to
the Executive or other <i>Yüan</i>, with no power at all to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span>
decide or to reject the policies adopted by the <i>Yüan</i>.
As a matter of fact, from the end of the Year XXI (1932)
down to the present, since the man filling the office of
Chairman [President] of the National Government is
very calm and law-abiding, he has never interfered in the
activities or policies of the various <i>Yüan</i>."<a name="FNanchor_11_48" id="FNanchor_11_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_48" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> This officer
has been the veteran Kuomintang leader, Lin Shên, long
a resident of the United States, a key man in overseas
affairs of the Party, and a person of much dignity,
charm, poise and prestige. With a long beard and a
humane, scholarly demeanor, President Lin has fulfilled
most admirably the requirements of his office.</p>
<p>Generalissimo Chiang regularly reports on government
activities to Lin <i>Chu-hsi</i>, addressing him attentively
and respectfully. This is no perfunctory sham,
but appears to be a very real search for advice and
guidance. The two men are close associates and have
been such for many years; the Generalissimo gives every
indication of regarding his venerable colleague with
affectionate esteem. During the Chungking bombings,
the President has commonly resided in a secure place
outside the city. He is not needed for the daily prosecution
of the war, but both the office and its incumbent
are strongly stabilizing factors in the National Government.
(The Japanophile Wang Ch'ing-wei, establishing
his duplicate regime in Nanking, left the Presidency
open for many months, pirating Lin Shên's name.
Finally Wang gave himself the title, although he patently
would have preferred Lin.)</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Council of State</span></h3>
<p>The Council of State (<i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui</i>,
National Government Committee) is the formal
governmental core of the Chinese Republic. Even in
peacetime, however, its importance was seriously undermined
by the vigorous activity of the Central Political<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span>
Council. The members of the State Council are commonly
persons who do not hold other important office;
hence the Council does not include the most effective
leaders. Although its sphere of activity is wide, its role
as ratifier of the decisions of the Supreme National Defense
Council reduces its plenary powers to a shadow.
Amnesties, general appropriation bills, appointments
and removals, solemnification of legislation adopted by
the Legislative <i>Yüan</i>, and inter-<i>Yüan</i> problems are all
within the scope of the State Council's authority, but
except for the power of organizing and supervising the
central independent agencies, subordinate only to itself,
there has been little practical power for it to exercise.<a name="FNanchor_12_49" id="FNanchor_12_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_49" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p>
<p>The independent agencies under the Council of State,
together with the latter's relation to the <i>Yüan</i> and the
Military Affairs Commission, are best shown on the
chart on p. 55.<a name="FNanchor_13_50" id="FNanchor_13_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_50" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p>
<p>Minor agencies are thus attached directly to the Council
of State, which also serves as a link and common
formal superior to the five <i>Yüan</i> and the Military Affairs
Commission. Authority of the Council is directed
primarily upon these agencies which, while minor,
serve useful needs. The Offices of Military (<i>Tsan-chün
Ch'u</i>) and of Civil Affairs (<i>Wên-kuan Ch'u</i>) are transmission
and ceremonial agencies, charged with the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span>
formal correctness of state documents and ceremonies;
the military office was originally designed to carry on
more important functions, including an independent
inspectorate of troops, but now seems to be restricted
to matters of protocol. Chinese government has for
centuries operated on the basis of a two-way current of
written materials: memorials, petitions, and other communications
come from the provinces and dominions to
the metropolis; orders, laws and other commands flow
outward in response.<a name="FNanchor_14_51" id="FNanchor_14_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_51" class="fnanchor">[14]</a></p>
<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;">
<img src="images/i_055.jpg" width="400" height="426" alt="The Supreme National Defense Council" />
</div>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span></p>
<p>The other four agencies directly dependent on the
Council of State are all of important character, but likely
to be impaired by a period of crisis. The Academia
Sinica (<i>Kuo-li Chung-yang Yen-chiu Yüan</i>) serves scientific
and educational work through its own research
bureaus, through systems of extended aid, and through
a program of publications; despite war, it has continued,
making heroic efforts to preserve the national cultural
vitality and continuity. The three remaining agencies
are of less importance, although the Planning Committee
for the Western Capital (<i>Hsi-ching Ch'ou-pei Wei-yüan-hui</i>)
found its work considerably extended when,
on October 1, 1940, Chungking was formally denominated
an auxiliary capital of the Chinese Republic, and
a long-standing anomaly—that of the city's uncertain
status—was removed.</p>
<p>The Council of State could be regarded, therefore, as
a mere excrescence upon the design of government were
it not that ceremonial and formal functions, indispensable
to any government but particularly salient in China,
can be delegated to it, and the actual policy-making
agencies thereby stripped down to maximal utility and
efficacy.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Executive</span> <i>Yüan</i></h3>
<p>The Executive <i>Yüan</i> is the political organ which includes
the ministries, and is therefore roughly analogous
to a cabinet, just as the Council of State is in loose parallel
to a Privy Council. Together with the Supreme National
Defense Council and the Military Affairs Commission,
it exercises actual control over the National
Government in war time. Its growth involves executive
giantism, and atrophy for the remaining <i>Yüan</i>. The
President (<i>Yüan-chang</i>) of the Executive <i>Yüan</i> (<i>Hsing-chêng
Yüan</i>) is the highest executive officer of the government.
This post has not always been held by Chiang
K'ai-shek. At various times Wang Ch'ing-wei (now in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span>
Nanking) and H. H. K'ung (now Minister of Finance
and Vice-President [<i>Fu-yüan-chang</i>] of the <i>Yüan</i>) have
held this office.</p>
<p>The Executive <i>Yüan</i> may be compared to a parliamentary
cabinet in respect to its relations to the President
of the National Government, but it possesses no
authority whatever over the Supreme National Defense
Council, nor over the Kuomintang C. E. C. and
the Kuomintang Congress. It cannot ask for its own
dissolution, nor demand the dissolution of the higher
policy-making agency whose will it executes.<a name="FNanchor_15_52" id="FNanchor_15_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_52" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> It resembles
a cabinet, therefore, in its service as a consultative
and unifying agency for the entire executive, but
differs in its lack of controlling interdependence with
a broad parliament. Again, the <i>Yüan</i> is unique among
national executive agencies in the modern world with
respect to its division of the task of policy-making and
policy-supervising. Most cabinets consist of meetings of
the heads of executive ministries or departments, with
the chief executive officer presiding, but have no elaborate
secretarial or administrative machinery interposed
between the cabinet and its direct subordinates (departments
or ministries). The Executive <i>Yüan</i> is peculiar
in possessing two elaborate staff agencies which
handle as much routine work as possible, act as a clearing
house for policy and general administration, and pre-digest
a maximum of problems. The outline on p. 58
illustrates the difference.</p>
<p>All matters short of the most critical moment are
referred to one or the other of the two staff organs
(<i>Mi-shu Ch'u</i> or Secretariat, under a Secretary-General;
and <i>Chêng-wu Ch'u</i>, or Office of Political Affairs,<a name="FNanchor_16_53" id="FNanchor_16_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_53" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> under
a Director of Political Affairs), which are nominally
separate but actually almost fused, with the Director<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span>
serving as a sort of assistant Secretary-General. All official
business (other than crucial matters raised by the
members of the Meeting) comes to these agencies, where
it is studied, assorted, and usually settled provisionally,
pending only formal ratification by the Meeting of the
Executive <i>Yüan</i>.</p>
<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;">
<img src="images/i_058.jpg" width="400" height="300" alt="The Cabinet" />
</div>
<p>The Executive <i>Yüan</i> Meeting occurs once weekly,
most commonly on Tuesday.<a name="FNanchor_17_54" id="FNanchor_17_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_54" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> Each Meeting is presented
with a formidable agenda, prepared by the Secretary-General,
and divided into three categories: reports,
matters for discussion, and appointments. The membership
of the Meeting consists of the <i>Yüan</i> President
and Vice-President, the Ministers heading the executive
Ministries, and the Chairmen of Commissions having
the rank of Ministry.<a name="FNanchor_18_55" id="FNanchor_18_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_55" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> The work of the Meeting is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span>
carried on in a business-like fashion. The Generalissimo,
as incumbent <i>Yüan</i> President, takes great interest in the
work of the <i>Yüan</i>, and makes faithfulness and punctuality
in attendance a matter of high importance. Because
of the Japanese air raids over the capital, the exact
place and hour of the weekly meeting are not announced,
nor are the proceedings public.</p>
<p>In giving effect to the decisions reached by the <i>Yüan</i>
Meeting, the <i>Yüan</i> itself issues orders in its own name
for matters which are of general interest, or which cannot
be handled by any single Ministry or Commission.
If the problem is within the province of a particular
agency, the <i>Yüan</i>—through its Secretariat—addresses the
appropriate form of intragovernmental communication,
and the decision is then set forth as the order or act of
the agency involved. The following subjects are within
the jurisdiction of the Executive <i>Yüan</i>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(1) laws or legal problems submitted for promulgation
by the Legislative <i>Yüan</i>;</p>
<p>(2) the budget, also passed <i>pro forma</i> by the Council
of State and put into legal form by the Legislative
<i>Yüan</i>;</p>
<p>(3) declarations of war and peace, on the motion of
the Legislative <i>Yüan</i>;</p>
<p>(4) appointment and discharge of the higher ranks
of officials;</p>
<p>(5) matters which cannot be settled by a single Ministry
or Commission;</p>
<p>(6) other matters which the <i>Yüan</i> President sees fit
to introduce for discussion or decision.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Executive <i>Yüan</i> has far outstripped all other
<i>Yüan</i> in war-time growth. Its central position, the urgency
of most government business, and the need for
speed have led to this. Executive exercise of the ordinance-making
power has led to the gradual desuetude of
the Legislative <i>Yüan</i>, which has found ample work in
the preparation of the Draft Permanent Constitution<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span>
and the attempt to systematize legislation in view of
rapid territorial and administrative change. The Executive
<i>Yüan</i>, by controlling personnel, usually short-circuits
the functions of the Examination and Control
<i>Yüan</i>; and the Judicial <i>Yüan</i> has never had practical
political parity. Hence, the five-power system must be
regarded as a system with strong executive, weaker legislative,
examinative, and censoral, and dependent judicial
divisions. Above the five powers, the Supreme National
Defense Council exercises its august authority;
within them, the Executive stands forth; and to them,
in the course of the war, a new agency, almost comparable
to a sixth <i>yüan</i>, has sprung forth with an elaborate
bureaucracy of its own: the Military Affairs Commission.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Military Affairs Commission</span></h3>
<p>Some sense of the perpetual urgencies underlying Chinese
government in the past decade may be obtained
by consideration of the Military Affairs Commission.<a name="FNanchor_19_56" id="FNanchor_19_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_56" class="fnanchor">[19]</a>
A similar agency was one of the political wheels on
which the Nationalist-Communist machine rolled victoriously
North in the Great Revolution of 1925-27.
After the organization of a relatively stable government
at Nanking, the separate military commission was due
for absorption into the coordinate pattern of government;
instead, it has lingered under one form or another
for almost twenty years, growing great in recurrent
crises, while the Ministry of War (which was to
have absorbed it) has become its adjunct. War led to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span>
sudden distension of the Commission, and the creation
of an agency comparable to a sixth <i>yüan</i>, if not to a
duplicate, shogunal government in the Japanese sense.
The Commission had its own head, its own <i>Pu</i> (Ministries
or Departments), its own staff and field services.
Duplicating the regular government on the one
side, and the party administration on the other, it
flowered into bureaucracy so lavishly that a fourth
agency—co-ordinator for the first three—began to be
needed.</p>
<p>Simplicity of government structure has not been a
part of the Chinese tradition; the quasi-state of the
Empire had been as elaborate as its more potent European
counterparts; and the foliation of government at
war cannot be taken as <i>prima facie</i> proof of inefficiency.
Personnel is provided by giving each officer two, five,
even ten jobs; the work is done—delegation and counter-delegation
frequently cancel out—and the creation of
new agencies does not inescapably involve confusion.</p>
<p>The Military Affairs Commission consists of a Chairman—the
Generalissimo (<i>Tsung-ssŭ-ling</i>), who is
Chiang K'ai-shek—and seven to nine other members,
all appointed by the Council of State upon designation
by the Supreme National Defense Council.<a name="FNanchor_20_57" id="FNanchor_20_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_57" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> The key
officers of the armed forces are <i>ex officio</i> members, and
the Commission is charged with the military side of
the prosecution of the war. Its power has been liberally
interpreted. New agencies have been attached to it as
they arose; now it deals with social work, relief, education,
agitation, propaganda, espionage,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span>
government-sponsored "social revolution," and many economic matters
in addition to its narrowly military affairs.</p>
<p>The work of the Commission falls into two parts. On
the one hand, it is the supreme directing agency for all
the armies; on the other, the managing agency for a
variegated war effort away from the combat lines. The
Commission's work in theory covers all armies, but in
practice confines its supervisory powers to the forces in
Free China and—less clearly—to the major guerrilla units
in the occupied areas.</p>
<p>The Commission's governmental structure coordinates
military and political functions. The Chief of the
General Staff serves as assistant to the Chairman of the
Commission. The Main Office serves to smooth interdepartmental
affairs and to act as a central clearing point
for orders and other transmissions. Beneath the Commission
and the main office, there are twelve divisions
with the rank of <i>Pu</i>. The Department of Military
Operations (<i>Chün-ling-pu</i>) serves as a military planning
and strategic agency. The Department of Military
Training (<i>Chün-hsün-pu</i>) supervises training facilities,
military schools, and in-service training.<a name="FNanchor_21_58" id="FNanchor_21_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_58" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> The Directorate-General
of Courts-Martial (<i>Chün-fa Chih-hsing
Tsung-chien-pu</i>) and Pensions Commission (<i>Fu-hsüeh
Wei-yüan-hui</i>) are explained by their titles; the pension
program is probably behind that of every Western
power, and the personal grants made by the Generalissimo
under his own extra-governmental arrangements
are more effective than governmental pensions. The
Military Advisory Council (<i>Chün-shih Ts'an-i-yüan</i>)
acts as a research and consultative body, in no sense
cameral. An Administration of Personnel (<i>Ch'uan-hsü
T'ing</i>) applies some principles of the merit system. A<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span>
Service Department (<i>Hou-fang Ch'in-wu-pu</i>) is in
charge of transportation, supplies, and sanitation. The
National Aviation Commission (<i>Hang-k'ung Wei-yüan-hui</i>)
has won world-wide fame for its spectacular work
in procuring a Chinese air arm, and in keeping Chinese
air power alive against tremendous odds of finance,
transportation, equipment, and personnel; Mme.
Chiang's association with and interest in its success has
been of material aid. Finally, on the strictly military
side, there is the Office of the Naval Commander-in-Chief
(<i>Hai-chün Tsung-ssŭ-ling-pu</i>), formerly the Naval
Ministry, controlling the up-river remnants of the
navy. The War Ministry (<i>Chün-chêng-pu</i>) occupies an
anomalous position in this scheme. Subordinate to the
Executive <i>Yüan</i>, it is also subordinate to the Commission,
so that in effect it is a Ministry twice over, and is
even shown as two ministries on occasion.<a name="FNanchor_22_59" id="FNanchor_22_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_59" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> General Ho
Ying-chin, as Minister of War, is subordinate to the
Generalissimo as <i>Wei-yüan-chang</i> (Chairman) of the
Commission.</p>
<p>The two remaining agencies of the Commission are
of considerable interest. A system of having political
commissars in the army, a Soviet device, was adopted
by the Kuomintang forces when first organized under
Chiang K'ai-shek, and political training accounted for
much of that success of the Northward drive (1926-27).
After the Nationalist-Communist split, political training
as such fell into considerable disuse, and was replaced
by ethical training provided by the Officers'
Moral Endeavor Corps.<a name="FNanchor_23_60" id="FNanchor_23_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_60" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> With the renewed entente,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span>
and war of national union for defense, a Political Department
(<i>Chêng-chih-pu</i>) was established. A graceful
tribute to Communist skill in combining war and agitation
was paid when Chou En-lai, the celebrated Red
general, was designated Vice-Minister of this Department.
One of the Generalissimo's most orthodox and
able subordinates was made Minister. The Political Department
extends its function in an enormous sweep
across China, and renders aid in military education
within the armies, in civilian organization, and in war
propaganda. Active and omnipresent, it is an excellent
instance of functioning national unity.</p>
<p>The Party and Government War Area Commission
(<i>Chan-ti Tang-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i>) is a coordinate
agency for propaganda, relief, and social, economic and
military counter-attack within the war area (the occupied
zone), rather unusual in being a formal amalgamation
of Kuomintang and government administration.
Through this agency most of the guerrilla aid is extended,
and the Nationalists seek to rival the Communists
and independents in the number of Japanese<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span>
they can destroy, or the amount of damage they can do.
The more active branches of this Commission are a part
of the Party structure, but the dual function of the
Commission enables it to coordinate Party and Army
work. The very role of the Commission is indicative
of the fact that the Kuomintang is trying to meet rivalry
by patriotic competition and not by suppression. Its
integration with the military makes it a perfect example
of the triune force which Nationalist China is
bringing to bear on the enemy—army, government, and
Party all seek to reach into the occupied zone, to articulate
spontaneous mass resistance, to maintain the authority
of the central government pending the <i>révanche</i>,
and to uphold the existing political system, canalizing
social change into evolutionary rather than class-war
lines.<a name="FNanchor_24_61" id="FNanchor_24_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_61" class="fnanchor">[24]</a></p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Judicial, Legislative, Examination and
Control</span> <i>Yüan</i></h3>
<p>The appearance of an actual three-power administration—army,
government, Party—has led to the sharp
relative decrease in importance of the four further <i>Yüan</i>.
The Judicial <i>Yüan</i> (<i>Ssŭ-fa Yüan</i>) was even in peace
time the least important of the five divisions of the
government, failing to display—as an American might
expect—a tendency toward effective judicial independence
to counterweight the executive and legislative.
The Legislative <i>Yüan</i> (<i>Li-fa Yüan</i>), while exceedingly
active in the years between the Mukden and Loukouchiao
incidents, has been reduced in importance by
the coming of hostilities. Its work has been confined
largely to drafting the Permanent Constitution, and continued
codification of administrative law—particularly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span>
for coordination of central government and war area
(occupied China) affairs.<a name="FNanchor_25_62" id="FNanchor_25_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_62" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> The Examination <i>Yüan</i>
(<i>K'ao-shih Yüan</i>) has attempted to continue in the field
of civil service reform, and the Control <i>Yüan</i> (<i>Chien-ch'a
Yüan</i>) has maintained war-time efforts.</p>
<p>The Legislative <i>Yüan</i>, under the <i>Yüeh Fa</i> of 1931,
consists of a <i>Yüan-chang</i>, a <i>Fu-yüan-chang</i>, and forty-nine
to ninety-nine members (<i>Li-fa Wei-yüan</i>), appointed
by the Supreme National Defense Council for
a two-year term upon nomination by the <i>Yüan</i> President.
The term's shortness increases the dependence
of members upon the President, and transforms the
<i>Yüan</i> to a legislative study institute. Furthermore, the
newly-developed People's Political Council has assumed
the function of representation. The President of the
<i>Yüan</i> retains sole and arbitrary power over the agenda,
the final decision, and the allocation of personnel, although
the incumbent, Dr. Sun K'ê, is one of China's
leading moderates and an exponent of constitutional
process, not likely to exercise arbitrary power.</p>
<p>Apart from its significant constitutional powers, which
remain unimpaired, the <i>Yüan</i> finds much of its work
performed at present through ordinances of the Supreme
National Defense Council, administrative action
of the Executive <i>Yüan</i>, or commands by the Military
Affairs Commission. The jurisdiction retained includes:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(1) general legislation;</p>
<p>(2) the budget;</p>
<p>(3) general amnesty;</p>
<p>(4) declaration of war (never exercised);</p>
<p>(5) declaration of peace;</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span></p>
<p>(6) "other important matters" (which, in practice,
has referred to the more open and solemn aspects of
treaty-making, and whatever topic may be assigned the
<i>Yüan</i> by the highest Party agency).
<a name="FNanchor_26_63" id="FNanchor_26_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_63" class="fnanchor">[26]</a>
</p></blockquote>
<p>The Judicial <i>Yüan</i> serves as an administrative and
budgetary agency for four agencies. The Ministry of
Justice (<i>Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng-pu</i>) is, obviously, the prosecuting
agency, attached to the executive in the United
States, but made a part of the general judicial system in
China. The Administrative Court (<i>Hsing-chêng Fa-yüan</i>)
is an agency only potentially important; so is the
Commission for the Disciplinary Punishment of Public
Officers (<i>Kung-wu-yüan Ch'êng-chieh Wei-yüan-hui</i>).
The <i>Yüan</i> President is <i>ex officio</i> chief magistrate of the
Supreme Court (<i>Tsui-kao Fa-yüan</i>). Wang Shih-chieh
says of this <i>Yüan</i>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Because of the fact that the Judicial <i>Yüan</i> is itself not
an organ of adjudication, and since all affairs concerning
prosecution at law are handled by the Ministry of Justice,
the actual work to be performed by the Judicial <i>Yüan</i> is
very simple and light. In addition to framing the budget
for the <i>Yüan</i> itself and approving the general estimates of
the organs under it, the Judicial <i>Yüan</i> has only three further
duties to perform: (1) to bring before the Legislative
<i>Yüan</i> legislative measures connected with the Judicial
<i>Yüan</i> and its sub-organs; (2) to petition the President of
the National Government with respect to such cases as
special pardon, commutation of sentence, and the restoration
of civil rights; and (3) to unify the interpretation of
laws and orders, and changes in judicial procedure.<a name="FNanchor_27_64" id="FNanchor_27_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_64" class="fnanchor">[27]</a></p></blockquote>
<p>With peace, reconstruction and prosperity, the Judicial
<i>Yüan</i> might acquire importance through its control
of the administrative and technical aspects of the court
system. Meanwhile, courts are more closely associated
with their respective levels or areas of government than
with one another in a unified judicial system.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span></p>
<p>The Examination <i>Yüan</i>, with a President and Vice-President,
is composed of a central <i>Yüan</i> office, which
supervises two organs: the Ministry of Personnel
(<i>Ch'uan-hsü Pu</i>), operating a selective promotion system,
and the Examinations Commission (<i>K'ao-hsüan
Wei-yüan-hui</i>). In absolute numbers, few examinations
have been held. In practice, standard recruitment technique
continues to involve introduction, influence, or
family connections. The familiarity of such devices in
China at least gives them a high polish, and precludes
utter inefficiency. Under the circumstances, the Examination
<i>Yüan</i> finds scope for valuable, creative work
in the preparation of administrative studies and analyses
of very considerable importance.</p>
<p>The Control <i>Yüan</i> is of interest to Westerners, because
of the novelty of its functions. Through the
courtesy of the <i>Yüan</i> President, a full official memorandum
on the structure and procedure was prepared,
surveying the work of the <i>Yüan</i> during the course of the
war. This is reproduced as Appendices <a href="#Page_313">I (E)</a> and <a href="#Page_318">I (F)</a>
below.<a name="FNanchor_28_65" id="FNanchor_28_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_65" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> Some of the unofficial observers, both Western
and Chinese, felt that the <i>Yüan</i> possessed further enormous
possibilities of activity, and that the need for controlment
was very great indeed. In general, the <i>Yüan</i>
resembles its legislative, judicial and examination coordinates,
in that the war-time executive growth has
relegated it to a secondary position.</p>
<p>Decrease in the importance of the <i>yüan</i> system during
hostilities cannot be taken, by a too simple cause-and-effect
argument, as proof of the unwieldy or impractical
character of this five-power system. Measured
on a scale of other world governments, success is slow;
but it is enormous in contrast to other Chinese central
political institutions. At present, it is most improbable
that the form of government will be changed, save in
the event of catastrophe beyond all reckoning</p>
<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_38" id="Footnote_1_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_38"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See Sun Yat-sen, <i>San Min Chu I</i>, Shanghai, 1927, henceforth cited
as "Price translation," p. 296 <i>ff.</i>; or d'Elia, Paschal M., S. J., <i>The Triple
Demism of Sun Yat-sen</i>, Wuchang, 1931, p. 348 <i>ff.</i></p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_2_39" id="Footnote_2_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_39"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> An attempt to correlate Sun's democratic theory with Western concepts
is made in the present author's <i>Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen</i>,
cited, p. 107-9. The notion is clearly put in <i>L'Esprit des Lois</i>, Book 11,
ch. 2.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_3_40" id="Footnote_3_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_40"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> See Holcombe, Arthur N., <i>The Chinese Revolution</i>, Cambridge
(Massachusetts), 1930, passim, for the outstanding elaboration of this
curious experiment, and for a lucid delineation of the genesis of the
National Government.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_4_41" id="Footnote_4_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_41"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Statement to the author by Col. Ch'in Po-k'u, interview cited,
p. <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, n. 20, above.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_5_42" id="Footnote_5_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_42"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> The names of agencies and offices in the discussion of government
and Kuomintang organization are taken from K'ao-shih <i>Yüan</i> [Examination
<i>Yüan</i>], <i>Tang Chêng Chien Chih T'u-piao</i> [Charts of Government
and Party Development and Organization], Chungking, XXIX (1940),
<i>passim</i>. This work has not yet been published, since it is a draft printing,
to be revised and re-edited before formal publication. The author
was allowed to consult a copy through the courtesy of the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wang Ch'ung-hui, and the kind assistance of
Mr. C. C. Chi of the Party-Ministry of Publicity. These charts, provisional
as they are, are by far the most systematic presentation of
modern Chinese government structure which the author has ever
seen. For a brief commentary on the Council, see the one-paragraph
section, <i>The Supreme National Defense Council</i> in Tsiang Ting-fu,
"Reorganization of the National Government," <i>Chinese Year Book
1938-39</i>, cited, p. 356. Dr. Tsiang, whose other writings on Chinese
government have been models of clarity, candor, and concreteness, is
obliged to state: "As its major functions are involved in the prosecution
of the war, military necessity compels the writer to withhold the
details of its organization and work for a later issue."</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_6_43" id="Footnote_6_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_43"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> For a biased but bitterly graphic portrayal of Chiang's tiger leaps
in politics, see Isaacs, Harold, work cited, <i>passim</i>. Mr. Isaacs' portrayal
of Chiang shows him as ambitious, able, and villainous in his need
for power and his hostility to the proletariat. The Trotskyite viewpoint
is a usefully different one from that obviously adopted by the
present author.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_7_44" id="Footnote_7_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_44"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Statement to the author, August 1, 1940, in Chungking, by Dr.
Wang Shih-chieh, Secretary-General of the People's Political Council
and Party-Minister of Publicity.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_8_45" id="Footnote_8_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_45"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Wang Shih-chieh, <i>Pi-chiao Hsien-fa</i>, cited above, p. 658 <i>ff.</i></p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_9_46" id="Footnote_9_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_46"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> For example, the date of the law given in Appendix I (G), p. <a href="#Page_324">324</a>,
below, is given as August 31, 1939, and it is stated to have passed the
Council on that date at the <i>14th</i> Regular Session; since the Council
had been established seventeen months previously, some notion of the
frequency or length of sessions may thus be derived.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_10_47" id="Footnote_10_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_47"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Wang Shih-chieh, <i>Pi-chiao Hsien-fa</i>, cited, p. 662. The author
adds that though the Central Political Council possesses ample
authority to interfere in the specific work of the Judicial, Examination,
and Control <i>Yüan</i>, such authority was rarely exercised, the Executive
and Legislative <i>Yüan</i> constituting the prime objects of its attention.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_11_48" id="Footnote_11_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_48"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> The same, p. 666.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_12_49" id="Footnote_12_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_49"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> The same, p. 667-68. The following materials on the independent
agencies are also adapted in general from Wang Shih-chieh's work, although
interviews, other materials, and the practical experience of the
author have been taken into account. From 1930 to 1937 the author's
father, Judge Paul Linebarger, was Legal Advisor (<i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu
Fa-lü Ku-wên</i>), directly subordinate to the Council of State, and
throughout this period the author served as Private Secretary to the
Legal Advisor, being authorized by the Council of State to take charge
of the American office of the Advisor during the latter's absences from
the United States.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_13_50" id="Footnote_13_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_50"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Adapted from the Examination <i>Yüan</i>, <i>Tang Chêng Chien Chih
T'u-piao</i>, cited; various issues of <i>The Chinese Year Book</i>, Shanghai
and Hong Kong; and [The China Information Committee] <i>An Outline
of the Organization of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Government</i>,
Chungking, 1940.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_14_51" id="Footnote_14_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_51"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> For a description of this function in the T'ang dynasty, see des
Rotours, Baron Robert, <i>La Traite des Examens</i>, Paris, 1932, <i>passim</i>;
and see Fairbank, J. K., and Têng, S. Y., "Of the Types and Uses of
Ch'ing Documents," <i>Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies</i>, Vol. 5, No. 1
(January 1940), particularly p. 5 <i>ff.</i>, for the Manchu empire.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_15_52" id="Footnote_15_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_52"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Wang Shih-chieh, <i>Pi-chiao Hsien-fa</i>, cited, p. 671.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_16_53" id="Footnote_16_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_53"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Not to be confused with the Office of Civil Affairs (<i>Wên-kuan
Ch'u</i>), adjunct to the Council of State, described above.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_17_54" id="Footnote_17_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_54"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> A brilliant and informative discussion of the practical work of the
Executive <i>Yüan</i> is to be found in Tsiang Ting-fu, "Executive <i>Yüan</i>,"
The Chinese Year Book 1936-37, cited, p. 241-6.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_18_55" id="Footnote_18_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_55"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> For these Ministries and Commissions, see the following <a href="#Page_69">chapter</a>.
These are not to be lumped with the Party-Ministries and Commissions
which, if anything, are even more complex in structure, but whose titles
follow the same scheme of terminology as that of the government.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_19_56" id="Footnote_19_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_56"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> <i>Chün-shih Wei-yüan-hui</i>. <i>The Chinese Year Book</i>, <i>v.d.</i>, cited,
and most of the official publicity from Chungking translates this term
as "National Military Council," which is far from the original, literally
"military-affairs-committee." "National Military Council" is also easily
confused with the Supreme National Defense Council. Hence the present
translation is employed, following Tsang, O. B., <i>A Supplement to
a Complete Chinese-English Dictionary</i>, Shanghai, 1937, and the
original.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_20_57" id="Footnote_20_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_57"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> See Ho Yao-tsu, "The National Military Council," in <i>The Chinese
Year Book, 1938-39</i>, cited, p. 361-3; Carlson, Evans Fordyce, <i>The
Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency</i>, New York,
1940, p. 26 <i>ff.</i>; and frequent references in <i>China At War</i> and the <i>News
Release</i> of the China Information Committee, both semiofficial, particularly
the issue of the latter for July 15, 1939. A list of the highest
military personnel and brief outline of the General Staff may be
found in Woodhead, H. G. W., editor, <i>The China Year Book 1939</i>,
Shanghai, n. d., p. 216-17, and p. 225.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_21_58" id="Footnote_21_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_58"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> Descriptions of the subordinate organs of all these agencies but
the Pensions Commission and the War-Area Commission will be found
in Ho Yao-tsu, cited immediately above. The translations of the titles
here given, however, are those of the author.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_22_59" id="Footnote_22_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_59"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> As an instance, see <i>Outline of the Organization of the Kuomintang</i> ..., cited
above, p. <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, n. 13.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_23_60" id="Footnote_23_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_60"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> This is a semi-official agency sponsored by the Generalissimo. See
below, p. <a href="#Page_149">149</a>. The new war-time change is well illustrated by the
following statement: "Special commissioners were assigned to every
group army, and political departments in the divisions were augmented.
Enough political directors were assigned to every company of troops
withdrawn from the front for reorganization, and to Chinese forces behind
the enemy lines. In addition, political corps were formed to
organize and train civilians. Because of the lack of personnel, so far
there have been no political officers in units engaged in military operations.
</p>
<p>
"Conscious and hard-working, the political officers have done much
to remove irritations which used to occur between the commanding
officers and the political men....
</p>
<p>
"Political work in the army formerly consisted in a weekly or fortnightly
talk by the officers, whereas now well-planned lessons on
political subjects, reading classes, discussion groups, individual conversations
and twilight meetings are conducted with clockwise regularity.
Singing, theatricals, cartooning, sports, are promoted among the
soldiers so long as they do not jeopardize their discipline. Among the
civilians, the political officers have also been active. The organization
of people's service corps, self-defense units in areas close to the war
areas and money contributions to the war chest from people in the rear
are a few of their accomplishments." China Information Committee,
<i>News Release</i>, October 2, 1939.
</p>
<p>
The comment of Generalissimo Chiang in the interview on p. 371
is, despite its laconicism, relevant to this topic. A further discussion
is available in Chên Chêng, "Three Years of Political Training Work,"
<i>The China Quarterly</i>, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Autumn 1940), p. 581-5.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_24_61" id="Footnote_24_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_61"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> The official view of this work, silent on the competition of the
Communists and independents, is found in Li Chai-sum, "Chinese
Government Organization behind the Enemy Lines," last citation above,
p. 595-600.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_25_62" id="Footnote_25_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_62"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> Statement to the author by Sun K'ê (Sun Fo), President of the
Legislative <i>Yüan</i>, Chungking, July 17, 1940. A summary of the work
of the <i>Yüan</i> will be found in various issues of <i>The Chinese Year Book</i>;
in Escarra, Jean, <i>Le Droit Chinois</i>, cited above, containing bibliographies;
and in Tyau, M. T. Z., "The Work and Organization of the
Legislative <i>Yüan</i>," <i>The China Quarterly</i>, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Christmas
Number, 1936), p. 73-88.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_26_63" id="Footnote_26_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_63"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> Wang Shih-chieh, <i>Pi-chiao Hsien-fa</i>, cited, p. 676 <i>ff.</i></p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_27_64" id="Footnote_27_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_64"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> The same, p. 691.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_28_65" id="Footnote_28_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_65"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> See p. <a href="#Page_313">313</a> and p. <a href="#Page_318">318</a>.</p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span></p>
<h2><span class="smcap">Chapter III</span><br />
CONSULTATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS</h2>
<p>The outbreak and continuance of war has left the
fulcrum of power relatively untouched. The highest
organs of state are primarily in Kuomintang hands;
the Party Chief of the Kuomintang is, even at law, governmentally
more important today than in 1937; and
the constitutional monopoly of power remains under the
Kuomintang. Even changes in the highest organs—such
as establishment of the Supreme National Defense
Council and the Military Affairs Commission—have left
very little impress on the sources of power. Reforms
have altered only the mode of power, not its tenure.</p>
<p>Modifications have, however, been introduced at the
level of government just below the apex. These are
important in two remarkable ways. The People's Political
Council (<i>Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui</i>) admixed an
ingredient of representation which (save for the Party)
had been lacking since the dubious, betrayed, inaugural
years of the Republic. Furthermore, sweeping administrative
reorganization and reinvigoration made possible
the vitalization of the central government in the course
of the war, so that despite Japanese pressure and rising
Leftist rivalry, the National Government is, on any absolute
scale, becoming more powerful year by year.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The People's Political Council</span></h3>
<p>The People's Political Council was established by
order of the Emergency Session of the Kuomintang
Party Congress held in Hankow, March 1938. Its creation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span>
was a compromise measure between the proposal
for a European-type United Front government, based
on popular elections to a National Convention, and a
continuation of the Kuomintang monopoly of government
hitherto prevalent. Like many similar compromises
in other countries, the institution has proved
its viable and useful character. Without exaggeration,
it may be stated to be the closest approximation of representative
government which China has ever known.
Simple, improvised, legally an instrument promising
little independence or <i>élan</i> in its work, the Council
demonstrates the effectiveness of the Chinese when purpose
accompanies design. Formally the least representative
of the Chinese constitutional parliaments, congresses,
or conventions, the Council is the first to get
down to business and—almost unexpectedly—to represent!</p>
<p>Membership, originally set at 150, was raised before
the First Session to 200, and again in the autumn of
1940 to 240.<a name="FNanchor_1_66" id="FNanchor_1_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_66" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> The number, unlike the 1681 tentatively
projected for the People's Congress, is small enough to
allow genuine discussion and to avoid unwieldiness.
Attendance, considering war-time hazards, has been
very good, with between two-thirds and four-fifths of
the members usually present.</p>
<p>Although the Council was designed to meet quarterly
by its fundamental Statute,<a name="FNanchor_2_67" id="FNanchor_2_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_67" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> it soon changed to semi-annual
sessions and has actually met at intervals running
from six to eight months. Each session lasted for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span>
ten days (legislative, not calendar).<a name="FNanchor_3_68" id="FNanchor_3_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_68" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> As the Council
sessions recurred, the Council became more and more
free and representative. Despite the narrowness of its
legal foundations, the Council has provided invaluable
exercise in the arts of democratic discussion.</p>
<p>As a technique of representation, the Council's recruitment
system is novel. The membership was, while
the Council's total was at 200, divided into the following
four categories:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>Group A</i>: representatives of the Provinces and Special
Municipalities—88;</p>
<p><i>Group B</i>: four representatives for or from Mongolia
and two for or from Tibet—6;</p>
<p><i>Group C</i>: representatives for or from the overseas
Chinese—6;</p>
<p><i>Group D</i>: representatives of cultural, professional,
and economic bodies, or persons who have been active
in political leadership—100.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There were no elections. In the case of Group A
candidates, nominations were made by municipal or
provincial governing bodies in joint session with the
Kuomintang Party organ of corresponding location and
level. Group B candidates were nominated by the
Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission. Group C
candidates were nominated by the Overseas Chinese Affairs
Commission in the Executive <i>Yüan</i>. Group D<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span>
candidates, which included the representatives of the
Communists and independent Left, were nominated
by the Supreme National Defense Council. Two candidates
could be presented for each seat on the Council.
Subject to a minor detour or two on qualifications or for
other reasons,<a name="FNanchor_4_69" id="FNanchor_4_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_69" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> the final selection or election was made
by the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.</p>
<p>Thus, an independent or Leftist, whose life had been
more or less in danger for years, because of his hostility
to the Kuomintang and its policies, might find himself
nominated for the Council by the Kuomintang's highest
government-supervising agency, and elected by the
Kuomintang's highest Party agency. Leaders of the
hitherto suppressed, still technically illegal parties and
factions—which meant all save the Kuomintang—were
designated representatives through the fiction of selection
for individual merits. They might take an active
share in hammering out policy, and—on the same day—find
themselves legally debarred from overt public expression
of their own party work. By this device, the
Kuomintang provided a safety-valve for opposition without
touching the apparatus of its own power.</p>
<p>Had the Kuomintang leaders been obtuse and made
the Council something less than a genuine sounding
board for public opinion, or had they picked unrepresentative
members of the other groups, the whole experiment
would have failed. In practice, the compromise
worked and gave China a focus for the national concentration
of will.</p>
<p>The Council did not elect its own Speaker (<i>I-chang</i>)
and Deputy-Speaker (<i>Fu I-chang</i>); these were elected
for it by the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. Down<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span>
to 1940, the Council elected a Resident
Committee of fifteen to twenty-five members from its
own membership; under a recent reorganization, this
and the Speaker and Vice-Speaker are to be replaced by
a Presidium, to be elected by but not necessarily from
among the Council, to consist of five members and to
hold the authority of designating presiding officers.
This would amount to a further step in the independence
of the Council. In both cases, the Secretariat (<i>Mi-shu-ch'u</i>)
of the Council is to be under a Secretary-General
(<i>Mi-shu-chang</i>) and Deputy Secretary-General (<i>Fu
Mi-shu-chang</i>) and to include services of correspondence,
general affairs, Council affairs, and police.<a name="FNanchor_5_70" id="FNanchor_5_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_70" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p>
<p>With respect to competence, the Council is possessed
of three powers:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(1) the right to deliberate on all important measures,
whether of domestic or foreign policy, before these are
enacted into law by the Central Government (but not,
however, the right of making such law);</p>
<p>(2) the right to submit proposals to the government
(but since the Supreme National Defense Council is
the highest government-directing agency in China, its
concurrence is patently necessary);</p>
<p>(3) the right to demand and hear reports from the
<i>Yüan</i> and the Ministries, and to interpellate the officers
of state.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The distinguished Chinese constitutional scholar,
Wang Shih-chieh, Secretary-General of the People's Political
Council (Generalissimo Chiang himself being the
Speaker) writes of its functions:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>From the foregoing description, the peculiarities of
the People's Political Council may be clearly seen. It is
not an advisory body of the Government in the ordinary
conception of the term, because the Government is bound,
except in emergency cases, to submit to it for consideration
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span>all important measures before they are carried out. The
Council possesses not only the power to advise, but also
the right to be consulted. Nor is it a legislative organ, as all
its resolutions merely embody broad principles of legislation
or administration, i.e., lines of policy which, even
after being assented to by the Supreme National Defense
Council, will still have to go through the ordinary legislative
or ordinance-making process in order to become laws
or administrative ordinances.</p>
<p>As regards the representative character of the Council,
it rests not so much with the method by which the Councillors
are chosen, as with the fact that, being composed of
men and women most of whom enjoy wide popularity or
respect in one way or another, the Council can really speak
for almost all the articulate group-interests of the nation.
In the less than 30 years of China's experience in republican
government, numerous experiments had been attempted
at representative government before the convention of the
People's Political Council. Few of these were deficient in
theoretic grandiloquence, but none of them was found to
be serviceable in practical applicability.</p>
<p>Theoretically, the Council is not a popular assembly; but,
as I remarked elsewhere,* "it is open to question whether
any form of election by popular suffrage can result in so
truly representative a body." Even with reference to the
limited scope of the Council's powers, I submit that the
provision represents a progressive step in that any alternative
that is less realistic would impede rather than facilitate
the contributive work of the Council.<a name="FNanchor_6_71" id="FNanchor_6_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_71" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p>
<p>* <i>Chinese Year Book, 1938</i>, Chap. 17. [Wang Shih-chieh's note.]</p></blockquote>
<p>The author adds that the resolutions have tended
to be of an extraordinarily practical character, and that
bombast has remained conspicuously absent.</p>
<p>The procedure of the Council has been kept very
simple. A quorum requires only a simple majority
(101 members), and a simple majority of a quorum (51)
is all that is needed to pass a resolution. To ensure
the proper spacing of the calendar, all resolutions initiating
new business must come within the first four days<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span>
of the ten-day session. Introduction may not be completed
by the action of a single member; a petition of
20 members, one proposing and 19 endorsing, is necessary
for introduction. Reference may then be either to
the plenary session or to the committees. (There are
five standing committees—military, foreign, civil, financial
and economic, educational and cultural affairs—which
provide further facilities through subdivision into
subcommittees, or through the addition of special committees.)
Reports by the government are introduced
during the first three days of each session.<a name="FNanchor_7_72" id="FNanchor_7_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_72" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p>
<p>Members cannot waste time over the pork-barrel, log-rolling,
riders, or minor fiscal questions. Since they
all have the same constituency at law, and that constituency—the
C. E. C. of the Kuomintang—asks nothing
of them except representation of their moral constituencies—the
groups and areas from which they derive,
Councillors are untroubled by constituents or appropriations.
The budget is submitted by the government
to the Council for approval, not enactment. Salaries
of the Councillors are nil. Each is given Ch. $350.00
(about U. S. $20.00) per mouth for expenses, without
regard to mileage, and even overseas Chinese representatives
receive no further emoluments. Since government
officials are excluded from membership, use of a
Council seat for purposes of preferment is precluded.</p>
<p>A liberalization of representation and of procedure
occurred early in 1941. A new Council—involving the
first turnover in membership since 1938—was elected.
Educational and other unofficial representatives obtained
an additional twenty seats on the Council. The
changes were scarcely sufficient to compensate for the
further postponement of the promised Constitution,
but they indicated a willingness of the government to
meet demands for democratization. Procedural changes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span>
increased the effectiveness of individual members. A
minor but characteristic feature was the increase in
number and importance of women members.</p>
<p>Partisan organization in the Council, although elementary,
has begun to function. Each clique has informal
caucuses; careful scrutiny discloses the presence
of whips from these caucuses on the floor. The groupings
in the Council are so fluid that they can be variously
classified by persons with different viewpoints. (Formally,
of course, everyone is either Kuomintang or
non-Party, even though <i>The Chinese Year Book</i>, under
informal Chungking government sponsorship, proudly
lists the high rank of the Communist members of the
Council—"Chen Shao-yu (Wang Ming), [age] 33, [province]
Anhwei, [remarks] Member, Presidium, Central
Executive Committee, the Third International.")<a name="FNanchor_8_73" id="FNanchor_8_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_73" class="fnanchor">[8]</a>
The popular classification of the Council cliques, commonly
seen in the press, is based on the Four Parties
(<i>Ssŭ Tang</i>) and the Four Cliques (<i>Ssŭ P'ai</i>). The four
parties are the Kuomintang, National Socialist, Communist,
and <i>La Jeunesse</i>.<a name="FNanchor_9_74" id="FNanchor_9_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_74" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> The Four Cliques, which
according to popular credence, formed soon after the
first meetings of the Council, are based on intellectual
sympathy and the interplay of temperaments, and not
on dogma.</p>
<p>The most Leftist clique is believed to be the <i>Hua-chung
P'ai</i> (Central China Clique), with the National
Salvationists' Seven Gentlemen at their core. Deeply
sympathetic with the masses, and violently patriotic,
this group helped to bring about the war by opposing
appeasement. Like-thinking Council members, however
affiliated, are believed to fall under the legislative leadership
of the Central China Clique. Near to this, still far
to the Left of the government, is the <i>Tungpei P'ai</i>
(Northeast Clique). The Northeastern Manchurian<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span>
Chinese officers, exiled in the Northwest, were the first
bridge between the Communists and the rest of the
country. Since their native provinces and kinsfolk have
had almost ten years' Japanese domination, the Northeast
group is emphatic in demands for national unity.
Communists circulate from one group to the other, always
cooperative in offering their leadership on the
basis of a United Front, which the Comintern still decrees
for the Far East after jettisoning the Popular
Fronts of Europe.</p>
<p>The two relatively Rightist cliques are the <i>Ch'ê-yeh
Chiao-yü P'ai</i> (Vocational Educationists' Clique) and
the <i>Chiao-shou P'ai</i> (Professors' Clique). Composed of
men still so far from attaining office that they possess
perfect freedom of criticism, they therefore stand Left
of the government in daily comment, although they
may be Right of it in theory. The former group stresses
simple, direct problems: it seeks to attack the opium
problem, disease, illiteracy, and so forth, without necessarily
fighting the social revolution against the landlords.
It derives its name from two distinguished leaders
of the vocational education movement who have abstained
from active political work until finding a forum
in the Council. The Professors' Clique is reputedly led
by the group of young professors who were eminent in
their fields before the outbreak of war, opposed to the
government's appeasement policy, but tactful enough
not to rebel. They are considered to stand as far Right
as anyone on the Council—that is, to discuss politics in
terms of soundness of public policy, budgetary reasonableness,
immediate practicality, and other common-sense
standards, which appear conservative beside the
fervid idealism of their colleagues.</p>
<p>The description of the <i>Ssŭ P'ai</i> just given is one which
exists in the popular credence. A more authoritative
source placed the groups in the Council under the following
four headings:</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span></p>
<blockquote>
<p>(1) the Kuomintang and non-Party majority;</p>
<p>(2) the <i>La Jeunesse</i> Party and the National Socialists;</p>
<p>(3) the Communists;</p>
<p>(4) the "Popular Front" group, including the intellectuals and the National Salvationists.
</p></blockquote>
<p>On this basis, the Kuomintang would retain its working
control of the Council, which appears to be the
case, in terms of work performed. The unaffiliated
majority, selected by their local governments and Kuomintang
offices and elected by the Kuomintang C. E. C.,
would in doubtful cases be inclined to turn to Kuomintang
leadership. The <i>La Jeunesse</i> Party, despite the fact
that it is a Western-returned student organization, is
strong in Szechuan; its influence could be expected to
run with that of the National Socialists. Both parties,
while minute, are decidedly averse to Communist fellow-travelling
and not at all disposed to alter the <i>status
quo</i>, except to carve modest niches for themselves and
to advance their programs in an agreeable way. The
Communists stand alone, although they offer their cooperation
to the independents.</p>
<p>The Popular Front group is a category widely recognized
in China—the Left Kuomintang, the discontented
idealists, the irrepressible patriots, the minor
parties, the indefatigable conspirators of Chinese hopefulness
who are always on the scene. For years they
have been unforgotten witnesses to the ferocious integrity
of ideals which (in individuals scattered at random
at all levels of society) call Chinese out of the
lethargy of being very practical.</p>
<p>The Popular Front leaders, more than any other in
China, have withstood perennial temptation for years
and have kept their activities, under whatever name
undertaken, intact. They can be distinguished from
other Party leaders, both Nationalist and Communist,
by the facts that they have never set up a government,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span>
with jobs in it for themselves; have never controlled
a government, save through lacunae in power politics;
and have never preserved a government which they did
control. Warm-hearted, philanthropic, patriotic, their
shrill zeal has been audible in China for many years.
Without formal organization, they have stood behind
others who sought real power, and today—between the
cold, realistic leaders of the two opposing Parties—are
assembled, ever-hopeful, and advocating a Popular
Front.</p>
<p>The Secretary-General stated to the author that he
regarded three of the Council's contributions as of
history-making importance. First, the Council openly
expressed a Chinese national unity unprecedented in
modern history. Forms apart, never before had a
crisis found all Chinese so united; the Council gave a
symbol to that unity. Second, the Council raised the
probability of successful democratic processes in China.
Failures under the Peking parliaments had reduced
democratic discussion to a sham. The Council erased
this discredit, making many people believe that democracy
promises a real value to the country—not merely
as an ideal, but as a practicable means of government.
This contribution was reinforced by a third: the Council
actually served to make definite, serious, concrete
improvements in government and Kuomintang structure,
through criticism and through the issues aired.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Administrative Pattern</span></h3>
<p>Central policy-making is complicated by a trifurcation
of organs—Party Headquarters, Military Affairs
Commission, and Executive <i>Yüan</i>. For example, the
nation's publicity and broadcasting services, as well as
direction of the official news agencies, are under the
(Kuomintang) Party-Ministry of Publicity, while the
Foreign Office possesses its own publicity organs for the
international relations field, and the Political Department<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span>
of the Military Affairs Commission handles much
domestic propaganda and agitation. The strictly governmental,
permanent administrative agencies are simplified
from their pre-war complexity, as the following
list will show:</p>
<p><span class="smcap lowercase">EXECUTIVE</span> <i>Yüan</i></p>
<blockquote><p>
Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
Ministry of the Interior<br />
Ministry of Finance<br />
Ministry of Economic Affairs (to be reorganized)<br />
Ministry of Social Affairs (pending)<br />
Ministry of Education<br />
Ministry of Communications<br />
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry<br />
Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs<br />
Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs<br />
National Relief Commission<br />
Ministry of War (also under the Military Affairs Commission)<br />
Material and Resources Control and Supervision Ministry (pending; status uncertain)</p>
</blockquote>
<p><span class="smcap lowercase">JUDICIAL</span> <i>Yüan</i></p>
<blockquote><p>Ministry of Justice</p></blockquote>
<p><span class="smcap lowercase">CONTROL</span> <i>Yüan</i></p>
<blockquote><p>Ministry of Audit</p></blockquote>
<p><span class="smcap lowercase">EXAMINATION</span> <i>Yüan</i></p>
<blockquote><p>Ministry of Personnel<br />
Examination Commission</p></blockquote>
<p>The Ministries outside the Executive are well adapted
to their respective <i>Yüan</i>, although Americans may
think the Ministry of Justice misplaced. The Executive
Ministries form the heart of the administrative system,
immediately below the cabinet (Executive <i>Yüan</i> Meeting).
The Party scaffolding is to be torn down with
constitutionalization; the military scaffolding, with
peace. The administrative organs at the center will<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span>
then bear the real burden of nourishing and protecting
the nation which now they help to create.</p>
<p>Despite strong Chinese imprints, the central administrative
agencies are organizationally more Westernized
than the policy-making agencies. For this reason, and
because administrative emphasis is on matters economic
(outside the scope of the present work), the reader is
referred to other sources for a detailed appraisal of the
work of the ministries. Particularly fortunate is it that
<i>China Shall Rise Again</i>, partly written and partly edited
by Madame Chiang K'ai-shek,<a name="FNanchor_10_75" id="FNanchor_10_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_75" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> has been published,
including authoritative statements by the leading ministers
on the work of their respective ministries.</p>
<p>The Ministries (<i>pu</i>) may be classified into three
groups, according to the major tenor of their work: political,
social and cultural, and economic. Military defense
through economic development and social reconstruction
remains their common goal, however divergent
the approaches.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Political Ministries</span></h3>
<p>Senior and most famous of all Chinese ministries is
that of Foreign Affairs (<i>Wai-chiao Pu</i>). It inherits the
splendid traditions of Chinese diplomacy, dating back to
the redoubtable Pan Ch'ao, who almost single-handed
conquered Central Asia in the first century <span class="smcap lowercase">A.D.</span> by unsleeping
guile and consistent boldness. Modern Chinese
diplomacy has made the best of a hundred years of defeat,
successfully exploiting the mutual suspicions of
the imperialist powers. The morale and professional<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span>
cohesion are high. Despite incessant political changes,
the foreign office and diplomatic service have preserved
their continuity from the Empire to the present. The
Chungking government probably possesses a foreign
office superior to the Gaimusho of Tokyo.<a name="FNanchor_11_76" id="FNanchor_11_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_76" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p>
<p>The effectiveness of Chinese international statesmanship
has aroused an almost superstitious dread among
the Japanese, publicists, officials, and others. Japan consistently
complains that China is superior at propaganda,
and sees, behind the world-wide mistrust of Japan, occult
forces from the Comintern or vile Chinese guile.
After they perpetrated the Nanking horrors, insulted
neutral men and women in Tientsin, machine-gunned
a British ambassador, sank an American gunboat, and
violated all available international law, the Japanese
believed that British and American lack of sympathy
was mostly due to the machinations of Chinese diplomacy.
The recent Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr.
Wang Ch'ung-hui, a former Judge of the Permanent
Court of International Justice (World Court), is one
of the modern world's greatest legal scholars. Eminent
in political leadership ever since the first foundation of
the Republic, he has always urged moderation, legality,
and intelligence in government.</p>
<p>The Ministry of the Interior (<i>Nei-chêng Pu</i>) forms
the apex to China's constitutional system of provincial
and local governments. In accordance with Sun Yat-sen's
teaching, the National Government has consistently
sought to reduce the importance of the provinces
and to foster direct local-central intergovernmental relationships.
The importance of this ministry is reduced
somewhat by the fact that other agencies possess their
own field services, and are therefore not obliged to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span>
route policy through it, but it remains significant because
of its control and supervision of China-wide administrative
development. The National Health Administration
(<i>Wei-shêng Shu</i>), formerly separate, is
now a department of this Ministry.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Social and Cultural Agencies</span></h3>
<p>The Ministry of Education (<i>Chiao-yü Pu</i>) has continued
active despite the war. The heroic marches of
the Chinese universities to their new homes in the West
have become a world-famous epic. Students, faculty, and
staffs moved out of the sinister zones of enemy occupation,
usually travelling on foot, until they found new
homes hundreds or even thousands of miles from their
original locations. Some colleges have found homes in
old temples or in caves where, with a minimum of
equipment and library material, they continue their
work. Others, more fortunate, have become guests of
West China institutions. West China Union University
in Chengtu has four other universities on its campus,
all using the same facilities for the duration of the war.
Still other institutions have been consolidated.</p>
<p>The Ministry of Education has subsidized education
as generously as possible, and fosters progress despite
the war and because of it. In spite of all handicaps,
institutions of higher learning have risen in number
from 91 in 1937-38 to 102 in 1939-40, with a corresponding
rise in enrollment of 31,188 to 41,494.<a name="FNanchor_12_77" id="FNanchor_12_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_77" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> The
entering class for 1940-41 was about 12,000, indicating
a continued rise.<a name="FNanchor_13_78" id="FNanchor_13_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_78" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span></p>
<p>In addition to the accredited institutions, there are
innumerable volunteer agencies, some of which are
patriotic but educationally elementary schools for saboteurs,
agitators, and guerrillas. Education is propaganda,
but such is its immediate appeal that Left schools
obtain capacity attendance. A few students are disappointed.
One wrote, "The most unpleasant thing to me
was that, as soon as I entered the Resist-Japan University,
I was deprived of my liberty. I was not free in
speech; I was not allowed to say anything outside of
Marxism-Leninism ..." and went home.<a name="FNanchor_14_79" id="FNanchor_14_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_79" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> The total
attendance remains high; if added to that of the accredited
institutions operating according to government
standards, it would swell the sum enormously.</p>
<p>In addition to formal aid to institutions of higher
learning, and administration of the National Government
colleges, the Ministry sponsors the mass literacy
movement. In this it has had the benefit of the work of
Dr. James Y. C. Yen and his associates.<a name="FNanchor_15_80" id="FNanchor_15_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_80" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> The war,
moving vast masses of people and shifting the modernized
city-dwellers from the coast to the interior, has
proved a stimulus to the rise of literacy and the demand
for popular literature.</p>
<p>The Ministry is headed by Ch'ên Li-fu, whose
brother, Ch'ên Kuo-fu, is head of the (Kuomintang)
Central Political Institute. Together they stand at the
Right center of the Kuomintang, exerting enormous influence
on the Party and on the country. Both have
been very close to the Generalissimo, and took a large
share in revitalization of the Kuomintang before and
during the war.</p>
<p>The two Commissions serve important needs. The
Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs (<i>Ch'iao-wu<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span>
Wei-yüan-hui</i>) is the informal Chinese equivalent of a
colonial office. The Commission looks after the welfare
of the overseas settlements of the Chinese, fostering
language schools, hospitals and the like. It acts through
Chinese community associations, rarely through official
channels. Practices of hyphenated citizenship, so offensive
to one Western nationality when undertaken by
another, are unobtrusive and necessary in the case of the
Chinese. With the outside states putting Chinese in a
special economic, legal, and political category—through
immigration laws, administrative practice, and extra-governmental
pressure including lynching—the individual
Chinese who deracinates himself is indeed a lost
soul. Few Chinese worry about overseas Chinese <i>irredentas</i>.
The Commission fosters no <i>putsches</i> and
mobilizes no fifth columns, but does help to keep Chinese,
whatever their nationalities, still Chinese.</p>
<p>The Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs
(<i>Mêng Tsang Wei-yüan-hui</i>) is the supreme agency for
the dependencies. It has a record of considerable success
in fostering a good-neighbor policy toward the half-autonomous
dominions of Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang,
also called Chinese Central Asia),<a name="FNanchor_16_81" id="FNanchor_16_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_81" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> Tibet, and
Inner Mongolia. Outer Mongolia is under indirect
Soviet control, and Eastern Inner Mongolia under
the Japanese. The Chinese have utilized every device
of courtesy and diplomacy in retaining their precarious
grip on these areas. The Commission includes dominion
members.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Economic Ministries</span></h3>
<p>The Ministries dealing in economic matters bear the
ultimate burden of resistance. Upon their success<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span>
depend China's tools of war. If artillery, aircraft, machine-guns,
munitions, food, clothing and other necessities are
not available to the central armies, the opportunity for
counter-attack may come and go, and China be lost—not
through the power of her enemy, but through her
own weakness. Unless economic mobilization succeeds,
the guerrilla warfare in the occupied area will be frustrated,
since its purpose is merely to prepare for a
<i>révanche</i> from Free China; history affords few examples
of guerrillas defeating mass armies, fighting positionally,
without the intervention of other mass armies.</p>
<p>The Ministry of Finance (<i>Ts'ai-chêng Pu</i>) is the
leader of the Economic Ministries. Headed by H. H.
K'ung, successor to the celebrated T. V. Soong, it has
performed fiscal miracles in maintaining the credit of
the National Government. Chief among its accomplishments
has been the institution, within the past decade,
of a managed currency on the gold-exchange standard.
Specie had been the immemorial medium of exchange,
and Chinese experience with paper money—from the
earliest times to the present—had been unfortunate.
Starting with the 1860's, China had undergone one
paper-money inflation after another. Governmental currency
was frequently a receipt for silver on deposit, in
which case it amounted to no more than a commodity
warehouse certificate, thereby subject to discount for
transportation charges, and fluctuating meanwhile with
the world price of silver; otherwise it was fiat money,
guaranteed by stranglers' cords and long knives. Fractional
coins passed by metallic weight; the shifts in the
price of copper in New York and London determined
the number of pennies which farmers received for their
silver dollars, even on the threshold of Tibet.</p>
<p>By putting private bank notes, both Chinese and
foreign, out of circulation, systematizing note issuance
to four government banks and a limited number of
carefully supervised provincial agencies, the National<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span>
Government made the change with far less difficulty
than anyone, even optimists, dared to hope. Until the
outbreak of war subsidiary coinage was copper and
aluminum; this has been replaced by fractional paper,
circulating decimally without discount for exchange
into larger bills. Simple peasants, who used to hide
a slug of silver in their fields, now conceal a Bank of
China, Bank of Communications, Central Bank of
China, or Farmers' Bank of China <i>fa pi</i> (legal tender)
note in roofs or walls.</p>
<p>Other noteworthy reforms include the standardization
of levies in the provinces, now proceeding to some
degree, and the imposition of direct taxes, a revolutionary
step for China. Income and inheritance taxes,
previously thought to be uncollectible in a pre-modern
area such as China's hinterland, are yielding substantial
sums. War borrowing is done almost entirely through
domestic loans. These are issued in the form of patriotic
contribution bonds, and are available in denominations
as low as Ch. Nat. $5.00 (about 28 U. S. cents). Further
support has come in the form of American, British, and
Soviet fiscal aid, and—until the outbreak of the European
war—additional credits, both private and intergovernmental,
from continental Europe. The Ministry has
moved with a financial prudence which promises to
maintain China's domestic and foreign credit for further
years of war.</p>
<p>The Ministry has engaged in direct conflict with the
enemy through bank-note rivalry. Throughout the occupied
area, National Government currency is in conflict
with the issuances of the Japanese army and the
pro-Japanese governments. The Chungking policy has
been to hold back the invasion currencies, on the assumption
that continued circulation of the national
currency maintains a continued popular stake in the
government. Many guerrilla leaders believe that the occupied
areas should use nothing of value to the Japanese,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span>
and therefore encourage the issuance of local emergency
currency.</p>
<p>Under the Ministry of Finance, numerous efforts have
been made to keep foreign trade alive. With war-time
pressure on transportation facilities, foreign trade has
become a virtual monopoly of the government; few
major transactions are made by wholly private interests,
since in addition to monopolizing the highways, government-owned
corporations also have access to differentials
in foreign exchange (which often mark the
difference between great profits and none). In the
matter of the governmentalized Sino-American trade,
correlated with the American credits, the Foo Shing
Corporation (export) and the Universal Trading Corporation
(import) control the current both ways. The
Ministries of Communications and of Economic Affairs
also have a share in this state-capitalist business.<a name="FNanchor_17_82" id="FNanchor_17_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_82" class="fnanchor">[17]</a></p>
<p>Subdivisions in the Ministry of Finance include sections
for customs, salt gabelle, internal revenue, general
taxation, public loans, currency, national treasury, accounting,
and general affairs. Efforts are now in progress
to consolidate all intragovernmental fiscal services,
so that the budget shall cover the entire government, and
separate agencies will no longer be able to make half-controlled
collections and disbursements.</p>
<p>The Ministry of Economic Affairs (<i>Ching-chi Pu</i>) is
in general responsible for the industrialization of an
area half the size of Europe with well over two hundred
million inhabitants. No non-industrial state can defeat
an industrial state unless it has access to the industrial
resources of third parties. The Chinese, realizing this,
have launched a modernization process unparalleled
in modern history. The two greatest migrations of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span>
twentieth century have occurred, most probably, in
China: the first the settlement of Manchuria, and the
second the flight to the West. In each case more than
twenty million persons have been involved. The Ministry
of Economic Affairs has transformed this rout into
a pioneering advance. Refugees have been taught to
bring their tools with them; when they had no tools
their skills have been sought out and utilized. As the
national armies and government retreated up the Yangtze
and inward, they brought along the personnel of
a modern economic system, and set an industrial society
down in a world technologically backward.</p>
<p>West-China modernization will probably be the most
durable economic consequence of the war. Cities near
the edge of Tibet have underground electric power and
automatic telephone systems. Primitive salt-drying areas
have been modernized; in one instance, steel pipe being
lacking, bamboo pipelines, plastered and cemented for
reinforcement, run cross-country. Filthy, tax-ridden,
vicious little cities which had been the haunts of opium-sotted
militarists are now given the double blessing of
fair government and a business boom. (The author felt,
when he returned to America in September 1940, that
he was going from a new country to an old, leaving
the hope, zest and high spirits of the Chinese
frontier for the comfortable melancholy of American
half-prosperity.)</p>
<p>On the government side, the stimulation to technological
advance has consisted of broad, experimental use
of government personnel, subsidies, and part-ownership,
together with some outright state socialism. Four types
of encouragement appear with particular frequency:
the government-controlled movement of private industries
from the endangered areas to the West, government
sponsorship of brand new industrial enterprises,
official encouragement of cooperatives, and state ownership-management
of enterprises.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span></p>
<p>Many industries were saved for China through compulsory
movement. Thousands of tons of industrial
equipment were moved up to the West, floated on
barges and river-boats, or dragged by hand over macadam
highways, dirt roads, and mud footpaths. One
single enterprise, the Chung Fu Joint Mining Administration
of Honan, successfully transferred one hundred
and twenty thousand tons of equipment, now applied
to coal mining in the Southwest.<a name="FNanchor_18_83" id="FNanchor_18_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_83" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p>
<p>Government sponsorship of new enterprises covers
the entire field of modern industry. Investors wait in
line before opportune undertakings. Electric light
bulbs, safety matches, automobile parts and tools, clothing—everything
from machine-shop tools to luxury
goods is being produced in the West. Bottlenecks do
occur in new industries competing for priorities in imported
machinery.</p>
<p>In the field of cooperatives, the C. I. C. (China Industrial
Cooperatives) stand out as truly important social
and economic pioneering. (See below, p. <a href="#Page_223">223</a>.)</p>
<p>Government ownership has not been niggard or
timorous. In most cases it has followed American patterns
and appeared in the form of government-owned
corporations, but there are also a considerable number
of frankly state-operated enterprises, such as municipal
food stores, ferries, and heavier industrial undertakings.
The munitions and motor fuel trades are, so far as the
author could find, entirely a matter of government ownership.
In the air communications and airplane production
field, government ownership is relaxed to the point
of a senior partnership in joint companies with foreign
corporations; the latter provide the supplies and trained
personnel.</p>
<p>The Ministry of Economic Affairs is under the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span>
control of Wong Wen-hao,<a name="FNanchor_19_84" id="FNanchor_19_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_84" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> whose career was first distinguished
in geology and educational administration. His
scientific outlook stands him in good stead, since the
exploitation of West-China resources requires scientific
as well as business application. Subdivisions of his Ministry
include those of mining, industry, commerce, water
conservancy, and general affairs.</p>
<p>A Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (<i>Nung Lin
Pu</i>) was set up in 1940 as the third economic ministry.
Industrialization's dependence on farm products makes
this an invaluable coordinate to the other two Ministries.
The Chinese are in many cases proceeding directly
from pre-industrial to the latest chemico-industrial
techniques, and skipping the phase of reliance
upon subsoil minerals. Gasoline is being mixed with
fuel alcohol derived from grain; plastics are appearing.</p>
<p>Agriculture also involved China's greatest social problem—that
of encouraging freehold or cooperative farming
at the expense of sharecropping. Much of the agricultural
reform is undertaken by the new local government
and provincial government plans, but the problems
of farm prices, general farm planning, and utilization
of agricultural products fall on the Ministry.
It is headed, not by a farm leader or expert, but by the
General Chên Chi-tang, former governor of Kwangtung
Province.<a name="FNanchor_20_85" id="FNanchor_20_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_85" class="fnanchor">[20]</a></p>
<p>A proposed Material and Resources Control and Supervision
Ministry (or Ministry of Economic Warfare),
based approximately upon the British Ministry of
Supplies, is in process of organization.<a name="FNanchor_21_86" id="FNanchor_21_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_86" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> The Ministry
may be kept independent of either the Executive <i>Yüan</i>
or Military Affairs Commission, since it is to coordinate
a group of industrial and commercial agencies which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span>
are now independent. Upon its establishment, the
Ministry of Economic Affairs will become one of Industry
and Commerce, and a central agency for economic
war work will be available.</p>
<p>The National Relief Commission (<i>Chên-chi Wei-yüan-hui</i>)
supervises the general relief work of the government,
which is performed in part by the extragovernmental
war and Party agencies and in part by local and
provincial authorities. The immensity of the relief
problem in China has always been such that organized
relief can do no more than stir the misery of the masses.
Opportunely for the National Government, the Imperial
Japanese Army is securely in possession of the world's
greatest relief problem, and unable to relinquish it.
Chungking is more fortunate. (The author never
dreamed that prosperity such as he saw in West China
could exist in Asia. Prices are extremely high, but
wages and farm prices tend to follow, and unemployment—always
low in China because of the work-sharing
role of the family—is almost completely out of sight.
Skilled labor commands remuneration fantastic by pre-existing
scales.)</p>
<p>All these agencies, and much of the rest of the government,
depend upon the Ministry of Communications
(<i>Chiao-t'ung Pu</i>). The invasion struck at existing communications
lines; Japanese are now in control of the
mouths of all major Chinese rivers, most of China's
railway mileage, and the coastal system of modern highways.
A glance at the map of China will show that
Japanese forces have hugged modern communications
lines, whether steamship, railway, or highway. Whenever
the Japanese ventured far from these lines, they
met with disaster.</p>
<p>The Ministry of Communications has used existing
facilities to draw new networks. The short stretches of
railway in Free China are still operated; <i>matériel</i> from
the occupied zone was brought West on them, and they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span>
are undergoing rapid development. Roadbeds are being
constructed in anticipation of future imports of
steel rails. Steamship enterprises, under government
subsidy, operate extensively, and new reaches of river
have been opened to service.</p>
<p>Three lines of reconstruction have proved very fruitful:
motor communications, telecommunications, and
the rationalization of pre-modern facilities already at
hand.</p>
<p>Motor communications, both highway and aerial,
have shown enormous progress. Air service is maintained
by the China National Aviation Corporation and
the Eurasia Company, both owned by the Chinese Government,
the former jointly with Pan American Airways
and the latter with German interests. Through connections
from New York to Berlin are available by the
combined services of the two companies.</p>
<p>The highway system can be thought of as spider-like.
Three enormous legs reach to the outside: the Chungking-Kunming-Lashio
route, famous as the Burma
Road; the trans-Sinkiang route, finally connecting
with the Soviet Turksib Railroad beyond thousands of
miles of desert and mountains; and the due North
route, now being developed, reaching the Trans-Siberian
Railroad. The body of the system is a tight,
well-metalled skein of roads interconnecting the major
cities of Free China. Most highways are all-weather,
and well-engineered, but niceties of surfacing have been
postponed.</p>
<p>Truck and bus service is regular, but very crowded,
with inescapable confusion as to priority. The majority
of the operating firms are government-owned, either by
the central government or the provinces. Complaint has
arisen over the restrictions to private enterprise in this
field. Since gasoline costs about U. S. $1.00 per gallon
and is available only under permit, further official obstructions
to highway use seem unnecessary.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span></p>
<p>Telecommunications have been maintained and extended.
Telegraph service has reached into hitherto
untapped areas, and wireless is extensively employed.
Radio services operate under the Kuomintang, not the
government; stations XGOX and XGOY reach North
America and Europe with propaganda in the world's
leading languages. The telephone has come to be a
regular part of Chinese official and business life, and
is to be seen, far off the beaten track, as one of the
heralds of industrialization.</p>
<p>All these modern services would, however, be grossly
insufficient for the needs of the whole nation at war.
They have been supplemented through the use of every
available type of pre-modern transportation. Most of
these rely on man-power, and have had their own
elaborate organization for many centuries: boatmen's
guilds, unions of transport coolies, carters, muleteers
and camel-drivers. It has been possible to ship heavy
freight through country consisting of mountains traversable
only by stone-flagged footpaths or torrential
streams. The Ministry has regimented this complicated
pre-modern world, with impromptu modernizations as
startling as they are efficacious. Where once couriers
trotted, they now speed by on bicycles or motorcycles;
the squealing wooden-axled wheelbarrows of the Chinese
countryside are yielding to pneumatic-tired carts
which resemble American farm trailers. Three to eight
men can drag one cart, with half a ton of freight, over
any terrain, making up to forty miles a day. Provision
can be made, therefore, for moving a quarter-million
tons of raw materials across territory lacking even the
most elementary roads. The roughness of the country,
which bars the Japanese army, is no obstacle to huge
coolie gangs, drafted sometimes, but more usually hired.</p>
<p>The Minister of Communications gave the following
written answers to questions put by the author:<a name="FNanchor_22_87" id="FNanchor_22_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_87" class="fnanchor">[22]</a>
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span></p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. In view of the political interruptions to commerce
through British and French territories south of China, will
efforts be maintained to keep communications on the same
schedules southward that they had before?</p>
<p>Yes, because commercial and export traffic is still being
carried on southward, and there is a large accumulation
of important materials to be moved from the frontier
inward.</p>
<p>2. Will the restriction of gasoline lead to the abandonment
of certain truck and bus routes, and the maintenance
of others, or do you expect to restrict all routes evenly?</p>
<p>We expect to restrict all important routes evenly if the
motor fuel situation becomes really acute.</p>
<p>3. Is a motor road running through Inner and Outer
Mongolia directly north to the Trans-Siberian Railroad
a feasible project?</p>
<p>Yes, it is a feasible project.</p>
<p>4. For all practical purposes, is the Soviet route as it
exists an adequate although expensive channel for the import
of high-class American machinery, such as trucks?</p>
<p>Yes, the Soviet route as it exists is adequate though expensive
for the purpose.</p>
<p>5. Is there evidence that mail between the United States
and China has been censored or tampered with while in
transit past Japan?</p>
<p>No, there is no such evidence so far.</p>
<p>6. How extensive a foreign personnel do you have in
the varied agencies under your Ministry?</p>
<div class="center">
<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary=" Agencies under the Ministry">
<tr><td align="left">Postal Service:</td><td align="right">28</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">China National Aviation Corporation:</td><td align="right">15</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Eurasia Aviation Corporation:</td><td align="right">13</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Railways:</td><td align="right">8</td></tr>
</table></div>
<p>7. What developments of the last three years do you
regard with most pride, as evidence of China's power to
cope with the emergency?</p>
<p>The timely completion of the Yunnan-Burma Highway
may be considered as evidence of China's power to cope
with the emergency and as an important development in
the field of war-time communications. The Highway is
960 kilometers long from Kunming to Anting on the
frontier. Construction began in October 1937. Eleven
months later, the road was opened to through traffic. At
one time during its construction, as many as 100,000 laborers
were employed on the road.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span></p>
<p>The highest point on the Highway is 2,600 meters above
the sea level, yet the road has to pass two deep valleys, the
Mekong and the Salween, where the Highway dips a few
thousand feet within a distance of several miles in order
to reach the river bed, and rises precipitously again in the
same manner just beyond the suspension bridges over the
two turbulent rivers. The scarcity of local labor, the
enervating climate, and the wild and sparsely populated
country traversed, all combine to make the construction
work difficult. But now, anyone may take a motor car and
cover the distance between Chungking and Rangoon in
two weeks, as Ambassador Johnson did soon after the Highway
was completed.</p></blockquote>
<p>The Minister Chang Kia-ngau (Chang Chia-ao) is
one of the most eminent bankers in China. His Ministry
is a model of business-like organization and systematic
routines; he has a great reputation for getting
things done in the American fashion—quickly, and
without ceremony.</p>
<p>In addition to these major ministries, there are the <i>Pu</i>
of Justice (part of the Judicial <i>Yüan</i>, sharing its war-time
somnolence), of War (affiliated with the Military
Affairs Commission), of Audit, of Personnel, and—in
process of establishment—of Social Affairs, supplementing
the Party-Ministry of Social Movements (<i>Shê-hui
Yün-tung Pu</i>) now under the Kuomintang Headquarters.</p>
<p>All Ministries are headed by a Minister (<i>Pu Chang</i>),
seconded by a Political Vice-Minister (<i>Chêng-wu Tzŭ-chang</i>)
and Administrative Vice-Minister (<i>Ch'ang-wu
Tzŭ-chang</i>). Since almost all officers are political appointees,
and few of the new career men have touched
the higher levels of the bureaucracy, this duplication
prevents a job famine and keeps personnel levels high;
the utility of a large administrative staff depends, obviously,
on the nature of the executive. Some of the
most crowded ministries seem permanently under-staffed
because of the intense activity they maintain; others,
with skeleton staff, appear to have far more civil servants<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span>
than service. The over-all picture of the Ministries,
however, leads inescapably to the conclusion that they
are really functioning today. Long-transmitted vices of
sloth and sinecures are on the wane. The war, high-lighting
every demerit into treason, has created optimum
conditions for administrative progress in China.</p>
<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_66" id="Footnote_1_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_66"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> China Information Committee, <i>News Release</i>, Chungking, September
30, 1940; and the same, December 30, 1940.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_2_67" id="Footnote_2_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_67"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Wang Shih-chieh, "The People's Political Council," <i>The Chinese
Year Book 1938-39</i>, cited, p. 346-55; the same, <i>The People's Political
Council</i>, [Chungking], [1939?], pamphlet, reprinted from <i>The China
Quarterly</i>, Vol. 4, No. I (Winter 1938-39). Dr. Wang's contributions,
brief as they are, worthily supplement his pre-war constitutional
studies, and provide the most carefully annotated data on the Council
which the present author has found. The list of members given in
the first article, above, is one of the most interesting documents of
our time, giving, as it does, the residence, profession, and age of each
Councillor. Beside "Former Prime Minister" one finds "Living
Buddha attached to the Panchen Lama," "Reserve Member, Executive
Committee, the Third International," "Professor, National Peking
University" and "Head of the Mêng Clan, Descendants of Mencius."</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_3_68" id="Footnote_3_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_68"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Woodhead, H. G. W., editor, <i>The China Year Book, 1939</i>, Shanghai,
n. d., Ch. IX, "The Kuomintang and the Government," contains
a detailed summary of the first two sessions of the People's Political
Council (p. 231-7). Quigley, Harold S., "Free China," <i>International
Conciliation</i>, No. 359 (April 1940), includes a judicious appraisal of
the work and meaning of the Council in its first two and one-half
years (p. 137-8).</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_4_69" id="Footnote_4_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_69"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Wang Shih-chieh, "The People's Political Council," cited, p. 346 <i>ff.</i>
The new system, inaugurated early in 1941, provided for 90 members
to be directly elected by Provincial and Municipal People's Political
Councils.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_5_70" id="Footnote_5_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_70"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Tang Chêng Chien Chih T'u-piao</i>, cited, chart of the <i>Kuo-min
Ts'an-chêng Hui</i>.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_6_71" id="Footnote_6_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_71"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Wang Shih-chieh, <i>The People's Political Council</i>, cited, p. 5.
Obvious misprints have been corrected.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_7_72" id="Footnote_7_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_72"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> The author is indebted for some of these facts to an interview with
Dr. Wang Shih-chieh in Chungking on August 1, 1940.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_8_73" id="Footnote_8_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_73"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>1938-39</i> issue, p. 351.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_9_74" id="Footnote_9_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_74"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Described below, p. <a href="#Page_159">159</a> <i>ff.</i></p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_10_75" id="Footnote_10_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_75"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> May-ling Soong Chiang (Madame Chiang K'ai-shek), <i>China Shall
Rise Again</i>, New York, 1941. Chinese economic developments are the
subject of careful study by the Institute of Pacific Relations, whose
<i>Far Eastern Survey</i> follows contemporary developments closely and
whose <i>Inquiry Series</i> offers a monumental collection of linked works on
Pacific affairs, with particular stress on the economic background to
politics. The volume in this series on Chinese political development,
by Lawrence K. Rosinger, may be expected to fill an important gap
in the literature on China today.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_11_76" id="Footnote_11_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_76"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> For the latest description of the organization of the <i>Wai-chiao Pu</i>,
see Wang Ch'ung-hui, "China's Foreign Relations during the Sino-Japanese
Hostilities 1937-1940," Chapter XIII of Chiang, May-ling
Soong, <i>China Shall Rise Again</i>, cited, p. 139-40.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_12_77" id="Footnote_12_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_77"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>China at War</i>, Vol. V, No. 2 (October 1940), p. 37.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_13_78" id="Footnote_13_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_78"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> The same, Vol. V, No. 4 (November 1940), p. 78. See also Wu Yi-fang
and Price, Frank W., <i>China Rediscovers Her West</i>, New York,
1940; Chapter VII, "Holding the Educational Front" (p. 69-76) is by
Y. G. Chen, President of the University of Nanking. The entire work
edited by Messrs. Wu and Price is of value; written from the missionary
point of view, it presents first-hand statements of affairs on Western
China, and continues with liberal and socially conscious appraisals
of the needs of Christian work.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_14_79" id="Footnote_14_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_79"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> Wang Wên-hsiang, "K'ang-jih Ta-hsüeh yü Ch'ing-nien Fan-mên"
("The Sorrows of Youth and the Resist-Japan University") in
the symposium entitled So-wei "<i>Pien-ch'ü</i>" (The So-called "Frontier
Area"), Chungking, XXVIII (1939), p. 30 <i>ff.</i></p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_15_80" id="Footnote_15_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_80"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> See the discussion of the mass education problem, below, p. <a href="#Page_218">218</a>.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_16_81" id="Footnote_16_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_81"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Among the recent books on Sinkiang, one, unusual because
it is by a Chinese author, stands out: Wu, Aitchen K., <i>Turkistan
Tumult</i>, London, 1940. The travel books of Sven Hedin, Ella Maillart,
Peter Fleming, and Sir Eric Teichman also contain material of
political interest.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_17_82" id="Footnote_17_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_82"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>The Far Eastern Survey</i> keeps effectively up to date with all new
developments in this field. An authoritative but understandable explanation
of the work of the Ministry is found in H. H. K'ung,
"Holding China's Financial Front," Ch. XI, work by Mme. Chiang
K'ai-shek, cited above.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_18_83" id="Footnote_18_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_83"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> Wong Wen-hao, Minister of Economic Affairs, "Industrialization
of Western China," Ch. XIV, work by Mme. Chiang K'ai-shek, cited
above, p. 142.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_19_84" id="Footnote_19_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_84"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> He also spells it Oung Wen-hao; by the Wade transliteration,
Wêng Wên-hao.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_20_85" id="Footnote_20_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_85"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> China Information Committee, <i>News Release</i>, Chungking, July 1,
1940.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_21_86" id="Footnote_21_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_86"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> The same, December 23, 1940.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_22_87" id="Footnote_22_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_87"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> Communication of August 12, 1940; in the present author's
possession.</p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span></p>
<h2>Chapter IV<br />
PROVINCIAL, LOCAL, AND SPECIAL-AREA GOVERNMENT</h2>
<p>China consists of twenty-eight provinces, varying
in size about as do the European nations. Of the
twenty-eight, fourteen are wholly under Chinese control,
or are so slightly touched by invasion that normal
governmental processes continue. Ten provinces are
under dual or triple government—by the Japanese and
pro-Japanese Chinese, by guerrilla and other semi-independent
groups, and by the usual constitutional
authorities. The remaining four are under firm Japanese
domination, under the name <i>Manchoukuo</i>.<a name="FNanchor_1_88" id="FNanchor_1_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_88" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> Well
over half of China's population is under the National
Government, and about one-ninth under unchallengeable
Japanese control; the residuum is the subject of
sharp political competition. The war is not merely a
war between governments: it is a struggle for the creation
of government.<a name="FNanchor_2_89" id="FNanchor_2_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_89" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p>
<p>This problem would be immense even if there were
no war. Under the successive Imperial dynasties of the
past millennium, China developed extreme regional
autonomy. Despite absolutist theory, the provinces
under their governors or viceroys were practically as
independent as states of the American union in the early
nineteenth century.</p>
<p class="center">PROVINCIAL AND URBAN GOVERNMENT</p>
<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;">
<a href="images/i_098fp-large.jpg"><img src="images/i_098fp.jpg" width="400" height="529" alt="Provincial and Urban Government" /></a>
</div>
<p class="center">* optional<span style="margin-left: 5em;">† legal, not administrative, entity</span></p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span></p>
<p>With the advent of war, the position of the provinces
has become more precarious, truly new political devices
in the form of novel regional governments have
appeared, and the concrete problems of reform in the
village communities have become as imperative as
military measures.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Provinces</span></h3>
<p>The war-lord period was ushered in by the death of
Yüan Shih-k'ai, dictator-President and commander-in-chief,
in 1916. He had inherited a tradition of dual
government—civil and military—no less sharp than the
Japanese distinction, and had continued it by placing
his military henchmen in power as provincial satraps.
After his death, each province had a military governor
(<i>Tuchün</i>), who sometimes tolerated a civil governor
(<i>Shêng-chang</i>) and sometimes held both posts concurrently.
The various <i>tuchün</i> rivalled one another in a
vain turmoil until the rise of the National Government
suppressed or incorporated them. Even today some of
these men hold remnants of their power, but it is still
declining. The power of the National Government has
increased almost every year for over fifteen years, and
its programs, bequeathed by Sun Yat-sen, call for the
constant diminution of provincial authority, until in
the end the province shall be little more than a postal
link between the central government and the districts
(<i>hsien</i>).</p>
<p>Continued vitality of the provinces as a form of political
life is shown by the chariness with which the government
approaches the problem of re-subdividing the nation,
by the continued effect of provincialism through
the influence of geography, botany, ecology, economics<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span>
and spoken language, and by the manifest utility of the
provinces in the prosecution of the war. It is impossible
to discuss any aspect of Chinese affairs for very long
without entering into distinctions between provinces.</p>
<p>In mild, modified, and controlled form, the pattern
of civil-military contrast in provincial government still
prevails. The civil governor, now in almost all cases
the weightier official, is legally termed Chairman of the
Province (<i>Shêng Chu-hsi</i>), but he frequently possesses
a military colleague amiably designated Pacification
Commissioner (<i>Sui-ching Chu-jên</i>).<a name="FNanchor_3_90" id="FNanchor_3_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_90" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> The war has eradicated
almost the last vestiges of provincial militarism.
No Chinese army is in a position to make peace with
Japan through the negotiated treason of its commander,
although small groups occasionally change sides both
ways.<a name="FNanchor_4_91" id="FNanchor_4_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_91" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> On the other side of the picture, it is not altogether
certain how far the National Government could
go in replacing local leaders; more has been done than
ever before, but the Generalissimo has tried to work<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span>
honestly with all leaders, provincial or independent,
subsuming their power under his and the Government's
without destroying it. Four provinces still show
traces of autonomy.</p>
<p>Largest of the four is Sinkiang (Chinese Central
Asia), under the military leader Shêng Shih-ts'ai; it is
subject to very strong Soviet influence, since it is more
accessible from the Soviet side of the border, via the
Turksib Railroad, than from China. Its trade naturally
flows out through the Soviet Union. The provincial
authorities have been harsh toward Christian work, and
casually cruel to occasional travellers. Since the National
Government is exceedingly anxious to maintain
good relations with the Soviet Union, and obtains much
of its supplies from that country across Sinkiang province,
it has made no attempt to interfere. The province
has cooperated enthusiastically in war efforts; it is
strange to see Central Asiatics with European features
marching with Chinese troops. Many of the independent
Leftist leaders have been welcomed in the area, although
simon-pure Marxians are rare, and the province,
with a new university, new air bases, new industries, and
a trans-Asia highway, is undergoing rather spectacular
development. The British and the Soviets are mutually
so suspicious that the Chinese are likely to keep
control, but the Chinese central government, taking no
chances, cooperates rather than commands.</p>
<p>Yünnan, under General Lung Yün, is the second
province with special features. Relatively isolated from
the rest of China until the completion of the Kunming-Chungking
stretch of the Burma Road, it has never
been occupied by large National Government forces.
The provincial chairman submitting in form and cooperating
in fact has been left unmolested in his position.
The province is becoming modernized by a great
deal of commerce and development; it is likely that this
vestigial autonomy will fade away unnoticed.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span></p>
<p>Kwangsi province possesses as leader General Pai
Chung-hsi, one of the ablest military men in China. A
Kuomintang leader of long standing, he followed, in
conjunction with the leaders in Kwangtung (Canton),
a policy of <i>de facto</i> autonomy down to the very outbreak
of war. He and his associates even had an independent
air force, which was promptly merged into the National
air service. During the war, he has fought in central
China. The economic ruin of Kwangtung and the occupation
of Canton city by the Japanese has quenched
Cantonese autonomy, but Kwangsi has been relatively
untouched. No whisper of suspicion has imputed separatism
to General Pai, but should he desire it, he is one
of the few men left in China still to have the means.</p>
<p>In Fukien province, General Ch'ên I serves as Chairman.
He studied in Japan and has a Japanese wife. He
remains loyal to the National Government, and he has
fought the Japanese along the coast. No Chinese observer
has criticized him, but Westerners have observed
that Fukien is remarkably quiet; the Japanese have done
little beyond blockading the coast and seizing the major
ports, and the Chinese have launched no counter-attacks.
It is possible that some unexpressed sense of understanding
between the Governor and the Japanese prevents
further conflict, while the Generalissimo—content
to leave well enough alone—lets matters stand as they
are.</p>
<p>Provincial government, as outlined in the chart at
p. 98, is very simple in structure. The Commission
plan, similar in many respects to the Galveston plan in
American municipal government, reduces the Provincial
Chairman to the status of <i>primus inter pares</i>. The departments
of the provincial government are headed by
members of the province's committee. The presence of
provincial offices of the Kuomintang, military services,
and war agencies makes a provincial capital a place more
important than it seems in theory. A valuable innovation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span>
in provincial administration has been the inauguration
of the Provincial People's Political Councils (<i>Shêng
Ts'an-chêng Hui</i>). These are being taken seriously by
the administrations. Although they occasionally pass
visionary, impracticable, or bombastic resolutions, their
work has for the most part been concrete. They have
aided a great deal in transforming the atmosphere of
government, and act as competent outside critical bodies
to check the administrative officers.</p>
<p>Provincial government has been significantly transformed
by the war. Dr. T. F. Tsiang (Chiang T'ing-fu),
a distinguished historian who served on a central
inspection commission to the Southwest in 1940, stated<a name="FNanchor_5_92" id="FNanchor_5_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_92" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>
that provincial government has improved in two
outstanding ways: first, there is a real desire to understand
the common people, and to do something for
them. This was unheard-of a few years past. Second,
all—or almost all—of the officials work very hard. There
is far more work than there are men. Money is frequently
available but unexpendable because there are
not enough experts to go round. Hence, the provincial
governments find their need is for men rather than
funds, and the war is bringing new levels of actual accomplishment.
Although most of the governors have
military titles, many of these are like Kentucky colonelcies,
courtesy titles from time past. The over-all
effect is of hard work and little bombast.</p>
<p>Special Municipalities, most of which are now under
Japanese occupation, are directly subject to the National
Government and only incidentally a part of the provinces
in which they are located. Ordinary Municipalities
are under their respective provincial governments,
but not under a <i>hsien</i> (district or county) administration; in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span>
some cases they include several former hsien.
The Municipality is headed by a Mayor (<i>Shih-chang</i>),
advised by a City Council (<i>Shih-chêng Hui-i</i>) composed
of the chiefs of the administrative sections, several supplementary
counsellors, and representatives from the
Municipal Advisory Assembly (<i>Shih Ts'an-i-hui</i>), if
one exists. Below the <i>Shih</i> the urban pattern of local
government differs somewhat from the rural, but otherwise
city government displays no features peculiarly
Chinese.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Local Government</span></h3>
<p>Chinese local government has been the ever-fertile
soil out of which successive Empires grew. To no other
level of government has the Republic reached so poorly.
Since China is constituted of about half a million villages,
several thousand market towns, and a few hundred
major cities, the bulk of the population is rural, but
rural in a way foreign to the West. Congestion imposes
upon agrarian China many problems and evils known
as urban in the West. Corruption in government, extortion
in economics, demoralization in social and family
life—these start with the village and the <i>hsien</i>. Inconspicuous
in any single village, each evil summed to
its China-wide aggregate becomes tremendous.</p>
<p>Government has not been beloved by the Chinese
farmer. Governmental benefits—for the continuance of
scholastic culture, the protection of the realm, the creation
of grandiose public works—were remote, but taxes
were not; government meant the taxgatherer. Fêng Yü-hsiang,
one of the great war-lords and now a Kuomintang
general, says of his own childhood:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The people, except for paying their taxes, had nothing
to do with the government. The government never paid
any attention to the conditions under which the people
lived, and the people never bothered themselves about what
the government was doing. One party collected the taxes;
the other paid them. That was all there was to it. Although Paoting
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span>city was only about two <i>li</i> [less than a mile]
away, the inhabitants of Kang-k'ê village showed no interest
in city civilization; instead, they rather looked down
on that sort of thing. No discussions of politics were
heard, and nothing about the encroachments of the foreign
powers on China. All the big changes seemed to have taken
place in another world, and very seldom affected this place.</p>
<p>When the government was about to collect taxes, the <i>Li
Chêng</i> [a petty local officer] would ring a gong from one
end of the village to the other, shouting:</p>
<p>"Pay your taxes! Four hundred and sixty coins to the
<i>mou</i> [about one third of an acre] for the first harvest!"</p>
<p>When the people heard the gong, they did not go and
pay their taxes immediately. They would walk listlessly
to their doorways, only to withdraw after having taken a
nonchalant look at the <i>Li Chêng</i>—as though they had
heard nothing. They would wait until the very last minute,
until they could not put it off any more, and then go, group
by group, to the city to hand in money they had earned by
sweat and blood.</p>
<p>They were industrious and miserable all through the
year ...<a name="FNanchor_6_93" id="FNanchor_6_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_93" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p></blockquote>
<p>This basic level of Chinese society is not easily susceptible
to standardization, or the imposition of ready-made
bureaucracies. Even in the United States, it would
be almost impossible to impose a uniform plan for community
organization from Bangor to San Diego and
Walla Walla to the Bronx. Sun Yat-sen once said to
Judge Linebarger, "China is a land of autonomy from
the smallest village upward. Who shall dictate to the
sub-governments of China the form and manner in
which they shall express their local governmental needs?
Of course, we must have a minimum of uniformity for
both economy and efficiency in government, but the
will of the people must be followed."<a name="FNanchor_7_94" id="FNanchor_7_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_94" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> By seeking to
remedy political abuses the National Government<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span>
apparently hopes that economic inequalities will be ironed
out by the people themselves.</p>
<p>The Chinese land problem cannot be understood except
at the politico-economic nexus, where low political
morale exposes the farmers to the unrestrained power
of the gentry, acting in the triple capacity of officials,
landlords, and money-lenders. The cycle, familiar in
the West, of freehold farmers or yeomen first mortgaging
their land, then becoming tenants, and finally ending
in utter economic helplessness, has been familiar in
China. In China's past, the cycle had another phase:
agrarian insurrection sweeping the land with banditry
and innumerable rebellions, thereby increasing the fiscal
burden on the remaining land, leading to worse exploitation,
until the slate was swept clean by dynastic
collapse, general civil war, and a new Imperial house,
whose administrative decline began another cycle. The
peasantry never won completely, and never lost utterly.
Today, if one judges by past experience, rebellion or reform
seems long overdue.<a name="FNanchor_8_95" id="FNanchor_8_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_95" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p>
<p>The detailed legislation adopted by the National
Government in war time is given in <a href="#Page_324">Appendix I (G)</a>,
and Chiang K'ai-shek's own explanation of the new
system in <a href="#Page_388">Appendix III (C)</a>.<a name="FNanchor_9_96" id="FNanchor_9_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_96" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> One might explain the
general plan quite simply in terms of inter-connection
between the central government and the millions of
households. The <i>pao-chia</i> system is one of mutual aid
and mutual responsibility between households and
groups of households, under government supervision.
It has appeared in China from time to time since the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span>
Ch'in dynasty (221-203 <span class="smcap lowercase">B.C.</span>). If used for welfare purposes,
it amounts to a recognition of the pluralistic
character of Chinese society by the government, and the
happy utilization of the family pattern. Applied for
police purposes, it is well suited to repression and terror.
Thus, today the National Government is applying the
<i>pao-chia</i> system (in relation to its whole scheme of
local government) as a measure of progress and reform,
while the Japanese encourage the same organizations in
occupied China as a device for despotism and exploitation.</p>
<p>Expressed in law, now being applied in fact, the <i>chia</i>
is a group of six to fifteen families (households), and
the <i>pao</i>, a group of six to fifteen chia. The hsiang is
formally composed of six to fifteen pao; actually it approximates
what is loosely termed a community in the
United States (<i>e.g.</i>, a city ward, a single suburb, part of
a rural election district). The <i>ch'ü</i> is the rough equivalent
of a township. The <i>hsien</i> (district; county) is the
fundamental unit of the traditional China-wide bureaucracy.
Hence the missing steps are not those between
the <i>hsien</i>, near to two thousand in number, and the
central government. The gaps occur between the half-billion
Chinese and their two thousand <i>hsien</i>. The following
chart shows the broad outlines of the system:<a name="FNanchor_10_97" id="FNanchor_10_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_97" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p>
<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;">
<img src="images/i_107.jpg" width="400" height="211" alt="Outlines of The System" />
</div>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span></p>
<p>This is the official government plan. If ever put into
complete effect, China will consist of hundreds upon
hundreds of thousands of self-governing units, arranged
on seven levels (the five local levels; provinces; nation),
and the world will wonder at a massive new democracy.
In practical politics, what seems to be happening is that
the system extends to the National Government areas,
involving less than three hundred million people. Much
of the application is purely formal, and signifies no more
than did the grant of an imaginary suffrage under the
first Republic. Elsewhere the new system is installed
with telling administrative effect, improving the bureaucracy,
strengthening the state, but not arousing
much popular participation or enthusiasm. And in the
remainder the program is beginning to work as is intended
with genuine elections and popular participation
in government.</p>
<p>The three chief devices which have been applied to
the reform of local government are: instruction, mandate,
and other remote controls; inspection systems; and
training courses. First are the attempts to change local
government by transmission from the capital of voluminous
instructions, manuals, etc., supplemented by
similar Kuomintang action for Party reform. In the
second case, central officials go to the provinces. During
the summer of 1940, a number of such groups of officials
divided China between themselves, each group taking
a number of provinces for its inspection zone. The
presence of a central delegation in the field led to some
housecleaning, provided an incentive for immediate
work, and informed the National Government of the
condition of the country. Some junketing was observable,
but not enough to vitiate the work of inspection.
By the third device, local officials are called to training
centers. The Generalissimo is very fond of this method.
He encourages the selection of younger men, who
thereby feel that their careers are given a boost. They<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span>
are taught modern governmental practice while living,
in most cases, a disciplined but comfortable half-military
life. Some training conferences are convened <i>ad hoc</i> in
a promising area; others continue from year to year under
the government or related organizations. Many
thousand men and women undergo some form of training.
The program has clearly discernible effects in improving
local government. The selection of persons
who either hold office or are likely to hold office provides
a practical self-interest motivation. Further minor devices
of local government reform include the grants in
aid to the provinces, the establishment of model <i>hsien</i>,
the military eradication of banditry, the reclamation of
farm land and forests, some resettlement, and much
planned modernization with small-scale projects. Town
after town has received the stimuli of modernization
from one of these sources.</p>
<p>Estimates—nothing more could be found—concerning
the effectiveness of this program varied considerably.
Since two equally skilled observers, considering the
same institution at first hand, can differ sharply in their
value judgments of efficacy or integrity, this is not surprising.
A few Westerners and Leftists have insisted that
the program was almost altogether sham. A few formal,
optimistic officials have insisted that it has succeeded
almost everywhere. One competent foreign observer
told the author that he believed the <i>pao-chia</i> system to
be installed in 90 per cent of Free China, and to be
actually working in 50 per cent. Another agreed more
or less with these figures, but suggested that there were
enormous differences between the provinces, some being
genuinely transformed and others remaining unaffected.
A Chinese official, himself a social scientist,
who had been intimately connected with local reform,
stated that 50 per cent application for all Free China
would be much too high an estimate, except for the
holding of token elections. Only in Kwangsi province<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span>
was the new self-government structure working over
half of the countryside; elsewhere, the ratio was about
one-fifth effective as against four-fifths nominal.</p>
<p>Most of all, genuine application consists in making
institutions available, and thereupon letting the people
help themselves. If local government is of practical use
to the common people, they can be counted on to discover
its utility promptly. If it is of no practical use,
they will know that too. Whatever the present degree
of success, obstacles still confront the program. Local
extragovernmental institutions possess enormous vitality.
If superficial or slipshod reforms are made, the new
local governments will be merely operated as screens
for secret societies, landlords' unions, or other narrow
cliques.</p>
<p>Contrastingly, a tradition of discussion and public
action makes it equally possible that the rural masses,
familiar with cooperative action, will operate the new
institutions successfully. The difference between success
and failure is not to be measured in terms of wholly
new achievement; it is determined by the choice of
existing institutions which, transmuted and fitted, fill
the pattern of the rationalized local government system.
If narrow, class-bound or unprogressive groups assume
the regalia of a novel legality, using their position to
obstruct further development, the program will fail.
If the town-meeting, cooperative potentialities of the
entire adult population are aroused, and if the ordinary
farmer or coolie can see that he has the opportunity of
bettering his livelihood through political action, the
success of democracy will be assured.</p>
<p>Potentialities in the field of local autonomy are enhanced
by the fact that the National Government has
competitors. The Japanese have an opportunity which,
instead of utilizing, they have done their best to destroy:
conquest through prosperity. If they and their Chinese
associates offered low prices, easy marketing, and fair<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span>
taxes, in the place of arson, rape, thievery and bluster,
their failure would become less certain. As a third side
to the triangle of competitive power, the Communists
and independent Left, while allied to the National
Government, rival it in winning the loyalty of the population.
Huge areas in Communist and guerrilla sections
are sampling reform of a drastic and immediate kind:
the lowering of taxes, the democratization of government,
the abolition of usury. With the traitors on its
Right and the Communists or guerrillas on its Left, the
National Government does not abandon its chief politico-economic
weapon by disregarding land and labor
reform. None of the three parties has anything to gain
by inaction. None has an interest which binds it to self-dooming
reaction.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Communist Zone</span></h3>
<p>Three new governmental areas which are neither
provinces nor local governments have come forth out
of unification and war. Their relationship to Chungking
is strange, perhaps unique. They are not states
members of a federal union, since China is a unitary republic.
They are not new regional commissions, creatures
and extensions of the central government, because—whatever
the theory—they were independently initiated.
They are not allies, because they profess national
unity. They are not rebellions, because they fight
a common enemy, only occasionally coming into conflict
with government troops. Yet they possess some of
the features of each of the following: federal states,
regional subgovernments, allied states, and rebellions.
They cut across the pattern of the National Government.
Two are governments; one is an army. The
army and one government are largely Communist; the
other government is a genuine United Front of the
parties. Two are North Chinese; one is Central Chinese.
But all three have this in common: they are Leftist,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span>
actively revolutionary; they are objects of patronizing
suspicion to the central authorities, who are glad of
the help but worry about its post-war cost.</p>
<p>The first and most famous of these areas is the Communist
zone in the Northwest. Formally it includes
eighteen <i>hsien</i>; the Communists claim inclusion of twenty-three.
After being termed the Special Administrative
District of the Chinese Republic (<i>Chung-hua Min-kuo
T'ê-ch'ü Chêng-fu</i>), and then Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia
Frontier Area (<i>Shan-kan-ning Pien-ch'ü Chêng-fu</i>), the
zone assumed the much more modest style of Administrative
Area of North Shensi (<i>Shan-pei Hsing-chêng-ch'ü</i>).<a name="FNanchor_11_98" id="FNanchor_11_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_98" class="fnanchor">[11]</a>
This Frontier Area is in personnel and Party
life a direct continuation of the Chinese Soviet Republic.
Leftist and Communist circles talk as though it
were a wholly autonomous state, resting on its own
military power, but cooperating with the National Government
for national resistance and reconstruction.
This is largely true—at any rate, more realistic than the
opposing view, which avers that no change has taken
place in the Northern part of Shensi province, and that
the Communists are interfering with the proper processes
of government. The following is a characteristic
statement of the latter position:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>At present the name "Frontier Area" seems to be very
common because it is so called in false propaganda about
the "independent sovereignty" [<i>tzŭ-li wei-wang</i>]. But if
we agree that the so-called "Frontier Area" is a part of
the territory of the Chinese Republic, the name ought to
have been issued in conformity with the decrees of the
central government. According to central government decree,
it is only a "Supplementary Recruitment Area for the
Eighth Route Army," but not an area of civil administration.
[The author, in an extended discussion, challenges
the re-division of the provinces as a matter not to be undertaken
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span>casually, denies the legal foundation of the term
"Frontier Area," and then examines its practical justifications.
He finds that the Communists have two: the regime
is now a <i>de facto</i> system, its existence is a <i>fait accompli</i> and
further discussion must proceed from this point; also, the
regime is founded in popular opinion, and the government
should not violate the wishes of the people. He disagrees
with both of these and seeks to refute them, insisting on
lawful procedure and constitutional government. He concludes
with a peroration to the Communists themselves.] ... this
problem is really quite simple, unlike the Sudeten
problem. Was it the Communist Party of China which
called the Sudeten Party of Czechoslovakia violators of the
unity of their own country and running dogs of Fascism?
Therefore, I think that they would never imitate what the
reactionary Sudeten party did. And was it the Communists
who originated the "United Front"? Hence they must understand
very clearly what unification means to China, and
must never utter things which they do not really believe.
Therefore, with the rising tide of national unity and
concentration, I suppose that the odd name "Frontier
Area," which is contrary to the real sense of unification, will
soon pass away and be a mere historical term.<a name="FNanchor_12_99" id="FNanchor_12_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_99" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p></blockquote>
<p>In practical terms this implies the informal reconciliation
of two claims constitutionally and legally incompatible.
The Chinese Communist leaders operate
under the national law codes as much as they are able.
They employ the national currency. They use the
nationally standard system for local government. They
profess unity. At the same time they maintain, as a
hard reality, a separate regime in which the Communist
Party is supreme, the Party Line is gospel, and dissidents
are dealt with as "pro-Japanese traitors" or otherwise.
Transit between National Government territory
and Communist territory is not altogether easy. Leftists
are reported to have died on their way to the Northwest,
and Nationalists are equally well reported to have
disappeared after they got there.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span></p>
<p>The Area itself is an unpromising piece of land.
"From 36° N. Lat. on up, South of the Great Wall and
West of the Yellow River, there lies a vast, desolate
tract of yellow plateau, inhabited by half a million people.
The plateau slopes from North to South; the further
South it runs, the lower the land lies, but it is still
1000 meters above sea-level at the lowest place. This is
what we have already known as Northern Shensi. In this
region, the ground is always covered with a layer of
yellow dust ... Furthermore, rainfall is scarce and no
irrigation has been introduced, so that agricultural
products are extremely scant. Under such geographical
limitations, Northern Shensi has become a region notorious
for its poverty."<a name="FNanchor_13_100" id="FNanchor_13_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_100" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> For a Chinese to call an area
notoriously poor implies a degree of destitution which
the American mind cannot grasp. In such an area, the
welcome to Communism is obvious, and the problems
of Communism, once settled, are equally obvious. The
probability of mineral resources opens up opportunities
for development under Red rule, but these are distant.</p>
<p>Interpretation of the achievements of the Communist
regime vary with the political standpoint of the observer,
just as they do in the case of the Soviet Union. Sympathetic
observers, both Western and Chinese, report
enormous improvements in agriculture, fair land taxes,
new cooperatives, brilliant experimental democracy,
bold education, and great enthusiasm.<a name="FNanchor_14_101" id="FNanchor_14_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_101" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> No<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span>
unsympathetic Western visitors have been reported admitted,
and a few neutrals came away enthusiastic; but critical
Chinese have found as much to question as one might
find in a similar Western situation: terrorism, puppet
elections, murder both judicial and plain, sham education,
and immorality are charged.</p>
<p>The position of the Frontier Area is clear in a few
respects.<a name="FNanchor_15_102" id="FNanchor_15_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_102" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> In the first place, it is not declining. Communist
strength is believed to be growing, by persons
of almost all forms of political belief; differences arise
only over the rate and probable maxima of that growth.
The Communist strength in the Northwest is far less
than it was in South Central China seven years ago, but
much of that loss of power has been compensated for
by increased relations with sympathetic guerrillas. Secondly,
the Communist area is strategically poorly located.
The land itself is poor; the adjacent large cities
are completely under Nationalist control; and the general
military-political locale is something like northern
Arkansas in the United States. This explains the willingness
of the Nationalist commanders to avoid friction
with the Communists, and the positive zest with which
they suggest further consolidation of Communist forces
around the one center at Yenan. It soothes the impatience
of Communists who wish unrestricted rights<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span>
of agitation, organization, and propaganda throughout
the country. Although the Communists make little
visible headway against the Japanese in the great urban
slums of the coast, they are anxious to obtain freer access
to city workers. Thirdly, the Communist area displays
no structural peculiarities of government. Its profound
difference from the rest of Free China is not a
difference in institutional forms, but in the forces operating
behind and through those forms. The Chinese
Communists have achieved very considerable success in
working within the legal limits of another state philosophy,
and have done it with a minimum of violence;
this augurs well for the perpetual continuation of the
truce. Their practical accomplishments are extensive
and novel; their leadership, brilliant; that their government
should be so orthodox in form is all the more
significant. By remaining within orthodox limits they
challenge the National Government on common
ground; the gain is theirs and China's.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Guerrilla Governments</span></h3>
<p>The special area second in importance is the Hopei-Chahar-Shansi
Border Region (<i>Chin-ch'a-chi Pien-ch'ü
Lin-shih Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i>). Widely publicized
in the Western world as the Hermit Government,
this regime functions altogether within the Japanese
lines. A number of competent Western observers have
visited this area, among them Major Evans Fordyce Carlson,
Mr. Haldore Hanson, and Professor George Taylor.
All have come away most enthusiastic about the work
of the government. The governmental picture which
emerges from their and other accounts is one of a
highly flexible mechanism, working with great efficacy
and superb morale.<a name="FNanchor_16_103" id="FNanchor_16_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_103" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> The driving power behind the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span>
regime is social revolution as a means to national resistance,
made easy by the flight of many former local
bureaucrats, and by the treason of some ultra-conservatives,
who affiliated themselves with the Provisional
Government established by the Japanese in Peiping.
The personnel is as genuinely United Front as may be
found anywhere in the world; the position is eased by
the circumjacency of the Japanese, and the formal recognition
of the area by the Military Affairs Commission
and the Executive <i>Yüan</i>.</p>
<p>The Border Region, like smaller guerrilla areas elsewhere
in occupied China, is scarcely a domestic political
problem because it is enfolded by the Japanese armies.
Even a United Front area, such as the Border Region,
would lead to far greater difficulties in political adjustment
if established in Free China. The tension and
balance between the Parties is such that this strain might
not be borne. Behind the Japanese lines, where the
central armies cannot do anything even if they wish,
the Border Region finds Chungking's acquiescence to
be stimulated by Chungking's impotence. What could
or will happen if the Japanese leave the dividing area,
and the Border Region has to settle the issue of <i>status
quo</i> v. <i>status quo ante bellum</i> with the central
govern<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span>ment, no one knows. The Generalissimo told the present
author that he did not fear the encroachments of
the guerrilla groups, because he and they were all working
for democracy.</p>
<p>Following from this involuntarily protective and insulating
role of the Japanese forces is the constitutional
theory of the Border Region. Unlike the Frontier
Area, where it is exceedingly difficult to gloss over the
autonomy of Communist rule, the Border Region is
definitely established as a war-time agency, controlling
territory beyond the reach of the provincial governments.
The provincial governments still function, in
unoccupied corners of their provinces, or in exile, and
the openly provisional (<i>lin-shih</i>) nature of the Border
Region makes it palatable even to Kuomintang conservatives.</p>
<p>The pattern of government is one of devolution from
an Executive Committee, which was established by a
meeting of officials, volunteers, mass organizations, and
others at Fup'ing in January 1938. The area is divided
into provincial districts which are able to function with
economy of personnel. The following outline illustrates
the structure of this area:<a name="FNanchor_17_104" id="FNanchor_17_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_104" class="fnanchor">[17]</a></p>
<p class="center">EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE</p>
<p class="center">Secretariat<br />
Civil Affairs Department<br />
Financial Affairs Department<br />
Education Department<br />
Industry Department<br />
Justice Department</p>
<p class="center">Inspectorates of the Seven Provincial Districts</p>
<p class="center"><i>Hsien</i> Governments or Joint <i>Hsien</i> Governments or
Sub-<i>Hsien</i> Governments</p>
<p class="center"><i>Hsien</i> Districts</p>
<p class="center">Village Committees</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span></p>
<p>A very high degree of direct popular government has
been achieved. Over wide areas, the average age of the
<i>hsien</i> magistrates is in the twenties. Recruitment to the
Region of numerous professors and students from Peiping
has helped to fill the need for trained personnel,
and has assisted in maintaining the area as a genuine
multi-group affair rather than a Communist front.
Communists, although present and highly esteemed, do
not hold the highest formal offices. (For further consideration
of the United Front problem, see below,
p. <a href="#Page_123">123</a>.)</p>
<p>The New Fourth Army (<i>Hsin-ssŭ-chün</i>), third of
the special zones, was formed by re-consolidation of the
small mutually isolated Soviet areas left behind when
the main Communist forces made the celebrated Long
March. When first assembling under the truce, these
Red units faced a certain amount of difficulty from
the provincial military who did not grasp the United
Front idea, but the Military Affairs Commission recognized
them. The Army did not establish a government
except through its Political Department, which
coordinated political work of the volunteer village
committees.<a name="FNanchor_18_105" id="FNanchor_18_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_105" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p>
<p>According to available reports, the Army stands far
to the Left of the Border Region. Formally United
Front, its proportion of Communists is much higher
and Communist control more telling. Operating in East
Central China—the Anhwei-Kiangsu-Kiangsi-Fukien-Chekiang
area—which provided the base of ten years'<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span>
Communist insurrection and was long the home of the
Chinese Soviet Republic, the New Fourth Army Zone
represents a recrudescence of Soviet activities under
different names and with a different military objective.
This fact has caused intense dissatisfaction among some
Kuomintang generals, who spent half their careers trying
to root out Communism in that same area. They do
not mind the Communist zone in the Northwest, where
an effective informal <i>cordon sanitaire</i> can be drawn,
but renewed Communist activity in the Yangtze valley
impresses them as an evil not much less than pro-Japanese
treason.</p>
<p>The New Fourth Zone, the Border Region, and the
Frontier Area—together with a wide scattering of guerrilla
areas and governments individually of less but
collectively of equal importance—are the military step-children
of the Chinese government. They all receive
subsidies for their work, varying in amount. Usually
this is calculated on the number of <i>hsien</i> actually occupied
as bases, so that the sum provides for a far smaller
number of villages than those directly affected. In the
case of troops, the salary allowances are based on the
permitted size of the units, in almost all cases below the
actual numbers. The money is paid to the commanders
or other leading officials, who then set salary rates incomparably
lower than those of the central forces. The
money thus saved is applied to the general budget of
the forces. Corruption, while occasional and inescapable,
seems to be more sharply punished in the guerrilla
than in the government areas.</p>
<p>In January 1941, the New Fourth Army was officially
abolished, following a clash with regular National
Government forces. The clash arose from a fundamental
difference between the Generalissimo and the
New Fourth leaders concerning the nature of the Chinese
government. The Communists and their sympathizers
held that the unity of China was a political<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span>
union between separate groups. When the Generalissimo
ordered the New Fourth Army to move North, and
oppose the Japanese forces above the Yangtze, the New
Fourth countered with a demand for arms and funds.
Treating this as military insubordination in war time,
the central forces attacked the New Fourth—each side
claiming that the other opened hostilities—capturing
Yeh Ting, the commander. The rest of the Army was
officially abolished, although its main forces were within
the occupied zone and outside the Generalissimo's
reach. A full Communist-Nationalist clash was avoided,
however, and the Red leaders unwillingly acquiesced in
the Generalissimo's interpretation of the episode as a
military and not a political affair. The conflict brought
forth the fundamental Communist question: are the
Chinese Communists loyal first to the Chinese government,
or first to the Communist Party? No answer
was forthcoming, although the Communists failed to
rebel elsewhere. The Generalissimo, by military swiftness
and political acumen, had triumphed in one more
particular instance.</p>
<p>With the parsimonious policy of the central government
keeping them in fiscal extremity, the more Leftist
guerrilla units make up their lack of funds with direct
economic measures. These include suspensions of rents
to landlords, regulation of share-cropping, lowering of
taxes on the poorer farmers, and creation of cooperatives.
The Communists have strained every point to
avoid actual class war, and the economic reforms of
the guerrilla and special areas are smoothed by the
usual absence of the landlords. The political necessity
of a bold economic policy remains important, if the
special areas are to continue their activity against Japan
or—in the Frontier Area case—their independence. Political
development thus is inclined to stress the use of
popular machinery of government, not for the creation
of systematic, modern, responsible bureaucracy, but for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span>
pushing vigorous mass action, direct popular government,
and socio-economic reconstruction, revolutionary
by implication if not by immediate content.</p>
<p>Not all the guerrilla areas fall into the Left pattern.
The Kuomintang, so long habituated to control of the
state mechanism that its revolutionary background is
somewhat dimmed, is bringing Kuomintang guerrilla
work into action. The Party and Government War
Area Commission is the chief supervisory agency for
this work, and an enormous amount of planning has
been done. Actual application of mass-movement work
seems as yet to lag behind that of the Left. Meanwhile,
in most areas except the Communist Northwest, Kuomintang
officers, officials, teachers, and volunteers are
active. The guerrilla groups all accept the same flag,
hail Chiang as their leader, recognize the <i>San Min Chu I</i>
as the state ideology, and maintain the cherished symbols
of unity.</p>
<p>The Government and the Kuomintang were reportedly
seeking a settlement of the whole special-area
problem, in anticipation of the close of war, by urging
the movement of all Communist or Communist-infiltrated
forces Northward, so that a more or less continuous
Left corridor would run from the Border Region
to the Frontier Area. This precipitated the clash
with the New Fourth Army; in March 1941 no settlement
has been reached. Part of this is owing to the
Communist desire to have unrestricted agitational
rights, and to official Kuomintang insistence that no
Party other than itself is constitutionally legitimate.
The special areas meanwhile prepare fighters in the
anti-Japanese war, and are helped by a government
which is proud of them as Chinese but mistrustful of
them as Leftists. And they develop vigorous applications
of democratic formulae which challenge the reality
and sincerity of everything the National Government
does behind the lines.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span></p>
<p>Despite recurrent clashes, it is likely that the areas
and the government will continue their present relations.
In part this is owing to the genuineness of the
universal hatred of Japan and the devotion to the long-cherished
unification now achieved; in even greater
part the wrangling, acrimonious, but effective cooperation
of the government and the guerrilla Left depends
on their equal and great desire for such cooperation.
The highest Kuomintang leaders—above all others,
Chiang—have pledged themselves to unity and cooperation,
and are determined to eschew civil war in the
midst of invasion; the higher Communist leaders are
equally determined. In three years of collaboration,
the highest officers on each side have developed very
genuine respect for each other's sincerity. Quarrels are
provoked by the men in-between, overbearing Nationalists
or the doctrinaire Communists, who cannot forget
1927-37. (The author talked to one Communist leader
who had an odd, not unattractive muscular tic in his
face: the consequence of Kuomintang torture a few
years past. Yet he collaborates, and so do his Kuomintang
equivalents, men whose parents lie in unknown
graves.) The common people on both sides want peace
above all else, internal peace between factions, and
peace—after victory, and then only—with Japan. The
juxtaposed and competitive forces watch one another,
compete in the development of institutions, and engage
in an auction of good government: whoever wins
the deepest love and esteem of the Chinese people
wins China in the end. Few institutional reforms in
the West have had such fateful stimuli.</p>
<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_88" id="Footnote_1_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_88"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> For an excellent definition of Free China, see Quigley, Harold S.,
"Free China," cited, p. 133-35. The most readable geography of
China is Cressey, George B., <i>China's Geographic Foundations</i>, New
York, 1934.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_2_89" id="Footnote_2_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_89"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> For further development of this problem, see below, p. <a href="#Page_185">185</a>. The
present author considered this question in relation to the Chinese
political heritage, in <i>Government in Republican China</i>, cited, p. 2-12,
69-74, 188-89. Professor George Taylor, in <i>The Struggle for North
China</i>, cited, relates this problem to the broad issues of world discussion,
in a most acute analysis of "The Problem of China," p. 8-16,
and gives a clear answer to the questions thus posed, p. 197-201.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_3_90" id="Footnote_3_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_90"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Tsang, O. B., <i>A Supplement to a Complete Chinese-English Dictionary</i>,
Shanghai, 1937, p. 267. The older, standard dictionaries do
not include the term. Lieutenant H. S. Aldrich, in his <i>Hua Yu Hsü
Chih: Practical Chinese</i>, Peiping, 1934, gives <i>Sui-ching Ssŭ-ling</i> as
Pacification Commissioner (Vol. II, p. 74).</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_4_91" id="Footnote_4_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_91"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> An apt, grisly story is reported in the semi-official English-language
journal of the Nanking regime. The "Peace Movement" is, of course,
the Japanophile movement of Mr. Wang Ch'ing-wei. This is the way
it was given in <i>The People's Tribune</i>, Vol. XXIX, Nos. 7-10 (October-November
1940), p. 305:
</p>
<p>
"In response to President Wang Ch'ing-Wei's peace appeal to the
nation, Mr. Tan Shih-Chang, member of the Chungking Air Force,
flew to Hankow by his own plane on June 10 to join the Peace Movement.
Upon his arrival in Nanking, Mr. Tan was warmly received by
the re-organized National Government. Later, he was sent to Macao
on an important mission, but upon his arrival there, he was instantly
killed by desperadoes in the employ of the Chungking regime.
</p>
<p>
"It is learned that the plane he left in Hankow has now been repaired
by the Japanese Air Force and brought to the Capital. Following
its arrival, the plane was immediately handed over to the Military
Commission by the Japanese military authorities."
</p>
<p>
(This would need further corroboration before it could definitely
be accepted.)</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_5_92" id="Footnote_5_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_92"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> In an interview with the author, Chungking, July 31, 1940; the
interview was unfortunately terminated by the raid alarm. It might
be noted at this point that proposals for the reinstitution of strong
provincial executives have been postponed from year to year since
1932. See <i>The China Year Book 1939</i>, cited, p. 217 n.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_6_93" id="Footnote_6_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_93"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Fêng Yü-hsiang, <i>Wo-ti Shêng-huo</i> (My Life), Kweilin, 1940,
p. 22.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_7_94" id="Footnote_7_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_94"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> As reported by Paul M. W. Linebarger in his <i>Conversations with
Sun Yat-sen</i> [as yet unpublished; in the author's possession]. Book
II, Chapter V.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_8_95" id="Footnote_8_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_95"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> The author has sought to trace the political and military aspects
of this cycle in <i>Government in Republican China</i>, cited. There are
numerous works on the subject from the economists' point of view.
Outstanding are the books by John Lossing Buck, R. H. Tawney,
J. B. Condliffe, Karl Wittfogel, Ch'en Han-seng, and the articles
by Norman Hanwell (chiefly in <i>Asia</i>, <i>Amerasia</i>, and <i>The Far Eastern
Survey</i>).</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_9_96" id="Footnote_9_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_96"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Below, p. 324, and p. 388.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_10_97" id="Footnote_10_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_97"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> A detailed chart will be found in Appendix III (C), at p. <a href="#Page_253">388</a>.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_11_98" id="Footnote_11_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_98"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> See above, p. <a href="#Page_13">13</a>. The last term is literally Executive Area (or
District) of North Shan (Shensi). In the text, Frontier Area is used
throughout as the simplest English equivalent.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_12_99" id="Footnote_12_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_99"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Chin Chi-yin, 'Pien-ch'ü' ti Ming-ch'êng' (The Name "Frontier
Area"), in <i>So-wei "Pien-ch'ü</i>," cited above, p. 3-6.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_13_100" id="Footnote_13_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_100"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Ts'ui Yün-ch'ang, <i>Shan-pei Lun Kuo-hua</i> (A Brief Sketch of
Northern Shensi), Kweilin, 1939, p. 4-5. This author concludes that
Communist rule worsened the economic status of the area. "Then
there occurred the campaigns for 'the extermination of landlordism'
and for 'division of the lands.' The result of such proletarian disturbances
was an astonishing decrease of population, caused by massacre
and emigration, and the devastation of much land." (p. 6.)</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_14_101" id="Footnote_14_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_101"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> See the works cited above, p. <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, n. 16. It is possible to find
a contradictory interpretation in Chinese sources for almost every point
cited by Western visitors as meritorious. Since the Nationalists are
not interested in promoting the international reputation of the
Frontier Area, and at the same time are unable to launch any counter-propaganda
(for fear of alienating Leftist sentiment in the West, because
it would give the Japanese a propaganda advantage, and would
disturb the appearance of the United Front), very little criticism—sound
or otherwise—of the Chinese Communist area has appeared in
the West. Even in a case such as the issuance of paper money, universally
regarded as a clever move by the Communists and guerrillas,
Chinese writers have charged that the issuance is fiat currency imposed
by Communist force (e.g., Wang Ssü-ch'êng, <i>Ju-tz'ŭ Pien-ch'ü</i>
[So this is the Frontier Area!] Chungking, 1938, p. 38 <i>ff.</i>) Within
China, Communism is just as open to interpretation as the Soviets are
in the Western world. Western data now available seems to cover
only one side of the case, which is doubtless well-founded; but there
must be another. There always is.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_15_102" id="Footnote_15_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_102"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Since the author has neither extensive acquaintance with Chinese
Communists, nor has visited Yenan, he offers these conclusions
more tentatively than he would others, concerning the Kuomintang.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_16_103" id="Footnote_16_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_103"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Professor George Taylor's <i>The Struggle for North China</i> presents
a full and clear picture of the Border Region and the Peiping
regime in startlingly apposite juxtaposition. He concludes by pointing
out the significant paradox that the Japanese established a reactionary
regime designed to keep China agrarian, backward, and exploitable,
but that they had not managed to extend their affiliate beyond the
cities. The country, which they had hoped to capture, escaped them
through the political resurgence of the Border Region. P. C. Nyi,
article cited above, p. <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, n. 10, presents an outline of the regime
which supplements the first-hand materials Professor Taylor appends
to his work. Major E. F. Carlson's works, which describe this,
are <i>Twin Stars of China</i> and <i>The Chinese Army</i>, both cited above;
the latter, a valuable contribution to the <i>Inquiry Series</i> of the Institute
of Pacific Relations, includes Wang Yu-chuan, "The Organization
of a Typical Guerrilla Area in South Shantung" (p. 84-130), a
brilliant survey which reveals, sometimes unwittingly, the values and
dangers of a Communist-Nationalist-popular union. Mr. Hanson's
work is "<i>Humane Endeavour</i>," cited above; as a personal account, it
is the most engrossing of the group.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_17_104" id="Footnote_17_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_104"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> P. C. Nyi, article cited in <i>The Chinese Year Book 1938-39</i>, p. 255.
Reading between the lines will illustrate much of the Chungking attitude.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_18_105" id="Footnote_18_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_105"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> On the New Fourth Army, see Epstein, I., <i>The People's War</i>,
cited above, p. 260 <i>ff.</i> Agnes Smedley, the well-known pro-Communist
writer, has lived among the New Fourth recently. Another foreign
visitor has been Jack Belton, of the Shanghai <i>Evening Post</i>. Publicity
for the New Fourth Army, reduced to an absolute minimum by
Chungking, is handled by an independent agency, the New China
Information Committee (not to be confused with the semi-official
China Information Committee) in Hong Kong. The China Defense
League, in which the moving spirit is Mme. Sun Yat-sen, also in Hong
Kong, acts as an agency for receiving gifts, etc., for the Army.</p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span></p>
<h2><span class="smcap">Chapter V</span><br />
THE KUOMINTANG</h2>
<p>The Kuomintang, a Chinese political party, was
formed by federation of old anti-Manchu secret societies,
and has become the vehicle for the will of its
Leader, Sun Yat-sen: constitutionally and legally it is
the superior of the Chinese National Government; administratively,
one of the three chief organs of policy
execution for the regime; politically, the only legal
political party in Free China. It has had undisputed
primacy, but not monopoly, in domestic Chinese politics
for fourteen years. Despite revolutionary purposes, and
idealistic obligations, the Kuomintang is responsible for
the welfare of the government which it created. Its interest
is therefore superior to and identical with the
government's; the party of a one-party state has no business
criticizing the government, since the party at all
times possesses the means of correction or change.</p>
<p>By its constitution and organization the Party is
democratic. In practice it has been a loose oligarchy,
similar to the machinery whereby American presidential
candidates are nominated. In composition it is by its
own statement a cross section of China, composed of
persons who qualify as a political elite by their zeal
in seeking and obtaining entrance to the Party. Administratively,
the Kuomintang possesses a group of
Ministries (<i>pu</i>), closely similar to the governmental
ministries, and executing quasi-governmental policy,
plus an additional group of separate or affiliated organizations
having common purposes. In power politics,
the Kuomintang claims supremacy in all unoccupied<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span>
China and legitimate power over the occupied areas; in
practice it yields frequently to the demands of dissidents.
In function, its highest purpose—bequeathed by Sun
Yat-sen—is to destroy its own monopoly of power when
the time for democracy shall come; like medicine, it is
committed to the eradication of the reason for its own
existence.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Party Constitutional System</span></h3>
<p>The Kuomintang adopted a Party-Constitution after
thirty-odd years of activity when, at the suggestion of
Soviet advisers, it reorganized on January 28, 1924
as a formal party, with membership books, regular dues,
etc. Up to then it had operated through techniques
intermediate in formality between American major-party
looseness and Chinese secret-society formality. In
twelve chapters, the Constitution dealt with Membership,
Organization, Special Areas, the Leader (Sun
Yat-sen, <i>Tsung-li</i>), the Highest Party Organs, Provincial
Party Organization, <i>Hsien</i> Organization, District
(<i>ch'ü</i>) Organization, and Sub-district (<i>ch'ü-fên</i>,
roughly equivalent to the <i>pao</i> in local government)
Organization, Terms of Office, Discipline, and Finance.<a name="FNanchor_1_106" id="FNanchor_1_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_106" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>
The actual application of this Constitution is best described
in the words of Wang Shih-chieh, who wrote
before the current hostilities:<a name="FNanchor_2_107" id="FNanchor_2_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_107" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>The system of organization of the Chinese Kuomintang
is based upon the <i>Constitution and Bye-laws of the Chinese
Kuomintang</i> [<i>Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Hsien-chang</i>] which
was passed in the First Party Congress [<i>Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao
Ta-hui</i>] on January 28, Year XIII [1924], and amended in
the following two Party Congresses on January 16, Year
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span>XV [1926] and on March 27, Year XVIII [1929]. No amendment
of any sort was made in the Fourth and Fifth Party
Congresses held in the Years XX [1931] and XXIV [1935] respectively.</p>
<p>According to the above <i>Constitution and Bye-Laws</i>, the
Kuomintang has five divisional organizations, <i>viz.</i>: one for
the whole country, one for each province, one for each
<i>hsien</i> (or governmental district), one for each district, and
one for each district subdivision [<i>ch'ü-fên-pu</i>]. The organ
possessing the highest authority in the Kuomintang is
the Party Congress of the Kuomintang. When this Congress
is not in session, the Central Executive Committee is
the highest authority. The organization of the Congress
and the method of electing the Delegates are fixed by the
Central Executive Committee, while the members of the
Central Executive Committee are elected by the Party
Congress. Moreover the number of these members is also
fixed by the Congress. Article I of the "Outlines of the
Organization of the Central Executive Committee," passed
in the First Session of the Fifth Central Executive Committee
Meeting, on December 6, Year XXIV [1935], provides:
"The Central Executive Committee appoints nine
standing members of the Committee, to form a Standing
Committee which shall discharge the duties of the Central
Executive Committee when the latter is not in Session. The
Standing Committee is provided with a Chairman and a
Vice-Chairman, elected from among the nine standing
members." Hence it can be said that when the Central
Executive Committee is not in session, this Standing Committee
represents the highest authority of the Kuomintang.
The offices of the Chairman [superseded by the Party Chief,
<i>Tsung-ts'ai</i>] and the Vice-Chairman have been provided
for since December, Year XXIV [1935]. Whether the Chairman
can be the representative of the highest authority of
the Kuomintang or not, under the tacit consent of the
Standing Committee, still depends upon the changes in
circumstances. The said "Outlines of the Organization"
does not state clearly the rights and duties of the Chairman
and the Vice-Chairman. Hence, the highest authorities
of the Kuomintang as prescribed by various written laws are
(1) the Party Congress, (2) the Central Executive Committee,
and (3) the Standing Committee of the Central
Executive Committee. When the larger organ is not in
session, the next following organ represents the highest
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span>authority of the Kuomintang. But this only applies in theory.
As a matter of fact, when the lower organs are exercising
their power, they can not but be limited by certain restrictions.
Whenever important questions arise which may
cause fierce disputes among members or among the people,
the lower organs which have the authority to decide when
the upper organ is not in session usually reserve the questions
for discussion in the meeting of the upper organ. The
resolutions passed by the upper organs—the Party Congress
down to the Central Executive Committee Meeting—are
usually elastic so that the lower organs—the Standing
Committee up to the Central Executive Committee—do not
experience great difficulties or restrictions in facing various
troublesome situations.</p>
<p>According to the <i>Constitution and Bye-Laws of the
Chinese Kuomintang</i>, there is, besides the Central Executive
Committee, a Central Control Committee for the Kuomintang.
Its organization is similar to that of the Central
Executive Committee, though with fewer members. It occupies
the same rank as the Central Executive Committee,
and its duty is to superintend and inspect the personnel
of the Kuomintang.</p>
<p>The names and organizations of the various organs directly
controlled by the Central Executive Committee have
unavoidably undergone some changes, though in principle
their structures have remained the same. According to the
"Outlines of the Organization of the Central Executive
Committee," the organs under it are divided along three
lines: organization, publicity, and popular training, with
various committees. These organs are to discharge all
affairs of the Kuomintang. Besides these, there is a Political
Committee [superseded by the Supreme National Defense
Council], to "act as the highest directing organ in all governmental
policies and to be responsible to the Central
Executive Committee." Although these organs are authorized
by the Central Executive Committee and formed in the
Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee, the
Standing Committee can still exercise authority over them
when the Central Executive Committee is not in session,
because in accordance with the <i>Constitution and Bye-Laws</i>,
the Standing Committee takes the place of the Central Executive
Committee. As a matter of fact, since the activities
along the lines of organization, publicity, and popular
training are the internal activities within the Kuomintang,
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span>these organs are usually under the rigid control of the
Standing Committee. As the Political Committee discharges
various political affairs, its position may be said to be
independent. Any resolution passed by this Committee is
sent to the government for execution, and the Standing
Committee has no power to restrict its activities. Hence
under the party government of the Chinese Kuomintang,
the Political Committee is in reality the highest directing
and supervisory authority in matters concerning governmental
policies.</p></blockquote>
<p>The Emergency Party Congress of the Kuomintang,
Hankow, March 29-April 1, 1938, provided for two
further amendments to the Party Constitution. It
abolished the system of reserve members, and, far more
significantly, it created the post of <i>Tsung-ts'ai</i>, here
translated Party Chief, which was indistinguishable except
as a matter of terminology from the post of <i>Tsung-li</i>,
held in perpetuity by Sun Yat-sen. Chiang K'ai-shek
was elected Party Chief, and the powers of his office
were stated to be duplicates of those given originally to
the <i>Tsung-li:</i> a general provision that "all members
shall follow the direction of" the <i>Tsung-li</i>, which was
not implemented; chairmanship of the Party Congress
and of the Central Executive Committee (<i>a fortiori</i>, of
the Standing Committee of the C.E.C.); and a veto
over the acts of the Congress and the C.E.C. Furthermore,
the Political Committee (Central Political Council)
was replaced by the Supreme National Defense
Council, of which Chiang was also elected Chairman.</p>
<p>Since Chiang had been Chairman of the Standing
Committee, it follows that the change of formal labels
did not much alter the constitutional organization of
the Kuomintang, nor materially change Chiang's position.
Chiang does not help to create machinery of
power in order to lurk behind it, thus proclaiming
it a mere façade. He, as a public servant reared in the
Confucian tradition, possesses sufficient respect for
words to let them mean what they are publicly declared<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span>
to mean. The post of <i>Tsung-ts'ai</i> is more than ample in
providing Chiang with the power he feels necessary to
accomplish national unification, mitigate social injustice,
and promote serious representative government.
He accepts the full measure of his power; doing so publicly,
his subsequent actions appear relatively modest.
By Western standards, Chiang is naive enough to be
honest.</p>
<p>A point brought out in connection with the National
Government (p. <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, above) is worth reiteration.
Neither by Party action nor by governmental change
has the Kuomintang monopoly of political power been
modified by law. There is no United Front, Popular
Front, or any other kind of front in the legal system;
even in practical administration, the entrance of non-Party
men has been at Party direction; and it is only
in the Special Areas, the special war services, and the
military organization that the Kuomintang has relaxed
its control of power. Other groups are sharing in the
work of the People's Political Council. The prudence
of such a policy may appear open to question; its consistency
is not.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Party Organization</span></h3>
<p>Organizationally the Party is bipolar, with the power
concentrated in the entire membership at the base, and
in the Chief (<i>Tsung-ts'ai</i>) at the apex. The highest
authority of the Kuomintang is the Party Congress
(<i>Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao Ta-hui</i>), which could also be
translated as All-Nation Convention of Party Delegates.
Party Congresses have been held as follows: I, Canton,
1924; II, Canton, 1926; III, Nanking, 1929; IV, Nanking,
1931; V, Nanking, 1935; and the Emergency
Party Congress, Hankow, 1938. Wang Ch'ing-wei organized
a rump Kuomintang on the basis of a "Sixth
Party Congress" held in 1939; the legitimate Sixth
Congress has not yet been called.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span></p>
<p>The Party Congress is the highest agency of the
Kuomintang, and thereby the highest legal authority
in China—a position which it now shares with the Party
Chief, <i>ex officio</i> its Chairman. The Kuomintang Party
Constitution provides that the Congress should ordinarily
meet every other year (<i>Art.</i> 27), but permits
the C.E.C. to postpone a Congress for not more than
one year. This provision has frequently been violated.
In actual effect the Congress is neither an effective governing
body, nor, at the other extreme, a completely
helpless tool. No Party Congress has led to a drastic
shift of actual political power.</p>
<p>The barometer of influence functions outside the
Congress, and the Congress ratifies and establishes what
has actually occurred. The high authority of the incumbent
C.E.C. in matters of accrediting delegates,
plus its power to appoint delegates from areas not represented
(a feature taken from Soviet practice), gives the
political Ins a formidable weapon with which to bludgeon
down opposition, but since the value of the
Party Congress is that of a legitimizing agency, overt
interference with Party functions would destroy the
utility of the Congress. Its level of freedom and efficacy
may be compared with American party conventions.
Unwieldy, improvised agencies are not able to meet the
challenges of well-knit executive groups, but their very
unmanageability preserves to them a freedom of incalculable
action. The Party Congress could not in
practice exercise its formal, legal power of overthrowing
the entire Party leadership and starting the Party off
on a new tack; it could, however, so humiliate the incumbents
by subtle but obvious political gestures
familiar to all Chinese, that the leadership would retire
for reasons of health, or because of a yearning to contemplate
the cosmos.</p>
<p>The elaborate structure of the Kuomintang is shown
on the chart of organization (p. 331). Abstraction of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span>
the most essential features of this chart reveals the
following:</p>
<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;">
<img src="images/i_131.jpg" width="400" height="132" alt="Kuomintang chart of organization" />
</div>
<p>The Central Executive Committee (<i>Chung-yang Chih-hsing
Wei-yüan-hui</i>) is a relatively large body with one
hundred and twenty members. The Party Constitution
requires that it meet every six months or less. These
sessions, the Plenary Sessions of the C.E.C., are by far
the best-established political processes in the Chinese
state. Actual shifts in power are here fought out, since
the C.E.C. possesses authority ample for almost any
emergency. The expulsion of Wang Ch'ing-wei was
effected through C.E.C. action, and did not require the
work of any higher body.</p>
<p>The Central Control Committee (<i>Chung-yang Chien-ch'a
Wei-yüan-hui</i>) is an agency which the Chinese
adapted from two sources, the Bolshevik pattern of an
independent intra-party control system, and the native
<i>chien-ch'a</i> power. Similar in function to the Commission
of Party Control employed by the Communist
Party in the Soviet Union rather than to the Organization
Bureau, the Central Control Committee (also
termed, in another common translation, Central Supervisory
Committee) is in charge of an inspective system.
Because of the relative laxness of Kuomintang organization,
the work of this Committee is far less than one
might expect. It has not been adequate to ensure rigidly
strict Party efficiency, diligence, or honesty; neither has it
become a terrorist agency inflicting an inviolable Party
line. Few faults in politics fail to be virtues as well;
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span>inefficiency has its minor compensations. In times of secure
power, rigid Party discipline might let the Kuomintang
grow into a genuine and full-fledged tyranny;
nevertheless, in times of stress, such as the present, the
Party stands in need of stiffening and control.</p>
<p>The third agency, the Supreme National Defense
Council, is the Party's agent in charge of government.
(See above, p. <a href="#Page_46">46</a> <i>ff.</i>)</p>
<p>Immediately under the Central Executive Committee
there are three agencies of vitality and importance.
The first of these is the <i>San Min Chu I Ch'ing-nien
T'uan</i> (usually translated <i>San Min Chu I</i> Youth Corps,
or Kuomintang Youth Corps). A war-time addition
to the Party, it became politically possible when the
abandonment of appeasement re-aligned government
and youth. The Communist Youth Corps (<i>Kung-ch'an
Ch'ing-nien T'uan</i>) provided a model and rival. The
Constitution of the Corps, together with an appraisal
(from the official point of view) of its work, is given
below in Appendices <a href="#Page_313">II (B)</a> and <a href="#Page_340">II (C)</a>. In terms of
practical political effect, the Corps is significant, although
far less important than its organization scheme
would indicate. It combines some of the functions of
a military training system with social and propaganda
work. Leftists have complained against it bitterly as an
agency of espionage and repression within student
groups; others have acclaimed it as a meeting of the
Kuomintang and the youth, fruitful in terms of national
unity. The importance of the Corps lies in its organization
of a broad group of young men, one or more steps
up from the bottom of the economic scale, and in the
fact that the government and Kuomintang—after years
of overriding youth opinion—now find it feasible to
organize their own affiliate. Few charges of corruption
have touched the Corps, which lies particularly within
the purview of the Generalissimo. A minor but active
element in the political scene, it stands for the Kuomintang's<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span>
bid for permanence, and, in the event of internal
dissension, would be a valuable prop to the
<i>status quo</i>. The political indecision and laxness of
China in general has kept the group from becoming
either a <i>Hitlerjugend</i> or a frankly democratic C.C.C.
(Civilian Conservation Corps) on the American plan;
the Corps is at best a laggard bid to young men, and a
belated competition with the Left and the Communists.<a name="FNanchor_3_108" id="FNanchor_3_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_108" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p>
<p>The Party Affairs Committee (<i>Tang-wu Wei-yüan-hui</i>)
supplements the work of the Central Control
Committee in investigating Party personnel and acting
as a supplementary housekeeping agency for intra-Party
organization.</p>
<p>The third of these agencies is the [Central] Training
Committee (<i>Hsün-lien Wei-yüan-hui</i>). To this Committee
has fallen the labor of invigorating the Kuomintang
under conditions of strain, from war, from
the Wang schism, and from new domestic competition.
The Generalissimo has put the most vigorous efforts
into the work of this agency, and has organized under
it a Kuomintang Training Corps (<i>Hsün-lien T'uan</i>)
which is providing extensive new resources of leadership
to the Party. Enterprising or promising young men are
gathered together in training meetings, and given intensive
work in Party doctrine, propaganda and organization
methods, local administration, etc. The Corps
has tended to accept youths and some men of middle age
from positions of responsibility, and to equip them with
the knowledge and the discipline necessary to continuation
of pre-democratic government. In the constant
race between government activity as a positive force and
government apathy combined with outside anti-governmental
revolution as negative forces, the training
agencies are doing as much as any single enterprise to
stabilize the regime.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span></p>
<p>The Central Political Institute (<i>Chung-yang Chêng-chih
Hsüeh-hsiao</i>) tops the entire program, as a training
agency combining features of a university, a camp, and
a Party office. Under the personal control and leadership
of Dr. Ch'ên Kuo-fu, one of the Generalissimo's
intimates and the elder of the celebrated Ch'ên brothers,
the Institute stands high for its selection of students,
the discipline and instruction it imparts, and its practical
political effect. The Kuomintang, pronounced moribund
by competent foreign observers ten years ago,
today is in a better position for leadership and development
than it has been for many years. (The author,
who visited the Institute during the summer of 1940,
found the student body as well disciplined as any he
has seen outside of Germany, the staff highly competent
[mostly American-trained], and the physical facilities
unsurpassed.) Admission to the Institute is open to
graduates of Middle Schools (secondary); students who
are married may be admitted, but single students may
not marry while in attendance. The courses of study are
in general the equivalent of American undergraduate
work, although some graduate study is offered. The
curriculum includes such subjects as military training,
Japanese language and politics, and Marxian thought
(in connection with <i>min shêng chu-i</i>). The general
course is supplemented by two special courses—the
Civil Service Training Corps and the Advanced Civil
Service Training Corps—which are set up in collaboration
with the Examination <i>Yüan</i>. Graduates are organized
into alumni associations, to which the faculty
are admitted as supervisory members. It is a matter
of success and distinction to undergo the training of
the Institute, which is the equivalent of a West Point
for political and governmental work. The Generalissimo
visits the Institute and speaks before it as much
as possible, frequently as often as bi-weekly, but with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span>
occasional gaps of months.<a name="FNanchor_4_109" id="FNanchor_4_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_109" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> In addition to the Central
Political Institute, there is a [Kuomintang] Northwest
Academy of Youth, which has been even more active
in training young men for Party and government service.
Proximity to the Red training center at Yenan
makes its work urgent; training, according to report, is
briefer, cruder, and more vigorous than in the central
agency. The sub-surface possibility of renewed class
war by the Communists makes the Academy peculiarly
necessary.</p>
<p>Apart from the Youth Corps, the training agencies,
and the Party Affairs Committee, but also directly underneath
the Kuomintang C.E.C., come the coordinated
and uncoordinated agencies of Party administration.
Their organization is as follows:</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span></p>
<p class="center">C.E.C. OF THE KUOMINTANG STANDING COMMITTEE</p>
<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;">
<img src="images/i_136.jpg" width="400" height="321" alt="Agencies of party administration" />
</div>
<p>The Party-Ministries<a name="FNanchor_5_110" id="FNanchor_5_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_110" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> constitute a part of the governing
machinery of China. The Organization Party-Ministry
is important because of its intra-Party work;
the Minister, Dr. Ch'u Chia-hua, a German-educated
student, is one of the most active Party leaders, and
deeply suspect by the Left. His work is the field of
Kuomintang Party administration. The Party-Ministries
of Social and Overseas Chinese Affairs combine
the functions of government with those of the Party;
the former is a bureau of protocol, and the latter acts
as an extra-governmental colonial office. The Secretariats
provide study agencies for the governmental<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span>
system. They perform functions which are in the
United States both governmental and private (e.g.,
the work of the Brookings Institution, the Public Administration
Clearing House, the various Presidential
research and advisory committees, and intra-departmental
housekeeping agencies). The system of local
government reform is sponsored by the Central Kuomintang
Secretariat (<i>Chung-yang Mi-shu-ch'u</i>), even
more than by the Ministry of the Interior in the government,
under whose jurisdiction it falls. The Secretary-General
is a benign revolutionary veteran, Yeh-Ch'u-tsang;
the Deputy Secretary-General, Dr. K'an Nai-kuang,
is a Party official of almost twenty years' standing,
who studied in the United States and visited Europe
in quest of data on administration. Boundlessly energetic,
he is typical of the younger scholars who combine
the academic and the political and impart to the Kuomintang
a large share of its present energy.</p>
<p>Internationally, the most important Party-Ministry
is that of Publicity (<i>Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan Pu</i>),
which carries out most of the Chinese propaganda program.
Headed by Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, a very outspoken
man, its functions are distributed between Sections
of General Affairs, Motion Pictures, Newspapers,
Advisory, Consultation, and International Publicity,
together with services such as China's leading semi-official
news service (the Central News Agency), the
Party newspapers, the Central Motion Picture Studios,
and the official broadcasting system. Because of the difficulties
of language, travel, and passports, the International
Department supplies most of the news which
reaches the world press from Free China. The function
of the Western newspapermen consists largely in editing
and supplementing this news from whatever independent
source they can find, or, occasionally and at
the cost of considerable hardship, to attempt to discover
the facts for themselves.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span></p>
<p>In general, the Chinese follow the policy of giving
the favorable side of the news, simply omitting anything
that could conceivably be unfavorable. Their publicity
services are no more guilty of positive <i>suggestio falsi</i>
than the services of the British or Americans. Nevertheless,
Chinese notions of dignity and public policy
differ widely from Americans'; news would be hard
to obtain or valueless when obtained, except for the
fact that the staff of the International Section is almost
entirely American-trained and well-acquainted with
American notions of news. The very able and active
Hollington Tong, one of China's most successful newspapermen,
who was in press work long before he became
a Party official, has led in the supply of ample
news in the face of great difficulties. He is esteemed by
Westerners to be, along with Mme. Chiang, one of the
Generalissimo's most effective publicity advisers.</p>
<p>The Party-Ministry of Publicity also attends to the
needs and interests of Western newspapermen and other
visitors, arranging appointments, schedules, etc., and
even boarding many of them at a Press Hostel. These
attentions, while from time to time irritatingly restrictive,
are in the end almost always appreciated as
invaluable. Only the Leftists shun the Publicity Ministry;
they do so unsuccessfully, and to their loss. No
other Asiatic, and few Western, states can boast as alert
and effective a system of propaganda. In the troubled
shifts and crises of world politics, the Chinese have
managed to retain the sympathy of the most diverse
audiences—from American church people to Soviet agitation
squads, and from British conservatives to Nazi
clubs in Germany. The American traditions of frankness,
zest, liveliness in news are transplanted; while they
have suffered a sea-change, they still operate with telling
effect.<a name="FNanchor_6_111" id="FNanchor_6_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_111" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span></p>
<p>The Ministry of Women's Affairs, decreed in 1940,
is in process of organizing women's work for the Party.
Previously, most women's organizations had been knit
together in the affiliated New Life Movement. The
minor committees of the Party—historical, pensions, etc.—lie
outside the scope of war activities. Although they
continue, their functions are subordinate to the purposes
of resistance and reconstruction.</p>
<p>Formal field organization follows seven patterns:</p>
<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;">
<img src="images/i_139.jpg" width="400" height="381" alt="Formal field organization" />
</div>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span></p>
<p>Much of this exists only on paper. After the break
with the Communists in 1927, and the transformation
of the Kuomintang from a government-destroying to a
governing agency, the functional and agitational groups
were allowed to slip into desuetude. Under the pressure
of war, and the encouraging political situation,
which puts a premium on action, the Kuomintang has
adopted a variety of policies designed to maintain its
position.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Kuomintang Bid for Leadership</span></h3>
<p>Chief among the new devices is the reintroduction of
the Small Group, or Party Cell (<i>hsiao-tsu</i>). A comprehensive
plan for small-unit organization has been proclaimed;
the text is given below, <a href="#Page_354">Appendix II (D)</a>.
This cell system, as explained by the Deputy Secretary-General
of the Kuomintang, Dr. K'an Nai-kuang, will
provide the roots of the Party with new vigor.<a name="FNanchor_7_112" id="FNanchor_7_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_112" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> The
small group provides for further diffusion of Party work,
and introduces novel principles of political organization
to the Party. Self-criticism, airing of opinion, mutual
personal examination—these are expected to stimulate
Party work. The war provides the Party with the
opportunity to do with ease things which seemed insurmountably
slow and difficult before Japanese bombers
helped unification. Opium-suppression, bandit-eradication,
and similar work of organization and improvement
challenges the Party to further effort. The
imminence of democracy requires more intensive preparation
in discussion and in self-organization for small
groups. The <i>hsiao-tsu</i> system is designed to bolster
Party morale, improve the Party work, and spread the
teaching of Sun Yat-sen.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span></p>
<p>The new governmental pattern of local government
is to be reinforced by the corresponding development
of Kuomintang agencies. In the government's plan,
rural development operates on four levels: the militia;
the school system; the agricultural and industrial cooperatives;
and the political organization. The same
person in each village or hamlet would be responsible
for all four. If he is to be a Party man, he must be
effective to be of service and a credit to the Party.</p>
<p>In order to eradicate undesirable personnel, the Kuomintang
has increased its Party-purging facilities with
what is known as the Party Supervisor's Net (<i>Tang-jên
Chien-ch'a Wang</i>). By action of the C.E.C. on
June 13, 1940, the sub-district Party organs are to elect
one to three members each to serve, with a six months'
term, as Control Members. With a power of report
on Party discipline, and responsibility for Party conditions,
this change was expected to drive undesirables
more effectively out of the Party.</p>
<p>Three years from 1940 was set as the final date for
the installation of the new system. While the fractionization
of a Party may seem to be of minor importance,
it actually is a major factor in the potential development
of the Kuomintang. In the period of Party government,
the more popular organs of Party members
tended to slough off, leaving large <i>Tangpu</i> (Party Headquarters)
in the <i>hsien</i> or cities. These quite often fell
into the hands of local machines, with the consequence
that they interfered with government, and promoted
the usual evils of party machines. The diffusion of
Party work, by letting individuals participate more
freely as individuals, may help to break the monopoly
of these bureaus, and restore the Party effectiveness
with less reliance on supervision from above.</p>
<p>The Kuomintang, in addition to these reorganization
devices, is meeting competition from the Left by increasing
its membership. Membership figures are not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span>
available in war time; the total is probably over two
million. In some instances the new members are no
particular improvement on the pre-existing group, but
in the majority of cases the Party broadens its base of
popular support.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Intra-Kuomintang Politics</span></h3>
<p>The years which saw the rise of the Kuomintang to
power, and its subsequent period of authority, showed
a diminution of the disparateness of Party fractions.
For a long time the adherents of Wang Ch'ing-wei stood
formally Left; those of Hu Han-min, formally Right;
while various older Party alignments preserved their
outlines more or less clearly (e.g., the Kuomintang
Western Hills Group). With the consistent rise of
Chiang K'ai-shek to Party and national leadership, and
the steady influx of non-Party or merely nominal Party
men into the government, Party distinctions lost their
cogency in practical affairs.</p>
<p>In terms of influence, patronage, and effective policy-making,
the Kuomintang is a conglomeration of innumerable
personal leaderships knit together by a common
outlook, a common interest in the maintenance of
the National Government and formal Party power, and
a common loyalty to the Party Chief. The clearest
groups are those which are out of the current political
stream; most notable among these is the Wang schism,
and a few scattered irreconcilables of half-forgotten
Party struggles. Within the regime, Kuomintang groups
tend to coalesce as the leaders meet, negotiate, and
govern together in the councils of state.</p>
<p>So completely in the ascendant that they have lost
their general character as groups are the <i>Erh Ch'ên</i>
(literally "the two Ch'êns"; also termed "C.C. group"
by English-speaking Chinese), led by the brothers,
Ch'ên Li-fu, Minister of Education, and Ch'ên Kuo-fu,
head of the Central Political Institute, and the <i>Huangpu</i>
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span>(Whampoa Academy) groups, led by the Generalissimo
himself. The Ch'ên brothers have been close adherents
of Chiang throughout his career. Brilliant,
vigorous, sharp in the retention of power, they have
made themselves anathema to the Left. They are effective
reorganizers of the Kuomintang, keenly aware of
its position as monopoly Party, and their protégés and
trainees are omnipresent through government and Party.
Their military counterpart is the <i>Huangpu</i> group. It includes
officers either trained by Chiang himself or under
his close supervision. With the passage of each year, the
proportion of Whampoa (or daughter-institution) graduates
in the national armies rises. The officers include a
high proportion of technically qualified men, whose
capabilities and interests are chiefly military. Builders
of the new army, they look to the Generalissimo and the
Party for dicta on social, economic, and political policy;
they provide China with the unpolitical army which has
been an American ideal, although rejected by Soviet
and South American practice. The officers are not
encouraged to assume decisive roles in local politics,
but to refer such things back to Headquarters. In consequence,
although the danger of a new <i>tuchünism</i> has
almost disappeared, the army staff does not readily
adapt itself to a <i>levée en masse</i>, or to the problems of a
social-revolutionary army. The very factors which make
of the army a tool and not a practice-ground of government
also make it somewhat rigid in dealing with guerrilla
situations.</p>
<p>Both the C. C. and Whampoa groups are instilled
with notions of Party and military discipline which trace
back in the first place to the instruction given by Russians
from the Soviet Union. While they follow Sun and
Chiang in accepting the promises of democracy, their
notion of democracy is as different from that of the Left
as Washington's was from the Jacobins'. They are interested
in sound, disciplined, powerful national government,
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span>representative, republican, and stable; they see the
revolution as largely complete in the power-destroying
phase, and are beginning to think in the reconstruction
phase. After ten years of strain and terror in fighting
the Communists, they look with suspicion on political
changes which would open the nation to
opportunist Communist agitation, or make Chungking
the helpless diplomatic dependency of the Narkomindel.
The bitterness of internecine conflict has made
them deeply suspicious of sudden or radical reform, although
they themselves profess a genuine interest in
social welfare. The actual reforms which have been accomplished
are, in the scale of political reality, already
stupendous: opium eradication, tax collection, diffusion
of national authority, communications, industrialization,
military advance, etc. To the Kuomintang center,
a demand for sharp or shocking change is suspect. They
desire to amplify what they have, and to let changes wait
on the ability of trained personnel—not entrusting
progress to the vagaries of mass movements with incalculable
force and direction.</p>
<p>While the National Government was at Nanking,
there was a <i>Fu-hsing Shê</i> (Regeneration Club), organized
by a few hot-headed members of the Kuomintang
center. Its activities in support of the Generalissimo
and the government, under the further sobriquet of
Bluejacket or Blue Shirt group, earned it the reputation
of a Chinese <i>Schutzstaffel</i>. The comparison was
at best fanciful, but any comparison at all was heartily
desired by the Europocentric Chinese Left and by the
world press. Magnified beyond recognition, the Club
was identified with almost every agency in the government
and Party, not excluding the New Life Movement.
As applied, the name <i>Blue Shirt</i> covered a wide
scattering of unrelated agencies which had the common
features of a Kuomintang-center position, an inclination
to effective action (including violence) and some<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span>
secrecy. Effective political-police work is led by one
T'ai Li, whose name is whispered by dissidents; but
counter-espionage and supervision of suspects is also
performed through Party agents, the regular military,
and governmental agencies.</p>
<p>Around the Kuomintang center there are other
groups, some closely related to Chiang, some remote.
The Political Scientists (<i>Chêng-hsüeh Hsi</i>) owe their
name to a society which once existed in Nanking. They
include many of the administrators, men with American
training who are interested in industrial and fiscal development.
The clarity of this group has faded by
its absorption into the governing center. The Cantonese
are represented by two levels of politics: those who
based their power on Canton province and those who
remained within the government. President Sun K'ê
of the Legislative <i>Yüan</i> has been outstanding in his
willingness to cooperate with the Communists and Left,
and is on cordial terms with relatively independent progressives,
such as Mme. Sun Yat-sen. Further groups
within the Kuomintang are constituted by the loyalist
followers of Wang Ch'ing-wei, who now attach themselves
to other leaders, and by other personal or regional
followings (e.g., the <i>Tungpei</i> followers of Chang Hsüeh-liang,
ex-<i>tuchün</i> of Manchuria and ex-Vice-Commander-in-Chief,
still "retired" as a result of the Sian
kidnapping). Finally, a number of elder Party leaders
remain because of their seniority or connection
with Sun Yat-sen; they do not need to attach themselves
to any particular clique in order to retain their
position. These include such men as the venerable
Secretary-General of the Party, Yeh Ch'u-tsang; the
President of the National Government, Lin Shên; and
the President of the Control <i>Yüan</i>, Yü Yu-jên.</p>
<p>What has been said about the groups in the People's
Political Council (see p. <a href="#Page_76">76</a> <i>ff.</i>) applies to these. It is
possible, as in American congressional or administrative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span>
circles, to distinguish blocs of leaders with differing interests
or policy; but clarity fades upon scrutiny. The
orientation, even by the participants, is subjective.
Lacking continuous institutional form, clustering of
leaders is transient, shifting with political events.</p>
<p>It is difficult to appraise the role of the Kuomintang
without at the same time assessing the position of the
government. The two are inescapably connected. Although
the Communists profess recognition of the government,
and pledge it loyalty, they offer only comradeship—on
their own terms—to the Kuomintang.
This arrangement may last for a considerable length
of time, but the National Government is a Kuomintang
creation; short of violent revolution, Party control
will scarcely break in war time. Upon the Party, therefore,
depends much of the efficacy of the Government.</p>
<p>Many well-known Leftist writers on China—such as
Edgar Snow—make the comment that whereas the National
Government is deserving as a government, and
worthy of support, the Kuomintang is hopelessly corrupt,
a creature of landlords and capitalists, or, of even
worse, "feudal elements." Such a distinction, based on
strong moral urges and a desire to achieve historical
parallels, is untenable in practice. Kuomintang power
has weathered more than a decade of adversities. The
Generalissimo depends upon it. Analysis of the Kuomintang
as the party of the Chinese national bourgeoisie,
and ascription of a mass character to the Communists
alone, is a fallacy, comparable to a consideration
of Earl Browder as the real leader of the American
working class.</p>
<p>In point of fact, neither the Kuomintang nor the
Communist Party in China is a mass party. Neither ever
has been, although each sought mass character in the
Great Revolution. Still largely apolitical, the Chinese
masses are organized socially, culturally, and economically
into a village and guild system which functions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span>
through most of the country. The Kuomintang includes
a very high proportion of shopkeepers, returned overseas-Chinese,
Chinese still resident overseas, Christians,
landlords, and Western-returned students. The class
composition of the Kuomintang is largely incidental
to its functional character. Since the Kuomintang was
the party of Westernization, it gathered in revolutionary
days Chinese of all classes who were sufficiently modernized
to be interested. Naturally the poorest peasants
and the coastal proletariat did not constitute a large
proportion of such membership. The men who entered
did so as Christians, as travellers, as temperamental
rebels, rather than as representatives of the bourgeoisie.
When the Communists, whom a recent writer<a name="FNanchor_8_113" id="FNanchor_8_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_113" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> with
unconscious humor calls the party of the Chinese proletariat,
came on the scene, the same social elements
contributed to its membership. Once the Communist
Party abandoned the Trotskyist line of urban revolt
for the leadership of endemic peasant rebellions, its
composition changed somewhat, although the Communist
leaders of today are socially much like their
Kuomintang equivalents. The men who are class-conscious
are, like Lenin, historically, philosophically, and
morally so; it is a matter of literary necessity, not of
fact.</p>
<p>The Kuomintang is in power; the Communist and
Left parties are not. As the governing group, the Kuomintang
naturally attracts those persons who would
seek to enter any government. Since it has not and does
not promote rural class warfare, pre-existing class<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span>
relationships continue. The Party and the Government
have sought, not always efficiently or faithfully to the <i>n</i>th
degree, to carry out the programs of land reform, democratization,
etc., to which they have been committed.
The Kuomintang has tolerated widespread sharecropping,
land destitution, usury, and rural despotism—because
it found these in existence, and was preoccupied
with building a national government, a modern army,
adequate finance, and with eradicating some of the
worst evils, such as opium, bandits, and Communists
(who, whatever their ideals, nevertheless helped to impoverish
a poor nation by merciless civil war).</p>
<p>If the Kuomintang were out, it too could point to
existing evils. Whoever controls government bears the
responsibility. A class element is to a certain degree
inescapable in any government; illiterate, unqualified
persons do not assume leadership even in the Soviet
Union until they have escaped their handicaps through
training. But to make of the Kuomintang the party of
the Chinese landlords and merchants alone is as fallacious
as to make the Republicans or Democrats solely
the instruments of American capitalism. A comment
such as this would be unnecessary in the case of the
United States; but persons who are not Marxian with
respect to the analysis of current American events often
assume a Left approach to China because of impatience
with evils which they see but cannot understand.</p>
<p>The final appraisal of the Kuomintang must be based
on the practical work of the government and the Party.
In 1940, their effective control was wider and deeper
than ever before. The Chinese state was more nearly
in existence. The armies were undefeated. The growth
of China in the past ten years, and the stand made by
China at war, has been made under the unrelaxed control
of the Kuomintang monopoly of constitutional
power, together with its clear primacy in more tangible
power—schools, finance, armies, and police.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span></p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The New Life Movement and Other Affiliates</span></h3>
<p>The important New Life Movement (<i>Hsin Shêng-huo
Yün-tung</i>) is, strictly speaking, not a Party organization;
but Chiang is its Chairman, and in purposes
and personnel it interlocks with the Party. Convinced
that institutional and economic reform required accompanying
moral and ideological reform, the Generalissimo
founded an Officers' Moral Endeavor Corps
as early as 1927. This organization was placed, soon
after its initiation, in the hands of Colonel (now Major-General)
J. L. Huang, a graduate of Vanderbilt University
and an experienced Y.M.C.A. secretary. The
Corps' purposes were comparable to those of a Y.M.C.A.
with American armies, but Chinese morality in general,
not Christian sectarian teaching, was stressed. With
Chiang's encouragement, the Corps came to include
a high percentage of the officers. Teaching cleanliness,
truthfulness, promptness, kindness, dignity, etc., it
helped build morale.</p>
<p>In 1934, after seven years of war against the Communist-led
agrarian insurrections in South Central
China, the Generalissimo decided to extend to the
whole people the type of work done by the Corps. On
February 19, 1934, he made his first speech announcing
the New Life Movement and on the following March
11, a mass meeting of about one hundred thousand
people, representing five hundred organizations, signalized
the formal inauguration of the movement.<a name="FNanchor_9_114" id="FNanchor_9_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_114" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> From
then on the Movement was continued as a regular phase
of anti-Communist reconstruction. It elicited praise for
its attempt to reach the roots of China's political demoralization,
and its intent to remedy the everyday<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span>
life of the people,<a name="FNanchor_10_115" id="FNanchor_10_115"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_115" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> although there was skepticism as
to its effectiveness in removing troubles deeply ingrained
in the economic system.</p>
<p>The type of evil against which the New Life Movement
struggles is well-illustrated by Mme. Chiang's
enumeration of the seven deadly sins: self-seeking,
"face," cliquism, defeatism (<i>mei-yu fa-tzŭ</i>, the Chinese
<i>nitchevo</i>), inaccuracy (<i>ch'a-pu-to</i>), lack of self-discipline,
and evasion of responsibility.<a name="FNanchor_11_116" id="FNanchor_11_116"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_116" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> In addition to
these sins of social and political behavior, there are
others such as filthiness, carelessness of infection, indecent
or sloppy dress, bad manners, unkindness, etc.
The Movement, easily understood in view of the traditional
Confucian emphasis on personal conduct, seeks
to reach individual behavior. The West European and
North American peoples have been disciplined by
technology itself: timeliness, cleanliness, regularity,
have come to be a part of daily life. Any nation which
seeks to shift from an agrarian to an industrial economy
discovers that amiable defects become ruinous flaws:
machinery cannot wait; a machine society requires a
discipline of its own. The New Life Movement is attacking
the points of social behavior which strike the
newcomer to China most immediately and most unfavorably.</p>
<p>The positive virtues of the New Life Movement were
formulated by the Generalissimo. Four in number,
they are <i>li</i>, <i>i</i>, <i>lien</i>, and <i>ch'ih</i>. <i>Li</i> is the fundamental
Confucian virtue, and is based upon <i>jên</i>. <i>Jên</i> being<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span>
humane self-awareness, or consciousness of membership
in society, <i>li</i> is the application of this awareness to conduct;
it thereby signifies proper behavior, not in the
superficial sense of empty formality, but in the sense
of behavior which is <i>human</i>: the full expression of
man's moral and ethical stature. The traditional translation
of <i>li</i> is <i>rites</i>, <i>ceremonies</i>, or <i>etiquette</i>—terms
which, because of their connotations of an empty ceremonialism,
are inadequate as a rendition of the original.
The Generalissimo writes of <i>li</i>: "It becomes natural
law, when applied to nature; it becomes a rule, when
applied to social affairs; and signifies discipline, when
applied to national affairs. These three phases of one's
life are all regulated by reason. Therefore, 'li' can
be interpreted as regulated attitude of mind and
heart."<a name="FNanchor_12_117" id="FNanchor_12_117"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_117" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> Chiang thus reconciled, for his own thought,
the naturalistic ethics of Confucius, wherein man and
nature were parts of an inseparable ethical structure,
and the pragmatism of Sun Yat-sen.</p>
<p><i>I</i> is the element in man which makes him observe <i>li</i>:
ethics or justice. <i>Lien</i> is "clear discrimination (honesty
in personal, public, and official life): Integrity."
According to the lexicographer,<a name="FNanchor_13_118" id="FNanchor_13_118"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_118" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> it is "pure, incorrupt,
not avaricious." The fourth principle is <i>ch'ih</i>, given
by the dictionary as "to feel shame,"<a name="FNanchor_14_119" id="FNanchor_14_119"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_119" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> and rendered by
the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang as "real self-consciousness
(self-respect): Honor."<a name="FNanchor_15_120" id="FNanchor_15_120"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_120" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> From this the
Generalissimo evolved his formulation of a theory of
action.<a name="FNanchor_16_121" id="FNanchor_16_121"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_121" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> That he is not unaware of criticisms directed
against him for talking about morality when people are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span>
fighting and starving is shown by his spirited counter-attack:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There are two kinds of skeptics:</p>
<p>First, some hold the view that the four virtues are simply
rules of good conduct. No matter how good they may be,
no benefit to the nation can be derived from them if the
knowledge and technique used by that nation are inferior
to others.</p>
<p>Those who hold this view do not seem to understand the
difference between matters of primary and secondary importance.
From the social and national point of view, only
those who are virtuous can best use their knowledge and
technique for the salvation of the country. Otherwise,
ability may be abused for dishonorable purposes. "Li," "i,"
"lien," and "ch'ih" are the principal rules alike for a community,
a group, or the entire nation. Those who do not
observe these rules will probably utilize their knowledge and
ability to the disadvantage of society. Therefore, these
virtues may be considered as matters of primary importance
upon which the foundation of a nation can be solidly built.</p>
<p>Secondly, there is another group of people who argue
that these virtues are merely refined formalities, which have
nothing to do with the actual necessities of daily life. For
instance, if one is hungry, can these formalities feed him?
This is probably due to some misunderstanding of the
famous teachings of Kuan-Tze, who said: "When one does
not have to worry about his food and clothing, then he
cares for personal honor; when the granary is full, then
people learn good manners." The sceptic fails to realize
that the four virtues teach one how to be a man. If one
does not know these, what is the use of having abundance
of food and clothing? Moreover, Kuan-Tze did not intend
to make a general statement, merely referring to a particular
subject at a particular time. When he was making broad
statements, he said: "'li,' 'i,' 'lien,' and 'ch'ih' are the four
pillars of the nation." When these virtues prevail, even if
food and clothing are temporarily insufficient, they can be
produced by man power: or, if the granary is empty, it
can be filled through human effort. On the other hand,
when these virtues are not observed, there will be robbery
and beggary in time of need: and from a social point of
view robbery and beggary can never achieve anything.
Social order is based on these virtues. When there is order,
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span>then everything can be done properly: but when everything
is in confusion, very little can be achieved. Today robbers
are usually most numerous in the wealthiest cities of the
world. This is an obvious illustration of confusion caused
by non-observance of virtues. The fact that our country
has traitors as well as corrupt officials shows that we, too,
have neglected the cultivation of virtues, and if we are to
recover, these virtues must be adopted as the principles of
a new life.<a name="FNanchor_17_122" id="FNanchor_17_122"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_122" class="fnanchor">[17]</a></p></blockquote>
<p>Generalissimo and Mme. Chiang both work actively
in the Movement, inspecting its branches and enterprises,
speaking at its meetings, and supervising its
functions. The Movement possesses a small but very
active central staff, with Major-General Huang as
Secretary-General and Dr. Chu Djang, a Johns Hopkins
political scientist, as his assistant. Efforts are made to
improve the daily life of the people. Shops are encouraged
to join the Movement, on conditions requiring
cleanliness, uniform prices, etc. Thus in addition to
the work of a Y.M.C.A. for all ages and classes, the
Movement attempts the role of a municipal health campaign
agency, a better business bureau, and a civic
service club. Marriages have traditionally depleted family
budgets; many a Chinese farmer or worker has
fallen into usurious debt because of the social necessity
of extravagant feasting and celebration. The Movement
accordingly organized inexpensive mass marriages, collectively
celebrated under official auspices; the purpose
is not to increase the population, but to circumvent a
wasteful custom. Peep-show operators have been given
displays which are patriotic instead of mythical, chivalric,
or licentious. Story-tellers are taught new, public-spirited
stories to tell. The New Life Movement seeks
to reinvigorate Chinese society by adapting existing institutions
or businesses to new needs.</p>
<p>In addition to attempting change in traditional life,
the Movement has introduced innovations. The only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span>
cafeteria in Chungking serving cheap but dietetically
sound meals is operated by the New Life Headquarters.
Chinese foods were hard to preserve and unpleasant to
eat in the darkness of air raid shelters; China has had
no sandwiches, crackers, or equivalent preparations; the
New Life Movement concocted a cheap but tasty and
nutritious wheat and soy biscuit, and scattered the recipe
broadcast. News is distributed to the illiterates through
lantern-slide lectures in market-places. Mass singing,
virtually unknown in China until now, is making
enormous strides with the war; the New Life Movement
is diffusing this, along with calisthenics.<a name="FNanchor_18_123" id="FNanchor_18_123"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_123" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p>
<p>A group of minor New Life agencies are clustered
about the Headquarters. These, like the Movement, are
not financed by popular subscription, membership fees,
or collection drives. All administrative expenses are
borne by the Generalissimo and his closest associates,
who contribute from their private funds or from available
contingent funds of their offices, and from contributions
by local governments. Since part of the program
is distribution of cash gifts to all wounded soldiers,
the budget runs into fairly high figures, but the Generalissimo
realizes that in China there is no better way
to create mistrust of an enterprise than to collect money
for it. The leading agencies affiliated with the New
Life are:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(1) the War Area Service Corps, designed for propaganda,
instruction, spreading of cooperatives, relief, etc.,
in the occupied and combat zones;</p>
<p>(2) the Rural Service Corps, designed to perform
the same functions behind the lines, and to aid in rural
reconstruction;</p>
<p>(3) the New Life Students Rural Summer Service
Corps, an organization which organizes students from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span>
the colleges during their summer vacations, and sends
them out on the land for service work, along with new
agricultural information, hygienic teaching, literacy
drives, etc.;</p>
<p>(4) the Wounded Soldiers' League, a self-help organization
for disabled veterans, who are assisted and
encouraged to set up their own cooperatives; they have
done so with particular success in cigarette-making,
printing, and shoe-weaving;</p>
<p>(5) the Friends of the Wounded Society, wherein
volunteers become friends to veterans who are in hospitals,
or who return to civil life as cripples (each Friend
contributing money, transmitted direct to the veteran;
Friends are also encouraged to write or visit the veterans);</p>
<p>(6) the New Life Secretaries' Camp, virtually a summer
undergraduate college, with an academic curriculum,
strict discipline, and ample organized recreation;
and</p>
<p>(7) the Women's Advisory Council, which in turn
tops another pyramid of war-time activity in the hands
of women's organizations.<a name="FNanchor_19_124" id="FNanchor_19_124"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_124" class="fnanchor">[19]</a></p>
</blockquote>
<p>In addition to these major activities, there are innumerable
further enterprises, including another industrial
cooperative system, a really extensive chain of
orphanages for war orphans, schools for girls, training
camps for young women, etc. It is no uncommon sight
to stand on a city street in West China and see three-fourths
of the young people wearing the uniforms of
various war activities, most of which—outside the army—are
affiliates of the Party or the Movement.</p>
<p>These activities have not received much praise from
Leftists or foreign visitors. They begin at a level so
far below American requirements of social service that
they seem ineffectual. The author once saw, in China's
<i>tuchün</i> years, old people dying in the streets while<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span>
pedestrians walked by, uncomfortable but aloof; he saw
children with burnt-out eyes whining for alms, to the
profit of a beggars' syndicate; he watched soldiers rotting
alive on the flagstones of temple courtyards. The
Kuomintang, the New Life, and their affiliates cannot
relieve the general poverty of China, nor alter the
fundamental economic faults and continuing maladjustments
of class functions. These agencies do, however,
eliminate evils so bad that the ordinary American
would not remember them for his schedule of social
reform. In the vast reaches of Free China, these organizations—like
many others—almost disappear in the
perpetual routines of ancient, enduring institutions:
the market-place, the hucksters' streets, the tea-house.
But their influence is felt. In contrast with the entire
American New Deal, they are nothing at all; in contrast
with the Y.M.C.A., Komsomol, or similar organizations,
they are agents of one of the greatest practical
social reforms ever undertaken in Asia, and a step bound
to have political repercussions.</p>
<p>Popular non-participation still stultifies them. The
leadership of the agencies parallels government personnel.
Women leaders are in many instances the wives
of officials; an exceptional person, such as Mme. Chiang
or her celebrated sisters, may be a leader in her own
right, but this is no usual rule. In many agencies, such
as intended mass organizations for reform, instruction,
health, etc., the mass character is entirely lacking. The
masses are the beneficiaries of Kuomintang action, but
not often participants in that action. The Communists
and the independent Left hold an enormous leverage
in popular interest; ignoring class lines, illiteracy, or
lack of preparation, they draw the common people into
a real share in government and social reconstruction.
The Kuomintang has ignored this opportunity—in part
because of the Confucian cleavage between scholars and
the untutored which made the scholar, however benevolent<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span>
or philanthropic, a being apart from the commonalty.</p>
<p>Two further organs—the National Spiritual Mobilization
(<i>Kuo-min Ching-shên Tsung-tung-yüan</i>) and the
Mass Mobilization—are Kuomintang devices for mass
participation. The former, developed as an antidote to
defeatism engendered by protraction of the war, rising
prices, and the treason of Wang, actually consists in a
propaganda machine, which holds torchlight vigils, national
fealty ceremonies, and similar festivals in the
larger cities; it has adapted some of the stagecraft of
the German National Socialists, but lacks a broadly popular
character. The Mass Mobilization is under the
Training Department of the Military Affairs Commission;
useful as a military device, its political character
is slight in Free China. In the guerrilla and occupied
zones, a genuine <i>levée en masse</i> has been accomplished;
in the free areas, safeguards which hedge Mobilization
have robbed it of utility save that which is strictly military.
As an adjunct to the army, this is useful; otherwise
it has been ineffectual, despite the competitive success
obtained by the guerrilla zones in equivalent organizations.</p>
<p>The over-all picture of the Kuomintang and its activities
is hard to bring into focus. One general contrast
will point some of its strength and weakness clearly: as
a governing agency, which created and maintained the
government, the Kuomintang has been more effective
than any other group in China. The Party has met
and overcome obstacles in practical politics, international
relations, working administration, internal unification,
and national defense. The Party has succeeded
well enough to remain in power, which none of its predecessors
or competitors have managed to do. As a
social and political force, its governing character colors
its work. More has been done by the government for
the people than in any comparable situation in East<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span>
Asia. But Kuomintang rule, however excellent when
measured by the standards of authoritary or colonial
government, still falls far short of even elementary application
of democratic techniques. The flexibility of the
Party, and a continued ability to yield power in order
to retain power, are the most hopeful factors in the
view of the Kuomintang future.</p>
<p>The Kuomintang could not be overthrown by any
force—mere force—on earth, unless the Party betrayed
itself. Attacked by a major power, it has emerged unscathed.
But the Communists or other opponents may
find their most useful weapons in the weaknesses of the
Kuomintang itself: in the slowness of its change, or in
its unadaptability to rapidly changing conditions; or
in an extra-Party resentment arising from severe economic
dislocation which, though consequent to war
rather than to governmental policies, was not swiftly
enough controlled by a slowly-moving Kuomintang. By
contrast with 1935, however, the Kuomintang has
gained much power; the Communists have lost some.
Regional and half-separatist regimes, often corrupt,
have almost altogether disappeared. Along with the
Kuomintang, the independent Leftists have also profited.</p>
<p>No prediction, to be plausible, can assume the early
demise or collapse of the Kuomintang. The Party has
obtained power; its organization is one of the three
policy-executing branches of the new national organization.
Ruin of the Kuomintang implies ruin of the
emergent Chinese state, so laboriously constructed;
though a successor might arise, too much of the work
would have to be done over again. Many Chinese, of
all classes, realize this. Kuomintang rule is the <i>status
quo</i>; despite demerits, it is the first stable government
modern China has had, and China's chief tool of defense
today.</p>
<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_106" id="Footnote_1_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_106"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> The text of this Constitution is given in Arthur N. Holcombe's
invaluable study of the Great Revolution, <i>The Chinese Revolution:
A Phase in the Regeneration of a World Power</i>, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
1930, p. 356-70.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_2_107" id="Footnote_2_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_107"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Wang Shih-chieh, <i>Pi-chiao Hsien-fa</i>, Shanghai, XXVI (1937),
p. 651-3.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_3_108" id="Footnote_3_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_108"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> See <i>China at War</i>, Vol. V, No. 3 (October 1940), p. 77-8, for a
recent official account of the Corps.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_4_109" id="Footnote_4_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_109"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Information given the author by Dr. Ch'ên Kuo-fu and members
of his staff, at the Central Political Institute, August 18, 1940. Few
places are more beautiful than the valley in which the cool, spacious
buildings of the Institute are set. Landscaped for centuries, and celebrated
as a beauty spot, the area is filled with carved shrines, severely
simple monuments, and flagstone walks. A river runs through a
forested gorge; waterfalls feed the stream.
</p>
<p>
Dr. Ch'ên supplemented his hospitality in Western China by transmitting
to the author a series of statements in reply to questions which
were put to him in writing. Of these, the two most interesting refer,
first, to the economic status of the Institute's students, and secondly, to
the Kuomintang training plan in the Northwest: "Judged by functions
and economic levels, students of the Central Political Institute
represent all economic strata of Chinese society. Those of peasant origin
are most numerous, forming over 40% of the total number."—"For
the purpose of educating young men and women in the border provinces,
the Central Political Institute has established a School for the
Border Provinces, of which branches were established at Powtow
(Suiyuan province), Sinin (Chinghai province), and Kangting (Sikong
province) in October 1934. Another branch was established at Shuchow
(Kansu province) in August 1935, this being the school sponsored by
the Kuomintang in the Northwest. The Powtow branch was suspended
in 1940, and those in Sinin and Kangting were handed over to the
Provincial Governments concerned at the same time. So the only
Kuomintang school in the Northwest at present is the one at Shuchow.
It is subdivided into three parts: namely, a Normal School, a Middle
School, and a Primary School. Its annual budget is one hundred thousand
dollars Chinese national currency." (Letter to the author,
March 10, 1941.)</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_5_110" id="Footnote_5_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_110"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> The term <i>pu</i> is usually translated Board, but the <i>pu-chang</i> (<i>pu</i>
chief) is given as Minister. Since the identical terms are rendered
Ministry, Minister, Vice-Minister, etc., in the case of the government,
the term Party-Ministry is here adopted as both distinct and descriptive.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_6_111" id="Footnote_6_111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_111"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Visitors to Chungking owe much to the Foreign Affairs Section
of the International Publicity Department. Its chief, the
affable Mr. C. C. Chi, a well-known economist from Shanghai, has acted as host
to almost every visitor to Hankow or Chungking. He has fulfilled
endless requests—many of them irrational—with unfailing patience,
good humor, candor, and intelligence. Few books on contemporary
China fail to bear the imprint of his help; the present one is no
exception.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_7_112" id="Footnote_7_112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_112"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Statement to the author at Kuomintang Central Headquarters,
Chungking, July 16, 1940; Dr. K'an also supplied the facts for the
new organizational features of the Party. The following interpretations
are the author's alone.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_8_113" id="Footnote_8_113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_113"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> For a Marxian analysis of the Kuomintang, carefully stripped of
frank Marxian verbiage, see "Wei-Meng-pu," "The Kuomintang in
China: Its Fabric and Future" in <i>Pacific Affairs</i>, Vol. XIII, No. 1
(March 1940), p. 30-44. The author <i>a priori</i> defines the Kuomintang
as the party of the national bourgeoisie in China, in effect exhorting
it to fulfill its historic mission of completing the national
democratic revolution, whereupon socialism [i.e., Stalinism] may historically
follow. Nevertheless, its comment on personalities is informing
in terms of practical politics.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_9_114" id="Footnote_9_114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_114"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> The China Information Committee, <i>News Release</i>, March 4, 1940.
English translations of names such as the New Life Movement, Officers'
Moral Endeavor Corps, National Spiritual Mobilization, etc.
are often awkward or jejune where the original is not.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_10_115" id="Footnote_10_115"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_115"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Young, C. W. H., <i>New Life for Kiangsi</i>, Shanghai, 1935, is a
missionary work which praises the New Life Movement highly. The
book includes interesting, first-hand, unfavorable accounts of the
rule of the quondam Chinese Soviet Republic, and explains some of
the opposition to the Communists. The interconnection between
Communist-suppression and the New Life Movement is consciously
and clearly demonstrated.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_11_116" id="Footnote_11_116"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_116"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> Chiang, May-ling Soong, <i>China Shall Rise Again</i>, New York,
1941, p. 38 <i>ff.</i> Mme. Chiang's work also includes a full account of the
enterprises of the New Life Movement and of its affiliates.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_12_117" id="Footnote_12_117"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_117"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Chiang K'ai-shek, <i>Outline of the New Life Movement</i>, Chungking (?),
n.d. p. 8. This is the translation, by Mme. Chiang, of
<i>Hsin Shêng-huo Yün-tung Kang-yao</i>, Nanking, n.d., originally published
in May 1934.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_13_118" id="Footnote_13_118"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_118"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Giles, Herbert, <i>A Chinese-English Dictionary</i>, Second Edition,
Shanghai and London, 1912; ideograph No. 7128.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_14_119" id="Footnote_14_119"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_119"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> The same; ideograph No. 1999.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_15_120" id="Footnote_15_120"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_120"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Chiang K'ai-shek, cited, p. 7.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_16_121" id="Footnote_16_121"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_121"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Reprinted as Appendix III (B), p. <a href="#Page_373">373</a>, below.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_17_122" id="Footnote_17_122"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_122"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> Chiang K'ai-shek, cited, p. 6-7.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_18_123" id="Footnote_18_123"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_123"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> Most of these and the following facts, but not the interpretations,
are based on interviews which the author had with the hospitable
Major-General J. L. Huang in Chungking, on July 14, 1940, and
subsequently.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_19_124" id="Footnote_19_124"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_124"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> For an excellent outline of the role of women in the war, see
Chiang, May-ling Soong, <i>China Shall Rise Again</i>, cited, p. 287 <i>ff.</i></p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span></p>
<h2><span class="smcap">Chapter VI</span><br />
THE COMMUNIST AND MINOR PARTIES</h2>
<p>The party politics of Republican China fall into
two periods: the early period of competitive, pre-parliamentary
parties, 1912 to the Great Revolution;
and a later period of struggling monopoly-power parties,
from the Great Revolution to the present. In the earlier
period the Kuomintang and its rivals tolerated one another's
existence; each regarded co-existing parties as
natural, desirable, and useful. But the sham democracy
of the prostituted Republic disheartened the Kuomintang,
which thereupon bid for the complete conquest
of power, brooking no legitimate competitors; its rivals
did likewise. The first coalition (1922-27) of Kuomintang
and Communists was therefore not the democratic
competition of two parties with different stresses upon
a common ideological foundation, but a war-time alliance
of basically incompatible forces. After the 1927
break, the Kuomintang became the only legal party in
most of the country, while the Communists—with a
rebel army, an unrecognized government, and a territory
of their own—enjoyed legality within the limits of
their own swords. The Kuomintang, embraced by all
major groups save the Communists, became the foremost
vehicle for Chinese political life. Minor parties
enjoyed precarious, ineffectual existences, underground
or expatriate.</p>
<p>With the outbreak of war in 1937, Nationalists and
Communists adopted a truce, formally a Communist
surrender of armed rebellion, subversive ideology, and
separate government. In actuality it was an alliance<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span>
of deadly enemies against the Japan which threatened
them both. Today, Chinese party politics revives in the
People's Political Council, and to a slight degree in
public opinion. The legal prohibition of minor parties,
including the Communists, remains in effect. Chinese
party politics, in the Western sense of a friendly subdivision
of common opinion, remains vestigial. The
only guarantee of party rights is an unstable toleration
extended by the Kuomintang in the negative form of
non-prosecution. The Kuomintang is the Party for
most of China. The Communist Party is the party for
a separate fraction of China. The minor parties, holding
neither territory nor armies in the game of power,
maneuver between and about the two, struggling to
attain legal existence.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Chinese Communists: Party and Leaders</span></h3>
<p>Literary Marxism runs back to the Ch'ing dynasty,
but the first formal organization of a Chinese Communist
Party occurred with the first Congress of the Chinese
C.P., in Shanghai, during July of 1921.<a name="FNanchor_1_125" id="FNanchor_1_125"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_125" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> The
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span>Soviet-Kuomintang entente was, strictly speaking, not a union
between the Kuomintang and the Communist parties,
although it came to be such in fact; it was collaboration
between the Third International, which agreed that
Communism was unsuited to China, and the Kuomintang.
The development of a Chinese Communist Party,
and open Communist debate concerning the assumption
of power, made the Kuomintang mistrustful, repressive,
and finally hostile. The suppression of the Communists
by Chiang in 1927 has become world history; Vincent
Sheean and André Malraux have preserved aspects of
it in moving literature.<a name="FNanchor_2_126" id="FNanchor_2_126"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_126" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p>
<p>In the period 1927-37 the Chinese Communists operated
the Chinese Soviet Republic (<i>Chung-hua Su-wei-ai
Kung-ho-kuo</i>),<a name="FNanchor_3_127" id="FNanchor_3_127"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_127" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> primarily in Kiangsi, but also in the
Ao-yü-wan (Hupeh, Honan, Anhui) area. In the Long
March of 1934-35 the main forces of the Communists,
in the most spectacular military move in China since
the great Northern raid of the T'aip'ing, marched a
distance of some six thousand miles, and established
their new area in North Shensi (see above, p. <a href="#Page_112">112</a> <i>ff.</i>).
Not only did the Chinese Red Army remain intact;
through great and successful effort, the Communists
transplanted schools, banks, and other institutions intact.
The Long March was comparable to the celebrated
Flight of the Tartars, in that it amounted to the transplanting
of an entire people, their worldly goods, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span>
their most highly treasured institutions and traditions.</p>
<p>Despite Kuomintang theory, the Frontier Area is a
one-party <i>imperium in imperio</i>, and its unchallenged
party is the Communist. Under conditions requiring
great fortitude, the Chinese Communist leaders have
consolidated power, and use their base to spread Marxism
through the guerrilla movement. They are thus in
the best possible political position; their strategic excellence
makes them welcome in precisely those zones
wherein their doctrines can best take effect. Their party
organization controls the Frontier Area through formal
appointment of the leading officials by the National
Military Affairs Commission, and through formulae of
election for the subordinate officials.</p>
<p>The hierarchy of the Chinese C.P. is much like that
of the Kuomintang, which also copied Soviet models:<a name="FNanchor_4_128" id="FNanchor_4_128"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_128" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p>
<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;">
<img src="images/i_162.jpg" width="400" height="240" alt="Chinese Communist Party Hierarchy" />
</div>
<p>The shibboleth of Democratic Centralism applies to
the Chinese as well as to other Communist Parties; in
practice this means the high and unqualified concentration<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span>
of power at the top of the hierarchy following
action by the democratic, or mass, element of the party
through the Party Council or Congress. In effect, nothing
is decided at such elections, since the plebiscites,
according to the familiar authoritarian pattern, concern
questions to which only one answer is reasonably
possible: the answer decided by the party rulers. The
free use of meaningless elections characterizes Communist
activity in governmental as well as party matters.
The voting act gives the impression of concurrence, improves
morale, and ceremonializes the approval of the
majority for the minority. The purpose which elections
serve in democracies—that is, of providing a decision to
issues not previously ascertained—appears very rarely in
Communist elections, where a near unanimity is constructed
to indicate popular support, and contested elections,
disunity.</p>
<p>In terms of personnel, the Communist hierarchy has
been consistently compliant with world Communist
policy as made in Moscow. This is a tribute to the high
international unity and uniformity of the ecumenical
Communist movement, but raises, in China, problems
of intra-national Communist policy. Revolutionary
veterans of the party, who fought, suffered, studied, and
worked for their cause through ten, fifteen, or twenty
years of effort, often find themselves displaced, dictated
to, or expelled by the clique of younger men who have
lived comfortably in Moscow studying the dialectic
mystagogy and acquiring an inside track in Stalinist
cliquism.<a name="FNanchor_5_129" id="FNanchor_5_129"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_129" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> The Chinese Communist Party has been
shaken by violent schisms, casting off many once highly-valued
leaders.</p>
<p>No sooner does a man become suspect to the ultimate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span>
authorities than his previous record, hitherto
praised, is re-examined and captious criticism proves
that he was a traitor from the beginning, like Trotsky,
Bukharin, Chicherin, and Zinoviev. The profound
vitality of the Chinese Communist movement as a
quasi-religious, self-sacrificial organization is demonstrated
by the fact that it has weathered these storms.
The terrible hunger for a guidance in life, an insight
into the ethical meanings of things, and an absolute
which asks nothing but acceptance and obedience—these
factors call for courage, humility, abasement,
fortitude. They do not favor imagination, individual
integrity of thought, or the examination of fact. There
has been no indication whatever, despite the wishful
thinking of Western liberals, that the mentality of the
Chinese Red leaders is one whit different from that of
Western Communists. They talk practical democracy,
moderation, collaboration with the Kuomintang; they
do so because this is the Comintern's China policy, just
as they have fought the National Government in the
past when the Soviet authorities disliked Chiang more
than they did Japan.</p>
<p>Their all-China collaboration is no doubt sincere;
but the sincerity is based not on the wish to collaborate,
but on what, in their special phrasing, is termed the
"objective" analysis of the situation. If the Soviet
Union, the chief "proletarian" force in the world,
turned against Chiang, the Communist <i>ipso facto</i> would
be against collaboration. The war of China against
Japan would no longer be a war of "national liberation"
but an "inter-imperialist" war in which the true
interests of the "working classes" would be against
<i>both</i> sides. This provides to Marxians, under the name
"science," an absolute, infallible guide to ethics in
practical politics, because it presumes to reveal the
inescapable long-range meaning of human affairs. The
supposition that daily affairs may in fact possess none<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span>
but short-range meaning, outside of slow, general,
nearly impalpable changes in ecology, demography, and
genetics, etc., is anathema to the Marxians. A humanism
trained to deal directly, pragmatically, and simply
with events is as far beyond the Chinese Communists
as it is beyond other Marxians.</p>
<p>This orthodoxy, so complete that it enthralls the
leadership to Moscow and paralyzes Marxian heretics in
the very act of dissidence, reaches throughout the upper
levels of the party. This fact does not mean that the
Chinese Communist movement is in no wise different
from other national Communist movements. The historical
basis of the Chinese Communism, ever since
Chiang smashed the urban unions in 1927, has been
that of an exotic faith imposed upon a native <i>jacquerie</i>,
in which the exoticism is unwittingly traditionalist.
Peasant revolts of the Chinese past have operated with
the counter-ideocratic leverage of a superstition, normally
Taoist in derivation. The heads of the Yellow
Turbans (ca. 200 <span class="smcap lowercase">A.D.</span>) and the Boxers (ca. 1900) were
all magicians; the T'aip'ing (ca. 1850) leader was a
Christian in communication with God Himself. These
heresies against the all-pervading order of Confucian
common sense disappeared after their high-pitched dynamics
died down in social readjustment.</p>
<p>Marxism provides an element of faith, devotion, and
irrational submission which has operated in past Chinese
history. The frugality, honesty, and integrity of
the Chinese Red leaders are celebrated by foreign visitors
and even by Nationalist officials; such revolutionary
virtues seem new in China, whereas they are the twentieth-century
manifestation of a common enough phase
of Chinese political activity. However, one cannot
herefrom conclude that the Chinese Communist movement
is destined to disappear with its predecessors, for
it has three things which they did not have: an extra-Chinese
application, which not only supports it, but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span>
proves its concreteness and relative realizability; a modern
system of education, and thereby a class of counter-ideologues
to compete with the post-Confucian Nationalists;
and leaders with revolutionary experience
greater than any in the world, not excepting that of the
great Soviet leaders themselves. Ancient peasant uprisings
revealed a final cleavage between dervish-type organizers
and the peasants, once infuriated, who finally
sought normalcy. If the Chinese Communist leaders
can, through the example of the Soviet Union, or by
education, or by dexterous leadership, make Communism
into normalcy, they may retain their hold on
such sections of the peasantry as their leadership has
captured.</p>
<p>Two men stand forth above all others in Chinese
Communism. Both would be remarkable individuals
in any historical setting. Their partnership has led
them to be described by one hyphenated phrase: <i>Chu-Mao</i>:
Chu Tê and Mao Tse-tung. Chu Tê, the military
genius of Chinese Communism, was born of a gentry
family in Szechuan, and attended the Yünnan Military
Academy at the time that Chiang was in Japan; he entered
the years of his early maturity as an aide to a
provincial <i>tuchün</i>. According to Edgar Snow, he was
at this time sunk in vice, enjoying wealth, opium-smoking,
a harem, and the amenities of a war-lord existence.<a name="FNanchor_6_130" id="FNanchor_6_130"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_130" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>
Chu felt an urge within himself to escape this rut. He
abandoned his worthless existence, leaving his harem
provided for, and went to the coast, where he could become
acquainted with the revolutionary movement.
On the way he broke himself of the drug habit. He
went to Europe, living in France and Germany, and in
the latter country joined the Chinese Communist
branch established among the students. He returned
in 1926 during the Great Revolution, and served as
political officer in the Kuomintang forces. Later he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span>
was instrumental in the creation of the Chinese Soviet
Republic, and was the prime military leader of the
Communist forces in the long civil war. He led the trek
to the Northwest, and is esteemed as a military hero of
Arthurian proportions. Friendly, candid, interested in
specific tasks, he is characteristic of the superb leadership
which preserved Communism in China. He is the
only Chinese military leader who was not defeated by
Chiang, although Chiang pursued him six thousand
miles. Major Evans Carlson, the American Marine
officer, compares him with Robert E. Lee, U. S. Grant,
and Abraham Lincoln—drawing on the best features of
each for the purpose.<a name="FNanchor_7_131" id="FNanchor_7_131"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_131" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p>
<p>Mao Tse-tung was born in Hunan in 1893 of a well-to-do
farmer family. His autobiography, dictated to Edgar
Snow, is a classic of Western literature on China.<a name="FNanchor_8_132" id="FNanchor_8_132"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_132" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> His
history was that of many other restless young Chinese
intellectuals, struggling for education amidst turmoil,
and adjusting their sense of values to the chaotic early
Republic. He was caught up by the Marxism of the
literary Renaissance after 1917, served in the Kuomintang
during the Great Revolution, and worked as head
of the All-China Peasants Union. During the Soviet
period, in which he first became a colleague of Chu Tê,
he stood forth as the chief political leader. He and Chu
between them formed a team to rival Generalissimo
Chiang, although Mao shared his political leadership
with various others, particularly Chang Kuo-tao. Mao<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span>
is an expert dialectician, skilled in rationalizing the
policies of the Communist International, and keenly
critical within the limits of his Marxian orthodoxy.
Less genial than Chu Tê, he is nevertheless an inspiring
leader. His political skill, in following the lurches and
shifts of the Stalin party line while simultaneously leading
an enormous Chinese peasant revolt, is monumental.
His earlier rivals and colleagues are in most cases dead
or forgotten. He survived both ideological and practical
ordeals.</p>
<p>A third Communist leader, Chou En-lai, is of importance
because he acts as liaison officer between the
National Government and the Frontier Area. The Communist
quasi-legation in Chungking is maintained as
a purchasing and communications office of the Eighteenth
Army Corps (formerly Eighth Route Army).
Chou, who studied abroad in Japan, France, and Germany,
served at the Whampoa academy under Chiang,
and in the period of civil war he was one of the chief
political officers, twice Chinese Communist delegate
to Moscow. He is an old acquaintance of many Kuomintang
leaders from Chiang on down, and appears
to be one of the most successful diplomats in the world.
Despite acrimony from secondary leaders on both
sides, Chiang and Mao seek to maintain their alliance
against Japan, and Chou is their chief intermediary. At
Chungking he is seconded by the alert, brilliant Ch'in
Po-k'u, a veteran of Communist political-bureau work.</p>
<p>The difficulties and conditions of Communist collaboration
with the National Government are well illustrated
in the life of Chang Kuo-tao. One of the
founders of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai,
in 1921, Chang was of the upper classes, like Chu Tê;
and like Mao, he was a radical student in Peking. Just
before his departure from the party in 1938, he had
been chairman of the Northwestern Soviet, taking precedence
over Mao himself; but with the coming of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span>
national unity, Chang wished to cooperate fully with
China's leader, government, and legal Party, the Kuomintang.
He adopted subterfuges to get out of the
Communist Area. Arriving in Hankow, he announced
his desire to form a genuine United Front on the basis
of a candid and sincere acceptance of the <i>San Min Chu I</i>,
which would mean the actual abandonment of Marxian
dreams of Communist "proletarian" dictatorship in
China, even for the future. He did not renounce Communism,
but simply took his colleagues at their words,
and announced his intention of cooperating honestly,
and not through compulsion of the Moscow dialectic.
He wrote:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>According to the views of the Chinese Communists, the
present United Front is only a temporary union of many
political groups, which are entirely different from one another
in nature. These political groups have their own social
bases, and they represent the interests of different
classes. "The Kuomintang," so they believe, "represents
landlords and capitalists, while the Communist Party represents
the working class." No [ultimate] compromise can
be made between the two parties.</p>
<p>Now we often hear such slogans of the Chinese Communists
as, "Let's lead the people <i>together</i>," "Let's <i>all</i> take
responsibilities," "Let us <i>both</i> be progressive," and "Let's
act under the <i>same</i> principles." These represent the old
ideas of striving for leadership. These show that they do not
have the foresight to work unselfishly for the nation and
the people. They want to retain their military forces. They
want to maintain the Frontier Area and special, privileged
positions in certain occupied areas. They keep these in
order to await future developments....</p>
<p>I hope they [the following suggestions] will receive the
consideration of the Chinese Communists:</p>
<p>(1) the Chinese Communists should always remember
that the benefits of the nation and the people go before
everything. They should support the movement of Resistance
and Reconstruction under the leadership of Mr.
Chiang K'ai-shek. They should carry out the <i>San Min Chu I</i>
without hesitation. What they do must agree with what
they say;</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span></p>
<p>(2) there should be complete coordination of governmental
and military operations, under all conditions....
I hope the Chinese Communists will not think that the
Eighth Route Army is one privately owned by the Communist
Party.... The Frontier Area [where Chang Kuo-tao
had so recently been leader] should not be made a Communist
base, nor made into an isolated place where Communist-made
laws are executed and prejudice, together
with political persecution, prevails....</p>
<p>(3) with a view to working for the nation and the
people, the Communists should follow the foreign policies
adopted by the central government.<a name="FNanchor_9_133" id="FNanchor_9_133"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_133" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p>
</blockquote>
<p>Chang demanded that the Communists react more
sincerely, that they accept the full implications of a
united China, and abandon their long-range dialectic
for power.<a name="FNanchor_10_134" id="FNanchor_10_134"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_134" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> For this he was denounced, his years of
service were reappraised, and he was dropped from the
Communist Party.<a name="FNanchor_11_135" id="FNanchor_11_135"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_135" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> He was accused of hurting the
United Front, because he urged a more nearly perfect
union. The chief Communist leaders challenged him
in open letters, revealing their continued adherence to
an ideology which made an eventual struggle for power
inescapable.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span></p>
<p>The Communists have, therefore, cooperated as far
as they are able, without emerging from the infallibilities
of their cult. They retain the Marxian rationalization
apparatus, and the linkage with Moscow. As such, they
are welcome but not completely trustworthy allies.
Their presence is undoubtedly the greatest check to the
development of democracy in China; the presence of a
totalitarian party, respecting no rules but its own,
jeopardizes the entire experiment. The Communists
want democracy, but they want it quite frankly as a
step toward "working-class" (Marxist) power; they accept
the <i>San Min Chu I</i> on the condition that it be read
as elementary Marxism. They do not insist on the term
Communism, but employ the terms "working-class"
interests for their party, "scientific objectivity" for their
ideology, and "a people's movement" for radical, arbitrary
reforms to rip Free China open with social revolution.
The Kuomintang leaders are fully aware of the
support in name plus subversion in fact which the
Communists offer, and complain bitterly about the
principles of Sun being twisted about to Marxism as in
the form of "'independent' nationalism, 'free' democracy,
and 'beneficent' livelihood," the qualifying
terms sufficing for the alignment.<a name="FNanchor_12_136" id="FNanchor_12_136"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_136" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> They understand
that the Communists are incapable of sincere extra-class
democracy; the Communists are hurt by the Kuomintang's
unwillingness to admit that it is not a Party of
patriots, but the Party of a transitional, historically
doomed middle class.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Communism: Patriotism or Betrayal?</span></h3>
<p>If the Communists were as inflexible, disciplined,
ferocious, and intransigeant as they like to appear to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span>
themselves, China would have had a three-sided war
long ago. In practice, however, the Chinese Communists
yield amazingly. The Communist International
is not goading the Chinese Communists into the sabotage
of Chiang and of national resistance. Whether
Moscow could do so is a standing question of Chinese
politics. The answer cannot be known except by practical
test. One might, however, plausibly suppose that
an attempt by Stalin to consummate a Moscow-Tokyo
pact (possibly in accordance with pressure from Berlin,
which would require immediate protection of the proletarian
fatherland) would create a deep schism in Communist
ranks; but it is unthinkable that all the Chinese
Communists would abjure their faith. Moscow would
not be naive enough to require the Communists to
cease fighting Japan <i>in form</i>. Such a Kuomintang-Communist
break would probably weaken the National
Government; it would not destroy the Chungking
regime unless the Generalissimo ignored the
chance offered by a Leftward turn, to retain some
of the peasant-radical and guerrilla forces in his
own ranks. It would, however, enormously strengthen
Japan, and be a severe blow to China. The greatest
danger of a Kuomintang-Communist break would lie
in an American defeat of Japan. By removing the
necessity of Soviet support of Chiang, and increasing
the power of the National Government, American
aid would lessen the opportunities of Communism in
China.</p>
<p>At present, however, the Chinese Communists welcome
American aid, even though the effect of such
aid is to strengthen the China of Chiang as against
the China of Chu-Mao. The Communist spokesman,
Ch'in Po-k'u, told the author that American aid was
not feared in China, but was <i>welcome</i>, emphasizing the
word. He even stated, in response to a far-fetched hypothetical
question, that actual American troops would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span>
be welcome at Yenan, and stated that inter-party trouble
was to be expected only in case of defeat.<a name="FNanchor_13_137" id="FNanchor_13_137"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_137" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p>
<p>The final picture of the Communist position which
emerges in China is about as follows:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(1) the Communists are gaining ground because of
their helpfulness and vigorous leadership in organizing
the guerrilla areas; wherever the Japanese forces
go, the Communists (thus shielded from Chinese National
armies) increase their influence;</p>
<p>(2) the Communists are benefiting politically by
a genuine popular movement in both Free and occupied
China, particularly in the latter, where spontaneous
mass action is providing a base either for
Sunyatsenist democracy or for Communism in the
future;</p>
<p>(3) in view of their belief that time is on their
side, because of the present direction of Soviet foreign
policy, the Chinese Communists are very cooperative
in the alliance against Japan, patiently postponing
demands for "democracy" (i.e., unrestricted rights of
organization and agitation);</p>
<p>(4) they have superlative leadership, rich in practical
experience, which represents the super-orthodox
residuum of years of schism and purging; such a leadership
is not likely to abandon the fundamentals of
Communism, such as the dialectic, the class-outlook
on all history and politics, and belief in the inescapable
universality of future "proletarian" rule (Communist
world conquest); therefore, it is almost unthinkable
that they would fail to do Moscow's bidding, if the
party line demanded national treason in war time;</p>
<p>(5) the interests of the Soviet Union run parallel
with those of non-Communist China for a long time
in the future, unless the European balance of power
forces the U.S.S.R. to appease Japan; under such circumstances,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span>
the Soviet Union will be very anxious to maintain
the foothold of Communism in China, and will
not be likely to ask the Chinese Communists to commit
candid treason;</p>
<p>(6) lastly, the Kuomintang possesses the opportunity
of rivaling Communism, of overtaking its rate of growth
in political power, by a bold policy of freeing speech,
constitutionalizing the government, reforming the land
tenure system, and pushing cooperative industrialism;
the base of Communism has been widespread peasant
revolt. If the conditions of peasant revolt are eliminated,
Communism will not be much more of a threat to
China than it is to the advanced countries of Europe.
(Wisely or not, the Kuomintang has not consented to
meet the Communists in open ideological competition.
If it did so, and won, Kuomintang morale would be
strengthened. At present the practical aims of Party
policy toward Communists are about as follows: restriction
and isolation of the Frontier Area and of the
Border Region, so far as agitation is concerned, before
ingestion by the constitutional national system; military
precautions, balancing Communist forces with Nationalist;
standardization of Red military practice by
national rules, and the elimination of peculiar political
features; eventual dissolution of fellow-travelling organizations,
and their absorption into the corresponding
officially sponsored movements; supervision of Communists
and channels of Communist propaganda; courtesy
toward Communist leaders, strictness toward Communist
subordinates, and harshness toward the Communist
laboring class following. A corresponding policy
toward the Kuomintang is pursued by the Communists.)</p></blockquote>
<p>Finally, the deepest element eludes political analysis:
the moderation of the Chinese character, and the heritage
of Confucian common sense. The Chinese language
and the Confucian inheritance of ideological
sophistication lead to clarity, pragmatism, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span>
practicality. The Chinese have long delighted in ingenious
formulae with which to meet <i>de jure</i> impasses, while
proceeding <i>de facto</i> in quite another direction. The
Chinese are perhaps the only people in the world with
enough finesse about "face" to save the Communist
face. The Generalissimo is in theory consciously anti-Marxian;
but when he was asked whether it is possible
that Communists or Leftists might exploit democratic
rights for unscrupulous power politics, he answered
quietly by writing: "No, because democracy in
itself has the ability to work out the solutions for those
problems if there are any." A Communist leader said,
the Generalissimo would have nothing to fear from the
Communists if he won the war. His prestige would be
unassailable. Chiang and the Communists both know this.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The National Salvation Movement</span></h3>
<p>The National Salvation (<i>Chiu Kuo</i>) movement is
third in point of size and influence, and has been largely
instrumental in assisting national unification and resistance.
The movement began in 1935 with the organization
of a number of professors, students, and
young intellectuals who were influenced by the student
anti-appeasement movement in North China. It had
a simple, and very clear program: stop civil war; stop
appeasement.<a name="FNanchor_14_138" id="FNanchor_14_138"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_138" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> Unlike the Kuomintang or the Communists,
the National Salvationists never developed
formal dogma, or a comprehensive ideology. Genuinely
a movement, it had no membership books, no formal or
systematic organization, no minorities, and no schisms.
The movement spread like wildfire, across the length
and breadth of China as well as overseas; and, because
of its lack of formal hierarchy, was ignored by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span>
the National Government. Its loose organization, consciously
based on the middle class of clerks, students, business
men, professors, etc., followed functional lines familiar
to the Chinese.</p>
<p>When the National Salvationists began the creation
of a structure, however rudimentary, by forming an
inter-professional federation for National Salvation, and
when they followed this with the national congress for
National Salvation, the government took action, which
resulted in the celebrated trial of the Seven Gentlemen
(<i>ch'i chün-tzŭ</i>). The term (<i>chün-tzŭ</i>) is the Confucian
word for superior or upright person, without reference
to gender, and was applied in affectionate derision by
the press. One of the <i>chün-tzŭ</i> was a lady. The seven,
who included a celebrated and popular law school dean
(Shên Chun-lu), a banker, and authors (Tso Tao-fên,
the spokesman among them) were tried and imprisoned
late in 1936. Demands for their release figured in the
Sian kidnapping.</p>
<p>The movement was financed very simply through
volunteer contributions. Most of the work was done
by volunteers who asked no pay, travelling and working
at their own expense. About Ch. $5,000 (then about
U. S. $1,000) sufficed to cover the whole expenses of
headquarters. Despite the imprisonment of its leaders,
the movement gathered momentum. Funds were collected
to support guerrillas opposing Japan in transmural
China. Most literate persons not already committed
to formal Kuomintang or Communist membership
fell under the influence of the movement. General
Shêng Shih-ts'ai in Sinkiang offered the movement a
home, and many of its workers went to the West.</p>
<p>In practical terms, the National Salvationists often
work with the Communist Party, although they are
strictly Chinese and do not have an elaborate dialectic.
A strain of economic determinism runs through their
thought, but this is not systematized. The leaders of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span>
the movement were released after the outbreak of war,
but their organizations continued to be suppressed,
and work is largely suspended. The leaders told the
author that they had no means of estimating the actual
number of their adherents; they had no formal membership
roll, and they were still legally suppressed in
Chungking areas. The quest for policy and principle
instead of power is new to Chinese politics, and the
National Salvation leaders are esteemed almost universally
and hated by none. Nevertheless the Kuomintang
has not admitted the legality of the movement,
which continues to exist in non-public fashion. Some
of the leaders were recognized to the extent of being put
on the People's Political Council. In addition to standing
with the Communists in matters of practical domestic
reform, the National Salvation leaders demand
two fundamental policies: continuation of the war,
and unity of the country above all party considerations.</p>
<p>The National Salvation leaders are able, modest, and
patriotic. They represent the older non-political sentiment
of China, infused with modern Leftist content.
Dean Shên of Shanghai, the senior of the movement, is
an elderly man of almost dainty gentleness, keenly intelligent
demeanor, and serious but charming good
humor. Mr. Tso Tao-fên, an author, is a world traveller.
Their colleagues are of the student, publisher,
author type: intellectual, patriotic, common-sense in
outlook.</p>
<p>The National Salvation movement looks forward to
constitutionalism. It has become almost universal in the
guerrilla areas. The leaders have faith that the Constitution
and liberalized public life are developing, although
they expected in the summer of 1940 that the
Convention would be postponed until 1941, to allow
the Communists and Nationalists further opportunity
for balancing and adjusting power relationships. The
National Salvationists are past masters in the techniques<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span>
of indirect, almost invisible pressures. Their disinterestedness,
high principles, and patriotism put them
in an admirable position to act as a determined moderating
force between the two major Parties. As such they
are the third party of China, although another, smaller
group bears this name.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Third Party</span></h3>
<p>The party commonly called The Third Party (<i>Ti-san
Tang</i>) was organized by dissident Communists and
Left Kuomintang members who wished to keep on collaborating
after the major parties broke apart in 1927,
thus ending the Great Revolution. Led by the indomitable
Têng Yen-ta, who was finally shot to death in
Shanghai, the party began illustriously with the participation
of Mme. Sun Yat-sen (Soong Ching-ling) and
the Left ex-Foreign Minister, Eugene Chen. The
formal names of the party varied. From 1927 to 1929,
and again from 1930 to 1937, it was the Revolutionary
Action Commission of the Chinese Kuomintang
(<i>Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang K'ê-ming Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i>);
in 1929-1930, the Chinese Revolutionary
Party (<i>Chung-kuo K'ê-ming Tang</i>); and after 1937,
the Acting Commission for the National Emancipation
of China (<i>Min-ts'u Chieh-fang Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i>).<a name="FNanchor_15_139" id="FNanchor_15_139"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_139" class="fnanchor">[15]</a>
The party is at present led by Dr. Chang Pai-chün,
a returned student from Germany and lieutenant
to the late Mr. Têng. It suffers from the official ban
on minor parties, but retains, by its own statement,
a formal organized membership of about 15,000. (This
estimate would, in the opinion of independent observers,
need to be discounted.)</p>
<p>The Third Party is a <i>San Min Chu I</i> party. It accepts
the legacies of Dr. Sun, in their Left-most phase as they
were at the time of his death. The party is strongly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span>
anti-imperialist, socialist, and land-reform in its teaching.
Its socialism is of an independent kind; the party
neither seeks nor wishes collaboration with the Third
International, although it is willing to cooperate with
the Communists as well as the Kuomintang. It finds
its chief political dogma in the last policies of Sun,
executed in the period just before his death: (1) a pro-Soviet
orientation in international power politics; (2)
a Nationalist-Communist entente; and (3) immediate
aid for the peasants and workers. It is therefore more
like the old Left Kuomintang than the Communists.</p>
<p>At the present time, the party seeks to promote collaboration
between the two major parties, thus becoming
the second third-party to that friendship, and
urges constitutional government. Eventually it would
prefer a representative government of the whole people
(<i>p'ing min</i>), with the executive agencies composed 60
per cent of peasants and workers, 40 per cent of others,
chiefly intellectuals. (The proportion is believed to be
Mme. Sun's contribution.) In past practical politics,
The Third Party took part in the Foochow insurrection
of 1933-34, but has on no other occasion obtained
power. It is not expected to attain major status.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Chinese National Socialist Party</span></h3>
<p>The elder brother of Chang Kia-ngau, who is the
enterprising Minister of Economic Affairs, has organized
a political party after the fashion of the traditional
pavilions of learning and patriotism. In China's
past, Confucians frequently developed an institution
which admixed the features of a perpetual resort camp,
a library, a seminar, and a club. Living together amid
scenically beautiful and scholastically adequate surroundings,
they made their influence felt through their
writings and their example, whenever one of their
number returned to public life. Dr. Carson Chang
(Chang Chia-shêng) has organized an Institute of National
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span>Culture at Talifu in Yünnan, in the mountains
just below Tibet. There he associates with kindred
souls to attempt a restoration of traditional values in
the traditional manner.</p>
<p>The confusing and unhappy similarity of the name
of his party to Adolf Hitler's party is explained in the
following communication:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>To give to the world in a clear and unambiguous way
the principles our party stands for and the platform we
wish to adopt should we have the chance to serve our
country, I have written a book, entitled <i>What A State Is
Built On</i>. In formulating my political philosophy, though
I have drawn freely upon the wisdom of the West, I have
kept my eye steadily on the needs of my people and the circumstances
of my country as the guiding and controlling
principles in shaping my own thought. In view of the
possibility of distortions you have suggested in your letter,
an extract is now being prepared in English, with the idea
to facilitate the understanding of our movement and to
present to the intellectual world of the West our principles
and policies ...</p>
<p>The accidental similarity of names between our party
and Hitler's is indeed an endless source of misunderstanding,
but the similarity is truly "accidental." In Chinese
the name of our party runs "Kuo Chia She Hui Tang,"
which may be literally translated into "Nation (Kuo Chia)
Society (She Hui) Party (Tang)," a name we adopted long
before Hitler's party became known, embodying principles
widely different from what Hitler's party stands for. The
suspicion abroad of our connection with Hitler's National
Socialist Party may be traced to an incident two years ago
at Hankow when Kuomintang first came to recognize the
legal status of minor political parties. The foreign correspondents,
in reporting my exchange of letters with
Generalissimo Chiang with regard to the recognition of
our party, referred without a second thought to our party
as "Nazi," thus creating all distortions which might have
occurred even without such mischief. I shall be more than
grateful to you if you would undertake to clear the suspicion
on us and pave the way for lasting understanding between
us and your people.<a name="FNanchor_16_140" id="FNanchor_16_140"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_140" class="fnanchor">[16]</a></p></blockquote>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span></p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Social Democrats and</span> <i>La Jeunesse</i></h3>
<p>These two minuscule parties are both expatriate
groups organized in Paris. The Social Democratic
Party was organized in 1925. It has no connection with
the Socialist Party of the pro-Japanese Kiang Kang-hu,
but is simply the Chinese affiliate of the Second International.
The Social Democratic Party may unite with
the Third Party, in view of the close similarity of aims
and ideology; its leader, Mr. Yang Kan-tao, has been
recognized by being seated in the People's Political
Council.</p>
<p>The party called <i>Kuo-chia Chu-i Pai</i> (<i>La Jeunesse</i>, or
<i>Parti Républicain Nationaliste de la Jeune Chine</i>) was
organized in 1923 in Paris, by a Mr. Tseng Chi, with
whom is now associated Mr. Tso Shen-sheng, the most
active worker for the party. It survived for years as an
expatriate organization, joined by successive generations
of Chinese students in France. Its policies are
strongly democratic and social-minded. A functional
legislature, the cooperative movement and state capitalism
have suggested a similarity to Fascism in the minds
of some observers; of Trotskyism, to others.<a name="FNanchor_17_141" id="FNanchor_17_141"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_141" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> The
party, through accident and the family connections of
its founder, has connections in Szechuan, and the transfer
of the National Government to Chungking was a
corresponding aid to the slight influence of the party.
Long in exile, it is known by one of its French names
even in China; all it does is to help diversify opinion.
Mr. Tso occupies a seat in the People's Political Council.<a name="FNanchor_18_142" id="FNanchor_18_142"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_142" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p>
<p>The National Salvationists are an operating force<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span>
in China, and the Communists, while a minority party,
are not a minor party in the American sense. Unhappily,
the existence of minuscule parties among both
patriots and pro-Japanese elements suggests that multi-party
constitutionalism is likely to degenerate into innumerable
party fractions, splinter parties, and novel,
unstable groups. The Kuomintang and the Communists
possess their respective monopolies of power; the
National Salvationists have a popular and sincere cause.
The other parties exist in part because they obtain
recognition. As long as Chinese political processes
depend on leadership by personality, individuals will
be free to form their own parties, while the geographical,
cultural, and economic diversity of the country
holds out little hope for the appearance of two or
three China-wide democratic parties. Far more likely
is it that, with the presumable advent of constitutionalism,
the Kuomintang-Communist alignment will continue,
while the present minor parties will gain some
ground, and innumerable new parties will appear in
order to profit by democratic guarantees of minimal
representation, or to fulfill functions exercised by fraternal
societies in the United States.</p>
<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_125" id="Footnote_1_125"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_125"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Miff, P., <i>Heroic China</i>, New York, 1937, p. 14. This valuable
pamphlet is by one of the Comintern's leading expounders of Marxism
as applied to China. Trotskyist Marxism is represented by a far
fuller, more careful work by Harold Isaacs, cited, together with the
following, cited on p. 20, n. 16. Edgar Snow, the distinguished
American journalist, operates on the basis of an independent, unacknowledged
type of Marxism, which shows itself in consistent
prejudice against the Kuomintang, and in a soul-hungry search for
a dialectical, inner meaning of things with which to supplement
common-sense observation; his "Things that Could Happen," <i>Asia</i>,
Vol. XLI, No. 1 (January 1941), employs Hegelianism at tenth-remove
to analyze the future. It leads to a frequent implication of motives
and to subjective interpretations which rearrange fact as it
ought to be in terms of a rational economic dialectic (i.e., an occult
pattern which provides a uniform key to all human experience).
Thus, in his <i>Red Star Over China</i>, p. 306, he ascribes the massacre
of Reds by Kuomintang officers to the fact that the officers were
the sons of local landlords, enraged by expropriation of the land.
Land-expropriation is a class motive; a moment's reflection would
reveal that previous massacre of the officers' families by Communists
would be a better common-sense motive for blood-thirstiness. This
feature of diluted Marxism would not be worth mentioning were
it not common to so many books about Communists written by
self-proclaimed "non-Communists" habituated to the dialectic. It is
found in the writings of Agnes Smedley, Victor Yakhontoff, Anna
Louise Strong, and I. Epstein, to mention but a few.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_2_126" id="Footnote_2_126"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_126"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Sheean, Vincent, <i>Personal History</i>, New York, 1937; Malraux,
André, <i>Man's Fate</i>, New York, n.d.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_3_127" id="Footnote_3_127"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_127"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Kung-ho-kuo</i> is the Western-type term for Republic; the Kuomintang
uses <i>Min-kuo</i> or Folk-realm. <i>Su-wei-ai</i> is a phonetic representation
of "Soviet"; the characters, not intended to have meaning,
are unconsciously humorous in that their lexicographical signification
is "Revive (and) maintain dust!"</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_4_128" id="Footnote_4_128"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_128"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Based on the Party Constitution, <i>Kung-ch'an-tang Tang-chang</i>
[Party Constitution of the Communist Party], [Chungking?], XXVII
(1938), p. 1-21. The entire Constitution is reprinted below as
Appendix II (E), p. <a href="#Page_359">359</a>.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_5_129" id="Footnote_5_129"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_129"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Harold Isaacs, in the work cited, has many passing references
to this phenomenon; his caustic indictment of Ch'en Shao-yu (Wang
Ming), p. 438 <i>ff.</i>, is a case in point. Note Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li Li-san,
Chang Kuo-tao—in China, as in Russia, most of the founders and
early leaders of the Communists have been set aside.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_6_130" id="Footnote_6_130"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_130"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Snow, Edgar, work cited, p. 348 <i>ff.</i></p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_7_131" id="Footnote_7_131"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_131"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Twin Stars of China</i>, cited, p. 66. Major Carlson adds to this
description in his <i>The Chinese Army</i>, cited, p. 35 <i>ff.</i> Most enthusiastically,
he attributes to the Red Leaders honesty, humility, selflessness,
truthfulness, incorruptibility, and a desire to do what is right.
He praises their superb tactical abilities, their efficiency as organizers,
their competence as leaders. He accepts the statements made
by the Communist leaders as matters of good faith, and does not
question their sincerity. Since he is the only qualified military
visitor to put his impressions on record, these appraisals are valuable.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_8_132" id="Footnote_8_132"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_132"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Snow, Edgar, <i>Red Star Over China</i>, cited, p. 111-167.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_9_133" id="Footnote_9_133"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_133"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Chang Kuo-tao, <i>T'ou-li Kung-ch'an-tang Mien-mien-kuan</i> [An
Impartial Survey of (My) Departure from the Communist Party],
Kuangchou [Canton], 1938, p. 27 <i>ff.</i></p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_10_134" id="Footnote_10_134"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_134"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> The same, p. 10.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_11_135" id="Footnote_11_135"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_135"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> The Resolutions of the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the
Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of China
comment as follows: "The danger of the 'Right' opportunists lies
in the fact that they execute the tactics of an anti-Japanese National
United Front at the expense of the independence of the party, politically
and organizationally distorting the policy of the proletariat
[<i>sic</i>] in building an Anti-Japanese National United Front so that <i>the
working class and the Communist Party become tails of the bourgeoisie
rather than the vanguard</i>." (Italics inserted in translation.) New
China Information Committee, <i>Resolutions and Telegrams of the
Sixth Plenum, Central Committee, Communist Party of China, November
6, 1938</i>, Hong Kong [1939?], p. 9. The demand for vanguard
position from a minority party still technically illegal, and the damning
of the Government and Kuomintang as "bourgeois," are continuous
features of Communist policy. Their concept of cooperation is,
as in Germany, Spain, and elsewhere, cooperation <i>under</i> Communist
leadership.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_12_136" id="Footnote_12_136"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_136"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Ch'ao Shê [The Morning Club], <i>Niu-wu Yen-lun Chien-t'ao Kang-yao</i>
[A General Review of Fallacious Utterances], Chungking, XXIX
(1940), p. 7. The work is a Kuomintang reply to Communist theses
in a debate on the nature of national union.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_13_137" id="Footnote_13_137"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_137"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Statement of Col. Ch'in Po-k'u to the author, Chungking, July
29, 1940.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_14_138" id="Footnote_14_138"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_138"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> An early statement of National Salvation views is found in
Wang Tsao-shih, "A Salvationist's View of the Sino-Japanese Problem,"
<i>The China Quarterly</i>, Vol. II, No. 4 (Special Fall Number, 1937),
p. 681-9. The author is one of the Seven Gentlemen.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_15_139" id="Footnote_15_139"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_139"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Statement by the head of The Third Party, Dr. Chang Pai-chün
(Chang Peh Chuen), to the author, Chungking, August 2, 1940. The
translations were also supplied by Dr. Chang.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_16_140" id="Footnote_16_140"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_140"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Letter to the author, dated October 24, 1940.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_17_141" id="Footnote_17_141"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_141"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> E.g., John Gunther in his <i>Inside Asia</i>, New York, 1939, p. 272.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_18_142" id="Footnote_18_142"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_142"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> By far the most complete summary of the minor and minuscule
parties is to be found in two articles by a young Chinese newspaperman:
Shen, James, "Minority Parties in China," <i>Asia</i>, Vol. XL, no. 2
(February 1940), p. 81-3; and a second installment, in the same
periodical. Vol. XL, no. 3 (March 1940), p. 137-9.</p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span></p>
<h2><span class="smcap">Chapter VII</span><br />
GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS OF THE JAPANESE AND PRO-JAPANESE</h2>
<p>Facing the National Armies, and encircling the
guerrillas, lie the Imperial Japanese forces. Frank
agents of Imperial policy, they—unlike the Hitler-Mussolini
contingents in Spain—make no pretense of subordination
to their Chinese allies. Publicly and legally
instruments of the Japanese state, their function is to
destroy the Chinese government, to control and bend
Chinese society to the Imperial purposes, and to protect
Chinese who come forth as allies. The Japanese
Empire is accordingly itself militarily extended to
China; occasional, half-hearted attempts to deny the
ensuing international complications have been sternly
rejected by other great powers. The United States is
not alone in insisting on full Japanese responsibility
for everything that happens within the zone of Japanese
control.</p>
<p>The position of the Japanese army as a governing
engine, unacknowledged colonial machinery of a vast
unassimilable colony, is not one relished by the Japanese
people or by their leaders. Even in the case of
Manchoukuo, the Japanese played a half-deception
on themselves by pretending that they were extending
the area of their influence, not the extent of their
responsibilities. In part this distaste for overt control
is based on the ease, cheapness and irresponsibility of
indirect rule, employed in varying degrees by the British
in Malaysia, the French in Indo-China, and the Soviets
in Outer Mongolia. The Japanese like to think that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span>
they are aiding China, and incidentally themselves,
to a New Order in East Asia—autarkic, stable, racially
independent of the Whites, militarily secure. They do
not like to contemplate the slaughter of innocent people
for sheer conquest, or to consider the hopeless immensity
of trying to overwhelm China. This complicates
their position.<a name="FNanchor_1_143" id="FNanchor_1_143"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_143" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p>
<p>For if the status of the Japanese army in China is
clear, its purposes are not. The war aims of the Japanese
are confused. Japan's goal is defined by overtones
of the inexpressible—in economic motivation,
once valid, no longer meaningful; in rationalizations so
long reiterated that they become genuine; in the toss
and push of world affairs, tempting Japan's leaders to
this opportunism or that; in sheer sentiments of Japanolatry,
Emperor-worship, racialism, archaic resentment
against China, fellow-feeling for the Chinese
orientals, and plain fear. A few Japanese know exactly
what they want. The policy as a whole, the policy
of the Imperial state, encompasses ill-assorted economic,
political, strategic, racial and purely ideological
objectives.</p>
<p>Even at the simple level of institutional control, the
Japanese aim in China has been ill-defined. The restoration
of the Manchu monarchy in Manchoukuo was an
appeal to monarchist legitimism, to the Chinese past,
and to common Confucianist values. When the Japanese
came further into China, it was at first expected
that they might install Mr. Chin P'u-yi as Emperor
of all China, and rehabilitate him in the Palace-museum
he left when a youth. Instead, they apparently attempted
to create a chain of linked, reactionary, agricultural
Chinese states, mixed in form—a federation of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span>
princes in Inner Mongolia, an Empire in Manchoukuo,
republics elsewhere. They began by going as far as
to create a dozen or more ephemeral pro-Japanese agencies—for
a while one might legitimately have expected
that a Nanking government follow a Peking government,
a Hankow government, a Canton government,
<i>ad infinitum</i>. But the trend was reversed when the
Autonomous East Hopei Anti-Communist Government
of Mr. Yin Ju-kêng was merged with the Peking regime,
and—as pressure rose in Japan for a settlement of the
China affair—a China-wide Japanophile government
was first contemplated, and then established. The establishment
of these institutions has not meant the
abdication of the Imperial Japanese forces from the
government of China. The pro-Japanese governments
were and are civil auxiliaries of the Japanese army; their
influence has in no case extended beyond the immediately
effective reach of the Japanese infantry. Even
in planning the long-range permanent settlement of
Chinese affairs—on her own terms—Japan does not propose
to withdraw all her troops from China.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Japanese Army as a Chinese Government</span></h3>
<p>The Japanese army is the effective military government
of occupied China. The Japanophile Chinese
have a few troops, who function in close proximity to
Japanese, and are in no sense a military counterweight
to the invaders. The Japanese army is a large force,
modern by somewhat second-rate standards, which requires
the use of an effective communications system,
modern economic auxiliaries such as shops, banks, post
offices, and a variety of other services including hospitals,
shrines, brothels, and crematories. These do not
exist in China in forms suited to Japanese needs, nor
could Japan afford to trust Chinese with the railways,
the air services, the river commerce, the telegraphs, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span>
food warehouses, and other most vital services. Thus,
all over occupied China, the Japanese have installed a
military government.</p>
<p>This government assumes direct responsibility for
administering whatever seems necessary or profitable.
Thus, in the city of Nanking, the best buildings are
occupied by the Japanese, and the Wang government
is profoundly gratified to be allowed to share some of
them, obtaining second choice. The Japanese military,
through protected corporations, supervises the operation
of the railroads and airlines, but it does not even
rely on the corporations to provide military transport,
which is under direct army control. If a Chinese who
has gone over to the Japanese and occupies a high position
in their protected governments wishes to ride on
a Chinese train between Shanghai and Nanking, he
must buy a ticket from a Japanese clerk, show it to a
Japanese conductor under the eyes of a Japanese guard,
with Japanese detectives standing about, order a Sino-Japanese
or pseudo-European meal in a Japanese dining
car with Japanese waitresses from a menu printed
in Japanese, and must pay, not in his own puppet-bank
currency, but in special Japanese currency not
acceptable in Japan.</p>
<p>To govern China, the Japanese Army has not developed
beyond the usual devices of military rule. There
are several reasons for this, primary among them the
difficulty of governing Chinese at all. In a pluralistic
society, such as China, command is largely superseded
by negotiation, and the issuer of a command must be
prepared for oblique thwarting. A Japanese who tells
a Chinese to do something needs a bayonet with which
to gesture; otherwise the Chinese, accustomed to circumventing,
avoiding, or mocking authority, will disregard
him. The Germans may order the Danes to
make a two-way street a one-way street, and the
Danes, accustomed to authority, will concur. When<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span>
the Japanese promulgate a regulation, nothing short
of massacre could ensure its absolute, unconditional
obedience.</p>
<p>The language difficulty is another obstacle to direct
Japanese government. A cultivated Japanese and Chinese
may write classical Chinese to one another, and
even the barely literate can scribble a few characters,
the meanings of which may coincide; but the spoken
languages differ from one another almost as much as
English differs from either. To govern China directly
would involve an enormous feat of language training,
or an overnight re-shaping of the Chinese national
character. Non-violent resistance, wilful but concealed
negligence, lurking impertinence, consistent sloppiness,
obsequiousness mingled with hatred—these Chinese
tools of resistance, added to the language barrier, prevent
any early Japanese hope of direct government. In
years to come, if such come, Japanese trained in the
Chinese language could supersede every Chinese above
the level of foreman. A strong tendency in that direction
is observable in Manchoukuo.<a name="FNanchor_2_144" id="FNanchor_2_144"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_144" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p>
<p>The Japanese have abandoned direct government for
the present. They would defeat their own purposes by
assuming a task for which they have insufficient personnel,
which would be very costly, and for which their
army is ill-equipped in morale or technical ability.
Difficult though it may be to employ pro-Japanese Chinese
associates, it would be even more difficult to find
Chinese now ready to profess direct loyalty to Japan.
The only Chinese thus far Japanized are a number of
Taiwanese (Formosans), whose island was ceded to
Japan forty-six years ago. Chinese by blood and language,
many of them have been reared in the third
generation of Japanese rule. Some are fighting with
the Chinese forces, but others, loyal to their lawful
superiors, betray their fellow-Chinese. The Formosans<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span>
are insufficient in number to govern China, or to provide
Japan with even the most elementary foothold.
The Japanese have hence turned to the peculiar form
of indirect rule identified by the popular appellation,
<i>puppet states</i>.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Problem of Puppet States</span></h3>
<p>Lawful, well-established indirect rule is a familiar
feature of colonial practice. Constituting an internationally
recognized legal relationship between the paramount
power and the encompassed state, it has been applied
extensively by the European powers in Africa
and Asia. The Indian and Malay states, under Britain;
Cambodia and Annam-Tonkin, under France; the East
Indian sultanates, under the Netherlands—these offer
a rich repository of precedent.</p>
<p>Unacknowledged intervention involving no legal relationship
is also a known feature of modern politics.
The practices of the United States in the Caribbean and
Central America, particularly during the 1920's, are
familiar, but the leading case of intervention without
responsibility occurred in the relationship between the
Soviet Union (first the R.S.F.S.R.) and the Outer Mongol
People's Republic. Four features of what has since
come to be called political puppetry are here made
fully manifest: first, the establishment of the subordinate
through the military aid of the superior; second,
the continued effective control, unacknowledged in
law, of the subordinate by the superior, coupled with
economic coordination of the two; third, bilateral insistence
upon the formal independence of the subordinate
state; fourth, the claim of the superior that it
<i>has not</i> intervened, coupled with international non-recognition
of the new relationship. The four features—establishment,
coordination, fictitious independence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span>
and international nonentity—were clearly defined by
Soviet political practice in Outer Mongolia and Tannu-Tuva
long before Manchoukuo was created.</p>
<p>In addition to this neighborly example, the Japanese
had another source, commonly ignored in current Western
comment on the Far East, on which to draw: the
quasi-familist Confucian international system which
prevailed down to the time of men now living. Successive
Chinese Empires developed a clear, viable scheme
of senior-junior relationships controlling their intercourse
with other organized governments. The other,
smaller states acknowledged China to be the senior
realm, conceding that the Chinese Emperor was lord of
the world. They paid formal tribute to China; their envoys
were not ambassadors but tributary agents, while
Chinese envoys came as high commissioners, superior in
rank to the courts to which they were accredited. This
relationship (awkwardly termed "dependency," "vassalage,"
"tributary" status, or subjection to "suzerainty,"
in Western terms) could not be fitted into the Western
state system. Involving the assertion of Chinese power
without concurrent admission of Chinese responsibility,
it was rejected by the Western states, and lapsed following
the French seizure of Indo-China, the British occupation
of Burma, and Korean independence under
Japanese compulsion. Today, Japan's moral effusions
concerning the New Order in East Asia and her digressions
from Western patterns of international law
in dealing with Manchoukuo and Wang Ch'ing-wei
both indicate that the Japanese move freely, sincerely,
and unconsciously in a frame of reference which, obvious
to them, is invisible to Westerners. The Japan-Manchoukuo
or Japan-Wang relationship could be
aligned with the relationship which Li Hung-chang
wished, sixty years ago, to maintain in Korea, and found
significantly similar. The Japanese understood the position<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span>
of juniority in international relations: to their intense
humiliation, they confessed themselves China's
junior during the Ashikaga period.<a name="FNanchor_3_145" id="FNanchor_3_145"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_145" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p>
<p>A third meaningful context for Japanese practice
is found in the basic, factual scheme of current international
relations. No nation in an interdependent world
is independent except by legal fiction; none could maintain
its present level of civilization without the existence
of the others. In these terms, legal independence fades
as time passes, and cross-national power becomes more
evident. Western imperialism was described by Sun
Yat-sen as reducing China to a hypo-colony. More recently,
first the Communists and then the Japanese have
accused Chiang K'ai-shek of being the puppet of imperialism,<a name="FNanchor_4_146" id="FNanchor_4_146"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_146" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>
while occasional Leftists regard Chiang as
even now a puppet of Japan<a name="FNanchor_5_147" id="FNanchor_5_147"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_147" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> and a few citizens of imperialist
states see him as a Communist puppet. The
Germans treat Churchill as the puppet of Roosevelt,
and Roosevelt as a puppet for international Jewry,
while the present Stalinist line attributes puppetry to
the entire catalogue of world political institutions save
those made quick by its own infallibility. The fundamental<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span>
point of such appraisal depends upon the <i>attribution</i>
of power relationships. Dependence is indisputable
only if one government functions within the military
framework of another, or if the personnel of the
subordinate is drawn from the superior, or if clear
and immediate causal relationships can be proved between
the continued fiscal or military action of the
sustaining government and the actual existence of the
sustained government—although even this last leads to
subjective interpretation.</p>
<p>The term <i>puppet</i> is not clear or apt, except in its most
concrete sense—that of a person who is almost literally
a marionette, whose utterances public and private are
not his own, whose actions are supervised, and whose
personal choice or opinion is not merely thwarted,
but left out of consideration. Not all the Chinese who
work with Japan are ventriloquists' dummies. The author
talked freely with men who staked their careers
on the inescapable success of the Japanese military,
and who functioned in absolute conformity to general
limits of policy and publicity laid down by the Japanese;
these general limits were wide enough to permit
a considerable degree of latitude of manners, and to
allow variance in power and policy between the various
Chinese under Japan. Use of the term <i>puppet</i> in such
cases is not clear. It implies a higher degree of effective
Japanese control, and a greater pliability of Chinese
cooperators, than can be shown to exist.</p>
<p>Since, however, the National Government is recognized,
both by the majority of the Chinese people and
by <i>all</i> powers (including Germany and Italy) except
Japan, to be the legitimate government of China, representing
the Chinese nation, action against that government
may properly and strictly be denominated
treason; a person so acting may be called, formally, a
traitor and, less formally but more descriptively, a Japanophile.
Juridically the Chinese Soviet leaders were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span>
also traitors, but they were never Japanophile. This
term gains by specificity what it loses through awkwardness.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Provisional and Reformed Governments</span></h3>
<p>The Japanese have determined, assisted and promoted
establishment of a number of friendly Chinese
governments. Huapeikuo, a North China separatist
state, went the way of the Francophile Rhineland Republic;
it never got off the drafting board. The East
Hopei Autonomous Anti-Communist Government of
Mr. Yin Ju-kêng provided, within the North China demilitarized
zone, a vast gateway for smuggling; when
the National Government withdrew its forces from
North China, the Japanese sought more pretentious
aids to conquest. The Provisional Government was
the first of these, following an Inner Mongol federation
(<i>Mêng-liu Lien-ho Tzŭ-chih Chêng-fu</i>), affiliated
with Manchoukuo; it was soon rivaled by the Reformed
Government; and in March 1940, both were incorporated
into the Reorganized National Government of
Mr. Wang Ch'ing-wei. Other governments, sponsored
by various quarreling departments of the Japanese military,
or organized by Chinese confidence men, have
appeared transiently and then disappeared.</p>
<p>Three points concerning Japanophile governments
contribute to assessment of their chances; their origin
and structure; their ideological (narrowly, propagandist)
position; and their personnel. These points illustrate
a significantly ambivalent trend: the Japanese
have found their degree of freedom of action less
than they had expected in Chinese politics, and to
that extent have been defeated; they have also yielded
to the demands of the situation, and have won, in
part, in that their chances of success appreciate with
realism.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span></p>
<p>The Provisional Government of the Republic of
China (<i>Chung-hua Min-kuo Lin-shih Chêng-fu</i>) was
formed at Peking on December 14, 1937, and ended
by merger into the Wang Ch'ing-wei government on
March 30, 1940, perpetuating a high degree of separatism
under the subgovernmental style, North China
Political Council. Like its predecessors and successors,
it was created by a self-proclaimed committee organized
with the consent and knowledge of the Japanese military,
if not by the Japanese directly. The members of
the Provisional Government were old, weak men,
mostly adherents of the Anfu clique which had been
Japanophile during and after the War of 1914-18. A
few were even brought forth from more archaic strata,
lonely adherents to the abandoned monarchy. The
youngest were in their fifties and the leading officers
were extreme conservatives—men of some intelligence
and reputation, but obsolete.</p>
<p>The structure of the <i>Lin-shih</i> Government was interesting
in that it formed a republic of three committees,
as follows:<a name="FNanchor_6_148" id="FNanchor_6_148"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_148" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p>
<p class="center">PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT (Committee)</p>
<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;">
<img src="images/i_193.jpg" width="400" height="168" alt="Lin-shih government" />
</div>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span></p>
<p>Structurally important features are: the absence of
any method of election, direct or indirect, or of any
ultimate source of "sovereign" personnel—the government
having borne itself out of chaos, constitutionally
a remarkable feat; the elimination of even nominal
party control of government, or cameral legislation, or
constituent assembly, these being hated vestiges of the
Chinese and Western, but not Japanese, notion that
popular sovereignty is to receive genuflections if not
credence; and, most startlingly, the absence of a head!
There was no President, Protector, Chief of State,
Leader, or Dictator; the highest officer was the Shanghai
banker, Mr. Wang K'ê-min, Chairman of the Executive
Division (literally, <i>yüan</i>, but not in the Nationalist
sense). The scope, succession and competence
of this Provisional Government were as much in doubt
as its origin.</p>
<p>Under the Provisional Government there flowered a
new political philosophy, the <i>Hsin Min Chu I</i> ("Principles
of the Renewed People," "People-Renewing Principles,"
or "Principles of the New People"). The similarity
of this principle to the <i>San Min Chu I</i> is striking,
but is no more than verbal. Propaganda under this
credo resembled the Japanese-prepared state-philosophy
of <i>Wang Tao</i>, the <i>kingly</i> (as opposed to tyrannous and
unnatural) <i>way</i> of the Confucian canon, which—revered
throughout the Far East, even by Sun Yat-sen—had been
slanted to suit Manchoukuo through a Concordia Society
(<i>Hsieh-ho-hui</i>). Each of the Sunyatsenist principles
was refuted in detail, Pan-Asian racialism was
encouraged, a class-war <i>between</i> the nations was emphasized,
and conservatism in thought, manners, and
morals recommended. The Peking propaganda machinery
was well-financed; the <i>Hsin-min-hui</i> became the
only tolerated political group. This <i>hui</i> was headed by
Mr. Miao Ping, a Kuomintang Party veteran whose political-bureau
experience dated back to the days of
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span>Borodin. His renegation, never publicly explained,
enabled Japan to issue a careful parody of the <i>San Min
Chu I</i>. His assistant was a Japanese. Business associations,
student groups, and educational administration
were fitted into the pattern. The principles were not
logically or systematically developed, but the key terms
sufficed to coordinate opportunist appeals justifying the
invasion, and opposing resistance, guerrillas, modernizations,
and democracy. The <i>Hsin Min Chu I</i> received
no credence through conversion, faith, or loyalty. Operating
on sound advertising principles, however, they
served well even if they failed to command obedience
but did unsettle allegiance to the other side, and ubiquitous
iteration muddied thought.</p>
<p>The personnel of the Provisional Government included
no actively important political leader. Many
had been important long before; some were conspicuous
in fields other than politics, and had even served on
the semi-buffer Hopei-Chahar Political Council which
was Chiang's last compromise with Japan. Japan's failure
to obtain an effective political leader is important,
for this lack eventually led to the acceptance of Wang
Ch'ing-wei. The old age, past misfortunes, the motley
reputations of the Provisional Government leaders attested
a national sentiment sufficient to enforce unity
beyond the reach of national law.</p>
<p>The Reformed Government of the Republic of
China (<i>Chung-hua Min-kuo Wei-hsin Chêng-fu</i>) was
established March 28, 1938. It lapsed simultaneously
with its rival and colleague, the Provisional Government.
There were several suggestive points of difference,
although the chief difference was the fact that the
Provisional Government operated from Peiping and the
Reformed from Nanking. Both were national in form,
a difficulty which was solved by the creation of a United
Council to speak for all occupied China. This Council
had only the power to issue news releases, which it did.
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span>Despite duplication of capitals and national form, the
Nanking government revealed a slipping in the Japanese
insistence on conformity to their ideas.</p>
<p>In structure, the Reformed Government was a mutilated
copy of the National Government. It possessed
five <i>yüan</i>, thereby continuing the Sunyatsenist constitutional
system which Japan first sought to destroy. In
doctrine, it took over the North China-Manchoukuo
pattern, under the name <i>Ta Min Chu I</i> (Principles of
the Great People), with a party under the name <i>Ta-min-hui</i>.
The walls of Nanking were covered with the
emblem of the party, a red circular shield with a yellow
crescent moon enclosing a white star. Quasi-educational
work approximated that of the North; but the Japanese
found the Yangtze sympathetic to the National Government
and Kuomintang, and hence employed devices
reminiscent of Chungking.</p>
<p>For Reformed Government personnel, the Japanese
found individuals who were in most instances either as
old as their Peiping colleagues, but less famous, or much
younger, and relatively unknown. With the city of
Shanghai only partially under its control, because local
opportunists reached the tax offices first, the Reformed
Government provided an outlet for persons who had
felt themselves unjustly denied office, or slighted by
the Kuomintang, or who had wrecked careers, once
promising, by some ghastly misstep or crime and now
saw a miraculous chance to return.</p>
<p>These new governments could not on principle claim
the allegiance of their own clerks. The personnel, disloyal
and of poor morale, was often so corrupt that
no government services—needed by Japanese civilians
and army alike—could be entrusted to them. Multiple
taxes blocked Japanese trade in the area Japan had
occupied. The Japanese realized that the United Council
and the senescent politicians were not enough. Instead
of abandoning interventionist governments, they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span>
tried a leader of genuine importance, considerable ability,
and some following. His treason was Japan's last
chance to govern China without assuming the task herself,
risking a premature undertaking. To understand
the moves and motives of Wang Ch'ing-wei it is necessary
to regard his character and political history.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Reorganized National Government of Wang
Ch'ing-wei</span></h3>
<p>In contrast to Chiang, who receives the obloquy
which goes with power, Wang Ch'ing-wei has spent the
greater part of his life as a political Out. He began brilliantly.
While in his twenties, he became a revolutionary
hero by a bold attempt to assassinate the Prince
Regent, and after the establishment of the Republic
followed the unhappy meanders of the Nationalist
movement. His association with Sun in the years before
Sun's death was very close, and he has as good a title
as anyone to the apostolic succession. (His title is not
necessarily much better than that of various other Kuomintang
leaders; a score or so of elder statesmen of the
Party could claim a longer service of Party leadership
and equality or seniority to Wang in Party rank.)</p>
<p>In 1927 Chiang and Wang had different regimes
for the first time, and Wang went into exile; he tried
again in 1930, and went into exile; and he is trying
now. His cooperation with the Japanese must not be
regarded as the sudden prostitution of a worthy figure,
nor as the culminating criminality of an utter rogue.
As in a Greek tragedy, Wang, blinded by self-esteem and
goaded by political frustration, has chosen his unsavory
course from understandable motives. Several lines of
continuity lead up to his establishment of the Reorganized
National Government at Nanking, and condition
the nature of this government.</p>
<p>Primarily, Wang has been an in-and-out schismatic
in Kuomintang ranks. It is quite possible that in terms<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span>
of a head count, he may have had the immediate support
of a greater portion of the membership than did
Chiang in the first break in 1927, but his proportion
has fairly steadily declined ever since. There have been
a large number of men who accepted him as leader,
just as in the preceding decade there were men <i>Wu mi</i>
("infatuated with Wu [Pei-fu]"). In 1930-31 his
organization paralleled the Government-supported Kuomintang
in all parts of the world. Today he has some
followers who follow even to Nanking. These men are
bound to him by ties of long, habitual obedience, by
blood kinship, and by generously offered loyalty: the
distinguished and vigorous Ch'en Kung-po, now Mayor
of Shanghai; by Chou Fu-hai, who—before his proscription—was
the most popular commentator on the <i>San
Min Chu I</i>; Lin Pai-sheng, who had served Wang well
as spokesman; and the entertaining T'ang Leang-li, a
Javanese-Chinese writer of international fame, who has
probably written more books on China in English than
any other Chinese.</p>
<p>On the other hand, he has lost office-holding followers
by the scores, many of whom hold positions ranging
up to Vice-Ministerships in Chungking, and he
seems to have lost almost all of his rank and file followers.
The chief defection was that of Messrs. Tao
Hsi-shêng and Kao Tsung-wu, who fled from Chungking
to Shanghai and Nanking, and then fled back
again, bringing with them sensational copies of Wang's
secret preliminary agreements with the Japanese. Dr.
Tao, a historian, served Wang temporarily as Party-Minister
of Publicity; Dr. Kao had been in the foreign
office while Wang still collaborated with Chiang.<a name="FNanchor_7_149" id="FNanchor_7_149"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_149" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> His
following consisted almost entirely of politicians, ranging
from the rank of scholar-bureaucrat down to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span>
hooligans. The masses which he led in 1927 have dwindled
to hundreds, and the replacements are of distinct unworthiness—persons,
already cooperating with the Japanese,
whom he must lead for lack of better. He has lost
followers with almost every move he has made, whether
rebelling, going into exile, accepting government post
under Chiang, or working with Japan. The Wang
clique may be represented by a consistently declining
curve.</p>
<p>In the face of this, it is unexpected to find that Wang
has been reasonably honest and consistent, as were
Trotsky and Röhm. His consistency may be described
as a perfectly regular spiral, which maintains unchanging
direction but never goes in a straight line. Wang
has always favored not-fighting, peace, civilian and constitutional
government, and making friends with any
nation which professes friendship for China. The loftiness
of his motives might be impugned by pointing out
that each is the antithesis of one of Chiang's characteristics;
but the ultimate test of Wang's sincerity lies with
the psychiatrists rather than with political scientists.
Assuming sincerity, how did these consistent standards
lead him to Nanking?</p>
<p>In 1927 Chiang broke with the Communists quite a
while before Wang did. Wang was willing to yield a
doubtful point here, to credit the other side with good
motives there, and to keep the Wuhan government going
as long as he could. His difficulties were the difficulties
of a constitutionalist willing to maintain the
constitution at the cost of some appeasement. In the
following years of exile, he upbraided Chiang's machine-boss
tactics within the Kuomintang; the name
"Reorganized Kuomintang" which he selected for his
schismatics, is indicative of his desire to promote regularity
in party elections and free democratic discussion
in party congresses.</p>
<p>A striking instance of repetition may be seen in contrasting<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span>
the Nanking of 1940 with the Peking of 1930.
In 1930 Chiang K'ai-shek had been threatened by military
attack and had found a great part of China wrested
from him by superior forces, those of the <i>tuchün</i> Feng
Yü-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan; but the National Government
maintained its position in the capital. In 1940,
the capital had moved to Chungking and the armed
enemies were Japanese; Hu Han-min (the great Rightist
leader) was dead, a new Communist alliance was in
effect, and the outside world was in a turmoil more
profound than China's. Despite the supervening
changes, Wang Ch'ing-wei was found in 1940 in precisely
the role of 1930. Again he was the front for a
military regime. In 1930 he had been a Left-liberal
front for native militarism; in 1940, he was the appeasing,
conservative front for the Imperial Japanese army.
In 1930 he had his own "Reorganized" Kuomintang;
he had his "Orthodox" again in 1940. In 1930 he
usurped the National Government offices, titles, and
regalia; he did this again in 1940. In 1930 his career
ended with military defeat and he went into exile, later
bargaining his position back into Chinese politics.</p>
<p>Wang appears to have become the victim of an <i>idée
fixe</i>: he believes that if he impersonates government
devotedly enough, and with careful enough detail, he
will become government. Brilliant, sincere, adroit, he
is burdened by a pathological self-esteem and is so much
the victim of his own past rationalizations that he is no
longer inventive. Obviously such a character, in the
face of recurrent failure, cannot assume the blame for
it. Wang's demon is the Generalissimo.</p>
<p>Another characteristic of Wang appears clearly at
this point: the belief of the appeaser that he can outsmart
the appeased; he no doubt thought that his
<i>tuchün</i> colleagues would become victims of the government
which they let him create. On his way out of
China after Chiang's armies and Chang Hsüeh-liang's<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span>
intervention had settled this affair, he stopped over in
Canton to take part in an even more transitory and less
successful rebellion.</p>
<p>The next round of Wang-Chiang rivalry displays the
consummate political strategy of the Generalissimo and
the ruin of Wang by his own virtues. For three full
years, 1932 through 1935, Wang was President of the
Executive <i>Yüan</i> and second only to Chiang. After a
little more than a year out of office—owing in part to a
gunshot wound—he returned in the crucial months of
1937 just before the outbreak of general hostilities,
and stayed with the National Government through the
first year and a half of the war—until December 1938.
In fifteen more months he reached terms with the Japanese;
eight months after he set up a government with
their consent and sponsorship, they recognized that
government. Throughout this period Wang advocated
peace, non-aggression to the point of non-defense and
surrender, and universal conciliation. These attitudes
made him very useful to Chiang when Chiang needed
him, and made him dispose of himself when he was no
longer helpful to Chiang.</p>
<p>Wang was ruined by the long, agonizing appeasement
of which Chiang was the leader, in the six years between
the Japanese invasion of China's Manchurian provinces
and the outbreak of undeclared war in July 1937.
Throughout this period the forces of Leftist reform, of
Communist pressure (both military and political), of
student sentiment, of overseas-Chinese patriotism, and
finally of national self-respect itself, fed the opposition
to Chiang, who knew that, whatever the cost, China
was not militarily or politically ready to fight Japan.
Wang Ch'ing-wei, who when out of office had espoused
some of the most genuinely popular and necessary reforms,
found himself civilian leader of a government
following an intensely unpopular policy, and unable
to profit by the rise of opposition. The Generalissimo<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span>
needed someone to replace Hu Han-min, with whom
he disagreed and whom he temporarily incarcerated.
Wang provided a counter-balance to the Hu Han-min
group, undermined his own popularity, and helped
shield Chiang from anti-appeasement criticism.</p>
<p>Wang Ch'ing-wei, in this period, feared war and
grasped at the conciliation which the Japanese offered
between successive invasions. In 1937, Wang worked for
the localization of the war at the cost of North China,
on the theory that the Japanese could take what they
wished. He reiterated his old point that the Chinese
could not possibly whip the Japanese on the fields of
battle, but that they might outmaneuver them over the
tables of diplomacy. The advent of war was a disappointment
and source of worry to him.</p>
<p>In the course of the celebrated retreat from Nanking
to Hankow, and from Hankow to Chungking, Wang lost
no opportunity to work for peace. When the Germans
offered themselves as intermediaries in the Hankow
period, Wang sought the opening of negotiations.
There was a violent uproar in the People's Political
Council, not then reported in the press. When the government
moved to Chungking, Wang was even more
despondent: victory seemed remote, the Communists
worried him as much as did the Japanese, and the Generalissimo
swept opposition aside with the slogans of
resistance. Like other peoples in war time, the Chinese
began to confuse peace and treason. Wang and his
closest supporters felt that they were being deprived
of freedom of speech; their known inclination to surrender
and negotiate had supplied Chiang with a weapon
which might even prove personally dangerous to
them. The death by firing-squad of General Han Fu-ch'u
showed that treason, or the charge of it, had become
serious. Wang and his followers rationalized their
own fearfulness concerning the war into the belief that
they were expressing the will of the peace-loving masses.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span>
In December 1938 he got out of China by a surprise
flight to Indo-China. His followers had previously been
filtering down to Hong Kong. The Konoye statement,<a name="FNanchor_8_150" id="FNanchor_8_150"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_150" class="fnanchor">[8]</a>
just issued, gave him an opening to treat with the Japanese.</p>
<p>Throughout the negotiations, Wang behaved as
though he were himself the legitimate Chinese government.
He did not accept the minimum Japanese
conditions, but held out for an agreement which would
preserve the fictions of Chinese independence, allow
him to fly the national flag, establish his version of
the Kuomintang, and attempt every kind of linkage
with the past. One of his followers asked the author in
Nanking, "Do you think we were traitors when we spent
more than a year getting a fair peace agreement from
the Japanese?" This agreement, released by Messrs.
Tao and Kao, consisted of the cession of broad military,
foreign-relations, and economic rights over China to
Japan. The Chinese were to lose no territory <i>pro forma</i>,
and were to keep a minimum of 35 per cent interest in
major economic enterprises.</p>
<p>The regime is sufficiently well known so that there
is no need to detail its history: the long dickering with
the two Japanophile "governments" already established
in Peking and Nanking, since they were the third parties
to the Japan-Wang negotiations, the installation of
the government in March 1940, and its recognition the
following November. The more significant problem is—what
part can this Nanking establishment play in
the actual contest for power in East Asia?</p>
<p>In the first place, the Reorganized National Government
(<i>Chung-hua Min-kuo Ts'an-chêng Kuo-min
Chêng-fu</i>) of China is not a puppet government in the
sense that the Manchoukuoan government is. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span>
Japanese have a very loose surveillance of the officers
of state. Interviews with officials indicate pretty conclusively
the absence of dictaphones or of Japanese
Special Service agents. The leaders in the government
at Nanking are not watched or hounded in
any intimate way. One of them said: "Why should the
Japanese watch us? They know that we cannot do anything
to them, and they know that their only chance
of success lies in our becoming a real government."</p>
<p>Secondly, the personnel of the Nanking regime is not
sufficient to cope with the problems which face it. The
Nanking regime has no diplomatic officer who has
regularly represented any other Chinese government;
only a few consuls, in Japanese territory, joined it.<a name="FNanchor_9_151" id="FNanchor_9_151"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_151" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> In
no single instance can a Nanking officeholder, compared
with his Chungking counterpart, be regarded
(patriotism apart) as better-qualified or more able than
his rival. In an enterprise of this sort, it would seem
likely that Nanking should have the better man in
some few positions. Diligent and disinterested inquiry
fails to reveal a single one. Finally, the personnel is a
mixture of Wang cliquists, politically obsolete conservatives,
careerist Japanophiles, colorless opportunists,
and actual criminals.</p>
<p>A Western newspaper man, well acquainted with the
Nanking situation, told the author that he estimated
the regime as 5 per cent Japanophiles, 5 per cent upright
men who worked with the enemy because of a
sense of public duty toward the Chinese people in the
occupied areas, 20 per cent opportunists, and 70 per cent
low characters interested in thievery. Nanking officials,
to whom these estimates were communicated without
revelation of the source, felt the latter categories to be
much too high. Several of the more intelligent men in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span>
Nanking offered the argument that if they did not share
in the regime, unscrupulous elements would deceive the
Japanese and oppress the people; or they stated that
the Reorganized Government had brought back the
flag, the constitution, the titles, the law codes, and the
political doctrines of the National Government, so that
occupied and unoccupied China had the same polity.
They disregarded the point that this abetted the enemy.</p>
<p>Thirdly, the government has nothing to do. The
power of the Nanking regime in no instance reaches
beyond the Japanese patrols. No counties are under
Nanking control which are not also under Japanese control.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has no foreign
affairs. The Ministry of Finance collects some excises
and disburses many salaries, as well as limited amounts
for the upkeep of some schools, law courts, minimal
public services, and state property, insofar as the Japanese
have returned any. (It is interesting to note that
the officials at Nanking, deploring the "Communist"
tendencies of Chiang, live in commandeered houses,
and use the commandeering of private property as a
form of patronage for their supporters.) The Central
Political Council has so little to do that it draws up a
budget and solemnly debates items of less than U. S.
$100.<a name="FNanchor_10_152" id="FNanchor_10_152"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_152" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> The officials cannot ride far from the city limits
of Nanking, because of the guerrillas who operate all
about. The railroad runs only by daylight. The Nanking
police are mostly unarmed, except for clubs—an
unprecedented condition for modern China!—and many
who carry rifles or pistols seem to have no cartridges.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span></p>
<p>Fourthly, the Nanking government is an encouraging
indication that the modern Chinese have finally come
to the point where five-power republicanism is the
norm. It is significant that the Nanking regime practices
an extreme purism of organization and nomenclature,
conforming precisely to antebellum practice.<a name="FNanchor_11_153" id="FNanchor_11_153"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_153" class="fnanchor">[11]</a>
The regime has changed the theoretical structure of
the National Government very little, but added the
Party ministries to the government cabinet. One further
change has consisted in the logically desirable
transference of the Ministry of Justice to the Executive
<i>Yüan</i> from the Judicial, thus eliminating the anomaly
of having both prosecuting and adjudicatory agencies
under the same control.<a name="FNanchor_12_154" id="FNanchor_12_154"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_154" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> The minister, Li Shêng-wu,
is a well-known scholar in international law and an educational
editor.<a name="FNanchor_13_155" id="FNanchor_13_155"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_155" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p>
<p>Since the Japanese may be expected to foster the
kind of Japanophile government which would help
them most, it is interesting that their crusade against
Sunyatsenism has turned to a quasi-Kuomintang structure<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span>
for aid. The attempt does not, as yet, seem to be
working, but the technique of the deception reveals
the depth to which Kuomintang principles and practices
have penetrated in the past generation. The Nanking
incumbents make every effort to confuse their regime
with the National Government at Chungking, even to
the extent of copying the names of all minor offices, the
forms of the stationery, and the organization of semi-public
cultural associations. Chinese fashion, they confuse
correct form and legitimacy. Given a long enough
period, this technique may succeed. Meanwhile, the
failure of the earlier traitor Governments, non-Nationalist
in form, is a real indicium of the value of the Sunyatsenist
pattern.</p>
<p>Along with the bewildering <i>Doppelgänger</i> effect
which prevails in all other matters, there are two Kuomintangs.
The major, recognized Kuomintang continues
from Chungking. At Nanking Wang and his
friends have organized the "Orthodox Kuomintang."
This can scarcely be thought of as a Party fraction, so
much has it dwindled. The overseas branches have
been lost, and the populace in its own cities is savagely
contemptuous. Wang Ch'ing-wei held a "Sixth Plenary
Session of the C.E.C. of the Kuomintang" on August 29,
1939, and the affair seems to have been an uproarious
farce, with all of Wang's friends bringing in random
acquaintances in order to make up a quorum.<a name="FNanchor_14_156" id="FNanchor_14_156"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_156" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> Since
then, the vestigial party has been equipped with appropriate
party organs, and is preparing to share its
hypothetical power with an equally <i>ad hoc</i> Nanking
People's Political Council. The Kuomintang leaders in
Nanking, as a part of their application to the Chungking
pattern, have even listed a considerable number of
minor parties which are on their side of the Japanese
army. Persistent, specific inquiry in Nanking failed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span>
to elicit the name of a single <i>bona fide</i> minor party
representative, other than representatives of the <i>Hsin
Min Hui</i> (ex-Provisional), the <i>Ta Min Hui</i> (ex-Reformed),
the Republicans (<i>Kung-ho Tang;</i> Hankow;
merged with the Orthodox Kuomintang), and the Chinese
Socialist Party, which consists of the venerable Dr.
Kiang Kang-hu. It is perhaps fair to conclude that the
Nanking regime is not a Kuomintang regime because
a sizable portion of the Kuomintang membership were
weary of war, but because some few Kuomintang leaders
found no other way to power, and because the Japanese
had reluctantly decided that the simulacrum of the
Kuomintang was the minimum requirement of any
Chinese government.</p>
<p>Lastly, the lack of success of Wang Ch'ing-wei and his
government is proof of the emergence of a state in
China. This is not the first time that Wang has set
up his own government. It is not even the first time
that Chinese have accepted foreign aid in such enterprises.
Wang thought, and presumably thinks, that he
is playing the accepted game of Chinese politics; he is
likely to find that he has committed a treason which is
disastrously real to him. The non-support of his government
is a clear proof of the rising race-national
awareness among China's common millions.</p>
<p>Stripped of the confusion and distortion which have
surrounded the Wang Ch'ing-wei secession, the rivalry
between Wang and Chiang is not so very different from
Benedict Arnold's departure from the then dubious
American revolution. In this century we have revised
our opinion of Benedict Arnold upward—in part—and
Wang Ch'ing-wei may, perhaps, justly fit the same category.
A gifted but maladroit and unhappy political
leader had brought his misfortunes to the Japanese.
They, <i>faute de mieux</i>, have accepted his aid. So far
this has been ineffectual. Most probably, only a very
long lapse of time or the truly catastrophic ruin of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span>
their opponents could place Wang and his group in a
position of autonomous importance and power. On the
world scene Wang stands halfway between Quisling and
Pétain. A traitor to the emergent Chinese state, he
demonstrates the ancient Chinese capacity to surrender,
appease, and survive. Had he antagonists less formidable
than Chiang and the infuriated masses, his Reorganized
Government might secure actual power.</p>
<p>The Japanese finally recognized the Reorganized National
Government of Wang Ch'ing-wei on November
30, 1940, after many months of delay. <i>Art.</i> I provided
for mutual recognition, but added the provision that
the two countries should "... at the same time take
mutually helpful and friendly measures, political, economic,
cultural, and otherwise ..." and in the future
prohibit "... such measures and causes as are destructive
to the amity between the two countries in politics,
diplomacy, education, propaganda, trade and commerce,
and other spheres." <i>Art.</i> II was an anti-Communist
agreement leaving Japanese forces in North China indefinitely.
<i>Art.</i> IV left the problem of Japanese evacuation
to separate annexes. <i>Art.</i> VI provides "Economic
cooperation," with the inescapable implications. By
<i>Art.</i> VII Japan relinquishes extraterritoriality (in the
future), but obtains the opening of all China to Japan.<a name="FNanchor_15_157" id="FNanchor_15_157"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_157" class="fnanchor">[15]</a>
These terms, which not only involve admission of Chinese
defeat, but preclude any possible attempt of China
to restore military, economic, or political independence,
are the best that Japan has to offer. When one considers
that even these are merely legal, whittled back to
realism by protocols and annexes, and that they are
made with Japan's Chinese friends, Japan appears<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span>
incapable of ending the China incident. The Japanese do
not know when to stop. Gauche in power politics, they
are undone by greediness and inexperience.</p>
<p>The recognition is important only in that it assists
Japan in escaping responsibility for action taken by or
through the Chinese affiliates, while at the same time
pinning Japan to the Chinese earth and committing the
Empire to indefinite continuation of hostilities. If the
Japanese achieved complete success in international
power politics, there is a possibility that the Reorganized
Government might remain as the functioning half-autonomous
affiliate of Japan. Otherwise, Nanking can
be nothing more than an ornamental, occasionally useful
auxiliary to the Imperial Japanese Army, itself an
uncomfortable Chinese government <i>pro tem</i>. Having
ultimate authority, the Army cannot yet escape or delegate
final responsibility.</p>
<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_143" id="Footnote_1_143"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_143"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> An excellent bibliography, providing further references to the
Japanese side of the war, is found in Borton, Hugh, <i>et al.</i>, <i>A Selected
List of Books and Articles on Japan</i>, Washington, D. C., 1940. An
outstanding short discussion is Colegrove, K. W., <i>Militarism in Japan</i>,
Boston (World Peace Foundation), 1936.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_2_144" id="Footnote_2_144"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_144"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Bisson, T. A., <i>Japan In China</i>, cited, <i>passim</i>, for many instances.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_3_145" id="Footnote_3_145"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_145"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> It is unfortunate that work on the nature of old Far Eastern
international relations has no more than just begun. Descriptions
from the viewpoint of Western international law often possess the
unreal lucidity of dialectical materialism or of theosophy, since it is
necessary to read into Chinese and other Far Eastern political institutions
the characteristic features of a European invention—the
juridical, omnicompetent, secular, territorially limited state. See
Djang Chu, <i>The Chinese Suzerainty</i>, unpublished doctoral dissertation,
the Johns Hopkins University, 1935; Nelson, Melvin Frederick,
<i>The International Status of Korea, 1876-1910</i> unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Duke University, 1939, particularly Part I, "The International
Society of Confucian Monarchies" and Part II, "Korea in
Conflicting Societies of Nations"; both attempt to reconstruct the
working Asiatic theory in terms comprehensible to the West. Clyde,
Paul H., <i>United States Policy Toward China</i>, Durham, 1940, Section
XXIV, gives a succinct statement and relevant American public
documents.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_4_146" id="Footnote_4_146"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_146"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Taylor, George, <i>The Struggle for North China</i>, cited, p. 66.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_5_147" id="Footnote_5_147"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_147"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Statements to the author, by persons not in Chungking.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_6_148" id="Footnote_6_148"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_148"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Nyi, P. C., "Plans for Economic and Political Hegemony in
China," cited, p. 239. Compare this with the chart in George Taylor,
work cited, p. 204. Professor Taylor's study covers the entire history
of the Provisional Government, significantly aligned with that of
its rival, the guerrilla Border Region.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_7_149" id="Footnote_7_149"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_149"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>The Japan-Wang Ch'ing-wei Secret Agreements, 1938-1939-1940</i>,
Shanghai, 1910; these also appeared in the <i>China Weekly Review</i>,
January 27, 1940, p. 318; February 3, 1940, p. 341.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_8_150" id="Footnote_8_150"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_150"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Statement of the Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Fumimaro
Konoye, December 22, 1938, Jones and Myers, <i>Documents on American
Foreign Relations, 1939-40</i>, Boston (World Peace Foundation), p. 299.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_9_151" id="Footnote_9_151"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_151"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Ch'ên Lo died, and the only persons with any diplomatic experience
had, in the past, been only casually connected with the
Foreign Office.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_10_152" id="Footnote_10_152"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_152"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> See <i>The People's Tribune</i> (Shanghai), XXIX, p. 130 <i>ff.</i>, August
1940. This is the semi-official English organ of the regime; each issue
contains a selection of public documents. It is edited by the volatile
T'ang Leang-li. The other English-language journal is <i>The Voice
of China</i>, fortnightly, Nanking, edited by Mr. L. K. Kentwell, a graduate
of Oxford and Columbia Universities, Hawaiian-born of British
and Cantonese parentage. The journal is spirited, and very anti-British.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_11_153" id="Footnote_11_153"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_153"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> Such a chart is found in <i>The People's Tribune</i>, XXIX (March
1940), p. 214, together with a list of incumbents on the following
pages. The issue is headed by an editorial, "The National Government
Returns to Its Capital" and "Peace, Struggle, and Save China"
by Wang Ching-wei (<i>sic</i>). The official outline of the government
is to be found in [Reorganized Government], <i>K'ao-shih Yüan Kung-pao</i>
(Public Gazette of the Examination <i>Yüan</i>), Nanking. Vol. I,
No. 2 (June 1940), following p. 80.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_12_154" id="Footnote_12_154"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_154"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> [Reorganized Government], <i>Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng Kung-pao</i> (Public
Gazette of the Ministry of Justice), Nanking, gives a well-edited
résumé of the work of the Ministry and its policy in prosecutions.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_13_155" id="Footnote_13_155"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_155"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> [<i>China Weekly Review</i>; J. B. Powell, editor], <i>Who's Who in
China, Fifth Edition</i>, Shanghai, [1937], p. 145. For further information
see the supplement on the pro-Japanese leaders in <i>Who's Who
in China, Supplement to Fifth Edition</i>, Shanghai, [1940]. This presents
a hall of notoriety for all the major Chinese leaders affiliated
with the enemy. This <i>Who's Who</i> is regarded by the present author
as one of the most valuable sources on all Far Eastern politics. It is
engrossingly good reading and entertainment, the pictures of the
subjects being included in most instances. Behind these simple and
short biographies, there lies more drama than Hollywood dare produce.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_14_156" id="Footnote_14_156"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_156"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> For an account of this see, "Wang's Farcical C.E.C. Session,"
<i>China At War</i> (Hong Kong), III, No. 6, p. 57; January 1940.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_15_157" id="Footnote_15_157"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_157"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> The full text of the treaty is to be found in China Information
Committee, <i>News Release</i>, December 2, 1940, together with the
Generalissimo's comment. For a brief account, clearly interpreted,
see Steiger, G. Nye, "Japan Makes Peace—with Wang," <i>Events</i>, Vol. 9,
No. 49 (January 1941), p. 60-2. The Generalissimo's comment on
the Nanking regime will also be found below, Appendix III (A), <a href="#Page_372">No. 7</a>.</p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span></p>
<h2><span class="smcap">Chapter VIII</span><br />
EXTRA-POLITICAL FORCES</h2>
<p>Government, wherever organized, is distinguished
from other social institutions by claims
to universality of scope and competence, and paramountcy
of authority; the term <i>political</i>, on the basis
of such a distinction, refers to activities, occasionally
individual but more usually collective, involving access
to the symbols of government; and the term <i>governmental</i>
refers to the application of such symbols in governmental
sanctions and services. The process of government
is accordingly one wherein groups smaller
than the totality of society seek ("politically") to obtain
action in the name of the totality ("governmental"),
for or against other groups according to
shifting interests. In the West this politico-governmental
process has been further characterized by ceremonial
forms ("laws") and reinforced by conceptions
of amoral omnicompetence ("sovereignty").</p>
<p>The cellular socio-economic structure of old China,
plus the Confucian employment of ideological as opposed
to governmental control, kept the entire process
of politics and government at a very low level of intensity.
Modern China, inheritor of an apolitical past,
is still the most pluralistic society in the world, and
modern Chinese government—despite recent gigantism—a
frail legal superstructure above a flood of extra-political
power. Western societies depend upon their
states; the Chinese state depends upon a society which
could, albeit uncomfortably, dispense with states altogether.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span></p>
<p>This condition amounts in international politics, to
both a strength and a weakness. Chinese society suffers
more political ruin with less social disturbance than
does any comparable society; the guerrillas, for example,
probably find government helpful when available, but
regard it as a luxury rather than a necessity. Chinese
society is near to an orderly anarchy; uniform conditioning
from the past, or uniform present opinion, takes
the place of mass organization and totalitarian government.
The high death rate of traitors is probably not
owing to activity on the part of Chungking, but to the
spontaneous action of ordinary men; on one occasion a
high pro-Japanese official was shot by his own bodyguard
while the two sat in a sedan on a busy street: the
bodyguard had experienced a revulsion of conscience.
Fu Hsiao-ên, Wang Ch'ing-wei's Mayor of Shanghai, was
also killed by a member of his own household. Spontaneous
but uniform action applies not only to sensational
political matters; it appears in less dramatic but
equally important affairs, such as commercial rivalry,
landlord-tenant relationships, and the police power of
the community and the family. However, in a contest
for power, while the Chinese lose little by defeat, their
counter-attacks are correspondingly more difficult. The
fluid autonomy of innumerable groups slows down the
engines of formal power. The political-governmental
process is apt to be sluggish in crises.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Foundations of Chinese Government</span></h3>
<p>The society upon which the National Government
of China, its Left associates, and its Japanophile rivals
rest is not a settled, stagnant society. An extraordinary
ferment has gripped China for more than a century—arising
from cadastral, agrarian, technological, economic,
fiscal, ideological, political, and governmental
change. The Chinese people have endured; they have
also acted. Within a single century, three blazing revolutions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span>
have swept China: the T'aip'ing Rebellion, put
down with Western aid after fifteen years of war; the
Boxer uprising, deflected into xenophobia by the
Manchus; and the Great Revolution, which succeeded
in part. Between these, there have been changes, bloody
but of secondary magnitude: the Moslem rebellions;
the minor uprisings of Sun Yat-sen; the Republican
Revolution; the 1919 movement; the <i>tuchün</i> wars; the
Communist communes, which failed utterly in Shanghai
and Canton; the Communist <i>jacqueries</i>, which continued;
and the present rip tide of resistance. None of
these was effectively mastered by organized government;
each was exploited by one government, and opposed by
another. Unlike a Western state, wherein government
becomes the prime mobilizer during crises, Chinese
society shifts its incalculable forces, and governments
leap forward to take advantage of them.</p>
<p>This extensive, unorganized residue of opinion and
power, outside the reach of government, keeps any
modern Chinese government in a peculiar condition.
Like a perpetual process of revolution, social changes
demand that a government exploit them, deflect them,
or employ them—but not launch or stop them. The
Kuomintang has failed in its attempts to launch favorable
mass movements, and also failed to stop antagonistic
ones. The secret of the Chinese Communist power
has lain in the skill of the Red leaders, who utilized
available movements. Hence the continued development
of Chinese government rests upon the wills,
fancies, interests, mob action, enthusiasm or dispiritedness
of a people who in their own communities do not
read newspapers, listen to radios, or pay much attention
to the national state. Despite attempts to bring
society under the control of government, in order to
make it possible to bring government under the control
of society (constitutionalism), the decisive forces
of modern Chinese life are outside the reach of propaganda
or control.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span></p>
<p>General opinion in China is not ascertainable, except
through action. In vital matters this action is apt to
be either violent, or the equivalent of violent: sit-down,
general, or go-slow strikes; boycotts; universal derision.
The National Government possesses unprecedented
amounts of power by Chinese standards. By
Western standards it is incredibly obliging, casual, and
unsystematic. The power which the Government, with
Chiang as leader, enjoys, arises from a support which
it could not compel, and which it cannot ensure by any
means other than the pursuance of support-arousing
policies. The Kuomintang, the Communists, the National
Salvationists, the independent Left guerrilla
leaders—these agencies are not the organization of entire
opinion groups, but the spearheads of immeasurable
forces. The modernization of government, both administrative
and constitutional, awaits the transformation
of materials around and under government. Greatest
of these is popular mentality. Ancillary are economic,
organizational, educational and cultural forces.
Progress toward the omnicompetent state is slowed by
the fact that few Chinese wish to abandon the freedom
of a pluralist society for the efficient universality of
legalism. They desire modernization, but haggle at the
price.</p>
<p>Three factors in particular are working upon and
among the millions of farmers and townsmen: mass education,
rural reconstruction, and the cooperative movement.
Each not only takes immediate, beneficial effect,
but also transforms the political material of China.
These forces, not in any strict sense political, possess
enormous political importance.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Mass Education</span></h3>
<p>Literacy has risen very rapidly in modern China.
Before the impact of the West, becoming literate was
in itself a career. By the time one could read at all, one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span>
was a scholar, unless one learned the limited quasi-shorthand
of the merchants. Educational reforms came
about as the result of modern schools, particularly
British and American Protestant schools, and the action
of the government. The fabric of Chinese society had
begun to change even before the downfall of the Ch'ing
dynasty. The literary revolution led by Hu Shih after
1915, which popularized <i>pai-hua</i> (a written form of the
Chinese spoken language) had extensive repercussions,
and made possible the rapid diffusion of ideographic
literacy. (Phonetization failed then, and later.) Almost
every government in China has attempted the diffusion
of literacy. The popular demand is intense.</p>
<p>The present status of literacy in China is revealed
by official figures from the Ministry of Education, which
may err somewhat on the side of optimism. These put
the total population of China at 450 million (Manchuria
presumably remaining unmentioned), of which
90 million are literate and 360 million illiterate. Such
an estimate would give China about the same absolute
number of literates as the United States. The remaining
360 million illiterates are broken down as follows:
40.05 million children below the age of six; 45 million
aged six to twelve; 29.25 million aged twelve to fifteen;
79.43 million persons over forty-five; and 1.57 million
dumb, deaf, cripples, or insane. The adults to be
reached by the mass literacy movement amount therefore
to 165 million; government estimates state that
46,348,469 illiterates were educated since 1938, of
whom 25.2 million were adults between fifteen and
forty-five, leaving roughly 140 million to be educated.<a name="FNanchor_1_158" id="FNanchor_1_158"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_158" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p>
<p>The mass education program is supplementary to
the education of children, which is far from complete
or even adequate. The literacy imparted is of the most
elementary kind; but in a civilized society such as China
this has immediate effect. The author never knew a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span>
Chinese who could read and was not addicted to it; a
common sight in Western China is a knot of coolies
deciphering a newspaper together. The intense reverence
for learning and scholarship makes the training
welcome, and the teachers who seek to teach the minimum
of one thousand ideographs in six weeks never
lack pupils.</p>
<p>The program of the National Government was summarized
by Ch'ên Li-fu, the Minister of Education,
speaking over the radio after the Mass Education Conference
of March 1940:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Accordingly, our first step is to wipe out illiteracy. In
this respect we proceed simultaneously with the enlightenment
of the masses of adult illiterates, both men and women,
and with the education of children in order to put an end
to illiteracy that may otherwise arise in the future. At
the National Conference on People's Education held from
the twelfth day to the sixteenth day of this month in
Chungking, the <i>five-year plan for the people's education</i>,
adopted by the Executive <i>Yüan</i>, was further deliberated
and promulgated. The proper enforcement of this plan
will help to convert at least one hundred and forty million
(140,000,000) adult illiterates into intelligent citizens
for China within the coming five years.</p>
<p>At present there are already 44 per cent of the entire
number of children of school age (from six to twelve) in
school; that is, nineteen million and eight hundred thousand
(19,800,000). By the enforcement of this plan, there
should be, during the first two years, at least one people's
school in every three <i>pao</i>. And each village should have a
nucleus school, according to the plan. In this way there
should be at least more than 260,000 people's schools for
the 800,000 <i>pao</i> of the entire nation at the end of the first
two years. Each people's school consists of three divisions
or classes, namely, the children's division, the men's division,
and the women's division. During the second two
years there should be at least one people's school in every
two <i>pao</i>. In the fifth and last year there should be at least
one people's school in each <i>pao</i>. That is to say, at the end
of the fifth year there should be at least 800,000 people's
schools for the 800,000 <i>pao</i> of the nation, besides the 80,000
or more nucleus schools and the 200,000 schools of the
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span>same grades now already existent which can be improved,
to provide education for at least 90 per cent of the entire
number of children of school age. As a matter of fact,
certain provinces have already succeeded in establishing
one or even two people's schools in each <i>pao</i>. Kwangsi
Province, for instance, has at present one people's school in
each <i>pao</i>, while Fukien Province even has two people's
schools in each <i>pao</i>. The fulfillment of this five-year plan
needs at least $2,932,000,000 and 1,600,000 properly trained
teachers.</p>
<p>Our vocational education aims at building a sound
middle cadre for the various professions and industrial
enterprises. There are training schools and short-time classes
for mechanics, electrical communications, metal work, etc.
Also, special classes are opened in more than ten colleges
and universities for advanced studies along such
lines.</p>
<p>Our attempt to universalize productive education may
be evidenced by the incorporation of productive education
courses into the middle school curriculum, besides instituting
organizations for the same in the various vocational schools
in order to facilitate the practice of students along such
lines.... In 1938, for example, only 53.0 per cent of
the entire number of students who took part in the examination
studied science and engineering, but in 1939 it
jumped to 59.4 per cent.<a name="FNanchor_2_159" id="FNanchor_2_159"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_159" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p></blockquote>
<p>This statement gives the official view, which is highly
optimistic. In terms of practical politics, however, the
Generalissimo has given the movement his cordial backing,
and sees in it a preliminary to democracy. Although
final results might fall far short of the hopeful
estimate, the effect would still be considerable. Diffusion
of literacy creates a momentary satisfaction with
the political system which makes literacy possible, but
the after-effect of literacy is to make men of any nationality
easier to govern well and harder to govern
badly. A government which diffuses literacy without
advancing reforms is sharpening weapons against itself.
The National Government's American-inspired trust in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span>
education as a panacea implies that Chiang and his fellow
leaders expect to remain popular, and do not contemplate
appeasement, reaction, or other unpopular
measures.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Rural Reconstruction</span></h3>
<p>An even more interesting aspect of the mass-education
movement is its connection with rural reconstruction.
In this field much is owed to Dr. James Y. C. Yen, a
graduate of Yale and Princeton who began his work
with the Chinese labor corps in France during the
1914-18 war. The war-time work of the correlated mass
education and rural reconstruction movement was summarized
by Dr. Yen himself:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The most hopeful factor in the whole China situation is
that her greatest and most valuable resource, the three hundred
and fifty million farmers, has not yet been tapped for
the upbuilding of the nation. The Chinese farmer has had
a measure of freedom and responsibility, of dignity and independence.
He is thrifty and industrious, intelligent and
an expert in intensive farming. A great number of our
national leaders are sons and daughters of our farmers.
The fathers of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek were farmers.</p>
<p>These nearly three years of terrible war have proved
beyond doubt that our faith in the Chinese farmer has not
been misplaced. It has revealed his greatness. Our nation
is rediscovering the "forgotten man," the tiller of the soil.
Most of our soldiers come from the farm. To a remarkable
extent he has also financed the war. He is the real hero
of this war.</p>
<p>The Chinese Mass Education Movement was organized
in 1923 to explore the potentialities of the rural masses
and find a way of drawing out the best in them. Since
the first publication of the "thousand character test," it has
been estimated that some thirty million illiterate people
have been taught to read during the past five years.</p>
<p>Beginning with 1929 the point of emphasis of the Movement
shifted from extensive promotion of literacy to intensive
study of the life of the farmers in the rural districts.
As a living social laboratory in which to do our research
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span>and to work out principles and techniques, we selected
Tinghsien, a district of four hundred thousand people,
one-thousandth of the total population of China, in Hopei
Province. This was the first time in our history that an
organized group of Chinese intellectuals went deliberately
to the country to live among the rural people to study
their life and find out how to develop their latent possibilities.
The Movement has evolved what is known as the
"Tinghsien Four-fold Reconstruction Education" including
the cultural, economic, health, and the political.</p>
<p>Several other experimental <i>hsien</i>,—Hengshan in Hunan,
Central China, and Hsintu in Szechwan, West China, were
established in cooperation with the provincial governments.
One of our special emphases in these experimental
<i>hsien</i> has been the reform of the <i>hsien</i> government, i.e. the
local government.</p>
<p>The Tinghsien Experiment with its "laboratory approach"
to social and political problems and with its <i>correlated</i>
program of rural reconstruction as demonstrated in
the district attracted attention from all over China and inspired
similar experiments in various parts of the country.
As a result the movement for rural reconstruction gained
great momentum in China.</p>
<p>Since the outbreak of hostilities the Mass Education
Movement has thrown itself unreservedly into the task of
assisting the Central and Provincial governments in
strengthening the nation's struggle against the enemy. It
was most gratifying that at this hour of China's supreme
struggle we have been able to help the government to revitalize
the <i>hsien</i> government, to train civil service personnel
and to mobilize the farmers. Extensive application of the
new system as developed in the experimental <i>hsien</i> was
made to an entire province such as we did in Hunan—a rich
province with a population of thirty million.</p>
<p>In order to insure that the new political machinery should
function effectively a School of Public Administration to
train administrative and technical personnel from the
magistrate down to the village elders was established with
the senior members of our Movement taking full charge.
Altogether the School trained about 4,000 higher officials
for the local government and some 35,000 of the village elders.
Since Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek assumed concurrently
the governorship of Szechwan, a new system of <i>hsien</i>
government (chiefly modelled after the experimental <i>hsien</i>
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span>of the country) with the object of releasing the new life of
the rural masses has been promulgated. Under his order
the same is taking place in neighboring provinces.</p>
<p>Unless serious and painstaking study of rural reconstruction
is made by scientists and scholars on the one hand,
and administrative and technical personnel are systematically
trained and imbued with a spirit of service to the rural
masses on the other, the movement for rural reconstruction
may dwindle away as so many other movements have done
in the past.</p>
<p>It is most heartening to state that Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek has given his public approval and backing to the
new National Institute of Rural Reconstruction which he
considers to be of fundamental importance to China's
post-war reconstruction. The inspiration of the Institute
has already helped to mould the principal rural reconstruction
groups in the country into one national force. The
rural reconstruction movement has achieved a united front
unparalleled in its history. Today it is a great unifying
force, an outstanding national platform upon which all
Chinese can agree. It will meet the needs of China today
and lay the foundation for the China of tomorrow.<a name="FNanchor_3_160" id="FNanchor_3_160"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_160" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p></blockquote>
<p>This program possesses obvious merit. Lacking a
foundation of dogma, it requires no implementation
through terrorism. The politically innocuous character
of the movement is attested by the frequent demands by
provincial officials for personnel from the Mass Education
training centers. Since the purpose is to improve
the entire community without revolutionizing its class
structure, the enlightened landlords are as favorable as
the peasants themselves. Unfortunately, enlightened
landlords are not always prevalent. Despite the modesty
of the program, it finds stumbling blocks in actual corruption,
extortion, and illegality. Many <i>hsien</i> are under
local machines which permit wealthy conservatives to
evade tax payments, steal government funds, and repress
genuine farmer organization. The consequence
has been that the movement succeeds only when it has<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span>
the immediate backing of a provincial or central authority;
its progress has been slow. Many critics, both
Chinese and Western, have become disgusted with the
slowness of social reform on the land, and despair of
anything save reconstruction through implicit class
war.<a name="FNanchor_4_161" id="FNanchor_4_161"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_161" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p>
<p>The present period of resistance and reconstruction
opens a very promising period in rural modernization.
In the first place, war-time stress puts great power in
the Generalissimo's hands. Ubiquitous armies can, on
short notice, enforce orders from Chungking. The
shift of troops among provinces makes the central government
an outside power now physically present in
tens of thousands of communities. Devolution of
watchfulness by the Commander-in-Chief and his staff
results in slow but irreversible accumulation of governmental
authority.</p>
<p>Secondly, the proclamation of manifold programs has
the effect, obviously, of drawing attention to each of
them. The Kuomintang, anxious to retain its paramountcy,
promotes new local government changes.
These face frustration by mass illiteracy. Mass education
is impeded by local economic injustices. The
Whampoa and <i>Erh Ch'ên</i> groups in the Kuomintang,
while they have landlord connections, are interested—even
assuming a strong economic-class interest—in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span>
maintenance of government. Action is appearing, slow
and haphazard by Western standards, but indisputably
present. The minimum of good government in China
is a very low minimum, but it is rising in the face of the
Communist and Japanese pressure. One may be sure
that the National Government will not pass below that
minimum if the state's existence is in danger.</p>
<p>Thirdly, there is a very genuine boom condition in
Western China. The movement of the government to
the West, and lightening of intolerable but long-endured
<i>tuchün</i> exactions, would in itself have led to
sudden prosperity. To this are added more than twenty
millions of new population, a growing network of communications,
a sharp but controlled inflation. These
further stimulate speculation and construction and
development. The most important factors in a new
prosperity have been, however, the reappearance of
handicraft-type industry as a consequence of blockade,
and governmental advocacy of every conceivable development.
The author beheld, during the summer of
1940, conditions of prosperity in Szechwan which he
had not expected to find in China within the space of
one lifetime. Narcotics were eradicated. The working
population was commanding high wages, but suffering
from high prices; the prices were somewhat ahead of the
wages, but not so far that social morale was troubled.
Skilled labor was in a superb bargaining position; chauffeurs,
electricians, good carpenters, etc. were in considerable
demand. The salaried classes were suffering at
all levels, a factor which was patently wholesome in
stimulating working-class morale. The clerical class,
which had held itself aloof from manual labor with a
persistence which boded ill for China, was placed more
nearly on a par with its American equivalent. While
poverty was still universal by Western standards, the
pathological squalor endemic to the coast was nowhere
visible.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span></p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Chinese Industrial Cooperatives</span></h3>
<p>The Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (<i>Chung-kuo
Kung-yeh Ho-tso Hsieh-hui</i>) are an important and
widely publicized outgrowth of the war, and are perhaps
the only feature of domestic Chinese affairs—outside
of the Communist area and the roads program—which
is as well known beyond China as within. The
purpose of the cooperatives is to launch an enormous
program of decentralized industry throughout Free
China, with thirty thousand separate industrial cooperatives
for the first major goal. The purpose is to
develop an industrial system which will keep China
autarkic for resistance and reconstruction; long-range,
the purpose is to circumvent impending evils of concentrated
industrialism, slums, megalopolitan crowding,
extra-legal oppression. China might thus proceed directly
from a decentralized half-handicraft economy to
the decentralized power economy of the future. Four
principles underlie the program: sound technical design,
cooperative organization, voluntary self-discipline,
and social welfare on the basis of Sun's <i>min shêng</i>.<a name="FNanchor_5_162" id="FNanchor_5_162"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_162" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p>
<p>Formally, the C.I.C. Headquarters is a social organization
sponsored by the Executive <i>Yüan</i>. H. H. K'ung,
Minister of Finance and Vice-President of the <i>Yüan</i>, is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span>
its Chairman. The Secretary-General and Associate
Secretary-General, Messrs. K. P. Liu and Hubert Liang,
are both American-returned students; the former once
worked in the Ford factories while studying at the University
of Cincinnati and later was a banker in Manchuria.
The most inspiring force in the movement is
Mr. Rewi Alley, a New Zealander strongly interested
in cooperatives and in labor welfare, formerly factory
inspector in the International Settlement. Familiar,
because of his Shanghai experiences and famine-relief
work, with the problems of economic organization in
China, he presented his plan to Generalissimo and
Mme. Chiang through the intervention of that extraordinarily
popular British Ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr.
The Chiangs were impressed with it, and the
Generalissimo gave it his support. A headquarters was
established at Hankow in August 1938, with the following
five departments: <i>general</i>, for secretarial and administrative
housekeeping; <i>financial</i>, administering
funds for the headquarters and the cooperative units;
<i>organization</i>, in charge of planning and inauguration
of cooperatives; <i>technical</i>, devising simple industrial
techniques; and <i>accounting</i>, an independent agency of
audit.<a name="FNanchor_6_163" id="FNanchor_6_163"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_163" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> The Executive <i>Yüan</i> has continued to make administrative
funds available; the central headquarters
near Chungking now has a staff of about seven hundred.
Professor J. B. Tayler of Yenching University,
a noted economic expert, is consultant for staff service.</p>
<p>As projected by Rewi Alley and his fellow-enthusiasts,
the C.I.C. had to adjust itself to three zones of China's
war-time economy. A guerrilla zone in and around
the combat area, as well as behind the Japanese lines,
concentrated on the creation of immediate war-time
necessities. Some of these were in the form of direct<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span>
medical and military supplies; others, replacements of
indispensable articles which otherwise would have been
procured from the enemy. The second zone, of light
industry, was within easy reach of Japanese air raids
and espionage, and consequently given to enterprises
having light capital investment, mobile, and readily
concealed. The third, or inmost Chinese zone, being
best protected, was the proper area for the development
of the heavier industries, although even here no grandiose
or heavily centralized works are planned. The
ultimate aim, peace-time as well as military, of the
C.I.C. is to distribute industry across the countryside,
replacing the once flourishing handicraft industries,
and allowing Chinese society to develop naturally and
continuously.</p>
<p>The author attended a C.I.C. exhibit in Chungking
which presented a startling array of modern goods. Ford
tools and auxiliary parts, matches, lamps (electric,
kerosene, and an improved wood-oil lamp which equals
kerosene), light electric appliances, lathes, machine-shop
tools, medical kits, Western shoes, toothpaste,
canned foods, paper, printing presses, books, and fountain
pens—all were produced in areas which did not
even have the spinning wheel in some instances, and
which until recently imported all Western or modern
goods from the coast or from outside.</p>
<p>The organization and practical accomplishments of
the C.I.C. are well summarized in a recent article by
K. P. Liu, Secretary-General:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><span class="smcap lowercase">INTRODUCTION</span>: When it became clear that in order to continue
economic resistance against Japan China must at all
costs develop production in the rear of the fighting line,
one of the steps taken was the founding of the Chinese Industrial
Cooperatives by Dr. H. H. Kung.</p>
<p>The plan was to construct throughout China chains of
small industries which should use local materials to supply
the manufactured goods fundamentally necessary to the life
of the people.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span></p>
<p>Industrial cooperative societies are organized around
about 60 depots over 16 provinces. An average depot of
about 25 cooperatives is supervised and advised by a group
of men consisting of depotmaster, accountant, technician,
and two or three organizers.</p>
<p>For the coordination of work depots are divided among
five regions: the Northwest (NW), the Southeast (SE),
the Chuankang (Szechwan and Sikang) region (CK), the
Southwest (SW), and Yunnan (Y). Each is headed by
regional headquarters, which are responsible to the Central
Headquarters at Chungking which represents the C.I.C. on
general questions and negotiations, and decides, in consultation
with regional chiefs, on broad lines of policy. The
Central Headquarters also supplies the services of traveling
advisers on engineering, accounting, and organization problems.</p>
<p>The staff of 700 is financed by Government funds, since
the C.I.C. has been named a social organization responsible
to the Executive Yüan. Further, the C.I.C. was given
$5,000,000 by the Central Government to be used as loan
capital for cooperatives. More recently, negotiations with
various banks have made new large sums available, so that
the amount which can now be used for the capitalization of
cooperatives is near $30,000,000.</p>
<p>The above two sources of income provide no money for
education, research, evacuation of workers from occupied
areas, technical training, refugee work relief, medical help,
or capital loans in guerrilla regions. Necessary auxiliary activities
as these are provided for to a certain extent by gifts
from interested men and women in China and abroad....
<span class="smcap lowercase">FORMING AN INDUSTRIAL COOPERATIVE</span>: When a depot is first
set up, the depotmaster advertises the objectives of the
C.I.C. by posters and speeches. But as soon as a few workmen
get to know about its activities there is no more need
to advertise. There are always plenty of workers who will
prefer the security and freedom of a cooperative to unemployment
or to working for a master.</p>
<p>The number of men needed to form a cooperative is at
least seven, but there is no upper limit. They first come to
talk things over with a C.I.C. organizer, present their plan
for setting up a factory or workshop, with proof of their
qualifications and a tentative budget showing how much
loan capital will be needed to start work. The organizer explains
to them the cooperative system of self-government,
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span>Chinese cooperative law, and the C.I.C. Model Constitution.
Then they take some descriptive literature home,
and discuss among themselves whom they want as their
officers.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, their plans are talked over by the depotmaster,
accountant, organizer, and engineer, and modifications
suggested. If, as often happens, it turns out that they
are only merchants anxious to get rich quick and not <i>bona
fide</i> workmen ready to work hard, the plans are rejected.</p>
<p>If all is satisfactory, a meeting is held for the election of
officers, determination of share capital, voting of wages, and
work begins as soon as the loan is put through. At least
one quarter of the subscribed share capital must be paid up
immediately, and the total loan—long-term and short—cannot
exceed 20 times the subscribed share capital....
The actual ratio of share to loan capital averages about
1 to 6.</p>
<p><span class="smcap lowercase">INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION:</span> Distribution of industry is shown
in the following condensed table:</p>
<div class="center">
<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="Industrial Distribution">
<tr><td align="left">Textiles</td><td align="right">610</td><td>[cooperatives]</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Engineering</td><td align="right">49</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Mining</td><td align="right">118</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Chemical</td><td align="right">206</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Pottery</td><td align="right">69</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Foodstuffs</td><td align="right">83</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Transport</td><td align="right">4</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Miscellaneous</td><td align="right">395</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="right">———</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="right">1,534</td></tr>
</table></div>
<p>There are no less than 114 types of cooperatives, and almost
every daily need of the people can be met.</p>
<p>Before any cooperative is organized, investigations are
made to ensure that (I) there are raw materials near at
hand, (II) there is skilled workmanship available, and
(III) there is a market for the finished product. Where
these three do not co-exist at one place, a compromise of
the most reasonable kind is effected if possible. Some examples—by
no means exhaustive—of the adaptation of
types of industry to meet local conditions are described as
follows:</p>
<p><i>Wool</i> ... In the beginning of 1939 woolspinners of
Chentu were still using either the simple old whorl or the
handturned wheel. The volume of production was very<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span>
small. But during 1939 the C.I.C. embarked on a huge
program of blanket production for the army, and improved
streamlined treadle spinners were introduced, and thousands
of men and women taught the technique of using
them. Blankets were made at eight centers of west and
northern China; everywhere improved woolspinning and
woolweaving machines and techniques brought new productive
power. During the winter of 1939-40, 400,000
blankets were turned out, and another million and a half
will be made during the remainder of 1940.</p>
<p>The wool used by the blanket-making cooperatives comes
from the highlands of Chinghai, Kansu, Ningsia, and
Shensi, and now instead of being carried raw to Tientsin
or Shanghai as in the old days, it is being spun and woven
near to the source of supply. Improvements are constantly
being made—better machines, finer spinning, use of waterpower,
better carding and finishing—so that the whole project
works to raise the efficiency and living standard of the
local people.</p>
<p><i>Cotton</i>. Wherever cotton is grown spinning and weaving
cooperatives are numerous, for clothing is one of the fundamental
needs of life....</p>
<p><i>Grass Cloth</i>. Linen, or more correctly grass cloth, was
introduced into Szechwan from Kwangtung generations
ago, and now fine cloth is woven. Production thereof from
ramie thread was at its height 20 years ago, but since then
the craft has declined until recently, when the partial
blockade of the war made the industry profitable again....</p>
<p><i>Goldwashing</i>. Placer gold exists along every river in West
China and in many parts of South China too. Even in
Chungking one may see needy coolies scraping up and
washing riverside mud for its tiny precious content.</p>
<p>The gold is easily available by simple methods, though
certain difficulties have hitherto prevented its extraction on
a larger scale. But now every grain is an asset to China in
economic warfare, and so many goldwashing cooperatives
have been organized. In the whole country there are 66
cooperatives, most of which are in the Han valley....
Now the cooperatives ... are self-supporting and produce
60 to 70 oz. of gold a day.</p>
<p><i>Coal and Iron</i>. Throughout the hinterland of China
new sources of coal and iron are being needed continually
by newly transplanted industry. Szechwan has good coal,
widespread, but rather thin in seam....</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span></p>
<p>At the same time plans for the construction of blast
furnaces have been worked out by C.I.C. engineers, and
only wait for adequate financing. It is planned first to set
up in South Shensi at a point within easy distance of coal
and iron supplies a coke-making and a smelting plant, the
total capitalization being $105,000.</p>
<p><i>Alcohol.</i> A first experimental plant for the production of
96 per cent pure alcohol has been running nearly a year
with a maximum output of 350 gallons a day. Since the cost
of such a plant is comparatively small, and available supplies
of grain make the cost of alcohol much less than that
of gasoline, other plants have been set up. There are now
six in operation and greater production in the future is
envisaged. The sites of alcohol plants are naturally at key
positions on the highway, where good supplies of coarse
grain meet with the traffic line.</p>
<p><i>Prime Movers.</i> In many cooperatives one may see a
quaint mixture of old and new, where big flywheels are
turned by human labor to maintain the spin of lathes,
carding machines, and the like. This is a useful temporary
expedient, possible where labor is cheap. Animal power is
also used.</p>
<p>But C.I.C. engineers are not satisfied with this state of
affairs; they are always on the lookout for new sources of
power. So charcoal-or gasoline-burning internal combustion
engines are commonly employed.</p>
<p>But most popular are waterwheels, and in every part of
China will be found old wheels adapted for modern uses—driving
textile machinery, turning lathes, grinding flour—undershot
or overshot, single or in series. Gradually the
wheels are being made of better materials and more efficient.
Iron wheels are constructed at present weighing about one
ton, at a cost of $3,000, and generating over 30 H.P.</p>
<p>In the plains waterpower is rarely available, but in the
foothills of Tibet, the Tsingling Shan, or in the rough
country of southern China this cheapest of all forms of
power will come more and more into its own as C.I.C. machine
shops construct improved waterwheels.</p>
<p><span class="smcap lowercase">ACCOUNTING:</span> During the past two years the C.I.C. staff has
tackled the question of modern accounting wholeheartedly
in every depot, and training classes in cost accounting have
been given for cooperative accountants who only know old
style Chinese bookkeeping. C.I.C. trained accountants
have been allocated to cooperatives—for big cooperatives<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span>
one accountant is employed by each society, for small, one
accountant serves two or three. Emphasis has been placed
on the presentation of monthly balance sheets and yearly
closing of accounts with profit sharing.</p>
<p>Profits are divided among the members once—or in rare
cases twice—a year. The usual method of division, all claims
including interest on loans and shares having first been
paid, is as follows:</p>
<div class="center">
<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="Method of Profit Division">
<tr><td align="left">Reserves</td><td align="left">20 per cent</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Emergency Fund</td><td align="left">10 per cent</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Bonus to Officers of Society</td><td align="left">10 per cent</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Common Good Fund</td><td align="left">10 per cent</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">Divided among Members</td><td align="left">50 per cent</td></tr>
</table></div>
<p>The division accords with Chinese Law. The bonus to
officers is usually made to include gifts to apprentices and
hired workers such as cooks, and the Common Good Fund
is used for education, medical welfare, and other social
service. The division among members is made in strict
proportion to wage and time worked.</p>
<p>Local conditions and various industries differ so much
that no wage-policy has at present been applied. In general
it may be said that wages in cooperatives—fixed by the
members themselves—are about the same as those in private
factories of the district. The products in general sell at
prevailing rates, though in some cases the prices have been
lowered and profiteering prevented by the action of the
cooperatives.</p>
<p><span class="smcap lowercase">COOPERATIVE FEDERATIONS:</span> Wherever the societies have
passed the first short period of infantile dependence on the
C.I.C. they have been associated into federations, sometimes
according to trade, but more often and more wholesomely,
according to districts. The most important immediate
function of the federation is to open a supply
and marketing agency, which by its centralization, specialization,
and greater supply of circulating capital is able to
relieve the cooperatives of most of their problems of buying
and selling....</p>
<p><span class="smcap lowercase">TRAINING:</span> Training of organizers is of vital importance,
for it is they who will succeed or fail in giving to the workers
true conceptions of cooperation, industry, and business,
and in inculcating efficient methods and habits. Classes for
organizers have consequently been held in every region.</p>
<p>Training of cooperative chairmen in their duties is also<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span>
undertaken. They "learn by doing,"—how to conduct meetings,
business principles, cooperative law, history of cooperation,
scope and significance of industrial cooperation
in China.... The most usual training is by weekly night
classes and meetings. There is also constant informal training
by the organizers, who devote about one day a week to
each cooperative, and work with the members on the solution
of immediate problems by the application of cooperative
principles. Popular education of workers will
be described later.</p>
<p>Another important aspect of training is technical. In
no case is a society organized until the technical ability of
the members is adequate for making a successful business.
So, with refugees and unskilled peasants it is usually necessary
to give preliminary training—mainly in textiles. Wherever
there is textile work, training classes have been held in
spinning and weaving....</p>
<p><span class="smcap lowercase">SOCIAL WELFARE WORK:</span> No statistics have been compiled
about the social contribution of the C.I.C. to the communities
around its depot. The work varies according to
local needs and opportunities, and according to available
resources in funds and manpower....</p>
<p><span class="smcap lowercase">OUTLOOK:</span> After the war there will undoubtedly come a
period of readjustment, when the renewed influx of machinery
and machine-finished goods will demand a shift of
emphasis—for instance handspinning cannot survive indefinitely,
no matter how essential it is at present. It is
to be expected that at that period the C.I.C. will continue
to use in some industries methods now employed, but that
in others there will be a transition to rationalization and
mechanization. With a soundly integrated network of
skilled workmen, experienced engineers, and bankers' confidence,
the C.I.C. will be able to make this transition without
severe dislocation.</p>
<p>The C.I.C. is essentially a non-political organization; its
functions are all technical, and its staff is composed of experts
in various lines—cooperative methods, accounting,
engineering. Success does not depend on political position
or power, but on the simple and essential condition that this
type of industry produces efficiently the goods that China
needs. The C.I.C. objective is just Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Third
Principle—People's Livelihood—practically expressed.</p>
<p>The success of cooperative movements in other parts of
the world—their ability to weather economic crises and
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span>depressions—has been due to the solidarity that comes when
the motive force in industry and commerce is not the profit
of a few but the livelihood of many. In the same way the
C.I.C. can become a permanent force for national stability
and strength.<a name="FNanchor_7_164" id="FNanchor_7_164"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_164" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p></blockquote>
<p>The Model Constitution for an Industrial Cooperative<a name="FNanchor_8_165" id="FNanchor_8_165"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_165" class="fnanchor">[8]</a>
establishes safeguards to keep the cooperatives
from becoming profiteering sweatshops. Bankrupts,
drug addicts, persons incapable of working, and persons
already members of a unit are forbidden to join a unit
being formed (<i>Art.</i> 7). No member may subscribe
more than 20 per cent of the share capital of a single
society (<i>Art.</i> 9). A general annual meeting, with the
quorum set at one-half, and action requiring the majority
of a quorum, is the highest authority in a unit
(<i>Art.</i> 19). This meeting elects a board of directors and
a separate board of supervisors (<i>Arts.</i> 22 and 23).
Sweeping disqualifications keep members from mixing
personal or outside interests and cooperative matters
(<i>Art.</i> 32). The design of the unit constitution is such
that each unit is an authentic, autonomous cooperative,
governed well or badly in accordance with the abilities
and needs of its members, and is not a mere fraction of
state capitalism.</p>
<p>The C.I.C. taps a level of Chinese society hitherto
largely unused<a name="FNanchor_9_166" id="FNanchor_9_166"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_166" class="fnanchor">[9]</a>—the family, guild, village, and volunteer-society
devices of the peasantry and townsmen who
lived beneath the lowest limits of the scholastic bureaucracy. The
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span>Communists act as the inheritors to temporarily
fanatical peasant rebellions; the National Government
and Kuomintang, to ascendant mandarinates;
the C.I.C. brings into play the rich experience of the
Chinese with collective action. The resources of the
social power so mobilized cannot easily be estimated,
but general success would reshape much of Chinese
society.</p>
<p>In fitting the C.I.C. to the general Chinese scene,
however, it is important to compare the movement with
some of the New Deal reforms in the United States,
such as T.V.A. (Tennessee Valley Authority). Though
these are important, neither the American nor the Chinese
enterprises proclaim social revolution or charter
Utopias. The reforms of President Roosevelt have had
incalculable effect; no one knows what would have happened
without them. Nevertheless, it is excessive to
suggest that the existence of the United States as a
political society depends upon these reforms. Similarly,
the continuation of the National Government of China
does not rest on the C.I.C., or on any other single institution
alone.</p>
<p>The C.I.C. extends patterns of cooperation and farm-factory
balance already tried in Europe, and also approached
by such diverse agencies as the Soviet state
and collective farms, and Mr. Henry Ford's worker-garden
plans. Hitherto the Chinese cooperative workers
have had a closer contact with Dearborn, Michigan, than
with Moscow, R.S.F.S.R. The endeavor is a serious and
important one. It supplements and develops the facilities—themselves
very extensive—which are under full
state-capitalist or private control. But Free China's
markets, while they contain C.I.C.-made goods, are
mostly filled with private or government products. A
private Chinese business system which has survived
thirty years of domestic war does not obsolesce instantaneously.
The cooperative movement is, largely because<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span>
of the integrity, enthusiasm, and tirelessness of
Mr. Alley, the nearest thing to a realization of <i>min shêng</i>
which China has yet seen; but the Right still plans for
a China with vast state-capitalist and state-subsidized
private industries, along with an all-pervading flow of
<i>laissez-faire</i> commerce. The Marxians look on sympathetically
but contemptuously.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Unorganized Pressure</span></h3>
<p>The long one-party rule of the Kuomintang, now
relaxed but not disestablished, has habituated the Chinese
to the use of completely non-political groups—families
and their connections; economic associations
of various kinds; religious agencies—for political leverage.
There are relatively few groups which possess clear
public purposes and at the same time maintain unofficial
status. Indeed, the stamp of quasi-official approval
is so highly prized that many groups which seem
to have no affiliation with the government are discovered
to seek affiliation or to have acquired it roundabout.</p>
<p>Among the private or quasi-private groups which
take most effect may be mentioned, however, the People's
Foreign Relations Association, the League of Nations
Union, and the China Branch of the International
Peace Campaign. The first of these publishes the useful
quarterly, <i>The China Herald</i>. The Campaign, which
was launched as a world-wide center-and-left drive for
peace, was under respected European leadership, and
was favored by a large labor bloc in England. In the
United States it was associated in the minds of some
people with the Stalinist fellow-travellers—the elements
who sat in the councils of the temporarily-joined forces
of anti-Fascism and pro-Stalinism, who organized the
American League for Peace and Democracy (a Popular
Front movement), the American Friends of the Chinese
People, and who dominated groups such as the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span>
American Youth Congress. In China, contrariwise, the
International Peace Campaign, fitting in with purposes
of government and people, seemed to offer a
world-wide sympathy for China's anti-aggression activities.
The China Branch was among the most effective
organizations in the Campaign. It developed vitality
in diffusing peace propaganda—that is, for peace
after the war. There was no trace of defeatism, sabotage
of national defense, or obstruction to defensive war.
With the outbreak of the European war, the I.P.C. disappeared
almost altogether from the Western scene, but
continues in China. Finally, the China League of Nations
Union publishes <i>The China Forum</i>, and carries
on an educational campaign.</p>
<p>Christian activities have been extended and activized
by war. Never before have the missions had as many opportunities
for social and national service in China.
Their schools are filled; their hospitals, crowded; their
cause, related to America, to peace, and to a sane long
view, is welcomed. The Chinese Y.M.C.A. has met the
shock of war with extensive participation in relief,
particularly among students and soldiers. Medical aid,
tragically inadequate but infinitely better than nothing
at all, is coming into China. The curtailment of mission
activities in occupied China makes exploitation of the
Christian field in the West even more desirable from
the viewpoint of the Western churches. A recent work,
by two Christians born in China, one American and
the other Chinese, describes this situation clearly and
significantly: <i>China Rediscovers Her West</i>.<a name="FNanchor_10_167" id="FNanchor_10_167"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_167" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p>
<p>The other side of extra-political pressure comes in
the form of class and regional interests. The phenomena
of lobbying and special favor are less evident
in Chungking than in previous governments of China.
Special groups representing industries, areas, or vested
interests do appear, but are apt to work through casual,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span>
untraceable patterns of personal relationships. There
is no Chinese C.I.O., nor A. F. of L., but there is also
no National Association of Manufacturers. The politics
of economics gains by diffusion and absence of protest
what it loses in sensitivity and explicitness. An
economic group which feels itself outraged takes a
long time to develop group consciousness; hence, it is
less apt to feel outraged, and the generality of the
people, the public, is often better off. There are undoubtedly
scurrilous, politically vile, selfish advantages
being taken in West China today; but the net outcome
is counterbalanced by concrete improvement in the condition
of the people as a whole, and the unquestionable
morale of the leading and administrative classes.</p>
<p>Every government, where and however it may operate,
has a double set of barriers which form its corridor of
further existence: on the left it must meet the minimal
needs of the governed, satisfy their physical and moral
appetites sufficiently to keep itself from being ignored
or overthrown; on the right it must compensate the
persons who govern, and do so well enough to retain
personnel adequate to government. The Marxians stress
the former element; the Paretians, the latter. Both are
visible in China. Had the exigencies of reform, social
change, and military activity proved too sharp, too
violent, too profitless, the personnel trained by experience
and fitted by temperament to government
might have gone over to Japan. The low caliber of
Wang Ch'ing-wei and his clique is testimony to the
<i>élan</i> of the West Chinese leaders. Chungking has ample
reserves of administrative talent, military intelligence,
and political acumen upon which to draw.</p>
<p>The last part of the picture is the most important:
the <i>lao-pai-hsing</i>, the Old Hundred Names, the common
people of China. They are the ultimate arbiters of this
war, and of all future wars in East Asia: to this degree
they are a superlative force in the world. Hundreds of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span>
millions strong, adept, flexible, trained in a culture
which has flowed under (but not through) literacy for
centuries, hard-working, patient, and physiologically
sound, they are perhaps the greatest unified human
group. Upon their anger against Japan depends the
future of that Empire; if the <i>lao-pai-hsing</i> are determined
to resist, Chiang could go, Chungking fall, the
government scatter, the Communists collapse, and there
would yet be war—restless, bitter, implacable, with the
ferocity of a sane man employing violence as a last
defense against violence not sane. Leaders exist aplenty
in that sea of men, waiting for circumstance to cast them
forth. Intelligence, information, cunning, power, and
patience are all at hand.</p>
<p>The difference between a strange half-industrial
modern Chinese Republic, striding toward the twenty-first
century with seven-league boots of progress, and a
Chinese chaos stinking with vice and disease under
Japanese rule—this difference lies within the decision
of the common people. The war has roused the workers,
peasants, and petty townsmen. The Japanese bombers
have carried ubiquitous messages of alarm. The
Western world gasped when across the dusty plains of
North China there rolled the tidal wave of Boxerism;
but the <i>I Ho Ch'üan</i> of yesteryear is a passing fad in
contrast to the bitterness and resolution of today's
common people. There is no defeat in most of the faces
in Shanghai, no surrender in the eyes of men who live,
and must keep on living, surrounded by enemy vainglory.
The traitors are marked by their own behavior;
they bear the stigmata of a surrender to vice. Yet even
they cannot be trusted by Japan. One who has visited
the sources and the mouths of the rivers, who has seen
the free Yangtze pouring out of Tibet and the captive
Yangtze ripple past the grey flanks of Imperial Japanese
destroyers, can testify that the Chinese people are not
beaten now. If they are ever going to be beaten, it will<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span>
take a bigger force than Japan to do it—a morally
greater, technically surer, politically wiser force.</p>
<p>The Chinese people know they are unconquered.
They do not know it with their minds, despite hopeful
calculations in terms of years and yen and reserves of
oil. They do not even know it with a conscious assumption
of faith, a fanatical determination to die for the
new state. They know it just as men have always known
the simplest things of life—things so simple that they
may trouble the psychologist or elude the philosopher,
and never even enter the vocabulary of political science.
The Chinese sense of victory is like a reminiscent
fragrance, a half-heard but poignant sound, a flash of
inexpressible but profound meaning out of everyman's
irrecoverable past. This omnipresent sense of victory
and freedom may be twisted. Weak and cunning men
rationalize this sense of victory into self-deceiving subterfuges
of boring from within; they accept Japanese
salaries while promising themselves sometime, always
tomorrow, to subvert Japan; but even they lack no assurance
of ultimate Chinese victory.</p>
<p>The winning of that victory lies on the sweating
backs of men—in paddy-fields, on flaring highways, on
flagstone pathways across a world, or behind the adobe
and lattice walls of China's workshops. The war has
conjured up an awareness of power. No one asks the
<i>lao-pai-hsing</i> what they want; no ballots, no polls can
reach them. But no people can hold such overt power
and be unconscious of their own strength. China has
awakened.</p>
<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_158" id="Footnote_1_158"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_158"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> The China Information Committee, <i>News Release</i>, April 1, 1940.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_2_159" id="Footnote_2_159"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_159"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> The same, April 8, 1940. Minor changes in punctuation have
been introduced.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_3_160" id="Footnote_3_160"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_160"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> The same, May 6, 1940.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_4_161" id="Footnote_4_161"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_161"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Research Staff of the Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations,
<i>Agrarian China, Selected Source Materials from Chinese Authors</i>,
Shanghai, 1938. A more Leftist and even gloomier view is taken
by Chen Han-seng, <i>Landlord and Peasant in China</i>, New York, 1936,
and the same author's <i>Industrial Capital and Chinese Peasants, A
Study of the Livelihood of Chinese Tobacco Cultivators</i>, Shanghai,
1939. Two general surveys of the Chinese economy are Condliffe, J. B.,
<i>China Today: Economic</i>, Boston, 1932, and Tawney, R. H., <i>Land
and Labour in China</i>, New York, 1932. A significant hypothesis of
the relations of economics, government, and culture in China is
found in Lattimore, Owen, <i>Inner Asian Frontiers of China</i>, New York,
1940, Ch. III, esp. p. 39 <i>ff.</i>; this rests in part upon Wittfogel, Karl
August, <i>Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas</i>, Leipzig, 1931, the leading
Marxian exposition of the subject.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_5_162" id="Footnote_5_162"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_162"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Publicity release of Indusco, Inc., The American Committee in
Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, New York, January 1940
[1941]. This agency, exceedingly active in publicizing China's cooperative
progress, has released a great deal of up-to-date information
on the movement. The Western literature on the C.I.C. has appeared
mostly in popular sources, to which <i>The Bulletin of Far Eastern
Bibliography</i> issued by the Committees on Far Eastern Studies of the
American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, D. C., serves
as a useful guide. The writings of Edgar Snow are of special
value and vividness in treating this topic: articles in <i>Asia</i>, various
dates; "China's Blitzbuilder, Rewi Alley," <i>The Saturday Evening
Post</i>, Vol. 213, no. 32 (February 8, 1941); and his recent <i>The Battle
for Asia</i>, New York, 1941, which appeared as this work was completed
and sent to press. A convenient handbook is the anonymous
<i>The People Strike Back! or The Story of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives</i>,
Shanghai, (1939?).</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_6_163" id="Footnote_6_163"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_163"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> "The Movement in Action," <i>New Defense, A Journal of the
30,000 Industrial Cooperatives Movement in China</i> (Chungking)
Vol. I, no. 1 (April 1939), p. 5.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_7_164" id="Footnote_7_164"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_164"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> The China Information Committee, <i>News Release</i>, July 15, 1940.
The article and tables have been somewhat abridged. The cooperatives
spread so rapidly that figures are often obsolete before they are
tabulated.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_8_165" id="Footnote_8_165"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_165"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> "Model Constitution for Chinese Cooperative Societies, Revised
July 7th, 1940," The China Information Committee, <i>News Release</i>,
July 15, 1940.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_9_166" id="Footnote_9_166"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_166"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Nevertheless, the rural cooperative movement must be counted
in as having made some beginnings, despite the obstacles it has faced.
More than seventy thousand credit and marketing cooperatives were
in service last year. (The same, April 22, 1940.)</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_10_167" id="Footnote_10_167"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_167"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Wu Yi-fang and Price, Frank W., editors; New York, 1940.</p></div></div>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span></p>
<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;">
<img src="images/i_239fp.jpg" width="400" height="525" alt="Dr. Sun Yat-sen" />
<span class="caption"><i>Dr. Sun Yat-sen</i></span>
</div>
<hr class="chap" />
<h2><span class="smcap">Chapter IX</span><br />
SUN YAT-SEN AND CHIANG K'AI-SHEK</h2>
<p>The two highest offices in the Kuomintang are
<i>Tsung-li</i> (Leader) and <i>Tsung-ts'ai</i> (Chief). These
are occupied by Sun Yat-sen as Leader and Chiang
K'ai-shek as Chief. Sun Yat-sen, though he died on
March 12, 1925, holds the higher office in perpetuity.
So vast is his legacy to modern China that it exceeds full
enumeration: founder of the effective revolutionary
movement and Party, first practical republican, political
organizer of the modern and overseas Chinese, first
President of the Republic, and therefore officially
acknowledged State Founder, a drafter of the national
plan of modernization, author of the accepted ideology
(<i>San Min Chu I</i>), initiator of the Nationalist-Communist
entente and of the consequent Great Revolution,
promulgator of the Outline of National Reconstruction,
and posthumous patron of the National
Government. Keenly and devotedly an advocate of
democracy, Sun Yat-sen established by practical example
the principle of charismatic leadership. He most
certainly left a mantle. This is now, after years of
struggle, draped about the shoulders of Chiang K'ai-shek,
although Wang Ch'ing-wei retains a few threads
torn from the hem.</p>
<p>Sun Yat-sen was a leader in the sense that the great
religious and philosophical figures have been leaders.
He is not to be compared to Alexander, Genghis Khan,
Napoleon, or Hitler, but to Confucius, Gautama Buddha,
or Mohammed. Like the spiritual leaders he
blended profound humility and complete assurance.
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span>He knew that he was the savior of China, and knew it
long before anyone else did. He did not rely on rising
to power within a party, as did Lenin, or within a state,
as did Hitler. He created his own Party and his own
state. Had he not succeeded, he would have been
labelled a maniac; so would most of the other major
figures of human history, had they failed. His success,
whatever its future fortune, is already so immense that
it makes his sense of leadership seem modest. And
within the limits of success, he was very modest;
throughout life Sun remained more open-minded, ready
to consult, deferential to the opinions of others, and
more willing to yield power for the sake of harmony
than the majority of his compeers. This duality has
troubled some of his biographers. As late as 1939 an
anonymous Englishman published an attack on Sun,
which, missing the history of six decades, failed to note
that Sun had lived, had succeeded, and had died objectively
justified in his conception of himself.</p>
<p>Sun's example, unconsciously at variance with his
teachings, has left a strong Caesarian strain in practical
Chinese politics. Without Sun Yat-sen in the background,
it is altogether impossible to understand the
role played by Chiang, or to resolve the contradiction
between a state pledged to democracy and a leader over-loaded
with power. No group in China, except the
officials of Manchoukuo, disavows Sun Yat-sen: the
Japanophiles, the Nationalists, and the Communists all
claim to execute his will.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Sun Yat-sen</span></h3>
<p>Sun Yat-sen was born in Kwangtung Province, near
the Portuguese city of Macao. Although he was uncertain
of the date, the National Government has found
it to be November 12, 1866. Both his provincial and
class background had effect on his later life. The
Cantonese are among the most turbulent of Chinese,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span>
living at the southern edge of China and speaking a
dialect far different from the majority of the country.
Active, rebellious, enterprising, the Cantonese were disposed
to change. Sun's use of their tongue and knowledge
of their customs gave him an audience which both
suffered and profited by its distinctness. Sun's family
was certainly not of the gentry class, and yet not so
utterly poor that it lacked all profitable connections.
Otherwise his potentialities might have been thwarted
by ruinous poverty, disease, or early death.</p>
<p>In adolescence, Sun felt the stings and urges of resentment
driving him to reform and revolution. He
had kin who were involved in the T'aip'ing Rebellion
(1850-65), the vast peasant uprising which, under
Christian collectivist leadership by the Messianic Hung
Hsiu-ch'üan, swept North to the Yangtze and drowned
in a sea of blood less than two years before Sun's birth.
He thus had direct knowledge not merely of Chinese
revolt against the alien Manchu empire, but he knew
of the revolutionary technique of a religious leader.
The effect of this presumptive knowledge has never
been explored; it would explain a great deal in Sun's
career—much of the sharp enthusiasm, the use of
ecstatic slogans, the emphasis on will, his demands for
faith in himself—if one could know that he followed the
instance of a Chinese Joseph Smith or Brigham Young,
not that of a Chinese Mazzini or Marx. The other important
feature about his early life was Western education.<a name="FNanchor_1_168" id="FNanchor_1_168"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_168" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span></p>
<p>Western training gave him a channel upward which
the Confucian system had denied a hundred generations
of his predecessors. Patriots, rebels, reformers—these
have been sown by temperament and fortune
across the centuries of Chinese social existence, but
such potential heroes have been ploughed out or crippled
by the language and the examinations. No man could
command power—save in its transient forms: banditry,
conspiracy, commerce—without mastering the Confucian
canon. Once the intricate scholarship of the past
gripped him, the complex, beautiful, archaic language
of the mandarinate stopped up his mouth for plain
utterance. He was isolated from the people. Sun escaped
this by the use of the English language and the
command of Western science. He was par excellence the
great counter-ideologue, whose self-confidence and command
of men rested upon foundations beyond the ken
of his adversaries. Judge Linebarger wrote, on the
basis of what Sun told him:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Like a soldier who after long study and practice has at
length mastered the manual of arms so as to have complete
confidence in his weapons, Sun now began to feel at last
a confidence in his ability to show others the path of his
new wisdom, for, while thus enjoying a steady advance
under English tutelage in the ways of the foreigner, he was
by no means neglecting his study of Chinese politics, even
in the pressure of college work. He knew now that he
would have to lead out in the Great Reform. At Hong
Kong, Macao, and Canton he had college intimates, and
these he sought out as often as his college course would
permit.<a name="FNanchor_2_169" id="FNanchor_2_169"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_169" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p></blockquote>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span></p>
<p>Sun lived with his elder brother in Honolulu on two
occasions, and finally, after a period of discontent and
rising turbulence at home, went to study medicine in
Hong Kong. He was the outstanding student in the
school because of his already fluent command of the
English language,<a name="FNanchor_3_170" id="FNanchor_3_170"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_170" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> and was graduated as one of the
very first Chinese physicians to be trained in Western
medicine. Through their very nature, medical studies
impart to the student a sense of responsibility for others,
and also incline them toward the expert's indifference
to lay opinion. Throughout his life Sun never lost
confidence in the powers of his own reason, or in the
belief that, although difficult, it was both necessary
and possible to know the form and nature of social
no less than of biological processes, and to prescribe
remedies for an ill civilization as well as for a sick
man.</p>
<p>With traditional patriotism, a Cantonese background,
the memory of poverty, foreign training, and contact
with overseas China, Sun was already a marked man in
his twenties. By 1895 he was important enough for the
Imperial Chinese Legation in London to kidnap him,
preparing to charter a ship to return him to China,
where the torturers of the Board of Punishments waited.
In a <i>cause célèbre</i>, Sun was released; from then on he
had an international reputation.</p>
<p>His technique of revolution was little affected by the
growing proletarian parties of Europe. He adhered to
traditional Chinese methods, working through the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span>
consolidation of pre-existent secret societies, the recruitment
of terrorists, the launching of insurrection after
insurrection in the hope that one of them would catch
the waiting tinder and blaze across China. In Japan,
in America, and in Europe, he travelled, gathering
funds, carrying on vigorous polemics against his fellow-exiles,
the monarchist reformers. His followers were
organized under a variety of names, of which Kuomintang
is the last and best-known. By 1911 the revolution
broke out, flared sporadically across the central
and southern provinces, then lapsed into negotiations
between the Republicans and the Empire. Sun Yat-sen,
in America when the clash was precipitated, returned
home to be elected Provisional President of the Chinese
Republic, on January 1, 1912. But his revolution had
begun to pass into other hands. Opportunists, no rare
breed in China, leapt aboard the bandwagon, minimizing
the role of the Nationalists and grasping for the materials
of power: offices, guns and money, slogans. The
new-born Republic was taken over by the formidable
Yüan Shih-k'ai and converted into a pyramid of military
dictatorships; with Yüan's death the nation fell into
<i>tuchünism</i> and foreign meddling.</p>
<p>The years following were the saddest in Sun's life. He
headed miscellaneous governments in Canton, lived for
a while in Shanghai, and died at a fruitless unification
conference in Peking. In his last years, obsessed by his
clear realization of the evils which beset his country,
he was even derided. He saw the vast economic maladjustments
which would follow the World War, and
wrote a work, <i>The International Development of
China</i><a name="FNanchor_4_171" id="FNanchor_4_171"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_171" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> which in its grandeur anticipated the Five-Year
and Four-Year Plans; his idea was to finance a spectacular
modernization of China through public works
by a scheme of international loans. Not only would the
imports of capital goods have benefited the Western<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span>
powers, but the development of a prosperous China
would have provided the expansion necessary to support
an imperialist capitalism. His argument was that
international capitalism needed a market; China, one
fourth of humanity, provided a market; international
guarantees and supervision would make modernization
possible; and modernization, while building state-socialism
and the material basis of prosperity in China,
would have enriched capitalism throughout the world.
There is no evidence that anyone save his followers and
friends took his plan seriously.</p>
<p>The next step, in 1922, was a turning from capitalist
democracies, which had disappointed him, to a Russia
which professed a new justice in the world. Sun negotiated
with emissaries of the Third International, accepting
Red help on the clear understanding that Communism
was recognized, by him and by the Communists,
as unsuited to China—a proposition which
history calls into question. Only in his last stay in
Canton did he escape the ten-year pattern of frustration
which had been broken only by his happy second
marriage, to Soong Ching-ling. (The author, then a
small boy, remembers Sun in Shanghai as a man of
gentle kindness and rueful gaiety; Sun was never too
busy to speak to him, nor to remember little presents;
and in the midst of revolution Sun found time to write
a note of encouragement and good cheer.) With the
new allies, Sun, a dying man, went South, founded the
lineal predecessors of the Chungking government, called
his comrades to him, and discovered an effective military
helper—his first after Huang Hsing, dead in the
years of Yüan. This military aide was Chiang K'ai-shek.</p>
<p>Just before his death Sun made sixteen lectures, out
of a scheduled program of eighteen. He did not write
them, but they were transcribed and roughly edited.
In other years he had drafted monumental political<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span>
treatises; when the manuscripts were lost he did not
reconstruct them. The lectures, improvised, filled with
minor inaccuracies, incomplete arguments, and appeals
to immediate opinion, rank nevertheless among works
of political genius. They are sharp, stirring, pointed,
hopeful, concrete. They define China's position in the
world, and the goals of the Chinese revolution. They
adumbrate the reinforced democracy which was to come
and now fights for existence. And they prescribe an economic
philosophy humane beyond the dogma of the
Russo-German dialecticians and far more self-conscious
than the obstinate torpor of Coolidge's capitalism. Sun's
lectures are today the foundation of the Chinese state
philosophy, taught in all curricula, required in all examinations.
As the <i>San Min Chu I</i>, they form an ideology
with more legal adherents than Marxism and National
Socialism and Fascism combined. For democrats,
wherever they may be, this is a matter of importance,
bearing directly on the confused uncanalized
struggles of our time. China possesses a doctrine which
indefeasibly associates her independence, her democracy,
and her prosperity.</p>
<p>It would be a mistake to consider these lectures and
Sun's lesser writings the only source of Sun Yat-sen's
dogma. Since the government is in the hands of the
Kuomintang, and Kuomintang seniority depends largely
on closeness of association with Sun Yat-sen, Sun's personal,
casual, unconsidered influence on his friends
forms a vital background to state policy. Sun's American
biographer wrote,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Some criticize the <i>San Min Chu I</i>, because it seems to
them severe and lofty. To this I reply that there are things
other than what is written in the <i>San Min Chu I</i>. The
English and other nations have their laws, written and
unwritten. So too do we, the partisans of Sun Yat-sen, have
our laws, written and unwritten. And this unwritten law
is to us the dearer, is closer to our hearts, and is more moving
as the goal of our activity, than even the written
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span>commentaries. This unwritten law is for us, who, sitting at
his feet, received his teaching, the highest of all laws of
truth and fidelity, the law of <i>bona fides</i>.<a name="FNanchor_5_172" id="FNanchor_5_172"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_172" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p></blockquote>
<p>The continuing power of Sun Yat-sen is shown by the
prestige and power of his kin. Sun Yat-sen had two
families. Early in life, before his medical studies had
ended, he was married to a woman of his own class who
was devoted, family-loving, characteristically Chinese,
untouched by the West, and undisposed to revolution.
She bore him three children; the son, Dr. Sun K'ê,
was reared largely in the United States and has been an
important figure in Chinese politics ever since his return
to China from Columbia University. Successively
Mayor of Canton, Chairman of Kwangtung Province,
Minister of Communications, of Finance, and of Railways,
President of the Executive and of the Legislative
<i>Yüan</i>, he has served with distinction. A practical and
moderate man, he has always advocated a moderate, constitutional
application of his father's dogma, has espoused
full democratic government, stood for Party
abdication, and worked for national unity. One of his
sisters died young and the other married a gentleman
who was later Chinese Minister to Brazil. Mrs. Sun
Yat-sen, Sun K'ê's mother, lived to a ripe old age in
Macao. Charitable, pious, humane, she was an enthusiastic
Christian convert and a terror to sluggard
officials in that European outpost of vice. She took no
part in politics.</p>
<p>Sun Yat-sen's second family was acquired when he
married Miss Soong Ching-ling. After his defeat by
Yüan Shih-k'ai and the frustration of the first Republic,
Sun Yat-sen felt very much in need of a companion to
hearten him, help his work, and share his troubles.
He had been on very close terms with C. J. Soong, a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span>
Christian business man, and had asked Mr. Soong's eldest
daughter, Ai-ling, to act as his secretary. When Miss
Ai-ling Soong left, her sister succeeded her. Sun fell
genuinely and deeply in love with the beautiful, vivacious,
American-educated girl who understood his work
and desired to share his troubles. In all his life, it is
likely that Sun met no one more devoted to himself,
more understanding of what he sought from life and
from his work for China, than Ching-ling Soong. They
were married on October 15, 1915, in Japan, Sun Yat-sen
having provided for separation from his first wife.
The younger wife has since become world-famous as
Mme. Sun Yat-sen.</p>
<p>Ching-ling and Ai-ling Soong had a third sister,<a name="FNanchor_6_173" id="FNanchor_6_173"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_173" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>
May-ling, who married Chiang K'ai-shek after Ai-ling
had married H. H. K'ung. (Hence Chiang K'ai-shek's
closest family connection with Sun Yat-sen consists in
being brother-in-law to the second wife.) The three
Soong sisters thus married the two outstanding leaders
and another who stood just below. The Soong brothers
were less successful, although one, T. V. Soong, has
been a leading fiscal reformer and financial expert.</p>
<p>The beauty, American education, polished cosmopolitan
manners, and sense of publicity of the three
sisters have made them sensational news figures. Their
eldest brother's success has added distinction to this
family. The inescapable consequence has been a great
deal of speculation about the "Soong dynasty"; but
the surprising feature of the Soongs is not their fame
and power through marriage, plus ability, but their
slight cohesion as a Chinese family. They have stood
together only at times of highest crisis, and not always
then. Mme. Sun Yat-sen has continued along the Leftist<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span>
tangent which her husband followed just before he
died. For years she was the only Leftist in China who
did not fear death or a more painful fate. She kept
her ideals; from the homes of her family she wrote
scathing denunciations of the blood-soaked tyranny of
her brother-in-law, her sisters, her stepson, and her
brother. Mme. K'ung appears to have worked most
steadfastly in the interest of the entire family, although
rivalry between her brother and her husband has been
a matter of general report. Mme. Chiang K'ai-shek,
the youngest of the three sisters, has been a loyal wife
first of all, and has contributed enormously to the Generalissimo's
international prestige. No other modern
leader possesses an able publicity adviser, capable and
apt, so near to himself. The family relationships of
Sun Yat-sen thus display themselves in his son, constitutional
and moderate, who is inclined to favor Mme.
Sun, with Sun's sisters-in-law and brothers-in-law following
their respective political courses with their own
families—all on cordial political terms, but scarcely a
monolithic family bloc.</p>
<p>In addition to his doctrine, his Party, his followers,
and his family, Sun Yat-sen has bequeathed his name.
As Chung Shan, he fills the void in Chinese polity left
by the Emperor. Every Monday morning his will is
read, throughout every government office in the land.
His picture is seen everywhere. His sayings and slogans
have become the shibboleths of revolution, union, and
reconstruction. The reverence paid to him is a form
of secular worship, focussed upon a magnificent mausoleum
near the cenotaphs of the Ming Emperors on
Purple Mountain, Nanking. All virtues and most knowledge
are attributed to him; inescapably, some hard-headed
people react against the cult. Dead, he is to the
Chinese what the King is to the British, or the assembled
forefathers to the Americans, or—save partial
eclipse by Stalin—Lenin is to the Soviet Union. Perpetual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span>
leader of the Kuomintang, Sun has in death
more power than life vouchsafed him. In a world wild
with alarm and hungry for leadership, his sense of providential
mission and of terrible political urgency no
longer seems shrill or vain. His is the greatest of posthumous
satisfactions: vindication by history.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The San Min Chu I</span></h3>
<p>Out of the broad body of doctrine embodied in the
public and private utterances of Sun Yat-sen, one single
integrating philosophy stands forth, which entitles him
to rank as a major political thinker. This is the <i>San
Min Chu I</i>, which may be translated "three principles
of the people," "three principles of government for the
benefit of the people," "three principles concerning
people" and so forth, or may—most accurately—be represented
by the neologism, "tridemism."<a name="FNanchor_7_174" id="FNanchor_7_174"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_174" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> It consists
of an affirmation of a body of theory and a scheme of
programs to be applied generally to human experience,
and particularly to the modern problems of China.</p>
<p>The prime problem faced by Sun Yat-sen was displacement
of the Confucian ideology, long refreshed
and perpetuated by the mandarinate. (The scholastic
bureaucracy rested on the difficulty and character of the
language, which removed writing from speaking and,
lacking what Westerners commonly consider grammar,
depended upon exact, appropriate choice of terms.)
Confucius, anticipating semantic controversialists by
many centuries, established a doctrine of meaning
which made politics the by-product of correct speech
and thought, to be performed by conspicuous, informed,
and majestic persons. When ideas and ideals were clear,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span>
moral standards firm and visible, and demeanor correct—as
determined by archaic natural standards—the realm
would prosper. Education was stressed as a means to
public service. In succeeding centuries Confucians first
monopolized education, establishing the Confucian
classics as formal Chinese canons, and then monopolized
the bureaucracy. Providing for elementary circulation
of an academic elite, although economically based on
land-ownership, they gave China a modified sort of
representative government, which operated by the all-encompassing
constitutionalism of common sense itself,
and rested ultimately on the lack of an alternative to
common sense. The Confucians were intellectually indifferent
to natural science and economically unfriendly
to technological change; China, unsurpassed for political
sophistication and deliberate social order, was
immobilized by an ancient success. Ideological control
led to veneration of the scholar, even veneration of
writing. Emperors, officials, people—all were captive to
accomplishment, and so completely indoctrinated that
they presumably enjoyed a very high conscious freedom.
Rigid social and mental uniformity spelled political
laxity; the state became atrophied and vestigial.</p>
<p>Social rigidity made China only very slowly progressive
in mechanical terms. Political laxity made the
country weak in the face of invasion, exploitation, and
possible partition. Intellectual traditionalism shut off
stimuli available from the outside. Confucius had said,
"If terms be not correct, language is not in accordance
with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance
with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried
on to success."<a name="FNanchor_8_175" id="FNanchor_8_175"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_175" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> Sun Yat-sen, Confucian in spirit
though not in form, turned to the dynamics of ideological
rather than legal control. To stir the immense<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span>
lethargy of China, he substituted science for archaism;
a Party elite for the scholastic system, propaganda to
replace doctrinal education, and agitation to supersede
incantation and reverence.</p>
<p>He struck at ideas first: "We cannot say in general
that ideas, as ideas, are either good or bad. We must
judge whether, when put into practice, they prove useful
or not. If they are of practical use to us, they are
good; if they are impractical, they are bad. If they are
useful to the world, they are good; if they are not useful
to the world, they are not good."<a name="FNanchor_9_176" id="FNanchor_9_176"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_176" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> This pragmatic
utilitarianism was to be the philosophical foundation
of his revolution. The <i>San Min Chu I</i> therewith remained
alien to Marxism, which is dependent upon the
occult mysteries of a topsy-turvy Hegelianism; Sun's
thought is kin to the working philosophy of America,
a pragmatism tinctured by idealist vestiges.</p>
<p>The first political principle he developed was <i>Nationalism</i>
(<i>min ts'u</i>). The theoretical basis for this was
a racialism which, scientifically no more tenable than
National Socialist Aryanism, is clear in common practice.
Very few Chinese have trouble in identifying
another Chinese. Sun Yat-sen pointed out that although
the European peoples were divided, China was to him
both a race and a nation. He thereby established for
his followers a foundation for nationality more credible
than any mere appeal to state allegiance. Treason
against one's government is taken lightly in China:
witness the Japanophiles. Treason to the Chinese race
is a far more serious matter. In order to preserve the
Chinese race-nation, Sun Yat-sen called for ideological
reconstruction from three elements: ancient Chinese
morality, traditional Chinese social knowledge (e.g.,
bureaucratic techniques; arbitration instead of adjudication),
and Western physical science. He urged
a return to cosmopolitanism through nationalism. By<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span>
becoming strong—instead of extinct under alien colonial
rule—the Chinese state could lead the world back to
the old pacific cosmopolitanism of Eastern Asia.</p>
<p>Programmatically, Sun subsumed under his <i>min t'su</i>
theory, the necessity of a patriotic elite, formed into
the party of his followers, which was to unify China
and to cultivate a genuine state-allegiance instead of
the veneration of a concretely paramount Emperor
or other leader. He also advocated that China maintain
independence, make independence a reality in which
the entire race-nation should share by fostering actual
autonomy (hence, democracy), and by fighting defensively
against economic exploitation by the imperialist
powers.</p>
<p>The second principle presented was <i>Democracy</i> (<i>min
ch'üan</i>). He pointed out that old China was democratic
in allowing considerable social mobility, and much
equality within the framework of that mobility, and
that popular government was a reality in local affairs,
while popular supremacy (corresponding to Western
theories of popular sovereignty) followed from the universally
admitted Chinese right of rebellion. He justified
democracy on the grounds that it was commanded
by China's antique sages, was necessarily consequent
upon nationalism, was decreed by the <i>Zeitgeist</i>, was
necessary to good administration, and was a modernizing
force. But he modified his democracy by a distinction
between <i>ch'üan</i> (power) and <i>nêng</i> (ability), keeping
government and people perpetually dual, and making
the problem of democratic personnel one of popular
choice plus the control of popular choice. The programs
of democracy involved the revolution of three
stages, the five-<i>yüan</i> government, and emphasis on the
<i>hsien</i>.<a name="FNanchor_10_177" id="FNanchor_10_177"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_177" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p>
<p>The third principle is based on Sun Yat-sen's own
philosophy of history. <i>Min shêng</i>, frequently<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span>
translated "the principle of the people's livelihood," rested
upon Sun Yat-sen's belief that history is not based exclusively
on materialism and that it cannot be analyzed
merely in terms of the ownership of the means of production.
He insisted that history was based on the
fundamental fact that man has <i>jên</i>—humane self-awareness;
human fellow-sympathy; consciousness of being
located in society, together with orientation by values
social, not individually or materially established; benevolence.
<i>Min shêng</i> is accordingly an ethical doctrine
first, and an economic one afterward. It is the basis of
history (<i>min-shêng wei li-shih-ti chung-hsin</i>). It presupposes,
for China: (1) a national economic revolution
against imperialism and for democracy; (2) an industrial
revolution for the enrichment of China; and (3) a
prophylactic against social revolution. Although showing
the influence of Karl Marx, Henry George, and
the modern American, Maurice William,<a name="FNanchor_11_178" id="FNanchor_11_178"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_178" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> the doctrine
remained Chinese in spirit, pragmatically collectivist in
application. Under the programs of <i>min shêng</i> Sun included
the bold projects for which he had sought all
his life, desiring the independent, socially just prosperity
of his country.</p>
<p>These doctrines form the constitutional foundation
of government action, as well as being the Party credo
of the Kuomintang. Whoever proposes policy in China
must first square it with the <i>San Min Chu I</i>. In this
the Generalissimo has combined adroitness with profound
sincerity.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chiang K'ai-shek</span></h3>
<p>Despite a small shelf of biographies, Chiang K'ai-shek
remains a personality above and behind the news,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span>
not in it. His former teacher and present publicity adviser,
Hollington Tong, has written an authorized life,
clear, detailed, and well expurgated. The celebrated
Sven Hedin published a study of Chiang; virtues, but
not specific personality stood forth. An able American
newspaperman had recourse to his files, and some Chinese
admirers sketched an incredibly soft, lovely picture:
the background was clarified, but not Chiang.
Two world-famous reporters, trained to epitomize a life
or a nation in a double column or sharp review, failed
to grasp Chiang. He eludes everyone.</p>
<p>Part of the trouble comes from the fact that he possesses
virtues which, once lauded, are now suspected
of being mythical, wheresoever they occur. Frederick the
Great, George Washington, Julius Caesar in his careerist
years—authentic in history, as contemporaries these
leaders would strike the moderns as characters inflated
or incredible. Sincerity has become consistency with
one's source of income; persons who fail to fit into the
accepted moral and intellectual types of Western industrialist
society are labelled fakes. One is a gentleman-liberal,
an intellectual-liberal, a capitalist, a picturesque
<i>native</i>, a war-lord sinister, obscene, cruel, and
criminal—one fits such a type, and if one doesn't, one
does not exist. Yet Chiang exists, and is thereby suspect
to a host of commentators. Sun Yat-sen as First President
was an acceptable news figure; as Saint of the
Great Revolution he became vulnerable. When Chiang
seems neither a general nor a reactionary, he bewilders
many Westerners.</p>
<p>Within China, Chiang is more readily grasped. In
any other age, he would be the founder of a new dynasty.
The establishers of Imperial houses have, as a group,
combined intense vigor with a flair for the disreputably
picturesque, in turn qualified by the highly respectable
associates they sought out after success. Several have
been bandits; one was an unfrocked Buddhist priest.
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span>For vigor and a timely libertarianism, they compare
favorably with the Claudian line. Today the Dragon
Throne is irrecoverably remote; the Manchoukuoan
Emperor Kang Tê lacks elementary plausibility. Chiang
is far too wise, far too modern in his own motivations,
to wish or dare dream of Empire. Upon him has descended
grace of a new kind, the charismatic halo of Sun
Yat-sen. His reputation can be carved in the most enduring
of materials: indefeasible history. With a son who is
a Bolshevik, a little Eurasian grandchild, and an
adopted son of no high merit, Chiang does not face
the problem of power-bequeathal. He has power now;
it matters little where power goes after his death; the
value to him lies in immediate use.</p>
<p>Assuming even an abnormal egocentrism, Chiang—at
the apex of state—is above ambition; he has no welfare
but that of the state. In fact, Chiang is a man of
almost naively insistent morality. Even Westerners act
on the stage of today with posterity as an audience; Chinese,
state-building, moral, Chiang moves under the
glare of his perpetual reputation. As in the case of
Sun, his sense of leadership would be maniacal if not
grounded on fact; but what assumption would not?
A peanut-vendor who thinks he is the King of Egypt
is crazy; Farouk is not therefore crazy because King
of Egypt. If Chiang were not the leader of China, he
would be mad; but he, and he alone, is leader. His
humility begins with the assumption of his power.</p>
<p>Twenty-one years the junior of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang
was born in 1888 in Chekiang province.<a name="FNanchor_12_179" id="FNanchor_12_179"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_179" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> His family<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span>
was of a class intermediate between the truly eminent
landlord-official or merchant families, and the farmers.
They had been farmers, but also minor gentry, and
had been connected with the salt-revenue system. His
grandfather attained considerable renown as a scholar,
but Chiang's own father died when Chiang was eight
years of age. The child had few special advantages. His
family background is one which is of common occurrence
among political leaders; his widowed mother,
mastering and managing for the family, inculcated a
sharp morality, an unrelenting frugality, and a persistent
drive of industriousness in her children. To
such a person, who rises from poverty and hardship by
his own efforts, the failure of others to do likewise
becomes a personal problem. By his own case he has
proved that opportunities are there. He is impatient
with the poor, the stupid, or the shiftless; instead of re-arranging
society to give them a chance, he expects them
to improve themselves to meet existing realities. Chiang
has not explicitly stated all these points; many of them
are qualified by the fact that the <i>status quo</i> in modern
China is the <i>status quo</i> of perpetual revolution.</p>
<p>Leftist commentators, dubbing Chiang a combined
product of landlordism, compradore class, and criminal
gangs, explain him through a mystagogic economic
determinism. Actually, Western impress on Chiang is
of a more special nature: Western religion, and Western
warfare. The ideals which animate him, and determine—so
far as these are visible—his own sense of values,
are concepts and attitudes extraneous to the Chinese
scene. Deduct the threaded recurrency of religion, and
the sense of technique from military training, and
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span>Chiang could be paired with many other modern Chinese
leaders—soldiers of turmoil, administrators of the
<i>ad interim</i>, complacent leaders of hypothetical groups.
He and Sun stand out because each had a Western
technique so thoroughly mastered that it gave him a
clear competence over other men: Sun, the physician;
Chiang, the strategist. Each also had a Western moral
drive which turned hungrily to the past and justified
itself in Chinese antiquity: Sun, the all-around Christian,
who professed and denied the churches alternately
throughout life, and Chiang, the Bible-quoting Methodist,
both cite the Confucian canons; both esteem the
Chinese ethics; both discern the forcefulness of Western
spirituality.</p>
<p>Leadership, plus technical power, plus alien moral
reinforcement, spells preeminence. The Confucians
have gone; the serene mandarins are dead. Methodist
soldiers, Baptist bankers—such Chinese control China.
Marxism, which by combining jargon and act of faith,
is both religion and erudition, unites these ideocratic
forces; Wang Ming can feel that he is a scientist analyzing
society with peculiar objectivity, and he can feel
morally gratified at the same time. Chiang and the
Nationalist leaders keep such sustenance dual.</p>
<p>The special religious background came to him
through his mother. Women have traditionally turned
to Buddhism for piety in China, and Mrs. Chiang was
one of the exceptional characters who combined intense
hard work with great piety. The children grew with
the infinite looming over them; every misstep meant
thousands upon thousands of years of hopeless, damnable
rebirth. Buddhism can match the Christian, "It
is a fearefull thing to fall into the hands of the living
God ...,"<a name="FNanchor_13_180" id="FNanchor_13_180"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_180" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> with the even more fearful doom of life
in a world which does not want to live. Buddhism,
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span>socially, goes about in circles; the Mahayana sect provides
a qualified kind of salvation, but not the salvation
which a determined man can wring bloody-handed
out of circumstance itself. The discipline, the austerity,
were ready; Christianity, when it came to him, fell on
plowed and waiting ground. The other instinct of
ascendancy was cultivated by his education: professionalism.
His life falls into three stages after childhood:
education; wasted years; and the mastery and use of
power.</p>
<p>Chiang went to the Imperial Military Academy at
Paotingfu. Aloof and ambitious, he was so successful
that within a year he was sent to the Shinbo Gokyo
(Preparatory Military Academy) in Tokyo; he remained
in Japan four years. The Japanese under whom
he studied retained no special impression of him, except
that he eagerly accepted discipline. As a part of
his study, he served with the 13th Field Artillery (Takada)
Regiment of the Imperial Army. Chiang therewith
acquired not merely military knowledge, but a
working insight into Japanese language, mentality, and
strength.</p>
<p>His military studies were terminated by the outbreak
of the Republican Revolution in 1911. Chiang returned
to Shanghai, and began a vigorous military
career under the local military commander, pro-Sun
in politics. Chiang himself had come into contact with
the Republican-Nationalist group while in Japan.
There was already no question of where his loyalties
lay. He made rapid progress, and saw something of
fighting. He took part in the abortive Second Revolution,
of 1913, which was the military attempt by Sun
Yat-sen and his first military coadjutant, Huang Hsing,
to check Yüan Shih-k'ai and to save the newborn Republic
by force. In this time, while the enthusiasm of
his military studies had not yet worn off, Chiang wrote
prodigiously. No Westerner has, so far as the present<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span>
author knows, taken the trouble to go through Chiang's
writings in order to study him. Chinese commentators
praise them as full of military acumen, a sense of the
novel and important forces in Chinese society, and a
vigorous moralism—modern-military in form, but archaic
in language—which animated Chiang's youthful
desire to improve the world with good, technically
apt gunfire. He was at this time twenty-three or twenty-four.</p>
<p>Between this early career and the later years of
Chiang's life—the years in which his star rode incessantly
ascendant—there is a gap of several years, 1913 to
1918. In this time Chiang lived a life primarily civilian,
although he remained under the patronage of his first
military leader, General Chen Ch'i-mei, murdered in
1915. Chiang went on a military intelligence trip for
the Sun Yat-sen group, travelling through Manchuria
in 1915. He opposed Yüan's moves, and stayed in close
contact with the patriotic organization. Yet, the total
picture of his life in these years lacks the connecting
linkage which binds his childhood, his school days, and
his mature career. His activity, while considerable, was
diffuse.</p>
<p>He went down to Canton in 1918, and fought under
the command of Sun Yat-sen, with the inferior troops
and hopeless expeditions which the Leader, politically
adept but strategically inexpert, kept throwing against
the confusion of the <i>tuchün</i> wars, with the result that
the war-lords, counting him as another element in their
balance of power, did not even set up a united front
against him. Chiang, a Central Chinese, was unsympathetic
to the intense provincialism of the Cantonese,
and was hopelessly tactless in criticizing old-type soldiers
upon whom Sun then relied. Disillusioned but still
loyal, he went back to Shanghai and wrote letters of
advice to his friends in the South, including Dr. Sun.
Throughout this time he was simply one more among<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span>
the dozens of bright young military men who were, in
the existing crudity of warfare, unneeded in China.
(Chu Tê, Chiang's present colleague and rival who
heads the Soviet Chinese military system, was at this
time besotted in Yünnan—a petty war-lord of landlord
family, trapped hopeless on his little island of power
amidst ruin.)</p>
<p>The period in the Shanghai years was filled in with
business activity. Chiang was acquainted with some of
the most influential merchants of the city, among them
the crippled Chang Ching-chiang, a Paris merchant
whose personal wealth was an informal treasury of
Sun's movement. Chiang entered brokerage, and is
supposed to have made a great deal of money. He became
acquainted with the modernized, Westernized
young Chinese of the metropolis, and left many friends
behind him among the Chinese business men and industrialists.</p>
<p>Speculative or unfriendly writers asseverate that
Chiang joined the Green Gang, an association which
combined the features of a protection racket and a
benevolent society. (Such a society, common in China
during periods of disturbance, is the archetype of the
American-Chinese Tong [<i>tang</i>] in its more violent
phases.) If so, membership gave Chiang the key to an
underworld as well organized as François Villon's Paris,
wherein beggars, thieves, pickpockets, kidnappers, labor
contractors, burial societies, and legitimate associations
merged under the extra-legal government of a Masonic-like
hierarchy. (The author is acquainted with a Chinese
League of Nations official who joined the Gang
as a necessary implement of social research, and was
afforded genuine courtesy in preparing a report, general
but accurate as to prevailing conditions, through the
assistance of his fellow-members.)</p>
<p>Chiang's marriage, which had been made Chinese-fashion
in his late boyhood, had given him posterity—a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span>
son, now the pro-Communist, Soviet-trained Major-General
Chiang Ching-kuo—but little companionship.
His wife and son remained most of the time at his native
home, whence he returned to see them and his mother,
at Fenghua in Chekiang. Social contacts, acquaintance
with capitalism, looseness of family connections, spasmodic
work for the Revolution, and some military
work—this, combined with the making and the losing
of a fortune, fill the early maturity of Chiang.</p>
<p>He appeared upon the national and the world scene
by his selection in 1923 to go to Moscow under the terms
of the Nationalist-Soviet understanding, there to receive
military training. He had definitely cast in his lot with
Sun Yat-sen, making soldiery his vocation, and the selection
implied that Sun began to see in him a military
aide, to replace Huang Hsing of the first revolution.
Chiang spent four months in the Soviet Union. The
Communists, whom he was to fight six years later,
showed him their combination of political and military
warfare applied in Trotsky's Red Army. Chiang,
already the beneficiary of Japanese training, had found
Japanese military science dependent upon the framework
of a stable constitutional system. In China his
earlier training had been superior to its environment
and did not have the practical utility of five years'
banditry. Chiang, professional by spirit, restless under
the drive of conscience and ambition, now found in
Moscow the intermediate steps between modern warfare
and government-building. He found that an army,
from being the tool of pre-existing order, could become
the spearhead of an accompanying order. Returning
to China via the Trans-Siberian Railroad, he
met General Galens (Vassili Bluecher), later his chief
Soviet military aide at Canton.</p>
<p>In Canton, the first military creation on Soviet models
was the Whampoa (<i>Huangpu</i>) Academy. Decreed by
Sun Yat-sen, who made Chiang chief, the Academy had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span>
Soviet advisers, eager to instill revolutionary and civil-war
techniques. Chiang began the development of a
modern army, and the real accretion of his own power.
Even before he commanded full armies, Chiang used
his cadets to good purpose in actual combat.</p>
<p>From this point on, Chiang's career becomes a part
of the military history of the revolution. In his earlier
years of power, Chiang emerged to leadership by cooperating
with various intra-Kuomintang groups. He
stood with the Left and utilized the Communists, although
he managed to provoke, suppress, and appease
the Communists in a way which no one else managed.
He led the victorious Northern Expedition in 1925-27,
carrying his forces on the crest of the Great Revolution.
He was little known, but seen to be ambitious, zealous,
incalculable, and a political strategist of ruthless genius.
He soon found himself one of the triumvirate of Sun
Yat-sen's successors: Hu Han-min, the Right Kuomintang
leader, editor of Sun's works; Chiang; and Wang
Ch'ing-wei, the Left Kuomintang leader.</p>
<p>At Shanghai, in 1927, Chiang's troops turned suddenly
against the Communists and Left groups, quenching
the uprising which had taken the city under his
flag. This coup was undertaken because Chiang felt
that the Communists were outrunning their promises.
The Soviet advisers, who had come to help the Nationalists,
had professed their concern for China's
national struggle, and for the desirability of a fight
against imperialism. They had not told Sun himself
that he was a mere precursor to the proletarian revolution,
nor informed the Nationalists that they were being
given the privilege of fighting a war to advance the
historical necessity of Nationalist extinction, as the next
step in China's dialectic progression. Trotsky talked
openly in Moscow about overthrowing the Chinese
revolutionaries, and hijacking the Chinese revolution
with the Chinese Communists, while Stalin believed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span>
in appeasing the Nationalists longer before discarding
them. Of this Chiang was fully aware, and he struck
at the sources of Communist power, labor and peasant
unions, using a ruthlessness comparable to theirs. He
went further, establishing the National Government (in
the five-power form) at Nanking, and leaving the Left
Kuomintang uneasily in the company of the Communists
at Hankow. When the Communists proceeded
to debate the question of monopolizing the remnants,
even the Left-Kuomintang had had enough. They
suppressed the Communists, and dissolved, coming down
river to Nanking and joining the new government,
while Chiang stepped technically out of the picture
to ease the healing of the schism. Chiang's legitimacy
in the leadership of the Kuomintang and the Sun Yat-sen
revolution is shown by the fact that within two years
he had an overwhelming majority of the veteran Kuomintang
leaders at his capital.</p>
<p>In the ensuing years Chiang dedicated himself to
three tasks: the development of the National Government,
the stabilization of his own power, and the
modernization of the country, both moral and mechanical.
In 1927 he had married Miss May-ling Soong,
and brought himself into alliance with the influential
Soong family. The success of his efforts is attested by
the continued functioning of a National Government at
Chungking, the resistance and unification of China,
which Chiang has come to symbolize, and the stalemate
of Japan. These things would have appeared in some
form, even without Chiang, but they would probably
not exist with their present clarity and strength. The
ten years of armament, modernization, and Japan-appeasement
built an area into a nation, changing one
more government into an elementary national state.</p>
<p>The Generalissimo has changed in appearance and
manner considerably in the past ten years; these changes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span>
seem to have immediate bearing on his political role.
In 1931 he was unmistakably the first soldier of China—brusque,
forthright, sharp-voiced, and dismayingly lacking
in the devious but pleasant <i>k'ê-ch'i</i> (ceremonial
politeness) which is carried to professional heights by
Chinese officials. Even then he was a masterful and
clear-willed sort of man, who upset political precedents
by a directness which would have been naive were it not
so obviously both self-conscious and sincere. He possessed
a keen awareness of his own historical importance,
and a consistent responsibility before history—which
still animates him—was the result. When coupled with
the regular exercise of authority, this trait may have
the consequence of moderating arbitrariness and minimizing
opportunism.</p>
<p>With Chiang's self-possession there went an impatience
with opposing views, a carelessness of means
in the face of ends, and a fanatical insistence on loyalty.
He now seems little older in body, despite the injury
to his back during the Sian episode, but the years have
left a very clear impress on his moral character. To
the sharp discipline and authority of the soldier he has
added the characteristics of a teacher—reserved kindliness,
a daily preoccupation with moral questions, an
inclination to harangue his followers on the general
meaning of their problems. Ten years ago it was very
difficult to find out what Chiang really believed and
wanted; his ambition and patriotism were both patent,
but beyond them there was little detail to be filled
in. He is beginning to have the relationship of, let
us say, Lenin to Marx in his treatment of the <i>San Min
Chu I</i> of Sun Yat-sen, and is beginning to stand forth
as an interesting political theorist in his own right. He
gives every indication of maturing in office, and of rising
in stature in proportion to the responsibilities which
are thrust upon him.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span></p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chinese Appraisals of Chiang</span></h3>
<p>Among both official and unofficial circles in Chungking
there is a widespread and apparently well-founded
belief that the two critical points of China's resistance
and continued national independence rest more on
Chiang's life, activity, and support than on any other
single man or institution. These points are, of course,
the domestic armistice and the promotion of resistance
and reconstruction. The enormous strains which collaboration
imposes on Nationalists and Communists
are borne by Chiang. The finesse necessary to keep regions,
classes, and groups in line, would probably not
be available if the Generalissimo were dead. It is a
tribute to his associates and followers of all parties that
they work with him and with each other, but at the
same time it is the supreme accomplishment of Chiang
to have developed so that he can personify unity.</p>
<p>A question which the writer put to almost everyone
he met in Western China was, "What do you think
of Chiang? And what do you think Chiang thinks of
himself?" The answers varied in tone and detail, but
showed an interesting unanimity in major stress. One
of the National Salvationist leaders,<a name="FNanchor_14_181" id="FNanchor_14_181"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_181" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> bitter about
Chiang's high-handed repression of Left-liberal movements
in pre-war years, replied "Impossible!" to the
question, "From your point of view, could General
Chiang become an outright dictator?" But this leader
explained that Chiang differed from President George
Washington in that the latter's own conception of his
role was in close harmony with public expectation and
governmental necessity, whereas Chiang—believing in
democracy as a part of his loyalty to his leader, Dr.
Sun, and to the <i>San Min Chu I</i>—found himself unready
to trust democratic processes in really vital issues.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span></p>
<p>The critic continued by adding that the difference
between Sun and Chiang was to be found in the fact
that the former, whatever his impatience, let the Plenary
Session of the C.E.C. of the Kuomintang reach its
decisions through discussion, whereas Chiang tried to
help the committee decide by lecturing at it. He concluded
thus: if there were no political group other
than the Kuomintang, Chiang might become a dictator
in fact while remaining a democratic leader in name.
The presence of other parties and groups makes this difficult,
if not impossible. For example, the Kuomintang
might try to apply the new constitution in such a way
as to prevent its being an additional step on the road
to democracy; but the other groups, including the Communists,
could thwart this move by refusing to take
part in any of the constitutional ceremonies, and thereupon
[in the traditional Chinese fashion] discredit the
whole thing. These opinions are of special interest
when one considers that they stem from a group which
is still suffering from a very careful police supervision
and a state of non-recognition and semi-repression.</p>
<p>Another interesting interpretation of Generalissimo
Chiang's role is found among the Communists. One
of the Chinese Communist leaders<a name="FNanchor_15_182" id="FNanchor_15_182"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_182" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> had the question
put to him, "On what long-range basis of practical
politics can you people and the Generalissimo cooperate?
After all, you must be consolidating power which
can be used against him and he power which can be
turned against you?" He replied that if Chiang made
terms with the Japanese, or if he failed to resist, the
Communists would need to have nothing to do with
him, nor he with them, since he would be ruined in
any case. On the other hand, if the war came to a successful
end, Chiang would be the supreme hero of
modern China; the Communists could not turn against<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span>
him; and Chiang knew this well enough to know that
if he defeated Japan he had won China. The commentator
did not explore other obvious possibilities, such
as a long stalemate in the Japanese war, or a shift in
Soviet policies, but what he said indicates the present
reality of the common interests between the Communists
and the Generalissimo.</p>
<p>From these and other comments, the visitor to China
soon learns that although Chiang is the Chief (<i>Tsung-ts'ai</i>)
of the Kuomintang, his power rests as much on
broad national support as it does on Party power. It
is significant that although Chiang still has two groups
of semi-secret protective police, one Party and the other
Army, he has far less occasion to use them than he
did five years ago. There is an inadequacy of due
process, of course, which would strike the lay American
as critically unsatisfactory, but the smoothness,
evenness, and relative frankness of government is far
greater than at any other time in modern China.</p>
<p>Democracy is obtaining some real beginnings, not
because of a sudden lurch in political necessity, nor because
of the charm of a theory, but because the firm
ground of a common opinion is knitting the country
together and affording the limits indispensable to the
functioning of democratic techniques; this common
opinion, the universal popularity of the war, is based on
the resistance-and-reconstruction policy. The same patriotic
surge which supports the war supports Chiang,
as the hero and chief technician of the war.</p>
<p>The political changes which translated Chiang from
the status of a Party leader and a new kind of militarist
into a real national leader are mirrored in his writings.
His published political works now run to a considerable
number of volumes, representing collections of his
speeches and essays.<a name="FNanchor_16_183" id="FNanchor_16_183"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_183" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> It would, perhaps, be interesting<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span>
to note the main trends of his political philosophy, since
it serves as the firm ground of his policy. It is possible
that no other leader in the world, except Stalin, has
satisfied himself so thoroughly with the connection between
his own epistemological and ethical presuppositions
and his working conclusions in terms of action
as has Chiang.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Ideology of Chiang</span></h3>
<p>First and foremost, Chiang accepts the <i>San Min Chu
I</i> of Sun Yat-sen, deviating from the letter of these doctrines
by no single brush-stroke. In his spirit of interpretation,
he follows in general the Rightist exegeses,
as represented by the works of Hu Han-min and T'ai
Ch'i-t'ao, although he has developed his own conclusions
in great part from his first-hand memory of Dr.
Sun, and from his own experience. (Needless to say,
he is worlds apart from the interpretations given by such
Leftists as the Communists, the Third Party, or Mme.
Sun, or such ultra-Rightists as the Japanophiles.)</p>
<p>Secondly, he has found the pragmatic elements of
Sun's philosophy highly palatable. Apart from his public
life, he has always made a fetish of action, and has
stood for getting something done. His orthodox but
modified Sunyatsenism and his practicality can best be
shown by excerpts from a recent essay of his which
states his position.<a name="FNanchor_17_184" id="FNanchor_17_184"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_184" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> One notes the stress on practicality,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span>
the Christian influence in the matter of love, and the
opinions of Communism, Fascism, and Democracy:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In order to make a scientific study of any subject it is
best to use the analytical, deductive and inductive methods.
By applying this principle to the study of the <i>San Min Chu
I</i>, I have made a chart showing its system and working
procedure.... In order to realize his ideas, Sun invented
the most complete and the most practical political principles,
the <i>San Min Chu I</i>. At the present there are mainly
three schools of political thought, namely, Democracy so-called,
Communism, and Fascism. None of them is perfect.
For instance, take Communism. It attaches enough importance
to the economic side of life and resembles the
Principle of Livelihood, but it ignores the ideas embodied in
the Principles of Nationalism and Democracy. Furthermore,
it considers the economic interests of only one class of people,
and not of all. The Fascist school stresses only those ideas
as embodied in the Principle of Nationalism and ignores
the other two principles. Besides, it ignores the interests
and welfare of other nationalities. So-called Democracy
is too much involved with capitalism and can hardly solve
the problems of <i>min shêng</i>. The Three Principles of Sun
are different from these in that they originate from the
idea that <i>the world belongs to the public</i>. His aim is to
bring about the real equality of the people without any
distinction of classes, religion, and occupations. After this
is realized in China, it is expected that the equality of all
nationalities in the whole world can be brought about by
means of the spirit of mutual help and sincere cooperation.</p>
<p>Of all the common human feelings, the sentiment of
nationality is the most worthy one. The Principle of Nationalism
is based on this point. Laws specifically define
the popular responsibilities and privileges which underlie
the Principle of Democracy. And lastly, in Livelihood,
each man's reasoning power is used to advantage in working
out the most rational way of distribution, whereby
people will be put in an equitable position economically.
Thus it can be seen that the Three Principles are very
adaptable to China as well as to any other nation.</p>
<p>As I outline above, Sun, starting with the Principle of
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span><i>people's livelihood</i> and embodying the idea that <i>the world
belongs to the public</i>, established the <i>San Min Chu I</i>. But
just having a Principle won't do; a motive power is needed
to fulfill it. That power is revolution....</p>
<p>Revolution is not an easy thing. It needs a very strong
driving force to carry it out. What are the driving forces
in the case of the Chinese revolution? They are wisdom,
love, and courage. I wish to point out specially that the
second factor is the most important. "Love" means, among
other things: Save your country, even at the cost of your
life!</p>
<p>Let us define more fully the meanings of these three
words. Wisdom means, how to understand Love. It also
means: first, wide reading; second, care in your inquiries;
third, careful thinking; fourth, the power of distinguishing
right and wrong. By Love is meant loyalty, filial piety,
faithfulness, and peace. Courage means the determination
to do what is right. Besides, what is the most important
is the need for persistence, without which nothing can be
accomplished.</p>
<p>When you have the virtues of Wisdom, Love and Courage
and the persistence required, the next move is to start and
work. Sun told us that it is hard to know and easy to do.
If you study the <i>San Min Chu I</i> carefully and yet don't do
what is required of you, it is not because you can't do it, but
because you won't do it. If you just won't do it, you are not
a faithful disciple of the <i>San Min Chu I</i>.</p>
<p>When you are to start the revolutionary work, you must
have a Party, because in a Party all the revolutionary forces
can be consolidated and all the revolutionary activities can
be planned and directed....</p></blockquote>
<p>The character of Chiang as a political leader which
emerges from his military training, his successful marriage
and even more successful jockeying for power,
his maturity under the influence of that power, and his
somewhat crude but austere recognition of responsibility,
is quite different from the portraits drawn by
the coastal diehards or by Leftists. To the former he
is just another Asiatic swashbuckler who conceals murder
and extortion behind orotund banality; to the latter
he is a sort of Franco, supinely cooperative with
Anglo-American imperialism because of his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span>
compradore-class mentality, who faces a last chance of dialectical
salvation if he yields to the Chinese Communists in
their version of democracy and promotes upper-class
liquidation in war time. It is likely that he will break
the limits of either attempt to define him, and will—if
the war succeeds—play a distinctly Chinese part in
the construction of a China which, by reason of the
speed of technological progress coupled with the rising
extent of governmental economics, will break through
the ruinous Right-Left pattern of Western politics.
Chiang probably has enough awareness of Chinese history
to realize that as the founder of an enduring democratic
system his prestige would exceed that obtainable
by any process of dictatorship. If he becomes a dictator,
he will have successors; but as first President of a real
democracy, he would be eternally unique, and as <i>de
facto</i> founder of a great power, a world figure for this
century. Against his desire to let democracy grow beneath
his military aegis, his conservatism of habit and
his anxiety to get things done right continue to militate;
but there is thirteen years' evidence to show that he has
tried very hard to work within the limits of the constitutional
system of the National Government, has
avoided arbitrariness as much as he thought possible,
and has at worst behaved like a Salazar, Atatürk, or
Pilsudski.</p>
<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_168" id="Footnote_1_168"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_168"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Sun Yat-sen</i> is the Cantonese pronunciation of <i>Sun I-hsien</i>, just
as <i>Chiang K'ai-shek</i> is that of <i>Chiang Chieh-shih</i>. Both men first
acquired their world reputations under this pronunciation, which has
become standard in English. According to Chinese custom, one's given
name is used only by one's elders; consequently Sun Yat-sen has been
referred to, by his grateful followers, by his "courtesy name" Wên,
which is the name by which one refers to one's elder. In addition,
he is referred to by another special name which he took for conspiratorial
work, Chung-shan (allusive to an ancient hero), or by his
title—as <i>Tsung-li</i> or <i>Sun Tsung-li</i>, much as we refer to President
Wilson rather than to Woodrow Wilson. Sun was known most widely in
life as Sun Wên; Chiang is most commonly mentioned as Chiang
Chung-chêng. The question of names is extensively discussed in
the biographies of the two leaders, cited below.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_2_169" id="Footnote_2_169"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_169"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Linebarger, Paul [M. W.], <i>Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Republic</i>,
New York and London, 1925, p. 176; this is the authorized life of
Sun Yat-sen, written much as he wished it. The standard critical
biography is Sharman, Lyon, <i>Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning</i>,
New York, 1934. Sun Yat-sen also wrote a number of short autobiographies,
some of which are deliberately inexact. Western language
material on Sun is surveyed in an annotated bibliography appended
to the present author's <i>The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen</i>, Baltimore,
1937, p. 265 <i>ff.</i> A work which has since appeared is "Sagittarius,"
<i>The Strange Apotheosis of Sun Yat-sen</i>, London, 1939.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_3_170" id="Footnote_3_170"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_170"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Statement to the author by Wên Chung-yao, President of the
Legislative <i>Yüan</i> of the Reorganized National Government of Wang
Ch'ing-wei, at Nanking, September 5, 1940. Dr. Wên was a classmate
of Dr. Sun at Queen's College.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_4_171" id="Footnote_4_171"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_171"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> New York, 1922; reissue, 1929.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_5_172" id="Footnote_5_172"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_172"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Linebarger, Paul Myron, <i>Mes Mémoires Abrégés sur les Révolutions
de Sun Yat-sen</i>, Paris, 1938, p. 194. Paragraphing deleted in
translation from the French.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_6_173" id="Footnote_6_173"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_173"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> In the case of Chinese names which are commonly transliterated
in an Americanized form, the Western name-order is preserved. According
to standard Sinological practice, the three sisters are Sung
Ai-ling, Sung Ch'ing-ling, and Sung Mei-ling; their famous brother
(T. V. Soong) is Sung Tzŭ-wên.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_7_174" id="Footnote_7_174"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_174"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> d'Elia, Paschal M., S. J., <i>The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen</i>,
Wuch'ang, 1931, p. 36-49, gives an exhaustive analysis of possible
translations. Stylistically, the term should be given <i>San Min Chu I</i>
as a classical title; <i>san-min chu-i</i> as a noun; and <i>san-min-chu-i</i> when
used as an adjective. The first form alone is followed because of its
wide currency.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_8_175" id="Footnote_8_175"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_175"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>The Analects</i>, Book XIII, Ch. v; Legge, James, <i>The Chinese
Classics</i>, Oxford, 1893 [Peiping, 1939], I, p. 93; the word <i>terms</i> has been
substituted for <i>names</i> in rendering <i>ming</i>.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_9_176" id="Footnote_9_176"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_176"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> d'Elia translation, cited, p. 130-1.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_10_177" id="Footnote_10_177"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_177"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> See above, p. <a href="#Page_42">42</a>.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_11_178" id="Footnote_11_178"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_178"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> See William, Maurice, <i>Sun Yat-sen vs. Communism</i>, Baltimore,
1932, for an appraisal which stresses the importance and degree of
this influence; on the opposite side, see "The Alleged Influence of
Maurice William on Sun Yat-sen" by P. C. Huang and W. P. Yuen
in <i>T'ien Hsia Monthly</i>, V, 4 (November 1937), p. 349-76.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_12_179" id="Footnote_12_179"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_179"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Biographies of Chiang are: Chen Tsung-hsi <i>et al.</i>, <i>General
Chiang Kai-shek, the Builder of New China</i>, Shanghai, 1929; Tong,
Hollington K. (Tung Hsien-kuang), <i>Chiang Kai-shek, Soldier and
Statesman</i>, 2 vols., Shanghai, 1937, the authorized biography and a
model of its kind; Berkov, Robert, <i>Strong Man of China</i>, Boston.
1938; and Hedin, Sven, <i>Chiang Kai-shek, Marshal of China</i>, New York,
1940. <i>Who's Who in China</i> is, as usual, useful for Chiang and for the
members of his family. Almost every book on modern China, or
magazine dealing with Asiatic materials, has discussions of Chiang.
Among the most noteworthy writers on his career and personality are
Gustav Amann, whose account remains the most carefully detailed;
Edgar Snow and John Gunther, the reporters mentioned above; and
Harold Isaacs. The Generalissimo's own diary and speeches, together
with Mme. Chiang's writings, are unconsciously rather than deliberately
revelatory.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_13_180" id="Footnote_13_180"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_180"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> John Donne, in a sermon of commemoration of the Lady Danvers,
late wife of Sir John Danvers; 1627.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_14_181" id="Footnote_14_181"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_181"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> One of the Seven Gentlemen (<i>Ch'i Chüntzŭ</i>), whose name is withheld
by request, interviewed August 2, 1940, in Chungking.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_15_182" id="Footnote_15_182"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_182"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Communist leader, interviewed in Chungking, whose name is
also withheld by request.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_16_183" id="Footnote_16_183"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_183"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Some of the recent volumes are: <i>Lu-shan Hsün-lien Chi Hsüan-chi</i>
(Collected Papers of the Lu Shan Training Conference), Chungking,
1939; <i>O-mei Hsün-lien Chi Hsüan-chi</i> (Collected Papers of the
Omei Training Conference), Chungking, 1939; <i>Li-hsing Chê-hsiao</i>
(The Philosophy of Being Practical), Chungking, 1940; <i>Tsung-ts'ai
Chien-kuo Yen-lun Hsüan-chi</i> (The Tsung-ts'ai's Utterances on Reconstruction),
Chungking, 1940; <i>Tsung-ts'ai Wai-chiao Yen-lun Hsüan-chi</i>
(The Tsung-ts'ai's Utterances on Diplomacy), Chungking, 1940;
and <i>Tsung-ts'ai K'ang-chan Yen-lun Hsüan-chi</i> (The Tsung-ts'ai's
Utterances on Resistance), Chungking, 1940. A collection of the
Generalissimo's leading speeches, in English, is in press and is to be
issued soon by the China Information Publishing Company, Hong
Kong.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_17_184" id="Footnote_17_184"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_184"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> [Chiang K'ai-shek], <i>San-min-chu-i chih T'i-hsi nai ch'i-shih
Hsing-ch'êng-hsü</i> (The <i>San Min Chu I</i> System and its Method of
Application), Chungking, 1939. This booklet is part of a series called
<i>Conclusions of the Party Chief</i>, published by the Central Headquarters
of the Kuomintang Training Corps, Chungking, 1939.</p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span></p>
<h2>CONCLUSION</h2>
<p>The China of Chiang K'ai-shek has withstood the
shock of foreign war, and has demonstrated its
capacity to grow and survive as a state despite heavy
domestic adversity. The constitutional structure nears
a condition of realistic operation. The political organs,
while still monopolized by the Kuomintang, are highly
effective; their unrepresentative character is mitigated
by the new experiments with consultative legislation.
Administratively, both as to special functions and in
developing local government, significant new enterprises
are under way. Communist-Nationalist rivalry,
while still bitter, has avoided domestic civil war during
the invasion; despite the clash of National troops with
the New Fourth Army, the postponement may be indefinitely
continued. Taken all together, Free China
presents a hopeful picture; and it therefore acquires international
importance as the presumptive predecessor
of a great Asiatic democracy.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the fact that a Chinese central government
has emerged in time for effective action, and has
withstood invasion, does not provide proof that Japan
is doomed to fail. Japanese progress thus far in China
has depended in great part upon Japanese world commerce—on
raw materials and finance from her lucrative
American trade. China's resistance has depended, but
to a lesser degree, on Western aid. In each case, the
early history of the conflict was qualified if not determined
by the character of third-party relations. If
the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and Germany
continued for the next twenty-odd years to do in
the Far East precisely what they have been doing for the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span>
past ten, the future might be more or less predictable
on the basis of the Far Eastern elements alone. Such
a prediction is, however, wholly unsupportable at the
present time; it is indeed safe to predict the contrary,
and assume that it is impossible for the major outside
powers to continue their reciprocal power-relationships
unchanged, in the Far East or elsewhere. China's future
is therefore bound up with European and American
uncertainties. The Three-Power Pact, signed at Berlin,
September 27, 1940 between Germany, Italy and Japan,
and the American Lease-Lend Bill have already begun
to interlock the European and East Asiatic wars.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Chief Alternatives in China</span></h3>
<p>The Chinese domestic situation will inescapably be
bound up with China's international position. The
extremes of probability can be readily marked off: on
the one hand, it is most improbable that the Chinese
resistance should collapse altogether, and leave the way
open for an almost effortless Japanese victory, through
the consolidation of the Wang regime without guerrilla,
volunteer or West-China opposition; on the other
hand, an immediate and complete Chinese victory,
coupled with solution of Nationalist-Communist rivalry,
is not at all in sight. Somewhere between these
two extremes there lie a number of more probable alternatives.</p>
<p>Chief among these is a Kuomintang China, winning
a slow victory against Japan under the continuation of
existent institutions and leadership. Such a country—nationalist,
democratic, and economically pragmatist—would,
by the fact of victory over Japan, create a nucleus
for liberal democracy in Asia.<a name="FNanchor_1_185" id="FNanchor_1_185"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_185" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> A variant of this
solution would be a United Front China, wherein the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span>
independents and the Left actually shared power with
the Kuomintang under conditions of broad popular
suffrage; this would presumably lie between the United
States and the Soviet Union in the matter of ideology
and foreign policy. Neither of these would afford Japan
much opportunity for continued influence on the continent.</p>
<p>A long continuation of the present hostilities might
imply the development of a permanently divided China—permanent
save in terms of centuries—with Nationalists
and Communists landbound in inner Asia, and
pro-Japanese governments along the coast. Such a
violation of Chinese cultural and economic unity would
perpetuate disequilibrium, and imply continuing wars.
Differing from this in degree rather than kind would be
a reversion of China to <i>tuchünism</i> and anarchy. Neither
of these possibilities could command acceptance from
the awakened, vigorous China of today.</p>
<p>Outside intervention presents a third group of alternatives:
the partition of China through a Soviet-Japanese
understanding, or the complete Sovietization of
China, through the combined efforts of Soviet and Chinese
Communists. Soviet-Japanese partition, once almost
unthinkable, appears within the range of possibility
because of the apparent weakness of the Soviet
Union, which calls for unconventional remedies. If
Communist dialectic insured the Soviets who shared
China with Japan an ultimate victory over Japan as
well, the evil might seem transitory to the Soviet Union.
Were such a step taken to thwart rising American influence,
it might seem the lesser of two evils. Neither
this nor a Soviet China (which would swell the Communist
frontier and resources immeasurably) appeared
probable in the spring of 1941.</p>
<p>The more practical aspects of the China-building
problem still concern the immediate, local effectiveness
of the Japanese military effort to control the growth
of Chinese government.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span></p>
<p>To create a victorious condition, Japan has sought
the collaboration of phantom Japanophile governments.
But in the face of the continuing National Government,
and guerrilla opposition, these governments are
incapable of functioning. When the conquerors of
China entered the cities, and took over the government,
they were strangers holding mere islands in the
greatness of China.</p>
<p>Japan has the seven most important cities of China.
She has most of the railroads. The waters around China
are closed by the Japanese fleet. But how is Japan to occupy
the hundreds of thousands of villages? How is
Japan to persuade the Chinese people, who are still
overwhelmingly country people, that they are conquered
when Japan thinks that they are?</p>
<p>The Japanese have not yet succeeded in making much
impression on the Chinese farmers, except to anger
them with cruelty and rapine. In Manchuria, where the
Japanese have had undisputed sway for ten long years,
thousands of bandits, a Chinese version of Minute Men,
are still fighting. Ten, five, even three miles from the
great fortified centers of the Japanese army in China,
Chinese irregulars, peasant volunteers, spring up in
the night. In the darkness there is shooting, sudden
flames, perhaps an airplane burning or a gasoline storage
tank set on fire; when dawn comes there is nothing to
be seen except the patient quiet coolies working in their
little fields.</p>
<p>At the present time the war has reached its quiescent
stage. The Japanese army has done what in most other
cases would be called winning a victory. The battle is
accordingly a battle between the Chinese government
in the West and the Japanese in the East of China,
not with guns or ships so much as with words and with
price levels—not for strategic territory, but for the support
of the Chinese masses.</p>
<p>The Chinese must make it possible for their own people<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span>
to live successfully and happily. But they have the
world's greatest farm problem, a problem of over-indebtedness,
sharecropping, soil exhaustion, prices and
markets. Japan wanted to prevent the creation of a
united China strong enough to take Manchuria back,
and to drive the Japanese off the Asiatic continent back
to Japan. Japan accordingly took the disastrous and
painful step of conquering the world's greatest relief
problem—the millions of underfed, undernourished,
desperate Chinese farmers. Now she has them.</p>
<p>In this light, the Far Eastern conflict takes on a different
appearance from the usual picture of China
versus Japan. It is a conflict, not merely of one nation
against another but of competing governments within
the same territory. China is trying to build one way;
Japan, another; but they are both building for the same
end, control of the Far East, and on the same foundations,
the Chinese people. Both Japan and the independent
Chinese government are struggling for the
mastery of an area which is in the grip of a tragic farm
problem. The key to power is the mastery of the problem,
not the mastery of the men. The Chinese farmers
would welcome Communism, capitalism, or almost any
kind of leadership which could guarantee them a good
livelihood in return for their long and patient labor.
The basic issues are social, technological, and economic,
as well as political and military. The Japanese failure in
China is not a failure of the economic resources; Japan
could have been a weak but adequate economic partner
to China. The failure of Japan now leads China
to look elsewhere for help.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The United States in Chinese Politics</span></h3>
<p>The American Lease-Lend Bill, designed primarily
to extend effective aid to Britain, also applied to China.
The United States executive was clearly aware of the
purposes of Japan, and displayed a temper to thwart<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span>
them. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, presenting a
statement in support of the Bill to the House Foreign
Affairs Committee on January 15, 1941, stated:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated
from the start by broad and ambitious plans for
establishing herself in a dominant position in the entire
region of the Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared
their determination to achieve and maintain that
position by force of arms and thus to make themselves
master of an area containing almost one-half of the entire
population of the world. As a consequence, they would
have arbitrary control of the sea and trade routes in that
region.</p>
<p class="center">.<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span>
<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span>
<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span>
<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span>
<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span>
<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span>
<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span>
<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span>
<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span>
<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span>
<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span></p>
<p>It should be manifest to every person that such a program
for the subjugation and ruthless exploitation by one country
of nearly one-half the population of the world is a matter
of immense significance, importance and concern to
every nation wherever located.</p></blockquote>
<p>On March 15, the President's speech to the White
House Correspondents' Association included a ringing
promise to give help to the Chinese people, who had
asked for aid through Chiang K'ai-shek. The United
States moved toward a more definite policy in Asia as
well as giving more aid to Britain in the North Atlantic
area. The lease-lend program might upset the entire
balance of power in the Far East even more readily than
in Europe; but immediate evidence of such large-scale
application was not forthcoming.</p>
<p>In his message to President Roosevelt, March 18,
1941, Chiang K'ai-shek said:<a name="FNanchor_2_186" id="FNanchor_2_186"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_186" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>The people of China, whether engaged in fighting the
aggressor or toiling in the fields and workshops in the rear
in support of the defenders, will be immeasurably heartened
by your impressive reaffirmation of the will of the American
people to assist them in their struggle for freedom from
foreign domination, and in the resumption of their march
towards democracy and social justice for all.</p></blockquote>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span></p>
<p>Significantly, the statement of Secretary Hull may
apply to future Soviet advance in China as well as to
the Japanese invasion. American aid which would
weaken Japan and strengthen the Soviet Union thereby,
would be welcome to Stalin; but American influence,
carried to the point of consolidating the National Government
against the Communists, and reducing the
probabilities of rising Communist influence, would not
be welcome.</p>
<p>Whether the United States Government and the
American people are pro-Chinese or not, the National
Government of China is pro-American. The only influence
to rival the American in modern China is that
of the Soviet Union. Soviet and American impress are
found in intellectual life, in political ideals, in standards
and types of organization, and in ethical creeds. It is no
accident that the Kuomintang traces its three principles
back to Lincoln, while the Chinese Communists quote
Lenin and Stalin. The rivalry is clear, and acute. American
aid to China strengthens the pro-American party
and weakens the Communists; cessation of the Burma
route traffic in the summer of 1940 stimulated discussion
of a closer Sino-Soviet rapprochement.</p>
<p>Generalissimo Chiang is a Christian. He is surrounded
by American-trained officials. The common
secondary language of the Nationalists is English. The
Chinese Industrial Cooperatives are based on an American
background with New Zealand and British advice.
The educational system is patterned after that of the
United States in great part; the American impress on
the system of higher education, in particular, cannot be
overestimated. The interests, appetites, and orientation
of the Kuomintang and the National Government
are Pacific-centered; much bitterness of an intimate,
almost uncomplaining sort, has been aroused by America's
continued aid to Japan through business channels.</p>
<p>Adjustments within China are bound to react to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span>
pressures in the outside world. If the United States
abandons Free China, the Japanese will probably not
conquer China; but the Soviets will be in an excellent
position to try, for themselves or through agreement
with the Japanese, to demoralize Chinese resistance so
that the Soviet forces could intervene because of a political
vacuum and protect the "racially kin working
classes," as in Poland. Whether China should go Communist
through the triumph of the Chinese Communists,
or through military occupation by the Soviet Red
Army, would not matter much to the United States.
What would matter would be the loss of an incomparable
ally, an ally who today is almost embarrassingly
cordial toward us, thankful to us, and who admires our
institutions and culture.</p>
<p>Once Japan were forced out of the picture as an aggressive
power, once the United States and China were
to reach an understanding, the Soviet Union—debarred
from a warm-water naval base on the Pacific—could be
left in the <i>status quo</i>, its menace removed, to work out
its own destiny if it did not challenge renewed intervention
by renewed provocation of co-existing societies.
No other challenging power could appear on the Pacific.
A group of nations from Buenos Aires to Labrador,
from Melbourne to Kashgar, from Lhasa to Boston
would cover three and one-half continents. The area
thus freed from war and aggression, encompassing the
Americas and the Pacific basin, would include every
necessary article in the entire schedule of man's appetites.
The Chungking government, elementarily and
crudely, has broken ground for the culture-political
American advance into Asia. Strong without us, Free
China is a great power with us, and the one place in
the world where construction, liberty, education, and
hope still rise day by day. Both cosmopolitan and national,
the Chinese are ready to accept their share of
responsibility for the new world order.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span></p>
<p>The responsibility for building a democratic world,
whether or not the four authoritarian powers go down,
lies in great part upon the United States. Generalissimo
Chiang, alone among leaders, has stood forth for world
government, for world freedom. He has written:<a name="FNanchor_3_187" id="FNanchor_3_187"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_187" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p>
<p>"In as much as cosmopolitanism and world peace are
two of the main aims of <i>San Min Chu I</i>, China will
naturally be disposed to participate in any world federation
or confederation based on the equality of nations
and for the good of mankind."</p>
<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_185" id="Footnote_1_185"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_185"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> This discussion includes extracts from the author's "China: Right,
Left, or Center?", <i>The Quarterly Review of the Michigan Alumnus</i>,
Vol. XLVI, No. 14 (Winter 1940).</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_2_186" id="Footnote_2_186"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_186"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Department of State, <i>Bulletin</i>, IV, p. 335.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_3_187" id="Footnote_3_187"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_187"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> See below, p. <a href="#Page_371">371</a>.</p></div>
</div>
<hr class="chap" />
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span></p>
<h2>APPENDIX I. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS</h2>
<hr class="chap" />
<h2><i>A.</i> THE GOVERNMENT DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION<a name="FNanchor_1_188" id="FNanchor_1_188"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_188" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2>
<blockquote>
<p>Released April 30, 1937, this differs from the celebrated Double Five
Draft (<i>q.v.</i> in Text) by the omission of an article providing that the
first Kuo-min Ta-hui should exercise full power, and not be confined
to the preparation of a constitution. This Draft represents the official
viewpoint and was prepared by the Legislative <i>Yüan</i> with the help and
criticism of private persons; accordingly, it is the outstanding draft
constitution.</p></blockquote>
<p>By virtue of the mandate received from the whole body
of citizens and in accordance with the bequeathed teachings
of Dr. Sun, Founder of the Republic of China, the People's
Congress of the Republic of China hereby ordains and
enacts this Constitution and causes it to be promulgated
throughout the land for faithful and perpetual observance
by all.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter I. General Provisions</span></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 1. The Republic of China is a <i>SAN MIN CHU
I</i> Republic.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 2. The sovereignty of the Republic of China is
vested in the whole body of its citizens.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 3. Persons having acquired the nationality of
the Republic of China are citizens of the Republic of China.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 4. The territory of the Republic of China consists
of areas originally constituting Kiangsu, Chekiang,
Anhwei, Kiangsi, Hupeh, Hunan, Szechwan, Sikang, Hopei,
Shantung, Shansi, Honan, Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai, Fukien,
Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow, Liaoning, Kirin,
Heilungkiang, Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan, Ningsia, Sinkiang,
Mongolia and Tibet.</p>
<p>The territory of the Republic of China shall not be
altered except by resolution of the People's Congress.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span></p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 5. All races of the Republic of China are component
parts of the Chinese Nation and shall be equal.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 6. The National Flag of the Republic of China
shall have a red background with a blue sky and white sun
in the upper left corner.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 7. The National Capital of the Republic of
China shall be at Nanking.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter II. Rights and Duties of the Citizens</span></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 8. All citizens of the Republic of China shall
be equal before the law.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 9. Every citizen shall enjoy the liberty of the
person. Except in accordance with law, no one may be
arrested, detained, tried or punished.</p>
<p>When a citizen is arrested or detained on suspicion of
having committed a criminal act, the authority responsible
for such action shall immediately inform the citizen himself
and his relatives of the cause for his arrest or detention
and shall, within a period of twenty-four hours, send him
to a competent court for trial. The citizen so arrested or
detained, or any one else, may also petition the court to
demand from the authority responsible for such action the
surrender, within twenty-four hours, of his person to the
court for trial.</p>
<p>The court shall not reject such a petition; nor shall the
responsible authority refuse to execute such a writ as mentioned
in the preceding paragraph.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 10. With the exception of those in active military
service, no one may be subject to military jurisdiction.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 11. Every citizen shall have the freedom of
domicile; no private abode may be forcibly entered,
searched or sealed except in accordance with law.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 12. Every citizen shall have the freedom to
change his residence; such freedom shall not be restricted
except in accordance with law.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 13. Every citizen shall have the freedom of
speech, writing and publication; such freedom shall not be
restricted except in accordance with law.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 14. Every citizen shall have the freedom of
secrecy of correspondence; such freedom shall not be restricted
except in accordance with law.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 15. Every citizen shall have the freedom of
religious belief; such freedom shall not be restricted except
in accordance with law.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span></p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 16. Every citizen shall have the freedom of assembly
and of forming associations; such freedom shall
not be restricted except in accordance with law.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 17. No private property shall be requisitioned,
expropriated, sealed or confiscated except in accordance
with law.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 18. Every citizen shall have the right to present
petitions, lodge complaints and institute legal proceedings
in accordance with law.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 19. Every citizen shall have the right to exercise,
in accordance with law, the powers of election, recall,
initiative and referendum.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 20. Every citizen shall have the right to compete,
in accordance with law, in state examinations.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 21. Every citizen shall, in accordance with law,
be amenable to the duty of paying taxes.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 22. Every citizen shall, in accordance with law,
be amenable to the duty of performing military service.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 23. Every citizen shall, in accordance with law,
be amenable to the duty of rendering public service.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 24. All other liberties and rights of the citizens
which are not detrimental to public peace and order or
public welfare shall be guaranteed by the Constitution.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 25. Only laws imperative for safeguarding national
security, averting a national crisis, maintaining public
peace and order or promoting public interest may restrict
the citizens' liberties and rights.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 26. Any public functionary who illegally infringes
upon any private liberty or right, shall, besides
being subject to disciplinary punishment, be responsible
under criminal and civil law. The injured person may
also, in accordance with law, claim indemnity from the
State for damages sustained.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter III. The People's Congress</span></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 27. The People's Congress shall be constituted
of delegates elected as follows:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. Each district, municipality or area of an equivalent
status shall elect one delegate, but in case its population
exceeds 300,000, one additional delegate shall be elected
for every additional 500,000 people. The status of areas
to be equivalent to a district or municipality shall be defined
by law.</p>
<p>2. The number of delegates to be elected from Mongolia
and Tibet shall be determined by law.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span></p>
<p>3. The number of delegates to be elected by Chinese
citizens residing abroad shall be determined by law.</p></blockquote>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 28.</span> Delegates to the People's Congress shall
be elected by universal, equal, and direct suffrage and by
secret ballots.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 29.</span> Citizens of the Republic of China having
attained the age of twenty years shall, in accordance with
law, have the right to elect delegates. Citizens having attained
the age of twenty-five years shall, in accordance with
law, have the right to be elected delegates.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 30.</span> The term of office of Delegates of the People's
Congress shall be six years.</p>
<p>When a Delegate is found guilty of violation of a law
or neglect of his duty, his constituency shall recall him in
accordance with law.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 31.</span> The People's Congress shall be convened
by the President once every three years. Its session shall
last one month, but may be extended another month when
necessary.</p>
<p>Extraordinary sessions of the People's Congress may be
convened at the instance of two-fifths or more of its members.</p>
<p>The President may convene extraordinary sessions of the
People's Congress.</p>
<p>The People's Congress shall meet at the place where
the Central Government is.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 32.</span> The powers and functions of the People's
Congress shall be as follows:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. To elect the President and Vice-President of the
Republic, the President of the Legislative Yuan, the
President of the Censor Yuan, the Members of the Legislative
Yuan and the Members of the Censor Yuan.</p>
<p>2. To recall the President and Vice-President of the
Republic, the President of the Legislative Yuan, the
President of the Judicial Yuan, the President of the
Examination Yuan, the President of the Censor Yuan,
the Members of the Legislative Yuan and the Members
of the Censor Yuan.</p>
<p>3. To initiate laws.</p>
<p>4. To hold referenda on laws.</p>
<p>5. To amend the Constitution.</p>
<p>6. To exercise such other powers as are conferred by
the Constitution.</p></blockquote>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 33.</span> Delegates to the People's Congress shall not
be held responsible outside of Congress for opinions they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span>
may express and votes they may cast during the session of
Congress.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 34.</span> Without the permission of the People's Congress,
no delegate shall be arrested or detained during the
session except when apprehended in <i>flagrante delicto</i>.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 35.</span> The organization of the People's Congress
and the election as well as recall of its Delegates shall be
determined by law.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter IV. The Central Government</span></h3>
<h4>Section 1. <i>The President</i></h4>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 36.</span> The President is the Head of the State
and represents the Republic of China in foreign relations.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 37.</span> The President commands the land, sea and
air forces of the whole country.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 38.</span> The President shall, in accordance with law,
promulgate laws and issue orders with the counter-signature
of the President of the Yuan concerned.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 39.</span> The President shall, in accordance with law,
exercise the power of declaring war, negotiating peace and
concluding treaties.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 40.</span> The President shall, in accordance with
law, declare and terminate a state of emergency.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 41.</span> The President shall, in accordance with law,
exercise the power of granting amnesties, special pardons,
remission of sentences and restoration of civil rights.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 42.</span> The President shall, in accordance with law,
appoint and remove civil and military officials.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 43.</span> The President shall, in accordance with law,
confer honors and award decorations.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 44.</span> In case the State is confronted with an
emergency, or the economic life of the State meets with a
grave danger, which calls for immediate action, the President,
following the resolution of the Executive Meeting,
may issue orders of emergency and do whatever is necessary
to cope with the situation, provided that he shall submit his
action to the ratification of the Legislative Yuan within
three months after the issuance of the orders.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 45.</span> The President may call meetings of the
Presidents of the five Yuan to confer on matters relating
to two or more Yuan, or on such matters as the President
may bring out for consultation.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 46.</span> The President shall be responsible to the
People's Congress.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span></p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 47.</span> Citizens of the Republic of China, having
attained the age of forty years, may be elected President or
Vice-President of the Republic.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 48.</span> The election of the President and Vice-President
shall be provided for by law.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 49.</span> The President and Vice-President shall hold
office for a term of six years and may be re-elected for a
second term.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 50.</span> The President shall, on the day of his inauguration,
take the following oath:</p>
<p>"I do solemnly and sincerely swear before the people that
I will observe the Constitution, faithfully perform my
duties, promote the welfare of the People, safeguard the
security of the State and be loyal to the trust of the people.
Should I break my oath, I will submit myself to the most
severe punishment the law may provide."</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 51.</span> When the Presidency is vacant, the Vice-President
shall succeed to the office.</p>
<p>When the President is for some reason unable to attend
to his duties, the Vice-President shall act for him. If both
the President and the Vice-President are incapacitated, the
President of the Executive Yuan shall discharge the duties
of the President's office.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 52.</span> The President shall retire from office on
the day his term expires. If by that time a new President
has not been inducted into office, the President of the
Executive Yuan shall discharge the duties of the President's
office.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 53.</span> The period for the President of the Executive
Yuan to discharge the duties of the President's office
shall not exceed six months.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 54.</span> Except in case of an offense against the
internal or external security of the State, the President
shall not be liable to criminal prosecution until he has
been recalled or has retired from office.</p>
<h4>Section 2. <i>The Executive Yuan</i></h4>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 55.</span> The Executive Yuan is the highest organ
through which the Central Government exercises its executive
powers.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 56.</span> In the Executive Yuan, there shall be a
President, a Vice-President and a number of Executive
Members, to be appointed and removed by the President.</p>
<p>The Executive Members mentioned in the preceding
paragraph who do not take charge of Ministries or Commissions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span>
shall not exceed half of those who are in charge of
Ministries or Commissions as provided in the first paragraph
of <span class="smcap">Article 58.</span></p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 57.</span> In the Executive Yuan, there shall be various
Ministries and Commissions which shall separately exercise
their respective executive powers.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 58.</span> The Ministers of the various Ministries and
the Chairmen of the various Commissions shall be appointed
by the President from among the Executive Members.</p>
<p>The President and the Vice-President of the Executive
Yuan may act concurrently as Minister or Chairman mentioned
in the preceding paragraph.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 59.</span> The President of the Executive Yuan, the
Executive Members, the Ministers of the various Ministries
and the Chairmen of the various Commissions shall be individually
responsible to the President.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 60.</span> In the Executive Yuan there shall be Executive
Meetings composed of the President, the President
of the Executive Yuan and the Executive Members to be
presided over by the President. In case the President is unable
to be present, the President of the Executive Yuan
shall preside.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 61.</span> The following matters shall be decided at
an Executive Meeting:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. Statutory and budgetary bills to be submitted to
the Legislative Yuan.</p>
<p>2. Bills concerning a state of emergency and special
pardons to be submitted to the Legislative Yuan.</p>
<p>3. Bills concerning declaration of war, negotiation of
peace, conclusion of treaties and other important international
affairs to be submitted to the Legislative
Yuan.</p>
<p>4. Matters of common concern to the various Ministries
and Commissions.</p>
<p>5. Matters submitted by the President.</p>
<p>6. Matters submitted by the President of the Executive
Yuan, the Executive Members, the various Ministries
and Commissions.</p></blockquote>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 62.</span> The organization of the Executive Yuan
shall be determined by law.</p>
<h4>Section 3. <i>The Legislative Yuan</i></h4>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 63.</span> The Legislative Yuan is the highest organ
through which the Central Government exercises its legislative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span>
powers. It shall be responsible to the People's Congress.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 64. The Legislative Yuan shall have the power
to decide on measures concerning legislation, budgets, a
state of emergency, special pardons, declaration of war,
negotiation of peace, conclusion of treaties and other important
international affairs.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 65. In the discharge of its duties the Legislative
Yuan may interrogate the various Yuan, Ministries and
Commissions.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 66. In the Legislative Yuan, there shall be a
President who shall hold office for a term of three years
and may be eligible for re-election.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 67. In regard to the election of Members of the
Legislative Yuan, the Delegates of the various provinces,
Mongolia, Tibet and of citizens residing abroad, to the
People's Congress shall separately hold a preliminary election
to nominate their respective candidates and submit
a list of their names to the Congress for election. The candidates
are not confined to the Delegates to the People's
Congress. The respective number of candidates shall be
proportioned as follows:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. A province with a population of less than 5,000,000
shall nominate four candidates. A province with a population
of more than 5,000,000 but less than 10,000,000
shall nominate six candidates. A province with a population
of more than 10,000,000 but less than 15,000,000
shall nominate eight candidates. A province with a
population of more than 15,000,000 but less than 20,000,000
shall nominate ten candidates. A province with
a population of more than 20,000,000 but less than 25,000,000
shall nominate twelve candidates. A province
with a population of more than 25,000,000 but less than
30,000,000 shall nominate fourteen candidates. A province
with a population of more than 30,000,000 shall
nominate sixteen candidates.</p>
<p>2. Mongolia and Tibet shall each nominate eight
candidates.</p>
<p>3. Citizens residing abroad shall nominate eight candidates.</p></blockquote>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 68. Members of the Legislative Yuan shall hold
office for a term of three years and may be eligible for re-election.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 69. The Executive Yuan, Judicial Yuan, Examination
Yuan, and Censor Yuan may submit to the
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span>Legislative Yuan measures concerning matters within their
respective jurisdiction.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 70. The President may, before the promulgation
or execution of a legislative measure, request the
Legislative Yuan to reconsider it.</p>
<p>If the Legislative Yuan, with regard to the request for
consideration, should decide to maintain the original measure
by a two-thirds vote of the Members present, the President
shall promulgate or execute it without delay; provided
that in case of a bill of law or a treaty, the President may
submit it to the People's Congress for a referendum.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 71. The President shall promulgate a measure
presented by the Legislative Yuan for promulgation within
thirty days after its receipt.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 72. Members of the Legislative Yuan shall not
be held responsible outside of the said Yuan for opinions
they may express and votes they may cast during its session.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 73. Without the permission of the Legislative
Yuan, no member may be arrested or detained except when
apprehended in <i>flagrante delicto</i>.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 74. No Member of the Legislative Yuan may
concurrently hold any other public office or engage in any
business or profession.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 75. The election of Members of the Legislative
Yuan and the organization of the Legislative Yuan shall
be determined by law.</p>
<h4>Section 4. <i>The Judicial Yuan</i></h4>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 76. The Judicial Yuan is the highest organ
through which the Central Government exercises its judicial
powers. It shall attend to the adjudication of civil, criminal
and administrative suits, the discipline and punishment
of public functionaries and judicial administration.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 77. In the Judicial Yuan, there shall be a President
who shall hold office for a term of three years. He
shall be appointed by the President.</p>
<p>The President of the Judicial Yuan shall be responsible
to the People's Congress.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 78. Matters concerning special pardons, remission
of sentence and restoration of civil rights shall be submitted
to the President for action by the President of the
Judicial Yuan in accordance with law.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 79. The Judicial Yuan shall have the power to
unify the interpretation of statutes and ordinances.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span></p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 80. Judicial officials shall, in accordance with
law, have perfect independence in the conduct of trials.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 81. No judicial official may be removed from
office unless he has been subject to criminal or disciplinary
punishment or declared an interdicted person; nor may
a judicial official be suspended or transferred, or have his
salary reduced except in accordance with law.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 82. The organization of the Judicial Yuan and
the various Courts of Justice shall be determined by law.</p>
<h4>Section 5. <i>The Examination Yuan</i></h4>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 83. The Examination Yuan is the highest organ
through which the Central Government exercises its examination
powers. It shall attend to the selection of civil
service candidates by examination and to the registration
of persons qualified for public service.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 84. In the Examination Yuan there shall be a
President who shall hold office for a term of three years, to
be appointed by the President.</p>
<p>The President of the Examination Yuan shall be responsible
to the People's Congress.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 85. The Examination Yuan shall, in accordance
with law, by examination and registration determine the
following qualifications:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. For appointment as a public functionary.</p>
<p>2. For candidacy to public office.</p>
<p>3. For practice in specialized professions and as technical
experts.</p></blockquote>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 86. The organization of the Examination Yuan
shall be determined by law.</p>
<h4>Section 6. <i>The Censor Yuan</i></h4>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 87. The Censor Yuan is the highest organ
through which the Central Government exercises its censorial
powers. It shall attend to impeachment and auditing
and be responsible to the People's Congress.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 88. In the discharge of its censorial powers, the
Censor Yuan may, in accordance with law, interrogate the
various Yuan, Ministries and Commissions.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 89. In the Censor Yuan, there shall be a President
who shall hold office for a term of three years and
may be eligible for re-election.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 90. Members of the Censor Yuan shall be
elected by the People's Congress, from candidates separately
nominated by the Delegates of the various provinces, Mongolia,
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span>Tibet and Chinese citizens residing abroad. Each
group of Delegates shall nominate two candidates. The
candidates are not confined to Delegates to the Congress.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 91. Members of the Censor Yuan shall hold
office for a term of four years and may be eligible for re-election.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 92. When the Censor Yuan finds a public functionary
in the Central or local government guilty of violation
of a law or neglect of his duty, an impeachment may be
instituted upon the proposal of one or more Members and
the indorsement, after due investigation, of five or more
Members. Impeachment against the President or Vice-President,
the President of the Executive Yuan, Legislative
Yuan, Judicial Yuan, Examination Yuan or Censor Yuan
may be instituted only upon the proposal of ten or more
Members and the indorsement, after due investigation, of
one-half or more Members of the entire Yuan.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 93. When an impeachment is instituted against
the President or Vice-President or the President of the
Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, Judicial Yuan, Examination
Yuan or Censor Yuan in accordance with the preceding
Article, it shall be brought before the People's Congress.
During the adjournment of the People's Congress,
the Delegates shall be requested to convene in accordance
with law an extraordinary session to decide whether the
impeached shall be removed from office.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 94. Members of the Censor Yuan shall not be
held responsible outside of the said Yuan for opinions they
may express and votes they may cast while discharging their
duties.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 95. Without the permission of the Censor Yuan,
no Member of the Censor Yuan may be arrested or detained
except when apprehended in <i>flagrante delicto</i>.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 96. No Member of the Censor Yuan may concurrently
hold any other public office or engage in any
business or profession.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 97. The election of the Members of the Censor
Yuan and the organization of the Censor Yuan shall be
determined by law.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter V. The Local Institutions</span></h3>
<h4>Section 1. <i>The Provinces</i></h4>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 98. In the Province, there shall be a Provincial
Government which shall execute the laws and orders of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</a></span>
the Central Government and supervise local self-government.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 99. In the Provincial Government there shall
be a Governor who shall hold office for a term of three
years. He shall be appointed and removed by the Central
Government.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 100. In the province, there shall be a Provincial
Assembly which shall be composed of one member from
each district or municipality to be elected by the district
or municipal council. Members of the Provincial Assembly
shall hold office for a term of three years and may be eligible
for re-election.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 101. The organization of the Provincial Government
and the Provincial Assembly as well as the election
and recall of the Members of the Provincial Assembly
shall be determined by law.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 102. The government of areas not yet established
as provinces shall be determined by law.</p>
<h4>Section 2. <i>The Districts</i></h4>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 103. The district [<i>hsien</i>] is a unit of local self-government.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 104. All matters that are local in nature are
within the scope of local self-government.</p>
<p>The scope of local self-government shall be determined
by law.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 105. Citizens of the district shall, in accordance
with law, exercise the powers of initiative and referendum
in matters concerning district self-government as well as the
powers of election and recall of the District Magistrate and
other elective officials in the service of district self-government.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 106. In the district, there shall be a District
Council, the members of which shall be directly elected by
the citizens in the District General Meeting. Members of
the District Council shall hold office for a term of three
years and may be eligible for re-election.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 107. District ordinances and regulations which
are in conflict with the laws and ordinances of the
Central or Provincial Government shall be null and
void.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 108. In the district, there shall be a District
Government with a District Magistrate who shall be elected
by the citizens in the District General Meeting. The Magistrate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</a></span>
shall hold office for a term of three years and may be
eligible for re-election.</p>
<p>Only those persons found qualified in the public examinations
held by the Central Government or adjudged qualified
by the Ministry of Public Service Registration may be candidates
for the office of District Magistrate.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 109. The District Magistrate shall administer
the affairs of the district in accordance with the principles
of self-government and, under the direction of the Provincial
Governor, execute matters assigned by the Central
and Provincial Governments.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 110. The organization of the District Council
and District Government as well as the election and recall
of the District Magistrate and the Members of the District
Council shall be determined by law.</p>
<h4>Section 3. <i>The Municipalities</i></h4>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 111. Unless otherwise provided by law, the provisions
governing self-government and administration of
the district shall apply <i>mutatis mutandis</i> to the municipality
[<i>shih</i>].</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 112. In the municipality, there shall be a Municipal
Council, the Members of which shall be directly
elected by the citizens in the Municipal General Meeting.
One-third of the Members shall retire and be replaced by
election annually.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 113. In the municipality, there shall be a Municipal
Government with a Mayor to be directly elected
by the citizens in the Municipal General Meeting. He shall
hold office for a term of three years and may be eligible for
re-election.</p>
<p>Only those persons found qualified in the public examinations
held by the Central Government or adjudged qualified
by the Ministry of Public Service Registration may be
a candidate for the office of Mayor.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 114. The Mayor shall administer the affairs of
the municipality in accordance with the principles of municipal
self-government and, under direction of the competent
supervising authority, execute matters assigned by
the Central or Provincial Government.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 115. The organization of the Municipal Council
and Municipal Government as well as the election and
recall of the Members of the Municipal Council and the
Mayor shall be determined by law.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</a></span></p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VI. National Economic Life</span></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 116. The economic system of the Republic of
China shall be based upon the Min Shêng Chu I (Principle
of Livelihood) and shall aim at national economic sufficiency
and equality.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 117. The land within the territorial limits of
the Republic of China belongs to the people as a whole.
Any part thereof the ownership of which has been lawfully
acquired by an individual or individuals shall be protected
by, and subject to, the restrictions of law.</p>
<p>The State may, in accordance with law, tax or expropriate
private land on the basis of the value declared by the owner
or assessed by the Government.</p>
<p>Every landowner is amenable to the duty of utilizing
his land to the fullest extent.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 118. All subterranean minerals and natural
forces which are economically utilizable for public benefit,
belong to the State and shall not be affected by private
ownership of the land.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 119. The unearned increment shall be taxed by
means of a land-value-increment tax and devoted to public
benefit.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 120. In readjusting the distribution of land,
the State shall be guided by the principle of aiding and
protecting the land-owning farmers and the land-utilizing
owners.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 121. The State may, in accordance with law,
regulate private wealth and enterprises when such wealth
and enterprises are considered detrimental to the balanced
development of national economic life.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 122. The State shall encourage, guide and protect
the citizens' productive enterprises and the nation's
foreign trade.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 123. All public utilities and enterprises of a
monopolistic nature shall be operated by the State; except
in case of necessity when the State may specially permit
private operation.</p>
<p>The private enterprises mentioned in the preceding paragraph
may, in case of emergency for national defense, be
temporarily managed by the State. The State may also,
in accordance with law, take them over for permanent
operation upon payment of due compensation.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 124. In order to improve the workers' living
conditions, increase their productive ability and relieve<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</a></span>
unemployment, the State shall enforce labor protective policies.</p>
<p>Women and children shall be afforded special protection
in accordance with their age and physical condition.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 125. Labor and capital shall, in accordance with
the principles of mutual help and cooperation, develop together
productive enterprises.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 126. In order to promote agricultural development
and the welfare of the farming population, the State
shall improve rural economic and living conditions and
increase farming efficiency by employment of scientific farming.</p>
<p>The State may regulate the production and distribution
of agricultural products, in kind and quantity.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 127. The State shall accord due relief or compensation
to those who suffer disability or loss of life in
the performance of military or public services.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 128. The State shall give suitable relief to the
aged, feeble, or disabled who are incapable of earning a
living.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 129. While the following powers appertain to
the Legislative Yuan in the case of the Central Government,
they may be exercised by the legally designated organ
if, in accordance with law, such matters may be effected independently
by a province, district or municipality:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. To impose or alter the rate of taxes and levies, fines,
penalties, or other imposts of a compulsory nature.</p>
<p>2. To raise public loans, dispose of public property
or conclude contracts which increase the burden of the
public treasury.</p>
<p>3. To establish or cancel public enterprises, monopolies,
franchises or any other profit-making enterprise.</p>
<p>4. To grant or cancel public enterprises, monopolies,
franchises or any other special privileges.</p></blockquote>
<p>Unless specially authorized by law, the government of a
province, district or municipality shall not raise foreign
loans or directly utilize foreign capital.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 130. Within the territorial limits of the Republic
of China all goods shall be permitted to circulate
freely. They shall not be seized or detained except in accordance
with law.</p>
<p>Customs duty is a Central Government revenue. It shall
be collected only once when the goods enter or leave the
country.</p>
<p>The various grades of government shall not collect any<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</a></span>
dues on goods in transit within the country, with the exception
of tolls levied for the purpose of improving the
waterways and roads, on vessels and vehicles making use of
them.</p>
<p>The right to impose taxes and levies on goods belongs
to the Central Government and shall not be exercised except
in accordance with law.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VII. Education</span></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 131. The educational aim of the Republic of
China shall be to develop a national spirit, to cultivate a
national morality, to train the people for self-government
and to increase their ability to earn a livelihood, and
thereby to build up a sound and healthy body of citizens.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 132. Every citizen of the Republic of China
shall have an equal opportunity to receive education.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 133. All public and private educational institutions
in the country shall be subject to State supervision
and amenable to the duty of carrying out the educational
policies formulated by the State.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 134. Children between six and twelve years of
age are of school age and shall receive elementary education
free of tuition. Detailed provisions shall be provided by
law.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 135. All persons over school age who have not
received an elementary education shall receive supplementary
education free of tuition. Detailed provisions shall
be provided by law.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 136. In establishing universities and technical
schools, the State shall give special consideration to the
needs of the respective localities so as to afford the people
thereof an equal opportunity to receive higher education,
thereby hastening a balanced national cultural development.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 137. Educational appropriations shall constitute
no less than fifteen per cent of the total amount of the
budget of the Central Government and no less than thirty
per cent of the total amount of the provincial, district
and municipal budgets respectively. Educational endowment
funds independently set aside in accordance with law
shall be safeguarded.</p>
<p>Educational expenditures in needy provinces shall be
subsidized by the central treasury.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 138. The State shall encourage and subsidize
the following enterprises or citizens:</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</a></span></p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. Private educational institutions with a high record
of achievement.</p>
<p>2. Education for Chinese citizens residing abroad.</p>
<p>3. Discoverers or inventors in academic or technical
fields.</p>
<p>4. Teachers or administrative officers of educational
institutions having good records and long service.</p>
<p>5. Students of high records and good character who
are unable to pursue further studies.</p></blockquote>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VIII. The Enforcement and Amendment of the Constitution</span></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 139. The term "law" as used in the Constitution
means that which has been passed by the Legislative
Yuan and promulgated by the President.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 140. Laws in conflict with the Constitution are
null and void.</p>
<p>The question whether a law is in conflict with the Constitution
shall be settled by the Censor Yuan submitting
the point to the Judicial Yuan for interpretation within
six months after its enforcement.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 141. Administrative orders in conflict with the
Constitution or laws are null and void.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 142. The interpretation of the Constitution
shall be done by the Judicial Yuan.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 143. Before half or more of the provinces and
territories have completed the work of local self-government,
the Members of the Legislative Yuan and of the
Censor Yuan shall be elected and appointed in accordance
with the following provisions:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. The Members of the Legislative Yuan: The Delegates
of the various provinces, Mongolia, Tibet, and of
the citizens residing abroad, to the People's Congress
shall separately hold a preliminary election to nominate
half of the number of the candidates as determined in
Article 67 and submit their list to the People's Congress
for election. The other half shall be nominated by the
President of the Legislative Yuan for appointment by the
President.</p>
<p>2. The Members of the Censor Yuan: The Delegates
of the various provinces, Mongolia, Tibet, and of the
citizens residing abroad, to the People's Congress shall
separately hold a preliminary election to nominate half
of the number of candidates as determined in Article 90
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[Pg 300]</a></span>and submit their list to the People's Congress for election.
The other half shall be nominated by the President of
the Censor Yuan for appointment by the President.</p></blockquote>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 144. The Magistrates of districts where the
work of self-government is not yet completed shall be appointed
and removed by the Central Government.</p>
<p>The preceding paragraph is applicable <i>mutatis mutandis</i>
to those municipalities where the work of self-government
is not yet completed.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 145. The methods and procedure of helping
the establishment of local self-government shall be determined
by law.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 146. No amendment to the Constitution may be
made unless it shall have been proposed by over one-fourth
of the delegates to the People's Congress and passed by at
least two-thirds of the delegates present at a meeting having
a quorum of over three-fourths of the entire Congress.</p>
<p>A proposed amendment to the Constitution shall be made
public by the proposer or proposers one year before the assembling
of the People's Congress.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 147. In regard to those provisions of the Constitution
which require further procedure for their enforcement,
such necessary procedure shall be determined by law.</p>
<div class="footnotes">
<h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_188" id="Footnote_1_188"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_188"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>T'ien Hsia Monthly</i>, v. X, No. 3 (May 1940), p. 493-506. The
transliterations have not been altered. <i>Yüan</i> therefore appears as
"Yuan."</p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<h2><i>B.</i> THE SYSTEM OF ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS<a name="FNanchor_1_189" id="FNanchor_1_189"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_189" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2>
<blockquote>
<p>The following laws were passed by the Legislative <i>Yüan</i> April 31,
XXVI (1937), in amended form, after the election had been postponed.</p></blockquote>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 1. The National Congress shall frame the Constitution,
and shall determine its date of execution.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 2. <i>i.</i> The National Congress shall be organized
by the Representatives of the people to the Congress.</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>ii.</i> The manner of electing these Representatives is
fixed in another set of laws.</p></blockquote>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 3. Members and reserve members of the Central
Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, and of the
Central Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang shall be
Representatives to the Congress without election; members<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[Pg 301]</a></span>
of the National Government and its officials may attend
the Congress.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 4. The date of convening the Congress is to be
fixed by the National Government.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 5. The Congress shall convene in the locality
occupied by the National Government.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 6. Representatives to the Congress shall take an
oath of allegiance during the opening ceremonies of the
Congress, to wit: "I,———, do hereby promise with absolute
sincerity that as a representative of the Chinese people,
I shall receive the instructions of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the
Father of the Republic, and that I shall execute my official
power only according to law, and shall obey the discipline
of the National Congress."</p>
<p>After taking the oath, the Representatives should thereto
sign their names.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 7. Thirty-one members shall be elected from
among the Representatives themselves to form the Presidium
of the Congress. Their duties shall be:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>i.</i> To fix the manner of discussing motions and to
regulate the progress of the discussion.</p>
<p><i>ii.</i> To discharge executive affairs of the Congress.</p>
<p><i>iii.</i> To perform other duties fixed in this code of laws.</p></blockquote>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 8. During a meeting of the Congress, the Presidium
shall elect the Chairman of the Meeting.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 9. The National Congress shall form special
committees to examine the qualifications of the Representatives,
to examine motions and proposals and for other
matters. These committees shall be organized upon the request
of the Presidium and passed by the Meeting.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 10. The period of a session of the Congress is
10 to 20 days; it may be extended whenever necessary.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 11. The duties of the National Congress are
fully discharged when its Meeting closes.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 12. A quorum shall consist of at least half of the
total number of members. Motion can be passed when more
than half of the members present vote for it.</p>
<p>In adopting the Constitution, at least two-thirds of the
total number of the members shall be present, and adoption
shall require a majority greater than two-thirds of the members
present.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 13. The Congress may adopt any of the following
methods to put a motion to vote: raising the hands,
standing up, or balloting. In case of a tie, the Chairman
may cast the deciding vote.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[Pg 302]</a></span></p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 14. The National Congress shall have a Secretariat
and an organization of police guards. Their organization
and duties shall be decided by the Presidium.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 15. The National Congress shall have a Secretary
General, appointed by the Presidium, and discharging
the affairs of the entire Congress.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 16. The Representatives shall not assume any
responsibility towards the general public for any opinion
expressed by them during the session of the Congress.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 17. Except by approval of the Congress, no
Representative of the Congress may be detained or arrested
when the Congress is in session.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 18. During the session, a Representative who
does not abide by the rules of the Congress may be warned
by the Chairman, or may forfeit his privilege to speak.
Adequate punishment shall be imposed upon any who may
commit serious offenses.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 19. The above mentioned punishment will be
decided by the Congress, upon the examination of the
Punishment Committee (formed by the Representatives to
the Congress).</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 20. The date of adoption of this code of laws
is to be fixed in an order from the Central Government.</p>
<div class="footnotes">
<h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_189" id="Footnote_1_189"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_189"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> "Kuo-min Ta-hui Tsu-chih Fa" in Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan Pu
(Party-Ministry of Publicity), <i>Hsien-chêng Chien-shê Fa-kuei</i>, Chungking,
XXVIII (1939), p. 35-8.</p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<h2><i>C.</i> ACT OF THE LEGISLATIVE <i>YÜAN</i>, APRIL 31,
XXVI (1937) GOVERNING THE ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE
NATIONAL CONGRESS<a name="FNanchor_1_190" id="FNanchor_1_190"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_190" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2>
<blockquote>
<p>[Note particularly the world-wide electoral areas.]</p></blockquote>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter I. General Principles</span></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 1. These laws are formulated in conjunction
with what is provided in Section <i>ii</i> of Article 2 in the Law
concerning the System of Organization of the National
Congress.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 2. Besides the Representatives to the National
Congress without election, there shall also be provided:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>i.</i> 665 Representatives elected through district election.</p>
<p><i>ii.</i> 380 Representatives elected through professional
election.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[Pg 303]</a></span></p>
<p><i>iii.</i> 155 Representatives elected through special election.</p>
<p><i>iv.</i> 240 Representatives appointed by the National
Government.</p></blockquote>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 3. All citizens of China above 20 years of age
have the privilege of voting for Representatives to Congress,
upon taking the oath of citizenship.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 4. The following persons have no privilege of
voting:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>i.</i> Rebels against the National Government, proven
or under arrest.</p>
<p><i>ii.</i> Corrupt officials, proven or under arrest.</p>
<p><i>iii.</i> Those whose citizenship privileges have been forfeited
due to crimes, etc.</p>
<p><i>iv.</i> Those who are insolvent.</p>
<p><i>v.</i> Those afflicted with mental diseases.</p>
<p><i>vi.</i> Those smoking opium or substitutes therefor.</p></blockquote>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 5. Each voter may have not more than two
choices.</p>
<p>Those who may both elect in the district and the professional
elections should participate in the professional election.
Those who may both elect in the professional election
and the special election should elect in the special election.
In professional election, an elector eligible in more than
two professions should vote only in one of them at his
choice.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 6. The Representatives to the National Congress
are elected by balloting which does not require signature,
and by single entry. The names of candidates for Representative
should be printed on the ballot, and the electors are
to choose one man out of them.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 7. Candidates for Representative who receive a
majority vote are elected as Representatives. In case of tie,
the candidates shall draw lots to decide who is the elected
Representative.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 8. After the full number of Representatives has
been obtained, those candidates who obtain some votes [but
less than a majority] will be reserve Representatives. Their
rank will be based upon the number of votes. In number
the reserve Representatives shall correspond to the elected
Representatives.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter II. District Election</span></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 9. All provinces and cities directly under the
Executive Yüan shall elect a number of Representatives<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[Pg 304]</a></span>
corresponding to the attached List No. 1, and according to the
laws governing District Elections.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 10. The Representatives from various provinces
are elected in various districts. The division of districts and
the number of Representatives elected in every district are
fixed in the attached List No. 2.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 11. The Heads of the <i>hsiang</i> [suburb of a city]
and of the <i>chên</i> [a village market] of each <i>hsien</i> in the electorate
should nominate candidates. The number should be
ten times that of the number of Representatives to be
elected. If there is a <i>shih</i> within the electorate, the Head of
the <i>fang</i> [a group of houses in a <i>shih</i>] should also participate
in the nomination. If there is no Head of the <i>hsiang</i>
or <i>chên</i> in a <i>hsien</i>, then the corresponding officials of the
<i>hsiang</i>, <i>chên</i>, or <i>hsien</i> shall nominate.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 12. Candidates for Representative should have
the following qualifications:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>i.</i> Possess the qualifications of an elector of the Representatives
and have taken the citizenship oath in an
electorate other than this one.</p>
<p><i>ii.</i> Be above twenty-five years of age.</p>
<p><i>iii.</i> Be a resident of the respective electoral district.</p></blockquote>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 13. Representatives to the National Congress in
each district are elected in the manner prescribed in Article 6.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 14. The Special Municipalities directly under
the Executive Yüan should elect their Representatives according
to Articles 11-13 and Article 15.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter III. Professional Election</span></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 15. The various professional organs in provinces
or Special Municipalities should elect a number of
Representatives according to the attached List No. 3.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 16. Organs of the liberal professions shall elect
Representatives not according to localities or districts.
Their numbers are fixed in attached List No. 4.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 17. The professional organs participating in
the election are limited to those who were legally recognized
before the adoption of this code of laws.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 18. The officers of the various professional organs
shall nominate Representatives for those particular
professions. Their number should be three times the number
of Representatives to be elected. The officers mentioned
above are limited to those who have executive power
in that particular professional organ.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[Pg 305]</a></span></p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 19.</span> Nominated Representatives for professional
election should have the following qualifications:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>i.</i> Possess the privileges of an elector.</p>
<p><i>ii.</i> Be above twenty-five years of age.</p>
<p><i>iii.</i> Have been practicing in that profession for three years or more.</p>
<p><i>iv.</i> Be a member of that professional organization.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The period of practicing that profession may be the sum
of intermittent periods of practice.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 20.</span> The Representatives of professional organs
should be elected by legally recognized electors according to
Article 6.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 21.</span> If there are several sub-organs to a professional
organization, the nomination of Representatives
should be made by the officials of the lowest sub-organ, and
elected by the members of the lowest sub-organ.</p>
<p>If the members of the professional organization form
groups, then the election of Representatives should be done
by the individual members of those groups.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 22.</span> In Special Municipalities directly under the
Executive Yüan, the nomination and election of Representatives
from professional organizations should be in accordance
with Article 24.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 23.</span> For organs of the liberal professions, their
manner of nominating and electing is the same as for professional
organizations.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter IV. Special Elections</span></h3>
<h4>Section 1. <i>Elections in the Provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol</i></h4>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 24.</span> No distinction concerning district or profession
is made in the election of Representatives in these
four provinces. Their numbers are:</p>
<div class="center">
<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="Numbers of representatives from provinces">
<tr><td align="right"><i>i.</i></td><td align="left">For Liaoning</td><td align="right">14</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right"><i>ii.</i></td><td align="left">For Kirin</td><td align="right">13</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right"><i>iii.</i></td><td align="left">For Heilungkiang</td><td align="right">9</td></tr>
<tr><td align="right"><i>iv.</i></td><td align="left">For Jehol</td><td align="right">9</td></tr>
</table></div>
<p>Two of the Representatives from Kirin are elected in the
Special Eastern District of that Province.</p>
<p>[Provision is made for the use of polls in exile and for
absentee ballots.]</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[Pg 306]</a></span></p>
<h4>Section 2. <i>Elections in Mongolia and Tibet</i></h4>
<p>[This follows the provisions of Section 1.]</p>
<h4>Section 3. <i>Representatives from Overseas</i></h4>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 32.</span> The numbers of Representatives from overseas
are as follows:</p>
<div class="center">
<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="Representatives from overseas">
<tr><td align="left">1 from Hawaii</td><td align="left">1 from Chile</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">1 from Peru</td><td align="left">1 from Cuba</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">1 from Mexico</td><td align="left">1 from Central America</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">3 from the United States</td><td align="left">2 from the Philippines</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">2 from Canada</td><td align="left">4 from Malaya</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">3 from Annam</td><td align="left">2 from Thailand (Siam)</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">1 from India</td><td align="left">2 from Burma</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">1 from Europe</td><td align="left">1 from Japan</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">1 from Korea</td><td align="left">1 from Australia</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">1 from Tahiti</td><td align="left">1 from Africa</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">4 from The Netherlands East Indies</td><td align="left">1 from Hong Kong</td></tr>
<tr><td align="left">1 from Macao</td><td align="left">1 from Formosa</td></tr>
</table></div>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 33.</span> The nomination of overseas Representatives
is modelled after that of Professional Elections. But the
groups nominating the Representatives are to be approved
by the Central Committee of Overseas Affairs.</p>
<p>The National Government shall fix twice the number of
Representatives electable as nominated Representatives.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 34.</span> The election of Overseas Representatives is
modelled after that governing provincial districts.</p>
<h4>Section 4. <i>Elections in the Army, Navy, and Air Forces</i></h4>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 35.</span> Thirty Representatives shall be elected from
the Nation's army, navy, air force, and other military organs.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 36.</span> Nominations of Representatives from the
military are as follows:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>i.</i> The Army: Two nominations from every division.
One from every independent lü [brigade] or from special
brigades holding more than two tuan [regiments]. For
the rest of the smaller forces, nomination of Representatives
shall be made by combination of the forces.</p>
<p><i>ii.</i> The Navy: Each fleet may nominate one Representative.
All the Marines combined may nominate one
Representative. The Department of the Navy will combine
the remainder to nominate Representatives.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[Pg 307]</a></span></p>
<p><i>iii.</i> The Air Force shall nominate one Representative.</p>
<p><i>iv.</i> Three Representatives shall be nominated by other
military organs.</p></blockquote>
<p>The National Government will appoint ninety Representatives
thus nominated as the nominated Representatives.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 37.</span> The nominated Representatives will be
elected by the officers and soldiers of the military who have
the qualifications of electors. Representatives are elected in
the manner prescribed in Article 6.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 38.</span> Representatives nominated should have the
following qualifications:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>i.</i> Possess the qualifications of an elector.</p>
<p><i>ii.</i> Be more than twenty-five years of age.</p>
<p><i>iii.</i> Have served for more than five years in the troops
with good record, or be a graduate of good standing from
a military school.</p></blockquote>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter V. Election of the Chief Election Office and of the Election Inspectors</span></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 39.</span> The National Government forms the Chief
Election Office of the Representatives of the National Congress.
The Office is headed by a Commissioner and a Deputy
Commissioner. Election Inspectors are also specially
appointed to direct and watch all affairs of the election.
The appointment of the Chief Election Office is determined
by order.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 40.</span> The Election Inspector of every province is
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Civil Affairs of the
province.</p>
<p>The Provincial Election Inspector is the highest executive
official of the province. In case there is no highest official,
the Chief Election Office will appoint one of the executive
officials to fill the post.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 41.</span> In Special Municipalities directly under the
Executive Yüan, the Inspector is the City Mayor.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 42.</span> In elections in Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang,
and Jehol, and of liberal professional organizations,
the Minister of the Ministry of the Interior will be the
Inspector-General. In elections in Mongolia and Tibet, the
Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission
will be the Inspector-General. In overseas elections,
the Chairman of the Overseas Affairs Committee will be the
Inspector-General.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[Pg 308]</a></span></p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 43.</span> Elections in Mongolia, Tibet, and overseas
and military elections shall be under the Inspectors appointed
by the Chief Election Office.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 44.</span> The qualifications of the electors, the nominated
and elected Representatives shall be examined by
the Inspectors.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 45.</span> The date and locality of the election are
fixed by the Election Inspectors.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 46.</span> The rest of the officials for the election, <i>e.g.</i>,
ballot administrators and inspectors, etc., are also appointed
by the Inspectors-General.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 47.</span> Inspectors and officials for electoral affairs
cannot be the Congress Representatives of that district or
professional organization.</p>
<p>[<span class="smcap">Article 48 omitted in the text.</span>]</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VI. Election and Forfeited Election</span></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 49.</span> The election is considered null and void if:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>i.</i> It is legally proved that more than one-third of
the electorate are cheating in or manipulating the election;
or,</p>
<p><i>ii.</i> It is legally proved that the election is not conducted
according to the laws prescribed.</p></blockquote>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 50.</span> In case of an election being forfeited, it
should be performed again according to law, unless it be
too late to repeat under the existing circumstances.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 51.</span> Elected Representatives lose their privilege
when:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>i.</i> They die; or,</p>
<p><i>ii.</i> It is legally proved that their submitted qualifications
are false; or,</p>
<p><i>iii.</i> It is legally proved that the number of ballots is
incorrect.</p></blockquote>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 52.</span> When an elected Representative loses his
privilege or when he refuses to take his privilege, the reserve
Representative will take his place as prescribed in
Article 8.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VII. Law Suits Concerning Election Affairs</span></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 53.</span> Electors or nominated Representatives who
are not elected may file suit within ten days of the date of
the election against any administrative officer of the election
if they hold that he abuses his duty.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[Pg 309]</a></span></p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 54.</span> If electors or nominated Representatives
who are not elected see that the number of ballots cast for
the elected Representatives are untrue, or that the qualifications
of the elected Representatives are untrue, they may
file suit within five days of the date for announcement of
successful candidates.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 55.</span> All law suits connected with election affairs
will be heard by the Supreme Court. They shall take
precedence over all other cases, and sentence will be given
after one single hearing. Law suits connected with military
elections will be heard before a military tribunal.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 56.</span> Offenses committed during an election are
governed by the criminal code.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VIII. Supplement</span></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 57.</span> When it is impossible to elect in Special
Elections as prescribed in Chapter IV, the National Government
may appoint Representatives.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 58.</span> The Chief Election Office for the Election
of Representatives to the National Congress is the sole organ
empowered to interpret the meaning of this set of laws.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 59.</span> The detailed procedure for enforcing these
laws will be fixed by order.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 60.</span> The date of enforcing these laws will be
fixed by order.</p>
<p>[The attached lists are omitted.]</p>
<div class="footnotes">
<h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_190" id="Footnote_1_190"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_190"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> "Kuo-min Ta-hui Tai-piao Hsüan-chü Fa" in Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan
Pu (Party-Ministry of Publicity) <i>Hsien-chêng Chien-shê Fa-kuei</i>,
Chungking, XXVIII (1939), p. 38-49.</p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<h2><i>D.</i> THE PROGRAM OF RESISTANCE AND RECONSTRUCTION<a name="FNanchor_1_191" id="FNanchor_1_191"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_191" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2>
<blockquote>
<p>This quasi-constitutional proclamation of war policy for the nation
was adopted by the Kuomintang Party Congress, Emergency Session,
at Hankow, March 29, 1938.</p></blockquote>
<h3>A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES:</h3>
<p>1. Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary principles and his
other teachings are hereby declared to be the supreme authority,
regulating all war-time activities and the work of
national reconstruction.</p>
<p>2. All war-time powers and forces are hereby placed under<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[Pg 310]</a></span>
the control of the Kuomintang and of General Chiang
K'ai-shek.</p>
<h3>B. DIPLOMACY:</h3>
<p>3. China is prepared to ally herself with all states and
nations that sympathize with her cause, and to wage a common
struggle for peace and justice.</p>
<p>4. China is prepared to safeguard and strengthen the
machinery of peace as well as all treaties and conventions
that have the maintenance of peace as their ultimate object.</p>
<p>5. China is prepared to ally herself with all forces that
are opposed to Japanese imperialism in order to check
Japanese aggression and to safeguard peace in the Far East.</p>
<p>6. China is prepared to improve still further the existing
friendly relations with other Powers in order to gain
more sympathy for the cause.</p>
<p>7. All bogus political organizations which Japan has
created in consequence of her military occupation of Chinese
territory, and all their actions, are hereby repudiated
and declared null and void.</p>
<h3>C. MILITARY AFFAIRS:</h3>
<p>8. The army shall receive more political training, so that
both officers and men may appreciate the importance of
war-time national reconstruction and be ready to lay down
their lives for the nation.</p>
<p>9. All able-bodied men shall be trained; the people shall
have their military strength increased; the troops at the
various fronts shall be supplied with new recruits. Overseas
Chinese who have returned home to offer their services
at the front shall be given a proper course of training to fit
them for their work.</p>
<p>10. All people who have arms of their own shall receive
the support and encouragement of the Government and,
under the direction of local military authorities, shall cooperate
with the regular army to defend the country against
foreign invasion. Guerrilla warfare shall be waged in the
enemy's rear with the object of smashing and dividing his
military forces.</p>
<p>11. Both the wounded and the killed shall be pensioned;
the disabled shall be cared for; and the families of soldiers
fighting at the front shall be treated with the utmost consideration,
so that people will rejoice to fight for their
country and the work of national mobilization may proceed
with the highest degree of efficiency.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[Pg 311]</a></span></p>
<h3>D. POLITICS:</h3>
<p>12. A People's Political Council shall be created in order
to unify the national strength, to utilize the best minds of
the nation, and to facilitate the formulation and execution
of national policies.</p>
<p>13. The district [<i>hsien</i>] shall be taken as the fundamental
unit from which the work of increasing the self-defensive
power of the people shall be started. The conditions of
local self-government shall be fulfilled as soon as possible, so
that the political and social basis of the present war shall
have been firmly established and a preparation shall have
been made for the eventual promulgation of a constitution.</p>
<p>14. A thorough reform in the central and local governmental
machinery shall be instituted with the object of
simplifying and making it rational. Only thus can administrative
efficiency be obtained to meet the urgent needs
of war.</p>
<p>15. The conduct of all officials, both high and low, shall
conform to rules of propriety. They shall be faithful to
their work, ready to sacrifice themselves for the cause of the
nation, observe discipline, and obey orders, so that they
may serve as a model for the people. If they prove to be
disloyal and obstruct the prosecution of the war, they shall
be tried by court martial.</p>
<p>16. Corrupt officials shall be severely punished, and their
property shall be confiscated.</p>
<h3>E. ECONOMICS:</h3>
<p>17. Economic reconstruction shall concern itself mainly
with matters of military importance, and incidentally with
matters that contribute to the improvement of the livelihood
of the people. With these objects in view, a planned
economy shall be put into operation, investments by people
both at home and abroad shall be encouraged, and large-scale
war-time production shall be undertaken.</p>
<p>18. The greatest measure of energy shall be devoted to
the development of village economy, the encouragement of
cooperative enterprises, the unhampered transportation of
foodstuffs, the cultivation of waste land, and the work of
irrigation.</p>
<p>19. Mining shall be undertaken; the foundations of
heavy industries shall be laid; light industries shall be encouraged;
and handicraft industries in the various provinces
shall be developed.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[Pg 312]</a></span></p>
<p>20. War-time taxes shall be levied, and thoroughgoing
reforms in financial administration shall be instituted.</p>
<p>21. The banking business shall be strictly controlled, so
that commercial and industrial activities may be properly
adjusted.</p>
<p>22. The legal tender shall be made unassailable; foreign
exchange shall be controlled; and imports and exports shall
be regulated in order to secure financial stability.</p>
<p>23. Facilities of communication shall be improved; transportation
by steamers, automobiles, and aeroplanes shall
be undertaken; railroads and highways shall be built; and
air lines shall be increased.</p>
<p>24. No profiteering or cornering shall be allowed; and a
system of price-fixing shall be instituted.</p>
<h3>F. MASS MOVEMENT:</h3>
<p>25. The people throughout the country shall be organized
into occupational groups such as farmers, laborers,
merchants, and students. The principle shall be: From
each according to his ability. The rich shall contribute in
money, and the able-bodied shall sweat. All classes of people
shall be mobilized for war.</p>
<p>26. In the course of the war, the freedom of speech, the
freedom of the press, and the freedom of assembly shall be
fully guaranteed to the people, provided they do not contravene
Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary principles or the
provisions of the law.</p>
<p>27. Refugees from the war areas as well as unemployed
people shall receive relief, and shall be given proper training
to fit them for war-time work.</p>
<p>28. National consciousness shall be instilled into the people,
so that they may assist the Government in detecting and
eradicating treasonable acts. Traitors shall be severely punished,
and their property shall be confiscated.</p>
<h3>G. EDUCATION:</h3>
<p>29. The whole educational system shall be reorganized.
A course of war-time education shall be instituted and
emphasis shall be placed on the cultivation of morals,
scientific research, and the expansion of research facilities.</p>
<p>30. Various technical experts shall be trained and assigned
to proper posts in order to meet the requirements of
war.</p>
<p>31. The youths of the nation shall be properly trained,
so that they may offer their services to society and contribute
to the cause of the war.</p>
<div class="footnotes">
<h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_191" id="Footnote_1_191"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_191"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Official English text from Ch'u Chia-hua (Party-Minister of Organization
of the Kuomintang), "Consolidation of Democracy in
China," in Council of International Affairs, <i>The Chinese Yearbook
1938-39</i>, [Hong Kong], 1939, p. 337-8.</p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[Pg 313]</a></span></p>
<h2><i>E.</i> AN OUTLINE OF WAR-TIME CONTROLMENT<a name="FNanchor_1_192" id="FNanchor_1_192"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_192" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2>
<blockquote>
<p>An official but unpublished statement, this document was presented
by the President of the Control <i>Yüan</i> to the author for inclusion in
the present work.</p></blockquote>
<p>According to Article 46, Chapter VIII of the Organic
Law of the National Government, the Control <i>Yüan</i> is "the
highest supervisory organ of the government, obliged to
exercise the power of impeachment and auditing in accordance
with law." Since the beginning of our resistance
against the Japanese invasion, the powers of control have
been gradually strengthened so as to meet the demands of
this critical time. A static control has developed into a
dynamic one; that is, more emphasis is laid upon prevention
than upon correction. Therefore the duties of the
office become heavier and more complicated, as its work becomes
more intensified. But the influence which the <i>Yüan</i>
has exercised over Chinese politics as a whole becomes also
wider and wider. In this report, we are going to describe the
activities of the <i>Yüan</i> under the two headings of the Control
<i>Yüan</i> and the Ministry of Audit.</p>
<h3>THE CONTROL YÜAN:</h3>
<p>The function of auditing is performed by the Ministry of
Audit, subsidiary to the <i>Yüan</i>. What is directly performed
by the <i>Yüan</i> is impeachment. On the authority of the Impeachment
Act, any motion of impeachment, after being
proposed by some control Committee or control Commissioner,
is to be reviewed by three other control Committees.
If the bill is passed by the three, the accused must be punished.
Whenever a bill is rejected and its proponent does
not agree to the rejection, the bill shall be reviewed once
more by five other committees whose determination shall
be final. Furthermore, emergency relief measures may be
requested, according to the urgency of the occasion; and in
order to facilitate the performance of its functions, the
<i>Yüan</i> is permitted to investigate the documents of other<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[Pg 314]</a></span>
offices as well as to demand explanations from them. The
initiation of a motion of impeachment must be based upon
one of the three following conditions:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> Article 2, Impeachment Act: "If any illegal action or
negligence of duty of an official be discovered, the Control
<i>Yüan</i> itself is permitted to bring an impeachment against
him."</p>
<p><i>b.</i> Article 4, Regulations for the Execution of Government
Rights; and Article 11, Act for the Punishment of
Officials: "Specified officials may be impeached on demand
of the superior who has submitted the case of his guilty
subordinate to the Control <i>Yüan</i>."</p>
<p><i>c.</i> "If an official be accused by the people, the case must
be investigated. If the accusation prove to be true, the accused
shall be impeached."</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Although it is very prudent that the legislators have
obliged the impeaching officers to take such steps as investigation,
motion, and review, yet in this critical time
these complicated measures must be considered too slow to
keep pace with the development of affairs.</p>
<p>After the outbreak of war, the Central Government published
the "Temporary Regulations for the Execution of
War-time Controlment," in which the Control <i>Yüan</i> was
charged with the duties of <i>censure</i> and <i>proposition</i>, besides
what have already been mentioned. By censure it is meant
that when emergency measures must be taken against an
official whose illegal action or negligence of duty has been
discovered, a written notice of censure may be submitted
to the officer who directly controls, or is immediately superior
to, the official in question. The officer receiving the
notice must decide in as short a time as possible to deal
with the censured with the administrative power in his
hands. If he holds the censured innocent, he must reply,
giving sufficient reasons. If he takes no measures, or fails
to reply, or replies groundlessly, the control Committee
making the censure is obliged to change the motion of
censure into one of impeachment, and the impeached is
liable to a penalty. Hence the principal significance of
censure is that it takes emergency measures against the undesirable
conduct of officials, so as to meet the demands of
the war-time. This also implies further extension of the
controlment to the administrative system, in order to
quicken efficiency.</p>
<p>As for <i>proposition</i>, this means that when some legally
specified obligations of office are administered feebly or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[Pg 315]</a></span>
inadequately, the Control <i>Yüan</i> may make a proposal or express
its views to the office involved or to the office immediately
superior. The office which receives the proposal
must in as short a time as possible take adequate measures
to remedy the situation. The duties of <i>proposition</i>, therefore,
can not only correct administrators, but can also improve
agencies. They are preventive, capable of requiring
strict improvement of governmental activities. Effective anticipatory
control may now be exercised over Chinese government
agencies. Since being charged with the two new
duties of censure and proposition, the Control <i>Yüan</i> has
carried them into action with prudence. And the effects
are rather remarkable.</p>
<p>When, in 1937, the government was moved to Chungking,
a part of the <i>Yüan</i> employees were ordered dismissed. But
the <i>Yüan</i> authorities still prepared copies of "Directions for
the Work of Control <i>Yüan</i> Employees in Their Native (or
Other) Cities (or Provinces)," and "Directions for the
Work of Dismissed Control <i>Yüan</i> Employees," which were
distributed to the dismissed. The former employees have
been obliged to make monthly reports upon the local phenomena
according to the "Directions." These reports are
sent to the <i>Yüan</i>, thus helping its understanding of the
truth in all corners of China.</p>
<p>In view of the fact that the "Temporary Regulations for
the Execution of War-time Controlment" came into force,
the Control <i>Yüan</i> accordingly prepared "Directions for Inspection
and Investigation." From time to time, the control
commissioners have been ordered to tour their respective
districts. Moreover, control committees have been
selected and sent out to different places to perform inspection
of administration, national spiritual mobilization, conscription,
military confiscation and requisition, the organization
and training of the people, hoarding and reserves of
supplies, communication and transportation, public support
of the war, public security, the utter erasure of traitors,
anti-air-raid preparations, ambulance equipment, the management
of wounded soldiers and of refugees, taxation and
other imposts on the people, production, construction, education,
and all other things related to the war. Thus the
work of the <i>Yüan</i> has become all the more intensified. In
order to adapt itself to the circumstances, its organization
was readjusted. A "Board of Legislative Study," subordinate
to the <i>Yüan</i>, was established, with a view to studying Dr.
Sun Yat-sen's "Constitution based upon the Principle of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[Pg 316]</a></span>
Separation of Five Powers," the Control system, and anything
related to war-time legislation about controlment.
Besides, a "Committee on Procedural Technique" was
added under the Secretariat, so that it will prepare plans for
the improvement of <i>Yüan</i> activities, and will help to carry
them into action.</p>
<p>In the spring of 1939, a "Plan of War-time Procedure
for the Second Stage of War" was passed in the Fifth Plenary
Session of the C.E.C. and C.S.C. of the Kuomintang.
Both the decision concerning Article VI of Political Report
and the lecture delivered by Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek
in this meeting showed that much was expected from
the Control <i>Yüan</i>. Abiding by the government's policy and
taking into consideration its present needs, the <i>Yüan</i>, in
addition to the performance of impeachment, censure, proposition
and other functions established by law, prepared
"An Outline of the Execution of War-time Controlment for
the Second Stage" and its "Preliminary Procedure," with
the extension of inspection as the chief means to set the
machinery in motion.</p>
<p>According to the aforementioned "Outline" and "Procedure,"
the work of inspection is classified into two kinds.
The inspection of the conduct of political officers and administrative
officials is termed the <i>general inspection</i>. When
special agents are sent out to inspect specified cases, this is
called the <i>special inspection</i>. For the general inspection
of the Central Government, the units are the offices, while
for that of the local governments, the units are the districts
[<i>hsien</i>]. In the case of a special inspection, when the agents
are sent out solely by the Control <i>Yüan</i>, the term used is
<i>exclusive inspection</i>; the inspection performed cooperatively
by agents both of the <i>Yüan</i> and of other offices is called
<i>joint inspection</i>.</p>
<p>The general inspection has, since January 1940, been
vigorously put into effect. For instance, the anti-air-raid
preparations on the outskirts of Chungking, the relief and
management of wounded soldiers, refugees, and suffering
children, and the spiritual mobilization of central and local
government offices (including problems of efficiency and
diligence) have all been carefully examined. Moreover,
Control Committees have been sent out to different districts
within certain periods, the frequency of which is based upon
the importance of the place. Some went to Kweichow and
Szechwan to inspect local administration in different districts.
Recently, committees have been sent out to Shantung<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[Pg 317]</a></span>
to make a variety of inspections. As for the special
inspections, delegates have been incessantly sent out to
make exclusive inspections; and joint inspections have also
been made, by the joining of many control committees into
the Itinerant Inspection Corps for Military Discipline and
Morale, and the War-time Economic Inspection Corps.
Committees which have thus been delegated to joint work
are not only obliged to fulfil duties required by the Corps,
but are also permitted independently to impeach or censure
illegal or incompetent officials, whether civil or military.
The primary functions of the committees remain unaffected.</p>
<p>Since military operations must be in harmony with political
administration, wherever the military power reaches,
the power of controlment must follow in its wake. The
Control <i>Yüan</i> recently prepared the "Regulations for the
Organization of Control <i>Yüan</i> War-time Inspection Corps
of War Districts," which were later sanctioned and then
promulgated. The number of the corps and of the areas to
be inspected are fixed according to the War Districts marked
off by the Military Affairs Commission. Each corps consists
of three committees, and is organized by the control committees
themselves; if there is a control commissioner in the
area, he of course joins the committee, and performs all the
functions established for him by law. Under each committee
there are one secretary, one inspecting agent, three
assistants, and one clerk—to assist the committees in routine
administration.</p>
<p>Since the work of the control commissioners is stationary,
behind the battle lines, the Inspection Corps of War Districts
are itinerant, so that their emphasis can be laid upon
the front. They are mutually dependent and intimately
correlated. The network of national controlment is completed
by the mobilization of the control committees to be
sent out to make inspections, so that corruption may be eliminated
and law and order enforced. And undoubtedly our
resistance against the Japanese invasion has been benefited.
This work is indeed a great help to the construction of a
new China.</p>
<div class="footnotes">
<h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_192" id="Footnote_1_192"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_192"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> An unpublished memorandum presented in manuscript by President
Yü Yu-jên of the Control <i>Yüan</i> to the author in Chungking,
September 1940. It consists of nine folios, not numbered, with a chart.
It is entitled <i>Chan Shih Chien-ch'a K'ai-lüeh</i> (An Outline of War-time
Controlment), and is dated August, XXVIII (1939). The present extract
is folios 1-A to 4-B.</p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[Pg 318]</a></span></p>
<h2><i>F.</i> A CHART OF THE CONTROL <i>YÜAN</i> FROM JULY 1937 TO
JUNE 1940<a name="FNanchor_1_193" id="FNanchor_1_193"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_193" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2>
<h3>THE READJUSTMENT:</h3>
<p>Since the outbreak of war, the <i>Yüan</i>, together with other
offices of the Government, was moved from Nanking to
Chungking. In order to adapt itself to the circumstances,
its organization was readjusted. A "Board of Legislative
Study" was established, while the six sections of General
Affairs, Editing, Book-Collection, Printing, Receipt and
Transmission,<a name="FNanchor_2_194" id="FNanchor_2_194"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_194" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> and Archive, all subordinate to the Secretariat,
were merged into four departments. Moreover, a
"Committee on Administrative Procedure" and two new
sections, called the first and the second, were added to the
main body of the <i>Yüan</i>.</p>
<h3>THE FUNCTIONS:</h3>
<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;">
<img src="images/i_318.jpg" width="400" height="129" alt="The functions" />
</div>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[Pg 319]</a></span></p>
<h3>THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION:</h3>
<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;">
<img src="images/i_319.jpg" width="400" height="165" alt="The present organization" />
</div>
<h3>THE WORK:</h3>
<div class="center">
<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="The Work">
<tr><td>1.</td><td align="left">Acceptance of people's petitions and investigations:</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">Number of petitions received in this period....<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">[Number is omitted from original report.]</span></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">Number of cases in which delegates were sent out to investigate....<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">[Number omitted.]</span></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">Number of cases in which other offices were charged to investigate....<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">[Number omitted.]</span></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left" colspan="3">(Those petitions which were either outside the function
of control or false in the<br />
description of facts were remarked upon and preserved by the committees.)</td></tr>
<tr><td>2.</td><td align="left">Motions:</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">Number of impeachments moved</td><td align="right">121</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">Number of censures moved</td><td align="right">149</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">Number of propositions moved</td><td align="right">234</td></tr>
<tr><td>3.</td><td align="left">Supervisions of Civil Service Examinations:</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">Number of Higher Examinations supervised</td><td align="right">2</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">Number of Common Examinations supervised</td><td align="right">5</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">Number of Special Examinations supervised</td><td align="right">34</td></tr>
<tr><td>4.</td><td align="left">Supervisions of the relief of sufferers from natural calamities:</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td align="left">Total number</td><td align="right">5</td></tr>
<tr><td>5.</td><td align="left" colspan="2">Inspections:<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">[A detailed enumeration of inspections performed and results
accomplished is here omitted.]</span></td></tr>
<tr><td>6.</td><td align="left">Cooperation with other offices:<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">[The detailed summary is omitted.]</span></td></tr>
</table></div>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[Pg 320]</a></span></p>
<h3>THE MINISTRY OF AUDIT:</h3>
<p>The functions of audit, as performed by the Ministry
of Audit, are founded upon the Auditing Act. The old
Auditing Act, however, is too tradition-bound and therefore
inconvenient. The necessity of revision is especially
pressing in war-time. In the spring of 1938, the Ministry
prepared a draft Act and submitted it to the Legislative
<i>Yüan</i>. The latter adopted this and published a New Auditing
Act. According to the New Auditing Act, the Ministry
is charged with three functions of internal checking (interior
auditing), auditing (post-auditing) and supervision.
These functions include:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>i.</i> Supervision of the execution of the budgets;</p>
<p><i>ii.</i> Scrutiny of orders of receipt and payment;</p>
<p><i>iii.</i> Scrutiny of computations and balance sheets;</p>
<p><i>iv.</i> Control of illegal or unfaithful conduct in financial affairs.
</p></blockquote>
<p>Two merits of the New Auditing Act should be mentioned.
In the first place, emphasis has been laid upon
visiting auditing. For instance, the work of internal checking
is not limited to the supervision of the receipts and
disbursements of the State Treasury by the scrutiny and
indorsement of the receiving and paying orders; but even
receiving and paying vouchers of Government offices have
been made ineffective, unless scrutinized and indorsed by
auditors stationed in the offices by the Ministry. Owing to
the vastness of the area of China, and owing also to the
limited number of workers available in this line, this system<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[Pg 321]</a></span>
is not universally applicable. Only offices in which the
work of receiving and paying is especially heavy find such
auditors present. As for auditing, the Government offices
were formerly obliged only to submit to the Ministry accounting
reports which they themselves had prepared. It
is different now. The New Act ordains that auditors should
be sent out periodically by the Ministry to visit the Government
offices and scrutinize their books and vouchers.
Or in each year, some offices should be selected to be thus
scrutinized. The duties of supervision were not clearly defined,
but they now include the following items: (<i>a</i>) the
supervision of the revenue and expenditures of the offices;
(<i>b</i>) the scrutiny of cash, bills, and bonds in the offices;
(<i>c</i>) the supervision of the construction of buildings and of
the purchase or sale of the property attached to the offices;
(<i>d</i>) the supervision of the drawing and repayment of bonds
and the destruction of bonds returned; (<i>e</i>) joint-administration
with the financial departments of other offices; and
(<i>f</i>) the scrutiny of other administrative affairs related to
finance.</p>
<p>Secondly, the New Auditing Act ordains that the Ministry
of Audit is directly responsible for the auditing of financial
affairs of the offices of different ranks of the Central Government,
while that of the local governments is under the
charge of local auditing offices, subordinate to the Ministry.</p>
<p>[A detailed narrative of the war-time work of the ministry
is omitted.]</p>
<p>Before the outbreak of war, the Ministry had established
auditing offices in the Provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Hupeh,
Shensi and Honan and in the city of Shanghai, and
one sub-office for the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. The office
of Shanghai concurrently took charge of the auditing
affairs of the Nanking-Shanghai Railway; and that of
Hupeh, the affairs of the Peiping-Hankow Railway. In
1938 the offices of Hunan, Kweichow and Szechwan were
established. In July 1939, a conference of auditors was
held in Chungking. All auditors sent out now returned to
attend it. They reported on their work, assisted the auditors
in the Ministry, and discussed with them the directions
of war-time auditing. In October, Mr. Lin Yün-kai,
the Minister of Audit, visited Szechwan, Shensi, Kansu,
and Chinghai to inspect the audit work going on in Shensi
and Szechwan and at the same time to examine the local
financial conditions as a step toward the extension of the
auditing system.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[Pg 322]</a></span></p>
<p>In the spring of 1939, the Ministry prepared "An Outline
for the Execution of War-time Audits" which was passed
and enacted by the Supreme National Defense Council.
There are eleven items, to be carried out in several periods,
in this outline. A part of them are required by the New
Auditing Act, while the rest are the new work arising from
the war. They are as follows:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> Auditing prefectural [<i>hsien</i>] finance: A prefecture, on
the authority of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Constitution, is the unit
of self-government; and whenever the self-government is accomplished,
China becomes constitutional. This being the
case, the prefectural finance actually concerns the future of
the country and the people. Therefore, beginning from
1939, the Ministry introduced the auditing of prefectural
finance. It ordered the provincial offices to have the prefectures
make monthly reports on their revenue and expenditure.
The reports should be submitted to the provincial
auditing offices which will also send out delegates to scrutinize
the accounting records of some selected prefectures
as well as to investigate the prefectural financial organizations,
the taxation system, and the sorts of taxes. Up to
June 1940, there have been 84 prefectures selected for such
investigation.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> The auditing of the Central Government Offices in
the provinces and cities where no auditing offices have been
established: In such cases, the Ministry has appointed the
auditing offices of neighboring localities to take charge.
But the Ministry has taken over the auditing affairs of
Chungking for the moment. Meantime, plans have been
made to establish auditing offices in Kwangsi, Fukien,
etc.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> The auditing of the receipts and disbursements of
public treasuries: Since October 1939, when the Public
Treasury Act came into force, the Ministry has sent delegates
to the State Treasury Bureau to scrutinize and indorse
the accounting vouchers, and the provincial offices have
sent delegates to Provincial Treasuries as well.</p>
<p><i>d.</i> The auditing of special funds: As a rule, the institutes
in charge of special funds have from time to time submitted
their reports on their receipts and disbursements to the
Ministry. Since 1939, the Ministry has also sent delegates to
examine strictly these funds.</p>
<p><i>e.</i> Itinerant auditing: The present economic conditions
do not permit the Ministry to establish auditing offices in
all the government-owned concerns. But itinerant auditing,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[Pg 323]</a></span>
after the model of circuit courts, has been introduced since
1939. The Suchow-Kunming and Yünnan-Burma Railways
have been thus examined. The provincial offices have also
applied this system to the business offices.</p>
<p><i>f.</i> The visiting auditing: The system of visiting auditing
has been developed gradually. Delegates have been stationed
in Sufferers' Relief Committee, City Government of
Chungking, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economics,
and Ministry of Communications. Other delegates have
been sent out to visit some selected offices who have submitted
their accounting reports.</p>
<p><i>g.</i> The supervision of the revenue of government offices:
Salt Tax and Commodities Tax have been scrutinized.</p>
<p><i>h.</i> The supervision of clothing, provisions, and other
military supplies: Since the outbreak of war, the amount
of clothing, provisions, etc. purchased by the military
authorities has greatly increased. The delegates from the
Ministry are always present on the occasions of signing contracts,
announcing the bids, deciding the winning bidder,
and delivering the goods. If the supplies are purchased in
the provinces, the provincial offices are in charge of the
supervision.</p>
<p><i>i.</i> The supervision of mass purchase and constructions:
The delegates from the Ministry or its provincial offices are
always present on the occasions of signing contracts, announcing
the bids, deciding the winning bidder, and delivering
the goods or completing constructions when there
are any mass purchases or sales of government-owned property
or any construction work.</p>
<p><i>j.</i> The financial scrutiny of the war-time provisional organizations:
There are huge sums of receipts and disbursements
in such organizations as the "Joint Emergency Air
Raid Relief Office of Chungking" and the general office
of the "National Committee for Soldiers' Comfort," so that
their auditing affairs are made the charge of the delegates
from the Ministry.</p>
<p><i>k.</i> The supervision of the payment, preservation, and
usage of contributions of all sorts: National Salvation Bonds,
Aviation Contribution, and all other contributions donated
by the Chinese at home and abroad have been scrutinized
by the Ministry delegates.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Many considerable results have been achieved since the
execution of the above items from January 1939, to date.
The "Auditing Plan for 1941" has already been prepared
by the Ministry. When it is passed by the Supreme
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[Pg 324]</a></span>National Defense Council, it will come into force from January
of next year.</p>
<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_193" id="Footnote_1_193"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_193"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Continuation of Appendix I (E), p. <a href="#Page_133">313</a>; this comprises folios
5-A to 9-A with chart.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_2_194" id="Footnote_2_194"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_194"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> A formal agency for the receipt and registry of incoming communications,
and of verification and transmission of outgoing ones.</p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<h2><i>G.</i> REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION
OF THE VARIOUS CLASSIFICATIONS OF <i>HSIEN</i><a name="FNanchor_1_195" id="FNanchor_1_195"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_195" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2>
<blockquote>
<p>These laws, a fundamental charter for local self-government, were
approved and promulgated by the 14th Regular Meeting of the Supreme
National Defense Council, August 31, 1939. For the Generalissimo's
lecture on the same subject, see Appendix III (C), p. <a href="#Page_388">388</a>.</p></blockquote>
<h3>A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES</h3>
<p>1. Each <i>hsien</i> is a self-administrative unit. Its size and
area are determined by customs and history but subject to
the demarcation of the National Government.</p>
<p>2. There are three to six classes of <i>hsien</i>, classified according
to area, population, and conditions of economy,
culture, and communications. The classifications are to
be worked out by the Provincial Government and subject
to the approval of the Ministry of Interior.</p>
<p>3. Regulations governing <i>hsien</i> administration are to
be promulgated by the National Government.</p>
<p>4. Each <i>hsien</i> is divided into <i>hsiang</i>, and each <i>hsiang</i> is
further divided into <i>pao</i> and <i>chia</i>. If a <i>hsien</i> is too large,
it may be first divided into <i>ch'ü</i> to be under the charge of
several bureaus. Education institutions, police, public
health and tariff offices should be distributed in accordance
with above-mentioned divisions.</p>
<p>5. Each <i>hsien</i> and each <i>hsiang</i> is a legal person.</p>
<p>6. At the age of twenty, a man or woman of Chinese nationality,
after living in the <i>hsien</i> for six months or more,
or having possessed a residence for more than one year, is
qualified as a citizen of that <i>hsien</i>. He or she has the right
of suffrage, recall, initiative, and referendum in this <i>hsien</i>.
The following persons are disqualified:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> Those who are deprived of citizenship by the National
Government.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[Pg 325]</a></span></p>
<p><i>b.</i> Those who owe governmental money.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> Those who have been imprisoned for [political] corruption<a name="FNanchor_2_196" id="FNanchor_2_196"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_196" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>
or forgery.</p>
<p><i>d.</i> Those who are not allowed to possess personal property.</p>
<p><i>e.</i> Those who are opium or other poisonous smokers.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3>B. THE <i>Hsien</i> GOVERNMENT (<i>hsien chêng-fu</i>)</h3>
<p>7. There shall be one magistrate (<i>hsien-chang</i>) for each
<i>hsien</i>. His duties are:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> To supervise the local administration of the whole
<i>hsien</i> under the control of the Provincial Government.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> To carry out Provincial or Central Government orders
under the supervision of the Provincial Government.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>8. The <i>Hsien</i> Government consists of the following departments:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> Civil Affairs Department.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> Financial Department.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> Educational Department.</p>
<p><i>d.</i> Reconstruction Department.</p>
<p><i>e.</i> Land Affairs Department.</p>
<p><i>f.</i> Social Affairs Department.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The number of departments and the distribution of functions
are determined by the Provincial Government in accordance
with the class and necessities [of the <i>hsien</i>], and
registered with the Ministry of the Interior.</p>
<p>9. In the <i>Hsien</i> Government there are to be secretaries,
department heads, advisors, police officers, clerks and technicians.
The number of such staff and their salaries are to
be determined by the Provincial Government and subject
to the approval of the Ministry of the Interior.</p>
<p>10. The examination, training, appointing, and discharging
of a magistrate or of general staffs are to be done according
to the promulgated National law.</p>
<p>11. There shall be a <i>Hsien</i> Council (<i>hsien chêng hui</i>)
which is to be convened every two weeks. The following
matters should be settled in this Council:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> Cases brought out by the <i>Hsien</i> People's Council.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> Other important matters concerning <i>hsien</i> policies.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>(The regulations governing the <i>Hsien</i> Council are promulgated
by the Ministry of the Interior.)</p>
<p>12. The <i>Hsien</i> Council meeting can be held before the
establishment of the <i>Hsien</i> People's Council.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[Pg 326]</a></span></p>
<p>13. Regulations concerning a <i>hsien</i> shall be drafted by
the Provincial Government and submitted to the Executive
<i>Yüan</i> for its approval through the Ministry of the Interior.</p>
<p>Any organizations which are not mentioned in the regulations
should not be established.</p>
<p>14. Regulations governing the <i>hsien</i> administration shall
be drafted by the Provincial Government and registered in
the Ministry of the Interior.</p>
<h3>C. THE <i>Hsien</i> PEOPLE'S COUNCIL (<i>hsien ts'ang-chêng hui</i>)</h3>
<p>15. The <i>Hsien</i> People's Council is organized by the members
of the Council who are elected from People's Representative
Committee. Each <i>hsiang</i> elects one member. Representatives
of public organizations may be recognized as
members, but the number of such members should not comprise
more than one-third of the whole Council.</p>
<p>16. The chairman of the Council should be elected from
its members.</p>
<p>17. The bylaws and the duties of the Council shall be
dealt with separately.</p>
<h3>D. FINANCES OF A <i>Hsien</i></h3>
<p>18. <i>Hsien</i> revenue consists of the following items:</p>
<blockquote><p><i>a.</i> Part of the land tax.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> Surtax on the land tax.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> Thirty per cent of the stamp tax.</p>
<p><i>d.</i> Taxes on land after improvement.</p>
<p><i>e.</i> Part of the business taxes.</p>
<p><i>f.</i> Income from public properties.</p>
<p><i>g.</i> Income from public enterprises.</p>
<p><i>h.</i> Other legal taxes.</p></blockquote>
<p>19. Funds required for the execution of Provincial Government
orders shall be provided from the National Treasury
or the Provincial Treasury. Local collection of such
funds is prohibited. <i>Hsien</i> which are financially self-sufficient
may resort to their own treasuries to meet educational
and administrative expenses. <i>Hsien</i> with scanty population
and most of their area uncultivated may be subsidized by
both the Provincial and National Treasuries.</p>
<p>20. Extra expenses for reconstruction shall be collected
by a means of floating loans with the approval of the <i>Hsien</i>
People's Council and the Provincial Government.</p>
<p>21. The incomes and expenses of the <i>hsien</i> proper shall
be the independent responsibility of the <i>Hsien</i> Government.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[Pg 327]</a></span></p>
<p>22. If the <i>Hsien</i> People's Council has not been established,
the budgets and financial statements shall be examined
by the <i>Hsien</i> Council and then submitted to the
Provincial Government by the Magistrate.</p>
<p>23. After the establishment of the <i>Hsien</i> People's Council,
the budgets and the financial statements shall be examined
by this Council first and then be submitted to the Provincial
Government. In case of emergency the Magistrate may submit
such documents to the Provincial Government directly.</p>
<h3>E. <i>Ch'ü</i></h3>
<p>24. Each <i>ch'ü</i> is constituted by fifteen to thirty <i>hsiang</i>.</p>
<p>25. The <i>Ch'ü</i> Bureau, a subsidiary office of <i>hsien</i>, represents
the <i>Hsien</i> Government to perform the educational and
administrative work. If the <i>hsien</i> is not divided into <i>ch'ü</i>
then this work is done by the special officers sent by the <i>Hsien</i>
Government.</p>
<p>26. There shall be one <i>Ch'ü</i> Chief (<i>ch'ü-chang</i>) and two
to five advisers in each <i>ch'ü</i>. Their duties are to take charge
of civil, reconstruction, educational and military affairs.
They shall be trained and examined before appointment.</p>
<p>27. There shall be police stations in each <i>ch'ü</i> under the
supervision of the <i>Ch'ü</i> Chief.</p>
<p>28. A Rural Reconstruction Committee is to be formed
in a <i>ch'ü</i>. The members of this committee shall be elected
from among the popular persons in that <i>ch'ü</i>. The <i>Ch'ü</i>
Chief shall concurrently be Chairman of the Committee.</p>
<h3>F. <i>Hsiang</i><a name="FNanchor_3_197" id="FNanchor_3_197"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_197" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></h3>
<p>29. Each <i>hsiang</i> is constituted by six to fifteen <i>pao</i>.
[See <a href="#Page_329">Art. 45</a> <i>ff.</i>]</p>
<p>30. Systems of <i>hsiang</i> and <i>pao chia</i> are to be worked out
by the <i>Hsien</i> Government and submitted to the Provincial
Government. They must be registered with the Ministry of
the Interior.</p>
<p>31. There shall be one <i>Hsiang</i> Chief (<i>hsiang-chang</i>) and
one to two Assistant Chiefs (<i>fu-hsiang-chang</i>) in each <i>hsiang</i>
office. They shall be persons possessing the following qualifications:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> Those who have passed the ordinary examinations.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> Those who have served in the Delegated Appointment<a name="FNanchor_4_198" id="FNanchor_4_198"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_198" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>
capacity.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[Pg 328]</a></span></p>
<p><i>c.</i> Those who have graduated from Middle and Normal
schools.</p>
<p><i>d.</i> Those who have contributed service for the public
good.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>32. There shall be four sections in each <i>hsiang</i> to take
charge of the civil, economic, educational affairs and police
service. Each section has one chief and several secretaries.
One of the secretaries shall take charge of controlment. The
<i>hsiang</i> staff shall be selected from among the primary school
teachers. If the <i>hsiang's</i> financial resources are insufficient
these sections may be amalgamated into one office.</p>
<p>33. The tenure of <i>Hsiang</i> Chiefs shall be two years, with
permissible re-election.</p>
<p>34. The offices <i>Hsiang</i> Chief, the headmaster of the
primary school, and officer of militia<a name="FNanchor_5_199" id="FNanchor_5_199"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_199" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> may be delegated to
one person. If the <i>hsiang</i> possesses sufficient financial resources,
the headmaster of the primary school shall not be
allowed to hold other office.</p>
<p>35. Plans initiated by the <i>hsiang</i> itself must be passed
by the <i>Hsiang</i> Council meeting before they are adopted.</p>
<p>36. The <i>Hsiang</i> Chief shall act as the chairman of the
Hsiang Council Meeting. Every section chief is required to
attend the Meeting. The <i>pao</i> chiefs must also attend this
Meeting.</p>
<p>37. The procedure of training of <i>Hsiang</i> Chiefs and other
<i>hsiang</i> staff shall be dealt with separately.</p>
<h3>G. THE <i>Hsiang</i> PEOPLE'S COUNCIL</h3>
<p>38. The members of the <i>Hsiang</i> People's Council shall
be elected from the <i>Pao</i> People's Council. Each <i>pao</i> shall
elect two members.</p>
<p>39. The <i>Hsiang</i> Chief may act as the chairman of the
<i>Hsiang</i> People's Council provided that he has been elected
by the Council as the Chief.</p>
<p>40. The bylaws and the duties of the <i>Hsiang</i> People's
Council shall be dealt with separately.</p>
<h3>H. FINANCE OF THE <i>Hsiang</i></h3>
<p>41. The <i>hsiang's</i> revenue consists of the following items:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> All legal taxes.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> Income from public properties.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> Income from public enterprises.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[Pg 329]</a></span></p>
<p><i>d.</i> Subsidiary funds.</p>
<p><i>e.</i> Special incomes to be collected with the approval of the
<i>Hsien</i> Government.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>42. The procedure of purchasing properties shall be
dealt with separately.</p>
<p>43. The bylaws of the <i>Hsiang Treasury</i> Committee shall
be dealt with separately.</p>
<p>44. The financial report prepared by the <i>hsiang</i> office
shall be submitted to the <i>Hsien</i> Government. The expenses
of the <i>hsiang</i> shall be included in the <i>hsien's</i> financial report
after audit.</p>
<h3>I. <i>Pao</i> AND <i>Chia</i></h3>
<p>45. Each <i>pao</i> is constituted of six to fifteen <i>chia</i>.</p>
<p>46. Public primary schools, cooperatives, and warehouses<a name="FNanchor_6_200" id="FNanchor_6_200"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_200" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>
shall be established within two or three <i>pao</i> where
the population is dense. The <i>Pao</i> Chief shall be in charge
of these institutions. Reserves of each <i>pao</i> shall be trained
separately.</p>
<p>47. There shall be one <i>Pao</i> Chief (<i>pao-chang</i>) and one
assistant <i>Pao</i> Chief (<i>fu-pao-chang</i>) in each <i>pao</i>. They
are elected by the <i>Pao</i> People's Council. And they must be
chosen from among persons with the following qualifications:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> Those who have graduated from middle schools.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> Persons who have worked more than one year in
Government.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> Those who have been specially trained.</p>
<p><i>d.</i> Those who are active in social work.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Before the time of election, the <i>Pao</i> Chief may be recommended
by the <i>hsiang</i> office to the <i>Hsien</i> Government for
appointment.</p>
<p>48. The tenure of the <i>Pao</i> Chief shall be two years; he
may be re-elected.</p>
<p>49. The offices of <i>Pao</i> Chief, headmaster of the <i>pao</i>
primary school, and militia officer may be delegated to one
person. When the <i>pao's</i> financial resources are sufficient the
headmaster is not allowed to hold other office.</p>
<p>50. There shall be two to four secretaries in each <i>pao</i>
to take charge of the political, educational, cultural affairs,
and police service. The <i>pao</i> staff shall be elected from
among the primary school teachers. If the <i>pao's</i> financial
resources are not sufficient, there shall be only one person
to take care of all these activities.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[Pg 330]</a></span></p>
<p>51. The procedure of training of the <i>pao</i> office staff shall
be dealt with separately.</p>
<p>52. One representative of each family is required to be
present at the <i>Pao</i> People's Council (<i>pao-min ta-hui</i>) meeting.
The bylaws and the duties of this council shall be
dealt with separately.</p>
<p>53. Each <i>chia</i> consists of six to fifteen families.</p>
<p>54. There shall be one <i>Chia</i> Chief (<i>chia-chang</i>) in each
<i>chia</i>. He is elected by the Family Chiefs Council and is
registered with the <i>hsiang</i> office through the <i>pao</i>.</p>
<p>55. There shall be established a Family Chiefs Council
and <i>Chia</i> People's Council in each <i>chia</i>.</p>
<p>56. The old names of the streets may be used as the names
of <i>pao</i>.</p>
<p>57. The bylaws of <i>pao</i> and <i>chia</i> shall be dealt with
separately.</p>
<p>58. The controlment procedure for <i>pao</i> and <i>chia</i> shall
be dealt with separately.</p>
<p>59. The present bylaws shall become effective after the
date of promulgation.</p>
<p>60. If any item in these regulations conflicts with the
National laws, it shall be null.</p>
<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_195" id="Footnote_1_195"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_195"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Chung-yang Hsün-lien T'uan [Central (Kuomintang) Training
Corps], <i>Hsien Ko-chi Tzŭ-chih Kang-yao</i> [Regulations Concerning the
Organization of the Various Classifications of <i>Hsien</i>], Chungking, XXVIII
(1939); these regulations are also found in Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan
Pu [Central Publicity Board], <i>Hsien-cheng yü Ti-fang Tzŭ-chih</i>
[Constitutional Government in Relation to Local Self-Government],
Chungking, XXVIII (1939), p. 37-44.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_2_196" id="Footnote_2_196"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_196"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> The practice termed <i>squeeze</i> on the coast.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_3_197" id="Footnote_3_197"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_197"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> In some areas termed the <i>chên</i>.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_4_198" id="Footnote_4_198"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_198"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> A level in the National civil service.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_5_199" id="Footnote_5_199"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_199"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>The chuang-ting-tui tui-chang</i>, heading a local force of able-bodied
citizens; the regular rank is not specified.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_6_200" id="Footnote_6_200"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_200"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> In Far Eastern English parlance, <i>godown</i>.</p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<h2><i>H.</i> A CHART OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION</h2>
<blockquote>
<p>The chart facing this page is a composite of various official charts to
which the author was allowed access in Chungking. Revisions cover
changes down to the opening of 1941.</p></blockquote>
<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;">
<a href="images/i_330fp-large.jpg"><img src="images/i_330fp.jpg" width="400" height="259" alt="Chart of Government Organization" /></a>
</div>
<hr class="chap" />
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[Pg 331]</a></span></p>
<h2>APPENDIX II. DOCUMENTS ON PARTY POLITICS</h2>
<hr class="chap" />
<h2><i>A.</i> A CHART OF KUOMINTANG ORGANIZATION</h2>
<blockquote>
<p>The chart facing this page is a composite of various official charts to
which the author was allowed access in July and August 1940.</p></blockquote>
<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;">
<a href="images/i_331fp-large.jpg"><img src="images/i_331fp.jpg" width="400" height="282" alt="Chart of Kuomintang Organization" /></a>
</div>
<hr class="chap" />
<h2><i>B.</i> CONSTITUTION OF THE SAN MIN CHU I YOUTH CORPS, YEAR XXVII
(1938)<a name="FNanchor_1_201" id="FNanchor_1_201"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_201" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2>
<blockquote>
<p>Proclaimed June 16, 1938, amended by the Fourth Meeting of the
Corps' Provisional Central Managing Board, July 17, 1939, this is the
fundamental charter of the most significant Kuomintang auxiliary to
appear in many years.</p></blockquote>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter I. General Principles</span></h3>
<p>1. The name of the organization is the San Min Chu I
Youth Corps.</p>
<p>2. The object of the Corps is to unite and train young
people, to enforce the San Min Chu I, to defend the nation,
and to bring national rebirth.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter II. Membership</span></h3>
<p>3. All Chinese youths, male or female, aged between 16
to 25, vowing to abide by the Corps constitution, can become
members of the Corps upon the payment of the
membership fee.</p>
<p>Members of the Managing Boards of various subordinate
Corps agencies and other Headquarters officials specially
admitted are not restricted by the above rule. Members
who pass 25 years of age can still retain their membership
in the Corps.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[Pg 332]</a></span></p>
<p>4. Two members of the Corps must propose and second
a member before the latter can become eligible. The new
member must also be approved by the Sectional Corps and
Troop and his name registered in the Central Corps Headquarters.</p>
<p>5. New members must take an oath before admittance, as
follows:</p>
<p>"I hereby swear that I promise to abide by the principles
of San Min Chu I, to obey the order of the Corps Leader,
to abide by the constitution of the corps, to act according
to the principles of the New Life Movement, to be ever loyal
to the Principles, to work for all other people, to stand firm
against all hardships, and to be prepared to sacrifice my
all. I promise that if I fail to perform the above duties,
I will be willing to receive the severest punishments."</p>
<p>6. The private life of the members should be in conformity
with the regulations fixed by the Corps.</p>
<p>7. Members of the Corps who die in service or who
lose their profession because of service in the Corps will
receive pensions or other relief. The detailed procedure will
be fixed later.</p>
<p>8. Members, upon a change of profession or job, or upon
removal to other localities, must register with their identification
cards at the local Corps Headquarters.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter III. System of Organization</span></h3>
<p>9. The system of organization of the Corps is as follows:
the Central Corps Headquarters, the Branch Corps, the
Divisional Corps, the Sectional Corps, the Divisional Troop,
the Sectional Troop.</p>
<p>10. Besides the above, the Corps may organize other
sub-organizations according to the nature of the locality,
the profession of the members, etc. The details will be
further fixed.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter IV. The Corps Leader</span></h3>
<p>11. The Corps Leader is the highest executive of the
Corps, and is concurrently the Party Chief of the Kuomintang
[Chiang K'ai-shek].</p>
<p>12. The Corps Leader is the chairman in the All-Corps
Representative Assembly, and has the power to veto a
resolution already passed by the Assembly; he also has the
power to finally sanction all resolutions passed by the Central
Managing Board and the Central Controlment Board.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[Pg 333]</a></span></p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter V. The All-Corps Representative Assembly
and Other Meetings of Representatives</span></h3>
<p>13. The All-Corps Representative Assembly may be held
every two years. At the discretion of the Corps Leader or
the Central Managing Board, however, it may be postponed
or a temporary meeting be held instead.</p>
<p>14. The works of the All-Corps Representative Assembly
are:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> to discuss and examine the report submitted by the
Central Managing Board and the Central Controlment
Board.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> to fix plans for the Corps activities.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> to discuss motions proposed by the Corps Leader.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>15. The Meeting of Representatives of the Branch Corps
may be held once a year. At the discretion of the Central
Managing Board, however, the Meeting may be postponed
or a temporary Meeting be held instead.</p>
<p>16. The duties of the Meeting of Representatives of the
Branch Corps are:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> to examine and discuss the reports submitted by the
Managing Board and the Controlment Board of the Branch
Corps.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> to fix plans for the Branch Corps activities.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>17. The Meeting of Members of the Sectional Corps is
held every six months. At the discretion of the Managing
Board of the Branch Corps, it may be postponed or a
temporary meeting be held instead. If the number of members
of the Section is too big or if the communication system
is unfavorable, a Meeting of the Representatives of the
Sectional Corps may be held.</p>
<p>18. The duties of the Meeting of the Members of the
Sectional Corps are:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> to examine and discuss the reports submitted by the
Managing Board and the Controlment Board of the Sectional
Corps.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> to fix plans for the Sectional Corps Activities.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>19. The Meeting of Members of the Divisional Troop
is to take place every three months. At the discretion of its
Managing Board, it may be postponed, or a temporary
meeting be called.</p>
<p>20. The duties of the Meeting of Members of the Divisional
Troop are:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> to examine the reports submitted by the Leader
of the Divisional Troop.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[Pg 334]</a></span></p>
<p><i>b.</i> to fix the plans for the Divisional Troop activities.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>21. Meetings for the Members of the Sectional Troop
will be held every week, to be presided over by the Leaders
of the Sectional Troop. Unless specially permitted, these
meetings must not be postponed. During these meetings,
reports concerning politics, the Troop activities, discussions,
etc., will be read. New members are admitted through
these meetings too, and plans for the Sectional Troop
activities will be fixed.</p>
<p>22. The system of organization for the various Meetings
of Members or Meetings of Representatives will be fixed
later.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VI. The Central Headquarters</span></h3>
<p>23. The Central Managing Board of the Central Corps
Headquarters is formed by twenty-five to thirty-five managing
directors, in addition to the nine to fifteen reserve members
of the Managing Board.</p>
<p>24. The Central Managing Board has the following
powers:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> to execute the orders of the Corps Leader [Chiang
K'ai-shek] and to execute the resolutions passed in the
All-Corps Representative Assembly.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> to fix the plans for activities.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> to form various corps of lower rank, and to command
or inspect their activities.</p>
<p><i>d.</i> to execute all resolutions submitted by the Central
Controlment Board.</p>
<p><i>e.</i> to form a budget to regulate various financial questions
of the Corps.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>25. The Central Managing Board forms a Standing
Managing Board consisting of nine Standing Managing
Directors, appointed by the Corps Leader from among the
twenty-five to thirty-five Managing Directors. This Standing
Managing Board fulfills the duties of the Central
Managing Board Meeting when the latter is not in session.</p>
<p>26. The Corps Leader appoints a Secretary-General to
the Central Managing Board from among the Standing
Managing Directors, to direct all the affairs of the Board.</p>
<p>27. The various sub-organs of the Central Managing
Board will be formulated later, together with their system
of organization.</p>
<p>28. There are a Manager and a Vice-Manager in the
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[Pg 335]</a></span>Office of the Secretary-General. They are nominated by
the Secretary and appointed by the Corps Leader.</p>
<p>29. In every Department of the Central Managing
Board there is a Commissioner and one or two Deputy
Commissioners. They are appointed by the Corps Leader
upon the nomination of the Secretary-General.</p>
<p>30. The Central Corps Headquarters has a Central
Controlment Board of twenty-five to thirty-five members
and nine to fifteen reserve members.</p>
<p>31. The duties of the Central Controlment Board are:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> to inspect the progress of the Corps activities.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> to raise and examine all statements concerning any
member who does not fulfill his duties.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> to audit all incomes and expenditures of the Corps.</p>
<p><i>d.</i> to direct Controlment Boards of lower rank in their
work of inspection.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>32. The Central Controlment Board forms a Standing
Controlment Board consisting of five members of the Controlment
Board, appointed by the Corps Leader. This
Standing Controlment Board shall function when the Controlment
Board is not in session.</p>
<p>33. The Central Controlment Board has also a Secretary-General,
appointed by the Corps Leader from among the
Standing Controlment Board members. He shall direct
the affairs of the Central Controlment Board.</p>
<p>34. The Central Controlment Board has various sub-organs,
of which the system of organization will be fixed
later.</p>
<p>35. Both the Central Managing Board and the Central
Controlment Board will hold meetings every three months,
to be presided over by the Corps Leader. Under special
circumstances there may be temporary meetings or combined
meetings for the two Boards.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VII. The Branch Corps</span></h3>
<p>36. The Branch Corps has a Managing Board consisting
of seven to eleven members, besides the three to five reserve
members.</p>
<p>37. The duties of the Branch Corps Managing Board
are:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> to execute the orders from the Central Corps Headquarters
and the resolutions passed in the Meeting of the
Representatives of the Branch Corps.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> to fix the plans for the activities of the Branch Corps.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[Pg 336]</a></span></p>
<p><i>c.</i> to command and inspect the works of the lower organs.</p>
<p><i>d.</i> to execute all resolutions submitted by the Branch
Corps Controlment Board.</p>
<p><i>e.</i> to form a budget regulating the financial state of the
Branch Corps.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>38. The Managing Board has a Secretary, appointed
by the Corps Leader, from among the members of the
Managing Board. He is to direct all affairs of the Managing
Board.</p>
<p>39. The Managing Board has various sub-organs, the
system of organization of which will be fixed later.</p>
<p>40. The Branch Corps has a Controlment Board consisting
of three to five members with three reserve members.</p>
<p>41. The Controlment Board has a Secretary, appointed
by the Corps Leader from among the Controlment Board
members, to discharge all affairs of the Board.</p>
<p>42. The system of organization of the various sub-organs
of the Controlment Board will be fixed later.</p>
<p>43. The duties of the Controlment Board are:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> to inspect the progress of the activities done by the
lower organs.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> to raise and examine statements concerning any member
who rebels against the discipline of the Corps.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> to audit the budget and all financial statements of the
Branch Corps.</p>
<p><i>d.</i> to direct the Controlment Boards of lower rank in
their work of inspection.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>44. The Managing Board of the Branch Corps should
hold meetings every half-month. The Controlment Board
should meet once every month. The meetings are to be
presided over by the Secretaries. Under special circumstances,
temporary sessions or combined meetings may
be held.</p>
<p>45. The Branch Corps has also one to five Directors, appointed
by the Corps Leader, to direct the affairs of the
Branch Corps.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VIII. The Divisional Corps</span></h3>
<p>46. The Divisional Corps has three to five Managing
Directors, who have power to command, direct, inspect,
and examine the work done by the Divisional Corps, in
accordance to the will of the higher Corps Headquarters.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[Pg 337]</a></span></p>
<p>47. There is a Secretary of the Divisional Corps, appointed
by the Corps Leader from among the Managing
Directors, whose duty it is to discharge all the affairs of
the Divisional Corps.</p>
<p>48. The Managing Directors should perform their duties
in various localities at various periods.</p>
<p>49. Whenever necessary, the Secretary of the Divisional
Corps can call a Managing Directors' meeting.</p>
<p>50. A Divisional Corps will be formed when there are
more than five Sectional Corps under it. But this may not
take place if the Managing Board of the Branch Corps
sees no necessity for such action.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter IX. The Sectional Corps</span></h3>
<p>51. The Sectional Corps has a Managing Board formed
by three to five members and one to three reserve members,
elected in the General Meeting of the Members of the
Sectional Corps or in the Meeting of the Representatives of
the Sectional Corps.</p>
<p>52. The duties of the Managing Board are:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> to execute the orders of the higher Corps Headquarters
and the resolutions passed in the Meeting of the
Members of the Sectional Corps or the Meeting of the
Representatives of the Sectional Corps.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> to fix the plans for activities.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> to direct and watch the activities of the lower organs.</p>
<p><i>d.</i> to form a budget and other financial statements.</p>
<p><i>e.</i> to execute the resolutions passed in the Meeting of
the Controlment Board.</p>
<p><i>f.</i> to examine the work done by the Divisional Troops
and Sectional Troops.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>53. The Managing Board has a Secretary, appointed by
the Corps Leader from among the members of the Managing
Board, to discharge all the affairs of the Managing
Board.</p>
<p>54. The system of organization of the various sub-organs
of the Managing Board will be formulated later.</p>
<p>55. The Sectional Corps has a Controlment Board
formed by three members and one reserve member. Under
special circumstances, there is sometimes only one Controller
without any Controlment Board.</p>
<p>56. The Controlment Board has one Secretary, appointed
by the Corps Leader from among the members of the Controlment
Board, who is to discharge all affairs of the Board.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[Pg 338]</a></span></p>
<p>57. The duties of the Controlment Board are:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> to inspect the works done by the Sectional Corps, and
by the Divisional and Sectional Troops under the Sectional
Corps.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> to raise and examine statements concerning members
who rebel against the Corps discipline.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> to audit financial statements of the Sectional Corps
and those of the Divisional and Sectional Troops under it.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>58. The Managing Board and the Controlment Board
of the Sectional Corps will hold separate meetings once
every half-month. The respective Secretaries shall preside.
Under special conditions they can call for temporary
sessions.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter X. The Divisional Troop</span></h3>
<p>59. The Divisional Troop has a Leader and an Assistant
Leader, elected from among the Leaders and Assistant
Leaders of the Sectional Troop and by themselves.</p>
<p>60. The Divisional Troop executes the orders of the
superior organs and the resolutions passed in the All-Corps
Representative Assembly. The Divisional Troop also
directs and examines the work of the members.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter XI. The Sectional Troop</span></h3>
<p>61. The Sectional Troop is the basic organization of the
San Min Chu I Youth Corps. It is formed by eight to
fifteen members, with a Leader and an Assistant Leader
elected by the members themselves.</p>
<p>62. The chief duties of the Sectional Troop are:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> to execute the orders of all superior organs and all
resolutions passed in the Sectional Troop Meeting.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> to call for new members and to collect the fees.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> to train and examine every member.</p>
<p><i>d.</i> to read books, to propagate San Min Chu I and its
policies, to distribute publicity literature.</p>
<p><i>e.</i> to participate in all social activities.</p>
<p><i>f.</i> to investigate political and social conditions.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>63. All extra-Corps organs holding more than three
members may form special Groups, upon the sanction of
the Sectional Troop. Their duty is to execute the principles
of the Corps and to watch the work of the members. Whenever
necessary, the chief of the Group may attend the Sectional
Corps Meetings.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[Pg 339]</a></span></p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter XII. The Election of Officers and Their Term of Service</span></h3>
<p>64. Unless already specified, the members of the Managing
Boards of the various Corps and Troops are elected in
the General Meeting or the Meeting of Representatives
of the respective Corps and Troops. Before the General
Meeting or the Meeting of Representatives, the members
of the Managing Boards are appointed by the Corps Leader.</p>
<p>65. The duration of service of members of the Managing
and Controlment Boards of the Central Corps Headquarters
is two years. That of members of the corresponding
Boards of the other Corps is one year. That of the Leaders
and Assistant Leaders of the two Corps is six months. All
of them can be re-elected.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter XIII. Discipline</span></h3>
<p>66. All members should obey the following commandments:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> All questions may be freely discussed. But no dispute
is allowed, once the final resolution is passed.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> It is not allowed to rebel against the principles of
the New Life Movement.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> It is prohibited to reveal the secrets of the Corps.</p>
<p><i>d.</i> It is prohibited for members to join other organizations.</p>
<p><i>e.</i> It is prohibited to criticize unfavorably the Kuomintang
and the Corps, or to plot against other members.</p>
<p><i>f.</i> It is prohibited to express one's ideas too freely upon
current events, especially those that are against the resolved
plans or policies of the Kuomintang or the Corps.</p>
<p><i>g.</i>. It is prohibited to form other organizations within
the Corps.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>67. Those who are proved to act against the above rules
will e punished in the following ways:</p>
<blockquote><p><i>a.</i> warning</p>
<p><i>b.</i> demerit</p>
<p><i>c.</i> cross-questioning</p>
<p><i>d.</i> expulsion</p>
<p><i>e.</i> other appropriate punishments.</p></blockquote>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter XIV. Fees</span></h3>
<p>68. Every member must pay a membership fee of ten
cents on entering the Corps.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">[Pg 340]</a></span></p>
<p>69. A monthly contribution of ten cents is required of
every member. Under special circumstances other contributions
may be called for.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter XV. Amendments, etc.</span></h3>
<p>70. This Constitution may be amended, with the approval
of the Corps Leader, in the All-Corps Representative
Assembly or in the Meeting of the Central Managing
Board.</p>
<p>71. The Constitution is enforced upon the day of announcement,
having been approved by the Corps Leader.</p>
<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_201" id="Footnote_1_201"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_201"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> San-min-chu-i Ch'ing-nien T'uan Chung-yang T'uan-pu [<i>San Min
Chu I</i> Youth Corps Central Corps Headquarters], <i>San-min-chu-i
Ch'ing-nien T'uan T'uan-chang</i> [Corps Constitution of the <i>San
Min Chu I</i> Youth Corps], Chungking, n.d.</p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<h2><i>C</i>. THE DUTIES AND GENERAL ACTIVITIES
OF THE SAN MIN CHU I YOUTH CORPS (CH'ÊN CH'ÊNG)<a name="FNanchor_1_202" id="FNanchor_1_202"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_202" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2>
<blockquote>
<p>A lecture delivered May 9, 1940, before a Kuomintang training class:
note the somewhat pedagogical outline. General Ch'ên Ch'êng, until
recently Secretary-General of the Corps, is one of the closest military
associates of the Generalissimo.</p></blockquote>
<h3><span class="smcap">Outline</span></h3>
<p>A. THE DUTIES AND NATURE OF THE CORPS:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. <i>Duties</i>: to organize and train the nation's youth with
a view to enforcing the San Min Chu I; to lead and unify
the ideals, opinions and activities of the nation's youth; to
centralize and cultivate special talents, forming a nucleus to
serve as a model.</p>
<p>2. <i>Activities</i>: to urge youths to join the practical work
connected with the war of national defense; to enforce
military and political training; to encourage civil progress,
labor and skill in production.</p>
<p>3. <i>Nature</i>: the Corps is an organization composed of
young people and included within the Kuomintang. The
Kuomintang and the Corps are one and indivisible.</p></blockquote>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[Pg 341]</a></span></p>
<p>B. THE GROWTH AND THE PLAN CONCERNING THE INTENSIFICATION
OF THE WORK OF THE CORPS:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. <i>Growth</i>: Period of formation, July 9, 1938 to September
1939; full establishment since September 1939, when
the Central Managing Board and the Central Controlment
Board were formed.</p>
<p>2. <i>Plan concerning the intensification of activities</i>:
Amendment of the Corps Constitution; issuing of general
procedures for the carrying out of the activities to various
sections; general principles governing the future activities
of the Corps.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>C. GENERAL ACTIVITIES OF THE CORPS:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. <i>Organization</i>: general development of the organization
in various localities; calling for new members; regulating
the inner structures of the organization; the formation
of a selected central nucleus.</p>
<p>2. <i>Training</i>: entrance training and normal training;
young men's summer camp; training of talented gliders.</p>
<p>3. <i>Publicity</i>: periodicals at fixed intervals; the compilation
of various collective works; the formation of a committee
for publicity.</p>
<p>4. <i>Social works</i>: the establishment of a Young Men's
Labor Service Camp; the distribution of Young Men's Entertaining
Offices in various localities; the work of Youths'
Service Associations and Corps in various localities.</p>
<p>5. <i>Financial assistance</i>: compilation of Dr. Sun's works
on economics; aid given to young men's work for material
productivity; planning of business organizations under
group management.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>D. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE TWO YEARS' ACTIVITIES OF
THE CORPS AND THE PRINCIPLES GUIDING THE NATION'S YOUTH:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. <i>General discussion of the two years' activities</i>: its good
as well as its bad points.</p>
<p>2. <i>Principles guiding the nation's youth</i>: conclusion.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3><span class="smcap">A. The Duties and Nature of the Corps</span></h3>
<h4>1. The Duties</h4>
<p>It is two years since the establishment of the San Min
Chu I Youth Corps was declared at Hankow on July 7,
1938. From the name, we know that the purpose of its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[Pg 342]</a></span>
creation is to employ the unified efforts of the nation's
youth in the work of carrying out the San Min Chu I. As
youth is the vital element in a nation's life and the foundation
for all future social and political progress, the Kuomintang
has, in the second and present stage of national salvation,
especially organized a Youth Corps to reinforce the
powers of the Kuomintang by shouldering the following
epochal duties:</p>
<p>First, to unite and train the nation's youth for the promulgation
of San Min Chu I, the defense of the nation and
the salvation of its people.</p>
<p>Secondly, to lead the nation's youth to a unity of thought
and activities so that they can justly perform the great task
of national salvation, thus completing the second phase of
the achievements of the People's Revolution.<a name="FNanchor_2_203" id="FNanchor_2_203"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_203" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p>
<p>Thirdly, to collect youth of especial talents for the central
nucleus as a model for all, thereby giving new and
ever-confirming life to the Kuomintang, and enabling it
to carry out its future work.</p>
<h4>2. The Activities</h4>
<p>The Corps Leader [Chiang K'ai-shek] has clearly stated
in his open letter to the nation's youth that the chief activities
of the Corps are six in number:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. To mobilize the activities of youth according to the
National General Mobilization Act.</p>
<p>2. To give thorough military training to develop the
skill in defending the nation.</p>
<p>3. To heighten political training, giving every youth
the required political knowledge for a citizen of a republic.</p>
<p>4. To encourage civil progress, thus raising the general
intellectual standard of the nation.</p>
<p>5. To encourage labor and service, according to the
motto: Life is to serve.</p>
<p>6. To develop the skill in material productivity according
to scientific principles, thus hastening the work of national
construction.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The first two of the above are collectively the fundamental
works of military reconstruction, the third and
fourth are those of education, and the last two those of
economic reconstruction. The Corps has classified the various
aspects of the above works of national construction as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[Pg 343]</a></span>
the works of the youth. Besides, we should clearly understand
that they are the fundamental requisites of a complete
system of national defense, and form the first stage
towards the completion of a republic based upon the San
Min Chu I.</p>
<h4>3. The Nature</h4>
<p>The Corps is a Youth association included within the
organization of the Kuomintang, under one principle, one
leader, one command, and is willing to struggle for the
sake of the People's Revolution. The Kuomintang and
the Corps are one and indivisible. It is "The Kuomintang's
[own] Corps." If a distinction is necessary, then we may
say that the members of the Corps have a special duty to
organize and train the nation's youth so that it may be
able to shoulder the responsibilities and work concerning
social welfare and national salvation. Thus the Corps may
be said to be the younger and newer life of the Kuomintang.
Besides, it may also serve the Kuomintang in various aspects;
for example, if, as in case of overseas localities, Kuomintang
work is difficult to execute, the Corps may be established
instead, or also, if people are not willing to join the Kuomintang,
they may join the Corps. With the formation of the
Corps, therefore, the Kuomintang may be enlarged and
strengthened.</p>
<p>The relation between the Kuomintang members and the
Corps members is clearly stated. According to the amended
Constitution of the Corps, the age of members has been
changed from eighteen to thirty-eight years, to sixteen to
twenty-five years. Also according to the resolution of the
Central Regular Meeting of the Kuomintang, the relation
between the two is as follows:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. Members joining the Kuomintang should be above
twenty-five years of age.</p>
<p>2. Corps members reaching the age of 25 will become
Kuomintang members.</p>
<p>3. Students staying in schools, irrespective of their age,
are considered Corps members. Those who previously
joined the Kuomintang should also become members of
the Corps, reserving their membership in the Kuomintang.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>We can see that Kuomintang members and Corps members
differ chiefly in their ages. Except for this, the two
are in fact one.</p>
<p>With a view to the system of organization, the Kuomintang
and the Corps each has its own structure. The Kuomintang<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[Pg 344]</a></span>
leads the Corps, but this does not mean that the
Corps is under the Kuomintang in authority. In the speech,
"The Relation between the Kuomintang and the Corps,"
made by the Corps Leader [Chiang K'ai-shek], we are told
that under the same general system of organization, the
aim of the Kuomintang's leadership of the Corps is to unite
all our efforts under the same banner. Leading does not
mean in the least commanding or ordering. To lead is to
help. Hence a Corps member may also lead a Kuomintang
member. The idea is to make both members combine their
energy towards helping our leader. The strength of the
Corps depends upon the well-being of the Kuomintang,
while the future of the Kuomintang depends upon the
growth of the Corps. There should be mutual help between
the two in order to reach the same final goal.
Hence the activities of the two organizations should be
everywhere combined into one, employing division of
labor and cooperation wherever and whenever possible.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">B. The Growth and the Plan concerning the
Intensification of the Works of the Corps</span></h3>
<h4>1. The Growth</h4>
<p>In April 1938, the Representatives of the Kuomintang
gathered together for a Meeting (Congress) to amend the
Constitution of the Kuomintang and to form the San Min
Chu I Youth Corps in order to gather the nation's youth
for the great task of national reconstruction. It was also
resolved that the Party Chief (Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek)
is at the same time the Corps Leader. On June 16,
the Corps Leader issued his Letter to the Nation's Youth, and
announced the constitution of the Corps. On July 9, a
Central Managing Board was temporarily formed as the
Corps' central organization. The growth of the Corps activities
can be divided into two periods:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. <i>Period of formation</i>: July 1938 to September 1939.
During this period, the Central Managing Board was
formed. While the other work of organizing was done according
to a principle of simplicity, as advised by the Corps
Leader, all other internal organs were formed according
to their necessity. The various subsections in different
provinces and districts were also formed during this period.</p>
<p>2. <i>Period of full establishment</i>: September 1939 to the
present. In accordance with general opinions, the Central
Managing Board temporarily formed was dissolved after<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[Pg 345]</a></span>
its fourth general meeting, and on September 1, 1939 a
permanent Central Managing Board and a Central Controlment
Board were formed. The Corps Leader has on
various occasions appointed thirty-five members for the
Central Managing Board with fifteen more as reserve members,
and thirty-five members for the Central Controlment
Board with fifteen reserve members also. Besides, there
are five standing members of the Central Managing Board
and five standing members of the Central Controlment
Board. The rest of the officials are also appointed. The
system of organization is as follows:</p>
</blockquote>
<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;">
<img src="images/i_345.jpg" width="400" height="202" alt="System of Organization" />
</div>
<h4>2. Plan concerning the Intensification of Activities</h4>
<p>The aim of having a permanent Central Managing Board
is to conclude the work of the formative period and start
the work of calling for the nation's youth in the task of
national reconstruction. The plans concerning the intensification
of activities are all based upon the orders of the
Corps Leader, the past experiences of the Corps members,
and the present situation; the chief plans are:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. <i>Amendment of the Constitution</i>—to increase the training
of the Corps members and to fix the system of organization
for the All-Corps Representative Assembly in accordance
with the idea of democracy. The chief points are (<i>a</i>)
the change in age limit from eighteen to thirty-eight years
to sixteen to twenty-five years, and (<i>b</i>) to fix the system
of organization for the General Meetings of the Corps
members and their Representatives; the fixing of rules concerning
the election into office of the members and their
period of service.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[Pg 346]</a></span></p>
<p>2. <i>Issuing of general procedures for the carrying out of
the activities of various sections</i>: (<i>a</i>) to make all members
and all youth understand that the Corps is a youth organization
to train and unite all youth in the principles of San
Min Chu I, with the aim of strengthening the nation's defense;
(<i>b</i>) to lead the nation's youth in the cultivation of
good national characteristics, to exemplify their deeds and
actions, and to correct all fallacious beliefs, and childish
actions. These are the ways of training good useful youth
for the national service; (<i>c</i>) the subsections of the Corps
should work for all the members of the Corps, while the
members should work for all the youth of the country.
They should encourage all youth to serve all the citizens of
the nation, thereby fulfilling the duties of youth toward the
country; (<i>d</i>) in calling for members, special attention is
paid to discover youth of higher abilities. At the same time
it is necessary that the Corps work should be good enough
so as to be able to influence all the youth of the nation so
that they will join the Corps of their own accord; (<i>e</i>) the
subsections in schools should work in conjunction with the
educational authorities. The assistance of the teachers is
necessary in order to develop the political ideas, the mind
work, the physical constitution of the youth, besides the
cultivation of the power to organize and cooperate; (<i>f</i>) to
organize society's youth, especially those having a profession
or those who are capable of material productivity, so
that they may be joined to the youth in schools in forming
a combined strength necessary to the establishment of a
revolutionary nation; (<i>g</i>) to point out to the youth the
activities done in the war of national defense, the international
relations, and the intrigues of the traitors and
enemies, thus making every youth able to distinguish the
right from the wrong. At the same time, they should be
encouraged under favorable conditions to work for national
defense; (<i>h</i>) to help every youth solve the problem of
his livelihood. For example, the choice of a profession, the
question of education, etc. The members should therefore
look upon their Corps as their family, not as a mere institution
for work.</p>
<p>3. <i>General principles governing the future activities of
the Corps</i>: (<i>a</i>) in obedience to the ideas expressed by the
Corps Leader, and based upon the experience obtained during
the period of two years, it has been resolved that the
chief aim of the activities of the Corps is to solidify the
union of the members, so that it may become the central<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[Pg 347]</a></span>
motivating force for all the youth of the nation; (<i>b</i>) the
activities of the Corps will also be directed to benefit youths,
especially those in school, to help them solve all questions
and troubles that usually confront young men. Besides, the
Corps also aims at mobilizing the youth in war districts, and
behind the enemy front, to increase the force of national
defense; (<i>c</i>) the principles regarding the admittance of
new members will be: 1, that quality as well as quantity
will be considered; 2, that youths in schools will be especially
fitted for membership, although youths having professions
will not be neglected; 3, that women members will
be especially welcome; (<i>d</i>) in establishing the various subdivisions
of the Corps in various localities, importance will
be especially given to provinces of Szechwan, Kweichow,
Shensi, and Kansu. Except these, attention is also given
to overseas districts (the Malay Archipelago) and behind
the enemy lines. All subdivisions formerly established will
be unified under one status, and be turned into regular
subdivisions; (<i>e</i>) a date for the All-Corps Representative
Assembly will be fixed, as well as the dates for the General
Meetings of Members; (<i>f</i>) the training of the members will
be chiefly military and political, emphasizing the skill to
produce, with plenty of practice in various actual fields, so
that the works of the Corps and those of society will be
interrelated; (<i>g</i>) the training of the members is divided
into primary, middle, and senior parts, with special attention
upon the lower two. Different training courses are
given according to the abilities, talents, and inclinations
of the members; (<i>h</i>) the training of the central nucleus
is based upon the general training for groups, laying special
emphasis upon mental and physical training so that
the central nucleus may be the model for other members.</p>
<p>(<i>i</i>) The central aim of publicity is to lead the nation's
youth to recognize the history and national character of
the Chinese nation, to fight for national unity and salvation,
to find the way of becoming a "Chinese," and to abolish all
fallacious beliefs that are detrimental to the growth of the
nation; (<i>j</i>) to intensify the movement to all classes of people,
attention is drawn to the fact that: 1, every member
is a publicity member; 2, actions and not words should be
the basis of publicity; 3, care should be given to the difference
in locality, time, or people, when the members
are helping to do social work; 4, members' actions and
thoughts should be earnest, devoted, intelligent, ingenuous,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[Pg 348]</a></span>
and truthful; (<i>k</i>) to increase the cooperation between
youths, the amount of publicity literature should be increased.
Encouragement should also be given to the study
of science and to development of the physical constitution;
(<i>l</i>) social service is especially aimed at relieving the poor
and the sick, paying attention to the wounded soldiers,
their families, refugees, and other helpless people; (<i>m</i>) the
calling in and training of students who have no chance to
study should be emphasized. Help should be given them to
find work or continue studies. Attention should also be
given to those behind the enemy's lines so that they may
not turn out to be traitors.</p>
<p>(<i>n</i>) The work of the Young Men's Labor Service Camp,
the Young Men's Service Association and Corps should be
intensified, aiming at the increase of necessary public services
during wartime, and the hastening of social advancement;
(<i>o</i>) concerning the financial help given to the members,
attention is given to group works like cooperative
stores, etc. Encouragement is given for thrift, saving, etc.;
(<i>p</i>) members should be encouraged to produce more, to
heighten the skill in production; (<i>q</i>) members should spread
the new economic thought expressed in the San Min Chu I.
They should also study the various books on economics;
(<i>r</i>) encouragement is given to young women, especially
those in war districts and students who want to join the
Corps. Training will be given to them. Their work is
chiefly to spread the spirit of the Corps among women,
to render war-time assistance and educational help; (<i>s</i>)
rigid inspection of the Corps personnel is to be enforced:
1, not only may a lower officer be reprimanded by a senior
officer, but vice versa; 2, in every subdivision of the Corps
an organization to inspect the personnel is formed; 3, attention
is given to the reserve list of the Corps personnel;
4, rigid censure of careless and corrupt officials, and also
of those who recommended them.</p>
<p>(<i>t</i>) A system of inspecting the various activities of the
Corps is to be formed; 1, the inspectors are given the authority
to watch and to lead; 2, the various subdivisions
should elect officials who shall constantly make inspection
tours; 3, close cooperation with the Central Controlment
Board should be established; (<i>u</i>) a competition of activities
among various subdivisions should be encouraged, whether
it be interdivisional, personal, etc. Competitions are based
upon research statistics, exchange of views, grading of work,
etc.</p></blockquote>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[Pg 349]</a></span></p>
<h3><span class="smcap">C. The General Activities of the Corps</span></h3>
<h4>1. Organization</h4>
<p>With the formation of the Central Managing Board of
the Corps, organizing work has been pushed ahead to
hasten the mutual movements of the nation's youth, especially
those in the provinces of Szechwan, Shensi, Kansu,
and Kweichow. The chief points concerning the organizing
movement are as follows:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. <i>General development of the organization in various
localities.</i> The subdivisions originally planned have all been
formed. In Szechwan, subdivisions are formed in every city
(<i>hsien</i>). In the rest of the provinces, subdivisions are
formed in different districts. Subdivisions have also been
formed in the chief universities and middle schools in the
country. Owing to special circumstances, overseas and war
districts are under the investigation of special officials sent
there to inspect the local surroundings before the subdivisions
be formed.</p>
<p>2. <i>Membership enrollment</i>: Members are chiefly youthful
students and youths with some ability. According to
the report made in April 1940, there are 126,111 members
in the Corps. Members will be called according to the
basic plan in the future, and especially women members
and other young men will be encouraged to join.</p>
<p>3. <i>Regulation of the inner structures of the organization
and the formation of a central nucleus</i>: to insure perfect
harmony in carrying out various activities, those temporary
subdivisions which have been doing good work and
which have an efficient central nucleus are to be made into
regular subdivisions. The selection of the central executive
nucleus will be based upon the talent of the members. The
method of selection is by means of questioning, recommendation,
or other ways.</p>
</blockquote>
<h4>2. The Training</h4>
<p>Training of the Corps members is to organize an efficient
executive organization for the sake of practical national
reconstruction according to the principles of San
Min Chu I. Besides military and political training, attention
is given to the development of skill in production.
At present, the chief training work of the Corps is as follows:
(<i>a</i>) Entrance training and normal training: there
are usually three stages of training, viz.: entrance training,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[Pg 350]</a></span>
normal training, and special training for nucleus members.
Except the last mentioned, all members of the Corps
must undergo the first two trainings. The period of entrance
training is two weeks, during which the training of
the mind is emphasized. Normal training is divided into
reading, discussion, and recommended readings. Weekly
gatherings are held for all members of a division to attend.
The recommended readings are based upon the
Corps Leader's "Recommended Readings and Methods of
Discussion." Every member must read a number of required
books, according to the systematic plan given.
(<i>b</i>) Young Men's Summer Camp—this is aimed at collectively
training all members who are attending schools.
During July and August 1938, a tentative camp has been
formed at Chungking and Chengtu, with mostly university
and middle school students as attending members. It is
planned to start similar camps at Chengtu, Chungking,
Sian, and Changsha this year. (<i>c</i>) Training of gliders: this
is aimed at heightening the interest in aviation shown by
youths. The Corps has arranged with the Aviation Committee
to form a class of amateur gliders, who will become
pilots in the future.</p>
<h4>3. Publicity</h4>
<p>Besides the normal work concerning publicity, special
attention is given to:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. Fixed periodicals, such as the "Chinese Youth
Monthly," the "News of the Corps Activities," the "Civil
News," the "Materials for Publicity," etc. They aim at
teaching the various subdivisions the work of publicity and
at supplying materials for publicity. Besides these, there
are many local publications of the Corps.</p>
<p>2. The compilation of collected works, such as the
"Young Men's Books concerning National Defense," the
"Young Men's Books of History and Geography," the "San
Min Chu I Series for Youth," etc. Among pamphlets for
publicity are "Dr. Sun's teachings for the Young Men,"
"The Way of Leading Youth's Career," "The May 4 Movement
and Modern Young Men's Movements," etc. Besides
these, the Corps has other publicity organs, such as the
Central Publicity Corps, the Youth's Dramatic Associations
of various subdivisions, etc. Publicity literature is distributed
in various localities by the China Civil Supply Association,
or its branches, or sometimes by specially chartered
book companies.</p></blockquote>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[Pg 351]</a></span></p>
<h4>4. Social Work</h4>
<p>At present the Social Work of the Corps is aimed at
cultivating youths' ability to serve, especially in the present
stage of warfare: (<i>a</i>) the formation of Young Men's Labor
Service Camps—this is to develop the skill of production so
as to help the country materially. This camp was tentatively
formed at Chengtu and Chungking where young men
were gathered to receive the required training; (<i>b</i>) various
local Young Men's Entertaining Offices—these are established
in eleven places among which are Chungking, Sian,
Changsha, Kweilin, Kinhwa. There is a monthly accommodation
capacity of about three thousand men. Many of
them are to be sent later to the Young Men's Labor Service
Camp for training; (<i>c</i>) various local Young Men's Service
Associations and Corps—their aim is to serve in the war
zone, and to help the productivity of society. The Service
Associations under the various subdivisions of the Corps
are formed at Chengtu, Sian, Lanchow, Changsha, Kweilin,
Ch'ü-chiang, etc., numbering forty-two in all. The Service
Corps are formed in twenty-three places, such as Hungyang,
Neichuan, Wanling, Kingshan, etc.</p>
<h4>5. Financial Assistance</h4>
<p>The aim of this branch of work is to spread Dr. Sun's
economic thoughts as shown in the San Min Chu I, besides
helping the members financially by means of cooperative
movements. At present, the works emphasized are:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. Compilation of Dr. Sun's economic works—they are
based upon the San Min Chu I, the various manifestos issued,
and a study of comparative economy of other countries.
There are twelve series of books thus published, <i>e.g.</i>,
"The Economic Theories and System of the San Min Chu
I," "The Population Policy of China," "The Labor Policy
of China," "The Policy of Land Tenure in China," etc.</p>
<p>2. Aid given to youth along material productivity—the
Corps pays special attention to the theory and practice of
material productivity. It has arranged with the Board of
Economy a plan to establish cooperative organizations with
the Board, and the Central Office for Agricultural Research,
so that the Corps members can have practical work in
economic reconstruction.</p>
<p>3. Planning of business organizations under group management—temporarily,
the activities along this line will be
the establishment of cooperative stores. These are now the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[Pg 352]</a></span>
"Young Men's Dressing Stores," the "Haosen Cooperative
Store," and other local Young Men's Cooperative Stores.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3><span class="smcap">D. General Discussion of the Two Years' Activities of
the Corps and the Principles Governing the Nation's Youth</span></h3>
<h4>1. Discussion of the Corps' Past Work</h4>
<p>Due to lack of experience, there were some unavoidable
points which await reformation. According to the reports
submitted by the touring inspectors, the work for 1939 and
that of the first three months of 1940 can be described in
a list:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. <i>Bad Points</i>: 1, Due to the short period of time, activities
of the Corps have failed to cope with the original plan
and schedule; 2, The development of the Corps activities
has not yet been made known to the mass of youth. Thus
the foundation of the Corps is not yet strong enough; 3,
Publicity and service have not yet been adequately mixed.
The ideal "service is publicity" has not yet been reached.
At the same time, owing to traffic interruption, publicity
literature has not been widely distributed; 4, Members are
deficient in their conception of the central activities of the
Corps. The subdivisions in schools are especially lacking
in this conception. They require further training; 5, The
officers lack adequate force. Many of them occupy other
positions so that their whole attention cannot be concentrated
upon the Corps activities.</p>
<p>2. <i>Good Points</i>: 1, On the whole, officers and members
of the central nucleus are persevering, and possess the
will to sacrifice. The remuneration of the Corps officers is
very low. Those working in the front receive a monthly
maintenance fee of only fifteen to twenty dollars. They
are living a soldier's life; 2, Due to the care of the Corps bestowed
upon social services, many social activities were first
started by the Corps to be followed later by the people; 3,
As a rule, the youths trained by the Corps have good discipline;
example may be taken from the fact that all the
university students of Chungking behaved very well in their
schools after the training; 4, As a rule, members are influenced
by the spiritual loftiness of the Corps Leader [Generalissimo
Chiang]. They have the will to sacrifice, as shown
by the fact that many have willingly taken up work behind
the enemy's lines.</p></blockquote>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353">[Pg 353]</a></span></p>
<h4>2. Principles Guiding the Nation's Youth</h4>
<p>Since the Corps has for its mission the training of
youth, the officers must shoulder the responsibility of
leading youth to be good, to avoid all past errors, corruption,
etc., that harms the mind of youth instead of benefiting
it.</p>
<p>We must lead the youth according to the following principles:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. As ones who have joined the People's Revolution, we
should lead the youth in accordance with the principles of
San Min Chu I, in order that we may conclude the work of
the People's Revolution. We must use every possible
method to love and train all youth so as to make them
strong figures in the work of national defense and reconstruction.</p>
<p>2. In order to lead youth, we must know the youthful
mind. The few young men who went the wrong way are
not bad in themselves, but merely influenced by untrue and
selfish ideas. To correct this we must first correct ourselves,
and be their example. We must love them as we do
our own children. In this way they shall certainly be happy
to come to us.</p>
<p>3. It is necessary to know that the only real danger
against our People's Revolution is Japanese imperialism.
The rest of the political factions will be easily dealt with
by political action in the future. We must not be irritated
at their existence.</p>
<p>4. In leading the youths to fight against imperialism and
other reactionary ideas, we must first of all conquer our
own worst selves before we can expect to be their leaders.</p>
<p>5. In leading the youths, we must induce them to shoulder
all future responsibilities. Let them understand that
what they suffered in youth should not be suffered by posterity.
Do unto others what you expect others to do unto you.
The generations must progress, not go backward.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The future activities of the Corps will be chiefly to unite
and train youth in productive work. On the one hand, we
should call for all good youths to be members of the Corps.
On the other, we should select specially qualified ones to
form a central nucleus to shoulder jointly the activities of
the Corps. In this respect, the Corps shall and must be
able to accomplish the task that has been ever hoped for by
the Corps Leader.</p>
<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_202" id="Footnote_1_202"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_202"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Ch'ên Ch'êng, <i>K'ang-chan Chien-kuo Yü Ch'ing-nien Tsê-jen</i> [Resistance
and Reconstruction in Relation to the Duties of Youth],
Chungking XXIX (1940), p. 43-68. The book was published by the
Political Department of the Military Affairs Commission (<i>Chün-shih
Wei-yüan-hui Chêng-chih-pu</i>) of the National Government.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_2_203" id="Footnote_2_203"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_203"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Kuo-min kê-ming</i>, i.e., the revolution (<i>kê-ming</i>) as planned by
Sun Yat-sen.</p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354">[Pg 354]</a></span></p>
<h2><i>D.</i> THE <i>HSIAO-TSU</i> (SMALL GROUP) TRAINING PROGRAM<a name="FNanchor_1_204" id="FNanchor_1_204"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_204" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2>
<blockquote>
<p>A formal statement of Party policy, this was passed by the 117th
session of the Fifth Central Standing Committee of the Kuomintang
on March 23, 1939 and amended by its 123rd session on June 15, 1939.
This typifies the Kuomintang drive to establish closer contact with
broad reaches of the population.</p></blockquote>
<h3><span class="smcap">Introduction</span></h3>
<p>The Sub-District Party Organ (<i>ch'ü-fen-pu</i>) is the fundamental
unit of the Kuomintang. Due to its large membership,
it has been found extremely difficult to give the members
proper training. As a measure of remedy, the Central
Party Headquarters has promulgated a set of regulations
governing the small-group conference. However, due to the
fact that the position and nature of such an institution as
well as its relations with the Kuomintang have not been
adequately defined, this plan has not been successfully
carried out. Recently, the Chairman of the Central Executive
Committee of the Kuomintang [The Party Chief,
Chiang K'ai-shek] has repeatedly instructed that the small-group
conference be put into practice in order to improve
the Party affairs. Hence, the regulations were promulgated
to be enforced by the various Party organs.</p>
<p>The Kuomintang aims to have a Party organ established
in every organization.<a name="FNanchor_2_205" id="FNanchor_2_205"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_205" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> In order to realize this aim, the
following points must be observed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. The small-group conference is just for training the
Party members. It is different from the Sub-District Party
Organ which is the lowest administrative authority. Consequently,
only matters concerning the Party principles are
to be discussed in the small-group conference while other
important issues are left to the Sub-District Party Organ.</p>
<p>2. The Sub-District Party Organ may have unlimited
membership. Its members may be organized into more than
two small-group conferences. If the members are not more
than ten in number, one small-group conference may be
formed.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355">[Pg 355]</a></span></p>
<p>3. As the small-group conference is to be organized from
the Sub-District Party Organs, a distinction between the
District Party and the Sub-District Party Organ must be
made. The fundamental principle is that there will be one
Party organ for one single [extra-Party] organization. If a
Sub-District Party has too many members, several Sub-District
Party Organs may be formed under the charge of a
District Party Organ. It is not permissible for several
parallel Party Organs to exist in one single organization
nor may the members of several organizations go into one
Party organ. However, if the number of Party members
of one organization is too small to form a Sub-District
Party Organ, they may join the neighbor Sub-District Party
Organ. It is to be remembered that the best policy is to
have enough Party members in each organization to form
its own Sub-District Party Organ.</p>
<p>4. Small-group conferences may be named in numerical
order such as, First and Second Small-Group Conference, or
the First and Second Small-Group Conference of a certain
<i>hsien</i> or Sub-District Party Organ. If there is only one
small-group conference, it will not necessarily be named
as such.</p>
<p>5. When such small-group conference is organized in
every institution down to the <i>pao-chia</i>, then the people will
be better enlightened concerning the Government and Party
policies. Thus it will help the Government in having its
orders fully enforced.</p>
<p>6. The small-group conference and the Sub-District
Party meeting should take place every two weeks alternately.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>All the Party organs upon receipt of this memorandum
should make a careful study of the local conditions and
submit to the Provincial Kuomintang in ten days' time their
working plan. Approval should be given not later than ten
days, and within a month all such small-group conferences
should be organized. However, if there should be any difficulty
encountered or any comments to be made they may
be submitted to the proper Party authority for their consideration.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">A. Organization</span></h3>
<p>1. A small-group conference is established for training
the Party members of the Sub-District Kuomintang Organ.</p>
<p>2. A small-group conference may have three to ten members.
If a Sub-District Party Organ has more than ten members,
two or more small-group conferences may be organized<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356">[Pg 356]</a></span>
and members distributed according to their intellectual
standing, interests and occupations. It is the best policy
that the members of higher education should be evenly distributed
among the small-group conferences.</p>
<p>3. In the border districts, if the number of Party members
is less than five, and consequently a Sub-District Party
Organ cannot be formed, a small-group conference may be
organized first to be under the direct charge of some other
higher Party authorities.</p>
<p>4. A small-group conference may be reorganized every
six months. If there are too many shiftings of members and
any other difficulties, it may be reorganized before that time.</p>
<p>5. Every small-group conference has one Chief who is
responsible for calling conferences, reading reports and giving
guidance regarding the thoughts and activities of his
members. He is to be elected by the members and may be
re-elected after six-months' service.</p>
<p>6. If the intellectual standing of the members of a small-group
conference is equivalent to that of a primary school
student, the Chief may be appointed by the Executive Committee
of the Sub-District Party.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">B. Conferences</span></h3>
<p>7. Small-group conferences are to be held every two
weeks. The conference is to last not more than two hours.
Members are to be notified by the Chief of the time and
place of the conference. It is important that conferences
should be planned so as not to interfere with the work of
the members.</p>
<p>8. In the conferences each member may be the Chairman
by turn. Minutes are to be recorded by any member appointed
at the conference. The minutes are to be read by
the Chief in the Sub-District Party meetings.</p>
<p>9. Agenda of the small-group conference includes:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> The Chief announces the opening of the conference.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> The Chief reads Dr. Sun's will.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> The Chief reports communications from the Sub-District
Party Organ, important current problems, publications
of the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the
Central Kuomintang Headquarters, and any other topics.</p>
<p><i>d.</i> Discussions.</p>
<p><i>e.</i> Comments.</p>
<p><i>f.</i> The Chief reads regulations governing Party members.</p>
<p><i>g.</i> The Chief announces the adjournment of the conference.</p></blockquote>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357">[Pg 357]</a></span></p>
<p>10. The discussions include:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> Party principles,</p>
<p><i>b.</i> current issues,</p>
<p><i>c.</i> working abilities,</p>
<p><i>d.</i> book reviews.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>11. Materials for discussion may be given by the Central
Party Headquarters or prepared by the <i>Hsien</i> Party Organ,
if necessary.</p>
<p>12. Members are required to read certain books. In the
case of those who cannot read by themselves, assistance may
be given by the fellow members or by an instructor especially
appointed for this purpose. Encouragement should
be given to those who can do good written work.</p>
<p>13. Small-group conferences are responsible for the education
of the illiterate members.</p>
<p>14. Every member should take part in the discussion.</p>
<p>15. If the members of the small-group conference cannot
reach an agreement regarding any one of the four topics
enumerated in the Item No. 10, they may refer to Central
Party Headquarters or the <i>Hsien</i> Party Headquarters
through the Sub-District Party Organ.</p>
<p>16. If it is found that all the small-group conferences
cannot reach an agreement regarding certain topics discussed
or if the Secretary of the Sub-District Party Organ
considers it necessary, a Sub-District mass meeting may be
called to discuss these topics. The agenda for the small-group
conference can also be used for the Sub-District Party
meetings.</p>
<p>17. When the small-group Chief considers it necessary,
he may decide whether to have the Item "Comment" only
on the agenda.</p>
<p>18. In commenting, the members may do:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> Self-comment: Members may tell in the conference
their own thoughts, activities and past experiences, as well
as plans for the future.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> Mutual comment: Members may make comments upon
each other's thoughts, activities, etc., in the most sincere and
friendly manner.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>19. All the comments should be recorded in the minutes
for future reference. After the conference members should
not broadcast each other's secrets.</p>
<p>20. At every fourth meeting, the conference may be held
in the form of a tea party or a picnic. In such meetings,
members may express their ideas freely regarding Party,
politics, economics, and any other social problems. It is not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358">[Pg 358]</a></span>
necessary to reach a conclusion, but the discussions should
be recorded.</p>
<p>21. Regulations governing leave of absence for the Sub-District
Party Organ are applicable to the small-group conference.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">C. Guidance and Examination</span></h3>
<p>22. Small-group conference is the major work of all the
Party organs. The Sub-District Party Organ may appoint
a person to attend and supervise the small-group conferences.</p>
<p>23. The Sub-District Party Organ will see to it that the
small-group conferences are held according to schedule. It
will submit monthly to its superior organ the results of
such small-group conferences and in every three months to
the Central Party Headquarters.</p>
<p>24. The small-group conference Chiefs may attend the
Sub-District Party meeting to discuss matters concerning
small-group training.</p>
<p>25. The District Party Organ may send out inspectors at
any time to supervise the small-group conferences. Every
six months it may call a meeting which all the Secretaries
of the Sub-District Party Organs, small-group conference
Chiefs, will attend to discuss matters concerning small-group
conferences. The Secretary of the Sub-District Party
Organ will take the chair in the meeting and the minutes
will be submitted to the <i>Hsien</i> Party.</p>
<p>26. The <i>Hsien</i> Party Organ may also send out inspectors
to supervise the small-group conferences. Every six months,
after the meeting as stated in Item 25 has taken place, a
<i>Hsien</i> Party meeting is to be called to discuss the small-group
conferences in the whole <i>hsien</i>. The Secretary of
the <i>Hsien</i> Party Organ will preside in such meetings. Minutes
are to be submitted to the Provincial Party Headquarters.</p>
<p>27. If necessary, the <i>Hsien</i> Party Organ may hold different
competitions in such fields as sports, speeches, Party
principles, etc., in order to make the small-group conferences
more interesting.</p>
<p>28. The Provincial Party Organ, besides sending out inspectors
to make inspections of the small-group conferences,
may obtain at any time the minutes of a certain small-group
conference of a certain <i>hsien</i> for examination.</p>
<p>29. The Provincial Party Organ may have a general examination
of the small-group conferences that have taken<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359">[Pg 359]</a></span>
place, taking the <i>hsien</i> as a unit. Encouragement and punishment
should be given according to merit.</p>
<p>30. The Central Party Headquarters, besides sending out
inspectors, may obtain any number of minutes of the small-group
conferences for examination.</p>
<p>31. Those Party organs below the <i>Hsien</i> Party Organ
should pay especial attention to the character, morals and
intellectual ability of the members. The names of those
members who have made special contributions to the Party
work should be filed with the Central Party Headquarters
for appointment.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">D. Appendix</span></h3>
<p>32. All the <i>Hsien</i> Parties upon receipt of this Program
should make a study of local conditions and make out a
plan for carrying them out.</p>
<p>33. For the border districts and war areas strict observance
of these items may be dispensed with, upon the request
of the local Party organ to the Central Party Headquarters.</p>
<p>34. The items contained in this memorandum are
applicable to Special Municipal Party Organs, Seamen's
Party Organs, Overseas Party Organs, and agencies under
the charge of the Central Party Headquarters.</p>
<p>35. The above is effective after the approval of the Central
Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.</p>
<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_204" id="Footnote_1_204"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_204"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Mimeographed memoranda from the Central Party Headquarters
of the Kuomintang; presented to the author on July 17, 1940, by
Dr. K'an Nei-kuang, Deputy Secretary-General of the Kuomintang.
The original title is <i>Hsiao-tsu Hsün-lien Kang-ling</i>; undated, unpublished.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_2_205" id="Footnote_2_205"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_205"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> I.e., factory, cooperative, school, etc.</p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<h2><i>E.</i> PARTY CONSTITUTION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY<a name="FNanchor_1_206" id="FNanchor_1_206"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_206" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2>
<blockquote>
<p>Despite the many changes in the governmental form of the Communist-controlled
areas, the Chinese Communist Party has retained
the same Party Constitution for many years. The following constitution
was adopted in 1928 by the Sixth Party Congress.</p></blockquote>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter I. Title</span></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 1. <i>The Title</i>: The Communist Party of China
is a branch of the Communist International. Therefore the
title is "The Chinese Communist Party."</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360">[Pg 360]</a></span></p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter II. The Members</span></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 2. <i>Qualifications of Party Members</i>: The Party
members should accept the regulations and constitution of
the Communist International and of the Chinese Communist
Party. They should join one of the Party Organs
and abide by the resolutions which have been passed by the
Communist International and the Chinese Communist
Party. They are required to pay the Party dues regularly.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 3. <i>Procedure to Join the Party</i>: The candidates
of the following qualifications can be recognized as Party
members with the approval of the <i>hsien</i> Party Councillor
and the sanction of the Branch Organs:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> Factory Laborers: recommended by one Party member
and approved by one Branch of Production Party
Organ.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> Farmers, handicraft men, intellectuals and public
functionaries of the lower grades: recommended by two
Party members.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> High public functionaries: recommended by three
Party members.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Note:</p>
<p>1. The sponsor must take full responsibility for the
candidate. In case qualifications are false, the sponsor
shall receive punishment according to the regulations.
He may be expelled in a serious case.</p>
<p>2. The candidate shall be asked to do some Party
work for trial before he can be recognized as a member,
in order that his qualifications and understanding of
party principles can be examined.</p></blockquote>
<p><i>d.</i> A candidate who is an ex-member of other Parties
shall become a Communist Party member by the recommendation
of three Party members of more than three years'
standing. If he was an ordinary Party member of the other
Party, his membership in the Communist Party shall be
sanctioned by the Provincial Party Committee; if he was a
special member of another Party, then his membership shall
be sanctioned by the Central Party Organ.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 4. <i>The Adherence of Organized Groups</i>: In
case other political groups or branches of other parties want
to join the Communist Party, their organization systems
must be studied and amended according to the ideas of the
Communist Central Party Organ.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 5. <i>The Transfer of Members</i>: The Party members
may be transferred from one Organ to another if they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361">[Pg 361]</a></span>
move from one place to another. The transfer, however,
must be approved by the Central Party Organ.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 6. <i>The Expulsion of Members</i>: The expulsion
of members must be first passed by the general meeting of
that particular Branch Organ and then be approved by the
higher Organ. Until the approval is obtained, it is necessary
to stop the work of the member involved. In case the
member is not satisfied with the discharge, he is allowed to
send a petition to the highest Party Organ for final judgment.
Every Party committee has the power to expel a
member who is discovered as an anti-Communist. The
resolution must be communicated to the Organ to which
that member belonged.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter III. The Organization</span></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 7. <i>The Principle of Organization</i>: Like other
Communist International Branch Parties, the essential of
organization of the Chinese Communist Party is Democratic
Centralism. By Democratic Centralism is meant:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> Both superior and subordinate Party Organs shall be
formed according to resolutions which have been passed
in the Councils of Party Delegates and the National Communist
Party Congress.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> Each Party Organ is required to make a report of its
newly elected members.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> Subordinate Party Organs must accept orders issued
by the higher Organs. They shall strictly obey the regulations
of the Party. They shall effectively carry out the resolutions
and plans which have been determined by the Communist
International Central Committee and its supervisory
Party Organs. The Party members may discuss and argue
on certain points which are not yet passed by the Party
Organ. In other words, they must obey unconditionally
the resolutions which have been already determined by the
Communist International or their superior Organs, whether
they agree with these resolutions or not.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 8. <i>The Supervisory Party Organs</i>: Under certain
circumstances, subordinate Party Organs are allowed to
appoint new supervisory Committees to join the Party with
the sanction of its superior Organs.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 9. <i>The Distribution of Party Organs</i>: The distribution
of Party Organs is according to geographic units.
The Administrative Party Organ in a certain place is the
supervisory Organ of that place. People of different nationalities<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_362" id="Page_362">[Pg 362]</a></span>
may all join the Communist Party. However, they
must first join a Chinese District Party Organ before they
can become members of the Chinese Communist Party.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 10. <i>Duties of the District Organs</i>: The District
Organs have the power to settle their local affairs within the
scope of resolutions passed by the Communist International
and the Chinese Communist Party.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 11. <i>The Supreme Party Organs</i>: The supreme
Party Organs are the Party Members' Mass Meeting and the
Councils of Party Delegates.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 12. <i>The Party Committee</i>: Different classes of
Party committees shall be elected from among the Party
Members' Mass Meeting and the Councils of Party Delegates<a name="FNanchor_2_207" id="FNanchor_2_207"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_207" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>
and the National Communist Party Congress.<a name="FNanchor_3_208" id="FNanchor_3_208"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_208" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> The
committees shall supervise the routine procedures of their
subordinate Organs.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 13. <i>Problems of Criticism</i>: In the case of <i>hsien</i>
Branch Party Delegates, it is necessary for them to undergo
criticism by the (subordinate) officers of higher Party Organs.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 14. <i>The Organization System of the Communist
Party Organs</i>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> Different Branch Party Organs shall be established in
every factory, workshop, shop, street, village, and army unit.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> There shall be a District Party Council and District
Council of Party Delegates in every city or country district,
under the supervision of a District Party Committee.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> There shall be a Hsien or Municipal Council of Party
Delegates in each <i>hsien</i> or municipality, under the supervision
of a Municipal Party Committee.</p>
<p><i>d.</i> A special Council of Party Delegates which is constituted
by several <i>hsien</i> or parts of a province shall be established
when necessary. The establishment must be approved
by the Provincial Committee.</p>
<p><i>e.</i> There shall be a Provincial Council of Party Delegates
in every province, to be supervised by a Provincial Party
Committee.</p>
<p><i>f.</i> There shall be a National Communist Congress in
the nation, supervised by the Central Committee.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_363" id="Page_363">[Pg 363]</a></span></p>
<p><i>g.</i> For the convenience in training Party members, a special
Central Executive Bureau shall be established and
special central officers shall be sent to different places. This
Bureau and the officers shall be appointed and supervised
by the Central Committee.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 15. Further departments and subordinate committees
shall be established to deal with special Party functions,
such as the Organization Department, Publicity Department,
Labor Movement Committee and Women's Movement
Committee. These departments and committees shall
be under the supervision of their respective Party Committees.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Note: To improve understanding of differences in custom
and language among Party members of different
nationalities, several Nationality Movement Departments
shall be formed.</p></blockquote>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter IV. Branch Party Organs</span></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 16. <i>Fundamental Organizations</i>: Branch Party
Organs of the factories, mines, workshops, shops, streets, villages,
and armies are the fundamental organization of the
Communist Party. Members working in the above-mentioned
places shall join the Branch Party Organs. New
Branch Party Organs can be organized when there are at
least three or more members. But they must be under the
control of the <i>Hsien</i> Committee.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 17. <i>Special Organizations of the Branch Party
Organs</i>: Members of certain businesses can join the Production
Branch Organ of the same occupation in their
neighboring city. Special Branch Organs shall be organized
according to the localities and the nature of their work,
such as handicraft laborers, free laborers, family laborers, or
intellectuals.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 18. <i>Duties of the Branch Party Organs</i>: The
Branch Party Organ unites the strength of the farmers and
laborers. Its duties are:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> To use its systematic and effective agitation and
slogans to absorb farmers and laborers into the Communist
party.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> To use its power of organization to join the political
and economic struggles of the farmers and laborers. To encourage
the people's revolutionary spirit. To teach the
meaning of class-struggles. To supervise the farmers' and
laborers' revolutions. To lead proletarians to the Communist
International and the Chinese Communist Party.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_364" id="Page_364">[Pg 364]</a></span></p>
<p><i>c.</i> To enlist and train new members. To distribute
Party periodicals among members and non-members in order
to encourage political and educational work.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 19. <i>Branch Organ Executive Committee</i>: Each
Branch shall have three to five executive committeemen to
manage the routine Party work. They shall take charge of
the division of labor, such as the publicity work, distribution
of printed materials, organization of farmer and labor
parties, women's movements, and youth movements. There
shall be one secretary; he shall carry out resolutions and
orders.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter V. City and Country District Party Organs</span></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 20. <i>The District Council of Party Delegates</i>:
In the sphere of the city or country districts the supreme
Party Organs are the Party Members' Mass Meeting and
the District Councils of Party Delegates. The Party Members'
Mass Meeting and the Councils of Party Delegates
shall receive and approve the reports of the District Party
Committee; shall elect the Delegates to District, <i>Hsien</i>,
Municipal, or Provincial Councils of the Party Delegates
Meeting.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 21. <i>District Party Committee</i>: The District
Party Committee shall take charge of the supervision
of affairs within that district before and after the Party
Members' Mass Meeting or the District Council of Party
Delegates' Meeting. Regular meetings of the city or
rural District Party Committee shall be directed by the
Standing Committee, elected by the Party Committee
itself.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VI.</span> <i>Hsien</i> <span class="smcap">and Municipal Party Organs</span></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 22. <i>The Hsien Council of Party Delegates</i>: The
supreme Party Organ in the <i>hsien</i> is the <i>Hsien</i> Council of
Party Delegates. The special meeting of the Council shall
be called once in three months. It shall be called by the
demand of a majority of other organizations in the <i>hsien</i>;
by determination of the Provincial Party Committee or
Special District Party Committee. The <i>Hsien</i> Council of
Party Delegates which is called by the <i>Hsien</i> Party Committee
shall read reports issued by the <i>Hsien</i> Party Committee
or the <i>Hsien</i> Control Committee. It shall elect Delegates
of the <i>Hsien</i> Party Committee, <i>Hsien</i> Control Committee,
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_365" id="Page_365">[Pg 365]</a></span>Provincial Party Committee, and Special District
Party Committee.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 23. <i>Hsien Party Committee</i>: The <i>Hsien</i> Party
Committee is elected by the <i>Hsien</i> Council of Party Delegates.
Before and after the meetings of <i>Hsien</i> Council of
Party Delegates this Committee is the supreme Party Organ
in the <i>hsien</i>. The Committee shall be constituted by <i>Hsien</i>
Delegates and delegates from important villages. The meeting
of the Committee shall be called at least once a month,
and its date shall be determined by the <i>Hsien</i> Committee
itself. A Standing Committee shall be elected to take care
of routine Party affairs. There shall be one secretary of
the Standing Committee, to be elected from among the
Committee members.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 24. A <i>Hsien</i> Party Committee shall put into effect
previously passed resolutions of the <i>Hsien</i> Council of
Party Delegates, the Provincial Party Committee, and the
Central Party Committee. Whenever possible, different
committees, such as the Organization Committee, Publicity
Committee, Women's Movement Committee, and Farmers'
Movement Committee, shall be established. The <i>Hsien</i>
Party Committee shall also appoint the editors of <i>Hsien</i>
Party newspapers. It shall take dual responsibilities to obey
the orders of its superior Organ and to report its own merits
to its superior Organs.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 25. No Municipal Party Committee shall be
formed in a city where a <i>Hsien</i> Party Committee has already
been established. In such a case the Party affairs of the
city shall be in charge of the <i>Hsien</i> Party Committee. A
City District Party Committee under it may be formed to
take an active part in the City Party affairs.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 26. <i>The Municipal Party Committee</i>: The organization
of the Municipal Party Committee is the same
as that of the <i>Hsien</i> Party Committee. A City District Party
Committee is subordinate to it. This Committee shall administer
its Branch Party Organs and Branch Organs of its
neighbors. No Municipal Party Committee shall be established
in a place where the Provincial Party Committee
or Special District Party Committee has already been established.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 27. The organization and functions of the Special
District Party Committee shall be the same as the <i>Hsien</i>
Party Committee. In the place where there is no Provincial
Party Committee provided then the Special District Party
Committee shall be directed by the Central Party
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_366" id="Page_366">[Pg 366]</a></span>Committee. In such a case the functions and organization of the
Special Party Committee shall be the same as the Provincial
Party Committee.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VII. Provincial Party Organs</span></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 28. <i>The Provincial Council of Party Delegates</i>:
The Provincial Council of Party Delegates is the supreme
Party Organ in the province. The regular meeting of the
Council shall be called to meet once semi-annually. Special
meetings shall be called according to the demand of a
majority of other organizations of the province, or by the
determination of the Central Party Committee. The regular
meeting of the Provincial Council of Party Delegates, which
is called by the Provincial Party Committee, shall have the
responsibility of hearing reports issued by the Provincial
Party Committee, and by the Provincial Control Committee.
It shall discuss the social work and Party affairs
problems of the province; and elect delegates to Provincial
Party Committee, Provincial Control Committee, and National
Party Congress.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 29. <i>Provincial Party Committee</i>: Before and
after the meeting of the Provincial Council of Party delegates,
the Provincial Party Committee is the supreme Party
Organ in each province. Delegates of the central Provincial
organizations or other district Party Organs are required to
join the Provincial Party Committee. The meeting of the
Provincial Party Committee shall be called at least once in
two months; the date of the meeting shall be determined
by the Committee itself. A Standing Committee under it
shall be authorized to take charge of Party affairs before
and after the meeting of the Provincial Party Committee.
Secretaries are to be appointed accordingly.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 30. <i>The Duties and Organization of Provincial
Party Committees</i>: The duties of the Provincial Party Committee
are: to put into effect the passed resolutions of the
Provincial Council of Party Delegates or Central Party
Committee; to organize the subsidiary Party Organs; to
appoint editors for the Party newspapers; to distribute the
Party funds; to control the accounting department; to supervise
the Party work among non-Communists; to draft
regular reports to the Central Party Committee; to announce
the Party Movement to its subordinate Organs. For
the furtherance of important work different departments
and committees shall be provided, such as the Provincial
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_367" id="Page_367">[Pg 367]</a></span>Organization Department, Publicity Department, Labor
Movement Department, etc. The department heads who act
concurrently in the Provincial Party Committee shall supervise
Party affairs under the control of the Provincial Standing
Committee.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 31</span>. The Provincial Party Committee shall help
the District Party Committee to carry out the Party activities.
Therefore the <i>Hsien</i> Party Committee in that particular
city should only take care of the Party work within its
own sphere.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VIII. The National Party Convention</span><a name="FNanchor_4_209" id="FNanchor_4_209"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_209" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 32</span>. The National Party Convention shall be
called to meet twice annually. The numbers of candidates
and Delegates to be elected by different organs are to be
determined by the Central Party Committee.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 33</span>. The previously passed resolutions of the
Convention shall be put into effect after the approval of
the Central Party Committee.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 34</span>. In case the Convention meeting is held before
the meeting of the Communist International then
several Delegates can be elected to attend the meeting of the
latter. However, they must get the consent of the International
Communist Committee.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter IX. The National Party Congress</span></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 35</span>. The National Party Congress is the supreme
Party Organ in the country. The meeting shall be
called once annually by the Central Party Committee and the
Communist International. Special meetings can be called
by the Central Party Committee or initiated by the Communist
International. It may also be called by request of
a majority of the Delegates who attended the last meeting.
The call of the special meeting, however, must be approved
by the Central Party Committee first. Resolutions which
have been passed by the majority of the Delegates shall
become effective. The number of Delegates and percentage
in each Party Organ shall be determined by the Communist
International, the Central Party Committee, or the
preliminary session of the Party Convention.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article 36</span>. The duties of the National Party Congress
are:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> To receive and examine reports issued by the Central
Party Committee.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_368" id="Page_368">[Pg 368]</a></span></p>
<p><i>b.</i> To determine Party regulations.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> To determine the important political or organization
plans.</p>
<p><i>d.</i> To elect the Central Party Committee.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 37. Delegates to the Party Congress are to be
elected by the Provincial Councils of Party Delegates. In
special cases requiring secret action, they may be appointed
by the Provincial Party Committee with the approval of
the Communist International Committee. A provisional
Congress can be substituted for the regular Congress with
only the consent of the International Communist Committee.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter X. The Central Party Committee</span><a name="FNanchor_5_210" id="FNanchor_5_210"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_210" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 38. The number of the Central Party Committee
members shall be determined by the National Party
Congress.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 39. While the National Party Congress is in session,
the Central Party Committee is the supreme Party
Organ. It represents the Party in contacts with the other
political parties. Besides this its duties are: to establish
various subordinate Party Organs; to supervise and control
subordinate Party Organs; to edit the Party newspapers;
to send special Party officers to different provinces; to
form the Central Executive Bureau in order to encourage
Party principles; to distribute the Party funds; to control
the Central Accounting Department. The Central Party
Committee shall be called at least three times a month.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 40. A Political Bureau shall be established in
the Central Party Committee. It shall supervise the political
affairs before and after the meeting of the Central Party
Committee. A Standing Committee is to be elected to take
charge of routine work.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 41. When necessary the Central Party Committee
shall establish different subordinate departments or
committees such as the Organization Department, Publicity
Department, Laborers' Movement Committees, Women's
Movement Committees and Farmers' Movement Committees.
The functions of these Departments and Committees
shall be guided by the Central Party Committee,
which shall also appoint Department heads and Chairmen.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 42. The Central Party Committee shall determine
the work and the scope of work of the District Party
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_369" id="Page_369">[Pg 369]</a></span>Organs with reference to their political and economic background.
The distribution of Party Organs shall also be
settled by the Central Party Committee.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter XI. The Central Control Committee</span><a name="FNanchor_6_211" id="FNanchor_6_211"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_211" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 43. For the control of the financial and accounting
work of the subordinate Party Organs, Central or District
Control Committees shall be elected by the National
Party Congress, Central or District Party Committee.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter XII. The Party Discipline</span></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 44. Strict obedience to Party discipline is the
highest duty of every Communist. Resolutions passed by
the Communist International, Central Party Committee, or
other superior Party Organs shall be carried out effectively
and exactly by the Party members. Until resolutions have
been passed, members are allowed to discuss them freely.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 45. Those who have failed to put into effect
the orders or resolutions, or those who violate the Party
discipline shall be punished by the Party Organs with reference
to the Party regulations. The punishments for
Organs are: reprimand, dissolution, and reregistration of its
members. The punishments for the members are: reprimand,
warning, deprivation of Party activities, expulsion
from membership, or suspension from duties for stated
periods. Cases involving punishment shall be studied and
examined by the Party Members' Mass Meeting or by
respective Party Organs. Special Committees may be formed
with the approval of Party Organs to settle difficult cases.
Expulsion from membership shall be carried out according
to particulars stated in Item 6 of this Constitution.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter XIII. Party Finance</span></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 46. The sources of the Party revenue are:
Party fees, special levies, income from printed materials,
and the compensations from its superior Organs.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 47. The amount of the Party fee shall be determined
by the Central Committee. Members without employment
or those in poverty are allowed exemption from
payment. Those who do not pay their fees for three months,
without stating reasons, shall be recognized as released from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_370" id="Page_370">[Pg 370]</a></span>
membership, and their names shall be announced to the
Mass Meeting.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter XIV. Special Party Groups [Corps]</span><a name="FNanchor_7_212" id="FNanchor_7_212"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_212" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 48. Special Party Groups are to be constituted
by three or more Party members. The main function of
these Party Groups is the encouragement of the Party principles
among the non-Communist groups. The routine affairs
of the Group shall be in charge of a Managing Board
elected from the Party Group. Whenever a Party Committee
and a Special Party Group conflict and then come to
an agreement on certain points, these points shall be reconsidered
and concurrently passed by the two Organs.
Quick action must be taken. If agreement is not reached,
a petition is required for submission to a superior Party
Organ for final determination.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 49. Delegates of Party Groups shall attend the
Party Committee Meeting whenever there is matter dealing
with the Party Group.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 50. A Managing Board shall be formed in each
Group with the approval of the Party Committee. The
Committee can appoint its members to the Board and may
also recall or remove those members when necessary. In
such cases, however, the reasons for recall or removal require
announcement to the Party Group.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 51. A list of names of the staff members of the
Party Group shall be submitted to a Party Organ for approval.
Removal of staff members from a group shall also
require approval by the Party Organ.</p>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 52. Resolutions to be carried out by the Party
Group shall first be passed by the Group Meeting or Meeting
of the Managing Board. In a Party Members' Mass
Meeting all the Group members must support a resolution
which is already passed by its own Group. If one fails to
do so he may be punished according to the regulations.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter XV. Relationship with the Communist
Youth Corps</span><a name="FNanchor_8_213" id="FNanchor_8_213"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_213" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></h3>
<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 53. The District or Central Party Organs shall
send Delegates to the Communist Youth Corps for exchanging
ideas. At the same time the Communist Youth Corps
can also send their members to attend the various meetings
of the different Councils of the Party Delegates.</p>
<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_206" id="Footnote_1_206"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_206"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Kung-ch'an-tang Tang-chang</i> [Party Constitution of the Communist
Party], [Chungking?], XXVII (1938), p. 1-21.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_2_207" id="Footnote_2_207"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_207"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> The term <i>Tai-piao Ta-hui</i> rendered "Council of Party Delegates,"
may also be put as "Party Conference." Cf. "The Rules of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union" in Rappard, William E., <i>et al.</i>,
<i>Source Book on European Governments</i>, New York, 1937, p. v34-v52.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_3_208" id="Footnote_3_208"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_208"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Ch'üan-kuo Ta-hui</i> is given as "National Party Congress"; the
term <i>Ch'üan-kuo</i> has been translated as "All-China" elsewhere.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_4_209" id="Footnote_4_209"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_209"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Ch'üan-kuo Hui-i</i>.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_5_210" id="Footnote_5_210"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_210"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Chung-yang Wei-yüan-hui</i>.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_6_211" id="Footnote_6_211"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_211"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> The term here is <i>shên-ch'a wei-yüan-hui</i>, not <i>chien-ch'a</i>, which is
the term used for "Control" as one of the five powers of Sun Yat-sen's
plan.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_7_212" id="Footnote_7_212"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_212"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Tang-t'uan</i>.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_8_213" id="Footnote_8_213"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_213"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Kung-ch'an Ch'ing-nien T'uan</i>.</p></div>
</div>
<hr class="chap" />
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_371" id="Page_371">[Pg 371]</a></span></p>
<h2>APPENDIX III. MATERIALS ON POLICY</h2>
<hr class="chap" />
<h2><i>A.</i> REPLY TO QUESTIONS (CHIANG K'AI-SHEK)<a name="FNanchor_1_214" id="FNanchor_1_214"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_214" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2>
<blockquote>
<p>Replies to the following questionnaire were very kindly supplied
by Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek. The questions by the present
author were submitted to him on July 23, 1940; the replies were transmitted
through the Vice-Minister of Publicity, Mr. Hollington Tong,
on November 26, 1940.</p></blockquote>
<p>(1) Do you believe that the <i>San Min Chu I</i> are suited to
China alone, or do you think it possible that they represent
a golden mean between totalitarianism and democracy?</p>
<p><i>San Min Chu I is a type of democracy particularly
suited to China. In its general features, I think, it is
similar to Western democracies.</i></p>
<p>(2) Do you feel that a <i>San Min Chu I</i> China will have any
positive proposals to make concerning the subject of
world federation or confederation, if that subject is
raised at the end of the current European war?</p>
<p><i>In as much as cosmopolitanism and world peace are
two of the main aims of San Min Chu I, China will
naturally be disposed to participate in any world federation
or confederation based on the principle of equality
of nations and for the good of mankind.</i></p>
<p>(3) Do you believe that the inauguration of the constitution
and of a constitutional period will lead to the uncontrolled
freedom of minor parties, including the
Communist? Is there not a danger that the minor parties,
because they do not share the responsibility for
government, will be able to exploit formal democratic
rights more unscrupulously than the Kuomintang?</p>
<p><i>No, because democracy in itself has the ability to work
out the solutions for those problems if there are any.</i></p>
<p>(4) What do you regard as the clearest factual indication of
the growth of democracy in Free China?</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_372" id="Page_372">[Pg 372]</a></span></p>
<p><i>The following are the clearest indications of the
growth of democracy in China: 1, the convocation of
the People's Political Council; 2, the convocation of
the Provincial Political Councils; 3, the growth of
popular interest in both public and national affairs;
4, the growth of the sentiment of national solidarity;
5, the spontaneous response to the call for public
services.</i></p>
<p>(5) Within the army, what democratic tendencies have you
fostered or observed?</p>
<p><i>Since the army is now recruited from the different
walks of life, it naturally shares the growing democratic
sentiment. Within the army, however, the soldiers and
officers are of course trained and disciplined in strict accordance
with military regulations.</i></p>
<p>(6) When the war against Japan is successfully concluded,
do you believe that the National Government will have
any difficulty in re-establishing its full authority over
the guerrilla-governed areas, which will have tasted
autonomy?</p>
<p><i>No, because all these forces are fighting for the liberty
and independence of China.</i></p>
<p>(7) Do you believe that the bogus Government at Nanking
is intended by the enemy to deceive the Chinese,
to fool the Japanese home public, or actually to govern
China? Why do you think that a man as ambitious as
Wang Ch'ing-wei put himself in such a humiliating
and ridiculous position—before the world, and before
history?</p>
<p><i>Whatever may be the intention of the Japanese in putting
up Wang Ch'ing-wei as the head of the bogus government,
they certainly have no idea of letting him or
any other puppet govern China in reality. As to the
latter part of the question, I prefer that you would ask
Wang directly.</i></p>
<div class="footnotes">
<h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_214" id="Footnote_1_214"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_214"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Private communication by and to the present author, and in
his possession.</p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_373" id="Page_373">[Pg 373]</a></span></p>
<h2><i>B.</i> WHAT I MEAN BY ACTION, OR A PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION (CHIANG
K'AI-SHEK)<a name="FNanchor_1_215" id="FNanchor_1_215"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_215" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2>
<blockquote>
<p>The following essay, delivered as a speech, represents the clearest
formulation by Generalissimo Chiang of his own philosophy. To this
must be joined his exegesis on the San Min Chu I, quoted in part
above, p. <a href="#Page_270">270</a>.</p></blockquote>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Truths We Must Endeavor to Grasp Anew</span></h3>
<p>In 1932 I delivered a lecture on the subject "Stages in
the Development of Revolutionary Philosophy." In it I dealt
with two points of especial importance. Firstly, I tried to
explain how the actual grasp of what we know comes only
with positive action. I said: "The universe contains spirit in
addition to matter. Spirit implies mind, and mind implies
conscience. Conscience must find its expression in action, in
the practice of what it urges. Otherwise the conscience
would be a barren thing, and there would be no way of
avoiding a futile idealism on the one hand or determinist
materialism on the other." Secondly, I explained the importance
of the philosophy of action in regard to the
Revolution. I said: "Only the word 'action' covers the
meaning of what has brought into being all things in
space and time. Our philosophy therefore takes as the one
central principle of human life and thought the maxim:
'From true knowledge action naturally proceeds.' In short,
any philosophy of ours must be a philosophy of action.
The consummation of the Republican revolution and the
overthrow of Japanese Imperialist aggression depend upon
our putting into practice Dr. Sun's principle of action as the
natural product of knowledge."</p>
<p>Since I suggested this term <i>philosophy of action</i> and
became the advocate of <i>positive action</i> as the course the
revolutionary must follow, a considerable effect has been
visible in our ranks. The spirit of positive action has been
intensified among us. In the army and in schools, and in
political and social life generally, a gradual transformation
has taken place in the state of inert frustration, vagueness
and depression formerly prevalent. There has been a general
tendency to take the initiative, to express ourselves in
positive action. Such indeed was my aim in promoting this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_374" id="Page_374">[Pg 374]</a></span>
<i>philosophy of action</i>. When I take note of the results
achieved by our <i>action</i>, however, I remain unsatisfied on a
number of points. For instance, there is sometimes mere
action without clear realization of its why and wherefore,
resulting in what the ancients called "unreal action." With
others there is initial vigor and great positive effort, followed
by impatience of checks and failure to persevere in
the face of difficulties, leading some to throw the blame on
circumstances and others upon their fellow-men. The
irritable then proceed to arguing and quarrels; while the
sweeter-tempered lose heart. In this way the real issue is
lost to sight and obstacles unnecessarily multiplied; or the
individual may be overcome with outright disgust and take
on a completely negative attitude, the initial speed of his
progress being in the end equalled by the speed of his
subsequent retrogression. Another kind of failure comes
with a man who impulsively imitates others; who when he
sees others on the go feels any move on their part calls for
some move on his; who spends all his time in acting on the
spur of some transitory stimulus or exigency, forgetful of
our broad revolutionary conceptions and far-reaching aims.</p>
<p>In seeking the reasons for such faulty conduct, I have
been forced to the conclusion that it is due to imperfect
knowledge of the essential meaning of <i>positive action</i>, and
to imperfect realization of the significance and nature of
<i>action</i>, that there is lack of determination, faith and perseverance
among us.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Action Is Life Itself: the Tireless Pertinacity
of Nature Our Example</span></h3>
<p>According to my own individual experience, our first step
must be to draw a clear distinction between <i>action</i> and <i>motion</i>.
The monosyllabic structure of the Chinese language
has occasioned the use of substantival phrases consisting of
two words. One of these phrases is <i>hsing-tung</i> (action-motion),
which in common parlance often has the meaning
properly covered only by the word <i>hsing</i> alone, a word of
far deeper and wider meaning than the word <i>tung</i>. In
fact, we may say that action is <i>human life</i> itself. An antithesis
is commonly implied between the words <i>action</i> and
<i>thought</i>, and between <i>word</i> and <i>act</i>. In reality, however,
thought and word are processes of action, and are properly
to be considered as included within the scope of <i>action</i>,
rather than as foreign to it. From birth to death, while he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_375" id="Page_375">[Pg 375]</a></span>
is subject to space and time, a man cannot withdraw himself
from the sphere of action; he grows up in action and
his character is formed and elevated by action. All saintly
and heroic men, like the devoted revolutionary, attain their
ends and achieve their nobility of character only through
their planned and determined actions.</p>
<p>If we wish to realize the true nature of <i>action</i> we can do
no better than take as the <i>point-de-départ</i> for our thinking
the words of the <i>I-ching</i> or <i>Book of Changes</i>: "Let the superior
man exert himself with the unfailing pertinacity of
Nature." For the most obvious thing in the universe, the
very principle animating all its phenomena, is the activity
of the forces of Nature. The gloss reads: "Day by day the
heavens revolve, with a constancy that only a supreme
pertinacity could maintain. The superior man models himself
upon it in the unceasing exertion of his energies." This
<i>pertinacity</i> is something perennially unimpaired and ever
changeless, greatest strength united to greatest durability,
and moreover an absolute thoroughness and completeness.
And we must model ourselves on the activity of nature, on
its spontaneous and unremitting flow of energy. If there is
this realization of the value and place of human life in the
universe, action will appear to us something inevitable, and
there will follow as a matter of course single-minded devotion
to purpose, a completely natural attitude, and resolute
advance with firm strides towards our ends—we shall have
achieved, in the words of the <i>Chung-yung</i>, "the highest integrity,
unfailing and enduring." Man's existence and progress
depend entirely upon his perception of these truths.</p>
<p><i>Action</i>, therefore, differs from <i>motion</i>. <i>Motion</i> is by no
means necessarily <i>action</i>, though <i>action</i> may on occasion include
some form of <i>motion</i>. Action is continuous, whereas
motion is intermittent; action is essential, whereas motion is
accidental; action is spontaneous, whereas motion is usually
due to the application of external force. Action is in response
to the supreme order of things and in harmony with
the nature of man. Motion is impulsive response to some
fortuitous external stimulus. Action we may describe as
more natural and smoother intrinsically than motion; and
extrinsically it is wholly good in its outcome, whereas motion
may be good or may be evil. Action unfolds in uninterrupted
continuity; motion proceeds by fits and starts.
As an illustration, action may be compared to a ceaseless
flow of water, in the words of Confucius, "racing on, unpausing
day and night." The unremitting and insistent<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_376" id="Page_376">[Pg 376]</a></span>
character of <i>positive action</i> may thus be figured forth. Motion
on the other hand may be compared to the impact of
a stone upon water into which it is thrown. The water is
violently agitated and leaps high into the air; its movement
is tumultuous while it lasts, but subsides when after a
moment or so the extraneous force that caused it is expended.
Such motion is, therefore, transitory, simply because
its motive force comes from without.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Action Is Not Mere Motion</span></h3>
<p>We cannot of course say that all <i>motion</i> is bad, but we
can at least say that the value of <i>motion</i> is never comparable
with that of <i>action</i>. What we commonly call <i>impulse</i> is a
manifestation of the reflex action of some sense or faculty.
When we speak of a man's motions as "blind," "wild," or
"furious," it is always a case of response to external stimulus
or of the application of external force. Such motions are not
spontaneous and they therefore pursue no definite course;
they have no basis in the consciousness of the individual and
no precise direction or aim; the individual's concern with
them is limited to the passing moment of their duration; he
envisages nothing as to what may be their result. There may
be great initial activity and force, but because there is no
basis in reason, consciousness and spontaneity, momentary
agitation is succeeded by relapse into quiescence. A man
who lives by passion and impulse, who <i>moves</i> rather than
<i>acts</i> is like a bell, which when struck vibrates and emits
sound but unless struck is silent. All passive and transient
activity, arising from mere impulse and sense-stimulation, is
in opposition to the positive action required of us by
our revolutionary philosophy, for such <i>motion</i> has no
lasting effect and is powerless to transform the lives of
men.</p>
<p>It is imperative therefore that there should be no confusion
of what we mean by <i>action</i> with what is better termed
<i>motion</i>. The action of which I have been speaking is the
operation of man's innate faculties according to the true
natural laws of his being; it is what I have called the expression
of conscience in practice, the exercise of conscience.
Although we colloquially speak of "violent actions" and
"wrong-minded action" in describing men's conduct, such
conduct, being that of men acting under the influence of
impulse or illusion, should properly be classed as a form of
<i>motion</i>. It is not what we mean by action.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_377" id="Page_377">[Pg 377]</a></span></p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Action Is Nature at Work in Man: the Whole
Universe Is the Scene of Action</span></h3>
<p>Genuine action is necessarily ordered, rhythmical, systematic
and directed towards some aim. It arises from
that fullness of consciousness described as the "calm of
mature reflection." It is inevitably straightforward and continuous,
undeviating and unhesitating. Such motion as that
of the revolving globe we ought not to call mere motion;
that ceaseless axial and orbital rotation is a phenomenon
called in ancient times the <i>activity</i> of nature; and it may
serve us as the best possible illustration of the qualities of
action. We may proceed to a fuller description of the nature
of action by saying it is always marked by a certain regularity
and order in the course of its fulfilment. Human life in
all its aspects of growth and development, in each transition
from stage to stage, in the preparatory and supplementary
acquisitions of substance and experience between phase and
phase,—all this is action. The normal routine of daily life,—sleeping,
resting, eating and working,—is all to be considered
within the scope of action. For the meaning of
action may apply equally well to what occurs both in states
of repose and in states of movement. While work throughout
the process of carrying out a given task may clearly be
action, recreation may also be action. States of motion and
repose are of course to a superficial view opposites. Moreover
in the modern world <i>motion</i> is especially set up in opposition
to <i>repose</i>, and emphasized almost to the exclusion
of the latter. This has caused the importance of <i>stability</i> to
be lost to view.</p>
<p>For the truth of the matter is: "stability allows of repose;
repose allows of calm; calm allows of reflection, and reflection
gives grasp." It should be realized that repose can
have a positive function. And what I call the philosophy of
action permits of no distinction between motion and repose,
a distinction which is superficial. A course of action may involve
intervals of both motion and of repose, just as the
invisible working of living matter contributes to the
visible growth of the body. We need only concern ourselves
as to whether what is done is in harmony with the
laws of man's innate character.</p>
<p>The natural processes of the universe and of human life
go on unceasingly, and in trying to ameliorate human life
by positive action we must realize that such action to be
effectual must be similar to those processes in its continuity<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_378" id="Page_378">[Pg 378]</a></span>
and tenacity. Positive action in its every phase, whether
outwardly visible or impalpable, never ceases to be action,
never really for a moment comes to a halt. The whole universe
is the scene of such action, and man in so far as he
truly acts participates in its immense activity. Let us therefore
distinguish clearly between mere <i>motion</i> and the true
<i>action</i> that works by a steady advance in an undeviating
course, with the timeless inexhaustibility of flowing water
towards its appointed aim.</p>
<p>And now I have something more to add in definition of
the essential meaning of action and its relation to life. The
ancients said "Man's innate character is given him at birth
together with life itself." I consider <i>action</i> to be the expression
of that innate character, and so as inseparable
from life as it. Man in his earliest infancy can laugh and
cry, eat and drink; as he grows up he learns to gaze and
listen, speak and walk; and once grown up, no matter
whether he be intelligent or stupid, he strives for existence,
progress, and development. Or, in other words, he seeks to
conform to the elementary needs of human life. All these
phenomena are phenomena of <i>action</i>, the action of the
faculties for discerning moral and material good, with which
man is naturally endowed.</p>
<p>It is apparent to me that love of ease and dislike of exertion
are no part of fundamental human nature, but that on
the contrary mankind is naturally disposed to labor and
work. If you compel a lively man accustomed to be always
on his feet and busy with his hands to be idle and sedentary,
depriving him of anything to do, he is certain to feel exceedingly
unhappy. In the same way, the least intelligent or
experienced of men has felt the satisfaction and content that
come with work, the joy of contributing to the accomplishment
of some undertaking. There is a colloquialism current
in certain coastal districts of China which substitutes the
word "life" for the word "work"; thus, you may be asked
whether you have "lived your life" for the day, in the sense
of "have you done your day's work?" Work is indeed life;
unless a man be totally incapable he will inevitably require
the means of expression for his abilities, and particularly
such expression as will accrue to the benefit of somebody
beyond himself. Even a little child is conscious of the intense
satisfaction to be derived from doing one's best in
the service of others. Though no praise be awarded the
child it is aware of an extraordinary complaisance within
itself.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_379" id="Page_379">[Pg 379]</a></span></p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Broadest Sense of Life</span></h3>
<p>All these little illustrations bear witness to the fact that
action is the object of man's life; and we should, vice versa,
make life the object of our action. We are born with
faculties for the discernment of moral and material good;
life, from childhood to old age, is the energetic, ceaseless,
use of them, at first chiefly for the satisfaction of the needs
of one's own existence, to secure one's own footing in life,
but next, as one's mental perspective broadens, the family,
the village, the community, the nation, and mankind become
objects of the desire to express oneself and give of
oneself. When we speak of <i>life</i> it should mean for us the
life of mankind, the life and existence of people and nation,
the livelihood of masses and citizenry. And when we speak
of <i>action</i>, we should mean action performed in the service
of life in such a broad sense.</p>
<p>The difference between man and the beasts of the field
and the birds of the air consists just in this. We read in
the classics of "a virtue of surpassing excellence, which is
given to the people as a law of their being," and the virtue
alluded to is this propensity to look after one's own welfare
and at the same time the welfare of one's fellow-men. We
are naturally endowed with the disposition to will the good
of others and to act in their service. "Action," with the
qualities I have sketched, is something primordially bound
up with life.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Revolution Demands Action of All Men at All
Times</span></h3>
<p>The essential meaning of action being once understood we
may proceed to inquire into its spirit and wherein it finds
its highest expression. How is it that men for all the apparent
unity of their existence sometimes live lives of such
devotion to the good of mankind and the world that they
earn the admiration of posterity, while others live degenerate
lives governed by the lowest desires, to the detriment
of themselves and their neighbors? Education and environment
are factors that play their part in this, but more important
is what the ancient called "material desire"—the
tendency to seek possession rather than creation, to enjoy
rather than contribute. In the words of Dr. Sun, "making
one's aim acquisition and not service" leads to degraded and
uncontrolled conduct which is an obstacle to human progress<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_380" id="Page_380">[Pg 380]</a></span>
and what we as comrades in Revolution must strive our
utmost to avoid and eradicate.</p>
<p>Revolutionary motives are motives of service, of self-sacrifice
for the good of others. The task the Revolution
sets itself is the "practice of goodwill" in the broadest
sense of those words,—action inspired by love for men to the
exclusion of all that tends to their harm. In our revolutionary
zeal to promote <i>positive action</i> throughout our world
we aim to create an all-pervading moral attitude to life such
as is rationally conformable to man's true nature; and we
moreover seek to bring into full play the deep funds of
humanity and benevolence in our own people. We push
aside considerations of individual ability, of past education
and environment, and of how far bad habits acquired may
have become ingrained. We appeal to all as they are to take
fresh stock of their lives and realize how from the very fact
of their being alive they possess the ability to act,—to act in
no less a sense than the great deliverers of mankind in their
saintly and heroic deeds. The difference between such deeds
and the actions of normal daily life is one of degree, not of
kind. We are everyone men born of woman and passing our
days between heaven and earth; not for us to vex ourselves
with fear of failure; the only failure is in failing to act.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Meaning of Ease</span></h3>
<p>Let use take the three key-virtues of judgment, goodwill,
and courage as our guides in the task of "playing the
man." For the rest, let us follow the dictum of Sun Wên to
the effect that "the very clever and able should strive to
serve ten million fellow-men; a man of lesser ability may
aspire to serve ten hundred men; while a man devoid of
talent may content himself with doing the best he can for a
single fellow-man." The highly talented may perform their
duties with ease; the moderately gifted may make smooth
progress with theirs; while the poorly gifted may do so with
only a narrow margin of competence; but all that matters is
our full use of our faculties in positive action for the good
of others. If we advance without ever falling away from a
pure and concentrated resolve to do our best, we shall certainly
be able to realize the ideal of <i>action</i>. In a sense it
will prove <i>easy</i>, though this does not of course mean that
anything can be got without pains or anything managed in
a facile and quiescent fashion. Nor does it mean that all
will necessarily be plain sailing, fraught with no obstacles.
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_381" id="Page_381">[Pg 381]</a></span>Our path through life is strewn with dangers, hindrances
and obstructions. Revolutionary action is attended by many
risks; it requires the will to make great sacrifices. Nevertheless,
man's capacity for positive action has achieved many a
colossal feat in the course of his history, the prodigious
hydraulic engineering of the ancients, ascent into the air
and penetration of the earth, and revolutionary deeds that
have transformed the face of human affairs. The ultimate
consideration is always whether we possess thorough determination
and a spirit of unflinching zeal, for with these
we may overcome towering obstacles as it were "in our
stride," and "face dangers with imperturbable calm." A
man worthy of his place in the ranks of the Revolution will
regard as nothing extraordinary difficulties and dangers that
would daunt others. His revolutionary spirit, which is the
very spirit of action, gives him a sublime indifference to
whatever may be the magnitude of the demands his duty
makes upon him; whatever his principles, faith and responsibility
involve is "all in the day's work" for him,
though it be ordeal by fire and water or the abnegation of
everything dearest to him. He takes no account of difficulty,
and fear is a thing still stranger to him. It is in the sense
that to a man with such an attitude action is <i>easy</i> that I use
the word.</p>
<p>Action born of that innate character given us with life,
conceived in absolute sincerity, and aimed at the good of
others treats things as "all of a piece." From beginning to
end of an appointed task it maintains a uniform consistency
and integrity of purpose. The seeds of its final success are
inherent in its first beginnings. Difficulty and failure as I
understand them can have no part in such action.</p>
<p>Positive action with a complete integrity of purpose
produces that honesty and trustworthiness which are distinctive
marks of all true action. It penetrates to the core of
matters, and deals only in realities. It is free from superficial
trappings and fuss; permits of no slack approximation and
evasion of the point, all of which comes from that shrinking
from effort and hardship that is so incompatible with the
spirit of positive action. Whereas I have called all true action
<i>easy</i>, those who go about things without its spirit find
themselves confronted with seemingly insurmountable difficulties
everywhere. When the ancients said: "There is
nothing either difficult or easy in the world," they had in
mind this way of thinking, as I had too when I said that
wartime and peacetime were one and the same.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_382" id="Page_382">[Pg 382]</a></span></p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Sincerity the Root of Action and Goodwill</span></h3>
<p>The next thing to consider is what is to be the central
aim of our action. I would answer if asked this with a
single word: "Goodwill." Action is the <i>practice of goodwill</i>
in its deepest sense.</p>
<p>Goodwill is grounded in the sense of justice and issues
from complete sincerity. The sincere man is necessarily
conscious of goodwill and he is necessarily possessed of the
moral courage required to practice it. The ancients said
"there is completeness in sincerity," and again, "where
there is not sincerity there is a void." The place of sincerity
in human life is indeed like that of energy in the atom, the
structure of which would collapse without it. If a man's
life lacks "ardent sincerity," he will likewise be powerless
to form and manifest the three key-virtues of judgment,
goodwill, and courage. And without the strength to be
derived from those virtues, the Three Principles of the
People can make no headway. Only by action inspired
with perfect sincerity can the splendid truths of those Principles
be asserted and translated into fact.</p>
<p>Sincerity is dependent upon the sense of justice. The
keynote of our Republican Revolution has been the smashing
of selfish individualism and the rescue of our people
from their sufferings and of our nation from its peril. To
achieve what yet remains to be done, to acquit ourselves
well as a section of humanity, and to explore the full
scope of possible human well-being, all we do and enact
must be grounded in perfect sincerity. Then the pains we
take and the plans we devise will prove creative, progressive,
and constructive; we shall put flesh on the bones of the
egalitarian philosophy of social justice; we shall be clear
as to what we think and are aiming at; we shall be able
to give full expression to our true nature and faculties,
proceeding in all we do resolutely, frankly, and boldly.</p>
<p>Action attains its highest point of intensity in the giving
of one's life in the cause of justice, when death in that
cause is accepted as sweet and shorn of all its terrors. "One
may die in the course of willing men good, but life is not to
be purchased at the price of willing them ill" is a classical
teaching we may take as a supreme ideal of positive action.
Action that lives up to that ideal will inevitably be <i>revolutionary</i>,
while, vice versa, it is only genuinely revolutionary
conduct that possesses the true qualities of positive action.
Sincerity is the primal motive force of action. With it, a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_383" id="Page_383">[Pg 383]</a></span>
man is aware only of the interests he has in common with
his fellow-men, and of none that conflicts with those of
his fellow-men. With sincerity, a man acts his will to good
in perfect self-possession, pushing steadily onwards through
difficulty and danger to success. This is the bearing of Dr.
Sun's teaching on the revolutionary movement.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">The Laws of Action</span></h3>
<p>In what I have said so far I have sketched the outlines of
our conception of action. Men differ in profession, rank
and work; but there is not a single one of us but must be
a <i>man of action</i> if our revolutionary aims are to be completely
realized. Action, however, is subject to certain laws,
which I now wish to go into. It must, firstly, have its <i>point-de-départ</i>,
secondly its regular order of procedure (that is,
a methodical and scientific plan), thirdly, its definite goal,
and lastly it must possess the qualities of constancy and
continuity.</p>
<h4>One: The Starting Point</h4>
<p>Firstly, by <i>point-de-départ</i> we mean the careful selection
of whatever way of approach may be most appropriate, direct,
and efficacious for the carrying out of our projects.
The same is true of study, affairs, and revolutionary action.
The ancients said: "Ascent must start from places low; remote
objectives are attained from near beginnings." This
was their way of expressing the nature of the <i>point-de-départ</i>.
If any mistake is made about it we are bound to miss our
objective and destination however sure we may be of the
direction in which we want to go. Again, if we try to run
before we can walk, or skip preliminaries, or gain the
heights by some ill-considered short-cut, our work will inevitably
prove abortive.</p>
<h4>Two: Ordered Unfolding of Plans</h4>
<p>Secondly, the necessity for what I have called "a regular
order of procedure" means the uselessness of reliance upon
mere verve and enthusiasm, and the futility of action taken
on the spur of some transitory turn of thought, action which
is bound to encounter unforeseen obstacles in its course,
be disconcerted by them, and lose its character as action
by becoming some irrational form of <i>motion</i>. Action must
be preceded by the laying down of plans and choice of
a mode of procedure whereby all possible contingencies<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_384" id="Page_384">[Pg 384]</a></span>
may be allowed for and prepared for. The plans, moreover,
must be precise in matters of time and space, and
in quantitative and numerical considerations. They must,
when decided upon, be carried out with due attention to
detail, and with periodical stock-taking of the ground covered.
A steady rate of advance will thus be maintained.
When it is possible to make plans it is obviously also possible
to foresee to a great extent the circumstances of time
and place under which the plans will be carried out and
the quantitative and numerical requirements that will have
to be met. In scientific accordance with these foreseen circumstances
and requirements the execution of the whole
project should be apportioned among the persons involved
so that each has work in all respects congenial to his qualities,
while provision is also made for cooperation between
all concerned. With order and method in procedure there
will be no putting of the cart before the horse, no abrupt
intrusion of irrelevancies, no slackening at moments of
urgency, or precipitate speed where none is needed; day by
day and step by step substantial progress will be made.
In this way we shall have no abortive enterprises, nor the
disappointment they engender.</p>
<h4>Three: Unswerving Aim at the Target</h4>
<p>Coming, thirdly, to the matter of <i>goal</i>, it should be like
a conspicuous target at which one takes steady, unfaltering,
aim. No matter whether the work we are engaged in be
of vast or slight dimensions, its aim should be seen, as it
were, through sights trained on the main target of an ideal
goal. To every piece of work there must be a beginning and
an end, a clearly-defined destination. Before the destination
be reached there can be no pause in our concentrated
effort.</p>
<h4>Four: The Even Texture of a Life of Action</h4>
<p>Lastly, with regard to the fourth and especially important
point: perseverance and continuity, the very qualities that,
as I said at the beginning, distinguish <i>action</i> from <i>motion</i>.
I spoke of action as essentially regular, orderly, and purposeful,
and said that such action would necessarily be revolutionary
action and its influence revolutionary influence. In
other words, revolutionary action unfolds in an unbroken
uniformity of effort; it draws on the funds of moral vigor
in our national genius, and provides a new channel for the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_385" id="Page_385">[Pg 385]</a></span>
expression of the great moral qualities of which that genius
is composed, whereby it may rehabilitate the status to which
it is properly entitled. It must be realized that our Revolutionary
and the reconstructive activities pursue a broad
and enlightened policy free from all manner of trickery
and opportunism. We are actuated by a spirit of extraordinary
power, but what we are doing is nothing abnormal
as the word should be understood, and our methods
are wholly realistic.</p>
<p>All unnatural and inhuman conduct, and illogical and
unscientific methods, result in frustration and can have no
place in revolutionary activity. The ancients spoke of
"acts of routine virtue" in their emphasis upon the almost
<i>humdrum</i>, stolid, qualities of true virtue. Our Revolution
is likewise dependent upon the capacity to maintain a
course of persevering and continuous effort; the behavior
required is in no way peculiar or foreign to everyday life.
For out of continuity comes perseverance and what we
may call <i>ease</i>. Tsêng Kuo-fan said: "things should be done
soundlessly and as it were 'odorlessly,' with both precision
and economy of effort." By this he meant not wooden impassivity
or dry-as-dust pedantry but directness, simplicity,
and an absence of fuss, a straightforward and unassuming
way of going about things. In working for the success of
the Revolution we should cultivate the attitude of the
nameless hero who braves dangers and endures hardships
as matters of course. We shall thus keep in touch with the
people and render the influence of what we do in the service
of mankind broad and lasting.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Formation and Constancy of Purpose</span></h3>
<p>Unremitting perseverance to the very end of our task,
every day we live a day of positive action, and full employment
of our powers in harmony with the laws of Nature
and Man, are the conditions for our successful accomplishment
of our revolutionary mission. Among Tsêng Kuo-fan's
self-admonitory words on "Formation of Purpose"
there are the following phrases: "To cast away the gifts of
Heaven and live in sloth will bring upon me some evil
catastrophe.... This I swear never to forget as long as I
can still draw breath." That is to say, the formation of
our purpose in life requires of us diligent and courageous
devotion and the full exercise of our talents. The great
writer and statesman also admonished himself on the subject<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_386" id="Page_386">[Pg 386]</a></span>
of steadfastness of purpose, reproaching himself: "Again
and again have you been delinquent in your duties and
endeavors, and been swayed by material temptations; but
no one has ever heard of your being unpunctual at mealtimes!"
How is it, he meant, that if we can be regular in
attending to our material wants we cannot be equally unfailing
in the performance of our duties? The full accomplishment
of any aim requires strong-minded formation and
steadfastness of purpose. The true meaning of the words
"let the superior man exert himself with the unfailing
pertinacity of Nature" embraces this.</p>
<p>I have now completed my explanation of the fundamental
principles involved in positive action. I wish to conclude
by once again exhorting you all to firm faith in the Tsung-li's
teaching: "From true knowledge action naturally proceeds."
The meaning of the Revolution is as bright and
spacious as the skies; and the clearer our comprehension of
it the more vigor we shall put into the practice of it.
Moreover, the methods we are to adopt and the mode of
procedure we are to follow have been laid down for us in
detail by Dr. Sun Wên. We have only to obey his directions,
each of us playing a part for which his temperament,
calling and knowledge fits him, relying upon his faculties
for the discernment of moral and material good at every
step in his bold and resolute execution of his duty to nation
and people.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Action Engenders Knowledge</span></h3>
<p>I wish to say another word on the subject of the <i>knowledge</i>
from which as we have seen action proceeds; and what
I have to say is: that just as action proceeds from knowledge,
action in its turn engenders knowledge. Dr. Sun said:
"The ability to know implies the ability to act." I would
add the words: "without action one cannot attain to knowledge."
For knowledge comes with experience, and apart
from the broad and fundamental truths of revolutionary
thought our knowledge need not necessarily be in the first
place very rich. Though, therefore, we must of course do
all we can to acquire knowledge for its own sake, we must
at the same time seek it as one of the fruits of positive
action. Any knowledge acquired in the course of study, research,
or experience which we do not proceed to put to the
test of practice in the field of actuality is not to be considered
with certainty as worthy of being called true knowledge.
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_387" id="Page_387">[Pg 387]</a></span>So it is that in all our undertakings practice will
yield us true knowledge, and action alone will give us the
ability to extend and enrich our knowledge. Chu Hsi in his
commentary on the <i>Great Learning</i> wrote: "By long application
of our powers we one day reach a point whence we
see the whole scheme of things spread out before us, we
perceive the realities underlying phenomena, the relation
of accident to essence, and the structure and workings of the
human mind." This attainment can come only as the
fruit of positive action. If in the course of practice and
experience knowledge we have acquired and methods we
have based on it prove inefficacious we may take it that
what we valued as knowledge was not true knowledge. In
this way we shall be constantly broadening the scope and
sifting the quality of our knowledge, which is the genuine
process of gaining knowledge. "To be aware of ignorance
brings knowledge" and "the open mind invites the entrance
of information," are maxims than which none are better
as guides in the search for knowledge.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Comrades in Revolution! Resolve Anew!</span></h3>
<p>I am well aware of the magnitude of our revolutionary
task of Resistance and Reconstruction, and I have been no
less impressed with recent manifestations of my comrades'
will to action. I have felt impelled by the one and encouraged
by the other to present you today this exposition
of positive action and of what is requisite for its success,
in the hope that you will all keep in mind these indispensable
principles, gathering fresh knowledge with experience,
acting with deliberation, perspicacity, and conscientiousness,
spurning all things that tend to distract you from your
fixed purpose and involve you in the wild and motiveless
conduct of those who possess no such fixed purpose. In
the <i>Chung-Yung</i>, or <i>Doctrine of the Mean</i>, there is a passage
emphasizing the importance of "conscientiousness" in
action, by which it means the refusal to be satisfied with
half-measures, the pursuit of ends to their logical conclusion.
If you give earnest thought to what I have said you
will realize that very much of what has long passed with us
for action has not been true action, that is, not positive
action, and that therefore we have failed in much that we
have undertaken. It is only because our action has not been
really positive that we have allowed our minds to enlarge
on the difficulties and dangers of the Revolution. In fact,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_388" id="Page_388">[Pg 388]</a></span>
these difficulties exist only for those whose minds lack
resolution, enthusiasm and faith. The ancient adage says:
"There's nothing difficult in the world if there's a man of
spirit to be found" (where there's a will there's a way).
This is a piece of the age-old proverbial wisdom of the
people, and it may well serve us as a salutary warning
against the slack thinking and evil habits concealed beneath
the airy phrase: "It's easy enough to know what should be
done; it's acting accordingly that's hard."</p>
<p>We need, therefore, in the revolutionary nation-building
we have before us only to assert our wills, inflame our
hearts with a fresh sincerity and faith, and give ourselves
up to positive action. If everyone of us does so, I have no
hesitation in pronouncing it will mean the certainty of
our success.</p>
<div class="footnotes">
<h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_215" id="Footnote_1_215"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_215"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Chiang K'ai-shek, <i>A Philosophy of Action, or What I Mean by
Action</i>, Chungking, 1940; p. 7-20. The accompanying foreword and
notes are here omitted. The translation is the work of Mr. Ma P'in-ho,
a naturalized Chinese scholar but of European race and nativity.</p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<h2><i>C.</i> DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF
THE VARIOUS CLASSIFICATIONS OF <i>HSIEN</i> (CHIANG K'AI-SHEK)<a name="FNanchor_1_216" id="FNanchor_1_216"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_216" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2>
<blockquote>
<p>One of a series of lectures, each issued separately, entitled <i>The Conclusions
of the Party Chief</i>, and originally delivered before the Party
and Government Training Class of the Central Training Corps. Compare
with Appendix I (G), p. <a href="#Page_324">324</a>.</p>
<p>The chart, opposite, is a translation of the chart appended to the
original Chinese of the Generalissimo's booklet on <i>Hsien</i>. P.M.A.L.</p></blockquote>
<p class="center">ORGANIZATION OF THE VARIOUS CLASSIFICATIONS OF HSIEN</p>
<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;">
<a href="images/i_388fp-large.jpg"><img src="images/i_388fp.jpg" width="400" height="663" alt="" /></a>
</div>
<p>At the fifth meeting of the Fourth Plenary Session of the
Central Executive and Supervisory Committees of the
Kuomintang on April 8, 1938, I made a speech on "The
Reform of Party Affairs and Readjustments for Party and
Political Organizations." Attached to that speech was a
draft chart showing the interrelations among the Party and
political organizations under the <i>hsien</i>, with illustrations
and explanations. I pointed out then that the chart was
only intended as an initial draft. As to promulgating the
detailed formulae and laws for execution, I pointed out that
the draft was only to serve as a basis and that the wording
in which the draft was written should not prove too<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_389" id="Page_389">[Pg 389]</a></span>
binding. There should be plenty of room for further study and
discussion so that perfection might be obtained. Furthermore,
the draft chart was intended mainly as an exposition
of the relations between Party and political organizations
(hence it was also called "Party and Political Affairs
Chart"). The various administrative organizations were attached
as an appendix to it.</p>
<p>Since the publication of this draft chart, the serious attention
of many of our comrades, scholars and specialists
has been aroused. In many districts experiments have been
carried on—a fact which is indeed very gratifying and
which evidences the earnest desire on the part of various
local administrations for reform.</p>
<p>The Party and Political Personnel Training Class was
recently inaugurated by the Central Training Corps. In
order to lecture on the problems covered in the draft chart
and lay out the necessary formulae, I had instructed several
of my associates to collect views and data from all possible
sources and to make a thorough study of the question.
Under my personal supervision, the original draft has been
revised and supplemented. The main points contained
therein may be summarized as follows:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. In connection with Party organizations, the <i>ch'ü</i><a name="FNanchor_2_217" id="FNanchor_2_217"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_217" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>
(township) office should be linked up with the <i>hsiang</i>
(<i>chên</i>), while small units should be established under the
<i>pao chia</i> system. Thus the Party organizations are brought
to conformity with the political. The network of Party members'
supervisory organizations should be placed directly
under the Supervisory Committee of the <i>hsien</i> Party headquarters.</p>
<p>2. The <i>hsien</i> is the unit of local government autonomy.
The <i>hsien</i> should be classified into three to six groups according
to their area, population, economic resources, cultural
and communication development. Below the <i>hsien</i>,
the <i>hsiang</i> (<i>chên</i>) constitutes the basic lower unit, with <i>pao</i>
or village and streets as their constituents. Elasticity may
be allowed between the <i>hsien</i> and <i>hsiang</i> according to local
requirements. When and where necessary, a <i>ch'ü</i> (township)
office may be established to serve as the connecting link,
but if this is not needed, the <i>hsiang</i> (<i>chên</i>) should be placed
under the direct jurisdiction of the <i>hsien</i>. The same elasticity
may exist between the <i>hsiang</i> (<i>chên</i>) and <i>pao</i>. In densely<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_390" id="Page_390">[Pg 390]</a></span>
populated areas, a village and a street may form one natural
unit, inseparable from each other. In such cases, one unit
may consist of two or three <i>pao</i> with one <i>pao chang</i> (chief
of the <i>pao</i>) at the helm of affairs, so that unnecessary breaking-up
of the village from the street may be avoided. To
eliminate difficulties arising from finances and personnel,
all the posts of secretaries (<i>kan shih</i>) of the <i>hsiang</i> (<i>chên</i>)
and <i>pao</i> (or village and street) may be concurrently served
by the teachers of primary schools, while the school principals
of the <i>hsiang</i> (<i>chên</i>) and <i>pao</i> should concurrently
serve as leader of the able-bodied citizens' corps (<i>Chuang
ting tui</i>) in accordance with the principle of unity of administration,
instruction, support and protection. In areas
with better economic and educational development where
affairs concerning local autonomy are multifarious, the
principals of <i>hsiang</i> (<i>chên</i>) primary schools and pao citizens'
[mass education] schools should preferably concentrate
on their school jobs with a view to efficiency. The masses
should be organized into different groups to undertake
different works in order to meet the actual requirements.</p>
<p>3. In connection with organs for expressing the views
and opinions of the people, there should be organized the
<i>pao</i> people's assembly, the <i>hsiang</i> (<i>chên</i>) people's representative
assembly, the <i>hsien</i> council, each vested with
proper authority, with a view to increasing the people's
interest in participating in government affairs. Thus the
influence of the masses may be properly magnified and the
goal of true democracy attained. With a view to greater
alacrity, I wish to explain in further detail as follows:</p>
</blockquote>
<h3><span class="smcap">A. Readjustments in the Relations among the Various Administrative
Party and Political Organizations of the</span> <i>Hsien</i></h3>
<p class="center">(<i>This item, consisting of eleven articles, is not intended for publication.</i>)</p>
<p>A routine announcement of Party duties, of Party supervision of
local morale, of seniorities as between Party and Government officers,
etc. follows. It has been omitted in accordance with the statement in
parentheses.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">B. Political Organizations</span></h3>
<p>1. The <i>hsien</i> is the unit of local autonomy. These units
can be classified into from three to six groups according to
the population, economic status, culture and communication.
On the one hand, the <i>hsien</i> governments should<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_391" id="Page_391">[Pg 391]</a></span>
handle affairs concerning local autonomy of their respective
district under the supervision of the provincial government
and on the other hand should carry out the orders of the
Central and provincial governments.</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> The area of the <i>hsien</i> under the present system
should remain the same as before. The cancellation of the
<i>hsien</i> and the change in its area are to be decided upon only
with the authorization and approval of the Central Government.
In the <i>hsien</i> there should be a magistrate, under
whom there should be secretaries, section chiefs, directors,
police officers, senior and junior staff members in the different
sections, technicians and assistants and police patrol
officers handling civic, financial, educational, construction,
military, land, and social affairs. The number of sections
to be provided under the <i>hsien</i> governments and their duties
is to be decided by the provincial government which in making
decisions is to take into consideration the local requirements
of the <i>hsien</i> concerned. The number of staff members,
and their ranks and salaries, is likewise to be decided upon
by the provincial government.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> In each <i>hsien</i> there should be held <i>hsien</i> political
affairs meetings at which decisions concerning the <i>hsien</i>
administration are to be reached and proposals made for
submission to the <i>hsien</i> People's Council. The <i>hsien</i> political
affairs meetings should be held irrespective of whether
the <i>hsien</i> Council has been established or not.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> The rules and regulations governing the organization
of the <i>hsien</i> governments should be promulgated by
the provincial governments and then submitted to the Central
Government for approval.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>2. The <i>ch'ü</i> (township) office is a subsidiary organization
to the <i>hsien</i> government. Its duty is to supervise the
affairs of the various <i>hsiang</i> (<i>chên</i>) on behalf of the <i>hsien</i>
government in connection with the enforcement of local
autonomy.</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> The scope of the <i>ch'ü</i> should consist of from six
to fifteen <i>hsiang</i>. In those <i>hsien</i> in which the total number
of <i>hsiang</i> is below fifteen, no <i>ch'ü</i> office should be established.
The <i>hsiang</i> in such cases are to be placed under
the direct jurisdiction of the <i>hsien</i> government. In frontier
regions where special conditions obtain, specifications for
the number of <i>hsiang</i> for the <i>ch'ü</i> office may be modified.</p>
<p>In <i>hsien</i> where no <i>ch'ü</i> office is established, the <i>hsien</i>
government should appoint representatives to supervise
the affairs of the different <i>hsiang</i>.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_392" id="Page_392">[Pg 392]</a></span></p>
<p><i>b.</i> The <i>ch'ü</i> office is headed by a district chief under
whom there should be two to five directors handling civic,
financial, construction, education, and military affairs. All
such personnel are by special appointment with pay, and
they should be chosen by the superior organizations from
those who have received appropriate training. The district
chiefs should preferably be those who come from the districts
to which they are designated, their qualifications and treatment
to be fixed by law.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> In the place where the <i>ch'ü</i> office is seated, there
should be established a police bureau which is to be under
the direction of the district chief dealing with the police
administration of the place.</p>
<p><i>d.</i> In the <i>ch'ü</i> there should be established the <i>hsiang</i>
reconstruction committee comprising local leaders as members.
This committee is to conduct research and map out
the plans concerning rural reconstruction, the district
chief acting concurrently as its chairman.</p>
<p><i>e.</i> In order to increase the vocational ability of the
people and develop local industries, there should be established
in the <i>ch'ü</i> vocational training classes.</p>
<p><i>f.</i> In addition to the number of policemen as specified,
there should be organized in the <i>ch'ü</i> the joint able-bodied
citizens' corps (<i>Chuang-ting lien tui-pu</i>) office which is
to control and supervise the <i>Chuang-ting</i> of the various
<i>hsiang</i> (<i>chên</i>). Whenever necessary, the <i>chuang-ting</i> may
be summoned together for special training and organization.</p>
<p><i>g.</i> The <i>ch'ü</i> office should unite together all the <i>hsiang</i>
(<i>chên</i>) cooperative societies and organize them into cooperative
unions. Each union is to consist of several departments
dealing with different cooperative enterprises. The
<i>ch'ü</i> office should appoint a supervisor to be stationed in
the union.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>3. The <i>hsiang</i> (<i>chên</i>) is to be defined as the basic administrative
unit under the <i>hsien</i>, and its organization
should be substantiated accordingly.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a. Each <i>hsiang</i> in principle comprises six to fifteen <i>pao</i>.
In drawing such limits, however, consideration should be
given to the historical background and natural conditions
of the locality. The demarcation and the organization of
the <i>pao chia</i> system are to be decided upon by the <i>hsien</i>
government, subject to the approval of the provincial
government. Reports must also be submitted to the Central
Government.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_393" id="Page_393">[Pg 393]</a></span></p>
<p><i>b.</i> The chief personnel of the <i>hsiang</i> guild (<i>kung so</i>)
should include a director (<i>hsiang chang</i>) and one or two
vice-directors. They are to be elected from qualified citizens
at the <i>hsiang</i> people's representative meetings. In the guild
there should be provided four departments, handling civic,
police, economic and cultural affairs respectively, each to be
headed by one man with several staff members. These posts
should be held by the vice-directors and teachers of the
<i>hsiang</i> primary schools. The date for the election of the
director and vice-directors of the <i>hsiang</i> is to be fixed and
announced in orders to be issued by the <i>hsien</i> government.
The term of their office will be two years.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> There should be established in each <i>hsiang</i> a central
school composed of three divisions for children, women
especially, and adults. There should be primary and
higher primary classes. The posts of the school principal,
leader of the able-bodied citizens' corps, and director of the
<i>hsiang</i> are to be concurrently held by one man. The
teachers are to undertake the extracurricular duties of
training and supervising. They are also to help the <i>hsiang
director</i> to handle affairs of the <i>hsiang</i>. In the higher
primary class of the school stress should be laid on training
the masses to enable them to undertake the work of census-taking,
promotion of health and sanitation and cooperative
affairs.</p>
<p>In places with better economic and educational development,
the principals of the <i>hsiang</i> central schools should
preferably concentrate on their own duties at school.</p>
<p><i>d.</i> The cooperative societies also have the <i>hsiang</i> as
the unit (with branch societies in the <i>pao</i>). There should
also be established in the <i>hsiang</i> public safe-deposit agencies
for the storage of articles. Separate granaries should be
set up whenever necessary.</p>
<p><i>e.</i> The leader of the <i>hsiang</i> able-bodied citizens' corps
should from time to time summon chosen groups of the
<i>chuang ting</i> of the <i>pao</i> to the <i>hsiang</i> to undergo advanced
training. During the training period, they are to perform
police duties and when the period expires they are to be
sent back to take up the work as junior officers of the able-bodied
citizens' corps of the <i>pao</i>, charged also with the
duties of promoting local autonomy in the <i>pao</i>. Thus not
only will the police force be strengthened, but various
activities properly developed. The outposts established in
the <i>hsiang</i> by the <i>hsien</i> police bureaus should also be placed
under the direction of the <i>hsiang</i> director.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_394" id="Page_394">[Pg 394]</a></span></p>
<p><i>f.</i> The <i>hsiang</i> should convene <i>hsiang</i> affairs meetings
with the director as chairman and all the department heads
and senior members of the staff in attendance. The chiefs
of the <i>pao</i> concerning whom proposals are submitted to
the meeting should also be present.</p>
<p><i>g.</i> A hospital or clinic should be established for each
<i>hsiang</i> or a number of <i>hsiang</i>. These hospitals or clinics
should be staffed with Western-trained doctors. In case of
lack of personnel and finance, [old-style] Chinese physicians
may do on a temporary basis.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>4. The <i>pao</i> should be defined as a constituent of the
<i>hsiang</i> and its organization be substantiated accordingly.</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> Each <i>pao</i> is to consist of from six to fifteen <i>chia</i>,
headed by a <i>pao chang</i> (chief of the <i>pao</i>) and an assistant
<i>pao chang</i>. They are to be elected from qualified citizens
at the <i>pao</i> people's meeting, and their names are to be submitted
by the <i>hsiang</i> guild to the <i>hsien</i> government. Before
the election, the <i>pao chang</i> and assistant <i>pao chang</i> may
be nominated by the <i>hsiang</i> guild subject to official appointment
by the <i>hsien</i> government. In the office of the <i>pao</i> there
should be two to four secretaries (<i>kan shih</i>) handling civic,
police, economic and cultural affairs. These posts may be
concurrently held by the assistant <i>pao chang</i> and teachers
of citizens' (mass education) schools. In <i>pao</i> with limited
finances, one secretary may suffice.</p>
<p>The term of office for the <i>pao chang</i> and assistant <i>pao
chang</i> will be two years. They may be re-elected at the expiration
of their term of office.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> All affairs of the <i>pao</i> should be discussed and transacted
at <i>pao</i> affairs meeting in which as many capable citizens
of the <i>pao</i> as possible are to be asked to participate, in
order to hasten progress of the reconstruction of the <i>pao</i>.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> All the activities undertaken by the <i>pao</i> are to be
under the supervision and direction of the hsiang guild,
the <i>ch'ü</i> office and the <i>hsien</i> government. The latter superior
organs should give constant help and advice so that the
program of work may be carried out step by step as desired.</p>
<p><i>d.</i> Every <i>pao</i> is to have a mass education school, with
the principal of the school concurrently serving as the <i>pao
chang</i> and as the leader of the <i>pao</i> able-bodied citizens'
corps. The school is to comprise three divisions for children,
for women especially, and for adults, and its aim is
to raise the level of education and vocational ability of the
masses. Teachers are also to help the <i>pao chang</i> in dealing
with various affairs of the <i>pao</i>.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_395" id="Page_395">[Pg 395]</a></span></p>
<p>In <i>pao</i> better-developed in economic resources and education,
the principles of the mass education schools should
preferably concentrate on their school duties.</p>
<p><i>e.</i> Membership of the <i>pao</i> branches of the cooperative
societies is composed of the families in the <i>pao</i>. The directors
of the branch societies are to be elected by members.
The <i>pao chang</i> can be elected and concurrently hold this
office.</p>
<p><i>f.</i> The <i>pao</i> office, the <i>pao</i> able-bodied citizens' corps
and the <i>pao</i> mass education schools should be simultaneously
established. They should have a joint office so that
affairs of common interest may be pushed from the same
center.</p>
<p><i>g.</i> In densely populated areas where a village and a
street seem each to be an integral part of the other, two
or three <i>pao</i> may be amalgamated, the amalgamation not
exceeding three <i>pao</i>. The mass education schools, branch
cooperative societies and treasuries, likewise, may be amalgamated,
with only the <i>pao</i> able-bodied citizens' corps remaining
separate. One presiding <i>pao chang</i> is to be elected
to take the helm of affairs, and a joint office is to be established.</p>
<p><i>h.</i> The <i>pao</i> should be equipped with a medicine box,
with one of the mass education school teachers trained in
rudiments of the medical science, in charge. He is to
give simple treatment for diseases and to give small-pox
vaccination. If this should prove beyond the finances of
one <i>pao</i>, several <i>pao</i> may join together.</p>
<p><i>i.</i> The organization of the <i>chia</i> is to consist of from
six to fifteen families, headed by a <i>chia chang</i>. There should
be meetings of the heads of families, and general <i>chia</i> conferences,
held from time to time.</p>
<p>The <i>chia chang</i> is to be elected at the meeting of heads
of families. His name is to be submitted by the <i>pao</i> office
to the <i>hsiang</i> guild.</p>
<p><i>j.</i> The <i>pao</i> may retain its old name, such as <i>ts'un</i>
(village), <i>chieh</i> (street) or <i>ch'ang</i> (market), but it is desired
that they should gradually adopt the official name of
<i>pao</i> with a view to uniformity.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3>C. <span class="smcap">People's Organs through Which Popular
Political Opinions May Be Expressed</span></h3>
<p>1. To increase the people's interest in participation in
government affairs and to train their political insight and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_396" id="Page_396">[Pg 396]</a></span>
ability in accordance with the principle of the inherent
unity of teaching, learning and practicing, people's organs
for discussion of government affairs for the various administrative
units under the <i>hsien</i> should be established
within specified time limits, and these organs should be
vested with the appropriate authority.</p>
<p>2. In the <i>pao</i> should be established the <i>pao</i> people's
meeting to elect the <i>pao chang</i>; the <i>hsiang</i>, the <i>hsiang</i> people's
representative meeting to elect the <i>hsiang chang</i>.<a name="FNanchor_3_218" id="FNanchor_3_218"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_218" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>
(The qualifications and standards of both the <i>pao chang</i>
and the <i>hsiang chang</i> are to be specified by law.) Thus it
is hoped to attain the ideal standards of local government
and to establish the system of the people's supervision of
the government. No people's organ is needed for the <i>ch'ü</i>
(district), while the <i>hsien</i> people's council will serve as
the general organ for people of the entire <i>hsien</i>.</p>
<p>3. With a view to flexibility in the exercise of the people's
privileges, members of the <i>hsien</i> people's council are
to be brought forth at the <i>hsiang</i> people's representative
meetings. Each <i>hsiang</i> is entitled to elect one representative
as member of the council. The number of representatives
of legitimate professional bodies may be increased in order
to put representation of the districts and that of the professions
on equal footing. Representatives to the <i>hsiang</i>
people's meeting are to be produced at the <i>pao</i> people's
meeting. Each <i>pao</i> is entitled to two representatives. The
<i>pao</i> people's meeting should be attended by one person
from each family whose qualifications and position in the
family conforms to specifications in the law.</p>
<p>4. The <i>hsiang chang</i> and <i>pao chang</i> who are elected may
both act as chairmen of their respective people's organs,
namely the <i>hsiang</i> people's representative meeting and the
<i>pao</i> people's meeting. The <i>hsien</i> people's council for the
time being is not to elect the magistrate. It is to elect its
own chairman.</p>
<p>5. Before the <i>hsien</i> people's council is organized, the
budget and accounts of the <i>hsien</i> government should be
studied and passed by the <i>hsien</i> Administrative Meeting and
then submitted by the magistrate to the provincial government
for approval.</p>
<p>After the <i>hsien</i> people's council is inaugurated, the
budget and accounts of the <i>hsien</i> should be presented to
the council for examination and then submitted to the
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_397" id="Page_397">[Pg 397]</a></span>provincial government for approval. When necessary, the
budget and accounts may first be sent to the provincial
government for approval and then the council may be
approached for confirmation and verification.</p>
<h3><span class="smcap">Explanation</span></h3>
<p>1. The basic spirit of this draft is to arouse and mobilize
the masses, to strengthen local organization and hasten
district autonomy enterprises so that the cornerstone of
the revolution and national reconstruction may be laid.
Some may be of the opinion that as education has not
been popularized, it would be difficult to allow the masses
participation in government affairs. But the political system
stressing on people's privileges must be founded on
the will of the masses. If participation in government affairs
is allowed only after education has been developed
on a nation-wide scale, the slogan "revolutionized people's
privileges" will be of no meaning. The people need only
be trained practically in the exercise of their political
privileges, and the main task of the government during the
political tutelage period lies in teaching the people how to
exercise their four rights [election; recall; initiative; referendum].
Tutelary government [Party-dictatorship] and constitutional
government are different only in degree but not in
fundamentals. During the period of tutelage, therefore, the
interest of the people in participation in government affairs
must be gradually aroused and increased. Thus measures
enforced with this purpose in view during the political
tutelage period may not contravene the aims of constitutional
government, and the progress from tutelage to constitutionalism
may be attained smoothly. This explains the
transitional process from the beginning to the complete
realization of autonomous government and it was for such
an explanation that this draft was prepared.</p>
<p>2. With a view to the solution of the personnel and
financial problems confronting the various basic administrative
units, the <i>hsiang</i> chief, <i>hsiang</i> central school principal,
and the <i>hsiang</i> leader of the able-bodied citizens'
corps, excepting in those areas more highly developed in
education and economic resources, should be the same man.
The same thing applies to the <i>pao</i>. All those charged with
administrative duties should pay attention to education
which should serve as the means to attain the objectives of
the revolution and national reconstruction. Those with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_398" id="Page_398">[Pg 398]</a></span>
educational responsibilities should give their time and
energy also to the organization and training of the masses.
They should consider the masses as their students, the
society as a school and all existing circumstances and conditions
as references of instruction. Emphasis should also
be laid on instructing the people how to live properly, how
to accomplish their duties. The basic principles governing
the revolutionary movement and national reconstruction as
laid down by our late Leader [Sun Yat-sen], measures on the
control of rice and the control of land as stipulated in the
ordinances and regulations governing district autonomy,
together with the seven measures previously announced by
the Central Government, should all be included in the scope
of instruction. It was with these considerations in mind
that this draft provides that teachers of the <i>hsiang</i> middle
[secondary] and <i>pao</i> mass-education schools should concurrently
act as secretaries of the <i>hsiang</i> guild and <i>pao</i> office.
It would not do to maintain the old system when school
teachers only taught in the classroom, with the result that
in many places where schools have been conducted for
many years people still refuse to be conscripted, to pay
taxes, to observe the New Life principles. This could be attributed
to the fact that teachers and others in charge of
the schools failed to do their duties.</p>
<p>It is also provided in the ordinances and regulations governing
the initial enforcement of district autonomy that
"aside from enabling people to read and write, schools
should also emphasize what has been known as the 'omnipotency
of both hands' campaign." We should try to make
all the tools or machines that can increase the productive
ability of both hands, instead of relying on others. From
now on, therefore, local schools should emphasize vocational
training by which the students may be taught how to manufacture
simple machines. This is not merely scientific education
but also an important way of carrying out the doctrine
of the people's livelihood. It is therefore provided in
this draft that in the <i>ch'ü</i> (township) there should be established
the district vocational training class so that education
and living may be closely wedded.</p>
<p>In the past, educational organization has been too complicated.
Besides primary schools, there have been mass
education schools, short-term primary schools, rural schools.
Now, since it is stipulated that the <i>pao</i> has <i>pao</i> mass education
schools and the <i>hsiang</i> has <i>hsiang</i> middle schools, the
children and adults should be taught in separate classes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_399" id="Page_399">[Pg 399]</a></span>
but at the same school so that all the former units of education
may be absorbed. The tutor (<i>tao shêng</i>) system should
be used as much as possible in the hope that the entire
people of the nation may be given at least the minimum
education for citizenship within a limited period of time.
Thus all the personnel and finances may be concentrated;
the teachers may conveniently do their duty in directing
the masses into proper participation in various local enterprises.
In this way, education and autonomy may be closely
affiliated with each other.</p>
<p>3. The organization of the various local administrative
units is roughly in accordance with the decimal system. In
such provisions of this draft, allowances have been made
whereby the difficulties in the way of enforcement of the
system may be solved. Once the scope of the various local
administrative units is fixed, all plans and programs such
as establishing schools, training personnel, appropriation
of funds and statistics may be mapped out according to
definite standards. The conduct of a big nation with its
variegated enterprises depends on strict organization in
war-time as well as in peace-time. In the army, for instance,
the number of units composing each army corps is definitely
fixed. Scientific administration must be governed by rules
and regulations.</p>
<p>For the convenience of execution, certain elasticity has
been allowed in provisions concerning organization in this
draft. The <i>hsiang</i>, for instance, is composed of from six to
fifteen <i>pao</i>, and so on with other lower administrative units.
In cases where the village and the street cannot be separated,
joint organizations for the handling of affairs of common
interest is allowed. All these provisions are arrived at
in order to allow some flexibility whenever and wherever
necessary. Within the bounds of these regulations, the
various local district governments may exercise their discretion
in disposing their respective affairs without consulting
their superior governments. But they will not be permitted
to trespass beyond the limits because disorderly organizations
will make control and supervision hard.</p>
<p>After the scope of the various local administrative units
is fixed, their respective spheres of education, health, cooperative
movements and police must also be uniformly determined
so that control, instruction, support, and protection
may have an equal and well-balanced development.</p>
<p>4. Concerning the organization and training of the
masses, it is indeed regrettable that no wholesome<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_400" id="Page_400">[Pg 400]</a></span>
accomplishments have been achieved during the past many
years. According to this new draft, the following explanations
have to be made:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> Demarcation among people's groups and organizations:
the former is determined by professions and the latter
according to age and sex. From the standpoint of the requirements
of the country, the latter should be organized
first. Especially urgent is the demand for such organizations
as the able-bodied citizens' corps and women's associations.
From the standpoint of the needs of the people, the
organization of the professional groups should be put on
a sound basis as soon as possible, particularly the farmers,
laborers, and merchants groups which are vitally concerned
with the economic reconstruction movement of the country.
Steps, therefore, should immediately be taken in the
order of urgency. Next, for people's organizations, emphasis
is to be laid on organization and training; for the groups,
direction and supervision are to be stressed.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> The work of organizing the various people's groups
should proceed from the bottom upwards because wholesome
organizations can only be had when the foundation is
soundly laid. In peace-time, this will help forward self-rule.
In war-time, it will help meet military needs. In the
past, the various people's groups (such as farmers' associations
and women's associations) had only nominal existence,
hanging their shingles in the <i>hsien</i> city, but few really
worked. The reasons might be many, but the main one has
been the failure on the part of those responsible to penetrate
into the lower strata of activities and help develop
them. It must be realized that the various people's groups
are necessary to the various administrative units in the
district autonomous government system just as parts to the
main body of a machine. Without the parts, the machine
would not be able to operate. From now on, therefore,
efforts must be made to substantiate the people's bodies so
that they may be enabled to function efficiently.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> The able-bodied citizens' corps are necessary in
peace as well as in war-time. Attention should be paid both
to training and to the supervision so that their usefulness
may be fully developed. The constituents of the able-bodied
citizens' corps are the pillars of society, and on them
depends the successful realization of most enterprises concerning
district autonomy. In this lies the importance of
our late Leader's [Sun Yat-sen] teaching about "omnipotency
of both hands." During the training, emphasis should<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_401" id="Page_401">[Pg 401]</a></span>
not be on military alone but also on general and vocational
ability, in order to turn corps members into useful members
of society.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>5. The people's organs for various local administrative
units serve best the purpose of training the people in the
exercise of their rights in government affairs. They constitute
the prerequisites for democracy. In the past, it has
proved difficult to secure <i>hsiang</i>, <i>pao</i> and <i>chia</i> chiefs; or,
after they were elected to their respective offices, they failed
to do their duties and some of them even committed acts
harmful to the people which slipped the notice of the superior
government offices. All these shortcomings must be
overcome by virtue of democratic measures. The higher
supervisory organizations, limited in personnel, can hardly
keep an eye on every small detail. The <i>hsiang</i> and <i>pao</i>
chiefs and other staff members under them are most closely
associated with the people. In order to prevent them from
undermining the people's interest for their selfish gains,
the democratic (<i>Min-chu</i>) control and supervision system
should be enforced as the most efficient and effective method.
That the <i>pao</i> people's meeting should be attended by the
families as representative units is a preliminary step. This
is so because China is an agricultural country, different
from other industrialized nations where the individual citizens
constitute the representative units. Representatives to
the <i>hsiang</i> people's representative meetings are to be produced
at the <i>pao</i> people's meeting. Councilors from the
<i>hsiang</i> and higher administrative units for the <i>hsien</i> people's
council are to be produced by indirect instead of direct
election. Next comes the question of increasing the
people's economic stability and developing local enterprises.
It is specially provided that adequate representation to the
various professional groups should be given in the <i>hsien</i>
people's council. (This is limited to the professional groups
and their representation is not to exceed thirty per cent.)
In this way the district conception and the interests of professions
are given equal consideration.</p>
<p>6. To prepare the personnel for the various local administrative
government units, the various grades of schools
should be adapted to the needs of the local organizations
and enterprises. With such adaptation, the school training
may not be in vain and young students upon graduation
may find appropriate employment. A separate set of rules
and regulations should be promulgated whereby these
youths may be encouraged and their future welfare<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_402" id="Page_402">[Pg 402]</a></span>
safeguarded. At present, the training of such personnel and
their future disposal have not been systematically enough
planned. Proper remedy must be provided so that definite
standards may be fixed. Most important of all, persons
properly trained should be assigned to places where are
located their native home villages or towns. All such jobs
concerning the development of district enterprises like insurance
of treasuries or storehouses, transportation of rice
and foodstuffs, farmland irrigation, fishing, grazing, and
land reclamation, should all be filled by persons with
special technical training. As the development of such
district enterprises continues, the demand for appropriate
personnel will grow as a foregone conclusion.</p>
<p>7. With regard to financial problems, the late Leader instructed
that the district self-rule organizations should be
founded on the basis of "political and economic cooperation."
The sources of finance, therefore, should be derived
from the people's public productive enterprises, instead of
depending on new taxes. There are many public properties
in various localities that should be utilized. Instead, these
have mainly been exploited and monopolized by individuals
who cared for nothing but their own selfish interests. Henceforth,
these properties should be placed under public control.
With efficient management, the proceeds from these
enterprises should serve as finances for the entire <i>hsiang</i> or
<i>pao</i>. In case such properties consist of land, they could be
turned into experimental farms and be placed under the
management of the schools for the improvement of agricultural
products and for training the people in reformed
farming methods. The joint property of a clan should be
dealt with in a similar way so that their income may be
increased and the results of agricultural improvement programs
may be extended from one locality to another easily.
In places where there are no such lands, steps should be
taken to reclaim the mountainous or hilly regions or the
streams and ponds. Free labor may be utilized with a view
to increasing the income. Besides, surplus rice may be
stored in the <i>hsiang</i> and the <i>pao</i>, under the management of
the people of the respective districts. The various cooperative
societies transporting agricultural products should also
provide granaries and issue mortgage loans. Part of the
profits thus derived should be devoted as funds for the development
of local enterprises. Thus not only will the
financial problem be solved but district autonomy development
will follow local needs. Before the local public<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_403" id="Page_403">[Pg 403]</a></span>
enterprises (as described above) are so developed that
income is sufficient to meet financial requirements, attention
should be paid to the following measures:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><i>a.</i> Taxes which the <i>hsiang</i> guild may collect independent
of the superior government offices.</p>
<p><i>b.</i> The finances of the <i>hsien</i> should be demarcated
from those of the province, and the quota of the former
should be gradually increased if possible.</p>
<p><i>c.</i> In lean <i>hsien</i>, the <i>hsien</i> government should be subsidized
by the provincial government.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>8. Last of all, it should be pointed out that this draft
was drawn up after repeated discussions and studies. Henceforth,
all the <i>hsien</i> and lower district government units in
the autonomy system should observe this draft as the basis.
This is a time of national crisis when the destiny of our
entire nation and race is hanging between life and death. It
is hoped that all comrades of our Party and our fellow-countrymen
should strive with strong determination for
nation-wide enforcement of these district autonomy measures.
Bold initiative should solve any unforeseen difficulties
that may arise. Fear and hesitation should never
be allowed to gain the upper hand. Only in this way, may
we hope that the cornerstone for various political levels of
true democracy is laid on a sound basis, and only in this
way may we hope that the stupendous task of national reconstruction
can be accomplished.</p>
<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_216" id="Footnote_1_216"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_216"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> [Chiang K'ai-shek], <i>Ch'üeh-ting Hsien Ko-chi Tsu-chih Wên-t'i</i>
(Definition of the Problems Concerning the Organization of the Various
Classifications of <i>Hsien</i>), [Chungking], 1939, p. 43 and chart.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_2_217" id="Footnote_2_217"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_217"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> For explanation of such local government terms as <i>hsiang</i>, <i>pao</i>,
<i>ch'ü</i>, see the text, p. <a href="#Page_107">107</a>.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_3_218" id="Footnote_3_218"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_218"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Heretofore translated as "director of the <i>hsiang</i>."</p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<h2><i>D.</i> A DISCUSSION OF MAO TSÊ-TUNG'S COMMENTS
ON THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (CH'ÊN KUO-HSIN)<a name="FNanchor_1_219" id="FNanchor_1_219"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_219" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2>
<blockquote>
<p>The following article, expressing the general Kuomintang view,
but written and published unofficially, illustrates debate on foreign
policy, and the type of discussion between Nationalists and Communists.
Written in the autumn of 1939, it was reprinted in 1940
as a part of a symposium, forming a critique of Chinese Communist
views. Mao Tsê-tung (see above, p. <a href="#Page_166">166</a>) is the outstanding Chinese
Communist leader.</p></blockquote>
<h3>I. <span class="smcap">The Question of Unexpected Political "Coups"</span></h3>
<p>As the Central Government has already formulated correct
principles of action, the recent German-Soviet Pact has<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_404" id="Page_404">[Pg 404]</a></span>
no influence upon our National policies. If we follow these
policies, that Pact does not compel our attention. But it is
not so with the Chinese Communists and their external organs.
They are confounded and struck dumb by this unexpected
blow so much that they can only keep their grief
to themselves.</p>
<p>In all propaganda literature of the Communist Party, we
can easily discern the great confusion resulting from this
coup. For example, Hitler was the "Fascist Robber" or the
"mad dog," but within these days, he becomes the Führer,
with all due respects. The word "Fascist" is still being used,
but whether they are planning to discard it altogether, we
do not know. For instance, on the day previous to the announcement
of the Pact, the Communists were saying,
dreamily, that a clause prohibiting Germany's seizure of
other countries was included in the Pact. Again, when
Germany attacked Poland, the Communists cleverly said
that this was caused by Great Britain's playing Judas against
Poland, and they decisively said that Great Britain and
France would not aid her, and some even said that the two
antagonistic fronts were still there, though without giving
any reason. When reports of these momentous international
changes arrived in quick succession, they tried every means
to make them appear unimportant. They did this perhaps
to avoid the too much "heating up" of their followers on
one side, and to avoid committing blunders before they
could receive orders concerning their future policy. They
were afraid of punishment, to be sure. Hence many ridiculed
these poor people, saying that they were like a herd
of sheep without a shepherd, for they showed their ignorance,
their childishness, hesitation, and paradoxical
thoughts and actions during this period.</p>
<p>Public opinion as a whole praises the policies we now
adopt since they are independent of any outside element.
On the other side, these praises show that while the principles
of National Defense are still as sound as ever, the ten
principles of the Communist Party are now just like ten big
stones falling on Communist toes. The Communists are
about to be killed by their own weapons. Had the Government
of China been formed by the Communists, it
would, in that event, have collapsed as easily as any Japanese
cabinet since the War. What would become of the
country, if under the present crisis foreign policy were to be
the speculation of foreigners? These are exactly the ideas
expressed by public gossip and in discussions in schools. It<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_405" id="Page_405">[Pg 405]</a></span>
is true that the Chinese Communists cannot hold power because
they lack political training and profound learning.
This is their inner, incurable trouble. In fact, many young
Communists have also spoken with me, and they show their
sorrow when they feel the lack of a really efficient central
organ.</p>
<p>But speaking with consideration, we can see their good
qualities shown by censoring a great part of the news concerning
Moscow's abolition of the Anti-Fascist movement,
and on the other hand advertising in a special manner the
news concerning the will of the French Communists to fight
on the first line of defense, and to help the French Government
to destroy Fascism. Perhaps this is a true revelation
of the editor's faith in the principle "Country and
Nation above all," so that unconsciously he showed it in his
actions. This point is worthy of our praise and sympathy.</p>
<p>After about ten days of hesitation and aimless probing,
Mr. Mao Tsê-tung, as the head of the Party, issued a lengthy
talk entitled "On the Present International Situation and
the War of National Resistance," in the form of a catechism
in which the questions are asked by a news reporter.
In the first section, he explained the German-Soviet Pact;
in the second, he predicted the future development of international
affairs, in the third he discussed the future of
China. His aim in publishing this article is to pacify the
agitated hearts of his fellow Communists. But since it is
made public, we have the liberty of discussing it, especially
so since the Communists themselves have the same habit
and they also emphasize free speech. I hope they will not
be irritated.</p>
<h3>II. <span class="smcap">Is the German-Soviet Pact Casual?</span></h3>
<p>Mr. Mao seems to take it for a treaty that has been signed
"all of a sudden." Now this is quite untrue if we consider
the facts.</p>
<p>Many periodicals and newspapers have published articles
proving that the Pact was long-planned. We shall not consider
them. We shall not even consider the original friendship
between Germany and monarchic Russia. But we must
remember how Germany brought Lenin back to Russia in a
sealed train, how the formation of the Red Army was based
upon German plans, and the fact that Germany established
an aviation school in Russia. We see how Germany helped
the Russian Soviet Revolution to succeed. I often think<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_406" id="Page_406">[Pg 406]</a></span>
that if we trust the words of a country's foreign minister and
the slogans the people shout to provide us an outline of the
country's foreign policy, we end in the position of buying
goods upon reading an advertisement. In the end we will
find ourselves cheated. In fact shops which are "liquidating"
their goods may sell their goods at an even higher
price than in an ordinary sale. A more reliable way of
observation is to judge the policy by studying the secret
tendencies in the actions of high military and economic
organs which are essential in national defense. If we believe
in slogans alone, we might as well ask a salesman
about the curative power of his patent medicine. In reality,
the salesman is a mere hireling. What pharmacist discloses
his real formula and method of combinations? Hence, to
probe into the real relation between the two countries, we
must ask the smaller nations between them; these make the
closest observations.</p>
<p>For two years, these small states have been expecting this
treaty. The question of "which to side with" gives them
sharp suffering which has made them all the more sensitive.
They know what the two countries have been planning
when they see so many secret delegates coming and going
very busily. Within the last two years, observers in Europe
and America have also predicted cooperation between Germany
and Soviet Russia. Even in China, did not Mr. Chiang
Po-li write an essay to this effect, warning the Chinese people?
According to them, the slogans shouted in both countries
are strange diplomatic weapons; like the masques worn
in a Greek play, they do not show the faces of the actors.
When the Jewish Litvinoff went off the stage, it was the
sign: "First Act Completed." Now the spectators who wear
red glasses are still enchanted by the first act. Anyway, Mr.
Mao's explanation that the Pact is a sudden one is unreasonable.</p>
<p>In China, many were doubting the National policy of independent
struggle. Not until their "Soviet Help," "Single
Alliance with Russia" essays had been erased by the recent
coup, did the policy of independent struggle begin to shine
in its brilliancy. At first our policy of independent foreign
relations lost influence to the better-sounding slogan of "A
united foreign front." After this lesson, we can perhaps see
more clearly. Such a lesson to a political party not in power
is a very wholesome admonition; had the party been in
power, we know the damage which could have befallen the
nation. Speaking with consideration, I also earnestly hoped<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_407" id="Page_407">[Pg 407]</a></span>
for the success in the British-French-Soviet parleys because
it would ensure safety in Europe by safeguarding all lesser
states. Furthermore, it would help us also by checking
Germany and Japan. But this was only a hope, and I
seriously doubted its realization. The "united foreign policy
front" advocated by the Communists is not too unreasonable;
its error lies in stating with certainty the necessity of
two international fronts. Some even acknowledged the
existence of such a situation two years ago, and they forbade
any doubt expressed to fellow-members concerning
this point. Even a week prior to the signing of the Pact,
they said with certainty that the rumor of such a Pact was
a mere invention of Trotskyites and German spies. Such a
ban on free speech is not only detrimental to the progress of
a nation, but even to the Communists' own welfare. Their
members will not only be made to look foolish, but they
will even lose their faith by being called upon to change
about. For the sake of our national intelligence, for the
sake of the Communists themselves, I hope that in the future,
such bans will be lifted, thus encouraging freer and
more reasonable ideas. I hope this appeal will do some
good, even to the editors of their newspapers.</p>
<h3>III. <span class="smcap">Why the German-Soviet Pact?</span></h3>
<p>Concerning this Pact, Mao Tsê-tung used words like
"reactionary," "Capitalistic," "intrigue," etc., about Great
Britain and France. On the other hand, he employed words
like "great" (to be added "talented" if Ch'ên Shao-yü were
to write it), "increasing the power," "more progressive,"
etc., about Soviet Russia. In the end, he even used the
phrase "have laid the foundation for the world's oppressed
people to seek for liberty and emancipation." All right!
The term does not sound ugly, and to ensure better Sino-Soviet
relations, we may leave it at that. But under the
present state of affairs, too many attacks directed against
Chamberlain and Daladier are certainly not good. As a
matter of fact, all this is like sending congratulations to
Soviet Russia, and a letter of condolence to those with whom
Soviet Russia is dissatisfied. All these are but social affairs,
the only point is that in both the ideas are not too logically
expressed. That's all!</p>
<p>Now if you look at the Pact in the same way that you
look into a kaleidoscope, you can see as many meanings as
you want, while turning the thing around. Basically, Germany's<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_408" id="Page_408">[Pg 408]</a></span>
only reason for wanting this Pact is, as she has
stated, to avoid the British encircling policy. The economic
cooperation talked of by politicians can also give further
meaning to the Pact. Recently, in the occupation of Danzig
and Warsaw, the sound of guns is the wordless explanation.
As to the plan of partitioning Poland and absorbing
the Eastern European States (enclosed in a secret clause),
we do not know yet. Let us for the time being not discuss it.</p>
<p>As to Soviet Russia, her effort at bettering her friendly
relationship with China can be no better revealed than in
Molotov's own speech. He said: "We have always been trying
to increase the amity between the peoples of Germany
and Russia. This Pact is important because it means that
the two big Powers in Europe have decided to be friends and
to live peacefully." Thus we can see that the Pact is not a
casual happening. Molotov again says: "There are some
who want to take advantage of the strained relationship
between Great Britain and Germany.... Such people aim
at involving Soviet Russia in a war against Germany by
taking sides with Great Britain. How foolish these political
speculators for war are!" Hence we know that the
Pact was signed according to Soviet Russia's own will, and,
unlike what Mao said, it was planned long ago, and not
at all after the failure of the British-French-Soviet parleys.
Now we only want those who advocate "united foreign
policy front" to think of the meaning of words like "foolish"
and "war speculators." These words are new compared
with "retrograde," "stubborn," "Trotskyites," etc.</p>
<p>Perhaps the greatest part of all in Molotov's speech is:
"The Soviet Union will still continue to proceed in her
own independent policy which is based upon the welfare
of all Soviet Russian citizens." This corresponds exactly
with our "Nation and country above all!" Sun Yat-sen also
said that the success of the Soviet Russian October Revolution
was based upon its ability to apply the laws concerning
Nationalism. Leninism corrects Marxism by adding the
idea of Nationalism. And Stalinism intensifies Leninism by
an even greater emphasis laid on Nationalism. Hence we
can say what the Soviet Revolution adopted was Leninism,
and that what the Soviet Union is now adopting is Stalinism.
The success of Lenin and Stalin is largely due to this
reason. This Pact between Germany and Soviet Russia is
but the fruit borne out of the principle "national welfare
above all." The Soviets believe "The Soviet Government
above all." Now what should we in China have?</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_409" id="Page_409">[Pg 409]</a></span></p>
<p>As for Mr. Mao's reasons concerning the failure of the
Three-Power Parley, the explanation he gives is just a reduced
and "Chinafied" copy of the Soviet explanation concerning
this problem. We can also say it is abridged. Mr.
Mao always "Chinafies" things. I am sorry that this article
has not been "Chinafied" (much to his distaste, I suppose)
so its power must be weaker.</p>
<h3>IV. <span class="smcap">A Discussion on the "New Front" as Made
in a Chinese Story-Teller's Way</span></h3>
<p>The manner in which Mr. Mao discussed the question
resembles that of a Chinese story-teller, though his speech
is less vivid. When he spoke of the "future development of
the present international situation," it was like talking to
a class of naive schoolboys who are always credulous.</p>
<p>He said that the present state of affairs in Europe was
caused by the policy of non-intervention. The Second Imperialistic
War has already entered the second stage. This
is a war of plunder, not a rightful one. Concerning the
East, he also made a vain distinction. He said the present
state of affairs in China is also a new stage. No other explanation
was given. We suppose he is always careful in
expressing his ideas, so that if necessary he will have plenty
of chances to make a shift. He divided the imperialistic
nations into several camps: Germany and Italy belong to
the Fascist<a name="FNanchor_2_220" id="FNanchor_2_220"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_220" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> camp; Great Britain and France belong to the
Fascistic<a name="FNanchor_3_221" id="FNanchor_3_221"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_221" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> camp; the Americas under the U. S. are a capitalistic
camp. As to Soviet Russia, she is presumably in another
world. Mr. Mao said that she would cooperate with the
U. S. to start the world's peace movement. Besides these,
there were numerous tales as enchanting as the Arabian
Nights. The most important ones: in Europe, a war on the
entire front, and the movement planned by English and
French Communists and Social Democrats to overthrow
the Fascist regime; in the East, British policy was to partition
China between herself and Japan. According to him,
these are "present" situations, and if we take into consideration
his manner of speaking, we can almost say that
they meant the "actual" position at present.</p>
<p>His chess-board analysis of international situations resembles
his former "front" theory—perhaps it is his new
front theory. His aim, we believe, is to cheat his spectators.
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_410" id="Page_410">[Pg 410]</a></span>Being ignorant of the real situation, he was at first dumbfounded.
Now he tries to move our attention to other
things, just like a magician at work, who needs a band to
create enough noise to shift the audience's attention. We
should be considerate, knowing his difficulties. But I suppose
such a manner of doing things does not increase the
reputation of the Chinese Communists, does it?</p>
<p>In fact, if any one of the following events occurs, his
new front will immediately be shattered: 1. Soviet Russia
also adopts a non-intervention policy; 2. Italy keeps herself
aloof or joins the side of the Allies; 3. A sufficiently
large number of European states remain neutral; 4. America
cooperates with Great Britain; America or any country in
America declares war against Germany; 5. Great Britain
does not help Japan in dividing up China; 6. Soviet inclination
to sign treaty with Japan is revealed; etc., etc. I
believe anyone who has sufficient knowledge of international
relations will know that the error in the old
"front" theory lies in its presumption that countries of the
same systems of government will tend to unite against those
of another system. The new front theory is based upon the
presumption that the central motivating ideas of different
countries will form the basis of separating them between two
hostile fronts. This is an even more mistaken conception
than the first. It is built on sand. It is easy to teach such
a rigidly formulated doctrine of "hostile fronts" but in case
they meet with a really intelligent and well-informed member,
they will be certainly at a loss. Hence as a matter of
fact, such authoritative articles do more harm than good.
Mr. Mao has written a great deal since the war for publication;
if we now connect all these articles together for a
thorough study, we can find numerous places where he is
dropping a stone upon his own toe. In fact such a chess-board
analysis of the international situation is based upon
materials gotten from the G. P. U. plus some "judgment"
derived accidentally. As a matter of fact, such G. P. U. reports
are unreliable down to the last word. The work of
the G. P. U. is to pay special attention in getting the past
record of a man or organ important in a given country.</p>
<p>When required, some high-sounding or bad names are
added to the personality so as to strengthen the mood of
speech in propaganda literature. So somebody even said:
"If you wish to follow the propaganda methods of the Communist
Party, observe two dogs barking in the street. After
due observation you should analyze their points of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_411" id="Page_411">[Pg 411]</a></span>
difference. You should be able to speak like this: This is a
dog infused with British, French, American, German or
Japanese imperialistic ideas. He is stubborn, retrograde,
reactionary, capitalistic, Fascist, and in danger of being a
Trotskyite traitor or a person like Wang Ch'ing-wei. Now
the other is a Soviet Socialistic dog, talented, progressive,
belonging to the world of light, a supporter of world peace,
a dog who sides with the poor and oppressed."</p>
<p>In fact how can confused international situations be so
simply analyzed by a mere figure drawn on a chess-board?
Unless all their members are mechanical men deprived of
the power of thinking, they will have their own doubts,
especially when Mr. Mao has repeatedly dropped stones on
his own toe. The more he shouts the correctness of his
views, or the success of his work, the more he will be a
laughing-stock to the people. He will be the Don Quixote
of China, or Ah-Q,<a name="FNanchor_4_222" id="FNanchor_4_222"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_222" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> to be ridiculed by all. Yet in fact,
there is no necessity for him to make these comments, and
such methods of talking without material basis are usually
avoided by politicians, especially when they are in service
or partly in service. For example, Molotov spoke very
cleverly on the Pact: after giving a historical explanation of
the necessities for signing the Pact, he concluded, almost
carelessly, by saying: "When Germany showed her willingness
to improve the friendship between the two countries,
Soviet Russia certainly had no reason to refuse. Hence the
Pact is made." Besides, he talked of the welfare of the nation,
as if to give a further proof of the necessity in signing
the Pact. How clever his manipulations are! But the same
thing under Mr. Mao's pen becomes a series of hot-faced
scoldings, now praising A, then cursing B. And concerning
his doctrine that the German-Soviet Pact is caused by the
failure of the British-French-Soviet parleys, he expounded
and expounded his reasons and proof, only to lead himself
into greater confusion, so that fewer will believe him. Now
comparing these two events, this will be very detrimental to
the Communists, who find it difficult to give a satisfactory
explanation. Even from a rhetorical point of view, no matter
how Mao curses the British non-intervention policy, no
matter how he curses this policy as the reason for Japanese
invasion of China, for German occupation of Austria,
Czechoslovakia, no matter how he condemns the Munich
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_412" id="Page_412">[Pg 412]</a></span>Meeting, any reader will correspondingly ask: Is Soviet Russia
also adopting the policy of non-intervention? How about
Poland? What is the difference between the Munich Meeting
and the German-Soviet Pact? All these questions will
produce the exactly opposite effect in the minds of the readers
as that which was wished for by Mao. This is but one
point. If we go on to have a closer analysis, we see that Mr.
Mao's art of speaking needs more practice. As to his material
proof in his article, up to date [September 15, 1939], the
Soviet attitude is still the sit-and-look attitude condemned
by him, as being the result of non-intervention policy; the
countries proclaiming their neutrality are quite numerous;
Italian attitude is yet uncertain; the British Communist
Party is declaring that full confidence is placed in Chamberlain;
the French Communists are on the front to fight
for their motherland and the Third International has now
no power over them. On the other hand, there are rumors
concerning a <i>rapprochement</i> between Japan and
Soviet Russia. All these only tend to disprove the sayings
of Mr. Mao.</p>
<h3>V. <span class="smcap">A Single Enemy? Or a Single Ally?</span></h3>
<p>Everybody knows that our foreign policy during the
period of the war is to spot one enemy only. We attack
only Japan. We try to be friends with every country other
than Japan. This spirit can be seen in the manifestoes and
other proclamations of the Government. Hence although
Germany and Italy are the allies of our enemy, we still have
every wish to bind their friendship, and hope that they will
help our enemy the less in her war of aggression, and contribute
more materially to our success by selling us armaments.
Such a "one-enemy" foreign policy is the basis of
our future success. Otherwise, the Nation will easily be
led into a path of thorns, if we adopt the policy of allying
with one today and cutting another tomorrow. In Molotov's
report, there are several sharp sentences: "In foreign
policy, the aim is always not to make more enemies, but
rather to lessen the number of enemies." This can be jotted
down as a note to the "one-enemy" policy.</p>
<p>But what about Mao Tsê-tung's idea? In fact he preaches
"one-ally" policy. He has condemned them all, except for
the Soviet Union. Now he again places Soviet Russia in
another almost intangible world. What does he mean, then?
Does he mean that we can satisfy our hunger by looking at
a cake? In fact, this was the same old question long before<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_413" id="Page_413">[Pg 413]</a></span>
disputed. We can all remember that the Communists were
the advocates of a military alliance with Soviet Russia.
Now it was Soviet Russia, not we, who declined. Those
who were boasting of the alliance were Communists; and
so were those who stopped it. Soviet Russia said that she
alone was too weak and that she hoped China could find
more allies. Because of this, the "one-ally" policy did not
gain as much support as the British-American-French-Soviet
union. When the British-French-Soviet parleys broke off,
Mr. Mao found it difficult to give a good explanation, so
that he could not but take up the old theory of "one-ally"
to ward off attack.</p>
<p>The chief countries helping China in the war are Great
Britain, the U. S. A., and Soviet Russia. In the past, at
present, and in the future, their central powers of aiding
China are economic power from Great Britain, political
power from the U. S. A., and military power from Soviet
Russia. It is a fact that even if Soviet Russia remains at
peace, she can check Japan (unless Soviet Russia proclaims
amity with Japan, and makes adequate assurances, in which
case it will greatly influence our condition). But the
economic power of Great Britain and the political power
of the U. S. A. are also absolutely necessary. At present, we
are still enjoying these advantages, and the breaking-up of
the British-French-Soviet parleys does not influence this
situation. We don't know why Mr. Mao is bent upon rejecting
the friendly assistance of Great Britain and the
U. S. Should we act like this if we believe that "the country
and the nation are above all?" Now suppose we follow
the Communists and throw ourselves into the bosom of
Soviet Russia, are we sure that she will do everything for
us? If she signs a treaty with our enemy, what then?</p>
<p>The most unreasonable point in Mao's discussion is his
attitude toward Great Britain. He probably wants to please
his superiors by guessing their ideas. Perhaps he thinks
that the Third International is going back on the policy
adopted years ago—the policy of "Anti-Britain" so much
sung by Trotsky and his followers. Hence Mao starts this
movement in China, and gathers false proofs that Japan
and Great Britain will sooner or later be allies so that they
can divide up China. Up to now, Mr. Mao's words have not
yet become fact. Furthermore, Great Britain has reassured
us that her policy towards China will not be changed. To
us this is good news—but perhaps unhappy news for Mr.
Mao.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_414" id="Page_414">[Pg 414]</a></span></p>
<p>Mr. Mao's opinion that we "may approach Germany"
does not sound very safe or very natural. Mr. Mao does not
adopt the foreign policy of "befriend those who help us and
hate those who help our enemy," but rather of "befriend
Soviet Russia's friend, attack Soviet Russia's enemies." This
is flatly against the principles of independent foreign policy.
The old German-Italian line advocated by Wang Ch'ing-wei
is wrong because it makes us bend our knees. But we
must also know what the new German line amounts to.
Japan's <i>rapprochement</i> with Soviet Russia and Great Britain
are rumors scattered out simultaneously, but are things
that cannot be possible. According to foreign telegraphic
reports, the German foreign minister is now trying to pull
together Japan and Soviet Russia, with the hope of forming
a future grand alliance among Germany. Italy, Japan,
and Soviet Russia. As to the Japan-Soviet line, it is based
upon the "double-south policy" of attacking Great Britain.
Japan will move south from the Pacific and [Soviet] Russia
will move south from Central Asia, so that British interest
in all districts lying between the Near and the Far East will
be equally divided up by [Soviet] Russia and Japan. Their
method of procedure is like this: 1, A treaty will be signed
by Soviet Russia, as the protector of Outer Mongolia, and
Japan; Soviet Russia will stop enmity against "Manchukuo"
and Japan, so that Japan may concentrate her attention
on China. 2, A commercial treaty will be signed
between them. 3, A final alliance promising mutual non-interference
with appended clauses. Of course this is Germany's
dream, or may be a flat rumor, since it is unbelievable
that Soviet Russia should join Japan. Even from the
point of material benefit, why should Soviet Russia act so
as to hurt others but remain doubtful that she can derive
real benefit? But to insure absolute safety, we must be
careful of any German intrigue. We must warn her often.
In the past we used to buy munitions from her, so we must
have her goodwill. Now with the War, it is unlikely that
Germany will still sell us munitions. Hence why must we
still follow Germany and "approach her"? After all, what
is the difference between this and the German-Italian line
advocated by Wang Ch'ing-wei? Now, just a "warning":
if [Soviet] Russia and Japan do join up to form an alliance,
I must ask the Chinese Communist Party a question: Concerning
the name, the Chinese Communist Party, are they
going to throw away the word "Chinese" and adopt a Soviet
Russian nationality, or, as said in the <i>Hsin Min Pao</i>, to be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_415" id="Page_415">[Pg 415]</a></span>
so base as to join Wang Ch'ing-wei's regime, or shall they
stick to the word "Chinese" and cancel the word "Communist"?
I hope they will reply to my question.</p>
<p>Concerning the theory of a Second Imperialistic War,
Mao himself has for two years forbidden his followers to
comment, on the charge of being a Rightist, a closed-door
Rightest, a childish Rightest, or a Trotskyite who is plotting
with Germany. Now we see that he himself has fully
adopted a Trotskyite view. In that article he used the
words "progressive" and "retrogressive" to suppress any upheaval
within his party; but now what he means by "progressive"
is exactly "retardation"; what he formerly advocated
as "progress" is now a discarded fig. He is just making a
circle, like a donkey fastened to turn a grind-stone, pressed
onward by whipping and kicking, and when he has turned
half a circle, he may be said to have retarded half a circle.</p>
<p>Now Mr. Mao condemns every country as imperialistic.
But we must ask, in his opinion, does he think that Poland
is imperialistic? Why is the war of national defense on the
part of Poland not a rightful war? Under the exactly similar
conditions, why did the Communists formerly show
sympathy for Abyssinia and Spain, and are now cold toward
Poland? He says that Communists always hate wars;
then why did he advocate the Help-Abyssinia Movement?
This is a paradox. Perhaps the saying that Communists
hate war is invented by Mr. Mao himself. So far as we
know, the Communists in Poland, Great Britain, and France
are absolutely sympathizing with the Poles in their defensive
war.</p>
<p>There is another ridiculous point: Mr. Mao also labelled
Chamberlain and Daladier as Fascist Reactionaries. Before
the German-Soviet Pact, they were hailed as saints, but now
they are convicts, as it were. If Mr. Mao is not satisfied with
them, then condemn them as he wishes. But why must he
put such a "Fascist" hat upon the oldest democratic countries?
This spring, one American political commentator
predicted jokingly that in the near future Hitler will say
that the headquarters of the Communists are located in
London and Paris, hence anti-Communist will mean anti-French.
Now the direction of this pseudo-prophecy is already
established, though Hitler did not give the above
reason. But we did not expect that the Chinese Communists
would adopt such a belief by calling democratic countries
Fascist and by advocating "that we may approach Germany."
This is perhaps a conclusion by their special logic.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_416" id="Page_416">[Pg 416]</a></span></p>
<h3>VI. <span class="smcap">A Reasonless Conclusion</span></h3>
<p>Concerning the future of China, Mr. Mao made many
surface talks, though in general there is no serious fault.
But his theories and his conclusions are disjointed. For
example, if he makes light of the Polish war, what will
be the value of this Oriental war? Besides, is the policy
of "single alliance with Soviet Russia" in unison with the
principle: "We will befriend those who aid us, and attack
those who aid our enemy"? If Soviet Russia aids Japan,
what shall then be done? If he opposes the splitting movement,
then why not advocate unity? These are but a few
of the numerous contradictions that may be found in his
article.</p>
<p>Especially strange is his idea that to ally with countries
other than Soviet Russia, we should ally with their peoples
and not with their governments. But the word "people" is
not used in foreign affairs and its meaning is also most
indistinct. According to him (I presume) he desires that
China fan up revolutions in all countries while carrying on
the War of National Resistance. True, the method may
apply to Japan, but not to other countries. Otherwise, all
world Powers will begin to hate China who is still fighting
the War of National Resistance. What will we think of
this? Now to speak frankly, the Communists in various
countries have not succeeded in fanning up revolutions in
their countries, and on the contrary, with their force weakening
year after year, what shall we help them for? When
we ourselves have not yet stood up firmly, we are already
thinking of shouldering a weight of a thousand pounds. Is
there a reason in such an attempt? In reality, we know the
force of the Chinese proletarian classes. They amount to
about two million people, mostly in Shanghai and Tientsin.
Now the puppet regimes of Yin Ju-keng and Wang Ch'ing-wei
are all formed in these districts. Ch'ên Shao-yü is the
chief representative of the Shanghai section of the Communist
Party. Has he gone there for an investigation? To
whom do those who are performing Anti-Japanese and
Anti-Traitor work belong—to the Communist Party, or
what? It is better for Communists to moderate their tune
and not boast of any more world revolution.</p>
<p>Concerning the present European war, Mr. Mao's attitude
is that of a man expressing his joy on seeing others' loss
and misfortune. This is not the way of the Chinese people.
We always express our sorrow in a war. What General
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_417" id="Page_417">[Pg 417]</a></span>Chiang has said concerning his hope for peace in Europe is
the natural revelation of the Chinese moral character based
upon love and compassion. What Mr. Mao expresses is
something like the spirit of "kill-kill-kill" advocated by the
notorious robber Chang Shen-chou. This is because Mr.
Mao has not yet thoroughly imbibed the idea of "Chinafying"
things. I express my sympathy for him in his policy
of "Chinafication." This of course does not mean that I
believe in the preachings of old-fashioned Chinese that the
eight planets were first discovered by the Chinese because
a line can be found in the <i>Book of Poetry</i>:<a name="FNanchor_5_223" id="FNanchor_5_223"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_223" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> "Three and
Five stars in the East." What I mean by sympathy is that
I like the way he appreciates the Chinese national culture,
and wants to be a one hundred per cent Chinese.<a name="FNanchor_6_224" id="FNanchor_6_224"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_224" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> In this
respect he is more worthy than Ch'ên Shao-yü, and hence
deserving of greater achievement.</p>
<p>Lastly, I sincerely hope that Mr. Mao can find a better
secretary, without considering the question of class. He
must not follow the example of Mr. Lu, the Vice-President
of the Anti-Japanese University, who never employs a secretary
unless she is beautiful. Though he does not consider
the question of class, such actions do not befit Mr. Mao.
But speaking about this, we can have a comparison. The
second wife of Mr. Mao, Miss Ho, is the heroine who
marched with the Red Army for a distance of twenty-five
thousand <i>li</i> to North Shensi. But why is it that Mr. Mao
sends her to Soviet Russia, and lives together with film
actress Miss Lan Pin? The reason is quite simple: considering
the question of class, Miss Ho stands higher than Miss
Lan; considering the question of sexual love, Miss Lan is
much more beautiful than Miss Ho. Hence with similar
reasoning, I should say that the standard set by Mr. Mao
concerning the employment of a secretary will be whether
she can write beautifully, and the question of class must not
be considered. If so, I can predict that Mr. Mao's articles
will be better written, not like his past ones which arouse a
great deal of unnecessary argumentation. I hereby humbly
present before him my personal ideas.<a name="FNanchor_7_225" id="FNanchor_7_225"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_225" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_418" id="Page_418">[Pg 418]</a></span></p>
<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_219" id="Footnote_1_219"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_219"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Min-i Ts'ung-k'an (Popular Opinion Series), <i>Mao Tsê-tung Ch'ên
Shao-yü Tsui-chin Yen-lun-ti Tsung Chien-t'ao</i> (A General Review of
the Most Recent Utterances of Mao Tsê-tung and Ch'ên Shao-yü),
Chungking, 1940; p. 1-17.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_2_220" id="Footnote_2_220"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_220"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Fa-hsi-ssŭ</i>.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_3_221" id="Footnote_3_221"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_221"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Fa-hsi-ssŭ-hua-ti</i>, i.e., changing to Fascism.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_4_222" id="Footnote_4_222"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_222"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> The hero of a novella by Lu Hsün, China's outstanding modern
writer, Ah-Q is a figure of profound pathos.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_5_223" id="Footnote_5_223"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_223"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Shih Ching</i>, one of the Confucian classics.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_6_224" id="Footnote_6_224"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_224"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> The Americanism, <i>i-pai-fên chih pai-ti Chung-kuo-jen</i>, occurs in
the original.</p></div>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_7_225" id="Footnote_7_225"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_225"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> The conclusion, couched in billingsgate, is less a violation of
the unmentionable in China than it would be in America; but it
does strike a note sharply discordant to the gently sardonic tone of
the main line of debate. A secretary is germane to the point of
literary style, however; ghost-writing is a rarely disturbed tradition
of Chinese public life. Mao Tsê-tung, according to Western observers,
is, with Chiang K'ai-shek, one of the few leaders to write his own
speeches, so that the present charge, while familiar, is certainly
unjust.</p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<h2>E. <span class="smcap lowercase">CHINA'S LONG-RANGE DIPLOMATIC ORIENTATION (WANG CH'UNG-HUI)</span><a name="FNanchor_1_226" id="FNanchor_1_226"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_226" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2>
<blockquote>
<p>This memorandum was graciously supplied by Dr. Wang Ch'ung-hui.</p></blockquote>
<h3>1. <span class="smcap">Outline of China's Foreign Policy</span></h3>
<p>Since the establishment of the National Government,
China's foreign policy has been elucidated from time to
time. Following the outbreak of the war, the Extraordinary
Session of the Kuomintang National Congress convened
in 1938 laid down five principles:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>"1. China is prepared to ally herself with all states and
nations that sympathize with her and to wage a common
struggle for peace and justice.</p>
<p>"2. China is prepared to safeguard and strengthen the
machinery of peace as well as all treaties and conventions
that have the maintenance of peace as their ultimate object.</p>
<p>"3. China is prepared to ally herself with all forces that
are opposed to Japanese aggression and to safeguard peace
in the Far East.</p>
<p>"4. China will endeavor not only to preserve but also
to enhance the existing friendly relations with other countries.</p>
<p>"5. China repudiates all bogus organizations which
Japan has created and declares all their actions null and
void."</p>
</blockquote>
<h3>2. <span class="smcap">China's Stand Vis-à-Vis Japan</span></h3>
<p>From the above outline it can be clearly seen that China's
foreign policy aims at achieving independence internally
and co-existence externally.</p>
<p>Shortly before the outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident I
told a group of Japanese newspapermen in Nanking that
"China's diplomatic policy has always been consistent. It
aims at self-existence and co-existence.... It is important
to harmonize the friendship between the two peoples; but
such a task should not rest only upon the shoulders of one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_419" id="Page_419">[Pg 419]</a></span>
party.... If any foreign country has any designs on China,
the Chinese people are determined to resist.... I hope
Japan will respect China's territorial integrity and political
sovereignty and will seek to readjust Sino-Japanese relations
through diplomatic channels and in accordance with
the spirit of reciprocity and equality."</p>
<p>Japan was bent on disturbing peace and order and
launched her attack on North China on July 7, 1937. Not
only had every effort at conciliation failed, but the hostilities
were extended to Shanghai on August 13th. On the
following day the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made China's
position clear in an official statement, an extract of which
follows:</p>
<p>"The Chinese Government now solemnly declares that
China's territorial integrity and sovereign rights have been
wantonly violated by Japan in glaring violation of such
peace instruments as the Covenant of the League of Nations,
the Nine-Power Treaty and the Paris Peace Pact.
China is in duty bound to defend her territory and her
national existence, as well as the sanctity of the above-mentioned
treaties. We will never surrender any part of
our territory. When confronted with aggression, we cannot
but exercise our natural right of self-defense. If Japan
did not entertain territorial designs on China, she should
use her efforts to seek a rational solution of Sino-Japanese
problems and at the same time cease all her aggressions and
military movements in China. In the event of such a
happy change of heart, China would, in conformity with
her traditional policy of peace, continue her efforts to
avert a situation pregnant with dangerous possibilities both
for East Asia and for the world at large.</p>
<p>"In this our supreme fight not only for a national but for
a world cause, not only for the preservation of our own
territory and sovereignty, but for the maintenance of international
justice, we are confident that all friendly nations,
while showing sympathy with us, will be conscious of their
obligations under the international treaties to which they
have solemnly subscribed."</p>
<h3>3. <span class="smcap">Non-Recognition of Puppet Regimes</span></h3>
<p>With regard to Japanese-sponsored puppet regimes in
China, the Chinese Government has consistently denounced
them as illegal. On December 20, 1937, following the appearance
of the so-called "Provisional Government" in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_420" id="Page_420">[Pg 420]</a></span>
Peiping, the National Government solemnly declared that
"the establishment of any bogus regime in Peiping or other
localities under Japanese military occupation constitutes a
violation by Japan of China's sovereignty and administrative
integrity. Any action taken by such puppet regimes,
whether of an internal or external nature, shall <i>ipso facto</i>
be null and void."</p>
<p>Following the installation by the Japanese of Wang
Ch'ing-wei as the chief puppet of the bogus "National Government"
in Nanking, the Foreign Minister reiterated this
stand in his identic notes of March 30, 1940 to the various
embassies and legations in China to the following effect:</p>
<p>"The Chinese Government desires to take this opportunity
to repeat most emphatically the declaration already
made on several occasions that any act done by such an
unlawful organization as has just been set up in Nanking or
any other puppet body that may exist elsewhere in China,
is <i>ipso facto</i> null and void and shall never be recognized
by the Chinese Government and people. The Chinese
Government is convinced that all self-respecting States will
uphold law and justice in the conduct of international relations
and will never accord <i>de jure</i> or <i>de facto</i> recognition
to Japan's puppet organization in China. Any manifestation
of such recognition, in whatever form or manner,
would be a violation of international law and treaties and
would be considered as an act most unfriendly to the
Chinese nation, for the consequences of which the recognizing
party would have to bear full responsibility."</p>
<h3>4. <span class="smcap">China's Foreign Relations Based on Nine-Power Treaty</span></h3>
<p>China's foreign policy relating to the Sino-Japanese hostilities
is based upon the Nine-Power Treaty, which provides
that the contracting Powers, other than China, agreed to
the following:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence and
the territorial and administrative integrity of China;</p>
<p>2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity
to China to develop and maintain for herself
an effective and stable government;</p>
<p>3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually
establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity
for the commerce and industry of all nations
throughout the territory of China.</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_421" id="Page_421">[Pg 421]</a></span></p>
<p>4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in
China in order to seek special rights or privileges which
would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly
States, and from countenancing action inimical to the
security of such States.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Under present conditions, the aggressor is still reluctant
to attend any international conference for seeking a just
settlement. Therefore, the only alternative is for China to
continue her war of resistance until Japan comes to her
senses or reaches the point of exhaustion, which can be
accomplished through the extension of greater assistance
to China and the application of an embargo on military
supplies to Japan.</p>
<p>There is no need to elaborate on the well-known fact that
the role of the United States in the maintenance of peace
in the Pacific area is an important one. We have great confidence
in the sense of justice of America, our traditional
friend, who realizes the full significance of the so-called
"New Order in Greater East Asia," which Japanese spokesmen
admit applies to the South Seas region.</p>
<p>World peace and peace between China and Japan are
indivisible. An era of prosperity in this part of the world,
which cannot but be of benefit to the world in general, can
only be ushered in after a just and lasting solution to the
Sino-Japanese conflict has been found.</p>
<div class="footnotes">
<h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3>
<div class="footnote">
<p><a name="Footnote_1_226" id="Footnote_1_226"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_226"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Private communication transmitted from Chungking, September
10, 1940; in possession of the present author.</p></div></div>
<hr class="chap" />
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_423" id="Page_423">[Pg 423]</a></span></p>
<h2>GLOSSARY</h2>
<p>[Chinese ideographs have been attached to the names of all
the more important political terms, as given in the following
list. Proper names may be found with their correct ideographs
in <i>Who's Who in China</i> and the <i>Supplement</i> thereto, cited above.
Place-names have been given in the Chinese Postal transliteration;
all other names and terms are given in the Wade-Giles
spelling, but with the tones omitted. In a few cases, the
spelling of a name has been well established by long newspaper
usage, by the caprice or decision of a man in re-spelling
his own name, or by common practice which has become
standard English. Examples are <i>tuchün</i>, Kuomintang (instead
of <i>Kuo-min Tang</i> or <i>Kuo-min-tang</i>) and T. V. Soong. Capitalization
and hyphenation follow, as closely as possible, the
practices established by the <i>Quarterly Bulletin of Chinese Bibliography</i>,
Peking and Kunming.]</p>
<p><i>Chan-ti Tang-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i> 戰地黨政委員會 the (Kuomintang)
Party and (National) Government War Area Commission;
the Chungking agency for the government of
those parts of China technically occupied by the Japanese;
under the Military Affairs Commission</p>
<p><i>chang</i> 長 a chief, or head</p>
<p><i>Ch'ang-wu Wei-yüan</i> 常務委員 a Standing Committee, or administrative
committee</p>
<p><i>Ch'ang-wu Tz'ŭ-chang</i> 常務次長 an Administrative Vice-Minister
(of a <i>pu</i>)</p>
<p><i>chên</i> 鎮 a unit of local government; "community"; the equivalent
of a <i>hsiang</i></p>
<p><i>Chên-chi Wei-yüan-hui</i> 振濟委員會 the (National) Relief Commission</p>
<p><i>Chêng-chih-pu</i> 政治部 the Political Department (of the Military
Affairs Commission); the important and powerful agency
which coordinates civilian aid to the war from Chungking,
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_424" id="Page_424">[Pg 424]</a></span>in propaganda, civilian mobilization, etc.; competitive
with the Chinese Communists</p>
<p><i>Chêng-wu Ch'u</i> 政務處 a Political Affairs Department; the political
secretariat of a <i>Yüan</i></p>
<p><i>Chêng-wu Tz'ŭ-chang</i> 政務次長 a Political Vice-Minister (of a
<i>pu</i>)</p>
<p><i>Ch'i Chün-tzŭ</i> 七君子 the "Seven Gentlemen"; the leaders of
the National Salvation movement</p>
<p><i>chia</i> 甲 a group of households; a unit in the <i>pao-chia</i> system of
local government</p>
<p><i>Chiao-t'ung Pu</i> 交通部 Ministry of Communications</p>
<p><i>Ch'iao-wu Wei-yüan-hui</i> 僑務委員會 Commission on Overseas
Chinese Affairs (under the Executive <i>Yüan</i>)</p>
<p><i>Chiao-yü Pu</i> 教育部 Ministry of Education (under the Executive
<i>Yüan</i>)</p>
<p><i>chien-ch'a</i> 監察 one of the five powers of government in the
plans of Sun Yat-sen; a combination of impeachment,
audit, supervisory investigation and other functions</p>
<p><i>Chien-ch'a Yüan</i> 監察院 the Control (or Censoral) <i>Yüan</i>; one
of the five major divisions of the government</p>
<p><i>Chien Kuo Ta Kang</i> 建國大綱 the <i>Outline of National Reconstruction</i>,
a manifesto by Sun Yat-sen which charted the subsequent
formal policies of the Kuomintang</p>
<p><i>ch'ih</i> 恥 self-respect; honor</p>
<p><i>Chin-ch'a-chi Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i>
晉察冀邊區臨時行政委員會 "Provisional Executive
Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region";
formal style of the Border Region, <i>q.v.</i></p>
<p><i>Ching-chi Pu</i> 經濟部 Ministry of Economic Affairs (under the
Executive <i>Yüan</i>)</p>
<p><i>Chiu Kuo</i> 救國 National Salvation; an anti-aggression movement
organized outside the Kuomintang</p>
<p><i>Chu-hsi</i> 主席 chairman; refers particularly to the <i>Kuo-min
Chêng-fu Chu-hsi</i> (President of the National Government)</p>
<p><i>ch'ü</i> 區 a unit of local government above the <i>pao</i>, <i>chia</i>, and
<i>hsiang</i>, but below the <i>hsien</i> ("county"); a township; with
reference to the Party organization of the Kuomintang, a
district</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_425" id="Page_425">[Pg 425]</a></span></p>
<p><i>ch'ü-fên</i> 區分 sub-district; the lowest territorial unit in Kuomintang
organization</p>
<p><i>ch'üan</i> 權 "power," <i>i.e.</i>, of the people, as contrasted with the
nêng (capacity) of the government; the distinction is Sun
Yat-sen's, and applies to the political process</p>
<p><i>Ch'üan-hsü Pu</i> 銓敘部 the Ministry of Personnel; under the
Examination <i>Yüan</i></p>
<p><i>Ch'üan-hsü T'ing</i> 銓敘廳 Administration of Personnel (for the
military); under the Military Affairs Commission</p>
<p><i>Ch'üan-kuo Hui-i</i> 全國會議 the (Chinese Communist) National
Party Convention</p>
<p><i>Ch'üan-kuo Ta-hui</i> 全國大會 the (Chinese Communist) National
Party Congress</p>
<p><i>Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao Ta-hui</i> 全國代表大會 the (Kuomintang)
Party Congress</p>
<p><i>Chün-chêng-pu</i> 軍政部 the Ministry of War; under the joint
jurisdiction of the Executive <i>Yüan</i> and the Military
Affairs Commission</p>
<p><i>Chün-fa Chih-hsing Tsung-chien-pu</i> 軍法執行總監部 the Directorate-General
of Courts Martial; under the Military Affairs Commission</p>
<p><i>Chün-hsün-pu</i> 軍訓部 Department of Military Training; under
the Military Affairs Commission</p>
<p><i>Chün-ling-pu</i> 軍令部 Department of Military Operation;
office of the Chinese high command; under the Military
Affairs Commission</p>
<p><i>Chün-shih Ts'an-i-yüan</i> 軍事參議院 Military Advisory Council;
under the Military Affairs Commission</p>
<p><i>Chün-shih Wei-yüan-hui</i> 軍事委員會 the Military Affairs Commission;
the chief politico-military organ of the National
Government</p>
<p><i>Chung-hua Min-kuo Kuo-min Chêng-fu</i> 中華民國國民政府 literally:
the Republic of China, National Government; the
style of the National Government under the Kuomintang</p>
<p><i>Chung-hua Min-kuo Lin-shih Chêng-fu</i> 中華民國國民政府 the
"Provisional Government of the Republic of China,"
Peking, 1937-1940; pro-Japanese</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_426" id="Page_426">[Pg 426]</a></span></p>
<p><i>Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ê-ch'ü</i> 中華民國特區政府
"Special District Government of the Chinese Republic";
the first formal style of the Chinese Soviet area in the
Northwest after the intra-national armistice</p>
<p><i>Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsiu-chêng Kuo-min Chêng-fu</i> 中華民國修正國民政府
the "Reorganized National Government of the
Republic of China"; the National Government of Wang
Ch'ing-wei at Nanking; pro-Japanese</p>
<p><i>Chung-hua Min-kuo Wei-hsin Chêng-fu</i> 中華民國維新政府 the
"Reformed Government of the Republic of China,"
Nanking, 1938-1940; pro-Japanese</p>
<p><i>Chung-hua Su-wei-ai Kung-ho-kuo</i> 中華蘇維埃共和國 the Chinese
Soviet Republic</p>
<p><i>Chung-kuo Kê-ming Tang</i> 中國革命黨 the Chinese Revolutionary
Party; style of the Kuomintang, 1914-1920; style
of the Third Party, 1929-1930</p>
<p><i>Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Kê-ming Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i>
中國國民黨革命行政委員會 the Revolutionary Action
Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang; first style of the
Third Party</p>
<p><i>Chung-kuo Kung-yeh Ho-tso Hsieh-hui</i> 中國工業合作協會 the
Chinese Industrial Cooperatives</p>
<p><i>Chung-yang Chêng-chih Hsüeh-hsiao</i> 中央政治學校 the Central
Political Institute; under the Kuomintang</p>
<p><i>Chung-yang Chêng-chih Wei-yüan-hui</i> 中央政治委員會 the Central
Political Council; the agency whereby the Kuomintang
exercised its power over the National Government
until the Supreme National Defense Council was
created</p>
<p><i>Chung-yang Chien-ch'a Wei-yüan-hui</i> 中央監察委員會 the (Kuomintang)
Central Control Committee</p>
<p><i>Chung-yang Chih-hsing Wei-yüan-hui</i> 中央執行委員會 the (Kuomintang)
Central Executive Committee</p>
<p><i>Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan Pu</i> 中央宣傳部 the (Kuomintang)
Party-Ministry of Publicity [or Central Publicity Board]</p>
<p><i>Chung-yang Wei-yüan-hui</i> 中央委員會 the (Chinese Communist
Party) Central Committee</p>
<p><i>fa pi</i> 法幣 (National Government) legal tender notes</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_427" id="Page_427">[Pg 427]</a></span></p>
<p><i>fang</i> 坊 a territorial unit of municipal government; roughly, a
precinct</p>
<p><i>Fu-hsing Shê</i> 復興社 the Regeneration Club; former center of
the so-called Blue Shirts</p>
<p><i>Fu-hsüeh Wei-yüan-hui</i> 撫郋委員會 the Pensions Commission;
under the Military Affairs Commission</p>
<p><i>Fu I-chang</i> 副議長 Deputy Speaker (of the People's Political
Council)</p>
<p><i>Fu Mi-shu-chang</i> 副秘書長 a Deputy Secretary-General</p>
<p><i>Fu-yüan-chang</i> 副院長 the Vice-President of a <i>Yüan</i> (one of the
five divisions of the government)</p>
<p><i>Hai-chün Tsung-ssŭ-ling-pu</i> 海軍總司令部 Office of the Naval
Commander-in-Chief, successor to the Ministry of the
Navy which manages the up-river remnants of the
Chinese fleet; under the Military Affairs Commission</p>
<p><i>Hang-k'ung Wei-yüan-hui</i> 航空委員會 the (National) Aviation
Commission; under the Military Affairs Commission</p>
<p><i>Hou-fang Ch'in-wu-pu</i> 後方勤務部 the [Rear-Area] Service
Department under the Military Affairs Commission</p>
<p><i>hsiang</i> 鄉 a unit of local government, also termed <i>chên</i>; a village
or community</p>
<p><i>hsiao-tsu</i> 小粗 the "small-group"; the lowest fraction of Kuomintang
organization</p>
<p><i>Hsieh-ho-hui</i> 協和會 the Concordia Society; the propaganda
agency of Manchoukuo</p>
<p><i>hsien</i> 縣 district; roughly comparable to the American
county</p>
<p><i>Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an</i> 憲法草案 the Draft Permanent Constitution;
the official sponsored project for the new constitution,
known most widely in the version of the Double Five Draft
of May 5, 1936</p>
<p><i>Hsin-min-hui</i> 新民會 a political "party" organized by pro-Japanese
elements in North China</p>
<p><i>Hsin Min Chu I</i> 新民主義 a pro-Japanese doctrine taught in
occupied North China</p>
<p><i>Hsin Shêng-huo Yün-tung</i> 新生活運動 the New Life Movement</p>
<p><i>Hsin-ssŭ-chün</i> 新四軍 New Fourth Army; a guerrilla force
under Communist influence; operating in the Yangtze
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_428" id="Page_428">[Pg 428]</a></span>lowlands, it clashed with Chinese National forces early
in 1941, and was formally disbanded</p>
<p><i>Hsing-chêng Fa-yüan</i> 行政法院 the Administrative Court; under
the Judicial Yüan</p>
<p><i>Hsing-chêng Yüan</i> 行政院 the Executive <i>Yüan</i>, greatest of the
five divisions of the government</p>
<p><i>Hsün-lien T'uan</i> 訓練團 the Training Corps (of the Kuomintang)</p>
<p><i>Hsün-lien Wei-yüan-hui</i> 訓練委員會 the (Central) Training
Committee (of the Kuomintang)</p>
<p><i>Huangpu</i> 黃埔 the name of a military academy (in Cantonese,
Whampoa), now applied to the Generalissimo's protégés
as a political faction</p>
<p><i>hui</i> 會 a meeting, guild, league, or society</p>
<p><i>Hui-i</i> 會議 a deliberative body; particularly, a City Council
(Shih-chêng Hui-i)</p>
<p><i>i</i> 議 propriety; ethics; justice</p>
<p><i>I-chang</i> 議長 Speaker (of the People's Political Council)</p>
<p><i>I Ho Ch'üan</i> 義和拳 the "Boxers" of 1900</p>
<p><i>Kan Shih</i> 幹事 the police executive in a <i>hsiang</i> or <i>chên</i></p>
<p><i>K'ang-chan Chien-kuo Kang-ling</i> 抗戰建馘綱領 the Program of
Resistance and Reconstruction; the formal declaration of
government policy during the invasion; adopted at
Hankow in March, 1938</p>
<p><i>K'ao-hsüan Wei-yüan-hui</i> 考選委員會 the Examinations Commission;
under the Examination <i>Yüan</i></p>
<p><i>K'ao-shih Yüan</i> 考試會 the Examination <i>Yüan</i>; one of the five
major divisions of the government</p>
<p><i>Kung-ch'an Ch'ing-nien T'uan</i> 共產青年團 the Communist
Youth Corps</p>
<p><i>Kung-ch'an Tang</i> 共產黨 the (Chinese) Communist Party</p>
<p><i>Kung-wu-yüan Ch'eng-chieh Wei-yüan-hui</i> 公務員懲戒委員會 the
Commission for the Disciplinary Punishment of Public
Officers (under the Judicial <i>Yüan</i>), a lower agency than
the Commission for the Disciplinary Punishment of Public
Officials (attached to the Council of State)</p>
<p><i>Kuo-chia Chu-i P'ai</i> 國家主義派 the "Nationalist Party"; Parti
Républicain Nationaliste de la Jeune Chine</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_429" id="Page_429">[Pg 429]</a></span></p>
<p><i>Kuo-chia Shê-hui Tang</i> 國家社會黨 the (Chinese) National
Social(ist) Party</p>
<p><i>Kuo-fang Tsui-kao Wei-yüan-hui</i> 國防最高委員會 the Supreme
National Defense Council; the quasi-governmental
agency whereby the Kuomintang controls the National
Government; established in 1938 as a war measure, it
supersedes the <i>Chung-yang Chêng-chih Wei-yüan-hui</i> (Central
Political Council)</p>
<p><i>Kuo-li Chung-yang Yen-chiu Yüan</i> 國立中央研究院 the Academia
Sinica; the national scientific and scholastic body,
attached to the Council of State</p>
<p><i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui</i> 國民政府委員會 "National
Government Council"; commonly termed Council of
State, this is the highest strictly governmental agency in
China</p>
<p><i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu Chu-hsi</i> 國民政府主席 "chairman of the
National Government"; more formally, President of the
National Government of China; <i>ex-officio</i> chairman of the
Council of State, and ceremonial chief of the government</p>
<p><i>Kuo-min Ching-shên Tsung-tung-yüan</i> 國民精神總動員 the National
Spiritual Mobilization</p>
<p><i>Kuo-min Hui-i</i> 國民會議 the National People's Convention of
XX (1931), which adopted the Provisional Constitution</p>
<p><i>Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui</i> 國民參政會 the People's Political
Council; advisory legislature inaugurated in Hankow</p>
<p><i>Kuo-min Ta-hui</i> 國民大會 the National Congress or People's
Congress; this term designates both the constituent body
which shall adopt the projected Constitution, and a subsequent
constitutional legislature meeting triennially</p>
<p><i>lao-pai-hsing</i> 老百姓 old inhabitants; common people; archaically
or etymologically, the Old Hundred Names</p>
<p><i>li</i> 禮 rites; ceremonies; ideological conformity</p>
<p><i>Li-fa Wei-yüan</i> 立法委會 members of the quasi-cameral plenary
session of the Legislative <i>Yüan</i>; experts in legal matters,
they combine the function of legislators with that of consultants
in codification</p>
<p><i>Li-ja Yüan</i> 立法會 the Legislative <i>Yüan</i>; one of the five divisions
of the government</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_430" id="Page_430">[Pg 430]</a></span></p>
<p><i>lien</i> 廉 integrity</p>
<p><i>lü</i> 旅 a brigade</p>
<p><i>Mêng-ku Lien-ho Tzŭ-chih Chêng-fu</i> 蒙古聯合自治政府 the
"Federated Autonomous Government of Mongolia";
pro-Japanese</p>
<p><i>Mêng Tsang Wei-yüan-hui</i> 蒙藏委員會 Commission on Mongolian
and Tibetan Affairs (under the Executive <i>Yüan</i>)</p>
<p><i>Mi-shu-chang</i> 秘書長 a Secretary-General</p>
<p><i>Mi-shu Ch'u</i> 秘書處 a Secretariat; particularly important in
the case of the Executive <i>Yüan</i></p>
<p><i>min ch'üan chu-i</i> 民權主義 the "principle of democracy," by
Sun Yat-sen; second of the <i>San Min Chu I</i></p>
<p><i>min-shêng chu-i</i> 民生主義 the "principle of the people's livelihood,"
by Sun Yat-sen; third of the <i>San Min Chu I</i></p>
<p><i>Min-ts'u Chieh-fang Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i> 民族解放行政委員會
the Acting Commission for the National Emancipation
of China; third, final, formal style of the Third
Party</p>
<p><i>min ts'u chu-i</i> 民族主義 the "principle of nationalism," by Sun
Yat-sen; first of the <i>San Min Chu I</i></p>
<p><i>Nei-chêng Pu</i> 內政部 the Ministry of the Interior (or of home
affairs); under the Executive <i>Yüan</i></p>
<p><i>nêng</i> 能 "capacity" (see <i>ch'üan</i>)</p>
<p><i>Nung Lin Pu</i> 農林部 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
(under the Executive <i>Yüan</i>)</p>
<p><i>Pa-lu-chün</i> 八路軍 "Eighth Route Army"; the chief Chinese
Communist force, formerly the Chinese Red Army and
now the Eighteenth Army Corps</p>
<p><i>pao</i> 保 a unit of local government; roughly, a neighborhood</p>
<p><i>pao-chia</i> 保甲 a system of local government embodying principles
of collective responsibility and mutual aid within
interlocking groups of households and neighborhoods</p>
<p><i>Pien-ch'ü</i> 邊區 Frontier Area or Border Region; the former
translation is used for the Communist zone in the Northwest,
and the latter for the guerrilla government in North
China</p>
<p><i>Pu</i> 部 a Ministry (under the <i>Yüan</i>), Department (under the
Military Affairs Commission), or equivalent organ of
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_431" id="Page_431">[Pg 431]</a></span>government; the term is one of long standing in Chinese
government</p>
<p><i>Pu Chang</i> 部長 Minister; head of a <i>pu</i></p>
<p><i>San Min Chu I</i> 三民主義 the three principles of the people;
Sun Yat-sen's political philosophy, now the official state
dogma of China</p>
<p><i>San Min Chu I Ch'ing-nien T'uan</i> 三民主義青年團 the <i>San Min
Chu I</i> Youth Corps</p>
<p><i>Shan-kan-ning Pien-ch'ü Chêng-fu</i> 陝甘寧邊區政府 the "Government
of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Frontier Area";
second formal style of the Communist zone in the Northwest</p>
<p><i>Shan-pei Hsing-chêng-ch'ü</i> 陝北行政區 the "Administrative
Area of North Shensi"; third formal style of the Communist
zone in the Northwest (Frontier Area)</p>
<p><i>Shê-hui Yün-tung Pu</i> 社會運動部 the (Kuomintang) Party-Ministry
of Social Movements</p>
<p><i>Shên-ch'a Wei-yüan-hui</i> 審查委員會 the (Chinese Communist
Party) Control Committee</p>
<p><i>Shêng</i> 省 a province</p>
<p><i>Shêng-chang</i> 省長 Governor; the civilian head of a province;
now superseded by a Provincial Chairman</p>
<p><i>Shêng Chêng-fu</i> 省政府 a Provincial Government</p>
<p><i>Shih</i> 市 a Municipality</p>
<p><i>Shih-chang</i> 市長 a Mayor</p>
<p><i>Sui-ching Chu-jên</i> 綏靖主任 a Pacification Commissioner; the
chief military officer of a province</p>
<p><i>Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng-pu</i> 司法行政部 the Ministry of Justice, literally
the "executive ministry of the judiciary"; under the
Judicial <i>Yüan</i> in the National Government, but under the
executive in the Reorganized Government of Wang
Ch'ing-wei</p>
<p><i>Ssŭ-fa Yüan</i> 司法院 the Judicial <i>Yüan</i>, one of the five divisions
of the government</p>
<p><i>ssŭ p'ai</i> 四派 the "four cliques" (in the People's Political
Council)</p>
<p><i>ssŭ tang</i> 四黨 the "four parties" (in the People's Political
Council)</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_432" id="Page_432">[Pg 432]</a></span></p>
<p><i>Ta-min-hui</i> 大民會 a political "party" organized by pro-Japanese
elements in Central China</p>
<p><i>tang chih</i> 黨治 "party government"; the single-party tutelary
dictatorship of the Kuomintang</p>
<p><i>Tai-piao Ta-hui</i> 代表大會 the (Chinese Communist) "Council
of Party Delegates"</p>
<p><i>Tangpu</i> 黨部 (local) Party Headquarters of the Kuomintang</p>
<p><i>Ti-san Tang</i> 第三黨 the Third Party; a popular name</p>
<p><i>Ts'ai-chêng Pu</i> 財政部 Ministry of Finance</p>
<p><i>Ts'an-chêng-hui</i> 參政會 a People's Political Council; preceded
by a term indicating the level at which established, <i>e.g.</i>,
<i>Shêng Ts'an-chêng-hui</i>, Provincial People's Political Council</p>
<p><i>Ts'an-chün Ch'u</i> 參軍處 Office of Military Affairs; a military
secretariat attached to the Council of State</p>
<p><i>Ts'an-i-hui</i> 參議會 an Advisory Council, as in the Municipality</p>
<p><i>Tsui-kao Fa-yüan</i> 最高法院 the Supreme Court; under the
Judicial <i>Yüan</i></p>
<p><i>Tsung-li</i> 總理 the [Party] Leader; the formal office held by
Sun Yat-sen in the Kuomintang; his in perpetuity, the
title is used as a respectful form of reference to Sun</p>
<p><i>Tsung-ts'ai</i> 總裁 the [Party] Chief, or leader; title vested in
Chiang K'ai-shek as formal head of the Kuomintang by
the Emergency Party Congress, Hankow, March, 1938</p>
<p><i>t'uan</i> 團 a regiment</p>
<p><i>tuchün</i> 督軍 the military chief of a province, a war-lord</p>
<p><i>Wai-chiao Pu</i> [also written <i>Waichiaopu</i>] 外交部 the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs; under the Executive <i>Yüan</i></p>
<p><i>Wang Tao</i> 王道 "the kingly way," a cardinal concept of traditional
Chinese political thought; now, reinterpreted, the
state philosophy of Manchoukuo</p>
<p><i>Wei-shêng Shu</i> 衛生暑 National Health Administration (in the
Ministry of the Interior)</p>
<p><i>Wei-yüan-chang</i> 委會長 chairman (of a committee, commission,
etc.); this title often refers to Generalissimo Chiang in
his capacity of Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission</p>
<p><i>Wên-kuan Ch'u</i> 文官處 Office of Civil Affairs; a civilian
secretariat attached to the Council of State</p>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_433" id="Page_433">[Pg 433]</a></span></p>
<p><i>wu-ch'üan hsien-fa</i> 五權憲法 the "five power constitution"; the
five-fold separation of powers taught by Sun Yat-sen and
applied by the National Government</p>
<p><i>Yüan</i> 院 literally "board"; one of the five divisions of the
National Government of China</p>
<p><i>Yüan-chang</i> 院長 the President of a <i>Yüan</i></p>
<p><i>Yüeh Fa</i> 約法 the Provisional Constitution, adopted in 1931</p>
<hr class="chap" />
<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_435" id="Page_435">[Pg 435]</a></span></p>
<h2>INDEX</h2>
<div>
Ability (<i>nêng</i>), <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br />
<br />
Academia Sinica (<i>Kuo-li Chung-yang Yen-chiu Yüan</i>), <a href="#Page_56">56</a><br />
<br />
<i>Act Governing the Elections of Representatives to the National Congress</i>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a><br />
<br />
<i>Acting Commission for the National Emancipation of China</i> (<i>Min-ts'u Chieh-fang Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_178">178</a><br />
<br />
Administration of Personnel (<i>Ch'uan-hsü T'ing</i>), <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br />
<br />
Administrative agencies, chart, <a href="#Page_80">80</a><br />
<br />
Administrative Area of North Shensi (<i>Shan-pei Hsing-chêng-ch'ü</i>), <a href="#Page_112">112</a><br />
<br />
Administrative Court (<i>Hsing-chêng Fa-yüan</i>), <a href="#Page_67">67</a><br />
<br />
Administrative:<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">development, <a href="#Page_96">96</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">law, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">organs, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">pattern, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></span><br />
<br />
Administrative Vice-Minister (<i>Ch'ang-wu Tz'ŭ-chang</i>), <a href="#Page_96">96</a><br />
<br />
Adult education, <a href="#Page_30">30</a><br />
<br />
Agitation, <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br />
<br />
Agrarian problems, <a href="#Page_104">104</a><br />
<br />
Agriculture, <a href="#Page_91">91</a><br />
<br />
Agriculture and Forestry, Ministry of (<i>Nung Lin Pu</i>), <a href="#Page_91">91</a><br />
<br />
Air communications, <a href="#Page_90">90</a><br />
<br />
Alexander the Great, <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br />
<br />
Alley, Rewi, <a href="#Page_224">224</a><br />
<br />
Amendments to the Constitution (proposed constitutional provisions), <a href="#Page_300">300</a><br />
<br />
American Friends of the Chinese People, <a href="#Page_234">234</a><br />
<br />
American Lease-lend Bill, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br />
<br />
American loans, <a href="#Page_19">19</a><br />
<br />
Ao-yü-wan, <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br />
<br />
Appointment and discharge of officials, <a href="#Page_59">59</a><br />
<br />
Armistice, intra-national, <a href="#Page_10">10</a><br />
<br />
Army participation in rural reform, <a href="#Page_221">221</a><br />
<br />
Atatürk, Kemal, <a href="#Page_272">272</a><br />
<br />
Audit, Ministry of, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a><br />
<br />
Autonomous East Hopei Anti-Communist Government, <a href="#Page_185">185</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Bank of China, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br />
<br />
Bank of Communications, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br />
<br />
Basic patterns of modern Chinese politics, <a href="#Page_8">8</a><br />
<br />
Bibliographical notes, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a><br />
<br />
"Blue Shirts," <a href="#Page_144">144</a><br />
<br />
Border Region, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">chart of government, <a href="#Page_118">118</a></span><br />
<br />
Boxers (<i>I Ho Ch'üan</i>), <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a><br />
<br />
Buddhism, <a href="#Page_258">258</a><br />
<br />
Budget, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a><br />
<br />
Bureaucracy:<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">traditional ideal, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">at Chungking, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></span><br />
<br />
Burma, <a href="#Page_189">189</a><br />
<br />
Burma road, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a><br />
<br />
Bukharin, <a href="#Page_164">164</a><br />
<br />
Bus services, <a href="#Page_93">93</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Cabinet, <a href="#Page_56">56</a><br />
<br />
Canton, <a href="#Page_18">18</a><br />
<br />
Cantonese clique, <a href="#Page_145">145</a><br />
<br />
Capacity (<i>nêng</i>), <a href="#Page_43">43</a><br />
<br />
Capitalism, <a href="#Page_30">30</a><br />
<br />
Caribbean, <a href="#Page_188">188</a><br />
<br />
Carlson, Major Evans Fordyce, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a><br />
<br />
"C.C." clique, <a href="#Page_142">142</a><br />
<br />
Censor <i>Yüan</i> (<i>see</i> Control <i>Yüan</i>)<br />
<br />
Censoral power, <a href="#Page_27">27</a><br />
<br />
Censorship of news, <a href="#Page_138">138</a><br />
<br />
Censure, motion of, <a href="#Page_314">314</a><br />
<br />
Central America, <a href="#Page_188">188</a><br />
<br />
Central Bank of China, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br />
<br />
Central China clique (<i>Hua-chung P'ai</i>), <a href="#Page_76">76</a><br />
<br />
Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_72">72</a><br />
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_436" id="Page_436">[Pg 436]</a></span><br />
Central government (proposed constitutional provisions), <a href="#Page_287">287</a><br />
<br />
Central Secretariat of the Kuomintang (<i>Chung-yang Mi-shu-ch'u</i>), <a href="#Page_137">137</a><br />
<br />
Central News Agency, <a href="#Page_137">137</a><br />
<br />
Central Political Council (<i>Chung-yang Chêng-chih Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a><br />
<br />
Central Political Institute (<i>Chung-yang Chêng-chih Hsüeh-hsiao</i>), <a href="#Page_134">134</a><br />
<br />
Central Publicity Board (<i>see</i> Party-Ministry of Publicity)<br />
<br />
Chamberlain, Neville, <a href="#Page_15">15</a><br />
<br />
Chang, Carson (<i>Chang Chia-shêng</i>), <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br />
<br />
Chang Ching-chiang, <a href="#Page_261">261</a><br />
<br />
Chang Hsüeh-liang, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a><br />
<br />
Chang Kuo-tao, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a><br />
<br />
Chang Peh Chuen (Chang Pai-chün), <a href="#Page_178">178</a><br />
<br />
Charts (<i>see also</i> type of government)<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Control <i>Yüan</i>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>Hsien</i> classifications, <a href="#Page_388">388</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Kuomintang organization, <a href="#Page_331">331</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">national governmental structure, <a href="#Page_330">330</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">provincial and urban government, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></span><br />
<br />
<i>Chên</i> (<i>see</i> Community)<br />
<br />
Chen Ch'i-mei, <a href="#Page_260">260</a><br />
<br />
Chen Chi-tang, <a href="#Page_91">91</a><br />
<br />
Chen, Eugene, <a href="#Page_178">178</a><br />
<br />
Ch'ên brothers, <a href="#Page_134">134</a><br />
<br />
Ch'ên Ch'êng, <a href="#Page_340">340</a><br />
<br />
Ch'ên I, <a href="#Page_102">102</a><br />
<br />
Ch'ên Kung-po, <a href="#Page_198">198</a><br />
<br />
Ch'ên Kuo-fu, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a><br />
<br />
Ch'ên Kuo-hsin, essay on Mao Tsê-tung, <a href="#Page_403">403</a><br />
<br />
Ch'ên Li-fu, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a><br />
<br />
Ch'ên Lo, <a href="#Page_204">204</a><br />
<br />
Ch'ên Shao-yu (Wang Ming), <a href="#Page_163">163</a><br />
<br />
Ch'ên Tu-hsiu, <a href="#Page_163">163</a><br />
<br />
<i>Ch'ê-yeh Chiao-yü P'ai</i> (<i>see</i> Vocational Educationists' Clique)<br />
<br />
<i>Chia</i>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_395">395</a><br />
<br />
Chiang Chieh-shih (<i>see</i> Chiang K'ai-shek)<br />
<br />
Chiang Ching-kuo, <a href="#Page_262">262</a><br />
<br />
Chiang K'ai-shek:<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">biography, <a href="#Page_254">254</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Canton, <a href="#Page_260">260</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">character, <a href="#Page_255">255</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">childhood, <a href="#Page_257">257</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chinese appraisals, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and Christianity, <a href="#Page_257">257</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on constitutionalism, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>Definition of the Problems of Various Classifications of Hsien</i>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">ethical theory, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">governmental role, <a href="#Page_48">48</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">historical role, <a href="#Page_255">255</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">ideals, <a href="#Page_257">257</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">kidnapped at Sian, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in the Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">life, <a href="#Page_256">256</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">marriage, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">military rise, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">military writings, <a href="#Page_260">260</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">nature of his power, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the New Life Movement, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">political theory, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">present personality, <a href="#Page_265">265</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and President Lin, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relations with Wang Ch'ing-wei, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">rise in the Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and Roosevelt, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">secret police, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Shanghai, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the Shanghai Communists, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">statement to the author, <a href="#Page_371">371</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Soviet training, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and Sun Yat-sen, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">training in Japan, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>What I Mean by Action (Li-hsing Chê-hsiao)</i>, <a href="#Page_373">373</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">writings, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></span><br />
<br />
<i>Chiao-shou P'ai</i> (<i>see</i> Professors' Clique)<br />
<br />
Chicherin, <a href="#Page_164">164</a><br />
<br />
Chief (<i>Tsung-ts'ai</i>), <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br />
<br />
<i>Chien-ch'a</i> power, <a href="#Page_27">27</a><br />
<br />
<i>Chien Kuo Ta Kang</i>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a><br />
<br />
<i>Ch'ih</i>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a><br />
<br />
China Branch of the International Peace Campaign, <a href="#Page_234">234</a><br />
<br />
China Defense League, <a href="#Page_119">119</a><br />
<br />
<i>China Forum, The</i>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a><br />
<br />
<i>China Herald, The</i>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a><br />
<br />
"China's Long-range Diplomatic Orientation," <a href="#Page_418">418</a><br />
<br />
China National Aviation Corporation, <a href="#Page_93">93</a><br />
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_437" id="Page_437">[Pg 437]</a></span><br />
Chinese Central Asia (<i>see</i> Sinkiang)<br />
<br />
Chinese Communist Party (<i>see</i> Communist Party)<br />
<br />
Chinese ideals, <a href="#Page_2">2</a><br />
<br />
Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (<i>see</i> C.I.C.)<br />
<br />
Chinese Mass Education Movement, <a href="#Page_218">218</a><br />
<br />
Chinese National Socialist Party (<i>Kuo-chia Shê-hui Tang</i>), <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br />
<br />
Chinese Red Army, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br />
<br />
Chinese Republic, <a href="#Page_2">2</a><br />
<br />
Chinese Revolutionary Party (<i>Chung-kuo K'ê-ming Tang</i>), <a href="#Page_178">178</a><br />
<br />
Chinese Soviet Republic (<i>Chung-hua Su-wei-ai Kung-ho-kuo</i>), <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br />
<br />
Chinese Turkestan (<i>see also</i> Sinkiang), <a href="#Page_85">85</a><br />
<br />
Chi, C.C., <a href="#Page_139">139</a><br />
<br />
Chin P'u-yi, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a><br />
<br />
Ch'in state and dynasty, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a><br />
<br />
Ch'in Po-k'u, <a href="#Page_168">168</a><br />
<br />
Chou En-lai, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a><br />
<br />
Chou Fu-hai, <a href="#Page_198">198</a><br />
<br />
Christian activities, <a href="#Page_235">235</a><br />
<br />
Chu Djang, <a href="#Page_153">153</a><br />
<br />
<i>Chu-Mao</i>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a><br />
<br />
Chung Fu Joint Mining Administration, <a href="#Page_90">90</a><br />
<br />
Chungking, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a><br />
<br />
Chung Shan (<i>see also</i> Sun Yat-sen), <a href="#Page_249">249</a><br />
<br />
Chu Tê, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a><br />
<br />
<i>Ch'ü</i>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a><br />
<br />
<i>Ch'üan</i> (power), <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br />
<br />
Ch'üan-min K'ang-chan Shê (United Front Club), cited, <a href="#Page_37">37</a><br />
<br />
Ch'u Chia-hua, <a href="#Page_136">136</a><br />
<br />
C.I.C. (Chinese Industrial Cooperatives; <i>Chung-kuo Kung-yeh Ho-tso Hsieh-hui</i>):<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">appraisal, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">distribution of profits, <a href="#Page_230">230</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">establishment, <a href="#Page_224">224</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">formation of cooperatives, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the Model Constitution, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">regions, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relation to government, <a href="#Page_223">223</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">social welfare work, <a href="#Page_231">231</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the three zones, <a href="#Page_224">224</a></span><br />
<br />
Citizenship (proposed constitutional provisions), <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br />
<br />
City Council (<i>Shih-chêng Hui-i</i>), <a href="#Page_104">104</a><br />
<br />
Civil governor of a province (<i>Shêng-chang</i>), <a href="#Page_99">99</a><br />
<br />
Civil service reform, <a href="#Page_66">66</a><br />
<br />
Civil Service Training Corps, <a href="#Page_134">134</a><br />
<br />
Clark-Kerr, Sir Archibald, <a href="#Page_224">224</a><br />
<br />
Class politics in China, <a href="#Page_146">146</a><br />
<br />
Class war, <a href="#Page_13">13</a><br />
<br />
Coal and iron, <a href="#Page_228">228</a><br />
<br />
Coal mining, <a href="#Page_90">90</a><br />
<br />
Collection of revenue, <a href="#Page_86">86</a><br />
<br />
College students, <a href="#Page_9">9</a><br />
<br />
Commission for the Disciplinary Punishment of Public Officers (<i>Kung-wu-yüan Ch'êng-chieh Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_67">67</a><br />
<br />
Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (<i>Mêng Tsang Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_8">8</a><br />
<br />
Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs (<i>Ch'iao-wu Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_84">84</a><br />
<br />
Committee Chairman (<i>Wei-yüan-chang</i>; <i>see</i> name of Committee)<br />
<br />
Communications, Ministry of (<i>Chiao-t'ung Pu</i>), <a href="#Page_92">92</a><br />
<br />
Communications Southward, <a href="#Page_95">95</a><br />
<br />
Communications system, foreign personnel in, <a href="#Page_95">95</a><br />
<br />
Communism, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a><br />
<br />
Communist communes, <a href="#Page_213">213</a><br />
<br />
Communist Party (<i>Kung-ch'an Tang</i>), <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and American aid to China, <a href="#Page_172">172</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">appraisal of, <a href="#Page_173">173</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Branch Party Organs, <a href="#Page_363">363</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Central Party Committee, <a href="#Page_368">368</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">chart of structure, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and Chiang K'ai-shek, <a href="#Page_175">175</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>Constitution</i>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Council of Party Delegates, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_364">364</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">foundation, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>Hsien</i> Organs, <a href="#Page_364">364</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">international policy, <a href="#Page_403">403</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">leaders, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and Moscow, <a href="#Page_163">163</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">motives, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">National Party Congress, <a href="#Page_367">367</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">National Party Convention, <a href="#Page_367">367</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">organization, <a href="#Page_361">361</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and peasants, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a></span><br />
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_438" id="Page_438">[Pg 438]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 1em;">in perpetual revolution, <a href="#Page_213">213</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">policy toward the Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">potential treason, <a href="#Page_172">172</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Provincial Party Organs, <a href="#Page_366">366</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">purges and schisms, <a href="#Page_169">169</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Sun Yat-sen's alliance, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Supreme Party Organs, <a href="#Page_362">362</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">views on Chiang K'ai-shek, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></span><br />
<br />
Communist Youth Corps (<i>Kung-ch'an Ch'ing-nien T'uan</i>), <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_370">370</a><br />
<br />
Communist zone (<i>see</i> Frontier Area)<br />
<br />
Communists:<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">compared with Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the five-power system, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the guerrillas, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in the People's Political Council, <a href="#Page_76">76</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">policy of collaboration, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the proposed Constitution, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">rivalry with Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></span><br />
<br />
"Community" (<i>hsiang</i>), <a href="#Page_107">107</a><br />
<br />
Community life in China, <a href="#Page_4">4</a><br />
<br />
Complexity of government structure, <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br />
<br />
Concordia Society (<i>Hsieh-ho-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_194">194</a><br />
<br />
Conflict: the term, <a href="#Page_11">11</a><br />
<br />
Confucianism, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a><br />
<br />
Confucius, <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br />
<br />
Constitution, Chiang's comment on, <a href="#Page_32">32</a><br />
<br />
<i>Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic</i>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a><br />
<br />
<i>Constitution of the</i> San Min Chu I <i>Youth Corps</i>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a><br />
<br />
Constitutional change, issues of, <a href="#Page_31">31</a><br />
<br />
Constitutionalism, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_371">371</a><br />
<br />
Constitutions (<i>see also</i> Draft Constitution), <a href="#Page_21">21</a><br />
<br />
Constitutions, ineffectual, <a href="#Page_39">39</a><br />
<br />
Consultative organs, <a href="#Page_39">39</a><br />
<br />
<i>Control</i> (<i>chien-ch'a)</i> power, <a href="#Page_27">27</a><br />
<br />
Control <i>Yüan</i> (<i>Chien-ch'a Yüan</i>):<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">appraisal, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">chart of functions, <a href="#Page_318">318</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">diagram of organization, <a href="#Page_319">319</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_292">292</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">reorganization under the proposed Constitution, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">war work, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a></span><br />
<br />
Cooperatives (<i>see also</i> C.I.C.), <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a><br />
<br />
Corruption, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a><br />
<br />
Cotton, <a href="#Page_228">228</a><br />
<br />
Council of State (<i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui</i>):<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">administrative and constitutional status, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">agencies directly attached, <a href="#Page_54">54</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">functions, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional role, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></span><br />
<br />
County (<i>see hsien</i>)<br />
<br />
Courts of justice (proposed constitutional position), <a href="#Page_292">292</a><br />
<br />
Credit, national, <a href="#Page_86">86</a><br />
<br />
Currency, Japanese, <a href="#Page_186">186</a><br />
<br />
Currency rivalry, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br />
<br />
Currents of documents in Chinese government, <a href="#Page_55">55</a><br />
<br />
Customs, <a href="#Page_88">88</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Declarations of war and peace, <a href="#Page_59">59</a><br />
<br />
<i>Definition of the Problems Concerning the Organization of the Various Classifications of Hsien</i>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a><br />
<br />
Delegates to the constituent People's Congress, <a href="#Page_38">38</a><br />
<br />
Democracy (<i>min chu</i>; Sun Yat-sen's term, <i>min ch'üan</i>), <a href="#Page_270">270</a><br />
<br />
Democracy in free China, <a href="#Page_371">371</a><br />
<br />
Democracy, inauguration of, <a href="#Page_38">38</a><br />
<br />
Democracy, prospects, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br />
<br />
Democracy (<i>min ch'üan</i>), the theory of, <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br />
<br />
Democratic Centralism, <a href="#Page_162">162</a><br />
<br />
Democratic tendencies in the armies, <a href="#Page_372">372</a><br />
<br />
Democratic toleration, limits of, <a href="#Page_40">40</a><br />
<br />
Department of Military Operations (<i>Chün-ling-pu</i>), <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br />
<br />
Department of Military Training (<i>Chün-hsün-pu</i>), <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br />
<br />
Deputy Secretary-General (<i>Fu Mi-shu-chang</i>) of the People's Political Council, <a href="#Page_73">73</a><br />
<br />
Deputy Speaker (<i>Fu I-chang</i>) of the People's Political Council, <a href="#Page_72">72</a><br />
<br />
Dialectical materialism (<i>see</i> Communism, Communists)<br />
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_439" id="Page_439">[Pg 439]</a></span><br />
Diplomacy, <a href="#Page_310">310</a><br />
<br />
Diplomatic Orientation, China's Long-range, <a href="#Page_418">418</a><br />
<br />
Direct taxes, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br />
<br />
Director of Political Affairs, <a href="#Page_57">57</a><br />
<br />
Directorate-General of Courts-Martial (<i>Chün-fa Chih-hsing Tsung-chien-pu</i>), <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br />
<br />
<i>Discussion of Mao Tsê-tung's Comments on the Present State of International Relations</i> (Ch'ên Kuo-hsin), <a href="#Page_403">403</a><br />
<br />
District (<i>see hsien</i> for government; <i>ch'ü</i> for parties)<br />
<br />
Double Five Constitution (<i>see</i> Draft Permanent Constitution)<br />
<br />
Draft Permanent Constitution (<i>Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an</i>), <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a><br />
<br />
<i>Duties and General Activities of the</i> San Min Chu I <i>Youth Corps</i>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a><br />
<br />
<br />
East Hopei Autonomous Anti-Communist Government, <a href="#Page_192">192</a><br />
<br />
Eastern Inner Mongolia, <a href="#Page_85">85</a><br />
<br />
Economic affairs:<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">advance in the West, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">industrial development, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in <i>Program of Resistance and Reconstruction</i>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">policy and administration, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_296">296</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">war finance, <a href="#Page_87">87</a></span><br />
<br />
Economic Affairs, Ministry of (<i>Ching-chi Pu</i>), <a href="#Page_88">88</a><br />
<br />
Economic cycle in China, <a href="#Page_106">106</a><br />
<br />
Economic groups in politics, <a href="#Page_236">236</a><br />
<br />
Economic theory in the <i>San Min Chu I Youth Corps</i>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a><br />
<br />
Economics of old China, <a href="#Page_3">3</a><br />
<br />
Education, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a><br />
<br />
Education, Ministry of (<i>Chiao-yü Pu</i>), <a href="#Page_83">83</a><br />
<br />
Education: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_298">298</a><br />
<br />
Eighteenth Army Corps, <a href="#Page_168">168</a><br />
<br />
Eighth Route Army, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a><br />
<br />
Election Committee for Representatives to the People's [Constituent] Congress, <a href="#Page_38">38</a><br />
<br />
Elections, Communist, <a href="#Page_163">163</a><br />
<br />
Elections of representatives to the National [People's] Congress, <a href="#Page_302">302</a><br />
<br />
Emergency Session of the Kuomintang Party Congress, <a href="#Page_16">16</a><br />
<br />
Empire, Chinese, <a href="#Page_2">2</a><br />
<br />
<i>Erh Ch'ên</i> group, <a href="#Page_142">142</a><br />
<br />
Espionage, <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br />
<br />
Establishment, period of, <a href="#Page_5">5</a><br />
<br />
Eurasia airlines, <a href="#Page_93">93</a><br />
<br />
Examination <i>Yüan</i>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_292">292</a></span><br />
<br />
Examinations Commission (<i>K'ao-hsüan Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_68">68</a><br />
<br />
<i>Exclusive inspection</i>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a><br />
<br />
Executive <i>Yüan</i> (<i>Hsing-chêng Yüan</i>):<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">executive responsibility, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">functions, <a href="#Page_59">59</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Meeting, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">structure, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></span><br />
<br />
<br />
<i>Fa chih</i> (government of laws), <a href="#Page_33">33</a><br />
<br />
Farmers, <a href="#Page_218">218</a><br />
<br />
Farmers' Bank of China, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br />
<br />
Fêng Yü-hsiang, <a href="#Page_104">104</a><br />
<br />
Fenghua, Chekiang, <a href="#Page_262">262</a><br />
<br />
Farouk, <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br />
<br />
Fascism, <a href="#Page_270">270</a><br />
<br />
Finance, Ministry of (<i>Ts'ai-chêng Pu</i>), <a href="#Page_86">86</a><br />
<br />
Five-fold separation of powers, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a><br />
<br />
Five-power constitution (<i>wu-ch'üan hsien-fa</i>), <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a><br />
<br />
<i>Five rights</i>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a><br />
<br />
Five <i>yüan</i>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br />
<br />
Foo Shing Corporation, <a href="#Page_88">88</a><br />
<br />
Foochow insurrection, <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br />
<br />
Ford, Henry, <a href="#Page_233">233</a><br />
<br />
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of (<i>Waichiaopu</i>), <a href="#Page_81">81</a><br />
<br />
Foreign financial aid, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br />
<br />
Foreign policy, <a href="#Page_403">403</a>, <a href="#Page_418">418</a><br />
<br />
Foreign trade, <a href="#Page_88">88</a><br />
<br />
Formosans, <a href="#Page_187">187</a><br />
<br />
Four Cliques (<i>Ssŭ P'ai</i>), <a href="#Page_76">76</a><br />
<br />
Four Parties (<i>Ssŭ Tang</i>), <a href="#Page_76">76</a><br />
<br />
<i>Four powers</i>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a><br />
<br />
France, <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br />
<br />
Frederick the Great, <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br />
<br />
Free China, extent of, <a href="#Page_98">98</a><br />
<br />
Free China, prosperity, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a><br />
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_440" id="Page_440">[Pg 440]</a></span><br />
Freedoms under the proposed constitution:<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">assembly and forming associations, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">domicile, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">religious belief, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">speech, writing, and publication, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></span><br />
<br />
French Indo-China, <a href="#Page_19">19</a><br />
<br />
Friends of the Wounded Society, <a href="#Page_155">155</a><br />
<br />
Frontier Area (for Chinese, <i>see</i> Administrative District of North Shensi), <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a><br />
<br />
Fu Hsiao-ên, <a href="#Page_212">212</a><br />
<br />
Fukien province, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a><br />
<br />
Function of auditing, <a href="#Page_313">313</a><br />
<br />
Fup'ing, <a href="#Page_118">118</a><br />
<br />
Future development of Chinese politics, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<i>Gaimusho</i>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a><br />
<br />
Galens, General (Vassili Blücher), <a href="#Page_142">142</a><br />
<br />
Gasoline, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a><br />
<br />
Gautama Buddha, <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br />
<br />
<i>General inspection</i>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a><br />
<br />
General Staff, <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br />
<br />
General strikes, <a href="#Page_39">39</a><br />
<br />
Generalissimo (<i>Tsung-ssŭ-ling</i>), <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br />
<br />
Genghis Khan, <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br />
<br />
Gentry in politics, <a href="#Page_106">106</a><br />
<br />
George, Henry, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a><br />
<br />
Germany, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br />
<br />
Glossary, <a href="#Page_423">423</a>-<a href="#Page_433">433</a><br />
<br />
Gold-washing, <a href="#Page_228">228</a><br />
<br />
Government-owned corporations, <a href="#Page_90">90</a><br />
<br />
Government, nature of, <a href="#Page_211">211</a><br />
<br />
Government organization: chart, <a href="#Page_330">330</a><br />
<br />
Grants in aid to the provinces, <a href="#Page_109">109</a><br />
<br />
Grass cloth, <a href="#Page_228">228</a><br />
<br />
Great Revolution, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a><br />
<br />
Green Gang, <a href="#Page_261">261</a><br />
<br />
Groups of households (<i>chia</i>), <a href="#Page_107">107</a><br />
<br />
Guerrillas:<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">areas, <a href="#Page_372">372</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">governments, <a href="#Page_116">116</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the Military Affairs Commission, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the National Salvationists, <a href="#Page_177">177</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">schools, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">strategy, <a href="#Page_12">12</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">warfare, <a href="#Page_310">310</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">zones under Chungking, <a href="#Page_64">64</a></span><br />
<br />
Guilds, <a href="#Page_10">10</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Han dynasty, <a href="#Page_3">3</a><br />
<br />
Han Fu-ch'u, <a href="#Page_202">202</a><br />
<br />
Hankow, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a><br />
<br />
Hanson, Haldore, <a href="#Page_116">116</a><br />
<br />
Hedin, Sven, <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br />
<br />
Highway system, <a href="#Page_93">93</a><br />
<br />
Hitler, Adolf, <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br />
<br />
Hong Kong, <a href="#Page_4">4</a><br />
<br />
Honolulu, Sun Yat-sen in, <a href="#Page_243">243</a><br />
<br />
Hopei-Chahar Political Council, <a href="#Page_195">195</a><br />
<br />
Hopei-Chahar-Shansi Border Region (<i>Chin-ch'a-ch'i Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i>), Provisional, Administrative Committee of, <a href="#Page_116">116</a><br />
<br />
Ho Ying-chin, <a href="#Page_63">63</a><br />
<br />
<i>Hsiang</i> (or <i>chên</i>; "community"), <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a><br />
<br />
<i>Hsiang</i> guild, <a href="#Page_393">393</a><br />
<br />
<i>Hsiao-tsu</i> ("small group") training program, <a href="#Page_354">354</a><br />
<br />
<i>Hsien</i> ("county" or district), <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">area, <a href="#Page_391">391</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">definition of problems by Chiang K'ai-shek, <a href="#Page_388">388</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">experimental, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">governments, <a href="#Page_391">391</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">organizations of the Communists, <a href="#Page_364">364</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">regulations (text), <a href="#Page_324">324</a></span><br />
<br />
<i>Hsin Min Chu I</i>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a><br />
<br />
<i>Hsin Min Hui</i>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a><br />
<br />
Huang, J. L., <a href="#Page_149">149</a><br />
<br />
Huang Hsing, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a><br />
<br />
<i>Huangpu</i> (Whampoa) Academy and political group, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a><br />
<br />
Huapeikuo, <a href="#Page_194">194</a><br />
<br />
Hu Han-min, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a><br />
<br />
<i>Hui-i</i> (a legislative "council"; <i>see</i> level of government concerned)<br />
<br />
Hull, Cordell, <a href="#Page_278">278</a><br />
<br />
Hunan, <a href="#Page_19">19</a><br />
<br />
Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, <a href="#Page_241">241</a><br />
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_441" id="Page_441">[Pg 441]</a></span><br />
Hu Shih, <a href="#Page_215">215</a><br />
<br />
Hypo-colony, <a href="#Page_190">190</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<i>I</i> (ethics), <a href="#Page_150">150</a><br />
<br />
Ideological control, <a href="#Page_251">251</a><br />
<br />
<i>I Ho Ch'üan</i> (Boxers), <a href="#Page_237">237</a><br />
<br />
Impeachment, <a href="#Page_313">313</a><br />
<br />
Impeachment, proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_293">293</a><br />
<br />
"In accordance with law," <a href="#Page_26">26</a><br />
<br />
Incident, <a href="#Page_11">11</a><br />
<br />
Income taxes, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br />
<br />
Indirect rule, <a href="#Page_183">183</a><br />
<br />
Indo-China, <a href="#Page_183">183</a><br />
<br />
Indusco (<i>see</i> C.I.C.)<br />
<br />
Industrial cooperatives (<i>see</i> C.I.C.)<br />
<br />
Inheritance, the Chinese political, <a href="#Page_1">1</a><br />
<br />
Inheritance taxes, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br />
<br />
Inner Mongolia, Federated Autonomous Government of (<i>Mêng-ku Lien-ho Tzŭ-chih Chêng-fu</i>), <a href="#Page_192">192</a><br />
<br />
Inner Mongolia and Chungking, <a href="#Page_85">85</a><br />
<br />
Inspection systems, <a href="#Page_108">108</a><br />
<br />
Institute of National Culture, <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br />
<br />
Intellectual traditionalism, <a href="#Page_251">251</a><br />
<br />
Interior, Ministry of (<i>Nei-chêng Pu</i>), <a href="#Page_82">82</a><br />
<br />
Internal revenue, <a href="#Page_88">88</a><br />
<br />
<i>International Development of China, The</i>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a><br />
<br />
International relations (<i>see</i> diplomacy, foreign policy, etc.)<br />
<br />
Interpretation of statutes and ordinances: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_291">291</a><br />
<br />
Invasion, period of, <a href="#Page_5">5</a><br />
<br />
Italy, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Japanese:<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">aims in China, <a href="#Page_184">184</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">army, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">army as a Chinese government, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">attitudes to Chinese foreign policy, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Imperial Government in China, <a href="#Page_183">183</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">prospects in China, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">recognition of Wang Ch'ing-wei, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">role of the army, <a href="#Page_183">183</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">subsidiary Chinese governments (<i>see</i> Pro-Japanese Groups)</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">training of Chiang K'ai-shek, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></span><br />
<br />
Japan's puppets or Japanophiles (<i>see</i> Pro-Japanese Groups)<br />
<br />
<i>Joint inspection</i>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a><br />
<br />
Judicial <i>Yüan</i> (<i>Ssŭ-fa Yüan</i>), <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a><br />
<br />
Justice, Ministry of (<i>Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng Pu</i>), <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a><br />
<br />
<br />
K'an Nai-kuang, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a><br />
<br />
Kang Tê, Emperor of Manchoukuo, the (<i>see</i> Chin P'u-yi)<br />
<br />
Kao Tsung-wu, <a href="#Page_198">198</a><br />
<br />
Kentwell, L. K., <a href="#Page_205">205</a><br />
<br />
Kialing river, <a href="#Page_18">18</a><br />
<br />
Kiang Kang-hu, <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br />
<br />
Kiangsi, <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br />
<br />
Korea, <a href="#Page_189">189</a><br />
<br />
Kung, H. H., <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a><br />
<br />
Kung, Mme. H. H. (Ai-ling Soong), <a href="#Page_248">248</a><br />
<br />
Kung so, <a href="#Page_393">393</a><br />
<br />
<i>Kuo-chia Chu-i P'ai</i> (<i>La Jeunesse</i> party), <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br />
<br />
Kuomintang:<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">appraisal of, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">army connections, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">attitude toward Communists, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Bolshevik pattern of organization, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">bureaucracy, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">central administrative structure, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Central Control Committee (<i>Chung-yang Chien-ch'a Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Central Executive Committee (<i>Chung-yang Chih-hsing Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Central Political Institute (<i>Chung-yang Chêng-chih Hsüeh-hsiao</i>), <a href="#Page_134">134</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Central Publicity Board (<i>see</i> Publicity, Party-Ministry of)</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Central Training Committee (<i>Hsün-lien Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_133">133</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">chart of field organization, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">chart of central organization, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">chart of general structure, <a href="#Page_331">331</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the Ch'ên brothers, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the Communists, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></span><br />
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_442" id="Page_442">[Pg 442]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Congress (<i>Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao Ta-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_57">57</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">constitutional status, <a href="#Page_124">124</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">democratic outlook, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and economic classes, <a href="#Page_135">135</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Emergency Session of the Party Congress, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>hsiao-tsu</i> ("small-group"), <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">intra-Party politics, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">membership, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">monopoly of government, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">organization, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"Orthodox" fraction, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Party cell, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Party Chief (<i>Tsung-ts'ai</i>), <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Party Congress (<i>see</i> Congress)</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Party Constitution, <a href="#Page_125">125</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Party democracy, <a href="#Page_124">124</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Party-Ministries, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Party purges, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in the People's Political Council, <a href="#Page_76">76</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">policy toward Communist Party, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">purposes, <a href="#Page_125">125</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"Reorganized" fraction, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">rivalry with Communists in the Northwest, <a href="#Page_135">135</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"small-group" (<i>see hsiao-tsu</i>)</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Supreme National Defense Council (<i>Kuo-fang Tsui-kao Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_132">132</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Training Corps (<i>Hsün-lien T'uan</i>), <a href="#Page_133">133</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Wang Ch'ing-wei, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Youth Corps (<i>see San Min Chu I</i> Youth Corps)</span><br />
<br />
Kwangsi province, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a><br />
<br />
Kwangtung province, <a href="#Page_102">102</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Labor:<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">law, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></span><br />
<br />
<i>La Jeunesse</i> (Parti ... de la jeune Chine; <i>Kuo-chia Chu-i P'ai</i>), <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br />
<br />
Land problem:<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_296">296</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">reform, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></span><br />
<br />
Landlords, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a><br />
<br />
<i>Lao-pai-hsing</i> (the common people), <a href="#Page_236">236</a><br />
<br />
Lattimore, Owen, <a href="#Page_3">3</a><br />
<br />
Law: the term, <a href="#Page_299">299</a><br />
<br />
<i>Laws Governing the System of Organization of the National Government of the Republic of China</i> (1925), <a href="#Page_23">23</a><br />
<br />
<i>Laws Governing the System of Organization of the National Government</i> (1931), <a href="#Page_24">24</a><br />
<br />
Leader (<i>Tsung-li</i>), <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br />
<br />
League of Nations Union, <a href="#Page_234">234</a><br />
<br />
Left Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_264">264</a><br />
<br />
Leftists and Leftism, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a><br />
<br />
Legal Adviser to the National Government (<i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu Fa-lü Ku-wên</i>), <a href="#Page_54">54</a><br />
<br />
Legal tender notes (<i>fa pi</i>), <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a><br />
<br />
Legislative <i>Yüan</i> (<i>Li-fa Yüan</i>): function, <a href="#Page_65">65</a><br />
<br />
Members (<i>Li-fa Wei-yüan</i>), <a href="#Page_66">66</a><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a></span><br />
<br />
<i>Li</i> (ideological conformity), <a href="#Page_150">150</a><br />
<br />
<i>Li chih</i> (government by <i>li</i>), <a href="#Page_33">33</a><br />
<br />
Liang, Hubert, <a href="#Page_224">224</a><br />
<br />
<i>Lien</i> (integrity), <a href="#Page_150">150</a><br />
<br />
Li Hung-chang, <a href="#Page_189">189</a><br />
<br />
Li Li-san, <a href="#Page_163">163</a><br />
<br />
Linebarger, Paul M. W., <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a><br />
<br />
Lin Pai-shêng, <a href="#Page_198">198</a><br />
<br />
Lin Shên (Lin Sen; Lim Sun), <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a><br />
<br />
Li Shêng-wu, <a href="#Page_206">206</a><br />
<br />
Literacy, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a><br />
<br />
Liu, K. P., <a href="#Page_224">224</a><br />
<br />
Local finance, <a href="#Page_402">402</a><br />
<br />
Local government (<i>see also hsien</i>):<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">appraisals, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">chart, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chiang K'ai-shek's comment, <a href="#Page_397">397</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">general role, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">under the <i>Hsien Fa</i>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional reforms, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in the recent past, <a href="#Page_104">104</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">reform of, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></span><br />
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_443" id="Page_443">[Pg 443]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 1em;">reform under the Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">reform methods, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></span><br />
<br />
Long March of the Chinese Reds, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br />
<br />
Long-Range Diplomatic Orientation, China's, <a href="#Page_418">418</a><br />
<br />
Lung Yün, <a href="#Page_101">101</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Mahayana Buddhism, <a href="#Page_259">259</a><br />
<br />
Mail censorship, <a href="#Page_95">95</a><br />
<br />
Main Office of the Military Affairs Commission, <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br />
<br />
Malaysia, <a href="#Page_183">183</a><br />
<br />
Malraux, André, <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br />
<br />
Manchoukuo, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a><br />
<br />
Manchoukuo-Outer Mongol war, <a href="#Page_19">19</a><br />
<br />
Manchu Empire of China (Ch'ing dynasty), <a href="#Page_5">5</a><br />
<br />
Manchuria, <a href="#Page_89">89</a><br />
<br />
Manchus, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a><br />
<br />
Mao Tsê-tung, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_403">403</a>-<a href="#Page_417">417</a><br />
<br />
Marx, Karl, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a><br />
<br />
Marxism, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a><br />
<br />
Marxism and Chinese history, <a href="#Page_165">165</a><br />
<br />
Marxism-Leninism, <a href="#Page_84">84</a><br />
<br />
Marxist effect on the <i>San Min Chu I</i>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a><br />
<br />
Mass:<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">action, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">education, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">literacy movement, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">marriages, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">mobilization, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">movements, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">singing, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></span><br />
<br />
Material and Resources Control and Supervision Ministry, <a href="#Page_91">91</a><br />
<br />
Mayor (<i>Shih-chang</i>), <a href="#Page_104">104</a><br />
<br />
Mayors under the proposed constitution, <a href="#Page_295">295</a><br />
<br />
Mazzini, <a href="#Page_241">241</a><br />
<br />
Miao Ping, <a href="#Page_194">194</a><br />
<br />
Migration of schools, <a href="#Page_83">83</a><br />
<br />
Migrations, <a href="#Page_88">88</a><br />
<br />
Militarism in the provinces, <a href="#Page_100">100</a><br />
<br />
Military Advisory Council (<i>Chün-shih Ts'an-i-yüan</i>), <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br />
<br />
Military affairs, <a href="#Page_310">310</a><br />
<br />
Military Affairs Commission (<i>Chün-shih Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a><br />
<br />
Military governor (<i>tuchün</i>), <a href="#Page_99">99</a><br />
<br />
Military jurisdiction under the <i>Hsien Fa</i>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br />
<br />
Military policy, <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br />
<br />
Military service under the <i>Hsien Fa</i>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a><br />
<br />
Military unification, <a href="#Page_6">6</a><br />
<br />
Militia, <a href="#Page_393">393</a><br />
<br />
<i>Min-ch'üan chu-i</i> (<i>see</i> Democracy, Sun Yat-sen, and <i>San Min Chu I</i>)<br />
<br />
<i>Min shêng chu-i</i>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br />
<br />
<i>Min ts'u chu-i</i> (<i>see</i> Nationalism, Sun Yat-sen, and <i>San Min Chu I</i>)<br />
<br />
Ming Emperors, <a href="#Page_249">249</a><br />
<br />
Minister (<i>Pu Chang</i>), <a href="#Page_96">96</a><br />
<br />
Ministry of —— (<i>see</i> name of Ministry)<br />
<br />
Ministries, <a href="#Page_81">81</a><br />
<br />
Minor parties:<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and constitutionalism, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">at Nanking, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in occupied China, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">representation, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">status, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></span><br />
<br />
Minority democracy, <a href="#Page_41">41</a><br />
<br />
Mobilization, economic, <a href="#Page_86">86</a><br />
<br />
Model <i>hsien</i>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a><br />
<br />
Modernization of West China, <a href="#Page_89">89</a><br />
<br />
Mohammed, <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br />
<br />
Monarchist legitimism, <a href="#Page_184">184</a><br />
<br />
Morale, governmental, <a href="#Page_236">236</a><br />
<br />
Moscow (<i>see</i> Communism)<br />
<br />
Moslem rebellions, <a href="#Page_213">213</a><br />
<br />
Motor communications, <a href="#Page_93">93</a><br />
<br />
Motor fuel trade, <a href="#Page_90">90</a><br />
<br />
Municipal Advisory Assembly (<i>Shih Ts'an-i-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a><br />
<br />
Municipal food stores, <a href="#Page_90">90</a><br />
<br />
Municipal government, <a href="#Page_103">103</a><br />
<br />
Municipal People's Political Council (<i>see</i> Municipal Advisory Assembly)<br />
<br />
Municipalities under the <i>Hsien Fa</i>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a><br />
<br />
Munitions, <a href="#Page_90">90</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Nanking, capture of, <a href="#Page_14">14</a><br />
<br />
Nanking regimes (<i>see</i> Reorganized Government; Reformed Government)<br />
<br />
Napoleon, <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br />
<br />
"National" (<i>see also</i> "People's," "Chinese")<br />
<br />
National Aviation Commission, <a href="#Page_63">63</a><br />
<br />
National capital in the <i>Hsien Fa</i>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br />
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_444" id="Page_444">[Pg 444]</a></span><br />
National [Constituent] Congress (<i>Kuo-min Ta-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a><br />
<br />
National Congress: election of representatives, <a href="#Page_302">302</a><br />
<br />
National Congress: system of organization, <a href="#Page_300">300</a><br />
<br />
National Government (<i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu</i>): the term, <a href="#Page_52">52</a><br />
<br />
National Government Committee (<i>see</i> Council of State)<br />
<br />
National Health Administration (<i>Wei-shêng Shu</i>), <a href="#Page_83">83</a><br />
<br />
National Institute of Rural Reconstruction, <a href="#Page_220">220</a><br />
<br />
National Military Council (<i>see</i> Military Affairs Commission)<br />
<br />
National People's Convention (<i>Kuo-min Hui-i</i>), <a href="#Page_7">7</a><br />
<br />
National Relief Commission (<i>Chên-chi Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_92">92</a><br />
<br />
National Salvation (<i>Chiu Kuo</i>) movement, <a href="#Page_175">175</a><br />
<br />
National Socialism (German), <a href="#Page_252">252</a><br />
<br />
National Socialist Party (<i>Kuo-chia Shê-hui Tang</i>), <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br />
<br />
National Spiritual Mobilization (<i>Kuo-min Ching-shên Tsung-tung-yüan</i>), <a href="#Page_157">157</a><br />
<br />
National treasury, <a href="#Page_88">88</a><br />
<br />
Nationalism (<i>min ts'u</i>), theory of, <a href="#Page_252">252</a><br />
<br />
Negrin, <a href="#Page_15">15</a><br />
<br />
Neighborhood (<i>pao</i>), <a href="#Page_107">107</a><br />
<br />
Nêng (ability), <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br />
<br />
New Fourth Army (<i>Hsin-ssŭ-chün</i>), <a href="#Page_119">119</a><br />
<br />
New Life Movement (<i>Hsin Shêng-huo Yün-tung</i>), <a href="#Page_149">149</a><br />
<br />
New Life Secretaries' Camp, <a href="#Page_155">155</a><br />
<br />
New Life Students Rural Summer Service Corps, <a href="#Page_154">154</a><br />
<br />
New Order in East Asia, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a><br />
<br />
News services, <a href="#Page_137">137</a><br />
<br />
North China, <a href="#Page_14">14</a><br />
<br />
North Shensi (<i>see also</i> Frontier Area), <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br />
<br />
Northeastern Clique (<i>Tungpei P'ai</i>), <a href="#Page_76">76</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Occupied China:<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chungking control over, <a href="#Page_64">64</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">missions, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">poverty, <a href="#Page_92">92</a></span><br />
<br />
Office of Civil Affairs (<i>Wên-kuan Ch'u</i>), <a href="#Page_54">54</a><br />
<br />
Office of Military Affairs (<i>Tsan-chün Ch'u</i>), <a href="#Page_54">54</a><br />
<br />
Office of the Naval Commander-in-Chief (<i>Hai-chün Tsung-ssŭ-ling-pu</i>), <a href="#Page_63">63</a><br />
<br />
Office of Political Affairs (<i>Chêng-wu Ch'u</i>), <a href="#Page_57">57</a><br />
<br />
Officers' Moral Endeavor Corps, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a><br />
<br />
Old China:<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">economics, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">government, <a href="#Page_5">5</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">socio-economic structure, <a href="#Page_211">211</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Sun Yat-sen's theory, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></span><br />
<br />
Old Hundred Names (<i>lao-pai-hsing</i>), <a href="#Page_236">236</a><br />
<br />
Opinion, public, <a href="#Page_39">39</a><br />
<br />
Organic Law of XVII (1928), <a href="#Page_28">28</a><br />
<br />
Organization of the Kuomintang, etc. (<i>see</i> relevant group or agency)<br />
<br />
"Orthodox" Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a><br />
<br />
Outer Mongol People's Republic, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a><br />
<br />
<i>Outline of National Reconstruction</i>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a><br />
<br />
<i>Outline of War-Time Controlment</i>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a><br />
<br />
<i>Outlines of Political Tutelage</i>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a><br />
<br />
Overseas Chinese, <a href="#Page_84">84</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Pacification Commissioner (<i>Sui-ching Chu-jên</i>), <a href="#Page_100">100</a><br />
<br />
Pai Chung-hsi, <a href="#Page_102">102</a><br />
<br />
<i>pai-hua</i> (written vernacular), <a href="#Page_215">215</a><br />
<br />
Pan American airlines, <a href="#Page_93">93</a><br />
<br />
Panchen Lama, <a href="#Page_71">71</a><br />
<br />
Pan Ch'ao, <a href="#Page_81">81</a><br />
<br />
<i>Pao</i> ("neighborhood"), <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_394">394</a><br />
<br />
<i>Pao</i> schools, <a href="#Page_216">216</a><br />
<br />
<i>Pao-chia</i> system, <a href="#Page_106">106</a><br />
<br />
Paper money, <a href="#Page_86">86</a><br />
<br />
<i>Parti Républicain Nationaliste de la Jeune Chine</i> (<i>see Kuo-chia Chu-i P'ai</i>)<br />
<br />
Party Affairs Committee of the Kuomintang (<i>Tang-wu Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_133">133</a><br />
<br />
Party Chief (<i>Tsung-ts'ai</i>), <a href="#Page_41">41</a><br />
<br />
Party Constitution (<i>Tang-chang</i>):<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Communist, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_125">125</a></span><br />
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_445" id="Page_445">[Pg 445]</a></span><br />
Party dictatorship (<i>tang chih</i>), <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a><br />
<br />
Party-government relations, <a href="#Page_49">49</a><br />
<br />
Party and Government War Area Commission (<i>Chan-ti Tang-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a><br />
<br />
Party headquarters, <a href="#Page_141">141</a><br />
<br />
Party-politics, <a href="#Page_158">158</a><br />
<br />
Party-politics in the People's Political Council, <a href="#Page_76">76</a><br />
<br />
Party Supervisor's Net (<i>Tang-jên Chien-ch'a Wang</i>), <a href="#Page_141">141</a><br />
<br />
Party-Ministries of the Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_136">136</a><br />
<br />
Party's role in the constitutional system, <a href="#Page_23">23</a><br />
<br />
Peasant rebellions, <a href="#Page_4">4</a><br />
<br />
Pensions Commission (<i>Fu-hsüeh Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br />
<br />
People's Advisory Political Council (<i>see</i> People's Political Council)<br />
<br />
People's Congress (<i>see</i> National Congress)<br />
<br />
People's Foreign Relations Association, <a href="#Page_234">234</a><br />
<br />
People's Political Council (<i>Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui</i>):<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">competence, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">election, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">function of representation, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">membership, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">nominations, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">practicality, <a href="#Page_74">74</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">procedure, <a href="#Page_74">74</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in <i>Program of Resistance and Reconstruction</i>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">reorganization, <a href="#Page_75">75</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">sessions, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></span><br />
<br />
Permanent Constitution, Draft (<i>Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an</i>), <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a><br />
<br />
Personnel, Ministry of (<i>Ch'üan-hsü Pu</i>), <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a><br />
<br />
<i>Philosophy of Action, A</i>, <a href="#Page_373">373</a><br />
<br />
<i>Pi Chiao Hsien Fa</i> (<i>Comparative Constitutions</i>, by Wang Shihchieh), translated and quoted, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a><br />
<br />
Pilsudski, <a href="#Page_272">272</a><br />
<br />
Planning Committee for the Western Capital (<i>Hsi-ching Ch'ou-pei Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_56">56</a><br />
<br />
Pluralism, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a><br />
<br />
Policy-making, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a><br />
<br />
Political Affairs Department or Office (<i>Chêng-wu Ch'u</i>), <a href="#Page_57">57</a><br />
<br />
Political commissars in the army, <a href="#Page_63">63</a><br />
<br />
Political Department (<i>Chêng-chih-pu</i>) of the Military Affairs Commission, <a href="#Page_64">64</a><br />
<br />
Political laxity, <a href="#Page_251">251</a><br />
<br />
Political rights: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_285">285</a><br />
<br />
Political Scientists' group (<i>Chêng-hsüeh Hsi</i>), <a href="#Page_145">145</a><br />
<br />
Political Vice-Minister (<i>Chêng-wu Tz'u-chang</i>), <a href="#Page_96">96</a><br />
<br />
Politics of ideology, <a href="#Page_8">8</a><br />
<br />
Popular democracy, <a href="#Page_39">39</a><br />
<br />
Popular Front group, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a><br />
<br />
Popular government in the Border Region, <a href="#Page_119">119</a><br />
<br />
Population, <a href="#Page_3">3</a><br />
<br />
Poverty in occupied China, <a href="#Page_222">222</a><br />
<br />
Power (<i>ch'üan</i>), <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br />
<br />
Pragmatic utilitarianism of Sun Yat-sen, <a href="#Page_252">252</a><br />
<br />
Presidency proposed under the <i>Hsien Fa</i>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a><br />
<br />
President (<i>Yüan-chang</i>) of the Executive Yüan, <a href="#Page_56">56</a><br />
<br />
President (<i>Chu-hsi</i>) of the National Government, <a href="#Page_52">52</a><br />
<br />
Presidium of the People's Political Council, <a href="#Page_73">73</a><br />
<br />
Pressure politics, <a href="#Page_234">234</a><br />
<br />
Prime movers, <a href="#Page_229">229</a><br />
<br />
Principles of the Great People (<i>Ta Min Chu I</i>), <a href="#Page_196">196</a><br />
<br />
Private rights: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br />
<br />
Private property: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_285">285</a><br />
<br />
Privy Council, <a href="#Page_56">56</a><br />
<br />
Problems of the <i>hsien</i>: comment of Chiang K'ai-shek, <a href="#Page_388">388</a><br />
<br />
Professors' Clique (<i>Chiao-shou P'ai</i>), <a href="#Page_77">77</a><br />
<br />
<i>Program of Resistance and Reconstruction</i> (<i>K'ang-chan Chien-kuo Kang-ling</i>), <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a><br />
<br />
Pro-Japanese elements, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a><br />
<br />
Propaganda, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a><br />
<br />
<i>Proposition</i>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a><br />
<br />
Prosperity, <a href="#Page_222">222</a><br />
<br />
Protestant schools, <a href="#Page_215">215</a><br />
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_446" id="Page_446">[Pg 446]</a></span><br />
Provincial Governments (<i>Shêng Chêng-fu</i>):<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chairman (<i>Shêng Chêng-fu Chu-hsi</i>), <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">connection with central government, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">councils, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">current role, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_293">293</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Provincial People's Political Councils (<i>Shêng Ts'an-chêng-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_103">103</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">structure, <a href="#Page_102">102</a></span><br />
<br />
Provincialism, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a><br />
<br />
Provisional Constitution (<i>Yüeh Fa</i>), <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a><br />
<br />
Provisional Executive Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region (<i>Chin-ch'a-chi Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i>; <i>see also</i> Border Region), <a href="#Page_16">16</a><br />
<br />
Provisional Government of the Republic of China (<i>Chung-hua Min-kuo Lin-shih Chêng-fu</i>), <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a><br />
<br />
<i>Pu</i> (ministries or departments), <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br />
<br />
Public Administration, School of, <a href="#Page_219">219</a><br />
<br />
Public opinion, <a href="#Page_214">214</a><br />
<br />
Public service: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_285">285</a><br />
<br />
Public utilities: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_296">296</a><br />
<br />
Publicity, <a href="#Page_79">79</a><br />
<br />
Publicity, Party-Ministry of (<i>Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan Pu</i>), <a href="#Page_137">137</a><br />
<br />
Publicity of the <i>San Min Chu I</i> Youth Corps, <a href="#Page_350">350</a><br />
<br />
"Puppet states," <a href="#Page_188">188</a><br />
<br />
Purple Mountain, <a href="#Page_249">249</a><br />
<br />
P'u Yi (<i>see</i> Chin P'u-yi)<br />
<br />
<br />
Races: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br />
<br />
Radio, <a href="#Page_94">94</a><br />
<br />
Railways in Free China, <a href="#Page_92">92</a><br />
<br />
<i>Resistance and Reconstruction, Program of</i>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a><br />
<br />
Reformed Government of the Republic of China (<i>Chung-hua Min-kuo Wei-hsin Chêng-fu</i>), <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a><br />
<br />
Regeneration Club (<i>Fu-hsing Shê</i>), <a href="#Page_144">144</a><br />
<br />
Regional autonomy, <a href="#Page_8">8</a><br />
<br />
Regular troops, <a href="#Page_8">8</a><br />
<br />
<i>Regulations Concerning the Organization of the Various Classifications of Hsien</i>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a><br />
<br />
Relief, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a><br />
<br />
"Reorganized Kuomintang," <a href="#Page_200">200</a><br />
<br />
Reorganized National Government of China (<i>Hsiu-chêng Kuo-min Chêng-fu</i>):<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">affiliation with Japan, <a href="#Page_183">183</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">creation and function, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">personnel, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">practical work, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">significance to Chiang K'ai-shek, <a href="#Page_372">372</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">status, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></span><br />
<br />
Representation, function of, <a href="#Page_66">66</a><br />
<br />
Republic: the term, <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br />
<br />
Republican revolution, <a href="#Page_213">213</a><br />
<br />
Republicans (<i>Kung-ho Tang</i>), <a href="#Page_208">208</a><br />
<br />
Resident Committee of the People's Political Council, <a href="#Page_73">73</a><br />
<br />
Resist-Japan University, <a href="#Page_84">84</a><br />
<br />
Resistance, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a><br />
<br />
Revolution by three stages, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br />
<br />
Revolutionary Action Commission of the Chinese Kuomintang (<i>Chung-hua Kuo-min-tang K'ê-ming Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_178">178</a><br />
<br />
Rights, constitutional, <a href="#Page_28">28</a><br />
<br />
Roosevelt, Franklin D., <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a><br />
<br />
Rosinger, Lawrence K., <a href="#Page_81">81</a><br />
<br />
Rural education, <a href="#Page_218">218</a><br />
<br />
Rural reconstruction, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_397">397</a><br />
<br />
Rural Service Corps, <a href="#Page_154">154</a><br />
<br />
Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, (R.S.F.S.R.), <a href="#Page_188">188</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Salazar, Antonio de O., <a href="#Page_272">272</a><br />
<br />
<i>San Min Chu I</i>:<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and Chiang K'ai-shek, <a href="#Page_270">270</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">explanation and comment, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_371">371</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and <i>Hsin Min Chu I</i>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional provisons, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></span><br />
<br />
<i>San Min Chu I</i> Youth Corps (<i>San Min Chu I Ch'ing-nien T'uan</i>):<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">appraisal, <a href="#Page_352">352</a></span><br />
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_447" id="Page_447">[Pg 447]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 1em;">chart of organization, <a href="#Page_345">345</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Constitution, <a href="#Page_331">331</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">description by General Ch'ên Ch'êng, <a href="#Page_340">340</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">history, <a href="#Page_341">341</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Leader, <a href="#Page_342">342</a></span><br />
<br />
Salt gabelle, <a href="#Page_88">88</a><br />
<br />
Scholars of old China, <a href="#Page_3">3</a><br />
<br />
Scholastic bureaucracy, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a><br />
<br />
School for the Border Provinces, <a href="#Page_135">135</a><br />
<br />
Schools (<i>see</i> education), <a href="#Page_216">216</a><br />
<br />
<i>Scorched earth</i> policy, <a href="#Page_12">12</a><br />
<br />
Second Revolution, <a href="#Page_259">259</a><br />
<br />
Secret societies, <a href="#Page_10">10</a><br />
<br />
Secretariat (<i>Mi-shu-ch'u</i>), <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a><br />
<br />
Secretary-General (<i>Mi-shu-chang</i>), <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a><br />
<br />
Service Department, military (<i>Hou-fang Ch'in-wu-pu</i>), <a href="#Page_63">63</a><br />
<br />
Seven Gentlemen (<i>Ch'i Chün-tzu</i>), <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br />
<br />
Shanghai, <a href="#Page_13">13</a><br />
<br />
Sharecropping, <a href="#Page_91">91</a><br />
<br />
Sheean, Vincent, <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br />
<br />
Shên Chun-lu, <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br />
<br />
Shêng Shih-ts'ai, <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br />
<br />
Shensi (<i>see</i> Frontier Area)<br />
<br />
Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Frontier Area (<i>Shan-kan-ning Pien-ch'ü Chêng-fu</i>), <a href="#Page_112">112</a><br />
<br />
<i>Shih</i> (<i>see</i> municipality, <i>q.v.</i>)<br />
<br />
Sian affair, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br />
<br />
Sinkiang (Chinese Central Asia; Chinese Turkestan), <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a><br />
<br />
Sino-American trade, <a href="#Page_88">88</a><br />
<br />
Sino-Siberian highway, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a><br />
<br />
Small-Group Training Program, <a href="#Page_354">354</a><br />
<br />
Smith, Joseph, <a href="#Page_241">241</a><br />
<br />
Snow, Edgar, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a><br />
<br />
Social Affairs, Ministry of, <a href="#Page_96">96</a><br />
<br />
Social Movements, Party-Ministry of (<i>Shê-hui Yün-tung Pu</i>; also translated Party-Ministry of Social Affairs, Board of Social Affairs), <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a><br />
<br />
Social Democratic Party, <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br />
<br />
Social rigidity, <a href="#Page_251">251</a><br />
<br />
Social work, <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br />
<br />
Social work of the <i>San Min Chu I</i> Youth Corps, <a href="#Page_351">351</a><br />
<br />
Socialist Party, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a><br />
<br />
Soong, C. J., <a href="#Page_247">247</a><br />
<br />
Soong, T. V., <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a><br />
<br />
Soong Ching-ling, <a href="#Page_245">245</a><br />
<br />
Soong sisters, <a href="#Page_248">248</a><br />
<br />
Sovereignty: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_283">283</a><br />
<br />
Soviet China, <a href="#Page_275">275</a><br />
<br />
Soviet form of government in China, <a href="#Page_45">45</a><br />
<br />
Soviet influence in Sinkiang, <a href="#Page_101">101</a><br />
<br />
Soviet-Japanese understanding, <a href="#Page_275">275</a><br />
<br />
Soviet policy in China, <a href="#Page_171">171</a><br />
<br />
Soviet training of Chiang K'ai-shek, <a href="#Page_262">262</a><br />
<br />
Soviet Union (<i>see also</i> Communists; Marxism), <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a><br />
<br />
Speaker (<i>I-chang</i>) of the People's Political Council, <a href="#Page_72">72</a><br />
<br />
Special Administrative District of the Chinese Republic (<i>Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ê-ch'ü Chêng-fu</i>), <a href="#Page_112">112</a><br />
<br />
Special-area governments, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a><br />
<br />
<i>Special inspection</i>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a><br />
<br />
Special Regional Government ... (<i>see</i> Special Administrative District ...)<br />
<br />
Specie, <a href="#Page_86">86</a><br />
<br />
Stalemate, <a href="#Page_12">12</a><br />
<br />
Stalin, Joseph, <a href="#Page_263">263</a><br />
<br />
Stalinism (<i>see also</i> Communist Party), <a href="#Page_234">234</a><br />
<br />
State Council (<i>see</i> Council of State)<br />
<br />
State examinations: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_285">285</a><br />
<br />
State socialism, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a><br />
<br />
Steamships, <a href="#Page_93">93</a><br />
<br />
Strategy of the Chinese, <a href="#Page_12">12</a><br />
<br />
Sub-district (<i>ch'ü-fên</i>) of the Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a><br />
<br />
Subterranean minerals: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_296">296</a><br />
<br />
Sung Ai-ling (<i>see</i> Kung, Mme. H. H.)<br />
<br />
Sung Ch'ing-ling (<i>see</i> Sun Yat-sen, Mme.)<br />
<br />
Sung Mei-ling, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a><br />
<br />
Sung Tzu-wên (<i>see</i> Soong, T. V.)<br />
<br />
Sun I-hsien (<i>see</i> Sun Yat-sen)<br />
<br />
Sun K'ê (Sun Fo), <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a><br />
<br />
Sun Yat-sen:<br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">biography, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">doctrines (<i>see also San Min Chu I</i>), <a href="#Page_6">6</a></span><br />
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_448" id="Page_448">[Pg 448]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 1em;">family, <a href="#Page_247">247</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">historical role, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on imperialism, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on local government, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Provisional President, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">revolutionary technique, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">sense of mission, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">state planning, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Western training, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></span><br />
<br />
Sun Yat-sen, Mme., <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a><br />
<br />
Supreme Court (<i>Tsui-kao Fa-yüan</i>), <a href="#Page_67">67</a><br />
<br />
Supreme National Defense Council (<i>Tsui-kao Kuo-fang Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a><br />
<br />
Symbolism of government, <a href="#Page_45">45</a><br />
<br />
System of organization of the National Congress, <a href="#Page_300">300</a><br />
<br />
Szechwan, <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br />
<br />
<br />
T'ai Li, <a href="#Page_145">145</a><br />
<br />
T'aip'ing Rebellion, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a><br />
<br />
Taiwanese, <a href="#Page_187">187</a><br />
<br />
<i>Ta Min Chu I</i>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a><br />
<br />
<i>Ta-min-hui</i>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a><br />
<br />
<i>Tang Cheng Chien Chih T'u-piao</i>, cited, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a><br />
<br />
T'ang Leang-li, <a href="#Page_198">198</a><br />
<br />
Tannu-Tuva, <a href="#Page_189">189</a><br />
<br />
Tao Hsi-shêng, <a href="#Page_198">198</a><br />
<br />
Tayler, J. B., <a href="#Page_224">224</a><br />
<br />
Taylor, George, <a href="#Page_116">116</a><br />
<br />
Taxation: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_285">285</a><br />
<br />
Telecommunications, <a href="#Page_93">93</a><br />
<br />
Telegraph, <a href="#Page_94">94</a><br />
<br />
Telephone, <a href="#Page_94">94</a><br />
<br />
Têng Yen-ta, <a href="#Page_178">178</a><br />
<br />
Territory: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_283">283</a><br />
<br />
Third International (<i>see also</i> Communist Party), <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a><br />
<br />
Third Party (<i>Ti-san Tang</i>), <a href="#Page_178">178</a><br />
<br />
Three-Power Pact, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br />
<br />
Three-stage war, <a href="#Page_12">12</a><br />
<br />
Three stages of revolution (<i>see</i> Revolution by three stages)<br />
<br />
"Three principles of the people" (<i>see San Min Chu I</i>)<br />
<br />
Tibet, <a href="#Page_85">85</a><br />
<br />
Tientsin, <a href="#Page_4">4</a><br />
<br />
Tinghsien, <a href="#Page_219">219</a><br />
<br />
Tong, Hollington, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br />
<br />
Tongs (<i>tang</i>), <a href="#Page_261">261</a><br />
<br />
Township (ch'ü), <a href="#Page_107">107</a><br />
<br />
Training Committee (<i>Hsün-lien Wei-yüan-hui</i>) of the Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_133">133</a><br />
<br />
Training conferences, <a href="#Page_109">109</a><br />
<br />
Trans-Sinkiang highway, <a href="#Page_93">93</a><br />
<br />
Tridemism (<i>see San Min Chu I</i>)<br />
<br />
Trotsky, Leon, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a><br />
<br />
Truck service, <a href="#Page_93">93</a><br />
<br />
Tseng Chi, <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br />
<br />
Tso Shen-sheng, <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br />
<br />
Tso Tao-fên, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br />
<br />
<i>Tsung-ts'ai</i>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a><br />
<br />
<i>Tuchünism</i>, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a><br />
<br />
<i>Tungpei P'ai</i> (<i>see</i> Northeastern Clique)<br />
<br />
Turksib railroad, <a href="#Page_101">101</a><br />
<br />
Tutelage, period of, <a href="#Page_7">7</a><br />
<br />
Tutelary dictatorship (<i>tang chih</i>), <a href="#Page_23">23</a><br />
<br />
Types of government sponsorship, <a href="#Page_89">89</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Unearned increment, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a><br />
<br />
United Council of the pro-Japanese, <a href="#Page_195">195</a><br />
<br />
United Front, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a><br />
<br />
United States of America, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a><br />
<br />
Universal Trading Corporation, <a href="#Page_88">88</a><br />
<br />
Urban pattern of local government, <a href="#Page_104">104</a><br />
<br />
<i>Utterances on Reconstruction, The Party Chief's (Tsung-ts'ai Chien-kuo Yen-lun Hsüan-chi)</i>, quoted, <a href="#Page_33">33</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Vayo, Julio Alvarez del, <a href="#Page_15">15</a><br />
<br />
Vice-President of a <i>Yüan (Fu-yüan-chang)</i>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a><br />
<br />
Vocational education, <a href="#Page_217">217</a><br />
<br />
Vocational Educationists' Clique (<i>Ch'ê-yeh Chiao-yü P'ai</i>), <a href="#Page_77">77</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Wang Ch'ing-wei, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_372">372</a><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">agreements with the Japanese, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">flight from Chungking, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">following, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">record of schism, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 1em;">significance, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></span><br />
<br />
Wang Ch'ung-hui, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_418">418</a><br />
<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_449" id="Page_449">[Pg 449]</a></span><br />
Wang K'ê-min, <a href="#Page_194">194</a><br />
<br />
Wang Ming, <a href="#Page_257">257</a><br />
<br />
Wang Shih-chieh, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a><br />
<br />
<i>Wang Tao</i>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a><br />
<br />
War Area Service Corps, <a href="#Page_154">154</a><br />
<br />
War finance, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br />
<br />
War, Ministry of (<i>Chün-chêng-pu</i>), <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a><br />
<br />
War: the term, <a href="#Page_11">11</a><br />
<br />
War-time Controlment, Outline of, <a href="#Page_313">313</a><br />
<br />
Washington, George, <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br />
<br />
Water-conservancy regions, <a href="#Page_4">4</a><br />
<br />
Western imperialism, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a><br />
<br />
Western states, <a href="#Page_3">3</a><br />
<br />
Whampoa (<i>see Huangpu</i>)<br />
<br />
<i>What I Mean By Action</i>, <a href="#Page_373">373</a><br />
<br />
William, Maurice, <a href="#Page_254">254</a><br />
<br />
Wireless, <a href="#Page_94">94</a><br />
<br />
Women's Advisory Council of the New Life Movement, <a href="#Page_155">155</a><br />
<br />
Wong Wen-hao, <a href="#Page_91">91</a><br />
<br />
Wool, <a href="#Page_227">227</a><br />
<br />
Workers' living conditions: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_296">296</a><br />
<br />
World federation, <a href="#Page_371">371</a><br />
<br />
World government: comment of Chiang, <a href="#Page_281">281</a><br />
<br />
Wounded Soldiers' League, <a href="#Page_155">155</a><br />
<br />
Wu, Dr. John C. H., <a href="#Page_26">26</a><br />
<br />
Wu-han government, <a href="#Page_15">15</a><br />
<br />
Wu Pei-fu, <a href="#Page_198">198</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Yang Kan-tao, <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br />
<br />
Yangtze, <a href="#Page_18">18</a><br />
<br />
Yeh Ch'u-tsang, <a href="#Page_137">137</a><br />
<br />
Yen, Dr. James Y. C, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a><br />
<br />
Yenan, <a href="#Page_115">115</a><br />
<br />
Yin Ju-kêng, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a><br />
<br />
Y. M. C. A., <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a><br />
<br />
Young, Brigham, <a href="#Page_241">241</a><br />
<br />
<i>Yüan</i>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a><br />
<br />
<i>Yüan-chang</i>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a><br />
<br />
Yüan Shih-k'ai, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a><br />
<br />
Yü Yu-jên, <a href="#Page_145">145</a><br />
<br />
Yünnan, <a href="#Page_101">101</a><br />
<br />
<br />
Zinoviev, G., <a href="#Page_164">164</a><br />
</div>
<hr class="chap" />
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<div class="transnote">
<h2>TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE:</h2>
<p>Obvious printer's errors have been corrected.</p>
<p>Inconsistent spellings have been kept, as well as inconsistent use of
hyphens (<i>e.g.</i>, "war-time," "wartime," and "war time"), inconsistent
use of space in contractions (<i>e.g.</i>, "C. E. C." and "C.E.C.") and
inconsistent Chinese transcription (<i>e.g.</i>, "Chün-tzŭ" and
"Chüntzu").</p>
</div>
<p> </p>
<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 50465 ***</div>
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