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If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - - -Title: History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol. III (of 3) - Third Edition - - -Author: Sir John William Kaye - - - -Release Date: October 30, 2015 [eBook #50342] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - - -***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, -VOL. III (OF 3)*** - - -E-text prepared by Giovanni Fini, Brian Coe, and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images generously made -available by Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries -(https://archive.org/details/toronto) - - - -Note: Images of the original pages are available through - Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries. See - https://archive.org/details/historyofwarinaf03kayeuoft - - - Project Gutenberg has the other two volumes of this work. - Volume I: see http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/48083 - Volume II: see http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/49447 - - -Transcriber’s note: - - Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_). - - Text enclosed by equal signs is in bold face (=bold=). - - - - - -HISTORY OF THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN. - -by - -JOHN WILLIAM KAYE, F.R.S. - -Third Edition. - -In Three Volumes. - -VOL. III. - - - - - - - -London: -Wm. H. Allen & Co., 13, Waterloo Place, -Publishers to the India Office. -1874. - -London. -Printed by W. Clowes and Sons, Stamford Street -and Charing Cross. - - - - -CONTENTS. - - - BOOK VII. - - - CHAPTER I. - - [1841-1842.] - - PAGE - - Efforts at Retrieval—Close of Lord Auckland’s Administration - —Embarrassments of his Position—Opinions of Sir Jasper - Nicolls—Efforts of Mr. George Clerk—Despatch of the First - Brigade—Appointment of General Pollock—Despatch of the - Second Brigade—Expected Arrival of Lord Ellenborough—Further - Embarrassments 1 - - CHAPTER II. - - [January-April: 1842.] - - The Halt at Peshawur—Position of Brigadier Wild—His Difficulties - —Conduct of the Sikhs—Attempt on Ali-Musjid—Failure of the - Brigade—Arrival of General Pollock—State of the Force—Affairs - at Jellalabad—Correspondence between Sale and Pollock 34 - - CHAPTER III. - - THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. - - [January-March: 1842.] - - Situation of the Garrison—Letters from Shah Soojah—Question of - Capitulation—Councils of War—Final Resolution—Earthquake at - Jellalabad—Renewal of the Works—Succours expected 53 - - CHAPTER IV. - - [April, 1842.] - - The Forcing of the Khybur Pass—State of the Sikh Troops—Mr. - Clerk at the Court of Lahore—Views of the Lahore Durbar—Efforts - of Shere Singh—Assemblage of the Army at Jumrood—Advance - to Ali-Musjid—Affairs at Jellalabad—Defeat of Akbar Khan - —Junction of Pollock and Sale 74 - - CHAPTER V. - - [January-April: 1842.] - - The Last Days of Shah Soojah—State of Parties at Caubul - —Condition of the Hostages—the Newab Zemaun Khan—Letters of - Shah Soojah—His Death—Question of his Fidelity—His Character - and Conduct considered 103 - - * * * * * - - BOOK VIII. - - - CHAPTER I. - - [November, 1841-April, 1842.] - - Affairs at Candahar—Evil Tidings from Caubul—Maclaren’s Brigade - —Spread of the Insurrection—Arrival of Atta Mahmed—Flight of - Sufdur Jung—Attack on the Douranee Camp—Continued Hostilities - —Attack upon the City—Action in the Valley of the Urghundab - —Fall of Ghuznee—Defence of Khelat-i-Ghilzye—Movements of - England’s Brigade 122 - - CHAPTER II. - - [April-June: 1842.] - - The Halt at Jellalabad—Positions of Pollock and Nott—Lord - Ellenborough—Opening Measures of his Administration—Departure - for Allahabad—His Indecision—The Withdrawal Orders—Their - Effects—The “Missing Letter”—Negotiations for the Release of - the Prisoners 189 - - CHAPTER III. - - [January-April: 1842.] - - The Captivity—Surrender of the Married Families—Their Journey - to Tezeen—Proceed to Tugree—Interviews between Pottinger and - Akbar Khan—Removal to Budeeabad—Prison Life—Removal to Zanda - —Death of General Elphinstone 215 - - CHAPTER IV. - - [December, 1841-June, 1842.] - - Stoddart and Conolly—Intelligence of the Caubul Outbreak—Arrest - of the English Officers—Their Sufferings in Prison—Conolly’s - Letters and Journals—Death of the Prisoners 235 - - CHAPTER V. - - [April-July: 1842.] - - Affairs at Caubul—Elevation of Futteh Jung—Opposition of the - Barukzyes—Arrival of Akbar Khan—His Policy—Attack on the Balla - Hissar—Its Capture—Conduct of Akbar Khan—Barukzye Strife - —Defeat of Zemaun Khan—Situation of the Hostages and Prisoners 264 - - * * * * * - - BOOK IX. - - - CHAPTER I. - - [June-September: 1842.] - - The Advance from Jellalabad—Instructions of Lord Ellenborough - —The Question of Responsibility—Employment of the Troops at - Jellalabad—Operations in the Shinwarree Valley—Negotiations - for the Release of the Prisoners—The Advance—Mammoo Khail - —Jugdulluck—Tezeen—Occupation of Caubul 283 - - CHAPTER II. - - [May-September: 1842.] - - The Advance from Candahar—The Relief of Khelat-i-Ghilzye - —Reappearance of Akbar Khan—General Action with the Douranees - —Surrender of Sufdur Jung—The Evacuation of Candahar—Disaster - near Mookoor—The Battle of Goaine—The Recapture of Ghuznee - —Flight of Shumshoodeen Khan—Arrival at Caubul 313 - - CHAPTER III. - - [September-October: 1842.] - - The Re-occupation of Caubul—Installation of Futteh Jung—The - Recovery of the Prisoners—Their Arrival in Camp—The Expedition - into the Kohistan—Destruction of the Great Bazaar—Depredations - in the City—Accession of Shahpoor—Departure of the British Army 341 - - CHAPTER IV. - - [October-December: 1842.] - - Effect of the Victories—Lord Ellenborough at Simlah—The - Manifesto of 1842—The Proclamation of the Gates—The - Restoration of Dost Mahomed—The Gathering at Ferozepore - —Reception of the Troops—The Courts-Martial—Conclusion 374 - - APPENDIX 403 - - - - -THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN. - - - - -BOOK VII. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - -[1841-1842.] - - Efforts at Retrieval—Close of Lord Auckland’s - Administration—Embarrassments of his Position—Opinions of Sir - Jasper Nicolls—Efforts of Mr. George Clerk—Despatch of the First - Brigade—Appointment of General Pollock—Despatch of the Second - Brigade—Expected Arrival of Lord Ellenborough—Further Embarrassments. - - -At this time the Governor-General and his family were resident at -Calcutta. The period of Lord Auckland’s tenure of the vice-regal office -was drawing to a close. He was awaiting the arrival of his successor. -It had seemed to him, as the heavy periodical rains began slowly to -give place to the cool weather of the early winter, that there was -nothing to overshadow the closing scenes of his administration, and -to vex his spirit with misgivings and regrets during the monotonous -months of the homeward voyage. The three first weeks of October -brought him only cheering intelligence from the countries beyond the -Indus. The Envoy continued to report, with confidence, the increasing -tranquillity of Afghanistan. The Douranee insurrection seemed to have -been suppressed, and there was nothing stirring in the neighbourhood of -Caubul to create anxiety and alarm. - -But November set in gloomy and threatening. The clouds were gathering -in the distance. It now seemed to Lord Auckland that his administration -was doomed to close in storm and convulsion. Intelligence of the -Ghilzye outbreak arrived. It was plain that the passes were sealed, -for there were no tidings from Caubul. There might be rebellion and -disaster at the capital; our communications were in the hands of the -enemy; and all that was known at Calcutta was that Sale’s brigade -had been fighting its way downwards, and had lost many men and some -officers in skirmishes with the Ghilzye tribes, which had seemingly -been productive of no important results. There was something in all -this very perplexing and embarrassing. Painful doubts and apprehensions -began to disturb the mind of the Governor-General. It seemed to be the -beginning of the end. - -Never was authentic intelligence from Caubul looked for with so much -eager anxiety as throughout the month of November. When tidings came -at last—only too faithful in their details of disaster—they came -in a dubious, unauthoritative shape, and, for a time, were received -with incredulity. At the end of the third week of November, letters -from Meerut, Kurnaul, and other stations in the upper provinces of -Hindostan, announced that reports had crossed the frontier to the -effect that there had been a general rising at Caubul, that the -city had been fired, and that Sir Alexander Burnes had been killed. -Letters to this effect reached the offices of the public journals, -but no intelligence had been received at Government House, and a hope -was expressed in official quarters that the stories in circulation -were exaggerated native rumours. But, a day or two afterwards, the -same stories were repeated in letters from Mr. George Clerk, the -Governor-General’s agent on the north-western frontier, and from -Captain Mackeson at Peshawur; and the intelligence came coupled with -urgent requisitions for the despatch of reinforcements to Afghanistan. - -Though no authentic tidings had been received from Caubul, the advices -from our political functionaries, on the intermediate line of country, -were of a character not to be questioned; and Lord Auckland, who a -day or two before had received letters from Sir William Macnaghten, -assuring him that the disturbances were at an end, awoke to the -startling truth that all Caubul was in a blaze, and the supremacy -of the Suddozye Princes and their foreign supporters threatened by -a general outburst of national indignation. Afghanistan—serene and -prosperous Afghanistan—with its popular government and its grateful -people, was in arms against its deliverers. Suddenly the tranquillity -of that doomed country, boasted of in Caubul and credited in Calcutta, -was found to be a great delusion. Across the whole length and breadth -of the land the history of that gigantic lie was written in characters -of blood. It was now too deplorably manifest that, although a British -army had crossed the Indus and cantoned itself at Caubul and Candahar, -the Afghans were Afghans still; still a nation of fierce Mahomedans, -of hardy warriors, of independent mountaineers; still a people not to -be dragooned into peace, or awed into submission, by a scattering of -foreign bayonets and the pageantry of a puppet king. - -The blow fell heavily upon Lord Auckland. An amiable gentleman and a -well-intentioned statesman, he had made for himself many friends; and, -perhaps, there was not in all Calcutta at that time, even amongst the -most strenuous opponents of the policy which had resulted in so much -misery and disgrace, one who did not now grieve for the sufferings of -him whose errors had been so severely visited. Had it fallen at any -other time, it would not have been so acutely felt. But it came upon -him at the close of his reign, when he could do nothing to restore the -brilliancy of his tarnished reputation. He had expected to embark for -England, a happy man and a successful ruler. He had, as he thought, -conquered and tranquillised Afghanistan. For the former exploit he had -been created an earl; and the latter would have entitled him to the -honour. It is true that he had drained the treasury of India; but he -believed that he was about to hand over no embryo war to his successor, -and that, therefore, the treasury would soon replenish itself. The -prospect was sufficiently cheering, and he was eager to depart; -but the old year wore to a close, and found Lord Auckland pacing, -with a troubled countenance, the spacious apartments of Government -House—found him the most luckless of rulers and the most miserable of -men. - -Never was statesman so cast down; never was statesman so perplexed -and bewildered. The month of December was one of painful anxiety; -of boding fear; of embarrassing uncertainty. There was no official -information from Caubul. The private accounts received from Jellalabad -and Peshawur, always brief, often vague and conflicting, excited the -worst apprehensions without dispelling much of the public ignorance. -In this conjuncture, government were helpless. The Caubul force, cut -off from all support, could by no possibility be rescued. The utmost -vigour and determination—the highest wisdom and sagacity—could -avail nothing at such a time. The scales had fallen from the eyes -of the Governor-General only to show him the utter hopelessness of -the case. In this terrible emergency he seems to have perceived, for -the first time, the madness of posting a detached force in a foreign -country, hundreds of miles from our own frontier, cut off from all -support by rugged mountains and impenetrable defiles. Before a single -brigade could be pushed on to the relief of the beleaguered force, -the whole army might be annihilated. Clearly Lord Auckland now beheld -the inherent viciousness of the original policy of the war, and, in -sorrow and humiliation, began to bethink himself of the propriety of -abandoning it. - -What Lord Auckland now wrote publicly on this subject is on record; -what he wrote privately is known to a few. That the Governor-General, -in this terrible conjuncture, succumbed to the blow which had fallen -upon him; that his energies did not rise with the occasion, but that -the feebleness of paralysis was conspicuous in all that he did, has -often been asserted and never confidently denied. But it may be doubted -whether his feelings or his conduct at this time have ever been fairly -judged or clearly understood. The truth is, that he had originally -committed himself to a course of policy which never had his cordial -approbation, and his after-efforts to uphold which he inwardly regarded -as so many attempts to make the worse appear the better reason. It is -plain that, very soon after the occupation of Caubul had for a time -brought the Afghan campaign to a close, the Governor-General began to -entertain very painful doubts and misgivings; and that, although he -by no means anticipated the sudden and disastrous fall of the whole -edifice he had raised, he had, long before the close of 1841, repented -of his own infirmity of purpose, in giving way to the counsels of -others; and had begun to doubt whether we had succeeded in the great -object of the war—the establishment of such a friendly power in -Afghanistan as would secure us against western aggression. He must have -seen, too—for he was, in the main, a just and an honest man—that the -policy, which he had sanctioned, cradled in injustice as it was, was -continually perpetuating injustice; and he must have heard the wrongs -of the Afghan chiefs and the Afghan nation eternally crying out to him -for redress. Macnaghten complained that Lord Auckland and Mr. Colvin -were too ready to believe all the stories of the unpopularity of the -government and discontent of the chiefs and the people, which reached -them through obscure channels of information; though those channels -of information were the local newspapers, whose informants were -generally officers of rank and character. But in spite of the Envoy’s -assurances and denials, Lord Auckland had begun to suspect that there -was something rotten at the core of our Afghan policy; and something -pre-eminently defective in the administrative conduct of those to whom -its working out had been entrusted. He did not, in the autumn of 1841, -believe that any sudden and overwhelming storm would cloud the last -days of his Indian government; but he had begun to encourage the belief -that he had made a fatal mistake, and that, sooner or later, the real -character of his Afghan policy would be revealed to the world. - -But there was something more than his own doubts and misgivings to be -considered. Lord Auckland knew that the connexion he had established in -Afghanistan was distasteful in the extreme to the East India Company. -There was good reason for this. The necessity of sustaining Shah -Soojah on the throne of Caubul had drained the financial resources -of the Company to the dregs, and was entailing upon them liabilities -which, if not speedily retrenched, they might have found it impossible -to discharge. The injustice of the occupation of Afghanistan was not -confined to the people of that country. A grievous injustice was -being inflicted upon the people of India, the internal improvement -of which was obstructed, to maintain the incapable Suddozye in the -country from which he had been cast out by his offended people. No -man knew this better, or deplored it more deeply, than Lord Auckland -himself. The opinions of the East India Company upon this subject -had been well known from the very commencement of the war. But the -Court of Directors had no constitutional authority to suspend the -operations which they had not been called upon to sanction, and only -so far as they were represented in the Secret Committee had they any -influence in the Councils which shaped our measures in Afghanistan. -But no one knew better than Lord Auckland that there was scarcely -one of the twenty-four Directors’ rooms in the Great Parliament of -Leadenhall-street in which the continued occupation of the country -beyond the Indus was not a subject of perpetual complaint. - -And when he turned his thoughts from Leadenhall-street to -Downing-street, it appeared to him that there were still weightier -reasons for the abandonment of our ill-omened connexion with the -countries beyond the Indus. The Whigs had sent him to India; the -Conservatives were now in office. At the end of August the Melbourne -ministry had resigned; and Peel was now at the head of the cabinet. It -was known that the Conservative party either were, or made a show of -being, radically opposed to the Afghan policy of the government which -they had displaced. It was natural, therefore, that Lord Auckland, -who was now awaiting the arrival of his successor, should have shrunk -from committing him to any extensive measures for the recovery of our -position in Afghanistan, which, in all probability, he would not be -disposed to carry out. Whatever amount of energy the old ruler might -now throw into the work before him, it was certain that he would only -be able to commence what he must leave to his successor to complete. To -have handed over to the new Governor-General the outline of a political -scheme, just sufficiently worked out in its details to render its -abandonment impossible, would have been to embarrass and hamper him, -at the outset of his career, in a manner that would have perplexed the -new ruler in the extreme, and jeopardised the interests of the empire. -He believed that the policy of the Conservatives was nearly identical -with that of the East India Company, and that they would eagerly -take advantage of the present crisis to sever our connexion with the -countries beyond the Indus, and to declare the failure of the original -scheme propounded in the Simlah manifesto of 1838. - -It is right that Lord Auckland should have ample credit for suffering -these important considerations to exercise their due influence over -his counsels. It is right, too, that it should be clearly recognised -how great was the moral courage it demanded, either practically to -declare by himself, or to leave to others to declare, the utter -failure of a great political scheme for which he was responsible to -his country, and with which, from generation to generation, his name -will be indissolubly associated in history. But when all this has been -said, there still remains to be recorded the humiliating fact that a -great crisis suddenly arose, and Lord Auckland was not equal to it. He -had begun to doubt the justice and expediency of the policy of 1838. -And these doubts, added to his knowledge of the views of the Home -governments, forced upon him the conviction that it had now become his -duty to direct all his efforts to the one object of withdrawing our -beleaguered garrisons in safety to Hindostan. But he seems, in the -bewilderment and perplexity which followed the stunning blow that had -descended so suddenly upon him, to have forgotten that there are in the -lives of nations, as of men, great and imminent conjunctures, which not -only sanction, but demand a departure from ordinary rules of conduct -and principles of statesmanship. Such a conjuncture had now arisen; -and, important as were all the considerations recapitulated above, -they should have given place in his mind to the one paramount desire -of demonstrating to all the nations of the East the invincibility -of British arms. Neither the wishes of the East India Company nor -the opinions of the Conservative government had been declared in the -face of a great disaster. The withdrawal of the British army from -Afghanistan might, and I believe would, have been a measure of sound -policy; but only if the time and manner of withdrawal had been well -chosen. It could never have been sound policy to withdraw under the -pressure of an overwhelming defeat. To retire from Afghanistan was one -thing; to be driven out of it was another. A frank avowal of error, -calmly and deliberately enunciated, under no pressure of immediate -danger or insurmountable difficulty, would have denoted only conscious -strength. It would have been the dignified self-negation of a powerful -state daring to be just to others and true to itself. But to abandon -the country, precipitately and confusedly, under the pressure of -disaster and defeat, would have been a miserable confession of weakness -that might have shaken to its very foundation the British Empire in the -East. - -And such a confession of weakness Lord Auckland was inclined to make. -He seemed to reel and stagger under the blow—to be paralysed and -enfeebled by the disasters that had overtaken him. His correspondence -at this time betokened such painful prostration, that some to whom he -wrote destroyed, in pity, all traces of these humiliating revelations. -It was vaguely rumoured, too, how, in bitterness of spirit, he spent -long hours pacing by day the spacious verandahs of Government House; -or, by night, cooling his fevered brow on the grass-plots in front -of it, accompanied by some member of his household endeared to him -by ties of blood. The curse brooded over him, as it was brooding -over Elphinstone and Macnaghten, darkening his vision, clouding his -judgment, prostrating his energies—turning everything to feebleness -and folly. New tidings of disaster—misfortune treading on the heels -of misfortune—came flooding in from beyond the Indus; and the chief -ruler of the land, with a great army at his call, thought only of -extrication and retreat; thought of bringing back, instead of pushing -forward, our troops; of abandoning, instead of regaining, our position. -Fascinated, as it were, by the great calamity, his eyes were rivetted -on the little line of country between Caubul and Peshawur; and he did -not see, in his eagerness to rescue small detachments from danger, and -to escape the immediate recurrence of new disasters in Afghanistan, -that the question now to be solved was one of far greater scope and -significance—that it was not so much whether Afghanistan were to be -occupied, as whether India were to be retained. But there were old and -experienced politicians, well acquainted with the temper of the chiefs -and the people of India and the countries beyond, who believed that any -manifestation of weakness, in this conjuncture, would have endangered -the security of our position in India; and that, therefore, cost what -it might, a blow must be struck for the recovery of our military -supremacy in the countries beyond the Indus. - -But from the very first Lord Auckland began to despond, and steadfastly -set his face against any measures of military re-establishment. -When, on the 25th of November, he received from Mr. Clerk and -Captain Mackeson intelligence which confirmed the newspaper accounts -received two days before, and read the pressing requisitions of those -officers for the despatch of more troops to the frontier, he wrote -to the Commander-in-Chief, who was then journeying through the Upper -Provinces of India: “It is not clear to me how the march of a brigade -can by possibility have any influence upon the events which it is -supposed may be passing at Caubul.... They may be at Jellalabad in -February, and could not march onwards to Caubul before April.... It -may be well, perhaps, that two or three regiments should be assembled -at Peshawur.... I wish the requisition had been made with less -trepidation.” Again, on the 1st of December, he wrote to the same -officer: “It seems to me that we are not to think of marching fresh -armies for the re-conquest of that which we are likely to lose.... -The difficulty will not be one of fighting and gaining victories, -but of supplies, of movements, and of carriage.... The troops in -Afghanistan are sufficiently numerous. They would but be encumbered -by greater numbers, and reinforcements could not arrive before the -crisis will have passed. If the end is to be disastrous, they would but -increase the extent of the disaster.” On the following day he again -wrote to Sir Jasper Nicolls, setting forth the views of government, -to the effect—“1st. That we should not fit out large armaments for -re-conquest—such an enterprise would be beyond our means. 2nd. That -even for succours the season is unfavourable and impracticable, and -months must pass before it could be attempted. 3rdly. That if aid can -be given, the officer in command should not be prohibited from seizing -the opportunity of affording it. I fear,” added the Governor-General -in this letter, “that safety to the force at Caubul can only come from -itself.” On the 5th he wrote to the same correspondent, that “we should -stand fast and gather strength at Peshawur”—on the Sutlej, and on the -Indus. “Our power,” he said, “of giving succour is extremely limited, -and if it come at all, it can only come tardily.... We must look on -an advance from Jellalabad for some months as utterly out of the -question. An advance even to Jellalabad could only be to give security -to Sale, and with the aid of the Sikhs, one brigade, with artillery, -should be sufficient. If all should be lost at Caubul we will not -encounter new hazards for re-conquest.”[1] On the 9th of December he -wrote, still more emphatically: “The present state of affairs, whether -its issue be fortunate or disastrous, is more likely to lead within a -few months to the withdrawal of troops to our frontiers than to the -employment of larger means beyond it.” A week afterwards he wrote, -still to the Commander-in-Chief: “We must know more before we can -decide anything, or lay down any large scheme of measures.... There -are already more regiments beyond the frontier than we can feed or -easily pay.... You know I would not be too profuse in sending strength -forward.”[2] What Lord Auckland’s intentions were at this time may be -gathered from these letters. He thought only of saving all that could -be saved; and of escaping out of Afghanistan with the least possible -delay. - -The Commander-in-Chief to whom these letters were addressed was, as -has been said, at this time on his way through the Upper Provinces of -India. Sir Jasper Nicolls had been consistently opposed to the entire -scheme of Afghan invasion, and had with rare prescience and sagacity -foretold the disastrous downfall of a policy based upon a foundation -of such complicated error. He had spent his life in the camp; but his -public minutes, as well as his private letters and journals, written -throughout the years 1840-41, indicate a larger amount of political -sagacity than we find displayed in the expressed opinions of his -official contemporaries, to whom statesmanship was the profession -and practice of their lives. He had all along protested against the -withdrawal of our troops from their legitimate uses in the British -Provinces, and urged that it was necessary either so to increase the -Indian army as to enable the government to keep up an adequate force -in Afghanistan without weakening the defences of Hindostan, or to -withdraw the British troops altogether from the countries beyond the -Indus. It was now his opinion—an opinion in which the Governor-General -participated—that, inasmuch as the Indian army, largely indented upon -as it was for service beyond the frontier, was greatly below the right -athletic strength, it would be impossible to pour strong reinforcements -into Afghanistan without weakening the British Provinces in such a -manner as to provoke both external aggression and internal revolt.[3] -But supineness, in such a conjuncture, was more likely to have provoked -aggression than activity, although the latter might have denuded -India of some of its best troops. Macnaghten told Runjeet Singh, in -the summer of 1838, that the military resources of the British-Indian -Government were such that 200,000 soldiers might at any time be brought -into the field to resist simultaneous aggression from all the four -sides of India; and although this may have been only an approximation -to the sober truth, it is certain that, if the dispatch of a couple -of brigades to Jellalabad, and subsequently to Caubul, would have -jeopardised the security of India, the military resources of the -government must have been in a very depressed state. When Sir Jasper -Nicolls, meeting the flood of intelligence from beyond the Indus, as he -advanced through the Upper Provinces of India, recorded, in letters to -the Governor-General, his belief that it would be unwise to prosecute -another war in support of the Suddozye provinces,[4] he expressed only -the sound opinion of a sagacious politician. But he seems to have -forgotten that there was something more than the restoration of the -Suddozye dynasty to be accomplished—there was the restoration of the -military supremacy of Great Britain in Central Asia to be achieved; and -whatever may have been the scruples of the statesman, in such a crisis -as this, the soldier ought not to have hesitated for a moment. - -But whilst such were the opinions of the Governor-General and the -Commander-in-Chief, there were other functionaries nearer to the scene -of action at the time, whose feelings prompted, and whose judgment -dictated, a more energetic course of procedure. Among these were Mr. -Robertson, the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, and -Mr. George Clerk, the Governor-General’s Agent on the North-Western -Frontier. Both of these able and experienced officers recognised the -paramount necessity of pushing on troops to Peshawur with the utmost -possible despatch. On the latter devolved, in the first instance, the -responsibility of moving forward the regiments which were in readiness -to proceed for the periodical relief of the troops in Afghanistan,[5] -as well as a regiment which was in orders for Sindh.[6] On the 16th of -November, he addressed letters to Colonel Wild, the commanding officer -at Ferozepore, and Colonel Rich, who commanded at Loodhianah, urging -them to send on to Peshawur, as speedily as possible, the regiments -named in the margin.[7] In compliance with these requisitions, the -64th Regiment crossed the Sutlej on the 18th of November and the 60th -on the 20th of November. The 53rd, which was accompanied by the 30th -Regiment,[8] crossed the river on the 26th. - -Having expedited the movement of these regiments, Mr. Clerk began to -make preparations for the despatch of another brigade to Peshawur, -and addressed General Boyd, who at that time commanded the Sirhind -division, on the subject. At the same time, he addressed urgent letters -to the Court of Lahore, apprising them of the intended march of the -regiments through the Punjaub—calling on them to supply boats for -the passage of the river—and suggesting to the Maharajah that he -should “cause the immediate march of his son, Koonwur Pertab Singh, on -Peshawur, with 5000 of their best troops from the neighbouring district -of Chuck Huzara.” Captain Mackeson had before applied to the Sikh -authorities at Peshawur for 6000 men to march on Jellalabad; but had -been told by General Avitabile that he had few troops at Peshawur, and -that he required them all for the protection of the Sikh territory. - -Lord Auckland, however, was strongly of opinion that the second -brigade, which was to comprise her Majesty’s 9th Foot, the 10th Light -(Native) Cavalry, and a troop of Horse Artillery, ought not to be moved -forward. “We do not now,” wrote the Governor-General in Council, on -the 3rd of December, “desire to send a second brigade in advance, for -we do not conceive it to be called for, for the objects of support -and assistance which we contemplate; and we think it inexpedient to -despatch any greater number of troops than be absolutely necessary -from our own provinces.” And two days afterwards he wrote privately -to the Commander-in-Chief: “I heartily hope that the second brigade -may not have been sent.” He could not, he added, “see of what service -it could be at present. One brigade, with the artillery which you -purpose sending, should be sufficient to force the Khybur pass; and ten -brigades could not, at this season of the year, force the passes to -Caubul.” - -But the “one brigade with artillery” never went to Peshawur. The Native -Infantry crossed the Punjaub under the command of Brigadier Wild. Some -artillerymen went with them;[9] but there was no Artillery, for there -were no guns. It was expected, however, that the Sikhs would supply the -ordnance which the British had left out of the account. “You have not -at present any guns,” wrote the Head-Quarters’ Staff to Brigadier Wild, -“but you have artillerymen, sappers and miners, and officers of both -corps. His Excellency is not aware of any difficulty likely to prevent -your being accommodated by the Sikh Governor-General, Avitabile, with -four or six pieces; and you will solicit such aid, when necessary, -through Captain Mackeson.” But when Brigadier Wild reached Peshawur, -a day or two before the close of the year, he found that difficulties -had arisen to prevent the preparation of the expected Sikh guns for -service. The artillerymen were disinclined to hand them over to the -British; and though great doubts were entertained as to whether they -were in reality worth anything, it was hard to compass a loan of the -suspected pieces. And so Brigadier Wild, urged as he was from all -quarters to push on to Jellalabad, with the provisions, treasure, and -ammunition he was to escort thither, sate down quietly at Peshawur, -whilst Captains Mackeson and Lawrence were endeavouring to overcome the -coyness of the Sikh artillerymen; and began to apprehend that his march -would be delayed until some field-pieces were sent to him from India. - -His suspense, however, was of not very long duration. On the 3rd of -January, four rickety guns were handed over to the British officers; -but not without a show of resistance on the part of the Sikh -artillerymen. On the following day, one of the limbers went to pieces -under trial; and then it had to be replaced. Other difficulties, too, -met Wild at Peshawur. His camel-men were playing the old game of -desertion. The Afreedi Maliks had not yet been bribed into submission -by Mackeson; and the loyalty of our Sikh allies was so doubtful, that -they were just as likely, on Wild’s brigade entering the Khybur, to -attack him in rear as to keep the pass open for him. All these elements -of delay were greatly to be lamented. There was a forward feeling among -the Sepoys which might have been checked. They were eager to advance -when they reached Peshawur; and their enthusiasm was little likely to -be increased by days of inactivity in a sickly camp, exposed to the -contaminating influences of the Sikh soldiery, who, always dreading the -deep passes of the Khybur, now purposely exaggerated its terrors, and -endeavoured by other means to raise the fears, to excite the prejudices -of the Sepoys, and to shake their fidelity to the government which they -served. - -In the mean while active preparations for the despatch of further -reinforcements to Peshawur were going on in the North-Western Provinces -of India. Lord Auckland could not readily bring himself to recognise -the expediency of sending forward a second brigade: but Mr. Clerk -had taken the initiative, and the Governor-General was unwilling -to disturb any arrangements which already were being brought into -effect. The 9th Foot had been ordered to hold itself in readiness, -and another regiment, the 26th Native Infantry, was to be sent with -it, accompanied by some irregular horse, and a scanty supply of -artillery.[10] The Commander-in-Chief was “not prepared” for this -demand, and the Governor-General in Council thought it “undesirable” -to send more troops in advance. But it was obvious to the authorities -on the north-western frontier that the state of affairs in Afghanistan -was becoming every day more critical; and that it was expedient -to concentrate the utmost available strength on the frontier of -Afghanistan. Towards the end of the year, the Governor-General having -expressed a strong opinion regarding the necessity of attaching some -regular horse to the brigade, the 10th Cavalry were ordered to proceed -under Brigadier M’Caskill (of the 9th Foot), who, as senior officer, -took command of the force; and on the 4th of January the brigade, -consisting of 3034 fighting men, crossed the Sutlej on its way to -Peshawur. - -To command the body of troops now assembling for service beyond the -frontier, it became necessary to select an officer of good military -repute and unquestionable energy and activity, combined with a cool -judgment and a sound discretion. Sir Jasper Nicolls had, in the month -of November, when the despatch of a Queen’s regiment to Peshawur was -first contemplated, pointed to Sir Edmund Williams, as a general -officer well fitted for such command. But to the Governor-General it -appeared expedient to place an experienced officer of the Company’s -service at the head of affairs, and Sir Edmund Williams was a general -of the royal army, who had served but two years in India at the time -of the Caubul outbreak, and who knew as little of the Sepoy army -as he did of the politics of Afghanistan. Lord Auckland had made -his election. In Major-General Lumley, the adjutant-general of the -army, he thought that he saw all the qualifications which it behoved -the commander of such an army to possess. But there was one thing -that Lumley wanted; he wanted physical health and strength. When -the Governor-General sent up the nomination to head-quarters, the -Commander-in-Chief at once replied that Lumley could not take the -command; and again Nicolls recommended the appointment of Sir Edmund -Williams. Indeed, he had determined on sending for that officer to -his camp, and arming him at once with instructions; but subsequent -letters from Calcutta made it only too plain that the appointment -would be extremely distasteful to the Supreme Government; and so the -intention was abandoned. General Lumley was at head-quarters. The -Commander-in-Chief sent for him to his tent, placed in his hand a -letter his Excellency had just received from the Governor-General -relative to Lumley’s employment beyond the frontier, and called upon -him for his final decision. The General was willing to cross the -Indus; but, doubtful of his physical ability to undertake so onerous a -duty, placed the decision of the question in the hands of his medical -advisers, who at once declared that he was totally unequal to meet “the -required exertion and exposure” demanded by such a campaign. - -The Commander-in-Chief at once determined to nominate another Company’s -officer to the command of the troops proceeding to Peshawur. His choice -then fell upon General George Pollock, who commanded the garrison of -Agra.—Receiving his military education at the Woolwich Academy, this -officer had entered the Indian army as a lieutenant of artillery in -the year 1803, when Lake and Wellesley were in the field, and all -India was watching, with eager expectancy, the movements of the grand -armies which, by victory after victory, were breaking down the power -of the Mahrattas. At the storm and capture of Dieg, in 1803, young -Pollock was present; and in 1805, during the gallant but unsuccessful -attempts of the British army to carry Bhurtpore by assault, he was -busy in the trenches. At the close of the same year he was selected by -Lord Lake to command the artillery with the detachment under Colonel -Ball, sent in pursuit of Holkar. From this time he held different -regimental staff appointments up to the year 1817, when, in command of -the artillery with General Wood’s force, he took part in the stirring -scenes of the Nepaul war. In 1818 he was appointed Brigade-Major; -and subsequently, on the creation of that appointment, held the -Assistant-Adjutant-Generalship of Artillery up to the year 1824, when, -having attained the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, he volunteered to join -the army which was assembling for the prosecution of the Burmese war, -and was nominated by Sir Edward Paget to command the Bengal Artillery -attached to the force under Sir Archibald Campbell, proceeding to -Rangoon. For his services during the war he received the decoration -of the Companionship of the Bath. From this time, except during an -interval of some three years spent in England for the recovery of his -health, he held different regimental and brigade commands, until, at -the close of 1841, being then Major-General, in command of the garrison -of Agra, he was selected by Sir Jasper Nicolls to take command of the -troops proceeding to Peshawur, and ordered at once to proceed to the -frontier by dawk. - -The appointment of General Pollock gave the greatest satisfaction -to the Supreme Government, and not even a murmur of disapprobation -arose from the general body of the army. The nomination of this old -and distinguished Company’s officer was believed to be free from -the corruption of aristocratic influence and the taint of personal -favouritism. It was felt, that in this case at least, the selection -had been made solely on the ground of individual merit. And the merit -which was thus rewarded was of the most modest and unostentatious -character. There was not, perhaps, in the whole Indian army a man of -more unassuming manners and a more retiring disposition: there was -not one less likely to have sought notoriety for its own sake, or to -have put himself forward in an effort to obtain it. Pollock’s merits -did not lie upon the surface. He was not what is called a “dashing -officer;” he shrunk from anything like personal display, and never -appealed to the vulgar weaknesses of an unreflecting community. But -beneath a most unassuming exterior there lay a fund of good sense, of -innate sagacity, of quiet firmness and collectedness. He was equable -and temperate. He was thoroughly conscientious. If he was looked upon -by the Indian Government as a _safe_ man, it was not merely because he -always exercised a calm and dispassionate judgment, but because he was -actuated in all that he did by the purest motives, and sustained by -the highest principles. He was essentially an honest man. There was a -directness of purpose about him which won the confidence of all with -whom he was associated. They saw that his one paramount desire was a -desire to do his duty to his country by consulting, in every way, the -welfare and the honour of the troops under his command; and they knew -that they would never be sacrificed, either on the one hand by the rash -ambition, or on the other by the feebleness and indecision, of their -leader. The force now to be despatched to the frontier of Afghanistan -required the superintendence and control of an officer equally cool -and firm, temperate and decided; and, perhaps, in the whole range of -the Indian army, the Government could not have found one in whom these -qualities were more eminently combined than in the character of General -Pollock. - -Hastening to place himself at the head of his men, Pollock left Agra, -and proceeded by dawk to the frontier. The second brigade was then -making its way through the Punjaub, under General M’Caskill; and the -authorities in the North-Western Provinces were exerting themselves to -push on further reinforcements to Peshawur. - -On the 22d of January, the Commander-in-Chief and Mr. George Clerk -met at Thanesur, some two marches distant from Kurnaul. They had -received the melancholy tidings of the destruction of the Caubul force; -and they took counsel together regarding the measures to be pursued -in consequence of this gigantic calamity. Very different were the -views of these two functionaries. To Sir Jasper Nicolls it appeared -that the destruction of the Caubul force afforded no reason for the -advance of further reinforcements; but rather seemed to indicate the -expediency of a retrograde movement on the part of all the remaining -troops beyond the Indus. It was his opinion—an opinion to some extent -shared by the Supreme Government—that the retention of Jellalabad -being no longer necessary to support the Caubul army, or to assist -its retreat, the withdrawal of the garrison to Peshawur had become -primarily expedient; and that, as the re-conquest and re-occupation of -Afghanistan were not under any circumstances to be recommended, it was -desirable that, after the safety of Sale’s brigade had been secured, -the whole force should return to Hindostan. But Mr. Clerk was all for -a forward movement. He argued that the safety and the honour of the -British nation demanded that we should hold our own at Jellalabad, -until the garrison, reinforced by fresh troops from the provinces -of India, could march upon Caubul, in conjunction with the Candahar -force moving from the westward, chastise the enemy on the theatre of -their recent successes, and then withdraw altogether from Afghanistan -“with dignity and undiminished honour.”[11] It was gall and wormwood -to George Clerk to think for a moment of leaving the Afghans, flushed -with success, to revel in the humiliation of the British Government, -and to boast of the destruction of a British army. Emphatically he -dwelt on the disgrace of inactivity in such a crisis; and emphatically -he dwelt upon the danger. Coolly and quietly, as one whose ordinary -serenity was not to be disturbed by any accidental convulsions, Sir -Jasper Nicolls set forth in reply that the return of so many regiments -to the provinces, and the vast reduction of expenditure that would -attend it, would place the government in such a position of strength as -would enable it summarily to chastise any neighbouring state that might -presume upon our recent misfortunes to show a hostile front against -us. The demand for more troops he would have resisted altogether; but -the urgency of George Clerk was not to be withstood, and two more -regiments—the 6th and 55th Native Infantry—were ordered to hold -themselves in readiness to proceed to Peshawur. But when Clerk asked -for a detachment of British dragoons, Nicolls peremptorily resisted -the demand, and referred the question to the Supreme Government.[12] -Before the reference reached Calcutta, the Supreme Government had -received intelligence of the massacre of Elphinstone’s army; and wrote -back to the Commander-in-Chief that it was essentially necessary that a -commanding force should assemble at Peshawur—that it was particularly -important that the force should be effective in cavalry and artillery, -and that at all events two squadrons of European dragoons should be -pushed on to Peshawur. The 1st Regiment of Native Cavalry and a troop -of Horse-Artillery were subsequently added to the third brigade. - -In the meanwhile increasing care and anxiety were brooding over -Government House. Gloomily the new year dawned upon its inmates. And -there was not in that great palaced city, or in any one of the smaller -stations and cantonments of India, an Englishman whose heart did not -beat, and whose hand did not tremble with anxiety, for the fate of the -Caubul force, when he opened the letters or papers which brought him -intelligence from beyond the frontier. No one who dwelt in any part of -India during the early months of 1842, will ever forget the anxious -faces and thick voices with which tidings were sought; questions and -opinions interchanged; hopes and fears expressed; rumours sifted; -probabilities weighed; and how, as the tragedy deepened in solemn -interest, even the most timid and desponding felt that the ascertained -reality far exceeded in misery and horror all that their excited -imaginations had darkly foretold. There was a weight in the social -atmosphere, as of dense superincumbent thunder-clouds. The festivities -of the cold season were arrested; gaiety and hospitality were not. -There were few families in the country which did not sicken with -apprehension for the fate of some beloved relative or friend, whilst -unconnected men, in whom the national overlaid the personal feeling, -in this conjuncture, sighed over the tarnished reputation of their -country, and burned to avenge the murder of their countrymen and the -insults that had been heaped upon the nation. - -It would be pleasant to record that, in this great and melancholy -crisis, the public looked up with confidence and assurance to the -statesman upon whom was now thrown the responsibility of extricating -from the quickset of danger and difficulty that environed them, the -imperilled affairs of the British Indian Empire. But history can give -currency to no such fiction. As time advanced it became more and more -painfully evident that Lord Auckland was reeling and staggering beneath -the blow that had descended upon him. He appeared to be unable to -decide upon any consistent plan of action. At one time he seems to have -contemplated the withdrawal of the Jellalabad garrison to Peshawur, -leaving it to fight its own way through the pass; at another, he seems -to have been fully impressed with the necessity of retaining the former -post, if only for the protection of the Caubul force; then he talked, -as I have shown, of concentrating a large army at Peshawur, and almost -immediately afterwards began to think that it would be more expedient -to have our advanced post at Ferozepore. There was only one point -on which he seems clearly to have made up his mind. He was resolute -not to recommend a forward movement for the re-occupation of Caubul. -He believed that any such attempt would be attended with disaster -and disgrace; and he considered that it became him, on the eve of -departure, as he was, not to embarrass his successor by inextricably -pledging the Government to measures which the new Viceroy might -consider “rash, impolitic, and ruinous.” - -On the 30th of January, the worst fears of the Government were -confirmed. An express arrived from Mr. Clerk, setting forth, on the -authority of letters received from Macgregor at Jellalabad, that -the Caubul force had been utterly destroyed. Some vague rumours of -this crowning disaster had obtained currency in Calcutta a day or -two before; and now the terrible apprehensions of the public were -found to have been only the presages of actual truth. The immediate -effect of this astounding intelligence upon the conduct of Government -was to rouse the Governor-General into something like a temporary -demonstration of vigour. He issued a proclamation declaring that he -considered the calamity that had overtaken the British arms only “as -a new occasion for displaying the stability and vigour of the British -power, and the admirable spirit and valour of the British-Indian army.” -But it was little more than a spasm of energy. The ink with which this -notification was written was hardly dry, before the Governor-General -in Council wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, that Jellalabad was not a -place which he desired to be kept at all hazards, and after succour -should have been given to Sir R. Sale’s brigade then, and relief should -have been given to parties arriving from Caubul, the Governor-General -in Council would wish General Pollock, rather than run extreme risks in -that position, to arrange for the withdrawal of it, and the assembling -of his force at or near Peshawur.[13] - -As time advanced, the retrograde tendencies of Lord Auckland’s -determination became more and more apparent. On the 10th of February, -the Governor-General in Council wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, -instructing him to inform General Pollock that, “as the main inducement -for the maintenance of a post at Jellalabad—namely, that of being a -point of support to any of our troops escaping from Caubul—having -now unhappily passed away, it is the object of the Government that -he should, unless any unforeseen contingency should give a decidedly -favourable turn to affairs, confine himself to measures for withdrawing -the Jellalabad garrison in safety to Peshawur, and there for the -present, holding together all the troops under his orders in a secure -position, removed from collision with the Sikh forces or subjects.” And -on the same day, Mr. Maddock, the chief secretary, under instructions -from the Supreme Government, wrote to Mr. Clerk that “it would be -highly desirable that when Jellalabad was no longer held by us, our -detachments, which have been moved forward in support to meet a present -emergency, should be brought gradually back to their cantonments, in -order that any ulterior operations that may be determined upon for -another advance beyond the Indus (and that towards the Khybur and -Jellalabad is probably not the one to which preference would be given) -may be undertaken after full preparation, with a complete equipment, -and in fresh and well-organised strength.”[14] - -Lord Auckland had been startled by the astounding intelligence of the -massacre of Elphinstone’s army into an ebullition of energy by no means -in accordance with the previous tenor of the measures which he had -initiated, and not more in accordance with those which were about to -emanate from him. After the first paroxysm of horror and indignation -was over, he began again to settle down quietly in the conviction that -it was best to do as little as possible on the other side of the Indus, -lest worse misfortunes should descend upon us, and the attempt to -recover our lost reputation should result only in further disgrace. - -By this time the doubts of those who had speculated on the subject of -the succession to the Governor-Generalship had been set at rest by -the arrival of the Overland Mail. The despatches received in December -announced that the choice of the home ministry had fallen upon one -of their own body; and that the East India Company had ratified the -choice. Lord Ellenborough, who had before filled and was now filling -the office of President of the Board of Control, had been appointed -Viceroy of India. The question of the succession had been canvassed -with more than common eagerness, and its solution looked forward -to with unusual interest. When the intelligence at last arrived it -took the majority by surprise. The probability of the appointment -of Lord Ellenborough had not been entertained. Sir James Graham, -Lord Heytesbury, Lord Lichfield—nay, even Lord Lyndhurst, had been -named; but speculation had not busied itself with the name of Lord -Ellenborough. - -But the intelligence, though unexpected, was not unwelcome. It -was, indeed, received with universal satisfaction. The Press, with -one accord, spoke of the appointment with approbation; and the -public confirmed the verdict of the Press. All parties were alike -sanguine—all prepared to look for good in the new Governor-General. -There is not a community on the face of the earth less influenced -by the spirit of faction, than the community of British India. To -support, or to oppose the measures of a Governor, simply because he -is a Whig or a Tory, is an excess of active prejudice wholly unknown -in India. There are no political parties, and there is no party -Press to play out such a game as this. Public men are judged, not by -what they belong to, but by what belongs to them; and thus was Lord -Ellenborough judged. Whig and Tory alike hailed the appointment: for -the new Governor-General was held in some degree of estimation as one -who had made India his study, and cherished a laudable interest in its -welfare. He was believed to be possessed of more than average talent; -to be assiduous in his attention to business; and rather an able man of -detail than a statesman of very brilliant promise. They, who thought -most about the matter, anticipated that he would make a good, steady, -peace-governor; that he would apply himself devotedly to the task of -improving the internal administration of the country; and by a steady -and consistent course of policy soon disengage the country from the -pressure of financial embarrassment which had long sate so heavily upon -it. They knew little and cared less about the personal eccentricities -which in England had been imputed to him. Neither the Press nor the -Public concerned itself about these manifestations of the outer man. -They thought of the newly appointed Governor-General as an able and -laborious man of business, with a more than common knowledge of the -history of India and the details of its administration. They knew that -not only had his occupancy, for many years, of the chief seat at the -India Board, rendered him familiar with the workings of the Indian -Government; but that, on every occasion, when Indian affairs had been -discussed in the House of Lords, in power or out of power, he had taken -a prominent part in the debates. In 1833, when the provisions of the -existing charter were under the consideration of Parliament, he had -distinguished himself as one of the ablest, but most moderate opponents -of certain of its clauses, contending in favour of the diminution of -the powers of the Indian Governors by the imposition of the wholesome -control of Council; and earnestly protesting against the perilous evil -of leaving too much to the unbridled passions or the erratic caprice of -a single man. In later days, he had denounced the war in Afghanistan, -in fitting terms of severe censure; and all things combined to render -the Indian public hopeful of a good, steady, peaceful administration. -Conservative exchanged congratulations with Liberal on the cheering -prospects, now opening out before them, of many years of peaceful -government and financial prosperity. Lord Ellenborough was believed to -be a moderate statesman—somewhat too liberal for the Tories of the -ministerial camp, but not for the modified conservatism of India, where -every man is more or less a Reformer; and as a moderate statesman all -men were prepared to welcome him. - -In October, 1841, he was elected to fill the office of -Governor-General; and on the 4th of the following month, he attended -the usual complimentary dinner, given, on such occasions, by the -Court of Directors. The report of that dinner, which reached -India simultaneously with the intelligence of Lord Ellenborough’s -appointment, had a natural tendency to increase the confidence, -engendered by his Lordship’s previous history, in the judgment and -moderation of the new Governor-General. On returning thanks, after his -health had been drunk, Lord Ellenborough, at that farewell dinner, -on the 4th of November, 1841, made a most emphatic declaration of -his intentions to govern India upon peace principles; he abjured all -thoughts of a warlike, aggressive policy; and declared his settled -determination, on assuming the reins of government, to direct all the -energies of his mind towards the due cultivation of the arts of peace; -to emulate the magnificent benevolence of the Mahomedan conquerors; -to elevate and improve the condition of the generous and mighty people -of India. He spoke, it is true, in ignorance of the terrible disasters -which soon afterwards cast a pall over the land; but there was in -the speech so clear and explicit an exposition of what were supposed -to be fixed principles, that the Public could not but rejoice over a -declaration which promised so much eventual benefit to the people of -the soil. They looked forward to the advent of the new Governor-General -as to that of a man who, at the earliest possible moment consistent -with the dignity of our position, would sever at a blow our ill-fated -connexion with Afghanistan, and devote the remaining years of his -administration to the practical development of those high principles -which he had so enthusiastically professed. - -It is probable that the nomination of Lord Ellenborough increased the -embarrassments of Lord Auckland, and strengthened him in his resolution -to suspend, as far as possible, all retributive measures until the -arrival of his successor. There was no public man in England whose -opinions, regarding the justice and policy of the war in Afghanistan, -had been more emphatically expressed than those of the Governor-General -elect. Lord Auckland knew that he was to be succeeded by a statesman -who had pronounced the war to be a blunder and a crime; and there was -a strong conviction within him that Lord Ellenborough would be eager -to withdraw every British soldier from Afghanistan, and to sever at -once a connexion which had been attended with so much disaster and -disgrace. As the responsible author of the war, this demanded from him -no small amount of moral courage. It was, indeed, to court a reversal -of the policy which he had originated, and to place the power of a -sweeping practical condemnation in the hands of a political rival. -If the conduct of Lord Auckland, at this time, were wanting in energy -and decision, it was by no means wanting in honesty. He saw that he -had committed a blunder of enormous magnitude, and he left it to -a statesman of a rival party, and an opposite faith, to pronounce -sentence upon it. - -But it was not permitted to Lord Auckland so to suspend the progress -of events, as to enable him to hand over to his successor only the -chart of a virgin campaign, to be accepted or rejected by the new -ruler, as might seem fit to him, on taking up the reins of office. It -was decreed that his administration should set amidst the clouds of -continued disaster. There was nothing but failure to be written down -in the concluding chapter of his unfortunate reign. Scarcely had he -risen up from the prostration that followed the first stunning effects -of the dire intelligence of the massacre in the Caubul passes, when -there came from Peshawur tidings that the brigade under Colonel Wild -had been disastrously beaten in the Khybur Pass. The first scene of -the new, like the last of the old campaign, was a great calamity; and -Lord Auckland, now more than ever dispirited and dejected, earnestly -longed for the day when it would be vouchsafed to him to close his -portfolio, and to turn his back for ever upon a country where sloughs -of difficulty and thickets of danger seemed to cover the whole expanse. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - [January-April: 1842.] - - The Halt at Peshawur—Position of Brigadier Wild—His - Difficulties—Conduct of the Sikhs—Attempt on Ali-Musjid—Failure of - the Brigade—Arrival of General Pollock—State of the Force—Affairs - at Jellalabad—Correspondence between Sale and Pollock. - - -The position of Brigadier Wild at Peshawur was not one to infuse -into a military commander any very overflowing feelings of hope and -exultation. He was called upon to encounter formidable difficulties -with slender means. Everything, indeed, was against him. He had four -Native infantry regiments, containing a large number of young soldiers. -They had been exposed for some time to the deteriorating contact of -the mutinous Sikh soldiery, who had done their best to fill our Sepoys -with that horror of the Khybur to which they had always abandoned -themselves. The only cavalry with the brigade was a troop of irregular -horse. The only guns were four pieces of Sikh artillery, which had a -bad habit of knocking their carriages to pieces whenever they were -fired. There was a scarcity of ammunition. Carriage was beginning to -fail altogether. It was believed that the camels had been hired at -Ferozepore to proceed as far as Jellalabad; but now the owners declared -that they had entered into no such contract, and resolutely refused -to proceed further than Peshawur. The most dispiriting intelligence -was coming in from Afghanistan. Every day seemed to add some darker -tints to the picture of our discomfiture, and to bring out in more -prominent colours the triumphant success of the Afghans. Sale and -Macgregor were writing from Jellalabad to urge the immediate advance -of the brigade; and General Avitabile was endeavouring, on the other -hand, to persuade the Brigadier that it would be dangerous to enter -the pass with the force which he then commanded.[15] The co-operation -of the Sikh soldiery, in spite of Avitabile’s exertions, seemed every -day to become a fainter probability. They peremptorily refused at one -time to proceed to Jumrood, from which point it was intended that the -operations should commence, and declared that they would return to -Lahore. Then threatening to kill Avitabile himself if he interfered -with them, they intercepted one of the guns which were moving forward -for our use, and carried it back to their lines. It was obvious, -indeed, that they desired our discomfiture more than our success; and, -in spite of the declared wishes of their Sovereign, whose sincerity at -this time is not to be questioned,[16] and the efforts of the local -governor, did everything that they could do, to render the latter the -more probable contingency of the two. The negotiations with the Afreedi -chiefs were not going on prosperously, and there was every prospect of -heavy opposition in the pass. Under such circumstances, Brigadier Wild -could only write that he was prepared to move forward whenever it was -expedient to do so, but that he could not answer for the consequences -of a precipitate advance. - -It was not, however, permitted him to remain long in doubt and -inactivity. The fortress of Ali-Musjid lies some five miles within the -entrance of the Khybur Pass, and about twenty-five from Peshawur. It -consists of two small forts, connected by a wall of little strength, -and stands upon the summit of an isolated oblong rock, commanded on -the southern and western sides by two lofty hills. It has always -been regarded as the key to the Khybur Pass; and now that it was -lying between the two positions of Sale and Wild, it was of immense -importance that it should be held by British troops or their allies. -It had recently been garrisoned by a small detachment of a local -corps, composed of men of the Eusofzye tribe—some of whom, under -Mr. Mackeson,[17] had been true to their employers, and gallantly -commanded, had gallantly resisted the attacks of the Afreedi clan. But -there was now every chance of its falling into the hands of the enemy. -Nothing appeared to be of so much primary importance as the occupation -of this post. It was resolved, therefore, that one-half of the brigade -should be pushed forward, in the first instance to seize and garrison -Ali-Musjid. - -Accordingly, on the 15th of January, Colonel Moseley with the 53rd and -64th Sepoy regiments, prepared to commence the march to Ali-Musjid. -They started under cover of the night, and reached their destination -soon after daybreak. They met with little opposition on the way; -but soon after their arrival under the rock of Ali-Musjid, Captain -Mackeson, who had accompanied the force, discovered to his dismay -that, instead of 350 supply-bullocks, for the advance of which he had -made suitable arrangements, only fifty or sixty now were straggling -in with the rear-guard. The remainder, by some mismanagement or -miscomprehension of orders, had been left behind. Thus had the two -regiments which, had the cattle come on to Ali-Musjid, might have held -that place in security for a month, shut themselves up in an isolated -fortress without provisions; and the plans which had been so anxiously -debated by our political officers at Peshawur, utterly frustrated by an -oversight of the most disastrous character, of which it is difficult to -determine on whom we are to fix the blame.[18] - -The only hope of extrication from this dilemma, without disaster and -discredit, lay in the advance of the two other regiments, with the Sikh -guns and the Sikh auxiliaries. But day after day passed, and Mackeson -and Moseley gained no certain intelligence of the movements of their -comrades. They were more than once under arms to support the coming -reinforcements; but the reinforcements never appeared in sight. Wild, -with the two regiments, had made an effort to throw supplies into -Ali-Musjid, but had been disastrously beaten in the attempt. - -Wild was to have moved forward with the Sikh auxiliaries on the morning -of the 19th of January, but on the preceding evening, at eleven -o’clock, the Sikh troops mutinied to a man, and refused to enter the -pass. They were at this time with the British at Jumrood. But when Wild -prepared to advance, they turned their faces in an opposite direction, -and marched back upon Peshawur.[19] General Avitabile sent orders to -his officers to close the city gates against the mutinous regiments; -and then shut himself up in the fort. - -At seven o’clock, the 30th and 60th regiments with the Sikh guns -commenced their march to Ali-Musjid. The enemy appeared at the entrance -of the pass and met the advancing column with a fire from their -jezails. The Sepoys at the head of the column wavered, stood still, -crowded upon each other, fired anywhere, aimless and without effect. -The officers moved forward, but the regiments did not follow them. In -vain the Brigadier and his staff called upon them to advance; they only -huddled together in confusion and dismay. The Sikh guns, when brought -into action, broke down one after the other; and the Sepoys lost all -heart. Lawrence exerted himself manfully to save the guns; but he could -not induce the men to make an effort to carry them off; and one of the -heavy pieces was finally abandoned.[20] There was nothing to be done -after this but to fall back. The Brigadier himself was wounded in the -face; several of our officers were injured; one killed. The loss among -the Sepoys was severe. It was plain that they would not advance; so the -column fell back on Jumrood, and Ali-Musjid was not relieved. - -How this disaster happened it is not easy to explain. Exaggerated -native reports of the immense hordes of Khyburees, who were assembling -in the pass, had been in circulation; and the regiments seem to have -commenced their march, anticipating such formidable opposition as they -were never doomed to encounter. The ominous intelligence from Caubul -had alarmed them. The lies spread abroad by the Sikhs had probably -alarmed them still more. The opposition was not strenuous.[21] Had the -regiments been in good heart, they would not have been beaten back. -But there was anything but a strong forward feeling among them when -they commenced their march. The defection of the Sikhs had damped their -ardour, and the breaking down of the guns now seemed to complete what -the misconduct of our allies had commenced. The first attacks of the -enemy threw the Sepoys at the head of the column into confusion; and -all hope of success was at an end before a battle had been fought. - -The two regiments that occupied Ali-Musjid might have held that post -for any length of time against the Khyburees. But they had a lamentable -scarcity of provisions. The water, too, seemed to poison them. The -troops were put upon half-rations, but, in spite of this, in a few days -the supplies were nearly exhausted. Without bedding and without tents, -kept ever on the alert, under a severe climate, and under depressing -influences, the health and spirits of the Sepoys were giving way. They -were crowding into hospital. There seemed to be no prospect of relief; -so, on the 23rd of January, Colonel Moseley determined to evacuate the -fortress of Ali-Musjid, and to cut his way back to Jumrood. - -To Mackeson, who saw clearly the political evils that must result -from the surrender of so important a position, this was a heavy -blow. Anything seemed better than the total abandonment of such a -post. A small party of resolute men might hold it; for a small party -might be fed. There were at least two men in the garrison eager for -the proud distinction of holding, in an imminent conjuncture, a -dangerous isolated post against a multitudinous enemy. Captain Burt, -of the 64th Native Infantry, volunteered to remain with a party of -regular troops; but the Sepoys would not volunteer. Captain Thomas, -of the same corps—the staff officer of the detachment—a man of -a bold and fearless nature, and of large acquirements—stepped -forward and volunteered to hold the fortress with 150 men of the old -Eusofzye garrison. The offer was accepted; arrangements were made -for the defence; but the fidelity of the Eusofzyes, which had been -long failing, now broke down altogether. They refused to occupy the -dangerous post after the departure of the Sepoy regiments; and so, on -the 24th, the entire force moved out of Ali-Musjid, and suffered it to -fall into the hands of the Afreedis. - -“The regiments are safe through—thank God!” was the emphatic -announcement which Captain Lawrence, on the 24th of January, forwarded -by express to Mr. George Clerk. It had been a time of intense and -painful excitement. The communications between the two detachments -were cut off, and anxious as they were to act in concert with each -other, they had, up to the evening of the 22nd, failed to ascertain the -intentions of each other, and to effect a combined movement.[22] On -the 23rd, the two regiments which Wild had commanded, now, owing to -the Brigadier’s wound, under the charge of Colonel Tulloch, with the -two serviceable Sikh guns, went forward to line the pass, and cover -the march of Moseley’s regiments; but no sound of an advancing column -was heard, and about mid-day they returned to camp. On the following -morning they moved out again. Moseley had quitted Ali-Musjid, and was -making the best of his way to Jumrood. The Khyburees mustered strong; -but the Sepoy corps in both detachments did their duty well and the -regiments made good their passage. Captain Wilson, of the 64th, was -killed at the head of his men; and Captain Lock, of the 60th, fell -also with his sword in his hand. There was some loss of baggage on the -retreat—some of the sick and wounded were abandoned; and the general -conduct of the affair is not to be dwelt upon with pride or pleasure. -But when the four regiments were once more assembled together at -Jumrood, in spite of the disasters of the week, a general feeling of -relief was experienced; and our officers congratulated one another, -thankful that it was “no worse.” - -Nothing was to be done now but to wait patiently for the arrival of -General Pollock and the reinforcements which were marching up through -the Punjaub. It was obvious that, without cavalry and without guns, -every effort to relieve Jellalabad must be a disastrous failure. The -want of guns was now severely commented upon. Everybody had something -to say about the remissness of those in high places, who had suffered -the advanced brigade sent for the relief of our beleaguered troops -to appear at the mouth of the Khybur Pass without a single piece of -British artillery. Brigadier Wild lamented the want of artillery: -Colonel Moseley lamented the want of artillery: Captain Mackeson -lamented the want of artillery. All were certain that the first effort -at retrieval would not have been a new calamity and a new disgrace, -if a proper complement of British guns had been sent on with the -Sepoy regiments. The omission was a great one, but it appears to have -been more the result of circumstances than of any culpable negligence -on the part of the military authorities. The four Sepoy regiments, -forming Wild’s brigade, were sent forward by Mr. George Clerk, on a -requisition from Captain Mackeson. Mackeson wrote for the immediate -despatch of the troops which, before the outbreak at Caubul, had -been warned for the ordinary relief. The regiments under orders for -Afghanistan were therefore hurried forward, and another regiment, -which was on the frontier, ordered to march with them. Expedition -rather than efficiency was then sought; and to have got artillery ready -for service would have delayed the despatch of the infantry corps. -Captain Lawrence, himself an artillery officer, saw the expediency -of despatching artillery to Peshawur, and did not omit to throw out -suggestions regarding the preparation of this important arm; but Mr. -George Clerk, who was Captain Lawrence’s official chief, and subject -only to whose confirmation that officer had any authority to call -for the despatch of troops, did not follow up the intimation of his -subordinate. “Your Excellency will have observed,” wrote Mr. Clerk to -the Commander-in-Chief,[23] “that I have limited the requisitions, -which I have presumed to make upon the commanding officers of -Loodhianah and Ferozepore, to the three infantry regiments which were -already preparing to march to Afghanistan. I consider that this is -what Captain Mackeson means in his urgent request for the despatch of -the brigade warned for the Caubul relief. I therefore have not followed -up the intimation made by Captain Lawrence to the commanding officer -at Ferozepore regarding artillery and cavalry, by requesting that a -detachment of either should move forward.”[24] - -It appears, therefore, that Captain Mackeson, at Peshawur, limited -his requisitions to the troops actually under orders to proceed, in -ordinary routine, to Afghanistan—that Captain Lawrence, at Ferozepore, -suggested the expediency of sending forward some guns, if they could be -got ready; and that Mr. Clerk, at Loodhianah, declined to endorse the -suggestion, and left it to the Commander-in-Chief to decide whether any -artillery should be sent forward with the Sepoy regiments. - -But the power of decision was not in the hands of the -Commander-in-Chief. The odium of having sent forward four Native -infantry regiments, without cavalry and without guns, has been cast -upon Sir Jasper Nicolls. But the truth is, that the regiments had -crossed the Sutlej before he knew that they had been ordered forward. -He was moving upwards towards the frontier when intelligence of the -outbreak in Afghanistan, and the consequent measures of Mr. Clerk, met -him as he advanced. On the 18th and 20th of November the two first -regiments crossed the Sutlej; and the Commander-in-Chief received the -notification of the demand for these regiments not before the 22nd. On -the 26th of November the two other regiments crossed the Sutlej; and -the Commander-in-Chief did not receive intelligence of their despatch -before the third of December. - -Thus far it is plain that no discredit attaches to the -Commander-in-Chief, or to any other authority, for not having sent -forward any guns _with_ Wild’s brigade. But the question yet remains -to be asked why guns were not sent _after_ it. Though Mr. Clerk, in -the first instance, anxious not to delay the advance of the infantry -regiments, made no requisition for artillery, he directed General -Boyd’s attention to the subject soon after the despatch of those corps, -and suggested that one of Wild’s regiments should halt on the other -side of the Sutlej, whilst the guns were proceeding to join it.[25] As -there was no available artillery at Ferozepore, it was proposed that -Captain Alexander’s troop of Horse Artillery should move at once from -Loodhianah to the former station on its way across the frontier; but -on hearing that the Commander-in-Chief had ordered some details of a -foot artillery battery to be warned for service, Mr. Clerk withdrew -his requisition for the movement of the troop beyond the frontier, -but still suggested that it should be pushed on to Ferozepore. This -was on the 2nd of December.[26] On the 4th, having heard that some -delay must attend the despatch of the details warned by orders of the -Commander-in-Chief, Mr. Clerk wrote a letter to Captain Alexander, -requesting him, as the means of more rapid movement were at his -command, to push on across the Sutlej with all possible expedition.[27] -But a few days afterwards he received a letter from Sir Jasper Nicolls, -prohibiting the despatch of the Horse Artillery; and he accordingly -apprised Captain Alexander that the request made to him on the 4th -of December for the advance of the troop was withdrawn.[28] And so, -instead of a troop of Horse Artillery being sent to overtake Wild’s -brigade, which reached Peshawur at the end of December, half of a foot -artillery battery was warned to proceed with M’Caskill’s brigade, which -did not arrive before the beginning of February. But in the interval, -Wild had been disastrously beaten in the Khybur Pass, and Ali-Musjid -had fallen into the hands of the Afreedis. - -Whatever may have been the causes of this first failure, and to -whomsoever its responsibility may attach, it is certain that its -results were of a very dispiriting and deteriorating character.[29] -The regiments remained inactive in the vicinity of Peshawur; and the -usual consequences of inactivity under such circumstances were soon -painfully apparent in the camp of Brigadier Wild. The Sepoys fell sick; -crowded into hospital; seemed to have lost all heart, and, without any -of the audacity of open mutiny, broke out into language only a little -way removed from it. Exposed to the alarming hints and the alluring -temptations of the mutinous Sikh soldiery, some began to desert their -colours, whilst others openly declared that nothing would induce them -again to face the horrors of the Khybur Pass. As General Pollock -advanced through the Punjaub, the worst reports continued to meet him -from Peshawur. Not only was he informed that the Sepoys of Wild’s -brigade were enfeebled by disease and paralysed by terror; but that -even the officers of the force were using, in an unguarded and unworthy -manner, the language of disheartenment and alarm.[30] - -On the 5th of February, General Pollock reached Peshawur; and found -that the stories, which had met him on the road, had by no means -exaggerated the condition of the troops under Brigadier Wild. There -were then 1000 men in hospital; and the number was alarmingly -increasing. In a few days it had increased to 1800; so even with the -new brigade, which marched in a day or two after the General’s arrival, -he had, exclusive of cavalry, scarcely more troops fit for service than -Wild had commanded a month before. - -An immediate advance on Jellalabad was not, under such circumstances, -to be contemplated for a moment. General Pollock had much to do, before -he could think of forcing the Khybur Pass and relieving Jellalabad. -The duties of a General are not limited to operations in the field. -When Pollock reached Peshawur he found that the least difficult part -of the labour before him was the subjugation of the Afreedi tribes. -“Any precipitancy,” wrote the Commander-in-Chief some time afterwards, -“on the part of a general officer panting for fame might have had the -worst effect.”[31] To have advanced on Jellalabad in that month of -February would have been to precipitate a strangling failure. Instead -of flinging himself headlong into the pass, Pollock made his way to -the hospitals. On the day after his arrival he visited the sick of -the different regiments, inquired into their wants, conversed with -their medical attendants, endeavoured to ascertain the causes of the -prevalent sickness, and encouraged by every means at his command, by -animating words and assuring promises, the dispirited and desponding -invalids. - -Nor was there less to do out of the hospitals. The _morale_ of the -troops was in the lowest possible state. It seemed, indeed, as though -all their soldierly qualities were at the last gasp. The disaffection -of the Sepoys broke out openly, and four out of the five regiments -refused to advance. Nightly meetings of delegates from the different -regiments of Wild’s brigade were held in camp; and the 26th Regiment -of Native Infantry, which had come up with M’Caskill’s brigade, was -soon invited to join the confederacy. In less than forty-eight hours -after the arrival of that corps, active emissaries from the disaffected -regiments were busy among the men, not only working upon their fears, -but appealing to their religious feelings.[32] The taint seems to -have reached even to some of the officers of Wild’s brigade, who -did not hesitate openly to express at the mess-table the strongest -opinions against a second attempt to force the Khybur, and to declare -their belief that very few would ever return to Peshawur. One officer -publicly asserted that it would be better to sacrifice Sale’s brigade -than to risk the loss of 12,000 men on the march to Jellalabad; and -another said that, if an advance were ordered, he would do his best to -dissuade every Sepoy of his corps from again entering the pass.[33] - -To instil new courage and confidence into the waverers was no easy -task; but coolly and sagaciously, as one who understood the cause -of their disheartenment, and could make some allowances for their -misconduct, Pollock addressed himself to the work of re-animating and -re-assuring them. He made them feel that they had been placed under -the care of one who was mindful of their welfare and jealous of their -honour—one who overlooked nothing that contributed to the health -and comfort of his men, and who would never call upon them to make -sacrifices to which he would not cheerfully submit himself. There was, -in all that he did, such an union of kindness and firmness; he was -so mild, so considerate, and yet so decided, that the Sepoys came in -time to regard him with that child-like faith which, under prosperous -circumstances, is one of their most noticeable characteristics; and -when the hour of trial came they were not found wanting. - -All through the months of February and March, Pollock and his -regiments remained inactive in the neighbourhood of Peshawur. -Mortifying as it was to the General to be compelled to halt so long at -the entrance of the Khybur Pass, no other course was open to him, at -the time, that did not threaten renewed disaster. Pollock’s position -was, doubtless, painful, but it was not perplexing. His duty in this -conjuncture was plain. The eyes of all India were turned upon him. The -safety of the gallant garrison of Jellalabad was to be secured by his -advance. Sale and Macgregor were writing urgent letters, calling upon -him to push on without delay; but it was still his duty to halt. The -Sepoys were gradually recovering both their health and their spirits. -But reinforcements were coming across the Punjab, with British dragoons -and horse artillery among them; and nothing did more to animate and -re-assure those who had been discouraged by previous failure, than the -knowledge that when they again advanced they would be supported by -fresh troops, strong in every branch, and numbering among them a good -proportion of stout European soldiers. Had the advance been ordered -before the arrival of these reinforcements, it is at least a probable -contingency that some of the native regiments would have stood fast, -and, by open mutiny almost in the face of the enemy, have heaped up -before us a mountain of difficulty, such as no prudence and no energy -on the part of a commander could ever suffice to overcome. - -Still it required much firmness to resist the pressing appeals made -to Pollock by his comrades at the other end of the Khybur Pass. He -had not been many days at Peshawur before he received a communication -from General Sale, setting forth the exigencies of the Jellalabad -garrison, and urging him to advance to their relief. The letter was -written partly in English and partly in French, as was much of the -correspondence of the time, with the view of rendering the work -of translation more difficult. But Sale so often blurted out, in -one sentence of plain English, what he had wrapped up in another of -indifferent French, that his efforts at disguise could hardly have been -successful.[34] He was too old a soldier to be very clever in such -devices, and he had been too long fighting the battles of his country -in India to write very unexceptionable French. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. - - January-March: 1842. - - Situation of the Garrison—Letters from Shah Soojah—Question of - Capitulation—Councils of War—Final Resolution—Earthquake at - Jellalabad—Renewal of the Works—Succours expected. - - -With heavy hearts did the officers of the Jellalabad garrison perform -the melancholy duties, which devolved upon them, after the arrival of -Dr. Brydon. Horsemen were sent out to explore the surrounding country, -and to bring in, if any could be found, the bodies of the dead. Hopes, -too, were entertained, that some survivors of the terrible retreat -might still be concealed in the neighbourhood, or lying wounded by the -wayside, unable to struggle on towards the sheltering walls of the -fortress. Every effort therefore was made, and every precaution taken, -to indicate to the sufferers that succour was at hand, and to aid them, -in their extremity, to reach it. The stillness of the night was broken -by the loud blasts of the bugle, proclaiming from the ramparts, to any -stragglers that might be toiling through the darkness, the vicinity of -the British camp. - -But profitless were all these efforts. The few who had escaped the -massacre in the passes were captives in the hands of the Afghans; and -the Jellalabad officers now asked one another whether the fate of the -prisoner were less to be deplored than the fate of the dead. It was -hard to believe that they who had butchered thousands of their enemies -like sheep, in the passes, would treat with kindness and respect the -few who had fallen into their hands. The only hope was, that Afghan -avarice might be stronger than Afghan revenge, and that the prisoners -might be preserved, like merchandise, and sold for British gold. - -They sorrowed for their unhappy countrymen; but there was ever present -with them the best remedy for sorrow. They had abundance of work to do. -In the midst of their grief for the destruction of the Caubul army, -it was necessary to consider in what manner that great catastrophe -affected themselves. They reasoned that, perhaps, for some days, the -Afghans would be gorging themselves with plunder; dividing the spoil; -and burying the corpses of their countrymen; but that, this done, large -bodies of troops would be released, and that Akbar Khan might soon -be expected to come down upon Jellalabad, with an overwhelming force -flushed with victory, and eager to consign them to the terrible fate -which had overtaken the British army posted at the capital. It was soon -said, that the Sirdar was organising an army, at Lughman, some thirty -miles distant from Jellalabad. It was necessary, therefore, to prepare -for his reception. - -To such good purpose had Broadfoot worked, that the defences of -Jellalabad were now fast becoming formidable realities; and the -officers said among themselves and wrote to distant friends, that -nothing but a failure of provisions, or ammunition, could give the -Sirdar a chance of carrying the place. Our fighting men, however, were -too few to man the works with good effect. Sale, therefore, embodied -the camp-followers; and thus enabled himself to employ his effective -troops beyond the walls. Day after day, foraging parties were sent -out with good results. Our great requirements were wood and grass. It -was expedient to obtain these as expeditiously as possible, for the -place might soon be invested; and then the garrison would be thrown -back entirely on its internal supplies. About the same time, all -the Afghans in Jellalabad, including 200 men of Ferris’s Jezailchee -regiment, were ordered to quit the walls, in the belief that in an -extremity they would certainly turn against us. - -Then news came of Wild’s failure. To the younger and bolder spirits in -Sale’s brigade, this was scarcely a disappointment. They had expected -little from Wild’s advance. They believed, however, that the disaster -would necessarily retard Pollock’s forward movement; and in this there -was something discouraging. But they said among themselves that they -could hold out till May, that it was then only January, and that it was -hard, indeed, if Pollock could not relieve them within the next three -months. - -But whilst everything appeared thus plain to the younger and the -irresponsible officers of the Jellalabad force, difficulties were -rising up before the eyes, and doubts were assailing the minds of the -responsible chiefs. Already had they begun to question, whether the -Government at Calcutta had any intention to make a genuine effort, on -a sufficient scale, to relieve them. All that they had heard of the -views and measures of Lord Auckland led them to the painful conclusion -that they would be left to their fate; at all events, until the arrival -of his successor. In the meanwhile, not only was Akbar Khan collecting -an army in Lughman, but Shah Soojah himself, acting perhaps under -compulsion—perhaps not—was preparing to despatch troops both to -Ghuznee and Jellalabad for the expulsion of the Feringhee garrisons. -From the Shah nothing was to be expected beyond, at best, a little -friendly delay. On the 21st of January, Macgregor received a letter -from him. It contained much about the past; it alleged that if the -Shah’s advice had not been disregarded, all would have gone well; -that he alone could now hold the country, and that he wanted nothing -from us but money.[35] This was a long, private letter—somewhat -incoherent—the work of the King himself. But another also came from -the King, as from the head of the government, asking the English at -Jellalabad what were their intentions. “Your people,” it said, in -effect, “have concluded a treaty with us, consenting to leave the -country. You are still in Jellalabad. What are your intentions? Tell us -quickly.” What now was to be done? - -The crisis was a perilous one; the responsibility was great. Sale and -Macgregor were sorely perplexed. It was plain that by continuing to -occupy Jellalabad, they could do nothing to support their comrades in -Afghanistan; for the Caubul army had been destroyed, and the Candahar -and Ghuznee garrisons would fall back, if at all, on Scinde. They were -not bound to support Shah Soojah, for the Shah himself declared that he -wanted nothing but our money, and was evidently compromised with his -own countrymen by our continued occupation of Jellalabad. The safety of -the prisoners appeared more likely to be secured by our departure from -Afghanistan than by our continuing in a hostile attitude in one of the -chief places of the kingdom. And it was at least doubtful whether the -policy of the Government at Calcutta would not be aided rather than -embarrassed by the withdrawal of the garrison to Peshawur. - -All these considerations weighing heavily on his mind, Sale determined -to summon a Council of War. On the 26th of January, the Council met -at the General’s quarters. It was composed of the commanding-officers -of the different components of his varied force.[36] The political -officer, Macgregor, was also a member of the Council. On him devolved -the duty of explaining the circumstances which had induced the general -to call them together. All the letters and documents bearing upon the -great question were read and laid upon the table. Macgregor, acting -as spokesman, declared that it was his opinion, and that also of the -General, that little was to be hoped from the efforts of Government to -relieve them. It was obvious that they must trust to themselves. Shah -Soojah appeared to desire their departure; he had virtually, indeed, -directed it. Were the members of the Council, he asked, of like opinion -with himself and Sale, that it was now their duty to treat with the -Shah for the evacuation of the country? - -Then Macgregor read to the Council the terms of the proposed letter to -the King. It set forth that his Majesty’s letter had been received; -that the British held Jellalabad and the country only for the King, and -that as it was his desire that they should return to India, of course -they were willing to do so. But that after what had happened, it was -necessary that the manner and the conditions of their withdrawal should -be clearly understood. The terms upon which the garrison of Jellalabad -would consent to evacuate the country were these: that they would give -four hostages in proof of their sincerity; that the King should send a -force to escort them in honour and safety to Jellalabad—that is, with -their arms, colours, guns, &c.; that the escort should be commanded by -one of the Prince’s own sons; and that carriage and supplies should be -furnished for our march; that Mahomed Akbar and his force were to be -withdrawn from Lughman before the British quitted Jellalabad; and that -hostages should be given by the Afghans to accompany the British force -as far as Peshawur, and there to be exchanged for our own hostages and -prisoners; these hostages to be a son of the Newab Zemaun Khan—a son -of Ameen-oollah Khan—Sooltan Jan, said to be a favourite cousin of -Mahomed Akbar—with some Shinwarree and Khyburee chiefs. - -Great now was the excitement in the Council; earnest the discourse. Men -lifted up their voices together, in vehement debate, eager to speak, -little caring to listen. Arguments were enunciated with such warmth -of language, that they lost all their argumentative force. It was -apparent, however, that the feelings of the majority of the Council -were in favour of withdrawal. There was a prevailing sense amongst them -that they had been abandoned by the Government at Calcutta; that there -was no intention to maintain the supremacy of our arms in Afghanistan; -that Shah Soojah did not wish them to remain there; and that, if -they could make their own way to Peshawur, they would best fulfil -the desires of their masters, and that their first care should be to -further the views of the Government which they served. And yet their -indignation ran high against that Government, which had abandoned them -in the hour of their need. - -But against all this there was one officer who steadfastly set his -face; who had viewed with horror and detestation the proposal to -capitulate, and flung the paper of terms indignantly on the ground. -This was George Broadfoot, of the Sappers. Eagerly he lifted up his -voice against the proposal; eagerly he declared it to be impossible -that the Government should leave them to their fate, and do nothing -to restore our lost national reputation in Afghanistan; eagerly -he set forth to his comrades that a new Governor-General was -coming, doubtless with new counsels, from England; that the Duke of -Wellington was in power at home, and that so inglorious a policy -could never ultimately prevail. But he lacked, in that conjuncture, -the self-restraint, the moderation of language, and the calmness of -utterance which might have secured for him respectful attention. -They said that he was violent, and he was. Even his best friends -said afterwards, that his warmth was unbecoming, and, doubtless, it -weakened his cause. It was soon apparent to him that in the existing -temper of the council, he could do nothing to change their resolves. He -determined, therefore, to endeavour to delay the final resolution, and, -with this object proposed an adjournment of the Council. The proposal -was carried; the Council was dissolved, and the members went to their -quarters or to their posts, to talk, or brood over what had happened, -and to fortify themselves with new arguments in support of the opinions -which they had determined to maintain. - -The Council met again on the following day. There was much and earnest -discussion; but it was painfully obvious that the majority were in -favour of capitulation, and that at the head of the majority were the -military and political chiefs. The proposed terms were again brought -under review, and again George Broadfoot lifted up his voice against -them. He was told by his opponents in the Council that the warmth of -his feelings had obscured his judgment; but, resolute not to weaken -his advocacy of so great a cause by any frailty of his own, he had -submitted his views to writing, and had invited the sober criticism -of his calmer friend Henry Havelock.[37] With this paper in his hand, -holding his eager temperament in restraint, he now did resolute battle -against the proposal for surrender. First, he took the votes of the -Council on the general question of the propriety of any negociation; -and then, one by one, he combated the separate terms of the proposed -treaty of surrender. But, two only excepted, his comrades were all -against him. Backhouse, a man of fiery courage and of plain discourse, -though recognising the force of much of Macgregor’s reasoning, voted -against withdrawal. Oldfield said little, but that little, with his -vote, was against capitulation. Havelock, who attended only as the -General’s staff, was without a vote; but his heart was with those who -voted for the manlier and the nobler course. - -The chief spokesmen were, George Macgregor on the one side, and -George Broadfoot on the other. The former, enunciating the views of -his military chief, contended that the Jellalabad garrison had been -abandoned by the Government; that after Wild’s failure, no movement -for their release was likely to be made; that there was no possibility -that their little force could hold its own much longer, and that it -could not retreat except under terms with the victorious enemy. He -believed that the terms, of which he had spoken, would be strictly -observed. Macnaghten and Pottinger had failed to take hostages from the -Afghans, and therefore our army had been destroyed; but hostages being -given, it was urged, the treaty would never be violated, and on the -arrival of the force at Peshawur, our prisoners would be surrendered. -Moreover, as Macgregor had contended from the first, the British troops -held Jellalabad, and every other post in the Afghan dominions, only on -behalf of Shah Soojah; and if the Shah directed our withdrawal, we had -no right, it was said, to remain, especially when our own Government -apparently desired the speedy evacuation of the country. - -But this Broadfoot denied. He denied that the British troops held -Jellalabad only on behalf of Shah Soojah; he denied that the British -Government—under whose orders alone, he contended, the force could -with propriety be withdrawn from Jellalabad—had directed, or were -likely to direct, the immediate evacuation of Afghanistan. He denied -that the brigade could not hold out in Jellalabad; he denied that -it could not make good its retreat to Peshawur. He declared that -hostages had been given before, at Tezeen—that still our camp had been -attacked;[38] and that, so long as the enemy held our hostages and -prisoners in their hands, there was really little additional security -in such a resource. Sale said that he would execute an Afghan hostage -if the terms of the treaty were violated. “Would you do this,” asked -Broadfoot, “if the enemy threatened to kill, before our faces, two -English ladies for every man that we put to death?” It was urged, -by another officer, that if the British troops did not evacuate -Jellalabad, our hostages at Caubul would be murdered. “Then,” contended -Broadfoot, “in such a warfare, the most barbarous must be most -successful. Whoever is prepared to execute his hostages and prisoners -must gain his object, and triumph by the mere force of his barbarity.” - -And thus, point after point, Broadfoot combated the arguments of -those who supported the policy of capitulation; and at last took his -stand boldly upon “first principles.” When it was said that a body of -troops, thus abandoned by Government, were entitled to look to their -own safety, he replied, that they had a right to save the troops only -when, by so doing, they would confer a greater benefit on the state -than by risking their loss. And when mention was made of the views of -the Governor-General, the chief officer of the state, he declared that -there was a higher duty still which they were bound to discharge. If, -as had been contended, the Government of India had abandoned them, -the covenant between them was cancelled by the failure of the higher -authority. But they had a duty to perform towards their country—a -duty which they could never decline. And it was plainly their duty, in -the conjuncture which had arisen, to uphold the honour of the nation. -In these views Havelock openly concurred; though, for reasons already -stated, he took little part in the debates. - -The terms of the proposed capitulation were carried, with but one -exception. It was determined that hostages should not be given. -Macgregor volunteered himself to be one; and both he and Sale contended -vehemently in support of the proposal; but the voice of the assembly -was against it. Its rejection detracted little from the humiliation of -the surrender; and Broadfoot stood forward in the hope of persuading -his comrades to reconsider the remaining terms. He dwelt especially on -the discredit of demanding the withdrawal of Akbar Khan from Lughman, -as though they stood in fear of the Sirdar; he urged upon them the -expediency of requiring the surrender of all the British prisoners -in the hands of the Afghans, as a preliminary to the evacuation of -Jellalabad; and he implored them to consider whether, if they were -determined to abandon their position, they could not give some dignity -to the movement, by imparting to it the character of a military -operation, deceiving the enemy as to real intention, and fighting, -if need be, their way down to Peshawur. All these proposals were -overruled. At a later date, the last received some support from men who -had before condemned it. - -And so, slightly altered in its phraseology—which Broadfoot had -denounced as too abject—the letter was carried through the Council -and prepared for transmission to the Shah. After the votes had been -given, Broadfoot sarcastically congratulated them on the figure that -they would make if the relieving force arrived just as the brigade -was marching out of Jellalabad, under the terms of a humiliating -convention. In such a case, Dennie, who had not the clearest possible -perception of the obligations of good faith in such matters, declared -that he would not go. Upon which he was told that he would be “made -to go;” and the Council broke up amidst greater hilarity than had -inaugurated its assemblage. - -The letter was despatched to Shah Soojah, and, amidst varied and -contending emotions, the members of the Council awaited a reply. In the -meanwhile some of them recorded their reasons for the votes they had -given; and all earnestly considered the course to be pursued when the -expected answer should be received from Caubul. There could be little -difference of opinion upon this score. It was determined that, if the -answer received from the Shah should be a simple and unconditional -acceptance of the proposed terms, the garrison must at once evacuate -Jellalabad, and, if faith were broken by the enemy, fight its way to -Peshawur; but that, if the answer should be evasive or clogged with -reservations and conditions, they would be at liberty to adopt any -course that might seem most expedient to them. - -The answer came. It called upon the chief officers at Jellalabad, -if they were sincere in their proposals, to affix their seals to -the letter. A Council of war was held. Sale and Macgregor urged the -members to put their seals to a copy of the original paper of terms. -Broadfoot, pleading that the nature of the Shah’s letter, expressing a -doubt, as it did, of their sincerity, liberated them from all foregone -obligations, proposed that the whole question of capitulation should -be reconsidered. He then offered to the acceptance of the Council -the draft of a letter, stating that as the Shah and his chiefs had -not answered their former communication—either by accepting or -rejecting the proposed terms—that they should be referred to the -Governor-General. There was much warm discussion. The proposed letter -was pronounced violent, and eventually rejected. Another letter to the -same effect, but more temperate in its tone, was proposed by Backhouse, -and also rejected. Sale denounced, in strong language, the opposition -of these men; some still more vehement discussion followed, and the -council was adjourned. - -An hour afterwards the members re-assembled, they who had felt and -spoken hotly had cooled down; and the debate was resumed more gravely -and decorously than it had broken off. Colonel Dennie and Captain -Abbott had, by this time, determined to support the proposal for -holding out, and Colonel Monteith, who had before recorded his opinions -in favour of the course recommended by Major Macgregor, now prepared -a letter, which, though couched in much less decided terms than -those proposed by Broadfoot and Backhouse, was not a renewal of the -negotiation. After some discussion this was accepted by the council, -and a messenger was despatched to Caubul with the important missive. -It left them free to act as they should think fit;—most happily it -left them free, for the next day brought tidings from Peshawur that -large reinforcements were moving up through the Punjab, and that -strenuous efforts were to be made for their relief. It was clear that -the government had not abandoned them to their fate. It was now equally -clear to all, that it was their duty to hold out to the last hour. -There was no more talk of withdrawal.[39] - -This was on the 13th of February. The garrison were in good heart, -and the fortifications of Jellalabad were rising rapidly around them. -In spite of all opposition at Caubul—in spite of the counsels of -Alexander Burnes, who heartily despised the enemy—in spite of a -sneering remark from the envoy, that the sappers would have nothing to -do but to pick a few stones from under the gun-wheels, Broadfoot had -insisted on taking with him a good supply of working tools, some of -which he had ordered to be made for him, by forced labour, in the city; -and had sent an urgent indent on the march for further supplies.[40] -It seemed, he said afterwards, “as though Providence had stiffened -his neck on this occasion;” for now at Jellalabad, he found himself -with implements of all kinds and with large supplies of blasting -powder, able alike to make and to destroy. And gallantly the good work -proceeded, in prospect, too, of an immediate attack, for Akbar Khan, -with the white English tents which proclaimed our disgrace, was within -a few miles of the walls which we were turning into formidable defences. - -But a great calamity was now about to befall the Jellalabad garrison. -On the morning of the 19th of February the men were busied with -their accustomed labour. With their arms piled within reach, they -were plying axe and shovel, toiling with their wonted cheerfulness -and activity at the defences, which they had begun to look upon with -the satisfied air of men who had long seen their work growing under -their hands, and now recognised the near approach of its completion. -They had worked, indeed, to good purpose. Very different were the -fortifications of Jellalabad from what they had been when Sale entered -the place in November.[41] They were now real, not nominal defences. -The unremitting toil of nearly three months had not been without its -visible and appreciable results. It seemed, too, as though the work -were about to be completed just at the time when the defences were most -needed. Akbar Khan was in the neighbourhood of Jellalabad, and every -day Sale expected to be called upon to meet the flower of the Barukzye -horse on the plain. But on this 19th of February, when the garrison -were flushed with joy at the thought of the near completion of their -work, a fearful visitation of Providence, suddenly and astoundingly, -turned all their labour to very nothingness. There was an awful and -mysterious sound, as of thunder beneath their feet; then the earth -shook; the houses of the town trembled and fell; the ramparts of -the fort seemed to reel and totter, and presently came down with a -crash.[42] On the first sound of the threatened convulsion the men -had instinctively rushed to their arms, and the greater number had -escaped the coming ruin; but it is still among those recollections of -the defence which are dwelt upon by the “illustrious garrison” in the -liveliest spirit of jocularity, how the field-officer of the day—a -gallant and good soldier—but one who had more regard for external -proprieties than was generally appreciated in those days, was buried -beneath a heap of rubbish, and how he was extricated from his perilous -position by some men of the 13th, under circumstances which even now -they enjoy in their retrospect with a relish which years have not -impaired.[43] - -But although the earthquake which threw down the walls of Jellalabad, -wrought in a minute more irreparable mischief than a bombarding army -could have done in a month, in nowise disheartened by this calamity, -the garrison again took the spade and the pick-axe into their hands, -and toiled to repair the mischief. “No time,” says Captain Broadfoot, -“was lost. The shocks had scarcely ceased when the whole garrison -was told off into working parties, and before night the breaches were -scarped, the rubbish below cleared away, and the ditches before them -dug out, whilst the great one on the Peshawur side was surrounded by -a good gabion parapet. A parapet was erected on the remains of the -north-west bastion, with an embrasure allowing the guns to flank the -approach of the ruined Caubul gate; the parapet of the new bastion was -restored, so as to give a flanking fire to the north-west bastion, -whilst the ruined gate was rendered inaccessible by a trench in front -of it, and in every bastion round the place a temporary parapet was -raised. From the following day all the troops off duty were continually -at work, and such was their energy and perseverance, that by the end of -the month the parapets were entirely restored, or the curtain filled in -where restoration was impracticable, and every battery re-established. -The breaches have been built up, with the rampart doubled in -thickness, and the whole of the gates retrenched.”—Such, indeed, was -the extraordinary vigour thrown into the work of restoration—such the -rapidity with which the re-establishment of the defences was completed, -that the enemy, seeing soon afterwards no traces of the great -earthquake-shock of the 19th of February, declared that the phenomenon -must have been the result of English witchcraft, for that Jellalabad -was the only place that had escaped. - -If Akbar Khan, who at this time was within a few miles of Sale’s -position, knew the extent to which the defences of Jellalabad had been -weakened, he committed a strange oversight in not taking advantage of -such a casualty. The garrison felt assured that the Barukzyes would not -throw away such a chance; and they made up their minds resolutely for -the encounter. Intelligence had just been received of the publication -of the government manifesto of the 31st of January; and this spasmodic -burst of energy and indignation, welcomed as an indication of the -intention of the Supreme Government to wipe out at all hazards the -stains that had been fixed upon the national honour, fortified and -re-assured the heroes of Jellalabad, who had so long been grieving -over the apparent feebleness and apathy of the official magnates at -Calcutta.[44] - -Sale published the proclamation in garrison orders; and the result did -not belie his expectation. Like the chiefs of the Jellalabad force, the -junior officers and men had felt, with acute mortification, the neglect -to which they had seemingly been subjected.[45] But now, that Lord -Auckland had declared that he regarded the disasters that had befallen -us merely as so many new opportunities of demonstrating the military -power of the British Empire in the East, the hearts of the brave men, -who had been so long defying the enemy that had destroyed Elphinstone’s -army, again began to leap up with hope and exultation; and as they saw -their defences rising again, almost as it were by supernatural agency, -before their eyes, they began rather to regret the caution of the -Barukzye chief, which seemed to restrain him from venturing under the -walls of Jellalabad. - -There seems, indeed, to have been in the Afghan camp a strange -shrinking from anything like a hand-to-hand encounter with the intrepid -soldiers of Sale’s brigade. The reluctance of Akbar Khan to near the -walls of Jellalabad is a painful commentary upon the arrogance and -audacity of the Afghans, who a few weeks before had been bearding -Elphinstone and Shelton under the shadow of the Caubul cantonments. -Akbar Khan now seemed resolute to risk nothing by any dashing movement, -that might decide, at once, the fate of the Jellalabad garrison. -Instead of assaulting the place he blockaded it. - -He seemed to trust to the efficacy of a close investment; and so -moved in his troops nearer and nearer to our walls, hoping to effect -that by starvation which he could not effect by hard fighting in the -field. And so, for some time, he continued, drawing in more and more -closely—harassing our foraging parties, and occasionally coming -into contact with the horsemen who were sent out to protect the -grass-cutters. Not, however, before the 11th of March was there any -skirmishing worthy of record. Then it was reported that the enemy were -about to mine the place. _Sungahs_ had been thrown up on the night of -the 10th, and the enemy were firing briskly from behind them. It was -plain that some mischief was brewing; so on the morning of the 11th, -Sale, keeping his artillery at the guns on the ramparts, sent out a -strong party of infantry and cavalry, with two hundred of Broadfoot’s -sappers. Dennie commanded the sortie. As they streamed out of the -Peshawur gate of the city, Akbar Khan seemed inclined to give them -battle. But ever as the enemy advanced the hot fire from our guns drove -them back. They could not advance upon our works, nor protect the -_sungahs_ which our skirmishers were rapidly destroying. It was soon -ascertained that the story of the mine was a mere fable; ammunition was -too scarce to be expended on any but necessary service; so there was -nothing more to be done. Dennie sounded the recall. The British troops -began to fall back upon their works; and then the enemy, emboldened by -the retrograde movement, fell upon our retiring column. No sooner had -our people halted and reformed, than the Afghans turned and fled, but -still they wrought us some mischief, for they wounded Broadfoot; and -those were days when an accident to the garrison engineer was, indeed, -a grievous calamity. Not a man, however, of Sale’s brigade was killed. -The carnage was all among the enemy. - -The remainder of the month passed quietly away—but the anxieties of -the garrison were steadily increasing. Provisions had become scarce; -ammunition was scarce; fodder for the horses was not to be obtained. -It was obviously the design of the enemy to reduce the garrison by a -strict blockade. It would be difficult to exaggerate the eagerness -with which, under such circumstances, they looked for the arrival of -succours from Peshawur. Excellent as were Pollock’s reasons for not -proceeding to the relief of Jellalabad until his force was strengthened -by the arrival of the European regiments on their way to Peshawur, it -is easy to understand, and impossible to condemn, the eagerness with -which Sale and Macgregor continued to exhort him to advance for their -succour.[46] - -Pollock had expected that the dragoons would reach Peshawur by the 20th -of March; but on the 27th they had not arrived; and the General wrote -to Jellalabad, explaining the causes of delay, but still hoping that -he would be able to commence his march on the last day of the month. -“There appears,” he wrote, “to be nothing but accidents to impede the -advance of the dragoons. They were five days crossing the Ravee. I have -sent out 300 camels to help them in; and I hope nothing will prevent my -moving on the 31st. God knows I am most anxious to move on, for I know -that delay will subject us to be exposed to very hot weather. But my -situation has been most embarrassing. Any attempt at a forward movement -in the early part of this month I do not think would have succeeded, -for at one time the Hindoos did not hesitate to say that they would -_not_ go forward. I hope the horror they had has somewhat subsided; but -without more white faces I question even now if they would go. Since -the 1st we have been doing all to recover a proper tone; but you may -suppose what my feelings have been, wishing to relieve you, and knowing -that my men would not go. However desirable it is that I should be -joined by the 31st Regiment, your late letters compel me to move, and -I hope, therefore, to be with you by about the 7th. I cannot say the -day exactly, because I want to take Ali-Musjid. When that is taken, -your situation may, perhaps, become better.”[47] The dragoons reached -Pollock’s camp on the 30th, and on the following day he began to move -forward. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - -[April, 1842.] - - The Forcing of the Khybur Pass—State of the Sikh Troops—Mr. - Clerk at the Court of Lahore—Views of the Lahore Durbar—Efforts - of Shere Singh—Assemblage of the Army at Jumrood—Advance to - Ali-Musjid—Affairs at Jellalabad—Defeat of Akbar Khan—Junction of - Pollock and Sale. - - -Whatever embarrassments may have lain in the way of General Pollock -during these months of February and March, and compelled him, eager -as he was to advance to the relief of Jellalabad, to remain inactive -at Peshawur, it is certain that they were greatly increased by the -reluctance of our Sikh allies to face the passes of the Khybur. The -conduct of the Nujeeb battalions, which had mutinied on the very eve of -Wild’s movement into the pass, left no room to hope for any effectual -co-operation from that source. All the efforts of Captain Lawrence -to obtain any assistance from the Sikh troops at Peshawur, through -General Mehtab Singh,[48] had failed; and Lawrence was of opinion that -the General’s conduct, in admitting the Afreedis into his camp, had -established such a clear case of hostility, that he and his traitrous -followers ought to be dismissed with disgrace. But now that Rajah -Gholab Singh, accompanied by the Crown Prince of Lahore, was advancing -with his regiments to Peshawur, as those regiments were composed of -a different class of men, and the influence of the Rajah over these -hill-levies was great, it was hoped, that on his junction with General -Pollock’s camp, a new order of things would be established. But it -soon became painfully evident to the General that very little cordial -co-operation was to be looked for from the Jummoo Rajah and his troops. - -When, early in February, Pollock, on his way back to Peshawur, reached -the Attock, he found the left bank of the river occupied by the Sikh -troops under Gholab Singh, whilst the Nujeeb battalions, which had -disgraced themselves a few weeks before, were posted on the opposite -side.[49] Captain Lawrence, who had left Peshawur to expedite the -Rajah’s movements, was then in the Sikh camp; and M’Caskill’s brigade -was a few marches in the rear. There appeared every likelihood, -therefore, of a collision that would impede the progress of the -British troops; but the exertions of Pollock and Lawrence were crowned -with success; and the Sikh force moved off before M’Caskill’s brigade -arrived on the banks of the river. On the 14th, Gholab Singh and the -Prince reached Peshawur. On the 20th, Pollock held a conference with -the Rajah—Lawrence and Mackeson being present—and a day or two -afterwards, forwarding an abstract of the conversation that had taken -place between them, wrote to the Supreme Government: “I confess that I -have no expectation of any assistance from the Sikh troops.” - -On the conduct of Gholab Singh at this time, some suspicion has been -cast. It has been said that he not only instigated, through the agency -of an influential messenger, the Nujeeb battalions to rebel, but -carried on a friendly correspondence with our Afghan enemies at Caubul. -That there was no hearty co-operation, is true; but hearty co-operation -was not to be expected. Gholab Singh had other work on hand at that -time; and, whilst he was playing and losing a great game in Thibet, -it would have been strange, indeed, if he had thrown his heart into -the work which he was called upon to perform for others at the mouth -of the Khybur Pass. He had no confidence in his troops. He had no -inducement to exert himself.[50] The latter obstacle, it was thought, -might be removed; and Lawrence and Mackeson were of opinion that it -would be well to bribe him into activity by the offer of Jellalabad, to -be held by him independently of the Sikh ruler; but Mr. Clerk was of -opinion that such a measure would be neither politic nor honest.[51] -It would, indeed, at that time, have been an injustice done by the -British Government against both the other parties to the tripartite -treaty. It would have injuriously affected both Shah Soojah and Shere -Singh; and would have involved the Jummoo Rajah in difficulties and -perplexities from which he would have found it difficult to extricate -himself. Indeed, Captain Mackeson himself very soon came to the opinion -that, if we desired to bribe Gholab Singh into co-operation by promises -of territorial aggrandisement, it was necessary that we should lay -our finger on some other part of the map than that which represented -Jellalabad; and he asked whether Shikarpoor, which Runjeet Singh had -coveted, and which the tripartite treaty had snatched from him, “would -not do better.”[52] - -In the mean while, it appeared to Mr. Clerk that his presence at -the Court of the Sikh ruler, would have the effect of cementing the -alliance between the two states, and enable him the better to obtain -from the Lahore Government the military assistance that was so greatly -needed. He had never doubted the good faith of the Maharajah himself. -Whatever selfish motives he may have attributed to him, it was not -to be doubted that at this time his feelings and his conduct alike -were those of a friend. Clerk declared that no native state had ever -taken such great pains to accelerate the movements of our troops by -preventing plunder, supplying boats at the ferries, and furnishing food -for the use of our army. The Maharajah had given us the best aid and -the best advice, and in the opinion of the British agent was willing to -act up to the spirit of the Tripartite treaty. He was, indeed, the only -man in the Punjab who really desired our success. - -On the 2nd of March, Clerk arrived at Umritsur, resolute to “get what -he could out of the Sikhs.”[53] Early on the following morning he -waited on Shere Singh. The first visit was a visit of condolence on the -deaths of Kurruck Singh and his son. The attendance at the Durbar was -small. No troops were in waiting beyond a single wing of a battalion -drawn up to salute the arrival and departure of the British Mission. -The Court were in mourning of white. Everything about the Durbar was -quiet and subdued. It was a meeting of condolence on both sides. -Clerk’s expressions of regret were reciprocated by those which the -Sikh ruler freely uttered with reference to the death of Sir William -Macnaghten. Dhyan Singh and the Fakir Azizoodeen were both loud in -their praises of the envoy; and expressed a lively hope that the -treacherous Afghans would be duly punished for their offences. After -other complimentary interchanges, the Mission departed; and on the -following morning proceeded to pay a visit of congratulation to the new -ruler. The Court now wore a different aspect. Along the garden-walks -stretched walls of crimson broadcloth, and lines of armed Goorcherrahs, -in new appointments, glittered along the paths. Everything was bright -and joyous. The courtiers shone in splendid apparel. The Maharajah -himself was bright with jewels, of which the _Koh-i-noor_ was the -lustrous chief. The young Rajah Heera Singh, old Runjeet’s minion, -radiant with emeralds and pearls, sate beside Shere Singh, whilst his -father, the minister, stood beside the regal chair. The officers of the -British Mission sate on a row of chairs opposite; and the old Fakir -Azizoodeen was seated on the floor beside the chair of the British -chief. The conversation was of a general and complimentary character. -The _Khelat_ of accession was presented to the new ruler; the fidelity -of the Sikh Government and the character of its administration were -belauded; and then the Mission took its departure. - -On the 5th, Clerk, having intimated his desire to wait on the -Maharajah, to discuss matters of business, was invited to attend at his -own time. He went in the afternoon; and at once solicited the honour -of a private audience. Heera Singh was sitting beside him, and other -courtiers were in attendance. A motion of the hand dismissed them all; -and Clerk was invited to seat himself in Heera Singh’s chair. But the -British minister, not wishing that the conversation should be carried -on without any witnesses, suggested the recall of Dhyan Singh and the -Fakir, who, with Heera Singh and one or two others, were present at -the interview. Clerk had a difficult game to play at this time. He had -to obtain the most effectual co-operation of the Sikh Government that -could be elicited in this hour of trial; and yet he was unwilling to -lay bare to the Sikh Durbar the real designs of his own government. He -had been directed to disclose those designs to the Sikhs—to intimate -that it was the intention of the British government, after rescuing the -Jellalabad garrison, to withdraw the army to the British frontier; but -inwardly indignant at the feebleness of the policy which was favoured -at Calcutta, he shrunk from avowing these intentions of withdrawal, and -endeavoured rather to elicit the views of the Lahore Cabinet than to -expose the designs of his own. But Shere Singh was not inclined to be -less cautious than the British envoy. When Clerk asked what he intended -to do to rescue Sale’s garrison from destruction, the Maharajah replied -that the Sikhs were very desirous to aid the British Government, -but that the matter called for consideration. Bristling up at the -coolness of this reply, Clerk said that the whole question of the -alliance between the two states might call for future consideration; -but that the present moment when the safety of a beleagured garrison -was at stake, was no time for consideration. Qualifying then his -former remark, the Sikh ruler said that he meant only that the mode -of procedure called for consideration, and he began to talk about the -advantage of erecting sungahs and crowning the heights of the Khybur -Pass[54]—to all of which Clerk readily assented. - -Then Dhyan Singh, who all this time had been sitting silent, with -a dejected air and drooping head, looked up, and with a cheerful -countenance began to take part in the conversation. He had before -seemed to think that the purport of the discussion was to consign his -brother, Gholab Singh, to inevitable destruction; but he now said -that he was certain the troops under the command of that chief would -willingly co-operate with the British; but that “an iron lock required -an iron key.” He then abruptly asked why more British troops were not -sent;[55] and the Fakir Azizoodeen whispered the same question. Clerk -could have blurted out an answer to this; but it was one which would -have opened the eyes of the Sikh Durbar, more than it was desirable -to open them, to the true nature of British policy at this time, and -the true character of our rulers. He, therefore, answered in general -terms that the British government were collecting troops; but that, -nevertheless, the co-operation of the Sikh Government was much desired; -and, whilst he added that an intimation would be sent to General -Pollock regarding the manner in which the Durbar recommended the war in -the Khybur to be carried on, Shere Singh promised to send the desired -instructions to Gholab Singh; and so the conference ended. - -True to his word, the Maharajah at once despatched instructions to -Gholab Singh to co-operate heartily and steadily with General Pollock -and Captain Mackeson; and it is believed that at the same time Dhyan -Singh wrote privately to his brother in a similar strain of exhortation -and encouragement. But it was plain to Mr. Clerk that both the -Sovereign and his minister regarded, with feelings of painful anxiety, -the necessity of avoiding an open rupture with the British Government, -by aiding in the perilous work that lay before the troops posted at -Peshawur. Mr. Clerk remained at the Maharajah’s Court, which had -removed itself from Umritsur to Lahore, and exerted himself to keep up -the fidelity of our ally to the right point of effective co-operation. -But as time advanced, Shere Singh became more and more uneasy and -apprehensive. It appeared to him that a failure in the Khybur Pass -would bring down such a weight of unpopularity upon him that his very -throne would be jeopardised by the disaster. One day—it was the 4th -of April—holding Durbar in the Huzooree-Bagh, the Maharajah appeared -ill at ease. Having conversed a little while on general topics, but -with an abstracted air, he ordered the intelligence forwarded to him -by the Peshawur news-writers to be read to the British envoy; then -took him by the hand and led him to another seat in the garden. Alone -with the English gentleman the Sikh ruler opened out his heart to him. -He was concerned, he said, to learn that the British authorities at -Peshawur were making no progress in their negotiations for the purchase -of a safe passage through the Khybur, and were disinclined to accept -the offers of the old Barukzye Governor of Peshawur, Sultan Mahomed, -who had declared his willingness to “divide, scatter, and make terms -with” our enemies. He apprehended that there would be much fighting -and much slaughter; and it was only too probable that the Sikh troops -at Peshawur, seeing clearly the danger of the movement, and not by any -means understanding the advantages that would accrue to them from it, -would refuse to enter the pass. Or if they entered it, it was probable -that they would suffer severely at the hands of the Afghans—and in -either case, as he had been continually writing to Peshawur to impress -upon the officers there the necessity of effective co-operation with -the British, the odium would descend upon him, and perhaps cost him his -throne. It was easier to listen to all this than to reply to it. Clerk -saw as plainly as the Maharajah himself, that as the Sikh troops had -always evinced an insuperable repugnance to enter the Khybur Pass, even -when the glory of the Khalsa was to be advanced by the movement, and -the dominions of the Lahore Government to be extended, it was hardly -reasonable to expect them to show greater alacrity in the advancement -of the objects of another nation whom they cordially detested, and -whose disasters they regarded with secret delight.[56] - -But whilst Shere Singh was thus expressing his misgivings at Lahore, -and the British agent was inwardly acknowledging the reasonable -character of the Maharajah’s doubts, the Sikh troops at Peshawur were -settling down into a state of quiet obedience, and making up their -minds to penetrate the Khybur Pass. The letters despatched by Shere -Singh and his minister to Avitabile and Gholab Singh had not been -without their effect. A confidential friend and adviser of the Sikh -ruler—Boodh Singh—had arrived at Peshawur, charged with messages from -the King and the minister, which were supposed to have had an effect -upon the Jummoo Rajah, sudden and great. Lawrence, too, had been busy -in the Sikh camp, and little anticipating the circumstances under which -it was decreed that they should one day meet in that lovely province -of the old Douranee Empire over which the Jummoo Rajah since exercised -undisputed dominion, had been holding long conferences with Gholab -Singh.[57] The good tact, good temper, and quiet firmness of General -Pollock, had been exercised with the best results, and the arrival of -further reinforcements of European troops had done much to give new -confidence to the Khalsa. And so it happened, that when General Pollock -prepared to enter the Khybur Pass, the Sikh troops had resolved not to -suffer their faces to be blackened before all India; and really, when -the hour for exertion came, did more for the honour of their own arms -and the support of the British Government than the most sanguine of our -officers had ventured to expect. - -The dragoons and the horse artillery reached Peshawur on the 29th of -March, and Pollock at once made his preparations to enter the Khybur -Pass. On the 31st he pitched his camp at Jumrood, in the expectation -of advancing on the following morning; but new elements of delay -arose. The camel-drivers were deserting. Gholab Singh had not moved -up his camp. And, above all, the rain was descending in floods. It -would have dispirited the troops to have moved them forward at such a -time and rendered more difficult the advance of the baggage. Pollock -had done his best to diminish to the least possible amount the number -of carriage-cattle that were to move with him into the Khybur Pass. -But an Indian commander has no more difficult duty than this. Under -no circumstances is the general addiction to much baggage very easily -overcome. Men are not readily persuaded to leave their comforts behind -them. A fine soldierly appeal was issued to the army;[58] and men of -all ranks felt that it came from an officer who was not less ready to -make sacrifices himself than to call upon others to make them.[59] -Circumstances, too, at this time, tended to reduce the amount of -the baggage. The camel-drivers had deserted in such numbers, that -there was not even sufficient carriage for the ammunition. The 33rd -Regiment, which had just arrived at Peshawur, could not come up to the -encamping-ground for want of cattle; and another day’s halt was the -result of the delay.[60] In the meanwhile, the Sepoys were deserting -from Wild’s Brigade; and no satisfactory progress was making in the -negotiations which Mackeson had been carrying on for the purchase of -a free passage through the Khybur from the Afreedi Maliks.[61] But -there was one advantage in the delay. It gave time for the Sikh troops -to prepare themselves, after their own fashion, to co-operate with -our army, and General Pollock felt that whatever might be the amount -of active assistance to be derived from the efforts of our allies, a -combined movement would have a good moral effect. - -The order of march was now laid down, and was well studied by -commanding officers. Brigadier Wild was to command the advance guard, -and General M’Caskill the rear. At the head of the column were to march -the grenadier company of the 9th Queen’s Regiment, one company of the -26th Native Infantry, three companies of the 30th Native Infantry, and -two companies of the 33rd Native Infantry, under Major Barnewell, of -the 9th. Then were to follow the Sappers and Miners, nine pieces of -artillery,[62] and two squadrons of the 3rd Dragoons. After these, the -camels, laden with all the treasure of the force and a large portion of -ammunition, were to move on, followed by a squadron of the 1st Native -Cavalry. Then the Commissariat stores, protected by two companies of -the 53rd Native Infantry, were to advance, and a squadron of the 1st -Cavalry were to follow. Then the baggage and camp-followers, covered -by a Ressalah of Irregular Horse, and a squadron of the 1st Native -Cavalry, were to move forward, with a further supply of ammunition, and -litters, and camel-panniers for the sick. - -The rear-guard was to consist of three foot-artillery guns—the 10th -Light Cavalry—two Ressalahs of Irregular Horse—two squadrons of -the 3rd Dragoons—two horse-artillery guns—three companies of the -60th Native Infantry; one company of the 6th Native Infantry; and one -company of her Majesty’s 9th Foot. - -These details formed the centre column which was to make its way -through the pass. Two other columns, composed entirely of infantry, -were told off into parties, and instructed to crown the heights on -either side of the pass. Two companies of her Majesty’s 9th Foot, -four companies of the 26th Native Infantry, with 400 jezailchees, -were placed under the command of Colonel Taylor, of the 9th Foot; -seven companies of the 30th Native Infantry, under Major Payne; three -companies of the 60th Native Infantry, under Captain Riddle; four -companies of the 64th Native Infantry, under Major Anderson, with -some details of Broadfoot’s sappers, and a company and a half of her -Majesty’s 9th Foot; the party being commanded by Major Davis, of the -9th, made up the right crowning column. - -The left crowning column was to consist of two companies of her -Majesty’s 9th Foot, four companies of the 26th Native Infantry, and -200 jezailchees, under Major Huish, of the 26th Native Infantry; seven -companies of the 53rd Native Infantry, under Major Hoggan, of that -corps; three companies of the 60th Native Infantry, under Captain -Napleton, of that regiment; and four and a half companies of the -64th Native Infantry, and one and a half companies of her Majesty’s -9th Foot, under Colonel Moseley, of the 64th. With these last were -to go some auxiliaries, supplied by Torabaz Khan, the loyal chief -of Lalpoorah. The flanking parties were to advance in successive -detachments of two companies, at intervals of 500 yards. - -The order of march having been thus arranged and judicious rules laid -down for the guidance of commanding officers,[63] Pollock marched -his force to Jumrood. On the 4th of April, whilst the troops were -encamped at that place, he issued further and more specific orders to -regulate the movements of the following morning. In the evening, the -General went round to all his commanding officers to ascertain that -they thoroughly understood the orders that had been issued for their -guidance; and to learn from them what was the temper of their men. -There did not seem to be much cause for inquietude on this score. The -_morale_ of the Sepoys had greatly improved. - -At three o’clock on the morning of the 5th of April the army commenced -its march. It moved off in the dim twilight, without beat of drum or -sound of bugle. Quietly the crowning columns prepared to ascend. The -heights on either side were covered with the enemy, but so little was -the mode of attack, which the British General had determined upon, -expected by the enemy, that it was not until our flankers had achieved -a considerable ascent that the Khyburees were aware of their advance. -Then, as the morning dawned, the positions of the two forces were -clearly revealed to each other; and the struggle commenced. - -Across the mouth of the pass the enemy had thrown up a formidable -barrier. It was made of mud, and huge stones, and heavy branches of -trees. The Khyburees had not wanted time to mature their defensive -operations; and they had thrown up a barricade of considerable -strength. It was not a work upon which our guns could play with any -good effect; but it was a small matter effectually to destroy the -barrier when once our light infantry had swept the hills. And that -work was soon going on gallantly and successfully on both sides, -whilst the centre column, drawn up in battle-array, was waiting the -issue of the contest. Nothing could have proved better than the -arrangements of the General; and no General could have wished his -plan of attack to be carried out with better effect. On the left, the -crowning column was soon in vigorous and successful action. On the -right, the precipitous nature of the ground was such that it seemed -to defy the eager activity of Taylor and his men. But he stole round -the base of the mountain unseen, and found a more practicable ascent -than that which he had first tried. Then on both sides the British -infantry were soon hotly engaged with the mountaineers, clambering up -the precipitous peaks, and pouring down a hot and destructive fire -upon the surprised and disconcerted Khyburees. They had not expected -that our disciplined troops, who had, as it were, been looking at the -Khybur for some months, would be more than a match for them upon their -native hills. But so it was. Our British infantry were beating them in -every direction, and everywhere the white dresses of the Khyburees were -seen flying across the hills. The Duke of Wellington had said, some -time before, that he “had never heard that our troops were not equal, -as well in their personal activity as by their arms, to contend with -and overcome any natives of hills whatever.”[64] And now our British -infantry and our Bengal Sepoys were showing how well able they were to -meet the Khyburees on their native hills. The mountain-rangers, whom -Macnaghten wished to raise, because Sale’s brigade had been harassed -by the Ghilzyes, could not have clambered over the hills with greater -activity than our British troops, and would not have been half as -steady or half as faithful. - -It was now time for Pollock to advance. The centre column did not -attempt to move forward until the flankers had fought their way to -the rear of the mouth of the pass. But when he had fairly turned the -enemy’s position, he began to destroy the barrier, and prepared to -advance into the pass. The enemy had assembled in large numbers at the -mouth, but finding themselves outflanked—finding that they had to deal -with different men and a different system from that which they had seen -a few months before, they gradually withdrew, and, without opposition, -Pollock now cleared his way through the barricade, and pushed into the -pass with his long string of baggage. The difficulties of the remainder -of the march were now mainly occasioned by the great extent of this -convoy. Pollock was conveying both ammunition and provisions to Sale’s -garrison; and there were many more beasts of burden, therefore, than -were used by his own force. But skilfully was the march conducted. -Encumbered as he was, the General was compelled to move slowly forward. -The march to Ali-Musjid occupied the greater part of the day. The heat -was intense. The troops suffered greatly from thirst. But they all -did their duty well. Whatever doubts may have lingered to the last -in Pollock’s mind, were now wholly dispersed; and when he reached -Ali-Musjid in safety, and had time to think over the events of the day, -nothing refreshed him more than the thought that the Sepoys had fairly -won back the reputation they had lately lost.[65] - -The enemy had evacuated Ali-Musjid in the morning, and now Ferris’s -jezailchees were sent in to garrison the place. A part of Pollock’s -force, with the head-quarters, bivouacked near the fortress. The night -was bitterly cold; but the command of the heights was maintained, and -the men, both European and Natives, who had been under arms since three -o’clock in the morning, did not utter a complaint. They appeared to -feel that they had done a great work; but that the utmost vigilance -was necessary to secure the advantage they had gained. The enemy were -still hovering about, and all night long firing upon our people. It was -necessary to be on the alert. - -It was a great thing to have accomplished such a march with so little -loss of life, and no loss of baggage. Avitabile said that Pollock and -his force were going to certain destruction. Had he moved precipitately -with his main column into the pass, he would probably have been driven -back with great slaughter; but the precaution he took in crowning the -heights and turning the enemy’s position, secured him, though not -without some fighting the whole way, a safe passage. The enemy are said -to have lost about 300 men killed, and 600 or 800 wounded. - -The Sikh troops moved up by another pass to Ali-Musjid. Pollock, -still doubtful of their fidelity, and not desiring to have them -too near his own troops, suggested that when he pushed forward by -the Shadee-Bagiaree Pass, they should take the other, known as the -Jubogee.[66] Pollock had entered into a covenant with Gholab Singh for -the occupation of the pass by the Sikh troops until the 5th of June. -It was necessary that he should keep open his communications with the -rear; and the Sikhs undertook to do it. But when Pollock marched to -Jellalabad, they began to bargain with certain Afreedi chiefs, hostile -to our interests, to keep open the pass for the stipulated time, for -a certain sum of money, thus making known to the tribes the time for -which they had covenanted to hold it.[67] Early in May the Sikhs -suddenly quitted their position at Ali-Musjid and returned to Jumrood, -seizing some of our baggage-cattle on the way, throwing their loads on -the ground, and employing the animals to carry their baggage.[68] - -In the mean while, Pollock had reached Jellalabad. “We found the fort -strong,” he wrote to a friend; “the garrison healthy; and, except for -wine and beer, better off than we are. They were, of course, delighted -to see us. We gave three cheers as we passed the colours; and the band -of each regiment played as it came up. It was a sight worth seeing. All -appeared happy.”[69] It was, indeed, a happy meeting. Sale’s little -garrison had been shut up for five months in Jellalabad. They had long -been surrounded with perils, lessened only by their own daring. They -had looked in vain for succours, until they became so familiar with -danger that they had begun to feel secure in the midst of it. But they -were weary of their isolation, and were eager to see their countrymen -again. Right welcome, therefore, was the arrival of Pollock’s force; -and happy the day on which it appeared with streaming colours and gay -music. But the prospects of the garrison had brightened; and if Pollock -had to speak of his victories, Sale, too, had his to narrate. - -Pollock, before he entered the pass, had received intelligence of -the gallant sortie made by the garrison on the 1st of April, when -they swept away from the covering parties of the enemy a flock of 500 -sheep and goats, which had secured them a further ten days’ supply of -meat.[70] Writing of this to General Pollock, Macgregor had said: -“Our troops of all arms are in the highest pluck, and they seem never -so happy as when fighting with the enemy. I verily believe we could -capture Mahomed Akbar’s camp, even with our present means, were it our -game to incur the risk of an attempt of the kind.”[71] This was lightly -spoken; a mere outburst of the abundant animal spirits of the writer; -but Pollock was scarcely on the other side of Ali-Musjid, when he -received tidings which made it clear to him that now the light word had -become a grave fact, and the capture of Mahomed Akbar’s camp had been -actually accomplished. - -And now that they had reached Jellalabad, every one in Pollock’s camp -was eager for details of this great victory. It was, indeed, a dashing -exploit. On the 5th of April, Macgregor’s spies brought in tidings -from Akbar Khan’s camp that Pollock had been beaten back, with great -slaughter, in the Khybur Pass. On the morning of the 6th, the Sirdar’s -guns broke out into a royal salute, in honour of the supposed victory. -Other reports then came welling in to Jellalabad. It was said that -there was another revolution at Caubul, and that the Sirdar was about -to break up his camp and hasten to the capital. In either case, it -seemed that the time had come to strike a blow at Akbar Khan’s army; so -a council of war was held, and the question gravely debated. It is said -that councils of war “never fight.” But the council which now assembled -to determine whether the Sirdar’s camp should be attacked on the -following morning, decided the question in the affirmative. Unsurpassed -in personal courage by any daring youth in his camp, and ever eager to -fight under another man’s command, Sale sometimes shrunk from energetic -action when it brought down upon him a burden of responsibility. But -Havelock was at his elbow—a man of rare coolness and consummate -judgment, with military talents of a high order, ripened by experience, -and an intrepidity in action not exceeded by that of his fighting -commander. He it was who, supported by other zealous spirits, urged -the expediency of an attack on the enemy’s position, and laid down the -plan of operations most likely to ensure success. Sale yielded with -reluctance—but he did yield; and it was determined that at daybreak on -the following morning they should go out and fight. - -Sale issued directions for the formation of three columns of infantry, -the centre consisting of her Majesty’s 13th Light Infantry, mustering -500 bayonets, under Colonel Dennie; the left, under Lieutenant-Colonel -Monteith, C.B.; and the right, composed of one company of the 13th -Light Infantry and one of the 35th Native Infantry, and the detachment -of Sappers, under Lieutenant Orr (the severity of Captain Broadfoot’s -wound still rendering him non-effective), the whole amounting to -360 men, commanded by Captain Havelock, of her Majesty’s 13th Light -Infantry. These were to be supported by the fire of the guns of No. 6, -Light Field Battery, under Captain Abbott, to which Captain Backhouse, -of Shah Soojah’s Artillery, was attached, and by the whole of the small -cavalry force under Captain Oldfield and Lieutenant Mayne.[72] Such -were the components of the little force that was to attack the camp of -the Sirdar. - -At daybreak they moved out of the fort by the western gate. Akbar Khan -was ready to receive them. He had drawn out his troops before the camp, -with his right resting on a fort, and his left on the Caubul river. He -had not less than 6000 men. The plan of action proposed by Havelock -was, that they should make a sudden and vigorous onslaught on the -Sirdar’s camp and drive him into the river, which at that time was a -rapid and unfordable torrent. But, abandoning this simple device, Sale, -on issuing from the gate, ordered Dennie forward to attack a small -fort, several hundred yards to the right, from which the enemy had -often molested us before, and in which they were now strongly posted. -Gallantly, at the head of his men, went Dennie to the attack—a brave -and chivalrous soldier ever in the advance—but an Afghan marksman -covered him with his piece, and the ball passed through Dennie’s -body.[73] The movement was a false one; it cost us the life of this -good soldier, and well nigh lost us the battle. The force being thus -divided, the Afghan horsemen came down impetuously on Havelock’s weak -infantry column; and if he had not persuaded the General to recall -the 13th from the fort, the action might have had a different result. -The recall was not too late. Sale now gave his orders for a general -attack on the Sirdar’s camp; and his orders were carried into effect -with an impetuosity and success worthy of the defenders of Jellalabad. -In the forcible language of the General’s despatch, on which I cannot -improve, “The artillery advanced at the gallop, and directed a heavy -fire upon the Afghan centre, whilst two of the columns of infantry -penetrated the line near the same point, and the third forced back -its left from its support on the river, into the stream of which some -of his horse and foot were driven. The Afghans made repeated attempts -to check our advance by a smart fire of musketry, by throwing forward -heavy bodies of horse, which twice threatened the detachments of -foot under Captain Havelock, and by opening upon us three guns from -a battery screened by a garden wall, and said to have been served -under the personal superintendence of the Sirdar. But in a short time -they were dislodged from every point of their position, their cannon -taken, and their camp involved in a general conflagration. The battle -was over—and the enemy in full retreat in the direction of Lughman by -about 7 A. M. We have made ourselves masters of two cavalry standards, -recaptured four guns lost by the Caubul and Gundamuck forces, the -restoration of which, to our government, is matter of much honest -exultation among our troops, seized and destroyed a great quantity of -materiel and ordnance stores, and burnt the whole of the enemy’s tents. -In short, the defeat of Mahomed Akbar in open field, by the troops whom -he had boasted of blockading, has been complete and signal.” Although -our cavalry were not stopped in pursuit, as some held they might have -been with advantage, the enemy’s loss was severe. “The field of battle -was strewed with the bodies of men and horses, and the richness of -the trappings of some of the latter seemed to attest that persons of -distinction had been among the casualties.” The loss on our side was -small. Eight privates of the 13th Native Infantry, and two of the 35th -Native Infantry, were killed. Three officers and about fifty men were -wounded. - -Great was the joy which the intelligence of the victories of Pollock -and Sale diffused throughout all India; and in no one breast did so -much of gladness bubble up as in that of Lord Ellenborough. He wrote, -that although it was his misfortune not to be a soldier by profession, -he knew how to appreciate soldierly qualities and soldierly acts. It -was then that, being at Benares at the time, he issued that well-known -notification which conferred on Sale’s brigade the honourable title by -which it has since been so well known—the title of the “Illustrious -Garrison.”[74] That garrison had now done its work, and taken its place -in history. Sale ceased to command at Jellalabad; and soon letters -from Lord Ellenborough set aside the political functions of Macgregor. -In Pollock and Nott, on either side of Afghanistan, had been vested -supreme political authority; and Macgregor soon took his place beside -the General, simply as his _aide-de-camp_. By Pollock’s side, too, -holding the office of his military secretary, was Shakespear, who had -done such good service in liberating the Russian slaves at Khiva; who -had won his spurs by this Central-Asian exploit, and returned to India -Sir Richmond Shakespear. Pollock knew the worth of these men, and -turned their experience to account. But the reign of the “Politicals” -was at an end. Lord Ellenborough had determined to dethrone them. - -The Governor-General knew his men. He did well in trusting Pollock and -Nott. But after the melancholy illustration of the trustworthiness of -military officers of high rank displayed in the conduct of affairs -at Caubul, the time hardly seemed a happy one for opening out the -question of political and military responsibilities, and their relative -effects upon the interests of the state. It is right, however, now -that it has been stated how the whole system, which exercised so -great an influence over events in Afghanistan, was abolished by the -Governor-General, that something should be said upon the general -character of the diplomatic functionaries employed on the great field -of Central Asia. - -There is no single controversial topic which has struck out so many -sparks of bad feeling—so much personality, so much bitter invective, -and I fear it must be added, so much reckless mendacity, as this -question of political agency. At one time a “Political” was, by many -writers, considered fair game. To hunt him down with all conceivable -calumny and vituperation, was regarded as a laudable achievement. -Every one had a stone to throw at him—every one howled at him with -execration, or shouted at him in derision. Temperate men on this topic, -became intemperate; charitable men, uncharitable; sagacity ceased to be -sagacious; discrimination ceased to discriminate. All alike lifted up -their voices to swell the chorus of popular indignation. - -The Caubul outburst, with its attendant horrors, filled this cup of -bitter feeling to the brim. It would be difficult to embody, in a page -of mere description, the popular notion of an Afghan “Political.” He -was believed to be a very conceited, a very arrogant, a very ignorant, -and a very unfeeling personage; a pretender, who, on the strength of -a little smattering of Persian and some interest, perhaps petticoat -interest, in high places, had obtained an appointment, the duties of -which he was not capable of performing, and the trust involved in which -he was well-nigh certain to abuse. He was looked upon as a creature -whose blunders were as mischievous as his pretensions were ridiculous; -one, whose ideas of diplomacy were limited to the cultivation of a -moustache and the faculty of sitting cross-legged on the ground; who -talked largely about Durbar, rode out with a number of Sowars at his -heels; and was always on the point of capturing some fugitive chief, -and never achieving it after all. But this was only the more favourable -aspect of the picture. There was another and a darker side. He was -sometimes represented as a roaring lion, going about seeking whom he -should devour; unveiling Afghan ladies and pulling Afghan gentlemen by -the beard; inviting chiefs to a conference and then betraying them; -blowing Sirdars from guns; conniving at wholesale massacre; bribing -brothers to betray brothers, fathers their sons; keeping fierce dogs -to hound them at innocent countrymen; desecrating mosques, insulting -Moollahs, trampling on the Koran—in a word, committing every -conceivable outrage that cruelty and lust could devise. There was no -amount of baseness, indeed, of which these men were not supposed to be -capable; no licentiousness to which they were not addicted; no crimes -which they did not commit. This was the popular notion of an “Afghan -Political.” It was constantly illustrated in oral conversation and in -the local literature of the day. Men talked and wrote upon the subject -as though the question—if ever question there were—had long ago -been settled by common consent; and it was not until the war had been -brought to a close, that a doubt was raised respecting the validity of -the charges so generally brought against the Ishmaels of diplomacy in -the East. - -Very much of this is now mere exploded slander. I cannot say that -the political officers, who distinguished themselves throughout the -Afghanistan campaign, have _lived down_ the calumny of which they were -the victims. Very few of the number survive. But a reaction, in public -opinion, is discernible,—a growing disposition to do justice, at -least to the memories of the dead. Men speak and write more temperately -on the subject. Exaggeration no longer over-strides all our utterances -on this topic; and, in some cases, full justice has been done to the -noble qualities of head and heart which have adorned, perhaps do adorn -men amongst us, under the great “Political” reproach. - -It would serve no good purpose to run from one extreme into the other. -It is the evil of sudden reactions of popular feeling, that men escape -from one error only to be precipitated into another of an opposite -class. The system of political agency is not one of unmixed good; nor -are political agents exempt from the common frailties of humanity. -Many mistakes were unquestionably committed; sometimes a stronger word -might without exaggeration have been applied to the things that were -done in Afghanistan by our diplomatic agents. Diplomacy is, at all -times, a dangerous game. It has seldom, if ever, been played in any -part of the world, without some loss of purity, some departure from -integrity. In Europe, the diplomatist treads a tortuous path. Guile -is met with guile. Fraud is often counteracted by fraud. Minister -overreaches minister. One state jockeys another. And, in the affairs -of nations, arts are resorted to, which, in the concerns of private -life, would stamp the wily plotter with infamy not to be escaped. But, -in the East, in the midst of the worst contagion, tempted on every -side, stimulated by the fear of failure, irritated by the duplicity -of others, far greater is the difficulty of preserving intact the -diplomatic integrity which is exposed to so many corrupting influences. -I am not asserting the propriety of fighting all men with their own -weapons. I have no faith whatever in the worldly wisdom, apart from -all considerations of right and wrong, of playing off wile against -wile—meeting treachery with treachery—lie with lie. Such tactics -may succeed for a season; but, in the long run, truth and honesty -will be found the most effective weapons. All I desire to plead in -behalf of our Oriental diplomatists is the extraordinary temptations -to which they have been exposed. Many of them were necessarily without -experience in the difficult game; and, therefore, apprehensive of -failure—little confident in themselves, when called upon to encounter, -perhaps for the first time, the deep duplicity of Eastern intrigue. -Fearful of being drawn into a snare, and deeply impressed with a sense -of the responsibilities resting upon them, they have sometimes, in -their eagerness to bring negotiations to a successful issue, departed -from that strict line of integrity, which we could wish our countrymen -ever to maintain. This much at least must be admitted—but who has ever -gained a reputation as a skilful diplomatist without some deviation -from the straight path of open and truthful manliness of conduct? - -“If a man is too stupid or too lazy to drill his company,” wrote -General Nott, “he often turns sycophant, cringer to the heads of -departments, and is made a ‘Political,’ and of course puts the -government to an enormous expense, and disgraces the character of -his country.” Nothing was ever more unlike the truth. The Afghan -“Politicals” were among the best soldiers in the country. Many of them, -as Todd, Rawlinson, Nicolson, &c., were practised drill-instructors and -had shown an especial fitness for this particular duty in disciplining -foreign troops or raw levies. And no one, who takes account of the most -honourable incidents of the Afghan War, will overlook the military -services rendered by Pottinger, Macgregor, H. M. Lawrence, Mackeson, -Broadfoot, Outram, and others, who are known to us as Political Agents. -There have been no finer soldiers in the Indian Army than some of those -who distinguished themselves during the war in Afghanistan, under the -unpopular designation of “Politicals.” - - - - -CHAPTER V. - -[January-April: 1842.] - - The Last Days of Shah Soojah—State of Parties at Caubul—Condition - of the Hostages—the Newab Zemaun Khan—Letters of Shah Soojah—His - Death—Question of his Fidelity—His Character and Conduct considered. - - -It is time that I should pause in the narration of the retributory -measures of the British-Indian Government, to dwell, for a little -space, upon the events at Caubul which succeeded the departure of -Elphinstone’s army. It had been rumoured throughout India—and the -rumour had created no little astonishment in the minds of those who -had believed that the Caubul insurrection was a movement against the -Feringhees and the King—that ever since the departure of the former -Shah Soojah had continued to occupy the Balla Hissar, and had been -recognised as the supreme authority by the very men who had recently -been in arms against him. And the rumour was a perfect echo of the -truth. Ever since the departure of the British army Shah Soojah had -reigned at Caubul. - -He had reigned at Caubul, but he had not ruled. His power was merely -nominal. The chiefs wanted a puppet; and in the unhappy Shah they -found the only one who was ever likely to stand between them and the -vengeance of the British nation. Day after day they made their salaam -to him in the Balla Hissar; but so imperfect even was their outward -recognition of his regal dignity, that money was still coined in the -name of the Newab Zemaun Khan. The Newab, who had been raised to the -sovereignty by the voice of the chiefs soon after the first outbreak -of the insurrection, had cheerfully resigned the honour that had been -thrust upon him, and accepted the office of Wuzeer. Ameen-oollah Khan -was appointed Naib, or deputy. For a little time there was some outward -show of harmony; but there was no real union between the King and -the chiefs. The Barukzyes spoke scornfully of the King; and the King -could not refrain from expressing his mistrust of the whole tribe of -Barukzyes. Ameen-oollah Khan, openly swearing allegiance to both, seems -to have held the balance between the two opposing factions, and was in -reality the most influential man in the state. He had amassed, by fraud -and violence, large sums of money, which the other chiefs, straitened -as they were by an empty treasury, and unable to carry out any great -national measure, would fain have made him disgorge. From the Shah -himself they contrived to extort some three or four lakhs of rupees; -but when Akbar Khan wrote pressing letters to Caubul for guns and -ammunition, that he might lay siege to Jellalabad, no one would move -without pay, and money was not forthcoming. - -All parties were jealous of each other; and especially jealous of the -rising power of Akbar Khan. The young Barukzye was in Lughman; and the -elder chiefs at Caubul, even if they had possessed the money to enable -them to answer these emergent indents upon their military resources, -would have been little inclined to send him the reinforcements and -munitions for which he was continually writing. They talked about -raising an army of their own, and opposing the retributory march of -the British through the Khybur Pass; but the want of money presented -an insuperable obstacle to any military movement on a scale that -would afford a prospect of success. The Shah himself talked openly in -Durbar about standing forward as defender of the faith, and declaring -a religious war against the Kaffirs; but he privately assured Conolly -that he was heart and soul with the British, and he wrote long letters -to the Governor-General, Clerk, Macgregor, and others, declaring his -inviolable fidelity, and eagerly clamouring for money. - -In the mean while the English hostages remained under the protection -of Mahomed Zemaun Khan. Nothing could exceed the kindness of the good -old man. Faithful among the faithless, he was resolute to defend the -Christian strangers at all risks; and never, when the popular clamour -ran highest, and other men of note were thirsting for the blood of the -captives, did he waver for an instant in his determination to shield -the helpless Feringhees from the malice of his remorseless countrymen. -He was a Barukzye chief—a near relative of Dost Mahomed Khan; and -there was not among the Sirdars of all the tribes one in whom the -spirit of nationality glowed more strongly and more purely. But whilst -the independence of his country was as dear to him as to any of his -brethren, he did not burn with that fierce hatred against the English -which broke out in other places, nor did he ever, in the advancement -of the most cherished objects of his heart, stain his patriotism with -those foul crimes from which elsewhere there was little shrinking. -Regarding with abhorrence the conduct of those who had betrayed our -unhappy people, he himself did all that, single-handed, he could do, -to atone for the cruelty of his countrymen; and no father could have -treated his children more kindly than the good Newab cherished and -protected the English hostages who found a sanctuary in his house. - -But it was necessary, whilst the excitement ran so high at Caubul, -and there was a prospect of violent contention among the chiefs, to -do something more than this. Ameen-oollah Khan never slackened in his -exertions to obtain possession of the persons of the hostages. Having -tried every kind of stratagem, and failed to secure them by fraud, he -would have resorted to open violence. It was necessary, therefore, to -oppose force to force; so the Newab raised an army of his own. His -pecuniary resources were limited; but he did not hesitate to spend -his little store freely in entertaining followers. Mainly for the -protection of the English gentlemen he raised a body of 1000 footmen, -whom he armed with English bayonets; another body of 1000 horse, and -some Jezailchees—in all, about 3000 men. The English guns, too, were -in his possession, and he refused to yield them up to the Shah.[75] - -The King regarded his proceedings with mistrust. There was no sort of -cordiality between them. The old Suddozye and Barukzye strife seemed -about to be renewed with all its pristine vigour. At last the Shah, -about the middle of the month of March, corrupted the commandant of the -Newab’s army, who went over with all his followers to the Balla Hissar. -This event, which threatened entirely to change the state of parties at -the capital, threw all Caubul into a ferment. The shops were closed; -the people began to arm themselves. The Newab demanded the restoration -of his troops; but the King only yielded a conditional assent. He -appears at this time to have been entirely in the hands of Ameen-oollah -Khan; and he replied, that if the hostages were sent to the house of -the Loghur chief, the recreant commandant should be sent there at -the same time. The Newab, however, resolutely refused to give up the -English gentlemen. The proposal seems to have strengthened Conolly’s -suspicions of the fidelity of Shah Soojah. It nearly cost the hostages -their lives. - -It now seemed that Caubul was about to become the theatre of -internecine strife. The gates of the Balla Hissar were half closed, -and the Shah never ventured beyond them. The chiefs were all -mustering retainers. The King was endeavouring to cast suspicion on -the nationality of the Newab; and the Newab’s party were doubting -the fidelity of the King. The Populzye leaders of the insurrection -clustered round the monarch, but he had neither popularity nor power. -Money he had; but making an outward show of poverty, he resolutely -refused to produce it; and the people began to abuse him for his -parsimony. In this conjuncture he continued to write to the British -authorities, declaring that he could do anything for them if they -would only send him money; but the British authorities were deaf to his -entreaties, and only sent him advice.[76] - -But the difficulties of the Shah were now drawing to a close; his -days were numbered. Whilst he was awaiting the receipt of answers to -his letters, the excitement in Caubul was increasing—the division -among the chiefs was becoming more and more irreconcilable. Horribly -perplexed and bewildered, anxious at once to appear in the eyes of his -countrymen true to the national cause, and to retain the good-will of -the English by some show of fidelity to them, he fell into every kind -of inconsistency, was suspected by both parties, and either way was -rushing on destruction. At last the chiefs called upon him to prove -his sincerity by placing himself at the head of all the available -troops, and marching down upon Jellalabad. The Shah yielded a reluctant -consent; and, on the 29th of March sent round his criers to proclaim -that he was about to march southward on the 31st; that the chiefs were -to accompany him, and to send out their tents on the preceding day. -The summons was scantily obeyed. The Kuzzilbash chief declared that as -neither the King nor the minister had supplied him with money, he could -not move. The King said that he had no confidence in the chiefs, and -that, therefore, he would not go, but that Ameen-oollah might go for -him. And so the expedition was postponed. In the mean while, Akbar Khan -was writing urgent letters to Caubul clamouring for reinforcements, and -urging that it was wretched policy to be eternally at variance with one -another—quarrelling for money and quarrelling for rank—instead of -making common cause against the hated Feringhees.[77] - -After a pause of a few days the King again consented to march. His -suspicion of the Barukzyes, however, was not easily to be allayed. Nor -was it wholly without reason. Even impartial lookers-on prophesied -that if he left Caubul he would either be murdered or blinded by the -Barukzyes.[78] Aware of these suspicions, the Newab sent his wife to -Shah Soojah with a sealed Koran, assuring the King with a solemn oath -that the Barukzyes and other chiefs would be true to him. Fortified -by this assurance, the Shah moved out of the Balla Hissar on the 4th -of April, but before nightfall returned to the palace, determined -on the following morning to review his troops and then to start for -Jellalabad. Rising early on the morning of the 5th, he arrayed himself -in royal apparel, and, accompanied by a small party of Hindostanees, -proceeded under a salute, in a chair of state, towards his camp, which -had been pitched at Seeah-Sungh. But Soojah-ool-dowlah, the son of -the Newab, had gone out before him, and placed in ambush a party of -Jezailchees. As the Shah and his followers were making their way -towards the regal tent, the marksmen fired upon them. The volley took -murderous effect. Several of the bearers and of the escort were struck -down; and the King himself killed on the spot. A ball had entered his -brain. Soojah-ool-dowlah then rode up; and as he contemplated his -bloody work, the body of the unhappy King, vain and pompous as he was -to the very last, was stripped of all the jewels about it—the jewelled -dagger, the jewelled girdle, the jewelled head-dress; and it was then -cast into a ditch. - -The news of the King’s murder spread like wildfire. Great was the -consternation. Futteh Jung, the second son of the Shah, on receiving -the sad tidings of his father’s death, made with all speed towards -the Balla Hissar; but the gates were guarded; so he turned back and -sought refuge in the fort of Mahomed Khan, Bayat. That night however, -Mahomed Khan, in concert with Ameen-oollah, who held the Balla Hissar, -restored the Prince to the palace; and they agreed to proclaim him -King. The body of Shah Soojah was recovered, and for some days it -lay in state. The royal family declared that until sentence had been -passed upon the murderer it should not be buried. The Moollahs were -assembled to expound the punishment due to so atrocious an offender; -and they pronounced, on the authority of their religious books, that -the murderer of the King should be stoned to death. But Ameen-oollah -Khan interposed. He said that it was not a time to carry out such a -sentence; all parties were bound to league themselves together to fight -against the Feringhees; and intestine animosities ought therefore to be -forgot. - -To no one were the circumstances of the Shah’s death a source of -deeper horror and regret than to the good old Newab, the father of the -murderer. He is said to have sworn an oath never again to see his son -beneath his roof, or to suffer him to be named in his presence.[79] -Various circumstances have been assigned as the proximate causes of -the murder of the unfortunate Shah. It was said that he had drawn down -upon himself the increased animosity of the Barukzyes, by appointing to -the command of the army a son of Ameen-oollah Khan. Akbar Khan, too, -had recently been wounded by an accidental shot from a Pesh-Khidmut, -or attendant, which was said to have been designed to take the life of -the Sirdar; and it had been rumoured that Shah Soojah had bribed the -man to make the murderous attempt. That the Newab Zemaun Khan was not -implicated in the foul transaction, all men are willing to believe; -but it was intended to strengthen the party of which he was then the -acknowledged chief. It was the consummation of the great strife which -for forty years had been raging between Shah Soojah and the Barukzye -Sirdars. Indeed, it would have been little in accordance with the -general tenor of Afghan history if this unfortunate Prince had not died -a violent death. After so eventful a life, it would have been strange -indeed if he had sunk to rest peaceably on his bed. - -Among the obscurer points of Afghan history, there is not one more -obscure than that which involves the question of the fidelity of Shah -Soojah. That doubts were cast upon his sincerity has been already -shown. Conscious of this, he entered upon a defence of his conduct -in a series of letters to the British authorities which I have now -given to the world. Written hastily, and under the influence of -strong excitement, they carry very little conviction with them. The -main object of these letters appears to have been the extraction of -money from the British treasury. The Shah continued to assert, that -having no money he had no power, but that if money were sent to him -he would be able to do great things for his late allies. Death makes -many revelations. The death of Shah Soojah revealed the mendacity and -the avarice of the man. Some twenty lakhs of rupees, besides jewels -of large value, were found to have been in his possession when he -died.[80] This disagreeable circumstance, though by no means conclusive -against the general fidelity of the Shah, certainly will not predispose -the inquirer to take an unduly favourable view of his conduct. - -It must, however, be always kept steadily in view, that the -circumstances of Shah Soojah’s position were such as to surround him -with an atmosphere of doubt and suspicion. That the chiefs made use -of the King’s name at the outset of the insurrection, and produced an -inflammatory document said to bear the royal seal, is one of the most -notorious facts in the entire history of the war. The seal was genuine, -but the document was a supposititious one. Nothing is more common, -in times of popular excitement, than for the Afghans to endeavour to -injure one another by giving currency to forged instruments. It was -to the last degree improbable that, at this time, Shah Soojah should -have committed himself by putting the seal to any documents which -might have fallen into the hands of his European allies, and laid -bare the blackness of his treachery. But that he would have been glad -to have cast off the Feringhee alliance, and to have ruled without -the restraint of our superintendence and interference, is not to be -questioned. He may, therefore, have regarded with inward satisfaction -the progress of the insurrectionary movement, and rejoiced in its -ultimate success; but he does not appear to have been more than a -passive instrument in the hands of others. It was obviously his policy -to appear all things to all people. He could not venture to take any -decided course. He never in the prime of life had been conspicuous for -manliness of character; and now, in his old age, he was more than ever -a waverer and a waiter upon fortune. Perhaps, I should not err if I -were to say that he was true neither to his own countrymen nor to his -British allies. He was prepared to side with either the one or the -other, according to the direction in which the tide of success might -be seen to flow. He had no affection for the English; but he dearly -loved English money. He knew the value of British aid; but he would -fain have had it from a distance. From the very first he had disliked -the obtrusive manner in which it had been forced upon him. He wanted -the _prestige_ of British support without the incumbrance of British -control. To retain our friendship, and yet to rid himself of our -presence, was unquestionably the desire of the Shah; but it is doubtful -whether his desire would ever have shaped itself into any overt acts of -hostility against the government which had restored him to the throne -of his fathers. He was not deficent of gratitude, even if there had -been anything to call it forth;[81] but he had sufficient sagacity -to know that his political existence was dependent upon the will of -the British Government. And he was cautious not to do anything to -provoke its vengeance. The chiefs believed, at the commencement of the -November outbreak, that though the insurrection would soon be crushed, -such a manifestation of popular feeling would in all probability cause -the British authorities to tremble for the safety of their position, -and induce them to evacuate the country in the ensuing spring. -Encouraging a similar belief, Shah Soojah may have regarded with inward -satisfaction the outbreak of the revolution. But he was surprised and -alarmed by the rapidity of its progress; and was wholly unprepared for -the sanguinary termination of his connection with his Christian allies. -That he was in a state of painful depression and prostration throughout -the entire period of the insurrection is not to be questioned; and -it is scarcely less certain that he never wholly recovered from the -terror which then bewildered him. The irruption culminated somewhat -too violently for a man of Shah Soojah’s temperament; and when he -found what a convulsion had been raised around him, he shrunk back in -dismay. On either side dangers and difficulties started up in his path. -He strove to save himself by doing little, and being to all outward -seeming the friend both of the Afghan insurgents and their European -foes. Duplicity is never long successful. Doubted by both parties, the -king became an object of general contempt. He trimmed between the two -contending hosts, and escaped the rocks on neither side of the vessel. - -On such a question as this, it is right that the opinions of the -leading political officers, who were best acquainted with the character -and the conduct of the Shah, and had the best opportunities of -investigating the circumstances of the Caubul insurrection, should be -summarily recorded. “To my mind,” wrote Captain Mackeson to Mr. Clerk, -“there has ever appeared but little doubt that his Majesty Shah Soojah -was, in the commencement, the instigator of the Caubul insurrection. -Had the first blow struck by the rebels been effectual, his Majesty -might, perhaps, have thrown off the mask earlier; but our troops in -cantonments held their position though surrounded by foes without -number, whilst those in the Balla Hissar held his Majesty in check. -Nay, the chances were at one time so much in favour of our success, -that his Majesty discarded his own instruments, refusing all their -solicitations to place himself at their head. To such an extent did -he carry his reluctant adherence to us, that at length the rebels, in -their turn, were obliged to seek for a leader among the Barukzyes. His -Majesty then husbanded his own resources, allowing the Barukzyes and -our people to fight out the battle. Sir William Macnaghten would not -have treated with Mahomed Akbar Khan had he not been convinced of the -treachery towards us of Shah Soojah.”[82] - -Captain Macgregor’s opinion coincides, but with some amount of -qualification, with that of the last witness. “I agree with you” -(Mackeson), he wrote, “in thinking that the Shah was more or less -implicated in the insurrection; but when he saw that it took such a -serious turn, I really believe that he repented—even so soon as he -heard of Burnes’s assassination, and of the massacre of the other -officers in the city. His Majesty pressed Sir William to remove all the -British troops into the Balla Hissar, which in itself looked like a -friendly feeling towards us.”[83] - -The opinion of Major Rawlinson sets in an opposite direction. It throws -a side-light from Candahar on the conduct of the Shah at this time. -“From everything I can learn, I should say that the Shah was certainly -well inclined to us; and, if assured of our again placing confidence -in him, would cordially support our advance. He has certainly done as -little as he could, keeping up appearances with the Mussulman party, to -complicate our position at this place, and I learn that for some time -past the prevalent opinion in the Douranee camp has been that the Shah -desired our success.”[84] - -Captain Mackenzie’s opinion, as to the conduct and motives of the -Shah, involves some considerations not noticed by others: “The king -highly esteemed and loved Macnaghten personally, as indeed all the -Afghans did who came into direct intercourse with that accomplished -and courteous English gentleman. Macnaghten’s chivalrous consideration -for the proud but dependant monarch, who felt his somewhat false -position keenly, had been unvarying and unremitting: perhaps more so -than the public interests warranted. But we can afford to admire the -high tone and delicacy of the envoy’s motives, especially as few public -functionaries are likely to be misled by similar knightly scruples. The -king more than once openly discussed with Macnaghten the likelihood -of attempts to sow dissension between them, by the propagation of -reports of his want of faith towards his British allies, and he always -added: “You are yourself aware that you are as necessary to me as -my nails are to my fingers.” Burnes was a man of totally different -temperament from Macnaghten, and his demeanour towards the king was -neither conciliatory nor deferential. It is not saying too much, that -the king hated him; he was aware that his friend the Envoy was about -to depart from Caubul, thus leaving him in Burnes’s hands; and after a -careful consideration of the character of his proceedings from first to -last, of the nature of the motives by which he was generally actuated -(_i. e._ petty and personal), and also of the opinion of many of the -most intelligent Afghans, the most probable conjecture is, that Shah -Soojah was aware of the plot and combination against himself and the -Feringhees before the outbreak; that he hoped it would be sufficient to -detain Macnaghten in the country, but not enough to baffle our military -power; and that, when he became thoroughly alarmed on the morning of -the 2nd of November, he did his best to quell the insurrection, and -openly expressed his astonishment and disappointment at the apathy and -inefficiency of the English leaders and their troops. He can scarcely, -with due consideration for the peculiarities of the Asiatic mind, and -the desperate circumstances of his position, be judged by the European -standard of honour and morality, if he subsequently temporised with the -dominant Barukzyes. He well knew what he had to expect at their hands, -and he fully anticipated the fate which afterwards overtook him.”[85] - -But of all the officers connected with the British Mission, John -Conolly was the one who enjoyed the best opportunities of arriving at -a correct estimate of the conduct of the Shah. During the insurrection -he was in attendance on the king at the Balla Hissar, and he was at -Caubul up to the time of his death. Conolly’s opinions are on record. -He seems at one time to have entertained the strongest possible -conviction that the Shah was true to his British allies. “I believe,” -he wrote on the 17th of January, “that he is heart and soul in our -interest; and it is contrary to all reason to suppose otherwise.” But -by the 15th of February his belief in the fidelity of the Shah seems to -have been shaken; for he wrote to Macgregor: “It is generally believed -and asserted throughout the town that his Majesty instigated the late -rebellion. I have never been able to prove the accusation, though I -cannot but think that he was, directly or indirectly, the cause of -the revolution.” A month afterwards, writing still more distinctly to -General Pollock, he cast further doubts on the fidelity of the Shah. -“I would suggest,” he said, “that some direct understanding be come -to with his Majesty. It is generally believed that he caused the late -rebellion; and his conduct lately has been strange, to say the least -of it. He tried to raise a popular tumult against us, hoping thereby -to ruin the Newab. He did not interest himself in any way about our -sick when their wretched, helpless condition was formally represented -to him in a petition from me—added to the circumstance alluded to of -his telling our host to send us to Ameen-oollah, who is our most bitter -enemy. He is, moreover, surrounded by the Populzye leaders of the late -insurrection, whose persons, I presume, our government will demand. I -have not received a letter from him for a month; but the fear of being -suspected of being in communication with us may be the cause of his -disregard of us.” And again, at the end of the month, writing to Major -Rawlinson, he said: “The king is generally abused, and reported as the -instigator of the late rebellion. He has proved himself, I think, -unworthy of our friendship. If we are not able to prove his villany, -his cunning will, no doubt, prompt him to side with us on the near -approach of our troops, for he is well aware that his subjects would -seize him if he ventured out of the Balla Hissar. He is, as the Afghans -say, like grain between two mill-stones.”[86] - -Many more passages might be cited from the correspondence of our -political officers, to show the opinions entertained at this time by -those most competent to determine the question of the Shah’s fidelity. -But, after all, the question remains an open one. The future historian -may still lose himself in a sea of conjecture. From the facts before -us, and from all that is known of the character of Shah Soojah, the -inference is, as I have said, that the king was faithful neither to -his own countrymen nor to his British allies. He was at best a poor -creature. He had few good qualities. But it should in justice be -remembered, that he was surrounded by circumstances against which an -abler and a better man might have struggled in vain. He had long been -greatly perplexed and embarrassed by the anomalies of his position. -He was tired of playing the part of the puppet; and had begun to long -for an opportunity either of becoming king indeed, or of throwing down -the trappings and the cares of royalty, and ending his days in the -calm security of his old asylum at Loodhianah. He used to say that -Macnaghten did all the good that was done in Afghanistan—and all the -evil too; for that he himself did nothing. Unpopular measures of which -he was not the author were executed in his name; he was compelled -outwardly to sanction much of which he inwardly disapproved; he saw -dangers thickening around him without the power of averting them, and -painfully felt that he had always been a cipher, and had now become a -hissing and a reproach. - -Under the directorship which we had forced upon him, Shah Soojah was -not happy. He was altogether a disappointed man. He did not find -the sweets of restored dominion what he expected them to be. He was -an isolated being. The sympathies neither of the Afghans nor of -the English were with him. All men suspected him. None loved him. -When, therefore, he talked about leaving Caubul, he was probably not -insincere; but he may have thought sometimes that if the English would -leave Caubul, he might enjoy his sovereignty more. If to have desired -to rid himself of an incubus, which sate so heavily upon him, was to be -faithless to the British, Shah Soojah was unquestionably faithless; but -this is a kind of infidelity so common to humanity of all ranks and in -all places, that to record it against the Shah is only to say that he -was a man. - -But as regards the actions of the King, it is to be observed that Shah -Soojah was not a man of action. His early life had been one rather of -strenuous passiveness than of genuine activity. Since the British had -taken him in hand, he had actually done nothing. When the insurrection -burst over Caubul, he sate down and waited. After the departure of -the British, he sate down and waited. He was afraid of both parties; -and unwilling to declare himself openly until he could clearly see -how the contest would end. He had not strength of mind sufficient to -keep him faithful to any one. He was not even true to himself. The -question is less a question of fact than of character. The solution of -the difficulty is to be found in the idiosyncrasy of the man. He had -led a very eventful life; but the vicissitudes of his career had not -strengthened his character. Anything decided, active, or energetic, was -not to be expected from him. The infirmity of age was now superadded -to the infirmity of purpose which had characterised his greener -manhood; and if he had taken any decided part in the great contest -which followed the outburst of the Caubul insurrection, it would have -been an inconsistency at variance with the whole tenor of his past -life. As it was, the conduct of the man in this crisis was in keeping -with all that was known of his character and his antecedents. Shah -Soojah was not a hero; and he did not play a heroic part. The British -Government had picked him out of the dust of Loodhianah, simply as a -matter of convenience to themselves; and they had no reason to complain -that, in a great and imminent conjuncture, he thought less of their -convenience than his own. He proved himself at the last to be very much -what we had helped to make him. We could not expect him to be an active -workman, when we had so long used him as a tool. - - - - -BOOK VIII. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - -[November, 1841-April, 1842.] - - Affairs at Candahar—Evil Tidings from Caubul—Maclaren’s - Brigade—Spread of the Insurrection—Arrival of Atta Mahmed—Flight - of Sufdur Jung—Attack on the Douranee Camp—Continued - Hostilities—Attack upon the City—Action in the Valley of the - Urghundab—Fall of Ghuznee—Defence of Khelat-i-Ghilzye—Movements of - England’s Brigade. - - -The attention of the reader ought now no longer to be withheld from -that part of the country where General Nott and Major Rawlinson were -gallantly and successfully holding out against the insurgent Douranees, -and maintaining the character of the British nation before the tribes -of Western Afghanistan. At the beginning of November, wrote Rawlinson, -in a summary of events, drawn up with such masterly distinctness and -comprehensiveness, that the historian has little to do, in this place, -but to submit himself to its guidance;[87] “affairs wore a more -tranquil and promising appearance in the Candahar province than I had -ever witnessed since my assumption of the charge of the agency. Akram -Khan, the leader of the Derawat rebellion, captured by Lieutenant -Conolly, had been executed at this place by his Majesty’s orders. -Eight of the most influential of his colleagues had been sent by me, -according to the orders of the Envoy, under the charge of Lieutenant -Crawford, to Caubul; that officer having my written instructions to -destroy his prisoners in the event of an attempt at rescue. The Hazareh -and the Belooch tribes had been effectually conciliated; the Douranees -of the northern and western districts had been humbled and overawed.” - -The troops then at Candahar consisted of her Majesty’s 40th Regiment; -the 2nd, 16th, 38th, 40th, and 43rd Regiments of Bengal Native -Infantry; Captain Blood’s battery (Bombay Artillery); the Shah’s -Horse Artillery, under Captain Anderson; some regiments of the -Shah’s infantry, and some detachments of Irregular Horse (Shah’s -and Skinner’s), the weakness of the force lying in this arm. The -tranquillity of the country seemed to authorise the diminution of this -force, and a brigade, comprising the 16th, 42nd, and 43rd Regiments of -Bengal Native Infantry, was about to proceed, under Colonel Maclaren, -to the provinces of Hindostan. On the 7th of November it commenced -its march; but on the evening of that day some startling intelligence -was brought into Candahar. A detachment of 130 men under Captain -Woodburn—that officer who, in the month of July, had so distinguished -himself on the banks of the Helmund, in action with the Douranee rebels -under Akhtar Khan—was proceeding from Candahar to Caubul, when, on -the 2nd of November, after they had passed Ghuznee, they were attacked -by swarms of Afghans, through whom, with consummate gallantry and -skill, Woodburn fought his way to the little fort of Syedabad. The -place was occupied by a man supposed to be friendly to us;[88] and the -English officer, surrounded as he was by the enemy, gladly accepted his -offer of protection. But there was no safety within the fort. For a day -and a night he held his position against a besieging enemy, and nobly -he defended himself. But his ammunition fell short; and then there came -tidings of the success of the insurgents at Caubul. On this, the chief -admitted parties of the enemy into the towers of his own Harem, which -overlooked the court-yard, in which the Sepoys were quartered. Then the -massacre commenced. Many of the Sepoys were killed on the spot. Others -threw themselves over the walls, and were shot down outside the fort. -Woodburn himself, with a few of his men, took post in a tower of their -own court, and for some hours they gallantly defended themselves. But -they fell at last. The enemy burnt them out; and massacred them almost -to a man. - -On receipt of this intelligence Rawlinson at once recommended the -General to halt Maclaren’s brigade. It was accordingly brought back to -Candahar. It was plain that some mischief was brewing in the country -to the north. A week of doubt and anxiety passed; and then letters -came from Macnaghten and Elphinstone, announcing that Caubul was in a -state of insurrection, and ordering Maclaren’s brigade to be despatched -at once to the capital. These letters came on with indorsements from -Colonel Palmer at Ghuznee, and Major Leech at Khelat-i-Ghilzye, which -showed that in the intervening country there were signs of the coming -storm.[89] On the 17th of November, accompanied by a troop of horse -artillery, the three regiments commenced their march to the northward. - -Anticipating that some evil might arise from the presence of the -Prince, Sufder Jung, in the province, after his supercession by his -elder and better disposed brother, Rawlinson had invited him to come in -from Zemindawer, and he now suggested the expediency of his proceeding -to Caubul, with Captain Hart’s Janbaz regiment, which was to follow in -the rear of Maclaren’s brigade. The Prince yielded to the suggestion, -and went. The fidelity of the Afghan horse was doubtful, and Rawlinson -was glad to rid himself of the presence both of a discontented Prince -and a body of treacherous Afghan horsemen—soldiers raised, mounted, -armed, equipped and disciplined by Shah Soojah and his British -supporters, seemingly for the one sole purpose of drawing their swords -against the very power to which they owed their military existence. - -All through the month of November Candahar remained tranquil. But it -was obvious that the course of insurrection was setting towards the -West. Tidings came in from the country about Ghuznee, which showed that -the road to the capital was infested by the insurgents. Lieutenant -Crawford, who was escorting the Douranee prisoners to Caubul had been -attacked by overwhelming numbers near Ghuznee; and had suffered his -prisoners to escape; or rather, had lost them, with all his baggage, -and a considerable number of his horses and men.[90] Soon afterwards -Guddoo Khan, an Afghan officer in the service of the Shah and his -British supporters, who had accompanied Crawford’s detachment—a -man of unimpeachable integrity and unquestionable gallantry and good -conduct—was on his return from Ghuznee to Candahar “overpowered by -numbers and slain, with seventeen of his best men, losing at the -same time forty-five horses, and all the arms and baggage of the -Ressaleh.” These incidents seemed to portend the near approach of the -thunder-clouds that were breaking over Caubul. Candahar was as yet only -beneath the skirts of the storm. - -On the 8th of December Maclaren’s brigade returned to Candahar. How -it happened that these regiments had failed to make good their march -to Caubul is not to be satisfactorily explained. It is still stated -by officers who accompanied the detachment, that the difficulties of -the march have been greatly exaggerated; and that, at all events, they -might have been overcome. Nott sent the brigade with a reluctance -which he took no care to conceal. It was his wish to retain the -three regiments at Candahar; and he was not a man to shrink from the -utterance of his feelings on such a subject as this. “Remember,” he -said to Maclaren and his staff, when they presented themselves at the -General’s quarters to take leave of their old commandant, “the despatch -of this brigade to Caubul is not my doing. I am compelled to defer to -superior authority; but in my own private opinion I am sending you -all to destruction.” The brigade marched; but, starting under such -auspices, there was little likelihood of its reaching its destination. -There were few officers in the force who did not know that, on the -first colourable pretext, it would be turned back. - -A pretext very soon presented itself. Two marches beyond -Khelat-i-Ghilyze there was a light fall of snow. On the following day -there was more snow, and some of the commissariat donkeys died upon -the road. On the next, Maclaren halted the brigade, and ordered a -committee to assemble and report upon the state of the commissariat -cattle, with reference to their fitness for the continuance of their -march to Caubul. The committee assembled; registered the number of -deaths among the carriage-cattle during the two preceding days; and -reported that as winter had now set in, and as the loss of cattle -would increase every march that was made to the northward, it would -be impracticable for the force to reach Caubul at all in an efficient -state. On this, about the end of November, Maclaren ordered the brigade -to retrace its steps. - -But the snow had now ceased. The little that had fallen soon melted -away, and for weeks not another flake fell throughout the entire -country. The weather was remarkably fine and open; and there is not a -doubt that the brigade might easily have made good its way to Caubul. -But it does not appear ever to have been seriously intended that the -force should reach its destination. Maclaren and his officers knew -well that the return of the brigade to Candahar would be welcome to -General Nott, and that there was not likely to be a very close inquiry -into the circumstances attending the retrograde movement. There was in -reality little more than a show of proceeding to the relief of Caubul. -The regiments were wanted at Candahar; and to Candahar they returned. -How far their arrival might have helped to save Elphinstone’s force -from destruction can only be conjectured. But it is said that both the -English and the Afghan hosts looked with eager anxiety to the arrival -or the repulse of Maclaren, as the event which was to determine the -issue of the pending struggle. The relief of Ghuznee, would in itself -have been great gain to us, for it would have opened the road between -that place and Caubul, and have sent many of the rebellious tribes -to their home; and that the appearance of reinforcements would have -determined many waverers, the venal and vacillating Kuzzelbashes -included, to side with the British, may be recorded as a certainty. -It is right, however, to admit the belief, that if Nott had known to -what straits the Caubul army would soon be reduced, he would not have -uttered a word to encourage the return of the relieving brigade to -Candahar. - -But whatever may have been the causes of the failure, soon after the -retrograde movement of Maclaren’s brigade became known, unmistakeable -signs of inquietude were discernible in the neighbourhood of Candahar. -Mahomed Atta Khan had been detached by the Caubul party to raise an -insurrection in Western Afghanistan. No sooner had the chief reached -the frontier than such unequivocal symptoms of popular excitement began -to manifest themselves, that Major Rawlinson at once perceived the -necessity of adopting active measures for the suppression of disorder -and the maintenance of the tranquillity of the surrounding country. -His efforts in the first instance were directed to the avoidance of -any actual collision with the people, and the preservation of outward -smoothness and regularity in the administration of affairs. With this -primal object, he withdrew from the outlying districts all the detached -troops, and concentrated them at Candahar. A single party of Janbaz, -protected by the Hazarehs from the possibility of attack, were left -in Tezeen, whilst all the other troops, Hindostanee and Afghan, were -posted in and around the city of Candahar. But this was not enough. -The safety of our military position might be provided for; but it was -not sufficient to feel confident of our ability to overcome any enemy -that might venture to attack us. It was obviously expedient to strike -rather at the root than at the branches; to prevent the growth of -rebellion rather than to beat it down full-grown. At all events, it -was politic to secure such a division of parties as would annihilate -even the possibility of a powerful coalition against us. Relying upon -the general unpopularity of the Barukzyes with the Douranee tribes, -whom the Sirdars had so long and so severely oppressed, Major Rawlinson -exerted himself to get up a Douranee movement in our favour. He bound -the chiefs, by all the most solemn oaths that Mahomedanism affords, -to stand firm in their allegiance to Shah Soojah and the Shah-zadah -Timour. The priesthood ratified the bond; and the families of the -Douranee chiefs were placed as hostages for their fidelity in the -hands of the British officers. The chiefs themselves, with Prince -Timour’s eldest son at their head, and accompanied by Meerza Ahmed, -the Revenue-manager of Candahar, a man of considerable talents and -unsuspected fidelity, to whom Major Rawlinson had entrusted a lakh -of rupees for the management of the movement, were despatched to the -eastern frontier to raise the tribes against the Barukzyes and their -Ghilzye allies. In the meanwhile the British at Candahar remained -apparently unconcerned spectators of the contest, which, it was hoped, -would resolve itself into a question of Suddozye or Barukzye supremacy -in the Douranee Empire. - -The objects contemplated by Major Rawlinson were, however, only -partially attained. He succeeded in gaining time, and in removing the -Douranee chiefs from the neighbourhood of our camp. “The Douranees -quitted Candahar in the middle of December, delayed for a considerable -time the advance of Mahomed Atta Khan, and prevented to the utmost of -their power the spread of religious fanaticism among their tribes.” -But the good faith so apparent at the outset was destined soon to be -overclouded. As long as the Douranees believed that to carry out the -wishes of the British was really to fight the battle of the Suddozyes, -they were true to our cause; but they soon began to give credit to -the report that Shah Soojah himself was in the ranks of our enemies, -and then they fell away from us. Even Meerza Ahmed, in whom so much -confidence had been reposed, turned his fine talents against us, and -became the mainspring of a hostile Douranee movement. - -But they did not at once declare themselves. For a while the Douranees -quietly watched the progress of affairs. Those events as they -developed themselves seemed more and more favourable to the spread of -insurrection in western Afghanistan. As the old year wore to a close, -it seemed that our difficulties were thickening, and the new year came -in with a crowd of fresh embarrassments. Sufder Jung had returned to -Candahar. On the retrogression of Maclaren’s brigade he had declared -that he could not trust the Janbaz to escort him to Caubul, and again -set his face towards the south. The presence of these traitorous -horsemen at Candahar had always been a source of considerable anxiety -to Major Rawlinson. The 1st Regiment of Afghan horse had been in -Zemindawer; and when the political agent recalled the other troops from -that part of the country, it was his intention that the Janbaz should -remain at Ghirisk. Their enmity to the surrounding tribes was so well -known, that there was less chance of their uniting with the rebels in -that part of the country than in any other. Owing, however, to the -miscarriage of a letter, Rawlinson’s intentions were defeated. The -Janbaz returned to Candahar with the other details of the Zemindawer -detachment, on the 9th of December. But Rawlinson was determined -to remove them. He suspected their treachery; but sooner than he -anticipated, they threw off all disguise, and openly arrayed themselves -against us. - -Before daybreak on the 27th of December the men of the Janbaz regiments -were to have commenced their march to Ghirisk. There were 250 men of -the 1st Regiment under Lieutenant Golding, and 150 of the 2nd under -Lieutenant Wilson. Lieutenant Pattinson was to accompany them in -political charge. The object of the movement was two-fold—to escort -treasure and ammunition to Ghirisk, and to remove from Candahar a -body of men whose fidelity was more than suspected. Two hours after -midnight the party was to have moved and made a double march, for the -purpose of clearing the villages on the Urghundab, which had been -greatly excited during the few preceding days. Golding was ready at the -appointed hour; but, through some misconception of orders, Wilson’s -men were not prepared to march. So the movement was countermanded. -Golding and Pattinson, therefore, returned to the tent of the former, -and laid themselves down again to sleep. The 1st Janbaz regiment had -been drawn up ready for the march with their cattle loaded, and the -postponement of the movement now took them by surprise. They had laid -a plot to mutiny and desert upon the march, and they believed that the -conspiracy had been detected. After waiting for half an hour, drawn up -in the chill air of early morning, they determined at once to throw -off the mask; so they streamed into Golding’s tent with their drawn -swords, and attacked the two officers in their beds. When they thought -that their bloody work was complete, they rushed confusedly out of the -tent, mounted their horses, and fled. The treasure was plundered, and -some horses belonging to Golding and Pattinson were carried off; but -nothing else was touched by the assassins. Pattinson was stunned by a -blow on the head, but recovering his senses, he made his way out of the -tent, wounded as he was in seven places, mounted a horse which his -Meerza had saddled on the spot, and effected his escape.[91] Golding -was less fortunate. He rushed out of his tent, and fled on foot towards -the cantonments; but the Janbaz followed and cut him down when within a -short distance of our camp.[92] - -A party of the Shah’s horse under Captain Leeson, and a detachment of -Lieutenant Wilson’s Janbaz, who had remained true to us in the face of -strong temptation, were sent out against the mutineers. The detachment -came up with the rebels about twelve miles from Candahar. There was a -brief but sturdy conflict. The mutineers charged in a body, but were -gallantly met by Leeson’s men; and after a hand-to-hand struggle, were -broken and dispersed.[93] Thirty of their number were killed by our -cavalry, who followed up their advantage; many more were wounded, and -the remainder fled in confusion to the camp of Atta Mahomed. - -Two days after the defection of the Janbaz, Prince Sufder Jung fled -from Candahar, and joined the camp of Atta Mahomed. The Sirdar had -fixed his head-quarters at Dehli, about forty miles from Candahar, -and there, early in January, Rawlinson was eager to attack him. The -political agent saw clearly the expediency of crushing the insurrection -in the bud. Every day was adding to the importance of the movement, -and swelling the number of the insurgents. Some of the tribes were -standing aloof, unwilling to declare themselves against us, yet in -hourly expectation of being compelled to secure their own safety by -ranging themselves under the banners of the Prince. But the General was -unwilling to divide his force; and refused to send a brigade to Dehli. -Whilst Rawlinson urged strong political considerations in favour of -promptitude of action, Nott, with equal firmness, took his stand upon -military grounds, and argued that it would be inexpedient, at such a -season of the year, to send a portion of his force a distance of forty -miles from Candahar to beat up the quarters of a fugitive Prince. -“Sufder Jung,” wrote Rawlinson, “has fixed his abode at Dehli, and has -declared himself the leader of an insurrection, aiming at our expulsion -from the country. Up to the present time no very considerable number -of men have joined his standard, and the only chiefs in attendance of -any note, are those who have accompanied Mahomed Atta Khan from Caubul, -together with the Ghilzye leaders, Sumud Khan, Meer Alim Khan, and the -Gooroo. It would thus be an easy matter by the detachment of a brigade -to Dehli to break up the insurgent force, and whether the rebels fought -or fled, the consequences would be almost of equal benefit with regard -to the restoration of tranquillity. But I anticipate a very serious -aggravation of affairs if we allow the Prince to remain unmolested -for any length of time at Dehli, or to move from that place in the -direction of Candahar with the avowed purpose of attacking us. Our -inactivity would not fail to be ascribed by the great body of the -Ooloos to an inability to act on the offensive, and an impression of -this sort having once gained ground, the natural consequences, in the -present highly excited state of religious feeling, would be a general -rise of the population against us.”[94] - -Reason and experience were both on the side of this argument, and -Rawlinson stated the case clearly and well. But Nott took a soldier’s -view of the question. He argued, that to send out a brigade at such -a season of the year, so far from its supports, would be to destroy -his men in the field, and to expose the city to the attacks of the -enemy. “I conceive,” he wrote in reply to Rawlinson’s letter, “that -the whole country is in a state of rebellion, and that nothing but -the speedy concentration of the troops at this place has saved the -different detachments from being destroyed in detail, and the city of -Candahar from being besieged.... Because this young Prince is said to -have assembled 1000 or 1500 followers at a distance of forty miles from -Candahar, it would, indeed, be truly absurd were I, in the very depth -of winter, to send a detachment wandering about the country in search -of the rebel fugitive, destroying my men amidst frost and snow, killing -the few carriage-cattle we have left, and thus be totally disabled at -the proper season from moving ten miles in any direction from the city, -or even have the means of falling back, should that unfortunately ever -become necessary.”[95] - -The movements of the rebel army soon settled the question between -them. No attempt having been made to dislodge the insurgent chiefs, -they quietly moved down the valley of the Urghundab, and on the 12th -of January took post on the river, about five miles to the west of the -city of Candahar. - -General Nott lost no time in moving out to attack them. Taking with -him five and a half regiments of infantry, the Shah’s 1st Cavalry, a -party of Skinner’s Horse, and sixteen guns,[96] a formidable body of -troops, weak only in the mounted branch—he made a four hours’ march -over a few miles of country, and came upon the enemy,[97] posted -near the fortified village of Killa-chuk, on the right bank of the -Urghundab. The British troops crossed the river, and at once advanced -in column of battalions, flanked by the artillery and cavalry, to the -attack. The action was of brief duration. At the end of twenty minutes, -during which our guns and musketry, telling with deadly effect upon -the heavy masses of the enemy, were answered by a wild and ineffective -fire from their ranks, the rebel army was in confusion and flight. The -Ghilzyes fled in one direction; the Janbaz in another; the people from -the villages[98] hastened to their own homes. Atta Mahomed attempted -to make a stand; but our troops moved forward—carried the village by -storm—and slaughtered every man, woman, and child, within its walls. -The British line was then reformed, and Atta Mahomed prepared to meet -a second attack. But the cavalry, with two horse-artillery guns, were -now slipped upon the enemy, who broke and fled in dismay; and the -humiliation of Atta Mahomed and his princely ally was complete.[99] - -The Douranee chiefs now began to throw off the mask. They moved down to -the assistance of the rebel army, but the battle had been fought before -they could arrive upon the field, and they only came up in time to -see their countrymen in panic flight.[100] Sufder Jung, Atta Mahomed, -and the other rebel chiefs found an honourable refuge in the Douranee -camp; and from that time, they who had left Candahar as our friends, -presented a front of open hostility to our authority.[101] - -Meerza Ahmed was the head-piece of the Douranee party. Nott had -pronounced him a traitor.[102] Rawlinson had now ceased to believe in -his fidelity; but he had never ceased to respect his talents. He knew -him to be an Afghan of rare ability, and he believed that the sagacity -of the Meerza would not suffer him to doubt the difference between -the power of his countrymen and that of the British Government. But -the Meerza had sounded the depth of the difficulties which surrounded -us with no little accuracy, and had estimated aright the nature -of the crisis. He saw in the distance our compulsory abandonment -of Afghanistan, and doubted the wisdom of leaguing himself with a -declining cause. - -From the 20th of January to the last day of February the Douranees -remained encamped in the neighbourhood of Candahar. Nothing but the -genius of Meerza Ahmed could have kept together, throughout so long -a season of comparative inactivity, all the discordant elements of -that Douranee force. The winter had set in with its snowy accessories. -Nott was unwilling to expose his troops to the severities of the -winter season; and the enemy seemed equally disinclined for war whilst -the snow was on the ground. But during this period of suspended -hostilities very different were the occupations of the two contending -forces—very different the feelings with which they contemplated the -renewal of the struggle. The attitude of the British at this time -denoted a consciousness of strength. There was no despondency—there -was no excitement. Our officers and men, having nothing to do in the -field, fell back again into the ordinary routine of cantonment life, -as though the country had never been convulsed or disturbed. They rode -steeple-chases; they played at rackets; they pelted one another with -snow-balls. The dreadful snow which had destroyed the Caubul army was -only a plaything in the hands of their brethren at Candahar.[103] - -The enemy, on the other hand, were kept continually in a state of -restless and absorbing activity. Meerza Ahmed saw the danger of -suffering the Douranee chiefs, disunited and jealous of each other -as they were, to dwell too intently upon the embarrassments of their -own position. He gave their thoughts an outward direction; and, by -skilful management, kept them both from risking prematurely a general -engagement with the British, and from breaking out into internal -dissensions.[104] “Meerza Ahmed alone,” says Major Rawlinson, in the -masterly despatch I have already quoted, “could have so long preserved -union among the discordant elements of which this camp was composed; he -alone could have managed, by the most careful revenue arrangements, to -have supported the concourse which was assembled round the standard of -Sufder Jung; he alone, perhaps, could have prevented the Douranees from -risking an action in which they were sure to be defeated; his measures -throughout have been most skilful and well sustained. The chiefs were, -in the first place, sent to recruit in the different districts where -their influence chiefly prevailed; revenue was raised in the usual form -for the support of the troops in anticipation of the coming harvest, -the ryots receiving an acquittance from Meerza Ahmed in case the -management should continue in his hands, and being assured that if our -power prevailed we were too just to subject the cultivators to a double -exaction; statements of the Shah’s connivance in the Caubul revolution -were industriously circulated; incessant attempts were made to tamper -with our Hindostanee troops (not altogether without success), and -letters were designedly thrown into our hands to render us suspicious -of such chiefs as adhered to us, whilst the most stringent measures -were adopted to deter the villagers around the city from bringing -supplies into Candahar. Such was the line of policy pursued by Meerza -Ahmed from the 20th of January to the 20th of February. In this interim -General Nott had laid in five months’ supplies for the troops; he -had repaired the fortifications to a certain extent; and, intending -on the 12th of February to march out and attack the enemy, he had -concurred in the advisability of disarming the population preparatory -to the movement of our troops.[105] Severe weather, however, rendered -a march impracticable at the time he meditated; and before it became -sufficiently mild to enable him to take the field, the tactics of the -enemy had undergone a total alteration in consequence of advices from -Caubul.” - -But there were many circumstances at this time to create uneasiness -in the minds of those to whom was entrusted the direction of affairs -at Candahar. The garrison was not threatened with a scarcity of -provisions; but fodder for the cattle was very scarce. The horses -were becoming unserviceable from lack of nourishment; the sheep were -so miserably lean as to be scarcely worth killing for food. It was -intensely cold; and fuel was so scarce, that the luxury of a winter -fire was denied even to the sick. The hospitals had their inmates; -but there were no medicines. And above all, money was becoming so -scarce, that the most serious apprehensions were entertained by Major -Rawlinson, who knew that there was no weapon of war so serviceable -as the money-bag in such a country as Afghanistan.[106] Under such -circumstances it may readily be supposed how anxiously the arrival of a -convoy from the southward was looked for, and how necessary it seemed -that the communications with Sindh should be opened in such a manner as -to secure the arrival of treasure and supplies. - -But whilst the hopes of the garrison were directed towards the country -to the southward, their thoughts, with fear and trembling, turned -themselves towards the North. On the 21st of February a messenger -arrived at Candahar, bringing a letter from General Elphinstone -and Major Pottinger, ordering the evacuation of Candahar and -Khelat-i-Ghilzye.[107] The original had been written nearly two months -before; and that which now reached Major Rawlinson was a copy forwarded -by Leech from Khelat-i-Ghilzye.[108] There was no doubt in Rawlinson’s -mind about the genuine character of the document; but he could not -bring himself to recognise for a moment the obligations which it was -intended to impose upon him. He could not, however, help perceiving -that the turn which political affairs had taken in Caubul placed him in -a strange and anomalous position. Shah Soojah was now the recognised -sovereign of Afghanistan, ruling by the consent and with the aid of the -Barukzye chiefs; and it could no longer be said that the presence of -the British troops was necessary to the support of the Suddozye Kings. -The Douranee chiefs saw this as plainly as Rawlinson; and they did -not fail to take advantage of the circumstance. They now endeavoured -to reason the British out of Candahar when they found it difficult to -expel them; and Rawlinson and Nott found it less easy to rebut their -arguments than to repel their assaults. - -On the 23rd of February, Rawlinson received a packet of letters from -the Douranee camp, the contents of which supplied much food for earnest -reflection. Sufder Jung and the Douranee chiefs wrote to the British -agent, setting forth that, as it had always been declared that the -British merely occupied the country in support of Shah Soojah, and as -the Shah was now recognised by the chiefs and the people, and had no -longer any need of our support, it was incumbent upon us to withdraw -from the country. If, it was added, the British would now consent -to retire from Candahar, an unmolested passage to Quettah would be -guaranteed to them; but that, if they insisted on maintaining their -position, they must expect that the fate of the Caubul army would be -theirs. Meerza Ahmed, in a private letter to Rawlinson, besought him -to retire before the whole Douranee nation rose against the British. -But perhaps the most important of the letters brought in that morning, -was one from Shah Soojah to Prince Timour, to the following effect: -“You must understand that the disturbances which you have, no doubt, -heard of at Caubul, have been a contest between the followers of Islam -and the unbelievers. Now that the affair is decided, all the Afghans -have tendered their allegiance to me, and recognised me as King. It -is necessary that you should keep me duly informed of all proceedings -in your government; and rest assured of my favour and affection.” -When Rawlinson took this letter to the Shaz-zadah Timour, the Prince -at once declared it to be a forgery; but the British officer knew how -to decypher stranger characters than those of a Persian _Dust-Khut_, -and to decide upon the authenticity of far more perplexing scriptures. -Rawlinson’s practised eye saw at once that the document was a genuine -one. - -The letter from the chiefs demanded an answer; and Rawlinson now took -counsel with the General. The hour for decision had arrived. It became -them to look their position boldly in the face, and to shape their -course for the future. Nott was not a man to listen patiently to the -language of insolent dictation from the Afghan chiefs. He had already -made up his mind to maintain his position at all risks, pending the -receipt of instructions from India issued subsequently to the receipt -by government of intelligence of the Envoy’s murder.[109] Rawlinson was -of the same opinion. So he drew up a letter to the Douranee chiefs, -setting forth that, as there was every reason to believe that Shah -Soojah was acting under compulsion, and that he in reality, in spite of -existing appearances, desired the support of the British, it would not -become the latter to withdraw from Afghanistan before entering into a -final explanation with the King. He drew the attention of the chiefs -to the difference of our positions at Caubul and Candahar—said that -any attempt to expel us by force must inevitably fail—and recommended -the Douranees to refrain from engaging in unprofitable hostility. But -he added, that the British had no desire to conquer the country for -themselves—that the Candahar army was only waiting for instructions -from government—and he believed it was the desire of that government -to restore to Shah Soojah the uncontrolled exercise of his authority, -and to be guided by the provisions of a new treaty which would probably -be negotiated between the two states.[110] On the following day,[111] -the despatch of the letter having been delayed by the difficulty -of finding a trustworthy messenger, Rawlinson added a postscript, -setting forth that intelligence had since been received, which clearly -demonstrated that the Shah was little more than a prisoner in the hands -of the Barukzyes; and he added, that forces were on their way from -India to avenge the murder of the Envoy. - -The activity of Rawlinson, at this time, was unceasing. He exerted -himself, and often with good success, to detach different tribes from -the rebel cause; and was continually corresponding both with the chiefs -in the Douranee camp and in the neighbouring villages. It was his -policy to draw off the Barukzyes from the Douranee confederacy, and to -stimulate the Douranees against the Barukzyes, by declaring that the -Shah was a mere instrument in the hands of the latter. It was debated, -indeed, whether the Douranees could not be induced to move off to -Caubul for the rescue of the King.[112] - -But, in spite of these and other favourable indications, it appeared, -both to the military and political chief at Candahar, that it was -necessary now to strike some vigorous blow for the suppression of -the insurrection and the maintenance of our own security. So Nott -determined to attack the enemy; and Rawlinson, after many misgivings, -to expel the Afghans from the city. This movement he had been painfully -contemplating all through the month of February; and now, at the -beginning of March, he believed that he could no longer postpone, with -safety, the accomplishment of this harsh, but necessary, measure of -defence.[113] All doubts regarding the wishes of the Indian Government -had been, by this time, set at rest by the receipt of a copy of a -letter, addressed by the Supreme Government to the Commander-in-Chief -on the 28th of January, in which letter the continued occupation of -Candahar was spoken of as an event which the British-Indian Government -believed would be conducive to the interests of the state; and it -afforded no small pleasure to Nott and Rawlinson to find how completely -they had anticipated the wishes of the Governor-General and his Council. - -On the 3rd of March, Rawlinson began to clear the city of its Afghan -inhabitants.[114] Inspecting the census he had made, and selecting -a few who were to be permitted to remain—peaceful citizens, as -merchants, followers of useful trades, and a few members of the -priesthood, he expelled the remainder of the Afghan inhabitants—in -all, about 1000 families. No resistance was offered. The work was -not completed before the close of the 6th. The municipal authorities -performed their duties so remissly, that it was necessary to tell off -an officer and a party of Sepoys to each district, to see that the -clearance was more effectually performed. Some 5000 or 6000 people -were driven out of the city. Every exertion was made to render the -measure as little oppressive as possible; but the expulsion of so many -citizens from their homes could not be altogether free from cruelty and -injustice.[115] - -The city having thus been cleared of all its suspected inhabitants, -Nott, on the 7th of March, took the field, with the main body of his -troops. The 40th Queen’s—the 16th, 38th, 42nd, and 43rd regiments -of Native Infantry—a wing of one of the Shah’s regiments—all the -cavalry in the force, and sixteen guns, went out against the enemy. The -2nd regiment of Native Infantry, with two regiments and a wing of the -Shah’s foot, remained behind for the protection of the city. All the -gates of the city, but the Herat and a part of the Shikarpoor gate, -were blocked up, and Candahar was believed to be secure against the -assaults of the whole Douranee force. - -As Nott advanced, the enemy, who had been hovering about the -neighbourhood of Candahar, retired before him. He crossed the Turnuk -and advanced upon the Urghundab in pursuit of them; but they shrank -from meeting our bayonets, and it was long before they even ventured -to come within reach of our guns. The artillery then told with such -good effect on the dense masses of the enemy, that they were more than -ever disinclined to approach us. On the 9th, however, there seemed -some prospect of a general action. The enemy’s footmen were posted -on a range of hills, and, as our column advanced, they saluted us -with a volley from their matchlocks. The light companies of the 40th -Queen’s and 16th Native Infantry, under Captain F. White, of the -former regiment, were sent forward to storm the hills on the right; -and the Grenadiers of the 40th, under Lieutenant Wakefield, performed -the same good service on the ascents to the left. The hills were soon -cleared; and the enemy’s cavalry were then seen drawn up in front of -our columns. Their line extended across the plain; their right resting -upon a range of high ground, and their left on a ruined fort, built on -a high scarped mound.[116] Hoping to draw them within his reach, the -General now kept his guns quiet. But they were not inclined to meet us -in the field. They were planning another game. - -Whether it had been the original design of the Douranee chiefs to draw -Nott’s army out of Candahar, and to strip the city of its defences; -or whether, awed by the magnitude of the force which the General had -taken out with him, they shrunk from the conflict, was not at first -very apparent.[117] But it subsequently became known to the British -authorities that the stratagem was planned by the subtle understanding -of Meerza Ahmed. The enemy, after the skirmish of the 9th instant, -retired before our advancing battalions, and, industriously spreading -a report that they purposed to attack Nott’s camp during the night, -recrossed the river and doubled back upon Candahar. Up to this time -the city had remained perfectly quiet; and the minds of the British -authorities had not been disturbed by any thoughts of coming danger. -But on the morning of the 10th it was seen that a number of Afghan -footmen had come down during the preceding night and taken possession -of old Candahar. Rawlinson at once despatched three messengers to -Nott’s camp, to inform him that the enemy had doubled back in his rear, -and that it was apparently their intention to attack the city. His -suspicions were soon confirmed. His scouts brought him intelligence -to the effect that the Douranee army was to concentrate during the -day, before Candahar, and to attack it in the course of the night. -All day long the numbers of the enemy continued to increase, and at -sunset Sufder Jung and Meerza Ahmed arrived and posted themselves in -the cantonments. Night came on with pitchy darkness; and the garrison -could not trace the movements of the enemy. They had no blue lights—no -fire-balls—no means of casting a light beyond the defences of the -city. The Ghazees were swarming close to the walls; and at eight -o’clock they commenced the attack. They had heaped up some faggots at -the Herat gate; and now they fired the pile. They had poured oil on the -brushwood, and now it blazed up with sudden fury.[118] The gate itself -ignited as readily as tinder, and the flames now lit up the mass of -white turbans, the gleaming arms, and the coloured standards, which had -before been only seen, in scattered glimpses, by the momentary light -of the kindled match of the Afghan jezails.[119] - -Desperate was the attack of the Ghazees, and steady the resistance of -the garrison. A gun upon the bastion poured in its deadly shower of -grape among the besiegers; and the guard kept up a heavy fire from the -ramparts. But the Ghazees pressed on with desperate resolution. The -success of their first movement had given them confidence and courage; -and now they were tearing down the blazing planks with intrepid hands, -fearless of the red-hot bars and hinges of the falling gate. Many -of them, intoxicated with bang, were sending up the fearful yell of -the Afghan fanatic, and rushing upon death with the eagerness of the -martyr. Others were calling upon Prince Timour to come out and win -Paradise by aiding the cause of the true believers. At one time it -seemed that victory would declare itself on the side of the infuriated -multitude that was surging round the city walls. But there were men -within the city as resolute, and far more steady and collected in their -resolution, than the excited crowds beyond it, who were hungering after -our destruction. Major Lane commanded the garrison. Rawlinson was there -to counsel and to aid him. They brought down the gun from the bastion, -and planted it in the gateway. They brought another from the citadel to -its support. They strengthened the point of attack with fresh bodies -of infantry, and called out all the water-carriers to endeavour to -extinguish the flames. But more serviceable even than these movements -was one which opposed a solid obstacle to the entrance of the besieging -multitude. They brought down from the Commissariat godowns a number of -grain-bags, and piled them up at the burning gate. About nine o’clock -the gate fell outwards, and then a party of Ghazees climbed the lofty -barricade of grain-bags, as men weary of their lives. Many fell dead or -desperately wounded beneath the heavy fire of our musketry. Spirited -was the attack—spirited the defence. The fate of Candahar seemed to -tremble in the balance. For three more hours the Ghazees renewed, at -intervals, the assault upon the gateway; but they could not make good -their entrance to the city; and at midnight they drew off in despair. - -Whilst this desperate struggle was going on at the Herat gate of the -city, attempts had been made upon the Shikarpoor and Caubul gates. But -the enemy could not fire the brushwood they had collected. The garrison -were too prompt and alert. It appears that Meerza Ahmed, confident -of the success of the attack upon the Herat gate, had arranged that -a given signal should announce this success, and that then he should -proceed to the assault of the Eedgah gate leading to the citadel. But -when at midnight the attack was finally repulsed, a council of war -was held. Baffled in their attempts on the city, the angry fanatics -levelled the most violent reproaches against Meerza Ahmed, and were -with difficulty restrained from laying violent hands on the man, who, -they declared, had betrayed them into an attempt which had sacrificed -the lives of hundreds of true believers, and ended only in failure -and disgrace. It is said that the Ghazees lost six hundred men in the -attempt. They were busy until daybreak in carrying off the dead. - -It is not to be doubted that, during that night of the 10th of March, -Candahar was in imminent danger. Had the city fallen into the hands of -the enemy at this time, it is doubtful whether Nott’s force, on its -return, would have succeeded in recapturing it. The troops had gone -out without tents, and were insufficiently supplied with ammunition. -Everything, indeed, was against them; and even if the courage and -constancy of the force had prevailed at last, success could have been -achieved only after an immense sacrifice of life. That the General was -out-manœuvred, is plain. But it may be doubted whether he is fairly -chargeable with the amount of indiscretion which has been imputed to -him. It has been said that he left the city unprotected. But as he -was to have engaged the enemy himself in the open country, and all -sources of internal danger had been removed by the expulsion of the -Afghans and the disarming of the other inhabitants, it was confidently -believed that the troops left in the city were more than sufficient -for its defence. It must, however, be acknowledged that Nott was -lamentably ignorant of the movements of the enemy, who doubled back in -his rear without raising a suspicion of their designs in the British -camp. But this is no new thing in Indian warfare. To be ignorant of -the intentions of the enemy is the rule, not the exception, of Indian -generalship. Our intelligence-department is always so miserably -defective, that we lose the enemy often as suddenly as we find him, and -are either running ourselves unexpectedly upon him, or suffering him to -slip out of our hands. - -General Nott re-entered Candahar on the 12th of March. The repulse -which the insurgents had received at the city gate gave a heavy blow -to their cause. It brought disunion into the Douranee camp, and made -the Ghazees denounce the chiefs who had plunged them into disaster, and -resolve to forswear the perilous trade of fanaticism which brought so -much suffering upon them. The ryots, who had joined the standard of the -true believers, now returned in numbers to their peaceful avocations; -and Major Rawlinson exerted himself to the utmost to re-assure the -public mind, and restore peace and prosperity to the surrounding -villages.[120] As the month advanced there were many encouraging signs -of the approaching dissolution of the Douranee camp. Some of its -components were already talking of moving off to Caubul; and it was -said that Meerza Ahmed had sent his family to the capital preparatory -to retreating in that direction himself. - -But there is never anything sustained and consistent in Afghan -politics. The appearances of to-day belie the appearances of yesterday, -and are again succeeded by varied symptoms to-morrow. The Douranee -chiefs at one time seemed to be on the point of a general disruption; -and then, after the lapse of a few days, they met in council, and -cooling down under a shower of mutual reproaches, swore solemn oaths -to be true to each other, and to league themselves together for -another attack upon the Feringhees. At the end of the third week of -March they were again upon the move. Upon the 24th, they were within a -short distance of Killa-chuk, where Nott had before attacked them. On -this day the Parsewan Janbaz attempted to renew certain negotiations, -which they had initiated a few days before, but which had been coldly -received. They offered to quit the Douranee camp and to move off to -Caubul, if a month’s pay were given them to defray their expenses on -the march. But Nott indignantly rejected the proposal. “I will never -give them,” he wrote to Rawlinson, “one rupee; and if I can ever -get near them I will destroy them to a man. It is my wish that no -communications shall be held with them. They have murdered our people, -and plundered the country.”[121] - -On the following day, our troops again encountered the enemy in the -field. A brigade under Colonel Wymer had been sent out, partly to clear -the country on the Candahar side of the Urghundab from the Douranee -horse, who were threatening our position, and partly to relieve the -garrison, which was straitened for forage, by sending out the camels -to graze in the open country. Wymer took with him three regiments of -infantry, a troop of horse artillery, and a party of some four hundred -mounted men. In the neighbourhood of Baba-Wallee the Douranee horse -crossed the river—3000 strong—to attack him. Having sent a messenger -to Candahar to inform the General of his position, Wymer prepared to -defend himself. He had to guard his cattle as well as to fight the -enemy; and the former necessity greatly crippled his movements. Weak, -as the Candahar detachments always were, in the mounted branch, he -found himself at a disadvantage opposed to the large bodies of the -enemy’s horse, who now appeared in his front. Our Hindostanee cavalry -were driven in by the Douranees under Saloo Khan, who gallantly charged -our squares.[122] But the fire of our guns and the volleys of our -musketry soon checked the audacity of the Afghan horsemen; and the -affair became one of distant skirmishes. But, in the mean while, the -roar of our artillery had been distinctly heard at Candahar, and Nott -had moved out to the support of Wymer’s brigade. The Douranees were -still surrounding our camp, when the General, with the reinforcing -brigade, entered the valley. What the men who followed Nott then saw, -is described as “a beautiful spectacle,” which will not readily be -forgotten.[123] The bright afternoon sun shed its slant rays upon -the sabres of the enemy, and lit them up like a burning forest. Our -infantry were drawn up in a hollow square covering a crowd of camels; -the horse artillery guns, which had done such good service before, -were playing gloriously, under Turner’s direction, upon the dense -bodies of the enemy’s horse, whom their heavy fire kept at a cautious -distance. “And just as General Nott,” adds an eye-witness,[124] “with -the reinforcements came in sight, Lieutenant Chamberlaine, of the -Bengal service, an officer in the Shah’s cavalry, who at the head of a -small party had charged the enemy, was driven back, and, emerging from -a cloud of dust, formed in rear of the infantry, with the loss of a -few men killed, himself and many of his party wounded—but not without -having given very satisfactory proofs of his power as a swordsman, -albeit his treacherous weapon had broken in his hand.” As our -reinforcing regiments approached, the enemy retired; and our cavalry -were quite useless.[125] The Douranee camp had been left standing, and -Nott, though the day was far advanced, was eager to cross the river and -attack it; but the guns could not be brought down to the bank without -great labour, and the fords were well-nigh impracticable. So Nott -determined to withdraw the brigade to Candahar for the night, leaving -Wymer in position, and to return on the following morning to disperse -the Douranee horse. - -On the morning of the 26th, Nott went out again, with the brigade -that had accompanied him on the preceding day, to the banks of the -Urghundab; but the enemy had struck their camp during the night; and -as soon as day broke, the Douranee horse had moved off and dispersed -themselves in different bodies. So the General returned to Candahar; -whilst Colonel Wymer re-halted in the valley to graze his cattle, -unmolested and secure. Rawlinson remained in the valley throughout the -day, “visiting the different villages, conversing with the Moollahs and -head-men, and endeavouring to restore confidence. Imprecations against -the Ghazees were general in every village, and the damage which had -been caused by their depredations was evidently very great.”[126] - -The result of this affair was a growth of fresh disunion in the -Douranee camp. The chiefs accused each other of cowardice, and all -assailed Meerza Ahmed with measureless abuse. But tidings were now -coming in, both from the north and the south, which went some way to -comfort and re-assure them. It was currently reported in their camp -that Ghuznee had capitulated. This intelligence had been received -some days before by the British officers at Candahar, and had not -been disbelieved. On the 31st of March, a letter from Major Leech, -at Khelat-i-Ghilzye, was received by Nott at Candahar, and though it -announced the fall of Ghuznee only on native authority, it seemed to -divest the fact entirely of all atmosphere of doubt. It appeared, from -the statements that reached Candahar, that Ghuznee had been invested by -an overwhelming force, and that, after holding out for some weeks, the -garrison had been reduced more by a want of water than by the attacks -of the enemy. It was reported, that before the arrival of orders from -Caubul for the evacuation of the place, the town of Ghuznee had been -taken by the surrounding tribes—“that the Hindoos of the Bazaar were -all killed, fighting on our side—that Palmer, during the two months -he was in the Balla Hissar, paid a daily sum for his provisions, -water, and wood—that Shumshoodeen was the bearer of orders from the -British at Caubul to give up the fortress—that the failure of water -was the reason that made him agree to vacate the upper citadel on -the 8th instant—that the mass of Ghazees did not respect the treaty -formed, with a guarantee given to Palmer by Shumshoodeen, but attacked -our garrison, and they only 400 strong, on their leaving the citadel, -killing 100 and losing many themselves—that Palmer now wanted a -guarantee for the safety of the officers, and that this being given, -they surrendered themselves with two or three European females.”[127] -At the same time, Leech reported that he was in possession of a letter, -bearing the seal of Shumshoodeen Khan, and addressed to the Shamalzye -chiefs, exhorting them to assemble and march on Khelat-i-Ghilzye, and -holding out to them hopes of honour and wealth to be conferred upon -them by the King and Ameen-oollah Khan, if they succeeded in capturing -the place; and promising himself, upon the breaking up of the snow, to -march down upon it “with fort-destroying guns and an army crowned with -victory.” - -The tidings of the fall of Ghuznee were most calamitously true. The -fortress, which the English had taken with so much difficulty, and the -capture of which had been proclaimed with so much pomp, was now in the -hands of the enemy. The slight outline of the melancholy events which -had ended in the destruction of the garrison and the captivity of the -surviving officers, which Leech had sent from Khelat-i-Ghilzye, was -substantially correct. The enemy appeared before Ghuznee on the 20th of -November. On the same day snow began to fall. Maclaren’s brigade was -then advancing from Candahar, and the enemy, expecting its appearance -in their neighbourhood, drew off their investing force; but they soon -reappeared again. Maclaren’s retirement gave them new heart; and on the -7th of December they collected again, in increased numbers, around the -walls. The garrison were now completely enlaced. The city was in their -possession, but they could not stir beyond it. Soon, however, they -lost even that. The inhabitants undermined the walls, and admitted the -enemy from without. On the 16th of December, through the subterranean -aperture which the townspeople had made, the enemy streamed in by -thousands. The city was now no longer tenable. The garrison shut -themselves up in the citadel. - -The winter now set in with appalling severity. The Sepoys, kept -constantly on the alert, sunk beneath the paralysing cold. Bravely as -they tried to bear up against it, the trial was beyond their physical -capacity to endure. The deep snow was lying on the ground; it was -often falling heavily when the Sepoys were on their cold night-watch. -The mercury in the thermometer had fallen many degrees below zero. Men -who had spent all their lives on the burning plains of Hindostan, and -drunk their tepid water out of vessels scorched by the fierce rays -of the Indian sun, were now compelled to break the ice in the wells -before they could allay their thirst. Fuel was so scarce, that a single -seer[128] of wood was all that each man received in the day to cook -his dinner and keep off the assaults of the mysterious enemy that was -destroying them. They were on half-rations; and the scanty provisions -that were served out to them were of such a quality that only severe -hunger could reconcile them to it. Numbers of them were carried into -hospital miserably frost-bitten. The northern climate was doing its -work. - -The Afghans, in the mean while, in possession of the city, continued -to harass the garrison in the citadel, by firing upon them whenever -they showed their heads above the walls. This continued till the middle -of the month of January, when, it appears, that some suspension of -hostilities supervened. It was believed that the English at Caubul had -entered into a treaty with the Afghan Sirdars; and that Shumshoodeen -Khan would shortly arrive with orders from the existing government to -assume possession of the place. Weeks, however, passed away, and the -new governor did not make his appearance.[129] About the middle of -February he arrived, and summoned Palmer to surrender. Unwilling to -submit to the humiliating demand, and yet hopeless of the efficacy of -resistance, the English officer contrived to amuse the Sirdar until -the beginning of March. Then the patience of Shumshoodeen Khan and the -other chiefs was exhausted; and they swore that they would recommence -hostilities with unsparing ferocity if the citadel were not instantly -surrendered. So, on the 6th of March, Palmer and his men marched out of -the citadel. The enemy had solemnly sworn to conduct them in safety to -Peshawur, with their colours, arms, and baggage, and fifty rounds of -ammunition in the pouches of each of our fighting men. - -But it soon became only too miserably apparent that the enemy had sworn -falsely to protect Palmer and his men. The British troops had scarcely -taken up their abode in the quarter of the town which had been assigned -to them, when the Afghan chiefs threw off the mask. On the day after -their departure from the citadel, when the Sepoys were cooking their -dinner, the Ghazees rushed with sudden fury on their lines. Three days -of terror followed. House after house, in which the English officers -and their suffering Hindostanee followers endeavoured manfully to -defend themselves, was attacked by the infuriated enemy. Fire, famine, -and slaughter were all working together to destroy our unhappy men. At -last, on the morning of the 20th, the survivors were huddled together -in two houses which had been assigned to the head-quarters of the -force—soldiers and camp-followers, men, women, and children, crammed -to suffocation in every room, all hourly expecting death. The enemy -were swarming around. The citadel guns, which had been useless in our -hands, but were now most effective in those of the enemy, were sending -their round-shot “crashing through and through the walls.”[130] Hour -after hour, and still the enemy seemed to pause, as though unwilling -to shorten, by a last annihilating attack, the sufferings of their -victims.[131] But Shumshoodeen Khan had begun to relent. He was in -council with the other Sirdars; and it was determined that the wretched -men, who were now so wholly at their mercy, should be admitted to -terms. The Ghazees were still crying aloud for their blood. But the -chiefs assured the officers of their safety, if they would lay down -their arms and place themselves in their hands. The Sepoys had by this -time thrown off all authority, and determined to make their own way to -Peshawur.[132] So the British officers, under a solemn oath from the -chiefs that they should be honourably treated and conducted in safety -to Caubul, laid down their arms, and trusted to the good faith of the -Afghan Sirdars.[133] The Sepoys, in the mean while, were endeavouring -to prosecute their insane scheme of escaping across the open country to -Peshawur. Snow began to fall heavily. They wandered about the fields -helpless and bewildered. Many of them were cut down or made prisoners -by the enemy; and to all who survived, officers and men alike, a time -of suffering now commenced, all the circumstances of which are burnt -into their memories as with a brand of iron. - -The fall of Ghuznee was a great disaster and a great discredit. Among -the officers of Nott’s division it was regarded as more disgraceful -than the loss of Caubul. Want of water was said to be the cause of -Palmer’s surrender; but it was believed that he might have retained -possession of the great well by running a covered way down the mound; -and it is still asserted that if he had taken the more decided step -of expelling the treacherous inhabitants from the town, he might have -held out until he was relieved from Candahar. This at least would -have given him both firewood and water. And it is not improbable that -Afghan cupidity would have prevailed over Afghan resentment, and that -grain and other provisions would have been brought in to him in return -for bills on the British Government. But Palmer wanted decision; and -Ghuznee was lost. - -In the mean while, Khelat-i-Ghilzye was gallantly holding out against -the enemy. Situated between Ghuznee and Candahar, about eighty miles -from the latter city, this isolated fortress stands upon a barren -eminence, exposed to the wintry winds and driving dust-storms—one of -the dreariest and bleakest spots in all the country of Afghanistan. It -had been originally garrisoned by the Shah’s 3rd infantry regiment, a -party of forty European artillerymen, and some sappers and miners; but -Maclaren’s brigade, on its return towards Candahar, had dropped some -250 Sepoys of the 43rd Regiment at Khelat-i-Ghilzye to strengthen the -garrison; and now, commanded by Captain John Halkett Craigie, of the -Shah’s service, this little party prepared to resist the assaults of -the investing enemy and the cruel cold. For months the cold was far -more irresistible than the enemy. In that bleak, exposed situation, -the icy winds were continually blowing from the north. “The lower -the temperature sunk, the higher blew the north wind.” The barracks -were unfinished; there were neither doors nor windows to keep out the -chilling blasts; and there was a scanty supply of firewood in store. -How the Hindostanee soldiers bore up against it, it is difficult to -say, for the European officers declare that they “never experienced a -winter so continuously cold.” There was an abundance of grain in store; -but all the surrounding country was against them, and the wheat could -not be ground. After more than two months of ineffectual labour they at -last constructed serviceable hand-mills. The Europeans often lived for -days together upon bread and water; but not a murmur arose. The winter -passed wearily away. The enemy were inactive. But with spring came a -renewal of active work on either side. The garrison were labouring -to strengthen their defences, and the enemy, as the year advanced, -began to draw more closely round the fortress, their numbers and their -boldness increasing together. After a time, they began to dig trenches -round the place, and, covered by the loopholed parapets, to keep up a -hot fire upon the garrison, which it was impossible to return with good -effect. But Craigie and his men had no thought of surrender. They held -out, cheerfully and uncomplainingly, thankful if they could get a shot -at the enemy when the parties in the trenches were being relieved. - -Such was the condition of the garrisons of Ghuznee and Khelat-i-Ghilzye -when disastrous intelligence from the southward reached Nott and -Rawlinson at Candahar. They had been, for some time, looking forward -with the greatest anxiety to the arrival of a convoy from Sindh, -which was to throw treasure, ammunition, hospital stores, and other -necessaries into the garrison, and increase the number of their -available troops. Brigadier England, who commanded the Sindh field -force, was at Dadur towards the close of February, and there he -received instructions to move on through the Bolan Pass, to assemble -a strong body of troops at Quettah, and thence to push his succours -through the Kojuck with all expedient despatch. Major Outram was -then in Sindh, earnest amongst the earnest to retrieve our lost -position in Afghanistan, and active amongst the active to carry out -the work of throwing troops into the country which had witnessed our -abasement.[134] “All my endeavours in this quarter,” he wrote on the -15th of March, “have been to urge forward movements, and at last I have -managed to send up every disposable man. Brigadier England marched from -Dadur on the 7th (of March), and must be at Quettah by this time. The -remainder of his troops intended for service above will march about -the 23rd or 24th, so that he will have assembled at Quettah by the -end of the month (including the garrison) one troop of European Horse -Artillery, six guns; half a company of Bombay European Artillery; Major -Sotheby’s company of Bengal European Artillery; her Majesty’s 41st -Foot; three regiments of Native Infantry and a flank battalion of the -same; two squadrons of Native Regular Cavalry, and 200 Poonah Horse. -Of the above, two regiments of Native Infantry and half a company of -artillery will be required to garrison Quettah. All the remainder will -be available to reinforce General Nott, and will march on Candahar -with that view in the first week of April, I trust, with everything -that is required by the Candahar garrison, namely, twenty lakhs of -treasure, ammunition, and medicines. I hope, however, that Brigadier -England will, in the mean while, push on a detachment with a portion -of these supplies to meet a brigade at the Kojuck, which General Nott -talks of sending out to receive what can be afforded.”[135] - -On the 16th of March, Brigadier England arrived at Quettah. On the -following day, he wrote to Lieutenant Hammersley, the political agent -at that place: “The 22nd is at length fixed as the day of my departure -from hence, and in truth I do not see how it could advantageously be -hastened, owing to the numerous demands made on my small means. I -propose, unless other intervening events should change such purpose, -to move as far as Hykulzye on the 24th, and there await intelligence -from the northern extremity of the Kojuck Pass. This you must manage -for me. I could move at once to Killa-Abdoollah; but it seems to me -advisable to try the influence of our presence in the Pisheen valley, -in the matter of supplies and camels. The amount of treasure I take to -Candahar will not exceed four lakhs, and about one-third of a lakh of -musket ammunition; we have not carriage or protection for more at a -time.” On the following day he wrote again to Lieutenant Hammersley, -stating that he was determined to halt in the Pisheen valley, unless -General Nott had actually sent two or three regiments to the Kojuck to -meet the treasure; and Hammersley, when he forwarded a copy of this -letter to Outram, wrote that there were officers in England’s brigade -who openly prophesied that the detachment would be sacrificed between -Quettah and the Kojuck Pass.[136] - -On the 26th of March, the Brigadier moved forward on the Pisheen -valley, taking with him five companies of her Majesty’s 41st Regiment, -six companies of Bombay Native Infantry, a troop of the 3rd Bombay -Cavalry, fifty men of the Poonah Horse, and four Horse-Artillery guns. -Early on the 28th he “arrived at the entrance of a defile which leads -to the village of Hykulzye,” at which place he “had intended to await -the remainder of the brigade now in progress to this place through -the Bolan Pass.”[137] It was plain that General Nott had no intention -to send any troops to the southward to co-operate with England’s -detachment;[138] and it soon became apparent that the latter would have -done well to have retained his position at Quettah until reinforced -by the troops moving up from the southward. England found himself -near the village of Hykulzye, knowing nothing about the country, and -nothing about the movements of the enemy. Colonel Stacy accompanied the -force as its political director. He had, some days before, informed -the General that he might expect to meet the enemy at Hykulzye; but -as they approached that place no intelligence of their position was -to be obtained, and not before England was close upon them had he any -knowledge that they were in his front. Mahomed Sadig had come down -determined to dispute our progress, and was now posted, with his -troops, behind some _sungahs_ on the Hykulzye heights. - -England halted the column, and rode forward with his staff to -reconnoitre the enemy’s position. After the lapse of about a quarter -of an hour he returned, and the force was ordered to advance. The -Horse-Artillery guns were now opened on the hills to the left, whilst -Major Apthorp, with the light battalion, was instructed to storm -the hills to the right. Leslie’s battery played with good effect, -throwing its shrapnel among the enemy; but the infantry column was -disastrously repulsed. The enemy rose up suddenly from behind their -sungahs and poured in such a destructive fire upon our columns that the -light companies fell back. Captain May, of the 41st, was shot dead. -Major Apthorp,[139] who commanded the light companies, was carried, -desperately wounded, to the rear. A sabre-cut had laid open his skull, -and another had nearly severed his right arm. Of a party of less than -500 men nearly a hundred were killed or wounded. The enemy fought -with uncommon gallantry, and many of them were bayoneted or shot on -the hill. Among them were five or six of their chiefs. Mahomed Sadig -himself, who had been behind the defences, but had quitted them on the -advance of our light battalion, and joined the horsemen on the hill, -received a bayonet-wound on the shoulder. - -Our men, after their repulse, soon rallied, and were eager again to be -led to the attack. But England had determined to retreat. Colonel Stacy -volunteered to lead a party of a hundred men up the hill and to carry -the defences; but the gallant offer was declined.[140] Three times he -pressed it upon the General, but with no effect. It was believed by the -latter that the Hykulzye defences could be carried only by a strong -brigade, and one, too, equipped with mortars. So he wrote to General -Nott, urging him to send a force so equipped to meet him; and in the -mean while fell back upon Quettah.[141] And there he began to entrench -himself, as though he were about to be besieged by an overwhelming -force. - -No satisfactory reasons have yet been assigned for this unhappy -miscarriage. But excuses have been urged in abundance. It was alleged -that the defences at Hykulzye were impracticable—that they had been -two months in course of erection—that the General had received no plan -of them from the political authorities—that he was not, in fact, aware -of their existence—that he had been deceived by false accounts of the -number of the enemy—that strong reinforcements had come down from -Candahar—and that the Sepoys did not support the European soldiers -at Hykulzye. But upon a careful examination of all these charges and -assertions, it does not appear that one can be maintained. - -The defences at Hykulzye were not formidable. General England had not -seen them at this time. Lieutenant Evans, of the 41st, did see them; -and he said that there were “no breastworks, but merely a four-foot -ditch filled with brushwood.” The elevations were nothing more than -those heaps of earth and stone known as _sungahs_, which may be, -and often are, thrown up in a few hours. The best information that -Hammersley could obtain went to show that these defences were thrown up -by Mahomed Sadig when General England’s force had reached Koochlag; but -not before. When the brigade advanced from Quettah a month afterwards, -the Hykulzye defences were found to be so formidable that some of the -officers rode over them, not knowing where they were. - -The strength of the enemy at Hykulzye seems to have been exaggerated -very much in the same manner as the strength of the defences. -General England wrote to Hammersley on the 28th of March, after his -unsuccessful engagement, that the enemy were “a hundred to one -stronger than any one expected.”[142] Hammersley and Stacy had both -told the General that he might expect Mahomed Sadig to make a stand at -Hykulzye. The former officer had computed the strength of the enemy -at 1000 foot and 300 horse; and his subsequent inquiries went to show -that he had rather overstated than understated the number actually -engaged. England’s own officers estimated the strength of the enemy -at from 1000 to 1300 men; and native testimony went to show that -they had overstated the number of horsemen in the field. The strong -reinforcements which were said to have come down from Candahar before -the 28th of March were purely fabulous. There had been some talk of -such a movement, but not until after the affair with Colonel Wymer’s -brigade on the 25th of March. Then it was debated among the chiefs -whether a party should not be sent down to the Kojuck to intercept the -convoy advancing from the southward. An invitation from Mahomed Sadig -had arrived in their camp, and it had come at an opportune season. -Greatly depressed by the failure of their efforts in the neighbourhood -of Candahar, the Douranee chiefs were almost on the point of breaking -up their camp, when intelligence of the fall of Ghuznee came to -revive their spirits. They were then at Dehli. There the tidings of -the advance of England’s convoy reached them, and there they received -an invitation from Mahomed Sadig to send troops to reinforce him. -Expecting that their own camp would be strengthened by the arrival of -Shumshoodeen Khan, they believed that they might safely detach a party -to the southward. Accordingly, Saloo Khan and some other chiefs[143] -set out towards the Kojuck. But they had hardly commenced their march -when England was driven back at Hykulzye. The chiefs fell out on the -road, and Saloo Khan alone made his way to the southern passes; but -not a man of his party had joined Mahomed Sadig on that disastrous 28th -of March, when England sought to justify his failure by a reference to -the reinforcements from Candahar. - -Only one more point remains to be mentioned in connexion with a subject -which the chronicler of these events is but too anxious to dismiss. -General England insinuated that he had no reliance upon his Sepoy -troops. He is said to have remarked, that although when his troops and -those of General Nott were united they would have 15,000 men under -their command, they could not oppose a whole nation with two weak -regiments.[144] He thought that her Majesty’s two regiments, the 40th -and 41st, were the only two corps that could be relied upon. Nott told -a different story. “My Sepoys are behaving nobly,” was his constant -report. I can find no mention of any backwardness on the part of the -Sepoys, in any of the letters written by the officers of either service -after the affair at Hykulzye; and I believe, that if Colonel Stacy -had been suffered to storm the works after the first repulse, a large -number of Sepoys would have volunteered to follow him. - -When all the circumstances of the case come to be considered, it -appears that a disaster of a very discouraging character was sustained -by the adoption of a course which had no object of importance -commensurate with the risk that was incurred. General England had no -intention of advancing upon Candahar. He ought, therefore, to have -remained at Quettah. The advance into the Pisheen valley was a grave -error. It was plainly England’s duty, at this time, either to have -cleared the pass with the treasure and stores which were so much -needed by the Candahar garrison, or to have waited patiently for his -reinforcements at Quettah. To advance from that place, and then to fall -back upon it, was to do that which Nott said, in anticipation, would -be more injurious to the position of the Candahar force than 20,000 of -the enemy in the field.[145] Major Outram also strongly advised General -England to await at Quettah the arrival of the reinforcements from -below; but England would go on to be beaten.[146] - -To Nott, this failure was mortifying in the extreme. He was in no mood -to brook delays and excuses. The disaster at Hykulzye was sufficiently -annoying to him; but the seeming unwillingness of General England to -redeem his character by a vigorous movement in advance, irritated -him still more. He had been for some time complaining bitterly of -the neglect to which he and his force had been subjected by the -authorities below. “I know not the intentions of Government regarding -this country,” he wrote to General England; “but this I know and -feel—that it is now from four to five months since the outbreak at -Caubul, and in all that time no aid whatever has been given to me. I -have continually called for cavalry, for ammunition, treasure, stores, -and medicines for the sick. I have called loudly, but I have called -in vain. Had the least aid been sent—even a regiment of cavalry—I -could have tranquillised or subdued the country. I have been tied to -this important city, when a few additional troops for its garrison -would have set me free; and I now would have moved on Ghuznee and -Caubul. All I have now to do is to uphold the honour of my country in -the best manner I can without the assistance above alluded to, and -in ignorance of the intentions of government.”[147] In this frame of -mind, his patience well-nigh exhausted, his temper never of the most -genial cast now more than ever overclouded, he received intelligence, -first of England’s defeat, and then of his reluctance to move forward. -England himself announced the latter, if not in so many plain words, -in language equally unmistakeable. After setting forth all the dangers -and difficulties of a forward movement, he concluded, on the 10th of -April, a letter to Nott by saying: “Whenever it so happens that you -retire bodily in this direction, and that I am informed of it, I feel -assured that I shall be able to make an advantageous diversion in your -favour.”[148] - -This was too much for Nott. Determined at once to settle the question -of England’s advance, he sate down and wrote a letter to the General, -declaring that he had well considered England’s position, that he knew -the country well, that he was determined to uphold the honour of his -country, and that it was necessary that the brigade from Quettah should -push on at once with money, medicine, and ammunition, for the relief -of Candahar. “I am well aware,” he added, with keen sarcasm, “that war -cannot be made without loss; but yet, perhaps, the British troops can -oppose Asiatic armies without defeat.”[149] - -It was impossible to resist the urgency of this appeal. The orders from -Candahar were not to be misunderstood. They were clear as the notes of -a trumpet, and ought to have been as spirit-stirring. England’s brigade -now began to prepare for a forward movement. So little, however, had -it been anticipated that the force would ever leave Quettah, that the -officers of the brigade had been buying houses and settling down for -cantonment life.[150] But on the 26th of April, England broke ground; -and on the 28th—precisely a month after the date of his disastrous -failure—was again before Hykulzye. The enemy, emboldened by their -previous success, were posted on the ground they had occupied before; -but they soon found that they had not estimated aright the character of -British troops, and that what they had regarded as a proof of their own -superiority in the field, was an accident not likely to be repeated. -The British troops were told off into three parties—one, under Major -Simmons, to storm the hills to the left; another, under Captain -Woodburn, to attack the hill on the right, where the disaster of the -previous month had occurred; and a third, under Major Browne, was kept -in reserve. When they had taken up their position, the guns of Leslie’s -battery opened with good effect on the enemy; and then the infantry -advanced with a loud “hurrah” to the attack. They are said to have -moved forward “as steady as on parade.”[151] The coolness and courage -of the infantry soon completed what the admirable practice of the guns -had commenced. The enemy turned and fled. Delamaine’s cavalry were then -slipped in pursuit; and there was an end of the defence of Hykulzye. - -On the morning of the 30th, England’s brigade entered the defile -leading to the Kojuck Pass. Here, for some unaccountable reason, the -General halted the column, dismounted from his horse, called for a -chair, and sate himself down. In vain Colonel Stacy implored him to -move on. In vain he urged that the Candahar troops were entering the -pass from the other side, and that all the glory of the enterprise -would be theirs. In vain Major Waddington, the engineer, pressed the -same advice on the General. The Bombay force was locked-up at the -entrance to the pass, whilst Wymer, with the Bengal regiments, was -gallantly crowning the Kojuck, and reporting everything clear for -the advance of the Quettah brigade. The Sepoys of those three noble -regiments—the 2nd, the 16th, and 38th, who would have followed Wymer -wheresoever he pleased to lead them—were now climbing the precipitous -ascents, disincumbered of whatever might clog their movements,[152] -and every accessible height was bristling with the bayonets of the -Candahar force. The Bombay troops were bitterly disappointed; but they -cordially fraternised with their new comrades, and, if they felt any -pangs of envy, they were too forbearing to express them. - -Without any opposition the two united brigades now marched on to -Candahar, and entered the city on the 10th of May. The enemy had broken -up and dispersed. Saloo Khan, who had come down to the assistance of -Mahomed Sadig, had fallen out with that chief. He had never thrown his -heart into the cause, and was, indeed, at any time, to be purchased -by British gold. Rawlinson thought that a little money would be well -expended on the purchase of his allegiance, but Nott objected to the -measure.[153] In the meanwhile, however, Stacy had been exerting -himself with good success below the Kojuck to obtain the co-operation -of this man in the important work of keeping open the communication -between Quettah and Candahar; and when he reached the latter place, -he was able to report that Saloo Khan had promised all that was -required of him; and that Atta-oollah Khan, the brother of the chief, -was now accompanying him, for the purpose of concluding the necessary -arrangements.[154] - -In the meanwhile, the Douranee chiefs, though disunited, were not -inactive. It was hard to determine with any distinctness what were -their designs at this time—so contradictory were the accounts which -reached our camp, and so inconsistent the movements of the enemy. But -it seemed that our difficulties were very sensibly diminishing. As -the spring advanced, the general aspect of affairs was brighter and -more encouraging than it had been since the first outbreak of the -revolution. The chiefs were scattered about in all directions—some -wounded and dying—others eager to make terms with the British. -Meerza Ahmed and Sufder Jung were contemplating a withdrawal across -the frontier to Laush and Jowayan. The latter was corresponding with -the British agent, and expressing his desire to return to our camp. -The Caubul Janbaz had deserted in disgust. The principal men of the -surrounding villages were sending messages into our camp, offering to -withdraw all their people from the rebel standard if we would guarantee -them against the depredations of our troops. The trade of the _Ghazee_ -was plainly at a discount. And whilst the elements of decay were thus -discernible within, there were external influences at work to weaken -the rebel cause. Glad tidings arrived from the eastward. General -Pollock had advanced upon Jellalabad; had relieved the garrison of that -place; and had, it was said, determined to march upon the capital. A -royal salute was fired at Candahar; and as the tidings of our successes -spread through the country the spirits of the insurgents became more -and more depressed.[155] - -Still it was obvious that whilst Meerza Ahmed and Atta Mahomed -continued to flit about the neighbourhood of Candahar, there was -no prospect of permanent tranquillity. Lesser chiefs might tender -their submission, but whilst these, the mainsprings of the great -insurrectionary movement, were employing their talents and exercising -their influence in hostility against us, there was little chance of -any effective movement for the suppression of rebellion in Western -Afghanistan. Armed with authority from the Shah himself, granted prior -to the great outbreak, Meerza Ahmed was raising revenue in the name of -the local government, and expending the money thus collected on the -maintenance of the war. It appeared expedient, therefore, to Nott, to -cause a proclamation to be issued, cautioning the inhabitants against -paying revenue to the Meerza. This was a measure of unquestionable -propriety; but Nott was disposed to go far beyond it. He was eager -to offer a reward to any one who would bring in either Meerza Ahmed -or Atta Mahomed to his camp; and on the 7th of April he wrote to -Rawlinson on the subject: “I wish a proclamation to be immediately -issued, prohibiting any person paying revenue to Meerza Ahmed or to -Sufder Jung, and making them to understand, that whatever sums they -pay to these chiefs will be their own loss, as the regular revenue due -to his Majesty the Shah will be exacted from them by the authorities -of Candahar. I will thank you in the proclamation to offer a reward -of 5000 rupees to any person who will bring in either Meerza Ahmed or -Mahomed Atta. The sooner this is done the better. Let me see the draft -of the proclamation before it is issued.”[156] - -Startled at this bold and questionable proposition, Rawlinson, having -asked in the first place whether the proclamation was to be issued -in the General’s own name, or in that of Prince Timour, and having -suggested that on a question of such importance as that of the raising -of revenue the wishes of the Prince should be previously ascertained, -went on to speak in his letter, of the proposed rewards. “Is the -reward of 5000 rupees,” he asked, “also offered to any one bringing -in Mahomed Atta or Meerza Ahmed, to apply to these people dead or -alive, or is it merely to be given in the event of any of the Afghans -bringing them in as prisoners? I do not think the Prince would have any -objection to issue the proclamation about revenue, and to signify to -all his subjects that he has appointed Meerza Wulee Mahomed Khan to the -management of this department, notwithstanding he is aware that papers -of an exactly opposite tenor, issued by his father, are in Meerza -Ahmed’s hands; but I greatly doubt his aquiescing in the subject of the -reward, as whatever may be the secret feelings of Mahomedans regarding -betrayal or assassination, it is altogether repugnant to their habits -to avow such objects in a public proclamation.”[157] - -To this Nott replied that, as a matter of course, he intended the -proclamation regarding the revenue to be issued in the name of the -Prince. “In regard,” he added, “to the reward for the apprehension -of Meerza Ahmed, that is a different thing; and if the Prince will -not consent to include it in the proclamation regarding the revenue, -where it ought to appear, I will issue a separate proclamation. Meerza -Ahmed has murdered my camp-followers and Sepoys in the most cruel and -atrocious manner, and it is my duty, merely as commander of the force, -to offer a reward to any person who will bring him in. Mahomed Atta -has, like a monster, murdered our officers in their houses, and cut to -pieces our unarmed and inoffensive camp-followers. I will show no mercy -to these men. My note said nothing about ‘dead or alive,’ and I thought -clearly indicated bringing them in prisoners. Why you make use of the -word ‘assassination’ I know not—but I do know that it ought not to be -used by Englishmen in any public document, and therefore it could never -enter into my mind when speaking of a proclamation. Meerza Ahmed is -collecting what he is pleased to call revenue, to enable him to raise -men to attack the force under my command. Such plunder ought to be put -a stop to.”[158] - -Then Rawlinson answered, that he regretted that the unguarded use of -the ugly word “assassination,” which he only intended to convey the -meaning which the Prince might put upon a general offer of reward for -the persons of the proscribed chiefs, should have given any offence -to the General; but that he trusted Nott would excuse him if he made -a few remarks upon the subject of the proposed proclamation. “We are -accused, and perhaps suspected,” he wrote, “of having lately suborned -people to attempt the life of Mahomed Akbar Khan; and Captain Nicolson -is known to have offered a high reward on one occasion for the head of -the Gooroo; and it would be very difficult therefore, it appears to -me, in our present proclamation, to get the Afghans to appreciate the -difference between the offer of a reward for the betrayal of Meerza -Ahmed and Mahomed Atta into our hands, to be executed by the Prince -(as every one must know they would be) on their arrival at Candahar, -and for anticipating this sentence by taking their lives on the spot, -wherever a man might be found bold enough to attempt the deed. Now, if -any misunderstanding on this subject existed, and we were believed by -our proclamation to be aiming at the lives rather than at the liberty -of Meerza Ahmed and Mahomed Atta, it would be only natural for them to -retaliate, and, aided by religious enthusiasm, and with the voice of -the country in their favour, they would be far more likely, I think, -to succeed in bribing Ghazees to kill our officers, than we would be -in tempting any of the Afghans to seize the persons of the proscribed -individuals and hand them over to us for execution. I cannot help -thinking also, that even supposing the proclamation to be expressly -stated and understood to aim only at the liberty of the two heads of -the Candahar rebellion, still it would operate rather to our detriment -than our advantage, and would tend greatly to increase the inveteracy -of our present contest with the Afghans. It would, probably, be met -by the kidnapping of our own officers at this place, and I suspect -it would be fraught with danger to our unfortunate countrymen in -confinement at Lughman, at Caubul, and at Ghuznee. Should you still, -however, desire to make the attempt to obtain possession of the persons -of Meerza Ahmed and Mahomed Atta, I shall be happy to render literally -into Persian any draft of a proclamation which you will send me, and to -give the proclamation all possible publicity.” - -The arguments of Rawlinson prevailed. But soon another source of -inquietude arose. The ex-chief of Candahar, Kohun-dil-Khan, appeared -to be again turning his thoughts towards the government of his old -principality.[159] He had, ever since his expulsion from Afghanistan, -been quietly domiciliated at Shuhur-i-Babek, in the Persian -territories, between Shiraz and Kirman; but now it appeared that he had -sent an agent into Seistan to communicate with his Candahar adherents; -and was otherwise intriguing for the recovery of the dominion he had -lost. Not without some difficulty had Rawlinson throughout this season -of convulsion contrived to maintain a recognised system of government, -in the name of Shah Soojah. The internal administration of the country -had never been suspended; but it was only through the agency of some -of the old Barukzye functionaries that the British political chief had -succeeded, in the midst of such disturbing influences, in carrying -on the government of Western Afghanistan. But there was little hope -of his continuing to exercise this influence if the old Barukzye -Sirdars again appeared on the stage. Already had Kohun-dil-Khan sent -letters to Meerza Ahmed appointing him his Wakeel in all matters of -revenue. It was even reported at one time that the ex-Sirdars were only -a few marches from Candahar.[160] These anxieties, however, were but -short-lived. After-intelligence from Persia encouraged the belief that -the Persian Government would restrain the ex-Sirdars from crossing the -frontier.[161] But other sources of inquietude and annoyance soon came -to take their place. The heaviest blow of all was now about to descend -upon them. It came from the Supreme Government itself. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -[April-June: 1842.] - - The Halt at Jellalabad—Positions of Pollock and Nott—Lord - Ellenborough—Opening Measures of his Administration—Departure for - Allahabad—His Indecision—The Withdrawal Orders—Their Effects—The - “Missing Letter”—Negotiations for the Release of the Prisoners. - - -Pollock and Nott were now eager to advance. On both sides of -Afghanistan a junction had been effected which enabled the two generals -to maintain a bold front in the face of the enemy, to over-awe the -surrounding country, and to inspire with new hopes and new courage the -hearts of those whom the failures of Wild and England had filled with -despondency and alarm. The English in India never doubted that the -conduct of operations in Afghanistan was now in the hands of men equal -to the duty which had been entrusted to them. They had full confidence -in Pollock and Nott. There were now two fine forces of all arms, -European and Native, in good health and good spirits, eager to advance -on Caubul, and sure to carry victory before them. It seemed that the -tide had now begun to turn in our favour. As the hot weather came on, -the spirits of the Anglo-Indian community rose with the mercury in the -thermometer; everybody said that we had seen the worst; and everybody -looked for the speedy lustration of the national honour, which had been -so hideously defiled. - -But as the confidence of the public in the generals and their armies -rose, the confidence of the public in the man upon whom had now -devolved the great duty of shaping the counsels of the generals, and -directing the movements of the armies, began rapidly to decline. On the -28th of February, Lord Ellenborough had landed at Calcutta and taken -the oaths of office. The guns on the saluting battery of Fort William -roared forth their welcome to the new Governor-General, and drowned -the voices of those who were assembling in the Town-Hall to do honour -to the departing ruler. The first intelligence of the disasters that -had overtaken our arms in the countries beyond the Indus, had been -telegraphed to him from Fort St. George, when, standing on the deck of -the _Cambrian_ in the Madras Roads, he looked out upon the white surf, -the low beach, and the dazzling houses of the southern presidency. He -arrived, therefore, at the seat of the Supreme Government with little -to learn beyond the measures which his predecessor had sanctioned for -the extrication of the emperiled affairs of the British-Indian Empire -from the thicket of difficulty that surrounded them. - -What those measures were it is unnecessary to repeat. In the last -letter written by Lord Auckland’s administration to the Secret -Committee—it bears date February 19, 1842—the Governor-General in -Council said: “Since we have heard of the misfortunes in the Khybur -Pass, and have been convinced that from the difficulties at present -opposed to us, and in the actual state of our preparations, we could -not expect, at least in this year, to maintain a position in the -Jellalabad districts for any effective purpose, we have made our -directions in regard to withdrawal from Jellalabad clear and positive, -and we shall rejoice to learn that Major-General Pollock will have -anticipated these more express orders by confining his efforts to the -same objects.” And on the 24th of the same month—in one of the last -public documents of any importance written under the instruction -of Lord Auckland—in a letter to General Pollock, that officer is -distinctly informed that “the great present object of your proceedings -at Peshawur is, beyond the safe withdrawal of the force at Jellalabad, -that of watching events, of keeping up such communications as may -be admissible with the several parties who may acquire power in the -northern portion of Afghanistan, of committing yourself permanently -with none of these parties, but also of declaring positively against -none of them, while you are collecting the most accurate information -of their relative strength and purposes for report to the government, -and pursuing the measures which you may find in your power for -procuring the safe return of our troops and people detained beyond -the Khybur Pass.”[162] These were the parting instructions of the old -Governor-General. Lord Ellenborough found matters in this state when he -assumed the reins of office; and every one was now eager to ascertain -what measures the new ruler would adopt. - -The first public document of any importance to which he attached his -name was a letter to the Commander-in-Chief. It was a letter from -the Governor-General in Council, dated the 15th of March. It was a -calm and able review of all the circumstances attending our position -beyond the Indus, and was as free from feebleness and indecision on -the one side, as it was from haste and intemperance on the other. -Lord Ellenborough at once decided that the conduct of Shah Soojah -was, at least, suspicious,[163] and that the British Government was -no longer compelled “to peril its armies, and with its armies the -Indian Empire,” in support of the tripartite treaty. Therefore, he -said, “Whatever course we may hereafter take must rest solely upon -military considerations, and hence, in the first instance, regard to -the safety of the detached bodies of our troops at Jellalabad, at -Ghuznee, at Khelat-i-Ghilzye and Candahar; to the security of our -troops, now in the field, from all unnecessary risk; and finally, to -the re-establishment of our military reputation by the infliction of -some signal and decisive blow upon the Afghans, which may make it -appear to them, and to our own subjects and to our allies, that we have -the power of inflicting punishment upon those who commit atrocities and -violate their faith, and that we withdraw ultimately from Afghanistan, -not from any deficiency of means to maintain our position, but because -we are satisfied that the King we have set up has not, as we were -erroneously led to imagine, the support of the nation over which he -has been placed.” Here, in a few sentences, was mapped out the policy -recommended by such men as Mr. Robertson and Mr. Clerk, the policy -which Pollock and Nott were eager to reduce to action, and which, with -few exceptions, the entire community of British India were clamorously -expressing their desire to see brought into vigorous effect. - -This letter to the Commander-in-Chief was written in Calcutta; and it -bears the signatures of the different members of the Supreme Council -of India—of Mr. Wilberforce Bird, of General Casement, and of Mr. H. -T. Prinsep. Nothing like it was ever written afterwards. On the 6th -of April Lord Ellenborough left Calcutta. It seemed desirable that he -should be nearer to the frontier—nearer to the Commander-in-Chief. -The movement, at all events, indicated an intention to act with -promptitude and energy. Already had the new Governor-General startled -the sober, slow-going functionaries of Calcutta by his restless, -and, as they thought, obtrusive activity. He seemed resolved to -see everything for himself—to do everything for himself. Almost -everything had been done wrongly by others; and now he was going to -do it rightly himself. All this created a great convulsion in the -government offices; but out of doors, and especially in military -circles, men said that the new Governor-General was a statesman of -the right stamp—bold, vigorous, decided, thoroughly in earnest, no -fearer of responsibility—quick to conceive, prompt to execute—just -the man to meet with bold comprehensive measures such a crisis as -had now arisen. A few sober-minded men of the old school shook their -heads, and faltered out expressions of alarm lest the vigour of the new -Governor-General should swell into extravagance, and energy get the -better of discretion. But no one ever doubted that the leading ideas -in the Governor-General’s mind were the chastisement of the offending -Afghans and the lustration of our national honour. - -After a day or two spent at Barrackpore, Lord Ellenborough put himself -into a palanquin, and proceeded to Allahabad. Halting at Benares, he -addressed the Secret Committee on the 21st of April. Much stirring -intelligence had met him as he advanced. Good and evil were blended -together in the tidings that reached him between Calcutta and Benares. -Pollock had entered the Khybur Pass and forced his way to Ali-Musjid. -Sale had defeated Akbar Khan in a general action on the plains of -Jellalabad. But England had been beaten back at Hykulzye, and withdrawn -his brigade to Quettah. All these things the Governor-General now -reported to the Secret Committee, in a despatch which can by no means -be regarded as a model of historical truth. Writing again on the -following day to the home authorities, he stated that he had “by no -means altered his deliberate opinion that it is expedient to withdraw -the troops under Major-General Pollock and those under Major-General -Nott, at the earliest practicable period, into positions wherein they -may have certain and easy communication with India.” He had already -written to General Nott, instructing him to take immediate measures to -withdraw the garrison of Khelat-i-Ghilzye and evacuate Candahar. “You -will evacuate,” wrote the Chief Secretary, “the city of Candahar.... -You will proceed to take up a position at Quettah, until the season -may enable you to retire upon Sukkur. The object of the above-directed -measure is to withdraw all our forces to Sukkur at the earliest -period at which the season and other circumstances may permit you -to take up a new position there. The manner of effecting this now -necessary object is, however, left to your discretion.”[164] And so -the Governor-General, who in Calcutta had determined to “re-establish -our military reputation by the infliction of some signal and decisive -blow upon the Afghans,” could now hardly write a sentence suggestive of -anything else but withdrawal and evacuation. - -How it happened that, within the space of little more than a month, -so great a change had come over the counsels of the Governor-General, -it would be difficult to determine, if he himself had not furnished -the necessary explanation. “The severe check,” he wrote to the -Commander-in-Chief, “experienced by Brigadier England’s small corps -on the 28th ultimo—an event disastrous as it was unexpected—and of -which we have not yet information to enable us to calculate all the -results—has a tendency so to cripple the before limited means of -movement and of action which were possessed by General Nott, as to -render it expedient to take immediate measures for the ultimate safety -of that officer’s corps, by withdrawing it, at the earliest practicable -period, from its advanced position into nearer communication with -India.” - -On this same 19th of April, the Governor-General addressed another -letter to the Commander-in-Chief, relating to the position of General -Pollock. “The only question,” wrote the Chief Secretary, “will be, in -which position will Major-General Pollock’s force remain during the -hot months, with most security to itself, and with the least pressure -upon the health of the troops? its ultimate retirement within the -Indus being a point determined upon, because the reasons for our first -crossing the Indus have ceased to exist.” The Commander-in-Chief was -then directed to issue his own instructions to General Pollock; and -another letter was immediately afterwards addressed to him (the third -despatched to Sir Jasper Nicolls on this prolific 19th of April), in -which, after speaking of the withdrawal orders addressed to Pollock -and Nott, the Governor-General goes on to say: “It will, however, -likewise be for consideration whether our troops, having been redeemed -from the state of peril in which they have been placed in Afghanistan, -and it may be still hoped not without the infliction of some severe -blow upon the Afghan army, it would be justifiable again to push -them forward for no other object than that of revenging our losses, -and of re-establishing, in all its original brilliancy, our military -character.” - -It was Lord Ellenborough’s often-declared opinion that “India was won -by the sword, and must be maintained by the sword.” In his despatch of -the 15th of March he had written: “In war, reputation is strength.” -And yet we now find him questioning the expediency of undertaking -operations beyond the Indus with “no other object than that of -re-establishing our military character.” If we hold India by the sword, -and reputation is strength, a statesman need hardly look for any object -beyond the establishment of that reputation, which is the strength by -which alone our empire in India is maintained. - -But England’s miscarriage at Hykulzye had not only driven all the -forward feeling out of Lord Ellenborough, but had blunted his logical -acumen and deadened all his feelings of compassion. He seems to have -forgotten that at this time there was a party of English prisoners in -the hands of the Afghans—that the generals who had commanded our army -at Caubul—the widow of the murdered Envoy—the brave-hearted wife of -the commander of the illustrious garrison of Jellalabad—the man who -had rescued Herat from the grasp of the Persian, and done the only -thing that had yet been done to roll back from the gates of India the -tide of Western invasion—with many more brave officers and tender -women, were captives in the rude fortresses of the Afghan Sirdars. The -Governor-General seems to have forgotten that there were prisoners to -be rescued; and he doubted the expediency of undertaking operations -merely for the re-establishment of our military reputation—although -upon that reputation, in his own opinion, our tenure of India depended. - -The request conveyed to Sir Jasper Nicolls in the government letter -of the 19th of April met with prompt compliance; and on the 29th, the -Commander-in-Chief, who was then at Simlah, instructed General Pollock -to withdraw every British soldier from Jellalabad to Peshawur. “The -only circumstances,” he added, “which can authorise delay in obeying -this order, are: 1st. That you have brought a negotiation for the -release of the prisoners lately confined at Budeeabad to such a point -that you might risk its happy accomplishment by withdrawing. 2ndly. -That you may have attached a lightly equipped force to rescue them. -3rdly. That the enemy at Caubul may be moving a force to attack you. -In this improbable case, should any respectable number of troops -have descended into the plain below Jugdulluck with that intent, it -would be most advisable to inflict such a blow upon them as to make -them long remember your parting effort.” Of these instructions the -Governor-General “entirely approved;” and on the 6th of May the Chief -Secretary wrote to General Pollock, saying: “They are in accordance -with the general principles laid down by his Lordship for your -guidance, and you will execute them to the best of your ability, having -regard always to the health of your troops and to the efficiency of -your army.” - -In the interval, however, between the 19th of April and the 6th of May, -the Governor-General having somewhat shaken off the uneasy sensation -which the disaster at Hykulzye seems to have engendered in his mind, -and having arrived at the conclusion that the phantoms which had so -intimidated him had not struck terror into the brave heart of General -Pollock, had written to the General, anticipating the possibility of -his having advanced upon Caubul. - -“The aspect of affairs in Upper Afghanistan,” wrote the Chief -Secretary, on the 28th of April, “appears to be such, according to -the last advices received by the Governor-General, that his Lordship -cannot but contemplate the possibility of your having been led, by the -absence of serious opposition on the part of any army in the field, -by the divisions amongst the Afghan chiefs, and by the natural desire -you must, in common with every true soldier, have of displaying again -the British flag in triumph upon the scene of our late disasters, -to advance upon and occupy the city of Caubul. If that event should -have occurred, you will understand that it will in no respect vary -the view which the Governor-General previously took of the policy -now to be pursued. The Governor-General will adhere to the opinion -that the only safe course is that of withdrawing the army under your -command, at the earliest practicable period, into positions within -the Khybur Pass, where it may possess easy and certain communications -with India.” Why Lord Ellenborough should have entertained a belief -even of the possibility of Pollock advancing upon Caubul, in the face -of positive instructions to the contrary and a known deficiency of -carriage, it is not easy to conjecture. Probably Lord Ellenborough -himself could not have explained the source of this extraordinary -buoyancy of expectation, for six days afterwards he declared that he -had been led to expect “that you (Pollock) will have already decided -upon withdrawing your troops within the Khybur Pass, into a position -wherein you may have easy and certain communication with India, if -considerations, having regard to the health of the army, should not -have induced you to defer that movement.” The idea of the advance upon -Caubul seems only to have been a temporary apprehension arising out -of a not erroneous estimate of the military aspirations of General -Pollock; and it very soon passed away. But it had one important result. -It called forth from the General the following soldierly letter: - -TO T. H. MADDOCK, ESQ., SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, ETC. - - Jellalabad, May 13, 1842. - SIR. - I had the honour to forward with my letter No. 32, dated - 12th instant, a copy of a letter from his Excellency the - Commander-in-Chief. I have now the honour to acknowledge the receipt - of your letter, dated 28th ultimo, which adverts to the present - aspect of affairs in Afghanistan, and the probability of my having - advanced towards Caubul; stating also, that in such an event, the - views of the Governor-General as to the withdrawal of the troops - will not be altered; and further, that whatever measures I may - adopt I must have especial regard to the health of the troops. I - trust that I am not wrong in considering this letter as leaving to - me discretionary powers, and, coming as it does from the supreme - power in India, I venture to delay, for some days, acting up to the - instructions communicated in his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief’s - letter, dated 29th ult. - - I regret much that a want of carriage-cattle has detained me here; if - it had not been so, I should now be several marches in advance, and I - am quite certain that such a move would have been highly beneficial. - Affairs at Caubul are, at the present moment, in a very unsettled - state; but a few days must decide in favour of one of the parties. - Mahomed Akbar is at Caubul, exerting all his influence to overpower - the Prince. He is without means; and if he cannot, within a very - short period obtain the ascendancy, he must give up the contest, in - which case I have no doubt I shall hear from him again. With regard - to our withdrawal at the present moment, I fear that it would have - the very worst effect—it would be construed into a defeat, and our - character as a powerful nation would be entirely lost in this part of - the world. - - It is true that the garrison of Jellalabad has been saved, which it - would not have been, had a force not been sent to its relief. But - the relief of that garrison is only one object; there still remain - others which we cannot disregard—I allude to the release of the - prisoners. I expect about nineteen Europeans from Budeeabad in a - few days. The letters which have passed about other prisoners have - already been forwarded for the information of his Lordship. If, while - these communications were in progress, I were to retire, it would - be supposed that a panic had seized us. I therefore think that our - remaining in this vicinity (or perhaps a few marches in advance) is - essential to uphold the character of the British nation; and in like - manner General Nott might hold his post; at all events till a more - favourable season. - - I have no reason, yet, to complain that the troops are more unhealthy - than they were at Agra. If I am to march to Peshawur, the climate is - certainly not preferable; and here I can in one or two marches find a - better climate, and I should be able to dictate better terms than I - could at Peshawur. - - I cannot imagine any force being sent from Caubul which I could not - successfully oppose. But the advance on Caubul would require that - General Nott should act in concert and advance also. I therefore - cannot help regretting that he should be directed to retire, which, - without some demonstration of our power, he will find some difficulty - in doing. I have less hesitation in thus expressing my opinion, - because I could not under any circumstances, move in less than - eighteen or twenty days; and your reply might reach me by express in - about twenty-two days. The difference in point of time is not very - material, but the importance of the subject is sufficient to justify - the delay of a few days. In the mean time, I shall endeavour to - procure carriage-cattle as fast as I can, to move either forward or - backward, as I may be directed; or, if left to my discretion, as I - may think judicious. Under any circumstances, I should not advocate - the delay of the troops either at Candahar or on this side beyond the - month of November; and in this arrangement advertence must be had to - the safety of the Khybur, which I consider the Sikhs would gladly - hold if they were allowed to take possession of Jellalabad. - - I have the honour to be, &c., - GEORGE POLLOCK, Major-Gen.[165] - - Unwilling to return to the provinces without striking a signal blow at - the Afghans, and doing something great to re-establish the military - reputation of Great Britain in the countries beyond the Indus, Pollock - grasped eagerly at the faintest indication of willingness on the - part of the Governor-General to place any discretionary power in his - hands; and expressed his eagerness to traverse, with a victorious - army, the scene of our recent humiliation. If he had had carriage he - would have advanced at once; but the want of cattle paralysed the - movements of the force, and kept Pollock inactive in the neighbourhood - of Jellalabad. In one respect this want was a gain and an advantage. - Mindful both of the honour of his country, and of the safety of his - captive countrymen and countrywomen, Pollock adroitly turned the - scarcity of carriage to good account, by declaring that he had not the - means of retiring to Peshawur. Thus gaining time for something to be - written down in the chapter of accidents, he continued to maintain his - advanced position, and exerted himself to secure by negotiation the - release of the prisoners from the hands of Akbar Khan.[166] - - In the mean while, the announcement of the Governor-General’s - determination to withdraw the troops from their advanced positions - had reached Candahar. Nott had always consistently declared that he - would not yield an inch of ground without the instructions of the - Supreme Government, but that, fortified by such instructions, he was - prepared to move either in one direction or the other—to abandon - all the posts in Western Afghanistan, or to march victoriously on - the capital. He had his own opinions on the subject of withdrawal; - but the obedience of the soldier was paramount over all his words - and actions; and when he received the instructions of which mention - has been made, he wrote to the Chief Secretary on the 17th of May: - “These measures shall be carried into effect, and the directions of - his Lordship accomplished in the best manner circumstances will admit - of.” And again he wrote on the 21st to the same functionary: “I shall - not lose a moment in making all necessary arrangements for carrying - into effect the orders I have received, without turning to the right - or to the left, by the idle propositions and wild speculations daily - and hourly heaped upon me from all parts of Afghanistan and Sindh, - by persons who are, or fancy themselves to be, representatives of - government West of the Indus. I know that it is my duty and their duty - implicitly and zealously to carry into effect every order received, - without inquiring into the reasons for the measures adopted, whatever - our own opinions or wishes may be, and without troubling government - with unnecessary references.”[167] But it was plain that he read the - orders of the Supreme Government not without acute mortification. He - yielded in effect a prompt assent; but in spirit it was a grudging - one. The orders for the evacuation of Candahar took Nott and Rawlinson - by surprise, and filled them with as much pain as astonishment. What - was really felt by the Candahar authorities is not to be learnt from - the published papers; but in the following letter written by Rawlinson - to Outram on the 18th of May, not only are the real feelings of the - military and political chiefs clearly revealed, but the probable - effects of the evacuation of Candahar sketched out, with a free hand - by the latter: - - The peremptory order to retire has come upon us like a thunder-clap. - No one at Candahar is aware of such an order having been received, - except the General and myself, and we must preserve a profound - secrecy as long as possible. The withdrawal of the garrison from - Kelat-i-Ghilzye and the destruction of the fortifications at that - place must, I fancy, however, expose our policy, and our situation - will then be one of considerable embarrassment. - - General Nott intends, I believe, to order all the carriage at Quettah - to be sent on to Candahar. A regiment is to escort the camels laden - with grain to Killah Abdoolah, where the troops will remain in charge - of the depôt, and from whence a regiment or two regiments detached - from this will bring on the camels empty to Candahar. It must be our - object to collect carriage, on the pretext of an advance on Caubul; - but how long the secret can be kept, it is impossible to say. When our - intended retirement is once known, we must expect to have the whole - country up in arms, and to obtain no cattle except such as we can - violently lay hands on. - - If the worst comes to the worst, we must abandon all baggage and - stores, and be content to march with sufficient food to convey us to - Quettah, for which I believe the carriage now available will suffice. - - It will be quite impossible to destroy the works of Candahar, as - directed in the government letter: the worst that can be done is to - blow up the gateways. I have hardly yet had time to reflect fully - upon the effects, immediate and prospective, of our abrupt departure. - There is no man at present on whom I can cast my eyes in all Candahar - as likely to succeed to power. Sufder Jung will be a mere puppet - of course, and will be liable to deposition at any moment. Should - the Barukzyes triumph at Caubul, and should we no longer oppose the - return of Kohundil, he will be the most likely chief to succeed; - but the natural consequence of his return, and of our determined - non-interference with the affairs in this quarter, will be of course - to render Persian influence paramount at Herat and Candahar; and, with - the prospect of a Russian fleet at Astrabad and a Persian army at - Merve, it is by no means impossible that the designs which threatened - us in 1838 may at last be directly accomplished. Strong measures - of intimidation, both against Russia and Persia, will be our best - protection.[168] - -But, however great may have been the mortification which Nott and -Rawlinson were now condemned to experience, the orders of the Supreme -Government were so explicit, that the General believed it to be his -duty at once to begin to carry them into effect. A brigade had already -been equipped for the relief of Khelat-i-Ghilzye and the rescue of -the Ghuznee prisoners. It was now despatched, on the 19th of May, to -bring off the garrison, and to destroy the works of the former place. -Colonel Wymer commanded the force. It consisted of those three noble -Sepoy regiments with which he had before done such good service;[169] -her Majesty’s 40th Regiment, Leslie’s troop of Horse Artillery, four -guns of Blood’s battery, the Bombay cavalry details, and the Shah’s 1st -Regiment of Horse. Some troopers of Haldane’s cavalry, some details of -Bengal artillery, and of the Madras sappers, completed the components -of the force. - -Thus, in the later weeks of May, Pollock was holding his post at -Jellalabad, eager to receive authority to march upon Caubul, and -rejoicing in the pretext of a scarcity of carriage for delaying the -withdrawal of his force; Nott, eager, too, for a forward movement, -but unable to perceive in the instructions of government the least -indication of an intention to place any discretionary power in his -hands, was taking measures to secure, with all promptitude, the -accomplishment of their wishes; and the Governor-General, from -Allahabad, was writing strong letters to the Generals, impressing upon -them the necessity of maintaining a discreet silence regarding the -intentions of government and the future movements of the troops. - -There was nothing, in truth, more desirable than this. The intentions -of the Governor-General were of such a character as to render these -revelations, in the existing state of things, dangerous, if not fatal, -to the interests of Great Britain in the countries beyond the Indus. -But official secrets are not easily kept in a country where so many -copies of every public letter are forwarded to different authorities, -in distant parts of the country; where so many clerks are employed -to copy, and so many staff-officers allowed to read them. Before the -end of May it was known, not only in General Pollock’s camp, but in -all the cantonments of India, that the armies were to be withdrawn. -The secret had welled out from the bureau of the Commander-in-Chief; -and bets were made at the mess-tables of Jellalabad regarding the -probable date of the withdrawal of the troops. No man knew better -than Pollock the danger of such revelations,[170] and he did his -best to counteract the evil tendency of the reports which were now -the common gossip of his camp, and were soon likely to be current -in all the Afghan bazaars. “I have taken steps,” he wrote to the -Commander-in-Chief, “to prevent any great mischief resulting, by -ordering the deputy-quarter-master-general a few miles in advance, to -mark out a new encamping ground; and I shall have such inquiries made -among the natives about bringing supplies there, that will make them -believe that I shall move forward.” - -And Pollock still hoped that something might arise to wring from the -Governor-General an order to march upon the Afghan capital. But the -letters he received from Lord Ellenborough and Sir Jasper Nicolls were -calculated not only to discourage but to embarrass him. There was no -possibility of misunderstanding the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief; -but the Governor-General, whilst imperatively directing the speediest -possible withdrawal of Pollock’s army, was every now and then throwing -out a hint that a forward movement for the chastisement of the Afghans -would not be ungrateful to him. And whilst the Governor-General was -obviously intending to place some discretionary power in the General’s -hands, the Commander-in-Chief was writing to assure him that the -orders of the Supreme Government all tended towards an immediate and -unconditional withdrawal. - -The letter of the 13th of May elicited no answer; but a letter written -a week afterwards,[171] in which Pollock pointed out the evils and -difficulties of an immediate withdrawal to Peshawur, found the -Governor-General in one of his more forward and chivalrous moods. -Pollock, in this letter of the 20th of May, had said: “I shall be glad -if any letter from government may authorise my remaining till October -or November;” and now, on the 1st of June, the Governor-General, -through the Chief Secretary, replied: “It would be desirable, -undoubtedly, that before finally quitting Afghanistan, you should have -an opportunity of striking a blow at the enemy; and since circumstances -seem to compel you to remain there till October, the Governor-General -earnestly hopes that you may be enabled to draw the enemy into a -position in which you may strike such a blow effectually.” And again, -in the same letter: “It will be for your consideration whether your -large army, one half of which would beat, in open field, everything -that could be brought against it in Afghanistan, should remain entirely -inactive during the period which must now apparently elapse before it -can finally retire. Although you may not have, or soon be able to -procure the means of moving your whole army, you may possibly be able -to move a part of it rapidly against some portion of the enemy’s force -incautiously exposed, and of giving it a severe blow.” This was, at all -events, something gained. And the gain was a sudden one. Only three -days before, the Governor-General, in a letter to Pollock, had resented -the presumption of Mr. Clerk in drawing from a former letter an -inference in favour of the continued occupation of Jellalabad, in the -event of negotiations being on foot for the release of the prisoners, -and had expressed a strong opinion that no negotiations had yet been -entered upon of a nature to impede the backward movement of the force. -The letter of the 1st of June was, therefore, doubly welcome. Pollock -had now received a constructive permission to remain at Jellalabad -until October;[172] and, as every effort was to be made in the interval -to collect carriage-cattle in the provinces of Hindostan, ostensibly -for the purpose of his withdrawal from Afghanistan, he determined -to lose no opportunity of turning those means of withdrawal to the -best possible account. If there were carriage to enable him to fall -back upon Peshawur, there would be carriage to enable him to advance -upon Caubul, for the mistake of hiring cattle, with local limitations -affixed to the engagements, was not to be perpetuated. So General -Pollock looked forward with confidence to the coming autumn, as to a -time when a vigorous and decisive blow might be struck at the nation -which had humbled the pride and defiled the honour of the conquerors -of Hindostan. - -Patiently, therefore, biding his time, Pollock turned the halt at -Jellalabad to the best possible account, by endeavouring to obtain -by negotiation the ransom of the British prisoners. What those -negotiations were, and what was their result, should be stated in -this place. It was on the evening of the 25th of April that some -excitement was created in Pollock’s camp at Jellalabad, by rumours, -presently confirmed, of the arrival of Captain Colin Mackenzie, one -of the prisoners in the hands of Akbar Khan, with a letter from -Major Pottinger, and overtures from the Sirdar. Pottinger’s letter -briefly shadowed forth the terms on which Akbar Khan and his Ghilzye -confederates were prepared to release the prisoners—but the language -employed was rather that of inquiry than dictation. “The Sirdar,” -wrote Pottinger, “wishes to know, in the first place, if we will -consent to withdraw the greater part of our troops, and leave an agent -with a small body of men to act with whomever the confederates may -elect as chief, in which case they propose to be guided by the wishes -of the two factions in Caubul, and wish us to release Dost Mahomed -Khan. _Secondly_—They propose, that if the British Government have -determined on subjecting the country and continuing the war, that the -prisoners at present in Afghanistan shall be exchanged for Dost Mahomed -Khan, his family and attendants, and that the issue be dependent on the -sword. _Thirdly_—In the event of neither of these propositions being -approved of, they wish to know what terms will be granted to themselves -individually; whether we, in the event of their submission, will -confine them, send them to India, take hostages from them, reduce their -pay, or, in short, what they have to expect from our clemency.”[173] - -To this General Pollock replied, that “kindness and good treatment of -our prisoners would meet with due consideration at the hands of the -British Government, and the release of them much more so; that if money -were a consideration, he was prepared to pay into the hands of any one -the Sirdar might depute to receive it the sum of two lakhs of rupees, -whenever the prisoners might be delivered into his hands;” and that -Mahomed Shah Khan and his brothers would be “suffered to enjoy the -advantages arising from their hereditary dominions.”[174] - -With this letter Mackenzie left Jellalabad on the evening of the -28th of April. He had been instructed by the Sirdar to ascertain, if -possible, from General Pollock whether there was any chance of the -British Government admitting him to terms, on his own account, if he -would detach himself from the national cause, and exert his influence -to advance our interests in Afghanistan. But upon this Pollock could -express no definite opinion. “His position,” wrote the General to the -Supreme Government, “is evidently different from the others. That -he was the murderer of the Envoy there cannot be a question, and he -evidently feels his guilt to be an insuperable bar to any terms from -us; but he also feels that he has possession of the persons of our -countrymen, and that circumstance seems to hold out to him a hope that -his proffers of submission will meet with a favourable reception.”[175] - -The reply of General Pollock to the overtures of Akbar Khan -disappointed the Sirdar; and Captain Mackenzie was again despatched -to Jellalabad. This time he was the bearer of a string of proposals -far more extravagant than those which had been conveyed by him on his -first mission. The requests of the Barukzye chief, as set forth in -Pottinger’s letter to the General, were— - - 1stly. That a written promise of amnesty be given to himself, Mohamed - Shah Khan, and the latter’s family, for all past acts up to the date - of delivery. 2ndly. That neither he nor any of the above-mentioned - family shall be sent out of the Caubul and Jellalabad districts - against their wishes. 3rdly. That they may not be obliged to pay their - respects to you in our camp till they be assured against any danger. - 4thly. If we merely intend to revenge ourselves on the enemy, and then - leave the country, he trusts its government will be conferred on him. - 5thly. He wants a jaghire to support his family, and he names two - lakhs as adequate. 6thly. He wants eight lakhs of rupees as a present - to start him with. (His great fear, as it is of all Afghans, is of - being removed from his country.) He also asks for his own women, who - are in his father’s _harem-serai_. They have asked for the money, - if it is paid, to be given to Sir-Bolund Khan, who will remain as - a hostage till the prisoners are delivered, or that you pay it to - Hindoos, who can empower their agents in Caubul to pay it on delivery - of the prisoners.[176] - -To these proposals Pollock replied: - - With regard to the first, it follows as a matter of course that, - whenever we agree to any terms, amnesty for the past will result. - - The second request, about residing at Caubul and Jellalabad, is out of - place now; it must depend upon contingencies, and be discussed only - after other and more important points have been agreed upon. - - With reference to the third request, the Sirdar Mahomed Akbar may - be assured that I would guarantee his personal safety whenever he - may visit my camp; but his doing so would require some preliminary - arrangement, unless he voluntarily claims our protection, in which - case I could immediately arrange for his safety, and appeal to the - government on his behalf. - - The fourth request refers to matters entirely depending on future - results, and which are known to God alone. It would therefore be vain - to speculate on them at this stage of our negotiation. - - With regard to the fifth and sixth requests, I have already told - you that I suppose the Sirdar rests his claim to any present on his - delivering up the prisoners, which, as I have before stated, will be - the best evidence of good faith, and a sincere wish for favourable - terms with the British Government. I have accordingly already - mentioned the sum of two lakhs of rupees. The Sirdar Mahomed Akbar - must recollect that he is desirous of obtaining the females of his own - family. The British Government will not require any money to be paid - on their account; and I hereby guarantee that, on all the prisoners - being delivered over to me, I will write to India for the women of - the Sirdar Mahomed Akbar, and I have no doubt that my request will be - complied with. - - As to the payment of the money for the prisoners now with, or in the - power of Mahomet Akbar, it shall be made to any person the Sirdar may - appoint to receive it, or it shall be paid to Hindoos who can give - bills on Caubul. The good faith and honour of the British nation is - not doubted, and I therefore hereby pledge myself to pay the two lakhs - of rupees on account of government whenever the prisoners are made - over to me.[177] - -Mackenzie took his departure with these replies. There was stirring -work, at this time, for Akbar Khan at Caubul; and the negotiations -had no result. But the visits of the British officer to Jellalabad had -not been without their uses. Mackenzie had been the bearer of much -information of the deepest interest, and had placed many valuable -documents in the hands of General Pollock. The General had laid before -him a string of questions relative to the causes and progress of the -insurrection at Caubul, the answers to which, in the existing state of -information even in the best-informed quarters, threw a flood of light -upon many dark points of recent history. And whilst in official places -many important revelations were made, all through the general camp -there transpired, in time, from the same source, much that was eagerly -sought, eagerly discussed when found, and eagerly transmitted to every -cantonment in India, where the fate of the captives in the hands of -Akbar Khan was a matter of the liveliest concernment, and a source of -the most painful alarm.[178] - - - - -CHAPTER III. - -[January-April: 1842.] - - The Captivity—Surrender of the Married Families—Their Journey to - Tezeen—Proceed to Tugree—Interviews between Pottinger and Akbar - Khan—Removal to Budeeabad—Prison Life—Removal to Zanda—Death of - General Elphinstone. - - -Few were the letters which Mackenzie brought from his fellow-captives -to their friends at Jellalabad. There may have been state reasons -for the secrecy which enveloped his movements; but to all parties -the disappointment was great. Every one at Jellalabad was eager for -intelligence regarding the incidents which had befallen the little -band of prisoners, and for particulars of all the daily environments -of their captive state. All through the camp ran eager inquiries; and -little by little the much-coveted information began to radiate from the -General’s tent, and to diffuse itself in more remote quarters. What was -then told in mere outline may here be given more in detail. - -It was on the 9th of January that the married families were made over -to the protection of Mahomed Akbar Khan. The following day was spent -by them in a small fort, where they found Pottinger, Lawrence, and -Mackenzie, who had been surrendered as hostages at Boot-Khak. Rude as -was the accommodation, and untempting as was the fare, that were here -offered them, after the miseries and privations of the retreat through -the snowy passes, the “small dark hovels” in which they were crowded -together were a very palace, and the “greasy palao” in which they -dipped their fingers was regal fare. They slept that night on the bare -ground—but there was a roof between them and the open sky; and they -thought little of the smoke, which almost suffocated them, whilst in -the enjoyment of the reviving warmth of a wood fire.[179] - -On the morning of the 11th, through scenes of unexampled horror, the -party of captives were conducted to the Tezeen fort. The road was -strewn with the stark bodies of the mangled dead. Here and there little -groups of wretched camp-followers, starving, frost-bitten, many of -them in a state of gibbering idiocy, were to be seen cowering in the -snow; or solitary men, perhaps wounded and naked, were creeping out -of their hiding-places, in an extremity of mortal suffering and fear. -The sickening smell of death rose from the bloody corpses through -which our English ladies guided their horses, striving not to tread -upon the bodies, or in their camel-panniers jolted and stumbled over -the obstructing carrion. Happy were they all, when, about the hour of -evening prayer, that dreadful journey was at an end, and the fort of -Tezeen appeared in sight. There they were hospitably received—and -there another captive was added to their number. Lieutenant Melville, -of the 54th Native Infantry, who had been wounded on the retreat, and -whose wounds had been bound up by the hand of Akbar Khan himself, was -waiting their arrival in the fort. - -On the following day they were carried to Seh-Baba; and the same -dreadful scenes of carnage sickened them as they went along. On the -march another prisoner, and a welcome one, was added to the party—one -whom the sick and wounded had much wanted—a medical officer, -Dr. Macgrath. On the 13th, partly over remote mountain paths, so -precipitous that the camels could scarcely keep their footing, and -partly along the bloody track of our slaughtered army, the captive band -were escorted to Jugdulluck. Here three ragged tents had been pitched -for their reception. Here they found General Elphinstone, Brigadier -Shelton, and Captain Johnson, who had been claimed as hostages by Akbar -Khan; and here they learnt that all the soldiers and camp-followers -who had left Caubul, with the exception of this little handful of -prisoners, had, in all probability, been annihilated on the march. - -Next morning they resumed their journey—the General, the Brigadier, -and Captain Johnson, accompanied by Akbar Khan, bringing up the rear. -A more rugged and difficult road had seldom been travelled over. -The ascents and descents were seemingly impracticable; it made the -travellers giddy to look at them. The road was “one continuation of -rocks and stones, over which the camels with the greatest difficulty -scrambled” with their burdens.[180] At night they bivouacked on the -banks of the Punshuhur river. There were no tents, no shelter of any -kind for the ladies. So they rolled themselves up in their warmest -garments, laid their heads upon their saddles, and composed themselves, -as best they could, to sleep. - -Early in the morning of the 15th of January, they crossed the deep and -rapid fords of the Punshuhur river. The passage was not accomplished -without difficulty and danger; but the active kindness of the Afghan -Sirdars availed to escort the party over in safety.[181] A bitterly -cold wind was blowing as they passed; and a few followers and cattle -were lost. Proceeding then in a north-easterly direction, they made -their way over a barren, inhospitable country, where neither grass nor -water was to be seen, into the fertile valley of Lughman; and halted in -the vicinity of the Tugree fort. The following day was the Sabbath. A -day’s halt had been determined upon; and it fell, by a happy accident, -on the Christian’s day of rest. A Bible and Prayer-book had been -“picked up on the field at Boot-Khak;” and the service of the Church of -England was read to the little band of prisoners. It is easy to imagine -with what deep emotion they must have joined in the prayer beseeching -the Almighty to have mercy “upon all prisoners and captives.” - -On the morning of the 17th, they were again upon the move.[182] Tugree -is only thirty miles distant from Jellalabad; and up to this time a -faint hope had been encouraged by the captives that they were to be -escorted to that place. But now an order came for them “to prepare for -a march higher up the valley,” and in a different direction. It was now -found that their destination was the fort of Budeeabad. This was to be -their resting-place. It had been recently erected; and was the property -of Mahomed Shah Khan, the father-in-law of the Sirdar. Five rooms, -composing two sides of an inner square, or citadel, were allotted to -the British prisoners. The buildings were “intended for the chief and -his favourite wife,”[183] and it may therefore be presumed that they -afforded the best accommodation in the place. The party consisted -of nine ladies, twenty gentlemen, and fourteen children. Seventeen -European soldiers, two European women, and a child, were located in -another part of the fort. - -On that night of the 17th of January, Pottinger and Akbar Khan were -in close and earnest conversation. The Sirdar entered on the subject -of his father’s release; and asked the English officer if he would -guarantee an interchange of prisoners and the evacuation of Jellalabad. -Pottinger could only answer that he was a prisoner and powerless; and -could give no promises with any certainty of their being performed. -But he undertook to write to Macgregor on the subject; and to urge him -to lay the wishes of the Sirdar before the Supreme Government.[184] -It appeared to Pottinger that no more expedient course could be -adopted than that involving a general interchange of prisoners and the -restoration of the country to Dost Mahomed Khan. - -Ostensibly for the purpose of proceeding southward for the reduction of -Jellalabad, Akbar Khan took his departure on the following day; and the -captives began to settle down into the monotony of prison-life. In this -place they continued to reside for nearly three months. The incidents -of captivity, during this period, were not many, or very memorable. -Here for the first time, after the lapse of a fortnight, they were -able to change their clothes.[185] Clean linen was very scarce; and -the nice sensibilities of delicate English ladies were outraged by the -appearance of nauseous vermin. The food that was served out to them was -not of the most luxurious description. It consisted of rice, mutton, -and thick cakes of unleavened dough, prepared by the Afghan cooks in a -manner little relished by English palates.[186] Captain Lawrence acted -as the steward of the captive party, and divided the supplies, whether -they were the daily food of the prisoners, or parcels of clothes, -money,[187] and other equally acceptable presents sent them either by -their Afghan captors or their friends at Jellalabad. - -There was nothing very painful in the outward circumstances of their -captivity, except the unmitigated dirt, which the cleanly habits of the -English in India must have rendered peculiarly offensive. They were -not suffered to wander far from their prison-house; but within its -walls they found both occupation and amusement, and the time passed at -Budeeabad is not now, in the retrospect, the saddest of their lives. -They had among them a few books; some had been brought for sale by -natives of the country, who had picked them up on the road traversed -by the army on its retreat; others had been forwarded by friends at -Jellalabad. Now and then a stray newspaper came in from that place. -It is hard to say how greedily its contents were devoured, and how -eagerly they were discussed. Sometimes letters were received from -below; there was a good deal of cypher correspondence between the -prisoners and Sale’s garrison,[188] and many long letters were written -to friends in India or in England, to be despatched when opportunity -might offer. Then there were amongst them two or three packs of old -playing cards—dirty and limp, but not the less serviceable for these -conventional defects. Some rude backgammon and draft boards had been -constructed for prison service; and there was quite enough elasticity -of spirits left among the captives to render them not disinclined -for more active and boisterous sports. They played at “hop-scotch;” -they played at “blind-man’s buff.” A favourite game among them was -the latter; and when some ten or fifteen healthy and cheerful little -boys and girls joined in the sport, the mirth ran fast and furious. -A Christmas party in old England seldom sees madder gambols than -these—seldom has the heart’s laughter risen more freely from a band of -merrier children than those who romped with their elders in prison at -Budeeabad. But from those elders were seldom absent the memory of the -harrowing past, painful apprehensions regarding the future, and, above -all, a depressing sense of the national humiliation. - -The Sabbaths were always kept holy. Every Sunday saw the little -party of Christian prisoners assembled for the worship of their God. -Sometimes in the open air, sometimes in tents, in huts, or any other -place available for the purpose, Sunday after Sunday, the Church -Service was read to as devout a band of worshippers as ever assembled -to render thanks to the Almighty, and to implore the continuance of His -mercies. Nor were these observances lost upon their guards. Wild and -savage as were their keepers, they seemed to respect the Christians’ -day of rest. There was more decorum in their demeanour, more courtesy -in their manner, than on the working-days of the week. An atmosphere of -peace and rest seemed to envelop them on that sacred day. Some, who had -saved little else, had saved their Bibles, and every evening little -knots of captives might have been heard in their cells, lifting up the -voice of prayer, and reading to one another God’s blessed promises to -the heavy-laden and the afflicted. - -On the 23rd of January, Akbar Khan, accompanied by Sooltan Jan, -returned to Budeeabad. The object of his visit was to induce Pottinger -to write to Macgregor at Jellalabad, stating the terms on which the -Sirdar was willing to treat with the British for the release of the -prisoners. The letter was duly written;[189] but Pottinger repeated -that he had no hope of the surrender of Jellalabad; and added that he -advised the Sirdar not to attack it lest a war should be commenced of -which it was difficult to see the end. Pottinger believed that the -Sirdar was sincere in his expressions of a desire to establish friendly -relations with the British. “But,” he added, “he has been brought up in -the midst of treachery, and does not know how to trust; and I regret -that our own conduct in this country has put our government’s faith on -a par with themselves. Our defeat, though sufficiently galling to a -soldier, really loses its sting when the taunts of our broken promises, -which we know to be true, are thrown in our teeth by men who know the -truth only by name.”[190] - -About the middle of the month of February the captive party was -increased by the arrival of Major Griffiths and Captain Souter; and -a few days afterwards, the same terrific earthquake which had shaken -down the ramparts of Jellalabad made the walls of their prison-house -reel and totter, and levelled a portion of the fort with the dust. -For many days lesser shocks of earthquake kept the people in a -continued state of alarm. The prisoners slept in the open court-yard, -which was filled with their beds; and all kinds of rude awnings were -thrown up to secure a little privacy. The cold was intense, and the -heavy dews saturated the bedding like rain. No lives were sacrificed -within the fort by this great convulsion of nature; but narrow was -the escape of Lady Sale, Brigadier Shelton, Captain Mackenzie, Mr. -Eyre, and General Elphinstone. The first four were on the house-top -when the shock commenced; and had scarcely time to secure a footing -on a safer spot when the roof fell in with a crash. The poor old -General was bed-ridden. His sufferings had been every day increasing. -He had been wounded on the retreat. His constitutional infirmities -had been aggravated both by the external hardships to which he had -been subjected, and the corroding anxieties which had preyed upon his -mind. It was plain to all that his end was approaching. But he bore -his accumulated sufferings with heroic fortitude; and the warmest -sympathies of his fellow-captives were with him. Unable to bestir -himself, when the walls of the fort were shaken by the earthquake, he -was for a little time in imminent peril; but a soldier of the 44th, -named Moore, who had acted as the General’s personal attendant, rushed -into the room and carried off the attenuated old man in his arms. “The -poor General,” says Eyre, who records this incident, “was greatly -beloved by the soldiery, of whom there were few who would not have -acted in a similar manner to save his life.” - -The month of March passed quietly over the heads of the captives. -There was little to mark the monotony of prison-life. Good and bad -tidings came in by turns. All sorts of rumours were in circulation, -and all were volubly discussed. About the middle of the month, the -Nazir, or steward, in charge of the prisoners, announced that Mahomed -Shah Khan was willing to release them all for two lakhs of rupees. The -proposition was made to Captain Johnson, who convened a meeting of -the gentlemen. The offer was a tempting one, and it might have been -accepted; but Pottinger protested against it. He was unwilling to aid -the enemy with money without the express sanction of his Government. So -the question was referred to Captain Macgregor; and in the mean while -the perils which beset their position began to thicken around them. -Akbar Khan about this time was wounded by the accidental discharge of a -matchlock in the hands of one of his attendants; and it was generally -believed throughout the country that Macgregor had bribed the man to -assassinate the Sirdar. Had the wound proved mortal, there was at least -a possibility of all the prisoners being massacred in revenge. - -April came;[191] and at the end of the first week arrived the glorious -tidings of Sale’s victory over Akbar Khan on the plain of Jellalabad. -Somewhat confusedly was the story told at first. It was said that -the Sirdar had been killed in the action; and that Mahomed Shah Khan -had also fallen. It was a day of intense excitement—of painful -speculation and suspense. Some thought that Sale would push on to their -rescue—others, that the Sirdar, if alive, would condemn them to death -in revenge for his discomfiture; or that, if he had fallen, they would -be massacred by their guards.[192] Another day—and another of doubt -and anxiety followed. The captives watched, with deep and fearful -interest, the deportment of their keepers, who were seen grouping -together and conversing in low mysterious whispers. “A frightful -stillness appeared to prevail.”[193] Then came terrible rumours to the -effect that the captives were to be massacred at sunset. They had been -disarmed; they had neither swords nor pistols—no means of resistance -were within their reach. They could only submit to be slaughtered like -sheep in the shambles. But at sunset their fears were dissipated. -Mahomed Shah Khan arrived with a large party of followers. He went -among the prisoners with frank cordiality—civilly shook hands with -them all—and then sate down and entered into conversation with them. -It was necessary, he said, that they should be removed from Budeeabad; -and that they should commence their march on the following morning. -Not a hint fell from him regarding their future destination, and none -were inclined to question him. He slept that night in the fort; and -the prisoners began to make preparations for the morrow’s march. This -was no difficult matter. “All my worldly goods,” wrote Captain Johnson, -“might be stowed away in a towel.” - -Morning dawned; and Mahomed Shah Khan busied himself in the work of -plunder.[194] There was still some valuable property clinging to the -unhappy captives. They who had nothing else had good horses. Lady -Macnaghten had jewels and rich shawls. The Ghilzye chief helped himself -freely. Then, utterly ignorant of the direction in which they were -to proceed, the anxious captives started for their new prison-house. -Four camels, with litters, were assigned to the ladies and such of the -gentlemen as sickness prevented from mounting the ponies which had been -parcelled out amongst them. A guard of fifty Afghans, horse and foot, -escorted the little band of prisoners on their mysterious march. The -European soldiers were left behind. - -They had not proceeded many miles, when two or three horsemen galloped -up, and the party of captives were suddenly ordered to halt. Tidings -had come, it was said, to the effect that Pollock had been beaten back -in the Khybur Pass, with the loss of his guns, his treasure, and half -his force. Confident of the truth of this atrocious story, the Afghans -of the guard broke out into loud exultation, and the English officers, -reluctant as they were to believe it, were overborne at last by the -confidence of their escort and compelled to credit the distressing -news. False as was the report, it was not ineffective. The prisoners -were carried back to Budeeabad. With heavy hearts and sad countenances -they returned to their old prison-house, thinking of the new disasters -which had overtaken their unhappy country. But their hearts were soon -re-animated, and their faces soon brightened up, by the news which -greeted them at Budeeabad. Pollock had not been beaten back; but had -forced the Khybur Pass, and was marching triumphantly upon Jellalabad. -Again, therefore, the captive party were ordered to resume their -interrupted march; and on the following morning again they started. - -Proceeding for about ten miles, “through a bleak and barren country,” -they came upon a patch of cultivated ground—which smiled up in the -faces of the prisoners like an oasis in the desert.[195] Crossing the -river, they overtook Akbar Khan, sitting in a palanquin, his arm in -a sling, looking pale, haggard, and dejected, as one whose fortunes -were not on the ascendant. They saluted the Sirdar, passed on, and -halted at a short distance from him. The bivouac was a comfortless one. -Strictly guarded and insufficiently sheltered, they passed the night -in dreary discomfort. Rain fell, and under the scanty tents there was -not room for the bedding of the captives. The next day was one of equal -misery—there was scarcely any food either for man or beast. On the -morning of the 13th a distressing rumour was current among them. It was -said that the married families were to be carried off in one direction, -and the other captives in another. The scarcity was so great—it was -so difficult to subsist them all on one spot—that it was necessary to -divide the party. This was not to be submitted to without an effort -to obtain the rescision of the obnoxious order. Lawrence went to the -Sirdar, and implored him to suffer them all to remain together, and to -share the same fate. The Sirdar relented; and they all resumed their -march together. - -Their route lay over barren hills and through narrow stoney valleys. -Every now and then little patches of cultivation sparkled up in the -arid waste. There was little or no food to be obtained. A few almonds -and raisins, or other dried fruits, sufficed to appease the hunger -of the captives, whilst their horses were reduced to skeletons. The -heat was intense. The burning sun scorched the faces of the European -travellers, and peeled off the white skin. The journey was a long and -painful one, up a steep ascent almost along the whole line of march. -The prisoners knew not whither they were going; and it seemed that -Akbar Khan did not know where to take them. Some of the captives were -suffering severely. The bad roads and the vicissitudes of the climate, -for heavy rains followed the parching sun, tried them as in a furnace. -General Elphinstone was dying. Lady Macnaghten and Lady Sale were sick. -When Akbar Khan was made aware of the latter fact, he took compassion -on the English ladies. He was still weak, and suffering from the -effects of his wound; but he gave up the palanquin, or litter in which -he had been carried, for their use; and rode on horseback to the end of -the march. - -This was on the 19th of April. On the evening of that day the prisoners -reached Tezeen, and were conducted to a fort belonging to a petty -Ghilzye chief, in which were all the wives and women of Mahomed Shah -Khan. There they remained, poorly accommodated and scantily fed, until -the 22nd,[196] when, with the exception of General Elphinstone and two -or three other invalids, they were all carried off in the direction of -the hills, up a gradual ascent of many thousands of feet, to a place -called Zanda. There they halted for some weeks, and in the mean while -Captain Mackenzie was despatched in disguise to Pollock’s camp at -Jellalabad; and General Elphinstone died. - -By his fellow-captives his dissolution had long been anticipated, and -was now hardly deplored. Death brought him a merciful release from an -accumulation of mortal sufferings. Incessant pain of body and anguish -of mind had long been his portion. He felt acutely the humiliating -position into which it had pleased Providence to cast him, and neither -hoped nor wished to live to face his countrymen in the cantonments of -Hindostan, or in the streets of that great western metropolis which -he ought never to have quitted. They who watched beside the poor old -man, during the painful close of his life, bear testimony, in touching -language, to the Christian fortitude with which he bore his sufferings, -and the Christian charity with which he spoke of others, under all the -burdens which pressed upon him. The hardships to which he had been -subjected on the march from one prison-house to another had, perhaps, -accelerated the crisis which was hanging over him; but he had long -been passing away to his rest, and they, who loved him most, scarcely -desired to arrest the progress of the maladies which were so surely -destroying him. He left on record a statement of all the circumstances -of our disasters—a statement which I have freely quoted in a preceding -part of my narrative—but even with this statement in his hand, he -could not have faced his countrymen without bringing down upon himself -a verdict of condemnation. After all that has been written of his -deficiencies at Caubul, it may seem a startling inconsistency to say -that he was a brave and high-minded gentleman. He was so esteemed -before, in an evil hour for his own and his country’s reputation, he -was ordered to carry his infirmities across the Indus; and in spite -of all the humiliating circumstances of our discomfiture at Caubul, -posterity may so esteem him. Not upon him, but upon those who are -responsible for his appointment to high military command at such a time -and in such a place—first, upon those who sent him to India; secondly, -and chiefly, upon those who sent him to Afghanistan—must we fix the -shame of this great miscarriage. When he consented to leave the quiet -enjoyment of an honoured old age at home, to carry his good fame and -his broken constitution to a distant Indian Presidency, he committed -a fatal error, for which he made terrible atonement. But there are -few who will not pity rather than condemn the man, who found himself -suddenly, with all his weakness upon him, in a sea of difficulty which -demanded almost superhuman strength to buffet through it. In these -pages he has appeared only as the military leader—as one who, in the -hour of danger, was tried and found wanting. His fine social qualities -cannot be accepted as a set-off to his military deficiencies. It is -not to be pleaded in answer to the charge of having sacrificed an army -at Caubul, that he was an agreeable gentleman in private life, that he -was always ready with an anecdote and told it well, and that it was -very hard not to love him. But now that it has been recorded how the -soldier became the captive, and how the captive passed away to his -rest, these things may be set down with a kindly hand upon the last -page which bears his name; and it may be permitted to us, for a little -space, to forget the deficiencies of the soldier whilst we sympathise -with the sufferings of the man.[197] - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - -[December: 1841-June: 1842.] - - Stoddart and Conolly—Intelligence of the Caubul Outbreak—Arrest of - the English Officers—Their sufferings in Prison—Conolly’s Letters - and Journals—Death of the Prisoners. - - -There is a painful episode in this epic of the Afghan war, which -perhaps can be introduced in no place more fitly than in this. Whilst -the prisoners, who surrendered themselves on the march between Caubul -and Jellalabad, were suffering such hardships only as were inseparable -from their position in a rude and inhospitable country, and the -hostages at Caubul were under the protection of a benevolent and -high-minded Afghan nobleman, two enlightened and chivalrous British -officers were enduring unparalleled sufferings in the dungeons of an -Oosbeg tyrant, far beyond the snowy mountains of the Hindoo-Koosh. -Colonel Stoddart and Captain Conolly were being devoured by vermin in a -cheerless prison in the city of Bokhara. - -It has been shown that in the autumn of 1840, Arthur Conolly had -started from Caubul, ostensibly on a mission to Khiva and Kokund. He -had subsequently, on the invitation of the Ameer, and with the implied -permission, if not under the direct instructions of the Caubul envoy, -proceeded to Bokhara, where Colonel Stoddart was still detained, but -outwardly in a more honourable and less painful state of captivity -than that which he had been condemned to endure during a part of the -preceding years.[198] It was in the summer of 1841[199] that this -invitation was forwarded to Conolly, then at Kokund; but that state -was then at war with Bokhara, and its rulers hesitated to allow the -departure of her Christian guest. After some delay, however, Conolly -received his passports, and, proceeding by a circuitous route, reached -Bokhara in the month of November. The crisis was an unfortunate one. -Conolly was from the first regarded with suspicion. The Ameer believed, -or affected to believe, that he had instigated the states of Kokund -and Khiva to war against him. But other circumstances of a still more -inauspicious character were gathering around the ill-fated Englishmen. - -It was in the middle of the month of December, 1841, that intelligence -reached Bokhara to the effect that all Caubul and the surrounding -country had risen against Shah Soojah and his Feringhee allies, that -Sir Alexander Burnes had been killed, and the British troops beaten -in battle. A few days before, an answer had been received to a letter -addressed by the Ameer to the Queen of England. The answer was written -by the Foreign Secretary, and it referred the King to the Government -of India. This indignity—for so he regarded it—was still rankling -in his mind, when tidings of the Caubul outbreak reached Bokhara. The -Ameer now sent for the English officers; asked them many questions; -said that he would release Colonel Stoddart, but detain Captain -Conolly; and finally, after pondering the matter for a few days, -condemned them both to imprisonment in the house of the Topshee-Bashee, -or chief artilleryman of Bokhara.[200] - -Here their condition became every day more deplorable. They were not -allowed a change of raiment, and the clothes rotted on their backs. -Nauseous vermin preyed upon their bodies, and they tore the irritated -flesh with their nails. They were not denied either a sufficiency of -food or firing; but water leaked through the roof of the miserable room -in which they were confined. Ague and fever racked them grievously; but -they comforted one another with Christian consolation, and they prayed -together to the Christians’ God. - -In this wretched prison-house, though strictly guarded, they were -not so closely watched that Conolly could not contrive to spend many -an hour chronicling, in small characters upon Russian paper, all the -incidents of captive life, and drawing up, for the information of his -Government, elaborate memoranda on the politics of Central Asia. In -spite of all difficulties of transmission, many of these notes and -memoranda found their way from Bokhara to Caubul; and, surviving all -the chances of destruction to which the convulsed state of Afghanistan -necessarily exposed them, were conveyed in safety to the British camp, -and are now lying before me.[201] In no way could the sufferings which -the Bokhara captives endured be set forth so truthfully as in extracts -from such of Conolly’s letters and journals as have fortunately been -preserved. - -The English officers must have been thrown into prison about the 17th -of December. At the end of that month, or on the first day of the new -year, Allahdad Khan, the Caubul envoy, was brought in to share their -captivity.[202] “The Topshee-Bashee, on leaving Allahdad Khan with -us,” wrote Conolly in his journal, “made over to me a superfluous -_posteen_[203] belonging to my friend, which enabled me to throw aside -the stinking garment given by the Meer Shub (Master of the Police); -this and his allowing Allahdad Khan to keep the rest of his clothes, -looked as if the Ameer had somewhat relented, as the Topshee-Bashee -would not have dared to show us so much kindness without leave.” But -these hopes were delusive. The Ameer had not relented. Day after day -passed, and their sufferings increased. - -All through the month of January little change took place in the -condition of the captives. On the last day of the month, wrote Conolly, -“a Mehrum came to desire that we would minutely describe the city and -castle of Caubul, and also give an account of Heraut. Allahdad Khan -drew a plan of the first place; Stoddart was named as the one who -best knew the second; but the Mehrum did not take his account of it. -We next day learnt that he had been sent to the Akhondzadeh,[204] who -had drawn a large plan of his native city.” As February wore on, other -encouraging signs of the Ameer’s desire to treat the prisoners with -greater kindness presented themselves. On the 9th of February another -gleam of hope burst in upon them. The incident is thus touchingly -described in Conolly’s journal: - - _February 9 [1842]._—Moolla Nasir came to ask if we had seen the - Peacock throne of India. As every lettered Asiatic should know that - Nadir Shah carried that throne away to Persia, and Moolla Nasir’s - manner was pointedly kind, we judged that the question he had been - sent to ask was a pretence, and that the Ameer desired an opening - for a return to proper treatment of us. Stoddart, therefore, gave - him this, by speaking of his position here as British agent, and - expressing regret that he had not been able to relieve the Huzrut’s - mind from the doubts which he seemed to entertain of the English - Government’s friendship. We showed the sad state of our clothes - (Stoddart had been obliged to put aside his shirt in consequence of - the roof’s having leaked over him the night before), and expressed - hope that the Ameer would soon improve our condition; but we both - spoke cheerfully, that the King might not think we entertained - resentment for his treatment of us.[205] - -All the symptoms of a favourable change in the state of the Ameer’s -feelings proved delusive. Day after day passed, and the prisoners -still remained in the same unhappy condition; at last, at the end of -February, Conolly wrote: - - We hoped from Moolla Nasir’s visit, and that of the page, who brought - my thermometer, that the Ameer was relenting, but nothing has since - occurred to favour this idea; on the contrary, the chief would appear - to find pleasure in his servant’s accounts of our discomfort, which - may be imagined from the fact that we have now been seventy-one days - and nights without means of changing or washing our linen, which is - hanging in filthy tatters from our persons. The Topshee-Bashee, who - looks in upon us every seven or eight days, replies to our entreaties - for an improvement in this respect, that our state must be well known - to the Huzrut, whose mind retains thought of the greatest and least - matters, and that nothing can be said to his Majesty about us till he - opens the subject. The Topshee-Bashee, has, I believe, been as kind - to us as he has dared to be. We have had quite enough firing and food - throughout the cold season we have passed in his house, and continue, - thank God! in good health. We sometimes think, from the Ameer’s - keeping back Said’s and the Akhondzadeh’s packets, that he must have - received the Governor-General’s communication, and that he is acting - big in irritation at not having been answered from the English throne; - but it is impossible to form certain conclusions from his conduct, - for it is very often influenced by caprice, which is not very far - from madness. We hope that all is well in Afghanistan, and that, soon - as the Hindoo-Koosh roads become open, the Ameer will receive some - communication which will induce him to properly treat or dismiss us. - We beg that government will convey its sentiments to the Ameer in - Persian, as he will not take our word for what is written in English - any longer than it suits him, and also that no allusion may be made - to the above details, for if the King knew that we were able to send - intelligence he might treat us worse, and perhaps kill everybody about - us. The Russians propose to go about No-roz. We kept Colonel Boutenoff - informed of our proceedings up to the date of our seizure, and if he - should reach Europe ere our release, he may be able to enlarge this - abstract, which is necessarily very imperfect. - -In the second week of March, Conolly’s sufferings broke out openly in -the shape of cold and fever. Enfeebled and irritated by disease, he -then began to despond. It seemed to him that he was in the toils of -death; and in a high state of excitement, after many sleepless nights, -he wrote to his brother, John Conolly, then also a prisoner in the -hands of a Mussulman enemy, the following touching letter: - - From our Prison in the Bokhara Citadel, - _11th March, 1842._ - MY DEAR JOHN, - - This will probably be my last note hence, so I dedicate it to you, - who now, alas! stand next to me. We both dedicate everything we feel - warmest to William, whom may God bless in all belonging to him, for - his long and untiring brotherly affection to us all! Send my best - love to Henry and to all our dear sisters. - - This is the eighty-third day that we have been denied the means of - getting a change of linen from the rags and vermin that cover us; - and yesterday, when we begged for an amendment in this respect, the - Topshee-Bashee, who had before come occasionally as our host to speak - encouragingly, set his face like a flint to our request, showing that - he was merely a vane to the withering wind of his heartless master, - and could not help us thus, so that we need not ask him to do so. - This, at first, astonished and defeated us; we had viewed the Ameer’s - conduct as perhaps dictated by mad caprice; but now, looking back - upon the whole, we saw instead that it had been just the deliberate - malice of a demon, questioning and raising our hopes, and ascertaining - our condition, only to see how our hearts were going on in the - process of breaking. I did not think to shed one warm tear among such - cold-blooded men; but yesterday evening, as I looked upon Stoddart’s - half-naked and nail-lacerated body, conceiving that I was the special - object of the king’s hatred because of my having come to him after - visiting Khiva and Kokund, and told him that the British Government - was too great to stir up secret enmity against any of its enemies, - I wept on entreating one of our keepers, the gunner’s brother, to - have conveyed to the chief my humble request that he would direct his - anger upon me, and not further destroy by it my poor brother Stoddart, - who had suffered so much and so meekly here for three years. My - earnest words were answered by a “Don’t cry and distress yourself;” - he also could do nothing. So we turned and kissed each other, and - prayed together, and then said, in the words of the Kokunders, - “_My-bish!_”[206] Let him do as he likes! he is a demon, but God is - stronger than the devil himself, and can certainly release us from - the hands of this fiend, whose heart he has perhaps hardened to work - out great ends by it; and we have risen again from bed with hearts - comforted, as if an angel had spoken to them, resolved, please God, to - wear our English honesty and dignity to the last, within all the filth - and misery that this monster may try to degrade us with. - - We hope that, though the Ameer should now dismiss us with gold - clothing, the British and Afghan Governments will treat him as an - enemy; and this out of no feeling of revenge. He treacherously - caused Stoddart to invite me here on his own Imayut-Nameh; and after - Stoddart had given him a translation of a letter from Lord Palmerston, - containing nothing but friendly assurances, which he could have - verified, with our entire consent, at the Russian embassy, he pent - us both up here, because we would not pay him as a kidnapper for our - release, to die by slow rot, if it should appear that he might venture - at last to put us altogether out of the way. We hope and pray that God - may forgive him his sins in the next world; but we also trust that - some human power will soon put him down from his oppressive throne at - this capital, whence emanates the law by which the Khivans harry and - desolate the roads and homes of the Persians. He wishes every soul - to crouch before him, and not breathe God’s air freely without his - leave, nor dare to be happy or at ease. For instance (and we are at - the fountain-head of police reports), a poor wretch, confined without - food for three days and nights in the Bug House, an infernal hole - used for severe imprisonment, said incautiously, on being taken out, - that he was alive and well. “He is, is he!” said the Ameer, on the - report; “then put him in for three days and nights more.” Again, the - other night, fifty-six grooms assembled at a house outside the city, - to make merry on pilau and tea, with money liberally given by one of - the Oosbeg men, Rahman Kool Tohsaba, to his head groom, who acted - as master of the feast: they were convicted of having got together, - so all that the police-master could seize received seventy-five - blows each on the back with a heavy thorn-stick; and because one man - uncomplainingly bore his punishment, which was inflicted on all before - the King, he had him hoisted for seventy-five more, saying, “He must - have been struck softly.” “But what was the crime in this innocent - meeting of poor grooms?” we asked our gaolers. “Who knows?—he is - a king, and gave the order.” The master of the entertainment stood - with his dagger against some thirty policemen, till he was felled by - a stone thrown at his head, to let all who could escape; for this - heavier offence he was condemned to be thrown from a part of the - citadel wall, which gives a culprit a chance of escape with only the - fracture of a limb, because it has a slope: he threatened to pull down - with him any who should approach the brink to throw him off, and, - leaping boldly down, came to the ground with whole bones, and lives, - let us hope, for many a happy meeting yet with his friends in this now - oppressed city. This is how the Ameer would treat such ambassadors as - he dares insult, who do not bend reverently enough before him; but the - days for such despotism are passing quick, and he must himself be made - to go down before the strong spirit of Western civilisation. Stoddart - has asked me to put on paper my notions as to the measures that should - now be adopted for the settlement and independent happiness of the - Central Asian states;—here they are, briefly and freely; those of - a man born and bred, thank God! in Protestant England, who has seen - Russia, Persia, and Afghanistan, and all the three Oosbeg States. - - Turn out the horrible Wuzeer Yar Mahomed Khan, who has sold 12,000 - men, women, and children, since he obliged the Persians to retire from - Herat, and buy out Kamran’s family from that principality. Kamran - himself forfeited all his kingly right here by his letter to the Khan - Huzrut of Khiva, which the latter chief gave me in return for my frank - communication to him, and which I sent to Sir William Macnaghten. - Thus will be gained the only point from which the Afghan nation can - lend its weight to the preservation of peace and the advancement - of civilisation in Toorkistan, protect its weakest subjects from - being stolen or sold away, and properly guard its own and India’s - frontier. Next, let Pottinger come in attendance upon Shah Soojah’s - heir-apparent, Shah-zadah Timour, with a few thousand select Afghan - horsemen of both the tribes, half Douranee and half Ghilzye, to blow - down the gate of the citadel, which unjustly imprisoned us, against - the rights of all nations, except those the Oosbegs profess. The Ameer - scornfully says that the Afghans and English are one people; let him - feel that they really are so in a good cause. I really do believe - that if Shah-zadah Timour were to return, after such a proceeding, - to assume the actual exercise of government at his father’s capital, - taking back with him all real Afghans now enslaved in Toorkistan, - whose orthodoxy, according to the Soonees, is unquestionable, and who - might easily be collected for a friendly offering, the Afghans would - so thoroughly like him and understand us, that every English and - Indian soldier might be withdrawn to Hindostan. - - Let the Shah-i-Shah of Persia at the same time write these few words - to the Court of the faithful at Bokhara, sending copies of his letter - by friendly and high ambassadors to Khiva and Kokund: “I want all - my enslaved subjects who are not willing to remain in Bokhara, and - I am now coming, in reliance upon the only God of justice, to free - them, and to destroy the law of THY Mooftehed, by which people who - pray towards the same Kebla are sold as cattle.” Let Mahomed Shah - lithograph this, and send a copy to be stuck up at every mosque where - his authority or influence can reach, in Persia, Afghanistan, and - Tartary. This writing will tell the Ameer that his kingdom has been - weighed and found wanting; it will do much to soften and liberalise - Mahomedan feeling wherever it is read; and if the Persian nation are - informed that it comes to them recommended by English sympathy, they - will dismiss all irritation of mind that was caused by our checking - their military career at Herat. - - I feel confident that this great and most necessary measure of Persian - emancipation may be effected at once without shedding one drop of - blood. I never uttered a word of hostility against the Ameer, either - at Khiva or Kokund; but now I am authorised to show how I thought - the rulers of these states, who both hate him, may be made to end or - lessen their own foolish enmity by his removing from between them. Let - the Shah of Persia send a firman to Syud Mahomed Zahed, Kurruck Kojeh - at Kokund, whom he knows, saying—“Tell the Khan Huzrut, of Kokund, - who, I am happy to find, does not deal in my people, that I am about - to liberate all those oppressed men and women who are unwillingly - detained as slaves in Bokhara. I don’t want that country; and if you - will send Lushker Begglerbegge, or Mahomed Shereff Atalik, with the - Kokund army about the same time to Samarcand, my prime minister shall - make it over to him by treaty, as the capital of Mawarulneh. I shall - give up Merve to the Khan Huzrut of Khiva to be made the capital of - Kharasm, on condition of his doing all he can to restore and content - my unfortunate people, whom his tribes have carried off during my wars - in other directions.” - - The best Oosbeg troops are mere rubbish as opponents to Persian - regulars and cannon, and they all know it. Allah Kouli Khan is the - best and most sensible man in his country, and he will remain quiet - while Mahomed Shah comes against Bokhara, if Shakespear can be - empowered to tell him that this is a reform which must be effected, - and which Persia is determined now to effect, with the commerce of - England and Russia. Shakespear can mediate between the Khan Huzrut - and Mahomed Shah for the gentle emancipation of those who may wish to - return home in the next four or five years, or to settle in the fine - waste land of Merve; and perhaps Mahomed Shah may give to Allah Kouli - Khan the very large colony of [ ],[207] now settled here, who really - yet long for the home of their fathers: this, and securing to him the - Kokund frontier up the Oxus to Balkh, perhaps leaving the khan of it - his easy tributary, would make him agree to all that the Afghans need - for the formation of their frontier from Persian Khorassan to the Oxus. - - England and Russia may then agree about immutable frontiers for - Persia, Afghanistan, Mawarulneh, and Kharasm, in the spirit which - becomes two of the first European nations in the year 1842 of Jesus - Christ, the God incarnate of all peace and wisdom. May this pure and - peaceable religion be soon extended all over the world! - - ARTHUR CONOLLY. - - _March 12th._ - - I beg that fifty tillas may be given to Jooma Bai, the servant who - will convey this to Long Joseph. (Let the utmost caution be used - always in mentioning their names while this Ameer lives and reigns.) - As for Long Joseph, I don’t know what reward to propose for him. He - has risked his life for us in the most gallant manner, as few men - would, except for a brother, and he is a noble fellow. I feel sure - that Government will forgive me for not being able to make an account - of my stewardship during my Toorkish mission, and that it will use - every exertion to set free and to reward all who have suffered with - me, but remained alive. - - Allahdad Khan had some 400 tillas in cash when he was brought back, - besides his baggage and horses. Akhondzadeh Saleh Mahomed has served - too well to make it necessary for me to recommend him. I trust that - God has preserved his life. Stoddart and I will comfort each other - in every way till we die, when, may our brotherhood be renewed in - heaven through Jesus Christ our Saviour! Send this assurance to all - our friends, and do you, my dear John, stand in this faith. It is the - only thing that can enable a man to bear up against the trials of this - life, and lead him to the noblest state of existence in the next. - Farewell—farewell! I shall send this to be forwarded, if news reaches - Stoddart’s faithful man Ibraheem of our death, through Jooma Bai and - Long Joseph.[208] - -On the 22nd of March, Conolly again wrote, full of affectionate -solicitude for the sufferings of his friends, but little mindful of his -own: - - After sending a page with my thermometer on the 15th ult. (February), - to ask how much cold it indicated, as detailed in my last letter, - the Ameer took no notice of us till the 13th of this month, when he - sent the gold chronometer which I had given him, to show that its - chain was broken, and to ask if we could repair it; a pretence, the - Topshee-Bashee said, to ascertain what state we were in. We had both - become ill a few days before, from a sudden cold change of weather - and the discomfort of filthy clothing; and I, who had given in most - to the sickness, owing to anxiety of mind regarding the many persons - whom I had been the means of bringing into the Ameer’s tyrannous - hands, was lying weak in bed with fever when the last page came. The - Topshee-Bashee, who for some time spoke encouragingly about changing - our clothes, had by this time caused us plainly to understand that he - neither dared himself to amend our position in this respect, nor even - to represent it to the Ameer. He now tried to save us by telling the - page that I had been confined to my bed eight days, and by remarking - upon the wretched state of our apparel after eighty-five days’ and - nights’ wear. I showed the Mehrum that Stoddart had been obliged to - cast away all his under-clothing, and was suffering much from cold - on the chest. I experienced hope that the Ameer would take some pity - upon us, and especially upon such of my late travelling companions - and people as might be suffering under his displeasure. The page said - that he would make a representation if the Huzrut questioned him; and - he afterwards told the Topshee-Bashee that, on the Ameer’s doing so, - he had stated that the King’s last-come slave, Khan-Ali (Conolly), - had been very ill for eight or nine days; to which the Huzrut had - replied, “May he not die (or, I suppose, he won’t die) for the three - or four days that remain till his going.” We thought from this that - the Ameer proposed to send us away with the Russians, who were said - to be preparing to depart after the _No-roz_. Nothing else has since - transpired regarding ourselves; but through the indefatigable Long - Joseph we have learnt the following items of intelligence about our - friends.[209] - - On the 13th inst., Ibraheem wrote: “With regard to Caubul be quite at - ease; 30,000 people (rebels?) have been slaughtered there.” Allahdad - Khan, the Akhonzadeh, Eusoff Khan (Augustin), the Jemadar, Meer Akhor, - with Bolund Khan, Kurreem Khan, and Gool Mahomed, had been released; - for which we sincerely thanked God. Their sufferings, poor fellows, in - that horrible dungeon, must have been great.... - - On the 23rd, we were made further happy by the verbal intelligence of - Long Joseph that Allahdad Khan and the rest of our people had been - released. - -On the 24th, he again recorded that a ray of hope had broken into his -dreary dungeon: - - _24th._—This forenoon, the Topshee-Bashee coming to see us, said, - with a cheerful manner, “‘Sewonchee’—Reward me for glad tidings. I - represented your great want of clothes, and proposed to buy shirts and - trousers for you from the bazaar: but the Huzrut said, ‘They don’t - wear bazaar clothes; in three or four days I’ll give them dresses - of honour and dismiss them.’ And the Huzrut asked Meerza Juneid - which road would be the best one for you to travel by, saying, ‘They - cannot now go in that direction’ (apparently meaning Caubul). Meerza - Juneid replied, that the route by Persia would now be the best. After - which the Ameer spoke graciously about you. He said that Khan-Ali - was a well-informed person, that the Meerza represented that he had - conversed very little with Khan-Ali, but that Stoddart of whom he had - seen much, was a man instructed upon all matters.” We doubted the - Topshee-Bashee’s having dared to make a representation of himself - regarding us. And the old guardian mentioned afterwards that Meerza - Juneid had come to his brother’s office. Probably desiring to know - whether I was better or worse in health since the 13th, the Ameer sent - Meerza Juneid, in his capacity of physician, to make inquiries in this - matter. - -A few days afterwards, remembering how he had written, under the -excitement, almost the delirium of fever, a desponding letter to John -Conolly, he wrote more cheerfully to his brother, begging him, if the -letter reached its destination, not to be dispirited by it, for that -both he and Stoddart were now in good health: - - Bokhara Citadel, _28th March, 1842_. - MY DEAR JOHN, - - We have been comforted by intelligence that the Ameer has released - Allahdad Khan and all my people from the gaol in which he so unjustly - and cruelly confined them.... The Ameer has lately been talking, we - hear, of sending us away, and though we do not set much store by his - words, we think it possible he may give us to the Russian Mission, - who are about to depart.... I wrote you a longish letter on the - 11th of this month, when I was in a high state of excitement, from - fever and several nights of sleepless anxiety. The burden of it was - an entreaty to the last effect regarding my poor people, and a hope - that the British Government would seize the opportunity which the - Ameer’s faithlessness had given them to come forward with Persia to - put him down, and give his country to Kharasm and Kokund, on condition - of the entire suppression of the Persian and Afghan slave trade in - Toorkistan. If that paper (which I shall endeavour to recover) - should reach you, compress its words into this purport and destroy - it, reserving my last good wishes for the friends to whom I addressed - them, thinking that I might not live much longer. I am now, thank God, - almost well in health again, and the news regarding our people has - set my mind at rest. Stoddart, also, who was suffering awhile from - severe cold, is, I rejoice to say, convalescent. We are both in a - very uncomfortable state, as you may imagine, having been ninety-nine - days and nights without a change of clothes; but we are together. - Stoddart is such a friend as a man would desire to have in adversity, - and our searchers having missed the little Prayer-book which George - Macgregor gave us (tell him), we are able to read and pray, as well - as to converse together. God bless you, my dear John. Send my love to - everybody, and believe me, - - Yours, ever most affectionately, - ARTHUR CONOLLY.[210] - To J. B. Conolly, Esq., Caubul. - -The passages omitted from this letter relate almost entirely to the -services and the pay of Conolly’s attendants. There is nothing more -remarkable in his letters and journals, written at this time, than his -tender regard for others, and his forgetfulness of self. Not only did -he grieve for the sufferings of his friend, and endeavour, by putting -him forward as the real representative of the British Government, to -obtain Stoddart’s release, or at least a mitigation of the severity of -his confinement, but he exhibited, also, the tenderest solicitude for -the welfare of all the servants who had accompanied him to Bokhara, -and, in the midst of his own affliction, even on the bed of sickness -and in the near prospect of death, thought of nothing more earnestly -than the future welfare of his poor dependents.[211] On the 5th of -April he wrote in his journal: - - _April 5._—When I came here, Stoddart did his utmost to put me - forward; but now, as long as the Ameer detains him, I shall refer to - him as the accredited British agent, every communication on business - that the Ameer may make to me, whether we should be together or - separated. He well knows all the people here, and the dignity of our - government is safe in his hands. - - We have heard that the Russians are about to depart, and that they - are to take their enslaved people with them; but we cannot get at the - truth of the statement. Report also says that the Ameer will march - with his army seven or eight days hence. There is no doubt that he is - preparing for an early move; but though Takkind and Kokund are named - as his points of attack, it is not certain that he will go eastward. - This is the 107th day of our confinement, without change of clothes; - but the weather having become warmer, we can do without the garments - that most harboured the vermin that we found so distressing, and we - are both now, thank God! quite well. We trust that our friends will be - informed of our well-being. We have desired all our servants, except - Ibraheem (who remains behind to keep up correspondence), to return to - their homes as soon as their strength enables them to travel, begging - them to make their way anyhow, and to rest assured that everything due - will be made up to them on their reaching Caubul.... Allahdad Khan - behaved very firmly in refusing to allow that he was the servant of a - Feringhee servant, as the Ameer wished him to do, and did justice both - to the dignity of his royal master and to the policy of the British - Government in Afghanistan. I beg that his conduct may be mentioned to - Shah Soojah, and I trust that all his losses will be made up to him; - but if the preparation of the account is left to him, he will make it - a very large one, and part of the settlement may perhaps be deferred - till it is decided whether or not the Ameer is to be called upon for - repayment. - - When our last packet was despatched we deemed it not impossible, - from the Ameer’s expressions, which had been reported to us, that - his Majesty designed to send us away with the Russian Mission. Our - keepers rather inclined to the idea that Huzrut would dismiss us about - the same time by the route of Persia; and the Topshee-Bashee’s old - brother talked seriously about performing a pilgrimage to the holy - city of Meshid in our company. - -These hopes were most delusive. As time advanced, the prospects of -restoration to liberty became more and more remote. About the middle -of the month of April, the Russian Mission took its departure; and the -Ameer set out from Bokhara at the head of a grand military expedition -against the state of Kokund. On the 13th of April, Conolly wrote in his -journal: - - _April 13._—We heard that the Russians had been dismissed with - presents of honour, that the Kodiyar Beg Karawool Beggee, ranking as - captain or commander of 100, had been attached to Colonel Boutenoff as - the Ameer’s envoy to St. Petersburg, and that the Huzrut had promised - to promote him to the grade of Tok-Suba, commander of 1000, privileged - to bear a cow-tail banner, on his return after the performance of - good service. The Ameer’s own arrangements were said to be completed, - and the direction of it certainly to the eastward. An envoy from - Kokund, who arrived two days ago, was not received, but was told to - go about his own business wherever he listed. Our informant mentioned - at the same time that the last envoy from Khiva had been dismissed a - fortnight before with extraordinary honour, all his servants getting - dresses. We now also learned that the heir of the Koondooz chief had - sent an envoy to the Ameer, who had ordered one of his officers, a - Khojeh, styled Salam Aghassi, to accompany that agent to Koondooz on - his return. It was thought, we were told, that the Khojeh of Balkh - would endeavour to take Koondooz on Meer Morad’s death, and the heir - may, in this apprehension, have been alert to put himself under the - Ameer’s protection. This morning the Ameer showed the Topshee-Bashee - an especial mark of favour by sending him a loaf of refined sugar from - the palace; towards evening his Majesty rode four miles to a place of - pilgrimage, and on his return at night had the Topshee-Bashee up to - give him some orders. - -The narrative then proceeds: - - Early next morning (the 14th) the Ameer marched out to the sound of - his palace kettle-drums and trumpets, leaving us in the filthy clothes - which we had worn for 115 days and nights. We said to the Gunner’s - old brother, when he mentioned the Ameer’s having departed, “Then the - Meshid caravan apparently stands fast.” “No,” was his reply; “please - God it will go soon. I asked the Topshee-Bashee last night if nothing - had been settled about you, and he replied, ‘When the Russians get out - a march or so, the Dustan Kanchee will make a petition about them, - and they will be dismissed.’” The old man also remarked, probably - from what he had heard his brother say, that the Ameer had expressed - himself to the effect that he knew the Russian Elchee was led to get - us in order to make a boast of having procured our release, which made - it seem as though Colonel Boutenoff had been endeavouring to obtain - our dismissal. Our old keeper persisted for some days in assuring us - of his belief that our immediate dismissal was designed, and on the - 18th said that he was going down into the city to seek out my Dewan - Beggee, Eusoff Khan (Augustin), to set his mind at ease about us; he - returned, saying that he had been referred from place to place without - finding Eusoff Khan, or any of our people; but that one Meer Hyder and - another shopkeeper of his acquaintance had assured him that they were - all in the town, and that four or five of them were in the habit of - coming occasionally at night to a certain quarter, to hear books read. - We had thought the gunners might have received orders to collect some - of our people in order to our respectable dismissal; but knowing that - all our men, except Ibraheem, had left Bokhara, we concluded that the - Topshee-Bashee had made use of his old brother to deceive us, in order - to keep us hopeful and quiet for another period, as he said nothing - about changing our clothes, and kept himself quite aloof from us, - which he would hardly have done had he believed what he reported in - the Ameer’s name. - - Just before the Ameer’s departure, we heard that a British Elchee had - arrived at Merve, on his way hither. We could get no further accounts - of the said Elchee, but judged that it might be Shakespear on his way - to Khiva.... [_MS._ defaced] ... From the 4th to the 7th of May the - palace drums and trumpets were continually sounding for intelligence - that Kokund had been taken after a faint endeavour at resistance under - the famed Kokund general, Guda Bai; that the latter had been taken - prisoner, and that the rebellious town had been given up to plunder, - &c. - -Then follows much of Bokhara politics, the manuscript being greatly -defaced—and after this, some passages of personal narrative, the -chronicle of which extends up to the 24th of May—the latest date under -which I have been able to discover anything in the hand-writing of -Arthur Conolly: - - We had expressed to our old guardian a wish to get some money from - Meshid, with which to reward him for his kindness, (and to get) him - privately to buy (us) a few necessaries in the event of our further - detention, and, liking the idea, he, on the 19th instant (May), - brought secretly to see us his son-in-law Budub, employed as a - caravan-bashee between Bokhara and the Holy City, who agreed to act - as agent in the business after another week. Inquiring the news from - Budub, we heard that Kamran was said to be confined in Herat by Yar - Mahomed Khan—that the English remained as before at Candahar and - Caubul—and that four Elchees, English, Russian, Persian, and Turkish, - had gone together to Khiva, each displaying his national flag, and - told the Khan Huzrut that he had the choice of quietly giving up - plundering and slave-dealing, or of meeting the Shah of Persia, who - had assembled a large army for the redress of his people. - - * * * * * - - Our old friend now informed us, on the authority of his Afghan - acquaintance, Meer Hyder, that all our people had left Bokhara on - hearing that they had been inquired about.... Possibly the Ameer - really did mean to send us away at the time of his marching, but - deferred to do so on hearing that we had no servants left here, or - from one of his incalculable caprices. I had noted, in a detailed - report of our proceedings after leaving Kokund, which when we were - seized I was waiting the Ameer’s permission to despatch by a courier - to Caubul, an expression which the Naib heard his Majesty had uttered - in his camp after my arrival, to the effect that he would give the - English a few rubs more, and then be friends with them again. Though - we were not sure that the Amer had so spoken, the plan seems one - likely to be entertained by an ignorant and weak man, anxious to - give an imposing impression of his greatness and confidence; and to - it I partly attributed the ungraciousness of my public reception - in camp, though I was the Naib’s honoured guest; the failure of - the Huzrut to recover the horses and the property of my servants - which had been plundered at his outposts, when bringing letters to - him, and the hauteur with which, at the first joint reception of - Stoddart and myself here, he caused it to be signified to us that - as in old times there had been friendship between the Mussulmans - and infidels, there existed no objection to the establishment of - friendly relations between the states of Bokhara and England; but - that the Huzrut desired to know whether we (the English) had been - travellers over all Toorkistan to spy the land with a view to take - it, as we had taken Caubul, or for other purposes; and wished all - our designs to be unveiled, in order that if they were friendly they - might become apparent, and that if hostile, they might still be known. - The Government of India, knowing what communications it has sent to - Bokhara, will be able to judge the Ameer’s conduct better than we are. - - On the 19th (May) the Topshee-Bashee paid us a visit of a few moments, - after keeping away for two months. He mentioned that a man with a - name like Noor Mohumnud had come three or four days before from - Persia, bringing a load of things for Stoddart, of which the Dustan - Kanchee had forwarded a list to the Ameer—probably the articles which - should have accompanied Lord Palmerston’s letter. The Huzrut, the - Topshee-Bashee said, would doubtless, on his return, be gracious to - us, and give us fine robes of honour, and treat us even better than - before. - - About sunset on the 23rd, as Stoddart and myself were pacing up and - down a small court of twenty feet long, which encloses our prison, one - of the citadel doorkeepers came and desired us both to sit down in a - corner; we complied, wondering what would follow, and presently saw - heads peering at us from the adjoining roofs, when we understood that - the Ameer’s heir, a youth of seventeen, had taken this way of getting - a sight of the Feringhee Elchees. We must have given him but a poor - impression in the remains of our clothes, and with heads and beards - uncombed for more than five months. - - On the 23rd, Jooma Bai was accosted by a man named Makhzoom, known to - Stoddart, who gave him a token, and a note written in such bad grammar - as scarcely to be understood, in which he said one Juleb arrived - lately from Khiva, mentioned that he saw Pottinger Sahib there, - and another person named Moosa having come, bringing a letter from - Pottinger Sahib, who, he says, is at Khiva, with the Elchee of Mahomed - Shah. - -Authentic history here terminates. Beyond this all is doubt and -conjecture. On the 28th of May, Stoddart despatched an official -letter to the Indian Government,[212] which was forwarded with -Conolly’s journals; and at this point we lose altogether the track -of the footprints which the Bokhara captives have left on the great -desert of time. That they perished miserably is certain. “No change -has taken place in our treatment,” wrote Stoddart—it is the last -sentence penned in the Bokhara prison which seems to have reached its -destination—“though hopes, so long proved to be deceitful, are held -out to us on the return of the chief.” But the Ameer, glutted with -conquest, returned from the Kokund expedition, and ordered them out -to death. They died by the hands of the public executioner. But the -precise period of their death is not with certainty to be ascertained. - -There is but scanty evidence to enable us to determine the point. That -which is most credible is the evidence of Saleh Mahomed, a youth whom -Major Todd despatched from Herat, to join Captain Conolly’s suit. His -story is, that in the month of June, 1842, Stoddart and Conolly were -executed by order of the Ameer; that he derived his information from -one of the executioners; and that he saw their graves. On the 17th of -June, it is related, they were taken out of their prison, and, in the -presence of an assembled multitude, led into a small square. Their -hands were bound together before them. Their graves were dug before -their eyes. Stoddart was first marked for death. He cried aloud against -the tyranny of the Ameer; and his head was cut off with a knife. -Conolly was then offered his life, on condition that he would adopt the -Mussulman faith. But he indignantly rejected the proposal. “Stoddart,” -he said, “became a Mussulman, and yet you kill him: I am prepared to -die.” And then Arthur Conolly, full of faith in the merits of his -Redeemer, stretched forth his neck, and died.[213] - -There is nothing more painful than this in all the history of the -Central-Asian war. It would be unjust to encourage a belief in the -reader’s mind that efforts were not made to compass the liberation of -Colonel Stoddart. From the time when Major Pottinger first received -at Herat intimation of his friend’s captivity, and wrote to the -Ameer a protest against the outrage he had committed, to a date long -subsequent to the deaths of Stoddart and Conolly, continual efforts -were made, both from the side of India and of England, to accomplish -this great object. Todd did all that he could do from Herat; Abbott and -Shakespear did all that they could do from Khiva; Macnaghten did all -that he could do from Caubul; Lord Auckland did all that he could do -from Calcutta. From London, Lord Palmerston directed our ambassadors -at St. Petersburgh and Constantinople to obtain the agency of the -Courts at which they were resident; and both the Sultan and Count -Nesselrode wrote urgent letters to Bokhara in behalf of the British -prisoners.[214] But when all this is related, it still appears that -more regard might have been shown for Stoddart’s position, and that -if there had been greater promptitude in answering the references -made by him to the home authorities, he might have taken advantage -of a favorable change in the feelings of the Ameer, and of his own -circumstances, to take his departure from Bokhara. Certain it is that -Stoddart felt acutely the culpable indifference to his fate displayed -by the British Government. As far back as the July of the preceding -year he had written: - - News from me you will not expect, nor have I the least word of - interest to offer you, except that I am waiting the replies of - government, before I am finally released and take my departure. - Nothing can be more slack than the time and means taken to provide me - with those replies, and my disgust perfectly negatives any attempt to - write a commonly agreeable note. My last news from Caubul, dated June - 6, says that poor Todd is there awaiting, if possible, a mitigation - of his sentence. Conolly is not yet here from Kokan, nor have my - messengers to him yet returned. They conveyed the orders from Caubul, - and an invitation to the Ameer, to return by this route.[215] - -On the 28th of February, 1842, he wrote again, as a kind of endorsement -to one of Conolly’s letters: - -TO THE SECRETARY OF GOVERNMENT IN INDIA. - - SIR, - - The Governor-General in Council will be informed by the accompanying - abstract how far my position here [_and that of Captain Conolly_] has - been sacrificed. - - I have the honour to be, Sir, - Your obedient, humble servant, - CHARLES STODDART. - -The words within brackets were erased—most probably by Conolly.[216] - - But Stoddart, though he may have resented the injustice of sacrificing - him to no purpose, was ready to become a sacrifice if, by so doing, - he could promote the interests of his country. “I beg sincerely,” he - wrote on the 5th of April, “that no one will regret any sacrifice - of me, for it is nothing at all. It may yet not be requisite—but if - it be, I regard the probable result, from the action of government - in doing justice to others, and bringing all these countries to - reasonable conduct, as fully compensating a much greater sacrifice - than that of so humble an individual as I am.”[217] If anything could - increase the sorrow with which we contemplate the fate of this brave - man, it would be a perusal of such noble sentences as these. - -It was under a high and chivalrous sense of duty to his government -that Colonel Stoddart continued to face the dangers of his position -at Bokhara, after he might have escaped from them; and it was under -an equally strong sense of duty that Captain Conolly made his way -to the inhospitable city. To describe them officially as “innocent -travellers,” was clearly a misapplication of language; and yet, when -on the famous 1st of October, 1842, Lord Ellenborough addressed the -following letter to the Ameer of Bokhara, he so described them both: - - Simlah, _October 1st, 1842._ - - A. C. - - The Queen of England, my royal mistress, has sanctioned my coming to - India, to conduct its government, and direct its armies. - - On my arrival, I found that great disasters had befallen those armies, - and much injury had been inflicted on my countrymen and the people of - India by the treacherous Afghans, under Mahomed Akbar Khan. - - In forty days from the time when I directed to British armies, - reinforced from India, to move forward, three great victories have - been gained over the Afghans; the city and citadel of Ghuznee have - been destroyed, and now the Balla Hissar of Caubul is in my power. - - Thus, by God’s aid, have I afflicted with merited punishment the - murderers of their own king and of a British minister. In this I have - avenged the cause of all sovereigns and of all nations. - - The wife and family of Mahomed Akbar Khan are prisoners, and my - soldiers are now conducting them to the sea. - - Thus are the wicked punished, even in their wives and families. - - I hear that you, too, have gained great successes, at which I rejoice, - if you had just ground of complaint against your enemy. - - It is in the midst of successes that clemency most becomes the - conqueror, and gives to him an extent of permanent fame which often - does not attend on victory. - - I was informed, when I reached India, that you detained in confinement - two Englishmen, supposing them to have entertained designs against - you. This must have been your reason, for no prince detains an - innocent traveller. - - I am informed that they are innocent travellers. As individuals they - could not entertain designs against you; and I know they were not - employed by their government in such designs, for their government is - friendly to you. - - Send them away towards Persia. It will redound to your honour. They - shall never return to give you offence, but be sent back to their own - country. - - Do this as you wish to have my friendship. - - ELLENBOROUGH.[218] - -So manifest a repudiation of the official character of these two -officers was not right; and it has been said, by one whose zeal and -enthusiasm overlaid his judgment and discretion, but who is still -entitled to honourable mention for his generous exertions in a hopeless -cause,[219] that this very letter, in all likelihood, caused the -execution of the prisoners. To describe them as travellers was, it is -said, to proclaim them as spies. But the letter, however dangerous -in itself, was at least harmless in its results. Before it was even -written, the “innocent travellers” had journeyed to a land where the -tyranny of princes could not reach them—where the wicked cease from -troubling and the weary are at rest.[220] - - - - -CHAPTER V. - -[April-July: 1842.] - - Affairs at Caubul—Elevation of Futteh Jung—Opposition of the - Barukzyes—Arrival of Akbar Khan—His Policy—Attack on the Balla - Hissar—Its Capture—Conduct of Akbar Khan—Barukzye Strife—Defeat of - Zemaun Khan—Situation of the Hostages and Prisoners. - - -On the death of Shah Soojah there commenced in Caubul a civil war. -The whole city was thrown into convulsion. Futteh Jung, the second -son of the murdered Shah, was proclaimed King. He was a man of weak -understanding and infamous character; but he was believed to be -friendly to the British Government, and he both hated and feared the -Barukzyes. In himself a mere cypher, he could have done nothing to -resist the encroachments of that powerful tribe; but Ameen-oollah Khan -threw all the weight of his influence into the scales in favour of the -Prince, and for some time they seemed equally balanced. The Naib cared -nothing for the Prince; but he scented the royal treasures, and where -the money lay the thickest, there was sure to be Ameen-oollah Khan. - -In such troublous times as he had now fallen upon, the Prince had -little taste for royalty. He remembered the fate of his father; and -shrunk from the perilous excitement in which he was now about to be -plunged. Weak, too, as he was, he had sagacity enough to perceive that -British power was again on the ascendant, and that whatever might -be the result of the internecine strife which was now convulsing the -capital, the supremacy of the British would be speedily re-established. -It was expedient, therefore, he thought, to exert himself to the -utmost, to obtain the favourable consideration of his old Feringhee -allies; so he despatched earnest letters to Captain Macgregor at -Jellalabad, pleading both for himself and the memory of his murdered -father, protesting his inviolate attachment and loyalty to the English -Government, and imploring them to tell him what to do. - -Futteh Jung had been proclaimed King by Ameen-oollah Khan and the -Populzyes; but the Barukzyes refused to recognise him. Again they -set up the Newab Zemaun Khan, and openly defied the Suddozye power. -Soon the two contending parties broke out into open hostilities. -Ameen-oollah Khan and his puppet were the first to draw the sword. -On the 1st of May there was fighting from house to house—the whole -city was in commotion. On the following day, success began to declare -itself on the side of the Barukzyes. Ameen-oollah Khan made a false -move, and disastrously over-reached himself. Believing that the -act would dishearten the Barukzyes, he seized the person of Meer -Hadjee, the chief Moollah. But very different was the real from the -anticipated effect of this outrage. Nearly all the townspeople, before -neutral, rose to avenge this insult offered to their High Priest. -The Kohistanees joined them. The Hadjee was released. But popular -indignation ran high against Ameen-oollah Khan. His house was burnt. -His property was plundered. His servants were seized. Compelled to seek -safety in flight, he flung himself into the Balla Hissar. - -The Prince made a show of welcoming him, but secretly declared that -he would willingly surrender him and his Populzye associates to the -British, if Pollock would advance upon Caubul—that one of his main -objects, indeed, in opening the gates to them was to have the rebels -more securely in his power.[221] The Naib knew that his position was a -dangerous one, and declared that he would throw himself on the mercy -of the British and take his chance of being hanged. There was a more -unrelenting enemy beyond the walls of the Balla Hissar. The Barukzyes -were eager to destroy him. - -The contest now raged furiously. The guns of the Balla Hissar were -opened upon the city. Multitudes of the townspeople fled in dismay. -There were 5000 men in the citadel; there was no lack of provisions. -The money was all in the hands of the Prince; and he disbursed it -freely to his adherents. But the Barukzyes were miserably poor. They -could only raise money by the sale of jewels and the exaction of fines; -and the Kohistanees and others who flocked to their standard envied the -fortunate followers of the more opulent Prince.[222] - -It was not likely that Akbar Khan would regard with unconcern these -proceedings at the capital. He was awaiting the return of Captain -Mackenzie from Jellalabad, when intelligence of the disturbed state -of affairs at Caubul was brought to him. Determining first, however, -to learn the result of the mission to General Pollock’s camp, he -resolved to set out for the scene of strife, and to take one or two of -the English officers with him. Mackenzie returned on the 3rd of May, -and was immediately despatched by the Sirdar on a second mission to -Jellalabad, whilst Akbar Khan, taking Pottinger and Troup with him, set -out on the following day for the capital. - -Arrived at Caubul, the Sirdar played his game with some address. -Sedulously giving currency to the intelligence that he had been -in treaty with General Pollock, who was said to have recognised -his authority, he enhanced his own importance in the eyes of his -countrymen, and sowed disaffection among the adherents of the royal -party. Many who had before been neutral, now, believing that the -British were on amicable terms with the Sirdar, openly espoused his -cause. Khan Shereen Khan and the Kuzzilbashes had hitherto remained -inactive; but feeling the importance of their coadjutancy, Akbar Khan -made strenuous efforts to obtain it, and gained at last a promise of -support.[223] From day to day there was continual strife and much -fighting. The advantage was for the most part on the side of the -Barukzyes. The Prince had thrown up some outworks round the Balla -Hissar; but partly owing to the weakness and partly to the treachery -of the guards, they had been carried by the enemy.[224] Pottinger -witnessed some of these engagements, and wrote of them as most -contemptible affairs. - -It soon became only too probable that the Balla Hissar itself would -fall before the Barukzyes. The energy and vigour of Akbar Khan and his -confederates greatly exceeded that of the wretched Prince and his few -interested supporters. Fearful of this, Futteh Jung continued to write -pressing letters to the British authorities at Jellalabad, urging them -to push on to his relief, and Mohun Lal gave cogency to the request -by setting forth the probability of the Balla Hissar falling into the -hands of the Barukzyes, and the strength which that party would derive, -not only from the occupation of such a commanding position, but from -the possession of the royal treasures. Like his father, however, the -Prince continued to declare that his money was failing, and to request -the British to supply him with funds to carry on the war. But more than -all he clamoured for the advance of the British army. On the 11th of -May he wrote to Captain Macgregor: - - The reason of the present contest is this. I wished to excite a - dispute between the Barukzyes and the other wicked men, with a view - that they should have no leisure even to touch their own heads, and - thus the English army may reach here unmolested. To effect this cause, - whatever gold and silver I had has been paid to the people, with the - object of securing the interests of the British.[225] Now I have very - little cash remaining in the treasury—enough only to support me for - some ten or fifteen days more. After that period, without assistance - from the British, I shall be reduced to the greatest difficulty. The - men of the world are the disciples and worshippers of money. If you - will not raise the victorious standard of the British troops quickly, - or do not send me reinforcements within a few days, all the people - will desert me on account of not having money, and the Barukzyes will - then have the upper-hand over me. - - If the Barukzyes establish their power, serious evil is to be - apprehended; and the household of the British ally (Shah Soojah) will - be destroyed. After this there will be nothing in store for us but - repentance and disgrace. It is as clear to all the people as the sun, - that I am soliciting the assistance of the friends and nations of my - late father. In delaying this object many dangers may arise, and much - harm may befall the needy. In such a crisis as this, all objects may - be easily gained; and the affairs which are now reduced to a state of - disorder will, without much difficulty, be brought into order again. - - If you are delaying your march on account of supplies of grain, you - need not care for this. If it pleases God that I should recover my - authority, there will be thousands of “Khurwars” (measures of ten - maunds) of grain, as well as plenty of fodder for the horses. - - I have heard that the Bombay forces have reached Candahar, and also - marched thence to this quarter. It would be highly desirable, if the - victorious army of Calcutta should possess this country before the - arrival of the Bombay forces, that it should show the world that - your arms alone have gained the victory. Although the army of both - sides belongs to the same government, I write thus because I wish you - well.[226] - -On the day after this letter was written, three holy men presented -themselves before the Prince, with overtures of peace from the -Sirdar. They set forth that whatever oaths Futteh Jung might desire -the Barukzye chief to swear to him, would be solemnly sworn on the -Koran. “Of what avail are oaths,” asked the Prince; and sending for -several Korans from another apartment, showed the _Syuds_ how they were -covered with the seals of the Barukzye, the Douranee, the Caubulee, -the Persian, and the Kohistanee chiefs. “This,” added the Prince, “is -God’s holy book, in which all the faithful believe. Look at these seals -and the oaths of fidelity written upon the margin, declaring that the -enemies of the royal family are the enemies of Mahomed—and yet the -Barukzyes have murdered the King, my father. If there be any other -Koran sent from Heaven, let the Barukzyes swear solemnly upon it—this -has been tried too often, and too often found wanting.” The Syuds were -then dismissed. Nothing was done towards a satisfactory arrangement. -So Mahomed Shah Khan was sent to conduct the negotiations with the -Suddozye Prince. - -What were the proposals made to the Prince, and in what light he -regarded them, may be gathered from the letter which, on the following -day, he addressed to Captain Macgregor: - - The circumstances of this quarter are as follows. Since the arrival - of Mahomed Akbar Khan, the Barukzyes at the head of the Ghilzyes, - Caubulees, and the Kohistanees, attacked the trenches I had built out - at a distance. Some of them were taken by the enemy on account of the - weakness of my guards, and others in consequence of the treachery of - my people. All the trenches round the Balla Hissar have fallen into - the hands of the enemy, and we are now in a perfect siege. Yesterday, - Mahomed Shah Khan, Ghilzye, came to treat with Ameen-oollah Khan into - the Balla Hissar, and the result of their negotiation, after solemn - oaths, was as follows:—That I should be acknowledged as King—Mahomed - Akbar Khan as Minister of State—and that Ameen-oollah Khan should - hold the situation of Deputy (“Naib”) under the minister. After this, - Mahomed Shah Khan was brought to my presence, and I was obliged to - give him a “Khelat;” but agreeably to the advice of my well-wishers, I - deferred giving my acquiescence to the result of their negotiation for - two or three days to come. - - They have made four proposals to me,—Firstly, that I should allow - Mahomed Akbar Khan to be my minister, and Ameen-oollah Khan his - deputy. They are then both to raise an army and to go and fight with - the English forces coming up to Caubul. Secondly, they will stand - neutral, if I like; but I must prepare to go and oppose the British - troops. Thirdly, if I am powerful, I must get ready to wage war with - the Barukzyes. Fourthly, that I should take the whole family of the - late King, and go wherever I like to go with them. - - It appears that Ameen-oollah Khan, on account of our weakness, has - consented to their proposals, and has therefore gone out of the Balla - Hissar to have a conference with Mahomed Akbar Khan. These proposals - have perplexed me greatly, and I am lost in speculation. If I were - to appoint Mahomed Akbar Khan my minister, he would raise a force to - oppose the English, and I should be forced to give up my artillery to - him, which will be a dangerous business. In case of my refusal, the - family of the late martyr (King) will be outraged. - - My anxiety for your departure from Jellalabad for Caubul appears - thoroughly useless. It is now forty days since your victorious army - has passed up through Khybur, and you have not yet left Jellalabad. - I endeavoured to excite a dispute among the rebels, with the view - that the English army should reach here without opposition. Although - I have successively sent letters through Mohun Lai, asking you to - advance immediately to this side, but no symptoms of the kind have yet - appeared. In such delay dangerous evils are to be apprehended. - - It is a long time that I have deputed and entrusted Meerza - Ameen-oollah with my verbal messages to you; but no answer has yet - reached me about it. You should quickly reply to my letters, as well - as the messages I have sent you by him, and also let me know the day - of your march, as I am now in much perplexity. If there be any hope - of your immediate advance, I will undergo every hardship to defend - the Balla Hissar, and engage the rebels in fight. In case of any - more delay the object will be lost, and an easy end will be obtained - with the utmost difficulty hereafter. What can I write you more than - this?[227] - -Feeling himself utterly powerless to resist the demands of the -Barukzyes, for all his principal supporters were deserting him, the -Prince now placed himself in the hands of Ameen-oollah Khan, who went -out to a conference with Mahomed Shah Khan, which mutual distrust -nearly strangled in the womb, and consented to the first of these -propositions.[228] Futteh Jung was to be the nominal occupant of the -throne. Akbar Khan was to be minister; and Ameen-oollah Khan, his Naib, -or deputy. It was the object of the Sirdar to arrest the internal -dissensions which were so weakening the great national and religious -cause, to obtain possession of all the available money and munitions, -and then to carry on the war with new vigour against the infidels. - -But Mahomed Zemaun Khan was the recognised chief of the Barukzye -party; and he now asked on what authority the Sirdar ventured without -his sanction to make peace with the Suddozyes. There appeared to be -every chance of an open rupture between them; and scarcely had Akbar -Khan concluded his negotiations with the Prince, then the Newab made a -hostile demonstration, attacked the Balla Hissar, but was beaten back -with much slaughter. It was, however, currently reported that a secret -understanding existed between the two Barukzye chiefs, whose common -object it was to obtain possession of the Balla Hissar. Two or three -days afterwards they were, outwardly, again united. An attempt had -been made to lure the Prince to an interview with Akbar Khan beyond -the walls of the Balla Hissar. The Arabs in the garrison, who remained -true to the royal family, dissuaded the Prince from exposing himself to -the treachery of the Sirdar; mutual distrust soon engendered a rupture -between them; and it was plain, that if some arrangement could not be -promptly made between the Prince and the Barukzyes, through the agency -of the Kuzzilbash chief, the Balla Hissar, the treasure, and the guns, -would speedily fall into the hands of Akbar Khan and his confederates. - -The Barukzyes now laid siege, with redoubled vigour, to the Balla -Hissar. The Prince was well-nigh deserted.[229] He called upon Oosman -Khan, Shah Soojah’s old minister, to aid him, but upon some frivolous -pretext, the Wuzeer declined to league himself with so perilous a -cause. It was assiduously given out that the Prince was holding the -Balla Hissar only for the Feringhees; and, as the national feeling -became stronger and stronger against him, if it had not been for the -strength of the place itself, he would hardly have been able to hold it -for a day against the Barukzyes. But the fortress held out, in spite -of the weakness of the Prince and the garrison; and so at last the -Barukzyes began to undermine the works. “Last night,” wrote Futteh -Jung to General Pollock, at the beginning of June, “they made an -assault; now they have made mines in every direction. My affairs are in -a very critical state.... If you do not come quickly, the Balla Hissar -and the throne will be lost, and you will be a sufferer. At this time -I am at my last gasp. Moreover, there is nothing in the magazine.[230] -Now is the crisis.”[231] - -On the 6th of June, after an ineffectual attempt at negotiation, -Akbar Khan issued orders for the springing of the mine. But it was -not carried sufficiently far to damage the works.[232] The explosion -killed a large number of the besiegers; whilst the storming party was -driven back by the garrison with considerable loss. The troops of the -Shah-zadah are said to have “behaved very nobly, and like heroes, -to have defeated the assault.” Mohun Lal reported, but with some -exaggeration, that not less than 1000 of the followers of Akbar Khan -fell upon this day. - -But the elation of the garrison was but short-lived. On the following -day the Barukzyes brought up some heavy ordnance and began to -cannonade the Balla Hissar. The defenders then lost heart. The -Hindostanee and Arab fighting men, who composed the bulk of the -Prince’s followers, began to tremble for the safety of their families, -and to call upon Futteh Jung to enter into some accommodation with -their assailants. Thus deserted by his garrison, who declared that they -would open the gates to the enemy if the Prince did not submit, he had -nothing to do but to abandon the defence, and to suffer the Barukzyes -to enter the Balla Hissar. - -With many professions of fidelity and demonstrations of respect, Akbar -Khan presented himself before the Prince, declared that he had the -prosperity of the royal family at heart, and that he himself was merely -the servant of the Suddozyes. Futteh Jung offered him money; but he -declined it—offered him a dress of honour, but he meekly refused to -wear it. He wanted nothing, he said, but the prosperity of the Prince, -and he could not wear the dress of honour until he had adjusted all his -differences with Mahomed Zemaun Khan. But these differences were not -very easily to be adjusted. The Newab was unwilling to recognise the -sovereignty of Futteh Jung; and was jealous of the rising power of the -Sirdar. Meeting after meeting was held, and many attempts were made to -reconcile the conflicting interests of the two Barukzye leaders. It was -urged, on the one side, that if Futteh Jung were acknowledged as the -nominal ruler of Afghanistan, all his wealth would be in the power of -the chiefs, and that the war might then be waged against the infidels -with every chance of success. But, on the other hand, it was asked by -the friends of Zemaun Khan—and Meer Hadjee, the High Priest, adopted -the same views—since during the lifetime of Shah Soojah the Newab had -been chosen King by the chiefs and accepted by the nation, why should -they now revert to the old Suddozye sovereignty, which the country had -so emphatically repudiated?[233] - -As time advanced, the difficulties in the way of a reconciliation -between the two parties seemed to thicken. The Newab declared that he -was King—that Akbar Khan might hold the office of Commander-in-Chief -of the Afghan army, but that Oosman Khan was to be the Wuzeer.[234] In -the meanwhile, the Sirdar was gaining over the Kohistanee chiefs, and -preparing himself for the inevitable conflict. But the Kuzzilbashes -now refused to league themselves with Akbar Khan, and talked of joining -the British on their advance. There was no prospect of a reconciliation -of the differences between the two Barukzye chiefs. The old Newab -bitterly deplored the strife which seemed likely soon to plunge the -city again into the miseries of war, and openly prayed that God might -send General Pollock quickly, so that he and Akbar might fly from -Caubul before they had caused bloodshed among the people by the violent -arbitrement of their disputes. - -Equally did Akbar Khan claim credit for his forbearance. On the 21st -of June, after many fruitless attempts at an amicable adjustment of -affairs, the two factions came into open collision. A battle was -fought; and “after an insignificant fight of two or three hours’ -duration,” the Newab was defeated. He and his sons were taken. His -house was plundered. The leading chiefs of his party were seized -and subjected to every conceivable insult. The victory, indeed, was -complete; but it was mainly achieved by the money which had been -pillaged from the treasury of the Prince. Some of the most influential -men of the Newab’s party were bribed over to desert him; and he found, -when it was too late, that he was betrayed. - -The Prince was throned on the 29th of June. But he exercised no regal -power. The Sirdar, who conferred upon him the title of sovereign mainly -to conciliate the Populzyes, began rapidly to strip him of his wealth, -and to reduce him to a mere pageant and a name.[235] After possessing -himself of all the tangible property upon which he could lay his hands, -he called in all the secretaries and managers of the royal household, -and compelled them to give an account of their stewardship. He had -taken up his residence in the Balla Hissar; was digging a ditch around -the place; and laying in military stores. He then began to endeavour to -compass the possession of all the hostages and captives, and to secure -them against the chance of rescue by confining them in the Balla Hissar. - -The situation of the English gentlemen at Caubul, who had resided -so securely under the protection of the good Newab, now became more -critical.[236] On the death of Shah Soojah the Caubulees had called -upon Zemaun Khan to deliver them up to Meer Hadjee, the High Priest. -The Newab had long resisted the demand. But the clamour of the people -had drowned his prayers. His tears and intercessions were fruitless. -At last he surrendered them to the Hadjee, imploring him to treat them -with kindness, and sending at the same time the ladies of his family to -the priest’s house that they might, in some sort, be a protection to -the British captives. Under the guardianship of Meer Hadjee, Conolly -and his associates remained until the beginning of July. By this time -Akbar Khan was dominant in Caubul. He had determined to gain possession -of the persons of the whole of the English hostages and prisoners in -Afghanistan, and he now began to importune Meer Hadjee to send them to -the Balla Hissar. Day after day he went, on this errand, to the High -Priest’s house; but for some time his importunities were fruitless. -At last, he tried the effect of money. The avarice of Meer Hadjee was -notorious. Akbar Khan had bought him over to his cause; and now he -bethought himself of buying the prisoners. He did not bid high for -them. It appears that Akbar Khan offered 4000 rupees for the persons -of the hostages, and that the offer was accepted. - -The hostages were now conveyed to the Balla Hissar, where they -remained under the immediate custody of Akbar Khan. Mohun Lal, who -had been rendering good service to the British Government, by keeping -the authorities at Jellalabad continually supplied with information -relative to the events which were passing at Caubul, was seized by the -Sirdar and tortured. The Moonshee had been residing in the house of -the Kuzzilbash chief, Khan Shereen Khan; but now, early in July, Akbar -Khan, having first seized the person of the host, contrived to obtain -possession of the guest; and immediately began to extort money from -him by the cruel agency of physical torture. It was not until General -Pollock wrote an urgent letter to Akbar Khan, that the unhappy Moonshee -was relieved from this terrible persecution.[237] - -In the mean while, the British prisoners, who had been in custody at -Budeeabad, were in a fort in the neighbourhood of Caubul. When last I -spoke of them they were halting in the valley of Zandah, where they -were detained for about the space of a month. On the 22nd of May they -received orders to march on the following day for Caubul.[238] The road -lay along the track of the slaughtered army, and the putrid corpses -sickened the captives as they went. About three miles from Caubul, on -the banks of the Loghur river, is the fort of Ali Mahomed, a chief of -Kuzzilbash connexions. Here they were lodged in the apartments recently -occupied by the ladies of the chief’s family[239]—the best and most -commodious quarters which the prisoners had yet enjoyed. - -In Ali Mahomed’s fort the prisoners led a life of comparative freedom. -They had a spacious garden in which to exercise themselves at certain -times. They had the use alike of the walks and of the fruits. They were -suffered to bathe in the river. They were permitted to visit, and to -receive visits from, their friends in the Balla Hissar. Many of them -had the means of borrowing money from the Caubulees; and were able to -purchase many necessaries which they had not enjoyed at Budeeabad. -Letters and papers from Jellalabad, from the provinces of India, and -from old England, were brought to them without interruption. They had -much to think about and much to discuss. Intelligence from Jellalabad -and intelligence from Caubul came, in some shape, every day. Life was -comparatively but little wearisome; there was abundant occupation for -the mind, and abundant exercise for the body. True, indeed, it is that -many of the party fell sick, and that some died; that their guards -were sometimes insolent and extortionate; and that ever and anon there -reached them rumours of the intentions of Akbar Khan to carry them off -to Toorkistan; but they had much to be thankful for, on the other side, -and on the whole, perhaps, they enjoyed greater comfort and happiness, -than commonly fall to the lot of the prisoner and the captive in the -hands of a barbarous foe. - - - - -BOOK IX. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - -[June-September: 1842.] - - The Advance from Jellalabad—Instructions of Lord Ellenborough—The - Question of Responsibility—Employment of the Troops at - Jellalabad—Operations in the Shinwarree Valley—Negotiations - for the Release of the Prisoners—The Advance—Mammoo - Khail—Jugdulluck—Tezeen—Occupation of Caubul. - - -The summer months passed away, and still left General Pollock at -Jellalabad, and General Nott at Candahar. Whether it were the intention -of the Governor-General that they should advance upon Caubul, or -fall back at once upon Peshawur and Quettah, was a problem of very -difficult solution. Such data as were afforded them by the letters -of Lord Ellenborough and his secretaries sufficed only to plunge -them into a state of still deeper bewilderment and mystification. -Every fresh letter seemed to render the obscurity more obscure. The -Governor-General’s instructions to Pollock and Nott at this time -resembled nothing so much as those given to children in the “game of -contraries”—to hold fast when they are ordered to let go, and to -let go when they are ordered to hold fast. Lord Ellenborough was, in -effect, perpetually telling the generals that when he suggested to them -to go forward it was their business to come back. - -It is probable that Lord Ellenborough himself had no very clear -perception, at this time, of the course which he purposed to pursue. -He had made up his mind, he said, to save India in spite of every man -in it who ought to give him support;[240] but it seemed to be his -idea to save India rather by withdrawing all our troops within the -Sutlej, than by striking a decisive blow for the re-establishment -of our military supremacy in Afghanistan. It was his opinion that -the danger of our position at that time arose from the absence of -so large a body of troops from the provinces of Hindostan; and that -we might better afford to leave our external injuries unredressed, -than weaken our means of defence in India itself for the purpose of -redressing them. Viewing the matter in this light, Lord Ellenborough -thought less of redeeming the military character of the British nation -than of bringing back the troops to Hindostan; and he would have -brought them back without an effort at such redemption, if the almost -universal voice, not only of the chief civil and military officers, -but of the Anglo-Indian community at large, had not been lifted up -against so inglorious and degrading a concession. The opinions and -desires of Pollock and Nott—of Robertson and Clerk—of Rawlinson, -Outram, Macgregor, Mackeson, and others, who were eager for a forward -movement, and little inclined to conceal their genuine sentiments -under a cloak of official reserve—how little soever Lord Ellenborough -might have been disposed outwardly to acknowledge their influence—were -not without their effect. Public opinion he professed to despise. The -judgments of the Press he pretended to hold in such absolute contempt, -that he lived in habitual ignorance of all that emanated from it; -but it is believed that this disregard of public opinion was rather -a profession than a fact, and that Lord Ellenborough was shaken in -his determination to bring back the armies to the provinces, by the -clamour that, from one end of India to the other, was raised against -the obnoxious measure of withdrawal. He had by this time, too, received -information from England that an inglorious retirement from the scene -of our late humiliation, and the abandonment of all the brave men, -tender women, and innocent children, in the hands of the Afghans, -would be viewed with no satisfaction either by his old ministerial -colleagues, or by the people of Great Britain. Many powerful external -influences, therefore, roused him to a sense of the necessity of doing -something in advance; but the “withdrawal policy” was emphatically his -own, and he was resolute to preserve the shadow of it if he could not -maintain the substance. - -In this conjuncture, he betook himself to an expedient unparalleled, -perhaps, in the political history of the world. He instigated Pollock -and Nott to advance, but insisted that they should regard the forward -movement solely in the light of a retirement from Afghanistan. No -change had come over the views of Lord Ellenborough, but a change had -come over the meaning of certain words of the English language. The -Governor-General had resolutely maintained that the true policy of -the English Government was to bring back our armies to the provinces -of India, and that nothing would justify him in pushing them forward -merely for the re-establishment of our military reputation. But he -found it necessary to yield to the pressure from without, and to push -the armies of Pollock and Nott further into the heart of the Afghan -dominions. To preserve his own consistency, and at the same time to -protect himself against the measureless indignation of the communities -both of India and of England, was an effort of genius beyond the -reach of ordinary statesmen. But it was not beyond the grasp of Lord -Ellenborough. How long he may have been engaged on the solution of the -difficulty before him, History cannot determine. But on the 4th of July -it was finally accomplished. On that day Lord Ellenborough, who had -entirely discarded the official mediation of the Commander-in-Chief, -despatched two letters to General Pollock and two to General Nott. In -these letters he set forth that his opinions had undergone no change -since he had declared the withdrawal of the British armies to the -provinces to be the primal object of Government; but he suggested -that perhaps General Nott might feel disposed to retire from Candahar -to the provinces of India by the route of Ghuznee, Caubul, and -Jellalabad;[241] and that perhaps General Pollock might feel disposed -to assist the retreat of the Candahar force by moving forward upon -Caubul. - -It has been seen, that on the 1st of June Lord Ellenborough had granted -General Pollock a constructive permission to remain at Jellalabad until -the month of October; and that General Pollock had determined to turn -this permission to the best account. The mind of the statesman was -running on retirement; the mind of the soldier on advance. The great -obstacle either to retirement or to advance had been the scarcity -of carriage. But in the early summer months every exertion had been -made by the authorities in Upper India to procure carriage for the -use of the armies in Afghanistan. Lord Ellenborough had exerted -himself to obtain cattle; Mr. Robertson, the able and energetic -Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, had exerted himself -to obtain cattle.[242] The Governor-General threw his heart into the -work, because he was eager to bring back the armies to Hindostan; the -Lieutenant-Governor threw his heart into the work, because he was eager -to push them on to Caubul. So it happened, that before the end of -June, there was a sufficiency of cattle at General Pollock’s disposal -to enable him to do something; and he reported to Government that his -means of movement were such that he was able to make a demonstration in -the neighbourhood of Jellalabad. Upon this, Lord Ellenborough, through -his secretary, wrote to him on the 4th of July that he was rejoiced to -hear, the General was able to do something; but that he (the General) -must, on no account, think that any change had come over the opinions -of Government, which still inclined resolutely towards the withdrawal -of the army at the earliest moment consistent with the health and -efficiency of the troops.[243] - -On this same 4th of July the Governor-General wrote twice to General -Nott—once through his secretary and once with his own hand. He sent -the General a copy of his instructions to Pollock, impressing upon -him that all his views were in favour of a prompt withdrawal; and -he addressed to him a long inconclusive letter, instructing him to -withdraw from Afghanistan, but telling him, at the same time, that the -line of withdrawal was to be left to his own choice. He might retire -by going backward, by Quettah and Sukkur, or he might retire by going -forward, by Ghuznee, Caubul, and Jellalabad. But whichsoever line he -might take, he was never for a moment to lose sight of the fact that -Lord Ellenborough had decreed that he should retire, and that retire he -must.[244] - -It was fortunate for Lord Ellenborough and for the country that he -had to deal at this time with men who thought more of the honour of -Great Britain than of their own safety; and who did not shrink from -responsibility, if, by incurring it, they had a reasonable chance of -conferring great and lasting benefits upon the government which they -served, and the nation which they represented. But Lord Ellenborough’s -instructions to the Generals were so worded—whether by accident or -by design I do not presume to determine—as to cast upon them all the -onus of failure, and to confer upon the Governor-General, or at least -to divide with him, all the honour of success. One thing at least is -certain—the letter of the 4th of July, addressed to General Nott and -signed by the Chief Secretary, ought not to have been written. It is -either from first to last a masterpiece of Jesuitical cunning, or it -indicates a feebleness of will—an infirmity of purpose—discreditable -to the character of a statesman entrusted with the welfare and the -honour of one of the greatest empires in the world. - -But, whatever may have been the amount of responsibility cast upon the -two Generals, neither Pollock nor Nott shrunk from it. They cheerfully -took up the burden and placed it on their own shoulders.[245] They had -obtained now all that they wanted. They had no doubt of the ability of -their troops to carry everything before them. Cattle had been supplied, -or were being supplied, sufficient for all their movements. It was -only necessary that they should act in concert with each other—that -they should so combine their operations as to reach the capital at -the same time, and strike the last blow together. But it was no easy -thing in those days to carry on a correspondence between Jellalabad -and Candahar; and it was long before Pollock received an answer to -his letters. Five messengers were despatched in succession to Nott’s -camp;[246] but it was not before the middle of August that Pollock -could assure himself of his brother-general’s intentions to advance -upon Caubul at all.[247] - -In the mean while, neither General had been wholly inactive. At -Jellalabad, Pollock had been making a demonstration against some -hostile tribes, and carrying on negotiations for the release of the -British prisoners. The Governor-General had several times, in rather -obscure language, suggested to Pollock that it might be desirable to -strike a blow at some one somewhere in the neighbourhood of Jellalabad; -and now the General sent out Monteith into the Shinwarree valley -to read a lesson to the tribes who had possessed themselves of the -property plundered from our army, and who held in their hands one -of our captured guns. These things were to be now demanded from the -tribes, or to be wrested from them at the point of the bayonet. In the -middle of June, Monteith descended into the valley, with a brigade -of European and Native troops, and a sufficiency of guns for his -purpose. The troops, so long held in restraint, were now all fire and -impetuosity. The first sight, in the village of Ali-Boghan, of some -property that had belonged to our slaughtered army, maddened them past -control.[248] They began at once to fire the houses and to plunder -the inhabitants. But Monteith and Macgregor interfered for their -protection. The plundered property was restored. Even the money that -had been taken was made over again to the inhabitants. - -The report of the violence that had been committed at Ali-Boghan spread -like wildfire through the valley. The people believed that the British -troops were about to fire all the villages; so they began at once -to remove their property, and to fly in every direction from their -homes. Macgregor exerted himself to restore confidence among them, by -explaining the real designs of his government; and the people began to -return to their dwellings. But, although indiscriminate plunder and -destruction were not the objects of the expedition, the brigade had -been sent out to do certain work, and it soon became evident that it -could not be done without inflicting some injury upon the people. The -captured gun and the plundered property were to be recovered. It was -known that two of the principal chiefs of a place called Goolai were -in possession of a portion of the treasure that had fallen into the -hands of our enemies. It was known, too, that the captured gun was at -Deh-Surruk. It was determined, therefore, that the brigade should move -against these two places. - -On the morning of the 20th of June, Monteith moved upon Goolai. “It -presented all the appearance of a flourishing little settlement. -Several of the forts were extensive and in good repair. They were -shaded by clusters of mulberry and willow trees. Flowing water passed -close to the forts, and served to irrigate the neighbouring fields -of cotton, rice, and jewaree. The summer harvest had just been -collected, and was stocked outside the fort in its unwinnowed state. -The inhabitants had evidently only time to escape with their portable -property before the troops reached Goolai. In fact, our visit was most -timely. Three or four days’ delay would have enabled them to carry off -their grain.”[249] - -Monteith pitched his camp on some rising ground near the village, and -demanded the restitution of the plundered treasure. On the following -day evasive answers were received; there was no prospect of obtaining, -by peaceful negotiation, the concession that was demanded from the -chiefs. So the work of destruction commenced. Their forts and houses -were destroyed. Their walls were blown up. Their beautiful trees were -ringed and left to perish.[250] The retribution was complete. - -The work of destruction went on for some days. In the mean while the -captured gun had been given up, and the people of Deh-Surruk were -willing to restore the treasure which they had taken; but they could -not easily recover it from the real possessors. However, after some -difficulty, upwards of 10,000 rupees, besides other property, were -recovered from the Shinwarrees. A large quantity of grain, timber, -boosa, and other requisites was appropriated at Goolai; and it was -supposed that the declared objects of the expedition had now been fully -accomplished. - -But the Shinwarrees had not been thoroughly coerced. They had always -been a refractory people—unwilling to pay revenue either to Barukzye -chief or Suddozye Prince. It was thought advisable, therefore, to read -them a more severe lesson. So Monteith made a progress through the -valley, applied the firebrand to their forts, and shot them down in -their places of refuge. “At one time the interiors of five-and-thirty -forts were in a blaze along the valley.”[251] At a place named Mazeena -the tribes made some show of resistance; but the steady gallantry of -her Majesty’s 31st Regiment and of their Sepoy comrades was not to be -withstood; the shells from Abbott’s howitzers were irresistible; and so -Monteith effectually beat down the opposition of the Shinwarrees. This -was on the 26th of July. On the 3rd of August the brigade returned to -Jellalabad. From the 17th of June to this date, “both men and cattle -had entirely subsisted on the resources of the country.” “The cattle -especially,” added Captain Macgregor, concluding his report, “will be -found to have greatly improved in condition while employed on this -service. Indeed, in whatever way it may be viewed, it will be found -that the expedition has been highly beneficial to British interests.” - -Whilst Monteith was carrying on these operations in the Shinwarree -valley, Pollock was carrying on negotiations for the release of the -British prisoners. On the 10th of July, Mackenzie having been stricken -down by fever and lying, as was supposed, at the point of death, -Captain Troup, accompanied by a native gentleman, named Hadjee Buktear, -had been despatched to General Pollock’s camp; but had brought back no -satisfactory intelligence to encourage and animate the Sirdar.[252] -The fact is, that Pollock had by this time begun to see his way to -Caubul. Lord Ellenborough and Mr. Robertson had exerted themselves -most successfully to supply him with carriage. He was eager to plant -the British standard on the Balla Hissar, and was unwilling to hamper -himself with any negotiations which might impede or delay his advance. -It was thought by some in Pollock’s camp that the Sirdar was not -sincere in his overtures, and that his real object was to gain time. -But Pollock was equally anxious to gain time. The emissaries were not -dismissed in a hurry; and when they returned at last to Caubul they -carried back only a verbal message, and that message contained a demand -for all the guns and trophies in the possession of the enemy.[253] It -was expected that another reference would be made to Jellalabad; and -that in the mean while Pollock would be supplied with the means of -rescuing the prisoners more majestically than by such negotiations. He -had received so many assurances from influential men at the capital -that the Caubulees would not suffer Akbar Khan to carry off the -prisoners to Toorkistan, that he believed the advance of his army would -tend more surely to their release than any diplomatic measure which he -could possibly adopt. - -But Akbar Khan held a different opinion. When Troup returned to Caubul, -the Sirdar summoned him and Pottinger to an interview, declared that -he was not satisfied with Pollock’s verbal message, and candidly asked -their advice. Pottinger replied that the best advice he could offer -was, that Akbar Khan should immediately send down the whole of the -prisoners to Pollock’s camp at Jellalabad, as a proof of his sincerity -and good feeling. If there were any delay, he added, the negotiations -would be broken off, and the army would advance. To this the Sirdar -replied, that without a written promise from General Pollock to -withdraw his troops from Afghanistan the prisoners would not be sent to -his camp; and that they might at once banish the thought of a forcible -release of the prisoners on the advance of the British army, for that -as soon as intelligence should reach him of our troops having arrived -at Charbagh, he would send them all off to Toorkistan—scattering them -about by twos and threes among the different chiefs—and come down -himself with his fighting men to dispute the progress of the advancing -army. - -To Pollock, this appeared a mere idle threat. He still clung to the -belief that there was a party in Caubul able and willing to prevent the -departure of the prisoners; and when Troup, accompanied by Lawrence, -came down again to Jellalabad, he found the General still less inclined -than before to promise to withdraw his army. He had, indeed, already -moved a brigade forward to Futtehabad—two marches in advance of his -old position; and Sale, who commanded this brigade, had written that -it was “a good place for a fight.”[254] All that Pollock, therefore, -could now promise was, that he would not advance beyond that point -before the expiration of a certain number of days. The negotiations -had, by this time, become the merest sham. It was obvious that Pollock -could not proceed with them to a successful issue without encumbering -himself with conditions which would have hung as a millstone round the -neck of a military commander, eager to drive his battalions into the -heart of the enemy’s country. The Governor-General wrote to him that -“all military operations must proceed, as if no negotiations were on -foot;” but Akbar Khan had rendered this impossible, by demanding, as a -condition of the delivery of the prisoners, that all the British troops -should withdraw from Afghanistan.[255] - -Weary of these protracted negotiations, Pollock was now eager to -advance upon Caubul. He was only waiting the arrival of specific -information from Candahar relative to the movements of his -brother-general. “As I have offered to meet him,” he wrote to a -friend in high place, “he will find some difficulty in resisting the -_glorious_ temptation; but if he does resist, he is not the man I -take him for.”[256] The glorious temptation was not resisted. The two -Generals were worthy of each other. Nott had determined to retire to -India by Ghuznee, Caubul, and Jellalabad; and in the middle of the -month of August, a messenger, long expected and most welcome, brought -the cheering intelligence into Pollock’s camp.[257] - -On the 20th of August, Pollock began to move from Jellalabad. On that -day the advanced guard under the General himself reached Sultanpore, -on its way to Gundamuck. At the latter place he intended to assemble -the whole of the troops which he had selected to accompany him to the -capital[258]—in all, about 8000 men. On the 23rd, Pollock, with the -advance, reached Gundamuck. About two miles from that place lies the -village of Mammoo Khail. Two hostile chiefs, having sent away all their -women and children, had mustered a strong body of the Ooloos, and were -occupying this position. Pollock at once determined to dislodge them; -and ordered up from Sale’s camp in the rear Broadfoot’s sappers and a -squadron of dragoons. On the following morning the brigade advanced, -and the enemy began to retire. Then, dividing his infantry into two -columns, with a wing of her Majesty’s 9th Foot at the head of each, -Pollock entered the village. The enemy had abandoned their positions -there, and at another village, called Koochlee Khail; but they rallied -and returned to occupy a range of heights within musket-shot of the -latter place, and from these commanding eminences, they kept up, for -some time, a hot fire from their jezails. But Colonel Taylor attacked -them on one side; Broadfoot, with his sappers, on the other.[259] The -heights were carried. The forts and villages were taken, and the enemy -dispersed. The chiefs fled to Caubul with a few followers. Mammoo Khail -and Koochlee Khail were destroyed by fire; and the fruit-trees were cut -down.[260] - -Having accomplished this, Pollock returned to Gundamuck. The attack -on Mammoo Khail, which is not on the road to Caubul, was a diversion -rendered necessary by the appearance of the enemy in that direction. -But the General had yet to assemble his entire force, to assure himself -of the sufficiency of his supplies, and to make all the necessary -arrangements for his advance upon the capital. The delight with which -the announcement of the intended advance upon Caubul had been received -throughout the general camp is not to be described. The question of -advance or withdrawal had been for months eagerly discussed. Every -symptom had been watched with the closest interest—every report had -been canvassed with wondering curiosity. Acting under instructions from -the Supreme Government, Pollock had kept all his intended movements a -close secret. It was not, indeed, until the middle of August that even -Sir Robert Sale knew that the force would advance upon Caubul; and then -he was so wild with excitement that he could scarcely write a note to -the General to express his unbounded delight.[261] - -There were now no longer any doubts regarding the forward movement -of the force. Officers and men were eager to push on to Caubul; and -willing to advance lightly equipped, leaving behind them all the -baggage that was not absolutely necessary to their efficiency. The -13th Light Infantry, ever ready to set an example to their comrades, -sent back a considerable portion of their baggage to Jellalabad, and -prepared to march with only a single change of linen. The officers of -the regiment were content to congregate, three or four together, in -small hill tents; and Broadfoot, at all times a pattern of chivalrous -zeal, offered to take on his sappers without any tents at all.[262] - -Full of hope and courage the troops moved up, by brigades, to -Gundamuck. Making all his arrangements for the march, and waiting -intelligence from Nott,[263] Pollock remained at that place until the -7th of September. Supplies were pouring freely into camp. The rich -orchards and fruit-gardens of the surrounding country yielded their -luscious produce; and our officers were writing to their friends -that they were “luxuriating quietly on the most delicious fruits and -supplies of all kinds.” The neighbouring chiefs were coming in and -making submission to the English General. It was plain that already -the tidings of our advance were striking terror into the hearts of the -chiefs and people of Afghanistan. - -It was on the 1st day of September, when Pollock was awaiting at -Gundamuck the assembling of his brigades, that an Afghan, of forlorn -aspect, in soiled and tattered clothes, rode upon a wretched pony, -attended by three followers, into the British camp. Two officers of -the general staff, Burn and Mayne, met the stranger as he approached, -and recognised him. They knew him to be Futteh Jung. They knew him -to be the man who, a day or two before, had borne the title of King -of Caubul. The fugitive was kindly received, and conducted to the -General’s tent. A salute was fired in his honour. Accommodation was -provided for him in the British camp, and everything that could conduce -to his comfort was freely granted to the unfortunate Prince. - -For some time, Futteh Jung had been a wretched puppet at the Caubul -Court. He had been but a King of straw. The merest shadow of royalty -had been suffered to cling to him. Akbar Khan, for his own uses, held -the imbecile Prince firmly in his hands; and every day tightened his -grasp. He stripped him of all his power; he stripped him of all his -wealth. He threatened—he overawed him. He compelled him to attach his -seal, or his signature,[264] to papers resigning all authority into the -hands of the Wuzeer, and signifying his assent to everything that might -be originated or sanctioned by him.[265] Deeming that the unscrupulous -tyranny of Akbar Khan would soon manifest itself in the murder of -the whole royal family, the Prince directed his thoughts towards the -expediency of flight, and determined to claim the hospitality of the -British General. But Akbar Khan suspected his intentions, and flung him -into close confinement in the Balla Hissar. A Kuzzilbash gentleman, -named Aga Mahomed, aided him to escape from his perilous captivity. A -hole was cut through the roof of his prison, and he emerged into the -outer air. But, overcome by terror and by opium, his limbs refused -to perform their office, and on his perilous way to the Kuzzilbash -quarters, he more than once implored his deliverer to carry him back -to his place of captivity. The resolution, however, of Aga Mahomed -prevailed, and, having lodged the wretched Prince for a while in the -house of a Kuzzilbash lady—the Aga’s aunt—he raised a few thousand -rupees by pledging his own and his mother’s property, and then started -him on his perilous journey to the camping-ground of the British. With -some difficulty, often fired upon as he went, Futteh Jung made his way -through the passes; and at last, on the 1st of September, struggled -into Pollock’s camp.[266] - -On the morning of the 7th of September, General Pollock, with the first -division of his army, accompanied by General Sir Robert Sale, moved -from Gundamuck,[267] in progress to the capital. The second division, -under General M’Caskill, marched on the following day. A party of the -Sikh contingent, under Captain Lawrence, accompanied this division. -These regiments had been sent up to Jellalabad in June, and had been -encamped on the opposite side of the river. They were the old Mussulman -corps who had behaved so infamously on the other side of the Khybur, -but who now had been talked over by Gholab Singh into something like -propriety of demeanour.[268] They behaved at least as well as the -British General expected, and when Lawrence sought permission for a -party of 500 men, horse and foot, to accompany, under his directions, -Pollock’s army to Caubul, the General was but little inclined to -refuse the request. So a party of 300 horse and 200 foot marched, -under Lawrence, with M’Caskill’s division; and the remainder occupied -positions at Neemlah and Gundamuck. - -On the 8th of September, as the first division of Pollock’s army -approached the hills which commanded the road through the Jugdulluck -Pass, he found that their summits were occupied by the enemy. -Large bodies of Ghilzyes, under different chieftains, each with a -distinguishing standard, were clustering on the heights. “The hills -they occupied formed an amphitheatre inclining towards the left of the -road, on which the troops were halted whilst the guns opened, and the -enemy were thus enabled on this point to fire into the column, a deep -ravine preventing any contact with them.”[269] The practice of the guns -was excellent; but the Ghilzye warriors stood their ground. The shells -from our howitzers burst among them; but still they held their posts. -Still they poured in a hot fire from their jezails. So Pollock sent his -infantry to the attack; and gallantly they ascended the heights. On one -side, Broadfoot, ever in advance, led up his little band of sappers. -On the other, Taylor, with the 9th Foot, ascended the hills, where the -enemy, horse and foot, were posted behind a ruined fort. In the centre, -Wilkinson, with the 13th, pushed up the ascent towards the key of the -enemy’s position. All went forward with impetuous gallantry; and as -they clomb the hill-sides and seized the Ghilzye standards, up went an -animated and enthusiastic cheer from the British stormers. It was plain -that their heart was in the work, and that nothing could turn them -back. The flower of the Ghilzye tribes were there, under many of their -most renowned chieftains, and they looked down upon the scene of their -recent sanguinary triumphs. But they had now to deal with other men, -under other leaders. The loud clear cry of the British infantry struck -a panic into their souls. They turned and fled before our bayonets. -Then galloped Lockwood with his dragoons after the enemy’s horse; -but the nature of the ground was against him, and they escaped the -annihilation which otherwise would have been their fate. - -But the battle was not yet over. A considerable body of the enemy had -betaken themselves for safety to an apparently inaccessible height. -On the summit of a mountain they planted their standards, and seemed -to look down with defiance upon our troops. But Pollock was resolute -not to leave, on that day, his work incomplete. He believed that where -the enemy could post themselves his infantry could attack them. So, -under cover of Abbott’s and Backhouse’s guns, Broadfoot and Wilkinson -again led up their men, and stormed that precipitous height. “Seldom -have soldiers had a more arduous task to perform, and never was an -undertaking of the kind surpassed in execution.”[270] The Ghilzyes -looked down upon them with astonishment and dismay. They saw at once -the temper of our men, and they shrunk from the encounter. Our stormers -pushed on, and the Ghilzye standards were lowered. The enemy fled in -confusion; and left the stronghold, from which they had looked down in -the insolence of mistaken security, to be occupied by British troops. - -The victory was complete. It was mainly achieved, under Pollock’s -able directions, by the brave men of the old Jellalabad garrison. -Sale himself, who was never far off when there was likely to be hard -fighting, led up the heights in front of his old regiment, and was -wounded in the affray. The loss upon our side was trifling. Nothing -could have told more plainly than such a victory as this how little -formidable in reality were the best Ghilzye fighting men in their most -inaccessible strongholds, when opposed to British infantry under the -eye of a capable commander. The Ghilzye butchers were now seen flying -like sheep before the comrades of the men whom a few months before they -had slaughtered in these very shambles at Jugdulluck. - -The first division alone of Pollock’s army was engaged with the enemy -at Jugdulluck.[271] The second division passed on, much molested by -the enemy, and often compelled to fight its way against large bodies -of Ghilzye footmen. On the 11th of September they joined the advance -in the neighbourhood of Tezeen. The exertions of a forced march had -fatigued M’Caskill’s cattle; so Pollock determined to devote the 12th -to a halt. Before the day had closed, it was evident that the enemy -were close at hand, and that we were on the eve of a great struggle. -Akbar Khan had been true to his word. He had despatched the bulk of -the English prisoners to the Hindoo-Koosh, and was now preparing -to meet our army. On the 6th of September he had moved his camp to -Begramee—distant some six miles from the Balla Hissar—and there -sent for Captain Troup.[272] The English officer repaired to the camp -of the Sirdar, who summoned a meeting of the principal chiefs. The -Newab Zemaun Khan, Jubbar Khan, Ameen-oollah Khan, Mahomed Shah Khan, -and other chief people of the empire attended the council. Troup was -not permitted to be present at the conference; but he soon learnt -its result. He was required immediately to proceed to Gundamuck on -a mission to Pollock’s camp. The chiefs had determined to endeavour -to conciliate the British General. They were willing to agree to any -terms he might please to dictate, if he would only consent to stay the -advance of his army upon the capital. - -Troup declared his willingness to proceed on the mission. But he had -no hope, he said, of its success. The time for negotiation had passed. -Nothing could now stay the progress of Pollock’s army but the entire -destruction of his force. But so urgently did the Sirdar press his -request on the British officer, that Troup could not refuse his assent -to the proposal. He made his preparations for the journey, and then -returned to the Afghan camp. There, in the presence of Akbar Khan and -Mahomed Shah Khan, he again set forth the uselessness of the mission, -and prevailed with them to forego it.[273] - -There was nothing now left for the Sirdar but to appeal to the God -of battles, and bring all the force that he could muster to oppose -the progress of Pollock’s army through the passes. He now moved down -to Boodkhak, and from that place summoned Troup and Bygrave to his -camp. It appeared to him that the English officers might render him -essential service in the negotiation of terms, if the tide of victory -turned against him. On the morning of the 11th they entered his camp at -Boodkhak. That evening he summoned them to his presence, and was for -some time in earnest consultation with them. He declared that he had -no wish to oppose the progress of the British army, but that he had -compromised himself too far to recede, and that the people would not -hear of submission. The English officers assured him that his defeat -was certain; and that opposition to our advance would only occasion an -useless expenditure of life. “I know,” said the Sirdar, “that I have -everything to lose; but it is too late to recede.” He declared that he -was indifferent as to the result. The issue of the contest was in the -hands of God, and it little mattered to him who was the victor. - -On the following morning he sent for Troup, and announced that he and -Bygrave must accompany him to Koord-Caubul. Arrived at that place, -intelligence of the intended halt of Pollock’s army at Tezeen reached -the Sirdar. The Afghan chiefs had intended to make their last decisive -stand at Koord-Caubul; but the halt of the advancing army seemed to -indicate indecision, and it was rumoured that difficulties had arisen -to obstruct the progress of the force. On this, the Sirdar at once -determined to move on to Tezeen; and sent to Troup to announce his -intentions.[274] The English officer sought and obtained permission to -return to Ali Mahomed’s fort; and Akbar Khan went forward to do battle -with the British.[275] - -On the 13th the two forces met. Great were the advantages of the ground -to the Afghan levies. The valley of Tezeen is commanded on all sides -by lofty hills; and the chiefs had posted their jezailchees on every -available height. Indeed, on that morning of the 13th of September, -Pollock’s camp was encircled by the enemy; and it was plain that every -effort had been made to turn the natural defences of the country to the -best possible account. There was a hard day’s work before Pollock’s -army; but never were a finer body of troops in finer condition, or -more eager for the work before them. All arms had now a chance of -distinguishing themselves—the cavalry on the plain, the infantry on -the hills, and the artillery everywhere. Fortunately the enemy’s horse -entered the valley, attracted by the hope of plundering our baggage. -The opportunity so eagerly desired by the dragoons was now at hand. -A British squadron, gallantly led by Unett, was let loose upon the -Afghan horsemen. The Native cavalry followed. There was a brilliant and -successful charge. The enemy turned and fled; but the sabres of the -dragoons fell heavily upon them; and many were cut up in the flight. - -The infantry were not less successful. Gallantly they ascended the -heights on either side of the pass, and gallantly the Afghans advanced -to meet them. The stormers of the 13th Light Infantry clomb the hills -on the right; the 9th and 31st on the left; and as they went, hotly -and thick upon them poured the iron rain from the Afghan jezails. But -never, beneath the terrible fire that greeted them, as they pushed up -the hill-side, did these intrepid soldiers waver for a moment. They -knew that their muskets were no match for the Afghan jezails. The -enemy, indeed, seemed to deride them. So having reached the hill-top, -our men fixed their bayonets, and charged with a loud hurrah. The -cold steel took no denial. Down went the Afghan marksmen before the -English bayonets; the foremost men stood to be pierced, and the rest, -awed by the fall of their comrades and the desperate resolution of -the British troops, fled down the hill in confusion. The strength of -the Afghan force was broken; but the work of our fighting men was not -done. All through the day a desultory warfare was kept up along the -ridges of these tremendous hills. The Afghans occupying the highest -ground, fired down upon our infantry, hiding themselves when they could -behind the rocks, and shrinking now from a closer contest. Never did -British troops display a higher courage in action, or a more resolute -perseverance. Nobly did the Native Sepoy vie with the European soldier; -and nowhere was there a finer sight than where Broadfoot with his -sappers clambered up the steepest ascents under the hottest fire, -and drove before them the stalwart Afghans—giants beside the little -Goorkhas who pressed so bravely upon them. Many gallant feats were -done that day; and many an Afghan warrior died the hero’s death on his -native hills, cheered by the thought that he was winning Paradise by -such martyrdom. Desperate was the effort to keep back the invaders from -clearing the heights of the Huft-Kotul; but the British troops, on that -day, would have borne down even stouter opposition. The Huft-Kotul was -mounted; and three cheers burst from the victors as they reached the -summit of that stupendous ascent. - -A more decisive victory was never gained. The Afghan chiefs had -brought out their best fighting men against us. They had done their -best to turn the difficulties of the country to good account against -the strangers. Their people were at home in these tremendous defiles; -whilst few of our troops had ever seen them—few were accustomed to -the kind of warfare which now alone could avail. There was everything -to stir into intense action all the energies of the Barukzye chief and -his followers. They were fighting in defence of their hearths and -altars; the very existence of the nation was at stake. It was the last -hope of saving the capital from the grasp of an avenging army. But with -everything to stimulate and everything to aid him, Akbar Khan could -offer no effectual resistance to the advance of Pollock’s retributory -force. The Afghans were fairly beaten on their own ground, and in their -own peculiar style of warfare. It has been often said that our troops -were maddened by the sight of the skeletons of their fallen comrades, -and that they were carried on by the irrepressible energy of revenge. -It is true, that all along the line of country, from Gundamuck to -Koord-Caubul, there rose up before the eyes of our advancing countrymen -hideous evidences of the great January massacre—enough to kindle the -fiercest passions in the hearts of the meekest men. But I believe that, -if no such ghastly spectacles had lain in the path of the advancing -army, the forward feeling would have glowed as strongly in the breasts -of every soldier of Pollock’s force. - -The struggle was now at an end. Akbar Khan saw that the game was up, -and that it was useless to attempt to bring together the scattered -fragments of his routed army. Taking Captain Bygrave with him as the -companion of his flight, he fled to the Ghorebund valley. The fighting -men, who had opposed us at Tezeen, were now in disordered masses, -hurrying homewards along their mountain paths, and seeking safety in -places remote from the track of the avenging army, whilst Pollock -marched onwards with his regiments in orderly array,[276] and on the -15th of September encamped on the Caubul race-course. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -[May-September: 1842.] - - The Advance from Candahar—The Relief of - Khelat-i-Ghilzye—Reappearance of Aktur Khan—General Action - with the Douranees—Surrender of Sufder Jung—The Evacuation of - Candahar—Disaster near Mookoor—The Battle of Goaine—The Recapture - of Ghuznee—Flight of Shumshoodeen Khan—Arrival at Caubul. - - -Whilst the force under General Pollock was fighting its way from -Jellalabad to Caubul, and carrying everything before it, the Candahar -division, under General Nott, was making a victorious march upon the -same point along the countries to the westward. - -But it is necessary that, before I trace its progress to the capital, -the circumstances which preceded the evacuation of Candahar should -be briefly narrated. It has been stated that, in obedience to the -instructions contained in the government letters of the 19th of April, -a brigade under Colonel Wymer had been despatched to Khelat-i-Ghilzye, -to rescue the garrison there beleaguered, and to destroy the defences -of the place. On the 19th of May, Wymer’s force left Candahar. It -seems that the Ghilzyes had obtained information of the intended -movement, and determined to anticipate the attempted relief by making -a desperate, and, as they believed, decisive assault upon the place. -Accordingly, they prepared a number of scaling-ladders, practised -escalading, and, in the dim twilight of early morning on the 21st -of May, advanced in two heavy columns, each 2000 strong, to the -attack. Ascending the mound where the slope was easiest, they placed -their scaling-ladders against the walls, and gallantly mounted to the -assault. Three times they ascended to the crest of the works, and -three times they were nobly repulsed by Craigie and his men. The heavy -showers of grape and musket-shot which the garrison poured in upon -them, did not deter those desperate assailants—they went on again -and again to the attack, and were bayoneted on the parapets. For more -than an hour this desperate struggle lasted; and then the assailants, -whose impetuous courage had been overmatched by the steady gallantry -of Craigie’s garrison, gave way and abandoned the assault. The failure -was dearly purchased. More than a hundred dead bodies were found at -the foot of the works; and it was computed that the entire loss of the -enemy did not fall short of five hundred men. Not a man of the British -garrison was killed. - -Before sunset the Ghilzyes had dispersed. Colonel Wymer, when he -reached Khelat-i-Ghilzye, had nothing to do but quietly to withdraw the -garrison, and to destroy the works of the place. It was believed that -the measure, as indicating the intentions of the British Government -to withdraw from Afghanistan, would create considerable sensation -throughout the country, and greatly embolden the enemy. But the Afghans -seemed rather to wonder why we had not extricated the garrison of -Khelat-i-Ghilzye before, and did not associate it with any ideas of the -general policy to be pursued by the British. - -But before Wymer had returned from the northward, the Douranees had -again made trial of their strength in the field, and had again been -signally beaten. Aktur Khan, the Zemindawer chief, who throughout the -preceding year had been keeping the western districts of Afghanistan -in a state of continual turmoil, and who had more than once given -battle to our troops, was now again in the field against us. He had, -since his return from Herat, whither he had betaken himself for safety, -watched the progress of events without openly committing himself, -and had hitherto shown little disposition to link himself with the -Douranee cause. Indeed, at the beginning of May he had made overtures -to the British authorities, and offered, if they would confirm him -in the government of Zemindawer, to attack the Douranee camp. As -the month advanced, his conduct became more and more mysterious. He -was in constant communication with the Douranee chiefs, and yet at -the same time he was professing the strongest friendship for the -British Government, and offering to break up the Douranee camp. But -before the expiration of the month he threw off the mask, joined his -brother-chiefs with a considerable body of fighting men, and took the -command of the van-guard of the Douranee force. - -It was obvious now that we were on the eve of another conflict. -The Ghazees moved down on the Urghundab, and made arrangements to -concentrate their troops in the neighbourhood of Baba-Wullee. It seemed -probable that they would be able to raise the neighbouring tribes -against us; and bring into the field a body of 4000 or 5000 men. -Weakened by the absence of Wymer’s brigade, and remembering the danger -to which the city had been exposed when he last moved out to attack -the Douranee camp, Nott determined to halt the detachment which he was -about to despatch to the Kojuck to bring up the carnage which had been -assembled for the withdrawal of his force. The enemy had chosen their -time wisely and well. They believed that, in the absence of some of his -best regiments, and nearly the whole of his cavalry force, Nott would -be little able to hold Candahar and to do battle with the Douranee -force in the open field. So they neared the city; and on the 29th of -May seemed to invite the contest. - -Aktur Khan had drawn into his hands the chief control of the force. -What were his designs, at this time, it is not easy to determine. -On the 27th he had again made overtures to the British authorities, -offering to seize Meerza Ahmed, and to do his best to dissolve the -Douranee force. At all events, if he could not accomplish this, he -would, he said, on the first attack of the British, draw off his own -followers, and then, taking advantage of their discomfiture, fall on -their rear and plunder their baggage. But these offers were thrown away -upon Nott and Rawlinson. They had no faith in the man. - -Early on the morning of the 29th of May the enemy began to appear in -the neighbourhood of Candahar—hovering about the cantonments, and -carrying off our baggage-cattle. As the day advanced, their numbers -increased; but it was still believed by the General that they were only -reconnoitring our position, and that they would not then give battle to -our troops. Under this impression, Colonel Stacy, with two regiments of -infantry and four guns, had been sent out to sweep away the intruders. -It happened that his movements deceived the enemy. Believing at one -time that he was retreating, the Ghazees pushed forward and occupied -some rocky heights to the west of our cantonments, from which they -opened a distant fire on our line. These movements were seen from the -city.[277] It was obvious that the enemy were determined to bring on -an engagement. So Nott sent out the 41st Queen’s and eight guns; and an -hour after mid-day mounted his horse and rode out to take the command -of his troops. Rawlinson went with him. - -Covered by the fire of the guns, the light companies were now ordered -to storm the heights. The work was done rapidly and well. Standing out -in bold relief against the sky, the forms of our stormers were soon -seen upon the ridge of the hills; and as the enemy were driven down, -Chamberlaine’s Horse swept round amongst them and cut them up with -heavy slaughter. Rawlinson then took the Parsewan Horse to clear the -hillocks, to the right, of the detached bodies of the enemy which still -clung to them, and Tait, with his horse, was sent to support him. The -Parsewan Horse charged gallantly; but the ground was difficult, and the -enemy fled towards the mouth of the Baba-Wullee Pass. Rawlinson pushed -on in hot pursuit; but turning off to follow a party of the enemy’s -horse, who seemed to have missed the outlet, well-nigh cut down or -captured Mahomed Atta himself, who was afterwards known to have been at -the head of them. - -The rout of the enemy was complete.[278] But the movements of our -troops were too slow to turn it to good account. The Ghazees made for -the Baba-Wullee Pass. They had barricaded this pass with stones, and -they had thrown up a strong breast-work in another direction, intending -them as defences to lie between the British position and their own. But -now, instead of finding these works in their front, they found them -in their rear. They had not intended that the battle should be fought -so near to the walls of Candahar. It was their design to take up a -position within these defences; but, emboldened by the stories of the -scouts, who had reported that we were too weak to operate beyond the -walls, they had determined to pitch their camp in the vicinity of the -cantonment and to invest Candahar. Had our guns been pushed on with -sufficient activity, the enemy would have found the barricade which -they had erected for their defence a terrible obstruction on their -retreat. But the greater number of them effected their escape; and -Nott, contented with his victory, drew off his troops.[279] - -On the following day, Stacy went out with a brigade, and Rawlinson -took the Parsewan Horse to the banks of the river. The enemy’s horse -had not wholly disappeared; and it was believed that they might again -be drawn into another skirmish. But they were not inclined for more -fighting. As our skirmishers advanced, they fell back and crossed the -river. The chiefs held a council of war, and the day was spent in -stormy debate. But when the shades of evening fell upon them, they had -matured no plan of operations. They broke up without a decision. Again -they met on the following day. One plan and then another was discussed. -Some proposed that they should proceed to Caubul. Some that they should -assemble in Zemindawer. Others recommended that they should hold their -ground upon the Urghundab; but the greater number were of opinion that -it would be more expedient to move off to the northern district, and -there await the issue of events at the capital. Many of them sent into -the British camp to ask for terms; and it was obvious that, although -the suspicion of our approaching departure kept up considerable -excitement throughout the country, the Douranees had now arrived at the -inevitable conclusion that it was useless any longer to contend with us -in the field.[280] - -In the meanwhile, Prince Sufder Jung was waiting a favorable -opportunity to cast himself upon the mercy of his enemies. On the -day after the action of the 29th of May, he had received a letter -from his brother, Futteh Jung, at Caubul, urging him to throw himself -upon the protection of the British; and the young Prince, weary of -the peril-laden life he had been leading, and seeing clearly the -hopelessness of the cause to which he had attached himself, determined -to follow the advice of his brother. So, on the following day, he -despatched a messenger with a note to Rawlinson, informing him that -he was on the point of mounting his horse to ride into the British -camp. But before the British officer’s answer reached him, Meerza -Ahmed and the chiefs discovered his intentions, and carried him off -with them across the river. His resolution, however, was not to be -shaken. The chiefs made him a close prisoner, and openly denounced him -as a traitor. But he continued to make overtures to Rawlinson, and at -last effected his escape. On the 18th of June a letter was brought -into the British camp, announcing that he had forsaken the Douranees, -and had made a night-journey to Baba-Wullee. Rawlinson reported -the circumstance to Nott, and the General consented to receive the -submission of the boy.[281] So, on the morning of the 19th, the British -political chief rode out with a party of Parsewan Horse to the mouth of -the Baba-Wullee Pass, and, through a crowd of excited gazers, who lined -the thoroughfares from the cantonments to the city, bought the Prince -into Candahar. - -No easy part was that which Rawlinson was now called upon to play. The -conflicting claims and interests of the two Princes greatly distracted -and perplexed him. Justice and policy appeared to be at variance -with each other. Timour was a well-intentioned man; his fidelity had -never been questioned. He was the eldest son of Shah Soojah, and his -claims to the throne of Caubul were more valid, therefore, than those -of either of his brothers. But he was utterly without influence. -Convinced that he could never make his way with the chiefs or people -of Afghanistan, the British authorities were unwilling to support his -pretensions. Even for the governorship of Candahar they held him to be -incompetent; and now that Sufder Jung had returned to his allegiance, -they desired, on the earliest fitting opportunity, to place the -administration in his hands. The Candahar force was under orders to -return to Hindostan, and the best means of disposing of Prince Timour -was by the quiet removal of his Highness to the British provinces. This -was not yet to be openly announced to the Prince, for it was expedient -that the measure of withdrawal should not be publicly declared; but -Rawlinson hoped, that when the time came, he would be able to persuade -Timour to accompany the army to India, and to leave Sufder Jung in -possession of Candahar. In the meanwhile, both Princes were uneasy and -dissatisfied. Jealous of his younger brother, Timour protested against -his being permitted to mediate for the Douranee chiefs, or to interfere -with the Candahar Government; whilst Sufder Jung was continually -complaining of the incertitude of his position, and importuning -Rawlinson to come to some definite explanation with him.[282] - -So Rawlinson determined to temporise. Putting off from day to day -the adjustment of these differences, he trusted to the chapter of -accidents, and ere long found something written down in his favour. -Before the end of June, it was announced at Candahar that Futteh Jung -had been overcome by the Barukzyes at Caubul, and that he was in effect -a mere prisoner in their hands. The intelligence, as regarded British -interests in general, was supposed to be unfavourable; but it went far -to diminish the difficulties which the presence of the two Princes at -Candahar arrayed against the British authorities. “Whilst Futteh Jung’s -star was on the ascendant,” wrote Rawlinson in his journal, “it was -equally difficult to manage Timour and Sufder Jung; but now they both -feel that they are entirely dependent upon us for support, and are -disposed, in consequence, to lay aside their private jealousies.” - -The three first weeks of July passed away; and Nott was preparing -for his retirement from Afghanistan. Major Clarkson had, at the end -of June, brought up the convoy of camels from Quettah. The supply of -carriage and provisions for the movement of the army had now reached -its necessary amount. Everything was in train for withdrawal, when the -Governor-General’s letter of the 4th of July was put into Nott’s hands. -He saw at once the weight of responsibility that it threw upon him; -but he did not shrink from assuming the burden. Cheerfully taking it -up, he wrote to the Governor-General on the 20th of July: “Having well -considered the subject of your Lordship’s letter of the 4th instant; -having looked at the difficulties in every point of view, and reflected -on the advantages which would attend a successful accomplishment of -such a move, and the moral influence it would have throughout Asia, I -have come to a determination to retire a portion of the army under my -command _viâ_ Ghuznee and Caubul.” - -The Candahar force was now to be divided. A portion of it was to be -sent to Quettah and Sukkur under General England; and the remainder, -under General Nott, was to “retire” to India by the route of Ghuznee, -Caubul, and Jellalabad. The heavy guns and six pieces of the Shah’s -artillery were to be sent down with England’s column, and with it -were to be despatched the Bombay Infantry, two companies of Bengal -Artillery, three regiments of the late Shah’s force, and some details -of Irregular Horse. Nott would not part with one of those “beautiful -Sepoy regiments” which had fought so well for him ever since he had -commanded the Candahar division; nor could he think of suffering the -40th Queen’s to be disunited from their old comrades. But of the 41st -Queen’s he wrote to Lord Ellenborough: “I certainly could have wished -to have taken her Majesty’s 41st Regiment with me, knowing the great -consequence of the adventurous march before me. But when I look to -Sindh, and to the want of confidence in our brave troops shown by -certain officers, I must give up that wish, however desirable, to -ensure the safety of the division which I am not to accompany.” But -he subsequently changed his mind, and took the 41st with him. Two or -three days passed; some slight preparations betokening departure were -made; the old and unserviceable guns were destroyed; the repairs, -which were going on, on the works, were arrested; and then it was -publicly announced that the force was to hold itself in readiness to -return to India. But by what route it was to retire was still a secret. -Speculation was busy throughout the garrison. There were all sorts of -rumours and conjectures, and then it was declared that Nott’s column -was to make its way across the country by the route of Dehra Ismael -Khan. It soon, however, was obvious that this was nothing more than a -report, which might have its uses, and the heart of every soldier in -Nott’s division soon beat with chivalrous emotion at the thought, that -the General, under whom they had so long and so gloriously served, was -about to lead them on to the re-conquest of Afghanistan.[283] - -And now again came up for adjustment, rather than for consideration, -the question of the disposal of the Princes. Timour was eager to -proceed with the British force to Caubul, and hoped to be placed upon -the throne by his old supporters. His fidelity at least deserved -our support—but something else was required to induce the British -authorities to identify themselves with the interests of the Prince. -It was fortunate for Rawlinson that at this time the decision was -not left in his hands. On the 29th of July, letters were received -from the Governor-General, emphatically expressing his opinion of the -inexpediency of permitting the Prince to accompany the army in the -direction of Caubul, or even of permitting him to remain at Candahar. -His presence at Caubul, it was said, might greatly embarrass our -proceedings there; and though it would be advantageous for us that he -should establish his independent authority at Candahar, there seemed so -little likelihood of his being able to maintain his position after the -departure of the British troops, that, on the whole, it was the most -expedient course that he should accompany that portion of the force -which was to proceed by the way of Sindh to the provinces of India. The -communication of these resolutions to the Shaz-zadah was a painful -duty; and when Rawlinson announced them, they produced an explosion -very foreign to the passive nature of the apathetic Prince. - -On the 7th of August, the British force evacuated Candahar. There were -no demonstrations of ill-will on the part of the inhabitants. No acts -of licentiousness were committed by the soldiery. The movement was -effected in the most orderly and peaceable manner. The soldiers and the -citizens were seen embracing each other. Before night closed upon the -scene, Prince Timour moved out of the citadel, and Sufder Jung remained -in possession of Candahar. - -On the following day, completing their Commissariat arrangements, Nott -and England remained in camp under the city walls. Many of the most -influential people of the new government waited upon Rawlinson, seeking -his advice. On the 9th, Nott commenced his march to the northward, -and England prepared to move in the opposite direction. The latter -was dissatisfied with the components of his force. He applied to Nott -for an European regiment to accompany him, and received in reply an -indignant rebuke. - -From Candahar to Mookoor the progress of Nott’s division was easy and -uneventful. But few traces of the recent excitement were discernible -along the line of march. The villages seemed wonderfully tranquil. The -villagers brought in their supplies more freely than our officers had -ever ventured to expect. Every precaution was taken by the General to -prevent the commission by his troops of acts of lawless depredation. He -declared, that if any soldier were caught in the act of plundering, or -returning with plunder in his possession, he would hang the offender, -and remove the officer to whose regiment he might belong from the -command of his corps. - -On the 27th of August, the force arrived at Mookoor. Up to this -point—a distance of 160 miles—not a shot had been fired. But there -were symptoms now of more active work for our troops. Some days -before their arrival at Mookoor, Shumshoodeen Khan had moved out of -Ghuznee with a party of 500 horse and two guns, to collect revenue in -the adjacent country. He was ignorant, at the time, of our advance; -but when the tidings reached him, he prepared at once to contest the -progress of the British force; threw all his energies into the work of -raising the country between Ghuznee and Mookoor; and made arrangements -“for all the chiefs to rendezvous at the latter place, and fight us at -the source of the Turnuck.”[284] - -But the British force approached Mookoor; and Shumshoodeen Khan was not -ready to receive them. The chiefs had not come to the rendezvous. His -preparations were not completed. He had fallen back to the vicinity of -Oba, and there the chiefs were flocking to his standard. But, as Nott -advanced that sultry morning through a thick haze upon Mookoor, it -was plain to him that he was in an enemy’s country. The villages were -deserted. Supplies were not brought into his camp. He was compelled -to send his cavalry out to forage. It was plain, too, that the enemy -had wisely chosen the ground on which they had determined to give us -battle. There was no more defensible position on the whole line of -country from Candahar to Caubul than that at the source of the Turnuck, -which Shumshoodeen Khan had selected as his point of defence.[285] - -The next day was an eventful one. On the morning of the 28th of August -the force advanced from Mookoor. The rear-guard had scarcely moved -from their encamping-ground when the enemy came down upon them. Nott -ordered out his irregular cavalry, under Captain Christie, who cut up -some fifty of the enemy’s footmen; and, but for an interposing ravine, -would have destroyed the whole. Without further molestation the force -reached its halting-ground and encamped. It was known that Shumshoodeen -was somewhere in the neighbourhood; but through the thick haze which -enveloped the camp, it was impossible to determine his position. The -camels went out to graze. The grass-cutters went out to obtain forage -for their horses. Everything was going on in camp after the wonted -fashion, when, an hour before noon, a report came in that Delamain’s -grass-cutters were being cut to pieces by the enemy. Delamain waited -for no orders—never paused to inquire into the truth of the story -that was brought to him—but at once ordered his troopers into their -saddles, and rode out, with all the disposable cavalry, in search of an -imaginary foe. - -He soon found that it was a false alarm. His grass-cutters were not -in the hands of the enemy. But he went on to reconnoitre, and about -three miles from camp came up with a party of the enemy’s footmen on -the plain. Some twenty of them were cut down by our troopers, and the -remainder put to confusion and flight. Delamain went after them in -hot pursuit, and coming to the foot of a range of hills, turned the -shoulder of one of them, and found that the heights were crowned, in -considerable strength, by the enemy’s jezailchees, who opened upon him -a galling fire. He was falling back, in orderly retreat, when a body -of the enemy’s Horse, about 150 strong, showed themselves on the ridge -of a hill, flaunting a white standard. Delamain at once determined to -attack them. A squadron of the 3rd Bombay Cavalry charged up the hill; -but a hot fire from a party of jezailchees, who suddenly appeared on -their flanks, saluted them as they advanced; and then the enemy’s -Horse poured down upon them with tremendous effect. Captain Reeves was -shot near the foot of the hill. Captain Bury and Lieutenant Mackenzie -gained the ridge; but fell beneath the sabres of the Afghan horsemen. -The troopers now seeing their officers fall, borne down by the weight -of the Afghan Horse, and suffering severely from the fire of the -jezailchees, turned and fled down the hill. Their companions at the -foot of the hill caught the contagion from them. The panic spread, and -the whole body of British Horse were soon in disastrous flight. Riding -each other down in wild confusion, they were not easily reduced to -order. The loss among them had been severe. Two officers were killed, -and three wounded; and fifty-six of our men had been killed or disabled -in the fight. - -In the mean while, exaggerated stories of the disaster had spread -throughout Nott’s camp. Messenger after messenger had come to the -General, and reported that the enemy were in immense force, and that -Delamain and his cavalry had been annihilated.[286] Twice he sent out -instructions for the troops to return to camp. At last it was reported -to him that the enemy were 7000 strong, and that Delamain, if not -already destroyed, was in imminent peril. So Nott took out his army and -moved against the enemy—expecting to find them flushed with success -and eager for a general action. But when they came upon the ground, it -was found that the enemy had moved off. Their videttes alone were to be -seen on the peaks of the hills. - -But there was still work to be done. From some fortified villages in -the neighbourhood of the field of action it was said that shots had -been fired. The General marched upon them. In an attitude of abject -submission the villagers came out and prayed for quarter. Nott granted -the boon. But a company of the 40th Queen’s was sent in to search the -houses, where it was believed some plunder would be found. From the -matchlocks of some Ghazees shots were fired as our soldiers entered -the place. The result of the misdeed was terrible. The place was -given up to carnage. The women and children were spared; but the men -were indiscriminately butchered.[287] Not less than a hundred of the -villagers were massacred for the offences of a few men. - -Whilst the General was thus employed, the cavalry, which had sustained -so mortifying a defeat, were endeavouring, with the aid of the horse -artillery and some infantry details, to rescue the bodies of their -dead. The corpses were brought off; and then the entire force returned -to camp. That evening the two European officers[288] received Christian -burial. The wounded officers recovered. - -“This was a bad beginning,” wrote Rawlinson to Outram, “but we have -amply redeemed it since.” On the 30th of August the Candahar division -was again engaged with the enemy; and with better success. On the -preceding day, Shumshoodeen Khan had sent round the heads of the -officers who had fallen in the action of the 28th,[289] and, greatly -exaggerating the victory he had gained, endeavoured to raise the people -against the infidels whom he had beaten so gloriously in the field. On -that day considerable reinforcements joined him. He was seen on the -hills to the right of Nott’s camp, with four or five thousand men, and -it was believed that he would attack our troops in the course of the -morrow’s march. The morrow came. Nott marched to Ghoaine. Shumshoodeen -Khan moved parallel to him, and took up his position again on the -hills to the right of the British camp. As every hour was increasing -his numbers, he desired to postpone the inevitable collision. On the -afternoon of the 30th he is said to have mustered not less than 10,000 -men.[290] - -Not far from the ground on which Nott halted on that morning, was a -fort held by the enemy which he determined to attack. But the day -was sultry. The troops were exhausted by their march. So the General -pitched his camp at once, and giving his troops a few hours to recruit -and refresh themselves, postponed the attack to the afternoon. -At three o’clock the General went out with the 40th Queen’s, the -16th and 38th Native Infantry Regiments, all his cavalry details, -Anderson’s troop of Horse Artillery, two guns of Blood’s battery, and -two eighteen-pounders. The ground between our camp and the fort was -difficult. Some time elapsed before the guns could be brought up to -breaching distance. And, when at last they opened upon the fort, they -made so little impression, that Shumshoodeen was persuaded by his -chiefs not to shrink any longer from a general action with a force -whose cavalry had been already beaten in the field, and whose artillery -now seemed so little formidable. So, scattering his horsemen on both -sides so as to outflank us, Shumshoodeen moved down with the main -body of his infantry and his guns; and, planting the latter on the -nearest height, opened a rapid and well-directed fire on the British -columns.[291] Then Nott drew off his troops from the attack of the -fort, and advanced in column to the right, flanked by Anderson’s guns -and Christie’s Horse, upon the main body of Shumshoodeen’s fighting -men. On this the enemy crowded upon the other flank, keeping up a smart -fire both from their guns and jezails; so Nott “changed front to the -left, deployed, threw out skirmishers, and advanced in line, supported -by the guns.”[292] For some time, the enemy seemed inclined to engage -us, and kept up a sharp fire from their guns and jezails; but when -our troops came to the charge, and pushed on with a loud and cheerful -hurrah, the Afghans turned and fled before us. One of their guns broke -down and was immediately captured. Christie, with his Horse, went off -in pursuit of the other, sabred the drivers, and carried off the piece. -Shumshoodeen’s tents, magazines, and stores were found scattered about -the plain. The chief himself fled to Ghuznee; and the tribes who had -joined his standard now dispersed to their homes. - -Nott halted upon his ground during the following day, and on the 1st -of September resumed his march. On the 5th, he was before Ghuznee. -The day was spent in desultory fighting. Shumshoodeen, who had been -reinforced from Caubul by Sultan Jan, occupied with a strong body of -horse and foot some heights to the north-east of the fortress. The -gay attire and fine chargers of the chiefs made them conspicuous even -at a distance.[293] The gardens, the ravines, and water-courses were -filled with jezailchees; and the city seemed to be swarming with men. -Before encamping his force, Nott determined to clear the heights; and -gallantly the work was done. Our troops ascended in noble style, and -drove the enemy before them until every point was gained.[294] In the -mean time the camp had been pitched. Two infantry regiments and two -guns were left out to occupy the heights, and the remainder of the -troops were then withdrawn. - -Scarcely, however, had the troops entered their camp, when the great -Ghuznee gun, the “Zubbur Jung,” began to open upon it. It was plain -that Nott had taken up a position too near to the enemy’s works. -Fourteen shots were thrown into our camp without doing any mischief; -but the warning was not thrown away. The tents were struck, and the -camp was moved to another position, in the vicinity of the village of -Roza.[295] The movement was not without danger;[296] but the enemy -wanted spirit to turn it to good account—and in their new position our -troops were secure.[297] - -Before sunset the firing had ceased. Sanders, the engineer, a man -of rare talent, now began to make his arrangements for the siege of -Ghuznee. It was not believed that the defence would be conducted with -much vigour. The fort was very poorly manned. It was obvious that -Shumshoodeen had trusted more to external operations. The tribes who -had been summoned for the defence of the city had already begun to lose -heart. When they saw our engineers at work busily constructing their -batteries, they called upon Shumshoodeen to come within the walls, and -take his share of the dangers of the siege. Vainly he represented that -his cavalry were of greater service beyond the walls—vainly he set -forth that as there was no barley in the city his horses could not be -fed. They had made up their minds to evacuate the place; and when night -closed in upon them, they moved out quietly by the water-gate of the -city, and betook themselves to the hills. Seeing now that all was over, -Shumshoodeen mounted his horse, and with a small party of followers -fled to Caubul. - -The engineers worked busily throughout the night; but as the batteries -took shape under their hands, the stillness within the walls of Ghuznee -aroused their suspicions. So at early dawn, with a party of some twenty -men, North, the engineer, went down to reconnoitre; and finding the -water-gate open, and the city apparently abandoned, sent intelligence -to the party on the hill, and the 16th Regiment, which had remained -out to protect the working parties, was marched down to occupy the -place. They found it almost deserted. A few Hindoos and some Sepoys of -the unfortunate 27th Regiment were the only occupants of Ghuznee.[A] -And when, at early dawn, the officers of Nott’s camp looked through -their telescopes towards the citadel, they plainly saw our Sepoys on -the ramparts. Soon the British flag was waving from the highest tower, -and Shumshoodeen’s artillery, worked by his enemies, was roaring out -a royal salute in honour of their triumph. The General and his staff -rode out from camp to inspect the place, and to make arrangements for -its destruction. They found the city a mass of ruins; and in the houses -which had been occupied by the officers of Palmer’s garrison, many -sorrowful mementoes of the sufferings they had endured, written or -scratched on the walls. The citadel was in good repair, and every one -who inspected it marvelled how it happened that Palmer had yielded it -up, and trusted himself and his men to the honour of his treacherous -opponents.[298] - -And now began the work of destruction. The artillery officers burst -the enemy’s guns, and the engineers ran mines and exploded them, under -different parts of the works. After this the town and citadel were -fired. The wood-work soon ignited, and all through the night the flames -of the burning fortress lit up the over-hanging sky.[299] - -But there was something else now to be done. At the village of Roza, -in the vicinity of Ghuznee, is the tomb of Sultan Mahmoud. A peculiar -odour of sanctity is exhaled from that shrine. The priests, in whose -guardianship it is held, have their traditions concerning it, in which -the spurious greatly prevails. Its boasted antiquity is not supported -by any credible evidence; and when Major Rawlinson carried to the -examination of the inscriptions on the tomb all that profound knowledge -and acute penetration which have since attained for him, in the Eastern -and in the Western world, so wide a celebrity as the first of Oriental -antiquaries, he had at once detected unmistakeable proofs of their -belonging to a more recent period than the Moollahs had claimed for -them.[300] Still the shrine was a venerable one, and by the priesthood -of Afghanistan held in no common esteem. The famous sandal-wood gates -of Somnauth, which Mahmoud had carried off from their home in Guzerat, -were deposited at the conqueror’s tomb. Such at least had long been the -popular faith; and among the priesthood and the people of Afghanistan, -no one doubted that the trophies were genuine. It was reserved for -European scepticism to cast discredit upon the reality of the sacred -relics. - -But, whether genuine or spurious, upon these gates Lord Ellenborough -had fixed his desires. What he knew about them, where he had read -of them, or by whom his attention was drawn to them, History -cannot determine. It is sufficient that on the 4th of July, when -the Governor-General wrote to General Nott, authorising him to -“retire” to the provinces of India, by the route of Ghuznee, Caubul, -and Jellalabad, he inserted in this memorable letter a paragraph -instructing the General to despoil the tomb of Sultan Mahmoud. “You -will bring away,” he wrote, “from the tomb of Mahmoud of Ghuznee, his -club, which hangs over it, and you will bring away the gates of his -tomb, which are the gates of the Temple of Somnauth.” So, on the 8th -of September, under Sanders’s superintendence, the gates of Mahmoud’s -tomb were carried off, as tenderly as they could perform the duty, -by a party of English soldiers. The Moollahs wept bitterly. But the -shrine was not otherwise profaned; and the excitement which the -spoliation created scarcely extended beyond the holy circle of the -priesthood.[301] - -Onward went Nott with his trophies. On the 12th he was before -Sydeabad, where Woodburn and his men had been decoyed and massacred. -This fort was at once destroyed; and another was fired by the -camp-followers.[302] On the following day the enemy crowned the hills -on both flanks; but not until the 14th did they appear in sufficient -numbers, or assume such an attitude, as to bring on a collision with -our advancing troops. On that day, near Mydan, Nott attacked them on -the heights. It seemed that Shumshoodeen and Sultan Jan had determined -to make a last stand for the defence of the capital; but having -hitherto gained so little advantage by meeting us in the open country, -had resolved to try the effect of opposing us at the gorge of the hills -stretching towards Mydan. Here they had thrown up breastworks. Nott, -however, precipitated the engagement, and carried the contest to the -heights.[303] All arms were now engaged. The day was a busy one. It -was one of doubtful victory on either side. The heights were carried; -but they were not held. And when night fell upon the contending hosts, -and the moon again lit up the scene, it seemed that the work was not -yet done. A busy night was looked for as the sequel of a busy day. But -suddenly the exertions of the enemy slackened. News of the defeat of -Akbar Khan at Tezeen had reached the camp of the chiefs. They seemed to -have changed their tactics, and to have moved off to Urghundeh—a place -a few miles nearer to the capital. - -The position which Shumshoodeen had intended to take up, at the gorge -of the Mydan Pass, was found, when Nott advanced on the following -day, to have been abandoned. But the day was a busy one. The tribes -were up along the line of march and harassed us severely with their -jezails. The breaking down of one of our guns crippled our movements -and gave some temporary advantage to the enemy. All arms of our force -distinguished themselves. The practice of the guns was excellent. -The infantry clomb the heights with their wonted gallantry; and the -cavalry did good service. The result was all that could be wished, and -to the Afghans the day was a disastrous one. The Mydanees, who had -been actively engaged in the Caubul insurrection, and some of whom -had now accompanied Sultan Jan in his march to the southward, and had -been engaged, under his standard, with the British troops at Ghuznee, -now sent a deputation to the General claiming his protection. Nott -dismissed them with an indignant rebuke. Little protection was there -in store for them. The Sepoys and camp-followers began to fire their -forts, and at sunset six-and-twenty of them might have been counted -lighting up the evening sky. - -The march was now nearly at an end. Passing Urghundeh on the 16th of -September—the place where, in the autumn of 1839, Dost Mahomed had -planted his guns, and determined to make a last stand against Sir John -Keane’s advancing army—Nott’s division neared Caubul. On the 17th, it -had encamped at a distance of some four or five miles from the city. -But the Jellalabad army had anticipated its arrival. Caubul was already -in possession of the British. Pollock had planted the British ensign -upon the heights of the Balla Hissar. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - -[September-October: 1842.] - - The Re-occupation of Caubul—Installation of Futteh Jung—The - Recovery of the Prisoners—Their Arrival in Camp—The Expedition into - the Kohistan—Destruction of the Great Bazaar—Depredations in the - City—Accession of Shahpoor—Departure of the British Army. - - -On the 15th of September, Pollock’s force had encamped on the Caubul -race-course. It had encountered no opposition along the line of road -from Bootkhak, and it was plain now that there was no enemy to be -encountered at the capital. Akbar Khan had fled to Ghorebund, ready, -if need be, to take flight across the Hindoo-Koosh. The other hostile -chiefs were supposed to be in the Kohistan. Everything at Caubul -betokened the panic engendered by the approach of our retributory arms. - -On the day after his arrival, Pollock prepared formally to take -possession of the Balla Hissar. A detachment of horse and foot, with a -troop of horse artillery, was told off, to give effect to the ceremony. -The British flag was to be hoisted on the highest point of the citadel, -and the British guns were to roar forth a royal salute in honour of the -re-occupation of the capital of Afghanistan. - -All this was done—but, on that September morning, there occurred -coincidentally with it another event much controverted and much -misunderstood. The wretched Prince Futteh Jung, who, two weeks before, -had carried his tattered clothes and his bewildered brain to General -Pollock’s camp at Gundamuck, had now returned under the General’s -protection, to start again as a candidate for the throne from which he -had been driven by the Barukzye Sirdar. It was not the policy of the -British Government openly to interfere for the establishment of any -government in Afghanistan, or to identify itself with any particular -party or Prince. But both Pollock and Macgregor were of opinion, that -so long as the British were to remain at Caubul, it would be desirable -that a government of some kind should be established, if only to enable -our armies more surely to obtain their supplies. Some sort of indirect -assistance and protection was therefore extended to the Prince. The -friendly chiefs were encouraged to give in their allegiance to him; -and he was suffered to turn to his own uses the ceremony of the -re-occupation of the Balla Hissar. He asked and obtained permission to -accompany the British detachment; because, he said, treachery was to be -apprehended, if he proceeded to the palace without the support of his -father’s allies. - -And so it happened, that when the British detachment moved from its -ground towards the Balla Hissar, the Prince, attended by some of his -principal adherents, fell in at the head of the procession. A portion -of the town was traversed by the detachment on its way to the citadel. -But, although the hideous sights of the last few days were still fresh -in the memory of the troops, they resisted all temptation to violence -and outrage. Not a man was hurt, or a house injured. In orderly -procession they streamed into the citadel. The road to the point at -which the colours were to be hoisted ran by the palace gates. As a -road for the passage of artillery, indeed, it terminated there. It -was necessary that the General should halt the guns and troops in the -vicinity of the palace. There was no point beyond, to which they could -proceed. The Prince and his attendants entered the royal abode; and the -British General, with some of his principal officers, were invited to -appear at his installation. Pollock sate on a chair on the right of the -throne, and M’Caskill on the left. Then was gone through the ceremony -of appointing officers of state; and the British allies of the new -King took their departure, and went about their own work. The General -and his Staff moved forward with the British colours, and planted them -on the highest conspicuous point of the Balla Hissar. As the colours -were raised the troops presented arms, the guns broke out into a royal -salute, the band struck up the National Anthem, and three hearty cheers -went up to announce that the vindication of our national honour was -complete. - -So far was the restoration of Futteh Jung to the throne of his fathers -encouraged and aided by the British General. The Prince had been -suffered to hang on to the skirts of Circumstance, and to make the -most of a favourable coincidence. But so careful was Pollock not to -encourage in the breast of the Shah-zadah and his adherents any hope -of more direct assistance from the British Government, that Macgregor -was deputed to wait on Futteh Jung after the Durbar, and to enter into -a definite explanation of our views. He was emphatically told that -he was to look for no assistance, in men, money, or arms, from the -British Government; and that therefore it behoved him to turn his own -resources to the best account.[304] He was instructed, too, that the -British authorities were unwilling to interfere in any way in the -administration, and that it was necessary that he should immediately -proceed unbiassed to the election of a minister. The choice lay between -the Nizam-ood-dowlah and Gholam Mahomed Khan, Populzye. On the evening -of the 18th a council was held, and the decision of the Prince and the -chiefs was eventually in favour of the latter. - -In the mean while, Pollock’s mind was heavy with thoughts of the -probable fate of the British prisoners. They had been carried off -towards the regions of the Hindoo-Koosh, and were, perhaps, even now -on the way to hopeless slavery in Toorkistan. Immediately on his -arrival at Caubul, the General had despatched his military secretary, -Sir Richmond Shakespear, with a party of 600 Kuzzilbash Horse,[305] to -overtake the prisoners and their escort. But there was a possibility of -this party being intercepted by the enemy. It was said that Sultan Jan -was hovering about with some such mischievous intent. At all events, -it was expedient to send a strong detachment of British troops to the -support of Shakespear and his Kuzzilbashes. The service was one which -any officer might have been proud to undertake. Pollock offered the -honour of the undertaking to Nott and the Candahar division. But the -offer was not accepted. - -The two divisions of the British army were on opposite sides of -Caubul. The first communication that had taken place between them was -accomplished through the agency of Major Rawlinson. He had ridden in -Afghan costume from Nott’s camp at Urghundeh, and had joined Pollock’s -division on the morning of the 16th of September, shortly after the -British colours had been planted on the Balla Hissar. On the following -day Rawlinson returned to Nott’s camp. Mayne, who had done such good -service at Jellalabad, and who was now attached to Pollock’s staff, -rode with him, attended by a party of Irregular Horse. They bore a note -from Pollock, suggesting that a brigade from the Candahar division -should be detached towards Bameean, to assist the recovery of the -prisoners. The Candahar force were pitching their camp at Char-Deh, -when Rawlinson and Mayne reached them. Nott received the letter of his -brother-general in no very genial mood. He had already made up his -mind on the subject. Twice before had the officers of his own force -suggested to General Nott that the recovery of the prisoners would be -facilitated by the despatch of a detachment from his division.[306] But -he had always answered, that he believed the recovery of the prisoners -to be a matter of indifference to Government, and that he did not -consider it expedient to divide his force. - -When, therefore, the proposal came to him in a more official shape from -his brother-general—upon whom, as the senior officer, had now devolved -the command of all the troops in Afghanistan—he received it as one -on which he had no consideration to bestow, and determined at once, -within the bounds of due subordination, to decline it. It would be well -if there were nothing else to record. Unhappily, the temper of the -Candahar General was such, that the officer—one of the bravest and, -for his years, the most distinguished in Afghanistan—who presented -himself in Nott’s camp, to bring back the General’s answer, met with -a welcome which may little have surprised, however much it may have -pained, the officers of Nott’s Staff, but which, upon one accustomed, -in Sale’s and Pollock’s camps, to the courtesies due to a soldier and -a gentleman, burst like a loaded shell. Chafing under the thought of -being recommended by his superior to do what his own better judgment -suggested to him that he ought to have done unprompted, the Candahar -General poured upon Mayne and his escort all the vials of his wrath. -What he said was heard by many, and is upon record. Mayne, stung by -the insult put upon him by the veteran commander, refused to continue -in his camp, and said he would await at the outlying picket the answer -which he was commissioned to carry back to Pollock’s tent.[307] - -But when Nott entered his tent, and sat down to write a reply to his -brother-general, he did not wholly forget the duties of a soldier to -his superior in rank. He stated, in emphatic language, his reasons for -protesting against the adoption of the course suggested to him; but -at the same time declared his willingness to obey the orders of his -superior officer. What these reasons were must be set forth in his own -words: - - Camp, September 17th, 1842. - MY DEAR GENERAL, - - I have been favoured with your note of this date, in which you express - a wish that I should detach a brigade towards Bameean; before you - decide on sending it, I would beg to state as follows:— - - 1st. The troops under my command have just made a long and very - difficult march of upwards of 300 miles, and they have been - continually marching about for the last six months, and most certainly - require rest for a day or two—the same with my camels and other - cattle. I lost twenty-nine camels yesterday, and expect to-day’s - report will be double that number. - - 2nd. I am getting short of supplies for Europeans and natives, and I - can see but little probability of getting a quantity equal to my daily - consumption at this place. I have little or no money. - - 3rd. I have so many sick and wounded that I fear I shall have the - greatest inconvenience and difficulty in carrying them; and should - any unnecessary operations add to their number, they must be left to - perish. If I remain here many days I shall expect to lose half my - cattle, which will render retirement very difficult. - - 4th. I sincerely think that sending a small detachment will and must - be followed by deep disaster. No doubt Mahomed Akbar, Shumshoodeen, - and the other chiefs, are uniting their forces, and I hourly expect - to hear that Sir R. Shakespear is added to the number of British - prisoners. In my last affair with Shumshoodeen and Sultan Jan, they - had 12,000 men; and my information is that two days ago they set out - for Bameean. - - 5th. After much experience in this country, my opinion is that, if the - system of sending out detachments should be adopted, disaster and ruin - will follow. - - 6th. After bringing to your notice, showing that my men require rest - for a day or two, that my camels are dying fast, and that my supplies - are nearly expended, should you order my force to be divided, I - have nothing to do but implicitly to obey your orders; but, my dear - General, I feel assured you will excuse me when I most respectfully - venture to protest against it under the circumstances above noted. I - could have wished to have stated this in person to you, but I have - been so very unwell for the last two months that I am sure you will - kindly excuse me. - - Yours sincerely, - WM. NOTT.[308] - -On the following day, Nott having excused himself on the plea of -ill health from visiting Pollock in his camp, Pollock, waiving the -distinction of his superior rank, called upon his brother-general. -The conversation which ensued related mainly to the question of -the despatch of the brigade in aid of the recovery of the British -prisoners. Nott had made up his mind on the subject. He was not to -be moved from his first position. There were few besides himself who -considered the arguments which he advanced to be of the overwhelming -and conclusive character which Nott himself believed them to be; and -it was, at all events, sufficiently clear, that as it was of primal -importance on such a service to lose the least possible amount of time, -it was desirable to detach a brigade from Nott’s camp, in preference -to one from Pollock’s, if only because the former was some ten miles -nearer to Bameean than the latter. Nott was inflexible. Government, he -said, “had thrown the prisoners overboard”—why then should he rescue -them? He would obey the orders of his superior officer, but only under -protest. So Pollock returned to camp, and delegated to another officer -the honourable service which Nott had emphatically declined. Sir Robert -Sale was not likely to decline it. Though his own heroic wife had not -been one of the captives, every feeling of the soldier and the man -would have responded to the appeal. - -So Sale took out with him a brigade from the Jellalabad army, and -pushed on in pursuit of Shakespear and the Kuzzilbashes. But already -had the release of the prisoners been effected. They had accomplished -their own liberation. Sale met them with Shakespear and the Kuzzilbash -escort on their way to Pollock’s camp. - -The story which they had to tell was this. On the afternoon of the -25th of August the prisoners,[309] who had already received a general -intimation that they were to be carried off to Bameean, but who had -still ventured to hope that some efforts might be made by the chiefs -in our interests to release them, were warned by Captain Troup, who -had just returned from an interview with the Sirdar, to prepare for the -journey towards the Hindoo-Koosh. Soon after sunset a guard of three -hundred men arrived to escort them. Their ponies, camels, and litters -were brought, and an hour or two before midnight they started upon -their dreary journey. - -They were not suffered to sleep that night, nor the next; but were -painfully hurried on towards the inhospitable regions of the Indian -Caucasus. All the forts and villages by which they passed poured -forth their inhabitants to stare, with wondering curiosity, at the -Feringhee captives.[310] But none insulted them in their misfortunes. -Often, indeed, by the rude inhabitants of the country through which -they passed, were many looks, and words, and deeds of kindness freely -bestowed upon them. Onwards still, in upward direction, they went, -thousands of feet above the level of the sea. The days were painfully -sultry, and the nights were bitterly cold. The alternations of climate -told fearfully upon the constitutions of the European prisoners; and -their sick increased in numbers. The soldiers and camp-followers, for -whom no carriage was provided, dragged their infirm limbs wearily -over the barren wastes and up the steep ascents of the Hindoo-Koosh, -the officers giving up their horses to the ladies, for whom the camel -panniers were no longer secure, toiled wearily after them up the rugged -slopes. - -On the 3rd of September they reached Bameean. Conducted to one wretched -fort and then to another, they remonstrated against the noisome -quarters to which it was proposed to consign them; and twice their -importunities prevailed. But at last, on the 9th of September, the -commandant of their escort ordered them to take up their abode in -another fort, scarcely less wretched than the others, and portioned out -among them some small and comfortless apartments, so dark that they -could scarcely see in them, and so filthy that they could write their -names in the soot that covered the roof. But their residence in this -place was but brief. They soon effected their escape. - -The commander of the escort was one Saleh Mahomed. A soldier of -fortune, who had visited many countries and served under many masters, -he had been at one time a soubahdar in Captain Hopkins’s regiment of -infantry, and had deserted with his men to Dost Mahomed on the eve of -the contest at Bameean. A good-humoured, loquacious, boasting man, he -was never happier than when narrating his adventures to the English -officers under his charge. Among them there was not one who better -understood the Afghan character, or who had made more friends in the -country, than Captain Johnson; and now, in a short time, between him -and Saleh Mahomed an intimacy was established, which the former began -to turn to the best account.[311] He rode with the commandant, listened -to his stories; and soon began to throw out hints that a lakh of -rupees and a pension in Hindostan might be found for him, if, instead -of carrying off his prisoners to Bameean, he would conduct them in -safety to the British camp. To Pottinger, who had hitherto been the -chief negotiator on the part of the captives, Johnson would now have -confided the delicate duty of inducing the deserter again to desert; -but the task was declined, on the plea that the attempt was more likely -to succeed in the hands of the latter, who seemed to have inspired -a feeling of friendship in the breast of the commandant. Pottinger -disliked the man; and the man seemed to dislike him. So Johnson began, -with admirable tact and address, to work upon the cupidity of his -friend. - -On the 29th of August, the suggestion was put forth, in a light and -jesting manner; and not until he had convinced himself that there would -be no danger in a more direct proposition, did Johnson suffer Saleh -Mahomed to feel that he was thoroughly in earnest. The Afghan was in -no hurry to commit himself. Days passed. The party reached Bameean; -and no allusion was made to the subject; till one day—the 11th of -September—Saleh Mahomed sent for Johnson, Pottinger, and Lawrence, -and in a private room of the fort, which had been appropriated to Lady -Sale, produced a letter which he had just received from Akbar Khan. -The Sirdar had instructed him to convey the prisoners to Kooloom, and -to make them all over to the Wullee of that place. It seemed then that -they were about to end their days in hopeless captivity among the -Oosbegs. But the despair which fell upon them was but short-lived. -Saleh Mahomed soon dispersed their fears by saying that one Syud -Moorteza Shah, a Cashmeree, who, during the Caubul insurrection, had -helped Johnson to collect grain from the villages, had arrived from -Caubul, and brought a message from Mohun Lai to the effect, that if -he would release the prisoners, General Pollock would ensure him a -life-pension of 1000 rupees a month, and make him a present of 20,000 -rupees. “I know nothing of General Pollock,” then said Saleh Mahomed, -“but if you three gentlemen will swear by your Saviour to make good -to me what Syud Moorteza Shah states that he is authorised to offer, -I will deliver you over to your own people.” The offer was at once -accepted. With little delay an agreement was written out in Persian by -Syud Moorteeza Shah, and signed by Johnson, Pottinger, Lawrence, and -Mackenzie.[312] It was a perilous game—for Saleh Mahomed had twice -played the traitor before, and might assume the same character again. -But the prize was too great and too tempting for them to hesitate even -to risk their lives; so they flung themselves without hesitation into -the hazardous plot. - -Cheerfully did the prisoners now bind themselves to provide from -their own resources, all according to their means, the money that -was required to carry out the grand object of their liberation. -The signatures of all the officers and ladies were obtained to the -bond.[313] Saleh Mahomed proved to be staunch and true. The conspiracy -was wholly successful; and the conspirators soon grew bold in their -success. The rebellion of Saleh Mahomed and his European allies -was openly proclaimed to all the chiefs and people of Bameean and -the surrounding country. A flag was hoisted on the fort which they -occupied. They deposed the governor of the place, and appointed a -more friendly chief in his stead. They levied contributions upon a -party of Lohanee merchants, who were passing that way; and so supplied -themselves with funds. And, to crown all, Major Pottinger began to -issue proclamations, calling upon all the neighbouring chiefs to come -in and make their salaam; he granted remissions of revenue; and all the -decent clothes in the possession of the party were collected to bestow -as _Khelats_. - -But, in spite of the boldness of their outward bearing at this time, -they were not without some apprehensions that their dominion might -soon be broken down, and the lords of to-day reduced again to captives -and slaves to-morrow. Some of the confederate chiefs might ere long -appear at Bameean and overwhelm the rebellion of Saleh Mahomed. So the -new rulers began to strengthen their position, and make preparations -to stand a siege. They had promised their guards—in all some 250 -men—four months’ pay, as a gratuity, on reaching Caubul; and there -was every reason to rely on their fidelity.[314] Commanded by -European officers, it was believed that they would make a good show -of resistance. So Pottinger and his companions began to clear out -the loopholes of the forts—to dig wells—to lay in provisions—and -otherwise to provide against the probability of a siege. They were -busily employed in this manner on the 15th of September, when a -horseman was observed approaching from the Caubul side of the valley. -Eager for intelligence from the capital, they left their work and -gathered round him. He brought glad tidings. Akbar Khan had been -defeated by General Pollock at Tezeen, and had fled no one knew -whither. The aspect of affairs was now changed, indeed. The common -voice of the prisoners—prisoners no longer—declared in favour of -an immediate return to Caubul. It was decided that, on the following -morning, they should set out for Pollock’s camp. - -At eight o’clock on the morning of the 16th they started on their -journey. Sleeping that night, in the clear moonlight, on hard stony -beds, they were awakened by the arrival of a friendly chief who brought -a letter from Sir Richmond Shakespear, stating that he was on his way -to Bameean, with a party of 600 Kuzzilbash horse. This was cheering -intelligence. At daybreak they were again astir, pushing on with -increased rapidity, in a whirl of excitement, unconscious of hunger or -fatigue. Their trials were now nearly at an end. They had heart enough -to do and to suffer anything. - -About three hours after noon on the 17th of September, a cloud of -dust was observed to rise from the summit of a mountain-pass in their -front. Presently a few straggling horsemen made their appearance, -and, in a little time, the English officers could plainly see a body -of cavalry winding down the pass. Great now was the excitement in our -little party. The horsemen who were now approaching might be Shakespear -and the Kuzzilbashes, or they might be a body of the enemy. It was -well at least to prepare for their reception. Saleh Mahomed’s drums -were beaten; all stragglers were called in; every man stood to his -arms; a line was formed;[315] the muskets were loaded; and Saleh -Mahomed seemed all eagerness to give the enemy a warm reception. But -there was no enemy to be defeated. An English officer soon appeared -galloping a-head of the horsemen. Shakespear had arrived with his -Kuzzilbashes. He was soon in the midst of the prisoners, offering them -his congratulations, receiving their thanks, and endeavouring to answer -their thick-coming questions. - -At daybreak on the following morning they pushed on again. Some better -horses had been obtained from the Kuzzilbashes; and now they moved -forward with increasing rapidity. On the 20th, as two or three of the -officers riding on a-head of the party were nearing Urghundeh, which -was to be their halting-place, another cloud of dust was observed -rising over the hills; and soon the welcome tidings reached them that -a large body of British cavalry and infantry was approaching. This was -the column which Pollock had sent out in support of the Kuzzilbash -Horse—the column that Sale commanded. In a little time the happy -veteran had embraced his wife and daughter; and the men of the 13th -had offered their delighted congratulations to the loved ones of their -old commander. A royal salute was fired. The prisoners were safe in -Sale’s camp. Their anxieties were at an end. The good Providence that -had so long watched over the prisoner and the captive now crowned its -mercies by delivering them into the hands of their friends. Dressed -as they were in Afghan costume, their faces bronzed by much exposure, -and rugged with beards and moustachios of many months’ growth, it was -not easy to recognise the liberated officers who now pushed forward -to receive the congratulations of their friends. On that day they -skirted the ground on which the Candahar force was posted, and out -went officers, and soldiers, and camp-followers, eager and curious, to -gaze at the released captives, and half-inclined to fall upon their -guards.[316] On the 21st of September they passed through the city, on -their way to Pollock’s camp. They found the shops closed; the streets -deserted; and they paused, as they went along, before some melancholy -memorials of the great outbreak which, a year before, had overwhelmed -us with misery and disgrace.[317] - -Great was the joy which the recovery of the prisoners diffused -throughout the camps of Pollock and Nott; and great was the joy -which it diffused throughout the provinces of India. Rightly judged -Pollock that, if he returned to Hindostan without the brave men and -tender women who had endured for so many months the pains and perils -of captivity in a barbarous country, his countrymen would regard the -victory as incomplete. Let him fight what battles, destroy what forts, -and carry off what trophies he might, he would, without the liberation -of the prisoners, be only half-a-conqueror after all. Pollock knew -that his countrymen had not “thrown the prisoners overboard.” He -had rescued them now from the hands of the enemy; that object of the -war was obtained. There was little else, indeed, now to be done, -except to fix upon Caubul some lasting mark of the just retribution -of an outraged nation. It had been the declared wish of the Supreme -Government that the army should leave behind it some decisive proof of -its power, without impeaching its humanity; and now Pollock prepared to -carry, as best he could interpret them, those wishes into effect. - -The interpretation, however, was not easy. Very different opinions -obtained among the leading officers in the British camp respecting -the amount of punishment which it now became the British General to -inflict upon the Afghan capital. It was a moot question, involving many -considerations, and not to be hastily solved; but there could have been -no question whether, at that time, justice and expediency did not alike -require that the inhabitants of Caubul and the neighbourhood should -be protected against unauthorised acts of depredation and violence. -Against the plunderings of soldiers and camp-followers Pollock had -steadfastly set his face; but in the neighbourhood of Nott’s camp -much was done to destroy the confidence which Pollock was anxious to -re-establish, and to alarm and irritate the chiefs whom he desired to -conciliate.[318] After a few days the new minister and Khan Shereen -Khan, the chief of the Kuzzilbashes, determined to represent to -Pollock, in a joint letter, the grievances of which they thought they -were entitled to complain.[319] - -The minister had been anxious to pay his respects to the gallant -commander of the Candahar division, and had waited upon him with a -letter from Macgregor; but Nott had peremptorily refused to give him -an audience. He believed it to be the desire of Lord Ellenborough that -no Afghan Government should be recognised by the British authorities, -and he was unwilling to favour any such recognition by receiving visits -of ceremony from the functionaries appointed by the government which -had been established at Caubul. As Pollock had not been equally nice -upon this point, the refusal of his brother-general to extend his -courtesies to the minister could only have embarrassed our supreme -authorities at Caubul, and attached suspicion to the sincerity of our -proceedings. But Nott, at this time, was in no mood of mind to extend -his courtesies either to Afghan or to British authorities. It was his -belief that even then the British army ought to have been on its way -to Jellalabad. He had with him a sufficiency of supplies to carry him -to the latter place; and was irritated at the thought that Pollock had -come up to Caubul without provisions to carry him back.[320] If he had -been in supreme authority at Caubul, he would have destroyed the Balla -Hissar and the city, and would have marched on with the least possible -delay to Jellalabad. He placed his sentiments on record regarding the -impolicy of the halt at Caubul—declared that he would be compelled -to make military requisitions to rescue his troops from starvation; -and denounced Futteh Jung and the new ministers as the enemies of the -British. Nothing, indeed, could dissuade Nott that every Afghan in the -country was not our bitter foe. - -Pollock, however, was inclined to discriminate—to protect our friends -and to punish our enemies. Whilst supplies were coming in but slowly -to his camp, it seemed good to him that another blow should be struck -at the hostile chiefs. It was reported to him that Ameen-oollah Khan -was in the field at Istaliff, in the Kohistan, endeavouring to bring -together the scattered fragments of the broken Barukzye force. It was -believed to be the design of the chief to attack the British on their -retirement from Caubul; and it was expedient, therefore, at once to -break up his force, and to leave some mark of our just resentment on a -part of the country which had poured forth so many of the insurgents -who had risen against us in the preceding winter. A force taken from -the two divisions of the British army was therefore despatched, under -General M’Caskill, to Istaliff, to scatter the enemy there collected, -and to destroy the place. It was thought, moreover, that Ameen-oollah -Khan, dreading the advance of the retributory army, would endeavour to -conciliate the British General, by delivering up to him the person of -Mahomed Akbar Khan, if he could adroitly accomplish his seizure. The -Sirdar had sent his family and his property into Turkistan; and was -himself waiting the progress of events in the Ghorebund Pass, ready, it -was said, to follow his establishment across the hills, if the British -troops pushed forward to overtake him. - -The hostile chiefs were all now at the last gasp—all eager to -conciliate the power that a few months before they had derided and -defied. Already had Ameen-oollah Khan begun to make overtures to the -British authorities—to declare that he had always at heart been their -friend; but that he had been compelled to secure his own safety by -siding with the Barukzyes. And now Akbar Khan with the same object, -sent into Pollock’s camp a peace-offering, in the shape of the last -remaining prisoner in his hands. Captain Bygrave was now restored to -his friends. It might have been a feeling of generosity—for generous -impulses sometimes welled up in the breast of the Sirdar; it might -have been a mere stroke of policy, having reference solely to his own -interests; or it might, and it probably was, a mixture of the two -influences that prevailed upon him; but he would not any longer make -war upon a single man, and upon one, too, whom he personally respected -and esteemed with the respect and esteem due to a man of such fine -qualities as Bygrave. So he sent the last remaining prisoner safely -into Pollock’s camp; and with him he sent a letter of conciliation, -and an agent commissioned to treat for him. He was eager to enter into -negotiations with the British. It was little likely that so weak a -Prince as Futteh Jung would be able to maintain his regal authority in -Afghanistan a day after the departure of the British; and it appeared -to him not wholly improbable that, wishing to leave behind them a -friendly power in Afghanistan, the British authorities might be induced -to enter into a convention with him before their final departure from -the country. - -Even now was Futteh Jung himself beginning to acknowledge his utter -inability to maintain himself in the Balla Hissar after the striking of -Pollock’s camp. Pollock had refused to supply him with troops, money, -or arms; and the Prince himself had closed the door of reconciliation -with his old Barukzye enemies by destroying their houses and property. -Among the houses thus destroyed, it is deplorable to state, was the -house of Mahomed Zemaun Khan—the very house in which the good old -man, with real parental kindness, had so long and so faithfully -protected the British hostages. The houses of Oosman Khan, Jubbar -Khan, and others fell also. It was the policy of the Prince thus to -compromise his supporters, and to prevent an alliance between them and -the Barukzye party; but having done this, he felt that it was only -by destroying the hostile chiefs that he could, in any way, maintain -his position. He watched, therefore, with anxiety the issue of the -expedition into the Kohistan, and deferred his ultimate decision until -the return of M’Caskill’s force. - -Aided by and relying on the wise counsels of Havelock, M’Caskill made -a rapid march upon Istaliff, and took the enemy by surprise. The town -is built, terrace above terrace, upon two ridges of the spur of the -Hindoo-Koosh, which forms the western boundary of the beautiful valley -of Kohistan. It was held in high repute as a maiden fortress by the -Afghans, who had now collected, in its fortified streets and squares, -their treasure and their women. Looking to it as to a place of refuge, -secure from the assaults of the invading Feringhees, they had scarcely -made any military dispositions. M’Caskill’s first intention had been -to attack the left face of the city; but the intelligence brought in -by a reconnoitering party, on the evening of his arrival, caused him -to change his plan of operations, and to conduct the assault on the -right. Soon after daybreak, therefore, on the following morning (the -29th of September), the camp was in motion towards the right of the -city. The enemy soon marked the movement; and, believing that our -columns were in retreat, poured in a sharp fire upon them. Growing -more and more audacious in this belief, the foremost Afghans pressed -closely upon our covering party, which, composed of Broadfoot’s sappers -under their intrepid chief, soon found themselves in fierce collision -with a large body of the enemy posted in a walled garden. There was a -sturdy hand-to-hand conflict. The little band of sappers pushed on, -and the Afghans retreated before them up the slopes in the direction -of the city, where they would have been overwhelmed. But the time had -now come for operations on a larger scale. Havelock and Mayne, who -had observed the dangerous position of the sappers, galloped to the -General, and urged the necessity of supporting Broadfoot. M’Caskill, -who had made his arrangements for the assault, now ordered the columns -to advance upon the city. Her Majesty’s 9th Foot and the 26th Native -Infantry, who had done such good service before, delighted to receive -the word to advance to the support of the sappers, tore across the -intervening space, in generous emulation, and rushed cheerily to the -encounter; whilst on the other side of the enemy’s position, the -light companies of Her Majesty’s 41st, and the 42nd and 43rd Sepoy -regiments of Bengal, stormed, with steady gallantry, the village and -vineyard to the left. The Afghan marksmen gave way before our attacking -columns; and as our men pursued them up the slopes, a great panic -seized the people. They thought no longer of defence. Their first -care was to save their property and their women. Ameen-oollah Khan -himself fled at the first onset. As our troops entered the town, the -face of the mountain beyond was covered with laden baggage-cattle, -whilst long lines of white-veiled women, striving to reach a place of -safety, streamed along the hill-side. The forbearance of our people -was equal to their gallantry. M’Caskill, respecting the honour of -the women, would not suffer a pursuit; but many fell into the hands -of our soldiers in the town, and were safely delivered over to the -keeping of the Kuzzilbashes.[321] Two guns and much booty were taken; -the town was partially fired; and then M’Caskill went on towards the -hills, meeting no opposition on the way, destroyed Charekur, where the -Goorkha regiment had been annihilated, and some other fortified places -which had been among the strongholds of the enemy; and then returned -triumphantly to Caubul. - -On the 7th of October, M’Caskill’s force rejoined the British camp. -It was now necessary that immediate measures should be adopted for -the withdrawal of the British troops from the capital of Afghanistan. -Already had Pollock exceeded, but with a wise discretion, the time -which the Supreme Government would have accorded to him. But there -was yet work to be done. No lasting mark of our retributory visit to -Caubul had yet been left upon the accursed city. Pollock had been -unable to shape his measures before, for the nature of the retribution -to be inflicted was dependent upon the constitution of the new Afghan -Government; and it was long uncertain what government the British -General would leave behind him. Futteh Jung had been for some time -trembling at the thought of the prospect before him. If M’Caskill had -brought back Akbar Khan a prisoner, or had sent his head to the British -camp, the new King might have summoned resolution to maintain his seat -on the throne. But he could never forget the treatment he had received -from the Sirdar, or nerve himself again to meet the unscrupulous -Barukzye.[322] So now he peremptorily declined to wear the crown which -we would fain have kept a little longer on his head; and implored the -British General to afford him the protection of his camp, and convey -him to the provinces of India. - -Willing to spare the city and the Balla Hissar for the sake of -a friendly government, Pollock had despatched Shakespear to the -Kuzzilbash camp, which was then in the Kohistan, to take counsel with -Khan Shereen Khan, and the other chiefs of the Persian party. It -seems that they had been sceptical of the intentions of the British -General to evacuate the country; but Shakespear now announced that the -departure of the army was at hand, and that it was necessary finally to -determine upon the nature of the new government. In this conjuncture, -the Kuzzilbashes, trembling for the safety of the city, and feeling -that there was little hope of their being reconciled to the Barukzye -party, laid their hands upon another puppet. There was a younger scion -of the Suddozye House then at Caubul—the Prince Shahpoor. His mother -was a high-born Populzye lady, and it was believed that his recognition -would tend to conciliate the Douranees. Postponing, however, the final -enunciation of their views until their return to Caubul, they now -proposed that the young Prince should be set up in the place of his -brother. At Caubul, a general meeting of the chiefs was held. The voice -of the assembly declared in favour of the elevation of Shahpoor. The -Prince himself, a high-spirited boy, willingly accepted the crown that -was offered to him, and a declaration to that effect, from the Wuzeer -and the Kuzzilbash chief, was then sent in to Pollock’s camp. - -Determined to make a last effort to obtain substantial assistance -from the British authorities, the chiefs now waited upon Pollock, and -entreated him to leave some British troops behind him for the support -of the new monarch. Pollock resolutely refused the request. They then -asked him for money. This he also refused. Then came before them the -painful subject of the “mark” that was to be left on Caubul. The chiefs -pleaded for the city and for the Balla Hissar. Urgently they now set -forth the necessity of a Suddozye Prince maintaining the appearance of -royalty in the palace of his fathers—urgently they now set forth that -the Arabs and Hindostanees, who in the hour of extremest peril had -been so faithful to Futteh Jung, were all located in the Balla Hissar; -and that the blow would fall with the greatest severity on those who -were least deserving of punishment.[323] So Pollock consented to spare -the Balla Hissar. - -But it was still necessary that some mark of the retributory visit of -the British should be left upon the offending city. Pollock, therefore, -determined to destroy the great Bazaar. There the mutilated remains -of the murdered Envoy had been exhibited to the insolent gaze of the -Afghans; and there it was deemed fit that the retributory blow should -fall. So, on the 9th of October, Abbott, the chief engineer, received -instructions from the General to destroy the Bazaar; but so anxious -was Pollock not to extend the work of destruction, that he strictly -enjoined the engineer to abstain from applying fire to the building, -and even from the employment of gunpowder, that other parts of the city -might not be damaged by his operations. At the same time, a strong -detachment of British troops, under Colonel Richmond—one of the -best and ablest officers of the force—was sent with the engineers, -to protect the town from injury and the inhabitants from plunder and -outrage. - -But it was no easy task to destroy that great Bazaar simply by the work -of men’s hands. Abbott did his best to obey the instructions he had -received from the General; but he was baffled by the massiveness of the -buildings on which he had been sent to operate. It was necessary to -employ a more powerful agent. On his own responsibility, therefore, he -betook himself to the use of gunpowder. But the explosions damaged no -other buildings than those which had authoritatively been marked for -destruction. The operations against the great Bazaar lasted throughout -the 9th and 10th of October. Every effort was made to save the city -from further destruction; but all Richmond’s protective measures -were insufficient to control the impetuosity of the soldiers and -camp-followers who poured themselves into the town. - -That many excesses were then committed is not to be denied. The -principal gates of the city were guarded; but there were many other -points of ingress, and our people streamed into the streets of -Caubul, applied the firebrand to the houses, and pillaged the shops. -Guilty and innocent alike fell under the heavy hand of the lawless -retribution which was now to descend upon the inhabitants of Caubul. -Many unoffending Hindoos, who, lulled into a sense of delusive security -by the outward re-establishment of a government, had returned to the -city and re-opened their shops, were now disastrously ruined.[324] -In the mad excitement of the hour, friend and foe were stricken down -by the same unsparing hand. Even the _Chundarwal_—where dwelt the -friendly Kuzzilbashes—narrowly escaped destruction. Such excesses -as were committed during the three last days of our occupation of -Caubul must ever be deplored, as all human weakness and wickedness -are to be deplored. But when we consider the amount of temptation -and provocation—when we remember that the comrades of our soldiers -and the brethren of our camp-followers had been foully butchered by -thousands in the passes of Afghanistan; that everywhere tokens of our -humiliation, and of the treachery and cruelty of the enemy, rose up -before our people, stinging them past all endurance, and exasperating -them beyond all control, we wonder less, that when the guilty city lay -at their feet, they should not wholly have reined in their passions, -than that, in such an hour, they should have given them so little head. - -It was now time that the British army should depart. Nothing remained -to be done. Any longer continuance at Caubul would only have aggravated -the sufferings of the people and increased our own difficulties. So, -on the 11th of October, orders were issued for the commencement of -the march on the following day. The unhappy Prince, Futteh Jung, had -claimed and sought permission to accompany Pollock’s camp to India, -and to seek an asylum in the Company’s dominions. The old blind King, -Zemaun Shah, after all the vicissitudes of his eventful life, was -now about again to become an exile, and to end his days in the same -hospitable country. For the family of Shah Soojah protection also -had been sought, and not refused; and now all these fragments of the -great wreck of royalty—these miserable records of a most disastrous -enterprise—were committed to the charge of one who had largely -participated in its sufferings, but had happily escaped the ruin which -had overwhelmed his comrades and his chief.[325] On the evening of -the 11th of October they came out of the town, and found safety in -Pollock’s hospitable camp.[326] The British colours, which had floated -over the Balla Hissar, were now lowered; the regiment which had been -posted there was withdrawn; and every preparation was made for the -departure of the British army. - -On the following morning the two divisions commenced their march. -Fearful that the Candahar division, if left in occupation of its -old ground, whilst the head-quarters of the army were proceeding -in advance, would commit many unauthorised excesses, Pollock had -determined that the whole force should move on the same day. There -was some inconvenience in this, for Nott’s division came up before -Pollock’s had crossed the Loghur river; but to the cause of humanity -it was, doubtless, great gain. The unfortunate Hindoos, who had been -rendered destitute by the destruction of Ghuznee and the spoliation of -Caubul, had crowded into the British camps, hoping to obtain, in their -utter misery, safe conduct to the provinces of India.[327] Pollock -took with him what trophies he could, but he had not carriage for all -the guns,[328] and even on the first day’s march he was compelled to -begin their destruction; whilst Nott, rejoicing in a letter from the -Governor-General, who was in ecstasies about the gates of Somnauth, and -in the notification of his appointment to the Residency of Lucknow, -went off with those venerable relics, and turned his face towards the -country, from which they had been traditionally ravished. - -And on that day, as Pollock was leaving Caubul, and Nott was striking -his camp, the guns of the Balla Hissar roared forth a royal salute in -honour of the accession of Prince Shahpoor—the _Fatiha_ was read in -his name, and the chiefs tendered their allegiance. It was, perhaps, a -mere mockery; but it had saved the Balla Hissar.[329] So the new King -was paraded about the streets of Caubul—only to be dethroned again -before the British army had reached the provinces of India; and that -army turned its back upon Afghanistan, not as of old, in the agony of -humiliation and defeat, but in the flush of victory and triumph. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - [October-December: 1842.] - - Effect of the victories—Lord Ellenborough at Simlah—The Manifesto - of 1842—The Proclamation of the Gates—The Restoration of Dost - Mahomed—The Gathering at Ferozepore—Reception of the Troops—The - Courts-Martial. - - -Never was intelligence received in India with stronger and more -universal feelings of delight than the intelligence of the victories of -Pollock and Nott; and the happy recovery of the prisoners. There was -one general shout of triumphant congratulation, caught up from station -to station along the whole line of country from Sirhind to Tinnevelly. -Suspense and anxiety now died away in the European breast; and, in the -words of one of the ablest Indian statesmen, “it was a comfort again to -be able to look a native in the face.”[330] - -To Lord Ellenborough the brilliant achievements of the two Generals -were a source of unbounded gratification. Everything that he could have -desired had been accomplished. Pollock and Nott, under his orders, -had “retired” so adroitly from Afghanistan, that everybody believed -they had advanced upon the capital of the country. The movement had -produced, or was producing, a grand moral effect all over Hindostan. -Again was there likely to be a season of universal repose. The -excitement which had stirred the hearts of the native community was now -passing away. All those vague hopes and longings which had sprung up, -at the contemplation of our disasters, in Native States of doubtful -friendliness and fidelity, were now stifled by the knowledge of our -success. The Governor-General had threatened to save India in spite -of every man in it who ought to give him support;[331] but it now -seemed as though, in reality, Pollock and Nott had achieved the work of -salvation in spite of the Governor-General himself. - -But Lord Ellenborough was not less delighted than if the work had -been emphatically his own. He was at Simlah when the glad tidings of -the re-occupation of Caubul reached him. He was at Simlah, and in the -very house which had been the cradle of the great manifesto of 1838, -out of which had come all our disasters. He was at Simlah; and the -1st of October was temptingly at hand. On the 1st of October, four -years before, that manifesto had been issued. From Simlah, therefore, -now, on the first of October, another manifesto was to be made to -issue. The utter failure of Lord Auckland’s policy in Afghanistan was -to be proclaimed from the very room in which it had taken shape and -consistency.[332] From this very room was to go forth to all the -chiefs and people of India a proclamation, laying bare to the very core -the gigantic errors which had been baptised in the blood of thousands, -and shrouded in contumely and disgrace. - -And thus ran the proclamation: - - _Secret Department, Simlah, the 1st of October, 1842._ - - The Government of India directed its army to pass the Indus in order - to expel from Afghanistan a chief believed to be hostile to British - interests, and to replace upon his throne a sovereign represented to - be friendly to those interests, and popular with his former subjects. - - The chief believed to be hostile became a prisoner, and the sovereign - represented to be popular was replaced upon his throne; but, after - events, which brought into question his fidelity to the government by - which he was restored, he lost by the hands of an assassin the throne - he had only held amidst insurrections, and his death was preceded and - followed by still existing anarchy. - - Disasters unparalleled in their extent, unless by the errors in which - they originated, and by the treachery by which they were completed, - have, in one short campaign, been avenged upon every scene of past - misfortune; and repeated victories in the field, and the capture of - the cities and citadels of Ghuznee and Caubul, have again attached the - opinion of invincibility to the British arms. - - The British arms in possession of Afghanistan will now be withdrawn to - the Sutlej. - - The Governor-General will leave it to the Afghans themselves to create - a government amidst the anarchy which is the consequence of their - crimes. - - To force a sovereign upon a reluctant people, would be as inconsistent - with the policy as it is with the principles of the British - Government, tending to place the arms and resources of that people - at the disposal of the first invader, and to impose the burden of - supporting a sovereign, without the prospect of benefit from his - alliance. - - The Governor-General will willingly recognise any government approved - by the Afghans themselves, which shall appear desirous and capable of - maintaining friendly relations with neighbouring states. - - Content with the limits nature appears to have assigned to its - empire the Government of India will devote all its efforts to the - establishment and maintenance of general peace, to the protection - of the sovereigns and chiefs its allies, and to the prosperity and - happiness of its own faithful subjects. - - The rivers of the Punjaub and Indus, and the mountainous passes and - the barbarous tribes of Afghanistan, will be placed between the - British army and an enemy approaching from the West, if indeed such an - enemy there can be, and no longer between the army and its supplies. - - The enormous expenditure required for the support of a large force, in - a false military position, at a distance from its own frontier and its - resources, will no longer arrest every measure for the improvement of - the country and of the people. - - The combined army of England and of India, superior in equipment, in - discipline, in valour, and in the officers by whom it is commanded, - to any force which can be opposed to it in Asia, will stand in - unassailable strength upon its own soil, and for ever, under the - blessing of Providence, preserve the glorious empire it has won, in - security and in honour. - - The Governor-General cannot fear the misconstruction of his motives - in thus frankly announcing to surrounding states the pacific and - conservative policy of his government. - - Afghanistan and China have seen at once the forces at his disposal, - and the effect with which they can be applied. - - Sincerely attached to peace for the sake of the benefits it confers - upon the people, the Governor-General is resolved that peace shall be - observed, and will put forth the whole power of the British Government - to coerce the state by which it shall be infringed. - - By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India. - - T. H. MADDOCK, - Secretary to the Government of India, with - the Governor-General. - -It would have been well if Lord Ellenborough had resisted the puerile -temptation to date this proclamation on the 1st of October. That it -was written then is not to be doubted. But, though written, it was -not issued.[333] The Governor-General was not prepared to issue it. -There was no immediate necessity, indeed, for the preparation of such -a notification as this. It might have been delayed for a few weeks -without injury to the state; whilst, on the other hand, it could not -have been delayed for a few days without great advantage to Lord -Ellenborough. On the 1st of October, the Governor-General knew that the -British ensign was floating over the Balla Hissar of Caubul; but he did -not know that the British prisoners had been released from captivity. -Had he suppressed the inclination to write “_October 1_” at the head -of his proclamation, he might have announced in it the attainment of -all those objects which his countrymen had at heart, and fully declared -that the war was at an end. But there were not wanting those who now -commented bitterly on the fact that this proclamation was drawn up -by the Governor-General of India whilst yet in ignorance of the fate -of the prisoners. The delay of a few days would have placed him in -possession of the intelligence, for which all India was looking with -the deepest interest and anxiety; but the temptation of the “1st of -October” was not to be resisted; and Lord Ellenborough sacrificed his -character for humanity for the sake of a little dramatic effect. - -Having drawn up this proclamation, and handed it over to the -translators to be arrayed in Oriental costume, Lord Ellenborough began -to take counsel with Sir Jasper Nicolls on the subject of the honorary -distinctions to be conferred on the officers and men who had gained -these great victories in Afghanistan; and to draft another proclamation -to be issued to the Chiefs and Princes of India. This was the famous -proclamation of the Gates. On the 5th of October, he sent a rough -draft of it to Sir Jasper Nicolls, inviting the comments of the Chief. -Freely asked, they were freely given. What they were is not on record. -The Governor-General took the comments of the Commander-in-Chief “in -good part,” and was not wholly impervious to the criticism of the -veteran commander.[334] Subjected to a long and laborious incubation, -this address to “all the Princes, chiefs, and people of India,” was -translated into the Persian and Hindee languages, circulated among -those to whom it especially appealed, and finally published in its -English dress on the 16th of November.[335] It was by no means, -therefore, an ebullition of impulse and enthusiasm on the part of the -Governor-General, but the result of many weeks of thought and study, -and, perhaps, much consultation with others. The Duke of Wellington -called it a “Song of triumph.” Thus rose the pæan, in its English dress: - - FROM THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL TO ALL THE PRINCES AND CHIEFS, - AND PEOPLE OF INDIA. - - MY BROTHERS AND MY FRIENDS, - - Our victorious army bears the gates of the temple of Somnauth in - triumph from Afghanistan, and the despoiled tomb of Sultan Mahomed - looks upon the ruins of Ghuznee. - - The insult of eight hundred years is at last avenged. The gates of - the temple of Somnauth, so long the memorial of your humiliation, are - become the proudest record of your national glory the proof of your - superiority in arms over the nations beyond the Indus. - - To you, Princes and Chiefs of Sirhind, of Rajwarra, of Malwa, and of - Guzerat, I shall commit this glorious trophy of successful war. - - You will yourselves, with all honour, transmit the gates of - sandal-wood through your respective territories to the restored temple - of Somnauth. - - The chiefs of Sirhind shall be informed at what time our victorious - army will first deliver the gates of the temple into their - guardianship, at the foot of the bridge of the Sutlej. - - MY BROTHERS AND MY FRIENDS, - - I have ever relied with confidence upon your attachment to the British - Government. You see how worthy it proves itself of your love, when, - regarding your honour as its own, it exerts the power of its arms - to restore to you the gates of the temple of Somnauth, so long the - memorial of your subjection to the Afghans. - - For myself, identified with you in interest and in feeling, I regard - with all your own enthusiasm the high achievements of that heroic - army; reflecting alike immortal honour upon my native and upon my - adopted country. - - To preserve and to improve the happy union of our two countries, - necessary as it is to the welfare of both, is the constant object of - my thoughts. Upon that union depends the security of every ally, as - well as of every subject of the British Government, from the miseries - whereby, in former times, India was afflicted: through that alone has - our army now waved its triumphant standards over the ruins of Ghuznee, - and planted them upon the Balla Hissar of Caubul. - - May that good Providence, which has hitherto so manifestly protected - me, still extend to me its favour, that I may so use the power now - entrusted to my hands, as to advance your prosperity and secure your - happiness, by placing the union of our two countries upon foundations - which may render it eternal. - - ELLENBOROUGH. - -No document that ever emanated from the bureau of a statesman has -been overwhelmed with so much ridicule as this. It is still fresh -in the recollection of men who dwelt in India at this time, how the -authenticity of the proclamation was gravely doubted—how many, at -first, declared their conviction that it was a newspaper satire upon -the Napoleonic style of address which Lord Ellenborough had recently -adopted; and how at last, when it came to be known—thoroughly known -and understood—that it was a genuine emanation from the “Political -Department,” with the right official stamp upon it, such a flood -of ridicule and censure was let loose upon it as had never before -descended upon an Indian state-paper. The folly of the thing was past -all denial. It was a folly, too, of the most senseless kind, for it -was calculated to please none and to offend many. It was addressed to -“all the Princes and Chiefs, and People of India.” The “Brothers and -Friends” thus grandiloquently apostrophised, were a mixed family of -Mahomedans and Hindoos. Upon the Mahomedans it was an open and most -intelligible outrage. To the Hindoos, the pompous offer of the polluted -gates of Somnauth was little better than a covert insult. The temple to -which it was to have been restored was in ruins, and the sacred ground -trodden by Mahomedans. Looking at the effusion from the Oriental side, -it was altogether a failure and an abortion.[336] Among Europeans, -worldly men scouted the proclamation as a folly, and religious men -denounced it as a crime. It was said to be both dangerous and profane. -The question suggested by the latter epithet I do not propose to -discuss; but of the dangers of such a proclamation it may be said that -they existed only in the imaginations of those who discerned them. It -was altogether an event of no political importance. In Afghanistan, -the rape of the Gates created little or no sensation. In India, the -proclamation produced no excitement among the “brothers and friends” to -whom it was addressed. The effect of the measure was personal to Lord -Ellenborough himself. It damaged his reputation, and left the rest of -the world as it was before. - -But there was another proclamation published about this time—launched -into the world, indeed, before the proclamation of the Gates, but of a -somewhat later conception. The Afghan drama was now well-nigh played -out. The Afghan policy of Lord Auckland had been publicly declared -a failure, and the grounds on which it had been originated wholly a -mistake. Everything, indeed, was to be reversed. The Tripartite treaty -was at an end. Shah Soojah was dead. The people of Afghanistan had -felt an obvious distaste for foreign interference, and had evinced it -in a very unmistakeable manner. The Suddozye Princes had demonstrated -the feebleness of the tenure by which they could hope to maintain -possession of the throne. It was impossible wholly to revert to the -state of things that had existed in 1838, for thousands of lives and -millions of money had been buried in the passes of Afghanistan—and -there was no earthly resurrection or restoration for them. But there -was one victim of the war in Afghanistan for whom restoration was -yet possible. The first victim of our national injustice was yet -a prisoner in the hands of the British. The Governor-General had -publicly announced, in his proclamation of the 1st of October, that -Dost Mahomed was only “believed to be hostile to British interests,” -and that Shah Soojah was only “represented” to be friendly to those -interests, and popular with his own people. It was announced, too, in -this proclamation, that the British Government had determined to leave -the Afghans to form a government for themselves, and to recognise -that government when formed. After such announcements as these, the -retention of Dost Mahomed in captivity would have been confessedly -inconsistent and unjust. - -Ever since the intelligence of the outbreak at Caubul had reached the -provinces of Hindostan, Dost Mahomed had been watched with greater -suspicion, and guarded with greater care. It was believed that he would -place himself in communication with the leaders of the revolutionary -party, and would make an effort to escape from the captivity which -embittered his lot. It does not appear, however, that he manifested -any feelings of exultation at the thought of the calamities which -had befallen his captors, or, in any way, desired to increase the -difficulties which surrounded them. On the other hand, he seemed -willing, if not anxious, to impart to the British Government, through -Captain Nicolson, such local information as he thought would be -serviceable to them in the conjuncture which had arisen; and even -offered suggestions tending to facilitate their re-invasion of his -country. The vigilance with which he was guarded, and the consequent -inconveniences to which he was subjected, seemed to cause him much -vexation and annoyance. He always protested that he knew nothing of -the secret history of the Caubul outbreak—that it was his belief the -Suddozyes had instigated it, as no other family in Afghanistan, since -the overthrow of the Barukzyes, had sufficient influence to initiate a -great national movement. Any expression or intimation of a doubt of his -honesty seemed to pain him. “Recollect,” he said, on one occasion to -Captain Nicolson, “that I have, from the first day I came in, been on -your side, heart and soul. I swear by the most holy God, that since my -submission I have not communicated with Caubul and its people, except -through you. But it is possible that news may have reached my sister at -Loodianah through her other brothers. I am your guest or your prisoner, -whichever you please. I came to you in the hope of being in time -employed by you; and I should say what is not true, if I denied still -entertaining that hope; and I am ready to lay down my life in your -service.”[337] It may be doubted whether he entertained any hope, or -any desire to regain the dominion he had lost. He had resigned himself -submissively to his fate. If it seemed to be the will of God that he -should return to Caubul, he was willing to retrace his steps to the -Balla Hissar. But he was little inclined to take into his own hands the -shaping of his future destinies, and to win his way back to empire by -violence or fraud.[338] - -It has been seen that the Government of India, ever since the -disastrous downfall of our efforts to prop up the Suddozye dynasty, -had contemplated the possibility of restoring Dost Mahomed to the -country from which we had expelled him. Lord Auckland had hinted at -the restoration of the ex-Ameer as a measure to which, under certain -circumstances, he would offer no opposition. He would gladly, indeed, -have availed himself of the opportunity afforded, by a proposed -interchange of prisoners, to render tardy justice to the man whom he -had so palpably wronged. The subsequent progress of events had tended -to render more and more obvious the propriety of this resolution. It -was now plainer than ever that the retention of Dost Mahomed as a -prisoner of state could no longer be justified, on the score of either -political rectitude or expediency. So Lord Ellenborough did, as it -became him to do. He issued a proclamation, setting forth that when the -“British army returning from Afghanistan shall have passed the Indus, -all the Afghans now in the power of the British Government shall be -permitted to return to their country.” This was equally reasonable -and just. But the proclamation was not without characteristic -disfigurements, for the Governor-General, who had set his heart upon a -grand pageant at Ferozepore, added a codicil, to the effect that the -released Afghan Princes were to present themselves, before returning -to their desolated country, at the Durbar of the Governor-General in -his camp at Ferozepore. - -The popular feeling against this contemplated outrage was strong and -universal. There was not a generous mind in the country which did -not feel deeply the wrong that was to be done to these unfortunate -Princes. But the Governor-General, in a better hour, conscious of -error, consented to forego the pitiful delight of gracing his triumph -with the presence of a dethroned monarch, whose national feelings were -not so wholly extinguished by exile as to render his appearance at the -Ferozepore festivities anything but a painful and humiliating trial. -The order issued in thoughtlessness was revoked in good feeling; and -Dost Mahomed, without suffering this last crowning injury at the hands -of the British Government, returned to Afghanistan, with hopes and -expectations falling far short of the long years of restored dominion, -which actually lay before him. - -Quitting Simlah, the Governor-General moved down to the plains of -Ferozepore. There an army, under the personal command of Sir Jasper -Nicolls, was now assembled. It had been originally projected by Lord -Auckland, at a time when it was believed that the presence of such an -army on our north-western frontier would have a great moral effect -upon the neighbouring states. It has been said, that when it did -assemble, at the commencement of the cold season of 1842-1843, it -was intended to answer no other purpose than that of a vast pageant; -that the Governor-General had determined on celebrating the return -of the victorious armies with all possible pomp; and that he looked -forward, with childish delight and anxiety, to the magnificent _fête -champêtre_ of which he had appointed himself director-in-chief. It -must be admitted that Lord Ellenborough took a somewhat undignified -interest in the details of these puerilities; but the justice of the -assertion, that the army was kept together for no other purpose than -that of presenting arms to the “Illustrious Garrison” of Jellalabad, -and turning out for a grand field-day, may be reasonably disputed. The -fidelity of the Sikhs had long been suspected. It was now considered by -no means an impossible event, that the march of our army, worn, sick, -and incumbered, through the Punjab, would offer a temptation too strong -to be resisted by the mutinous Sikh soldiery, whose real feeling had -betrayed itself early in the year at Peshawur. Had the Governor-General -felt secure in the reality of the formal alliance with the Punjab, he -might have dispersed the Army of Reserve when the Afghanistan force -crossed the Attock. Such expositions of the military resources of a -great nation are never wholly without profit in such troubled times; -and as doubts, and not unreasonable doubts, of Sikh fidelity had -arisen, it was sound policy to keep a force on the frontier until the -returning troops had actually crossed the Sutlej. - -On the 9th of December the Governor-General arrived at Ferozepore. -The Army of Reserve was drawn out to receive him. A noble sight, it -must have stirred the heart of one who loved to express his regret -that circumstances had not made him a soldier. There was much work -to be done; and he flung himself into it with characteristic energy, -resolute to give the returning warriors an honourable reception, and to -dazzle the eyes of all the native potentates who could be lured to the -scene of triumph. Four years before there had been a grand gathering -at the same place, when Runjeet Sing and Lord Auckland had exchanged -courtesies, and the army of the Indus had commenced its march for the -invasion of the Douranee Empire. The war in Afghanistan had opened with -a grand spectacle at Ferozepore; and now, with due dramatic propriety, -it was to close with a similar effect. The Maharajah of the Punjab, -with his ministers of state and his principal military chiefs, were -invited to grace the festival.[339] The Princes of Sirhind, and other -“brothers and friends,” were asked to take part in the rejoicings. And -everywhere from the neighbouring stations, under lordly encouragement, -flocked our English ladies to Ferozepore—the wives and daughters -of the returning warriors and of the officers there assembled—and -everywhere was a flutter of excitement, such as had not been known in -those regions for years. - -Day after day, as Lord Ellenborough busied himself with his -preparations for the reception of the victorious Generals, tidings -reached him from their camps. There was nothing in this intelligence to -dim the pleasure which was animating his Lordship’s breast. Pollock had -brought back his army with little loss through the formidable passes -of Afghanistan, and was now making an uninterrupted march through the -Punjab. The withdrawal of the force had been looked forward to with -some anxiety by many, who believed that the tribes would harass the -rear of the retiring army, and work them grievous annoyance. But so -completely had the strength of the Afghans been broken by continual -defeat, that they made no energetic or combined effort to annoy the -British columns on their line of march. Pollock wrote that he had not -seen an enemy; but M’Caskill and Nott, who followed with the centre -and the rear divisions, were not quite so fortunate. From Caubul to -Jellalabad, however, there was little to contend against, except some -desultory night attacks on our baggage.[340] There was, indeed, no -organised resistance. - -The entire force assembled at Jellalabad; and halted there for a few -days. Pollock had determined to destroy the defences of the place. When -the British army was halting at Peshawur in the spring, the question -of the transfer of Jellalabad to the Sikhs, as a _douceur_ to ensure -cordiality of co-operation with us, had been earnestly discussed, -but at that time the project had fallen to the ground. It was felt, -that so long as Shah Soojah survived, and the Tripartite treaty had -not been annulled, any design to dissever the Douranee Empire, and to -invite the Sikhs to share in the partition, would be premature, both -as regarded the justice and the expediency of the measure. But the -death of Shah Soojah gave a new aspect to the state of affairs; and -the British Government lost little time, after authentic intelligence -of that event had been received, in communicating to Mr. Clerk its -willingness that certain territories on the right bank of the Indus -should pass into the possession of the Sikh Government or of the Jummoo -Rajahs, with the permission of the Lahore Durbar; and it was intimated -that the British Government would facilitate the accomplishment of -this object by placing Jellalabad in the hands of the Sikhs. The offer -was formally made; but, in the then uncertain position of affairs, -prudently declined. It was not unreasonably urged by the Durbar, that -until they were in possession of the ultimate intentions of the British -with respect to Afghanistan, it would be hardly politic in the Sikhs -to place themselves in a prominent position, or in any way to identify -themselves with measures the future out-turn of which they could as -yet but dimly foresee. But it was believed, that as soon as ever our -withdrawal from Afghanistan was fully determined upon, and about to -be put in execution, the Sikhs, without further explanation, would -be willing to take possession of Jellalabad. And they were so; but -not having fully made up their minds upon the subject (probably from -some mistrust of our intentions) until the British force had actually -marched from Caubul, their acceptance of the offer came too late to -save the place from destruction. General Pollock had, in accordance -with instructions, destroyed the fortifications of Jellalabad before he -received a communication from the Government, intended, if possible, -to arrest such proceeding, and ordering him to make over the place -uninjured to our allies. It may be doubted whether either party very -much regretted the accident. - -Having destroyed the defences of Jellalabad, Pollock pushed on to -Peshawur. The Khybur Pass had now to be traversed again. The Afreedi -Maliks offered to sell us a free passage; but Mackeson answered that -Pollock would take one. The first division, under the General himself, -who effectively crowned the heights as he advanced, passed through -with only the loss of two or three privates. M’Caskill was not equally -successful. He had not taken the same precautions, and the Khyburees -came down upon the rear-guard, under their old enemy, Brigadier Wild. -Favoured by the darkness of night, they rushed among our people, and -threw them into confusion. Two of our officers were killed,[341] and -two of our guns were abandoned. But the chief object of the Khyburees -seems to have been plunder. They made no effort to carry off the -guns.[342] - -Altogether, the return march of the British troops was singularly -peaceful and uneventful. If the same precautions to crown the heights -along the line of march, as were systematically taken by Pollock, -had been taken by M’Caskill and Nott, it may be doubted whether we -should even have heard of the appearance of an enemy. The Afghans -are famous plunderers, and they are habitually armed. When they saw -their opportunity, they came down upon our baggage-laden columns, and -molested us as best they could. But there was nothing like organised -resistance.[343] - -The fortress of Ali-Musjid was destroyed, and the army then pushed on -to Peshawur. Having partaken of Avitabile’s magnificent hospitality, -the victorious Generals commenced their march through the Punjab. It -was an uneventful, but a melancholy one. Sickness broke out in the -returning army. There had always been a scarcity of carriage-cattle, -and now the number of sick made it more severely felt. But all the -inconveniences of the march were from within. The Sikhs wrought us no -annoyance. - -Whilst such were the tidings from the returning army which reached the -Governor-General in the midst of his preparations, there came from -Afghanistan intelligence of a more dubious and, at the same time, a -less interesting character. Lord Ellenborough had left the Afghans to -suffer the punishment due to their crimes; and it little mattered to -him whether one party or another were dominant at Caubul. But the news -which now reached him from the Afghan capital all went to show that the -Suddozye Princes were utterly destitute of power and influence; and -that the new government had not the means of supporting the youthful -puppet upon the throne. The Wuzeer had sought to re-establish the -supremacy of the Douranees, had hedged in the new King with Douranee -influences, and by his exclusiveness given general offence. The -downfall of the Suddozye Prince followed rapidly upon this.[344] Akbar -Khan had been biding his time about the regions of the Hindoo-Koosh. -He was in no hurry to return to Caubul. It was more prudent to leave -the dissensions which were certain to arise at the capital to work out -their own debilitating effects upon those in power, and pave the way -for his triumphant return to the capital. - -And so, after a time, there came into Ferozepore tidings, forwarded -from Pollock’s camp, to the effect that the Suddozye prince, Shahpoor, -had been expelled from the Balla Hissar, and had fled for safety to -Peshawur. The poor boy had narrowly escaped with his life. Akbar -Khan had made a descent upon Caubul, and carried everything before -him. The Newab Zemaun Khan, it was said, had been made Governor of -Jellalabad, Shumshoodeen of Ghuznee, Sultan Jan of Candahar; and in the -meanwhile Dost Mahomed was making his way through the Punjab to his old -principality. “Everything,” it was added, with bitter significance, “is -reverting to the old state of things—as it was before we entered the -country.” - -And now the heart of the Governor-General began to beat with -expectation of the immediate arrival of the victorious armies. -Everything was ready for their reception. The army of reserve was -spread out over the great plain of Ferozepore. Triumphal arches had -been erected. A temporary bridge had been thrown across the Sutlej. -The elephants, no insignificant portion of the coming spectacle, had -been gorgeously painted and decorated, and tricked out in their gayest -trappings and caparisons; and as much of tinsel, and bamboo-work, and -coloured cloth, as could give effect to the triumph, had been expended -to grace the occasion. On the 17th of December, Sir Robert Sale crossed -the Sutlej at the head of that gallant body of troops which had -composed the garrison of Jellalabad. The Governor-General went forth to -meet them. A street of two hundred and fifty elephants, more or less -caparisoned, had been formed, and through this marched the heroes of -Jellalabad—the 13th Light Infantry, Sale’s own regiment, at the head -of the column; but although the docile animals had been instructed to -make a simultaneous salaam at a given signal, and to snort out a note -of welcome from their huge trunks, they resolutely refused to make an -obeisance, and were obstinately silent as the Illustrious Garrison -filed between the huge walls of caparisoned flesh. The morning was dull -and lowering—not a gleam of sunshine lighted up the festive scene; but -there were sunny hearts and bright faces; and as the horse-artillery -guns boomed forth their welcome, and the band of the Lancers struck -up the ever-animating “Conquering Hero” tune, and each regiment -in succession, as the column passed on, saluted their long-absent -comrades, the heart must have been a dull one that did not acknowledge -that there is something of a bright side even to the picture of war. - -On the 19th, General Pollock crossed the Sutlej; and on the 23rd, -General Nott arrived, bringing with him the gates of Somnauth.[345] -Then there was feasting and festivity in the gigantic tents, hung with -silken flags, on which, in polyglot emblazonments, were the names of -the actions that had been fought; many complimentary effusions, in -the shape of after-dinner harangues;[346] and in the mornings, grand -field-days, more or less, according to the “skyey influences.” The -year—a most eventful one—was closed with a grand military display. -The plain was covered with British and Sikh troops, and in the presence -of Pertaub Singh, the heir apparent of Lahore; Dhyan Singh, the -minister; the Governor-General, the Commander-in-Chief, and others of -less note, some forty thousand men, with a hundred guns, were manœuvred -on the great plain. On this grand tableau the curtain fell; and the -year opportunely closed in gaiety and glitter—in prosperity and parade. - -The Sepoy regiments having been feasted with their “favourite -_mehtoys_” (sweetmeats), and the important event announced in a -Government notification, the army of reserve was broken up;[347] -but not before the Governor-General, moved by that characteristic -admiration of gallantry, which earned for him in India the title of the -“Friend of the Army,” had done all that lay in his power to reward the -troops who had achieved such brilliant successes. The honours which he -could not bestow he solicited from the Crown, on behalf of the brave -men who had so fairly earned them; and the distribution of honorary -distinctions which ensued gave almost universal satisfaction, It erred -rather on the side of liberality; and, perhaps, there are some old -soldiers, in the scantily-decorated Queen’s army, who think that during -the last few years, honours have been bestowed so profusely as to lower -their real value, by showing how easily they are to be earned. But it -is better to err on the side of liberality than of chariness—better -even that the unworthy should be decorated, than that the worthy should -pine in vain for distinction.[348] - -But there was still something more to be done. The prisoners, towards -whom the flood of sympathy had been setting in so strongly for many -months, and whom the English in India now welcomed back with cordiality -and delight, were not to be suffered all at once to sink into privacy -and obscurity. Some of them were to be tried by courts-martial, or to -be summoned before courts of inquiry, for abandoning their posts, going -over to the enemy, or otherwise disgracing themselves. The courts sate, -but they could not pronounce the officers arraigned before them guilty -of any offence. Brigadier Shelton was acquitted. Colonel Palmer,[349] -Captains Anderson, Boyd, Troup, and Waller, and Lieutenant Eyre, were -honourably acquitted; and the court of inquiry, over which Mr. Clerk -presided, must have risen from its investigation into the conduct of -Major Pottinger with increased respect for the high soldierly qualities -of the young officer who had beaten back the Persians at Herat, and -protested against the capitulation of Caubul in the teeth of all the -veterans of the force. - -On the 20th of January, 1843, Dost Mahomed arrived at Lahore, on his -way to the frontier of Afghanistan, and was honourably received by -the Sikh Durbar. The Suddozye Princes and their families, to whose -reception in the British provinces Lord Ellenborough had evinced an -insuperable repugnance, found an asylum in the Sikh dominions;[350] -and British connection with Afghanistan was now fairly at an end. - -Little more remains to be said. The proclamations which were issued -by the Supreme Government of India in the autumn of 1842, are in -themselves the best commentaries on the war in Afghanistan. The -Governor-General of 1842 passed sentence of condemnation upon the -measures of the Governor-General of 1838. No failure so total and -overwhelming as this is recorded in the page of history. No lesson so -grand and impressive is to be found in all the annals of the world. Of -the secondary causes which contributed to the utter prostration of an -unholy policy, much, at different times, has been written in the course -of this narrative; much more might now be written, in conclusion, -of the mighty political and military errors which were baptised in -the blood and tears of our unhappy countrymen. These errors are so -patent—are so intelligible—they have been so often laid bare by the -hand of the anatomist—and they have been so copiously illustrated in -these volumes, that I do not now purpose to enlarge upon them before I -lay down my pen. But if none of these causes had been in operation to -defeat and frustrate our policy, it must still have broken down under -the ruinous expenditure of public money which the armed occupation of -Afghanistan entailed upon the Government of India. It is upon record, -that this calamitous war cost the natives of India, whose stewards we -are, some fifteen millions of money. All this enormous burden fell -upon the revenues of India, and the country for long years afterwards -groaned under the weight. The bitter injustice of this need hardly be -insisted upon. The Afghan war was neither initiated by the East India -Company, nor at any stage approved of by that great body. The ministers -of the crown were responsible for the invasion of Afghanistan, but the -revenues of the East India Company, in spite of a feeble effort to -shift a part of the burden on to the British Exchequer, were condemned -to bear the expense. It was adroitly designed, indeed, from the -beginning, that the Company should bear the charges of the expedition. - -And what was gained by the war? What are the advantages to be summed -up on the other side of the account? The expedition across the Indus -was undertaken with the object of erecting in Afghanistan a barrier -against encroachment from the West. The advance of the British army was -designed to check the aggressions of Persia on the Afghan frontier, -and to baffle Russian intrigues, by the substitution of a friendly -for an unfriendly power in the countries beyond the Indus. After an -enormous waste of blood and treasure, we left every town and village of -Afghanistan bristling with our enemies. Before the British army crossed -the Indus, the English name had been honoured in Afghanistan. Some dim -traditions of the splendour of Mr. Elphinstone’s mission had been all -that the Afghans associated with their thoughts of the English nation; -but, in their place, we left galling memories of the progress of a -desolating army. The Afghans are an unforgiving race; and everywhere, -from Candahar to Caubul, and from Caubul to Peshawur, were traces of -the injuries we had inflicted upon the tribes. There was scarcely a -family in the country which had not the blood of kindred to revenge -upon the accursed Feringhees. The door of reconciliation seemed to be -closed against us; and if the hostility of the Afghans be an element of -weakness, it seemed certain that we must have contrived to secure it. - -It has been said that the tendency of all these great movements -in Central Asia has been to diminish the mutual jealousies and -apprehensions of the British and the Muscovite powers, by revealing, -in all their true proportions, the tremendous quicksands which lie -waiting to engulph our armies in the inhospitable countries between -the borders of the Russian and the Indian Empires. But although both -states have learnt—the one from her Afghan, the other from her Khivan -expedition—terrible lessons not to be forgotten, it may still be -questioned whether the Cossack and the Sepoy are further apart than -they were. The “Macadamisation” of Sindh and the Punjab has given -England a forward position, which, advantageous as it is in itself, -may have stimulated Russia to increased activity, whilst our awful -disasters in Afghanistan have encouraged anew the aggressions of the -Persian, and the intrigues of his Muscovite ally, by revealing the -sources of our disinclination to entangle our armies again in its -perilous defiles. - -It needed but the announcement of the arrival of a Persian army at -Herat, and the establishment of Persian dominion in the province, to -consummate the completeness of the failure. After a lapse of twenty -years from the date of the first siege of Herat, we found that the very -event which had stimulated our English statesmen to decree the invasion -of Afghanistan, had actually come to pass. The Shah of Persia had -conquered Herat, and his viceroy held the key of the “Gate of India” -in his hand. It was still believed to be essential to the security of -our Indian empire either to maintain the integrity of Herat, as an -independent principality, or to attach it to the territories of the _de -facto_ ruler of Afghanistan. Dost Mahomed was still that ruler. For -some time after his restoration, he had been the enemy of the British -Government; but, as years passed, and the memory of his humiliation -grew fainter and fainter, he had come to recognise the wisdom of an -alliance with his opponents; and, in 1852, a treaty of general alliance -between the two states was concluded at Herat, by Hyder Khan and John -Lawrence. When, therefore, in 1856, the usurpations of the Shah of -Persia again roused England to a sense of the necessity of “doing -something” to wrest Herat from his grasp, she found in the Caubul -Ameer a willing, because an interested, ally. The very policy which -ought to have been pursued in 1837—the policy which was recommended -by Sir John M’Neill—is that which then presented itself, but under -what altered circumstances, for our adoption. If, instead of expelling -Dost Mahomed from his principality, we had advanced him a little money -to raise, and lent him a few officers to drill, an army, the Persians -would not, twenty years afterwards, have been lining the walls of -Herat. When the old difficulty, therefore, presented itself with a new -face in 1856, England adopted, in a modified form this once-rejected -policy. She supplied money and arms to Dost Mahomed, to enable him to -resist the tide of Kujjur invasion. Because Persia was aggressive on -one side of the Afghan frontier, she meditated no aggressions on the -other. She did not make war upon the ruler of Afghanistan, in revenge -for hostile intrigues at the Persian capital, and hostile movements in -the Persian camp. But when Persia offended her she struck promptly at -Persia. The demonstration was successful. Under a treaty, signed at -Paris by the English and Persian ambassadors, Herat was evacuated, and -all claims to sovereignty yielded by the Shah; and, whatever may be its -results,—whatever may be the verdict of history upon the policy of the -Persian War of 1856-1857, it will at least be recorded, that it had -not, like the war which I have endeavoured to chronicle, the foul stain -of injustice upon it. - -Whether, as many now contend, a later and more terrible disaster owes -primarily its origin to our humiliating expulsion from Afghanistan, -it is not my duty to inquire. The calamity of 1842 was retribution -sufficient, without any conjectural additions, to stamp in indelible -characters upon the page of history, the great truth that the policy -which was pursued in Afghanistan was unjust, and that, therefore, -it was signally disastrous. It was, in principle and in act, an -unrighteous usurpation, and the curse of God was on it from the first. -Our successes at the outset were a part of the curse. They lapped us -in false security, and deluded us to our overthrow. This is the great -lesson to be learnt from the contemplation of all the circumstances of -the Afghan War—“The Lord God of recompenses shall surely requite.” - - - - -APPENDIX. - -NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. - - -THE COMMAND OF THE CAUBUL ARMY.—WILLIAMS, LUMLEY, AND POLLOCK. - -[_Book VII., chapter 1, pages 19, 20._] - -On the 20th of November the Commander-in-Chief wrote to Lord Auckland: -“I purpose that H.M.’s 9th should proceed with the second army. This -corps is 900 and upwards strong, including serjeants and drummers. -The Buffs are somewhat nearer, but they have been nineteen and a-half -years out of England, and should be moved towards Calcutta for early -embarkation, especially as the 49th and 55th are so far out of reach. -The Buffs have now nearly 200 men in hospital. The right to join, which -the Court’s order gives to Major-General Sir Edmund Williams, may be -especially dispensed with by your Lordship, should you not choose to -give him the command. Sir Edmund is in very good health, a hale, strong -man—moreover, was Lieutenant-Colonel of a Light Infantry battalion of -Portuguese in the Peninsular war.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] - -On the 15th of December, Sir Jasper Nicolls wrote to Lord Auckland: -“I very much regret that the state of Major-General Lumley’s health -entirely forbids the hope of his being able to undertake the command of -the troops advancing to Peshawur. If, therefore, the force is raised -to six regiments, I shall order the Major-General Sir Edmund Williams -to join my camp by dawk, and push him forward, as soon as I shall have -furnished him with instructions, and armed him with all the information -and advice which the known state of affairs at his departure may seem -to require.”—[_Papers relating to Military Operations in Afghanistan._] - -“In your Lordship’s letter of the 8th, you have, I think, given -a preference to General Nott, wherefore Sir E. Williams need not -be disturbed. To send him to Cawnpore merely to force his way to -Jellalabad and Caubul, and then return, giving over the command to a -junior officer, would, I think, be unfair. As to his holding the chief -command, it is a matter of no moment to me. The officer to command, -if your Lordship could find such a man, should be also the Envoy—a -Malcolm, Close, or Ochterlony.”—[_Sir Jasper Nicolls to Lord Auckland: -December 19, 1841. MS. Correspondence._] “Twice I laid before the -Governor-General the name of Major-General Sir Edmund Williams, and -as a Light Infantry officer he was deemed most qualified to meet an -enemy in a mountainous country; he was active, zealous, and in perfect -health. In the command of a division he had shown a clear judgment, and -given me satisfaction.... The Governor-General gave such an unwilling -and discouraging reply to my second communication, that I clearly -saw the whole onus of the appointment and its consequences would be -mine.”—[_Sir J. Nicolls to Lord Fitzroy Somerset: September 2, 1842. -MS. Correspondence._] - -“In obedience to your Lordship’s wishes, that Major-General Lumley -should be placed in command of the force assembling at Peshawur, I -requested his attendance at my tent, and placed the despatch now -acknowledged (_Governor-General in Council to Sir J. Nicolls: December -15, 1841_) in his hands. The general is still very weak, though -improved in health; he is willing to proceed, but requested that his -medical adviser should be consulted as to his ability to undertake -such a service. Assistant-Surgeon Turner decidedly assured me that his -state of health would by no means admit of the required exertion and -exposure.”—[_Sir J. Nicolls to Government: December 24, 1841. Papers -relating to Military Operations in Afghanistan._] - - -LORD AUCKLAND AND THE RETRIEVAL QUESTION. - -[_Book VII., chapter 1, page 27._] - -Lord Auckland’s private letters to the Commander-in-Chief exhibit -better than anything else the alternations in the Governor-General’s -opinions. On the 3rd of January he wrote: “It is melancholy to think -how mighty interests may be compromised by such errors as seem to have -been committed. Our officers are very wild in their requisitions. We -have given all that we can prudently give—perhaps even more; and the -chance of operations must be measured by those means.”—On the 5th of -January, after describing the tidings from Caubul as “inexplicable -as they are appalling,” and declaring that he “was prepared for -everything but for such misdirection and misconduct as seem to have -taken place,” he proceeded to say, “I can make no further suggestions -to you until I know more; but you may shortly have to consider what -instructions should be given to General Sale, and as to whether it may -not be better that he should fight down, than that Brigadier Wild or -General Pollock should fight up, the pass. This must greatly depend on -the manner in which matters may end at Caubul.”—On the 21st of the -same month he wrote, that he “still adhered to his opinion, that it -would be madness with such force and means of carriage, as we could -easily collect, to attempt a fresh advance upon Caubul; and that such -a movement would only have been justified, if we had been led to it -by objects of rescue. It would be my wish, if it could be done with -safety, that Jellalabad should be retained for some weeks, and until -the fate of the British troops in other parts of Afghanistan should be -ascertained.”—On the 26th he wrote: “I agree with you that, at least -so long at the fate of the force at Caubul is uncertain, the post as -Jellalabad must be maintained. I think it will be absolutely necessary, -under any circumstances, to maintain for a time a strong force at -Peshawur—also at Quettah and Sukkur. If our retirement carry with it a -general appearance of defeat and of flight, it will bring on Peshawur -and the Punjab—on Beloochistan and Sindh—a tide of aggression and -disaster which it may be difficult to stem, and against the chance of -which we must endeavour to guard.”—On the 28th, growing still more -convinced of the expediency of doing something for the recovery of our -lost honour, he wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, speaking first with -reference to the refusal of Sale and Macgregor to evacuate Jellalabad: -“We approve of the determination taken at Jellalabad not to withdraw -the troops as directed. Far from withdrawal, under such circumstances, -I am anxious to learn that Brigadier Wild has found it safe to advance -to Jellalabad.... Whatever happens beyond the passes, we should be -strong for a time in Peshawur.... For the present, at least, Jellalabad -should be firmly held;—General Elphinstone was not in a condition to -make stipulations, except for his own troops at Caubul.”—On the 3rd -of February he expressed his opinion that Jellalabad should be held -so long as there was a chance of assisting the escape of fugitives: -“I apprehend,” he added, “that its evacuation will, in a very short -time, become absolutely necessary; if so, the movement should not be -long delayed.” He expressed a doubt, too, whether, with the “force -that we can employ, the pass (Khybur) can be so occupied as to secure -through it a safe passage of detachments and convoys. A descent through -the Jugdulluck passes to Caubul is beyond our present power. It would -require vast exertions and months of preparation, and in the end -would be an enterprise of no light danger. I almost conceive that it -would be an impossible enterprise with any means that we could bring -to bear upon it, unless some party should separate from the present -combination, and then with what confidence should we render it? I have -therefore, in dissent from many for whom I have the highest respect, -earnestly wished that the force at Jellalabad could be safely and -creditably withdrawn to Peshawur.... I would not have it hastily retire -beyond Peshawur, or any healthy spot near it.... The post should be as -forward as it safely can be; and my successor could then pursue the -line of policy which he may think best. I would not have the government -inextricably pledged to measures which my successor may regard as rash, -impolitic, and ruinous.” But he soon came to modify these opinions -in favour of a forward position; and later on the same day wrote that -the disaffection of the Sikhs might cause him to alter his views with -regard to Peshawur: “I am coming fast to the opinion,” he said, “that -our furthest point of support in advance must be Ferozepore, and that -we must bear the disgrace and disadvantage of retiring to this frontier -with as little of loss as may now be ensured.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] - - -THE JANUARY PROCLAMATION. - -[_Book VII., chapter 1, page 27._] - - “Fort William, Jan. 31, 1842. - - “Intelligence having been received which leaves no room to doubt - that, after the British force at Caubul had maintained its position - against overpowering numbers of insurgents for more than six weeks, - the officer commanding had judged it necessary, in consequence of a - failure of provisions, to agree to a convention of the enemy, and - to retire, in reliance on the faith of that convention, towards - Jellalabad, when the troops, exposed to the worst rigours of cold - and privation, in the mountain defiles, and harassed by treacherous - attacks, suffered extreme disasters—the Governor-General in Council - deems it proper to notify that the most active measures have been - adopted, and will be steadfastly prosecuted, for expediting powerful - reinforcements to the Afghan frontier, and for assisting such - operations as may be required in that quarter, for the maintenance of - the honour and interests of the British Government. - - “The ample military means at the disposal of the British Government - will be strenuously applied to these objects, so as at once to support - external operations, and to cause efficient protection for its - subjects and allies. - - “A faithless enemy, stained by the foul crime of assassination, has, - through a failure of supplies, followed by consummate treachery, been - able to overcome a body of British troops, in a country removed, by - distance and difficulties of season, from the possibility of succour. - But the Governor-General in Council, while he most deeply laments - the loss of the brave officers and men, regards this partial reverse - only as a new occasion for displaying the stability and vigour - of the British power, and the admirable spirit and valour of the - British-Indian army. - - “By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in - Council, - - “T. H. Maddock.” - - -THE APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL POLLOCK. - - [_Book VII., chapter 2, page 45._] - - SIR JASPER NICOLLS TO LORD HILL. - - MY LORD, - - I have the honour to acknowledge your Lordship’s letter of the 13th - of June, calling upon me for an explanation of the appeal made to the - General Commanding in Chief, by Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, in - consequence of his not being permitted to accompany the regiment of - which he is senior Colonel, on service beyond the Indus—I beg you will - apprise his Lordship, that, in addition to the rule quoted by Sir J. - Thackwell, the special appointment of Major-General Pollock prohibited - his employment in Afghanistan. - - I shall explain the circumstances of that appointment. - - In December, 1841, the Governor-General of India in Council instructed - me to place Major-General Lumley, of the Company’s army, in command of - the reinforcements which passed through the Punjab in January last; - and, in addition to the command of the whole force in Afghanistan, - it was his Lordship’s intention to place in his hands the political - control also. - - Major-General Lumley’s health was such as to preclude all hope, or - even desire, that he should undertake so great a charge, and it - became necessary that I should propose another officer for this - important duty. Twice I laid before the Governor-General the name of - Major-General Sir Edmund Williams; and as a Light Infantry officer - he seemed most qualified to meet an enemy in a mountainous country: - he was active, zealous, and in perfect health. In the command of a - division he had shown a clear judgment, and given me satisfaction. - - I need not inform Lord Hill that the management of the native army, - or of small portions of it, is a matter, at times, of delicacy - and difficulty. It will not do to distrust or disparage it, as - Colonel Monson did. The Governor-General gave such an unwilling and - discouraging reply to my second communication, that I clearly saw - the whole onus of the appointment and of its consequences would be - mine. This I would not undertake, and Major-General Pollock being - near at hand, and honoured by Lord Auckland’s confidence (as I know), - I ordered him by dawk to join the 9th Foot and other corps. This - done, Government was pleased to confer upon him the political powers - intended for Major-General Lumley; without which Sir Edmund Williams - would have had to act, not from himself, but according to requisitions - made by the local political authorities—viz., Brevet-Captains - Mackeson and M’Gregor. Upon the more abstract question of the - Lieutenant-Colonelcy, it must be remarked that Sir Edmund Williams - held that rank in the 9th Foot, which gave _him_ no claim to go to - Afghanistan, though some officious friend has since asserted it. - - I had soon occasion to rejoice that Sir Edmund was not appointed to - the command on my sole responsibility, for the four sepoy corps first - sent, under Brigadier Wild, having been most sadly mismanaged (_at - the instance of the political authorities, against my instructions - and earnest caution_), when Major-General Pollock arrived at Peshawur - he found 1800 men of the four regiments in hospital; the sepoys - declaring that they would not advance again through the Khybur Pass; - the Sikh troops spreading alarm, and in all ways encouraging and - screening their desertion, which was considerable. It was well that - a cautious, cool officer of the Company’s army should have to deal - with them in such a temper, 363 miles from our frontier. General - Pollock managed them exceedingly well, but he did not venture to - enter the pass till April (two months and a-half after Brigadier - Wild’s failure), when reinforced by the 3rd Dragoons, a regiment of - cavalry, a troop of horse artillery, and other details. Lord Hill will - at once perceive that the _morale_ must have been low when _horse - artillery and cavalry_ were required to induce the General to advance, - with confidence, through this formidable pass. Any precipitancy - on the part of a general officer panting for fame might have had - the worst effect. I must now return to Sir J. Thackwell’s appeal. - The General Order, quoted very ingenuously by the Major-General, - contains a full and complete reply to his complaint. He was senior - to Major-General Pollock, and his proceeding with the 3rd Dragoons - would have interfered with a divisional command. He certainly did - offer to serve under that officer, but I could not recommend the - government to suffer him to do so, all such arrangements being in my - opinion most faulty in principle, and, depending chiefly on good - temper, dangerous. I have since called up Sir Joseph Thackwell to my - head-quarters, in order to command the cavalry, had it been necessary - (as seemed possible) last winter to collect an army. The Major-General - is in error when he states that I intended him to command an army of - observation on the Sutlej: that post I retained for myself, aided - by Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Arbuthnot. In November next it is - proposed to collect an army of reserve in this vicinity, and Sir J. - Thackwell will have the command of the cavalry. I cannot have the - smallest objection to the Major-General’s bringing himself to Lord - Hill’s notice as he has done, except the infraction of a rule in doing - so direct. But if he had remembered that he commanded the cavalry of - Lord Keane’s army; had been twice named by me for similar duty; has - long been a Brigadier commanding a division or station; he would have - found little cause to complain of ill-fortune or neglect. I have known - many of Her Majesty’s officers, Colonels and old Lieutenant-Colonels, - to reside ten to fifteen years in India without having had any such - opportunities of service and distinction, and, further, to command - divisions without receiving the smallest remuneration. - - I have the honour, &c. - - (Signed) J. NICOLLS. - - P.S.—I am happy to say that the Governor-General has displaced all the - minor political agents in Afghanistan but one, and entrusted the power - to the Generals Pollock and Nott. - - J. N. - - Simlah, _2nd Sept., 1842_. - - [_MS. Records._] - - -SALE’S FRENCH AND ENGLISH LETTERS. - -[_Book VII., chapter 2, pages 51, 52._] - - Jellalabad, Feb. 14th, 1842. - - MY DEAR GENERAL, - - Captain Macgregor’s cossids yesterday brought me the information of - your arrival at Peshawur, and of full military and political powers - in Afghanistan being vested in you. I lose no time in sending such - a view of the state of this garrison as may enable you to form your - own opinion on the necessity of moving to its relief. Nous avons des - provisionnemens pour les soldats Britanniques pour soixante-dix - jours, pour les Sipahis et les autres natifs demi-provisionnemens pour - le même temps, et pour les chevaux de la cavalerie et l’artillerie - de large pour vingt-cinq jours. Autant que nous pouvons renvoyer nos - parties pour la fourrage, nous ne manquerons cela pour la cavalerie, - mais nous serons entièrement privé de cette ressource après le premier - jour d’investissement. A présent nous n’avons de fourrage que pour - trente jours pour tous les animaux. Les chevaux d’artillerie et les - yaboos des sapeurs sont de ce pays et mangent seulement boozeut - kurlise. Nous manquons beaucoup aussi des munitions de guerre, plomb, - &c. - - When our animals can no longer be sustained by corn or forage only, - we must of course destroy them. The hospitals are ill supplied with - medicines, and much sickness may be apprehended when the weather grows - hot. At present the health of the garrison is excellent. We have no - prospect of adding to our resources above detailed even if we had - money, which we have not. The country possesses abundance of supplies, - of which the presence of a force would give us command. - - Mahomed Akbar is at Cherbyl, in the Lughman district, and threatens - an attack; and we may, in about fifteen days, though I think not - sooner, be invested by a large force from Caubul, with a considerable - artillery. - - Believe me to be, my dear General, - Yours very truly, - RT. SALE, M.-G. - - P.S.—I shall view la perte of my cavalry, should such occur, with - much sorrow, as from their successes against the enemy they have - acquired a confidence in themselves, and contempt for their enemies, - which feeling is equally participated in by the rest of the troops. - As I cannot now get an opportunity to send you a return, I give a - memorandum:—Cavalry, effective, deux cents quarante-un; malade, - vingt-un. Artillerie, effective, un cent soixante-onze; malade, - quarante-onze. Sapeurs, effective, trois cents quatre; malade, - quarante-cinq. Infanterie Britannique, effective, sept cents dix-neuf; - malade, trente. Sipahis, effective, huit cents trente-huit; malade, - quarante-huit. - - _February 16._—Hier Mahomed Akbar a passe la rivière, et a pris - position sur ce côté près de dix milles de cette ville. On dit qu’il a - des soldats de tous armes et quatre pièces de canon. On peut voir son - camp d’ici. - - R. SALE. - - _February 16._—I have received this morning yours of the 9th instant. - S’ils n’envoyent pas des canons de siège de Caubul, _peut-être_ je - puis maintenir ma position dans cette ville pour le temps que vous - avez écrit; mais si une force avec les pièces (que nous avons perdu) - arriveront ici, ce sera impossible, et avant cette époque nos chevaux - moureront de faim. Il sera bien difficile et incertain de vous donner - avis de mon intention de retirer, parce qu’à ce moment Mahomed Akbar - est près avec une force de deux milles hommes (qui s’augmente jour par - jour), et à présent ses patrouilles et videttes parcourent tout le - pays. - - RT. SALE, M.-G. - - -THE EARTHQUAKE AT JELLALABAD. - -[_Book VII., chapter 3, page 67._] - -Sale and Macgregor were both writing to Pollock when this event -occurred. I subjoin their letters:— - - Jellalabad, February 19th, 1842. - MY DEAR GENERAL, - - * * * A l’égard à mon pouvoir de maintenir ma position ici, j’ai - déjà vous donné avis de tous mes moyens et ressource. Je n’ai pas - rien de craindre de la force à présent avec Akbar Khan, même si il - est joint par tous les colors de Ningraher; mais je veux bien que - vous vous comprenez que nos parapets ne sont pas assez forts pour - résister les bouts de canon, et il est sujet de doubte si nous pouvons - résister une siège pour peu de temps si l’ennemi envoyent des pièces - de siège de Caubul; et en aucune cas les chevaux de la cavalerie et - de l’artillerie comme les yaboos et les chameaux après vingt-cinq - jours periront. Cette époque le rendre impossible pour nous à vous - ajouter dans aucun plan de retraite que vous voudrais; et de plus il - sera impossible communiquer avec vous au moment que je me trouverais - au point d’être écrassé (overwhelmed) par une force irrésistible. En - perdant las yaboos et les chameaux, qui sont absolument nécessaire - pour les travaux de la fortification, je perd aussi tous mes moyens de - transporter mes malades et les munitions de guerre, sans laquelle il - ne faut pas contempler une retraite. J’ai extrême.... Soixante-huite - chameaux et _cinq trente neuf_ yaboos. Ces circonstances me semble de - demander que votre avance à notre secours sera prompt—the only means - of securing the avowed object of government, _i.e._, the relief of the - troops who have so long defended Jellalabad. After writing the above, - the dreadful earthquake of this day a fait tomber deux bastions, et - plusieurs autres sont culles—une brèche de côté de Peshawur dans les - murs et beaucoup des maisons (casèmees) aussi. Sans doute l’ennemi - prend avantage de cet calamité. Nous travaillons sans cesse de réparer - le dedommage. - - Believe me to be, my dear General, yours, very truly, - R. SALE, M.-Genrl. - -[_MS. Records._—I give the postscript to this letter in a note, -though of no historical importance,[351] as I cannot deny myself the -pleasure of quoting a tribute to the worth of one whom I am proud -to recognise as a fellow-labourer in the field of Afghan history: -“P.S.—Understanding from the 3rd para. of the letter from the -Adjutant-Gen. that the authority of Major-Gen. Elphinstone has ceased, -I venture to mention to you that Captain Havelock, 13th L.I., was -appointed in general orders Persian Interpreter to the M.-General, -so long as he continued to command in Afghanistan. He was by his -permission, however, attached to me from the period of my force leaving -Caubul, and I have received from him very valuable assistance in every -way throughout our operations, as I have already intimated in public -despatches. I trust you will pardon my undertaking to say, that if -you would be pleased to re-appoint him to the same situation under -yourself, I feel persuaded that his local experience would render -him most useful to you. In the meantime, I have nominated him Per. -Intr. to myself, subject to confirmation, as I cannot, under present -circumstances, dispense with his services. Be good enough to make this -known also to H. E. the C. in C.”] - - Jellalabad, February 19th, 1842. - - MY DEAR GENERAL, - - * * * Since I commenced writing to you, we have been visited by a - very severe earthquake, which has in a great measure demolished two - or three of our bastions, and nearly the whole of the parapet of the - ramparts, to raise which cost the troops more than a couple of months - of hard labour. A number of houses in the town have been thrown down - by the shock, and the small court-yard attached to the house in which - the General and myself reside, is filled with the rubbish of a number - of out-offices which fell crashing at our feet, we having sought - the centre of the yard as a place of safety. It was with difficulty - we could preserve our footing, so great was the undulating motion - of the ground we stood upon. Our dwelling-house seemed to heave to - and fro, as if it would topple on us. I have not heard of more than - two or three persons who have been killed by the falling houses or - walls. Colonel Monteith was buried up to the neck; but he has not, I - believe, sustained any serious injury. If this town had been seriously - bombarded for a month, I don’t think it could have suffered more - than at present. God grant that we may not have to witness anything - so fearful again. I feel still giddy, although the earthquake took - place a couple of hours ago. It is to be expected that on the enemy - discovering the damage which our defences have sustained, they will be - encouraged to attack us. - - Gold mohurs and bootkees would be of use to us, but I fear that - Mackeson would find it impracticable to send them to us in safety. - - Captain Bygrave is alive, and with Mahomed Akbar Khan. Captain Souter, - 44th Regiment, is also there. He saved the Queen’s colour of his - regiment by rolling it round his waist, and he writes that a shot - struck him there, and the colour saved his life. - - Believe me, very truly yours, - G. H. MACGREGOR. - - -THE ADVANCE FROM PESHAWUR. - -[_Book VII., chapter 3, page 72._] - -[The following is the correspondence to which reference is made in the -text.] - - Jellalabad, March 8th, 1842, 9 P.M. - - MY DEAR GENERAL, - - I had the pleasure of receiving a few hours ago yours of the 26th - ultimo. I must confess that its contents have deeply disappointed me, - since I gather from it that it is not your intention to advance to - my succour until you shall have been reinforced by the brigade which - you expect to reach Peshawur on the 22nd instant. Now, independently - of other considerations, Macgregor will inform you that he yesterday - got a Dust-i-Khat from the Shah’s Durbar at Caubul, demanding - categorically our evacuation of this place. He referred the King and - his councillors to you, and their next measure will probably be to - march an overwhelming force against us, aided by our captured iron - nine-pounders. I have reiterated in several letters the fact that - mes mains ne sont pas assez forts pour résister tel artillerie, and - therefore desire to make you once more fully aware of the risk, if not - certainty, of our being overpowered if your advance to our support is - not sufficiently prompt to anticipate this movement of our enemies. - The responsibility, therefore, of such a result, will now rest - entirely upon you, and not on me. Money is not now of the slightest - use to me, Mahomed Akbar having established a most rigid blockade, - which effectually prevents all supplies from reaching us. Our foraging - parties are also daily attacked. - - Believe me to be, my dear General, yours sincerely, - ROBERT SALE, M.-G. - - P.S.—As I remark that your letter does not contain any distinct avowal - of an intention of advancing even when your reinforcements reach - you, I shall be obliged, for the sake of this garrison, if you will - specifically inform me when it is probable I may calculate on its - being relieved.[352] - -At the same time Macgregor despatched another letter of a similar -tendency, and to this letter Pollock replied: - - March 12th, 1842. - - MY DEAR MACGREGOR, - - I will write you a very short note in reference to yours and Sale’s of - the 8th. It must no doubt appear to you and Sale most extraordinary - that, with the force I have here, I do not at once move on. God knows - it has been my anxious wish to do so, but I have been helpless. I came - on ahead to Peshawur to arrange for an advance, but was saluted with a - report of 1900 sick, and a bad feeling among the Sepoys. I visited the - hospital, and endeavoured to encourage by talking to them, but they - _had no heart_. I hoped that when the time came they would go. This, - however, I could not write to you or Sale in _ink_, either in English - or French. On the 1st instant the feeling on the part of the Sepoys - broke out; and I had the mortification of knowing that the Hindoos, of - four out of five native corps, refused to advance. I immediately took - measures to sift the evil, and gradually a reaction has taken place, - in the belief that I will wait for reinforcements. This has caused me - the utmost anxiety on your account. Your situation is never out of my - thoughts; but having told you what I have, you and Sale will at once - see that necessity alone has kept me here. - - I have sent five expresses to hurry on the first division of the next - brigade. It consists of the 3rd Dragoons, a troop of Horse Artillery, - 1st Light Cavalry, the 33rd N.I., and two companies of the 6th N.I., - all fresh and without a taint. I really believe that if I were to - attempt to move on now without the reinforcement, the four regiments - implicated would, as far as the Hindoos are concerned, stand fast. - Pray, therefore, tell me, without the least reserve, the latest day - you can hold out. If I could, I would tell you the day when I expect - reinforcements, but I cannot. I may, however, I believe with safety - say, that they will arrive by the end of this month. - - The case, therefore, now stands thus:—Whether I am to attempt with - my present materials to advance, and to risk the appearance of - disaffection or cowardice, which in such a case could not again be - got over, or wait the arrival of a reinforcement, which will make all - sure. This is the real state of the case. If I attempted now, it might - risk you altogether; but if you can hold out, the reinforcements would - make your relief as certain as any earthly thing can be. - - Our only object in going to Jellalabad is to relieve you and bring you - back with us to this; but it is necessary that this should be kept a - profound secret. - - I am, &c. &c. - - GEORGE POLLOCK. - -To this Sale replied: - - Jellalabad, 23rd March, 1842. - - MY DEAR GENERAL, - - Yesterday arrived yours of the 12th instant addressed jointly to - Captain Macgregor and myself. I have only, in reply thereto, to say - that in my last I informed you definitively that I would, by God’s - blessing, hold this place to the 31st instant, by which time you - acquainted me that you could arrive at Jellalabad with the dragoons. - You now state to me your expectation that they will only reach your - present encampment by that date. Our European soldiers are now on - two-thirds of their rations of salt meat, and this the commissariat - supply; on the 4th proximo that part of the force will then be without - meat, notwithstanding every arrangement to lessen the consumption. - I have this day directed all the camels to be destroyed, with the - view of preserving the _boosa_ for the horses of the cavalry and - artillery; and these valuable animals cannot receive any rations of - grain whatever after the 1st proximo, but must be subsisted entirely - on _boosa_ and grass, if the latter can be procured. - - Believe me to be, yours sincerely, - R. SALE.[353] - - -GHOLAB SINGH AND THE SIKH ARMY. - -[_Book VII., chapter 3, page 77._] - -On the 10th of February Mr. Clerk wrote to the Government Secretary: -“There seems to have been no good reason for the delay of Rajah Gholab -Singh in crossing the Attock, unless he really feared a collision -with the Nujeeb battalions, encamped on the other side. But for the -Rajah’s apparent reluctance immediately to undertake to co-operate -in the Khybur Pass, there may be better grounds. These may be either -an apprehension of his inability to oppose the enemy there; or, as -supposed by Captain Lawrence, a want of incentive to exertion—or both -these causes may retard his movements. In regard to the former, the -presence of the large body of British troops assembling at Peshawur -will encourage him. With respect to the latter, I should be glad to be -provided with the instructions of government.”—[_MS. Records._] - -Writing again, on the 13th of February, he says: “In regard to the -means of inducing zealous co-operation on the part of the Sikh troops, -I do not think that the expectations of Captains Mackeson and Lawrence -are quite reasonable, or the almost indefinite extent of proposed -reward judicious, or the direct negotiation with the Jummoo Rajahs -for their immediate aggrandisement honourable.... It would not be -compatible with the friendship long subsisting between the British -Government and the Lahore Government, now to assign suddenly and -directly to the Jummoo Rajahs any territories as a compensation for -services demanded of the Sikh Durbar. This would be precipitating the -decline of a power which it may be soon expedient to prop, both against -Afghans and Jummooees.”—[_MS. Records._] But though Mr. Clerk thought, -at this time, that it would not be honourable openly to treat with the -Jummoo Rajahs for the transfer of Jellalabad, he was not unwilling to -place it permanently in their hands by a stroke of _finesse_. I confess -that I cannot see very distinctly how the course suggested by Mr. Clerk -is so much more “honourable,” and “compatible with friendship,” than -that suggested by Captains Mackeson and Lawrence. - - -POLLOCK’S APPEAL TO HIS ARMY. - -[_Book VII., chapter 4, page 84._] - -After alluding to the defence of Jellalabad, and the probability that -the Peshawur force would immediately advance to its relief, General -Pollock said: “Success in relieving these troops will raise for this -force the admiration and gratitude of all India, and the Major-General -commanding feels assured that officers and men will cheerfully make -any sacrifices to attain so noble an object. He therefore now calls -upon the Brigadiers to assemble the commanding officers under their -orders, and determine on the least quantity of baggage and the smallest -number of camp-followers with which their regiments can advance. The -success of this enterprise will greatly depend upon the quantity of -baggage taken, as from the nature of the country between Peshawur and -Jellalabad, the line most consistent with safety must be as little -incumbered as possible. The Major-General commanding trusts that the -confidence he feels in the troops will be repaid by their confidence -in him. The soldiers may rest assured that his thoughts are constantly -engaged in ensuring their provisions and securing their comforts, and -they may be convinced they will never be called upon by him to make -useless sacrifices, or to undergo unnecessary hardships. Arrangements -will be made for placing such baggage as may be left behind in perfect -security at Peshawur.” - - -FORCING THE KHYBUR.—POLLOCK’S GENERAL ORDERS. - -[_Book VII., chapter 4, pages 87, 88._] - -[The following are the rules laid down for the guidance of commanding -officers, to which allusion is made in the text.] - - * * * * * - -1. A bugler or trumpeter to be attached to each commanding-officer of a -party or detachment of the several columns. - -2. Whenever an obstacle presents itself, or accident occurs, of a -nature to impede the march of any part of either of the columns, and -occasions a break in its continuity, the officer in command nearest to -the spot will order the halt to be sounded, which will be immediately -repeated by the other buglers, and the whole will halt till the removal -of the difficulty enables the columns to proceed in their established -order, when the signal to advance will be given. - -3. The baggage-master will superintend the placing of the baggage, &c., -in the order prescribed, and the Major-General commanding requests that -commanding-officers will use their best exertions to facilitate this -important object. The quarter-master of each corps will see that the -baggage of his regiment is placed in its proper position in the column, -and an officer from each is to be appointed to the duty. - -4. No private guards are to be allowed. The parties of cavalry and -infantry, allotted at intervals in the line of march, are to be the -only troops attending it. - -5. The officers entrusted with the command of the parties which are -to flank the rear-guard on the heights, must give their most vigilant -attention to the important duty of preventing their men from hurrying -in advance of it; its rear must never be left exposed to fire from the -heights. - -6. The troops to be told off on their regimental parades, as above -detailed, and marched at the appointed hour to their respective posts. - -7. The force will march to Jumrood to-morrow morning, in the order -above prescribed. The general to beat at four, and the assembly at five -o’clock. - -8. The baggage and camp-followers of each corps are to be kept with -their respective regiments till notice is given by the baggage-master -that they are required to take their places in the column.[354] - - Camp Jumrood, 4th April, 1842. - - The force to be under arms to-morrow morning at half-past three - o’clock, ready to move forward, at which time all the treasure, - ammunition, baggage, &c., will be moved to the low ground to the - right front of the hills now occupied by picquets. No fires are to be - lighted on any account; no drums to beat, or bugles to be sounded. - The six companies of the 60th Regiment, and six companies of the - 33rd Regiment, will remain with the baggage, in the vicinity of the - treasure and ammunition. The parties for crowning the heights, under - the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor and Major Anderson, will move - forward to the hill on the right of the pass. The parties for the - same duty, under the command of Major Huish and Lieutenant-Colonel - Moseley, will in like manner move forward to the hill on the left. - Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor’s party will be accompanied by the - Irregulars who lately garrisoned Ali-Musjid. - - Captain Ferris’s jezailchees will accompany the left advancing party. - - When the heights have been crowned on both hills, four companies - of the 9th Foot, the eight companies of the 26th, under - Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor and Major Huish, also the jezailchees, under - Captain Ferris, will descend the hills to be in readiness to enter the - pass. - - Six horse-artillery guns, four from the foot-artillery, with the two - mountain guns, will be drawn up in battery opposite the pass. - - The advance guard, seven companies of the 30th, and seven companies of - the 53rd, will accompany the guns. - - The whole of the cavalry will be so placed by Brigadier White, that - any attempt at an attack from the low hills on the right may be - frustrated. When the baggage, &c., is directed to advance, the same - order of march will be preserved as was formerly prescribed, with - the following alteration: Six companies of the 60th N.I. will be - together on the right, and six companies of the 33rd, now arrived, - will follow the 53rd N.I. When the rear of the column is entering the - pass, the two rear companies of Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley’s and Major - Anderson’s parties should descend the hills. - - G. PONSONBY, Capt., A. A. General.[355] - - -LORD ELLENBOROUGH’S JELLALABAD PROCLAMATION. - -[_Book VII., chapter 4, page 98._] - - Secret Department, Benares, 21st April. - - The Governor-General feels assured that every subject of the British - Government will peruse with the deepest interest and satisfaction the - report he now communicates of the entire defeat of the Afghan troops, - under Mahomed Akbar Khan, by the garrison of Jellalabad. - - That illustrious garrison, which, by its constancy in enduring - privation, and by its valour in action, has already obtained for - itself the sympathy and respect of every true soldier, has now, - sallying forth from its walls, under the command of its gallant - leader, Major-General Sir Robert Sale, thoroughly beaten in open field - an enemy of more than three times its numbers, taken the standards of - their boasted cavalry, destroyed their camp, and recaptured four guns, - which, under circumstances which can never again occur, had during the - last winter fallen into their hands. - - The Governor-General cordially congratulates the army upon the return - of victory to its ranks. He is convinced that there, as in all former - times, it will be found, while, as at Jellalabad, the European and - Native troops mutually supporting each other, and evincing equal - discipline and valour, are led into action by officers in whom they - justly confide. - - The Governor-General directs that the substance of this notification, - and of Major-General Sir Robert Sale’s report, be carefully made known - to all troops, and that a salute of twenty-one guns be fired at every - principal station of the army. - - -STATE OF CAUBUL AFTER ITS EVACUATION BY THE BRITISH. - -[_Book VII., chapter 5, page 104, et seq._] - -The letters of John Conolly written at this time afford a sufficiently -clear insight into the state of parties at Caubul. On the 17th of -January he wrote to Macgregor: “The accounts of our most ill-fated -force become more distressing every day. Hundreds of Sepoys, wounded, -frost-bitten, starving, and naked, come into the city. The Oosbegs -buy many, and some find their way to us, and are relieved in the -hospital, which is now crowded to excess; and the poor wretches are -dying off fast. That villain, Ameen-oollah, is evidently anxious that -the sick should die, for he will not assist them in any way, nor attend -in the least to our repeated requests for assistance. The Newab is -so completely in the hands of the Naib that he cannot afford us any -relief. The Afghans are very sanguine in the expectation of assistance -and co-operation of the Sikhs, and talk in court of Sultan Mahomed -having received instructions from the Durbar to do our force as much -injury as possible, and that Shere Singh has an understanding with -them to prevent our force re-entering the country. You must be aware -whether there is any foundation for these reports.... This morning the -Newab, attended by Ameen-oollah and all the chiefs, went to pay their -respects to the King in the Balla Hissar. The King has paid two lakhs -of rupees already, and has promised one more in ten days. The Newab is -Minister—Ameen-oollah, Naib; and oaths and protestations have been -taken on the Koran that they are to be friends to each other, and -supporters of the true faith. The Newab abuses the King most loudly and -openly. The King does the same with the whole family of the Barukzyes. -Ameen-oollah Khan has sworn eternal faith to the cause of his -Majesty—bares his head and swears most solemn oaths in the Musjids to -uphold the Newab’s dignity against the King and all the royal family. -His Majesty has sent me several messages, saying that he submits to the -extortion of the three lakhs because he is not strong enough to oppose -the demand; but that, _Inshallah!_ when he has received the salaam of -the chiefs, he will gain power daily, and be able, should our troops -come on, to play his own game with advantage to himself and ourselves. -I believe that he is heart and soul in our interest; and it appears -contrary to all reason to suppose otherwise. The measures which obliged -the Newab to resign his throne are, I believe—1st. The dread of our -vengeance, which the people think the King can in some way avert, if a -force is sent strong enough to shut out all hope of opposition. 2nd. -The dread of Akbar’s rising power. 3rd. The suspicions of the fidelity -of their own party, who had shown symptoms of disaffection, and some -of whom had openly espoused the cause of his Majesty. Such a condition -cannot, I should think, last long between such Yorks and Lancasters. -There is one thing very certain, that unless a very large force is -sent up, which will preclude all hope of opposition, every man in the -country will rise against us; and the people in the vicinity of Caubul -have so compromised themselves, and dread our vengeance so much, that -they will strain every nerve to oppose us, and may be his Majesty will -feel that his safest plan is to join his countrymen against us. He said -at the Durbar this morning that he was glad that affairs had taken such -a turn, and that he was now able to call himself defender of the faith. -This much could not have been avoided under the circumstances.... -We are amused all day long by abuse and scurrilous verses about the -Kaffirs. Books are being sold by the weight. I have not yet been able -to get hold of the children—most exorbitant prices are demanded. The -Newab promises, but has not the power to fulfil. Salutes are being -fired, and there is a general rejoicing in honour of the coalition -between the two Kings. Artillerymen are being sent to Akbar.”—[_MS. -Correspondence._] - -On the 24th of January, John Conolly wrote: “The King holds Durbar -regularly, at which all the chiefs attend. He pretends to have shaken -off all connection with our government, but secretly sends me messages, -professing all sincerity and attachment. There is much talk of a large -force being sent to oppose the army which is said to be advancing from -Hindostan; but money is wanting; the religious feeling against us -continues very strong, and the chiefs have compromised themselves so -much, that they will rise to a man, unless an overpowering force is -sent. The Newab’s kindness is beyond description, and he professes, -and I believe sincerely feels, great anxiety to secure the friendship -of our government. He is most deeply distressed at the treacherous -conduct of the chiefs. We are quite ignorant of the intentions -of government. Mohamed Akbar is continually writing for guns and -ammunition; but not a man can be induced to march without pay, and -every one is jealous of Akbar Khan’s rising power. The Barukzye faction -of his party view each other with great suspicion. Ameen-oollah is the -go-between. Akbar Khan is procuring all the money he can by extortion -from Sourkars and others.”—[_MS. Correspondence_.] This was interlined -invisibly on the advice of a bill drawn by Major Pottinger on the -Ferozepore treasury, and was produced on the application of iodyne -to the paper. On the same day Lieutenant Conolly wrote to Mr. Clerk: -“The King is obliged to talk of sending troops to oppose us at the -Khybur; but he declares secretly to me his sincerity for the British -Government. The chiefs talk of collecting an army, but the sinews -of war are wanting.... Thanks to the Newab, we are safe; but it has -more than once been proposed that we should be killed.... Since our -troops left this, the King has been recognised by the Newab and the -rebel chiefs on the payment of three lakhs of rupees to the Newab and -Ameen-oollah Khan. The former is Vizier; the latter deputy. The Newab -is most anxious to serve our government. He has not been in any way -concerned in the treacherous conduct to our troops. His kindness and -attention to us is great, and he is sincerely anxious to establish -a friendship with the British Government—being afraid of the King -and Mohamed Akbar, and disgusted with the conduct of the chiefs, who -deceived him with oaths and protestations. Great excitement prevails -in the town; the feeling against us continues very strong, and every -man will oppose our re-entering the country, unless a force is sent -which will preclude all hope of successful opposition.”—[_MS. -Correspondence._] - -On the 15th of February Conolly wrote to Macgregor: “Since my former -notes, the latest of which was dated the 10th, affairs have assumed -a very different aspect. Naib Ameen-oollah, having given up the guns -entrusted to his charge, has shaken the confidence of the Barukzye -party in his (the Naib’s) sincerity, and exposed the King’s ultimate -designs of making himself strong and independent of, if not inimical -to, the Newab’s clique. Yesterday the Naib called on the Newab, on the -part of his Majesty, to send his guns to the Balla Hissar. His demand -was directly refused; and the Newab declared his determination of not -again attending the Durbar until his Majesty gave proofs of confidence -and honesty. This morning Fuzil-i-Almud, son of Kasee Hussun, brought -an order from his Majesty that I should wait upon him; but I declined -the honour in this instance, as I had done before, feeling that no good -could come from an interview, ignorant as I am of the intentions of -government and of your wishes, and having been, moreover, frequently -warned against moving out of our present residence. I gathered from -the Kasee’s son, that his Majesty was forming a party in opposition to -the Barukzye faction, the principal characters being Ameen-oollah, the -Populzye, many of the Kuzzilbash, and some of the Caubul chiefs. You -will perceive among his partisans the chief conspirators in the late -rebellion, Ameen-oollah, Abdool Salam, and Sekundur,—men who have -nothing to hope for at our hands. I presume the first demand made by -our government will be the persons of these chiefs, who planned and -were most conspicuous in the late revolution; and if the information -I have alluded to be correct, his Majesty may object to give up the -chiefs. But these are matters for future consideration; and should his -Majesty be disinclined to use his utmost endeavours for the furtherance -of the wishes of government, such unwillingness must, of course, be -regarded as hostility. It is generally believed and asserted throughout -the town, that his Majesty instigated the late rebellion. I have never -been able to prove the accusation, though I cannot but think that his -Majesty was, directly or indirectly, the cause of the revolution. When -you know the intentions of government, you will be able to see your -way more clearly. I would, however, suggest that his Majesty be made -to understand, either from yourself or through me, that he must either -meet our wishes or go his own road. Things are so very unsettled here -just now, that the most learned cannot foretell the events of the -morrow. All eyes are turned upon you. The evacuation of Jellalabad will -have the worst possible effect. Every one here has turned soldier and -the people are in a high state of excitement, and hungering after pay, -which is not forthcoming. Our host has assembled a regiment of 1000 -bayonets, 1000 horsemen, some Jezailchees, and a park of twelve guns, -the ammunition for which, by the Meerza’s return yesterday, amounted -to about thirty shot, and no cartridges. There must be some serious -disturbance ere long. We are very anxious about the sick, which we fear -will be sacrificed in any popular tumult. For ourselves, we must trust -to Providence; should things come to the worst, we shall try and escape -to your stronghold.—P.S. We have just heard that a change of ministry -has been proposed by his Majesty, and likely to be effected, Oosman -Khan to be acting premier, and the Newab to be a sleeping partner. - -“15th, P.M., 10 o’clock.—To-day there has been a noisy debate between -the Newab and Ameen-oollah, the former abusing the latter in rather -round terms. The Naib left the room in a huff, and things are as -unsettled as can be. The Newab says he won’t give up his guns, or -go to the Durbar: and insists upon ... his Majesty pursuing the -non-interference system to which he is bound by the terms of his -treaty. There is nothing but Nifag: everybody suspects his neighbour; -everything is in capital trim for us if our army advances; I only wait -your authority to spend a little money, and above all a guarantee -to our host of a handsome provision if he sides with us, or stands -neutral—for he is a most worthy and honest old gentleman, and had no -hand in the late melancholy occurrences. Ghoolam Mahomed Khan has also -kept aloof from the late rebellion. There is a report that Palmer has -broken up the treaty, and is again besieged in the Balla Hissar. He -writes for orders, which kindly send with all expedition. For God’s -sake beware of Mahomed Akbar.” - -In a letter of March 5th, the same writer says: “Futteh Jung (Shah -Soojah’s son) has gone out yesterday to join Akbar. Things are very -unsettled here still, and the Kohistanees are fighting amongst -themselves. The Newab is still treating us with the greatest kindness. -He has enlisted about 3000 men, principally for our protection, and is -determined to fight rather than give us up. The Naib here has been -trying to get us, and has a strong party of Sepoys enlisted also. The -Newab asked me yesterday if, when his money is out, we shall be able -to assist him, as he only has sufficient ready cash to pay his men for -one month and a half more. Can you authorise me to make him an advance -when his money fails? For, as I said before, his entertaining troops -is almost entirely on our account. He would be safe enough were we not -his guests. In the meantime he has bought ammunition, and got his guns -ready in case of an attack.” - -And in another letter of the same date: “The bearer will be able to -tell you all the news. I have written to you several times, but have -received no acknowledgment of my letters. Always try solution of iodyne -on my notes.... We are very kindly treated by the Newab, but close -prisoners. Ameen-oollah has tried stratagem and threats to get us out -of the Newab’s hands, with a view of screwing us; but, thanks to the -Newab, we are as yet safe, though our situation is an unpleasant one. -The King is sitting in the Balla Hissar; but his authority is only -nominal, all power being in the hands of Ameen-oollah. Prince Futteh -Jung has started with a few horsemen towards Jellalabad, and will -probably halt for some days at Bootkak. The King sends me occasionally -messages professing sincerity for the British Government; but he does -not, in his present circumstances, do anything which would lead his -subjects to suspect his attachment to us, or the whole population would -rise up against him.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] - - -THE LETTERS OF SHAH SOOJAH. - -[_Book VII., chapter 5, page 108._] - -[Containing the King’s version of the causes and circumstances of our -disasters at Caubul, and throwing some light upon his own character -and conduct, the unpublished letters of Shah Soojah are sufficiently -curious and interesting to induce me to insert a few of them in this -place. It is important also to consider their bearing upon some of the -events recorded in the chapter on the Defence of Jellalabad.] - - -FROM SHAH SOOJAH TO CAPTAIN MACGREGOR. - -(_Received January 21st, 1842._) - - Let it be known to Captain Macgregor: you are aware of all that has - occurred here. Notwithstanding all I said regarding the treachery of - these men, they (the British) did not understand, but were guided by - the advice of my enemies—that is, the Barukzyes—until arrived at - this pitch. The clans of the Barukzyes had this object, that suspicion - and ill-will should exist between the British and me. To the British - they said, that I had instigated the rebellion; and to the Mahomedans - they said, that I and the Feringhees were one, until they made me - generally unpopular. Well; such was fated! It has caused me much grief - and regret. God grant this wish of my heart, that the fate of Sir - William Macnaghten and Mr. Trevor and the other gentlemen may befall - my enemies! I frequently desired them, on the first outbreak of the - rebellion, to bring everything into the Balla Hissar, which is a place - of strength. They did not listen to my advice. I then begged them to - endeavour to gain time—that when I could arrange matters with these - men (Afghans) all would be well. During the time that I was besieged, - I expended all that I had collected with so much labour, until I - brought every one of influence over to my side by payment. Please God - they may remain faithful to me! - - No one but myself could manage these people (Afghans) and carry on - the government. My sincerity and friendship to the East India Company - was formerly well known: at present it is as evident to all the world - as the light of day. If I had only some treasure, that during the two - or three remaining months of winter I might strengthen myself, please - God there is no one in this country who could displace me, and, by - the blessing of God, everything would be arranged according to my - desire. The men here are not to be won without money. God grant this - wish of my heart! Before this I spent four lakhs of rupees in this - affair, and I also gave two lakhs more; I have nothing else left. If - some money could be received that I might win over these men, please - God everything could be arranged according to my desire. It is to be - hoped, as you will see, that in a few months I could collect horse and - foot so that no one could stir. God grant this wish of my heart! - - The bearer of this will verbally inform you of all other - circumstances. It is advisable that you should send this paper to - Peshawur, or even to the Governor-General. And send me an answer - to this speedily. Whenever you hear of the arrival of this paper at - Peshawur, be good enough to let me know, that I may feel sure of its - having passed out of this country; because the evil-disposed are - spreading reports that I am united to the Feringhees. Until I have - gained my proper footing, it is necessary that, for some time, money - should be sent to enable me to manage matters. When I have succeeded - in establishing my power, I shall not require assistance from any one. - Everything will be easy. Don’t let the men of this country know these - things. Afterwards, whatever may be desirable for my good and for - yours, God will grant. And God grant this wish of my heart! The bearer - will tell you how matters stand. Whenever money has been received and - I have reinstated myself, I shall have these people so much under my - control, that if I order it they will carry the shoes of the Sahibs on - their own heads.—[_MS. Records_]. - - -FREE TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM SHAH SOOJAH TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL -OF INDIA. - -(_Without date, brought on the 2nd of February, by a messenger fifteen -days from Caubul._) - - Be it known to my friend that I am King, and know the people well. It - is right to treat people according to their deserts; some by kindness, - others by severity. - - Some evil-disposed persons, from fear of me, took refuge with Sir W. - Macnaghten and Sir A. Burnes, and I could say nothing to them; they - stirred up strife. - - During the last two or three years I considered the Sahibs, and - especially the Envoy, whom I valued more than my life, as my equals; - without their pleasure I did nothing. - - It was God’s will I should see what I would have wished not to have - seen. May no other have such experiences. - - Could it have been my wish to see my enemies and their families in the - place of my friends? - - Once or twice I wrote to you to send a person to inquire and inform - you of the state of things in this country; but it was not done. - - For two or three years I consoled the people, who told me if I was - not King, they should understand it was the Feringhee; and they (the - former) told me that when I came they expelled Dost Mahomed, but - that I had disappointed them; that now their women left them, their - country was lost; and, although at first they received pay, even that - was stopped. I could not console the people, but I spoke of them - to the Envoy, and told him that, sooner or later, there would be a - disturbance; but he listened not to me. I told him they were deceiving - him; but he believed me not, and desired me to be at ease, for that he - would settle the country with two Pultuns (regiments). - - He further told me to confine and expel some evil-disposed persons. I - did so; but they got access to Nizam-oo-dowlah, and through him to the - Envoy, who asked me to release them. I did so. Now I am distressed by - those very people. - - When the Envoy was going away I asked him to take me with him; for - that I was in an extremity; I told him of what was going on, and - was not listened to. I told him that complaints were daily made to - me of Afghan women being taken to Burnes’s Moonshee, and of their - drinking wine at his house, and of women being taken to the Chaonee - (cantonments) on horseback, and of my having myself witnessed it. - When people complained to me of such things, I asked who did so, - that I might inquire; and told them not to defame the Sahibs. I - first comforted and then reproved them; and said, if any person uses - violence to your women, tell me, and inquiry shall be made. - - The people have often before acted as they have now; they confined - my brother Mahmood in the Balla Hissar; the conspirators then were - Mooktear-oo-dowlah and Ahmed Khan, Noorzye, &c. They pretended it - was a quarrel between the Sheeahs and Soonees; but it proved a great - matter, and they saw that without me they could not settle matters. I - was then among the Kakurs. The Khans sent for me, and all obeyed me. - - In the present instance people said, “There are crores of rupees in - the Chaonee; let us strengthen Islam.” Such are the people. Three or - four dogs are gone (dead); as many remain. - - Nizam-oo-dowlah was a dog and ruined all. I begged the Envoy not to - ruin the people. Nizam-oo-dowlah said to the Douranees, the King and - Envoy will destroy you. I will help you, but Captain Trevor will not - let me. The people were thus stirred up. I was annoyed, but could not - help myself; now, please God and by the help of friends, much may be - done. - - All were against me on account of you. They sent to me to separate - myself from you, and for the sake of the faith to be King myself (some - Sahibs were then in the Balla Hissar). I did not give a reply at the - time, but sent word to the Envoy, who told me to turn them away. I - did so, saying I owed everything to the Sahibs. They told me I would - repent. - - For some days there was fighting near the Chaonee and Balla Hissar - and Balla Boorj; at which time I sent word to the Envoy to come with - all his baggage to the Balla Hissar, where the troops could hold - out for a year or two, telling him that three or four thousand of - the inhabitants might be turned out, and guns and stores brought. - After much debate, no answer was given. I said, “Very good! Please - yourselves.” - - Some days after I sent to the Chaonee, and warned them not to abandon - it; that I knew the designs of the enemy, who intended to attack them; - and by expending five or six lakhs of rupees I endeavoured to bring - the people from the common enemy towards myself; but they told me to - separate myself from you. On this account three or four Barukzyes - separated themselves from me; but though I could not trust people, I - managed matters by first paying three or four lakhs, and afterwards - two or three, which they asked of me, thinking I would refuse, and - they would have an excuse for separating from me; but I gave all I - had, and now am moneyless. If, however, I had money, I could openly do - much; but nothing is to be done without money (they are dogs). If I - had money I could raise troops, and many of my old (Hindostanee) ones - who returned naked are anxious to serve me; but I have no money. In - heart I am yours, though all the world are separated from me. - - Nizam-oo-dowlah knew a night before it occurred what was to happen, - but did not tell me or the Envoy that we might prevent it. - - The conspirators told the people that I was with them; and when the - Prince went out with the troops, they (the traitors) said, “They are - with us.” - - I sent Mahomed Sherreef to settle matters, but he was not attended to; - and he, as well as many of my troops, was killed, which event opened - the eyes of the people of Caubul; so the conspirators, to implicate - the people, attacked Sir A. Burnes. - - If my counsel is taken much may yet be done; or, if not, I will go - to Mecca. Here the people are confirmed traitors, or I could easily - settle the whole country, and Persia and Khorassan. - - What was fated has happened. I have not seen it in my sleep, but have - actually witnessed it. May God remove the sorrow, that my enemies and - their families should be in the place of my friends. Is there any in - the world who gave their enemies the means to kill them? The dog - Akbar came as a beggar from Toorkistan. His enmity to the Sahib-Log - and myself was apparent; but lakhs of rupees were given him to escort - the troops in their retreat; and what was the consequence? In the - midst of the discussions I sent several times to the Envoy, and asked - him why he nourished his enemy; but I was not attended to. - - All Mussulmans turned from me on account of you; and for three months, - for your sake, I experienced trouble and distress, and then the Envoy - agreed to give the country to Mahomed Akbar, and to allow me a lakh of - rupees a year, or four lakhs in Hindostan; but I knew and said, that - as soon as they left the Chaonee they would be destroyed; and so it - has proved. - - Between us there were no differences, and there will not be. - - When I saw how things were going, I expended money to draw the - people from Mahomed Akbar; but now I can do nothing. I sent news to - Macgregor, and to Ghuznee, and to Candahar. - - The road is unsafe, so I cannot write aright.—[_MS. Records_]. - - -FROM SHAH SOOJAH TO CAPTAIN MACGREGOR (WRITTEN IN SECRET BY HIS -MAJESTY’S OWN HAND). - -(_Received February 6th._) - - Let it be known to Captain Macgregor what misfortunes have befallen - me! Everything occurs contrary to expectation. I wrote, that after - labouring from earliest morning to nightfall, I had by a thousand - schemes satisfied these men and made them swear fidelity. One came and - another went; but all saying, “Be not united to the Feringhees.” This - is what the Barukzyes are spreading among the people. I said in reply - to them, “You yourselves have said that they (the Feringhees) have - done nothing for the Sirkar, and have not fulfilled their promises; - then how should the Sirkar be well disposed towards them? During the - time that I was with them I felt that my name suffered, and I felt - this disgrace—that it was known to all the world. I continued with - them until the time when Sir William Macnaghten purposely told me - to cast them (the Feringhees) off.[356] I then dismissed them, and - you yourselves informed me that they (the Feringhees) had come to an - understanding with Mahomed Akbar. How then could I still preserve any - understanding with them? Rest perfectly satisfied. At present I have - no understanding with the Feringhees.” At length, by every means in - my power, I pacified them. These men at present, whether Barukzyes or - other Afghans or Parsewans, are all obedient to me. Without my orders - they do nothing. However, I place no trust in them. God grant that - I may obtain the wish of my heart! I have no other desire. I cannot - think that you are possessed of a proper sense of honour, since Dost - Mahomed and his family remain there with honour. Should Akbar fall - into my power, if I am a Mussulman or a man, what treatment he shall - receive! Dost Mahomed and his wives and children, in revenge for the - Sahibs who have fallen in this country, should be seen wandering in - destitution through the bazaars and streets, that it should be known - to all the world. What has been your treatment of that dog (Dost - Mahomed)? So much wealth! And what return have you received from this - faithless wretch (Mahomed Akbar)? May God accomplish this desire of - my heart! It is now some days since they (the Afghans) have requested - me to send Shumshoodeen Khan to Ghuznee. Until to-day I have delayed. - I have also made delays in the direction of the Khybur. At length - I am helpless, and if I do not consent I shall be suspected. And - from Khybur intelligence has come that 200 men have been killed, and - two loads of treasure and two guns abandoned to the enemy, and that - Mackeson Sahib is shut up in Ali-Musjid requiring succour. If this - is true, what management! How often have I said that if I possessed - money I might collect some thousands of troops of my own! I should - not require assistance from any one. I could do anything I liked. But - I have nothing whatever. At this moment there is only remaining two - or three thousand ducats. These men, who are my own servants, have - remained with me; but, poor wretches, how many months are they in - arrears! The other Afghans I have ordered to be mustered daily in my - presence. Such as I may select I shall continue in service. I never - have had and never can have any interest separate from yours. Alas! - that you should not have known my worth! I will delay the despatch - of the men some days longer. I shall be suspected. If I could know - the truth I would arrange accordingly. If you think that this affair - will succeed, and that an army will come, let me know the truth, and - if it is unlikely, write to me that I may make such arrangements - as shall fully satisfy you that not a cat belonging to you shall - be injured. The retreat of the Caubul Pass was quite a different - affair. All were then our mortal enemies. If I had money I should - not require assistance from any one. Since I have no money, if the - Lord (Auckland) does not think it advisable to send it, I must go - somewhere else. There is not another person but myself who could - manage this affair. I know these men well; and I have not seen a man - who could do anything without my permission. Write these circumstances - to the Governor-General, and tear up this paper. What misfortunes have - befallen! Write explicitly, that arrangements may be made accordingly. - They (the Afghans) have made many petitions regarding Candahar, that - an order may be sent to the prince. It has been written and sent, - carefully worded, to the best of my ability. - - About this affair of Mackeson, I cannot understand what management - this is. If it is true, you are destroying yourselves. I don’t know - whether there is an understanding between you and Shere Singh that - your troops should have a free passage (through the Punjab). I wrote - to Shere Singh that it was a religious war, that he might understand. - Tear up this paper; and remove from about your person the men of this - country.—[_MS. Records._] - - -FROM SHAH SOOJAH TO CAPTAIN MACGREGOR. - -(_Received February 8th._) - - Let it be known to Captain Macgregor, I have no certain intelligence - about affairs. I don’t know what perverseness is this, that up to the - present time you will not appreciate my worth, nor understand your own - position or interests. You do not correctly explain things to me; and - if there is a prospect of your being supported from the rear, and you - have, or are likely to have, a good understanding with Shere Singh, - so that an army may come, then I would act here as such a state of - circumstances would render expedient; but if there be no prospect of - this, and you determine on any other course, I will then take such - measures as may be desirable. May God grant the wish of my heart! I - have prayed God to grant this prayer. God is omnipotent. Write to the - Governor-General. I am not happy in this country; but if my friends - desire it, I cannot oppose myself to their wishes. The settlement of - that country can be satisfactorily managed; but the country could - never have been settled in the manner in which you were making - arrangements.—[_MS. Records._] - - -FROM H. M. SHAH SOOJAH TO CAPTAIN MACGREGOR. - - Let it be known to Mr. Macgregor, to the General, and to the other - gentlemen, that which I did not wish to see, and which never entered - into my imagination, it has been my lot to see. What I have already - suffered, and am suffering, is known only to God. - - Although I frequently remonstrated, they paid no attention to my - words. These men have made fraud and deceit their trade. * * * During - the time they were committing these excesses, and would not come - in for some days, they continued plundering the shops and exciting - disturbances in the city; and in this business all the Sirdars were - concerned, and on this account the lower orders became like hungry - dogs: but God shamed them, for they got nothing. What has happened was - fated, and was owing to our own neglect. However much I said, “Come up - above; the fort is strong; for one year no one can be brought within - it; with my servants, and from 500 to 1000 others, the fort would be - strong; and 2000 or 3000 others, with guns, sallying out might collect - grain”—[it was in vain.] However, it has passed—such was our fate. I - sent messages to cantonments, begging them not to defer their coming - from to-day to to-morrow, from to-morrow to next day—that, please - God, all would be right. - - I had collected five or six lakhs of rupees in gold mohurs, knowing - that these people, except for money, would not act honestly, even with - God. I spent three or four lakhs of rupees amongst them. Every tribe - made oath, wrote on the Koran, and sealed; but they still said, “The - King and the Feringhees are one.” However, I have managed to bring - them thus far, and given two lakhs more. It is a pity that I have no - more money. If I had any more, and could raise 2000 or 3000 sowars, - and 2000 foot-soldiers of my own, I would defy any one to stir. The - foot-soldiers, too, who returned from the army, I collected—300 or - 400—that they might be with my regiment. Oh! that God had never let - me see this day! Although, if money reaches me, God will prosper - everything. To give money to an enemy to collect troops, and to come - and kill you, did ever any one so trust an enemy? Even now have - nothing to say to that dog.[357] This, too, I have said to you, even - as I warned you before. I am night and day absorbed in this one - thought; it has occurred to my mind that it would be better if the - few ladies and gentlemen should be brought here, in order that they - might be released from the hands of that dog. This entered my mind, - and I consulted with the Sirdars, and brought them to agree; before - this, I had sent a paper to this effect to that dog. It struck me - that that dog would not release and send them here. I then decided - that it would be judicious that Jubbar Khan should be sent. I hope - that he will bring them to this place in safety. By the blessing of - God, my mind will be at ease. No one will have power to say anything - to them; they will remain in safety. If this is approved of by you, - I will take this course; but inform me if you do not approve of it, - and can suggest anything else, that it may be arranged. Now, men of - all ranks are flocking to me. * * * I have asked of God—if some - money could be obtained all would go well, by God’s assistance. * * - * At present, my subjects make petition to me to send money, and one - of the princes with guns and an army to Candahar. * * * I had sent - for Mr. Conolly, and other gentlemen, to consult with them, as they - had themselves asked the Sirdar to send for them; but some one said - to them, “If you go to the King he will kill you.” It was their (the - Sirdars’) intention that the King should kill them. They had sent me - word secretly beforehand. I replied, that if the world was upset, and - every one my enemy, I would not do so. They then said, that it was - really true what Jubbar Khan and Oosman Khan had said—that the King - was not separate from the Feringhees. If he is, they said, give these - (English gentlemen) to the king, that he may kill them. I heard this, - and gave them answer. They understood their position, and repented of - the step they had taken. Since this occurrence they come and go; and - I have re-assured them. They now swear and protest that they will do - nothing whatever without my wishes. If you think it can be done, God - will shame my enemies.—[_MS. Records._] - - -FROM SHAH SOOJAH TO CAPTAIN MACGREGOR. - -(_Written in secret by the Shah himself. Received at Jellalabad on the -7th of March._) - - This is the state of affairs—that night and day I am disturbed about - you. God help us! I did not wish to see such a day as this. All day I - am thinking of this. The evil-disposed Mahomed Akbar, from the day he - went to Lughman, has managed matters by the means of the money which - was given to him. From that quarter letters arrived here (Caubul), - and money was given to men who went to join him; at length it was - put a stop to, some men were even stripped (on their way to join) in - Bootkhak. At last, people went under the plea of Gazza (religious - war); by these means only a few now go. It is nearly one month that - I have delayed (sending troops to Jellalabad): no accounts have been - received (from you). I have made myself unpopular with all Mahomedans - on your account, and you have not comprehended it. This is an affair - affecting life. Up to this time nothing is known (of your intentions). - I know not upon what misfortunes I have fallen; and these men are - displeased with me (saying) “It is not the Shah’s wish that we should - go to Jellalabad; he wishes to destroy the true faith.” God help us! - There is no saying when those men (British troops) will arrive. If - things are thus managed, what may be expected in Hindoostan? - - I am altogether devoted to you—may God protect me! If they (British - troops) arrive within the next ten or fifteen days, it is well; but - if not, what ought to be done? Whatever you think advisable, write to - me plainly, that it may be well understood and arrangements made. I - am always thinking how I can obtain possession of those gentlemen and - ladies, that they may be in safety, and that this villain (Mahomed - Akbar) may not injure them. - - I sent a message to Mahomed Shah (Ghilzye) that, if any injury - happened to them (the English prisoners), I would revenge it on him - and his family, and root out his race, and that I would seize him. God - will prosper this matter, though it is very difficult and complicated. - - These rascals (Afghans) make numerous oaths, and in their hearts there - is villany. May God put them to shame! - - The true state of the case is this; if you think it will succeed, and - that they (British troops) will arrive, the sooner the better. This is - not a matter to be trifled with. - - Shumshoodeen Khan, who went to Ghuznee, I ordered not to press the - garrison hard until I had completed an engagement with you. - - I have forgotten my own sorrows, and am grieving for yours. Neither - day nor night can I rest, nor think of anything else. - - If I came myself (to Jellalabad), I could arrange the affair as - I wished. It has two advantages and one objection. I am puzzled. - God deliver me! All that has happened has been caused by want of - forethought. Now may God give me assistance! - - I always said to Sir William Macnaghten that this affair would end - badly. - - The day that he made arrangements for leaving (Caubul for Bombay) I - was ready to precede him, saying that I did not like the appearance of - things here. He did not listen to me. The bearer will inform you of - other particulars. What can I do? These men are the greatest curse in - the world. If I had any money I could collect my army—then “could - it be in the power of any one to injure even a dog that belonged to - you?”—[_MS. Records._] - -The letters which Macgregor wrote in reply to the Shah were very brief, -and intended to convey as little meaning as possible. One or two -specimens will suffice: - - -CAPTAIN MACGREGOR TO HIS MAJESTY SHAH SOOJAH. - - Your Majesty’s letter was received by me on the 21st of January, and I - feel much honoured. The fact is, that what has occurred was fated. It - is true that they (the British) made a mistake in not following your - Majesty’s advice. - - Please God, you may rest at ease regarding affairs here. In this - quarter there is no enemy except Mahomed Akbar, who is at Lughman, and - is the foe both of your Majesty and the British Government. The rabble - of Ghilzyes who were with him have carried away to their homes what - they were able to steal. With the exception of 200 or 300 Barukzyes - there is no one else with him. And please God, if he comes, he will - meet with a warm reception. - - A copy of your Majesty’s letter was immediately forwarded to Peshawur, - requesting that it might be sent with all possible haste to the - Governor-General, and that an answer might be received, which may be - soon expected. Rest at ease, that while I breathe I will not fail to - assist your Majesty to the utmost of my ability. The army with the - artillery may be considered to have arrived near this; indeed, they - will be here as soon as the distance can be crossed. - - -FROM CAPTAIN MACGREGOR TO HIS MAJESTY SHAH SOOJAH. - - March 9th. - - Your Majesty’s letter, which was sent by the hands of a trustworthy - person, has been received. Please God, if you can only cause delay for - one month, whatever may be your wish can be arranged. Rest at ease, - since the army under General Pollock, together with the Sikh force, - has arrived at Peshawur, and may be considered as having arrived near - this. Whatever the bearer of this may say is worthy of belief.—[_MS. - Records._] - - -NOTT’S LETTERS TO ENGLAND AND POLLOCK. - -[_Book VIII., chapter 1, page 179, et seq._] - - Candahar, April 18th, 1842. - - SIR, - - I have been favoured with your letters of the 1st and 10th instant. - I have also heard of the affair you had with the enemy on the 28th - ultimo, and deeply regret the result. I have attentively perused the - government despatch of the 15th ultimo forwarded through you. I have - looked at our position in Afghanistan in every point of view that my - judgment, aided by three years’ experience of its people, will admit - of. I now deliberately note what I consider to be necessary to carry - out the intention of the Supreme Government, and to assert and uphold - the honour of our country, even should the government ultimately - determine on withdrawing the British troops from the right of the - Indus, it would be impossible to retire the troops below the passes - before October. The troops at Candahar are four months in arrears, - and we have not one rupee in the treasury. In the event of much field - service we should run short of musket ammunition, and we are without - medicine for the sick and wounded. I think it absolutely necessary - that a strong brigade of 2500 men should be immediately pushed - from Quettah to Candahar with the supplies noted in the foregoing - paragraph. I therefore have to acquaint you that I will direct a - brigade of three regiments of infantry, a troop of horse artillery, - with a body of cavalry, to march from Candahar on the morning of - _the 25th instant_. This force will certainly be at Chummun, at the - northern foot of the Kojuck, on the morning of the 1st of May, and - possibly on the 30th of this month. I shall, therefore, fully rely - on your marching a brigade from Quettah, so that it may reach the - southern side of the pass on the above-mentioned date. I believe there - can be no difficulty whatever in accomplishing this, nor of crossing - the Kojuck without loss, provided the heights are properly crowned on - either side. I have crossed it three times in command of troops, and - I know that what I now state is correct. There can be no danger in - passing through Pisheen provided a careful and well-ordered march is - preserved, and patroles and flanking parties of horse are thrown well - out. The people of this country cannot withstand our troops in the - open field. I am well aware that war cannot be made without loss, but - yet, perhaps, the British troops can oppose Asiatic armies without - defeat; and I feel and know that British officers should never despair - of punishing the atrocious and treacherous conduct of a brutal enemy. - You say you are not aware if I know the localities of Quettah. I know - them well and I hope I shall be excused when I express my surprise - that the authorities at Quettah should for a moment have thought of - throwing up breastworks and entrenching that straggling and wretched - cantonment, when the town and its citadel is so well calculated for - every purpose which can render a post at all desirable in Shawl, and - I am quite certain may be well defended by 500 men. Did I command at - Quettah, I would relinquish the cantonment—it is useless. Quettah is - not a place for a large body of troops. I feel obliged to you for - pointing out the many difficulties attending our position, but you - are aware that it is our first and only duty to overcome difficulties - when the national honour and military reputation is so deeply - concerned—nothing can be accomplished without effort and perseverance. - On the last para. of your letter of the 10th instant, I have only to - observe that I have not yet contemplated falling back. Without money - I can neither pay the long arrears due to the troops, nor procure - carriage for field operations. I deeply regret this state of things, - which ought to have been attended to months ago. Had this been done, - I should now have been on my march to Ghuznee. I shall fully rely on - your brigade being at the Kojuck on the 1st of May or before. This - letter I request may be forwarded to Major Outram. - - W. NOTT, Major-General. - - To Major-General England, commanding - S. F. Force. - - P.S.—You will of course perceive that I intend your brigade should - join and accompany the detachment sent from this to Candahar. I have - no cattle for treasure or stores. - - [It was with no common anxiety that Nott awaited the return of - his regiments from Candahar. He had sent them reluctantly to the - Kojuck, and was eager to commence operations in another direction—to - march upon Ghuznee, and then onward to meet Pollock at the capital. - In the letters which he addressed at this time to his brother - General at Jellalabad, his feelings found vent. They are eminently - characteristic:] - - Candahar, April 29th, 1842. - - MY DEAR GENERAL, - - My last news from your side was of the 5th instant. I regret I am not - on my way to Ghuznee—I am tied to this place. My troops have had no - pay since December, 1841. I am in want of almost everything. I have - not carriage even for three regiments, and I have not a rupee to buy - or to hire cattle. For five months I have been calling for aid from - Sindh--none whatever has been sent. At last Major-General England - moved with money and stores, but received a check in Pisheen, and then - retired to Shawl! I have now been obliged to send the best part of my - force to the Kojuck Pass, in hopes of getting the treasure and stores - I have so long been expecting, and without which my small force is - paralysed. It is dreadful to think of all this. I ought to have been - on my way to extend my hand to you from Ghuznee instead of which I - am obliged to make a movement on the Kojuck. I have felt the want of - cavalry. I have the Shah’s 1st Regiment, but I have never been able to - _get them to charge_. My Sepoys have behaved nobly, and have licked - the Afghans in every affair, even when five times their number. The - moment my brigade returns from the Kojuck I move on Kelat-i-Ghilzye - and Ghuznee, in hopes of saving some of our officers and men at the - latter place. Instead of sending me cavalry, money, &c., the authority - in Sindh coolly says, “When you retire bodily I hope to render you - some assistance.” I believe I shall go mad! I have much to say, but am - confined to a slip of paper. - - Yours sincerely, - W. NOTT.[358] - - * * * * * - - Candahar, May 6th, 1842. - - MY DEAR GENERAL, - - I have this day received your letter of the 14th ultimo. I had before - heard of your progress up to the 6th of April: this is the only note - I have received from you. I enclose a copy of my note of the 29th - of last month, which was sent _viâ_ Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and by which - you will perceive how much I have been disappointed, and the state - of the force under my command. It drove me almost mad to be forced - to send the best part of my force to the Kojuck Pass instead of - marching towards Caubul; but I had not a rupee to pay the long arrears - of the troops, or to purchase cattle. The people of this country - unfortunately have an idea that we are to retire whether we are - successful or not, and therefore they will part with nothing; and, - as far as cattle are concerned, we are nearly helpless. God knows - why such delay has occurred in sending me money and stores. This is - dreadful. I shall move towards Caubul the moment I can get carriage. - General England’s retrograde movement has been a sad disappointment to - me. - - Yours sincerely, - W. NOTT.[359] - - P.S.—England has now, with the aid of my brigade, crossed the pass. He - brings with him two twelve-pounder howitzers; but for these I should - not have a single howitzer at command. Mortars I have none. I expect - the troops here on the 10th. The Ghazehs still keep head within a few - miles of us, not in great strength: the nucleus, however, exists. I - have directed all camels within reach to be procured on any terms: - want of money alone prevented me doing this earlier. The force I shall - take from this must depend upon the available cattle. I trust it may - amount to 5000 men. Rely on my making every effort to communicate - with you; but from past experience I must regard this as extremely - doubtful, and that we must not depend on mutual intelligence enabling - us to make combined movements. No opportunity shall be lost; but if - all attempts at correspondence fail, I will still hope that, as we - have one object at heart, the similarity of our operations may in some - measure supply the want of a concerted plan. - - -GENERAL NOTT AND THE SHAH’S FIRST CAVALRY. - -[With reference to the passage in one of the above letters, to the -effect that the Shah’s cavalry would not charge, I have received the -following letter:] - - - Jhelum, April 28, 1852. - - MY DEAR SIR, - - In the second volume of your “War in Afghanistan,” page 447. General - Sir William Nott, in a letter to General Sir George Pollock, dated - Candahar, April 29, 1842, states: - - “I have felt the want of cavalry. I have the Shah’s 1st Regiment, but - I have never been able _to get them to charge_.” - - Captain Leeson, who commanded the regiment during my absence on - sick leave, has since died. I therefore desire, without delay, to - contradict this most extraordinary assertion. Fortunately, the - regiment has built too solid a foundation by its own gallantry - to be shaken by so malicious a representation, albeit made by a - General Officer in whose word and opinion the public and Government - placed such implicit faith; but General Nott was prejudiced against - everything and everybody in any way connected with Shah Soojah and his - country. - - Facts are stubborn things, and I shall therefore make a few extracts - from your valuable history of the War, which of themselves give denial - to General Nott’s _mis-statement_. - - Page 441, vol. i., states: - - “A gallant charge of the Shah’s Horse, led by Peter Nicolson” (who - took no undistinguished part in the after events of the war), “checked - the onslaught of those desperate fanatics.” - - In the engagement alluded to (page 591, vol. i.) at Assea Ilmee, no - mention is made of the Shah’s 1st Cavalry; but it is well known that, - under the command of Captain Leeson, aided by Lieutenant Moorcroft - of the Madras Army, who was proceeding to join his regiment at - Kelat-i-Gilzhee, and, who was a volunteer for the occasion, the Shah’s - 1st Cavalry did make a very gallant charge by moonlight. - - Page 603, vol. i., states: - - “And then the Cavalry, headed by the young Prince Sufdur Jung, who had - something more than the common energy of the Piczal race, charged with - terrific effect, and utterly broke the discomfited mass of Dooranies.” - - It is true that the Prince did _accompany_ the charge, but a squadron - of the Shah’s 1st Cavalry, under Lieutenant Crawford of the Bombay - Army, who was wounded, did nearly all the execution, and followed in - pursuit long after the Dooranie Horse under his Royal Highness had - given up the chase. - - Page 400, vol ii., states: - - “A party of the Shah’s Horse, under Captain Leeson, and a detachment - of Captain Wilson’s Jan Baz, who had remained true to us in the - face of strong temptation, were sent out against the mutineers. The - detachment came up with the rebels about twelve miles from Candahar. - There was a brief but sturdy conflict. The mutineers charged in a - body, but were gallantly met by Leeson’s men, and, after a hard - struggle, were broken and dispersed.” - - I send you a copy of Captain Leeson’s report of the affair. General - Nott expressed to Captain Leeson his admiration of the gallantry of - the regiment, and his determination to recommend it to the marked - notice of Government. - - Whatever his expressed intentions were, I have very good reason for - believing that he never fulfilled them! - - * * * * * - - No. 235. Candahar, 28th December, 1841. - - SIR, - - I have the honour to report for the information of the Major-General - that, agreeably to his orders, I proceeded in search of the mutineers - of the 1st Jan Baz Regiment with the details as per margin,[360] and, - having received information on the road of a body of horse being in - the direction of Chupreal, I ordered the Afghan Horse, who were in - front, to proceed at a trot. After proceeding three or four miles they - halted, and appeared in confusion, and on my riding to the front to - learn the reason, I found they would not obey their officers’ orders - to form, in consequence of the mutineers of whom we were in pursuit - being drawn up to receive them, amounting from 250 to 300 men, joined - by about 80 footmen, who, however, took no active part in the fight. - - I immediately took the lead with my regiment, formed into line, and - advanced at a trot. After proceeding a little distance, my progress - was arrested by a wide ditch, through which I had to pass my regiment - by files, and which was performed most steadily. The mutineers, seeing - us advance so slowly, fancied us to be wavering and advanced to the - charge. I waited for the last files to cross the ditch, when I charged - them. The collision was severe, and the conflict, for the time it - lasted, bloody, as will be seen by the accompanying return of killed - and wounded. The struggle lasted for about five minutes, when the - mutineers broke and fled in two bodies. I pursued that which appeared - to me the largest one, upwards of fourteen miles, cutting down the - only three stragglers we came up with, and having seen the body enter - the enclosed country on the Urghandab below Hinz-i-Muddud Khan, and - having only sixteen men with me, I gave up the chase. - - It is impossible that men could have behaved better than those of the - 1st Cavalry. Their formations were as steadily performed as ever I saw - them done on parade, and they advanced on the foe in as beautiful a - line as possible. - - The whole of our work was done by the sabre, not a shot being fired on - our side from either matchlock or pistol, thus proving the confidence - these men have acquired in their proper weapon. - - I regret to say that the conduct of the 2nd Jan Baz was shameful and - cowardly. In the first instance, they refused to form when ordered - by their officer, until sheltered by my line, and afterwards, when - ordered by him to cross the water-course and join in the attack, they - refused, notwithstanding the gallant example set them by Lieutenant - Wilson, who charged, followed by his standard-bearer, alone. He was - immediately joined by several of my men, who, seeing the precarious - situation of their old adjutant, rallied round him, and I must not - omit to mention that the lives of myself and Lieutenants Chamberlain - and Wilson, who were with me, were saved by the devotion of these - gallant men, who, whenever we were in danger, rushed to the rescue. - - It seemed to be the main object of the mutineers to destroy the - officers, which must inevitably have been the case, had it not been - for the devotion of the men of the 1st Cavalry. - - I have not mentioned the number of the enemy slain. I should say they - must have amounted to between fifty and sixty, for I saw from twenty - to twenty-five fall near me, and Lieutenant Wilson reports having seen - thirty to forty bodies in the direction he took. The pursuit being - immediate, there was no time to look about us, and on my return to - the field of action, there were only three bodies remaining, which I - believe to have been those of Sheeahs. - - I have the honour to be, &c., - (Signed) - JOSEPH LEESON, - Captain Commanding Shah’s 1st Cavalry. - - To Captain Ripley, - Fort Adjutant, Candahar. - -Killed: 1 sowar, 26 horses.—Wounded: 1 resaldar, 1 naib, 1 jemadar, 1 -duffadar, 26 sowars, 16 horses. - - * * * * * - -Four months after this event, which I believe _was the only instance -throughout the whole war_ where _both parties met at full gallop in -good earnest_, General Nott was pleased to say “I have never been able -_to get them to charge_.” - -But I will adduce further proof of General Nott’s untruth. - -Page 404, vol. ii., states: - -“But the Cavalry, with two Horse Artillery guns, were now slipped upon -the enemy, who broke and fled in dismay.” - -This was sixteen days after Chuplanee, and the men were mad to be at -the enemy—indeed, they would not be restrained, and no sooner was the -charge sounded than, with a terrific yell, they flew over the plain in -pursuit of an intimidated foe, who knew from experience that they would -give no quarter, and ask none. - -We now come to the cause of General Nott’s aspersion of the Regiment. - -Page 416, vol. ii., most truly states: - -“But they shrank from meeting our bayonets, and it was long before they -even ventured to come within reach of our guns. The artillery then told -with such good effect on the dense masses of the enemy, that they were -more than ever disinclined to approach us.” - -It was on the 8th of March 1842, the day after General Nott took the -field ostensibly to war, but truly to feed his half-starved cattle, -that the enemy, who had threatened our camp on the previous evening, -were now collected in dense masses and _entirely cavalry_. They owed -the Shah’s 1st Regiment a grudge for the lesson read to the mutinous -Jan Baz, and they were determined to pay them off. General Nott’s -cavalry, consisting of 400 sabres Shah’s 1st Cavalry, and 150 of -Skinner’s Horse, certainly the aggregate was not 600, were pushed to -the front with Anderson’s twelve guns, commanded by Captains Cooper and -Turner. The country was intersected by large, deep, wide water-courses, -over which there was great difficulty in transporting the guns. General -Nott and his Infantry were fully _one mile_ in the rear, with two or -three of the nullahs alluded to between. The cavalry and guns were -halted after some cannonading at the enemy, who hovered in front and on -both flanks. Captain Saunders, of the Engineers, brought up an order -from General Nott, desiring Captain Leeson to charge the enemy, but -which body, or to which flank, was not named. Captain Leeson’s reply -was, “If I do, the enemy will possess himself of the guns, as they will -be totally unsupported.” From a mound close at hand the enemy were seen -in swarms, computed from 5000 men and upwards, and _all cavalry_. A -second, and a third, and a fourth message were brought by Lieutenant -North, Bombay Engineers, and Captains Polwhele and Waterfield, and -one of them brought word to say that General Nott had desired him to -say that if Captain Leeson would not lead the charge, he would do -so himself. Whilst this delay occurred, a party of the enemy having -seen Skinner’s Horse, under Lieutenant Travers, on the other side of -a village, determined to destroy them, and came down to the attack. -Travers flew for refuge to the guns, which had hardly wheeled about -for action. Nor had the Shah’s 1st Cavalry much time to form close -column in rear of the guns, which were drawn up in a curve, when a -body of the Dooranie Horse charged down with yells, brandishing their -swords and waving their flags along the ground. They were received with -grape, and it was not until several saddles had been emptied that they -withdrew. This attempt to charge the guns, _supported by_ ALL _General -Nott’s cavalry_, showed in what estimation, in their then _overpowering -numbers_, the Dooranies held the Hindostanee Horse!! Opinions were -divided as to the propriety of Captain Leeson’s refusal to charge: by -many he was censured, and by many he was praised _highly_, for having -had the _moral_ courage (when from General Nott’s distance from the -scene, and the amount of responsibility which devolved upon him) to -determine not uselessly to lead a regiment to utter destruction, _and -not to sacrifice twelve out of General Nott’s only eighteen guns_! He -did all that he could do. He immediately tendered the resignation of -his command, which was not accepted. He begged for a court of inquiry, -and demanded a court martial. He attended upon General Nott, and -personally tendered resignation a second time, and a second time it -was refused, General Nott assuring him that he was well satisfied with -him, &c., but that in having disobeyed his orders to charge, _he had -committed an error in judgment_. I doubt not but that it was founded -upon this event, that General Nott wrote as he did. But surely it was -no fault of the regiment. The men had never been ordered to charge. Had -they, they would have done so most willingly! - -Again page 423, vol. ii., states: - -“The bright afternoon sun shed its slant rays upon the sabres of the -enemy, and lit them up like a burning forest. Our Infantry were drawn -up in a hollow square, covering a crowd of camels. The Horse Artillery -guns, which had done such good service before, were playing gloriously, -under Turner’s direction, upon the dense bodies of the enemy’s Horse, -whom their heavy fire kept at a cautious distance; and just as General -Nott, with the reinforcements, came in sight, Lieutenant Chamberlain, -of the Bengal Service, an officer of the Shah’s Cavalry, who, at the -head of a small party, had charged the enemy, was driven back, and -emerging from a cloud of dust, formed in rear of the Infantry with the -loss of a few men killed, himself and many of his party wounded, but -not without having given very satisfactory proof of his power as a -swordsman, albeit his treacherous weapon had broken in his hand.” - -This occurred at Baba Wullee 25th March, and everyone in the force -except General Nott was aware that the combined charge of a party -of the Shah’s 1st Cavalry, and a similar party of Skinner’s Horse, -although most unnecessarily ordered by Colonel Wymer commanding, was -most gallantly executed. - -Page 587, vol. ii., in a foot note, in a letter from General Nott to -Lieutenant Hamersley, dated June 2nd, alluding to an action fought -under the walls of Candahar, he says “a detail of the 1st Cavalry, -under Chamberlain, behaved very well indeed:” but he never said so in -his public despatch, nor did he ever allude to the recovery by the -Shah’s 1st Cavalry of the guns which Shumshoodeen carried off after the -action of Ghoine, but to which allusion is made in page 602, vol. ii. - -General Nott was determined that the Shah’s Cavalry never should have -any credit. He said after the action at Ghoine that he would mention -their gallantry, but that he did not do so, everyone knows. - -I think I have said quite sufficient to disprove General Nott’s -assertion. I do not consider it just, quietly to submit to the charge -of cowardice imputed to the regiment on the page of history. - -The Shah’s 1st Cavalry has for some years past been transferred into -the 9th Regiment Irregular Cavalry, and the mottoes on the standards, -gallantly displayed by them, are refutations of Sir William Nott’s -assertion. - -In proportion as your work has had an extensive circulation, so am I -desirous that this explanation should be made known; and when your work -goes through the second edition, I trust you will make such remarks as -may be an antidote to the letter which has caused this long statement. - - Believe me, my dear Sir, faithfully yours, - J. CHRISTIE, Lieutenant-Colonel, - Commanding 9th Irregular Cavalry, - Late Commanding Shah Soojah’s 1st Cavalry. - - To J. W. Kaye, Esq., Bletchingley, Surrey. - -[_Book VIII., chapter 3, page 226._] - -[The following is the letter from Pottinger to Macgregor, alluded to -in the text. It is important, as showing what, in the course of my -researches after truth has been emphatically denied, that at this early -period Akbar Khan had begun to open negociations for the restoration of -Dost Mahomed.] - - “Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan has been with us to-day; and from what I - can learn, it seems that Shah Soojah has entirely thrown us overboard, - and is about to proceed to open war with us; and the following appears - to be the grounds on which he wishes to treat. The agreement he wishes - us to enter into is, that if Shah Soojah, or any of Shah Soojah’s sons - in enmity to the English may send an army to attack Jellalabad, it - will thus become evident that the King is the enemy of the English; - and the English will treat him as such—and then Sirdar Mahomed Akbar - Khan will be considered the friend of the English, who will act - according to his wishes with respect to this country, and will release - the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan with all his family, and send them to - this country with all honour and respect, and will restore him to his - government, in the same manner as they took it from him to give it to - Shah Soojah; but will leave to the Ameer and Sirdar Mahomed Khan the - full control of the people and government; and if any enemy attack - the government thus established, the British Government will aid it - with either money or an army, and the friends of the one government - will be the friends of the other. The agreement which the Sirdar - will enter into is this, that he will hereafter be the friend of the - English; but that at present, to prevent himself being abused by his - people, he must proceed to close the Khybur Pass against the approach - of the English army; but he will not attempt to attack Jellalabad - before the arrival of Shah Soojah’s son and army; and after their - arrival he will use every endeavour to secretly aid the garrison until - the arrival of his father and family.” [_Major Pottinger to Major - Macgregor: Budeeabad, January 23, 1842. MS. Correspondence._] From - Major Pottinger’s letters written about this time, his real opinion of - the conduct of Akbar Khan can only be extracted by ascertaining the - circumstances under which the different documents were prepared—some - of them having been written at the request of the Sirdar himself. - There are two letters of January 23, one of an official tendency, - quoted above—the other of a more private and more genuine character, - in which the writer says: “He” (Akbar Khan) “sent out the day before - yesterday a Persian letter for me to send to you in English; I wrote - a letter telling you the meaning, which he sent back to-day, and - requesting me to give him an exact copy of his own. I have done so it - is true; but I fancy his humanity was only a sham, and every sinew - was strained to destroy our poor fellows. He has, however, treated - us personally well, and very much so.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] The - despatch of these private letters was discovered by the Sirdar, who - is said to have disarmed all the prisoners in consequence of this - discovery.—[_Eyre._] - - -THE EARTHQUAKE AT BUDEEABAD. - -[_Book VIII., chapter 3, page 226._] - -“_February 19._—At about eleven we were visited by the most fearful -earthquake within the memory of any man in this country. The day -was beautifully clear, and nothing indicated the approach of such -a visitation. Most of us were inside our rooms, when we heard a -heavy rumbling noise, as of thousands of heavy carriages. This was -immediately succeeded by a heaving of the earth, which caused a rocking -of the walls, and made us all rush out into the court-yard, which we -had no sooner entered than the shock, which had ceased for an instant, -again came on with a hundred-fold violence. The high massive walls by -which we were surrounded, heaved to and fro most fearfully, whilst -we, for security, huddled together as closely as we possibly could -in the centre of the square, where there was a deep wood-cellar. All -of a sudden, there was a frightful crash around us; and the earth -heaved up and down to such a degree that we could scarcely stand. The -crash was succeeded by a dense cloud of dust, which, for five or six -seconds, prevented our seeing the amount of injury done. The walls of -the wood-cellar fell in. The earth around us was giving way; and we -were afraid to move to the right or left, as it would bring us within -range of the walls which were falling on both sides of us. The shock -had now expended itself. The dust cleared away. And we then saw that -our out-houses and the roof of one of our sleeping-rooms had tumbled -in. The upper parts of the walls were down, and those portions -which still remained were either thrown out of their perpendicular -or had large rents in them. God grant we may never again experience -such a visitation. On the shock ceasing, we went outside the fort, -and frightful was the devastation. The whole valley was one cloud of -dust. Almost every part had been either wholly or partially destroyed, -and great was the loss of life. Even mountains did not escape; and -fearful were the crashes of huge rocks, as they were precipitated -with awful violence to the plains below. We had shocks at least a -dozen times during the day—but none of so alarming a nature as the -first.”—[_Captain Johnson’s Narrative of his Captivity. MS._] - - -LETTER OF FUTTEH JUNG TO CAPTAIN MACGREGOR. - -[_Book VIII., chapter 5, page 265._] - - HIGH IN PLACE, - - The astounding event of the Shah’s murder will be known to you. These - treacherous tyrants, how tyrannical has been their act! If the Shah - had not been united to the interests of the English, and had not - attended and acted according to their advice, why should he have met - with such an end, and why was he with them until the last, save that - he hoped for their co-operation? They placed that ungrateful man, - the Nizam-oo-dowlah (Oosman Khan), in power, and, by their acting - according to his advice, matters came to such a pass. The Shah was - aware of the treachery and disaffection of these persons, and how - much soever he warned the English of this, it was of no use. It was - because the Shah looked upon himself and the English as one, and - attended to their pleasure, that the revolution took place; but this - is known to you. The people, high and low, have sealed the Koran, sent - their deputies with it to the Shah, stating that, if the Shah would - forsake the English and ally himself to Islam, they would acknowledge - him as their King. The Shah replied: “They and I are one; I am not - separated from them.” These bastards united and proclaimed the Shah an - infidel. The Shah told the English to leave the cantonments and enter - the Balla Hissar. The English did not consent to this. The Shah then - endeavoured to conciliate the rebels, and night and day took oaths - with them, with the view of carrying out the plans of the English. - After the English left the cantonments, the people tendered to the - Shah their submission, and endeavoured to persuade the King to attack - Jellalabad. The Shah, by a thousand devices, managed for two and a - half months to put them off, in order that the British reinforcements - might reach you. All the money that the Shah possessed he gave to - the people. The people gave out that as the Shah would not go to - Jellalabad, it was evident that he was friendly to the (British) - infidels; he and they were one. The Shah felt embarrassed. He said to - his confidential servants: “If I go to Jellalabad, lakhs of people - would collect, and I should be unable to control them, and if by this - time the British reinforcements had not arrived, it would be bad for - the cause.” The King, not knowing that the reinforcements had arrived, - agreed to leave the city, but determined not to reach Jellalabad for - twenty days—500,000 registered troops—and if he saw that it was to - their advantage, he would join the British. On the 22nd Suffur (5th of - April), the Shah’s murder took place; on the 23rd Suffur, the Populzye - nobles, and Ameen-oollah Khan, Loghuree, placed me on the throne. - Even as the Shah was the friend and well-wisher of the English, so - am I the friend and well-wisher of the English. On account of this - friendship the King sacrificed his life and property. Had he accepted - the friendship of the Mussulmans, the Shah would neither have been - proclaimed an infidel, nor have thus met with his death from the - hands of the Barukzyes. I am not pleased at having been placed on the - throne by these people. If God places me on the throne, and if this - country is again in the possession of the British, and they support - me on the throne and in getting my revenge from these tyrants who - killed the Shah, then I shall be pleased. The Shah sacrificed his - life and property on account of the English, and now it is for them - to uphold the reputation of his family. If in a few days your army - does not arrive at Caubul, they will carry off the Shah’s family. - Write speedily, and tell me what I am to do, and what the family of - the Shah is to do. It is necessary that the British should arrive - soon. The death of the Shah has caused disunion among the chiefs. - It is necessary that your army, with a large army of the Sikhs (God - willing), should advance. When I was first placed on the throne, the - people were considering the death of the Barukzyes, but on hearing - that your army had arrived at Jellalabad, and that Mahomed Akbar had - been defeated, the people agreed to suspend hostilities among us, and - endeavoured to induce me to attack Jellalabad. Up to the present time - this is what they are striving to effect, but I tell them, that if - they will in the first place avenge the Shah’s death, then I’ll go to - Jellalabad. But I am powerless, and shall anxiously expect a letter - from you. Tell me how to act. To defeat this people is at present - very easy, for great is their disunion. Start soon for Caubul.—[_MS. - Records._] - - -DEFEAT OF THE NEWAB ZEMAUN KHAN. - -[_Book VIII., chapter 5, page 277._] - -“The reason of the overthrow of the Newab is the disaffection of -some of the most influential men of his party—the chief one being -Oosman Khan, who was bought over with 1000 gold mohurs. The Pultuns -also went over, and our host (Meer Hadjee) was bribed with 4000 gold -mohurs, and during the fight his brother, Mahomed Dost, took an active -part against the Newab. Poor old Zemaun Khan was a dupe throughout -to Hotspur’s (Akbar Khan’s) perfidy, and a victim to misplaced -confidence.”—[_Lieutenant John Conolly to Captain Macgregor: Caubul, -June 23, 1842. MS. Records._] - -Akbar Khan’s own account of the affair, and of his subsequent treatment -of Zemaun Khan, is on record in the following letter to the Shinwarree -chiefs: “Up to the day of writing this, the 17th of Jamadi-ul-aroal -(26th July), all is well here with me. As it was an object of paramount -importance that in the contest with the race of misguided infidels the -whole of the numbers of the true faith should be united together, and -the attainment and perfecting of this object appeared indispensable, -therefore did the whole of the devoted followers of the true faith -consent to choose me as their head, and to place themselves under -my command. All the tribes and leaders of the Douranees, Ghilzyes, -and Kuzzilbashes and Kakulees and Kohistanees, have submitted to me, -and I have placed on the throne the King, high in power, majestic -as Alexander, ambitious as Kai-Khusro, Shah-zadah Futteh Jung, son -of the late King, and caused the Khutba to be read and coin to be -struck in his name, redoubted as that of Faridoon. Newab Mahomed -Zemaun Khan, having in some respects opposed himself to my views and -interfered with me, at length came to an open rupture, and commenced -hostilities against me. After several of my people had been killed -and wounded, then, and not till then, I, of necessity, gave the order -to them to retaliate. In two hours the engagement was at an end; and -all order being destroyed among the troops of the Newab, they were -dispersed. His guns and magazines, stores and horses, and regiments -and jezailchees, and other appendages of power which he had newly -prepared, all fell into my possession. As the Newab was a part and -parcel of myself—not wishing to reduce him to a state of poverty and -want—I, on the same day, restored to him all his horses: the rest of -his property I kept possession of. Since then, all the leaders of the -different tribes have acknowledged my authority, and I firmly trust -that all my future undertakings will in like manner be crowned with -success, and that the object nearest the hearts of me and you, and all -the race of Islam—viz., the extermination, root and branch, of the -detested race of infidels, may be without difficulty accomplished. -Set your mind perfectly at rest on this subject, and do not entertain -any misgivings, and gird up your loins for action, and be ready with -the fear-inspiring and punishment-inflicting Ghazees, and use your -utmost exertions and efforts to close the Khybur road and intercept -their dawk communications, that their messengers may not pass to and -fro, and that no grain may reach them from any quarter; for this is -the real way to defeat this misguided and detested race,—this is the -real battle of martyrdom which you must fight: therefore consider this -injunction as of the very first importance. In a short time, by the -favour of God the Almighty, and the assistance of the founders of our -religion, this humble servant of God, with a terror-inspiring army from -this country, and an artillery thundering and flashing fire, and with -jezailchees threatening like Mars, and with artillerymen like Saturn, -and Ghazees, who march hand-in-hand with victory, will set out for your -direction: and if it be the will of God, will soon clear the surface -of that country, sweeping from it the rubbish from the bodies of the -enemies of our religion. Meanwhile it behoves you, in anticipation of -the arrival of the exalted standards, the emblems of victory, to spare -no exertions to stir up the strife of religion, and send me constantly -news of your welfare, and of the movements of the vile infidels, that -according to your information I may take measures to counteract them. -Futteh Mahomed, the son of Saadat Khan, is here, and will shortly leave -me to join you with the Ghazees.”—[_MS. Records._] - - -LORD ELLENBOROUGH AND SIR JASPER NICOLLS. - -[_Book IX., chapter 1, page 286._] - -It was not until the 27th of August that the Commander-in-Chief was -informed, by a letter from General Pollock, of the instructions sent to -General Nott on the 4th of July. How entirely the Governor-General had -set aside the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, and what Sir Jasper -Nicolls thought both of Lord Ellenborough’s conduct and of the advance -on Caubul, may be gathered from the following extracts from his journal: - -“_June 6._—To my astonishment, Lord E., in consequence of General -Pollock’s complaints of want of carriage, has consented to his -remaining beyond the Khybur till October, though he quotes the Duke -of Wellington’s dictum, that an army, which cannot be moved as you -will, is no army at all. He will thus have an unhealthy, difficult -pass behind him for four or five months, and possibly involve us in -another dreadful campaign. These changes are dreadful. I wish that I -had nothing to do with them.” - -“_June 30._—The Secret Committee review the proceedings of Government, -from December to February last, not with asperity, but with decided -disapprobation of the uncertain policy of that time, and the -contradictory resolutions and orders which were then passed. This is -very well deserved, for it was then, in November or December, that -Government ought to have decided to leave the country or to resume our -full control over it.” - -“_August 8._—The wants of General Pollock’s army are put down at 6½ -lakhs _per mensem_, and we are just going to send 20 to clear him -off—the last, I believe and hope, which we shall send to be buried in -the Punjab and Afghanistan. Twenty-one lakhs he had before.” - -“_August 15._—General Nott has fixed on the 2nd of this month for -leaving Candahar, and in two divisions—the Bombay troops by Quettah -and Sukkur—the Bengal column by Dehra Ismael Khan. This is quite new -to me, and may be either ordered by the General or suggested by Lord E.” - -“_August 20._—This order as to retirement by Dehra Ismael Khan appears -the effect of impulse. Its neglect of me I forgive, though a manifest -slight; but I do not find that he has ordered the necessary supplies to -be collected for the retreat through the Sikh territory, which is, in -parts near that place, almost a desert.” - -“_August 24._—The 3rd Dragoons, and another troop of horse artillery, -are about to join Sir R. Sale at Futtehabad. Can the General be now -organising an advance on Caubul? Is he commanded to do so? Can he -effect it? Is he to encamp at Gundamuck till Nott’s attack on Ghuznee -(if that take place)? It is curious that I should have to ask myself -these questions; but so it is. I am wholly ignorant of the intended -movements of either. Lord Ellenborough means to surprise friend and foe -equally.” - -“_August 27._—_To-day_ I find, by a despatch from General Pollock, -that General Nott has decided on returning to the provinces, _viâ_ -Ghuznee and Caubul. Lord E., by letter dated 4th of July, gave him -a choice as to the line by which to withdraw, and he has chosen -this—certainly the noblest and the worthiest; but whether it -will release our prisoners and add to our fame, I cannot venture -to predict. Lord E.’s want of decent attention to my position is -inexcusable.”—[_Sir Jasper Nicolls’ MS. Journal._] - - -THE GHUZNEE PRISONERS. - -[_Book IX., chapter 3, page 349._] - -I have stated in a note that the Caubul prisoners, before their removal -to Bameean, had been joined by their fellow-captives from Ghuznee. -Some idea of the sufferings of the latter may be derived from the -following passages of Lieutenant Crawford’s Narrative: “Every little -thing we had managed to secure, such as watches, penknives, money, -&c., was taken from us, and we were strictly confined to a small -room, eighteen feet by thirteen. In it there were ten of us. * * * -When we lay down at night we exactly occupied the whole floor; and -when we wanted to take a little exercise we were obliged to walk up -and down (six paces) by turns. Few of us had a change of linen, and -the consequence was we were soon swarming with vermin, the catching -of which afforded us an hour’s employment every morning. I wore my -solitary shirt for five weeks, till it became literally black and -rotten. * * * On the 7th of April we heard of Shah Soojah’s death, -and from that date the severities of our confinement were redoubled. -They shut and darkened the solitary window from which we had hitherto -derived light and air, and they also kept the door of our room -constantly closed, so that the air we breathed became perfectly -pestiferous. On the 21st of the month they tortured Colonel Palmer -with a tent-peg and rope in such a manner that it is wonderful he -ever recovered the use of his foot. I cannot in a letter explain the -process of the torture, but we all witnessed it, and it was something -on the principle of the Scotch boot described in ‘Old Mortality.’ * * -* In the end of April our guards suddenly became particularly civil to -us for a few days, and we found that they had a report of the advance -of our troops. * * * On the 12th of May we were permitted to quit our -prison-room, and walk on the terrace of the citadel for one hour. * * -* Just at this period (June 15) one of our number, Lieutenant Davis, -27th N. I., had sickened with typhus fever. We had no medicines, no -comforts for him, and he lay on the ground delirious, raving about home -and his family, and every hour proving worse, till, on the 19th, death -put an end to his sufferings. We read the burial service, and then made -his body over to the guard to bury; but I am afraid they merely flung -the poor fellow into a ditch outside the gate. On the following day we -were removed to another building, where we had three or four rooms to -ourselves, and a court-yard to walk about in. This was a delightful -change. From this date the conduct of Shumshoodeen towards us improved -greatly. * * * It was on the 19th of August, we had, as usual, wrapped -ourselves up in our cloaks, and taken lodgings on the cold ground for -the night, when the chief suddenly entered the yard, and told us we -were to march immediately for Caubul; and sure enough in half an hour -we found ourselves moving towards the capital. * * * We went direct -to Mahomed Akbar’s quarters in the Balla Hissar, and from him we -met with the kindest reception. He bade us be of good cheer, as our -future comfort would be his care, and we should find ourselves treated -like officers and gentlemen. * * * We found our countrymen living in -what appeared to us a small paradise. They had comfortable quarters, -servants, money, and no little baggage, and a beautiful garden to walk -in.” - -THE ALLEGED EXCESSES AT CAUBUL. - -[_Book IX., chapter 3, page 360._] - - ABSTRACT TRANSLATION OF A LETTER - FROM GHOLAM MAHOMED KHAN, THE - WUZEER, AND KHAN SHEREEN KHAN REMARKS BY GENERAL NOTT. - THE KUZZIL-BASH CHIEF, TO THE - ADDRESS OF GENERAL POLLOCK, C.B. - - A.C. - - On the 14th of Shah Bau 1. This is unfounded, with the - (20th September) the inhabitants exception of a few worthless - of Aushar and Chardeh were articles, stolen by surwans and - plundered by the Candahar force, grass-cutters, for which they were - and sustained loss of life and most severely punished. - property(1): their women were - not respected. In the village of 2. I never heard of two Afghans - Deh Dānā Causim, and in Zeibah having been killed; but - Shewan Khan, and at Chardeh, four Europeans unarmed, walking - two persons were killed(2). at a little distance from - The Ausharries are employed in camp, were killed by these - your service, in the rescue of monsters. - your prisoners: if their houses - are plundered and their people(3) 3. What people? The population - killed, all confidence among the of this valley had left ithave - people will at once be destroyed. before my force had arrived, and - If it is your intention that not been here since, with the - protectionshould be afforded to exception of a few individuals. - the people, and to avail yourself - of our resources(4), redress 4. Why are not these resources - should be granted under our brought in when an extravagant - promises of protection to the price is offered for them? - people returning to their homes. - 5. This is a false assertion, for - We are satisfied that it is not which the writer ought to be - your pleasure that the troops instantly punished: the troops - should behave in this manner(5). have not behaved ill. - - To-day, the 15th of Shau Bau 6. What this man means by this I - (21st September), the army know not; no army, no detachment - which was appointed to destroy was appointed by me to destroy a - Meer Hajee’s fort also destroyed fort. I did hear that General Sale - the property belonging to people ordered one to be burnt, but - of the neighbourhood: these whether he did so or no I do not - people should also have redress know; but if he did, I dare say he - granted them(6). had good reasons. - - If the English do not grant 7. I repeat that there are no - them redress, the ryots(7) will ryots in the villages. All men - fly from their homes, and they capable of bearing arms are with - will have no longer confidence different chiefs, and there is no - in us. knowing the hour we may be - attacked by them. - Just now news has reached us - that the Candahar force has 8. Yes, I have encamped, and - encamped at Allaábád(8), which I can but admire the extreme - belongs to us, and where our insolence of this man in presuming - families are lodged(9); the force to object to it. - has already plundered our grain - and fruit(10). 9. This is false; there are no - families near the place. - If your friends suffer in this - way, what may your enemies 10. This is false; with the - expect?(11) Those people who exception of fruit in the - returned to the town are leaving immediate vicinity of camp. - it again. - 11. We have not a friend in - Redress should be speedily Afghanistan; and I know what - granted, and Lamars should be our enemies ought to expect for - stationed at each village for its their cruelty, treachery, and - protection(12). bloody murders. - - 12. What insolence in this - man, whose hands are still red - with the blood of our countrymen, - to dictate how and where - we are to place our troops! - - I cannot conclude my remarks - on this document without offering - my opinion that the writer - should be instantly seized and - punished for sending such a - grossly false and insolent - statement. - - W. NOTT, M.-Gen. - - - Camp near Caubul, 22nd September, 1842. - - SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of - this day’s date, and to acquaint you that I conceive that General - Pollock, C.B., must have received some erroneous information. No army - ever moved with fewer instances of plunder than that under my command, - and not an instance of irregularity has occurred without punishment - being inflicted. The persons who had made this complaint ought to - be made to prove the truth of what they say. I believe the enemy (I - mean Futteh Jung’s party and the rest of the people) are organising - a system to bring our men to the same state of starvation to which - General Elphinstone’s army was reduced, in hopes of the same results. - - While I think it my duty to state this, I must declare that I will - not, to please a few Afghans, who have scarcely washed their hands - from the blood of our countrymen, allow my army to be destroyed, and - my country to be dishonoured. There is grain in the country, and I - think it ought to be brought in immediately, the same being paid for. - - General Pollock’s order shall be proclaimed through my camp - immediately, but I have not heard of a single act of plunder during - the last twenty-four hours. - - I have, &c. - W. NOTT, Major-General, - Commanding Field Forces. - - To Captain Ponsonby, - Assistant Adjutant-General, Camp. - - -SUCCESSION TO THE THRONE OF CAUBUL. FUTTEH JUNG AND SHAHPOOR. - -[_Book IX., chapter 3, pages 366-367._] - -[The following extract of a letter from General Pollock, shows what was -really done by that officer with respect to the Suddozye succession. -The declaration of the chiefs alluded to at page 367 is subjoined.] - -“Shortly after my arrival at Caubul I despatched a force, under -Major-General M’Caskill, to disperse the followers of Ameen-oollah -Khan and Mahomed Akbar, and to endeavour to secure the person of the -latter. Futteh Jung continued for several days in power, and appeared -disposed to endeavour to retain it. The hope which then existed, that -Mahomed Akbar Khan would fall into our hands, no doubt had great -influence with him; but when this hope vanished, the representations -of his female relations, and the remembrance of the gross treachery he -had experienced from the chiefs on former occasions, appear to have -alarmed him; and at length he announced to me his determination to -accompany the British troops to Hindostan. At the same time I received -a letter, a translation of which I have now the honour to forward, from -Gholam Mahomed Khan (the minister) and Khan Shereen Khan, the chief of -the Kuzzilbashes, on the part of several other chiefs, avowing their -determination to support the brother of Futteh Jung (Shahpoor) on -the throne of Caubul. It was long before I could convince the chiefs -comprising this party that they could not hope for any assistance -from the British Government, either in money or troops; but as they -still persisted in urging me to allow the Prince Shahpoor to remain, -and as he repeatedly assured me he was anxious to do so, I did not -conceive myself authorised by my instructions to remove him forcibly -from Caubul, and only stipulated that the British Government should -not be supposed to have raised him to the throne. On the morning of -the 12th of October, after the British troops had marched from Caubul, -Prince Shahpoor was put on the throne, and the chiefs took the oaths -of fidelity to him.”—[_General Pollock to Lord Ellenborough: MS. -Correspondence._] - - - FROM WUZEER GHOLAM MAHOMED KHAN, POPULZYE; AND KHAN SHEREEN KHAN, - CHIEF OF THE KUZZILBASHES, ON THE PARTS OF ALL THE CHIEFS AT CAUBUL. - - A.C. - - Be it known to you, that since we, the Populzyes and the other - Douranee tribes and the Kuzzilbash cannot exist under the Barukzyes; - and as such a state of things is altogether out of the range of - possibility; and moreover, since his Royal Highness Futteh Jung has - decided on quitting the country; we agree and accept of the Prince - Shahpoor as our King, and will obey him as our ruler. But we hope that - you will, from this time, put a stop to the destruction of forts and - other property, that the people may regain confidence, and return to - their own houses; and we also beg that Meer Soofaee Byanee, who is a - prisoner in Charekur, be sent for and made over to us, that people - may be induced to come in to us. And if you will make over to us any - guns and ammunition, it will be a great assistance. For the rest, - as long as we live we shall hope for the friendship of the British - Government.[361] - - -DESTRUCTION OF THE BAZAAR AT CAUBUL AND THE IMPUTED EXCESSES OF THE -TROOPS. - -[_Book IX., chapter 3, page 369._] - -SIR GEORGE POLLOCK TO LORD ELLENBOROUGH. - - _April 2nd, 1843_, Allahabad. - - MY LORD, - - I have had the honour to receive your Lordship’s letter, dated 23 - ultimo, intimating that disapprobation had been expressed at the - destruction of the bazaar and mosque at Caubul, and of trees; also, - that excesses have been imputed to the troops. - -It is difficult to grapple with vague and anonymous accusations -against the conduct of the troops. Many detailed statements in the -newspapers were entirely unfounded, and were got up with the sole -object of creating a sensation; but I confess that if individual and -isolated instances of excess had occurred, I should not have been much -surprised, composed, as all India armies are, of such a heterogeneous -mass, comprising all classes and castes; more than two-thirds of whom -are either public or private servants and adventurers, who, though -nominally following some occupation useful to an army, proceed with -it for the sole purpose of plundering when a favourable opportunity -offers. Some excesses may, unknown to me, have been committed; but I -will venture to assert that no troops ever conducted themselves with -more forbearance under such unprecedented aggravations: perhaps no army -was ever placed in a more trying situation. - - During the whole course of their progress towards the capital they had - ocular proofs of the treachery and brutality of a merciless enemy; - but still I am unable to call to mind any wanton, deliberate act of - inhumanity on the part of the troops; and cannot but regret that - the culpable instances alluded to have not been specified, as I may - possibly be suspected of suppressing facts. This, however, I beg to - assure your Lordship I have no wish to do. - - The feeling of the Hindoos against the Afghans was very naturally - strong, in consequence of the latter having deprived the Hindoos - of their caste whenever they came into their power; but no troops - could feel otherwise than excited at the sight of the skeletons of - their late brethren in arms, which still lie covering the road from - Gundamuck to Caubul; and as if the more to rouse a spirit of revenge, - the barricade at Jugdulluck was literally covered with skeletons. - - What I have stated above will not be considered as justifying excesses - on the part of a British army; but it may be admitted in extenuation - of individual cases. - - A few days previous to the march of the brigade under Brigadier - Monteith, an European was murdered by the Afghans at Jellalabad. The - destruction of Alli Boghan by some men under Brigadier Monteith’s - command, was caused by one of those sudden bursts of feeling which, - being wholly unexpected, no precautions were deemed necessary; but it - was a solitary instance, and occurred nearly as follows:—Some camp - followers entered the village, and having found parts of the dress of - some of our soldiers who had been massacred on the march from Caubul, - a number of men proceeded to the village, which was eventually burnt, - whether accidentally or intentionally is doubtful; so very soon was - the mischief perpetrated, that the Brigadier was hardly aware of it - till the place was in flames. He immediately took measures to prevent - a recurrence of such scenes, and I wrote in strong terms on the - subject. Subsequent to that event, during the whole time the Brigadier - was detached, I heard of no more excesses. In the instance of Alli - Boghan, after a most minute inquiry, I have reason to believe that not - a man, woman, or child was injured, and I know the greater part of the - property was returned to the head man of the village. - - In subsequent engagements with the enemy at Mamookail, Jugdulluck, - and Tezeen, I neither saw or heard of any excesses. A report was - circulated that an European was burnt alive at Jugdulluck, and that - two Afghans were burnt in like manner by our troops in revenge, the - whole of which was an infamous fabrication. - - I know of no instances of cruelty or excess at Istaliff; and the - feeling of the army could not have been very prone thereto when about - four or five hundred women and children were protected from insult and - injury, and made over to their families after the engagement. If any - excess has been committed which I have not noticed, I can only affirm - that I recollect none; and I beg to add, that the praise bestowed on - the troops on a late occasion by your Lordship for their “forbearance - in victory,” is, as far as I am able to judge, well merited; and I - trust your Lordship will never have cause to alter your good opinion - of their conduct. - - On the subject of trees being destroyed, I am unable to call to - recollection what occurred in Brigadier Monteith’s detachment; and - the only instance of their destruction, which came under my personal - observation, was at Mamookail, where the ground was such that I was - obliged to encamp the different regiments in the gardens surrounding - the fort. Without this precaution I should have been subjecting the - troops to constant annoyance, as the enemy would certainly have - occupied them. The destruction of the vines and other small plants was - almost a necessary consequence of our occupying Mamookail. - - With regard to the destruction of the Caubul bazaar and mosque, it may - possibly be supposed that with them was destroyed other property; but - this was not the case. - - The insult offered to the remains of the late Envoy was notorious to - the whole of the chiefs and inhabitants of the city. They admitted - that the mutilated body was dragged through the bazaar and treated by - the populace with every indignity, and eventually hung there, that - every Afghan in the city might witness the treatment of the remains - of the representative of the British Government. The intended measure - was communicated to the chiefs, who not only admitted the propriety - of destroying a place were such scenes had transpired, but offered - to, and did, accompany the party sent for its destruction. Those - who resided at and near the bazaar had two days’ previous notice to - remove their property (which they did), and I am not aware of any - instances of violence having occurred. It was not possible entirely - to prevent plundering; but during the time the engineer was employed - in the destruction of the bazaar and mosque attached, both cavalry and - infantry were on duty in the city to prevent any outrage. - - I have the honour, &c. - GEO. POLLOCK. - - [_MS. Records._] - - -FROM GENERAL POLLOCK TO LORD ELLENBOROUGH. - - Ghazeepore, _10th April, 1843_. - - MY LORD, - - Since I had the honour to address your Lordship on the 2nd instant, in - reply to your Lordship’s letter dated the 23rd ultimo, it has occured - to me that I could not produce better proof of the forbearance of - the troops under my command than by a reference to their conduct on - the morning of the 16th of September last. I have already officially - detailed the number of troops which accompanied me on the occasion - of planting the colours on the Balla Hissar. It was deemed advisable - on that occasion to go through a part of the city, and although - the troops had arrived only the day before from a march which was - abundantly calculated to irritate and exasperate them, they so fully - and literally obeyed the orders I had previously given, that not a - house or an individual was injured, either in going or returning from - the Balla-Hissar. The destruction of the residence of Koda Bux, the - chief of Teezeen, may perhaps have been considered an excess; I will - therefore explain, that during the time the army remained in advance - of Teezeen, the chief of that place was the cause of our communication - being cut off. He was repeatedly warned what the consequences would be - when an opportunity offered, if he persisted in such a course; but I - beg to add that the injury sustained by the chief in the destruction - of his residence entailed no loss on others that I am aware of, as the - injury done was confined almost entirely to the fortified dwelling. - Forage was found there and brought to camp, but not an individual was - injured. - - I have the honour to be, &c., &c. - GEO. POLLOCK. - - -FROM GENERAL POLLOCK TO THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL. - - Dinapore, _18th April, 1843_. - - SIR, - - I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated - the 29th ult., which awaited my arrival here. I regret that I was - not sooner in possession of your letter, as I fear this will be too - late for the purpose required. Nearly all the information it is in - my power to give is contained in the accompanying copies of letters - which I have addressed to the Right Honourable the Governor-General - in reply to a reference his Lordship was pleased to make to me. With - respect to the extent of injury done by the brigade under Brigadier - Monteith, I am unable to give any detailed account. The provisions, - grain, etc., and materials for building, were taken from those of the - inhabitants who were openly opposed to our troops; but in both cases - the cost of things taken was carried to the account of government. - I have already, in my letters to his Lordship, stated that I am not - aware of any Afghans having been killed when unresisting, or from - any feeling of revenge on the part of the troops. Torabauz Khan, the - chief of Lallpoora, and the governor of Jellalabad, accompanied the - brigade to point out what property should be respected. With regard - to the violation of woman, I heard of no instance of the kind; and I - am quite sure that Brigadier Monteith would have done his utmost to - prevent such excuses. I have stated to his Lordship what occurred at - Mamoo Kail, and I know most positively that no Afghan was killed on - that occasion except in fair fighting. The families had, I believe, - gone the day before the place was taken. I cannot say when or by whom - the fort or adjoining houses were set fire to. I passed through with - the right column in pursuit of the enemy, and did not return till - the afternoon, when I had determined to encamp there. On my return - I found Brigadier Pollock with his column (the left) occupying the - gardens. The fort and adjacent houses were still burning. On the - return of the whole of the troops, it was necessary for their security - to take advantage of the gardens surrounded by walls, and the men - were accordingly encamped there. The destruction of the vines was a - necessary consequence, as every one must know who has seen how grapes - are cultivated in Afghanistan. There were very few trees cut down, - but the bark of a number of them was taken from about two or three - inches. With reference to the third paragraph of your letter, I beg - to state, that from the date of my arrival at Caubul on the 15th of - September, the inhabitants commenced returning to their houses. They - had assurances from me of protection, and, with the exception of the - covered bazaar, I did my utmost to protect both the inhabitants and - their dwellings from injury. I have already stated to his Lordship why - I considered that particular spot (the bazaar) should suffer, and on - the 9th of October the engineer commenced his operations. I believe - I am quite justified in stating that no lives were lost; the private - property had been removed, and I had both cavalry and infantry on duty - in the city to prevent plundering. Some injury was no doubt sustained - by the city, but the damage done even when we left it was partial - and comparatively trivial. I consider it mere justice to the troops - who proceeded under my command to Caubul, and who passed over scenes - which were particularly calculated to cause great excitement among - them, to state, that their conduct on proceeding to the Balla Hissar - (passing through a part of the city) was quite unexceptionable, and - the good effect resulting therefrom was immediately felt: confidence - was restored; in proof of which I may state that supplies both of - grain and forage were brought in abundantly, everything being paid - for. I have no memorandum from which to quote the exact quantities - of grain which came into camp, but my recollection of the quantities - in round numbers is as follows:—The first day 500 maunds, second day - 1000 maunds, third day 1600 maunds, fourth day 2000 maunds, fifth day - 1000 maunds. The falling off of the supplies on the fifth day was - the consequence, I was told, of some of the men of General Nott’s - force having plundered those who were bringing in supplies. I wrote - to General Nott on the subject; but from that period the supplies - never came in so freely as before, and I am sorry to add that many - complaints were made. I have hitherto been silent on this subject, and - should have continued so, for reasons which it is perhaps unnecessary - to explain; but as the third paragraph of your letter calls for a more - particular report than I have hitherto made, I reluctantly forward the - accompanying documents, upon which it is unnecessary for me to make - any comments. - - I beg, however, to state distinctly, that until plundering commenced - supplies of every description were abundant, and the people were - fast returning to the city. In reply to that part of the third - paragraph in which I am directed to state what injury I understood - had been committed by the Candahar force after my march, I have - merely to observe, that from all I had heard I thought it advisable - that the whole force should move from Caubul the same day; and this - precaution, I have reason to believe, prevented some excesses. - - In reply to the fourth paragraph, I believe I may with great truth - state that no Afghans were destroyed in cold blood, either before or - after reaching Caubul. No women were either dishonoured or murdered, - that I am aware of. With regard to the destruction of that particular - part of the Caubul bazaar where the envoy’s remains were treated with - indignity, and brutally dragged through to be there dishonoured and - spit upon by every Mussulman, I admit that I considered it the most - suitable place in which to have decided proofs of the power of the - British army, without impeaching its humanity. - - I have, as directed by you, forwarded a copy of this letter and the - original documents to Colonel Stewart, for the information of the - Governor-General. - - I have the honour to be, Sir, &c. &c. &c. - GEO. POLLOCK. - - -POLITICAL DEPARTMENT. - -THE COURT OF DIRECTORS TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL. - - London, _2nd April, 1843_. - - The Secret Committee has communicated to us the letters noted - below,[362] relating to inquiries addressed by order of the - Governor-General to the General Officers lately commanding in - Afghanistan, on the subject of certain rumours of outrages alleged to - have been perpetrated by the British troops, and conveying replies to - those inquiries from Major-Generals Sir George Pollock, Sir William - Nott,[363] and Sir John M’Caskill. - - When these rumours were first brought to our knowledge, we deemed them - to be great exaggerations, if not altogether unfounded; and we did - not doubt that we should receive, in due course, full and exculpatory - explanations as to what had actually taken place. - - Whilst we regard the statements made by the three General Officers - as generally satisfactory, we cannot avoid the expression of our - regret that Sir William Nott should have been hurried, by the warmth - of his feelings, into throwing on the government which he served the - reflection contained in the last paragraph of that letter, and which - was quite unnecessary to the vindication of his own character, and - that of the troops under his command. - - Neither can we do otherwise than notice with regret the publication - of Sir William Nott’s letter in an English newspaper. 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It will be for -you and for this government to consider in what manner all that belongs -to India may be most immediately and most honourably withdrawn from the -country.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] - -[2] _MS. Correspondence._ - -[3] Mr. George Clerk at that time entertained very similar opinions -regarding the danger of sending more regiments away from the -North-Western Provinces. “Whatever may take place,” he wrote to -Lord Auckland on the 25th of November, “in regard to Caubul, and in -whatever degree our troops there may be reinforced, we should not -weaken this frontier. Any reduction of our military strength causes -some presumption or audacity in our native allies generally.” And on -the 29th he wrote to the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western -Provinces (Mr. Robertson): “I really do not see how our muster-roll -is to stand this draining of more troops—and probably many more, -west—whilst reinforcements are also proceeding eastward. Undoubtedly -the remainder will be inadequate to the due maintenance of our high -supremacy in India.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] There was, unquestionably, -a choice of evils at this time. But Sir Jasper Nicolls and Mr. George -Clerk differed in opinion as to which was the greater of the two. - -[4] On the 27th of November he wrote to Lord Auckland from Mynpoorie: -“If it be decided that we are to support Shah Soojah under all -circumstances and difficulties, I must entreat your Lordship’s early -attention to the means of effecting this object, which may be a more -arduous undertaking than the occupation of the country in 1839.” And -again, in the same letter: “There is a dark, perhaps a random hint, -in one of these letters that the rebellion is instigated by the royal -family at Caubul. If so, I would advise the early abandonment of them, -their country, and their cause.” On the 28th he again wrote: “I really -would not advise our forcing either him or ourselves upon a nation -so distant, and in all respects so dissimilar both to our Sepoys and -ourselves, at an expense so decidedly ruinous.” And on the 30th, in -still more emphatic language, he said: “My opinion regarding a renewal -of our efforts to support Shah Soojah on his throne, and to establish a -permanent influence in Afghanistan, is without change or modification. -That we have no base of operations has been always clear; but now, were -we to march a reinforcement on the best horses, we could not be sure of -carrying the Khybur Pass, and if snow has fallen, the road to Caubul -would still be closed.”—[_MS. Correspondence of Sir J. Nicolls._] - -[5] The 53rd and 64th Native Infantry. - -[6] The 60th Native Infantry. - -[7] Two days before, Captain (afterwards Sir Henry) Lawrence, Assistant -to Mr. Clerk, whose later career justified the high expectations -which were formed of him during his connexion with the North-Western -Agency, on his way out after a dacoity party, met the intelligence of -the Caubul outbreak, and immediately after forwarding it on to Mr. -Clerk went to Colonel Wild, to urge him to push on the 60th and 64th -Regiments, and to warn the Light Infantry Battalion and some details of -the 10th Cavalry, for service beyond the frontier.—[_Capt. Lawrence to -Mr. George Clerk: Nov. 14, 1841. MS. Records._] - -[8] Mr. Clerk sent forward the 30th, which was Wild’s regiment, in -order that the colonel might take command of the brigade, General Boyd -having thrown out a hint that he was a more efficient officer than the -colonels of the other regiments. - -[9] These artillerymen were on their way to Afghanistan to relieve the -company then in the country, serving with Abbott’s battery. - -[10] Two nine-pounders and a howitzer. - -[11] _Sir Jasper Nicolls to Government: January 24th, 1842._ - -[12] _Sir Jasper Nicolls to Government: January 23rd._ See also -private journal, “_Thanesur_, January 23rd.—Mr. C. joined us on the -ground. He is anxiously in favour of our sending forward more troops, -in view, I believe, to our undertaking the re-conquest of Caubul. To -this I decidedly object. We have neither funds nor men available, -without in the latter instance leaving India so bare as to risk its -safety.”—[_MS. Records._] - -[13] _Supreme Government to Sir Jasper Nicolls: January 31, -1842._—[_Published Papers_.] - -[14] _Papers relating to Military Operations in Afghanistan._ Lord -Auckland’s private letters were still more decided on these points. -“I should be glad,” he wrote to Sir Jasper Nicolls on the 10th of -February, “to hear that Sir R. Sale has been able to withdraw his -brigade from a position so perilous as to make me regard its possible -fate with extreme anxiety.” Two days afterwards he wrote to the same -correspondent: “I have from the beginning believed a second conquest -of Caubul with our present means to be absolutely impossible.”—[_MS. -Correspondence_.] - -[15] It was, moreover, of great importance to accelerate the movement, -because it was believed that any day might witness the appearance of -the Barukzye horsemen on the road between Peshawur and Jellalabad. -“Time is most precious to us,” wrote Mackeson to Clerk; “a few days -more may see a party of the Barukzye troops in the plains of Ningrahar, -and then thousands will be required where hundreds now would do the -work.” - -[16] Shere Singh despatched urgent purwannahs both to General Avitabile -and to Raee Kishen Chund, calling upon them to aid the British by every -means in their power. “You are a general of the Khalsa Government,” he -wrote to the former, “and noted for the confidence placed in you. This -is the time to serve the two allied powers; and you will, therefore, -unreservedly devote your attention to discharge your trust, so as to -please the two friendly governments, and to earn such a name that the -services performed shall be known in London.” To the latter he wrote, -“Orders have been issued to Koonwur Pertab Chund to march to Peshawur, -and the zeal of the Durbar will at once make itself manifest to Mr. -Clerk (as the sun suddenly shining forth from beneath a cloud) when -he is informed of all by the letters of Captain Mackeson.”—[_MS. -Records._] When Mackeson received from George Clerk a copy of the -purwannah to Avitabile he was in conference at that officer’s quarters -with the Sikh general, Mehtab Singh, and the commandants of all the -Sikh battalions. “I read out this purwannah,” says Mackeson, “but -was somewhat confounded to find at its conclusion that the Durbar -limited the operations of General Avitabile and the Sikh troops to -Futtehgurh—their own frontier post. It was fortunate that, before the -arrival of this _purwannah_, the commandants of the auxiliary Mussulman -troops had left the room, having previously engaged to march as far -as Ali-Musjid in support of our troops, and to move on again with -General Pollock’s brigade.”—[_Mackeson to Clerk: January, 1842. MS. -Records._] The passages referred to in the _purwannah_ might bear this -construction, but it is doubtful whether this was their intent. George -Clerk, in a marginal note to Mackeson’s letter, says: “The _purwannah_ -did not limit it; but directed them to move on to Futtehgurh and act in -concert and by Captain Mackeson’s advice.”—[_MS. Records._] - -[17] A cousin of Captain Mackeson. Holding no recognised place in the -army either of the Crown or the Company, his services were neither -fairly estimated nor adequately rewarded. But there were few more -gallant episodes in the war than his defence of Ali-Musjid. Mr. -Mackeson had been long disabled by extreme sickness, but was carried -about in a litter to superintend the defence. - -[18] See _Mackeson to Government: January 27, 1842_. _Published papers._ - -[19] “The _Nujeebs_ struck their tents when we did, and moved back to -Peshawar, and the Sikhs made no demonstration, though twice we wrote to -General Avitabile during the night; and just before daylight I told him -they were not moving, and again at sunrise.”—[_Captain H. M. Lawrence -to Mr. Clerk: 19th January, 1842._] Lawrence adds: “I impute no blame -to General Avitabile for the man not telling us what we might expect -from his miscreant troops. His own intentions are kind and friendly to -our government and ourselves.” The misconduct of the Sikh troops was -rendered more atrocious, and our own mortification more bitter, by the -circumstance that Mackeson had advanced a lakh and a half of rupees -to the Sikh authorities, for the payment of the men whose services we -hoped to retain. - -[20] “We have been disgracefully beaten back,” wrote Captain Lawrence -to Mr. Clerk. “Both our large guns broke down; one was on an elephant, -but was taken down to put together when the other failed, but its -carriage breaking too, the Sepoys lost all heart, and I grieve to say -that I could not get men to bring one off, though I tried for an hour, -and at last, finding we were only expending ammunition, we left it in -their hands, but it was broken completely down and spiked.”—[_MS. -Records._] - -[21] “I confess,” wrote Captain Lawrence to Mr. Clerk, “that I never -heard any very heavy fire, or saw the enemy in any numbers. I was not -with the advance, and therefore may be mistaken; but was afterwards -within a hundred yards of the advanced gun for an hour or more, and -could see into the pass, but observed no breast-work, and but very few -of the enemy; certainly not above a thousand, and not half that number -of fire-arms.”—[_MS. Records._] - -[22] The two detachments met at the mouth of the pass. - -[23] _Mr. G. Clerk to Sir Jasper Nicolls: November 17, 1841._ I have -taken this passage from a MS. copy. It is quoted, however, in the Blue -Book, but with the usual fatality attending such compilations, there -are two errors in these few lines. Mr. Clerk is made to say that he had -called upon “the commanding officer of _Lahore_ and Ferozepore” to send -forward the regiments. - -[24] It is not very clear, however, that Captain Lawrence actually -made any written requisition to the commanding officer at Ferozepore -(Colonel Wild) for the despatch of artillery details. He wrote a -private letter to Mr. Clerk, saying: “If four guns can be made -effective, they also shall be got ready.” In this letter he says that -he was about to call upon Colonel Wild; and he may orally have broached -the subject of the guns; but in his official letter, written on the -same day (November 14), there is no mention of artillery, although he -suggests the expediency of sending forward the 10th Cavalry without -delay. - -[25] “Though I have not yet heard that any artillery is ordered up -to the frontier, I would beg leave to recommend, in anticipation of -the speedy arrival of reinforcements so necessary on the Sutlej, that -artillery should move forward from hence. I shall transmit a copy of -this letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Wild, in case he may think proper -to halt one of the regiments under his command, until the arrival of -such artillery as you consider can best be spared from Loodhianah or -Ferozepore; but the latter is, I believe, for want of horses, incapable -of moving; and this leaves an insufficiency for the due protection of -this border, during an unsettled state of parties at Lahore.”—[_Mr. -George Clerk to Major-General Boyd: November 27th, 1841. MS. Records._] - -[26] “Having had the honour to receive from the acting Adjutant-General -a statement of the reinforcements which his Excellency the -Commander-in-Chief has ordered to be put in motion for the purpose of -forcing the Khybur, I beg leave to state to you that I would not now -wish that the 3rd troop, 2nd Brigade of Horse Artillery, should move -from the British frontier on my requisition, though I do not propose, -in consequence of this information, to request Lieutenant-Colonel -Rich to recall the order for the intended march hence of that -troop to-morrow in progress to Ferozepore.”—[_Mr. George Clerk to -Major-General Boyd: Loodhianah, December 2nd, 1841. MS. Records._] - -[27] “Having heard that it is possible the guns which his Excellency -the Commander-in-Chief has directed to move across the frontier may not -be ready to move so immediately as the passage across the Sutlej of -your troop may be effected, I deem it to be advisable, adverting to the -emergency of the occasion, to recommend that you nevertheless proceed -on, in anticipation of the sanction of his Excellency to your doing -so, by orders of the Major-General commanding the division issued at -my request, provided that you can do so without crippling the means of -marching requisite for the artillery, which his Excellency has directed -to be put in motion for the frontier, and which should follow as -expeditiously as possible.”—[_Mr. George Clerk to Captain Alexander, -commanding 3rd troop, 2nd Brigade of Horse Artillery: December 4th, -1841. MS. Records._] - -[28] “I do myself the honour to inform your Excellency that, in -consequence of my receipt of your Excellency’s letter of the -2nd instant, prohibiting the advance of horse artillery as a -reinforcement to proceed to Afghanistan, I have apprised Captain -Alexander, commanding the 3rd troop, 2nd brigade, now on its way to -Ferozepore, and Major Huish, commanding that station, that they are to -consider the request made by me, for the advance of that troop to be -withdrawn.”—[_Mr. George Clerk to Sir Jasper Nicolls: December 7th, -1841._] - -[29] See Appendix. - -[30] On the 29th of January, Sir Jasper Nicolls wrote to General -Pollock: “My dear General,—In some late letters Captain Lawrence has -expressed himself in a very decided manner touching the disheartened -and unguarded language held by officers belonging to the corps which -were beaten back in the Khybur Pass on the 19th instant. God forbid -that they should feel any panic, or even alarm; but if you observe it, -I rely on your addressing yourself to them in a very forcible manner, -and shaming them out of such very unbecoming, unmilitary, and dangerous -conduct. Their duty is obedience—prompt and energetic obedience—such -as executes without expression of doubt. If more has been said than the -case seemed to require, take no notice of this further than to warn -Captain L., if you think proper to do so.—Always yours faithfully, J. -NICOLLS.” - -[_MS. Correspondence._] - -[31] _Sir Jasper Nicolls to Lord Hill: Simlah, September 2nd, -1842._—[_MS. Correspondence._] In this letter, which will be -found entire in the Appendix, the Commander-in-Chief says: “When -Major-General Pollock arrived at Peshawur he found 1800 men of the -four regiments in hospital; the Sepoys declaring that they would not -again advance through the Khybur Pass; the Sikh troops spreading -alarm, and in all ways encouraging and screening their desertion, -which was considerable. It was well that a cautious, cool officer of -the Company’s army should have to deal with them in such a temper, 363 -miles from our frontier. General Pollock managed them extremely well.” - -[32] An intelligent and trustworthy officer of the 26th Native -Infantry, whose letter is now before me, writes: “In less than -forty-eight hours after our (the 9th Foot and 26th Native Infantry) -arrival, active emissaries, particularly from the 53rd and 60th -Regiments, were in our camp, using every effort to induce our men to -desert, and to refuse to enter the Khybur; and had actually gone the -length of sending Brahmins with the Gunga Jul to swear them in not -to advance; and did not desist until orders were given to seize the -first man caught in the lines under suspicious circumstances. This -information was several times communicated to me by old Sepoys and -non-commissioned officers, and the fact of the attempts made to seduce -the men from their allegiance is too well known to the officers of the -26th to admit of a moment’s doubt.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] - -[33] _MS. Correspondence._ I need not say that these statements would -not be made except upon the testimony of officers who heard the -speeches to which I have referred. - -[34] See Appendix. - -[35] This and other letters of Shah Soojah will be found in the -Appendix. Macgregor’s answer to the private letter received on the 21st -was to the effect, that they had no fear of Mahomed Akbar, to whom, -please God, they would give a warm reception, if he ventured to attack -them. - -[36] Colonel Dennie, commanding the 13th L.I.; Colonel Monteith, -commanding the 35th; Colonel Oldfield, commanding the Cavalry; Captain -Abbott, the Company’s Artillery; Captain Backhouse, the Shah’s -Artillery; and Captain George Broadfoot, the Sappers and Miners. - -[37] The late Major-General Sir Henry Havelock, K.C.B. - -[38] _Memorandum by Major George Broadfoot._—“Captain Macgregor -vehemently denied that we had ever received hostages at Tezeen. I -mentioned several things to show that we had; but, as he persisted in -his denial, I said that I had been under some extraordinary delusion, -and that, of course, any argument founded on it must fall to the -ground, but I still held hostages utterly worthless while the enemy -had our hostages and prisoners in their hands.” Again, Broadfoot says: -“Hostages were announced in General Sale’s orders, and reported to -General Elphinstone. I was blamed for opposing one of them in a fight -at the time; and afterwards met him in charge of Captain Mackenzie on -his mission to General Pollock, when he reminded me of having nearly -killed him when he was a hostage. There are many grounds for still -thinking that I was right.” _Both_ were, to a certain extent, right. -The men to whom Broadfoot referred were not actually hostages. They -were Afghan agents, sent into the British camp to re-establish our -thannahs, &c. So Macgregor describes them in his despatch. Macnaghten, -referring to them, in a letter dated October 27, says: “I explained to -his Majesty that these people were not sent as hostages, but merely to -assist our troops and be the medium of friendly communication.” - -[39] It need scarcely be said that this account of the councils at -Jellalabad, which appears for the first time in the present edition, -is based upon what I conceive to be undeniable evidence, which has -come into my possession since the book was first published. No one -who peruses it should, for a moment, lose sight of the fact that the -responsibility was with Sale and Macgregor, who had to regard the -position in which they were placed with respect to Shah Soojah’s and -to their own government, both of which were, at that time, believed to -be anxious for the evacuation of Jellalabad. In circumstances similar -to those which surrounded Broadfoot and Backhouse, I do not doubt that -Sale and Macgregor would have counselled the same course of resistance. -We err greatly when we judge by the same standard men in supreme and -men in subordinate command. Apart even from the consideration of the -paralysing effects of a sense of responsibility, it is obvious that -what is a man’s duty in one case, is not his duty in another. There -were no braver spirits in the garrison than those of Sale and Macgregor. - -[40] The requisition crossed a letter from Brigadier Anquetel, -censuring Broadfoot for taking with him an unnecessary supply of tools. -The requisition was complied with, and the censure withdrawn. - -[41] The work of the Jellalabad garrison was not confined to the -strengthening of their own defences. The destruction of all the -adjoining cover for the enemy was no small part of their labour. With -reference to these works, General Sale says, in his official report: -“Generally I may state that they consisted in the destruction of an -immense quantity of cover for the enemy, extending to the demolition -of forts and old walls, filling up ravines and destroying gardens, -and cutting down groves, raising the parapets to six or seven feet -high, repairing and widening the ramparts, extending the bastions, -retrenching three of the gates, covering the fourth with an outwork, -and excavating a ditch ten feet in depth and twelve feet in width -round the whole of the walls. The place was thus secure against the -attacks of any Asiatic army not provided with siege artillery.” This -admirable report was written by Havelock, as were all Sale’s Jellalabad -despatches. - -[42] “But it pleased Providence, on the 19th of February, to remove -in an instant this ground of confidence. A tremendous earthquake -shook down all our parapets, built up with so much labour, injured -several of our bastions, cast to the ground all our guard-houses, -demolished a third of the town, made a considerable breach in the -rampart of a curtain in the Peshawur face, and reduced the Caubul gate -to a shapeless mass of ruins. It savours of romance, but is a sober -fact, that the city was thrown into alarm, within the space of little -more than one month, by the repetition of full one hundred shocks -of this terrific phenomenon of nature.”—[_Report of General Sale: -Jellalabad, April 16, 1842._] “On the 19th of February, an earthquake, -which nearly destroyed the town, threw down the greater part of the -parapets, the Caubul gate with two adjoining bastions, and a part of -the new bastion which flanked it. Three other bastions were also nearly -destroyed, whilst several large breaches were made in the curtain, and -the Peshawur side, eighty feet long, was quite practicable, the ditch -being filled, and the descent easy. Thus in one moment the labours of -three months were in a great measure destroyed.”—[_Report of Captain -Broadfoot, Garrison Engineer._] - -[43] See Appendix. - -[44] “The officers of the garrison,” wrote Macgregor to Pollock on -the 21st of February, “came upon rations to-day. They are willing to -brave all difficulties and dangers, now that they feel certain that -government will resent the insult offered to our national honour by -these rascally Afghans.” And again, on the same day, writing to the -same correspondent, he said: “I am glad to find that government intend -to uphold the national honour by resenting the insults which have been -offered to it by the rascally Afghans; and I feel assured that this -garrison will continue to perform the part which has devolved upon -them at this crisis with credit to themselves and advantage to the -state. General Sale intends to publish in to-day’s garrison orders the -proclamation of the Indian Government, a copy of which you kindly sent -to me by Torabaz’s Sowars.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] - -[45] The rescue of the Jellalabad garrison had in reality been the -primary—indeed, the sole acknowledged reason of the movement in -advance; but the Supreme Government, whilst by no means unmindful of -the claims of the Jellalabad garrison, long omitted to communicate with -Sale or Macgregor—to convey to them directly any instructions for -their guidance, or any expressions of approbation of their conduct. - -[46] The correspondence which passed between Jellalabad and Peshawur at -this time unfolds the real nature of the respective positions of the -two generals. It will be found in the Appendix. - -[47] _General Pollock to General Sale: March 27th, 1842. MS. -Correspondence._ Pollock did not exaggerate the backwardness of the -native regiments, or the importance of associating with them a larger -body of Europeans. Even the new corps which were moving up from the -provinces, and which the General believed to be “without a taint,” -were openly expressing their disinclination to advance. Shere Singh -mentioned this to Mr. Clerk. “Yesterday, early,” wrote the latter, -“the Maharajah, Rajah Dhyan Singh, and myself, being together for -a short time, quite unattended, they told me that Commandant Cheyt -Singh, who had come into Lahore for a day from Colonel Bolton’s camp, -to escort which from Ferozepore to Peshawur the Durbar had appointed -him, had mentioned that our Sepoys in that brigade did not like going -to the westward, and were sometimes grouped eight or ten together, -expressing their dissatisfaction; but that on the other hand the -Europeans (her Majesty’s 31st and artillery) were much delighted at the -prospect of fighting with the Afghans. The Maharajah added, ‘If you -could send two or three more European corps, they would penetrate the -Khybur or anywhere else so successfully against the Afghans, that the -Hindoos, who are now alarmed, would, after one action, all take heart -again.’”—[_Mr. Clerk to Government: Lahore, March 19th, 1842. MS. -Records._] - -[48] Shere Singh was at this time a confirmed drunkard, and he thought -more of potations than of politics. When the first intelligence of our -Caubul disasters reached him, Mr. Clerk wrote: “The effect which these -events in Caubul will have on Lahore, will, I imagine, be as follows. -The Rajahs will inwardly rejoice thereat; the Khalsa will be vexed at -any Mahomedan exultation; and Shere Singh will congratulate himself -on the prospect this may open to him of drawing closer his relations -with us as a means of procuring good champagne.”—[_Mr. Clerk to Mr. -Robertson: Nov. 29th, 1841. MS. Records._] - -[49] Their design was to arrest the progress of Gholab Singh’s force; -and some of our officers thought that the Rajah ought to have attacked -them. But Mr. Clerk was of opinion that his forbearance was a proof of -his friendship towards us. “In the same manner,” he wrote, “that the -reluctance of Rajah Gholab Sing to have recourse to measures of open -hostility towards the Mussulman battalions, when arrayed against him -across the Attock, was, I believe, in a great measure caused by his -apprehension of embarrassing the British brigade coming up and near -at hand, should he be found making of the high road an unseemly and -uncertain field of battle for the coercion of mutinous battalions, so I -conceive that he may very naturally feel disinclined hastily to pledge -himself to take as far as Jellalabad, or into any arduous service, -troops which for fourteen months past have generally assumed a tone of -defiance of the control of their appointed officers.”—[_Mr. George -Clerk to Government: February 13th, 1842. MS. Records._] - -[50] Gholab Singh was employed in the Hazareh country in operations -against Poyndah Khan and a rebel force when he was summoned to proceed -to Peshawur. At this time, too, the Jummoo Rajah had an army in Ladakh -and Thibet engaged in active warfare with the Chinese, and it was -sustaining serious reverses at the time that Gholab Singh was called -upon to aid the British Government. “What with this reverse on the -eastern frontier of his possessions,” wrote Mr. Clerk to government, -“and the apprehension that in his absence his lately victorious -troops will lose ground in the Hazareh country, Rajah Gholab Singh -evinces little ardour to co-operate with the Sikh troops at Peshawur. -It is also probable that the Jummoo Rajah would rather contemplate -the difficulties of the British Government in that quarter, than be -instrumental in removing them.”—[_Mr. Clerk to Government: January 20, -1842._] - -[51] See Appendix. - -[52] “Lawrence is making out a digest of our conversation with the -Rajah yesterday. I should say that not even with Sultan Mahomed Khan -would the Sikhs hold Jellalabad with any advantage to themselves. If -we would bribe them with offers of territory, it must be in some other -direction. Would Shikarpoor do better!”—[_Mackeson to Clerk: Feb. 21, -1842. MS. Records._] - -[53] “My course, I think, is clear—to get what I can out of the Sikhs, -and, if to my mind that is anything like substantial co-operation -in advancing or even securing support in the rear, to accept it for -General Pollock if he will use it, and officially to recommend to him -that, if it proves serviceable, he should, contrary to the orders of -government, continue to maintain Jellalabad, whilst awaiting further -orders from government on the subject.”—[_Mr. Clerk to Mr. Robertson: -Umritsur, March 4, 1842._] - -[54] This was merely an echo of what Gholab Singh had been recommending -by letter to the Maharajah. - -[55] There were more than enough, the minister said, to beat all -Afghanistan on the plains, but it was a different thing to convey -supplies through the defiles of the Khybur. - -[56] “The aversion which the Sikhs have to penetrate the Khybur is -not more inconvenient to the British Government than it is alarming -to the Maharajah; for their resentment against the government, which -has imposed upon them the arduous duty, will be enhanced, should they -suffer from the swords of the Afghans. Nor can any thinking person in -this Durbar fail to apprehend that by proceeding to invade Afghanistan -in support of its ally, whilst deprived by the circumstances of the -alliance of all latitude of securing parties among the Afghans, such as -it would create and turn to advantage in aid of its encroachments, if -acting on its own account, it may be raising a hornet’s nest which may -involve the Khalsa in long wars for the preservation of its territories -on the Indus.”—[_Mr. George Clerk to Government: Lahore, April 5th, -1842. MS. Records._] - -[57] The same year (1857) witnessed the death of Gholab Singh, and, -alas! of Henry Lawrence, one of the best of men. - -[58] See Appendix. - -[59] Pollock had reduced his own baggage-cattle to one camel and two -mules. - -[60] “My detention here has been most annoying. We have had heavy rain, -and the Sikhs begged that I would wait till to-morrow. I have consented -to this, because the troops of both powers advancing simultaneously for -the same purpose ought to produce a good effect. I should have been -better pleased had Mahomed Akbar not sent the last reinforcement—save -the guns, which I hope we shall be able to give a good account of. The -pluck of the Sepoys is doubtful; but I hope when we carry the mouth -of the pass, they will feel confidence. The 9th are most anxious to -be let loose, and—please God! by to-morrow, we shall be well into -the pass... I still much regret that I have not the 31st; but after -Sir Robert Sale’s letter received some time back, I consider that -he has put it out of my power to wait longer, although I am quite -sure that the addition of 900 Europeans would have operated very -favorably for the prisoners. I, however, hope that you will be able, -through the Ghilzyes, to pave the way for their release when we reach -you.”—[_General Pollock to Captain Macgregor: Jumrood, April 3rd, -1842. MS. Correspondence._] - -[61] The negotiations, indeed, failed altogether. The chiefs had given -hostages, and were to have received 50,000 rupees, for the safe conduct -of the force from Jumrood to Dhaka—one moiety to be paid in advance, -and the other on the army reaching the latter place. “They were to -clear the pass for us to Dhaka, and make arrangements for guarding it -afterwards. They engaged to remove all hostile Afreedis from the pass, -as far as Ali-Musjid, and then we were to repel any troops of Mahomed -Akbar Khan sent to oppose us.”—[_Captain Mackeson to General Pollock: -April 2, 1842. MS. Records._] Mackeson adds: “Yesterday the Afreedis -in our pay proposed to seize on the mouth of the pass; but as the -Sikhs were not ready to move on, and they promised to be ready on the -following day, the movement was postponed. To-day the Afreedis of our -party have pleaded that Mahomed Akbar’s troops have come down to the -mouth of the pass, and that they can no longer perform their agreement. -They offer to return the money that has been given to them.”—[_MS. -Records._] - -[62] Four horse-artillery guns, two guns of the mountain-train, and -three foot-artillery guns. - -[63] See Appendix. - -[64] See Appendix, vol. ii. - -[65] “The Sepoys behaved nobly,” wrote General Pollock, on the -day after the action. “They merely required a trial in which they -should find that they were not sacrificed. There were, however, many -desertions before we advanced. Now they are in the highest spirits, -and have a thorough contempt for the enemy. This is a great point -gained. You are aware that Mahomed Akbar sent a party, about 800, -with one or two guns, to oppose us; but they thought better of it, -and abandoned the fort of Ali-Musjid this morning. I have accordingly -taken possession. The Sikhs are encamped near us, and are much more -respectful and civil since our operations of yesterday.”—[_MS. -Correspondence._] - -[66] Pollock saw nothing of the Sikhs till the afternoon of the 6th. -They doubted his success, and held discreetly back until they found -that he had made good his way to Ali-Musjid. - -[67] “I have been given to understand that, on the advance of our army -to Jellalabad, the Sikh authorities at Peshawur, without intimating -their intentions to Captain Lawrence, and without reference to -any engagements between the Afreedis and ourselves, entered into -arrangements with the Afreedis to purchase, for the sum of 6000 rupees -or 4000 rupees, the security of that portion of the pass they have -engaged to protect for a period of two months. The parties they agreed -to pay were Abdul Rahman Khan, Kooki Kheil, Mahomed Jalim Sipa, and -Alia Dad Malik, Din Kheil, son of Khan Bahadur, all of whom were at -that time hostile to us, although Abdul Rahman Khan has since come -over. There could have been no objection to the Sikhs entering into -an arrangement with the Afreedis; but it should have been done in -communication with us, and without imparting to the Afreedis the term -for which the Sikhs were bound to hold the pass.”—[_Mackeson to -Pollock: May 6, 1842. MS. Records._] - -[68] “I regret to have to report that the Sikh regiments posted at -Ali-Musjid, yesterday left their post, and returned to Jumrood; on -their way throwing the loads off some of our mules and bullocks that -they met, and employing the animals to carry their own baggage. -My letter to Koonwur Pertab Singh, and his answer, are herewith -enclosed. You will observe that the whole Sikh regiment was actually -recalled by order, without notice being given to me, or without -their being relieved, although four regiments were within a mile of -them.”—[_Captain Lawrence to Mr. Clerk: May 9, 1849. MS. Records._] - -“I waited on Koonwur Pertab Singh yesterday. I spoke strongly on the -outrage of the morning, and on the necessity of a severe example -being made of the offenders.... I repeatedly returned to the subject, -declaring the necessity of punishing the offenders, whom, I said, there -could be no difficulty in recognising, as they were for hours in the -heart of the town, and had been seen by General Avitabile himself, as -well as by Captains Lane and Johnstone, and by many of the Commissariat -agents. It was not denied that the men could be recognised; but I much -fear that no punishment will be inflicted on them.”—[_Lawrence to -Pollock: May 8, 1849. MS. Records._] - -[69] Mr. Gleig says that the band of the 13th went out to play them in; -and that the relieving force marched the two or three last miles to the -tune, “Oh, but ye’ve been lang o’ coming.” - -[70] Mr. Gleig says: “On the 2nd, Sir Robert Sale proceeded to -distribute the captured sheep among the corps and departments -composing his garrison. The 25th declined to accept the boon. They -sent a deputation to the General, which respectfully acquainted him -that animal food was less necessary for them than for Europeans, and -besought him to give their portion of the booty to their gallant -comrades of the 13th. No wonder that between these two corps there -should have sprung up a romantic friendship, which, though the -accidents of service have parted them, probably for ever, neither is -likely to forget, at all events as a tradition, while they keep their -places respectively in the armies of the Queen and of the East India -Company.” - -[71] _MS. Correspondence._ - -[72] _General Sale’s Public Despatch._ - -[73] Mr. Gleig gives the following account of Dennie’s end: “With -undaunted resolution the 13th rushed at the fort, Colonel Dennie nobly -leading; and finding the aperture sufficiently large to admit of it, -they rushed through the outer wall—only to find themselves exposed -to a murderous fire from the untouched defences of the inner keep. -Here Dennie received, just as he approached the breach, his mortal -wound. A ball entered the side, passing through the sword-belt; and -he bent forward upon his horse. Lieutenant and Adjutant (now Captain) -Wood instantly rode up to him, and expressed a hope that the hurt was -not serious. But it was more than serious; it was fatal. A couple -of orderlies, by Captain Wood’s direction, turned his horse’s head -homewards, and leading it by the bridle, endeavoured to guide him to -the town. But he never reached it alive. He died with the sound of -battle in his ears, hoping, but not living to be assured, that it would -end triumphantly.” - -[74] See Appendix. - -[75] A letter to General Pollock, written on the 18th of March, says: -“Affairs here are as unsettled as they can possibly be. The day before -yesterday the commandant of the Newab’s regiment was bribed by his -Majesty to desert to the Balla Hissar with all his soldiers. The -Newab demanded their restoration, but was refused. Yesterday, after -much dispute, his Majesty sent a message to our host, saying that the -commandant should be sent to Ameen-oollah’s house if we were delivered -over to the same authority. Fortunately for us the Newab refused to -give us up. This proposition was made through jealousy of the Newab, -and with the view to conciliate Ameen-oollah, by whom it had been -represented to his Majesty that we were supplying our host with money, -&c. Ameen-oollah had been for many days trying to get possession of -our persons with a view to try and extort money from us. His Majesty’s -proposition nearly cost us our lives.... Since the desertion of the -commandant the whole city has been in an uproar. The shops are all -closed, and every man has armed himself. The feeling against us is -reawakened. The gates of the Balla Hissar are half shut; and each chief -has collected his followers. Three or four thousand men have flocked -round our host. The Barukzye’s and Suddozye’s party-spirit bids fair -to be renewed with all its rancour.... The King has, however, now but -few friends, and his parsimony is as a proverb; and his suspected -connexion with us adds to his unpopularity.... The Naib has written -for the Kohistanees to accompany him on a crusade, and unless some -accommodation is made with his Majesty, the Balla Hissar will in all -probability be the first point of attack. It will be a popular cause, -as there are hopes of plunder.” - -[76] See Appendix for translations of Shah Soojah’s letters. - -[77] On the 2nd of April Mohun Lal wrote from Caubul: “A letter has -been received by Mahomed Akbar Khan, which was carried by Ameen-oollah -Khan and read by the Shah. It also passed under my sight through -the kindness of the Persian chiefs. It contained that Mahomed Akbar -has been always writing to send the troops to assist him against -Jellalabad, but nobody has heard him. Now he has been informed by -his trusty men at Peshawur that five battalions of the English have -reached Hussna Abdal, and when they join the forces at Peshawur they, -in company with the battalions of the Najeebs of the Sikhs, will force -their march through Khaibur, though he has sent Sultan Jan with a few -hundred men to reinforce the people of Khaibur; but if the English -enter and pass the Khaibur once, no one shall be able to oppose -them. Therefore the chiefs, as well as the Shah, at Caubul, should -not quarrel for the distribution of the money and ranks, but exert -themselves to come down immediately to Jellalabad and reduce it before -the English should pass Khaibur; otherwise he (Akbar) is risking and -ending his life for the faith of Mahomed, and will continue to exert -himself as long as he lives.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] - -[78] “The Shah, I am told, has made up his mind again to proceed -in person to Jellalabad; but I scarcely believe that he will ever -march, and if he does he will either be murdered or made blind by the -Barukzyes.”—[_Letter of Mohun Lal: MS. Correspondence._] - -[79] The murderer was a godson of the Shah, who had shown great -personal kindness to the youth. It is said that his evil passions had -been greatly excited, not only by the disappointment spoken of in the -text, but by the fact also that when he went to remonstrate, the King -caused the purdah or curtain of his Durbar tent to be let down, and so -denied ingress to the remonstrant. - -[80] Mohun Lal, in a letter to Captain Mackeson, Caubul, April 10, -1842, says: “Prince Futteh Jung was taken prisoner in the fort of -Mahomed Khan, Bayat, and at even released by force of Ameen-oollah and -the Populzyes. As soon as he reached the palace he opened the treasury -hoarded up with great pains by his father, the King. He spends a good -deal of it, to employ the people and make his party strong.... It is -estimated to be twenty lakhs in cash and a considerable quantity of -jewels.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] - -[81] I utterly repudiate the cant which fixes the stigma of ingratitude -on the character of Shah Soojah. No one knew better than the Shah that -we had carried him back to Caubul, and kept him there not for his -purposes but for our own. - -[82] _MS. Correspondence._ - -[83] Macgregor was of opinion that after the departure of the British -from Caubul, the conduct of the Shah indicated a friendly feeling -towards us. “The Shah is, I believe, acting in a friendly manner -towards us,” he wrote to General Pollock; “and will, if he has the -power, prevent the march of an army from Caubul. He knows that whilst -Dost Mahomed is in our possession we can make use of him as a powerful -weapon against his Majesty, and this is the great hold we have upon his -friendship.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] - -[84] _MS. Correspondence._ - -[85] _MS. Memorandum._ - -[86] _MS. Correspondence._ - -[87] _Major Rawlinson to Government: March 6, 1842._ This important -despatch was published by Lord Ellenborough in the Government Gazette, -and subsequently appeared in the Blue Book. To an unpublished letter, -written by Major Rawlinson to Mr. Colvin, on the 13th of December, I am -indebted for the information contained in the earlier portion of this -chapter. - -[88] He was connected with our postal establishment. - -[89] The letter to General Nott was worded as follows: - -“Assistant Quarter-Master-General’s Office, Head Quarters, Caubul, -November 3, 1841. - -“SIR,—I have the honour, by direction of Major-General Elphinstone, -commanding in Afghanistan, to request that you will immediately direct -the whole of the troops under orders to return to Hindostan from -Candahar to march upon Caubul instead of Shikarpore, excepting any that -shall have got beyond the Khojuck Pass, and that you will instruct the -officers who may command to use the utmost practicable expedition. -You are requested to attach a troop of his Majesty the Shah’s Horse -Artillery to the above force, and likewise half the first regiment of -cavalry. - -“I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient servant, - -“J. PATON, Capt. A. Q. M. G. - -“To Major-General Nott, Commanding at Candahar.” - -This letter was sent, under a flying seal, through Colonel Palmer, -at Ghuznee, and Major Leech, at Khelat-i-Ghilzye—Palmer sent it on -with this indorsement: “The country getting more disturbed every day. -Burnett came in yesterday after being attacked on the road. He was -pursued, when he fortunately fell in with some horsemen I had sent -after the fifty-two camels from Candahar, which have been taken off. No -tidings of Crawford.” Leech wrote:— - -“Khelat, Nov. 12, 1841. - -“The whole of the Ghilzye prisoners escaped from Caubul, and the family -of Husan Khan from this neighbourhood. Khaker Khan and Munsoor Khan in -custody, and all the other families expected by this evening to be safe -at this place.——What are we to say to the appearance _en route_ to -Candahar at this crisis of Saifadeen, nephew of Atta Mahomed Khan. He -was here on the evening of the 8th.” - -Macnaghten’s letter was addressed to Rawlinson, and it ran in the -following words:— - -“Caubul, Nov. 3, 1842. - -“MY DEAR RAWLINSON,—We have a very serious insurrection in the city -just now, and from the elements of which it is composed, I apprehend -much disturbance in the surrounding country for some time to come. -It would be only prudent, therefore, that the 16th, 42nd, and 43rd, -with a troop of horse artillery and some cavalry, should come here -immediately. General Nott will be written to officially in this -respect. We have been shelling the city all day, but apparently with -little effect. I hope there will be no difficulty about supplies. Your -writing to Leech will obviate this. On second thoughts I shall forward -this letter under a flying seal through Palmer and Leech. Unless you -send up this reinforcement there will be a probability of our supplies -being cut off. - -“W. H. MACNAGHTEN.” - -A line from Captain Lawrence to Colonel Palmer requested him to send on -the letter express through Leech. Leech forwarded it with a few words -to Rawlinson, saying, “What think you of a Prince and some treasure -with the brigade? Please reinforce this post (Khelat-i-Ghilzye) by -160, or if possible, 200 men—infantry.” Another indorsement stated, -“There are nearly 100 maunds of atta here, belonging to the Bengal -commissariat, disposable for the brigade proceeding towards Caubul. We -have six months supply for the garrison. - -“H. MILNE.” - -—[_MS. Records._] - -[90] It does not appear that the conduct of Lieutenant Crawford was, -in any way, open to censure. He was the bearer, as has been shown, -of written instructions, authorising him to destroy the prisoners if -they attempted to escape, but there seems to have been no connivance -between them and the party who attacked the escort. Crawford himself -says, in a narrative which he drew up, and which was subsequently -published in a Bombay paper: “One prisoner was cut down by a horseman -of the enemy (plainly showing there was no collusion between them), -two others rolled over in a ditch, where, with their horse a top of -them, and their legs chained under his belly, I left them; indeed, I -now found it was impossible I could ever get my charge into Ghuznee -alive, and I had only to decide on putting them to death or setting -them at liberty. My instructions would have justified my pursuing -the former course, but the poor wretches had clearly made no attempt -to escape; they were in no way answerable for the attack made on my -party, as was evident from one of their number falling by the sword of -our adversaries; and I conceived then, and do now conceive, that in -letting these men go with their lives, I was not only acting according -to the strict letter of my instructions, but that justice and humanity -required I should not slay them in cold blood. Had I put them to death, -then Shumshoodeen or Mahomed Akbar would have been equally justified -in taking our lives (the lives of all their prisoners) on the advance -of Pollock and Nott on Caubul. I may add that the Court of Inquiry, -which I called for, after investigating all the circumstances, decided -that I had acted perfectly right.” These escaped prisoners, however, -subsequently became the most active of our enemies. - -[91] He died, after much suffering, in March. - -[92] _Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._ - -[93] “The mutineers moved down to the Barukzye villages in apparent -expectation of being joined by the Ooloos, but wherever they went they -received neither support nor encouragement, notwithstanding that they -gave out our troops were on the march to destroy the Douranee villages. -The Janbaz at last took up a position at Chuplanee, a village about -twelve miles off, where our cavalry came up with them; Captain Leeson -had to file his men across a difficult canal, and had only just formed -line when the enemy charged in a body. Our men charged at the same time -in line, and the flanks swept round the Janbaz horse, who were probably -not above 150 strong—numbers having left the rebel standard before -reaching Chuplanee. For about five minutes a splendid fight took place, -hand-to-hand, when the Janbaz broke and fled, pursued by our cavalry. -Of the enemy, about thirty were killed and fifty wounded in the flight -and pursuit. Our loss was trifling.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[94] _Major Rawlinson to Major-General Nott: January 7th, 1842. MS. -Correspondence._ as end ref - -[95] _General Nott to Major Rawlinson: January 8th, 1842. MS. -Correspondence._ There is a characteristic passage in this letter which -is worthy of quotation. “I have no right to interfere with the affairs -of the government of this country, and I never do—but in reference to -that part of your note where you speak of political influence, I will -candidly tell you that these are not times for mere ceremony, and that -under present circumstances, and at a distance of 2000 miles from the -seat of the Supreme Government, I throw responsibility to the winds, -and tell you that, in my opinion, you have not had for some time past, -nor have you at present, one particle of political influence in this -country.” - -[96] Her Majesty’s 40th Regiment; the 2nd, 16th, 38th, and a wing of -the 42nd Native Infantry; the Shah’s 5th Infantry; Anderson’s two -troops of Horse Artillery (Shah’s); Blood’s Battery (Bombay Artillery); -Leeson’s and Haldane’s Horse. - -[97] The number of the enemy has been variously stated at all sorts of -amounts, from 5000 to 20,000. General Nott, in his official despatch -addressed to the Military Secretary, says: “After a march of four hours -over a very difficult country, I came in sight of the rebel army, from -fifteen to twenty thousand men, drawn up in a strong position on the -right bank of the Urghundab.” Major Rawlinson says: “From what I myself -saw, as well as from information I have received from parties in the -enemy’s camp, I should estimate their entire force at 5000-3000 of -which accompanied the chiefs from Sir-a-bund, whilst the other 2000 -joined from the Alekozye villages.”—[_MS. Journal._] There is nothing -of which the historian ought to speak with less confidence than the -“number of the enemy.” There is nothing more difficult to determine -than the fact; and nothing more likely to draw upon him a large amount -of acrimonious criticism, than his manner of stating it. As a general -proposition, I think it may be laid down that military commanders -seldom under-state the number of the enemy they have beaten. - -[98] “Two canals in advance of the village were lined by matchlock -men—the horse crowded the slope of the tuppa upon which Killa-chuk is -built, and occupied the entire space intervening between that village -and Kohuck, the hillocks adjoining which latter place were covered by -large masses of footmen collected from the neighbouring villages to -witness rather than to participate in the combat.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s -MS. Journal._] - -[99] Major Rawlinson, in his despatch of the 6th of March, describes -this affair as a “brief skirmish.” General Nott has described the -action in a few pregnant sentences. A graphic account of it is to be -found in Captain Neill’s _Recollections of Four Years’ Service in the -East_. Captain Neill was present as Adjutant of her Majesty’s 40th -Regiment. He speaks of the affair as the “Battle of Urghundab.”—“the -first success after our recent disasters at Caubul,” as it was. He -adds: “The victory having been obtained over a force so immensely -superior to that which was opposed to it by the British, most -effectually damped the spirit of our enemies in that part of the -country.” As Nott’s force had sixteen guns, it can hardly be said that -the enemy’s force was immensely superior. - -[100] The Prince seems to have been inclined to desert to the British -in the course of the action. He and Tej Mahomed (the Sirdar of the -recreant Janbaz, who had been forced to accompany the mutineers after -their attack on their British officers) had been in consultation in -the morning about going over to the British camp. The chiefs had some -suspicion of this, and “when they saw Tej Mahomed detach himself, they -immediately accused the Prince of treachery. They talked, indeed, of -seizing him; upon which the boy, with his immediate followers, galloped -off the field.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] Tej Mahomed would -have come in; but an inopportune shower of grape from Blood’s battery -kept him at a discreet distance. - -[101] The Douranee chiefs were irritated against Atta Mahomed for -precipitating the conflict with the British. They had been anxious to -stand aloof until the issue of the Caubul contest could be more clearly -seen by them. - -[102] On the 8th of January, the General wrote to Rawlinson: “I am -sorry that I have not the same confidence in Meerza Ahmed which you -appear to have. The force under this man has been in the immediate -vicinity of Candahar for the last month. Why this has been permitted I -know not. He has a very considerable body of men with him, both horse -and foot; and my information tells me that they are increasing daily -and hourly.... You ought to be the best judge of this man’s fidelity; -but I believe him to be a traitor; and I should not be surprised to -hear of his being joined by his expected confederates, and before -twenty-four hours marching off and forcing the young Prince Sekunder to -accompany him. Yet he is on the watch, and will play his game according -to circumstances.”—[_General Nott to Major Rawlinson: January 8th, -1842. MS. Correspondence._] The position of Meerza Ahmed, and the near -prospect of his defection, were among the reasons urged by the General -in support of his refusal to quit the near neighbourhood of Candahar. - -[103] _Neill’s Recollections._ There was, however, comparatively little -snow at Candahar. It seldom lies there long upon the ground. - -[104] He was not, however, completely successful. It would have been -a miracle if he had been. “_February 4._—There have been several -squabbles in the Douranee camp already: 1stly. A quarrel took place -between the Janbaz and Populzyes regarding _bhoosa_; 2ndly. Sufder Jung -fell out with Meerza Ahmed, and abused him for not spending his money -freely on the Ghazees; and 3rdly. The Janbaz have regularly cleaned -out an Ishakzye Khail in another dispute about supplies.”—[_Major -Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[105] Major Rawlinson, preparatory to the commencement of the work -of disarming, took a census of the inhabitants of the city, which -greatly alarmed the people, as it was believed to be our intention to -expel them. When it was found that they were only to be disarmed, they -recovered their serenity, and submitted very patiently to the ordeal. - -[106] “_February 11._—I am becoming seriously alarmed about money. -A lakh is the utmost that I shall be able to raise from the Candahar -merchants, and with the most rigid economy this will hardly last us -to the end of March—the godowns at the same time being opened to -supply the troops. It seems, therefore, absolutely indispensable -that the road should be opened from the south, either by Outram or -ourselves.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[107] “_February 21._—Two Cossids reached me to-day from Leech, one -with letters of the 13th and 15th, the other with letters of the 17th. -Enclosed was a copy of a letter addressed to me by Major-General -Elphinstone and Major Pottinger, requesting me to intimate to -Major-General Nott their wish that he would evacuate Candahar and -Khelat-i-Ghilzye, in pursuance of the agreement entered into at -Caubul for the return of our troops to India. This letter appears -to be genuine, but I cannot consider it in any way binding on us; -and for the reasons stated in my letter to General Nott of the 1st -instant, I still conceive that we are best consulting the interests -of government in maintaining our position pending the receipt of -further instructions from Calcutta.... The question regarding Shah -Soojah is very perplexing. He is certainly nominally at the head of -the government, and we can no longer be supposed to be here in support -of his authority. Still, however, a month sooner or later in retiring -can make little difference, and it seems to me indispensable that some -definite arrangements, approved of by government, should be entered -into for the future administration of the province before we withdraw -our troops.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[108] It ran thus: “_Caubul, 25th December, 1841._—SIR,—It having -been found necessary to conclude an arrangement, founded on that of the -late Sir W. H. Macnaghten, for the evacuation of Afghanistan by our -troops, we have the honour to request that you will intimate to the -officer commanding at Candahar our wish that the troops now at that -place and at Khelat-i-Ghilzye, together with the British authorities -and troops within your jurisdiction, should return to India at the -earliest convenient season. Newab Jubbar Khan, who is the bearer of -this letter, will render you all the assistance in his power. He -has been appointed Governor of Candahar on the part of the existing -government. - -”E. POTTINGER. “W. K. ELPHINSTONE, M.-G. - -“P.S.—If you require two or three days to make your preparations, you -must not remain in the city, but proceed to your cantonment. Whatever -you are obliged to leave behind, you will make over to the Newab Jubbar -Khan.” - -[109] “I have only to repeat,” wrote General Nott, on the 23rd of -February, in reply to Major Rawlinson’s official letter on the subject -of the evacuation orders received from Caubul, “that I will not treat -with any person whatever for the retirement of the British troops -from Afghanistan, until I shall have received instructions from the -Supreme Government. The letter signed ‘Eldred Pottinger’ and ‘W. K. -Elphinstone’ may, or may not, be a forgery. I conceive that these -officers were not free agents at Caubul; and therefore their letter or -order can have no weight with me.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] - -[110] _Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._ - -[111] February 28. - -[112] “I have been for some days past in communication with the -Barukzye tribe, and have, I believe, succeeded in detaching them -from the Douranee confederacy. They had deserted their villages and -gone off to the desert; but, on a promise of protection, have now -returned, and bound themselves to admit none of the enemy’s horse -within their borders. The Alekozyes of the Urghundab also propose to -enter into the same engagements; and if we can fairly detach these -two powerful tribes, the Douranee cause must, I should think, expire -of an atrophy.... Timour suggests that he should endeavour to get the -Douranee chiefs to march on Caubul, in order to release the Shah from -the Barukzyes, feigning that he has received his father’s instructions -to this effect; and I see no objection to such an attempt being made. -I also hear that the Caubul Janbaz insist on proceeding to the north, -and that Meerza Ahmed has the greatest difficulty in restraining -them.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[113] “_March 1._—The General now has made up his mind to take the -field; and, after considering the case fully, I have determined that -the Afghans must be turned out of the city. It is not as if the -present affair were a mere transient disturbance. We are engaged in a -regular national war, and Outram does not anticipate that we shall be -able to take the field in sufficient force to put down all opposition -before next winter. We must, therefore, look forward to a protracted -struggle at Candahar all through the summer; and the security of the -city appears to me, under such circumstances, indispensable.”—[_Major -Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[114] A week before, a strong conviction of the necessity of the -measure had forced itself upon his mind. But he was only too willing -to postpone the execution of it. On the 22nd of February he wrote: -“The Moollahs are now again stirring themselves, and I have very -good grounds for supposing a large quantity of arms to be concealed. -I almost fear that affairs are approaching that state when, for our -immediate safety, we shall be obliged to incur the odium of expelling -the Moollahs and Afghans from the city. It is not that these people -can do us any serious injury within the city; but the probability of -an insurrection inside the walls simultaneously with the disturbances -outside, gives confidence to Meerza Ahmed’s party and dispirits our -Parsewan adherents. It is to be considered, however, that if we expel -the Afghans and retain the Parsewans, we shall embitter the national -feeling against us with the rumour of sectarian animosity, and shall, -moreover, sacrifice the Sheeah party in the event of our retirement. -The most obvious necessity of self-preservation could alone, I think, -warrant such a course, and I cannot doubt but that it is my duty to -temporise as long as prudence will admit.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. -Journal._] - -[115] “No doubt much property has been sacrificed in carrying the -measure into effect; but we have done all in our power to alleviate -the evil. Valuable property, which the people were unable to take away -with them, has been transferred to the safe keeping of the Hindoos and -merchants who have remained, and the grain is to be all taken charge -of by the commissariat, receipts in money being granted by us to the -owners.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[116] _Captain Neill’s Recollections of Service in the East._ - -[117] “The plan of enticing the General to Telookham, delaying him -there by keeping a body of horse in his vicinity, and then doubling -back on the town, was all preconcerted by Meerza Ahmed; and on the -night of the attack every chief in the country was present except the -Noorzyes.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[118] The gate had been closed for the night. Lieutenant Cooke was on -guard, and was endeavouring to trace the movements of the enemy in the -distance, when a villager drove his donkey, loaded with brushwood, -over the bridge and demanded admission. He was told the gate would be -opened for no one; upon which he growled out a malediction, and tossing -the brushwood on the ground, said he would leave it there for the -night, and take it into the town in the morning. The villager, having -recrossed the bridge with his donkey, dived among the ruined huts -opposite the Herat gate, and was out of shot in a moment. At the same -instant flames burst forth from the brushwood, and the gate was fired. - -[119] See the letter-press to Lieut. Rattray’s admirable drawings of -the Scenery and Costumes of Afghanistan. - -[120] The Ghazees had so damaged the canal banks, that the irrigation -was destroyed, and there was every prospect of a failure of the crops; -but through Rawlinson’s agency the people of the Urghundab were induced -to labour at their repair, and in a short time the waters began again -to flow in their accustomed course. - -[121] _General Nott to Major Rawlinson: March 25, 1842._ [_MS. -Correspondence._] - -[122] “In the charge of the horse under Saloo Khan, when after driving -back our cavalry they were stopped by the fire of the guns and the -light company of the 38th, which had been thrown out in advance, Yar -Mahomed of Dehrawat, who was Saloo’s nephew, fell, and in another part -of the field, Hubeeboollah, Akhondzadeh, and Mahomed Raheen, Noorzye, -were wounded. The total loss of the enemy in killed and wounded I -estimate, from all I could learn on the field and from the villagers, -at about 150. We had a few men killed and some forty wounded. Amongst -the latter are two cavalry officers, Chamberlaine, and Travers of the -2nd. The Douranee horse came on more boldly on this occasion than they -had ever been seen to do before. Some of the 38th Sepoys, indeed, -received sabre-cuts from our horsemen; but they cannot stand our -artillery or musketry fire. They had been so taunted with cowardice, -that they resolved to have one conflict with us before they quitted the -vicinity of Candahar, and had not reinforcements gone out, they would -have sustained, I doubt not, a much heavier loss, by making repeated -charges on different parts of the camp during the afternoon.”—[_Major -Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[123] _Captain Neill’s Recollections of Service._ - -[124] Captain Neill. - -[125] “A few squadrons of dragoons,” wrote Rawlinson in his journal, -“would have swept the Douranee horse from the field; as it was, they -were permitted to re-cross the river almost unmolested.” - -[126] _Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._ Rawlinson adds: “Our own -camp-followers, I also found, had committed extensive ravages, and when -I endeavoured to persuade the people that our troops were there for -their protection, they uniformly answered that they knew not whether -they had most to fear from their friends or their enemies.” - -[127] _Major Leech to General Nott: Khelat-i-Ghilzye, March 9, 1842. -MS._ - -[128] Two pounds. - -[129] Shah Soojah claimed credit for having delayed his march. - -[130] If there had been any one in Ghuznee acquainted with the use and -practice of artillery, the garrison might have held out till April. - -[131] “On the morning of the 10th, Poett and Davis were obliged to -retire from their posts, and the survivors here now assembled in the -two houses held by Colonel Palmer and the head-quarters of the corps. -You cannot picture to yourself the scene these two houses presented; -every room was crammed not only with Sepoys, but camp-followers, men, -women, and children, and it is astonishing the slaughter among them -was not greater, seeing that the guns of the citadel sent round-shot -crashing through and through the walls. I saw high-caste men groping -in the mud, endeavouring to discover pieces of unmelted ice, that -by sucking them they might relieve the thirst that tormented them. -Certainly, when that morning dawned, I thought it was the last I -should see on this earth, and so did we all, and proceeded to make a -few little arrangements ere the final attack on us took place. The -regimental colours were burned, to prevent their falling into the hands -of the enemy; I destroyed my watch, and flung it, and what money I had, -over the wall of the ditch; I also burnt my poor wife’s miniature, -first cramming the gold frame of it into a musket, being determined -that one of the Ghazees should have his bellyful of gold ere I died. -Hour after hour passed on, and still we sate expecting every minute to -hear the shout of the final attack; but it came not. From our loopholes -we saw the enemy swarming all around us—in every lane and house, and -on the hill of the citadel—the place was black with their masses; -and as they themselves afterwards told us, there were not less than -ten thousand men thirsting for our blood.”—[_Lieutenant Crawford’s -Narrative._] - -[132] Lieutenant Crawford says: “During the three preceding days’ -fighting, Shumshoodeen had repeatedly offered us terms; but they were -such as we could not accede to, inasmuch as they commenced by desiring -we would surrender ourselves to him and abandon the Sepoys to the fury -of the Ghazees. The Sepoys, it appears, had held a consultation among -themselves, and believing they had no chance of their lives, determined -on forcing their way out of the town and endeavour to get to Peshawur. -When we first heard of this mad design and spoke to the men about it, -they denied it; but, on the 10th, two Native officers came forward -and told us they had made up their minds to go off that night—that -if we chose to accompany them they would be exceedingly glad, but, if -otherwise, they would go alone.” - -[133] It is pleasant to record any act of individual heroism. The -late Brigadier Nicholson, who fell at Delhi, in 1857, “then quite a -stripling, when the enemy entered Ghuznee, drove them thrice back -beyond the walls at the point of the bayonet before he would listen -to the order given him to make his company lay down their arms. He at -length obeyed, gave up his sword with bitter tears, and accompanied his -comrades to an almost hopeless imprisonment.”—[_Rattray._] - -[134] How strongly Outram felt on the subject of the withdrawal -policy may be gathered from the following passage in a letter to -Sir Richmond Shakespear: “As this is not a time to mince matters, -no sooner did I see the orders of government to General Pollock to -withdraw the Jellalabad garrison, and to retire to India under any -circumstances (except the Sikhs rising against us, which, by-the-by, -that measure would have brought about most probably), than I wrote, -in the most earnest manner I was capable of, pointing out that our -bitterest foe could not have devised a more injurious measure, -whether viewed politically or in a military light; but expressing my -trust that Mr. Clerk would act on the responsibility vested in him -to prevent so ruinous a step. My mind is now set at rest by General -Pollock’s determination, now gleaned from your letters. I honour the -General, therefore; and should he be allowed to carry out his views, -we shall have mainly to thank him, not only for retrieving our honour -in Afghanistan, but for saving India to us, the loss of which would -ultimately result from disgracefully succumbing to the Afghans now.... -Nothing is easier than to retrieve our honour in Afghanistan previously -to finally withdrawing, should the government so determine; and I pray -God, Lord Ellenborough may at once see the damnable consequences of -shirking the undertaking, and order accordingly; otherwise the disaster -of Caubul will be but the commencement of our misfortunes.”—[_Major -Outram to Sir Richmond Shakespear: March 15, 1842. MS. Correspondence._] - -[135] _Major Outram to Sir Richmond Shakespear: March 15, 1842. MS. -Correspondence._ - -[136] “There are some officers in camp who think that Brigadier -England’s detachment will be sacrificed between this and the Kojuck; -but with such fine examples as those set by Woodburn on the Helmund, -Anderson at Tazee, and Wymer at Assyai, surely there ought to be no -doubt of success between this and the Kojuck, when no natural obstacles -to signify intervene.”—[_Lieutenant Hammersley to Major Outram: March -18, 1842. MS. Correspondence._] - -[137] _Major-General England to Government: April 2, 1842. Published -Papers._ - -[138] Nott had resolutely refused to send any troops to meet England’s -detachment, though earnestly pressed by Rawlinson to do so. The General -urged that he could not afford to send troops to the Kojuck, whilst he -was liable at any time to be called upon to proceed to the relief of -Khelat-i-Ghilzye. Rawlinson pointed out the immense evils attending -a total deprivation of treasure, and said that even the compulsory -abandonment of Candahar might follow the failure of General England -to effect the passage of the Kojuck. Nott, however, was obdurate. The -detachment was not sent. Wymer’s brigade, however, was then out to -the southward of Candahar, and it was believed that the object of the -movement was to support the party advancing through the Kojuck. Nott -withdrew the brigade to Candahar, and an impression gained ground among -the enemy that we had endeavoured to open our communications with the -troops below, but had drawn back in despair. - -[139] Of the 20th Bombay Native Infantry. He was greatly esteemed as a -gallant and good soldier. “They have a fine fellow at the head of the -light battalion,” wrote Hammersley to Outram, a few days before the -brigade left Quettah, “and it is to be hoped that he will inspire the -crest-fallen with a little ardour.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] - -[140] “General England and his staff were dismounted, and standing in -conversation not far from where the light companies had rallied. I -joined them. It was useless to stand and lament over what could not be -recalled. A retreat was determined upon. I observed to the General that -the day might be retrieved, and offered to lead into the entrenched -position with a hundred men properly supported; and I am confident -that I should have succeeded. The men were in courage, and anxious -to recover the bodies of their comrades. The General replied, he had -not men. I proposed that the left hill should be attacked first, as -it commanded the smaller one. The enemy were certainly in strength, -and very bold, but our men burned with rage at seeing their comrades -cut up before their eyes. I think I pressed my offer three times, the -last time volunteering to lead with eighty men; but the General felt -he had too few, and that the stake was too great.”—[_Colonel Stacy’s -Narrative of Services in Beloochistan and Afghanistan in the Years -1840, 1841, 1842._] - -[141] It appears to have been England’s intention, after the disaster -on the 28th, to have commenced his retreat on the same evening; but -Colonel Stacy persuaded him not to move until the following morning. On -the 29th he struck his camp and marched to Hykerzye, halted at Koochlag -on the 30th, and on the 31st reached Quettah. - -[142] Hammersley complained that the General’s letter was so very -unsatisfactory, that if it had not been for some private letters, he -would have been left in ignorance of the real nature of the events that -had occurred. The original letter, now before me, is worth quoting. -England seems to have been so unwilling to state distinctly that he had -been defeated, that even when writing officially to General Nott on the -1st instant, he shrunk from a plain statement of the circumstances of -the case; so that Nott, writing to him on the 18th, could only say: “I -have been favoured with your letter of the 1st instant, &c.... I have -_also heard of the affair you had with the enemy on the 28th ult_.” The -letter to Nott is, however, less obscure than the letter to Hammersley, -which runs thus: - -“Camp, three miles south of Hykulzye, 2 P.M. - -“MY DEAR HAMMERSLEY,—I wish you would acquaint Colonel Marshall, -that as the insurgent force has been much reinforced from Candahar, -and have so strongly protected themselves with breastworks, &c., on -the ground commanding our line of route this side of Hykulzye, I -shall fall back to Hykerzye to-morrow, my presence here being now of -no use, and inviting their insults; and it is probable that as the -position at Hykerzye is not a good one, having much broken ground in -its rear, that I shall further fall back on Cutchlak. I have had so -many men killed and wounded by the enemy, that my baggage is increased -whilst my means of defending it is lessened. If Colonel Marshall, -through your information, thinks the Cutchlak Pass occupied, he may -make such efforts as his numbers will enable him to keep it open and -communicate with us; and as the enemy is a hundred to one stronger than -any one imagined, I must wait for the reinforcements till I try them -again. Meanwhile, the fortification of Quettah must be proceeded with -vigorously. Show this to Colonel Marshall and Major Waddington. - -“Sincerely yours (in haste), “R. ENGLAND.” - -[143] “_April 1._—The Douranees having received positive accounts from -Mahomed Sadig of the advance of Brigadier England with treasure, have -resolved to make an effort to intercept it. Saloo Khan accordingly, -with Mahomed Azim (Noorzye), Fyz Tullub, Hubeeboollah, Sooltan Mahomed -(Barukzye), &c., have gone off by the desert to the Kojuck Pass. The -body of horse with the chiefs is about 1000; but they expect to raise -some 4000 or 5000 of the Noorzye, Atchekzye, Barukzye, and Populzye -Ooloos to assist in holding the pass.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. -Journal._] - -[144] “You will understand the insinuation,” wrote one of the most -chivalrous of the many chivalrous officers who served beyond the -Indus (James Outram). “If he is ever heard to libel our Sepoys in -that manner, surely it will be noticed by our officers.”—[_MS. -Correspondence._] - -[145] After adverting to the reported intention of England to leave -Quettah with a small supply of money and ammunition, but not to push -through the Kojuck, Nott goes on to say: “This I deeply regret; -firstly, because I cannot send a force to the southern side of the -pass; secondly, I require a large supply of ammunition, which I have -for two years been endeavouring to get, but without success; thirdly, -four lakhs of rupees will be of little use here—the troops and -establishments are going on for four months in arrears; fourthly, -your moving into Pisheen with a convoy, known by the whole country to -be intended for Candahar, and then halting or retiring to Quettah, -will have the very worst effects throughout Afghanistan, and will -be more injurious to my present position than 20,000 of the enemy -in the field. I sincerely hope that you have not moved, or that you -have determined to push across the Kojuck with all the force you -can muster.”—[_General Nott to General England: April 2, 1842. MS. -Records._] - -[146] “I strongly advised Brigadier England, through Lieutenant -Hammersley, in letters I addressed to them both so long ago as the -10th ultimo (March), to await at Quettah the junction of the remainder -of his brigade, unless very urgent circumstances should require his -more immediate advance to meet an advance from Candahar. The latter, -so far from being the case, General Nott requested might not be -attempted.”—[_Major Outram to Captain Durand: April 3, 1842. MS. -Correspondence._] - -[147] _General Nott to General England: April 2, 1842. MS. Records._ - -[148] _General England to General Nott: April 10, 1842. MS. Records._ - -[149] There is so fine a soldierly flavour about this letter, that I -give it entire in the Appendix. - -[150] _Colonel Stacy’s Narrative._ - -[151] _Colonel Stacy’s Narrative._ - -[152] “These fine fellows had been led forward by Colonel Wymer, at -daybreak, to occupy the heights commanding the pass from Chummemo to -the western side, to secure General England’s party a safe passage. -I have never seen our Sepoys to such advantage. It was impossible to -climb the precipitous hills in pantaloons; this part of their dress -had, therefore, been discarded, and the men were in their doties. As -they showed on every accessible point, they were the admiration of -all. I can easily imagine how painful it must have been to the Bombay -regiments to find the Candahar troops in full possession of the pass -before they were allowed to enter it.”—[_Colonel Stacy’s Narrative._] - -[153] “I have only,” wrote Nott, “to repeat my sentiments—namely, -that I will not sanction a rupee being given from the British treasury -to these people. I have for three years viewed with deep regret the -ruinous system of giving away large sums to the chiefs and Sirdars of -Afghanistan, which I sincerely believe has brought upon us all our -present difficulties in this country. I have offered to guarantee the -personal safety of Saloo Khan if he returns to his allegiance by a -certain day. If there are any other chiefs who can make it appear that -they are worthy of the indulgence of my guarantee for their personal -safety, I will take their wishes into consideration; but I will make -them no other promises. This does not apply to Mahomed Atta or to -Meerza Ahmed, as I will not receive these two men on any terms, without -the order of higher authority.”—[_General Nott to Major Rawlinson: -April 9, 1842. MS. Correspondence._] - -[154] See _Colonel Stacy’s Narrative_, and his correspondence with -Major Rawlinson. Rawlinson, however, doubted whether the negotiations -with Saloo Khan would have a favourable result: “Had a long -conference,” he wrote on the 10th of May, “with Atta-oollah Khan, -who has come in to treat for his brother, Saloo; and the latter, if -his agent is to be believed, certainly desires to espouse our cause. -Knowing, however, as I do, Saloo’s ambition and avarice, I question -very much whether we shall come to any satisfactory arrangement -with him. We merely require Saloo Khan’s co-operation, in order to -facilitate the re-establishment of our dawk communication; but the Khan -talks of rank, power, and pay, as the return he has a right to expect -for joining us, and is not likely to be satisfied with any moderate -measure of conciliation.”—(_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._) Saloo -Khan, however, in the sequel rendered good service and proved his -fidelity in the face of strenuous opposition from some of the other -chiefs: “His falling off from the cause of Islam,” wrote Rawlinson in -his Journal, “has plunged him into personal difficulties. He has been -twice attacked by Mahomed Sadig and Meer Afzul, and has been wounded, -together with his brother and his nephew.” - -[155] _MS. Correspondence._ - -[156] _MS. Correspondence._ - -[157] _MS. Correspondence._ - -[158] _MS. Correspondence._ - -[159] “Letters are said to have been received from the ex-Sirdars -announcing their intended journey to this place, according to Meerza -Ahmed’s invitation which was sent to them in January last. Mahomed Reza -Khan of Seistan is also said to have promised to assist them with 100 -camels, and to send horsemen to escort them to this frontier. This news -appears to be _vraisemblable_ in the extreme. If the ex-Sirdars can -get away from Shuhur-i-Babek, either with or without the connivance of -the Persian Government, nothing is more likely than that they should -make an attempt to recover Candahar; and I should greatly dread their -appearance on this frontier, for we are enabled to keep up the form, -and something of the power of a local government, almost solely from -the adherence to us of the old Barukzye retainers—people on whose -fidelity we could not possibly depend if the Sirdars took the field -against us.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal: April 4, 1842._] - -[160] “A messenger from Shah Persund Khan of Laush reports that two of -the horsemen sent down to Kohun-dil-Khan in January by Meerza Ahmed -returned lately, and gave out that they were only a few days in advance -of the Sirdars, who had left Shuhur-i-Babek secretly, and were coming -here _viâ_ Seistan.”—[_Major Rawlinson to General Nott: April 8, 1842. -MS. Correspondence._] - -[161] Kohun-dil-Khan did not make his appearance in person in the -Candahar territory till the beginning of 1843, when we had announced -to the Persian Government that we had withdrawn behind the Sutlej, and -were indifferent as to what became of the Sirdars of Afghanistan. - -[162] _Mr. Maddock to General Pollock: February 24, 1842. Published -Papers._ - -[163] “The information received with respect to the conduct of Shah -Soojah during the late transactions is necessarily imperfect, and, -moreover, of a somewhat contradictory character. It is not probable -that the insurrection against our troops should have originated -with him. It is most probable, and it is almost proved, that he has -adopted it, and, powerless in himself, is prepared to side with either -party, by which he may hope to be maintained upon his precarious -throne.”—[_Governor-General in Council to Sir Jasper Nicholls: March -15, 1842. Published Papers._] - -[164] _Mr. Maddock to General Nott: April 19, 1842. Published Papers._ - -[165] This is not only a remarkable letter in itself. It is remarkable -for its misadventures. Its outer history is somewhat curious. It never -found its way into the published volume of correspondence, and its -existence was only to be inferred from the fact of a reference to it -in another letter. It was at last brought to light by the inquiries in -Parliament of Lord Lansdowne and Lord Palmerston. It was to be found -nowhere in England; but a copy was at last elicited from India. The -Governor-General then declared that “the original despatch of the 13th -of May never reached the office, and must have been lost in transit. -The duplicate was received and acknowledged on the 11th of July. It is -the practice of the Secretary’s office to keep the unreported papers on -all important subjects for each month together, and to forward copies -of them to the Secret Committee by the monthly Overland Mail. The -despatch in question was inadvertently put up in its proper place in -the May bundle of reported papers, instead of being left for a time, as -it should have been, among the unreported papers of July. Hence, when -the July papers were copied for transmission to the Secret Committee, -this despatch was omitted.” Nothing less explanatory than this was -ever offered in the way of explanation. It does not appear whether the -original letter miscarried altogether on its way to Lord Ellenborough, -or whether it miscarried only on its way to the office. There is an -equal obscurity about the history of the duplicate which was “received -and acknowledged on the 11th of July.” It might be inferred from this -that it was received on the 11th of July, and acknowledged on the same -day. But it happens that the duplicate was despatched on the 30th of -May—and ought surely to have come not among the July, but among the -June papers. In this letter of the 11th of July the Secretary says: “I -am directed to state that the original letter has never reached me, and -that the duplicate _has only lately been received_ and laid before the -Governor-General, whose previous instructions to you appeared to render -any special reply to this communication unnecessary.”—[_MS. Records._] -In the face of so distinct a denial as this, little can be said, except -that in a letter from Pollock of May 20th, which was duly acknowledged, -reference is made to the letter of the 13th. If that letter had not -been received, some allusion certainly ought to have been made by -Government to its non-receipt. - -[166] There was no scarcity of provisions at Jellalabad at this -time. But, to secure a continued supply, Pollock was sensible of -the necessity of encouraging a belief throughout the country that -the intentions of the British Government inclined towards a forward -movement. “We are all quiet here,” he wrote on the 6th of May to Mr. -Clerk, “grain coming in in abundance; at least, in as great quantities -as we could expect after the dreadful alarm into which this force seems -to have put the whole country. Every village was deserted. I did my -utmost to protect them from plunder, and in most cases succeeded; and -the consequence is that we, in a measure, command the resources of -the country.” And on the 11th of the same month, writing again to Mr. -Clerk, he said: “While I remain here I can command supplies, and I have -no doubt that I shall be able to do so as long as the natives suppose -that we intend remaining in the country; but if they thought otherwise, -our supplies would be stopped.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] - -[167] _Published Correspondence relating to Military Operations in -Afghanistan._ - -[168] _MS. Correspondence._ In his journal, too, Rawlinson wrote: “The -order to retire came upon us like a thunderbolt. We had not, from Lord -Ellenborough’s former letter, thought such a measure possible until -Caubul should be retaken. As there is no discretionary power, however, -vested in General Nott by the late letter, he has only had to consider -the best way of carrying the order into effect.”—[_MS. Journal._] - -[169] The 2nd, 16th, and 38th. - -[170] “In a late letter to government,” he wrote to the -Commander-in-Chief on the 24th of May, “you will have seen how -anxious I was that any proposed movement towards Peshawur should be -communicated to no one from whom it could be withheld. The moment such -a thing is known, it is probable supplies will cease to come in; we -should be in difficulty about forage; all who are now friendly would -be ready to oppose us; and if I had not time to secure the pass, the -consequences might be serious indeed.”—[_Published Papers relating to -Military Operations in Afghanistan._] - -[171] In this letter of the 20th of May, Pollock says: “I have -already, in my letter dated the 13th inst., entered on the subject (of -withdrawing to Peshawur), and must receive a reply before I shall be -able to move.” If that letter of the 13th had not been received and -read, surely this allusion to it would have called forth a remark to -that effect. - -[172] It was outwardly only an acknowledgment of the General’s -inability to retire at an earlier period—but there was more meaning in -it than this, for on the same day the Chief Secretary wrote to Nott: “I -am directed to inform you that, in consequence of the very defective -state of the means of movement possessed by Major-General Pollock, it -appears to be out of his power to retire from Jellalabad until October, -when his retirement will certainly take place.”—[_Published Papers._] - -[173] _Major Pottinger to General Pollock: Tezeen, April 20, 1842. -Published Papers._ Together with this letter from Pottinger came a -paper from Akbar Khan himself. It was without seal and signature, for -the Sirdar was fearful of compromising himself with his countrymen, and -the document might have fallen into their hands. After some allusions -to the painful past, and a declaration that he was unable to restrain -the disorganised mob of Afghans from attacking the English army, the -Sirdar went on to say: “If I allow the English, who are my guests, to -depart according to your suggestion; or according to Pottinger Sahib’s -advice, if I allow the English ladies to depart before the gentlemen, -in either case all Mahomedans will look upon me as their enemy, and -the whole multitude will be opposed to me. Under these circumstances -I beg you to reflect, that not having come to an understanding with -you, and having made enemies of them, how can I exist?... I prefer your -friendship to the throne of Caubul, because, if I was to go to Caubul -now, the men of Caubul would push me forward, and then it would be -difficult to release my guests and to be on friendly terms with you. On -this account I have written to show my friendship for your government. -Please God my services shall exceed the injuries I have done you.” - -[174] _General Pollock to Major Pottinger: Jellalabad, April 26, 1842. -Published Papers._ - -[175] _General Pollock to Government: Jellalabad, April 28, 1842._ In -reply to this letter, the Chief Secretary wrote: “It is not consistent -with the honour of the British Government to enter into any terms for -the making of a provision for so great a criminal. We might engage to -spare his life if he were to fall into our hands, because it would be -difficult so to bring him to trial as to protect the government from a -colourable charge of violently prosecuting an unworthy revenge; but no -more than this can be done, and this only if he should promptly do all -he can to repair the crimes he has committed.”—[_Published Papers._] - -[176] _Major Pottinger to General Pollock: May 3, 1842._ I have quoted -from the original in Pottinger’s hand-writing. But the letter is given -among the published papers, with the usual official emendations. Thus -the passage, “They have asked for the money, if it is paid, to be given -to Sir-Bolund Khan”—is printed, “They have asked for the money, &c., -to be given to _his Colund Khan_.” It may puzzle the future historian -to discover who “his Colund Khan” may have been. - -[177] _General Pollock to Major Pottinger: Jellalabad, May 10, 1842. -Published Papers._ Lord Ellenborough was unwilling that any money -should be paid for the release of the captives; but was inclined to -exchange Dost Mahomed and his family for the prisoners in the hands -of the Sirdar. “Undoubtedly,” he wrote, “on the 26th of April, you -remained authorised, by the instructions of the 24th of February, -to give money on the public account for the release of individual -prisoners; and if, previously to the receipt of my letter of the 25th -of April, you should have concluded a negotiation for the release of -any individual prisoners on that condition, the Governor-General would -feel himself under the necessity of sanctioning any payment of money -to which you may have then pledged yourself. After the receipt of that -letter, you will, of course, in any future negotiation, have adhered to -the instructions contained in it. It cannot but be a subject of much -regret that you should have considered it to be necessary, under any -circumstances, to have had any communication whatever of a diplomatic -nature with Mahomed Akbar Khan, in whom it must be impossible for -any one to place any trust.”—[_Published Papers._] Akbar Khan, at -this time, seems almost to have considered the release of his father -and family as hopeless; and Pollock did not think he was authorised -to propose an exchange of prisoners; for although, on the 24th of -February, Lord Auckland suggested that he “might speak of the release -of Dost Mahomed as an event which might not be altogether impossible,” -he did not know how far such a measure might be sanctioned by Lord -Ellenborough. Moreover, Pollock believed that the exchange had only -been authorised in the event of his being able to treat for the release -of the whole of the British prisoners; and they were not all in the -hands of Akbar Khan. - -[178] The questions were—“1st, What were the terms negotiated by Sir -W. Macnaghten with the rebels? 2nd. What alteration was made by Major -Pottinger? 3rd. What does Major Pottinger allude to when he talks -of breach of faith? 4th. What were the manner and causes of Sir W. -Macnaghten’s murder?” I have found the information conveyed in Captain -Mackenzie’s answers of some use in the course of my narrative. - -[179] On that day Akbar Khan sought an interview with Lady Macnaghten. -Painful as such a meeting must have been, the bereaved widow was not -in a position to refuse to see her husband’s murderer. He spoke very -kindly to her; and as she sat in silent sorrow before him, he declared -that he would give his right arm that the deed which he so much -regretted might be undone. - -[180] _Captain Johnson’s Journal._ The writer adds: “At the -commencement of the defile, and for some considerable distance, passed -two or three hundreds of our poor miserable Hindostanees, who had -escaped up this unfrequented road from the massacre of the 12th. They -had not a rag to cover them, and were all more or less frost-bitten, -wounded, or starving. The poor wretches were huddled together in -thirties and forties, so as to impart to each other a little animal -heat, as other warmth was denied them by the barren, inhospitable -wilderness around them. We afterwards learnt that scarcely one of -these poor wretches escaped from the defile in which they had taken -shelter; and that, driven to the extremes of hunger, some of them had -for a few short hours sustained life by feeding on their dead comrades. -The wind was blowing bitterly cold at our bivouac. No shelter of any -kind for the ladies of our party during the whole night. Happiness is -comparative; and truly fortunate did General Elphinstone, Brigadier -Shelton, and myself consider ourselves when one of our Afghan -attendants told us to accompany him inside a miserable cow-shed, which -on our first entrance was so blackened with the dense smoke from a -good blazing fire in the centre of the hut, that we could see none of -the objects around us, until we had stretched ourselves at length on -the floor, and consequently out of the influence of the smoke, when we -perceived our companions to be three or four half-starved Hindostanees, -who had accompanied our party. Our attendant wished to eject them; but -we too truly sympathised with their sufferings to permit such an act -of tyranny. We shortly afterwards got an invitation from Mahomed Akbar -to join him and his party to dinner inside the fort. The room of our -reception was not much better than that we had left. We had, however, -a capital dinner, some cups of good tea, and a luxurious rest for the -night, the room having been heated with a good blazing fire and lots of -smoke, with no outlet for either, except the door and a small hole in -the roof.”—[_MS._] - -[181] Captain Johnson says in his journal: “Both Mahomed Akbar and his -chiefs were most attentive in escorting over in safety the ladies and -their children and wounded Europeans.” There is other testimony to -the same effect: “Many of the ladies, being mounted on ponies, were -obliged to dismount and ride astride on the chargers of their Afghan -acquaintance, to avoid getting wet. Nothing could exceed the politeness -and attention of Mahomed Akbar on this occasion, who manifested the -greatest anxiety until all had crossed over in safety.”—[_Eyre’s Rough -Notes of Imprisonment in Afghanistan._] “The chiefs gave us every -assistance. Mahomed Akbar Khan carried Mrs. Waller over behind him -on his own horse. One rode by me to keep my horse’s head well up the -stream. The Afghans made great exertions to save both men and animals -struggling in the water.”—[_Lady Sale’s Journal._] - -[182] “_Jan. 17, 1842._—Early in the morning we were, to our surprise, -told to prepare for a march higher up the valley, and further removed -from Jellalabad, from which place Tugree is about thirty miles -distant. All our hopes, which we had entertained hitherto of being -escorted to Jellalabad, are now blighted, and we see plainly that we -are nothing more nor less than prisoners, until such time as General -Sale shall evacuate Jellalabad, or Dost Mahomed Khan be permitted by -our government to return to the country. Started at nine, and arrived -at Budeeabad, almost at the top of the valley, and close to the first -range of hills towards Kafiristan. It belongs to Mahomed Shah Khan, is -nearly new, and has a deep ditch and _fausse-braie_ all round it. Our -abode consists of five rooms on two sides of a small square. This space -is to accommodate nine ladies, twenty gentlemen, and fourteen children, -and in the Tei-Khana are seventeen European soldiers and three European -women—all prisoners.”—[_Captain Johnson’s Narrative of his Captivity. -MS._] - -[183] _Lady Sale’s Journal._ - -[184] “Last night, Mahomed Akbar and I had a long conversation. He was -very anxious for the release of his father, and made many promises -in his name if we would release him. I pointed out that at least two -months must elapse before we could in any way have the instructions of -government regarding the release of the Ameer. I can see no objection -to the release of the Ameer, unless government intends making an -example of the city of Caubul. Our release and that of the hostages -at Caubul appears to depend upon his release. His family’s release -requires that of the women here. I wish for these last something could -be done; but I fear not. You must use your influence. They tell me we -shall be forwarded to Peshawur if you evacuate Jellalabad; and the -Sirdar begs me that I write you on the subject. I have explained that I -have no authority now, and said that I cannot promise anything of the -sort. I hope government will see nothing prejudicial to its interests -to release the Dost and family.”—[_Major Pottinger to Major Macgregor: -Lughman, January 18, 1842. MS. Correspondence._] - -[185] “_January 19._—Changed my clothes for the first time since -leaving Caubul, January 6, and was fortunate enough to have a clean -shirt. My feet had become so swollen that I could not again put on my -boots when once pulled off. My eyes still very sore from the effects -of the snow on the march.”—[_Captain Johnson’s Narrative of his -Captivity. MS._] - -[186] Subsequently the materials were served out to the prisoners and -dressed by their own Hindostanee servants. - -[187] “_January 29._—The Sirdar and Sooltan Jan came to see us. Made -a bet with the latter of 1000 rupees that Dost Mahomed Khan, the -ex-Ameer, will be released by the 30th of January, and will return to -Afghanistan. The former gave 1000 rupees to be distributed among us for -the purpose of purchasing sugar and other little luxuries. My share is -fifty rupees; which sum is very acceptable, as I have not had a pice -about me since leaving Caubul.”—[_Captain Johnson’s Narrative. MS._] - -[188] It was dangerous to send military or political news in the -ordinary form of epistolary correspondence. So the officers at -Jellalabad hit upon the expedient of dotting off letters in old -newspapers, so as to form words and sentences—“an easy mode of -carrying on secret correspondence not likely to be detected by an -Asiatic.” These dotted letters communicated to the prisoners the -tidings of Wild’s repulse in the Khybur Pass—the despatch of General -Pollock to Peshawur—and the arrival of Dr. Brydon at Jellalabad. - -[189] The letter is given in the Appendix. - -[190] See Appendix. - -[191] The 1st of April was not forgotten. It is a curious proof of the -irrepressible love of practical joking which clings to our countrymen -in all places and in all situations, that the prisoners in Afghanistan, -on the 1st of April, turned their misfortunes into food for a joke. -Captain Johnson says: “_April 1, 1842._—Was awakened early by M—— -telling me a letter had been received by L—— from Macgregor at -Jellalabad, informing him that our ransom had been effected for three -and a half lakhs of rupees, and that we were to start in five or six -days. Was up in an instant—off to L——; and heard the story confirmed -by him. The report spread through the whole fort, among our servants as -well as the Europeans, in less than a minute. All was intense delight; -when, on its being a little sobered down, to my horror, I was told that -the story was all fudge. I was half mad with rage at being made such -an April fool of, on a subject which, of all others in our situation, -should have been the last for any of our party to have expended his wit -upon.”—[_Captain Johnson’s Narrative of his Captivity. MS._] - -[192] “Up to this date, Mirza Báudín Khan (who had saved Captain -Mackenzie’s life on the assassination of Sir William Macnaghten, and -who had previously to the breaking out of the insurrection informed -that officer of the advent of Akbar Khan at Bámian) had been the keeper -of the prison. This man was secretly well affected to the English, and -professed an especial friendship for Troup and Mackenzie, to whom he -immediately confided his intention of marching out with the prisoners -and his garrison (the majority of whom he had gained over) to meet -Sale’s troops as soon as he should hear of their proximity; for he -naturally expected that the General would have followed up his decisive -victory over Akbar by marching direct upon Badeeabad, distant from -Jellalabad not forty miles. As evening drew on, he became very anxious, -frequently visited the ramparts to look out for the British force, and, -passing over Sale as of no account in the matter, grievously abused -Macgregor for not coming to the rescue. This might have been very -easily accomplished, not only without risk, but with an effect on the -fortunes of Akbar and his party, which might have saved much subsequent -misery to the captives; expense, and bloodshed, in the advance upon -Caubul; and vacillation and moral cowardice in the councils of the -supreme government. But Sale came not, although the road was quite -open; and the following morning the friendly gaoler was deposed, and -his place taken by the Nazir or chief-steward of Mahomed Shah Khan, -whose insolence and brutality contrasted disagreeably with the conduct -of Báudín Khan.”—[_MS. Memorandum._] - -[193] “_April 9._—The whole of this day and yesterday passed in the -greatest suspense. Reports reached us to-day that the Sirdar and -Mahomed Shah Khan had arrived at the fort of the latter, about two -miles distant from us. The rout of the Afghan army appears to have been -perfect, and we hear that they have lost all their guns, camp-equipage, -and private property. All our guard appear very mysterious—group -together—and talk in whispers. The inhabitants of the fort have -removed their property and left their homes. Towards the afternoon, -several of our guard, with whom we had been in the habit of conversing, -and who had always been kind to us, on our asking them what would -become of us, would shake their heads and say, ‘You are in the hands -of God.’ A frightful stillness appeared to prevail. By degrees we -began to hear fearful rumours that we were all to be massacred at -sunset. Whether these first originated in the imaginations of some of -our party, or in those of the Afghans, I cannot say—but knowing the -revengeful temper of those in whose hands we were, nothing appeared -to us more probable; and our anxiety and suspense increased as the -day wore on. At about sunset a report was brought in that Mahomed -Shah Khan was on his way to visit us. Even this was a relief to us, -as we knew that what would happen to us must take place shortly. In -about ten minutes he arrived with a large party of his followers. On -coming up to us, our alarms were at an end as concerned our lives, as -he regarded us civilly, and shook hands with the whole of us. We all -sate down together. He entered slightly into the defeat of the day -before yesterday, and told us that we must be in readiness to leave -Budeeabad in the morning, without, however, giving us any hint as to -our destination; nor had any of us inclination to ask questions of him. -His will is law to us. After sitting for some time he wished us ‘Good -evening,’ and withdrew. He slept in the fort that night, and we were -busy making preparations for the morrow’s march. These, however, were -shortly at an end. All my worldly goods and chattels might be stowed -away in a towel or a handkerchief.”—[_Captain Johnson’s Narrative of -his Captivity. MS._] - -[194] “_April 10._—Up at daylight; had a cup of tea and was ready -for the march. Took out my saddle to put on my horse; found that some -rascal had stolen my stirrups. This was soon rectified by a piece of -rope. As I was about saddling my horse, which was a good Hissar-stud -animal, Mahomed Shah Khan sent a man to tell me that this was to be -his property, and that he would furnish me with some other beast, as -none of us were to be permitted to ride horses for fear of making our -escape.... In the mean time, Mahomed Shah Khan, having heard that -Lady Macnaghten was possessed of a great number of magnificent shawls -and valuable jewels, which she had been so lucky as to have saved up -to this time, went inside and coolly commanded her, without sending -any previous message, to open her boxes. These were all very soon -ransacked; and shawls and jewels to the amount of near two lakhs of -rupees were taken possession of by this chief of freebooters—politely -telling her ladyship that she might retain one or two shawls and any -particular jewel for which she might have more value than another. -Many of the little things were also taken possession of by a young -whelp—the worthy son of so worthy a sire. Remonstrance was useless. -About 9 A.M. we started; but still without the slightest knowledge of -where we were going.”—[_Captain Johnson’s Narrative of his Captivity. -MS._] - -[195] _Captain Johnson’s Narrative. MS._ - -[196] On the 20th, Mrs. Waller, who had been necessitated to perform -the dreadful march from Budeeabad on horseback, was delivered of a -daughter. She was allowed an interval of one day’s rest, and was then -hurried onwards by the same distressing mode of conveyance. - -[197] General Elphinstone’s remains were sent by Akbar Khan, for -interment, to Jellalabad. The General’s faithful servant, Moore, -accompanied the body. “I have the honour to inform you,” wrote -Pottinger to Pollock, on the 26th of April, “that Mahomed Akbar -Khan yesterday despatched to you the body of the late Major-General -Elphinstone. It was, however, intercepted by a party of the Ghilzyes, -under the supposition that the Prince in Caubul had sent it, the party -made prisoners, and the European servant, who had been allowed to -accompany it, wounded. The savages, however, on hearing that Mahomed -Akbar Khan had sent it, deputed one of their number to learn the truth. -The Sirdar is much grieved at the accident, and now sends a party, -with Private Moore, the General’s servant, to replace the corpse and -forward it on. The Sirdar at present is unable to release the two -servants from the hostility of the intermediate clans; but he promises -to do so as soon as a person may arrive sufficiently powerful to -protect them.”—[_Major Pottinger to General Pollock: Castle of Afzool -Khan, Tezeen, April 26, 1842. MS. Records._] The General’s remains -subsequently reached Jellalabad, and were interred with military -honours. - -[198] I am informed that one of Conolly’s inducements to visit Bokhara -was the hope of persuading Stoddart outwardly to recant his profession -of Mahomedanism. My informant, who was at this time at Caubul, writes: -“Arthur Conolly availed himself of a certain margin left him in his -instructions for visiting Kokund and Bokhara, to proceed to the latter -place, principally to obtain Stoddart’s release, and also with a -view to his restoration to that precious faith in a Divine Redeemer, -which he had outwardly denied. True it is, that He who cannot lie -has declared that whosoever denies Him before men, him will He deny -before God the Father; but, if ever an act of apostasy called for -tears of compassion, it is that of the martyr Stoddart, for he, too, -like Cranmer, died for the Faith which he once denied. Long before -Conolly’s arrival, the Ameer of Bokhara, who was accounted even by his -own countrymen an incarnation of perfidy and ferocity, had been led by -the contempt with which his letter to the Queen had been treated by -the Foreign Office, to wreak his vengeance on the only individual of -the offending nation in his power. By his order, Stoddart was kept in -a loathsome prison, frequently severely beaten, _which never extorted -a groan from him_, and starved into a state of pitiable weakness. -Meanwhile, he was repeatedly ordered to become a Mahomedan, which he -steadfastly refused to do. To conquer his obstinacy, the Ameer threw -him into the Chah-i-Seeah (or black pit), a place of torment for the -vilest criminals. It is such a pit as that into which Jeremiah was -cast, the bottom of it being composed of indescribable filth—men’s -bones, decomposed animal matter, &c. In it, amongst other vermin, -are large ticks, which bury themselves in the flesh of the victim, -producing noisome sores. Before life was extinct, Stoddart was drawn up -from this horrible dungeon, and, on reviving somewhat, was exposed in -one of the great gates of the city, all who entered being instructed -to spit in his face and buffet him. Still he refused to abjure -Christianity. The next day he was again severely beaten, his grave dug -before his face, and it was announced to him that, unless he pronounced -the Mahomedan confession of faith, in that very grave he would -forthwith be buried alive. Hitherto, this noble gentleman’s resolution -had not failed him; but in this fearful moment of temptation, -when _mere_ human nature could sustain no more, to use his own -expression,—‘The grating of the spades against the sides of the grave -jarred on his shattered nerves beyond endurance.’ Certain Mahomedans, -whose sympathy had been enlisted by his noble constancy, besought him -almost with tears to spare them the disgrace of his murder, and to -pronounce the confession as a mere matter of form; and thus, almost -unconsciously, he with his mouth owned the Arabian impostor as the true -Prophet of God. Arthur Conolly’s arrival, exhortations, and prayers -speedily produced the blessed effect aimed at. Stoddart renounced -Mahomedanism (having previously refused to live with the wife assigned -him as a new convert), and thus subjected himself to a new series of -cruelties and indignities which, as we have seen, ended in his and -Conolly’s public martyrdom.”—[_MS. Memorandum._] - -[199] In July, Stoddart wrote to Major Rawlinson, saying: “Conolly is -not yet here from Kokund, nor have my messengers to him yet returned. -They conveyed the orders from Caubul, and an invitation from the Ameer -to return by this route.”—[_MS._] - -[200] “The Ameer was very much enraged at finding that the Queen had -not answered his letter; but had referred Colonel Stoddart to the -Indian Government, for all matters connected with Bokhara. About five -days after this, intelligence was received that Sir Alexander Burnes -had been murdered at Caubul. On the receipt of this intelligence -a servant of the Ameer was sent to call the two gentlemen to his -presence. The Ameer asked Colonel Stoddart which road he could now -take, even supposing he (the Ameer) was willing to release him. The -Colonel said he could go either by Russia or Persia. The Ameer said he -would release him in seven or eight days, and keep Captain Conolly. A -few days afterwards the English gentlemen were sent for to the palace -and confined.”—[_Statement of Shah Mahomed, Populzye, one of Captain -Conolly’s attendants. MS. Records._] This part of the statement is -entirely confirmed by that of Saleh Mahomed, Akhondzadeh, as taken by -Colonel Sheil. - -[201] Some of these papers, written closely on both sides, had been cut -into three pieces, and apparently sent by as many messengers. - -[202] Allahdad Khan, the Afghan envoy, who accompanied Captain -Conolly, had been permitted to take his departure from Bokhara, but -was afterwards brought back and confined. He remained for some days -in the same apartment with Stoddart and Conolly, but was subsequently -removed to other quarters. The servants of the latter officer were also -thrown into prison—some of them into the well, or log-house, in which -Stoddart had been incarcerated. - -[203] An Afghan over-coat. - -[204] Saleh Mahomed, the Akhondzadeh, made a similar statement to -Colonel Sheil. I see no reason to doubt the statements of this man, -which are confirmed in many particulars by the accounts of other -witnesses. - -[205] _Arthur Conolly’s MS. Journal._—A Russian Mission was then at -Bokhara, under the charge of Colonel Boutenoff, who seems to have been -in higher favour than the English gentlemen; and to have greatly pitied -their condition. On the 15th of February the prisoners despatched a -letter to him by the hands of one of their dependents known as Long -Joseph, whose exploits are thus recorded: - -“_February 15._—This day Long Joseph gallantly darted into our room, -and carried off a note which we had written for Colonel Boutenoff, to -inform him of our situation. - -“_February 16._—Long Joseph having won a servant of the -Topshee-Bashee’s, conveyed to us a note from the gaoler, and sent it to -him; Stoddart writing to government through Sir J. M’Neill.” - -Colonel Stoddart had interchanged visits with the Russians before -Conolly’s arrival. Saleh Mahomed says: “There was an ambassador at this -time from the Russian Government who came twice to see the English -gentlemen, who also visited him.”—[_MS. Records._] - -[206] Obscure in _MS._ - -[207] Obscure in _MS._ - -[208] _MS. Correspondence of Arthur Conolly._ - -[209] The men formerly in Dr. Gerrard’s service, enslaved fifteen years -ago, whom I had ransomed at Khiva by order of Government. A. C. - -[210] _MS. Correspondence._—Arthur Conolly was painfully anxious to -remove from the minds of his friends the impression which might have -been produced upon them by his letter of the 11th of March. Again he -wrote in his journal-letter: “I take this opportunity of explaining -that my letter of the 11th of March was written when I was very ill -with fever. Thinking that he might forcibly be sent away from me on -the departure of the Russians (as they brought a request for his -dismissal), or that we might be otherwise separated, Stoddart had -begged me to give him a memorandum of my opinions regarding the policy -to be pursued towards these states; and I wrote off a hasty summary of -these notions, which were running in my head, with many things that I -was anxious to say about my unfortunate servants, and to my friends, -when under excitement, which must have made my expressions very wild -and incoherent. I hoped that the paper containing them remained in -the hands of Long Joseph; but he, misunderstanding our instructions, -instead of keeping it, gave it to Eusofee-i-Roomee (Augustin), who, -apparently, went off at once with it to Caubul. When I got better I -drew up for Stoddart the memorandum which he had asked for, and which -he now decides on forwarding. It is written in a more calm and less -indignant tone than the letter aforesaid, but allowance must be made -for the brevity and freedom of the propositions, for we were so liable -to be interrupted and discovered, that I could only pen my opinions by -snatches, and paper is a scarce article with us.”—[_Arthur Conolly’s -MS. Journal._] - -[211] General Pollock exerted himself to obtain an adjustment of the -claims of Captain Conolly’s servants; and he succeeded. The letter -which was written in reply to Pollock’s application shows in what -light Lord Ellenborough regarded Conolly’s mission: “With reference,” -wrote the Chief Secretary, “to your letter of the 23rd ultimo, on the -subject of the remuneration applied for, on behalf of the servants -attached to the mission of Lieutenant A. Conolly to Kokund, I am -directed to inform you that the Governor-General has no knowledge of -Lieutenant A. Conolly’s mission to Kokund having been authorised. On -the contrary, his Lordship was informed, by the late President of the -Board of Control, that Lieutenant A. Conolly was expressly instructed -by him not to go to Kokund; and, in all probability, he owes all his -misfortunes to his direct transgression of that instruction. The -servants entertained by him, however, are not responsible for the -indiscretion of their master. They were in the service of an officer -apparently employed on a public mission by his government, and the -Governor-General is prepared to consider their position favourably. His -Lordship, therefore, authorises the disbursement of the sums stated -in the papers attached to your letter, under reply to be due to these -several persons; but the sums so paid on account of wages accruing to -these several persons, after they left Khiva (after deducting therefrom -the amount of wages which would have become due during a direct march -to Caubul) will be made a charge against Lieutenant A. Conolly, who -will be required to refund the amount, as well as all sums which may -have been drawn on account of such an unauthorised extension of his -mission.”—[_Mr. Maddock to General Pollock: Simlah, Nov. 3, 1842. MS. -Records._] - -[212] An abstract of this letter was forwarded by another route, and -it reached John Conolly at Caubul on the 4th of July. In this letter, -Stoddart reports the success of the Ameer at Kokund. “The Ameer,” -he wrote, “entered Kokund on the 11th of May, and gave it up to -pillage—destroyed its rulers—unpeopled its capital, and is now on -his return, having distributed the different governments among his own -Bokharan chiefs. He is become master of immense treasure, and will now -probably march against Khiva, which, unless saved by some demonstration -from Persia or Afghanistan, must fall in August or September, after a -short campaign.” With reference to the efforts of the Russian Mission, -he says: “The Russian Mission left this towards the end of April. I -feel convinced that Colonel Boutenoff’s kind desire to procure our -release failed solely in consequence of the unreasonableness of the -Ameer.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] - -[213] General Pollock officially reported Captain Conolly’s death -from Caubul, in a letter dated September 30; but he added: “The only -authority for the death of this very intelligent officer is conveyed -in a Persian letter from a native of Caubul, who writes from Bokhara -to Moollah Ahmed Khan, of this city, saying, ‘Tell Moostafah (Captain -A. C.’s servant) that his uncle, whom he left here sick, saying he -was a great traveller and had visited Kokund, was taken very ill, -and though we gave him medicine and did all in our power, it was of -no avail. It was the will of God that he should die.’ Moostafah and -Moollah Ahmed Khan are both of opinion that Captain A. Conolly is the -person alluded to, and as the letter proceeds to say that the effects -of the deceased are at Bokhara, and can be sent when required; and as -Moostafah had no uncle, to whom could the description apply? I fear -there can be no reason to doubt the death of the above-named officer. -Colonel Stoddart is, from native report, said to be alive, and still -in confinement.”—[_MS. Records._] This is mere conjecture; and by no -means tallies with the more credible account of the execution of the -two prisoners. On the 3rd of November, 1842, the Supreme Government -assumed that Conolly was still alive. But the home authorities adopted -Saleh Mahomed’s story, and struck Stoddart’s name out of the army list, -from the 17th of June, 1842. I believe this really to have been the -date of their deaths. Major Rawlinson, on the morning of the 16th of -September, 1842, met one of Stoddart’s servants near Caubul, and the -man whom he knew, informed him that he had come direct from Bokhara, -having started immediately after the execution of his master.—[_MS. -Notes._] The reader may consult the works of Captain Grover and Dr. -Wolff. - -[214] See the _Edinburgh Review, July, 1845_, for an account of these -efforts. The paper derives additional value from the assignment of its -authorship to Sir John M’Neill. - -[215] _Colonel Stoddart to Major Rawlinson: Bokhara, July 7, 1841. MS. -Correspondence._ It may be gathered from this letter that Stoddart -had no intention of awaiting Conolly’s arrival at Bokhara; and that -Conolly proceeded thither under orders from Caubul, and an invitation -from the Ameer. An attempt has been made to control, in some measure, -the flood of sympathy which sets in so strongly towards Arthur Conolly, -by asserting that he was not authorised to proceed even as far as -Kokund, and that he therefore brought his misfortunes down upon his -own head. But I have before me the strongest proof that Conolly _was_ -authorised by the Supreme Government to proceed to Kokund, and to use -his best endeavours to obtain the liberation of Colonel Stoddart. -In a letter, an official copy of which is now before me, the Chief -Secretary writes to the Envoy and Minister: “As in the present aspect -of affairs it does not seem necessary to continue the restriction -which had at first been imposed, his Lordship in Council authorises -you to permit Captain Conolly to proceed from Khiva to Kokund, if he -should think it expedient, and if he finds that he can do so without -exciting serious distrust and jealousy at the former place. In his -personal intercourse with the Khan of Kokund, he will be guided by the -instructions which have been issued, prescribing the purport of his -written communications. Captain Conolly may, in such a journey, find -increased means of using an useful influence at Bokhara for the release -of Colonel Stoddart; and his Lordship in Council need not add, that he -would wish every such means to be employed with the utmost earnestness -and diligence for that purpose.”—[_Mr. Maddock to Sir W. Macnaghten: -Dec. 28, 1840. MS. Records._] - -[216] Two other notes were written by the prisoners on the back of -this paper: one to Miss Stoddart at Norwich, and the other to John -Conolly at Caubul. “Don’t believe all you hear or may hear,” wrote -Stoddart. “Keep all friends informed of my health, and don’t let them -be disturbed by rumours,” wrote Conolly. - -[217] _MS. Correspondence._ - -[218] _MS. Records._ - -[219] Captain Grover. - -[220] The extracts from Captain Conolly’s letters and journals in this -chapter are all made from the originals, and have, in some places, been -deciphered with much difficulty; the manuscript, written in very minute -characters, being greatly defaced by damp and attrition. - -[221] On the 5th of May, Mohun Lal wrote: “The Prince (Futteh Jung) is -very, very anxious that the General should march to Caubul; he appears -now involved in difficulties, and undoubtedly is friendly to our -government. He says he would not allow Ameen-oollah and the Populzye -rebels to come into the palace, the evening they were obliged to leave -the city, but by allowing them to come in, he entertained two objects. -Firstly, to employ their services against the enemies of both states -(the Barukzyes, who murdered the Envoy and also his father, the King, -placed by the English Government on the throne) till the arrival of -General Pollock. Secondly, he may keep them quietly in his possession, -and catch them as rebels, when you approach.”—[_MS. Records._] - -[222] “The Prince,” said Mohun Lal, “is of course very liberal to -those that espouse his cause, while the Barukzyes pay very little by -selling jewels and finery. The Kohistanees or disciples of Meer Hadjee -are towards the Barukzyes; but they groan to receive money lesser than -those who are with the Prince.”—[_MS. Records._] - -[223] “Khan Shereen Khan,” wrote Mohun Lal, on the 9th of May, “came -last night to me and said, that the Barukzyes press upon him to side -with them to oppose the Prince; and if he does agree he is sure he -will be ruined. He says he is going to send his wives to some of the -country forts, and then either go into the Balla Hissar or wait upon -you at Jellalabad; and then he thinks that the whole of the Persians -will follow him.”—And again, on May 10th: “Yesterday, about noon, ... -Mahomed Akbar Khan came in person to Khan Shereen Khan, and persuaded -him, after a long talk, to side with him to oppose the Prince towards -Benee Hissar. When Mahomed Zemaun Khan heard this he got jealous, -and sent a message to Khan Shereen Khan, if he did not go himself or -send his son to assist Soojah-ool-Dowlah, as the Newab had requested -him, he had better not go, with Mahomed Akbar too. The latter at last -succeeded.”—[_MS. Records._] - -[224] “When Mahomed Akbar,” wrote Mohun Lal, “appeared in the field -opposite the first or distant fort, Abdul Salem became traitor, and -waited on Mahomed Akbar, who gave him a horse and desired him to go to -his village. Upon this the people of the Prince, who were stationed -in the forts between the fort of Abdul Salem and Balla Hissar, became -disheartened and cowardly, obliged to desert the forts without -fighting, and fly to the Balla Hissar. Mahomed Akbar’s people followed -the fugitives to the very gates of the Balla Hissar, and possessed the -gun of the Prince. Mahomed Akbar had taken Major Pottinger also with -him to the fight.”—[_MS. Records._] - -[225] “In consequence of establishing the British harmony.”—[_Mohun -Lal’s Translation._] - -[226] _MS. Records._ - -[227] _MS. Records._ - -[228] _MS. Records._ - -[229] According, however, to our English notions, the contest was -very far from a vigorous one. John Conolly wrote from Caubul: “The -contending parties continue to amuse themselves with firing long shots -with their guns and jezails, and the Balla Boorj is attacked—that -is, fired at for three or four hours by one or two thousand men every -third night or so.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] Conolly says, in the same -letter: “There is an anecdote here, that three Feringhees arrived at -the Balla Hissar in disguise, and that on hearing this the Barukzyes -withdrew their outposts to a considerable distance.” In another letter -(May 26) he says: “The Prince holds out still in the citadel. The -Barukzyes have been battering at the Upper Boorj, and firing into the -Balla Hissar. According to our ideas, their efforts have been almost -harmless; but the garrison, I fear, have become alarmed, and would be -glad to see relief.”—[_MS. Records._] - -[230] The Prince had no powder. Mohun Lal, however, contrived to -procure some and to convey it to the Balla Hissar, through the agency -of the Kuzzilbash chiefs. - -[231] On the 5th of June, Mohun Lal wrote to Sir R. Shakespear, -Pollock’s military secretary: “If you will not march immediately, or -in four days, to Gundamuck, you will lose all your prisoners, and the -Barukzyes will possess the riches of the late Shah, as well as the -Balla Hissar and the artillery.”—[_MS. Records._] John Conolly’s -letters, written about this time, contain the same urgent exhortations -to advance, as the only means of saving the Balla Hissar and the -prisoners. - -[232] The mine was altogether the merest bug-bear. It frightened the -Prince and the garrison; but Mohun Lal assured the former that it could -not by any possibility do him any harm, as it had not been properly -dug, nor run sufficiently far under the works to damage them, even if -the strength of the masonry were not such as to bid defiance to the -attempt. - -[233] _Correspondence of Mohun Lal. MS. Records._ Futteh Jung continued -to write to the British authorities that he had little or no money; and -that if the British did not advance, the royal family would be ruined -and disgraced. “It is well known to you,” he wrote to General Pollock, -“that Mahomed Akbar has made peace, with the view to derive wealth from -me; but I know that I have none. If I could sell everything that I -possess, I should not be able to raise a lakh of rupees.” - -[234] The Newab had little money; but the most valuable jewels of Shah -Soojah were in his possession. The Shah was wont to carry them about -with him in a bag; and he had them in his possession at the time of -his murder. “Mahomed Zemaun Khan,” wrote Mohun Lal to Sir Richmond -Shakespear, “has got hold of the most valuable jewels of the late King, -who, report said, had them thrown into a ditch when Soojah-ood-Dowlah -murdered him. This was seen by an Afghan at a distance, who after some -days went to the place and took out the small bag of jewels, which -he, being ignorant of their worth, sold them for 600 rupees. This was -reported to the Newab, who imprisoned the bidders and got all the -jewels from them. The bankers say that they are worth 50 lakhs of -rupees, but here are no men to purchase them.”—[_MS. Records._] Akbar -Khan had contrived to extract a considerable sum of money from the -Prince. On the 17th of June, Mohun Lal reported that the Sirdar had -received a lakh and a half of rupees from the royal treasury. On the -18th, John Conolly wrote that the Sirdar had drawn two lakhs, adding: -“He has taken an inventory of all the property and treasure in the -citadel; and has his own men there.” “It will be a great consolation -to us all,” he wrote in conclusion, “if you will tell us that no -negotiations beyond the ransom of the prisoners will ever be entered -into with Akbar. He is certainly the most uncompromising villain that -ever lived.”—[_Lieutenant Conolly to Captain Macgregor: Caubul, June -18, 1842. MS. Records._] - -[235] “The Prince was seated on the throne on the 29th. Akbar -constituted himself prime minister of all Afghans. The Hindostanee -dependents on the Prince had been previously removed from the Balla -Hissar, and none but his immediate attendants were allowed to -remain—the garrison being composed of Akbar’s own soldiers. The -remnant of the royal jewels, treasure, and property, even to a few -silver cooking utensils, had been also made over to Akbar. It was -Akbar’s intention to have deposed the Prince; and several meetings -were convened to discuss the question. The resolution to crown the -Prince was sudden, and suggested by an idea that the Populzyes who -had connected themselves with Timour at Candahar might be induced to -recognise the present arrangements in a preference to a Suddozye King -under British auspices.”—[_Lieutenant J. B. Conolly to Sir Richmond -Shakespear: July 1, 1842. MS. Records._] - -[236] All the circumstances attending their surrender ought to be -related. The incident is thus feelingly chronicled by Captain Johnson: -“Two days after the death of Shah Soojah, the people of Caubul demanded -that our hostages, who had been left under charge of Mahomed Zemaun -Khan, should be given up to the care of the son of the late High -Priest, Meer Hadjee. The former noble-hearted gentleman, than whom no -father could have behaved more tenderly to his children, begged and -entreated with tears that the separation should not take place—adding -that he was willing to give up his own family to the popular will, -but not the English gentlemen who had been entrusted to his care, and -who were his honoured guests—that he would, if the people so willed -it, make over to them his own son, with his sword round his neck, and -his turban for a winding-sheet, to be dealt with according to their -pleasure; but that force alone should deprive him of the society of his -friends. When all entreaties failed, he hoped to work upon the feelings -of the party at the conference by telling them that their chief and his -own sister and relations were in the hands of the British Government, -and that vengeance would assuredly be dealt upon them if the English -gentlemen sustained the slightest injury. On this, a grey-bearded -old gentleman told him and the rest that they might make their minds -perfectly easy as regarded the Afghan prisoners in India, as it was -contrary to the uses of Englishmen to hurt a hair of the heads of -their captives. The clamour of the people prevailed over all that the -Newab could urge, and with many a bitter feeling did this amiable man -make over the hostages to Meer Hadjee, with prayers and entreaties -to the latter that he would behave kindly to them; and at the same -time he sent with them to the latter’s house all the females of his -family, as the surest means of their protection; for however excited a -Mussulman population may be, it is seldom or ever that they violate a -harem.”—[_Captain Johnson’s MS. Journal._] - -[237] Mohun Lal’s own account of his sufferings is worth quoting: “I -have the honour to address you, for the information of Major-General -Pollock, C.B., that Akbar Khan, on the night of the 11th inst. (July), -put me in charge of Moollah Said, Atchekzye, in whose house I was -forced to lay down, and a couch placed over me, on which the people -jumped, and are beating me with sticks in a very unmerciful manner. -Akbar wants 30,000 rupees from me—says, otherwise, that he will pull -out my eyes. All my body has been severely beaten. I cannot promise -anything without government’s order, but see myself destroyed.... All -my feet is wounded by bastinadoing.”—[_Mohun Lal to Sir R. Shakespear: -July 14, 1842. MS. Records._] “I suffer very much. Sometimes I am -pinioned and a heavy stone is placed on my back, whilst the red pepper -is burnt before my nose and eyes. Sometimes I am bastinadoed. In -short, I suffer every conceivable agony. He wants 30,000 rupees, out -of which he has hitherto got 12,000, after using me very rudely. The -remainder, if not paid in the course of ten days, he says he will pull -out my eyes, and burn my body with a hot iron.”—[_Mohun Lal to Sir R. -Shakespear: July 17. MS. Records._] - -[238] The cause of this hasty removal is to be found in Akbar’s -suspicions that the Jabbar Khail, the most powerful of the western -Ghilzye clans, intended to carry off the prisoners and sell them to -General Pollock on their own account. This plot really existed, and had -been suggested to the chiefs of the Jabbar Khail by Captain Mackenzie -during his journeys to and from Jellalabad. - -[239] They were turned out of the fort, indeed, to make room for the -prisoners, to the infinite annoyance of the unhappy chief, who made -every possible excuse for not receiving them, but was overruled by -Akbar Khan, who obtained admittance for them, in the first instance, on -the plea that he only required accommodation for the night, and then -urged that the fort would suit them better than any other place in the -neighbourhood. It was altogether a most unfortunate occurrence for Ali -Mahomed, as, subsequently, on the advance of the British, the fort was -levelled with the ground, and the garden destroyed. - -[240] “I attach much weight,” wrote Lord Ellenborough, at the end of -May, “to what Major Sleeman says of the disposition of the Mahomedans; -but I am surprised that it has not occurred to him and to others, that -whatever may be the disposition of the Mahomedans, it is the absence, -not the presence of our troops, of whom more than three-fourths are -Hindoos, that alone can lead the Mahomedans to act against us. The -danger is in the position of the army, almost without communication -with India, too far off to return quickly at any season, unable -from the season to return now, without adequate supplies of food or -carriage. This is the danger which all the great statesmen in India -would perpetuate if they could, and while they maintain it, destroy -the confidence of the Sepoy and ruin our finances. _If I save this -country, I shall save it in spite of every man in it who ought to -give me support, but I will save it in spite of them all._”—[_MS. -Correspondence._] - -[241] Some readers, not having maps before them, will better understand -the nature of this retirement if I liken it to the case of a man -wishing to retire from Reigate to London, and taking Dover and -Canterbury in his way. - -[242] The services rendered by Mr. Robertson to his country, at this -time, have never been adequately acknowledged, except by General -Pollock himself, who never lost an opportunity of expressing his -gratitude for the assistance he had derived from the exertions of the -Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces. Mr. Robertson, -aware of the difficulty of collecting camels in sufficient number -for the purposes of the army, ordered letters to be addressed to the -principal collectors in Upper India, calling upon them to purchase -as many ponies and mules as they could get together in their several -districts. And it was in no small measure owing to these exertions that -Pollock was at length enabled to advance. - -[243] _Mr. Maddock to General Pollock: July 4, 1842. Published Papers._ - -[244] _Mr. Maddock to General Nott: July 4, 1842, and Lord -Ellenborough, same date. Published Papers._ - -[245] “If I have not,” wrote Pollock, “lived long enough to judge -of the propriety of an act for which I alone am responsible, the -sooner I resign the command as unfit the better. I assure you that I -feel the full benefit of being unshackled and allowed to judge for -myself.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] - -[246] A letter, too, was sent by Captain Troup to Akbar Khan with -a request that he would forward it to Nott. A few harmless lines -were written in ink; and much important matter in rice-water, to be -brought out by the application of iodine. The employment of Akbar Khan -himself, as the medium of communication between the two Generals, who -were contemplating his destruction, is not one of the least amusing -incidents of the war. - -[247] Pollock was afraid that Nott would have commenced his retreat -before the receipt of the despatch of July 4. “My movement will of -course depend,” he wrote in a confidential letter to Mr. Robertson on -the 10th of August, “on General Nott’s ability to meet me. Our late -accounts from that quarter are not favourable. They say that General -Nott is bent on retiring, and I very much fear that he will have made -several marches to the rear before the government despatch can reach -him.... I ought by this time to have heard from General Nott, in reply -to my letter by the first of the five messengers. If he is not coming -on, my negotiations for the prisoners will be a very simple affair; -but it must ever be a subject of regret that he should so hastily -retire, and at such a time, while he commands an army in every respect -efficient, and amounting to about 15,000 men.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] - -[248] It was reported in camp, and subsequently set forth in the local -journals, that some women had been violated by our soldiery. “But,” -says Captain Macgregor, “I made the strictest inquiry into the matter, -both from the Afghan chiefs who were with me, and from the inhabitants -of the village, but could not trace in the slightest degree any just -foundation for the report in question. Had there been any, it would -doubtless have formed a subject of great grievance to the people, -who are so very jealous of the honour of their women.”—[_Captain -Macgregor’s Report on the Operations in the Shinwarree districts. MS. -Records._] - -[249] _Captain Macgregor’s Report. MS. Records._ - -[250] There was no need to cut them down. It was sufficient to cut -deep rings through the bark to the heart of the tree; for they seldom -survived the operation. There is something in this so repugnant to our -civilised and Christian ideas of righteous retribution, that it is -only just that I should give in this place the explanation of an act, -perpetrated, indeed, upon other occasions, in the words of an officer -equally gallant and humane. “All the injury,” said Captain Macgregor, -“that we could do to their forts and houses could, with facility, in -a short time be repaired by them. From their proximity to the hills, -they could always obtain timber in abundance; and where water is -plentiful they could rebuild easily the bastions we might blow up; -and therefore a greater degree of punishment than this seemed to be -necessary, and was completely within our power, if we destroyed their -trees—a measure which seems barbarous to a civilised mind; but in no -other way can the Afghans be made to feel equally the weight of our -power, for they delight in the shade of their trees. They are to be -seen under them in groups, during the summer, all day long, talking, -reading, weaving, and sleeping. Even women and children seek the shade -of their trees. The Afghan mountaineer is not tangible to us in any -other way. He removes his herds, flocks, and property to the hills on -the shortest notice; and flies before our troops to places where he is -inaccessible to them. The Goolai people, moreover, were deserving of -no mercy. The amount of treasure they had plundered (viz., 18,000 or -20,000 rupees) was considerable. They had been very pertinacious in -attacking Captain Ferris’s cantonment; and equally so, subsequently, -our troops at Jellalabad. Therefore the Brigadier determined at once -to commence the work of destruction, desired that neither fort, house, -tree, grain, nor _boosa_ should be spared to them. This assuredly was -the best plan for preventing the necessity of harsh measures in future. -Working parties from the brigade were accordingly appointed for this -purpose.”—[_Captain Macgregor’s Report. MS. Records._] - -[251] _Report of Brigadier Monteith: July 27, 1842. Published Papers._ - -[252] “It is impossible,” wrote General Pollock, “to guess how this -mission may succeed, because, in dealing with Afghans, you deal -with treachery and deceit; but appearances are as fair as they can -be for the release of the prisoners. Captain Troup says that if it -had depended on Mahomed Akbar alone, some of the ladies would have -been sent with him; but Mahomed Shah appears to be a bitter enemy -of ours—much more so than I had reason to suppose. The man who has -come with Captain Troup was selected in opposition to the wish of -Mahomed Akbar, who wished to send Dost Mahomed Khan, a brother of -Mahomed Shah. Dost Mahomed was objected to by the chiefs as being too -bigoted to his own party, whereas Hadjee Buktear Khan was considered -neutral. He is a Candahar man—has been at Bombay and others of our -settlements, and is better acquainted with the European character than -the other.”—[_Jellalabad, July 15. MS. Correspondence._] - -[253] “Captain Troup,” wrote General Pollock, “is still here. I am -glad that, in proposing terms, I insisted on having the guns, for I -think there is almost a certainty of an objection being made to that, -in which case, of course, I can back out.... On this occasion I have -written nothing.”—[_Jellalabad, July 18. MS. Correspondence._] - -[254] “I have my camp in two lines,” he wrote a few days afterwards -to Pollock, “the cavalry facing the river, and rear to the water—the -front of our encampment an open stony plain—_a good place for a -fight_. The left of our line rests on a small hill that commands a view -all round.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] - -[255] The Governor-General, however, seems to have considered it not -wholly improbable that the contemplated military movement upon Caubul -would be suspended by the favourable conclusion of the negotiations -with the enemy; and actually authorised Pollock to exercise his -discretion in ordering Nott to retire by Quettah, even though the march -upon Ghuznee and Caubul had been commenced.—[_Lord Ellenborough to -General Pollock: July 29, 1842._] Subsequently the Governor-General -seemed to awaken to a sense of the extraordinary character of this -suggestion, for he wrote to General Pollock to say that he “could -hardly imagine the existence of circumstances which could justify the -diversion of Major-General Nott’s army from the route of Ghuznee and -of Caubul, when his intention of marching by that route shall have -been once clearly indicated.”—[_Lord Ellenborough to General Pollock: -August 26, 1842._] - -[256] _MS. Correspondence._ - -[257] Nott’s letter was despatched on the 27th of July. It comprised -but a few lines: - -“Candahar, July 27, 1842. - -“MY DEAR GENERAL,—You will have received a copy of a letter from the -Governor-General under date the 4th instant, to my address, giving me -the option of retiring a part of my force to India _viâ_ Caubul and -Jellalabad. I have determined to take that route, and will write to -you fully on the subject as soon as I have arranged for carriage and -supplies.—Yours truly, W. NOTT.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] - -[258] The force consisted of the 3rd Dragoons; the 1st Native Cavalry; -a squadron of the 5th and of the 10th ditto, with the head-quarters; -600 Sowars of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry; her Majesty’s 31st Regiment; -the 33rd Regiment of Native Infantry; the whole of Sir Robert Sale’s -and of Colonel Tulloch’s brigades; with seventeen guns, a company of -Sappers and Miners, and a regiment of Bildars (Pioneers) under Mr. -Mackeson. A small force was left (chiefly for want of carriage) at -Gundamuck, and the rest remained in garrison at Jellalabad. - -[259] In this affair we lost seven men killed, and about fifty -wounded. Among the latter were four officers, Major Huish (26th -Native Infantry), Captain Edwards (9th Foot), Captain Tait (Irregular -Cavalry), Ensign Robertson (37th Native Infantry). - -[260] With regard to the destruction committed at Mammoo Khail, see -Appendix. - -[261] “Hurrah!” he wrote; “this is good news. _All_ here are prepared -to meet your wishes to march as light as possible. _I_ take no carriage -from the Commissariat; and our officers are doubling up _four_ in a -small hill tent, and are sending all to the rear that they can dispense -with.... _I am so excited that I can scarce write._”—[_General Sale to -General Pollock: Futtehabad, August 16, 1842. MS. Correspondence._] - -[262] _General Sale to General Pollock: August 18, 1842. MS. -Correspondence._ - -[263] Pollock had received no later intelligence from Nott’s camp than -that contained in the brief letter of July 27, though he had despatched -ten messengers to the westward. It was not until midnight of the -6th-7th of September that letters from Nott’s camp were received by -Pollock at Gundamuck. - -[264] To many of his letters to General Pollock, Futteh Jung signed his -name in English characters. - -[265] Akbar Khan compelled the Prince to write to Pollock: “I have -given to Sirdar Mahomed Akbar the full and entire management of all my -property and affairs of every description, and have resigned to him in -perpetuity full power to judge and settle all questions on all points. -Whatever arrangement he may make with the English Government I agree to -confirm, and no alteration shall be made.” And again: “The arrangements -which have been made with Captain Troup and Hadjee Buktear have been -all approved of by me. I have delegated all powers over my country and -wealth to the Wuzeer, Mahomed Akbar Khan, Barukzye!” But the Prince -took the first opportunity to write privately to the General: “My -friend, it will have been evident to you that in this matter I have -been compelled to act thus. I did not even know that Captain Troup and -Hadjee Buktear had been sent, and I had not the slightest knowledge -of the proposals made by them. Captain Troup is well aware of this, -since we had never met, nor had any of my confidential people been -employed between us.”—[_Futteh Jung to General Pollock: Translation. -July 21, 1842. MS. Records._] This letter was evidently written in a -state of painful alarm. It concludes with the words: “You must be very -careful not to let it be known that I have written to you; since, -should these villains hear of it, they would put me and my family -to death.” In reply to this letter, Pollock expressed his surprise -that, “notwithstanding his Majesty’s friendship, the good-will of the -chiefs, and the unanimity of the people at Caubul, still they cannot -prevent the treachery of one man from causing dissension between the -two governments, and that they are unable to show their good-will to -us by releasing our prisoners.” To this, on the 1st of August, Futteh -Jung replied: “You express surprise at my many well-wishers not being -able to find a remedy for one evil-disposed person. You write: ‘If this -could be effected, a great object would be obtained.’ Eminent in rank! -You write truly. But in a religious war, a father cannot trust his -son—a son, his father.” - -[266] In consequence of this act, Aga Mahomed became a marked man. -His father was assassinated, and he and his brother cut down by order -of Akbar. Being ruined, he found his way to Hindostan, and became the -guest of an English officer, who obtained from the Government a pension -of twelve rupees a month for him. He served on the late expedition to -Bushire, and died leaving a helpless widow, like himself, a convert to -Christianity. - -[267] A squadron of the 5th Light Cavalry; a squadron, and the -head-quarters of the 10th Light Cavalry; the left wings of the 33rd -and 60th N.I., with two guns of the 3rd troop 2nd brigade of Horse -Artillery, were left at Gundamuck. - -[268] They, however, diverted themselves with a little internal -mutiny—rising up against the Sikh general, Gholab Singh Provindea, and -burning his tent. The poor old man, in an extremity of terror, sought -refuge under Pollock’s skirts. - -[269] _General Pollock’s Report._ - -[270] _General Pollock’s Report._ - -[271] For an account of the operations of the second division of -Pollock’s army, see Lieutenant Greenwood’s “Narrative of the late -Victorious Campaign in Afghanistan, under General Pollock.” - -[272] Captains Troup and Bygrave, when the other prisoners were sent -to Bameean, had been taken by Akbar Khan to the Balla Hissar—but had -subsequently been permitted to remove themselves to Ali Mahomed’s -force, where Captain and Mrs. Anderson and Mrs. Trevor, with their -children, had been left, on account of sickness, under charge of Dr. -Campbell. - -[273] They required Troup, however, to write a letter to General -Pollock making known Akbar Khan’s wishes, and inclosing one from the -Sirdar himself. The letters were sent, but the messengers returned some -days afterwards, declaring that they had not been able to penetrate the -British camp.—[_Captain Troup to General Pollock. MS. Correspondence._] - -[274] Bygrave had before gone on to Tezeen with Sir-Bolund Khan. - -[275] _Captain Troup to General Pollock. MS. Correspondence._ See -Appendix. - -[276] Nothing could have been better than the conduct of the troops -throughout the whole of these operations. “I think no officer,” wrote -Pollock, in a private letter, on the 23rd of September, “could possibly -have had finer regiments under his command than I have had, and to -them do I owe all my success, which, as far as I am able to judge, has -been so far complete. I hope the Governor-General may think so, and -I shall be satisfied.” In this letter, the difficulties with which -Pollock had to contend, from the scarcity of cattle, are thus detailed. -“I have had,” he wrote, “great difficulties to contend against even -to the last, from the great want of carriage-cattle. At Gundamuck, -after my first engagement with the enemy, I found myself so reduced in -cattle, that, to enable me to take on only fourteen days’ supplies, -I was obliged to leave at that place two horse-artillery guns, two -squadrons of cavalry, and two wings of Native infantry; and yet with -all this, all the camp-followers, public and private, were compelled -to carry eight days’ supplies. The fighting men carried three. The -1st Cavalry carried eight days’ supplies on their horses. The rest of -the cavalry carried three or four days’. In this way we were enabled -to move.... The night before I left Gundamuck, I received an official -letter and a survey report, setting forth that the whole of the camels -of one regiment were unserviceable, and that they could not get up even -without their loads. This was rather provoking, for I have only three -Native regiments with me. My answer was short. ‘Tell the commanding -officer, that if his regiment can’t march, he will relieve the two -wings ordered to remain behind, and who are willing to go forward on -any terms.’ The regiment marched, and I heard no more about their -camels. After our last engagement with the enemy (it was a severe -struggle) we had 160 killed and wounded; and again carriage was in -requisition. The spare horses of the cavalry were had recourse to; and -I lent my own riding-horse to one poor fellow.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] - -[277] “The view from the look-out in the city,” wrote Rawlinson in his -journal, “was now very fine. The hillocks on the right were crowned -with masses of horsemen, numbering apparently about 1500—a crowd of -footmen occupied the rocky heights in front of our line and beyond, -the shoulder of the Peer-Paee-Mal hill was covered with human beings -thick as a flight of locusts, bodies of horse continually debouching -round the shoulder and pushing on to join their comrades on the -right.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[278] Nott, in his public despatches, was always somewhat chary of -his praise, but in his private letters he delighted to dwell upon -the achievements of his Sepoy regiments. Writing to Hammersley about -this affair of the 29th of May, he said: “You will hear enough of our -affair of the 29th with the enemy. The troops behaved well, and I am -really surprised that our loss was so trifling; but I have remarked -that the Afghans fire high. Our Sepoys are noble fellows—1000 are -fully equal to 5000 Afghans or more. A detail of the 1st Cavalry, -under Chamberlaine, behaved very well indeed. The enemy had 8000 men -in position and 2000 in reserve. We had 1500 of all arms in the field. -The enemy have broken up. I expect Wymer back in a day or two, when I -will drive the rebels out of the Candahar district. How I should like -to go to Caubul! It is wonderful that the people in Hindostan should be -so panic-struck; and they seem to believe that our Sepoys cannot stand -the Afghans. Now, I am quite sure, and should like to try it to-morrow, -that 5000 Bengal Sepoys would lick 25,000 Afghans.”—[_General Nott to -Lieutenant Hammersley: June 2, 1842. MS. Correspondence._] - -[279] It is said that the widow of Akrum Khan, who was executed -at Candahar in the preceding autumn, was in the field, riding her -husband’s charger, and bearing a Ghazee standard. Lieutenant Rattray -writes: “As the enemy drew near, a white object was observed in the -centre of their front ranks, which seemed the rallying-point for the -Ghazees, chieftains, Moollahs, kettle-drums, and standard-bearers. -This proved to be no less a personage than the heroic widow of the -slaughtered Akrum Khan. Throwing aside her timid nature with her -‘Boorkha,’ she had left the sacred privacy of the Zenana for the -foremost rank in the battle-field, had bestrode her husband’s charger, -and with his standard in her hand had assembled the tribes.” - -[280] _Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._ It appears that early in June -the enemy’s suspicions of our intended withdrawal were confirmed in a -curious manner, and that they seemed then to think of terms. Rawlinson -says: “It appears that when the entire party of the Douranee chiefs -were on the point of dissolution, a Hindostanee deserter joined the -camp from the town, saying that he and his comrades had received -letters from India, stating positively that orders had been sent up -for our retirement. The man, in fact, explained in detail all our -plans—the abandonment and destruction of Khelat—the march of the -brigade to bring up camels from Quettah—and he even asserted that we -were preparing to destroy the four corner bastions of the city and the -gateways, and that we should leave in a month hence. This decided the -chiefs on dropping their offers of accommodation, and holding on until -events became more developed.” - -[281] It is to be borne in mind that the supreme political authority -had been vested by the Indian Government in the General. Nott, however, -was not inclined to interfere in the political management of affairs, -and Rawlinson continued to conduct them very much as he had done before -the order was issued; but he referred all important questions to the -General, who, for the most part, deferred to the opinions of his more -experienced political associate. - -[282] _Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._ - -[283] “The particular object to be gained by adopting this latter route -it was difficult to divine, and the generally-received impression -among the officers—perhaps because the one most desired—was that our -General was to lead us on to Caubul, and that the mention of Dehra -Ismael Khan was merely to throw dust in the eyes of the natives. -Indeed, it was afterwards accounted for, whether justly or not, by -this fact, that if the Lohaunies, upon whom we were dependent for a -large proportion of our camels, had had an idea that our intention -was to have marched on Ghuznee and Caubul, they would have declined -accompanying our army.”—[_Neill’s Recollections._] - -[284] _Major Rawlinson to Major Outram: Ghuznee, September 7. MS. -Correspondence._ - -[285] “We accordingly marched on unmolested to our encamping-ground, -and as we passed the source of the Turnuck, with the precipitous -hill on our left, and the strong grounds intersected with bogs and -canals, and supported by forts upon our right, every one acknowledged -that there was no better defensible position on the entire road from -Candahar to Caubul.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[286] “The General first learnt of what was going on about two o’clock, -when an orderly came back from Captain Delamain reporting that no -enemy was in sight, and asking for orders. The General immediately -ordered the troops back. Shortly afterwards Lieutenant Brett galloped -in, saying that about 2000 of the enemy had appeared in front of -Captain Delamain, and were too strongly posted on some rising ground -to be attacked. The General again ordered the troops back. A third -orderly came galloping, to say the cavalry were engaged; and very -shortly afterwards other men came from the field, declaring our Horse -to be annihilated. The General now went out with all the troops, for -the enemy’s force was reported to be above 7000, and we expected -them to be flushed with their success. The horse artillery reached -first, and Leslie took the command. We came up shortly afterwards, and -found the cavalry still in a body, but having evidently suffered a -defeat.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[287] “The General now turned down to some forts, from which some shots -were reported to have been fired. The villagers all came out with -Korans and ropes round their necks, praying for quarter. The General -granted quarter, but sent in the light company of the 40th to search -the houses. A shot was fired from some Ghazee in the place, and orders -were then given for an indiscriminate massacre. The women and children -were spared, but I suppose 100 of the villagers were butchered. I -do not think the men were to blame—had they supposed themselves -committed, they would have fled to the hills before the troops moved -out, but no doubt there were _Ghazees_ in the place, desperate men -who had no wish to save their own lives, provided they could destroy -an infidel, and to the infatuation of these few men were the others -sacrificed. Five Commissariat camels were found inside, so that parties -in the fort had certainly been plundering; and as we approached -the place, I remarked a Moollah from one of the Boorjes, evidently -haranguing the people and urging them to die as Ghazees. It has been a -most unsatisfactory business altogether, and a few more such affairs -will compromise us seriously.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[288] Reeves and Bury—“Reeves was shot. Bury was cut down. Mackenzie -received a severe sabre-wound in the elbow joint of his right arm.... -Ravenscroft had been shot before the charge; but the wound turns out -not to be dangerous. Malet had a very narrow escape. His hunting-cap -(round which a shawl was wound) saved him, but he was slightly -wounded in the face. Christie was ridden over in the confusion and -lost his horse, but was remounted by one of his Native officers and -saved.”—[_Major Rawlinson to Major Outram Ghuznee, September 7, 1842. -MS. Records._] - -[289] He declared that one of them was Nott’s. - -[290] _Major Rawlinson to Major Outram: September 7, 1842. MS. -Correspondence._ - -[291] Fired, however, from a height, the balls never ricocheted, and -did but little mischief. - -[292] _Major Rawlinson to Major Outram: September 7, 1842. MS. Records._ - -[293] _Colonel Stacy’s Narrative._ - -[294] _General Nott’s Official Despatch._ - -[295] “The extensive village or town of Roza is situated about two -miles from Ghuznee, and is lovely to behold. When this city was taken -by the force under my command, Roza was full of inhabitants—men, -women, and children. My troops were encamped close to its walls. Its -gardens and its houses were full of property; its barns and farmyards -were well stored; its orchards were loaded with fruit; its vineyards -bent beneath a rich and ripe vintage; the property taken from our -murdered soldiers of the Ghuznee garrison were seen piled in its -dwellings.... Four days the victorious Candahar army remained encamped -close to this village, with all these temptations before it, and at -its mercy; but not a particle of anything was taken from the Afghans. -The fruit brought for sale was paid for at a rate far above its -value. No man nor living thing was injured.”—[_General Nott to the -Adjutant-General: Lucknow, April 4, 1843._] - -[296] “An active and spirited enemy might have annoyed us exceedingly -during this movement; but the Afghans appeared to have lost all heart -from the affair of the morning, and a little cavalry skirmishing was -all that occurred.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[297] “The enemy appear to have been unable to traverse their big gun -sufficiently to bring it to bear on our new position; and I suspect, -also, they must have expended their shot, for the last two rounds which -were fired as we were changing ground, and which fell short, were old -shells of ours filled with earth.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[298] Colonel Palmer and the other British officers had been carried to -Caubul. - -[299] The engineer officers fathomed the great well in the citadel, and -found fifty-one feet of water in it. The bottom of the well is believed -to be below the level of the river, so that it could not be drained. -The fear of a failure of water ought not, therefore, to have driven -Palmer to surrender. He might easily have secured the possession of the -well by running a covered way from it, and protecting it with his guns. - -[300] “I visited Roza in the evening, took another copy of the Cufic -inscription upon Mahmoud’s tomb, and had a long conversation with the -Moollahs of the shrine. They assert that the tomb was constructed in -its present state immediately after Mahmoud’s death; that it remained -intact during the Ghuzneevide and Ghooride dynasties, but that when -Ghenghiz Khan, in his pursuit of Jellaladeen, threatened Ghuznee, the -inhabitants heaped the tomb over with earth and ruins to preserve it -from desecration, and deserted the place. They further pretend that the -tomb thus remained buried until the time of Sultan Abdool Rizak, the -grandson or great-grandson of Timour, to whom the spot was revealed -in a vision, and who excavated and repaired the place, and dedicated -to it rich endowments of lands. The endowments remained, they say, -till the time of Nadir, when they were resumed by the government, and -since that time the establishment at the tomb has been dependent for -support upon a few gardens attached to the village, and the voluntary -offerings of devotees. The Moollahs uphold that the gates are really -those of Somnauth, and that the inscriptions on the tomb date from the -time of the son of Mahmoud; but this I hold to be morally impossible, -for although the Cufic may possibly be of the form used in that age -(which, however, I doubt), the inscription in the Nuskh character -on the reverse of the sarcophagus, which details the precise date -of the Sultan’s death, is obviously of a much later age. From many -circumstances, I feel positively certain that the tomb does not boast -a higher antiquity than that of Sultan Abdool Rizak, who built the -present walls of Ghuznee, and who is himself buried in a rude mausoleum -on the outskirts of the village of Roza. The gates, therefore, are -certainly not those of Somnauth; but it is of course the interest of -the Moollahs to keep up the delusion, and to affect for the spot the -odour both of sandal and sanctity. I was much struck by the crowds -of pilgrims, Mussulman officers in our ranks, who thronged the tomb -during my visit there to make the _Ziarut_.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. -Journal._] - -[301] Major Rawlinson’s account of the removal of the gates is very -interesting. “We moved our camp,” he writes, “this morning from the -west to the east of Roza, preparatory to fairly setting out on the -march to Caubul; and during the day the measure was carried into effect -of removing the gates of Mahmoud’s tomb. The work was performed by -Europeans, and all possible delicacy was observed in not desecrating -the shrine further than was absolutely necessary. The guardians of the -tomb, when they perceived our object, retired to one corner of the -court and wept bitterly; and when the removal was effected, they again -prostrated themselves before the shrine and uttered loud lamentations. -Their only remark was: ‘You are lords of the country, and can of -course work your will on us; but why this sacrilege? Of what value can -these old timbers be to you; while to us they are as the breath of our -nostrils?’ The reply was: ‘The gates are the property of India—taken -from it by one conqueror, they are restored to it by another. We leave -the shrine undesecrated, and merely take our own.’ The sensation is -less than might have been expected; and no doubt the Moollahs, who -have had the guardianship of the tomb for generations in their family, -will be the chief sufferers by the measure. I doubt if the Afghan -tribes lately risen from obscurity to power, and holding the country -rather as conquerors than citizens, possess that feeling of unity -with each other, and identity with the interests they are supposed to -protect, to view the abduction of the gates as a material outrage. -The act may be made use of by the priesthood to excite fanaticism -against us; but if the Barukzye chiefs could only retain their darling -plaything, power, they would care little about the gates of Somnauth. -With Shah Soojah the case was different. As the representative of the -Suddozye family, aiming at the reconsolidation of monarchical power, -he could not but view the demand of Runjeet Singh for the gates as a -national indignity, powerfully affecting his own personal and political -interests. At present, religious excitement is alone to be apprehended -from our carrying off these trophies. I call them trophies, although -assured that they are spurious, for the belief in their genuineness is, -politically considered, the same as if they really were so.”—[_Major -Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[302] The enemy harassed our camp at night, firing on our picquets, -and working us other annoyance. “I doubt the policy,” wrote Rawlinson, -“of our firing a few forts and going no further. It exasperates the -Afghans without intimidating them. I believe that we should either have -abstained altogether from retribution, or have carried fire and sword -before us.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[303] “The attack upon the heights and their subsequent abandonment,” -says Major Rawlinson, “might have led to unpleasant consequences, -had not the news of Akbar’s defeat arrived just in time to prevent -Shumshoodeen from availing himself of this advantage. We were all -most anxious to have gone straight on to Mydan, and to have attacked -Shumshoodeen in his position, throwing the light companies along the -heights to the left, which were already in our possession, the whole -way down to the Mydan gorge; but the General would not stir beyond the -place he had first marked out for his encampment, for fear of harassing -the cattle.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[304] _MS. Notes._—See also the following from Rawlinson’s Journal: -“As it appeared desirable that a direct communication should be -established between the camps as soon as possible, I proposed to the -General, on arriving at Urghundeh, that I should ride in and see -General Pollock. My offer was accepted, and I immediately put on an -Afghan dress, and escorted by the Parsewans who had come out to the -camp, rode in through the town to the race-course, where I found the -Jellalabad force encamped. I experienced no sort of difficulty or -inconvenience on the road, being generally taken for an Afghan. I now -learnt from General Pollock that there were no fresh orders from Lord -Ellenborough regarding the establishment of an Afghan Government; in -fact, that he was prohibited from pledging the government to recognise -any one, but that still, as Futteh Jung had thrown himself on our -protection, and that as it was absolutely necessary something like -a government should be established, in order to enable us to obtain -supplies (the Jellalabad Commissariat being entirely exhausted) as -well as to facilitate our subsequent departure, General Pollock had -resolved to give Futteh Jung such indirect assistance as he was able. -In this view he had recommended the Kuzzilbash and Douranee chiefs -to tender their allegiance to him, and he had so far given him his -countenance as to accompany him to the Balla Hissar in the morning, and -even, as the Shah elect took his seat on the throne, to fire a royal -salute, ostensibly for the remounting of the British colours on the -citadel of Caubul, but of course, in the apprehension of the Afghans, -as an honorary recognition by us of the new monarch’s accession. I met -Macgregor in my way to the camp, coming into the Balla Hissar with -all the chiefs to make their salaam to Shah Futteh Jung as he is now -called, and I now hear that Macgregor, who conducts all the political -duties of General Pollock’s camp, endeavoured, in a private audience -which he had of his Majesty after the Durbar, to come to an explanation -with him regarding our inability to support him with men, money, or -arms, and the necessity, in consequence, of his relying entirely on his -own resources. At first sight, it appears to me out of the question -that Futteh Jung should be able to hold his own after our departure, -and I see no great object even in making the attempt, but I cannot yet -form a proper judgment.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[305] Shakespear, with characteristic gallantry, had volunteered for -this service. The Kuzzilbashes had tendered their services to Pollock. - -[306] “_September 14._—As we find that the prisoners have certainly -been carried off to Bameean, and the Kuzzilbashes are disposed to -assist us in their recovery, while General Pollock is not likely to -encounter further opposition on his march upon Caubul, it was suggested -to the General to-day that he should despatch a brigade from Urghundeh, -where the Bameean road strikes off, to form a support for our party, -assisted by the Hazarehs, to fall back upon. He would not, however, -listen to this proposal, declaring that he had only one object in view, -that of marching his force to India _viâ_ Caubul, without turning to -the right or left; and that he considered, from the tenor of all Lord -Ellenborough’s despatches, the recovery of the prisoners to be a matter -of indifference to government.” - -“_September 15._—It was again to-day urged upon the General to send -a brigade to Bameean, or in that direction, to assist in the rescue -of the prisoners, but he seems to have made up his mind that he will -not separate his force unless positively ordered to do so by higher -authority.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[307] _Statement of Lieutenant Mayne—MS. Correspondence of Officers -on the Staff of General Nott._—The only apologetic explanation of -this which has yet reached me is to be found in the assertion, that -Mayne’s escort crowded on Nott’s staff. Mayne posted his horsemen on -the reverse flank, and it is his belief that they were not in the way -of the staff. - -[308] _MS. Correspondence._ - -[309] They had been joined by their fellow-captives from Ghuznee. See -note in the Appendix. It may be mentioned that John Conolly, the last -of three ill-fated brothers, had died at Caubul on the 7th of August, -deeply deplored by all who had served with him in Afghanistan. - -[310] “_August 28._—Every hamlet and fort we passed after daybreak -poured forth its inhabitants to stare and wonder at the Feringhee -prisoners. Not an uncivil word or gesture have I ever heard or seen in -all our wanderings; but, on the contrary, many a sympathising word and -look has been expressed, and especially by people who had previously -any knowledge of us.” - -“_August 29._—On passing the above fort (of Mustapha Khan, -Kuzzilbash), where Saleh Mahomed and I were the first to arrive, I -was most agreeably surprised by the owner bringing out two or three -large trays full of excellent cakes and sweetmeats, and begging I -would distribute them among the ladies and children—expressing at the -same time the most unfeigned sympathy for all of us. To people in our -unfortunate situation, a civil word even is well appreciated, but such -a mark of kindness as this worthy Persian showed us, is not easily -forgotten. His very look bespoke him a man of generous and kindly -feeling. Our little fellow-prisoners—both boys and girls—had such a -feast as they have not had for many a day. On arriving at our bivouac, -another Kuzzilbash, who had a fort close by, hearing from Ahmed Khan -that I wanted to buy a horse, brought me one for sale. As I was, -however, afraid of running out of funds, I told him my fears. His reply -was, ‘I know you, and I will be satisfied with your note of hand. I am -a relation of Naib Sheriff Khan.’ This was a mark of confidence I could -not have expected in such dangerous times, when my life is not worth -twenty-four hours’ purchase. I did not take the animal.”—[_Captain -Johnson’s Narrative. MS._] - -[311] “The commandant of our guard appears very civil and inclined to -oblige us in every possible way—at any rate he is so to me. I was -quite delighted to hear him talk in such enthusiastic terms of my -deceased and lamented friend Hopkins (his former commanding officer). -On asking him why he deserted with his company to Dost Mahomed in -September, 1840, his reply was, that he was disgusted with the abusive -language used towards him by the European non-commissioned officers; -and I do not doubt that this had a great effect in alienating him -from our service, although certainly not the immediate cause of his -desertion. Saleh Mahomed is a good-humoured, jolly fellow, and without -any prejudices against us Kaffirs. He is a soldier of fortune, cares -little whom he serves, has been to Bokhara, Yarkund, and was at the -taking of Kokund a few months ago. Rode with him the whole march, and -was much amused at his traveller’s tales. He is the greatest hero in -his own estimation I ever came across. There is no end to his feats of -valour, to which I am a ready listener, for two reasons: _firstly_, -that I am amused; _secondly_, that he is flattered by my being so good -a listener—by which I hope to turn him to good account.”—[_Captain -Johnson’s Narrative of his Captivity. MS._] - -[312] The words of the bond may be thus translated:— - -“We gentlemen, Pottinger, Johnson, Mackenzie, and Lawrence, in the -presence of God and Jesus Christ, do enter into the following agreement -with Saleh Mahomed Khan:—Whenever Saleh Mahomed Khan shall free us -from the power of Mahomed Akbar Khan, we agree to make him (Saleh -Mahomed Khan) a present of 20,000 rupees, and to pay him monthly -the sum of 1000 rupees; likewise to obtain for him the command -of a regiment in the government service; and we attest that this -agreement is not false; and should we have spoken falsely then will we -acknowledge ourselves to be false men, even in the presence of Kings. - - “E. POTTINGER, C. MACKENZIE, - “H. JOHNSON, G. ST. P. LAWRENCE.” - -—[_Translated from the counterpart of the Agreement given by Saleh -Mahomed to Captain Johnson._] - -[313] The agreement is thus worded:—“We, whose signatures are hereunto -attached, do bind ourselves to pay into the hands of Major Pottinger -and Captains Lawrence and Johnson, on condition of our release being -effected by an arrangement with Saleh Mahomed Khan, such a number of -months’ pay and allowances as they shall demand from us—such pay and -allowances to be rated by the scale at which we shall find ourselves -entitled to draw from the date of our release from captivity. We, who -are married, do further agree to pay the same amount for our wives and -families as for ourselves. We, whose husbands are absent, do pledge -ourselves in proportion to our husbands’ allowances.” The agreement -is drawn up on half-a-sheet of foolscap paper, in the hand-writing of -Captain Johnson. The names of all the prisoners (officers and ladies) -are attached to it; the first being that of Brigadier Shelton. There -is a codicil to it, signed by Lady Macnaghten and Mrs. Sturt, in these -words:—“We, who are widows, do pledge ourselves to pay such sums as -may be demanded from us by Major Pottinger and Captains Lawrence and -Johnson in furtherance of the above scheme”—“In our prison at Bameean: -11th September, 1842.”—[_MS. Records._] - -[314] The European soldiers at Bameean were so reduced by sickness as -to be scarcely able to hold a musket. And they had lost all heart. - -[315] “In order,” says Captain Johnson, from whose Narrative these -details are taken, “to show as imposing a front as possible, there was -no rear rank.” - -[316] Seeing that Saleh’s Mahomed’s men wore our English belts and -pouches, the soldiers of Nott’s division were disposed to fall upon -them. It was intimated to the commandant that it would be expedient to -remove them out of the way of danger. - -[317] “On passing the corner of the street where I formerly lived, -I could not forego the desire of looking on the ruins of a house -in which I had passed a period of two years of happiness. Although -I had expected to see the whole place unroofed, I was not prepared -for such a scene of desolation. Not one brick was left standing on -another in either my house or that of Sir Alexander Burnes (the -adjoining one). They were nothing but a heap of dirt, covering the -mouldering remains of our unfortunate people. A spot was pointed out -to me in Sir Alexander’s garden as that in which his body had been -interred.”—[_Captain Johnson’s Narrative of his Captivity. MS._] - -[318] “_September 19._—Our Sepoys and camp-followers, taking their -cue, I fancy, from their officers, are very unruly, and commit -extensive depredations on the lands and villages near our camp; and -as the property thus plundered chiefly belongs to the Kuzzilbash -chiefs, General Pollock, who relies mainly on these people for the -consolidation of the new government, is subject to great embarrassment. -I have a sort of misgiving that Caubul will, after all, be destroyed. -In the present state of feeling, any accidental quarrel would lead to -a general rush upon the town, and the Sepoys once there, massacre and -conflagration would assuredly follow. General Pollock, by proclamations -of encouragement, has been endeavouring to persuade the Caubullees to -return to their houses and re-open their shops; but, after all that has -happened, it is difficult to persuade the townspeople that we do not -aim at retribution, and the proceedings about our camp at Char Deh are -anything but calculated to allay their suspicions; the city continues, -therefore, more than half closed, and supplies are procurable with -difficulty.” - -“_September 20._—Our men have been plundering to-day as usual about -the camp, and in some scuffle which took place at Deh Afshur, four of -the Kuzzilbashes, with Khassim Khan, a chief, were slain by the Sepoys.” - -“_September 21._—The fort of Mahomed Meerza, one of our worst enemies, -was given up to plunder, and we did not even respect the property at -Aliabad, which belongs to Gholam Mahomed Khan, the lately appointed -minister.... The townspeople had returned in small numbers to the town, -and had re-opened their shops; but owing to the affair at Deh Afshur, I -believe, a panic seized the people, and every one fled, believing that -orders had been issued for a general massacre.” - -“_September 22._—The depredations of the Sepoys and followers from -this camp continue, notwithstanding all the efforts that are made to -repress them. The Kuzzilbashes cannot help believing that we encourage -these excesses, and in consequence they are not half satisfied of -General Pollock’s sincerity.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[319] The General forwarded a translation of the letter to Nott, who -sent it back with his comments. The charges and the denials appear in -the Appendix as they were forwarded to Pollock’s camp. - -[320] He asked Mayne, on the 17th, when that officer appeared in his -camp, as mentioned at page 347, how many days’ supplies General Pollock -had with him? and when Mayne replied that he believed the General had -about a week’s supplies for his troops, “What business, then,” asked -Nott, “has General Pollock up at Caubul with only a week’s supplies?” -Mayne, of course, made no answer. - -[321] A considerable body of Kuzzilbashes, under the command of -Shah-zadah Shahpoor and Khan Shereen Khan, the whole in charge of -Captain Colin Mackenzie, had accompanied M’Caskill’s force, and -co-operated with much effect, especially in rescuing a number of -sepoys and camp-followers of Elphinstone’s force from slavery. General -Pollock had appointed Captain Mackenzie to this important duty in -consequence of Lord Ellenborough’s request that he would select that -officer or John Conolly, if within his reach, for any political mission -that might be called for, even to the important duty of accompanying -General Nott’s force, if it were expedient for that officer to return -by a different route from Pollock’s. On reaching Hindostan, however, -Mackenzie met with the same neglect and injustice as the other -“children of another Government.” - -[322] See Papers in the Appendix. - -[323] _Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._ - -[324] “On the 9th our engineers set to work to blow up and destroy -the _Char Chutta_. The cry went forth that Caubul was given up to -plunder. Both camps rushed into the city, and the consequence has -been the almost total destruction of all parts of the town, except -the Gholam-Khana quarter and the Balla Hissar.... Numbers of people -(about 4000 or 5000) had returned to Caubul, relying on our promises -of protection—rendered confident by the comparative immunity they -had enjoyed during the early part of our sojourn here, and by the -appearance, ostentatiously put forth, of an Afghan Government. They had -many of them re-opened their shops. These people have been now reduced -to utter ruin. Their goods have been plundered, and their houses burnt -over their heads. The Hindoos in particular, whose numbers amount to -some 500 families, have lost everything they possess, and they will -have to beg their way to India in rear of our columns. The Chundarwal -has had a narrow escape. Safeguards have been placed at the different -gates; but I doubt not if our parties of plunderers would not have -forced an entrance had not the Gholam Khana stood to their arms, and -showed and expressed a determination to defend their property to the -last.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[325] Captain G. St. P. Lawrence, Sir W. Macnaghten’s Military -Secretary, who had been present at his murder, and had subsequently -shared the perils of the captivity. - -[326] “Futteh Jung had urged his people to set fire to the palace as -he came out, observing that Shahpoor’s rule would be a brief one, and -that his own feelings revolted at the idea of the Suddozye seraglio -falling to the lot of either Mahomed Akbar or the Ghilzyes. Some -attempts were in consequence made at incendiarism, but the flames did -not spread.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[327] They seem to have been admitted by Pollock, but to have been -expelled by Nott. “General Pollock’s camp,” wrote Rawlinson in his -journal, “is crowded with hangers-on, imperfectly provided with -carriage or supplies, and he necessarily experiences much inconvenience -in consequence. General Nott has positively refused to permit his force -to be encumbered in the same way, and yesterday evening a general -clearance of our camp took place, preparatory to the march. About 500 -men were expelled from the Bazaar of the 16th Regiment alone, where -they had taken refuge. Most of these people were the destitute Hindoos -of Caubul and Ghuznee. They had hoped to have found means of returning -to Hindostan with our column; but have been now obliged to go back to -Caubul and bide their fate among the Afghans.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. -Journal._] - -[328] Pollock took forty-four guns and a large quantity of ordnance -stores; but not the least of his trophies were a large number of -miserable mutilated natives of India, crippled by wounds or by the -frost, who had escaped with their lives from the great wreck of -Elphinstone’s army. Pollock now provided them with carriage, appointed -two officers to the charge of them, and conveyed them to Hindostan. - -[329] Major Rawlinson says: “It is whispered that the recognition of -Shahpoor on the part of the Gholam-Khana has been a mere _ruse_ to -save the Balla Hissar, and that the chiefs hope to make use of this -successful manœuvre to propitiate Mahomed Akbar. The Kuzzilbash, -however, if they do meditate anything of this sort, will assuredly -overreach themselves, for if any _bonâ fide_ Afghan Government succeeds -in establishing itself at Caubul, the Gholam-Khana, after what has -happened, will certainly be extirpated, root and branch.”—[_Major -Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[330] The late Colonel Sutherland. “It is, indeed,” he wrote, “a -comfort to be able to look a native in the face again with confidence; -for although there was in reality no change that one could see in their -bearing towards us in this region, yet one could not help feeling that -we had fallen from our high position; and they would have felt this -too, and in the end, perhaps, shown that they did, had not the noble -resolution been taken of moving forward to retrieve our tarnished -reputation. Now all is right. How easily achieved! And we stand on -surer ground now in all quarters than we ever did at any former period -of our Indian history.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] - -[331] See letter, _ante_, page 284, _note_. - -[332] “_October 1._—The Governor-General brought me some papers to -consult me upon. Among others, a proclamation announcing that we retire -from Afghanistan, leaving to the Afghans the choice of their sovereign. -It was on this day, four years ago, that Lord Auckland issued the -proclamation announcing the grounds of his interference; and on the -same day, _in the same room_, Lord Ellenborough signed his notification -of altered intentions, in a clear, short, decided paper, which I much -approve. He could not avoid avowing some of his predecessor’s military -errors; but he has not touched at any length on the political, further -than that we lost our name and an army by neglect on the part of our -agents.”—[_Sir Jasper Nicholls’s MS. Journal._] - -[333] Lord Ellenborough’s explanations on this subject are to be found -in the following letter to General Pollock, which calls for no comment: - -“Simlah, Oct. 12, 1842. - -“GENERAL,—I enclose for your information a copy of a proclamation, -signed by me here on the 1st of this month, but withheld from immediate -publication, with the view to the having previously made and circulated -to the Native Courts, and amongst the natives generally, a correct -translation which might be the official document in the native -language, and prevent any misrepresentation, or misapprehension of -the intentions of the government. I further wished not to make known -here the intention of withdrawing the army, until I knew that you had -actually the prisoners in your hands, and had made arrangements for -leaving Caubul. Your letter received here on the 5th removed every -ground for withholding the publication of the proclamation, had the -translation been prepared; but in consequence of the absence of Mr. -Clerk on duty in the plains, no such translation had been made as I -could fully rely upon. - -“In the mean time, by a combination of accidents, and some irregularity -in the transaction of business in the Secretary’s office, the printed -copies of the proclamation were, without my knowledge, or that of -the Secretary himself, transmitted to the presidencies and the -political officers generally. There is no object in your publishing -the proclamation in your camp. Mr. Clerk returned last night, and the -translation will hardly be ready for transmission before to-morrow. - -“I have, &c. “ELLENBOROUGH.” - -—[_MS. Correspondence._] - -[334] “_October 5._—His Lordship sent me the draft of his letter to -the Hindoo chiefs, relating to the gates of the Somnauth temple; and -invited remarks on it, which I freely gave; and he took them in good -part, adopting some of them.”—[_Sir Jasper Nicholls’s MS. Journal._] - -[335] The Governor-General, when he first drafted the proclamation, -only knew that Nott had reached Caubul with the gates. He may have -thought it expedient to withhold the issue of it, lest by some untoward -accident the gates might be lost on their journey through the passes of -Afghanistan. - -[336] We have no word very fitly to represent the character of the -affair. The French would have called it a _bêtise_. It was a _bêtise_ -of the first magnitude. - -[337] _Memorandum, by Captain Peter Nicolson, of a Conversation with -Dost Mahomed Khan: February 13, 1842. MS. Records._ - -[338] He was candid enough, too, at one time, to acknowledge that, -after the expulsion of the British from Caubul, the only chance of -establishing a settled government was through the agency of Shah -Soojah. “The Ameer concluded,” says Captain Nicolson, in the memorandum -cited above, “by using an expression exactly the same as one Shah -Soojah uses in his letter to Captain Macgregor.” He said: “The people -cannot now do without the King, for there is no one else who could -carry on the government.”—[_MS. Records._] - -[339] Mr. Clerk was despatched to Lahore with an invitation from the -Governor-General; and Shere Singh was inclined to accept it, but he -was overruled in Durbar. The Crown Prince, Pertab Singh, and Dhyan -Singh, the minister, were sent to represent the Maharajah at for -Governor-General’s Court. - -[340] A smart skirmish between Nott’s division and the enemy, on the -Huft-Kotul, may, perhaps, be considered as an exception. Colonel Stacy -describes it as “a severe affair;” and Nott, who was not inclined -to write lengthy despatches, or to exaggerate the importance of his -engagements, thought it worthy of a brief despatch. In _Colonel Stacy’s -Narrative_ and _Captain Neill’s Recollections of Service_, the reader -will find ample details of all the operations of the rear division. -_Lieutenant Greenwood’s Narrative_ may also be consulted for some -particulars of the movements of M’Caskill’s division. - -[341] Lieut. Christie, of the Artillery; and Ensign Nicholson, of the -30th Native Infantry. - -[342] “It was a night attack of some plunderers to obtain baggage. There -appears to have been sad confusion. The two officers were about that -time killed. But the guns were not, I believe, even attempted to be -carried off; otherwise we certainly never should have seen anything of -them again, whereas, the next day, the mountain howitzer and carriage -were found in _statu quo_, and the carriage of the three-pounder; -and were brought in. I dare say the three-pounder was not far. It in -all probability upset, and parted from the carriage; but if an enemy -(so usually termed) had made the attack, it is very improbable that -either guns or carriage would have been left, for a very few men -could carry gun, carriage, and all.”—[_MS. Correspondence of General -Pollock: Camp near Ali-Musjid, Nov. 1, 1842._] Of this unfortunate -business, another officer writes: “Night overtook our unfortunate 3rd -Brigade. The enemy, emboldened by the darkness, came down upon them -in strength. Some of our men were _cut off in the column_. Numbers -of them were hit by stones, which were flying in all directions. The -confusion must have been great. The Irregular Cavalry rode right over -the infantry, knocking down several of the officers. Christie and his -two mountain-guns were lost sight of in the dark, and are lost, himself -killed. Young Nicholson, of the 30th, is killed. As to the number of -men killed, nothing is yet known; but the whole of the Gholundauz that -were with Christie are missing.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] - -[343] Pollock, determined to give the robber tribes as little -opportunity as possible of plundering his baggage, ordered that every -camel that could not come on should be shot, and that his load, if it -could not be brought on, should be immediately burnt. - -[344] One more glimpse at Afghan politics from Major Rawlinson’s -interesting journal, may be afforded before we finally close it: “A -messenger arrived to-day from Caubul with letters from the Kuzzilbash -party, inviting the Nizam-ood-Dowlah to return, as Gholam Mahomed Khan -had already given offence by endeavouring to re-establish an exclusive -Douranee influence round the puppet King. At present, Khan Shereen is, -as far as real power is concerned, paramount, and he seems determined -to carry things with a high hand, having given out that if Shapoor -lends himself to Douranee intrigue he will force him to abdicate in -favour of another Prince. A strong Kuzzilbash detachment has at the -same time been sent to Ghuznee under Mahomed Hussein Khan, to occupy -that place, and in conjunction with the Hazarehs to hold in check any -possible movement of Ghilzyes or Douranees from the westward. Prince -Hyder, with another party of the Gholam Khana, has gone to Bameean, -and expects to secure the passes during the winter against the return -of the Barukzyes. Mahomed Akbar’s force, which remained for some time -at Khanjan, is said to have completely dispersed, the Sirdar himself, -with Ameen-oollah, having gone to Tash Noorghan, and the men having -all returned to their homes at Caubul. Newab Zemaun Khan, Jubbar Khan, -Oosman Khan, and Meer Hadjee, are said to be at Khooloom. The people of -Caubul have nearly all returned to the city, and are busy re-opening -their houses against the winter. Many of the Kohistan chiefs, Gool -Mahomed and Khoda Buksh, Ghilzyes, have also paid their respects to -Shahpoor, and Ameen-oollah was expected shortly to return. Mahomed -Akbar either really fears for his personal safety, now that a party -with which accommodation is impossible has come into power, or he -thinks it better policy to allow dissension to fructify in the capital -before he makes his reappearance on the scene. The Douranees are in -a large minority at Caubul, and must necessarily give way before the -Gholam Khana, if Khan Shereen acts with any energy. I look to Candahar -as their natural and necessary retreat, and no doubt at that place -Suddozye royalty, supported by their influence, will continue to -glimmer on, until Persia turns her attention to her eastern frontier, -and pushes forward the Barukzye Sirdars to play a game for her. The -Kuzzilbashes at the same time, cannot expect to hold their ground at -Caubul for any length of time.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] - -[345] Lord Ellenborough had determined to bestow exclusive honours -upon Sale’s brigade; but Sir Jasper Nicolls desired to receive both -Pollock and Nott with the same military distinctions. “I wished,” he -wrote in his journal, “to have one of the reserve divisions to receive -each of the divisions as it came, but he (Lord Ellenborough) did not -desire that the honours paid to the garrison should be extended to any -other part of the army. This I regret, for they have all seen hard -work, great exposure, and some arduous days of service.”—[_Sir Jasper -Nicolls’s MS. Journal._] - -[346] The rejoicings, in the opinions of many, were very much marred -by the prejudiced exclusiveness of the Governor-General, who seems to -have set his face very strenuously against the political officers, no -matter what their services. With all his admiration of the illustrious -garrison, Lord Ellenborough slighted Macgregor, who was its very life -and soul; and with all his appreciation of gallantry, he seemed unable -to appreciate the services of Eldred Pottinger. - -[347] I wish it to be distinctly understood, that I have neither -censured nor ridiculed the assembling of the army of reserve at -Ferozepore. I believe it to have been a very politic movement. - -[348] Pollock and Nott received most deservedly the distinction of -the Grand Cross of the Bath; and Lord Ellenborough, who was created -an Earl, formally invested them at Agra, and delivered some flowery -speeches upon the occasion. It may be mentioned here that the gates of -Somnauth, which had been brought up from Ferozepore on a triumphal car, -were deposited in the magazine of Agra. - -[349] In confirming the acquittal of Colonel Palmer, Sir Jasper Nicolls -wrote that “the circumstances under which Colonel Palmer surrendered -Ghuznee to the Afghans, were such as he could neither control, alter, -nor alleviate.” - -[350] And afterwards became again pensioners at Loodhianah, where -several members of the family have died since the original edition of -this work was published. - -[351] It has now, however (1858), become a fact of some historical -importance. The Captain Havelock to whom allusion is here made, is the -late Sir Henry Havelock of Lucknow. - -[352] _MS. Correspondence._ - -[353] _MS. Correspondence._ - -[354] _MS. Records._ - -[355] _MS. Records._ - -[356] Alluding to his Majesty’s dismissing the troops at Sir William -Macnaghten’s request from the Balla Hissar. - -[357] Mahomed Akbar. - -[358] _MS. Correspondence._ - -[359] _MS. Correspondence._ - -[360] H.M. 1st Cavalry:—captain, 1; lieutenant, 1; resaldars, 2; -rescudars, 2; naibs, 4; duffadars, 20; sowars, 220; trumpeters, 2; -nishan burdurs, 5; and about 150 of the 2nd Jan Baz. - -[361] _MS. Records._ - -[362] Extract letter from the Governor-General to the Secret Committee, -No 26, dated 6th April, 1843. - -Letter from Major-General M’Caskill to Military Secretary to -Government, 2nd April, 1843. - -Letter to Adjutant-General Lumley, 2nd April, 1843, with enclosure. - -Major-General Pollock to Lord Ellenborough, 2nd April, 1843. - -Major-General Pollock to Lord Ellenborough, 16th April, 1843. - -Major-General Nott to Military Secretary to Government of India, 4th -April, 1843. - -Major-General Nott to Adjutant-General Lumley, 4th April, 1843. - -[363] Sir W. Nott’s letter is to be found in Captain M’Neill’s -narrative, in the _Quarterly Review_ (July, 1845), and elsewhere. - - - - - * * * * * * - - - - -Transcriber’s note: - -—Obvious errors were corrected. - - - -***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, -VOL. III (OF 3)*** - - -******* This file should be named 50342-0.txt or 50342-0.zip ******* - - -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: -http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/5/0/3/4/50342 - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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