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diff --git a/old/50265-0.txt b/old/50265-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 4c08354..0000000 --- a/old/50265-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7271 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Battle of the Falkland Islands, by -Henry Edmund Harvey Spencer-Cooper - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: The Battle of the Falkland Islands - Before and After - -Author: Henry Edmund Harvey Spencer-Cooper - -Release Date: October 21, 2015 [EBook #50265] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS *** - - - - -Produced by John Campbell and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images generously made available by The -Internet Archive) - - - - - - - - - - TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE - - Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. - - A superscript is denoted by ^{x}; for example, 8^{th}. - - The format of time in the original text has been retained. For example, - 10.30 A.M. or 7.3 P.M. - - Gun caliber in the original text is of the form 9.1" or sometimes 9·1". - For consistency all calibers have been changed to the 9.1" (or - 9.1-inch) form. - - Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been - corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within - the text and consultation of external sources. - - More detail can be found at the end of the book. - - - - - THE BATTLE OF THE - FALKLAND ISLANDS - -[Illustration: _Glasgow_ _Cornwall_ _Leipzig_ - - THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, 8th DECEMBER, 1914 - - The "Cornwall" engaging the "Leipzig" - - _From a Colour Drawing by Lieut.-Comm. H. T. Bennett, R.N._ -] - - - - - The Battle of the - Falkland Islands - - Before and After - - By - Commander H. Spencer-Cooper - - _With Coloured Frontispiece - and Ten Maps and Charts_ - - - CASSELL AND COMPANY, LTD - London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne - 1919 - - - - - To the Memory - - of the - - Officers and Men - - of the Royal Navy and the Royal Naval Reserve - - who so gallantly gave their lives in the actions - described in this book - - - - - CONTENTS - - - Part I.--Exploits off South America - - CHAPTER PAGE - - 1. GERMAN MEN-OF-WAR IN FOREIGN SEAS 3 - - 2. THE POLICY OF ADMIRAL COUNT VON SPEE 13 - - 3. BRITISH MEN-OF-WAR OFF SOUTH AMERICA 19 - - 4. LIFE AT SEA IN 1914 28 - - 5. THE SINKING OF THE "CAP TRAFALGAR" 35 - - 6. THE ACTION OFF CORONEL 45 - - 7. CONCENTRATION 60 - - 8. POSSIBILITIES AND PROBABILITIES 67 - - - Part II.--The Battle of the Falklands - - 9. AWAY SOUTH 79 - - 10. ENEMY IN SIGHT 87 - - 11. THE BATTLE-CRUISER ACTION 96 - - 12. THE END OF THE "LEIPZIG" 110 - - 13. THE SINKING OF THE "NÜRNBERG" 124 - - 14. AFTERMATH 134 - - 15. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SAILOR IN ACTION 141 - - 16. VON SPEE'S AIMS AND HOPES 151 - - 17. THE PARTING OF THE WAYS 158 - - 18. THE LAST OF THE "DRESDEN" 163 - - - Part III.--Official Dispatches - - 1. THE ACTION OF H.M.S. "CARMANIA" 169 - - 2. THE ACTION OFF CORONEL BY H.M.S. "GLASGOW" 172 - - 3. REPORT BY VICE-ADMIRAL COUNT VON SPEE 174 - - 4. THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 178 - - 5. THE SURRENDER OF THE "DRESDEN" 194 - - - Appendix - - A LIST OF THE OFFICERS SERVING IN THE - ACTIONS RECORDED 197 - - INDEX 221 - - - - -MAPS AND CHARTS - - - PAGE - - THE WAR ZONE IN WESTERN SEAS 5 - - CHART OF COURSE IN "CARMANIA"--"CAP TRAFALGAR" - DUEL 39 - - THE CORONEL ACTION: POSITION WHEN ENEMY - SIGHTED 49 - - THE CORONEL ACTION: POSITION AT SUNSET 51 - - CHART OF "CORNWALL" ACTION (_Inset_) 79 - - CHART OF BATTLE-CRUISER ACTION (_Inset_) 79 - - STANLEY HARBOUR: POSITIONS OF WARSHIPS 83 - - BATTLE OF THE FALKLANDS: POSITIONS AT 1.20 P.M. 94 - - BATTLE OF THE FALKLANDS: POSITIONS AT 2.45 P.M. 112 - - DUEL BETWEEN "KENT" AND "NÜRNBERG" 127 - - - - -INTRODUCTION - - -This plain, unvarnished account, so far as is known, is the first -attempt that has been made to link with the description of the -Falkland Islands battle, fought on December 8th, 1914, the events -leading up to that engagement. - -In order to preserve accuracy as far as possible, each phase -presented has been read and approved by officers who participated. -The personal views expressed on debatable subjects, such as strategy, -are sure to give rise to criticism, but it must be remembered that -at the time of writing the exact positions of the ships engaged in -overseas operations were not fully known, even in the Service. - -The subject falls naturally into three divisions: - -PART I. deals briefly with the movements of British and German -warships, and includes the duel fought by the _Carmania_, and the -action that took place off Coronel. - -PART II. describes the Falkland Islands battle itself, and the -subsequent fate of the German cruiser _Dresden_. - -PART III. contains the official dispatches bearing on these exploits. - -The words of Alfred Noyes have been referred to frequently, because -they are in so many respects prophetic, and also because of their -influence in showing that the spirit of Drake still inspires the -British Navy of to-day. - -The author takes this opportunity of expressing his warmest thanks -to those who have helped him in collecting information and in the -compilation of this book. - - - - -PART I - -EXPLOITS OFF SOUTH AMERICA - - - - - "Meekly content and tamely stay-at-home - The sea-birds seemed that piped across the waves; - And Drake, bemused, leaned smiling to his friend - Doughty and said, 'Is it not strange to know - When we return, yon speckled herring-gulls - Will still be wheeling, dipping, flashing there? - We shall not find a fairer land afar - Than those thyme-scented hills we leave behind! - Soon the young lambs will bleat across the combes, - And breezes will bring puffs of hawthorn scent - Down Devon lanes; over the purple moors - Lav'rocks will carol; and on the village greens - Around the maypole, while the moon hangs low, - The boys and girls of England merrily swing - In country footing through the flowery dance.'" - - --ALFRED NOYES (_Drake_). - - - - -THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS - - - - -CHAPTER I - -GERMAN MEN-OF-WAR IN FOREIGN SEAS - - "I, my Lords, have in different countries seen much of the - miseries of war. I am, therefore, in my inmost soul, a - man of peace. Yet I would not, for the sake of any peace, - however fortunate, consent to sacrifice one jot of England's - honour."--(_Speech by Lord Nelson in the House of Lords, November - 16th, 1802._) - - -We are now approaching the end of the third year of this great -war,[1] and most Englishmen, having had some of the experience that -war inevitably brings with it, will agree that the words which -Nelson spoke are as true to-day as when they were uttered just over -a century ago. Furthermore, as time and the war go on, the spirit -of the whole British nation--be it man or woman--is put to an -ever-increasing test of endurance, which is sustained and upheld by -those two simple words, "England's Honour." An old platitude, "Might -is Right," is constantly being quoted; but the nation that reverses -the order is bound to outlast the other and win through to the -desired goal. The justness of the cause, then, is the secret of our -strength, which will not only endure but bring success to our arms -in the end. - - -When Great Britain plunged into this Armageddon on August 4th, 1914, -the only German squadron not in European waters was stationed in the -Western Pacific, with its main base at Tsingtau. In addition there -were a few German light cruisers isolated in various parts of the -world, many of them being in proximity to British squadrons, which -would point to the fact that Germany never really calculated on Great -Britain throwing in her lot on the opposite side. - -The recent troubles in Mexico accounted for the presence of both -British and German cruisers in those waters, where they had been -operating in conjunction with one another in the most complete -harmony. As an instance, it might be mentioned that on August 2nd, -1914, one of our sloops was actually about to land a guard for one of -our Consulates at a Mexican port in the boats belonging to a German -light cruiser! - -A short description of some of the movements of the German ships -during the first few months of war will suffice to show that -their primary object was to damage our overseas trade as much as -possible. Further, since it is the fashion nowadays to overrate -Germany's powers of organisation and skill, it will be interesting -to observe that in spite of the vulnerability of our worldwide trade -comparatively little was achieved. - - -The German squadron in China was under the command of Vice-Admiral -Count von Spee. The outbreak of war found him on a cruise in the -Pacific, which ultimately extended far beyond his expectations. The -two armoured cruisers _Scharnhorst_--in which Admiral von Spee flew -his flag--and _Gneisenau_ left Nagasaki on June 28th, 1914. Their -movements southward are of no particular interest until their arrival -on July 7th at the Truk or Rug Islands, in the Caroline group, -which then belonged to Germany. After a few days they leisurely -continued their cruise amongst the islands of Polynesia. About -the middle of the month the light cruiser _Nürnberg_ was hastily -recalled from San Francisco, and sailed on July 21st, joining von -Spee's squadron at Ponape (also one of the Caroline Islands), where -the three ships mobilised for war. On August 6th they sailed for an -unknown destination, taking with them an auxiliary cruiser called the -_Titania_. - -[Illustration: THE WAR ZONE IN WESTERN SEAS - - The Mappa Co. Ltd London -] - -Apparently they were somewhat short of provisions, particularly of -fresh meat and potatoes, for it was said in an intercepted letter -that their diet consisted mainly of "spun yarn" (preserved meat). - -On August 22nd the _Nürnberg_ was sent to Honolulu to get papers -and to send telegrams, rejoining the squadron shortly afterwards. -A day or two later she was again detached, this time to Fanning -Island, where she destroyed the British cable station, cut the cable, -rejoining the squadron about September 7th, apparently at Christmas -Island. Hearing that hostile forces were at Apia (Samoan Islands), -von Spee sailed southward only to find, on his arrival, that it was -empty of shipping. - -The squadron now proceeded eastward to the French Society Islands to -see what stores were to be found there. Completing supplies of coal -at Bora Bora Island, it suddenly appeared off Papeete, the capital -of Tahiti, on September 22nd. A French gunboat lying in the harbour -was sunk by shell-fire, the town and forts were subjected to a heavy -bombardment, whilst the coal stores were set on fire. Calling in -later at the Marquesas Islands, the German Admiral shaped his course -eastward toward Easter Island, which was reached on October 12th. - -The light cruiser _Leipzig_ sailed from Mazatlan, an important town -on the west coast of Mexico, on August 2nd. Ten days later she was -reported off the entrance to Juan de Fuca Straits, between Vancouver -and the mainland, but never ventured inside to attack the naval -dockyard of Esquimalt. When war broke out the Canadian Government -with great promptitude purchased two submarines from an American -firm at Seattle; this was probably known to the Germans, and might -account for their unwillingness to risk an attack on a port that was -otherwise practically defenceless. - -The Canadian light cruiser _Rainbow_, together with the British -sloop _Algerine_, did excellent work on this coast. The former, in -particular, showed much zeal in shadowing the _Leipzig_, though they -never actually met. - -The _Leipzig_ achieved absolutely nothing worthy of note, although -she remained on the west coast of America for a long time. It was -not till the middle of October that she joined Admiral von Spee's -squadron at Easter Island, without having caused any damage to the -British Mercantile Marine. - - -The light cruiser _Dresden_ was at St. Thomas, one of the larger of -the Virgin Islands group, West Indies. She sailed on August 1st and -proceeded straight to Cape Horn, only staying her career to coal at -various places _en route_ where she was unlikely to be reported. -Crossing and re-crossing the trade route, she arrived on September -5th at Orange Bay, which is a large uninhabited natural harbour a -few miles to the north-west of Cape Horn. Here she was met by a -collier, and stayed eleven days making adjustments to her engines. -She evidently considered that she was now free from danger--we had -no cruisers here at this period--for she continued her course into -the Pacific, easing down to a speed of 8½ knots, and keeping more in -the track of shipping. She met the German gunboat _Eber_ on September -19th, to the northward of Magellan, and continued her way, apparently -on the look out for allied commerce, but only succeeded in sinking -two steamers before joining the flag of Admiral von Spee at Easter -Island on October 12th. Altogether she sank three steamers and four -sailing vessels, representing a total value of just over £250,000. - - -The light cruiser _Karlsruhe_, the fastest and most modern of the -German ships on foreign service, was in the Gulf of Mexico at the -commencement of the war. On her way to her sphere of operations in -the neighbourhood of Pernambuco she was sighted on August 6th, whilst -coaling at sea from the armed liner _Kronprinz Wilhelm_, by the -British cruiser _Suffolk_. Admiral Cradock, who was then flying his -flag in the _Suffolk_, immediately gave chase to the _Karlsruhe_, -the _Kronprinz Wilhelm_ bolting in the opposite direction. During -the forenoon Admiral Cradock called up by wireless the light cruiser -_Bristol_, which was in the vicinity, and, giving her the position of -the _Karlsruhe_, ordered her to intercept the enemy. The _Karlsruhe_ -was kept in sight by the _Suffolk_ for several hours, but was never -within gun-range, and finally escaped from her by superior speed. It -was a beautiful moonlight evening when the _Bristol_ sighted her -quarry at 8 P.M., and a quarter of an hour later opened fire, which -was returned a few moments later by the _Karlsruhe_, but it was too -dark for either ship to see the results of their shooting. All the -enemy's shots fell short, so that the _Bristol_ incurred no damage. -Both ships went on firing for fifty-five minutes, by which time the -German had drawn out of range. Admiral Cradock signalled during the -action, "Stick to it--I am coming"; all this time the _Suffolk_ was -doing her best to catch up, but never succeeded in reaching the scene -of the first naval action in the world-war. The German disappeared in -the darkness, and was never seen again by our warships. - -In her subsequent raids on British commerce along the South Atlantic -trade routes the _Karlsruhe_ was, on the whole, successful, until she -met a sudden and inglorious end off Central America. Her fate was -for a long time shrouded in mystery, the first clue being some of -her wreckage, which was found washed up on the shores of the island -of St. Vincent in the West Indies. Some of her survivors eventually -found their way back to the Fatherland and reported that she had -foundered with 260 officers and men--due to an internal explosion -on November 4th, 1914, in latitude 10° 07′ N., longitude 55° 25′ W. -(_See_ Map p. 5.) - -In all she sank seventeen ships, representing a value of £1,622,000. - - -There remain three German armed merchant cruisers that claim our -attention on account of their operations off South America. The _Cap -Trafalgar_ only existed for a month before being sunk by the armed -Cunard liner _Carmania_. A description of the fight is given in a -subsequent chapter. - -The _Prinz Eitel Friedrich_ was more directly under the orders of -Admiral von Spee, and acted in conjunction with his squadron in the -Pacific until the battle of the Falkland Islands, when she operated -on her own account against our trade with South America. She achieved -some measure of success during the few months that she was free, -and captured ten ships altogether, several of which, however, were -sailing vessels. Early in March she arrived at Newport News in the -United States with a number of prisoners on board, who had been -taken from these prizes. She was badly in need of refit; her engines -required repairs, and the Germans fondly imagined that they might -escape internment. On hearing that one of her victims was an American -vessel, public indignation was hotly aroused and but little sympathy -was shown for her wants. Her days of marauding were brought to an -abrupt termination, for the Americans resolutely interned her. - -Lastly, there was the _Kronprinz Wilhelm_, which, as we have seen, -was in company with the _Karlsruhe_ when the latter was sighted and -chased by the _Suffolk_ only two days after war was declared. She was -commanded by one of the officers of the _Karlsruhe_, and worked under -her orders in the Atlantic. In fact, the German cruiser transferred -two of her Q.F. guns to the armed merchantman, and they were mounted -on her forecastle. She was skilful in avoiding our cruisers and -literally fed upon her captures, being fortunate in obtaining coal -with fair frequency. In the course of eight months the _Kronprinz -Wilhelm_ captured and destroyed fifteen British or French ships, -four of which were sailing vessels. It will be realised how small -was the toll of our ships sailing these seas, especially when it is -recollected that the main object of the Germans at this time was to -make war on our maritime trade. Finally, sickness broke out on board -and there were several cases of beriberi; moreover, the ship leaked -and was in want of repairs, so on April 11th she also steamed into -Newport News and was interned. - -That the Germans did not approach the results they hoped for in -attacking our commerce was in a large measure due to the unceasing -activity of our cruisers, who forced the German ships to be -continually on the move to fresh hunting grounds. Thus, although -many of them escaped capture or destruction for some time, they were -perpetually being disturbed and hindered in their work of depredation. - - -The exploits of the light cruisers _Emden_ and _Königsberg_ are -outside the scope of this book, but the following brief summary may -be of interest. - -Sailing from Tsingtau on August 5th, with four colliers, the _Emden_ -apparently proceeded to cruise in the neighbourhood of Vladivostock, -where she captured a Russian auxiliary cruiser and one or two -merchant ships, before going south to make history in the Bay of -Bengal. She was eventually brought to book off the Cocos Islands on -November 9th, 1914, by the Australian light cruiser _Sydney_, in a -very gallant action which lasted over an hour and a half, when she -ran herself ashore in a sinking condition on North Keeling Island. -She sank seventeen ships all told, representing a total value of -£2,211,000. - -The _Königsberg_, at the commencement of hostilities, was lying at -Dar-es-Salaam, the capital of what was formerly German East Africa. -She sank the _Pegasus_, a light cruiser only two-thirds of her size -and of much inferior armament, at Zanzibar on September 20th, but -only succeeded in sinking one or two steamers afterwards. She was -eventually discovered hiding in the Rufiji Delta in German East -Africa, towards the end of October, 1914, where she was kept blocked -up by our ships for nearly nine months. Finally, on July 11th, 1915, -she was destroyed by gunfire by the monitors _Severn_ and _Mersey_, -who went up the river--the banks on both sides being entrenched--and -reduced her to a hopeless wreck where she lay, some fourteen miles -from the sea. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -THE POLICY OF ADMIRAL COUNT VON SPEE - - -It is clearly impossible to state with any exactitude the motives -which governed von Spee's policy; but, in briefly reviewing the -results, a shrewd idea of the reasons which led him to certain -conclusions may be formed. Also, it will assist the reader to a -conclusion on the merits and demerits of the strategy adopted, and -will help him to follow more easily the reasons for some of the -movements of our own ships described in the next chapter. - -That Admiral von Spee did not return to Tsingtau at the outbreak of -hostilities appears significant, since he was by no means inferior to -our squadron, and wished to mobilise his ships. He, however, sent the -_Emden_ there with dispatches and instructions to the colliers about -meeting him after she had escorted them to sea. Japan, it will be -remembered, did not declare war till August 23rd, 1914, and therefore -could scarcely have come into his earlier calculations. His action in -continuing his cruise in the Southern Pacific, where he was handy and -ready to strike at the French colonies[2] at the psychological moment -of the outbreak of hostilities, gives the impression that he did not -consider England's intervention probable. - -Previous to the war, the _Leipzig_ and _Nürnberg_ had been detached -to the West Coast of America, and it appears likely that von Spee was -influenced in his decision to remain at large in the Pacific by this -fact, as, before this dispersal of his squadron, he would have been -distinctly superior to the British Fleet in the China Station at that -time. Great care was taken by him to keep all his movements secret, -and he appears to have avoided making many wireless signals. - -The decision of the British Government to proceed with operations -against the German colonies in the Southern Pacific must have had a -determining effect on German policy; this decision was made at the -very outset and allowed the enemy no time to make preparations to -counter it. The value of the patriotism and loyal co-operation of the -Dominions in building up their own Navy in peace time was now clearly -demonstrated, Australia being the first of our Dominions to embark on -this policy. - -The German China squadron was inferior in strength to our ships in -Australian waters, and could not afford to risk encountering the -powerful battle-cruiser _Australia_ with her eight 12-inch guns; -consequently, von Spee was compelled to abandon the many colonies -in Polynesia to their fate. Finally, the advent of Japan into the -conflict left him little choice but to make his way to the eastward, -since not to do so was to court almost certain destruction, while to -move west and conceal his whereabouts was an impossibility. That von -Spee felt his position to be precarious, and had difficulty in making -up his mind what to do, is shown by the slow and indecisive movement -of his squadron at first. - -The movements of the German light cruisers lead to the conclusion -that they must have received orders to scatter so as to destroy our -trade in various spheres. The _Leipzig_ apparently patrolled the -western side of North America, whilst the _Karlsruhe_ took the South -Atlantic, and so on. - -Why the _Dresden_ should have steamed over 6,000 miles to the Pacific -instead of assisting the _Karlsruhe_ is hard to explain, unless she -had direct orders from the German Admiralty. She could always have -joined von Spee later. - -With the exception of the _Emden_, who operated with success in the -Bay of Bengal, and the _Karlsruhe_, whose area of operations was -along the junction of the South Atlantic and the West Indian trade -routes, none of them succeeded in accomplishing a fraction of the -damage that might reasonably have been expected at a time when our -merchantmen were not organised for war and business was "as usual." -It cannot be denied that the _Emden's_ raids wholly disorganised the -trade along the east coast of India. The local moneylenders--who are -the bankers to the peasants--abandoned the coast completely, trade -nearly came to a standstill, and the damage done took months to -recover. In this case the effects could by no means be measured by an -armchair calculation of the tonnage sunk by the _Emden_ in pounds, -shillings and pence. - -The main anxiety of the German Admiral lay in the continuance of his -supplies, which could only be assured by careful organisation. This -was rendered comparatively easy in South America, where every port -teemed with Germans; the wheels of communication, through the agency -of shore wireless stations, were well oiled by German money, and -there were numerous German merchantmen, fitted with wireless, ready -to hand to be used as supply ships or colliers. - -It was thus of paramount importance that the German Squadron should -be rounded up and annihilated before it could become a serious menace -to our trade and that of our Allies. The other remaining light -cruisers of the enemy, who were operating singly, could be dealt with -more easily, since our ships could afford to separate in order to -search for them, thus rendering it only a matter of time before they -were destroyed. - -What was the object, then, of the German Admiral? This was the -all-important question that occupied the thoughts of all our naval -officers in foreign parts. On the assumption that he would come -eastwards, there appeared to be few choices open to him beyond the -following: - -(1) To bombard the seaports of our colonies on the west coast of -Africa and to attack weakly defended but by no means valueless naval -stations (such as St. Helena), at the same time operating against -British and French expeditions going by sea against German colonies. - -(2) To go to South Africa, destroy the weak British squadron at the -Cape, and hang up Botha's expedition by supporting a rising against -us in the South African Dominions. - -(3) To endeavour to make his way home to Germany. - -(4) To operate in the North Atlantic. - -(5) To harass our trade with South America. - -Both the first and second appeared quite feasible, but they had the -twofold disadvantage of involving actions nearer England and of -very possibly restricting the enemy a good deal in his movements; -there are few harbours on this coast, and his every movement would -become known in a region where we held the monopoly in methods of -communication. Consequently, any success here was bound to be more or -less short-lived. On the other hand, matters were undoubtedly very -critical in these parts. De la Rey, when he was shot, was actually -on his way to raise the Vierkleur at Potchefstroom, and any striking -naval success which it would have taken us three weeks to deal with -at the very least, might have just set the balance against us at this -time in the minds of the waverers. Moreover, it would not have been -difficult to ensure supplies from the German colonies. - -The third may be dismissed as being extremely improbable at the -outset, for it is difficult to run a blockade with a number of ships, -and, for the enemy, it would too much have resembled thrusting his -head into the lion's jaws. Besides, he could be of far greater -service to his country in roaming the seas and in continuing to be a -thorn in our side as long as possible. - -The fourth will scarcely bear examination; cut off from all bases, he -could hardly hope to escape early destruction. - -The fifth seemed by far the most favourable to his hopes, as -being likely to yield a richer harvest, and, if successful, might -paralyse our enormous trade with South America, upon which we were so -dependent. - -German influence was predominant as well as unscrupulous along the -Brazilian coasts, which would render it easy to maintain supplies. To -evoke sympathy amongst the smaller Republics would also come within -his horizon. Finally, he could have had little idea of our strength -in South Africa; whereas information gleaned from Valparaiso (which -von Spee evidently considered reliable) as to the precise extent of -our limited naval resources then on the east coast of South America, -must have proved a deciding factor in determining his strategy. - -Whichever course were adopted, it was practically certain that the -German Admiral would move eastwards, either through the Straits -of Magellan or, more probably, round the Horn to avoid having his -whereabouts reported. That this occurred to the minds of our naval -authorities before the action off Coronel took place is practically -certain, but it is to be regretted that reinforcements to Admiral -Cradock's squadron operating in South American waters were not sent -there in time to prevent that disaster. - -This, then, in brief, was the problem that presented itself to our -commanders after the battle of Coronel took place, and no doubt -influenced them in the choice of the Falkland Islands as a base, its -geographical position making it almost ideal in the event of any move -in that direction on the part of the Germans. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -BRITISH MEN-OF-WAR OFF SOUTH AMERICA - - "If England hold - The sea, she holds the hundred thousand gates - That open to futurity. She holds - The highways of all ages. Argosies - Of unknown glory set their sails this day - For England out of ports beyond the stars. - Ay, on the sacred seas we ne'er shall know - They hoist their sails this day by peaceful quays, - Great gleaming wharves i' the perfect City of God, - If she but claims her heritage." - - --ALFRED NOYES (_Drake_). - - -Before attempting to give a description of the battle of the Falkland -Islands, it is necessary to review very briefly the movements and -dispositions of our ships, as well as the events preceding the -battle, which include both the duel between the armed merchant -cruiser _Carmania_ and _Cap Trafalgar_ and the action fought off -Coronel on the coast of Chile by Admiral Cradock. - -Our naval forces were scattered in comparatively small units all -over the world when war broke out. Ships in various squadrons -were separated from one another by great distances, and, with the -exception of our Mediterranean Fleet, we possessed no squadron in any -part of the globe equal in strength to that of von Spee. - -Attention is directed to the positions of Easter Island, where the -Germans had last been reported, Valparaiso, Coronel, Magellan -Straits, Staten Island, the Falkland Islands, Buenos Ayres, -Montevideo, Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco, and the Island of Trinidad -off the east coast of South America, since they occur continually in -the course of this narrative.[3] - -In the early part of 1914 Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, -K.C.V.O., C.B., flying his flag in the _Suffolk_, was in command -of the fourth cruiser squadron, which was then doing some very -useful work in the Gulf of Mexico. On August 2nd he was at Kingston, -Jamaica, and received information that the _Good Hope_ was on her way -out to become his flagship, so he sailed northwards to meet her. On -the way he sighted and gave chase to the _Karlsruhe_ on August 6th, -as has been related. The _Suffolk_ and the _Good Hope_ met at sea ten -days later, and the Admiral went on board the latter immediately and -hoisted his flag. - -Turning south, he went to Bermuda, called in at St. Lucia on August -23rd, and thence proceeded along the north coast of South America -on his way to take up the command of a newly forming squadron of -British ships patrolling the trade routes and protecting the merchant -shipping in South American waters. At St. Lucia Admiral Cradock would -probably have learned of the sailing of von Spee's squadron from -Ponape on August 6th, and this accounts for his haste in making south -in order to meet and form his ships together. - -The squadron was gradually augmented as time went on, and in the -months of September and October, 1914, consisted of the flagship -_Good Hope_ (Captain Philip Francklin), _Canopus_ (Captain Heathcoat -Grant), _Monmouth_ (Captain Frank Brandt), _Cornwall_ (Captain W. M. -Ellerton), _Glasgow_ (Captain John Luce), _Bristol_ (Captain B. H. -Fanshawe), and the armed merchant cruisers _Otranto_ (Captain H. McI. -Edwards), _Macedonia_ (Captain B. S. Evans), and _Orama_ (Captain J. -R. Segrave). - - -No news was obtainable as to the whereabouts of the German squadron -stationed in the Pacific, which consisted of the _Scharnhorst_, -_Gneisenau_, _Emden_, _Nürnberg_, and _Leipzig_, except that it was -known that the two latter had been operating on the east side of the -Pacific, and that the _Emden_ was in the Bay of Bengal. The vaguest -rumours, all contradicting one another, were continually being -circulated, in which it is more than likely that German agents had a -large share. - -Admiral Cradock proceeded south in the middle of September to -watch the Straits of Magellan, and to patrol between there and -the River Plate, as he doubtless hoped to prevent the _Karlsruhe_ -and _Dresden_--which, when last heard of, were in South American -waters--from attempting to effect a junction with their main -squadron. With him were the _Monmouth_, _Glasgow_, and the armed -Orient liner _Otranto_, in addition to his own ship the _Good Hope_, -which, together with his colliers, had their first base in the -Falkland Islands. - -On hearing of the appearance of the Germans off Papeete and of the -bombardment of the French colony there on September 22nd, it was -apparently considered expedient to proceed to the west coast of South -America in order to intercept the enemy. Accordingly, early in -October the _Monmouth_, _Glasgow_, and _Otranto_ went round to the -Pacific, diligently searching out the many inlets and harbours _en -route_, and arrived at Valparaiso on October 15th, but only stayed -a part of one day in order to get stores and provisions. They then -went back southwards to meet the _Good Hope_ and _Canopus_, vainly -hoping to fall in with the _Leipzig_ or _Dresden_ on the way. The -_Good Hope_ reached the Chilean coast on October 29th, and all ships -filled up with coal; the _Canopus_ was due very shortly, and actually -sighted our ships steaming off as she arrived. - -In order to carry out a thorough and effective examination of the -innumerable inlets that abound amongst the channels of Tierra del -Fuego, in addition to the bays and harbours on both coasts of South -America, it became necessary to divide up this squadron into separate -units. To expedite matters, colliers were sent to meet our ships, so -that valuable time should not be lost in returning to the base at the -Falkland Islands. The first fine day was seized to fill up with coal, -care always being taken to keep outside the three-mile territorial -limit. - -It must have been a trying and anxious time for both officers and -men, while pursuing their quest, never knowing what force might -suddenly be disclosed in opening out one of these harbours. From the -weather usually experienced in these parts some idea may be formed of -the discomforts. An officer in the _Glasgow_, writing of this period, -says: "It blew, snowed, rained, hailed, and sleeted as hard as it -is possible to do these things. I thought the ship would dive under -altogether at times. It was a short sea, and very high, and doesn't -suit this ship a bit. The _Monmouth_ was rather worse, if anything, -though not quite so wet. We were rolling 35 degrees, and quite -useless for fighting purposes. The ship was practically a submarine." - -Imagine, too, the position of the _Otranto_, searching these waters -by herself, without the least hope of being able to fight on level -terms with one of the enemy's light-cruisers. The words of one of her -officers sum up the situation: "We finally got past caring what might -happen," he said; "what with the strain, the weather, and the extreme -cold, we longed to find something and to have it out, one way or the -other." - -When the depredations of the _Karlsruhe_ became more numerous, the -Admiralty dispatched ships--as could best be spared from watching -other trade routes--to reinforce Admiral Cradock's command. Thus, -what may be termed a second squadron was formed, consisting of -the _Canopus_, _Cornwall_, _Bristol_, the armed P. & O. liner -_Macedonia_, and the armed Orient liner _Orama_. This latter squadron -carried out a fruitless search during September and October for the -ever elusive _Karlsruhe_, but, so far as is known, did not succeed in -getting near her, for she was never actually sighted. In the absence -of orders from Admiral Cradock, the duties of Senior Naval Officer -of this northern squadron frequently involved the consideration of -matters of no little consequence. These duties primarily devolved -upon the shoulders of Captain Fanshawe of the _Bristol_, who was -succeeded on the arrival of the _Canopus_ by Captain Heathcoat Grant. -As the poor state of the engines of the _Canopus_ did not enable -her to steam at any speed, she remained at the base and directed -operations, forming a valuable link with her wireless. Orders, -however, were received from Admiral Cradock which necessitated her -sailing on October 10th in order to join his southern squadron, so -that Captain Fanshawe was again left in command. - -On October 24th the _Carnarvon_ (Captain H. L. d'E. Skipwith) -arrived, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral A. P. Stoddart, who, though -acting under the orders of Admiral Cradock, now took charge of the -sweeping operations necessitated by our quest. Admiral Stoddart had -previously been in command of the ships operating along our trade -routes near the Cape Verde Islands, where the _Carnarvon_ had not -long before made a valuable capture, the German storeship _Professor -Woermann_, filled with coal and ammunition. - -The comparatively large number of men-of-war mentioned is accounted -for by the fact that at this time the _Karlsruhe_ began to make her -presence felt by sinking more merchant ships, which caused no little -apprehension amongst the mercantile communities in all the ports on -the north and east coasts of South America, Brazilian firms at this -period refusing to ship their goods in British bottoms, although some -British vessels were lying in harbour awaiting cargoes. The German -ship's activities were mainly confined to the neighbourhood of St. -Paul's Rocks, Pernambuco, and the Equator. - -It is not easy to put clearly the disposition of the ships acting -under Admiral Cradock at this time, nor to give an adequate idea of -the many disadvantages with which he had to contend. The difficulties -of communication on the east coast of South America between his two -squadrons were very great, on account of the long distances between -them (often some thousands of miles and always greater than the range -of our wireless). The only method found feasible was to send messages -in code by means of passing British merchantmen--usually the Royal -Mail liners. The inevitable result of this was that it was frequently -impossible for Admiral Cradock to keep in touch with his northern -squadron, and important matters of policy had thus to be decided on -the spot, the Admiral being informed later. - - -On the rare occasions that our ships visited Brazilian ports, which -were crowded with German shipping, the crews of these ships, having -nothing better to do, would come and pull round our cruisers--in -all probability cursing us heartily the while--much to the interest -and amusement of our men. These visits could only take place at the -most once every three months, when the opportunity of getting a good -square meal at a civilised restaurant was hailed with delight by -those officers who were off duty. - -Our coaling base in these waters was admirably selected. There was -sufficient anchorage for a large number of ships four or five miles -from any land, but protected from anything but a heavy swell or sea -by surrounding ledges of coral awash at low water. Sometimes colliers -got slightly damaged by bumping against our ships when there was a -swell, but in other respects it suited its purpose excellently. The -Brazilians sent a destroyer to investigate once or twice, but could -find nothing to arouse their susceptibilities, for our ships were -always well outside the three-mile limit. Our sole amusement was -fishing, frequently for sharks. - - -Towards the latter part of August, the armed merchant cruiser -_Carmania_ (Captain Noel Grant) was sent out to join Admiral -Cradock's squadron with coal, provisions, and a large quantity of -frozen meat, which was sadly needed. She was ordered by him to assist -the _Cornwall_ in watching Pernambuco on September 11th, as it was -thought that the German storeship _Patagonia_ was going to put to -sea on September 11th to join the _Karlsruhe_. On her way south she -got orders to search Trinidad Island in the South Atlantic to find -out whether the Germans were making use of it as a coaling base, and -there fell in with the German armed liner _Cap Trafalgar_, which -she sank in a very gallant action that is described in a subsequent -chapter. - -The armed merchant cruiser _Edinburgh Castle_ (Captain W. R. Napier) -was sent out from England with drafts of seamen and boys, as well -as provisions and stores for our men-of-war in these waters. On her -arrival at the base on October 12th, she was detained on service -to assist in the sweep that had been organised to search for the -_Karlsruhe_. Some of us have pleasant recollections of excellent -games of deck hockey played on the spacious promenade deck during her -all too short stay with us. - -The _Defence_ (Captain E. La T. Leatham) touched at the base to coal -on October 27th, being on her way south to join Admiral Cradock's -southern command. She had to coal in bad weather, and perforated the -collier's side in doing so, but succeeded in completing with coal in -the minimum possible time under difficult conditions. Without loss -of time she proceeded to Montevideo, but never got any farther, as -it was there that the news of the Coronel disaster first reached -her. Admiral Cradock hoped to find von Spee before the German -light-cruisers _Dresden_ and _Leipzig_ joined the main squadron; -but he also was most anxious to wait for the _Defence_. She would -have made a very powerful addition to his squadron, and it seems a -thousand pities that it was not possible to effect this junction -before he quitted the eastern shores of South America for the Pacific. - -The _Defence_ was very unlucky, and had a great deal of hard work -without any kudos; not till Admiral Sturdee's arrival did she leave -to join the _Minotaur_ on the Cape of Good Hope station, and the -very day she arrived there got the news of the Falkland Islands -battle! Having covered 23,000 miles in two and a half months, the -disappointment at having missed that fight was, of course, intense. -It is sad to think that few of her gallant crew are alive to-day, as -she was afterwards sunk in the battle of Jutland. - - -The _Invincible_, flagship of Vice-Admiral F. C. Doveton Sturdee -(Captain P. H. Beamish), the _Inflexible_ (Captain R. F. Phillimore, -C.B., M.V.O.), and the _Kent_ (Captain J. D. Allen) enter the scene -of operations later. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -LIFE AT SEA IN 1914 - - "A seaman, smiling, swaggered out of the inn, - Swinging in one brown hand a gleaming cage - Wherein a big green parrot chattered and clung - Fluttering against the wires." - - --ALFRED NOYES (_Drake_). - - -A short digression may perhaps be permitted, if it can portray the -long days, when for months at a time little occurs to break the -monotony of sea life. The reader may also experience the charitable -feeling that, at the expense of his patience, the sailor is indulging -in the "grouse" that proverbially is supposed to be so dear to him. - -Of necessity, work on board ship in wartime must be largely a matter -of routine; and, though varied as much as possible, it tends to -relapse into "the trivial round, the common task." All day and all -night men man the guns ready to blaze off at any instant, extra -look-outs are posted, and there are officers and men in the control -positions. The ship's company is usually organised into three watches -at night, which take turns in relieving one another every four hours. - -After sunrise the increased visibility gives ample warning of any -possible attack. The messdecks, guns, and ship generally are cleaned -before breakfast, while the forenoon soon passes in perfecting the -guns' crews and controls, and in physical drill. After dinner at -noon and a smoke, everyone follows the old custom of the sea, and has -a caulk (a sleep)--a custom originated in the days of sailing ships -who were at sea for long periods at a time, and watch and watch (i.e. -one watch on and one off) had to be maintained both day and night. -The men lie about the decks, too tired to feel the want of either -mattresses or pillows. The first dog watch (4-6 P.M.) is usually -given up to recreation until sunset, when it is time to go to night -defence stations. Day in and day out, this programme is seldom varied -except to stop and examine a merchant ship now and again. - -Every ship met with on the high seas is boarded for the examination -of its passengers and cargo, an undertaking often attended by some -difficulty on a dark night. On approaching, it is customary to -signal the ship to stop; if this is not obeyed at once, a blank -round is fired as a warning; should this be disregarded a shotted -round is fired across her bows, but it is seldom necessary to resort -to this measure. At night these excursions have a strange, unreal -effect, and our boarding officer used to say that when climbing up a -merchantman's side in rough weather he felt like some character in -a pirate story. Getting out of a boat, as it is tossing alongside, -on to a rope ladder, is by no means an easy job, especially if the -officer is inclined to be portly. The searchlight, too, turned full -on to the ship, blinding the scared passengers who come tumbling -up, frequently imagining they have been torpedoed, adds to the -mysterious effect produced, whilst the sudden appearance of the -boarding officer in his night kit suggests a visit from Father -Neptune. But any idea of comedy is soon shattered by the grumpy -voice of the captain who has been turned out from his beauty sleep, -or by the vehement objections of a lady or her husband to their -cabin being searched. As a matter of fact, we were always met with -the most unfailing courtesy, and the boat's crew was often loaded -with presents of cigarettes or even chocolates, besides parcels of -newspapers hastily made up and thrown down at the last moment. - -Off a neutral coast the food problem is an everlasting difficulty, -and as soon as the canteen runs out and tinned stores cannot be -replenished, the menu resolves itself into a more or less fixed item -of salt beef ("salt horse") or salt pork with pea soup. The old -saying, "Feed the brute, if a man is to be kept happy," has proved -itself true, but is one which at sea is often extraordinarily hard -to follow, especially when it is impossible to get such luxuries as -eggs, potatoes, and fresh meat. If flour runs out, the ship's biscuit -("hard tack"), which often requires a heavy blow to break it, forms -but a poor substitute for bread; although it is quite good eating, -a little goes a long way. The joy with which the advent of an armed -liner is heralded by the officers cannot well be exaggerated; the -stewards from all ships lose no time in trying to get all they can, -and the memory of the first excellent meal is not easily forgotten. - -The ever-recurring delight of coaling ship is looked forward to -directly anchorage is reached. Coal-dust then penetrates everywhere, -even to the food, and after a couple of hours it seems impossible -for the ship ever to be clean again. Nearly every officer and man on -board, including the chaplain and paymasters, join in the work, which -continues day and night, as a rule, until finished. If this takes -more than twenty-four hours there is the awful trial of sleeping, -clothes and all, covered in grime, for hammocks have to be foregone, -else they would be quite unfit for further use. The men wear any -clothes they like. In the tropics it is a warm job working in the -holds, and clothes are somewhat scanty. A very popular article is -a bashed-in bowler hat, frequently worn with white shorts, and a -football jersey! There is, generally, a wag amongst the men who keeps -them cheery and happy, even during a tropical rain storm. His powers -of mimicking, often ranging from politicians to gunnery instructors, -bring forth rounds of applause, and all the time he'll dig out like a -Trojan. - -The sailor is a cheery bird, and seldom lets an opportunity of -amusement escape. On one occasion, when lying at anchor in the -tropics, someone suggested fishing; after the first fish had been -caught many rods and lines were soon going. A would-be wit enlivened -matters by tying an empty soda-water bottle on to a rather excitable -man's line while he was away, which met with great success on the -owner crying out, "I've got a real big 'un here" as he carefully -played it to the delight of everyone. Shark fishing was a favourite -sport, and three were caught and landed in one afternoon; one of them -had three small sharks inside it. - -The band (very few ships had the good fortune to possess one) plays -from 4.30 to 5.30 P.M., when Jack disports himself in Mazurkas -and d'Alberts, and dances uncommonly well before a very critical -audience. Some men are always busy at their sewing machines when off -duty, making clothes for their messmates; this they call "jewing"; -others are barbers, or bootmakers, and they make quite a good -thing out of it. Now that masts and sails are things of the past, -substitutes in the way of exercise are very necessary, particularly -when living on salt food. Boxing is greatly encouraged, and if -competitions are organised, men go into strict training and the -greatest keenness prevails. A canvas salt-water bath is usually -rigged, and is in constant demand with the younger men. The officers -congregate in flannels on the quarter-deck playing quoits, deck -tennis, or cricket; some go in for doing Swedish exercises, Müller, -or club swinging, and, to finish up with, a party is formed to run -round the decks. - -The Admiralty are extraordinarily good about dispatching mails to our -ships, but sudden and unexpected movements often make it impossible -to receive them with any regularity. When war broke out everyone -wondered how their folk at home would manage, whether money and food -would be easily obtainable. In our own case we were moved from our -original sphere of operations, and did not get our first mail till -October 19th, over eleven weeks after leaving England, and many -other ships may have fared even worse. Again, our Christmas mail of -1914 was not received till six months afterwards, having followed -us to the Falkland Islands, then back home, out again round the -Cape of Good Hope, finally arriving at the Dardanelles. On this -occasion one of the men had a pound of mutton and a plum pudding -sent him by his wife; it can easily be imagined with what delight he -welcomed these delicacies, which had been through the tropics several -times, as did those others whose parcels were anywhere near his in -the mail bag. It may appear a paltry thing to those who get their -daily post regularly, but the arrival of a mail at sea is a very -real joy, even to those who get but few letters. The newspapers are -eagerly devoured, and events, whose bare occurrence may have only -become known through meagre wireless communiqués, are at length made -comprehensible. - -Darkening ship at sunset is uncomfortable, more particularly in the -tropics, when the heat on the messdecks becomes unbearable from lack -of air. However, this is now much improved by supplying wind-scoops -for the scuttles, fitted with baffles to prevent the light from -showing outboard. Everyone sleeps on deck who can, risking the -pleasures of being trodden upon in the dark, or of being drenched by -a sudden tropical shower, when the scrum of men hastily snatching -up their hammocks and running for the hatches equals that of any -crowd at a football match. On moonless nights little diversions are -constantly occurring. A certain officer, perfectly sober, on one -occasion walked over the edge of the boat-deck into space, and then -was surprised to find that he was hurt. - -The hardships and anxieties of the life are probably overrated by -people ashore. The very routine helps to make the sailor accustomed -to the strange and unnatural conditions, nearly all of which have -their humorous side. As is the way of the world, we on the coast of -South America all envied those in the Grand Fleet at this time, in -modern ships fitted with refrigerating rooms and plenty of good fresh -food; and they, no doubt, willingly would have changed places with -us, being sick to death of the uneventful life, cold, rough weather, -and constant submarine strain from which we were fortunately immune. -Events took such a shape a few months later that those of us who were -fortunate enough to be in the battle of the Falkland Islands would -not have been elsewhere for all the world. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -THE SINKING OF THE "CAP TRAFALGAR" - - "When, with a roar that seemed to buffet the heavens - And rip the heart of the sea out, one red flame - Blackened with fragments, the great galleon burst - Asunder! All the startled waves were strewn - With wreckage; and Drake laughed: 'My lads, we have diced - With death to-day, and won!'" - - --ALFRED NOYES (_Drake_). - - -It has already been mentioned that the _Carmania_ was ordered to -search the Brazilian island of Trinidad (not to be confused with the -British Island of the same name), which lies in the South Atlantic -about 600 miles to the eastward of South America, and in about the -same latitude as Rio de Janeiro. It was uninhabited at this time, and -seemed a likely place for the Germans to use as a temporary coaling -base; they have never had any compunction about breaking the laws of -neutrality if it suited their purpose. - -The following narrative is taken from the official report, -supplemented by an account written by the author two days after -the action from a description given him by the officers of H.M.S. -_Carmania_. - -Land was sighted on the morning of September 14th, 1914. A moderate -breeze was blowing from the north-east, but it was a lovely day, with -a clear sky and the sun shining. Shortly after 11 A.M. the masts of a -vessel were observed, and on approaching nearer the _Carmania_ made -out three steamers, apparently at anchor in a small bay that lies to -the south-west of the island. One of these was a large liner, but the -others were clearly colliers and had their derricks topped; they were -probably working when they sighted us, and they immediately separated -and made off in different directions before the whole of their hulls -could be distinguished. - -The large vessel was apparently a liner about equal in size,[4] -having two funnels which were painted to resemble those of a Union -Castle liner. After running away for a while, the larger steamer, -which turned out to be the _Cap Trafalgar_ (though this was not known -for certain till weeks afterwards), altered course to starboard and -headed more in our direction. She was then steering about south at -what appeared to be full speed, while the _Carmania_ was steaming 16 -knots on a sou'-westerly course. - -There could no longer be any doubt that she meant to fight, and the -duel now ensued that has been so happily described by a gifted naval -writer, the late Fred T. Jane, as "the Battle of the Haystacks." -To my idea, it appears almost a replica of the frigate actions of -bygone days, and will probably go down in history as a parallel to -the engagement fought between the _Chesapeake_ and _Shannon_. For -gallantry, pluck and determination it certainly bears comparison with -many of these actions of the past. - -About noon she fired a single shot across the enemy's bows at a -range of 8,500 yards, whereupon he immediately opened fire from his -after-gun on the starboard side. This was quickly followed on both -sides by salvoes (all guns firing nearly simultaneously as soon as -their sights came on to the target), so matters at once became lively. - -Curiously enough, the enemy's first few shots fell short, ricocheting -over, and then, as the range decreased, they went clean over the -hull, in consequence of which our rigging, masts, funnels, derricks, -and ventilators all suffered, though the ship's side near the -waterline--the principal anxiety--was so far intact. Some of the -_Carmania's_ first shots, which were fired at a range of 7,500 -yards, were seen to take effect, and she continued to score hits -afterwards with moderate frequency. The port battery was engaging -his starboard guns at this period, so that he was on her port hand, -and a reference to the plan will show that she was ahead on bearing. -The range was rapidly decreasing since they were both on converging -courses, but unfortunately the German ship had the speed of her, for -the Cunarder could only do 16 knots, due largely to a lack of vacuum -in the condensers. As far as could be judged the _Cap Trafalgar_ was -steaming between 17 and 18 knots. (_See_ Diagram, p. 39.) - -At 4,500 yards, two of our broadsides were seen to hit all along the -waterline. As the range decreased to 4,000 yards the shot from the -enemy's pom-poms (machine guns), fired with great rapidity, began -to fall like hail on and all round the ship; this induced Captain -Grant to alter course away with promptitude, thus opening out -the range and bringing the starboard battery into play. The port -4.7-inch guns--they were all over twenty years old--were by this time -wellnigh red-hot. That the enemy did not apprehend this manœuvre was -demonstrated by his erratic fire at this moment, when the Britisher -was enabled to bring five guns into action to his four through being -able to use both the stern guns. It was now that the German suffered -most heavily, the havoc wrought in such a short time being very -noticeable. He then turned away, which brought the two ships nearly -stern on to one another; two of his steam pipes were cut by shell, -the steam rising into the sky, he was well on fire forward, and had a -list to starboard. - -[Illustration: (Diagram of action between 'CARMANIA' and 'CAP -TRAFALGAR'.) - - The Mappa Co. Ltd London -] - -One of his shells, however, had passed through the captain's cabin -under the fore bridge, and although it did not burst it started a -fire, which rapidly became worse; unhappily no water was available to -put it out, for the fire main was shot through, while the chemical -fire extinguishers proved of little use. All water had to be carried -by hand, but luckily the fire was prevented from spreading over the -ship by a steel bulkhead, together with an ordinary fire-proof swing -door, which was afterwards found to be all charred on one side. -Nevertheless it got a firm hold of the deck above, which broke into -flame, so the fore-bridge had to be abandoned. The ship had now to -be steered from the stern, and all orders had to be shouted down by -megaphone both to the engine rooms and to this new steering position -in the bowels of the ship, which was connected up and in operation in -fifty-seven seconds! To reduce the effect of the fire the vessel was -kept before the wind, which necessitated turning right round again, -so that the fight resolved itself into a chase. - -The action was continued by the gun-layers, the fire-control position -being untenable due to the fire, so each gun had to be worked and -fired independently under the direction of its own officer. Among -the ammunition supply parties there had been several casualties and -the officers, finding it impossible to "spot" the fall of the shell, -owing to the flashes from the enemy's guns obscuring their view from -so low an elevation, lent a hand in carrying the ammunition from the -hoists to the guns. In these big liners the upper deck, where the -guns are mounted, is approximately 70 feet above the holds, whence -the ammunition has to be hoisted and then carried by hand to the -guns--a particularly arduous task. - -Crossing, as it were, the enemy was at this time well on the -starboard bow, but firing was continued until the distance was over -9,000 yards, the maximum range of the _Carmania's_ guns. Owing to -his superior speed and a slight divergence between the courses, the -distance was gradually increasing all the time, and at 1.30 he was -out of range. His list had now visibly increased, and his speed began -to diminish, probably on account of the inrush of water through his -coaling ports. It was surmised that there had not been sufficient -time to secure these properly, for he had evidently been coaling at -the time she arrived upon the scene. - -Towards the end the _Cap Trafalgar's_ fire had begun to slacken, -though one of her guns continued to fire to the last, in spite of -the fact that she was out of range. It became patent that she -was doomed, and her every movement was eagerly watched through -field-glasses for some minutes by those not occupied in quenching -the fire. Suddenly the great vessel heeled right over; her funnels -being almost parallel to the surface of the sea, looked just like two -gigantic cannon as they pointed towards the _Carmania_; an instant -later she went down by the bows, the stern remaining poised in -mid-air for a few seconds, and then she abruptly disappeared out of -sight at 1.50 P.M., the duel having lasted an hour and forty minutes. - -There were no two opinions about the good fight she had put up, and -all were loud in their praise of the gallant conduct of the Germans. - -One of the enemy's colliers was observed approaching this scene of -desolation in order to pick up survivors, some of whom had got away -from the sinking ship in her boats. The collier had been flying the -United States ensign, evidently as a ruse, in the hope that the -_Carmania_ might be induced to let her pass without stopping her -for examination. It was, however, impossible to interfere with her -owing to the fire that was still raging in the fore part of the ship. -This kept our men at work trying to get it under, and necessitated -keeping the ship running before the wind, the direction of which did -not permit of approaching the spot in order to attempt to pick up -survivors. - -Smoke was now seen away to the northward, and the signalman reported -that he thought he could make out the funnels of a cruiser. As the -_Cap Trafalgar_, before sinking, had been in wireless communication -with some German vessel, it was apprehended that one might be -coming to her assistance. As the _Carmania_ was totally unfit for -further action, it was deemed advisable to avoid the risk of another -engagement, so she steamed off at full speed in a southerly direction. - -As soon as the collier and all that remained of the wreckage of the -_Cap Trafalgar_ was lost to view the gallant Cunarder was turned -to the north-westward in the direction of the anchorage. She was -unseaworthy, nearly all her navigational instruments and all the -communications to the engines were destroyed, making the steering and -navigation of the ship difficult and uncertain. When wireless touch -was established, the _Cornwall_ was called up and asked to meet and -escort her in. But as she had only just started coaling she asked the -_Bristol_ to take her place. The next day the _Bristol_, which was in -the vicinity, took the _Carmania_ along until relieved the same night -by the _Cornwall_, which escorted her on to the base, where temporary -repairs were effected. - -One of the enemy's shells was found to have passed through three -thicknesses of steel plating without exploding, but in spite of this -it set fire to some bedding which caused the conflagration under -the fore bridge. Where projectiles had struck solid iron, such as -a winch, splinters of the latter were to be seen scattered in all -directions. The ship was hit seventy-nine times, causing no fewer -than 304 holes. - -There were 38 casualties. Five men were killed outright, 4 -subsequently died from wounds, 5 were seriously wounded and 22 -wounded--most of the latter were only slightly injured. All the -casualties occurred on deck, chiefly among the guns' crews and -ammunition supply parties. No one below was touched, but a third of -those employed on deck were hit. - - -The following remarks may be of interest, and are taken from the -author's letters, written on September 16th, after having been shown -over the _Carmania_: - -"When I went on board this morning, I was greatly struck by the few -fatal casualties considering the number of holes here, there, and -everywhere. Not a single part of the upper deck could be crossed -without finding holes. A remarkable fact was that only one officer, -Lieutenant Murray, R.N.R., was hurt or damaged in any way, although -the officers were in the most exposed positions, and the enemy's -point of aim appeared to be the fore bridge. - -"They had only three active service ratings on board; some of the -gunlayers were old men, pensioners from the Navy. - -"One of the senior officers told me that the first few rounds made -him feel 'a bit dickey,' but that after that he took no notice of the -bigger shells, though, curiously enough, he thoroughly objected to -the smaller pom-poms which were 'most irritating.' He added that the -men fought magnificently, and that the firemen worked 'like hell.' As -flames and smoke from the fire on deck descended to the stokeholds by -the ventilators instead of cool air, the states of things down below -may easily be imagined. - -"One chronometer was found to be going in spite of the wooden box -which contained it having been burnt. - -"The deeds of heroism were many. - -"I liked the story of the little bugler boy, who had no more to -do once the action had commenced, so he stood by one of the guns -refusing to go under cover. As the gun fired he shouted: 'That's one -for the blighters!' And again: 'There's another for the beggars--go -it!' smacking the gunshield the while with his hand. - -"Again one of the gunlayers, who lost his hand and also one leg -during the engagement, insisted upon being held up when the German -ship sank, so as to be able to cheer. I talked to him, and he waggled -his stump at me quite cheerily and said, 'It was well worth losing an -arm for.' - -"It is good to feel that the spirit of our forefathers is still -active in time of need." - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -THE ACTION OFF CORONEL - - "Then let him roll - His galleons round the little Golden Hynde, - Bring her to bay, if he can, on the high seas, - Ring us about with thousands, we'll not yield, - I and my Golden Hynde, we will go down, - With flag still flying on the last stump left us - And all my cannon spitting the fires - Of everlasting scorn into his face." - - --ALFRED NOYES (_Drake_). - - -The wanderings of the German squadron in the Pacific have been -briefly traced as far as Easter Island, where it arrived on October -12th, 1914, and found the _Dresden_. The _Leipzig_, which had been -chased from pillar to post by British and Japanese cruisers, and -succeeded in eluding them, joined up shortly after to the relief of -the German Admiral. - -The contractor at Easter Island, an Englishman named Edwards, -who supplied the Germans with fresh meat and vegetables, was a -ranch-owner, and had no idea that war had even been declared. One -of his men, in taking off provisions to the ships, discovered this -amazing fact, which had carefully been kept secret, and informed -his master. The account was not settled in cash, but by a bill made -payable at Valparaiso. The German squadron sailed for Mas-a-Fuera -a week later, so the ranch-owner took the earliest opportunity of -sending in his bill to Valparaiso, where it was duly honoured, vastly -to his astonishment and relief. - -For the reasons already adduced, it seemed almost certain that -Admiral von Spee would make his way round South America. That there -was a possibility of his descending upon Vancouver and attacking -the naval dockyard of Esquimalt is acknowledged, but it was so -remote as to be scarcely worthy of serious consideration. The three -Japanese cruisers, _Idzuma_, _Hizen_, and _Asama_, were understood -to be in the eastern Pacific at this time, and this was probably -known to the German Admiral. The risk, too, that he must inevitably -run in attacking a locality known to possess submarines was quite -unjustifiable; besides, he had little to gain and everything to lose -through the delay that must ensue from adopting such a policy. - -The vessels engaged in the action off Coronel, with their armament, -etc., were:[5] - - _Names_ _Tonnage_ _Armament_ _Speed_ _Completion_ - - _Good Hope_ 14,100 2--9.2" 23.5 1902 - 16--6" - _Monmouth_ 9,800 14--6" 23.3 1903 - _Glasgow_ 4,800 2--6" 25.8 1910 - 10--4" - _Otranto_ (armed 12,000 8--4.7" 18 1909 - liner) gross - - Speed of squadron 18 knots. - - _Names_ _Tonnage_ _Armament_ _Speed_ _Completion_ - - _Scharnhorst_ 11,420 8--8.2" 22.5 1908 - 6--5.9" - 20--3.4" - _Gneisenau_ 11,420 8--8.2" 23.8 1908 - 6--5.9" - 20--3.4" - _Leipzig_ 3,200 10--4.1" 23 1906 - _Dresden_ 3,544 12--4.1" 27 1908 - 4--2.1" - _Nürnberg_ 3,396 10--4.1" 23.5 1908 - 8--2.1" - Speed of squadron 22.5 knots. - -It will be noticed that our two armoured cruisers were respectively -six and five years older than the Germans'. Our armament was much -inferior in size, number, and quality on account of the later -designs of the enemy's artillery. The range of the German 4.1-inch -guns was _nearly equal to that of our 6-inch guns_. But perhaps the -greatest point in favour of the enemy was the fact that Cradock's -ships, with the exception of the _Glasgow_, were only commissioned -at the outbreak of war, and had had such continuous steaming that -no really good opportunity for gunnery practices or for testing the -organisation thoroughly had been possible, whilst von Spee's had -been in commission for over two years and had highly trained crews, -accustomed to their ships. - -The following account has been compiled from personal information -received from officers who took part, from letters that have appeared -in the Press, from a translation that has been published of Admiral -von Spee's official report, and from the official report made by -Captain Luce of the _Glasgow_. - -Admiral Cradock, as we have seen, joined the remainder of his little -squadron with the exception of the _Canopus_ off the coast of Chile -on October 29th. The latter was following at her best speed. The -squadron proceeded northwards, whilst the _Glasgow_ was detached to -Coronel to send telegrams, a rendezvous being fixed for her to rejoin -at 1 P.M. on November 1st. - -No authentic news of the movements of the Germans was available at -this time; in fact, the last time that von Spee's squadron had been -definitely heard of was when it appeared off Papeete and bombarded -the town toward the end of September. That the enemy might be -encountered at any moment was of course fully realised, but it was -hoped that either the _Dresden_ and _Leipzig_ or the main squadron -might be brought to action separately, before they were able to -join forces. Time was everything if this was to be brought about, -so Admiral Cradock pushed on without delay. The anxiety to obtain -news of a reliable character may be imagined, but only the vaguest -of rumours, one contradicting the other, were forthcoming. Reports -showed that the German merchant shipping in the neighbourhood were -exhibiting unwonted signs of energy in loading coal and stores, -but this gave no certain indication of the proximity of the entire -squadron. - -Rejoining the British squadron at sea on November 1st, the _Glasgow_ -communicated with the _Good Hope_. Our ships had recently been -hearing Telefunken[6] signals on their wireless, which was proof -that one or more enemy warships were close at hand. About 2 P.M., -therefore, the Admiral signalled the squadron to spread on a line -bearing N.E. by E. from the _Good Hope_, which steered N.W. by N. at -10 knots. Ships were ordered to open to a distance of fifteen miles -apart at a speed of 15 knots, the _Monmouth_ being nearest to the -flagship, the _Otranto_ next, and then the _Glasgow_, which was thus -nearest the coast. - -[Illustration: DIAGRAM I. (Enemy sighted) 4.20 p.m.] - -There was not sufficient time to execute this manœuvre, and when -smoke was suddenly sighted at 4.20 P.M. to the eastward of the -_Otranto_ and _Glasgow_, these two ships were still close together -and about four miles from the _Monmouth_. The _Glasgow_ went ahead to -investigate and made out three German warships, which at once turned -towards her. The Admiral was over twenty miles, distant and out of -sight, and had to be informed as soon as possible, so the _Glasgow_ -returned at full speed, warning him by wireless, which the Germans -endeavoured to jam, that the enemy was in sight. - -The squadron reformed at full speed on the flagship, _who had altered -course to the southward_, and by 5.47 P.M. had got into single -line-ahead in the order: _Good Hope_, _Monmouth_, _Glasgow_, and -_Otranto_. The enemy, in similar formation, was about twelve miles -off. - -For the better understanding of the movements which follow, it may be -stated that the ideal of a naval artillerist is a good target--that -is, a clear and well defined object which is plainly visible through -the telescopic gunsights; the wind in the right direction, relative -to the engaged side, so that smoke does not blow across the guns, -and no sudden alterations of course, to throw out calculations. -The tactics of a modern naval action are in a large measure based -on these ideals, at any rate according to the view of the gunnery -specialist. - -It is evident that it was Admiral Cradock's intention to close in -and force action at short range as quickly as possible, in order -that the enemy might be handicapped by the rays of the lowering sun, -which would have been behind our ships, rendering them a very poor -target for the Germans as the squadrons drew abeam of one another. -He therefore altered course inwards towards the enemy, but von Spee -was either too wary or too wise, for he says in his report that he -turned away to a southerly course after 5.35, thus declining action, -which the superior speed of his squadron enabled him to do at his -pleasure. The wind was south (right ahead), and it was blowing very -fresh, so that a heavy head sea was encountered, which made all -ships--especially the light-cruisers--pitch and roll considerably. It -seems very doubtful whether the _Good Hope_ and _Monmouth_ were able -to use their main deck guns, and it is certain that they could not -have been of any value. This would mean that these two ships could -only fire two 9.2-inch and ten 6-inch guns on the broadside between -them, instead of their whole armament of two 9.2-inch and seventeen -6-inch guns. - -[Illustration: DIAGRAM II 6.40 p.m.] - -There was little daylight left when Admiral Cradock tried to close -the Germans, hoping that they would accept his challenge in view of -their superior strength. - -At 6.18 Admiral Cradock increased speed to 17 knots, making a -wireless message to the _Canopus_, "I am about to attack enemy now." -Both squadrons were now on parallel courses approximately, steering -south, and about 7½ miles apart. A second light cruiser joined the -German line about this period; according to von Spee's report the -_Scharnhorst_ was leading, followed by the _Gneisenau_, _Leipzig_, -and _Dresden_. - -As the sun sank below the horizon (about 6.50 P.M.) the conditions -of light became reversed to our complete disadvantage; our ships -were now lit up by the glow of the sunset, the enemy being gradually -enshrouded in a misty haze as the light waned. Admiral Cradock's -last hope of averting defeat must have vanished as he watched the -enemy turning away; at the best he could only expect to damage and -thus delay the enemy, while it was impossible to withdraw. He had no -choice but to hold on and do his best, trusting in Providence to aid -him. In judging what follows it should be kept in mind that in the -declining light even the outlines of the enemy's ships rapidly became -obliterated, making it quite impossible to see the fall of our shots -in order to correct the range on the gunsights; on the other hand, -our ships showed up sharply against the western horizon and still -provided good targets for the German gunners. Von Spee in his report -says his "guns' crews on the middle decks were never able to see the -sterns of their opponents, and only occasionally their bows." This -certainly implies that the upper deck gunners could see quite well, -whilst we have information from Captain Luce's report that our ships -were unable to see the enemy early in the action, and were firing at -the flashes of his guns. - -Accordingly, as soon as the sun disappeared, von Spee lost no time -in approaching our squadron, and opened fire at 7.4 at a range of -12,000 yards. Our ships at once followed suit with the exception -of the _Otranto_, whose old guns did not admit of her competing -against men-of-war at this distance. The German Admiral apparently -endeavoured to maintain this range, so as to reap the full advantage -of his newer and heavier armament, for the two 9.2-inch guns in the -_Good Hope_ were the only ones in the whole of our squadron that -were effective at this distance with the possible exception of the -two modern 6-inch guns in the _Glasgow_. Von Spee had, of course, -calculated this out, and took care not to close until our armoured -cruisers were _hors de combat_. - -The Germans soon found the range, their fire proving very accurate, -which was to be expected in view of the reputation of the -_Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ for good shooting--the former had -won the gold medal for the best average. These armoured cruisers -concentrated their fire entirely on our two leading ships, doing -considerable execution. In addition, they had a great stroke of luck, -for in the first ten minutes of the engagement a shell struck the -fore turret of the _Good Hope_, putting that 9.2-inch out of action. -The _Monmouth_ was apparently hit several times in rapid succession, -for she was forced to haul out of the line to the westward, and her -forecastle was seen to be burning furiously, but she continued to -return the enemy's fire valiantly. This manœuvre caused her to drop -astern, and compelled the _Glasgow_, who now followed on after the -_Good Hope_, to ease speed to avoid getting into the zone of fire -intended for the _Monmouth_. - -It was now growing dark, but this did not deter both squadrons from -continuing to blaze away as hard as they could; in fact, the fight -was at its height; the German projectiles were falling all round -and about our ships, causing several fires which lit them up with a -ghostly hue. The heavy artillery of the enemy was doing great damage, -and it was evident that both the _Good Hope_ and _Monmouth_ were in -a bad way; the former sheered over unsteadily towards the Germans, -returning their fire spasmodically, whilst the latter had a slight -list and from her erratic movements gave the impression that her -steering arrangements had been damaged. The results of our shooting -could not be distinguished with accuracy, though von Spee mentions -that the _Scharnhorst_ found a 6-inch shell in one of her storerooms, -which had penetrated the side and caused a deal of havoc below but -did not burst, and also that one funnel was hit. The _Gneisenau_ had -two men wounded, and sustained slight damage. - -At 7.50 P.M. a sight of the most appalling splendour arrested -everyone, as if spellbound, in his tussle with death. An enormous -sheet of flame suddenly burst from the _Good Hope_, lighting up the -whole heavens for miles around. This was accompanied by the noise -of a terrific explosion, which hurled up wreckage and sparks at -least a couple of hundred feet in the air from her after funnels. A -lucky shot had penetrated one of her magazines. "It reminded me of -Vesuvius in eruption," said a seaman in describing this spectacle. -It was now pitch dark, making it impossible for the opposing vessels -to distinguish one another. The _Good Hope_ was never heard to fire -her guns again, and could not have long survived such a terrible -explosion, though no one saw her founder. - -The moon had risen about 6.30 P.M. and was now well up, but it was -too overcast to see much. According to von Spee the squadrons had -closed in to about 5,400 yards, which caused him to sheer off, -fearing torpedo attack. It seems certain that although firing was -continued it could not have been effective, for three minutes -after the _Good Hope_ blew up the Germans ceased fire altogether. -Shortly afterwards von Spee ordered the _Leipzig_, _Dresden_, and -_Nürnberg_--the last-named having joined the squadron during the -action--to make a torpedo attack. - -The _Monmouth_ ceased firing just before the explosion on board the -_Good Hope_, and was then steering roughly N.W. It was clear she was -on her last legs, as her list had increased and she was down by the -bows. She now suddenly altered course to the N.E. in the direction -of the oncoming enemy. Captain Luce was senior naval officer, being -senior to Captain Brandt, of the _Monmouth_. He saw the Germans -approaching and signalled the _Monmouth_ at 8.30, "Enemy following -us," but received no reply. Clearly there was no alternative left -him but to save his ship, if he was not to make a needless sacrifice -of his men, as it was obvious that he could be of no further -assistance to his doomed consort. In addition, it was essential that -the _Canopus_ should be warned in time to avert a further calamity, -a task not so simple as it sounds, for the Germans were jamming -our wireless messages. It is said that when last seen the gallant -_Monmouth_ turned and made straight for the enemy in a heroic attempt -to ram one of their ships. Von Spee reports that the _Nürnberg_ sank -the _Monmouth_ at 9.28 P.M. by bombardment at point-blank range; this -accounts for the seventy-five flashes of gunfire as well as the play -of the beams of a search-light, which were observed by the _Glasgow_ -after leaving the scene of action. It must have been brutal work. - -Thus perished Admiral Cradock together with 1,600 gallant officers -and men. In fairness to the Germans it should be stated that our own -officers considered it too rough for boats to be lowered with any -safety. - -The _Glasgow_ had been subjected to the combined fire of the -_Leipzig_ and _Dresden_, whose gunnery was fortunately not very -effective owing to the long range maintained between the two -squadrons before the light failed. That she had withstood this -combined onslaught for fifty-two minutes (von Spee's report) was -remarkable, but that she had suffered no material damage was little -short of a miracle. Her casualties amounted to four men slightly -wounded. She was hit five times, on or near the water line, but not -in vital places. The protection afforded by the coal in her bunkers -saved her on three occasions, as otherwise in the nasty sea running -at the time she would have found herself in a very precarious -position. Of the remaining two hits, one penetrated the deck but did -not explode, while the other wrecked the captain's pantry and cabin. -There was one large hole, which luckily did not prevent her eluding -her pursuers at high speed by steering out to the W.N.W., and thence -in a wide circle to the southward to the Magellan Straits, finally -arriving at Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands. - -At the outset of the engagement the _Good Hope_ made a signal down -the line to the _Otranto_, the only words received being, "Leaving -_Otranto_." The latter, therefore, hauled out to endeavour to get -this signal direct from the flagship, but as the _Good Hope_ had -been badly hit, nothing further was received. As projectiles were -falling all round her, and it was realised that the _Otranto_, being -a large ship, would be used by the enemy as a rangefinder to enable -him to calculate the distance of the _Glasgow_, she hauled out still -farther to upset the accuracy of his gun-fire. The enemy proceeded -to carry this method of ranging into effect; the first salvo passed -over the _Otranto's_ bridge, the second missed the bows by 50 yards, -the third fell 150 yards astern, while others which followed fell, -some over, some short. By this time she had worked out of the line -about 1,200 yards, so turned to the same course, as far as could be -judged, as the remainder of the squadron. She was now out of range. -The _Otranto_ ran the gauntlet of the enemy's most successfully, -since she emerged from this storm of shell quite unscathed, but it -must have been touch and go. Moreover--and hardest of all--she had to -submit to this treatment without being in a position to retaliate. -After the flagship blew up, nothing was seen of the _Monmouth_; -subsequently the _Glasgow_ was reported crossing her stern. Seeing -that she could be of no assistance, the _Otranto_ dodged her -opponents by straining full speed to the westward for 200 miles, and -thence to the southward. Rounding Cape Horn, she passed between -the Falklands and the mainland and arrived at Montevideo. Both she -and the _Glasgow_ must have accounted themselves most fortunate in -escaping safely from this unequal contest. - -The _Canopus_, which had been steaming northward with two colliers, -intercepted a wireless message from the _Glasgow_ to the _Good Hope_ -reporting the enemy in sight. She immediately increased to her full -speed, dispatching the colliers to Juan Fernandez, and proceeded -on her course northward in the hope that she would arrive in time -to engage the enemy. About 9 P.M. she received a signal from the -_Glasgow_ that it was feared the _Good Hope_ and _Monmouth_ had been -sunk, and that the squadron was scattered. Seeing the hopelessness of -continuing on her course, the _Canopus_ turned round, picked up her -colliers, and made for the Magellan Straits via Smyth's Channel, the -successful navigation of which reflects great credit, since she was -probably the first battleship ever to make use of it. By this means -she succeeded in reaching Port Stanley without molestation, although -the German ships were constantly in close proximity. - -Admiral Cradock appears to have had definite orders to prevent the -enemy coming round to the east coast of America. The _Canopus_ was -only 120 miles away when he met the enemy. But had the Admiral -waited for her the Germans might have slipped past him during the -night, and, moreover, her slow speed would have seriously hampered -the mobility of his squadron. Speaking of Admiral Cradock, Sir Henry -Newbolt[7] says, "He had asked for reinforcements, and the Admiralty -had sent him what they thought sufficient. It was not for him to hold -back." - -The advantages of speed and modern guns of superior range were -perhaps the outstanding features of the Coronel action. It was not -the vain sacrifice which at first sight it might appear to be, as it -probably saved our ships operating on the east coast of South America -from a similar fate. - -Admiral Cradock carried out unflinchingly his search for a force -which he knew would almost certainly be superior to his own. His -unhesitating acceptance of the action and the gallantry of the fight -uphold the finest traditions of the Royal Navy, and will always be -recalled by it with pride. Surely, before God and man, such deeds of -heroism go far to mitigate the infamy of war. - - "At set of sun, - Even as below the sea-line the broad disc - Sank like a red-hot cannon-ball through surf - Of seething molten lead, the _Santa Maria_, - Uttering one cry that split the heart of heaven, - Went down with all hands, roaring into the dark." - - ALFRED NOYES (_Drake_). - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -CONCENTRATION - - "And Drake growled, ... - ... 'So, lest they are not too slow - To catch us, clear the decks. God, I would like - To fight them!'" - - --ALFRED NOYES (_Drake_). - - -Several disquieting wireless messages were received by the British -warships on the east coast of South America, giving garbled and -unreliable accounts of the Coronel action. It was not till November -5th that a statement which appeared to be fairly authoritative, in -spite of its German origin, was received from Valparaiso. It said -that the _Monmouth_ was sunk and that the _Good Hope_ had probably -shared her fate; no mention was made of the _Canopus_, _Glasgow_, or -_Otranto_. - -The command in these waters now devolved upon Rear-Admiral Stoddart -(flying his flag in the _Carnarvon_), who was still busily engaged -in the search for the _Karlsruhe_. His ships had been operating -over a wide area extending from the neighbourhood of Rio de Janeiro -to the northward of St. Paul's Rocks and the Rocas, and thence to -the westward along the north coast of South America. This otherwise -fruitless search achieved one notable result in compelling the -_Karlsruhe_ to abandon her system of obtaining supplies through -German storeships coming from Pernambuco, as that port was kept -under rigid observation. She was thus forced to leave the trade -route between Great Britain and South America for longer periods in -order to meet her consort, the armed liner _Kronprinz Wilhelm_, who -now became a link between her and her sources of supply in Central -America. There was, in consequence, a marked falling off at this -period in the number of her captures. - -Assuming that the worst had happened, and that the German squadron -was now on its way round to the east coast, it became imperative to -unite our remaining ships into one squadron as quickly as possible. -It was obvious that with the Australian and Japanese ships behind -them, the Germans could not afford to linger where they were; -moreover, they had learned at Valparaiso that we had no naval force -of any preponderance with which to oppose them. Flushed with their -recent victory, it seemed probable that if they were not much damaged -they would most likely hasten their movements in the hope of meeting -our ships before we had had time to unite or to gather reinforcements. - -The German squadron would not be able to separate with any safety -once we had succeeded in joining together our scattered forces, -so that the damage they might do to our commerce would be thereby -reduced to a minimum. - -For these reasons it will be seen that the River Plate was admirably -situated for the rendezvous of our ships that had escaped from -Coronel to the Falklands, and of the northern squadron. Again, it -was possible to coal there without infringing territorial rights, -as there is an excellent anchorage well outside the three mile limit -from the foreshore. - -The following calculations, written on November 6th, 1914, were made -by the author: - -"The German Admiral will expect us to get reinforcements out from -England, so that it seems probable that he will lose no time in -coming round to the east coast. - -"He arrived at Valparaiso on November 3rd. Supposing he coals there -and leaves at earliest on November 4th, the distance from Valparaiso -to the Plate is roughly 2,600 miles, or nine days at 12 knots; -therefore, allowing one day for coaling _en route_, the earliest that -he could be off the Plate would be the 13th, more likely not before -November 15th." - -The strategical aspect in this sphere of operations was completely -changed by the success of the German squadron off Cape Coronel, and -necessitated not only a complete change of plans, but also an entire -redistribution of our ships. These consisted of the _Carnarvon_, -_Cornwall_, _Bristol_, _Macedonia_, and _Edinburgh Castle_, also the -_Defence_ and _Orama_, who were near Montevideo, and the _Canopus_, -_Glasgow_, and _Otranto_. - -Admiral Stoddart, therefore, decided to go south to Montevideo at -once in order to meet the remainder of our scattered ships. The -_Bristol_, _Macedonia_, and _Edinburgh Castle_ were left to continue -the search for the _Karlsruhe_, although as a matter of fact she had -blown up on November 4th. Colliers were sent down south to Montevideo -to be in readiness for our ships, and were ordered to sail at -twelve-hour intervals to diminish the chance of capture. - -The _Carnarvon_ and _Cornwall_ left the base on November 6th, the -former calling at Rio de Janeiro on the way for telegrams. Arriving -at the Plate on the 10th, where we found the _Defence_ and _Orama_, -the Admiral immediately transferred his flag to the former ship, -which was the newest and most powerful of our cruisers. All ships -filled up with coal and awaited the arrival of the _Glasgow_ and -_Otranto_; meanwhile, patrols were constantly maintained at the mouth -of the river. - -The following evening the _Glasgow_ arrived amidst congratulations -from us all; she had put in to the Falkland Islands to coal, in which -assistance was provided by volunteers from amongst the inhabitants. -After coaling, she was detached to Rio de Janeiro to go into dry -dock, so that the damage to her side might be properly repaired. The -same day the _Orama_, whilst patrolling, met and sank the German -storeship _Navarra_ which was set on fire by the Germans when escape -was seen to be impossible. We also got the cheering news that the -_Emden_ had been sunk and that the _Königsberg_ had been bottled up, -tidings which augured well for the future. - -The Admiralty seem to have had a premonition that the Germans -intended to attack the Falklands for the _Canopus_, although on her -way north to Montevideo, was ordered back to the Falkland Islands in -order to fortify and arm the harbour of Port Stanley in co-operation -with the local volunteers, converting herself into a floating fort. - -The possibility of our encountering and having to fight von Spee was -the subject uppermost in all minds at this time, and led to a great -deal of discussion. The outstanding feature in the situation was the -extraordinary lack of homogeneity of the composition of our squadron. -It consisted of three armoured cruisers of entirely different -classes, each carrying a different armament, one light cruiser and -four armed merchantmen. The latter could not, of course, be pitted -against warships even of the light-cruiser type, and therefore had to -be left out of the reckoning. Amongst the four fighting ships there -were four descriptions of guns, viz. two 9.2-inch, fourteen 7.5-inch, -twenty-two 6-inch, and ten 4-inch, while the German squadron had -only three descriptions, viz. sixteen 8.2-inch, twelve 5.9-inch, -and thirty-two 4.1-inch. A prominent question, therefore, was what -range we should endeavour to maintain during an action; the answer to -which was very varied, preference being given to ranges from 14,000 -yards downwards. From the gunnery point of view the enemy undoubtedly -held an advantage, as not only was his squadron more homogeneous, -having only two classes of ships, but also the range of his guns was -greater. As regards speed, there was nothing to choose between the -two squadrons, who were evenly matched in this respect. Much would -depend upon whether he would choose to keep his squadron together -for the purpose of an action or to disperse them on reaching the -east coast. Opinions on this and on many other points were divided. -All were agreed, however, that we ought to give a good account of -ourselves. - -The wildest reports about von Spee's movements were constantly -received from Chilean and other sources. Whilst at Montevideo rumours -were circulated that the German ships had been seen coming round Cape -Horn. - -The Admiralty now informed Admiral Stoddart that reinforcements were -being sent out from England at once; they had actually started just -after our arrival at the Plate. The secret of this news was well -kept, not an inkling leaking out at home or abroad--a fact which -contributed very largely to our subsequent victory. It was decided, -therefore, to return northwards in order to effect a junction with -the two battle-cruisers that were on their way out. The squadron -sailed on November 12th, spread out in line abreast, and put in some -useful exercises on the way. Arriving at the base five days later, -we found the _Kent_, which was expected as we had heard that she was -being sent out to reinforce us; she had brought a mail, which made -her doubly welcome. The _Bristol_ and _Edinburgh Castle_ rejoined, -but the latter was ordered off northwards on other service, and -sailed on November 19th, taking a mail for England. It was blazing -hot, but the next few days passed quickly enough in carrying out -gunnery practices, patrolling, and coaling ship, during which the -_Glasgow_ returned from Rio, spick and span. - -Most of November was a time of some suspense for our ships, as we -were hourly expecting an encounter with the enemy, and it was with -mixed feelings that we learned of the nature of the reinforcements -that were coming out with such despatch. Our feelings of relief were -also tempered with regret at not having been afforded an opportunity -to prove our mettle. Further, there was an awful and terrible thought -that it might be considered necessary to leave one of us cruisers -behind to guard the base. - -Most of our ships had had steam on their main engines incessantly -since war broke out, and a rest to let fires out so as to make -necessary adjustments was badly needed, but was quite impossible near -a neutral coast. - -On November 26th our hearts were gladdened by the sight of the -_Invincible_, bearing the flag of Vice-Admiral Sturdee, and the -_Inflexible_; these two formidable-looking ships had come out from -England at a mean speed of over 18 knots for fifteen days. Truly a -fine performance! - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -POSSIBILITIES AND PROBABILITIES - - -The various possible courses open to Admiral Count von Spee, both -before and after Coronel, have already been discussed, but the -movements of his squadron have not been subjected to examination in -the light that they bear on the policy which he adopted, nor have the -results of that action been considered from his point of view. - -The German squadron sailed from Mas-a-Fuera on October 27th, and -three days later arrived about noon at a position some fifty miles -to the westward of Valparaiso, where it remained for upwards of -twenty-four hours. On October 31st--the same day that the _Glasgow_ -went into Coronel with telegrams and the day before that action -was fought--the squadron steamed off south, leaving the _Nürnberg_ -to wait off Valparaiso for a few hours and probably to get -information of importance. The German Admiral undoubtedly went to the -neighbourhood of Valparaiso with the express intention of obtaining -news and was in communication with the shore, for he begins his -official report on the action fought off Coronel by saying that his -three light cruisers reached on November 1st a point about twenty -"sea miles from the Chilean coast, in order to attack a British -cruiser (_Glasgow_), which, according to trustworthy information, had -reached the locality on the previous evening." - -It is, of course, impossible to know what were von Spee's intentions -at this moment; they can only be surmised from a general survey of -the situation and the means that he had of obtaining information. The -latter was acquired by an organised system, for there were German -agents in every South American port. It may be taken as certain that -any ship calling at or passing Punta Arenas (Magellan Straits) would -be reported to him, and that the names of the ships and certain of -their movements on the south-east coast would also be known to him. - -Easter Island--which was von Spee's original base--is approximately -2,300 miles from Valparaiso, and therefore out of range of wireless -communication, although it is possible he might occasionally be able -to take in a message under favourable conditions. However, it is -known from an officer survivor of the _Gneisenau_ that on October -19th the German Admiral received a message--possibly through a German -supply ship--stating that a British Squadron consisting of "_Good -Hope_, _Monmouth_, and _Glasgow_ was to the south." Now we know that -this squadron was at Punta Arenas on September 28th, and leaving on -that date was employed searching inlets and bays round Tierra del -Fuego for some days. The _Good Hope_ then returned to the Falklands, -finally leaving them on October 22nd, whilst the others went on to -the coast of Chile and were there from October 11th onwards, making -use of a sequestered spot as a base. The _Glasgow_ was at Coronel on -October 14th and at Valparaiso the day following, so the fact of a -British Squadron being "south" was well known, though the information -did not reach von Spee till the 19th. - -On receiving this news von Spee sailed immediately. He knew he was in -superior force to Cradock's squadron, and the presumption is that he -went over to prospect and, if possible, to force an action. He went -straight to Mas-a-Fuera, only remained two days to coal, and then on -to a position off Valparaiso to pick up further information. - -Immediately on hearing that the _Glasgow_ was at Coronel on the 31st, -he proceeded south to cut her off, and, as was likely to be the case, -to meet Cradock. He must have judged that the rest of the squadron -could not be far behind the _Glasgow_. The probability was that he -received information of the _Good Hope_ passing through the Straits -about the 24th or 25th, and he might also have heard of the _Canopus_ -doing so a day or two later, in which case he would have calculated -that the latter could scarcely be so far north by this time. - -There is no indication that by this date von Spee had made up his -mind to quit the South Pacific. He had hardly had time to make his -arrangements for so doing, and there is no doubt that they were not -then completed. - -Von Spee was at his full strength, having recently added the -_Dresden_ and _Leipzig_ to the squadron while at Easter Island, he -possessed the advantage of homogeneity, and his squadron was far more -modern. The result we know, our ships were out-gunned and completely -outclassed. Fate played right into the hands of von Spee on this -occasion. - -It was undoubtedly a severe blow to British prestige in these -parts, and the Germans in all the large towns were not slow in -making the most of this temporary success in order to advance their -own interests. The rumours that were circulated caused no little -perturbation amongst the neutral shipping agents, who feared that von -Spee would lose no time in attacking British trade, and that those -cargoes which were consigned to Great Britain would be in jeopardy. -Insurance rates rose with a bound, and it is said that the Germans -went about openly deriding the British and causing the most fantastic -articles to be inserted in the local Press. The exaggerated reports -that were published, both of the action and of its effects, certainly -lends colour to this source of information. - -It will be interesting to consider what von Spee would have done if -he had missed Admiral Cradock and the action off Coronel had not -been fought. In view of his superior speed, von Spee would in all -probability have continued on his southerly course and rounded Cape -Horn, leaving Admiral Cradock behind him. There seem to be grounds -for supposing that he might go to the Cape of Good Hope, but the -campaign in German South West Africa could scarcely be said to be -progressing favourably for the Germans, and it is not unreasonable -to suppose he would have preferred to go north along the eastern -side of South America to harass our trade. It is legitimate to -suppose that in this case he would not have delayed to attack the -Falkland Islands, with Cradock's squadron on his heels and Stoddart's -ships converging on him from the north; in fact, it would have been -suicidal, for the wireless station there would have given our ships -warning of his approach, and the delay might have enabled our two -forces to unite. From Stoddart's squadron alone he had nothing to -fear, and most likely would have welcomed an opportunity of bringing -it to action. The presence of the _Defence_ at Montevideo would -certainly have been known to him at that time, and he would probably -have hoped to intercept her before she joined Cradock. Had all this -come to pass, the Germans might then have separated, and when it was -found that the theatre of operations in the South Atlantic became -too hot for them, they might have endeavoured to make their way home -after doing as much damage as possible to our commerce. - -As events turned out, however, von Spee waited about at sea for a day -or two after the action, apparently in the hope of either hearing -news of the _Good Hope_ or finding her. Writing at sea on November -2nd, he says, in a letter that afterwards appeared in the German -Press: "If _Good Hope_ escaped, she must, in my opinion, make for -a Chilean port on account of her damages. To make sure of this, I -intend going to Valparaiso to-morrow with _Gneisenau_ and _Nürnberg_, -and to see whether _Good Hope_ could not be disarmed by the -Chileans." Writing under date of November 5th, he adds: "We arrived -at Valparaiso this morning.... The news of our victory had not yet -reached here, but spread very quickly." The squadron split up, it -seems, arriving at different dates at Mas-a-Fuera, which became the -temporary headquarters of the German squadron for the next fortnight. -Here all ships coaled in turn. Communication was maintained by -sending the German light cruisers into Valparaiso one after the other -to get the latest information. The _Leipzig_ was there somewhere -about November 13th. This would show a proper caution on his part, -as belligerent vessels cannot use neutral ports except at extended -intervals. - -At Valparaiso von Spee must have obtained information concerning the -movements of our squadron under Admiral Stoddart, who had then just -sailed north from Montevideo. He would also have probably been aware -of the presence of the Japanese squadron operating in the Northern -Pacific. - -In order to make the position clear, it must be apprehended that -a squadron consisting of the British light cruiser _Newcastle_, -together with the Japanese cruiser _Idzuma_, and the small battleship -_Hizen_, was concentrated in the North Pacific. The battle-cruiser -_Australia_ left Suva, Fiji, on November 8th to strengthen this -squadron, so that it may be deduced that this was a direct result of -the Coronel action which took place just a week before. She joined -these ships on November 26th at Chamela Bay on the west coast of -Mexico. The object of this squadron was to prevent von Spee from -coming north, and to close on him should he remain on the western -coast of South America. Sailing southwards, these ships visited the -Galapagos Islands and then proceeded on their quest for the enemy, -the _Newcastle_ searching the Cocos Islands _en route_. When nearing -the coast of Colombia, the splendid news of the Falkland Islands -battle was received, after which these ships split up and separated. - -In view of these various courses of action open to von Spee, the -reader will appreciate how our minds were occupied with the question -of his future movements. Would he, in the hope of adding further to -his laurels, attempt to repeat his success by going into the North -Pacific to engage the Allied squadron there, which might have been -inferior to him in strength? Or would he go south and follow up -his advantage in a direction where there was nothing to oppose him -for the moment, except the _Canopus_ and _Glasgow_? He could not -hope successfully to combat all the different squadrons looking for -him, nor, for that matter, did he wish to risk his ships, for there -were no others to replace them. It was not his rôle to adopt such -an offensive. He therefore chose to give the impression that he -was remaining off Chile, and then suddenly vanished into complete -oblivion. Leaving no trace of his movements, he was careful to -forgo using all wireless; and, having completed arrangements as to -future supplies, he determined to appear suddenly where he was least -expected. History repeats itself, and he evidently decided that the -boldest plan was what would be least anticipated, and therefore most -likely to be productive of success. - -Taking another point of view, it was obviously to von Spee's -advantage to hasten round to the east coast of South America as -quickly as possible after the action off Coronel took place, and -thus to reap the full benefit of the success that he had already -gained. He could not possibly have shut his eyes to the fact that the -immediate following up of his victory was the most promising policy -for any scheme of operations in the South Atlantic. He would then -have been able to strike before reinforcements could come out from -England, which he must have been aware would be sent out to hunt him -down. Why, then, did he delay a whole month? On his own showing the -repairs necessary to render his ships fit for further service only -took a few days, and it would not take long to arrange for his future -supplies on the east coast of South America with all the German -shipping cooped up in this part of the world waiting to be put to -any useful purpose. Is it, therefore, unreasonable to suppose that -he waited in order to collect German reservists from Chile, either -to garrison the Falkland Islands once they had been captured, or -to take or escort them home to Germany? He knew that he was really -superior to the force under Admiral Stoddart, yet he delayed leaving -till November 26th, a period of nearly four weeks. The inference of -which is that he was not ready, and further that a seizure of the -Falkland Islands was deliberately contemplated and prepared for, and -was to be his first step. An additional possible explanation lies in -the deduction that he could not have estimated that he would have -defeated Cradock so completely, and therefore took time to consider -the altered situation before committing himself to a definite move, -hoping in the interval to get more information which might lead to -a further stroke of good fortune. The threat of the _Australia_ and -the Japanese squadron to the north was not sufficiently pronounced to -force him to hurry. - -We have seen that it was almost out of the question for von Spee to -maintain his ships in the Northern Pacific, but the conditions were -entirely different on the west coast of South America. Here there -were a number of uninhabited anchorages where he could shelter, and -he had a large German population to help him on the coast of Chile. -In fact, he did maintain himself here until he knew that hostile -forces were concentrating and would move south to drive him out. -Meanwhile, he had effected repairs to his ships, and had completed -arrangements in advance for the supplies of his ships on the east -coast of South America. Thus the conclusion appeared to be that there -was no alternative open to von Spee but to leave the Pacific, where -he had already shot his bolt. - -Whatever the true explanation of his policy may be, the movements -of his squadron point to his having been quite at a loss what to do -next. His position was so hazardous and uncertain, so full of future -difficulties, that he could not see his way clear for any length of -time in order to work out any concerted plan. He was a fugitive pure -and simple, and felt that whatever he did was in the nature of a -venture. - -It was not till Cradock was defeated that he appears to have -formulated his plan for attacking the Falkland Islands. He then seems -to have been carried away by the effect that the temporary capture -of a British colony and the hoisting of the German flag would have -on our prestige throughout the world. He would have destroyed the -wireless station, seized the coal and provisions lying there, and -would then have had to abandon the colony to subsequent recapture. -Had he originally contemplated such a dramatic coup, he would never -have delayed a moment longer than was necessary. - -Keeping well away from the usual trade routes, the German ships -sailed south, and on the way were lucky enough to meet the _North -Wales_, one of Cradock's colliers. They arrived at San Quintin Sound -on November 21st, coaled, and stayed five days. Thence von Spee kept -out for 200 miles from the land before turning south, and got into -very rough weather. - -An officer in the _Gneisenau_ states: - -"_November 27th_--Force of wind up to 12. Later the weather moderated -a little so that we could proceed at 8 knots. - -"_November 29th_--Impossible to lay the tables. Broken up furniture -thrown overboard. All crockery was smashed. Impossible to be on deck. -Necessary to secure oneself with ropes. We are about off the entrance -to the Magellan Straits. - -"_December 2nd_--Sighted two icebergs, appear to be 50 metres high. - -"_December 3rd_--We are lying at the eastern exit of the Beagle -Channel close to Picton Island. - -"_December 6th_--We are going to Port Stanley." - -In judging von Spee's motives, it is as well to bear in mind that he -attained no success whatsoever after Coronel except for the capture -of two sailing ships and a collier. That our squadron under Admiral -Sturdee, having only arrived the day previously, met him on his -arrival off Port Stanley, was the turn of Fortune's wheel in our -favour. - -As all the world now knows, the battle of Coronel, the greatest naval -disaster that had befallen our arms in the war, was to be avenged -five weeks afterwards, when the German squadron in its turn drank to -the dregs the bitter cup of despair. - - - - -PART II - -THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLANDS - -[Illustration: _Plan of Action of H.M.S. "CORNWALL"_ - - _December 8^{th} 1914._ - - The Mappa Co. Ltd. London -] - -[Illustration: _Plan of Action between the Battle Cruisers -"INVINCIBLE" & "INFLEXIBLE" and the German Armoured Cruisers -"SCHARNHORST" & "GNEISENAU"_ - - _December 8^{th} 1914._ - - The Mappa Co. Ltd. London -] - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -AWAY SOUTH - - "Into the golden West, across the broad - Atlantic once again. 'For I will show,' - Said Drake, 'that Englishmen henceforth will sail - Old ocean where they will.'" - - --ALFRED NOYES (_Drake_). - - -The two battle-cruisers looked very businesslike as they steamed up -to the anchorage; their trip out had taken off a good deal of paint, -and they presented something of the appearance of hardened warriors -returning from a spell in the trenches, as has been so well portrayed -by Captain Bruce Bairnsfather. To our joy they brought a small mail -only three weeks old. - -No sooner had the rattle of their cables ceased than preparations for -coaling were seen to be in progress. - -The same day, November 26th, the _Defence_ sailed for Cape Town via -St. Helena to join the flag of Rear-Admiral H. G. King-Hall. The -_Macedonia_ and _Otranto_ had been sent to Sierra Leone some time -previously to let out fires and examine boilers. - -The British Squadron was now under the command of Vice-Admiral F. -C. D. Sturdee, who held the title of Commander-in-Chief, South -Atlantic and Pacific. The Admiral's plan of operations possessed the -distinctive feature of every good invention; it was extremely simple -when once understood. Roughly speaking, it was this. The squadron -was to sail south to the Falklands, spreading out to extreme visual -signalling distance and searching for the enemy's ships. All signals -were to be made by searchlight, and wireless was not to be used -unless it was absolutely necessary. The battle-cruisers were placed -in the centre of the squadron, comparatively close together, with the -double object of being able to concentrate quickly in any direction -and of keeping secret their presence in these waters. Orders were -subsequently given that, after coaling at the Falklands, the squadron -would leave on December 9th, "in order to get round the Horn before -the enemy comes East." The enemy was sure to be reported if he used -the Straits of Magellan; but it is believed that, to make doubly sure -of not missing him, the Admiral intended to divide our squadron. Some -of the cruisers would then have gone through the Straits, meeting him -with the battle-cruisers somewhere in the Pacific; by this means the -presence of the latter would not become known. - -Sailing on November 28th, on a lovely calm morning, Admiral Sturdee -must have indeed felt a proud man; after years of labour in his -profession, he had his ambition realised by the command of a powerful -squadron in war with a definite task before him. It consisted of -_Invincible_ (flag), _Inflexible_, _Carnarvon_ (flag), _Cornwall_, -_Kent_, _Glasgow_, and _Bristol_. The _Macedonia_, now on her way -back from Sierra Leone, was to join us on the voyage south. - -On December 1st a report was received that "the German fleet was 400 -miles off Montevideo" the previous evening, but no one believed it. -The next day we left dinner hurriedly; a signal was received, "Alter -course together" to starboard 60 degrees. We altered and stood by for -action, but it only turned out to be a British vessel--a false alarm -which, however, was excellent practice. Information came through on -the 3rd that the German tender _Patagonia_ left Montevideo during the -night with stores for the German warships; therefore presumably they -were not far off. - -We arrived off Port Stanley on the morning of December 7th, and were -piloted into harbour through a channel in the line of mines, which -had been hastily constructed from empty oil-drums, and laid across -the entrance by the _Canopus_. As there were only three colliers -here, the ships were ordered to coal in turn; the remainder, under -convoy of the _Orama_, were following us down from the base. - -The Falkland Islands number about two hundred only two of which, -East and West Falkland, are of any size. The coast line of both -these islands is deeply indented and much resembles one of the -Outer Hebrides. Devoid of all trees, the dark brown and green -moors, relieved here and there by patches of granite quartz, look -uninviting, but abound in penguins hares, and sheep. Some of us, -being unable to coal ship, landed on the day of our arrival and shot -some hares and geese--a welcome change for the larder. It was the -breeding season, and the penguin camps or rookeries were a striking -sight; on approaching them hundreds would stand up and waddle forward -in a threatening attitude, making a terrible din in order to protect -their eggs. So numerous are they compared with the inhabitants that -the Governor is locally called the "King of the Penguins." - -The little town of Port Stanley, the capital, lies on the south side -of the inner portion of a harbour on the east coast of East Falkland, -and consists of two streets of houses, almost all, except Government -House and the cathedral, constructed of timber and corrugated iron. -It is very much like one of the new small towns of Canada. The -principal fuel is peat, which may be seen stacked as in Ireland. The -population numbers about a thousand, and another thousand--mostly -farmers and shepherds of Scottish origin--live out on the moors of -the islands. - -During the summer the temperature averages about 48° Fahr., and it is -nearly always blowing hard, raining, hailing, or snowing. Situated in -a cold current from the Antarctic, the temperature only falls eleven -degrees in the winter; as a result, scarcely any of the inhabitants -can swim, it being too cold to bathe. Owing to the absence of sun and -summer heat, wheat, oats, and English vegetables do not thrive, but -the colony is none the less remarkably healthy. - -[Illustration: STANLEY HARBOUR with PORT WILLIAM - - The Mappa Co. Ltd. London -] - -When the news of the Coronel disaster reached them, the islanders -were naturally much concerned for their safety. They had a volunteer -corps of a few hundred men, which took to training most assiduously -and quickly improved in efficiency. Every man was a good horseman -and proficient with the rifle, but the corps were not sufficiently -numerous to prevent a landing. A council of war was held by the -Governor, at which the position was fully discussed. It seemed -only too probable that the Germans would attack the Islands, and -arrangements were made to send away from Stanley the few women and -children. Stores of provisions were secreted within easy reach of the -town, and the public money, official documents, confidential books, -and valuables were either removed to a place of safety or buried. - -This was the position when the _Canopus_ and the _Glasgow_ arrived on -November 8th. Sailing the same evening, the _Canopus_, when half-way -to Montevideo, was ordered by the Admiralty to return and guard the -colony. - -On November 13th a warship was sighted from the signal station at -Port Stanley making straight towards the harbour from the eastward, -an unusual direction from which to approach. The volunteers were -called out by the church bells sounding the alarm, and every -preparation was made to resist a landing; the _Canopus_ on her part -could get no reply from the wireless station, so was only able to -conclude that Port Stanley had fallen into the enemy's hands. When -it was seen that the visitor was none other than the _Canopus_, the -feelings of joy and relief were universal and knew no bounds. - -Most of the inhabitants buried all their worldly goods of any value, -some using their back gardens, which are lightly fenced off from one -another, whilst others even carried furniture some distance inland. -Several amusing stories resulted. One of these Scots, from the window -of his house, had watched his neighbour burying a tin box, and had -carefully noted its exact position. Being hard up, he scaled the -fence that night and dug up and forced the box. Finding it contained -sovereigns, he helped himself to a portion, replaced the box, and -covered it over carefully with earth. A few days later, temptation -getting the better of him, he paid his neighbour's garden another -visit; on the third occasion, however, he was caught red-handed. When -brought to book his defence was that as they were such friends he had -not taken the whole lot the first time, which would have been quite -easy to do, but only a little just when it was needed to tide him -over his difficulties. - -The _Bristol_, _Glasgow_, and _Inflexible_ were ordered to coal -as soon as we arrived, the remainder awaiting their turn. The -_Carnarvon_, _Cornwall_, and _Bristol_ were allowed to put fires out -to clean boilers and make adjustments to the valves and machinery -of the main engines, in preparation for a protracted sea voyage. -The _Macedonia_ patrolled the entrance to the harbour, the _Kent_ -being ordered to relieve her at 8 o'clock the following morning. The -_Bristol_ and _Glasgow_, being of light draught, proceeded into the -inner harbour, but the rest of the squadron anchored in the outer -harbour, Port William, as will be seen from the plan. - -There is no telegraph cable to the Falklands, so that it was obvious -the first point of attack by the enemy would be the wireless -station. To protect this the _Canopus_ entered the inner harbour, -forced herself aground on the muddy bottom, and moored taut head and -stern in a position that would enable her to command the southern -approach. Here she was able to fire over the narrow neck of low-lying -land, that at the same time served partially to conceal her. An -observation station, connected with the ship by telephone, was set -up ashore, with an elaborate plan for obtaining the bearing and -elevation for the guns. Top-masts were housed, and the ship, masts, -and funnels were painted all the colours of the rainbow in great big -splodges to render her less visible. A look-out station was set up in -Sparrow Cove, and three 12-pounder batteries were hastily constructed -to dominate the approaches. The landing and placing of these guns, -together with the digging of the emplacements, called for a great -deal of hard work. Every credit is due to the _Canopus_ for the -admirable manner in which she dealt with the situation. - -Major Turner, who was in command of the Falkland Island Volunteers, -was indefatigable in his efforts to prepare efficient land defences. -This corps gave valuable assistance to the _Canopus_, co-operating in -the work of preparing the coast defences. Prior to the arrival of the -_Canopus_, their only guns were a 12-pounder 8-cwt. field gun which -had been lent by the _Glasgow_, and a few very antique muzzle-loading -field guns. - - - - -CHAPTER X - -ENEMY IN SIGHT - - "And from the crow's nest of the Golden Hynde - A seaman cried, 'By God, the hunt is up!'" - - --ALFRED NOYES (_Drake_). - - -December 8th, 1914, was apparently to prove an exception to the -general rule in the Falklands, where it usually rains for twenty-one -days during the last month of the year, for a perfect mid-summer's -morning gave every promise of a fine day to follow. The prospect of a -busy day coaling, and taking in stores, brought with it thoughts of -the morrow when we were to set forth on our quest after the enemy. -The colliers went their round from ship to ship, and the rattling of -the winches hoisting the coal inboard never ceased. - -At 7.56 A.M. the _Glasgow_ fired a gun to attract the attention -of the _Invincible_, who was busy coaling, to the signal of the -_Canopus_ reporting smoke in sight to the south. - -Shortly after 8 A.M. the officers in the _Cornwall_ were all sitting -at breakfast when the Chief Yeoman of Signals entered with a beaming -face, full of news, to report that cruisers were in sight to the -southward. The general opinion was that some Japanese cruisers -were probably coming to join us, and attention was again turned to -breakfast. - -About 8.15 A.M. came a signal from the flag ship: "Raise steam for -full speed, report when ready." Rumour had been so rife of late that -we still remained sceptical until a few minutes later news came from -the signal station on Sapper Hill that two hostile men-of-war were -approaching from the southward, and shortly after that smoke was -visible beyond these vessels. - -It afterwards transpired that a lady named Mrs. Felton, the wife -of a sheep farmer living near Point Pleasant, in the south of the -Island, sent her maid and house-boy to the top of a ridge to report -everything they saw whilst she telephoned the sighting of the enemy's -ships to the nearest signal station, from which it was passed to Port -Stanley. She continued to send messages reporting every subsequent -movement of the German ships. The three German colliers, two of which -were sunk, were also first sighted by her and duly reported. She -afterwards received a silver salver from the Admiralty in recognition -of her prompt action, and her maid a silver teapot, whilst the -signalman at Sapper Hill, Port Stanley, received £5 from Admiral -Sturdee--a fact we had cause to remember later on, when frequent -reports of "hearing distant firing," "sighting smoke," resulted in -one or two wild-goose chases! - -"Enemy in sight." What a thrilling message for us all! We could -scarcely believe our ears. "What a stroke of luck!" was the general -comment. But this was no time for ruminating; deeds, not words, were -required. At last "the Day" for which we had prepared had dawned. -In very truth the hunt was up. The magic news travelled round the -ship's company like lightning, and they fell in in record time--in -spite of having to forgo some of their breakfast. The _Invincible_, -_Inflexible_, and _Carnarvon_ were in the middle of coaling. -Colliers were cast off, and all ships prepared for action in case the -enemy appeared off the entrance to Port William. - -As several of our ships had one engine down at six hours' notice, the -bustle and activity in the engine rooms may well be imagined. We on -deck naturally enough were soon ready, and chafed at the delay. - -The _Kent_ went out of harbour to reconnoitre, to report on the -movements of the enemy, and to relieve the _Macedonia_. The enemy's -two leading ships--the _Gneisenau_ and _Nürnberg_--were in sight -and were approaching the wireless station, intending to wreck it. -When near the Wolf Rocks they stopped engines and turned to the -north-eastward. The bearing and elevation of the enemy ships having -been telephoned from the observation station, the _Canopus_, finding -that they could get no closer, opened fire over the low neck of land -at 9.20 A.M. with her 12-inch guns, firing five rounds at a range -of 12,000 yards (_see_ page 83). It was the first time that most of -us had heard a shot fired in a naval action, and it brought home -very forcibly the fact that we should soon be tackling the job to -which we had looked forward for so long. Hoisting their colours, -the enemy turned away S.E. to join the main squadron, which headed -out to the eastward. It afterwards transpired that the Germans had -seen the tripod masts of our battle-cruisers over the land, which -probably decided von Spee in turning away from his objective. In one -moment all his hopes of destroying our Fleet--supposed to consist of -_Carnarvon_, _Cornwall_ and _Bristol_, and possibly the _Canopus_ -and _Glasgow_--the wireless station, and then capturing the colony, -were dashed to the ground. From survivors it appears that one of the -_Canopus's_ shells had ricocheted, striking the _Gneisenau_ at the -base of her after funnel; it was also claimed that a piece of another -hit the _Nürnberg_--good shooting by indirect fire at such a range, -with guns of an old type and improvised fire-control arrangements. - -Officers of the _Canopus_, who were in the observation station -ashore, saw through the telescope of their theodolite the men on -board the _Gneisenau_ fallen in on deck; they could be distinguished, -quite plainly, dressed ready for landing, in order to capture the -wireless station under cover of their ship's guns. But when the -_Canopus_ opened fire with her first two projectiles they lost no -time in scuttling away to their action stations. - -An amusing incident occurred on board the _Canopus_ when the enemy -first hove in sight. The stokers off watch climbed up inside the -foremost funnel to see what was going on and sat round the edge, -feeling quite secure as they knew the ship was ashore--hard and fast. -They very soon came down, however, when they were informed that the -boilers of that funnel were being lit up and the ship going to sea. - -At 9.40 A.M. the _Glasgow_ went out to join the _Kent_ in observing -the enemy's movements. Five minutes later the squadron weighed, with -the exception of the _Bristol_, who had all her fires out to clean -boilers. She was ready three-quarters of an hour later, however, -which must have constituted a record for ships of her class. The -_Carnarvon_, _Inflexible_, _Invincible_, and _Cornwall_ proceeded -out in the order named, the _Inflexible_ ramming a sailing pinnace -belonging to the _Cornwall_, half full of stores, on her way through -the line of mines; fortunately a barrel of beer belonging to the -wardroom officers had previously been rescued! The _Macedonia_ was -ordered to remain behind in Port William. It was very clear with -a slight north-westerly breeze--ideal conditions for a long-range -action. - -The last of our line cleared the harbour about 10.30 A.M., when the -five enemy ships could be seen hull down on the horizon to the S.E., -12 to 13 miles off, steaming off in the hopeless attempt to escape. -The signal "General chase" was flying from the _Invincible_, and the -magnificent spectacle of our ships, each with four or five white -ensigns fluttering in the breeze, all working up to full speed, will -always live in the memory of those who witnessed it on that eventful -day. - -The surprise and horror of the Germans at seeing our two -battle-cruisers for the first time was testified by the survivors, -who said, "They tried not to believe it." It must have been an awful -moment finding themselves suddenly face to face with almost certain -destruction. First of our ships came the little _Glasgow_, dashing -along like an express train, then the two huge battle-cruisers going -about 25 knots, belching forth volumes of dense black smoke as they -made use of their oil fuel to quicken their fires, followed by the -_Kent_, _Carnarvon_, and _Cornwall_ doing about 22 knots. - -The Admiral reduced speed for an hour to 20 knots at 11.15 A.M., to -allow the "County" cruisers to catch up, for it was evident that we -were rapidly gaining on the enemy, as we sped along on an easterly -course. The _Glasgow_ was ordered to keep three miles ahead of the -_Invincible_. There was now an opportunity to get out of coaling kit -and have a hasty wash. The ship's companies were consequently sent to -dinner early, acting on the good old maxim that a man always fights -better on a full stomach; but the excitement was too intense for -most men to have more than a bite, and they were mostly to be seen -crowding about the ship's decks munching a hastily made sandwich. - -At 11.27 A.M. the _Bristol_ reported that the smoke of three -steamers, enemy transports, had been sighted from the signal station -at Point Pleasant to the southward of the Island, whereupon the -Commander-in-Chief ordered the _Bristol_ and _Macedonia_ to destroy -them. They arrived to find only two, both big colliers, the _Baden_ -and _Santa Isabel_; the _Bristol_ took off the crews and then sank -the vessels. Half an hour later the _Bristol_ learnt the news of -the result of the action, and that the sacrifice of their valuable -cargoes had been unnecessary. The _Macedonia_, who was first upon the -scene, sighted smoke on the horizon, but could see no ship. Rumour -had it that this third ship was the _Seydlitz_, and that she had a -landing party of armed men and field guns on board, but this has -never been substantiated in any way. - -The _Glasgow_ was ordered back, and at 12.20 P.M. the -Commander-in-Chief decided to attack the enemy with the -battle-cruisers, whose speed was increased to 25 knots. The enemy -were steaming in two divisions in quarter-line, first the _Gneisenau_ -and _Nürnberg_ on the left of the line, then the _Scharnhorst_ -(flag), _Dresden_, and _Leipzig_; the latter being astern of the -remainder of their ships, who were on the starboard bow of our -squadron, became the first target. "Action" was sounded, and at once -not a soul was to be seen about the decks, each man being busy at -his appointed station. The Admiral hoisted the signal "Open fire" -at 12.47, and eight minutes later the _Inflexible_ fired at the -_Leipzig_ the first round of the action; the _Invincible_ followed -almost immediately afterwards. Both ships were now going their full -speed, nearly 27 knots, and firing slowly and deliberately at the -great range of 16,000 yards (over nine land miles). The huge columns -of water, over 150 feet high, thrown up by our 12-inch projectiles, -which weigh 840 lb., sometimes completely blotted out the enemy -target at this distance. Owing to the German ships being end-on, it -was difficult to get the direction, but our shots were falling very -close to them at times, and soon produced a drastic change in their -movements. - -Admiral von Spee is said to have now made this signal to his ships: -"The armoured cruisers will engage the enemy _as long as possible_, -the light cruisers are to use every endeavour to escape." Acting -on this, at 1.20 P.M. the _Dresden_, the _Nürnberg_--which one of -our battle-cruisers claimed to have hit--and the _Leipzig_ turned -away to the southward, the positions of the ships being roughly as -shown in the plan (p. 94). The _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ will be -seen turning to port to engage the battle-cruisers, which altered -simultaneously on to a parallel course, whilst the remainder of -our squadron, except the _Carnarvon_, which presumably had orders -to proceed with the Commander-in-Chief, turned and gave chase to -the _Dresden_, _Leipzig_, and _Nürnberg_. The _Carnarvon_ was, of -course, unable to keep up with the big ships, and did not get into -action until later; she was now 10 miles astern, and altered course -to port to cut a corner and join the Flag. - -[Illustration: ROUGH DIAGRAM OF ACTION OFF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS - - 8^{TH} DECEMBER, 1914. -] - -All this while the "County" cruisers were coming along with -all possible speed. The _Glasgow_ was stationed clear of the -battle-cruisers, which were followed by the _Kent_, _Cornwall_, and -_Carnarvon_. When the action commenced the crews of these ships had -the most perfect view of a modern naval engagement fought at long -range. As an officer in the _Kent_ described it: "We were spectators -in the front row of the stalls, as it were, so close that we could -almost touch the actors on the stage, yet so far that no stray -missile disturbed the comfort of our view. The best seats in the -house at a performance of one of the few remaining spectacles which -cannot be bought for money." - -Imagine a calm, smooth sea, the sun shining and not a cloud in the -sky, the ship steaming at something over 23 knots, and the men -crowded on the turrets and in every available corner, tier upon -tier, for all the world as if looking on at a cup tie at the Crystal -Palace.... It was a wonderful sight. The big ships buried their -sterns in the sea, throwing up the seething water in their wakes -as they dashed onwards. The bright flashes of their guns showed up -strikingly, followed successively by the dark brown puffs of cordite -smoke; the seconds were counted until the reports were heard and huge -columns of water thrown up by the splashes were seen. Many of the -men had had friends in the _Good Hope_ and _Monmouth_ whose fate was -fresh in their minds. "Give 'em one for the _Monmouth_!" and "Go on, -boys, give 'em hell--let the blighters feel what it's like!" were -shouted quite unconsciously, punctuated by loud cheers when a salvo -pitched perilously close to the enemy ships. Of course, the majority -realised our superiority, but those in authority must have felt a -pride in such men who gave the impression they would face odds with -intrepidity. - -The battle now divided itself into two separate engagements, the -battle-cruisers and the _Carnarvon_, which were engaging the two -enemy armoured cruisers, and the _Cornwall_, _Kent_, and _Glasgow_, -which gave chase to the light cruisers. Later, a third action -developed when the _Kent_ went after the _Nürnberg_. Each of these -will be taken in turn and described separately. - - - - -CHAPTER XI - -THE BATTLE-CRUISER ACTION - - "Are hell-gates burst at last? For the black deep - To windward burns with streaming crimson fires! - Over the wild strange waves, they shudder and creep - Nearer--strange smoke-wreathed masts and spare, red spires - And blazing hulks." - - --ALFRED NOYES (_Drake_). - - -A few minutes after the German light-cruisers turned away to the -S.S.E. in accordance with his orders, Admiral Count von Spee, -apparently deciding to accept the inevitable, determined to try and -close so as to get into the effective range of his 8.2-inch guns. -With this intention, his two armoured cruisers turned in succession -about 80 degrees to port, which brought them into line-ahead with the -_Gneisenau_ leading, and then opened fire at 1.30 P.M. But he had -reckoned without his host, as this very obvious manœuvre did not at -all suit Admiral Sturdee's book, who was acting on the principle that -ammunition is cheaper than human life, and was resolved to fight at -his own chosen range. Our ships, therefore, eased speed to 24 knots, -and turned together away from the enemy to port, which brought them -at the same time into line-ahead with the flag ship _Invincible_ in -the van. - -The two squadrons were on nearly parallel courses (_see_ facing page -79). The _Inflexible_ had checked fire for a while, but now reopened -on the _Scharnhorst_ at a range of 14,500 yards. Both the enemy ships -concentrated their fire on the _Invincible_ at this time, whilst ours -fired each at his opponent. The respective armaments are seen from -the following: - - _Name_ _Tonnage_ _Armament_ _Speed_ _Completion_ _Armour_ - _Belt_ - - _Invincible_ } 17,250 { 8--12" } 26 { 1909 7 to 4 in. - _Inflexible_ } { 16--4" } { 1908 7 to 4 in. - _Carnarvon_ 10,850 4--7.5" 22 1903 7 to 4 in. - 6--6" - _Scharnhorst_} { 8--8.2" } { 23.5 1908 6 to 3 in. - } 11,420 { 6--5.9" } { - _Gneisenau_ } { 20--3.4" } { 23.8 1908 6 to 3 in. - - Compiled from "Brassey's Naval Annual." - -As Admiral Sturdee edged away and did not allow the range to get -below 13,500 yards, the fire of the Germans was not effective. -A gunnery officer stated that their fire control was efficient, -and that their salvoes, fired frequently, fell well together, the -spread being about 200 yards. They had been firing about ten minutes -when the _Scharnhorst_ went ahead and took the lead, so our ships -changed targets. For a short time both German ships now fired at the -_Inflexible_, but without result; soon afterwards they again honoured -the _Invincible_ with their attentions, and, getting the range, -scored their first hit about 1.45 P.M. The range was now increased, -spotting the fall of shot became more and more difficult, and finally -smoke interfered with our gunfire. At 2 P.M. the distance of the -enemy was 16,450 yards. Ten minutes later von Spee turned right away -and made a second attempt to escape, as he had been unable to get to -close quarters. We turned gradually after him, but as he continued -to turn away, in the words of Admiral Sturdee, "A second chase -ensued." All firing ceased, and there was an appreciable lull in the -proceedings. - -Of the damage to the _Scharnhorst_ at this time no estimate can be -formed, but survivors from the _Gneisenau_ stated that they had three -direct hits, resulting in fifty men being killed and wounded. To the -uninitiated this may seem to be poor shooting; but the difficulty of -seeing clearly enough to make accurate corrections to the gunsights, -the extreme range, and the disturbing effect of the enemy's fire must -all be taken into account. Doubtless, too, there were several hits of -an insignificant nature on the upper works and rigging that were not -taken into account. It was impossible to tell at such a long range -whether we scored a hit unless a fire resulted. - -The efficiency of the engine-room staff was now put to the test; -they nobly responded, with the result that our big ships attained a -greater speed than they had ever done before. - -At this juncture a full-rigged sailing ship appeared on the port -hand of our battle-cruisers; she was painted white, and her sails -were shining as if bleached in the bright sunlight; with stunsails -and every stitch of canvas spread she sailed majestically along, -looking a perfect picture. So close was she that the Admiral was -forced to alter his course to pass a couple of miles clear of her, so -that the enemy's shell ricocheting should not hit her. Truly it must -have been a thrilling and dramatic moment for her to find herself -an involuntary witness of such a wonderful spectacle! Imagine her -consternation at being plunged suddenly into the middle of a red-hot -naval action between powerfully armed modern men-of-war, with shell -falling in the water quite close alongside. - -The distance of the retreating enemy was rapidly decreasing, until -at 2.45 P.M. Admiral Sturdee gave the order to open fire at a range -of about 15,000 yards. Von Spee held on his course in the vain -hope, apparently, of drawing us on, so that by a sudden turn made -later he might "get to grips." Eight minutes afterwards the Germans -were forced to turn to port towards us, forming into line-ahead and -opening fire as soon as they came round. We hauled out once again -on to an almost parallel course. The range had appreciably dropped, -and was at one time under 12,000 yards. Things now became fast and -furious, shot and bursting shell were everywhere in the air, and -our 12-inch guns were doing terrible execution. "It was like hell -let loose," said a petty officer in the flagship, which was hit -several times. The German gunnery was not nearly as good as it had -been in the first phase of the engagement, whilst we had settled -down to business and were, on the whole, more accurate than before. -An officer in the _Inflexible_ remarked that at this time several -of the enemy's shell fell between our two ships and that as his -ship approached these yellow-green patches, he wondered whether the -debatable maxim that no two projectiles ever hit the same spot would -prove accurate. - -The _Scharnhorst_ was badly hit at 3 P.M., starting a fire forward, -but she continued to blaze away; the _Gneisenau_ also bore signs -of the severe treatment she had received from the _Inflexible_. The -_Invincible_ now met with some damage, and suffered by far the most -as the enemy's fire was naturally concentrated on her. The wind -had increased, and was blowing the smoke across the guns, impeding -our gunners, and the _Carnarvon_ was coming up astern, so at 3.18 -Admiral Sturdee executed a sudden manœuvre by putting his helm -over to starboard, turning completely around, and crossing his own -track so as to steer roughly S.W.; this put the enemy completely -off the range, and also forced him five minutes later on to a -parallel course, in order to avoid the alternative of being raked -fore and aft. As both our ships had altered course together, their -respective positions became reversed--the _Inflexible_ leading--and -they presented their port sides to the enemy (_see_ facing p. 79). -The _Carnarvon_ cut the corner and came up on the off side of the -battle-cruisers, in accordance with Admiral Sturdee's orders, -as her guns were useless at ranges exceeding 12,000 yards. The -_Scharnhorst_, who had already had a bad hammering from the flagship, -was now subjected to the concentrated fire of our two big ships for -a very short time, during which the _Gneisenau_ was lost sight of -in her consort's smoke. At 3.30 P.M. the _Scharnhorst's_ fire had -slackened perceptibly, and one shell had shot away her third funnel. - -The _Invincible_ now engaged the _Gneisenau_, who was not nearly so -badly damaged and was firing all her guns. In fact, all ships were at -it as hard as they could go, but the _Inflexible_ came off lightly on -account of the plight of her opponent. The noise was indescribable, -shell were hurtling through the rigging; when one actually struck -and burst, the whole ship quivered and staggered, while the crash -of steel plates falling, and splinters of shell striking the upper -works, sounded like hundreds of empty tins being hurled against one -another. - -The _Scharnhorst_ was clearly in a very bad way, and looked, as -she was, a perfect wreck. Masses of steel were twisted and torn as -if growing out in all directions like the roots of a tree, clouds -of steam were going up sky high, and she was blazing fore and aft. -The Admiral says, "At times a shell would cause a large hole to -appear in her side, through which could be seen a dull red glow of -flame." She was 14,000 yards distant. Up till quite near the end, -however, she continued to fire in salvos, her starboard guns having -only been in action since the last turn was made. At 3.56 P.M. the -Commander-in-Chief decided to close in and give her the _coup de -grace_, which enabled the Carnarvon to get into action and open fire -for the first time. By 4 P.M. both the _Scharnhorst's_ masts, as well -as her three funnels, were shot away, and she was listing heavily to -port. She struggled on hopelessly and went over more and more, until -at 4.10 P.M. she was on her beam ends. For seven minutes she remained -in this position, her screws still going round, and then suddenly -sank like a stone, with her flag still flying. - -Shortly before the German flagship sank, our ships checked fire and -then opened on the _Gneisenau_. It will be seen from the plan of -the action that at the time the _Invincible_ turned two complete -circles in a sort of figure of eight, the _Gneisenau_ hesitated for -a minute or two as to whether she should stand by her consort to save -life. Under the impression, apparently, that our flagship, which had -turned towards the _Scharnhorst_, was about to pick up survivors, the -_Gneisenau_ passed on the far side of the sinking ship and opened a -heavy and well-directed fire on the _Inflexible_. We were now three -against one, who was, nevertheless, determined to sell herself as -dearly as possible. It was a gallant attempt. - -The distance was fortunately too great to see clearly the wretched -survivors of the _Scharnhorst_ left struggling hopelessly against -their fate, but it brought the dark side of war very vividly into -notice for the first time. A quarter of an hour after she sank the -_Carnarvon_ passed over the exact spot, but neither survivors nor -wreckage were to be seen. - -The weather now changed, a light drizzling mist obscuring the former -visibility. It was obvious that there could be only one end to the -fight now in progress, and that it could not long be delayed. At 4.15 -P.M. the _Invincible_ opened fire on the _Gneisenau_, which shifted -her target from the _Inflexible_ and fired at the flagship with -creditable precision. She was "straddling" the _Invincible_ at 4.25, -the range being about 10,000 yards, so this was increased. During the -next quarter of an hour our flagship was hit three times, but the -German was taking terrible punishment. At 4.47 she ceased firing; her -colours had been shot away several times, but she had hoisted them -again and again. Now, however, no colours were to be seen, so it was -only natural to conclude she had struck, though it was afterwards -ascertained that she had no more left to hoist. Our ships turned to -avoid getting too far off, when, to the surprise of all, she suddenly -fired off a solitary gun, showing that she was still game. Unlike -her late consort, which looked a perfect wreck for some time before -actually sinking, she had to all appearances suffered very little. At -5.8 P.M., however, her foremost funnel went by the board. - -The carnage and destruction wrought in the _Gneisenau_ by our three -ships were terrible, and it was astonishing what a deal of hammering -she was still able to bear. That her casualties at this time were -very heavy was beyond doubt, as shell were to be seen tearing up -her decks as they burst, while the upper works became a veritable -shambles. It was not till 5.15 that the doomed ship, being badly hit -between the third and fourth funnels, showed real signs of being -_in extremis_. She was still firing, however, and even scored an -effective hit--the last one she was to get--about this period. - -At 5.30 she was obviously dead beat and turned towards our squadron -with a heavy list to starboard, afire fore and aft, and steam issuing -in dense clouds from all directions. Admiral Sturdee now ordered -"Cease fire," but before the signal could be hoisted _Gneisenau_ -opened fire again, and continued to keep it up with her one remaining -undamaged gun. This was returned until it was silenced, when our -ships closed in on her. The ensign flying at her foremast head was -hauled down at 5.40, but the one at her peak was left flying. Five -minutes later she again fired, but only one solitary round, after -which she maintained silence. The signal was made to cease firing -immediately afterwards, when it was evident that her gallant struggle -was at an end. - -She now heeled over quite slowly, giving her men plenty of time to -get up on deck. At 6 P.M. our ships were perhaps 4,000 yards off, -and the Germans could be seen gathering together on her "forecastle -quarter deck." Remaining on her beam ends for a few seconds, during -which the men were seen clambering about on her side, she quite -gently subsided and disappeared without any explosion, although a -film of steamy haze hovered over the spot where she sank. The bow -remained poised for a second or two, after which she foundered at 6.2 -in latitude 52° 40′ S., longitude 56° 20′ W., having withstood the -combined fire of our ships for an hour and forty-five minutes. - -The sea was no longer quite calm, and a misty, drizzling rain was -falling. Closing in hastily, every effort was made to save life, and -boats were got out and lowered. This is no easy job after an action, -as the boats are turned inboard, resting on their crutches, and are -kept partially filled with water in case a shell might strike them -and cause a fire. This water must first be drained out, then the -weight of the boat is hoisted on to the slips to enable it to be -swung outboard, which is not easy if the ship has been hit near the -water-line, causing a list. Finally, several of the boats are certain -to be riddled with shell splinters. - -A midshipman, describing the scene that followed, writes, "We cast -overboard every rope's end we can and try our hands at casting to -some poor wretch feebly struggling within a few yards of the ship's -side. Missed him! Another shot. He's further off now! Ah! the rope -isn't long enough. No good; try someone else. He's sunk now!" - -The men, however, had not yet heard of the rough weather during -the Coronel action, and still thought that the Germans might have -saved our poor fellows there. Lines were thrown over with shouts of, -"Here, Sausage, put this round your belly," and the like. Taking into -consideration that it was estimated some 600 men had been killed -or wounded, and that the temperature of the water was 40°, it was -fortunate that as many as 170 officers and men were rescued. The -gallant Admiral Count von Spee, whose conduct bears out the best -traditions of naval history, and his two sons, all lost their lives -in the course of the day. - -A curious feature of this action was the terrific damage done by -12-inch lyddite shell. One of the _Gneisenau's_ turrets was severed -from its trunk and blown bodily overboard. Nearly every projectile -that hit caused a fire, which was often promptly extinguished by the -splash of the next one falling short. Indeed, it was stated by the -prisoners that the guns' crews in the German ships were frequently -working their guns up to their knees in water, and towards the latter -part of the engagements were unable to fire on account of the volume -of water thrown up by short shots. - -The _Invincible_ had been hit about twenty-two times, but the -fighting efficiency of the ship was not affected. Eighteen of these -were direct hits, two being below the water-line on the port side, -one of which flooded a bunker and gave her a list to port. There -were no casualties, however, amongst her complement of 950. The -_Inflexible_ was only hit directly twice; she had one man killed and -three slightly wounded. Her main derrick was cut in two, so that she -was unable to use her steam boats. The few casualties speak more -eloquently than any words of the tactics adopted by Admiral Sturdee -in putting to the greatest possible use the heavier armament at his -disposal. - -The _Invincible_ had some interesting damage. One 8.2-inch shell -burst and completely wrecked her wardroom, making a gigantic hole -in her side. Two others hit the stalk of her after conning tower -and burst, but did no damage to the inmates, who only complained -of the fumes being sweet and sickly, leaving an unpleasant taste -which, however, soon wore off. Another interesting case was the -extraordinary damage done by a spent projectile falling at an angle -of fifty degrees. Passing close under her forebridge, it cut the -muzzle of one of her 4-inch guns clean off, after which it passed -through the steel deck, through a ventilating trunk, through the -deck below, and finished up in the Admiral's storeroom--side by -side with the cheese, which put the finishing touch to its career. -Another shell caused a nasty hole on the water-line, seven feet by -three, which was found to be beyond the capabilities of the ship's -staff to repair temporarily. The bunker had to be left flooded, all -the surrounding bulkheads being carefully shored up and strengthened -until she returned to England. In "A Naval Digression"[8] "G. F." -says: "On a part of the main deck one might have imagined for a -second that a philanthropist had been at work, for there, strewn -about, were a thousand odd golden sovereigns; a shell had come -through the upper deck, and, visiting the Fleet-Paymaster's cabin, -had 'upset' the money chest. It had then gone through the bulkhead -into the chaplain's cabin next door, and finally passed out through -the ship's side, taking with it a large part of the reverend -gentleman's wardrobe, and reducing to rags and tatters most of what -it had the decency to leave behind." - -The Commander of the _Gneisenau_ was picked up by the _Inflexible_, -and gave some interesting details. Describing the time when the -_Canopus_ fired at the _Gneisenau_ and _Nürnberg_ on their first -approach to Port Stanley, he told us that he said to his Captain, -"Captain, we must either fight or go faster," adding that in his -opinion the day would have ended very differently had they come -up boldly off the mouth of the harbour and bombarded our ships at -anchor before they were able to get out. There can be no doubt that -the issue would have been the same, but the Germans might have been -able to inflict some serious damage, especially to those ships -lying nearest the mouth of the harbour, who would have masked the -battle-cruisers' fire. However, his Captain elected to run, so they -went "faster." - -During the action he had to go round the ship with the fire-master, -putting out any fires that were discovered. Whilst going his rounds -during the engagement he found a stoker near one of the drinking -tanks on the mess deck, who said he had come up to get a drink of -water. The Hun Commander told him that he had no business to leave -his post, and, drawing his revolver, shot him dead where he stood. - -A curious yarn is connected with Admiral Stoddart, who was in the -_Carnarvon_. He had a distant cousin in the German Navy whom he -had never met and about whose career he had frequently been asked -in years gone by. This cousin of his was one of those saved by the -_Carnarvon_, and when he got aboard he said, "I believe I have a -cousin in one of the British ships. His name is Stoddart." To find he -was the Admiral on board that very ship must have indeed given him -what the sailor terms "a fair knock out." He stated that practically -every man on the upper deck of the _Gneisenau_ was either killed or -wounded, and that it was a feat of the greatest difficulty to climb -across the deck, so great was the havoc wrought in all directions. - -Another officer, who was stationed in one of the 8.2-inch turrets, -had a remarkable experience. The turret was hit by a 12-inch shell, -and he emerged the sole survivor. He then went on to a casemate, -which was also knocked out and most of the crew killed. Trying a -third gun, he was perhaps even more fortunate, as it was also hit by -a 12-inch shell, and the same thing happened, but shortly after the -ship sank and he was saved! This hero was a fat, young lieutenant, -who apparently drowned his sorrows the evening before he quitted the -_Carnarvon_. Before retiring to bed he stood up in the mess, drink in -hand, bowed blandly to everyone and said, with a broad smile on his -fat face, "Gentlemen, I thank you very much--you have been very kind -to me, and I wish you all in Hell!" - -The wisdom of Admiral Sturdee's orders to the _Carnarvon_ to keep -out of range of the Germans was brought home by an officer survivor -of the _Gneisenau_, who said that they knew they were done and had -orders "to concentrate on the _little_ ship and sink her if she came -within range!" - -Upwards of 600 men had been killed or wounded when the _Gneisenau's_ -ammunition was finally expended. The German captain "fell-in" the -remainder and told them to provide themselves with hammocks or any -woodwork they could find, in order to support themselves in the water. - -A certain number of the German sailors that were rescued from the icy -ocean succumbed to exposure and shock, though the proportion was very -small. They were given a naval funeral with full military honours and -were buried at sea the day after the battle. When the funeral service -was about to take place on the quarter-deck of one of our warships, -the German prisoners were told to come aft to attend it. On rounding -the superstructure, however, the leading men suddenly halted dead, -brought up aghast with fright at the sight of the guard of armed -marines falling in across the deck, who were about to pay the last -tributes of military honours to the dead. When ordered on, these -terrified Huns point blank refused to move, being convinced that the -Marine Guard was there in order to shoot them! - - - - -CHAPTER XII - -THE END OF THE "LEIPZIG" - - "War raged in heaven that day ... - ... Light against darkness, Liberty - Against all dark old despotism, unsheathed - The sword in that great hour." - - --ALFRED NOYES (_Drake_). - - -It will be recollected that during the chase the battle-cruisers -were firing at the _Leipzig_ before the main battle with Admiral -von Spee took place. This compelled the Germans to divide into two -separate squadrons, since a direct hit from a 12-inch gun might -easily prove fatal to one of their light-cruisers. Foreseeing that -this manœuvre was likely to occur, Admiral Sturdee had directed the -_Cornwall_, _Kent_, and _Glasgow_ to follow in pursuit. No time was -lost, therefore, in giving chase to the enemy light-cruisers when -they turned off to the S.S.E. at 1.20 P.M., the _Glasgow_ leading the -way at 26 knots, followed by the _Kent_ and the _Cornwall_ keeping -neck and neck and going about 23½ knots. The _Dresden_ led the enemy -light-cruisers with the _Leipzig_ and _Nürnberg_ on her starboard and -port quarter respectively. - -In the ever-increasing distance between our two squadrons, the main -battle could still be seen through field glasses, which made the -necessity for turning away from a spectacle of such absorbing and -compelling interest all the more tantalising. But there was solid -work to be done, requiring concentration, thought, and cool judgment. - -A stern chase is proverbially a long one, and the difference in speed -between our ships and the Germans' was not sufficient to justify any -hope of getting to business for at least two hours, as the slowest -enemy ship was probably doing 23 knots at this time. Every effort was -now made to go as fast as possible, and the _Cornwall_ and _Kent_ -had quite an exciting race as they worked up to 24 knots or slightly -more--a speed actually exceeding that realised along the measured -mile when these ships were new. The engine-room staffs on both ships -"dug out for all they were worth," and the keenest rivalry prevailed. - -It was very evident that a long chase lay before us, for the -_Glasgow_ was the only ship of the three that had a marked -superiority in speed to the enemy. The _Cornwall_ and _Kent_ were -gaining very slowly but surely on the _Leipzig_ and _Nürnberg_, but -were losing on the _Dresden_. - -The enemy kept edging away to port continually, and about 2.15 we -passed over the spot where later in the day the _Gneisenau_ was sunk -by our battle-cruisers. - -About 2.45 P.M. the positions of the ships were as plan (_see_ page -112). The _Leipzig_ was the centre rearmost ship, with the _Dresden_ -some four to five miles on her starboard bow, while the _Nürnberg_ -was about a mile on her port bow. Both these ships were diverging -slightly from the _Leipzig_, spreading out in the shape of a fan to -escape being brought to action. The _Cornwall_ and _Kent_ were some -eleven miles astern of the _Leipzig_, and the _Glasgow_ was four -miles distant on the starboard bow. - -[Illustration: _Diagram showing position at 2.45 p.m. weather -conditions not so good wind and rain from N.W._] - -As the _Glasgow_ drew ahead she edged over to starboard in the -direction of the _Dresden_. About 3 P.M. she opened fire with her -two 6-inch guns on the _Leipzig_ at 12,000 yards, in the hope of -outranging her and reducing her speed, so that the _Cornwall_ and -_Kent_ might come into action. The _Leipzig_, however, held on her -course, and replied to the _Glasgow's_ fire, though it was evident -that she was at the limit of her gun range. The firing was spasmodic -and not very effective. - -The _Glasgow's_ speed was so much superior to that of the enemy that -she soon closed the range very appreciably, and the _Leipzig_ was -seen to straddle her with her salvoes on more than one occasion. The -_Glasgow_ therefore altered course outwards, at the same time firing -her after 6-inch gun, and then, having opened the range, turned up on -to a roughly parallel course with the German. The duel between these -ships continued intermittently. - -The _Cornwall_ and _Kent_ were still keeping fairly level, and had -closed in to a distance of about half a mile from one another. The -chase continued, each minute seeming an age, as the range-finders -registered the slowly diminishing distance of the enemy. The crews -watched the proceedings from the forecastles with the greatest -interest; now and again a half-smothered cheer would break out when -the _Glasgow's_ shots fell perilously near the mark. When the bugle -sounded "Action," the men responded with a spontaneous cheer as they -rushed off at the double to their appointed stations. Their spirit -was fine. - -Captain J. Luce, of the _Glasgow_, was the senior naval officer -of our three ships, and at 3.20 P.M. signalled the _Cornwall_ to -ask, "Are you gaining on the enemy?" To which a reply was made, -"Yes--range now 16,000 yards." A quarter of an hour later the -_Glasgow_ ceased fire for a while. Captain W. M. Ellerton, of the -_Cornwall_, now made a signal to the _Kent_: "I will take the centre -target (_Leipzig_) if you will take the left-hand one (_Nürnberg_), -as we appear to be gaining on both of them." The _Glasgow_ again -opened fire on the _Leipzig_ at 3.45, but her shots falling short, -she very soon afterwards ceased fire. At 4.6 the _Glasgow_ and -_Leipzig_ again fired at one another, and shortly afterwards the -former was hit twice; an unlucky shot, descending at a steep angle, -killed one man and wounded four others. - -Captain Luce now found himself face to face with a difficult -decision, which had to be made promptly. Was he to use his superior -speed and endeavour to cut off the _Dresden_ or not? He decided -to assist the _Cornwall_ and _Kent_ in order to make sure of the -destruction of the _Leipzig_ and _Nürnberg_. At 4.25 P.M. the -_Glasgow_ turned to starboard away from the action and took station -on the port quarter of the _Cornwall_, who had by that time come into -action with the _Leipzig_. - -During this period the _Cornwall_ and _Kent_ had been gaining fairly -rapidly on the _Leipzig_ and slowly on the _Nürnberg_, though losing -on the _Dresden_, who was easily the fastest of the three German -light-cruisers. The latter kept edging away gradually to starboard, -outdistancing her pursuers, and finally made good her escape without -firing a single shot. - -At a quarter past four the _Cornwall_ and the _Kent_ opened fire -on the _Leipzig_ almost simultaneously at a range of 10,900 yards. -The effect of this was that the German altered course slightly to -starboard and was followed by the _Cornwall_, while the _Kent_ went -after the _Nürnberg_, as had been arranged. - -The _Leipzig_ now directed her fire on to the _Cornwall_. At the -outset we were astounded to find that her projectiles were falling -over us at this distance, but she soon found this out, and most -of her splashes were well short for some minutes. As the range -diminished the firing became more accurate, and it was possible to -judge of its effect. It was not till 4.22 that the _Cornwall_ scored -her first visible hit, which carried away the enemy's fore-topmast, -killing the gunnery lieutenant and disabling the fire control. The -enemy thereupon altered course away slightly to starboard, at which -we made a bigger turn in the same direction, so as to cut him off, -as well as to cross his course the more rapidly in the event of his -dropping mines overboard. This manœuvre brought the range down to -8,275 yards at 4.56, when he scored some hits. Captain Ellerton then -turned away to starboard to give the enemy a broadside, at the same -time opening the range, which completely upset the accuracy of the -_Leipzig's_ fire. - -The _Glasgow_ took up her self-appointed station on the port quarter -of the _Cornwall_ (_see_ Plan, p. 112), and the action developed -into a running fight between our two ships and the _Leipzig_, who -concentrated her fire on the _Cornwall_, which, however, had superior -armament: - - _Name_ _Tonnage_ _Armament_ _Speed_ _Completion_ - - _Cornwall_ 9,800 14--6" 23.68 1904 - _Glasgow_ 4,800 2--6" - 10--4" 25.8 1900 - _Leipzig_ 3,200 10--4.1" 23.5 1906 - - From "Brassey's Naval Annual." - -Mist and a light drizzling rain now set in, so we broke into -independent firing on account of the difficulty of spotting the fall -of shot. The range opened to 9,800 yards, and still we were being -hit, which clearly showed the efficiency of the German 4.1-inch gun. -Our course soon took us out of range, so we again turned towards the -enemy, ceasing fire from 5.12 to 5.29 P.M. This was analogous to -the interval that occurred in the battle-cruisers' action, and is -significant; both took place on the same day, and both were due to -the same cause--namely, the idea of making full use of the heavier -armament in our ships, and thus eliminating the risk of incurring -unnecessary casualties. - -Shortly after 5.30 P.M. the _Cornwall_ was hit no fewer than nine -times in as many minutes at a range of over 9,000 yards, so course -was again altered to starboard, a broadside being fired as the -ship turned. We continued these tactics, closing in and firing the -foremost group of guns and then turning out again as soon as we had -got in too close, at the same time getting in broadside fire, by -which we managed to score a number of hits with common shell. - -Fire was checked at 5.46, slow salvoes being resorted to on account -of the difficulties of spotting. At this time a heavy thud was felt -forward, which made the whole ship quiver; a shell had landed in -the paint room, where it burst and made rather a mess of things. -No material damage resulted, and there was fortunately no fire. At -6.15 we started using lyddite instead of common shell, having again -decreased the range. The result was stupendous, the dark smoke and -flash caused by those projectiles as they struck could be plainly -seen, and not long afterwards the enemy was on fire. His return fire -began to slacken appreciably, though he still managed to get a hit -every now and again. Captain Ellerton decided to close and went in to -nearly 7,000 yards, turning and letting the German have it from the -port broadside. - -It was now 6.35, and the news came through by wireless from the -flagship that the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ had been sunk. It -passed round the ship like lightning, even penetrating the watertight -bulkheads in some miraculous manner, and cheered up all hands -tremendously. - -Keeping the range between 7,000 and 8,000 yards, our ships continued -to do great damage, and at 6.51 the enemy was seen to be badly on -fire forward. In spite of this he continued to fire with great -spirit, and even registered a few hits between 6.55 and 7.45 P.M. -Then his firing stopped completely, and it was observed that he was -on fire the whole length of the ship. The scuttles showed up like a -series of blood-red dots gleaming from the ship's side, the whole of -the foremost funnel and part of the centre one had disappeared, the -upper works were severely damaged, while smoke was issuing here and -there. The ship, indeed, presented a sorry spectacle. - -All this time the _Glasgow_, which was still on the quarter of the -_Cornwall_, had also been busily engaged with the _Leipzig_, but at a -greater range. - -We ceased firing at 7.10, thinking that the enemy would strike his -colours; but not a bit of it, so three minutes later we reopened fire -with reluctance, though only for a couple of minutes. We closed in to -4,700 yards, turning 16 points in order to keep well out of torpedo -range, and gave him a few more salvoes of lyddite with our starboard -guns. The light was beginning to wane, and though twilight is very -prolonged in these southern regions during the summer, it would soon -have been too dark to see through the telescopic sights. At 7.43 -an explosion took place on board the _Leipzig_; three minutes later -the mainmast went slowly over, and finally collapsed with a crash. -We waited to give her an opportunity to haul down her colours and -surrender, and then opened fire again just before 8 P.M. At last, at -8.12, the Germans sent up two green lights as signals of distress, at -which we both immediately closed in, stopped, and proceeded to get -out boats. Darkness fell rapidly, and searchlights were turned on -to the enemy, lighting up the ghastly scene where men could be seen -jumping clear of the ship into the icy-cold water. The _Leipzig_ was -heeled over to port, almost on her beam ends; she only had a bit of -one funnel left, and all the after part of the ship was in flames. -The fire on her forecastle had also burst into flame. Thick clouds of -white steam escaping, showed up against the dense black smoke, and -increased the dramatic effect. Our little boats became visible in the -beams of the searchlights, as they rowed round to pick up survivors. -At 9.21 P.M. a shower of sparks suddenly announced an explosion, -directly after which the _Leipzig_ foundered. Several of our boats -were holed, and we only succeeded in saving six officers and nine men -between the two of us, all of whom, however, survived the extreme -cold. They told us that before the ship was abandoned the Kingston -valves had been opened. - -No further casualties had occurred on board the _Glasgow_ since -those already mentioned, as after joining the _Cornwall_ she had not -come under direct fire, although some projectiles intended for the -latter did hit her. The _Cornwall_ was even more fortunate in having -no casualties at all except for a solitary pet canary, in spite of -having eighteen direct hits not counting splinter holes, of which -there were forty-two in one funnel alone. This absence of casualties, -which was also a feature of the battle-cruiser action, speaks for the -efficient handling of the ship by Captain Ellerton. - -Survivors stated that von Spee was originally going direct to the -Plate to coal, but that having captured a sailing vessel full of coal -at Cape Horn, he changed his plans and decided to attack the Falkland -Islands. It was also stated that the _Leipzig_ had a large amount of -gold on board. - -One of the survivors rescued by the _Cornwall_ was a naval reservist, -who in time of peace had occupied the post of German interpreter to -the Law Courts at Sydney, in Australia. When hauled into the boat -the first words he used as soon as he had recovered his breath were: -"It's bloody cold" in a perfect English accent. It is a well-known -fact that sailors rarely make use of bad language, and the bowman who -had hauled him out of the water is said to have fainted! Evidently -the language of the Law leaves much to be desired. - -The torpedo lieutenant of the _Leipzig_ was amongst those saved -by the _Cornwall_. When brought alongside he was too exhausted to -clamber up the ship's side unaided, but when he reached the upper -deck he pulled himself together and stood to attention, saluting our -officers at the gangway. When he came into the wardroom later on he -explained that he had been on board before as a guest at dinner at -the time that the ship paid a visit to Kiel for the regatta in 1909, -adding that he little expected then that his next visit would take -place under such tragic circumstances. - -This officer surprised us all by suddenly asking when the _Cornwall_ -had had bigger guns put into her, and went on to say that when -we fired our "big guns"--meaning when we started to use lyddite -shell--the damage was appalling, arms and legs were to be seen -all along the decks, and each shell that burst started a fire. He -went on to say that the _Cornwall's_ firing was very effective and -accurate, but doubtless most of the prisoners told their captors -the same thing. We explained that the armament had not been changed -since the ship was originally built. He also told us that the German -captain had assembled all the ship's company when their 1,800 rounds -of ammunition were expended, and said, "There is the ensign, and any -man who wishes may go and haul it down, but I will not do so." Not a -soul moved to carry out the suggestion, but about fifty men, having -obtained permission, jumped overboard and must have perished from the -cold. There were only eighteen left alive on board at the end, so far -as he could judge, and of these sixteen were saved. All the officers -carried whistles, which accounted for their being located in the -water so easily. - -The prisoners naturally wished to glorify themselves, their captain, -and their shipmates in the eyes of their fellow-countrymen, before -whom they knew that these stories would eventually be repeated. -Therefore these yarns about the ensign, the men jumping overboard, -and the opening of the Kingston valves must be taken with a grain of -salt. - -The _Cornwall_ had one or two interesting examples of the damage -done to a ship by modern high-explosive shell. The most serious was -a shell that must have exploded on the water-line, as the ship was -rolling, for the side was afterwards found to be indented 5 inches -at a position 5 to 6 feet below the water-line, and consequently -below the armoured belt, a cross bulkhead being at the precise point -of impact. Curious as it may appear, even the paint was untouched, -and there was no sign of a direct hit from outboard, except for the -bulge that remained and the starting of a good many rivets from their -sockets. The cross bulkhead behind was buckled up like corrugated -iron, and the two coal bunkers, which had been empty, were flooded, -giving the ship a heavy list. When we got into Port William we -managed to heel the ship sufficiently to enable our carpenters to -get at the leak, and they succeeded in completely stopping it in -two days, working day and night--a fine performance, for which Mr. -Egford, the carpenter, received the D.S.C., whilst his staff were -personally congratulated by the Commander-in-Chief. - -Another shell passed through the steel depression rail of the -after 6-inch turret, by which it was deflected through the deck at -the junction of two cabin bulkheads; it next penetrated the deck -below and finally burst on the ship's side, causing a large hole. -An amusing incident was connected with this. The projectile cut a -fire-hose in half, the business end of which was carried down the -hole into one of the officer's cabins, where it continued to pump in -water for the remainder of the action. At the end of the day this -officer found all his belongings, including his full dress and cocked -hat, floating about in two or three feet of water. - -Another officer was seated on a box in the ammunition passage waiting -for the wounded, when a shell struck the ship's side close by him, -the concussion knocking him off. Getting up, he saw the doctor near -by, and thought he had kicked him, so asked him angrily what the -blazes he thought he was doing. It was not until after a long and -heated argument that he could be persuaded to believe that he had not -been the victim of a practical joke. - -In another case a shell shot away the fire main immediately above -one of the stokeholds, which was flooded. Stoker Petty Officer W. A. -Townsend and Stoker John Smith were afterwards both decorated with -the D.S.M. for "keeping the boiler fires going under very trying -circumstances." - -It was mentioned before that some ships had leave to open up their -machinery for repairs. The _Cornwall_ was to have steam at six hours' -notice, and had the low-pressure cylinder of the port engine opened -up and in pieces for repairs when the signal to raise steam was -made. Chief Engine Room Artificer J. G. Hill was awarded the D.S.M. -"for his smart performance in getting the port engine, which was -disconnected, into working order." It will have been noticed that the -ship was steaming 20 knots two and a half hours after the signal to -raise steam. This was a remarkable performance, and reflected great -credit on her entire engineering staff. - -A signalman, Frank Glover, was given the D.S.M. for "carrying out his -duties of range-taker in a very cool manner during the whole of the -action." He was in an entirely exposed position on the fore upper -bridge. - -More has been said about the part taken by the _Cornwall_, as the -writer was on board her, and most of the incidents described came -under his personal observation. They are, however, typical of the -conduct of the officers and men in the other ships that took part.[9] - - - - -CHAPTER XIII - -THE SINKING OF THE "NÜRNBERG" - - "While England, England rose, - Her white cliffs laughing out across the waves, - Victorious over all her enemies." - - --ALFRED NOYES (_Drake_). - - -We must now go back to the commencement of the action with the -_Leipzig_. At 4.30 P.M., in accordance with a signal made by the -_Cornwall_, the _Kent_ branched off in pursuit of the _Nürnberg_ and -was soon out of sight. - -Thus a third fight developed through the high speed attained by -the _Kent_, which enabled her to catch up and force action on the -_Nürnberg_. The following description has been largely compiled from -a narrative written by an officer in the _Kent_, while from the -particulars undernoted concerning the ships two important features -stand out: the speed of the two ships was nearly equal, and the -German was built five years later than her opponent, and therefore -should have been able to maintain her speed with less difficulty. - - _Name_ _Tonnage_ _Armament_ _Speed_ _Completion_ - - _Kent_ 9,800 14--6" 23.7 1903 - _Nürnberg_ 3,396 10--4.1" 23.5 1908 - 8--2.1" - - "Brassey's Naval Annual." - -In the course of the afternoon the weather became misty, so that it -seemed imperative to get to close quarters as rapidly as possible. -That this was fully realised and acted upon is shown by what was -written by an officer in the _Kent_: "In the last hour of the chase, -helped by a light ship and a clean bottom, by the most determined -stoking, by unremitting attention to her no longer youthful -boilers--in short, by the devotion of every officer and man in the -engine and boiler rooms, the _Kent_ achieved the remarkable speed of -25 knots." - -Both ships were steering a south-easterly course at 5 P.M. when the -_Kent_ got within range of the _Nürnberg_, which opened fire with -her stern guns. The chase had in all lasted nearly seven hours, -so the sound of the enemy's guns proved doubly welcome, since it -brought home the fact that the German was now trapped. The fall -of the enemy's shot was awaited with that eagerness combined with -anxiety which only those who have undergone the experience can fully -realise. Accurate ranges were hard to take on account of the abnormal -vibration caused by the speed at which the ship was travelling, but -it was expected that the enemy's first salvoes would fall short. But -not a sign was to be seen anywhere of these projectiles. Where, then, -had they gone? - -Officers glanced round the horizon to make quite certain that the -enemy was not firing at another ship, but nothing else was in sight. -A light, drizzling rain was falling, so that it was not till the -third salvo that the splashes were discovered astern of the ship. -This bore out the experience of the _Cornwall_ and _Glasgow_, which -had also been astonished at the long range of the German 4.1" gun, -which is said to be sighted up to 12 kilometres (13,120 yards). - -Nine minutes after (5.9) the _Kent_ opened fire at 11,000 yards -with her fore turret, but the shots fell short. Altering course -slightly to port, she was able to bring her two foremost 6-inch on -the starboard side to bear, making four guns in all. The light was -poor, and both ships had difficulty in seeing well enough to correct -the gun range at this distance. Thus this opening stage of the combat -was not very fruitful of results as far as could be judged, though -survivors subsequently stated that the _Kent_ scored two effective -hits, one of which penetrated the after steering flat below the -waterline and killed all the men in it with one exception. On the -other hand, the enemy (missing mainly for deflection) only got in one -hit during the same period. - -About 5.35 two boilers of the _Nürnberg_ burst in quick succession, -apparently from excess of pressure due to her strenuous efforts to -escape. This reduced her speed to 19 knots, when all hope of averting -disaster, even with the aid of several lucky shots, was shattered at -one fell swoop. The _Kent_ now gained very rapidly on her opponent, -and all anxiety as to the chase being prolonged until dark was -dispelled. - -[Illustration: _Plan of action between H.M.S. "KENT" and German Light -Cruiser "NÜRNBERG" off FALKLAND ISLANDS December 8^{th} 1914_ - - The Mappa Co. Ltd. London -] - -Realising the hopelessness of continuing the attempt to escape, the -German decided to fight it out, and altered course ten minutes later -90 degrees to port (_see_ Plan). The _Kent_ turned about 70 degrees -to port, so that both ships were on converging courses, and able to -bring every gun on the broadside to bear. The running fight was over, -and the action developed during the ensuing quarter of an hour -into as fierce a duel as it is possible to imagine, with the range -rapidly decreasing from 6,000 to 3,000 yards and all guns firing -in succession, keeping up one continuous thunder. The _Kent_ now -started using her lyddite shell. As was only to be expected, a good -deal of damage resulted. In a very short time a fire broke out near -the German's mainmast, followed a little later by the fall of her -main-topmast, which bent gracefully forward like a sapling, and then -fell with a crash. Both ships were firing their guns independently, -not in salvoes, and in consequence the sequence of the discharges -was almost unbroken. A fearful din resulted, which was as loud as -it was penetrating, and soon began to have an irritating effect on -the nerves. The incessant clanging and clashing jarred horribly and -gave the impression that the ship was being continually hit; in fact, -those below began to think that matters were not going too well from -the constant concussions and severe jolts that were felt, until they -were reassured by the optimistic and cheering bits of news passed -down through the voice-pipes. The _Kent's_ fore-topgallant-mast now -suddenly fell over, fortunately remaining suspended in midair by the -stays; a chance shot had cut right through the heel. - -From the rate of fire maintained at such a short range it was -patent that matters would soon be brought to a finish so far as -the _Nürnberg_ was concerned. By 6.5 P.M. her fore-topmast had -disappeared, she was on fire in two or three places, and her speed -was still further reduced. She turned away, as if to escape such -heavy punishment, the details of which could be plainly observed at -this short distance. Her upper deck was a veritable shambles, and -most of the guns' crews, only protected by gun shields, had been -killed. In the words of one of the _Kent's_ officers, "her foretop -and foremost funnel were so riddled that they appeared to be covered -with men"; the torn and twisted steel sticking out in every direction -caused this paradoxical illusion. Only two of her guns on the port -side remained in action. - -On the other hand, the _Kent_ herself had by no means come out -unscathed. In addition to the hits already mentioned, there were many -more that had struck the ship's side and boat deck on the starboard -side, but no fires of consequence had taken place, nor had there been -any hits on the water-line of a vital character. One of the enemy's -shells burst just outside the midship casemate situated on the main -deck. Only fragments entered, but there were ten casualties, most -of them burns; one man was killed instantly, and he remained in -the same position after death with arms bent for holding a cordite -charge. A small fire was caused, and the flames passed down the -ammunition hoist to the passage below, igniting a charge which was -hooked on ready to be hoisted. Had it not been for the prompt action -of Sergeant Charles Mayes, of the Royal Marines, complete destruction -might easily have followed. With the greatest presence of mind, he -immediately isolated the cordite charges in the vicinity, closed the -sliding scuttle in the hoist, and at the same time ordered his men -to run for the nearest hoses to flood the compartment. The fire was -extinguished before it could get a hold, and for this brave deed he -was awarded the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal and an annuity of £20. - -The _Nürnberg_ executed a sudden and unexpected manœuvre at 6.10 by -turning inwards as if about to ram her opponent. Continuing the turn, -however, she eventually passed astern of the _Kent_ and brought her -starboard guns into play for the first time. During this manœuvre, -and while in an end-on position, two of our shells burst almost -simultaneously on her forecastle, causing a fire and putting the guns -there out of action. - -In reply to this manœuvre the _Kent_ turned to a nearly opposite -course. It will be realised from the plan that the _Kent_ was -travelling well over twice as fast as her opponent at this time, and -that her port guns were now brought into action. The courses of both -ships were again roughly parallel, the _Kent_ taking care to avoid -getting on the beam of the _Nürnberg_, which would have afforded the -latter an opportunity of using her torpedoes. - -From now on the distance between the two ships gradually increased. - -The German's fire was very spasmodic, and it was evident that she -could not last much longer. By 6.25 her engines were apparently -stopped, for she was barely moving through the water. She was now -badly battered and scarcely recognisable as the ship of an hour and -a half before. The _Kent_ had to turn right round again to keep -somewhere near her, and continued to fire at her with devastating -effect. - -At 6.36 the enemy ceased fire altogether, the _Kent_ followed suit, -and for a short while awaited developments. Being now on fire all -along her fore part, the German ship looked a complete wreck, and -showed not a vestige of life as she lay helpless on the water. She -had a list, and was at a dead standstill. In vain the _Kent_ waited -for her to strike her colours, and so, as she showed no signs of -sinking, opened fire once more, slowly closing and keeping well -before her beam, firing at her with all guns that would bear. Not -till 6.57 did she haul down her colours, whereupon all firing ceased. - -On examination it was found that nearly all the _Kent's_ boats were -splintered or smashed up by the enemy's fire, and there were only -two that could be temporarily patched up in a short space of time. -While the necessary repairs were in progress, the _Nürnberg_, which -had been heeling over more and more, turned over on her starboard -side, and in a deathlike silence disappeared beneath the surface -at 7.27 P.M. Captain J. D. Allen, in Writing of his Men, says, "No -sooner had she sunk than the _Kent's_ men displayed the same zeal and -activity in endeavouring to save life as they had done in fighting -the ship. Boats were hastily repaired and lowered, manned by men -eagerly volunteering to help. Unfortunately, the sea was rough and -the water very cold, so we only succeeded in picking up twelve men, -of whom five subsequently died." The search for the survivors was -continued till 9 A.M. It is said that even the living were attacked -by albatrosses. - -While the ship was sinking a few German seamen gathered at the stern -and waved their ensign to and fro before going down with the ship. - -The _Kent_ was hit thirty-seven times altogether, but suffered -no damage affecting her seaworthiness. Her wireless telegraphy -transmitting instruments were smashed to pieces by a shell, which -passed through the wireless office. She was thus unable to report the -result of her action, and caused the Commander-in-Chief some anxiety -regarding her fate. The receiving instruments, however, were intact, -so all the wireless signals made by the Commander-in-Chief inquiring -as to her whereabouts were taken in and read, though she was -powerless to reply. The upper works on the starboard side presented -a sorry spectacle, but the armour, though hit, was unpierced. Only -two shots burst against the unarmoured part of the ship's side, -one making a hole about four feet square just before the foremost -starboard 6-inch gun on the main deck, and the other a hole of about -equal size on the same side immediately below the after shelter deck. - -A German officer who was saved said that they had heard by wireless -that the British had "blown up the harbour" at the Falklands, and had -fled to the west coast of Africa! He also stated that the _Nürnberg_ -had not been refitted for three years, and that her boilers were in -a very bad state, which was borne out by some of them having burst -during the chase. - -Each seaman 6-inch gun's crew had five Royal Naval Reservemen in it, -and their conduct speaks volumes for the all-round efficiency of the -men that the Navy has drawn from the Reserve during the War. - -The total casualties in the _Kent_ amounted to 16 men, 5 of whom were -killed, whilst 3 of the wounded afterwards died of their wounds. - -Commander Wharton, of the _Kent_, gives a remarkably realistic -description of the closing scenes: "It was strange and weird -all this aftermath, the wind rapidly arising from the westward, -darkness closing in, one ship heaving to the swell, well battered, -the foretop-gallant-mast gone. Of the other, nothing to be seen -but floating wreckage, with here and there a man clinging, and the -'molly-hawks' swooping by. The wind moaned, and death was in the air. -Then, see! Out of the mist loomed a great four-masted barque under -full canvas. A great ghost-ship she seemed. Slowly, majestically, she -sailed by and vanished in the night." This was the same ghost-ship -that had appeared in the middle of the action fought by the -battle-cruisers--a very fitting apparition, which upholds the legend -that one always appears at a British naval engagement. Meeting one -of the officers of this sailing vessel later on in the Dardanelles, -it was revealed that she had been out at sea so long that she was -unaware that war had even been declared, until she suddenly found -herself a spectator of two naval actions on the same day. - -A silk ensign, presented to the ship by the ladies of Kent, was -torn to ribbons in the course of the day. The pieces, however, were -carefully collected by Captain J. D. Allen, and returned to the -donors, who sewed them together. This ensign now hangs in Canterbury -Cathedral. A new silk ensign was given to the ship by the ladies of -the county of Kent, and was hoisted on the first anniversary of the -battle, December 8th, 1915. - - - - -CHAPTER XIV - -AFTERMATH - - ... "England - Grasped with sure hands the sceptre of the sea, - That untamed realm of liberty which none - Had looked upon as aught but wilderness - Ere this, or even dreamed of as the seat - Of power and judgment and high sovereignty - Whereby all nations at the last should make - One brotherhood, and war should be no more." - - --ALFRED NOYES (_Drake_). - - -The battle of the Falkland Islands was, perhaps, more like the -old-time naval engagements fought by sailing ships of the line than -any other naval battle that is likely to take place nowadays. There -were no submarines, no destroyers, no aeroplanes or Zeppelins, nor -any other of the manifold death-dealing devices that tend to make war -so much more hideous than in days gone by. In a word, it was open -fighting. Not a torpedo was fired. Not even a mine was dropped, if -the survivors who stated that the German ships did not carry them -can be believed. There were a few anxious moments when zinc cases -were seen floating on the surface ahead, glistening in the sunlight, -but they turned out to be empty cartridge cases that the enemy had -dropped overboard. - -There were three very general feelings that followed on after the -battle: firstly, that we had at last been able to achieve something -of real value; secondly, that it was quite as good as a fortnight's -leave (the most one usually gets in the Navy); and thirdly, that -the war would now soon be over. In a similar manner, after a local -success on land, the soldiers at the beginning of the war frequently -hoped that it might bring matters to a conclusion. Thus do local -events in war assume an exaggerated importance. - -There can be no two opinions as to the decisive nature of this -battle. In the course of a single day, the whole of this German -squadron, together with two colliers, had been destroyed with the -exception of the light cruiser _Dresden_. A comparison of the -difference in the casualties points not only to its decisiveness, but -also to the success of Admiral Sturdee's dispositions and methods of -bringing the enemy to action. It was a strategic victory. - -The German Admiral found himself very much in the same position as -Admiral Cradock at Coronel, with one important difference. Cradock -sought action despite the many odds against him, whereas von Spee -tried to run when he found he was outclassed. Sir Henry Newbolt puts -the proposition admirably. After remarking that running is the game -of the losing side, he says, "You have only to consider what it would -have been worth to Germany to have had a Cradock flying his flag in -the _Scharnhorst_ on that December 8th. You can imagine him, when the -great battle-cruisers came out of harbour, signalling, 'I am going -to attack the enemy now,' and going straight to meet them at full -speed. Their steam was not yet up--he could have closed them then -and there. What a fight that would have been! No impotent scattering -flight, no hours of burning misery, with ships turning this way and -that, to bring their guns to bear upon an enemy beyond their reach; -but a desperate short-range action with every shot telling--a chance -of dealing the enemy a heavy blow before the end, and the certainty -of leaving a great tradition to the Service." - - -Directly the _Gneisenau_ was sunk, wireless signals were made by the -Commander-in-Chief asking where the _Dresden_ was last seen, and in -what direction she was heading at that time. It will be recollected -that she had the speed of our armoured cruisers and got clean away -without firing a single round, having been last seen by the _Glasgow_ -steering away to the S.S.W. Later signals were made calling up the -_Kent_, as no one knew what had happened to her, since she was last -seen going after the _Nürnberg_. These calls were repeated again and -again without result on account of her damaged wireless, and it was -not till the afternoon of the following day that all anxieties were -allayed by the _Kent_ arriving at Port William, bringing with her the -news of another brilliant success. - -The problem of the moment, therefore, was to complete the victory by -rounding up the _Dresden_ as soon as possible. Should she escape now -and take refuge in one of the innumerable inlets or channels that -abound in the unsurveyed localities of the southern part of South -America, clearly it would be a matter of great difficulty to catch -her. With his characteristic energy, Admiral Sturdee did not lose a -moment in following up his victory. The _Carnarvon_ was despatched -to escort the _Orama_ and colliers coming south from the base to -Port Stanley. The two battle-cruisers _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ -proceeded with all haste to Staten Island, and thence made a careful -search for the _Dresden_ in the numerous bays around Tierra del -Fuego. The _Glasgow_ was ordered to the Straits of Magellan in the -hope that she might intercept her, whilst the _Bristol_ searched for -both the _Dresden_ and the _Kent_ to the southward of the Falklands. -Owing to lack of coal, the _Cornwall_ was obliged to return to -harbour, and was the first ship to arrive there on December 9th; she -was followed shortly afterwards by the _Kent_. - -During the night of December 8th a thick fog came on, which made -the navigation of those of our ships endeavouring to make land no -easy matter. Magnetic compasses are apt to be considerably affected -by gun-fire, and consequently the dead-reckoning positions of our -ships were by no means to be relied upon, and were not sufficiently -accurate to give confidence in approaching an indented coast like the -east side of the Falklands. - -Sad to relate, not a vestige of the _Dresden_ was seen by any of our -ships that were scattered in the search for her. She was careful -to abstain from using her wireless, even though there must have -been several German supply ships in the vicinity who would urgently -require to be informed of the annihilation of their squadron. This -quest entailed travelling at high speed, so shortage of coal and -oil fuel forced our ships to return one by one. By the evening of -December 11th the whole squadron had once again reassembled at the -Falklands. - -Congratulations now poured in from all parts of the world, and were -promulgated by the Commander-in-Chief. The Governor of the Falkland -Islands, the Hon. William Allardyce, C.M.G., visited the flagship -and congratulated Admiral Sturdee, together with the whole of our -squadron, in glowing terms on behalf of the colony. Admiral Sturdee -issued an interesting Memorandum, which is given _in toto_, calling -attention to the urgent necessity for completing the victory by -running the _Dresden_ to earth. These messages are given in Part III. - -Casualties in any decisive modern naval engagement are frequently -very one-sided, one fleet suffering enormous losses whilst the other -escapes with comparative immunity. This battle proved no exception to -this rule. In the British squadron, the _Invincible_ and _Cornwall_ -had no casualties, though they both had a big share of hits. The -_Carnarvon_ and _Bristol_ were untouched. The _Inflexible_ had 1 man -killed and 3 slightly wounded. The _Glasgow_ had 1 man killed and -4 wounded through a single unlucky shot. The heaviest casualties -occurred in the _Kent_, who had 5 men killed and 11 wounded, 3 of -whom subsequently succumbed to their wounds; most of these were -caused by the bursting of one shell. She was hit thirty-seven times, -and went in to a much closer range than the remainder of our ships. -The squadron, therefore, incurred a total loss of 10 men killed -and 15 wounded, whilst the Germans lost some 2,260 men all told. -The crews of their ships totalled 2,432 officers and men, and were -estimated as follows: - - _Scharnhorst_ 872 _Gneisenau_ 835 - _Nürnberg_ 384 _Leipzig_ 341 - -The prize bounty amounted to the sum of £12,160, to be divided -amongst the officers and crews of the _Invincible_, _Inflexible_, -_Carnarvon_, _Cornwall_, _Kent_, and _Glasgow_, being calculated -at the usual rate of £5 per head. In the course of the Prize Court -proceedings the following reference to the German Admiral Count von -Spee was made in regard to his action at Coronel: "Whatever others -might have thought of this twist of the lion's tail, it appeared that -the German Admiral was under no delusion.... It was perhaps as well -to put on record that the German Admiral, when he took his fleet into -Valparaiso, refused to drink the toast of 'Damnation to the British -Navy,' and apparently had a premonition that his end was very near." - -The prisoners of war were all sent home in the _Macedonia_ and the -storeship _Crown of Galicia_, but not before Admiral Sturdee had -given them to understand in the firmest possible manner that if any -man was found tampering with the ship's fittings, or was discovered -out of that portion of the ship allocated to his use, he would be -very severely dealt with. - -The few days spent at Port Stanley after the battle will always live -in the memory of those who were present. They were days full of hard -work, combined with visits to friends and interesting discussions on -individual experiences. The interest of meeting, boarding, and going -over other ships to view the shot holes may be imagined. Reports and -plans had to be made out. Several ships had to be heeled over to get -at the damaged part, and presented a comic appearance, the _Cornwall_ -being so far over as to look positively dangerous. All ships had to -coal and were busy at it night and day. Few will forget those night -coalings--ugh!--in a temperature of forty degrees, with a bitterly -cold wind accompanied almost invariably by occasional squalls of hail -and rain. - -Those cheers we gave one another will not be forgotten; they rang -true, being full of pent-up enthusiasm, and, as Mr. John Masefield -says, "went beyond the guard of the English heart." - -Unfortunately, subsequent events have made it impossible to recall -this overwhelming victory without a feeling of sadness due to the -loss of the gallant _Invincible_ in the battle of Jutland. One -description of that battle says that four of her men succeeded in -boarding a raft, and as one of our ships passed, taking them at -first for Huns, the narrator adds, "The four got up on their feet -and cheered like blazes. It was the finest thing I have ever seen." -Most of her crew were lost, but we have at least the satisfaction of -knowing they died as heroes. - - - - -CHAPTER XV - -THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SAILOR IN ACTION - - "Mother and sweetheart, England; ... - ... thy love was ever wont - To lift men up in pride above themselves - To do great deeds which of themselves alone - They could not; thou hast led the unfaltering feet - Of even thy meanest heroes down to death, - Lifted poor knights to many a great emprise, - Taught them high thoughts, and though they kept their souls - Lowly as little children, bidden them lift - Eyes unappalled by all the myriad stars - That wheel around the great white throne of God." - - --ALFRED NOYES (_Drake_). - - -The naval man is often confronted with the question: "What does -it feel like to be in an action at sea?" This is undoubtedly very -difficult to answer in anything approaching an adequate manner. There -are various reasons for hesitancy in reply. Broadly speaking, the -answer depends on two main factors, environment and temperament, but -there are many minor points depending on the experience, education, -and character of the man in question that at the same time vitally -affect it. An attempt to generalise, therefore, is sure to be open to -criticism. It is consequently with much diffidence that the following -ideas are set forth, in the hope that they may assist the landsman to -appreciate, in some slight degree, the various points of view of the -officers and men who fight in our warships. - -There is obviously a wide difference in the outlook, and consequently -in the working of the mind, of the man behind a gun, or in any other -position where he can see and hear how matters are progressing, and -the man buried in the bowels of the ship, who is stoking, working -machinery, or engaged in the supply of ammunition. When once the -action has begun, the former will probably never give a moment's -thought to his own safety or that of the ship he is in, whilst the -latter, during any intervals that may occur in his work, can only -think of how things are going with his ship. Lastly, there is a -very divergent view between the man who knows he is going into a -battle such as that fought off the Falkland Islands, where our ships -possessed a marked superiority, and the man who was present, say, at -Coronel, where the conditions were reversed. - -During an action, the captain of a man-of-war is usually in the -conning-tower, where he is surrounded by several inches of steel. -A good all-round view is obtained through a slit between the roof -and the walls. From this point of vantage he can communicate with -the gunnery control positions, the gun positions, engine-rooms, -torpedo-rooms, and, in fact, with every portion of the complex -machine represented by a modern warship. Having spent a number of -years at sea, he has frequently pictured to himself what a naval -engagement would be like, but it is very problematical whether he has -ever taken the trouble to analyse what his own feelings would be; in -any case, his imaginations were probably both far from the reality. -When approaching the scene of action he most likely gives a passing -thought to his kith and kin, but his responsibility will be too -great to admit of his feelings taking hold of him, and his thoughts -will afterwards be concentrated entirely on the work in hand. During -the action he is watching every movement with the utmost keenness, -giving a curt order where necessary as he wipes from his face the -salt water splashed up by a short projectile. His nerves and even -his muscles are strung up to a high pitch of tensity, and he loses -himself altogether in working out the problem before him. - -The gunnery officer in the control position on the foremast is, -of course, in a much more exposed position; without any armour -protection to speak of. Doubtless there flashes across his mind a -hope that he will come through without being picked off by a stray -shot. The thoughts of the men with him, and those of the men working -the range-finders, who also have practically no protection, will -probably be very similar to his. But when approaching the enemy, all -their attention is needed to acquire as much information as possible, -in order to get an idea of his approximate course and speed. Later, -all their faculties are exercised in determining the corrections to -be made to the sights of their guns as regards range and deflection, -so as to hit the enemy, and in giving the orders to fire. - -The navigation officer, notebook in hand, is with the captain in the -conning-tower, and his thoughts are not far different. His attention -is riveted on the course of the ship and any impending manœuvre that -he may presume to be imminent or advisable. In some of the older -ships, where the quartermaster steers from the conning-tower, his -observation is often made more irksome by salt-water spray getting -into his eyes and preventing him from seeing the compass clearly. - -With the commander and others who may be below in the ammunition -passages in the depths of the ship, the one thought obsessing the -mind to the exclusion of almost everything else will be: "What is -happening, and how are we getting on?" Passing up ammunition is no -sinecure; it is invariably a warm job down below. Stripped to the -waist, hard at it, and perspiring freely, many a joke is cracked -in much the same spirit as inspires Tommy in the trenches. Now and -again a bit of news comes down and is passed along like lightning -from mouth to mouth. For example, in one case a shell hits one of our -ship's funnels, and it has gone by the board with a frightful din, -as if hell were suddenly let loose; the news is passed down to the -commander in the ammunition passage, to which he cheerily replies: -"That's all right; we have plenty left, haven't we?" Again, a shell -strikes the hull of the ship, making her quiver fore and aft and -almost stop her roll; naturally the effect of this is felt down below -far more than on deck, and though some may wonder whether it has -struck on the waterline or not, there is merely a casual remark that -the enemy is shooting a bit better. - -The engineer officers in the engine-rooms are constantly going to -and fro along the greasy steel floors, watching every bearing and -listening intently to every sound of the machinery in much the same -way as a motorist listens to hear if his engine is misfiring. They, -too, are longing for news of how the fight is going on as they -keenly watch for any alteration of the engine-room telegraphs, or of -the hundred and one dials showing the working of the various engines -under their charge. - -The stokers, stripped to a gantline, and digging out for daylight, -are in much the same position as those passing up ammunition, save -that they seldom, if ever, get a lull in their work in which to -indulge their thoughts. Those trimming the coal in the boxlike -bunkers have perhaps the most unenviable task. Breathing in a thick -haze of coal dust, black from head to foot, they work on at full -pressure in these veritable black holes, without the chance of -hearing any news of what is going on "up topsides." - -Every man in the ship is working at his appointed station during -an action--even the cooks are busy assisting with the supply of -ammunition--everyone is behind armour, or below the waterline, with -the exception of those few whose duties do not permit of it. This -fact accounts for the comparatively few casualties in the ships that -come out the victors in a sea fight, in spite of the tremendous havoc -done by a shell bursting in the vicinity of cast steel, which throws -up multitudes of splinter in all directions. - -The guns' crews are all working at their respective weapons, -sometimes wading in water if a heavy swell falls short close to -them. Yet they see the result of their work, and every bit of damage -done to the enemy is invariably put down to the handiwork of their -individual gun. They may be said to be having the time of their lives -in a successful action. During a lull, the enemy's fire is heavily -criticised; suggestions as to the corrections that should be applied -to his gunsights in order to get a hit are calmly made as they watch -the splashes of his projectiles, and are as soon contradicted by some -other authority who suggests something different. When their own ship -is hit a remark is made to the effect--"That was a good 'un!" from -the coldly calculating point of view of the expert. Unaccountable -as it may seem, during artillery fire at sea there is usually this -irrepressible desire to figure out the corrections needed for the -enemy's gunsights in order that he may register a direct hit. -Several of our naval officers testified to this strange phenomenon -at Gallipoli, when undergoing a bombardment from Turkish forts and -batteries, and added that they were held fascinated in doing so. - -On the other hand, when a shell goes beyond the ship, at the first -shrill whiz-z-z overhead, one calculates deliberately that the enemy -will shortly lower his range, and, discretion being the better part -of valour, the welcome shelter of a turret, casemate, or conning -tower is speedily sought. It is curious that if the shells are -falling short there is no such concern for the safety of one's skin. -The writer has seen a group of officers having a spirited argument -as to the corrections that should be made to the sights of a Turkish -gun whose shell fell a few hundred yards short of the ship. It was -not till one screamed past their heads, pitching in the water on the -far side, that they thought of taking cover. The analogy does not -apparently hold good to the same extent in the sister Service, for on -terra firma the range is registered with fair accuracy, and it is -usual to scuttle off to a dug-out as soon as Beachy Bill or Long Tom -opens fire. - -A shell from a heavy gun whistling close overhead seems to recall -something of the physical emotion experienced as a child, when one -ventured too high in a swing. There is a sort of eerie feeling -in the interior which seems to struggle upward to one's throat, -thereby causing a throttling sensation; and this seems to take place -continuously, though it diminishes slightly as time goes on. - -Another feature that is perhaps worth mentioning is what the sailor -calls "getting a cheap wash." This occurs incessantly in a naval -action, for a large shell fired at a long range falling into the -water close to a ship will throw up a solid wall of water, often two -or three hundred feet in height, so that it is no uncommon thing to -get frequently soused. In the Falkland Islands battle the men right -up in the control tops on the masts of the battle-cruisers complained -of being unable to work their instruments satisfactorily owing to -frequent drenchings by spray. - -The strain that is undergone during a naval action can easily be -imagined, though most men will agree that they are unconscious of it -at the time; it is not until everything is over and finished with -that its effects materialise. In the Navy every officer and man -bears the burden of responsibility, and frequently it is one upon -which may depend the safety of the lives of his shipmates. He may -have to execute a manœuvre of vital importance--close a watertight -compartment, put out a fire caused by a high explosive shell--or -do any of the hundred and one duties that are necessary in a -man-of-war. Newton's law of gravitation tells us that to every action -there is an equal and opposite reaction. This fundamental principle -undoubtedly holds good in the working of the human mind. The old -example that a piece of cord, gradually stretched tighter and tighter -until its limit of elasticity is attained, sags when the force is -removed, is a very good parallel indeed of what takes place during -and after action so far as the average fighting man is concerned. -His mind, and all his faculties, have been extended to their full -capacity in concentrating on the work in hand, in seeing that -there is no sign of a hitch anywhere, in forestalling any possible -accident, and in thinking out his own line of action in any given -circumstance that may arise. The man who has been toiling physically -has also been strung up to the highest possible pitch; the very best -that is in him has been called forth, and he has in all probability -never done better work, or striven so hard in his life before. - -The bugle call "Cease fire" does not necessarily imply that all is -over; it may only mean a temporary cessation or lull in the action; -but when the "Secure" is sounded, there is no mistaking that the -fight is finished. This is followed by the "Disperse," when all guns -are secured, ammunition returned, and all the magazines and shell -rooms locked up. Then a large number of the men are free; orders are -given to the engine-room department regarding the speed required, -enabling some of the stokers told off as relief parties and employed -in trimming coal to be released. - -As a general rule, however, the guns are kept manned and speed is -not reduced after a modern naval action, so that the number of -men released from duty is comparatively small. Perhaps the enemy -is sinking, when the seamen will be engaged in turning out boats -preparatory to saving life. The men who are unemployed watch the -sinking of an enemy ship with very different sentiments. All -experience a glow of satisfaction, and most men will pity the poor -wretches who are drowning or clinging more or less hopelessly to -floating pieces of wreckage. A few are entirely callous, deeming such -emotions a sign of weakness in view of the many atrocities committed -by the enemy. This scarcely applied after the battle of the Falkland -Islands, where the "Hymn of Hate" and other German propaganda -fostering feelings of enmity had not embittered men's minds. - -Lastly, there comes the utter physical weariness both of mind and -body, attended by an intense longing for food, drink, and sleep, -accompanied by the pleasant thought that the war will now soon be -over. Officers crowd into the wardroom to get a drink and something -to eat. The galley fire will be out, for the chef has been passing up -ammunition, so no hot food, tea, or cocoa will be available for some -little time. A walk round the ship reveals men lying in all sorts of -impossible postures, too done up to bother about eating; others are -crowding round the canteen, or getting any food that they can on the -mess deck. - -After the battle of the Falkland Islands one of the boy stewards -who had been passing up shell during the action was found in the -ammunition passage, "dead to the world," lying athwart an old -washtub. There he was, in that stale and stuffy atmosphere, in the -most uncomfortable position imaginable, fast asleep, completely worn -out from sheer exhaustion, with his head and arms dangling over one -side of the tub. - -A large number have to continue their labours on watch in the engine -room or on deck, in spite of having the greatest difficulty in -keeping their eyes open. The extreme tension and strain is over, and -it requires a strong effort to resist the temptation to let things -slide and relapse into a state of inanition. - -That the men brace themselves to grapple with their further duties -in a spirit which allows no sign of reluctance or fatigue to -show itself, does them infinite credit. They must look forward -nevertheless to the moment when the ship will pass safely into some -harbour guarded by net-defence from submarine attack, where all -the guns' crews are not required to be constantly awake at their -guns, and fires can be put out. Then, after coaling, prolonged and -undisturbed sleep may be indulged in to make up for the lost hours, -and "peace, perfect peace," will reign--for a while. - - - - -CHAPTER XVI - -VON SPEE'S AIMS AND HOPES - - -The British Public and our gallant Allies have no doubt fully -appreciated the commercial importance of the battle of the Falkland -Islands. The relief that was thereby given to our shipping and trade -not only in South American waters, but throughout our overseas -Empire, can only be realised by those who have large interests -therein. British trade with South America was first upset by the -exploits of the _Karlsruhe_, later on prestige was still more -affected by the Coronel disaster, and, finally, most of all by the -expectation of the arrival of von Spee's squadron in the Atlantic. -The freedom since enjoyed by our merchant shipping on all the -sea-trade routes of the world was in great part due to the success of -this portion of our Navy, the blockade having been firmly established -by our powerful fleet in home waters. The toll of ships sunk and -captured in the early months of the war would have been much greater, -trade would have been seriously dislocated for the time being, and -the pinch of a shortage in food supplies would probably have been -felt had it not been for this very opportune victory. - -What were von Spee's intentions after the destruction of Admiral -Cradock's squadron we shall probably never know, but it is evident -that he could not remain in the Pacific; it is fairly certain, also, -that he intended to seize the Falkland Islands if he found them -insufficiently guarded, as he had reason to infer was the case. -Obviously the most tempting course then open to him, whether he took -the Falklands or not, was to hold up our trade along the whole of the -east coast of South America. But the possibility of doing this was -diminished by his fatal delay after Coronel, before making a move. -Had he acted at once he might have been able to do this with impunity -for at least a month, by dividing up his squadron into small units. -His coal and other supplies would have been easily assured through -the armed merchant cruisers _Prinz Eitel Friedrich_ and _Kronprinz -Wilhelm_, organising the colliers and shoreships along these coasts. -The _Kronprinz Wilhelm_ had been operating for months past on the -north coast of South America in conjunction with the _Karlsruhe_, and -therefore already knew the tricks of this trade. - -Had he been permitted to pursue this policy, von Spee was inevitably -bound to touch on the delicate subject of neutrality in arranging -supplies for so numerous a squadron. Now, according to the laws laid -down by Article 5 of the Hague Conference, 1907, "belligerents are -forbidden to use neutral ports and waters as a base of operations -against their adversaries." By Article 12 it is laid down that -in default of any other special provisions in the legislation of -a neutral Power, belligerent warships are forbidden to remain in -the ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters of the said Power for -more than twenty-four hours, except in special cases covered by the -Convention. It is left to the neutral to make regulations as to the -hospitality it will afford, and those laid down by Brazil were that a -belligerent vessel was only allowed to visit one of their ports once -in three months for the purpose of obtaining supplies. - -Being aware of these conditions, and that neutrality could not be -imposed upon to an unlimited extent, it follows that von Spee would -have been dependent in a great measure on supply ships which were -able to evade the scrutiny of the neutral authorities--a precarious -state of existence. Coal would be his prime necessity, and he might -have hoped to secure a supply of this from captured colliers, but he -could not depend upon it for such a large number of ships. Meanwhile, -however, very considerable damage might have been done to our -shipping, and it is generally believed the Germans were optimistic -enough to hope that England would be brought to her knees from -starvation by being cut off from both North and South American ports -during this period, although there was really no ground whatsoever -for such a surmise. Perhaps we shall in the future be careful not -to frame so many laws for the conduct of war, since the Power that -neglects these laws rides roughshod over her more conscientious -opponent. - -Such a scheme may have been the natural outcome of von Spee's -success at Coronel. On the other hand, it is impossible to state -with certainty that he did not intend to go ultimately to the Cape -of Good Hope or some other part of Africa, but the pros and cons -have already been discussed, and it scarcely appears probable. Von -Spee, of course, had no notion of the prompt measure taken by our -Admiralty in dispatching two powerful battle-cruisers of high speed -to these waters without loss of time and in complete secrecy, though -he must have concluded that no time would be lost in sending out -reinforcements. Apparently his judgment was here at fault; hence the -proposed attack on our colony in the Falkland Islands, the capture -of which would have yielded him coal for his squadron's immediate -requirements. - -Von Spee is said to have been over-persuaded by his staff to -undertake this latter venture. His movements here certainly led to -the conclusion that he had no fixed plan. When the _Invincible_ -reached Pernambuco on her way home, there was a strong rumour that -three colliers had been waiting off the coast for the _Scharnhorst_ -and _Gneisenau_; this points to the capture of the Falklands not -being included in the original plan. Admiral Sturdee searched the -area for these ships but found nothing. - -Both the British and German squadrons refrained from using wireless, -and so had no knowledge of their proximity during the first week in -December. Had the German ships passed our squadron whilst coaling at -the Falklands, they would in all likelihood have separated, and would -then have had a free hand--for some time, at any rate--along the east -coast, whilst our ships would have gone round the Horn and searched -for them in vain in the Pacific. The first intimation of their having -eluded our squadron would have been that much of our shipping would -be reported overdue in England from South American ports (for von -Spee would most assuredly have avoided approaching within sight of -land). This would very probably have been put down in the first few -instances to the depredations of the _Karlsruhe_, whose fate was at -this time quite unknown. The _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ were -sufficiently powerful to cope with anything which von Spee thought -was likely to be in these seas. As a matter of fact, however, the -battle-cruiser _Princess Royal_ was in North American waters at this -time, having left England in secrecy soon after the _Invincible_ and -_Inflexible_ were dispatched south. - -In further support of this theory of what was the German Admiral's -plan of campaign, it may be mentioned that a fully laden German -collier was forced to intern at a South American port south of the -Plate in order to avoid capture by the _Carnarvon_ and _Cornwall_, -who were searching the coast there just after the battle of the -Falklands took place. Another collier, the _Mera_, put back into -Montevideo very hurriedly and interned herself, and lastly, the -tender _Patagonia_ ended her career in like manner. The presence of -all these ships in this locality is evidence of the organisation -arranged for the supply of the German squadron along this coast, and -precludes the idea of its going to Africa. - -There is evidence to show that von Spee picked up naval reservists -for his squadron at Valparaiso, but there is none to confirm the -rumour that he proposed to occupy the Falkland Islands, retaining -a garrison there after they had been captured. He could never have -hoped to occupy or to hold them for any length of time. Baron von -Maltzhan, the manager of a large sheep farm in Chile, was selected to -take command of an expedition consisting of an armed force of some -500 men, whose function was to assist in the capture of the Falkland -Islands, but not necessarily to remain on as a permanent garrison. - -The damage that can be done to merchant shipping and trade by a -single hostile ship has been demonstrated on more than one occasion -during this war. If, therefore, it is presumed that the revised -German programme was to capture the Falkland Islands, thus aiming a -blow at British prestige, and then to scatter in the manner suggested -so as to hamper or cripple our trade with the New World as long as -possible, it will then be seen how opportune a victory this was for -the British nation. - -Had von Spee escaped being brought to action, it seems probable that -he would have endeavoured to work his way home in preference to the -alternative of internment. - -In brief, then, this is a rough outline of events that "might"--one -could almost use the word "would"--have taken place, had not such -prompt steps been taken by the Admiralty to meet him wherever he -went by superior forces. Von Spee knew he was being cornered, and is -reported to have said so at Valparaiso. - -If additional proof of the decision of the Germans to bring about -this war, whatever the cost, were required, it is to be found in -the testimony of a captured German reservist, who has already been -mentioned in this book. He was German interpreter to the Law Courts -at Sydney. This man told a naval surgeon who was examining him after -he had been rescued, when he was still in a very shaken condition -and could have had no object in lying, that he had been called up by -the German Admiralty on _June 26th_. In company with several other -reservists, therefore, he took passage in a sailing ship bound for -Valparaiso, where he ultimately joined the _Leipzig_. This tale is -corroborated by the fact that von Spee put into Valparaiso to pick up -naval reservists in accordance with instructions from Germany, which -perhaps may have been the cause of his delay in coming round the Horn -after defeating Admiral Cradock. Other prisoners informed us that -they had been cruising up and down the Chilean coast in order to meet -a storeship from Valparaiso with these reservists on board, so as to -avoid being reported. The latter, however, never turned up, so the -Germans were obliged to put in there a second time. - -The murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria and of his -wife, the alleged cause of this war, took place at Serajevo, the -capital of Bosnia, two days after this man was called up by German -Admiralty orders, namely, on Sunday, June 28th, 1914. - -A German newspaper, in speaking of the success of Admiral von Spee -at Coronel, also admirably sums up the issue of the battle of the -Falkland Islands: "The superiority of our fleet in no way detracts -from the glory of our victory, for the very essence of the business -of a strategist is the marshalling of a superior fleet at the right -place and at the right moment." - - "Not unto us," - Cried Drake, "not unto us--but unto Him - Who made the sea, belongs our England now! - Pray God that heart and mind and soul we prove - Worthy among the nations of this hour - And this great victory, whose ocean fame - Shall wash the world with thunder till that day - When there is no more sea, and the strong cliffs - Pass like a smoke, and the last peal of it - Sounds thro' the trumpet." - - ALFRED NOYES (_Drake_). - - - - -CHAPTER XVII - -THE PARTING OF THE WAYS - - "Now to the Strait Magellanus they came - And entered in with ringing shouts of joy. - Nor did they think there was a fairer strait - In all the world than this which lay so calm - Between great silent mountains crowned with snow, - Unutterably lonely - From Pole to Pole, one branching bursting storm - Of world-wide oceans, where the huge Pacific - Roared greetings to the Atlantic." - - ALFRED NOYES (_Drake_). - - -The failure to round up the _Dresden_ directly after the battle was -naturally a great disappointment, but our recent success prevented -anyone from feeling it too keenly. Hearing that the _Dresden_ had -suddenly put into Punta Arenas (Magellan Straits) to coal, Admiral -Sturdee immediately ordered the _Inflexible_, _Glasgow_, and -_Bristol_ to go in pursuit of her in that direction. Sailing at 4 -A.M. on December 13th, the _Bristol_ arrived there the following -afternoon to find that the _Dresden_ had left the previous evening at -10 P.M., steaming away westwards. It was tantalising to have got so -close to her, for she was not heard of again for months after this. -All our ships now joined in the search, during which every possible -bay and inlet was thoroughly examined. A glance at a large-scale -map of this locality will show the difficulties that had to be -surmounted. There were thousands of possible hiding-places amongst -the channels and islands, many of which were quite unsurveyed; and, -at first sight, it appeared nearly impossible to investigate all of -these in anything short of a lifetime. - -The Admiralty now ordered the _Invincible_ to go to Gibraltar. On -leaving harbour on the 14th, the _Cornwall_ gave her a rousing -send-off by "cheering ship," to which she enthusiastically replied. -Admiral Sturdee sailed from Port Stanley on December 16th, to the -great regret of the remainder of the squadron. He called in at -Montevideo, Rio de Janeiro, and Pernambuco _en route_, and was -received in almost the same spirit in which Nelson was acclaimed by -the Ligurian Republic at Genoa in 1798. - -Rear-Admiral Stoddart in the _Carnarvon_ now took over the command of -our squadron. The _Inflexible_ continued the search for some days, -after which she also was ordered off and sailed for the Mediterranean -on December 24th. The remainder of our ships were scattered on both -sides of South America and around Cape Horn. - -Few people have the opportunity of realising the beauty and grandeur -of the scenery in this part of the world, which resembles nothing -so much as the fjords of Norway in the winter time. The depth -of water allows ships to navigate the narrowest channels, where -glacier-bounded mountains rise precipitously from the waters edge. -Once on rounding a headland we came upon a most unusual sight: some -forty albatrosses were sitting on the water. Our arrival caused them -considerable inconvenience and alarm, and it was the quaintest -sight to see these huge birds with their enormous spread of wing -endeavouring to rise, a feat which many of them were unable to -achieve even after several attempts. All these "fjords" abound in -seals--chiefly of the hairy variety--sea-lions, and every imaginable -kind of penguin. Long ropes of seaweed, usually known amongst the -seafaring world as kelp, grow on the submerged rocks, and are an -invaluable guide to the sailor as they indicate the rocky patches. -They grow to an enormous length, and are to be seen floating on the -face of the water; in fact, we had many an anxious though profitable -moment in these unsurveyed localities owing to their sudden and -unexpected appearance. At intervals a sliding glacier would enshroud -the face of a mountain in a dense mist formed by myriads of -microscopic particles of ice, which would be followed by wonderful -prismatic effects as the sun forced his way through, transforming -the scene into a veritable fairyland of the most gorgeous lights -and shades. Towards sunset the rose-pink and deep golden shafts of -light on the snow-covered peaks beggared all description, and forced -the onlooker literally to gasp in pure ecstasy. Only the pen of a -brilliant word-painter could do justice to the wealth of splendour of -this ever-changing panorama. - -The true Patagonian is nearly extinct, and the Indians inhabiting -Tierra del Fuego are of a low social order, very primitive, and wild -in appearance. We sometimes passed some of these in their crude -dug-out canoes, which they handle most dexterously. Considering the -severity of the climate, the temperature of which runs round about -40° Fahr., they wear remarkably few clothes, and the children -frequently none at all, which accounts for the hardiness of those -that survive. - -The difference between the east and west territory of the Straits -of Magellan is very marked. The Atlantic end is bordered by sandy -beaches and green, undulating slopes backed by mountains, and the -weather at this time of year is generally fine and calm; whereas the -Pacific side is devoid of all vegetation, glaciers and mountain crags -covered with snow descend nearly perpendicularly to the Straits, and -it is no exaggeration to say that it is possible to go almost close -alongside these high walls without any damage to the ship. Here the -weather is altogether different, frequent blizzards are attended -by rough weather, with heavy seas off the entrance, and it is far -colder. The cause of this contrast lies in the Andes, which extend -down to Cape Horn and break the force of the strong westerly winds -(the roaring forties) that prevail in these latitudes. - -On Christmas Day, 1914, the two battle-cruisers were on their way to -Europe. The _Carnarvon_ spent the day coaling in Possession Bay in -the Straits of Magellan. We were also there in the _Cornwall_, but -were more fortunate in having finished coaling the previous evening; -however, we went to sea during the afternoon. It was scarcely what -one would term a successful day, for the ship had to be cleaned, -and it was impossible to decorate the mess deck, as is the custom. -Nevertheless, we had a cheerful Service, which was followed by Holy -Communion, and for the mid-day dinner there was plenty of salt pork -and plum-duff! Unfortunately, as has been related, we were not to -get our mail or our plum-puddings for many a long day. The _Kent_, -_Glasgow_, _Bristol_, and _Orama_ had poor weather off the coast of -Chile, which did not help to enliven their Christmas. The _Otranto_, -perhaps, was the best off, having recently come from Sierra Leone, -where she had filled up with provisions. - -The _Cornwall_ was the next ship to be ordered away. We left Port -Stanley on January 3rd, 1915, and sailed for England to have the -damage to our side properly repaired in dry dock. - -It would be tedious to follow in detail the wanderings of the -remainder of our ships, who proceeded with colliers in company to -ferret out every nook and cranny in this indented coastline. The -_Newcastle_ and some Japanese cruisers operated farther to the north -along the Pacific side. Admiral Stoddart's squadron must have covered -many thousands of miles with practically no respite in this onerous -and fatiguing duty. Their lot was by no means enviable, they were -perpetually under way, except when they stopped to replenish with -coal, their mails were of necessity very irregular, and they were -seldom able to get fresh food. Imagine, then, with what joy they -ultimately found the termination of their labours in the sinking of -the _Dresden_! - - - - -CHAPTER XVIII - -THE LAST OF THE "DRESDEN" - - "Tell them it is El Draque," he said, "who lacks - The time to parley; therefore it will be well - They strike at once, for I am in great haste." - There, at the sound of that renowned name, - Without a word down came their blazoned flag! - Like a great fragment of the dawn it lay, - Crumpled upon their decks.... - - ALFRED NOYES (_Drake_). - - -There is remarkably little to tell about this action, which concludes -the exploits of our ships in these waters. The whole fight only -lasted a few minutes altogether--a poor ending to a comparatively -fruitless career, considering the time that the _Dresden_ was at -large. During the months of January and February, 1915, the search -for her had been carried on unremittingly; but though she had managed -successfully to evade us, she was so pressed that she was unable to -harass or make attacks on our shipping. That she never once attempted -to operate along the main trade routes shows the energy with which -this quest was prosecuted. From the time of her escape on December -8th till the day on which she sank, the _Dresden_ only destroyed -two sailing vessels. She, however, made such thorough arrangements -to cover her movements that no reliable information as to her -whereabouts ever leaked through to our squadron. Rumours were legion, -and there were "people who were prepared to swear that they had seen -her." The two places they mentioned were practically uncharted and -were found to be full of hidden dangers. Acting on this "reliable" -information, the localities were examined by our cruisers early in -March, but it was found out afterwards that the _Dresden_ had never -visited either of them. - -The armed merchantman _Prinz Eitel Friedrich_ had been much more -successful, and had captured and destroyed ten ships during these two -months. Many, it is true, were sailing vessels, but none the less -anxiety began to make itself felt in local shipping circles, and the -whole position once more became uneasy and disturbed. Early in March -the _Prinz Eitel Friedrich_ arrived at Newport News in the United -States with a number of prisoners on board, which had been taken -from these prizes. She was badly in need of refit, and her engines -required repairs. On learning that one of her victims was an American -vessel, public indignation was hotly aroused, and but little sympathy -was shown for her wants. Her days of marauding were brought to an -end, for the Americans resolutely interned her. - -On March 8th the _Kent_, in the course of her patrol duties, sighted -the _Dresden_ in latitude 37 S., longitude 80 W. It was a calm, misty -morning, which made it impossible to see any distance. During the -afternoon the haze suddenly lifted, and there was the _Dresden_, only -ten miles away. The _Kent_ seems to have sighted the _Dresden_ first, -and steamed full speed towards her for a few minutes before being -observed. This interval, however, did not allow her to get within gun -range. Of course the _Dresden_, being a far newer and faster vessel, -soon increased the distance between them, and after a five-hours' -chase, finally escaped under cover of the darkness. This was the -first time she had been sighted by a British warship since December -8th. It was noticed that she was standing well out of the water, -and this chase must have used up a lot of coal. It was obvious, -therefore, that she would require coal very shortly, and at a no very -distant port. - -The _Kent_ proceeded to Coronel to coal, informing the _Glasgow_ -and _Orama_. A search was organised, and, as a result of a wireless -signal from the _Glasgow_, the _Kent_ rejoined her not far from where -the _Dresden_ had been sighted. The _Glasgow_, _Kent_, and _Orama_ -caught sight of their quarry at 9 A.M. on March 14th, 1915, near Juan -Fernandez Island. Smoke was seen to be issuing from the _Dresden's_ -funnels as our ships closed in on her from different directions. She -was taken completely by surprise, and it was evident that there was -no possible escape for her. As our ships approached she kept her -guns trained on them, but did not attempt to open fire. Then all -three British ships fired together, to which the German replied. The -official statement tersely reports: "An action ensued. After five -minutes' fighting the _Dresden_ hauled down her colours and displayed -the white flag." - -Immediately the white flag was hoisted, all the British ships ceased -firing. The crew of the _Dresden_ then began to abandon her in -haste, and were to be seen assembling on shore. Just as the last -party of men were leaving the ship, the Germans made arrangements -to blow up the foremost magazine. Not long afterwards there was a -loud explosion, and the ship began to sink slowly, bows first. The -_Dresden's_ officers and men had all got well clear of the ship. -An hour later, at a quarter-past twelve, she disappeared below the -surface, flying the white flag and the German ensign which had been -re-hoisted at the last. All the surgeons and sick-berth staff of the -British ships now attended to the German wounded, who were afterwards -conveyed in the _Orama_ to Valparaiso, where they were landed and -taken to the German hospital. - -Such a tame finish to their labours naturally caused disappointment -amongst our ship's companies, who expected the enemy to uphold the -traditions of Vice-Admiral von Spee by fighting to the last. The main -object, however, had been achieved, the victory gained by Admiral -Sturdee at the battle of the Falkland Islands had at last been made -complete, and our ships in South American waters were now free to -proceed on other useful service. - - - - -PART III - -OFFICIAL DISPATCHES - - - - -OFFICIAL DISPATCHES - - - - -I - -DISPATCH OF THE ACTION OF H.M.S. "CARMANIA" - -September 14th, 1914 - - -The Secretary of the Admiralty communicates the following for -publication. It is a narrative of the action in South Atlantic on -September 14th, 1914, between H.M.S. _Carmania_ and the German armed -merchant ship _Cap Trafalgar_:-- - - Shortly after 11 A.M. we made out a vessel, and on nearer - approach we saw there were three vessels, one a large liner, - the others colliers. The latter had derricks topped, and were - probably working when we hove in sight. Before we had raised - their hulls they had separated, and were making off in different - directions. The large vessel was, apparently, about our own - size, with two funnels painted to represent a Castle liner. - After running away for a little while, the large steamer turned - to starboard and headed towards us. She was then steering about - south, and we were steering about south-west. The weather was - fine and sunny, with a moderate breeze from the north-east. Our - speed was 16 knots, and his apparently about 18. At 8,500 yards - we fired a shot across his bows, and he immediately opened fire - from his starboard after gun. We opened with all the port guns, - and the firing became general. We were now well within range, and - most of his shots went over. Consequently our rigging, masts, - funnels, derricks, and ventilators all suffered. He was then - well open on our port side. All our port guns and his starboard - guns engaged, and firing became rapid. Owing to the decreasing - range, his machine guns were becoming particularly dangerous, so - the ship was turned away from him and the range opened. The ship - continued to turn until the starboard battery was engaged. - - Two of our hits were seen to take his deck steam pipes. He was - well on fire forward, and had a slight list to starboard. One of - his shells had passed through the cabin, under our forebridge, - and although it did not burst, it started a fire which became - rapidly worse, no water being available owing to the fire main - having been shot through. The chemical fire extinguishers proving - of very little use, the fire got such a firm hold that the - forebridge had to be abandoned, and the ship conned from aft, - using the lower steering position. At this time the enemy was on - our starboard, with a heavy list to starboard, and at 1.50 P.M., - or one hour and forty minutes from the firing of the first shot, - she capsized to starboard and went down bows first, with colours - flying. It was some time before we got the fire under, which - necessitated keeping the ship before the wind, and consequently - we could not go to the assistance of the survivors, some of whom - got away in boats and were picked up by one of the colliers. - - The enemy before sinking was in wireless communication with some - German vessel, and as smoke was seen in the northern horizon and - the signalman thought he could make out a cruiser's funnels, we - went off full speed to the southward. When we were in touch with - the _Cornwall_ all we asked him was to meet us, as the ship was - unseaworthy and practically all communications and navigational - instruments were destroyed, rendering the conning and navigation - of the ship difficult and uncertain. - - On the 15th, at 4.30 P.M., the _Bristol_ picked us up and - escorted us until relieved by the _Cornwall_, who took us on to - an anchorage to effect temporary repairs. - - The following were decorated for their services during this - engagement: - - CAPTAIN NOEL GRANT, Royal Navy, awarded the C.B. He commanded and - manœuvred the _Carmania_ throughout the action, and handled the - ship with rare skill and judgment. - - ACTING-COMMANDER JAMES C. BARR, Royal Naval Reserve, awarded the - C.B. He was primarily concerned in getting the fire under, and - prevented it spreading. - - LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER E. L. B. LOCKYER, Royal Navy, awarded - the D.S.O. Controlled the gun-fire in the most cool and - efficient manner, after which he concentrated all his energy on - extinguishing the fire. - - CHIEF GUNNER HENRY MIDDLETON, Royal Navy, awarded the D.S.C. - Did extremely well in charge of the ammunition parties, and - encouraged his men by his personal behaviour and coolness. - - ACTING SUB-LIEUTENANT G. F. DICKENS, Royal Naval Reserve, awarded - the D.S.C. Saved vital parts of the Standard Compass when the - bridge was abandoned, and then assisted in saving the charts. - - MIDSHIPMAN D. N. COLSON, Royal Naval Reserve, awarded the - D.S.C. Took the fire-hose into the Chart House, and in spite of - being burned by falling wood, managed to pass the charts out to - Sub-Lieutenant Dickens. - - - LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER W. J. O'NEIL and LIEUTENANT P. A. MURCHIE, - of the Royal Naval Reserve, together with CHIEF-ENGINEER F. - DRUMMOND and 2ND ENGINEER J. MCDONALD, were all specially - mentioned in dispatches. - - In addition to the above, twelve men were awarded the D.S.M. for - various acts of gallantry. - - - - -II - -DISPATCH OF THE ACTION FOUGHT OFF CORONEL - -November 1st, 1914 - -THE NAVAL FIGHT OFF CHILE - - -The Secretary of the Admiralty announces that the following report -has been received from H.M.S. _Glasgow_ (Captain John Luce, R.N.) -concerning the recent action off the Chilean coast:-- - - _Glasgow_ left Coronel 9 A.M. on November 1 to rejoin _Good Hope_ - (flagship), _Monmouth_, and _Otranto_ at rendezvous. At 2 P.M. - flagship signalled that apparently from wireless calls there - was an enemy ship to northward. Orders were given for squadron - to spread N.E. by E. in the following order: _Good Hope_, - _Monmouth_, _Otranto_, and _Glasgow_, speed to be worked up to 15 - knots. 4.20 P.M. saw smoke; proved to be enemy ships, one small - cruiser and two armoured cruisers. _Glasgow_ reported to Admiral, - ships in sight were warned, and all concentrated on _Good Hope_. - At 5 P.M. _Good Hope_ was sighted. - - 5.47 P.M., squadron formed in line-ahead in following order: - _Good Hope_, _Monmouth_, _Glasgow_, _Otranto_. Enemy, who had - turned south, were now in single line-ahead 12 miles off, - _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ leading. 6.18 P.M., speed ordered - to 17 knots, and flagship signalled _Canopus_, 'I am going - to attack enemy now.' Enemy were now 15,000 yards away and - maintained this range, at the same time jambing wireless signals. - - By this time sun was setting immediately behind us from enemy - position, and while it remained above horizon we had advantage in - light, but range too great. 6.55 P.M., sun set, and visibility - conditions altered, our ships being silhouetted against - afterglow, and failing light made enemy difficult to see. - - 7.3 P.M., enemy opened fire 12,000 yards, followed in quick - succession by _Good Hope_, _Monmouth_, _Glasgow_. Two squadrons - were now converging, and each ship engaged opposite number in - the line. Growing darkness and heavy spray of head sea made - firing difficult, particularly for main deck guns of _Good Hope_ - and _Monmouth_. Enemy firing salvo got range quickly, and their - third salvo caused fire to break out on fore part of both ships, - which were constantly on fire till 7.45 P.M. 7.50 P.M., immense - explosion occurred on _Good Hope_ amidships, flames reaching 200 - feet high. Total destruction must have followed. It was now quite - dark. - - Both sides continued firing at flashes of opposing guns. - _Monmouth_ was badly down by the bow and turned away to get - stern to sea, signalling to _Glasgow_ to that effect. 8.30 P.M., - _Glasgow_ signalled to _Monmouth_, 'Enemy following us,' but - received no reply. Under rising moon enemy's ships were now - seen approaching, and as _Glasgow_ could render _Monmouth_ no - assistance, she proceeded at full speed to avoid destruction. - 8.50 P.M., lost sight of enemy. 9.20 P.M., observed 75 flashes of - fire, which was no doubt final attack on _Monmouth_. - - Nothing could have been more admirable than conduct of officers - and men throughout. Though it was most trying to receive great - volume of fire without chance of returning it adequately, all - kept perfectly cool, there was no wild firing, and discipline - was the same as at battle practice. When target ceased to be - visible, gunlayers spontaneously ceased fire. The serious reverse - sustained has entirely failed to impair the spirit of officers - and ship's company, and it is our unanimous wish to meet the - enemy again as soon as possible. - - - - -III - -OFFICIAL DISPATCH OF VICE-ADMIRAL COUNT VON SPEE - - -The following official report of the action fought off Coronel on -November 1st appeared in the German Press, and is interesting in the -light of being an accurate account as viewed by our enemies. - -On comparing it with Captain Luce's account, it will be seen that -the German clocks were about thirty minutes slow on our time. Other -evidence also points to this conclusion:-- - - The squadron under my command, composed of the large cruisers - _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_, and the small cruisers _Nürnberg_, - _Leipzig_, and _Dresden_, reached on November 1st a point about - twenty sea miles from the Chilean coast, in order to attack a - British cruiser which, according to trustworthy information, had - reached the locality on the previous evening. On the way to the - spot the small cruisers were several times thrown out on the - flanks to observe steamers and sailing ships. - - At 4.15 P.M. the _Nürnberg_, which was detached on one of - these missions, was lost sight of to the north-east, while the - _Dresden_ remained about twelve sea miles behind. With the bulk - of the fleet, I was about forty miles north of Arauco Bay. At - 4.17 P.M. there were sighted to the south-west at first two - ships, and then at 4.25 P.M. a third ship about fifteen miles - away. Two of them were identified as warships, and were presumed - to be the _Monmouth_ and _Glasgow_, while the third was evidently - the auxiliary cruiser _Otranto_. They, too, seemed to be on a - southerly course. The squadron steamed at full speed in pursuit, - keeping the enemy four points to the starboard. The wind was - south, force 6, with a correspondingly high sea, so that I had to - be careful not to be manœuvred into a lee position. Moreover, the - course chosen helped to cut off the enemy from the neutral coast. - - About 4.35 P.M. it was seen that the enemy ships were steering - to the west, and I gradually changed my course south-west, the - _Scharnhorst_ working up 22 knots, while the _Gneisenau_ and the - _Leipzig_ slowed down. The enemy's numerous wireless messages - were 'jammed' as far as possible. - - At 5.20 the arrival of another warship was reported which took - the head of the line, and was identified as the _Good Hope_, the - flagship of Rear-Admiral Cradock. - - The enemy ships now got into battle formation, hoisted their - mast-head flags, and tried slowly to approach a southerly course. - From 5.35 P.M. onwards I held to a south-westerly course, and - later to southerly course, and reduced speed to enable my own - ships to come up. At 6.7 both lines--except _Dresden_, which - was about one mile astern, and the _Nürnberg_, which was at a - considerable distance--were on an almost parallel southerly - course, the distance separating them being 135 hectometres - (14,760 yards). - - At 6.20, when at a distance of 124 hectometres, I altered my - course one point towards the enemy, and at 6.34 opened fire at - a range of 104 hectometres. There was a head wind and sea, and - the ships rolled and pitched heavily, particularly the small - cruisers, on both sides. - - Observation and range-finding work was most difficult, the seas - sweeping over the forecastles and conning-towers, and preventing - the use of some guns on the middle decks, the crews of which - were never able to see the sterns of their opponents, and only - occasionally their bows. On the other hand, the guns of the two - armoured cruisers worked splendidly, and were well served. - - At 6.39 the first hit was recorded in the _Good Hope_. Shortly - afterwards the British opened fire. I am of opinion that they - suffered more from the heavy seas than we did. Both their - armoured cruisers, with the shortening range and the failing - light, were practically covered by our fire, while they - themselves, so far as can be ascertained at present, only hit the - _Scharnhorst_ twice and the _Gneisenau_ four times. At 6.53, when - at a distance of 60 hectometres, I sheered off a point. - - The enemy's artillery at this time was firing more slowly, while - we were able to observe numerous hits. Among other things, it - was seen that the roof of the fore double turret was carried - away, and that a fierce fire was started in the turret. The - _Scharnhorst_ reckons thirty-five hits on the _Good Hope_. - - As the distance, in spite of our change of course, had now - decreased to 49 hectometres, it was to be presumed that the enemy - doubted the success of his artillery, and was manœuvring for - torpedo firing. The position of the moon, which had risen about - six o'clock, favoured this manœuvre. At about 7.45, therefore, I - gradually sheered off. In the meantime, darkness had set in, and - the range-finders in the _Scharnhorst_ for the moment used the - reflections of the fires which had broken out in the _Good Hope_ - to estimate the distances; gradually, however, range-finding and - observation became so difficult that we ceased fire at 7.26. - - At 7.23 a big explosion was observed between the funnels of the - _Good Hope_. So far as I could see, the ship did not fire after - that. The _Monmouth_ seems to have stopped firing at 7.20. - - The small cruisers, including the _Nürnberg_, which came up in - the meantime, were by 'wireless' at 7.30 to pursue the enemy and - make a torpedo attack. At this time rain squalls limited the - range of vision. The small cruisers were not able to find the - _Good Hope_, but the _Nürnberg_ came upon the _Monmouth_, which, - badly damaged, crossed her bows and tried to come alongside. At - 8.58 the _Nürnberg_ sank her by a bombardment at point-blank - range. - - The _Monmouth_ did not reply, but she went down with her flag - flying. There was no chance of saving anybody owing to the heavy - sea, especially as the _Nürnberg_ sighted smoke, and believed - that another enemy ship was approaching, which she prepared to - attack. - - At the beginning of the fight the _Otranto_ made off. The - _Glasgow_ was able to keep up her harmless fire longer than her - consorts maintained theirs, and she then escaped in the darkness. - - The _Leipzig_ and the _Dresden_ believe that they hit her several - times. The small cruisers sustained neither loss of life nor - damage. The _Gneisenau_ had two slightly wounded. The crews went - into the fight with enthusiasm. Every man did his duty, and - contributed to the victory. - - - - -IV - -DISPATCH OF THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS - -December 8th, 1914 - -ADMIRAL STURDEE'S DISPATCH - - - _Admiralty, 3rd March, 1915._ - -The following dispatch has been received from Vice-Admiral Sir F. C. -Doveton Sturdee, K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G., reporting the action off the -Falkland Islands on Tuesday, the 8th of December, 1914:-- - - _Invincible at Sea, - December 19th, 1914._ - - SIR, - - I have the honour to forward a report on the action which took - place on 8th December, 1914, against a German Squadron off the - Falkland Islands. - - I have the honour to be, Sir, - Your obedient Servant, - F. C. D. STURDEE, - _Vice-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief_. - - _The Secretary, Admiralty._ - - - (A)--PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS - - The squadron, consisting of H.M. ships _Invincible_, flying - my flag, Flag Captain Percy T. H. Beamish; _Inflexible_, - Captain Richard F. Phillimore; _Carnarvon_, flying the flag of - Rear-Admiral Archibald P. Stoddart, Flag Captain Harry L. d'E. - Skipwith; _Cornwall_, Captain Walter M. Ellerton; Kent, Captain - John D. Allen; _Glasgow_, Captain John Luce; _Bristol_, Captain - Basil H. Fanshawe; and _Macedonia_, Captain Bertram S. Evans; - arrived at Port Stanley, Falkland Islands, at 10.30 A.M. on - Monday, the 7th December, 1914. Coaling was commenced at once, in - order that the ships should be ready to resume the search for the - enemy's squadron the next evening, the 8th December. - - At 8 A.M. on Tuesday, the 8th December, a signal was received - from the signal station on shore: - - "A four-funnel and two-funnel man-of-war in - sight from Sapper Hill, steering northwards." - - At this time, the positions of the various ships of the squadron - were as follows: - - _Macedonia_--At anchor as look-out ship. - _Kent_ (guard ship)--At anchor in Port William. - _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_--In Port William. - _Carnarvon_--In Port William. - _Cornwall_--In Port William. - _Glasgow_--In Port Stanley. - _Bristol_--In Port Stanley. - - The _Kent_ was at once ordered to weigh, and a general signal was - made to raise steam for full speed. - - At 8.20 A.M. the signal station reported another column of smoke - in sight to the southward, and at 8.45 A.M. the _Kent_ passed - down the harbour and took up a station at the entrance. - - The _Canopus_, Captain Heathcoat S. Grant, reported at 8.47 A.M. - that the first two ships were 8 miles off, and that the smoke - reported at 8.20 A.M. appeared to be the smoke of two ships about - 20 miles off. - - At 8.50 A.M. the signal station reported a further column of - smoke in sight to the southward. - - The _Macedonia_ was ordered to weigh anchor on the inner side of - the other ships, and await orders. - - At 9.20 A.M. the two leading ships of the enemy (_Gneisenau_ and - _Nürnberg_), with guns trained on the wireless station, came - within range of the _Canopus_, who opened fire at them across - the low land at a range of 11,000 yards. The enemy at once - hoisted their colours and turned away. At this time the masts - and smoke of the enemy were visible from the upper bridge of the - _Invincible_ at a range of approximately 17,000 yards across the - low land to the south of Port William. - - A few minutes later the two cruisers altered course to port, as - though to close the _Kent_ at the entrance to the harbour, but - about this time it seems that the _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ - were seen over the land, as the enemy at once altered course and - increased speed to join their consorts. - - The _Glasgow_ weighed and proceeded at 9.40 A.M. with orders to - join the _Kent_ and observe the enemy's movements. - - At 9.45 A.M. the squadron--less the _Bristol_--weighed, and - proceeded out of harbour in the following order: _Carnarvon_, - _Inflexible_, _Invincible_, and _Cornwall_. On passing Cape - Pembroke Light, the five ships of the enemy appeared clearly in - sight to the south-east, hull down. The visibility was at its - maximum, the sea was calm, with a bright sun, a clear sky, and a - light breeze from the north-west. - - At 10.20 A.M. the signal for a general chase was made. The - battle-cruisers quickly passed ahead of the _Carnarvon_ and - overtook the _Kent_. The _Glasgow_ was ordered to keep two miles - from the _Invincible_, and the _Inflexible_ was stationed on the - starboard quarter of the flagship. Speed was eased to 20 knots at - 11.15 A.M. to enable the other cruisers to get into station. - - At this time the enemy's funnels and bridges showed just above - the horizon. - - Information was received from the _Bristol_ at 11.27 A.M. that - three enemy ships had appeared off Port Pleasant, probably - colliers or transports. The _Bristol_ was therefore directed to - take the _Macedonia_ under his orders and destroy transports. - - The enemy were still maintaining their distance, and I decided, - at 12.20 P.M., to attack with the two battle-cruisers and the - _Glasgow_. - - At 12.47 P.M. the signal to "Open fire and engage the enemy" was - made. - - The _Inflexible_ opened fire at 12.55 P.M. from her fore turret - at the right-hand ship of the enemy, a light cruiser; a few - minutes later the _Invincible_ opened fire at the same ship. - - The deliberate fire from a range of 16,500 to 15,000 yards at the - right-hand light cruiser, who was dropping astern, became too - threatening, and when a shell fell close alongside her at 1.20 - P.M. she (the _Leipzig_) turned away, with the _Nürnberg_ and - _Dresden_ to the south-west. These light cruisers were at once - followed by the _Kent_, _Glasgow_, and _Cornwall_, in accordance - with my instructions. - - The action finally developed into three separate encounters, - besides the subsidiary one dealing with the threatened landing. - - - (B)--ACTION WITH THE ARMOURED CRUISERS - - The fire of the battle-cruisers was directed on the _Scharnhorst_ - and _Gneisenau_. The effect of this was quickly seen, when at - 1.25 P.M., with the _Scharnhorst_ leading, they turned about 7 - points to port in succession into line-ahead and opened fire at - 1.30 P.M. Shortly afterwards speed was eased to 24 knots, and the - battle-cruisers were ordered to turn together, bringing them into - line-ahead, with the _Invincible_ leading. - - The range was about 13,500 yards at the final turn, and increased - until, at 2 P.M., it had reached 16,450 yards. - - The enemy then (2.10 P.M.) turned away about 10 points to - starboard and a second chase ensued, until, at 2.45 P.M., the - battle-cruisers again opened fire; this caused the enemy, at 2.53 - P.M., to turn into line-ahead to port and open fire at 2.55 P.M. - - The _Scharnhorst_ caught fire forward, but not seriously, and her - fire slackened perceptibly; the _Gneisenau_ was badly hit by the - _Inflexible_. - - At 3.30 P.M. the _Scharnhorst_ led round about 10 points to - starboard; just previously her fire had slackened perceptibly, - and one shell had shot away her third funnel; some guns were - not firing, and it would appear that the turn was dictated by a - desire to bring her starboard guns into action. The effect of - the fire on the _Scharnhorst_ became more and more apparent in - consequence of smoke from fires, and also escaping steam; at - times a shell would cause a large hole to appear in her side, - through which could be seen a dull red glow of flame. At 4.4 - P.M. the _Scharnhorst_, whose flag remained flying to the last, - suddenly listed heavily to port, and within a minute it became - clear that she was a doomed ship; for the list increased very - rapidly until she lay on her beam ends, and at 4.17 P.M. she - disappeared. - - The _Gneisenau_ passed on the far side of her late flagship, and - continued a determined but ineffectual effort to fight the two - battle-cruisers. - - At 5.8 P.M. the forward funnel was knocked over and remained - resting against the second funnel. She was evidently in serious - straits, and her fire slackened very much. - - At 5.15 P.M. one of the _Gneisenau's_ shells struck the - _Invincible_; this was her last effective effort. - - At 5.30 P.M. she turned towards the flagship with a heavy list - to starboard, and appeared stopped, with steam pouring from her - escape pipes and smoke from shell and fires rising everywhere. - About this time I ordered the signal "Cease fire," but before it - was hoisted the _Gneisenau_ opened fire again, and continued to - fire from time to time with a single gun. - - At 5.40 P.M. the three ships closed in on the _Gneisenau_, and at - this time the flag flying at her fore truck was apparently hauled - down, but the flag at the peak continued flying. - - At 5.50 P.M. "Cease fire" was made. - - At 6 P.M. the _Gneisenau_ heeled over very suddenly, showing the - men gathered on her decks and then walking on her side as she lay - for a minute on her beam ends before sinking. - - The prisoners of war from the _Gneisenau_ report that, by the - time the ammunition was expended, some 600 men had been killed - and wounded. The surviving officers and men were all ordered - on deck and told to provide themselves with hammocks and any - articles that could support them in the water. - - When the ship capsized and sank there were probably some 200 - unwounded survivors in the water, but, owing to the shock of the - cold water, many were drowned within sight of the boats and ship. - - Every effort was made to save life as quickly as possible both - by boats and from the ships; life-buoys were thrown and ropes - lowered, but only a proportion could be rescued. The _Invincible_ - alone rescued 108 men, 14 of whom were found to be dead after - being brought on board; these men were buried at sea the - following day with full military honours. - - - (C)--ACTION WITH THE LIGHT CRUISERS - - At about 1 P.M., when the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ turned - to port to engage the _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_, the enemy's - light cruisers turned to starboard to escape; the _Dresden_ was - leading and the _Nürnberg_ and _Leipzig_ followed on each quarter. - - In accordance with my instructions, the _Glasgow_, _Kent_, and - _Cornwall_ at once went in chase of these ships; the _Carnarvon_, - whose speed was insufficient to overtake them, closed the - battle-cruisers. - - The _Glasgow_ drew well ahead of the _Cornwall_ and _Kent_, and - at 3 P.M. shots were exchanged with the _Leipzig_ at 12,000 - yards. The _Glasgow's_ object was to endeavour to outrange the - _Leipzig_ with her 6-inch guns and thus cause her to alter coarse - and give the _Cornwall_ and _Kent_ a chance of coming into action. - - At 4.17 P.M. the _Cornwall_ opened fire, also on the _Leipzig_. - - At 7.17 P.M. the _Leipzig_ was on fire fore and aft, and the - _Cornwall_ and _Glasgow_ ceased fire. - - The _Leipzig_ turned over on her port side and disappeared at 9 - P.M. Seven officer and eleven men were saved. - - At 3.36 P.M. the _Cornwall_ ordered the _Kent_ to engage the - _Nürnberg_, the nearest cruiser to her. - - Owing to the excellent and strenuous efforts of the engine room - department, the _Kent_ was able to get within range of the - _Nürnberg_ at 5 P.M. At 6.35 P.M. the _Nürnberg_ was on fire - forward and ceased firing. The KENT also ceased firing and closed - to 3,300 yards; as the colours were still observed to be flying - in the _Nürnberg_, the _Kent_ opened fire again. Fire was finally - stopped five minutes later on the colours being hauled down, and - every preparation was made to save life. The _Nürnberg_ sank at - 7.27 P.M., and as she sank a group of men were waving a German - ensign attached to a staff. Twelve men were rescued, but only - seven survived. - - The _Kent_ had four killed and twelve wounded, mostly caused by - one shell. - - During the time the three cruisers were engaged with the - _Nürnberg_ and _Leipzig_, the _Dresden_, who was beyond her - consorts, effected her escape owing to her superior speed. The - _Glasgow_ was the only cruiser with sufficient speed to have - had any chance of success. However, she was fully employed - in engaging the _Leipzig_ for over an hour before either the - _Cornwall_ or _Kent_ could come up and get within range. During - this time the _Dresden_ was able to increase her distance and get - out of sight. - - The weather changed after 4 P.M., and the visibility was much - reduced; further, the sky was overcast and cloudy, thus assisting - the _Dresden_ to get away unobserved. - - - (D)--ACTION WITH THE ENEMY'S TRANSPORTS - - A report was received at 11.27 A.M. from H.M.S. _Bristol_ that - three ships of the enemy, probably transports or colliers, had - appeared off Port Pleasant. The _Bristol_ was ordered to take the - _Macedonia_ under his orders and destroy the transports. - - H.M.S. _Macedonia_ reports that only two ships, steamships - _Baden_ and _Santa Isabel_, were present; both ships were sunk - after the removal of the crew. - - I have pleasure in reporting that the officers and men under my - orders carried out their duties with admirable efficiency and - coolness, and great credit is due to the Engineer Officers of all - the ships, several of which exceeded their normal full speed. - - The names of the following are specially mentioned: - - OFFICERS - - Commander Richard Herbert Denny Townsend, H.M.S. _Invincible_. - - Commander Arthur Edward Frederick Bedford, H.M.S. _Kent_. - - Lieutenant-Commander Wilfrid Arthur Thompson, H.M.S. _Glasgow_. - - Lieutenant-Commander Hubert Edward Danreuther, First and Gunnery - Lieutenant, H.M.S. _Invincible_. - - Engineer-Commander George Edward Andrew, H.M.S. _Kent_. - - Engineer-Commander Edward John Weeks, H.M.S. _Invincible_. - - Paymaster Cyril Sheldon Johnson, H.M.S. _Invincible_. - - Carpenter Thomas Andrew Walls, H.M.S. _Invincible_. - - Carpenter William Henry Venning, H.M.S. _Kent_. - - Carpenter George Henry Egford, H.M.S. _Cornwall_. - - - PETTY OFFICERS AND MEN - - Ch. P.O. D. Leighton, O.N. 124238, _Kent_. - - P.O., 2nd Cl., M. J. Walton (R.F.R., A1756), O.N. 118358, _Kent_. - - Ldg. Smn. F. S. Martin, O.N. 233301, _Invincible_, Gnr's Mate, - Gunlayer, 1st Cl. - - Sigmn. F. Glover, O.N. 225731, _Cornwall_. - - Ch. E. R. Art., 2nd Cl., J. G. Hill, O.N. 269646, _Cornwall_. - - Actg. Ch. E. R. Art., 2nd Cl., R. Snowdon, O.N. 270654, - _Inflexible_. - - E. R. Art., 1st Cl., G. H. F. McCarten, O.N. 270023, _Invincible_. - - Stkr. P.O. G. S. Brewer, O.N. 150950, _Kent_. - - Stkr. P.O. W. A. Townsend, O.N. 301650, _Cornwall_. - - Stkr., 1st Cl., J. Smith, O.N. SS 111915, _Cornwall_. - - Shpwrt., 1st Cl., A. N. E. England, O.N. 341971, _Glasgow_. - - Shpwrt., 2nd Cl., A. C. H. Dymott, O.N. M. 8047, _Kent_. - - Portsmouth R.F.R.B.-3307 Sergeant Charles Mayes, H.M.S. _Kent_. - - F. C. D. STURDEE. - - - - -BATTLE OF FALKLAND ISLANDS, - -December 8th, 1914. - -MESSAGES OF CONGRATULATION. - - - H.M.S. _Invincible_. - _11th December, 1914._ - - _Memorandum._ - -The following copy of a telegram received from the Admiralty, and the -reply thereto, are forwarded for information. Both of these messages -are to be read to the whole Ship's Company on the Quarter Deck of -H.M. Ships under your command. - - (Signed) F. C. D. STURDEE, - _Vice-Admiral_, - _Commander-in-Chief_. - - _The Rear-Admiral and Officers Commanding - H.M. Ships, - South Atlantic and South Pacific Squadron._ - - - _For_ ADMIRAL, _Invincible_. (_Date_) 9.12.14 - - _From_ ADMIRALTY. - -The following message has been received for you from His Majesty:-- - - I heartily congratulate you and your officers and - men on your most opportune victory. - - GEORGE R.I. - - 2. Our thanks are due to yourself and to officers - and men for the brilliant victory you have reported. - - - _Reply to_ HIS MAJESTY: - -Your Majesty's gracious message has been received with pride and -satisfaction by myself, the Rear-Admiral, Captains, Officers, and -Ship's Companies under my command. - -We hope soon to have the privilege of completing our mission by -disposing of the remaining cruiser. - - COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, _Invincible_. - - - _Reply to_ THEIR LORDSHIPS: - -Admiralty congratulations not received till to-day. Myself, officers -and men desire to thank their Lordships for the approbation of our -efforts. - - - _From_ C.-IN-C. HOME FLEETS, H.M.S. _Cyclops_. - - (_Date_) 10.12.14. 1.14 A.M. - -With reference to your telegram 485[10] may I be permitted to offer -my sincere congratulations on the splendid success attending your -dispositions. - - - _From_ ADMIRAL, _Marseillaise, Brest_. (_Date_) 10.12.14. - - _To_ NAVAL ATTACHÉ. - -I beg to express to the Admiralty how fully I share their joy at the -brilliant revenge taken by the British Navy at the Falklands. - - F.N.A. OFFICE. - - - _From Petrograd._ - - _To_ VICE-ADMIRAL STURDEE, _Admiralty, London_. - - (_Date_) 12.12.14. 3.0 A.M. - -Please accept Heartiest Congratulations from the Russian Navy for the -Brilliant Action of your Squadron in fighting the Enemy and sweeping -out the oceans. - - VICE-ADMIRAL ROUSSIE NOMER. - - - _From_ C.-IN-C. HOME FLEETS, H.M.S. _Cyclops_. - - (_Date_) 11.12.14. 4.58 A.M. - -Submit the hearty congratulation of the Grand Fleet on his victory -may be conveyed to Admiral Sturdee. - - -Messages exchanged between H.E. the Governor of the Falkland Islands -and C.-in-C. South Atlantic and Pacific: - - GOVERNOR _to_ VICE-ADMIRAL: - - _11th December, 1914._ - -Warmest congratulations from self and Colony on your Victory. - -VICE-ADMIRAL _to_ GOVERNOR: - -May I thank you and the Colony for myself, the R.A., Captains, -Officers and men of the Squadron for your congratulations on our -success, which will not be complete until _Dresden_ is accounted for. -We wish to convey our thanks for the early warning of the approach of -the enemy due to the good lookout from Sapper's Hill. - -We feel the honour that the _Canopus_ and the Squadron were in a -position to prevent an old British Colony from being insulted or -injured in any way, and hope that the enemy will have been taught -a lesson not to repeat such action against any other part of the -British Empire. - - -This Memorandum is to be read to whole Ship's Company on the Quarter -Deck. - - _Invincible, at Port William,_ - - _11th December, 1914._ - - _Memorandum._ - -The Commander-in-Chief wishes to congratulate all the ships of the -squadron on the success of their main encounter with the enemy's -squadron, and to thank the Rear-Admiral, Captains, Officers and Men -for their individual assistance in attaining this great result. The -zeal and steadiness under fire of all hands were most noticeable. - -2. The victory will not be complete until the remaining cruiser -is accounted for, and directly the squadron is coaled a further -organised search will be made. - -3. One of the greatest merits of the action is the small list of -casualties due to the able handling of the ships by their Captains, -who utilised the power of the guns and the speed of the ships to the -best advantage. Further, the effective fire at long range and the -thorough organization were very evident and enabled the action to be -fought with success against a foe who displayed splendid courage, -determination and efficiency. - -4. The excellent way in which the Engine Room Departments responded -to a sudden and unexpected demand reflects great credit on the -officers and the whole engine room complements--this demand was made -at a time when ships were coaling and making good defects during the -few hours the ships were in harbour. - -5. The successful disposal of the two powerful cruisers, two of the -three light cruisers, and two colliers, will be of great advantage to -the Naval Strategy of the British Empire. - -6. Therefore all concerned can feel that they have performed a -National Service on the 8th December, 1914, off the Falkland Islands. - - (Signed) F. C. D. STURDEE, - _Vice-Admiral_, - _Commander-in-Chief_. - - _The Rear-Admiral, Captains, Officers, and all concerned, - South Atlantic and South Pacific Squadron._ - - - - -GALLANT SERVICES - -"KENT" SERGEANT'S BRAVE DEED - - - _Lord Chamberlain's Office, - St. James's Palace, S.W., - 3rd March, 1915._ - -The KING has been graciously pleased to give orders for the following -appointment to the Most Honourable Order of the Bath in recognition -of the services of the undermentioned Officer mentioned in the -foregoing dispatch:-- - -_To be an Additional Member of the Military Division of the Third -Class or Companion:_ - - CAPTAIN JOHN LUCE, Royal Navy. - - - _Admiralty, S.W., - 3rd March, 1915._ - -The KING has been graciously pleased to give orders for the award of -the _Distinguished Service Cross_ to the undermentioned officers in -recognition of their services mentioned in the foregoing dispatch:-- - - CARPENTER THOMAS ANDREW WALLS. - CARPENTER WILLIAM HENRY VENNING. - CARPENTER GEORGE HENRY EGFORD. - - -The following awards have also been made:-- - -_To receive the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal:_ - -Portsmouth R.F.R.B.-3307 Sergeant Charles Mayes, H.M.S. _Kent_. A -shell burst and ignited some cordite charges in the casemate; a -flash of flame went down the hoist into the ammunition passage. -Sergeant Mayes picked up a charge of cordite and threw it away. -He then got hold of a fire hose and flooded the compartment, -extinguishing the fire in some empty shell bags which were burning. -The extinction of this fire saved a disaster which might have led to -the loss of the ship. - - -_To receive the Distinguished Service Medal:_ - - Chf. P.O. D. Leighton, O.N. 124238. - P.O., 2nd Cl., M. J. Walton (R.F.R., A1756), O.N. 118358. - Ldg. Smn. F. S. Martin, O.N. 233301, Gnr's Mate, Gunlayer, 1st Cl. - Sigmn. F. Glover, O.N. 225731. - Chf. E.-R. Artr., 2nd Cl., J. G. Hill, O.N. 269646. - Actg. Chf. E.-R. Artr., 2nd Cl., R. Snowdon, O.N. 270654. - E.-R. Artr., 1st Cl., G. H. F. McCarten, O.N. 270023. - Stkr. P.O. G. S. Brewer, O.N. 150950. - Stkr. P.O. W. A. Townsend, O.N. 301650. - Stkr., 1st Cl., J. Smith, O.N. SS 111915. - Shpwrt., 1st Cl., A. N. E. England, O.N. 341971. - Shpwrt., 2nd Cl., A. C. H. Dymott, O.N. M. 8047. - - -The following officers subsequently received recognition:-- - -Vice-Admiral Sir F. C. Doveton Sturdee, K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G., was -honoured with a Baronetcy of the United Kingdom. - -To be made Companions of the military division of the Bath:-- - - Captain John Luce (H.M.S. _Glasgow_). - Captain J. D. Allen (H.M.S. _Kent_). - -Engineer-Commander E. J. Weeks was promoted to Acting -Engineer-Captain. - - -The 1st Lieutenants of the _Invincible_, _Inflexible_, _Cornwall_, -_Kent_, and _Glasgow_ were all promoted to the rank of Commander in -the next batch of promotions on December 31st, 1914:-- - - Lieutenant-Commander J. Wolfe-Murray (_Cornwall_). - Lieutenant-Commander H. E. Danreuther (_Invincible_). - Lieutenant-Commander W. A. Thompson (_Glasgow_). - Lieutenant-Commander E. L. Wharton (_Kent_). - Lieutenant-Commander R. H. C. Verner (_Inflexible_). - -Engineer Lieutenant-Commander J. F. Shaw, the senior officer of his -rank in the squadron, was promoted to Engineer Commander. - - - - -LIST OF BRITISH CASUALTIES AT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS - - -The following is the complete revised casualty list of the action off -the Falkland Islands on December 8th, 1914:-- - - -H.M.S. "GLASGOW" - -_Killed._--Martell, E. H., stoker petty officer, Po./310682. - -_Dangerously wounded._--Bridger, M. J. E., A.B., Po./J7095. - -_Severely wounded._--Ford, H. B. S., signalman, Po./J4597; Major, -P. E., shipwright 2nd class, Po./344489; Scotchmer, A. D., A.B., -Po./232275. - - -H.M.S. "INFLEXIBLE" - -_Killed._--Livingstone, N., A.B., (R.F.R., Ch./B3593), Ch./190790. - -_Slightly wounded._--Hasler, T., ord. seaman, Ch./J18032; Mayes, A., -seaman, R.N.R., 4754A; Spratt, G. F., A.B., Ch./237219. - - -H.M.S. "KENT" - -_Killed._--Kelly, S., pte., R.M.L.I. (R.F.R., A366), Po./3793; Kind, -W. J., pte., R.M.L.I., Po./15049; Titheridge, A. C., pte., R.M.L.I. -(R.F.R., B1254), Po./11220; Wood, W., pte. R.M.L.I., Po./16920; -Young, W., seaman, R.N.R., 2543C. - -_Died of wounds._--Duckett, G. A., officers' steward 1st cl., -Po./L2428; Snow, G., pte., R.M.L.I., Po./16858; Spence, T., sergt., -R.M.L.I. (R.F.R., A811), Po./5674. - -_Wounded._--Arnold, W. P., R.M.L.I. (R.F.R., B860), Po./8302; Brewer, -G. S., stoker petty officer (R.F.R., A3572), Po./150950; Day, F. -T., pte., R.M.L.I. (R.F.R., A1008), Ch./6517; Lindsey, H., stoker -1st cl. (R.F.R., B3754), Po./SS101403; Joy, E., lance-corporal -R.M.L.I. (R.F.R., B659), Po./10568; Pear, J., stoker 1st cl. (R.F.R., -4172), Po./SS102840; Restall, J., stoker 1st cl. (R.F.R., B4055), -Po./291073; Sheridan, A. P., pte., R.M.L.I., Po./13708. - - - - -THE "DRESDEN": ACTION WITH "KENT" AND "GLASGOW" - - -The Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement:-- - - On 14th March, at 9 A.M., H.M.S. _Glasgow_, Captain John Luce, - C.B., R.N.; H.M. Auxiliary Cruiser _Orama_, Captain John R. - Segrave, R.N.; and H.M.S. _Kent_, Captain John D. Allen, C.B., - R.N., caught the _Dresden_ near Juan Fernandez Island. - - An action ensued. After five minutes' fighting the _Dresden_ - hauled down her colours and displayed the white flag. - - She was much damaged and set on fire, and after she had been - burning for some time her magazine exploded, and she sank. - - The crew were saved. Fifteen badly wounded Germans are being - landed at Valparaiso. - - There were no British casualties, and no damage to the ships. - - - - -APPENDIX - -A LIST OF OFFICERS SERVING IN THE ACTIONS RECORDED IN THE NARRATIVE - - - - -APPENDIX - -A List of Officers serving in the Ships that took part in the Actions -recorded in the Narrative. - - -H.M.S. "CARMANIA" - -Armed Merchantman - - _Captain_ Noel Grant - _Com. R.N.R._ James Barr - _Lieutenant_ Edmund L. B. Lockyer - _Lieut.-Com. R.N.R._ Wm. J. O'Neill - _Lieut. R.N.R._ Peter A. Murchie - E. B. Dalby - Walter C. Battle - J. Henessey - M. F. Murray - William V. Ogley (_act._) - A. Parnis (_act._) - _Ch. Eng. R.N.R._ Francis Drummond - _Sen. Eng. R.N.R._ James Mcdonald - _Eng. R.N.R._ Robert Craig - Alexander Lindsay - Claude Shore - Robert Wilson - John O. Teare - James Duncan - Harold Kendall - Charles Rennie - Walt Fraser - James McPherson - _Fleet-Surgeon_ A. Cropley (_ret._) - _Tempy. Surgeon_ E. Maynard - Harry Clough - _Ch. Gunner_ Henry Middleton - _Act. Sub-Lieutenant_ G. F. Dickens - _Asst. Eng. R.N.R._ Joseph Verdin - Albert E. Brittlebank - Percival J. Thompson - _Asst. Paym. R.N.R._ (_in - charge_) Walter H. Ramsden - _Asst. Paym. R.N.R._ Arthur H. Burden - Ernest W. Turney - _Midshipman R.N.R._ William Man - D. N. Colson - E. R. Linger-Burton (_proby._) - J. R. Bane (_proby._) - W. Barr (_proby._) - R. P. Nisbet (_proby._) - J. B. Mein (_proby._) - - -H.M.S. "GOOD HOPE" - -Armoured Cruiser - - _Rear-Admiral_ Sir Christopher G. F. M. Cradock, - K.C.V.O., C.B. - - _Personal Staff_ - - _Secretary_ George B. Owens - _Flag Lieut.-Com._ George E. Cumming - - _Lieut. R.M._ Harold S. Walker - _Clerk to Sec._ John Egremont - Edward C. Webber - _Captain_ Philip Francklin, M.V.O. - _Commander_ Arthur T. Darley - Walter Scott - _Lieut.-Commander_ Percival Van Straubenzee - Gerald B. Gaskell - Godfrey B. J. Benyon - _Lieutenant_ Lancelot A. Montgomery - Gordon E. E. Gray - John M. H. Fisher - Douglas C. Tudor - Arthur G. Smith - _Lieutenant R.N.R._ Edward J. French - _Eng. Com._ Arthur Brown - _Eng. Lieut.-Com._ Herbert W. Couch - _Major R.M._ Frederick C. Edwards - _Chaplain_ Rev. Arthur H. J. Pitt - _Fleet Surgeon_ James J. Walsh, M.B. - _Fleet Paym._ Alfred H. Veitch - _Surgeon_ Francis C. Searle - _Surgeon_ (_Reserve_) Ferdinand L. J. M. de Verteuil, M.B. - _Sub-Lieutenant_ (_act._) Francis J. A. Cotter - _Asst. Paym._ John E. Tizard - Stuart Watson - _Ch. Gunner_ George F. Organ - _Ch. Sig. Boatswain_ William Penny - _Boatswain_ Franklyn F. Stephens - John W. Bushell - _Warrant Officer_ (_act._) Robert C. T. Roe - _Gunner_ William D. Wright - Francis A. G. Oakley - Robert J. Page (_act._) - William W. Kingdom (_act._) - _Carpenter_ Albert J. Hellyer - _Artif. Eng._ Richard M. Healy - William R. Henon - Joseph Duckworth - _Wt. Mechanician_ William A. Bass - _Mid. R.C.N._ W. A. Palmer - F. V. W. Hathaway - A. W. Silver - M. Cann - _Mid. R.N.R._ Graham Trounson (_proby._) - Henry K. D. Cuthbert (_proby._) - Geoffrey M. Dowding (_proby._) - _Asst. Clerk_ Charles G. Cook (_tempy._) - _Naval Cadet_ G. Coffin - I. M. R. Campbell - S. M. Raw - D. A. Willey - R. A. Macdonald - - -H.M.S. "MONMOUTH" - -Armoured Cruiser - - _Captain_ Frank Brandt - _Commander_ Spencer D. Forbes - _Lieut.-Commander_ Bertie W. Bluett - Hugh D. Collins - Hon. Peter R. H. D. Willoughby - _Lieutenant_ John A. Lees - Thomas Stapleton - Harry P. Rogers - Alfred Edgar - Wilfred D. Stirling - Maurice J. H. Bagot - _Eng. Com._ John B. Wilshin - _Eng. Lieutenant_ Bernard C. Child - Lionel B. Wansbrough - _Captain R.M._ Geoffrey M. I. Herford - _Chaplain_ ------ - _Staff Surgeon_ Henry Woods - _Fleet Paym._ John Cooper - _Surgeon_ Albert J. Tonkinson - _Sub-Lieutenant_ Hanway Cooper - _Asst. Paym._ Douglas B. Lee - _Ch. Gunner_ Robert T. H. V. Lee - _Ch. Carpenter_ Frederick G. Hartland - _Gunner_ James Bennett - _Boatswain_ William J. Barrett - Thomas B. Ireland (_act._) - _Artif. Eng._ George H. Farebrother - Alfred T. Johns - William Day - _Wt. Mechanician_ Alfred Start - _Wt. Eng. R.N.R._ Charles Driver - _Clerk_ Basil St. M. Cardew - _Asst. Clerk_ Cecil T. Martin (_tempy._) - _Naval Cadet_ K. A. M. Somerville - G. R. Bruce - J. F. Boulton - V. G. E. S. Schreiber - J. R. Le G. Pullen - F. A. Cooper - C. Musgrave - J. M. Pascoe - G. W. Muir - P. S. Candy - - -H.M.S. "GLASGOW" - -Light Cruiser - - _Captain_ John Luce - _Lieut.-Commander_ Wilfred A. Thompson - Charles L. Backhouse - Maurice P. B. Portman - _Lieutenant_ Herbert I. N. Lyon - Charles G. Stuart - _Lieut. R.N.R._ Walter M. Knowles - T. W. F. Winter - _Sub-Lieutenant_ Frederick B. Alison - _Eng. Lieut.-Com._ Percy J. Shrubsole - _Eng. Lieut._ John S. Machan - _Fleet Surgeon_ Robert T. Gilmour - _Staff Surgeon_ Alexander T. Wysard (_ret._) - _Staff Paymaster_ Francis E. Adams - _Asst. Paym._ Lloyd Hirst - Norman H. Beall - _Gunner_ Arthur G. Foreman - William R. Heilbroun - George H. Bartlett - _Carpenter_ Sylvester G. Pawley - _Artif. Eng._ Charles A. Palser - James Milne (_act._) - _Midshipman R.N.R._ George W. Wilson - - -H.M.S. "OTRANTO" - -Armed Merchantman - - _Captain_ Herbert M. Edwards - _Commander R.N.R._ Walter de M. Baynham, R.D. - _Lieutenant_ Julian M. Ogilvie - _Lieutenant R.N.R._ T. B. Storey - H. W. Woodcock - H. G. Thompson - R. M. Ward - F. R. O'Sullivan - A. W. Clemson - _Ch. Eng. R.N.R._ David Montgomery - _Sen. Eng. R.N.R._ William J. Philip - _Engineer R.N.R._ William Mackersie - Robert Pittendrigh - Andrew Allen - Adam A. I. Kirk - _Tempy. Surgeon_ W. Meikle - S. Robertson - _Sub-Lieutenant R.N.R._ G. F. Willdigg - R. Roscoe - _Asst. Eng. R.N.R._ Alan Cameron - Peter Brown - Thomas R. Blellock - Alexander C. Mearns - John Gemmell - Aymer. R. McDougall - William McL. Allan - _Asst. Paym. R.N.R._ Roland H. Draper - Thomas B. Wildman - _Gunner_ W. J. Drew (_ret._) - _Midshipman R.N.R._ Charles E. F. St. John - Herbert J. Anchor - George D. Scott - George E. D. Billam - D. N. White - C. C. Lawrence - - -H.M.S. "CANOPUS" - - - _Captain_ Heathcote S. Grant - _Commander_ Philip J. Stopford - _Lieut.-Commander_ Andrew Kerr (_ret._) - Philip Hordern - _Lieutenant_ Harry T. Bennett - Henry N. Lesley - Owen W. Phillips - _Lieut.-Com. R.N.R._ Arthur H. Bird - _Lieutenant R.N.R._ Charles T. Keigwin. R.D. - Clarence Milner - David M. Clarke (_act._) - William A. Williamson (_act._) - Malcolm C. Powell - _Eng. Commander_ William Denbow - _Eng. Lieut.-Com._ Sydney P. Start - _Captain R.M.L.I._ Gerald S. Hobson - _Fleet Paymaster_ Albert Greenwood - _Lieutenant R.N.R._ Charles C. Cartwright - William J. Donohue - _Staff Surgeon_ August J. Wernet - _Tempy. Surgeon_ Michael Vlaste - _Surgeon R.N.V.R._ Charles H. F. Atkinson - _Asst. Paym. R.N.R._ Harold E. W. Lutt - _Chaplain_ Rev. James D. de Vitre - _Ch. Boatswain_ John Myers - _Gunner_ James Irish - _Boatswain_ William Evans - William E. T. Honey (_act._) - _Ch. Artificer Eng._ Walter G. Morris - _Art. Eng._ Ernest E. Moorey - _Wt. Eng. R.N.R._ T. W. Greenwood - _Ch. Carpenter_ Albert Hughes - _Midshipman_ C. R. O. Burge - R. T. Young - P. R. Malet de Carteret - J. L. Storey - H. M. L. Durrant - R. H. L. Orde - R. K. Dickson - B. R. Cochrane - L. H. P. Henderson - L. H. V. Booth - _Mate_ R. C. T. Roe (_act._), left by _Good Hope_ - on an island at Vallenar Roads, Chile - _Clerk_ Jean le Jeune - _Midshipman, R.N.R._ Lawrence H. Faragher - - -H.M.S. "CARNARVON" - -Armoured Cruiser - - _Rear-Admiral_ Archibald P. Stoddart - _Secretary_ Thomas R. Waterhouse - _Flag Lieutenant_ Hon. Humphrey A. Pakington - _Clerk to Sec._ H. Guy Pertwee - _Captain_ Harry L. d'E. Skipwith - _Commander_ Thomas A. Williams - Ronald E. Chilcott - _Lieut.-Commander_ Arthur S. Burt - Arthur G. Leslie - Ralph Leatham - _Lieutenant_ A. M. Donovan - David B. Nicol - _Lieutenant R.N.R._ Bertram Shillitoe - Bertram H. Davies - _Eng. Commander_ Alfred T. P. Read - _Eng. Lieutenant_ Edward Iliff - _Maj. R.M._ Edmund Wray - _Captain R.M._ Arthur J. Mellor - _Chaplain_ Rev. John Beatty - _Fleet Surgeon_ Edward Cooper - _Fleet Paym._ Albert E. B. Hosken - _Surgeon_ Arthur G. Valpy French - _Surgeon R.N.V.R._ William H. Condell - _Sub-Lieutenant_ Philip F. Glover - Frederick W. F. Cuddeford - _Asst. Paym._ Herebert E. Symons - _Gunner_ William H. Hunt - Sidney C. Woodriffe - John F. Hannaford - W. H. Ellis - _Boatswain_ Alfred Hill - Albert E. Pearson - _Sig. Boatswain_ Herbert H. Hunwicks - _Carpenter_ Norman O. Staddon - _Artif. Eng._ Harold E. Oyler - Claude B. King - James Telford - Charles Hill - William S. Branson - _Clerk_ Charles H. Doubleday - _Midshipman_ J. R. Warburton - P. M. S. Blackett - P. J. M. Penney - S. P. Broughton - A. C. Jelf - R. M. Dick - R. G. Fowle - C. J. M. Hamilton - J. C. E. A. Johnson - M. S. Graham - R. Mandley - L. H. Peppe - - -H.M.S. "CORNWALL" - -Armoured Cruiser - - _Captain_ Walter M. Ellerton - _Commander_ Herbert A. Buchanan-Wollaston - _Lieut.-Commander_ James Wolfe-Murray - Henry E. H. Spencer-Cooper, M.V.O. - _Lieutenant_ Mansel B. F. Colvile - Edward W. Sinclair - Kenneth B. Millar - Norman Whitehead - John S. Hammill - Robin E. Jeffreys - _Sub-Lieutenant R.N.R._ Desmond A. Stride - William H. Richardson - _Eng. Commander_ Archibald W. Maconochie - _Eng. Lieutenant_ Douglas G. Campbell - Cecil J. Meggs - _Captain R.M._ Herbert R. Brewer - _Chaplain and N.I._ Robert McKew, B.A., B.D. - _Fleet Surgeon_ Malcolm Cameron - _Fleet Paymaster_ Harry G. Wilson - _Naval Inst._ Chas. S. P. Franklin, B.A. - George H. Andrew, M.A. - _Surgeon_ Cecil R. M. Baker - _Asst. Paym._ Henry Rogers - _Asst. Paym. R.N.R._ Joseph H. Wilson - _Ch. Art. Eng._ Thomas R. I. Crabb - Edwin C. Edwards - _Gunner_ Ernest Stone - Richard F. Hall - Edward W. Pearne (_T._) - _Boatswain_ Ernest H. Gearing - _Carpenter_ George H. Egford - _Art. Eng._ Percy S. Walkey - Edwin Foster - _Midshipman_ Philip F. Armstrong - Arthur H. Ashworth - Hugh E. Burnaby - John Bostock - Douglas M. Branson - Lycett Gardiner - Jocelyn S. Bethell - Morice Blood - Richard F. Carter - Willoughby N. Barstow - Nigel D. Bury - William S. Batson - - -H.M.S. "BRISTOL" - -Light Cruiser - - _Captain_ Basil H. Fanshawe - _Commander_ Harry L. Boyle - _Lieut.-Commander_ Ernest G. H. Du Boulay - _Lieutenant_ Robert F. U. P. Fitzgerald - Archibald B. Cornabé - Edward G. G. Hastings - _Lieutenant R.N.R._ James A. Hodges - _Eng. Commander_ James D. W. H. F. Cranley - _Eng. Lieutenant_ Edward G. Sanders - _Staff Surgeon_ Leslie M. Morris - _Staff Paym._ Tom Henley - _Sub-Lieutenant_ Cyril A. H. Brooking - Charles H. L. Woodhouse - _Gunner_ Stephen W. Duckett - George W. Callaway - _Boatswain_ Frank Box - _Carpenter_ William L. Harfield - _Artif. Eng._ William Tearle - Joseph L. Wagstaff - _Clerk_ John G. B. Collier - James Hogg - - -H.M.S. "MACEDONIA" - -Armed Merchantman - - _Captain_ Bertram S. Evans, M.V.O. - _Commander R.N.R._ Edwin P. Martin - _Lieut.-Commander_ Valentine D. English - _Lieut.-Com. R.N.R._ Henry G. Westmore, R.D. - W. F. Pollard - _Lieutenant R.N.R._ W. C. Young - T. C. W. Thompson - F. Cross - _Ch. Eng. R.N.R._ James G. Crichton - _Sen. Eng. R.N.R._ Thomas S. Ferguson - _Eng. R.N.R._ William C. O. Taylor - Walter J. Hickingbotham - James Finnecy - George R. R. Cushing - Edmund J. Caws - Frederick P. Voisey - _Tempy. Surgeon_ A. M. Russell - _Sub-Lieutenant R.N.R._ Alfred W. Drew - E. F. Hannan - O. Taylor - Jeffery Elliott - _Surg. Prob. R.N.V.R._ Harold Williamson - _Asst. Eng. R.N.R._ Oliver J. R. Pinkney - F. C. Masters - Joseph Neale - William G. Cheeseman - _Asst. Paym. in charge_ Herbert W. Landon - _Asst. Paym. R.N.R._ Percy Selwin - _Gunner_ James W. Drew - _Midshipman R.N.R._ H. J. Miller - G. V. Thomas - F. H. E. Firmstone - Gordon D. Brown - B. V. Rutley - W. G. Hiscock - - -H.M.S. "ORAMA" - -Armed Merchantman - - _Captain_ John R. Segrave - _Commander R.N.R._ John F. Healey, R.D. - _Lieut.-Commander_ Joseph W. L. Hunt - _Lieut. R.N.R._ Geoffrey G. Thorne - Edward S. Carver - Henry T. Heale (_ret._) - Allen Fielding - Frederick W. Willsden (_ret._) - T. P. Webb - W. A. Assenheimer - _Ch. Engineer_ John Robertson - _Sen. Engineer_ Donald McL. McWilliam - _Engineer_ J. R. Dowling - James Imrie - H. P. Jack - Alexander S. Hall - _Asst. Engineer_ Alexander Manson - Neil H. T. Hill - Charles W. Howil - Donald Matheson - David A. Sheeby - David M. Johnston - William Turner - William Houston - James Piggott - James McAdam - George Herd - _Tempy. Surgeon_ Herbert E. Scowcroft - Sydney Welham - _Sub-Lieut. R.N.R._ M. W. Cooksey - _Asst. Paym. R.N.R._ Herbert Newman - John F. Cooper - _Ch. Gunner_ Arthur J. Burstow - _Midshipman R.N.R._ Edward Roberts - Stuart F. Pocock - Leonard E. Fordham - Bernard K. Berry - S. S. Adley - H. Schofield - H. C. C. Forsyth - G. E. G. Sandercock - - -H.M.S. "INVINCIBLE" - -Battle-Cruiser - - _Vice-Admiral_ Sir F. C. Doveton Sturdee, K.C.B., - C.V.O., C.M.G. - _Secretary_ Cyril S. Johnson - _Flag Lieutenant_ Reginald W. Blake - _Clerk to Sec._ Arthur D. Duckworth - _Captain_ Percy T. H. Beamish - _Commander_ Richard H. D. Townsend - _Lieut.-Commander_ Hubert E. Dannreuther - Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham - John C. F. Borrett - Lionel H. Shore - Edward Smyth-Osbourne - _Lieutenant_ Cecil S. Sandford - Cameron St. C. Ingham - Hugh H. G. Begbie - _Lieutenant R.N.R._ George ff. H. Lloyd - _Eng. Commander_ Edward J. Weeks - _Eng. Lieut.-Commander_ James F. Shaw - _Eng. Lieutenant_ Francis L. Mogg - _Major R.M._ Robert C. Colquhoun - _Captain R.M._ Charles H. Malden - _Temp. Lieut. R.M._ John T. Le Seelleur - _Chaplain_ Rev. Arthur C. Moreton, M.A. - _Fleet Paym._ Ernest W. Mainprice - _Fleet Surgeon_ Walter J. Bearblock - _Surgeon_ Ernest MacEwan - Clarence E. Greeson, M.B. - _Sub-Lieutenant_ Alexander P. McMullen - Robert R. Stewart - _Asst. Paym._ Gordon Franklin - _Asst. Paym. R.N.R._ Clement A. Woodland - _Gunner_ William C. Hunt - Robert Connolly - Mark W. Cameron - Ernest J. Read - Sydney C. Kennell - _Boatswain_ Frederick Luker - Philip J. Warrington - Wilfred Turner - _Sig. Boatswain_ William F. Raper - _Gunner R.M._ Albert E. Nixon - _Carpenter_ Thomas A. Walls - _Artf. Engineer_ Walter H. Bull - John Dews - Frederick C. Fry - _Clerk_ William R. C. Steele - _Midshipman_ Gordon T. Campbell - Edwin T. Hodgson - Douglas A. C. Birch - John M. Shorland - John H. G. Esmonde - Allan G. McEwan - Rupert C. Montagu - Lionel D. Morse - Duncan G. Reid - - -H.M.S. "INFLEXIBLE" - -Battle-Cruiser - - _Captain_ Richard F. Phillimore, C.B., M.V.O. - _Commander_ Ernest Wigram - John W. Carrington - _Lieut.-Commander_ Rudolf H. C. Verner - Hon. Patrick G. E. C. Acheson, M.V.O. - Frederic Giffard - Ralph B. Janvrin - _Lieutenant_ Edward C. Denison - Kenneth H. D. Acland - Arthur W. Blaker - Brian L. G. Sebastian - _Lieutenant R.N.R._ Herbert J. Giles - _Eng. Commander_ Harry Lashmore - _Eng. Lieut.-Commander_ Arthur E. Lester - _Eng. Lieutenant_ Rey G. Parry - _Major R.M._ John B. Finlaison - _Captain R.M._ Robert Sinclair - _Chaplain_ Rev. Ernest S. Phillips, M.A. - _Fleet Surgeon_ Edward H. Meaden - _Fleet Paym._ Henry Horniman - _Surgeon_ John H. B. Martin, M.B., B.A. - Martyn H. Langford - _Sub-Lieutenant_ (_act._) Thos. H. Welsby - Alexander C. G. Madden - Leicester St. J. Curzon-Howe - Robert D. Oliver - Alfred E. B. Giles - John H. Macnair - George T. Philip - Terence H. Back - _Asst. Paym._ John F. Stephens - _Ch. Gunner_ Edward Fox - _Ch. Boatswain_ Alfred M. Cady - _Ch. Artf. Eng._ George E. Martin - _Gunner_ John H. Moore - Frederick W. Furmadge - _Boatswain_ John A. Brander - _Sig. Boatswain_ Phillip J. Jones - _Gunner R.M._ John Cameron - _Carpenter_ William A. Cawsey - _Artf. Engineer_ Charles A. Richards - _Artf. Eng._ (_act._) William S. Barnes - _Bandmaster R.M._ Herbert Reely - _Midshipman_ Rupert E. Bethune - John D. Chapple - Regd. G. France-Hayhurst - David D. Mercer - _Clerk_ Crichton F. Laborde - - -H.M.S. "KENT" - -Armoured Cruiser - - _Captain_ John D. Allen - _Commander_ Arthur E. F. Bedford - _Lieut.-Commander_ Eric L. Wharton - James R. Harvey - _Lieutenant_ Victor H. Danckwerts - _Lieut.-Com. R.N.R._ Charles M. Redhead, R.D. - _Lieutenant R.N.R._ Harold T. Dunn - Frederic C. Howard - William G. B. Jones - Walter R. Tilling - James Marshall - John L. S. G. Lilley - _Eng. Commander_ George E. Andrew - _Eng. Lieutenant_ Victor O. Foreman (_ret._) - _Captain R.M._ Robert W. J. Laing - _Chaplain_ Rev. Norman B. Kent, B.A. - _Fleet Surgeon_ Edward B. Pickthorn (_ret._ ) - _Paymaster_ Sydney G. Andrews - _Temp. Surg._ Ronald E. B. Burn - _Surgeon R.N.V.R._ Thomas B. Dixon - _Asst. Paym. R.N.R._ William G. Stewart - _Gunner_ Thomas P. Collins - Claude H. Griffiths - _Boatswain_ William T. Dunning - Walter H. Speed - _Sig. Boatswain_ Leonard C. Croucher - _Carpenter_ William H. Venning - _Artf. Engineer_ William Muirhead - _Wt. Engineer R.N.R_ John Garrow - John W. Scott - Donald Campbell - _Midshipman R.N.R._ Robert L. Burridge - John D. Ross - David T. M. Williams - George C. B. Liley - Cecil B. Hogan - Harold W. S. Wright - _Midshipman R.N.R._ Frederick E. Valentine - George W. Barker - Edgar H. Cowan - _Clerk_ Reginald H. Kitchin - - - - -INDEX - - - Allardyce, the Hon. William, Governor of Falkland Islands, 138 - - Allen, Captain J. D., of _Kent_, 27 - a tribute to crew of _Kent_ by, 131 - created a C.B., 191 - - America (South), apprehension in, 24 - Germans in, 16, 68 - scenery of, 159 - - _Asama_ in eastern Pacific, 46 - - Atlantic (South), battle in, 9, 26, 35, 169 - - _Australia_ joins North Pacific squadron, 72 - - - _Baden_ sunk by _Bristol_, 92 - - Barr, Acting-Commander James C., awarded C.B., 171 - - Battle-cruiser action, a, 96, 181 - - Beamish, Captain P. H., of _Invincible_, 27 - - Boarding parties and their work, 29 - - Brandt, Captain Frank, of _Monmouth_, 21 - - Brazilian ports, enemy shipping at, 25 - - Brewer, Stkr. P.O. G. S., a D.S.M. for, 191 - - _Bristol_, officers of, 211 - opens fire on _Karlsruhe_, 9 - - British casualties in the Falklands, 193-4 - men-of-war off South America, 19-27 - - - Canada purchases submarines, 7 - - _Canopus_, an amusing incident on, 90 - converted into a floating fort, 63, 85 - fine work of, 58 - good shooting by, 90 - officers of, 205 - skilful navigation of, 58 - - _Cap Trafalgar_, sinking of, 9, 26, 35 - official dispatch on action, 169 - - _Carmania_, a conflagration on, 38 - decorations for officers and men, 171 - heroism of crew, 44 - officers of, 197-8 - sinks _Cap Trafalgar_, 9-10, 26, 35 _et seq._, 169 - - _Carnarvon_, a German's toast, 108 - a valuable capture by, 24 - chases the enemy, 93 - officers of, 207 - - Chilean coast, action off the (_see_ Coronel, battle of) - - China, German squadron in, 4 - - Coaling, the "delights" of, 30, 140 - - Colson, Midshipman D.N., awarded D.S.C., 171 - - Concentration, necessity of, 61, 64 - - _Cornwall_ chases enemy, 110 - decorations for crew, 121-3 - escorts _Carmania_ to base, 42 - officers of, 209 - opens fire on _Leipzig_, 114 - - Coronel, battle of, 45 _et seq._ - enemy torpedo attack at, 55 - official dispatches on, 172-7 - outstanding features of, 59 - unreliable accounts of, 60 - vessels engaged in, 46 - visibility conditions advantageous to enemy, 52 - von Spee's report on, 52, 174 - - Cradock, Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher, a tribute to, 58 - goes down with his ship, 56 - his command reinforced, 23 - his objective at Coronel, 50 - hoists his flag, 20 - sights and chases _Karlsruhe_, 8, 20 - - _Crown of Galicia_, German prisoners on, 139 - - - Danreuther, Lieut.-Com. H. E., promotion for, 192 - - _Defence_ essays to join southern command, 27 - sails for Cape Town, 79 - - Dickens, Acting Sub-Lieut. G. F., awarded D.S.C., 171 - - _Dresden_, a vain search for, 136, 158 - arrives at Orange Bay, 7 - chase of, 110 - eludes her pursuers, 114 - hoists the white flag, and sinks, 165, 166 - joins von Spee, 8 - sinking of: Admiralty announcement on, 194 - - Dymott, Shpwrt. A. C. H., awarded D.S.M., 191 - - - Easter Island, German squadron at, 6, 45 - - _Edinburgh Castle_, deck hockey on, 26 - - Edwards, Captain H. McI., of _Otranto_, 21 - - Edwards, Mr., of Easter Island, 45 - - Egford, Carpenter G. H., receives D.S.C., 121, 190 - - Ellerton, Captain W. M., of _Cornwall_, 21, 113 - efficient handling of his ship, 119 - - _Emden_, exploits and sinking of, 11-12, 15, 63 - - England, Shpwrt. A. N. E., a D.S.M. for, 191 - - Evans, Captain B. S., of _Macedonia_, 21 - - - Falkland Islands, battle of, Admiral Sturdee's dispatch on, 178 - battle-cruiser action, 96 _et seq._, 181 - British casualties in, 138, 193-4 - commercial importance of, 151 - congratulations on, 138, 186-9 - decisive nature of, 135 - enemy sighted, 87 - light cruiser action, 110, 183 - the prize bounty, 139 - contemplated seizure of, 74, 75, 89, 119, 152 - land and sea defences of, 63, 85 - topography of, 81 - why chosen as base, 18 - - Fanning Island, British cable station destroyed at, 6 - - Fanshawe, Captain B. H., of _Bristol_, 21, 23, 24 - - Felton, Mrs., her services recognised, 88 - - Food problem in wartime, 30 - - Francklin, Captain Philip, of _Good Hope_, 20 - - French colonies, Germans and, 13 - - - German barbarity, a typical instance of, 108 - casualties in the Falklands, 138, 139 - 4.1-inch gun, range of, 47, 126 - light cruisers, chase of, 110 - men-of-war in foreign seas, 1 _et seq._ - sailors buried at sea, 109 - - Germans abandon colonies in Polynesia, 14 - in South America, 16, 68 - - Germany, her responsibility for the war, 156, 157 - - _Glasgow_, a duel with _Leipzig_, 112 - casualties in Coronel battle, 56 - chases enemy cruisers, 110 - officers of, 203 - sights enemy, 49 - - Glover, Signalman Frank, awarded D.S.M., 123, 191 - - _Gneisenau_, a gallant fight by, 102 - accurate shooting by, 53 - end of, 104 - her commander rescued, 107 - - _Good Hope_ becomes Admiral Cradock's flagship, 20 - loss of, 54-5 - officers of, 199-200 - - Grant, Captain Heathcoat, of _Canopus_, 21, 23 - - Grant, Captain Noel, of _Carmania_, 26, 37 - awarded C.B., 171 - - Great Britain and German colonies, 14 - enters the War, 4 - - - Hague Conference and the law of neutrality, 152 - - High explosives, curious examples of damage by, 121 - - Hill, Chief Engine Room Artificer, awarded D.S.M., 122, 191 - - _Hizen_ in the Pacific, 46, 72 - - - _Idzuma_ in the Pacific, 46, 72 - - _Inflexible_, a fine run by, 66 - first shot in Falkland Islands battle, 93 - officers of, 217 - - _Invincible_ and Falkland Islands battle, 93 - damaged, 105, 106 - joins Admiral Stoddart's squadron, 66 - lost in Jutland battle, 140 - officers of, 215 - - - Japan declares war, 13, 14 - - Japanese cruisers in the eastern Pacific, 46 - - - _Karlsruhe_, chase and escape of, 8 - end of, 9, 62 - - _Kent_, anxiety regarding fate of, 132 - casualties on, 132 - chases German cruisers, 110 - duel with _Nürnberg_, 128 - ensign of, 133 - officers of, 219 - opens fire on _Leipzig_, 114 - sights _Dresden_, 164 - - _Königsberg_ blocked up and destroyed, 12, 63 - - _Kronprinz Wilhelm_, escape of, 8 - internment of, 11 - - - Leatham, Captain E. La T., of _Defence_, 26 - - Leighton, Chf. P.O. D., a D.S.M. for, 191 - - _Leipzig_, a running fight by, 115 - chase of, 110 - eludes her pursuers, 45 - end of, 110 _et seq._, 118 - joins von Spee's squadron, 7, 45 - on fire, 117 - stories of survivors, 119 - - Life at sea in 1914, 28 _et seq._ - - Lockyer, Lieut.-Commander E. L. B., awarded D.S.O., 171 - - Luce, Captain John, of _Glasgow_, 21 - and Falkland Islands battle, 113, 114 - awarded C.B., 191 - report on Coronel action, 52, 172 - - Lyddite shell in warfare, 105, 116, 128 - - - _Macedonia_ conveys German prisoners, 139 - officers of, 212 - - Magellan, Straits of, 161 - - Maltzhan, Baron von, 155 - - Martin, Ldg. Smn. F. S., awarded D.S.M., 191 - - Mas-a-Fuera, temporary headquarters of German squadron, 71 - - Mayes, Sergt. Charles, brave deed recognised, 129, 130, 190 - - McCarten, E.-R. Artr. G. H. F., awarded D.S.M., 191 - - _Mera_, voluntary internment of, 155 - - Merchant ships, increased enemy sinkings of, 24 - - _Mersey_ destroys _Königsberg_, 12 - - Middleton, Chief Gunner Henry, awarded D.S.C., 171 - - _Monmouth_ in Coronel action, 53 - loss of, 56 - officers of, 201-2 - - Murray, Lieut.-Com. J. Wolfe, promotion for, 192 - - - Napier, Captain W. R., of _Edinburgh Castle_, 26 - - Naval actions, tactics of modern, 50 - - _Navarro_ sunk by _Orama_, 63 - - Navy, the, life at sea, 28 _et seq._ - postal arrangements of, 32 - work in wartime, 28-34 - - Newbolt, Sir Henry, on Admiral Cradock, 58 - on Falkland Islands battle, 135 - - _Newcastle_ in the North Pacific, 72 - - _Nürnberg_, chase of, 110 - duel with _Kent_, 128 - joins von Spee's squadron, 6 - sinking of, 131 - sinks _Monmouth_, 56 - - - _Orama_, officers of, 213 - sinks a German storeship, 63 - - _Otranto_, officers of, 204 - under enemy fire, 57 - - - Pacific (Western), the, German squadron in, 4 - - Papeete, bombardment of, 21 - French gunboat sunk at, 6 - - _Patagonia_, internment of, 155 - - _Pegasus_, sinking of, 12 - - Phillimore, Captain R. F., of _Inflexible_, 27 - - Port Stanley, arrival of _Canopus_: the scene, 84 - description of, 82 - - Port William, British squadron in, 85 - - Postal arrangements at sea, 32 - - _Princess Royal_ in North American waters, 155 - - _Prinz Eitel Friedrich_, internment of, 10, 164 - - _Professor Woermann_, capture of, 24 - - - Royal Naval Reserve, efficiency of, 132 - - - Sailors, the psychology of, 141 _et seq._ - - _Santa Isabel_, sunk by _Bristol_, 92 - - _Scharnhorst_ badly hit, 99, 100 - good marksmanship of, 53 - sinking of, 101 - - Segrave, Captain J. R., of _Orana_, 21 - - Serajevo tragedy, the, 157 - - _Severn_ and the end of _Königsberg_, 12 - - _Seydlitz_, escape of, 123 - - Shark fishing as a pastime, 31 - - Shaw, Eng. Lieut.-Com. J. F., promotion for, 192 - - Skipwith, Captain H. L. d'E., of _Carnarvon_, 24 - - Smith, Stoker John, a D.S.M. for, 122, 191 - - Snowdon, Act.-Chf. E.-R. Artr. R., a D.S.M. for, 191 - - South America (_see_ America, South) - - Spee, Vice-Admiral Count von, and his command, 4 - aims and hopes of, 151 _et seq._ - contemplates seizure of Falklands, 74, 75, 89, 119, 152 - death of, 105 - movements of his squadron, 67 - policy of, considered and analysed, 13-18 - refuses to drink a toast, 139 - report on Coronel battle, 52 - - Stoddart, Rear-Admiral and a rescued kinsman, 108 - commands British squadron, 159 - reinforcements from England for, 65 - succeeds Admiral Cradock, 60 - transfers his flag, 63 - - Sturdee, Vice-Admiral F. C. Doveton, 27 - a Baronetcy for, 191 - dispatch on battle of Falkland Islands, 178 _et seq._ - his strategic victory, 135 - in command of British squadron, 79, 80 - ordered to Gibraltar, 159 - - Submarines purchased by Canadian Government, 7 - - _Suffolk_ chases _Karlsruhe_, 8 - - _Sydney_ in action with _Emden_, 11 - - - Thompson, Lieut.-Com. W. A., promotion for, 192 - - _Titania_, enemy auxiliary cruiser, 6 - - Townsend, Stoker P.O. W. A., awarded D.S.M., 122, 191 - - Tsingtau, German base at, 4 - - Turner, Maj., commands Falkland Island Volunteers, 86 - - - Venning, Carpenter W. H., awarded D.S.C., 190 - - Verner, Lieut.-Com. R. H. C., promotion for, 192 - - - Walls, Carpenter T. A., awarded D.S.C., 190 - - Walton, P.O. M. J., a D.S.M. for, 191 - - Weeks, Engineer-Com. E. J., promotion for, 191 - - Wharton, Com., and sinking of _Nürnberg_, 133 - promotion for, 192 - - Wireless stations, German, 16 - - - PRINTED BY CASSELL & COMPANY, LIMITED, LA BELLE SAUVAGE, LONDON, E.C.4 - F20.519 - - - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] _Note._--This book was completed in May, 1917, but was withheld -from publication on account of the many omissions prescribed by the -Naval Censor. - -[2] The German Chancellor had publicly declared the intention to -capture the French colonies. - -[3] _See_ Map, p. 5. - -[4] _Carmania_, Cunard S.S. Co.--19,524 tons, 650 feet long, triple -screw turbines. - -_Cap Trafalgar_, Hamburg-Sud-Amerik S.S. Co.--18,710 tons, 590 feet -long, triple screw turbines. - -[5] According to "Brassey's Naval Annual." - -[6] German wireless system. - -[7] "Tales of the Great War" (Longmans). - -[8] "Blackwood's Magazine." - -[9] The _Seydlitz_--the German auxiliary that escaped--took in the -wireless signal announcing the victory and actually heard the firing -of the _Cornwall_ and the _Glasgow_ on her beam about four miles -off. She managed to escape under cover of the fog by steering to the -south, but it was a near thing. - -[10] Reporting sinking of three German ships. - - - - - TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE - - Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. - - A superscript is denoted by ^{x}; for example, 8^{th}. - - The format of time in the original text has been retained. For example, - 10.30 A.M. or 7.3 P.M. - - Gun caliber in the original text is of the form 9.1" or sometimes 9·1". - For consistency all calibers have been changed to the 9.1" (or - 9.1-inch) form. - - Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been - corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within - the text and consultation of external sources. - - Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, - and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained. For example: - flagship, flag ship; midair, mid-air; conning tower, conning-tower; - skilful; inanition. - - Pg 19, 'Chili' replaced by 'Chile'. - Pg 22, 'Chilian' replaced by 'Chilean'. - Pg 37, 'ricochetting' replaced by 'ricocheting'. - Pg 43, 'poms-poms' replaced by 'pom-poms'. - Pg 55, 'we jamming' replaced by 'were jamming'. - Pg 60, 'Rear Admiral' replaced by 'Rear-Admiral'. - Pg 85, 'the follow-morning' replaced by 'the following morning'. - Pg 90, 'ricochetted' replaced by 'ricocheted'. - Pg 92, 'Seidlitz' replaced by 'Seydlitz'. - Pg 94, 'Carvarvon' replaced by 'Carnarvon'. - Pg 96, 'line ahead' replaced by 'line-ahead'. - Pg 98, 'ricochetting' replaced by 'ricocheting'. - Pg 141, 'fight our' replaced by 'fight in our'. - Pg 157, 'Chilian' replaced by 'Chilean'. - - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Battle of the Falkland Islands, by -Henry Edmund Harvey Spencer-Cooper - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS *** - -***** This file should be named 50265-0.txt or 50265-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/0/2/6/50265/ - -Produced by John Campbell and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images generously made available by The -Internet Archive) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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